Opinion ID: 2321828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: analysis

Text: Genger raises three claims of error on this appeal. First, as to the Spoliation Opinion, he contends that the Court of Chancery erroneously concluded that he destroyed evidence in violation of the Status Quo Order; consequently, the court abused its discretion by finding him in contempt and by awarding sanctions entirely disproportionate to any violation. Second, as to the Merits Opinion, Genger claims that the Court of Chancery erred by concluding that: (i) the Trump Group never ratified his transfer of Trans-Resources shares to the Sagi Trust (as part of the 2004 Transfers), and (ii) the Irrevocable Proxy associated with the Sagi Trust Shares was invalid and unenforceable. Third, Genger argues that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by adjudicating, in the Side Letter Opinion, the beneficial ownership of the Orly Trust Shares and the Genger Shares, because neither the Orly Trust nor TPRboth indispensable parties to any such adjudicationwere properly before the trial court or subject to its in personam jurisdiction. Genger's claims rest, in whole or in part, on the premise that the trial court erred as a matter of law. We review a trial court's formulation and application of legal principles de novo. [32] To the extent that Genger attacks the trial court's factual findings, we will not disturb those findings unless they are clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. [33]
Genger's first claims that because the Court of Chancery erroneously found that he caused material evidence to be spoliated, it abused its discretion by holding him in contempt of the August 29, 2008 Status Quo Order. Alternatively, Genger argues that even if the trial court's contempt and spoliation findings are correct, the resulting sanctions were an abuse of the court's discretion, because the $3.2 million expert and attorneys' fee award was disproportionate and excessive. A trial court has broad discretion to fashion and impose discovery sanctions. [34] In exercising appellate review, this Court will not disturb a trial judge's decision regarding sanctions imposed for discovery violations absent an abuse of discretion. [35] Although we may not substitute our own notions of what is right for those of the trial judge, the trial judge's decision to impose sanctions must be just and reasonable. [36] To the extent a decision to impose sanctions is factually based, we accept the trial court's factual findings so long as they are sufficiently supported by the record, are the product of an orderly and logical reasoning process, and are not clearly erroneous. [37] Moreover, [where] factual findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses . . . the deference already required by the clearly erroneous standard of appellate review is enhanced. [38] For the reasons that follow, we conclude that Genger's arguments are without factual or legal merit. We therefore uphold the Court of Chancery's spoliation and contempt findings and the resulting sanctions imposed.
Genger first claims that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had destroyed relevant documents or that the Trump Group was thereby prejudiced. Because there can be no spoliation without a factually-grounded determination that documents were destroyed, Genger argues, the trial court's spoliation finding lacks record support. Moreover, because the Status Quo Order did not expressly require the unallocated free space on his computer's hard drive to be preserved, no spoliation or contempt finding would be proper. [39] That Order directed only that the parties refrain from tampering with, destroying or in any way disposing of any [Trans-Resources]-related documents, books or records. Because no provision in the Status Quo Order expressly addressed his computer's unallocated free space, Genger claims that the trial court erred by adjudicating him in contempt. Genger also urges us to reverse on a broader groundnamely, that requiring a party-litigant to preserve a computer's unallocated free space whenever a document-retention policy is in place, would impossibly burden a company-litigant by effectively requiring the company to refrain from using its computers entirely. Genger argues that in the course of a computer's normal operation, its operating system is constantly overwriting the unallocated free space by creating and deleting temporary files. [40] Given that technological reality, to expand the scope of a routine document-retention order so as to require preservation of unallocated free space would impose an unworkable standard. [41] We do not read the Court of Chancery's Spoliation Opinion to hold that as a matter of routine document-retention procedures, a computer hard drive's unallocated free space must always be preserved. The trial court rested its spoliation and contempt findings on more specific and narrow factual groundsthat Genger, despite knowing he had a duty to preserve documents, intentionally took affirmative actions to destroy several relevant documents on his work computer. These actions prevented the Trump Group from recovering those deleted documents for use in the Section 225 and