Opinion ID: 1918350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Legitimate Purposes to Relocate

Text: ALI Principles's express recognition of a number of legitimate purposes for relocation furthers the goal of preventing negative inferences drawn against relocating parents. The ALI section offers the judgment that: A relocation is for a legitimate purpose if it is to be close to significant family or other support networks, for significant health reasons, to protect the safety of the child or another member of the child's household from a significant risk of harm, to pursue a significant employment or educational opportunity, or to be with one's spouse [or spouse equivalent. . .] who is established, or who is pursuing a significant employment or educational opportunity, in another location. The relocating parent has the burden of proving the legitimacy of any other purpose. ALI Principles, supra, § 2.20(4)(a), at 340. While this list of legitimate purposes may not be exhaustive and future cases could establish other presumptively legitimate purposes, this list is certainly a place to begin. It conserves judicial resources by preventing time-consuming litigation on the reason for the move, where the reason is one enumerated above. The comments to this section clarify that where the parent is relocating for one of the purposes enumerated in § 2.20(4)(a), these guidelines relieve[] the relocating parent of the burden of convincing the court that their purpose is legitimate. Id. cmt. d., at 349. Therefore, if a parent has been exercising a significant majority of custodial responsibility and the move is in good faith, then no further analysis is required. Id. This approach allocates judicial resources efficiently by taking certain issues off the discussion table, such as whether a move can ever be in good faith and whether certain purposes are legitimate, thus allowing courts to use their time wisely in other areas. Finally, ALI Principles turns to the issue of relocation where the parents are joint custodians, neither exercising a significant majority of custodial time. [8] Again, ALI Principles returns to the inquiry of good faith, and then asks whether the relocation is for a legitimate purpose and is to a reasonable location in light of that purpose. If these queries are satisfied, then the court must allocate custodial responsibility in light of the best interests of the child, using all relevant factors, including the advantages and disadvantages of the relocation. The court must compare the situation of the children if custodial responsibility is allocated to either parent; the court cannot require the parties to maintain the status quo. Thus, the situation of the relocating parent is compared to the situation of the remaining parent, assuming each one has sole (or primary) custody. The court is to consider all relevant factors including the potential benefits of the relocation and the disruption inherent in both situations. Any award of sole custody from a joint custody situation will result in changes for the children. Incorporating factors such as these into our analysis of relocation cases is consistent with the legislature's statutory scheme and our previous relocation decisions. The statute requires that a modification of custody must be based upon a real, substantial and unanticipated change of circumstances and in the best interests of the child. 15 V.S.A. § 668. We modified this two-step test in Lane, 158 Vt. at 489, 614 A.2d at 786. There, we held that where a custodial parent wants to relocate and the noncustodial parent shows changed circumstances, the noncustodial parent must further show that the move would so undermine the best interests of the children that a transfer of custody is necessary. See id. at 499, 614 A.2d at 792. Lane thus added an intermediate step, a showing by the parent challenging the move as to the effects of the relocation on the children, such that the children's best interests can only be served by transferring custody to the remaining parent. This step, considering the impact of relocation, is broadly worded and apparently provides scant guidance to trial courts on how to evaluate a relocation. The parents attempting to make such a snowing have little guidance regarding what factors carry weight in this inquiry. I propose to use the ALI Principles to fill in the blank. Once changed circumstances have been shown, there are a series of other questions that should be asked, prior to reopening the best interests of the children analysis: Is the moving parent acting in good faith? Is the opposing parent acting in good faith? Is the move for a legitimate purpose? Is the proposed location reasonable with respect to the stated purpose? And, rather than limiting the trial courts to the clumsy terms of custodial parent and noncustodial parent, we ought to provide a working standard such as a parent exercising a significant majority of custodial responsibility. This means a parent who has custodial responsibility at least 60 percent of the time. [9] What we did in Lane was no more and no less than what an appellate court should do. There, we provided guidance consistent with the statutory framework and interpreting that framework. What I propose here is neither novel nor inappropriate in our role as an appellate court. In this case, because the court relied on finding that father had a fractional majority of custodial time and then failed to consider mother's situation on an equal footing, I cannot tell which of the ALI rules ought to apply. If, as she contends, and as the evidence suggests, she was the custodial parent, the court should have accorded deference to her decision to relocate, as outlined in ALI Principles and as required by Lane. See also McCart v. McCart, 166 Vt. 629, 630, 697 A.2d 353, 354 (1997) (mem.) (trial court cannot substitute its judgment for that of custodial parent choosing to relocate). If, on the other hand, the parents truly shared joint custody, then the court should have moved from establishing the fact of joint custody to inquire into the good faith and legitimacy of the move. Only at that point should the court have engaged in a de novo review of the children's best interests. Although the trial court here did reference the statutory factors regarding the best interests of the children, its findings are deeply and unmistakably erroneous, and deprived mother of a fair hearing. The scope and significance of the lower court's errors requires reversal under any standard we might use.