Opinion ID: 612705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Parole Commission's June 14, 2005, reopening

Text: We next consider the lawfulness of the Parole Commission's decision to reopen Bowers' case on June 14, 2005, to reconsider the Parole Commission's May 2005 evenly-split original jurisdiction decision that resulted in the grant of mandatory parole. We focus on the actions of Commissioner Spagnoli surrounding the decision to reconsider Bowers' case, and conclude she violated the Parole Act's mandate that the Parole Commission function as an independent agency, impermissibly tainting the Parole Commission's decision to reopen. Congress established the Parole Commission as an independent agency in the Department of Justice. 18 U.S.C. § 4202. The legislative history indicates Congress intended that parole decisionmaking be independent of, and not governed by, the investigative and prosecutorial functions of the Department of Justice. S.Rep. No. 94-648, at 21 (1976) (Conf.Rep.). The Parole Commission's decision-making machinery is independent so as to guard against influence in case decisions. S.Rep. No. 94-369, at 20 (1975); see also Dye v. United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376, 1378 (10th Cir.1977) (noting the emphasis in the Parole Act is on increasing procedural safeguards in reducing arbitrary decision-making). The Parole Act also preserves the independence and integrity of the U.S. Parole Commission by providing the Attorney General (and through the Attorney General, the prosecutorial arm of the Department of Justice) with a formal procedure for making objection to any parole release or denial ordered by a Commissioner. Paroling, Recommitting, and Supervising Federal Prisoners: Procedures for Attorney General Requests to Review Parole Decisions, 59 Fed.Reg. 40257-08 (Aug. 8, 1994). The Parole Commission explicitly recognized the application of this independence principle to Bowers' case, noting it would not be in the Commission's best interests to explain itself to the Attorney General because it would suggest[] a relationship incompatible with the independence sought by Congress when it established the Commission and could create the appearance of an attempt to influence. Here, the actions of Commissioner Spagnoli demonstrate she was not acting as an independent and neutral decision-maker at the time of the Parole Commission's June 14, 2005, decision to reconsider its evenly-split original jurisdiction decision. Commissioner Spagnoli prepared a 14-page Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General on June 1, 2005, without the knowledge or consent of the other Parole Commissioners. Spagnoli Memorandum, R10, Exh. 71. The Parole Commission does not dispute that the memorandum was in fact sent to and received by a Deputy Attorney General within the Department of Justice. Although Commissioner Spagnoli's memorandum was entitled Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General, it did not list a specific recipient. The specific recipient is not relevant to the bias of Commissioner Spagnoli; the existence of the memorandum, which the Parole Commission does not dispute was sent to and found in the files of the Department of Justice, is sufficient to establish Commissioner Spagnoli's bias against Bowers. The Parole Commission did not become aware of Commissioner Spagnoli's memorandum until September of 2007, after the Office of Information and Privacy of the Department of Justice referred the memorandum following a Freedom of Information Act request from another party. The subject of Commissioner Spagnoli's memorandum was Issues relating to whether or not the Attorney General should appeal the Parole Commission's [d]ecision to grant mandatory parole to Veronza Bowers. Spagnoli Memorandum, R10, Exh. 71 at 1. The Parole Commission concedes this memorandum, which it does not dispute was found in the files of the Department of Justice, creates the appearance that [Commissioner Spagnoli] may have not exercised impartial judgment in voting on the Attorney General's request to review the parole decision for Bowers. We agree. As the magistrate judge noted, Commissioner Spagnoli's memorandum can be characterized as a polemic against the decision to parole. The memorandum described Bowers in negative terms and omitted all favorable information. For instance, in the memorandum, Commissioner Spagnoli cited selective portions of a December 2004 forensic evaluation of Bowers that she interpreted as highly relevant to a determination that [Bowers] has a reasonable possibility of committing future crimes. Spagnoli Memorandum, R10, Exh. 71 at 7. The memorandum failed to include the forensic evaluation's positive conclusion that should [Bowers] be granted parole, [he] would in all likelihood continue to engage in a lifestyle that is respectful of himself and others. R1, Exh. 27 at 10. In addition, the memorandum included a criminal charge of aiding and abetting an assault that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had considered and instructed the [Parole] Commission to disregard... because [Bowers'] due process rights were violated  not because he didn't commit the act. Spagnoli Memorandum, R10, Exh. 71 at 9. Commissioner Spagnoli's memorandum provided this information so that the Attorney General could make sure that we make specific findings as to each and every angle that exists statutorily and legally to potentially keep this defendant in prison. Id. In preparing this Memorandum for the Deputy Attorney General presenting potential appeal issues, Commissioner Spagnoli departed from her statutory role of a neutral decision-maker as a Parole Commissioner and took on an advocate's role of seeking a particular outcome. See Dye, 558 F.2d at 1378 (The Commission does not function as an adversary to the prisoner.). Moreover, she attempted to enlist the aid of the Department of Justice, by way of the Attorney General, to achieve her desired outcome. [17] Commissioner Spagnoli's secret memorandum violated the Parole Act's mandate that the Parole Commission function as an independent agency in the Department of Justice. 