Opinion ID: 1134803
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Issue 7: Was There Defective Legal Representation During the Trial's Guilt Phase?

Text: Review of an ineffective assistance claim begins with a strong presumption that counsel's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To prevail on this claim, Pirtle must show his attorneys were not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment and their errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The first element is met by showing counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Rice, 118 Wash.2d at 888, 828 P.2d 1086. The second element is met by showing that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a reasonable probability the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. Rice, 118 Wash.2d at 888, 828 P.2d 1086. Pirtle claims his trial counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase because his trial counsel (i) conducted an ineffective investigation; (ii) provided inadequate cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses; (iii) failed to object to inadmissible opinion testimony; (iv) opened the door to examining Botner about Pirtle's lack of remorse; (v) was ineffective in numerous off the record conferences; (vi) failed to provide a jury instruction on a diminished capacity defense; and (vii) was ineffective in handling Deputy Walker's testimony. Some of these issues have already been addressed in earlier claims. A. Ineffective Investigation. Pirtle claims he was prejudiced because his trial counsel (1) did not interview a few police witnesses, (2) did not investigate alleged jailhouse informants, and (3) failed to review a police report that discussed the initial police meeting with jailhouse witness Wheeler. These claims fail. First, Pirtle asserts his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel allegedly failed to interview the four investigating police officers, relying instead only on the police reports themselves. While having formal interviews with these witnesses may have been helpful, there is no absolute requirement that defense counsel interview witnesses before trial. This court has previously held that the law must afford the attorney a wide latitude and flexibility in his choice of trial psychology and tactics .... [including], in some instances, whether to interview some witnesses before trial.... State v. Piche, 71 Wash.2d 583, 590, 430 P.2d 522 (1967). Moreover, although there were no formal interviews, Pirtle's counsel spent considerable time reviewing evidence and obtaining answers to various questions with lead Detective Grabenstein and his assistant, Detective Henderson. There has been no showing that this approach was inadequate. Second, Pirtle claims his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to interview two alleged jailhouse informants, Botner and Wheeler. As noted earlier, a central theme to Pirtle's PRP is the assertion that secret inducements were given to these individuals in exchange for their trial testimony. Pirtle contends that interviewing these witnesses would have uncovered these alleged inducements, allowing for impeachment. However, as previously noted, there were no undisclosed inducements to either witness. The declarations of Detectives Grabenstein and Henderson support this fact. Thus, prejudicial error asserted by Pirtle is nonexistent. Third, Pirtle asserts his counsel was ineffective because counsel neglected to review a police report which would have: (1) demonstrated defense counsel's alleged conflict of interest arising from the simultaneous representation by the Spokane Public Defender's Office of Pirtle and prosecution witness Wheeler, (2) demonstrated a Massiah violation, and (3) provided a wealth of impeaching evidence. Pirtle Brief at 158-59. Yet, as previously noted in issues one and three, there was neither a conflict of interest nor a Massiah violation in this case and this claim fails. B. Inadequate Cross-Examination. This claim, which overlaps Pirtle's failure to impeach claim, is that Pirtle's trial counsel violated Pirtle's Sixth Amendment right because counsel did a poor job in cross-examining Botner and Wheeler. However, even a lame cross-examination will seldom, if ever, amount to a Sixth Amendment violation. Henderson v. Norris, 118 F.3d 1283, 1287 (8th Cir.1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1081, 140 L.Ed.2d 138 (1998). Pirtle has not shown or established by evidence that counsel's cross-examination was either ineffective or prejudicial. C. Inadmissible Opinion Testimony. Pirtle asserts his trial counsel failed to object to damaging opinion testimony from Wheeler. Specifically, Pirtle contends that reversal is required because Wheeler was allowed to express his opinion that Pirtle could premeditate. Yet, issues involving premeditation were already examined on appeal. Moreover, even if there was an evidentiary error with Wheeler's opinion testimony, such an error does not constitute a fundamental defect amounting to a miscarriage of justice entitling Pirtle to relief, especially in light of Pirtle's own testimony. Cook, 114 Wash.2d at 811, 792 P.2d 506. The evidence presented at trial established premeditation and motive. Pirtle, in addition to having motive for revenge for his termination from Burger King, chose to rob an establishment where he was well known and could be identified. Pirtle's actions that day, as illustrated by the following excerpt from his appeal, demonstrate premeditation. Pirtle took Dawnya into the walk-in cooler where he struck her several times in the head with two paint cans, then, after she was already unconscious and lying on the floor, he cut her throat. Both Pirtle's testimony and physical evidence show Dawnya resisted the attack. Pirtle then talked Tod into leaving the freezer and