Opinion ID: 1882379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Theory of Defense Instructions

Text: Stephens urges reversal of his murder conviction, alleging the trial court erred in denying his request for several special jury instructions concerning his theory of defense. [6] While a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed on his theory of defense, the failure to give special jury instructions does not constitute error where the instructions given adequately address the applicable legal standards. See Palmes v. State, 397 So.2d 648 (Fla.1981). The trial court in the instant case gave the standard jury instructions for first-degree felony murder. The standard jury instructions are presumed correct and are preferred over special instructions. See State v. Bryan, 290 So.2d 482 (Fla.1974). Thus, Stephens has the burden of demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in giving standard instructions. See Phillips v. State, 476 So.2d 194 (Fla.1985); Williams v. State, 437 So.2d 133 (Fla.1983). The jury was instructed as follows on the issue of first-degree felony murder: Before you can find the defendant guilty of first degree felony murder, the State must prove the following three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: 1. Robert Sparrow, III is dead. 2. (a) The death occurred as a consequence of and while the defendant was engaged in the commission of a kidnapping, or a robbery, or a burglary; or (b) The death occurred as a consequence of and while the defendant was attempting to commit a kidnapping, or a robbery, or a burglary; or (c) The death occurred as a consequence of and while the defendant was escaping from the immediate scene of a kidnapping, or a robbery, or a burglary. 3. (a) The defendant was the person who actually killed Robert Sparrow, III; or (b) Robert Sparrow, III was killed by a person other than the defendant, but both the defendant and the person who killed Robert Sparrow, III were principals in the commission of an attempt to commit kidnapping, or robbery, or burglary. In order to convict of first degree felony murder, it is not necessary for the State to prove that the defendant had a premeditated design or intent to kill. The elements of kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, robbery, attempted robbery, burglary, and attempted burglary will be explained to you when I read pages 11 and 12 of these instructions. Thereafter, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of kidnapping, robbery, burglary, and attempts to commit these offenses. These instructions informed the jury that a conviction for felony murder could only be supported if the death occurred as a consequence and while the defendant was committing or attempting to commit one of the named felonies. In order to be entitled to a special jury instruction, Stephens must prove: (1) the special instruction was supported by the evidence; [7] (2) the standard instruction did not adequately cover the theory of defense; [8] and (3) the special instruction was a correct statement of the law and not misleading or confusing. [9] The trial court did not err in denying these special instructions because Stephens failed to prove the instructions given did not adequately cover his theory of defense or that the special instructions were a proper statement of the law that would not mislead and confuse the jury. See Parker v. State, 641 So.2d 369, 376 (Fla.1994) (trial court did not err in denying special instructions where [a]ll of the requested instructions [were] either adequately covered by the standard instructions, misstate[d] the law, or were not supported by the evidence.). Here, Stephens adequately showed the special instructions would have supported his theory of defense; however, he failed to establish that the special instructions were necessary and were not likely to confuse the jury. Moreover, Stephens claims he is entitled to the special instructions based upon the holdings in Parker v. State, 570 So.2d 1048 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and Mills v. State, 407 So.2d 218 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). However, the statements upon which the special instructions are based have been taken out of context and would likely confuse the jury. In both of those cases, the defendants were found guilty of felony murder. In Mills, which was quoted by Parker, the underlying felony was a robbery, which occurred twenty-four hours prior to the murder. There, the court stated: The fact that the taking of Meli's money and car had been accomplished some twenty-four hours before the killing occurred did not, under the facts of the present case, terminate the robbery so that it could no longer constitute the underlying felony for felony murder purposes. In the absence of some definitive break in the chain of circumstances beginning with the felony and ending with the killing, the felony, although technically complete, is said to continue to the time of the killing. Jefferson v. State, 128 So.2d 132 (Fla.1961). Neither the passage of time nor separation in space from the felonious act to the killing precludes a felony murder conviction when it can be said, as it can be so readily here, that the killing is a predictable result of the felonious transaction. Campbell v. State, 227 So.2d 873 (Fla. 1969). Mills, 407 So.2d at 221 (footnote omitted). The Mills court further explained, [T]the application of a rule of technical termination of the felony would produce the absurd result that felony murder would be precluded in all instances where the killing followed the `completion' of the felony. Id. at 221 n. 5. Thus, the cases Stephens cites in support of his argument that he was entitled to the special instructions demonstrate that the instructions would have been, at a minimum, confusing and misleading, if not a misstatement of the law altogether. Accordingly, Stephens has failed to demonstrate the trial court clearly abused its discretion in denying the proposed special instructions. See Sans, 731 F.2d at 1530; Parker, 641 So.2d at 376.