Opinion ID: 2974500
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment for the City of Dayton

Text: On appeal, Plaintiffs assert that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the City of Dayton on Plaintiff's § 1981 and § 1985 claims. Plaintiffs do not appeal the district court's ruling as to their tortious interference, detrimental reliance, and civil conspiracy claims against the City.
Page 22 of 25 In essence, Plaintiffs alleged that the City failed to select Plaintiffs, the BAT entities, as the City's partner in bringing baseball to Dayton based on Rock Newman's race. In moving for summary judgment, the City proffered numerous legitimate reasons–largely financial–for its ultimate decision to select Mandalay rather than Plaintiffs, and the district court found that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the City's articulated reasons for its actions were pretextual. The district court accordingly entered summary judgment in favor of the City on Plaintiffs' § 1981 claim. As noted by the district court, the City believed that it could not unilaterally terminate the MOU/DPBC without incurring significant liquidated damages. Indeed, the MOU/DPBC provided that, in limited defined circumstances, the the City ha[d] the right, but not the obligation, to withdraw from the Project upon a majority vote of the City Commission . . . and upon payment by the City to the Tenant of $500,000 as liquidated damages for such withdrawal. J.A. at 1186. Plaintiffs contend that Myers's November 1997 public announcement that she was terminating her efforts to bring baseball to downtown Dayton constituted a de facto termination of the MOU/DPBC, freeing the City from its obligation to pay liquidated damages. It is undisputed, however, that, when the City asked Myers to memorialize what appeared to be her termination of the MOU/DPBC, she refused to do so. Moreover, in a letter dated December 6, 1997, weeks after Myers made her public announcement, SSI's Ehrenreich expressed concern about the continuing effect of the MOU/DPBC, explaining to the City Manager that we cannot present our proposal to the City until you formally terminate the City's agreement with Tom Dickson and Sherrie Myers, which the City Commission authorized weeks ago.4 J.A. at 1052. As correctly recognized by the district court, the City had 4 By letter dated December 1, 1997, the Mayor of Dayton, Michael Turner, offered SSI the City's assistance in bringing minor league baseball to our downtown. J.A. at 1351. Prior to that time, the City Manager had informed Ehrenreich that he could provide to the City, on an unsolicited Page 23 of 25 a genuine concern, from a legal perspective, that it could not terminate the DPBC MOU unilaterally without incurring a $500,000 penalty. J.A. at 606. Consistent with its concern about the continuing effect of the MOU/DPBC, the City decided to explore the possibility that Myers might sell the Rockford Cubbies and assign the MOU/DPBC to another group interested in bringing baseball to Dayton. BAT was one such group. Indeed, on November 12, 1997, the day following the public announcement by Myers, Ehrenreich called someone–he couldn't recall if it was Myers's attorney or one of the guys at the Cubs–to offer to purchase Myers's interest in the Cubbies. The response was: We're still taking [what happened yesterday] all in and we'll call you if we're interested. J.A. at 1019. Ehrenreich never received a call back and he never pursued the matter further. As he admitted in his deposition: I was really never interested in purchasing her interest. Id. at 1043. Thus, as proffered by the City and noted by the district court, BAT failed to make itself a practicable option for the MOU/DPBC-bound City. Mandalay, on the other hand, not only agreed to acquire the MOU/DPBC by purchasing the DPBC; it also agreed to negotiate different financial terms with the City: namely, it agreed to increase the stadium budget cap to $22.7 million (to reflect added environmental costs), decrease the City's funding commitment to $14.5 million (to reflect the City's budget problems), and find a third party (perhaps the team) to cover the shortfall. Thus, unlike BAT, Mandalay presented the City with what the City considered to be a viable option, an option that not only resolved the contractual issues with which the City struggled but also addressed the budgetary problems with which the City was newly faced. Although Plaintiffs contend that the agreement reached with Mandalay was a far worse stadium deal than the deal informally offered by BAT, BAT never presented the City with basis, SSI's proposal for bringing baseball to downtown Dayton. Id. at 1148. Page 24 of 25 an option that was similar to the overall-acceptable option presented by Mandalay. As the district court quite properly determined, Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the City's contractual and financial reasons for choosing Mandalay were pretextual. The district court was not persuaded otherwise by Plaintiffs' reference to a purportedly racist comment made by the Mayor of Dayton. According to Ehrenreich, the Mayor at one time asked Ehrenreich whether BAT would consider dealing with Dayton without the involvement of Newman. The Mayor explained by saying: [W]ell, [Newman] called me a racist and I resent that. J.A. at 1028. The district court determined that this statement constituted neither direct nor indirect evidence of racial animus. Rather, the court wrote: [I]t gives rise to a finding that Mayor Turner did not like Newman. Id. at 610. The district court thus rejected Plaintiffs' argument that the Mayor's resentment of Newman (for calling the Mayor a racist) was sufficient to give rise to an inference that the Mayor himself was emoting racist sentiments. As the district court correctly suggested, it is not unlawful to resent someone for the disparaging remarks he or she makes. Plaintiffs contend that the district court failed to draw reasonable inferences in Plaintiffs' favor, granted unwarranted deference to the City's business judgment, and ignored Plaintiffs' evidence that, even if the City's proffered reasons had a basis in fact, those reasons were insufficient to motivate the City's decision to award the minor league baseball franchise to Mandalay rather than BAT. We find no merit to Plaintiff's arguments. The district court correctly found that the City was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs' § 1981 claim, Plaintiffs having utterly failed to establish pretext.
The district court disposed of Plaintiff's § 1985 conspiracy claim by writing: Page 25 of 25 The Plaintiffs have not adduced any evidence that the City entered into an agreement to deprive them of their equal protections of the law. There is also no evidence of racial animus. . . .[T]here being no genuine issue of material fact, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment is SUSTAINED. J.A. at 611. We find no error in the district court's treatment of this claim.