Opinion ID: 2277634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mark only one.)

Text:  (a) We unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the above circumstance exists.  (b) We unanimously find by a preponderance of the evidence that the above circumstance does not exist.  (c) After a reasonable period of deliberation, one or more of us, but fewer than all 12, find by a preponderance of the evidence that the above circumstance exists. We fail to see how it could be any clearer that the appropriate standard for proof of mitigating circumstances is the preponderance standard. Taking the instruction as a whole, especially when combined with language of the Findings and Sentencing form given to the jury, we do not believe the jury could have concluded it was to apply the reasonable doubt standard to its findings of mitigating circumstances. We therefore reject this assertion of error.
Bruce next contends that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the parties' burdens of proof at the sentencing. Again, Bruce has taken out of context isolated remarks from the transcript to argue that the trial judge acted improperly. Again, we must reject his contention. At issue is the judge's explanation to the jury that mitigation is another word for lessening. The State has to prove aggravating. That's increasing the penalty from life imprisonment to either life without parole or death. And the defendant introduces evidence to establish that mitigating factors exist to bring it back down to life imprisonment.... Bruce argues that this advisement incorrectly inflated the effect of the finding of an aggravating circumstance, and therefore imposed a burden upon the defense greater than the law provides for. In particular, he focuses on the trial judge's use of the words bring it back down to life imprisonment, claiming that this portion of the instruction implies that the death penalty is mandatory if the defendant fails to introduce evidence of mitigating circumstances. Bruce notes that the existence of an aggravating factor does not establish, in and of itself, that a death sentence is appropriate. (Emphasis in original). This, Bruce continues, would violate the principles in Foster v. State, 304 Md. 439, 499 A.2d 1236 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1010, 106 S.Ct. 3310, 92 L.Ed.2d 723 (1986). In Foster, the defendant asserted that the death penalty statute itself was unconstitutional because a jury, finding a single aggravating circumstance in a case where the defendant had not proven mitigating circumstances, would be obliged to return a death sentence even where the sentencer is unconvinced that death is the appropriate punishment. Id. 304 Md. at 473, 499 A.2d at 1253. We rejected this interpretation, saying [a] sentencing authority, unconvinced that death is appropriate, may list as a mitigating circumstance whatever factor or factors may have led to this conclusion, irrespective of what the defendant produced or argued. If the sentencing authority perceives anything relating to the defendant or the crime which causes it to believe that death may not be appropriate, it may treat such factor as a mitigating circumstance and decide that it outweighs the aggravating circumstances. Therefore, as we have repeatedly stated, the Maryland statute is not a mandatory death penalty law. Id. at 474-75, 499 A.2d at 1254. For basically the same reasons expressed in Foster with regard to the statute itself, we believe the trial judge's instruction did not erroneously imply that the death penalty was mandatory. Rather, it correctly reflected the law that a finding of aggravating circumstances, in the absence of any juror finding either statutory or non-statutory mitigators, will result in a death sentence as per the sentencing form. If there was anything objectionable in this portion of the instruction, it was that the trial judge only referred to the defendant's ability to introduce mitigating circumstances. In fact, were this the only instruction given regarding mitigating circumstances, there might be cause for concern. As we indicated in Foster, the ability of the jury to consider any factor as a mitigator, not only those introduced by the defendant, is crucial to the non-mandatory character of the death penalty statute. The trial judge, however, properly instructed the jury when she said soon thereafter: For purposes of this sentencing proceeding a mitigating circumstance is anything about the defendant or about the facts of the case that in fairness or in mercy may make the death sentence an inappropriate penalty for this defendant.       In determining whether or not there are any mitigating circumstances, consider all of the evidence presented regardless of who introduced it.       You need not find a statutory mitigating circumstance in order to impose a sentence of life imprisonment or life without parole. Nothing in the law forbids you from extending mercy out of compassion or belief that life imprisonment or life without parole is sufficient punishment under all of the circumstances. Since we review jury instruction error by looking at the entire instruction, and not a particular portion in isolation, Collins, 318 Md. at 283, 568 A.2d at 8, we believe that the instructions set out directly above fully overcome any potential error in the instruction that Bruce cited. The judge did not commit any error.
Of the six asserted jury instruction errors, Bruce properly preserved only one for appeal. Among the instructions that Bruce requested, but which the trial judge refused to give, was the following: I advise you that if for any reason you are unable within a reasonable period of time to reach a unanimous judgment as to the balancing required by Section IV of the form, I will sentence Kirk Bruce to life imprisonment. Bruce objected on the record to the judge's refusal to give this proposed instruction, which apparently has its basis in § 413(k)(2) of the death penalty statute. Section 413(k)(2) provides that [i]f the jury, within a reasonable time, is not able to agree as to whether a sentence of death shall be imposed, the court may not impose a sentence of death. Unlike the preceding five assertions of error, Bruce properly preserved this assertion for appeal. We find that the trial judge did not err. The propriety of this exact instruction was before us in Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992), and there we held that the court was not required to give it. 327 Md. at 642-43, 612 A.2d at 265. We have repeatedly rejected the notion that a judge must instruct the jurors in a capital sentencing proceeding prior to their deliberations that if they cannot agree on sentencing within a reasonable time, a life sentence would be imposed. See Booth v. State, 327 Md. at 153-54, 608 A.2d at 169; Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 771, 506 A.2d 580, 623, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986); Calhoun v. State, 297 Md. 563, 593-95, 468 A.2d 45, 58-60 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 993, 104 S.Ct. 2374, 80 L.Ed.2d 846 (1984). In Calhoun, we noted that [g]iving the [proposed] instruction to the jury before deliberation could prompt someone to hold out for just a bit more than a reasonable time to insure that the death penalty was not imposed. It likewise could cause a jury to rush through its deliberations to avoid being called back by the court and told that because a reasonable time had passed without a verdict the sentence would be life imprisonment. The statute is a mandate directed to the court, not the jury. As the jury here reached its decision within a reasonable time, no instruction was required. Id. at 595, 468 A.2d at 60. The jury here reached its decision within a reasonable time. No such instruction was required, and the trial judge did not err in refusing to give it.