Opinion ID: 621843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retirees as Employees under the RLA

Text: First, Retirees contend that they are not covered by the RLA. Citing the language governing the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, 181, Retirees argue that their status as former employees exempts them from the RLA's mandates. This argument has been squarely rejected by this court. See Bowcock v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. 10-20856, 2011 WL 2672521 (5th Cir. July 8, 2011) (unpublished). [2] In that case, one of the appellants here, Craig Bowcock, pursued similar litigation based on his allegation that Continental breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA by indicating that he would have to abandon his contemporaneous pension claims (the suit before us now) in order to take advantage of an early retirement program. This Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Bowcock's claims due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at . Bowcock argued, just as Retirees do here, that the RLA's mandatory dispute resolution procedures were not applicable to him as a retiree because retirees are not employees under the RLA. Id. at . As noted in Bowcock, the Supreme Court decided this issue in Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Day, 360 U.S. 548, 79 S.Ct. 1322, 3 L.Ed.2d 1422 (1959). The Day Court considered whether the National Railroad Adjustment Board maintained exclusive jurisdiction over a former rail employee. Id. at 551, 79 S.Ct. 1322. Holding that the RLA applied despite the claimant's status as a retiree, the Court stated that [a]ll the considerations of legislative meaning and policy which have compelled the conclusion that an active employee must submit his claims to the Board, and may not resort to the courts in the first instance, are the same when the employee has retired and seeks compensation for work performed while he remained on active service. Id. at 552, 79 S.Ct. 1322. Despite Day 's clear pronouncement, Retirees invite us to ignore Supreme Court precedent because they believe the current Supreme Court would overrule Day. We are a strict stare decisis court, Bowcock, at  (citing FDIC v. Abraham, 137 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir.1998)), and are in no position to challenge the statutory construction utilized by the Supreme Court in Day. The Supreme Court has sole authority to overrule its own decisions, meaning that the courts of appeal must follow the Supreme Court's directly controlling precedent even if it appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989). Our sister circuits agree. See, e.g., Bloemer v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 401 F.3d 935, 939 (8th Cir.2005); Leu v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 820 F.2d 825, 831 n. 10 (7th Cir.1987); Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 735 F.2d 328, 328 (9th Cir.1984); see also Bowe v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 974 F.2d 101, 103 (8th Cir.1992) (finding that claimant's status as a former employee does not fall within the narrow exceptions to the RLA's exclusive jurisdiction). We thus follow the Supreme Court's precedent and leave to that Court the determination of whether Day survives another day.