Opinion ID: 762503
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disputed Findings

Text: 39 The district court's adoption of an incorrect standard for the unions' rebuttal burden requires remand of the Special Master's findings of class membership with respect to two claimants, because we are unable to determine whether the Master would have made the same findings if he had applied the correct burden of proof. In the remaining disputed cases, the validity of the Master's findings turns not on the quantum of the parties' evidence, but on issues that can be resolved without reference to the burden of proof. Our disposition of the findings disputed by the parties is as follows: 40 1. O.C. Brown. The plaintiff class includes those experienced rodmen who attempted to become, or were deterred or discouraged from becoming, members of Local 201 during the liability period-i.e., between June 1971 and October 21, 1975. See Order of Reference, J.A. 216; see also Berger I, 843 F.2d at 1411. Although there was uncontested evidence to support the Special Master's finding that O.C. Brown was discouraged and deterred from admission to Local 201, J.A. 86, the conclusion that this occurred during the liability period depends upon disputed inferences from circumstantial evidence. Because we are unable to determine whether the Master would have reached the same conclusion had he applied the correct burden of proof, we remand Brown's case for redetermination. 41 2. Silburn Francis. There was conflicting testimony and other evidence as to whether Silburn Francis sought union membership during, rather than after, the liability period. See J.A. 400-04. Because the Special Master weighed this evidence according to an incorrect standard, we remand for redetermination under the correct burden of proof. 5 42 3. John Offer. The unions do not dispute that John Offer sought union membership in June 1972. They contend, however, that this predat[es] the critical period, which they define as October 21, 1972 to October 21, 1975. The unions are mistaken as to the start of the liability period. October 21, 1972 starts the period for which the remedy of back pay is available under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See Order of Reference, J.A. 216. However, as Berger I held, membership in the class is established by having sought (or having been deterred from seeking) entry into the union from the end of the Open Period [June, 1971] until the filing of suit on October 21, 1975--notwithstanding that back pay may not be awarded for the early part of that period. See 843 F.2d at 1422. See generally Thomas v. Denny's, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1513-14 (10th Cir.1997) (discussing distinction between a liability limitation period, which may effectively be extended by a continuing violation, and the period within which damages can be recovered, which is fixed by statute). 43 The unions also contend that Offer was ineligible for the Apprenticeship Program for the lawful reasons that he could not meet that Program's educational (high school diploma) and age requirements. However, because Berger I established that the Apprenticeship Program itself was an unlawful prerequisite to union membership for experienced rodmen, see 843 F.2d at 1414, 1421, that Program's own prerequisites are irrelevant. Offer's membership in the class is affirmed. 44 4. Wordia Parks. Wordia Parks appeals from the Special Master's finding that he abandoned efforts to join Local 201 prior to the eligibility period, and that he therefore neither sought nor was discouraged from seeking membership during that period. See J.A. 461. The Special Master also found that Parks' evidence was inconsistent and contradictory, and that he had repeatedly impeached his own responses to interrogatory questions. J.A. 462. The Master's findings regarding Parks are not clearly erroneous and therefore are affirmed. 45 5. Charles Dean and Eldridge Harmon. To be a member of the class, a claimant must have been an experienced rodman. The unions challenge the Special Master's finding that Charles Dean and Eldridge Harmon were sufficiently experienced, on the ground that the Master counted nonunion rodwork toward the number of hours required to be regarded as experienced. This, the unions contend, is contrary to the law of the case, because Berger I assertedly established that only union-referred rodwork could be counted as experience. We reject this contention because nothing in Berger I limited the definition of experience to union-referred rodwork. See 843 F.2d at 1414-15, 1421-22. 46 Counting non-union-referred experience, the Special Master accepted the deposition testimony that Charles Dean had the 2,150 hours of experience that all agree is sufficient to establish the necessary experience. See J.A. 990. The Master further noted in his report that by 1974, Dean had performed rodwork for seven years, J.A. 391, which is far in excess of the two-year figure from which the 2,150-hours number was extrapolated. See Berger I, 843 F.2d at 1414. Because the unions offer no evidence to rebut this prima facie case--no evidence at all that Dean's total hours were less than 2,150--Dean's membership in the class is affirmed. 47 With regard to Eldridge Harmon, the Special Master expressly credited Harmon's testimony that he had worked over 2,150 hours by December 1972. J.A. 407. Although the unions complain that the Master should have required Harmon to provide documentation to substantiate his testimony, they offer no evidence to rebut Harmon's prima facie case. Accordingly, Harmon's membership is affirmed as well. 48 6. Alfonzia Berger. Claimant Alfonzia Berger appeals the Special Master's decision to deny him class membership on the ground that he had no rodwork experience prior to 1974. Although Berger now argues that he was discouraged from seeking the very experience that would have made him a class member, the holding in Berger I was limited to discrimination against experienced rodmen. 843 F.2d at 1419. Alfonzia Berger is not a member of the class of experienced rodmen, and the Special Master's determination is therefore affirmed. 49 7. Paul Brown, James Hicks, and James Brown. The unions contend that the Special Master should have excluded from the class two claimants who failed the Open Period exam (Paul Brown and James Hicks), and one claimant who assertedly failed to take that exam despite being given an opportunity to do so (James Brown), because those failures allegedly demonstrate that these claimants were not qualified to be union journeymen. Berger I, however, made clear that the relevant question is not whether a claimant was qualified during the Open Period, but whether he was qualified during the liability period--which did not begin until the Open Period ended. The union is liable, we said, to those class members who were experienced workers, but were delayed entry to union ranks by the particular educational prerequisites affecting them from the end of the Open Period until the filing of suit on October 21, 1975. 843 F.2d at 1422. That is the issue upon which the Special Master properly focused. See, e.g., J.A. 383, 412. 50 Although a failure on the Open Period exam may have rendered a claimant unqualified to enter the union during that period, contrary to Judge Sentelle's dissent it did not by itself render him unqualified to do so during the liability period. The Local did not have a rule that an applicant who failed the Open Period exam (or any other pre-liability period exam) was ineligible to gain entry by subsequently taking and passing the exam during the liability period. Indeed, claimant Hicks was permitted to do just that, and passed the exam in 1974. J.A. 412. Failing to pass the exam during the Open Period is no different than having had less than 2,150 hours of rodwork experience during that period. It may mean a claimant was unqualified to be a journeyman at that time; it does not mean he could not become qualified by the time of the liability period. 51 Nor was a failure on the Open Period exam conclusive evidence that a claimant would have failed had he been permitted to take the exam during the liability period. As we noted in Berger I, the Open Period exam was different from and notably more difficult than the exam offered during the liability period. During the Open Period, only 70.6% of white examinees and 35.3% of black examinees passed the exam. By contrast, 100% of white rodmen and 97.6% of black rodmen who took the exam given during the liability period passed. 843 F.2d at 1405-06 n. 2. 52 The Special Master's determination of class membership for these claimants is affirmed. 53 8. Albert Berger. Finally, claimant Albert Berger appeals the Special Master's decision to deny him class membership on the ground that he failed the exam and then failed to avail himself of an opportunity to retake the exam during the Open Period. This denial is inconsistent with the Master's correct decision not to exclude the preceding claimants for the same reason. Berger's failure prior to the liability period neither rendered him unqualified to retake the exam during the liability period, nor indicated he would fail again if permitted to do so. Indeed, like Hicks, Berger ultimately did retake and pass the exam in 1974. J.A. 361. He was not permitted to do so, however, until he completed the Training Program--a requirement we held unlawfully discriminatory in Berger I, 843 F.2d at 1414, 1421. Accordingly, Albert Berger's exclusion from the class is reversed.