Opinion ID: 4563583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Georgia Analysis

Text: To determine whether Congress validly abrogated sovereign immunity for Geness’s Title II and Fourteenth Amendment claim against AOPC, we must apply the three-part Georgia test.9 The District Court, without explicitly noting that it was applying Georgia, concluded that the first and second inquiries were satisfied, thus permitting the claim against AOPC to proceed. Pursuant to the analysis below, we disagree with the District Court and conclude that Geness has failed to satisfy the first requirement of Georgia because he failed to set forth a plausible claim that AOPC violated Title II. Because Geness’s allegations fail to satisfy Georgia’s first requirement, we need not address the second and third requirements. To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, in satisfaction of the first Georgia requirement, a party must sufficiently plead that “(1) he is a qualified individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or was subjected to discrimination by any such entity; (4) by reason of his disability.” 10 Geness, 902 F.3d at 9 As noted above, this test requires courts to examine “(1) which aspects of the State’s alleged conduct violated Title II; (2) to what extent such misconduct also violated the Fourteenth Amendment; and (3) insofar as such misconduct violated Title II but did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, whether Congress’s purported abrogation of sovereign immunity as to that class of conduct is nevertheless valid.” Georgia, 546 U.S. at 159. 10 It is undisputed that AOPC is a “public entity.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1231(1)(B) (stating that public entities include 16 361 (quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 178–79); 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 11 In our prior precedential opinion, we concluded that the first and second requirements were satisfied, as well as the third and fourth requirements as they relate to the Commonwealth. Id. at 361–62. We must now determine whether AOPC denied Geness “the benefits of [its] services, programs, or activities . . . by reason of his disability.” Id. The following are Geness’s allegations regarding AOPC, drawn directly from his Second Amended Complaint: 12 “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government”). 11 A plaintiff seeking compensatory damages under the ADA must also sufficiently allege that the public entity intentionally discriminated against him or her. Haberle, 885 F.3d at 181. To satisfy this element of intentional discrimination, a plaintiff must allege at least “deliberate indifference,” which requires “(1) knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially likely to be violated . . . and (2) failure to act despite that knowledge.” Id. (quoting S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 265 (3d Cir. 2013)) (alteration in original); see also Geness, 902 F.3d at 362 n.13. We will not address deliberate indifference here because we hold that Geness’s allegations fail to satisfy Title II’s other requirements. 12 Geness’s Second Amended Complaint also links AOPC’s alleged wrongdoing to the conduct of judges in their disposition of his case. See, e.g., App. 43 ¶ 52 (“The abovedescribed Judges continued to permit Plaintiff’s case to be listed for trial, despite their actual knowledge of his 17 • “Defendant AOPC is a subsidiary unit of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and as such acts as an agent of the Commonwealth in various matters related to supervision and administration of the Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System. The Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System includes judges of the Court of Common Pleas of the various Pennsylvania counties, including Fayette County. In its capacity as a subsidiary unit of the Commonwealth, AOPC administers the Pennsylvania Unified Judicial System and is responsible for the prompt and proper disposition of all business of the courts of the Commonwealth of incompetency.”). Allegations of wrongdoing based on judicial conduct are omitted here because AOPC’s administrative functions and the independent role of the judiciary must not be conflated. See Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (“The doctrine of judicial immunity is founded upon the premise that a judge, in performing his or her judicial duties, should be free to act upon his or her convictions without threat of suit for damages.”). The parties do not present and we are not aware of any legal authority that would permit AOPC to be found liable based on judicial conduct. Further, Geness acknowledges that AOPC cannot be held liable based on judges’ decision-making. Appellee’s Br. 25 (“The AOPC does not have oversight over criminal cases and the decisions that are required in each such case to the extent that those are duties to be performed by the Judges of the Common Pleas Court. . . . AOPC does in fact have the duty to oversee the actions of those Judges to ensure that, among other things, the courts comply with the rights of disabled individuals.”). 