Opinion ID: 899653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stafford’s Challenges to the Sentencing

Text: A district court’s interpretation and application of the ACCA is a question of law, reviewed de novo. United States v. Graves, 60 F.3d 1183, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995). Whether a prior conviction qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA is also a question of law the court reviews de novo. United States v. Johnson, 675 F.3d 1013, 1016 (6th Cir. 2012). No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 17 The ACCA provides a mandatory minimum fifteen-year term of imprisonment for offenders convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), felon in possession of a firearm, after having sustained three qualifying prior convictions of either crimes of violence or serious drug offenses. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Section 924(e) defines “violent felony” as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The district court found that Stafford qualified as an armed career criminal based on four prior predicate offenses, including two convictions for “aggravated riot,” in violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2917.02(A)(2). The district court found Stafford had an adjusted offense level of 32, criminal history category VI, resulting in an advisory Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months of imprisonment. With the ACCA enhancement, the district court found Stafford had a total offense level of 34, criminal history category VI, resulting in an advisory Guidelines Range of 262 to 327 months of imprisonment. Stafford argues that his “aggravated-riot” convictions do not qualify as “violent offenses.” As the parties do not contend that the “aggravated-riot” conviction falls under the first two types of “violent felonies” in § 924(e), it falls under the statute’s “residual clause”: a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). “[I]n determining the nature of a defendant’s prior conviction, we apply a ‘categorical’ approach, meaning that we look at the statutory definition of the crime of conviction, not the facts underlying that conviction, to determine the nature of the crime.” United States v. Ford, 560 F.3d 420, 421–22 (6th Cir. 2009); see also Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). If the court finds that the statutory language No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 18 fails to clarify whether the underlying conviction is a crime of violence, or if “it is possible to violate a criminal law in a way that amounts to a crime of violence and in a way that does not,” Ford, 560 F.3d at 422, the court may consider “the statutory definition, charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented” to determine if the underlying conviction was a crime of violence. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005); see also United States v. Jones, 673 F.3d 497, 504 n.2 (6th Cir. 2012) (calling this analysis the “modified categorical approach”). At Stafford’s sentencing, the district court found that under the categorical approach or even modified categorical approach, both of [the “aggravated-riot” convictions] qualify as predicate offenses of violence, and I further find that with respect to [Stafford’s 2005 “aggravated-riot” conviction], that the Bill of Particulars, which was filed about three months before [Stafford’s] guilty plea, makes clear that this was a crime of violence . . . . [T]here’s no question in the Court’s mind that this aggravated riot was a crime of violence. Stafford argues that the district court erred in applying the modified categorical approach and finding that his convictions under Ohio’s “aggravated riot” statute were violent felonies because it relied on both the PSR and the Bill of Particulars that accompanied his 2005 “aggravated-riot” conviction, both of which are impermissible documents under Shepard. The Government agrees that the district court erred in considering these documents. The Government argues, however, that we should find that Stafford’s “aggravated-riot” convictions are violent felonies based on the permissible Shepard documents in the record. This court previously considered, in an unpublished opinion, the question of whether Ohio’s “aggravated riot” offense qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. United States v. Sanders, 301 F. App’x 503 (6th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In Sanders, a panel of this court determined that “aggravated riot” under the Ohio statute included both violent and non-violent offenses. The statute provides, in relevant part: No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 19 (A) No person shall participate with four or more others in a course of disorderly conduct in violation of [Ohio’s Disorderly Conduct statute]: (1) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony; (2) With purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of any offense of violence; (3) When the offender or any participant to the knowledge of the offender has on or about the offender’s or participant’s person or under the