Opinion ID: 2262991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct ÔÇö Alleged Improper Remarks During Closing Arguments

Text: Flonnory argues that the Deputy Attorney Generals made improper remarks during summation and rebuttal because they vouched for witness's credibility, commented on the defendant's exercise of his right to remain silent, and attacked the defendant's character. We review a claim of prosecutorial misconduct de novo to determine whether the conduct was improper or prejudicial. [86] To the extent we find that prosecutorial misconduct exists, we then consider (1) the closeness of the case; (2) the centrality of the issue affected by the alleged error; (3) the steps taken to mitigate the effects of the alleged error [87] ; and (4) whether the prosecutor's statements were repetitive errors that require reversal because they cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. [88] Flonnory cites three instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the State's summation and rebuttal arguments. He first argues that the prosecutors improperly injected their personal beliefs concerning the credibility of witnesses and Flonnory's character by stating: Some witnesses had difficulty recalling every detail of their earlier interviews. Some witnesses didn't want to recall them at all when faced eyeball to eyeball with the defendant. Remember what Parsons said? It is not cool to be a snitch. Is it not likely that they are the witnesses who want to remain silent when they are face-to-face with the defendant[?] After hearing this comment, the defense immediately requested to approach the bench. Defense counsel argued to the trial judge that this statement represented a personal opinion of the prosecutor that people would be afraid of Freddy Flonnory. He then asked for a mistrial. The prosecutor responded that this statement was merely an explanation why in private [people] will say one thing but in the presence of other individuals they may not give the same explanation because, as Renee Parsons says, it is uncool to be a snitch. The trial judge concluded, I'm going to let the prosecutor go on with the summation. I think that depending on how that goes, obviously, there could be no inference whatsoever that there is a fear of the defendant because there is no evidence in the record.... If it is clear as to what you are saying then I think that solves the problem if there is any created. Defense counsel then requested that the trial judge give the jury a curative instruction that there was no evidence that the witnesses were afraid of Flonnory. The trial judge declined to do so, noting that would raise the whole issue of violence, that would be more prejudicial. After the sidebar the prosecutor continued: It is true, ladies and gentlemen, that memories can fade and people recall different things differently at different points in their lives. Human nature being what it is, people will give statements behind closed doors or with a police officer when they are trying to benefit themselves. But in the clear light of day when it is going to be known publicly they provided information, they don't want to accept responsibility for their prior statements. Certainly, many of these people were friends and family of the defendant. Is it any wonder they wouldn't want it to be known they, in fact, had provided such information or be looked at as a snitch? Because as Renee Parsons says, it is not cool to be a snitch. The prosecutor then continued with summation without further objection from the defense. It is well-settled that prosecutors may not express their personal opinions or beliefs about the credibility of witnesses or about the truth of any testimony. [89] In this case, however, as a factual matter, we do not think that the statements are personal opinions that amount to improper prosecutorial comment. The defense seizes upon one sentence in the first paragraph, some witnesses didn't want to recall [every detail of their earlier interviews] at all when faced `eyeball to eyeball' with the defendant, and uses that sentence to suggest that the prosecution expressed personal beliefs about Flonnory's character and several witnesses' credibility by implying that the witnesses were afraid of Flonnory. We disagree with this interpretation. The statements, read in context, were not improper expression of personal beliefs about the credibility of the witnesses, but rather were possible explanations for why several witnesses in the case took the stand and failed to remember their earlier statements. Moreover, in context, the prosecutor was not arguing that the witnesses were afraid of Flonnory. Accordingly, there was no misconduct and no need to now engage in the Hunter-Hughes inquiry. Flonnory also contends that the prosecution made a recklessly inaccurate statement which seriously denigrated his defense. The statement in which the prosecution alleged misrepresented evidence was: Ladies and gentleman, the defense put up a list of, quote, suspects in this return gunfire theory. They are asking you to speculate, to guess. They are hoping you might buy that ÔÇö the list really doesn't make a whole lot of sense ÔÇö this white van sticks out. Out of all the reams of paper that are involved in this case, probably thousands, maybe even hundreds of thousands of pieces of paper in this case, they take out one line. At this point, defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was commenting about matters not in evidence. The prosecution agreed to rephrase his statement; he continued: Ladies and Gentleman, out of all the paper that is involved in this case, no matter how much it is, it certainly is a lot, the defense takes one line out of one report that says something about Dwayne Warren and white vans and throws it up against the wall to see whether it will stick or not. What evidence did they ÔÇö let me rephrase that, your Honor. How much faith can you have in that one line taken out of one report? It was an evaluation of Dwayne Warren in August of '99, more than two years after the incident. And Dwayne Warren apparently, from the report, is suffering emotionally over what happened. He is very emotional, his cousin got killed, all right in front of him, panic, anxiety. This is the guy that, he testified in his former testimony, that he actually tripped over his cousin's body as he was trying to get away from the shooting. The guy that was right there when he died. I'm hit. The last words he says is Smoke. You didn't hear anything else about that. One line. Did Dwayne Warren say it. Don't know. Did Dr. Zewell get it right? Don't know. Did he record it accurately in his report? Don't know. The defense counsel then asked to approach the bench. He argued to the trial judge that the prosecution had taken advantage of the fact that Warren was unavailable for testimony because of the pending charges. In order to mitigate the effect of this statement, the defense counsel requested an instruction telling the jury that Warren was not available because he was facing other charges. The trial judge gave the jury that instruction. [90] Again, in this area the law is well-settled: prosecutors may not misrepresent