Opinion ID: 2832467
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Response to Rubman’s October 22 Letter

Text: After initially misinterpreting Rubman’s FOIA request, CIS’s subsequent actions failed to cure—and in fact exacerbated—the error. In his October 22 letter, Rubman unambiguously requested preexisting internal documents such as “statistical reports” and “emails.” Eggleston, CIS’s Director of FOIA Operations, responded that the disclosure of e-mails (she didn’t address his request for reports) “would not provide you with an accurate calculation,” “would not alter the outcome of the results that were provided to you,” and “rather [would] only create additional confusion.” Although agencies are not required to provide “explanatory material” along with the records they disclose, see Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. at 162, the risk of confusion is not a legitimate basis for refusing to perform a FOIA search. 7 The district court thought that CIS was not required to perform a new search in response to Rubman’s October 22 letter because it constituted a “modified” request. We recognize the importance of finality in the FOIA search process, and that “[r]equiring an additional search each time the agency receives a letter that clarifies a prior request could 7 In her affidavit Eggleston insists that her statement that internal e-mails would confuse Rubman should not be interpreted as a concession that any responsive e-mails (or any other internal documents) exist. While we understand that CIS has not yet performed a search of preexisting internal documents, we are highly skeptical of CIS’s suggestion that it might not have any such documents given its statutory and regulatory obligations to issue H-1B visas subject to the 65,000 cap. CIS also acknowledges that if Rubman filed a new FOIA request demanding preexisting internal documents, it would be obligated to perform such a search. No. 14-3733 19 extend indefinitely the delay in processing new requests.” Kowalcyzk v. DOJ, 73 F.3d 386, 388 (D.C. Cir. 1996). But Rubman’s October 22 letter only requested “the documents [he] originally asked for” and then quoted the “all documents” language from his initial FOIA request. For the reasons discussed above, Rubman’s initial request was properly understood to have been for preexisting internal documents. Once he made clear that he was not satisfied with CIS’s counteroffer of a statistical table, the agency should have performed a search of its internal documents. The cases cited by CIS on this point are not relevant because they all involved modified requests well outside of the scope of the original request. See, e.g., Larson v. Dep’t of State, 565 F.3d 857, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“[Plaintiff’s] FOIA request gave no indication that she sought DOS documents regarding the agency’s previous responses to her 1995 FOIA request.”); Kowalcyzk, 73 F.3d at 389 (holding that a FOIA request sent to FBI headquarters and that made no reference to New York did not obligate the FBI to search records held in its New York field office). Agencies are entitled to make requesters refile (and go to the end of the queue) when they want to alter the parameters of their initial search request. But that’s not what happened here, and neither CIS nor Rubman treated his October 22 letter as a modified request. Finally, CIS argues that Rubman waived his objection to the data table when he failed to demand preexisting internal documents in his October 1 letter; instead he asked CIS to provide a “corrected response” that properly classified the visa receipts by year. We don’t see it that way. “A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.” Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 20 No. 14-3733 464 (1938). Rubman’s willingness to entertain the possibility that an (accurate) data table could meet his needs did not mean that he intentionally relinquished his right to have his original request answered, particularly given that he never expressly disclaimed his desire for documents. A strict waiver rule would be inappropriate in the FOIA context; the statute is supposed to be administered with minimal procedural formality and “in a spirit of cooperation, recognizing that … agencies are servants of the public.” Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 21, 2009).