offender’s or participant’s control, uses, or intends to use a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2917.02(A). Sanders held that violation of subsection (A)(1) was not an offense of violence, as it “lack[ed] as an element the use of force.” Sanders, 301 F. App’x at 506. Sanders then discussed the offenses in subsections (A)(2) and (A)(3) of the statute: Here, subsections (A)(2) and (3) of the aggravated riot statute prohibit conduct that poses risk of physical injury through “offense[s] of violence” or use of “a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance.” As a categorical matter, conduct under those subsections would obviously qualify as a crime of violence. However, as previously discussed, it is equally obvious that conduct under subsection (A)(1), does not necessarily pose a risk of physical injury. Id. (alteration in original) (footnote omitted). Although unpublished decisions are not binding precedent on subsequent panels, “their reasoning may be ‘instructive’ or helpful,” Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 405 (6th Cir. 2011), “especially where there are no published decisions which will serve as well,” Hood v. Keller, 229 F. App’x 393, 398 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, no other Sixth Circuit case is on point. Therefore, Sanders is instructive and we will follow its reasoning. Stafford argues that Sanders is inapplicable to the instant case because, in that case, the panel found that Sanders violated subsection (A)(3) of the “aggravated-riot” statute, not subsection (A)(2). In fact, however, Sanders did not determine which subsection the defendant violated. The panel applied the modified categorical approach and reviewed Sanders’s indictment, which stated that Sanders No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 20 did participate with four (4) or more others in a course of disorderly conduct in violation of Section 2917.11 of the Revise[d] Code with purpose to commit or facilitate the commission of an offense of violence [and] . . . had used or intended to use a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance, in violation of Section 2917.02 of the Ohio Revised Code. Id. at 507 & n.2 (first alteration in original). The panel found that Sanders’s indictment did not “cite to a specific subsection of section 2917.02. However, the language of the indictment was identical to the statutory language, revealing that his prior conviction was undoubtedly for violation of either subsection (A)(2) or (A)(3) of Ohio’s aggravated-riot statute, both of which are crimes of violence . . . .” Sanders, 301 F. App’x at 507 (emphasis added). Therefore, the reasoning of Sanders is instructive. Following the modified categorical approach and looking beyond the statutory language of the Ohio Revised Code to the underlying Shepard documents, Stafford’s state-court indictments specifically charged him with violating section 2917.02(A)(2). The language of Stafford’s indictments tracks the statutory language and the language used in the Sanders indictment. Both of Stafford’s plea agreements provided he agreed to plead guilty to violations of section 2917.02(A)(2). The judgment states that Stafford violated section 2917.02(A)(2). In Sanders, the panel analyzed nearly identical language in an indictment and concluded that whether the defendant was convicted of violating either subsection (A)(2) or (A)(3), the violation would be a “crime of violence” for sentencing purposes. Sanders, 301 F. App’x at 507. Because the finding that subsection (A)(2) was categorically a violent felony under the ACCA was not essential to the holding in Sanders, we will now separately address that subsection. Stafford argues that the district court erred in classifying “aggravated riot” as a “violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because the offense “does not necessarily involve conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Stafford cites his state-court indictments and argues that they fail to identify what “offense of violence” he was convicted of committing, and are therefore not sufficient to qualify “aggravated riot” as a “violent felony” under the ACCA. Stafford argues that No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 21 the term “offense of violence,” as used in section 2917.02(A)(2), must encompass all the “offenses of violence” enumerated in Ohio Revised Code Section 2901.01(A)(9), some of which do not require the “offender’s use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or “otherwise involve conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” As a result, Stafford claims the “breadth of the offenses of violence the statute includes[] cannot reasonably be found to be roughly similar, in kind and degree of risk posed, to the listed enumerated crimes in the ACCA—crimes which typically involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” The ACCA’s residual clause is not a catch-all provision. See United States v. Benton, 639 F.3d 723, 731 (6th Cir. 2011). Instead, “the provision’s listed examples—burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives—illustrate the kinds of crimes that