Opinion ID: 765719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: U.S.S.G. S 3A1.3: Restraint of Victim Enhancement

Text: 19 Along with the four-level enhancement discussed above, the district court interpreted U.S.S.G. S 3A1. 3 to apply to Johnson and granted the government's request for a two-level enhancement. We review de novo the district court's interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Bailey, 139 F.3d 667, 667 (9th Cir. 1998). Under that standard, we conclude that the district court properly granted the government's application for a two-level enhancement based on restraint of victim. 20 U.S.S.G. S 3A1.3 provides for a two level enhancement [i]f a victim was physically restrained in the course of the offense. Johnson admitted in his reply brief that he restrained Kelly on March 20 when he held her in her car when she returned home from work. See Reply Br. at 10 (The March 20 incident in the parking lot of Mr. Johnson's apartment building involved the brief restraint of Kelly Johnson while she was seated in her own car.) (emphasis added). In addition, Johnson testified at the sentencing hearing that he restrained Kelly: I got to grab the keys out of her car so she doesn't leave . . . . However, he claims that his conduct was not in the course of the offense of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. That phrase -- in the course of the offense -- is not defined in the Sentencing Guidelines or in Ninth Circuit case law. 21 Only the Sixth Circuit has looked at this specific part of S 3A1.3. In United States v. Cross, 121 F.3d 234 (6th Cir. 1997), the court held that whether an act of restraint occurred in the course of the offense under S 3A1.3 should be analyzed by looking to whether the act of restraint could be considered relevant conduct under U.S.S.G.S 1B1.3. Id. at 238-39. We now follow the Sixth Circuit's lead on this issue and look to S 1B1.3 to determine if the acts of physical restraint here are relevant conduct and thus took place in the course of the offense. Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides as follows: 22 Unless otherwise specified . . . (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the basis of the following: (1)(A) all acts and omissions commit ted, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense. 23 U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 4 24 Whether either of the two incidents of physical restraint falls within S 1B1.3(a)(1)(A) is the critical inquiry here. Of the three temporal options within the last part of the guideline -- occurring during the offense, in preparation for the offense, or in the course of evading responsibility or detection -- only the first has relevance to this case. Thus, if Johnson restrained Kelly while he engaged in the offense of possession on March 20, the enhancement was proper. 25 Resolution of this matter requires an understanding of when possession occurs. Previously, this Court has defined possession as follows: The element of possession may be satisfied by proof of constructive or joint possession. To establish constructive possession, the government must produce evidence showing ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the premises or vehicle in which contraband is concealed. United States v. Shirley, 884 F.2d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 1989) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis added). It is undeniable that when Johnson restrained Kelly at her car on March 20 he had dominion over his apartment where the gun was stored. Because the legal definition of possession includes having dominion over the premises in which the contraband is concealed, Johnson possessed the weapon while restraining Kelly at her car. The district court thus properly applied the two-level enhancement for restraint of victim to this case.