Opinion ID: 3002179
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Wheeler’s Unlawful Arrest Claim

Text: Probable cause is an absolute defense to a claim of wrongful arrest asserted under section 1983 against police officers. Wagner v. Wash. County, 493 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997). A police officer has probable cause to arrest “if, at the time of the arrest, the ‘facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the 10 No. 07-1791 suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’ ” Wagner, 493 F.3d at 836 (quoting Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979)) (alteration in original); see also Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90 (1964); Maxwell v. City of Indianapolis, 998 F.2d 431, 434 (7th Cir. 1993). Probable cause, therefore, “does not require evidence sufficient to support a conviction, nor even evidence demonstrating that it is more likely than not that the suspect committed a crime.” United States v. Sawyer, 224 F.3d 675, 679 (7th Cir. 2000) (explaining that there must be a “probability or substantial chance of criminal activity on the suspect’s part”). In determining whether an officer had probable cause, the court steps into the shoes of a reasonable person in the position of the officer. Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2006). Consequently, we “evaluate[] probable cause ‘not on the facts as an omniscient observer would perceive them,’ but rathe r ‘as they would have appeared to a reasonable person in the position of the arresting officer.’ ” Id. (quoting Kelley v. Myler, 149 F.3d 641, 646 (7th Cir. 2000)). The probable cause determination must be made by a jury “if there is room for a difference of opinion concerning the facts or the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them.” Maxwell, 998 F.2d at 434 (explaining that, “[i]f the underlying facts supporting the probable cause determination are not in dispute, the court can decide whether probable cause exists”). Detective Lawson submits that he had probable cause to arrest Ms. Wheeler for maintaining a common nuisance. The Indiana Code defines the offense of “maintaining a common nuisance” as follows: No. 07-1791 11 A person who knowingly or intentionally maintains a building, structure, vehicle, or other place that is used one (1) or more times: (1) by persons to unlawfully use controlled sub- stances; or (2) for unlawfully: (A) manufacturing; (B) keeping; (C) offering for sale; (D) selling; (E) delivering; or (F) financing the delivery of; controlled substances, or items of drug paraphernalia as described in IC 35-48-4-8.5; commits maintaining a common nuisance, a Class D felony. Ind. Code § 35-48-4-13(b). The knowledge element of this crime may be established by showing that the defendant had constructive possession of the drugs and other contraband. Bradley v. State, 765 N.E.2d 204, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002); see also Jones v. State, 807 N.E.2d 58, 65 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). To establish constructive possession, the defendant must have had (1) the intent to maintain dominion and control over the drugs and (2) the capability to maintain dominion and control over the drugs. Jones, 807 N.E.2d at 65; Chandler v. State, 816 N.E.2d 464, 467-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). Indiana courts have defined “control” as “the 12 No. 07-1791 power, by way of legal authority, or in a practical sense, to control the place where, or the items in which, the substance is found.” Jones, 807 N.E.2d at 65 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prove the intent element, the Indiana courts have held that the State must demonstrate the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband. This knowledge may be inferred from either the exclusive dominion and control over the premises containing the contraband or, if the control is non-exclusive, evidence of additional circumstances pointing to the defendant’s knowledge of the presence of the contraband. Id. (citation omitted). Under Indiana law, therefore, when possession is non-exclusive, constructive possession may be proved with the assistance of additional circumstances corroborating the defendant’s knowledge of the contraband. These additional circumstances include: (1) incriminating statements given by the defendant; (2) attempted flight or furtive gestures; (3) a drug manufacturing setting; (4) proximity of the defendant to the contraband; (5) contraband in plain view; and (6) location of the contraband in close proximity to items owned by the defendant.7 Id.; see also Bradley, 765 N.E.2d at 212. 7 Both parties contend (and the district court assumed) that the crime of maintaining a common nuisance requires the State to prove a continuous or recurring violation. As support for this proposition, the parties rely on Wells v. State, a 1976 case that interpreted the term “maintaining” to require a “showing of (continued...) No. 07-1791 13 These circumstances are probative and corroborative of actual knowledge because their presence increases the likelihood that the defendant observed or was aware of the contraband. Concomitantly, the presence of these corroborating circumstances decreases the likelihood that the concept of constructive knowledge will be stretched so broadly that it will ensnare innocent bystanders. See Godar v. State, 643 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“Mere presence where drugs are located or association with persons who possess drugs is not alone sufficient to support a finding of constructive possession.”); Snyder v. State, 460 N.E.2d 522, 525 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (recogniz- 7 (...continued) more than an isolated or casual instance of the prohibited activity.” 