Opinion ID: 781300
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The application of Sullivan

Text: 88
89 We now proceed to consider the first prong of the Sullivan test — whether Attorney Murphy's successive representations created a conflict of interest. In order to demonstrate a conflict of interest under Sullivan, the petitioners must point to specific instances in the record that suggest an actual conflict or impairment of [their] interests. Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481 (internal citations and quotations omitted). They further must make a factual showing of inconsistent interests and demonstrate that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses of action, such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one client but harmful to the other. Id. However, if the conflict is as to a matter that is irrelevant or the conflict is merely hypothetical, there is no constitutional violation. See Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708 ([U]ntil a defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance.). See also United States v. Hopkins, 43 F.3d 1116 (6th Cir.1995) (finding a hypothetical conflict where attorney simultaneously represented one client who provided information to the government inculpating another of the attorney's clients without the attorney's knowledge). 90 The petitioners assert that their successive representations created a conflict of interest because Attorney Murphy's competing loyalties to Moss and Kohn impaired his ability to secure plea agreements requiring cooperation. This Court has stated that a conflict of interest occurs where defense counsel is prevented from effectively engaging in any separate plea negotiations on one party's behalf without detrimentally affecting co-defendants. Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481-482. However, such cases generally have addressed scenarios where a plea offer has been extended and defense counsel either (1) is unable to accept the plea on behalf of one client out of fear of detrimentally impacting the interest of another client; or (2) actively pressures the defendant into accepting the plea in order to ensure that defense counsel's other clients receive similar pleas. See Hall, 200 F.3d at 966 (determining that a conflict of interest arose from defense counsel's rejection of a plea agreement offered to jointly represented co-defendants); Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481-482 (finding a conflict of interest where the prosecutor extended a package plea where all three jointly represented co-defendants had to accept offer; two defendants were willing to accept the offer; and defense counsel pressured the third defendant to accept plea). 91 In the instant appeal, the record conclusively demonstrates that AUSA Janice did not extend plea offers to the petitioners. AUSA Janice repeatedly testified that he did not extend plea offers to the petitioners and the record lacks any documentary evidence indicating the existence of such offers. 21 As there was no plea offer, it was impossible for Attorney Murphy to either reject or accept a plea as a result of divided loyalties to Moss and Kohn. 92 Several unpublished decisions of this Court impliedly have indicated that a conflict of interest may arise where defense counsel's competing loyalties prevent the exploration of plea negotiations with the government. See Newman v. United States, No. 96-6326, 1998 WL 553048, 1998 U.S.App. LEXIS 20565 (6th Cir. August 19, 1998) (remanding for a evidentiary hearing where counsel failed to communicate the defendant's willingness to cooperate with government authorities); United States v. Holt, No. 95-5173, 1996 WL 262466, 1996 U.S.App. LEXIS 15631 (6th Cir. May 15, 1996) (reviewing claim that defense counsel failed to explore plea negotiations because of a conflict of interest arising from co-defendant's payment of the defendant's legal fees). These decisions are consistent with the Supreme Court's statements in Holloway that, in this case [a conflict of interest] may well have precluded defense counsel ... from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 489-90, 98 S.Ct. 1173 (emphasis added). Therefore, it is a reasonable expansion of prior precedent to hold that a conflict of interest arises where, as a result of joint representation of co-defendants, or successive representation of co-defendants in the same proceeding, defense counsel fails to explore possible plea negotiations. 93 The Court in Holloway established, however, an express limitation on conflict of interest claims where the claims are predicated upon defense counsel's failure to explore plea negotiations. The Court stated that such inaction may be proof of a conflict of interest only provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Id. At a minimum, Holloway requires a defendant alleging that his attorney's conflict of interest prevented the exploration of plea negotiations to demonstrate that the government was willing to extend, or consider, an invitation to commence plea negotiations. 94 The petitioners have met this burden because it is undisputed that the government was willing to negotiate a plea with Kohn during the April, 1991 meeting between Attorney Murphy and AUSA Janice. AUSA Janice specifically testified that he did not offer a plea at the time, but the [U.S. Attorney's Office was] willing at that point to discuss resolution by plea which included substantial assistance. Attorney Murphy also testified that [AUSA] Janice would have been very lenient to Kohn if [Kohn] had come in. 95 The petitioners further have demonstrated that Attorney Murphy's successive representations prevented him from exploring possible plea negotiations with AUSA Janice. While testifying at the evidentiary hearing, Attorney Murphy acknowledged the conflict posed by the government's requirement that Kohn cooperate against Moss: 96 Q. Do you see any ethical problems with having represented Mr. Moss through at least the arraignment, taking Mr. Kohn and his offer of substantial assistance against Moss and having him cooperate. 