Opinion ID: 2646880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Common Law Right of Access to Public Records

Text: As demonstrated above, the statutes and rules applicable to the State Bar do not bar plaintiffs‟ request, but neither do they specifically require disclosure. We turn to the question of whether the common law, including cases interpreting contemporary statutory language, recognizes a right of public access to the records requested by plaintiffs. As discussed above, the Court of Appeal concluded that the common law establishes a presumptive right of access to the State Bar‟s admissions database “subject to balancing against the private interests implicated by disclosure” because the “Bar is a public corporation and the records sought relate to its official function of administering the bar exam, a matter of legitimate public interest. The State Bar does not dispute that a common law right of access to public records exists or that this right applies to the State Bar. (See Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 548, 563 [State Bar and its officers are “public officers”].) However, the State Bar argues that the common law applicable to all public entities — upon which the Court of Appeal relied — applies only to records that officially memorialize or record government action. The State Bar contends that the Court of Appeal erred in concluding that under common law principles, there is a presumption of public access to any record maintained by a public entity that relates in some way to the public‟s business. 14 The State Bar interprets the common law right of public access too narrowly. Historically “ „[a]t common law every person was entitled to the inspection, either personally or by his agent, of public records, including legislative, executive, and judicial records, provided he had an interest therein such as to enable him to maintain or defend an action for which the documents or records sought could furnish evidence or necessary information.‟ ” (Craemer, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at p. 220, fn. 3, quoting State v. McGrath (Mont. 1937) 67 P.2d 838, 841.) In California, the right of public access was codified in 1872 in statutes that did not limit the right to those seeking access for the purpose of litigation. (See Code Civ. Proc., former § 1888 [enacted 1872]; former Pol. Code, § 1032 [enacted 1872].)5 The State Bar is correct that under early California law, the term “public records” was generally used to refer to the official records of public entities. Code of Civil Procedure, former section 1892 provided: “Every citizen has a right to inspect and take a copy of any public writing of this State, except as otherwise expressly provided by statute.” (Enacted 1872, repealed by Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 25, p. 2945.) Public writings were defined in the 1872 Code of Civil Procedure as “[t]he written acts or records of the acts of the sovereign authority, of official bodies and tribunals, and of public officers, legislative, judicial, and executive” and “[p]ublic records, kept in this State, of private writings.” (Code Civ. Proc., 5 The Code of Civil Procedure and the Political Code (as well as the Civil Code and Penal Code) were enacted in 1872. “The four codes were not published as part of the Statutes of 1871-72 and were not given chapter numbers.” (Kleps, The Revision & Codification of Cal. Statutes 1849-1953 (1954) 42 Cal. L.Rev. 766, 775.) 15 former § 1888, enacted 1872 and repealed by Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 24, p. 2945; Craemer, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at p. 220.) The case law recognized, however, that the right of public access was not limited to “public records” as so defined. First, relevant statutory language contemplated disclosure of some “other matters.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1032.) Prior to the passage of the CPRA in 1968, both former Political Code section 1032 and its successor statute, Government Code section 1227 also provided: “The public records and other matters in the office of any officer are at all times, during office hours, open to the inspection of any citizen of this State.” (Former Pol. Code, § 1032, repealed by Stats. 1951, ch. 655, § 37, p. 1865; Gov. Code, former § 1227, enacted by Stats. 1951, ch. 655, § 23, p. 1851 and repealed by Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 38, p. 2945, italics added; see ante, p. 18.) The term “public records,” as used in these statutes, was interpreted to mean the same as “public writings,” as defined in Code of Civil Procedure, former section 1888. (Craemer, supra, 265 Cal.App.2d at p. 220.) As the quoted language shows, however, these statutes also permitted access to “other matters” in government offices. Case law interpreted the term “other matters” based upon fundamental public policy: “The „other matters‟ referred to . . . is matter which is „public,‟ and in which the whole public may have an interest.” (Whelan v. Superior Court (1896) 114 Cal. 548, 550 [holding that written instructions to a sheriff for carrying out a writ of execution on behalf of a creditor, although possessed by a public officer, were not subject to disclosure because the sheriff was acting as an agent of the creditor and not in his official capacity].) The scope of disclosure was not well-defined: “There is no precise formula by which it can be determined whether a writing is such „other matter‟; it depends in each instance upon the facts of the particular case. It is obvious that not every piece of correspondence or written statement lodged in the office of a