Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rhonda Miller Bribe

Text: Rhonda Miller testified that she recanted her statement that Andre Armstrong killed Kenneth Gentry because she was offered a bribe by the girlfriends of Jeff and Stanley Bryant. Defendants contended that the testimony was irrelevant without other evidence connecting the bribery attempt to the Bryants, and, further, that her testimony would be ―more prejudicial than probative.‖ The court found her testimony relevant. The jury could reasonably infer that, contrary to defendants‘ positions, Armstrong did not act on his own but instead killed Gentry on behalf of the Bryant Family. It also held that sufficient evidence connected the bribe to the Family. The court did not explicitly weigh the risk of undue prejudice against the probative value, but we may conclude it implicitly did so in overruling defendants‘ objections. (People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 924.) Defendants appear to concede that Miller‘s testimony was relevant to undermine the assertion that Armstrong killed Gentry on his own initiative. Indeed, the testimony was relevant for that purpose and properly admissible.29 The jury could logically and 29 The court also found Miller‘s testimony relevant to ―further buttress the credibility‖ of Armstrong‘s statements made to detectives, the admission of which we presumed erroneous. (See ante, pt. II.G.) Miller‘s testimony was relevant on its own to (footnote continued on next page) 75 reasonably infer that someone in charge of the Bryant Family ordered the bribery, and that these efforts showed the Family was involved in the Gentry murder. Defendants‘ argument that the evidence was unduly prejudicial also fails. This jury heard evidence, inter alia, that all three defendants murdered several people, including a young child. Evidence of bribery and witness dissuasion was not likely to evoke improper bias or an emotional response on the part of the jurors. (See People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1121.) As we recently explained in Scott, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pages 490 to 491: ― ‗ ― ‗Prejudice‘ as contemplated by [Evidence Code] section 352 is not so sweeping as to include any evidence the opponent finds inconvenient. Evidence is not prejudicial, as that term is used in a section 352 context, merely because it undermines the opponent‘s position or shores up that of the proponent. The ability to do so is what makes evidence relevant. The code speaks in terms of undue prejudice. Unless the dangers of undue prejudice, confusion, or time consumption ‗ ―substantially outweigh‖ ‘ the probative value of relevant evidence, a section 352 objection should fail. [Citation.] ‗ ―The ‗prejudice‘ referred to in Evidence Code section 352 applies to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has very little effect on the issues. In applying section 352, ‗prejudicial‘ is not synonymous with ‗damaging.‘ ‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.] [¶] The prejudice that section 352 ‗ ―is designed to avoid is not the prejudice or damage to a defense that naturally flows from relevant, highly probative evidence.‖ [Citations.] ―Rather, the statute uses the word in its etymological sense of ‗prejudging‘ a person or cause on the basis of extraneous factors. [Citation.]‖ [Citation.]‘ [Citation.]‖ (footnote continued from previous page) establish the connection between Armstrong and the Bryant Family. We need not discuss the court‘s alternate theory. 76