Opinion ID: 835001
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence of Witness Bias (Assignment of Error Number 6)

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of bias on the part of Robert Cameron, one of the state's primary witnesses, after Cameron made a comment to defendant while Cameron was leaving the courtroom. Cameron testified during the state's case-in-chief and was extensively cross-examined with respect to the substance of his testimony and his credibility, as we discuss in greater detail below. During the defendants' case-in-chief, they presented a witness, Brown, who asserted that Cameron had told him that he had lied to prison officials about defendants' involvement in Polin's death. [11] In the state's rebuttal, it again called Cameron, and he testified briefly that he had never talked to Brown about the case. As Cameron left the stand, he allegedly made a remark to defendants, which defense counsel described to the court, outside the jury's presence: `As Mr. Cameron was leaving the courtroom, he looked at our clients and maybe defense counsel as well and said: How do you like me now? And it was audible, certainly to our clients and people at counsel table. We believe the jury may or may not have heard it. We would like to make sure that the jury is informed that he made that statement. After a colloquy, the trial court stated: Mr. Cameron, when he got up, I saw him look towards both Mr. Haugen and Mr. Brumwell and I don't doubt he said something. I find that to be inappropriate on Mr. Cameron's behalf. I do not find it to be any evidence of anything that the jury should hear about. So, you've made a record of what Mr. Cameron said. It was inappropriate. If he was here, I would tell him that, but I'm not going to allow the jury to hear it. Defendant's attorney then said, [T]he jury doesn't have to hear it, but it may indicate his bias. (Emphasis added.) Two days later, before instructions and closing argument, defendant made a pro se objection, arguing that certain evidence should have been admitted, including Robert Cameron leaving the stand stating: How do you like me now?
The state first contends that defendant failed to preserve his argument that the trial court erred in excluding Cameron's remark from evidence. Requiring preservation of issues at trial is important to judicial efficiency because it allows the trial court to consider legal argument and correct the error. State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. S.P., 346 Or. 592, 604, 215 P.3d 847 (2009). In addition, the preservation requirement promotes fairness to the adversary parties. Id. There are various levels of specificity by which an issue may be preserved for review, consistent with those purposes. See State v. Stevens, 328 Or. 116, 122, 970 P.2d 215 (1998) (In analyzing preservation of error, an appellate court must view the facts in light of the purposes of fairness and efficiency that underlie the requirement.). A party ordinarily may preserve an issue for review merely by raising an issue at trial; alternatively (and preferably), a party may preserve an issue by raising the issue, identifying a source for the party's position, and advancing a particular argument. See State v. Hitz, 307 Or. 183, 188, 766 P.2d 373 (1988) (discussing alternative methods of preserving issues for review). Making an offer of proof is ordinarily part of preserving an argument that the trial court erred in excluding evidence. See State v. Bowen, 340 Or. 487, 500, 135 P.3d 272 (2006), cert. den., 549 U.S. 1214, 127 S.Ct. 1258, 167 L.Ed.2d 89 (2007) (so stating). The purpose of this rule [requiring an offer of proof] is to assure that appellate courts are able to determine whether it was error to exclude the evidence and whether any error was likely to have affected the result of the case. State v. Affeld, 307 Or. 125, 128, 764 P.2d 220 (1988). The state argues that an offer of proof requires a party to identify the evidence that the party believes should have been admitted. See State v. Busby, 315 Or. 292, 298, 844 P.2d 897 (1993) (An offer of proof must identify what the evidence would have shown.). The state asserts that defendant did not make clear to the trial court what evidence defendant wanted to put on regarding Cameron's bias; defendant did not suggest that Cameron be recalled to the stand to be examined about his statement or that either of the defendants or one of the four defense counsel take the stand to testify as to the statement. Instead, defendant asked only that the jury be informed that he made that statement. The state argues that, because defendant failed to offer any evidentiary vehicle for presenting evidence of Cameron's possible bias to the jury, his argument was not preserved. We conclude that the issue was sufficiently preserved for us to consider it. After Cameron left the stand, and before the jury was excused, the trial court asked whether defendants had any further evidence. Defense counsel replied that he might have one more witness and wanted a few minutes to discuss it. The jury was then excused, and defense counsel described the remark that Cameron had made when he stepped down, as quoted above. Defendant now responds to the state's argument that he did not indicate how Cameron's remark might be introduced as evidence by asserting that the reference to one more witness was a reference to recalling Cameron to testify about the remark if the court would permit it. Although defense counsel could have been clearer in stating to the trial court, after the jury had been excused, that he wished to recall Cameron as a witness to testify about the remark, we believe the purposes of preservation were served by what defense counsel did say. Having previously informed the court that he might have one more witness, defense counsel later stated that Cameron had made a comment while passing the defense table and repeated the substance of that comment. [12] He told the court that he wanted the jury to be informed of the remark. With knowledge that a comment had been made and what the comment was, the trial court then ruled that it was not going to allow the jury to hear it. The state also argues that defense counsel's statement, after the court had ruled, that the jury doesn't have to hear it, but it may indicate his bias, indicates that defendant did not disagree with the court and accepted its ruling. However, defendant's equally plausible reading of that remark was that defense counsel was acknowledging (by repeating) the court's unfavorable ruling (the jury doesn't have to hear it), but continuing to object that the witness's statement reflected bias and that the jury should know about it. In addition, defendant himself later stated to the trial court that the jury should have been told of Cameron's remark. Moreover, the trial court, immediately after ruling against defendant's request that the jury be informed of Cameron's remark, told defense counsel, So, you've made a record of what Mr. Cameron said. As noted, it would have been preferable for defense counsel to have requested that Cameron immediately be recalled to the stand or to have made an offer of proof by identifying the witness he would have called and what that witness's testimony would have been, but we think, in these circumstances, that defendant sufficiently apprised the trial court of his objection and the reasons for it. See State v. Milbradt, 305 Or. 621, 630, 756 P.2d 620 (1988) (citing State v. Foster, 296 Or. 174, 183, 674 P.2d 587 (1983)) ([A] defense attorney does not have to walk over any more legal coals to protect the record after first stating the grounds for the objection.).
