Opinion ID: 1890216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legally Qualified Health Care Provider

Text: The health care affidavit statute, section 538.225, first was promulgated in 1986. At its inception, section 538.225, RSMo 1986, provided that a plaintiff filing an action against a health care provider for damages for personal injury must file a health care affidavit. The affidavit must state that the plaintiff has obtained the written opinion of a legally qualified health care provider that the defendant failed to use such care as a reasonably prudent and careful health care provider would have under similar circumstances and that such failure to use reasonable care directly caused or directly contributed to cause the damages claimed in the petition. Id. This Court has recognized that the statute was a legislative response to the public concern over the increased cost of health care and the continued integrity of that system of essential services. Mahoney, 807 S.W.2d at 507. Mahoney instructed that the legislature intended section 538.225 to dismiss medical negligence lawsuits that lack even color of merit and to protect the public and litigants from the cost of ungrounded medical malpractice claims. Id. Although section 538.225, RSMo 1986, did not define legally qualified health care provider, [5] in 2005, the legislature passed House Bill 393, which did include a definition: As used in this section, the term legally qualified health care provider shall mean a health care provider licensed in this state or any other state in the same profession as the defendant and either actively practicing or within five years of retirement from actively practicing substantially the same specialty as the defendant. Section 538.225.2. The issue presented by this case is whether the trial court correctly interpreted section 538.225.2 in dismissing the action because Dr. Mathis was not a legally qualified health care provider as defined by the statute. This issue requires the resolution of two questions. First, this Court must determine whether the phrase substantially the same specialty applies to those health care providers actively practicing and those who are retired. Second, because the legislature did not define substantially the same specialty, this Court must ascertain the meaning of the phrase.