Opinion ID: 59687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Suppress Davis’s Firearm

Text: On appeal, Davis argues that the district court should have suppressed the firearm found in his car because the roadblock was unconstitutional. We need not address whether the roadblock was unconstitutional because the officers stopped Davis based on individualized suspicion not as part of the roadblock. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37, 121 S. Ct. 447, 457 (2000) (“When law enforcement authorities pursue primarily general crime control purposes at checkpoints . . ., stops can only be justified by some quantum of individualized 1 “A district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact.” United States v. Zapata, 180 F.3d 1237, 1240 (11th Cir. 1999). We review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and the district court’s application of the law to the facts de novo. Id. All facts are construed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below. United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). 4 suspicion.”); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979) (holding that there must be articulable and reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist when conducting discretionary license and registration checks); United States v. Holloman, 113 F.3d 192, 195 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The Supreme Court has never intimated that the Fourth Amendment prohibits automobile stops when officers have probable cause to believe that a violation of traffic regulations has occurred.”). The facts, taken in the light most favorable to the government, show that Davis was driving erratically at an excessive rate of speed and without his headlights on although it was dark outside. Given Davis’s driving, officers had an articulable and reasonable suspicion that Davis was violating state traffic laws. Thus, Davis’s erratic and dangerous driving provided the officers with ample reason to stop Davis regardless of the presence of the roadblock. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying Davis’s motion to suppress the firearm.