Opinion ID: 2525532
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Special Contract of Employment

Text: [¶ 40] Grommet posits that the contract between him and Newman is a special contract, and that that circumstance is central to the resolution of this case. In the course of his discussion, Grommet makes general reference to 23 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts, § 62:19 (4th ed. 2002). That section, and the ones that precede and follow it, cover much ground and Grommet's argument does not appear to take into account the full import of those sections. Moreover, the discussion does not appear to be directly tied to the circumstances of this case. We have carefully perused the materials found in Williston, and we are unable to agree that the argument Grommet propounds is supported by the material contained therein. Of significance, we also note that Grommet does not direct our attention to where in the record this specific argument was made to the district court or where in the district court's findings this matter is discussed or relied upon, or rejected by, the district court in reaching its decision. [¶ 41] Grommet also relies upon this Court's decision in McCartney, 627 P.2d at 1021, for this proposition. Once again, we are unable to discern from Grommet's brief exactly how the proposition argued in this appeal was directed to the attention of the district court or how the McCartney decision supports the point argued for in this section of his brief. However, we do discern two parts of that opinion which appear to have relevance here and those we set out below: Whether or not the meaning that appellants desire to give to the agreement was conveyed to appellee Kent Malm was a question of fact for the trial court. Madrid v. Norton, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1108 (1979). The trial court did not make specific findings in this regard, but it did find that there was no evidence of any collusion between appellees and others designed to deprive appellants of their commission, and it found that there was no evidence of bad faith on the part of appellees at any time in this transaction. Implicit in the finding of no bad faith is the conclusion that appellees did not understand that the agreement provided for payment of a commission upon sale of the property after expiration of the listing period.    `Good faith consists in an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another, even through the forms or technicalities of law, together with an absence of all information or belief of facts which would render the transaction unconscientious.'     Cone v. Ivinson, 4 Wyo. 203, 33 P. 31, 34 (1893) quoting from Gress v. Evans, 1 Dak. 387, 46 N.W. 1132 (1877); Wendling v. Cundall, Wyo., 568 P.2d 888, 890 (1977); see 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers §§ 100 and 167. McCartney, 627 P.2d at 1019-20. The application of this limitation to appellants' rights under this agreement is supported by this description of an exclusive right to sell: As a general rule, a broker who has been granted either an exclusive agency or an exclusive right to sell or lease property is entitled to a commission, at least by way of damages, on a sale or lease by or through another broker during the existence of the first broker's exclusive agency or right. Also, a broker who has been given an exclusive right to sell or lease property is entitled to a commission, at least by way of damages, on a sale or lease by the owner himself, without the aid or intervention of any broker, within the time specified in the contract of employment. To entitle a broker who has an exclusive agency or exclusive right to sell to a commission, a transaction effected by the principal himself or through another broker must be of the nature contemplated by the agreement. The sale or other transaction must occur within the time when the exclusive agency or right to sell exists, but the conclusion within that time of a contract is sufficient, even though a formal transfer of the property does not occur until later.    (Emphasis supplied.) 12 C.J.S. Brokers s 175, pp. 555, 559. See also, 12 Am.Jur.2d Brokers s 220. Annotation: Brokers right to commission on sales consummated after termination of employment, 27 A.L.R.2d 1348 (1953); Diehl & Associates, Inc. v. Houtchens, 173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977). Under the listing agreement the commission would be earned only if a sale were made during its term. Such was not here done. But even if the listing agreement were the more usual type and provided for payment of the commission upon the finding of a ready, able and willing buyer, it would have been difficult in this case for the trial court to have found appellants to have been the procuring cause of the sale to the extent necessary to entitle them to a commission. The evidence was substantial that appellees had concluded that appellants were not able to bring about an exchange with the Kelly property, and that the final exchange arrangement was accomplished by other real estate brokers. Where several brokers are involved, the commission is to be paid to the one who can show that his efforts were the efficient, predominating and procuring cause of the sale. There cannot be multiple procuring causes. The broker bringing about the meeting of minds and making it possible for the transaction to be consummated is entitled to the commission. See 12 Am. Jur.2d Brokers s 230; 12 C.J.S. Brokers s 171; Reed v. Taylor, 78 Wyo. 216, 322 P.2d 147 (1958). Viewing the evidence under the following standard, as we must, it does not reflect that appellants were the efficient, predominating and procuring cause of the sale:    (W)e must assume that the evidence in favor of the successful party is true, leaving out of consideration entirely the evidence of the unsuccessful party that conflicts with it, and giving to the evidence of the successful party every favorable inference which may reasonably and fairly be drawn from it.     