Opinion ID: 72003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether We Should Exercise Discretion to Remand

Text: We need not decide whether Davis has met his burden of showing reasonable probability, however, because assuming without deciding that he has, the error in this case is not the sort that we should, on plain error review, exercise our discretion to remedy. [11] Davis violated his supervised release only five months into a five-year sentence. He was found outside the state in which he was required to remain and was in possession of a firearm. He was carrying a bank bag and printed notes that strongly suggested that he intended to resume the same activities for which he initially had been convicted and imprisoned. On this record, we decline to conclude that the district court's imposition of a sentence of 24 months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release  particularly where a statutory maximum of 36 months of imprisonment and two years of supervised release was an available punishment  seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1429 (internal quotation marks omitted). Davis resists this conclusion, arguing that our precedent requires remand whenever an appellant can show a reasonable probability that an unpreserved error affected the sentence. But, as we observed in United States v. Ellis, 564 F.3d 370, 378 (5th Cir.2009), the case law on this point is [not as] settled or as categorical as language in some cases might make it seem. [12] In United States v. John, 597 F.3d at 286-88, we analyzed the relevant case law and concluded that in this circuit, whether a sentencing error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings is dependent upon the degree of the error and the particular facts of the case. The factual circumstances under which we have granted remand have typically involved disparities between the correct range and the sentence actually imposed that were more severe than that presented here. More importantly, these cases have involved facts that strongly suggest that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had it considered the correct sentence. See, e.g., id. (remanding because the 108 month sentence imposed was significantly above the 70 to 87 month advisory range and district court had shown no intention of imposing an above-Guidelines sentence); Price, 516 F.3d at 289 (remanding because the gap between the 110 month sentence imposed and the 92 month low-end of the correct range was significant, and because the district court's actions suggested that it would in fact have sentenced at the low end of the correct range); United States v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 712, 717 (5th Cir.2007) (per curiam) (remanding because the 76 month sentence imposed, which was within the incorrect 70 to 87 month advisory range, was substantially higher than the correct 30 to 37 month range). These cases also are not the only applicable precedent. We have held, in at least one case that predates these cases, that we may decline to remand when we are persuaded that the error, though plain, did not yield a result that seriously affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings. In United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir.2007), we concluded that although the district court had improperly based its 23 month upward departure on the appellant's lengthy arrest record, remand was not required, even if there was a reasonable probability that the appellant's sentence would have been less had the district court not considered the arrest record, because the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. We noted in particular that the sentence was supported by the facts that the appellant, who pled guilty in these proceedings to possession of firearms by a felon, had been found with a gun little more than a week after a state court felony conviction and had a long, troubling history with guns. Id. In short, although some of our sentencing precedent has been generous with remand, we have also recognized and acted on the proposition that [n]ot every error that increases a sentence need be corrected by a call upon plain error doctrine. Ellis, 564 F.3d at 378. The plain error test requires both a showing of effect on the appellant's substantial rights and an effect on the fairness or integrity of the proceedings before this court may exercise its discretion to remedy the error. Puckett, 129 S.Ct. at 1429. If, as Davis asserts, every error affecting substantial rights affects the fairness or integrity of the proceedings, this would effectively dispense[ ] with the final prong of the plain error test, and with it, our discretion. John, 597 F.3d at 291 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Ellis, 564 F.3d at 378 ([E]ven if an increase in a sentence be seen as inevitably `substantial' in one sense it does not inevitably affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial process and proceedings.). To conclude that the 24 month sentence imposed in this case casts [serious] doubt upon the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings  a sentence that is well within the statutory maximum and was rendered after Davis was found violating numerous terms of his supervised release and apparently planning a return to his prior criminal activities  would drain[] all content from the doctrine of plain error. Ellis, 564 F.3d at 379. Accordingly, we decline to exercise our discretion to remand for resentencing.