Opinion ID: 871589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chief Judge Nakamura’s Dissent

Text: Chief Judge Nakamura dissented; in his view, Count I of the Felony Information adequately apprised Walker of the charges he faced so as to adequately prepare his defense. State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 at  (App. 2011) (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting).20 In the charge at issue, Chief Judge Nakamura believed that “[t]he habitual offender phrase [(i.e., “a habitual operator of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant”)] tracked the language of the statute proscribing the offense and is statutorily defined to mean a person with three or more prior OVUII convictions within ten years of the charged offense.” Id. (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting). The dissent explained: As used in the context of the criminal offender, the term “habitual” is commonly understood to mean a recidivist, a person with multiple convictions for the same offense. In my view, the Habitual OVUII charge gave Walker, who was represented by counsel, fair notice of the attendant circumstances element regarding his habitual offender status . . . and adequately apprised him of what he must be prepared to meet. Id. at -2 (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge Nakamura also examined State v. Mita and noted: 20 Pinpoint citations to State v. Walker, No. 29659, 2011 WL 4537771 (App. 2011) (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting) are based on the hard copy opinion attached to Walker’s Application. In hard copy format, Chief Judge Nakamura’s dissent pagination restarts at . 20  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Wheeler does not require that the State provide statutory definitions in every charge which tracks the language of a statute that includes terms defined elsewhere in the code. Requiring the State to do so would render charges unduly complex, in contravention of the policy reflected in HRPP Rule 7(d) that “[t]he charge shall be a plain, concise[,] and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged.” Rather, as this court concluded in Wheeler, the State need only allege the statutory definition of a term when it creates an additional essential element of the offense, and the term itself does not provide a person of common understanding with fair notice of that element. Id. at  (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting Mita, 124 Hawai#i at 391-92, 245 P.3d at 464-65). Generally, “where the statute sets forth with reasonable clarity all essential elements of the crime intended to be punished, and fully defines the offense in unmistakable terms readily comprehensible to persons of common understanding, a charge drawn in the language of the statute is sufficient.” Id. at  (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting) (citing Wheeler, 121 Hawai#i at 393, 219 P.3d at 1180). According to Chief Judge Nakamura, [u]nlike in Wheeler, the statutory definition of the habitual offender phrase [in Walker’s case] does not create an additional essential element for the Habitual OVUII offense. The habitual offender element is already embodied in the habitual offender phrase which is part of the offense statute. The statutory definition of the habitual offender phrase simply elaborates on the meaning of that phrase with details that are consistent with the phrase’s commonly understood meaning. Id. at  (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, in the dissent’s view, neither of Walker’s additional arguments (i.e., that the circuit court erred by declining to suppress his statement to Officer Hill that he consumed eight or nine beers and that the circuit court erred by 21  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  admitting evidence of his HGN test performance) entitled him to relief. Id. at  (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting). For these reasons, inter alia, Chief Judge Nakamura would have affirmed Walker’s HOVUII conviction. Id. (Nakamura, C.J., dissenting).