Opinion ID: 776558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 11 We begin our analysis with the statute involved. When an individual corruptly... influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which any pending proceeding is being had before any department or agency of the United States, there is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1505. Senffner asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction under this statute, arguing that the evidence does not show that he in fact obstructed an SEC proceeding or that he endeavored to obstruct an SEC proceeding. We reject both arguments. 12 In rejecting these arguments, we are mindful of several standards that apply to our analysis. We must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable, justifiable inferences in its favor. In connection with that obligation, we will not reweigh the evidence, nor second-guess the jury's credibility determinations. Only when the record contains no evidence from which the jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, will we overturn the verdict. United States v. Masten, 170 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir.1999); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (stating the question as whether  any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt (emphasis in original)). 13
14 Senffner argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of obstruction of a proceeding pending before the SEC, because the SEC had no independent authority to freeze or distribute assets, or to impose civil penalties, but needed to obtain an order from the federal district court. He argues that he only obstructed the district court, not the SEC. His argument is without merit; he obstructed both. 15 The SEC, as a government agency, can only act through individuals or other instrumentalities using the enforcement mechanisms it has available. These mechanisms may be internal or involve other entities, including the federal courts. Therefore, whenever an entity acting for or at the direct request of an agency has been obstructed, the agency itself has also been obstructed. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 600, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995) (recognizing that although no obstruction occurs when an individual lies to FBI agents who might or might not testify before a grand jury, it may occur if the agents acted as an arm of the grand jury, or indeed that the grand jury had even summoned the testimony of these particular agents). The fact that an agency cannot perform a particular function itself or through its own labor is of no moment; rather the question is whether the agency proceeding affirmatively, by its specific actions, seeks to have the particular function performed as part of the proceeding. 16 The purpose of the SEC's initial proceeding, 1 investigating the securities law violations of Lauer, Senffner, and CCI, was not solely to investigate those violations for the sake of exposing them, but also to identify and recover CHA funds involved in the violations to remedy them. More to the point, that proceeding did not end by virtue of the filing of the lawsuit. To the contrary, the SEC prosecution of the lawsuit was a natural extension of that proceeding, and its efforts to recover and return the funds were necessary to achieve its goal. By obstructing the recovery of CHA funds, Senffner obstructed the district court, and, as a consequence, the SEC's initial investigation and enforcement of securities law violations (an SEC proceeding), which sought the return of the funds. 17 There exists, however, a more direct obstruction in this case. Assuming that the SEC's tracing of the funds was separate from its initial proceeding, that investigation constitutes a proceeding, even though the SEC lawsuit was already in progress and the SEC used the district court's process rather than its own. An SEC investigation is a proceeding — a term that is defined rather broadly — for the purpose of section 1505. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 36 F.3d 1118, 1127, (D.C.Cir.1994); United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410, 423 (2d Cir.1991). And, sufficient to distinguish an investigative proceeding (from a mere police investigation) is the authority to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. See Kelley, 36 F.3d at 1127. However, that does not mean that every aspect of the investigation must proceed under that authority. 18 We are not alone in reaching these conclusions. The Ninth Circuit has also rejected the very same argument in similar circumstances. See United States v. Hopper, 177 F.3d 824, 830-31 (9th Cir.1999). In Hopper, the IRS sought to collect un-paid taxes from members of the Juris Christian Assembly (a front for a tax evasion scheme), by placing an IRS tax levy on the salary of one of the members and a lien on the property of another. Id. at 828. They also obtained a judgment for the debt and a lien from a federal district court. Id. The members attempted to frustrate the enforcement of the levy and judgment lien by submitting false checks. Id. at 828-29. Two of the defendants were prosecuted for obstruction of an agency proceeding under section 1505 for their submission of a false check to the U.S. Marshall Service in satisfaction of the judgment lien. Id. at 830. They claimed that they had only obstructed the judgment of the federal district court, not an IRS proceeding. Id. 19 In rejecting their argument, the Hopper court concluded that the  enforcement of tax liens by the IRS is an IRS proceeding. The fact that the IRS was required to enforce its lien in federal court does not change the IRS's involvement. It was an IRS tax lien, prosecuted by an Assistant United States Attorney representing the IRS, and any money collected would have been paid to the IRS. Id. at 831 (emphasis added). Additionally, and more broadly, Hopper concluded that  collection of delinquent taxes is an IRS proceeding.  Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, obstruction of either proceeding, i.e., the IRS's efforts to enforce a lien in federal district court or collect delinquent taxes, violated section 1505, notwithstanding the intermediary involvement of the federal district court. Id. 20 Although Senffner tries to distinguish Hopper by pointing out that in that case the IRS was owed the particular debt, and the district court did not take control of the property involved there, neither distinction is persuasive. The SEC's interest, that the securities laws are properly enforced, is a concrete interest and it does not matter that the SEC was not itself actually harmed. The injury to its interest, the securities law violations in this case, could only be remedied if the funds were returned to their proper owner in accordance with the law. Not until that occurred was the agency proceeding completed. Whether the district court had control of the property or not is simply a rerun of Senffner's first argument, which we have already rejected. 21
22 Senffner also argues that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of obstruction of a proceeding pending before the SEC under section 1505, because the government failed to prove that he endeavored to obstruct an SEC proceeding. He argues that there was no evidence that he believed his transfer would frustrate an SEC proceeding, or that after the filing of the lawsuit, the SEC's initial proceeding continued. The jury rejected his characterization of the facts, as we do. 23 In order to prove that Senffner endeavored to obstruct an SEC proceeding under section 1505, the government need only show that Senffner's actions had the natural and probable effect of interfering with that proceeding. Cf. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (requiring the same for the similar obstruction provision in 18 U.S.C. § 1503). Such a showing is sufficient to satisfy the requisite mental state required in section 1505. Cf. id. We believe the government has met that burden. 24 To start, Senffner knew that the SEC was investigating and accounting for all of the funds in the lawsuit. At a minimum, his covert activity concealing the Tennessee Receiver check and his solicitation of Lauer to stall serves as evidence of that fact. The jury could have reasonably determined that his actions, in concealing the Tennessee Receiver check, also had the natural and probable effect of obstructing that investigation proceeding. 25 In addition, Senffner knew that the SEC initiated a proceeding before filing the lawsuit, and that the SEC brought the lawsuit and was prosecuting it as a result of that proceeding. He also knew that the purpose of those efforts was to recover the CHA funds and that purpose could not be achieved until all the funds had been returned. The jury could have reasonably determined that Senffner knew that the initial proceeding was not complete and continued until the funds were recovered. From that, the jury could have also reasonably determined that by concealing the Tennessee Receiver check, Senffner knew that he was obstructing that proceeding. 26 For these reasons, we conclude that Senffner has failed to show that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.