Opinion ID: 1674235
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Text: In considering a statute passed by the legislature, (Appendix A) the first question a court should decide is whether the statute is ambiguous. If it is not ambiguous, the court should simply apply the statute according to its plain meaning and should not use principles of statutory construction. Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306 (Miss. 1985); MISS CAL 204, LTD. v. Upchurch, 465 So.2d 326 (Miss. 1985); Mississippi Power Company v. Jones, 369 So.2d 1381 (Miss. 1979). Whether the statute is ambiguous, or not, the ultimate goal of this Court in interpreting a statute is to discern and give effect to the legislative intent. Anderson v. Lambert, 494 So.2d 370, 372 (Miss. 1986); Clark v. State ex. rel Mississippi State Med. Ass'n., 381 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1980). The last paragraph of the statute which was amended by representatives from Adams County, where Natchez is located, provides only that a member have served on active duty. The time of military service in relation to employment as a member is not set forth. No qualifying or limiting language in the paragraph attach to the word member. Natchez contends that the words may have been absent in other parts of the statute should also be read into the proviso pertaining only to Natchez and cites cases to the effect that statutes must be read as a whole and not in isolated parts in order to discern the legislative intent. McCaffrey's Food Mkt., Inc. v. Mississippi Milk Com'm, 227 So.2d 459, 463 (Miss. 1969); State v. Board of Supervisors of Warren County, 233 Miss. 240, 102 So.2d 198, 210 (1958). However, the omission of language from a similar provision on a similar subject indicates that the legislature had a different intent in enacting the provisions, which it manifested by the omission of the language. Hazardous Waste Treatment Council v. United States E.P.A., 861 F.2d 270, 276 (D.C. Cir.1988); Pennsylvania v. Bigelow, 484 Pa. 476, 399 A.2d 392, 395 (1979); Clallam Co. v. Bd. of Clallam Cty. Com'rs., 92 Wash.2d 844, 601 P.2d 943, 946 (1979). Further, the particular statutes dealing with a special and particular subject will control, as to the terms of the special subject, over the general statutes dealing with like subjects in a general way. McCaffrey's, 227 So.2d at 462. See also Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 257 Iowa 1277, 136 N.W.2d 410 (1965). Where there are two conflicting provisions in the same statute, the last expression of the Legislature must prevail over the former. Warner v. Board of Trustees of Jackson Mun. Sep. School Dist., 359 So.2d 345, 347 (Miss. 1978) (quoting Coker v. Wilkinson, 142 Miss. 1, 106 So. 886, 887 (1926)). We have been cited to only one case from another jurisdiction, which has interpreted a similar statute concerning a similar question. Its statute limited the credit for military service to service after the employment relationship had already begun. Regan v. Firemen's Relief & Pension Fund, 417 Pa. 573, 208 A.2d 844 (1965). However, the language in Regan provided that such service [in said city] shall total twenty years, and shall include and may include service in the armed forces of the United States in times of war or active service. Id., 208 A.2d at 845 (quoting 53 P.S. § 23611). The language of the Pennsylvania statute is different from the Mississippi statute, which does not include the time of military service in the period of city service. We also note that the Mississippi statute with reference to retirement of state employees provides for time served in the active military. We are of the opinion that the statute involved in the case at bar is unambiguous and that its plain meaning allows credit for all time served in the military up to four years, regardless of whether served before or after the employment began. Although the lower court found the statute ambiguous and, therefore, heard evidence, he correctly decided that, under the statute and the facts, Robert K. Sullivan was entitled to credit for four years he served in the military of the United States prior to becoming an officer of the City of Natchez. The judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., PRATHER, SULLIVAN, and McRAE, JJ., concur. BANKS, J., dissents with separate written opinion. PITTMAN, J. not participating. ROBERTS, J., not participating according to Internal Supreme Court rules.