Opinion ID: 172566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Mr. Cluff's Statements to Mr. Moltzan

Text: The district court permitted Mr. Moltzan to testify, over the objection of Mr. Pursley and his codefendants, regarding the content of two out-of-court statements that Mr. Cluff made to him after the assault, when Mr. Cluff was being transported to the hospital. These statements described what Mr. Shields yelled to Mr. Pursley after Mr. Shields arrived in the cell with Mr. CluffHey, Cluff is down here with us and Mr. Pursley's responseWell, you know what to do. R., Vol. XII, Tr. at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Pursley challenges the admission of these statements on two grounds. First, Mr. Pursley argues that the statements are inadmissible hearsay. Second, Mr. Pursley argues that even if the statements meet a hearsay exception, their admission violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. After careful consideration, we reject Mr. Pursley's challenges. We hold that the challenged statements satisfy the excited-utterance exception to the general prohibition against hearsay evidence. We further hold that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred because Mr. Pursley had an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Cluff at trial. [9]
Mr. Pursley preserved his hearsay objection at trial. We review the admission of evidence over a hearsay objection for abuse of discretion. Dazey, 403 F.3d at 1165-66. Due to the fact-specific nature of a hearsay inquiry, the district court's ruling necessitates heightened deference. United States v. Trujillo, 136 F.3d 1388, 1395 (10th Cir.1998). The district court ruled that both statements met the excited-utterance exception to the bar against hearsay evidence. [10] Hearsay evidence generally is not admissible except as provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 802. An exception is recognized for a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). The excited-utterance exception has three requirements: (1) a startling event; (2) the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of the event's excitement; and (3) a nexus between the content of the statement and the event. United States v. Ledford, 443 F.3d 702, 710 (10th Cir.2005). Mr. Pursley forgoes any challenge to the first and third elements. Indeed, Mr. Cluff clearly experienced at least one startling event, the brutal assault, and the out-of-court statements obviously relate to that event. Hence, Mr. Pursley's argument for why the exception does not apply is that Mr. Cluff was no longer under the shock of the event when these statements allegedly were made. Mr. Pursley cites the following factors to demonstrate that an interjection of reflection, if not prevarication, occurred: the lapse of time between the assault and Mr. Cluff's contact with Mr. Moltzan; the occurrence of intervening events; and Mr. Cluff's motive to fabricate the statement. Courts consider a range of factors in determining whether a declarant made a statement while under the stress of a particular event. Among the more relevant factors are: the amount of time between the event and the statement; the nature of the event; the subject matter of the statement; the age and condition of the declarant; the presence or absence of self-interest; and whether the statement was volunteered or in response to questioning. United States v. Marrowbone, 211 F.3d 452, 454-55 (8th Cir.2000); United States v. Rivera, 43 F.3d 1291, 1296 (9th Cir.1995); 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 7043 (interim ed. 2006). We have recognized that there is no precise amount of time between the event and the statement beyond which the statement cannot qualify as an excited utterance. Ledford, 443 F.3d at 711. We first define the startling event set forth in Rule 803(2). The startling event clearly is the brutal assault. We next measure the lapse of time between the end of the event and the challenged statements. Although the parties have not identified this time period with exactitude, we can infer it from the record. Mr. Cluff was subject to a brutal beating during which his dental plate was crushed at around 8:00 a.m. As Mr. Pursley concedes, Mr. Cluff was removed from the site of the assault approximately thirty to forty minutes later. At 9:00 a.m., Mr. Moltzan proceeded to transport Mr. Cluff to the hospital, and, within a minute after leaving the cell block, Mr. Cluff made the challenged statements. The overall passage of time between the assault and the statements was approximately one hour. [11] For more than half of this time, Mr. Cluff was in closed quarters with his assailants. They even warned him not to seek help from the guards, warnings that he followed because he was afraid and couldn't handle another beating. Id. at 473-74. Thus, when Mr. Cluff finally made his statements to Mr. Moltzan, approximately twenty to thirty minutes after his removal from the presence of his assailants, he was well within the temporal range of trauma contemplated by Rule 803(2). See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 712 (admitting a statement as an excited utterance over a hearsay objection when there was a thirty-five minute period between assault and statement to police upon arriving on scene); see also United States v. Cruz, 156 F.3d 22, 30 (1st Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a four-hour delay between spousal beating and statements made by victim at battered women's shelter); United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 128 (2d Cir.1998) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a three-hour delay between discovery that people were in burning building and declarant's statement admitting part in arson); Webb v. Lane, 922 F.2d 390, 395 (7th Cir.1991) (admitting a statement as an excited utterance when there was a two-hour delay between shooting and victim's statement identifying perpetrator of shooting). Other factors confirm that Mr. Cluff was still languishing under the event's agitation when he spoke with Mr. Moltzan. Mr. Moltzan testified that Mr. Cluff seemed excited; he appeared nervous, kind of fidgety, and unable to stop moving. R., Vol. XII, Tr. at 522. Mr. Cluff testified that he was in considerable pain, and, in fact, vomited on his way out of the cell. See Webb, 922 F.2d