Opinion ID: 1197771
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The David Is Going to Kill Me Statement

Text: 40. David next challenges the admission of a particular statement by Chaffee regarding a session he had with Debbie on January 10, 1990. During the proffer, Chaffee stated that on this date Debbie was afraid that David would hurt her and take the children. During his testimony before the jury, Chaffee stated that Debbie said, David is going to kill me. 41. The defense immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion for mistrial and did not strike the testimony or instruct the jury about it. In his briefs, David argues that the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial or by not striking this testimony, on the grounds that it differed substantially from the proffer. Although we conclude that the David is going to kill me statement was inadmissible, we also conclude that its admission was harmless error. 42. United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1236 (1994), 127 L.E.D.2d. 579 is a decision of the Tenth Circuit, originating from the District of New Mexico, with facts remarkably similar to the facts of this case. We find the rationale of Joe persuasive. The defendant in Joe was convicted of murdering his estranged wife. Eight days before her murder, the victim had seen a physician who treated her for rape. During treatment, she identified the defendant as the rapist. She also told the physician that she was afraid because the defendant had threatened to kill her. Id. at 1491. 43. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's admission of the statement identifying the defendant as the rapist. The court noted that the identity of the abuser is reasonably pertinent to treatment in virtually every domestic sexual assault case. Id. at 1494. Likewise, in this case, Chaffee testified that when situational depression stems from spousal abuse disclosure of the perpetrator is essential to diagnosis and treatment. As we concluded above, the trial court properly admitted Chaffee's testimony regarding David's abusive behavior towards Debbie. 44. The court in Joe then considered the victim's statement that she was afraid of the defendant because he had threatened to kill her. The court held that the first part of the statement, that she was afraid, was admissible as a statement of then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. Id. at 1492. See SCRA 1986, 11-803(C). However, the court held that the statement that the defendant would kill her was a prohibited statement of memory or belief, Joe, 8 F.3d at 1493, that was inadmissible under any hearsay exception, id. at 1497. 45. In this case, Chaffee testified that Debbie stated that David was going to kill her. He testified that she was calm when she said it, so it was not an excited utterance. Likewise, this was not a present sense impression or a statement of then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. It was a statement of memory or belief and, as such, was inadmissible. 46. However, not all erroneously admitted evidence necessitates reversal. We must next determine whether the error was harmless. Because David has invoked his rights under the Confrontation Clause, we apply the constitutional standard of review, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1497 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that the erroneous admission of Chaffee's testimony regarding Debbie's statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 47. Zelda and Butler testified that on January 8, 1990, just two days before her session with Chaffee, Debbie stated that David was going to kill her, and we have concluded that Zelda's and Butler's testimony was admissible. The jury could reasonably infer that Debbie's statement to Chaffee stemmed from the same incident two days earlier. In fact, Chaffee testified that he discussed this incident with Debbie in her session on January 10. Consequently, Chaffee's testimony regarding Debbie's statement was cumulative. The erroneous admission of cumulative evidence is harmless error because it does not prejudice the defendant. See State v. Worley, 100 N.M. 720, 725, 676 P.2d 247, 252 (1984) (holding Confrontation Clause error harmless because evidence was cumulative). 48. Furthermore, the prosecution did not elicit the David is going to kill me statement; Chaffee volunteered it. The record contains enough evidence aside from Chaffee's testimony from which the jury could infer David's intent. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986) (holding that Confrontation Clause error may be found harmless after weighing a host of factors, including whether the testimony was cumulative, whether the testimony was corroborated or contradicted, and the overall strength of the prosecution's case). The trial court did not commit reversible error.