Opinion ID: 894985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction of Pretrial Suppression Orders

Text: The parties both assume we have jurisdiction, but that of course does not dispose of the matter. [7] In a single paragraph, the State alleges jurisdiction based on an error of law that requires correction [8] But that jurisdiction does not include most interlocutory appeals, [9] which this pretrial suppression order surely is. [10] Our sister court, the Court of Criminal Appeals, routinely reviews pretrial suppression orders in criminal cases involving adults. [11] But the jurisdictional statute for that Court appears to be broader than ours, [12] and in any event does not expressly limit interlocutory appeals  as ours does. We have not addressed this question before because this appeal is the first of its kind. Although government appeals of suppression orders are common in criminal cases, [13] similar appeals in juvenile justice cases became available in Texas only in 2003, when the Family Code was amended to allow them in cases involving violent or habitual offenders: (b) The state is entitled to appeal an order of a court in a juvenile case in which the grand jury has approved of the petition under Section 53.045 [concerning violent or habitual offenders] if the order . . . grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission and if: (A) jeopardy has not attached in the case; (B) the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (C) the evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial importance in the case. [14] The new statute contemplates review in this Court, [15] but there is no grant of jurisdiction other than as in civil cases generally: An appeal from an order of a juvenile court is to a court of appeals and the case may be carried to the Texas Supreme Court by writ of error or upon certificate, as in civil cases generally. [16] In the absence of a specific statutory grant, or of a dissent in the court of appeals, [17] we thus have jurisdiction of this interlocutory appeal only if (as in civil cases generally) the court of appeals opinion holds differently from a prior decision of another court of appeals or of the supreme court. [18] This presents two interesting questions here. First, because this is the first appeal of a suppression order in a juvenile justice case, there can be no conflicts if the scope of comparison is limited to just those appeals. But our conflicts jurisdiction is no longer limited to rulings that are so far upon the same state of facts that the decision of one case is necessarily conclusive of the decision in the other. [19] For cases filed after 2003 (as this one was), [20] a conflict is sufficient for jurisdiction when there is inconsistency in the[] respective decisions that should be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants. [21] Second, our conflicts jurisdiction is generally limited to cases that conflict with a prior decision of another court of appeals or of the supreme court. [22] Juvenile cases, though classified as civil proceedings, are quasi-criminal in nature and frequently concern constitutional rights and procedures normally found only in criminal law. [23] This Court rarely addresses issues like the one here concerning the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona ; [24] indeed, our citation to that case in this sentence is only the second in the Court's history, [25] compared to almost 2,000 cases citing it by other Texas state courts. Instead, the law governing such issues is generally found in opinions from the United States Supreme Court and the Court of Criminal Appeals  two courts that are not listed in our jurisdictional statute. While this is perhaps a matter for legislative attention, it is not one we can disregard. [26] Accordingly, we have jurisdiction in this case if the court of appeals has held differently from a prior decision of another court of appeals on an issue that should be clarified to remove uncertainty or unfairness. We believe there is such a conflict. In suppressing the alleged murder weapon for a Miranda violation, the court of appeals held differently from other courts of appeals that have followed Baker v. State , an opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals. [27] While these other cases did not involve juveniles, the conflict requires clarification for several reasons. First, rules governing hundreds of out-of-court investigations must provide guidance that is clear and easy for law enforcement personnel to apply; [28] variations between the rules for juveniles and adults, or between the rules in one part of the state and another, may confuse those investigations and jeopardize many future cases. Second, we do not have the luxury of waiting for a final appeal to address these issues; if evidence is improperly suppressed, double jeopardy prevents the state from appealing after a juvenile is acquitted or the case dismissed for lack of admissible evidence. [29] Finally, we are especially cognizant of rendering fairness to the litigants in a case like this involving the most serious of crimes, an alleged murder. Despite the expansion of our conflicts jurisdiction, we remain reticent to address unsettled questions that may be clarified by developments during trial and thoughtful consideration by several intermediate courts. But the unique circumstances of juvenile proceedings  an unlikely and sometimes perplexing hybrid of civil and criminal law [30]  convince us that the conflicts involved here must be clarified to remove unnecessary uncertainty in the law and unfairness to litigants. [31] Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to consider the State's appeal.