Opinion ID: 1264793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Funkhouser v. Wilson

Text: We must first decide whether a church and its officials have a special relationship with either its workers or the children of its congregation which gives rise to a duty to take reasonable measures to prevent harm intentionally inflicted on the children by a church worker. The alleged facts pertaining to this issue are as follows: In 1968, David Schulz, a church elder, received a telephone call while he was doing volunteer work at the Church. The exact content of the conversation is disputed. However, Schulz admits the caller identified herself, asked to speak with a person of authority within the Church, and asserted inappropriate sexual conduct by Orin Wilson (the alleged molester of the plaintiffs) toward a young girl. At the time of the call, plaintiffs were living out-of-state. By 1969, one year later, plaintiffs had moved to Washington, their father had begun his pastorship at the Church and Schulz had become the first chairman of the Church's deacon board. At the time, Schulz did nothing to warn plaintiffs or their father of the accusation, or to prevent or discourage Wilson from being involved with the youth of the church. Schulz was, however, concerned enough that he watched, listened, and observed Wilson. Nevertheless, Wilson was subsequently made a deacon and was entrusted with various leadership positions within the Church that allegedly provided extensive contact with and authority over children. [10] We begin with the now well established principle that where a special relationship exists, a duty to protect against the intentional or criminal acts of third parties may arise. See, e.g., Nivens v. 7-11 Hoagy's Corner, 133 Wash.2d 192, 200, 943 P.2d 286 (1997); Niece, 131 Wash.2d at 43, 929 P.2d 420. A special relationship between the defendant and the intentional tortfeasor may give rise to a duty to control the tortfeasor's conduct for the benefit of third persons. See Niece, 131 Wash.2d at 43, 929 P.2d 420. A special relationship between the defendant and the victim may give rise to a duty to protect the victim against foreseeable harms, including harms intentionally caused. Many special relationships give rise to a duty to prevent harms caused by the intentional or criminal conduct of third parties. Niece, 131 Wash.2d at 44, 929 P.2d 420. Thus, for instance, a school has a duty to protect students within its custody from reasonably anticipated dangers, an innkeeper has a duty to protect its guests, and a hospital its patients. See Niece, 131 Wash.2d at 44-5, 929 P.2d 420 (citing cases). Similarly, even where an employee is acting outside the scope of employment, the relationship between employer and employee gives rise to a limited duty, owed by an employer to foreseeable victims, to prevent the tasks, premises, or instrumentalities entrusted to an employee from endangering others. Niece, 131 Wash.2d at 48, 929 P.2d 420. Whether there is a special relationship between a church and the children of its congregation that gives rise to a duty to protect the children against foreseeable harms is an issue of first impression. In important aspects, however, the activities of a church generate the kind of relationships where we have, in other contexts, imposed a duty of reasonable care. The children of a congregation may be delivered into the custody and care of a church and its workers, whether it be on the premises for services and Sunday school, or off the premises at church sponsored activities or youth camps. As in other agency relationships, a church chooses its officials, directs their activities, and may restrict and control their conduct. In many respects, the activities of a church, and the corresponding duties legitimately imposed upon it, are similar to those of a school. As a matter of public policy, the protection of children is a high priority. In general, therefore, we find churches (and other religious organizations) subject to the same duties of reasonable care as would be imposed on any person or entity in selecting and supervising their workers, or protecting vulnerable persons within their custody, so as to prevent reasonably foreseeable harm. Under the facts of this case, the more difficult question is whether the harm sought to be prevented fell within the scope of any duty. Here, plaintiffs do not allege the molestation perpetrated by Wilson occurred on Church premises or during Church activities. Nor do plaintiffs claim the victims were, at the time of the molestation, specifically within the protective custody of the Church. Nevertheless, plaintiffs assert the Church had a duty to protect the children of its congregation against foreseeable harms perpetrated by a Church official whom the Church placed in authority and in close relationship to church children, knowing of the danger. Funkhouser Supp. Br. at 7. On these facts, the trial court found no duty existed and dismissed the claims of Janelle Larson and Sheri Lewis (the Church had only moved for summary judgment on this issue against these