Opinion ID: 2032740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: -Insufficiency of Evidence-

Text: Sitting Crow's remaining two arguments do not exactly correspond to issues considered in Jaques, 428 N.W.2d 260. We first consider Sitting Crow's assertion that evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of second-degree manslaughter. Sitting Crow alleges that the State failed to link any blow by Sitting Crow to the injuries that caused Gray's death. We disagree. Sitting Crow's complicity in the fatally savage beating of Gray was not viewed by the jury to establish first-degree manslaughter, and the jury deemed that it was second-degree manslaughter. First-degree manslaughter is defined under SDCL 22-16-15 as follows: Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree when perpetrated: (1) Without a design to effect death by a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude; (2) Without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner; (3) Without a design to effect death, but by means of a dangerous weapon; (4) Unnecessarily, either while resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a crime or after such attempt shall have failed. Manslaughter in the first degree is a Class 1 felony. Second-degree manslaughter is defined under SDCL 22-16-20 as follows: Any reckless killing of one human being by the act or procurement of another which, under the provisions of this chapter, is neither murder nor manslaughter in the first degree, nor excusable nor justifiable homicide, is manslaughter in the second degree. Manslaughter in the second degree is a Class 4 felony. In determining the sufficiency of evidence on appeal, the question is whether there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the jury, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Banks, 387 N.W.2d 19, 27 (S.D.1986). In making that determination, the Court will accept that evidence, and the most favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict. Id. This determination `may depend upon the difference between pure speculation and legitimate inference from proven facts.' State v. Halverson, 394 N.W.2d 886, 888 (S.D.1986) (quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 233 (D.C.Cir. 1947)). Here, Sitting Crow's statement to the police reflected that he caught the fleeing victim, and, after refusing Gray's plea for release, he struck Gray numerous times until Gray was unconscious. Independent witnesses observed Sitting Crow striking Gray. After Gray was unconscious, according to the testimony of two neighbors, Sitting Crow kicked Gray in the head. The coroner testified that all of Gray's head injuries contributed to his death. While Sitting Crow stresses a single passage where the coroner testified that Sitting Crow's kicks could have contributed to Gray's death, that passage does not convey the full impact of the coroner's testimony. Gray died of cumulative injuries, no single one of which was fatal. As the coroner observed: The brain is kind of like a sponge in the sense that it can absorb just so much injury before someone dies as a result of that injury. In this context, aside from the kicks directed at Gray's head, the jury could infer that the blows referred to in Sitting Crow's own statement, as they resulted in unconsciousness, landed at least partly on Gray's head. The evidence supported the verdict. The facts of this case justified Sitting Crow's conviction on the lesser-included offense of second-degree manslaughter. Unlike the codefendant Jaques, who was convicted of first-degree manslaughter, Sitting Crow wielded no weapon, and left no bootprints on Gray's head. These facts, regarding Sitting Crow, apparently cast sufficient doubt upon the greater offenses of second-degree murder and first-degree manslaughter for the jury to convict Sitting Crow of second-degree manslaughter. `There must be sufficient evidence ... when read in the light most favorable to the defendant, which would justify a jury in concluding that the greater offense was not committed and that a lesser offense was, in fact, committed.' State v. Rich, 417 N.W.2d 868, 871 (S.D.1988) (citations omitted). See also State v. Goodman, 384 N.W.2d 677 (S.D.1986); State v. Waff, 373 N.W.2d 18 (S.D.1985). Here, unlike Rich, Goodman, and Waff, such evidence existed, and we find no error.