Opinion ID: 886760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Postconviction Relief is a Special Proceeding, and the Time Bar Therein is Jurisdictional

Text: ¶ 30 Peña argues that because the State failed to make the argument in District Court that his claim was time-barred under § 46-21-102, MCA, the State has waived this issue on appeal. The State concedes that the time bar was not raised in the District Court, but contends that the time bar is jurisdictional, and therefore, can be raised at any time in the proceeding. To resolve this issue, we first must determine the nature of the postconviction remedy, and of the one-year time limitation set forth therein. ¶ 31 Subpart (1) of § 27-1-102, MCA, states that judicial remedies are divided into two classes: actions and special proceedings. Subpart (2) of the same section defines action as an ordinary proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a public offense. Every other remedy is a special proceeding. Section 27-1-102(2), MCA. Thus, a special proceeding is every other remedy which is not an action. An action is further divided into the two subcategories of civil action and criminal action in § 27-1-103, MCA: 27-1-103. Civil and criminal actions. (1) Actions are of two kinds: (a) civil; and (b) criminal. (2) A civil action is prosecuted by one party against another for the enforcement or protection of a right or the redress or prevention of a wrong. Titles 45 and 46 define and provide for the prosecution of a criminal action. When the violation of a right admits of both a civil and criminal remedy, the right to prosecute the one is not merged in the other. Pursuant to these provisions, this Court has held that various statutory remedies, including driver's license reinstatement proceedings, guardianship proceedings and informal probate proceedings, are not actions, but rather special proceedings. See Neal v. State, 2003 MT 53, ¶ 19, 314 Mont. 357, ¶ 19, 66 P.3d 280, ¶ 19; Matter of Klos (1997), 284 Mont. 197, 201, 943 P.2d 1277, 1279; Deer Lodge County v. Kohrs, 2 Mont. 66, 1874 WL 3294,  (Terr.1874). ¶ 32 Further, the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a civil action is initiated by the filing of a complaint: Rule 2. One form of action. There shall be one form of action to be known as Civil Action. Rule 3. Commencement of action. A civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court. Section 46-21-102, MCA, in describing how a postconviction relief proceeding is initiated, states in relevant part: [A] petition for the relief referred to in § 46-21-101 may be filed at any time within 1 year of the date that the conviction becomes final. . . . Section 46-21-102(1), MCA (emphasis added). Thus, the procedure for a postconviction proceeding, including the initiation of the proceeding and the procedural time frame which follows, is different from that set forth for a civil action. In Neal, we stated: In contrast to the provisions defining a single form of action governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure, including initiation by complaint and the procedural time frame which follows, [the defendant's] challenge to the suspension of his license was maintained by the filing of a petition which invoked a specific statutory procedure and time frame distinct from that provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Neal, ¶ 16 (emphasis added). Section 46-21-201, MCA, provides that the Rules of Civil Procedure apply in postconviction relief proceedings only to the extent that they are applicable and are not inconsistent with the postconviction relief statutes. Section 46-21-201(1)(c), MCA. We have held, generally, that the Rules of Civil Procedure are not interjected into other statutory schemes which provide different procedural requirements. In Re Estate of Spencer, 2002 MT 304, ¶ 13, 313 Mont. 40, ¶ 13, 59 P.3d 1160, ¶ 13; see also Ellenburg v. Chase, 2004 MT 66, ¶ 12, 320 Mont. 315, ¶ 12, 87 P.3d 473, ¶ 12 ([t]he Rules of Civil Procedure apply to postconviction petitions only if they are consistent with the specific provisions of the postconviction statutes). With regard to postconviction petitions, we have recently stated that [u]nlike civil complaints, the postconviction statutes are demanding in their pleading requirements. Ellenburg, ¶ 12. ¶ 33 In State v. Placzkiewicz, 2001 MT 254, 307 Mont. 189, 36 P.3d 934, we specifically held that