Opinion ID: 2280600
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Heading: The Principle of Double Jeopardy

Text: That the state could not twice put a man in jeopardy for the same offense after an acquittal at a regular trial on an adequate indictment was well established at common law. 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown, 515 (8th ed. 1824); 2 Hale, Pleas of the Crown, 240-50 (1st Am. ed. 1847). In 4 Blackstone's Commentaries, it is said at p. 335: [T]he plea of autrefoits acquit, [2] or a former acquittal, is grounded on this universal maxim of the common law of England, that no man is to be brought into jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence. And hence it is allowed as a consequence, that when a man is once fairly found not guilty upon any indictment or other prosecution, before any court having competent jurisdiction of the offence, he may plead such acquittal in bar of any subsequent accusation for the same crime. This basic common law principle was incorporated in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States [3] and the constitutions of most of the states, Maryland being one of the notable exceptions. However, even though there is no provision in the State Constitution prohibiting double jeopardy, protection against it is available in this state by way of the common law. See Ford v. State, 237 Md. 266, 269, 205 A.2d 809 (1965); Wampler v. Warden, 231 Md. 639, 645, 191 A.2d 594 (1963); Bennett v. State, 229 Md. 208, 212, 182 A.2d 815 (1962); Moquin v. State, 216 Md. 524, 528, 140 A.2d 914 (1958); Eggleston v. State, 209 Md. 504, 513, 121 A.2d 698 (1956); State v. Adams, 196 Md. 341, 344, 76 A.2d 575 (1950); Robb v. State, 190 Md. 641, 650, 60 A.2d 211 (1948). In an early case  Hoffman v. State, 20 Md. 425 (1863), where a jury, after being sworn and charged to try the accused was dismissed because the witnesses did not appear, and, on the second trial, the accused was convicted and sentenced  our predecessors, in adopting the interpretation of the United States' Courts that the Fifth Amendment clause stating that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy (being a `maxim imbedded in the very elements of the common law') meant nothing more than that where there had been a final verdict either of acquittal or conviction, on an adequate indictment, the defendant could not be a second time placed in jeopardy for the particular offense, held that the accused, not having been twice put in jeopardy, was not entitled to be discharged. And in Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 Atl. 354 (1923), it was said at p. 466: That no person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy, is both a provision of the Constitution of the United States, and an established rule of the common law, and a plea of former jeopardy is good under either. The rule forbids a second trial for the same offense whether the accused at the former trial was acquitted or convicted. It is also interesting to note at the outset that the Supreme Court of the United States, applying the Fifth Amendment in a District of Columbia case  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957)  to a factual situation similar to that in the case at bar reached a different result from that here advocated by the State. In the Green case, where the verdict of second degree murder was silent as to murder in the first degree and the defendant, on retrial under the original indictment, after the denial of a plea of second jeopardy, was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death, it was held that double jeopardy precluded the second prosecution. While there is at present no question that the decision in Green does not control our decision in this case, there is some doubt as to whether or not the same result would be reached by the Supreme Court in a state case similar to Green through the application of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [4] Prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment there was not the slightest doubt that the first eight amendments (often referred to as the Bill of Rights) applied to and limited the power of the federal government but were not applicable to the states. See Harris v. State, 194 Md. 288, 71 A.2d 36 (1950). Since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, it has been held from time to time  more frequently in recent years than before  that under the due process clause of that amendment certain basic or fundamental rights, some of which are specifically contained in the Bill of Rights, are protected from violation by the states.