Opinion ID: 1389408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: retraction statute

Text: 4. In addition to granting Cannon partial summary judgment, the trial court also denied Mathis summary judgment, rejecting his contention that Cannon's failure to seek a retraction means he cannot recover punitive damages. The second issue in this case is whether the retraction statute applies to a publication involving the Internet and a non-media defendant, like Mathis, or applies solely to the written publications of the traditional print media. Although the dissent suggests that we should avoid deciding this issue because it is not properly before this Court, the Georgia Constitution gives this Court the power to review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are of gravity or great public importance. [27] In this case, the trial court and court of appeals decided the retraction statute issue, Mathis and Cannon briefed the issue in seeking this Court's review, and Cannon and amici thoroughly argued the issue in their briefs after we granted certiorari. Under these circumstances, we choose to rule on the statutory interpretation issue, which involves a question of law, rather than allow an erroneous court of appeals' interpretation to stand as the law of this state. OCGA § 51-5-11, the state retraction statute, provides that a plaintiff in any libel action shall not be entitled to any punitive damages if the defendant corrects and retracts the libelous statement in a regular issue of the newspaper or other publication in question after receiving a written demand. The relevant provisions state: (a) In any civil action for libel which charges the publication of an erroneous statement alleged to be libelous, it shall be relevant and competent evidence for either party to prove that the plaintiff requested retraction in writing at least seven days prior to the filing of the action or omitted to request retraction in this manner. (b) In any such action, the defendant may allege and give proof of the following matters, as applicable: (1) (A).... (B) That the defendant, in a regular issue of the newspaper or other publication in question, within seven days after receiving written demand, or in the next regular issue of the newspaper or other publication following receipt of the demand if the next regular issue was not published within seven days after receiving the demand, corrected and retracted the allegedly libelous statement in as conspicuous and public a manner as that in which the alleged libelous statement was published. There is a similar statute that applies in defamation actions involving a visual or sound broadcast. [28] Unlike the cases involving the Internet from other states cited by the dissent, the Georgia statute deals solely with claims for punitive damages in libel actions and does not affect an individual's right to sue for libel. In construing the retraction statute, we consider the statutory language and legislative intent in enacting it. Generally we give words their ordinary signification, except that we construe words of art or words connected with a particular trade or subject matter according to their meaning within that subject matter or trade. `It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that a statute must be construed in relation to other statutes of which it is a part, and all statutes relating to the same subject-matter, briefly called statutes in pari materia, are construed together.' [29] A review of the libel and slander code sections, of which the retraction statutes are a part, shows that the word publication is used in five different sections. OCGA § 51-5-1 defines libel as a false and malicious defamation of another and requires that the publication of the libelous matter is essential to recovery. OCGA § 51-5-2 defines newspaper libel as a false and malicious defamation of another in any newspaper, magazine, or periodical and also requires the publication of the libelous matter as essential to recovery. OCGA § 51-5-3 explains what constitutes publication of libel: A libel is published as soon as it is communicated to any person other than the party libeled. OCGA § 51-5-10 refers to the publication or utterance of a statement. Finally, the retraction statute, OCGA § 51-5-11, uses the word in three places. Subsection (a) provides that the retraction statute applies in any civil action for libel which charges the publication of an erroneous statement; subsection (b) permits the defendant to prove that a retraction has been published in a regular issue of the newspaper or other publication in question; and subsection (c) permits the defendant to plead the publication of the correction, retraction, or explanation in mitigation. The court of appeals in 1984 interpreted the provision newspaper and other publication in subsection (b) to mean a written publication produced by the print media. [30] Although the language of the retraction statute provides some support for this interpretation, we find it problematic for several reasons. First, it ignores legislative history showing that the General Assembly adopted the phrase other publication as a substitute for magazine or periodical in the initial statute. [31] This change suggests that the legislature intended for the retraction statute to apply to more than newspaper libel as defined in OCGA § 51-5-2. Second, the court of appeals gives the same word, publication, a different meaning within the same code section and a meaning other than the one historically used in defamation law. Third, the court of appeals makes a distinction between media and nonmedia defendants that is difficult to apply and makes little sense when the speech is about matters of public concern. [32] Finally, the court's definition fails to accommodate changes in communications and the publishing industry due to the computer and the Internet. [33] For example, under its view the retraction statute would not apply to a story that appears only on the on-line version of a newspaper or an advocacy group's monthly electronic newsletter to its members reporting on congressional voting. Moreover, we find unpersuasive the appellate court's rationale in this case for following the plain language of the retraction statutes. [34] Nothing in OCGA § 51-5-11 precludes applying the retraction statute to individuals. To the contrary, if the purpose of punitive damages in libel actions is to punish the speaker, it is fairer to prohibit punitive damages in actions brought against individuals, who may communicate a defamatory falsehood to one person, than to the traditional press, which publishes the defamatory statement to greater numbers of people. Also contrary to the court's reasoning, there is no guarantee that a retraction made by a newspaper, television station, or radio station would likely reach the same audience that heard the original defamatory statement. Therefore, a retraction posted on an Internet bulletin board is as likely to reach the same people who read the original message as any retraction printed in a newspaper or spoken on a broadcast. For these reasons, we reject the definition of the court of appeals as overly restrictive. Instead, we construe the word publication in subsection (b) of the retraction statute as meaning a communication made to any person other than the party libeled. [35] Under this interpretation, the retraction statute applies to the words that Mathis wrote in his messages posted on the bulletin board of Waste Industries, Inc. The practical effect of this decision is to require all libel plaintiffs who intend to seek punitive damages to request a correction or retraction before filing their civil action against any person for publishing a false, defamatory statement. Our reasons for preferring this broader reading are many. This construction makes the same word mean the same thing in all the libel and slander code sections. It treats a publication for purposes of seeking a retraction the same as a publication for purposes of imposing liability. It acknowledges that the legislature extended the retraction defense originally created for newspapers, magazines, and periodicals to include newspapers and other publications. It encourages defamation victims to seek self-help, their first remedy, by using available opportunities to contradict the lie or correct the error and thereby to minimize its adverse impact on reputation. [36] It eliminates the difficult task of determining what is a written publication and who is the print media at a time when any individual with a computer can become a publisher. [37] It supports free speech by extending the same protection to the private individual who speaks on matters of public concern as newspapers and other members of the press now enjoy. In short, it strikes a balance in favor of uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate in an age of communications when anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet can address a worldwide audience of readers in cyberspace. [38] Applying our decision to the facts here, we find that Cannon asked the Internet service provider Yahoo! to delete the three messages that Mathis posted, but did not ask Mathis to correct or retract any of his statements. Because it is undisputed that Cannon did not request a correction or retraction in writing before filing his complaint, he is not entitled to recover punitive damages from Mathis for any defamatory statements posted on the bulletin board on the Internet. Judgment reversed.