Opinion ID: 2981772
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Initial medical certification

Text: The FMLA allows an employee who suffers from a “serious health condition” to take a total of twelve weeks of leave each year if the condition renders him or her “unable to perform the -5- functions of the position.” 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Migraine headaches are considered a “serious health condition” for purposes of the FMLA. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(d) (providing that “headaches other than migraine” are not “serious health conditions” under the FMLA (emphasis added)). FMLA leave may be taken on an intermittent basis, see 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1), which this court has described as “a series of absences, separated by days during which the employee is at work, but all of which are taken for the same medical reason, subject to the same notice, and taken during the same twelve-month period.” Davis v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 543 F.3d 345, 350-51 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Graham claims that her initial medical certification entitled her to take leave in whatever increment she chose, and that BCBST’s reliance on her absences to justify her termination violated the FMLA. In other words, she asserts an “interference” claim under the FMLA. See Culpepper v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 321 F. App’x 491, 496 (6th Cir. 2009) (“An employee . . . who believes that she was entitled to FMLA leave with respect to her unexcused absences, may assert a cause of action for FMLA interference.”). In order to succeed on an interference claim, Graham must establish the following elements: (1) she was an eligible employee, (2) the defendant was an employer as defined under the FMLA, (3) she was entitled to leave under the FMLA, (4) she gave the employer notice of her intention to take leave, and (5) the employer denied the employee FMLA benefits to which she was entitled. Edgar v. JAC Prods., Inc., 443 F.3d 501, 507 (6th Cir. 2006). We agree with the district court’s ruling that Graham’s initial medical certification did not entitle her to take her remaining nine weeks of FMLA leave in the configuration of her choice—which goes to the fourth element of Graham’s claim. One of the FMLA’s purposes at issue -6- here—entitling employees to reasonable leave for personal medical reasons—must be effectuated “in a manner that accommodates the legitimate interests of employers.” 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1)–(3). The district court correctly observed that the FMLA’s requirement that an employee’s medical certification for intermittent leave include “the expected duration of the intermittent leave,” 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(6), serves to put the employer on notice as to how much work the employee might miss and to allow the employer to plan accordingly. To hold that a medical certification for intermittent leave—which provides no estimate as to the frequency or duration of the employee’s absences—authorizes an employee to take leave in whatever increment he or she chooses would not properly balance the employee’s interests with those of the employer. Because we agree with the district court’s ruling on this matter, our focus is on the fifth element of Graham’s interference claim. This requires us to analyze whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the reasonableness of BCBST’s request for medical recertification.