Opinion ID: 772328
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of First Indictment

Text: 31 Ben Zvi argues that the wire fraud conspiracy as charged in the First Indictment was time barred because none of the alleged overt acts occurred within five years of the indictment's return. We agree. 32 The First Indictment was not returned until August 11, 1993, and its latest overt act was on April 12, 1988, well beyond the five year limitations period. 33 The Government argues that the wire fraud conspiracy count is timely because it charged Ben Zvi with caus[ing] an electronic funds transfer to be made on August 15, 1988 from Lloyd's of London to its attorney in New York, Alan J. Martin, and that this is an overt act even if it was not expressly charged as one. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 197 F.3d 225, 228 (6th Cir. 1999). The Government's reliance on the wiring of funds from Lloyd's to Martin fails to cure the untimeliness, however, because the wiring of the funds was not an overt act by Ben Zvi or her co-conspirators. To constitute an overt act for purposes of the statute of limitations the act must involve some affirmative conduct or deliberate omission on the part of Ben Zvi or her coconspirators. See, e.g., Davis, 533 F.2d at 928 (issuance of the contract by [government agency] in reliance on the falsifications [of defendants] was not for purposes of the statute of limitations an overt act [by defendants] in furtherance of the conspiracy). The wiring of funds by Lloyd's to its New York counsel on August 15, 1988, though precipitated by earlier fraudulent acts and omissions of defendant and her coconspirators, did not involve or otherwise turn on any identifiable act or omission of the conspirators as of the time of the wire transfer. And therefore, the wiring of the funds cannot be used as an overt act to satisfy the statute of limitations.