Opinion ID: 785474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Interstate Commerce Element of the Hobbs Act Counts

Text: 27 Wilkerson next argues that the evidence supporting his Hobbs Act conviction was legally insufficient in that it did not satisfy the interstate commerce element of the Act, and that Judge Block erroneously instructed the jury concerning the evidence required to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the Act. We address these two arguments seriatim.
28 The Hobbs Act proscribes, inter alia, robberies, attempted robberies, and conspiracies to commit robberies that in any way or degree obstruct[], delay[], or affect[] interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(3). In a Hobbs Act prosecution, proof that `commerce [wa]s affected is critical since the Federal Government's jurisdiction of this crime rests only on that interference.' United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir.) (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960)), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 988, 123 S.Ct. 430, 154 L.Ed.2d 356 (2002). Indeed, [t]here is nothing more crucial, yet so strikingly obvious, as the need to prove the jurisdictional element of a crime. United States v. Leslie, 103 F.3d 1093, 1103 (2d Cir.1997). This jurisdictional nexus transforms the quintessential state crimes of robbery and extortion into federal crimes. United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, 37 (2d Cir.2002). Nevertheless, it is well established that the burden of proving a nexus to interstate commerce is minimal. Elias, 285 F.3d at 188. Indeed, [t]he jurisdictional requirement of the Hobbs Act may be satisfied by a showing of a very slight effect on interstate commerce. Even a potential or subtle effect will suffice. United States v. Angelilli, 660 F.2d 23, 35 (2d Cir.1981) (citation omitted). 4 29 Before turning to the evidence supporting Wilkerson's Hobbs Act conviction and our examination of whether that evidence was legally sufficient, we provide a brief summary of our recent Hobbs Act jurisprudence in which the legal sufficiency of the evidence was challenged. We do so because all of these cases were decided after Wilkerson was convicted, and the outcomes of these cases (and the reasoning supporting those outcomes) explain our conclusion that Wilkerson's Hobbs Act conviction must be affirmed, notwithstanding the exceedingly thin evidence concerning the interstate commerce element. 30 In United States v. Elias, 285 F.3d 183, the defendant was convicted of robbing $1400 in cash, along with cigarettes, subway MetroCards, telephone calling cards, and food stamps from a neighborhood grocery store in Queens. The evidence that this robbery affected interstate commerce was that the grocery story sold beer that had been brewed in Mexico and the Dominican Republic and fruit that had been grown in Florida and California. In affirming the defendant's conviction, we rejected the argument that the Government was required to show that some of the products sold at the grocery store were purchased directly from out-of-state suppliers. Specifically, we held that a robbery of a local distribution or retail enterprise may be said to affect interstate commerce if the robbery impairs the ability of the local enterprise to acquire — whether from out-of-state or in-state suppliers — goods originating out-of-state. Id. at 189. The rationale for our holding was that the grocery store 31 furnished an outlet for goods that move[d] in interstate commerce, and the robbery impaired its financial capacity to draw goods from interstate origins for local resale. Since the evidence at trial established that the [grocery store] stocked goods originating out-of-state, the requisite indirect, minimal effect on interstate commerce was thereby sufficiently established. 32 Id. 33 In United States v. Jamison, 299 F.3d 114, a divided panel of our court affirmed a Hobbs Act conviction arising out of the attempted murder and robbery of a businessman at his home. The victim was a part owner of an incorporated retail business..., which sold clothing, shoes, [pagers], cell phones, CDs, and tapes, and a trafficker in cocaine. Id. at 115-16. The attempted robbery occurred shortly after the victim had returned home from purchasing $15,000 worth of merchandise for his business, carrying approximately $3300 in unspent cash from his shopping trip. Id. at 116. In addition to the cash he was carrying with him when he returned home, the victim also had stored approximately $18,000 in cash in a safe in his house. 34 The defendant showed up at the victim's house with a gun, demanding to know [w]here[] the money was. Id. At the defendant's trial, the Government sought to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act by demonstrating the effect that the robbery would have had on the victim's clothing and narcotics businesses. The [G]overnment's theory was that [the defendant's] attempted robbery, if successful, would have depleted cash that [the victim had] regularly used to purchase items in interstate commerce as inventory for his clothing and cocaine businesses. Id. at 116-17. 