Opinion ID: 564390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Prior Robbery Conviction

Text: 32 Perkins finally contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to preclude introduction under Fed.R.Evid. 609 of his prior bank robbery conviction. Perkins claims that because the prior conviction is for the same crime as the charged offense, there is a strong likelihood that the jury would consider the evidence as character evidence. The district court's decision to admit this evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Browne, 829 F.2d 760, 762 (9th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 991, 108 S.Ct. 1298, 99 L.Ed.2d 508 (1988). 33 Rule 609(a)(1) allows the introduction of prior felony convictions to impeach the credibility of a witness if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. In Browne, where we considered a claim similar to Perkins's, we reiterated five factors which should be considered in performing this balancing: (1) the impeachment value of the prior crime; (2) the point in time of the conviction; (3) the similarity between the past crime and the charged offense; (4) the importance of the defendant's testimony; and (5) the centrality of the defendant's credibility. Browne, 829 F.2d at 762-63. There, as here, all of the factors except the similarity of the prior to the charged offense counseled in favor of admissibility. We therefore specifically noted that if a bank robbery conviction serves a proper impeachment purpose, it, like evidence of other crimes, may be admissible in spite of its similarity to the offense at issue. Id. at 763. Accordingly, the admission under Rule 609 of a bank robbery conviction in a bank robbery trial is not an abuse of discretion when the conviction serves a proper impeachment purpose, such as when the defendant's testimony and credibility are central to the case. See id. at 762-63; United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926, 99 S.Ct. 310, 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). 34 In this case, defendant's credibility and testimony were central to the case, as Perkins took the stand and testified that he did not commit the robbery. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Perkins's motion to preclude the government from asking him about his recent prior conviction for bank robbery, which Perkins admitted on direct examination, and painting a complete picture of Perkins's trustworthiness as a witness.