Opinion ID: 183473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brown’s Mandatory Minimum Sentence

Text: We review the adequacy of a 21 U.S.C. § 851 information de novo. United States v. Ramirez, 501 F.3d 1237, 1239 (11th Cir. 2007). The notice requirements of § 851 are jurisdictional. United States v. Jackson, 544 F.3d 1176, 1184-85 (11th Cir. 2008). In this case, Brown did not challenge the contents of the § 851 information at the sentencing hearing, but the jurisdictional nature of the § 851 notice requirement allows Brown to challenge the contents of the notice at any time. See United States v. Giraldo-Prado, 150 F.3d 1328, 1329 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that “a party may raise jurisdiction at any time during the pendency of the proceedings”). Because Brown did not raise an Eighth Amendment objection before the district court, that argument is subject to plain-error review. United States v. Raad, 406 F.3d 1322, 1323-24 (11th Cir. 2005). Section 851(a)(1) provides, in relevant part: No person who stands convicted of an offense under this part shall be sentenced to increased punishment by reason of one or more prior convictions, unless before trial, or before entry of a plea of guilty, the United States attorney files an information with the court (and serves a copy of such information on the person or counsel for the person) stating in writing the previous convictions to be relied upon. 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). We have explained that the government must strictly comply with the requirements of § 851(a)(1). Ramirez, 501 F.3d at 1239. If the 31 government fails to do so, the district court lacks jurisdiction to impose an enhanced sentence. Id. A prior conviction may serve as the basis for a sentencing enhancement only if it is final, meaning that “all avenues of direct attack have been exhausted.” United States v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 467 (11th Cir. 1982). We have not, however, specifically held that an § 851 information must list the date on which the prior conviction became final. We have determined that lengthy mandatory minimum sentences for recidivist drug offenders do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See United States v. Willis, 956 F.2d 248, 251 (11th Cir. 1992) (upholding mandatory life sentence for defendant with two prior felony drug convictions). More generally, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit severe sentences for recidivist offenders even where the defendant’s prior convictions are not particularly serious. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). In Rummel, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a mandatory life sentence imposed on a defendant who had committed three fraud-related offenses that involved a total of less than $250. Id. at 265-66, 285, 100 S.Ct. at 1134-35, 1145. The Court explained that the state had an interest not only in punishing the particular crimes at issue, but also in incapacitating repeat offenders who have proved themselves incapable of conforming their conduct to 32 the law. Id. at 276, 100 S.Ct. at 1140. The Supreme Court also has held that lengthy sentences for first-time drug offenders do not violate the Eighth Amendment. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (holding that a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment imposed on a first-time offender who was convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine did not violate the Eighth Amendment). In this case, Brown was given sufficient notice of the government’s intent to seek an enhanced sentence based on his prior Florida drug conviction. There is no merit to Brown’s suggestion that the defendant personally must be served with a copy of the information because § 851(a)(1) specifically provides that the government may serve the information on either the defendant or his counsel. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). Approximately two weeks before the trial began, the prosecutor filed an § 851 information using the district court’s CM/ECF system. Brown’s counsel at the time, Elliot, should have received an electronic notification that the information had been filed. Brown’s sentencing counsel, Pettus, ultimately conceded that the notice was available via the district court’s docket sheet. The district court did not err in concluding that the government had complied with the statutory notice requirements. Next, Brown has not established error with respect to the contents of the 33 § 851 information. The information set forth the date of Brown’s Florida conviction, and a copy of the judgment was attached to the information. Brown is correct that the information did not refer to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), nor did it state that the government would be seeking a 20-year sentence. However, the fact that the information listed two prior convictions put Brown on notice that the government would be requesting at least a 20-year sentence. Section 851(a) does not require that the information include the statutory section that authorizes an