Opinion ID: 2321987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burns Made the Necessary Showing For An In Camera Review.

Text: The final issue is what showing must Burns make to be entitled to an in camera review? In State v. Wood , the Superior Court held that Superior Court Criminal Rule 17 requires the defendant to: (1) identify precisely the records he or she is seeking, and assert a `compelling basis' for the request; (2) attempt to procure the consent of the victim for release of the records, before resorting to Rule 17; and (3) demonstrate to the court, with specificity, that the information he or she is seeking is relevant and material to his defense. [42] If such a showing is made, the court will then conduct an in camera review. [43] The State and Burns generally agree that the Wood framework should control, as do we. Burns claims, however, that he is required only to make a plausible showing that the information he is seeking is relevant and material, rather than having to establish relevance and materiality with specificity. Relying on a footnote in Ritchie, [44] Burns points out the impracticability and unlikelihood of a defendant ever establishing with specificity the relevance and materiality of unknown records. In response, the State argues that requiring anything less than a specific showing of relevance and materiality would result in the Superior Court having to conduct an in camera review in nearly all cases. That would strain court resources and increase the reluctance of sexual assault victims to seek counseling, for fear that their therapy records will be routinely disclosed. We conclude that a defendant need only make a plausible showing that the records sought are material and relevant. Otherwise, the defendant would find it impossible in most cases to establish materiality and relevance with specificity. It does not follow that every defendant will automatically be entitled to an in camera review. Defendants must still establish specifically what kinds or categories of records they are seeking, and must articulate a compelling basis for the request. The Superior Court must also be satisfied that the defendant is not embarking on a fishing expedition [45] into the witness' medical or psychological history. Moreover, the court may, where necessary, sanction defendants who abuse the Rule 17 process. We conclude that Burns has established his entitlement to an in camera review of the factual information in Tina and Sara Ames' therapy records relating to the charges against him. Because Burns sought only the factual information contained in those therapy records, his request was sufficiently precise and narrow. He also has established a compelling justification that that information was needed for impeachment purposes. The crimes with which he was charged had occurred years before, there was no physical evidence, the victims had made arguably inconsistent factual statements, and as in most child molestation cases where there is no physical evidence, the case would turn largely on the jury's determination of credibility. Burns sought the victims' consent before filing his Rule 17 motion to compel. Although Burns did not specifically show any material inconsistent statements by the victims, he did articulate concerns that established a plausible showing that the records sought were relevant and material, namely, that: (i) the girls had prepared detailed notes of their alleged abuse and destroyed those notes after their CAC interviews, and (ii) the girls presumably had discussed their interviews at length with their therapist. Those facts plausibly show that if there were factual inconsistencies in the girls' accounts, those inconsistencies could be discerned only from an in camera review of the factual information contained in the girls' therapy records. Because we find that Burns was entitled to an in camera review of the factual information in the victims' therapy records, we conclude that the Superior Court abused its discretion by denying that request. We therefore remand this case to the Superior Court. On remand that court must decide what remedy Burns is entitled to. Burns claims that on remand he is entitled to a new trial. The current record, however, does not enable us to decide that issue. Ritchie does afford us guidance. There, the United States Supreme Court remanded Ritchie's case to the trial court to conduct an in camera review: [46] ... to determine whether [the records in question] contain[] information that probably would have changed the outcome of his trial. If it does, he must be given a new trial. If the records maintained by CYS contain no such information, or if the nondisclosure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the lower court will be free to reinstate the prior conviction. [47] Ritchie requires a new trial only if information in the victim's therapy records would have changed the outcome of the trial. On remand, the Superior Court shall conduct an in camera review, and determine whether the information in the victims' therapy records would probably have changed the outcome of Burns' trial. If the Superior Court so finds, then it shall vacate the convictions and order a new trial. If, however, the Superior Court finds that the information would not have changed the outcome, then the convictions shall stand. In either case, the Superior Court shall report its findings to this Court within sixty days of the date of this Opinion.