Opinion ID: 2330376
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Materiality of the January 2004 Letter

Text: [¶ 7] Durango and Turner Barker argue that there is no genuine issue with respect to whether the January 2004 letter confirming that their holdover tenancy was subject to the terms of the lease was, in fact, sent to Small and Cunningham. A genuine issue exists when sufficient evidence supports a factual contest to require a factfinder to choose between competing versions of the truth at trial. Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. [¶ 8] Based on the parties' M.R. Civ. P. 56(h) statements of material fact, and the portions of the record to which the parties referred, see Prescott v. State Tax Assessor, 1998 ME 250, ¶ 5, 721 A.2d 169, 172, the record reveals a genuine issue of fact regarding the authenticity of the January 15, 2004, letter asserted to have been sent by Durango and Turner Barker, and whether Small or Cunningham ever received this letter. Although there is a genuine dispute of fact about whether the letter was sent and received, the Superior Court determined that that fact is not material to the result in this case, see Burdzel, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d at 575 (stating that a fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the suit), and that pursuant to the common law, the terms of the lease continued to govern Small and Cunningham's occupancy of the premises.