Opinion ID: 1901039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cruel and Unusual Punishment Under the United States Constitution.

Text: 1. General approach. The United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The clause embraces a bedrock rule of law that punishment should fit the crime. This basic concept stands for the proposition that even guilty people are entitled to protection from overreaching punishment meted out by the state. The United States Supreme Court has struggled with the proper approach to cruel and unusual punishment. In recent years, the cases of the Supreme Court have produced a multitude of majority, plurality, and dissenting opinions. Nonetheless, there are some principles that can be distilled from these opinions. Although some have argued that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is designed to address only methods of punishment, the Supreme Court has firmly held that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause applies to a sentence for a term of years. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 73, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 1173, 155 L.Ed.2d 144, 156 (2003); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20, 123 S.Ct. 1179, 1185, 155 L.Ed.2d 108, 117 (2003). Thus, a reviewing court has the authority to consider whether imprisonment for a term of years for a particular crime or crimes is so excessive as to violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. The Supreme Court has also emphasized that legislative determinations of punishment are entitled to great deference. In order to establish a claim for cruel and unusual punishment, a sentence must be grossly disproportionate to the underlying crime. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 271, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1138, 63 L.Ed.2d 382, 389 (1980). As Justice Rehnquist suggested, a life sentence for a parking ticket could run afoul of cruel and unusual punishment as being grossly disproportionate to the crime. Id. at 274 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. at 1139 n. 11, 63 L.Ed.2d at 391 n. 11. Strict proportionality in sentencing, however, is not required, and a reviewing court is not authorized to generally blue pencil criminal sentences to advance judicial perceptions of fairness. Severe, mandatory penalties may be cruel, but they are not unusual in the constitutional sense, having been employed in various forms throughout our Nation's history. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 994-95, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 2701, 115 L.Ed.2d 836, 864 (1991). While a sentence to a term of years might be so lengthy as to violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, such an occurrence outside the context of capital punishment has been exceedingly rare. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 272, 100 S.Ct. at 1138, 63 L.Ed.2d at 390. In evaluating whether a lengthy sentence is grossly disproportionate under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, the Supreme Court has developed a three-part test. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3011, 77 L.Ed.2d 637, 650 (1983), as modified in Ewing, 538 U.S. at 23-24, 123 S.Ct. at 1186-87, 155 L.Ed.2d at 118-19. The first part of the test, sometimes referred to as the threshold test, involves a preliminary judicial evaluation of whether the sentence being reviewed is grossly disproportionate to the underlying crime. Solem, 463 U.S. at 290-91 & n. 17, 103 S.Ct. at 3010 & n. 17, 77 L.Ed.2d at 649 & n. 17. This preliminary test involves a balancing of the gravity of the crime against the severity of the sentence. Id. at 291, 103 S.Ct. at 3010, 77 L.Ed.2d at 650. The Supreme Court has not articulated what factors go into this initial determination, but has stated that it is a `rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.' Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30, 123 S.Ct. at 1190, 155 L.Ed.2d at 123 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. at 2707, 115 L.Ed.2d at 871 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). If the threshold test has been crossed, the Supreme Court proceeds to steps two and three. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. at 2707, 115 L.Ed.2d at 871 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In step two, the Supreme Court engages in intrajurisdictional analysis, comparing the challenged sentence to sentences for other crimes within the jurisdiction. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3011, 77 L.Ed.2d at 650. In step three, the Supreme Court engages in interjurisdictional review, comparing sentences in other jurisdictions for the same or similar crimes. Id. These last two steps introduce objectivity into the determination of gross disproportionality. The general theory under Solem, Harmelin, and Ewing seems to be that a sentence for a term of years within the bounds authorized by statute is not likely to be grossly disproportionate under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Legislative judgments are generally regarded as the most reliable objective indicators of community standards for purposes of determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 301-02, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1772, 95 L.Ed.2d 262, 284-85 (1987). While the Supreme Court, particularly in recent years, has emphasized objective factors in analyzing cruel and unusual punishment cases, the Court has also noted that objective evidence, though of great importance, [does] not `wholly determine' the controversy, `for the Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought to bear on the question. . . .' Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2247, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, 345 (2002) (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 2868, 53 L.Ed.2d 982, 992 (1977)). 2. Validity of enhanced sentences for recidivists. The Supreme Court has had three occasions to directly consider the validity of lengthy sentences under criminal statutes that impose enhanced sentences on recidivists. In Rummel, the Court upheld a lifetime sentencewith the possibility of parole in ten or twelve yearsunder a Texas three strikes statute where the defendant's offenses all involved nonviolent property crimes and the monetary value of all three crimes totaled less than $250.00. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 265-66, 284, 100 S.Ct. at 1134-35, 1144-45, 63 L.Ed.2d at 385-85, 397. In Solem, the Court vacated a sentence where the defendant, convicted of uttering a no account check for $100, was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole because of six prior felony convictions. Solem, 463 U.S. at 279-81, 303, 103 S.Ct. at 3004-05, 3016, 77 L.Ed.2d at 642-43, 657-58. Finally, in Ewing, the Court held that the theft of three golf clubs valued at $1200, when coupled with prior nonviolent property crimes, was sufficient to support a sentence of twenty-five years to life. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18-20, 29-30, 123 S.Ct. at 1183-85, 1189-90, 155 L.Ed.2d at 115-16, 123. In a fourth case, Lockyer, the defendant was sentenced as a recidivist to two consecutive terms of twenty-five years to life where the final conviction consisted of stealing nine videotapes on two separate occasions. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 66-68, 123 S.Ct. at 1169-71, 155 L.Ed.2d at 152-53. The defendant's cruel and unusual punishment claim, however, was raised in the context of a federal habeas corpus proceeding with a restricted standard of review. Id. at 69, 123 S.Ct. at 1171, 155 L.Ed.2d at 154. The court in Lockyer declined to intervene, noting that the sentence did not violate clearly established law. Id. at 77, 123 S.Ct. at 1175, 155 L.Ed.2d at 159. As is apparent from these cases, the Supreme Court has generally supported harsh and severe sentences for repeat offenders even when the later offense was nonviolent. Further, the Supreme Court has found that incapacitation is among the legitimate penological objectives that a state may further through long prison sentences. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 25, 123 S.Ct. at 1187, 155 L.Ed.2d at 120; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999, 111 S.Ct. at 2704, 115 L.Ed.2d at 867-68 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). [3] 3. Role of individualized determination. In Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2990-91, 49 L.Ed.2d 944, 960-61 (1976), the Supreme Court held that in death penalty cases, courts must engage in consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense before the death penalty may be imposed. See also Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 3377, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140, 1152 (1982). Woodson established a prerequisite legal requirement in all death penalty cases. The question arises whether a criminal defendant in a noncapital case may attempt to attack a sentence as applied as constituting cruel and unusual punishment. The question of whether a defendant may attack a statute as applied as cruel and unusual is a different question than that considered in Woodson, where the statute was facially invalid. A noncapital criminal statute that does not require an individualized determination regarding the appropriate sentence may be valid in many, but not all applications. In Rummel, the Supreme Court seemed to utilize an individualized approach where a defendant challenged his lengthy noncapital sentence under recidivist statutes. The Court noted that the defendant did not challenge the constitutionality of the applicable recidivist statute as a general proposition. Rummel, 445 at 270-71, 100 S.Ct. at 1137, 63 L.Ed.2d at 388-89. Instead, Rummel challenged only the result of applying a concededly valid statute to the facts of his case. Id. The court then proceeded to consider, among other factors, the length of a prison term in real time (time that is likely to be served), the defendant's triggering criminal conduct (the offender's actual behavior or other offense-related circumstances), and the offender's criminal history. Id. at 265-81, 100 S.Ct. at 1134-43, 63 L.Ed.2d at 385-95. The Court seemed to take a similar approach in Solem. There, the court noted, among other things, that the culpability of the offender, including his intent or motive in committing a crime, may be considered in determining the proportionality of the penalty to the offense. Solem, 463 U.S. at 293, 103 S.Ct. at 3011, 77 L.Ed.2d at 651. After Rummel and Solem, the court decided Harmelin. Among other arguments, Harmelin claimed that it was cruel and unusual to impose a mandatory sentence of life in prison for drug possession. