Opinion ID: 1494368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to a Speedy Trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers

Text: Bruce first argues that the trial court violated his right to a speedy trial under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, codified at 11 Del. C. ch. 25. [2] Under 11 Del. C. § 2542, once the State indicts a prisoner who is incarcerated in another state and files a detainer [3] for the prisoner, the prisoner may file a request for final disposition on the Delaware charges. Upon filing this request, the State must bring the prisoner to trial within 180 days provided that for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance. [4] Bruce argues that the 180-day time limit expired before his trial began on March 16, 2000 (excluding a three-month delay attributable to confusion over Bruce's representation during which the time limit was tolled). The State counters that Bruce's unqualified request for a continuance in July 1999 operated as an automatic waiver of his rights under the detainer agreement. The basic timeline of events relating to this issue is undisputed. On October 26, 1998, the State charged Bruce with participating in the September 18, 1998 robbery and, shortly thereafter, issued a warrant for his arrest. While Bruce was incarcerated in Pennsylvania on unrelated charges, the State transported Bruce to Delaware for an arraignment on May 4, 1999. At the arraignment, the Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent Bruce and the 180-day clock under the detainer agreement began to run. The Superior Court scheduled Bruce's trial to begin on August 3, 1999. During a case review on July 6, 1999, Bruce notified the court that he and his family intended to retain private counsel from Pennsylvania to represent him at trial. By July 26, 1999, however, Bruce's Pennsylvania counsel had not entered an appearance for Bruce, [5] and the trial court concluded that the public defender was still Bruce's counsel. Because the public defender had not prepared for the August 3rd trial, he requested a continuance at the July 26, 1999 hearing. The court granted counsel's request and, on October 22, 1999, the court rescheduled Bruce's trial for January 27, 2000. In the scheduling order, the court allowed the parties two weeks to notify the court of any conflicts and/or witness unavailability on the scheduled date. [6] On November 15, 1999, the State notified the trial court by email that it could not go to trial on January 27th because of scheduling conflicts. [7] In a December 10, 1999 order, the court rescheduled the trial for March 16, 2000. [8] Defense counsel immediately objected to the new date via email, arguing that the date exceeded the 180-day time limit. In response to the objection, in a February 7, 2000 bench ruling the court scheduled the trial for February 10, 2000. During a scheduling hearing the next day, the State informed the court that several witnesses would be unavailable on February 10th, and the trial court scheduled the trial to begin on March 16, 2000. Defense counsel moved to dismiss Bruce's indictment because (1) the new trial date fell outside the 180-day limit and (2) the trial court's December 10, 1999 decision to schedule the trial for March 16, 2000 was not made after a hearing in open court as required by 11 Del. C. § 2542(a). The Superior Court held that the only continuance granted during the case was the continuance requested by the defense in July 1999 and that Bruce had waived his right to be brought to trial within 180 days by requesting that continuance. [9] The first question raised under the detainer agreement is whether the July 27, 1999 continuance requested by the public defender operated as a waiver of Bruce's rights under the statute or merely tolls the 180-day time limit. The United States Supreme Court held in New York v. Hill that defense counsel may waive the defendant's right to a speedy trial under the detainer agreement by agreeing to a trial date outside the 180-day limit. [10] But the Supreme Court in Hill did not hold that any request for a continuance operates as a waiver of the defendant's rights. The holding in Hill implicitly contemplates a waiver only where the defendant makes a request or agrees to a government request for a continuance that is inconsistent with the IAD's time limits. [11] In contrast, where a defendant requests a continuance that is consistent with the time limits under the statute, the 180-day limit is tolled for the duration of the delay rather than waived completely. [12] Applying this analysis to the present case, we conclude that the July 27, 1999 defense request for a continuance tolled the 180-day limit until the confusion about Bruce's representation was resolved. [13] The public defender's request for time to prepare a defense did not operate as a waiver of the time limit under the detainer agreement because Bruce did not agree to a trial date outside the time limit. This is therefore not a case in which the defendant willingly accept[ed] treatment inconsistent with the IAD's time limits, and then recant[ed] later on. [14] The next question is whether the trial court's actions violated Bruce's rights under the detainer agreement. Bruce argues (1) that the March 16 trial date violated his right to a speedy trial and (2) that the trial court's December 10, 1999 decision to schedule the trial for March 16th violated the detainer agreement's open court and good cause requirements. [15] Section 2542(a) provides that the trial court may grant any necessary or reasonable continuance beyond the 180-day limit for good cause shown in open court. Although the trial court found that the continuance requested by the defense was the only continuance granted before trial, [16] we think that the trial court's decisions to postpone the January 27, 2000 and February 10, 2000 trial dates are best characterized as continuances granted at the State's request over Bruce's objection. [17] Even assuming that the trial court's December 10, 1999 decision to postpone the trial was not made in open court [18] and that the March 16, 2000 trial date was outside the statutory 180-day period, we conclude that the February 8, 2000 postponement setting the final date for trial was for good cause and complied with the in open court requirement of Section 2542. Since counsel for the defendant and counsel for the State were both present at the February 8th scheduling conference, the conference was in open court. [19] Moreover, the postponement was granted for good cause because the State's witnesses could not appear on the scheduled dates in February. [20] As a consequence, the March 16th trial date was set in accordance with the statute, and any procedural defects before that point did not prejudice Bruce's right to a speedy trial under the detainer agreement.