Opinion ID: 2319789
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Availability of a Consent Defense

Text: Appellant does not dispute that his contacts with Brown on April 4 and 5, 2009, violated the terms of the December 2008 CPO that was then in effect, but contends that his conviction for contempt cannot stand because Brown consented to violation of the CPO when she participated in the couple's efforts to reconcile, beginning shortly after the CPO was issued; and when she willingly went out with appellant on April 4 and expressed willingness to remain with him (by telling the officer that things were okay and that she would get back into appellant's truck). Appellant argues that Brown never revoked her consent to his contacts, asserting that there is nothing on the record to show that her consent had been revoked when [appellant] texted and called her that night, or when he called her the next day. She never testified that she had told him not to contact her, or that she had told him the relationship was over. Thus, appellant urges us to recognize consent as a defense to violation of a CPOan issue we identified but did not decide in Ba v. United States, 809 A.2d 1178 (D.C.2002). In Ba, petitioner Howard had obtained a CPO against respondent Ba in December 1999. 809 A.2d at 1180. Nevertheless, immediately following the CPO hearing, the couple resumed living together and were attempting to work out problems in their relationship. Id. Three months later their relationship ended. Id. Six weeks later, Ba telephoned Howard and then showed up at her home, at which time he was placed under arrest for violating the December CPO. Id. at 1180-81. At trial, he argued that this was not a willful violation because of the fact that Ms. Howard in fact [caused] him to violate this order by changing their living arrangements. She lived with him during the time this order was in place from time to time. Id. at 1181. The trial court rejected this argument, stating that judicial orders are to be followed unless they're changed by the Court. People can't unilaterally decide to disobey Court orders. Id. On appeal, Ba renewed his argument, urging in addition that because Howard consented to the violation of the CPO when they reconciled shortly after the CPO was issued against him, the CPO no longer had legal effect when he entered her property. Id. at 1182. After considerable briefing by the Public Defender Service as amicus and the government regarding the propriety vel non of recognizing a consent defense to a CPO violation, we ultimately affirmed Ba's conviction on the ground that, by the time of the alleged violation (Ba's showing up at Howard's house six weeks after their relationship ended), Howard's consent to the violation of the CPO, if such consent was possible, was effectively revoked. Id. at 1183. Although recognizing that the parties and amicus raise serious and complex issues regarding the consent defense, id., we did not decide the issue of whether [u]nder the circumstances of [Ba's] case, consent [was] a defense to the Civil Protection Order; rather we declined to decide the issue because we concluded that, in any event, Howard had withdrawn her consent to Ba's contact. Id. at 1179. The government argues that we need not take up the issue left unresolved in Ba because the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Brown revoked any consent to Mr. Shirley's violation of the CPO prior to the violations here in question. We think the more straightforward issue on the facts of this case, and the controlling issue, is whether a petitioner's consent can be a defense to a charge of contempt for violation of a CPO, and thus we proceed to analyze and resolve that issue. In so doing, we bear in mind appellant's arguments that courts should not grant [relief for CPO violations] when a party has engaged in conduct utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice and that consensual reconciliation over several months with [appellant] constructively and permanently modified the protection order. Courts have long recognized that [t]he orderly and expeditious administration of justice . . . requires that `an order issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly and proper proceedings.' Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 459, 95 S.Ct. 584, 42 L.Ed.2d 574 (1975) (quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 293, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884 (1947)). This, in our view, is a sufficient basis for rejecting appellant's argument that Brown, by her (purported) consent, excused appellant from complying with the CPO. As to appellant's argument that Brown's consent effectively modified the CPO, we have already noted that the CPO in this case advised in bold and capital letters that ONLY THE COURT CAN CHANGE THIS ORDER. Even if we were otherwise inclined to accept appellant's argument that a petitioner's consent can modify a CPO, we could not conclude that Brown was able to modify the CPO involved here. Appellant contends, however, that because the legislature provided for a private right to enforce a CPO, Brown had the ability to render [the CPO] unenforceable. We reject this argument. As we clarified recently, criminal contempt actions for enforcement of CPOs, even when brought by the Office of the Attorney General on behalf of a petitioner, ha[ve] to be brought in the name and pursuant to the sovereign power of the United States. In re Robertson, Nos. 00-FM-925 & 04-FM-1269, 2008 WL 8506708, at  (D.C. May 19, 2011). Further, a CPO enforcement action is brought as an exercise of the court's authority to vindicate its order. Id. at  (noting also that criminal contempt proceedings are designed `to preserve the power, and vindicate the dignity of the courts, and to punish for disobedience of their orders. . . .' Id. at  (quoting Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 