Opinion ID: 4556341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Individual, Sequestered Voir Dire

Text: {¶ 34} At the beginning of the resentencing hearing, during voir dire, 15 prospective jurors indicated either that they supported capital punishment in all cases or that they opposed it in all cases. These prospective jurors were subjected to further voir dire with respect to their views on capital punishment. Kirkland asked the trial court to conduct the death-qualification voir dire of these 15 prospective jurors individually and outside the presence of other prospective jurors. The trial court denied the request and instead death-qualified these prospective jurors in a group. In his first proposition of law, Kirkland contends that the trial court erred by denying his request for individual, sequestered voir dire. {¶ 35} Capital defendants are not entitled to individual, sequestered voir dire. Rather, “[t]he determination of whether a voir dire in a capital case should be conducted in sequestration is a matter of discretion within the province of the trial judge.” State v. Mapes, 19 Ohio St.3d 108, 484 N.E.2d 140 (1985), paragraph three of the syllabus; see also State v. McKelton, 148 Ohio St.3d 261, 2016-Ohio-5735, 70 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 84. {¶ 36} Kirkland contends that the group voir dire prejudiced him in two ways. He argues that because the first prospective juror examined was excused after stating that she would be unable to consider imposing a death sentence, “all the other prospective jurors in the room saw what they should say to get out of jury 8 January Term, 2020 duty in a capital case.” Kirkland seems to suggest that subsequent prospective jurors may have lied about their beliefs “to get out of jury duty,” but nothing in the record supports that conjecture. Moreover, the voir dire process gave the defense a full opportunity to test the validity of any prospective juror’s claim of being biased against the death penalty. {¶ 37} Kirkland also contends that the prosecutor made two “improper remarks” during voir dire that tainted all prospective jurors in the courtroom. We examine each in turn. {¶ 38} First, Kirkland points to the following statement by the prosecutor: “[I]f in doing that weighing process, the aggravating circumstances have the greater weight, you shall recommend a sentence of death.” The defense objected to the use of the word “recommend” and moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. {¶ 39} The prosecutor’s use of the word “recommend” did not violate the Constitution. See State v. Bey, 85 Ohio St.3d 487, 496, 709 N.E.2d 484 (1999). A jury’s verdict in favor of death is a recommendation, since the judge may impose a life sentence even if the jury recommends death, see R.C. 2929.03(D)(3), and we have “consistently rejected” arguments that an accurate instruction to that effect “impermissibly reduces the jury’s sense of responsibility.” State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 559, 651 N.E.2d 965 (1995); see also State v. Maxwell, 139 Ohio St.3d 12, 2014-Ohio-1019, 9 N.E.3d 930, ¶ 88. {¶ 40} Second, Kirkland points to the prosecutor’s statement that jurors would be “required to sign a death verdict” if they found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors. “It is    only if you make such a finding, not only can you sign a death verdict, the law says to sit on this case, you have to sign a death verdict.” Kirkland does not explain how this statement was improper. And in fact, it is an accurate statement. See R.C. 2929.03(D)(2) (if the jury unanimously finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, it “shall recommend    that the sentence of death be imposed”). 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 41} Kirkland “has neither recited facts showing abuse of discretion nor demonstrated prejudice resulting from the court’s refusal to conduct a sequestered voir dire,” Carter at 555. Accordingly, we reject his claim that the trial court erred by denying his request for individual, sequestered voir dire.