Opinion ID: 374749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 6 I. Is there substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the Board's findings of unfair labor practices on the disputed charges? We answer in the affirmative. 7 II. Did the Board properly order Devon Gables to forthwith bargain with the Union? The answer is yes.
8 Our review of the record convinces us that the findings of the Board are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and, such being the case, the order must be affirmed. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); NLRB v. Broadmoor Lumber Co., 578 F.2d 238, 241 (CA9 1978). The fact that the Board's findings disagree with those of the ALJ does not change this standard. The deference accorded to the findings runs in favor of the Board, not the ALJ. Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1076 (CA9 1977). It is well settled that we may not substitute our choice between two fairly conflicting interpretations of the facts where the Board's choice is supported by substantial evidence. NLRB v. Walton Mfg. Co., 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S.Ct. 853, 854, 7 L.Ed.2d 829 (1962); NLRB v. Miller Redwood Co., 407 F.2d 1366, 1369 (CA9 1969). True enough, the ALJ's determinations on credibility weigh heavily in the court's review of the Board's findings contrary to the ALJ's. Penasquitos Village, Inc., supra, at 1079. However, Penasquitos also notes that the Board is to be accorded special deference in drawing derivative inferences from the evidence, 565 F.2d at 1079. Here, the Board does not disagree with the ALJ's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses, rather it draws different inferences from the statements made by the two witnesses upon whom the ALJ relied. These are the kind of inferences emphasized by the Penasquitos Village court in holding that the Board enjoyed special expertise.II. 9 Although the ALJ found that Devon Gables had committed a number of unfair labor practices, he also found a conspicuous absence of a pattern of unfair labor practices of such gravity and pervasiveness as to make the Union's card majority a more reliable test of employees' desire than an election. Consequently, he only recommended a cease and desist order with the posting of appropriate notices. The Board disagreed with the ALJ's findings and conclusions and concluded that the unfair labor practices created a duty to bargain which related back to the bargaining demand on September 23, 1976. 10 NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612, n. 32, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1939, n. 32, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1969), teaches us to accord great respect to the Board's selection of a remedy for unfair labor practices. True enough, we cannot ignore our own responsibility to be more than a mere rubber stamp for the Board's decisions. NLRB v. Chatfield-Anderson Co., Inc., 606 F.2d 266, 268 (CA9 1979). However, we are bound to follow Gissel in holding that if the Board finds a possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of insuring a fair election (or a fair rerun) by the use of traditional remedies, though present, is slight and that employees' sentiment once expressed through cards would, on balance, be better protected by a bargaining order, then such an order should issue. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614-15, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. Here, the Board applied the Gissel criteria concluding that the possibility of erasing the effects of the past unfair labor practices and insuring a fair election by the use of traditional remedies was slight. The Board's finding is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. We would add nothing to the validity of our decision by giving a detailed outline of the numerous unfair labor practices committed by Devon Gables. 11 Due consideration has been given to all of the respondents' arguments. We find them unconvincing. 12 The order of the Board must be enforced. Counsel shall prepare the necessary order and present it for signature within a reasonable time. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED.