Opinion ID: 6321839
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Barrett’s Relation to the Victim

Text: Sheppard next argues that stress affected Barrett’s ability to correctly identify the victim and that trial counsel was ineffective in cross-examining her on this point. However, the circuit court correctly concluded that Barrett could not be impeached regarding her initial fear that the victim was her nephew because she made no prior inconsistent statements. Barrett first told the police that she thought her nephew was injured during the shooting. She later told the police that she initially feared that her nephew was the victim of the shooting, but that she later realized that he was not the victim. At trial, Barrett testified that she was initially concerned that the victim of the shooting was her nephew; however, she ultimately did not know the victim, but that she “knew of him.” Trial counsel could not have used Barrett’s statements regarding her initial fear to impeach Barrett’s trial testimony because they were not inconsistent statements. See Lowe v. State, 259 So. 3d - 28 - 23, 43-44 (Fla. 2018); see also Wilcox, 143 So. 3d at 383. Therefore, because “[t]rial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue meritless arguments,” Deparvine v. State, 146 So. 3d 1071, 1093 (Fla. 2014) (citing Owen v. State, 986 So. 2d 534, 543 (Fla. 2008)), we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. (3) Failure to Hire a Crime Scene Reconstructionist Sheppard next challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a crime scene reconstructionist to refute Barrett’s account of the crime. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. At the evidentiary hearing, Sheppard presented Dr. Michael Knox, an expert crime scene reconstructionist, to challenge Barrett’s account of the shooting with measurements of the scene. In his testimony, Dr. Knox could pinpoint neither the exact location of the shooting nor Barrett’s location when the shooting began. Later at the hearing, trial counsel testified that he did not hire a crime scene reconstructionist because he had knowledge of Sheppard’s involvement in the shooting; and he feared that an accurate reconstruction of the crime scene would only prove Sheppard’s guilt. - 29 - We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that Sheppard failed to show that trial counsel was deficient for failing to hire a crime scene reconstructionist. The circuit court found that Dr. Knox’s reconstruction lacked specificity and did not undermine Barrett’s trial testimony. Furthermore, the circuit court ruled that trial counsel’s decision not to retain a crime scene reconstructionist was reasonable because the use of such an expert would have been fraught with risk considering Sheppard’s confession to trial counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. (4) Failure to Object to Inflammatory Statements Sheppard also argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel failed to object to unduly prejudicial statements made by Barrett and Detective Bowers at trial regarding Barrett’s description of the victim and Barrett’s agitated state. We affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief with respect to this claim. During Barrett’s trial testimony, she referred to Wimberly as a “baby” or “little boy” three times. Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that these references were not objectionable, particularly when the jury saw photos of the victim, who was sixteen years old. We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that - 30 - trial counsel’s strategy was reasonable and, therefore, not deficient. Furthermore, Sheppard cannot show prejudice. We agree with the circuit court’s assessment that, given the brief nature of Barrett’s description of the victim, and the State’s theory of the case that Wimberly was a rival gang member who was murdered as a result of a gang dispute, there is no reasonable probability that but for trial counsel’s failure to object to these statements the outcome of the trial would have been different. Barrett’s other statements at issue were expressions of fear that the shooter might return and harm her because she witnessed the crime. This Court considered these statements on direct appeal in the context of a fundamental error argument. We found no fundamental error because “Barrett did not know the identity of the shooter at the time she expressed fear of the shooter’s possible return.” Sheppard, 151 So. 3d at 1170. We have now considered these statements under Strickland and find no reasonable probability that the outcome at trial would have been different had trial counsel objected to these statements—nor do we find any error in the circuit court’s conclusion that trial counsel did not perform - 31 - deficiently in letting these comments pass without objection. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Regarding deficiency, when assessing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we must make every effort “to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.” See id. at 689. Considering Barrett’s comments in the context of the entire record, we cannot say that trial counsel’s decision not to object falls below the standard guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. The record shows that Barrett, who had since identified Sheppard as the shooter, stated her fear to provide an explanation for her failure to return to the police to give her statement immediately after the shooting. On the point of prejudice, Sheppard cannot show that, but for trial counsel’s failure to object to Barrett’s expression of fear, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. With respect to Detective Bowers’s testimony, the initial brief vaguely states that Bowers’s testimony was “full of objectionable statements” which “unduly prejudiced” Sheppard. However, the - 32 - brief does nothing more than recite in cursory fashion a portion of the testimony to which the argument applies and does not demonstrate error with respect to the circuit court’s