Opinion ID: 2229872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Rhonda Powers' Testimony

Text: Defendant raises several errors related to the testimony of Rhonda Powers. Upon questioning by the State, Rhonda testified that defendant and Tyler arrived at her home the night of the shooting red-faced and out of breath. Rhonda admitted that she asked the defendant what happened, but denied that defendant made any response. She then admitted telling the police prior to trial that defendant answered that he shot someone in the face near the Olan Mills studio, but claimed that statement was not true. The State impeached Rhonda with her prior handwritten, typed and videotaped statements, which the trial court admitted as substantive evidence pursuant to section 115-10.1(c)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(2) (West 1994)). Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in admitting Rhonda's prior statement containing defendant's admission that he shot someone. Section 115-10.1 provides for the admission of prior inconsistent statements as substantive evidence where certain prerequisites are satisfied and the statement narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness has personal knowledge. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(2) (West 1994). Defendant concedes that all other prerequisites for admission were satisfied, but argues that Rhonda lacked the required personal knowledge. Defendant relies upon several appellate court cases which have held that the personal knowledge required by the statute is not that which is acquired by being told something, even if an admission; rather, it means `the witness whose prior inconsistent statement is being offered into evidence must actually have seen the events which are the subject of that statement' People v. Cooper, 188 Ill.App.3d 971, 973, 136 Ill.Dec. 498, 544 N.E.2d 1273 (1989), quoting R. Steigmann, Prior Inconsistent Statements as Substantive Evidence in Illinois, 72 Ill. B.J. 638, 640 (1984); see also People v. Coleman, 187 Ill.App.3d 541, 547, 135 Ill.Dec. 172, 543 N.E.2d 555 (1989); People v. Saunders, 220 Ill.App.3d 647, 658, 162 Ill.Dec. 827, 580 N.E.2d 1246 (1991); People v. Hastings, 161 Ill.App.3d 714, 720, 113 Ill.Dec. 451, 515 N.E.2d 260 (1987). As Rhonda did not have personal knowledge of the murder of Gasgonia, defendant argues that her prior inconsistent statement that defendant admitted to committing that murder is not admissible as substantive evidence. The State responds that any error is waived. We agree. When the trial judge agreed to admit the handwritten, typed, and videotaped statements as substantive evidence, defendant's attorney voiced only a general objection. Defendant's attorney did not advance the argument that Rhonda lacked the requisite personal knowledge and the trial judge had no opportunity to rule on that issue. Moreover, defendant did not include this argument in his post-trial motion and he did not argue this point at the hearing on that motion. Defendant's failure to raise this issue below results in waiver on appeal. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 190-91, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (1988); People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill.2d 178, 192, 62 Ill.Dec. 172, 435 N.E.2d 1144 (1982) (finding that a general objection to the use of a prior inconsistent statement waives the issue for appeal). In his reply brief, defendant requests review of this issue under the plain error doctrine. 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a). The plain error doctrine is a limited exception to the waiver rule. People v. Herrett, 137 Ill.2d 195, 209, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1 (1990). The doctrine of plain error is applied to remedy errors so plain and prejudicial that failure to object to them is not a waiver for purposes of appeal. People v. Davis, 145 Ill.2d 240, 251, 164 Ill.Dec. 151, 582 N.E.2d 714 (1991). A reviewing court will examine an issue not properly preserved under the plain error doctrine where the evidence is closely balanced or the alleged error is so fundamental that it denies the defendant a fair trial. People v. Byron, 164 Ill.2d 279, 293, 207 Ill.Dec. 453, 647 N.E.2d 946 (1995). The evidence in defendant's trial was not closely balanced. Defendant's confession was consistent with all the evidence presented at his trial. This evidence included Rhonda's testifying that Ricky, Tyler and defendant were together on the night of the shooting. Gonyo testified that he saw Ricky Powers and two other people near a blue-grey Oldsmobile at the scene of the crime. The occurrence witnesses testified that three men attacked Gasgonia and one shot him in the face from close range. Even excluding any statements defendant made to Rhonda, her prior statements describing defendant and Tyler arriving at her home shortly after the murders red-faced and out of breath were admissible as substantive evidence. In addition, Rhonda's prior statement that Ricky arrived a short time later and argued with defendant was also admissible as substantive evidence. These facts combined with Delanda Ewing's testimony that defendant stated that he smoked that mog strongly corroborate defendant's confession. When viewed as a whole, the evidence of defendant's guilt is overwhelming. Moreover, the introduction of defendant's admission through Rhonda's prior inconsistent statement, if error, did not deprive defendant of a fair trial. Even redacting defendant's admissions from Rhonda's prior statement, the other portions of Rhonda's statement strongly corroborated defendant's participation in the murder. Given this fact and all the evidence presented at defendant's trial including defendant's confessions, any error in admitting defendant's admission would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, we find defendant's claim waived.
