Opinion ID: 1770743
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Engle Entitled To Compensation For Services He Performed?

Text: The second issue is whether the fact that Engle was not a licensed real-estate broker prevents him from charging and collecting fees from Fred and Brenda Ledford in connection with the sale of their Chilton County land and the loan/mortgage relating to the Shelby County land. The documents related to both the sale of the Chilton County property and the mortgage of the Shelby County property included an agreement between the plaintiffs and Engle that provided that a large portion of the proceeds of the sale and the loan would be paid to Engle as fees for his services. Initially, we must determine whether the applicable statute of limitations has run on the plaintiffs' claim that these agreements, which provided for fees to be paid to Engle, are void. An action arising out of a contract under seal must be brought within 10 years of the signing of the contract. Ala.Code 1975, § 6-2-33. Both the contract for the sale of the Chilton County property and the mortgage on the Shelby County property were contracts under seal. Both were signed in February 1990, and the complaint in this case was filed on February 14, 1997, well within the 10-year period. Consequently, there is no statute-of-limitations problem as to this issue. The requirement that one acting as an agent arranging for the sale of real estate hold a broker's license is set out in Ala.Code 1975, § 34-27-30. That statute provides: It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, corporation, or branch office, for a fee, commission or other valuable consideration, or with the intention or expectation of receiving or collecting a fee, commission or other valuable consideration from another, to do any of the following unless he is licensed under Articles 1 and 2 of this chapter: (1) Sell, exchange, purchase, rent, or lease real estate; (2) Offer to sell, exchange, purchase, rent, or lease real estate; (3) Negotiate or attempt to negotiate the listing, sale, exchange, purchase, rental, or leasing of real estate; (4) List or offer or attempt or agree to list real estate for sale, rental, lease, exchange, or trade; . . . . (7) Aid, attempt, or offer to aid in locating or obtaining for purchase, rent, or lease any real estate; (8) Procure or assist in procuring of prospects for the purpose of effecting the sale, exchange, lease, or rental of real estate; (9) Procure or assist in the procuring of properties for the purpose of effecting the sale, exchange, lease or rental of real estate; or (10) Present himself or be presented as being able to perform an act for which a license is required. If a person acts in violation of this statute, then any agreement to compensate that person for services mentioned in the statute is void and unenforceable. Liles v. Flatley, 643 So.2d 947, 948 (Ala.1994). See also Culverhouse v. Culverhouse, 420 So.2d 33, 37 (Ala.1982); Dillard v. Pan-American Invs., Inc., 347 So.2d 990, 991 (Ala. 1977). In order for the agreements providing for the payment of fees to Engle to be void and unenforceable, Engle must have been performing services as a realestate broker. Engle clearly performed a number of the actions listed in § 34-27-30. He found persons willing to purchase Fred and Brenda Ledford's Chilton County land and helped to negotiate the contract for the sale of that land. A real-estate broker is one who brings together those selling real estate and those buying it and in some way assists in the negotiation of the salepurchase transaction. Dillard, 347 So.2d at 991. It is undisputed that Engle both introduced the sellers to Shelley and Koenig and assisted in the negotiations of the contracts. Therefore, the record contains substantial evidence indicating that Engle was acting as a real-estate broker. It is irrelevant whether he told the plaintiffs that he did, or that he did not, have a license; it matters only whether he did the things a real-estate broker would have done. Because Engle was at no time licensed as a real-estate broker, it was for the trier of facts to determine if Engle violated § 34-27-30, and, thus, whether the agreements to compensate him for any of the services mentioned in the statute would be void and unenforceable. Engle received a total of $35,700 from the Ledfordsthe sum of $21,000 from the proceeds of the sale of the Chilton County land and the sum of $14,700 from the proceeds of the loan secured by the mortgage for advances, services rendered, surveys, title policy, fees, appraisal, and expenses. All of these fees were provided for in agreements included within the sales contract and the mortgage. The summary judgment for the defendants on this claim was improper. The judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals is reversed insofar as it affirmed the summary judgment on the claim relating to the validity of the agreements to compensate Engle, and the case is remanded with instructions to direct the trial court to determine what portion, if any, of the $35,700 constituted fees or other payment for those services mentioned in § 34-27-30, services for which Engle could not legally charge. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; AND REMANDED. HOOPER, C.J., and MADDOX, COOK, SEE, LYONS, BROWN, JOHNSTONE, and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.