Opinion ID: 2103664
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Habitability of the Housing Accommodation

Text: The gravamen of the tenants' claim and the Commission's decision is that the proposed improvements will not protect or enhance the habitability of the housing accommodation pursuant to D.C.Code § 45-2520. [11] The tenants concurred with the Commission's use of the housing code and the lease as an objective standard by which to measure habitability. Under the Commission's approach only items which are mentioned in the housing code, or already existing in the rental unit, may enhance the habitability of the housing accommodation. On the other hand, the housing provider argued that the record does not support the Commission's substitution of its findings for those of the hearing examiner. Our review of the record supports the housing provider's position that substantial evidence existed in the record to support the hearing examiner's rejected findings that the proposed items would enhance the habitability of the housing accommodation. See generally American Univ. v. District of Columbia Comm'n on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416 (D.C.1991). This court will defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute which the agency administers provided that the agency's interpretation is reasonable. Guerra v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 501 A.2d 786, 790 (D.C.1985); see also McCulloch v. Rental Hous. Comm'n, 584 A.2d 1244, 1248 (D.C.1991) (we must defer to an agency's interpretation of the statute it administers, as long as that interpretation is reasonable and not plainly wrong or inconsistent with its legislative purpose). The interpretation of a statute must begin with the language itself. See McDonald v. United States, 496 A.2d 274, 276 (D.C.1985) ([i]n interpreting a statute, we first look to the language of the act.). This court on numerous occasions has concluded that if the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, the statute will be given its plain meaning. See, e.g., Neighbors United for a Safer Community v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 647 A.2d 793, 797 (D.C.1994) (We will not look beyond the statute's plain meaning when the language is unambiguous and does not produce an absurd result.); Collins v. United States, 631 A.2d 48, 50 (D.C.1993) (In the absence of any ambiguity in the statute, we must give effect to the statute's clearly intended meaning.). D.C.Code § 45-2520 requires that the improvement protect or enhance the habitability of the housing accommodation. (Emphasis added.) In this case, the phrase at issue is  enhance the habitability.  [12] (Emphasis added.) Neither enhance nor habitability are ambiguous terms. Enhance means to increase. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 753 (1971). Habitability is defined as capable of being inhabitated; reasonably fit for occupation by a tenant of the class for which it was let or of the class ordinarily occupying such a dwelling. Id. at 1017. Hence, the statute will be given its plain meaning. The plain meaning of § 45-2520, simply put, requires that all proposed improvements increase the habitability of the housing accommodation. We are satisfied that substantial evidence existed in the record to support the examiner's decision that each of the proposed improvements would enhance the habitability of the housing accommodation. The Commission defined habitability as being limited to items (1) specifically mentioned in the housing code, or (2) already existing in the rental unit at the time of leasing. [13] We decline to accept the Commission's definition of habitability because its definition contradicts the ordinary and plain meaning of the language set forth in the statute. Moreover, in the absence of a statement by the District of Columbia Council that the Council intended for the term habitability to be defined in such a restrictive manner, we decline to adopt this definition over the ordinary meaning of habitability. In fact, the term habitability is conspicuously absent from D.C.Code § 45-2503 (1990), which provides definitions for terms used throughout the Act. The Council was surely in a better position than this court to determine what the Council meant by the term habitability. If the Council intended any meaning other than the ordinary meaning, the Council could have indicated as much within the Act. We caution, however, that the determination of whether a particular improvement enhances the habitability of the housing accommodation should not be made in a vacuum. This determination should be made within the context of the Rental Housing Act and its stated purposes. [14] We emphasize that all improvements proposed in connection with a capital improvement petition should not automatically be approved merely because the improvements are newer than those that they replace, or because the proposed improvements will add new features in the housing accommodation which do not presently exist. As § 45-2502(5) demonstrates, inherent in the determination of whether a proposed improvement enhances the habitability of the housing accommodation is the requirement to balance the need for moderately priced housing against the housing provider's desire to realize a return on their investment. Id. The delicacy of this balancing process can not be overstated. We recognize that where the proper balance lies on any particular item does not lend itself to an easy calculation. [15] The analysis must include, not only, a determination that the proposed item would increase the value or worth of the habitability of the housing accommodation, but also whether the proposed improvement would singularly, or in conjunction with other proposed improvements, serve to erode the availability of moderately-priced housing.