public officer partakes of such a public interest 16 as to be open to general inspection.” (City Council v. Superior Court (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 68, 75.) In Coldwell v. Board of Public Works (1921) 187 Cal. 510, 519-220, this court concluded that preliminary plans and estimates related to a public works project held in the office of the city engineer were not “public records” as defined in Code of Civil Procedure, section 1888, because they had not yet been approved; nevertheless, they were “other matters” to which the public had a right of access under former Political Code section 1032. The public policy in favor of access to matters of public interest informed our interpretation of this statute. These plans represented steps in the completion of a large public project that was being undertaken by public employees at public expense. “As such they are matters which affect the public, and in which the public has an interest, if that interest is only to see that the city engineer is taking steps toward the completion of [the project].” (Coldwell, supra, at pp. 520-521.) A number of Attorney General opinions addressing the right of public access under these former statutes expressed the view that particular documents in possession of government agencies were not subject to public disclosure because they were neither the “written acts or records of the acts” of public officials or bodies nor of sufficient public interest to qualify as “other matters” to which access was granted under section 1227 or similarly worded predecessor statutes. (See, e.g., 31 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 103, 104 (1958) [applications to the Real Estate Commissioner for various licenses are not public records because the information on these applications “is not of sufficient interest to the public”]; 18 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 231 (1951) [reports on county hospitals required to be made by Department of Public Health are subject to right of access, but investigative reports, data, and information upon which the report itself is based are not]; 11 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 41, 45 (1948) [concluding that production reports submitted by 17 mine operators to the Division of Mines for the purpose of assembling statistical data need not be disclosed because there is no public interest in the production figures of an individual mine operator, but noting that statutory clarification would be desirable because “the common law rule of inspection presents a nebulous and unsatisfactory standard”].) Courts applying these former statutes recognized exceptions to the policy in favor of a right of access when other public policies favored nondisclosure. They recognized that “public policy demands that certain communications and documents shall be treated as confidential and therefore are not open to indiscriminate inspection, notwithstanding that they are in the custody of a public officer or board and are of a public nature.” (Runyon v. Board etc. of Cal. (1938) 26 Cal.App.2d 183, 184 [holding that letters and communications voluntarily submitted to the parole board in connection with the determination of prisoners‟ applications for parole are confidential].) In Colnon v. Orr (1886) 71 Cal. 43, we denied a citizen‟s petition to inspect a letter filed with a state insane asylum that criticized its superintendent. “It is not every written charge made to a board of supervisors, a board of directors, or trustees of a college or other state institution, which, upon being filed in the office of their secretary or treasurer, or custodian of their records, becomes thereby a public record to which any citizen may have access at pleasure.” (Id. at p. 44.) We concluded that such a document was not part of the public record. (Id. at pp. 44-45.) Thus, prior to the adoption of the CPRA in 1968, case law applied the relevant statutes in light of a fundamental policy favoring access to records in which the public had a legitimate interest. Records maintained by a public entity were subject to a qualified right of public access if they were records that constituted the “written acts or records of acts” of the public entity, or if they constituted “other matters” of sufficient public interest to justify requiring public 18 access, taking into account the facts of the particular case, unless other interests, including a need for confidentiality, weighed in favor of nondisclosure. The State Bar cites Mushet v. Department of Pub. Service (1917) 35 Cal.App. 630, 634 (Mushet), as support for its argument that only records that officially memorialize or record government actions constitute public records under California common law. As we explain, however, we find Mushet consistent with the authorities discussed above, which recognize a qualified right of public access to records of government agencies that are of public interest, subject to countervailing public policy considerations. To be sure, Mushet, supra, 35 Cal.App. at page 634 did recognize that “public records,” as defined in the statutes of the time, included the official records of government action. Mushet, however, did not limit the right of access to documents that came within this definition, but applied a more expansive common law rule to require disclosure. (Id. at pp. 636-639.) Mushet applied the public access right to books, accounts, and other records possessed by the city explaining items of expenditure, and anticipated expenditures, related to a project to expand the infrastructure of power generation in Los Angeles. (Id. at p. 634.) These documents were not technically “public records” within the meaning of applicable statutes because, under the law in effect at the time, the city was acting as a private utility corporation in conducting those activities and therefore the records at issue were not “official.” Nevertheless, the records reflected the use of public funds. The court concluded that voters and taxpayers had “a great interest in the proper management of the business and matters pertaining to their county, and therefore are entitled to know whether the public officials whom they have selected to represent them have properly used, disbursed, and accounted for the public funds which under the law have been confided to their custody and administration.” (Id. at p. 637.) The court explained that “[t]he rules of the 19 common law will be applied to those cases which come within their reason and equity, even when such cases seem to be outside the strict letter of such rules as they are ordinarily stated. . . . (Id. at p. 638.)6 The state of the law of public access to the records of public entities prior to the 1968 adoption of the CPRA was succinctly summarized in an opinion of the California Attorney General as follows: “The phrase „public records‟ in Political Code section 1032 was limited to those documents meeting the definitions of „public writings‟ expressed in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1888 and 1894. To balance this restricted definition, the law also permitted public inspection of certain „other matters‟ in the office of a public officer if they were matters which were „public‟ and in which the whole public might have an interest. This „other matters‟ area was also subject to further enlargement by resort to common law principles.” (53 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 136, 142 (1970).) The right was not limited, 6 The federal courts have similarly recognized a common law right of public access to government documents, although the parameters of the right have not been clearly established. In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc. (1978) 435 U.S. 589, the court observed that “the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” (Id. at p. 597, fns. omitted.) “In contrast to the English practice, [citation], American decisions generally do not condition enforcement of this right on a proprietary interest in the document or upon a need for it as evidence in a lawsuit. The interest necessary to support the issuance of a writ compelling access has been found, for example, in the citizen‟s desire to keep a watchful eye on the workings of public agencies, [citations], and in a newspaper publisher‟s intention to publish information concerning the operation of government [citations].” (Id. at pp. 597-598.) Admittedly, the sparse case law recognizing this common law right made it “difficult to distill . . . a comprehensive definition” or “identify all the factors to be weighed.” (Id. at pp. 598-599.) The high court concluded that this process was best left to the “sound discretion of the trial court, a discretion to be exercised in light of the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular case.” (Id. at p. 599.) 20 as the State Bar contends it should be, to the official records of government actions. D. Common law principles as applied to court records The State Bar contends that because it is a judicial branch entity, and because it acts as an “administrative arm” of this court in connection with admissions, these general common law principles should not govern it. Rather, it argues, it should be subject to only the common law rules that are applicable specifically to court records. Public access to court records, the State Bar contends, is limited to those that “accurately and officially reflect[] the work of the court.” (Copley Press, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 113 [defining a judicial record as one that “accurately and officially reflects the work of the court, such as its orders and judgments, its scheduling and administration of cases, its assignment of judicial officers and administrators”].) Thus, it contends, public access to its records under the common law should be limited to those that accurately and officially reflect the work of the State Bar. As explained below, the general principles regarding public access to the records of public entities established in the statutes and case law discussed above continue to apply in the context of court records. Consequently, the right is not limited in the manner proposed by the State Bar. When the CPRA was adopted in 1968, Code of Civil Procedure sections 1888 and 1892 and Government Code section 1227, discussed above, which had codified the general right of access to public records, were repealed. (Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, §§ 24-25, 38, p. 2945.) Nevertheless, both statute and case law continued to recognize this right of access. The Legislature declared that “access to information concerning the conduct of the people‟s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every citizen of this state.” (Gov. Code, § 6250, enacted by 21 Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2946.) The courts were made exempt from most provisions of the CPRA, but the Legislature explicitly preserved existing law regarding “the status of judicial records as it existed immediately prior to the effective date of this section.” (Gov. Code, § 6260, enacted by Stats. 