Opinion ID: 4680148
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prior Identification

Text: Appellant Jenkins also challenges three out of court statements; two by Detective Bolding, and one by Mr. Wall’s cousin, Jerel Henderson, in which Jenkins was identified as the individual who attacked Mr. Walls. He argues that the statements are inadmissible hearsay and gratuitously bolster Mr. Walls’ testimony. The government counters that the statements are not hearsay as they fall under the prior-identification exception to the hearsay rule. While prior consistent statements of a witness are generally inadmissible and their “exclusion … is intended to avoid the prejudice of unfairly bolstering the witness’ credibility,” the “prior identification exception to the [general] rule . . . allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of . . . a third party who was present 5 Appellant Jenkins contends that these excited utterances “improperly bolster the government’s case” as prior consistent statements. While we agree that the general rule is that “prior consistent statements may not be used to bolster an unimpeached witness,” Daye v. United States, 733 A.2d 321, 325 (D.C. 1999) (internal quotation omitted), “spontaneous utterance[s]” are an exception to this rule. (Henry) Brown v. United States, 881 A.2d 586, 599 (D.C. 2005) (citing Warren v. United States, 436 A.2d 821, 836 (D.C. 1981)). 34 when the identification was made.” Taylor v. United States, 866 A.2d 817, 822 (D.C. 2005) (internal citations omitted). A statement is therefore not hearsay under the prior-identification exception “if the declarant testifies at the trial . . . and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is . . . an identification of a person made after perceiving the person.” D.C. Code § 14102(b)(3) (2012 Repl.). The description of the offense is admissible under the prior-identification exception “only to the extent necessary to make the identification understandable to the jury.” Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 89 (D.C. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). “[D]etailed accounts of the actual crime” are inadmissible. Id. Here, the statements in question were properly admitted as prior identifications. Two of the statements come from Detective Bolding’s testimony about the photo array identification procedure with Mr. Walls. Detective Bolding testified that Mr. Walls “described [appellant Jenkins] as the leader and stated that he was the one that robbed him,” and that Mr. Walls also said appellant Jenkins “asked me for a cigarette, then punched me in the mouth, knocked me to the ground, and robbed me.” It is undisputed that Mr. Walls, the declarant, was identifying appellant Jenkins after having perceived him to Detective Bolding when he testified at trial about both statements. A prior identification also requires 35 that the declarant “is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement,” D.C. Code § 14-102(b)(3), but we have held that a declarant’s availability to be crossexamined, along with meeting the other requirements, is enough for a statement to be admissible as a prior identification. See, e.g., Brown, 840 A.2d at 89 (“Because [declarant] was available for cross-examination, her statement to [the police officer] was admissible as substantive evidence”). While Mr. Walls was not crossexamined specifically about these statements, he was cross-examined extensively about the identification procedures Detective Bolding used during the photo array, and there is no evidence in the record that he was unavailable to be recalled after Detective Bolding testified about his statements. Thus, Mr. Walls’ statements to Detective Bolding were properly admitted as prior identification evidence. 6 The third statement in question comes from Mr. Walls’ conversation with his cousin, Jerel Henderson, which occurred approximately one week after the attack. Mr. Henderson testified that when he asked Mr. Walls “who jumped him,” Mr. Walls responded “[t]he one you said we was going to have a problem out of”; 6 Mr. Walls’ statements also do not rise to the level of “detailed accounts of the actual crime.” Brown, 840 A.2d at 89. Both statements give context to Mr. Walls’ claim that appellant Jenkins was the person who punched and robbed him, and we have held that “[s]ome limited reference in the identification to the criminal act is permissible” to make the identification understandable to the jury. Porter v. United States, 826 A.2d 398, 410 (D.C. 2003). 36 Mr. Walls also repeated that statement when Mr. Henderson asked Mr. Walls who had robbed him a few days earlier. Appellant Jenkins argues that this statement is “prejudicial” and a “needless presentation of cumulative evidence,” given Mr. Walls’ prior identification of appellant Jenkins during the photo array procedure. As an initial point, there is no dispute that the statement meets all three elements of the prior identification test. See D.C. Code § 14-102(b)(3). Also, rather than “unfairly bolstering the witness’ credibility,” Taylor, 866 A.2d at 822, the statement is a separate indication that Mr. Walls knew who appellant Jenkins was before the robbery occurred. Thus, the trial court properly credited the statement “because the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness’ mind.” Graham v. United States, 12 A.3d 1159, 1165 (D.C. 2011). As with Mr. Walls’ statements to Detective Bolding, his statement to Mr. Henderson was a prior identification. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting all three of Mr. Walls’ statements.