Opinion ID: 3062972
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Eighth Amendment Medical Treatment Claim

Text: Deliberate indifference to an inmate’s serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104, 97 S. Ct. 285, 291 (1976). However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment will state an Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at 105, 97 S. Ct. at 291. To state a claim of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must allege both an objectively serious medical need and the subjective intent of deliberate indifference. Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1351 (11th Cir. 2004). We agree with the district court that Smith’s alleged broken pelvis is an objectively serious medical need. 5 We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and take the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1997). 9 Thus, the issue on appeal is whether Smith sufficiently alleged the subjective component of deliberate indifference. “To establish the second element, deliberate indifference to the serious medical need, the prisoner must prove three facts: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; and (3) by conduct that is more than mere negligence.” Id. “[A] simple difference in medical opinion between the prison’s medical staff and the inmate” regarding the course of treatment does not state an Eighth Amendment claim. Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir. 1991). Thus, “whether governmental actors should have employed additional diagnostic techniques or forms of treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment and therefore not an appropriate basis for grounding liability under the Eighth Amendment.” Adams v. Poag, 61 F.3d 1537, 1545 (11th Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted). Here, Smith’s complaint alleges at most medical malpractice and not deliberate indifference. Smith’s own allegations establish that his broken pelvis could not be treated orthopedically, that Smith needed to remain in bed for five to seven days, that Smith received at least twelve days of bed rest in the infirmary and two additional days during which he began walking with a walker, that at the time of his discharge he could walk, albeit painfully, with the walker for up to 150 feet. Smith asserts that Nurse Wade should have taken additional X-rays. However, 10 Smith’s claim rests on his difference of opinion with the prison medical staff over the course of his treatment, which does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation.6 And, because Nurse Wade’s decision to discharge Smith after fourteen days in the infirmary does not constitute deliberate indifference to Smith’s medical needs, the alleged actions of Sergeant Murphy and Major Sheffield in enforcing that decision also do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S. Ct. at 291 (explaining that allegations that prison guards intentionally denied or delayed access to medical care or interfered with treatment once prescribed states an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim). The district court properly dismissed Smith’s Eighth Amendment claim.