the New York litigations. [42] The record establishes that Genger acted furtively, by (among other things) directing an employee to wipe his computer's unallocated free space using a program called SecureClean at around 1:00 a.m. on September 8, 2008. [43] Thereafter, that same employee ran SecureClean on the Trans-Resources company server on September 10, 2008. [44] At no point did Genger ever consult with the Trump Group or its counsel before directing that those actions be taken. The Trump Group remained unaware of the impact of Genger's covert conduct until weeks later, when the Trump Group found itself unable to locate copies of documents that should have been available on Genger's work computer. [45] Specifically, copies of eight separate documents and/or emails should have beenbut were notfound on either the Trans-Resources company server or Genger's work computer. [46] The absence of those documents was determined to have prejudiced the Trump Group, because [d]ifferent versions of documents or e-mail chains can take on material importance if there are alterations or additions to them. And who received what and when can be crucial. [47] From those missing documents the trial court inferred that other relevant documents would likely have been stored on Genger's computer and/or the Trans-Resources server, and had been permanently deleted and were now unrecoverable. [48] It was on that specific, narrow factual basis that the trial court: (i) found that Genger had spoliated evidence by intentionally destroying documents, (ii) sanctioned him for that spoliation, and (iii) adjudicated him in contempt of the August 29, 2008 Status Quo Order. We affirm the Court of Chancery's findings and resulting sanctions, because the trial court did not abuse its discretion or commit any erroneous finding of law or fact. Our affirmance should not be viewed as extending beyond the confines of this setting i.e., where a party is found intentionally to have taken affirmative steps to destroy or conceal information to prevent its discovery at a time that party is under an affirmative obligation to preserve that information. It is noteworthy that there is no evidence or claim in this case, that the use of the SecureClean program fell within Trans-Resources' ordinary and routine data retention and deletion procedures. [49] To avoid future repetitions of the unallocated free space issue presented here, we suggest that the parties and the trial court address any unallocated free space question that might arise before a document retention and preservation order is put in place. We recognize that instances may arise where a party-litigant will have a legitimate reason to preserve unallocated free space on a computer's hard drive. In addressing that issue, the parties must be mindful that court-ordered discovery of electronically-stored information should be limited to what is reasonably accessible. [50] That determination, by its very nature, must be made on a case-by-case basis. [51]
Genger next claims that even if the Court of Chancery's spoliation and contempt findings were correct, the court abused its discretion by awarding the Trump Group an additional $3.2 million in fees as a sanction for those violations. He argues that that fee award was disproportionate to any violations, particularly since the trial court had earlier imposed as sanctions a heightened burden of proof and a prior $750,000 attorneys' fees award. Assuming without deciding that $3.2 million falls on the higher end of the range of a reasonable fee, the record establishes that Genger expressly waived his right to challenge the reasonableness of that award. The Court of Chancery's Final Judgment Order expressly recites that Genger agree[d] that he w[ould] not challenge the reasonableness of the amount of such fee award (whether on appeal or otherwise), except on the ground that it was improper to award any sanction . . . for [the Court of Chancery's] contempt finding. . . . [52] Therefore, this issue was not properly preserved for appeal and, at most, is reviewable only for plain error. [53] We find no plain error. The $3.2 million figure was not arbitrarily determined. The amount of attorneys, expert, and technology consultant fees was hotly contested, and that $3.2 million figure was the result of the parties' compromise. [54] In these circumstances, the reasonableness of that fee award does not, nor could it, constitute plain error. Consequently, that award must be upheld.
Genger next claims that the Court of Chancery erroneously concluded, in its Merits Opinion, that the Trump Group did not ratify the 2004 Transfer to the Sagi Trust. Genger contends that the Trump Group, by its conduct, twice ratified those transfers after the June 13, 2008 meeting at which the Trump Group was first told about them. Genger also attacks, as legally erroneous, the Vice Chancellor's determination that the Irrevocable Proxy associated with the Sagi Trust Shares was invalid under New York law and that, in any event, the Proxy did not run with the Sagi Trust Shares after those shares were sold to the Trump Group. Both arguments fail because they ignore the trial court's factual findings and lack legal merit. Our reasons follow.
