Opinion ID: 1935220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Theft of the Hospital Smock Elopement from IMH

Text: The defendant argues that the introduction of evidence from Debra Gard (Gard), an employee of Women and Infants Hospital, that a nurse's smock had been stolen from the hospital constituted a violation of Rule 404(b) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence because it constituted a separate crime and would be unduly prejudicial to defendant. The trial justice determined that this evidence was relevant, but it should be noted that defendant did not object to Gard's testimony on the ground of a violation of Rule 404(b), thus pursuant to State v. Toole, supra , defendant has waived the right to raise this issue on appeal. Even if the issue had been raised, we have stated that under Rule 404(b) evidence of prior criminal acts are inadmissible only if that evidence is both prejudicial and irrelevant. State v. Lemon, 497 A.2d 713, 720-21 (R.I. 1985). The fact that defendant appeared in the hospital room wearing a hospital smock that was later found in her apartment and the source of this smock was found to have been the hospital were all highly relevant elements of the state's proof that defendant was the person who had committed the kidnapping. It must be noted that although defendant stipulated at the very end of the case to the state's having proved the kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt, during the trial no such stipulation was given. It was therefore essential for the state to prove each element of the crime. The defendant did object to this evidence on the ground that it violated Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The trial justice determined that adequate notice had been given to defendant concerning Gard's proposed testimony. Actually Gard did not and could not testify that Martinez had stolen the smock but only described where certain items were kept and their lack of availability to nonhospital employees. The prosecutor, on the basis of inferences drawn from this testimony, did suggest that the smock had been stolen. This was a fair inference to draw. The defendant also objects to the introduction of evidence of Martinez's attempted elopement from the IMH. The defendant does not expand upon this issue in her brief, but the court is of the opinion that neither the evidence of the smock nor the evidence of the elopement forms any basis for the granting of a motion for mistrial. The elopement was properly held to be relevant to the issue of lack of criminal responsibility since the reasons given for her elopement were considered evidence that she may have been feigning her mental illness. We have stated that evidence of criminal conduct may be introduced as long as it is relevant to the issues in the case. State v. Brown, 626 A.2d 228, 233 (R.I. 1993). The trial justice did not err in admitting this evidence or in declining to grant the motion for mistrial.