at 394-95 (acknowledging that physical suffering may well postpone the opportunity to reflect). Although Mr. Floyd, a federal marshal, testified that Mr. Cluff was alert and without disorientation or confusion when he requested medical attention, alertness is not tantamount to lack of excitement, or even lack of shock. Moreover, no intervening event occurred between the time of Mr. Cluff's removal from his cell and his interaction with Mr. Moltzan that could have diluted the effect of the event's trauma. His request for medical treatment to address his pain certainly did not constitute such a shock-defeating event. Importantly, Mr. Cluff's statements on the way to the hospital were spontaneousnot conscious, reflective responses to suggestive questioning. See United States v. Brun, 416 F.3d 703, 707-08 (8th Cir.2005) (noting that interaction between declarant and officer was unstructured, and not the product of police interrogation); Paxton v. Ward, 199 F.3d 1197, 1211 (10th Cir.1999) (looking to see whether statement was spontaneously volunteered rather than offered in response to questioning). In the face of this formidable argument, Mr. Pursley stresses that Mr. Cluff had a motive to fabricate. Mr. Pursley cites Mr. Cluff's admission that he subsequently filed a million-dollar lawsuit against the United States Marshals Service. Mr. Pursley argues that this lawsuit indicates that Mr. Cluff was not suffering from the stress of the assault when he spoke with Mr. Moltzan, but rather was incentivized by the prospect of a future payday. We disagree. We find it difficult to believe that during the very brief period after he was brutally assaulted, but before he spoke with Mr. Moltzan, that Mr. Cluff's attention was focused on setting the legal stage for a future payday. At the very least, we find dubious the notion that any such thoughts of a payday would have been sufficiently strong and pervasive to dispel Mr. Cluff's stress occasioned by the assault. Furthermore, we question whether the prospect of a lawsuit against the Marshals Service would have provided Mr. Cluff with a motive to lie about who perpetrated the assault. For instance, if Mr. Cluff had been motivated by a future payday against the Marshals Service, it seemingly would have been sufficient to point a finger at the direct physical actors in the altercationMr. Shields and Mr. Templemanrather than including Mr. Pursley and Mr. Wardell. But Mr. Cluff did not do that. In sum, we conclude that the Rule 803(2) factors heavily weigh in favor of admissibility.
Mr. Pursley argues that even if Mr. Cluff's statements meet the excited-utterance exception, their admission violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. In response, the government argues that no violation occurred for any of three reasons: (1) the statements were not testimonial; (2) Mr. Pursley had an adequate opportunity to confront Mr. Cluff; and (3) even if the statements were admitted erroneously, their admission was harmless. Ultimately, we conclude that the government's second contention (i.e., regarding the opportunity to confront Mr. Cluff) is persuasive. Accordingly, we reject Mr. Pursley's Confrontation Clause challenge. Mr. Pursley's Confrontation Clause objection was raised in a timely manner at trial. We review the district court's denial of his Sixth Amendment objection de novo. United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir.2007). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision in the context of the English common law in 1791. [T]he common law in 1791 conditioned admissibility of an absent witness's examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine. The Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations. The numerous early state decisions applying the same test confirm that these principles were received as part of the common law in this country. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); see Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2531, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009) (A witness's testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.). The Supreme Court has yet to issue an exhaustive definition of testimonial evidencethe kind of evidence implicating the Confrontation Clause. At the very least, testimonial evidence covers statements made in the course of police interrogations when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). We have interpreted Davis as validating our preexisting definition of testimonial evidence. See Townley, 472 F.3d at 1272. Hence, a statement is testimonial if a reasonable person in the position of the declarant would objectively foresee that his statement might be used in the investigation or prosecution of a crime. United States v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1043 (10th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2455, 171 L.Ed.2d 250 (2008); see also Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2540 (Whether or not they qualify as business or official records, the analysts' statements hereprepared specifically for use at petitioner's trialwere testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.). At trial, the district court adopted, as the basis for its ruling, the government's argument that Mr. Cluff's statements were nontestimonial. The district court further stated that even if the statements were testimonial, as excited utterances, they fit into one of the hearsay exceptions present at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted and, thus, their admission could not give rise to a Confrontation Clause violation. Although we have not yet spoken on this issue, contrary to the district court, we believe that an excited utterance is not per se excluded from the scope of the Confrontation Clause. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266 (noting that there is no per se exclusion for 911 calls; finding statement to police deemed excited utterance by state court to be testimonial). One of the lessons of Crawford and Davis, and their partial overruling of Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), is that even if a statement qualifies for an exception to the hearsay doctrinebased upon judicially fashioned reliability principlesthe statement's admission may violate the Sixth Amendment's mandate for confrontation if it constitutes testimonial hearsay. