Opinion ID: 1405111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review for Forum-Selection Clauses

Text: As an initial matter, I object to the majority's adoption of a completely new standard of review specifically for forum-selection clauses. The majority now holds, without providing any explanation, that [o]ur review of the applicability and enforceability of a forum-selection clause is de novo.  Given that this holding breaks from our existing precedent without justification, I cannot support this decision. While motions to dismiss based on a plaintiff's failure to state a claim are generally reviewed de novo, Sturm v. Board of Educ. of Kanawha County, 223 W.Va. 277, 280, 672 S.E.2d 606, 609 (2008), this Court has held that motions to dismiss based on venue are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Syl. Pt. 1, United Bank, Inc. v. Blosser, 218 W.Va. 378, 624 S.E.2d 815 (2005) (This Court's review of a trial court's decision on a motion to dismiss for improper venue is for abuse of discretion.). As recognized by the majority, motions to dismiss based on forum-selection clauses are motions to dismiss based on venue. Accordingly, by assigning a de novo standard of review to motions to dismiss based on forum-selection clauses specifically, the majority breaks with this Court's prior precedent. More importantly, this Court has long held as a general proposition that [i]n reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court, we apply a two-prong deferential standard of review. We review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court's underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review. Syl. Pt. 2, Walker v. W. Va. Ethics Comm'n, 201 W.Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167 (1997). The new test set forth by the majority for determining whether to dismiss a claim based on a forum-selection clause necessarily requires that courts applying the test make findings of fact as well as determinations of law. Specifically, the first inquiry under the majority's new test is whether the clause was reasonably communicated to the party resisting enforcement. This element does not require a legal interpretation of the clause itself; rather, it turns solely on a question of fact specific to each individual case. Similarly, the fourth element of the new test requires a court to consider whether the party resisting enforcement of the forum-selection clause has made a sufficiently strong showing that such enforcement would be unreasonable and unjust. Such showing likewise turns on the facts of the particular case, and is not related to the legal interpretation of the contract at issue. Faced with a similar question concerning what standard to use in reviewing the enforcement of a forum-selection clause, the Supreme Court of Washington acknowledged the nuances associated with reviewing such clauses, and concluded that: [G]enerally the abuse of discretion standard applies. Under this standard of review, a trial court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds. If the trial court's ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law or involves application of an incorrect legal analysis it necessarily abuses its discretion. Thus, the abuse of discretion standard gives deference to a trial court's fact-specific determination on enforceability of a forum selection clause, while permitting reversal where an incorrect legal standard is applied. If, however, a pure question of law is presented, such as whether public policy precludes giving effect to a forum selection clause in particular circumstances, a de novo standard of review should be applied as to that question. Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 160 Wash.2d 826, 161 P.3d 1016, 1020 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Thus, while affirming the basic tenet that questions of law are reviewed de novo, the Supreme Court of Washington recognized that, even in the context of forum-selection clauses, trial courts should be afforded the typical measure of deference generally granted to their factual findings. This approach is in keeping with this Court's prior precedent and there is no good reason to alter longstanding law to require de novo review of a circuit court's findings of fact merely because they relate to the applicability of a forum-selection clause. See Syl. Pt. 2, Walker, 201 W.Va. 108, 492 S.E.2d 167. Thus, I cannot support the majority's new holding on this issue, as its approach is too simplistic, not in conformity with our longstanding law, and seems designed to achieve an outcome for one specific case.