Opinion ID: 1057606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver by Participation

Text: For the first time in this litigation, Plaintiff urges us in her brief to hold that Defendants waived the service of process defense by participating in the litigation during the approximately eighteen months after Defendants filed their answer and before they filed their motion for summary judgment. However, because this issue was not raised below, it is waived. Tenn. R.App. P. 13(a) advisory comm'n cmt. Even if considered on its merits, however, this argument must fail. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively facts in short and plain terms relied upon to constitute... an affirmative defense. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. [16] Here, Defendants' answer listed improper service and insufficiency of process as their first affirmative defense. Defendants specifically pled that the summonses, complaint, and amended complaint were not delivered personally to Dr. Haynes or the authorized agent for service of process for MedSouth Healthcare, P.C. Plaintiff concedes that this statement of facts is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Rule 8.03, and we agree. Plaintiff also admits that no Tennessee case has found the defense waived under these circumstances, and that is also correct. Having adequately raised insufficiency of process as an affirmative defense in their answer, Defendants did not waive the defense by their continued participation in the lawsuit. See Toler v. City of Cookeville, 952 S.W.2d 831, 835 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1997) (holding that our Rules directly contradict the argument that defendant waives defense of insufficient process by merely filing an answer); see also State ex rel. Barger v. City of Huntsville, 63 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Tenn.Ct.App.2001) (after properly raising insufficiency of process by Rule 12.02 motion, any other participation in the lawsuit by the defendant does not constitute a waiver); 5C Wright & Miller, § 1391, at 505 (explaining that the same principle holds true in federal practice). The lone Tennessee case cited by Plaintiff is distinguishable, for in that case the defendant waived its insufficiency of process defense because its Rule 12 motion failed to recite the supporting facts in short and plain terms. See Barker v. Heekin Can Co., 804 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tenn.1991) (discussing Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.03). Here, by contrast, Plaintiff simply invites this court to force Defendants' hand by requiring Defendants to file the dispositive motion on a properly pled defense earliernamely, before the expiration of the statute of limitations. We decline the invitation. Defendants properly raised the defense in their answer and did not waive it prior to filing their motion for summary judgment. Because we hold that Plaintiff never effectively served Defendants with process and that Defendants have not waived this defense, the one-year statute of limitations for malpractice actions has run. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-116. Pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 3: [i]f process ... is not served within 90 days from issuance, regardless of the reason, the plaintiff cannot rely upon the original commencement to toll the running of a statute of limitations unless the plaintiff continues the action by obtaining issuance of new process within one year from issuance of the previous process.... Here, Plaintiff obtained timely issuance of process in conjunction with both the original and amended complaints. For the reasons stated supra, however, process was not effectively served on either complaint within the ninety-day window. Because Plaintiff did not obtain issuance of new process within one year of the issuance of the previous process, Plaintiff cannot rely on the filing of the original lawsuit to toll the statute of limitations. As Plaintiff concedes, by the time that Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment based on insufficiency of process, the statute of limitations had already expired.