Opinion ID: 3153324
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Amounts affirmed in Art Midwest II

Text: In diversity cases, federal law controls the award of postjudgment interest, including decisions about when postjudgment interest begins to accrue. Nissho-Iwai Co. v. Occidental Crude Sales, Inc., 848 F.2d 613, 622-24 (5th Cir. 1988). Federal law provides that postjudgment interest “shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment.” 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Under federal law, the district court erred when it recalculated interest on those portions of its judgment that this court affirmed in Art Midwest II. In Masinter v. Tenneco Oil Co., 929 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1991), affirmed in relevant part by Masinter v. Marlin Drilling Co., Inc., 938 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1991) (mem.), the district court held that Masinter was entitled to an award for past lost wages, pain and suffering, and future lost wages. 929 F.2d at 193. In Masinter’s first appeal, this court affirmed the awards for past lost wages and pain and suffering, while vacating the award for future lost wages. Id. On remand, the district court awarded Masinter postjudgment interest from the date of the second judgment, even as to those portions of the award that were affirmed. Id. In his second appeal, Masinter challenged the district court’s decision to recalculate postjudgment interest on the first two awards. We held that, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 37, postjudgment interest 6 Case: 14-10973 Document: 00513264310 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/09/2015 No. 14-10973 “should run from the date of judgment in the first trial” for those awards that were affirmed in the first appeal. Id. at 195. In Art Midwest II, this court vacated only “the award of combined contribution amounts.” 742 F.3d at 219. “We otherwise [affirmed]” in full. Id. Even though we affirmed all but one aspect of the first judgment, the district court recalculated pre- and postjudgment interest as to each award through the date of the second judgment. Under Appellate Rule 37(a) and Masinter, this was error. Postjudgment interest runs from the date of the first judgment. Accordingly, we vacate those portions of the second judgment relating to awards that this court affirmed in Art Midwest II, and remand to the district court with instructions to reinstate the corresponding portions of the first judgment. B. Section 4.02(d) damage award, vacated in Art Midwest II The district court also /failed to properly construe 28 U.S.C. § 1961 in determining the date from which postjudgment interest should run on the section 4.02(d) award. As several circuits have pointed out, the statute is silent on when postjudgment should start when there are multiple judgments. See Lewis v. Whelan, 99 F.3d 542, 545 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[W]here there has been more than one judgment, Section 1961 is silent as to which judgment post-judgment interest accrues from.”); see also Loughman v. Consol-Penn. Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 97-98 (3d Cir. 1993) (explaining that the determination of whether postjudgment interest should run from the original judgment turns on “the degree to which the original judgment was upheld or invalidated on appeal”); Cordero v. De Jesus-Mendez, 922 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1990) (“In general, where a first judgment lacks an evidentiary or legal basis, post-judgment interest accrues from the date of the second judgment; where the original judgment is 7 Case: 14-10973 Document: 00513264310 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/09/2015 No. 14-10973 basically sound but is modified on remand, post-judgment interest accrues from the date of the first judgment.”). The Clapper entities cite Reaves v. Ole Man River Towing, Inc., 761 F.2d 1111 (5th Cir. 1985), for the proposition that “a district court possesses no authority upon remand to calculate post-judgment interest from a date before its post-remand decision unless the mandate of the court of appeals directs otherwise.” Id. at 1112. Reading Reaves and related cases closely, however, suggests that they do not control here. Reaves and its kin are based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Briggs v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 334 U.S. 304 (1948). There, the court of appeals gave a specific order to the district court—to reinstate an award of $42,500, see id. at 305—and the question presented concerned judicial power: Whether the district court “had [any] power to enter judgment for an amount different than directed,” id. at 306. The Supreme Court said no. Id. at 306-07. The Judicial Conference then amended Appellate Rule 37 to incorporate Briggs’ holding. See Fed. R. App. P. 37(b) & advisory committee’s note to 1967 adoption. Following the enactment of Appellate Rule 37, this court has repeatedly affirmed that, where the court of appeals expressly or implicitly directs the entry of a money judgment on remand without mentioning interest, postjudgment interest accrues from the date of the later judgment on remand. See, e.g., Vickers v. Chiles Drilling Co., 882 F.2d 158, 159 (5th Cir. 1989) (per curiam); Gele v. Wilson, 616 F.2d 146, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, Briggs and Rule 37(b) do not limit the ART entities’ ability to challenge the district court’s interest award. This court’s mandate in Art Midwest II states that the case was “remanded to the District Court for further proceedings in accordance with the opinion of th[e] Court.” The court’s opinion provided that the district court should “decide whether the 2001 or 2002 amount [was] the appropriate measure of damages, and then, taking into 8 Case: 14-10973 Document: 00513264310 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/09/2015 No. 14-10973 account interest, recalculate the award.” Art Midwest II, 742 F.3d at 215. Reading the opinion and mandate together, makes clear that the district court had a duty to “tak[e] into account interest” when “recalculat[ing] the award.” Id. When the Art Midwest II panel vacated and remanded the section 4.02(d) contribution damages, it did so because it found that the district court’s calculation double counted those damages. Id. at 214-15. The panel thus remanded for the district court to choose one of two already determined (by the jury) damages amounts. In doing so, the Art Midwest II panel left much of the original judgment intact, including the liability determination. See Loughman, 6 F.3d at 100; see also Nissho-Iwai, 848 F.2d at 624 (emphasizing that although the previous panel remanded components of the damages calculation, it affirmed the jury’s finding of breach). Because, on remand, the district court calculated damages by choosing one of two predetermined amounts, without reopening the evidentiary record, it should have—according to the Art Midwest II mandate—calculated interest with reference to the first judgment. See Loughman, 6 F.3d at 97. Because we construe the mandate as directing the district court to award interest, we hold that the district court erred in calculating interest on the section 4.02(d) damages through the post-remand judgment. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s calculation of prejudgment and postjudgment interest on the section 4.02(d) damages, with instructions to recalculate with reference to the first judgment.