Opinion ID: 709549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ATSDR Activity at Hanford as Removal or Remedial Action

Text: 23 The HDC argues that ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activity at Hanford is not properly classified as removal or remedial action under CERCLA, and thus the district court erred in dismissing its action pursuant to CERCLA's Timing of Review provision. The HDC's interpretation of removal or remedial action is supported, plaintiffs contend, by an examination of the statutory language, a purposive reading of the statutory structure, and fidelity to CERCLA's purpose. We find that the language, structure, and purpose of CERCLA support the conclusion that ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activity at Hanford is removal or remedial action entitled to the protection of Sec. 9613(h).
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25 Plaintiffs appropriately begin their analysis with the language of the statute. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2547, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (instructing that in applying statutes courts should turn first to the language and structure of the relevant statute); Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.) (applying rule to interpretation of CERCLA), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 652, 126 L.Ed.2d 609 (1993). Plaintiffs note that Congress instructed the ATSDR to effectuate and implement the health related authorities  of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(1) (emphasis added). The HDC argues that when Congress characterized the ATSDR's responsibilities as health related authorities, it meant to distinguish them from Sec. 9604 response authorities. Thus, the HDC concludes, because ATSDR activities are distinguished from response authorities, and response authorities are defined as removal or remedial actions, ATSDR activities are not removal or remedial actions. 26 Plaintiffs' reading of the statute impermissibly isolates and extracts statutory language that must be read in context. Indeed, [w]hen we look to the plain language of a statute in order to interpret its meaning, we do more than view words or sub-sections in isolation. We derive meaning from context, and this requires reading the relevant statutory provisions as a whole. In re Rufener Constr., Inc., 53 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1995). Part of that context is the title of the section in which the relevant language appears. See Greyhound Corp. v. United States, 495 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir.1974) (noting that statutory titles can be very useful tool[s] in resolving the ambiguity); see also Oregon Pub. Util. Comm'n v. I.C.C., 979 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that although section title may not control the plain meaning of a statute, the title can be used to resolve ambiguity); United States v. Cha, 837 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir.1988) (same). 27 In this case, the language cited by plaintiffs appears within Sec. 9604, which is entitled [r]esponse authorities. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604. Thus, Congress characterized the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance authorities found in Sec. 9604 as both response authorities and as health related authorities. We now turn to a discussion of congressional intent. 28 Reading the Sec. 9604 health related authorities language cited by plaintiffs in conjunction with Sec. 9604's heading rather than in isolation indicates that, at the very least, Congress did not intend to distinguish ATSDR activities from other CERCLA response authorities. There is no indication that Congress' characterization of ATSDR authorities as health related was intended to render the Sec. 9604 response authorities section heading superfluous as to ATSDR actions. Instead, the most natural reading of the two statutory provisions is that the ATSDR's health related authorities are, in effect, a subset of a broader set of CERCLA response authorities. Thus, because Congress gave no indication that the universe of CERCLA response authorities cannot include both the health and non-health related activities found in Sec. 9604, we begin with the presumption that Congress did not intend to nullify Sec. 9604's response authorities heading by describing the ATSDR's authorities as health related. 29 This presumption is strengthened here because the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance actions are not the only health related authorities found within Sec. 9604. Indeed, Congress not only included provisions relating to the public health in other Sec. 9604 subsections, but also specifically characterized actions taken to effectuate other public health authorities as response measures. In Sec. 9604(a)(1), Congress provided that the President may take any other response measure ... necessary to protect the public health or welfare or environment. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(a)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(b)(1) (authorizing President to begin health assessment and surveillance activities whenever President believes public health is threatened). Thus, Congress clearly did not believe actions taken to secure the public health were different in kind from response authorities contained in Sec. 9604. Rather, Congress envisioned situations in which the President would have to take response measure[s], which would almost certainly include health assessment and surveillance activity, to protect the public health. 