Opinion ID: 2275841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: to make an adequate demonstration of the need for access to a defense expert.

Text: We disagree. The child was deemed incompetent as a witness at the first trial because the court was unable to even get her into the courtroom, much less conduct a hearing to test her competency by asking her questions, directly, regarding her ability to appreciate telling the truth on the witness stand. The trial court, in the first trial, relied heavily on the testimony of Dr. Carnelle Barnes, who testified at the competency hearing about the psychological trauma Ashley had experienced and what further trauma she would experience if she were compelled to testify. Due to Ashley's unavailability as a witness at that competency hearing, the trial court based its determination that Ashley was incompetent to testify on Dr. Barnes's testimony and the prosecutor's statements to the court that Ashley would not answer any questions for the purposes of that hearing. Ashley was deemed incompetent and Dr. Barnes's records were made available. Further, appellant had every opportunity and indeed did cross-examine Dr. Barnes heavily regarding both issues of Ashley Heath's competency as well as her veracity. The defense had in this case, prior to the second trial, the opportunity to cross-examine the child herself at the competency hearing, as the child was present and available for questioning at that time. The trial judge, in his discretion, deemed Ashley to be competent at the second trial based on her availability and willingness to be present for the hearing and her demonstration to the court of an understanding of the obligation of the oath and the consequences of false swearing, as well as her capacity to transmit to the factfinder a reasonable statement of what was seen or heard. See Jackson v. State, 290 Ark. 375, 720 S.W.2d 282 (1986). The competency of a witness is a matter lying within the sound discretion of the trial court and, in the absence of clear abuse, we will not reverse on appeal. Logan v. State, 299 Ark. 266, 773 S.W.2d 413 (1989); Hoggard v. State, 277 Ark. 117, 640 S.W.2d 102 (1982). Access to the requested records of her second therapist would have in no way aided the defense in challenging whether or not the child was able to appreciate telling the truth on the witness stand, as the child was herself present and available for cross-examination on this point. Therefore, in regard to the issue of the child's competency, the records sought were clearly irrelevant and therefore inadmissible for the purpose of challenging her competency at the second trial. Next, although the information sought could certainly be deemed relevant for purposes of challenging the witness's veracity both in cross-examination and in presentation of impeachment evidence, the question is whether the records were admissible. The trial court found that it was not admissible because it was privileged under Ark. R. Evid. 503. Appellant contends that because the witness had waived the psychotherapist/patient privilege prior to the first trial, then the privilege is forever waived and the witness may not now claim the privilege. The appellant further contends that the witness's assertion of the privilege interfered with his right to present a complete defense at trial. We hold these arguments to be without merit for the following reasons. Ark. R. Evid. 503(b) (1999) states: A patient has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing his medical records or confidential communications made for the purpose of diagnosis or treatment of his physical, mental or emotional condition, including alcohol or drug addiction, among himself, physician or psychotherapist, and persons who are participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction of the physician or psychotherapist, including members of the patient's family. The foregoing privilege applies in both criminal and civil cases, e.g., Baker v. State, 276 Ark. 193, 637 S.W.2d 522 (1982), and is inapplicable only when proceedings are initiated to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, when a mental examination is ordered by the court, or when the patient relies on his or her physical, mental, or emotional condition as an element of his or her claim or defense. Ark. R. Evid. 503(d)(1),(2), and (3) (1999). The appellant contends that this privilege was inapplicable pursuant to Rule 503(d)(3)(A) because Ashley's emotional condition was an element of her claim or defense. However, Rule 503(d)(3)(A) clearly anticipates that the privilege is inapplicable only as to a party to a proceeding who brings his or her own physical, mental, or emotional condition into issue. See Cavin v. State, 313 Ark. 238, 855 S.W.2d 285 (1993). Ashley was not and is not a party to the proceedings below, and therefore could not assert a claim or defense. If this Court were to follow appellant's reasoning, a third party could always circumvent Rule 503 by calling into question any witness's mental or emotional condition. Such a result is clearly not intended by this rule, the purpose of which is to limit access to confidential communications. We therefore hold that because Ashley Heath was not a party to the proceedings and did nothing to bring her own emotional condition into issue, she properly asserted her psychotherapist/patient privilege. The appellant further argues that because the privilege was waived by the witness at the first trial, it must be deemed waived at the second trial. This Court has long held that waiver of the privilege in one proceeding does not constitute waiver of the privilege at subsequent proceedings. See Maryland Casualty Co. v. Maloney, 119 Ark. 434, 178 S.W. 387 (1915). Although the Maloney decision was rendered long ago, this Court's ruling in that case is dispositive of the waiver issue. There, it was held that