Opinion ID: 3035462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Terry Weapons Frisk

Text: We review the District Court’s denial of the motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and we exercise plenary review over the Court’s application of the law to those facts. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 3 The defense theory at trial was that Broadus should not have been arrested because the gun was found between the vehicle’s center console and the passenger seat rather than in Broadus’ waistband. 4 2002). The “general rule” under the Fourth Amendment is that “warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable . . . .” Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990). However, the Supreme Court has recognized a number of exceptions to this rule; the one relevant to this case is the Terry “stop and frisk.” See United States v. Ubiles, 224 F.3d 213, 217 (3d Cir. 2000). In Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, the Supreme Court held that a police officer may conduct a reasonable search for weapons for his/her own protection without violating the Fourth Amendment “where [s/he] has reason to believe that [s/he] is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . . . The officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that [his/her] safety or that of others was in danger.” To make a showing of reasonable suspicion, “[t]he officer must be able to articulate more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ . . . .” Ubiles, 224 F.3d at 217 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Reviewing courts must make the reasonable-suspicion determination based on the totality of circumstances. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). Although Broadus’ nervousness was not alone enough to support the inference that he was concealing a weapon, see United States v. McKoy, 428 F.3d 38, 41 (1st Cir. 2005), the circumstances in this case are closer to our decision in United States v. Moorefield, 111 F.3d 10, 11-12, 14 (3d Cir. 1997), where we reversed the district court’s suppression 5 of the firearm seized from the defendant, who was a passenger in a car subject to a lawful traffic stop. We held that the defendant’s “furtive hand movements and refusal to obey the officers’ orders,” specifically the order to remain in the car with his hands in view, as well as the fact that the defendant leaned back and appeared to shove something toward his waist, constituted suspicious behavior. Id. at 14. Indeed, “Moorefield’s behavior embodied the kind of specific, articulable facts that Terry contemplates and, therefore, warranted a pat-down search for weapons.” Id. We dispose of this case similarly. Pursuant to a lawful traffic stop, Officer Younger “lawfully ordered [Broadus] to remain in the car with his hands in [view].” Id. at 13. The pat-down for weapons was also lawful because Officer Younger “pointed to ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’ reasonably warranted the pat-down.” Id. at 14 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21). Broadus acted nervously, his heart was pounding, he attempted to get out of the car, and he repeatedly stated that “everything’s cool.” Supp. App. at 19. Although nervousness standing alone does not justify a Terry frisk, “such behavior may be considered as a factor in the totality of circumstances.” United States v. Brown, 188 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir. 1999). The totality of the circumstances also included Broadus continually moving his left arm and hand to his left side, almost preventing Younger from seeing his left hand even though Younger had asked him to keep his hands in view. Furthermore, the traffic stop took place in a high crime neighborhood, which is a relevant, although not by itself 6 sufficient, factor in the Terry analysis. See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Because an “officer need not be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger,” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, Officer Younger’s pat-down search of Broadus was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.