Opinion ID: 444031
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Two Tips

Text: 35 The Supreme Court's recent decision in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), replaced the Aguilar-Spinelli 6 two-prong test of the reliability of informants' tips with a totality of the circumstances approach. The Court adopted this new approach because probable cause is a fluid concept--turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts--not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules. 103 S.Ct. at 2328. Under this new test, the issuing magistrate looks at an informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge under the totality of the circumstances in determining the value of the informant's report in establishing probable cause. Id. at 2327-28. Unlike the Aguilar-Spinelli test, which required the tip independently to satisfy both the veracity/reliability and basis of knowledge criteria, the Gates test permits a deficiency in one criterion to be compensated by a strong showing in another, or by some other indicia of reliability. Id. at 2329. The magistrate's task is to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. at 2332. 36 The Gates Court reiterated that the duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). The Court warned that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. Rather, [a] magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'  Id. at 2331 (quoting Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419, 89 S.Ct. 584, 590, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969)); see United States v. Seybold, 726 F.2d 502, 503 (9th Cir.1984).
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38 Roberts argues that Fries's tip was not a sufficiently reliable basis for establishing probable cause. Roberts concedes that the tip was against Fries's penal interest because Fries admitted that he broke into Roberts's residence. Roberts, however, points to two reasons why the magistrate should not have considered Fries's tip in determining probable cause--Fries did not indicate when he had broken into Roberts's residence and did not offer any reason to believe that the marijuana growing operation was ongoing. 39 In the leading case on admissions against penal interest, United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583-84, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 2081-82, 29 L.Ed.2d 723 (1971), the Court noted that [a]dmissions of crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of credibility--sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search. The Court conceded that admissions of crime do not always lend credibility to contemporaneous or later accusations of another, but found that in the case before it the admission was sufficient to establish probable cause because the informant admitted to committing currently and over a long period of time the crime that provided him with the information. Id. 40 In our case, Fries admitted to having broken in but did not say when the entry occurred. So it is arguable that Fries's tip would not, standing alone, be sufficient to establish probable cause--it gave no indication that a marijuana growing operation was currently in existence at Roberts's residence. Nevertheless, under Gates, the magistrate considered the tip under the totality of the circumstances and this court must accord his finding of probable cause great deference. 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2331. Although Fries's tip may not have established probable cause by itself, when considered in conjunction with the anonymous caller's tip and the agents' observations, it contributes to the conclusion that there was a fair probability that contraband would be found at Roberts's residence. 41
42 Roberts argues that the magistrate should not have considered this tip in determining probable cause because (1) the caller gave no indication that his information was based on personal knowledge or a reliable source, and (2) DEA Agent Moriarty made material misrepresentations in paraphrasing the tip in his affidavit. 43 As to the first argument, it is true that the caller did not say how he obtained his information. Standing alone, the tip could very well have been the type of casual rumor circulating in the underworld or ... accusation based merely on an individual's general reputation that the Court frowned upon in Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416, 89 S.Ct. at 589. However, when the tip is considered under the totality of the circumstances, including Fries's tip and the agents' observations, it plays an important part in establishing probable cause to search Roberts's residence. The fact that both Fries and the caller reported a marijuana growing operation, corroborated by the frost-free garage roof and covered windows, supports the magistrate's determination of probable cause. 7 44 As to Roberts's second argument, a simple comparison of the caller's actual words and Moriarty's paraphrase indicates that the magistrate's finding of probable cause was not based on a substantial misrepresentation. The Moriarty affidavit stated that [a]ccording to the citizen caller, a marijuana growing operation was about to be moved as a result of Fries's arrest and the citizen said that the operator was paranoid due to Fries's arrest and planned to move the operation this weekend. The caller's exact words were: 45 So, you know, if making that arrest in for yesterday, I think if you'd move fast on this one down here you'd still pick up--they may be using this house to--to move everything out of. In the paper it said it was a Los Angeles based group moving things into Seattle. 46 Roberts emphasizes that, contrary to Moriarty's statement in the affidavit, the caller did not say that the operation was going to be moved that weekend because of Fries's arrest. Although the caller did not explicitly say so, it is a reasonable inference from his statements. Moreover, Roberts did not produce any evidence, as Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) requires, 8 that Moriarty, intentionally or recklessly, misquoted the caller. Finally, probable cause to believe that marijuana was located at Roberts's residence would exist regardless of whether the operators planned to move the operation in the future. In short, any inaccuracies in Moriarty's paraphrase did not affect the validity of the magistrate's probable cause determination. 47
48 Roberts asserts that even if probable cause was established as to the garage, it was not established as to the house. Citing United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325-26 (7th Cir.1955), for the proposition that there must be probable cause for each unit searched, he argues that the warrant was overbroad and the district court should have excluded the items seized in the house as the fruit of an illegal search. 49 This argument fails for two reasons. First, we find that the information in Moriarty's affidavit does support probable cause to search the house. Randy Fries said that the operation was in his brother's place, not merely in his garage. In addition, the conduct of the occupant--refusing to open the door, denying that it was 196th Ave., and peering out from behind a drawn curtain--might suggest that he was hiding something in the house. We give the magistrate's determination of probable cause great deference and uphold his authorization to search the house. 50 Second, we note that the holding of Hinton is limited to separate occupancy units. If the defendant uses the whole building as a single unit or is in control of the entire premises, the entire premises are suspect. See our discussion of Hinton in United States v. Whitney, 633 F.2d 902, 907 & n. 3 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1004, 101 S.Ct. 1717, 68 L.Ed.2d 208 (1981); see also U.S. v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1008 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1593, 80 L.Ed.2d 125 (1984). There was every indication here that Roberts was using the garage and house as a single unit. Therefore, the search of both was not overbroad and the district court properly admitted evidence obtained from the house.