1968, ch. 1473, § 39, p. 2948.) The common law right of access continued to be applied and to develop in cases addressing court records, which recognized that “[t]o prevent secrecy in public affairs public policy makes public records and documents available for public inspection by newsmen and members of the general public alike.” (Estate of Hearst (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 777, 782.) “Absent strong countervailing reasons, the public has a legitimate interest and right of general access to court records . . . .” (Id. at p. 784.) The Court of Appeal in Copley Press, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at pages 113115, aptly summarized the principles governing public access to court records. It identified two categories of records typically used in the courts. The first included “documentation which accurately and officially reflects the work of the court, such as its orders and judgments, its scheduling and administration of cases, its assignment of judicial officers and administrators[,] . . . the official court minutes, all its written orders and dispositions, the official reports of oral proceedings, . . . the master calendar[,] . . . [and] the various documents filed in or received by the court . . . and the evidence admitted in court proceedings.” (Id. at p. 113.) These documents are “ „judicial record[s]‟ ” that “represent and reflect the official work of the court, in which the public and press have a justifiable interest.” (Ibid.) They are presumptively accessible to the public.7 7 Copley Press recognized that both the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and its state counterpart, article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution, “provide broad access rights to judicial hearings and (footnote continued on next page) 22 The second category of records identified in Copley Press includes informal and preliminary writings used by the courts, such as rough drafts, informal notes, memoranda, and other preliminary writings. (Copley Press, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 114.) Although such writings are used by judges in the course of judicial work, they are not subject to the right of public access. (Ibid.; see also NBC Subsidiary, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 1212, fn. 29.) The reason is that public access to such documents is not generally in the public interest because they are “tentative, often wrong, sometimes misleading . . . they do not speak for the court and do not constitute court action.” (Copley Press, supra, at p. 114.) Furthermore, access to such preliminary writings “would severely hamper the users of the materials” because their purpose is to “extract raw and immature thoughts from the brain to paper, so they can be refined and corrected.” (Ibid.) Knowing that such materials could be exposed to the public eye would inhibit their creation. Copley Press recognized, however, that not every document used and maintained by courts clearly falls into one of these two categories. It identified a third category of records that “are on the margin” of these two categories. (Copley (footnote continued from previous page) records.” (Copley Press, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 111; accord, NBC Subsidiary, supra, 20 Cal.4th at pp. 1208-1209 & fn. 25.) Under constitutional principles, records of civil and criminal adjudicatory proceedings must be disclosed to the public unless there is an overriding interest that supports sealing the record, there is a substantial probability that the interest will be prejudiced by disclosure, the sealing is narrowly tailored to serve the overriding interest, and there is no less restrictive means of achieving the overriding interest. (NBC Subsidiary, supra, at p. 1218; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 2.550(d).) Because the State Bar‟s records are not records of adjudicatory proceedings, neither the First Amendment nor the counterpart state free speech provision is implicated in the present case. 23 Press, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 115.) In Copley Press, members of the press sought access to the minute books of the clerks serving six superior court judges, in order to investigate whether gifts judges reported from certain attorneys may have influenced judicial conduct. The minute books are informal notes kept by the clerks as a precursor to the creation of the formal minutes of the court. The appellate court concluded that the clerk‟s rough minutes fall into this marginal category. They are not official records of the court and do not constitute court action, but “[o]n the other hand, they do not partake of the discretionary and incomplete content that characterizes the judge‟s bench notes or the first drafts of various court documents.” (Ibid.) The court concluded that the clerk‟s rough minutes should be disclosed to the public. The court noted that they are kept regularly by all clerks, they reflect ministerial actions by the clerk, and “the clerk‟s minute book presumptively contains only accurate, descriptive and nondiscretionary information.” (Ibid.) Significantly, the court pointed out that the minute book “is the one repository of easy access which provides a continuous chronology of each court‟s daily activities.” Thus, in deciding whether documents that do not clearly fall into the category of public court records are subject to a right of access, Copley Press focused on the usefulness of the records and thereby on the public‟s interest in access to those records. Pantos v. City and County of San Francisco (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 258 (Pantos), applied a similar approach. First, Pantos held that a court‟s master jury list of potential jurors qualified for service was a judicial record that must be disclosed to the public. (Id. at pp. 