Opinion ID: 2720490
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Absences from Various Proceedings

Text: Bryant contends the court erroneously conducted a number of ex parte meetings with members of the district attorney‘s office regarding the first defense recusal motion. (See ante, pt. II.C.) He also challenges two in camera meetings with jurors concerning security measures (see ante, pt. III.F.), and the permission granted Bryant to waive his personal presence at various proceedings. We assume Smith and Wheeler have joined these claims. There was no reversible error. 152
The first defense motion to recuse the LADA arose from a statement the lead prosecutor filed that trial evidence would show the Bryant Family had ―people inside‖ the office, as well as other public agencies. Defendants argued the LADA‘s failure to provide discovery on the subject and, apparently, to prosecute the infiltrators showed there was a conflict of interest that would prevent defendants from receiving a fair trial. The LADA argued that the statement had been misinterpreted, no discoverable information had been withheld, and no conflict of interest existed. To facilitate the court‘s resolution of the motion, the LADA agreed to disclose to the court the basis for the prosecutor‘s statement. It asserted that this information concerned completed and ongoing internal investigations and was confidential under the ―official information‖ privilege, section 1040 of the Evidence Code.73 The trial court observed that it would need to conduct in camera hearings to determine whether the privilege applied. It promised to provide the defense with any material it deemed discoverable. No defendant objected. The court then conducted a series of ex parte in camera meetings with LADA attorneys and investigators. The court also directed the LADA to conduct further investigation and report back. In the midst of these hearings, Bryant asserted in a written filing that the privilege did not apply because the LADA had publicly disclosed the allegations of infiltration, and, in any event, the defendants‘ need for the information outweighed any confidentiality interest. The court ultimately ruled: (1) there was no evidence of infiltration or of undisclosed exculpatory material; (2) the information 73 In relevant part, this provision establishes a public entity‘s privilege to withhold confidential information when ―[d]isclosure of the information is against the public interest because there is a necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information that outweighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice[.]‖ (Evid. Code, § 1040, subd. (b)(2).) 153 provided to the court in the ex parte meetings was privileged; and (3) no conflict of interest required recusal of the LADA. Defendants now claim the trial court erred by conducting the ex parte meetings. The court did not err. A criminal defendant has the right under the state and federal Constitutions to be personally present and represented by counsel at all critical stages of the trial. For purposes of the right to be present, a critical stage is ―one in which a defendant‘s ‗ ―absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings‖ [citation], or ―whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.‖ ‘ ‖ (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 133.) As to the right to counsel, a critical stage is one ―in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake‖ (People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 362), and ―the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant‘s basic right to a fair trial‖ (United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 227). Defendants did not specifically object to the court‘s decision to conduct in camera proceedings. After the meetings began, they argued that the court should not apply the official information privilege. They later pointed out that their absence from the meetings made it difficult for them to address the merits of the issue. They did not directly challenge the court‘s decision to hold the ex parte meetings as a denial of their constitutional rights to presence and counsel. The appellate claim is forfeited. Even if not forfeited, the claim fails. In general, a court ―has inherent discretion to conduct in camera hearings to determine objections to disclosure based on asserted privileges.‖ (Izazaga v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 356, 383, fn. 21.) We have acknowledged that, as to an assertion of the official information privilege, a trial court may properly conduct in camera proceedings to ―weigh the People‘s claim of privilege against defendant‘s asserted need for the information.‖ (Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 955.) As in People v. Roberts, supra, 2 Cal.4th at page 302, defendants fail ―to 154 persuade that [they have] a constitutional right to be present at an in camera hearing at which the prosecution will reveal sensitive and possibly privileged information.‖
As previously mentioned, the court ruled that the potential threat of juror harm called for various security measures. These included juror anonymity, escort to and from a confidential location and sequestration in a special jury room during recesses. Early in the trial proceedings, over defense objection, the court conducted two in camera meetings with the jurors from which all parties were excluded. The court discussed the arrangements and asked if they were causing the jurors any problems. The parties were provided transcripts of the meetings after the trial concluded. Defendants assert on appeal that they ―plainly . . . had a right to be present at proceedings where the court spoke with the jurors who would decide appellant‘s fate.‖ To the contrary, ―a trial court properly may engage in ex parte communications [with jurors] for ‗ ―. . . administrative purposes . . . that do not deal with substantive matters.‖ ‘ ‖ (Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 987.) The discussions at issue concerned the administrative matter of the jury‘s travels as well as other arrangements like the provision of lunch. Moreover, the court was reasonably concerned that the discussions remain confidential so security would not be compromised. As revealed by the transcripts, there was no discussion of any substantive matter related to the charges. In fact, the court cut off a juror who began to comment on the parties‘ use of exhibits. The court then had the juror express that concern in open court. The parties were provided a record of the proceedings after the trial, when the need for confidentiality had ended. Defendants‘ assertion that the ―cold record‖ does not ―reflect whether the court was successful in being neutral in tone and manner,‖ is not persuasive. That rationale would prohibit all ex parte communications between the court and the jury, contrary to law. Defendants have not established that the meetings were critical stages of the trial in the sense that the 155 absences could have frustrated the fairness of the trial or denied a full opportunity for defense.
In addition to the hearings discussed above, defendants were absent from a number of other proceedings. Defendants personally or through counsel orally waived their right to be present at most of these.74 Defendants claim that as a general matter, the federal Constitution mandates that a capital defendant be personally present at all trial proceedings, even if the defendant purports to waive that right. They also point out that state law prohibits a capital defendant from voluntarily waiving his presence during the taking of trial evidence, and requires written waivers of the right to be present. (See §§ 977, 1043; People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876,967-968.) Defendants assert that any violation of the statutes comprises the ―arbitrary deprivation‖ of a right secured by state law under Hicks v. Oklahoma, supra, 447 U.S. at page 346, and thus constitutes federal constitutional error as well. They urge the Attorney General has not carried the burden of demonstrating the asserted federal constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and that, applying state law, there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result had the error not occurred. The claim of federal constitutional error based on the mere fact of defendants‘ absences is without merit. Defendants make no effort to demonstrate that any of the proceedings were critical stages of the trial under the applicable standard, that their presence was necessary to ensure the full opportunity to defend themselves at a fair trial. 74 Bryant specifically mentions his absence without waivers from a discovery hearing and at the reassignment of the case after the first trial judge had been recused. He also challenges his absences following oral waivers from another discovery proceeding, a hearing on the admissibility of codefendant Settle‘s post-arrest statements, and during guilt phase deliberations after the jury had reached verdicts on the charges against him. 156 Further, the record does not support such a conclusion. As to waiver, contrary to defendants‘ arguments, the federal Constitution does not prohibit a capital defendant from waiving his right to be present at a critical trial stage. (Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 135.) Any statutory error in the trial court‘s accepting oral, rather than written, waivers is not elevated to federal constitutional error by invoking Hicks. (Rundle, at p. 136.) In sum, defendants have not established any error that would be subject to the Chapman standard. To the extent their absences at proceedings based on oral waivers violated the statutes, defendants have presented no support for the conclusion there is either a reasonable probability at the guilt phase or reasonable possibility at the penalty phase that the outcome would have been more favorable had defendants been required to make written waivers or forced to attend the proceedings despite their wishes to be absent.75 (See Rundle, at pp. 135-136.)