Genger claims that the undisputed facts establish that the Trump Group twice ratified the 2004 Transfers to the Sagi Trust. The first ratification, Genger argues, occurred at the June 25, 2008 meeting when the Trump Group solicited and accepted Genger's vote of the Sagi Trust Shares to approve the (later repudiated) 2008 Funding Agreement. Genger claims that by recognizing his right to vote the Sagi Trust Shares, the Trump Group necessarily ratified the disputed 2004 Transfers. The second ratification is said to have occurred when the Trump Group purchased the disputed Trans-Resources shares from the Sagi Trust under the 2008 Purchase Agreement. Without the 2004 Transfers, Genger insists, the Sagi Trust would have had no Trans-Resources shares to sell to the Trump Group. Therefore, the 2004 Transfers were necessarily ratified if the 2008 Purchase Agreement was to have any legal force. Neither argument, in our view, has merit. Ratification is an equitable defense [55] that precludes a party who [has] accept[ed] the benefits of a transaction from thereafter attacking it. [56] Ratification may be either express or implied through a party's conduct, but it is always a voluntary and positive act. [57] It is undisputed that the Trump Group never expressly or formally ratified the 2004 Transfers. The Court of Chancery explicitly found that [a]t no point did the Trump Group tell Genger that it [had] accepted the 2004 Transfers. [58] The sole issue, then, becomes whether the Trump Group, by its post-June 13, 2008 conduct, [59] implicitly ratified the 2004 Transfers. The record establishes that no implied ratification of the 2004 Transfers by the Trump Group ever took place. Implied ratification occurs [w]here the conduct of a complainant, subsequent to the transaction objected to, is such as reasonably to warrant the conclusion that he has accepted or adopted it, [and] his ratification is implied through his acquiescence. [60] Ratification of an unauthorized act may be found from conduct which can be rationally explained only if there were an election to treat a supposedly unauthorized act as in fact authorized. [61] Ratification may also be found where a party receives and retains the benefit of [that transaction] without objection, [] thereby ratify[ing] the unauthorized act and estop[ping] itself from repudiating it. . . . [62] The Court of Chancery found no basis to conclude that the Trump Group assented to the 2004 Transfers by accepting Genger's vote on behalf of the Sagi and Orly Trust[s] in favor of the [2008] Funding Agreement. [63] The record evidence fully supports that finding. The Trump Group never received or retained any benefit from the 2008 Funding Agreement, and ratification is not the only rational explanation for the Trump Group's conduct. The uncontroverted evidence shows that the Trump Group was reluctant to invest additional risk capital into Trans-Resources, and would do that only if given majority voting control. The Trump Group agreed to enter into the 2008 Funding Agreement with Genger, because Genger represented that he would rectify [his] violation of the Stockholders Agreement by ensuring that the Trump Group had voting control. [64] Moreoverand of critical importancethe parties never performed or even executed the 2008 Funding Agreement, because Genger repudiated it. [65] In these circumstances, the Trump Group's willingness to accept Genger's vote on behalf of the Sagi and Orly Trusts in favor of the 2008 Funding Agreement cannot be fairly viewed as acquiescing in the 2004 Transfers. That is because the Trump Group never received the negotiated benefit ( i.e., voting control) that was to be the quid pro quo for the Trump Group's alleged willingness to accept and recognize Genger's vote on those Trusts' behalf. [66] Nor can the Trump Group's conduct after the June 13, 2008 meeting be fairly viewed only as evincing an intent to approve the unauthorized acts [67] (here, the 2004 Transfers). Contrary to Genger's assertion, the 2008 Purchase Agreement did not implicitly ratify the 2004 Transfers, because in that 2008 Agreement, the Sagi Trust and TPR expressly conveyed only such interest as they may have had in the disputed Trans-Resources shares. Moreover, in Section 10 of the 2008 Purchase Agreement, both the purported transferor (TPR) and the purported transferee (the Sagi Trust) agreed on a mechanism where-by the Trump Group's share acquisition would be fully protected if the 2004 Transfers were determined to be void. Thus, the 2008 Purchase Agreement itself fatally undermines any claim that the Trump Group intended, by its conduct, to ratify the 2004 Transfers. At no point did the Trump Group ratify the 2004 Transfers, either expressly or by implication. To the contrary, at all times the Trump Group acted consistently with their position that the 2004 Transfers were void. [68] Genger's ratification claim, therefore, fails on factual and legal grounds.
