Opinion ID: 547535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: In conformity with the agency's interpretation

Text: 58 The county thus would be entitled to a good faith defense based on its reliance on the opinion letters, if its actions actually conformed with the letters and were objectively reasonable. As the Second Circuit has noted, section 259's language 59 in good faith in conformity with, precisely links the question of good faith to an act in conformity, and if there is no conformity, general good faith in other respects cannot save the day. 60 Home Insurance, 672 F.2d at 265. 61 An employer may well make an honest effort to become informed as to the precise requirements of the Act, but will not be insulated from liability for unpaid wages unless its actions actually conform to the agency's guidelines. Id. at 266. Our review of the letters regarding the compensation of sleep time convinces us that, regardless of whether LOMAR subjectively believed it was complying with the letters, LOMAR in fact did not act in conformity with them. 62 Both letters carve out an exception to the agency's regulations on sleep time based on the assumption that the facilities in which the employees work constitute a home-like environment ... with private quarters and other amenities. The county effectively has conceded that plaintiffs in this case simply were not provided with such quarters. 5 The letters are also based on the assumption that employees are able to get a full night's sleep. The evidence in this case establishes beyond question that relief employees averaged from zero to four hours of sleep during the nighttime hours. Where the demands of a job seriously interfere with an employee's ability to sleep, the 1981 letter expressly precludes deduction of sleep time from hours worked. 63 There are other inconsistencies between the circumstances described in the opinion letters and the actual circumstances at LOMAR's community residences. As the magistrate recognized, the opinion letters require that employees agree to any uncompensated sleep time, that employers provide compensation for all disturbances, and that the entire sleep time be paid when employees are unable to obtain five hours of sleep. LOMAR's relief employees were not compensated for their sleep time even if they were unable to get five consecutive hours of sleep, they received compensation only for significant disturbances of ten minutes or more, and their consent to uncompensated sleep time was obtained as a non-negotiable condition of their employment. 64 Finally, the letters appear premised on the notion that the relief employees remain on the premises for at least 24 hours, and often as long as two or three days. LOMAR's relief employees were scheduled for different facilities every shift, and did not remain on the premises for 24 hours or more. LOMAR's attempt to create a 24 hour shift by adding six hours of unscheduled off duty/on call time at the end of each shift does not comport with the circumstances described in the opinion letters. 65 Section 259 was not intended to allow an employer to insulate itself from liability for the consequences of its own improvident interpretation of the statute. Home Insurance, 672 F.2d at 266. Because we find LOMAR's policy on compensation of sleep time was not in conformity with the opinion letters upon which it alleges reliance, we agree with the magistrate's conclusion that the county has failed to establish a good faith defense under section 259. See generally 29 C.F.R. Sec. 790.14. 6