Opinion ID: 1158402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Adequacy of the recommended discipline

Text: (6a) We come now to the heart of this case. The State Bar Court's hearing judge recommended a 15-day actual suspension. Morse objected to that as excessive and requested the review department to consider the issue. The review department increased the recommended actual suspension to a period of 60 days. Morse then sought our review, claiming the period of actual suspension is excessive. Our order granting review placed him on notice that we would consider ... whether the level of discipline should be increased. As we shall explain, we conclude the 60-day actual suspension recommended by the review department is not sufficient. We increase the actual suspension to three years, subject to a possible reduction to two years, which reduction is contingent on Morse's timely and full payment of the superior court judgment against him for penalties and restitution. We begin by looking to the purpose of sanctions for attorney misconduct. (7) The primary purposes of disciplinary proceedings conducted by the State Bar of California and of sanctions imposed ... are the protection of the public, the courts and the legal profession; the maintenance of high professional standards by attorneys and the preservation of public confidence in the legal profession. (Std. 1.3; see also Garlow v. State Bar (1982) 30 Cal.3d 912, 916 [180 Cal. Rptr. 831, 640 P.2d 1106].) (8a) We next consider our role in reviewing recommended discipline. To be sure, [w]e generally accord great weight to the review department's recommendation. ( Bercovich v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 116, 131 [266 Cal. Rptr. 341, 785 P.2d 889]; In re Lamb (1989) 49 Cal.3d 239, 245 [260 Cal. Rptr. 856, 776 P.2d 765]; Garlow v. State Bar, supra, 30 Cal.3d 912, 917.) Nevertheless, ... the ultimate decision rests with this court, and we have not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than recommended by the department. ( In re Mostman (1989) 47 Cal.3d 725, 740 [254 Cal. Rptr. 286, 765 P.2d 448] [actual suspension increased from eighteen months to two years]; Carter v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1091, 1100-1101 [245 Cal. Rptr. 628, 751 P.2d 894] [one-year probation with no actual suspension increased to two years' probation with six months' actual suspension]; Martin v. State Bar (1978) 20 Cal.3d 717, 723 [144 Cal. Rptr. 214, 575 P.2d 757], [six months' actual suspension increased to one year].) When the facts have warranted doing so, we have even rejected a recommendation of suspension and disbarred the attorney. ( In re Nevill [1985], 39 Cal.3d 729, 735 [217 Cal. Rptr. 841, 704 P.2d 1332].) ( Blair v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 762, 776 [263 Cal. Rptr. 641, 781 P.2d 933], italics added [actual suspension increased from 18 months to 2 years]; accord Garlow v. State Bar, supra, 30 Cal.3d 912, 916 [The ultimate decision, of course, remains with us.].) As we shall explain, this is an appropriate case for increasing the recommended discipline. (See, e.g., Blair v. State Bar, supra, 49 Cal.3d 762, 776.) In deciding appropriate discipline, we consider the underlying misconduct and aggravating and mitigating circumstances, if any. ( Blair v. State Bar, supra, 49 Cal.3d 762, 776.) As the review department correctly observed in the present case, In a disciplinary proceeding, the deputy trial counsel must prove culpability and aggravating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (See In the Matter of Respondent H (Review Dept. 1992) 2 Cal.State Bar Ct. Rptr. 234, 239, and cases cited therein; Trans. Rules Proc. of State Bar, div. V, Standards for Atty. Sanctions for Prof. Misconduct (`stds.'), std. 1.2(b).) The attorney accused of misconduct must prove mitigating circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. (Std. 1.2(e).) (6b) As set forth above (pp. 201-202, ante ), Morse's misconduct is well established by the required clear and convincing evidence, and we fully agree with the review department's findings of misconduct. We also agree with the department's findings regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances. (Pp. 197-198, ante. ) (8b) To determine the appropriate level of discipline after these facts are established, we, like the review department, must look first to the standards for guidance. These guidelines are not binding on us, but they promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures. Hence, we have said that `we will not reject a recommendation arising from application of the Standards unless we have grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline....' ( In re Lamb, supra, 49 Cal.3d 239, 245, quoting Lawhorn v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1357, 1366 [240 Cal. Rptr. 848, 743 P.2d 908].) (6c) As the review department explained, the standards, however, provide little guidance in this case. Standard 2.6 provides that Morse's violation of section 6068 ... shall result in disbarment or suspension depending on the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim[s], with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3. Morse was also found by the review department to have violated rules 1-400(D)(2) and 1-400(D)(3). Those violations are subject to standard 2.10, which applies to a ... wilful violation of any Rule of Professional Conduct not specified in these standards.... Standard 2.10, like standard 2.6, provides for a wide range of discipline: ... reproval or suspension according to the gravity of the offense or the harm, if any, to the victim[s], with due regard to the purposes of imposing discipline set forth in standard 1.3. In light of the lack of specificity in the applicable standards, we must use as our lodestar the purposes of discipline, as set forth above. (P. 205, ante. ) We respectfully reject as inadequate the review department's recommendation for an actual suspension of only 60 days. Indeed, so short an actual suspension seems contrary to the department's own recognition of ... significant aggravating circumstances [even beyond those found by the hearing judge] ..., gross negligence, the extended and methodical nature of [Morse's] misleading advertisements, the absence of any significant mitigation, and the need to maintain high professional standards and to preserve public confidence in the legal