Opinion ID: 1302649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Possession of LSD[9]

Text: As is noted above, the defendant specifically requested an instruction on possession of LSD. Thus, the first condition of Stephens is met. There is also an appropriate relationship between delivery and possession. See People v Kamin, 405 Mich 482; 275 NW2d 777 (1979). First, the aims of prohibiting delivery and possession include the prevention of commercial distribution of dangerous substances. Second, proof of possession is generally necessarily presented as part of the proof of delivery. Thus, a close evidentiary nexus exists. We are not convinced, however, that the requested possession instruction was supported by a rational view of the evidence as is required by the third condition of Stephens. The Court of Appeals advanced several reasons for its conclusion that a possession instruction was supported. In proving delivery of LSD, however, the prosecutor must show: (1) that the defendant transferred the substance to another; (2) that the defendant intended to transfer the substance to another; and (3) that the defendant knew the substance was LSD. See CJI 12:2:03. Thus, the knowledge of the substance was in dispute and, therefore, delivery of LSD would have been in dispute. Because delivery is an element which distinguishes delivery of a controlled substance from possession or use of the controlled substance, the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on possession and use of LSD. [150 Mich App 743-744.] It seems to us that transfer is the element which distinguishes delivery from possession. We have difficulty in understanding the Court of Appeals syllogism. It appears that the Court is using lack of knowledge to result in lack of transfer; and concludes, therefore, that an element which distinguishes delivery from possession is in dispute. We find this reasoning to be unsound. Even assuming that the Court of Appeals was attempting to show that the mens rea was a distinguishing element, we do not follow the logic. The possession statute requires that a defendant knowingly possess the controlled substance, and the Court of Appeals concluded that delivery also requires knowledge of the controlled substance. [10] Hence, the only element which distinguished possession from delivery was transfer. In this case, transfer was admitted; it is inconceivable that the jury could consistently find the defendant innocent of delivery and guilty of possession. The factual issue  knowledge of the substance  was the same as to both the greater and lesser offenses. Because transfer was not disputed, the third condition of Stephens was not satisfied; thus, the misdemeanor instruction on possession was not required. The Court of Appeals then suggested that the instruction should have been given because a jury may disbelieve undisputed evidence. Although a jury may, in fact, disbelieve what it will, it should not be the duty of a trial court to provide the jury with opportunities to act illogically; such an approach would nullify Stephens. The Court of Appeals also seems to offer an opinion that Stephens left the Kamin reasoning intact for misdemeanors, that is, if the evidence shows any rational view for convicting of the lesser offense, then the instruction must be given. This is precisely what we did not hold. We explicitly held that instructions for lesser included misdemeanor offenses were to be determined by the more stringent conditions which we then articulated. In the absence of a request by the prosecutor, the fourth element of Stephens did not apply.