Opinion ID: 2826960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Antitrust Standing

Text: “[T]he focus of the doctrine of ‘antitrust standing’ is somewhat different from that of standing as a constitutional doctrine.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983); cf. NicSand, Inc. v. 3M Co., 507 F.3d 442, 449 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (describing the doctrine of antitrust standing as more rigorous than Article III standing and explaining courts “must[] reject claims under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) when antitrust standing is missing”). To bring a federal antitrust claim, “a private plaintiff must demonstrate that he has suffered an ‘antitrust injury’ as a result of the alleged conduct of the defendants.” In re Canadian Import Antitrust Litig., 470 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2006). An “antitrust injury” is an “injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent . . . that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). “[T]he Supreme Court [has] held that a remote or ‘indirect’ purchaser was not a person injured” under federal antitrust law. In re Midwest Milk Monopolization Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 529 (8th Cir. 1984) (citing Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 735 (1977)). The appellees claim Insulate, as an indirect purchaser of FSE, lacks standing to bring its antitrust claims. Our court has suggested that indirect purchasers may bring an antitrust claim if they allege the direct purchasers are “party to the antitrust violation” and join the direct purchasers as defendants. Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1170-71 & nn.3-4 (8th Cir. 1998). We now hold as much. Because Insulate’s complaint alleges conspiracies between Graco and the Distributors and names the Distributors as defendants, Insulate has adequately established it has antitrust standing. -5-