Opinion ID: 202945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Constructive Possession Errors

Text: Mangual-Garcia argues that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motion for acquittal as to the second count of the indictment, charging him with possession with intent to distribute approximately five kilograms of cocaine, because there was insufficient evidence on the possession element. We disagree. For purposes of the statute of conviction, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), possession may be either actual or constructive. United States v. Del Rosario, 388 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pacheo v. United States, 544 U.S. 970, 125 S.Ct. 1866, 161 L.Ed.2d 716 (2005). Constructive possession exists when a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mangual-Garcia argues that [t]here was no evidence that Mr. Mangual-Garcia was the owner of the plane, had command of the people transporting the kilos, or any evidence from which the fact finder could find, or at least infer, that he had the necessary power and intent to possess the cocaine. Appellant Mangual-Garcia Br. 7-8. To the contrary, there was sufficient evidence at trial for the jury to conclude that Mangual-Garcia constructively possessed the requisite amount of drugs during the events of December 21-22. First, the record contains evidence that the drugs involved in the conspiracy were owned by Mangual-Garcia. Moreover, tape recorded conversations introduced at trial and the testimony of cooperating witness Escobar-Lopez indicated that Mangual-Garcia was going to pay the person who placed the drugs on the December 22 plane and that the courier on that plane was supposed to deliver the drugs to Mangual-Garcia in the United States. Finally, other tape recorded conversations showed Mangual-Garcia scheduling the shipment of the drugs and coordinating who would place drugs on the plane. Based on all of this evidence (as well as additional evidence introduced at trial), we conclude that the district court did not err in denying Mangual-Garcia's Rule 29 motion for acquittal on the possession charge. Mangual-Garcia makes two other arguments related to constructive possession. First, he argues that the district court's jury instructions should have included a second sentence from Del Rosario in addition to the one quoted above in the text: [i]n a drug case, constructive possession may be inferred from a defendant's dominion and control over an area where narcotics are found. 388 F.3d at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). This quote is clearly just one example of when constructive possession can be found in a drug case, and the district court did not err in refusing to include this language in the instruction. Second, Mangual-Garcia argues that the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument improperly analogized constructive possession to when someone is shipping you something Fed Ex or UPS and you know it's coming to you . . . and you've got the tracking number but you haven't gotten possession of it yet. [10] Certainly, the facts of this case could be distinguished from the analogy, but we do not see how this analogy rises to the level of prosecutorial misconduct.