Opinion ID: 408095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charge Requirement

Text: 7 Appellant first argues that he has not been charged with an extraditable offense because the Swedish prosecuting authorities have not filed a formal document (called a summons) for gross arson and attempted gross fraud against him. See Matter of Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1239 n.3, citing Swedish Code of Judicial Procedure ch. 45, §§ 1, 4, 9 (A. Bruzelius trans. 1968). Appellant argues that at most he is subject to an arrest order and that no prosecution has been initiated. 8 The magistrate concluded that appellant had been charged with extraditable offenses within the meaning of the treaty; the district court determined that the magistrate's finding was not reviewable on habeas corpus, 538 F.Supp. at 1057, citing Matter of Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1244. The district court alternatively concluded that appellant had been charged with an extraditable offense within the meaning of the treaty. 538 F.Supp. at 1058. Because we agree with the district court that the magistrate's determination is not within the scope of review on habeas corpus, we do not reach the merits of appellant's argument. Matter of Assarsson, 635 F.2d at 1239-43; Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d 1189, 1193 n.1 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 989, 92 S.Ct. 1251, 31 L.Ed.2d 455 (1972). As explained by the Seventh Circuit in Assarsson 9 Fernandez defines the scope of review. Under Fernandez, we may review only whether the offense charged is within the treaty. We may therefore review only those conditions which preclude extradition for offenses which are otherwise extraditable. Any such conditions must come from the treaty itself.... 10 The existence of formal charges can be reviewable, then, only if the treaty itself conditions extradition for the offenses listed (which include arson and attempted fraud) in Article II on the existence of formal charges. The United States-Sweden treaty does not so condition extradition. 11 ... The filing of formal charges is not stated anywhere as a prerequisite to extradition.... Because the treaty does not so limit the class of extraditable offenses, we may not review the magistrate's determination that Assarsson (, the brother of appellant herein,) was charged under the terms of the treaty. 12 635 F.2d at 1241-42 (citations omitted). 13 Appellant argues that the question whether he has been charged with an extraditable offense within the meaning of the treaty is subject to review on habeas corpus because such an inquiry is relevant to the magistrate's jurisdiction. We must disagree. Appellant does not argue that the magistrate who certified his extradition was not authorized to conduct extradition hearings or that there was no personal jurisdiction. In the absence of such contentions there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the magistrate. See Garcia-Guillern v. United States, 450 F.2d at 1192, citing Gallina v. Fraser, 177 F.Supp. 856 (D.Conn.1959), aff'd, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851, 81 S.Ct. 97, 5 L.Ed.2d 74 (1960). 14 Appellant also argues that the magistrate erroneously determined that he had been ordered arrested for gross arson and attempted gross fraud by the Malm o district court. Appellant argues that the order of arrest was for his violation of the travel restrictions and reporting requirements only and that that is not an extraditable offense within the meaning of the treaty. This argument has not been properly preserved for review because appellant raises this argument for the first time on appeal. We note, however, that the Swedish documentary evidence (in translation) indicates that Sweden is seeking appellant's extradition on charges of gross arson and attempted gross fraud and not for violation of the travel restrictions and reporting requirements.