Opinion ID: 76773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Proceeding Pro Se

Text: 36 Cesal contends that the district court erred by not allowing him to proceed pro se at his sentencing hearing. 2 Under the Sixth Amendment, a criminal defendant has the right to represent himself. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2533, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). The defendant must knowingly and intelligently relinquish his right to counsel. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541; see also Brown v. Wainwright, 665 F.2d 607, 612 (Former 5th Cir.1982) (en banc) (A defendant is entitled to conduct his own defense ... so long as the request is intelligently and clearly made.  (emphasis added)). In the absence of a clear and knowing election, a court should not quickly infer that a defendant unskilled in the law has waived counsel and has opted to conduct his own defense. Brown, 665 F.2d at 610. Even if the defendant clearly asserts the right to proceed pro se, he may still waive the right through ... subsequent conduct indicating he is vacillating on the issue or has abandoned his request altogether. Id. at 611. Where it appears that the defendant has abandoned his right to proceed pro se, the district court need not engage in a dialogue with [the] defendant to determine whether there is a waiver of self-representation, in the absence of special circumstances. Id. at 612. 37 Prior to sentencing, Cesal wrote a letter to the court renewing his prior requests to proceed Pro Se, or as Co-counsel Pro Se. In its September 24, 2003 order, the district court said that it felt obliged to respond to Cesal's letter. It denied Cesal's request to proceed as co-counsel pro-se and stated that it would entertain any motions defendant might make to proceed without an attorney at sentencing. Order at 7 (Sept. 24, 2003). 38 At sentencing, a substantial amount of time was dedicated to considering whether Cesal would proceed pro se. Cesal vacillated between wanting to proceed pro se and wanting to be represented because he was not prepared to go it alone at that time. We conclude that the district court did not err in denying Cesal's request to proceed pro se. Even if Cesal's letter before sentencing was a clear request to proceed pro se, that request became obscured at the sentencing hearing. Because Cesal changed his mind at sentencing, the court was not required to engage in an extensive dialogue with him. See Brown, 665 F.2d at 612. Although Cesal belatedly reasserted the right to proceed pro se, the court was not required to delve into it then because of vacillation on Cesal's part. Id. at 611.