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62, 124 S.Ct. 1354 ([The Confrontation Clause] commands, not that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in ... the crucible of cross-examination.); Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2533 (discussing Ohio v. Roberts 's since-rejected theory that unconfronted testimony was admissible as long as it bore indicia of reliability). Therefore, although they qualify as excited utterances, the admission of Mr. Cluff's statements could be found under certain circumstances to violate the Confrontation Clause, if they are testimonial. For our decisional purposes here, we assume arguendo that Mr. Cluff's statements are testimonial. Cf. Spector Motor Serv. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 89 L.Ed. 101 (1944) (If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of constitutionality ... unless such adjudication is unavoidable.). That conclusion, however, does not end our inquiry. The parties' briefs on appeal draw our attention to a distinct ground upon which we conclude that the district court's Confrontation Clause ruling may be affirmed. Specifically, their briefing contests whether Mr. Pursley had an opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Cluff at trial. Compare Aplt. Opening Br. at 30 (There was no opportunity for confrontation of Mr. Cluff regarding this statement ....), with Aplee. Br. at 30 (noting in its brief heading The Defendant Had Adequate Opportunity to Confront Cluff (emphasis omitted)). We determine with little difficulty on this trial record that Mr. Pursley did indeed have a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Cluff. Consequently, we conclude that Mr. Pursley's Confrontation Clause challenge must fail. The parties did not advance this ground before the district courti.e., focusing on Mr. Pursley's opportunity vel non to crossexamine Mr. Cluff-nor did the district court address it. However, we clearly have the discretion under certain specified circumstances to affirm a district court on a previously unexplored ground. See Ledford, 443 F.3d at 707 (We may affirm the rulings of the lower court on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning. (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Sandia, 188 F.3d 1215, 1217-18 (10th Cir.1999) ([W]e are free to affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Laird v. Shell Oil Co., 770 F.2d 508, 511 (5th Cir.1985) ([W]hen the judgment of a district court is correct, it may be affirmed for reasons not given by the court and not advanced to it.). We are particularly comfortable exercising that discretion here where the parties have identified the issue, where they have had an opportunity to make arguments to us concerning it, and where no further factual development is necessary to resolve it. See Smith Eng'g Co. v. Rice, 102 F.2d 492, 499 (9th Cir.1938) (Here the parties were given opportunity to present arguments on the point raised, and they have done so. We see no reason why we should make what we think would be an erroneous decision, because the applicable law was not insisted upon by one of the parties.); cf. Payne ex rel. Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1038 (7th Cir.1998) (noting that with inter alia essentially legal issues to be resolved in this appeal, we believe that, as a prudential matter and in the interests of judicial economy, we should examine the entire record and should affirm on an alternate basis if the record reveals that the district court's decision was correct); Golden Nugget, Inc. v. Am. Stock Exch., Inc., 828 F.2d 586, 590 (9th Cir.1987) (We find no dispute as to material facts.... Since the issues have been briefed fully and argued to us, we probably are in a better position than the district court to decide them.). The sine qua non of a Confrontation Clause violation is the absence of an opportunity to confront the witness. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz, 129 S.Ct. at 2531. Despite Mr. Pursley's protestations to the contrary, the record clearly reveals that he had such an opportunity with respect to Mr. Cluff. Therefore, the district court did not err in denying his Confrontation Clause challenge. [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985). We recognize that Mr. Cluff did not testify as to the content of his post-assault statements to Mr. Moltzan. Nonetheless, Mr. Cluff testified that he did make such statements. He also testified as to the pre-assault conversation between Mr. Shields and Mr. Pursley as he remembered it. Mr. Pursley therefore had an opportunity to address these subjects during his cross-examination of Mr. Cluff. Moreover, Mr. Cluff remained available as a witness even after Mr. Moltzan testified. At Mr. Pursley's request, the district court instructed the parties that Mr. Cluff remain[ed] subject to recall for further testimony in the trial of this case. R., Vol. XII, Tr. at 518. Thus, Mr. Pursley retained the opportunity to confront Mr. Cluff about whether he actually made the challenged statements and, if so, whether Mr. Moltzan accurately described their content. Mr. Pursley's failure to seize this opportunity at trial demolishes his Sixth Amendment claim. [12] See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (The Clause does not bar admission of a statement so long as the declarant is present at trial to defend or explain it.). We certainly believe that Mr. Pursley had a greater opportunity to confront Mr. Cluff than defendants have had when testifying declarants have indicated that they cannot remember their out-of-court statements. Yet, courts have found no Confrontation Clause violation in that situation. See Johnson v. State, 878 A.2d 422, 427-29 (Del.2005) (finding no Confrontation Clause violation under these facts); State v. Gorman, 854 A.2d 1164, 1177-78 (Me.2004) (same); State v. Price, 127 Wash.App. 193, 110 P.3d 1171, 1174-75 (2005) (same); 30A Charles Alan Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure § 6371.2, at 64-65 (Supp. 2008) (approving trend). In sum, Mr. Pursley had more than one opportunity to confront Mr. Cluff about the challenged statements at trial. Although Mr. Pursley chose not to exploit them, he certainly had opportunities to confront[] ... the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI.