Opinion ID: 197677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Sullivan's Statement.

Text: 45 In a protest that harks back to his sufficiency challenge, the appellant takes umbrage with the district court's decision to admit, over his objection, evidence of certain out-of-court statements allegedly made by Sullivan to third parties. The statements, as recounted by Redpath, specifically linked the appellant to Sullivan; showed that Sullivan acted throughout with a view toward transshipping the computer equipment through Cyprus to Libya; and undermined the appellant's testimony that his attempt to off-load the equipment in Antwerp was not a ruse, but, rather, a sincere effort to abort the transaction once he became aware that it would violate U.S. law. We customarily review decisions to admit or exclude evidence for abuse of discretion, see United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1296 (1st Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 963, 136 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997), and we follow that praxis here. 46 The trial court admitted the challenged evidence on the authority of Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E), which creates an exception to the hearsay rule for extrajudicial statements by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The appellant's principal objection to the court's action stems from his extraterritoriality argument. We previously rejected that argument, see supra Part III, and the theory that undergirds it fares no better in an evidentiary context. 47 The second prong of the appellant's objection suggests that the government did not adduce sufficient evidence of Sullivan's involvement to bring his statements within the reach of Rule 801(d)(2)(E). This prong rests on an impeccable legal foundation. An out-of-court statement of a non-testifying coconspirator is admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) only if the district court supportably finds that it is more likely than not that the declarant and the defendant were members of the conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977); accord United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707, 715 (1st Cir.1992). 48 Factually, however, the objection falls flat. The government showed that Sullivan headed Afromed; that his name appeared on numerous documents created pursuant to the transaction; that he was in constant contact with the appellant regarding the status of the project (including the customs hold); and that he was responsible for arranging transshipment of the goods to the Libyan purchaser. The record also shows that, while in the United States, the appellant sent Sullivan a memo that advised Sullivan to use extreme caution in contacting him and to be very careful what he said in any such communication. In light of this evidentiary predicate, the district court had a reasonable basis for concluding that, more likely than not, McKeeve and Sullivan were coconspirators and that Sullivan's comments to Redpath were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Consequently, the decision to admit Sullivan's hearsay statements under the coconspirator exception did not constitute an abuse of discretion. 49