Opinion ID: 2345025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Competency to Waive Jury Trial

Text: Barnes first argues that his lack of competency was evident, and the district judge should have called a halt to the trial on her own initiative and ordered a second competency evaluation, rather than accepting his jury trial waiver and continuing with trial to the bench. Barnes did not raise this issue before the district court. Issues not raised before the district court generally cannot be raised on appeal. Exceptions may be granted if: (1) the newly asserted theory involves only a question of law arising on proved or admitted facts and is finally determinative of the case; (2) consideration of the theory is necessary to serve the ends of justice or to prevent denial of fundamental rights; or (3) the district court's judgment may be upheld on appeal despite its reliance on the wrong ground. State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 702, 233 P.3d 265 (2010) (citing State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 339, 153 P.3d 1208 [2007]; State v. Anthony, 282 Kan. 201, 206, 145 P.3d 1 [2006]). In State v. Foster , this court determined that the issue of competency to stand trial raised due process concerns reviewable even without defendant's pursuit of the issue before the district court. Foster, 290 Kan. at 702, 233 P.3d 265 (citing Shopteese, 283 Kan. at 339, 153 P.3d 1208; State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. 510, 513-17, 847 P.2d 1191 [1993]; K.S.A. 22-3302[1]). We therefore move to the merits of this issue. Our standard of review is abuse of discretion. See State v. Hill, 290 Kan. 339, 366-67, 228 P.3d 1027 (2010) (citing State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 984, 40 P.3d 139 [2001], cert. denied 537 U.S. 834, 123 S.Ct. 144, 154 L.Ed.2d 53 [2002], overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 102 P.3d 445 [2004]); see also Foster, 290 Kan. at 703, 233 P.3d 265 (defendant's challenge whether trial court should have sua sponte ordered competency evaluation reviewed under abuse of discretion). Judicial discretion is abused if judicial action (1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken the view adopted by the district court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based. See State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, ___, 256 P.3d 801 (2011) (citing State v. Gonzalez, 290 Kan. 747, 755-56, 234 P.3d 1 (2010)). K.S.A. 22-3301(1) provides the definition of incompetency to stand trial: [A] person is `incompetent to stand trial' when he is charged with a crime and, because of mental illness or defect is unable: (a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or (b) to make or assist in making his defense. A criminal defendant may not be tried unless he or she `has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding ... [and] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' Hill, 290 Kan. at 367, 228 P.3d 1027 (citing State v. McKinney, 265 Kan. 104, 107, 961 P.2d 1 [1998] [quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 (1960)]); see Harkness, 252 Kan. at 513, 847 P.2d 1191. `[I]f the accused is capable of understanding the nature and object of the proceedings going on against him; if he rightly comprehends his own condition with reference to such proceedings, and can conduct his defense in a rational manner, he is, for the purpose of being tried, to be deemed sane, although on some other subject his mind may be deranged or unsound. [Citations omitted.]' State v. Shopteese, 283 Kan. 331, 341, 153 P.3d 1208 (2007) (citing Van Dusen v. State, 197 Kan. 718, 722-23, 421 P.2d 197 [1966]). Courts presume a criminal defendant is competent to stand trial. State v. Cellier, 263 Kan. 54, Syl. ¶ 6, 948 P.2d 616 (1997). The party who raises the issue of competence to stand trial has the burden of going forward with the evidence, and the burden of proof is the preponderance of the evidence standard. 263 Kan. 54, Syl. ¶ 4, 948 P.2d 616. K.S.A. 22-3302(1) provides: At any time after the defendant has been charged with a crime and before pronouncement of sentence, the defendant, the defendant's counsel or the prosecuting attorney may request a determination of the defendant's competency to stand trial. If, upon the request of either party or upon the judge's own knowledge and observation, the judge before whom the case is pending finds that there is reason to believe that the defendant is incompetent to stand trial the proceedings shall be suspended and a hearing conducted to determine the competency of the defendant. (Emphasis added.) Barnes filed his motion to determine his competency to stand trial 17 months before trial began. The district judge ultimately found him competent, based on the report of Dr. Constance D. Gaston, Ph.D./L.C.P., of ComCare. Gaston evaluated Barnes, and his history of mental illness. She noted that Barnes had been a ComCare client since 1998 and had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and intermittent explosive disorder. Barnes reported to Gaston that he had experienced auditory hallucinations daily since his mid-20s and that he heard screaming, yelling, and talking. He reported that he was often paranoid, thinking others were talking and laughing about him. At the time of the evaluation, Barnes was taking medication and was not hearing voices, and he intended to continue taking his medication. Under these circumstances, Gaston found Barnes' thoughts logical