Opinion ID: 386976
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: unnecessary to prove irreparable harm

Text: 17 Moreover, it is not necessary that the Railroads show that they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. When the evidence shows that the defendants are engaged in, or about to be engaged in, the act or practices prohibited by a statute which provides for injunctive relief to prevent such violations, irreparable harm to the plaintiffs need not be shown. Referring expressly to § 306 of the 4-R Act, the court in State of Tennessee v. Louisville and Nashville R.R. Co., 478 F.Supp. 199, 210 (M.D.Tenn.1979), stated: 18 Since Congress has expressly authorized federal courts to grant injunctive relief in furtherance of the express purposes of Section 306, it is not required that irreparable harm or inadequacy of legal remedies first be shown. United States v. City and County of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 30, 60 S.Ct. 749, 757, 84 L.Ed. 1050 (1940). 19 In this case, the court below disagreed with the above statement. The trial court found that the rule stated in Tennessee was limited to situations where the statute in question protects the public health. Order, Dec. 3, 1980, p. 4, n.6. We disagree. The rule has also been applied to statutes which do not protect the public health, such as the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (American Fruit Growers, Inc., v. United States, 105 F.2d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 1939)); the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 (Civil Aeronautics Board v. Modern Air Transport, Inc., 81 F.Supp. 803, 806 (S.D.N.Y.1949) aff'd. 179 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1950)); the Commodity Exchange Act (Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Hunt, 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 2848, 61 L.Ed.2d 290, reh. den. 444 U.S. 888, 100 S.Ct. 189, 62 L.Ed.2d 122); the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 (Shadid v. Fleming, supra; Henderson v. Burd, 133 F.2d 515, 517 (2nd Cir. 1943)); the Interstate Commerce Act (Texas & P. Ry. Co. v. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 266, 273-4 (1926); Long Island Railroad Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 185 F.Supp. 673, 677 (E.D.N.Y.1960), aff'd 281 F.2d 379 (2nd Cir. 1960)); the Labor Management Relations Act (Davis v. Huttig Sash and Door Co., 288 F.Supp. 82 (W.D.Okla. 1968); Wirtz v. Harper Buffing Machine Co., 280 F.Supp. 376 (D.Conn. 1968)); the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (United States v. Cappetto, 502 F.2d 1351, 1358-9 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 925, 95 S.Ct. 1121, 43 L.Ed.2d 395 (1975)); The Postal Act (United States Postal Service v. Beamish, 466 F.2d 804, 806 (3rd Cir. 1972)); and the Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Torr, 87 F.2d 446 (2nd Cir. 1937); Securities and Exchange Comm. v. R. J. Allen and Assoc., Inc., 386 F.Supp. 866, 875 (S. D. Fla. 1974); Securities and Exchange Comm. v. Bennett and Co., 207 F.Supp. 919, 923 (D. N.J. 1962); Securities and Exchange Comm. v. J. & B. Industries, Inc., 388 F.Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974); Securities and Exchange Comm. v. General Refractories Co., 400 F.Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. D.C. 1975)). 20 An analogy may be made between the wording of § 306 of the 4-R Act and the wording of many of the statutes involved in the cases cited above. For example, under §§ 10(j) and 10(l ) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(j) and (l ), the district court has power to grant injunctive relief when presented with an unfair labor charge. The courts have interpreted these statutes as meaning that an injunction may be granted where there is reasonable cause to believe that an unfair labor practice has been committed. See e. g.: National Labor Relations Board v. Acker Industries, Inc., 460 F.2d 649 (10th Cir. 1972); Seeler v. Trading Post, Inc., 517 F.2d 33 (2nd Cir. 1975); Sachs v. Local 48, Journeymen and Apprentices, 454 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1972) (probable cause); Local Joint Board, Hotel and Restaurant Employees v. Sperry, 323 F.2d 75 (8th Cir. 1963); Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union v. Rains, 266 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1959); AFTRA v. Getreu, 258 F.2d 698 (6th Cir. 1958). 3 Similarly, where the trial court finds reasonable cause to believe that a violation of § 11503(b) has been, or is about to be, committed, an injunction should be granted to prevent that violation. As we stated in Shadid v. Fleming, supra, 160 F.2d at 753: 21 Where an injunction is authorized by statute it is unnecessary for plaintiff to plead and prove the existence of the usual equitable grounds, irreparable injury and absence of an adequate remedy at law. It is enough if the requirements of the statute are satisfied. (citations omitted) 22 The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo. Penn v. San Juan Hospital, Inc., 528 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1975). If the railroads are forced to pay the full amount of their assessed taxes to the State of Kansas, the status quo would not be maintained. 23 The trial court stated that the court is mindful that plaintiffs will probably prevail on the merits. Order, Dec. 3, 1980, p. 17. In light of that finding, the court should have granted the preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo. 4 24 We agree that under United States v. Brown, 331 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1964), the district court's decision to deny the preliminary injunction may only be overturned if the court abused its discretion in reaching that decision. We hold that in applying traditional equitable criteria to determine whether to grant or deny an injunction authorized by statute that the court abused its discretion.