Opinion ID: 415488
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Instructions on Aiding and Abetting.

Text: 63 The trial judge charged that anyone who aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures the commission of a federal offense is punishable as a principal. This instruction was repeated in response to a note from the jury asking for clarification of the meaning of intent as stated in the indictment. Thomas argues that this charge on aiding and abetting was unfairly prejudicial because it permitted the jury to convict him as an aider and abettor while finding insufficient evidence of his knowing membership in the conspiracy. This claim is also without merit. 64 In its main charge, the court had consistently discussed the conspiracy and substantive counts separately, and clearly specified and defined each of the elements of the conspiracy charge, including knowing participation. Before defining aiding and abetting, the court instructed at the outset that the concept could be considered in connection with the counts then under discussion, i.e., the substantive counts. Previously, the court had cautioned that Thomas was charged only with conspiracy and not with any substantive crimes. The court construed the jury's note as a request for clarification of the meaning of intent as relating to the phrase possession with intent to distribute, and concluded its response to the note as follows: 65 A person possesses with intent to distribute if she aids or abets some other person in selling or possessing with intent to distribute or distributing heroin, and does so knowingly and wilfully. 66 I instruct you that you may find intent from considering all of the evidence in the case. However, specific criminal intent must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a person may be convicted of any of these substantive crimes in this indictment with respect to possession or intent to distribute. (Emphasis added.) 67 Counsel for Thomas did not object to this charge. Nor did he request that the court distinguish between substantive crimes and the conspiracy charge at this point. 68 Objection came to the court's response to a later note from the jury requesting assistance regarding the liability of a defendant for acts committed by a co-conspirator. The court responded by instructing that:In deciding the substantive count you decide whether the person whose case you are then considering in the substantive count knowingly and wilfully either committed all the elements or knowingly and wilfully aided and abetted someone else to do the crime. An aider and abettor is accountable for the criminal acts of the principal. That I did tell you. But a member of the conspiracy is not on the theory of this case accountable for a substantive crime committed by a member of the conspiracy, by another member, in furtherance of it. (Emphasis added.) 69 Counsel for Thomas then requested the court to instruct that the charge on aiding and abetting was not applicable to the conspiracy count, and the court refused. 70 The court's charges on aiding and abetting, whether viewed separately or, as they should be in the context of the entire charge, United States v. Scacchetti, 668 F.2d 643, 649 (2d Cir.1982), were correct. In short, there is little likelihood that the jury was misled into believing that one who was not shown to be a knowing member of the conspiracy could be convicted as a member on a theory of aiding and abetting. The jury's lack of confusion is evidenced by its acquittal of Galloway on the conspiracy count while failing to reach a verdict on the substantive count. See, United States v. Sanzo, 673 F.2d 64, 69 (2d Cir.1982). 71