Opinion ID: 23709
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: bio-labs

Text: Bourque was injured on September 2, 1998. However, Bourque did not bring suit against Bio-Labs until January 28, 2000, almost seventeen months later. Finding that Bourque’s claims against Bio-Labs were prescribed by Louisiana’s twelve-month prescription statute for delictual actions, the district court granted summary judgment in Bio-Labs’ favor. In his response to Bio-Labs’ motion for summary judgment, Bourque argued that he filed a workers’ compensation claim against his employer, Entergy, within the twelve-month prescription period, thereby tolling prescription. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that Bourque presented no competent evidence that he filed the 10 workers’ compensation claim, that there was no evidence of solidary liability5 between Entergy and Bio-Labs, and that Bourque’s voluntary dismissal of his workers’ compensation suit vitiated any interruption of prescription that might have occurred. On appeal, Bourque contends that he did file a workers’ compensation claim against Entergy, which he voluntarily dismissed on June 7, 1999, and that Entergy was solidarily liable with Bio-Labs. Bourque asserts that, accordingly, he had one year from the date of voluntary dismissal to file suit against Bio-Labs. Because he filed suit against Bio-Labs within that time, Bourque argues that his claims against Bio-Labs are not prescribed. Therefore, if Bourque had filed a suit in which Entergy made a general appearance before Bourque’s voluntary dismissal, that suit could toll the prescription period. Under Louisiana law, “[d]elictual actions . . . are subject to a liberative prescriptive period of one year which begins to run from the day injury or damage is sustained.” Williams v. 5 A “solidary obligation” is “one where the obligors ‘are obliged to the same thing, so that each may be compelled for the whole, and when payment by one exonerates the other toward the creditor.’” Williams v. Sewerage & Water Bd., 611 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (La. 1993) (quoting Hoefly v. Gov’t Employees Ins. Co., 418 So. 2d 575, 576 (La. 1982); Lucero v. Burney Gear Co., 33,585, pp.2-3 (La. App. 2 Cir. 6/21/00), 764 So. 2d 181, 182-83 (finding, on the facts of the case, solidary liability of employer and third-party tortfeasor). “Suit against one solidary obligor interrupts prescription as to other solidary obligors.” Younger v. Marshall Indus., Inc., 618 So. 2d 866, 868 (La. 1993). 11 Sewerage & Water Bd., 611 So. 2d 1383, 1386 (La. 1993) (citing LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3492). If, on the face of the complaint, it appears that prescription has run, the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate an interruption or suspension of the prescriptive period. See Younger v, Marshall Indus., Inc., 618 So. 2d 866, 869 (La. 1993); Lima v. Schmidt, 595 So. 2d 624, 628 (La. 1992). Louisiana law provides that “a suit timely filed against the employer for worker’s compensation interrupt[s] prescription as to the subsequent claim against the third party tort-feasor for damages.”6 Williams, 611 So. 2d at 1390. Once such a suit is filed, interruption continues so long as the suit is pending. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3463 (West supp. 2001). Relying upon a recently amended Louisiana statute, the district court concluded that because Bourque voluntarily dismissed his workers’ compensation claim against Entergy, there was no interruption of the prescriptive period. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3463 (West supp. 2001) (“Interruption is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff . . . voluntarily dismisses the action at any time either before the defendant has made any appearance of record or thereafter[.]”). Bourque contends that the district court erred by relying upon the amended statute because it was not in effect when he filed suit 6 See supra note 5. 12 against Entergy. Bourque asserts that, instead, the prior statute and its interpretive case law should apply to the instant case. We need not decide which version of the statute applies to Bourque’s claims, because even assuming arguendo that Bourque is correct, his claim still fails under the earlier version of the statute. Before the 1999 amendment of Article 3643, it read: “Interruption is considered never to have occurred if the plaintiff . . . voluntarily dismisses . . . the suit[.]” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3463 (West 1994). During the time this version of Article 3463 was in effect, Louisiana courts interpreted the statute to apply only to those voluntary dismissals occurring prior to a general appearance by the defendant. See Roger v. Estate of Moulton, 513 So. 2d 1126, 1133 (La. 1987); Herbert v. Cournoyer Oldsmobile-Cadillac GMC, Inc., 419 So. 2d 878, 881 (La. 1982); Jones v. Dep’t of Transp. & Dev., 94 1908, pp.3-4 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/30/95), 659 So. 2d 818, 820. In other words, if the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the suit before the defendant has made a general appearance, the prescription period is not interrupted, and the plaintiff’s claims will be prescribed within the twelve-month period. Bourque alleges that Entergy made a general appearance in the workers’ compensation lawsuit before it was voluntarily dismissed. In his response to Bio-Labs’ motion for summary judgment, Bourque produced evidence that Entergy was served with 13 notice of a mediation hearing in connection with the workers’ compensation suit and alleges that Entergy made a general appearance in connection with the mediation hearing. Bourque fails, however, to provide this court with any evidentiary basis to support this assertion. While he did produce the mediation notice, it does not indicate whether Entergy actually attended the mediation hearing. Indeed, the director of the Louisiana Office of Workers’ Compensation is required under Louisiana law to set all workers’ compensation matters for mediation within fifteen days of a claim’s filing. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1310.3(B)(1) (West 1998). Moreover, there is no indication in the record regarding whether the mediation conference actually took place — evidence that we conclude would be readily available to Bourque. See id. (“Within five days following the conference the workers’ compensation mediator shall issue a report stating the results of the conference which shall be mailed to the parties and the director.”). Bourque may not rely on the “mere allegation” that Entergy made a general appearance in the workers’ compensation suit to toll the prescription period and thus defeat a motion for summary judgment. See Spivey v. Robertson, 197 F.3d 772, 774-75 (5th Cir. 1999). Bourque failed to present summary judgment evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Entergy made a general appearance before he voluntarily dismissed his workers’ compensation suit. Accordingly, we find that the 14 prescription period was not tolled, see Doyle v. Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc., 99-0460, p.7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/31/00), 764 So. 2d 1041, 1045 (“The interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of the suit is lost when the plaintiff voluntarily dismisses the suit prior to trial.”), and the district court did not err in finding that Bourque’s claims against Bio-Labs were prescribed.7