Opinion ID: 15644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Federal Law Arguments

Text: Turning to the parties’ federal law arguments, both appellants and FSB cite 12 U.S.C. § 1825(b)(2) as supporting their respective positions. Section 1825(b)(2), enacted as part of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub.L. No. 107-173, 103 Stat. 183 (1989), provides that “[n]o property of the [FDIC] shall be subject to levy, attachment, garnishment, foreclosure, or sale without the consent of the [FDIC], nor shall any involuntary lien attach to the property of 9 the [FDIC].” Appellants argue, inter alia, that section 1825(b)(2) relates only to the FDIC’s lien, not to Metroplex’s “equity.” Appellants also argue that, by its express terms, section 1825(b)(2) prevented foreclosure of the FDIC’s lien interest irrespective of whether the FDIC was made a party to the tax suit. Accordingly, they argue, the FDIC could not have been a “necessary party” to the tax suit because, pursuant to the prohibition of section 1825(b)(2), the state court lacked authority to extinguish the FDIC’s lien. FSB contests appellants’ interpretation and application of section 1825(b)(2). It also argues that the tax suit may well have been invalid pursuant to section 1825(b)(2) because the FDIC did not consent to the tax sale, which purported to vest “good and perfect title” in the purchaser, extinguishing all prior lien interests pursuant to the authority of Texas state law. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 34.01(d) (Vernon 1992).