Opinion ID: 3157590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Boardâs Reasonableness Determination Was Arbitrary and Capricious

Text: Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Because we have determined that the reasonableness of the Districtâs order is a finding of ultimate fact, we must give deference to the Boardâs conclusion regarding reasonableness. See Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1290 (explaining that school boards are vested with authority to reject a hearing officerâs findings of ultimate fact and substitute their own). That does not mean, however, that the Boardâs discretion is unfettered. Where a school board rejects a hearing officerâs ultimate findings and recommendation and substitutes its own, those new findings must be âfully warranted by the evidentiary findings of the hearing officer.â Id. Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, the Board rejected the hearing officerâs finding that the Districtâs order was unreasonable and concluded that it was reasonable. But the Board reached this result for reasons independent ofâand not justified by any ofâthe hearing officerâs evidentiary findings, contrary to the standard articulated by this court. The Board alsoÂ failed to make its determination in consideration of all of the hearing officerâs findings, ignoring relevant underlying circumstances. We therefore hold that the Boardâs ultimate finding of reasonableness was arbitrary and capricious.
Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Board, reversing the hearing officerâs conclusion on reasonableness, was required to justify its determination with the hearing officerâs evidentiary findings. Instead, the Board supported its determination with claims regarding Ritzertâs contractual obligations to return to duty even if she was going to be dismissed, none of which were based in the hearing officerâs findings. The Board failed to provide any evidenceâbeyond its own opinionsâof the rights and obligations of a district employee while on administrative leave. Further, this courtâs own review of the hearing officerâs decision reveals no findings of evidentiary fact that would support the Boardâs determination regarding those rights and obligations. Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The court of appeals held that the Board could âimplicitly construe[]â the Districtâs policy to find its order reasonable, Ritzert, slip op. at 16, but our precedent is clear that a school board may construe only those evidentiary facts found by the hearing officer. In other words, there must be a clear basis in the four corners of the hearing officerâs written findings supporting the school boardâs conclusion. See Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1117. If a school board determines that the hearing officerâs findings are insufficient to enable it to reach a conclusion, it must remand the matter for additional findings; it may not simply announce its own. Blair, 582 P.2d at 671â72. Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, there is no record evidence of a policy governing a teacherâs continuing obligations when put on paid leave, particularly where a district informs her that it intends for the leave to be permanent, does not desire her return, and encourages her to seek another job. We contrast these circumstances with Blaine, in which we affirmed a school boardâs dismissal of a teacher for drinking alcohol with cheerleaders she was chaperoning. 748 P.2d at 1283â84. The school board had a written and well-disseminated policy prohibiting students from using or possessing alcohol at school-sponsored events, and it required teachers to enforce the policy. Id. at 1283 & n.3. In its dismissal order, the board stated Blaine knew about the policy and about her duty to enforce it. Id. at 1285. While we agreed with Blaine that the hearing officer did not make any specific evidentiary findings about the policy, we concluded that the board did not err in relying on it because: (1) as head cheerleader sponsor, Blaine was presumed to know this particular policy; (2) the hearing officer found that Blaine told the students she could be disciplined for their conduct, which was âtantamount to a finding that [she] knew of the policy and her responsibility for its enforcementâ; and (3) Blaine admitted to knowing the policy in her testimony. Id. at 1293â94. Therefore, we held that the board did not abuse its discretion when it found that her conduct constituted neglect of duty. Id. at 1294. Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Similarly, in Flaming, we affirmed a school boardâs dismissal of a teacher for insubordination despite the hearing officerâs recommendation that she be retained. See 938 P.2d at 153. While the board had improperly made and relied on its own findings of evidentiary fact in addition to those made by the hearing officer, we concluded thatÂ its decision to terminate the teacher was not arbitrary or capricious because it was clearly supported by the hearing officerâs findings alone. Id. at 157, 159. Those findings, which we detailed in our opinion, included relevant district policy and Flamingâs knowledge of that policy. Id. at 159. Â¶39Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, unlike in Blaine and Flaming, there is no evidence to suggest common knowledge of any District policy regarding teachersâ rights and obligations while on administrative leave. We therefore have no basis for concluding that the Board, silent regarding the evidentiary support for its reasonableness determination, did not exceed its authority. Â¶40Â Â Â Â Â Â Â There is no contractual provision governing these circumstances either. While Ritzertâs contract is not in the record, a Salary Verification and Intent to Return Form is. It states, in relevant part, that a teacher owes a school district damages: [I]f [the teacher] abandons, breaches, or otherwise refuses to perform services for this school district . . . unless the teacher has given written notice to the Board . . . on or before July 1, 2012 that the teacher will not fulfill the obligations of [the teacherâs] appointment during the succeeding academic year or after the beginning of the academic year . . . . (emphasis added). 6 The Board in its dismissal order thus framed Ritzertâs dismissal according to basic contractual principles: [I]t is more than reasonable to direct a teacher who is currently employed and being compensated by the District to report for duty, including, as in this case, to return to duty from a period of administrative leave with pay. . . . [Ritzert] did not have the right to refuse to return to work or to set the terms and conditions upon which she would return to work. The Board did not believe âa teacher on administrative leave with pay has the right to obtain other employment, continue her employment with the District, and refuse to return to work at the District even if she is going to be dismissed.â That may be true, but the question here is not simply whether it was reasonable for the District to order Ritzert back to work even if it was going to dismiss her. The question is whether it was reasonable for the District to order her to return to work after it not only told her it was going to fire her, but also advised her to look for new employment because it would not ask her back. Â¶41Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Indeed, the hearing officer concluded that Ritzert âhad no basis to know that the School District would be ordering her back as a substituteâ (emphasis added). Inherent in this conclusion is the lack of a clear policyâexpress or impliedâthat would allow the hearing officer to conclude the Districtâs order was reasonable. Without some reference to the hearing officerâs findings to support the Boardâs conclusion, we are left to speculate whether the Boardâs contractual argument was based on evidence considered and rejected by the hearing officer. See deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 227; see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1291 (explaining that requiring school boardâs ultimate findings to be fully warranted by hearing officerâs evidentiary findings âfosters meaningful judicial review . . . by requiring that the grounds for any finding of ultimate fact by the board be clearly disclosed and adequately supported by the recordâ). Â¶42Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Boardâs justifications for its findings were announced for the first time in its Order of Dismissal and have no discernible basis in the hearing officerâs findings. WeÂ therefore conclude that the Boardâs decision in this case was not âfully warrantedâ by the hearing officerâs findings and was arbitrary and capricious.
Â¶43Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The Boardâs failure to ground its findings of ultimate fact in the hearing officerâs evidentiary findings, as determined above, means that its reasonableness determination was not âfully warrantedâ by those findings and was therefore arbitrary and capricious. âFully warrantedâ cannot solely mean based exclusively on the hearing officerâs findings and incorporating no others; it must also encompass a requirement to consider the entirety of the hearing officerâs evidentiary determinations. Thus, in order for a school boardâs reasonableness determination to survive arbitrary and capricious review, it must be made in consideration of all the hearing officerâs evidentiary findings. Â¶44Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In other contexts, we have recognized that an inquiry into what is reasonable necessarily requires an examination of the underlying circumstances. See, e.g., Herr v.Â People, 198 P.3d 108, 114 (Colo. 2008) (âWhat constitutes a reasonable effort [to secure a ruling on a Crim. P. 35(b) motion] by the defendant is dependent on the unique circumstances of the case.â (emphasis added)); Farmers Grp., Inc. v. Trimble, 691 P.2d 1138, 1142 (Colo. 1984) (â[T]he standard applicable to establish the tort of bad faith remains one of reasonableness under the circumstances.