Opinion ID: 2513973
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the 1998 restatement

Text: ¶ 18 We next examine whether the 1998 Restatement complied with the terms of the original trust and either (1) effected a revocation of the 1987 Trust Agreement or (2) was solely a modification as an amendment to the 1987 Trust Agreement. ¶ 19 The question concerns the effect and disposition of a restated trust agreement. The trial court held that absent an express revocation, the 1998 Restatement did not fully replace the 1987 Trust Agreement, and that the documents therefore must be read together to determine the governing terms of the trust. We disagree, and hold that the 1998 Restatement did, in fact, fully supercede the 1987 Trust Agreement. ¶ 20 The meaning of the term restate as it applies to an inter vivos trust document has not been established in Utah. We therefore look to other areas of trust law and the law of other states for guidance. In the law of business trusts, the meaning of a restated trust has been defined by statute in several states. These statutes address the meaning of a restated trust as it applies to various forms of corporate governance. For example, in Nevada a certificate of trust may be restated by integrating into a single instrument all the provisions of the original certificate [or trust instrument], and all amendments to the certificate, which are then in effect or are to be made by the restatement. (Emphasis added). Nev.Rev. Stat. 88A.220(2) (2002); see also Del.Code Ann. __ 12 § 3810(c)(1) (2002); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 47-14A-45 (2002). Thus, state legislatures in some states have codified the meaning of a restated business trust, providing that a trust may be restated by integrating into a single instrument all of the operative provisions of the trust. [3] ¶ 21 In the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act (the Act), the Utah legislature addressed, in another context, the meaning of the term restatement. Utah Code Ann. § 48-2c-409. The Act states that [a] company may integrate into a single document all of the provisions of its articles of organization and amendments thereto, and it may... further amend its articles of organization, by adopting restated or amended and restated articles of organization. Id. The Act further clarifies that a restated document that not only restates and integrates the operative provisions but that also amends the operative provisions shall so state with the appropriate language. Id. § 48-2c-409(2), (3). If the restated articles only restate and integrate, and do not further amend the provisions of the articles of organization as previously amended or supplemented, and there is no discrepancy between those provisions and the provisions of the restated articles, they must so state. Id. § 48-2c-409(4)(b). ¶ 22 In this case, the 1998 Restatement was titled a Restatement and declared that it amend[ed] and restat[ed] in full  (emphasis added) the 1987 Trust Agreement. Although it did not detail the provisions of the trust that were specifically amended, as a restatement it merged all of the operative provisions of the 1987 Trust Agreement together with amendments in a single instrument, and therefore superceded the 1987 Trust Agreement. The clear and unambiguous language of the 1998 Restatement demonstrated that it was intended to supplant the terms of the 1987 Trust Agreement with amended and restated terms. The 1998 Restatement unambiguously references the Almon J. Flake Family Trust dated September 22, 1987 as amend[ed] and restate[d] in full, and therefore reflects the settlor's intent to supplant the 1987 Trust Agreement. See Restatement (Second) Trusts § 331, cmt. c (stating that if the settlor reserves a power to modify or revoke the trust without specifying the method of modification, the power can be exercised in any manner which manifests the intent of the settlor to modify). In particular, the 1987 Trust Agreement provisions that provide for the needs of MARIAN R. FLAKE and which state that Marian shall also enjoy Almon's Social Security and all existing retirement funds were superceded due to their omission from the 1998 Restatement. Mrs. Flake is entitled only to what was provided for in the operative provisions of the 1998 Restatement.