the evidence presented at trial. [91] Flonnory points to the prosecutor's statement that Warren's inconsistent statement was one line taken from hundreds of thousands of pieces of paper to argue that it was factually incorrect and referred to facts not in evidence. The defense notes that there were not `hundreds of thousands of pieces of paper' presented as evidence or otherwise. Most of the evidence was testimonial. The magnitude of this representation of evidence is unacceptable. We disagree. Given the context, it is clear that the prosecutor was merely using hyperbole to make a point. After the defense's objection the prosecutor rephrased his statement: out of all the paper that is involved in this case, no matter how much it is, it certainly is a lot, the defense takes one line out of one report that says something about Dwayne Warren. Had the prosecutor made that (amended) statement to begin with, it would not have amounted to misconduct. The rephrased statement did not misstate the evidence yet made the same hyperbolic point as the initial statement. Given the broader context of the initial statement and its obvious hyperbolic nature, we cannot conclude that it amounts to prosecutorial misconduct. Flonnory's final prosecutorial misconduct argument is that the prosecution improperly commented on the exercise of his right to remain silent. In evaluating this argument, we quote extensively the prosecution's statements to the jury: The aftermath of the murders where is Freddy Flonnory? What does the defendant do after the shooting? After this, as he claims, is totally [sic] unexpected turn of events he lets Korey dispose of the guns, guns, as he says gun. Everybody else maintains there are two guns, but according to the defendant there is only one. At this point, ladies and gentleman, the defendants [sic] in action [sic] is as conspicuous as his earlier actions. He never once claims to have questioned Korey about the firing of a gun. If what he says is true and that's totally unexpected and he gets back to the car, why doesn't he comment, what the heck was that? What were you thinking? I thought we were going over there and rumble. Nothing. He never yells at Korey, you are nuts, this is going to come back on us now. He also never tells anyone about return fire they allegedly experienced at Sixth and Jefferson. It magically appears a year-and-a-half later in his testimony in a prior proceeding. He gives the return fire story after he has the benefit of the ATF report, the report which has definitely concluded at that point that two guns were used. No such return fire explanation when he original talks to the police, because at that point there was no known evidence about two weapons. It wasn't until the November ATF report when it was exclusively known the ballistics of two separate guns being used. Why doesn't he say something to Moose? Oh, my gosh, Moose, they started shooting back at us. There is no conversation about that either. They never go on back to the corner and say those you know what's fired back at us again. Not to anyone on the corner, not to Korey, not to Moose. We don't hear about it until a year-and-a-half later when he is testifying in another proceeding. After hearing the last statement, the defense counsel interrupted and asked to approach the bench. In an ensuing sidebar, counsel argued to the trial judge that the prosecutor's comment to the jury was essentially a comment on Flonnory's right to remain silent. The defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, which the trial judge denied (the defendant did not appeal that decision). After denying the mistrial, the trial judge instructed the prosecutor to clear up the issue. She did that by stating: As you will be instructed, your recollection controls with respect to the evidence. The State simply submits to you that in his original statement there was no mention truly of a return gunfire, however, that was inconsistent with what he said some 15 months later when he provided testimony in a proceeding. Several minutes later, the prosecutor made one more remark mentioning the 15 months: Eventually the defendant recalls 15 months after that there was some type of return fire. The defense counsel approached the bench. Where the following sidebar conversation ensued: Defense Counsel: We are returning, once again, to the suggestion that it is convenient that for the first time that he recalls there might be second gunfire 15 months later. THE COURT: You are going to point out that you believe he said at the time of the interview something like there was return gunfire? DC: Furthermore, he was represented by counsel by July 30th of that year and operating through counsel. To this idea, 15 months going by before saying anything, first of all, is telling the jury, well, this is the first trial, but 15 months before ÔÇö years before the first trial, then comes up with this. When did he first come up with the ÔÇö when does the State suggest he came up with that? Deputy Attorney General: It is not unfair to comment when he says anything at the time he talks to the police and 15 months later he says something else. There is no inference to be drawn. I'm simply going to point out that he made the statement and in the interim had the benefit of the ATF report, and that's when the evidence of the two guns is known. He responded during a prior proceeding that there was return gunfire. I was going to add there was some indication that the seed may have been planted, but you will have to review the evidence and see whether or not, in fact it was a relevant statement. THE COURT: Okay. Go Ahead. The prosecutor then continued addressing the jury: Ladies and gentleman, initially that [return gunfire] information was not provided to the police. After the ATF report was made available and known during the investigation, defendant indicated there was some type of return gunfire. However, there is not one scintilla of evidence[,] testimonial or physical[,] suggesting anything like that occurred. No witness saw any such thing. In deciding whether the prosecutor improperly commented on the defendant's right to remain silent, we determine `whether the language used was manifestly intended or was of such character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.' [92] In making this determination, we examine the prosecutor's comments in the context of the trial as a whole. [93] Again, given the context, we do not think that Flonnory's argument has merit. It is clear the repeated 15 months comments were not improper comments on Flonnory's silence, but merely attempts to illustrate the possible inconsistencies in Flonnory's initial statement to the police where he, according to the prosecution, did not mention any return gunfire, and his later testimony at his first trial, testimony that occurred after an ATF report indicated that a revolver had been involved in the shootings. In this case, the passages of the closing arguments of which the defendant complains do not amount to misconduct. The jury would not naturally and necessarily take these statements to be a comment on Flonnory's silence. Accordingly, Flonnory's final contentions on appeal have no merit.