Opinion ID: 2599444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Children's Eligibility for AFDC-FC Was Before the Court of Appeal

Text: On several grounds, the Department argues that the question of the children's eligibility for AFDC-FC was not properly before the Court of Appeal. None of these arguments has merit. The Department first asserts that because the juvenile court made no judgment or order determining that the children were not eligible for AFDC-FC, there was nothing for the Court of Appeal to review. In making this assertion, the Department argues that the juvenile court found only that it did not have the authority to determine if the children were entitled to [AFDC-FC] benefits. Thus, the Department argues, the Court of Appeal lacked jurisdiction to make an eligibility determination. The record does not support the Department's argument. Just before the juvenile court announced its ruling, the Department argued that the children lost their eligibility for benefits when they moved to Canada and lost their residency in the State of California. The juvenile court then stated that it was terminating its dependency jurisdiction, explaining in relevant part: (1) these children are permanent residents of Canada; (2) [w]hen a child in the State of California leaves the State of California for a legal guardianship in another state, we cannot provide funds to that state; (3) [i]f we do long-term foster care in another state, we can provide benefits; (4) I am not aware that children in another country can get funding if they are in long-term foster care; (5) I do not believe that this court is empowered to grant funding to a relative in another country with children in a legal guardianship who are permanent residents of that country; and (6) I do not believe this court has the authority to provide funds for the grandmother in Canada, under any theory of law. Fairly read, these comments support the Court of Appeal's view that the juvenile court found the children were not eligible for public assistance from California `under any theory of law' because they had become residents of Canada. Indeed, contrary to its current position, in the Court of Appeal the Department similarly described the juvenile court's decision, stating: The [juvenile] court found that the children were not eligible for funding from California because they were residing in Canada. On this record, the Department's argument fails. The Department next argues that the children's notice of appeal was insufficient to put their AFDC-FC eligibility at issue. In making this argument, the Department cites the language of the notice, which stated that the children were appealing from the [o]rders of the Juvenile Court issued August 28, 2003 terminating jurisdiction in this matter without first resolving whether the children will continue to receive funding.  (Italics added.) Based on the italicized language in the notice, the Department asserts that the children did not even attempt to appeal from an order actually mak[ing] an eligibility determination. Thus, the Department argues, the Court of Appeal had no jurisdiction to address or decide the [eligibility] issue. The Department's overly technical attempt to parse the notice of appeal's language is unmeritorious. [I]t is, and has been, the law of this state that notices of appeal are to be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appeal if it is reasonably clear what [the] appellant was trying to appeal from, and where the respondent could not possibly have been misled or prejudiced. ( Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d 54, 59, 10 Cal.Rptr. 161, 358 P.2d 289; see also rule 8.100(a)(2) [notice of appeal must be liberally construed].) A notice of appeal is sufficient if it identifies the particular judgment or order being appealed. (Rule 8.100(a)(2).) The notice in this case clearly met this requirement by identifying the juvenile court's order of August 28, 2003 terminating jurisdiction in this matter. To the extent, if any, the phrase without first resolving whether the children will continue to receive funding created ambiguity, there is no showing that the Department was or could have been misled or prejudiced because of the [arguably] ambiguous language. ( Luz, supra, at p. 60, 10 Cal.Rptr. 161, 358 P.2d 289.) Thus, the Department is incorrect in asserting that the notice of appeal was insufficient to give the Court of Appeal jurisdiction to review the juvenile court's eligibility determination. The Department also argues that because the children never applied for AFDC-FC, the issue of whether [they] were eligible for AFDC-FC benefits was not ripe for review by any court. According to the Department, [u]ntil the children apply for and are denied AFDC-FC benefits, the laws and regulations governing their eligibility generate no more than a difference of opinion. For several reasons, we reject the Department's ripeness argument. First, the Department did not make the argument in the Court of Appeal. As a policy matter, we normally will not consider an issue that the petitioner failed to timely raise in the Court of Appeal. (Rule 8.500(c)(1).) Second, the argument fails on its merits. The issue before the juvenile court was whether exceptional circumstances existed such that it should not terminate its dependency jurisdiction notwithstanding the children's placement for at least 12 months with a relative whom the court had appointed their legal guardian. (§ 366.3, subd. (a).) Under Joshua I, to answer that question, the court had to determine, among other things, whether the children would be eligible for AFDC-FC benefits were it to retain jurisdiction and change the guardianship to foster care. Thus, contrary to the Department's assertion, the ripeness requirement, which prevents courts from issuing purely advisory opinions, or considering a hypothetical state of facts in order to give general guidance rather than to resolve a specific legal dispute ( Hunt v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 984, 998, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 236, 987 P.2d 705), was satisfied in this case.