Opinion ID: 2525038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: as to dewey's individual claim, the district court was without authority to enter its enforcement order which addressed issues outside the record submitted of the individual proceeding

Text: ¶ 9 The Court begins its analysis by assessing the nature of the legal proceedings prosecuted by the parties before the district court. This is made difficult by the fact that the district court's March 5, 1997 judgment, which is final and now absolute, simultaneously addresses under a single case-number two different proceedings on the same subject [the availability of a military-service credit for firefighters who are war veterans and also possess vested interests in the firefighter-retirement system]. The parties' failure to comprehend the judgment's dual nature  i.e., as (1) a judgment which embodies an appellate opinion and (2) a decision on a class' application for declaratory relief  results in a failure to understand the full nature of the district court's March 5, 1999 postjudgment enforcement order. ¶ 10 Dewey, as an individual, brought a petition for review of Board's June 16, 1995 order entered in the individual proceeding on his administrative claim. His appeal from the agency's final order under the OAPA's provisions invokes the district court's appellate jurisdiction. [12] In response to his appeal the district court entered its March 5, 1997 judgment and the same is final and today beyond the reach of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Neither Dewey nor the Board can now be heard for the first time to appeal the judgment, its terms and provisions. ¶ 11 Dewey's appeal to the district court from the Board's order denying his claim was necessarily brought under the terms of 75 O.S.Supp.1992 § 318(A)(1). [13] The district court's March 5, 1997 judgment addressed the sole issue presented by the administrative hearing's record, i.e., Dewey's legal entitlement to a military-service credit. The district court remanded the cause to the agency for recalculation of Dewey's retirement benefits in a manner consistent with the reviewing court's legal conclusions. The March 5, 1997 judgment [ qua appellate opinion] became final and absolute when no appeal from its provisions was prosecuted within thirty (30) days after it was filed. ¶ 12 There are no OAPA provisions which authorize the district court to re-open appellate proceedings for enforcement purposes once they become final. Further, the issues of (1) entitlement to prejudgment interest and (2) the proper limitations period are not part of the administrative record which was forwarded to the district court for review. Extant jurisprudence requires that when considering an appeal brought under the OAPA's provisions the district court must confine its review to the record made before the administrative tribunal. [14] Hence, the district court was acting outside its authority when it attempted to enter its February 12, 1999 enforcement order as part of the appellate proceedings brought from the Board's June 16, 1995 adjudicative order. Insofar as the district court's February 12, 1999 order addresses Dewey's § 318(A)(1) [15] individual appeal, the same is reversed.