262-263.) The master list constituted an official list prepared by the jury commissioner that had historically been treated as a public document, and the Court of Appeal found no compelling reason for nondisclosure. (Id. at p. 263.) Second, Pantos held that questionnaires used by the jury commissioner to determine whether citizens were qualified for jury 24 service did not have to be disclosed. Although the questionnaires were used and maintained by the court, they had not historically been disclosed to the public. The plaintiff in Pantos argued that access to the questionnaires would enhance the selection of a fair jury, but the court concluded that voir dire questioning was sufficient for that purpose. (Id. at pp. 263-265.) Furthermore, the questionnaire stated that the prospective juror is compelled by law to provide the information and that the questionnaire is confidential and will not be made public. (Id. at p. 264.) “To disclose this information under these conditions may negatively impact on the prospective juror‟s willingness to serve and thus interfere with efficient court administration. . . . Public interest in withholding such questionnaires outweighs the public‟s interest in disclosure.” (Id. at pp. 264-265.) The approach to court records set forth in Copley Press and applied in Pantos is consistent with the general statutory and common law principles regarding the right of public access as applied in California before the adoption of the CPRA. As discussed above, the right applied to the “ „ “written acts or records of the acts” ‟ ” of government officials and entities and also to “other matters” that were of sufficient interest to the public to warrant disclosure, subject to countervailing public interests. (Coldwell v. Board of Public Works, supra, 187 Cal. at p. 518; accord, City Council v. Superior Court, supra, 204 Cal.App.2d at p. 73; see also Mushet, supra, 35 Cal.App. at p. 638 [“The rules of the common law will be applied to those cases which come within their reason and equity, even when such cases seem to be outside the strict letter of such rules as they are ordinarily stated.”].) The State Bar claims support in Washington Legal Foundation v. United States Sentencing Comm’n (D.C. Cir. 1996) 89 F.3d 897 (Washington Legal Foundation) for its contention that the right of public access to judicial branch records is limited to those that officially and accurately reflect the work of the 25 public agency. The court in Washington Legal Foundation applied the common law right of access to a judicial branch entity other than a court — an advisory committee to the United States Sentencing Commission. The petitioner in Washington Legal Foundation, supra, 89 F.3d at page 899 sought “ „internal documents and memoranda‟ ” relied upon by an advisory group in formulating its final public recommendations to the United States Sentencing Commission. The federal appellate court declared that under federal common law, a public record was “a government document created and kept for the purpose of memorializing or recording an official action, decision, statement, or other matter of legal significance, broadly conceived.” (Id. at p. 905.) It concluded that the public has a presumptive right of access to such records, subject to a balancing of public and private interests. (Ibid.) The court viewed this definition as allowing adequate public oversight of government agencies while avoiding “the necessity for judicial application of the second-step balancing test to documents that are preliminary, advisory, or . . . do not eventuate in any official action or decision being taken.” (Ibid.) The court clarified that this definition would include records of governmental expenditures, records of real estate transactions, and a list of tax abatements passed by a local government. (Washington Legal Foundation, supra, 89 F.3d at p. 905.) In contrast, this definition “would not encompass the preliminary materials upon which an official relied in making a decision or other writings incidental to the decision itself — for example, the report of a blood test provided in support of an application for a marriage license, the job application of a would-be government employee, a government auditor‟s preliminary notes used in the preparation of an official report, or a cover memorandum circulated with a copy of an official report or study.” (Id. at pp. 905-906.) The court held that the advisory committee records sought by the petitioner were not public records 26 because they were either “ „pre-decisional‟ ” or incidental to the official actions, decisions, and statements of that commission. (Id. at p. 906.) Consequently, there was no presumptive right of public access and the court was not required to balance competing interests. Washington Legal Foundation‟s categories of records that must be disclosed and those that need not be disclosed are essentially the same two categories recognized in Copley Press, and its holding is consistent with Copley Press because the internal documents and memoranda of an advisory committee would fall into the category of records that are not disclosable under Copley Press. Unlike Copley Press, however, the court in Washington Legal Foundation did not consider whether records might exist that did not clearly fall into either of these categories — the “marginal” category discussed in Copley Press. It had no need to do so, because the documents at issue clearly fell into the category that need not be disclosed. To the extent Washington Legal implicitly rejected the existence of such a category, and limited the right of public access to documents that memorialize or record government