Opinion ID: 1660094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: tennessee federal court cases from the 1970's

Text: Mention should be made of federal district court cases decided during the 1970's and discussing Tennessee apportionment plans under the United States Constitution. These cases, in chronological order, are: Kopald v. Carr, 343 F. Supp. 51 (M.D.Tenn. 1972); White v. Crowell, 434 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D.Tenn. 1977); Sullivan v. Crowell, 444 F. Supp. 606 (W.D.Tenn. 1978); and Mader v. Crowell, 498 F. Supp. 226 (M.D.Tenn. 1980). Interestingly, Ch. 3, § 2 of the Public Acts of 1965, which was expressly designed as a response to Baker v. Carr, supra , did not divide counties. Kopald dealt with the General Assembly's first apportionment plan after the 1970 census, which was enacted in 1972 and actually consisted of a principal and an alternate plan. It was admitted that the principal plan, which did not cross county lines, was unconstitutional; and that the alternate plan, which crossed county lines, had over a 21% variance in the House, principally from malapportionment in Knox and Shelby Counties. The court made certain changes in these and Rutherford Counties, which brought the variance to well below 10%. It noted that apportionment was primarily a legislative function; that plaintiffs had submitted plans even more mathematically precise; but that the evidence showed that the lesser mathematical precision of the [court's] plan may be justified on the basis of legitimate state policy considerations.  343 F. Supp. at 53-54 (emphasis added). The opinion was issued May 22, 1972. The court's modified plan was effective for the 1972 elections, with the Legislature given until July 1, 1973, to devise a constitutional plan. It is reflected in White v. Crowell, supra , that the Legislature passed the court-devised apportionment plan prior to July 1, 1973, deadline. This plan crossed county lines. White dealt with 1976 changes in three Senate (Gillock Amendment) and three House districts in Shelby County. After the changes, the variance from ideal district size was increased, although even then the largest of the six variances was only + 3.304%. The changes were challenged in May, 1976, so that court took no action at that time since primary elections were so close. The court found that the Legislature's reasons for making the changes were unjustified, so they were held unconstitutional. The case held that the variances of the six districts would have been constitutional if they had been part of the general 1973 reapportionment ordered in Kopald . However, the variances which resulted from the 1973 reapportionment were much smaller than the 1976 variances, thus demonstrating that the 1976 variances could be improved upon. Clearly the court was concerned with equal protection mandated by the federal constitution almost to the exclusion of all other considerations. Sullivan, supra , was actually three consolidated cases, referred to as  Sullivan ,   Algood  and  Nelson.  The Sullivan case dealt with four House districts altered by a 1977 act; Algood dealt with nine House districts altered by two 1976 acts; and Nelson dealt with seven House districts altered by a 1976 act. In Sullivan , the maximum total variance of the districts in question was increased from 2.34% to 21.78%; in Algood, it was increased from 2.39% to 35.57%. The court recognized that apportionment of state legislative districts was judged with a more flexible standard than congressional apportionment; and that fairly large variances are tolerated when they result from the even-handed implementation of a rational state policy. Here, the State's justification was to `put the counties back together' by taking a small number of magisterial districts of a county and isolated in a legislative district and combining them with the larger number of other districts in the county to which they all belong. 444 F. Supp. at 610. The court did not accept such an argument in that case because the record does not show that these reapportionment measures have significantly reduced the division of magisterial districts in the affected counties. Nor does the record show an attempt by the State to effect a statewide policy of putting the counties back together. On this record, the court does not find any relationship between county unification and the reapportionment legislation before the court. Id. at 611. Similarly, in Algood, there was no discernible legitimate reason advanced to justify so greatly increasing the variance in the affected district. We agree with the court's holding in that the variances in Sullivan and Algood were significantly larger than any figure which has been held constitutional. Secondly, the creation of a huge variance would not be acceptable if only a few magisterial districts were unified. Third, the language implies that if the record had supported the argument that the State was truly trying to keep counties together, and if the variances had been smaller, the reapportionment could have been held constitutional. In Nelson, maximum variance among the seven affected House districts was increased from 4.51% to 12.51%, a much smaller increase. Also, at least part of the justification for the change was to eliminate split precincts  precincts where voters from two legislative districts vote at the same polling place. There was no question that split precincts cause confusion, delays, long lines, and expenses for additional voting machines. Thus, the court held that their elimination would be a valid reason for increasing population disparities among legislative districts to the 12.51 percent level demonstrated here, if no alternative creating less severe imbalances is available. Id. at 614 (emphasis added). It appeared that the plaintiffs had a plan which would also eliminage split precincts while maintaining lower variances. The General Assembly was instructed to study the matter and take appropriate action. The elimination of split precincts cannot serve as a justification for malapportionment if it is possible to eliminate split precincts while maintaining legislative districts of more nearly equal population. Id. The Mader case was brought in March, 1978, to challenge the 1973 reapportionment ordered in the Kopald case. The court issued its initial holding January 15, 1979, which is reported as Appendix A to the opinion of March 27, 1980, published at 498 F. Supp. 226. The 1979 opinion held the 1973 apportionment unconstitutional because the maximum total deviation thereunder was 18.03%, far greater than the approximately 4% deviation under the plan devised by the Kopald court, under which the 1972 elections had been held. The State was unable to justify the 18.03% deviation under the Legislature's plan. The court observed: Although defendants point out that Article 2, section 6 of the Tennessee Constitution prefers districts that contain whole contiguous counties, (Defendants' Reply Brief and Argument, filed November 3, 1978, at 7), defendants have failed to indicate how the plan under attack furthers this preference or even that the preference rises to the level of an established state policy. Tennessee Code Annotated section 3-1-102 creates a number of districts that cut across county lines, and several of these districts deviate markedly from the optimum. Although Mahan [supra] teaches that other policy considerations might justify exceptions to a general policy of observing existing political boundaries, no such justifications have been identified for the noncontiguous districts now existing in this state. 498 F. Supp. at 234. The court gave the Legislature until June 1, 1979, to devise a new plan, and this deadline was complied with. [8] Under such new plan, maximum total variance was a mere .89%. [9] In the second case, plaintiffs made no equal protection challenge, but challenged the plan on two grounds not relevant in this appeal; in any case, their challenges were not upheld. Nothing further was said about districts crossing county lines.