two plaintiffs). The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning churches and the adult church workers who assume responsibility for the spiritual well-being of children of the congregation, whether as paid clergy or as volunteers, have a special relationship with those children that gives rise to a duty to protect them from reasonably foreseeable risk of harm from those members of the congregation whom the church places in positions of responsibility and authority over them. Funkhouser v. Wilson, 89 Wash.App. 644, 660, 950 P.2d 501 (1998). We agree with the Court of Appeals that the Church and Schulz owed a duty of reasonable care, but do so on slightly different grounds. Although we have not previously addressed the issue, we find the reasoning of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, in an analogous context, persuasive. In Marquay v. Eno, 139 N.H. 708, 662 A.2d 272 (1995), former school students who allegedly had been sexually abused by school employees filed suit against the school on theories of negligent supervision and failure to protect. None of the complaints alleged the abuse took place on school premises or during school hours. Marquay, 139 N.H. at 711, 662 A.2d 272. Nevertheless, the New Hampshire Supreme Court did not reject the existence of a duty as a matter of law. The court recognized that a principal's negligent failure to control an agent is not necessarily limited to conduct performed within the scope of employment or during work hours, so long as there is a causal connection between the plaintiffs injury and the fact of the agency relationship. Marquay, 139 N.H. at 719-21, 662 A.2d 272. The court reasoned that, under such circumstances, liability exists not because of when (or where) the injury occurs, but because the actor has brought into contact or association with the [victim] a person whom the actor knows or should know to be peculiarly likely to commit intentional misconduct.... Marquay, 139 N.H. at 719, 662 A.2d 272 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts ง 302B cmt. e(D)). [11] Accordingly, employers have been found liable for criminal conduct by off duty or former employees where such conduct was consistent with a propensity of which the employer knew or should have known, and the association between the victim and the employee was occasioned by the employee's job. Marquay, 139 N.H. at 719-20, 662 A.2d 272 (citing cases). We find the rationale adopted in Marquay persuasive when analogized to the circumstances presented here. In particular, we find the conjunction of four factors present in the case before us decisive to finding the existence of a duty is not foreclosed as a matter of law: (1) the special relationship between the Church and deacon Wilson; (2) the special relationship between the Church and the plaintiffs; (3) the alleged knowledge of the risk of harm possessed by the Church; and (4) the alleged causal connection between Wilson's position in the Church and the resulting harm. Under these circumstances, we simply do not agree with the Church that its duty to take protective action was arbitrarily relieved at the church door. Where a protective special relationship exists, a principal is not free to ignore the risk posed by its agents, place such agents into association with vulnerable persons it would otherwise be required to protect, and then escape liability simply because the harm was accomplished off premises or after-hours. Under these facts, the focus is not on where or when the harm occurred, but on whether the Church or its individual officials negligently caused the harm by placing its agent into association with the plaintiffs when the risk was, or should have been, known. [12] This approach is consistent with our cases recognizing a duty to prevent intentionally inflicted harm where the defendant is in a special relationship with either the tortfeasor or the victim, and where the defendant is or should be aware of the risk. See, e.g., LaLone v. Smith, 39 Wash.2d 167, 172, 234 P.2d 893 (1951) (employer liable for employee's criminal assault on third person because the employer antecedently had reason to believe that an undue risk of harm would exist because of the employment); Taggart v. State, 118 Wash.2d 195, 223-24, 822 P.2d 243 (1992) (special relationship giving rise to a duty to prevent intentional harm need not be custodial or continuous, but arises where ability to supervise is present and necessity for such supervision is or should be known); Petersen v. State, 100 Wash.2d 421, 428-29, 671 P.2d 230 (1983) (psychiatristpatient relationship gives rise to duty to take reasonable precautions to protect all persons foreseeably endangered by mental patient's release into community). Compare Carhen v. Wackenhut Corp., 73 Wash.App. 247, 256, 868 P.2d 882 (1994) (employer liable for security guard's attempted rape if employer knew of or should have known of guard's violent propensities and nevertheless conferred position of authority and responsibility), with Peck v. Siau, 65 Wash.App. 285, 289, 292-94, 827 P.2d 1108 (1992) (school