Opinion ID: 898621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1)(C)

Text: [¶ 37] Tiberts argue the district court erred by denying their original and renewed motions for judgment of dismissal as a matter of law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50. They, specifically, argue Minto Grain failed to present sufficient evidence at trial to support a claim for tortious interference with business and a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations. [¶ 38] During trial, Tiberts made oral motions to dismiss all the claims of Minto Grain under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50(a) based upon insufficiency of the evidence at the close of Minto Grain's case-in-chief, at the conclusion of Tiberts' case-in-chief, and following Minto Grain's rebuttal evidence. Although these grounds were not specifically argued in Tibert's written motions for judgment as a matter of law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1)(C), Tiberts assert these motions were sufficiently renewed after trial. [¶ 39] In the district court's memorandum opinion and order denying the defendants' renewed motions for judgment as a matter of law, the district court addressed only the grounds explicitly raised in both Tiberts' consolidated motion and William Tibert's separate motion to dismiss as a matter of law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1)(C). In its memorandum opinion, the court considered whether its decision granting summary judgment precluded the jury from determining whether any of the Tiberts acted in concert to establish joint and several liability, stating: As this issue serves as the sole basis for the Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law brought by all four Defendants, that motion shall be denied. Although Tiberts assert they renewed all of their Rule 50 motions, the court concluded this was the only issued raised in its post-trial consolidated motion for motion for judgment as a matter of law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1)(C). [¶ 40] As the Tiberts did in their briefs in support of their post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law, they assert in their brief on appeal the following in a footnote: The Tibert defendants/appellants in the instant appeal hereby incorporate by reference herein all arguments which were made by defense counsel on the record in support of both the defendants' above-referenced oral Rule 50 motions for a judgment of dismissal as a matter of law, as well as those written arguments which were made in renewed Rule 50 motions for judgments of dismissal as a matter of law following the return of the jury's verdict in this case.... (Emphasis in original.) We do not approve Tiberts' use of footnotes to incorporate and renew arguments. Nor were these arguments raised in Tiberts' new trial motion under N.D.R.Civ.P. 59. Had the Tiberts' assertions that the district court erred in denying their Rule 50 motions to dismiss all of Minto Grain's claims upon insufficiency of the evidence been raised, we conclude their arguments would be unavailing. [¶ 41] Tiberts assert on appeal that Minto Grain failed to present competent evidence to show any of Tiberts actions proximately caused any harm to any business proposal which Minto Grain may have had from BNSF railway to develop a 110-car load-out facility. Tiberts assert that William Slominski admitted at trial that the project was a dead horse before the fall of 2001 and that Minto Grain did not even have clear title to the roadway known as Kilowatt Drive until years later after litigation concerning the street's status. Tiberts argue that Minto Grain did not demonstrate there was even a possibility they would have obtained some economic benefit in absence of any interference on the part of Tiberts. With respect to Minto Grain's claim for tortious interference with contractual relations, Tiberts assert that Minto Grain failed to show any conduct of the Tiberts proximately caused any breach of contract or that Tiberts conduct proximately caused any damages or appreciable financial injury to Minto Grain. [¶ 42] In submitting the case to the jury, the district court gave instructions, including jury instructions on proximate cause, unlawful interference with business, intentional interference with contract, nuisance, trespass, in addition to a number of instructions relating to damages. The damages instructions included defining damages, the burden of proving damages, and the duty to mitigate damages. Specifically, the instruction for unlawful interference with business stated, in part: To prove a claim for unlawful interference with business, the Plaintiff must establish the following by the greater weight of the evidence: 1. The existence of a valid business relationship or expectancy between the Plaintiff and the BNSF or Plaintiff's contractors or customers; 2. Knowledge by the Defendant of the relationship or expectancy; 3. Defendant's interference with the relationship or expectancy by committing an independently tortious or otherwise unlawful act; 4. Defendant's interference was a proximate cause of the harm sustained; 5. Plaintiff was actually damaged. This instruction also provided, The Plaintiff claims that the Defendant committed the following independently tortious or otherwise unlawful conduct: defamation, nuisance, trespass, malicious prosecution and assault and battery. [¶ 43] The instruction for intentional interference with contract stated: To establish a claim for intentional interference with contract, the Plaintiff must prove by the greater weight of the evidence: 1) A valid contract existed; 2) The contract was breached; 3) A Defendant intentionally instigated the breach, or acted with knowledge that the breach would result, and 4) There was no justification for a Defendant's act. This instruction further provided: An act that interferes with a contract is justified if it is done with a legitimate business purpose and no improper means are used. An act that interferes with a contract is not justified if its indirect purpose is to injure the Plaintiff or benefit a Defendant at the Plaintiff's expense. [¶ 44] Tiberts concede on appeal that Minto Grain presented a parade of witnesses testifying to a number of regrettable hot-headed incidents by Tiberts individually and collectively, but that had no effect on whether or not Minto Grain was able to build a 110-car load-out facility. However, our review of the record suggests that Minto Grain presented extensive evidence to support their claims. There is evidence in this record that Tiberts, individually and collectively, hindered and interfered with construction, excavation, and surveying on land for Minto Grain's improvements to its property to facilitate expansion. There is evidence of refusal to move vehicles and personal property from Minto Grain's property, threatening conduct toward to Minto Grain's employees, contractors, and customers, and criminal charges including trespass and disorderly conduct with numerous reports filed with law enforcement regarding conflicts between the Tiberts and Minto Grain. [¶ 45] There is also evidence that Tiberts were aware of Minto Grain's expansion plans and evidence regarding Tiberts' efforts to prevent third parties from doing business with Minto Grain. Minto Grain presented evidence of letter agreements with BNSF calling for BNSF to subsidize their expansion depending on the size of the expanded facility and requiring Minto Grain to use all of its railroad right-of-way. Minto Grain invested more than $267,000 in improvements to complete the expansion project. There is evidence which supports an inference that Tiberts' actions and interference caused harm to Minto Grain. Minto Grain presented evidence that the Tiberts' continued trespass caused the loss of financing, preventing Minto Grain from closing any deal with BNSF, and the loss of the BNSF contract. Further, there is expert testimony that as a result of Minto Grain's failure to expand the facility, Minto Grain suffered damages of $6.8 million. At a minimum the evidence supports the inference that Tiberts' wrongful actions prevented Minto Grain from carrying out planned expansion of its facilities and interfered with Minto Grain customers, and supports the jury's award of damages. [¶ 46] Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Minto Grain and accepting the truth of the evidence and all reasonable inferences which support the verdict, the evidence favoring the verdict is not so insufficient that reasonable minds could only reach but one conclusion. We therefore conclude the district court did not err in denying Tiberts' consolidated motion for judgment as a matter of law under N.D.R.Civ.P. 50(b)(1)(C).