Opinion ID: 1198898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Richie's Conviction of Promoting Prostitution in the Second Degree Should Be Reversed

Text: Before addressing Richie's arguments, it is necessary to examine the applicable statutes. HRS § 712-1203 (1993) provides in relevant part: Promoting prostitution in the second degree. (1) A person commits the offense of promoting prostitution in the second degree if the person knowingly: (a) Advances or profits from prostitution[ [3] ] by managing, supervising, controlling, or owning, either alone or in association with others, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business or enterprise involving prostitution activity by two or more prostitutes[.] It is clear that the definition of promoting prostitution in the second degree incorporates the concept of prostitution. Prostitution is a separate offense defined in HRS § 712-1200 (1993), which provides in relevant part: Prostitution. (1) A person commits the offense of prostitution if the person engages in, or agrees or offers to engage in, sexual conduct with another person for a fee. (2) As used in subsection (1), sexual conduct means sexual penetration, deviate sexual intercourse, or sexual contact, as those terms are defined in section 707-700. Prostitution, therefore, requires sexual conduct, and sexual conduct expressly includes sexual contact, as defined in HRS § 707-700. HRS § 707-700 (1993) provides in relevant part: Sexual contact means any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of a person not married to the actor, or of the sexual or other intimate parts of the actor by the person, whether directly or through the clothing or other material intended to cover the sexual or other intimate parts.[ [4] ] Thus, by the plain meaning of HRS §§ 712-1200 and 707-700, touching the sexual or other intimate parts of another person, for a fee, constitutes prostitution, even if the touching occurs through clothing. It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning. Instead, our sole duty is to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious meaning. Alvarez v. Liberty House, Inc., 85 Hawai`i 275, 278, 942 P.2d 539, 542 (1997) (quoting Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai`i) Ltd., Inc., 76 Hawai`i 454, 461, 879 P.2d 1037, 1044-45 (1994)). Clearly, prostitution under HRS § 712-1200 encompasses touching through clothing. Consequently, promoting prostitution in the second degree under HRS § 712-1203 includes advancing or profiting from prostitution by controlling a prostitution business or enterprise where the alleged prostitution involves touching through clothing for a fee. Amicus Curiae State of Hawai`i, as represented by the Department of the Attorney General, notes that the broad definition of sexual contact in HRS § 707-700 was specifically enacted in response to a decision of this court. In State v. Rodgers, 68 Haw. 438, 718 P.2d 275 (1986), we held that the touching of breasts through clothing did not constitute sexual contact under the original version of HRS § 707-700. Id. at 444, 718 P.2d at 278. In response, the legislature amended HRS § 707-700 to include touching through clothing. See 1987 Haw. Sess. L. Act 181, § 7, at 410; Hse. Stand Comm. Rep. No. 691, in 1987 House Journal, at 1434. Thus, even if there were any ambiguity in the definition of sexual contact, the history of the statute indicates that the legislature specifically intended to prohibit touching through clothing. Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) notes that the definition of sexual contact in HRS § 707-700 is located in a different chapter of the Hawai`i Penal Code than prostitution. The ACLU, therefore, argues that the definition should be limited to the sexual offenses found in HRS ch. 707, Part V. The ACLU argues that the definition of sexual contact might make sense when applied to sexual assault under HRS §§ 707-730, 707-731, 707-732, and 707-733; however, it does not make sense when applied to prostitution under HRS § 712-1200. We concede that sexual assault and prostitution are distinguishable offenses. Therefore, it might have been wise for the legislature to adopt either a different definition of sexual contact specifically applicable to prostitution or even to eliminate sexual contact as a basis for prostitution. Certainly, it would have been reasonable for the legislature to limit prostitution to sexual penetration. However, the legislature did not do so. Instead, in HRS § 712-1200, the legislature expressly incorporated the broad definition of sexual contact found in HRS § 707-700. We cannot ignore the plain and unambiguous language of the statutes at issue in this case.
