Opinion ID: 3063036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Advisory v. Mandatory

Text: The government concedes, and we agree, that the district court appears to have mistakenly believed that a life sentence as to Count Two was mandatory rather than advisory. However, Count Two carries a statutory mandatory minimum of ten years’ imprisonment, not life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (providing that, if a violation involves five grams or more of cocaine base and if the defendant has a prior felony drug conviction, the defendant faces a term of imprisonment not “less than 10 years and not more than life imprisonment”). While Moore’s advisory guidelines range under Count Two was life imprisonment, the district court erred to the extent it treated that guidelines range as binding. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246, 125 S. Ct. 738, 757 (2005) (holding that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory). Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s calculation of Count Two’s 4 We also reject Moore’s argument that the district court was required to hold a resentencing hearing. In Moore I, this Court issued only a limited remand as to Count Two; it did not vacate Moore’s sentence in its entirety. Further, given that this Court affirmed Moore’s life sentence on Count One, any sentence imposed on remand as to Count Two would not have made Moore’s total sentence more onerous. See United States v. Tamayo, 80 F.3d 1514, 151820 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the district court does not commit reversible error in failing to give the defendant an opportunity to allocute during resentencing when the remand was limited and “the modification does not make the sentence more onerous”); United States v. Taylor, 11 F.3d 149, 151 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a defendant’s right to be present and allocute extends to resentencing when the “original sentencing package is vacated in its entirety on appeal and a case is remanded for resentencing”). 5 guidelines sentence of life imprisonment, but vacate Moore’s sentence as to Count Two and remand to permit the district court to resentence Moore on Count Two in light of the advisory nature of that guidelines sentence and the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).5 We express no opinion, however, as to what sentence the district court should impose after considering the advisory guidelines sentence and the § 3553(a) factors. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED. 5 As this is a limited remand, the parties may not reargue issues already and necessarily decided during the previous sentencing proceedings that either have been affirmed on appeal or could have been but were not raised on appeal. See United States v. Davis, 329 F.3d 1250, 1252 (11th Cir. 2003) (explaining that when the appellate court issues a limited mandate, “the trial court is restricted in the range of issues it may consider on remand”). 6