Opinion ID: 601466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Section 5K2.13 to Appellant's Sentence

Text: 36 Having determined that section 4B1.2 should not control the District Court's application of section 5K2.13, we turn to the decision of the District Court in the case before us. It is unclear, based on the sentencing transcript, how the District Court applied section 5K2.13 in this case. In deciding that a downward departure under section 5K2.13 was not available to the defendant, the court stated: 37 As to [section 5K2.13], I agree with the government that looking at the facts of this case, this was a crime of violence. The defendant presented a threatening note to the teller; there was no way for the teller to know that it was an idle threat. 38 I agree with the defendant that no force was used, other than the threat in the note, and that he did surrender voluntarily when confronted by the police.... But the threatening note itself is an act of violence, making this a crime of violence.... I rule as a matter of law that the downward departure [cannot] be granted.... 9 39 The District Court's reference to the facts of this case might lead one to conclude that the court considered the circumstances of Chatman's crime before deciding that section 5K2.13 did not authorize a departure. We recognize that the Government argued to the District Court that looking at the facts of this case and the guilty plea, this is a crime of violence. 10 Moreover, counsel for both the Government and the appellant cited Baskin to the trial court, and urged its applicability. Thus, since the trial court alluded to the facts of this case, and because a fact-based inquiry is required by Baskin, one [300 U.S.App.D.C. 105] might conclude that the District Court did evaluate the facts before imposing sentence. Even accepting this possibility, however, this would not be the end of the matter. 40 In our view, the trial court's decision cannot be affirmed because, even if a fact-based inquiry was conducted, it is unclear to us whether the District Court undertook that inquiry with a view to lenity, as section 5K2.13 implicitly recommends. The District Court may well have been guided by the principles of section 4B1.2, which is, as noted above, far less forgiving to the defendant. There is nothing to indicate that the trial court took these considerations into account in looking at the facts of this case. 41 Thus, because it appears that the trial court misconstrued the extent and nature of the discretion conferred upon it by section 5K2.13, we must vacate Chatman's sentence and remand the case to the District Court for resentencing. The District Court should thereupon reconsider whether Chatman is eligible for a downward departure under section 5K2.13. 42 In remanding, we wish to make clear one point on which we differ with the Poff dissent. That dissent might be read to suggest that any crime that does not actually involve physical violence is a non-violent offense. See Poff, 926 F.2d at 594-95 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) ([a] 'non-violent offense' ... is one in which mayhem did not occur.... '[N]on-violent offense' refers to crimes that in the event did not entail violence.). We think that such a rule would run contrary to the purpose of section 5K2.13, which is to allow downward departures where incapacitation is not particularly justified. Some offenses that never resulted in physical violence may, nonetheless, indicate that a defendant is exceedingly dangerous, and should be incapacitated. Thus, for instance, an offense that involved a real and serious threat of violence--such as assault with a deadly weapon--is not, in our view, within the compass of a non-violent offense. In short, in determining whether a particular crime qualifies as a non-violent offense, the District Court need not limit itself to determining whether the offense entail[ed] violence.