Opinion ID: 1602788
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was VFW Negligent?

Text: Because May brought a negligence claim against the VFW, he had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and damages. Foster v. Bass, 575 So.2d 967, 972 (Miss. 1990); Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354 (Miss. 1990); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491-92 (Miss. 1987). Only when the first two items are shown is it possible to proceed to a consideration of proximate cause since a duty and breach of that duty are essential to a finding of negligence under the traditional and accepted formula. Foster, 575 So.2d at 972. At the hearing on the summary judgment motion and in its brief on appeal, the VFW relies appropriately on Grisham v. John Q. Long VFW Post, No. 4057, Inc., 519 So.2d 413 (1988), in arguing that its duty was limited at most to exercising reasonable care to protect May and the other party goers from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons. In Grisham, two ex-wives of the same man attended a dance at a VFW Post in Tupelo. The post sold beer and allowed patrons to bring their own spirits. As one of the women, Mabeline, exited the post, the other ex-wife, Hazel, standing outside of the door, struck her with a bottle enclosed in a paper bag. 519 So.2d at 414. A member of the band that was playing that night went to Mabeline's aid. The VFW officials then were informed of the matter, but responded that they were too tied up to come out. Id. Subsequently, she filed suit against the VFW alleging that it was negligent for, inter alia, failing to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition; failing to provide security personnel to protect guests from physical harm; failing to supervise and regulate the conduct of and activities so as to protect guests from physical harm; failing to assist her when members were informed of her injury; failing to exercise ordinary care in the discharge of its responsibilities to prevent and protect patrons from such incidents; and allowing an atmosphere of violence to exist or develop on its premises. Id. at 414-15. The trial court entered a summary judgment order in the VFW's favor. This Court affirmed. Noting that the VFW was not an insurer of Mabeline's safety, this Court held that the limit of VFW's duty was to exercise reasonable care to protect Mabeline from reasonably foreseeable injury at the hands of another. Id. at 419 (emphasis added). Kelly v. Retzer and Retzer, 417 So.2d 556 (Miss. 1982) [1] More particularly, an owner may be liable for the acts of a third person only when he has cause to anticipate the wrongful or negligent act. Grisham, 519 So.2d at 417. [2] The requisite `cause to anticipate' the assault may arise from 1) actual or constructive knowledge of the assailant's violent nature, or 2) actual or constructive knowledge that an atmosphere of violence exists [on or about the premises.] Id. at 416-17. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the VFW could have been alerted to Triplett's impending actions. While he was at the bar, he did not appear to be drunk or boisterous. He only drank beer and shot pool and played other amusement games. The record does not support a conclusion that the VFW was the local bar room brawl type of establishment. See, e.g. Allen v. Babrab, Inc., 438 So.2d 356, 357 (Fla. 1983) (club had a history of fighting and other disturbances). Nonetheless, the VFW required the sponsors of the benefit to provide security. Consequently, the sponsors provided two security guards, and at least one of the guards broke up the fight between Triplett and May immediately. Furthermore, although May has insisted that the VFW was negligent in failing to provide adequate security, he failed to make a showing that an increased number of security guards would have prevented the attack. Grisham, 519 So.2d at 417. The fact that the attack or altercation happened in a quick and unexpected manner also strikes against May's assertion that the VFW was negligent. The actors both agree that the altercation occurred quickly. As a matter of fact, May explained: ... I felt somebody tap me on the shoulder, and said, do you remember the 7-11, and I leaned forward in my chair like that and turned around to see who it was, and that's when I saw him hit me and that's the last thing I remember because I went out.       ... I didn't even get a chance to stand up or nothing. Supp.Vol. I, T. 23, 24. In Kelly, although this Court relied on the decedent's voluntary intervention into the affray in determining that the defendants could not be liable for his death on its premises, we noted that the encounter was sudden and spontaneous. 417 So.2d at 561. Other courts similarly have considered this criterion in determining whether a defendant could be held liable for the actions of a third-party against one of its patrons. See, e.g., Papadimas v. Mykonos Lounge, 439 N.W.2d 280, 283 (Mich. App. 1989) (summary judgment appropriate because the incident ... occurred suddenly, unexpectedly, and to the complete surprise of the witnesses.); Delgado v. Laboucherie, Inc., 508 So.2d 956, 957-958 (La. App. 1987) (incident occurred very quickly, and that there was nothing that could have been done to prevent it    attack on plaintiff was sudden and could not have been reasonably prevented by defendants or their employees ... [S]cuffle broke out quickly); White v. HA, Inc. 782 P.2d 1125, 1131 (Wyo. 1989) (plaintiff failed to make even the threshold showing that [defendant] was placed on notice of impending danger to him.). Because of the spontaneity of the event in question, it is inconceivable that the VFW reasonably could have protected May from Triplett's attack. From this evidence it is apparent that May has failed to establish a breach of the premises owner's duty to exercise reasonable care to protect May from reasonably foreseeable injury.