Opinion ID: 423679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' Cross Appeal

Text: 27 In their initial complaint, plaintiffs asserted claims based on the EAHCA, the RHA, and the equal protection clause, as enforceable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and requested the court to award them actual and punitive damages for the time, expense, inconvenience and suffering resulting from MSC's failure to provide them a free appropriate public education. They also requested the costs of the action and reasonable attorney's fees. 28 On December 14, 1981, the court determined that damages were not available under the EAHCA. Plaintiffs have not appealed that decision. In its final order, on April 21, 1982, the court decided that damages were unavailable to plaintiffs under the RHA or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for the alleged violation of the equal protection clause. See 536 F.Supp. at 1388. Plaintiffs appeal only that portion of the court's decision denying them compensatory and punitive damages under the RHA. 7 29 The court acknowledged that an implied private right of action exists to enforce the RHA and that damages are probably available under that act, but declined to award them because it found that MSC's refusal to fund a residential placement could not possibly violate the RHA. Relying on its opinion in Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F.Supp. 577 (D.R.I.1982), the court determined that [f]unding a residential placement would constitute affirmative conduct making available to handicapped children facilities and programs not available to non-handicapped students, 536 F.Supp. at 1388, conduct which the Supreme Court has indicated, in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), is not required by section 504 of the RHA. 8 In light of the existence of regulations, promulgated pursuant to section 504 by the Secretary of HEW, which require educational programs that receive federal financial assistance to provide to handicapped children a free appropriate education, including, if necessary, the provision of residential placement, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.31 et seq., we think this issue requires close examination. 30 In Davis, the Supreme Court held that section 504 does not require affirmative efforts to overcome the disabilities caused by handicaps, but only the evenhanded treatment of qualified handicapped persons. 442 U.S. at 410, 99 S.Ct. at 2369. The Court recognized, however, that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons [will not always] be clear and counseled that [i]dentification of those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues to be an important responsibility of HEW. 442 U.S. at 412-13, 99 S.Ct. at 2370. 31 Several courts have upheld the Secretary's regulations as not imposing overly extensive affirmative obligations on the school systems and as consistent with a presumption that school children receive educational services appropriate to their needs, see e.g., Tatro v. Texas, 625 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.1980); Phipps v. New Hanover County Bd. of Educ., 551 F.Supp. 732 (E.D.N.C.1982). To our knowledge, however, none of those courts has specifically addressed the provision of residential placement. But see Dept. of Educ. v. Katherine D., 531 F.Supp. 517 (D.Hawaii 1982) (assuming the validity of 45 C.F.R. § 84.33, .34). Whatever the general validity of the theory that the regulations do no more than require the same attention to individualized needs for handicapped as for non-handicapped children, we agree with the district court that the theory breaks down where the individualized attention requires the payment of substantial funds for residential placement for handicapped children. Cf. University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 399, 101 S.Ct. 1830, 1836, 68 L.Ed.2d 175 (1981) (Burger, Ch. J., concurring) (on remand of challenge under section 504, of University's refusal to pay for a sign language interpreter, [t]he trial court must, among other things, decide whether the federal regulations at issue, which go beyond the carefully worded nondiscrimination provision of § 504, exceed the powers of the Secretary under § 504.); American Public Transit Ass'n v. Lewis, 655 F.2d 1272, 1277-78 (D.C.Cir.1981) (DOT regulations requiring extensive modifications of public transit systems to accommodate handicapped persons barred by Davis ). See also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981), ([I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously). 32 Without specifically addressing the Secretary's authority, under section 504, to require the funding of a residential placement, plaintiffs seek to avoid the bar of Davis by arguing that MSC's policy of providing residential placement for some handicaps but not for learning disabilities discriminates on the basis of plaintiffs' handicap. Although we have serious doubts whether Congress intended § 504 to provide plaintiffs with a claim for discrimination vis-a-vis other handicapped individuals, the argument is not without support. See e.g., Calhoun v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 550 F.Supp. 796 (N.D.Ill.1982); William S. v. Gill, 536 F.Supp. 505 (N.D.Ill.1982) (recognizing claims for relief under section 504 in allegations of wrongful exclusion from the benefits of EAHCA); see also Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164 (8th Cir.1982). It does not, however, persuade us that plaintiffs should be entitled to damages. Even assuming that plaintiffs can avoid the bar of Davis by framing their claim as one of discriminatory exclusion from benefits available to other handicapped persons, plaintiffs' claim stalls before a second hurdle. 33 In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981) and Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 99 S.Ct. 2345, 60 L.Ed.2d 957 (1979), the Supreme Court warned against courts' broadening the limited remedy provided by a specific statute by recourse to the provisions of a more general one. As the court noted in Turillo v. Tyson, 535 F.Supp. at 585, the question whether the EAHCA should be held to be the exclusive remedy for handicapped children aggrieved by their educational placement raises different issues from those addressed by the Supreme Court in Middlesex County and Novotny, in that [u]nlike §§ 1983 and 1985(3), which are purely remedial devices, the Rehabilitation Act contains its own substantive rights. In this context, however, the substantive rights imposed by the RHA derive wholly from the substantive requirement of the EAHCA. See Smith v. Cumberland School Committee, 703 F.2d 4 at 9 and n. 5 (1st Cir.1983). Although plaintiffs frame their challenge as one to MSC's discriminatory policy of not offering residential placement to learning disabled children, the focus of their complaint is that the policy reflects an error of educational judgment and does not satisfy the EAHCA requirement that plaintiffs be given residential placement necessary to provide them with a free appropriate public education. They do not suggest, nor is there any evidence suggesting, that MSC or its individual members have any particular animus towards learning disabled children. Cf. Monahan v. Nebraska, supra, 687 F.2d at 1170-71 (refusing to impose liability under section 504 for a mere failure to provide the 'free appropriate education' required by EAHCA, but suggesting that discrimination under section 504 might be found in something more such as bad faith or gross misjudgment). 34 In Smith, we applied the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Middlesex County to bar recovery of attorneys' fees under the RHA when they are unavailable under the comprehensive remedial scheme of the EAHCA. See Smith, supra, at 9-10. For similar reasons, we think the absence of a remedy of damages under the EAHCA for the injury complained of by plaintiffs in this case, see Doe v. Anrig, 692 F.2d 800, 811-12 (1st Cir.1982) (absent exigent circumstances, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) provides only injunctive relief), is a sufficiently clear indication of congressional intent to limit plaintiffs to prospective relief that plaintiffs may not avoid that limitation by recourse to the more general provisions of the RHA. See Novotny, supra, 442 U.S. at 374-77, 99 S.Ct. at 2350-51 (rights created by Title VII may not be asserted within the remedial framework of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), because to do so would allow a plaintiff to avoid the detailed and specific provisions of Title VII, including the unavailability of general or punitive damages). See also Reineman v. Valley View Community School District, 527 F.Supp. 661 (N.D.Ill.1981). 35 Appellants' motion for leave to file a brief in response to plaintiffs' cross appeal is granted. The judgments of the district court are affirmed.