Opinion ID: 167398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process — Impeachment Evidence

Text: 18 Because the Kansas state courts reached the substance of Sperry's argument that Brown's impeachment violated his due process rights, we apply AEDPA deference. At trial, Brown was cross-examined using statements she had made to police after the shooting, apparently without a prior Miranda warning. 1 The record contains no evidence of coercion or undue pressure, or any reason to doubt that Brown's statements to the police were voluntary. In fact, Brown submitted a letter in post-trial proceedings denying that her statements and testimony were untruthful or coerced. Sperry nonetheless argues that the use of impeachment evidence obtained in violation of the witness's Fifth Amendment rights violates his due process rights at trial. We disagree. 19 Sperry cites no relevant Supreme Court precedent in support of his argument, and we are aware of none. 2 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that statements taken in violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights, while inadmissible as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief, are admissible to impeach the defendant, so long as the statements were made voluntarily and without coercion. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 722-24, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). If a defendant's voluntary and uncoerced statements are admissible for impeachment purposes, we cannot discern how a witness's voluntary and uncoerced statements are any less tolerable. In both cases, the limited admissibility of such evidence aids the jury in ascertaining the truth while deterring the government from its extraction in violation of Miranda. See Hass, 420 U.S. at 722, 95 S.Ct. 1215. Precluding a witness's impeachment would disturb this truth-seeking/deterrent balance and allow the shield provided by Miranda ... to be perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or even perjuriously. Id. Consequently, we decline to do so. 20 Our holding is not inconsistent with United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285 (10th Cir.1999). In Gonzales, the question was whether a witness's statements were the product of police coercion. Although the trial court had suppressed the statements, on appeal we concluded that the statements had not been coerced. We therefore held that the statements could be admitted at trial. We did not have to reach the question of whether defendants' due process rights would be implicated if the subject witness was coerced into making false statements and those statements were admitted against defendants at trial. Id. at 1289 (italics omitted). To the contrary, the effect of a witness's impeachment on the defendant's due process rights was not at issue in Gonzales. In fact, the court found that the witness's statements were not the product of coercion, and therefore admissible. That is the case here. 21 The Kansas state courts therefore neither contravened nor unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in deciding Sperry's impeachment issue.