Opinion ID: 587012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prevailing Party Standard

Text: 11 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states, in relevant part: In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. Thus, the question in this case is whether Ruffin was a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. 12 The parties agree that the Supreme Court's decision in Texas State Teacher's Ass'n v. Garland Independent School District, 489 U.S. 782, 109 S.Ct. 1486, 103 L.Ed.2d 866 (1989), is controlling on the prevailing party issue. In Garland, the Court resolved a conflict between the circuits as to the proper standard for determining whether a civil rights plaintiff was a prevailing party, rejecting the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits' central issue test in favor of a more lenient standard. 1 The Garland Court held that [i]f a civil rights plaintiff has succeeded on 'any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit,' the plaintiff has crossed the threshold to a fee award of some kind. Garland, 489 U.S. at 791-92, 109 S.Ct. at 1493 (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). The Court further held: 13 [w]here the plaintiff's success on a legal claim can be characterized as purely technical or de minimis, a district court would be justified in concluding that even the generous formulation we adopt today has not been satisfied. [Citations omitted]. The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the material alteration of the legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to promote in the fee statute. Where such a change has occurred, the degree of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award under Hensley [v. Eckerhart, supra], not to the availability of a fee award vel non. 14 Id. at 792-93, 109 S.Ct. at 1493. 15 Appellant claims that because the district court's injunction materially altered the legal relationship between himself and Great Dane, he has satisfied the Garland test and has prevailed on a significant issue in the litigation that achieved some of the benefits he sought in bringing suit. 2 Appellee contends, conversely, that Ruffin did not satisfy the Garland standard for several reasons: first, appellee notes that Ruffin received none of the financial benefits he sought from bringing his lawsuit, such as a promotion or back pay; second, appellee argues that the court did not order Great Dane to initiate any further action with respect to the specific incidents of racial harassment out of which Ruffin's lawsuit arose; third, Great Dane contends that, given the district court's finding that Great Dane had taken some steps to eliminate the offensive racial atmosphere in its Birmingham shop, the court's injunction merely directed the appellee to do more of what the evidence established [it] had already done in the past. Ultimately, argues Great Dane, Ruffin achieved no more than a technical victory in district court, and lost on every significant claim presented to the court. 16 We disagree with the appellee, and hold that the district court abused its discretion in determining that Ruffin was not a prevailing party under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 and Garland, supra.