Opinion ID: 2032055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: swick's cross-appeal

Text: Swick contends that the trial court improperly granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict on the invasion of privacy, false light, count (count V). The trial court granted the directed verdict after finding that Liautaud's statements on which Swick originally based his claim, Exhibit 12 and two newspaper articles, were not defamatory per se. [2] Since Swick was required to, but did not, plead and prove special damages and extrinsic circumstances, the trial court found that Swick failed to establish all the elements of a false light claim and that defendants were entitled to a directed verdict. Swick, relying on Kolegas v. Heftel Broadcasting Corp. (1992), 154 Ill.2d 1, 17, 180 Ill.Dec. 307, 607 N.E.2d 201, now argues that to establish a cause of action for false light, he was only required to plead and prove that (1) he was placed in a false light before the public as a result of the defendants' actions, (2) the false light in which he was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and (3) defendants acted with actual malice. Swick asserts that a false light cause of action does not incorporate concepts of per se and per quod and does not require proof of extrinsic circumstances or special damages. Swick further contends that the statements in Exhibit 12 are defamatory per se and that he is entitled to a new trial on the false light count. Exhibit 12 is a statement of facts prepared by Capsonic in response to the circumstances surrounding Swick's employment and the taking of the photographs. The beginning of Exhibit 12 tells of Swick's initial employment with Capsonic, Capsonic's business and manufacturing operations, and Swick's duties. The exhibit then states: Following approximately two weeks of Mr. Swick's acceptance of his employment offer from Altair, Mr. Swick removed from the premises a detailed blueprint, physically identified as a Capsonic proprietary design and so marked, that detailed the complete layout and method of manufacture of this new Ford TFI Housing automated manufacturing system. On Saturday, 5 November 1988, with most of the employees gone, Mr. Swick was observed to have photographed, with his camera and film, Capsonic's entire plant, including the complete automated systems currently in production. On Wednesday, 9 November 1988, Andy Swick signed a document stating that he, without authorization from any officer or superior, and without informing any of the above, took a series of photographs of this proprietary equipment, automated devices, proprietary molds, fixtures and other such manufacturing devices that are the property of Capsonic and are guarded at the factory with a security system to maintain its propriety, acknowledging that this was in violation of the security rules of the Company. On Wednesday, 9 November 1988, Mr. Swick denied he had accepted employment with any other competitor, and specifically with Altair. On Thursday, 10 November 1988, a search warrant was issued, and executed by the Elgin Police Department, under the direction of Sergeant Olsen, and evidence was taken from the home of Mr. Swick that included 39 confidential Capsonic documents revealing detailed automated designs, any of which could cause great harm to Capsonic if known by Capsonic's competitors.    On 11 November 1988, Mr. Swick admitted to accepting employment by Altair, division of Augat, Inc. At trial, Liautaud admitted giving a copy of Exhibit 12 to the news media. Exhibit 12 was admitted into evidence and the jury was read portions of Exhibit 12. The two newspaper articles recount that Swick had been arrested and charged with theft for stealing company secrets and that Capsonic was pursuing a civil action against Swick. Swick contends that the underlying basis for the two articles was Exhibit 12. Illinois courts have recognized four types of per se defamation: (1) words that impute the commission of a criminal offense; (2) words that impute infection with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute the inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties or office or employment; or (4) words that prejudice a party, or impute a lack of ability, in his trade, profession or business. ( Kolegas, 154 Ill.2d at 10, 180 Ill.Dec. 307, 607 N.E.2d 201; Mittelman v. Witous (1989), 135 Ill.2d 220, 238-39, 142 Ill.Dec. 232, 552 N.E.2d 973.) Even if words fall into one of these four categories, the words are not defamatory per se if they are reasonably capable of an innocent construction. ( Kolegas, 154 Ill.2d at 11, 180 Ill.Dec. 307, 607 N.E.2d 201.) When words are defamatory per se, they are considered to be so obviously and naturally harmful to the plaintiff that the plaintiff need not plead and prove special damages. ( Mittelman, 135 Ill.2d at 235, 142 Ill.Dec. 232, 552 N.E.2d 973.) Each case must be decided on its own facts, as there is no clear rule for determining whether language is defamatory. Rosner v. Field Enterprises, Inc. (1990), 205 Ill.App.3d 769, 789, 151 Ill.Dec. 154, 564 N.E.2d 131. In the instant cause, the statements in Exhibit 12 could be found to be defamatory per se. The statements impute a want of Swick's integrity in the discharge of his duties at Capsonic. The statement accuses Swick of being an industrial spy, lying, stealing and attempting to deceive Capsonic's management. Further, the words are not susceptible to an innocent construction. Exhibit 12 goes straight to the core of Swick's honesty and integrity while employed at Capsonic. As Exhibit 12 can be interpreted as defamatory per se, the trial court's reasons for