the time limitation in § 46-21-102, MCA, controls over other tolling provisions, even though postconviction proceedings are civil in nature: With respect to postconviction proceedings, the Legislature has set forth a specific statute of limitations at § 46-21-102, MCA.... We hold that the specific statute of limitations for postconviction proceedings provided in Title 46, Chapter 21, controls over other statutes of limitations and the tolling provisions relating to those. Placzkiewicz, ¶ 19 (emphasis added). Thus, the postconviction time limitations are not subject to other generally applicable tolling provisions, but, rather, are governed by their own procedural requirements. ¶ 34 Consequently then, postconviction relief is a special proceeding governed by the statutes set forth in Title 46, Chapter 21, and is not a civil action governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. [2] The view that a statutory postconviction remedy is a special proceeding comports with the holdings of other states. See Nebraska v. Bronson (2003), 267 Neb. 103, 672 N.W.2d 244, 249 (special proceedings are every special statutory remedy which is not in itself an action); Williams v. Iowa (Iowa 1985), 378 N.W.2d 894, 896 (postconviction relief actions are treated as special proceedings at law); and Ohio v. La Mar, 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 1211 (the civil rules do not apply to special proceedings). As the Supreme Court of Ohio has explained: State collateral review is not itself a constitutional right.... Further, a postconviction proceeding is not an appeal of a criminal conviction but, rather, a collateral civil attack on the judgment.... Therefore, a petitioner receives no more rights than those granted by statute. State v. Calhoun (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 279, 714 N.E.2d 905, 909. ¶ 35 Likewise, postconviction relief is not a constitutional right under Montana law, but rather a statutory right. Because a postconviction petitioner cannot claim more rights, and, likewise, the courts cannot provide more rights, than granted by statute, the statutory rules which circumscribe the postconviction process are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, the time bar in § 46-21-102, MCA, is jurisdictional because it constitutes the time frame during which a district court has the power or capacity to entertain, hear and determine petitions for postconviction relief. See Johnson, 147 Mont. at 267, 410 P.2d at 935. We have repeatedly so held: This time limitation is a jurisdictional limit on litigation. . . . A failure to file within the allotted time defeats a court's jurisdiction to hear a postconviction claim. Sanchez, ¶ 9 (citing Maier v. State, 2003 MT 144, ¶ 20, 316 Mont. 181, ¶ 20, 69 P.3d 1194 ¶ 20; State v. Carson, 2002 MT 234, ¶ 13, 311 Mont. 485, ¶ 13, 56 P.3d 844, ¶ 13). Consequently, because the time bar is jurisdictional, it cannot be waived by the State by failing to raise the issue in the District Court. We conclude, therefore, that the State did not waive the time bar issue even though it has raised the issue for the first time on appeal. ¶ 36 The State also argues that Peña's claim is procedurally barred by § 46-21-105(2), MCA, the issue preclusion provision of the postconviction statutes, because Peña could have challenged the legality of his sentence on direct appeal from the original judgment but did not. Section 46-21-105(2), MCA, provides: (2) When a petitioner has been afforded the opportunity for a direct appeal of the petitioner's conviction, grounds for relief that were or could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal may not be raised, considered, or decided in a proceeding brought under this chapter. We have long recognized the importance of applying procedural bars regularly and consistently. Redcrow, ¶ 34. This Court applies § 46-21-105, MCA, as a procedural bar in order to prevent the abuse of postconviction relief by criminal defendants who would substitute those proceedings for direct appeal and in order to preserve the integrity of the trial and direct appeal. Watson v. State, 2002 MT 329, ¶ 11, 313 Mont. 209, ¶ 11, 61 P.3d 759, ¶ 11 (citing State v. Hanson, 1999 MT 226, ¶ 14, 296 Mont. 82, ¶ 14, 988 P.2d 299, ¶ 14). ¶ 37 We conclude that because Peña did not challenge the legality of his sentence on direct appeal, it is also procedurally barred by § 46-21-105, MCA.