Opinion ID: 2623403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The State's appeal: Brady claims

Text: The State contends that the district court erred in granting Bennett's petition based upon the State's alleged violations of the disclosure requirements of Brady v. Maryland . [18] Because these issues involve both questions of fact and law, we have conducted a de novo review of the district court's decision. [19] Bennett claims that the State violated Brady by failing to disclose to the defense various exculpatory items of evidence. The district court found that the State violated Brady by withholding evidence of a statement made by a jailhouse informant, but the district court's order is not clear as to whether it found violations relating to any other items of evidence. We conclude that violations occurred in regard to three items: the statement made by the jailhouse informant, Beeson's criminal records, and information that a witness was a paid informant.  Brady and its progeny require a prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the defense when that evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. [20] [T]here are three components to a Brady violation: the evidence at issue is favorable to the accused; the evidence was withheld by the state, either intentionally or inadvertently; and prejudice ensued, i.e., the evidence was material. [21] To raise a claim in an untimely and/or successive post-conviction habeas petition, the petitioner has the burden of pleading and proving specific facts that demonstrate good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bars. [22] Good cause and prejudice parallel the second and third Brady components; in other words, proving that the State withheld the evidence generally establishes cause, and proving that the withheld evidence was material establishes prejudice. [23] If a defendant makes no request or only a general request for information, the evidence is material when a reasonable probability exists that the result would have been different had it been disclosed. [24] However, if the defense request is specific, the evidence is material upon the lesser showing that a reasonable possibility exists of a different result had there been disclosure. [25] In addition, in determining its materiality, the undisclosed evidence is considered collectively and not item by item. [26]
We consider first the State's claim that the district court erred in concluding that the State had a duty, pursuant to Brady, to disclose the statement of Richard Perkins, a jailhouse informant. The State argues that Perkins' statement was not favorable to the defense and would not have changed the result. Bennett claims that the statement would have aided him during the penalty hearing to show that Beeson was the leader and instigator and, in turn, to persuade the jury to return a verdict less than death. We agree. In 1988, Perkins was an inmate in the Clark County Detention Center along with Beeson. On October 3, 1988, after both the guilt and penalty phase of Bennett's trial had been completed, but before Bennett's formal sentencing, the LVMPD interviewed Perkins regarding information he had received from Beeson about the crimes at the Stop N' Go Market. According to Perkins, Beeson said that he and Bennett were on drugs; they went into the store with the intention to rob the clerk and had agreed to kill all witnesses in the store; [27] Bennett shot and killed the clerk; and Beeson shot the customer but did not kill him. According to Perkins, Beeson also admitted that he planned the murder of the people in the store and convinced Bennett to do the killing. Under Brady, the first question is whether the evidence at issue is favorable to the defense. In regard to the guilt phase of the trial, Perkins' statement was not favorable to the defense because it indicated that Bennett killed the store clerk. However, in regard to the penalty phase, the statement was favorable to Bennett. It provided mitigating evidence characterizing Bennett as a follower with Beeson planning and instigating the murder and convincing Bennett to participate. The second question is whether the State withheld the evidence. The statement was made after the trial was concluded and the jury had rendered its verdict of death, but before Bennett was formally sentenced. If disclosed then, the fact of the statement would have provided grounds for a new penalty hearing. [28] In 1990, after Bennett filed his direct appeal, he specifically moved for discovery of statements made by an informant who, while in jail in 1988, received information from Beeson. The district court granted the discovery motion, but the State never produced Perkins' statement. If it had been disclosed when this request was made, the statement would have provided grounds for post-conviction habeas relief, as it does now. [29] The State, of course, has an affirmative duty to provide favorable evidence, if material, to a defendant even absent a request for the evidence. [30] Moreover, that duty exists regardless of whether the State uncovers the evidence before trial, during trial, or after the defendant has been convicted. [31] Bennett only discovered Perkins' statement in 1999 when he conducted an investigation for his federal habeas petition. Therefore, the answer to the second question under Brady is affirmative: the State did withhold the evidence from the defense. And as explained above, the nondisclosure of the evidence also provides good cause for Bennett's raising this issue for the first time in his instant habeas petition. The third question is whether the withheld evidence was material. Because Bennett made a specific request for this evidence, materiality is demonstrated if there is merely a reasonable possibility that the jury would not have returned a verdict of death had it been disclosed. [32] We conclude that this evidence was significant, and that there is not only a reasonable possibility, but there is also a reasonable probability of a different result if