Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 29

Heading: Unconstitutionality of California's Death Penalty Law

Text: Defendant contends several features of California's capital sentencing scheme violate the United States Constitution, both in general and as applied in his trial. For reasons largely explained in previous decisions, we disagree. Use of the word `extreme' in section 190.3, factor[ ] (d) . . . does not impermissibly restrict the jury's consideration of mitigating factors. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642, 134 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) The jury's consideration of prior unadjudicated criminal conduct under section 190.3, factor (b) does not render the statute's use unconstitutional. ( People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 507, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) California homicide law and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty, and the existence of prosecutorial discretion to seek the death penalty in a death-eligible case does not render the imposition of the penalty unconstitutionally arbitrary and capricious. ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 573, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 125-126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Our statute is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Generally, no instruction on burden of proof is required in a California penalty trial. ( People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) The terms aggravating and mitigating are not vague or ambiguous and do not require definition in the jury instructions. ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 267, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710.) In any event, the court here did define the terms, using CALJIC No. 8.88 (1989 rev.), and defendant does not criticize the definitions given. Instructions on the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and on the presumption of life were not constitutionally required. ( People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 573, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 123-124, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 172-173, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) International law does not compel the elimination of capital punishment in California. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 127, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Defendant's argument that the use of capital punishment as regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes violates international norms of human decency and hence the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution fails, at the outset, because California does not employ capital punishment in such a manner. The death penalty is available only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions different from those applying to regular punishment for felonies. (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, § 11; §§ 190.1-190.9, 1239, subd. (b).) Comparative intercase proportionality review by the trial or appellate courts is not constitutionally required. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; accord, e.g., People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182.) Citing Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion in Sawyer v. Whitley (1992) 505 U.S. 333, 357-360, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269, his dissent from denial of certiorari in Callins v. Collins (1994) 510 U.S. 1141, 114 S.Ct. 1127, 127 L.Ed.2d 435, and this court's decision in In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 509, 855 P.2d 729, defendant contends the procedural barriers to habeas corpus relief in state and federal courts have rendered the postconviction review of capital sentences unconstitutionally arbitrary and unreliable. Defendant's generalized complaints about the difficulty of obtaining relief on habeas corpus are premature in this direct appellate proceeding and, to the extent they concern the federal courts, are directed to the wrong tribunal as well. Citing Judge Noonan's dissenting opinion in Jeffers v. Lewis (9th Cir.1994) 38 F.3d 411, 425-427, defendant contends that the administration of California's death penalty suffers from the same arbitrariness perceived by Judge Noonan in Arizona's system, and in particular that the backlog of death cases in state courts .. . truncates the review eventually provided and renders impermissibly arbitrary the ultimate selection of who lives and who dies. In People v. Snow , we rejected a similar contention, based on the same dissenting opinion, that California's pace of execution, slow in comparison to the number of death judgments, makes our system arbitrary. We explained: The federal appellate court has rejected this argument ( Woratzeck v. Stewart (9th Cir.1997) 118 F.3d 648, 652); we do so as well. `If Woratzeck's death sentence does not violate the Eighth Amendment, then neither does the scheduling of his execution. Arizona must establish some order of execution. There has been no prima facie showing that this scheduling violates the Eighth Amendment.' ( Ibid. ) The same is true here. Defendant does not face imminent execution and can hardly claim he is being singled out for either quick or slow treatment of his appeal and habeas corpus proceedings. More generally, defendant makes no showing that the number of condemned prisoners executed in California, or the order in which their execution dates are set, is determined by any invidious means or method, with discriminatory motive or effect, or indeed according to anything other than the pace at which various defendants' appeals and habeas corpus proceedings are concluded, a matter by no means within the sole control of the state. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 127, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Defendant presents nothing to prompt reevaluation of that view. The claimed flaws in our state's death penalty statute identified by defendant, whether considered individually or together, do not make it unconstitutional.