Opinion ID: 2995557
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lre

Text: The core of this dispute involves whether the school district’s decision to place Beth in an ELS classroom violates the LRE provision of the IDEA. Under this clause, the district must mainstream Beth--that is, provide her an education with her nondisabled peers--to the greatest extent appropriate. 20 U.S.C. sec.1412(5). Again, Congress used the modifier appropriate in stating the requirements of the Act, limiting its mainstreaming mandate. The regular class room would be a less restrictive environment than the ELS classroom. That point is not at issue, however, because the Lake Bluff school district is not required to educate Beth in such an environment unless doing so would be appropriate. The Supreme Court, although it has not yet interpreted the language of the LRE provision, has stated that [t]he Act’s use of the word ’appropriate’ thus seems to reflect Congress’ recognition that some settings simply are not suitable environments for the participation of some handicapped children. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 197 n. 21. This case turns, then, on whether educating Beth in the regular classroom (or, more appropriately in the middle school setting, classrooms) would be appropriate. The relevant IDEA regulation provides that children may not be removed from the regular classroom unless their education there, with the use of supplementary aids and services, cannot be achieved satisfactorily. 34 C.F.R. sec.300.550(b)(2). This preference for mainstreaming demands a hard look and a careful analysis of the education Beth was receiving at Lake Bluff Middle School. Beth’s parents rely on misplaced language from Rowley to argue that so long as she was receiving any benefit-- improvement in eye contact, or progress in responding to a request to look or touch--her removal would violate the LRE requirement. We cannot agree with this definition of satisfactory education. Rowley requires, in its analysis of the FAPE provision, that the education to which access is provided be sufficient to confer some educational benefit upon the handicapped child. 458 U.S. at 200. The Court’s rationale behind using this standard was to leave the selection of educational policy and methods where they traditionally have resided--with state and local school officials. Daniel R.R., 874 F.2d at 1044 (citing Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207). The standard is intended to give school districts flexibility in educational planning. Id. By applying it to the LRE directive and arguing that the school district cannot remove Beth from the regular classroom if she receives any benefit there, Beth’s parents turn the some educational benefit language on its head. Instead of granting flexibility to educators and school officials, it places an extreme restriction on their policymaking authority and the deference they are owed; it essentially vitiates school districts’ authority to place any disabled children in separate special education environments. Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court intended such a result. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 181, fn. 4 (Congress recognized that regular classrooms simply would not be a suitable setting for the education of many handicapped children.). Each student’s educational situation is unique. We find it unnecessary at this point in time to adopt a formal test for district courts uniformly to apply when deciding LRE cases. The Act itself provides enough of a framework for our discussion; if Beth’s education at Lake Bluff Middle School was satisfactory, the school district would be in violation of the Act by removing her. If not, if its recommended placement will mainstream her to the maximum appropriate extent, no violation occurs. In this case we can say with confidence that the Lake Bluff school district’s decision to remove Beth from her regular school did not violate the IDEA’s mandate to mainstream disabled children to the maximum extent appropriate. Beth was in class for about fifty percent of each day. Her academic progress was virtually nonexistent and her developmental progress was limited. Although the school district provided her with aides, communication devices, computerized books, and an individual curriculum, she was receiving very little benefit from her time there. We agree with the school district’s decision that a modicum of developmental achievement does not constitute a satisfactory education. The ELS classroom, so long as it includes reverse mainstreaming opportunities, as well as time spent with nondisabled peers in nonacademic classes, during special projects, lunch, and the like, is at an acceptable point along the continuum of services between total integration and complete segregation, and satisfies the requirement that Beth be mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate. 34 C.F.R. sec.300.551; 20 U.S.C. sec.1412(5). The school officials’ decision about how to best educate Beth is based on expertise that we cannot match. They relied on years of evidence that Beth was not receiving a satisfactory education in the regular classroom. The placement shows a concern both for her development and for keeping her mainstreamed, to an appropriate extent, with her nondisabled peers. We cannot hold that the Lake Bluff School District has failed to provide her with the free, appropriate public education where she is mainstreamed to the maximum extent appropriate, to which she is entitled under the IDEA. Although we respect the input Beth’s parents have given regarding her placement and the their continued participation in IEP decisionmaking, educators have the power to provide handicapped children with an education they consider more appropriate than that proposed by the parents. Lachman v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 852 F.2d 290, 297 (7th Cir. 1988). We find that the district’s proposed IEP, which includes reverse mainstreaming and provides that Beth will take part in certain regular-education classes, does not violate the statutory LRE mandate.