it had been disclosed, particularly when it is considered collectively with the other undisclosed evidence discussed below. Bennett argued in mitigation that he was young and had fallen under Beeson's influence and that Beeson had instigated the crimes. Absent Perkins' testimony, this claim rested mainly on Bennett's own self-serving statement in allocution which the jurors were apt to easily disregard as nothing more than an attempt to evade responsibility. Perkins' testimony as to Beeson's admission would have corroborated Bennett and shown that Beeson himself acknowledged that he had been the leader and Bennett the follower, lending Bennett much needed credibility. This evidence could have been crucial in the jury's decision-making process. The State claims that Perkins' statement contains inadmissible hearsay and therefore cannot be material. Because the declarant, Beeson, is dead and Perkins gave an inconsistent statement in 1999 and no longer recalls some circumstances of Beeson's admissions, the State argues that the original statement lacks corroborating circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness. The State cites NRS 51.345(1), which requires such circumstances for the admission of a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused in a criminal case. We are unpersuaded by this argument. First, evidence is generally admissible at a capital penalty hearing on any matter which the court deems relevant to sentence, whether or not the evidence is ordinarily admissible. [33] But more importantly, in attacking the statement's trustworthiness, the State relies on facts that did not exist in 1988 when the LVMPD obtained it and when the State should have provided it to Bennett. The State cannot now be heard to complain that since then Beeson has died and Perkins has partially contradicted his original statement and forgotten some facts. The State's failure in 1988 to disclose the statement deprived Bennett of an important opportunity now lost to him to question Perkins, and possibly Beeson's other fellow jail inmates, if not Beeson himself, regarding Beeson's admissions. We therefore conclude that a reasonable probability exists that a jury would not have imposed a penalty of death had it been able to consider this evidence. This is particularly so when we consider that, as well, the jury relied upon an aggravator which was improper. Consequently, Bennett has also established the prejudice required to overcome procedural default. The State also violated Brady when it failed to disclose the prior criminal history contained in Beeson's juvenile records from Colorado, where he used the alias of Cass Goodman, and from Utah. This was mitigating evidence, favorable to the defense. Beeson's extensive juvenile records showed his criminal sophistication and lent credibility to Bennett's theory that Beeson acted as the leader in committing the crimes. This evidence was also material. As noted, undisclosed evidence is considered collectively and not item by item. [34] Had the jury learned of Beeson's juvenile record, as well as Perkins' statement, there is a reasonable probability that the jury would not have imposed death. Finally, the State failed to disclose to the defense that the Utah police had paid a witness for the State, Jeffrey Chidester, $50 on each of four or five occasions for informant work. After the murder, Bennett returned to Utah where he admitted the murder and robbery to Chidester. Chidester relayed this information to the Utah police and testified at the guilt and penalty phases of Bennett's trial, but the jury was never told that Chidester had a history as a paid informant. After Bennett filed his federal habeas petition, he discovered that a Utah police detective, Jerry Caldwell, had paid Chidester for prior informant work. The State argues that it lacked actual knowledge of the evidence, but `the state attorney is charged with constructive knowledge and possession of evidence withheld by other state agents, such as law enforcement officers.' [35] In this case, a Utah police detective was aware of the evidence. We conclude that it is appropriate to charge the State with constructive knowledge of the evidence because the Utah police assisted in the investigation of this crime and initially supplied the information received from Chidester to the LVMPD. Moreover, Detective Caldwell, who knew of the payments to Chidester, testified at the guilt and penalty phases of the trial but denied that Chidester was paid. That Chidester was paid small amounts is not material in regard to the jury's finding of guilt, and standing alone it would not be material in regard to the penalty phase. However, we have considered this evidence along with the other undisclosed evidence in concluding that the State withheld evidence material to the jurors' penalty determination. For example, the jury might have given less weight to Chidester's testimony regarding the claimed killing spree if the jury had information supporting the inference that Chidester could have been tempted to give police exaggerated information in order to ingratiate himself to the police and obtain benefits, monetary or otherwise. In sum, under Brady these three instances of undisclosed evidence were collectively material to Bennett's case in mitigation. Considering this undisclosed mitigating evidence in conjunction with the invalid aggravating circumstance, we conclude that the district court correctly vacated Bennett's death sentence and ordered a new penalty hearing.
Bennett also claims that the State violated Brady with respect to other items of evidence, including: (1) Beeson's medical records, (2) Beeson's refusal to take a polygraph test, (3) the prosecutor's conversations with an eyewitness, (4) a crime lab report regarding gunpowder burns, and (5) a picture of a shoeprint. We conclude that the State did not violate Brady in these respects. Bennett either fails to show that the State had a duty to disclose the evidence or that he was prejudiced by the nondisclosure.