Opinion ID: 2607459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Complaint About Defendant's Work

Text: Over defendant's objection, his janitorial supervisor, Rubalcaba, testified that three days before the crimes, defendant learned Progressive had complained about his work and that defendant had angrily threatened to get the responsible party. (13) Defendant claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude this evidence under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant suggests here, as below, that the evidence unfavorably characterized him as a bad employee and had little bearing on whether he was guilty of first degree murder or any other charged crime. No abuse of discretion occurred. The complaint and threat evidence tended to show a motive to harm Progressive and its employees. It bore powerfully on the prosecution's claim of first degree premeditated murder as to both victims, and was not inconsistent with the alternative theory of murder in the course of a rape or attempted rape. The trial court could reasonably conclude that such evidence was substantially more probative than prejudicial. (14) Defendant next observes that Rubalcaba's supervisor, Leppington, was called as a prosecution witness immediately after Rubalcaba. Leppington stated on direct and cross-examination that he discussed the foregoing incident with Rubalcaba and defendant the next day; that Rubalcaba and defendant shouted at each other during the meeting; that defendant behaved civilly towards Leppington; and that Leppington decided not to fire defendant. When defense counsel asked Leppington what reason defendant gave during the meeting for his confrontation with Rubalcaba, the prosecution objected on hearsay grounds. Defense counsel argued that the evidence was being offered to prove the state of mind of the several parties. The trial court summarily sustained the objection. Defendant now claims Leppington's testimony would have disclosed a personality conflict between Rubalcaba and defendant, and would have rebutted any inference of a motive to harm Progressive or its employees. Defendant contends the court erroneously failed to apply the mental state exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1250), and that its ruling violated various federal constitutional guarantees (due process, confrontation of witnesses, presentation of a defense, and reliable death judgment). No basis for reversal appears. Absent an offer of proof as to what Leppington's testimony would have been, defendant has not preserved any challenge to its exclusion on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 354.) In any event, the court's ruling was harmless under any standard now urged. Defendant explained at trial that he did not make any threats when presented with the Progressive complaint, and that he told Leppington the next day that he became angry as a result of Rubalcaba's attitude. Leppington's description of the meeting corroborated defendant's apparent theory that Rubalcaba and defendant disliked each other and that Leppington took that fact into account in deciding what employment action to take. The proffered evidence would have added little to the jury's understanding of the incident.