ruling as to any ineffective assistance of counsel claim related to the testimony summarily recited. We have found similar allegations in a brief “without any supportive argument or authority with regard to the manner in which trial counsel’s conduct was deficient or the prejudice he sustained” insufficient to warrant relief, Hannon v. State, 941 So. 2d 1109, 1139 (Fla. 2006), and find Sheppard’s argument regarding Detective Bowers’s testimony similarly lacking. Consequently, we affirm as to this issue without further analysis. (5) Failure to Challenge the Admission of the Video Recording of Sheppard’s Interrogation Sheppard further argues that his videotaped interrogation, which was played for the jury at trial, contained numerous prejudicial statements by Detective Bowers and that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the admission of the video. This Court considered the admission of the video on direct appeal and - 33 - concluded that it did not amount to fundamental error. Sheppard, 151 So. 3d at 1166. Applying Strickland, we now hold that the circuit court properly denied relief on Sheppard’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because Sheppard failed to establish deficiency and, moreover, failed to establish prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Regarding deficiency, the record shows that trial counsel made a strategic decision not to challenge the admission of the video because he had already viewed it and redacted the portions of the video he believed most damaging to Sheppard’s defense. Mere dissatisfaction with trial counsel’s strategy is not enough to satisfy Strickland’s deficiency prong where, as here, the strategy was reasonable. Johnston v. State, 63 So. 3d 730, 737 (Fla. 2011) (“There is a strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient.” (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690)). In any event, Sheppard failed to make the showing of prejudice required by Strickland. In the video, when Bowers offered theories on how Sheppard committed the murder, Sheppard denied his involvement in the shooting. In light of the evidence adduced at trial that pointed to Sheppard’s guilt, including the eyewitness - 34 - accounts and the identification of Sheppard as the shooter, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel been able to successfully preclude the jury from hearing the portions of the video he now argues should have been redacted. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s denial of relief. (6) Failure to Challenge the State’s Ballistic Evidence Sheppard also challenges the circuit court’s denial of his claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present an expert to challenge the State’s ballistics expert. In rejecting this claim, the circuit court explained: At the evidentiary hearing, the defense called William Tobin, a forensic metallurgist material scientist to testify about toolmark examinations for firearms. (E.H. at 25-27.) Tobin testified specifically that the science of toolmark examinations, which Warniment performed, is not a real science and has no foundational validity. (E.H. at 50, 57, 67, 76.) Tobin also testified, however, that the examination Warniment did in this case is still commonly accepted practice in the forensic community. (E.H. at 99.) Julie Schlax, Fletcher’s co-counsel at Defendant’s trial, testified at the evidentiary hearing that she crossexamined Warniment at trial. (E.H. at 160-61.) According to Schlax, she did not want to make an issue of the science behind Warniment’s testimony. (E.H. at 169.) “[I]f you try to make too large of a deal of the - 35 - science on the cross-examination technique when it is so widely accepted, you run the risk that—it’s almost why are they protesting so much if they claim it wasn’t him.” (E.H. at 169.) She testified that based upon her experience with Warniment, it would not have been effective to attack his credibility and expertise. (E.H. at 169.) She also testified the defense theory was “regardless of whether or not the gun was at either scene, Mr. Sheppard wasn’t the person pulling the trigger at either scene.” (E.H. at 168.) Similarly, Fletcher testified he has handled “hundreds if not thousands of cases [that] involve ballistic testimony.” (E.H. at 242.) According to Fletcher, ballistics testimony, “specifically the identification of shell casings at one location to shell casings at another location is commonly accepted not only in law enforcement but in the courts and in the general public[.]” (E.H. at 242.) He stated it would not be an effective strategy to try to discredit ballistics testimony that is so commonly accepted. (E.H. at 242-43.) Fletcher further testified that Warniment was an excellent State witness whose testimony is “credible and believable.” (E.H. at 242.) Like Schlax, Fletcher explained the defense was primarily that Defendant did not shoot either Stafford or Wimberly. (E.H. at 243.) “It was not the fact that those two cases were unrelated, it was the identification of the person behind the barrel of the gun[.]” (E.H. at 243.) Counsels’ strategy not to challenge the science behind Warniment’s ballistics examinations was reasonable given the defense’s theory that Defendant was not the shooter regardless of whether the murders were related. Moreover, Fletcher and Schlax reasonably believed that challenging Warniment’s conclusions would hurt them in front of the jury. Counsel was not ineffective. See Reynolds, 99 So. 3d at 472 (concluding counsel not deficient when reasonably believed strategy - 36 - was correct); see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 111(2011) (“Strickland does not enact Newton’s third law for the presentation of evidence, requiring for every prosecution expert an equal and opposite expert from the defense.”). The circuit court’s findings are supported by competent, substantial evidence, and we agree with the circuit court’s legal analysis. Accordingly, because Sheppard failed to establish deficient performance with respect to this claim, we affirm the denial of relief.