Opinion ID: 2337648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Giving and Refusal of Instructions

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in giving the State's offered Instructions 5, a verdict-director, and 6, a converse, and in refusing to give his proffered Instructions A, B, C, and D, which asked the jury to make a determination of independent contractor status. Though Defendant's point relied on is improperly drafted in that it contains multiple unrelated issues, this Court will still review his claims for plain error. See Helmig v. State, 42 S.W.3d 658, 666 n. 1 (Mo.App. 2001). Plain error is found when the alleged error facially establish[es] substantial grounds for believing a manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice occurred. State v. Baker, 103 S.W.3d 711, 723 (Mo. banc 2003) (alternation in original). To demonstrate that an instructional error constitutes plain error, Defendant must show that the trial court so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that the error affected the jury's verdict. Id. Defendant's first allegation of error is that State's Instruction 5 was erroneous because it used the word conduct. He contends there was no evidence that he engaged in conduct since the charge against him involved the failure to act. As more fully explained above, Defendant's failure to act did constitute conduct. The use of the word conduct was proper, and the trial court did not error in submitting this instruction. Defendant's next allegation of error is that State's Instruction 6 was erroneous because it was premised on him causing Corporation to fail to carry workers' compensation insurance when there was no proof of any conduct for which he could be held criminally liable. [9] As explained previously, there was conduct for which he could be held criminally liable. The trial court did not misdirect the jury in giving Instruction 6, and there was no plain error. Defendant's final allegation of error is that Instructions A, B, C, and D, which were refused by the court, should have been given to the jury. He contends that the instructions were proper in that they were based upon evidence that Brown was not an employee for Corporation, but instead was an independent contractor. As discussed above, whether or not Brown was an independent contractor was not a material issue because, based on the duties she performed as Corporation's secretary, she is considered an employee under the workers' compensation laws. It is irrelevant if she contracted with Corporation to do other work. Since this issue was not material, the trial court was under no duty to instruct on the matter. See State v. Flenoid, 838 S.W.2d 462, 469-70 (Mo.App. 1992) (finding that the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on the exception to the crime of unlawful use of a weapon because there was no evidence that the defendant was within the exception). The trial court did not err in refusing Defendant's instructions. None of Defendant's claims of error merit reversal in that Defendant failed to show that the trial court so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that the error affected the jury's verdict.