Opinion ID: 2061218
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Heading: the habeas corpus jurisdiction

Text: Under the common law of England the words, habeas corpus referred to a plurality of writs serving different functions. They shared the common name habeas corpus because each of them achieved the same preliminary objective of having a person brought before a court or judge. Once the person had been produced, the further function of the tribunal became the basis for distinguishing the writs by supplemental designations. Accordingly, the writs of habeas corpus at common law were variously designated, inter alia, as habeas corpus ad respondendum, ad faciendum et recipiendum, ad prosequendum, ad satisfaciendum, ad testificandum and ad subjiciendum et recipiendum. It was the last of these only, which was designed to procure liberation from illegal confinement.       Employed to vindicate the right of personal liberty by whatever power infringed, it became inseparably associated with that right; and in proportion as the right was valued, so was the writ by which it was defended. Hurd, The Writ of Habeas Corpus (p. 144) (1858) Thus, of the many writs of habeas corpus, one, the writ of habeas corpus ad sub-jiciendum et recipiendum, became identified as The Writ Of Habeas Corpus, the so-called Great Writ of Liberty because its special function was to have a person produced before a court, or judge, to protect and vindicate his right of personal liberty by freeing him from illegal restraint. As the Great Writ designed to accomplish summary release from illegal restraint whether governmental or otherwise, the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum became utilized in England, prior to and during the colonization of America, in disputes over the physical control of infants. If a child old enough to be capable of resisting were being held by actual force, habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum to free the child from the imprisonment or restraint against his will, in the most literal sense of the words, was operative. Not so clear, however, might be the case of a child too young to resist or to withhold consent who might be held, without actual force, under one person's control rather than another's. In this situation imprisonment or restraint, as commonly understood to involve a forceful or involuntary detention, might be deemed absent. The courts, however, adapted the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum to function in cases in which disputes occurred over the physical control of very young children. The technique employed was revealed by the statement of Patteson, J., in the case of Ex parte McClellan, 1 Dowl.P.C. 81 (1831). With respect to the argument, that some force or improper restraint must be used in order to authorize the court to remove an infant from    any one,    it is not necessary that any force or restraint should exist on the part of the person having    the infant towards it. (p. 84) As Hurd observes: In the case of infants an unauthorized absence from the legal custody has been treated,    as equivalent to imprisonment; and the duty of returning   , as equivalent to a wish to be free.  Hurd, The Writ of Habeas Corpus, (p. 454) (1858) (emphasis supplied) The logic by which the writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum was adapted to operate in cases in which infants were being held without force or violence generated the foundational and essential principle that petitioner must show himself to be the person having the pre-existing right to the custody of the infant in order to call the function of habeas corpus into play. Unless, (force being absent) the petitioner be, at least prima facie, the legally entitled custodian to whom the infant is presumed to wish to return because of legal duty to return, no basis appears to establish the illegal restraint from which it is the office of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum to provide release. Further corroboration of this crucial point appears in another principle which had been developed by the English Common Law in relation to habeas corpus jurisdiction over the control of infants:    the question before the Court upon habeas corpus is whether the person is in illegal custody without that person's consent.    above the age of fourteen in the case of a boy, and above the age of sixteen in the case of a girl, the Court will inquire whether the child consents to be where it is; and if the Court finds that the infant, no longer a child, but capable of consenting    is consenting to the place where it is, then the very ground of an application for a habeas corpus falls away.  (emphasis supplied) In re Agar-Ellis, 24 Chancery 317, 326 (1883) (in which the court was discussing the common law of habeas corpus). We may now summarize the basic principles of the English law dealing with habeas corpus ad subjiciendum et recipiendum (hereinafter referred to simply as habeas corpus unless otherwise designated) concerning the control of infants. (1) The special and sole office of the writ of habeas corpus is to free the infant from illegal restraint. (2) In those situations in which the infant is being detained without force or violence an illegal restraint will, nevertheless, be held to exist if the infant be away from the person legally entitled to custody, without authorization, or without consent if the infant is of the age of discretion. (3) Hence, in cases in which there is no actual force or duress being used to detain the infant, the petitioner for habeas corpus must show that he is the person having the legal right to the custody of the infantthereby to establish the illegal restraint of the infant which it is the office of habeas corpus to remove. There was, additionally, a fourth principle developed from the fact that the unique function of the writ of habeas corpus was to provide a summary remedy. The courts held that they lacked power in summary proceedings to adjudicate any change in the legal right to custody or to guardianship of an infant since appellate rights might be endangered. [3] The application of this latter principle appears most cogently in the cases of Rex v. DeManneville, 5 East 221 (1804) and Rex v. Greenhill, 4 Ad. & E. 624 (1836). In Rex v. DeManneville an unweaned eight month old child, sought in habeas corpus by the mother, was allowed to remain with the father, the person legally entitled to custody. In arriving at the decision, the court rejected arguments of counsel predicated upon the best interests and welfare of the child that the child was of very tender age, and considering that its removal from the mother deprived it of its accustomed proper nutriment, was an additional reason for restoring it to her possession, particularly when the father had obtained possession of it by force and stratagem, and in a manner so dangerous to it. (p. 223) In the case of Rex v. Greenhill, 4 Ad. & E. 624 upon a habeas