Opinion ID: 3016985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liability of Lawrence County.

Text: Mrs. Woloszyn argues that the county is liable because it failed to train its corrections officers to identify and prevent suicides, and failed to provide them with readily available equipment to resuscitate inmates who might attempt suicide. Municipal liability can be predicated upon a failure to train. City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989).7 However, a municipality is only liable for failing to train when that “failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference to the [constitutional] rights of persons with whom the police come in contact.’” Colburn II, at 1028 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388). Only where a municipality’s failure to train its employees in relevant respect evidences a 7 In City of Canton, the plaintiff claimed that her constitutional rights were violated when she was denied medical care while detained in municipal jail. 22 “deliberate indifference” to the rights of its inhabitants can such a shortcoming be properly thought of as a city “policy or custom” that is actionable under § 1983. . . . Only where a failure to train reflects a “deliberate” or “conscious” choice by a municipality – a “policy” as defined by our prior cases – can a city be liable for such a failure under § 1983. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 389. Therefore, not all failures or lapses in training will support liability under § 1983. M oreover, “‘the identified deficiency in [the] training program must be closely related to the ultimate [constitutional] injury.” Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1028 (quoting City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 391). In City of Canton, the Court stressed that a plaintiff asserting a failure to train theory is “required to prove that the deficiency in training actually caused [the constitutional violation, i.e.,] the [police custodian’s] indifference to her medical needs.” City of Canton, at 391. In discussing liability for a failure to train claim in the context of a prison suicide, we have explained: City of Canton teaches that . . . [i]n a prison suicide case, [under § 1983] . . . the plaintiff must
could reasonably be expected to prevent the suicide that occurred, and (2) must demonstrate that the risk reduction associated with the proposed training is so great and so obvious that the failure of those responsible for the content of 23 the training program to provide it can reasonably be attributed to a deliberate indifference to whether the detainees succeed in taking their lives. Colburn II, 946 F.2d at 1029-30. Here, Woloszyn’s wife points to the affidavit and report of R. Paul McCauley, Ph.D., a professor of criminology and former chairperson of the Department of Criminology at Indiana University of Pennsylvania. He identified the following as deficiencies in Lawrence County’s training: The facility failed to have in place appropriate intake documents necessary to the evaluation and prevention of suicide; The facility failed to have in place a policy which would have resulted in Woloszyn either being placed in a cell for prisoners at risk for suicide or with another person. Instead, Mr. Woloszyn was assigned to a cell with vented bunk (i.e. with an open hole through which a blanket could be tied) and a blanket. Mr. Woloszyn’s suicide occurred by use of the vent and blanket; The staff was not qualified to assess and prevent suicide; Emergency medical equipment was not located and personnel were not properly trained in its use. 24 The training deficiencies McCauley identified are as broad and general as they are conclusory. Prof. McCauley does not identify specific training that would have alerted LCCF personnel to the fact that Woloszyn was suicidal as Colburn I and II require. He also concludes that Hartman-Swanson “was not trained in suicide prevention and did not have a way to formally prepare a meaningful suicide risk assessment for Mr. Woloszyn.” However, he never identified specific training that could reasonably have caused Hartman-Swanson to assess whether Woloszyn’s behavior and demeanor indicated that Woloszyn posed a risk of suicide.8 McCauley also opined that Lawrence County’s training was deficient because emergency medical equipment was not available in HB Unit and personnel were not properly trained in its use. This alleged deficiency relates to Mrs. Woloszyn’s claim that a protective breathing mask was not immediately available, and that it was inserted backwards when finally brought to the HB unit. However, we have already explained that Stiles and Graziani started CPR without waiting for a protective breathing mask, and there is no suggestion that they did so improperly. Therefore, we fail to see the significance of the initial absence of a breathing mask. In addition, even if Graziani’s improper initial insertion of the breathing mask resulted from a lack of training, nothing suggests that it was a 8 For purposes of our analysis, we assume arguendo that Woloszyn’s conversation with Hartman-Swanson suggested a “particular vulnerability to suicide.” 25 significant factor in Woloszyn’s tragic death. The initial unavailability of a breathing mask, and Graziani’s improper insertion of it arguably establishes simple negligence, but is little more than a red herring insofar as our inquiry into deliberate indifference is concerned.