Opinion ID: 2114734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: arising out of and in course of employment

Text: Frank finally argues the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was no evidence proving his injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment at A & L. The Court of Appeals observed that the record sufficiently demonstrated that Frank's general carpentry work over the last 25 years subjected his arms, hands, and shoulders to numerous traumas each day. However, the Court of Appeals determined that [w]hile there may be sufficient evidence of trauma, there is no evidence showing the significance of that trauma or that it was greater then [sic] the ordinary wear and tear suffered by carpenters generally. Essentially, the court concluded there was no evidence of an accident warranting a workers' compensation award. Even though A & L's counsel stated during oral argument that I suspect ... there's enough information for [the judge] to determine that there was an accident, we will address Frank's contention given the absence of a clear indication of waiver. Compare State v. Reichert, 242 Neb. 33, 492 N.W.2d 874 (1992) (holding that where counsel concedes at oral argument that record does not support alleged error, error is waived). In Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, 239 Neb. 854, 860, 479 N.W.2d 440, 445 (1992), we addressed a similar situation to the case at bar, where we stated: While it is ... quite clear that a condition resulting from the cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma has some characteristics of both an accidental injury and an occupational disease... the compensability of ... a condition [resulting from the cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma] is to be tested under the statutory definition of accident. (Quoting Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 238 Neb. 209, 469 N.W.2d 542 (1991).) Under § 48-151(2), an accident is defined as an unexpected or unforeseen injury happening suddenly and violently, with or without human fault, and producing at the time objective symptoms of an injury. See, also, Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, 211 Neb. 149, 317 N.W.2d 910 (1982). The unexpected or unforeseen requirement of § 48-151(2) is satisfied if either the cause was of an accidental nature or the effect was unexpected or unforeseen. See McLaughlin v. Self-Insurance Servs., 219 Neb. 260, 361 N.W.2d 585 (1985). Here, there is no indication that Frank's condition was either expected or foreseeable. While he had complained of pain in the trapezius muscle for a time in 1993 and a lower back injury in late 1994, Frank had no complaints about his wrists, elbows, or shoulders until 1995. From the evidence, the Workers' Compensation Court could properly conclude that Frank's injuries, which were diagnosed in August of 1995, were not expected or foreseen. Based on Dr. Rohrick's opinions, the court could also properly conclude that Frank's 1995 treatment was not causally connected with his complaints of 1993 and 1994. The second specification of § 48-151(2) requires that an employee's injury must occur suddenly and violently to be compensable. We have held that suddenly and violently does not mean instantaneously and with force. The specification suddenly and violently is satisfied if the injury occurs at an identifiable point in time, requiring the employee to discontinue employment and seek medical treatment. Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, supra . Frank was asked during trial, [C]an you tell me when in 1995 you started having some physical difficulties while you were working, and Frank replied, [I]n the spring. Frank was then asked what type of activities he was performing when he first noticed these difficulties. Frank testified he had been doing some stucco work, which involved taking out windows and beating [the stucco] off with a hammer. Frank testified that he first noticed his right wrist began hurting while he was performing the stucco work. Frank also testified that within a week of the initial onset his left arm, along with his right and left shoulders, began hurting. These physical difficulties ultimately became so intolerable that Frank was forced to consult Dr. Gilles on August 8, 1995. Based on these facts, we find the record sufficient to satisfy the second specification. The third specification in § 48-151(2), that the accident produced objective symptoms, is satisfied if the symptoms manifest themselves according to the natural course of such things without any independent intervening cause. Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, supra ; Sandel v. Packaging Co. of America, supra . `We are of the opinion that the expression has a wider meaning, and that symptoms of pain, and anguish, such as weakness, pallor, faintness, sickness, nausea, expressions of pain clearly involuntary, or any other symptoms indicating a deleterious change in the bodily condition may constitute objective symptoms as required by the statute.' Sandel, 211 Neb. at 157, 317 N.W.2d at 915-16. Frank clearly manifested such symptoms when he found he could not continue to work, given the pain he was experiencing. The injuries in his upper extremities manifested themselves when his right wrist and left hand began hurting, his right-hand fingers started tingling, and his right shoulder and neck began hurting. When he consulted Dr. Gilles, he complained of pain in both shoulders, his left elbow, and his right wrist. After thoroughly examining him, Dr. Gilles diagnosed Frank with numerous problems affecting his spine, shoulders, and wrists. We find the facts of this case sufficient to support the Workers' Compensation Court's finding that Frank suffered a work-related accident. We therefore reverse the Court of Appeals' finding that Frank's injuries did not arise out of and in the course of his employment at A & L.