Opinion ID: 2257779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adequacy of Defendant's Waiver

Text: On several occasions throughout the trial, defendant elected not to attend the proceedings. Defendant was not in court during the voir dire of individual jurors, the jury deliberations at the guilt-phase trial, the penalty-phase trial, and the rendering of the penalty-phase verdict. Before his absence at each of these stages, except the penalty-phase verdict, defendant appeared before the court with counsel for the purpose of waiving his right to be present. Each time, the court questioned defendant regarding his waiver. Concerning the rendering of the penalty-phase verdict, defendant simply refused to return to court, despite the court's instruction that his presence at the verdict was required. The court, however, elected not to use physical force to assure defendant's presence. Jury selection for defendant's trial began on March 19, 1996. On April 10, with defendant present, defense counsel informed the court that defendant wished to waive his presence during the individual juror voir dire process. Counsel stated: I have explained to Mr. Morton that he has a Constitutional right to be here during all phases of the proceeding, as was evidenced yesterday when Mr. Morton was ill. We had to adjourn the proceedings since as of yesterday he did not wish to waive his appearance. I would indicate to the Court that in my discussion with Mr. Morton, I have inquired whether or not his desire to be present during the individual voir dire process is as a result of an ongoing illness and he has indicated that is not the case. The reason why Mr. Morton does not wish to be here is really not of the Court's concern, but the Court does at this point have to inquire of Mr. Morton as to whether or not he is voluntarily waiving his appearance during this part of the proceedings. .... The only other matter, Your Honor, is that Mr. Morton in waving his appearance today  obviously this is not a waiver that he cannot revoke in the future should he desire to participate in the individual  be present during the individual voir dire process. And I would ask that the Court in some way arrange so that Mr. Morton has the ability to communicate with counsel in the event he decides on a morning or during an afternoon session that he desires to be here .... The court then engaged in a colloquy with defendant to ascertain whether his waiver was knowing and voluntary. THE COURT: Mr. Morton, can you please stand up? For almost everything it's proper for the Judge not to direct his comments directly to the defendant. This is one of those rare cases where I have to do that, okay? You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: I understand. THE COURT: You heard what [defense counsel] said? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I did. THE COURT: You understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And you agree with what he said? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Now, I have to be a little more specific. When a defendant asks to be absent during a criminal jury trial I'm usually concerned about that. Because sometimes it can work out to a defendant's disadvantage. They can, you know, see the testimony, hear the witnesses and get a sense of the situation. It seems to me that this individual interview of jurors is different and that your absence here is far less critical than it might be at another point in the trial. I can't in any way advise you why you should or shouldn't be present. I just want to say to you that I am perfectly comfortable with it if you choose not to be here. ... I want you to feel perfectly free to change your mind at any time. You let us know if you want to be over here. We will get you right away.... If you just give us the word, we will be most happy to have you here.... And I will call the Warden and ask them if they can make sure that if you do want to come over, you can get the word to Mr. Call's office right away. You also, if you prefer, can remain here in the detention area. But my impression would be that you prefer to be back in the County Jail; is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: For right now, yeah. In this exchange, the court explained that, by waiving his right to be present, defendant was depriving himself of the opportunity to witness and assist in the trial. By informing defendant that his absence at the juror voir dire would be far less critical than at other stages of the trial, the court indicated the comparative importance of defendant's attendance at other phases of the trial. The court also informed defendant that he possessed an absolute right to change his mind and return to court. Although he chose to remain absent from most of the voir dire, defendant was present during the guilt-phase trial, until the jury began its deliberations. On June 25, 1996, after the jury began deliberations, defendant, through defense counsel, requested to waive his right to be present. The court engaged both defense counsel and defendant regarding this request. The discussion began when defense counsel presented defendant's request to the court. Counsel stated: It is Mr. Morton's desire that he be, or he be allowed to absent himself from the remaining proceedings up until the verdict. He does wish to be here for the verdict, but as to any other procedural matters, and any other questions which might be addressed by the Jury to the Court, he has indicated he has no desire to be here during those particular proceedings. He understands he has an absolute right to be here. We have done this before with Mr. Morton. He