Opinion ID: 1795704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Failure to Argue Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel on Direct Appeal

Text: Jackson next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because Hart failed to assign and argue that Jackson received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Because Jackson's postconviction motion was his first opportunity to raise this claim, it is not procedurally barred. [20] [13-16] We analyze Jackson's claim that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment under the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. [21] Under Strickland, Jackson has the burden to show that (1) counsel performed deficientlythat is, counsel did not perform at least as well as a criminal lawyer with ordinary training and skill in the area, and (2) this deficient performance actually prejudiced him in making his defense. [22] The prejudice prong requires that Jackson show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of the proceeding in question would have been different. [23] A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. [24] Notably, we can assess the prongs in either order. [25] [17,18] When analyzing a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, courts usually begin by determining whether appellate counsel failed to bring a claim on appeal that actually prejudiced the defendant. That is, courts begin by assessing the strength of the claim appellate counsel failed to raise. [26] Counsel's failure to raise an issue on appeal could only be ineffective assistance if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue would have changed the result of the appea1. [27] When, as here, the case presents layered ineffectiveness claims, we determine the prejudice prong of appellate counsel's performance by focusing on whether trial counsel was ineffective under the Strickland test. [28] If trial counsel was not, then the defendant suffered no prejudice when appellate counsel failed to bring an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim. [19] If trial counsel was ineffective, then the defendant suffered prejudice when appellate counsel failed to bring such a claim. We must then consider whether the appellate counsel's failure to bring the claim qualifies as a deficient performance under Strickland. In other words, whether the claim's merit was so compelling that appellate counsel's failure to raise it amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate counse1. [29] If it was, then the defendant suffered ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. If it was not, then the defendant was not denied effective appellate counsel. [20-22] Thus, although Jackson's claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel is procedurally barred, we address the issue to determine whether he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. In assessing trial counsel's performance under Strickland's two-prong test, there is a strong presumption that Poepsel acted reasonably. [30] This court has previously stated that trial counsel is afforded due deference to formulate trial strategy and tactics. [31] As such, when reviewing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, we will not secondguess reasonable strategic decisions made by counse1. [32]