Opinion ID: 2540614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the first-degree robbery instruction

Text: Smith first contends that the first-degree robbery instruction denied him his right to a unanimous verdict because the instruction included an option that allowed the jury to convict him if they believed that either Sharon or Hughes used force against the clerk. Smith argues that this prevented a unanimous verdict because a juror could have convicted him based on that theory despite there being absolutely no evidence that Sharon or Hughes had used force. Smith concedes that the error was not raised at trial, and so we will examine his argument under the manifest injustice standard contained in RCr 10.26. Before we address the issue, a caveat is in order to clarify a matter that was argued in the parties' briefs respecting this Court's role in reviewing unpreserved error. Although he acknowledged the erroneous instruction issue was not raised at trial, in his opening brief, Smith did not specifically request palpable error review. Therefore, citing to Shepherd v. Commonwealth, 251 S.W.3d 309, 316 (Ky.2008), the Commonwealth argued in its response brief that we should not address the issue at all. Shepherd holds that, absent extreme circumstances amounting to a substantial miscarriage of justice, an appellate court will not engage in palpable error review pursuant to RCr 10.26 unless such a request was made and briefed by the appellant. Smith did, at least, brief the issue, and we accordingly opt to address the matter on the merits, though we do not retreat from the Shepherd rule; rather, we continue to reserve our discretion to invoke the rule in any particular case. Responding to the Commonwealth's invocation of the Shepherd rule, Smith's reply brief argues that the Shepherd rule is incorrect because there is no court rule demanding this action and that it is unreasonable for the Commonwealth to claim the Court may create an appellate policy by means of case law; that RCr 10.26 cannot be justified under any reading of the constitution and that therefore [t]his Court should use this case to abrogate the [palpable error] rule and to announce that there is only one standard of review  error of record that likely influenced the result of the trial; and that RCr 9.54 (requiring objection to erroneous jury instructions) cannot be used to preclude [appellate] review of jury instructions and [t]he Court must declare that instruction issues will be reviewed under the regular standard regardless of RCr 9.54(2). Smith raised these points for the first time in a reply brief. Under Milby v. Mears, 580 S.W.2d 724, 728 (Ky.App.1979), [t]he reply brief is not a device for raising new issues which are essential to the success of the appeal. Nevertheless, for the benefit of appellate counsel we briefly note that the preservation of error rule is an indispensable underpinning of our adversarial criminal justice process. If unpreserved error, which we review for manifest injustice, were to be reviewed under the same standard as preserved error, which we review for whether the error substantially swayed the verdict, see Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009); see also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (A trial error involving the denial of a federal constitutional right is harmless when it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.), a trial counsel's principal motive for bringing reversible error to the trial court's attention would be eliminated. Moreover, a decisive incentive not to bring error to the trial court's attention would be created. Indeed, under Smith's appellate counsel's model rule of review, bringing reversible error to the trial court's attention could, in some instances amount to ineffective assistance because the trial judge's timely correction of such error would deprive trial counsel's client of a guaranteed reversal, a do-over in the event of an unfavorable verdict. Counsel's suggested rule would, in practice, be unworkable. By deliberate design trial attorneys would remain mute rather that bring reversible errors to the trial court's attention, and the unpreserved error, like preserved error, would be reviewed under the substantially swayed standard. Retrials would thereby abound. Accordingly, our preservation of error rules are integral to the efficient functioning of our entire process, and RCr 10.26, in the meantime, functions to assure that no defendant will suffer a manifest injustice because of unpreserved error. We return to the substantive issue at hand  whether extraneous language in the first-degree robbery instruction denied Smith his right to a unanimous verdict. As noted, following their arrests Sharon and Hughes pled guilty and testified against Smith at trial, identifying Smith as the one who had attacked the clerk. The clerk also testified and identified Smith as her attacker. The Commonwealth's theory of the case was that Smith alone was the attacker. The prosecutor stressed this point in both the opening statement and the closing argument. Likewise, Smith never suggested that either Sharon or Hughes had attacked the clerk. Despite the lack of any evidence that anyone other than Smith had used force against the clerk, the first-degree robbery