Opinion ID: 2582281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kelii

Text: In Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th 452, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518, we considered whether the court or the jury was the appropriate entity to determine whether a prior felony conviction qualified as a serious felony for purposes of the Three Strikes law. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) Kelii involved a defendant who was convicted by a jury of two counts of second degree burglary and two counts of grand theft. The jury subsequently found that the defendant previously had suffered three convictions of burglary and one of attempted burglary. The trial court determined that the prior convictions were of first degree or attempted first degree burglary and that they therefore were residential and qualified as serious felonies. The court sentenced the defendant to state prison for 25 years to life. On appeal, the defendant contended that the jury, not the court, should have determined whether his prior convictions qualified as serious felonies. ( Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 454, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518.) In rejecting the defendant's position in Kelii, we relied heavily upon our decision in Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th 580, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541, in holding as follows:  Determining whether a prior conviction qualifies as a strike under the Three Strikes law is also the type of inquiry that judges traditionally perform as part of the sentencing function. Often this determination is purely legal with no factual content whatever. The Three Strikes law defines a strike as, among other things, `any offense defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7 as a serious felony in this state.' (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) Section 1192.7, subdivision (c), lists some felonies that are per se serious felonies, such as murder, mayhem, rape, arson, robbery, kidnapping, and carjacking. If a defendant's prior conviction falls into this group, and the elements of the offense have not changed since the time of that conviction, then the question whether that conviction qualifies as a serious felony is entirely legal. Sometimes the determination does have a factual content, just as the question whether convictions were brought and tried separately has a factual content. As we explained in [ People v. ] Woodell [ supra, 17 Cal.4th 448, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85], `Sometimes the definition of the qualifying prior conviction is not completely congruent with the definition of the crime of which the defendant has been convicted. For example, in [ People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 243 Cal. Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150], the alleged prior conviction was for a `burglary of a residence.' ( People v. Guerrero, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 346, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150 [quoting Pen.Code, former § 1192.7, subd. (c)(18)].) The statutory use of the phrase, burglary of a residence, posed a problem because there is no offense specifically so defined in the Penal Code. ( Guerrero, supra, at p. 346, 243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150.) A particular burglary conviction might or might not have involved a residence.' ( People v. Woodell, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 452, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 950 P.2d 85.) But these factual questions are of limited scope. In determining whether a prior conviction is serious, `the trier of fact may look to the entire record of the conviction' but `no further.' ( People v. Guerrero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 343, 355, [243 Cal.Rptr. 688, 748 P.2d 1150], original italics.) Thus, no witnesses testify about the facts of the prior crimes. The trier of fact considers only court documents. It is true that sometimes the trier of fact must draw inferences from transcripts of testimony or other parts of the prior conviction record. (See, e.g., People v. Reed (1996) 13 Cal.4th 217, 220, [52 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 914 P.2d 184].) But the factual inquiry, limited to examining court documents, is not significantly different from the one we considered in Wiley. `[S]uch facts generally are readily ascertainable upon an examination of court documents. This is the type of inquiry traditionally performed by judges as part of the sentencing function.' ( Wiley, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 590, [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 889 P.2d 541].) Accordingly, the statutory right to have a jury decide whether the defendant `has suffered' (§§ 1025, 1158) the prior conviction does not include the inquiry whether the conviction qualifies as a strike. ( Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 456-457, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518, first italics added.) In so holding, we rejected the defendant's position that an amendment to section 1025 had removed from the jury the question of his identity as the person who suffered the prior conviction while leaving all remaining factual determinations for the jury: The new section 1025, subdivision (b), is substantially identical to the relevant portion of the previous version of section 1025. Only subdivision (c) is new. That subdivision clearly narrows, rather than expands, the jury's role. It does not overrule Wiley's interpretation of section 1025 or expand the jury's role beyond determining whether the defendant `has suffered' the prior conviction. The passage of this narrowing legislation soon after we narrowly interpreted the same statute strongly suggests legislative approval of our interpretation. ( Kelii, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 457, 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 981 P.2d 518.) [5] In view of our decision in Wiley, and the Legislature's response thereto (as discussed in Kelii ), we are convinced that there has been a clear expression of legislative intent that a jury play a very limited role in determining prior offense allegations and that a court, not a jury, examine records of prior convictions to determine whether the conviction alleged qualifies as a conviction under the applicable sentence-enhancement provision.