Defendant next contends that his sixth amendment right to cross-examine and confront witnesses was violated by the State's impeachment of Rhonda Powers. Rhonda testified that Ricky arrived at her home a short time after defendant and Tyler. She further testified that Ricky and defendant had an argument, but she denied knowing what the argument was about. At this time, the State impeached Rhonda with her prior statements to police in which she stated that Ricky became upset because defendant told her about the murder: Q. Did Ricky express any anger or aggravation toward the defendant at this point? A. Not really, they had an argument about something, but I'm not sure what it was. Q. Well, didn't you tell Detective McCarthy that Ricky got upset with [defendant] for getting you involved, or for telling you what had happened? A. Yes, I said that. Q. That's in the typed statement that you signed. A. Yes. Q. And in your handwritten statement, you wrote Ricky got upset with [defendant] and said, `Man, she's been through too much already.' And then you wrote in parenthesis, `because I told Ricky what [defendant] said,' close parentheses. `You shouldn't have told her nothing like that-.' The defense objected to this impeachment. After a sidebar conference, the trial judge gave a limiting instruction concerning Rhonda's testimony: THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentleman I'm instructing you that as to the alleged statements of [Ricky] Powers that is being gone into here, you are not to consider the statement which is a hearsay statement for its truthfulness of what was said; you are merely to consider that statement in connection with the possible impeachment that is carried out at this time, or allegedly is carried out at this time. But you are to consider that statement of [Ricky] Powers as being truthful or being establishing, or establishing the truthfulness of that statement (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that the trial judge's admonishment was confusing and insufficient to prevent the admission of Rhonda Powers' statements as substantive evidence. Defendant also contends that the impeachment of Rhonda Powers, which related an inculpatory statement made by a nontestifying codefendant, violated his right to confrontation under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and progeny. We need not determine whether the trial judge's instruction was sufficient to limit Rhonda's statement for its impeachment value because Rhonda's statement was admissible as substantive evidence. The admission of Ricky's statement through Rhonda's prior inconsistent statement presents a hearsay within hearsay problem. The first hearsay statement is the statement made by Ricky to defendant, which was overheard by Rhonda. Although Ricky's statement is not technically being introduced for the purpose of its truth, it is still hearsay because its purpose is to prove the implicit assertion that defendant told Rhonda about the murder. See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 801.1, at 565 (5th ed.1990). The second hearsay statement is the out-of-court statement Rhonda made to the police. Both statements, however, come under exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay. Ricky's statement to the defendant is admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. Under this exception, the statement of one coconspirator is admissible against the others where the statement is made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. People v. Davis, 46 Ill.2d 554, 264 N.E.2d 140 (1970). Although Ricky's statements occurred after the completion of the robbery and murder, the statements constituted an attempt at concealment. Our appellate court has repeatedly held that the course of a conspiracy includes subsequent attempts at concealment of the crime where sufficiently proximate in time to the offense. People v. Columbo, 118 Ill.App.3d 882, 948, 74 Ill.Dec. 304, 455 N.E.2d 733 (1983); People v. Meagher, 70 Ill.App.3d 597, 603, 26 Ill.Dec. 800, 388 N.E.2d 801 (1979); People v. McInnis, 88 Ill.App.3d 555, 566, 44 Ill.Dec. 120, 411 N.E.2d 26 (1980); People v. Eddington, 129 Ill.App.3d 745, 773, 84 Ill.Dec. 887, 473 N.E.2d 103 (1984); see also People v. Parmly, 117 Ill.2d 386, 393, 111 Ill.Dec. 576, 512 N.E.2d 1213 (1987) (assuming, but not deciding, that conspiracy includes subsequent efforts at concealment). Ricky's statement to defendant occurred immediately after the murder and expressed the desire to conceal the matter and prevent his fiancee's involvement. In addition, the statement was made prior to defendant's retrieving and disposing of the gun. Therefore, the statement was admissible against defendant as a coconspirator's statement. Ricky's statement to defendant also qualifies as an excited utterance. A statement related to a startling event made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event is admissible despite its hearsay nature on the theory that the declarant lacks an opportunity to fabricate. People v. Damen, 28 Ill.2d 464, 471, 193 N.E.2d 25 (1963). Here, Ricky's statements to defendant came in response to the startling event of discovering that defendant told his fiancee about the murder. In addition, Ricky's statements were related to that event and uttered without time to fabricate. Thus, Ricky's statements were also admissible as an excited utterance. Rhonda's prior inconsistent statement to police was also admissible despite its hearsay nature. As stated, section 115-10.1 provides for the admission at trial of prior inconsistent hearsay statements where the signed statement narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the witness ha[s] personal knowledge. 