Opinion ID: 2630479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions regarding liability of an establishment serving alcohol to intoxicated patrons

Text: Moyle further takes issue with the following instructions: Intoxicated liquor consumers may not seek recovery from the establishment which sold them alcohol; they are solely responsible for their own voluntary intoxication. In the absence of harm to an innocent third party, merely serving liquor to an already intoxicated customer and allowing said customer to leave the premises does not constitute actionable negligence. Moyle contends that he never raised the issue of an establishment's liability for selling alcohol and that these instructions obfuscated the question at hand, namely, whether the [Respondents were] negligent in not providing adequate security. Moyle did allege in his complaint and in his trial testimony that the Respondents were serving alcoholic beverages; however, Moyle never claimed that dram shop liability was the basis of his claim against the Respondents. In considering Moyle's contention that the instructions may have served to egregiously mis-focus[ ] the jury, this court looks to whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions were prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Stanford Carr, 111 Hawai`i at 297, 141 P.3d at 470 (quoting Haili, 103 Hawai`i at 101, 79 P.3d at 1275). The above instructions were modeled upon our decisions in Bertelmann v. Taas Assoc., 69 Haw. 95, 735 P.2d 930 (1987), and Winters v. Silver Fox Bar, 71 Haw. 524, 797 P.2d 51 (1990), which clarified the scope of Hawai`i's common law dram shop action, as enunciated by Ono v. Applegate, 62 Haw. 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980). This court emphatically reject[ed] the contention that intoxicated liquor consumers can seek recovery from the bar or tavern which sold them alcohol. Drunken persons who harm themselves are solely responsible for their voluntary intoxication and cannot prevail under a common law or statutory basis. Winters, 71 Haw. at 527-28, 797 P.2d at 53 (quoting Bertelmann, 69 Haw. at 100, 735 P.2d at 933). In this case, it is clear that Moyle in no way asserted that the Respondents were liable to him on the basis of their selling alcohol. While these instructions do not comport with the theory of liability put forth by Moyle, Moyle does not cite, nor have we uncovered, any Hawai`i cases holding that a trial court abuses its discretion by instructing the jury on bases of non-liability, as long as such instructions are not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading, Stanford Carr, 111 Hawai`i at 297, 141 P.3d at 470 (quoting Haili, 103 Hawai`i at 101, 79 P.3d at 1275). These instructions perform the function of identifying for the jury a theory of liability upon which the Respondents could not be found liable. See Winters, 71 Haw. at 528, 797 P.2d at 53 ([Dram shop legislation was] created to protect the general public from drunk driving accidents, not to reward intoxicated liquor consumers for the consequences of their voluntary inebriation. (Citation omitted.)) In other words, the trial court's decision to give the above instructions over objection by Moyle was a prophylactic act, which clarified the contours of the Respondents' potential liability. Accordingly, these instructions were not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading, Stanford Carr, 111 Hawai`i at 297, 141 P.3d at 470 (quoting Haili, 103 Hawai`i at 101, 79 P.3d at 1275), and the circuit court did not err in providing them to the jury.