Opinion ID: 1938270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: rosenthal's appeal

Text: An agent who enters into a contract without disclosing his principal is personally liable on it. Resnick v. Abner B. Cohen Advertising, Inc., 104 A.2d 254, 255 (D.C.Mun.App.1954). To avoid liability, he must disclose both the fact of his agency and the identity of his principal. American Ins. Co. v. Smith, 472 A.2d 872, 874 (D.C.1984). The agent must act promptly, for disclosure of the agency after execution of the contract will not relieve the agent of liability. Id. at 875; McNeill v. Appel, 197 A.2d 152, 153 (D.C.1964). Whether proper disclosure has occurred is a question of fact which depends on all of the surrounding circumstances. Smith, supra, 472 A.2d at 875. If, as National Produce contends, there was only a single 1979 umbrella agreement in this case, then it was incumbent upon Rosenthal to make effective disclosure before that agreement was completed. If, on the other hand, there were as many contracts as there were orders or deliveries, see D.C.Code § 28:2-206(1)(b) (1981), then Rosenthal's liability turns on whether National Produce received notice of his agency with regard to each individual contract. The trial judge, without expressly so stating, apparently found that although the business arrangement negotiated in 1979 by Ballard and Rosenthal was a very loose one, and although there was no corporate meeting of the minds, there was nevertheless an enforceable contract in 1979 between National Produce and Rosenthal. [9] We cannot agree. According due deference to the trial judge's presence on the scene and his opportunity, superior to ours, to obtain the feel of the case, we are nevertheless unable to find in the record the requisite evidence of an enforceable agreement. In a passage which could have been composed with this case in mind, Professor Corbin has written that [a] court cannot enforce a contract unless it can determine what it is. It is not enough that the parties think that they have made a contract; they must have expressed their intentions in a manner that is capable of understanding. It is not even enough that they have actually agreed, if their expressions, when interpreted in the light of accompanying factors and circumstances, are not such that the court can determine what the terms of that agreement are. Vagueness of expression, indefiniteness and uncertainty as to any of the essential terms of an agreement, have often been held to prevent the creation of an enforceable contract. 1 A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 95, at 394 (1963); see Stansel v. American Sec. Bank, 547 A.2d 990, 993 (D.C.1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 1746, 104 L.Ed.2d 183 (1989). A contract must be sufficiently definite as to its material terms (which include, e.g., subject matter, price, payment terms, quantity, quality, and duration) that the promises and performance to be rendered by each party are reasonably certain. J.D. CALAMARI & J.M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, § 2-13, at 43-44 & n. 17 (2d ed. 1977). That test is met when the contract provides a sufficient basis for determining whether a breach has occurred and for identifying an appropriate remedy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981). As the court stated in Robinson v. Gardiner, 196 Md. 213, 216, 76 A.2d 354, 356 (1950): If the agreement be so vague and indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it the intention of the parties, it is void because neither the court nor jury could make a contract for the parties. Such a contract cannot be enforced in equity nor sued upon in law. The requirement of definiteness cannot be pushed to extreme limits. CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra, at 44 n. 18. All agreements have some degree of indefiniteness and some degree of uncertainty. 1 CORBIN, supra, § 95, at 396. All the terms contemplated by the agreement need not be fixed with complete and perfect certainty for a contract to have legal efficacy. V'Soske v. Barwick, 404 F.2d 495, 500 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 921, 89 S.Ct. 1197, 22 L.Ed.2d 454 (1969). Reasonable definiteness in the essential terms of a purported contract must, however, be a precondition for its enforceability, for otherwise the court has no adequate means of identifying the obligations which it should enforce. In the present case, the requisite elements are lacking. As counsel for National Produce told the trial judge, the contract was we will deliver produce; you will pay us. There was little more. The evidence shows that following the discussions between Ballard and Rosenthal in the summer of 1979, Rosenthal began to place orders with National Produce, usually on a daily basis, and that this continued until the demise of the business in September 1984. There is no evidence, however, that the 1979 understanding obligated Rosenthal to purchase produce only from National Produce, or that he was obliged to place periodic orders with National Produce for any length of time, either definite or indefinite. [10] Moreover, there is no indication that National Produce was bound to deliver produce to R & R whenever Rosenthal placed an order. For aught that appears in the record, after Rosenthal reimbursed National Produce for a particular delivery, either party was free to terminate the relationship. There was no stated agreement as to price, quantity, quality, or duration. [11] See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra, § 2-13, at 43 n. 17. Under these circumstances, we are compelled to conclude that there was no contract formed in 1979, and that Rosenthal's failure to disclose his agency to National Produce during his conversations with Ballard in 1979 is not decisive with respect to his liability. [12] The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily mean that Rosenthal is not responsible for the payment of any of the goods delivered by National Produce. The judge found that at least through early 1984, Rosenthal did not disclose that he was acting for a corporate principal. It therefore appears that some disclosure was made during that year. Under the authorities cited, Rosenthal is personally liable for breach of contract with regard to each delivery made by National Produce prior to effective disclosure of his agency. [13] Personal liability does not attach, on the other hand, with respect to deliveries made after such disclosure. [14] Apparently because he viewed the case as involving only a single umbrella contract, the trial judge made no finding as to the date of disclosure or as to when National Produce made the deliveries for which it has not been paid. We must therefore remand the case to the trial judge for these additional findings and for a determination as to Rosenthal's liability in light of them. [15]