Opinion ID: 6109557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Adequately Impeach Eva's Testimony

Text: Mr. McFadden next alleges the motion court clearly erred in finding defense counsel were not ineffective in the guilt phase for failing to call several additional lay witnesses and failing to present photographs and measurements of the crime scene at trial to impeach Eva's testimony that she saw Mr. McFadden kill her sister. He notes Eva was the key witness for the State and, had she been further impeached, it would have undermined her credibility, and he would not have been convicted. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to call a witness, the defendant must show: (1) counsel knew or should have known of the existence of the witness; (2) the witness could be located through reasonable investigation; (3) the witness would testify; and (4) the witness's testimony would have produced a viable defense. Deck v. State, 381 S.W.3d 339 , 346 (Mo. banc 2012) (citation omitted). In this case, the only issue is whether the uncalled witnesses' testimony would have provided Mr. McFadden a viable defense by impeaching Eva's testimony. Ordinarily, the failure to call a witness will not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the choice of witnesses is presumptively a matter of trial strategy. Tisius v. State, 519 S.W.3d 413 , 427 (Mo. banc 2017) . This presumption applies to counsel's decision not to impeach a witness.  Barton, 432 S.W.3d at 750 . A trial strategy decision may only serve as a basis for ineffective counsel if the decision is unreasonable. McLaughlin v. State, 378 S.W.3d 328 , 337 (Mo. banc 2012) (citation omitted). The defendant has the burden of showing that the impeachment would have provided [him] with a defense or would have changed the outcome at trial. State v. Phillips, 940 S.W.2d 512 , 524 (Mo. banc 1997) . [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . Counsel can be found ineffective for failing to impeach witnesses with their prior inconsistent statements about the circumstances surrounding a crime when the defendant's mental state was the key issue in contention between the parties and the prior inconsistent statements related directly to the central issue of whether [the defendant] acted with deliberation or in a fit of rage or out of self-defense. Black v. State, 151 S.W.3d 49 , 56 (Mo. banc 2004) . In such circumstances, there is a reasonable probability this would have affected the outcome of the trial because, if believed, their testimony would have negated an element of the crime for which the defendant was convicted. Id. at 58 . Unlike in Black , Mr. McFadden fails to identify prior inconsistent statements Eva made and with which she could have been impeached, nor would the impeaching testimony of the uncalled witnesses have related directly to the central issue. Rather, and again unlike in Black , counsel made a strategic decision to not call additional lay witnesses after weighing their impeachment value against the damaging cross-examination to which they would have been subjected.
If called, Ms. Jones, Eva's friend and the owner of the house on Blakemore where Mr. McFadden confronted Eva, would have testified she did not hear Eva and Mr. McFadden fighting and Eva did not tell her they had been in an argument the night of Leslie's murder. The defense argues this would have impeached Eva's claim that she fought with Mr. McFadden outside the house the night Leslie was murdered. Defense counsel testified they made the strategic decision not to call Ms. Jones at this trial because the fight issue was not a central one. Further, Ms. Jones' testimony was only minimally helpful because she admitted she was in her bedroom the entire evening watching television. The only bedroom window was on the side of the house, not the front where the fight occurred, and the window was closed and the storm window was in place. Further, Ms. Jones could have been used by the prosecutor to bolster other aspects of Eva's testimony. She testified that the night Leslie was murdered she spoke with a very emotional Eva, who told her she had seen Mr. McFadden shoot Leslie multiple times. Ms. Jones testified she walked with Eva to the murder scene, and Eva told Ms. Jones she saw the murder while hiding in the bushes. This testimony would have corroborated Eva's testimony about the shooting and would have undercut Mr. McFadden's defense. As defense counsel stated at the postconviction hearing, this was one more instance in which if we thought that it didn't work or didn't go well in the first trial, we didn't do it again in the second trial. Ordinarily, the failure to call a witness will not support an ineffective assistance of counsel claim because the choice of witnesses is presumptively a matter  of trial strategy. Tisius, 519 S.W.3d at 427 .
