Opinion ID: 598974
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of the Alleged Exculpatory Statement

Text: 18 The appellants assert that the District Court erred in concluding that the tape recorded statement of an unavailable witness, purportedly exculpating the appellants, was inadmissible in the defense case where the court had already determined that the same tapes were reliable in the Government's case-in-chief. Appellant Spoto argues that the District Court improperly excluded a portion of the September 2, 1987 taped conversation between John Otto Heidel and co-defendant Tommy Roberto in which Heidel stated I'm the only watch guy they took. 19 Both Spoto and DeAngelo had been arrested at the scene of the Harkels burglary. The September 2, 1987 taped conversation included statements concerning both the Harkels burglary and the prior Bulova burglary. Based on Heidel's comment that he was the only watch guy they took, Spoto attempted to offer that portion of the tape as proof that Heidel was the only person involved in both the Bulova and Harkels burglaries. Appellant Spoto contends that Heidel's statement exculpated him and DeAngelo from any connection with the Bulova burglary. Counsel reasoned to Judge Glasser that this hearsay statement should have been admitted under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) as a declaration against Heidel's penal interest or under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(5), the residual hearsay exception. 20 The appellants point out that the District Court had previously admitted this series of tapes when offered by the Government, finding them to be sufficiently reliable under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) as containing statements against penal interest made by Heidel. The appellants argued that other portions of the tapes should be admitted to complete the story and to enhance the jury's understanding of circumstances in which those statements were made. When the appellants attempted to admit the only watch guy statement of Heidel as a statement against penal interest, the court ruled the statement inadmissible because its reliability was not sufficiently corroborated. 21 The portion of Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) which encompasses statements made against the declarant's penal interest concludes as follows: 22 A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 23 The District Court refused to admit the statement on the basis that it was not corroborated. The appellants maintain that the District Court missed the rationale behind the corroboration rule. Essentially, the appellants claim that corroboration was not necessary in this case because the statement was not made by the defendants' witness, but rather by the Government's own informant, on tapes which the Government made, and which the court had already ruled were sufficiently reliable to be admitted in their entirety. The appellants conclude that the government and the court were thus estopped from asserting that the tapes were unreliable. 24 Appellate review of this issue is limited to an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir.1992) (citing United States v. Salvador, 820 F.2d 558, 561 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 966, 108 S.Ct. 458, 98 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987)). It is self-evident that Heidel's murder rendered him an unavailable witness. Essentially, Rule 804(b)(3), the declaration against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule, requires that to be admissible, the statement must have been, at the time it was made, so far contrary to the declarant's best interests that a reasonable person would not make the statement unless the declarant believed it to be true. Bahadar, 954 F.2d at 828. Once that determination is made, the inquiry ends, unless the statement would simultaneously expose the declarant to criminal liability and exculpate the accused. In that case, the last sentence of 804(b)(3) applies, requiring corroborating circumstances to clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 25 The appellants claim that it was error for the District Court to rely entirely on Salvador, 820 F.2d at 561 in excluding the Heidel statement based upon the Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) test for corroboration of trustworthiness. In Salvador, this Court held that it is the defendants' burden to justify admission of the exculpatory statement by showing 'corroborating circumstances' that indicate 'the trustworthiness' of the statement. Salvador, 820 F.2d at 561. That burden is  'not an insignificant hurdle,'  id. quoting United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244, 253 (1st Cir.1976), and the inference of trustworthiness from the proffered 'corroborating circumstances' must be strong, not merely allowable. Salvador, 820 F.2d at 561. 26 Instead, the appellants argue that the District Court should have considered the three-part test for evaluating trustworthiness as set forth in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 300-301, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973): (1) the statement at issue was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime was committed; (2) it was corroborated by some other evidence in the case, such as the testimony of an eyewitness; and (3) it was self-incriminating and unquestionably against the declarant's penal interest. 27 Applying the rule in Chambers, we find that the appellants failed to establish these requisite elements of trustworthiness. Heidel's statement which was part of the September 2, 1987 taped conversation was not made shortly after the Bulova burglary which occurred during the 1986 Thanksgiving weekend. In addition, there was no eyewitness corroboration that Heidel was in fact the only person at the scene of the Bulova burglary. Nor was Heidel's statement against his penal interest at the time it was made. 28 As the Government points out, Heidel did not make the statement spontaneously because at the time the tape was made, he was cooperating with the Government and wearing a wire during a continuing investigation. This factor distinguishes the tapes which Judge Glasser earlier admitted--those which had been made in April, 1987, before Heidel undertook his cooperation with the Government. In addition, the exculpatory statement was not corroborated by other evidence in the case. On the contrary, in the recording of a September 2, 1987 conversation among Heidel, Spoto and DeAngelo, all three discussed their involvement in the Bulova burglary. At that time, Heidel's statement was also not against his penal interest because he was recording the conversations under the F.B.I.'s supervision and his statements did not subject him to criminal liability. Thus, Judge Glasser properly declined to admit this portion of the tape. 29 Similarly, the argument based on the residual hearsay exception, Rule 804(b)(5), is also without merit. The residual hearsay exceptions, 803(24) and 804(b)(5), are applied in the rarest of cases, and the denial of admission under the exceptions can only be reversed for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 489 (2d Cir.1991); United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 238-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cruz v. United States, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990); United States v. Beltempo, 675 F.2d 472, 480 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135, 102 S.Ct. 2963, 73 L.Ed.2d 1353 (1982); United States v. Rodriguez, 706 F.2d 31, 41 (2d Cir.1983). 30