Opinion ID: 884026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: discovery abuse

Text: Before discussing the propriety of the District Court's imposition of sanctions under Rule 37, M.R.Civ.P., it is necessary to address the Estate's contention on appeal that no discovery abuse exists in this case. The Estate contends that the only information not provided to the County was the amount of time one of its expert witnesses, Dr. Paul F. Cimmino, spent researching for this case. We disagree. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P., provides that [a] party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (Emphasis added). In its order of dismissal and accompanying memorandum, the District Court concluded that 1) [the Estate] did not provide the substance of facts which [sic] the experts were expected to testify; and 2) [the Estate] omitted a summary of the grounds for each opinion in violation of its order and Rule 26(b)(4), M.R.Civ.P. The Montana legislature adopted this rule from Rule 26, Fed.R.Civ.P. See Rule 26, M.R.Civ.P., Compiler's Comments. The underlying policies of Rule 26 are to eliminate surprise and to promote effective cross-examination of expert witnesses. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co. (10th Cir.1980), 626 F.2d 784, 792-93 (citing 28 U.S.C., Rule 26, Fed.R.Civ.P., Advisory Committee Notes). Before an attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination with an unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the bases of that opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is required to await examination at trial to get this information, he often will have too little time to recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the testimony. Smith, 626 F.2d at 794 (citation omitted). Review of the Estate's Rule 26 disclosure reflects that the Estate identified each person it expects to call as an expert witness and stated the general subject matter on which each expert is expected to testify as required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P. The District Court did not conclude, and the County does not argue, otherwise. Regarding the substance of facts to which its expert witnesses are expected to testify, the Estate provided the following statements: 1. Dr. Ruey-Lin Lin ... will testify that the decedent herein was not a hard-core criminal, had a relatively minor history, and would have rehabilitated himself, or been rehabilitated, at or near the age of thirty-five. 2. Thomas Rozza ... will testify that the Defendant's county attorney failed to meet acceptable corrections standards in protecting the decedent's life, and that the Defendant's jail failed to meet acceptable corrections standards in protecting the decedent's life. 3. Dr. Paul Cimmino ... will testify that, had the decedent lived, any antisocial aspects of his personality would have lessened and been brought under control ... [and] his abuse of drugs and alcohol would have been brought under control. He will also testify as to the loss suffered by the children upon the death of their father. 4. Dr. John Brower ... will testify as to the present value of the earnings the decedent might have expected, had he lived. These broad statements indicate the general topics on which the Estate's experts are expected to testify. They do not, however, provide the substance of facts to which the Estate's expert witnesses will testify, as required by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P. Concerning the bases of its expert witnesses' opinions, the Estate stated in its Rule 26 disclosure that those opinions are based upon the facts and information set forth in [their] deposition[s] which [are] in the possession of [the County], and upon [their] training and experience. The Estate also referred the County generally to the treatises upon which its expert witnesses relied. The Estate did not provide any further explanation or information concerning the bases or grounds for its expert witnesses' opinions. These statements by the Estate add nothing to the substance of the facts and the summary of the grounds for each opinion which are required to be disclosed by Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P. Moreover, nothing in Rule 26, M.R.Civ.P., permits a party to decline to comply with the Rule and a court order requiring compliance therewith on the basis of that party's belief or opinion that the opposing party already possesses the required information. Having submitted its disclosure, the Estate obtained the court's clarification order explicitly requiring it to provide its experts' opinions and the bases for those opinions. The District Court expressly noted therein that [w]hile [the County] previously deposed [the Estate's] experts, [the Estate's] attorney at the depositions of certain experts instructed the experts not to answer relevant questions about the basis of their opinions. The Estate did not provide any additional information relating to its expert witnesses in response to the District Court's clarification order. Instead, it merely stated that it had previously supplied the required information regarding those witnesses to the County and that the information supplied complies fully with Rule 26, MRCP[;] it referred the court to its Rule 26(b)(4) Disclosure. This final response essentially ignored the clarification order which the Estate requested and received, and totally failed to comply therewith. In light of the court's clear awareness that the expert witness depositions had been taken, and the court's clear determination that those depositions had not produced the required information about the bases of the experts' opinions, the Estate's response appropriately could be characterized  in the vernacular  as in your face. Whatever counsel's intent in framing his client's response to a clear court order may have been  whether gamesmanship with the County or disdainful one-upmanship with the District Court  the Estate's response did not comply with the explicit requirements of the court's clarification order. We conclude that the Estate's expert-related responses to the District Court's initial order on remand satisfied neither the substance of the facts requirement nor the summary of the grounds for each opinion requirement of Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i), M.R.Civ.P. We also conclude that the Estate's response to the District Court's clarification order totally failed to comply with the expert witness-related portion of that order. Therefore, we hold that the Estate committed discovery abuses after remand.