Opinion ID: 2274419
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: a school district may bring a declaratory judgment action to determine its proper boundaries

Text: Lake St. Louis argues that the filing of a declaratory judgment action is an appropriate mechanism by which a municipality can resolve a boundary dispute. O'Fallon disagrees, arguing that Lake St. Louis ultimately is seeking to oust O'Fallon from the contested land and, therefore, the exclusive remedy is through a writ of quo warranto. As it is undisputed that only the attorney general or a prosecuting or circuit attorney can bring an action in quo warranto, Rule 98.02, O'Fallon argues that Lake St. Louis has no authority to seek or obtain the relief it sets out in its petition. For the reasons noted below, while O'Fallon is correct that individuals are not permitted to bring declaratory judgment actions seeking to determine boundaries or to oust a municipal or other public corporation from disputed territory, municipalities, school districts and other public corporations are permitted to bring such actions.
Rule 98.02 provides that, (a) Proceedings in quo warranto shall be by a civil action in which the party seeking relief is relator and the person against whom such relief is sought is respondent, which action shall be brought in the name of the State of Missouri. See also § 531.010 et seq., RSMo 2000. [2] To bring an action in quo warranto the attorney general, prosecuting attorney, or circuit attorney may file an information ex officio, by virtue of the power of his [or her] office without leave of court when such an action would serve the public interest. State ex inf. Graham v. Hurley, 540 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Mo. banc 1976). The purpose of the action is to determine whether there has been a usurpation of any office or franchise and, if so, pray the court oust any such illegal holder. § 531.010; § 531.050. An action in quo warranto may be brought by the attorney general or prosecutor on behalf of the state directly or at the relation of another, Rule 98.02(b); Rule 98.04, including an individual who seeks to determine the legality of an annexation. [3]
A declaratory judgment provides guidance to the parties, declaring their rights and obligations or otherwise governing their relationship, Shipley v. Cates, 200 S.W.3d 529, 534 (Mo. banc 2006), and generally may be granted when a court is presented with: (1) a justiciable controversy that presents a real, substantial, presently-existing controversy admitting of specific relief, as distinguished from an advisory decree upon a purely hypothetical situation; (2) a plaintiff with a legally protectable interest at stake, consisting of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief; (3) a controversy ripe for judicial determination; and (4) an inadequate remedy at law. Mo. Soybean Ass'n v. Mo. Clean Water Comm'n, 102 S.W.3d 10, 25 (Mo. banc 2003). Individuals sometimes have sought to bypass the prohibition on an individual bringing a quo warranto action by seeking the same relief in a suit for an injunction or for declaratory judgment. Spiking Sch. Dist. No. 71, DeKalb Cnty. v. Purported Enlarged Sch. Dist. R-II, DeKalb Cnty., Mo., 362 Mo. 848, 245 S.W.2d 13, 15 (1952), provides a good example. Certain individual residents of a school district sought a declaratory judgment that a new and enlarged school district was invalidly formed and that their previous school districts continued to exist. In approving dismissal of their petition, this Court stated that a declaratory judgment action is not available to the individual plaintiffs who are residents, patrons and taxpayers of the reorganized district because they are only indirectly affected by the lack of de jur[e] existence of the reorganized district and the attempted action by them is in the nature of a collateral attack. Id. at 21. It prohibited such collateral attacks by individuals because individuals necessarily are only indirectly affected by whether a public or municipal corporation has a de jure existence. If one resident could bring suit, then all could, and it is intolerable that, every time a city sues on an account, it must first establish its right to exist. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). For these reasons, [t]he law is settled that when a public body has, under color of authority, assumed to exercise the powers of a public corporation of a kind recognized by law, so as to become at le[a]st a de facto corporation, the validity of its organization can be challenged only by direct proceedings in quo warranto by the state through its officers designated in [section] 531.010, and cannot be challenged by individuals. State ex rel. Junior Coll. Dist. of Sedalia v. Barker, 418 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Mo. banc 1967). As a matter of public policy, suits by individuals are not permitted due to the importance of stability and certainty in such matters, and the serious consequences which might follow if the existence of a public corporation could be called in question by persons who do not have an interest in the matter separate and distinct from that of the State itself. Id. at 65-66 (internal citations and quotations omitted). [C]orporate franchises are grants of sovereignty only, and, if the state acquiesces in their usurpation, individuals will not be heard to complain. