Opinion ID: 769647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII claims against the University

Text: 19 Bowman argues that the district court erred in dismissing his Title VII sexual harassment claims. Bowman argues that the Supreme Court in Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), held that a plaintiff does not need to prove that he suffered a tangible employment actioneven when the alleged harassment is not severe or pervasive. Bowman argues, in the alternative, that he suffered a tangible adverse employment action by the removal of his responsibilities as Coordinator. 4 Bowman also argues that the district court erred in holding that the alleged sexual harassment was not severe or pervasive. The district court's grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Lucas v. Monroe County, 203 F.3d 964, 971 (6th Cir. 2000). 20
21 To prevail under a sexual harassment claim without showing that the harassment was severe or pervasive, the employee must prove the following: 1) that the employee was a member of a protected class; 2) that the employee was subjected to unwelcomed sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances or requests for sexual favors; 3) that the harassment complained of was on the basis of sex; 4) that the employee's submission to the unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits or that the employee's refusal to submit to the supervisor's sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment; and 5) the existence of respondeat superior liability. See Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178, 186 (6th Cir. 1992). 22 The district court rejected Bowman's claim that he suffered a tangible job detriment by the removal of his responsibilities as Coordinator. The court reasoned that there was no tangible employment action for the following reasons: 1) Bowman's removal from the position was not a demotion because the Coordinator position was not an actual position at the University but, rather, merely a title provided to a person which describes the duties he or she was performing, and was not accompanied by a reduction in salary; 2) Bowman had not offered any evidence showing that the Coordinator position was viewed as more prestigious than the full-time teaching position in which he remained; and 3) the University reinstated Bowman to his position as Coordinator. 23 While a permanent loss of the Coordinator position may well have constituted a tangible job detriment, an issue we need not decide, it is clear that Bowman did not suffer an adverse employment action 5 by the very temporary loss of his position as Coordinator. In Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652 (6th Cir. 1999), the court noted the requirements for establishing a materially adverse employment action: 24 [A] materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment must be more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities. A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished materialresponsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. 25 Id. at 662 (citation omitted). The Sixth Circuit has consistently held that de minimis employment actions are not materially adverse and, thus, not actionable. See, e.g., Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough HealthCare Prod., 176 F.3d 921, 930 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that neither requiring plaintiff to work at home while she was recovering from out-patient surgery, nor rejecting computer expenses that previously had been approved, were materially adverse employment actions); Jackson v. City of Columbus, 194 F.3d 737 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that police chief's suspension with pay was not an adverse employment action); Hollins, 188 F.3d at 662 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that [s]atisfactory ratings in an overall evaluation, although lower than a previous evaluation, will not constitute an adverse employment action where the employee receives a merit raise); Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, 97 F.3d 876, 885 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that reassignments without salary or work changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims). 26 Even if we assume that the loss of the Coordinator position constitutes a significant change in employment status, there is no tangible employment action in this case because the very temporary nature of the employment action in question makes it a non-materially adverse employment action. Similar to cases where the employment action is not significant enough to rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action, cases where the employment action, while perhaps being materially adverse if permanent, is very temporary also do not constitute materially adverse employment actions. This principle was recognized in Kauffman v. Allied Signal, Inc., Autolite Div., 970 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1992), where the court indicated that even if a tangible job detriment has been suffered, there may be a de minimis exception for temporary actions or where further remedial action is moot and no economic loss occurred. See id. at 187. See also Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that there was no adverse employment action where temporary transfer did not result in loss of salary or benefits). The removal of Bowman from the Coordinator position for only approximately ten days with no loss of income is properly characterized as a de minimis employment action that does not rise to the level of a materially adverse employment decision. 6 27
28 A plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that the sex discrimination created a hostile or abusive work environment without having to prove a tangible employment action. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In order to establish a hostile work environment claim, an employee must show the following: 1) the employee is a member of a protected class, 2) the employee was subject to unwelcomed sexual harassment, 3) the harassment was based on the employee's sex, 4) the harassment created a hostile work environment, and 5) the employerfailed to take reasonable care to prevent and correct any sexually harassing behavior. See Williams v. General Motors Corp., 187 F.3d 553, 560-61 (6th Cir. 1999). 29 A hostile work environment occurs [w]hen the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)(internal quotations and citations omitted). Both an objective and a subjective test must be met: the conduct must be severe or pervasive enough to create an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive and the victim must subjectively regard that environment as abusive. See id. at 21-22. 