Opinion ID: 2618737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jury instruction on comparative negligence

Text: Jet Alaska also claims that even if there was enough evidence adduced for the comparative negligence issue to go to the jury, the court improperly instructed the jury on that issue. Instruction No. 26 provided: Defendants claim that the plaintiff, Jet Alaska, was contributorily negligent in that it voluntarily and unreasonably assumed a known risk of injury because it continued to use the Swearingen Metro II aircraft, TC-218, knowing the aircraft had a defective nose gear steering actuator. To establish this defense, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence all of the following propositions: 1. That Jet Alaska knew of the defect in the nose gear steering actuator. 2. That Jet Alaska knew the nature and magnitude of the risk arising from using the aircraft in its defective condition. 3. That Jet Alaska voluntarily encountered such risk. 4. That it was unreasonable for Jet Alaska to encounter such risk. In determining whether or not the first proposition is true, that is, whether Jet Alaska knew of the defect, it is sufficient if Jet Alaska knew of the effect the defect had on the operation of the aircraft, regardless of whether they knew the precise source or nature of the cause of such effect. Jet Alaska argues that the instruction was improper because it diverged from the instruction we approved in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 624 P.2d 790 (Alaska 1981), which required proof of an actual awareness of the alleged design defect. Caterpillar Tractor, 593 P.2d at 887-88 n. 54. We fail to discern any significant difference between the two instructions. Instruction No. 26 does not, as Jet Alaska asserts, employ an objective standard. It, too, insists upon actual subjective knowledge on the part of the plaintiff. The fact that the knowledge component can be satisfied by awareness of the effect of the defect, as opposed to knowledge of the precise technical source or cause of that effect, merely emphasizes that a sophisticated scientific understanding of the mechanism is not a prerequisite. This position finds support in Patricia R. v. Sullivan, 631 P.2d 91 (Alaska 1981) wherein we defined defective as encompassing any failure of safe performance rather than depending upon an awareness of specific reasons for a product's failure. Id. at 103. [5]