Opinion ID: 349452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Contentions Related to Pannirello's Testimony

Text: 25 Pannirello was permitted by the trial court to identify appellant Green in court, after a suppression hearing at which he testified that he had met Green between ten and twenty times at Green's apartment in 1971 and 1972 and that he had been shown a spread of photographs including Green's between the time of his grand jury testimony and trial testimony in the Tramunti case. An agent of the Drug Enforcement Agency testified at the hearing that he showed Pannirello photographs of Green in a spread of approximately five or six other mug shots, and that Pannirello identified Green's photograph, having previously given a description of Green. Under these circumstances we see no basis for saying that the spread shown by the agent to Pannirello was  impermissibly suggestive within Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), and no basis for concluding that the identification was not independently based upon Pannirello's ten to twenty meetings with Green at the latter's apartment. 7 See United States v. Counts, 471 F.2d 422, 424-25 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 935, 93 S.Ct. 1909, 36 L.Ed.2d 395 (1973); United States ex rel. Phipps v. Follette, 428 F.2d 912, 914-16 (2d Cir.) (upholding identification based on 20-30 second glance), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 908, 91 S.Ct. 151, 27 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970). 26 With regard to another aspect of Pannirello's testimony, appellant Green sought a mistrial. The witness testified that he had heard on the radio  that there was a big bust and that, as a result, he telephoned Green and told him they would have to make other arrangements because Pannirello was not  coming near the building (where Green's apartment was located) any more. The request for a mistrial was made on the basis that the jury could have inferred that Green had been arrested. At the time the big bust was mentioned, the court instructed the jury: (F)orget about it. He heard something on the radio. Subsequently, upon denying the mistrial motion, the court gave an additional instruction: When I suggest to you that a matter should be stricken from your mind, I want you to ignore it. Take out that little mental eraser and ignore it. 27 The statement by the witness here, uncalled for to be sure, was not so prejudicial in the overall context of the trial as to warrant a mistrial. The court's added remark, that (w)hatever I am asking you to forget about has nothing whatsoever to do with these defendants on trial, nothing at all, can be treated as eliminating any serious possibility of prejudice, coming as it did immediately after the bust testimony and the side-bar conference. A perfect trial, as Judge Sobeloff once reminded us, is as rare as the perfect crime. Jones v. United States, 262 F.2d 44, 48 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 972, 79 S.Ct. 886, 3 L.Ed.2d 838 (1959). 28 Appellant Salley asserts error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that it could not infer that the Henry Salley to whom Pannirello referred in his testimony was the defendant Henry Salley. Because Pannirello had not been able to identify Salley in the Tramunti trial, the court below prohibited him from identifying Salley in this trial. Pannirello was permitted to testify, however, about a meeting he and Provitera had at a New Jersey Howard Johnson's with Robinson and a man named Salley. This testimony could stand on its own and be given whatever weight the jury felt it deserved. There was other testimony linking Salley to Robinson, including Provitera's, and a hotel registration card placed Salley with Robinson at the Howard Johnson's at the time as to which Pannirello was testifying. The jury was therefore entitled to infer that Pannirello's Salley was the appellant Henry Salley, despite the lack of in-court identification.