351 N.E.2d 43, 46 (Ind. Ct. App. 1976). After Wells, Indiana courts continued to require such a showing. See, e.g., Bryant v. State, 660 N.E.2d 290, 302 (Ind. 1995). In 1998, however, the Indiana General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 35-48-4- 13(b) to add the phrase “one (1) or more times.” 1998 Legis. Serv. P.L. 31-1998. Compare Ind. Code § 35-48-4-13(b) (2008), with Ind. Code § 35-48-4-13(b) (1997). As a result, the statute currently states: “A person who knowingly or intentionally maintains a building, structure, vehicle, or other place that is used one (1) or more times.” Ind. Code § 35-48-4-13(b). This amendment abrogates the holding of Wells, which required proof of more than an “isolated or casual instance of the prohibited activity.” Wells, 351 N.E.2d at 46. Indeed, the Indiana Court of Appeals took notice of this amendment in Hale v. State, 785 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). The crime of maintaining a common nuisance, accordingly, no longer requires a showing of more than an isolated or casual instance of the prohibited activity. 14 No. 07-1791 ing the importance of “link[ing] the accused with the substance in question”); Watt v. State, 412 N.E.2d 90, 98 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (“[M]ere presence in the place [where the contraband is found] is not sufficient proof of intent to possess the substance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. DiNovo, 523 F.2d 197, 201 (7th Cir. 1975). The Indiana courts have recognized the doctrine’s breadth, and, at least in the sufficiency of the evidence context, they have exercised vigilance to maintain the doctrine within its proper and intended scope. See, e.g., Chandler, 816 N.E.2d at 468 (reversing a jury verdict because “the contraband was found in an undisclosed location in a middle bedroom and in the living room” and “not close to or intermingled with items” that the defendant owned); Smith v. State, 787 N.E.2d 458, 461 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (overturning a jury verdict because there was an absence of evidence that the defendant was in close “proximity to the contraband” or that the contraband was found in the defendant’s “plain view”). With these principles in mind, we turn to the parties’ submissions. Detective Lawson asserts that two of the additional circumstances corroborating a defendant’s knowledge—“a drug manufacturing setting” and “contraband [] in close proximity to items owned by the defendant”—are present in this case. He contends that Ms. Wheeler visited the garage on a weekly basis and that the contraband in the garage was found within close proximity to items belonging to her. The Detective further explains that numerous items used to manufacture methamphetamine and methamphetamine itself were found inside the garage, inNo. 07-1791 15 dicating that her personal items were in a drug manufacturing setting. These circumstances, according to the Detective, along with the security camera that was focused on the entrance of the garage, were sufficient to give him probable cause to arrest Ms. Wheeler for maintaining a common nuisance. We believe that, under the particular facts of this case, these additional circumstances did not create probable cause to believe that Ms. Wheeler knowingly or intentionally had maintained a common nuisance. As a preliminary matter, we must observe that the record suggests that the investigation about Ms. Wheeler’s conduct was undertaken in a rather nonchalant manner. Aside from short discussions with her immediately before and immediately after the fire was extinguished, Detective Lawson did not interview Ms. Wheeler about the fire or about the methamphetamine and methamphetamine-related items found inside the garage. During these two brief conversations, Detective Lawson learned only that Ms. Wheeler did not know the cause of the fire, that she was not aware that Rusty Dillard had been inside the garage and that she was not aware of any methamphetamine production taking place on her property. Detective Lawson did not ask Ms. Wheeler whether she had any personal items in the garage, and he did not question her about the frequency with which she used the garage. Detective Lawson also spoke only briefly with Darren Wheeler on the night of the incident, and neither the Detective nor any other officer conducted any follow-up interviews with him, despite his obvious and more prominent use of the garage. Even more notable is Detective Lawson’s failure to interview 16 No. 07-1791 Mark Dillard, who was the last individual to see Rusty Dillard alive inside the garage. These considerations are particularly relevant because, as we have noted, the probable cause inquiry turns on the evidence and circumstances known to the officer at the time of arrest. “Any evidence . . . that came to light after the arrest,” we have explained, “is not relevant to the probable cause inquiry.” Maltby v. Winston, 36 F.3d 548, 557 (7th Cir. 1994). Before the district court and on appeal, Detective Lawson asserts that Ms. Wheeler stored numerous personal items, including bicycles, a lawnmower, patio equipment and clothing, inside the garage and that she used the garage about once a week. In support of this factual assertion, however, Detective Lawson relies only upon Ms. Wheeler’s deposition that was taken for purposes of this case. Critically, nothing in Detective Lawson’s deposition or in the reports that were created in the course of the investigation indicates that, at the time that he arrested Ms. Wheeler, he knew that she kept personal items in the garage or that she used the garage once a