Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: 87-88, d.1-4)

Text: Defendant makes a series of claims based on the common premise that the seizure and search of the envelope and the admission of the audio tape into evidence violated defendant's right to the assistance of counsel and his privilege against disclosure of attorney-client communications. Defendant relies on the fact that Dougherty was an attorney and that the tape and the other enclosures in the envelope addressed, in part, matters in which Dougherty was to act on his behalf. The attorney-client relationship between Marshall and Dougherty concerned real estate and financial matters unrelated to defendant's criminal litigation. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 69, 586 A. 2d 85. By the time of the incidents at the Best Western Motel, investigators were aware that defendant had retained attorney Glenn Zeitz to handle the impending criminal charges. Dougherty had expressly declined to represent defendant in the criminal case, agreeing that his law firm would assist defendant's criminal counsel with legal research only. Ibid. In upholding the search warrant to open the envelope containing the tape, we held that the investigator's failure to include in the supporting affidavit that Dougherty was defendant's attorney was not improper because the record indicated that the officers believed that Dougherty, who was defendant's brother-in-law, was not representing defendant in the murder case. Id. at 70, 586 A. 2d 85. We held that [t]o whatever extent an attorney-client relationship between defendant and Dougherty may have existed at the time of the seizure, we are unpersuaded that the seizure of the envelope violated the attorney-client privilege. Ibid. Any attorney-client relationship was undisclosed. Id. at 73, 586 A. 2d 85. With regard to the content of the tape itself, we affirmed the trial court's holding that, defendant was communicating with Dougherty primarily as a trusted friend and relative, not as an attorney. Ibid. A note was seized from defendant's motel room that read: My name is Rob Marshall. Please contact my attorney Joseph Dougherty, and set forth a telephone number. At the suppression hearing, Mohel denied having seen the note previously. The record does not indicate which officer seized the note from defendant's motel room. The existence of the note was memorialized in an inventory of items seized from the motel room prepared by Investigator Daniel Mahoney on February 15, 1985, approximately five months after the incidents at the Best Western. Mahoney's inventory was not turned over to defendant until 1993 pursuant to a discovery request during the PCR proceeding. Defendant argues on PCR review that the failure to turn over the inventory before trial deprived him of the opportunity to show that the investigators were aware of the existence of the note, and consequently that they knew the Dougherty envelope contained protected attorney-client communications. Defendant also claims that the omission of any reference to the existence of the note from Mahoney's search warrant affidavit invalidated the warrant. Based on the discovery of the inventory, defendant reasserts in PCR filings that the seizure of the envelope from the Best Western's mailbox, the failure to mention the note naming Dougherty as defendant's counsel in the search warrant affidavit, the issuance of the search warrant itself, and the admission of the tape into evidence violated his privilege against disclosure of an attorney-client communication and thus his constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. Defendant also claims that the failure to turn over the inventory before trial was a violation of the State's discovery obligations. Several of defendant's claims based on attorney-client privilege fail because the content of the tape has been held not to constitute a privileged attorney-client communication. The fact that defendant wrote Please contact my attorney Joseph Dougherty, might offer support to the argument that a professional relationship existed between defendant and Dougherty, and the existence of the inventory would be relevant to the investigators' awareness of that relationship. However, the trial court noted, and we affirmed the proposition, that not every communication to one's attorney is a privileged attorney-client communication. Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 73, 586 A. 2d 85. Obviously, the details of defendant's affair with Kraushaar and the sums he had paid McKinnon were not communicated in furtherance of any legal representation of defendant. Moreover, because Dougherty had declined to represent defendant in the criminal matter, defendant could have had no reasonable expectation that communications relevant solely to the murder were in furtherance of their professional relationship. Thus, even if it were conceded that defendant's instructions to Dougherty concerning the disposition of his financial affairs were pursuant to an attorney-client relationship, the admissions on the tape relevant to the criminal charges against defendant were not within the scope of the representation, and, therefore, were not privileged. See also McCormick on Evidence § 88, 322-24 (Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992) (noting that consultation of attorney as business advisor or agent is not necessarily protected attorney-client communication). The existence of the note and its implications concerning the subjective awareness of the officers of an attorney-client relationship between defendant and Dougherty cannot change the content or character of the communication recorded on the audio tape. Because it has been determined that there was no breach of confidentiality of a protected communication, admission of the tape into evidence did not violate defendant's attorney-client privilege. Because no attorney-client confidence was exposed, defendant's claim that seizing the tape and admitting it into evidence violated his right to counsel is also rejected. Defendant argues that