walking to the office, telling Tod he only wanted to knock him out. He convinced Tod to take off his glasses and lie face down on the floor, whereupon he hit Tod twice with a fire extinguisher, then retrieved a knife and cut Tod's throat after he was unconscious. There were nine wounds to the front of Tod's neck and eight to the back of his neck, which could have been caused either by the knife or by a hacksaw found on Tod's body. After killing Tod, Pirtle returned to the cooler and cut Dawnya's throat some more, as Pirtle testified, because her body was makin' noises. He sawed at her throat with the knife at least sixteen times, nearly decapitating her. The examining physician speculated the hacksaw also may have been used on Dawnya's neck. Following the murders, Pirtle had the presence of mind to change clothes, gather the robbery proceeds and some of the evidence into a garbage bag, bring his car to the rear of the Burger King, and load the full garbage bag into the car. He drove home, cleaned up the car and himself, and hid the evidence in a compost pile in a neighbor's yard. The above facts, many of which are drawn from Pirtle's own testimony, are sufficient to establish premeditation. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 645, 904 P.2d 245 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). Even assuming the failure to object was deficient by counsel, in view of the other evidence, Pirtle has not met the burden of establishing a fundamental defect. D. Opened the Door. Pirtle contends his counsel was ineffective because counsel opened the door to examination of Botner about Pirtle's lack of remorse. This opportunity arose because Pirtle's trial counsel attempted to gain from Wheeler information that Pirtle had shown remorse when discussing the killings. The efforts of Pirtle's counsel to show Pirtle was remorseful were certainly relevant because they had a direct bearing in showing whether Pirtle's ability to remeditate was more probable or less probable. See ER 401. The attempt of Pirtle's trial counsel to have Botner testify Pirtle was remorseful only falls below an objective standard of reasonableness where, but for the alleged failure to meet an objective standard, there is a reasonable probability the proceeding's outcome would be different. Rice, 118 Wash.2d at 888-89, 828 P.2d 1086. No such showing has been made here. E. Off the Record Conferences. Pirtle contends his trial counsel was ineffective in handling off the record conferences. He claims his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to keep close track of all that transpired during these conferences, and never informed him he had a right to be present at these conferences. As earlier discussed, without additional information, Pirtle's argument fails. To give any weight to Pirtle's argument requires accepting an unsupported assertion as true and then relying on this assumed fact to support the proposition that (1) Pirtle was absent from conferences involving legal matters, Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 306, 868 P.2d 835, and (2) his absence resulted in being actually and substantially prejudiced by a violation of his constitutional rights or by a fundamental error of law. See Cook, 114 Wash.2d at 810, 792 P.2d 506; Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 303, 868 P.2d 835. These conclusions do not follow. Pirtle's has not meet the high burden required of him in this proceeding. F. Jury Instructions. Pirtle charges his counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to provide a diminished capacity instruction. However, on appeal Pirtle already challenged the jury instructions in numerous ways. [9] A personal restraint petition is not meant to be a forum for relitigation of issues already considered on direct appeal.... Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 329, 868 P.2d 835. And, as noted, a petitioner cannot simply revise a previously rejected argument by alleging different facts or by asserting different legal theories. Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 329, 868 P.2d 835 (citing In re Personal Restraint of Jeffries, 114 Wash.2d 485, 488, 789 P.2d 731 (1990).) Thus, Pirtle's ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on allegations of improper jury instructions merely attempts to relitigate issues previously considered on direct appeal. We, therefore, decline Pirtle's invitation to revisit this issue. G. Deputy Cal Walker's Testimony. Pirtle asserts his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to interview Deputy Walker because, if interviewed, Pirtle's counsel would have realized Deputy Walker planned to testify about Pirtle's incriminating one-sentence statement made during his arrest. [10] In response, Deputy Walker has supplied a certificate where he acknowledges he only recalled Pirtle's statement during his testimony. There are no facts to support the argument that interviewing Deputy Walker would have triggered his memory and made Pirtle's counsel aware of this evidence or, as previously discussed, established reversible error. Pirtle also contends his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to impeach Deputy Walker for not mentioning Pirtle's one-sentence statement in his police report. This claim is also unwarranted because, as noted in issue six, Pirtle has failed to meet the high burden required to show that the presentation of his one-sentence statement to Deputy Walker constituted prejudicial error. See Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d at 672, 904 P.2d 245; Cook, 114 Wash.2d at 810, 792 P.2d 506; Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 303, 868 P.2d 835. Any failure of Pirtle's counsel to impeach Deputy Walker does not fall below Sixth Amendment standards. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.