Opinion ID: 3065304
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wittman is entitled to derived quasi-judicial

Text: immunity. [15] Harris alleged Wittman breached the Settlement Agreement when she agreed that Swain was entitled to be paid from the estate approximately $1 million in “contrived claims” that had already been released by the Settlement Agreement, and when she sold the assets to Swain in exchange for $125,000 cash and Swain’s release of those claims. These acts of Wittman meet all four elements for derived quasi-judicial immunity. First, Wittman’s sale of the estate assets, as well as her determination that the consideration Swain was to pay for those assets was in the best interest of the estate, were within the scope of her statutorily conferred authority as trustee. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1). Second, Wittman filed notice of the proposed sale, and served Harris with such notice, on May 2, 2003. Third, the notice fully set out the details of the proposed sale of the Alpine property and 1957 Mercedes-Benz to Jack Swain, including the consideration Swain was to pay. The notice explained that Wittman believed the sale was in the best interest of the estate, that Swain was releasing the estate from liability for all the fees and costs associated with his prosecution of the fraudulent conveyance proceeding in his IN THE MATTER OF HARRIS 16677 role as Special Representative of the estate, including the attorneys’ fees of the Attorney defendants. The notice also provided a detailed accounting of the source of said fees and costs. Fourth, and finally, the bankruptcy court, after a hearing, approved the sale. 2. Swain and the Attorney Defendants are entitled to derived quasi-judicial immunity. [16] Harris alleged Swain and the Attorney defendants breached the Settlement Agreement because the approximately $1 million of estate liability—including the Attorney defendants’ attorneys’ fees from the fraudulent conveyance proceeding, Swain’s fees and costs from that proceeding, and Sandra Harris’s $218,000 lien against the Alpine property— that Swain was releasing or assuming in exchange for the estate assets had already been released by the terms of the settlement. Thus, Swain and the Attorney defendants were asserting rights to be paid from the estate, which Harris alleges they had agreed to release. However, Swain and the Attorney defendants, similarly to Wittman, satisfy all four elements for derived quasi-judicial immunity. First, their acts of making claims against the estate for their costs and fees associated with the fraudulent conveyance proceeding were within the scope of the authority conferred to them by the bankruptcy court. Under the Assignment Agreement, Swain was authorized to recover from the estate his costs of prosecuting the estate’s fraudulent conveyance proceeding against Harris and Mrs. Harris and 68% of the net recovery from that proceeding. The Attorney defendants were also authorized, under the Assignment Agreement, to recover their fees from the estate. The bankruptcy court specifically approved the Assignment Agreement and therefore authorized their recovery of fees and costs. Second, Harris had notice that Swain and the Attorney defendants were making these claims when Wittman served Harris with notice of the proposed sale on May 2, 2003, which notice included a detailed 16678 IN THE MATTER OF HARRIS account of these claims. Third, the notice fully set out the claims Swain and the Attorney defendants had against the estate and the source of all of their claims. Fourth and finally, after a hearing, the bankruptcy court approved all of these claims, and Swain’s release or assumption of those claims in exchange for the Alpine property. [17] Thus, all of the appellees are entitled to derived quasijudicial immunity. AFFIRMED.