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 994, 111 S.Ct. at 2701, 115 L.Ed.2d at 864. In part IV of his plurality opinion, Justice Scalia expressly refused to consider expanding the individualized capital sentencing doctrine outside the capital punishment context. Id. at 995, 111 S.Ct. at 2701-02, 115 L.Ed.2d at 865. Justice Scalia noted, We have drawn the line of required individualized sentencing at capital cases, and see no basis for extending it further. Id. at 996, 111 S.Ct. at 2702, 115 L.Ed.2d at 865. Justice Scalia's opinion could be broadly interpreted to mean that when considering cruel and unusual punishment challenges to a sentence, individualized analysis of the seriousness of the crime and the culpability of the offender is never appropriate outside the capital context. But there is also a narrower interpretation. In part IV, Justice Scalia was responding to the position that a statute imposing a mandatory sentence of life in prison, on its face, is unconstitutional and could not be applied against anyone. Justice Scalia rejected this facial argument. But a rejection of a facial challenge to a mandatory sentencing statute on the ground that individualized sentencing is not statutorily required does not mean that individualized analysis is never appropriate in a noncapital cruel and unusual punishment case. Narrowly read, the only proposition in part IV of Justice Scalia's opinion in Harmelin is that a mandatory sentencing statute cannot be stricken from the statute books and applied to no one, even the most deserving defendant, because of a lack of individualized sentencing. Part IV of the Scalia opinion simply does not address the question of whether a defendant may concede the facial validity of a mandatory sentencing statute, but then attack the constitutionality of its application in a particular case in light of all the facts and circumstances involved. A narrow reading of part IV of Justice Scalia's Harmelin opinion is supported by the Court's subsequent opinion in Ewing. In Ewing, the Court considered the constitutionality of a recidivist statute imposing a twenty-five-years-to-life sentence for property crimes. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 19-20, 123 S.Ct. at 1184-85, 155 L.Ed.2d at 116. In Ewing, the Court was highly fractured and no opinion commanded a majority. In her opinion joined by two other members of the court, Justice O'Connor examined the details of Ewing's criminal record, which included numerous separate terms of incarceration, commission of crimes while on parole, and serious felonies including robbery and three residential burglaries. Id. at 18-19, 123 S.Ct. at 1183-84, 155 L.Ed.2d at 115-16. Under these facts and circumstances, Justice O'Connor declared that Ewing's is not `the rare case in which a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed leads to an inference of gross disproportionality.' Id. at 30, 123 S.Ct. at 1190, 155 L.Ed.2d at 123 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1005, 111 S.Ct. at 2707, 115 L.Ed.2d at 871 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)). In reaching her decision, Justice O'Connor does not seem to be conducting a facial examination of the statute, where the underlying facts and circumstances would be entirely irrelevant. Instead, Justice O'Connor appears to be undertaking an analysis of the constitutionality of the statute as applied to Ewing. According to Justice O'Connor, it is Ewing's case that does not meet the gross disproportionality threshold of Solem, not the statute itself. Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Ewing, joined by three other members of the court, explicitly embraces the fact-specific approaches in Rummel and Solem. Id. at 36-39, 123 S.Ct. at 1193-95, 155 L.Ed.2d at 127-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting). As a result, a majority of the Supreme Court in Ewing seems to approve of an as-applied challenge to an otherwise valid statute under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. 4. Relevance of juvenile status in cruel and unusual punishment analysis. The Supreme Court has also struggled with the proper application of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause to juvenile defendants facing the death penalty. The cases have meandered. Compare Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2700, 101 L.Ed.2d 702, 720-21 (1988) (vacating death sentence in case involving juvenile), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116-17, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877-78, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 12 (1982) (same), with Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379-80, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 2980, 106 L.Ed.2d 306, 324-25 (1989) (finding death penalty could be applied to sixteen- or seventeen-year-olds). Most recently, however, the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 556, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1187, 161 L.Ed.2d 1, 13 (2005), considered a death sentence imposed on a seventeen-year-old convicted of murder. Justice Kennedy begins his analysis with a review of other jurisdictions. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564, 125 S.Ct. at 1192, 161 L.Ed.2d at 18. Although twenty states did not formally prohibit the death penalty for juveniles, Justice Kennedy stressed that, in practice, juvenile execution was infrequent. Id. at 564, 125 S.Ct. at 1192, 161 L.Ed.2d at 18-19. Based on the infrequency of its use even when it remained on the books and the growing trend toward abolition of the practice, Justice Kennedy concluded that juveniles were `categorically less culpable than the average criminal.' Id. at 567, 125 S.Ct. at 1194, 161 L.Ed.2d at 20-21 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 2249, 153 L.Ed.2d 335, 347 (2002)). After noting that the Eighth Amendment applied to the death penalty with special force, Justice Kennedy next turned to consideration of the mental abilities of juveniles. Id. at 568, 125 S.Ct. at 1194, 161 L.Ed.2d at 21. Citing the common experience of parents, confirmed by scientific and sociological studies, Justice Kennedy noted that juveniles tend to have immature judgment and act impulsively and without a full appreciation of the consequences of their actions, were more susceptible to negative peer influences than adults, were dependent on parents and others, and had personalities that were less well developed and more transitory than adults. Id. at 569-72, 125 S.Ct. at 1195-96, 161 L.Ed.2d at 21-23. Justice Kennedy noted that as a result of their immature judgment, impulsivity, dependence on others, and lack of