Opinion ID: 1578807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Goodwin first challenges the circuit court's denial of his motion for a directed verdict and argues that there was insufficient evidence to show that he intended to commit a theft. Intent to commit theft, he points out, was a necessary element of his conviction for aggravated robbery and the commission of an aggravated robbery, in turn, was a necessary element of his conviction for attempted capital-felony murder. Goodwin notes that there was no physical evidence connecting him to the crime. He concedes that Betty Word testified that he told her it was a robbery but argues that she did not testify that he took any property. The standard of review for the denial of a motion for a directed verdict is well established: We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. This court has repeatedly held that in reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the State and consider only the evidence that supports the verdict. We affirm a conviction if substantial evidence exists to support it. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. ... The credibility of witnesses is an issue for the jury and not the court. The trier of fact is free to believe all or part of any witness's testimony and may resolve questions of conflicting testimony and inconsistent evidence. See, e.g., Strong v. State, 372 Ark. 404, 409, 277 S.W.3d 159, 163 (2008) (citations omitted). In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the verdict, this court looks at all of the evidence presented, including any evidence that is alleged to have been admitted in error. Davis v. State, 318 Ark. 212, 219, 885 S.W.2d 292, 296 (1994). Goodwin is correct that his convictions for aggravated robbery and for attempted capital-felony murder required the State to introduce substantial evidence of intended theft. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-12-103 (Repl.2006) (A person commits aggravated robbery if he or she commits robbery... and the person ... [i]nflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another person.); Ark.Code Ann. § 5-12-102 (Repl.2006) (A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft... the person employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another person.); Ark.Code Ann. § 5-10-101 (Repl.2006) (A person commits capital murder if ... [t]he person commits or attempts to commit ... [r]obbery ... and... [i]n the course of an in furtherance of the [robbery] or in immediate flight from the [robbery], the person or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.). Under Arkansas law, [a] person commits theft of property if he or she knowingly ... [t]akes or exercises unauthorized control over ... the property of another person, with the purpose of depriving the owner of the property. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl.2006). The State presented substantial evidence of Goodwin's intent to commit theft. First, there was Mrs. Word's testimony, in which she stated that Goodwin told her that he was going to rob her. Then there was the fact that two twenty-dollar bills and some quarters were missing from the Fashion Center after the attack. There was also Goodwin's own videotaped statement in which he admitted to taking money from the cash register. There can be no doubt that this evidence, when looked at in the light most favorable to the State, was sufficient to allow a jury, without resorting to speculation or conjecture, to come to the conclusion that Goodwin intended a theft. We affirm on this point.