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Lake St. Louis does not disagree with the general rule that quo warranto offers the exclusive means of relief for individuals; they may not sue in their own right and may act as relators only in an action brought in the name of the state by the attorney general or county prosecutor. But, Lake St. Louis argues, this Court never has held that the sound reasoning underlying this rule applies when the dispute is between two municipalities or other public corporations concerning which one of them has the valid claim over a disputed area. In such cases, it suggests, a public corporation is the party directly affected by the territorial dispute. While the attorney general and prosecutor also may bring a suit in quo warranto on behalf of such a governmental entity, whether they choose to do so is within those officials' discretion. The governmental entity, therefore, as the party directly affected, should have the right instead to bring a declaratory judgment action in its own name to vindicate its directly affected interest in the office or territory. This Court has recognized on at least two occasions that the question of whether a public school district can bring a declaratory judgment action to resolve a territorial dispute is not resolved by the cases holding that individuals are not authorized to bring such actions. In 1952, Spiking noted the general rule regarding individuals but then found that because the plaintiffs in the action before it were not actually existing school districts (they had been dissolved prior to suit being brought): It is unnecessary to determine whether, under particular circumstances, an alleged existing common school district may by a declaratory judgment action directly attack the validity of an alleged reorganization proceeding which purports to destroy said district by consolidation or reorganization with other districts. 245 S.W.2d at 21. In 1967, while reaffirming the general rule that an individual is not authorized to bring a declaratory judgment action to challenge the validity of a district boundary and, instead, suit must be brought by the state in a quo warranto action, this Court similarly recognized that this holding was not dispositive of the question whether such a suit could be brought by the district itself, stating: Compare: Walker Reorganized School District R-4 v. Flint et al., Mo.App., 303 S.W.2d 200, 205-206(2), cited by respondent, holding that one school district can maintain an action against another school district for a judgment declaring that defendant district had become a part of plaintiff district by annexation. In so holding the court referred specifically to page 21 of the Spiking case (245 S.W.2d and noted ... that the Supreme Court has been careful to leave the door open for the decision that the cases in which individuals are endeavoring to attack the validity of an annexation or a reorganization through a proceeding other than by quo warranto in the name of the State are not necessarily controlling where two school districts are claiming the same territory. ... See also: Reorganized School District R-I of Crawford County v. Reorganized School District R-III of Washington County, Mo.App., 360 S.W.2d 376, 378(1-2). Barker, 418 S.W.2d at 65 n. 1. Walker Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-4 v. Flint , one of the cases cited in the Barker footnote, specifically noted that Spiking had left the door open for declaratory judgment actions when two school districts are claiming the same territory. 303 S.W.2d 200, 206 (Mo.App.1957). Walker walked through the door, holding that the public policy concerns behind prohibiting individuals from bringing an independent action had no application in suits involving public school districts. It held that because these municipal bodies' interests are affected directly by a dispute over their own boundaries, they should be permitted to bring a declaratory judgment action: Both plaintiff and intervenor are public school districts. Each in its public corporate capacity is claiming the same territory, the Coal Creek District.... Both plaintiff and intervenor have a direct interest in the matter. There is no threat of harassment by individuals questioning the validity of a school district. To permit plaintiff and intervenor, in a declaratory judgment action, to determine the question of which took the first valid step to acquire the Coal Creek District does not appear to violate any of the reasons for the rule that an individual cannot question in legality of the organization of a school district by a declaratory judgment action, but must proceed, if at all, by quo warranto in the name of the State. Since the reason for that rule fails as applied to this case we do not apply the rule. Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added). [4] O'Fallon nonetheless urges this Court to close the door left open in Spiking by holding that the prohibition on declaratory judgment actions by individuals also applies to school districts and other public corporations. In support, it cites State ex rel . Members of Bd. of Educ. of Everton R-III Sch. Dist. v. Members of Bd. of Educ. of Greenfield R-IV Sch. Dist., 572 S.W.2d 899 (Mo.App.1978), and State ex inf. Sanders, ex rel. City of Lee's Summit v. City of Lake Lotawana, 220 S.W.3d 794 (Mo.App.2007). This Court rejects that invitation. While Everton did conclude that school district boundaries could only be determined in quo warranto, 572 S.W.2d at 900, it cited only State ex inf. Dalton ex rel. Hough v. Eckley, 347 S.W.2d 704 (Mo. banc 1961), and State ex rel. Purdy Reorganized Sch. Dist. No. II v. Snider, 470 S.W.2d 805, 809 (Mo.App.1971), to support that conclusion. Neither case involved a declaratory judgment action brought by one school district or municipality against another, however, nor did either offer any reasoning why such declaratory judgment suits would not be proper. Moreover, Dalton merely noted (as this Court reaffirms today) that a suit in quo warranto is  a proper remedy to test the jurisdiction of a school board over territory claimed by another school district, 347 S.W.2d at 707 (emphasis added). It did not address whether other procedural alternatives also were available. [5] Lake Lotawana, the other case involving a public corporation relied on by O'Fallon, [6] cites only to Everton and a case involving a suit by individuals, State ex rel. Kansas City v. Harris, 357 Mo. 1166, 212 S.W.2d 733 (1948), and is similarly unpersuasive. Indeed, Lake Lotawana fails to cite Walker, Crawford, Spiking or Barker and offers no independent reasons why a declaratory judgment action should not be permitted where a municipality or school district seeks a declaratory judgment as to its own boundaries. This Court finds Walker 's reasoning more persuasive. To require a directly affected municipality or other similar public corporation to rely on a third party the attorney general or a county prosecutorto bring suit over its very boundaries would risk leaving it without a remedy if the attorney general and prosecutor exercise their discretion not to act. While this is appropriate where an individual litigant is involved, to avoid the multiplicity of suits that otherwise would ensue and to ensure that spurious claims are not asserted in an effort to adversely affect the public body, such reasoning does not apply to the municipality or other public corporation itself, as it has a direct and vital interest in determining its own boundaries. To the extent Everton and Lake Lotawana hold otherwise, they no longer should be followed. While they are correct that a quo warranto action by the attorney general or prosecuting or circuit attorney at the relation of the public corporation is proper to determine a boundary dispute such as this under Rule 98.02, so too is a declaratory judgment action brought directly by the municipality or other public corporation itself.
The motion to dismiss filed below also raised statute of limitations and laches defenses. Because the court failed to state the reasons for dismissal, this Court is unable to determine whether the dismissal was based on those grounds or on the ground principally relied on, that a municipality may not bring a declaratory judgment action. Allegations based on the statute of limitations or laches are in the nature of affirmative defenses and, as such, usually are raised in the answer. Lynch, 260 S.W.3d at 837. Here, however, O'Fallon brought its motion to dismiss in lieu of filing an answer. At this point, therefore, this Court can look only to the petition to determine whether dismissal was proper based on laches or the statute of limitations. Sheehan v. Sheehan, 901 S.W.2d 57, 59 (Mo. banc 1995). The petition alleges only that, between 1982 and the present, O'Fallon purported to annex certain property that in 1982 had been annexed by Lake St. Louis. Because the petition does not show on its face that the action is barred by the statute of limitations or laches, it would have been error to dismiss on these grounds.