Opinion ID: 1225431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Jeopardy and Manifest Necessity for Mistrial

Text: The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. amend. V. It applies to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 (1969). The Double Jeopardy Clause protect[s] a defendant against governmental actions intended to provoke mistrial requests and thereby to subject defendants to the substantial burdens imposed by multiple prosecutions. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 611, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976). It also protects a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal. Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949). At the same time, given the variety of circumstances that may make it necessary to discharge a jury before a trial is concluded, and because those circumstances do not invariably create unfairness to the accused, his valued right to have the trial concluded by a particular tribunal is sometimes subordinate to the public interest in affording the prosecutor one full and fair opportunity to present his evidence to an impartial jury. Washington, 434 U.S. at 505, 98 S.Ct. 824. Thus, it is well-settled that once jeopardy attaches, prosecution of a defendant other than before the original jury is barred unless (1) there is a `manifest necessity' for a mistrial or (2) the defendant either requests or consents to a mistrial. Johnson v. Karnes, 198 F.3d 589, 594 (6th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The manifest necessity doctrine was enunciated in United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). In Perez, the Supreme Court held that a judge may declare a mistrial and discharge a jury only if taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580. The Perez Court admonished that courts are to exercise a sound discretion on the subject; and grant a mistrial on the basis of manifest necessity with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes. Id. In Washington, the Supreme Court stated that the standard cannot be applied mechanically without regard for the particular facts and circumstances faced by the trial court in each case. Washington, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. 824. [T]he key word `necessity' cannot be interpreted literally; instead, . . . we assume there are degrees of necessity and we require a `high degree' before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate. Id.; Harpster v. Ohio, 128 F.3d 322, 328 (6th Cir. 1997) (The manifest necessity inquiry is a flexible one, with reviewing courts analyzing the trial court's exercise of discretion in light of the particular facts and circumstances of each individual case.). Washington established a sliding scale of scrutiny for determining whether manifest necessity existed. See Ross v. Petro, 515 F.3d 653, 669 (6th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 906, 173 L.Ed.2d 109 (2009). The strictest scrutiny applies when the mistrial is based on prosecutorial or judicial misconduct. Washington, 434 U.S. at 508, 98 S.Ct. 824. At the other end, great deference or special respect is due when the mistrial is based on a deadlocked jury. Id. at 509-10, 98 S.Ct. 824. Mistrials premised on the prejudicial effect of improper evidence or argument are akin to the latter situation and are also entitled to great deference. Id. at 511-14, 98 S.Ct. 824. In Washington, the trial court granted a mistrial based on the prosecutor's motion after the defense counsel told the jury during opening statements that there had been a prior trial and that the prosecution had hidden evidence from the defendant. 434 U.S. at 499, 98 S.Ct. 824. The prosecutor immediately moved for a mistrial. Id. The trial judge opined that the reason for the new trial was irrelevant to the issue of guilt or innocence and therefore inadmissible. Id. However, the trial court withheld ruling on the motion for mistrial after the defense counsel requested time to research the issue. Id. at 500, 98 S.Ct. 824. The next morning, after hearing extended arguments, and despite the fact that the defense counsel indicated that he was not prepared to provide authority to support his position, the trial court ultimately granted the prosecutor's motion. Id. at 501, 98 S.Ct. 824. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's decision. It held that manifest necessity existed for a mistrial because defense counsel had aired improper and highly prejudicial evidence, and the trial judge, evincing a concern of the possible double jeopardy consequences of an erroneous ruling . . . gave both the defense counsel and the prosecutor full opportunity to explain their positions on the propriety of a mistrial. Id. at 515-16, 98 S.Ct. 824. The Supreme Court reasoned that: An improper opening statement unquestionably tends to frustrate the public interest in having a just judgment reached by an impartial tribunal. Indeed, such statements create a risk, often not present in the individual juror bias situation, that the entire panel may be tainted. The trial judge, of course, may instruct the jury to disregard the improper comment. In extreme cases he may discipline counsel, or even remove him from the trial as he did in United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267. . . . Those actions, however, will not necessarily remove the risk of bias that may be created by improper argument. Unless unscrupulous defense counsel are to be allowed an unfair advantage, the trial judge must have the power to declare a mistrial in appropriate cases. Id. at 512-13, 98 S.Ct. 824 (footnote omitted). Moreover, [t]he interest in orderly, impartial procedure would be impaired if he were deterred from exercising that power by a concern that any time a reviewing court disagreed with his assessment of the trial situation a retrial would automatically be barred. The adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in this area, therefore, would seriously impede the trial judge in the proper performance of his duty, in order to protect the integrity of the trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to stop. . . professional misconduct. Id. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 612, 96 S.Ct. 1075) (footnote omitted). The Washington Court referenced Chief Justice Burger's comments in Dinitz, which also involved an improper comment by defense counsel during opening statements [3] : To make statements which will or cannot be supported by proof is, if it relates to significant elements of the case, professional misconduct. Moreover, it is fundamentally unfair to an opposing party to allow an attorney, with the standing and prestige inherent in being an officer of the court, to present to the jury statements not susceptible of proof but intended to influence the jury in reaching a verdict. Washington, 434 U.S. at 513 n. 32, 98 S.Ct. 824 (quoting Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 612, 96 S.Ct. 1075) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Washington Court also addressed the role of reviewing courts. Although a trial judge is entitled to deference, the trial judge must nonetheless `temper the decision whether or not to abort the trial by considering the importance to the defendant of being able, once and for all, to conclude his confrontation with society through the verdict of a tribunal he might believe to be favorably disposed to his fate.' Id. at 514, 98 S.Ct. 824 (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. at 486, 91 S.Ct. 547 (Harlan, J.)). Thus, reviewing courts have an obligation to satisfy themselves that, in the words of Mr. Justice Story, the trial judge exercised `sound discretion' in declaring a mistrial. Id. at 514, 98 S.Ct. 824.