Opinion ID: 1659158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Voluntariness of the Plea of Guilty

Text: A plea of guilty to a criminal offense is a solemn act requiring care and discernment. The gravity of such act is elevated in a case where the plea of guilty is entered against counsel's advice, as it was here. A plea of guilty involves not only an admission of guilt but a consent to judgment of conviction without benefit of a jury trial. For these reasons, a plea of guilty must not only be a voluntary expression of the defendant's choice, it must be a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of the act. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). Defendant points to a series of factors, which he claims mandate that the plea of guilty be set aside. Among these are the claims that defendant had a mistaken belief that he had a constitutional right to plead guilty, that defendant was not competent to plead guilty because he was suffering from a severe mental depression, that the plea of guilty was coerced by defendant being held in isolation in prison, and that defendant was not properly informed of his right to jury trial at the punishment phase.
At the July 17, 1989, hearing, the following statements were made by Judge Kinder: Well, Mr. Hunter, I'll tell you right now, you've got a constitutional right to plead guilty if that's what you want to do. .... If the man wants to plead guilty and he does so willingly, Mr. Catlett, that ought to be his judgment. He has a right to exercise his constitutional rights.... On July 21, 1989, the following exchange occurred between defendant and Judge Kinder: THE COURT: All right. Now, you and Mr. Catlett have had a difference of opinion. He indicates to me that he doesn't want you to [plead guilty]. DEFENDANT HUNTER: Well, but, you know THE COURT: You're putting him in a very awkward position. Now he can't represent you if he's not going to do what he thinks is in your best interest. DEFENDANT HUNTER: Well, but don't I have a choice in it? THE COURT: Yes, you do have a choice in it. But the question is, I don't want to put him in a position of representing you when what he's saying you're doing is wrong. DEFENDANT HUNTER: How does he know what's wrong? THE COURT: Well, that's his job. He is your lawyer and he's supposed to be looking after your best interests. DEFENDANT HUNTER: But don't I have a constitutional right to plead guilty? THE COURT: I believe you do, sir. DEFENDANT HUNTER: I have a constitutional right THE COURT: But you can't do that. Do you want to fire Mr. Catlett? DEFENDANT HUNTER: If that's what it takes. Will that stall the thing, too? THE COURT: No, no, not necessarily. Defendant now argues that the statements by Judge Kinder regarding defendant's constitutional right to plead guilty were erroneous statements of law. Defendant relies on State v. Meaney, 563 S.W.2d 117 (Mo.App.1978), and Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Defendant argues his plea of guilty was induced by the mistaken belief that he had such a constitutional right. The two cases relied on by the defendant do not hold that a defendant has no constitutional right to make a voluntary plea of guilty. Those cases hold that there is no absolute or constitutional right to require a court to accept a plea of guilty. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 498; Meaney, 563 S.W.2d at 118. Unquestionably, a person charged with a crime has a right to self-representation, and neither defense counsel nor the court may impose their will on a person who desires not to be represented. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. The statements of Judge Kinder, taken in the context of the record, were no more than an effort to ensure that the defendant knew he had a constitutional right to make his own strategic decisions regarding the case, even if those decisions are ultimately to his own detriment and contrary to what a skilled and experienced attorney might recommend. Faretta, supra . While it is true that a defendant has no constitutional right to be informed that he could reject counsel's advice and representation, it is equally true that Judge Kinder was under no duty to keep such information a secret from defendant. In addition, defendant's decision to plead guilty in this case was not a product of the judge's statements. Defendant's statements make it clear that the decision to plead guilty predated the July hearing before Judge Kinder by many months.
As previously noted, a psychiatric examination report was filed on July 6, 1989. While it indicated defendant had been cooperative in some aspects of the evaluation, he had not cooperated with the psychiatrist. As a result, the psychiatric evaluation was incomplete. Nevertheless, the report indicated that defendant was of at least average intelligence, had an antisocial personality disorder, and had abused cocaine. It also indicated that there was no psychotic disorder and that defendant was currently capable of assisting in his own defense. A second psychiatric examination was conducted on August 23, 1989, by Dr. Sam Parwatikar. Among other findings, Dr. Parwatikar found defendant's understanding of the legal situation to be impeccable, that he was functioning at the bright-average range of intelligence, and that defendant was well-oriented and understood the functions and characters involved in the judicial system. He concluded that defendant was capable of entering a voluntary plea of guilty and suffered no mental disease or defect within the meaning of chapter 552. Following the filing of the motion to withdraw the plea of guilty, a hearing was conducted on November 7, 1989. At that hearing, Lee Evans, a doctor of pharmacology with a specialty in psycho-pharmacy, testified. He had taken a history from defendant indicating daily cocaine use for about a year preceding the arrest in February of 1989. Dr. Evans opined that defendant's withdrawal from extended use of cocaine could have resulted in a severe depression and possibly affected defendant's ability to make a rational decision to plead guilty. Dr. Evans admitted that neither in his experience nor in the literature had he seen any case that would support a claim of severe depression induced by cocaine withdrawal which extended longer than three or four months after the use of the drug had ceased. On this evidence, the trial court did not err in failing to find defendant incompetent to enter his plea. The trial judge did not err by accepting the guilty plea before the results of the second mental exam were received. The