Opinion ID: 2833026
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pleading Standards for Discrimination Claims

Text: We turn to the question of what a plaintiff must plead in an employment discrimination case to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
In Littlejohn, we held that at the pleadings stage of an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff has a ʺminimal burdenʺ of alleging facts ʺsuggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.ʺ 2015 WL 4604250, at . While we made clear that Iqbal applies to employment discrimination cases, we also clarified that Iqbalʹs plausibility requirement ʺdoes not affect the benefit to plaintiffs pronounced in the McDonnell Douglas quartet.ʺ Id. We ruled nonetheless that the facts alleged in the complaint must provide ʺat least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.ʺ Id. at . The question remains what a plaintiff must allege to meet this minimal burden. The starting point is the statute. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675 (ʺ[W]e begin by taking note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim . . . .ʺ). upon which relief could be granted. See, e.g., Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007). ‐ 25 ‐ Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer ʺto fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individualʹs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.ʺ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(a)(1). Title VII thus requires a plaintiff asserting a discrimination claim to allege two elements: (1) the employer discriminated against him (2) because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. As to the first element, an employer discriminates against a plaintiff by taking an adverse employment action against him. ʺA plaintiff sustains an adverse employment action if he or she endures a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment.ʺ Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 202 F.3d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). ʺAn adverse employment action is one which is more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.ʺ Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). ʺExamples of materially adverse changes include termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices unique to a ‐ 26 ‐ particular situation.ʺ Id. (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that the assignment of ʺa disproportionately heavy workloadʺ can constitute an adverse employment action. Feingold, 366 F.3d at 152‐53. As to the second element, an action is ʺbecause ofʺ a plaintiffʹs race, color, religion, sex, or national origin where it was a ʺsubstantialʺ or ʺmotivatingʺ factor contributing to the employerʹs decision to take the action. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 249 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded on other grounds by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102‐166, 105 Stat. 1071; Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (ʺ[A] plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that ʹrace, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice.ʹʺ (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(m)). While the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff alleging age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act must allege ʺthat age was the ʹbut‐forʹ cause of the employerʹs adverse action,ʺ Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009), the ʺmotivating factorʺ standard still applies to discrimination claims based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, see Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 498 n.2 (2d Cir. 2009) (ʺTitle VII, ‐ 27 ‐ on the other hand, does authorize a ʹmixed motiveʹ discrimination claim.ʺ). Hence, a plaintiff in a Title VII case need not allege ʺbut‐forʺ causation. Under Iqbal and Twombly, then, in an employment discrimination case, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against him and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision. The question remains as to what ʺplausibilityʺ means in the context of employment discrimination claims. Several considerations guide the inquiry. First, as the Supreme Court explained in Iqbal, a plaintiff must plead ʺfactual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.ʺ 556 U.S. at 678. While ʺdetailed factual allegationsʺ are not required, ʺa formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.ʺ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. At the same time, the court must assume the factual allegations in the complaint to be true, ʺeven if [they are] doubtful in fact,ʺ id., and a complaint may not be dismissed ʺbased on a judgeʹs disbelief of a complaintʹs factual allegations,ʺ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (ʺWhen there are well‐pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity . . . .ʺ). ‐ 28 ‐ Second, in making the plausibility determination, the court is to ʺdraw on its judicial experience and common sense.ʺ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Of course, the court must proceed at all times in a fair and deliberative fashion, alert to any unconscious bias that could affect decisionmaking.9 In making the plausibility determination, the court must be mindful of the ʺelusiveʺ nature of intentional discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255 n.8. As we have recognized, ʺclever men may easily conceal their motivations.ʺ Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because discrimination claims implicate an employerʹs usually unstated intent and state of mind, see Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985), rarely is there ʺdirect, smoking gun, evidence of discrimination,ʺ Richards v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 668 F. Supp. 259, 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), affʹd, 842 F.2d 1288 (2d Cir. 1988). Instead, plaintiffs usually must rely on ʺbits and piecesʺ of information to support an inference of discrimination, i.e., a ʺmosaicʺ of intentional discrimination. Gallagher v. Delaney, 139 F.3d 338, 342 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated in part on other grounds by Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1988). Again, as we made clear in Littlejohn, at the initial stage of a litigation, the 9 In the case at hand, we do not question the district courtʹs fairness in approaching its work. ‐ 29 ‐ plaintiffʹs burden is ʺminimalʺ ‐‐ he need only plausibly allege facts that provide ʺat least minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory intent.ʺ 2015 WL 4604250, at . Finally, courts must remember that ʺ[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a ʹprobability requirement.ʹʺ Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; accord Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (ʺAsking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage . . . .ʺ); Littlejohn, 2015 WL 4604250, at . On a motion to dismiss, the question is not whether a plaintiff is likely to prevail, but whether the well‐pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., whether plaintiffs allege enough to ʺnudge[] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.ʺ Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678‐80. Accordingly, to defeat a motion to dismiss or a motion for judgment on the pleadings in a Title VII discrimination case, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse action against him, and (2) his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision. As we have long recognized, the ʺʹultimate issueʹ in an employment discrimination case is whether the plaintiff has met her burden of proving that ‐ 30 ‐ the adverse employment decision was motivated at least in part by an ʹimpermissible reason,ʹ i.e., a discriminatory reason.ʺ Stratton v. Depʹt for the Aging for City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 869, 878 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fields v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Retardation & Developmental Disabilities, 115 F.3d 116, 119 (2d Cir. 1997)). A plaintiff can meet that burden through direct evidence of intent to discriminate, see, e.g., Stratton, 132 F.3d at 878 & n.4, or by indirectly showing circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, see, e.g., Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 436‐37 (2d Cir. 2015). A plaintiff may prove discrimination indirectly either by meeting the requirements of McDonnell Douglas and showing that the employerʹs stated reason for its employment action was pretext to cover‐ up discrimination, see, e.g., Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1334 (2d Cir. 1997) (en banc), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1075 (1998), or by otherwise creating a ʺmosaicʺ of intentional discrimination by identifying ʺbits and pieces of evidenceʺ that together give rise to an inference of discrimination, Gallagher, 139 F.3d at 342. At the pleadings stage, then, a plaintiff must allege that the employer took adverse action against her at least in part for a discriminatory reason, and she may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination. See ‐ 31 ‐ Littlejohn, 2015 WL 4604250, at  (requiring facts ʺsuggesting an inference of discriminatory motivationʺ).
The Fourteenth Amendment provides public employees with the right to be ʺfree from discrimination.ʺ Demoret v. Zegarelli, 451 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2006). Consequently, public employees aggrieved by discrimination in the terms of their employment may bring suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against any responsible persons acting under color of state law. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 122‐23 (2d Cir. 2004). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two elements: (1) ʺthe violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States,ʺ and (2) ʺthe alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.ʺ Feingold, 366 F.3d at 159 (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). A state employee acting in his official capacity is acting ʺunder color of state law.ʺ Id. Once the color of law requirement is met, a plaintiffʹs ʺequal protection claim parallels his Title VII claim,ʺ except that a § 1983 claim, unlike a Title VII claim, can be brought against an individual. Id. Thus, for a § 1983 ‐ 32 ‐ discrimination claim to survive a motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plausibly allege a claim under the same standards applicable to a Title VII claim ‐‐ and that the adverse action was taken by someone acting ʺunder color of state law.ʺ