Opinion ID: 178001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Amendment Claims.(1) Right to Free Speech

Text: Several of Mr. Gee's allegations involve his First Amendment right to free speech, in particular his right to communicate with persons outside the prison. See Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 194 (10th Cir.1996). In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that federal courts must take cognizance of the valid constitutional claims of prison inmates. Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (citation omitted). It also has recognized, however, that courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, prisoners' rights may be restricted in ways that would raise grave First Amendment concerns outside the prison context. Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989). In particular, when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. The question with regard to Mr. Gee's First Amendment claims is, in light of Turner's deferential review and the plausibility standard of Twombly and Iqbal, how much does Mr. Gee have to plead to state an adequate claim? As discussed above, he has to plead sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. He must do more than plead facts that establish a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully, or facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Turner allows prohibitions and restrictions that are reasonably related to legitimate penological interests, Mr. Gee must include sufficient facts to indicate the plausibility that the actions of which he complains were not reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. This is not to say that Mr. Gee must identify every potential legitimate interest and plead against it; we do not intend that pro se prisoners must plead, exhaustively, in the negative in order to state a claim. It is sufficient that he plead facts from which a plausible inference can be drawn that the action was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. In paragraphs 27, 33, and 53, Mr. Gee alleges that on August 2, 2002, November 15, 2002, and September 4, 2005, Defendant Lopez intentionally, and for the purpose of harassing him, confiscated and destroyed letters sent to him by persons outside the prison under the guise of sticker and perfume violations. R. Doc. 1 at 11, 12, 16. [3] Although prison officials may regulate the content of incoming mail and properly ban items such as stickers, see Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 416, 109 S.Ct. 1874; Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir.1990), there is no legitimate penological reason to restrict mail simply to harass inmates or to confiscate mail that complies with prison policy. These allegations state plausible claims of violations of Mr. Gee's First Amendment rights. In paragraphs 28 and 29, Mr. Gee alleges that on August 11 and August 12, 2002, Defendant Lopez returned to him outgoing letters that had appropriate postage affixed ... without reason for not sending [them] to the Post Office for mailing. R. Doc. 1 at 11. A prisoner has a constitutional right to have his outgoing mail processed for delivery, absent legitimate penological interests to the contrary. See Treff, 74 F.3d at 195. Because Mr. Gee alleges that he placed adequate postage on his letters and that Defendant Lopez gave no reason for not processing his mail, these paragraphs state plausible claims of violations of Mr. Gee's First Amendment rights. A closer question is raised by Mr. Gee's allegations regarding mail from his sister. Paragraph 13 alleges that on March 5, 2002, Defendant Pacheco had him placed in an isolation cell on incommunicado status, during which he was not allowed to send out or receive personal mail, and that he was held in this incommunicado status until April 1, 2002. Paragraph 16 further alleges that during this period a letter from his estranged sister initially was mistakenly given to him and then confiscated by Defendant Halter or another official because of his incommunicado status, before he could read it. The letter was never returned to him. There are certainly legitimate penological reasons for isolating a prisoner for limited periods of time, but it is not apparent why a prisoner should be permanently deprived of a letter from an estranged family member solely because it arrived during such temporary isolation. The Supreme Court has recognized that [a]ccess is essential ... to families and friends of prisoners who seek to sustain relationships with them. Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 407, 109 S.Ct. 1874. Although Mr. Gee did not allege that prison officials provided no reason for the permanent confiscation of his sister's letter, we think that such confiscation is on its face sufficiently problematic that the claim deserves to proceed beyond the pleading stage. See id. at 414, 109 S.Ct. 1874 (applying Turner's reasonableness standard with confidence that such standard is not toothless (internal quotation marks omitted)).