8 In sum, we find that Congress' single reference to ATSDR authorities as health related should be read narrowly as a means to distinguish between different types of response authorities, rather than interpreted broadly as an effort to differentiate ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activity from response actions protected by the Timing of Review provision. 30 However, we do not hold that all CERCLA activities found under Sec. 9604's response authorities heading are per se removal or remedial actions for purposes of CERCLA's Timing of Review provision. In some instances, giving Sec. 9604's response authorities heading binding effect would be inconsistent with Sec. 9601's definition of removal or remedial action, or would conflict with CERCLA's remedial purposes. 9 Moreover, the application of a provision stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction must rest on more than the thin reed of a section heading. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of whether the ATSDR's health assessment and surveillance activities, which are presumptively response authorities by virtue of their position within Sec. 9604, independently satisfy CERCLA's definition of removal or remedial activity.b. ATSDR Activities and the Definition of Removal Action 10 31 CERCLA defines removal actions as measures necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances ... or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(23). We hold that the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities at Hanford satisfy the definition of removal action. 32 A plain reading of the statute supports the conclusion that the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities at issue in this case fall within the statutory definition of removal actions. Removal action under the statute includes those activities that are deemed necessary to prevent hazardous releases from adversely affecting the public health. The ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities challenged by the HDC, in turn, are a necessary part of the government's efforts to safeguard the public health at NPL sites. The ATSDR is responsible not only for assessing whether the health surveillance program sought by the HDC is appropriate at Hanford, but also must coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies to facilitate a cleanup that most effectively protects the health of those exposed to hazardous materials. The ATSDR's involvement at Hanford is mandated by CERCLA, and no other federal agency is responsible for evaluating what action should be taken in response to the historical releases of radioactive iodine at Hanford. The ATSDR, in short, is an integral part of Congress' effort to protect the health of those exposed to hazardous releases from facilities listed on the NPL. 33 We have held, however, that the definition of removal does not encompass all activity related to protecting the public health from hazardous releases. In Durfey v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir.1995), and Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir.1994), we held that private party medical monitoring activities, initiated and coordinated independently of ongoing CERCLA cleanup efforts, were not Sec. 9601 removal or remedial actions. 11 In each case, we held that excluding private medical monitoring programs from CERCLA's definition of removal actions was appropriate for two reasons. 12 First, we distinguished private medical monitoring programs from the five examples of removal actions provided by Congress in Sec. 9601(23), noting that those examples principally concern the threats posed by the physical removal of hazardous waste rather than medical monitoring of the long-term health effects of past hazardous releases. See Durfey, 59 F.3d at 125 (quoting Price ). Second, we determined that the relevant legislative history evinced a clear congressional intent to exclude private medical monitoring activity from CERCLA. See id. 34 The reasoning in Durfey and Price does not apply to health assessment and surveillance actions engaged in by a governmental agency pursuant to explicit CERCLA provisions. A careful examination of the specific examples of removal actions provided by Congress convinces us that ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities are within the scope of Sec. 9601(23). 13 Among the examples of removal action cited in the statute is any action taken under section 9604(b). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(23). Section 9604(b), in turn, provides that the President may act whenever there is reason to believe that 35 a release has occurred ..., or that illness, disease, or complaints thereof may be attributable to exposure to a hazardous substance ... he may undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information gathering as he may deem necessary or appropriate to identify ... the extent of danger to the public health or welfare. 36 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(b)(1). This example of removal activity differs from the ATSDR's health related authorities in only one notable respect: the President rather than the ATSDR is taking the action. Even if we felt this difference was material, which we do not, it is significantly diminished because the President subsequently delegated these functions to the ATSDR. See Exec.Order No. 12580, Sec. 2(a), 52 Fed.Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987), amended by Exec.Order No. 12777, Sec. 1(a), 56 Fed.Reg. 54757 (Oct. 18, 1991), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9615 (Historical and Statutory Notes). 