Opinion ID: 1787406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Does the ordinance constitute an attempted transfer of powers under Article VIII, Section 4 ?

Text: The trial judge did not expressly rule on the cities' contention that the County Commission has essentially proposed a transfer of powers, a procedure governed by Article VIII, Section 4 of the Constitution. The municipalities, joined by the Florida League of Cities, reassert that argument here. None of the parties seriously disputes the notion that this proceeding really involves a proposed transfer of functions between different units of government. The cities simply claim that the county's ordinance does not comply with Article VIII, Section 4 since it was initiated neither by law nor by resolution of all affected governments. Sarasota County suggests that charter counties are excluded from Article VIII, Section 4 by reason of Article VIII, Section 1(g), or alternately that the transfer requirements of Article VIII, Section 4 are met by Section 125.86(7), Florida Statutes (1975). [12] For the following reasons we conclude that the cities' position is the correct one. The county suggests that because it operates under a charter form of government, Section 1(g) of Article VIII alone governs its powers. We do not agree. Section 4 of Article VIII refers to counties, without distinction. The same term is used throughout the Constitution to refer both to charter and to non-charter counties. [13] Where there has been an intent to distinguish the two forms of county government, it has been done explicitly. [14] Not only are we disinclined to read into Section 4 something that is not expressly provided, but we are all the more reluctant to elevate the general provisions of Article VIII, Section 1(g) to a dominant position over the specific provisions of Article VIII, Section 4. We hold that Section 4 applies both to charter and non-charter counties. We also reject the county's assertion that Article VIII, Section 4 contemplates a law of general applicability such as Section 125.86(7), by which counties may accomplish the transfer of municipal functions by county resolution. A plain reading of Article VIII, Section 4 reflects that a transfer of governmental powers requires distinctive procedures for the initiation of a transfer, that is, by law or by resolution of the governing bodies of each of the governments affected. [15] We think it clear from the specificity of the procedure in Section 4 that the by law reference connotes the need for a separate legislative act addressed to a specific transfer, in the same manner that two or more resolutions of the affected governments would address a specific transfer. Section 125.86(7), in contrast, does no more than provide general authority for county commissions to exercise police powers. It in no way provides by law the procedures necessary to initiate the transfer of governmental functions or powers. We conclude, therefore, that Sarasota County's five proposed amendments constitute attempts to transfer powers and functions from the cities to the county within Article VIII, Section 4, but because the procedure by which the transfers have been proposed does not comport with the requirements of that Section, the county's resolution is ineffective for that purpose. We affirm the order of the Circuit Court of Sarasota County permanently enjoining a referendum on the five proposed amendments. It is so ordered. OVERTON, C.J., and BOYD, SUNDBERG, HATCHETT and DREW (Retired), JJ., concur.