Opinion ID: 4279239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assistance of Counsel at the Hearing

Text: Because the hearing was a critical stage in Schmidt’s case, the next question is whether Schmidt received the assistance No. 17-1727 29 of counsel during it. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasoned that Schmidt’s counsel was present for the ex parte hearing and could have advised Schmidt and answered any questions he had. Under AEDPA, we presume that this was a finding on the merits. Johnson v. Williams, 568 U.S. 289, 293 (2013). Even assuming AEDPA controls, it is unreasonable to conclude that counsel’s silent (and silenced) presence satisfied the Sixth Amendment. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Sixth Amendment guarantees the effective assistance of counsel, of course. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). The Sixth Amendment is not satisfied when “no actual Assistance for the accused’s defence is provided” and, as a result, the prosecution’s case is not tested against “the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654, 656 (internal quotations omitted). Attorneys can be constitutionally ineffective either because of their own errors or because the government interferes with their performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 692; Cronic, 466 U.S. 658–60 (categorizing circumstances when government interference with attorney performance violates Sixth Amendment). The Supreme Court has held that the government violates the Sixth Amendment when it interferes to such an extent that “although counsel is available to assist the accused,” the “likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659–60. A long line of Supreme Court cases has applied the rule that mere appointment or presence of counsel is insufficient 30 No. 17-1727 if state action converts counsel’s presence into a sham. In Powell v. Alabama, the Court held that “defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in any substantial sense” when the court appointed defense lawyers for the Scottsboro Boys but did not give the lawyers adequate time to prepare for trial. 287 U.S. at 57–58; see also Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940) (“[T]he denial of opportunity for appointed counsel to … prepare his defense, could convert the appointment of counsel into a sham and nothing more than a formal compliance with the Constitution’s requirement.”). In Ferguson, as noted, the Court found unconstitutional a rule that prohibited defense counsel—though present at trial—from directly examining a defendant who chose to speak in his own defense. 365 U.S. at 596. In Geders, the Court found that “an order preventing petitioner from consulting his counsel ‘about anything’” overnight during trial “impinged upon his right to the assistance of counsel.” 425 U.S. at 91. And in Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court found that the “mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the Sixth Amendment guarantee” when the state refused to appoint counsel free of conflicts of interest and “the advocate’s conflicting obligations … effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters.” 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978). Thus, the Court has “uniformly found constitutional error” when counsel was “either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage.” Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25 (emphasis added). Even comparatively modest government interference with the attorney’s ability to exercise judgment can render counsel ineffective and violate the Sixth Amendment. See Herring, 422 U.S. at 863, 865 (state violated Sixth Amendment by barring defense attorney from giving closing summation in bench No. 17-1727 31 trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612–13 (1972) (state violated Sixth Amendment by requiring that defendant who chose to testify be the first witness). The Court summarized its precedent in Strickland: That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused, however, is not enough to satisfy the constitutional com- mand. The Sixth Amendment recognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it en- visions counsel’s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair. For that reason, the Court has recognized that the right to counsel is the right to ef- fective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. at 685–86 (collecting cases; internal quotations omitted). In this case, Schmidt’s counsel was, in the trial judge’s own words, “just … present” and “not saying anything” during the ex parte hearing. The state thus prevented Schmidt’s counsel from performing the “role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685. Schmidt’s counsel was not allowed to speak while the court questioned his client on the most important issue in his defense. It was objectively unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Schmidt’s counsel could have provided effective assistance and meaningfully tested the arguments against the provocation defense by “not saying anything.” See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 656, citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 743 32 No. 17-1727 (1967) (summarizing Supreme Court precedent requiring counsel acting as an advocate). In this appeal, the State echoes the state court’s suggestion that Schmidt’s counsel “could have objected” during the hearing and was “functionally present” to help Schmidt. We find no factual support for these statements. The trial judge told Schmidt—and assured the prosecutor—that Schmidt’s counsel would not say anything during the hearing. Once in chambers, the judge reiterated that Schmidt’s counsel was not to participate. And throughout the ex parte hearing, Schmidt spoke uninterrupted by his counsel for long enough to fill thirty-five transcript pages. The judge addressed Schmidt di- rectly, not his counsel. Given the judge’s ground rules for the hearing, there is no basis for the conclusion that counsel could have objected or advised Schmidt. Doing so would have amounted to contempt of court. The State also argues that Schmidt could have cured any prejudice by supplementing his offers of proof after the ex parte hearing. The State points to an earlier pretrial hearing when the court announced that it would hold the hearing on the provocation defense and might allow Schmidt to supplement the record “if the Court is not satisfied” at “the end of that” hearing. There are three major flaws in this argument. First, the accused is entitled to the assistance of counsel during the entirety of a critical stage, not just part of it. Second, and more specifically, Schmidt needed counsel’s help in confronting the burden of production on a complex factual and legal defense. The prejudice he suffered came from disclosing irrelevant details and diluting the evidence that could support his defense. Any hypothetical opportunity to supplement the record later would not have reversed the damage to Schmidt’s No. 17-1727 33 case or satisfied Schmidt’s right to counsel during the critical hearing itself. Third, again, the factual record does not support the State’s argument. The trial court ruled on the provocation defense immediately after the ex parte proceeding. When Schmidt’s counsel mentioned supplementing the record a month later, the judge replied that he had already “ruled on” the defense. The State also points out that Schmidt’s counsel did not object to the judge’s ground rules that required counsel to re- main silent during the ex parte hearing. (Schmidt’s counsel did object to holding the hearing at all, and to the judge’s plan to question Schmidt himself, but on Fifth Amendment grounds.) The absence of a Sixth Amendment objection does not matter here. The accused himself may waive the right to counsel, whether for the entire case or for a particular stage of the proceeding, but any waiver must be knowing and intelligent. E.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) (state must prove “intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege” to show waiver of right to counsel at critical stage). There is also a strong presumption against waiver of constitutional rights that preserve a fair trial. Id.; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237–38 (1973). There is no indication in this record that Schmidt knew he had a right to effective assistance of counsel in the highly unusual ex parte, in camera hearing, let alone that he knew the judge’s ground rules would deny him that right or that he agreed to waive the right. Finally, the State points to the brief recess late in the hearing when the judge made a telephone call. Counsel asked if he might speak to his client during the short recess. The judge 34 No. 17-1727 said only that counsel could review the written offer of proof summarizing Schmidt’s intended defense. This limited opportunity for a brief talk with counsel was not enough to satisfy the Sixth Amendment “in any substantial sense,” and to conclude otherwise “would simply be to ignore actualities.” Powell, 287 U.S. at 58. As the Supreme Court has observed, the “tensions of a trial for an accused with life or liberty at stake might alone render him utterly unfit to give his explanation properly” when speaking “without the guiding hand of counsel.” Ferguson, 365 U.S. at 594 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Schmidt was never guided while explaining his offense and the provocation he claimed. The problems the Supreme Court predicted in Ferguson occurred here. Schmidt’s answers to the judge’s questions were so unfocused, with so much irrelevant and distracting details and sidetracks, that the judge asked him the same question six times: what was your mental state when you shot your wife? The Sixth Amendment guaranteed him more than a silenced attorney listening to his answers. When the State denies a defendant counsel at a critical stage, prejudice is presumed. E.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695–96 (2002); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–59. The district court’s judgment is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED with instructions to grant the writ of habeas corpus ordering that Schmidt be released or retried promptly, or perhaps, as the State suggested in the district court, that the state court modify Schmidt’s judgment of conviction to second-degree intentional homicide and re-sentence him accordingly. No. 17-1727 35