Opinion ID: 726773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ruelas's Defective Indictment Argument

Text: 7 Ruelas argues that count two of the indictment is defective. He contends this count fails to allege an offense, because it does not allege that he used or carried a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1). The prosecution contends we should reject this argument because Ruelas pleaded guilty to count two and waived the right to appeal the adjudication of his guilt. 8 We review de novo whether Ruelas waived his statutory right to appeal. United States v. Khaton, 40 F.3d 309, 311 (9th Cir.1994). The right to appeal is not a constitutional right, but is purely statutory. United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 480 (9th Cir.1991); see also United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321-22 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 942, 112 S.Ct. 1488, 117 L.Ed.2d 629 (1992). A waiver of the statutory right to appeal is enforceable if made knowingly and voluntarily. Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 480. 9 Ruelas does not argue that his waiver was not made knowingly and voluntarily. Instead, he argues the indictment did not allege an offense against him. If true, the district court's jurisdiction is affected.  'If [Ruelas's] claim were correct, the indictment would fail to state an offense against the United States and the district court would be deprived of jurisdiction. Because the defect complained of is jurisdictional, [Ruelas's] claim is reviewable.'  United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232, 1233 n. 2 (9th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1262 n. 1 (9th Cir.), cert. denied 444 U.S. 859, 100 S.Ct. 123, 62 L.Ed.2d 80 (1979)). Moreover, we have defined jurisdictional claims as [c]laims that the ... indictment fails to state an offense. United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.1989) (internal quotations omitted); United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir.1991). Thus, although Ruelas waived his right to appeal in the plea agreement, he could not by that waiver confer jurisdiction on the district court to receive the plea. Cf. Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1228 (9th Cir.1989) (explaining parties may not waive court's subject matter jurisdiction). We, therefore, conclude that Ruelas did not waive his jurisdictional challenge by waiving his statutory right to appeal. 10 Ruelas contends count two of the indictment fails to allege each element of an offense under section 924(c)(1) because, in the body of that count, the indictment states only that Ruelas did possess a firearm. In Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, ----, 116 S.Ct. 501, 506, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995), the Supreme Court concluded that use of a firearm under section 924(c)(1) requires proof that the defendant actively employed the firearm and is not satisfied by mere possession. We have concluded that the term carry also is not satisfied by mere possession, and requires proof that the defendant transported the firearm on or about his or her person. United States v. Hernandez, 80 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir.1996). 11 We review de novo the sufficiency of an indictment. United States v. James, 980 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 838, 114 S.Ct. 119, 126 L.Ed.2d 84 (1993). Although Ruelas may raise a defective indictment claim at any time, we liberally construe the indictment in this case because he did not object to it before he pleaded guilty. See id. at 1318; United States v. Coleman, 656 F.2d 509, 510-11 (9th Cir.1981). When the sufficiency of the indictment is challenged after trial, it is only required that the necessary facts appear in any form or by fair construction can be found within the terms of the indictment. James, 980 F.2d at 1317 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). 12 Although the text of count two alleged only that Ruelas possessed the firearm, the heading of the indictment and the heading of count two charged him with Use or Carry of a Firearm.... The indictment also refers to the relevant statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which includes use and carry. Reference to the applicable statute may adequately inform a defendant of the elements of the charged offense. James, 980 F.2d at 1317-18. 13 Moreover, the terms use and carry are refinements of the more inclusive term possession. By alleging Ruelas possessed the firearm during the drug offense, by referring to section 924(c) and by using the terms Use or Carry in the headings, count two of the indictment adequately informed Ruelas he was charged with using or carrying a firearm. If Ruelas believed he did not have adequate notice of the elements of the 924(c)(1) offense, he could have resolved any ambiguity by bringing an appropriate motion before pleading guilty. Id. at 1318. He did not do so. 14 We conclude count two of the indictment charges Ruelas with an offense under section 924(c)(1).