Opinion ID: 1443143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deliberate Indifference to Grieveson's Safety Needs

Text: For six of the assaults Grieveson suffered, we can assume without deciding that he satisfied the first prong of the deliberate indifference inquiry  that he was incarcerated in conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm. The second prong presents a greater challenge to Grieveson because the inquiry is not whether individual officers should have known about risks to Grieveson's safety, but rather whether they did know of such risks. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-43, 114 S.Ct. 1970. Even though `the defendants' knowledge of the risk can be inferred,' James v. Milwaukee County, 956 F.2d 696, 700 (7th Cir.1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)), for six of the seven assaults Grieveson presents no evidence showing that such an inference is appropriate. Although his attacker on November 30 called him a snitch, Grieveson presented no evidence that any of the named defendants were aware that Grieveson was perceived as a snitch by his fellow inmates. The mere fact that Grieveson thought he was considered a snitch does not allow a factfinder to conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.' Mayoral v. Sheahan, 245 F.3d 934, 938 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970). The only person who believes that Grieveson was considered a snitch (according to the evidence) is Grieveson himself. Any risk to Grieveson's safety on account of the snitch label was not obvious. See Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1010 (7th Cir. 2006) (stating that an inmate's need for surgery was not obvious); Payne for Hicks v. Churchich, 161 F.3d 1030, 1042 (7th Cir.1998) ([W]e do not believe that the allegations in the complaint about Mr. Hicks' conduct and tattoo message, without more, indicate an obvious, substantial risk of suicide.). Grieveson also points to the repeated assaults that he suffered at the hands of other inmates as evidence that the jail officers were subjectively aware of the obvious safety threats Grieveson faced. But looking at the facts uncovered in discovery, even we cannot discern the threat(s) Grieveson faced during his detention. Grieveson never informed the jail officers of a specific threat to his life ( i.e., that he was at risk because of his snitch reputation). See Butera, 285 F.3d at 606. Instead, he told jail officials only that he was afraid and that he wanted to be moved. After his first assault, Grieveson told the jail officers that the problem was taken out of the block already and that he wanted to let the situation pass. After the second assault, Grieveson informed jail officers that he had been assaulted by another inmate and that he wanted to be moved to another cell block. However, he did not tell the officers who assaulted him, why he had been assaulted (allegedly because of his snitch label), or whether he continued to feel threatened by the assaulting individuals. The type of information Grieveson shared with the jail officers is comparable to that shared in Butera v. Cottey , where the plaintiff told the jail guards that he was having problems in the block and need[ed] to be removed. 285 F.3d at 606-07. Such vague information did not put the jail officers on notice of a specific threat to Grieveson's safety. See id. Grieveson was assaulted the third time by an inmate who beat [him] senseless for taking too long to use the toilet. It is hard to imagine how the jail officers would have been on notice of this specific threat to Grieveson's safety. As sad as it may be, the toilet attack, in particular, demonstrates that Grieveson was a victim of the inherent, as it were the baseline, dangerousness of prison life. Case v. Ahitow, 301 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir.2002). The fourth assault occurred at the hands of a jail officer, according to Grieveson. This officer has not been identified, and there is no suggestion that the alleged assaulting officer is one of the named defendants in this case. `A plaintiff bringing a civil rights action must prove that the defendant personally participated in or caused the unconstitutional actions.' Alejo v. Heller, 328 F.3d 930, 936 (7th Cir.2003) (quoting Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d 653, 655 (7th Cir. 1981)). Grieveson does not argue that the named defendants in this case knew that another jail officer was going to slam Grieveson's arm in a door. [D]eliberate indifference requires that the corrections officer must have ` actual knowledge' of the risk. Guzman, 495 F.3d at 857-58 (quoting Washington v. LaPorte County Sheriff's Dep't, 306 F.3d 515, 517-18 (7th Cir. 2002)). Grieveson's fifth assault was similar to his third in that an inmate came after him out of personal frustration. Grieveson attests that he was pommelled [sic] in the face for allegedly snoring due to [his] broken nose. Skipping to the seventh assault, it also happened at the hands of an angry inmate: I was attacked by inmate Robert White, who was angry over losing a card game. Grieveson's account of these incidents does not suggest that the assailants lashed out at Grieveson because of his alleged reputation as a snitch. Instead, they demonstrate the tragic realities of jail and prison life that detainees are often subject to, absent fault on the part of individual jail guards. [P]risons are dangerous places. Inmates get there by violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more. Guards cannot turn away persons committed by the courts; nor do individual guards have any control over crowding and other systemic circumstances. Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 525 (7th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Tokash, 282 F.3d 962, 970 (7th Cir.2002) ([P]risons are inherently dangerous places and are inhabited by violent people....). There is no doubt that jail officials have a duty to protect detainees `from violence at the hand of other inmates.' Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir.2006) (quoting Washington, 306 F.3d at 517). But liability of a jail officer for failure to protect an inmate only materializes if the officer knew the inmate faced a `substantial risk of serious harm' and `disregard[ed] that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.' Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970). There is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the assaults Grieveson suffered at the hands of angry, unstable, violent inmates because there is no evidence demonstrating that any of the named officers knew about these threats to Grieveson's safety. See Guzman, 495 F.3d at 857-58. Grieveson's own affidavits and evidentiary materials confirm that Grieveson's main charge against the jail officers is that they should have known what was going on  not that they did know. He asks in an affidavit, How many trips would it take to the hospital emergency room for a trained Correctional Officer to realize that I was having problems in Cell Block 2-A? I had already taken 4 (four) trips to the emergency room. Elsewhere he attests: [a]t no time did the Defendants approach me and ask me as to my personal safety and well being.; Any layperson, let alone someone `trained' for observation, could readily see my injuries were consistent with being assaulted. Yet the Defendants did not take adequate measures to ... assure I was not attacked again.; Never was I approached by a correctional officer for determination of whether or not I needed assistance.; It is hard to understand how a prisoner standing there with free-flowing blood should not be enough to spark some interest; but it didn't in my case. Grieveson does not say that he told jail officers he was in danger; rather, he claims that the officers should have realized he was in danger. In the grievances Grieveson filed (two of which the jail does not report having received, but for purposes of summary judgment we will consider as having been received), he fails to identify a tangible threat to his safety or wellbeing. Grieveson wrote that he was real scared of my life here and the guards are even afraid to come into the block[]how do you think we feel. He asked to be moved to another jail or a safer block, but did not put the jail officials on notice of specific threats to his safety. Perhaps the jail officers should have done a better job with Grieveson  maybe they could have initiated more conversations with him, asked him to identify his assailants, invited him to come to them more often with his concerns  but proving deliberate indifference requires more than a showing of negligent or even grossly negligent behavior.... [T]he corrections officer must have acted with the equivalent of criminal recklessness. Borello, 446 F.3d at 747. Also problematic for Grieveson is his failure to tie actions of the named defendants to the injuries he allegedly suffered. See Alejo, 328 F.3d at 936; Starzenski v. City of Elkhart, 87 F.3d 872, 879 (7th Cir.1996). Throughout his affidavits and briefs, Grieveson refers to the defendants, claiming that the defendants failed to protect him. Vague references to a group of defendants, without specific allegations tying the individual defendants to the alleged unconstitutional conduct, do not raise a genuine issue of material fact with respect to those defendants. See Alejo, 328 F.3d at 936 (finding dismissal of named defendant proper where plaintiff failed to allege defendant's personal involvement in the alleged wrongdoings). Thus, for six of the seven assaults, Grieveson has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact about the jail officers' deliberate indifference. On the other hand, the sixth attack Grieveson suffered does survive summary judgment insofar as it relates to Officer Highbaugh. Grieveson attests that in March 2001, he was assaulted by other inmates when they stole his personal commissary items and his food. Grieveson claims that Officer Highbaugh witnessed the incident and failed to intervene; later Highbaugh allegedly commented to Grieveson that he needed to learn how to fight harder or don't come to jail. If Officer Highbaugh did witness an inmate assault, but failed to intervene, his actions would seemingly constitute a paradigm case of deliberate indifference. Haley v. Gross, 86 F.3d 630, 642 (7th Cir.1996). The evidence presented by Grieveson respecting the sixth assault establishes a genuine issue of material fact on both prongs of the deliberate indifference inquiry. First, the danger to the inmate must be objectively serious, posing a substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 640. Grieveson allegedly was assaulted by other inmates  an objectively serious danger that posed a substantial risk of serious harm to him  in the presence of Officer Highbaugh. Second, the prison official must have a sufficiently culpable state of mind  one of `deliberate indifference' to inmate health or safety. Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970). Officer Highbaugh allegedly watched the assault but did not intervene to protect Grieveson  exhibiting quintessential deliberate indifference. Finally, with respect to Marion County Officers Boomershine and Commiskey, the district court was correct to grant summary judgment in their favor. Grieveson did not demonstrate that they were personally involved in the injuries he suffered. As discussed above, `[a]n individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated in [the] alleged constitutional deprivation.' Starzenski, 87 F.3d at 879 (quoting Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 869 (7th Cir.1983)).