responsibility, nearly all states prohibit persons under eighteen years of age from voting, serving on juries, or marrying without parental consent. Id. at 569, 125 S.Ct. at 1195, 161 L.Ed.2d at 22. Finally, Justice Kennedy surveyed international law, noting that various sources of international law condemn the death penalty for juveniles and that only a few countries continue the practice. Id. at 576-77, 125 S.Ct. at 1198-99, 161 L.Ed.2d at 26-27. Because of the psychosocial and neurological differences between juveniles and adults, Justice Kennedy wrote that the penological justifications for the death penaltyretribution and general deterrence apply to juveniles with lesser force than to adults. Id. at 571, 125 S.Ct. at 1196, 161 L.Ed.2d at 23. Justice Kennedy noted that punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person. Id. at 572, 125 S.Ct. at 1196, 161 L.Ed.2d at 23. As a result, the death penalty categorically could not be applied to juveniles. Roper involved the constitutionality of the death penalty applied to juveniles, but its analysis has potentially broader impact notwithstanding the language of limitation in the opinion. In particular, academics began to assert that the analysis in Roper could be applied to challenge sentences of juveniles to life without possibility of parole. [4] The Supreme Court has recently agreed to hear two cases involving juveniles sentenced to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole for noncapital crimes. See Sullivan v. State, 987 So.2d 83 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2008) (thirteen-year-old convicted of sexual battery in connection with burglary sentenced to life without possibility of parole), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2157, 173 L.Ed.2d 1155 (2009); Graham v. State, 982 So.2d 43 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2008) (sixteen-year-old sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole based on armed burglaries, attempted robberies, and parole violation), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2157, 173 L.Ed.2d 1155 (2009). These cases could shed some light on the viability of a Roper -type reasoning outside the death penalty context under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the United States Constitution.
1. Introduction. The lower federal courts have, of course, followed the cruel and unusual punishment framework developed by the United States Supreme Court. In light of the fact that the Supreme Court has found only two noncapital sentences invalid under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause in the past one hundred years, Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910), and Solem, the vast majority of federal appellate cases apply the stringent standards developed by the Supreme Court and deny relief to defendants in a conclusory fashion. In the words of one federal appellate court, finding a sentence grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment will be hen's-teeth rare. United States v. Polk, 546 F.3d 74, 76 (1st Cir.2008). 2. Validity of as-applied challenge. Some federal appellate courts have been willing to engage in an examination of the specific facts and circumstances involved in a crime when a defendant challenges a sentence as cruel and unusual as applied. For instance, in Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 707 (8th Cir.2001), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals invalidated a life sentence for first-offense delivery of .238 grams of cocaine base. The court emphasized the small amount of drug involved, the fact that the defendant did not initiate contact with an informant who bought the drug, and that there was no indication that the defendant engaged in violence, had any weapons, or indicated any other trappings of the drug trade. Henderson, 258 F.3d at 710; see also United States v. Nagel, 559 F.3d 756, 763 (7th Cir.2009) (analyzing both a facial and an as-applied cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenge); Hawkins v. Hargett, 200 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir.1999) (noting the defendant's age as a factor in his cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim). Many federal courts engage in what one commentator has referred to as color matching by comparing the facts of a given case with those of Rummel, Solem, Harmelin, or Ewing to determine whether the facts of the case at hand, at a very high level of abstraction, are on par with those in the Supreme Court precedents. Donna H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 Ariz. St. L.J. 527, 579-82 (2008). Color matching is legal analysis by analogy as opposed to a deeper, rule-based analysis that legitimately applies principles of stare decisis. Id. at 579. 3. Federal appellate cases considering Roper outside the capital context. A number of federal appellate courts have also had occasion to consider whether the reasoning in Roper namely, that juveniles are categorically not as criminally culpable as adultsextends outside the death penalty context. Federal courts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits have declined to extend Roper outside the death penalty in a variety of situations. See, e.g., United States v. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d 858, 863-64 (7th Cir.2007) (upholding sentence enhancement based on armed robbery conviction committed as a juvenile); United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir.2006) (upholding life sentence for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under recidivist statute where prior adult conviction occurred at age seventeen); United States v. Wilks, 464 F.3d 1240, 1243 (11th Cir.2006) (upholding enhanced sentence where prior youthful offender convictions included aggravated assault, grand theft, burglary with assault, and strong-arm robbery). In limiting Roper 's application outside the capital context, lower federal courts generally stress that death is different the Eighth Amendment applies with special force in death penalty cases. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d at 863-64; Mays, 466 F.3d at 340; Wilks, 464 F.3d at 1243. These courts also distinguish Roper, where the defendant's punishment for a crime committed as a juvenile was at issue, from cases where a defendant's sentence for a crime committed as an adult is enhanced by a prior conviction committed when the defendant was under eighteen. Salahuddin, 509 F.3d at 863-64; Mays, 466 F.3d at 340; Wilks, 464 F.3d at 1243. [5]
