Opinion ID: 6110141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Merits of the Goodwin-Curry Guilt-Phase Argument for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are governed by the two-prong analysis in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) : (1) the petitioner must show ... that counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the petitioner must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Sparkman v. State , 373 Ark. 45 , 49, 281 S.W.3d 277 , 281 (2008) (citations omitted). In order to establish prejudice, the petitioner must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Lasiter v. State , 290 Ark. 96 , 98, 717 S.W.2d 198 , 199 (1986) (quoting Mason v. State , 289 Ark. 299 , 301-02, 712 S.W.2d 275 , 276 (1986) ). In order to demonstrate prejudice for failing to present a witness, there must exist a reasonable probability that, had counsel performed further investigation and presented the witness, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Smith v. State , 2015 Ark. 165 , at 9, 459 S.W.3d 806 , 813 (citation omitted). Turning to the case at hand, it is plain that the Goodwin-Curry Guilt-Phase Argument satisfies both prongs of the Strickland analysis. At the Rule 37 hearing, both Goodwin and Curry testified that Goodwin (from whom the prosecution and the circuit court accepted a plea before Reams's trial, and against whom the prosecution elected not to seek the death penalty), and not Reams, was the one who shot and killed the victim, and that neither of them were ever contacted by Reams's trial counsel. Their testimony, had it been secured for the guilt-phase of Reams's capital murder trial, would have corroborated Reams's ostensibly self-serving averments that he was not the shooter, that his and Goodwin's plan was only to rob the victim, and that there was never any plan or discussion of killing anyone. Reams's trial counsel's failure to even explore this information before Reams was convicted and sentenced to death was inescapably deficient and cannot be attributed to any reasonable trial strategy. See Farmer v. State , 321 Ark. 283 , 287-88, 902 S.W.2d 209 , 212 (1995) (counsel ineffective for fail[ing] to secure the testimony of the only witnesses available who could corroborate his client's version of the facts); see also State v. Dillard , 338 Ark. 571 , 573, 998 S.W.2d 750 , 751 (1999) (counsel ineffective for failing to interview or subpoena potential defense witnesses); Russell v. State , 302 Ark. 274 , 277, 789 S.W.2d 720 , 722 (1990) (counsel, who had no reason not to call defense witness, found ineffective). This deficiency prejudiced Reams during the guilt-phase of his murder trial. Contrary to the analysis contained in the circuit court's order, the fact that Reams acknowledged complicity in the robbery during his testimony at trial does not obviate the realization of any deficient-counsel-related prejudice for the guilt-phase. While testimony from Goodwin and Curry during the guilt-phase of Reams's trial may not have led to Reams being acquitted of all charges, it certainly could have meant the difference between a conviction for capital felony murder and a conviction for first-degree felony murder. In Arkansas, the elements for capital felony murder are exactly the same as the elements for first-degree felony murder, and the jury was free to convict Reams of either of these offenses during the guilt-phase of Reams's capital murder trial. See, e.g. , Ray v. State , 342 Ark. 180 , 181-82, 27 S.W.3d 384 , 384-85 (2000) (defendant convicted of first-degree murder, but acquitted of capital murder, in pre-planned armed robbery ambush where defendant provided the murder weapon but was not the shooter), O'Neal v. State , 321 Ark. 626 , 628-29, 907 S.W.2d 116 , 117 (1995) (defendant found guilty of robbery, burglary, and first-degree murder, but acquitted of capital murder, for being accomplice to burglary/robbery, rape, and murder of 92-year-old woman), Thompson v. State , 2015 Ark. 271 , at 1-2, 548 S.W.3d 129 , 130 (defendant convicted of robbery and first-degree murder, but acquitted of capital murder, for attempt to rob victim outside a nightclub, where codefendant shot and killed a second victim who intervened in robbery attempt). The significance of this circumstance cannot be overstated in light of these  crimes' respective sentences. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101 (c)(1) provides that capital murder is punishable by death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, while Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-401 (a)(1) provides that a Class Y felony, such as first-degree felony murder, is punishable by a sentence of not less than ten (10) years and not more than forty (40) years, or life[.] Accordingly, this question dictates whether a so-situated individual will be sentenced to death by lethal injection (or, at the very least, to spending the rest of his or her life in prison without possibility of release), or instead will be sentenced to a term of years in prison, after which one could potentially see again the light of day. See Sanders v. State, 305 Ark. 112 , 805 S.W.2d 953 (1991) ([W]e have held in cases where the statutes overlap and both instructions are required, the jury may refuse consideration of both the death penalty and life without parole by returning a guilty verdict as to the charge of murder in the first degree.). This question literally represents the difference between life and death. Here, the prosecution pursued a conviction against Reams, who was eighteen years old at the time of the crime, for capital felony murder, specifically under the theory that Reams was the one who shot and killed the victim. Central to this theory was the prosecution's assertion that Reams was lying in his testimony that Goodwin, and not Reams, was the one who shot and killed the victim. Under this theory, the jury convicted Reams of capital felony murder. The fact that the jury reached this determination without the benefit of testimony from either Goodwin or Curry undermines confidence in its decision to convict Reams of capital felony murder, and not the lesser charge of first-degree felony murder. If Reams's counsel had done an adequate investigation and presented the testimony from Goodwin and Curry during the guilt-phase, there is at least a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different, i.e., that the jury would have returned a conviction for first-degree felony murder instead of capital felony murder, which would have taken the death penalty off the table. This should be a basic point. If the failure to procure these witnesses' testimony was sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant relief for the penalty-phase of Reams's capital murder trial, as the circuit court found and this court affirms, then it was sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant relief for the guilt-phase as well. Accordingly, I would hold that Reams has already established that he is entitled to a new guilt-phase trial under Strickland , which would render any remand for further proceedings on Reams's Duren claim unnecessary.