Opinion ID: 1621927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court committed error in refusing to give plaintiff's jury instructions p-12 and p-16.

Text: ¶ 28. Coltharp alleges that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to grant plaintiff's jury instructions P-12 and P-16. These proposed instructions state as follows: P-12 You are instructed that it is the law of Mississippi that a party to a suit may admit negligence in the form of written admissions or oral admission to the Plaintiff, Michael Coltharp, or any other person. If you find from the evidence presented in this case that Dr. Carnesale admitted he negligently treated Michael Coltharp and if you further find that the admission of negligent treatment, if any, proximately caused injuries and damages to Michael Coltharp, then it is your duty to return a verdict for Michael Coltharp for such damages you determine adequately compensate him. P-16 An admission in a legal proceeding such as this by one of the parties means that those facts are presumed to be proven and true. If you find from the evidence in this case that Dr. Carnesale admitted his negligence by either his medical records, which have been introduced into evidence, or his testimony, then it is your sworn duty to find in favor of the Plaintiff, Michael Coltharp, if you additionally find that the admission of negligence, if any, proximately caused his damages. ¶ 29. Coltharp maintains that Dr. Carnesale admitted negligence by dictating the following statement into his medical records: I feel a bit remiss in not recognizing the underlying nature of the problem before. Additionally, Coltharp points out that Dr. Carnesale then read into the record Webster's Dictionary's definition of the word (remiss): Number 1, neglect in the performance of work or duty, careless; two, showing neglect or inattention. Therefore, Coltharp urges that this legal admission in the medical records and court testimony required the trial court to instruct the jury regarding the significance of an admission by a party. ¶ 30. Coltharp relies on this Court's decision in Meena v. Wilburn, 603 So.2d 866 (Miss. 1992) for his assertion that the trial court should have admitted above referenced instructions. In Meena, [t]he judge granted [the plaintiffs request for two peremptory instructions on liability] simply because [the defendants] admitted that they `deviated from the standard of care' with which they should have complied. Id. at 869 (emphasis added). On the other hand, Carnesale argues that Meena is distinguishable from the case at bar because Dr. Carnesale consistently denied that he negligently treated the plaintiff and denied that his treatment was the cause of the injuries sustained by the plaintiff. ¶ 31. In Meena this Court noted, [i]ndeed, throughout this case, [the defendant doctor] admitted to breach of a duty to which he was bound. He made the admissions: (1) in his answer to [the plaintiffs] complaint; (2) in his opening statement; (3) through his testimony; (4) through his objections; and (5) during the debate over jury instructions. Id. at 870 (citations omitted). ¶ 32. This Court finds that jury instructions P-12 and P-16 were correct statement of law and should have been granted. The two instructions were not peremptory in nature. Rather, the jury was instructed that if the evidence proved that Carnesale admitted negligence and if the admission of negligence was the proximate cause of Coltharp's injury then it was the duty of the jury to return a verdict in favor of Coltharp. In light of Carnesale's statement that he felt a bit remiss in not recognizing the underlying of the problem, there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to establish a jury question as to whether Carnesale made an admission. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the trial court's decision.