Opinion ID: 2293324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Weber's Right to a Speedy Trial.

Text: Finally, Weber claims that a nearly three year delay between his conviction and his sentencing violated his right to a speedy trial. [70] Essentially, Weber asserts a right to a speedy sentencing. The United States Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the Sixth Amendment requires speedy sentencing. [71] We assume, however, that an allegedly unconstitutional delay [in sentencing] is examined in the same way as an asserted denial of the right to a speedy trial. [72] We review the alleged infringement of a constitutional right de novo. [73] To determine whether a defendant received a speedy trial, we apply the Barker balancing test. [74] The four Barker factors to be balanced are: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant. [75] The threshold factor, the length of the delay, weighs in Weber's favor. [76] A 2 year, 9 month, and 20 day delay between Weber's conviction and sentencing is sufficiently long, and thus persuades us to examine the other factors. A lengthy delay, however, is not determinative. The second factor, the reason for the delay, weighs strongly in the State's favor. [T]he delay may range from inadvertence to deliberate acts.... [77] In examining this prong: Different weights are assigned to different reasons for the delay. Benign reasons for trial delays weigh less heavily against the State. A valid reason may justify appropriate delay and will not weigh against the State at all. If the defendant is the primary cause for the delay, this factor will weigh against him, in part because a defendant may be in a better negotiating position as witnesses (for the State or the defense) become unavailable or their memories fade. [78] Weber contributed significantly to the delay between his conviction and sentencing. He filed multiple post trial motions, asking the court for: an evidentiary hearing, a status hearing, to merge his offenses, to preclude imposition of his sentence, a new trial, and removal of his counsel. Weber also requested multiple continuances and filing extensions. For example, on June 10, 2005 (Weber's original sentencing date), Weber requested and received a continuance because he need[ed] more time. He received a similar continuance on September 16, 2005. Although the State and the Superior Court contributed, [79] it was Weber who caused the lion's share of the delay. Weber acted well within his rights by filing a plethora of motions and requests for continuances, but he must also accept responsibility for the inevitable consequence delayed sentencing. This factor demonstrably favors the State. The third prong, the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy sentencing, is of considerable significance in determining whether there has been a speedy [sentencing] violation. [80] Contrary to the State's claim that at no point in the proceedings does it appear that Weber asserted his right to a speedy sentencing, Weber did complain about the delay in sentencing to the Superior Court. Weber filed a motion to dismiss that included a claim for delay in sentencing. At the hearing for this motion, the trial judge explained to Weber that as long as Weber continued to file new motions, the trial court would have to give the parties time to respond, which would continue to delay his sentencing. Weber withdrew this motion to dismiss on October 22, 2007 and sentencing was set for December 14, 2007. Although Weber did not vigorously assert his right to a speedy trial, this factor weighs slightly in Weber's favor. [81] The fourth factor, prejudice to the defendant, marginally favors Weber. In analyzing this factor, we consider the interests that the right to speedy trial is designed to protect: (1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. [82] The State claims correctly that Weber did not allege any particular prejudice from his delayed sentencing. [83] In his Opening Supplemental Memorandum, Weber summarily argues that the delay was almost three years and [Weber] remained in jail with no bail during that period, and [a]fter balancing the Barker factors, this Court should conclude that [Weber's] right to a speedy sentencing under the Sixth Amendment and Delaware Constitution was violated. Although we apply the same analysis in light of the interest of the defendant in a speedy sentencing, in speedy sentencing cases the consideration of the particular interests is diminished. [84] From our review of the record, we find the sentencing delay only minimally prejudiced Weber. The outcome of the sensitive balancing of these factors is determined by the weight to be assigned to each factor. [85] Here, we conclude that the reason for the delay ( i.e., Weber's barrage of motions and requests for continuances) and Weber's failure to articulate any resultant prejudice tip the scales in favor of rejecting Weber's speedy trial claim.