14 Furthermore, the President was not the first to recognize the functional link between the President's health related authorities and the activities of the ATSDR. Congress provided in Sec. 9604(i) that: 37 [I]f a health assessment or other study carried out [by the ATSDR] contains a finding that the exposure concerned presents a significant risk to human health, the President shall take such steps as may be necessary to reduce such exposure and eliminate or substantially mitigate the significant risk to human health. 38 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(11). 39 Clearly, Congress did not believe that health assessment and surveillance activity pursued as part of the government's response to past or present hazardous releases fell outside the statute's definition of removal action. Rather, by explicitly including the President's Sec. 9604(b)(1) health related responsibilities within the scope of Sec. 9601(23), Congress demonstrated that it considered identifying and ameliorating the public health effects of hazardous releases to be among CERCLA's core removal functions. Moreover, because the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities are inextricably linked to the President's responsibilities by both executive order and the plain language of Sec. 9604(i)(11) we hold that the ATSDR's health assessment and surveillance authorities also satisfy Sec. 9601(23)'s definition of removal action. 40 Our interpretation of the scope of CERCLA removal actions is rooted in the distinction Congress drew between public and private efforts to monitor the public health. Congress expanded the role of the ATSDR as part of the 1986 Amendments to CERCLA specifically to address concerns that the original Act had not done enough to monitor, assess, and evaluate the public health effects of hazardous releases: 41 During the reauthorization debates that resulted in the passage of the SARA amendments to CERCLA, one prominent issue addressed by Congress was the need to better define the health risks presented by hazardous waste sites. There was substantial sentiment in both houses of Congress that inadequate attention had been given to the health effects of contaminants found at Superfund sites, as well as the risks to local residents posed by hazardous waste sites. To remedy the perceived inadequacies of the 1980 enactment, Congress created an expanded role for the [ATSDR] to provide medical examinations and testing of exposed individuals. 42 Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F.Supp. 1233, 1249 (M.D.Pa.1990); see also 4 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances, Sec. 8.2, at 482 (1992) (noting that ATSDR health assessment provisions were meant to address the failure of the original Act to adequately protect the public health). Congress clearly did not believe when it amended CERCLA in 1986 that the activities of the ATSDR bore an insignificant relationship to the physical cleanup of CERCLA sites. Rather, Congress meant to codify its understanding, gained through six years of experience with the operation of CERCLA, that Superfund removal and remedial activity must include an effective public health component. 43 Congress' decision to expand the role government health assessment and surveillance activity would play at CERCLA sites stands in stark contrast to Congress' treatment of private medical monitoring programs. As we noted in both Durfey and Price, Congress intentionally deleted all personal rights to recovery of medical expenses from CERCLA. Durfey, 59 F.3d at 125 (quoting Price, 39 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Daigle v. Shell Oil, 972 F.2d 1527, 1536-37 (10th Cir.1992))); see also Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537 (The deleted provisions, however, dealt with a personal right of recovery for medical expenses, not the comprehensive ATSDR health assessment procedures enacted under the 1986 SARA Amendments.). Congress omitted the recovery of private medical monitoring costs from CERCLA based on a determination that CERCLA was not a proper vehicle for facilitating either private medical monitoring efforts or the toxic tort actions that often accompany such efforts. See Ambrogi, 750 F.Supp. at 1238 (In passing [CERCLA] ... Congress did not intend to make injured parties whole or to create a general vehicle for toxic tort actions.). 44 We believe the language of CERCLA, supported by a close examination of the relevant legislative history, establishes that the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities at NPL sites are removal actions, and thus are eligible for Sec. 9613(h)'s jurisdictional protection.
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46 Plaintiffs argue that the structure of two CERCLA subsections proves that Congress did not believe ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities were response authorities or removal actions. The HDC argues that Sec. 9607(a)(4)(A), which provides for the recovery of all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Government, is separate from Sec. 9607(a)(4)(D), which provides for the recovery of the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out by the ATSDR. As a result, they argue that Congress must have generally intended to distinguish ATSDR activities from removal or remedial action. We disagree with the HDC's conclusion. 