actions, it is not consistent with the California case law on the right of public access. The State Bar suggests that if the common law right of access is not limited in the manner it proposes, it would create a level of access to judicial branch records that is equivalent to the level of access provided in the CPRA and thereby effectively eliminate the CPRA‟s exemption for the judicial branch. The CPRA applies to “any writing containing information relating to the conduct of the public‟s business prepared, owned, used, or retained by any state or local agency regardless of physical form or characteristics,” (Gov. Code, § 6252, subd. (e)) unless a specific statutory exemption applies (Gov. Code, § 6255, subd. (a); see 27 Gov. Code, §§ 6254 et seq., 6276 et seq.).8 “This definition is intended to cover every conceivable kind of record that is involved in the governmental process . . . . Only purely personal information unrelated to „the conduct of the public‟s business‟ could be considered exempt from this definition . . . .” (Assem. Statewide Information Policy Com., Final Rep. (Mar. 1970) 1 Assem. J. (1970 Reg. Sess.) appen. p. 9; accord, Commission on Peace Officer Standards & Training v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 278, 288, fn. 3.) The State Bar is correct that, unlike the CPRA, the common law does not recognize a presumptive right of public access to every record in possession of a government agency that is in any way related to the public‟s affairs. Copley Press, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at page 113, explicitly rejected the argument that “all writings created within the court premises by court personnel in connection with court business” were public records under California common law. It noted that if that definition applied, “access to court documents would be virtually the same as access to any other governmental documents,” as prescribed in the CPRA. (Ibid.; see City Council v. Superior Court, supra, 204 Cal.App.2d at p. 73 [“the mere fact that a writing is in the custody of a public agency does not make it a public record”].) We agree with the Copley Press court that the common law rule — although not limited in the manner proposed by the State Bar — does differ from 8 The CPRA itself specifies many exceptions and cross-references other statutes that exempt particular records from disclosure. (Gov. Code, §§ 62546254.29, 6276.02-6276.48.) The CPRA also includes a catch-all exemption that permits an agency to withhold a record if it can demonstrate that “on the facts of the particular case the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.” (Gov. Code, § 6255, subd. (a).) 28 the CPRA. The CPRA establishes a presumptive right of access to any record created or maintained by a public agency that relates in any way to the business of the public agency, and the record must be disclosed unless a statutory exception is shown. Under the common law, on the other hand, no such presumption exists. Although the official records of government actions have historically been treated as subject to public access and are readily categorized as “public records,” for other matters or types of records a determination must be made concerning whether the records at issue should be treated as public, taking into account the public‟s interest in disclosure as well as the competing interests involved. A report to a legislative committee considering a predecessor bill to the bill that was later adopted as the CPRA identifies this difference between the way public records previously were defined and the way they would be defined under the proposed legislation. (Assem. Com. on Government Organization, Staff Rep., Cal.‟s Public Records Law and Proposed Revision, prepared for hearing Jan. 6 and 7, 1966 on Assem. Bill No. 3015 (1966 Reg. Sess.).) The pending bill, Assembly Bill No. 3015 (1966 Reg. Sess.), contained a definition of public records similar to the one contained in the current version of the CPRA. The report states that the definition of public records under existing law is “broad and provides little guidance in determining whether or not a specific document is a public record. Generally, the courts have taken a restrictive view in applying these sections. [¶] In contrast, AB 3015 begins by making every document a public record. The only exceptions are those which are specifically recognized by the Legislature (either in the exemptions outlined in the bill or by specific statute). The significance of this change is twofold: (1) the burden for determining what is a public record is shifted; (2) it limits the authority of administrators to withhold records unless there is an expressed statutory right to do so.” (Id. at p. 6.) 29 In light of the differences between the common law approach to public records and the CPRA‟s approach, we see no conflict between the CPRA‟s exemption of judicial branch records and the recognition that a common law right of access continues to exist in records of those public entities not governed by the CPRA in which there is a legitimate public interest, if that interest is not outweighed by other interests. E. Application of common law principles to the admissions database
