Opinion ID: 2116540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: nissen's sentencing agreement

Text: Lotter asserts that the prosecution and the trial court erroneously engaged in an ex parte communication to obtain assurances from the court that Nissen would receive a life sentence if he testified against Lotter. He argues that this ex parte communication compromised the impartiality of the trial court; violated the separation of powers; rendered the judge an advocate for the prosecution; contravened Nebraska statutory law regarding sentencing requirements, use immunity, and out-of-state transfer; violated Lotter's right to the assistance of counsel; violated Lotter's right to an open court; and violated Lotter's right to notice and a hearing. The State argues that Lotter has no standing to assert his claims and that the communication at issue was not ex parte. As a threshold matter, we address whether the communication concerning Nissen's sentencing agreement was ex parte. Although this court has not previously defined ex parte communications, Canon 3 of the Nebraska Code of Judicial Conduct provides useful guidance. See State ex rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). Canon 3B(7) states that [a] judge shall not initiate, permit or consider ex parte communications or consider other communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties concerning a pending or impending proceeding.... (Emphasis supplied.) The commentary states that [t]he proscription against communications concerning a proceeding includes communications from lawyers, law teachers and other persons who are not participants in the proceeding.... Thus, the canon indicates that an ex parte communication occurs when a judge communicates with any person concerning a pending or impending proceeding without notice to an adverse party. See, D'Acquisto v. Washington, 640 F.Supp. 594 (N.D.Ill.1986); Borough of Kennett Square v. Lal, 164 Pa.Cmwlth. 654, 643 A.2d 1172 (1994), appeal denied 540 Pa. 586, 655 A.2d 517 (1994). In the instant case, the communication concerning the sentencing agreement did indeed concern Lotter's trial, which was pending before the trial court, and neither Lotter nor his counsel was present. The State argues that the communication was not ex parte, because it concerned Nissen's sentencing, not Lotter's trial, and Lotter was not a party to the State's proceeding against Nissen. Had the agreement at issue been a plea bargain, we would agree with the State. Nissen would have been granted sentence concessions for pleading guilty, thus receiving a benefit for the relinquishment of a right at issue in Nissen's case. The plea agreement would have been primarily concerned with the resolution of Nissen's case and only incidentally concerned with Lotter's, negating any assertion that such communication was ex parte. In the instant case, the benefit Nissen received was in no way conditioned upon his giving up any right in the State's case against him. He had already been found guilty by a jury. See State v. Nissen, 252 Neb. 51, 560 N.W.2d 157 (1997). The agreement was an inducement to secure Nissen's testimony at Lotter's trial, which testimony was presumably subject to use immunity in Nissen's case. Nissen's interests were not adverse to those of the State. Rather, the prosecution sought the judge's approval on behalf of Nissen. Lotter was the only party whose interests were adverse to those of the State, and neither Lotter nor his counsel had received notice of the communication concerning the agreement. Because the sole purpose of the communication at issue was to secure testimony at Lotter's trial, we conclude that the communication was ex parte.