Opinion ID: 76404
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: voting rights claim

Text: 35 Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, as amended, prohibits the use of any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure ... which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). 20 In 1982, Congress amended the Act to provide explicitly that a violation of Section 2 36 is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 37 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). 38 The 1982 amendments were passed in response to the Supreme Court's opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), which held that proof of intentional discrimination was necessary to establish violations of both the Fifteenth Amendment and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. The 1982 amendments instead established a results test to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to establish a violation of Section 2. S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 2 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 179; see also United States v. Marengo County Comm'n, 731 F.2d 1546, 1557 (11th Cir.1984) (describing the enactment of the 1982 amendments). 39 The new subsection (b) provides that the issue to be decided under the results test is whether the political processes are equally open to minority voters. S. Rep. at 2. In explaining the amended standard, the 1982 Senate Judiciary Committee majority report lays out a broad, non-exclusive list of factors to consider (the Senate factors), which include any history of voting-related official discrimination, the extent to which minority group members bear the effects of discrimination in other areas which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process, and the extent to which the State has used voting practices that tend to enhance the opportunity to discriminate against the minority group. 21 Id. at 28-29. 40 Guided by the relevant Senate factors, courts must then evaluate a Section 2 claim based on the totality of circumstances. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b). In other words, [t]he essence of a § 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). 22 Although different factors have varying relevance depending on the particular practice at issue, see S. Rep. at 28, it is clear that a proper examination cannot focus solely on one explanation for the vote denial or abridgement but must involve a [s]earching practical evaluation of the past and present reality of the challenged voting structure, Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45, 106 S.Ct. 2752, and its interaction with social and historical conditions, id. at 47 n. 8, 106 S.Ct. 2752, including the searching and meaningful evaluation of all the relevant evidence. Southern Christian Leadership Conference of Ala.v. Sessions, 56 F.3d 1281, 1293 (11th Cir.1995) ( en banc ). Each situation is particular, and as a result, each inquiry is fact-intensive. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. 2752 (This determination is peculiarly dependent upon the facts of each case, and requires an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of the contested electoral mechanisms.) (internal citations omitted). 41 In this case, the Plaintiffs challenge the adverse summary judgment on their Section 2 vote denial claim, arguing that the district court erred by failing to consider the evidence they presented in accordance with the totality of the circumstances standard delineated above. We agree. In granting summary judgment, the district court simply concluded that it is not racial discrimination that deprives felons, black or white, of their right to vote but their own decision to commit an act for which they assume the risks of detection and punishment. Johnson, 214 F.Supp.2d at 1341. This conclusion, however, only begs the question. The proper question here is whether felon status interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives. 23 Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 2752. Indeed, in Hunter, the Supreme Court found that Alabama's criminal disenfranchisement law could not constitutionally be used as a tool for discrimination on the basis of race, even though the plaintiffs had been convicted of crimes. 24 Thus, the fact that the Plaintiffs have been convicted of crimes was not a bar to the plaintiffs claims in Hunter v. Underwood, and should play no different role in the case at hand. Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F.Supp. 1304, 1313 (E.D.Wash.1997) ( Farrakhan I ), aff'd by Farrakhan v. Washington, 338 F.3d 1009, 1016 (9th Cir.2003) ( Farrakhan III ) (agreeing that disenfranchised felons may state a claim of vote denial under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act). We therefore find that the district court erred by relying at summary judgment solely on the fact of the Plaintiffs' criminal convictions rather than looking to the totality of the circumstances. 42 In addition, the district court relied on the Eastern District of Washington's opinion in Farrakhan v. Locke, No. 96-0076, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22212 (E.D.Wash.2000) ( Farrakhan II ), which granted summary judgment on the basis that discrimination in the criminal justice system was insufficient to establish that Washington's felon disenfranchisement law violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act. That case, however, was reversed, and the appellate court concluded that [t]o the extent that racial bias and discrimination in the criminal justice system contribute to the conviction of minorities..., such discrimination would clearly hinder the ability of racial minorities to participate effectively in the political process, as disenfranchisement is automatic. Thus, racial bias in the criminal justice system may very well interact with voter disqualifications to create the kind of barriers to political participation on account of race that are prohibited by Section 2, rendering it simply another relevant social and historical condition to be considered where appropriate. 43 Farrakhan III, 338 F.3d at 1020. We agree with this analysis and conclude that the district court erred in disregarding the Plaintiffs' evidence of discrimination in the criminal justice system at the summary judgment stage. The weight due to this evidence is a disputed question for the fact-finder at trial. 25 44 Finally, we note that the Plaintiffs presented evidence bearing on a number of relevant Senate factors, including, inter alia, (1) a history of official discrimination by the State of Florida touching on the right to vote, including but not limited to the racially discriminatory origins of blanket felon disenfranchisement in the state; (2) the use of voting practices or procedures that enhance opportunities for discrimination against the minority group; and (3) the effects of discrimination in other areas that affect felon disenfranchisement, such as education, employment, and health. 26 When taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, a fact-finder could conclude that under the totality of the circumstances test, this evidence demonstrates intentional racial discrimination behind Florida's felon disenfranchisement as well as a nexus between disenfranchisement and racial bias in other areas, such as the criminal justice system, in violation of the Voting Rights Act. 45 For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment should not have been granted on the Plaintiffs' Section 2 vote denial claim. 27