Opinion ID: 2746938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The Court will independently review the Commission’s findings “to determine if they are established by clear and convincing evidence.” Turner, 76 So. 3d at 901. This quantum of proof is an intermediate standard, more than “a preponderance of the evidence,” but less than “beyond and to the exclusion of a reasonable doubt.” In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d 716, 726 (Fla. 2002). This intermediate level of proof involves both a qualitative and quantitative standard. “The evidence must be credible; the memories of the witnesses must be clear and without confusion; and the sum total of the evidence must be of sufficient weight to convince the trier of fact without hesitancy.” Id. We have noted the significance of the fact that “the JQC is in a position to evaluate the testimony and evidence first hand.” Turner, 76 So. 3d at 901 (quoting In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d 744, 753 (Fla. 1997)). Moreover, and particularly applicable to this case, where multiple violations are found, “the cumulative weight of the improprieties [may] support removal.” In re Henson, 913 So. 2d at 593 (Fla. 2005) (bracketed material added). “This Court has emphasized that the object of disciplinary proceedings is not for the purpose of inflicting punishment, but rather to gauge a judge’s fitness to - 25 - serve as an impartial judicial officer.” In re McMillan, 797 So. 2d 560, 571 (Fla. 2001) (citing In re Kelly, 238 So. 2d 565, 569 (Fla. 1970)). In making this determination, judges should be held to higher ethical standards than lawyers “by virtue of their position in the judiciary and the impact of their conduct on public confidence in an impartial justice system.” Id. Where “the judge’s conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office,” removal may be the only appropriate sanction. See id. (quoting In re Graziano, 696 So. 2d at 753). We have carefully reviewed the entire record of this proceeding and conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the Hearing Panel’s factual findings and its conclusions that Judge Hawkins violated Canons 1, 2A, and 5D of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that she regularly used court resources, including the services of her judicial assistant, for Gaza Road Ministries business at work and during working hours. Judge Hawkins explained in her February 19, 2013, deposition, which was admitted into evidence at the hearing, that speaking engagement requests relating to Gaza Road Ministries may have come to her at work because that was the only way the requestor had to contact her. When asked if her judicial assistant handled those during working hours, Judge Hawkins responded that she had “no independent recollection” of how her judicial assistant did the work and had no recollection - 26 - “one way or the other” about telling her judicial assistant not to work on Gaza Road Ministries business in the courthouse. Judge Hawkins told the investigator that she used her State computer as a repository for her Gaza Road Ministries records and texts because she feared that if that material was only on her laptop, it might get stolen. Testimony by investigator Beiner and forensic examiner Yu established that a significant number of Gaza Road Ministries e-mails were routed through or placed on the work computers of Judge Hawkins and her judicial assistant. Evidence clearly established that Judge Hawkins showed her book to attorneys in her chambers and made clear it was for sale. She accepted payment from an attorney for one of her books while on the bench. She offered her book to another attorney in the courthouse hallway. Judge Hawkins testified at the hearing that three or four attorneys bought her book, as well as some judicial assistants, some court administration personnel, a judge, two bailiffs, an employee in the probation department, and some court clerks. She did not know all the names of those to whom she sold the book, and defended her noncompliance with the order to compel a complete list of purchasers by saying she was under no obligation to create anything, but just to provide what information she had. This conflicted with her earlier statements to the Investigative Panel that she kept a “fairly meticulous list” of those persons to whom she sold the book. - 27 - Pursuant to subpoena, 205 e-mails were found on court computers between Judge Hawkins, her judicial assistant, and persons interested in the Gaza Road Ministries materials or services. An analysis of other Gaza Road Ministries e-mails disclosed that a significant percentage of those e-mails were sent or received during work hours. Judge Hawkins testified that she might have been at home when many of the e-mails were written because if she had no hearings and her calendar was clear, she would usually stay home and not go into the office for part of the day. Based on this evidence, the Commission correctly found that Judge Hawkins thought her time was her own during the workday. Her conduct in this regard showed that Judge Hawkins devoted less than full time to her judicial duties. Clear and convincing evidence supported the conclusion that Judge Hawkins violated Canon 1 by failing to maintain and enforce high standards of conduct and personally observe those standards by her failure to pay state sales tax on the sale of her business products and failure to register the name of her business under the fictitious name law. Clear and convincing evidence also established that Judge Hawkins’ failings in this regard also violated Canon 2A, requiring respect and compliance with the law. Judge Hawkins acknowledged that she had not paid State sales tax on the sale of her books and had not registered her business under - 28 - the fictitious name statute, section 865.09, Florida Statutes (2013), which constitutes a second-degree misdemeanor. The Hearing Panel had before it clear and convincing evidence that Judge Hawkins linked the sale of her business products to her judicial office by her appearance on her website in judicial robes, which lent the prestige of the judicial office to advance private interests. This conduct violated Canon 5D, which prohibits judges from engaging in business dealings that may reasonably be perceived to exploit the judicial position. Judge Hawkins acknowledged that she appeared on her business website in photographs depicting her in her judicial robes. We also conclude that Judge Hawkins’ conduct during the investigation violated Canons 1 and 2A by her lack of candor required of a judge. Lack of candor is exhibited when a judge gives materially misleading and incomplete statements during a deposition, refuses to answer relevant questions during the investigation, and refuses to turn over relevant documents after being ordered to do so, as Judge Hawkins did in this case. Especially distressing is Judge Hawkins’ conduct in deleting Gaza Road Ministries financial data in the early morning hours of the day of her deposition after that data had been subpoenaed and after Judge Hawkins had originally agreed to produce it. This act alone is clear and - 29 - convincing proof of Judge Hawkins’ extreme lack of candor in these proceedings.7 This act alone violated the basic requirement of Canon 1 that a judge “shall personally observe those high standards [of conduct] so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved.” This act alone was a serious violation of Canon 2A that a judge “shall respect and comply with the law.” Compliance with the law includes compliance with the rules of procedure that govern this proceeding and with the lawful orders of the Investigative Panel and the Hearing Panel. Noncompliance, obfuscation, and avoidance of those rules and orders are not justified by a judge regardless of whether the judge personally believes the investigation is unwarranted. At the hearing, Judge Hawkins testified that she was offended that the Commission and the investigator sought to look at her financial records, and said, “Why would you expect me to give you the information to investigate me?” Concerning the Judicial Qualifications Commission’s request for a list of purchasers of her book, she testified, “You’re the one who said that I sold the books. Surely you should have gone around and figured out who I sold them to.” 7. We have explained that lack of candor may be the basis for discipline only where the lack of candor is formally charged, the Commission makes particularized findings on specific points in the record concerning lack of candor, and the lack of candor is knowing and willful. See In re McAllister, 646 So. 2d 173, 177 n.2 (Fla. 1994) (citing the three-prong test set forth in In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 405 (Fla. 1994)). This three-prong test was met in this case. - 30 - Judge Hawkins called the request for production of the documents a fishing expedition, although she ultimately provided the purchaser information in the form that she kept it, which did not always include last names, after motions and orders to compel. The record establishes by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Hawkins sought to frustrate the discovery of materials relevant to the investigation, which were subpoenaed or the subject of a request for production, and which were ordered to be produced pursuant to two motions to compel. We consider a judge’s deceit or dishonesty to be a very serious factor in determining an appropriate sanction. In the case of In re Ford-Kaus, 730 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 1999), that judge was removed for violations that included misrepresentations and untruthful statements to a client before becoming a judge, and untruthful statements to the Investigative Panel about the matters in issue. See id. at 273-75. We later referred to our Ford-Kaus decision in In re Eriksson, 36 So. 3d 580 (Fla. 2010), where we noted that we had “factored dishonesty into [our] decision to remove [Ford-Kaus] from office.” Id. at 591. Judge Hawkins’ misstatements to the investigating attorney and Investigative Panel, her deletion of subpoenaed financial information from her computer on the morning of her deposition, and her denial that she had flash drives are all forms of deception that can be equated to deceit or dishonesty for purposes of determining if removal is a proper sanction in this case. - 31 - In the case of In re Henson, 913 So. 2d at 587, we also noted that deception or deceit are important factors bearing on a judge’s fitness because “[t]he judicial system can only function if the public is able to place its trust in judicial officers.” Id. (quoting In re Ford-Kaus, 730 So. 2d at 277). Removal is an appropriate discipline where the actions of the judge simply “should erode confidence in the judiciary,” even where it does not appear that the public has lost confidence, and even where the Hearing Panel has recommended a lesser sanction than removal. In re Sloop, 946 So. 2d at 1055 (quoting In re LaMotte, 341 So. 2d 513, 518 (Fla. 1977)). In In re LaMotte, this Court removed the judge based on his use of a stateissued credit card for personal trips, even though the judge testified that he thought the personal charges would be deducted from his salary and he made restitution, and in spite of ample good character testimony. 