fall within the statute’s scope. Their presence indicates that the statute covers only similar crimes, rather than every crime that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 142 (2008) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). The offenses encompassed by § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) are limited “to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves.” Id. at 143; see also Johnson, 675 F.3d at 1019–20 (finding Missouri’s “third-degree felony assault” statute to be a violent felony); United States v. Clark, 458 F. App’x 512, 515–16 (6th Cir. 2012) (finding Kentucky’s “wanton endangerment” statute to be a violent felony); Benton, 639 F.3d at 732 (finding Tennessee’s “solicitation to commit aggravated assault” statute to be a violent felony) . In Benton, the Court stated, [W]hether an offense involves “violent, aggressive, and purposeful” conduct is not the only point of comparison that we may consider when determining whether an offense is similar in kind and degree to the listed examples. . . . Instead, Begay additionally directs us to look to whether the offense “conduct is such that it makes more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim.” No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 22 Benton, 639 F.3d at 731–32 (citation omitted) (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144–46). The Sixth Circuit has interpreted the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay as creating a two-part test: for an offense to be “considered a ‘violent felony’ under the second prong of the ACCA,” it must “‘(1) pose[] a serious potential risk of physical injury to others; and (2) involve[] the same kind of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as the enumerated offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, or offenses involving the use of explosives.’” Benton, 639 F.3d at 732 (quoting United States v. Young, 580 F.3d 373, 377 (6th Cir. 2009)). Analyzing the “aggravated-riot” offense under the Benton test, a court first asks if the acts “posed a serious potential risk of physical injury to others.” Ohio’s “aggravated-riot” statute is only violated when a group of four or more people act in a disorderly manner. Although Sanders found that there was a non-violent way of violating subsection (A)(1) of the “aggravated-riot” statute, it recognized that “not every hypothetical offense covered by a criminal statute need be violent in order to qualify as a crime of violence.” Sanders, 301 F. App’x at 507 (citing James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007)); see also Johnson, 675 F.3d at 1019 (finding third-degree assault to be a violent felony despite the fact that the offense could potentially be committed through “guile, deception, or deliberate omission”). Also, to violate subsection (A)(2), the group must act “with purpose” to commit an offense of violence. The proper inquiry, then, is whether “engaging in a course of disorderly conduct with at least four other individuals, with the specific intent to commit the offense of violence in question,” presents a risk of physical injury to others. The statute itself contemplates a risk of physical injury to others; in order to violate the statute one must have the purpose of committing an offense of violence. By its own terms, the violation presents a risk of injury. Multiplying that by four people, there is a “serious potential risk of physical injury to others.” See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961) (“[C]ollective criminal agreement . . . presents a greater potential threat to the public than individual delicts.”). The “aggravated-riot” statute requires specific intent to commit violence. Therefore, the “offenses of violence” No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 23 enumerated under section 2901.01(A)(9) that lack the adequate mens rea are excluded. As a result, the “aggravated-riot” statute is not over-broad as Stafford suggests. The second inquiry under Benton, whether the offense “involves the same kind of purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct as the enumerated offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, or offenses involving the use of explosives,” is also answered in the affirmative. As stated above, violation of Ohio’s “aggravated-riot” statute involves specific intent, just as do the offenses of burglary, arson, and extortion. There is no question, then, that “aggravated riot” involves “purposeful conduct” commensurate with the other offenses. When combined with Begay’s inquiry whether the “conduct is such that it makes more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim,” it is logical to conclude that the acts of four or more people, engaged in a course of disorderly conduct with the purpose to commit an offense of violence present a high risk of serious injury. Add to that the possession of a gun, and that risk is even greater. Therefore, the district court’s conclusion that a violation of Ohio Revised Code Section 2917.02(A)(2) is a “violent felony” under the ACCA and that Stafford qualified as an armed career criminal as a result is affirmed.
