Opinion ID: 185211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Motions for new trials that implicate jurisdictional issuesare reviewed de novo. See United States v. Torres, 115 F.3d1033, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Although we typically reviewdenials of new trial motions for abuse of discretion, becausethe district court dismissed Torres's motion on jurisdictionalgrounds, our review is de novo. (internal citations omitted)).
The District Court's actions are clearly proscribed by theSupreme Court's decision in Carlisle v. United States, 517U.S. 416 (1996), a case that the District Court's opinion failsto mention. In Carlisle, the Court considered whether adistrict court had authority to grant a post-verdict motion forjudgment of acquittal filed just one day outside of the timelimit prescribed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c). Rule 29(c) provides, in relevant part, that [i]f the juryreturns a verdict of guilty ..., a motion for judgment ofacquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after thejury is discharged or within such further time as the courtmay fix during the 7-day period. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). Itis true that the petitioner in Carlisle, unlike Mr. Hall, filed anuntimely motion. This factual distinction is not cause formuch concern, however, because like Mr. Hall, the petitionerin Carlisle argued that district courts should have the discretion to step outside of the Rules' strict time limits, and it isthis latter assertion upon which the Carlisle Court ultimatelyfocused. In particular, the Court read Rule 29(c) in conjunction with Rule 45(b), which provides that, absent a showing ofexcusable neglect, the court may not extend the time fortaking any action under Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35, except to theextent and under the conditions stated in them. Fed. R.Crim. P. 45(b). This language convinced the Court that, because [t]hese rules are plain and unambiguous ...[, t]here is simply no room in the text of Rules 29 and 45(b)for the granting of an untimely postverdict motion of acquittal.... Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 421. The Court thereforeconcluded that the text of the relevant Rules did not authorize district courts to circumvent Rule 29's time limits. The Court also considered and rejected petitioner's argument that, in the absence of textual support from the Rulesthemselves, courts retain limited inherent supervisory authority to depart from the Rules' strict time limits. Inadvancing this argument, the petitioner in Carlisle relied onUnited States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499 (1983), where theCourt held that courts may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or theCongress. Id. at 505. The Carlisle Court read the decisionin Hasting very narrowly, however, holding that [w]hateverthe scope of this 'inherent power,' ... it does not include thepower to develop rules that circumvent or conflict with theFederal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at426. In other words, as a general principle, when the text ofa rule is clear, it must be enforced as written. The Courtallowed that a failure to meet a prescribed time limit mightbe excused in the 'unique circumstances' that the cause ofthe failure to meet the Rule's deadline was an erroneousruling or assurance by the District Court itself. Id. at 428. At bottom, however, Carlisle says that [t]he case law of [the]Court ... does not establish any 'inherent power' to act incontravention of applicable Rules. Id. In the present case, Rule 33 is unambiguous. The Rulemeans what it says: A court can only extend the time inwhich to grant a motion for a new trial if a court fixes such atime within 7 days of the verdict or finding of guilty. Rule45(b) resolves any possible ambiguity by noting that a districtcourt's authority to extend time is limited to the extent andunder the conditions stated in Rule 33. Fed. R. Crim. P.45(b). We recognize that a trial court may exercise long ... unquestioned inherent power in the enforcement of Rules, but such a power may only be exercised when it does not runafoul of an express and unambiguous Rule to the contrary. Carlisle, 517 U.S. at 426. The long ... unquestioned powercaveat therefore has no application in this case, because Rule33 is absolutely clear in its terms. The District Court in this case sought to justify its disputedaction by suggesting that it would be fundamentally unfair toreject Mr. Hall's untimely motion: To penalize the defendant for the Court's delay in granting the motion, which delay resulted from an effort of the Court, sua sponte, to protect the government's right to respond, would be manifestly unjust, if not an unconstitutional violation of the due process clause. Mem. Op. at 4. We disagree. Indeed, the defendant doesnot even contend that the District Court somehow erred infailing to respond to the motion for extension of time withinthe 7-day period. This is not surprising, because nothing inRule 33 compels a district court to respond to a motion for anextension of time within the 7-day time limit; the Rulemerely provides that after the 7-day window has closed, adistrict court is without jurisdiction to grant an extension oftime. Thus, although the trial court's decision to delay itsdecision did not violate any law, its decision to grant anextension of time after the 7-day window had closed necessarily abrogated Rule 33 and was thus impermissible. Furthermore, there was no reason why Mr. Hall could nothave filed a motion for a new trial within Rule 33's 7-day timelimit. At oral argument, counsel offered no explanation forthis oversight, and we can discern none. Finally, Mr. Hall argues that the District Court effectivelyconverted a defense objection into a motion for a new trialwhen the trial judge addressed the parties before the casewas submitted to the jury. Following closing argument byMr. Hall's attorney, the prosecutor, in rebuttal, warned thejury not to allow Mr. Hall's attorney to get away with playinga race card. Mem. Op. at 7. Mr. Hall's attorney objectedand requested the trial judge to instruct the jury to disregard