18 Pennsylvania. Among the duties and responsibilities of the AOPC is insuring accessible and safe courts for all citizens. The duties of the AOPC include insuring that the courts of the Commonwealth comply with Title II of the [ADA]. The AOPC attempts to insure compliance with the ADA through interaction with ADA coordinators in each county of the Commonwealth. For Fayette County, Pennsylvania, the role of AOPC ADA coordinator is filled by the deputy court administrator, who reports directly to the court administrator.” App. 36 ¶ 7. • “AOPC, through the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas . . . discriminated against [him] because of his disability by depriving him of the administration of judicial services and the normal benefits of criminal procedure and due process of the law.” App. 44 ¶ 61. • “As part of its effort to fulfill its responsibility to insure the Commonwealth’s compliance with the ADA, Defendant AOPC makes regular inquires of each county’s ADA coordinator with regard to cases involving criminal defendants who are pretrial detainees whose cases have not been called to trial in a timely fashion according to Pennsylvania law.” App. 45 ¶ 66. • “Defendant AOPC repeatedly contacted the Fayette County court administrator directly to inquire about the Plaintiff’s case and the reasons for the Plaintiff’s extended incarceration without trial. Notwithstanding that those inquiries were made by Defendant AOPC, neither the AOPC, nor any other agent of AOPC, 19 including the AOPC’s local ADA coordinator in Fayette County, took any action designed to provide the Plaintiff with his right to be brought to trial on the charges he faced.” App. 45 ¶ 67. • “During the period of Plaintiff’s incarceration, the Fayette County ADA coordinator was the assistant court administrator. At all times relevant to this case, the assistant court administrator reported directly to the court administrator.” App. 45 ¶ 68. • “During the period of Plaintiff’s incarceration . . . , the Fayette County court administrator received from the Fayette County Prison a daily list of prisoners incarcerated in the Fayette County Prison. This list included various information about each incarcerated individual, including the date that the individual was incarcerated, as well as the minimum and maximum incarceration dates for each prisoner.” App. 45–46 ¶ 69. • “On each of the daily lists sent from the prison to the court administrator, Plaintiff Craig Geness appeared together with information about his incarceration described above.” App. 46 ¶ 70. • The AOPC’s conduct, described above, “deprived [Geness] of his right to the justice system, which is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” App. 47 ¶ 82. Identifying AOPC’s “services, programs, or activities” at the foundation of Geness’s Title II claim is a necessary first step to determining whether his claim is cognizable. See 20 Disability Rights N.J., Inc. v. Comm’r, N.J. Dep’t of Human Servs., 796 F.3d 293, 301–03 (3d Cir. 2015). “[T]he phrase ‘service, program, or activity’ under Title II . . . is ‘extremely broad in scope and includes anything a public entity does.’” Furgess v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 933 F.3d 285, 289 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Disability Rights, 796 F.3d at 301). In Disability Rights, this Court identified the alleged “service, program, or activity” as a judicial hearing before a mentally ill person can be forcibly medicated in a nonemergent situation. Id. at 303–04, 307 (holding that “judicial process before the nonemergent administration of psychotropic drugs is not a ‘service, program, or activity’ of New Jersey from which the civilly committed are excluded). In Furgess, this Court concluded that a prison’s “provision of a shower is a service, program, or activity.” 933 F.3d at 291 (holding that Furgess adequately alleged a Title II claim based on the prison’s failure to accommodate his need for a shower). In Bowers, the University of Iowa’s program was its provision of athletic scholarships. 475 F.3d at 553 (holding that Bowers stated a claim under Title II). Based on Geness’s Second Amended Complaint and his arguments before this Court, and because Geness concedes that AOPC’s liability cannot be premised on judicial decisionmaking, see supra note 12, the only “services, programs, or activities” at issue are AOPC’s administrative duties to (1) “intervene directly with the Fayette County Court to ensure that the Plaintiff’s case moved forward,” and (2) “seek intervention for such result by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.” Appellee’s Br. 22. Geness argues that Title II requires AOPC to provide him these two services from which he was 21 excluded based on his disability. 