Opinion ID: 2134533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Application to Ehlers' Case

Text: The district court failed to consider the implication of Ehlers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice. Instead, the district court applied rules we have used in civil cases to determine that Schirber should be disqualified. The district court first referred to the principle that an attorney, after receiving the confidence of a client, may not enter the service of others whose interests are adverse to such client's interest in the same subject matter to which the confidence relates, or in matters so closely allied thereto as to be, in effect, a part thereof. See, Hawkes v. Lewis, 255 Neb. 447, 586 N.W.2d 430 (1998); Bechtold v. Gomez, 254 Neb. 282, 576 N.W.2d 185 (1998); State ex rel. Wal-Mart v. Kortum, 251 Neb. 805, 559 N.W.2d 496 (1997). The district court next applied the principle from civil cases that confidences and secrets possessed by an attorney are presumptively possessed by other members of the attorney's firm. See, e.g., State ex rel. FirsTier Bank v. Mullen, 248 Neb. 384, 534 N.W.2d 575 (1995). Under this presumption, an attorney who leaves a firm is presumed to have acquired client confidences during his or her tenure at the firm. It is then further presumed that the attorney has shared or will share those client confidences with members of any subsequent firm with which the attorney becomes employed. See Bechtold v. Gomez, supra . In the civil context, we have also stated that when an attorney who was intimately involved with the particular litigation, and who has obtained confidential information pertinent to that litigation, terminates the relationship and becomes associated with a firm which is representing an adverse party in the same litigation, there arises an irrebuttable presumption of shared confidences, and the entire firm must be disqualified from further representation. State ex rel. FirsTier Bank v. Buckley, 244 Neb. 36, 503 N.W.2d 838 (1993). But in a criminal case, it has been held that it is error for a trial court to apply an irrebuttable presumption that former clients imparted confidences to the defendant's attorney when the former clients testified that no confidences had been shared and the defense attorney testified that he received no confidential information. United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965 (8th Cir.1982), abrogated on other grounds, Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). See, also, Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775 (5th Cir.2000) (refusing to apply irrebuttable presumptions in criminal case). See, generally, United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786 (7th Cir.1986) (refusing to apply holdings from civil cases in criminal case). The view that the presumptions in favor of disqualification that we apply in civil cases are inapplicable in a criminal case is illustrated by our court's decision in State v. Marchese, 245 Neb. 975, 515 N.W.2d 670 (1994). In State v. Marchese, supra , the defendant was charged with arson after he was alleged to have deliberately set two of his wife's dresses on fire, which caused damage to a building. At the time that Marchese entered his plea of guilty, his attorney was also representing the wife on a charge of aiding and abetting Marchese to resist arrest on the arson charge, as well as representing her in several other criminal matters and in an action to dissolve her marriage to Marchese. Marchese sought postconviction relief, contending that due to his attorney's conflict of interest, his plea of guilty was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court denied an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, we made note of the Sixth Amendment concerns at issue. Recognizing the possibility that an actual conflict of interest may have occurred, we reversed for an evidentiary hearing. In doing so, however, we stated: [T]he fact of multiple representation alone is not a per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.... Nor is the fact that an attorney has other clients, including one who would be a State witness and testify at trial, sufficient in and of itself to constitute a conflict of interest. ... Similarly, the mere possibility of a lawyer's conflict of interest is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. (Citations omitted.) (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 978, 515 N.W.2d at 673. See, also, State v. Narcisse, 260 Neb. 55, 615 N.W.2d 110 (2000); State v. Pope, 211 Neb. 425, 318 N.W.2d 883 (1982). State v. Marchese, supra , was decided after this court instituted the use of irrebuttable presumptions in civil cases. Further, if irrebuttable presumptions in favor of disqualification were applied in criminal cases, cases such as Marchese would require automatic reversal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. To avoid such cases, trial courts would have little choice but to disqualify a defendant's chosen counsel whenever there is a perceived conflict. To do so is in direct contradiction to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to counsel of choice and the presumption in favor of that choice. See, United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir. 1982) (distinguishing between civil and criminal cases); United States v. Armedo-Sarmiento, 524 F.2d 591 (2d Cir.1975) (stating that because civil cases do not involve crucial factor of criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, they are not controlling). By applying the presumptions we have applied in civil cases equally to a criminal case, the district court ignored the presumptions in favor of a criminal defendant's choice of counsel. The problem with such an approach is that the application of presumptions in favor of disqualification in a criminal case, particularly if those presumptions are irrebuttable, acts to deprive the defendant of a constitutional right. Thus, the rules we have applied in civil cases cannot be applied in the same manner in a criminal case. We further note that in this case, the concern of a conflict is focused on Regina who, as a witness, is not a party to the action, and who was never personally represented by either Schirber or Wagner. Although a witness may have some personal interest in the outcome of a criminal trial, he or she is not a party to the action and does not have standing to intervene as a party to the action. For example, Neb. Const. art. I, § 28, provides that a crime victim has the right to be informed of criminal court proceedings and a right to be present at trial absent a sequestration order by the trial court. It also provides, however, that it does not afford a victim standing to participate as a party. Accordingly, Schirber's representation of Ehlers is not directly adverse to Regina's interests. Instead, it is the State's interests that are directly at issue. We conclude that the district court erred when it applied presumptions applicable to civil cases to Ehlers' criminal proceedings. Rather, under Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988), a balance must be performed between Ehlers' Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice and his right to representation free from conflicts.