Opinion ID: 1925518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Appearance in Handcuffs

Text: We reach a similar conclusion in defendant's related argument that the trial justice committed reversible error in compelling Mr. Snell to stand trial in shackles or handcuffs. The defendant concedes, as he must, that he did not specifically object to his appearance before the jury in handcuffs. Indeed, the record of the trial itself is totally barren of any reference to handcuffs, leg irons, shackles, or restraints of any sort. On appeal, defendant asserts that his objection to prison clothing was sufficient to encompass any prejudice caused by being forced to stand trial while branded with an unmistakable mark of guilt. Mr. Snell did raise the issue in a post-trial motion for a new trial, but as his counsel acknowledged at the hearing on said motion, an alleged error of law is not a proper basis for relief under Rule 33. [1] Handcuffing a defendant is treated differently from prison attire because the former provides courtroom security while the latter does not. State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1256 (R.I.1981). The law has long forbidden routine use of visible shackles during the guilt phase; it permits a State to shackle a criminal defendant only in the presence of a special need. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, ___, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 2010, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). The reasoning for this rule is that shackling may diminish the defendant's presumption of innocence, prevent him from participating in his own defense, and undercut the trial justice's desire to maintain dignity in the courtroom. Id. at 2013. However, there are cases in which these perils of restraining a defendant are unavoidable. Id. at 2014. Trial courts are thus given latitude to make individualized determinations about whether such security measures are necessary. See id. A trial justice may compel a defendant to appear before the jury in restraints if justified by essential state interests such as physical security, escape prevention, or courtroom decorum. Id. at 2012. In contexts analogous to the one here, this Court has followed the United States Supreme Court's recognition that binding and gagging might possibly be the fairest and most reasonable way to handle a particularly disruptive defendant. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). For example, in State v. Thornton, 800 A.2d 1016, 1032-33 (R.I.2002), this Court held that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in deciding that safety precautions were necessary to restrain the defendant during sidebar conferences at his trial. Noting that the defendant had a past criminal record including forty-two criminal charges and had been disruptive in court by interrupting and making sarcastic remarks, we held that the trial justice's order that the defendant was to appear at sidebar only if handcuffed did not violate his constitutional rights. Id. at 1032 n.18, 1036. We indicated that the trial justice was correct in considering the severity of the crimes charged, the defendant's past criminal record, and his disruptive conduct and sarcastic demeanor in court in making the discretionary ruling on the need for handcuffs. Id. at 1032. Similarly, in Correra, 430 A.2d at 1256, although faced with the different question of the appropriateness of a witness appearing before the jury in handcuffs, we stated that the trial justice had a duty to shackle a witness if necessary to prevent escape, minimize danger, or maintain order in the courtroom. Although defense counsel had asked for the record to reflect that the witness appeared in handcuffs, we concluded that because he failed to specifically object, he did not preserve the issue for appeal. Id. at 1257. Moreover, we held that although shackling should be avoided if possible, witnesses whose records demonstrate that they are a threat to courtroom safety warrant restraint. Id. at 1256. Clearly, the same applies to a defendant whose record or conduct is likely to suggest a threat to courtroom safety and decorum. [2] In the present case, although Mr. Snell raised the issue of handcuffs in a motion for a new trial, he failed to raise any objection during trial and there is no record proof that he was in the courtroom in restraints of any sort. [3] Even if we were to conclude that the objection to his prison clothing sufficed to preserve the shackling issue, such objection was not timely made. The defendant therefore is unable to demonstrate the compulsion that is necessary to establish a constitutional claim. Moreover, in denying defendant's motion for a new trial, the trial justice gave adequate reasons for restraining Mr. Snell. The trial justice said that he was disruptive during his trial, speaking out-of-turn, making sarcastic faces, snickering, and laughing out loud while witnesses were testifying, despite being cautioned on several occasions. The trial record supports this assertion. The trial justice also noted that Mr. Snell was on trial for a serious criminal charge, was a high security inmate at the ACI, and had a history of violence. Clearly, these considerations warranted the trial justice's concern for courtroom safety and decorum. Based on these factors, even if defendant had objected to his appearance in handcuffs, we are satisfied that the trial justice had adequate reasons for restraining him to protect the courtroom from disruption and danger. See Thornton, 800 A.2d at 1032. Moreover, the cautionary instruction given to the jurors, that they were not to consider defendant's detention for any purpose, was sufficient to negate the possibility of prejudice. Accordingly, we decline to overturn defendant's convictions on these grounds.