328, 24 S.Ct. 665, 48 L.Ed. 997 (1904))). [4] Respondent Brown could neither preclude the United States from exercising its sovereign power nor preclude the Superior Court from vindicating its authority. Id. And, while the Council of the District of Columbia did intend to authorize victims of intrafamily offenses to seek protective orders without necessarily going through the [Office of the Attorney General], the Council also recognized that the public, not merely the individual complainant/petitioner, has an interest in preventing the intrafamily violence (or threatened violence) that CPOs are designed to forestall. D.C. Council, Report on Bill 4-195 at 2 (May 12, 1982). The Council's Committee on the Judiciary, explaining the need for this legislation, expressed concern about the impact that domestic violence has on the community at large, stating: Violence among family members is a growing national problem as well as a local phenomenon. The public record. . . is replete with testimony regarding the seriousness and widespread nature of domestic violence. . . . The direct harm inflicted through intrafamily violence is compounded by the fact that children, observing violence at home, learn to use force as a means of resolving interpersonal problems. They often grow up to be violent or victimized adults. Domestic violence, learned in the home, is thus maintained through an intergenerational vicious circle. Id. at 1-2. Nothing in the language of the statute or its legislative history suggests a legislative intent to remove the protection of a CPOwhich may be issued only upon a finding of good cause to believe the respondent has committed or threatened to commit a criminal offense against the petitioner, D.C.Code § 16-1005(c), or, as here, upon a respondent's consent in lieu of such a finding, see D.C.Code § 16-1005(i)just because the victim later consents to contact in violation of the CPO. Indeed, the Judiciary Committee report cites, as a rationale for amendments made to the statute in 1982, that criminal prosecutions should not be made impossible solely by the action of a private party. Report on Bill 4-195 at 9. Further, our case law makes clear that, while the trial court may not extend or modify a CPO except upon motion of a party, the court may sua sponte hold an evidentiary hearing and find a defendant in contempt for violating a CPO, even where there has not been any indication of interest in further proceedings by . . . the beneficiary of the protection order. Adams v. Ferreira, 741 A.2d 1046, 1047 (D.C.1999). [5] By declining to recognize consent as a defense to a charge of criminal contempt for violation of a CPO, we would not thereby render irrelevant evidence that it was a petitioner's conduct that placed a respondent in technical violation of a stay-away order. To be punishable, contempt of a CPO must be willful. See Hooks v. United States, 977 A.2d 938, 939 (D.C. 2009) (To establish the elements of a CPO violation, the government must present evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant engaged in: (1) willful disobedience (2) of a civil protection order. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, for example, if the evidence showed that the petitioner approached the respondent without his encouragement or consent, or that the contact was necessitated by an emergency, or that there was some type of compelling humanitarian consideration [6] that justified the respondent in contacting the petitioner, the court might be unable to find that the respondent willfully violated the CPO [7] (and, indeed, the government might hesitate to prosecute any claim of contempt). Here, however, the evidence belies any theory that Brown foisted herself upon appellant without his consent and willing participation, as it was appellant who initiated the text message and telephone calls that underlie his contempt convictions. Further, the trial court specifically stated that any argument about the necessity of making that [April 5] call . . . is just not something that the Court finds persuasive and that it was not persuaded that. . . there was any viable or credible necessity defense that been raised in the casefindings that we discern no reason to disturb. We hold that consent of the petitioner does not bar a conviction of criminal contempt for violation of a CPO. We might be inclined to hold otherwise if there were no procedure for seeking modification or termination of a CPO, or to recognize an exception if appellant had been misled into believing that he or Brown could not seek modification or rescission of the CPO. But neither of these circumstances exists: the statute specifically contemplates that any party to the original proceeding may move to extend, rescind, or modify the order for good cause shown, D.C.Code § 16-1005(d); and the record shows that appellant was present when the court agreed to rescind the October 2008 CPO, thus indicating that appellant was aware that such action was possible. It is also worth noting that the term of a CPO is limited to one year, see D.C.Code § 16-1005(d) (unless, upon motion by a party, the CPO is extended). Thus, passage of time without additional threats of intrafamily violence (that would furnish a basis for extending the CPO) can relieve a respondent of the limitations imposed by a CPO, removing any perceived necessity for willfully violating the terms of the CPO. We note in addition that the trial court retains broad authority to appropriately sanction persons who violate CPOs, and that broad authority includes the authority to decline[ ] to use its contempt powers and to opt[] to use a more benevolent approach so as not to saddle [a respondent] with a criminal record. Adams, 741 A.2d at 1047-1048 & 1048 n. 1. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in convicting appellant, having found that he acted blatantly in violation of a court order.