Opinion ID: 2981457
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ASP Baton

Text: The appropriate standard to use in analyzing an excessive force claim brought under §1983 “is determined by identifying the specific constitutional right infringed by the challenged application of force.” Lustig v. Mondeau, 211 F. App’x 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989)). All claims that police officers used excessive force in the course of an arrest should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its “objective reasonableness” standard. Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. Under this standard, the court must take into consideration the totality of 16 the circumstances. Id. at 397. In applying the objective reasonableness test, the court is required to pay “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including [1] the severity of the crime at issue, [2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. Furthermore, the test of the “reasonableness” of a particular use of force by law enforcement is objective, and “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. This court has stated that it should not substitute its own ideas in regard to what is “proper police procedure for the instantaneous decision of the officer at the scene.” Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2000). In addition, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments–in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97. The Supreme Court has stated that a mistaken belief may still be a reasonable belief, and the fact that it turned out to be mistaken does not undermine its reasonableness as considered at the time of the acts. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009). Plaintiffs, therefore, needed to show that Simmons’s use of force was objectively unreasonable. The magistrate judge found that Simmons’s use of force was objectively reasonable. Based on the testimony of Plaintiffs, Markus, and Simmons, the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that Simmons’s use of the baton was objectively reasonable. While two of the Graham factors may not support the use of force, the remaining factor weighs heavily in favor of Simmons’s use of force being reasonable. 17 The first factor is the severity of the crime. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The crime at issue was disorderly conduct, which is not a particularly severe crime. Therefore, this factor does not weigh in favor of Simmons’s use of force being reasonable. The second factor is “whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others.” Id. Plaintiffs were fighting with Burbrink and, therefore, they posed a threat to at least one another. It is indisputable that at least right before the officers arrived, Frodge was fighting Burbrink. Frodge argues, in his brief, that the fight had ended when he was struck with Simmons’s baton and, thus, the force Simmons used was unreasonable. However, Frodge’s testimony does not support this assertion. Specifically, Frodge argues in his brief that “[w]ith Burbrink on the ground and the fight over, [Frodge] was then grabbed and struck multiple times from behind.” Frodge supports this assertion with a citation to his interview with the Covington Police Department Professional Compliance Board.4 In his deposition, Frodge testified that he punched Burbrink, and that as he started to spin to the ground, the next thing he knew he was being hit with something. Frodge testified that he felt a strike to his leg within seconds of throwing the punch. He also observed that while Burbrink was falling to the ground, Pence kicked him. Therefore, based on Frodge’s deposition testimony, the fight had not completely ended at the time the officers reached the fight and when the baton was used. Furthermore, as Plaintiffs’ deposition testimony indicates, it was a Saturday night, lots of people were in the area, and the fight occurred in or near the street, 4 While Frodge points to his June 5, 2008, interview with the Covington Police Department Professional Compliance Board, wherein he indicates that the fight was not ongoing at the time Simmons hit him with the baton, that statement is not admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1)(B) as Plaintiffs argue. Although Plaintiffs contend that the district court did not address this issue, the district court’s ruling can be read as implicitly ruling on this issue, since the magistrate judge found the fight to still be ongoing at this point based on Frodge’s January 21, 2010, deposition testimony. 18 while the vehicles were stopped at the light. Simmons testified that he first called out to the parties to “knock it off,” but that his warning was not heeded. Thus, it would have been especially necessary for Simmons and Markus to respond quickly to break up the fight. Simmons testified that after he used his baton, the fight ended, demonstrating that the force served its proper purpose. Because the parties were fighting one another, there was a threat to each other and, given the highly populated area, possibly to others as well. Therefore, it was essential that the fight be brought to an end as quickly as possible. Consequently, this factor weighs in favor of Simmons’s use of force being reasonable. The third factor is whether the suspect “is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. While it is clear that Frodge and Burbrink did not stop fighting despite unrefuted testimony that Simmons, in full police uniform, told them to “knock it off,” there is no evidence that they were resisting arrest or attempting to evade by flight at that time. Although Plaintiffs argue there are several analogous cases that demonstrate the use of force was unreasonable when arresting plaintiffs for fairly minor crimes, these cases are easily distinguishable, as none of them involve incidents where the plaintiff was engaged in a fight, essentially in the street, in a highly populated area. In addition, the force used in those cases was much greater than that used in the instant case. See Grawey v. Drury, 567 F.3d 302 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that a police officer’s pepper spraying of the plaintiff when he was walking away from the officer, but was not under arrest, amounted to excessive force); Solomon v. Auburn Hills Police Dept., 389 F.3d 167 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding arresting officer’s actions could have amounted to excessive force because he twisted and grabbed the plaintiff’s arm with enough force to fracture it in several places even though she was not a flight risk and had followed officer’s orders); Landis v. Baker, 297 F. App’x 453 (6th 19 Cir. 2008) (finding police officers used excessive force in detaining arrestee where officers used at least ten strikes of a baton when arrestee was not actively resisting arrest, then tasered arrestee four times over just a few seconds and held arrestee’s face submerged in water for at least ten to fifteen seconds, and arrestee ultimately died). Thus, these cases are inapposite. A review of the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Simmons’s use of force was reasonable. Given that Simmons and Markus observed Plaintiffs actively fighting with Burbrink and needed to quickly break up the fight, the use of the baton was reasonable. There is no evidence that the baton was used with such force as to cause serious injury to Frodge. Frodge also asserts that taking him to the ground and twisting his arm behind his back also amounted to excessive force. However, Simmons testified that he took Frodge to the ground in the process of breaking up the fight and falling off the curb. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable for Simmons to twist Frodge’s arm behind his back and take him to the ground in Simmons’s efforts to end the fight and place Frodge under arrest. As the Graham court indicated, “[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments–in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving–about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” 490 U.S. at 396-97. Further, the reasonableness of Simmons’s actions “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. Taking into account the parties’ failure to respond to his command to “knock it off,” and given the location of the fight, it was reasonable for Simmons to employ some force in order to bring the fight to an end. Therefore, no constitutional violation occurred, and this court affirms the district court’s judgment in favor of Simmons. 20