Opinion ID: 2031928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admission of DNA Evidence

Text: Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in admitting deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence. He first contends that the trial court erred in denying a Frye hearing. Second, defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence when its prejudice outweighed its probative value. Before trial, defense counsel moved to exclude the results of the DNA testing in this case. ( Frye v. United States (D.C.Cir.1923), 293 F. 1013.) In Frye, the court held that the use of evidence that has not gained general acceptance within the relevant scientific community is improper. ( Frye, 293 F. at 1014; but see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993), 509 U.S. 579, 587-589, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 480 ( Frye test no longer applicable in Federal trials).) This court recognized the Frye standard in People v. Baynes (1981), 88 Ill.2d 225, 241, 58 Ill.Dec. 819, 430 N.E.2d 1070 (polygraph evidence). The defendant contended that a Frye hearing, in which the trial judge would determine outside of the jury's presence whether DNA evidence is generally accepted within the scientific community, was necessary here. The trial court refused to grant a Frye hearing. See People v. Lipscomb (1991), 215 Ill.App.3d 413, 429-32, 158 Ill.Dec. 952, 574 N.E.2d 1345; People v. Miles (1991), 217 Ill.App.3d 393, 402-04, 160 Ill.Dec. 347, 577 N.E.2d 477. During trial, the defendant renewed his objection to the admission of the DNA evidence. The defendant raised the issue of whether the DNA evidence was probative when the probability of a random match was 1 in 466, relying on People v. Harbold (1984), 124 Ill.App.3d 363, 383, 79 Ill.Dec. 830, 464 N.E.2d 734 (admission of probability statistic of 1 in 500 as relating to genetic marker testing was plain error). The trial court held an evidentiary hearing outside of the jury's presence. The State called as an expert witness Robert Coffin, a special agent with the FBI, who testified to the propriety of the FBI procedures. The defendant did not call an expert witness to challenge Coffin's testimony nor did he make an offer of proof. After considering Coffin's testimony, arguments of counsel, and relevant case law, the trial judge ruled that any questions as to the reliability of DNA testing in this case went to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility, and admitted the DNA evidence. To the extent that Harbold was contrary to its ruling, the court declined to follow it. The State then presented the DNA evidence to the jury. Coffin testified to a match between the defendant's blood and the seminal fluid from the victim's vaginal swab. Coffin further testified that the probability of a random match was 1 in 466. In response, defense counsel called as an expert witness Pravatchai Boonlayangoor, a medical laboratory scientist, who contested the results of the DNA testing and the significance of the probability calculated. Before this court, defendant again argues that the trial court erred in admitting the DNA evidence. We first examine the Frye hearing issue. While we believe the defendant raises an interesting issue as to whether the FBI's probability calculation method is generally accepted in the scientific community, we need not decide that question here. Initially, we note that the trial court did hold an evidentiary hearing before DNA evidence was presented to the jury. At that hearing, defendant did not present an expert witness to challenge the State's expert witness or make an offer of proof. As a result, defendant arguably waived his claim. Moreover, we believe that any error the trial judge may have made in denying a formal Frye hearing was harmless. When the competent evidence in the record establishes the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and it can be concluded that retrial without the erroneous admission of the challenged evidence would produce no different result, the conviction may be affirmed. ( People v. Arman (1989), 131 Ill.2d 115, 124, 137 Ill.Dec. 5, 545 N.E.2d 658 (mug shot evidence).) The evidence of the defendant's guilt in this case was overwhelming without considering the DNA evidence. We similarly believe that any error in admitting DNA evidence when the probability of a random match was 1 in 466 was harmless. We thus need not address the defendant's other argument that DNA evidence should not have been admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.