week. This absence of evidence thus eliminates one of the corroborating circumstances upon which Detective Lawson relies. The second corroborating factor to which Detective Lawson points is that there was evidence of a drug manufacturing setting. A drug manufacturing setting, however, is probative and corroborative of a defendant’s knowledge of contraband only to the extent that the No. 07-1791 17 defendant had been around the manufacturing setting.8 Detective Lawson, as we already have noted, had no evidence regarding Ms. Wheeler’s use of the garage and no evidence from which he could infer reasonably that Ms. Wheeler had entered the garage recently. In any event, even if there had been such evidence, we believe that this factor alone would have been insufficient to give Detective Lawson probable cause to arrest Ms. Wheeler. Although the property on which the contraband was found was owned jointly, Detective Lawson knew that Ms. Wheeler and her husband were living apart at the time that the fire occurred. From his discussion with Darren, Detective Lawson also knew that the contraband in the garage was found after Ms. Wheeler’s husband had spent the entire day in the garage with Mark Dillard. At no point in the day did Ms. Wheeler enter the garage, and, as far as she was aware, the men were performing work on Mark Dillard’s van. Both Ms. Wheeler and Darren told Detective Lawson that Ms. Wheeler was unaware that Rusty Dillard had arrived at the garage that evening and had remained inside after Darren and Mark Dillard left. Only after the explosion, when Ms. Wheeler called her 8 See, e.g., Floyd v. State, 791 N.E.2d 206, 210-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that “the officers found many of the items commonly used in manufacturing methamphetamine scattered around the kitchen and living room in plain view”); Jones, 807 N.E.2d at 65 (noting that authorities found digital scales, plastic baggies, ties and over forty-three grams of crack cocaine and that many of these items were found in multiple rooms of the house). 18 No. 07-1791 husband and Mark to inform them of the fire, did she learn that Rusty Dillard had been in the garage. All of the methamphetamine-related items found in the garage, moreover, are common items that would not raise a layperson’s suspicion about drug production. The presence of these items might have appeared particularly commonplace because Ms. Wheeler’s husband performed mechanical work on the side to supplement his carpentry job. With respect to the other items stored in the garage, there is no indication that, on days prior to the time of the fire, they were used in the manufacturing of methamphetamine. Although Detective Lawson found propane tanks and starter fluid, he also found a grill and a go-cart. Notably, there is no suggestion in the record that Detective Lawson knew that, prior to April 6, these common items had been kept together or arranged in a manner resembling a methamphetamine manufacturing setting. The record contains no evidence that, on the days prior to the fire when Ms. Wheeler may have visited the garage, the items had been kept in such a manner. In any event, nothing indicated to Detective Lawson that Ms. Wheeler had entered the garage while those items were so arranged. More fundamentally, the record does not indicate how long these items had been in the garage. Although a clear bag containing methamphetamine was found near Rusty Dillard’s body, Detective Lawson did not find anything indicating that this methamphetamine had been there prior to Rusty’s arrival that evening. Indeed, the record supports an inference to the contrary—namely, that Rusty Dillard had produced the methamphetamine No. 07-1791 19 himself that night. The pick-up truck that Rusty drove contained starter fluid, and laboratory testing further revealed that, at the time of his death, Rusty had methamphetamine in his system. Finally, Detective Lawson attached great significance to the security camera that had been installed on the garage. The presence of the security camera, standing alone, however, was insufficient to provide probable cause to arrest Ms. Wheeler for maintaining a common nuisance. The garage contained many valuable items, including a go-cart and a grill, and, therefore, the presence of the security camera does not corroborate the notion that Ms. Wheeler knew that Rusty Dillard or anyone else had been manufacturing methamphetamine inside the garage. There is no suggestion in the record, nor does Detective Lawson contend, that the other factors that are corroborative of knowledge were present here. Ms. Wheeler called 911 immediately after she was awakened by the explosion, and she did not make any incriminating statements; nor does Detective Lawson indicate that there was anything suspicious about Ms. Wheeler’s answers to his questioning at the crime scene. In short, Detective Lawson did not have any evidence tying Ms. Wheeler to the methamphetamine production other than her familial bond (cousin) to the individual, Rusty Dillard, who was involved in that illicit activity, and the fact that she resided on the property. There is no evidence in the record that Detective Lawson knew, at the time that he arrested Ms. Wheeler, that she either used the garage with any frequency or that she 20 No. 07-1791 had personal items stored in the garage. Furthermore, Detective Lawson could not infer reasonably that the methamphetamine-related items had been arranged in a manner resembling a methamphetamine manufacturing setting prior to the date of the fire. Consequently, we conclude that, as a matter of law, Detective Lawson did not have probable cause to arrest Ms. Wheeler.9 We shall now turn to the issue of qualified immunity.