This court reviews sentences for procedural reasonableness under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). A sentence will be deemed “procedurally unreasonable” when the district court sentencing the defendant “‘fail[s] to calculate (or improperly calculat[es] ) the Guidelines range, treat[s] the Guidelines as mandatory, fail[s] to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, select[s] a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fail[s] to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Taylor, 648 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 24 Stafford’s argument that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable concerns two Guideline enhancements: possessing a firearm in connection with another felony offense and creating a substantial risk of serious injury or death while fleeing from law enforcement. For the reasons discussed infra, Part II.B.3, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and Stafford’s sentence was procedurally reasonable. 3. Application of the Sentencing Guidelines Enhancements “We review de novo a district court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines when that application involves mixed questions of law and fact. . . . [and w]e review for clear error a district court’s findings of fact in connection with sentencing.” United States v. Hayes, 135 F.3d 435, 437 (6th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). “A factual finding is clearly erroneous when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 540 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court’s sentencing determination is reviewed ‘under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard’ for reasonableness, which has both a procedural and a substantive component.” United States v. Erpenbeck, 532 F.3d 423, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 41).
Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(6) applies when a defendant possesses a gun “with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The Guideline’s comments state that the subsection “appl[ies] if the firearm or ammunition facilitated, or had the potential of facilitating, another felony offense or another offense, respectively.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(A). The court “accord[s] due deference to the district court’s determination that [§ 2K2.1(b)(6)’s] enhancement applies.” Taylor, 648 F.3d at 431 (quoting United States v. Burke, 345 F.3d 416, 426–27 (6th Cir. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Assessing the nexus between a firearm and a felony requires a fact-specific inquiry, under which the court affords due deference to the district court’s No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 25 findings. Id. at 432. The district court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. Id. Stafford argues that the district court erred in “applying the enhancement because there was no evidence presented from which to infer any intent by Stafford to commit another felony offense with the gun.” Stafford relies on United States v. Payne, 462 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), claiming that the Government was required to show that Stafford possessed the “firearm with the intent to possess or use it, at some time in the future, in connection with another felony offense.” The comments to the Guideline, however, make it clear that the enhancement applies to situations where the “firearm or ammunition facilitated . . . another felony offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n. 14(A). By the plain language of the comments, it is not necessary to show that, at the time Stafford possessed the gun, he also had the intent to use it in a future felony. The district court found that Stafford possessed the gun and that he committed another felony offense, namely, shooting into a crowd: [T]here was evidence that the Defendant discharged the firearm either toward a car or into a crowd. Although he wasn’t charged, I heard the evidence at the trial, and I find by a preponderance of the evidence that the Defendant possessed the firearm, and that he committed . . . another crime at the time. Under the Guidelines, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and are affirmed.
Guideline § 3C1.2 applies if the defendant “recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. “Because the ‘question of what constitutes endangerment is a mixed question of law and fact . . . [that] is highly fact-based,’ we give ‘significant deference to the district court.’” United States v. Dial, 524 F.3d 783, 785 (6th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Hazelwood, 398 F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005)). In order to apply the § 3C1.2 enhancement, a court must No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 26 find that the defendant knew, or had reason to know, that he was fleeing from a lawenforcement officer. Hayes, 135 F.3d at 438. Stafford argues that the Government failed to meet its burden. Stafford claims that the district court failed to make a finding that Stafford knew or had reason to know that he was fleeing from law enforcement and that the trial record does not support the district court’s conclusion. Stafford also claims that the district court erred in concluding that “the act of carrying a loaded gun while allegedly fleeing law enforcement recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person.” (emphasis added). Stafford’s first claim, that the district court did not make a finding of fact that Stafford knowingly fled from law enforcement, is not supported by the record. At the sentencing hearing, Judge Polster stated, “I heard the trial testimony about the Defendant’s fleeing law enforcement while in possession of a loaded firearm, and so I find [Stafford’s objection to the enhancement is] overruled.” Furthermore, the record supports that finding. At trial, the court heard testimony that: Officer Figula witnessed Stafford fire the gun; Stafford