Opinion ID: 476834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sandstrom Instructions

Text: 7 We review a district court's decision on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus de novo. Chatman v. Marquez, 754 F.2d 1531, 1533-34 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 124, 88 L.Ed.2d 101 (1985). The district court's holding that the constitutional error in giving the Sandstrom instruction was harmless error is a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo. Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1190 n. 21 (9th Cir.1983).
8 A Sandstrom instruction is one that shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense on an essential element of the criminal offense, such as intent. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523-24, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2458-59, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). The jury instructions given by the trial court in McKenzie's case contained statements that the law presumes a person intends the ordinary consequences of his ordinary acts and that an unlawful act is done with unlawful intent. Neither party disputes that these are unconstitutional Sandstrom instructions. Therefore, the first issue we address is whether Sandstrom instructions on the element of intent can ever be considered harmless error. 9 Until its recent opinion in Rose v. Clark, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986), the United States Supreme Court had not resolved this question. 1 See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 103 S.Ct. 969, 74 L.Ed.2d 823 (1983). 10 The Court found in Rose that an instruction that impermissibly shifted the burden of proof on intent is not 'so basic to a fair trial' that it can never be harmless. Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3107. Furthermore, the Court found that the crucial inquiry is not whether intent was a disputed issue at trial. Id., 106 S.Ct. at 3109. Instead, it is whether, 'on the whole record ... the error ... [is] harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'  Id. (elipses and brackets in original) (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1981, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983)). See also Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 ('before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt'); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 97 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. at 983 n. 5 (Powell, J., dissenting) (in cases of Sandstrom error, 'the inquiry is whether the evidence was so dispositive of intent that a reviewing court can say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the presumption'). Id. Therefore, Hamilton and Hagler are overruled to the extent that Hamilton formulates an absolute rule against the application of the harmless error doctrine when intent is a disputed issue and to the extent that Hagler focuses inquiry on whether or not intent was actually a disputed issue rather than on whether or not the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Herd, 800 F.2d 1526. 11 The underlying reasoning and policy arguments found in Rose support overruling Hamilton and its progeny. The harmless error doctrine established in Chapman has been applied to a wide variety of constitutional errors ranging from failure to permit cross-examination on witness bias and denial of a defendant's right to be present at trial to admission of a confession obtained in violation of defendant's right to counsel and admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3104. As has often been stated, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Id. at 3106; Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). The type of errors cited by Chapman that could never be harmless either aborted the basic trial process, Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 78 S.Ct. 844, 2 L.Ed.2d 975 (1958) (use of coerced confession), or denied it altogether, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (denial of counsel); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (biased adjudicator). Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3106 n. 6. Thus, if a criminal defendant, represented by counsel, has the opportunity to present evidence and argument before an impartial judge and jury, there is a strong presumption that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 3106-07. 12 Furthermore, the purpose underlying Sandstrom supports our conclusion that a burden-shifting instruction on the element of intent is subject to the harmless error doctrine. The general rule is that the prosecution must prove 'every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [the defendant] is charged' beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 106 S.Ct. at 3107 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)). The purpose of this rule is to ensure that only the guilty are criminally punished. Sandstrom was a logical extension of that rule. But, when the verdict of guilty reached in a case in which Sandstrom error was committed is correct beyond a reasonable doubt, reversal of the conviction does nothing to promote the interest that the rule serves. Id. 13 Therefore, Sandstrom error on the element of intent is subject to harmless error analysis. But our inquiry does not end here. We must next address whether, under this harmless error analysis, the Sandstrom error that occurred in McKenzie's case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 14 As stated above, the inquiry is not whether intent was a disputed issue at trial. Instead, the inquiry centers on whether the evidence of intent is so dispositive that a reviewing court can say, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a jury would have found it unnecessary to rely on the presumption created by the Sandstrom instruction. See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 97 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. at 983 n. 5. How do we determine whether evidence of intent reaches this level? In Rose, the Court held that: 15 When a jury is instructed to presume malice from predicate facts, it still must find the existence of those facts beyond a reasonable doubt. (citation omitted). In many cases, the predicate facts conclusively establish intent, so that no rational jury could find that the defendant committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. (citation omitted). In that event the erroneous instruction is simply superfluous: The jury has found, in Winship's words, every fact necessary to establish every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. (citation omitted). 16 Rose, 106 S.Ct. at 3107-08. 17 So, two questions must be answered: (1) did the jury find that the relevant predicate facts existed beyond a reasonable doubt, and (2) from those facts can intent be inferred so that no rational juror could find that the defendant committed the acts without intending to cause injury? 18 There is no doubt that in McKenzie's case the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had committed the predicate acts--that is, he had kidnapped and murdered Lana Harding. In fact, McKenzie never denied or disputed that he kidnapped and killed Harding. His defense at trial focused entirely on the issue of mental competence, relying on the traditional insanity defense as well as the defense of diminished capacity. The jury's verdicts established that the only contested issue was whether McKenzie had the capacity to form a criminal intent. 19 The only question remaining, therefore, is whether from these predicate acts intent could be so conclusively established that no rational jury could find that [McKenzie] committed the relevant criminal act but did not intend to cause injury. Id. (Emphasis in original). 20 In this case, the pathologist who examined Harding's body testified how the killing occurred. He testified that he found evidence of sexual intercourse in close proximity to the time of death. He also testified that there was evidence consistent with the fact that Harding had been dragged. Nine abraded bruises were found on the front part of her chest in the area of her breasts. A segment of used clothesline rope had been found around Harding's neck which had been severely restricted about 45 minutes before her death, causing injuries severe enough to completely compress the airway into her lungs. Finally, there was evidence of several blows to Harding's head. The death blow had left open the entire side of her head. Her body was found clothed only in a shirt, sweater and bra. She was found draped over the tongue of a grain drill. 21 There is little doubt that the trial judge in McKenzie's case could have instructed the jury that it could infer rather than presume intent from the defendant's conduct. Id. [I]t is enough to recognize that in some cases that inference is overpowering. Id. In McKenzie's case, the Montana Supreme Court held: 22 The evidence on the issue of intent is overwhelming, uncontradicted and permits but one rational conclusion--that [McKenzie] purposefully and knowingly intended to kidnap and kill [Harding]. We conclude that a reasonable juror could not have found otherwise in the proof presented by the State, the instructions on rebuttable presumptions not withstanding. 23 McKenzie (III), 608 P.2d at 459. We agree. It would defy common sense to conclude that a violent torture-murder, such as the one committed in this case, was committed unintentionally, id. at 3108 n. 10; See Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 99 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 984 n. 7 (Powell, J., dissenting); See also Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605, 613, 102 S.Ct. 2049, 2053, 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982), and it follows that no rational jury would need to rely on the erroneous Sandstrom instructions on the issue of intent. 24 In light of Rose, and after examining the record, we affirm the district court's denial of McKenzie's petition for a writ of habeas corpus to the extent that the petition was based on the unconstitutional Sandstrom instructions to the jury on the element of intent. 2