Opinion ID: 2755011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jewelry?

Text: 10 Eakes or Barnes intended to rob Tehition when they killed him was the fact that Tehition was found in the trunk of his car without his wallet or shoes and his pockets turned inside out. Because Myra Christman was the key witness in the case, any evidence arguably impacting her credibility or bias was relevant, material, and should have been disclosed to Eakes’ counsel prior to trial. See Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028,1033-34 (6th Cir. 2009). The failure of the State to produce the suppressed evidence is inexcusable. The district court, in holding that under Brady the withheld evidence was immaterial, “never went beyond evaluating the materiality of each individual item of evidence separately.” See Castleberry v. Brigano, 349 F.3d 286, 292 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding the collective impact of withheld evidence material). In doing so, the district court failed to comply with Supreme Court precedent requiring courts to evaluate withheld evidence collectively, rather than item-by-item. Id. (“Because the state court applied only an item-by-item determination of materiality, the decision is contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles. The Court in Kyles specified that the materiality of withheld evidence may be determined only by evaluating the evidence collectively.” (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 419)); see also Brooks, 626 F.3d at 892 (noting that in determining whether undisclosed evidence is material, the evidence is reviewed “collectively, not item-by-item.” (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436)). That the district court failed to look at the suppressed evidence collectively is not the only problem with its analysis of the Brady claim. The district court misread the record (the VictimAdvocate’s report was drafted two years before the trial, not after the trial); it failed to address ADA Q. Yes. A. Well, I know that he pretty much wore jewelry all the time. Q. But do you recall whether or not he had it on that day? A. I can’t recall. (R. 47-5 at 35-36; Page 732-33.) 11 Haycox’s May 1999 case notes; and it reached an erroneous legal conclusion (contrary to the district court’s conclusion that the prosecutor was not responsible for failing to disclose the VictimAdvocate report because the Advocate was located “in a separate part of the District Attorney’s office,” the prosecutor is in fact responsible for disclosing all Brady information in the possession of that office, such as the Victim-Advocate report, even if the prosecutor was unaware of the evidence prior to trial). The undisclosed evidence was favorable to Eakes because it showed that Myra’s trial testimony over two years after the murder was significantly different than her recollection of events just three months after the murder. Without ADA Milam’s letter, there was no way for Eakes’ counsel to know that Myra was willing to change her initial detailed story about how Tehition came about carrying $175 the night of the murder to conform to the documentary evidence; there was no way for Eakes’ counsel to know that Myra earlier gave a different answer about who called Tehition the night he was murdered and left counsel unable to question her about where Tehition said he was going when he left the house; and there was no way for Eakes’ counsel to know that Myra added jewelry to the detailed list of items she recounted more than two years earlier. With the VictimAdvocate Report and ADA Haycox’s case notes, Eakes’ counsel could have attempted to show that Myra’s bias and vindictiveness led her to supplement the valuables Tehition supposedly wore to create evidence of Eakes’ motive for robbing Tehition. Furthermore, Eakes’ counsel could have used this evidence to show that Myra and her husband pressed the State to charge Eakes with felony murder so that he would receive the death penalty or a lifetime prison sentence when the prosecutors initially assigned to the case were reluctant to do so. 12 Since this evidence could have been used to attack Myra’s credibility, it may well have been determinative of Eakes’ guilt or innocence on the felony-murder charge. The evidence was material because Eakes’ felony-murder conviction rested largely on her testimony which was not strongly corroborated. If disclosed and used effectively, this evidence may have made the difference between Eakes’ conviction or acquittal on this charge. But the court reviewing a Brady claim need not determine whether Eakes can show it was more likely than not that he would have received a different verdict had he possessed that evidence. The question is whether, in its absence, he received a fair trial. Brooks, 626 F.3d at 892 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434). That said, before seeking federal habeas relief, state prisoners must first exhaust their available state court remedies