Opinion ID: 4533276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Larson’s Due Process Claim

Text: To prevail on her due process claim, Larson must establish that she had a protected property interest in her continued employment. Freeze, 753 F.3d at 665. As an officer of the City, Larson argues that the Algood charter and employee handbook gave her a property interest in her employment. This court looks to state law to determine if employees have a property intesest in their employment. Id. “Tennessee has long recognized the doctrine of employment at will, with the -11- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. mutual right of either party to terminate such a relationship with or without cause.” Brown v. City of Niota, 214 F.3d 718, 721 (6th Cir. 2000). Under the state’s contract law: [A] contractual interest in continued employment will not be inferred on behalf of an at-will employee from an employer’s conduct absent a “show[ing] that the agreement ... was supported by adequate consideration [other than the employee’s past services], that there was a mutual assent to the terms of the agreement and that it was sufficiently definite to be enforceable.” Aldridge v. City of Memphis, 404 F. App’x 29, 36 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Price v. Mercury Supply Co., 682 S.W.2d 924, 933 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)). “[W]hat would otherwise be an at-will contract may be modified by specific language which evidences an intent to modify the existent employment contract.” Shelby v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 999, 1006 (M.D. Tenn. 1993), aff’d, 19 F.3d 1434 (6th Cir. 1994). “Tennessee courts have recognized that an employee handbook may, under certain circumstances, become a part of the contract of employment between the employee and the employer.” Id. “In order to constitute a contract, however, the handbook must contain specific language showing the employer’s intent to be bound by the handbook’s provisions.” Rose v. Tipton County Pub. Works Dep’t, 953 S.W.2d 690, 692 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). The Tennessee Court of Appeals has held “that an employer’s reservation of a unilateral right to modify the provisions of its employee handbook generally precludes the handbook from being considered part of the parties’ employment contract.” Reed v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 4 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). This proposition does not apply, however, in cases “where the employer also has included within its handbook unequivocal language demonstrating its intent to be bound by the handbook’s provisions.” Id. “[T]he Reed court announced a high standard for establishing the existence of an employer’s specific intent to be bound by the terms of an employee handbook.” City of Niota, 214 F.3d at 721. Relevant provisions must be “interpreted in the context of the entire handbook, and read in conjunction with any other relevant -12- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. material.” Rose, 953 S.W.2d at 692 (quoting Claiborne v. Frito–Lay, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1319, 1321 (E.D. Tenn. 1989)). In Freeze, two police officers claimed that “the City terminated their employment in violation of their Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.” 753 F.3d at 664. The city’s Board of Mayor and Aldermen had passed a resolution creating an employee manual for the police department. Id. at 663. The resolution stated that “discipline shall be for cause and shall follow the basic concepts of due process” and outlined a five-step, progressive system of discipline mandating that employees “be informed in writing of the ‘exact offense violated.’” Id. at 663–64. The officers argued that the resolution “created a contract that changed their status from at-will employees to those with a property right in continued employment.” Id. at 665. This court found that the resolution contained “unequivocal language demonstrating the City’s intent to be bound by the handbook’s provisions.” Id. at 666. Specifically, the resolution provided “[t]hat all resolutions or parts of resolutions in conflict herewith are hereby repealed to the extent of that conflict” and thus “plainly state[d] that the Police Resolution trump[ed] any other conflicting agreements pertaining to police-officer employment.” Id. Second, the resolution contained “unequivocal terms demonstrating an intent to be bound to an agreement prohibiting termination without good cause.” Id. Specifically, the resolution stated “in plain language that ‘discipline shall be for cause and follow the basic concepts of due process.’” Id. Third, considering the “context of the entire handbook,” there was nothing in the resolution that detracted from the language mandating termination for cause. Id. at 667 (quoting Rose, 953 S.W.2d at 693–94). This court held that the facts met the standard necessary “for a handbook or manual to create not just a contract, but also a property right.” Id. at 665–66. -13- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. Like the handbook in Freeze, the handbook here uses mandatory language to describe the pre-termination hearing process. Unlike the Freeze handbook, however, the “context of the entire handbook” here makes clear that the City did not intend to be bound by the handbook’s provisions. The handbook states that it “is not an employment contract” and that the City “reserves the right to change any or all such policies, practices, and procedures in whole or in part at any time, with or without notice to employees.” M.R. 54-1, PID 373. There is “no clearer way for an employer to express its intent not to be bound by an employee handbook’s provisions than the employer’s specific statement that the handbook is not a contract or that the handbook should not be construed as a contract.” Reed, 4 S.W.3d at 688 (quoting Adcox v. SCT Prods., No. 01A01–9703–CV– 00123, 1997 WL 638275, at  (Tenn. App. Oct. 17, 1997)). Larson further relies on a charter provision that states that “any city official may be removed from office by the city council for the conviction of any crime in office or for grave misconduct showing unfitness for public service, or for permanent disability, by a majority vote of the other members of the city council voting for such removal” and details the proceedings for such a removal. Larson Br. at 20–21. This argument would give us pause were it not for Tennessee law clearly to the contrary. The Tennessee Court of Appeals considered a substantially similar charter provision in Ogburn v. Gas & Water Department, No. 01A01-9702-CH-00056, 1997 WL 528812 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 27, 1997). The charter in Ogburn read: The mayor or any alderman or any city official or employee may be removed from office by the City Council for any crime, misconduct, unfitness or disability by vote of the City Council. The proceedings for such removal shall be upon specific charges in writing, which, with a notice stating the time and place of the hearing, shall be served upon the person so charged or left at his or her usual place of residence. The hearing may be public and the accused shall have the right to appear and defend . . . . -14- Nos. 19-5862/5866, Medlin, et al. v. City of Algood, et al. Id. at . In rejecting Ogburn’s argument, the court reasoned that the charter used the permissive word “may” and did “not state that this is the only method that the city may use to discharge a city employee, or that the causes mentioned in the charter provision are the only legitimate reasons for which an employee may be terminated.” Id. at . The court concluded that the charter did not create a constitutionally protected property interest. Id. The City of Algood’s charter mirrors the charter considered in Ogburn. Although this court is not bound by Ogburn, “[w]e will accept the holding of a state intermediate appellate court with respect to state law unless we determine the highest court of the state would decide otherwise.” Aldridge, 404 F. App’x at 35 (quoting United States v. Philp, 460 F.3d 729, 732 (6th Cir. 2006)). As Larson has not given us reason to believe that the Tennessee Supreme Court would hold to the contrary, Ogburn compels the conclusion that the Algood charter did not create a property interest in her continued employment. Further, Larson testified that her understanding was that she did not have an employment contract with the City, that she was never told she had a contract, and that she signed an acknowledgment that she did not have a contract. Larson is unable to establish that she had a protected property interest in her continued employment.