Opinion ID: 201503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 12 We have requested the parties to brief the question whether the finality of the [bankruptcy court's] 10/27/03 order dismissing the case is undercut by the order's provision that the case `shall remain open' and that the deadline for filing a modified Plan shall be extended. Both parties to this appeal contend that this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) to hear this appeal. We agree. 13 Under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d), this Court has jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees. Although the BAP concluded that it had jurisdiction to review the 10/27/03 order even if interlocutory, this Court has jurisdiction only if the underlying bankruptcy court order is in fact final. See In re Flor, 79 F.3d 281, 283 (2d Cir.1996) (For purposes of § 158(d), a determination of the district court is not `final' unless the underlying order of the bankruptcy court is final.); see also In re Lievsay, 118 F.3d 661, 662 (9th Cir.1997) (If the underlying bankruptcy court decision is interlocutory, the BAP order affirming or reversing it is also interlocutory.). 14 The parties concede the bankruptcy court's 9/15/03 order denying confirmation of the plan was not final at the time it was issued because the Debtors remained free to propose an alternate plan. In re Bentley, 266 B.R. 229, 233 (B.A.P. 1st Cir.2001); see Bartee v. Tara Colony Homeowners Ass'n (In re Bartee), 212 F.3d 277, 283 (5th Cir.2000) (stating, If the order was not intended to be final — for example, if the order addressed an issue that left the debtor able to file an amended plan ... appellate jurisdiction would be lacking.). But even if the 9/15/03 order denying confirmation of the plan was not final at the time it was issued, the parties assert that the order became final after October 27, 2003, when the bankruptcy court entered its order dismissing the case. See In re Bentley, 266 B.R. at 234 (holding that order denying confirmation of plan became final when, upon being notified that the Debtors did not intend to seek confirmation of an alternate plan, the court dismissed their case). 15 In In re Parque Forestal, Inc., this Court held that a district court's appellate order was final and appealable, even assuming the underlying bankruptcy court order was not final at the time it was appealed, because the bankruptcy case had been dismissed before appeal to this Court, making the orders below, in effect, final. 949 F.2d 504, 508 (1st Cir.1991). 16 [E]ven assuming, for purposes of argument, that the [bankruptcy court] order then lacked finality, the subsequent dismissal of the bankruptcy proceeding makes this assumption largely irrelevant. The Supreme Court has held that the requirement of finality is to be given a `practical rather than a technical construction.' ... Whether or not the bankruptcy court's order was final at the time it was appealed to the district court, there is no possibility now that either court's order will be changed or become moot, or that piecemeal appeals will waste the time of this court or the parties. 17 Id. (citations omitted). See also Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989, 992 (2d Cir.1991) (holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice), vacated on other grounds, 501 U.S. 1247, 111 S.Ct. 2882, 115 L.Ed.2d 1048 (1991); cf. Clausen v. Sea-3, Inc., 21 F.3d 1181, 1184 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that by virtue of Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(2), [appellant's] premature notice of appeal ripened when the district court certified its December 31, 1992, amended judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b)). 18 Here, regardless whether the bankruptcy court's September 15, 2003 order denying confirmation of the plan was final when issued, it became final in light of the bankruptcy court's October 27, 2003 order dismissing the case and the Watsons' subsequent failure to file an amended plan within the limited time allowed in that order. 19 To be sure, the 10/27/03 order, while dismissing the case, also stated that, [f]or administrative purposes, the case shall remain open and that the deadline contained in Rhode Island Local Bankruptcy Rule 3015-3(e) would be extended until ten days after the entry of the BAP's decision in the case. Local Rule 3015-3(e) provides: 20 Confirmation of Plan Denied. If confirmation is denied, the Court may enter an order dismissing the Chapter 13 case, unless, within eleven (11) days after entry of the order denying confirmation: 21 (1) the debtor files a modified plan; 22 (2) the debtor moves to convert the case to one under another chapter of the Code; 23 (3) the debtor files a motion for reconsideration; 24 (4) the debtor appeals the order denying confirmation; or 25 (5) the Court otherwise orders. 26 It is evident from the docket entry for the hearing on the motion for stay that the 10/27/03 order was intended to leave the Watsons free for ten days after the BAP's decision to file an amended plan if the BAP affirmed the bankruptcy court's denial of confirmation. The entry states: Trustee suggested extending the time to file an amended plan until 10 days after a decision on the case by the BAP. Parties consent to this and will submit an order. The Watsons, however, never filed an amended plan within the ten-day grace period following the BAP's judgment which was issued on May 21, 2004. Instead, on June 15, 2004, 25 days later, they filed a timely appeal to this Court. Their appeal had the effect of transferring jurisdiction here from the bankruptcy court. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58, 103 S.Ct. 400, 74 L.Ed.2d 225 (1982) (The filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance — it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.). By this point, the window in the 10/27/03 order was closed, and, for all practical purposes, the 9/15/03 order was final. 27 [T]he requirement of finality is to be given a `practical rather than a technical construction.' Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152, 85 S.Ct. 308, 13 L.Ed.2d 199 (1964) (quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949)). This case, while not wholly identical, is conceptually similar to Parque. The bankruptcy court's 10/27/03 order dismissing the case left it open only [f]or administrative purposes designed to permit the filing of an amended plan within ten days after the BAP's decision came down. After that period had expired, the only remaining limitation upon total dismissal was the taking of an appeal to our court, an event which in no way compromised the finality of the bankruptcy court's own order. Dismissal and closure of a case are distinct events, and there is no reason why a case cannot be dismissed but kept open for limited administrative purposes. See Armel Laminates, Inc. v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Income Prop. Builders, Inc.), 699 F.2d 963, 965 (9th Cir.1982). We are satisfied that in the circumstances the appealed bankruptcy court's order denying confirmation of the plan was rendered final by the later order and occurrences. We have jurisdiction over this appeal. 3