Opinion ID: 1357018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: juvenile division

Text: IN THE MATTER OF THE WELFARE OF LARRY PRIEST, No. J-529 a minor, whose true name is SURRENDER OF Byrle Laird Dillenburg JURISDICTION Born 7-6-46. The Court having considered the nature and gravity of the charges preferred against the above named minor and the facts and circumstances said to be involved, IT IS HEREBY DECLARED, that the Juvenile Court refuses to accept and does now surrender jurisdiction of said minor. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that said minor may be placed and held (pending further order herein by the Court) in such jail or other secure place as the circumstances warrant and as directed by the said officers. DONE this 25 day of September, 1962, at Port Angeles, Washington. H.T. Rogers ______________________________________________ JUDGE [crossed out by pen] CHIEF PROBATION OFFICER [inserted by typing] The chief probation officer testified that petitioner was not given any formal hearing in the juvenile court after his arrest. The record shows that petitioner had been before the juvenile court on at least two previous occasions  in September, 1959, and in January, 1960. He had been committed at one time to the Luther Burbank School and at another time to the Fort Worden Diagnostic Center. As to his purpose in interviewing petitioner in jail a few days after his arrest, the officer testified: Q. Did you see the petitioner here on the 24th? A. I don't know whether I saw Larry in person on the 24th or not. I did talk to him and visit him in the jail a time or so while this was going on under juvenile jurisdiction. Q. What was the purpose of the visits? A. To talk to Larry, to get an idea of his attitude, and to make some decision as to whether the Juvenile Court could help this youngster. Q. Did Larry advise you that he had made a statement to the sheriff? A. I probably had a copy of the statement. Normally a copy of the statement is furnished to me with the officer's report. This is normal procedure, a copy of the officer's report and a copy of the statement, if any is taken. Q. And of course, during the time or times you visited him he was still being handled as a juvenile? A. Right. Q. And was one of the purposes of the visits and the studying of the report to make some decision in your mind as to whether it was a proper case for the Juvenile Court? A. Well, my prime concern here, as I recall there was no question so far as the Juvenile Court was concerned, as far as guilty or not guilty. It wasn't contested. But my objective was to talk to Larry and going over this report and trying to arrive at some decision or recommendations in order to give to Judge Church on what procedure to follow in using the Juvenile Court. In other words, to assess Larry's attitude and his feeling about himself, and what his chances of rehabilitation was. Q. And did you make such a recommendation? A. Yes. Q. What was that recommendation? A. I recommended to Judge Church Juvenile Court jurisdiction be waived and he be tried as an adult. He further testified as to his authority to sign the above quoted order as follows: Q. Had you signed documents similar to this in other cases? A. Yes. Q. Surrendering or referring jurisdiction over to the criminal court? A. Yes. But let me explain here that this was in compliance with policies that Judge Church had directed me to follow. I never signed one of these forms  if you will notice, that is a form order made out for Clallam County, the Clallam is knocked out and Jefferson is inserted, it is filled in in long hand  any time there was a juvenile situation came up where there was the possibility of waiver of jurisdiction, I always discussed this in person with Judge Church, and I never signed one of those unless it was by his direction I signed it and issued a waiver of jurisdiction. Q. Well, was it at his direction, then, that you signed this? A. At Judge Church's oral direction, right. I wouldn't consider signing one without it.... Q. Did you consider you actually had such authority to issue such an order over your signature before you were Court Commissioner? A. Only by the oral orders of Judge Church, not myself. I didn't have that authority by the fact that I was a probation officer, but Judge Church, I felt, had authority to give me an order, and when he gave me an order I carried it out. On October 3, 1962, the prosecuting attorney (William J. Daly) filed an information charging petitioner with the crime of burglary in the second degree, committed as follows: That on or about the 12th day of September, 1962, in the County of Jefferson, State of Washington, the said defendant, Byrle Laird Dillenburg, with intent to commit some crime therein, did, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously break and enter the dwellinghouse of another, to-wit: the dwellinghouse of one William Ellard, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Washington. Thereafter, the matter of petitioner's plea to this information and the sentence to be imposed was before the superior court six times as shown in the appendix. The crucial question before us is whether a boy 16 years and 2 months old who has been arrested on the charge of having committed a crime may be turned over to the proper officers for trial in the superior court as an adult under the provisions of the criminal code upon an order signed by the chief probation officer at the oral direction of the juvenile court judge. The statutory provisions relating to the constitution and operation of the juvenile court are found in RCW 13.04.030. The powers and duties of probation counselors are set forth in RCW 13.04.040, which provides that they shall make such investigations of the antecedents, character, family history, environments, and cause of the dependency or delinquency of every child brought before the juvenile court as may be required by the court. They are required to make a written report thereof to the juvenile court judge. These counselors are given all the powers conferred on sheriffs and police officers to make arrests for violations of state laws or ordinances relating to the care, custody, and