Opinion ID: 2974034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Employment Under Tennessee Law

Text: -5- No. 04-6391 Roberts v. United States Under Tennessee law, an employee acts within the scope of his employment if the employee’s conduct meets the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 228 (1957): (1) Conduct of a servant is within the scope of employment if, but only if: (a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b) it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; (c) it is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master; and (d) if force is intentionally used by the servant against another, the use of force is not unexpectable by the master. (2) Conduct of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is different in kind from that authorized, far beyond the authorized time and space limits, or too little actuated by a purpose to serve the master. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 840 S.W.2d 933, 938 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992). Roberts argues on appeal that the district court erred by not examining closely the motives of the individual defendants in determining whether their actions were “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.” She maintains that they maligned and disparaged her, and that their personal motivations took their actions outside the scope of their employment under Tennessee law. Had she been permitted additional discovery, she believes that her evidence of personal bias and motivation would have been even stronger. The district court properly focused on the individual defendants’ actions and the circumstances of those actions. While evidence of intent can be relevant to whether an employee’s -6- No. 04-6391 Roberts v. United States actions were “actuated . . . by a purpose to serve the master,”2 Tennessee law generally measures the scope of employment not by “the motive of the servant, but whether that which he did was something his employment contemplated, and something which if he should do it lawfully he might do in his employer’s name.” Hall Grocery Co. v. Wall, 13 Tenn. App. 203, 208 (1930) (quoting Deihl & Lord v. Ottenville, 82 Tenn. 191 (1884)). It is clear that under federal case law, an employee may engage in conduct that is not condoned by the employer – even in violation of the employer’s policies – and still be within the scope of his or her employment. See Arbour v. Jenkins, 903 F.2d 416, 422 (6th Cir. 1990). Under Tennessee law, an employee can act within the scope of his employment even when committing wanton or willful torts against another: The rule recognized in all the recent cases . . . is that for the acts of the servant, within the general scope of his employment, while engaged in his master’s business, and done with a view to the furtherance of that business and the master’s interest, the master will be responsible, whether the act be done negligently, wantonly, or even willfully. In general terms, if the servant misconducts himself in the course of his employment, his acts are the acts of the master, who must answer for them. Anderson v. Covert, 245 S.W.2d 770, 771-72 (Tenn. 1952) (quoting Mott v. Consumers’ Ice Co., 73 N.Y. 543, 547 (1878)). See also Johnson v. Chapman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 895, 899 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (“Plaintiff’s allegations that [the individual defendant] acted with vindictiveness and malice are not enough to overcome substitution where, even if true, [the employee’s] actions appear to have been taken within her authority as a federal employee during the course of her employment.”). This is consistent with the standards of several other states in our circuit. See, e.g., RMI, 78 F.3d at 1143- 2 Moreover, § 235 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that “An act of a servant is not within the scope of employment if it is done with no intention to perform it as a part of or incidental to a service on account of which he is employed.” -7- No. 04-6391 Roberts v. United States 44 (finding that, under Ohio law, the “bad or personal motive” of the alleged wrongdoer is of little import on whether the employee was acting within the scope of employment); Woods v. McGuire, 954 F.2d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Under Ohio law, employees, even though acting intentionally and maliciously, are within the scope of employment if acting in the course of employment and within their authority.”); Arbour, 903 F.2d at 422 (explaining that, under Michigan law, “an employee’s actions may be within the scope of his or her employment even if the actions constitute intentional torts”). Roberts tries to distinguish this line of cases by arguing that while supervisors might act within the scope of their employment even when they malign, harass, or otherwise mistreat the employees they supervise, nonsupervisory co-workers act outside their scope when they engage in similar behavior. She cites no case law to support this distinction. As the Government points out, there is nothing in the Westfall Act that limits immunity to supervisors. In fact, we have previously found a federal employee immune from a co-worker’s state tort action for, among other things, intentional infliction of emotion distress. Woods, 954 F.2d at 389-91 (affirming immunity under Ohio law of non-supervisor medical officer who purportedly made false allegations against the plaintiff). Thus, in determining whether the individual defendants were acting within their scope of employment, we look to whether their actions were “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.” Without question, Roberts’s presence in the surgical unit generated turmoil and hostility, regardless of who was at fault. While patient care might not have suffered yet, such a result would be expected at some point in the future if the situation had not been resolved in some -8- No. 04-6391 Roberts v. United States manner. Roberts acknowledges that the turmoil and hostile environment were not in furtherance of the VA’s interests. It is apparent that the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employment when they sought to have her removed from the unit. As for Hagen’s initial statement, she made it immediately after talking with a counselor about Roberts’s intention to file an EEO charge. She made it at work, to her co-workers. The substance of her comment involved her work – i.e., her transfer to another position within the VA. Thus, the comment was reasonably incidental to her employment. See Tenn. Farmers, 840 S.W.2d at 938 (“To be within the scope of employment, conduct must be . . . incidental to the conduct authorized.” (quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229)). Accordingly, even if Roberts’s allegations of personal bias and malice are true, they are not sufficient to counter the evidence provided by the individual defendants that their actions were “actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve” the VA hospital. As the individual defendants were acting within the scope of their employment, the Westfall Act requires that the Government be substituted as defendant, and Roberts’s only recourse for her tort claims is under the FTCA.3 There is no question that Roberts did not exhaust her administrative remedies as required by the FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). Therefore, the district court properly dismissed her lawsuit without 3 Roberts claims that the district court erred when it permitted only limited discovery. Upon review of the record, we find no error. The court allowed Roberts to engage in discovery on the pertinent issue, including taking the depositions of four of the five individual defendants. The court’s discovery order was well within its discretion. See Woods, 954 F.2d at 391 (finding no abuse of discretion where the plaintiff had an opportunity to depose two of the six defendants and had sufficient time to engage in other discovery); see also Schrob v. Catterson, 967 F.2d 929, 936 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that any discovery permitted should be “circumscribed as narrowly as possible” when a scope-of-employment certificate is challenged). -9- No. 04-6391 Roberts v. United States prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Singleton, 277 F.3d at 872-73.4