Genger next claims that the Merits Opinion erroneously determined that the Irrevocable Proxy was both legally invalid and, in any event, inapplicable to the shares acquired in the 2008 Purchase Agreement. The Court of Chancery held that even if the Trump Group did ratify the 2004 Transfer of the Trans-Resources shares to the Sagi Trust, the Sagi Trust Shares, once acquired by the Trump Group under the 2008 Purchase Agreement, were no longer subject to Genger's Irrevocable Proxy. The court so held for three reasons. First, the Irrevocable Proxy did not explicitly provide that it was to run with the Sagi Trust Shares if those shares were sold, nor did the Proxy explicitly reserve any voting powers to Genger in the event of a sale or transfer. [69] Second, even if the Proxy language was ambiguous on that point, public policy considerations relating to the separation of voting control from underlying economic stock ownership, which would result in empty voting, required construing the Proxy strictly against any implied reservation of voting power. [70] Third, and in any case, the Proxy was not irrevocable under New York law, because neither Genger nor the Sagi Trust were Trans-Resources shareholders, as Sections 609 and 620 of the New York Business Corporation Law required that they be, at the time the Proxy was executed. [71] Genger challenges these conclusions. With respect to the third issuewhether the Proxy was irrevocable under New York lawGenger claims that both he and the Sagi Trust were, in fact, Trans-Resources shareholders at the time the Proxy was executed. Genger asserts that the Proxy was executed on October 30, 2004, one day after he effectuated the 2004 Transfers to the Sagi Trust and to himself. Therefore, Genger tells us, the Proxy satisfied the requirements of Sections 609 and 620 of the New York Business Corporation Law. This argument suffers from two fatal flaws. First, it was never fairly presented to the trial court. Second, it is unsupported by the record. Genger represented to the Vice Chancellor that the Sagi Trust executed the Irrevocable Proxy on October 29, 2004, the same day that the 2004 Transfers were executed. At no point did Genger argue to the Court of Chancery (as he now argues to us) that the Irrevocable Proxy was executed the day after the 2004 Transfers took place. We therefore decline to consider Genger's first argument, raised for the first time on appeal, because it was never fully and fairly presented to the trial court, as Supreme Court Rule 8 requires. [72] On the second issuethe Irrevocable Proxy's inapplicabilityGenger contends that the Court of Chancery read the Proxy language too narrowly, by incorrectly applying a new, uncharted form of heightened scrutiny and thereby concluding that the Proxy created empty voting concerns. That was error, Genger argues, because the only legal principle applicable here is that a purchaser that buys shares with notice of an irrevocable proxy takes those shares subject to that proxy. Because the Trump Group knew of the existence of the Proxy at the time it negotiated the 2008 Purchase Agreement, Genger claims, that fact alone triggered the Proxy's applicability. That the Proxy contained no language explicitly binding subsequent transferees is of no relevance. This argument cannot withstand scrutiny either. First, as a matter of law, the Proxy was not irrevocable, because it did not satisfy the applicable New York statutory requirements. Whether or not the Trump Group knew of the Proxy at the time they purchased the Sagi Trust Shares is immaterial, because a contracting party's knowledge of a proxy's existence cannot cure that proxy's non-compliance with controlling statutory requirements, or transmute a terminable proxy into one that is irrevocable under New York statutory law. Finally, and apart from its failure to satisfy applicable statutory requirements, the Proxy's plain language defeats Genger's position. The Proxy relevantly provided that: The [Sagi Trust] . . . does hereby constitute and appoint Arie Genger . . . to vote as its proxy, all shares of common stock of [Trans-Resources] which are now or hereafter owned by the Trust, at any and all meetings of the stockholders of Trans-Resources. . . . Contrary to Genger's claim, the Court of Chancery did not interpret that Proxy language too narrowly. By its plain terms, the Proxy language applied only to the Trans-Resources shares owned by the Sagi Trust. That is, the Proxy would attach only to those Trans-Resources shares that were now or hereafter owned by the Trust.  The Proxy contains no provision that would bind any subsequent owner of those shares. Once sold or transferred to a subsequent owner, those shares were no longer owned by the [Sagi] Trust and therefore, were no longer subject to the Proxy. Genger cannot complain that the trial court erroneously interpreted the Proxy where its plain language compels that interpretation. For these reasons, we uphold the judgment of the Court of Chancery insofar as it adjudicates the merits of the Trump Group's Section 225 claims.
