Opinion ID: 2035760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Future Crimes and Improper Characterization

Text: Defendant next charges that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the prosecutor improperly suggested to the sentencing jury that, if the death penalty was not imposed, defendant would kill again. The prosecutor made the following comment during his closing at the aggravation/mitigation phase of the death penalty hearing: Think about what value you put on this life when [the defendant] spread those telephone pages on [the victim's] body and lit him on fire. Think about him and his contact when you weigh the evidence in this case to determine whether there is anything at all mitigating about [the defendant's] life. The conclusion you will draw, folks, is that this conduct, this murder was the work of the devil and nothing more, nothing more and nothing less, and think about the fact, ladies and gentlemen, that given the chance, [the defendant] will do it again. He will kill again if he is given the chance. This court has held that a prosecutor may not speculate before a sentencing jury, in the absence of supporting evidence, that a defendant may commit future crimes if he is not sentenced to death. (See Patterson, 154 Ill.2d at 481-82, 182 Ill.Dec. 592, 610 N.E.2d 16; People v. Johnson (1991), 146 Ill.2d 109, 148, 165 Ill.Dec. 682, 585 N.E.2d 78; Holman, 103 Ill.2d at 163, 165, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119.) However, in the instant case, it is apparent that the prosecutor's remark was based upon the evidence of prior misconduct. Evidence was introduced at the sentencing hearing that homemade knives were found in defendant's cell. The record also reveals that defendant was part of an attempted escape plan, which included the killing of a guard. We conclude that the prosecutor's statement herein was supported by the evidence and was therefore proper. Defendant also insists that he was deprived of a fair sentencing hearing by the prosecution's characterization of defendant as the devil. This court has found it improper to characterize a defendant as an animal or evil; however, such a characterization will not result in reversible error unless it substantially prejudiced the defendant. ( People v. Johnson (1992), 149 Ill.2d 118, 156, 171 Ill.Dec. 401, 594 N.E.2d 253 (court declined to reverse because of the prosecutor's reference to the defendant as an animal, evil, and creature since the defendant did not show substantial prejudice); People v. Coleman (1989), 129 Ill.2d 321, 347, 135 Ill.Dec. 834, 544 N.E.2d 330 (reference to defendant as an animal was improper, but there was insufficient prejudice to vacate the death sentence); People v. Spreitzer (1988), 123 Ill.2d 1, 39, 121 Ill.Dec. 224, 525 N.E.2d 30 (prosecutor's remarks that defendant should not be considered human and that to call defendant an animal    would be an insult to the animals were improper, but not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant vacating the death sentence).) In light of the overwhelming evidence introduced at the trial and sentencing hearing, we do not find that the prosecutor's reference to the devil substantially prejudiced defendant.