Opinion ID: 1890026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Crime-Fraud Exception and Its Application

Text: The Court of Special Appeals found that Friedman's testimony about the content of his disclosure under MRPC Rule 1.6 was admissible under the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. We disagree with the court's application of the exception. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers defines the crime-fraud exception as: The attorney-client privilege does not apply to a communication occurring when a client: (a) consults a lawyer for the purpose, later accomplished, of obtaining assistance to engage in a crime or fraud or aiding a third person to do so, or (b) Regardless of a client's purpose at the time of consultation, uses the lawyer's advice or other services to engage in or assist a crime or fraud. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, § 82 (2000, 2004 Cum.Supp.). We have never explicitly accepted the existence of a crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege under Maryland law. Nevertheless, we agree with the Supreme Court's assessment that it would be an abuse of the privilege to permit the attorney-client privilege to extend to communications `made for the purpose of getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or a crime. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563, 109 S.Ct. 2619, 2626, 105 L.Ed.2d 469, 485 (1989). Thus, we hold that the crime-fraud exception applies in Maryland to exempt communications seeking advice or aid in furtherance of a crime or fraud, from the protection of the attorney-client privilege. In the present case, the State suggests that we should opine that a statement of intention to commit a criminal or fraudulent act is equivalent to seeking advice or aid in furtherance of committing that crime from an attorney, brings that utterance within the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. We decline to so opine and join our colleagues on both the federal and state levels who have required more than a mere statement of the intent to commit a crime or fraud to trigger the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. See e.g., In re Richard Roe, 168 F.3d 69, 71-72 (1999) (stating that the use of an attorney's services must be in furtherance of a crime or fraud for the exception to apply); United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1503 (9th Cir.1996) (same); Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir.1992) (same); United States v. White, 887 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C.Cir.1989) (It does not suffice that the communications may be related to a crime. To subject the attorney-client communications to disclosure, they must actually have been made with an intent to further an unlawful act.); In re Murphy, 560 F.2d 326, 338 (8th Cir.1977) (same); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir.1987) (same); In re International Systems & Controls Corporation Securities Litigation, 693 F.2d 1235, 1242 (5th Cir.1982) (same); State v. Madden, 215 W.Va. 705, 601 S.E.2d 25, 37 (2004) (The crime-fraud exception comes into play when a prospective client seeks the assistance of an attorney in order to commit a crime or perpetrate a fraud on a third party or the court.); In re Public Defender Service, 831 A.2d 890, 901 (D.C. 2003) (reasoning that to create a crime-fraud exception that includes past statements made merely evidencing an intent to commit a crime or fraud, would undermine the attorney's ability to discourage such actions); Purcell, 676 N.E.2d at 441 ([The crime-fraud] exception applies only if the client or prospective client seeks advice or assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct.); Lane v. Sharp Packaging Systems, Inc., 251 Wis.2d 68, 640 N.W.2d 788, 806 (2002) (The test for invoking the crime-fraud exception is whether there is `reasonable cause to believe that the attorney's services were utilized in furtherance of the ongoing unlawful scheme.'), Henderson v. State, 962 S.W.2d 544, 553 (Tex.Crim.App.1997) ([W]e cannot conclude that the crime-fraud exception can be satisfied by the mere pendency of ongoing criminal activity or the mere threat of future activity. The attorney's services must be sought or used to further the activity in question.); Kleinfeld v. State, 568 So.2d 937, 939-40 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1990) (stating that Florida's crime-fraud exception required the client to seek the attorney's assistance in furthering the crime or fraud); In the Matter of Nackson, 114 N.J. 527, 555 A.2d 1101, 1105 (1989) (observing that the crime-fraud exception only applied where the client consulted with the attorney to obtain aid in the commission of a crime, to enable the client to avoid criminal prosecution, or to avoid lawful service of process); People v. Paasche, 207 Mich.App. 698, 525 N.W.2d 914, 917-18 (1994) (stating that to establish the crime-fraud exception it must be shown that the communication was in furtherance of a criminal or fraudulent enterprise), In re Marriage of Decker, 153 Ill.2d 298, 180 Ill.Dec. 17, 606 N.E.2d 1094, 1101 (1992) (defining the crime-fraud exception as only applying to communications with attorney in furtherance of a crime or fraud). To permit the mere statement of intent to defeat the attorney-client privilege would result in the exception swallowing the privilege. The Court of Special Appeals only addressed the application of the crime-fraud exception to the communications disclosed by Friedman under MRPC Rule 1.6. Newman v. State, 156 Md.App. at 48-49, 845 A.2d at 88. There is nothing in the record indicating that Newman sought advice or assistance in furtherance of a crime when she stated her intention to kill her husband and children. [6] Friedman testified that he disclosed communications with Newman in an attempt to thwart her plans. Moreover, Friedman stated that Newman's threats were typical in hotly contested custody proceedings. The State relies upon Friedman's fear that he was in danger of becoming an accessory before the fact of murder if [he] didn't do something to show that Newman consulted with Friedman in furtherance of a future crime or fraud. Although it shows that Friedman viewed Newman's threats as serious, the testimony relied upon by the State does little more, and does not establish that Newman consulted with Friedman for the purpose of obtaining assistance in furtherance of a future crime or fraud. Therefore, the communication disclosed by Friedman pursuant to MRPC Rule 1.6 is not subject to the crime-fraud exception and is privileged. Although the Court of Special Appeals did not address the application of the crime-fraud exception to the communications in Landry's presence, we will so do. The State relies upon Friedman's testimony that he felt that he was being sucked into their plan by Newman and Landry, and that they were bringing [him] into this relationship. Those statements do not evidence any intent to seek assistance in furtherance of a crime, but rather only show that Friedman was uncomfortable with the content of the communications. The State's position that Newman solicited Friedman to assist her in her alleged scheme, or requested advice to accomplish it, is not supported in the record. Both the communication disclosed by Friedman pursuant to MRPC Rule 1.6 and the conversations held in the presence of Landry are privileged.