Opinion ID: 1976452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The continuance from the June 28, 1983, trial date.

Text: We already have noted that on March 30, 1983, Judge Irvin was still considering the summary judgment motions. The court administrator, apparently anticipating the court could not meet the June 28, 1983, trial date, rescheduled the trial for July 19. The parties were notified promptly. They raised no objections and continued with discovery and additional filings. Gold Crown argues the court administrator is not a judge and the administrator's ex parte rescheduling in this instance, without an application and an order of court entered thereon after notice, was inadequate to satisfy rule 215.1 requirements. The record in this case demonstrates the fourth judicial district has followed modern court administration, endorsed by this court, in delegating the assignment of cases and the trial docket to court managers (in the fourth district, the court administrator), thus providing the judges more time for judicial functions. Much of our rationale set out in the last division applies here. On March 30, 1983, Judge Irvin still had the summary judgment motions under consideration. He had a heavy trial schedule. The parties had stipulated agreement to further continuances by the court. The district judges had delegated that administrative power to the court administrator. Before the June 28, 1983, trial date was reached, he rescheduled the trial to start July 19, 1983. Judge Burgett found this to be necessary to accommodate the Court's trial schedule, a finding no party has disputed in this litigation. We hold this case was not automatically dismissed on June 28, 1983, and, therefore, face the question of its status when not tried on July 19, 1983. Our factual recital has pointed out this failure was occasioned by Gold Crown's call to the court administrator on July 18, 1983, reporting the case had been settled. We suggested in Psotka v. Brockney, 260 N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1977), that irregularity or fraud in the dismissal of [a] case might make a difference. Id. at 414. Fraud is not asserted here, nor need we explore this irregularity because we are of the opinion that, assuming the case was dismissed, it was reinstated. III. Application for reinstatement. Gold Crown's application for further review asserts the court of appeals erred in holding D.R.R.'s application for continuance from the operation of rule 215.1, coupled with its resistance to Gold Crown's motion for formal order of dismissal, could be considered as an application for reinstatement. We start from the premise that [a] statute giving the court power to set aside dismissals is remedial, intended to be liberally construed and applied to the end that meritorious trials may be had. Rath v. Sholty, 199 N.W.2d 333, 337 (Iowa 1972) (quoting 27 C.J.S. Dismissal & Nonsuit § 78, at 491 (1959)). Reinstatement is mandatory upon a showing of oversight, mistake, or other reasonable cause. Werkmeister v. Kroneberger, 262 N.W.2d 295, 296 (Iowa 1978). Preliminarily, we also note this is not the typical case of neglected pursuit on the plaintiff's part. District court docket entries up to the time of the final ruling would constitute about four and one-half pages, typewritten and single spaced on letter-size paper. The district court filings were in four volumes, five and one-half inches in height. Substantial evidence supported the trial court finding the action was pursued vigorously in discovery, pleadings and motions and the attorneys were very active in the preparation of the case for trial. The problem is placed in proper perspective by reviewing the sequence of events leading up to and following the July 19, 1983, trial date. Surprisingly, Gold Crown, which later took the position it knew all along that the case was automatically dismissed on March 22, 1983, nonetheless was engaged in settlement negotiations with D.R.R. On the day before trial, Gold Crown's counsel called the court administrator's office to report a settlement and the case was dropped out of the assignment. [3] Shortly thereafter a disagreement must have arisen concerning the settlement terms. August 17, 1983, D.R.R. filed a motion for an order enforcing the settlement agreed upon, or in the alternative setting the matter for immediate jury trial. Gold Crown's resistance, filed September 12, 1983, alleged, inter alia, that D.R.R.'s counsel had refused to permit her to sign the settlement papers prepared by Gold Crown's counsel, and that the matter should be set for trial after pre-trial conference. September 20, 1983, this matter was submitted to the court, Judge Hanson presiding. The court ruled the case had not been settled, would not be dismissed under rule 215.1, and would stand continued to date fixed for trial by Court Administrator. September 26, 1983, Gold Crown filed an application for pretrial conference. December 12, 1983, the court administrator assigned the case for trial on March 13, 1984. December 16, 1983, Gold Crown filed its Motion for Formal Order of Court Dismissing Case, asserting the action had been dismissed by operation of rule 215.1 on March 22, 1983, and that no motion for reinstatement had been filed within the mandatory six-month period. December 21, 1983, D.R.R. filed an Application for Continuance to Avoid 215.1 Dismissal, reciting that the case in good faith was thought to be settled before the last trial date and thus not heard, that the case now was set for trial for March 13, 1984, and that the action be continued to March 13, 1984. The court administrator set these matters for hearing on December 30, 1983. D.R.R. later filed a resistance to Gold Crown's dismissal motion which was considered by the court in its ruling. In this resistance D.R.R. alleged her active pursuit of trial, the continuing nature of the October 22, 1982, stipulation, the order by Judge Hanson reinstating the case if in fact it had been dismissed before that date, and prayed that Gold Crown's motion be overruled. January 17, 1984, Judge Burgett filed the ruling that denied Gold Crown's motion and granted D.R.R.'s application. The court of appeals held the two above filings by D.R.R. substantially met the rule 215.1 requirements of an application for reinstatement. See Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School District, 360 N.W.2d 108, 115 (Iowa 1984) (two continuance ordersone not a rule 215.1 continuance read together substantially complied with rule 215.1). The court noted both parties were represented at the hearing and presented their arguments. In the unique circumstances of this case, we agree. We do not consider it dispositive that D.R.R. entitled her motion an application for continuance rather than an application for reinstatement. She unquestionably sought a holding that her consistent demand for trial not be frustrated by rule 215.1. Among other compelling grounds D.R.R. alleged the settlement that derailed the July 19 trial date had collapsed upon the expiration of six months following the first March 22, 1983, trial date. The substance of D.R.R.'s filings was to preserve her case for trial. That was, in the final analysis, the relief she sought. This court often has observed that we look to the substance of a motion rather than its title. Peoples Trust & Savings Bank v. Baird, 346 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Iowa 1984); State v. Wilt, 333 N.W.2d 457, 460 (Iowa 1983); E & M Machine Tool Corp. v. Continental Machine Products, Inc., 316 N.W.2d 900, 903 (Iowa 1982). We have indicated that form must give way to substance. Tigges v. City of Ames, 356 N.W.2d 503, 510 (Iowa 1984); see Troester v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 328 N.W.2d 308, 312 (Iowa 1982) (The motion to dismiss in this case was directed to the lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the court. ... The district court correctly recognized that this claim was in reality a challenge to the plaintiff's capacity to maintain the action.). Under these principles and in light of our recognition that trial court's power should be liberally applied to set aside dismissals to allow trials on the merits, we agree with the court of appeals that D.R. R.'s filings were adequate to constitute an application for reinstatement. We affirm the decision of the court of appeals. The writ of certiorari heretofore issued is annulled. Costs in this action are taxed to Gold Crown. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMED; WRIT ANNULLED; CASE REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.