Opinion ID: 1895332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Other Planned Wrongful Acts.

Text: Defendant's first contention is that the district court erred in admitting the contents of the two personal journals over his timely objections and motions to suppress. He bases his argument on the provisions of Iowa Rules of Evidence 403 and 404. He urges the only conceivable function of this evidence was to present a generalized self-portrait of his character for purposes of establishing that he acted in conformity with that character in perpetrating the crimes with which he was charged. This, he suggests, is not permitted under Iowa Rule of Evidence 404. In addition, he argues that even if the evidence is determined to have some relevancy to the issues on trial its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This circumstance, he urges, requires exclusion of the evidence under Iowa Rule of Evidence 403. The State responds to these contentions by urging that the challenged evidence was relevant and admissible in order to establish facts in issue which tend to link defendant with the crimes. The nature of the State's contentions in this regard is discussed more fully later in this opinion. Iowa Rule of Evidence 404 provides: (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: (1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; (2) Character of victim. (A) In criminal cases. Subject to Iowa R.Evid. 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in any case where the victim is unavailable to testify due to death or physical or mental incapacity to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor; (B) In civil cases. Evidence of character for violence of the victim of assaultive conduct offered on the issue of self defense by a party accused of the assaultive conduct, or evidence of peaceable character to rebut the same; (3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as provided in Iowa R.Evid. 607, 608, and 609. (b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Both the defendant and the State refer to subsection (b) of rule 404 as an exclusionary rule vis-a-vis evidence of other crimes or wrongful acts. We have so described it in our decisions. E.g., State v. Emerson, 375 N.W.2d 256, 260 (Iowa 1985). Subsection (b), we believe, purports to exemplify how subsection (a) of the same rule applies to evidence of specific acts tending to show bad character. The language of the first paragraph of rule 404(a) suggests that its exclusionary ambit includes situations where the proponent of the evidence tenders it with the avowed purpose of establishing propensity based on character. We believe, however, that the exclusionary force of the rule applies equally to instances where the proponent offers the evidence for another avowed purpose, but the court determines that in fact its only relevancy is to illustrate the character of the accused for purposes of establishing other actions in conformity with that character. A specific rule is required in order to exclude such evidence because it otherwise qualifies for admission under general relevancy standards. As explained in United States v. Fosher, 568 F.2d 207 (1st Cir. 1978), [t]he inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudice one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular charge. Id. at 212 (quoting Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76, 69 S.Ct. 213, 218, 93 L.Ed. 168, 174 (1948) (footnote omitted)). The primary thrust of subsection (b) of rule 404 is to illustrate some but not all situations in which evidence relevant to establish some legitimate issue in the case is not rendered inadmissible because it also reveals character or traits of character otherwise precluded by subsection (a) of the rule. In applying rule 404, our primary task continues to be the determination of whether the challenged evidence is relevant and material to some legitimate issue other than a general propensity to commit wrongful acts. Emerson, 375 N.W.2d at 260; State v. Gibb, 303 N.W.2d 673, 682 (Iowa 1981); State v. McDaniel, 265 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Iowa 1978). If it is relevant and material for this purpose, it is prima facie admissible, notwithstanding its tendency to demonstrate the accused's bad character. [2] In the district court, both the defendant and the State approached the issues as if contemplated wrongful acts which are not carried out constitute the type of wrongs embraced by rule 404(b). The trial court entertained some doubt in this regard. We need not decide whether this is always the case. Limiting our inquiry to the type of conduct described in defendant's journals, we find that any suggestion that the described acts be committed carries nearly as much potential for causing an unwarranted propensity inference as would the completed acts. We therefore view the journals in this light in determining the exclusionary force of rule 404(a). In considering the contents of defendant's journals, the trial court concluded that each had probative value regarding factual issues in the case apart from character propensities attributable to prior wrongful acts. We agree with that conclusion concerning the dated, 143-page journal. The entries it contains, when considered in conjunction with other evidence in the case, are relevant as tending to dispel an innocent purpose for defendant's actions in obtaining insurance on Walker's life. Defendant's statements to authorities indicated that he arranged for this insurance through the same agent who had written the life insurance on his former wife. He indicated he induced Walker to sign the application by suggesting that, if the two of them took a planned trip to California and she were somehow killed, her parents might sue him. He apparently convinced her the insurance was to protect him against this risk. Defendant continued to assert at the time of trial that this was his