Opinion ID: 1520503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 34

Heading: recusal of the post-conviction judge

Text: Calhoun alleges: This case involved the killing of two persons, one of whom was a police officer of the Montgomery County Police Department. One basis for seeking the death penalty was that a law enforcement official had been killed in the course of his duties. Prior to the original trial, Mr. Calhoun's counsel filed a motion for an order disqualifying either the Honorable John F. McAuliffe or the Honorable James S. McAuliffe from participating in the proceedings upon information and belief that their father, now retired, had been the chief of the Montgomery County Police Department. The motion to recuse was renewed by written motion when the case was assigned to Judge [James S.] McAuliffe for post conviction proceedings. On October 22, 1984, over objection, Judge McAuliffe heard the motion. Counsel for Mr. Calhoun requested that another judge rule on the motion. Judge McAuliffe answered a number of inquiries by counsel and filed supplemental statements which revealed that (1) his father was the Chief of Police for Montgomery County for over 15 years; (2) he had other relatives, two cousins and an uncle, who served as law enforcement officials, one of whom was killed in the line of duty; and (3) during his consideration of the petition his cousin, who was once a police officer was shot and killed during a robbery. (References to transcript omitted.) The post-conviction judge said: The matter of recusal is a serious matter. It asks this Court to step down from hearing this case. The Court has examined its conscience, did not ask for the case, does not want the case, in the sense that it does not want any case that ever deals with the life of a human being. When I took the oath of office, I understood that there were such cases out there and that someday I might be required to take one and maybe more. The case was assigned to me. I have no prejudice or bias against the Defendant in this case. I feel fully able to review the matters which are at hand and to make a determination under the law. Under the circumstances it seems to me that it would be inappropriate for me to recuse myself, although frankly there is a  there is a sort of an invitation from the side of me that says, take the easy way out. But, that is not what I agreed to do when I took this job. In short, the motion for recusal is denied. Calhoun first argues that the post-conviction judge erred in denying the request that the matter of recusal be heard by another judge, saying Once a substantial question has been raised, the motion should have been heard by another judge. C.f. Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 [, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481] (1921) (federal statute requires that once affidavit containing facts sufficient to warrant recusal, motion should be granted). The Court opened its opinion in Berger by stating: Section 21 of the Judicial Code provides as follows: `Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or criminal, shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before whom the action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any opposite party to the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, but another judge shall be designated in the manner prescribed in the section last preceding, or chosen in the manner prescribed in section twenty-three, to hear such matter. Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, ... No party shall be entitled in any case to file more than one such affidavit; and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are made in good faith. The same proceedings shall be had when the presiding judge shall file with the clerk of the court a certificate that he deems himself unable for any reason to preside with absolute impartiality in the pending suit or action.' 255 U.S. at 26-27, 41 S.Ct. at 231, 65 L.Ed. at 483. The Court held: We are of opinion, therefore, that an affidavit upon information and belief satisfies the section and that upon its filing, if it show the objectionable inclination or disposition of the judge, which we have said is an essential condition, it is his duty to `proceed no further' in the case. 255 U.S. at 35, 41 S.Ct. at 233, 65 L.Ed. at 486. We do not have in force in Maryland a statute similar to 28 U.S.C. § 144 which requires that such a motion be heard by another judge. Hence, the argument that Judge McAuliffe should not have ruled upon the matter is without merit. Calhoun next alleges that because of Judge McAuliffe's familial ties to the Montgomery County Police Department, he erred in not granting the motion to recuse, citing ABA Standards, The Function of the Judge (1968), which states: The trial judge should recuse himself whenever he has any doubts as to his ability to preside impartially in a criminal case or whenever he believes his impartiality can be reasonably questioned. In this instance the post-conviction judge had no doubt of his ability to preside impartially. The background for disqualifying judges was recently commented upon by the Supreme Court in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986): [T]he traditional common-law rule was that disqualification for bias or prejudice was not permitted. See, e.g., Clyma v. Kennedy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 A. 539 (1894). See generally Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605 (1947). As Blackstone put it, `the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea.' 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries []361. The more recent trend has been towards the adoption of statutes that permit disqualification for bias or prejudice. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31 [41 S.Ct. 230, 232, 65 L.Ed. 481] (1921) (enforcing statute disqualifying federal judges in certain circumstances for personal bias or prejudice). See also ABA Code of Judicial Conduct, Cannon 3C(1)(a) (1980) (`[A] judge should disqualify himself ... where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party'). But that alone would not be sufficient basis for imposing a constitutional requirement under the Due Process Clause. ___ U.S. at ___, 106 S.Ct. at 1584, 89 L.Ed.2d at 832. The State relies upon Costello v. State, 237 Md. 464, 206 A.2d 812 (1965). There a motion to disqualify was made after the trial and after the trial judge had considered the pre-sentence investigation. The judge insisted that an altercation between him and Costello's counsel had no effect on his action in respect to sentence. Judge Oppenheimer said for the Court: Nor do we agree with the appellant that the trial judge committed reversible error in refusing to disqualify himself. We have emphasized the fundamental principle that a judge shall not preside in any case unless he is disinterested and impartial. Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Steward, 203 Md. 574, 581, 102 A.2d 248 (1954) and cases therein cited. We have also held that we can not engraft upon our Constitution a provision that a judge is disqualified because he has expressed his opinion as to the case. Co. Commrs. Charles Co. v. Wilmer, 131 Md. 175, 180-181, 101 Atl. 686 (1917). In this case, the motion to disqualify was made after the trial had taken place before the judge involved and after he had considered a pre-sentence investigation made at his request. Judge Shure made it clear to the appellant in the hearing on the motion to reduce sentence that the unfortunate altercation between the judge and the appellant's counsel had no effect whatsoever on the judge's action in respect of the appellant's sentence. No corroboration of that statement is needed, but the nature of the sentence, in view of the appellant's record and his offense, of itself indicates the dispassionate consideration which justice requires. 237 Md. at 473, 206 A.2d at 817-18. The post-conviction judge referred to Canon 13 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which provides: A judge should not act in a controversy in which a near relative is party, witness, or lawyer; he should not suffer his conduct to justify the impression that any person can improperly influence him or unduly enjoy his favor, or that he is affected by the kinship, rank, position, or influence of any party or other person. He should not testify voluntarily as a character witness. He also referred to Rule 2 of the Rules of Judicial Ethics implementing that Canon which states: 2. A judge shall not exercise his duties with respect to any matter in which a near relative by blood or marriage is a party, has an interest, or appears as a lawyer. He shall not participate in any matter in which he has a significant financial interest or in which he previously acted as a lawyer. For the purpose of this rule `near relative' shall mean connection by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree, counting down from a common ancestor to the more remote. Recusal would not have been required either by the canon or the rule. In Marzullo v. Kovens Furniture Co., 253 Md. 274, 252 A.2d 822 (1969), the plaintiff in a personal injury case wanted the judge to disqualify himself because the defendant was represented by the law firm in which the judge was once a partner and by which his son was then currently employed. We found the issue moot because the case had been removed from Baltimore City to Howard County for trial. However, we observed: If disqualification had to be discussed, we would say that under the circumstances there was no constitutional, legal or practical need for the judge not to sit in the case and, having been within his rights in not disqualifying himself, `   his action in that respect is not the subject of review.' Ex Parte Bowles, 164 Md. 318, 326 [165 A. 169]. 253 Md. at 276, 252 A.2d at 823. Ex Parte Bowles, 164 Md. 318, 165 A. 169 (1933), involved an appeal from a finding of contempt. There the appellant had filed an affidavit claiming that the judge should be disqualified because his son was attorney for the son's father-in-law, a party to the case. The Court found that the judge had no interest within the meaning of Const. art. IV, § 7 which it defined as having reference to a pecuniary interest in the litigation or the result thereof, nor was he connected with either of the parties by affinity or consanguinity within the prohibited degrees set forth in the Constitution and Code (1924) Art. 26, § 31. Judge W. Mitchell Digges said for the Court: There may be, and doubtless are, many circumstances in which a delicate sense of propriety would, and probably should, induce a judge to decline to sit in a given case and, upon his own motion or upon motion of either of the parties, remove the cause to another jurisdiction or request some other judge of the same jurisdiction to preside at the trial. However, if the presiding judge, under such circumstances, refuses to do this, he is within his legal rights; and his action in that respect is not the subject of review. Where the alleged disqualification does not amount to a constitutional or legal disqualification, the question is left to the enlightened conscience, delicacy of feeling, and sense of fairness possessed by the individual judge. The long and honorable history of the judiciary of this state impels the belief that the decision of such questions can be safely left where the responsibility now reposes. Judges are selected to be useful public servants, and no judge's view of the proprieties in such questions should be carried to such an extent as would result in the serious curtailment of his usefulness as a public officer. We have always had, and will continue to have, situations where young men are practicing attorneys before the court presided over by their fathers; and what we have said is not to be construed as indicating a belief on the part of this court that justice, fairness, or delicacy of feeling should require, or even permit, the retirement of the judge in all such cases. 164 Md. at 326-27, 165 A. at 172. [3] See also Harper v. Harper, 49 Md. App. 339, 342, 431 A.2d 761 (1981), rev'd on other grounds, 294 Md. 54, 448 A.2d 916 (1982). There the trial judge had met the appellee's wife once and knew that the daughter of the parties worked for a fellow judge. Relying upon Marzullo, 253 Md. 274, 252 A.2d 822, the Court of Special Appeals found no impropriety in the failure to recuse. Countless times we have held jurors qualified when an impediment had been presented and the juror indicated that he or she could impartially decide the case without regard to that alleged impediment. In State v. Hutchinson, 260 Md. 227, 271 A.2d 641 (1970), the Court was concerned with the question of whether or not the trial judge, sitting as a jury, erred in preliminarily admitting into evidence, over objections, the inculpatory statement of the accused obtained during a custodial interrogation and taken in violation of Miranda guidelines. The trial judge had subsequently rejected the statement at the close of trial and declared that he would completely disregard it in reaching a verdict. As Judge Finan put it for the Court: On appeal to the Court of Special Appeals the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial because, in the opinion of the court, the `mere knowledge of the substance of the confession by the trier of the facts necessarily tended to deprive appellant [accused and appellee here] of his constitutional right to a fair trial.' 260 Md. at 229, 271 A.2d at 642. The Court said: This assumption of the court might be valid were we to first, not believe the trial judge's statement that he was disregarding and eliminating from his deliberations the substance of the inadmissible confession, and secondly, choose to ignore the professional expertise, experience, and judicial temperament with which our legal system has inherently invested a trial judge vis a vis a jury comprised of laymen. It is true that judges, being flesh and blood, are subject to the same emotions and human frailties as affect other members of the specie; however, by his legal training, traditional approach to problems, and the very state of the art of his profession, he must early learn to perceive, distinguish and interpret the nuances of the law which are its `warp and woof.' 260 Md. at 233, 271 A.2d at 644. Given our prior cases, the fact that as in Costello the post-conviction judge ruled in favor of Calhoun as demonstrated by Part I of this opinion, our holdings relative to jurors, and our holding in Hutchinson, we find no error in the failure of the post-conviction judge to recuse himself.