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1(c)(2) (West 1994). Assuming but not deciding that the personal knowledge required under the statute must be from observing the event, Rhonda witnessed the argument between defendant and Ricky and her statement described and narrated that event. Thus, Rhonda's prior inconsistent hearsay statement was admissible under the statute. As both Ricky's and Rhonda's statements come under exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay, the trial judge did not need to give the limiting instruction on the use of Rhonda Powers' statement. The use of Rhonda's statement as substantive evidence at defendant's trial did not deny defendant his constitutional right to confront witnesses. First, Rhonda took the stand and testified that she made the prior out-of-court statement to the police. Where a hearsay declarant testifies at trial, the right to confrontation is satisfied. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935, 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 497 (1970). In addition, Ricky's statements to defendant overheard by Rhonda and contained in her statement were admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. In Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the confrontation clause is not violated by the introduction of hearsay statements under the firmly rooted coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. See also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 394-400, 106 S.Ct. 1121, 1125-29, 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 398-402 (1986) (finding that confrontation clause does not require unavailability for admission of coconspirator's statement). Moreover, the fact that our hearsay exception for coconspirator's statements is slightly broader than the federal rule at issue in Bourjaily does not present a confrontation problem. Even where there is no firmly rooted hearsay exception, the confrontation clause is not violated where the statement is not inherently devastating, or where there are other sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statement. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 77, 91 S.Ct. 210, 214, 27 L.Ed.2d 213, 220 (1970), a nontestifying codefendant told a fellow prisoner [i]f it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch [codefendant], we wouldn't be in this now. The fellow prisoner testified to the statement at trial under a Georgia rule that provided for the admission of all statements by codefendants, even those made after arrest, as long as a conspiracy to conceal the crime continues. The Supreme Court found no confrontation violation in the introduction of the codefendant's statement. The Supreme Court first distinguished Dutton from the Bruton line of cases because the statement at issue did not constitute the use of a devastating confession which originated from custodial interrogation and which was introduced in the context of a joint trial. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 87, 91 S.Ct. at 219, 27 L.Ed.2d at 226. The Court then noted that there is no confrontation problem with proving that a particular statement was made by someone who does not testify: The hearsay rule does not prevent a witness from testifying as to what he has heard; it is rather a restriction on the proof of fact through extrajudicial statements. From the viewpoint of the Confrontation Clause, a witness under oath, subject to cross-examination, and whose demeanor can be observed by the trier of fact, is a reliable informant not only as to what he has seen but also as to what he has heard. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88, 91 S.Ct. at 219, 27 L.Ed.2d at 226. The Court further reasoned that on the issue of the inculpatory nature of the out-of-court statement, there was no confrontation problem because the statement did not carry any express factual assertion of defendant's guilt, but only an inference of guilt. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88, 91 S.Ct. at 219, 27 L.Ed.2d at 227. In addition, the Court noted that the statement by the nontestifying codefendant was spontaneous and against penal interest, which are additional indicia of reliability. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89, 91 S.Ct. at 219-20, 27 L.Ed.2d at 227; see also White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (finding that an excited utterance is a firmly rooted hearsay exception which does not offend the confrontation clause). The Court also noted that defendant was free to call the nontestifying codefendant as a witness if he wished to challenge his statement. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88 n. 19, 91 S.Ct. at 219 n. 19, 27 L.Ed.2d at 226 n. 19. Defendant's right to confront witnesses was similarly not violated by the introduction of Ricky's statements into evidence. Unlike Bruton, on which defendant relies, there was no introduction of a custodial confession at a joint trial. The statement was also admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule and it did not contain any express factual assertion of defendant's guilt. Moreover, Ricky's statement was spontaneous, against his penal interest, and generally made under circumstances which indicate the statement was reliable. Last, we also note that defendant was free to call Ricky as a witness. We therefore find no violation of defendant's constitutional right to cross-examine and confront witnesses.
Defendant argues that because Ricky's statement was inadmissible under the confrontation clause, the impeachment of Rhonda was on a collateral matter and therefore improper. We have determined that the statement was admissible as substantive evidence. Therefore, we need not further consider defendant's argument that the impeachment was improper.