Opinion ID: 2443833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence and the Probate Court's Findings

Text: [¶ 46] The Probate Court purported to establish the temporary coguardianship at issue in this appeal pursuant to 18-A M.R.S. § 5-204(c), which provides, in relevant part, that guardians or coguardians may be appointed for an unmarried minor when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that: [A] living situation has been created that is at least temporarily intolerable for the child even though the living situation does not rise to the level of jeopardy required for the final termination of parental rights, and that the proposed guardian will provide a living situation that is in the best interest of the child. 18-A M.R.S. § 5-204(c); see also 18-A M.R.S. § 5-207(c) (2009); In re Amberley D., 2001 ME 87, ¶ 19, 775 A.2d 1158, 1165. We held in Jewel I that a temporarily intolerable living situation must relate to a parent's inability to care for the child and that proof of parental unfitness is a required element to support the establishment of a guardianship over the parent's objection. 2010 ME 17, ¶ 12, 989 A.2d at 729. Accordingly: [A] guardianship may only be ordered pursuant to section 5-204(c) if the court finds that (1) the parent is currently unable to meet the child's needs and that inability will have an effect on the child's well-being that may be dramatic, and even traumatic, if the child lives with the parent, and (2) the proposed guardian will provide a living situation that is in the best interest of the child. Id. ¶ 13, 989 A.2d at 730; see also Guardianship of Jeremiah T., 2009 ME 74, ¶ 27, 976 A.2d at 962. [¶ 47] On appeal, we review the Probate Court's findings for clear error. In re Amberley D., 2001 ME 87, ¶ 20, 775 A.2d at 1165. Here, by appointing the father as a coguardian, the Probate Court necessarily concluded that the grandmother had failed to prove, to the clear and convincing evidence standard, that the father was an unfit parent. By allowing the child to reside with the father for part of each week, the Probate Court necessarily concluded that the grandmother had failed to prove, to the clear and convincing evidence standard, that the father's living situation was temporarily intolerable. With the grandmother having failed to prove these essential facts, her second petition for a temporary guardianship should have been denied. [¶ 48] The Probate Court's judgment establishing the current temporary coguardianship appears to have been based on a conclusion that a temporarily intolerable living situation had been created because [i]t would be traumatic and not in Jewel's best interest for her to be in the full custody of her father without a transition in counseling. This was certainly a legitimate concern, and one that was applied in the April 2009 order to justify imposition of the guardianship at that time. Had the transition contemplated in April 2009 occurred, this case would have been long over. The record of the April 2010 hearing unequivocally establishes that, by her action, the grandmother prevented the counseling transition from occurring. [¶ 49] The grandmother cannot prevail on her burden of proof to establish a temporary guardianship by creating the situation that prevents the father from establishing a new therapist for the child in the area where he lives. The court's finding and the evidence in the record do not support, to the clear and convincing evidence standard, the findings we have held are necessary to support imposition of a temporary guardianship and its invasion of a parent's fundamental liberty interest. The temporary guardianship awarded to the grandmother must be terminated immediately, as it is not supported on this record. The mandate shall issue immediately, without the usual fourteen-day waiting period. [¶ 50] We conclude with one other observation on issues that have impacted this case. At the point that the Probate Court had terminated the original temporary guardianship in accordance with our opinion, the only operative order governing custody of the child was the District Court parental rights order. The District Court is the court with primary jurisdiction over actions involving domestic relations, parental rights, and children. 19-A M.R.S. § 103 (2009). The Probate Court recognized this jurisdiction, referencing the District Court parental rights order in its April 2009 decision. To keep all issues before the court with primary jurisdiction for domestic relations and parental rights issues, the appropriate remedy for a grandparent seeking access to a child against a parent's wishes should be a Grandparents Visitation Act action pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. §§ 1801-1805 (2009). This is the primary remedy the Legislature has established to resolve grandparent-parent disputes. [¶ 51] While the Probate Court has authority to address grandparent-parent disputes pursuant to the guardianship statute, when there is an outstanding, valid parental rights order, as there is in this case, the Probate Court must, as a threshold matter, determine whether the grandparent should be required to exhaust the remedy provided by the Grandparents Visitation Act as prerequisite to proceeding on the guardianship petition. In this manner, the court recognizes the jurisdiction of the District Court under title 19-A and minimizes the possibility of separate, yet simultaneous proceedings involving the best interest of a child in two courts. Further, this threshold determination will enable the Probate Court to quickly dispose of marginal guardianship petitions in cases in which a grandparent visitation action can afford complete relief. The entry is: Judgment Vacated. Remanded to terminate the guardianship order. Mandate to issue forthwith.