Opinion ID: 1490576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: On February 4, 1995, the victims, Lester and Carol Dotts, were shot to death in their home in Knox County, Tennessee. Lester Dotts was shot five times and Carol Dotts was shot seven times with a 9 mm weapon. Their home had been broken into and ransacked. At the defendant's trial, Harley Watts, age thirteen, testified that he had been riding around in a car on the night of the murders with Scarbrough and Thomas Gagne. According to Watts, Gagne drove to a rich neighborhood, parked at a dead-end street, and said he intended to burglarize one of the homes. Gagne and Scarbrough got out of the car and Watts remained inside. Watts testified that when Gagne and Scarbrough hurriedly returned to the car thirty minutes later, Scarbrough was carrying a 9 mm gun, which he handed to Gagne as they drove away. Watts further testified that Gagne said, somebody came out on [me] and [I] started shooting, and that Gagne later threw something out of the car. Scarbrough told police that he was with Gagne and Watts on the night of the murders and that Gagne, who was in possession of a 9 mm gun, drove to the victims' neighborhood. Scarbrough stated that he waited behind the victims' house while Gagne went inside. After fifteen minutes, he heard gunshots and ran back to the car. Gagne also ran back to the car where, according to Scarbrough, he said, I had to do it. Defendant Scarbrough later told police that he had been in possession of the 9 mm gun when he got out of the car but that he gave the gun to Gagne. At trial, Scarbrough testified that he was not at the scene and was not involved in the crimes at all. He claimed that he was pressured to give the statements to police and that he had learned the details of the murders from Watts and from newspapers. The defendant testified that he was with his girlfriend, Kasey Keirsey, on the night of the murders. Keirsey admitted at trial, however, that she had been at a school basketball game with her friends on the night of the murders and that Scarbrough had not been with her at the basketball game. At the close of the trial, the jury convicted the defendant of two counts of felony murder, two counts of theft, and one count of aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the felony murder convictions after concluding that the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of facilitation of first degree murder. The intermediate court, however, upheld the convictions for theft and aggravated burglary. The case was remanded to the trial court for retrial on the felony murder charges. Before the retrial, however, the State filed a pretrial motion arguing that it should be permitted to rely on the defendant's conviction for aggravated burglary to prove the underlying felony for the felony murder at the retrial. The State reasoned that the defendant's aggravated burglary conviction was final and that the doctrines of law of the case and collateral estoppel prohibited the defendant from arguing that he did not commit the offense of aggravated burglary. The defendant disagreed, arguing that the State's position would violate his constitutional rights to a fair trial and a trial by jury. After the completion of the argument, the trial court applied the law of the case doctrine and concluded that the State could rely on (and the defendant could not challenge) the final conviction for aggravated burglary in the retrial for felony murder. An interlocutory appeal was requested by the defendant, which was granted by both the trial court and the Court of Criminal Appeals. The Court of Criminal Appeals then held that the law of the case doctrine was inapplicable and that the collateral estoppel doctrine cannot be applied against a defendant. The intermediate court explained that the defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial would be violated by the trial court's order which ... prevents him presenting proof which would question the burglary conviction. We granted the State's application to this Court for further interlocutory review.