Opinion ID: 821020
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Postjudgment Asset-Discovery Order

Text: As we have explained, the parties have done battle in extensive supplementary proceedings while this appeal Nos. 10-3413 & 12-2123 27 has been pending. Presently before the court is Asia Pulp’s appeal from the district court’s order declining to stay enforcement of JPMorgan’s asset-discovery citations. As to that order, we now conclude that we lack appellate jurisdiction. Judge Holderman’s order denying a stay and compelling compliance with the asset-discovery citations is not a final, appealable order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We “treat [a] postjudgment proceeding like a freestanding lawsuit and look for the final decision in that proceeding to determine the scope of” appellate review. Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 775 (7th Cir. 2009). Thus, “an order that addresses all the issues raised in the motion that sparked the postjudgment proceedings is treated as final for purposes of section 1291.” Id. at 776. In other words, the question is whether the district court’s order completely disposes of the postjudgment proceedings, not a single issue within those proceedings. A contrary approach would permit piecemeal appeals of interlocutory orders in ongoing postjudgment proceedings. Id. at 775-76. We have previously held that orders granting postjudgment discovery are not final, appealable orders. See Cent. States, Se. & Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Express Freight Lines, Inc., 971 F.2d 5, 6 (7th Cir. 1992); In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1994). In Asbestos Litigation we held that “[t]he denial of a motion to quash the citation proceeding simply lets the pro28 Nos. 10-3413 & 12-2123 ceeding continue and therefore is not final or appealable.” 1 0 22 F.3d at 760. The district court’s denial of Asia Pulp’s motion to stay is no different than the denial of the motion to quash in Asbestos Litigation. It is not the end of the postjudgment proceedings—to the contrary, the denial of a stay simply lets those proceedings continue. The district court’s order compelling compliance with the asset-discovery citations was not a final, appealable order. In the alternative, Asia Pulp argues that the district court’s order qualifies for immediate review under the collateral-order doctrine, which confers finality on an otherwise interlocutory order if the order conclusively resolves an important question completely separate from the merits of the action and the question is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Mohawk Indus., Inc. v. Carpenter, 130 S. Ct. 599, 605 (2009); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). 10 We have speculated that there may be room for exceptions to the rule that orders granting postjudgment discovery are nonfinal. In re Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d 755, 760 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Resolution Trust Corp. v. Ruggiero, 994 F.2d 1221, 1224 (7th Cir. 1993)). As in Asbestos Litigation, however, this case gives us no reason to explore this possibility. The “circumstances surrounding the ruling of the district court [made] it clear that the court did not regard its ruling as a final disposition of the matter before it.” Id. at 761. The same is true here. The district court explained that the denial of the motion to stay the citation proceeding “likely will not be this court’s last order in the postjudgment proceeding.” Nos. 10-3413 & 12-2123 29 “Collateral-order review is based on a practical construction of 28 U.S.C. § 1291; it is not an exception to the finaljudgment rule.” Ott v. City of Milwaukee, 682 F.3d 552, 554 (7th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). In making the collateral-order determination, we “do not engage in an ‘individualized jurisdictional inquiry.’ ” Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 605 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 473 (1978)). “Rather, our focus is on ‘the entire category to which a claim belongs,’” id. (quoting Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1992)), and whether “the class of claims, taken as a whole, can be adequately vindicated by other means,” id. Asia Pulp’s motion to stay enforcement of the assetdiscovery citations conclusively resolved an important question—whether Asia Pulp is entitled to rely on the Indonesian injunction to resist discovery of its assets— but this question is coextensive with, not distinct from, the merits of the postjudgment proceedings. The purpose of the postjudgment proceedings is to discover assets that might be available to satisfy the judgment, and, following discovery, to execute on those assets. Bank of Am., N.A. v. Veluchamy, 643 F.3d 185, 188 (7th Cir. 2011). Asia Pulp claims that the terms of the Indonesian injunction prevent it from complying with the assetdiscovery citations. This claim goes to the heart of the supplementary proceedings. Moreover, under Mohawk Industries, Asia Pulp cannot establish that the issue is effectively unreviewable if a collateral review is not allowed. In Mohawk Industries the 30 Nos. 10-3413 & 12-2123 Supreme Court concluded that collateral-order appeals were not permitted from pretrial discovery orders adverse to the attorney-client privilege. 130 S. Ct. at 606. The Court held that postjudgment appeal was sufficient to protect the interests secured by the privilege. Id. The Court emphasized that piecemeal appeals “undermine[] efficient judicial administration and encroach[] upon the prerogatives of district court judges.” Id. at 605 (inter- nal quotation marks omitted). The Court thus refused to expand the scope of collateral-order review to include claims of privilege, noting that several options exist for cases raising particularly acute concerns: interlocutory appeal by certification under § 1292(b), mandamus, and appeal from a contempt citation. Id. at 607-08. We have recently observed that the “overriding lesson from Mohawk Industries is that the class of collaterally appealable orders must remain narrow and selective in its membership.” Ott, 682 F.3d at 555 (declining to extend collateral-order review to the denial of a motion to quash a nonparty subpoena for pretrial discovery). If the privilege claim in Mohawk Industries failed to satisfy the requirements of the collateral-order doctrine, it’s hard to see how the present claim could qualify. Asia Pulp insists that without collateral review, it may be subject to monetary sanctions for violating the Indonesian injunction if forced to comply with asset discovery here. We note for starters that the district court found that Asia Pulp failed to establish this as a matter of fact; on the record before the court, the status and effect of the injunction was unclear. Even assuming the possibility of sanctions, Asia Pulp has not demonstrated that the Nos. 10-3413 & 12-2123 31 conflict-of-law question is effectively unreviewable if appeal is postponed until supplementary proceedings have concluded. “That a ruling ‘may burden litigants in ways that are only imperfectly reparable by appellate reversal of a final district court judgment . . . has never sufficed.’ ” Mohawk Indus., 130 S. Ct. at 605 (quoting Digital Equip. Corp., 511 U.S. at 872). We note as well that the procedural options that the Supreme Court found to be adequate alternatives for review of the privilege claim in Mohawk Industries—interlocutory appeal by certification under § 1292, mandamus, and appeal from a contempt citation—are also available here. Accordingly, we hold that the collateral-order doctrine does not extend to the district court’s order denying Asia Pulp’s motion to stay enforcement of the asset-discovery citations. For all the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the district court’s order entering summary judgment in favor of JPMorgan in its entirety. The appeal from the order denying Asia Pulp’s motion to stay enforcement of JPMorgan’s asset-discovery citations is D ISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. 2-21-13