Opinion ID: 3134413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The statements giving rise to this action were made during the November 11, 1994, broadcast of “Mancow Muller's Morning Madhouse,” a radio program aired weekday mornings on WRCX. Defendant Muller was the host of the program and defendant Blanco was Muller's “sidekick” and newscaster. According to Van Horne's complaint, during the broadcast, Muller repeatedly made statements to the effect that Van Horne had threatened and assaulted Muller earlier that morning. The complaint sets forth lengthy and detailed excerpts from the transcript of the broadcast. We will not recount all of the detailed comments contained in the complaint. In sum, on numerous occasions and in colorful detail, Muller stated that Van Horne had been waiting for him at the elevator bank outside the WRCX studio; that Van Horne chased him and threatened his life; and that Van Horne was, among other things, “out of control,” “extremely violent,” “psychotic,” “a danger to society” and “trained in killing people,” and “needs to be locked up.” According to the complaint, defendant Blanco engaged in “banter” with Muller about his encounter with Van Horne throughout the broadcast in which she contributed to and supported Muller's accounts of the alleged altercation. Blanco also reported Muller's account of the incident as a news item in her news broadcasts that morning. The complaint alleged that Muller's statements imputed that Van Horne had engaged in criminal conduct and that the statements were therefore defamatory per se . The complaint further alleged that the statements were false, and that Muller acted with actual malice in making the statements because Muller knew the statements to be false when he made them. As ultimately amended, the complaint contained eight counts. Count I asserted a claim for defamation per se against Muller. Count II asserted a claim for defamation per se against Blanco. Count III charged WRCX with defamation per se on the ground that WRCX published Muller's and Blanco's false statements by broadcasting them over the public airwaves. Count IV charged Evergreen with defamation per se under a theory of vicarious liability for the acts of its agents, WRCX, Muller and Blanco. Counts V and VI asserted claims against WRCX and Evergreen for negligent and reckless hiring of Muller. Count VII and VIII asserted claims that WRCX and Evergreen negligently and recklessly supervised and retained Muller. The circuit court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation per se counts against Muller, WRCX and Evergreen. The court granted, pursuant to section 2–615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 2/615 (West 1994)), the defendants' motion to dismiss the defamation per se count against Blanco. The circuit court also dismissed the negligent and reckless hiring, supervision and retention counts against WRCX and Evergreen, apparently on the ground that these causes of action require a physical injury. Plaintiff appealed and the appellate court reversed. The appellate court held that plaintiff had adequately pled that Blanco participated in the publication of Muller's defamatory statements. The appellate court further found that dismissal of this count was erroneous because Blanco published statements that were defamatory per se . The appellate court next held that the circuit court erred in dismissing the negligent and reckless hiring, supervision and retention counts. The appellate court concluded that these causes of action do not require an allegation that the plaintiff has sustained a physical injury. 294 Ill. App. 3d 649. We accepted a petition for leave to appeal filed by Blanco, WRCX and Evergreen (hereinafter defendants). 166 Ill. 2d R. 315. We subsequently allowed a group of broadcasters, publishers, editors and reporters to file an amicus curiae brief in support of defendants' position. Plaintiff filed a motion in this court to strike a portion of defendants' reply brief. That motion was taken with the case. We have reviewed the challenged portion of defendants' reply brief and we find no reason to strike it. Plaintiff's motion is therefore denied.