Opinion ID: 777291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court's additional findings regarding misconduct

Text: 58 Hicks argues that even if the district court were justified in sanctioning him under Rule 11 based on Christian's complaint and the follow-on motions, its conclusion was tainted because it impermissibly considered other misconduct that cannot be sanctioned under Rule 11, such as discovery abuses, misstatements made during oral argument, and conduct in other litigation. 59 Hicks' argument has merit. While Rule 11 permits the district court to sanction an attorney for conduct regarding pleading[s], written motion[s], and other paper[s] that have been signed and filed in a given case, Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a), it does not authorize sanctions for, among other things, discovery abuses or misstatements made to the court during an oral presentation. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., 892 F.2d 802, 813 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that misstatements made during oral argument cannot constitute sanctionable offenses under Rule 11); In re Yagman, 796 F.2d at 1187 (holding that discovery abuses cannot be sanctioned under Rule 11); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, advisory committee notes, 1993 Amendments, Subdivisions (b) and (c) (The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with or submitted to the court. It does not cover matters arising for the first time during oral presentations to the court, when counsel may make statements that would not be made if there had been more time for study and reflection.). 60 In its January 5, 2000, order, the district court cited multiple bases for its Rule 11 findings: 61 Mr. Hicks has filed a case without factual foundation. Moreover, while this court cannot evaluate Mr. Hicks' conduct in the litigation before Judge Matz, his conduct in this case and the related one pending before this court has fallen below the standards expected of attorneys practicing in the Central District of California. In the related case, this court has already ordered Mr. Hicks to personally pay plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred as a result of his culpable conduct. Order of July 13, 1999 in CV99-4667. In connection with the instant motion and the discovery preceding it, he has behaved boorishly, misrepresented the facts, and misstated the law. Accordingly, the court grants defendant's motion for Rule 11 sanctions against Mr. Hicks. 62 Original emphasis. 63 In connection with the conclusion on boorish behavior, the court cited Hicks' conduct (tossing Barbie dolls off a table) at a meeting of counsel and his interruption of a deposition following a damaging admission by his client. The charge of misrepresentation of facts was based on a statement made at oral argument that he had never seen a particular catalogue while a videotape of exhibit inspections showed him leisurely thumbing through the catalogue. Hicks' conflicting representations in pleadings as to the identity of allegedly infringing Barbie dolls was an additional example of misrepresentation noted by the court. Finally, the court determined that Hicks made misrepresentations in his briefs concerning the law of joint authorship in the copyright context. 64 The district court's subsequent June 12, 2000, order contained a somewhat oblique description of why it had decided to sanction Hicks and reiterated the multiple broad categories that justified sanctions: 65 The court predicated its decision to impose sanctions on the finding that the claims Mr. Hicks brought against Mattel were `meritless' and `without factual foundation.' It further found that Mr. Hicks `has behaved boorishly, misrepresented the facts, and misstated the law.' 66 Further, in determining that monetary sanctions were appropriate, the district court considered Hicks' failure to respond to lesser sanctions imposed in earlier actions and his continuing disregard for the most basic rules governing an attorneys' professional conduct. 67 The orders clearly demonstrate that the district court decided, at least in part, to sanction Hicks because he signed and filed a factually and legally meritless complaint and for misrepresentations in subsequent briefing. But the orders, coupled with the supporting examples, also strongly suggest that the court considered extra-pleadings conduct as a basis for Rule 11 sanctions. Although the court also referenced conduct in related litigation, it is unlikely that the court based its order on such conduct because Hicks had already been sanctioned for violating local rules in the context of the related litigation and the court noted that fact. 68 The laundry list of Hicks' outlandish conduct is a long one and raises serious questions as to his respect for the judicial process. Nonetheless, Rule 11 sanctions are limited to paper[s] signed in violation of the rule. Conduct in depositions, discovery meetings of counsel, oral representations at hearings, and behavior in prior proceedings do not fall within the ambit of Rule 11. Because we do not know for certain whether the district court granted Mattel's Rule 11 motion as a result of an impermissible intertwining of its conclusion about the complaint's frivolity and Hicks' extrinsic misconduct, we must vacate the district court's Rule 11 orders. 10 69 We decline Mattel's suggestion that the district court's sanctions orders could be supported in their entirety under the court's inherent authority. To impose sanctions under its inherent authority, the district court must make an explicit finding [which it did not do here] that counsel's conduct constituted or was tantamount to bad faith. Primus Auto. Fin. Serv., Inc. v. Batarse, 115 F.3d 644, 648 (9th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). We acknowledge that the district court has a broad array of sanctions options at its disposal: Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 11 and the court's inherent authority. Each of these sanctions alternatives has its own particular requirements, and it is important that the grounds be separately articulated to assure that the conduct at issue falls within the scope of the sanctions remedy. See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep't., 276 F.3d 1091, 1107 (9th Cir.2002) (holding that misconduct committed in an unreasonable and vexatious manner that multiplies the proceedings violates § 1927); Fink v. Gomez, 239 F.3d 989, 991-992 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that sanctions may be imposed under the court's inherent authority for bad faith actions by counsel, which includes a broad range of willful improper conduct). On remand, the district court will have an opportunity to delineate the factual and legal basis for its sanctions orders. 70