Opinion ID: 2635704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The NCIAA is unconstitutionally vague for criminal enforcement

Text: Because the district court severed the criminal portion of the statute, to determine the proper standard to apply to this facial challenge, we first address cross-appellant Chanos's contention that the district court erred in ruling that the criminal enforcement of the statute is unconstitutionally vague. If Chanos's cross-appeal is successful, then the statute would include criminal penalties. As a result, we apply the higher standard of whether vagueness permeates the statute's text to analyze the cross-appeal. [7] We conclude that vagueness permeates the NCIAA text in that it fails to provide sufficient notice of what conduct is prohibited and allows for arbitrary enforcement. With regards to both notice and arbitrary enforcement, the statute fails to adequately define to whom the Act is enforced against. While it is clear that a person cannot smoke in a restricted area, it is unclear if there is an obligation to affirmatively prevent smoking by a business owner, manager, or employee. The statute fails to explain whether business owners, such as appellants, have a responsibility to stop someone who is smoking in violation of the Act, and if so, what that responsibility entails. Consequently, we question whether it is sufficient, under the statute, to ask the person to stop smoking, or does the business owner have to demand that the person leave the premises, and if the person refuses to leave the premises, is the owner required to call the police? The statute fails to provide guidelines as to what action is required and how the statute is enforced, and therefore, it creates the possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Vagueness also permeates the NCIAA's text by failing to define several terms included in the statute that do not have a plain meaning. These terms include smoking paraphernalia and large room. For example, as one court has recognized, the term smoking paraphernalia is too vague because the reasonable parameters of exactly what constitutes such equipment are unstated and potentially boundless. Lexington Fayette Cty. Food v. Urban Cty. Gov, 131 S.W.3d 745, 754 (Ky.2004). The court reasoned that the term could include anything from cigarettes, cigars, and tools to make them, to air freshener and breath mints. Id. at 754-55. While it recognized that a fair assumption could be made that the statute covered cigarettes and cigars and did not cover air freshener and breath mints, the court stated that lying between those extremes... is a vast middle ground which is subject to characterization as lawful or unlawful in the discretion of the enforcing authorities. Id. at 756 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Thus, we conclude that vagueness as to the criminal penalties so permeates the NCIAA that it cannot withstand constitutional due process scrutiny. Accordingly, the statute is unconstitutionally vague for criminal enforcement under the higher standard that applies for a facial challenge of a criminal statute, and we affirm the district court's conclusion that the statute's criminal provisions could not be constitutionally enforced. Having so concluded, we next address whether the district court properly severed the criminal enforcement provisions from the statute.