Opinion ID: 222448
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause and Suppression

Text: After reaching its conclusion that Andrade’s search of the photographs quickly went beyond the bounds of a proper administrative search, the district court considered whether the photographs lawfully seen by the screeners provided probable cause to arrest McCarty. It answered that question by attempting to determine whether the lawfully-viewed photographs constituted child pornography. This approach was erroneous. [13] To show that the police had probable cause to arrest McCarty, the government is required to prove only that “ ‘at the moment of arrest the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officers and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” United States v. Jensen, 425 F.3d 698, 704 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Bernard, 623 F.2d 551, 559 (9th Cir. 1980)). Under this objective standard, the government need not “show[ ] that the officer[s’] belief is more likely true than false,” United States v. Brobst, 558 F.3d 982, 997 (9th Cir. 2009), and need not demonstrate “probable cause for every element of the offense,” Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463, 472 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the government must show that the officers had an objectively reasonable belief that McCarty committed a crime, based on the totality of the relevant circumstances. See Luchtel v. Hagemann, 623 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the government is not required to prove that all or any of the UNITED STATES v. MCCARTY 10039 photographs actually exhibited child pornography in order to establish probable cause for McCarty’s arrest.20 [14] On remand, the district court’s probable cause determination should proceed in two steps. First, the court should decide what materials may be considered in determining whether probable cause existed to arrest McCarty. As Jensen illustrates, courts generally consider the information known to the arresting officers at the time of the arrest. Here, Serrao testified that he had viewed all of the photographs in McCarty’s envelope and perhaps also some of the textual materials before making the arrest. The general rule must, however, be narrowed here, because the fruits of an unlawful search cannot provide probable cause for an arrest, see Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948), and it is clear some portion of this search was unlawful. Although—consistent with our enumeration of the search’s lawful scope—all of the photographs viewed by the screeners as part of the lawful search for explosives must be considered in reaching a probable cause determination, the textual materials seen by the screeners may only be considered if the government demonstrates that suppression is an inappropriate remedy. Similarly, the photographs not viewed by the screeners may be considered only if they do not consti20 Cf. United States v. Hill, 459 F.3d 966, 972-73 & n.9 (9th Cir. 2006) (while a single photo of a naked child in a bathtub would not suffice to establish probable cause for a search warrant, a detailed description of two photographs of semi-nude girls revealing their breasts and pubic areas, which could have been meant to “ ‘arouse or satisfy the sexual cravings of a voyeur,’ ” produced probable cause to believe that evidence of child pornography would be found on the defendant’s computer, even if the defendant could negate their contraband nature at trial (quoting United States v. Wiegand, 812 F.2d 1239, 1244 (9th Cir. 1987))); United States v. Moore, 215 F.3d 681, 686-87 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that photos of nude children, including some depicting nude boys in nature scenes that were not necessarily sexually suggestive and some depicting nude girls in sexually suggestive poses, produced probable cause to effect a warrantless arrest for possession of child pornography). 10040 UNITED STATES v. MCCARTY tute fruit of the poisonous tree. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the independent source, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis exceptions to the rule that evidence discovered as a result of an illegal search must be excluded).21 Once the district court determines which evidence may be considered as part of the probable cause determination, it must determine whether that evidence was “sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.” Jensen, 425 F.3d at 704. Again, we stress that, to meet this standard, the government does not need to prove that the arresting officers knew McCarty had committed a crime, but only that the officers’ belief that McCarty committed crimes related to child pornography was an objectively reasonable one. [15] Finally, the district court held that suppression was an appropriate remedy for the screeners’ overbroad search. Because this conclusion rested on the district court’s erroneous finding that the screeners searched McCarty’s photographs for evidence of child pornography, we vacate this holding and remand for the district court to reconsider whether suppression is appropriate in light of our conclusions here. 21 Although the government raised an inevitable discovery-type theory in its opposition to McCarty’s motions to suppress all evidence, see DCD #61 at 12-13 (contending that the TSA officers would inevitably have discovered the entire contents of the envelope, including all of the photographs, had they not stopped the administrative search before completion in order to call law enforcement), the district court did not consider this theory in its order granting McCarty’s motion to suppress. We express no opinion as to the merits of this argument, but note that the district court may wish to consider it on remand. UNITED STATES v. MCCARTY 10041