Opinion ID: 2657694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Semper’s Mandamus Claim

Text: In Count Four, Semper sought mandamus relief against then-Chief Judge Gomez on the grounds that he ―has a clear right to be employed as a probation officer until such time as he is found, after notice and an opportunity to [be] heard, that there is cause to terminate him‖ and that Chief Judge Gomez ―has a clear legal duty to continue to employ Officer Semper until such time as Officer Semper is given notice and a pre-termination hearing as to the basis for the claim that there is a cause to dismiss him.‖ (A32.) The Mandamus Act provides that ―[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any 46 agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.‖ 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Semper recognizes that the District Court of the Virgin Islands does not constitute an ―agency‖ for purposes of this statutory provision. Relying on the doctrine of judicial immunity as well as the Tenth Circuit‘s ruling in Trackwell v. United States Government, 472 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2007), he goes on to claim that a judge or judicial employee constitutes ―an officer or employee of the United States,‖ at least with respect to non-judicial administrative duties. However, as the Second Circuit explained in Liberation News Service v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379 (2d Cir. 1970), it appears that Congress, in enacting § 1361 (and 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), a related venue provision), ―was thinking solely in terms of the executive branch,‘‖ Eastland, 426 F.2d at 1384. ―Relying on Eastland, two other circuit courts have held that § 1391(e) does not apply to defendants affiliated with the judicial branch.‖ Trackwell, 472 F.3d at 1246 (citing King v. Russell, 963 F.2d 1301, 1303-04 (9th Cir. 1992); Duplantier v. United States, 606 F.2d 654, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1979)). The Trackwell court concluded that a district court lacked jurisdiction over a mandamus claim against the Clerk of the United States Supreme Court because, while the office of the Clerk is not the Supreme Court itself, the plaintiff was asking him to perform a judicial function delegated by the Supreme Court itself, i.e., the filing of an application (and, in the judicial immunity context, a court clerk who assists a court or a judge in the discharge of judicial functions is considered to be the functional equivalent of the judge). Id. at 1247. Likewise, we do not believe that it would be appropriate for the District 47 Court of the Virgin Islands to issue a writ of mandamus against its own Chief Judge, ―ordering him to reinstate Mr. Semper to his position as probation officer, retroactive to August 6, 2010, until ordering that he may not terminate Officer Semper without first providing him with notice and an opportunity to be heard as to the basis for any such termination‖ (A32). See, e.g., id. at 1246 (―For a district court to issue a writ of mandamus against an equal or higher court would be remarkable.‖); Semper, 2013 WL 2451711, at  (―Although a higher court has power to grant a writ of mandamus against a lower court, the district court has no power to issue the writ against its judicial officers or the federal courts.‖ (citing Smith v. Kriegh, 643 F. Supp. 2d 1274 (D. Colo. 2009); 28 U.S.C. § 1651). It is not surprising that Semper himself has failed to cite to any decision allowing such an unusual claim to go forward. We therefore conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Count Four on jurisdictional grounds. In any event, a writ of mandamus also represents an extraordinary remedy. See, e.g., Stehney v. Perry, 101 F.3d 925, 934 (3d Cir. 1996) (―‗It is not disputed that the remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.‘‖ (quoting Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980) (footnote omitted)). Specifically, ―[t]he common-law writ of mandamus, as codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief.‖ Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616 (1984) (citing Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 426 U.S. 394, 402-03 (1976); United States ex rel. Girard Trust Co. v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543-44 (1937)); see 48 also, e.g., Stehney, 101 F.3d at 934 n.6. As we have explained in some detail, Semper could pursue meaningful relief under the Consolidated Model Plan adopted by the District Court of the Virgin Islands. Accordingly, we do not believe that the extraordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus would be appropriate in the present circumstances. III. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court insofar as it dismissed Counts Two, Three, and Four of Semper‘s amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, we will remand this matter to the District Court with instructions to dismiss Count One of the amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 49