Opinion ID: 161717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Read and Heed Presumption

Text: 32 In order to prevail on her products liability claim, Plaintiff had to establish the following three factors under Oklahoma law: (1) a defect existed in the product at the time it left the manufacturer, retailer, or supplier's control; (2) the defect made the product unreasonably dangerous; and (3) the defect in the product was the cause of the injury. See Alexander v. Smith & Nephew, P.L.C., 90 F. Supp. 2d. 1225, 1232 (N.D. Okla. 2000). One of the theories asserted by Plaintiff was that Defendants' mower was defective and unreasonably dangerous because of the lack of adequate warnings about the need for a ROPS. In order to prevail on this claim, Plaintiff had to show that the lack of adequate warnings about a ROPS caused the injuries to Black. See Daniel v. Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d 1329, 1332 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, under Plaintiff's lack of warning theory, Plaintiff first had to establish that any warning about the need for a ROPS on Defendants' mower would have prompted Black to purchase a ROPS. 5 Under Oklahoma law, there is a rebuttable presumption that Plaintiff would have read and heeded an adequate warning. See id. This presumption, however, disappears once the defendant comes forward with some evidence indicating that the plaintiff would not have followed the warning. See id. 33 The immediate target of Defendants' appellate challenge is Jury Instruction No. 8, which stated: 34 The law presumes that if an adequate warning regarding the need for a ROPS safety frame had been given to John Black it would have been followed. You must follow this presumption unless and until evidence is presented that satisfies you by a preponderance of the evidence that such a warning would not have been followed by Mr. Black. 35 Defendants claim (1) that no presumption instruction should have been given because they presented evidence rebutting the presumption and (2) that the effect of the trial court's instruction was to shift to Defendants the burden of proving that Black would not have followed the proposed warning and purchased a ROPS. 36 Defendants, however, did not object to Instruction No. 8. This court's review of the jury instruction is thus limited. In a civil case each party must live with the legal theory reflected in instructions to which it does not object. Therefore, this court will not review instructions given to which no objections were lodged before the jury retired for deliberation unless they are patently plainly erroneous and prejudicial. Zimmerman v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 848 F.2d 1047, 1054 (10th Cir. 1988) (quotations and citations omitted). 37 This court agrees that Instruction No. 8 erroneously shifted the burden of proof from Plaintiff to Defendants on whether Black would have followed the proposed warning and purchased a ROPS. Defendants did present evidence that Black would not have purchased a ROPS even if a warning to that effect was included. Because of this evidence, under Oklahoma law the presumption disappeared and Instruction No. 8 should not have been given. See Ben E. Keith Co., 97 F.3d at 1332-33. 38 Instruction No. 8, however, did not result in such a miscarriage of justice that the jury's decision must be vacated. Aspen Highlands Sking Corp. v. Aspen Sking Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th Cir. 1984) (quotation omitted). Jury Instruction No. 2 properly informed the jury that [t]he burden is upon the plaintiff in a civil action such as this to prove every essential element of the claim by a preponderance of the evidence. If the proof should fail to establish any essential element of plaintiff's claim by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury should find for the defendants. It is possible that the jury resolved the discrepancy between Instruction No. 2 and Instruction No. 8 in favor of Defendants and thus correctly placed the burden of demonstrating that Black would have followed the warning on Plaintiff. 39 Even if the jury did follow Instruction No. 8 and shifted the burden to Defendants to prove Black would not have followed the warning, this court cannot state on appeal that this error was patently . . . prejudicial so as to require a reversal of the jury verdict. Zimmerman, 848 F.2d at 1054 (quotation omitted). Both sides presented evidence addressing whether Black would have bought a ROPS if there had been a warning that a ROPS was necessary. The jury was thus required to weigh conflicting evidence in determining whether a party had met its burden of proof. In doing so, it presumably followed that portion of Instruction No. 2 defining a preponderance of evidence as that amount and quality of evidence rendering a matter more likely so than not so. See Weber v. Cont'l Cas. Co, 379 F.2d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 1967). As a consequence, Defendants were prejudiced by Instruction No. 8's erroneous allocation of the burden of proof only if the jury considered the evidence of Black's likelihood to heed a warning presented by both sides equipoised. While it is conceivable that the jury viewed the evidence as being in complete equilibrium, this mere possibility does not rise to the level of demonstrating that Instruction No. 8 was patently . . . prejudicial to Defendants. Zimmerman, 848 F.2d at 1054 (quotation omitted). In light of this court's limited standard of review, Instruction No. 8 did not constitute reversible error. 40