purpose in buying the insurance. A case with some factual similarity to the present situation is United States v. Engleman, 648 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.1981). There, the defendant Engleman was charged with mail fraud for allegedly insuring the life of one Peter Halm and then murdering him. The government's theory was that Engleman was acting in concert with Halm's wife for a share of the insurance proceeds payable to her. The court approved the admission of evidence, over objection, that thirteen years before Halm's death Engleman had murdered one Eric Frey and split the proceeds of the insurance on the victim's life with Frey's widow. This evidence was found to be admissible for purposes of showing a fraudulent intent in obtaining the insurance. This intent was an element of the offense charged. It was also deemed admissible, however, because intent was placed in issue in light of defendant's theory that the killing was committed by [Halm's wife] out of passion. Id. at 479 n. 3. Given the importance of the life insurance to the theory of the State's case, it was entitled to present evidence tending to refute defendant's avowed purpose for buying the insurance on Walker's life. We believe the somewhat irregular circumstances surrounding defendant's actions in obtaining insurance on the life of his estranged wife approximately two years earlier fall within this category of proof. Entries in the journal indicating defendant was giving thought to killing his wife during the time the insurance was in force are a significant part of that chain of events. It would lessen our concerns regarding unwarranted prejudice if the statements in the journal concerning plans to cause harm to other persons could be excised so that only the items relating to defendant's wife might be conveyed to the jury. Our examination of this material suggests, however, that this would distort the context within which defendant's plans vis-a-vis his wife were formulated and detract from a complete understanding of the events related. We accordingly hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the 143-page journal in its entirety over defendant's objections based on rule 403 and rule 404. We cannot, however, agree with the trial court's decision to admit the contents of the other journal. It is difficult to imagine a more inflammatory subject matter for purposes of inducing prejudice into a trial than a suggestion that defendant, in order to cause a reward to be posted and then collect it, planned to kidnap and murder a newspaper carrier. The record indicates that this was a subject of great concern to the public because of similar crimes which had been publicized by the media. The State urges that the cumulative effect of the evidence in the two journals identifies defendant as a scheming and manipulative person more capable of planning complex crimes involving deception than the ordinary citizen. It is not suggested, however, that the rather sketchy plans for carrying out the crimes described in the second journal are even remotely similar to the modus operandi of the crimes for which defendant was being tried. In State v. Walsh, 318 N.W.2d 184 (Iowa 1982), we discuss problems in using evidence of similar crimes in order to establish that the same person committed both. We held that in order to permit this the crimes must be strikingly similar or of a unique nature. Id. at 186. Federal courts applying rule 404 have rejected proof of allegedly similar crimes in various contexts when this evidence was offered to establish defendant's identity as perpetrator of the crime on trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ezzell, 644 F.2d 1304, 1306 (9th Cir.1981) (points of similarity between robberies were common to most robberies); United States v. Krezdorn, 639 F.2d 1327, 1331 (5th Cir.1981) (commission of thirty-two forgeries merely demonstrates repetition of similar criminal acts, thus indicating propensity to commit this crime); United States v. Pisari, 636 F.2d 855, 859 (1st Cir.1981) (use of identical threats in commission of similar robberies falls far short of a signature upon which to posit an inference of identity); United States v. Myers, 550 F.2d 1036, 1046 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847, 99 S.Ct. 147, 58 L.Ed.2d 149 (1978) (common practice of wearing stocking masks, carrying similar bags, and going armed with revolvers is not so unusual as tending to prove that two crimes were the work of a single bandit). The State's claim that the cumulative effect of the entries in both journals serves to identify defendant as a person uniquely capable of committing the type of crime involved in the deaths of Walker and Willits is not persuasive. The thirteen-page journal does not appear to manifest any unique skills in crime preparation. The operational aspects of the proposed crimes are largely left to the imagination of the reader. The State urges that evidence of defendant's propensity for plotting criminal activity, manipulating people, and planting false clues for authorities suggests his participation in the present crimes because they involve the planting of false clues. The inference upon which this argument depends suffers from the fact that whether false clues were in fact planted is one of the most hotly contested factual issues in the case. Moreover, the attributes of scheming and manipulation upon which this inference depends are, we believe, precisely the type of character traits to which rule 404(a) relates. Unlike the entries in the 143-page journal, which have some relevance to the insurance motive, the traits depicted in the thirteen-page journal do not tend to establish any relevant fact in the case other than the type of propensity inference prohibited by that rule. The admission of such evidence over defendant's objection requires a reversal of his conviction as to both counts and the granting of a new trial.