Opinion ID: 2461850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial judge erred in failing to recuse himself because of information he learned while presiding over the subsequently withdrawn guilty plea.

Text: Appellant first contends that the trial judge should have recused himself sua sponte because of information he learned from appellant during the aborted guilty plea hearing. In response to the judge's questions, appellant admitted that George Owens handed him the victim's gun and that he shot Hamlin. Appellant also stated that he did not know why he did it. Appellant alleges that the judge relied on this information when sentencing him to death. KRS 26A.015(2)(a) and (e) mandate that a judge disqualify himself if he has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts..., or has expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the proceeding... or has knowledge of any other circumstances in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. This statute does not apply to the case at bar. If it did a judge would be required to recuse himself from subsequent proceedings whenever he presided over suppression hearings, guilty pleas, or trials. Here there is no evidence of actual bias or impartiality, only bare speculation. We adopt the Ninth Circuit's view as expressed in United States v. Winston, 613 F.2d 221, 223 (1980): . . . [R]ecusal is appropriate only when the information is derived from an extra-judicial source. Knowledge obtained in the course of earlier participation in the same case does not require that a judge recuse himself.