5 On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence did not allow the inference that [the victim had] intended to use the money in his possession to purchase goods in interstate commerce, and that where the robbery victim is a private individual, rather than a business, the robbery is less likely to affect commerce, and the [G]overnment must therefore show a `substantial' effect, rather than a minimal effect, on interstate commerce. Id. at 118. 35 We rejected the first argument and declined to reach the second. In particular, in concluding that the victim had commingled the moneys coming to him from all sources to be used for all purposes, we relied on his testimony that he had intended to use the approximately $21,000 he had in cash ... for `drugs or clothing, whatever.' Id. at 119. With respect to the defendant's argument that the victim's use of the word whatever indicated that the victim had intended to use the money for personal expenses, we found that the victim's testimony (when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government) established that he [had] used [the money] primarily to purchase business inventory for both businesses. Id. Thus, [t]he jury could draw the inference that, had [the] robbery attempt succeeded in depriving [the victim] of the $21,000 ... he had on hand at his house, this would have substantially diminished his inventory purchases of clothing manufactured [out of state], and cocaine originating [out of state]. Id. Furthermore, because we concluded that [r]obbing [this particular victim] in his home was no different in its effect on commerce from robbing a place of business, id. at 120 n. 2, we declined to reach the defendant's argument that a stricter standard should apply for satisfying the interstate commerce element in Hobbs Act prosecutions arising out of the robbery of an individual as opposed to a business. Id. at 119 n. 2 & 119-21. 36 In United States v. Fabian, 312 F.3d 550, another divided panel of our court affirmed a Hobbs Act conviction arising out of the robbery of (and conspiracy to rob) two separate victims, one of whom was a retired taxi cab driver. The defendant, believing that the retired taxi driver was a loan shark, broke into the victim's house and stole several thousand dollars and some jewelry. In affirming the defendant's conviction, we rejected the argument that the interstate commerce element was not met because the retired taxi driver was not, in fact, a loan shark involved in interstate commerce. What [was] legally relevant [was] whether at the time of the crime, [the defendant] believed he was robbing a loan shark ..., not whether the crimes actually involved a loan shark. Id. at 555 (emphasis added). 37 On the same day that we affirmed the Hobbs Act conviction in Fabian, we reversed the Hobbs Act conviction in United States v. Perrotta, 313 F.3d 33, where the only connection to interstate commerce [was] that the victim work[ed] for a company engaged in interstate commerce. Id. Such a link between the crime and interstate commerce, we held, was simply too attenuated to support federal Hobbs Act jurisdiction. Id. at 36. In reaching this conclusion, we join[ed] our sister circuits in drawing a distinction between the extortion of an individual and the extortion of a business for the purposes of establishing Hobbs Act jurisdiction. Id. 6 To permit the defendant's Hobbs Act conviction to stand, we concluded, would expand the reach of the Hobbs Act to include every robbery or extortion committed. Id. at 37. Finally, we identified circumstances in which the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act would be satisfied when the target of the defendant was an individual instead of a business: (i) where the victim directly participated in interstate commerce; (ii) where the defendant targeted the victim because of her status as an employee at a company participating in interstate commerce; (iii) where the assets of a company engaged in interstate commerce were, or would have been, depleted as a result of the harm or potential harm, respectively, to the individual victim; or (iv) where the defendant targeted the assets of a business engaged in interstate commerce rather than an individual. Id. at 37-38. But we also held that [m]erely showing employment with a company that [did] business in interstate commerce, without more, stretch[ed] the Hobbs Act too far. Id. at 38. 