Opinion ID: 772896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History of 212(c)

Text: 14 The current circuit split was foreshadowed by a history of differing interpretations of 212(c). Section 212(c) of the INA grants the Attorney General discretion to admit permanent resident aliens who temporarily travel abroad and seek readmission, even if they are otherwise subject to exclusion under the statute. 6 Although 212(c) by its literal terms offers relief only from exclusion, during the last four decades the INS has permitted aliens subject to deportation to apply for 212(c) relief. This expansion was justified under the theory that, if the INS allowed a resident alien to reenter the country despite his excludability and then initiated deportation proceedings, the alien should not be placed in a worse position than if he had been excluded in the first place. See Matter of GA-, 7 I. & N. Dec. 274 (BIA 1956); Matter of S-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 392 (BIA 1954, Att'y Gen.1955). 15 This extension, however, produced inequities in its application. While one resident alien who became deportable and then voluntarily left the country became eligible for waiver upon reentry, another alien who was deportable for the same reason but never left the country had no recourse. Finding this distinction not rationally related to any legitimate purpose of the statute, the Second Circuit struck it down as violating the Due Process Clause. Francis v. INS, 532 F.2d 268, 272 (2d Cir.1976). The BIA adopted the reasoning of Francis and extended 212(c) relief to deportable aliens regardless of whether they had left the United States after committing the act rendering them deportable. See Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 30 (BIA 1976). Under the rationale of Francis and Silva, therefore, deportable aliens could receive 212(c) exclusion-type relief. However, because the basis for the extension of relief was to equalize the treatment of aliens who were deportable versus excludable on equivalent grounds, the BIA extended 212(c) relief only to aliens whose deportability was based on a ground for which a comparable ground for exclusion existed. See Matter of Wadud, 19 I. & N. Dec. 182, 184 (BIA 1984); Matter of Granados, 16 I. & N. Dec. 726, 728 (BIA 1979). 16 In 1990, the BIA departed from its precedent to hold that 212(c) relief was available to all aliens facing deportation (unless the ground was one specifically excluded in 212(c)). See Matter of Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 268 (BIA 1990). This unexpected liberality was soon curtailed, however, as the Attorney General reversed the BIA, 7 and the reversal was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. See In re Hernandez-Casillas, 20 I. & N. Dec. 262, 280-93 (BIA 1991), aff'd mem., 983 F.2d 231 (5th Cir.1993). The issue in Hernandez-Casillas, as in this case, was whether 212(c) relief should be available to aliens deportable on the ground of entry without inspection. See id. at 280. Because there is no comparable ground for exclusion, the Attorney General concluded that 212(c) relief should not be available but that, pursuant to the BIA's former precedent, a 212(c) waiver is available only to aliens whose deportability was based on a ground for which a comparable ground for exclusion exists. See id. at 291-92. 17 The Seventh Circuit addressed this precise issue in Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939 (7th Cir.1993), and agreed with Hernandez-Casillas that a deportable alien's ineligibility for a 212(c) waiver does not violate his right to equal protection. See id. at 952. However, the Second Circuit has held that a 212(c) waiver is available in a deportation based on entry without inspection, despite the lack of an analogous ground for exclusion. See Bedoya-Valencia v. INS, 6 F.3d 891, 897 (2d Cir.1993) (extending the Francis rule to hold that an alien deportable for illegal entry was not rendered ineligible for a 212(c) waiver by his illegal entry, where he was also deportable for a drug conviction that did not render him ineligible for the waiver). 18 Other circuits, including this Circuit, have addressed the issue in the context of a firearms violation (a deportation ground for which no analogous ground for exclusion exists), and have uniformly followed the Attorney General's lead, concluding that a 212(c) waiver is not available in deportations for firearms violations because there is no analogous ground for exclusion. See Gjonaj v. INS, 47 F.3d 824, 827 (6th Cir.1995); Rodriguez-Padron v. INS, 13 F.3d 1455, 1460-61 (11th Cir.1994); Chow v. INS, 12 F.3d 34, 38 (5th Cir.1993); Rodriguez v. INS, 9 F.3d 408, 412 (5th Cir.1993); Campos v. INS, 961 F.2d 309, 316-17 (1st Cir.1992); Cabasug v. INS, 847 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir.1988). See also Matter of Montenegro, 20 I. & N. Dec. 602, 605 (BIA 1992) (stating that under Hernandez-Casillas an alien who is deportable for a firearms conviction is ineligible for 212(c) relief because there is no analogous ground for exclusion).