18 U.S.C. § 4202; see also Brennan v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 502 F.2d 30, 32 (5th Cir.1974) (noting an agency is no more than a creature of Congress and, as such, may proceed only in conformity with its congressional grant of authority). [18] Commissioner Spagnoli's inappropriate actions were not limited to the June 1, 2005, memorandum. She also initiated communications regarding the Bowers case with several other Department of Justice officials. For instance, on May 24, 2005, she contacted an Office of Intergovernmental and Public Liaison official, offering to walk her through the Bowers case. Commissioner Spagnoli also contacted several other Department of Justice officials, including those within the Office of Legal Counsel and the Office for Victims of Crime. After the Attorney General's petition for reconsideration of the original jurisdiction decision was granted, Commissioner Spagnoli contacted Edward McNally, the Department of Justice's point person on the Bowers appeal, stating: I need to talk to you ASAP about the appeal issue, I stopped by your office this am but your door was locked. I have talked to Kyle, Steve B. and Wendell Taylor ... Please call me as soon as you get a chance. This e-mail prompted a series of communications with Mr. McNally, which included Commissioner Spagnoli sharing both a proposed rule and internal Commission e-mails. These communications culminated in an e-mail sent from Commissioner Spagnoli to Mr. McNally on October 6, 2005, the date the Parole Commission agreed to deny Bowers' mandatory parole. The e-mail was succinct: Victory. Commissioner Spagnoli's clandestine communications with the Department of Justice also violated the Parole Act's mandate that the Parole Commission function as an independent agency in the Department of Justice. 18 U.S.C. § 4202; see Brennan, 502 F.2d at 32. Commissioner Spagnoli again inappropriately assumed the role of advocate against Bowers and functioned as an adversary to the prisoner. Dye, 558 F.2d at 1378. Before the district court, the Parole Commission conceded that in this case, a finding that Commissioner Spagnoli was biased would so undermine the integrity of the decision-making process that the decision must be vacated. Under the particular facts of this case, we agree that the decision of the Parole Commission to reopen Bowers' case was impermissibly tainted by Commissioner Spagnoli's unauthorized action[s] revealing her bias. Glumb, 891 F.2d at 873. We thus vacate the Parole Commission's June 14, 2005, order reopening Bowers' case. By vacating the June 14, 2005, order, we necessarily vacate the Parole Commission's October 6, 2005, original jurisdiction decision denying Bowers mandatory parole. [19] Bowers contends the appropriate remedy is to order him immediately released on mandatory parole. This we will not do. See, e.g., Jones v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 903 F.2d 1178, 1181 (8th Cir.1990) ([N]either the district court nor this court has the right to correct the mistake by ordering the prisoner released.) (citation omitted); Luther v. Molina, 627 F.2d 71, 76 (7th Cir.1980) ([Parole] [r]elease, whether outright or on bail, would rarely be necessary or appropriate.). Rather, we direct the district court to return this case to the Parole Commission in its posture as of May 17, 2005, the date of the last Parole Commission action taken before Commissioner Spagnoli's unlawful actions. As of May 17, 2005, the Parole Commission's evenly-split original jurisdiction decision was operative. In this posture, Bowers is entitled to mandatory parole based on the May 2005 original jurisdiction decision unless the Parole Commission takes further action pursuant to its rules and regulations. [20] Upon return, the Parole Commission shall immediately review Bowers' file to determine ab initio whether any further action is necessary or authorized. We express no opinion on the merits of either of the Parole Commission's May 2005 or October 2005 original jurisdiction decisions. Indeed, we are not deciding that the Parole Commission is barred from reconsidering its May 2005 original jurisdiction decision. [21] It is up to the Parole Commission, not this Court, to decide what, if any, further action is warranted in Bowers' case. All we hold is that, if the Parole Commission decides to take further action, it must proceed in the manner authorized by the Parole Act and the Parole Commission's rules and regulations. Finally, contrary to Bowers' claim, we believe Bowers will receive a fair and impartial hearing if any further action is, in fact, taken by the Parole Commission. Commissioner Spagnoli resigned in 2007, and there is no evidence any of the current Parole Commissioners would act outside the confines of the Parole Act or the Parole Commission's rules and regulations.