and goal-directed, and she said he was not paranoid or delusional at that time. Barnes understood the role of courtroom personnel and the procedure of trial. He understood the concept of plea bargaining and what he might anticipate if he went to trial. Gaston concluded that Barnes was competent to stand trial. Barnes does not challenge the district judge's pretrial finding of his competency to stand trial based on Gaston's report. Rather, he argues that the judge should have been willing to restart a competency inquiry based on his behavior during the jury trial waiver proceedings. In State v. Foster , we recognized a trial court judge's independent duty to inquire into a defendant's competency once the judge is on notice of a competency problem: [T]he failure to hold a competency hearing, when `evidence raises a bona fide doubt as to defendant's competency, is a denial of due process.' Foster, 290 Kan. at 704, 233 P.3d 265 (quoting State v. Davis, 281 Kan. 169, 177, 130 P.3d 69 [2006]). When Barnes' counsel announced, after 2 days of jury trial, that Barnes wanted to waive his right to a jury and continue with a bench trial, the district judge ensured that Barnes had additional time to discuss his desire with counsel. She then engaged in extensive questioning of Barnes, both in chambers and in open court. Barnes' participation in his private conference with counsel and his responses to the judge's inquiries show intermittent confusion on the roles of the jury and the judge. They also show some indecision on the question of whether the jury or the judge should decide his guilt. Both Foster, 290 Kan. at 705-06, 233 P.3d 265, and this court's earlier decision in State v. Harkness, 252 Kan. at 510, 847 P.2d 1191, offer guidance on this issue. In Foster, the defendant pointed to two trial incidents to argue that the district judge should have sua sponte ordered a second competency evaluation. The first incident occurred during jury selection, when the defendant indicated that he did not understand the process, and the trial court explained the proceedings. The second incident involved the defendant's expression of confusion over the consequences of testifying. On appeal, the defendant argued that the district judge's effort to educate him was proof that his competency required reevaluation. This court observed that the record showed the defendant communicating with counsel and the district judge's helpful interjections to improve the defendant's understanding of his circumstances. The record indicates [the defendant] understood the district court's explanations and signaled his understanding at the district court's and the prosecutor's later behests. Foster, 290 Kan. at 706, 233 P.3d 265. We went on to hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by failing to initiate a further competency evaluation. It was not error for the district judge to take time to explain the proceedings whenever the defendant indicated he did not understand. Foster, 290 Kan. at 706, 233 P.3d 265. In Harkness, the defendant also argued that the district judge should have sua sponte ordered a new competency determination, based on the defendant's behavior at arraignment and trial, his prior psychiatric history, and his ingestion of psychotropic medication to enhance his stability. The defendant had attacked a court reporter during his arraignment, and, at trial, when the jury requested a read back of testimony, the defendant expressed confusion about his options and whether he should be present for the read back. He had a difficult time making a choice. This court first noted that a defendant is not incompetent to stand trial simply because he or she has received or needs psychiatric treatment. Harkness, 252 Kan. at 516, 847 P.2d 1191 (citing Van Dusen v. State, 197 Kan. 718, 725-26, 421 P.2d 197 [1966]). We ultimately held that the district judge had not abused his discretion. The trial court also had the opportunity to observe Harkness' conduct, attitude, and demeanor at trial. It must be presumed the trial court considered all of this and did not find the defendant's competency wanting. Attacking a court reporter, showing confusion, having difficulty making decisions, and twiddling one's thumbs are not necessarily signs of incompetency. There are other plausible explanations. `It is the trial court in whose mind a real doubt of sanity or mental capacity to properly defend must be created before that court is required to order an inquiry solely on its own initiative. The necessity for an inquiry under such circumstances addresses itself to the discretion of the court and its decision will not be disturbed in the absence of abuse of sound judicial discretion.' Harkness, 252 Kan. at 516-17, 847 P.2d 1191 (quoting Van Dusen v. State, 197 Kan. 718, Syl. ¶ 6, 421 P.2d 197 [1966]). In this case, when the record is considered holistically, Barnes appears to have had difficulty making his choice between jury and bench trial. But his ambivalence did not necessarily indicate that he was suffering from a psychotic break of some sort. Rather, his indecision appears to have been induced by his realization that he had only unpleasant options. Barnes' counsel and the district judge took far more than the ordinary measures to be certain that Barnes understood the right he was waiving and the effects that waiver would have. Under these circumstances, the district judge did not abuse her discretion when she accepted Barnes' jury trial waiver and continued with the trial to the bench.