profession.... We agree with that view of this case. We believe, however, that such circumstances warrant more severe discipline in the form of a period of actual suspension for three years, subject to a possible reduction to two years. Before proceeding further to discuss Morse's particular circumstances, we note an additional shortcoming in the review department's approach. The department stated that: We do not consider more serious discipline than 60 days actual suspension in part because the deputy trial counsel has not urged us to recommend that [Morse] be actually suspended for a period longer than 15 days. (9) The review department should not have relied so heavily on trial counsel's recommendation. As the department noted earlier in its own opinion, the department ... must independently review the record and may adopt findings, conclusions, and a decision or recommendation at variance with the hearing decision. (6d) Returning to the merits of the present case, we note that, because the applicable standards allow such a wide range of discipline, the review department properly looked to decisional law for guidance. The review department explained: The discipline for improper personal solicitation of clients has ranged from six months actual suspension for isolated acts of solicitation to disbarment in extreme cases.... The current proceeding, however, involved the mailing of advertisements which raise different issues from personal solicitation since they are less intrusive. The department looked to three, more apposite, advertising cases. We shall consider them as well, although only briefly, because the scope of Morse's advertising was so broad as to render this a sui generis case. Moreover, the aggravating and mitigating circumstances varied from case to case. In Gadda v. State Bar (1990) 50 Cal.3d 344 [267 Cal. Rptr. 114, 787 P.2d 95], among other acts of misconduct, the attorney mailed between 500 and 800 letters advertising his ability to provide legal advice about a new federal immigration law. He based his letter on a newspaper headline and did not verify whether Congress had passed the law. In fact, the law did not pass until some three months after the letter was mailed. (The other misconduct included neglect of client matters, instructing a client to lie to a government official, and failure to supervise properly an associate.) In aggravation, the attorney was reluctant to recognize the seriousness of his misconduct and to accept responsibility for his wrongdoing. In mitigation, he had demonstrated zeal in undertaking pro bono work. The discipline was two years' stayed suspension and three years' probation, conditioned on actual suspension for six months and until the attorney made restitution. Although the discipline rested mainly on the attorney's other misconduct, we observed that his false advertisements were likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession. ( Id. at p. 355.) In Leoni v. State Bar (1985) 39 Cal.3d 609 [217 Cal. Rptr. 423, 704 P.2d 183], two attorneys who each had practiced law for more than 30 years mailed letters and informational pamphlets about debt problems to the public. From November 1978 to July 1980, they sent 83 versions of letters and pamphlets to approximately 250,000 persons. The recipients were defendants in small claims or municipal court actions or were owners of real properties in foreclosure. We concluded that the attorneys had violated former rule 2-101(A)(3), which prohibited the omission of facts necessary to make the advertisements not misleading; former rule 2-101(A)(4), which prohibited the failure to identify the advertisements clearly as communications for employment; and former rule 2-101(A)(6), which prohibited the sending of the advertisements in a format involving intrusion, threats, intimidation, harassment, or duress. Because the attorneys had no prior disciplinary records and had made good faith efforts to make the letters not misleading, we determined that a public reprimand was appropriate. In In the Matter of Mitchell (Review Dept. 1991), 1 Cal.State Bar Ct. Rptr. 332, the attorney committed acts of dishonesty in violation of section 6106 by knowingly misrepresenting his education on a resume sent to various law firms and by failing to correct the misrepresentation during an interview with a law firm. In aggravation, the attorney sent out false resumes for approximately three years and gave deceitful answers to interrogatories from the State Bar. The discipline was a one-year stayed suspension and one year probation, conditioned on sixty days' actual suspension. The review department in the present case concluded that Morse's misconduct was less serious than the attorney's in Gadda v. State Bar, supra, 50 Cal.3d 344, but was more serious than the attorney's misconduct in Leoni v. State Bar, supra, 39 Cal.3d 609, because Morse mailed approximately 4 million (rather than 250,000) misleading advertisements for more than 4 1/2 (rather than 1 1/2) years. In the Matter of Mitchell, supra, 1 Cal.State Bar Ct. Rptr. 332, was least apposite because of its particular aggravating and mitigating factors. These decisions provide some guidance, but our determination of the appropriate discipline ultimately depends on the answers to two key questions. First, what did Morse do wrong? Second, what is the discipline most likely to protect the public, the courts, and the profession, or stated conversely, to deter Morse from future wrongdoing? We begin with the wrongdoing. As explained above (pp. 195-197, ante ), the review department found a protracted pattern of serious misconduct with significant aggravating circumstances and no significant mitigating circumstances. Those facts tell a troubling tale. Morse sent approximately four million misleading advertisements to California homeowners seeking their money. In addition to being misleading, the solicitations did not comply with the simple requirements of section 17537.6. Morse made a net profit of $150,000 to $200,000. He was requested by the Attorney General and a district attorney to stop misleading the public. He refused, forcing the authorities to obtain an injunction. (This itself required an expenditure of public funds.) He was ordered to pay a total of $800,000 in penalties and restitution. He appealed. He lost. He sought our review. He did not get it. He went to the United States Supreme Court. He was turned away. He also sued those