â (emphasis added)); Spensieri v. Farmers All. Mut. Ins. Co., 804 P.2d 268, 270 (Colo. App. 1990) (holding that when an attorney fee award is made under a statute that does not define âreasonable,â the award should be determined âin light of all circumstancesâ (emphasis added)). ConsistentÂ with these cases, Blackâs Law Dictionary defines âreasonableâ as â[f]air, proper, or moderate under the circumstances; sensible.â 1456 (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added) . Â¶45Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Importing these general guidelines into the present inquiry, we conclude that a board cannot appraise reasonableness in a vacuum, turning a blind eye to the attending circumstances or entertaining only those facts that allow it to achieve a preordained result. The Boardâs dismissal order here does both. Â¶46Â Â Â Â Â Â Â First, the Boardâs dismissal order is contrary to the hearing officerâs finding that the Districtâs order was pretextual and made âwith an eye to developing an additional basis to dismiss [Ritzert] for insubordination.â The hearing officer concluded that the District, faced with having to prove the actual and more substantial charges of neglect of duty and other good and just cause, seized on the opportunity to tack on the insubordination charge when it learned about Ritzertâs new employment. Â¶47Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Blackâs Law Dictionary defines âpretextâ as a âfalse or weak reason or motive advanced to hide the actual or strong reason or motive.â 1380. Here, it is evident that the hearing officer found the insubordination charge to be a false or weak reason justifying Ritzertâs dismissal in light of the Districtâs âoverall conduct toward [her]â and the limited number of grounds for dismissal specified under TECDA. Â¶48Â Â Â Â Â Â Â This finding is not speculation or a mere expression of disapproval for how the Board handled Ritzertâs situation. The hearing officer made this finding after he considered the entire constellation of facts, including the testimony from the Districtâs witnesses and the evidence of its collective actions leading up to Ritzertâs noncompliance. The finding is an inference based on a credibility determination thatÂ the hearing officer was both empowered and expected to make as a neutral adjudicator. deKoevend, 688 P.2d at 226 (âIt is the hearing officer, rather than the board, who âis empowered to assess credibility, weigh conflicting evidence and draw factual inferences from the testimony and exhibits introduced by the parties.ââ (quoting Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1119)); see also Blaine, 748 P.2d at 1286â87 (âThe function of the hearing officer is to review the evidence and testimony, to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh conflicting evidence, [and] to draw reasonable inferences from the facts . . . .â). Â¶49Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Second, the Board did not mention the following additional undisputed evidentiary facts in its Order of Dismissal: (1) when the District placed Ritzert on leave, Air Academyâs principal told her she would not be returning to work at the school; (2) on May 10, 2012, the Assistant Superintendent for Human Resources for the District asked Ritzert to resign; (3) he asked her again two days later; (4) he also told her that the Board would dismiss her at its upcoming June meeting; and (5) the District did not show any interest in having Ritzert return to work until it learned about her employment with Falcon, which was after the date on which teachers were required to report for work in the District. By omitting these facts and focusing solely on Ritzertâs refusal to comply with the Districtâs order, the Board failed to meet the basic standard of assessing the reasonableness of a districtâs directive on a case-by-case basis. The Boardâs reasoning focused solely on the legitimacy of the Districtâs authority to issue the order but insulated the District from having to prove the order was reasonable under the circumstances. The Boardâs inadequate consideration of the full extent of theÂ hearing officerâs findings leads us to conclude that it did not properly assess the reasonableness of the Districtâs order and that its action was arbitrary and capricious. Â¶50Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Upholding the Boardâs order here would allow a school district to place a teacher on indefinite administrative leave, advising her that she will return from leave only if she prevails in the dismissal proceeding. If the teacher gets a job in another district while she awaits the proceedingâs outcome, the first district can order the teacher back to work merely to force her to choose which contractual obligation to honor. If the teacher chooses not to return, under the Boardâs reasoning, the district avoids any accountability for its conduct towards the teacher, including its manipulation of the situation to trigger the insubordination used to justify the teacherâs dismissal. This would nullify the statutory grounds for dismissal designed to protect teachers from arbitrary and capricious termination, thereby contravening a fundamental purpose of the dismissal procedures provided for under TECDA.