47 It bears noting that the ATSDR provision in Sec. 9607(a)(4)(D) was added to CERCLA's original Sec. 9607(a)(4) (which included Sec. 9607(a)(4)(A)) as part of the 1986 Superfund Amendments. Thus, we decline to read the failure of Congress to accomplish the seamless integration of ATSDR provisions with the other response authorities found under sub-section 9607(a)(4) as compelling proof of Congress' intent to distinguish ATSDR activities from removal and remedial actions. See Clark v. Uebersee Finanz-Korporation, 332 U.S. 480, 488, 68 S.Ct. 174, 177, 92 L.Ed. 88 (1947) (noting that court should not adopt an interpretation of statutory language that would run counter to the policy of the Act and be disruptive of its purpose ... [when] dealing with hasty legislation that Congress did not stop to perfect as an integrated whole.); Callejas v. McMahon, 750 F.2d 729, 731 (9th Cir.1985) (noting that when considering an Act that has been amended [i]t is the duty of a court to consider the time and circumstances surrounding the enactment); see also Rodgers, Sec. 8.2, at 485 (noting that one consequence of the conglomerate origins and features of SARA is a loss of coherence, because the law was not designed by a single intelligence or the meeting of a few minds). Nevertheless, there is at least a question raised as to what Congress intended when it added an autonomous ATSDR cost-recovery provision to sub-section 9607(a)(4). Since the statutory structure gives rise to ambiguity, we consult the legislative history, to the extent that it is of value, to aid in our interpretation. Straub v. A P Green, Inc., 38 F.3d 448, 452 (9th Cir.1994). 48 An examination of the legislative history reveals a clear congressional intent to identify at least some costs related to ATSDR health activities as response costs. The separate House and Senate versions of the SARA Amendments each provided that [i]n any case in which a health assessment ... discloses the exposure of a population to the release of a hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant from a facility, the costs of such health assessment may be recovered as a cost of response under section [9607] of [CERCLA]. H.R. 2817, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 116(f)(10) (1986); S. 51, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 116(i)(3)(G) (1986) (Senate version); see also Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, at 3302, 3304 (noting that both House and Senate bills provide that the costs of performing a health assessment may be recovered as a cost of response under the authority of section [9607] of this Act, where the assessment discloses exposure of a population to a release of a hazardous substance from a facility). Congress intended the final version of the Amendments to codify the House and Senate cost-recovery provisions: 49 The conference substitute [for the House and Senate ATSDR cost-recovery provisions] deletes the authority for recovery of costs associated with the performance of health assessments in both the House and Senate amendments, since that authority is covered in the conference substitute's amendments to section [9607] of the current law. 50 Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3306 (emphasis added). Thus, rather than establishing that Congress meant to distinguish ATSDR activities from response actions by amending CERCLA to include a separate ATSDR cost-recovery provision, the legislative history demonstrates that the House and the Senate agreed that at least some ATSDR health assessment activities were, in fact, response actions. The statutory structure of Sec. 9607(a)(4)(A) and (D) does not evince Congress' intent to exclude the ATSDR's Sec. 9604 health related authorities from CERCLA's definition of response action. 51
52 HDC asserts that the structure of Sec. 9611(a) and (c) provides another indication that Congress did not intend ATSDR activities to be classified as removal or remedial actions. In those subsections, Congress again separately addressed governmental response costs and ATSDR-related costs. Compare 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9611(a)(1) (addressing governmental response costs) with 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9611(c) (addressing ATSDR costs). Congress did not indicate in the legislative history what, if anything, it intended to convey by amending Sec. 9611 to include a separate ATSDR provision. Thus, given the statute's structural ambiguity and the absence of congressional guidance regarding the proper interpretation of Sec. 9611 as it relates to the classification of ATSDR activities as response actions, this court must choose the interpretation that is most consistent with the remainder of the Act. See Brooks v. Donovan, 699 F.2d 1010, 1011 (9th Cir.1983) (noting that court must confirm that its interpretation does not  'thwart the purpose of the overall statutory scheme or lead to an absurd result.' ) (citations omitted); see also Wilshire Westwood Assoc., 881 F.2d at 804 (applying Brooks in CERCLA context). We hold, notwithstanding the structural ambiguities highlighted by plaintiffs, classifying ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities at NPL sites as removal action is most consistent with the overall structure and purpose of CERCLA.3. CERCLA's Remedial Purpose 53 Concluding that the ATSDR's health assessment and surveillance activities fall within CERCLA's definition of removal activity, and thus are protected by the Timing of Review provision, is consistent with CERCLA's remedial purpose. Because  'CERCLA is essentially a remedial statute designed by Congress to protect and preserve public health and the environment[, courts] are ... obligated to construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustration of the beneficial legislative purposes....'  Wilshire Westwood Assoc., 881 F.2d at 804 (quoting Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081); see also 3550 Stevens Creek Assoc. v. Barclays Bank, 915 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir.1990) (We agree that [CERCLA] is to be given a broad interpretation to accomplish its remedial goals.