Opinion ID: 218450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Law Whistleblower Actions

Text: Plaintiffs maintain that they were intimidated, retaliated against, and had their employment constructively terminated for following their professional nursing ethical obligations by complaining about safety practices at the jail. According to them, CCA's conduct violated IC 22-5-3-3 (the Act), a statutory whistle-blower provision. CCA contends that plaintiffs' whistle-blower claims cannot move forward because plaintiffs fail to point out a violation of law, which is a prerequisite to a claim under the statute, and because plaintiffs failed to submit written complaints to an appropriate state agency or official. We evaluate the arguments on a nearly clean slate; Indiana Courts have had limited occasion to interpret the Act. Coutee v. Lafayette Neighborhood Housing Servs., Inc., 792 N.E.2d 907, 912 (Ind.Ct.App. 2003). While concerns over federalism lead us to tread lightly when interpreting matters of state law, the task before us is relatively simple and Indiana courts look to basic tools of statutory interpretation, see, e.g., Estate of Moreland v. Dieter, 576 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir.2009) (In Indiana, the lodestar of statutory interpretation is legislative intent, and the plain language of the statute is the best evidence of that intent.) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Our task is to deduce, as closely as possible, how the Indiana Supreme Court would rule. Hinc v. Lime-O-Sol Co., 382 F.3d 716, 720 (7th Cir.2004). We agree with CCA that plaintiffs do not point to a violation of law on which to hang their whistleblower claims. Because that resolves the matter, we decline to reach the parties' arguments regarding the Act's writing requirement. As ever with matters of statutory interpretation, we start with the Act's language. The Act protects employees from certain forms of retaliation, where their employers are under public contract. [4] In pertinent part, the provision at issue provides: (a) An employee of a private employer that is under public contract may report in writing the existence of: (1) a violation of a federal law or regulation; (2) a violation of a state law or rule; (3) a violation of an ordinance of a political subdivision (as defined in IC XX-X-X-XX); or (4) the misuse of public resources; concerning the execution of public contract first to the private employer, unless the private employer is the person whom the employee believes is committing the violation or misuse of public resources. In that case, the employee may report the violation or misuse of public resources in writing to either the private employer or to any official or agency entitled to receive a report from the state ethics commission under IC 4-2-6-4(b)(2)(G) or IC 4-2-6-4(b)(2)(H). If a good faith effort is not made to correct the problem within a reasonable time, the employee may submit a written report of the incident to any person, agency, or organization. IC 22-5-3-3(a). The protections of the Act do not attach unless and until the employee files a written report of the [complained of] incident to any person, agency, or organization. IC 22-5-3-3(b). In this case, plaintiffs filed internal reports primarily about safety practices at CCA. However, plaintiffs have not told us what state or federal laws were violated by the conduct they observed. The Act by its terms covers violations of federal laws or regulations, state laws or rules, and ordinances, as well as the misuse of public resources. IC 22-5-3-3(a)(1)-(4). A whistleblower has to complain about such a violation or misuse of public resources before the Act's protections are triggered. Here, plaintiffs point out no violation of a state law or rule, or anything else within the Act's ambit. Instead, they rely on their obligations as practical nurses, under 848 Ind. Admin. Code 2-3-2(10) (standards for practical nurses), to report to their bosses or state officials unprofessional conduct that may jeopardize patient safety. Ironically, by filing a report, plaintiffs ensured that there was no violation of state law, and they have not argued that the subject matter of their complaints fell within the coverage of the Act. Therefore, summary judgment on the plaintiffs' whistleblower claims was appropriate.