Opinion ID: 2265280
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Carolyn Skinner's Grand Jury Testimony

Text: The defendant argues that his motion to dismiss the indictment should have been granted on the ground that Carolyn had testified falsely before the grand jury. He asserts that Carolyn failed to admit that she was selling drugs with Patrick on the night of his death. She further testified to the grand jury that she returned to her home that evening between 8 and 10 p.m. and did not leave again. This testimony, defendant asserts, was not consistent with that of a Providence police officer who saw Carolyn with Patrick at one o'clock the following morning. Her testimony concerning the time that Ellis told her that he had shot Patrick was inconsistent with the indicated time of Patrick's death between 1 and 3:30 a.m. on February 3, 1988. There is no question that there were many inconsistencies in Carolyn's testimony at the bail hearing, before the grand jury, and also at trial. Presumably these inconsistencies were pointed out by counsel for defendant in the course of trial. The state had no choice in its presentation of Carolyn. She was without question the chief witness to whom defendant had allegedly admitted shooting Patrick. Her background and business enterprise made her credibility open to question by both prosecution and defense. It appears that Carolyn made statements that did not fully disclose her drug enterprises. Certain of her statements were inconsistent with others. Certain of her statements were inconsistent with other information known to the prosecution. However, the prosecution had little choice save to present Carolyn to the grand jury. We have stated on numerous occasions that we do not review the grand jury's determination in deciding to return an indictment on the grounds of adequacy of evidentiary support. In Lerner v. Moran, 542 A.2d 1089, 1093 (R.I. 1988), and in State v. Acquisto, 463 A.2d 122, 127 (R.I. 1983), we quoted with approval the standard for reviewing indictments established by the United States Supreme Court in Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363, 76 S.Ct. 406, 408-09, 100 L.Ed. 397, 402-03 (1956): '[A]n indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, like an information drawn by the prosecutor, if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charges on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.' As in Lerner v. Moran , numerous instances may be found in which witnesses before the grand jury may shade their testimony to protect their own interests and may make statements that are inconsistent with statements that they make later or with statements made by other witnesses. Neither we nor the Supreme Court of the United States conduct minitrials to determine the adequacy of evidence presented to the grand jury. We do not require that evidence that may later be determined by counsel for the defense to be exculpatory must be presented to the grand jury on pain of dismissal of the indictment. In United States v. Williams, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1735, 118 L.Ed.2d 352 (1992), this very question was considered by the Supreme Court of the United States. In an opinion by Justice Scalia the Court held that a United States District Court may not dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the government failed to disclose to the grand jury substantial exculpatory evidence in its possession. Justice Scalia described the grand jury as an accusatory rather than an adjudicative body. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1742-44, 118 L.Ed.2d at 365-67. He went on to observe that motions to quash indictments based upon the sufficiency of evidence relied upon by the grand jury have never been allowed and that it would therefore make little sense to scrutinize the sufficiency of the prosecutor's presentation. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 1746, 118 L.Ed.2d at 369. The state must take its witnesses as they find them. See State v. Chiellini, 557 A.2d 1195 (R.I. 1989), which requires that a defendant must demonstrate a defect in the very essence and function of the grand jury. In the case at bar the essential testimony given by Carolyn Skinner was found to be truthful and consistent by the trial jury, in spite of the fact that defendant pointed out inconsistencies and alleged inaccuracies. It was also found by the trial justice to be substantially truthful. In light of these determinations we see no basis to fault the trial justice in her refusal to grant the motion to dismiss the indictment.