Opinion ID: 606007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standing analysis

Text: 11 We have recognized that standing is essential to the exercise of jurisdiction and is a threshold question ... [that] determin[es] the power of the court to entertain the suit. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); U.S. v. One 18th Century Colombian Monstrance, 797 F.2d 1370, 1374 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1014, 107 S.Ct. 1889, 95 L.Ed.2d 496 (1987). We now turn our attention to this question, and address each of Coleman's asserted bases of standing. 1. Statutory Basis 12 Section 502(a) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a) (hereinafter,  § 1132(a)), ERISA's civil enforcement provision, limits those who can maintain suits under the statute to participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries. 3 Coleman is not, and never has purported to be, a participant, 4 or fiduciary 5 as defined by ERISA; therefore, if he is to establish standing under § 1132, he must satisfy the statute's definition of beneficiary. 13 ERISA defines beneficiary as a person designated by a participant, or by the terms of any employee benefit plan, who is or may become entitled to a benefit thereunder. ERISA § 3(8), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(8). Under this definition, Coleman is not a beneficiary. Charlie Coleman never designated his son or anyone else as beneficiary of his Plan assets 6 ; therefore, Coleman's assertion of beneficiary status rests upon the language and terms contained in the Plan. 7 14 Section 4.2 of the Plan defines beneficiary as any one or more of the persons comprising the group consisting of the participant's spouse, the participant's descendants, the participant's parents or the participant's heirs at law, ... or (b) the estate of such deceased participant ... Coleman argues that because he is Charlie Coleman's descendant, heir at law, and the representative of Charlie Coleman's estate, under Plan Section 4.2, he is Charlie Coleman's beneficiary for purposes of § 1132. We do not share appellant's view. 15 Plan Section 4.2 directs the Retirement Committee to designate a beneficiary from the aforementioned group if (1) death benefits are payable at the time of the Plan participant's death; (2) if the participant failed to specify an alternate payment option; and (3) if the participant failed to name a beneficiary. Crucial to this directive is that death benefits be payable at the time of the participant's death. In this case no death benefits were payable at the time of Charlie Coleman's death. 16 The Plan provides specifically that if an unmarried, terminated participant such as Charlie Coleman dies before beginning to receive his pension, no pension benefits are payable or owing. Plan Section 2.5(a). Charlie Coleman elected to remain under the normal Lifetime Only Income payment option. While this Plan option provides the greatest amount of monthly income, the Plan states clearly that, under this option, at the time of the participant's death, all pension benefits cease. 17 Because no pension benefits were payable at the time of Charlie Coleman's death, the Retirement Committee was not, and is not now, authorized to name a beneficiary from the list in Section 4.2. As such, the terms of Plan Section 4.2 do not afford Coleman beneficiary status as contemplated in § 1132. Coupled with the fact that Charlie Coleman did not name his son as his beneficiary, this conclusion forecloses any statutory basis for Coleman's assertion of standing. 18 Appellant next asserts alternative, non-statutory bases to support his claim of beneficiary status. 2. Fentron Non-Enumerated Party Analysis 19 Relying on Fentron Indus., Inc. v. National Shopmen Pension Fund, 674 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (9th Cir.1982), Coleman argues that standing to bring an action under ERISA is not limited to the list of parties enumerated in § 1132. The court in Fentron, looking to legislative history of ERISA, held that § 1132's list of possible plaintiffs was not exclusive, and concluded that employers could bring ERISA actions as well. Fentron employed a three-part analysis and held that in order to bring an action, a plaintiff must: (1) suffer an injury in fact; (2) fall arguably within the zone of interests protected by the statute; and (3) show that the statute itself does not preclude suit. Id. at 1305. 20 We have rejected the Fentron non-enumerated party standing concept previously, and do so again today. Where Congress has defined the parties who may bring a civil action founded on ERISA, we are loathe to ignore the legislature's specificity. Moreover, our previous decisions 8 have hewed to a literal construction of § 1132(a). Jamail, Inc. v. Carpenters Dist. Council of Houston Pension & Welfare Trusts, 954 F.2d 299, 302 (5th Cir.1992), citing Hermann Hosp. v. MEBA Medical & Benefits Plan, 845 F.2d 1286, 1289 (5th Cir.1988). 21 ... [O]nly Congress is empowered to grant and extend the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal judiciary, and ... courts are not to infer a grant of jurisdiction absent a clear legislative mandate. Pressroom Unions-Printers League Income Security Fund v. Continental Assurance Co., 700 F.2d 889, 892 (2d Cir.1983). Absent clear Congressional expression that non-enumerated parties such as the appellant have standing to sue under ERISA, we decline to confer such standing. 9 3. Christopher But For Analysis 22 Coleman next argues that he has standing by way of the but for analysis articulated in Christopher v. Mobil Oil Corp., 950 F.2d 1209 (5th Cir.1992). We do not agree. Christopher is distinguishable from the present case and does not provide Coleman with standing to bring his suit under ERISA. 23 In Christopher, certain employees brought suit against their employer, Mobil, for, among other things, violations of ERISA. At trial, these employees alleged that Mobil induced them into accepting early retirement and taking a lump sum pension payment, rather than the normal annuity payment. The employees were induced to take this action, they alleged, through Mobil's use of misinformation and manipulation in a scheme contrived to reduce Mobil's work force. 24 At issue in Christopher was whether the plaintiffs had standing under § 1132 as participants. 10 The Supreme Court, in Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 109 S.Ct. 948, 103 L.Ed.2d 80 (1989), held that the definition of participant in § 1132 referred to former employees who 'have ... a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment' or who have a 'colorable claim' to vested benefits. Id. 489 U.S. at 118, 109 S.Ct. at 958. Mobil, relying on Yancy v. American Petrofina, Inc., 768 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.1985), argued that because the plaintiffs had received a lump sum all of the benefits to which they were entitled, the plaintiffs lacked a colorable claim to vested benefits. Mobil also contended that the plaintiffs, because they had taken early retirement, did not have a reasonable expectation of returning to covered employment. As such, Mobil concluded, the former employees lacked standing. 