Opinion ID: 433513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the common law privilege for unsolicited communications

Text: TO A LEGISLATIVE BODY 11 The common law privilege for communications made to a legislative body is articulated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 590A (1977): 12 A witness is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter as part of a legislative proceeding in which he is testifying or in communications preliminary to the proceeding, if the matter has some relation to the proceeding. 13 Most courts confronted with allegedly defamatory communications directed to a legislative body have adopted the approach taken by the Restatement. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Bryant, 191 Mass. 591, 78 N.E. 394 (1906); Jennings v. Cronin, 256 Pa.Super. 398, 389 A.2d 1183 (1978); Logan's Super Markets, Inc. v. McCalla, 208 Tenn. 68, 343 S.W.2d 892 (1961). The issue, however, of whether unsolicited statements made to the CRS are absolutely privileged seems to be one of first impression. 6 14 In determining whether unsolicited statements to the CRS are privileged, we are guided by a well-settled common law principle: Grants of absolute immunity ought to be interpreted narrowly to serve only the purposes justifying the immunity. See, e.g., Asay v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 594 F.2d 692, 697, 698 (8th Cir.1979); Bradley v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 30 Cal.App.3d 818, 825, 106 Cal.Rptr. 718, 721 (1973); Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 223, 67 N.W.2d 413, 417 (1954). The purpose of granting immunity to communications addressed to a legislative body was set forth in Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md.App. 553, 558, 456 A.2d 59, 62, aff'd, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983): 15 In order for a democratic government to govern democratically, it is necessary that an atmosphere be created whereby facts may be freely presented to the governing legislative body. Without such a free-speaking environment, individuals might be discouraged from addressing their government. 7 16 An individual must feel unrestrained by potential defamation liability when addressing the legislature. Only then can the lawmaking process be fully informed and operate with maximum effectiveness. 17 We limit our definition of the privilege in this case to the context of unsolicited statements made to the legislature or its investigative arm. In tailoring the scope of the privilege, our ultimate objective must be to promote candid legislative input. At the same time, we must prevent overbroad applications of the privilege that would create a shelter from defamation liability. To achieve these goals, we reserve the absolute privilege for statements meeting the following two criteria. First, the communicator must show that he would not have made the unsolicited statement but for his intention to inform the legislative body on a subject properly within its jurisdiction. 8 Second, the statement must have some relation to the legitimate legislative business to which it is addressed. 9 18 The first criterion ensures that the privilege promotes only those statements made solely to inform the legislative process. 10 If the unsolicited statement would have been made for purposes other than legislative input, the speaker would necessarily have been willing to incur the risk of defamation liability to have his say. In such case, granting the privilege is not only unnecessary as an incentive, but also would cloak with a legislative privilege statements not meant only for the legislative body. It is just this kind of overbroad use of immunity denounced by the common law principle requiring privileges to be tailored closely to their justifications. 11 19 The second criterion requires some objective relation between the substance of the unsolicited statement and the legislative business to which it is addressed. This requirement also guards against overbroad application of the privilege. Legislative immunity is meant to encourage legitimate legislative input; it is not meant to insulate all statements, no matter how irrelevant to legislative business, that are channeled to the legislature. This is not to say, however, that the application of the privilege turns on the cogency of the disputed statement. The some relation requirement has been construed broadly precisely to avoid subjective judgments on the informative value of legislative input. See generally Brown v. Collins, 402 F.2d 209, 212 (D.C.Cir.1968); Circus Circus Hotels, Inc. v. Witherspoon, 657 P.2d 101, 104 (Nev.1983). So long as the statement has some objective pertinence to the legislative issue it was meant to address, it meets the second part of the test. 12 20 The parties in this appeal have disagreed vigorously on the proper interpretation of the Restatement's admonition against overbroad grants of immunity to communications preliminary to a legislative proceeding: 21 As to communications preliminary to a proposed ... proceeding, the rule stated in this Section applies only when the communication has some relation to a proceeding that is actually contemplated in good faith and under serious consideration by the witness or a possible party to the proceeding. The bare possibility that the proceeding might be instituted is not to be used as a cloak to provide immunity for defamation when the possibility is not seriously considered. 22 Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 588 comment e (1977) (emphasis added); id. Sec. 590A comment a. In the context of unsolicited statements offered to the CRS, we believe the contemplated in good faith requirement promotes the purpose of the privilege when directed at the communicator. Since the purpose of the privilege is to encourage candid legislative input, it is necessary that all privileged statements be contemplated in good faith and seriously considered to bear on potential legislative action. We thus read comment e in the context of this case to be entirely consistent with part one of the test outlined above. If an individual would not have forwarded a statement to the CRS but for his intention to influence potential legislative action, his efforts were necessarily contemplated in good faith to have legislative impact. 13 23 The district court held that unsolicited comments made to the CRS are privileged so long as they relate to inquiries of the CRS within the scope of that agency's responsibilities to Congress as enumerated in 2 U.S.C. Sec. 166(d). 561 F.Supp. at 1189. The district court thus appears to have focused on the second, some relation, part of the test we outlined above. 14 The court did not consider whether the disputed memorandum would have been sent to the CRS but for Mr. Anderson's intent to inform the CRS on a subject properly within its jurisdiction. Consequently, we must conclude that the district court's legal definition of the scope of the disputed privilege was, at best, only half complete. 24 Additionally, the district court has not made sufficient factual findings for us to determine whether the memorandum falls within the proper scope of the privilege. 15 Appellants argue with some force that Mr. Anderson sent the memorandum to Mr. Lindahl not to inform the CRS, but to preserve the reputation of Sun Company. Specifically, appellants contend that Mr. Anderson was concerned that an important business associate would think that Sun had been remiss in not giving the device more attention. Brief for Appellants at 9-10, 18-19. This ambiguity concerning Mr. Anderson's purpose is underscored by the following excerpt from his deposition: 25 Q. Was this letter that you have testified to as having been sent to Mr. Lindahl an effort on your part to influence Mr. Lindahl in connection with the device that Mr. Webster invented? 26
27 Q. You were not trying to influence him? 28 A. No. I was merely trying to prove to him that the interest that I had exhibited had fallen on deaf ears and that I really had tried. But you can see the result. That was the purpose, really. 29 Anderson Deposition at 75-76. See also excerpts cited supra note 4. Whether Mr. Anderson would have forwarded the memorandum but for the purpose of informing the CRS about the device thus remains an unresolved issue of material fact. 16