Opinion ID: 1984499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: statutory modifications to maximum sentence

Text: The crimes with which the jury convicted Appellants occurred on June 15, 1998. On July 15, 1998, a number of changes to the Kentucky Penal Code became effective, including changes to the sentencing ranges in felony cases. Lawson asserts that two of these changes are relevant to the judgment imposed by the Laurel Circuit Court: (1) although life imprisonment remains a possible sentence for any Class A felony or a Class B felony enhanced by first degree PFO status, the maximum indeterminate term of imprisonment to which a trial court may sentence a defendant for such an offense is fifty years; [38] and (2) trial courts may not aggregate multiple sentences of imprisonment for indeterminate terms for longer than a total of seventy (70) years. [39] The trial court instructed the jury and entered final judgment under the old statutory provisions which provided no limit on the term of years a defendant might receive in connection with a Class B felony enhanced by first degree PFO and made life imprisonment the only limit to which trial courts could aggregate multiple indeterminate prison sentences for offenses of this degree. Lawson received a term of sixty (60) years for his PFO-enhanced second degree arson conviction and a total sentence of eighty (80) years. Lawson alleges that the trial court lacked the jurisdiction to enter judgment sentencing him outside the statutory limits in place at the time of trial. We recently addressed a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Phon, [40] and held that KRS 446.110 governs the retrospective application of legislative amendments to punishment provisions of the Kentucky Penal Code. [41] KRS 446.110 reads: No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law as to any offense committed against a former law, nor as to any act done, or penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising under the former law, or in any way whatever to affect such offense or act so committed or done, or any penalty, forfeiture or punishment so incurred, or any right accrued or claim arising before the new law takes effect, except that the proceedings thereafter shall conform, so far as practicable, to the laws in force at the time of such proceedings. If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment is mitigated by any provision of the new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect. [42] At common law, when the legislature modified or repealed a statute, the courts no longer had the authority to enter any judgment relying upon the prior law. [43] KRS 446.110 modifies this common law rule so that, unless the General Assembly specifically designates otherwise, offenses committed against the statute before its repeal, may thereafter be prosecuted, and the penalties incurred may be enforced.  [44] Unquestionably, therefore, the trial court had jurisdiction to sentence Lawson under the pre-amendment provisions of KRS Chapter 532. This Court and its predecessor have consistently interpreted KRS 446.110 to require courts to sentence a defendant in accordance with the law which existed at the time of the commission of the offense unless the defendant specifically consents to the application of a new law which is certainly or definitely mitigating. [45] As Lawson did not raise any issue in the trial court concerning the new provisions of KRS Chapter 532, he certainly did not consent to the application of the modified provisions. Without reaching the issue of whether those statutory modifications definitely mitigate the existing penalty ranges, we hold that, under the law at the time of the commission of these offenses, the trial court did not err either in the manner in which it instructed the jury regarding the penalty range or in its final judgment imposing sentence. For the above reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court in each of these cases. All concur.