Opinion ID: 149135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reinstatement of Travis Thompson

Text: Cortez terminated Travis Thompson under Article 52 after an avoidable runaway accident, but later agreed to reinstatement in settlement of Thompson's resultant grievance. At his deposition, Cortez explained that the basis for reinstating Thompsonand, as we will see, several other comparatorswas that Thompson admitted and expressed remorse for the infraction. See Aplt.App. at 319-21. Cortez specifically noted that remorseful acknowledgment of error is what distinguished Thompson from Mr. Medlock. [6] Id. at 322-23. Medlock does not challenge the soundness of treating employees who admit error and indicate a motivation to avoid it in future differently than those who do notnor would we be in a position to second-guess such business judgment in any event, see, e.g., Salguero v. City of Clovis, 366 F.3d 1168, 1177 (10th Cir.2004); Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1233 (10th Cir.2000). Rather, Medlock points to several aspects of Cortez's deposition testimony that, he claims, undercut in different ways this stated justification for the disparate treatment. First, Medlock notes that Cortez could not remember the incident involving Thompson when initially questioned about it, yet an hour later was able to come up with the specific reasons why he reinstated Thompson but not Medlock. But a straightforward explanation for this came from Cortez himself: he had been looking through the paperwork over the last hour and had refreshed his memory. Aplt.App. at 320. Medlock cites no authority, nor are we aware of any, indicating that a memory refreshed in this way is per se insufficient to support summary judgment. On the contrary, see Crockett v. Abraham, 284 F.3d 131, 133-34 (D.C.Cir.2002) (granting summary judgment for employer based on justification for denial of promotion provided by decision-maker only after she refreshed her memory through review of pertinent records). Second, Medlock points to one response in Cortez's deposition where he referred to Thompson as [t]his young man. Aplt.App. at 320. We cannot agree with Medlock that this one passing use of a common colloquial reference to a younger adult male, used well after the operative events giving rise to this suit, materially undercuts the facial neutrality of the reason given by Cortez for reinstating Thompson but not Medlock. Third, Medlock makes much of Cortez's acknowledgment that his practice of reinstating Article 52 violators who admitted misconduct and pledged to correct it was not mandated by a formally documented UPS policy. Evidently, the tacit premise here is that an otherwise reasonable justification for a business decision somehow loses its legitimacy simply because it reflects an exercise of managerial judgment rather than a ministerial execution of written policyas if a manager could not legitimately fire an employee for vandalizing property, stealing from co-workers, or assaulting a customer absent a formal company policy specifically addressing such misconduct. Medlock offers no authority for this facially untenable idea, which is belied by countless employment discrimination cases decided on the basis of legitimate business justifications without any reference to formal policies necessarily legitimizing those justifications. Indeed, such a constricted view of legitimacy would render suspect innumerable decisions required in the practical operation of the workplace, leaving the management of businesses open to just the sort of second-guessing the case law consistently admonishes against. The decision at issue here is a case in point: we are asked to second-guess a classic (and facially plausible) business judgment by a manager, regarding the disciplinary relevance of an employee's remorseful acceptance of responsibility, simply because that judgment had not been preordained by a written policy. The law does not permit, much less require, us to do so. Finally, and more materially, Medlock cites this qualification by Cortez in his response regarding the reinstatement of a hypothetically remorseful Medlock: If Mr. Medlock had come in and said I left the vehicle in neutral or I didn't set the park brake; it was my fault, I'm remorseful[,] then the outcome could have turned out differently. I can't sit here and say yes, for sure he would have been able to come back. . . . . Chances are I would have [let him come back]. Aplt.App. at 323 (emphasis added). There is no further elaboration or follow-up explanation of this qualification, at least on the incomplete record of the deposition provided us. Thus, we are left with a bald concession by the decision-maker that, even if the asserted justification for treating Medlock differently had been absent, he might still have been treated differently. There may well be other reasonable interpretations of or explanations for the qualification expressed by Cortez, but one is relevant to the critical issue of motivation: it is an acknowledgment that the reason given as the sole basis for reinstating Thompson but not Medlock was not necessarily the only basis for treating these two employees differently. Thus, the asserted justification for the disparate treatment does not fully negate the possibility that age discrimination could have played a role in a potentially mixed-motive decision. This does not avail Medlock on his ADEA claim, for which it is not the employer's burden to negate any possible contributory role played by age in the challenged adverse action but, conversely, the employee's burden to show that age was the but for cause of the action. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2343, 2351, 174 L.Ed.2d 119 (2009). Cortez's testimony does not establish a triable issue of age as the but-for cause here. His main point, that failure to admit fault was the only operative basis for his decision not to reinstate Medlock, obviously weighs against age even being a factor. His hypothetical qualificationthat had Medlock admitted fault, something else might have led Cortez not to grant reinstatementdoes not deny the causal operation of the stated justification on the actual facts, much less substitute age as the but-for cause to satisfy Gross. Cortez merely acknowledged that some other, unspecified consideration(s) could count against reinstating Medlock, so that Medlock's failure to admit fault, though the operative basis for denying reinstatement here, may not constitute a but-for cause for doing so. But that is immaterial under Gross: it is not UPS's burden to show that its justification was the but-for cause for its challenged action, i.e., that it would have reinstated Medlock but for his failure to admit fault; rather, Medlock must show that age was the but-for cause, i.e., that UPS would have reinstated him, despite his failure to admit fault, but for his age. Nothing Cortez said supports the latter inference. [7] Indeed, nothing he said affirmatively supports an inference that age played any role in his decision. In sum, the comparison with Thompson does not create a triable issue of pretext or, alternatively, in prima facie case terms, the comparison does not give rise to a reasonable inference of age discrimination, see supra note 5. We turn next to the other Article 52 violators who were reinstated.