38 Finally, in United States v. Silverio, 335 F.3d 183 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam), we affirmed the Hobbs Act conviction of a defendant who attempted to rob a doctor in his apartment, in the belief that the doctor kept a substantial amount of cash from his medical practice there. Specifically, we held that the evidence demonstrated an interstate nexus because [the doctor] was a direct participant in interstate commerce through his business of treating a worldwide celebrity clientele, because the robbery would have depleted the assets of [the doctor's] business, and because the robbery targeted the assets of his business rather than his personal property. Id. at 187. We explained that in the absence of an actual effect on interstate commerce, a defendant's belief about the nature of his crime may be determinative. But when ... ample effects on interstate commerce [have been] demonstrated, the state of mind of the defendant is not relevant. Id. 39 With the above precedents in mind, we turn to the evidence introduced by the Government to support the interstate commerce element of Wilkerson's Hobbs Act conviction. At the time of the hold up, the Lopez brothers had been operating their landscaping business for about five years. According to Natividad, the landscaping business was an informal business, i.e., it was not incorporated; there was no separate bank account for the business; the business' phone number was the home phone number of one of the Lopez brothers; the income from the business was not reported to the Internal Revenue Service; and no written records were kept for the business. The services performed by the business were clipping trees and mowing and fertilizing lawns for residential, in-state customers. The demands of the business varied with the changing of the seasons, but during the summer, the Lopez brothers worked nine-to-ten hours a day, six days a week. 40 The Lopez brothers purchased the supplies used in their landscaping business from two local retail stores: Home Depot and Cale Brothers. The Lopez brothers typically purchased their supplies every week or two, typically on Mondays. Natividad testified that items shown in photographs of the basement taken shortly after the hold up were supplies that had been purchased for the landscaping business that were being stored in the basement. 7 These items included clippers, fertilizer, landscaping bags, peat moss, and a lawnmower. A Home Depot employee (who for nine years had managed the garden department in the Brooklyn Home Depot store in which he worked) testified that several of the landscaping supplies contained in the photographs of the basement were carried by his store and other Home Depot stores, although he could not confirm that the items in the photographs had, in fact, been purchased from Home Depot. The Home Depot employee further testified that most of the supplies featured in the photographs of the basement had originated outside New York. For example, the peat moss came from Canada; the lawnmower, from Minnesota; the lawnmower oil, from North Carolina; the fertilizer, from Ohio; and the lime, from somewhere in the southwestern United States. 41 Natividad also testified about the $350 to $400 Bilberto was carrying when he was killed. Although the hold up occurred on a Monday evening, the Lopez brothers had not yet purchased landscaping supplies for the week. According to Natividad, they were putting the money in the bank and cashing the checks ... in order to be able to make some payments that [they] had to make. Natividad further testified that they had intended to use this money to buy the equipment that [they] used in gardening and to pay for other, family-related expenses. There is no evidence in the record to indicate the source of the money Bilberto was carrying (e.g., the landscaping business, rental income from their building, salary from TGI Friday's, etc.). Finally, Toney testified that Wilkerson had given him a number of reasons for robbing the Lopez brothers: 42 [Wilkerson] ... knew these guys because they owned a landscaping company or lawn service or something, that he had worked with these guys before but he did not like the guy that had got killed, they [were] having confrontations as far as money or something but he didn't like the guy that had gotten killed and he knew they always kept money inside this establishment, large amounts of money. 43 In light of the Hobbs Act cases described above, the totality of this evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, establishes a sufficient nexus between the charged offenses and interstate commerce to satisfy the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act, albeit barely. Specifically, this evidence would permit a rational juror to infer that: (i) Wilkerson conspired (and aided and abetted an attempt) to rob the assets of the Lopez brothers' landscaping business; (ii) the landscaping business, although it serviced only in-state customers, purchased supplies from an in-state retailer, which had purchased those same supplies from out-of-state wholesalers; and (iii) if the attempted robbery had been successful, it would have depleted assets from the landscaping business that would have been used to buy supplies that traveled in interstate commerce. Under the Hobbs Act precedents discussed above, this evidence was legally sufficient to support Wilkerson's conviction. 