Opinion ID: 4219891
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unjustified Detention

Text: To be justified under the Fourth Amendment, an investigative stop needs only reasonable suspicion. United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2014). An arrest, on the other hand, demands the greater showing of probable cause. Id. Here, Windham argues that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion, and that, in any event, the detention was functionally an arrest such that probable cause was required.
The first question is whether the officers “ha[d] a reasonable suspicion . . . that criminal activity ‘may [have been] afoot.’” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). This inquiry “look[s] at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). “Although an 13 Case: 16-20686 Document: 00514234377 Page: 14 Date Filed: 11/13/2017 No. 16-20686 officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard.” Id. (citations omitted). The only relevant information is the information that was available to the officers at the time. Carroll v. Ellington, 800 F.3d 154, 171 (5th Cir. 2015). Pasket had reasonable suspicion to detain and investigate Windham for the crime of driving while impaired. See Tex. Penal Code § 49.04. From the seizure’s outset, Pasket was aware that (1) Windham had rear-ended the car in front of him; (2) the other driver’s passenger had informed both the 911 operator and Pasket that he believed Windham to be intoxicated; (3) the passenger had further reported that Windham fell asleep behind the wheel while waiting for the police; (4) Windham was taking prescription-strength painkillers; (5) Windham had not slept for twenty hours; (6) Windham’s eyes appeared bloodshot; and (7) Windham appeared confused and did not know that he had struck a car. These undisputed facts, taken together, surpass the low threshold for reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769 (1966) (driver’s involvement in an accident and bloodshot eyes contributed to proper finding of probable cause to arrest for driving under the influence). Windham’s arguments do not persuade us otherwise. Although he contends that the witness was mistaken and that Windham in fact was neither sleeping nor impaired, this argument says nothing about whether Pasket reasonably believed the witness. Similarly, although Windham’s brief asserts that “Windham’s eyes were not bloodshot,” it cites no record evidence to support that claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (requiring parties to support factual assertions with record citations). Finally, Windham has not argued that reasonable suspicion dissipated as the detention progressed. The district court 14 Case: 16-20686 Document: 00514234377 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/13/2017 No. 16-20686 correctly determined that the undisputed facts established reasonable suspicion.
The second question is whether the seizure exceeded the bounds of a traffic stop and became a de facto arrest. See United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 437 (5th Cir. 1993) (“A prolonged investigative detention may be tantamount to a de facto arrest, a more intrusive custodial state which must be based upon probable cause rather than mere reasonable suspicion.”). “A seizure rises to the level of an arrest only if ‘a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.’” Carroll, 800 F.3d at 170 (quoting United States v. Corral-Franco, 848 F.2d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 1988)). Windham makes two arguments on this front, both of which we reject. First, Windham asserts without citation that the traffic stop became an arrest because Pasket “confiscated . . . Windham’s driver’s license, making it impossible for [him] to drive away.” To be sure, taking a detainee’s driver’s license suggests that some type of seizure has taken place. 15 But examining a detainee’s driver’s license is an “ordinary . . . incident to [a] traffic stop.” Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015) (alteration omitted) 15See, e.g., United States v. Dortch, 199 F.3d 193, 198 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hat began as a consensual encounter quickly became an investigative detention once the agents received [defendant’s] driver’s license and did not return it to him.” (quoting United States v. Lambert, 46 F.3d 1064, 1068 (10th Cir. 1995))), modified on denial of reh’g, 203 F.3d 883 (2000). We note that, in this case, Pasket inadvertently failed to return the driver’s license to Windham after Windham was free to go. Pasket returned the license to Windham’s residence later that evening. Windham does not argue that this oversight is relevant to the unjustified detention claim. 15 Case: 16-20686 Document: 00514234377 Page: 16 Date Filed: 11/13/2017 No. 16-20686 (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005)). It does not indicate arrest. See, e.g., Shabazz, 993 F.2d at 437 (“[W]e have no doubt[] that in a valid traffic stop, an officer can request a driver’s license . . . .”). Second, Windham argues that the length of the traffic stop—close to ninety minutes—transformed it into an arrest. But “[t]here is . . . no constitutional stopwatch on traffic stops.” United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 511 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Instead, “[i]n assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we . . . examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685–86 (1985). The key requirement is that the stop “last no longer than is necessary to effectuate [its] purpose.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (plurality opinion). It is undisputed that Pasket determined that he needed the opinion of Dunn, a certified drug recognition expert, to assess the extent of Windham’s impairment. It is likewise undisputed that Dunn arrived as quickly as he could, that he administered the tests expeditiously once he arrived, and that those tests were germane to the reasonable suspicion that justified the stop. The parties dispute only whether Pasket’s belief was reasonable. According to Windham, because Pasket knew how to perform sobriety tests himself, “[i]t was not necessary to call another officer to obtain a second opinion.” But Windham offers no evidentiary basis for finding Pasket’s determination unreasonable. His brief justifies his assertion with just a single piece of evidence: Windham’s own declaration that “[a]ny well trained officer should be 16 Case: 16-20686 Document: 00514234377 Page: 17 Date Filed: 11/13/2017 No. 16-20686 able to administer the sobriety test.” 16 Suffice it to say, Windham’s bare, lay opinion as to the scope of a reasonable police officer’s abilities does not create a genuine factual dispute. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) (declarations used to oppose summary judgment motions “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated”); see also Fed. R. Evid. 701 (lay opinion testimony must be “rationally based on the witness’s perception” and “not based on . . . specialized knowledge”). Windham has not laid adequate foundation for this opinion, nor do we see how he conceivably could do so. His argument is therefore unavailing. We affirm the grant of summary on Windham’s unjustified detention claim.