Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Comment on length of deliberation.

Text: After the close of the penalty phase evidence, the judge held a conference with two jurors and two alternates who had advised the court of personal obligations or concerns that required their attention. He attempted to determine whether the anticipated trial schedule would avoid those problems. Based on information he had received from counsel, the judge stated during that conference that he anticipated that we can wrap the whole thing up by the following Wednesday, which was one week ahead. He later repeated that estimate, telling the jurors he thought they could count on being free of this on the following Wednesday. Because the court had told the jurors that closing argument would begin on Tuesday, the statement that the jurors would be free on Wednesday implied that jury deliberations would take a day or less. Appellant argues that the implication that penalty phase deliberation would be short suggested to the jurors that the penalty decision would be easy. If the court's statement conveyed that impression it was improper. Generally, the court may comment on evidence and on the credibility of a witness, so long as its remarks are accurate, temperate, and `scrupulously fair' ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 735, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741), but that authority does not extend to offering a view on how the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors should be weighed in the penalty phase of a capital case. Appellant did not object to the court's comment, however, and thus did not preserve this claim for appeal. ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 647, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80.) In any event, we do not agree with appellant's assertion that the comment would have undue and improper influence on the jury. The court had discussed scheduling with the jury on several occasions, apologizing when an early recess was necessary if witnesses were not available, and had expressed understanding of the jurors' need to cope with outside obligations. The jurors were aware that past estimates had been inaccurate and would understand that this estimate too was being offered only to ease their concerns. At this stage of the trial the jurors, who had already deliberated guilt and sanity, were familiar with the deliberative process and of the overarching importance of that process in determining the appropriate penalty. It is not reasonably probable that the court's estimate had any impact on the deliberative process at the penalty phase of the trial.