Opinion ID: 772536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: There was Error.

Text: 11 Title 43 U.S.C. S 1733(a) authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate regulations in order to enforce the statutes governing the management of public lands. Section 1733(a) also authorizes the Secretary to enforce the regulations through criminal sanctions: 12 The Secretary shall issue regulations necessary to implement the provisions of this Act with respect to the management, use, and protection of the public lands, including the property located thereon. Any person who knowingly and willfully violates any such regulation which is lawfully issued pursuant to this Act shall be fined no more than $1,000 or imprisoned no more than twelve months, or both. Any person charged with violation of such regula tion may be tried and sentenced by any United States magistrate judge designated for that purpose by the court by which he was appointed, in the same man ner and subject to the same conditions and limita tions as provided for in section 3401 of Title 18. 13 Chapter 43 C.F.R. part 3715 is one set of regulations promulgated under S 1733. Those regulations govern the occupancy of public lands for mining purposes. See 43 C.F.R. S 3715.0-1 (discussing the purpose and scope of part 3715). In this case, Defendant was convicted under 43 U.S.C. S 1733(a) of violating two subsections of 43 C.F.R. S 3715.6: subsection (e), which provides that the BLM prohibits [n]ot complying with any order issued under this subpart within the time frames the order provides; and subsection (g), which provides that the BLM prohibits [p]lacing, constructing, or maintaining enclosures, gates, or fences, or signs intended to exclude the general public, without BLM's concurrence. 14 It is clear from the text of 43 U.S.C. S 1733(a) that the government must show that violations of BLM regulations were committed knowingly and willfully  before a court can impose criminal liability on a defendant. 2 (Emphasis added.) We conclude that Congress' use of the word willfully compels the prosecution to establish that Defendant was aware that the conduct in question was unlawful in order to sustain a conviction under that statute. 15 The Supreme Court has recognized that [t]he word `willfully' is sometimes said to be `a word of many meanings' whose construction is often dependent on the context in which it appears. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998). Often, in the criminal context, in order to establish a `willful'violation of a statute, `the Government must prove that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct was unlawful.'  Id. at 191-92 (quoting Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 137 (1994)). In particular, proof of knowledge of unlawfulness is required when the criminal conduct is contained in a regulation instead of in a statute, and when the conduct punished is not obviously unlawful, creating a danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in apparently innocent conduct. Id. at 194; see also Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 146; United States v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826, 828 (9th Cir. 1976). 16 In Bryan, the Court held that the word willfully in 18 U.S.C. S 924(a)(1)(D), the provision penalizing violations of the statutes regulating the use and sale of firearms, required a showing that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful. The Court rejected the defendant's argument that the prosecution was required to prove that he had knowledge of the specific statutory provision that he was charged with violating, holding that the following instruction on wilfully was sufficient: 17 A person acts willfully if he acts intentionally and purposely and with the intent to do something the law forbids, that is, with the bad purpose to disobey or to disregard the law. Now, the person need not be aware of the specific law or rule that his conduct may be violating. But he must act with the intent to do something that the law forbids. 18 524 U.S. at 190 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 In Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 141, the Court held that the use of the word willfully in 31 U.S.C. S 5322(a), a provision penalizing violations of the currency-reporting statutes and regulations, created a specific-intent offense requiring proof of violation of a known legal duty. The statute provided:  `A person willfully violating this subchapter or a regulation prescribed under this subchapter shall be fined not more than $250,000, or [imprisoned] for not more than five years, or both.'  Id. at 140 (quoting 31 U.S.C.S 5322(a)). The Court reasoned that the lower courts' interpretation of willfully as requiring the government to prove only defendant's knowledge of the banks' reporting obligation and his attempt to evade that obligation, but [the government] did not have to prove defendant knew the structuring was unlawful,  rendered the word willfully mere surplusage. Id. at 137-38, 140. The Court cautioned: Judges should hesitate so to treat statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense. Id. at 140-41. The Court further reasoned that, without the requirement of specific intent to engage in conduct known to be illegal, individuals engaged in structured transactions that were not obviously illegal would be subject to criminal liabil-ity: [W]e are unpersuaded by the argument that structuring is so obviously `evil' or inherently `bad' that the `willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective of the defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring. Id. at 146. 20 This court, too, has addressed the question whether violations of regulations enforced under a statute criminalizing willful violations are specific-intent offenses. In LizarragaLizarraga, 541 F.2d at 828, we held that violations of the regulations governing the import and export of munitions were specific-intent offenses, requiring proof that a defendant was aware of the unlawfulness of the conduct. Subsection (c) of 22 U.S.C. S 1934 (repealed 1976), which governed the imposition of criminal penalties for violations of the regulations, provided that [a]ny person who willfully violates any provision of this section or rule or regulation issued under this section . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. Two reasons supported our conclusion that Congress' use of the word willfully created a requirement to prove specific intent. Id. First, the statute prohibits exportation of items listed by administrative regulation, not by the statute itself. Id. Second, our review of the regulations demonstrated that they prohibited conduct that was not obviously illegal:[I]tems might be exported or imported innocently. Under such circumstances, it appears likely that Congress would have wanted to require a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty not to export such items before predicating criminal liability. Id. 21 In this case, Congress' use of the word willfully similarly suggests that violations of BLM regulations enforced under 43 U.S.C S 1733(a) are specific-intent offenses. First, as in Lizarraga-Lizarraga, the conduct penalized by the statute is listed not in the statute, but in administrative regulations. Second, as in Lizarraga-Lizarraga and Ratzlaf, some of the regulations bar conduct that is not obviously illegal, such as the restriction on searching for buried treasure. 43 C.F.R. S 3715.6(j). Because it is not obvious that such conduct would subject an individual to criminal liability, it seems likely that Congress would have wanted to require a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty as a predicate to criminal liability. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d at 828. 22 Additionally, the magistrate judge's definition of willfully reads the term out of the statute; the Supreme Court cautioned against that result in Ratzlaf, 510 U.S. at 140. As discussed above, 43 U.S.C. S 1733(a) authorizes criminal punishment for those who knowingly and willfully  violate BLM regulations. In general, knowingly means that the prosecution must prove that the defendant possessed knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193 & n.15. That definition of knowingly is nearly identical to the magistrate judge's instruction on the meaning of willfully:  `willfully' means that a person knowingly and intentionally committed the acts which constitute the offenses charged. Consequently, it renders the word willfully surplusage. 23 We need not decide here the question presented in Bryan: whether the word willfully inS 1733 requires the government to prove that Defendant had knowledge of the content of the specific regulations at issue. But see United States v. Santillan, No. 99-50773, 2001 WL 246195 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2001) (holding that a criminal violation of the Lacey Act does not require the defendant to know precisely which law or regulation established the illegality of the taking of wildlife, but only that the defendant know (1) that he is importing or exporting wildlife and (2) that the animals are tainted by a violation of some law associated with their taking, possession, transportation, or sale). Defendant argues only that he was entitled to a general instruction that willfully means that he knew his conduct was unlawful, an instruction that is similar to the one approved by the Supreme Court in Bryan. We hold that the court erred by not giving Defendant's requested instruction. 24