control of delinquent or dependent children. They are given the duty of taking charge of the child before and after trial in such manner as the juvenile court shall direct. After providing for the initiation and conducting of hearings before the juvenile court, RCW 13.04.120 specifically deals with the procedure required after a child under 18 years of age has been arrested for alleged criminal activity. This section provides as follows: When, in any county where a juvenile court is held, a child under the age of eighteen years is taken into custody by a parole, peace, police or probation officer, such child shall be taken directly before such court, or placed in the detention home or place under the jurisdiction of such court, or into the custody of the court probation officer: Provided, That if the parent, guardian, custodian or a responsible relative of the child furnishes the officer a signed statement agreeing to produce the child at the next juvenile court session, the child may be released to the signer of the statement. Any such signer who fails, without just cause shown to the court, to produce such child as agreed, shall be guilty of contempt of court and may be punished accordingly. The court may proceed to hear and dispose of the case in the same manner as if the child had been brought before the court upon petition as hereinbefore provided. In any such case, the court shall require notice to be given and investigation to be made as in other cases under this chapter, and may adjourn the hearing from time to time for such purpose. Pending final disposition of the case the court may make such disposition of the custody of the child as it shall deem for the best welfare of the child. If, upon investigation, it shall appear that a child has been arrested upon the charge of having committed a crime, the court, in its discretion, may order such child to be turned over to the proper officers for trial under the provisions of the criminal code. Nothing in this section shall be construed as forbidding any peace officer, police officer or probation officer from immediately taking into custody, without process, any child who is found violating any law or ordinance, or who is reasonably believed to be a fugitive from his parents or from justice, or whose surroundings are such as to endanger his health, morals or welfare, unless immediate action is taken. In every such case, the officer taking the child into custody shall immediately report the fact to the juvenile court and the case shall then be proceeded with as provided in this chapter: Provided, That whenever a child is arrested for a violation of any law, including municipal ordinances, regulating the operation of vehicles on the public highways, a copy of the traffic citation and a record of the action taken by the juvenile court shall be forwarded by the court to the director of licenses in the same manner as provided in RCW 46.20.280. (Italics ours.) The circumstances under which the order involved in this case was signed by the chief probation officer are stated in his testimony which is quoted above. In the trial court's oral opinion in the present proceeding the court's reasons for upholding the validity of the chief probation officer's order were stated as follows: I think perhaps I will first discuss this transfer of jurisdiction of a juvenile to the Superior Court. It's given me a lot of concern. It is in the file. It has to be determined. Turning first to the section of the statute Mr. Murphy mentioned, it is quite clear in the beginning of this juvenile law, many years ago, it was provided that in counties in which there is no resident judge, the Court Commissioner shall have power and authority concurrent with the Superior Court and the judge thereof to hear all matters, relating to juveniles. Now, this specifically provided that a court commissioner has the right to enter any order or judgment. The court then discussed the statutory powers of a court commissioner. See RCW 13.04.030 and 040. Several months after the signing of the order here in question, the chief probation officer, on November 30, 1962, was appointed as court commissioner. However, his powers and duties in that capacity have no direct bearing on the question to be decided by this court. The oral opinion then continued as follows: I have read RCW 13.04.120 many times, and this morning I thought it was more worry than I feel now, because of the wording of the statute. It says, if upon investigation it shall appear that a child has been arrested upon the charge of having committed a crime the Court in its discretion may order such child to be turned over to the proper officers for trial under the provisions of the criminal code. The question is, does the statute indicate that it is necessary that a court enter a written order in order to direct the prosecution under the criminal code of a child who has committed a crime. I can't think it does. I think the Court in its discretion may so order, orally. Judge Church did, here. At the time of the arraignment he said, I will state this to you and both counsel. Now, that meant you, Mr. Dillenburg, and to both counsel, meaning your counsel and the prosecuting attorney. I thought this was a situation where a juvenile aspect should not be given, because I wanted this boy to be under a stricter and better and more effective and comprehensive probation than could be effected in the juvenile aspect of it. [1] We are not in agreement with the views expressed by the trial court at the habeas corpus hearing. Although there is no doubt that Judge Church, as juvenile court judge, was familiar with petitioner's criminal record as a juvenile offender and orally exercised his discretion, he (1) failed to give petitioner a juvenile court hearing as to whether he should be tried as an adult, and (2) failed to enter an order carrying out the result of his decision. [2] The matter of the trial of a juvenile under 18 years of age as an adult in the superior court on a felony charge is not a case over which that court has original jurisdiction. The superior court as such has no jurisdiction to try such juvenile offender on a felony charge unless