Opinion ID: 7016477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The origins of Tracy

Text: Tracy took root from Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972), and Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Tracy v. Salamack, 440 F.Supp. 930, 933-35 (S.D.N.Y.1977),. aff'd as modified, 572 F.2d 393 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam). In Morrissey, the Supreme Court found “that the liberty of a parolee, although indeterminate, includes many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts a ‘grievous loss’ on the parolee and often on others.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482, 92 S.Ct. 2593. The Court emphasized that a parolee, unlike a prisoner, is free to seek gainful employment and to be with family and friends. Id. Weighing the interests of the state in returning a parolee who has violated the conditions of parole to prison against the parolee’s liberty interest, the Court determined that the parolee must be accorded several rights before his parole status was definitively revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 483-89, 92 S.Ct. 2593. These rights included (a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses ...; (e) a ‘neutral and detached’ hearing body such as a traditional parole board ...; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole. Id. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Morrissey was followed by Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), in which the Court considered a statutory scheme that gave prisoners a right to accrue good-time credit against their sentences. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 557, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Prisoners could lose this credit — and thus the probability of a shortened sentence — only for “serious misbehavior.” Id. Because the statute created a liberty interest of “real substance” in good-time credits, the Court held that loss ,of the credits must be preceded by notice and a hearing. Id. at 557-58, 563-68, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Two years later, the Court held that not every “grievous loss visited upon a person by the State is sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976). Instead, the Meachum court required the inmate plaintiffs, who objected to their transfer without a hearing to a different prison, to identify a source for entitlement to the interest in state law. Id. at 226-28, 96 S.Ct. 2532. Tracy combines the holdings of Morris-sey and Meachum. In Tracy, we adopted the district court’s rationale for holding that a prisoner had a liberty interest in temporary release that could only be terminated through notice and a hearing. Tracy, 572 F.2d at 396. By adopting the district court’s rationale, we also adopted the district court’s conclusion that the plaintiffs must establish that (1) they suffered a grievous loss of liberty and (2) they had an “entitlement to this liberty ... interest arising out of federal or state law or practice.” Tracy, 440 F.Supp. at 933 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court found that plaintiffs’ loss of temporary release status, which had allowed them to be in the community for a portion of the time while also spending some time in prison, constituted a grievous loss of liberty within the meaning of Morrissey. Id. at 934. It found an entitlement to continued temporary release status within the meaning of Meachum in the wording of an agreement plaintiffs signed and in the official policy of the state for implementing the temporary release statute. Id. at 935.