looked toward the top of the hill where Figula’s car was located before he fled into the alley; Stafford emerged from the alley without a gun; Stafford saw the police car upon exiting the alley into the McDonald’s parking lot and continued to run; Stafford hid himself behind the First Merit Bank building; and the police found the loaded weapon discarded in the alley that Stafford had run through. Under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, there is sufficient evidence to find that Stafford knew he was fleeing from law enforcement. See United States v. Gates, 461 F.3d 703, 708 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[J]udicial fact-finding for sentencing purposes must continue as it was conducted prior to Booker, under a preponderance of the evidence standard.”); see also United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 384–85 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Therefore, the district court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. As for Stafford’s second argument regarding whether his actions rose to the required level of “recklessly” creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury, there was testimony that Stafford threw a loaded gun against a building, close to a No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 27 crowded street and nightclub. The Guidelines themselves explain that “reckless” means “a situation in which the defendant was aware of the risk created by his conduct and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.” U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1. While not binding authority, United States v. Howard, 301 F. App’x 446 (6th Cir. 2008), is instructive. In Howard, the defendant disputed his enhanced sentence under § 3C1.2 claiming that simply “having” a gun did not create the substantial risk necessary under the Guideline. 301 F. App’x at 449. The court in Howard found that the defendant did not “merely have a gun,” but instead “threw a loaded and cocked gun . . . while fleeing” and that such action created the substantial risk. Id. In the instant case, Stafford, too, was not simply “carrying” a gun; he was carrying a loaded gun that he then threw behind the staircase of a business. Stafford attempts to distinguish his case from previous Sixth Circuit cases upholding a § 3C2.1 enhancement by arguing that, in his case, “there was no evidence of pedestrian traffic, or nearby schools, churches, playgrounds, or residential housing” near the discarded firearm. See, e.g., United States v. May, 430 F. App’x 520, 525–27 (6th Cir. 2011) (upholding a § 3C2.1 enhancement where defendant discarded a loaded gun in a housing project, where children and pedestrian traffic were common); United States v. Allen, 51 F.3d 273 (6th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding that discarding a gun in a residential neighborhood, whether loaded or unloaded, where it could easily be recovered was reckless endangerment). Stafford erroneously concludes that these examples encompass the entire spectrum of locations where one would be reckless to discard a gun. To the contrary, Stafford’s acts are a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.” Stafford threw a loaded gun into an area in the rear of a restaurant, near where employees regularly took the restaurant’s trash. Officer Figula testified that other pedestrians were running through that alley shortly after the shooting. As a result, there was a significant possibility that a bystander could have come across the loaded weapon and been hurt, No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 28 or used it to hurt someone else. These actions created a substantial risk of serious injury. Under the Guidelines, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous and are affirmed. 4. Constitutionality of the ACCA’s “Residual Clause” “We review de novo a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute.” United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir. 2010). As discussed, supra Part II.B.1, the language “or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” is commonly referred to as the ACCA’s “residual clause.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Stafford argues that the “residual clause” is unconstitutionally vague because its prohibitions are “so indefinite an ordinary person would not know what conduct it prohibits.” Stafford contends that the clause is “void for vagueness, as there is no predictable, consistent, or fair definition that can be applied to the residual clause,” and that it fails to provide defendants with “any reasonable opportunity to know whether a prior conviction will qualify as a predicate offense under the ACCA.” Recently, in United States v. Perry, 703 F.3d 906 (6th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Campbell, 482 F. App’x 997 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), this court determined that the “residual clause” was not unconstitutionally vague. In Campbell, the panel recognized that the Supreme Court has held the clause to be constitutional and that it “provides guidance that allows a person to conform his conduct to the law.” Campbell, 482 F. App’x at 997; see also Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2277 (2011) (stating the residual clause provides “an intelligible principle and provides guidance that allows a person to conform his or her conduct to the law” (internal quotation marks omitted)); James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 210 n.6 (2007) (observing that the clause “is not so indefinite as to prevent an ordinary person from understanding what conduct it prohibits”). Stafford, like the defendants in Perry and Campbell, hopes to persuade us that the dissents in the Supreme Court’s ACCA caselaw favor a change to the interpretation of the clause. We are bound to follow Supreme Court precedent. Therefore, we hold that the ACCA’s residual clause is not unconstitutionally vague. No. 12-3238 United States v. Stafford Page 29