Opinion ID: 852106
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of Indiana's Right to Counsel.

Text: The right to counsel protections afforded through Article 1, Section 13, of our Constitution are sometimes broader than those flowing from the Sixth Amendmentparticularly in the context of invocation of the right and when the right attaches. See Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1079 (Ind.2003) (In light of Indiana's history of an expansive state right to counsel . . . an incarcerated suspect has a right under section 13 to be informed that an attorney hired by his family to represent him is present at the station and wishes to speak to him.); Suter v. State, 227 Ind. 648, 658, 88 N.E.2d 386, 390 (Ind.1949) (right to counsel violated when defendant requested counsel during interrogation, specified the particular attorney, and the police refused his request and refused to permit the attorney to see him); Batchelor v. State, 189 Ind. 69, 76-77, 125 N.E. 773, 776 (Ind.1920) (It has been held that a constitutional right to be heard by counsel is not limited to the right to be heard by counsel at the trial, but the spirit of the provision contemplates the right of accused to consult with counsel at every stage of the proceedings.). In Hall v. State, the Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant who requested counsel on one offense was entitled to counsel on other offenses. 870 N.E.2d 449 (Ind.Ct.App.2007). The police had arrested a juvenile based upon a tip that he was involved in a robbery-homicide. Id. at 454. His parents were brought to the detention facility and provided a list of the defendant's rights. The juvenile and his parents spent twenty-five minutes discussing whether he wanted to give a statement. Thereafter, the juvenile and his mother signed a waiver of rights and the juvenile confessed. Id. Based partially on this confession, the juvenile was chargedas an adultand found guilty of multiple counts of burglary, murder, robbery, and other offenses. On appeal, he argued that his statement to police violated his right to counsel under Section 13 because he had requested counsel at a prior court hearing and his statement to the police was provided outside that counsel's presence. Id. at 460-61. The prior hearing was more than a month before his arrest for robbery-homicide and involved a violation of a suspended commitment (juvenile probation). Id. The court found no violation of his right to counsel. Id. at 461. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the Indiana Constitution provides a more protective right to counsel than the Sixth Amendment, specifically in that Indiana's constitutional rightcontrary to the Sixth Amendmentcan attach prior to the filing of formal charges against the defendant, but both provisions guarantee the right to counsel at any critical stage of prosecution where counsel's absence `might derogate from the accused's right to a fair trial.' Id. at 460 (quoting Koehler v. State, 499 N.E.2d 196, 198 (Ind.1986)). But the Hall court appears to have treated Indiana's right to counsel as offense specific, just like the federal right. See id. at 461. The police have an interest in investigating new or additional crimes after an individual is formally charged with one crime. Id. `To find that the defendant invoked his . . . right to counsel on the present charges merely by requesting the appointment of counsel at his arraignment on the unrelated charge is to disregard the ordinary meaning of that request.' Id. (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178, 111 S.Ct. 2204). With this foundation of case law in mind, we proceed finally to the jurisprudential issue at hand: does the inextricably intertwined exception have a place within Indiana's constitutional protections?