Opinion ID: 662011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kakuda's Challenge to Liability Finding

Text: 8 Kakuda argues that we should reverse and remand in light of Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S.Ct. 995 (1992), decided after the trial in this case. Specifically, Kakuda contends that his application of physical force was justified to prevent Hirano from leaving the room during Kakuda's confrontation with the prisoner. We reject Kakuda's argument. Viewing, as the district court apparently did, the entire episode as the challenged cruel and unusual punishment, the district court properly applied the standard of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain reiterated in Hudson. See 112 S.Ct. at 999. The district court correctly refused to isolate Kakuda's blows with the chair from the unjustified confinement and confrontation of Hirano in the holding room. Finally, the district court's findings of fact do not support Kakuda's contention that his confrontation with Hirano was a justified investigation of Hirano's grievance. The district court's conclusion that Kakuda's attempt to chastise Hirano constituted an episode of physical and emotional harassment without any penological justification supports the judgment in Hirano's favor. 9 Kakuda also argues that any unauthorized use of force was de minimis and was not constitutionally cognizable. See Hudson, 112 S.Ct. at 1000. Kakuda focuses inappropriately on how minor Hirano's injuries were, rather than whether the force itself was de minimis. Considering all the force involved in the confrontation with Hirano, we conclude that the district court's findings cannot support application of the de minimis force exception. This was not simply an excessive on-the-spot response to a prisoner's conduct. Rather, it was a planned session of intimidation and abuse. The district court found that, in addition to holding Hirano in the room, and raising and lowering the chair onto Hirano's foot, Kakuda repeated the question 'you think you fucking hot shit?' several times, each time hitting Hirano's knees and shins with the chair. Ultimately, Kakuda pinned [Hirano] against the wall by holding the chair against Hirano's shins. Regardless of the extent of injury, accentuating hostile rhetorical interrogation with blows to the knees, slamming a chair onto the toe of a prisoner wearing slippers, and pinning a prisoner to the wall with a chair cannot fairly be termed de minimis force. 10 Finally, relying on Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1029, 1032 (2d Cir.1973), Kakuda contends that his confrontation with Hirano was an isolated attack not constituting punishment under the Eighth Amendment. We rejected a similar argument in McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780, 782-84 (9th Cir.1986). The Supreme Court's refusal to take a position on the existence of such an exception in Hudson does not change the fact that no such exception is recognized in this Circuit.