Opinion ID: 2092417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Comparison of the Act with other Wrongful Death Statutes

Text: We derive further evidence of the Legislature's intent to preclude punitive damages in a wrongful death case by comparing the Rhode Island act with statutes in other states. In those states in which punitive damages are allowed in a wrongful death case, the Legislature has either expressly allowed for their recovery [4] or impliedly done so with broad language that the courts have interpreted as granting to a jury or to the court the discretion to award punitive damages. [5] No such explicit or implicit authorization exists in the Rhode Island act. The petitioner cited numerous cases for the proposition that because courts in other states have allowed punitive damages, we may do the same. Summerfield v. Superior Court, 144 Ariz. 467, 698 P.2d 712 ( 1985); Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608 P.2d 861 (1980), overruled on other grounds by Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986); Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983); Bond v. City of Huntington, 166 W.Va. 581, 276 S.E.2d 539 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Rice v. Ryder, 184 W.Va. 255, 400 S.E.2d 263 (1990) (citing superseding statute). In those cases, however, the applicable statutes contained broad language allowing discretion in awarding damages, and the courts in those states noted such authority in their decisions that interpreted their states' acts as permitting punitive damages. For example, in Behrens, the Utah wrongful death statute at issue provided that `such damages    as under all the circumstances of the case may be just' may be awarded. Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1185. In interpreting the statute to allow punitive damages, the Utah Supreme Court wrote, the statute is broadly phrased and this Court has construed it accordingly. Id. (quoting Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105 (Utah 1982)). The court also noted that the division among the authorities [on the issue of the availability of punitive damages in a wrongful death case] can be traced to material differences in either the governing statute or its legislative history. Behrens, 675 P.2d at 1186. See also Summerfield, 698 P.2d at 717 ([t]he phrases `such damages as are fair and just'    invite the court to participate in construing the statutes and setting the parameters of the action); Gavica, 608 P.2d at 863 (court deciding that `such damages may be given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just' permits proof and allowance of punitive damages); Bond, 276 S.E. 2d at 541, 545 (relying in part on history of liberal construction given by the West Virginia court to the wrongful death statute and a history of finding punitive damages under the statute's fair and just standard). Many states, however, have refused to allow for such recovery in the absence of express statutory authority. See, e.g., Smith v. Printup, 254 Kan. 315, 866 P.2d 985 (1993); Dostie v. Lewiston Crushed Stone Co., 136 Me. 284, 8 A.2d 393 (1939); Smith v. Whitaker, 160 N.J. 221, 734 A.2d 243 (1999). For example, the New Jersey statute at issue in Smith, 734 A.2d at 248, expressly limited damages under the act to `the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, together with the hospital, medical and funeral expenses incurred for the deceased.' The court held that, under its statute, punitive damages are not permitted and stated that `[t]he fundamental purpose of a wrongful death action is to compensate survivors for the pecuniary losses they suffer because of the tortious conduct of others.'    An award of damages in a wrongful death action `is not a matter of punishment for an errant defendant.' Id. (holding that punitive damages are available in a survivor's action, but not in a wrongful death action, and quoting Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1398 (3d Cir.1997)). We are persuaded by thegeneral rule that unless the statute expressly or by clear implication confers the right to exemplary damages, none can be recovered in an action for wrongful death. The Rhode Island act neither explicitly provides for punitive damages, nor does it contain language granting broad discretion in awarding damages which would invite this court to participate in construing the [act] and setting the parameters of the action. Summerfield, 698 P.2d at 717. Instead, the General Assembly, knowing that our case law has precluded punitive damages in wrongful death cases, has chosen to design a statute with detailed damage provisions that do not provide recovery for punitive damages. The argument that barring punitive damages for a wrongful death shelters one whose conduct has resulted in the death of another, but not one who by the same conduct has merely injured another, is a compelling one. This Court, however, is not entitled to write into the statute certain provisions of policy which the legislature might have provided but has seen fit to omit   .    If a change in that respect is desirable, it is for the legislature and not for the court. Elder v. Elder, 84 R.I. 13, 22, 120 A.2d 815, 820 (1956). If the Legislature chooses to authorize punitive damages in a wrongful death case, it may do so at any time, but, as we have long held, this Court will not broaden statutory provisions by judicial interpretation unless such interpretation is necessary and appropriate in carrying out the clear intent or defining the terms of the statute. See Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Pelchat, 727 A.2d 676, 682 (R.I.1999) (interpreting the words `if there is no husband' in § 10-7-2 to mean `if there is no husband legally entitled to recover'); Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Curley, 585 A.2d 640, 642 (R.I.1991) (refusing to construe the act to allow persons who are the proximate cause of the decedent's demise from recovering wrongful death damages); Gott v. Norberg, 417 A.2d 1352, 1356 (R.I.1980) (holding that the judiciary cannot broaden a statute through interpretation unless the clear purpose of the legislation would fail without the implication); Coastal Finance Corp. v. Coastal Finance Corp. of North Providence, 120 R.I. 317, 325, 387 A.2d 1373, 1378 (1978) (same); New England Die Co. v. General Products Co., 92 R.I. 292, 297, 168 A.2d 150, 154 (1961) (same); McGaughey v. Tripp, 12 R.I. 449 (1879) (the term wrongful act in the act includes the negligent performance of a lawful act); Chase v. American Steamboat Co., 10 R.I. 79, 86 (1871) (the term person in the act includes individuals and corporations), aff'd, 16 Wall. 522, 83 U.S. 522, 21 L.Ed. 369 (1872). Thus, in light of the history of the Rhode Island act, case law, and the absence of a specific statutory provision allowing for punitive damages, we conclude that punitive damages are precluded in a Rhode Island wrongful death suit.