Opinion ID: 1347933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: coverage of the damages

Text: ¶ 20 Even though the policy clearly excludes in-flight damage to the aircraft, there is genuine issue as to the whether the damage was caused in-flight as defined by the policy. The policy defines in flight as follows: In flight means the time starting when your insured aircraft moves forward for takeoff and continues until it has landed. It has landed when it has safely stopped or left the runway under control. ¶ 21 In a motion for summary judgment, the moving party initially must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Okla. Stat. tit. 2, ch. 2, app. 1, rule 13(a) (1991); Bowers v. Wimberly, 1997 OK 24, ¶ 14, 933 P.2d 312, 315. Only after the moving party submits evidentiary materials establishing an entitlement to summary judgment is the non-moving party required to submit evidentiary materials controverting the moving party's statement of undisputed material facts. Okla. Stat. tit. 2, ch. 2, app.1, rule 13 (1991). In the present case, Avemco has not met its burden of establishing that the material facts are undisputed. ¶ 22 The policy excludes from coverage damage to the aircraft from the time that it moves forward for takeoff until it has safely stopped or left the runway under control. Avemco failed to submit any evidentiary materials regarding the cause of the fire or the time of the start of the fire. Further Avemco, did not present any evidentiary materials showing that the aircraft had not safely stopped before the damage from the fire occurred. In contrast, Wynn presented evidentiary materials that there was no evidence of a fire at the time the aircraft lost power. Wynn's evidentiary materials submit that the aircraft had landed safely before the fire started. Wynn, in his deposition, stated that at the time of the fire, the aircraft had safely landed, he and his passengers had exited, and several minutes had lapsed before the fire started. Wynn's expert witness, in his deposition, testified that twelve to fifteen minutes lapsed between the time the aircraft was parked and the time that it burst into flames. Wynn submitted the deposition testimony of his expert witness that the aircraft was not in flight when the damage occurred. ¶ 23 Avemco relies on several cases which he argues involve the same facts and issues as the present case. Those cases are Bressee v. Automobile Ins. Co., 1932 U.S. Avia. R. 53 (N.D.N.Y.1932); Smith v. Avemco Ins. Co., 157 Ga.App. 531, 278 S.E.2d 112 (1981); and James v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 N.J. 21, 73 A.2d 720 (1950). These cases are distinguishable because the definition of in flight is not the same as in the present case. Thus, we do not find them persuasive. ¶ 24 Summary judgment is a procedure to eliminate a needless trial. However, it is not to be used to defeat [a] litigant's right to have [a] jury resolve factual issue[s] bearing significantly on [the] outcome of [a] case. Martin v. Chapel, Wilkinson, Riggs and Abney, 1981 OK 134, ¶ 6, 637 P.2d 81. In this case, the evidentiary materials are insufficient to establish that either party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Thus, summary judgment was improper.