Opinion ID: 3019928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suggestive E-mail Address

Text: In addition to registering with multiple e-groups, we find significant Shields’ self-selected e-mail moniker, “LittleLolitaLove,” which carries much meaning in light of the unchallenged statements in the affidavit regarding the use of the term “Lolitas” in the parlance of child pornography. Specifically, the affidavit explained that “[s]ometimes individuals whose sexual objects are minors will refer to these images as “‘Lolitas,’” a term whose etymology “comes from the titles of old child pornography magazines.” App. at 88, ¶ 2(a).8 Accordingly, Shield’s use of the name “LittleLolitaLove” registering for multiple e-groups where such images were available and disseminated bolsters “a practical, commonsense decision” that Shields likely downloaded such images, and thus there existed “a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. challenge. While we need not discuss the issue separately, we note that a staleness challenge would not have altered our decision. The determination of staleness requires more than simply counting the months between the facts relied on and the issuance of the warrant and is instead context dependant. See Harvey, 2 F.3d at 1322. We have noted that collectors of child pornography often store their material and rarely discard it. See id. at 1322-23 (citing with approval cases that dismissed staleness challenges and noted that collectors of child pornography rarely, if ever, dispose of their collections). Furthermore, we have recognized that information suggesting a “continuing offense” is more durable than information of discrete offenses. See United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 774 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[W]here the facts adduced to support probable cause describe a course or pattern of ongoing and continuous criminality, the passage of time between the occurrence of the facts set forth in the affidavit and the submission of the affidavit itself loses significance.”). 8 Of course, as noted by the district court, despite the appropriation of the term by child pornographers, the term actually has a more distinguished pedigree rooted in the literature of Vladimir Nabokov, and, before him, Heinz von Lichberg. Nonetheless, given the context of this case and the lack of any representation to the contrary, we reject the possibility that Shields’ use of the name “LittleLolitaLove” was related to the texts of Nabokov or von Lichberg. 18 at 2332. Moreover, Shields’ use of this e-mail address undermines his present argument that the generalized information regarding the behavior of child pornography collectors has no bearing on probable cause absent “a foundation demonstrating that Shields has, in fact, exhibited that behavior.” Appellant’s br. at 25. His choice of e-mail address supports a practical commonsense inference to the contrary. Shields’ use of the “LittleLolitaLove” e-mail address sets his case even further apart from Perez and Strauser than does his membership in two e-groups devoted largely to exchanging child pornography rather than one e-group as was true in those cases. In Perez, the defendant did not have a suggestive e-mail address or screen name. See 247 F. Supp. 2d at 471 (“navajablade@aol.com”). While the defendant in Strauser had used mildly suggestive screen names, “EZ2bhrdnla” and “EZ2bhrdnSTL,” 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1137, these names fell far short of “LittleLolitaLove,” which pertains more precisely to child pornography and the criminal offense being investigated. Shields’ use of “LittleLolitaLove” makes this case more like Froman, in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit determined that certain of the defendant’s screen names, namely “Littlebuttsue” and “Littletitgirly,” “reflected his interest in child pornography.” 355 F.3d at 890. If anything, “LittleLolitaLove” with its express reference to “Lolitas,” understood in this context as images of child pornography, can be characterized as more overtly suggestive of offenses related to collecting child pornography than the screen names deemed suggestive in Froman. Finally, Shields’ use of “LittleLolitaLove” to register for both the Candyman and Girls12-16 e-groups and his failure to cancel his memberships, further undermine any suggestion that he may have “stumbl[ed] upon the sites,” never to return after discovering their content. See Appellant’s br. at 26. Thus, Shields’ choice of e-mail address largely eliminates a concern the district court articulated in Strauser “that one could not be sure that the site contained child pornography until after one had subscribed,” 247 F. Supp. 2d at 1144, for the e-mail address Shields chose suggests that he likely collected or at least sought out such images. Although Shields submits that his e-mail 19 address was simply “tasteless and sophomoric,” Appellant’s br. at 26, this is an understatement given the context in which he used it. We have reviewed Shields’ remaining arguments and find them to be without merit, and thus we need not discuss them at length. In particular, we find unavailing the suggestion that probable cause was lacking because the FBI could have determined with certainty whether he actually downloaded illegal images. Whether the FBI could have provided more information is not the benchmark, and other courts of appeals have rejected similar arguments. Gourde, 440 F.3d at 1073 n.5 (“[T]he benchmark is not what the FBI ‘could have’ done. An affidavit may support probable cause even if the government fails to obtain potentially dispositive information.”); United States v. Ozar, 50 F.3d 1440, 1446 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that trial court “erred in focusing [its] Franks v. Delaware analysis on what the FBI could have learned with more investigation.”). For purposes of our analysis, it is of no import that the FBI could have discovered more corroborating evidence, such as actual downloads, so long as the valid information it supplies satisfies the “fair probability” standard articulated in Gates. 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. at 2332.9