Jelly v. Dabney, Wyo., 581 P.2d 622, 624 (1978); Madrid v. Norton, supra. Further, the evidence viewed under this standard supports the finding by the trial court of good faith on the part of appellees. [Emphasis added.] McCartney, 627 P.2d at 1022. It is our conclusion that the McCartney case supports the district court's findings and conclusions, rather than the theory propounded by Grommet in this argument. [¶ 42] Grommet also cites Owens v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 50 Wyo. 331, 63 P.2d 1006, 1009, 1015-16 (1936) for the proposition that the contract at issue here was a special contract. We were unable to discern such a holding in that case. That opinion contains a lot of interesting information on the subject, much of which could be said to support the district court's decision herein, but as to special contracts it really only holds that the existence of a special contract need not be pled in order to get that issue before a jury (fact finder). Id. at 1016. On Page 40 of his brief, Grommet includes a snippet from the Owens case. We set out the snippet here in its full context (with the sentence Grommet draws our attention to highlighted immediately below): It is argued that the evidence in the case is not sufficient to warrant any judgment for the plaintiff. We have found this question to be an exceedingly difficult one. No cases involving facts exactly like those in the case at bar have been cited, and we have found none. Whether or not a commission is due to a broker depends largely upon the contract entered into between him and the owner. Kimmell v. Skelly, 130 Cal. 555, 62 P. 1067, 1068. If he has not complied with his contract, if he has not accomplished or done what he has undertaken to do, while his authority exists, he is not, in the absence of some fault of the owner, entitled to a commission. He must fulfill, if not prevented by the owner, the duty undertaken by him, and within the time given him, or he is not entitled to any compensation. 9 C.J. 587, 588; note, 139 Am.St.Rep. 241; note, 26 A.L.R. 784. If, on the other hand, a broker has done that which he was employed to do, he becomes entitled to his commission. Westlund v. Smith ([1935]) 291 Mass. 96, 196 N.E. 147; Schneider v. Stewart, 173 Okl. 596, 49 P.2d 186; Hugill v. Weekley, 64 W.Va. 210, 61 S.E. 360, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1262. Courts, and the parties herein, speak of an ordinary contract of a broker (without special terms) and a special contract; that is to say, a contract with special terms. They do not agree what the contract herein actually was. Counsel for the defendant have argued the case solely from the standpoint that the contract herein was a special one, namely, that the plaintiff should make a sale or find a purchaser at the price of $25,000 and no less, and that within a definite period of time. There can be no doubt that if the parties make a special contract, one, for example, to the effect that no commission will be due unless the property in question shall be sold for a definite price, and on definite terms, or that a definite result shall be reached, no commission will be due if these terms are not complied with, unless they are waived by the owner. Restatement of the Law of Agency, § 447, and comment thereon; note, 43 A.L.R. 1111, under subd. IV; Knoechelma's Adm'r v. Knoechelmann, 242 Ky. 662, 47 S.W.2d 534; Kirby L. Co. v. West (Tex. Com.App.) 236 S.W. 449; Murphy v. W. & W. Live Stock Co., 26 Wyo. 455, 187 P. 187, 189 P. 857; Watson v. Odell, 58 Utah, 276, 198 P. 772. But it must be observed that a material distinction must be drawnapplicable throughoutbetween cases in which no sale is made, and those in which one is actually made by the owner to the customer produced by the broker. Harris v. Owenby, 58 Okl. 667, 160 P. 596. And a waiver of the condition as to terms is readily and generally implied, where the owner proceeds to negotiate with the customer furnished by the broker and concludes a sale satisfactory to him. Note, 43 A.L.R. 1104; note, 15 L.R.A. (N.S.) 273, 44 L.R.A. 350, note g. If this were not so, states 4 R.C.L. 322, it would be very easy for an unscrupulous person having property for sale to get all the benefits of the broker's services in bringing the property under the notice of buyers and introducing them, by the simple method of fixing the price at a figure which he knows no person would give, and the reduction of which he is prepared to accept. The rule is stated somewhat differently, but to the same effect, in 4 R.C.L. 313, where it is said: Where a broker instead of procuring a person who is ready, able and willing to accept the terms his principal authorized him to offer at the time of his employment, procures one who makes a counter offer more or less at variance with that of his employer, the latter is at perfect liberty either to accept the proposed party upon the altered terms or to decline to do so. If he accepts, he is legally obligated to compensate the broker for the services rendered. Hence, as stated in other cases, a broker is entitled to his commission when he produces a purchaser who buys at a price satisfactory to the owner (unless the price has been made a condition of the payment of a commission). Wareham v. Atkinson, 215 Iowa, 1096, 247 N.W. 534; Home Banking & Realty Co. v. Baum, 85 Conn. 383, 82 A. 