the patient's waiver at the first trial did not serve as a waiver at retrial, even as to the privileged material that was disclosed at the first trial. Id. at 441, 178 S.W. at 389. From the holding in Maloney , it logically follows that if a patient is entitled to assert the privilege at a subsequent proceeding as to previously disclosed material, then a patient with a new body of privileged material may also assert the privilege. After all, the privilege exists between the patient and the psychotherapist, not between the patient and an issue in the case. The facts present in the instant case are even stronger on this point than Maloney , as the previously disclosed material in this case, that being the records of Dr. Barnes, were still made available at the second trial and were not asserted to be privileged; only the new body of material from the new therapist was asserted by the witness to be privileged and not subject to disclosure. Between the appellant's first trial and his retrial, Ashley Heath obtained a new psychotherapist, thus creating a new set of privileged therapy records and communications. Indeed, in light of Maloney , the trial court could have properly ruled that the records made prior to the appellant's first trial were subject to the privilege at retrial as well. However, to the appellant's benefit, it applied the privilege only to the material created after his first trial. Clearly, applying the holding in Maloney , this was not error. The appellant further makes several arguments which, taken together, essentially allege that the assertion of the privilege interfered with his right to present a complete defense. Specifically, the appellant contends that the privileged material was admissible evidence of bias, knowledge, or interest of the witness, that the material was discoverable under Ark. R.Crim. P. 17.1 and 17.4 (1999), and that the constitutional right to present his defense superseded Ashley Heath's right to the psychotherapist/patient privilege. Contrary to appellant's arguments, however, it has been established that said privilege preempts the need to discover all admissible evidence. The United States Supreme Court established in Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 116 S.Ct. 1923, 135 L.Ed.2d 337 (1996), that the psychotherapist/patient privilege is paramount to the need to gain access to the privileged material for evidentiary purposes. There, the Court stated the following: Exceptions from the general rule disfavoring testimonial privileges may be justified ... by a public good transcending the normally predominant principle of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth. Guided by these principles, the question we address today is whether a privilege protecting confidential communications between a psychotherapist and her patient promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.... Both reason and experience persuade us that it does.... In contrast to the significant public and private interests supporting recognition of the privilege, the likely evidentiary benefit that would result from the denial of the privilege is modest. If the privilege were rejected, confidential conversations between psychotherapists and their patients would surely be chilled, particularly when it is obvious that the circumstances that give rise to the need for treatment will probably result in litigation. Without a privilege, much of the desirable evidence to which litigants ... seek access ... is unlikely to come into being. This unspoken evidence will therefore serve no greater truth-seeking function than if it had been spoken and privileged. Id. at 9-10, 11-12, 116 S.Ct. 1923 (citations and quotations omitted). Although the decision in Jaffee acknowledged the federal privilege, it soundly rejected arguments such as the appellant's present contention that his constitutional right to present a defense supersedes the psychotherapist/patient privilege. Jaffee explicitly states that the privilege is more important than the need for probative evidence. Id. at 9-10, 116 S.Ct. 1923. The appellant argues that Ashley's psychotherapy records were discoverable pursuant to Ark. R.Crim. P. 17.1 and 17.4 and Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). However, that argument presupposes that the State had access to or knowledge of the records and their contents. Ark. Rule Crim. P. 17.1 places a duty on the State to disclose to the defense relevant or exculpatory material which is or may come within [its] possession, control, or knowledge[.] Here, the appellant has not shown that the State had access to the records sought. In fact, Ashley's assertion of her privilege would have precluded disclosure to the State as well as to the appellant. In the absence of a showing by the appellant that the State had access to the records, we hold that no Brady violation occurred. Finally, the appellant attempts to lend support to his arguments by referring to the contents of the privileged records. This is inappropriate and will not be considered. According to the plain language of Rule 503, records made during the course of treatment and not falling under one of the enumerated exceptions are subject to absolute privilege without regard to their content. As the appellant can not claim that the records were not made in the course of treatment, his references to their content is irrelevant to the determination of this case. In short, Ashley Heath's psychotherapy records were not relevant for a determination of her competency to testify at the second trial and were subject to the psychotherapist/patient privilege; she did not waive the privilege simply because she had waived it in the first trial; and the privilege outweighs the appellant's right to present a defense. Therefore, we hold that the trial court's decision to deny the appellant access to these records was proper and shall be affirmed.