judge noted that defendant appeared rational at the hearing on July 17, 1989, and at the plea of guilty hearing. The results of the second exam, results which were before the judge at the hearing to withdraw the guilty plea, confirmed that defendant was competent to enter the plea. In the post-conviction proceeding Dr. William O'Connor, a clinical psychologist, testified. He was of the opinion that the defendant's cocaine abuse and solitary pretrial confinement caused defendant to suffer severe depression. He was also of the opinion that at the time of the plea of guilty, the severe depression was a mental disease within the meaning of Chapter 552, RSMo. However, in cross-examination, Dr. O'Connor acknowledged that during the guilty plea, defendant was not retarded, not out of touch with reality, and not unable to think logically. The standard for determining a defendant's competence to plead guilty is essentially the same as that for determining if a defendant is competent to proceed to trial. Wilkins v. State, 802 S.W.2d at 502. Taken as a whole, the evidence before the post-conviction court justified a finding that defendant did not suffer from a mental disease or defect of sufficient magnitude to deprive defendant of the capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense. § 552.020.1. The fact that a defendant was suffering from depression when a plea of guilty was entered does not necessarily render him incompetent to plead guilty. Simpkins v. State, 766 S.W.2d 729, 731 (Mo.App.1989). An accused is competent to stand trial or plead guilty if he can rationally consult with counsel and the court and understands the proceedings against him. Newbold v. State, 492 S.W.2d 809, 818 (Mo.1973). The post-conviction judge had before him the psychiatric reports as well as the videotape showing defendant's statements, conduct and demeanor during the plea of guilty. The post-conviction court was entitled to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented at the post-conviction hearing. State v. Hurtt, 509 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo.1974). The post-conviction finding that defendant was competent to enter the plea of guilty is not clearly erroneous.
Among the subjects covered at the hearing on July 21, 1989, was the effect of defendant's segregation from other prisoners at the Missouri State Penitentiary. The following exchanges occurred: THE COURT: Has anybody threatened you in any way? Anybody over at that prison putting the squeeze on you to make you do this? DEFENDANT HUNTER: I'm harassed constantly. To do this? No. .... MR. CATLETT: Now, the fact that you're in that situation, locked down in solitary confinement, being mistreated, in your mind, is that a factor you have considered in deciding to enter a plea of guilty? DEFENDANT HUNTER: Well, the only factor that that is, is a factor that, you know, I don't want to be there any longer than I have to, O.K. But the situation as a coercement? No. I wanted to plead guilty before I was ever in 5-C. These statements are ample evidence to refute the post-conviction claim that defendant's solitary confinement coerced the defendant's plea of guilty. Judge McHenry did not err in concluding that defendant's plea was not coerced by solitary confinement.
Defendant also argues that he made an unknowing and unintelligent waiver of his right to have a jury assess his punishment when he entered the plea of guilty. The argument assumes such right exists. A defendant has no constitutional right to have a jury assess punishment. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 460, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3162, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984); State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 487 (Mo. banc 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113, 109 S.Ct. 3175, 104 L.Ed.2d 1036 (1989). A jury trial on the issue of punishment in a first degree murder case is permitted by statute. However, when a defendant pleads guilty or is found guilty after a trial to the court, he is not permitted to have a jury trial on the issue of punishment, except by agreement of the State. § 565.006.2. Here, before the plea of guilty was accepted, the defendant was informed of the aggravating circumstances asserted by the State, and that if he was found guilty of first degree murder, he would be entitled to present evidence of mitigating circumstances. He was also informed that if he pled not guilty and was found guilty by a jury, he would be entitled to have the jury assess his punishment, but by pleading guilty, the judge would assess punishment. Notwithstanding all this, defendant makes a convoluted argument that he was ill-advised or unadvised by Judge Kinder and defense counsel regarding specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances that could be submitted to the jury. What the argument overlooks is the fact that defendant made a decision early on to enter a plea of guilty. There is no evidence in this record to indicate that anything Judge Kinder or defense counsel said regarding mitigating or aggravating circumstances would have changed defendant's position. Specifically, the record shows defendant was correctly informed that his drug addiction was not a defense but that it might be considered in mitigation. The defendant's voluntary plea of guilty was not the result of any misinformation or lack of information regarding aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Thus defendant's plea of guilty was not rendered unintelligent or unknowing on that account. As an aside to this claim, defendant argues that Claim J of his motion for post-conviction relief was not addressed by the post-conviction court. Claim J contains a long list of items that the defendant claims the prosecutor failed to disclose in response to discovery. Defendant presented no evidence at his Rule 24.035 hearing in support of the factual claim that he was denied discovery. Rule 24.035(i) requires findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues presented. But a well-recognized exception to the rule is that when there has been an evidentiary hearing at which no substantial evidence is presented in support of a factual claim, there is no error in failing to make a finding of fact or conclusions of law regarding a bare allegation in a post-conviction motion. Burton v. State, 817 S.W.2d 928, 930 (Mo.App.1991); W.F.W. v. State, 779 S.W.2d 724, 725 (Mo.App.1989); Gawne v. State, 729 S.W.2d 497, 501 (Mo. App.1987). The plea of guilty was both intelligently and knowingly made.