and until the conditions precedent prescribed in RCW 13.04.120 (quoted above) have been complied with. The record of this compliance with the statute must appear officially in the record of the superior court which later tries the juvenile offender. An oral or memorandum opinion of a trial court is not a substitute for the final order or judgment. It is no more than the trial court's verbal expression of his informal opinion at that time. It has no final or binding effect unless formally incorporated into a written order signed by the court. See Ferree v. Doric Co., 62 Wn.2d 561, 383 P.2d 900 (1963), and cases cited therein. If the rule is applicable in those civil cases which define a final judgment, it should be equally applicable in the instance of a criminal trial of a juvenile where the superior court's jurisdiction depends on the official order of the juvenile court entered in the record. Until that written order is entered, the superior court has no jurisdiction. A court may give oral orders in certain circumstances in the conduct of a trial over which it has jurisdiction. However, when the object of the order is to surrender jurisdiction and to create jurisdiction of the case in another state court, we are of the opinion that the order must be in writing. This is particularly true since the order must appear in the record of the trial court in order to establish that the trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case. See State v. Hager, 157 Wash. 664, 290 Pac. 230 (1930). Generally speaking, the orders of the juvenile court are reviewable by this court upon petition for a writ of certiorari. Wade v. State, 39 Wn.2d 744, 238 P.2d 914 (1951). Had petitioner sought a review of the order signed by the chief probation officer, we could not have passed on the merits (the issue of whether the trial court had properly exercised discretion) because it was not signed by a juvenile court judge or even by a court commissioner. There was only an oral order. See Fairview Lumber Co. v. Makos, 44 Wn.2d 131, 265 P.2d 837 (1954), and Strickland v. Rainier Golf & Country Club, 156 Wash. 640, 287 Pac. 900 (1930). In State v. Ring, 54 Wn.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461 (1959), the defendant was under 18 years of age when the crime was committed but had reached his 18th birthday prior to the time of trial. We held that the superior court had jurisdiction to try him as an adult, saying, at p. 253: At the time of his arrest, Harold M. Ring was under eighteen years of age. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile department of the Stevens county superior court purported to transfer the case against said minor to the superior court, pursuant to RCW 13.04.120. A second amended information, which included Harold M. Ring, was then filed. The case went to trial on this information, at which time Harold M. Ring was eighteen years of age. It now appears that the copy of the order of the juvenile court, filed in this proceeding, was not properly authenticated; hence, defendant Harold M. Ring now contends that the superior court did not acquire jurisdiction over him. This argument is made for the first time in this court; it was not urged in the trial court. The superior court has original jurisdiction in all criminal cases amounting to felony. Art. IV. § 6, Washington constitution. The juvenile court act recognizes that the superior court has original jurisdiction in all cases coming within the terms of this chapter. RCW 13.04.030. RCW 13.04.120 provides that the juvenile court (really the superior court or a department thereof) may proceed to hear and dispose of the case against a child under eighteen years of age. This may be a bar to proceeding against him in the superior court while he is under eighteen, unless the juvenile court orders such child to be turned over ... for trial under the provisions of the criminal code, but it does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction after he reaches eighteen years of age. Our conclusion that defendant's contention is without merit is dictated by the rationale of State v. Melvin, 144 Wash. 687, 689, 258 Pac. 589 (1927), wherein this court said: We think it follows, therefore, that the law which provides for protection and reformation or punishment within the discretion of the court, in the case of a delinquent minor proceeded against before he arrives at the age of eighteen years, constitutes no bar to a criminal action brought against him, after he becomes eighteen years of age, for an act committed prior to that age. The fact that Harold M. Ring was under eighteen years of age when the second amended information was filed is of no moment. He was eighteen when the case was tried. This conclusion is in accord with the majority rule discussed in the annotation, Age of child at time of alleged offense or delinquency, or at time legal proceedings are commenced, as criterion of jurisdiction of juvenile court, appearing in 123 A.L.R. 446. In the case just cited, the juvenile court order was not properly authenticated. Therefore, if the defendant in that case had not become 18 years of age before he was tried, the inference is that the superior court could not have tried him as an adult. The only authority given by the juvenile court law to anyone to function as a judge is limited by the legislature to court commissioners in certain circumstances. See RCW 13.04.030 and RCW 2.24.040. Under the conditions described therein, the commissioner is vested with concurrent jurisdiction with the superior court judge to perform the functions of a juvenile court judge. If the legislature had intended to authorize probation officers to execute court orders in lieu of, or at the direction of, a juvenile court, it would have so provided by definite language in the act. [3] Furthermore, RCW 13.04.120 entitles the juvenile to a hearing before final disposition of his case can be made by the juvenile court. The investigations provided for in that section are not a substitute for but rather an aid to a hearing. This procedure includes, essentially, proper notice and the right to appear in a hearing before a juvenile court judge. See RCW 13.04.120 (quoted above) and RCW 13.04.070. The fact that the petitioner here had been before the juvenile court several times because of serious offenses and had a bad criminal record does not warrant the court's dispensing with a hearing on the question of whether he should be tried as an adult. The juvenile court judge must, before entering an order, exercise his discretion after affording the juvenile an opportunity to be heard as to whether he should be tried as a juvenile or as an adult. In any such case, the court shall require notice to be given and investigation to be made as in other cases under this chapter, and may adjourn the hearing from time to time for such purpose. The sentence just quoted requires a hearing, as well as an investigation, in all instances before an order is issued making final disposition of the child's custody within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. It seems obvious to us that the Surrender of Jurisdiction signed by the probation officer in this case is such a final disposition in that it purports to divest the juvenile court of jurisdiction and to vest jurisdiction in the superior court. Therefore, a hearing is required. The attorney general in his supplemental brief, in support of the trial court's dismissal of petitioner's petition, cites United States v. Stevenson, 170 F. Supp. 315 (1959), which he contends involves an act of Congress relating to the District of Columbia which is similar to the above-quoted portion of RCW 13.04.120. The district court in that case pointed out that the act of Congress did not require that a quasi-judicial or judicial hearing be conducted by the judge before making the waiver of jurisdiction and that the full investigation can be conducted on an ex parte basis. The recent opinion of the United States Supreme Court (filed March 21, 1966) concerning the District of Columbia statute relating to the juvenile court is a complete answer to the Stevenson case, supra, and the Attorney General's argument that only an investigation is needed. In Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 86 Sup. Ct. 1045 (1966), the juvenile court judge surrendered the jurisdiction of the juvenile court after a full investigation but without holding any hearing. He made no findings and gave no reason for the waiver. Petitioner Kent had a substantial prior juvenile court record. In holding that the juvenile court had denied to petitioner Kent the basic requirements of due process under the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, the United States Supreme Court, in the majority opinion, states: We agree that the order of the Juvenile Court waiving its jurisdiction and transferring petition for trial in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia was invalid. There is no question that the order is reviewable on motion to dismiss the indictment in the District Court, as specified by the Court of Appeals in this case. Kent v. Reid, supra [316 F.2d 331 (D.C. Cir.1963)]. The issue is the standards to be applied upon such review. We agree with the Court of Appeals that the statute contemplates that the Juvenile Court should have considerable latitude within which to determine whether it should retain jurisdiction over a child or  subject to the statutory delimitation  should waive jurisdiction. But this latitude is not complete. At the outset, it assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a full investigation. Green v. United States, 308 F.2d 303 (C.A.D.C.Cir.1962). The statute gives the Juvenile Court a substantial degree of discretion as to the factual considerations to be considered, the weight to be given them and the conclusion to be reached. It does not confer upon the Juvenile Court a license for arbitrary procedure. The statute does not permit the Juvenile Court to determine in isolation and without the participation or any representation of the child the critically important question whether a child will be deprived of the special protections and provisions of the Juvenile Court Act. It does not authorize the Juvenile Court, in total disregard of a motion for hearing filed by counsel, and without any hearing or statement or reasons, to decide  as in this case  that the child will be taken from the Receiving Home for Children and transferred to jail along with adults; and that he will be exposed to the possibility of a death sentence instead of treatment for a maximum, in Kent's case, of five years, until he is 21. We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been transferred; but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony  without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society's special concern for children, as reflected in the District of Columbia's Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. We hold that it does not. (Footnotes omitted) In our opinion, this decision is conclusive of the issue in this case of whether a judicial hearing is required by our statute in order to fulfill the procedural requirements of due process. For the reasons stated herein, we must hold that the purported order entitled Surrender of Jurisdiction (quoted above) was null and void, and hence the superior court, in accepting petitioner's plea of guilty and entering its judgment and sentence, was acting without legal authority. We note that petitioner is now over 18 years of age and may be tried in the superior court as an adult upon the information referred to in the appendix hereto. State v. Melvin, 144 Wash. 687, 258 Pac. 859 (1927); State v. Ring, 54 Wn.2d 250, 339 P.2d 461. Accordingly, the judgment and sentence of the superior court denying petitioner's petition for habeas corpus is reversed with directions to enter an order directing respondent to forthwith transfer petitioner to the county jail of Jefferson County. Petitioner shall be promptly rear-raigned upon the information filed in cause No. C-575, and thereupon be otherwise dealt with according to law. If the state fails to take such action within 20 days after his arrival at the county jail, petitioner shall be released from custody. It is so ordered. ROSELLINI, C.J., WEAVER and HAMILTON, JJ., and BARNETT, J. Pro Tem., concur.