Opinion ID: 2089120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of sec. 32.19 (4), Stats.

Text: It is the appellants' basic position on this appeal that the limitation on recovery for rent loss contained in sec. 32.19 (4), [1] Stats., is an arbitrary and unreasonable limitation on the right of recovery granted by the Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, sec. 13. [2] The respondents maintain that although the trial court correctly sustained the statute's constitutionality, it failed to properly apply the limitations upon recovery contained therein. They thus take the position that liability is limited by the statute to rent loss incurred in the year immediately preceding taking and only as that loss is reduced by the average annual rent loss caused by vacancies in the first four years of the five-year period preceding taking. The total rent loss in the year preceding taking was $4,200 (12 × $350). The property stood vacant for twenty months in the first four years of the five-year period preceding taking. The respondent Expressway Commission thus determined that the average vacant period during the first four years of the five-year period preceding taking was five months (20 months divided by 4). The respondent then multiplied 7 (12 months minus 5 months) times $300 per month and arrived at the $2,100 amount which it offered to the appellants. The trial court determined that the statutory language limiting recovery ... to the amount that exceeds the average annual rental loss caused by vacancies ... should be construed to limit recovery to the amount that exceeds average rental loss caused by vacancies other than those caused by the condemnation proceedings. Since it was conceded that the twenty months of vacancy during the first four years of the five-year period preceding the taking were caused by the pending condemnation proceedings, the trial court refused to subtract the average period of vacancy (five months) and thus awarded $4,200 (12 × $350) as rental loss. The trial court realized that were it to interpret the statute otherwise and apply the formulae urged by respondents, the respondents could avoid all liability for rental loss by simply delaying the taking for a sufficient length of time. While we think that the trial court was correct in construing sec. 32.19 (4), Stats., so as to avoid such a result, grave doubt exists as to whether such section conflicts with the just compensation provision of the Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, sec. 13. It is the respondents' position that compensation should be awarded for the physical property taken and that such was done when they awarded the fair market value of appellants' property. Respondents also maintain that consequential [3] damages, except as are provided by the legislature, are damnum absque injuria and are to be suffered in legal silence. They justify the limitations of sec. 32.19 (4), Stats., by, in effect, saying that what the legislature giveth, the legislature can taketh away. Although such justification ignores the possibility that compensation for rental loss is a constitutional necessity rather than a legislative dole, much authority exists for the proposition that the constitution does not require compensation for consequential losses.