Opinion ID: 805822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Infringement Defense

Text: The Monastery contends the Archbishop violated its exclusive right to display the Works. It specifically directs us to the Archbishop's statement in his Answer, conceding that copies of the Works were available on his website. The Archbishop counters that he may not be held liable for direct copyright infringement because he is not the person who posted the disputed Works on the website. Relying on Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., he argues that only the one who trespasses into [the copyright holder's] exclusive domain constitutes a direct infringer of a copyright; because he himself did not -46- volitionally copy or post the Works to the Website, liability may not attach to him. Sony, 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984). We disagree with the Archbishop's position. As set forth above, the Monastery is the owner of the copyrights at issue. See supra at Part II.A. By virtue of its ownership, it holds certain exclusive rights, including the right to perform or authorize reproduction of the Works, to prepare derivatives of the Works, to distribute copies to the public, or to publicly display the Works. See 17 U.S.C. § 106; see also Cartoon Network LLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 2008) (stating [s]ection 106 of the Copyright Act grants copyright holders a bundle of exclusive rights (quoting Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). An infringer of a copyright is thus [a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by section[] 106. 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). The specific exclusive right at issue here is the Monastery's right to display its Works. We turn to the Copyright Act itself for guidance. Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines copies as material objects . . . in which a work is fixed by any method . . . and from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated . . . . 17 U.S.C. § 101. A work is 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression when its -47- embodiment . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. Id. A display of a work is defined under the Act as show[ing] a copy of [a work], either directly or by means of a film, slide, television image, or any other device or process. 17 U.S.C. § 101. Applying these definitions to the facts, we draw the following conclusions. Here, the Archbishop's verbatim or near-identical versions of the Works constituted a copy under the Copyright Act. The translation images were embodied in a medium (here, the computer server and internet) where they could be perceived by, electronically communicated to, and/or reproduced by those who accessed the server. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. The copies also were embodied or 'fixed' in a tangible medium of expression, as they were loaded on the Archbishop's computer server and posted to his Website. Id.; see Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 129 (to determine whether a work is fixed in a medium, court must examine whether the work is embodied in the medium); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1993) and noting that a computer makes a 'copy' of a software program when it transfers the program from a third party's computer (or other storage device) into its own memory, because the copy of the program recorded in the computer is -48- 'fixed' in a manner that is 'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration' (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101)). The copies likewise satisfy the statute's transitory duration requirement, as they were continuously displayed on the Archbishop's Website. See 17 U.S.C. § 101; see also Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 129-30 (discussing meaning of Copyright Act's transitory duration requirement). Before the Monastery served the Archbishop with the Complaint in January 2008, the St. Isaac Work had been posted on the Website continuously since 2005, and the remaining six Works, since August 2007. Lastly, the Archbishop display[ed] the Works publicly -- that is, he show[ed] a copy of the Works by means of a . . . device or process, 17 U.S.C. § 101 -- when he posted the Works on his website. Although the question of whether a computer has displayed a copyrighted work may be a difficult one in other contexts, see, e.g., Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1160-62, it is beyond question here that the Archbishop has displayed the Works on his website. We need not delineate the outer bounds of the scope of the term display where, as here, the fact that the Works were displayed on the Archbishop's website is undisputed. The Archbishop asks us to overlook the fact that images of the Works were displayed via his computer, and instead, focus on whether he was the specific individual who so electronically placed -49- the images on the Website. He argues that because he himself did not personally engage or participate in any of the volitional display acts that infringed upon the Monastery's exclusive rights, he should not be held liable. The Archbishop's volitional act position is not a novel one; it is an argument that has been raised -- with varying degrees of success -- in our sister circuits. See, e.g., Quantum Sys. Integrators, Inc. v. Sprint, 338 F. App'x 329, 335-36 (4th Cir. 2009); Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131-32; Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App'x 833, 836-37 (3d Cir. 2007); CoStar Grp., Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 549-51 (4th Cir. 2004). We need not determine whether a volitional act must be shown to establish direct copyright infringement because, regardless of such a holding, the Monastery here still prevails. Contrary to the Archbishop's contention that he did not engage in infringing acts, the record makes clear that he performed several acts to ensure that copies of the Works were available on his server and posted to his Website. First, the Archbishop was the registered owner of the domain name, trueorthodoxy.info, i.e., the Website. Second, during deposition testimony the Archbishop admit[ted] he bears responsibility for and has authority over the content that appears on the [w]ebsite. In fact, he expressly stated: Q. Are you familiar with the website trueorthodoxy.info? -50- A. Yes, somewhat. Q. Who owns that website? A. I do.