Opinion ID: 1183195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Voir Dire Must Include a Definition of First Degree Murder

Text: Milligan asserts that the trial court erred because it did not sua sponte define first degree murder during voir dire for the veniremen. He argues that in order to determine if the prospective jurors were capable of following the law regarding the death penalty they must first have the elements of the crime defined for them. In addressing this argument we first note that Milligan's attorney made no effort to define first degree murder for the prospective jurors. For that reason alone we need not address this alleged error. Snow v. State, 101 Nev. ___, 705 P.2d 632 (1985). Nevertheless, because this is a death penalty case and requires a heightened review, we turn to the merits of this claim. Under Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 67, 21 L.Ed.2d 186 (1968), as further defined in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), jurors whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the instructions and juror's oath are not qualified to serve. The purpose of this rule is obvious: to ensure both the accused and the state a verdict founded on legal principles, not the individual ideologies of the jurors. We do not consider it necessary to the administration of this rule that the various elements of first degree murder be delineated for the jury. We reach this conclusion for several reasons. First, we believe that the term first degree murder is such that the common understanding of the average juror would already include a knowledge of the term sufficient to respond accurately to Adams style voir dire questioning. Secondly, a voir dire definition of first degree murder could result in confusion of jurors who would be anticipating proof of various elements of the offense which are not applicable to the case. See Oliver v. State, 85 Nev. 418, 456 P.2d 431 (1969), wherein we held that the appropriate points in a trial to discuss legal issues are during the instructions and closing arguments. We see no merit to this assignment of error. B.