25 The Christopher court distinguished Yancy however, and stated that the case before it fell somewhere between Yancy and Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142-44, 111 S.Ct. 478, 485, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990) (construing ERISA § 510 as foreclosing any state law cause of action for wrongful termination to prevent vesting of benefits). A wrongfully discharged employee under § 510, the court pointed out, would be a former employee lacking both a colorable claim for vested benefits and (unless he requested reinstatement) a reasonable expectation of returning to employment. Under this analysis, the plaintiff could look solely to ERISA for his remedy, yet he would be denied standing under ERISA. Recognizing the inequity of such a scenario, the court stated: 26 It would be unusual if in that situation his ability to assert a claim at all turned on whether or not his requested relief included reinstatement; it would seem more logical to say that but for the employer's conduct alleged to be in violation of ERISA, the employee would be a current employee with a reasonable expectation of receiving benefits, and the employer should not be able through its own malfeasance to defeat the employee's standing. 27 Id. at 1221, citing Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Murdock, 861 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir.1988) (emphasis in original). 28 The court held that in situations akin to § 510 violations, where the standing question and merits are unavoidably intertwined, whether a plaintiff has standing to assert ERISA rights may depend upon whether he can establish a discharge or some other conduct in violation of ERISA, but for which he would have standing. Id. at 1222. The court was careful, however, to contrast that situation with the one in which the alleged violation, such as the one in the present case, was not one that in and of itself divested aggrieved parties of their status as covered employees able to sue. Id. 29 Christopher clearly poses a different scenario than the one we face today. In Christopher, this court restored ERISA standing to individuals who had standing but were divested of that standing through the ERISA violations of their employer. The employees alleged that they had been wrongfully induced to retire, and but for the ERISA violation, would have continued their employment and plan participation, thereby retaining status to sue under ERISA. 30 In the present case, Coleman never had standing to sue under ERISA since he was neither a Plan participant nor a beneficiary. Thus, even if the Coleman's allegations of ERISA improprieties were true, those violations could not be said to have divested the him of his status to sue. As such, Christopher does not help the appellant.Murdock Equity Analysis 31 Like Christopher, Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. Murdock also fails to provide Coleman with standing to sue under ERISA. In Murdock, an employee benefit plan fiduciary breached his duty of loyalty to the plan when he contrived an elaborate scheme to profit on certain greenmail stock transactions and pension plan manipulations. The fiduciary, Murdock, invested plan assets in companies in which he personally held substantial shares of stock. Using the leverage he gained through control of the plan shares, Murdock forced the companies to repurchase the plan stock at a premium. These transactions netted the plan millions of dollars. 32 Murdock obtained this money by causing the plan to be amended, and then taking steps to terminate the plan and have its surplus assets distributed to him. The amendment to the plan provided that any surplus held by the plan would revert to the sponsor, and through a series of transactions, Murdock moved into the role of plan sponsor. He then terminated the plan by paying the participants and beneficiaries the amounts actuarially due them. 33 The question before the court was whether the participants and beneficiaries, having received all the benefits due them, had standing to seek a constructive trust remedy. Murdock challenged the plaintiffs' standing, citing Kuntz v. Reese, 785 F.2d 1410, 1411-12 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 318, 93 L.Ed.2d 291 (1986), for the proposition that plan participants and beneficiaries have no standing to seek monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty after they receive their contractually defined and vested benefits from an ERISA plan. 34 The Murdock court distinguished Kuntz and found that the participants and beneficiaries did have standing to seek a constructive trust remedy because ill-gotten profits can be held in constructive trust for participants and beneficiaries, and can be construed as equitably vested benefits under an ERISA plan. Murdock, 861 F.2d at 1419. Critical to the court's holding was the fact that the fiduciary engaged in a scheme to personally profit from the breach of his duty of loyalty. Id. at 1418. The plan amendments provided that any surplus plan profits reverted to the plan sponsor; therefore, any profits which would have been returned to the plan would have automatically passed to Murdock. The court held that such an outcome would run counter to the goals of ERISA, and stated that 35 It would be ironic if the very acts of benefit payment and plan termination that allegedly resulted in a fiduciary personally obtaining ill-gotten profits should also serve to deny plan beneficiaries standing to seek a constructive trust on those profits to redress the fiduciaries' alleged breach of the duty of loyalty. 36 Id. 37 The Murdock court granted standing because it was the only means available to give effect to the goals of ERISA. Id. at 1411. Moreover, the court stressed that its grant of standing was limited to the specific type of scenario before it. 38 The situation before us today is very different from that in Murdock. Coleman never has been a participant in or beneficiary of the Plan, he does not assert any action on the part of Champion to personally profit by its alleged activities, and he has not shown that granting him standing would be the only means available to give effect to the goals of ERISA. Murdock simply does not apply to Coleman's situation; as such, Coleman's reliance on Murdock as a basis for standing is misplaced.