not liable for teacher's off campus sexual assault of student where it did not know, nor reasonably should have known, of the risk posed by teacher). [13] Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, a jury could reasonably find Wilson's position in the Church was a causal factor in the resulting harm. Wilson was a prominent member of the Church, placed into positions of trust over children. This position not only brought him into close connection with the children of the congregation, it allegedly inspired confidence to place the plaintiffs into his care. In addition, there is evidence that Wilson baby-sat the victims in order that their father could travel on Church business and that the Church was aware of this arrangement. Given the Church's specific and superior knowledge of the facts, a jury could reasonably find the Church knew or should have known the children of its congregation, and specifically these particular plaintiffs, were exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm at the hands of Wilson. [14] Our decision not to foreclose the imposition of a duty as a matter of law under these facts is supported by the strong public policy in favor of protecting children against acts of sexual abuse. Current law makes it a criminal offense for certain professionals to fail to notify the proper authorities when there is reason to suspect childhood sexual abuse. See RCW 26.44.030 (medical practitioners, law enforcement personnel, school personnel, nurses, social service workers, licensed child care providers and their employees, among others, are required to report suspected child sexual abuse to the proper authorities); see also RCW 26.44.080 (failure to report is a gross misdemeanor). We note that at the time of the alleged abuse in this case, certain church officials were also required by law to report suspected abuse. See former RCW 26.44.030 (1969) (requiring any clergyman, as defined, to report suspected child sexual abuse). [15] While the reporting requirement is permissive as to other persons not specifically defined, see RCW 26.44.030(3), the Legislature has made clear that the prevention of child abuse is of the highest priority, and all instances of child abuse must be reported to the proper authorities who should diligently and expeditiously take appropriate action.... Laws of 1985, ch. 259 (legislative findings appended to RCW 26.44.030). Any person who makes a good faith report of suspected abuse is absolutely immune from civil or criminal liability arising from the reporting. RCW 26.44.060(1)(a). [16] We, therefore, conclude the Church and Schulz owed a duty of reasonable care to affirmatively act to prevent the harm, in view of their relationship to the plaintiffs, their relationship to Wilson, and given the knowledge they allegedly possessed. Whether there was a causal connection between the harm and the fact of Wilson's position in the Church, or whether the risk of harm was or should have been reasonably foreseen at the time the harm occurred, are questions of fact to be determined by the jury. We caution that our holding is limited. We do not suggest that a principal is an insurer against all harm occasioned by its agents simply because the work situation fortuitously provides an opportunity to perpetrate the harm. Nor do we decide that knowledge of potential harm alone is sufficient to give rise to a duty to warn in all cases. We do hold that where a special protective relationship exists a principal may not turn a blind eye to a known or reasonably foreseeable risk of harm posed by its agents toward those it would otherwise be required to protect simply because the injury is arbitrarily perpetrated off premises or after-hours. [17] Finally, we reject the Church's argument that the First Amendment or article I, section 11 of the state constitution prevent this court from imposing a duty on the Church. [18] The First Amendment does not provide churches with absolute immunity to engage in tortious conduct. So long as liability is predicated on secular conduct and does not involve the interpretation of church doctrine or religious beliefs, it does not offend constitutional principles. See, e.g., Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir.) (the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom cannot be construed to protect secular beliefs and behavior, even when they comprise part of an otherwise religious relationship between a minister and a member of his or her congregation. To hold otherwise would impermissibly place a religious leader in a preferred position in our society.) (second emphasis added), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S.Ct. 161, 142 L.Ed.2d 132 (1998). Similarly, while art. I, ง 11 of our state constitution protects [a]bsolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, that protection shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. Thus, the specific language of art. I, ง 11 defeats the Church's state constitutional claims. We affirm the Court of Appeals in Funkhouser and reverse the trial court on the issue of duty.