Opinion ID: 2633125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant's Invocation of the Right to Counsel

Text: We also reject the People's arguments that Redgebol's statement should not be suppressed because he either ambiguously invoked his right to counsel or, alternatively, he reinitiated the questioning after invoking his right to counsel. It is long settled that if a defendant makes an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel, the request must be scrupulously honored and no further questioning can occur until either a lawyer is provided for the accused or the accused voluntarily reinitiates the questioning. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); People v. Martinez, 789 P.2d 420, 422 (Colo.1990). For a suspect to reinitiate a conversation, his comments must `evince [ ] a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation,' and not merely question the reasons for custody. Martinez, 789 P.2d at 422 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983)). A court should reach its decision on whether a suspect reinitiated the conversation based on the totality of the circumstances of the case, including the background, experience and conduct of the accused. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). The prosecution must prove that the defendant waived his or her right to counsel by clear and convincing evidence. Id. There is no question that Redgebol's answer of Yes, he would like a lawyer to the question of Would you like a lawyer with you, while we talk today, or no? is an unambiguous and unequivocal request for counsel. [4] In addition, the People's argument that Detective Frederickson scrupulously honored Redgebol's invocation before Redgebol voluntarily reinitiated the questioning fails to acknowledge that the alleged reinitiation occurred within thirty seconds of Redgebol's request for counsel. The relevant time frame is reflected as follows: Redgebol: Yes, he would like a lawyer. [13:42] Frederickson: He would like a lawyer? Okay. [13:44. Frederickson begins to speak again at 13:48] Then I will stop. I forgot to say what time it was when we started this. We began this tape around 5:10 pm on June 23, 2004, and Sebet has just indicated that he would like a lawyer before any questioning. [14:05] Redgebol: [At 14:25, Abyei begins to translate Redgebol's statement] He said, I don't understand. Will you be questioning me, then after you go, the lawyer comes? Or will both of you be here, you and the lawyer? The People cite no case law from this jurisdiction or any other where a court has held that a defendant invoked his right to an attorney, thus ending the questioning, and then reinitiated questioning in less than a minute. Previously, we have found that a defendant voluntarily waived his Miranda right when, after the defendant invoked his right to counsel, the police left and twenty minutes later  or more often, hours or even days later  the defendant reinitiated the conversation. See People v. Rivas, 13 P.3d 315, 317-18, 320 (Colo.2000); People v. Gonzales, 987 P.2d 239, 240 (Colo.1999); Martinez, 789 P.2d at 422; accord Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1042, 103 S.Ct. 2830. Our recent decision in People v. Bradshaw, 156 P.3d 452 (Colo.2007), controls in the situation where the officer does not end the interrogation after a suspect requests counsel. In Bradshaw, we held that a defendant did not reinitiate the interrogation after requesting counsel, despite the defendant then asking What am I facing here?, because the officer never stopped the interrogation. Id. at 459. Thus we concluded, Had [the officer] scrupulously honored Bradshaw's first request for an attorney and ended the interrogation, Bradshaw's question, `What am I facing here?' may have qualified as a reinitiation. However, since [the officer] did not end the interrogation, Bradshaw did not reinitiate it. Id. In the case now before us, the trial court found that Redgebol requested an attorney and that Detective Frederickson should have terminated the interrogation and left the room until Redgebol could be appointed an attorney. This ruling is well supported by the record and is consistent with Bradshaw. It is undoubted that Redgebol unambiguously and unequivocally requested a lawyer. The trial court was also well within its discretion to determine that a thirty-second pause did not constitute the cessation of interrogation by the police and its voluntary resumption by Redgebol.