Opinion ID: 735902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to instruct on the defense of good faith

Text: 7 Rucker contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to give the jury his proposed instruction on the defense of good faith. But, as we have noted before, while: 8 [a] defendant is entitled to have the judge instruct the jury on his theory of the case, provided that it is supported by law and has some foundation in the evidence.... We may nonetheless affirm the refusal to give an otherwise proper theory of the defense instruction if the instructions actually given, taken as a whole, adequately encompass the defendant's theory. 9 United States v. Sarno, 73 F.3d 1470, 1485 (9th Cir.1995) (citation and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 2555 (1996); United States v. Dees, 34 F.3d 838, 842 (9th Cir.1994). We review de novo the legal adequacy of the instructions actually given by the district court; however, we review the formulation of the instructions for abuse of discretion. Sarno, 73 F.3d at 1485. 10 This circuit has held repeatedly that the failure to give an instruction on a good faith defense is not fatal, so long as the court clearly instructs the jury on the necessity of proof of specific intent as an element of the crime. Sarno, 73 F.3d at 1487 (under § 1014); Dees, 34 F.3d at 842 (under § 1341). Although these cases arose under the mail fraud and false statement statutes, we see nothing that would lead to a different result under the bank fraud statute, 28 U.S.C. section 1344. See United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1441 (9th Cir.1990) (the bank fraud statute was modeled on the mail and wire fraud statute and should be given the same broad scope). 11 Here, the court specifically instructed the jury that intent to defraud was an element the government must prove with respect to each of the offenses charged. Rucker was entitled to no more.