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 917, 111 S.Ct. 2014, 114 L.Ed.2d 101 (1991). We are convinced that classifying ATSDR's activities as removal or remedial activity is consistent with CERCLA's purposes for three reasons. 54 First, this circuit has joined others in recognizing that protection of the public health was one of the remedial goals of CERCLA. See Wilshire Westwood Assoc., 881 F.2d at 804; Dedham Water Co., 805 F.2d at 1081. More specifically, as we noted above, the health related authorities assigned to the ATSDR in 1986 were meant to redress perceived weaknesses in CERCLA's public health provisions. Given that Congress strengthened the ATSDR in hopes of better achieving CERCLA's remedial goal of protecting the public health, it follows that we must construe provisions relating to the ATSDR in a manner that is most likely to facilitate the effective performance of its statutory responsibilities. We believe that the ATSDR can most effectively protect the public health if the Agency receives the same protection from legal attack that is already extended to other CERCLA removal and remedial activity pursuant to CERCLA's Timing of Review provision. 55 Second, as we noted above, CERCLA affords a privileged position to governmental cleanup efforts as opposed to the efforts of private parties. Indeed, even the cost-recovery provisions relied upon by plaintiffs generally privilege government efforts to recover response costs over similar claims pressed by private parties. See, e.g., Washington State Dep't of Transp. v. Washington Natural Gas, 51 F.3d 1489, 1495-96 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that Sec. 9611(a) distinguishes the government's response cost recovery actions from similar actions brought by private parties and reviewing the more deferential legal standard applied to the government); see also Rodgers, Sec. 8.14, at 702 (In ... noticeable particulars, the government has an easier time than private parties in pursuit of response costs.). Moreover, as we noted in our discussion of Durfey and Price, Congress specifically chose to increase the authority of the ATSDR while intentionally omitting any provisions that would link the administration of CERCLA to private medical monitoring efforts. In short, we are convinced that granting jurisdictional protection to ATSDR activities is most consistent with Congress' intent to give government cleanup efforts wide latitude. 56 Most importantly, recognizing that the ATSDR actions at Hanford constitute removal or remedial action is most consistent with the role Congress intended the ATSDR to play within CERCLA. ATSDR health assessment and surveillance provisions were added to CERCLA due to congressional concern that government response efforts had not given enough attention to the effects hazardous materials were having on human health. See Ambrogi, 750 F.Supp. at 1249. To address this concern, the ATSDR was assigned a role to play at every NPL site, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(6)(A), and is expected to continually evaluate the appropriate responses to health-related problems the Agency identifies at each site. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(6)(G) (The purpose of health assessments ... shall be to assist in determining whether actions ... should be taken to reduce human exposure to hazardous substances from a facility and whether additional information on human exposure and associated health risks is needed.). The ATSDR is required to assist the EPA, Department of Energy, the Centers for Disease Control, and other federal, state, and local authorities with the implementation of health related provisions of CERCLA, see 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(1). This requirement is reinforced at Hanford by the inclusion of ATSDR in the FFA, the blueprint for Hanford's interagency cleanup effort. See Heart of America Northwest v. Westinghouse Hanford, 820 F.Supp. 1265, 1283 (E.D.Wash.1993) ([T]he [Hanford] FFA is an integrated CERCLA response plan and that the activities undertaken pursuant to the FFA are remedial actions selected under CERCLA section 104 and 120.). The ATSDR also must coordinate its activities with the President's response authorities in the event immediate threats to public health are identified. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(11). We hold that the clear and extensive congressional efforts to integrate ATSDR health assessment and surveillance action into NPL cleanups support the conclusion that the activities at issue in this case fall within the scope of Sec. 9613(h)'s jurisdictional proscription. 57 Because the ATSDR's health assessment and surveillance activities are removal or remedial actions under Sec. 9613(h), 15 we conclude that HDC's suit may be subject to CERCLA's Timing of Review provision. Plaintiffs argue, however, that even if the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activity may be entitled in some instances to Sec. 9613(h) protection, several specific Sec. 9613(h) requirements have not been met in this case. HDC asserts that: (1) it is not challenging the ATSDR's health assessment and surveillance authorities, and thus Sec. 9613(h) does not apply; (2) the initiation of a health surveillance program is required at Hanford, and Sec. 9613(h) protects only discretionary action; and (3) the ATSDR has taken health assessment action, and thus its suit should be allowed to proceed under the citizen suit exception to Sec. 9613(h). We examine each of these arguments in turn. 58