instruction stated as follows: You will find the defendant, Robert Smith, guilty of Complicity to Robbery in the First Degree if, and only if, you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following: A. That in Jefferson County on or about the 26th day of July, 2010, acting alone or in complicity with others, he stole or attempted to steal money from A-Z Grocery. AND B(1) That in the course of doing so, and with intent to accomplish the theft, he or one of his complicitors caused physical injury to [the clerk], who was not a participant in the crime by striking her. OR B(2)(a) That in the course of doing so, and with intent to accomplish the theft, he or one of his complicitors used or threatened the use of physical force upon [the clerk] with a flashlight; AND That said flashlight was a dangerous instrument as defined in Instruction No. 3. (emphasis added). As can be seen, the instruction provides that Smith could be convicted of first-degree robbery if the jury believed Sharon or Hughes used force against the clerk, even though no evidence whatsoever was presented at trial to support that theory. Smith contends that including this option in the instructions denied him his constitutional right to a unanimous verdict. The situation where multiple theories of a crime are presented in a single instruction has become known as a combination instruction. See, e.g., Johnson v. Commonwealth, 12 S.W.3d 258, 265 (Ky. 1999). We have addressed this type of situation on several occasions since the late 1970's. For example, in Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky.1978), we held that a verdict cannot be successfully attacked upon the ground that the jurors could have believed either of two theories of the case where both interpretations are supported by the evidence and the proof of either beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes the same offense. In other words, multiple theories of the same offense can be combined so long as there is sufficient evidence of each. This is because, no matter which theory they believed, all the jurors convicted under a theory supported by the evidence and all the jurors convicted the defendant of the same offense. Travis, 327 S.W.3d at 460. We addressed the situation where there is insufficient evidence supporting one of the theories in both Boulder v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Ky.1980) [2] and Hayes v. Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583, 584-85 (Ky.1981). In each case, we found the combined instruction erroneous because it permitted the jury to convict on a theory unsupported by evidence. See Boulder, 610 S.W.2d at 617 (They provided alternative grounds for a finding of guilt  either that [the defendant] intended to cause, serious physical injury to [the victim] or that he was wantonly engaging in conduct which created a risk of death to [the victim].' The state of the evidence, however, is such that it would be clearly unreasonable for a juror to believe that [the defendant's] conduct was other than intentional.); Hayes, 625 S.W.2d at 585; Travis, 327 S.W.3d at 460. Thus, Boulder and Hayes established that instructing on theories insufficiently supported by evidence is error. Twenty years after that pair of cases, we held in Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878, 883 (Ky.2000), [3] that when this type of error occurs and is preserved, it must always cause the conviction to be reversed. Burnett 's reasoning was based on the fundamental nature of one's right to a unanimous verdict. See Travis, 327 S.W.3d at 463. In Travis we retreated from the Burnett rule, stating: While holding true to that underlying principle, we now step back from our position in Burnett because the error resulting only from superfluous language does not present a pure unanimity problem. On the contrary, such flawed instructions only implicate unanimity if it is reasonably likely that some members of the jury actually followed the erroneously inserted theory in reaching their verdict. If that can be shown, then a unanimous verdict has been denied and the verdict must be overruled. However, if there is no reasonable possibility that the jury actually relied on the erroneous theory  in particular, where there is no evidence of the theory that could mislead the jury  then there is no unanimity problem. Though such a case presents an error in the instructions, namely, the inclusion of surplus language, the error is simply harmless because there is no reason to think the jury was misled. To the extent Burnett mandates reversal in this latter situation, it is now overruled. Id. at 463 (emphasis added). Because of the complete absence of any evidence that Sharon or Hughes used force against the clerk, there was absolutely no reason for any juror to believe that the alternative could have occurred. If some jurors even considered the possibility that Sharon or Hughes used force at all during their deliberations, they undoubtedly summarily rejected the possibility. Accordingly there is no reasonable possibility that the jury actually relied on the erroneous theory, and, it follows, we would find the error harmless even if it had been preserved. [4] As such, no manifest injustice occurred so as to entitle Smith to relief under RCr 10.26.