Opinion ID: 2614930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the commencement of the limitation period of section 100

Text: Title 12 O.S. 1991, § 100 provides: if any action is commenced within due time and the judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the plaintiff fail in such action otherwise than upon the merits, the plaintiff ... may commence a new action within one (1) year after the reversal or failure although the time limit for commencing the action shall have expired before the new action is filed. The statute has been termed a savings statute as it permits the filing of an action after the statute of limitations has run. See Ross v. Kelsey Hayes, Inc., 825 P.2d 1273, 1277 (Okla. 1991). It acts to extend the statutorily-established limitations period. Id. Grider urges that his October 12, 1989 refiling was well within the one-year period allowed by Section 100. He claims that the one-year period did not begin to run until the judgment became final, and that it did not become final until the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 2, 1989. The defendants, on the other hand, urge that the time period began when the federal District Court dismissed the state claims on April 2, 1987. In connection with that argument the defendants claim that Grider only appealed the federal court ruling as to the RICO and antitrust claims. They urge that he did not appeal the federal court's dismissal of the state claims of fraud and embezzlement. Both Plaintiff and Defendants claim that Chandler v. Denton, 741 P.2d 855 (Okla. 1987) supports their position. In Chandler, we were called upon to decide whether the savings provision operated to protect a cause of action which was based on multiple theories of liability, some of which were barred before the original petition was filed. That action was first asserted as a counterclaim, which was ordered dismissed by the trial judge. The aggrieved defendant filed a motion to reconsider. One of the questions was whether the one year commenced on the date of the original order of dismissal, or on the date the motion to reconsider was denied. We held that the one-year period commenced with the date the order of dismissal became final, rather than with the original order. Id. at 860, 863. Defendants here argue that an appeal in the first Chandler case indicated that we had held that an appeal does not delay commencement of the running of the one year. Such was not the Chandler holding, however. In Chandler we were not called upon to decide if an appeal could delay the running of the one-year period. This finality requirement has recently been discussed by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Twashakarris, Inc., v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 890 F.2d 236 (10th Cir.1989). Plaintiffs' first lawsuit in the Western District of Oklahoma was dismissed by the Court without prejudice. Rather than filing a new complaint plaintiffs appealed the dismissal. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal in March, 1986, and the plaintiffs refiled their complaint in February, 1987. The U.S. District Court dismissed this second complaint, stating that the statute of limitations had run. The Tenth Circuit looked to the language of our Section 100. It observed that Section 100 provides two situations where an additional year to file is permitted: (1) in the instance of reversal of a judgment for the plaintiff and (2) if the plaintiff fails in an action otherwise than on the merits. Although the questioned action fell into the second category, the court found the wording of the first useful in deciding whether the limitations period began after the completion of an appeal: The key to understanding this phrase is the word action. We hold that an action includes the initial judgment and any validly filed appeals that suspend the finality of the judgment. Thus, if a plaintiff's case were dismissed otherwise than on the merits and the plaintiff filed a timely appeal or a timely motion that tolled the time required for appeal, the plaintiff would be given an additional year from the time the appeal or motion was adjudicated in which to refile a complaint. Under these circumstances, the action would continue until the appeal was resolved. This interpretation complements the first clause of the statute which does not take effect until after an appeal. Id. at 237. Thus the Tenth Circuit held that, for Section 100 purposes, a validly-filed appeal would toll the limitations period until the appeal was resolved and the judgment became final. While the definition of final has taken on different meanings in different contexts, [1] we have consistently held to the rule that a final adjudication is either one in which no appeal has been taken and the time for appeal has run or one in which an appeal has been filed and acted upon by the appellate court. See State ex rel. Derryberry v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 516 P.2d 813, 820 (Okla. 1973); Benham v. Plotner, 795 P.2d 510, 512 (Okla. 1990); Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Hornung, 813 P.2d 1041, 1042 (Okla. 1991) (discipline is permitted for a felony conviction which has become final by failure to appeal or determination of appeal); Depuy v. Hoeme, 775 P.2d 1339, 1343 n. 23 (Okla. 1989) (a judgment has res judicata effect after the expiration of appeal time when no appeal has been taken). In Mabee Oil & Gas Co. v. Price, 198 Okl. 510, 179 P.2d 916, 918 (1947), we held that lodging an appeal in the Supreme Court does not constitute a new action or an original proceeding, but is simply the continuation of the suit commenced in the trial court. Our Section 100 tracks an identical statute from Kansas, originally General Statutes of Kansas, 1889, Paragraph 4100. The Kansas Supreme Court in New v. Smith, 86 Kan. 1, 119 P. 380 (1911) [2] answered this exact question. It rejected the argument that the one year commenced with the lower court's ruling, stating: The appellee's contention would compel a party who deems himself prejudiced by such an order to forego his right of appeal, as frequently, perhaps generally, he cannot get a hearing thereon in the Supreme Court and commence a new action within one year. To commence a new action in the same court without an appeal is virtually to submit to what he regards as an illegal order. This is not the intent of the Code ... We hold that the trustee had one year after the filing of the decision in the Supreme Court within which to commence a new action. An overwhelming majority of jurisdictions agree with Kansas and the Tenth Circuit that the time of commencement of the savings provisions is the date the judgment is decided on appeal, not the date of determination in the trial court. See Whetsel v. Gosnell, 56 Del. 248, 193 A.2d 200 (1963); Dinerman v. Sutton, 45 Misc.2d 791, 258 N.Y.S.2d 13 (1965); Young v. Garrett, 212 Ark. 693, 208 S.W.2d 189 (1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 814, 69 S.Ct. 31, 93 L.Ed. 369 (1948). [3] In general, these jurisdictions agree that a plaintiff should not be forced to choose between an appeal and a refiling of the claim to preserve rights given under a savings statute. Id. Because we have held in Chandler that the date of finality of the order of dismissal is the determinative date, and because a judgment is not final, in this context, until the opportunity for appeal has passed or the appeal has been acted upon, we agree that the operative date here is that of the U.S. Supreme Court's denial of certiorari. Thus, Section 100's one-year saving period did not begin to run until certiorari was denied on October 2, 1989. Until the appeal process ended the proceeding was a continuation of the action commenced in the trial court. Mabee, 179 P.2d at 918; Twashakarris, 890 F.2d at 237. Any other decision could result in a waste of judicial time and resources, because a decision on appeal could negate any need for the refiling of a claim. Requiring the filing of a suit in District Court to proceed simultaneously with an appeal on the same issue would not be judicially efficient. Consistent with our prior case law and following that of a majority of our sister jurisdictions, we hold that the critical date is that date on which the appeal process is final. Grider's action was timely filed within this one-year period.