Opinion ID: 2824353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Joinder of codefendant

Text: Rimer claims that the district court's failure to sever the joint trial deprived him of a fair trial because Colleen's inculpatory statement to police detectives was admitted into evidence, he and Colleen had mutually SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 21 (0) 194Th 40. exclusive defenses, and the nature of their defenses gave rise to an inference that they were both guilty. We review a district court's determination of whether to sever a joint trial for abuse of discretion. Chartier v. State, 124 Nev. 760, 763-64, 191 P.3d 1182, 1184-85 (2008). A joint trial must be severed `if there is a serious risk• that [it] would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Marshall v. State, 118 Nev. 642, 647, 56 P.3d 376, 379 (2002) (quoting Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539). Here, Rimer informed the district court that there were no Bruton-type problems, see Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 126 (1968) (holding that a defendant's constitutional right to confront his accusers is violated when a nontestifying codefendant's statement incriminates him and is used at their joint trial), and the district court determined that Rimer's defense—that he was sick in bed and relinquished all parenting responsibilities to Colleen—and Colleen's defense—that she had myotonic dystrophy and relied on others in the household to care for Jason—were not so inconsistent or inherently prejudicial that they require severance, see generally Marshall, 118 Nev. 644-48, 56 P.3d 377-80 (discussing inconsistent defenses). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in this regard.