13 AOPC counters that its “enumerated powers” do not authorize it to meddle in “specific litigation.” Appellant’s Br. 33. First, regarding AOPC’s alleged failure to directly intervene with the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, Geness acknowledged in his Second Amended Complaint that AOPC “repeatedly” made inquiries about the length of his detention to the court administrator. App. 45 ¶¶ 66–67. But, he alleged, AOPC failed to take “any action” beyond those inquiries that would “provide [him] with his right to be brought to trial.” App. 45 ¶ 67. He neither identifies in his Complaint nor argues before us what further action AOPC should have or could have taken. And it is difficult to imagine what action it could have taken in light of Geness’s concession that AOPC is not liable for judges’ decision-making in individual cases. See supra note 12. Thus, Geness’s allegation of AOPC’s failure to directly intervene with the county court in some unspecified manner, beyond its repeated inquiries to the court administrator, cannot sustain his claim under Title II of the ADA. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (stating that allegations must be more than “speculative” or “conclusory”). 13 To the extent Geness additionally alleges that AOPC had a duty to ensure his motions for habeas corpus relief and motions to dismiss the charge against him were heard and ruled upon in a timely manner, we conclude that these allegations are both dependent on judicial conduct and too speculative to sustain his claim because they are not linked to any alleged service, program, or activity of AOPC under Pennsylvania Rule of Judicial Administration 505 or otherwise. See supra note 12; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 22 This leaves only Geness’s argument that AOPC failed to seek intervention from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. He does not make this allegation anywhere in his Second Amended Complaint. It stems from AOPC’s “powers and duties” enumerated in the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration. Pa.R.J.A. No. 505. We will take judicial notice of the Pennsylvania Rules of Judicial Administration, as they are “matters of public record,” which the District Court considered as well. Buck v. Hampton Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting 5B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 1357 (3d ed. 2004)). AOPC’s duties include, in relevant part: (1) To review the operation and efficiency of the system and of all offices related to and serving the system and, when necessary, to report to the Supreme Court or the Judicial Council with respect thereto. . . . (6) To examine the state of the dockets and practices and procedures of the courts and of the district justices of the peace and make recommendations for the expedition of litigation. Pa.R.J.A. No. 505(1), (6). The “service, program, or activity” requirement under Title II is “extremely broad in scope and includes anything a public entity does.” Furgess, 933 F.3d at 289 (finding that “a prison’s provision of showers to inmates fits within this 23 expansive definition”). Nonetheless, the “service, program, or activity” must be one that the entity actually provides. See, e.g., Lane, 541 U.S. at 531 (holding that access to court proceedings is a service provided by the state). This is an obvious but important limitation. For example, in Disability Rights, we held that “the provision of judicial process before the [forcible] nonemergent administration of psychotropic drugs is not a ‘service, program, or activity’ of New Jersey from which the civilly committed are excluded.” 796 F.3d at 305, 307 (stating that this was not a “public service, program, or activity to which nondisabled individuals have access”). Our dissenting colleague cites Pa.R.J.A. No. 505(1), (6) as the basis of his opinion that Geness has stated a viable Title II claim against AOPC. These provisions, however, do not suffice to establish a Title II claim against AOPC. They charge AOPC with “review[ing] the operation and efficiency of the system” and reporting to the Supreme Court “when necessary”—and with “examin[ing] the state of the dockets and practices and procedures of the courts . . . and mak[ing] recommendations for the expedition of litigation.” Pa.R.J.A. No. 505(1), (6). These rules unambiguously require AOPC to facilitate an “efficien[t]” and “expeditio[us]” system, in line with its role as an administrative body. They do not task AOPC with policing potential civil rights violations in particular cases—to do so would task the AOPC with making legal determinations and recommendations. The AOPC is not, and should not be, a judicial back-seat driver. See supra note 12. Geness argues that AOPC’s failure to “seek intervention by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court” impacted his ability to be “timely [tried] on the charges that he faced.” Appellee’s Br. 11. This argument requires some unpacking. First, he was never competent to stand trial throughout his years of 24 detainment—and subjecting him to trial would have violated his due process rights. See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 354 (1996) (“We have repeatedly and consistently recognized that the criminal trial of an incompetent defendant violates due process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Secondly, Geness neither alleges nor attempts to argue that AOPC had any control over whether he was housed in a prison versus a long-term care facility while deemed incompetent. Thus, with his argument properly distilled, Geness is effectively urging this Court to hold that AOPC had a duty to seek intervention of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to have his case dismissed before it languished for nine years while he remained incompetent and—for reasons both unclear and inexcusable— remained imprisoned for much of that time. He makes this argument despite acknowledging that he had representation and access to the court throughout the years he was imprisoned and civilly committed. See App. 40 ¶¶ 30–31 (stating that Geness’s public defender “made no attempt to have [his] case removed from the trial list, despite [his] known incompetency to stand trial” and despite having “the authority and the opportunity to intervene with the Court”); App. 40 ¶¶ 26–27 (stating that Geness’s case was subject to the court’s “call of the list,” whereby his counsel, a district attorney, and a judge evaluated the status of his case on a monthly basis). By Geness’s argument, in order for AOPC to comply with Title II, it had to suggest to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that his case be dismissed because he was not competent to stand trial. AOPC would “in effect . . . be required to closely monitor, deeply evaluate, and consider intervening in every criminal case pending in the Commonwealth.” Appellant’s Reply 1. In a case such as this, AOPC argues, “even if aware of the procedural status,” it “would not have known whether 25 the extended delay was part of a strategic course by defense counsel, the thoughtful deliberative process of the judge, or some other factor peculiar to that specific case.” Appellant’s Br. 41. We find AOPC’s arguments persuasive. Further, AOPC’s powers do not allow it to actually hold a criminal trial, which Geness alleges it denied him. Appellee’s Br. 15, 25, 26 n.22. Even had AOPC reported to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas about the delay in Geness’s case, it remained the exclusive power of the courts to actually do something about it. Relatedly, since Geness was not competent to stand trial, a court’s decision regarding whether a case should be dismissed depends on the evidence and law underlying the charge and the basis for dismissal. Weighing such matters is indisputably a judicial function. This brings us full circle to Geness’s acknowledgement that AOPC does not have a duty to meddle with judicial decision-making. See supra note 12. Because judicial decision-making is not a service AOPC provides to either disabled or nondisabled individuals, Geness was not excluded from this service based on his disability. See Disability Rights, 769 F.3d at 305. Further, Title II requires not only that a public entity “excluded” a disabled individual from a service it provides but also that such an exclusion was “by reason of his disability.” Geness, 902 F.3d at 361 (quoting Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 171, 178–79 (3d Cir. 2018) and citing 42 U.S.C. § 12132). Neither Geness nor the dissent sets forth a plausible allegation or argument regarding how AOPC neglected to report the delay in his case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “by reason of his disability.” Id. While his case appears to have languished 26 due to his disability (i.e., while he was incompetent to stand trial), AOPC had no power over the disposition of his case, and there is simply no allegation or argument before us regarding how AOPC’s alleged failure to contact the Supreme Court connects to Geness’s disability. For the reasons set forth above, Geness’s allegations against AOPC fail to satisfy the first requirement of Georgia— setting forth a plausible Title II claim. We therefore hold that Congress has not validly abrogated AOPC’s sovereign immunity regarding this particular claim. In conclusion, we will reverse the District Court’s judgment and remand this case for dismissal of the claim against AOPC. Though we exclude AOPC as a potentially responsible party, the human suffering endured by Geness due to the mishandling of his case cannot be overstated. This opinion does not impact Geness’s claims against the Commonwealth and DHS, which are not currently before us. 27 Craig Geness v. Administrative Office of Pa., et al No. 19-2253