Having concluded that defendant preserved his objection, we turn to the question whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence of Cameron's comment to defendants as he left the witness stand. Evidence of a witness's bias is generally admissible. OEC 609-1 (The credibility of a witness may be attacked by evidence that the witness engaged in conduct or made statements showing bias or interest.); State v. Hubbard, 297 Or. 789, 796, 688 P.2d 1311 (1984) (A principle of evidence law in Oregon is that: It is always permissible to show the interest or bias of an adverse witness. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). However, our cases also make clear that, while evidence of bias is relevant and may be admitted, it is not necessarily error to exclude such evidence: Evidence relevant to the bias or interest of a witness need not always be admitted.     Where bias or interest is shown, but further questioning is objected to, the decision is within the discretion of the trial judge. Hubbard, 297 Or. at 799-800, 688 P.2d 1311. As the 1981 Conference Committee Commentary on OEC 609-1 states, although the rule permits the credibility of a witness to be attacked by evidence of conduct or statements showing bias or interest, [t]he trial judge retains discretion to control the extent to which proof of bias or interest may go. As with other evidence, where the evidence of conduct or statements showing bias is merely cumulative of other evidence of bias, the trial court has discretion to exclude it. See State v. Cox, 337 Or. 477, 487, 98 P.3d 1103 (2004), cert. den., 546 U.S. 830, 126 S.Ct. 50, 163 L.Ed.2d 81 (2005) (trial court did not err in excluding evidence of victim's violent acts towards others to show defendant's reasons for fearing victim, because evidence, although relevant, would not have added greatly to the evidence already before the jury). Defendant now argues in great detail that Cameron's statement was evidence of his animosity towards defendants and was therefore probative of his bias against them. Accordingly, defendant asserts, the statement should have been admitted as evidence of bias under OEC 609-1. Although the state responds that Cameron's statement did not necessarily demonstrate any particular hostility towards defendants, it also concedes that the comment might be susceptible of such a reading. If so, the statement was at least marginally relevant to the issues at trial because it tended to show Cameron's bias. Thus, it would have been permissible for the trial court to admit evidence that Cameron had made the statement. That does not mean, however, that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of the comment. As noted, our cases hold that a trial court has discretion to limit evidence of bias or interest under OEC 609-1 if it is simply cumulative of other, similar evidence of bias. The state argues that Cameron's remark itself was no more probative of [his general hostility towards defendants] than other evidence received at trial. Further, according to the state, because there was ample and specific evidence of Cameron's hostility, the admission of his comment would not have substantially assisted the jury in making a decision about his credibility. [13] We agree. Defendant cross-examined Cameron extensively during the state's case-in-chief and sought to develop evidence that he was hostile towards defendants and biased against them. [14] The record reflects that, while testifying before the jury, Cameron was mocking, hostile, and uncooperative toward defense counsel, calling one of defendant's attorneys a jerk off and asserting that the attorney was trying to peg [him] in a corner. Cameron testified that, after he had decided to testify against defendants, he received a death contract in the mail, threatening him and his brother. Cameron was upset with defendants for making him (as well as themselves) look guilty by committing the murder near the band room during the time when the band in which he and they were members was scheduled to practice. Moreover, they involved him in the attempted cover-up by trying to get him to hide their bloody clothes. He thought that murdering Polin because he was a rat made little sense, when there were baby killers, child molesters, all kinds of rats in this prison bigger than him. Why not them? And Cameron was hostile to defendants because they had killed a friend: I liked [Polin].    And had I known that somebody was going to kill him, I would have g[iven] him a head's up, you know. I wouldn't let somebody just, you know, sneak attack. I mean, there'sI mean, for what? For nothing. In short, Cameron's direct testimony and his answers on cross-examination provided evidence of bias against defendants. Cameron also testified that his life in prison had changed for the worse, not for the better, after coming forward to testify against defendantstestimony from which the jury could have inferred that he now bore some level of hostility towards defendants. He said that telling the authorities about defendants had turned my life upside down and that he now was being treated like shit. Cameron stated that the defendants were doing better time than I'm doing and that he was clearly upset about being placed in a segregation unit after coming forward as a witness. He concluded that, Since I came forward on this, I have got nothing but dicked. So, you [defense counsel] are sitting over there making all of these innuendos like I am getting something or I did this [coming forward to testify] for something. I was doing fine on my own. I didn't ask them to come to me with this shit. Given the detailed cross-examination of Cameron and the other evidence that defendant adduced at trial to show Cameron's dislike of defendants and the multiple reasons that the jury should view Cameron's testimony with suspicion, we conclude that the trial court's decision to exclude what defendant now asserts is additional evidence of biasCameron's remark to defendants as he left the witness standwas within the trial court's discretion. It was not error.