understands what his rights are, and understanding those rights he has asked me to request that the Court allow him to absent himself for all proceedings prior to the verdict. The court then addressed defendant regarding his request. THE COURT: Okay Mr. Morton, you want to stand up. Mr. Morton, we talked about this before, but I just need to put it on the record. You understand you have a perfect right to be here in the courtroom, you're welcome to be here. If you choose to, because you'd be more comfortable in the county jail, and not subject to the stress of being here in the courtroom, it's perfectly all right, and you've heard what your lawyer had to say. Do you wish to be excused from the courtroom until the Jury has a verdict? THE DEFENDANT: Yes I do. THE COURT: Okay. Now I understand that you have access to a telephone, and you can call Mr. Call's office or ask the jail people as well to contact my chambers. Any time you want to come over, we'll arrange for you to come over right away, okay? Once again, the court engaged in an on-the-record exchange with defendant in which defendant confirmed his wish to absent himself from the court proceedings. The next day, June 26, 1996, the jury found defendant guilty of the purposeful and knowing murder of Michael Eck by his own conduct. Before the commencement of the penalty phase, defendant, through counsel and in direct exchanges with the court, waived both his right of allocution and his right to be present during the penalty phase. After the court discussed with defendant the wavier of his right of allocution, defense counsel raised defendant's request to waive his right to be present. [COUNSEL]: Your Honor, also, again, as Mr. Morton has chosen not to exercise his right of allocution and speak with the Jurors, Mr. Morton has also requested that I, once again, indicate to the Court that he does not desire to be present during the penalty phase of the case. We have, Mr. Morton has exited the courtroom on several occasions, he has also been apprised by the Court of his various rights, and also, of his discretion not to be present during any particular aspect of the proceeding. I have gone over those rights once again with Mr. Morton, and he has asked that I, once again, request that he be excused from the remainder of the penalty phase of the case, although understanding that in the event there is a verdict in the case, or in essence, a sentence decided upon by the Jury, he will be required then to appear. THE COURT: Okay, and you've heard what [defense counsel] has said, correct, Mr. Morton? THE DEFENDANT: That is correct. THE COURT: And you wish to be not in the courtroom during the proceedings on the penalty? THE DEFENDANT: That is correct. THE COURT: Okay, sir. All right. That is understandable, I know you've talked it over with your lawyer, the advantages and disadvantages of that, and I take it to be your decision, which represents a knowing and intelligent waiver of your right to be present, and I will honor your request. THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. THE COURT: Now, we'll just let the jail know, as today, that we need you on pretty quick notice when we do finally need you, and we wish you good luck. Thank you, sir. To be sufficient, the waiver of a fundamental constitutional right must be given intelligently and voluntarily. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed. 2d 694, 707 (1966); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1466 (1938); Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 354-55, 700 A. 2d 306; Chew, supra, 150 N.J. at 61, 695 A. 2d 1301; Buonadonna, supra, 122 N.J. at 35, 583 A. 2d 747; State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 260, 511 A. 2d 80 (1986); State v. Jackson, 272 N.J. Super. 543, 550, 640 A. 2d 863 (App.Div. 1994), certif. denied, 142 N.J. 450, 663 A. 2d 1358 (1995). Implicit in that requirement is the judicial obligation to assure that defendants understand the implications of a waiver of the right to be present. To meet that requirement, trial courts should question defendants about their understanding of the nature and consequences of their absence from the trial. Here, the facts demonstrate that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to be present at his trial. On three separate occasions, the court engaged defendant and defense counsel regarding defendant's waiver. See Johnson, supra, 304 U.S. at 464, 58 S.Ct. at 1023 (noting validity of waiver is to be based on the specific facts of each case). Unlike the dissent, post at 466-68, 715 A. 2d at 270-71, we believe that the better approach when determining the adequacy of a defendant's waiver is to examine the totality of the facts. Cooper, supra, 151 N.J. at 355, 700 A. 2d 306 (To determine voluntariness, courts examine the totality of the circumstances.); see also R. 3:16(b) (noting waiver of defendant's right to be present may be found ... from the defendant's express written or oral waiver placed on the record). The court informed defendant of the importance of his absence, determined that defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntary, and explained to him that he could change his mind at any time. Confirming the voluntariness of defendant's waiver is his steadfast refusal to assist counsel in preparing mitigating evidence and his violent reaction to mitigation evidence regarding his intelligence and childhood. In sum, defendant wished to take no part in the penalty phase. Defendant's desire to be absent from the proceedings further manifested itself in his refusal to obey the court's order to return for the rendering of the penalty-phase verdict.