Opinion ID: 415604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: inquiry into background facts and circumstances

Text: 66 Part II established that all felony convictions are probative of credibility to some degree. However, evidence that a witness is a convicted criminal can also seriously prejudice the defense, especially when the witness is the defendant himself. 67 The jury is told to consider the defendant's prior conviction only on the issue of credibility and not on the overall issue of guilt. But limiting instructions of this type require the jury to perform a mental gymnastic which is beyond, not only their powers, but anybody's else. Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 556, 52 S.Ct. 457, 76 L.Ed. 945 (1932). In the words of Justice Jackson: The naive assumption that prejudicial effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury, all practicing lawyers know to be unmitigated fiction. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S.Ct. 716, 723, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring) (citations omitted). The transcript in this case ironically confirms these observations. It includes the following interchange between the trial judge and the prosecutor: 68 THE COURT: Say again why [Lipscomb's prior robbery conviction] is probative of his guilt in this case. 69 MR. CORNELL: It is not probative. If it was probative of his guilt-- 70 THE COURT: Probative of his credibility. Why is it probative of his credibility? 52 71 When the defendant is impeached by a prior conviction, the question of prejudice, as Congress well knew, is not if, but how much. 53 Congress in Rule 609(a)(1) therefore instructed the courts to admit evidence of a prior felony conviction only if ... the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. 72 In this part, we consider how much information the trial judge needs to perform this balance. To meet its burden of justifying admission of the conviction, the government at a minimum must furnish the district court with the name of the crime (to show that it is a felony) and the date of the conviction (to show that the conviction is less than 10 years old). At issue here is when the district court can or must seek additional information, and how much. Lipscomb argues that the district court must usually inquire into the underlying facts and circumstances, while the government argues that the district court should not be permitted to do so. 73 We note preliminarily that the district court must carefully and thoughtfully consider the information before it to determine if probativeness outweighs prejudice to the defendant. This balancing must not become a ritual leading inexorably to admitting the prior conviction into evidence. Rather, the final version of Rule 609(a)(1) must be understood as a compromise between the House preference for excluding all prior convictions unless the crime involved dishonesty or false statement and the Senate preference for admitting all prior felony convictions. In particular, there can be no legal presumption of admissibility. To the contrary, as noted earlier, the burden is on the government to show that the probative value of a conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. Accord United States v. Fountain, 642 F.2d 1083, 1092 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993, 101 S.Ct. 2335, 68 L.Ed.2d 854 (1981); United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir.1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034, 100 S.Ct. 706, 62 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980). 54 74 There is less risk of prejudice when a defense witness other than the defendant is impeached through a prior conviction because the jury cannot directly infer the defendant's guilt from someone else's criminal record. 55 The jury may, however, still presume guilt or lack of credibility of the defendant by association or may unduly discount the defense witness' testimony. And Rule 609(a)(1) still requires the trial judge to balance probativeness against prejudice to the defendant before admitting the conviction.A. Plain Meaning 75 A comparison of Rule 609(a)(1) with Rule 609(b) strongly suggests that Rule 609(a)(1) does not require the district court always to inquire into the facts and circumstances underlying a prior felony conviction. Under Rule 609(b), a felony conviction more than 10 years old can be admitted only if the probative value of the conviction supported by specific facts and circumstances substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. (Emphasis added.) Rule 609(a)(1), in contrast, does not require that the probative value of the conviction be supported by specific facts and circumstances. We must presume that the omission was intentional. 76 On the other hand, Rule 609(a)(1) is broadly phrased to require balancing of probativeness against prejudice, with no specific instructions as to how the balance is to be performed. The language of the Rule gives no hint that Congress intended to preclude the district court from considering all relevant evidence. And Rule 609(b) shows Congress' belief that the specific facts and circumstances of the prior crime are relevant to the balancing inquiry. 77 In addition, Rule 609(b) controls admission of convictions for which more than 10 years have elapsed since the date of the conviction or of the release of the witness from the confinement imposed for that conviction, whichever is the later date. To determine if the defendant was released from confinement less than 10 years ago even though the conviction occurred more than 10 years ago, the trial judge must inquire into some of the background facts; in particular, the sentence imposed and the release date. 78 Moreover, Rule 609(a)(2) creates a per se rule that probativeness outweighs prejudice for crimes involv[ing] dishonesty or false statement. Often, however, the trial judge will not be able to determine from the name of a crime whether the defendant's conduct involved dishonesty or false statement. All circuits that have considered the question, including our own, have held that the prosecution may adduce specific facts to bring a prior conviction within Rule 609(a)(2). United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 364 n. 28 (D.C.Cir.1976). 