30 The court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether, objectively, the alleged harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 562. [T]he issue is not whether each incident of harassment standing alone is sufficient to sustain the cause of action in a hostile environment case, but whether--taken together--the reported incidents make out such a case. Id. The work environment as a whole must be considered rather than a focus on individual acts of alleged hostility. See id. at 563. Isolated incidents, however, unless extremely serious, will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms or conditions of employment. See Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 2000). Appropriate factors for the court to consider when determining whether conduct is severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. 31 In considering the alleged incidents of harassment, the district court found several to be nonprobative because they were not based on Bowman's sex. The court found that the 1991 shoulder rubbing incident in Bowman's office was ambiguous and of no evidentiary value absent some other evidence suggesting that it should be considered a harassing act. The court also found the January 9, 1995, confrontation in Jahnke's office and the repeated telephone calls from Jahnke to be nonprobative because Bowman had offered no evidence that those acts constituted harassment on the basis of his sex. The court then considered whether the remaining alleged incidents, considered together, were sufficient to constitute sexual harassment that was severe or pervasive. The court found that the 1992 Christmas party incident, the 1994 whirlpool incident, and the 1994 swimming pool incident were imbued with sufficient sexual flavor to show that Bowman was subjected to uninvited harassment and that the harassment was based upon his status as a member of a protected class but found that the harassment was not severe or pervasive. 32 Non-sexual conduct may be illegally sex-based and properly considered in a hostile environment analysis where it can be shown that but for the employee's sex, he would not have been the object of harassment. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 565. Any unequal treatment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's gender may, if sufficiently severe or pervasive under the Harris standard, constitute a hostile environment in violation of Title VII. Id. However, Title VII does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at 'discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex.' Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (emphasis in original). The critical issue, Title VII's textindicates, is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed. Id. (citation omitted). 33 We agree with the district court that while Bowman recites a litany of perceived slights and abuses, many of the alleged harassing acts cannot be considered in the hostile environment analysis because Bowman has not shown that the alleged harassment was based upon his status as a male. Bowman, while alleging that Jahnke tormented him personally, has not show that the non-sexual harassment had an anti-male bias. In Title VII actions, however, it is important to distinguish between harassment and discriminatory harassment in order to ensure that Title VII does not become a general civility code. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (citation omitted). In Williams, evidence that the plaintiff was ostracized on myriad instances when others were not, combined with gender-specific epithets used, such as slut and fucking women, was sufficient to create an inference that her gender was the motivating impulse for her co-workers' behavior and allowed the non-sexual harassment to be considered in the hostile environment analysis. See Williams, 187 F.3d at 565-66. Unlike the plaintiff in Williams, Bowman has not alleged that Jahnke made a single comment evincing an anti-male bias. Besides a bare and unsupported assertion that some women employees were allowed to engage in work outside the University while he was not, Bowman has not shown that the non-sexual conduct he complains of had anything to do with his gender. While he may have been subject to intimidation, ridicule, and mistreatment, he has not shown that he was treated in a discriminatory manner because of his gender. 34 The only incidents that may arguably be considered in the hostile work environment analysis are the 1991 shoulder rubbing incident, the 1992 Christmas party incident, the 1994 whirlpool incident, the 1994 swimming pool incident, and the 1995 meeting in Jahnke's office. Although we consider more alleged incidents in the analysis than did the district court, we agree with the court's holding that the incidents that may properly be considered are not severe or pervasive and, thus, do not meet the fourth element of the hostile environment analysis. While the allegations are serious, they do not constitute conduct that is pervasive or severe. We note that like Williams, three of the alleged incidents in this case were not merely crude, offensive, and humiliating, but also contained an element of physical invasion. Williams, 187 F.3d at 563. However, the conduct in this case is not nearly as severe or pervasive as the harassment in Williams or in other cases where the court found that the conduct in question was not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile environment. In Williams, there were fifteen separate allegations of sexual harassment over a period of one year. See id. at 559. The allegations included derogatory and profane remarks directed at the plaintiff, sexually explicit comments directed at the plaintiff, offensive comments directed at women in general, denial of plaintiff's overtime, and the exclusion of plaintiff from certain workplace areas. See id. at 559. See also Burnett v. Tyco Corp., 203 F.3d 980, 985 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that under the totality of the circumstances, a single battery coupled with two merely offensive remarks over a six-month period does not create an issue of material fact as to whether the conduct alleged was sufficiently severe to create a hostile work environment); Morris v. Oldham County Fiscal Court, 201 F.3d 784, 790 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents including a sexual advance did not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of a plaintiff's employment); Sprague v. Thorn Am., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that five incidents of allegedly sexually-orientedoffensive comments during a sixteen-month period were not sufficiently frequent to create liability).