originally granting the motion to dismiss were improper. Swick should have been allowed to pursue a false light cause of action on the basis of Exhibit 12. Regarding the two newspaper articles, the articles appear to be a report of the criminal charges and civil lawsuit against Swick. However, the articles were not actually authored by Liautaud or Capsonic. There is little, if any, evidence in the record concerning whether Exhibit 12 is the basis for the articles and, if so, whether Exhibit 12 and the articles placed Swick in a false light before the public. Accordingly, this court cannot determine whether Swick has alleged or proven sufficient facts to establish the essential elements of a false light cause of action as developed in Kolegas. (See Kolegas, 154 Ill.2d at 17-18, 180 Ill.Dec. 307, 607 N.E.2d 201.) Thus, we remand the false light count for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Swick claims that the trial court erred in refusing to receive Exhibit 12 and the two newspaper articles as evidence in support of the libel count (count III) and that he should now be granted a new trial on this count. As outlined above, Swick attached Exhibit 12 and the newspaper articles to his original complaint, but the trial court excluded Exhibit 12 as it was not defamatory per se. The trial court later granted the defendants partial summary judgment on the libel count, finding that the two newspaper articles were not defamatory and could not be used in support of the count. In light of the conclusions reached regarding the false light count, Swick should have been allowed to use Exhibit 12 to pursue his claim of libel. Accordingly, we remand the libel count for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Swick argues that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the interference with prospective advantage count (count IV). In the complaint, Swick alleged that defendants' actions delayed his acceptance of employment with Altair, resulting in lost wages, and prevented him from marketing his services to other companies. The trial court granted a directed verdict for defendants on this count, finding that Swick had not proven damages. Swick now claims that the evidence presented at trial established that his employment at Altair was delayed and that he was hired at lower reporting level after Liautaud accused him of theft. A review of the record indicates that defendants' actions did not interfere with Swick's entering into a business relationship with Altair. Swick started work with Altair on the agreed date and at the agreed salary. The trial court properly directed a verdict for defendants.
Swick's next claim is that the trial court erred in granting defendant's motion for a directed verdict on count XI of the complaint, since he provided evidence of a civil conspiracy between Liautaud and Patel to initiate criminal proceedings. Swick titled this count Interference with lawful competition through malicious intimidation and re-alleged prior paragraphs of his complaint. The trial court found that count XI was the same as the count for interference with prospective advantage and granted a directed verdict. The record reflects that the trial court properly granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict as count XI incorporated all prior counts and did not raise any new allegations. The only difference between this count and the other counts of the complaint was its title. This count was merely duplicative of other counts.
Swick argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the reasonableness of his apprehension of and suffering from Liautaud's conduct in support of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Swick wanted to admit evidence of Liautaud's intimidating and harassing conduct toward former employees, competitors and public officials to show why he believed that Liautaud's threats toward him were not idle threats and why these threats caused him emotional suffering. The trial court granted a defense motion in limine which sought to exclude this evidence. [3] In support of his current contention, Swick relies on McGrath v. Fahey (1988), 126 Ill.2d 78, 88, 127 Ill.Dec. 724, 533 N.E.2d 806, where this court stated that when threats of improper use of power or authority form the crux of an action for emotional distress, it should appear that the plaintiff reasonably believed that those threats would be carried out. A trial judge has discretion in granting a motion in limine and a reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's order allowing or excluding evidence unless that discretion was clearly abused. (See Sher v. Deane H. Tank, Inc. (1995), 269 Ill.App.3d 312, 317, 206 Ill.Dec. 794, 645 N.E.2d 1046.) A review of the record indicates that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the defendants' motion in limine. The evidence which Swick wanted to admit did not directly involve Liautaud's conduct toward Swick and did not connect Liautaud to Swick in any manner. The evidence involved Liautaud's actions toward separate, unrelated individuals. Swick does not claim that Liautaud told him of this conduct or that Liautaud used this conduct to directly threaten or intimidate him. Since the evidence does not have any direct relationship to Swick, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion. For the above-stated reasons, we reverse in part and affirm in part the judgments of the appellate and circuit courts, and remand this cause to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Appellate court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded. HARRISON, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.