Opinion ID: 1718704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether There Was an Attorney Client Relationship at the Time of the Settlement Offer.

Text: As mentioned, the appellants first contend that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Hudson was their attorney at the time Hudson made the settlement offer on April 16, 1998. The appellants concede that Hudson represented them in September 1997 when Hudson filed an answer for all the defendants in the partition action. However, the appellants contend, when Rosalie made the counteroffer to Gilbride on April 2, 1998, the attorney-client relationship ended. The summary judgment record shows that all of the defendants except Theodore and Rosalie resisted Gilbride's motion. The resisting defendants conceded that Hudson was representing all of the defendants when the offer was made on April 16, 1998, notwithstanding Rosalie's counteroffer of April 2, 1998. Kahler's affidavit in support of the resistance to Gilbride's motion for partial summary judgment confirms this fact: When this partition action was started I contacted each one of the defendants and they agreed that we should have one lawyer. We selected James C. Hudson of Pocahontas, Iowa, to represent us, who filed an answer on behalf of all of the defendants. From the start of the lawsuit I was the spokesperson for the group of defendants and contacted them from time to time with information from attorney Hudson. They did not meet with him directly nor speak with him directly, but I was the contact person inasmuch as a number of the defendants in the Trunnelle family lived in California. . . . . Through negotiations just prior to trial in April 1997, we were able to reach an agreement. All of the defendants at that time agreed to the agreement that Ronald Gilbride should receive the east 37 acres. We instructed Mr. Hudson to prepare a deed and other paper work in conformance with that agreement. We were advised that the trial would not be held because we had settled it and I did not attend the trial. . . . Theodore R. Trunnelle and Rosalie Bonavia refused to sign the deed once it had been prepared. At that point in time it became obvious to those of us who were remaining landowners that there would be problems in the future with Rosalie Bonavia and Theodore R. Trunnelle and we decided at that point in time that we could no longer move forward to attempt to settle this by partitioning in kind but decided to file a cross-petition . . . to reiterate our belief that the farm could not be partitioned but needed to be sold. . . . Additionally, the resisting defendants concede in their statement of disputed facts that prior to trial the parties through their attorneys negotiated a settlement agreement evidenced by the notation of settlement agreement. The resisting defendants also stated in their memorandum of authority that [Hudson] continued to represent all of the defendants up to and including the time of entering into the notation of settlement. This has never been disputed by attorney Hudson nor any of the defendants. At such time as defendants Theodore R. Trunnelle and Rosalie Bonavia communicated to attorney Hudson that they did not want to sign deeds and they would not go along with the compromise, attorney Hudson encouraged them to participate in the compromise as he believed it was in their best interest. However, once it became clear that they did not, attorney Hudson felt that he no longer represented their interest. . . . Defendants Theodore R. Trunnelle and Rosalie Bonavia have basically been without representation in this matter since August of 1998. . . . (Emphasis added.) Therefore, according to the memorandum, to the extent the attorney-client relationship between the appellants and Hudson was actually terminated, such termination did not occur until sometime in August 1998over three months after the offer was made and the settlement was reached. In the absence of a resistance and an affidavit from the appellants to support their contention that Hudson did not represent them when the settlement offer was made and settlement was reached, no genuine issue of material fact exists as to this contention. The only record made by the appellants was Rosalie's statement at the summary judgment hearing that she opposed Gilbride's motion for partial summary judgment. According to our rules of civil procedure, that statement was not enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the attorney-client relationship. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 237(e) (providing that, when a motion for summary judgment is supported by affidavit, depositions, answers to interrogatories or oral testimony, the opposing party may not rest on his or her pleading but must respond by affidavit or as otherwise provided by the rule and set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial). Simply put, whether an attorney-client relationship between appellants and Hudson existed at the time in question was not an issue in the district court.