Genger's third and final claim of error is that the Court of Chancery exceeded its authority by deciding the issues addressed in its August 9, 2010 Side Letter Opinion. That opinion (to reiterate) invalidated the 2004 Transfers of Trans-Resources shares to the Orly Trust and to Genger himself, and adjudicated the Trump Group as the lawful record and beneficial owner of those transferred shares. [73] In its Merits Opinion, the trial court initially declined to reach the ownership issues relating to the Orly Trust and the Genger Shares, because those issues were unnecessary to resolve the Section 225 voting control dispute. [74] Later, however, in its supplemental Side Letter Opinion, the court noted that: (i) in deciding the Section 225 issues, it had overlooked the 2008 Side Letter Agreement, and (ii) it was necessary to determine who owned the Orly Trust Shares and the Genger Shares, because the right to elect two of the Trans-Resources' six directors would arguably depend upon that determination. [75] The trial court justified adjudicating the ownership of the Genger Shares at that late stage, because Genger himself sought to have this court declare who was the rightful owner of the [Genger] and Orly [Trust] Shares. [76] In its Final Judgment Order, the court ultimately determined that neither Genger nor the Orly Trust were the record or beneficial owners of any Trans-Resources shares, [77] and that TPR was the record and beneficial owner of all Trans-Resources shares not presently owned by the [Trump Group]. [78] In an about-face, Genger now claims that the Court of Chancery lacked the power to determine that the Trump Group lawfully purchased the Orly Trust Shares and the Genger Shares from TPR. He first argues that the trial court lacked in personam jurisdiction over the Orly Trust and TPR, because neither stockholder was made a party to the Section 225 action in any capacity. Second, he claims that all the Side Letter Agreement gave the Trump Group was an option to purchase the Genger and Orly Trust Sharesan option which was never exercised. Finally, Genger contends that adjudicating the validity of the 2004 Transfers under the Side Letter Agreement exceeded the Court of Chancery's jurisdiction, because the Trump Group's right to buy, and TPR's right to sell, the Genger Shares and the Orly Trust Shares were collateral issues, i.e., unnecessary to resolve the merits of the Section 225 claims. We agree with Genger's first claim, do not reach the second, and reject the third. [79] The purpose of a Section 225 action is to provide a quick method for review of the corporate election process to prevent a Delaware corporation from being immobilized by controversies about whether a given officer or director is properly holding office. [80] A Section 225 proceeding is summary in character, and its scope is limited to determining those issues that pertain to the validity of actions to elect or remove a director or officer. [81] In determining what claims are cognizable in a [Section] 225 action, the most important question that must be answered is whether the claims, if meritorious, would help the court decide the proper composition of the corporation's board or management team. [82] If not, then those claims are said to be `collateral' to the purpose of a [Section] 225 action and must be raised in a [separate] plenary action. [83] A Section 225 proceeding is not an in personam action. Rather, it is in the nature of an in rem proceeding, [84] where the defendants are before the court, not individually, but rather, as respondents being invited to litigate their claims to the res (here, the disputed corporate office) or forever be barred from doing so. The one exception is the corporation itself, which is the entity that embodies the  res,  and is only party before the Court in its individual capacity. The in rem character of a Section 225 action imposes important limits on the scope of [a] court's remedial powers even as to claims bearing on whether a person lawfully holds corporate office. [85] For example, in a Section 225 action, a plaintiff may claim that a director-respondent does not validly hold corporate office because that director obtained the office through fraud, deceit, or breach of contract. [86] The Court of Chancery may adjudicate that claim in a Section 225 proceeding, but only for the limited purpose of determining the corporation's de jure directors and officers. In a Section 225 proceeding the court cannot go further and actually rescind a transaction procured through such unlawful behavior or award money damages to those harmed by that behavior. [87] That type of ultimate relief can only be obtained in a plenary action in a court that has in personam jurisdiction over any necessary or indispensable parties. [88] Given the jurisdictional limitations that inhere in a Section 225 action, we affirm the judgment of the Court of Chancery insofar as it determines the record ownership of the disputed Trans-Resources shares in the Side Letter Opinion and the Final Judgment Order. All parties agree that the adjudication of record ownership was necessary to determine which side was lawfully entitled to elect the remaining two directors of the Trans-Resources board. We so conclude, even though initially the scope of the Section 225 action was limited to which sidethe Trump Group or Gengerhad the lawful power to designate the four directors who would comprise the Trans-Resources