Opinion ID: 2048105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Approval of the Reorganization Petition.

Text: Turning now to the Hedrick school district's allegations, we first consider those concerning Iowa Code sections 275.1 to 275.5 (1985). As the school district points out, section 275.9 makes the provisions of those sections mandatory prerequisite[s] to the the effectuation of any proposal for district boundary change. A mandatory duty is one that is essential to the main objective of the whole statute; failure to perform the duty will invalidate subsequent proceedings under the statute. Downing v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 415 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1987). Hence, if the agency here failed to perform its duties under sections 275.1 to 275.5, which the Code itself defines as mandatory, the agency's subsequent actions were invalid. The school district, while recognizing that the substantial compliance standard exists in this context, seems to be arguing for strict compliance with the mandatory duties. Substantial compliance is, however, still the standard by which we measure whether the mandatory duties were performed. Cf. Boyle v. Burt, 179 N.W.2d 513, 515 (Iowa 1970) (statute defining mandatory duty can require only substantial compliance) (citing Halvorson v. City of Decorah, 258 Iowa 314, 322, 138 N.W.2d 856, 862 (1965)). The defects under the mandatory sections, according to the school district, are that the agency (1) failed to conduct detailed studies and surveys, (2) failed to include alternative plans in its reorganization plan, (3) did not consult with officials and citizens, and (4) failed to adopt a reorganization plan before the petition was filed and did not conduct further studies and surveys when the petition did not conform to the adopted plan. See Iowa Code §§ 275.1, 275.2, 275.4, 275.5. We disagree, and in view of the whole record, construing the statutes liberally, we hold that the agency's compliance with these sections was substantial. First, the school district argues that the agency did not conduct the detailed studies and surveys required by section 275.1. It contends that the Rossi report, which was over five years old when the reorganization petition was filed, did not satisfy this requirement because the report did not contemplate any specific reorganization. Section 275.1 says that the purpose of conducting such studies and surveys is to provide for [a plan of] reorganization of school districts in order to effect more economical operation and the attainment of higher standards of education. We think the Rossi report coupled with the alternative plan for districts with substandard enrollments constituted substantial compliance with this stated purpose at the time of the petition's approval in August. The Rossi report, a lengthy and detailed study of the area school districts, was based on firsthand contact with the districts. It included all information called for by section 275.2. Moreover, contrary to the school district's contention, the report did consider boundary line changes. The conclusion of the report was that the districts were not interested in changing boundary lines but were content with the status quo. Requiring a plan to provide at all for reorganization assumes that the legislature mandated reorganization. We refused to make that assumption in Bloom, 270 N.W.2d at 597, and we reaffirm that view here. Section 275.1 signifies the legislature's policy of encouraging reorganization, but the statute does not mandate it except in districts maintaining less than twelve grades. Bloom, 270 N.W.2d at 597. We conclude that the Rossi report was not necessarily required to include a proposed reorganization of area districts. When the law was changed in 1984, Southern Prairie embarked on a long and tedious process to provide an alternative plan for the seven districts close to or below the 300-student enrollment standard. The alternative plan included updated information from the original plan, the Rossi report. Additionally, the alternative plan proposed mergers for the seven districts that were affected by the new law. As to the other districts the alternative plan indicated a continued policy of maintaining the status quo as long as possible: In most instances, the local boards have indicated that they want to maintain their school as long as possible. The general consensus is that they would first, share programs and staff with neighboring schools; second, tuition high school students to a neighboring high school; then, consider consolidation with other districts or dissolution of their school district. Clearly, there is substantial evidence in the record that when the reorganization petition was acted upon in August, a plan of reorganization existed for those districts having an enrollment of more than 300 students, and an alternative plan existed for those districts falling below this standard. Specifically, in providing for the Hedrick-Pekin merger, the alternative plan addresses essential matters that are necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of section 275.1. As such, that plan is in substantial compliance with the statute. See Brown, 423 N.W.2d at 194; Superior/Ideal, 419 N.W.2d at 407. Our response to the school district's first contention also answers its contention that Southern Prairie did not provide for alternative reorganization plans as required by section 275.2. That statute incorporates the 1984 change in the law that mandates the development of alternative plans for the reorganization of school districts with less than 300 students. The school district also contends that Southern Prairie did not consult with officials and citizens regarding the