Opinion ID: 2295437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trooper Berube's Testimony

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial or, in the alternative, to provide further curative instructions to the jury after the State elicited allegedly highly prejudicial and emotionally charged testimony from Berube. Specifically, the defendant argues that [v]iewed collectively, the disputed testimony and the court's instruction unambiguously conveyed to the jury that [he] had engaged in [other] conduct closely related to the conduct at issue in the trial. During the State's direct examination of Berube, counsel inquired about his initial contact with J.H., and the following colloquy ensued: [State]: All right. TheI want to direct your attention to the spring, specifically to March of 2008, and ask if you had occasion to become aware of and to have contact with a [J.H.]? [Trooper]: Yeah, I was investigating an unrelated matter for her sisters and then I became aware of it. Defense counsel objected and immediately moved for a mistrial. After a bench conference, the trial court denied the defendant's motion and issued the following instruction: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm striking the last answer that was just provided by Trooper Berube and I'm instructing you to not consider his answer. The only matter that is before you today, and the only matter in existence in this case involves the allegations of [J.H.] against this defendant. Later, defense counsel renewed his motion for a mistrial, or in the alternative, for stronger curative instructions that would make clear to the jury that there [were] no other investigations, that no other daughters made any allegations against [the defendant], [and] that there [were] no other charges out there against [the defendant] involving other daughters. Defense counsel maintained that without such instructions, the jury was left with the impression that there may be other investigations out there. Again, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for a mistrial, finding that [t]here's no inference in this case, nor has there been any suggested by Trooper Berube or anybody else, that there's any other allegation against [the defendant] other than the matter before this jury. The court also declined to provide further curative instructions to the jury, noting that its curative instruction did exactly what defense counsel [had] suggested need[ed] to be done. Subsequently, during cross-examination of Trooper Berube, defense counsel asked: [Defense]: I just want to clear one thing up first. You testified yesterday, when asked about how you first became aware of [J.H.], that you had been involved in an unrelated investigation concerning her sisters? [Trooper]: Yes, I did. [Defense]: That investigation did not result in any allegations of misconduct against [the defendant], correct? [Trooper]: No, there were no allegations of any criminal conduct against [the defendant] in that investigation at all. The defendant argues that the trial court's rulings were erroneous because: (1) contrary to the court's recollection, it had not given the jury the instruction the defense requested; (2) the evidence, together with the limited instruction . . . conveyed that [the defendant] had committed acts similar to the conduct at issue against his other daughters; and (3) although Trooper Berube's testimony on cross-examination lessened the prejudice, it was insufficient to cure the harm. Mistrial is the proper remedy only if the evidence or comment complained of is not merely improper, but is so prejudicial that it constitutes an irreparable injustice that cannot be cured by jury instructions. State v. Ellsworth, 151 N.H. 152, 154, 855 A.2d 474 (2004). Because the trial court is in the best position to gauge the prejudicial nature of the conduct at issue, it has broad discretion to decide whether a mistrial is warranted. State v. Kerwin, 144 N.H. 357, 359, 742 A.2d 527 (1999). It is well-settled that an incurable prejudice may result `when the testimony of a witness conveys to a jury the fact of a defendant's prior criminal offense. The infusion of such evidence into a trial is probably only equaled by a confession in its prejudicial impact upon a jury.' Id. at 360, 742 A.2d 527 (quoting State v. Woodbury, 124 N.H. 218, 221, 469 A.2d 1302 (1983) (citations and quotation omitted)). Thus, [t]he proper inquiry in this case, for determining whether the defendant was so substantially prejudiced that the remedy of mistrial was required, is whether the fact that the alleged prior acts were criminal in nature was unambiguously revealed to the jury. State v. Carbo, 151 N.H. 550, 554, 864 A.2d 344 (2004). Here, Berube's testimony did not unambiguously reveal evidence of prior criminal acts by the defendant. Rather, Berube testified that he had been investigating an unrelated matter  involving J.H.'s half sisters. (Emphasis added.) Berube's reference to another investigation was not specific and did not clearly convey criminal conduct by the defendant. See State v. Rogers, 138 N.H. 503, 505, 642 A.2d 932 (1994) (mistrial not required if challenged evidence is ambiguous as to inculpation). Compare Kerwin, 144 N.H. at 361, 742 A.2d 527 (holding that statement that that man raped some girl was highly prejudicial and warranted mistrial), and State v. Ayotte, 146 N.H. 544, 548, 776 A.2d 715 (2001) (holding that testimony about prior fire was similar to charged offense and warranted mistrial), with State v. Ellison, 135 N.H. 1, 5-6, 599 A.2d 477 (1991) (holding that a mistrial was not required in assault case where inadmissible testimony that the defendant previously fractured victim's nose could be viewed as an accident and thus was ambiguous as to criminal nature of conduct). Moreover, any inference that the unrelated investigation concerned criminal conduct by the defendant was dispelled by the trooper's testimony that there were no allegations of any criminal conduct against [the defendant] in that investigation. In addition, the trial court gave a curative instruction immediately following its ruling on the motion for a mistrial, directing the jury to disregard Berube's answer and focus on the only matter in existence . . . the allegations of [J.H.] against this defendant. The jury is presumed to follow the trial court's curative instruction. State v. Gibson, 153 N.H. 454, 460, 897 A.2d 957 (2006). We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument that the trial court erred because it did not give the instruction the defense requested. Because the trial court is in the best position to gauge prejudicial impact, it has broad discretion to fashion the appropriate remedial action. See Murray v. Developmental Servs. of Sullivan County, 149 N.H. 264, 268, 818 A.2d 302 (2003); see also State v. Boetti, 142 N.H. 255, 259, 699 A.2d 585 (1997) (noting the trial court is granted considerable deference in instructing the jury).