Opinion ID: 200058
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequate Assurance of Cruz Castro's Understanding of the Waiver

Text: 27 Cruz Castro focuses his argument on the second prong of the Teeter test — whether the district court question[ed] the defendant specifically about [his] understanding of the waiver provision and adequately inform[ed] [him] of its ramifications. Id. He argues first that the district court did not adequately inform him of the ramifications of the waiver. He also argues that the district court effectively abrogated the waiver, or at least left its import in doubt, by telling him that he did have the right to appeal in some circumstances. 28 At the change of plea hearing, in an effort to assure that Cruz Castro understood the scope of the waiver and its implications, the district court asked, Do you understand that by entering into this plea agreement and entering a plea of guilty you have given up your right to appeal all or part of your sentence? Cruz Castro argues that this seemingly straightforward question was misleading. Given the intricacy of his argument, we quote it at some length: 29 [T]he question fundamentally misled Mr. Cruz Castro as to the nature of his waiver of his right to appeal his sentence because the phrase all or part of as used in the question allowed two separate meanings to be attached to the question. The question could reasonably be understood by Mr. Cruz Castro as suggesting you have waived your right to appeal all of your sentence or part of your sentence. It could alternatively be equally reasonably understood to ask whether Mr. Cruz Castro understood he had waived his right to appeal any part of his sentence. In this case, it was natural for Mr. Cruz Castro to understand his potential sentence of imprisonment as having two parts: (1) the first part to be the inevitable minimum 96-month sentence he would receive if sentenced under the safety valve provision of the USSG [United States Sentencing Guidelines] and (2) the second part as comprising any additional length of time he might be sentenced to serve above and beyond that minimum of 96 months. If Mr. Cruz Castro understood his sentence as having two potential parts in this way and also took the Judge's question to have [the] first meaning stated above, as would be reasonable, the question would only have informed Mr. Cruz Castro that part of his sentence of imprisonment could not be appealed. 30 The plain language of the district court's inquiry does not bear the weight of this strained interpretation. If one cannot appeal all of a sentence, or part of it, there is plainly nothing left of the sentence to appeal. Even when the phrase is considered in the context described by Cruz Castro, it is difficult to understand how the judge's use of the phrase all or part could lead to Cruz Castro's alleged misunderstanding of the statement. We reject this argument. 31 Cruz Castro's second objection to the court's inquiry relates to an exchange between the court and the defendant which began with this question: Do you understand that under some circumstances you or the government may have a right to appeal any sentence that the court imposes? Cruz Castro answered in the affirmative. He now argues that [t]hat question was flawed because it failed to identify ... what categories of circumstances (such as government misconduct, ineffective representation) constituted `some circumstances.' Absent such explicit qualifications, Cruz Castro says, the reminder abrogated the waiver provision. 32 We said in Teeter that [i]f a presentence waiver of appellate rights is in place the court should be especially careful in its choice of words, taking pains to explain to the defendant that her right to appeal is circumscribed by her preexisting waiver. Id. Hence broad assurances to a defendant who has waived her appellate rights (e.g., `you have a right to appeal your sentence') ... muddy the waters and tend to instill false hope, and thus are to be avoided. Id. 33 There was no such broad assurance here. Context is important, and several elements crucial to the Teeter decision not to enforce the waiver of appellate rights at issue in that case are missing here. In Teeter, 34 [d]uring the change-of-plea colloquy, the district court questioned the appellant concerning her overall understanding of, and acquiescence in, the terms of the plea agreement, but did not direct her attention to the waiver provision.... [T]he court hampered, no doubt, by the newness of Rule 11(c)(6) and the consequent lack of any precedential guidance — neither directed the appellant's attention to the waiver provision nor discussed it with her.... 35 Given the court's failure to make inquiry into the waiver, its unfortunate contradiction of the waiver's terms, and the lack of any correction, then or thereafter, we cannot say with the requisite assurance that the appellant's surrender of her appellate rights was sufficiently informed. 36 Id. at 26-27 (footnote omitted). Whereas the district court in Teeter gave the defendant an unqualified assurance that she could appeal, the district court here only indicated that Cruz Castro could appeal in some circumstances. That statement is correct in the sense that we may entertain an appeal in order to correct a miscarriage of justice even in the face of a knowing and voluntary waiver of appeal. See id., 257 F.3d at 25 (and discussion below). 37 Moreover, whereas the court in Teeter failed entirely to assure that Teeter knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, the district court here asked Cruz Castro and his counsel if he knew that by entering into this plea agreement and entering a plea of guilty [he] would have waived or given up [his] right to appeal all or part of [his] sentence. Cruz Castro answered, Yes, sir. The district court also determined that Cruz Castro's counsel had explained this agreement to Cruz Castro in Spanish and [was] satisfied that he [understood] it. 38 Taken in context, the district court's reminder to Cruz Castro that he could appeal under some circumstances cannot reasonably be understood as a direct contradiction of the tenor of the waiver. Id. at 27 (finding that the waiver was not knowing and voluntary only after determining that the district court directly contradicted the tenor of the waiver provision). We conclude that the terms of the plea agreement and the colloquy at the change of plea hearing support the conclusion that Cruz Castro's waiver of appellate rights was both knowing and voluntary. 2