Opinion ID: 2512331
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ulterior purpose

Text: In addressing whether the defendant used process primarily for an `ulterior purpose,' the circuit court relied on the ICA's decision in Wong. The plaintiff in that case asserted that the defendants had committed an abuse of process by filing counterclaims and by asking him and his wife abusive questions during oral depositions and through written interrogatories in order to harass him and coerce him into either withdrawing his complaints in other actions or settling those claims for less than he was entitled to recover. 7 Haw.App. at 417, 772 P.2d at 698, 700. The circuit court entered summary judgment in the defendants' favor with respect to the plaintiff's abuse of process claim. Id. at 418, 772 P.2d at 698. On appeal, the ICA, examined this tort, as follows: Liability for abuse of process is imposed when the putative tortfeasor uses legal process primarily for an ulterior motive. The significance of [the word primarily] is that there is no action for abuse of process when the process is used for the purpose for which it is intended, but there is an incidental motive of spite or an ulterior purpose of benefit to the defendant .... For abuse of process to occur there must be use of the process for an immediate purpose other than that for which it was designed and intended. Id. at 420-21, 772 P.2d at 700 (citing Restatement of Torts  682 comment b) (emphasis added). It noted the plaintiff's argument that the defendant used process for the purpose of settlement, as well as to have [plaintiff] expend funds to defend himself from the counterclaims, [and] to harass and embarrass him.... Id. at 421, 772 P.2d at 700. The ICA held that, [s]ince the counterclaims and the questions, by [the plaintiff's] own admission, were asserted for the purpose of settlement, the `improper' motives ascribed by him to [the d]efendants were incidental. Id. In the case at bar, the circuit court correctly applied Wong when it essentially concluded that, because settlement is a valid litigation objective and because the first amended complaint alleged that the Defendants employed process in order to settle the underlying case, Young had failed to state an abuse of process claim. We do not, however, agree with the ICA's analysis in Wong. It rests on the false premise that, if process is used for at least one valid purpose, such as settlement, then any invalid purpose is incidental and the valid purpose is primary. See id. A purpose may be legitimate and yet, at the same time, incidental. See Levert v. Philadelphia Int'l Records, Civil Action No. 04-1489, 2005 WL 2789099, , 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25012, at  (E.D.Pa. Oct. 26, 2005) (If plaintiffs' primary purpose in seeking injunctive relief was not legitimate, defendants' abuse of process claim can survive, even if plaintiffs' secondary purpose was legitimate. (emphases in original)). We therefore overrule Wong on this score and hold that a defendant's use of process for a proper purpose does not necessarily mean that he used the process primarily for that purpose. In this case, the first amended complaint alleges that the Defendants used process in order to prevail in the underlying case through trial or settlement. While that general aim was clearly legitimate in the regular conduct of the underlying case, it also alleged that the Defendants used process to implement the CCPR plan, employing scorched earth litigation tactics to punish Young and to send a message to claimants and the plaintiffs' bar nationwide. In our view, that objective is patently illegitimate. [10] Whether that improper purpose was, in fact, the Defendants' primary motivation constitutes a question of fact that cannot be resolved by way of an HRCP Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Givens, 75 S.W.3d at 403 (concluding that, although the defendants may have used interrogatories and subpoenas solely for their lawful and intended purpose of gathering information relating to the merits of the case, their intention involved a question of fact not properly decided on a motion to dismiss). Accordingly, we conclude that the allegations sufficiently state that the Defendants employed process primarily for an ulterior purpose.