Opinion ID: 2979447
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: News Media Mail Claim

Text: Murphy claims that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to Berry and Seller on his claim that they violated his First Amendment rights by not allowing him to send confidential uncensored letters to the news media. There is a division of authority over whether an inmate has a constitutional right to send unmonitored letters to the news media. Compare Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 831-32 (8th Cir. 1993) (inmates have no right to unmonitored communication with the news media), and Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1307 (7th Cir. 1986) (same), with Burton v. Foltz, 599 F. Supp. 114, 117 (E.D. Mich. 1984) (inmates have a constitutional right to have mail to members of the news media sent unopened). However, it is unnecessary for us to resolve this issue because even if this right exists, Murphy has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Berry and Seller interfered with his right to send the letter with the requisite state of mind. Negligent interference with legal mail is not actionable under section 1983. See, e.g., Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997). Murphy’s letter was rejected the first time that he presented it due to lack of postage, then rejected a second time as improperly sealed segregation inmate mail. Murphy filed a grievance, and the Record Office Supervisor responded that the mail should have been sent out if addressed to the newspaper and that the mailroom staff should No. 09-2132 Murphy v. Grenier Page 7 be more careful in the future. Because Murphy has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Berry and Seller interfered with his right to send the letter with the requisite state of mind, we AFFIRM the district court’s decision granting Berry and Sellers summary judgment on Murphy’s news media mail claim. B. Claim That The District Court Prematurely Granted Summary Judgment Murphy argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment before he could engage in discovery. We review for abuse of discretion the claim that the district court prematurely entered summary judgment because Murphy needed additional discovery. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. American Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 627 (6th Cir. 2002). Rule 56(d) provides that a party may oppose a motion for summary judgment by submitting an affidavit explaining why it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d). The non-movant, however, has the burden of informing the district court of his need for discovery. Vance v. United States, 90 F.3d 1145, 1149 (6th Cir. 1996). Before the district court decides a summary judgment motion, “the non-movant must file an affidavit pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)1 that details the discovery needed, or file a motion for additional discovery. If he does neither, this court will not normally address whether there was adequate time for discovery.” Abercrombie, 280 F.3d at 627 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, although Murphy sent a signed document to the district court requesting an extension of time within which to respond to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, this document failed to meet the requirements of Rule 1 Recent amendments to the rules moved the provisions formerly found in subdivision (f) to subdivision (d). Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 advisory committee’s note (2010). No. 09-2132 Murphy v. Grenier Page 8 56(d) even under the more lenient standards applied to pro se litigants. Thus, we hold that the district court did not grant the defendants’ summary judgment motion prematurely. C. Motion for Leave to Amend Murphy claims that the district court erred in denying his motion for leave to amend. We review the district court’s denial of a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. Greenberg v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 177 F.3d 507, 522 (6th Cir. 1999). Ordinarily, leave to amend a complaint or other pleading shall be freely granted “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). However, leave to amend should be denied if “the amendment is brought in bad faith, for dilatory purposes, results in undue delay or prejudice to the opposing party, or would be futile.” Crawford v. Roane, 53 F.3d 750, 753 (6th Cir. 1995). The defendants moved for summary judgment on June 2, 2008. Murphy filed his response on August 1, 2008, and did not seek leave to amend his complaint until January 20, 2009, over seven months after the defendants filed their dispositive motion. Thus, granting the motion to amend would have resulted in undue delay and prejudice. Numerous defendants would have been required to file answers to the amendment and resubmit their summary judgment motion in light of the amendment. Thus, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion by denying Murphy’s motion to amend his complaint. D. Motion for Appointment of Counsel Because an appointment of appellate counsel is not necessary, we DENY the motion.