Opinion ID: 2521294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judges Must Be Sensitive To The Appearance Of Partiality

Text: A paramount concern of our judicial system is that judges be fair and impartial: One of the most fundamental social interests is that the law shall be uniform and impartial. There must be nothing in its action that savors of prejudice or favor or even arbitrary whim or fitfulness. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 112 (1921). [1] A judge who is free of bias is a necessary prerequisite to maintaining public confidence in the judicial system because [j]udicial decisions rendered under circumstances suggesting bias or favoritism tend to breed skepticism, undermine the integrity of the courts, and generally thwart the principles upon which our jurisprudential system is based. Richard E. Flamm, Judicial Disqualification: Recusal and Disqualification of Judges § 5.4.1, at 150 (1996). Such an undesirable result would be detrimental to our society as a whole. We all benefit from judges who exercise their judicial functions with integrity, impartiality, and independence . . . [and who] inspire trust and confidence. Jeffrey M. Shaman et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics § 1.01, at 2 (1990). Judicial impartiality is so important to our system of justice that we become concerned if there is even an appearance of partiality, irrespective of whether the judge is, in fact, biased: Since an appearance of bias may be just as damaging to public confidence in the administration of justice as the actual presence of bias, acts or conduct giving the appearance of bias should generally be avoided in the same way as acts or conduct that inexorably bespeak partiality. Flamm, supra, § 5.4.1, at 150 (footnotes omitted). Thus, this court has stated, Even where the trial judge is convinced of his own impartiality, the integrity of the judicial system is impugned when it appears to the public that the judge is partial. People v. Botham, 629 P.2d 589, 595 (Colo.1981); see also, e.g., People v. Dist. Court, 192 Colo. 503, 508, 560 P.2d 828, 831 (1977) (Courts must meticulously avoid any appearance of partiality.). The primary rationale for requiring disqualification on the basis of appearances stems from the recognized need for an unimpeachable judicial system in which the public has unwavering confidence. Allegations of judicial bias may serve to erode this public confidence. Flamm, supra, § 5.4.1, at 148 (footnotes omitted); [2] see also Johnson v. Dist. Court, 674 P.2d 952, 956 (Colo.1984) (Although the trial judge is convinced of his or her own impartiality, if it nonetheless appears to the parties or to the public that the judge may be biased or prejudiced, the same harm to public confidence in the administration of justice occurs.); Nordloh v. Packard, 45 Colo. 515, 521, 101 P. 787, 790 (1909) (stating that the impartial administration of justice is necessary to retain public respect and secure willing and ready obedience to [courts'] judgments). Avoiding even the appearance of bias also serves to assure parties to particular cases that they are, indeed, receiving a fair trial. Flamm, supra, § 5.4.2, at 151; Williams v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 720 P.2d 598, 601 (Colo.App.1985) (It is fundamental to the vitality of our judicial system that litigants believe in the fairness of the process. An unfavorable decision perceived to be the result of an impartial consideration may be bearable, but an unfavorable decision tainted by even the appearance of partiality cannot be condoned.). It is often extremely difficult for a party to prove that a judge has a bias, even though she may reasonably suspect that one exists. Thus, a rule requiring a judge to recuse himself when a reasonable person might question his impartiality serves to protect both the parties to a case and the general public as a whole. This is not to say that a judge who might reasonably appear to be biased is necessarily so. Again, I emphasize that I am confident that a wide range of persons, be they former prosecutors, public defenders, plaintiffs' attorneys, or defendants' attorneys, are extremely capable of conducting trials in a fair, impartial, and unbiased manner. Nonetheless, my belief in the need for unquestionably impartial judges is so great that I believe that it is vital that judges provide full disclosure of facts relevant to potential bias and, if necessary, recuse themselves whenever there is a reasonable question as to whether they are able to act in a fair manner. I do not stand alone in my belief. The Due Process Clause of the Constitution safeguards the right to impartial judges and requires recusal of judges who are or who appear to be biased. See, e.g., In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (stating that the Due Process Clause may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. But to perform its high function in the best way, `justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'). Consistent with this principle, a Colorado statute, procedural rules, and the Code of Judicial Conduct all provide guidelines to ensure that due process requirements are satisfied and that parties to civil and criminal cases are the beneficiaries of unassailably fair and impartial judges. See, e.g., § 16-6-201, 6 C.R.S. (2001); Crim. P. 21(b); C.J.C. 3(C). Each of these sources of law mandates recusal of judges in particular circumstances. Because Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically addresses the requirement that a judge must disqualify herself on the basis of an appearance of partiality, I turn to a discussion of that canon here, keeping in mind the fundamental fairness concerns discussed above.