341 So. 2d at 518. We are fully mindful that the Hearing Panel found that Judge Hawkins has a generally exemplary record as a dedicated public servant who cares about others and who has been efficient and innovative in dispensing justice. We are also aware that Judge Hawkins operated her Gaza Road Ministries business primarily as a charitable enterprise, with good intentions. The Hearing Panel found that these mitigating factors played a large part in the “close call” whether to remove or simply discipline Judge Hawkins. Nevertheless, we have found removal the appropriate sanction in cases where the judge has good character and a strong - 32 - record, such as the case of In re Henson. There, we stated, “We have previously removed judges despite strong character evidence or an unblemished judicial record when their misconduct was fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office or struck at the heart of judicial integrity.” 913 So. 2d at 593. We explained that “Judge Henson’s trustworthiness, competence, and strong work ethic both as an attorney and judge, cannot overcome the grievous nature of the violations.” Id. at 592-93.8 Similarly in this case, we are constrained to conclude that Judge Hawkins’ prior record of service and good intentions cannot overcome the grievous nature of the violations in this case. While sale of her book to employees and lawyers in the courthouse, standing alone, would not justify removal, we cannot ignore the fact that Judge Hawkins employed court resources in the operation of her business for a lengthy period of time and failed to see that such conduct was improper under the Canons of Judicial Conduct. Moreover, even in the response to our final order to show cause, Judge Hawkins maintained a defensive posture concerning her conduct in refusing to answer questions and refusing to provide investigatory 8. The cases cited by Judge Hawkins in her response to our second order to show cause are inapposite, in that they did not involve a series of violations or a lengthy investigation thwarted by obfuscation and frustration of discovery of relevant investigatory materials ordered produced by the Judicial Qualifications Commission. - 33 - materials, even after issuance of an order to compel. In defending her conduct, Judge Hawkins asserted that her faith instructed her to hold fast to her innocence and “fight the good fight.” We agree with the Commission that obfuscation and frustration of proper discovery, and refusal to answer questions posed by the Investigative Panel, Judicial Qualifications Commission counsel, the Investigator, and the Hearing Panel, do not constitute fighting the “good fight.” The Canons require a judge to personally observe high standards of conduct so that the integrity of the judicial system may be observed. See Canon 1, Code of Judicial Conduct. The Canons also require a judge to comply with the law. See Canon 2A, Code of Judicial Conduct. These Canons were violated by Judge Hawkins’ conduct in this case. In past cases, this Court has also given favorable consideration to a judge’s acceptance of responsibility for his or her actions, such as occurred in In re Holloway, 832 So. 2d at 729, and In re Schwartz, 755 So. 2d 110, 113 (Fla. 2000). However, in the present case, Judge Hawkins did not show acceptance of responsibility for her actions, or acknowledge their impropriety, until her response to the second order to show cause why removal from office is not the appropriate sanction. Only in her final words in that response did Judge Hawkins state “I apologize to the Investigative Panel of the FJQC for my responses, to all of the people that were affected by my actions, and to all the Justices of this Court.” - 34 - While this statement extends an apology, albeit a belated one given only when faced with the possibility of removal, it fails to accept responsibility for her actions or acknowledge their impropriety. Further, Judge Hawkins’ apology fails to overcome the grievous nature of her conduct during this proceeding, which was “fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office” and which “struck at the heart of judicial integrity.” In re Henson, 913 So. 2d at 593. Removal is proper when clear and convincing evidence is presented that the judge has engaged in “conduct unbecoming a member of the judiciary demonstrating a present unfitness to hold office.” Art. V, § 12(c)(1), Fla. Const.; see also In re Albritton, 940 So. 2d 1083, 1088 (Fla. 2006). We must gauge Judge Hawkins’ present fitness to hold office in light of the cumulative nature and seriousness of the violations proven in this case. See, e.g., In re Henson, 913 So. 2d at 593. When we do so, we conclude that Judge Hawkins’ conduct is fundamentally inconsistent with the responsibilities of judicial office, demonstrating present unfitness to hold office, and that removal is the only appropriate sanction in this case.