Opinion ID: 2536116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Interpretation of the Act

Text: Because this case involves statutory interpretation, this Court's review is de novo. Larimore v. State, 2 So.3d 101, 106 (Fla.2008). A court's purpose in construing a statute is to give effect to legislative intent, which is the polestar that guides the court in statutory construction. Id. (citing Bautista v. State, 863 So.2d 1180, 1185 (Fla.2003)). To discern legislative intent, a court must look first and foremost at the actual language used in the statute. Id. As this Court set forth in Velez, 934 So.2d at 1164-65: As this Court has often repeated, when the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning ... the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Further, we are without power to construe an unambiguous statute in a way which would extend, modify, or limit, its express terms or its reasonable and obvious implications. To do so would be an abrogation of legislative power. A related principle is that when a court interprets a statute, it must give full effect to all statutory provisions. Courts should avoid readings that would render part of a statute meaningless. (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Moreover, because forfeitures are considered harsh exactions, and as a general rule ... are not favored in law or equity[,] ... this Court has long followed a policy that it must strictly construe forfeiture statutes. Real Property, 588 So.2d at 961. The plain and unambiguous language of the Act leads us to adopt the statutory construction set forth in the Third District's opinion in Gomez for several reasons. First, the plain language of section 932.703 indicates that forfeiture proceedings in Florida are a two-stage process, which includes a seizure stage and a forfeiture stage, as recognized by this Court in Velez. 934 So.2d at 1164 (Forfeiture proceedings in Florida are a two-stage process.). Several subsections of 932.703 specifically distinguish between seizure and forfeiture. For example, section 932.703(1)(a) provides: Any contraband article, vessel, motor vehicle, aircraft, other personal property, or real property used in violation of any provision of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is taking place, may be seized and shall be forfeited subject to the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, section 932.703(1)(b) states: Notwithstanding any other provision of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, except the provisions of paragraph (a), contraband articles set forth in s. 932.701(2)(a)7. used in violation of any provision of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, or in, upon, or by means of which any violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act has taken or is taking place, shall be seized and shall be forfeited subject to the provisions of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. (Emphasis added.) See also § 932.703(2)(d), Fla. Stat. (2008) (If the court determines that probable cause exists to believe that such property was used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act, the court shall order the property restrained by the least restrictive means to protect against disposal, waste, or continued illegal use of such property pending disposition of the forfeiture proceeding. The court may order the claimant to post a bond or other adequate security equivalent to the value of the property.) (emphasis added). Second, as explained in Gomez, the unambiguous language of section 932.703(2), which deals with the seizure stage of a forfeiture action, clearly focuses on the property and not the owner's actual or constructive knowledge. Gomez, 17 So.3d at 326. Section 932.703(2)(c) states in relevant part: When an adversarial preliminary hearing is held, the court shall review the verified affidavit and any other supporting documents and take any testimony to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the property was used, is being used, was attempted to be used, or was intended to be used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act. If probable cause is established, the court shall authorize the seizure or continued seizure of the subject contraband. (Emphasis added.) Quite simply, under this unambiguous language, [i]f law enforcement establishes [at the adversarial preliminary hearing] probable cause to believe that the property was used in violation of the Act, the court shall authorize the seizure or continued seizure of the property. Gomez, 17 So.3d at 326. Third, section 932.703(6)(a), which places the burden on the seizing agency to prove the owner's actual or constructive knowledge, clearly refers to the forfeiture stage of the proceedings, not the seizure stage: Property may not be forfeited under the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act unless the seizing agency establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that the owner either knew, or should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that the property was being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity. (Emphasis added.) Fourth, as noted in Gomez, 17 So.3d at 327, the Legislature contemplated that some seizures would not ultimately result in forfeiture and provided for penalties against the seizing agency when there is insufficient evidence to support a forfeiture of the property and the seizing agency has retained or restricted seized property prior to forfeiture or acted in bad faith. Section 932.704(9)(b) provides: The trial court shall require the seizing agency to pay to the claimant the reasonable loss of value of the seized property when the claimant prevails at trial or on appeal and the seizing agency retained the seized property during the trial or appellate process. The trial court shall also require the seizing agency to pay to the claimant any loss of income directly attributed to the continued seizure of income-producing property during the trial or appellate process. If the claimant prevails on appeal, the seizing agency shall immediately release the seized property to the person entitled to possession of the property as determined by the court, pay any cost as assessed by the court, and may not assess any towing charges, storage fees, administrative costs, or maintenance costs against the claimant with respect to the seized property or the forfeiture proceeding. The Legislature also provided for an award of attorney's fees to claimants if the seizing agency does not prevail and has not acted in good faith: The court shall award reasonable attorney's fees and costs, up to a limit of $1,000, to the claimant at the close of the adversarial preliminary hearing if the court makes a finding of no probable cause. When the claimant prevails, at the close of forfeiture proceedings and any appeal, the court shall award reasonable trial attorney's fees and costs to the claimant if the court finds that the seizing agency has not proceeded at any stage of the proceedings in good faith or that the seizing agency's action which precipitated the forfeiture proceedings was a gross abuse of the agency's discretion.... Nothing in this subsection precludes any party from electing to seek attorney's fees and costs under chapter 57 or other applicable law. § 932.704(10), Fla. Stat. (2008). The conflict cases, Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus and Baggett, set forth a contrary interpretation of the Actthat the seizing agency must demonstrate the owner's actual or constructive knowledge at the adversarial preliminary hearing, which takes place in the seizure stage. In Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus, 798 So.2d at 10, the First District held: [E]stablishment of probable cause to believe that the property was ... used in violation of the Florida Contraband Forfeiture Act requires, among other things, a preliminary showing of a basis for belief that the owner knew, or should have known after a reasonable inquiry, that the property was being employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity. In Baggett, the Fifth District agreed with the First District's conclusion in Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus that the seizing agency must make a preliminary showing of innocent owner status at the adversarial preliminary hearing, but disagreed with the quantum of proof required by the First District in determining innocent owner status: We ... agree with the First District that the seizing agency must make a preliminary showing of innocent owner status at the adversarial preliminary hearing. The First District, in [ Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus ], established a basis for belief standard in determining innocent owner status at the adversarial preliminary hearing. However, we do not adopt this basis for belief standard because we believe the proper quantum of proof is probable cause. Thus, when an owner requests an adversarial preliminary hearing and asserts she did not know the property was being used in criminal activity, the seizing agency must show probable cause to believe that the owner knew or should have known, after a reasonable inquiry, the property was employed or was likely to be employed in criminal activity. Baggett, 4 So.3d at 69. We conclude that the interpretation of the Act in Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus and Baggett construes an unambiguous statute in a way that would impermissibly extend its express terms and therefore amount to an abrogation of legislative power. See Velez, 934 So.2d at 1164-65. The plain and unambiguous language of the Act states that the seizing agency's burden to prove the owner's actual or constructive knowledge is applicable only to the forfeiture stage. At the seizure stage, a seizing agency is required to establish only probable cause that the property was used in violation of the Act. Accordingly, we approve the Third District's decision in Gomez and disapprove the First and Fifth Districts' decisions in Forfeiture of 1993 Lexus and Baggett.