Opinion ID: 2085855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Appellate Counsel and Other Jury Instructions

Text: Bieghler faults his appellate lawyer for failing to make certain other challenges to jury instructions. First, Bieghler argues that reading the whole statutory definition of murder allowed the jury to convict on a lesser intent of knowingly rather than intentionally. (T.R. at 17-18.) Bieghler confuses two different charging instruments. There is no error in the guilt phase charge, which correctly charged murder. Likewise, the death penalty charge clearly charged intentional killing and multiple murders. (T.R. at 22.) The information made clear the nature of the charges and the essential elements to be proven in order to recommend death on either of two aggravating factors. (T.R. at 22.) Second, Bieghler cites faulty circumstantial evidence instructions that he did not challenge in either the trial court or the post-conviction court. He wants to argue this for the first time on an appeal from denial of post-conviction relief. He may not. Third, Bieghler contests an instruction about the jury's proper use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements. At the time of Bieghler's trial, the Patterson rule permitted prior inconsistent statements of a testifying witness to be used as both substantive and impeachment evidence. Patterson v. State, 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975). Bieghler now asserts that the instruction incorrectly stated the law, referred only to guilt, and mistakenly used the word substantial rather than substantive. The instruction at issue stated: The credibility of a witness may be attacked by introducing evidence that on some former occasion the witness made a statement inconsistent with his testimony in this case. It is inconsistent if the witness denied making the prior statement if the witness could not remember making the prior statement. Evidence of this kind may be considered by you in deciding the weight to be given to the testimony or that witness as well as substantial evidence of the guilt of the Defendant. (T.R. at 3243.) This is not an ideal instruction, but it does not support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The first sentence explicitlyand properlyaddresses witness credibility, as does the first part of the third sentence. The second sentence is not the clearest definition of an inconsistent statement, but it is not improper. It explains that prior statements are inconsistent when the witness blows hot and cold. [12] With respect to the second part of the third sentence, the concern is not that substantial is utilized instead of substantive, for any improper weighting is mitigated by the instruction's references to credibility. Likewise, the reference to proving guilt is immaterial because proving guilt, of course, is the central issue in a criminal prosecution. Fourth, Bieghler maintains he was subjected to a defective reasonable doubt instruction. He compares the instructions his jury was given to those given the juries in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), and Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), which equated a reasonable doubt with a `grave uncertainty' and an `actual substantial doubt,' and stated that what was required was a `moral certainty' that the defendant was guilty, Cage, 498 U.S. at 41, 111 S.Ct. at 329. The Supreme Court reasoned that the instructions suggested a higher degree of doubt than reasonable doubt and that proof to a moral certainty could be interpreted as less than the evidentiary certainty required by the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 41, 111 S.Ct. at 329. The court instructed Bieghler's jury that reasonable doubt is a fair, actual and logical doubt .... based upon reason and common sense, and arising from the state of the evidence, (T.R. at 3238-39), and that conflicts in the evidence should be resolved by giving Bieghler the benefit of the doubt, (T.R. at 3245). It also instructed: To prove the defendant's guilt of the elements of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence must be such that it would convince you of the truth of it, to such a degree of certainty that you would feel safe to act upon such conviction, without hesitation, in a matter of the highest concern and importance to you. (T.R. at 734.) The court also said that a conviction is not to be based on mere suspicion or conjecture. (T.R. at 3240.) These instructions do not approximate the faulty instructions given in Cage; they do comport with Bell v. State, 610 N.E.2d 229 (Ind.1993). Fifth, Bieghler complains the trial court failed to instruct on the elements of burglary during the penalty phase. This argument is specious. The jury was instructed on the elements of burglary during the guilt phase, and the jury found Bieghler guilty of burglary. Thus, the court was not required to give the jury the same instruction again at the penalty-phase. Sixth, Bieghler urges that the jury was unable properly to consider the mitigating evidence or to properly weigh the evidence because the concept of `mitigation' was not explained. Incredibly, he bases this argument on the catch-all mitigator, which allows a jury to consider any other circumstances appropriate, and an instruction on the presumption of innocence. He says that giving the jury freedom to consider any evidence favoring the defendant let the jurors define mitigating circumstances as they saw fit. (Appellant's Br. at 95.) There is no error here. Finally, Bieghler argues that the jury was prevented from fully considering mitigating evidence by an instruction not to consider sympathy or prejudice for or against the victims or the defendant. The same instruction was approved in Woods v. State, 547 N.E.2d 772, 783 (Ind.1989). In sum, none of Bieghler's arguments support his claim that his appellate lawyer was ineffective.