97 A. I suppose if there were a desire by Mr. Kohn to cooperate, if he had said, Yes, I want to cooperate and I want to say that this guy is doing the things they said, I might have had — I would have probably had a substantial problem. Attorney Murphy similarly testified: 98 Q. [I]f Mr. Kohn would have said, I would like to cooperate, you would have represented him, you would have gone to Mr. Janice and if an agreement would have been worked out you would have been a party to that? 99 A. I don't know about that because of my prior dealings with Mr. Moss. 100 The foregoing testimony reveals that a conflict of interest arose between Attorney Murphy's successive representations of Moss and Kohn in that Attorney Murphy could not explore AUSA Janice's invitation to pursue a plea negotiations on behalf of Kohn without breaching his duty of loyalty to Moss. As such, we determine that Attorney Murphy's successive and intertwining representations of Moss and Kohn satisfy the first prong of the Sullivan test — a conflict of interest. 101
102 In order for Attorney Murphy's conflicts of interest to be of a constitutional magnitude, Sullivan requires that the petitioners demonstrate that the successive representations adversely affected Attorney Murphy's performance. Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1243 (holding that the petitioner specifically must demonstrate that the conflicts affected the counsel's performance, as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties.). The showing must be that counsel was influenced in his basic strategic decisions by the interests [of the former client], as where the conflict prevents an attorney ... from arguing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing the other. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 160, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). See also Thomas, 818 F.2d at 481 (The Appellants... must demonstrate that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses of action, such as eliciting (or failing to elicit) evidence helpful to one client but harmful to the other.); See also Amiel v. United States, 209 F.3d 195, 199 (2d Cir.2000) (To show a lapse in representation, a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice — that the outcome of her trial would have been different but for the conflict — but only `that some plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic might have been pursued but was not and that the alternative defense was inherently in conflict with or not undertaken due to the attorney's other loyalties or interests.') (Citation omitted). 103 The petitioners advance separate arguments regarding adverse effect, and we address each in turn. Kohn's allegations of adverse effect 104 Kohn alleges that the successive representations adversely affected Attorney Murphy's ability to explore plea negotiations because Attorney Murphy knew that any plea offer would require Kohn to testify against Moss. Kohn specifically alleges that Attorney Murphy's failure to explore plea negotiations precluded him from receiving a plea agreement similar to that received by Jaeger, which resulted in a sentence of thirty-six months, rather than the 188 month sentences that Kohn actually received. 105 The district court considered Kohn's claim of adverse effect and determined that Attorney Murphy's unwillingness to explore plea negotiations did not derive from successive representation, but, rather, resulted from Kohn's desire to pursue a defense of innocence. The district court expressly determined, any choice by Attorney Murphy to forgo initiating plea negotiations was not harmful to the [Kohn] because [Kohn] would not have entertained the idea of pleading guilty and testifying against co-defendant Moss. Furthermore, the district court discredited Kohn's testimony that he was willing to plead guilty and cooperate with the government. The district court stated, the [c]ourt is mindful of the fact that [Kohn] acknowledged that when it was in his interest to do so, he gave false testimony under oath at trial. 106 The record supports the district court's finding. For instance, Kohn testified and maintained his innocence at trial. In addition, Attorney Murphy testified: 107 [Kohn] had a relationship with Mr. Moss, an ongoing relationship with Mr. Moss as I recall .... they had been friends and had a business relationship of some sort for many years, ... early on [Kohn] says, This is my relationship with Bob Moss. I don't know what these guys are talking about. They are not telling the truth. I didn't do anything like that. So how's he going to cooperate. So I didn't think early on that there was going to be a possibility he could cooperate with the government. As you know that's a position that's fluid. 108 .... 109 Mr. Kohn in every instance where I broached the subject said he would never cooperate against Mr. Moss. 110 Attorney Murphy further testified that, [i]f Mr. Kohn had expressed his desire to cooperate, I would have been knocking on Mr. Janice's door the next morning. 111 On appeal, Kohn accounts for his perceived unwillingness to enter into a plea agreement by alleging that his disinclination derived from Attorney Murphy's misadvice regarding his sentencing exposure. Kohn specifically alleges: (1) that Attorney Murphy immediately rejected a 5 year plea offer from AUSA Janice; (2) that Attorney Murphy stated, a five year plea offer would amount to no offer at all because that's all [Kohn's] exposure is [sic] would be five years; and (3) Kohn elected to go to trial because Attorney Murphy's advice led him to believe that his sentencing exposure was similar whether he pleaded or was convicted at trial. 