Opinion ID: 1353139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Prior Conviction as an Aggravator

Text: Error is next cited where the trial court allowed the admission of Appellant's 1974 willful murder conviction as an aggravator because it was not a capital conviction as required by KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1). Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling on two grounds: (1) that his 1974 conviction was not a capital conviction as required by KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1), and (2) that the absence of a record in the 1974 willful murder case left Appellant with no way to be heard in a challenge to the validity of the prior conviction. Appellant was convicted in 1974 of willful murder. He argues that the conviction was not a capital conviction as required by KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) because, at the time of sentencing, a federal moratorium against the death penalty was in place, as a result of the U.S. Supreme Court holding in Furman v. Georgia. [56] Hence, according to Appellant, the conviction was not a capital conviction because the death penalty was not an option at that time. We can dispense with this argument without determining whether a murder conviction obtained during the federal moratorium against the death penalty is nonetheless a capital conviction for purposes of KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1). A statutory aggravating circumstance serves to place the appellant in the class eligible for the death penalty. [57] Appellant was already eligible for the death penalty. [58] Thus, we need not decide whether the 1974 willful murder conviction was a capital conviction for purposes of KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1). Furthermore, we find no merit to Appellant's assertion that this issue renders KRS 535.010 and KRS 532.025(2)(a)(1) unconstitutionally vague. Appellant also challenges the use of his 1974 conviction as an aggravator on the grounds that no record of that trial exists. Appellant argues that he was never afforded an effective appeal due to the absence of a trial record, rendering the conviction constitutionally infirm, and therefore improperly admitted as an aggravator in the present matter. Of course, as stated above, this argument does not warrant reversal as the jury properly found the presence of another statutory aggravating factor, which alone would authorize imposition of the death penalty. However, we will briefly address Appellant's statement in his brief that this Court affirmed the 1974 conviction, despite the absence of any record, in violation of Section 115 of the Kentucky Constitution, which entitles all criminal defendants to one appeal upon the record. To state that Appellant was never afforded the opportunity of an effective appeal is materially misleading and hints at serious impropriety on the part of this Court. In an unpublished opinion rendered in May of 1994, this Court unanimously voted to affirm Appellant's 1974 willful murder conviction. [59] While noting the unusual procedural circumstances of the case due to apparent limitations of the record, this Court, after careful consideration as evidenced by the lengthy review of the procedural and factual history of the case, determined that the record on appeal in this case as approved and settled by the Pike Circuit Court pursuant to CR 75.13, is sufficient to provide for effective appellate review of the proceedings in the trial court leading to the appellant's conviction of the crime of willful murder and his sentence to life imprisonment. [60] Appellant was convicted by a jury and enjoyed effective appellate review; thus, the introduction of this conviction as a statutory aggravating factor was not improper.