Opinion ID: 513484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Court's Admission of Evidence.

Text: 24 Kinslow contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence that he raped Mrs. Blades in the family's home because the prejudicial impact of this evidence outweighed its probative value. In addition, Kinslow contends that the court erred in allowing the government to question him on cross-examination regarding his prior record. 25
26 Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that a district court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Fed.R.Evid. 403. The district judge is given wide latitude in determining the admissibility of evidence under this standard. See United States v. Layton, 767 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir.1985). In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the evidence of Kinslow's sexual assault upon Mrs. Blades to be admitted at trial. 27 The evidence regarding Kinslow's assault upon Mrs. Blades was probative of material matters in this case. It served to establish Kinslow's need to exercise power over the females in the Blades family and it provided evidence of Kinslow's orientation and intent under count six. See United States v. Sangrey, 586 F.2d 1312, 1315 (9th Cir.1978) (testimony that defendant raped another girl immediately before committing the charged rape admissible to show intent). 28 We do not find this evidence to have been so unfairly prejudicial that, despite its probative value, its admission was reversible error. It appears from this record as a whole and from Kinslow's motion in limine that the district judge adequately weighed the probative value and prejudicial effect of this evidence. See Sangrey, 586 F.2d at 1315 (court need not make explicit statement of balancing process where defense counsel argued the issue of prejudice in a motion in limine and court rejected it). The judge's decision to admit the evidence was within his broad discretion. 29
30 Kinslow contends that the government should not have been permitted to cross-examine him regarding his 1978 murder convictions, a past escape from a Wyoming jail, and a prior conviction for armed robbery. The testimony regarding the 1978 murder convictions was introduced by Kinslow on direct examination and was plainly reflected in the indictment. Moreover, the jury received a limiting instruction on the use of this evidence. Thus, the admission of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. 31 The questions relating to Kinslow's escape from a Wyoming jail were permissible to rebut Kinslow's testimony on direct examination that he was not a desperate man out to do any harm. Finally, the evidence of Kinslow's prior robbery conviction was proper impeachment under Federal Rule of Evidence 609, which authorizes impeachment by convictions involving dishonesty or false statement. Fed.R.Evid. 609. We have held that armed robbery is a crime that involves dishonesty and is thus always relevant to the question of a defendant's credibility. United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926, 99 S.Ct. 310, 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the government to cross-examine Kinslow on his prior conviction for robbery.