112 Kohn's argument is a modified version of the Lack of Advice Sentencing Exposure claim presented in his initial § 2255 motion. The district court rejected this claim based, in significant part, on its finding that AUSA Janice never extended a plea offer. In so doing, the district court reasoned that Kohn failed to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, in that Attorney Murphy's allegedly incorrect advice could not have influenced [Kohn's] decision to accept a plea offer, because, as the [c]ourt has already indicated, there was never any plea offer to accept. 113 Kohn again relies on Attorney Murphy's purportedly erroneous advice regarding sentencing exposure, but re-characterizes the claim as one arising from a conflict of interest. Kohn now contends that he failed to express a willingness to enter into a plea agreement because a conflicted Attorney Murphy provided erroneous advice regarding sentencing. 114 Kohn's re-characterization of the claim is of significant analytical import because, by couching his claim in terms of a conflict of interest, Kohn invokes an entitlement to the Sullivan presumption of prejudice. 115 In Thomas, 818 F.2d 476, this Court observed that [j]ust as the Strickland standard has to be adapted to the guilty plea context, so must the Cuyler [v. Sullivan] standard be adapted. 22 Id. The Court determined that, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel as a result of a conflict of interest, a petitioner who has entered a guilty plea must establish: (1) that there was an actual conflict of interest; and (2) that the conflict adversely affected the voluntary nature of the guilty plea entered by the defendants. 23 Thomas, 818 F.2d at 480 (citation omitted). 116 It is a reasonable extension of Thomas to hold that, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner who asserts a conflict of interest caused his counsel to recommend rejecting a plea, must demonstrate: (1) that counsel labored under a conflict of interest; and (2) that the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's recommendations regarding the plea. Cf. Hall, 200 F.3d at 966 (finding an actual conflict of interest where counsel jointly representing two brothers rejected a plea offer granting one brother a minimal sentence and the other brother a life sentence with possibility of a downward departure); Turner, 858 F.2d at 1205-06 (expanding the Hill Court's modified Strickland standard to claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel arising from counsel's advice to reject a plea offer). 117 Kohn's claims require an additional modification of Thomas. The standards provided in Thomas and its corollary direct the court's inquiry into whether the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's advice regarding a specific plea offer. Here, as we repeatedly have acknowledged, there was no plea offer. However, as we further have acknowledged, the non-existence of a plea offer does not preclude the court from inquiring into whether the conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's ability to explore plea negotiations with the government. Therefore, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance, a petitioner alleging that a conflict of interest prevented his attorney from exploring plea negotiations must demonstrate (1) there was a conflict of interest; and (2) that the conflict of interest prevented the attorney from exploring plea negotiations. 118 We recognize that we must be cautious and careful in imposing appropriate burdens not to give defendants easy avenues to obtain a second bite at the apple at the penalty stage once they have acknowledged guilt or it has been determined by the factfinders. We further recognize that the foregoing standard may engender concerns as to whether defendants will be encouraged to direct counsel to forgo plea negotiations and then seek to overturn the sentence on the basis of counsel's alleged failure to explore plea negotiations. Three safeguards alleviate any potential windfall to defendants. 119 First, the foregoing standard applies only in the limited context of counsel's failure to explore plea negotiations as a result of a conflict of interest. The standard derives from that established in Sullivan, which the Mickens Court determined was exclusively limited to situations of joint representation (and the hybrid successive representation presented at bar). In all other circumstances, a petitioner alleging that his counsel failed to explore plea negotiations must fulfill the Turner standard: (1) deficient performance on the part of counsel; and (2) but for counsel's advice, there is a reasonable probability that he would have pleaded guilty. Turner, 858 F.2d at 1205-06. 120 Second, as discussed supra, Holloway provides an additional safeguard in that the petitioner must demonstrate that the government was willing to accept or extend an invitation to plea negotiations. 121 Finally, our standard does not lower the petitioner's burden under Sullivan. A petitioner who alleges that a conflict of interest compelled his counsel to refrain from exploring plea negotiations still must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest caused his counsel to forgo plea negotiations. See Mickens, 122 S.Ct. at 1245 ([T]he Sullivan mandated inquiry does not reduce the petitioner's burden of proof; it was at least necessary, to void the conviction, for the petitioner to establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance.). This causative language of Sullivan requires that the defendant demonstrate a nexus between the conflict and the adverse effect on counsel's performance. See Riggs, 209 F.3d at 833 (Riggs has not explained any causal connection between Cox's failure to request the instruction and his prior AUSA position, his representation of Driskell's ex-wife, or his sharing office space with Kamenish and Chandler.); Hopkins, 43 F.3d at 1119 (Defendant's failure to accept the plea was unrelated to the dual representation.). 