Opinion ID: 844220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: adequacy of appellate record

Text: Defendant contends that errors and omissions in the appellate record have denied him his right to a meaningful appeal. We disagree. Under the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal Constitution‟s Fourteenth Amendment, and under state law, a criminal defendant is entitled to an appellate record that is “sufficient to permit adequate and effective appellate review.” (People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th 826, 857; accord, People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 195; People v. Galland (2008) 45 Cal.4th 354, 370.) “The defendant has the burden of showing the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review.” (People v. Rogers, at p. 858; see People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th 574, 659.) Defendant asserts that the record is deficient in four respects, which we consider in turn.
Defendant points out that the appellate record does not include a reporter‟s transcript of a conference in which the trial court and counsel discussed proposed jury instructions for either the guilt phase or the penalty phase. Defendant insists that the transcripts are missing, but he presents no evidence that any such conference ever occurred. Notably, the trial court‟s minute orders do not show that any such conference occurred, nor do the reporters‟ transcripts of the oral proceedings at trial contain any mention by the trial court or by counsel of a jury instruction conference. Although we recognize that such conferences commonly occur, particularly in capital cases, defendant has not carried his burden of showing that any occurred in this case. Were we to assume that such conferences were held but were not reported or transcribed, the absence of such transcripts would not establish a denial of 78 defendant‟s right to an adequate record. The appellate record contains a complete record of the jury instructions that were given, as well as copies of proposed instructions that the trial court rejected. We have considered on its merits each of defendant‟s claims of instructional error, and we have not rejected any of those claims on the ground that defendant failed to object to the instruction or failed to propose appropriate additional instructions. (See People v. Seaton, supra, 26 Cal.4th 598, 699.) The absence of transcripts of jury instruction conferences has not deprived defendant of meaningful appellate review. (See People v. Letner and Tobin, supra, 50 Cal.4th 99, 195; People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 111112.)
As already stated (see, ante, at p. 72), after defendant was first charged with the murder of Patrick Rooney, he briefly exercised his right of self-representation. The prosecution later dismissed and refiled the charges in a different judicial district, and court proceedings recommenced. The appellate record includes some documents relating to the original prosecution, including an order appointing a psychologist to examine defendant to determine his competence to represent himself, but it does not include a report from the psychologist, nor does it include a transcript of the hearing at which the trial court granted defendant‟s request for self-representation. Defendant contends that he has been prejudiced by these omissions, particularly in light of the trial court‟s comment, when it granted defendant‟s presentencing request for self-representation, that it was relying in part on “the fact that another judicial officer on a previous occasion made a finding that he was able to represent himself.” The court‟s order of appointment stated that the psychologist was to furnish a report “only to the court in camera” and the court‟s minute order similarly stated 79 that the psychologist was “appointed to examine the defendant and to provide a confidential report to the Court only.” It is unclear whether any report was ever made or whether any hearing on the motion for self-representation was ever held. In any event, defendant has failed to show he was prejudiced by the alleged omissions. When it granted defendant‟s presentencing motion for selfrepresentation, the trial court placed minimal reliance on the earlier determination that defendant was competent to represent himself. The existing appellate record is adequate to provide meaningful review of defendant‟s claim that the trial court erred in granting his motion for self-representation.
Defendant asserts that a written motion challenging the manner in which jurors were selected in Los Angeles County, and the transcript of a hearing on that motion, have been omitted from the appellate record. Defendant fails to show, however, that any such motion was ever filed or any such hearing was ever held. At the outset of jury selection proceedings, Defense Counsel Ramirez told the trial court that he was “considering filing a challenge to the petit panel” and asked when the court would hold a hearing on that challenge. The court indicated that the proper time would be the following Monday. The appellate record contains a reporter‟s transcript of proceedings on the following Monday, but that transcript does not include a hearing on a challenge to the jury panel, nor is such a hearing mentioned in the minute order for that date. As evidence that the motion was filed, heard, and denied, defendant quotes remarks by the trial court later during jury selection. In response to defense counsel‟s complaints about the low number of African-Americans on the jury panel, the court said: “I can‟t control that. And that part, as far as challenge to the panel, is behind us.” The court‟s remark is reasonably interpreted, however, as 80 meaning only that defendant‟s opportunity to challenge the panel had passed without any challenge having been made. D. Attorney’s Request for Appointment as Defendant’s Counsel Attorney Angela Wallace represented defendant during the preliminary hearing on the complaint, but at the arraignment on the information the trial court declined to reappoint her. The court stated that there was “a letter in the file” from Wallace requesting the appointment. Defendant asserts that he has been denied meaningful appellate review because Wallace‟s letter requesting reappointment is not part of the appellate record. Defendant has not shown that the omission of Wallace‟s letter from the appellate record prevents meaningful appellate review of any claim. The record before us includes the trial court‟s explanation, which was essentially that Wallace lacked the required experience. Among other things, the court said that it “would under no circumstances appoint an attorney on a capital case with less than ten years‟ admission to the bar.” Attorney Wallace then addressed the court, but did not dispute the court‟s statements about her experience. The appellate record is adequate to review any claim regarding the failure to reappoint Wallace, and defendant does not explain how the letter could be relevant to any other potential claim. E. Disorganization of Appellate Record Defendant complains that the appellate record is not entirely in chronological order, that it contains duplicate copies of some documents, and that other documents in the record appear to be unrelated to this case. Appellate counsel asserts that this disorganized condition has required additional time to sort through it and identify potential claims. We agree that the appellate record is not as well organized as it should be, and that these deficiencies have imposed added 81 burdens on appellate counsel and on this court. Defendant has not, however, carried his burden of showing that the record‟s condition has prevented meaningful appellate review of any claim.