Richie argues that his conviction of promoting prostitution in the second degree should be reversed because the definition of sexual contact is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The following standard of review applies to constitutional challenges based on vagueness or overbreadth: First, the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law which is reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Additionally, where it is alleged that the legislature has acted unconstitutionally, this court has consistently held that every enactment of the legislature is presumptively constitutional, and a party challenging the statute has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. The infraction should be plain, clear, manifest and unmistakable. Second, we construe penal statutes narrowly, considering them in light of precedent, legislative history, and common sense. Third, where possible, we will read a penal statute in such a manner as to preserve its constitutionality. To accord a constitutional interpretation of a provision of broad or apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to focus the scope of the provision to a narrow and more restricted construction. Provisions of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and reasonable interpretation under this doctrine in order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results. Put differently, a statute will not be held unconstitutional by reason of uncertainty if any sensible construction embracing the legislative purpose may be given it. Mere difficulty in ascertaining its meaning, or the fact that it is susceptible to interpretation will not render it nugatory. State v. Bates, 84 Hawai`i 211, 220, 933 P.2d 48, 57 (1997) (quoting State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i 127, 137-38, 890 P.2d 1167, 1177-78 (1995)) (brackets, ellipses, and internal block quotes omitted). When addressing a vagueness challenge, we apply the following principles: Due process of law requires that a penal statute state with reasonable clarity the act it proscribes and provide fixed standards for adjudicating guilt, or the statute is void for vagueness. Statutes must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct. This standard is essentially indistinguishable from the applicable standard under federal law. Thus we have so far not departed from the federal constitutional law in the area of void for vagueness challenges to criminal statutes. Under the applicable federal law, a criminal statute is void for vagueness unless it: 1) gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he or she may act accordingly, and 2) provides explicit standards for those who apply the statute, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Id. at 220-21, 933 P.2d at 57-58 (quoting Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i at 138, 890 P.2d at 1178) (internal block quotes omitted). In the present case, the definition of sexual contact in HRS § 707-700 is crystal clear. The statute establishes a bright-line rule, which in laypersons' terms can be summarized as: You can look but you can't touch. This definition gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited. It also constitutes an explicit standard that avoids arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and is not subjective. Thus, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. The doctrine of overbreadth, although closely related to a vagueness claim, is distinct in that while a statute may be clear and precise in its terms, it may sweep so broadly that constitutionally protected conduct as well as unprotected conduct is included in its proscriptions. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i at 142, 890 P.2d at 1182 (quoting State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 143, 597 P.2d 590, 594 (1979)). Richie argues that the constitutionally protected conduct infringed upon by the definition of sexual contact is nude dancing. It is true that, under certain circumstances, nude dancing is protected by the First Amendment. The United States Supreme Court has noted: Several of our cases contain language suggesting that nude dancing of the kind involved here is expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment. In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 932 [95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648] (1975), we said: [A]lthough the customary `barroom' type of nude dancing may involve only the barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 [93 S.Ct. 390, 34 L.Ed.2d 342] (1972), that this form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment protection under some circumstances. In Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 66 [101 S.Ct. 2176, 68 L.Ed.2d 671] (1981), we said that [f]urthermore, as the state courts in this case recognized, nude dancing is not without its First Amendment protections from official regulation (citations omitted). These statements support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that nude dancing of the kind sought to be performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 [111 S.Ct. 2456, 115 L.Ed.2d 504] (1991). However, nothing in the definition of sexual contact in HRS § 707-700 prohibits nude dancing per se. Individuals are not prevented from dancing in the nude. The conduct prohibited is the touching of sexual or intimate parts. Thus, the statute still permits dancing in the nude and allows customers to look at performers dancing in the nude; what the customers cannot do is touch the performers. The dancing at issue in Barnes and Schad apparently did not involve touching. Both cases involved coin-operated booths with the dancer performing behind a glass panel. See Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563, 111 S.Ct. 2456; Schad, 452 U.S. at 62, 101 S.Ct. 2176. Although Barnes also involved go-go dancing, there is no indication that this dancing involved physical contact with customers. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 563, 111 S.Ct. 2456. Similarly, the topless dancing in Doran does not appear to have involved physical contact. Doran, 422 U.S. at 924, 95 S.Ct. 2561. Thus, we believe that HRS § 707-700 does not unconstitutionally interfere with the protected activity of nude dancing. Richie raises additional examples of the statute's alleged overbreadth that we believe are extreme and patently absurd. Richie argues that dance instructors, fashion designers, and tailors would be affected by the definition of sexual contact. His most outrageous example is sitting on the lap of Santa Claus, or the Easter bunny. If one compares the conduct at issue in this case, see supra part I, with the examples just mentioned, it is clear that they are distinguishable. The conduct in this case had clear sexual overtones. Moreover, under HRS § 712-1200, the sexual contact must be for a fee; conversely, the fee must be specifically for the sexual contact. The examples cited by Richie are clearly absurd. In reviewing a penal statute, we accord it a limited and reasonable interpretation ... in order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results. Bates, 84 Hawai`i at 220, 933 P.2d at 57. Richie's attempt to apply HRS § 707-700 to extreme and absurd situations is not sufficient to render it unconstitutionally overbroad.
Richie next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of prostitution. Insofar as promoting prostitution in the second degree incorporates the concept of prostitution, Richie is apparently arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We have repeatedly stated: [E]vidence adduced in the trial court must be considered in the strongest light for the prosecution when the appellate court passes on the legal sufficiency of such evidence to support a conviction; the same standard applies whether the case was before a judge or jury. The test on appeal is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. State v. Quitog, 85 Hawai`i 128, 145, 938 P.2d 559, 576 (1997) (quoting State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 135, 913 P.2d 57, 61 (1996)) (emphasis omitted). `Substantial evidence' as to every material element of the offense charged is credible evidence which is of sufficient quality and probative value to enable a person of reasonable caution to support a conclusion. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i at 135, 913 P.2d at 61. In the present case, there was sufficient evidence of prostitution to support the jury's verdict. The testimony of Officer Villanueva and Officer Okagawa clearly support the conclusion that sexual contact occurred. There was abundant and repeated contact with breasts, contact with genitalia, and simulation of sexual intercourse. Some of the contact occurred directly and some of it occurred through clothing. Moreover, there was evidence supporting the conclusion that the officers obtained an agreement to engage in sexual conduct with Monica Alves. There was also evidence indicating that the sexual contact occurring that night was for a fee. Officer Villanueva paid Richie $750 for the entire performance. Inasmuch as the performance included sexual contact, that $750 payment constituted a fee for sexual contact. In addition, the jury could have reasonably concluded, based on the circumstances, that the tips received by the dancers also constituted a fee for sexual contact. Finally, the jury could have concluded that the $225 discussed in relation to having sex with Alves constituted a fee. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence of prostitution. In addition, Richie's activities in organizing and encouraging the performance that night, as well as his receipt of the $750 fee and a portion of the tips, support the conclusion that he advanced or profited from prostitution. His business, Fanta-See Express, could be interpreted as a prostitution enterprise that he controlled. Finally, three dancers were involved in the performance; therefore, there was evidence of two or more prostitutes. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support Richie's conviction of promoting prostitution.