Opinion ID: 1890550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Public Policy Argument

Text: General Laws 1956 § 45-15-16 provides in pertinent part that: Any town or city council or any fire district may, by ordinance or otherwise, indemnify any and all elected or appointed fire district officials, public employees, fire district employees, officials, members of boards, agencies and commissions appointed by town councils or any fire district or by any other person exercising appointing authority delegated to them by the town council; whether or not the elected or appointed fire district officials, employees, officials, or members are paid, from all loss, cost, expense, and damage, including legal fees and court costs, if any, arising out of any claim, action, compromise, settlement, or judgment by reason of any intentional tort   . The defendant urges upon this Court the proposition that the effect of the indemnification statute is to render the holding in Andrade nugatory, because municipalities commonly indemnify employees either through ordinance or collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, he argues, the net result is the very responsibility for prejudgment interest that Andrade prohibits. However, it is clear from the language of the indemnification statute that municipalities are not mandated to pay judgments rendered against their employees. Although § 45-15-16 provides that [a]ny town or city council or any fire district may, by ordinance or otherwise, indemnify any and all elected or appointed fire district officials, public employees   , defendant argues that the municipal principal ultimately is responsible for paying the judgments of its agents. (Emphasis added.) When applying the plain meaning rule, this Court has previously stated that the word may connotes permission. In re Barnacle, 623 A.2d 445, 450 (R.I.1993). May is not synonymous with must. It is precatory, not mandatory, language. See id. Therefore, the statute neither provides an employee with the right to indemnification nor orders indemnification to take place. As additional weight for his argument, defendant presents the collective bargaining agreement between the Town of South Kingstown and the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, in which the town agrees to indemnify officers sued as the result of actions performed in the course of their duties. However, this state's labor laws do not impose a compulsory indemnification duty on the municipality sufficient to bring the tortfeasor's liability under the umbrella of either the Governmental Tort Liability Act or prejudgment interest immunity. In the collective bargaining context, the municipality is liable to indemnify its employees only if it agrees to do so in the process of securing a labor agreement. We are not satisfied that the application of prejudgment interest to judgments against individual tortfeasors who happen to be state or municipal employees frustrates or contravenes the purpose of the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Enacted in 1970 to abolish sovereign immunity in Rhode Island, the act now limits damages against the state and its municipalities to $100,000. Sections 9-31-2, 9-31-3, as enacted by P.L. 1970, ch. 181, § 2. However, the cap does not apply to individual tortfeasors, nor does it apply when the state voluntarily indemnifies its employees. When an individual is found to be negligent, his own liability does not disappear simply by virtue of his status as a state or municipal employee. Therefore, the limitations of the Governmental Tort Liability Act are not implicated. In summary, there is no public policy argument that would justify our abandonment of the principles set out in Pridemore and Gelsomino.