Opinion ID: 2081107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statements Made to Officer Kanicki

Text: Officer Kanicki of the Lumberton, New Jersey Police Department arrested the defendant in that town early on the morning following the murders. Almost immediately and over the course of the next thirty minutes, the defendant made and repeated a series of incriminating statements. The only questions directed to the defendant by the police during this period were those pertinent to the identity of the defendant and certain booking information. At trial, the State offered Kanicki's testimony as to the incriminating statements made by the defendant. Although the defendant had not filed a pre-trial motion to suppress this testimony, he was given an opportunity to examine Kanicki outside the presence of the jury. Kanicki testified that he made no attempt to question the defendant and consequently did not advise him of his Miranda rights. The presiding Justice ruled that beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's statements were volunteered and not the product of either custodial interrogation or coercion. Kanicki then testified as to the statements made to him by the defendant. On appeal, the defendant does not argue that his arrest was unsupported by probable cause, see, e. g., State v. Ann Marie C., Me., 407 A.2d 715, 722 (1979), but rather that his statements were the product of custodial interrogation and were therefore inadmissible in the absence of Miranda warnings. In the case of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that the State may not use either inculpatory or exculpatory statements of a defendant stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. Only recently, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to define what is meant by interrogation within the context of this holding in Miranda. The Court stated: We conclude that the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Rhode Island v. Innis, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d 297, 307-08 (1980). This holding is consistent with our prior decision in State v. Simoneau, Me., 402 A.2d 870 (1979), in which we noted that [b]rief, routine questions posed to a suspect during `booking' procedures, for example, do not constitute `interrogation.' Id. at 873. Since the record fully supports the finding of the presiding Justice that the defendant had not been subjected to interrogation or coercion, there was no error in the admission of Kanicki's testimony.