Opinion ID: 505930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Witherspoon/Witt Claims

Text: 73 Appellant also argues that the exclusion of four venirepersons from the jury panel for cause violated his sixth amendment right to be tried before an impartial jury under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). 8 Before Witt was decided, most courts, including the district court in this case, applied the test approved in footnote 21 of Witherspoon to determine whether a juror had properly been excluded for cause. Under that test, jurors could be excluded for cause if they made it 74 unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. 75 391 U.S. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21 (emphasis in original). In Witt, however, the appropriate standard was clarified to provide that a juror could be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment if the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'  Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 852. This formulation dispenses with Witherspoon 's reference to automatic decisionmaking, and does not require that the juror's bias be proved with unmistakable clarity. The Supreme Court explained its modification of the Witherspoon standard as follows: 76 This is because determinations of juror bias cannot be reduced to question-and-answer sessions which obtain results in the manner of a catechism. What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear; these veniremen may not know how they will react when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings. 77 Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 852 (footnote omitted). The Court further held that, on a petition for habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254, the state trial court's determination that a prospective capital sentencing juror should be excluded for cause is a factual issue to which 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)'s presumption of correctness applies. 9 78 Applying the standard set forth in Witt to the facts of this case, we find no violation of appellant's sixth amendment rights. Appellant's strongest claim of improper exclusion for cause, and the only one he pursued in his briefing on this issue following the Supreme Court's decision in Witt, concerns the trial court's exclusion of juror Thomas L. Clark. After indicating at the outset of voir dire that he was conscientiously opposed to capital punishment, juror Clark indicated in single word responses to the trial court's inquiries that (1) his reservations about capital punishment would not prevent him from making an impartial decision concerning the defendant's guilt, (2) it was not the case that he could never vote to impose the death penalty, and (3) he would not refuse to consider its imposition in the case before him. 10 He was then asked by the trial court judge if he was irrevocably committed before the trial [had] begun to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of [the] proceedings, to which he responded Yes. Defense counsel was then permitted to examine juror Clark as follows: 79 THE COURT: Your name is Thomas L. Clark? THE JUROR: Yes, sir.BY [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: 80 Q. Mr. Clark, if this trial gets to the penalty phase, the issue to be considered would be whether the Court would impose the penalty of death or a penalty of life imprisonment. At that point, evidence will be offered on the issue of punishment. The Court will then charge you the law on the issue of punishment. Would you be willing to consider all the evidence and the law before reaching a verdict? 81 A. I will answer this way. It's my religious conviction: I cannot give a life, and I do not take a life. 82 Q. All right, sir, if the law charged to you that you must consider is that regardless of the facts of the case, under no circumstances must you impose a death penalty--under no circumstances must you impose a death penalty, do you then believe that you could consider the facts of the case from the evidence presented, look at it, deliberate it, and vote what you feel ought to be done? 83
84 Following legal argument, the trial court then excused juror Clark for cause, explaining its decision as follows: 85 THE COURT: Let me tell you how I view this. He has stated in response to my first question that he is conscientiously opposed to the death penalty. He has said his reservations about capital punishment would not prevent him from making an impartial judgment as to the defendant's guilt. He also said that his reservations about capital punishment were such that--were not such that he could never vote to impose the death penalty which puzzled me a bit. Then he finally says that he is irrevocably committed, before this trial--before this case is begun, before he has heard any evidence, to vote against the penalty of death regardless of the facts and circumstances that might emerge in the course of the proceedings. I think he is disqualified. 86 This clearly constituted a finding sufficient to invoke the presumption of correctness of section 2254(d), see Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 855-56, unless one of the statutorily enumerated reasons for avoiding the presumption is present in this case. Appellant has suggested only that the record is wholly insufficient to satisfy even the Witt test, at least as regards the exclusion of juror Clark. We disagree with this assertion. Although juror Clark's responses were inconsistent, the trial court's determination, measured against the Witt standard, is without question fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(8). This places upon appellant the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that the exclusion of juror Clark was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d). Appellant has not so demonstrated that juror Clark's views would not prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Witt, 105 S.Ct. at 852. We therefore find no error in the district court's determination that juror Clark was not improperly excluded for cause. We likewise agree with the district court that the exclusion of the other three jurors appellant claims were improperly excluded did not violate appellant's constitutional rights. 11 87 Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) disposes of appellant's argument that the exclusion of jurors opposed to the death penalty violates his constitutional right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community.