Opinion ID: 468600
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Law Enforcement Official

Text: 10 The plaintiff also argues that a probation officer is not a law enforcement official and thus the disclosure to Gahl does not come within subsection (d) of the routine use exceptions listed in note 3 supra. The Privacy Act does not define law enforcement official, although it does include probation officers in a general exemption section when it refers to any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal laws. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(j)(2). A probation officer is clearly a law enforcement official as the term is ordinarily used. A probation officer, either under the direction of the court or the Parole Commission, performs law enforcement-related functions. For example, a probation officer has an obligation to report to the court on the conduct of the probationer and ensure that he or she is abiding by the terms of probation and thus is expected to keep informed about such persons. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3655. A probation officer's job is to assist the court and criminal justice system in the rehabilitation of offenders. As such he or she is required to inform the court when the probationer violates the law or fails to pay fines or restitution. Id. A probation officer also has a limited power to arrest and issue bench warrants. Id.; Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445, 102 S.Ct. 735, 743, 70 L.Ed.2d 677 (probation officers partake of the sovereign's power to exercise coercive force over the individual). As the Supreme Court recently noted, a probation officer is a peace officer, and as such is allied to a greater or lesser extent with his fellow peace officers. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (quoting Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 720, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2569, 61 L.Ed.2d 197). A probation official, functioning as an arm of the criminal justice system, clearly assists in the enforcement of the criminal laws. 11 Kimberlin argues that Gahl was not a law enforcement official as to plaintiff because he was in prison, not on probation, and therefore Gahl had no supervisory power over him. This argument is unpersuasive for several reasons. First, Gahl was directly involved in Kimberlin's case. He prepared the pre-sentence reports after Kimberlin's criminal conviction. Also, he was the individual to contact the MCC to inform them of the civil judgment obtained by Mrs. DeLong against Kimberlin. Thus, although not under Gahl's direct supervisory power as a probation officer, Kimberlin's case was being handled by Gahl pursuant to his work in the court system. Second, routine use exception subsection (d) (see supra note 3) does not require that the law enforcement official be acting within the scope of his or her duties. So to interpret the exception would limit its application immeasurably. To follow plaintiff's logic, only prison officials could communicate with other prison officials because they are the only law enforcement officials with direct supervisory power over Kimberlin while he is in prison. Obviously, the routine use exception was to have greater applicability, especially given the broad coverage of legal proceedings (investigations, criminal, civil, and regulatory proceedings). We approve the district court's finding that Gahl was a law enforcement officer within the meaning of the Inmate Commissary Account System list of routine uses.