Opinion ID: 2621435
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Requirement of Strict Compliance

Text: ¶ 40 We now turn to plaintiffs' claim that the district court erred in applying the notice requirements of the Immunity Act. We review those requirements in the context of our case law and reaffirm our well-established rule of strict compliance. We then consider and reject plaintiffs' request that we excuse their noncompliance and recognize an exception to those requirements. ¶ 41 The Immunity Act bars claims against political subdivisions and their employees unless notice of claim is filed with the governing body of the political subdivision . . . within one year after the claim arises. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1998). The Immunity Act requires, in relevant part, that the claim be directed and delivered to . . . a member of the governing board, the executive director, or executive secretary. Id. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(F) (1998). This notice requirement is jurisdictional. Greene v. Utah Transit Auth., 2001 UT 109, ¶¶ 15-16, 37 P.3d 1156. ¶ 42 We consistently have interpreted the Immunity Act to require strict compliance by plaintiffs. See, e.g., Gurule v. Salt Lake County, 2003 UT 25, ¶ 5, 69 P.3d 1287; Greene, 2001 UT 109, ¶ 14, 37 P.3d 1156; Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 1999 UT 36, ¶ 19, 977 P.2d 1201. In Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (1972), we explained that the allowance of a claim against [a governmental entity] is a statutorily created exception to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. Inasmuch as the maintenance of such a case of action derives from such statutory authority, a prerequisite thereto is meeting the conditions prescribed in the statute. The statutory right to sue a governmental entity may be circumscribed by any conditions that the Legislature may see fit to impose, and compliance with those conditions is an indispensable prerequisite in suits against governmental entities. Artukovich v. Astendorf, 21 Cal.2d 329, 131 P.2d 831, 833 (1942). The requirement of strict compliance, therefore, is a recognition of the government's sovereign immunity and its right to dictate the terms and conditions of its waiver of that immunity. ¶ 43 Plaintiffs concede that they failed to provide CUCC with the notice required by the Immunity Act. Under section 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(F), plaintiffs were required to deliver a notice of claim to a member of CUCC's governing board, its executive director, or its executive secretary. Plaintiffs instead delivered the notice to the State Attorney General's office and the Juab County Clerk. They ask us to consider the confusing circumstances of their situation and recognize an exception to the rule of strict compliance. We decline to do so. ¶ 44 As we stated in Gurule, we have allowed for less than strict compliance [only] in cases which depended upon ambiguities in the [Immunity] Act; ambiguities clarified by the 1998 amendments. 2003 UT 25, ¶ 7, 69 P.3d 1287; see, e.g., Larson v. Park City Mun. Corp., 955 P.2d 343, 345-46 (Utah 1998) (upholding the validity of a notice sent to a city recorder where the then-controlling version of the Immunity Act failed to state how or in what manner a notice of claim should be filed with [a] city council). Barring statutory ambiguity, we have consistently declined to relax the requirements of the Immunity Act. ¶ 45 For example, in Greene, we refused to create an exception to the strict compliance rule where a claims adjuster employed by a state entity allegedly misdirected the plaintiff as to where to send the requisite notice. 2001 UT 109, ¶ 17, 37 P.3d 1156. Though we expressed concern about the intentionally misleading behavior alleged by the plaintiff, id. ¶ 19, we nevertheless affirmed the dismissal of the case: Even assuming [the claims adjuster] made the statements [the plaintiff] alleges he made, his delivery instructions cannot override the requirements set by the legislature. Because [the plaintiff] failed to strictly comply with the Immunity Act, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over her claim. Id. ¶ 17. ¶ 46 We understand that claimants may face byzantine and confusing bureaucracy when dealing with governmental entities. Indeed, government employees and officials may even intentionally mislead plaintiffs in some cases, as was alleged in Greene. Certainly, plaintiffs and their attorney in this case faced a difficult task in navigating the communication channels of an interlocal agency that serves six counties and receives substantial funding and supervision from the State. Jurisdiction, however, does not hinge on the difficulty of that task or the earnestness of plaintiffs' efforts. Jurisdiction instead springs when a claimant has effected full compliance with the Immunity Act. Barring statutory ambiguity, we will not disturb explicit legislative requirements and abrogate the government's sovereign immunity. Id. ¶ 15. ¶ 47 Plaintiffs point to no statutory ambiguity that could serve to excuse them from strict compliance in this case. As we noted in Gurule, the 1998 amendments to the Immunity Act resolved the ambiguities at issue in Larson v. Park City Municipal Corp., 955 P.2d 343 (Utah 1998), and Bischel v. Merritt, 907 P.2d 275 (Utah Ct.App.1995). The controlling version of the Immunity Act unambiguously instructed plaintiffs and their attorney to serve the requisite notice of claim on a member of CUCC's governing board, its executive director, or its executive secretary. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-11(3)(b)(ii)(F). ¶ 48 Plaintiffs must exercise the diligence necessary to effect strict compliance with the Immunity Act. And the plaintiffs in this case failed to do so. After conducting an initial investigation on December 23, 1998, plaintiffs' attorney apparently did nothing until November 22, 1999  one day before the limitations period expired. On that date, plaintiffs' attorney spoke with an unidentified employee of the Division of Mental Health, called Assistant Attorney General Reed Stringham, and finalized the notice of claim. What plaintiffs' attorney never did  and had one year to do  was contact an identified person of authority at CUCC. Instead, he spoke with unidentified employees of CUCC and the Division of Mental Health and relied on inferences and assumptions in directing the notice. Reliance on inferences and assumptions does not constitute due diligence. Because plaintiffs failed to exercise due diligence, we decline to recognize an exception to the requirement of strict compliance. ¶ 49 We reaffirm our statement in Greene that [w]here, as here, the statute is clear, readily available, and easily accessible by counsel, there is no reason to require anything less than strict compliance. 2001 UT 109, ¶ 14, 37 P.3d 1156. Because plaintiffs did not strictly comply with the Immunity Act by directing a notice of claim to CUCC, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of CUCC.