seeking to protect the public. He lost that case as well. He appealed again. He lost again. He was ordered to pay several thousands of dollars in sanctions. Even now, he continues to assert that he should not be disciplined. Of course, Morse, like any attorney accused of misconduct, had the right to defend himself vigorously. Morse's conduct, however, reflects a seeming unwillingness even to consider the appropriateness of his statutory interpretation or to acknowledge that at some point his position was meritless or even wrong to any extent. Put simply, Morse went beyond tenacity to truculence. Morse also appears unwilling to accept any meaningful discipline. The hearing judge recommended only a 15-day actual suspension, an exceedingly light sanction. Rather than count his good fortune, Morse felt wronged, arguing to the review department that the suspension was excessive. When the review department increased the actual suspension to 60 days, still a minor sanction, Morse sought our review. It is also important to appreciate the significance of the superior court's order of restitution. The restitution requirement reflects that Morse wrongly benefited from his actions. We can reasonably assume that at least some, if not most, of those who responded to his misleading solicitations were those who are unsophisticated in the law and perhaps least able to afford his purported service. Such an individual's fee, although perhaps paltry to Morse, was money the homeowner could have spent on other, more important items such as food, shelter, and clothing. Morse's misconduct reflects a callous disregard for those most in need of protection by the profession and the courts. We turn now to the second question: what is the discipline most likely to protect the public, the courts, and the profession, or, stated conversely, to deter Morse from future wrongdoing? We conclude that an actual suspension of three years, with a possible reduction to two years, is required. Such a period should demonstrate to Morse that we take seriously his misconduct. This period of forced respite from practice may also allow him time for introspection so that he will come to appreciate that law is more than a mere business. It is still a profession in which concerns for ethics matter. We have observed that an errant attorney's ... assertion that no discipline should be imposed shows that he does not recognize his problems and that he may not correct them. ( Blair v. State Bar, supra, 49 Cal.3d 762, 781-782.) We choose the three-year period for an important practical reason as well. Under standard 1.4(c)(ii), ... actual suspensions imposed for a two (2) year or greater period shall require proof satisfactory to the State Bar Court of the member's rehabilitation, present fitness to practice and present learning and ability in the general law before the member shall be relieved of the actual suspension. Any period shorter than a two-year actual suspension requires no such showing of rehabilitation and fitness. In light of Morse's misconduct and recalcitrance, we believe such a showing is required to protect the public. We also disagree with the review department's recommendation in one other respect. The State Bar hearing judge recommended as an explicit condition of probation that Morse pay $400,000 in restitution. The review department noted that the superior court in the civil enforcement action already had imposed that sanction. The department thus rejected the recommendation to impose restitution as an explicit condition of probation. The department reasoned that, as a condition of his probation, Morse must comply with the State Bar Act, including section 6103, which requires obedience to court orders. The department concluded that an explicit payment condition would thus be redundant of the superior court judgment requiring restitution. Perhaps, as a technical matter, the review department was correct on this point. We nevertheless choose for two reasons to impose as an explicit condition of probation that Morse comply with the civil judgment, in particular that he pay the civil penalties and cy pres restitution pursuant to the terms set forth in the Stipulation and Modified Judgment, filed on July 26, 1994. First, our doing so will eliminate any possible future argument by Morse, if the situation should arise, that the probation condition has not been violated unless there is a further court order finding such violation. The making of the payments an explicit condition of probation will allow the State Bar to take whatever action may be appropriate, independent of further civil court action. Second, we make payment of the restitution and penalities an explicit condition so that, as explained in greater detail in our dispositional statement below, if Morse timely makes full payment of those amounts, the period of actual suspension shall be reduced to two years. Finally, we note that, in response to our order indicating we would consider increasing the recommended discipline, Morse briefly raises a hodgepodge of reasons why we should not increase the discipline. We reject all his arguments. In particular, he reiterates his challenges to section 17537.6 and claims he had ... an honest belief in his innocence and possibly a negligent good faith mistake in law. As explained above, the facts belie this claim. He also points to the failure of the Attorney General and the State Bar to assist him in making his solicitations compliant with the law. That is not their proper function. Moreover, the record shows that Morse tenaciously rebuffed every effort by the State Bar and the Attorney General to halt his improper solicitations. He points to the absence of complaints from recipients of his solicitations and the presence of some truthful information in them. The absence of complaints does not show the solicitations were proper; nor does the presence of some truthful information eliminate the misleading information. Morse also contends that: (1) our increasing the discipline (as did the review department) would unconstitutionally deter him from asserting his rights in this State Bar proceeding; (2) it was unfair to place on him the burden of obtaining the legislative history of section 17537.6 to determine if it supported his claim of statutory vagueness; and (3) increasing the recommended discipline would unlawfully place Morse in double jeopardy. None of these assertions has the barest merit.