Opinion ID: 2291635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of Appellant's statement

Text: For his next point on appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in not suppressing the Appellant's video-taped statement to Officer Chris Shaw. It appears that Appellant is disputing the voluntariness of his confession. On appeal of a circuit court's determination of voluntariness of a confession, we make an independent determination based upon the totality of the circumstances. Clark v. State, 374 Ark. 292, 287 S.W.3d 567 (2008). The ruling is reversed if it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence, which we have interpreted as being the same standard as the clearly erroneous standard. Id. Any conflict in the testimony of different witnesses is for the circuit court to resolve. Id. In essence, this court reviews the circuit court's findings of fact for clear error, and we make an independent, or de novo, determination of voluntariness. Id. This court has consistently held that relevant factors in determining whether a confession was involuntary are age, education, and the intelligence of the accused, as well as the lack of advice as to his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, and the use of mental or physical punishment. Harper v. State, 359 Ark. 142, 194 S.W.3d 730 (2004). Officer Shaw testified that, because he had been informed that Appellant appeared to be under the influence of either narcotics or alcohol, he did not take Appellant back to Benton for an interview until the next day. Shaw stated that Appellant was aware of his Miranda rights prior to being transported from White Hall to Benton. According to Shaw, there was no interrogation of Appellant until 1:47 p.m. the next day at the Benton Police Department. During the interrogation, Officer Gwatney and Appellant's mother were present in the room. Before the interrogation began, Shaw read Appellant his rights and Appellant responded coherently to his questions. Shaw testified that no one promised Appellant anything, harmed him, or tried to coerce him in any way to give a statement. Shaw stated that, to the best of his knowledge, the statement was given freely and voluntarily. Shaw took both a video and audio recording of the conversation with Appellant. These recordings support Shaw's testimony. Furthermore, Appellant was two weeks from the age of eighteen at the time of the offense. He was the father of an infant and worked two jobs. At the March 5, 2008 hearing, the trial court found that he did not have a mental disease or defect, that he had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, that he had the capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, and that he had the capacity for acting in a purposeful manner. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress. Appellant also asserts that the trial court erred in not suppressing the portion of his statement that followed his conversation with his mother. Appellant did not raise this argument in his motion to suppress; therefore, it is not preserved for our review. See Tryon v. State, 371 Ark. 25, 263 S.W.3d 475 (2007).