56 It seems equally appropriate to permit the district court to elicit such facts in balancing probativeness against prejudice under Rule 609(a)(1). 79 We conclude from the language of Rule 609, then, that the district court can inquire into the background facts and circumstances, but need not always do so. Because the Rule does not indicate when the district court should seek this additional information, we further conclude that the district court has discretion to decide when it should do so. B. Legislative History 1. Rule 609(a) 80 Congress did not focus its attention on when the trial judge should inquire into the background facts and circumstances of a prior conviction. But the legislative history of Rule 609(a) suggests that Congress probably intended neither to require the trial judge to routinely inquire into the background facts and circumstances nor to preclude the judge from doing so. 81 Our review of that history begins, once again, with Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763 (D.C.Cir.1965). In Luck, we listed, as factors that might be relevant to the district court's decision to admit or exclude a prior conviction: 82 the nature of the prior crimes, the length of the criminal record, the age and circumstances of the defendant, and, above all, the extent to which it is more important to the search for truth in a particular case for the jury to hear the defendant's story than to know of a prior conviction. 83 Id. at 769 (footnote omitted). But we also emphasized the inescapable remoteness of appellate review and the need for the trial judge to exercise discretion in the light of the record as it develops before him. Id. 84 In Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029, 88 S.Ct. 1421, 20 L.Ed.2d 287 (1968), we again considered the relevant factors, this time listing whether the prior conviction rest[s] on dishonest conduct, its nearness or remoteness in time, subsequent legally blameless life, and whether the prior conviction was for the same or substantially the same conduct for which the accused is on trial. Id. at 940. But we recognized that many other factors ... may be relevant ... in a particular case. Id. (citing Luck, 348 F.2d at 769). Thus, our early decisions suggest that we thought it unwise to limit artificially the district court's exercise of discretion. 57 85 The Advisory Committee on the Rules of Evidence, in an early draft, codified the Luck-Gordon rule 58 and reaffirmed the broad discretion granted to the district court. The Committee's explanation for the Rule quotes our discussion in Luck of the relevant factors and then continues: 86 The application of Luck has been refined and clarified in numerous subsequent decisions of the court which rendered it, notably in [Gordon ].... Judge, now Chief Justice, Burger suggested in Gordon various factors to be considered ...: [list of Gordon factors]. It will be noted that [Rule 609(b) ] imposes a specific time limit and that [Rule 609(c) ] deals with aspects of rehabilitation; these provisions should be construed only as imposing outer limits upon the judge's determination and not as restricting his decision within them. 87 Proposed Fed.R.Evid. 609(a) advisory committee note, 51 F.R.D. 315, 393 (rev. draft 1971) (emphasis added). 88 As noted earlier, this discretionary approach was adopted in modified form by the House subcommittee that considered the Rules of Evidence, rejected by the House Judiciary Committee in favor of excluding all prior felonies, and rejected again after debate on the House floor. The Senate Judiciary Committee excluded all prior felony convictions for the defendant, but gave the trial judge discretion to balance probativeness against prejudice for other witnesses. The full Senate, however, made all felonies automatically admissible. Finally, the Conference Committee crafted the current compromise. 59 89 Nothing in this lengthy history supports either Lipscomb's contention that the district court must usually inquire into the facts and circumstances underlying a prior conviction or the government's contention that the district court cannot so inquire. Thus, Representative Hungate, the House floor manager for the Rules of Evidence, explained the discretionary approach in simple terms: We give discretion to the judge.... 120 Cong.Rec. 2378 (1974). Similarly, Senator Burdick endorsed the 'Luck Rule'  under which admissibility was left to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Id. at 37,079. 60 90 Some remarks do suggest, however, Congress' implicit understanding that the court can inquire into the background facts and circumstances if it wants to. Thus, Representative Brasco thought that the defendant should be able to show that a prosecution witness made a sweetheart deal with the prosecution in return for testifying. 120 Cong.Rec. 2378 (1974). Representative Smith, the principal House proponent of the discretionary approach, replied that this was an exact case under which the compromise I offer would apply, id. at 2379, thus implicitly assuming that evidence of a witness' plea bargain is properly part of the balancing analysis. Similarly, Senator Biden believed that one underlying fact, whether the defendant had pled guilty, was relevant; a guilty plea in a way is almost speaking for their credibility, having acknowledged they did it. Id. at 37,082. Also, an important part of the Conference Committee compromise was placing the burden on the government to show that the probativeness of a prior conviction outweighs prejudice to the defendant. It is implausible that the Committee would at the same time severely restrict the district court's ability to enforce that burden by precluding the court from asking the government for information beyond the name and date of the prior conviction. 2. Rule 609(b) 91 The legislative history also refutes any implication that because Rule 609(b) refers to specific facts and circumstances and Rule 609(a)(1) does not, judges should not look at specific facts and circumstances under Rule 609(a)(1). Rule 609(b), as proposed by the Advisory Committee and adopted with minor changes by the House, made convictions more than 10 years old automatically inadmissible. 