Opinion ID: 3013434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness and Numerosity

Text: The issues of timeliness involve Schwerdtfeger's cross-appeals. Schwerdtfeger appealed the following three decisions: (1) the District Court's Order of November 21, 2001, denying his motion for a new trial; (2) the District Court's Order of November 29, 6 2001, denying his motion for sanctions against defense counsel; and (3) the District Court's Order of January 4, 2002, denying his motion appealing the taxation of costs. Hesco argues that some of these appeals are untimely because the collateral issue of attorneys' fees does not extend the time to file an appeal as to the merits. The EEOC points to the Tenth Circuit's decision in Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Local Union No. 998, 4 F.3d 918, 924 (10th Cir. 1993), which held that a cross-appeal from a collateral order denying sanctions is timely if filed within 14 days of the appeal of the merits, as arguably supporting Schwerdtfeger's position that all of his appellate issues are timely. The Bridgestone/Firestone opinion dealt with a primary appeal of the merits that had been timely, allowing Firestone to rely on the 14-day extension under Rule 4(a)(3) to file an appeal of a collateral order. By contrast, this case involves an appeal of a collateral order that was timely, with the opposing party attempting to rely on the 14-day extension to appeal the merits and other collateral orders. However, Rule 4(a)(3) plainly states that [i]f one party timely files a notice of appeal, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date when the first notice was filed. The rule does not differentiate between types of appeals. As a result, we find all of Schwerdtfeger's appeal issues to be timely as his notice of appeal was filed within 14 days of the date when Hesco's notice of appeal was filed. Hesco asserts that the issue of whether a defendant qualifies as an employer under the ADA is a question of federal subject matter jurisdiction. Hesco further claims that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case because Hesco was not an 7 employer under the ADA. On April 29, 1994, the date Hesco refused to hire Schwerdtfeger, the ADA applied to an employer who has 25 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or proceeding year. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A). We decline to determine whether the 25 employee requirement is jurisdictional, because regardless of whether the 25 or more employees requirement is jurisdictional or goes to the merits of an ADA claim, Hesco is a covered entity. Hesco was covered by the ADA on April 29, 1994, if it had 25 employees for each working day in each of 20 weeks in either 1993, the preceding year, or 1994, the current year. Other Circuit Courts have interpreted similar language in other federal statutes in this fashion. See Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., 7 F.3d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1993) (concluding that under the ADEA [t]he current year is the year in which the alleged violation occurred, and the applicable period does not cease on the date of the violation, but rather continues until the end of the calendar year.); Slack v. Havens 522 F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1975) (rejecting the argument that current or preceding calendar year means the prior calendar year and only those months of the current year preceding the incident at issue as incompatible with the plain language of Title VII). While it had no employees during 1993 and the early part of 1994, Hesco stipulated that it had 25 or more employees for at least 20 weeks during the second half of 1994. As a result, under the plain language of § 12111(5)(A), Hesco was a covered entity under the ADA on April 29, 1994. Nevertheless, Hesco contends that the District Court erred in applying the ADA retroactively. Hesco contends that it did not become subject to the ADA until twenty 8 weeks after April 29, 1994. This argument is without merit. Retroactivity becomes an issue only when a new statute attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 270 (1994); Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156, 160 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (a statute has retroactive effect if it would reach back in time and alter the rights or obligations on which the parties relied prior to the statute's passage). Given that Hesco's actions took place four years after the enactment of the ADA, the issue of retroactivity is not pertinent. Prior to April 29, 1994, the plain language of the ADA indicated that any company employing 25 or more employees for 20 weeks during 1994 would be a covered entity under the statute.