Opinion ID: 1294532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of July 19 Letter.

Text: It is a basic proposition that evidence may be properly admitted for a limited permissible purpose even though it may not be admissible for all purposes. McCormick, Evidence § 59 (1954); Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 6 (1953). The letter, showing facts and circumstances prior to and contemporaneous with the execution of the contract, was not admissible for the purpose of showing that the unambiguous contract for employment as a consultant was in fact not a contract at all, since such a showing would violate the parol evidence rule. Midkiff v. Castle & Cooke, Inc., 45 Haw. 409, 422, 368 P.2d 887, 894 (1962). However, parol evidence is admissible for the limited purpose of showing actual compliance with the contract, Snidow v. Hill, 87 Cal. App.2d 803, 808, 197 P.2d 801, 804 (D.C.A. 1948); Carroll v. Jones, 206 Ga. 332, 335, 57 S.E.2d 173, 176 (1950). We hold that parol evidence is also admissible to show the manner in which a written contract has been acted upon, including evidence of willingness, ability, and readiness to perform obligations under the contract. One would be hard pressed to prove such readiness to perform other than by parol evidence. The letter was properly admitted to prove readiness to perform on the part of the plaintiff even though it would not be admissible for the purpose of defeating or contradicting the contract. The defendant also contends that the July 19 letter constituted hearsay and was therefore inadmissible. This alleged error was not raised and properly preserved in the lower court, and, therefore, will not be considered on appeal. Kawamoto v. Yasutake, 49 Haw. 42, 45, 410 P.2d 976, 978 (1966).