Opinion ID: 805822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Originality of the Works

Text: The Archbishop next asserts that the Works here were not original, and therefore, not copyrightable.12 See Johnson v. 11 The Monastery points to the Archbishop's undeveloped references to booklets lacking a copyright notice during the course of this dispute, but which he contended supported the conclusion of a publication without notice. The Monastery counters the Archbishop's argument with a sworn affidavit from the publisher of St. Nectarios Press stating that the versions the Archbishop references are inaccurate copies of those actually distributed to the public. Such evidence falls far short of supporting the conclusion that the Monastery authorized publication without notice of the underlying Works and relinquished its copyright. 12 The Archbishop brings additional challenges to the Works' originality. Because these arguments better fall into the analytical category of whether copying of the Works occurred, we turn to these points infra. -27- Gordon, 409 F.3d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 2005) (to establish ownership of a valid copyright, a plaintiff must show that the work, viewed as a whole, is original); Lotus, 49 F.3d at 813 (showing ownership of a true copyright requires that a plaintiff prove that the work as a whole is original). Principally, the Archbishop alleges that the underlying Works are derivative of other works, that is, they are merely a commixture of various ancient religious works that had previously been translated into English, with the Monastery making only minor edits, insignificant changes, or negligible additions or subtractions to the translations it relied upon. To bolster this argument, the Archbishop proffers affidavits from a colleague, Bishop John.13 The Bishop's sworn statements compare various texts to the Works and claim that the former texts clearly demonstrate the duplicative nature of the latter. Thus, so the Archbishop postulates, because the Monastery's translations are nothing more than a nearly identical, cobbling together of already translated religious texts, the Monastery cannot claim copyrights to the contested Works. The Monastery retorts that its translations are both unique and entitled to copyright protection, citing to the Copyright Act's express acknowledgment of the copyrightability of 13 According to his sworn affidavit, Bishop John is a hierarch in the Genuine Orthodox Church of America, who was ordained to the holy priesthood by Metropolitan Valentine, First Hierarch of the Russian Orthodox Autonomous Church and [f]or more than 20 years . . . ha[s] been a student of Orthodox Christianity. -28- derivative works. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103. Moreover, it notes that courts repeatedly have recognized the validity of copyrights to works that the Monastery claims are comparative to those at issue here. See, e.g., Merkos L'Inyonei Chinuch, Inc. v. Otsar Sifrei Lubavitch, Inc., 312 F.3d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) (recognizing copyrightability of translations of religious texts). The Copyright Act provides that [c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works of authorship. 17 U.S.C. 102(a). Assessing whether a work is original is a matter of law. Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 34 n.5 (1st Cir. 2001). Courts assessing the applicability of the Copyright Act's protections to allegedly unique works frequently note that the originality bar is set quite low. See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 ([T]he requisite level of creativity [required to show originality] is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark . . . .); Universal Furniture Int'l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417, 430 (4th Cir. 2010) (Establishing originality implicates only a light burden.). The Copyright Act makes clear that translations may be original and copyrightable, despite being derivative of another product. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (A 'derivative work' is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation . . . .); id. § 103 (The subject matter of copyright -29- as specified by section 102 includes compilations and derivative works . . . .) (emphasis added). The originality standard for such derivative works is, as set forth above, far from a high one. Specifically, courts have held there is a 'minimal,' 'low threshold,' Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 824 (11th Cir. 1982) (quoting Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1980)), that is modest at best, Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 1970), for establishing the originality of a compilation or derivative work. With this framework in mind, we have two responses to the Archbishop's argument that the Monastery's Works cannot be original or copyrightable because they are composed of an amalgamation of different English translations of religious texts. First, the law does not support the Archbishop's argument that such a derivative work or compilation cannot be copyrightable. Courts consistently have held that such works may be copyrighted provided that there is originality in [the works'] arrangement or selection. M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 438 (4th Cir. 1986); see also Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1984) (The mere fact that component parts of a collective work are neither original to the plaintiff nor copyrightable by the plaintiff does not preclude a determination that the combination of such component parts as a separate entity -30- is both original and copyrightable. (citing 1 Nimmer §§ 3.02, 3.03)). Indeed, in a case that is at least comparable to the Archbishop's framing of the Monastery's Works, the Seventh Circuit held that flashcards containing standard, publicly-known mathematical equations and their solutions were protected under copyright law because the arrangement, the plan and the manner in which [the equations and answers] were put together by the author, does constitute originality. Gelles-Widmer Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 313 F.2d 143, 147 (7th Cir. 1963); see also M. Kramer Mfg. Co., 783 F.2d at 439 (citing examples of copyrightable compilations and noting that [i]n each case the copyright depended on the fact that the compiler made a contribution - a new arrangement or presentation of facts - and not on the amount of time the work consumed).14 Thus, even if the Monastery's translations of the religious texts may be deemed nothing more than a blend of various pre-existing English versions, this, in and of itself, does not make the Monastery's gathering of such texts automatically unoriginal. Second, the record does not support the Archbishop's argument. The only evidence the Archbishop offers to show a lack of originality in the Works are Bishop John's affidavits, stating the Works contain insignificant changes or negligible additions or subtractions to other sources he has examined, assessed, and 14 Even Bishop John concedes that the Monastery has expended some effort in their copyrighted work. -31- compared to the Works.15 However, the Monastery examined the same sources the Bishop attested to having compared with the Works. The Monastery created a detailed comparison in which it placed its translations along-side those materials cited by Bishop John, as well as the Archbishop's translations, effectively demonstrating notable differences between the Bishop's referenced texts and the Monastery's (and nearly identical similarities between the Archbishop's translations and the Monastery's). Although the comparison shows certain similarities between the Monastery's Works and those referenced by the Bishop, the differences in the same reflect a creativity in the Monastery's word usage, structure, and overall translation. Cf. Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (stating [o]riginality does not signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, not the result of copying). It is well-accepted that [o]riginal, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. Id. at 345 (citing 1 Nimmer §§ 2.01[A],[B]). The evidence in the record satisfies us that the Monastery has cleared the extremely low 15 Bishop John's affidavits do not go into great detail as to the methodology he utilized to analyze the translations of the Archbishop's and Monastery's works, its comparison of the latter to other translations, or the process behind the selection of these other texts. -32- creativity bar. Id. We therefore affirm the district court's determination that the Monastery's Works were original and thus copyrightable. Having concluded our traversal of the ownership prong of a copyright infringement claim, we proceed to the second prong of our analysis, i.e., whether copying of the Works occurred. Situation Mgmt. Sys., 560 F.3d at 58.