Applying the principles discussed above, the admissions database falls into the “marginal” third category of records identified in Copley Press. The admissions database does not constitute an official record of the State Bar‟s actions and has not historically been treated as a public record. On the other hand, the admissions database does not fall into the category of preliminary, predecisional materials whose disclosure could undermine the purposes for which they were created and which could be misleading or inaccurate. The admissions database could be characterized as “preliminary” in that it constitutes the rough data upon which the bar‟s published statistical reports and other studies are based. Unlike a rough draft or internal memo, however, we have no reason to believe that it is inaccurate or misleading, or that its disclosure would interfere with the State Bar‟s use of it for its own purposes. The threshold consideration in determining whether these records are subject to public disclosure is the public interest that would be served by disclosure. In making that determination, the particular motive of the party seeking the information is not the relevant interest. (Connell v. Superior Court 1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 601, 616 [applying exemption to CPRA for cases in which public interest in disclosure is outweighed by other interests]; see also Department 30 of Defense v. FLRA (1994) 510 U.S. 487, 495-496 [applying exemption to Freedom of Information Act applicable to cases in which public interest in disclosure is outweighed by other interests].) Rather, we focus on “whether disclosure would contribute significantly to public understanding of government activities.” (City of San Jose v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1008, 1018; accord, Department of Defense v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, supra, at pp. 495-496.) Thus, although plaintiff Sander‟s motive in seeking the information is to facilitate his research regarding law school admissions practices, we focus on the interest of the general public in the activities of the State Bar. The public does have a legitimate interest in the activities of the State Bar in administering the bar exam and the admissions process. In particular, it seems beyond dispute that the public has a legitimate interest in whether different groups of applicants, based on race, sex or ethnicity, perform differently on the bar examination and whether any disparities in performance are the result of the admissions process or of other factors. Indeed, the State Bar uses the database to prepare a statistical analysis of the bar exam that reports the bar passage rates for various categories of applicants. Public access to the admissions database used by the State Bar to evaluate its admissions process would allow the public to independently ascertain and evaluate that process. Therefore, the public‟s interest in the information in the database would contribute to the public‟s understanding of the State Bar‟s admissions activities, and is sufficient to warrant further consideration of whether any countervailing consideration weighs against public access.
The State Bar asserts that, notwithstanding any public interest in the admissions database, it is not subject to public disclosure because the information 31 contained in it was obtained from applicants under a promise that it would remain confidential. Under longstanding common law and statutory principles, information obtained through a promise of confidentiality is not subject to the right of public access when the public interest would be furthered by maintaining confidentiality. (See Runyon v. Board etc. of Cal., supra, 26 Cal.App.2d at p. 185 [“in order to impartially and intelligently discharge the functions of the state board of prison terms and paroles it is essential to secure all possible information bearing upon applicants for parole; and necessarily much of the information thus obtained can be had only upon the understanding that the persons furnishing the same will be protected and that the information will be treated as confidential”]; Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.2d 548 [complaints to State Bar not resulting in disciplinary action were privileged, where confidentiality furthered State Bar‟s interest in encouraging citizens to provide information and attorneys‟ interests in avoiding publication of unfounded complaints weighed against disclosure]; Pantos, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at pp. 264-265 [access to the questionnaires used by a jury commissioner to determine the qualifications of potential jurors was denied, in part, because jurors were promised that their responses would be confidential].) This principle is currently reflected in Evidence Code section 1040, which provides a privilege to a public entity to refuse to disclose information acquired in confidence if “there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure.” (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b)(2).) As we have alluded to earlier, however, this principle has not prevented public access to otherwise confidential, private information in the possession of a public entity that is not linked to the individual to which it pertains. (See, e.g., City & County of S.F. v. Superior Court (1951) 38 Cal.2d 156 [names of private employers who provided specific wage information to city civil service 32 commission for purpose of determining prevailing wage rates were confidential, where information could not be obtained without promise of confidentiality and lists of wage rates obtained from employers was available to public in form that did not identify which employer submitted which wage list]; Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court (1950) 36 Cal.2d 538, 543 [banks seeking right to inspect tax returns of nonfinancial corporations considered by Franchise Tax Board in fixing the tax rate for financial corporations were supplied with “every item of information requested by them . . . with the exception of the individual taxpayers‟ identity”]; see also Zamudio v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 24 [requiring release of juror questionnaires with personal identifying information redacted].) Because plaintiffs do not seek the information in a manner that would reveal the identities of individual applicants, the State Bar‟s promises of confidentiality do not necessarily preclude public access to the database. Similarly, we cannot hold as a matter of law that bar applicants‟ constitutional rights of privacy preclude disclosure of the information in the database even in a de-identified form. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) The State Bar cites this court‟s statement in White v. Davis (1975) 13 Cal.3d 757, 775, that the constitutional right to privacy is aimed at, among other things, “the improper use of information properly obtained for a specific purpose, for example, the use of it for another purpose or the disclosure of it to some third party.” The cases cited by the State Bar that apply this principle, however, involve disclosure of information about a named individual. (See Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 825, 830 [complaint alleging that a university disclosed grades the plaintiff had earned at another university despite assurances that the grades would be used only for purposes of evaluating his application for admission stated a claim for violation of the right of privacy]; Urbaniak v. Newton (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1138 [complaint alleging that doctor disclosed plaintiff‟s HIV 33 status stated cause of action for invasion of privacy].) The State Bar‟s argument that disclosure of the requested data would violate applicants‟ privacy even if it cannot be connected to them as individuals is not supported by authority. The parties disagree concerning whether the information at issue can be provided in a form that does not breach the State Bar‟s promises of confidentiality. The State Bar contends that “the commonly held assumption that any data can be successfully [de-identified] as suggested by [plaintiffs], so that it can be made available to the public without risk that individual people‟s information be revealed, has proved to be false.” Plaintiffs counter that “[d]isclosure of deidentified information regarding individuals obtained from government databases is commonplace. . . . The routine release of such data refutes the claim that such information cannot be disclosed without undue risk of „re-identification‟ of those individuals.” This issue involves disputed questions of fact that we are not currently in a position to decide. By the parties‟ stipulation, litigation of this issue was reserved for the second phase of trial and may be decided in the trial court upon remand. F. Form in Which the Data is Kept The State Bar contends, as it did in the trial court, that in order to comply with Plaintiffs‟ request without infringing bar applicants‟ privacy interests it would be required not only to redact personal information but also to create new categories of information by “clustering” categories of data — a measure proposed by plaintiffs to make it more difficult to re-identify individuals. The State Bar concedes that if the admissions database is subject to the right of access it may be required to redact applicants‟ names, but contends that making the changes to the admissions database necessary to protect applicants‟ privacy would constitute the creation of a “new” record and that creation of a new record is not required. (See, 34 e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1975) 421 U.S. 132, 162 [federal Freedom of Information Act does not require agency to create documents; it requires only “disclosure of certain documents which the law requires the agency to prepare or which the agency has decided for its own reasons to create”]; Center for Public Integrity v. Federal Communications Comm’n (D.D.C. 2007) 505 F.Supp.2d 106, 114 [producing data in the form requested would amount to creation of a new record, which is not required by Freedom of Information Act].) We agree with the trial court that in the context of electronic records, and in particular electronic databases, to resolve this issue would require consideration of the complexity of the tasks required to produce the data in the form requested; consequently, it would be premature for us to attempt to resolve this issue. The parties have not yet litigated whether and how applicants‟ privacy interests could be protected if public access to the database were permitted. Therefore, we do not yet know what modifications would be necessary to protect these countervailing interests. Furthermore, by stipulation, the parties reserved for the second phase of trial the question whether disclosure would impose an undue burden on the State Bar. Plaintiffs have made clear that they would accept the data in its current form, without any modification other than the redaction of applicants‟ names. They have proposed additional modifications to the data, including the “clustering” of data, in order to satisfy the State Bar‟s concerns about bar applicants‟ privacy. In light of our holding recognizing the public‟s interest in the admissions database, the State Bar may choose to implement these proposals or may propose other measures that will satisfy the public‟s right of access while protecting applicants‟ privacy. If not, it will be necessary for the trial court to resolve whether and how a record that is responsive to plaintiffs‟ requests may be 35 produced without identifying individual applicants or otherwise unduly burdening any legitimate competing interests.