Opinion ID: 2097346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial Court Erred in Certifying Its Interlocutory Adjudication of Liability as Final, Appealable Order.

Text: [2,3] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to settle jurisdictional issues presented by a case. [6] Notwithstanding whether the parties raise the issue of jurisdiction, an appellate court has a duty to raise and determine the issue of jurisdiction sua sponte. [7] [4] For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction of an appeal, there must be a final order entered by the court from which the appeal is taken; conversely, an appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain appeals from nonfinal orders. [8] Here, the district court's order granting partial summary judgment reserved issues for later disposition, including the issue of monetary damages and liability in the children's case. Thus, the initial issue presented is whether the district court's order was a final order from which an appeal could be taken. Section 25-1315(1) provides that [w]hen more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Section 25-1315 permits a judgment to become final only under the limited circumstances set forth in the statute. [9] By its terms, § 25-1315(1) is implicated only where multiple causes of action are presented or multiple parties are involved, and a final judgment is entered as to one of the parties or causes of action. [10] [5,6] The term final judgment as used in § 25-1315(1) is the functional equivalent of a final order within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2008). [11] A final order is a prerequisite to an appellate court's obtaining jurisdiction of an appeal initiated pursuant to § 25-1315(1). [12] In other words, an order that was not appealable under § 25-1902 before § 25-1315 was enacted did not become appealable after § 25-1315 was enacted. [13] [7,8] Thus, with the enactment of § 25-1315(1), one may bring an appeal pursuant to such section only when (1) multiple causes of action or multiple parties are present, (2) the court enters a final order within the meaning of § 25-1902 as to one or more but fewer than all of the causes of action or parties, and (3) the trial court expressly directs the entry of such final order and expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay of an immediate appeal. Therefore, to be appealable, an order must satisfy the final order requirements of § 25-1902 and, additionally, where implicated, § 25-1315(1). [14] In the case at hand, we are presented with a consolidated action involving multiple causes of action and multiple parties. The district court's order granting the motion for partial summary judgment resolved the City's liability in the parents' action, but left unresolved the issues of liability in the children's case, in addition to monetary damages as to all of the causes of action and parties. The district court's order directing final judgment pursuant to § 25-1315(1) expressly states that [t]rial has not been held in the children's action, that the issue of damages was bifurcated from liability issues, and that a bench trial addressed only the liability issue. [9,10] We have consistently refused jurisdiction based on the lack of a final, appealable order in situations nearly identical to the present case. Since at least Hart v. Ronspies, [15] we have held in negligence actions that an interlocutory summary adjudication of liability alone, which does not decide the question of damages, is not a final, appealable order. In Hart, we denied jurisdiction where the district court rendered partial summary judgment for the plaintiff on the issue of the defendant's negligence but reserved for trial the issues of contributory negligence, proximate cause, and damages. [16] This is so because no substantial right is affected by such an interlocutory determination. [17] Similarly, in Burke v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, [18] we denied jurisdiction where the district court entered partial summary judgment on the issue of the defendants' liability but retained the issue of damages for later disposition. To be final, an order must ordinarily dispose of the whole merits of the case. [19] Simply put, we have consistently held that a finding of liability without a determination of damages is not a final, appealable order. [20] Here, no final order was entered (or determination made) regarding damages as required by § 25-1902, and accordingly, the court could not have directed the entry of a final judgment within the meaning of § 25-1315(1). Because the judgment does not dispose of the entirety of any one claim, it cannot be made an appealable judgment by recourse to § 25-1315. [21] As we have stated, § 25-1315 does not provide 'magic words,' the invocation of which transforms any order into a final judgment for purposes of appeal. [22] We conclude that the court erred in certifying its partial summary judgment as final under § 25-1315(1). Because the district court's order of partial summary judgment was not a final, appealable order, we are without jurisdiction.