1. Introduction. Most state constitutions contain cruel and unusual punishment provisions that are similar, if not identical, to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. [6] In construing the meaning of these state constitutional provisions, state courts are free to develop their own independent approaches to state constitutional doctrine. Some state supreme courts have followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court and adopted approaches to state constitutional provisions that mirror the developing federal law and have achieved similar results. See Adaway v. State, 902 So.2d 746, 747-52 (Fla.2005) (upholding life sentence for thirty-six-year-old engaging in oral sex with eleven-year-old under state and federal constitutions by comparing seriousness of crime with offenses in Harmelin and Ewing.) Some have gone even further and held that a sentence that falls within the legislatively-established range of sentences cannot be declared cruel and unusual. See Price v. State, 898 So.2d 641, 655 (Miss.2005). Other state courts, however, have adopted a more searching approach to cruel and unusual punishment. [7] 2. Acceptance of federal framework with independent application. One line of state supreme court cases departs from United States Supreme Court precedent by generally adopting the Supreme Court's [8] analytical framework for cruel-and-unusual-punishment claims but applying it in a more stringent fashion. For instance, in People v. Bullock, 440 Mich. 15, 485 N.W.2d 866, 870-71 (1992), the Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the same drug-sentencing statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Harmelin under its state constitution. The Michigan Supreme Court generally accepted the principles developed by the Supreme Court, but emphasized that it was free to follow what the court considered the better-reasoned dissenting opinions. Bullock, 485 N.W.2d at 870-74. The court then proceeded to rely heavily on Justice White's dissenting opinion in Harmelin, emphasizing that `punishment must be tailored to a defendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt.' Id. at 876 (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1023, 111 S.Ct. at 2716, 115 L.Ed.2d at 883) (White, J., dissenting); see also State v. Fain, 94 Wash.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720, 723, 725-28 (1980) (generally applying the framework developed by the United States Supreme Court but relying in part on dissent in Rummel to reach a different result); Wanstreet v. Bordenkircher, 166 W.Va. 523, 276 S.E.2d 205, 212-14 (1981) (invalidating life sentence under recidivist statute using Solem -type review). 3. Validity of as-applied challenge. Many state courts have also considered whether a criminal defendant may attack a sentence as cruel and unusual punishment as applied. Under an as-applied attack, a criminal statute imposing a certain sentence is not facially invalid in all circumstances, but only as applied under the facts and circumstances in a particular case. Many state courts, particularly post- Ewing, have allowed as-applied attacks based on individualized facts and circumstances. See Graham, 982 So.2d at 48 (discussing difference in cruel and unusual punishment context between facial attack and attack as applied); Humphrey v. Wilson, 282 Ga. 520, 652 S.E.2d 501, 510 (2007) (citing narrow age difference and fact that fifteen-year-old girl initiated oral sex as factors in invalidating sentence as cruel and unusual); People v. Miller, 202 Ill.2d 328, 269 Ill.Dec. 503, 781 N.E.2d 300, 306-09 (2002) (finding application of statutes that treat fifteen-year-old who stood as a lookout during the shooting and had only a moment to consider his participation, but never handled a gun, the same as the shooter in imposing life in prison without possibility of parole unconstitutional under state constitution); Kills on Top v. State, 279 Mont. 384, 928 P.2d 182, 206-07 (1996) (finding individualized determination beyond reckless indifference required to determine validity of death penalty in felony murder context); Naovarath v. State, 105 Nev. 525, 779 P.2d 944, 948-49 (1989) (invalidating as cruel and unusual punishment a life sentence without possibility of parole on thirteen-year-old in light of specific facts). 