Opinion ID: 6494576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Effect of Political Pressure on the Contested Hearing Process

Text: Kilakila also contends that the contested case hearing for the ATST project was tainted by political pressure on the decision-makers. The pressure upon Jacobson is evident from the consequences of such pressure— namely, Jacobson was forced to release an incomplete report that he subsequently disavowed. The degree of pressure on the Board is as yet undetermined in view of the lack of discovery. However, it is known that the Chairman participated in at least one, perhaps two, undisclosed meetings with government officials in person and engaged in at least two additional undisclosed ex parte communications—one with the Governor’s office and one with the senior senator’s office— that concerned their interest in the ATST project. “Where an agency performs its judicial function, external political pressure can violate the parties’ right to procedural due process, thereby invalidating the agency’s decision.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 123, 9 P.3d at 435. The due process right at stake when outside political influence is exerted upon a decision-maker is the right to an impartial decision. See Sussel, 71 Haw. at 103, 784 P.2d at 868 (An “impartial tribunal is an essential component of due process in a quasi-judicial proceeding!!]”); Mauna Kea, 136 Hawai'i at 389, 363 P.3d at 237 (explaining “a biased decisionmaker [is] constitutionally unacceptable” (citation omitted)). This due process right to an impartial decision-maker free of outside political influence has been described as “the sine qua non of American judicial justice.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 124, 9 P.3d at 436 (quoting Pillsbury Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 354 F.2d 952, 964 (5th Cir. 1966)). Where a sufficient nexus exists between the conduct of the government official and the decisionmaker, an appearance of impropriety exists that would warrant reversal. Id. at 126, 9 P.3d at 438.
Whether political influence is sufficient to invalidate an agency’s decision requires an examination of “the nexus between the pressure and the actual decision maker.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 124, 9 P.3d at 436 (quoting ATX, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Transp., 41 F.3d 1522, 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). In Waiahole, this court considered “[t]he relation between the communications and the adjudicator’s decisionmaking process.” Id. (citation omitted). For example, “congressional actions not targeted directly at the decision makers—such as contemporaneous hearings—do not invalidate an agency decision.” ATX, 41 F.3d at 1528; see also Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 124-25, 9 P.3d at 436-37 (holding requisite nexus did not exist where governor’s statements regarding his view of the case “arose in public forums apart from the instant proceeding and reached the Commission indirectly”). The court applied this analysis in Waiahole to determine whether public comments by the Governor regarding his opinions on the merits of the ease constituted political pressure sufficient to violate due process. Our court declined to invalidate the decision of the agency on the basis of the Governor’s comments because the comments were publicly expressed and not directed personally to the agency decisionmakers. Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 124-25, 9 P.3d at 436-37. Similarly, in ATX, the pressure was insufficient to invalidate the adjudication because the alleged political pressure, exerted through the introduction of two bills and multiple letters, did not have a direct nexus with the decision-maker. ATX, 41 F.3d at 1528. The introduction of the bills was analogous to contempo-i’aneous hearings not targeting a decision-maker. Id The court held that the letters did not have a nexus with the decision-maker because the decision-making process was “insulated ... from congressional interference.” Id.; see also Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 714 F.2d 163, 170 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding no political interference where a United States senator communicated with Department of Defense officials but not with the ultimate decision-maker). In contrast, where the nexus between the political pressure and the decision-maker has been direct, courts have invalidated agency decisions. For example, political pressure placed directly upon commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission during public hearings before a United States Senate subcommittee caused the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to find a violation of procedural due process rights in the pending agency hearing before a hearing officer appointed by the Federal Trade Commission. Pillsbury Co., 354 F.2d at 964. The subcommittee “focuse[d] directly and substantially upon the mental decisional processes” of the Federal Trade Commission “in a case which [was] pending before it,” and therefore directly intervened in the agency’s adjudicative function. Id. Here, the offices of the senior senator and the Governor directly contacted the Chairman without disclosure. The officials chose to express them requests privately rather than publicly, as in Waiahole and ATX. Thus, the pressure from the Governor and the senior senator was applied directly to the Chairman through private, face-to-face meetings as well as additional ex parte communications. Although the majority acknowledges that the Chairman was in direct ex parte contact with the Governor’s chief of staff and the senator’s chief of staff at the ex parte meeting, the majority concludes that improper political influences did not taint the Board’s decision. Specifically, the majority states that “the communications here do not show evidence of ‘direct contact’ with BLNR over the ‘merits of the dispute.’ ” Majority at 400, 382 P.3d at 212. The majority reaches this conclusion by determining that “there is no evidence that [at the ex parte meeting] they discussed anything other than the timing of BLNR’s final decision following the contested case hearing.” Majority at 400, 382 P.3d at 212. To the contrary, the record contains substantial evidence that the merits of the dispute were to be discussed at the March 21, 2012 ex parte meeting; specifically, an email sent less than three hours before the ex parte meeting confirms the topics identified for discussion were “the telescope, hearings officer and funding issue”—each of which are matters of substance. The sole basis for the majority’s conclusion that the merits were not discussed at the undisclosed meeting is the Board’s second explanation for the meeting, issued in its Minute Order No. 26 more than three months later, that the sole topic of discussion was the release of the Board’s final decision. While this order is interpreted by the majority to mean that “the telescope, hearings officer and funding issue” were not discussed with the Chairman, the order is also subject to a contrary interpretation as an acknowledgement by the Board that the matters identified in the March 21, 2012 email were discussed, but only in the context of the procedural nature of the timing of the final decision by the Board. Under this view, discussion of core substantive issues pertaining to the telescope, hearing officer, and funding are transformed from substantive to procedural matters once the Board defines the discussions as procedural. Prior communications with UHIfA offer additional evidence that the meeting was to discuss the merits of the ease, i.e. the need to grant the permit in a timely manner to prevent loss of funding. The two direct communications between the Chair, the Governor’s office, and the senator’s office in January-2012 were due to the need for a timely decision on the permit in order to protect funding for the telescope. Thus, all documentary evidence in the record—the March 21, 2012 email and the January 2012 emails—are consistent with discussion of the merits. A contrary interpretation that no substantive matters were discussed arises only from the declaration of the Board. Had the Board not repeatedly refused Kilakila’s requests for disclosure, the Chairman’s notes of what was discussed at the ex parte meeting—as well as any emails regarding the meeting—could have supported its exercise of discretion to meet privately and engage in undisclosed ex parte communications. As the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit stated, “where, as here, an agency justifies its actions by reference only to information in the public file while failing to disclose the substance of other relevant information that has been presented to it, a reviewing court cannot presume that the agency has acted properly[.]” Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 54. This court cannot presume that political influence did not taint the Board’s decision without full disclosure by the Board.
To understand the significance of the nexus between the political pressure and the decision-maker, this court has considered as an additional factor the status of the individual or entity exerting pressure on the decision-maker. The status of the entity or individual may heighten the pressure exerted on the decision-maker and may increase the pressure to “the level of interference that courts have deemed violative of due process.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 124, 9 P.3d at 436; see also In re Larsen, 532 Pa. 326, 616 A.2d 529, 562 (Pa. 1992) (noting “[t]he appearance of impropriety raised by the improper ex parte communications” was “exacerbated” when the individual exerting pressure stood in a “position of authority” over the decisionmaker). To evaluate the degree of political influence, this court has considered whether the “interference [was] by an office having superior status or some control over the salary or tenure of the decisionmaker.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 125, 9 P.3d at 437. Factors reflective of the power of the authority engaging in ex parte communication with the decision-maker were considered in Jarrot v. Scrivener, 225 F.Supp. 827 (D.D.C. 1964). In Jarrot, the court explained that the government officials exerting pressure on the members of the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment “possessed] vast power to bestow or not to bestow benefits of various kinds upon subordinate employees” and the board members “could not fail to be aware that they would incur administrative displeasure if they decided the appeal unfavorably.” Id. at 834. Both the senior senator and the Governor possessed significant status. The senior United States senator was a major political figure in Hawai'i. In 2012, when his staff was in contact with the Board Chairman, the senior senator was the chair of the Senate Appropriations Committee and the president pro tempore of the United States Senate, making him third in line to the presidency. Christopher M. Davis, The President Pro Tempore of the Senate: History and Authority of the Officer, Congressional Research Service 9, 21 (Sept. 16, 2015). The senior senator was also the “second-longest serving Senator in the history of the [United States Senate] chamber,” representing Hawai'i in Congress “from the moment [Hawai'i] joined the [United States].” Press Release, The White House, Statement by the President on the Passing of Senator Daniel Inouye (Dec. 17, 2012). The Governor is the highest-ranking state official. He nominates and appoints all members of the Board of Land and Natural Resources. Haw. Const. art. V, §§ 1, 6; HRS § 171-4(a) (2011). Thus, the Governor “occupies an obvious position of influence.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 124, 9 P.3d at 436. Because the Governor appoints the Board members, “[w]e do not take lightly the governor’s legitimate supervisory interest and role with respect to the [Board].” Id.; see also Haw. Const. art. V, § 6; HRS § 171-4(a) (2011). Accordingly, the Governor holds a substantial influence over the Chairman and the Board. Public officials such as the senior senator and the Governor are legally empowered to provide leadership and insight commensurate with their elected offices by voicing their opinions in public forums. Nonetheless, “public officials must also be mindful of the broader public interest in the fairness and integrity of the adjudicatory process.” Waiāhole, 94 Hawai'i at 127, 9 P.3d at 439. Undisclosed ex parte communications with deliberating decision-makers is thus not an avenue available to public officials. Review of this record is done mindful that it is not actual unfairness or actual partiality that is required to constitute a violation of the right to an impartial tribunal. It is the “probability of unfairness” that is at issue: “our system of [justice] has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.” Sussel, 71 Haw. at 107, 784 P.2d at 870 (citation omitted). Given the incomplete record and the significant questions raised by Kilakila regarding the extent of political pressure on the Board, Kilakila is entitled to discover from the Board its record of ex parte communications.