Opinion ID: 4521976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appointment Pay Discrimination Claims

Text: The district court did not err in dismissing Reddy’s and Sellman’s EPA and Title VII claims that DOE illegally appointed them at lower salaries based on their sex. Reddy and Sellman failed to present affirmative evidence that DOE’s explanation for the pay differences was pretext. The EPA prohibits employers from discriminating between employees on the basis of sex in the payment of wages. 29 U.S.C. § 206(1). We apply a burden-shifting framework to analyze sex discrimination claims brought pursuant 13 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 14 of 23 to the EPA. Mulhall v. Advance Sec., Inc., 19 F.3d 586, 590 (11th Cir. 1994). Under this framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing “that the employer paid employees of opposite genders different wages for equal work for jobs [requiring] ‘equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under similar working conditions.’” Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1077–78 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1995)). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the pay discrepancy is based on one of the four affirmative defenses provided for in the EPA: “(i) a seniority system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other factor other than sex.” 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); Irby, 44 F.3d at 954. “The burden is a ‘heavy one’ because the ‘[employer] must show that the factor of sex provided no basis for the wage differential.’” Id. at 954 (emphasis in original) (quoting Mulhall, 19 F.3d at 590); see also Bowen, 882 F.3d at 1362. “While an employer may not overcome the burden of proof on the affirmative defense of relying on ‘any other factor other than sex’ by resting on prior pay alone, . . . there is no prohibition on utilizing prior pay as part of a mixed-motive, such as prior pay and more experience.” Irby, 44 F.3d, at 955. 14 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 15 of 23 The plaintiff may then rebut the explanation with evidence showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is “pretextual or offered as a post-event justification for a gender-based differential.” Id. at 954. To establish pretext, the plaintiff “must produce evidence which directly establishes discrimination, or which permits a jury to reasonably disbelieve the employer’s proffered reason.” Steger, 318 F.3d at 1079; Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1472 (holding that, in the ADEA context, where employee “present[s] insufficient evidence that the nondiscriminatory reason is unworthy of credence or that [discrimination] more likely than not was a motivating factor, the jury’s verdict [finding pretext] cannot stand”). An employee cannot establish pretext “by simply quarreling with the wisdom” of the defendant’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason. Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1314 (11th Cir. 2018) (summary judgment was appropriate where employee merely “quarreled with the wisdom of [her employer’s] reasons, [but] failed to point to any affirmative evidence establishing that his proffered reasons were false or a pretext for unlawful sex discrimination”). If the plaintiff fails to produce such evidence, the district court does not err in granting summary judgment in favor of the employer. Steger, 318 F.3d at 1078–79. 15 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 16 of 23 Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). When the plaintiff bases a Title VII claim on circumstantial evidence, we review the claim under the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Miranda v. B&B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1992). Similar to an EPA claim, the plaintiff bringing a Title VII claim must first establish a prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1528. To do that, the plaintiff must show that she was a qualified member of a protected class and subjected to an adverse employment action in contrast to similarly situated employees outside the protected class. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1264 (11th Cir. 2010). And with the prima facie case established, just as with an EPA claim, “[t]he burden then shifts to the [employer] to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for [its actions].” Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1528. Moreover, the affirmative defenses of the EPA have been incorporated into Title VII. Cty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 176 (1981); Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1528. Finally, where the employer meets its burden, “the plaintiff must then 16 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 17 of 23 prove that the legitimate reason offered was a mere pretext for an illegal motive.” Miranda, 975 F.2d at 1528; see also Jackson v. Ala. State Tenure Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that, in the Title VII context, in order to withstand summary judgment on the issue of pretext, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that the proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision”) (quotations omitted). The plaintiff “may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.” Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); see also Jackson¸405 F.3d at 1276. Here, assuming as the district court did that Reddy and Sellman established a prima facie case of sex-based wage discrimination, the district court did not err in dismissing their EPA appointment pay discrimination claims because they did not present affirmative evidence that DOE’s explanation for the initial pay differences was pretextual. See Irby, 44 F.3d at 954. DOE asserted, and the district court found, that Sims was appointed at a higher initial salary than Reddy and Sellman because he: (1) had worked for DDS for nearly 14 years as a contract physician, (2) possessed current clinical experience, (3) held a higher, substantiated, current annual income than Reddy and Sims, and (4) specialized in a field that was hard to recruit and retain (psychiatry). 17 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 18 of 23 On appeal, Reddy and Sellman do not address the first three factors.10 Rather, they take aim only at the last factor: DOE’s difficulty in recruiting psychiatrists. Specifically, they assert that DOE’s explanation that psychiatrists such as Sims were difficult to recruit and retain is pretextual because: (1) DOE never recruited or posted an advertisement for a full-time psychiatrist DDP position; (2) Sims was one of four qualified applicants for the posted general DDP position; (3) DOE did not recruit Sims for the job when he was a part-time contractor; and (4) Sims did not negotiate his initial salary. When considered with other relevant facts, these assertions could not lead a reasonable juror to conclude that DOE’s justification is “unworthy of credence.” Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256 (Title VII); Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1312 (EPA). To begin, DOE’s employees’ testimony supports its explanation. Both Methvin and Ippolito (the current and former DDS Directors) testified that they had difficulty recruiting and retaining psychiatrists. And Methvin testified that, in 10 We note that in order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must produce “sufficient evidence to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of fact as to the truth of each of the employer’s proffered reasons for its challenged action.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1529 (11th Cir. 1997) (Title VII); see also Irby, 44 F.3d at 954−57 (EPA). But, before this Court, Reddy and Sellman have only attempted to rebut one of DOE’s four proffered explanations. They have therefore abandoned any arguments pertaining to the other three. See Marek v. Singletary, 62 F.3d 1295, 1298 n. 2 (11th Cir.1995) (“Issues not clearly raised in the briefs are considered abandoned.”). Thus, even assuming arguendo that the evidence supported their objections to that one explanation, we would still affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment. 18 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 19 of 23 comparison to Sims, DDS had no difficulty recruiting DDPs with Reddy’s and Sellman’s specialties. Moreover, the record undercuts the select facts Reddy and Sellman rely on to discredit this testimony. As for their claim that DOE never actively recruited or posted job advertisements for a psychiatrist, in fact, DOE could not post a job announcement for a psychiatrist DDP position because only SPD posts job announcements. Even then, SPD only posts for positions with defined Merit System classifications. There is no specific Merit System classification for DDPs who specialize in psychiatry—only DDPs, generally. Along those lines, although Reddy and Sellman correctly point out that Sims was one of four applicants for a general DDP position, they have not shown whether he was the only psychiatrist that applied for that position. Further, Ippolito believed Sims is the only psychiatrist DDS has ever employed full-time in a merit position. And the numbers reveal that DDS is not inundated with contract part-time psychiatrists: of the 61 DDS physician consultants, only seven (approximately twelve percent) are psychiatrists. Nor do DDS’s lack of recruiting efforts or Sims’s acceptance of his salary offer without negotiation create an inference that DDP could easily recruit qualified psychiatrists. Methvin testified that he does very little in the way of recruiting besides placing ads for consultants, receiving “calls of interest,” and, 19 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 20 of 23 from time to time, asking consultants whether they know of anyone who might be interested in a position. Instead of formal recruiting, SPD posts the DDP position, reviews the applicants, and provides DOE with a list of the top contenders. Reddy and Sellman have not shown that DDS even has the authority to recruit DDPs. With regard to negotiation, Sims’s independent decision to accept his salary without negotiation does not show DOE’s justification is ingenuine. Reddy and Sellman make a final, general objection to the veracity of DOE’s explanations: that their salary must be based on their sex because Sims’s salary is higher than theirs even though he “has been notified of low production, and performs four of five responsibilities.” But these facts go to the post-appointment step-level increases, and not the difference between their respective initial salaries. Nor do they address DOE’s explanations. Accordingly, Reddy and Sellman have not offered any evidence that would lead a reasonable juror to believe that the proffered non-sex based factors that were the basis for the salary appointment difference were pretextual. 11 We therefore conclude the district court did not err in granting DOE’s motion for summary judgment as to Reddy’s and Sellman’s EPA appointment pay discrimination claim. For the same reasons, the district court also did not err in granting DOE’s motion 11 Because we find in favor of DOE based on its “factors other than sex” affirmative defense, we do not address its merit system defense. 20 Case: 18-14433 Date Filed: 04/02/2020 Page: 21 of 23 for summary judgment as to Reddy’s and Sellman’s Title VII pay discrimination appointment claim.