Opinion ID: 784975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Matthews and Driskell

Text: 15 The Government also argues that the reasoning of our decisions in United States v. Matthews, 205 F.3d 544 (2d Cir.2000), and United States v. Driskell, 277 F.3d 150 (2d Cir.2002), in which we considered the appropriate treatment of New York youthful offender adjudications under other sections of the Sentencing Guidelines, compels the conclusion that defendant's youthful offender adjudication counts as an adult conviction for the purpose of section 2K2.1. 16 In United States v. Matthews, we considered whether the sentence imposed on a defendant after a youthful offender adjudication is appropriately counted under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 in the calculation of a defendant's criminal history score. Specifically, the defendant in that case argued that a youthful offender adjudication constituted an expunged conviction for the purpose of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j) (providing that [s]entences for expunged convictions are not counted). See Matthews, 205 F.3d at 545. 17 We rejected that argument, holding that whether a conviction had been expunged for the purpose of section 4A1.2(j) of the Guidelines depended on the language and design of the state statute, as well as its purpose. Id. at 546. Considering the nature of New York's youthful offender statutes, we noted the many instances, several of which we have enumerated above, see Analysis, section III, ante, in which New York law permits use of past youthful offender adjudications for the purposes of law enforcement. See id. at 547-48. We further noted the various declarations by the state courts of New York regarding the narrow purpose of the youthful offender statutory scheme: The youthful offender provisions of the Criminal Procedure Law emanate from a legislative desire not to stigmatize youths between the ages of 16 and 19 with criminal records triggered by hasty or thoughtless acts, People v. Drayton, 39 N.Y.2d 580, 584, 385 N.Y.S.2d 1, 350 N.E.2d 377 (1976), and [t]he `youthful offender' statute was not to shield a criminal from an overview of his criminal background in determining a proper sentence, Pina, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 346. Matthews, 205 F.3d at 548. Concluding that New York's youthful offender law evinced an intent only to set aside a conviction for the purposes of avoiding stigma, rather than to erase all record of the conviction or to preclude its future use by courts, we concluded that a youthful offender adjudication did not constitute an expunged conviction for the purpose of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(j). See id. at 548-49. 18 In United States v. Driskell, we considered the broader question whether a conviction replaced by a youthful offender adjudication could ever constitute an adult conviction under U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1, comment. (n. 1) and 4A1.2(d), which provide for calculating a defendant's criminal history by assigning points for, inter alia, each of his prior adult convictions. According to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d), adult convictions include offenses committed prior to a defendant's eighteenth birthday if the defendant was convicted as an adult and received a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month. We summarized the arguments and our conclusion in that case as follows: 19 Essentially, the parties dispute whether the label the New York statutory scheme places on Driskell or the substance of Driskell's attempted murder trial and resulting sentence control whether he was convicted as an adult within the meaning of U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2(d). We hold that a district court, in calculating a defendant's criminal history pursuant to [those sections], should look to the substance of the past conviction rather than the statutory term affixed to it by a state court. Accordingly, a court may consider a defendant's eligible past conviction, even when that conviction has been vacated and deemed a youthful offender adjudication under New York law, in those situations where, as here, the defendant although under age eighteen was tried in an adult court, convicted as an adult, and received and served a sentence exceeding one year and one month in an adult prison. 20 Driskell, 277 F.3d at 154. 21 Rejecting the defendant's argument that his youthful offender adjudication could not be considered an adult conviction because New York law did not designate it a conviction of any kind, we held in Driskell that, to identify an adult conviction for the purposes of sections 4A1.1 and 4A1.2(d) of the Guidelines, a district court must determine whether a defendant was convicted and received a sentence of a certain length, regardless whether the state court has ultimately reduced its disposition to judgment or to some other term. Id. at 156. Thus, [r]ather than finding New York's label conclusive, we held that the better course is for a district court to examine the substance of the prior conviction at issue; to `focus on the nature of the proceedings, the sentences received, and the actual time served.' Id. at 157 (quoting United States v. Pinion, 4 F.3d 941, 944 (11th Cir.1993)). 22 Defendant argues that Matthews and Driskell are not controlling in this case because neither case considered a Guidelines provision that included the precise language of Application Note 5 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, particularly that provision's reliance on whether a conviction is classified as an adult conviction in the forum in which a defendant was convicted. However, our reasoning in those cases, particularly Driskell, supports the Government's argument that whether a conviction is  classified as an adult conviction (emphasis added) under New York law for the purpose of Application Note 5 must depend on more than merely whether New York law uses the term conviction to describe the offense after the fact. We recently held in United States v. Reinoso, 350 F.3d 51 (2d Cir.2003), that the analysis of Matthews and Driskell applies to Guidelines provisions governing the calculation of a defendant's base offense level, despite the fact that both those cases interpreted provisions governing the calculation of a defendant's criminal history. See Reinoso, 350 F.3d at 54. We reasoned in that case, interpreting Driskell, that [b]ecause an eligible youth is not deemed a youthful offender until after he has been convicted as an adult, and `the court has, in its discretion, determined that the interest of justice would be served by relieving the eligible youth from the onus of a criminal record,' ... a youthful offender adjudication does not alter the substance of a defendant adult's conviction. Id. (quoting Driskell, 277 F.3d at 155 (internal quotation marks omitted)). We see no reason why the use of the word classified in Application Note 5 renders that analysis inapplicable in this case. 23 Moreover, in Driskell, we cited with approval the Eleventh Circuit's opinion in United States v. Pinion, 4 F.3d 941 (11th Cir.1993), which considered a Guidelines provision that included commentary using precisely the same language as Application Note 5. See Pinion, 4 F.3d at 944-45 & n. 6 (interpreting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment. (n.3) (1991)), cited in Driskell, 277 F.3d at 157 & n. 9. Despite that commentary's reference to the manner in which state law classifie[s] the conviction, the Eleventh Circuit held that the language of the commentary suggests the guidelines' willingness to accommodate a state's treatment of its criminals. Thus, because the guidelines do not specifically address `youthful offender' convictions, the mere title [of `youthful offender'] is not dispositive without an investigation of the pragmatic effect of the proceedings. Pinion, 4 F.3d at 944 n. 6. We agree. 24 As we observed in both Matthews and Driskell, the nature and apparent purpose of New York law regarding youthful offender adjudications contradicts defendant's argument — that youthful offender adjudications are categorically not adult convictions under New York law — in almost every respect beyond the purely semantic. Accordingly, we apply the reasoning of Matthews and Driskell to the instant case, and hold that determining whether a New York youthful offender adjudication is classified as an adult conviction under the laws of New York for the purpose of U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 requires district court[s] to examine the substance of the prior conviction at issue; to `focus on the nature of the proceedings, the sentences received, and the actual time served.' Driskell, 277 F.3d at 157 (quoting Pinion, 4 F.3d at 944). Here, where defendant was indisputably tried and convicted in an adult forum, and where defendant served his sentence in an adult prison, the District Court correctly applied section 2K2.1 to count his youthful offender adjudication as an adult conviction, which, along with defendant's second prior conviction, warranted a base offense level of 24 under section 2K2.1(a)(2).