Opinion ID: 504457
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Permissive Inferences Instruction

Text: The court instructed the jury as follows: 61 Possession of money recently stolen can be a circumstance from which the jury may reasonably draw the inference, in light of the surrounding circumstances reflected in the evidence, that the person in possession of that money, actual or constructive possession, knew that that money had been stolen, and, therefore, that it was a willful act on his part to steal it. It is up to you, however, your exclusive province, to determine whether the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence in this case warrant an inference such as is justified by the law in this case. 62 No objection was made under Rule 30, F.R.Crim.P., although counsel for Drift referred to this instruction and remarked that he was not able to hear the last phrase. The objection was thus waived. United States v. Young, 702 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir.1983). The appellate court may reverse only if the trial court committed plain error, affecting substantial rights, and resulting in a miscarriage of justice. United States v. McKnight, 799 F.2d 443, 447 (8th Cir.1986). 63 Defendants argue that the instruction set forth a mandatory, though rebuttable, presumption similar to an instruction held to have created an unconstitutional burden-shifting presumption with respect to an element of the crime. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 318, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1973, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). This argument fails because the language of the instruction clearly advised the jury of a permissive inference, and did not say that evidence to the contrary would be necessary to overcome it. In Francis, the Supreme Court distinguished between a mandatory presumption and a permissive inference, and said, [a] permissive inference violates the Due Process Clause only if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury. Francis, 471 U.S. at 314-15, 105 S.Ct. at 1971 (citing Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-163, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-2227, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979)). 64 Two defendants cite United States v. Johnson, 805 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir.1986). That opinion, however, was withdrawn. The court substituted one which disposed of the case without reaching the challenge to an instruction. United States v. Johnson, 812 F.2d 1329, 1330 n. 1 (11th Cir.1986). 65 Several defendants point to the language in the instruction permitting a second level of inference, and, therefore, that it was a willful act on his part to steal it. 6 On this particular record, in view of all the circumstances proved or reasonably inferrable, including the short span of time between the robbery and the proved possession, the inference was reasonable and there was no error in telling the jury so. 66 Some defendants point to the final clause, such as is justified by the law in this case. The standard is what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning. Francis, 471 U.S. at 316, 105 S.Ct. at 1972. They argue that a reasonable juror could have understood this clause, which modifies inference, as making it mandatory to draw the inference, even though that construction would have contradicted the first and principal part of the same sentence, which clearly left the matter to the jury. We do not find the suggested construction reasonable. 67 We conclude there was no plain error. 68