Opinion ID: 1957798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right to Counsel under the Minnesota Constitution

Text: We next address whether the Minnesota Constitution guarantees the right to counsel for a first review by postconviction proceeding, irrespective of whether this right to counsel is protected by the United States Constitution. Although we have not determined whether the right to one review in a first review by postconviction proceeding is guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution, this is not a prerequisite to a constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel in that proceeding. As we have seen in Douglas and Halbert, the right to counsel on appeal may be constitutionally guaranteed even where the right to appellate review is not. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355-56, 83 S.Ct. 814; Halbert, 125 S.Ct. at 2586-87. Having determined by examination of Minnesota statutes and case law that a criminal defendant in Minnesota has the right to one review of his or her conviction, the question before us is whether the Minnesota Constitution requires the assistance of counsel to make that one review meaningful. Until 2003, a defendant seeking a first review by postconviction proceeding was provided the assistance of counsel by section 590.05. And the right to counsel in a direct appeal as of right has always been grounded in the United States Constitution. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58, 83 S.Ct. 814 (citing U.S. Const. amend. XIV). Thus, we have not previously needed to answer the question of whether the right to counsel for one review is required by our state constitution. Section 590.05 was originally enacted in 1967 as part of the Postconviction Remedy Act. For over two decades, this statute provided representation by the state public defender for all postconviction petitioners who were financially unable to obtain counsel. Minn.Stat. § 590.05 (1990). A 1991 amendment excluded the appointment of counsel to petitioners who had already had a direct appeal. Act of June 4, 1991, ch. 345, art. 3, § 1, 1991 Minn. Laws 2575, 2684. The 2003 amendment, the one at issue in this case, further restricted representation by the state public defender of a subset of postconviction petitioners who had not pursued a direct appeal: those who had pleaded guilty and received no greater than the presumptive sentence. Act of May 28, 2003, ch. 2, art. 3, § 2, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1400, 1401. The 1991 amendment continued the assurance that a defendant would have assistance of counsel for at least one review. The 2003 amendment eliminates that assurance for a subset of postconviction petitioners. We have previously demonstrated a willingness to interpret the right to counsel under the Minnesota Constitution independently of the United States Constitution. In Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety we held that because of Minnesota's lengthy and historic recognition of human rights, human dignity, and the procedural protection for the rights of the criminally accused, implied consent procedures are a critical stage of criminal proceedings to which the right to counsel attaches. 473 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Minn. 1991) (citing Minn. Const. art. I, § 6 (The accused shall enjoy the right    to have the assistance of counsel in his defense.)). And in State v. Risk we held that because Minnesota has a long tradition of assuring the right to counsel, the Minnesota Constitution requires police to cease interrogating an accused who has made an ambiguous or equivocal statement that could be construed as invoking the right to counsel. 598 N.W.2d 642, 648-49 (Minn.1999). Although these cases address the right to counsel for defendants during the investigative stages of a criminal proceeding, which are not at issue here, they demonstrate our view, under the Minnesota Constitution, that a defendant's access to the other protections afforded in criminal proceedings cannot be meaningful without the assistance of counsel. We are also persuaded by the rationale underlying the Supreme Court's Douglas decision that the quality of a defendant's one review as of right of a criminal conviction should not hinge on whether a person can pay for the assistance of counsel. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 355-56, 83 S.Ct. 814. As the Court noted, [t]he indigent, where the record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal. Douglas, 372 U.S. at 358, 83 S.Ct. 814. Although we recognize the salutary purpose of the 2003 amendmentto direct the limited public defender resources to the cases that will likely present the greatest needwe nevertheless conclude that the 2003 amendment deprives some defendants of meaningful access to one review of a criminal conviction, in violation of their right to the assistance of counsel under Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution. We hold that a defendant's right to the assistance of counsel under Article I, section 6 of the Minnesota Constitution extends to one review of a criminal conviction, whether by direct appeal or a first review by postconviction proceeding. We therefore hold that section 590.05, as amended by Act of May 28, 2003, ch. 2, art. 3, § 2, 2003 Minn. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 1400, 1401, is unconstitutional. [6]