4. State cases considering Roper outside capital context. A number of state cases have considered the application of Roper outside the context of capital punishment. The case that is closest to the present controversy is State v. Rideout, 182 Vt. 113, 933 A.2d 706 (2007). In Rideout, the defendant was convicted of two counts of lewd and lascivious conduct with a child and one count of furnishing drugs to a child. Rideout, 933 A.2d at 708. He was subsequently sentenced under a Vermont habitual offender statute to two concurrent sentences of twenty to fifty years. Id. at 710. The defendant asserted that the sentence as applied to him constituted cruel and unusual punishment because four of his six predicate felonies occurred when he was sixteen years of age. Id. at 713. The Rideout court rejected the claim. Id. at 716. The court cited extensive federal and state case law prior to Roper generally standing for the proposition that convictions of minors in adult court may be used to enhance sentences of adults convicted of crimes. Id. at 715. The Rideout court distinguished cases refusing to allow juvenile adjudications to count toward habitual offender status on the ground that they were based upon the lack of procedural protections in juvenile court, specifically, the right to a jury trial. Id. at 715-16. The Rideout court distinguished Roper, noting the imposition of the death penalty and not imprisonment was a distinction critical to Roper 's reasoning. Id. at 718. Further, citing Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 400, 115 S.Ct. 2199, 2206, 132 L.Ed.2d 351, 364 (1995), the Rideout court noted that the defendant in Roper was sentenced to death solely for an offense committed while he was a minor, whereas in Rideout, the defendant was receiving a sentence for an adult crime even though the adult sentence was enhanced by crimes committed as a minor. Id. at 719. According to the Rideout court, Roper was premised, in part, on the opportunity for minor offenders to mend their ways. Id. The Rideout court noted that when dealing with recidivist adult offenders, with juvenile records, that possibility has largely gone by. Id. A few other state court cases have considered whether a Roper -type analysis applies outside the death penalty for juvenile conduct. These cases have generally declined to extend Roper to other contexts. See State v. Allen, 289 Conn. 550, 958 A.2d 1214, 1233-36 (2008) (declining to extend Roper to eighteen-year-old sentenced to life without possibility of parole); Wallace v. State, 956 A.2d 630, 641 (Del.2008) (declining to extend Roper to fifteen-year-old defendant sentenced to life in prison); England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 406-07 (Fla.2006) (finding use of juvenile convictions as aggravating factors supporting death penalty not contrary to Roper). 5. Case law involving challenges to nonviolent sex crimes generally. State courts have invalidated lengthy sentences for nonviolent sex crimes. In State v. Davis, 206 Ariz. 377, 79 P.3d 64, 66-67 (2003), a twenty-year-old defendant was sentenced to a mandatory minimum of fifty-two years without the possibility of parole as a result of his conviction on four counts of statutory rape for engaging in consensual sex with two post-pubescent teenage girls. After reviewing recent Supreme Court cases, the Davis court overruled its prior precedent and held that the court could undertake an individualized analysis of the penalty under the facts of the case. Davis, 79 P.3d at 71. The Davis court found under the facts of the case that the threshold test of gross disproportionality had been met, noting that Davis was caught in the very broad sweep of a statute which makes any sexual conduct with a person younger than fifteen years old by a person older than eighteen years old a dangerous crime against children, whether the offense is a rape-incest by a step-parent who forces sex on a trusting ward or a pedophile who uncontrollably preys upon young children . . . or the more benign boyfriend-girlfriend situation in which one party is older than eighteen and the other younger than fifteen. Id. at 72 (quoting State v. Taylor, 160 Ariz. 415, 773 P.2d 974, 976 (1989)). The court noted that the fact that other courts impose lengthy sentences for sex crimes demonstrate[s] why, when considering the proportionality of a sentence imposed, this court must look beyond the nomenclature of the crime charged and consider the facts of each particular case. Id. at 74.
Article I, section 17 of the Iowa Constitution prohibits cruel and unusual punishment in language materially identical to its federal counterpart. Our past cases have generally assumed that the standards for assessing whether a sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment under the Iowa Constitution are identical to the Federal Constitution. State v. Musser, 721 N.W.2d 734, 749 (Iowa 2006). In a number of cases, we have addressed whether the court may consider individual facts and circumstances in evaluating a challenge to a sentence as cruel and unusual. Our recent cases, relying in part on Harmelin, have indicated that an individualized challenge to the application of a statutorily-authorized sentence may not lie in the context of convictions for indecent exposure, criminal transmission of HIV, first-degree burglary, and commission of multiple forceable felonies. State v. Wade, 757 N.W.2d 618, 624 (Iowa 2008); Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749; State v. Rubino, 602 N.W.2d 558, 564 (Iowa 1999); State v. August, 589 N.W.2d 740, 743 (Iowa 1999). We have also considered attacks on mandatory sentences. In State v. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d 475 (Iowa 1978), we considered an attack on Iowa Code section 690.2, which mandated a life sentence for first-degree murder. We rejected the challenge, noting that life imprisonment for first-degree murder does not shock the conscience or sense of justice. Fuhrmann, 261 N.W.2d at 479-80. We considered the holding in Fuhrmann as dispositive in State v. Horn, 282 N.W.2d 717, 732 (Iowa 1979), where a defendant challenged a life sentence without the possibility of parole as cruel and unusual based on the fact that he was twenty years old at the time of the offense. We have also upheld mandatory prison terms in the face of cruel and unusual punishment challenges in a variety of other contexts. See State v. Phillips, 610 N.W.2d 840, 843-44 (Iowa 2000) (holding ten-year mandatory sentence for second-degree robbery does not rise to cruel and unusual punishment); August, 589 N.W.2d at 744 (finding forty-two-and-one-half-year mandatory, consecutive sentence for kidnapping in the second-degree and first-degree robbery not cruel and unusual); State v. Lara, 580 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Iowa 1998) (finding mandatory minimum sentence of over twenty-one years for first-degree robbery permissible).
