Opinion ID: 2322058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Defendant's Waiver of His Right to Counsel

Text: Mr. Sampson argues on appeal that he never knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. In defendant's view, the trial justice erred in forcing him to choose to defend himself pro se or proceed to trial with an attorney who refused to implement Mr. Sampson's personal right to waive a jury. We agree. A criminal defendant has a right to an attorney pursuant to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. Amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right    to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.). A defendant may waive that right to counsel and proceed pro se, provided that the waiver is given voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. E.g., State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377, 1379 (R.I.1996); see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). In conducting a determination as to whether or not a defendant's waiver of counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, this Court looks to the totality of the circumstances  and will consider a waiver properly effectuated only if a defendant knows what he [or she] is doing and his [or her] choice is made with eyes open.  Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1379-80 (brackets in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Separate and apart from a criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel is the right to a trial by jury; and, significantly, a defendant in this jurisdiction has the right to waive the jury and proceed with a bench trial. In Rhode Island, this Court has explicitly stated that the decision whether or not to waive the jury is ultimately the decision of the defendant and not of counsel. In State v. Moran, 605 A.2d 494 (R.I.1992) we wrote as follows with respect to that issue: Rhode Island law is well settled that a criminally accused defendant has an absolute right to waive a trial by jury if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This substantive right to invoke a bench trial belongs to the defendant and is subject only to the procedural requirement that a trial justice determine that the defendant understands and accepts the consequences of executing a waiver.  Id. at 496 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). [11] Unfortunately, and contrary to the clear pronouncement of this Court, defendant's attorney advised the trial justice that the decision as to whether or not to waive the jury belonged to him as Mr. Sampson's attorney and not to Mr. Sampson. While this Court certainly does not entertain even the slightest suspicion that defendant's attorney was attempting to purposefully mislead the trial justice, at the end of the day the attorney's erroneous statement of law, coupled with the trial justice's acquiescence therein, ultimately infected Mr. Sampson's waiver of counsel. It is clear from the record that the trial justice accepted defense counsel's representation as to who ultimately decides whether or not to waive the jury, and he proceeded to advise defendant in accordance with what defense counsel had said. The trial justice erroneously suggested to defendant that the decision as to whether or not to waive the jury was addressed in Article V, Rule 2.1 (and the comments thereto) of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, which Rule states that a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice. The more pertinent rule would have been Article V, Rule 1.2(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, which states in pertinent part: In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to    whether to waive jury trial   . (Emphasis added.) The trial justice also erroneously suggested to defendant on numerous occasions that, if he disagreed with his attorney's decision to proceed with a trial by jury, the appropriate forum wherein to pursue that grievance would be a postconviction proceeding. Essentially, Mr. Sampson was provided with two choices: (a) a trial by jury, against his wishes, represented by counsel or (b) a bench trial, in accordance with his wishes, representing himself. More unfortunate perhaps is the suggestion by the trial justice that Mr. Sampson should have elected to pursue option (a), take his chances under that option, and hope that the jury would not find him guilty, retaining postconviction relief as a remedial avenue if he were found guilty. A third choice was never presented to him: viz., (c) a bench trial, in accordance with his wishes, represented by counsel. [12] Because Mr. Sampson was never provided with that third choice and was never properly informed that the decision as to whether or not to waive the jury was his to make, his decision to waive his right to counsel was not voluntary, knowing, or intelligent. Having determined that Mr. Sampson's waiver of counsel was not voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, in violation of his Sixth Amendment constitutional right, we vacate the judgment of conviction. Furthermore, because the defect in Mr. Sampson's waiver of counsel was so pervasiveaffecting nearly every aspect of the trialMr. Sampson must be afforded a new trial on remand. See United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 373 (4th Cir.1991) (holding, on appeal from a bench trial, that [b]ecause we conclude that Tatum's counsel had conflicts of interest which deprived Tatum of the effective assistance of counsel during critical stages in the prosecution, we reverse and remand the case for a new trial ) (emphasis added). [13]