by fairly presenting all their claims to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b); Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005). “The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) codified the requirement that an applicant for a writ of habeas corpus first exhaust her claims in state court before presenting them to federal court.” Rockwell v. Yukins, 217 F.3d 421, 423 (6th Cir. 2000). Under AEDPA, for a court to grant relief on the merits of an unexhausted claim, it would have to find either that “there is an absence of available State corrective process,” or that “circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C § 2254 (b)(1)(B). Here, it appears that there are available state remedies to address Eakes’ Brady claim. In Tennessee, a defendant may challenge his conviction and sentence by filing a petition for post-conviction relief under Tennessee’s Post-Conviction Procedure Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30101 et seq. Prior to Eakes’ counsel discovering the aforementioned documentary evidence, Eakes filed a state post-conviction petition on two occasions. Both petitions were dismissed. While 13 Tennessee has held that Brady claims are not cognizable grounds for reopening post-conviction proceedings, Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 591 (Tenn. 2003), it has recognized Brady claims as grounds for a writ of error coram nobis, Freshwater v. State, 160 S.W. 3d 548, 556 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2004) (holding that a Brady claim discovered 30 years after conviction may be a cognizable claim in a coram nobis petition and equitably tolling the writ’s statute of limitation). Accordingly, it appears that Eakes may have available state remedies. “[T]he exhaustion requirement is not a jurisdictional one but rather an issue of comity between federal and state courts.” White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517, 526 (6th Cir. 2005). Thus, a state can waive the exhaustion requirement. See Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028,1032 (6th Cir. 2009). However, “[a] state shall not be deemed to have waived the exhaustion requirement or be estopped from reliance upon the requirement unless the State, through counsel, expressly waives the requirement.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3). Here, the State has not expressly waived its non-exhaustion defense, and none of the State’s actions before the district court can be reasonably construed as an express waiver. While the State has not raised non-exhaustion on appeal, this court may raise nonexhaustion sua sponte. See, e.g., Clinkscale v. Carter, 375 F.3d 430, 436-37 (6th Cir. 2004); King v. Berghuis, 744 F.3d 961 (6th Cir. 2014). When we are confronted with the appeal of a district court’s decision denying the petition of a state prisoner which asserts unexhausted habeas claims, we have three options: (1) affirm the denial of the petition if the unexhausted claims are meritless; (2) vacate and remand with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of exhaustion if there is no “cause” excusing petitioner’s failure to exhaust; or (3) vacate and remand the case to the district court if the petitioner has “cause” to excuse his failure to exhaust and wishes to pursue exhaustion of his state court remedies. See Harris, 14 553 F. 3d at 1031-32 (citations omitted). In Rhines, the Supreme Court noted that the “stay and abeyance” option should only be used where the petitioner had “good cause for his failure to exhaust, his unexhausted claims are potentially meritorious, and there is no indication that the petitioner engaged in intentionally dilatory litigation tactics.” Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982)). As noted above, rather than reviewing the undisclosed evidence collectively, the district court dissected each item of undisclosed evidence piecemeal in violation of Supreme Court precedent. See Castleberry, 349 F.3d at 291. Thus, we cannot affirm the district court’s ruling because it misapplied the Brady standard. Insofar as the district court’s ruling denied Eakes’ Brady claim on the merits, it is vacated. We remand the case to the district court with instructions to stay the case so that Eakes can pursue exhaustion of available state court remedies. Eakes has “good cause” for failing to exhaust his Brady claim in state court because his lawyer discovered the documentary evidence only after Eakes had filed his federal habeas petition. Furthermore, as discussed above, Eakes’ Brady claim is potentially meritorious. Given the tremendous lapse of time in procuring the undisclosed evidence – and the effort it took to do so – it may seem unfair to direct Eakes back to the state courts to resolve his Brady claim. But we are constrained by statute to do so. Accordingly, we VACATE the denial of the Brady claim on the merits and REMAND this case to the district court for further proceedings as outlined above. 15