Opinion ID: 2601941
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: bindover by commissioner

Text: ¶ 7 The district court vacated Ford's conviction, holding that the court commissioner who bound Ford over for trial lacked authority to do so, and therefore the district court had not had jurisdiction to try him. The district court apparently assumed that a bindover order constituted a core judicial function, and it ultimately concluded that under Salt Lake City v. Ohms , a commissioner could not properly enter such an order. 881 P.2d 844, 853 (Utah 1994). We disagree with the first premise, making an analysis under Ohms unnecessary. ¶ 8 In State v. Humphrey, we outlined the procedure for binding defendants over for trial: By the bindover order, the magistrate requires the defendant to answer the information in the district court. The information is then transferred to the district court, permitting that court to take original jurisdiction of the matter. At that point, the district court has the inherent authority and the obligation to determine whether its original jurisdiction has been properly invoked. In doing so, the district court need show no deference to the magistrate's legal conclusion, implicit in the bindover order, that the matter may proceed to trial in district court, but may conduct its own review of the order. 823 P.2d 464, 465-466 (Utah 1991) (citations, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted). ¶ 9 Article I, section 13 of the Utah Constitution gives magistrates the duty to conduct preliminary hearings. Offenses heretofore required to be prosecuted by indictment, shall be prosecuted by information after examination and commitment by a magistrate, unless the examination be waived by the accused with the consent of the State, or by indictment, with or without such examination and commitment. Utah Const. Art. I, § 13 (emphasis added); see also Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-17.5 (1992) (giving magistrates the authority to conduct a preliminary examination to determine probable cause). The Utah Constitution does not define a magistrate. At the time of Ford's preliminary hearing and conviction, the Utah Legislature defined a magistrate as a justice or judge of a court of record or not of record or a commissioner of such a court appointed in accordance with Section 78-3-31. Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-3(4) (Supp.1992). Commissioners at the time were appointed by the Judicial Council and a majority of the district court judges in the district to which the commissioner would be assigned. Id. § 78-3-31(2)(a) (1992). Commissioners were required to comply with applicable constitutional and statutory provisions, court rules and procedures, and rules of the Judicial Council, and comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct to the same extent as full-time judges. Id. § 78-3-31(5)(a)-(b). ¶ 10 In reviewing a 1991 statutory amendment that authorized court commissioners to accept pleas of guilty or no contest, impose sentence, and enter final judgment in misdemeanor cases, and conduct a jury or nonjury misdemeanor trial in accordance with law, Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-31(6)(a) (1992), this court declared that commissioners were unable to perform core judicial functions such as entering final orders and judgments or imposing sentence. Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 852 n. 17 (Utah 1994). However, this court did not invalidate the service of commissioners: Court commissioners have provided a valuable service to the judiciary for over thirty years pursuant to constitutionally valid statutes. They have conducted fact-finding hearings, held pretrial conferences, made recommendations to judges, and provided counseling and other worthwhile functions. However, over that thirty-year period, commissioners were never allowed to perform ultimate or core judicial functions such as entering final orders and judgments or imposing sentence. In every case, commissioner actions led to recommendations which resulted in final review and signature by a judge. Id. Whether an action is a core judicial function is based on whether the commissioners' actions are reviewable by a judge [and] ultimate judicial power remains with the judge. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 302 (Utah 1998) (holding that the issuance of a search warrant constituted a core judicial function). So long as the commissioner's actions are reviewed and the commissioner does not exercise ultimate judicial authority, his or her actions are not core judicial functions. Id. ¶ 11 Unlike the district court, we conclude that binding a defendant over to the district court for trial does not constitute a core judicial function. [O]ur statutory provisions make an unmistakable distinction between the functions and powers of a judicial officer acting as magistrate and one acting as judge of a court. Humphrey, 823 P.2d at 467. `A preliminary hearing is not a trial, and a magistrate ... does not sit as a judge of a court and exercises none of the powers of a judge....' Id. (quoting Van Dam v. Morris, 571 P.2d 1325, 1327 (Utah 1977)). ¶ 12 Ford argues that State v. Jaeger, 886 P.2d 53 (Utah 1994), stands for the proposition that when a magistrate refuses to bind a defendant over for trial and instead dismisses the information, the magistrate's order is final and appealable, thus qualifying the bindover decision as a core judicial function. However, Jaeger distinguished between dismissals, which it deemed to be subject to appeal, and bindover orders, which it described as interlocutory. It made no assessment of the character of either type of order as part of a core judicial function: The magistrate's decision to bind over is interlocutory; it keeps the case alive and on track. As such, the magistrate decides nothing more than that the case will proceed. Jaeger, 886 P.2d at 55. As noted in Humphrey, that decision has no final preclusive effect. 823 P.2d at 467-68. The district court has plenary authority to decide the jurisdictional question differently and quash the bindover order. ¶ 13 The commissioner who conducted the preliminary hearing and bound Ford over for trial had the authority to determine that the evidence to convict Ford was adequate to proceed to trial. The commissioner was not acting in a core judicial function, and Ford's bindover hearing was proper.