Opinion ID: 1855634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Wiley's appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the jury's finding of the avoiding arrest aggravating factor?

Text: ¶ 43. Wiley contends that his appellate counsel should have challenged the jury's finding that the capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest. The record reflects that this was one of two aggravating factors found by the jury. [3] The record also indicates that defense counsel unsuccessfully objected to the inclusion of the avoiding arrest aggravator in the sentencing instructions. ¶ 44. The adverse ruling on this objection was not raised for consideration in Wiley's direct appeal to this Court. Wiley lists three arguments to support his claim that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue this issue:
¶ 45. First, Wiley claims that the evidence was insufficient to support this aggravating circumstance. In support of his argument, Wiley cites the fact that one of the victims of the crime was not killed. Wiley also claims that there are no other facts to demonstrate that he attempted to avoid arrest. Wiley contends that this was a botched robbery, which resulted in a murder, but not a murder committed to avoid arrest. ¶ 46. The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support an `avoiding lawful arrest' instruction is. well-settled[.] Woodward v. State, 726 So.2d 524, 541 (Miss.1997). Each case must be decided on its own peculiar facts. If there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to `cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 858 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 153 (Miss.1991)). ¶ 47. `Thus, it is this Court's role to inquire into whether there is any credible evidence upon which the jury could find the aggravating circumstance in question.' Woodward, 726 So.2d at 541 (quoting Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 854 (Miss. 1995)). In the case sub judice, Wiley fired three shots, which killed one of the two witnesses to the robbery, and seriously injured the other witness. The decedent, a storeowner, knew Wiley, a patron of the store. Wiley left the murder weapon and a box (which had contained a money bag) in a nearby, thickly wooded area that had dense undergrowth. The area was described as gullies, briars, it was just one big thicket, it was just almost impenetrable. In addition, Wiley left the money bag laying in some weeds, in a field near a dirt road. ¶ 48. The victims in this case knew Wiley. Furthermore, Wiley's efforts to dispose of and/or conceal the evidence of his crime are sufficient to support the avoiding arrest instruction. That is, there is evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the murder was to conceal Wiley's identity, or cover his tracks, so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest. Therefore, the granting of the instruction on this aggravator was proper. See generally Woodward, 726 So.2d at 541 (the fact that the defendant threw the murder weapon in a creek could reasonably indicate that he did not want to be arrested).
¶ 49. Wiley also argues that, if the avoiding arrest aggravator is applicable to this case, then it is unconstitutionally overbroad. He contends that, if all that is required to support an instruction on the avoiding arrest aggravator is the killing of a victim, then all felony murders would, by definition, be committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest. That is, Wiley asserts that the avoiding arrest aggravator does not genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Wiley places great emphasis on the fact that the second gunshot victim (the decedent's daughter) was not killed. That is, one of the witnesses to the crime was left alive. [4] ¶ 50. A similar argument was considered and rejected in Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 611 (Miss.1995): Walker argues that because every murder necessarily eliminates a witness to that crime, the avoiding arrest aggravator must be given with a limiting instruction channeling the jury's focus to those situations where there is specific evidence demonstrating that one of the purposes behind the killing was the killer's desire to avoid detection and apprehension for an underlying crime. See State v. Williams, 304 N.C. 394, 284 S.E.2d 437, 455 (1981). However, Walker compares our law to that of surrounding jurisdictions and concedes, Mississippi, like our sister States, does not equate the killing of the victim with the elimination of a witness in every case. Walker's contention that this aggravator must be accompanied by a limiting instruction has been repeatedly rejected by this Court. In Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 152 (Miss.1991). The Court stated: It is argued some sort of limiting instruction need be given to narrow this aggravator. In Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 651 (Miss.1983), we rebuffed this contention, stating, if there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to `cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Id. at 152-53. Walker, 671 So.2d at 611. In Gray v. Lucas, the Fifth Circuit rejected almost identical contentions to those made here. 677 F.2d [1086] at 1109-1110 [(5th Cir.1982)]. It noted that the Mississippi courts had limited the application of the circumstances to refer to purposefully killing the victim of an underlying felony to avoid or prevent arrest for that felony. So construed, the court observed that this factor was directed to a legitimate state interest and was not so broad that it comprehends an impermissibly large group of murders. Id. at 1110. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 858 (Miss. 1994). Therefore, this aggravating factor, as construed, is not overly broad. ¶ 51. Furthermore, Wiley's assertion is based on the premise that, other than the murder, there is no evidence of avoiding lawful arrest. As discussed earlier, there is evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that Wiley committed the murder to avoid lawful arrest. Therefore, this argument is based on a false premise and is without merit.
¶ 52. Wiley further argues that, if the avoiding arrest aggravator is applicable to this case, then the aggravator impermissibly duplicates the other aggravating circumstance found by the jury (ie: that the capital offense was committed while Wiley was engaged in the commission of a robbery). ¶ 53. These arguments are basically a reiteration of those raised in the preceding subsection. As discussed above, more evidence is required to support the avoiding arrest instruction than evidence of a robbery and a murder. Therefore, Wiley's contentions on this point are without merit. ¶ 54. Thus, Wiley's ineffectiveness of counsel claim on this point is without merit. That is, even if appellate counsel's performance could be considered deficient for failing to raise the issue of the avoiding arrest instruction, Wiley has not proven the requisite prejudice to support an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. Therefore, Wiley's arguments on this point fail. See Hodgin, 702 So.2d at 116-17 (Miss. 1997) (reiterating that burden is on petitioner to prove both prongs of the Strickland test).