Opinion ID: 2338120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The trial court committed reversible error in admitting the twenty-four and twenty-five year old prior felony convictions for impeachment purposes.

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing in stale convictions as impeachment evidence. We agree. At trial, the prosecutor's first statement to Appellant upon cross-examination was, You are a convicted felon. Appellant's counsel immediately objected, maintaining that the convictions (theft and receiving stolen property) were too old to use, as the most recent conviction was twenty-four (24) years old. However, the trial judge determined that the convictions dealt with veracity and were thus admissible. Appellant then admitted that he was a convicted felon. KRE 609 governs the admissibility of prior convictions to impeach a witness's credibility. It permits the admission of a prior felony for impeachment, pursuant to certain limitations. See KRE 609(a). However, KRE 609(b) states that evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible  if it is more than ten (10) years old unless the probative value substantially outweighs its prejudicial effect. (emphasis added). Clearly, the language of KRE 609(b) creates a presumption of inadmissibility for convictions over ten years old unless the convictions are so substantially probative as to tip the scales back in favor of admissibility. While KRE 609(b) does not divest a trial judge of his discretion in admitting stale convictions, it is precatory in that it acknowledges a much higher threshold for admissibility. See McGinnis v. Commonwealth, 875 S.W.2d 518, 528 (Ky.1994) overruled on other grounds by Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416, 421 (Ky.1998). In Miller v. Marymount Medical Center, we noted that when ruling on admissibility for impeachment evidence under KRE 609(b), the balancing test is the exact inverse of the typical balancing test under KRE 403. 125 S.W.3d 274, 284 (Ky.2004) (Under KRE 403, relevant evidence is admissible unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Under KRE 609(b), the evidence is inadmissible unless its prejudicial effect is substantially outweighed by its probative value.). Moreover, this Court outlined a series of factors relevant in conducting this balancing test, which include: 1) whether the witness has placed his credibility in issue by testifying in contravention to other witnesses; 2) whether the prior conviction being offered for impeachment is probative of truthfulness; 3) whether the case is civil or criminal; and 4) the age of the conviction sought to be introduced. See id. at 285-286. Where the facts of any particular case fall along the spectrum of these factors will influence the balancing that a trial judge must undertake. For instance, prior felony convictions will be more prejudicial in a criminal case than a civil case, and a ten year old conviction will be more probative than a twenty year old conviction. Id. Here, the stale convictions did not just slightly miss the mark. Appellant's prior convictions occurred a quarter of a century prior to the circumstances for which he was on trial. This Court has consistently recognized the heightened scrutiny which stale convictions should receive. In Brown v. Commonwealth, we held that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting a twenty-two (22) year old prior conviction for storehouse breaking. 812 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Ky.1991), overruled on other grounds by Stringer v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883 (Ky.1997). Also, in Scruggs v. Commonwealth, we held that the trial court properly excluded appellant's seventeen (17) year old prior felony conviction because it was so remote as to have no bearing on credibility. 566 S.W.2d 405, 408 (Ky.1978). As we noted in Sommers v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 879, 887 (Ky.1992), [a]s a conviction recedes into the past, the value on the issue of credibility wanes proportionately, while its prejudice as to guilt is less easily dispelled. The standard of review for the admission of evidence is whether a trial court has abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999). And in conducting a KRE 609(b) balancing test, the onus is on a trial judge to render findings of fact. See Miller, 125 S.W.3d at 286. Here, the trial judge's findings of fact failed to support admissibility under the KRE 609(b) balancing test, and, thus, he abused his discretion in allowing the introduction of Appellant's twenty-four and twenty-five year old prior convictions. We disagree with the Court of Appeals' determination that the trial judge did engage in sufficient balancing and that, as in Miller, Appellant's prior convictions of theft and receiving stolen property were admissible because they reflected upon his credibility as crimes of dishonesty. See Miller, 125 S.W.3d at 285 (holding introduction of burglary conviction which was more than ten years old admissible). Although, certainly this is a relevant factor, it is not the only consideration. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 674 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Ky. 1984). In this regard, several important distinctions bear addressing. First, Miller was a civil case, whereas, this is a criminal matter. As the Court noted in Miller, while evidence that a party is a convicted felon is always prejudicial, it obviously is not as prejudicial in a civil case as in a criminal case. 125 S.W.3d at 285. Second, the nature of the offense is but one of the considerations the Court outlines in Miller that a trial judge should weigh. Third, although unclear from the opinion, it appears that the aged conviction in Miller was approximately twelve years old. Here, the most recent conviction was twenty-four years old. Thus, although the facts in Miller supported a determination of admissibility, given the circumstances of this particular case, we are, respectfully, disinclined to agree with the Court of Appeals' determination that the present instance was sufficiently analogous, or that the trial judge here reached the appropriate KRE 609(b) result. In the present instance, witness credibility was central to the furtherance of either side's position, as both Appellant and his accuser, V., gave drastically conflicting testimony about what happened on the night in question. Therefore, the result likely hinged on whose account the jury deemed more reliable. Assuredly, the introduction into evidence that one of the parties telling their story was a convicted felon had the potential to irreparably taint the jury's perception of that person. Here, the trial judge allowed the introduction of Appellant's stale offenses while properly disallowing introduction of his accuser's felony charge and diversion. While we find this secondary ruling correct, in all probability, it had the effect of further skewing the jury's perception of the testimony. Thus, we cannot say that introduction of this evidence was harmless. RCr 9.24. Therefore, the admission of Appellant's quarter-century old prior convictions was an abuse of discretion and particularly prejudicial, bearing in mind the nature of the case. Accordingly, we find that the trial court committed reversible error in so doing. See Brown, 812 S.W.2d at 503.