44 Admittedly, several factual anomalies converged to make this a somewhat unusual case. First, the Lopez brothers' landscaping business was not a traditional, incorporated business, such as the grocery store in Elias. But we have affirmed Hobbs Act convictions where the victims' businesses did not comply with all of the formalities observed in the legitimate business world and, indeed, even where the victims engaged in the buying and selling of contraband. See, e.g., Fabian, 312 F.3d 550 (drug trafficking by one victim and alleged loansharking by the other victim); Jamison, 299 F.3d 114 (cocaine trafficking); cf. United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276 (2d Cir.1994) (robbery victim was an undercover narcotics officer whose depleted assets were to be used to purchase narcotics). Second, the robbery took place at an individual's residence instead of at his place of business, in contrast to the robbery in Elias. But as we observed in Jamison, Fabian, and Silverio, the fact that a robbery takes place at a residence does not transform the robbery from the robbery of a business into the random robbery of an individual (as was the case in Perrotta ), so long as the evidence supports the conclusion that the robbery targeted the assets of a business. Third, the amount of money found on the victim was only a few hundred dollars. Given that Wilkerson was charged with the inchoate offenses of conspiracy and attempted robbery, however, the relevant inquiry is not how much money was at the crime scene (or indeed whether there was any money at the crime scene at all), but rather how much money Wilkerson intended to steal and what effect the theft of that amount of money would have had on interstate commerce. See Silverio, 335 F.3d at 187. 45 On appeal, Wilkerson argues that there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the interstate element of the Hobbs Act, because [t]he [G]overnment offered no evidence as to the source of [the] money; [i.e.,] whether it was from [the Lopez brothers'] dishwashing job, from rent, from lawn mowing, or from all of these sources. Given the evidence discussed above, however, this is a red herring. That some or all of the money Bilberto was carrying may have come from a source other than the landscaping business is of no moment, given that a rational juror could have inferred that Wilkerson had targeted the assets of the Lopez brothers' landscaping business and that at least some of the money Bilberto was carrying at the time of the hold up would have been used to purchase out-of-state supplies for that business. See Jamison, 299 F.3d at 119-21. 46 Wilkerson also argues that there was insufficient proof that the money Bilberto was carrying would have been used to purchase out-of-state gardening supplies. Specifically, Wilkerson points to the facts that the Lopez brothers purchased their supplies from both Home Depot and Cale Brothers and that no evidence was introduced concerning the origins of the landscaping materials sold at Cale Brothers. Nevertheless, the testimony from the Home Depot employee established not only that the supplies depicted in the photographs taken of the basement had been shipped to Home Depot from out-of-state suppliers, but also that several of these items (e.g., lime) could have been purchased only from an out-of-state supplier, as there were no local suppliers of these products in New York. Consequently, a rational juror could have inferred that the targeted funds would have been used to purchase landscaping supplies that could have come only from out of state. 47 Finally, Wilkerson argues that the evidence failed to establish that the Lopez brothers were targeted because of their landscaping business. In support of this argument, Wilkerson relies on the fact that, in Toney's testimony, he testified in separate sentences that (i) Wilkerson knew that the Lopez brothers owned a landscaping business, and (ii) Wilkerson knew that they always kept large sums of money inside their house. While Toney's testimony (like Ligon's) was not a model of grammatical clarity, a rational juror could have inferred from his testimony that Wilkerson had planned to rob the Lopez brothers at their home because he believed they kept large sums of money from their landscaping business there. 48 In affirming Wilkerson's Hobbs Act conviction based on the evidence that was presented to the jury, we are mindful that we stand on the metaphorical slippery slope, dangerously close to expand[ing] the reach of the Hobbs Act to include nearly every robbery ... committed. Perrotta, 313 F.3d at 37. Indeed, were we the first panel to rule on this type of sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenge, we might well reach a different conclusion. But we are not the first panel to address this issue and are bound by the decisions of prior panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the Supreme Court. See BankBoston, N.A. v. Sokolowski (In re Sokolowski), 205 F.3d 532, 534-35 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see e.g., United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir.2003) (en banc) (overruling in part, United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 104-07 (2d Cir. 2002)). 8 Accordingly, we find that the Government provided sufficient evidence for a rational juror to have found the essential elements of [the § 1951 count] beyond a reasonable doubt. See Glenn, 312 F.3d at 63.