122 Kohn's claim fails because there lacks any nexus between Attorney Murphy's conflicted interests and the alleged erroneous advice regarding sentencing. Kohn merely alleges that Attorney Murphy had conflicting obligations and Attorney Murphy provided erroneous advice regarding sentencing. Kohn fails to provide any specific and credible evidence linking Attorney Murphy's erroneous advice to the conflict of interest. Moreover, the record reveals, in any event, that it was unlikely that Attorney Murphy provided deficient advice to Kohn. The district court questioned Attorney Murphy during the evidentiary hearing: 123 Q. [Did you] discuss with Mr. Kohn the statutory maximum sentence he was facing if he went to trial and was convicted prior to the second superceding indictment? 124 A. Sure we discussed it. 125 Q. You remember it? 126 A. No. I don't remember, but you always discuss it. 127 Q. Based on your usual procedure what would you tell him? 128 A. First of all, I would say usually, Now take it easy. This is the maximum and it's very seldom that you're going to get the maximum, but this is the statutory maximum. This is the most you could get under the worst of all circumstances. I don't think that there is any possible circumstances that would apply to you that would trigger that number, but that's the number. If you go to trial that amount that government proves, within limits, if they prove anything at all, is going to determine what your sentence is. 129 We addressed a similar scenario in Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F.3d 348 (6th Cir.2000). There, the petitioner claimed that he was denied effective assistance of counsel by his attorney's failure to inform him that he could assert the right to testify despite his attorney's advice not to do so. 233 F.3d at 354. The magistrate judge's report, which was adopted by the district court, stated that defense counsel did not have an independent recollection of the specific advice that he rendered to [the petitioner] on the issue of his right to testify. Nonetheless, [defense counsel] was able to testify as to his customary practice with regard to advising his clients of their right to testify in criminal matters. Id. 130 In reaching a decision in Gonzales, this Court noted that the trial court credited the defense counsel's testimony as to his customary practices, and discredited the testimony of the petitioner. Id. at 357. It then went on to find that because this court does not disturb issues of credibility, the magistrate (and therefore the district court) did not clearly err in making his findings, and ... Petitioner's argument thus fails. Id. 131 The ruling in Gonzales compels the same result in the instant case. Attorney Murphy provided testimony regarding his customary practice, and Kohn failed to present any credible evidence challenging Attorney Murphy's assertions. In addition, the district court explicitly questioned Kohn's credibility. Moreover, the record belies Kohn's testimony that he was unaware of his potential maximum exposure because Kohn signed an Acknowledgment of Indictment indicating that the maximum sentence under the initial Indictment was forty years. Kohn, No. 97-CV-72174-DT, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10165 . Attorney Murphy expressly testified that he discussed this Acknowledgment of Indictment with Kohn. Attorney Murphy further testified that he discussed with Kohn the potential increases in sentencing exposure as a result the greater amount of marijuana alleged in the Second Superceding Indictment. Consequently, we are unable to conclude that Attorney Murphy provided erroneous advice to Kohn regarding potential maximum sentencing exposure. 132 Kohn therefore fails to demonstrate that it was Attorney Murphy's successive representations that adversely affected Attorney Murphy's ability to enter into plea negotiations. Rather, the lack of plea negotiations in this case derived from Kohn's protestations of innocence, as well as Kohn's disinclination to testify against Moss in exchange for such an agreement. As such, Kohn failed to demonstrate that Attorney Murphy's conflict of interest deprived him of his constitutionally secured right to effective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Kohn's conflict of interest claim. Moss's allegations of adverse effect 133 Moss alleges that Attorney Murphy's successive representations adversely affected his counsel's performance in that: (1) Attorney Murphy failed to explore plea negotiations with AUSA Janice; (2) Attorney Murphy failed to seek severance; and (3) Attorney Murphy failed to pursue a defense of multiple conspiracies. 134 The patent deficiency in Moss's assertions is that, as discussed supra, Attorney Murphy terminated his representation of Moss shortly after the arraignment. 24 Because Moss fails to allege that Attorney Murphy's successive representations adversely affected his representation during the pre-arraignment stage of the proceedings, Moss's conflict of interest claim fails as a matter of law. See, e.g., McNeal v. United States, 17 Fed.Appx. 258 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no conflict of interest where the defendant's former counsel represented the primary witness against the defendant.) Accordingly, Moss is unable to demonstrate that Attorney Murphy labored under a conflict of interest that adversely affected Attorney Murphy's performance. 135