Opinion ID: 2259410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Double Hearsay Issue

Text: Although the Federal Rules of Evidence characterize vicarious admissions as simply not hearsay, [i]t seems plain that any out-of-court party statement offered in evidence for its truth should, consistent with this definition, be classified as hearsay. Bein, supra, 12 Hofstra L.Rev. at 404. Accordingly, N.J.R.E. 803(b) classifies vicarious admissions as an exception to the hearsay rule, although the New Jersey rule borrows the language of the analogous federal rule in all other respects. Because the New Jersey rule classifies vicarious admissions within an exception to the hearsay rule, [a] statement is only admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4) if it would have been admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing. Thus if the declarant's statement was itself only hearsay, and not admissible under any of the exceptions to the hearsay exclusionary rule it could not be admissible under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4). Biunno, supra, comment 4 on N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4). Each component of plaintiff's statement must be admissible under an enumerated exception to the hearsay rule, or the statement is inadmissible. In this case, each component of the proffered testimony meets such an exception. All that is required for admission under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4) is that the statement offered against a party be a statement by the party's agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship. N.J.R.E. 803(b)(4). It could not be more clear that the statement made by Walker, the Personnel Director, concerned a matter within the scope of Walker's employment and that the statement was made during the existence of his employment relationship with BMS. In addition, the statements inferentially attributed by Walker to the other employees of BMS (Gentile, Mauzey and Oaks) would be admissible because those employees made the statements to Walker during the course of their employment and the statements concerned an issue within the scope of their duties as employees. To the extent that any of the statements refer to statements by Dr. Neu, it is unnecessary for plaintiff to show that Dr. Neu's statements were truthful. The plaintiff need only show that BMS employees were reacting to their perceived understanding of Dr. Neu's statements or attitudes. That they discriminated against plaintiff because of a misunderstanding of the impact of Dr. Neu's words is of no consequence. Because the truth of Dr. Neu's alleged statements is not at issue, the court on remand could consider excising the statements attributed to Dr. Neu or directing the jury to consider any such references only as background information. BMS relies primarily on Carden v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 850 F. 2d 996 (3d Cir.1988). In that age discrimination case, plaintiff testified that his supervisor, Clark, stated that he thought they wanted a younger person for the job. Id. at 998. The Third Circuit ruled that plaintiff's testimony was double hearsay because someone other than Clark constituted the they. Id. at 1002. It thus was impossible to determine whether the statements were made within the scope of their employment under the vicarious admission exception. Id. at 1003. There is no doubt in this case who the they were. This case fits most closely within the framework of Abrams v. Lightolier, Inc., 50 F. 3d 1204 (3d Cir.1995). In that case, the employer argued that the statement by a supervisor to an employer that the company frowned on older people was admissible. Id. at 1215-16. The court ruled: Where a supervisor is authorized to speak with subordinates about the employer's employment practices, a subordinate's account of an explanation of the supervisor's understanding regarding the criteria utilized by management in making decisions on hiring, firing, compensation, and the like is admissible against the employer. We so held in Zipf v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 799 F. 2d 889, 894-95 (3d Cir.1986), citing Rules 801(d)(2)(D) and 701.... We perceive no double hearsay problem because we do not think the supervisor's explanation, if offered through the testimony of the supervisor, would be subject to a hearsay objection. [Id. at 1216.]