Mr. McFadden also contends defense counsel were ineffective in failing to call Mr. McFadden's friend, Mr. Jackson. At a deposition taken for the postconviction hearing, Mr. Jackson testified Eva was inaccurate in testifying that, earlier in the day of the murder, Mr. McFadden slapped Eva, pointed a gun at Leslie, and got out of his friend's car after following it from the house on Blakemore. But defense counsel testified Mr. Jackson told them a different story when they interviewed him by telephone prior to the second trial for murdering Leslie; he said he remembered driving down the street the night of the murder but did not see or remember anything specific. Further, Mr. Jackson would have been especially vulnerable to impeachment based on his lengthy criminal record-including murder-and his admission he tried to get Mr. McFadden to leave the house after fighting with Leslie and Eva because Mr. McFadden was wanted for Mr. Franklin's murder. The motion court did not clearly err in finding defense counsel used a reasonable trial strategy. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .
Margaret Walsh is the technician who performed blood analysis testing on the clothing Mr. McFadden was wearing when he was arrested. Mr. McFadden claims Ms. Walsh's failure to find blood on his clothes, even though Leslie was shot at close range, was exculpatory. But Mr. McFadden was not arrested until two days after the shooting. Defense counsel testified at the postconviction hearing that, in weighing the minimal impeachment value against the risk of cross-examination by the State, they decided against calling her as a witness. The motion court did not clearly err in finding defense counsel used a reasonable trial strategy in not calling Ms. Walsh absent a showing Mr. McFadden was wearing the same clothes at the time of shooting or had not washed them.
Lastly, Mr. McFadden alleges defense counsel were ineffective in failing to present photographs the defense had taken of area lighting and distance measurements between where Eva reported she was standing and the location where the shooting occurred. Eva testified she hid in the bushes and saw Mr. McFadden shoot Leslie. Mr. Stevenson testified he saw Leslie walk down Naylor toward the murder scene, saw a man come up and argue with her, saw the man follow her around the corner, and then heard continued arguing and gunshots. Upon hearing the gunshots, Mr. Stevenson immediately went outside, ran toward Leslie's body, and called 911. The State also presented testimony from Eva regarding the lighting and distances around the crime scene. Defense counsel cross-examined both Eva and Mr. Stevenson about the lack of a street light on the side of Kienlen where Leslie's body was found, cross-examined Eva about whether she really could see the murder from the bushes, and brought out that Mr. Stevenson could not really see the body until a car drove up and shined its headlights on the area. Officer Hunnius, a crime scene investigator, took pictures of the scene the night of the murder and also made a diagram of the distance measurements. He testified the area was lit by four dusk-to-dawn street lamps that gave off more light than they appeared to give out in photographs,  that would have illuminated the area where Eva said she saw Mr. McFadden get out of the car, and that provided enough light for someone hiding in the bushes to see someone walking up Naylor. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited testimony the streetlight on Naylor did not illuminate the area near Kienlen and the distance between where Eva hid and where Leslie was shot was approximately 150 to 200 feet. Mr. McFadden now argues his counsel should have introduced its own photographs and measurements to further undercut and impeach Eva's claim she could see the murder from the bushes. In support, at the postconviction hearing, Mr. McFadden presented deposition testimony of an investigator who took photographs of the area and concluded the lighting was bad and a witness could not have seen much. The motion court found this testimony not credible and of little value because it was taken 10 years after the murder, during the daytime. The investigator was also unable to testify the lighting and other aspects of the scene had not changed. The testimony had little, if any, probative value. Defense counsel also testified at the postconviction hearing that they considered presenting their own photographic evidence but determined it would not be helpful. When the defense team visited the scene with investigators during the day, they found it possible Eva could have seen the murder from her location behind the bushes. The investigator who visited at night did not report that Eva would have had trouble seeing the shooting. Further, none of this evidence would have impeached Eva's statement that she recognized Mr. McFadden's voice when he was yelling at Leslie just before the shooting. Defense counsel, therefore, chose to cast doubt on Eva's ability to see the murder scene by cross-examining her and the State's other witnesses regarding the lighting at the murder scene and the distance from the bushes to the murder scene. [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible opinions are virtually unchallengeable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . The motion court did not clearly err in determining it was a reasonable strategy. McLaughlin, 378 S.W.3d at 337 .