Opinion ID: 2777285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶25. In considering the legal sufficiency of the evidence, “this Court will affirm the denial of a motion for JNOV if there is substantial evidence to support the verdict.” Daniels, 107 So. 3d at 963 (citing Johnson, 967 So. 2d at 22). “‘Substantial evidence’ is information of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded jurors in the exercise of impartial judgment might have reached different conclusions.” Daniels, 107 So. 3d at 963 (quoting Natchez Elec. & Supply Co. v. Johnson, 968 So. 2d 358, 362 (Miss. 2007)). This Court considers “whether the evidence shows ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction.’” Bush v. State, 895 So. 2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005) (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886, 889 (Miss. 1968)). This Court has held: Should the facts and inferences considered in a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence “point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,” the proper remedy is for the appellate court to reverse and render. Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843 (quoting Edwards v. State, 469 So. 2d 68, 70 (Miss. 1985) (citing May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 781 (Miss. 1984))). However, if a review of the evidence reveals that it is of such quality and weight that, “having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach 14 different conclusions on every element of the offense,” the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient. Bush, 895 So. 2d at 843 (quoting Edwards, 469 So. 2d at 70). “The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.” Daniels, 107 So. 3d at 963 (citing Johnson, 967 So. 2d at 22). ¶26. Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(4)(a)(iii) sets forth the requirements for proving a charge of aggravated domestic violence: “When the offense is committed against a current or former spouse . . . a person is guilty of aggravated domestic violence who . . . [s]trangles or attempts to strangle another.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(4)(a)(iii) (Rev. 2014). “Strangle” means “to restrict the flow of oxygen or blood by intentionally applying pressure on the neck, throat or chest of another person by any means or to intentionally block the nose or mouth of another person by any means.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(9)(a) (Rev. 2014). In order to prove allegations of aggravated domestic violence for which Kirk was indicted, the State bore the burden at trial of proving (1) that Marvin and Casey Kirk were current or former spouses and (2) that Marvin Kirk had strangled Casey Kirk by restricting “the flow of oxygen or blood by intentionally applying pressure on” Casey’s neck. ¶27. The State adduced testimony at trial that Marvin and Casey Kirk were married. Casey Kirk testified that Marvin “grabbed me by my neck, and he started choking [] me . . . . I couldn’t even cry or scream or anything because he had his hands on my neck and he was choking me.” She testified that she “wasn’t able to breathe.” Casey testified that, the next day, Marvin choked her again; she could not breathe and lost consciousness. Casey identified the pictures, State’s Exhibits 11, 12, and 13, as the result of “him choking me.” Colita 15 Ogletree, who provided refuge to Casey in her home after Casey fled her own home, recalled that Casey’s neck was red. The recording of the 911 call which Casey had placed shortly after arriving at Ogletree’s house was played for the jury. ¶28. Deputy Strait testified to marks on Casey’s neck. The other deputy called to investigate, Deputy Brad Sullivan, testified that he “noticed that [Casey] had red marks on her neck that she was pointing out to Deputy Strait . . . .” Sarah Horvath, a friend of both Marvin and Casey Kirk, testified for the State that she and Marvin had a telephone conversation regarding the events. She testified that, during this conversation, Marvin testified that “he fed up and that he ruined his family.” ¶29. Kirk argues on appeal that the only evidence of strangulation, “this fundamental element of the crime was the uncorroborated testimony of the Accuser, a self-admitted meth addict.” Kirk states that “the State moved forward without a medical expert to substantiate the Accuser’s claims that she was strangled” and that “[t]he only evidence the State presented in an attempt to corroborate the meth-addict’s testimony was the testimony of Deputy Strait, which was a mere reiteration of the accuser’s version of events.” But, even in the absence of testimony from an expert, Deputies Strait and Sullivan and Colita Ogletree, who all saw Casey on the day in question, testified to marks they observed on her neck. The jury observed photographs of Casey’s neck taken by Deputy Strait on the day in question. The jury reasonably could infer from this testimony and from the photographs that the red marks on Casey Kirk’s neck were sustained as a result of strangulation by Marvin Kirk. ¶30. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the guilty verdict, we find that any rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. As 16 such, the verdict was supported by substantial evidence and the trial court did not err in denying Kirk’s motion for JNOV.