Opinion ID: 1826525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: whether judicial disciplinary proceedings are criminal in nature.

Text: Judge Russell argues that a judicial disciplinary proceeding is criminal in nature and therefore he is entitled to a trial by jury and the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof. Judge Russell argues that because this Court has previously held that bar disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal and thus subject to a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof, that this Court obviously considers judicial disciplinary proceedings to be quasi-criminal. Judge Russell relies upon Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993), wherein the Supreme Court held that civil sanctions which are intended to punish are criminal in nature and therefore warrant criminal protections. More specifically, Judge Russell argues that the Supreme Court in Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574 (1967) held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was applicable to attorney disciplinary proceedings and therefore considered those proceedings criminal in nature. This Court addressed the Spevack decision in Mississippi State Bar v. Attorney Respondent, 367 So.2d 179 (Miss. 1979), where this Court held that the precise holding of Spevack was that an attorney could not be disbarred solely for relying on his privilege against self incrimination and refusing to honor a subpoena duces tecum. Moreover, this Court held [c]areful analysis of Spevack and In re Ruffalo [390 U.S. 544, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968)] shows that in neither case was it intended to create the inference that the Fifth Amendment or other constitutional rights were to apply with full force as in a criminal trial. Id. at 184. We concluded that [a] disciplinary proceeding held pursuant to a formal complaint filed by the complaints committee, while concededly having penal elements, is not a criminal case. Id. Although this Court has held that bar disciplinary proceedings are inherently adversary and of a quasi-criminal nature, we clearly held that there are among the procedural trappings normally attendant upon a criminal trial numerous `rights' which have no place in bar disciplinary proceedings. Mississippi State Bar v. Young, 509 So.2d 210 (Miss. 1987). In Young, this Court specifically held the attorney has no right to trial by jury. Id. at 212. See also Asher v. Mississippi Bar, 661 So.2d 722 (Miss. 1995). Further, this Court held, the attorney's `guilt' need not be established beyond a reasonable doubt, as in criminal cases. Id. at 213. ( citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2783-84, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). This Court, in discussing the application of speedy trial factors to bar disciplinary proceedings, made the following statement: First, the case sub judice is not a criminal case. The Respondent has a higher duty than does a criminal defendant. He is after all a lawyer, a member of the Bar and a person responsible to his clients, the Courts and Bar and finally responsible to the public at large. It is unseemly for a member of the Bar to assert and argue a criminal defense in a hearing concerning a professional misconduct charge. Mississippi Bar v. An Attorney, 636 So.2d 371, 374 (Miss. 1994). Judge Russell is also a member of the Bar and moreover occupies the position of a circuit court judge, he likewise has a higher duty than a criminal defendant. This issue is without merit.