Opinion ID: 2633542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is tort recovery allowed under the laws of Idaho?

Text: Rees brought a wrongful death action, premised on negligence, against both Ott and the Department. Under Idaho law, a cause of action for negligence includes proof of a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant[s] to conform to a certain standard of conduct. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999). The parties correctly agree the Department and Ott owed no general duty to Tegan; therefore, the issue for this Court becomes whether Idaho law recognizes a special duty of care in this instance. Rees argues the Idaho Child Protection Act (ICPA), I.C. § 16-1601 et seq., creates in the Department an affirmative duty to competently investigate reports of child abuse. In support, he asks this Court to adopt the reasoning of other jurisdictions that have examined their child protection statutes and regulations and determined a special duty arises during child abuse investigations. Conversely, Ott and the Department stand on two prior Idaho Court of Appeals cases refusing to recognize the tort of negligent investigation and point this Court to other jurisdictions that have refused to recognize a duty to competently investigate reported child abuse. [4] Ordinarily, there is no affirmative duty to act to assist or protect another absent unusual circumstances, which justifies imposing such an affirmative responsibility. An affirmative duty to aid or protect arises only when a special relationship exists between the parties. Id. at 399, 987 P.2d at 311; see also Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999) (citing Restatement (Second) Torts § 315 (1966) for the proposition that such an affirmative duty can arise under instances where a special relationship exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection). Determining when a special relationship exists sufficient to impose an affirmative duty requires an evaluation of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311 (quoting W. Prosser, Law of Torts 333 (3d ed.1964)). Most of the courts in other jurisdictions that have considered whether the state agency charged with investigating child abuse reports has a duty to competently investigate have determined such a duty exists. Horridge v. St. Mary's County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 382 Md. 170, 854 A.2d 1232, 1243 (2004). [5] Generally, courts that have considered this issue have used the same framework; they look to their statutes to determine whether they require a particular action by an agency to benefit a particular class of people rather than a duty running to the general public. See Turner v. Dist. of Columbia, 532 A.2d 662, 672 (D.C.App.1987); see also Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn.2005) (noting the public duty rule requires a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable); Jensen v. Anderson County Dept. of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615, 617 (1991) (An exception to this general rule of non-liability [under the public duty rule] exists when a duty is owed to individuals rather than the public only.). This approach accords with Idaho's law on determining whether a special relationship or duty exists. See Coghlan, 133 Idaho at 399, 987 P.2d at 311; Turpen, 133 Idaho at 248, 985 P.2d at 673. While various jurisdictions have employed different tests for determining whether a duty exists to competently investigate reported child abuse, we find the test employed by the Supreme Court of Minnesota is the most instructive in this case. In Radke the court applied a fact-intensive test when determining the agency charged with investigating reported child abuse owed a duty to a child who was beaten to death by his mother's boyfriend. 694 N.W.2d at 794, 796-97. There, the court noted under Minnesota law a statute alone could not create a special duty; rather there must be additional indicia the governmental unit has undertaken the responsibility of protecting a particular class of persons[] from the risks associated with a particular harm. Id. at 793. It then considered four non-exhaustive factors to determine if the government assumed responsibility for protecting reportedly abused and neglected children: (1) Whether the governmental unit had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition; (2) Whether there was reasonable reliance by persons on the governmental unit's representations and conduct (such reliance must be based on specific actions or representations which cause the persons to forego other alternatives of protecting themselves); (3) Whether an ordinance or statute set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole; and (4) Whether the governmental unit used due care to avoid increasing the risk of harm. Id. at 794. Importantly, these four factors need not all be met for the Court to determine that a duty exists, id. at 788, and they do not create a bright-line test, id. at 794. The Radke court began its analysis under this four-factor test by first looking to the third factordetermining if Minnesota's statutes set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole. Id. at 796-96. The statutes provided that when a child abuse or neglect report was received, `the local welfare agency shall immediately conduct an assessment . . . and offer protective social services for purposes of preventing further abuses, safeguarding and enhancing the welfare of the abused or neglected minor, and preserving family life whenever possible.' Id. at 796 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 626.556, subd. 10(a)) (emphasis removed). The court concluded: These mandatory acts prescribed by the statute are for the protection of a particular class of persons  children who are identified as abused or neglected. In fact, the express public policy set forth in the statute is to protect children whose health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse. The statute further emphasizes that it is the policy of this state to require the reporting of neglect, physical or sexual abuse of children in the home, school, and community settings; to provide for the voluntary reporting of abuse or neglect of children; to require the assessment and investigation of the reports; and to provide protective and counseling services in appropriate cases. Based on these declared public policy goals, we conclude that the acts mandated in CARA are not for the protection of the public or even children in general, but are mandated for the protection of a particular class of personschildren who are identified in suspected abuse or neglect reports received by the county.... [T]he children protected by CARA are uniquely vulnerable persons. These children have been identified by suspected child abuse or neglect reports. They are especially vulnerable because they are alleged to have suffered abuse or neglect in the privacy of their homes, often at the hands of a parent or other family member, and cannot protect themselves. Id. at 797 (internal citations omitted). Following the same analytical framework, we look first to the statutes and rules governing the Department and Ott and note our legislature has explicitly set out the policy behind the ICPA: The policy of the state of Idaho is hereby declared to be the establishment of a legal framework conducive to the judicial processing including periodic review of child abuse, abandonment and neglect cases, and the protection of any child whose life, health or welfare is endangered. At all times the health and safety of the child shall be the primary concern. Each child coming within the purview of this chapter shall receive, preferably in his own home, the care, guidance and control that will promote his welfare and the best interest of the state of Idaho, and if he is removed from the control of one (1) or more of his parents, guardian or other custodian, the state shall secure adequate care for him; provided, however, that the state of Idaho shall, to the fullest extent possible, seek to preserve, protect, enhance and reunite the family relationship. Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to allow discrimination on the basis of disability. This chapter seeks to coordinate efforts by state and local public agencies, in cooperation with private agencies and organizations, citizens' groups, and concerned individuals, to: (1) Preserve the privacy and unity of the family whenever possible; (2) Take such actions as may be necessary and feasible to prevent the abuse, neglect, abandonment or homelessness of children; (3) Take such actions as may be necessary to provide the child with permanency including concurrent planning; (4) Clarify for the purposes of this act the rights and responsibilities of parents with joint legal or joint physical custody of children at risk. I.C. § 16-1601 (2003) (emphasis added). This Court has recognized the dual aim of the ICPA, stating this language indicates that the legislature expressly intended [the ICPA] to protect children from parents, guardians or other custodians who posed a health and safety threat to their children, and to remove such children from unsafe family environments. In re Doe, 134 Idaho 760, 766, 9 P.3d 1226, 1232 (2000) (internal citations omitted). At the same time, this Court noted, the legislature [also] intended the ICPA to reunite the children with their families once the hazards could be removed. Id. at 766, 9 P.3d at 1232. [6] The ICPA also grants the Department primary responsibility to implement the purposes of this chapter. I.C. § 16-1623 (2003) (now codified at I.C. § 16-1629). To this end, [the Department] is empowered and shall have the duty to do all things reasonably necessary to carry out the purpose of this chapter.... Id. Additionally, the ICPA authorizes the Department to act upon receiving a report of child abuse, neglect or abandonment by causing an investigation to be made in accordance with this chapter as is appropriate. I.C. § 16-1625 (2003) (now codified at I.C. § 16-1631). In turn, the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act (IDAPA) sets out mandatory acts for the protection of abused, neglected, or abandoned children. It requires all suspected abuse be assigned for investigation, IDAPA 16.06.01.553, mandates statewide standards for prioritizing suspected abuse, neglect or abandonment, IDAPA 16.06.01.554, sets time-limits for investigation and requires supervisory review of those investigations in certain cases, IDAPA 16.06.01.555, and provides a mandatory, standardized format for conducting risk assessments, IDAPA 16.06.01.559. Our legislature has made clear that health and safety of reportedly abused children is the focus of the ICPA. I.C. § 16-1601. This is not a general duty; rather it is a duty running to a narrow class of persons  abused and neglected children  who are particularly vulnerable because they allegedly suffer abuse in the privacy of their homes and cannot protect themselves. Additionally, the ICPA and IDAPA make clear this state's policy to protect the life, health and welfare of children endangered by abuse or neglect by taking mandatory actions to prevent further abuse and neglect. Our legislature has created a duty owed to a narrow, easily identified class of persons to be protected from a particular harm. The relationship created by this statute between the Department and abused children goes far beyond that of police or other investigatory agencies and crime victims. The ICPA creates a class of mandatory reporters, I.C. § 16-1605 (2005) (formerly codified at I.C. § 16-1619), and grants immunity to any person who makes a good faith report of child abuse or neglect, I.C. § 16-1606 (formerly codified at I.C. § 16-1620). [7] The ICPA also mandates the creation of multidisciplinary teams consisting of at least law enforcement personnel, Department child protection risk assessment staff, and a representative of the county prosecuting attorney's office to investigate reports of child abuse. I.C. § 16-1617 (formerly codified at I.C. § 16-1609A). Their creation also shows the legislature's goal of providing professional investigation of suspected child abuse and neglect and also shows the intent that these investigations be carried out by the best groups available. We conclude from this that the ICPA creates a special relationship between allegedly abused children and the Department. Therefore, the third factor from Radke whether an ordinance or statute set forth mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class of persons rather than the public as a wholehas been met, and in this instance weighs heavily in favor of finding a duty under Idaho law to competently investigate reported child abuse. We will turn now to examining the other three factors set out by the Radke court. Examining the first factorwhether the Department had actual knowledge of the dangerous conditionwe note Rees reported suspected abuse, and there is no question that the Department knew about the danger to Tegan in Melissa and Griffeth's home. We conclude the Department had actual knowledge of the dangerous condition. This adds weight to the conclusion that the Department and Tegan had a special relationship creating a duty to competently investigate. Turning now to the second factor whether there was reasonable reliance on the investigator's representations and conduct that caused Rees to forgo other alternatives of protecting Teganwe find that Rees reasonably relied on both Black and the Department's statements and conduct. First, it is undisputed Black told Rees he would make sure Tegan was protected within what the law allows. Additionally, Tegan was removed from both Rees and Melissa so an investigation into the reported abuse could be conducted. It was reasonable for Rees to rely on both Black's statements and the Department's conduct in removing Tegan from his care. Such reliance also weighs in favor of determining that a duty to competently investigate the suspected abuse existed in this instance. Finally, we note the fourth factor requires us to consider whether the Department used due care to avoid future harm to Tegan. However, this analysis is substantially similar to the analysis required to determine if the Department is immune under the ITCA. While the question of due care will be discussed in greater detail below, we note here that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ott and the Department exercised due care in their investigation. Therefore, we conclude that under these circumstances the Department and Ott owed to Tegan a duty to competently investigate the reported child abuse because of the special relationship created once the report of suspected abuse was received.