Opinion ID: 338364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Requirements of Due Process

Text: 31 In determining what procedures are necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process, we are aided by a recent statement of the Supreme Court that: 32 (I)dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 33 Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 96 S.Ct. at 903. We conclude from our analysis of these factors that in the particular circumstances of this case due process requires that a rollback recipient be afforded notice and an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of presumptive SSI benefits. 34 In Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, the Supreme Court held that due process does not require that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing be afforded to recipients of disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. The Court reached this conclusion despite its holding in Goldberg v. Kelly, supra, which established the right to an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare assistance. The Court distinguished the two cases primarily by noting that Goldberg involved benefits which were based upon the crucial factor of financial need. The Court stated that (e)ligibility for disability benefits (under Title II) is not based upon financial need and that eligibility is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or support from many other sources. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 96 S.Ct. at 905. While the Court conceded that in view of the torpidity of the administrative review process and the typically modest resources of the family unit of the physically disabled worker, the hardship imposed upon the erroneously terminated disability recipient may be significant, it qualified the hardship in this way: 35 Still, the disabled worker's need is likely to be less than that of a welfare recipient. In addition to the possibility of access to private resources, other forms of government assistance will become available where the termination of disability benefits places a worker or his family below the subsistence level. 36 Id. at 906. (footnotes omitted). One such form of government assistance cited by the Court was the benefits receivable under the SSI program. The Court also considered significant the fact that a recipient whose benefits are terminated is awarded full retroactive relief if he ultimately prevails. The Court then concluded that, with respect to the private interest that would be affected, there was less reason    than in Goldberg to depart from the ordinary principle    that something less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action. Id. at 907. 37 In evaluating the probable value of additional procedural safeguards, the Court held that the nature of the inquiry on disability under Title II did not warrant the conclusion that a pre-termination hearing was required. Because the medical assessment of a worker's condition involves a more sharply focused and easily documented decision than the typical welfare determination and because the decision will usually turn on routine, standard, and unbiased medical reports, the potential value of an evidentiary hearing was substantially less than in Goldberg. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 96 S.Ct. at 907. The Court also indicated that the submission of written documents provided the recipient, in the disability context, with an adequate and effective means of communicating has case to the decisionmaker, 14 whereas such documents were not normally adequate in the welfare context. Id. at 907-08. 38 Finally, the Court held that imposing a requirement of a pre-termination evidentiary hearing would impose fiscal and administrative burdens out of proportion to any countervailing benefits. These burdens would arise out of the incremental cost resulting from the increased number of hearings and the expense of providing benefits to ineligible recipients pending decision. Mathews v. Eldridge, supra, 96 S.Ct. at 909. 39 The Court then concluded that the analysis of the relevant factors indicated that a pre-termination evidentiary hearing was not required and that the administrative procedures currently in use for termination decisions on Title II disability benefits fully comported with due process. 40 In this case, we deal not with Title II disability benefits but rather with Title XVI disability benefits under the SSI program. We find, after an analysis of the relevant factors, that the particular circumstances surrounding such benefits do require adequate notice and a pre-termination evidentiary hearing. 41 With respect to the plaintiff's interest in the continued receipt of these presumptive disability payments, we observe, as the Supreme Court noted in Eldridge, that SSI benefits are based in part upon financial need. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382(a)(1) and (2). In fact, the Supreme Court expressly relied upon this source of income as one of the other sources in Eldridge. 15 We thus conclude that the plaintiff's interest in the continued receipt of benefits is greater than it was in Eldridge and approaches, if not equals, the interest found in Goldberg. 42 Next, while the disability determination in this case is the same as that in Eldridge, the case is factually distinguishable. The plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity to submit additional information to the decisionmaker prior to termination nor was he informed of the reasons for or evidence supporting the termination decision prior to that decision so that he might seek to provide more information. In fact, the plaintiff was expressly notified that he need not supply any additional information unless he was requested to do so. Thus, the procedures for effectively communicating the plaintiff's case to the Secretary are not present here as they were in Eldridge. 16 43 Finally, imposing the requirement of a pre-termination hearing would not impose the undue financial or administrative burdens referred to in Eldridge. First, the number of hearings that would be required is not large. The class which plaintiff represents is composed of approximately 3,000 persons. Second, the requirement of a hearing would not impose a continuing burden on the Secretary as it would have done in Eldridge. Here, the burden will terminate once the cases of the rollback recipients are completed. Third, unlike the situation in Eldridge, the Secretary has, as is required by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c), established an administrative process for providing notice and pre-termination evidentiary hearings to nonpresumptive disability SSI recipients if requested by the recipient. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1336(c) and 416.1425. We do not perceive any undue administrative burden which would be imposed by requiring the Secretary to include the plaintiff and the members of the class with those regular SSI recipients who have a right to a pre-termination hearing. 44 We conclude that the District Court correctly held that due process requires adequate notice of and an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of the presumptive disability benefits of the plaintiff and the members of the class he represents. 17