corpus brought by the adulterous father of three female children under the age of six years, the court concluded that the absence of the children from their father who had legal right to their custody constituted illegal restraint. The court, being satisfied that it lacked powers in habeas corpus to adjudicate a change in the right to custody, required the maternal grandmother to release the children. [4] There has been suggestion in the literature that the decisions in Rex v. DeManneville and Rex v. Greenhill, supra, were too stringent reflections or applications of the established law of habeas corpus jurisdiction in cases dealing with the control of infants. It has been said that the cases of Rex v. Clarkson, 1 Strange 444 (1755), Rex v. Smith, 2 Strange 982 (1755) and Rex v. Delaval, 3 Burroughs 1434 (1764) indicated that the court in habeas corpus jurisdiction could exercise a discretion to adjudicate a change in the legal right to custody. Careful analysis of these cases reveals, however, that such conception seems to be a misunderstanding and that Rex v. DeManneville and Rex v. Greenhill were decided in accordance with the existing law. In Rex v. Clarkson the court properly discharged the function of habeas corpus by releasing the infant from illegal restraint constituted by the detention of the child, without authority, from the rightful custodian. The court said: All we can do is to declare that she is at liberty to go where she pleases. The infant, having thus been given privilege, then chose to go with the persons who had the legal right to her custody. There had been indication that her freedom to return might be impaired by conduct of other parties and the court added: We will order our tip-staff to wait upon her home to her guardians. What was done, as was observed in the case of In re Kottman, 2 Hill C.R. 363 (So.Car.1833) was that the court had refrained from ordering a delivery of possession even to the legally entitled custodians and had acted only to protect the infant in returning after the infant, given privilege, had herself chosen to return to the legal guardians. Similarly, in Rex v. Smith, supra, the court said of their jurisdiction under the writ of habeas corpus: Upon this writ they could only deliver him [the infant] out of the custody of the aunt and inform him he was at liberty to go where he pleased. The boy, once set free (and who happened to be within a few weeks of the age of fourteen, the age of discretion) wished to return to his aunt. In practical effect, therefore, the father, the legally entitled custodian, remained deprived of that physical possession of the boy which was an incident of his legal right to custody. The court emphasized that such result was consistent with the function of habeas corpus. The court said:    the right of guardianship could not be determined in this summary way, and the father was not without other remedy.    or other actions, that would properly bring the right of guardianship in question. Thus, Rex v. Smith, discloses that the function of habeas corpus is only to release from illegal restraint. The court must refrain from adjudicating a change in the right to custody and is, further, without duty to enforce, or vindicate, the rights of the person having the legal right to custody by ordering delivery of the physical possession of the infant to such custodian. Rex v. Delaval, supra, confirms this point. Lord Mansfield immediately avows the duty of the court in habeas corpus to inquire whether an improper restraint exists, and if it be found, to remove it. The discretion of which Lord Mansfield speaks, in a dictum, arises after the court finds an illegal restraint and releases the infant from it. The discretion is whether to allow the infant privilege to go as the infant chooses or whether, because of the infant's tender years or lack of capacity (or willingness) to make a wise judgment, the court should deny privilege, and without adjudicating any change in the legal right to custody or guardianship, order a delivery of the physical possession of the infant to some person, as circumstances might suggest. If no delivery is ordered to the legally entitled custodian, he is left to other remedies to vindicate the incidents of his legal right to custody. Thus, Rex v. Delaval, as Rex v. Smith, indicates only that habeas corpus may be an imperfect remedy for the legally entitled custodian to obtain the physical possession of the infant. [5] In habeas corpus the legally entitled custodian may succeed in having an adjudication that the absence or detention of the infant away from him constitutes an illegal restraint from which the infant is released, but the rightful custodian may discover that habeas corpus is an insufficient remedy to deliver to him the physical possession of the infant. [6] Such interpretation of Lord Mansfield's language in Rex v. Delaval, supra,that the discretion in habeas corpus is only as to whether to make an order relating to temporary physical possession rather than to adjudicate changes in the legal rights to custody or guardianshipreveals that both the dictum and the actual decision (in which an eighteen year old girl having been found to be in fact illegally restrained by force, was allowed privilege to go at liberty as she pleased) are consistent with earlier cases as well as with the subsequent decisions, above discussed, of Rex v. DeManneville and Rex v. Greenhill. Before we leave the discussion of habeas corpus jurisdiction regarding the control of infants to consider the scope of equity jurisdiction, a final point should be mentioned to avoid possible confusion. Since the application for the writ of habeas corpus could be brought before any judge, whether sitting in the common law courts or in the Chancery courts, habeas corpus proceedings regarding control of infants were often brought before judges of Chancery courts as well as the common law courts. If, however, a habeas corpus proceeding relating to the control of infants happened to be before a judge of the Chancery court, it was the Common Law of England rather than Chancery principles which governed the habeas corpus jurisdiction and scope. As was said by Brett, M.R., in the case of In re Agar-Ellis, 24 Chancery 317 (1883):    the application for a habeas corpus is no part of the law of equity as distinguished from the Common Law of England.    That seems to me to have been the rule, whether the habeas corpus was applied for to a Judge of the Court of Equity, or to a Judge of a Court of Common Law. All Judges had the duty of listening to such applications; and, when they had such an application for a habeas corpus, to my mind it is clear that they administered the same law,   . The law was administered in the same way by a Chancery Judge as by a Common Law Judge. Therefore, of course, the rules of equity, or the principles of equity as they are called, are not to prevail, because there is nothing for them to prevail over. (pp. 326, 327)