board majority. [89] This procedural posture was altered, however, after the Court of Chancery issued its Merits Opinion. At that point, all parties agreed that the scope of the Section 225 action should be expanded to encompass which side had the right to designate and elect the two remaining Trans-Resources directors. That additional question arose because the parties disputed whether the Trump Group was entitled, under its Purchase Rights conferred by the Stockholders Agreement, to acquire the Trans-Resources shares transferred to Genger and the Orly Trust in the 2004 Transfers. [90] If the Trump Group was so entitled, then as a legal matter those shares would continue to be held by TPR, and Genger and the Orly Trust would have no Trans-Resources shares to vote to elect the remaining two directors. If, however, the Trump Group had no contractual right to purchase the Genger and the Orly Trust Shares, then under the Stockholders Agreement, Genger would be entitled to designate the remaining two Trans-Resources directors. [91] Consequently, despite having earlier concluded that it was unnecessary to address these issues, the Court of Chancery, at the urging of all parties, now decided that it was necessary, and that it had the power to decide which party was entitled to vote the Genger and the Orly Trust Shares in the Section 225 action. If the only new issue decided at this late stage was who constituted the lawful record owners of the Genger and Orly Trust shares, the Court of Chancery's Side Letter Opinion and subsequent Final Judgment Order would pose no problem. The trial court determined that TPR was the record owner and entitled to vote. But, the trial court went furtherundoubtedly motivated by a desire to promote litigation efficiencyand adjudicated questions of ultimate beneficial ownership as well. In doing that, however, the Court of Chancery crossed a jurisdictional line and exceeded its powers under Section 225. An adjudication of who has the right to vote disputed corporate shares for Section 225 purposes cannot constitute a binding adjudication of who beneficially owns those shares, because a Section 225 action is by its nature an in rem, not a plenary, proceeding. Only in a plenary proceeding before a court that has in personam jurisdiction over the litigants may the court adjudicate the litigants' property interest in disputed corporate shares. [92] Here, the Orly Trust and TPR were never made parties to a plenary proceeding where the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over them. [93] In this case, Genger voluntarily asked the trial court to determine that he beneficially owned 13.99%, and that the Orly Trust beneficially owned 19.43%, of the Trans-Resources shares. To be sure, Genger and the Trump Group were legally free to consent to the Court of Chancery exercising plenary in personam jurisdiction over themselves personally. What Genger and the Trump Group could not do, however, was consent to that court's exercising personal jurisdiction over anyone elsein this case the Orly Trust or TPRwithout valid authorization. Only those entities, through their authorized representatives, were legally empowered to give their consent. The Court of Chancery never obtained consensual in personam jurisdiction over TPR, which was a party to the 2004 Transfers. Without having consented-to personal jurisdiction over TPR, the trial court could not enlarge the Section 225 proceeding into a concurrent plenary action that would empower the court to determine the ultimate beneficial ownership of the Genger and the Orly Trust Shares. Nor could the trial court exercise personal jurisdiction over the Orly Trust. Although not altogether clear, it appears that personal jurisdiction was exercised on the basis that Orly Genger, a trust beneficiary, had voluntarily appeared as a non-party witness at the Section 225 trial. That trial did not implicate the beneficial ownership of the Orly Trust Shares, [94] and the Court of Chancery itself acknowledged that the Orly Trust was not formally before the court. [95] The trial transcript shows that Orly's testimony related only to whether her father, Genger, had verbally informed Jules of the 2004 Transfers either at the time Genger and Dalia divorced or at some point thereafter, before the parties' June 13, 2008 meeting. Orly's willingness to testify before the trial court in her individual capacity as Genger's daughter did not constitute legal consent to the Court of Chancery's exercising in personam jurisdiction over the Orly Trust. [96] A separate consent, by an authorized representative of the Orly Trust, was required to accomplish that, and there is no evidence or claim that such consent was ever obtained. To summarize, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over either the Orly Trust or TPR, which was required for a binding adjudication of the beneficial ownership of their respective stock ownership interests. [97] Without personal jurisdiction over these entities, the Court of Chancery lacked the power to augment TPR's beneficial ownership interest, or diminish the Orly Trust's beneficial ownership interest, in Trans-Resources by adjudicating that TPR beneficially owned the Genger Shares and Orly Trust Shares. [98] Therefore, the beneficial ownership determinations that flow from the Court of Chancery's August 9, 2010 Side Letter Opinion and its August 18, 2010 Final Judgment Order must be reversed.