1. Standard to be applied under state constitution. Because Bruegger has not advanced a standard for interpreting the cruel and unusual punishment provision under the Iowa Constitution differently from its federal constitutional counterpart, we will apply the general principles as outlined by the United States Supreme Court for addressing a cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenge under the Iowa Constitution. See In re Detention of Garren, 620 N.W.2d 275, 280 n. 1 (Iowa 2000). Even so, we do not necessarily apply the federal standards in the same way as the United States Supreme Court. For instance, in Racing Association of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 562 (Iowa 2002), this court ruled that a statutory scheme taxing slot machines at racetracks at a higher rate than similar machines on riverboats violated equal protection. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Federal Equal Protection Clause, as properly applied, did not invalidate the classification. Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 110, 123 S.Ct. 2156, 2161, 156 L.Ed.2d 97, 105 (2003). On remand, we applied established federal equal protection principles in a different and more stringent fashion under our state constitution. Racing Ass'n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Iowa 2004) [hereinafter RACI]. We declared that a rational-basis review of legislation was not a toothless exercise in Iowa, and we came to a different result than that reached by a unanimous Supreme Court in the same case. Id. at 9. The principles of RACI apply in the cruel and unusual punishment context as well. As in RACI, we conclude that review of criminal sentences for gross proportionality under the Iowa Constitution should not be a toothless review and adopt a more stringent review than would be available under the Federal Constitution. See, e.g., Fain, 617 P.2d at 725-28; Wanstreet, 276 S.E.2d at 212-14. We also consider the applicability of Roper under the Iowa Constitution. As noted previously, the Supreme Court in Roper emphasized that its categorical ruling that the death penalty could not be applied to any person under the age of eighteen for any crime was limited to death penalty cases. Nonetheless, the reasoning in Roper, namely, that psychosocial and neurological studies show that juvenile brains are less developed and that, as a result, they are less culpable than adult offenders, has applicability outside the death penalty context. While it may be, as Roper suggests, that the only penalty that is categorically off the table for persons under eighteen is death, this does not mean that the age of an offender can never be a factor for cruel and unusual punishment analysis. 2. Attack on sentence as applied. Bruegger does not clearly distinguish between a facial attack or an attack as applied in his appeal. The language in Bruegger's brief, however, emphasizing the specific facts of the case, including a claim that K.S. was in love with him and consented to sexual intercourse, and that, as a result, the degree of his criminal culpability based upon his current crime and prior juvenile adjudication did not justify the lengthy mandatory sentence, evidences an as-applied challenge. Although not properly labeled, Bruegger's brief is essentially an attack on his sentence as cruel and unusual as applied to him, under all the facts and circumstances. We recognize that many of our cases reject individualized determinations in connection with cruel-and-unusual-punishment challenges in a number of contexts. See, e.g., Wade, 757 N.W.2d at 624; Musser, 721 N.W.2d at 749; Rubino, 602 N.W.2d at 564; August, 589 N.W.2d at 743. It is not always clear in these cases whether the court was rejecting a mandatory requirement of an individualized showing, as was required in Woodson, or the possibility of an as-applied challenge. In any event, we do not believe that a defendant can never challenge a sentence as cruel and unusual as applied. If individualized consideration of the facts and circumstances were never allowed, legislatures could eviscerate judicial review of the proportionality of punishment by broadly defining crimes and imposing mandatory stiff penalties in all cases. Such broadly-framed statutes would survive facial attack if the accompanying penalties were appropriate to some but not all crimes within the statute's broad ambit. As a result, we conclude that, at least in some instances, defendants who commit acts of lesser culpability within the scope of broad criminal statutes carrying stiff penalties should be able to launch an as-applied cruel and unusual punishment challenge. See Davis, 79 P.3d at 72-73 (holding where broad sweep of statute makes no distinction between perpetrators of incest, serial pedophiles, and statutory rape, an as-applied challenge was permissible); State v. Berniard, 860 So.2d 66, 75 (La.Ct.App.2003) (holding defendant may attack mandatory sentence by showing he is exceptional, that legislature has failed to assign sentences that are meaningfully tailored to the gravity of the offense, the culpability of the offender, and the circumstances of the case). The question is, then, whether this is a relatively rare case where an individualized assessment of the punishment imposed should be permitted. We conclude that it is. This case involves an unusual combination of features that converge to generate a high risk of potential gross disproportionalitynamely, a broadly framed crime, the permissible use of preteen juvenile adjudications as prior convictions to enhance the crime, and a dramatic sentence enhancement for