49 Wilkerson next argues that he is entitled to a new trial because Judge Block's instruction to the jury concerning the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act was erroneous. The propriety of a jury instruction is a question of law that we review de novo.  United States v. George, 266 F.3d 52, 58 (2d Cir.2001). A jury instruction is erroneous if it misleads the jury as to the correct legal standard or does not adequately inform the jury on the law. United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 52 (2d Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, a defendant who requests an instruction bears the burden of showing that the requested instruction accurately represented the law in every respect and that, viewing as a whole the charge actually given, he was prejudiced. United States v. Abelis, 146 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons set forth below, we find that Wilkerson has not overcome this burden. 50 Wilkerson's trial counsel requested that Judge Block deliver the following jury instruction concerning the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act: 51 [T]he [G]overnment must [p]rove beyond a reasonable doubt ... that the attempted robbery, if proved, had an actual or potential effect on interstate commerce. You may find an effect on interstate commerce if and only if the actions have depleted, or potentially depleted the assets of an individual who is directly and customarily engaged in interstate commerce. 52 Judge Block denied the request and instructed the jury as follows: 53 [Y]ou must ... determine whether there was an actual or potential effect on commerce between any two or more states or foreign countries. 54 If you decide that there was any effect at all on interstate or foreign commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element. Now, the effect can be minimal. For example, if a successful robbery of money would prevent the use of those funds to purchase articles which travel through interstate or foreign commerce, that would be a sufficient effect on commerce. 55 If you decide that interstate or foreign commerce would potentially or possibly be affected if [Wilkerson] had successfully and fully completed his actions, then the element of affecting commerce is satisfied. You do not have to find that interstate or foreign commerce was actually affected. 56 You do not have to decide whether the effect on interstate or foreign commerce was harmful or beneficial to a particular business, or to commerce in general. The Government satisfies its burden of proving an effect on interstate or foreign commerce if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt any effect ..., whether it was harmful or not. 57 Now, Mr. Duffy [Wilkerson's coconspirator] need not have intended or anticipated an effect on interstate or foreign commerce. You may find the effect is a natural consequence of his actions. If you find that Mr. Duffy intended to take certain actions ... and ... those actions have either caused, or probably would cause, an effect on interstate or foreign commerce, then you may find the requirement of this element have been satisfied. 58 On appeal, Wilkerson argues that Judge Block's jury instruction was flawed because it made no distinction whatsoever between a business and an individual. The charge did not require the jury to make any finding that a business was robbed, or that the robbery, if successful, would have depleted the assets of a business. According to Wilkerson, the jury was erroneously instructed that it could find the [interstate commerce] element proven if it found that the Lopez brothers[, as opposed to their business,] would have used part of their cash to buy goods that had once traveled in interstate commerce. We find Wilkerson's argument unpersuasive. 59 Even if (prior to our decision in Perrotta ) Judge Block should have instructed the jury that the robbery of an individual depleting the individual's personal funds should be governed by a different test from a robbery that depletes the assets of a business, it would not affect the present case. Jamison, 299 F.3d at 121. Here, as discussed above, a rational juror could have inferred that the attempted robbery, if successful, would have taken the cash that would have been used by a business to purchase supplies that traveled across state lines, even if (as in Jamison ) the cash was commingled with the Lopez brothers' personal assets. Indeed, as we explained in Perrotta, when the target of an attempted robbery is an individual, the interstate commerce element of the Hobbs Act is satisfied where the defendant targets the assets of a business, rather than an individual's personal assets, and where those assets would have been used to purchase supplies that traveled in interstate commerce. See 313 F.3d at 38. Accordingly, we reject Wilkerson's argument that he is entitled to new trial based on an erroneous jury instruction. 9