Opinion ID: 2607714
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity Under California Law The Initiative Process

Text: Is an initiative measure which directs the state Legislature to apply for a constitutional convention clearly invalid under California law? Clearly not. Before confronting that issue, however, we should first review certain fundamental principles which control our disposition. First and foremost, All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 1.) A corollary to this is that the legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature ..., but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum. ( Id., art. IV, § 1, italics added.) Finally, The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them. ( Id., art. II, § 8, subd. (a).) The majority would apply a narrow construction of the scope of the initiative power under the California Constitution. In the majority's view, directing the Legislature to apply for a constitutional convention involves neither a statute nor an amendment to the state Constitution. But use of such a narrow construction of the people's initiative right is directly contrary to the teachings of prior decisions of this court which require a liberal construction favoring the exercise of the initiative power. Justice Tobriner set forth the applicable principles as follows: The amendment of the California Constitution in 1911 to provide for the initiative and referendum signifies one of the outstanding achievements of the progressive movement of the early 1900's. Drafted in light of the theory that all power of government ultimately resides in the people, the amendment speaks of the initiative and referendum, not as a right granted the people, but as a power reserved by them. Declaring it `the duty of the courts to jealously guard this right of the people' ( Martin v. Smith (1959) 176 Cal. App.2d 115, 117 [1 Cal. Rptr. 307]), the courts have described the initiative and referendum as articulating `one of the most precious rights of our democratic process' ( Mervynne v. Acker [1961] 189 Cal. App.2d 558, 563 [11 Cal. Rptr. 340]). `[I]t has long been our judicial policy to apply a liberal construction to this power wherever it is challenged in order that the right be not improperly annulled. If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, courts will preserve it.' ( Mervynne v. Acker, supra, 189 Cal. App.2d 558, 563-564; Gayle v. Hamm, supra, 25 Cal. App.3d 250, 258.) ( Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591 [135 Cal. Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473, 92 A.L.R.3d 1038], italics added, fns. omitted.) Since Associated Home Builders, we have often followed these admonitions regarding this constitutional right. (See, e.g., Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 241 [186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274] [upholding the Victims' Bill of Rights initiative]; Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 41 [157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46] [upholding, in most respects, the Political Reform Act of 1974]; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 219-220, 248 [149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] [upholding the Jarvis-Gann property tax initiative]; see also Legislature, supra, 34 Cal.3d 658, 683 [dis. opn.].) Under a liberal construction of the precious and reserved initiative power, the people clearly would have authority to direct their own representatives in the state Legislature to apply for a constitutional convention. Such an initiative measure reasonably could be deemed a proposal for the adoption of a statute. There is no fixed, immutable definition of the term statute. The term could refer to any formal, written exercise of legislative power, whether or not codified and placed within the California codes. The Code of Civil Procedure defines statute as any written law other than a constitution. (§ 1897; see also former Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1 [initiative is the power to propose laws].) The people's written directive to the Legislature, mandating it to apply for a constitutional convention, certainly would qualify as a written law, i.e., a statute. Under this interpretation, we do not need to reach the further issue troubling the majority, namely, whether a legislative resolution applying for a constitutional convention is a statute. The statute involved here is the one enacted by the people, directing the Legislature to submit that application. For example, a recent initiative measure in part required the Legislature to adopt provisions implementing the right of crime victims to monetary restitution. (Prop. 8, adopted at the June 1982 Primary Election, now art. I, § 28, subd. (b).) Is not this procedural mandate from the people to the Legislature a written law? If so, then in what respects does the initiative measure before us fail to qualify as proposing such a law? Would it have made any difference if our measure had recited that its text would be formally incorporated into a new section of the Government Code? Surely such formalism cannot prevail over the people's right to be heard on matters of grave importance to them. Indeed, our prior cases require us to resolve all doubts in favor of the exercise of the initiative power, especially where the subject matter of the measure is of public interest and concern. (See Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 330 [118 Cal. Rptr. 637, 530 P.2d 605] [state initiative measure declaring state policy on forced busing]; Farley v. Healey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 325, 328-329 [62 Cal. Rptr. 26, 431 P.2d 650] [local initiative measure adopting policy favoring immediate ceasefire and withdrawal from Vietnam].) As stated in the Santa Barbara case, The people of California through the initiative process, have the power to declare state policy. (P. 330.) Surely, then, they have the power to direct the Legislature, as their representative, to declare such policy on their behalf. We should bear in mind that, unlike the limited referendum power, the initiative is not confined by any state constitutional restrictions upon its scope or use. (See Cal. Const., art. II, §§ 8, 9; Carlson v. Cory (1983) 139 Cal. App.3d 724, 728 [189 Cal. Rptr. 185] [repeal of state inheritance and gift taxes].) As Carlson observes, there is nothing in our state Constitution which prohibits the use of the statutory initiative to repeal tax laws. (P. 731.) Similarly, nothing in the state Constitution forbids use of the initiative to direct the Legislature to apply for a constitutional convention. In a case upholding the validity of another statewide initiative measure (Prop. 13, adopted June 6, 1978, now Cal. Const., art. XIII A), we acknowledged that the initiative may be viewed as a ` legislative battering ram ' aimed at `tear[ing] through the exasperating tangle of the traditional legislative procedure and strik[ing] directly toward the desired end.' [Citation.] ( Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, 228.) Given the numerous rejected or abandoned bills aimed at accomplishing the end sought by the initiative measure challenged in this case, the foregoing description seems unusually apt. As in Amador Valley, Although we express neither approval nor disapproval of the [measure] from the standpoint of sound fiscal or social policy (p. 229), we should uphold it in recognition of the constitutional principle that All political power is inherent in the people. (Cal. Const., art. II, § 1.) Liberally construed, the initiative power applies here.