Opinion ID: 1747222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the award of one-half (50 percent) of charles pierce's military pension to shirley pierce was error.

Text: Shirley's claim that she was vested with rights in Charles' military retirement pay ignores the limitations of our state laws and 10 U.S.C. § 1408, the Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (FUSFSPA). Unfortunately, as illustrated by the passage that follows, the lower court apparently made the same mistake: The Court is of the ... opinion that Mrs. Pierce and Mr. Pierce were married to each other and living as husband and wife for in excess of 20 years while Mr. Pierce was on active duty as a member of the United States Navy. Over this 20 year period Mr. Pierce earned and became eligible for retirement from the military service while Mrs. Pierce followed him faithfully throughout the years of their marriage up to the time of their last separation. The Court is of the opinion that Mrs. Pierce should be entitled to and the Court would grant Mrs. Pierce a 50 percent interest in Mr. Pierce's military retirement pay. (emphasis added). The Federal Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act does not vest any rights in a spouse, nor does Mississippi law. We have previously commented on this issue, stating that: As we perceive FUSFSPA, it did not vest any rights in anyone. It merely removed a federal bar and allowed the states to treat the military retirement pensions of their domiciliaries as personal property subject to state property laws. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 690-91 (Miss. 1990). Mississippi law has long recognized that, incident to a divorce, the Chancery Court has authority, where the equities so suggest, to order a fair division of property accumulated through the joint contributions and efforts of the parties. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 690 (Miss. 1990). See Brendel v. Brendel, 566 So.2d 1269, 1273 (Miss. 1990); Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d 574, 580-81 (Miss. 1988); Regan v. Regan, 507 So.2d 54, 56 (Miss. 1987); Watts v. Watts, 466 So.2d 889, 891 (Miss. 1985); Clark v. Clark, 293 So.2d 447, 450 (Miss. 1974). This Court recently announced that a chancery court can treat the retirement fund as marital property and that we recognize that marital partners can be equal contributors whether or not they both are at work in the marketplace. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909 (Miss. 1994). Furthermore, in that same case, this Court held that, [i]n arriving at an equitable distribution the chancellor should follow those guidelines as set out in Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, decided July 7, 1994. Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 915. Those guidelines are as follows: 1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows: a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property; b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets; 2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise; 3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution; 4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse; 5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution; 6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties; 7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and, 8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928. In this case, the lower court, however, made absolutely no findings of fact as to Shirley's contributions to the accumulation of the retirement fund, other than that [Mrs. Pierce] followed him faithfully and that Mrs. Pierce should be entitled... . Furthermore, even when property is found to be jointly accumulated, the chancellor must make specific findings in support of the share to be awarded to each of the parties because our cases hold that a spouse is not automatically entitled to an equal division of jointly-accumulated properties. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688 (Miss. 1990); Dillon v. Dillon, 498 So.2d 328, 330 (Miss. 1986); Rives v. Rives, 416 So.2d 653, 657 (Miss. 1982). The lower court made absolutely no finding in support of its division of the retirement fund. Apparently, the chancellor accepted Shirley's flawed vested rights argument. Clearly, a finding of more than the mere status of husband or wife is necessary to support the fifty-fifty division of a retirement fund, as required by Ferguson, supra . There, the majority of this Court announced the proper procedure that a chancellor should follow when equitably dividing marital assets, holding that: In light of the pronouncement of these guidelines for the equitable distribution method of division of marital assets, this Court reverses the issues relating to marital property division and remands for determination of value of all assets and further consideration of division in light of the principles established herein. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 937. Accordingly, this case should be reversed and remanded for a proper determination of the parties' rights with respect to the retirement fund under the aforementioned factors. HAWKINS, C.J., and BANKS and McRAE, JJ., join this opinion.