Opinion ID: 1324254
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: This Circuit's RFRA Precedents

Text: As I have described above, the majority's narrow definition of substantial burden conflicts with RFRA's text and purpose. The majority's approach also conflicts with our prior application of RFRA in this circuit. We first addressed the definition of substantial burden under RFRA in Bryant v. Gomez, 46 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1995). We stated that a substantial burden exists where: [A] governmental [action] burdens the adherent's practice of his or her religion... by preventing him or her from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a religious experience. ... This interference must be more than an inconvenience; the burden must be substantial. Id. at 949 ( quoting Graham v. C.I.R., 822 F.2d 844, 850-51 (9th Cir.1987)) (second, third, and fifth alterations in Bryant ) (emphasis added). Since Bryant, we have repeatedly refused to adopt the conclusion of the majority that a `substantial burden' is imposed only when individuals are forced to choose between following the tenets of their religion and receiving a governmental benefit ... or coerced to act contrary to their religious beliefs by the threat of civil or criminal sanctions. Maj. op. at 1053-54. See, e.g., Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d 1110, 1121 (9th Cir.2000) (substantial burden where government prevent[s] [plaintiff] from engaging in [religious] conduct or having a religious experience and is more than an inconvenience) (quoting Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1299 (9th Cir.1996); and Bryant, 46 F.3d at 949); Stefanow v. McFadden, 103 F.3d 1466, 1471 (9th Cir.1996) (same). We have noted that [a] statute burdens the free exercise of religion if it `put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,' including when, if enforced, it `results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution.' Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir.2002) (emphasis added) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); and Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961)). However, nothing in our opinions suggests that the government can substantially burden religion only by applying a penalty or withholding a benefit based on religion. In fact, we have held precisely the opposite. In Mockaitis, a district attorney for Lane County, Oregon, with the assistance of officials at the Lane County Jail, recorded the confession of a detained murder suspect to a Catholic priest. 104 F.3d at 1524-26. The prisoner and the priest learned of the taping only after it occurred. Id. at 1526. Although the prisoner did not seek suppression of the tape, the priest, together with the Archbishop of Portland, sought an injunction under RFRA barring future taping. Id. at 1526-1527. We concluded the initial taping violated RFRA and held that an injunction was warranted because, A substantial burden is imposed on [the Archbishop's] free exercise of religion as the responsible head of the archdiocese of Portland by the intrusion into the Sacrament of Penance by officials of the state, an intrusion defended in this case by an assistant attorney-general of the state as not contrary to any law. Archbishop George has justifiable grounds for fearing that without a declaratory judgment and an injunction in this case the administration of the Sacrament of Penance for which he is responsible in his archdiocese will be made odious in jails by the intrusion of law enforcement officers. Id. at 1531 (emphasis added). Mockaitis was not only correctly decided. It is also flatly inconsistent with the majority opinion. The majority does not dispute that Mockaitis is inconsistent with its approach today, but instead argues that Mockaitis cannot serve as precedent for two reasons. Maj. op. at 1073-74 n. 15. First, the Majority notes that City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 117 S.Ct. 2157, overruled our application of RFRA to a state subdivision in Mockaitis. But the federalism holding of City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532, 117 S.Ct. 2157, was entirely unrelated to our definition of substantial burden. We do not normally discard our prior view of the law simply because it was expressed in a case that is overruled on unrelated grounds. To the contrary, this circuit has cited cases that have been overruled on other grounds in 1,508 opinions. Mockaitis continues to demonstrate that we have previously refused to adopt the majority's restrictive definition of substantial burden. Second, the majority finds Mockaitis unhelpful because it did not define substantial burden, let alone analyze the substantial burden standard under the Sherbert/Yoder framework restored in RFRA, [or] attempt to explain why such framework should not apply to define substantial burden. Maj. op. at 1074 n. 15. As I have explained above, RFRA did not employ the term substantial burden as a term of art limiting the application of RFRA to burdens caused by the precise mechanisms at issue in Sherbert and Yoder. In rejecting this argument, the majority dismisses Mockaitis precisely because it proves my point. That is, because Mockaitis does not treat substantial burden as a term of art limited to burdens caused by the precise mechanisms at issue in Sherbert and Yoder, the majority must perforce reject it. The conflict between Mockaitis and the majority's approach today reflects the novelty of today's opinion, not any shortcomings of Mockaitis. Notably absent from the majority's opinion is any explanation of why the result reached in Mockaitis is incorrect. Under the majority's approach, it is clear that governmental eavesdropping on a prisoner's confession to his priest would not impose a substantial burden on the prisoner or priest under RFRA. This cannot be the law.