the omission from the affidavit in support of the warrant of the fact that police found the note naming Dougherty as defendant's attorney violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches. Defendant maintains that access to the inventory before trial would have helped him to establish that Mahoney intentionally had omitted the existence of the note from the affidavit and, furthermore, that Mahoney had notice of defendant's attorney-client relationship with Dougherty. Obviously, our holding in Marshall I, supra, that the warrant was not tainted by the failure to indicate in the supporting affidavit that there was a professional relationship between Dougherty and defendant, see 123 N.J. at 72-73, 586 A. 2d 85, did not take into account the then-undisclosed inventory of the items found in the motel room. Furthermore, the fact that the content of the tape was later determined not to be a privileged attorney-client communication is not dispositive of whether the search warrant was properly issued. See State v. Hutchins, 43 N.J. 85, 100-01, 202 A. 2d 678 (1964) (holding that search cannot be made lawful by product of search). To mount a successful challenge to the warrant's supporting affidavit, defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth included material, untrue information. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2684, 57 L.Ed. 2d 667, 682 (1978). Material omissions in the affidavit may also invalidate the warrant. State v. Stelzner, 257 N.J. Super. 219, 235, 608 A. 2d 386 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 396, 614 A. 2d 619 (1992). When a search intrudes on the attorney-client relationship, the special expectation of privacy in that relationship leads to heightened Fourth Amendment scrutiny. See United States v. Mittelman, 999 F. 2d 440, 445 (9th Cir.1993); National City Trading Corp. v. United States, 635 F. 2d 1020, 1025-26 (2d Cir.1980). However, a defendant's premises or possessions are not immune from search merely because they are associated with an attorney. See Mittelman, supra, 999 F. 2d at 445 (noting that [l]aw offices are not immune from search). Instead, as with the examination of any warrant, we consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a warrant was issued consistently with the dictates of the Constitution. See State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95, 122, 519 A. 2d 820 (1987). Defendant claims that the discovery of the inventory entitles him, at a minimum, to a hearing before the PCR court to establish that Investigator Mahoney knew of the note when he prepared the warrant affidavit, and that the warrant is therefore invalid due to a material, intentional omission by the swearing officer. We reject that claim because we find that, even assuming that Mahoney knew of the existence of the note when he signed the affidavit, such an omission would not have been material. The fact that in the note defendant named Dougherty as my attorney would not have established that Dougherty was defendant's attorney for the purposes of the impending criminal proceedings. In view of the fact that defendant had already retained criminal counsel, Mahoney reasonably could have assumed that the envelope contained admissions beyond the scope of whatever attorney-client relationship defendant had with Dougherty. Moreover, because of the attenuated nature of defendant's attorney-client relationship with Dougherty, Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 72, 586 A. 2d 85, even if Mahoney had disclosed the contents of the note in the warrant affidavit, a correct weighing of the totality of the circumstances would have mandated that a search warrant issue. Mahoney's affidavit informed the judge who issued the warrant that Dougherty was an attorney and defendant's brother-in-law. The affidavit established the strong probability that the envelope contained important evidence in a capital-murder case. Given the existence of separately retained counsel for the criminal matter, it was equally likely that any relevant evidence would be outside the scope of whatever attorney-client relationship existed between defendant and Dougherty. On those facts, even if the warrant judge knew of the note found in defendant's motel room, the totality of the circumstances would have required the issuance of the search warrant. Defendant claims that the failure to turn over the Mahoney inventory until the PCR discovery request was a violation of the State's discovery obligations. We are unable to determine from the record, however, the exact circumstances of this alleged violation. Defendant alleges the inventory was withheld from discovery, but does not state whether, for example, the State failed to produce it pursuant to a specific request, or whether the State claimed that the inventory was privileged. Thus we are unable to evaluate defendant's claim of a willful violation. However, because we find that defendant suffered no prejudice from the State's failure to turn over the inventory, defendant's claim that the State violated its discovery obligations is without merit. Defendant also claims that he was entitled to discovery of a report prepared contemporaneously with the search of the motel room detailing the circumstances of the seizure of the note. The State denies that such a reports exists, and defendant has made no showing to contradict that representation. Accordingly, that claim also must be denied. Finally, defendant asserts that the warrantless seizure of the envelope by Mohel violated defendant's right to assistance of counsel. We have already ruled on that issue. Id. at 70, 586 A. 2d 85. The existence of the note and Mohel's knowledge of its contents are irrelevant to the seizure of the envelopes, because the envelopes were seized before any law enforcement official entered defendant's motel room where the note was found. Therefore this claim is without merit. 3. Claims Alleging Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Connection With the Suicide Tape and the Items Seized at the Best Western Motel