Opinion ID: 3015564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ineffective Assistance Inquiry

Text: Relying on Commonwealth v. Kimball, 724 A.2d 326, 330 (Pa. 1999), the Superior Court determined that Beneshunas’s counsel was not ineffective. In Kimball, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania explained that: [t]he petitioner must still show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. This requires the petitioner to show: (1) that the claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and, (3) that, but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Id. We agree with the District Court that this standard comports with the leading Supreme Court case addressing ineffectiveness of counsel. In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the Supreme Court held that a petitioner seeking to have his conviction overturned because his counsel was ineffective must show both that his counsel was defective and that his defense was prejudiced by this defective performance. Pennsylvania’s standard comports with the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland. Werts, 228 F.3d at 204. Although the Superior Court identified the proper standard of review, Beneshunas claims that the Superior Court conducted no Strickland analysis, but based its decision on a presumption that “because trial counsel professed to have a strategy that it was, as a (emphasis added). 8 matter of fact and law, a reasonable one.” (Brief of Appellant at 23.) We disagree. The first part of the Strickland analysis requires the reviewing court to determine “whether counsel’s assistance was reasonable considering all of the circumstances.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. We are cautioned that our evaluation should be highly deferential to counsel and that we must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 689. The Superior Court explained that counsel’s failure to object during the prosecutor’s closing argument was based, in part, on his belief that he had “legitimately ‘opened the door’ to that line of inquiry.” (Appellant App. at 94.) The Superior Court agreed that no Fifth Amendment violation occurred. We therefore begin by examining the underlying Fifth Amendment issue.