Opinion ID: 63121
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Association’s Claims

Text: The Association also challenges the district court’s grant of the Boards’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. We review a district court’s ruling on a Rule 12(c) motion de novo. Guidry v. Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007). In so doing, we “accept[ ] all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (citations omitted). To survive a Rule 12(c) motion, the plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief on the face of the complaint. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (2007). The allegations must be sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. at 1965 (citation and footnote omitted). If the plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to “nudge[ ] [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [his] complaint must be dismissed.” Id. at 1974. 6 No. 07-30912 The Association’s complaint lodged forty-three vague allegations against the Boards dealing primarily with their management of Grambling University. The allegations can be broken down into four general categories. First, the Association complained of various acts or omissions concerning Grambling University’s internal and external management. Examples include allegations that the Vice President of Grambling failed to follow the directives of the President of Grambling and that the Boards mismanaged Grambling. Second, the Association complained about the manner in which Grambling University employees–none of whom are named plaintiffs–were treated. Examples include allegations that the Boards destroyed the morale of Grambling employees and that the Boards denied employees designated for termination any meaningful grievance procedure.4 Third, the Association complained that the Boards ignored or disregarded certain contracts. Examples include allegations that the Boards disregarded “the importance of the higher education settlement, which is a contract,” and that the Boards entered “into a consortium for doctorates in leadership with Louisiana Tech and the University of Louisiana at Monroe.” Finally, the Association lodged a number of miscellaneous allegations that are insufficient to state a claim under any of the civil rights laws the Association cites. Examples include allegations that the Boards removed the license plate from the vehicle of one of the Association’s members and that the Boards promoted “dissension among alumni and other interested parties.” We address these categories of allegations below. 1. Allegations Concerning the Boards’ Management of Grambling University 4 Although we dismissed the appeal of these claims at the Association’s request, they are relevant to the sanctions issue and thus discussed in that portion of our opinion. 7 No. 07-30912 The vast majority of the Association’s allegations concern acts or omissions committed by the Boards in their management of Grambling University. The Association contends that these acts and omissions harmed Grambling and thus somehow violated the Association’s civil rights. The district court properly held that the Association lacks standing to assert these claims.5 To establish the “irreducible constitutional minimum” of standing, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that it has suffered an “injury in fact,” which the United States Supreme Court has described as “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992) (internal citations omitted). The Association’s allegations concerning the Boards’ mismanagement of Grambling fail on this ground. These allegations relate to acts or omissions by the Boards that, while conceivably harmful to Grambling University or its employees, could not produce a “concrete” injury to the Association or the other named Plaintiffs. Further, the Association’s unsupported contentions that it should be entitled to rectify the purported harm to the University by suing on its behalf fail for the same reasons. It is fundamental that a litigant cannot sue on behalf of a third party absent an injury in fact giving the litigant a sufficient stake in the outcome of the disputed issue. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991); McCormack v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 845 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1988). The Association’s allegations concerning the Boards’ mismanagement of Grambling fail for another reason. These allegations are essentially a challenge 5 The presence of a current Grambling student as a plaintiff does not change the analysis. Nowhere in the Association’s complaint is that student’s connection to the alleged wrongdoing or any harm suffered therefrom explained in any way. See Doe v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Bd., 494 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that student lacked standing absent evidence that he was personally exposed to the alleged misconduct). Similarly, the other individual plaintiffs do not allege anything that would save their claims from dismissal or alter the analysis herein in their favor. 8 No. 07-30912 to the policy decisions of a politically appointed body and thus are wholly inappropriate for judicial resolution. Generally speaking, it is not this Court’s role to tell Louisiana how to exercise discretionary functions such as allocating university funding. Political complaints should be handled through the political process. 2. The Association’s Contract-Related Claims The Association’s complaint contains a number of contract-related claims presumably intended to be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 protects the equal rights of “[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States” to “make and enforce contracts” without respect to race. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 offers relief from racial discrimination that “blocks the creation of a contractual relationship” or “impairs an existing contractual relationship” but only where “the plaintiff has or would have rights under the existing or proposed contractual relationship.” Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 476 (2006). The Association’s complaint wholly fails to state the basic elements of a section 1981 claim. While the Association proposes amending its complaint to include its racial composition, its amended complaint would still fail to allege (1) instances in which the Boards refused to enter into a specific contract with the Association because of racial animus or, (2) that the Boards prevented the Association from enforcing any contractual rights based on the racial composition of the Association. Further, while the Association attempts to identify specific contracts related to its allegations, it fails to allege, and does not propose to allege, that it was a party to the vast majority of these contracts. The closest the Association comes to stating a viable section 1981 claim is in allegation “OO” of its complaint. There, the Association alleges that the Boards “replac[ed] the Grambling University National Alumni Association with the Grambling Black & Gold Foundation, Inc. in connection with the Bayou 9 No. 07-30912 Classic.” The Association alleged in its motion for reconsideration that “this is a violation of a private contract.” It also proposed an amendment alleging that the actions of the Boards were motivated by racial animus. Even with these amendments, however, allegation “OO” still fails to identify the content of the contract at issue, the particular contractual rights that the Boards prevented the Association from exercising, and how the Boards’ decision to “replace” the Association with a different organization was motivated by racial animus. Indeed, without some information concerning the racial composition of the organizations in question or other explanation of how this alleged breach of contract was racially motivated, the Association’s allegation cannot satisfy the plausibility threshold established by the Supreme Court in Twombly. 3. The Association’s Remaining Claims Finally, the Association’s complaint contains a number of allegations having no apparent nexus to civil rights statutes. The Association alleges that the Boards: • Threatened an Association member with legal proceedings • Removed a license plate from an Association vehicle • Promoted dissension amongst Grambling alumni • Released false information about the Association to a local paper Although the Association presumably intended these allegations to be actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or 42 U.S.C. § 1985, they fall well short of stating viable civil rights claims. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court’s decision to dismiss them. In light of the forgoing, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of the Association’s claims. The Association has not alleged that its allegations state viable state law claims, and we express no opinion on the subject.