Opinion ID: 2302332
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judge Colville's Opinion

Text: Upon his consideration of the evidence presented by both sides, Judge Colville sustained the Frye challenge and precluded the plaintiffs from adducing the any-exposure opinion. He described his review as follows: In resolving this Frye challenge I have considered the testimony of the witnesses, voluminous scientific literature, and numerous legal authorities proffered in support of the plaintiffs' and the defendants' respective positions. In the end, my decision ultimately rests upon whether the plaintiffs experts' opinions were based upon methodologies utilizing discrete and specific scientific principles logically applied in a manner that can be affirmatively articulated, referenced, reviewed, and tested, and empirically verified or whether the testimony was based upon the best estimate, the gut instinct, or the educated guess of the experts. See In re Toxic Substance Cases, No. A.D. 03-319, slip op., 2006 WL 2404008, at  (C.P.Allegheny, Aug. 17, 2006). Judge Colville opened his ensuing review with a general discussion of asbestos, noting its natural occurrence and background presence in ambient air. See, e.g., id. at  ([O]ne would expect to find, on average, one fiber of asbestos in every 10 liters of air on every street corner in Pittsburgh.). Further, he observed that no one contended that mere background or ambient air exposure was sufficient to cause asbestos-related disease. See id. (The argument in this Frye challenge, in part, revolves around the question of how much greater quantity of exposure is necessary to permit the causal attribution of an asbestos-related disease to a particular asbestos exposure.). Judge Colville recognized that no direct or observational evidence of causation plausibly could be expected of the plaintiffs. See id. at . Nevertheless, he reasoned that reliable expert opinion evidence was required from which a jury could infer that each of the defendants' products was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs' or decedents' diseases. See id. (explaining that an opinion as to general causation is insufficient to establish a prima facie case for liability). Focusing upon methodology, Judge Colville found no support for the any-exposure theory of specific causation in any of the sources upon which Dr. Maddox relied. For example, the court acknowledged the value of case reports, in that they assist scientists in developing hypotheses regarding the correlations and associations between disease and other known factors. See id. at -5. Nevertheless, Judge Colville explained, [c]ase reports are nothing more than reports by other physicians and professionals confirming the development of a disease in an individual patient with additional information about that patient. Id. at . While he regarded such reports as an impetus toward inquiry and development of scientific proofs, he observed that they were not proofs of causation in and unto themselves. See id. at . [9] Overall, Judge Colville could find no credible explanation for how it was that Dr. Maddox was able to determine if it was exposure to a defendant's friction product that caused a plaintiff's mesothelioma, and not some other exposure to asbestos material. See id. at . Rather, he agreed with the defendants' experts that Dr. Maddox's methodology was plagued by unwarranted liberties and logical errors. See, e.g., id. at , . Indeed, the court's reasoning suggests that Dr. Maddox's acknowledgement of the association between amount of exposure and risk of developing disease (couched as a dose-response curve) substantially undermines the any-exposure theory in terms of establishing legal causation. While the court did not discount that a single fiber may possibly increase the risk of developing disease, it did not accept that an unquantified (and potentially infinitesimal) increase in risk could serve as proof that a defendant's product was a substantial cause of a plaintiff's or decedent's disease. See id. at  (stating that the [plaintiffs'] experts do not offer support or methodology other than their subjective belief that each and every breath of asbestos causes or substantially contributes to the disease process suffered by the [plaintiffs].). In terms of the extrapolation (or, as Dr. Maddox would have it, interpolation) methodology, Judge Colville explained: The fallacy of the extrapolation down argument is plainly illustrated by common sense and common experience Large amounts of alcohol can intoxicate, larger amounts can kill; a very small amount, however, can do neither. Large amounts of nitroglycerine or arsenic can injure, larger amounts can kill; small amounts, however, are medicinal. Great volumes of water may be harmful, greater volumes or an extended absence of water can be lethal; moderate amounts of water, however, are healthful. In short, the poison is in the dose.    Generally accepted scientific methodology may well establish that certain high dose asbestos exposure causes, or contributes to, a specific hypothetical plaintiff's disease, but the plaintiffs have not proffered any generally accepted methodology to support the contention that a single exposure or an otherwise vanishingly small exposure has, in fact, in any case, ever caused or contributed to any specific individual's disease, or even less so, that in this case such a small exposure did, in fact, contribute to this specific plaintiff's disease. In re Toxic Substance Cases, No. A.D. 03-319, at -8. Judge Colville also drew support from the position articulated by Judge Klein in the evenly divided Summers v. Certainteed Corp., 886 A.2d 240 (Pa.Super.2005) (equally divided court), rev'd, 606 Pa. 294, 997 A.2d 1152 (2010): Just because a hired expert makes a legal conclusion does not mean that a trial judge has to adopt it if it is not supported by the record and is devoid of common sense. For example, [the plaintiff's expert] used the phrase, Each and every exposure to asbestos has been a substantial contributing factor to the abnormalities noted. However, suppose an expert said that if one took a bucket of water and dumped it in the ocean, that was a substantial contributing factor to the size of the ocean. [The expert's] statement saying every breath is a substantial contributing factor is not accurate. If someone walks past a mechanic changing brakes, he or she is exposed to asbestos. If that person worked for thirty years at an asbestos factory making lagging, it can hardly be said that the one whiff of the asbestos from the brakes is a substantial factor in causing disease. Id. at 244 (opinion in support of affirmance) (emphasis in original). Judge Colville acknowledged the plaintiffs' position found some support in the Superior Court's decisions in Smalls and Andaloro v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 799 A.2d 71 (Pa.Super.2002) (holding, inter alia, that the issue of whether a naval yard worker was exposed to a manufacturer's product was for the jury). Nevertheless, he reasoned that Smalls did not involve a Frye hearing, and, moreover, the Superior Court had not provided any analysis as to why the any-exposure theory is, in fact, generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. See In re Toxic Substance Cases, No. A.D. 03-319, at . With regard to Andaloro, Judge Colville believed that the only relevant analysis was dictum, which he read as merely reflecting the fact that, for asbestos fibers to cause disease processes within the human body, they must first be inhaled. The court found greater guidance in Rafter v. Raymark Industries, 429 Pa.Super. 360, 632 A.2d 897 (1993), where the Superior Court stressed that a jury instruction did not equate the mere inhalation of asbestos with substantial-factor causation. See id. at 901-02. Finally, Judge Colville declined to base his holding on the epidemiological evidence presented by the defendants in support of their Frye motion. See In re Toxic Substance Cases, No. A.D. 03-319, at . In this regard, the court found it appropriate to maintain a close focus on Dr. Maddox's particular methodology. See id. (This ruling is based upon inadequacies in the [Plaintiffs'] experts' methodologies, not upon the proffered merit of Defendants' epidemiological studies, or other explanations for why `friction products are different.'). Subsequent to the issuance of the common pleas court's Frye decision, Appellants sought and were awarded summary judgment, premised on the court's disapproval of the any-exposure theory. Appellee lodged an appeal in the Superior Court, which reversed. See Betz v. Pneumo Abex LLC, 998 A.2d 962 (Pa.Super.2010) ( en banc ). [10]