970; Weiss v. Gaines (Tex.Civ. App.) 51 S.W.2d 428; Clements v. Stapleton, 136 Iowa, 137, 113 N.W. 546. [Emphasis added.] Owens, 63 P.2d 1006 at 1008-9. The Owens case also supports the district court's decisions. [¶ 43] Grommet refers us to our decision in Havens v. Irvine, 61 Wyo. 309, 157 P.2d 570 (1945) in conjunction with this particular argument and so we address the opinion, or rather the opinions, issued in that case here, although it also figures in other arguments we will address later. In that case the real estate broker won his case in the trial court. District Judge Tidball wrote the principal opinion. In it he set out the facts in detail and concluded: The cases on this latter point are collected in notes in 43 A.L.R. 1104, and 44 A.L.R. 350(g) [sale to buyer who was produced by broker, but sale consummated by seller/owner]. An examination of these cases will, we believe, disclose that no court has held that a broker is entitled to his commission where the sale is made after his agency is terminated either by the express terms of the contract or by the act of the principal after the lapse of a reasonable time, where no time is specified in the contract, unless it was further found that the principal did not act in good faith or acted fraudulently, as is sometimes stated, in terminating the contract or in postponing the sale until the agency was terminated by the lapse of time specified in the contract. `Bad faith' in respect to the right of a broker to his commission has been said to arise where the owner revokes the broker's authority, or makes the sale through other means, when the broker has performed all he has undertaken or is plainly or evidently approaching success in his undertaking, or where a sale is made behind the broker's back. In another case it is said that `bad faith' means a purpose to obtain profits from the broker's exertions without payment, and exists where the employer revokes the broker's authority and makes the sale through other means when the broker has performed all he has undertaken or is plainly or evidently approaching success. Sherman v. Briggs Realty Co., 310 Mass. 408, 38 N.E.2d 637, 640, and Kacavas v. Diamond, 303 Mass. 88, 20 N.E.2d 936, 938. In Kellogg v. Rhodes, 231 Iowa 1340, 4 N.W.2d 412, 415, it is said: `If the principal acts in bad faith in a fraudulent attempt to avoid paying a commission to the broker who is the moving cause of the sale, the principal is held liable.    It cannot be said as a matter of law, however, that appellee so acted.' For other cases holding that where the broker is to receive his commission only when he sells on certain terms fixed by the principal, he cannot recover his commission even though the principal sells to someone introduced by the broker on different terms, unless the owner acts in bad faith, see cases cited on page 1112 of 43 A.L.R., and on page 857 of 44 A.L.R., and especially the cases of Patton, Temple & Williamson v. Garnett, 147 Va. 1009, 133 S.E. 495; Walsh v. Grant, 256 Mass. 555, 152 N.E. 884, 47 A.L.R. 852; Kellogg v. Rhodes, supra; and Hodgin v. Palmer, 72 Colo. 331, 211 P. 373. . . . . The outstanding fact is that here we have always non-success on the broker's part to comply with the listing contract which had been agreed upon. The owner had waited five months for the broker to fulfill that contract. Yet at the time the termination of the authority took place, the entire business of selling the ranch was at a complete standstill. There is, we think, not a scintilla of evidence or any circumstances whatsoever in the case that disclose that the broker would have earned a commission if Irvine, the defendant, had refrained from doing what he did in terminating the former's authority. The rule in such a situation has been concisely stated by Mr. Justice Campbell in Hodgin v. Palmer, 72 Colo. 331, 211 P. 373, 376, thus: `The plaintiffs never succeeded in bringing the minds of the buyer and seller to an agreement of sale at the price and terms upon which sale was authorized by the owner, and there is no proof that they probably could or would have succeeded, within a reasonable time, in doing so. In the absence of such proof, the right to a commission does not accrue. That has been often decided by this court.' Havens, 157 P.2d at 573-74. We conclude that this portion of the Havens opinion does not aid Grommet in his arguments to this Court. [¶ 44] Justice Riner authored a lengthy concurring opinion in which he fully agreed with Judge Tidball but cited a number of other cases at length, all of which are readily distinguishable from the case at bar. Justice Riner concluded: It would seem clear, as pointed out in the main opinion herein, that the proof utterly fails to establish a performance of the terms of the original listing. The condition to earning a commission herein was that the sale should be entirely for all or a large part in cash to be paid to Irvine. The compensation was to be earned when a customer should be obtained who would pay this price. There is no pretense that such a purchaser was found or that such a sale was made. Irvine finally entered into an altogether different sale agreement. The performance relied on by the plaintiff does not meet the requirements of the rule announced by the decisions hereinabove reviewed and cited, and succinctly declared by Mr. Justice Nelson in McGavock v. Woodlief, 61 U.S. 221, 227, 20 How. 221, 15 L.Ed. 884, where he said: `The broker must complete the sale; that is, he must find a purchaser in a situation and ready and willing to complete the purchase on the terms agreed on, before he is entitled to his commissions. Then he will be entitled to them.' Havens, 157 P.2d at 578-79.