Opinion ID: 1724109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether sovereign immunity bars the claims of the appellee and the co-defendant/cross-appellant.

Text: ¶ 10. The Department's primary argument is that, as a state agency, it is and was immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, which had been legislatively enacted in the form of Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-3 (Supp. 1996). That statute states that the State of Mississippi and its political subdivisions are immune from suits arising from tortious acts or omissions or breach of implied term or condition of any warranty or contract. Since this action arises from an alleged tortious act, the Department argues that it falls under the statute, and that as a result, the Department should be dismissed as a party to this lawsuit. ¶ 11. Jenkins argues that the statute is not a bar to recovery in this case because according to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-16(2), a state agency may be sued for tortious conduct and recovery may be had to the extent that the agency has liability insurance. Thus, sovereign immunity is waived to the extent of insurance coverage in effect at the time of the incident. Jenkins claims that the Department had a liability insurance policy in effect at the time of the accident which covered the conditions under which the accident occurred. That insurance was purchased under authority granted in Miss. Code Ann. § 65-1-8(p) (1972), repealed by its own terms effective July 1, 1992. That statute authorized the Department to purchase liability insurance for employees operating motor vehicles in the performance of their official duties. Jenkins could offer no more than could have and might have been evidence to suggest that the insurance policy covered the allegedly negligent flagman, who certainly was not operating a motor vehicle at the time of the accident. ¶ 12. This Court frowns upon the use of conjecture as evidence in negligence cases. Carpenter v. Nobile, 620 So.2d 961, 965 (Miss. 1993); Foster v. State, 508 So.2d 1111, 1118 (Miss. 1987). A plain reading of Miss. Code Ann. § 65-1-8(p) makes it clear that the insurance covered drivers of the Department's vehicles. Because the flagman does not fall into that category, we find that the Department should have been dismissed as a defendant in Jenkins' suit. As a result, the only way that the Department could remain a party in any fashion is if Mobile Medic's cross-claim against the Department would survive a sovereign immunity challenge. ¶ 13. Mobile Medic asserts that its claim is not a suit for damages in tort against the Department, which it agrees is barred by Miss. Code Ann. 11-46-1 et seq. (Supp. 1996). Rather, it argues that its claim is one for indemnification against the Commission. Because indemnification in any case is dependent upon a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Mobile Medic argues that its claim for indemnification against the Department is not yet ripe. Hopton Bldg. Maintenance, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv., 559 So.2d 1012, 1013 (Miss. 1990). Thus, Mobile Medic argues that the Department should remain a party to its cross-claim until such time as it is determined whether there is liability on the part for damages in favor of Jenkins. ¶ 14. While Mobile Medic is correct to assert that a claim for indemnity does not arise until there is legal liability to pay a judgment in favor of Jenkins, it could only be indemnified or get contribution from the Department if sovereign immunity were not a bar at that time. As stated earlier, sovereign immunity applies to all tort claims, of which this is one. Sovereign immunity can only be waived to the extent to which there was liability insurance in place covering the alleged tort at the time of the incident. Since the only liability insurance in place at the time of this incident was solely to cover drivers of department motor vehicles, it would not appear that Mobile Medic would not be able to gain indemnity or contribution from this source because no Department drivers were involved in this accident. ¶ 15. Further, Mobile Medic cites Miss. Code Ann. § 85-5-7 (1972) in support of its theory that it is entitled to contribution from the Department as a joint tortfeasor. However, Mobile Medic overlooks the specific provision of paragraph (5) of that very section which provides that Nothing in this section shall eliminate or diminish any defenses or immunities which currently exist, except as expressly noted herein. Clearly, that paragraph encompasses sovereign immunity in that sovereign immunity is not expressly mentioned in the section. Therefore, we find that the legislature intended that sovereign immunity apply to actions where the state is a possible joint tortfeasor, as is the case here. ¶ 16. As a result, we hold that the Department would be immune from contribution as a joint tortfeasor, and thus, there is no cognizable reason for the Department to remain a party to this action.