Opinion ID: 1128262
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: WHETHER M.R.E. 503(f) IS VIOLATIVE OF THE DEFENDANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

Text: ¶ 49. The appellee in Scott v. Flynt alleged that [preventing] him from divulging medical information because of a protected privilege would amount to a violation of his due process rights, his right to effective representation of counsel and a fair trial. Scott, 704 So.2d at 1007. However, the Court based its decision in Scott on statutory interpretation grounds and found it unnecessary to address the constitutional claims. Id. The Court stated that it (... will not decide a constitutional question unless it is necessary to do so in order to decide the case.) Id. (quoting Kron v. Van Cleave, 339 So.2d 559, 563 (Miss. 1976)). ¶ 50. The Defendants write for forty-three pages in their brief arguing the constitutionality of M.R.E. 503(f). We do not address at length all of their arguments, as they are lengthy and without merit. The Court's decision in this case will be determined on grounds other than constitutional concerns and, accordingly, the Court will not address those issues for the same reasons it did not in Scott. Id. ¶ 51. At this time the constitutionality of M.R.E. 503(f) is not ripe for appeal. No proceedings in this case have been had in accordance with this Court's holding in Scott v. Flynt . On remand, the proceedings will be bound by that decision. If the case goes to trial and a judgment entered against the Defendants, the issue would then be ripe for appeal purposes should the Defendants desire an appeal at that time. ¶ 52. We only address the constitutionality issue now in order to promote judicial economy in our courts because it appears as though it may continue to be raised. The Defendants allege on appeal that M.R.E. 503(f) is unconstitutional. They allege that Tinnon is obstructing the exchange of information among his medical providers under the guise of privilege. The Defendants claim that this privilege has no legitimate purpose when those seeking the information are licensed professionals, operating under rules of ethics and professional conduct which independently protect against public release or disclosure of confidential medical information, regardless of legal relevancy. Judge Terry stated [i]f [a physician] is advanced as an expert he's going to be asked does he have an opinion based upon his experience, his education as to whether or not there is a causal relationship between X and Y... . If he hasn't got sense enough to understand what is relevant to the proceedings, that language, how is he going to understand whether or not there is a causal relationship? ¶ 53. This Court spoke directly to this in Scott, by adopting the holding in Horner v. Rowan, 153 F.R.D. 597 (S.D.Tex. 1994). The decision to waive the privilege as to unrelated matters belongs to the patient; yet, if ex parte interviews are permitted, it would be left to the physician to determine what information is subject to disclosure and what remains privileged. The doctor is not only unskilled in making that determination, any error in judgment could, in addition, expose the physician to liability arising from an improper disclosure... . Scott, 704 So.2d at 1005 (quoting Horner, 153 F.R.D. at 601-02). ¶ 54. The Defendants argue that strict scrutiny should be applied because this Court has interpreted M.R.E. 503(f) to prohibit ex parte contacts. The Defendants claim this is a denial of equal protection, due process, and free speech. We disagree. ¶ 55. [I]n not one instance has a court found that ex parte conferences were necessary in order to permit defense counsel to obtain information that they were unable to obtain through the regular channels of discovery. Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App.3d 581, 102 Ill.Dec. 172, 176, 499 N.E.2d 952, 956 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 107 S.Ct. 3232, 97 L.Ed.2d 738 (1987). ([T]he fundamental holding that ex parte discussions between defense counsel and plaintiff's treating physician shall be conducted only through authorized methods of discovery has been overwhelmingly approved in subsequent ... cases.) Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367, 228 Ill.Dec. 636, 677, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1098 (1997) (quoting L. Bonaguro & M. Jochner, The Petrillo Doctrine: A Review and Update, 83 Ill. B.J. (6, 16 (1995))). Since [p]ublic policy forbids `that conduct which tends to harm an established and beneficial interest of society the existence of which is necessary for the good of the public,' the court held that `modern public policy strongly favors the confidential and fiduciary relationship existing between a patient and his physician.' Best, 228 Ill. Dec. at 678, 689 N.E.2d at 1099 (quoting Petrillo, 102 Ill.Dec. at 177, 499 N.E.2d at 957). ¶ 56. The Court holds that M.R.E. 503(f) does not deny the Defendants' equal protection, due process, or free speech rights. There are other avenues of discovery besides ex parte contacts. The Defendants are still able to conduct discovery according the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Any restrictions of the Defendants' rights are because the public policy favoring physician-patient privileges and a patient's right to privacy outweigh the Defendants' rights. ¶ 57. This issue is without merit. The case can be decided on other grounds without the Court delving into the constitutionality of M.R.E. 503(f). Also, this issue is not ripe for appellate consideration at this time. However, the Court has discussed this issue in order to promote judicial economy as it appears the issue will continually be raised by litigants. The public policy favoring physician-patient privileges and a patient's right to privacy outweigh the Defendants' rights. The Defendants may seek to obtain discovery from Dr. Gary through other avenues according to the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure and the Mississippi Rules of Evidence.