Opinion ID: 2977620
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probable Cause to Seize the Keys

Text: Defendant also argues that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to seize his keys and use them to unlock the Impala. We disagree. First, police may search an individual whom they lawfully have arrested. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that after “a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that Amendment”); United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 955 (6th Cir.) (stating that “[o]nce a lawful arrest has been made, the police officer is permitted to search the individual”), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 819 (2007); cf. United States v. Robinson, 390 F.2d 853, 871 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that this Court has allowed searches of automobiles incident to arrest even if the “arrestee was out of the car, handcuffed, and placed in the back seat of a police cruiser”). Second, they may seize both contraband and any instrumentalities, fruits, or evidence of a crime that they discover in the course of the search. See United States v. -7- Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 802-05 (1974); United States v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-02, 307 (1973); see e.g., United States v. Charles, 138 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding a seizure of a pager found in an automobile in a search incident to the arrest of its occupant).1 No one disputes, consequently, that the officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant (and, as we have concluded, they did), then they lawfully searched him and lawfully discovered the keys in his pocket. His statement disclaiming any knowledge of the keys,2 in turn, justified the further step of seizing the keys. That statement suggested two possibilities: One was that Defendant was speaking truthfully and that the keys did not belong to him, in which case the officers reasonably sought to identify the vehicle and owner to which they belonged. The other possibility was that Defendant was lying and that he owned (or at least knew something about) the vehicle associated 1 Defendant’s reliance on United States v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983), and Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992), is misplaced. Hayden held that both items of evidentiary value as well as instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband, may be seized in a lawful search. Hayden, 387 U.S. at 300-02. The Hayden court also stated that it has “recognized that the principal object of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and procedural barriers rested on property concepts.” Id. at 304. Whether viewed as having evidentiary value or as fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband, here the keys were seized as the result of a search incident to arrest. The seizure is not problematic under Hayden. Place too is dissimilar because it involved an investigative detention, not probable cause. See Place, 462 U.S. at 709. There the Supreme Court held that the police violated the Fourth Amendment by holding the defendant’s suitcase at the airport for ninety minutes, which exceed the limits of an investigative detention and which was not justified by probable cause. Id. at 708. Soldal held that the Fourth Amendment protected against unreasonable seizures of property in which the individual challenging the seizure has a possessory interest even when a privacy or liberty interest is not at issue. Soldal, 506 U.S. at 56-57 (holding that state actors violated the Fourth Amendment by physically removing the plaintiff’s mobile home even though a privacy or liberty interest was not implicated based on the owner’s property interest). Here, Defendant failed to assert that he had a property or privacy interest in the keys. 2 Defendant does not contest this. In his motion to suppress in the district court, he ezpressly stated that he “never claimed ownership of any automobile.” -8- with the keys found in his pocket, suggesting that the vehicle might contain fruits, evidence or instrumentalities of his drug-related offense. In either case, the officers were justified in seizing the keys to look for the vehicle. Defendant’s statement denying any connection to the keys, to be sure, came before the officers advised Defendant of his Miranda rights, but since Defendant does not argue his statement was involuntary, that fact does not affect the admissibility of the evidence the officers discovered as a result. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307-09 (1985); see United States v. Sangineto-Miranda, 859 F.2d 1501, 1517-19 (6th Cir. 1988). Furthermore, this Court has held that “[t]he mere insertion of a key into a lock, by an officer who lawfully possesses the key and is in a location where he has a right to be, to determine whether the key operates the lock, is not a search.” United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 456 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. DeBardeleben, 740 F.2d 440, 444-45 (6th Cir. 1975). The officers here did not conduct an actual search of the inside of the Impala until after they had probable cause based on the canine dog’s positive hit on the vehicle. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (stating that the use of a well-trained drug detection dog does not by itself implicate any privacy interests); Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (holding that a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 375 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[t]here is probable cause to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle once a properly trained and reliable drug detection dog alerts positively to the presence of drugs”). Thus, because they had probable cause to search the Impala, the subsequent seizure of the narcotics and gun was lawful. And finally, Defendant’s incriminating statements were made after he was advised of his Miranda rights.