Opinion ID: 2624988
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is evidence of an acquittal logically relevant?

Text: When the superior court declined to inform the jury of Hess's acquittal, it explained that Evidence Rule 404(b)(3) does not presuppose a prior charge; it presupposes a prior incident and that the issue of conviction or acquittal is irrelevant under what's required of this rule. Hess disputes the court of appeals's statement that he offered the acquittal for the purpose of proving that he was factually innocent of having non-consensual sex with A.R. He argues that the acquittal is relevant to the weight the H.W. jury gave A.R.'s testimony. The state argues that the relevance of an acquittal is limited to issuesdouble jeopardy and collateral estoppelthat are not material here. It asserts that an acquittal does not prove that the defendant was innocent, but merely establishes that the jury had reasonable doubt about the defendant's guilt. Evidence must be relevant to be admissible. [15] Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. [16] We agree that a defendant's acquittal of one charge is generally not relevant to prove factual innocence of the facts underlying that charge. [17] Such evidence is not relevant for that purpose because it proves only that the state did not prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [18] But evidence of an acquittal may have an alternative purposeto help the jury weigh the evidence of the prior act. [19] Even though the defendant's acquittal does not prove that he was innocent of the prior act, a jury may reasonably infer a greater probability of innocence from the fact of acquittal. [20] Alaska's relevance definition allows evidence to be admitted if it has any tendency to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable. [21] One commentator explains the minimal relevance approach with an example of a fleeing suspect: Fleeing the scene of a crime, for instance, could mean that the defendant, being conscious of the crime charged, actually is guilty; or it could mean that the defendant is innocent but fled to avoid being apprehended for some other reason entirely. However, the premise that, in general, people who flee are more likely to be guilty than those who do not is at least plausible, and as long as there is some plausible chain of reasoning that leads to the desired conclusion, the evidence is probative of that conclusion. [22] Thus, although the acquittal does not prove that Hess was innocent of the prior charge, the H.W. jury might plausibly have reasoned that the fact of the acquittal made it less likely that Hess recklessly disregarded A.R.'s wishes. It might also plausibly have reasoned that the fact of the acquittal made it less likely that Hess had a propensity to recklessly disregard a companion's lack of consent. The jury therefore might also plausibly have reasoned that the fact of the acquittal made it less likely that Hess recklessly disregarded H.W.'s wishes. Hess's acquittal was therefore relevant.