Opinion ID: 503299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Costilla's Prior Inconsistent Statement (The Bogus

Text: Alibi) 27 Costilla was arrested the morning after the robbery and murder. At that time, he told the police that he had been with a female companion around midnight, that he was alone with her all night, and that, on the following morning, he got up at 11:00 a.m. and went home. 28 The state courts considered Costilla's statement under the third Agurs standard of materiality, which then was applicable to situations in which evidence is obviously of such substantial value to the defense that elementary fairness requires it to be disclosed even without a specific request. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 110. In such situations, the Court stated: 29 The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern with the justice of the finding of guilt. Such a finding is permissible only if supported by evidence establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. 30 Id. at 112. 31 The state trial and appellate courts found that the statement would not have created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. However, the district court felt that petitioner's conviction rested almost directly on Costilla's testimony. Because the credibility of Costilla, the prosecution's 'chief witness,' was determinative of petitioner's guilt, use of the inconsistent statement would have created a reasonable doubt. 32 The state argues that although Costilla's statement would have been relevant in petitioner's trial to impeach Costilla, its effectiveness for that purpose would have been limited since he admitted at trial that he was testifying only to save his own skin and would not otherwise have testified; that he had been convicted of a felony; that he had participated in the aggravated robbery and murder; that he was a drug user; and that he had an adulterous relationship with petitioner's common-law wife. 33 Petitioner contends that it is difficult to conceive of a more powerful impeachment device than a prior statement in which the chief prosecution witness denies that he was present at the scene of the crime. 34 The question, then, for our decision is whether a reasonable probability exists that the jury would have reached a different conclusion if it had known that Costilla lied to the police when he was apprehended hours after the robbery and murder. Or, in the language of Bagley, is there a reasonable probability that the results of the proceedings would have been different? 35 At trial, petitioner was identified as having participated in the crime by Costilla and three other witnesses who were present at the scene. John Aguirre, owner of the Broadside Bar, testified that petitioner had been present in the bar earlier and, although he was ordered to the floor and could not see petitioner, he recognized his voice. Olga Adams, a girl friend of Aguirre, testified that she knew petitioner previously and identified him by his speech and exposed facial features. Mary Ann Marquez, Adams' sister, also testified to the same effect. When petitioner was arrested, a .38 caliber handgun was discovered in his car and, upon a search of his home, .38 caliber shells and a barrel and stock of a sawed-off shotgun were found. Ballistic tests indicated that the handgun was not the murder weapon. However, Costilla positively identified the barrel, by its distinctive markings, as having come from the shotgun used in the robbery. 36 Petitioner testified in his own defense. Both he and his wife testified that he had been present in the Broadside Bar earlier on the night of the robbery, but claimed to have been home alone when the robbery occurred. His wife's testimony was impeached by a prior statement she had given to police, in which she said that petitioner had been home the entire evening. Petitioner further testified that the witnesses against him lied, and that the apprehending officer lied when he testified that he witnessed petitioner attempting to conceal a handgun when the officer stopped his car. In addition, a defense witness stated that he had known petitioner well since he was a boy, that he did not recognize petitioner as being present at the robbery, and that petitioner was not, as Marquez had testified, the first robber to come through the door. 37 The inconsistencies in the testimony are those which might be expected where the criminal's plan was designed to make identification impossible. In such circumstances, identification testimony always requires careful deliberation by both jury and judge. Nevertheless, the evidence overwhelmingly indicates that petitioner was guilty. The question then becomes whether a reasonable probability exists that Costilla's statement, in light of the witnesses' limited opportunities for viewing and hearing the robbers, would have changed the outcome. 38 Costilla admitted that his participation in the crimes was related to his need for money to purchase drugs and, further, that he would not have testified against petitioner except for the plea bargain. The judge and jury observed his demeanor. The evidence must have conveyed to the jury, as it did to the trial judge, that Costilla's character was that of a person who would lie if he could get away with it, whether the lie was told to protect himself or to convict another. Further, the jury might have regarded his adulterous relationship with petitioner's wife as a motive to remove petitioner as a competitor for her affections. It is doubtful that rational jurors would be either surprised or affected by the additional knowledge that such a witness had lied to police. Thus, we are unable to accept petitioner's argument that the statement is such a powerful impeachment device. 39 Since Costilla had plea bargained for a reduced sentence and knew that he must truthfully testify in order to keep his part of the plea bargain, it is probable that he would have admitted making earlier statements to the police. A requirement that states must grant new trials under these circumstances might invite, in some cases, a deliberate omission of cross-examination as to prior statements to police in the hope of preserving a possible post-conviction remedy. 40 Accordingly, we hold that the district court's findings with respect to the materiality of Costilla's bogus alibi are erroneous. We are satisfied that no reasonable probability exists that, had the statement been disclosed to the defense, the results of the proceedings would have been different. The failure to disclose the statement does not undermine our confidence in the outcome of the trial.