61 The Senate Judiciary Committee, however, added the specific facts and circumstances language to permit the trial judge to admit a dated conviction in exceptional circumstances. S.Rep. at 15, 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 7061-62. Thus, the discretionary approach of Rule 609(a)(1) was already well-developed before specific facts and circumstances entered Rule 609(b). 92 Moreover, the Senate did not debate Rule 609(b). Thus, nothing suggests that the full Senate, by accepting this change in the Rule, meant to alter the understanding that the trial judge could inquire into all relevant facts under Rule 609(a)(1). Indeed, the opposite inference seems more plausible: The Senate assumed that the trial judge could look at specific facts and circumstances in all cases, and chose to require the judge to do so in one class of cases. C. Policy Considerations 93 The government argues that even if the district court can look into the facts and circumstances underlying a prior conviction, we should discourage the court from doing so because the inquiry would be burdensome and time consuming and is likely to yield nothing more than the fact, for example, that a larceny was a typical larceny. 62 A sufficient response is that Congress did not discourage such inquiry. But we are also unconvinced as a policy matter that we ought to discourage the district court from inquiring into the underlying facts. 94 First, the facts of this case contradict the government's assertion that the additional information will generally be of little help to the district court in assessing probative value. Smith's and Little's robberies seem fairly typical robberies. However, the extra information requested by the trial court and belatedly furnished by the government shows that both pled not guilty and were convicted after trial. 63 The record does not indicate whether either Smith or Little testified in his own defense, but if the government had shown that to be so, the jury's verdict ... is in a sense a de facto finding that the accused did not tell the truth when sworn to do so. Gordon, 383 F.2d at 940 n. 8. 95 Moreover, the extra information on Lipscomb--in particular, his more recent burglary conviction--shows that he has not been rehabilitated since his robbery conviction, and therefore enhances the probativeness of the robbery conviction. And Green, although convicted only for accessory after the fact to manslaughter, had in fact been part of a group, another member of which had robbed and stabbed an 18-year-old boy; the group members then fled to Green's home. 96 The reported cases supply numerous other examples of the relevance of background information. In some cases, the specific facts will make a conviction automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2). 64 In others, one specific fact--the date of release from confinement--will determine whether the district court rules on admissibility under Rule 609(a)(1) or under the much stricter standards of Rule 609(b). 65 In yet others, specific facts will simply prove relevant to the Rule 609(a)(1) balancing. The cases suggest the broad range of potentially relevant information. See, e.g., Jackson, 627 F.2d at 1210 n. 28 (manslaughter conviction; defendant had shot his wife and the man who was with his wife at the time); United States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d 1304, 1307 (10th Cir.1981) (defense witnesses were serving substantial prison terms, hence would have some motivation to testify falsely in a dispute with prison guards); United States v. Jones, 647 F.2d 696, 700 (6th Cir.) (prior crime was committed when defendant was only 20 years old), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 898, 102 S.Ct. 399, 70 L.Ed.2d 214 (1981); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 828 (2d Cir.) (defendant had been convicted after testifying in own defense), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977). 66 97 Nor do we consider the burden on the government or possible delay of the trial to be serious problems. First, the district court is fully capable of taking possible burden or delay into account in deciding how much information it needs. 67 Second, in many cases, the district court may be satisfied with readily available information--perhaps the witness' case jacket or presentence report, if available. Such information was sufficient to satisfy the district court in this case. The burden on the government to obtain this information is slight, and may well be outweighed by the possibility that--as for Lipscomb and Green--the extra information will strengthen the government's argument for admitting the convictions. Also, there need be no delay at all if the government makes a regular practice of obtaining this basic information before trial. We join the district court in urging the government to do so. See Tr. II, supra note 2, at 283-84 (as a matter of practice in the U.S. Attorney's office ..., you would be better served if you would come in with more detail about ... the previous conviction ... [e.g.], a copy of the indictment). 98 Third, extra information is most likely to be important for the defendant because prejudice is far greater when the defendant himself is impeached. But we find it hard to imagine a conscientious prosecutor not making a reasonable effort to obtain at least some details of the defendant's past convictions before deciding whether to seek an indictment, which charges to bring, or what sort of a plea bargain to offer. 68 Finally, we are unwilling to tell the trial judge to decide without adequate information the important question of whether to admit a prior conviction, simply because the government finds it a nuisance to gather the information. D. Summary 99 In sum, we hold, based on the language of Rule 609, the legislative history, and sound policy, that the district court has discretion to determine when to inquire into the facts and circumstances underlying a prior conviction and how extensive an inquiry to conduct. We decline at this time to establish general guidelines for determining when inquiry beyond the name and date of a conviction is necessary, although our discussion below of the specific convictions at issue in this case may shed some light on the matter. We will review the district court's decision as part of our overall deferential review of whether a decision to admit or exclude evidence is an abuse of discretion. 69