Opinion ID: 2345659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remedy at law

Text: The Commonwealth Court's opinion is advisory for several reasons. To begin, former Secretary of the Department of Conservation and Natural Resources (DCNR) Michael DiBerardinis, former Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) Kathleen McGinty, and Governor Edward G. Rendell (collectively Appellees) did not assert any cognizable injuries for which the Commonwealth Court could provide a legal remedy. The judgment entered by the Commonwealth Court provides an academic answer to a hypothetical situation that had yet to happen at the time that the declaratory judgment action was filed. [3] Appellees provided the Commonwealth Court with the following hypothetical scenario and sought the opinion of that court as to whether they would be exposed to liability. In 2007, the spouses of Mr. DiBerardinis and Ms. McGinty were associated with non-profit entities. Ms. Joan Reilly, Mr. DiBerardinis's spouse, is a manager of the Pennsylvania Horticultural Society (PHS), while Dr. Karl Hausker, Ms. McGinty's spouse, was an independent contractor associated with Enterprising Environmental Solutions, Inc. (EESI). In the past, PHS applied for grants to the DCNR and EESI applied for grants to the DEP. Both entities expected but had not applied for grants to the respective departments by the time the present declaratory judgment was commenced in the Commonwealth Court. Mr. DiBerardinis and Ms. McGinty were expected to participate in the grant award processes of their respective departments but had not yet participated by the time the present declaratory judgment was filed in the Commonwealth Court. Appellees filed an action in the Commonwealth Court seeking a declaration that, in the hypothetical scenario, Mr. DiBerardinis and Ms. McGinty would not have been violating the Ethics Act. [4] The decision depended on the interpretation of the term business, as used in the Ethics Act so the parties asked the Commonwealth Court to issue an opinion on the meaning of the term. [5] In general, however, a judgment declaring the law based on a hypothetical scenario is not a remedy recognized under Pennsylvania law. Philadelphia Entm't and Dev. Partners, L.P. v. City of Phila., 937 A.2d 385, 393 (2007) (holding that courts of the Commonwealth should not give answers to academic questions or render advisory opinions or make decisions based on assertions as to hypothetical events that might occur in the future). Indeed, such a declaration would amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion-an opinion that, like the advice of their own counsel, would merely alert Appellees to the legal consequences of possible future actions. [6] Nor does the Ethics Act open the doors to the court for Appellees to seek such a remedy. See 65 Pa.C.S. §§ 1101-1113. Under the Ethics Act, state officials like Appellees may obtain an advisory opinion from the Ethics Commission. See 65 Pa. C.S. § 1107(10), (11). However, the Ethics Act contains no provisions allowing Appellees to obtain the same in court. Thus, the Ethics Act provides no statutory basis for recognizing the remedy sought by Appellees. Finally, the Declaratory Judgment Act also does not provide Appellees with a remedy in this situation. According to the Declaratory Judgment Act, its purpose is remedial. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7541(a). A remedial law provides means to enforce rights or redress injuries. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1319 (8th ed.1999). As to the remedy, the Declaratory Judgment Act states that Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status, or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or franchise, and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal relations thereunder. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7533 (emphasis added). Under the plain language of the statute, only persons who  are affected by a statute, the Ethics Act here, may seek a declaratory judgment. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7533 (emphasis added). The Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a remedy to persons who will be or, even more remotely, may be affected by the statute. As noted above, Appellees here sought a declaration from the Commonwealth Court that the term business as used in the Ethics Act did not include non-profit corporations. The expressed harm for which Mr. DiBerardinis and Ms. McGinty sought a declarationthe Declaratory Judgment Act remedywas that they feared civil or criminal prosecution for engaging in the described conduct. The harm described by Governor Rendell was that he was denied the right to have the official of [his] choosing carry out [the duties and responsibilities of secretary]. Appellees' Reply Brief at 1; see also Appellees' Brief at 17. Respectfully, in my opinion, the expressed harms were not present but future, hypothetical harms for which the Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 7533. After all, Mr. DiBerardinis and Ms. McGinty had not engaged in the hypothetical conduct by the time the declaratory judgment action was filed (nor would they ever engage in that conduct) and Governor Rendell was not deprived of their services. The Declaratory Judgment Act does not provide a remedy when only a potential injury is averred. 42 Pa.C.S. § 7533. [7] Thus, because Appellees asserted only a potential injury in their declaratory judgment action, I would hold that the Commonwealth Court issued an advisory opinion that should be vacated. See Gulnac v. South Butler Cnty. Sch. Dist., 526 Pa. 483, 587 A.2d 699, 702 (1991) (holding that [a] declaratory judgment must not be employed to determine rights in anticipation of events which may never occur or for consideration of moot cases or as a medium for the rendition of an advisory opinion which may prove to be purely academic); Pennsylvania Railroad Co., supra. [8]