enhanced penalty or the exact length of the sentence that the government intends to seek. See 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). Although the information did not list the date on which Brown’s conviction became final, neither the statutory language nor this Court’s case law requires such notice. See id. Moreover, Brown has not even argued that his prior Florida conviction was not final. Thus, Brown has not shown that the § 851 information was inadequate. Finally, Brown’s Eighth Amendment argument is foreclosed by precedent. Although Brown’s prior conviction for third-degree felony possession of cocaine may have been relatively minor compared with other drug offenses, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit a substantial term of imprisonment for recidivist offenders whose prior convictions are not serious. See Rummel, 445 U.S. at 276, 100 S.Ct. at 1140. Moreover, in Harmelin, 34 the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for a first-time offender who possessed only 672 grams of cocaine. 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Unlike Harmelin, Brown had a prior drug conviction, and he also was held accountable for a larger amount of cocaine than Harmelin. If Harmelin’s sentence of life without parole did not violate the Eighth Amendment, Brown cannot show that his 20-year sentence violates the Eighth Amendment either, regardless of whether Brown’s prior conviction was serious. Brown has failed to establish that his enhanced sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and, therefore, he cannot satisfy the plain-error standard with respect to his Eighth Amendment claim. B. Calculation of Drug Quantity Attributable to Gonzalez We review a district court’s calculation of drug quantity for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2005). In a case where no drugs are actually seized, a district court should make a reasonable estimate based on the available facts. Id. Sentencing errors are harmless if they do not have a substantial effect on the defendant’s sentence. United States v. Foley, 508 F.3d 627, 634 (11th Cir. 2007). Here, during the May 13, 2009, meeting, Sanchez informed Gonzalez, Brown, and Cortes that the next shipment would include a total of 20 kilograms of 35 cocaine. On May 14, as the defendants and the CI were heading towards Sanchez’s office, the CI explained that the cocaine would be split “ten for us and ten for them.” Thus, the district court did not clearly err by concluding that Gonzalez was accountable for 20 kilograms of cocaine. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1296. Moreover, any error in the district court’s calculation would be harmless because Sanchez never mentioned any amount below 15 kilograms, and, under the Sentencing Guidelines, a defendant responsible for 15 kilograms of cocaine is subject to the same offense level as a defendant who is accountable for 20 kilograms of cocaine. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3); Foley, 508 F.3d at 634. C. Gonzalez’s Enhancement for Possession of a Dangerous Weapon We review a district court's factual findings at sentencing for clear error, and the court’s application of the Sentencing Guidelines to those facts de novo. United States v. Pham, 463 F.3d 1239, 1245 (11th Cir. 2006). Section 2D1.1(b)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that a defendant's offense level should be increased by two “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed.” A dangerous weapon is “an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury,” or any object that “closely resembles such an instrument.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 comment (n.1(D)). A defendant may be held liable for a co-conspirator's possession of a dangerous weapon if: 36 (1) the possessor of the [weapon] was a co-conspirator, (2) the possession was in furtherance of the conspiracy, (3) the defendant was a member of the conspiracy at the time of possession, and (4) the co-conspirator possession was reasonably foreseeable by the defendant. United States v. Gallo, 195 F.3d 1278, 1284 (11th Cir. 1999). When a conspiracy involves “trafficking in lucrative and illegal drugs,” it is reasonably foreseeable that one of the conspirators may possess a firearm. Pham, 463 F.3d at 1246. In this case, Gonzalez’s co-conspirator, Brown, was found to be in possession of an air pistol that closely resembled a firearm at the time of his arrest. It was reasonably foreseeable to Gonzalez that one of his co-conspirators might possess a weapon because the conspiracy involved a plan to steal a large amount of cocaine. See Pham, 463 F.3d at 1246. During the January 7, 2009, meeting, Gonzalez explained that his crew would enter the house “dressed as police . . . with rifles in their hands,” and would be prepared to use force if necessary. Although that initial plan fell through after Gonzalez’s first crew was arrested, Gonzalez’s statements show that he was aware that the robbery would be dangerous. We conclude that the district court did not err by enhancing Gonzalez’s offense level for possession of a dangerous weapon.