Opinion ID: 2068552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do Sections 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the Zoning Code Forestall Mootness?

Text: Petitioners assert that two sections of the Zoning Code prohibit expressly retrospective application to the Cresmont development of the text amendment enacted under Ordinance 04-855. As this argument proceeds, application of the Baltimore City zoning scheme as it exists does not moot the validity of the authorization to construct the parking lot granted by the City Council through Ordinance 04-659 in March of 2004. The first section of the Zoning Code upon which Petitioners rely is § 1-202. Section 1-202 provides: Nothing in this article may be taken to be a consent, license, or permit to: (1) use any property; (2) locate, erect, or maintain any structure or facility; or (3) carry on any trade, industry, occupation, or activity. Petitioners maintain that under § 1-202, no text amendment to the Zoning [Code] may be judicially determined to serve as, substitute for, or convey any construction or use permit. Second, Petitioners pin their hopes on § 3-306(a). That section [22] provides: (a) Unlawful preexisting uses and structures. Any structure or use that is unlawfully existing: (1) does not become lawful solely by the adoption of this article or any amendment to it; and (2) to any extent or manner that the unlawful structure or use is in conflict with the requirements of this article, that structure or use remains unlawful. Petitioners argue that, by enacting §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a), [23] the City Council made a legislative choice to restrain itself from being able (1) to approve unlawfully a developer's application for a conditional use authorization  here the parking lot ordinance, Ordinance 04-659  to allow construction to commence, and then (2) later amend the zoning text so as to relieve the need for its prior action. This application should be an exception to the Yorkdale rule, so it goes, because the operative effect of these sections is to prevent subsequent text amendments to the Zoning Code from legitimating previously enacted, but unlawful, authorizations to construct developments. [24] The City retorts that Petitioners misinterpret the intention of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the Zoning Code. With regard to § 1-202, the City contends that its plain meaning is simply that the existence of the Zoning Code, wherein lists of various uses of land are authorized (either as of right or by way of application to the Board or the City Council) does not eliminate the need for the use or structure to be in compliance with all other applicable laws and regulations, including obtaining the proper permits, or, in certain cases, obtaining a license or any other approval made necessary by some other pertinent part of the Baltimore City Code. The City describes that every decision by the Board recites similar language to inform applicants that even if an instant application is approved, the applicant, at a minimum, yet must obtain a permit from the pertinent authority. With regard to § 3-306(a), the City imagines the logical extension of Petitioners' interpretation to mean that any structure or use unlawful at the time of the 1971 recodification of the Zoning Code [25] (or any amendment thereafter) remains unlawful even if the Zoning Code is changed subsequently to permit such a structure or use. Petitioners' interpretation, thus stated, is inconsistent with the legislative choice of the word solely in § 3-306(a)(1), or with § 3-306(a)(2)'s provision that to any extent or manner that the unlawful structure or use is in conflict with the requirements of this article, that structure or use remains unlawful. A more logical reading of solely in subsection (a)(1) and the language of subsection (a)(2), according to the City, is that if a structure or use once prohibited is then made a permitted use, pursuant to a text amendment, the amendment does not otherwise free the structure or use from compliance with other requirements of the Zoning Code. The City illustrates its interpretation of these sections: A hypothetical example of how this might work follows. Assume for the moment that in 1971 retail uses were prohibited in certain districts of the City but that the owner of a property in such a district was nonetheless using the property for retail. Assume also that in 1971 the City Council, as part of its comprehensive rezoning of the City in that year, made retail a permitted use in the hypothetical property's zoning district. Under [Petitioners'] theory of the meaning of § 3-306, the use of the property at issue would remain unlawful notwithstanding the change and the property would be forever locked into the prior zoning scheme. This was surely not the intention of the drafters of the 1971 Zoning Code. After all, when they comprehensively rezoned the City in 1971, they specifically intended that their changes would eliminate the prior zoning scheme. [Petitioners'] theory would contravene that intention. The City's theory of the meaning of [§ 3-306(a)] is that if the hypothetical use independently violated some other provision of the Zoning Code that had not been changed-e.g., setback requirements, floor area ratio, etc.-the use or structure would remain unlawful and would still have to adhere to this other requirement. Viewed in such manner, the City's theory gives specific meaning to the use of the word solely in § 3-306(a)(1) as well as the inclusion of the language in § 3-306(a)(2) as part of the provision. (emphasis in original). We agree with the City's interpretation of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) of the Zoning Code. Although we are sympathetic to the Petitioners' position here because Ordinance 04-659, the ordinance pursuant to which the parking lot was constructed actually, later correctly was found to have been enacted in violation of the Maryland Open Meetings Act, Petitioners' interpretation of §§ 1-202 and 3-306(a) is misguided. Use of the word solely in subsection (a)(1) of § 3-306 indicates an intention on the part of the City Council that any change to the Zoning Code that authorizes a structure or use that was not authorized properly under the Code prior to the text change does not otherwise free that use or structure from compliance with any other pertinent requirements of the Code. Subsection (a)(2) affirms this intention by advising expressly that regardless of whether a change in the text of the Code authorizes the use or structure, that use or structure remains unlawful so long as it is in conflict with the other requirements of the Code. Also, § 1-202 simply provides that the text of the Zoning Code does not eliminate the need for the applicant to comply with the other requirements of the Baltimore City Code, including obtaining the proper permits, and any other approvals from the appropriate authorities, as provided in the City Code. [26] Were we to agree with Petitioners' interpretation, any change in the zoning text would not apply to any unlawful preexisting uses or structures to which the change in the text would be applicable. For obvious practical reasons, illustrated in the City's hypothetical, this is a result with which we cannot agree in the face of Yorkdale and Layton. [27]