Opinion ID: 3050155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Damages under California Law

Text: [4] Kay submits that the district court erred by holding that he was not entitled to compensatory damages under California law. The district court granted Kay only injunctive relief in the form of a peremptory mandate commanding the City to “adopt a new resolution allowing Kay to use his five mast antenna structure for commercial purposes, subject to reasonable conditions.” Writs of mandate are used under California law “for the purpose of inquiring into the validity of any final KAY v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 12911 administrative order. . .” CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1094.5(a). Here, the district court reviewed the final administrative order in response to Kay’s conditional use permit application, and “enter[ed] judgment . . . commanding [the City] to set aside the order or decision.” Id. § 1094.5(f). Under a companion provision of California law, “[i]f judgment be given for the applicant, the applicant may recover the damages which the applicant has sustained . . . and a peremptory mandate must also be awarded without delay.” Id. section 1095 (emphasis added). [5] The availability of damages under section 1095, however, is limited by California Government Code sections 818.4 and 821.2. State v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 237, 246 (1974). Section 818.4 provides that “[a] public entity is not liable for an injury caused by the . . . denial . . . of . . . any permit . . . or similar authorization where the public entity or an employee of the public entity is authorized by enactment to determine whether or not such authorization should be issued, denied, suspended, or revoked.” Section 821.2 is a corollary that immunizes public employees for their roles in the discretionary permit decisions governed by section 818.4. “The immunity applies only to discretionary activities.” Richards v. Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverages Control, 139 Cal. App. 4th 304, 318 (Ct. App. 2006). The decision whether to issue a conditional use permit is “discretionary by definition.” Breakzone Billiards v. City of Torrance, 81 Cal. App. 4th 1205, 1224 (Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). Kay claims that because he sought only to change the frequency from amateur to commercial use on the antennae, the City had no discretion to deny the CUP.6 This assertion is premised on the TCA’s preclusion of municipalities from “regulat[ing] the placement, construction, and modification of 6 Although the City eventually granted the CUP as to two of the antennae, we construe the City’s decision as a denial of the permit as to the three other antennae. 12912 KAY v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES personal wireless service facilities on the basis of the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions to the extent that such facilities comply with the Commission’s regulations concerning such emissions.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). Because the City had already approved his antennae for noncommercial use, and the switch to commercial use entailed only a change in radio frequency, Kay argues the City lacked discretion because it could not consistently with the TCA ever deny the CUP even in part. Kay’s argument is largely based on Thompson v. City of Lake Elsinore, 18 Cal. App. 4th 49 (Ct. App. 1993). There, the plaintiff renovated a building in compliance “with all the appropriate building codes, regulations and requirements,” and received a “Final Inspection Okay.” Id. at 53. Lake Elsinore nevertheless withheld the issuance of a certificate of occupancy for the building, allegedly in an attempt to cause the plaintiff to comply with city demands related to other properties he owned. Id. The Thompson court explained that because Lake Elsinore had already exercised its discretion during the building permit process, it had no discretion to refuse to perform the purely ministerial duty of issuing the occupancy permit. Id. at 58. Thompson is inapposite. There, Lake Elsinore had already found that the building at issue complied with all regulations, and was thus required by law to issue a certificate of occupancy. Id. at 56 (citing Uniform Building Code § 307). For that reason, the city lacked discretion to deny the certificate, and damages were available. Here, the City was considering an application for a permit to use a home in a residential neighborhood to engage in commercial operations. As the contentious transcripts from the City hearings demonstrate, decisions like this are freighted with concerns from neighbors and City officials intent on maintaining the residential character of the neighborhood. See Breakzone Billiards, 81 Cal. App. 4th at 1224 (“In considering applications for such permits, a city is obligated to examine permit applications on an KAY v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 12913 individual basis, applying sound principles of planning and zoning administration in a fair manner.”). The conditions attached to the City’s partial approval of the CUP reflect these sound principles. For example, the City imposed limits on the times for maintenance work, number of vehicles present at the property, noise levels, and yard maintenance. Kay also relies on City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 101 Cal. App. 4th 367 (Ct. App. 2002), to support his argument that the City was compelled to grant him a CUP. There, the Court of Appeal struck down an injunction against Abrams using a previously-approved amateur antenna for commercial purposes. The Court of Appeal reasoned that “the only change in Abrams’s operation would be the commercial use of frequencies allocated and assigned by the FCC. Because the trial court’s injunction prohibits that use, it is preempted by [the TCA].” Id. at 375. While we agree with the California Court of Appeal that regulation based solely on the transmission frequency is verboten, we do not read that preemption as giving amateur broadcasters immunity from local permit requirements if they decide to switch to commercial broadcasting on existing antennae. As discussed in Breakzone Billiards and reflected in the use permit conditions above, there are numerous legitimate local concerns implicated by a commercial operation that do not attach to amateur use, and which have nothing to do with “the environmental effects of radio frequency emissions.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iv). There are situations in which a municipality may deny, for reasons related to the impact of a commercial operation on the neighborhood, a permit for an amateur broadcaster to operate commercially. Cf. Tenn. ex rel. Wireless Income Props., LLC v. City of Chattanooga, 403 F.3d 392, 398 (6th Cir. 2005) (“The TCA does not preempt all authority of state or local governments over the regulation of wireless towers.”); Nat’l Tower, LLC v. Plainville Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 297 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2002) (“The [TCA] attempts, subject to five limitations, to preserve state and local authority over the placement and construction of facilities.”). 12914 KAY v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES [6] While the record suggests that the denial of Kay’s permit may have been driven at least in part by animus on the part of City officials, the record also shows that the City was exercising its discretion as part of its planning and administrative duties. For that reason, we hold that the City’s decision to deny Kay’s CUP was discretionary, and that his remedies under California law are limited to the peremptory writ already granted by the district court.