Opinion ID: 765610
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extra-Judicial Consequences of the Verdict

Text: 18 A prosecutor must refrain from attempting to deflect the jury's attention from the narrow issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence; any attempt to foist onto the jury responsibility for the extra-judicial consequences of a not-guilty verdict is improper. United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296, 1302 (1st Cir. 1994). Auch contends that the prosecutor committed such a transgression by arguing that a not guilty verdict would result in the biggest day of Auch's life and that he would laugh all the way to the bank. 13 19 The government candidly admits that the prosecutor did not choose his words carefully in this portion of the closing argument. We find the prosecutor's lack of discretion particularly troubling in this instance because the comments came towards the end of the government's rebuttal and, as the last words that the jury heard from the trial attorneys, had great potential to cause prejudice. See Manning, 23 F.3d at 575 (emphasizing the significance of the timing of improper remarks to the jury). 20 Nevertheless, the prosecutor's ill-advised rhetoric or pained attempt at humor appears to have been relatively harmless in this instance. The majority of our cases that address a prosecutor's references to the extra-judicial consequences of a jury's verdict involve more sweeping arguments. Typical examples include a prosecutor's attempt to enlist the jurors in the war on drugs, see Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1993) ([T]he defendants are not soldiers in the army of good. They are soldiers in the army of evil, in the army which only purpose [sic] is to poison, to disrupt, to corrupt.), or a demand that the jury prevent the defendant from harming other victims, see Whiting, 28 F.3d at 1302 (exhort[ing] . . . the jurors not to 'let other kids be succored [sic] in by [the defendant's] flash, that cash, that deception'). In this case, the prosecutor's remarks were confined to how Auch would react if the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty. Although the remarks may have been calculated to excite the jury, invite a partisan response, and distract its attention from the only issue properly presented by this case: whether the evidence established [Auch's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at 529-30, the prosecutor's remarks were not as far afield as those requiring reversal under the plain error standard.