Opinion ID: 201792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The BIA's Credibility Determination

Text: 26 Tai makes two arguments with respect to the BIA's adverse credibility determination. First, he says, the BIA rested the finding largely on the fact that he failed to obtain records of his wife's abortion and compulsory contraception. This was improper, Tai argues, because (1) he explained at his hearing that he could not obtain those documents because they are greatly restricted by the government, and (2) therefore the BIA's adverse credibility determination was based on unfair expectations of the evidence he could produce. Tai's argument fails because his premise is incorrect: the BIA relied for its adverse credibility finding not on the lack of corroboration but on the fact that Tai did not mention contraception or abortion in his initial interview. 2 27 Second, Tai argues that the BIA erred in relying on his failure initially to mention his wife's abortion because adverse credibility findings must be based on discrepancies that involved the heart of the asylum claim. Bojorques-Villanueva v. INS, 194 F.3d 14, 16 (1st Cir.1999). He says the BIA's finding here violated that command because it was based on trivia. 28 Tai's reliance on Bojorques-Villanueva is misplaced. The discrepancy relied upon by the BIA quite clearly went to the heart of Tai's claim: it is difficult to imagine what could be more central to a claim of asylum than the question of whether the events on which it was based ever happened. And while one could draw other inferences besides untruthfulness from Tai's failure initially to mention his wife's abortion — one could surmise, for example, that he did not think it relevant or was embarrassed to discuss it — the evidence certainly does not compel those inferences. See Bocova, 412 F.3d at 262. The BIA's adverse credibility finding therefore survives substantial evidence review. 3