repeat offenders. Each of these factors, standing alone, has the potential of introducing a degree of disproportionality into a sentence, but the convergence of these three factors presents a substantial risk that the sentence could be grossly disproportionate as applied. We thus conclude that Bruegger should be allowed to make an individualized showing that the sentence is cruel and unusual as applied to him. The first factor, breadth of crime, is an important one. The crime of statutory rape covers a wide variety of circumstances, from Romeo and Juliet relationships to much more objectionable situations involving the luring of youngsters by older individuals using manipulative techniques, positions of authority, threats of violence, and other aggravating factors. The legislature has, in part, recognized the variety of contexts in which the crime is committed by providing a broad range of penalties for the unenhanced crime. The second factornamely, Bruegger's age as a preteen when the predicate offense was committedis also material. If the prior crime occurred while the defendant was an adult, that might yield a different result. Here, however, the prior crime occurred when Bruegger was twelve. The underlying rationale in Roper is that a past act as a juvenile is not comparable to an adult act, and yet that is exactly what the statute does here, making no distinction between prior juvenile adjudications and prior adult convictions. It is true that under Ewing, the focus is said to be on the current crime, and Bruegger did commit his current crime as an adult. But the prior criminal history is what makes the current crime more aggravated, and if the prior criminal offense was committed by a preteen, it seems to follow that Bruegger is entitled to an opportunity to show that the consequences of his adolescent act become grossly disproportional to his sentence for the adult crime. We also note that the legislative policy regarding juvenile offenders is not entirely clear or consistent. In Iowa, a person who is under fourteen years of age cannot be tried as an adult in criminal court. Iowa Code § 232.45(6)( a ). This limitation appears to be a recognition that persons under fourteen should not be criminally culpable for their acts. If this is true, it seems inconsistent to suggest that the act of a twelve-year-old is a sufficient basis to dramatically enhance an adult sentence for the crime of statutory rape. We finally note that the increase in sentence under Iowa Code section 901A.2(3) is geometric. The maximum sentence for Bruegger's crime, without enhancement, was ten years, subject to various good time credits. His likely prison term, even if he received the maximum sentence, would have been about four years. Under the enhanced sentencing scheme, Bruegger must serve at least 21.25 years in prison, a five hundred percent increase in sentence. This geometric increase in sentence is another factor that contributes to our conclusion that, in this case, Bruegger is entitled to attempt to show that the enhanced sentence, as applied to him, amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. Our narrow conclusion that Bruegger, in light of the unusual convergence of a broadly-defined criminal statute, the use of a juvenile adjudication when he was twelve to enhance his sentence, and the dramatic increase in his punishment as a result the enhancement, may bring a cruel and unusual punishment challenge to Iowa Code section 901A.2(3) as applied to him, does not resolve the case. Before the trial court, Bruegger did not raise the issue of cruel and unusual punishment. As a result, there was no evidentiary hearing where the parties presented evidence for the purpose of addressing a claim that, under the facts and circumstances, the enhanced sentence of section 901A.2(3) could not constitutionally be applied to Bruegger. In light of this procedural posture, it is not surprising that the record is factually deficient in a number of respects. Notably, although some documents relating to Bruegger's prior Minnesota juvenile adjudication were introduced at sentencing, the record is limited regarding the underlying facts and circumstances of this offense. Further, the State has not had an opportunity to show in an evidentiary hearing that under all the facts and circumstances, a sentence under section 901A.2(3) is not cruel and unusual as applied to Bruegger. For instance, the State may wish to develop evidence regarding the impact of Bruegger's conduct on K.S. and her family, his lack of remorse, the nature of services provided in Minnesota and his inability to respond to such services, the need to incapacitate him through long-term incarceration, and any other potential factors that tend to aggravate the gravity of the offense and magnify the consequences on K.S. We conclude, therefore, that the current record in simply inadequate to resolve the issue. The Solem -type approach for evaluating Bruegger's cruel-and-unusual-punishment claim cannot be applied without a proper record. In closing, we note that Bruegger has committed a serious crime for which the legislature may impose a serious penalty. We do not view statutory rape as a victimless crime in light of the risk of disease, pregnancy, and serious psychological harm that can result from even apparently consensual sexual activity involving adults and adolescents. Nor do we believe that Bruegger's conduct as a juvenile is irrelevant to sentencing. Our sole concern here is whether, under the facts and circumstances, a mandatory sentence of 21.25 years is off the charts. We, therefore, vacate the sentencing order of the district court and remand the case for a new sentencing hearing to allow Bruegger and the State to present evidence as to the constitutionality of section 901A.2(3) as applied to the defendant. [9] We do not retain jurisdiction.