Opinion ID: 1372390
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Carter's Response to Ford's Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: But Carter's deposition testimony was not her last word on which events comprised her complaint. In her response to summary judgment, instead of responding to Ford's attacks on her claims arising out of her 2006 termination, she focused her argument exclusively on an FMLA claim arising out of her 2005 termination, which she says provided sufficient notice to Ford of what the fight was about. We disagree because we must consider Carter's response in context. Had the challenge to the sufficiency of her pleading arisen in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the district court would have applied the extremely modest standard of notice pleading, which direct[] courts to construe pleading[s] liberally. Minger v. Green, 239 F.3d 793, 799 (6th Cir.2001). But there is a crucial difference in timing when the sufficiency of a complaint arises at the summary judgment stage after a plaintiff has had an opportunity for discovery. Tucker v. Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, 407 F.3d 784, 789 (6th Cir.2005). As the Tucker court summarized, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provide for liberal notice pleading at the outset of litigation because `[t]he provisions for discovery are so flexible' that, by the time a case is ready for summary judgment, `the gravamen of the dispute [has been] brought frankly into the open for inspection by the court.' Id. at 788 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512-13, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002)). Notably, three months passed between Carter's deposition and when, as set forth in the litigation schedule, Carter responded to Ford's motion for summary judgment. Once Carter had information that would have caused her to reconsider her deposition testimony regarding the scope of her claims, she had several options. Under Rule 30(e)(1)(B), she had thirty days following her deposition to make changes in form or substance. Fed. R.Civ.P. 30(e)(1)(B). She was, after all, under a general duty to supplement or correct discovery responses. See Fed. R.Civ.P. 26(e). Alternatively, Carter could have amended her complaint if, in the course of discovery, she became aware of new causes of action. Carter pursued neither of these options. Instead, she waited until after the deadline for discovery had passed to give any indication that her deposition testimony did not accurately characterize the scope of her claims. Once a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage ... the liberal pleading standards under Swierkiewicz and [the Federal Rules] are inapplicable. Tucker, 407 F.3d at 788 (quotations omitted). As at the initial pleading stage, the question remains whether Ford had adequate notice of the charges it was defending. After Carter said in her deposition that her FMLA claim was about the 2006 termination, Ford had no reason to further investigate the events of 2005 or to formulate a defense based on that claim. And once discovery was closed, it could not. Even though, early in the litigation, Carter's ambiguous complaint could arguably have been construed to encompass the 2005 termination, Cater's deposition testimony expressly notified Ford that her claim focused on a separate eventthe 2006 request for medical leave. Because the issue is fair notice, in this case, Carter's attempt to revive or resurrect her 2005 claim at summary judgment was too little too late. In the face of an ambiguous complaint, Ford used the discovery process to probe the contours of Carter's claims. During the time period designated for discovery, Carter made no attempt to inform Ford that she was suing it based on her 2005 termination. Thus, based on the information revealed in discovery (including Carter's deposition testimony), Ford defended a lawsuit that it believed was limited to the events Carter described in her deposition. Of course, the notice inquiry necessarily proceeds on a case-by-case basis. Sometimes, as we have recognized, a claim raised in response to a summary judgment motion provides sufficient notice to the opposing party. See, e.g., Vencor v. Standard Life & Accident Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 629, 642 n. 11 (6th Cir.2003); Howington v. Quality Rest. Concepts, LLC, 298 F. App'x 436, 442 n. 6 (6th Cir.2008) (unpublished). But those cases are distinguishable because they did not involve, as here, an earlier express disavowal of the very claim the party attempted to raise in response to summary judgment. The conclusion that Carter's complaint did not, by the summary judgment stage, encompass the 2005 termination is consistent with the method we have followed in construing ambiguous complaints in other contexts. For example, in Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 516 (6th Cir.2008), this Court looked at the course of the proceedings to determine whether defendants had received notice of the plaintiff's § 1983 claims where the complaint was ambiguous. In concluding that the defense had notice of certain claims, the Court reviewed statements made by the plaintiff and his counsel during depositions and concluded that they demonstrate[d] that both sides understood the suit to encompass claims not explicitly set forth in the complaint. Id. Just the opposite is true here. The deposition is the only proceeding in the record where Carter explained the scope of her claims, and, at that time, neither she nor Ford understood it to include the March 2005 termination.