reorganization plans, which would be a violation of section 275.4. The record, however, indicates that Rossi, during his year's work on the project, visited every area school district and met with committees of parents, students, agency board members, and other citizens. During such meetings these people were encouraged to express their concerns about their districts as well as their preferences for the future development of their districts. In addition, the record indicates that as early as ten months before the current reorganization petition was approved, Southern Prairie began holding public meetings on the alternative plan and publicly aired board discussions on how the plan was developing. Both citizens and school officials were involved. Indeed, the petition itself was approved after a regularly scheduled meeting of the agency board. These meetings certainly constitute substantial compliance with section 275.4. The school district alleges other defects in the August 12 approval of the petition. It asserts that the formal board adoption of the alternative plan had not yet occurred on July 7, when the petition was filed. Consequently, the school district concludes, additional surveys had to be conducted. The school district maintains that Iowa Code section 275.5 was violated by this alleged defect, pointing to the following language in the statute to support its contention: Following receipt of a petition pursuant to section 275.12, the area education agency board shall review its plans and determine whether the petition complies with the plans which had been adopted by the board. If the petition does not comply with the plans which had been adopted by the board, the board shall conduct further surveys pursuant to section 275.4 prior to the date set for the hearing upon the petition. Iowa Code § 275.5 (emphasis added). Although section 275.5 does mention prior adoption of a reorganization plan and does mandate additional surveys when the petition differs, we do not agree with the school district's conclusion. While not formally adopted until one day after the reorganization petition was filed, the alternative plan had been given tentative approval by the agency board one month before. We will not draw a fine, technical line that would nullify this time-consuming and detailed reorganization process simply because the plan was formally adopted one day after the petition was filed. See Turnis, 252 Iowa at 938, 109 N.W.2d at 208. In addition, the plan did provide for the Hedrick-Pekin merger, just as the petition requested. Section 275.5 requires further surveys because of a difference between the plan and the petition, not because of any failure to adopt the plan before the petition is filed. The timing requirement is a means to an end, not an end in itself. We think the legislature contemplated the further survey requirement as a check in the event that a petition differed from a plan. This interpretation follows because in those circumstances, the effects of the plan called for by the petition would presumably not have been studied. When the plan and petition coincide, no such check is required. Requiring further surveys in the circumstances here would result in a useless and duplicative effort. Because no harm has been demonstrated by the premature filing of the petition, no further surveys should be required. Cf. Brown, 423 N.W.2d at 196 (absent a showing of prejudice, two-day premature mailing of petition substantially complied with statutory service provision). Construing the statute liberally, we think the agency board substantially complied with section 275.5. Consistent with our conclusion is this expression of legislative intent in section 275.6: It is the intent of this chapter that the area education agency board shall carry on the program of reorganization progressively and shall, insofar as is possible, authorize submission of proposals to the electors as they are developed and approved. We now turn to the school district's two allegations that are not based on mandatory code sections. Section 275.12(1) provides, in part, that [a] petition describing boundaries, or accurately describing the area included therein by legal descriptions of the proposed district ... shall be filed with the ... agency administrator. The school district contends this provision was violated by the agency's mistaken geographical description of the affected area. Apparently, 200 acres in the Hedrick school district were omitted. This error was inadvertent and slight. The error can be corrected prior to the election. We see no reason for halting the election because of such an easily corrected problem. Cf. Joint Bd. of Educ., 196 N.W. 2d at 427 (school reorganization upheld despite uncertainty over inclusion of certain areas). We note, in addition, that the provisions of section 275.12, unlike those of sections 275.1 to 275.5, are not defined to be mandatory prerequisites by section 275.9. No prejudice was shown to have resulted from the error in the description. Finally, the school district argues that the agency did not review the matter on its merits as required by section 275.15. The board apparently took only six minutes to approve the reorganization petition. We see nothing in section 275.15 that sets a minimum time for agency board consideration of a reorganization petition. While six minutes is very brief, it must be remembered that the agency board had been considering reorganization possibilities for at least several months before the day on which the petition was actually approved. Further, in June the board gave tentative approval to the alternative plan that recommended the Hedrick-Pekin merger. On the whole, we think the agency substantially complied with this statutory requirement.