Opinion ID: 1060419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Use of Other Cognitive Standards in Tennessee

Text: Ultimately, I am uncertain as to why the majority holds that the mere fact of mental retardation is determinative of the constitutional inquiry, rather than looking to the effect that the mental condition has upon the defendant. This holding is fundamentally at odds with the law, either constitutional or otherwise, in virtually all other areas in this state. Surely, these other standards must be of some persuasive force to show that Tennesseans have not reached a consensus that the cognitive, moral, or volitional capacities of a defendant are now irrelevant to his or her punishment. Though ignored by the majority, the following is a brief list of examples in which the focus of similar inquiries is upon the effect of the defendant's mental condition, and not upon the mere fact of the defendant's condition: The mere fact of mental retardation does not prevent a defendant's impending execution. Instead, a court must decide whether the mental condition affects the defendant's ability to understand the fact of the impending execution and the reason for it. See Van Tran, 6 S.W.3d at 266. The mere fact of mental retardation does not prevent a defendant from being found competent to stand trial. Instead, a court must decide whether the mental condition affects the defendant's ability to understand the nature and object of the proceedings, to consult with counsel, or to assist in the preparation of his or her defense. See State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 205 (Tenn.2000). The mere fact of mental retardation does not prevent a defendant from pleading guilty. Instead, a court must decide whether the mental condition affects the defendant's ability to understand the proceedings and to understand the significance and consequences of a particular decision. See Moten v. State, 935 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996) (citing and quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401 n. 12, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)). The mere fact of mental retardation does not prevent a defendant from waiving Miranda rights. Instead, a court must decide whether the mental condition affects the defendant's ability to waive those rights intelligently. See State v. Benton, 759 S.W.2d 427, 431 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988) (We recognize that no single factor such as age, education, or even mental retardation is conclusive on the waiver issue. (emphasis added)). The mere fact of mental retardation does not prevent a person from being a witness. Instead, a court must decide whether the mental condition affects the witness's ability to understand the nature of the oath and testify truthfully. See State v. Johnson, 685 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tenn.Crim.App.1984). Indeed, the mere fact of mental retardation does not prevent a defendant from being found guilty of first degree murder. Instead, a court reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence must decide whether the mental condition affected the defendant's ability to kill with intent or with premeditation and deliberation. See State v. Brown, 836 S.W.2d 530, 537 (Tenn.1992). Given that all these circumstances focus upon the effect of mental retardation as the relevant characteristic, it is indeed difficult to understand the majority's holding that the mere fact of retardation will prevent a defendant from being eligible for capital punishment. Although the General Assembly is free to enact a statute imposing such a per se prohibition if it so desires, the Court has now fashioned a new, broad constitutional rule where no such rule has previously existed and where no clear evidence exists to suggest that there is a contemporary societal consensus mandating its recognition. Indeed, only time will tell whether the majority's new constitutional holding founded upon generic assumptions regarding the abilities of all mentally retarded persons will work profound changes in other areas of constitutional law as well.