Opinion ID: 2576153
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Penalty phase constitutionality of the death penalty statute

Text: Defendant argues that the California death penalty statute under which his sentence was imposed violates several provisions of the federal Constitution. As he acknowledges, we have in the past rejected many of these same arguments, and we decline to revisit those holdings here. Specifically, we have held that section 190.2  setting out the special circumstances that, if found true, render a defendant eligible for the death penalty  adequately narrows the category of death-eligible defendants in conformity with the requirements of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1179, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 186-187, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980), and that section 190.3, factor (a)  designating the circumstances of the crime as a factor the jury may consider in assessing the appropriate penalty  is not impermissibly vague and does not allow for arbitrary and capricious sentencing in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution ( People v. Seaton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 598, 691, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 28 P.3d 175, citing Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 727, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248). Further, we have concluded that California's death penalty statute is not lacking in the procedural safeguards necessary to protect against arbitrary and capricious sentencing under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, neither the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment, nor the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances exist or that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances or that death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 593-594, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) Indeed, the trial court need not and should not instruct the jury as to any burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 417-418, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 682-684, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require that a jury unanimously find the existence of aggravating factors or that it make written findings regarding aggravating factors. ( People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 593-594, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 777-779, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113.) There is no requirement under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments that a jury find the existence of unadjudicated criminal activity under section 190.3, factor (b), unanimously or beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1068, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035; People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1273, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251.) Even if there were such a requirement, defendant would not benefit from it, because no evidence of unadjudicated criminal acts was presented at the penalty phase of his trial. Nor do the United States Supreme Court's recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a jury trial ( Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435) compel a different result. ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 731, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 682, 101 P.3d 568; People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 594-595, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 262-265, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 452-454, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) We further have held that intercase proportionality review is not required by the due process, equal protection, fair trial, or cruel and unusual punishment clauses of the federal Constitution. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 602, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) The use of adjectives such as extreme and substantial in section 190.3 penalty factors (d) and (g) does not impermissibly restrict the jury's consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 188-189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1191, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The failure to instruct the jury that some section 190.3 penalty factors (factors (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), and (j)) may be considered only in mitigation does not violate the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 705, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 187-188, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Additionally, as defendant acknowledges, we have rejected the notion that in view of the availability of certain procedural safeguards such as intercase proportionality review in noncapital cases, the denial of those same protections in capital cases violates equal protection principles under the Fourteenth Amendment. (See People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1182, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 691, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1287-1288, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115.) As we have observed, capital case sentencing involves considerations wholly different from those involved in ordinary criminal sentencing. ( People v. Danielson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 691, 719-720, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 838 P.2d 729, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 409, 25 P.3d 618.) By parity of reasoning, the availability of procedural protections such as jury unanimity or written factual findings in noncapital cases does not signify that California's death penalty statute violates equal protection principles. Defendant finally argues that the use of capital punishment as an assertedly regular form of punishment for substantial numbers of crimes, rather than as an extraordinary punishment for extraordinary crimes such as treason, violates international norms of human decency. This in turn, he argues, renders the death penalty as practiced in the United States violative of the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society ( Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 101, 78 S.Ct. 590, 2 L.Ed.2d 630 (plur.opn.)) under the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment. We disagree. As the United States Supreme Court recently explained, although international authorities and norms are relevant to the consideration whether a punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment, they are not controlling. ( Roper v. Simmons (2005) ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1198, 161 L.Ed.2d 1; see also id. at pp. 1215-1216 (dis. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) Eighth Amendment analysis instead hinges upon whether there is a national consensus in this country against a particular punishment. ( Roper v. Simmons, supra, 543 U.S. at pp. 562-566, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 1191-1194.) Defendant makes no claim that there exists a national consensus against the use of the death penalty as currently employed. Defendant also contends that the death penalty as an assertedly regular form of punishment violates the law of nations and is therefore unconstitutional inasmuch as international law is a part of our law. Defendant does not demonstrate, however, that the death penalty as applied in California violates international law. To the contrary, `[i]nternational law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.' ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 404, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244, quoting People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 511, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) Because we find no state or federal constitutional or statutory defect compelling reversal of defendant's conviction or sentence, this claim must fail.