Opinion ID: 1529733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: was the conduct of the prosecutor of such a nature as to deprive appellant of a fair trial?

Text: The challenged conduct occurred during the cross-examination of the appellant and during the closing argument. Appellant testified that he was nineteen years old at the time of the offense and twenty years old at the time of the trial. The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider the appellant's youth as a mitigating circumstance. KRS 532.025(2)(b)8; Ice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 667 S.W.2d 671, 680 (1984). In his closing argument, the prosecutor attempted to persuade the jury to reject appellant's youth as being in mitigation. He said: That James Earl Slaughter was a relatively young man at the time of the offense. Well, so he's twenty. I think one of the other witnesses who had been close to him had indicated something, if my memory serves me correctly and if I am wrong, rely upon what you heard, said something about the fact that the man indicated he was much older. (Emphasis added.) Appellant argues that there was no evidence that he was much older and that such statement is a flagrant misrepresentation of the evidence and that it is highly prejudicial when the jury was considering the appellant's youth as a mitigating factor. Clearly, there was no attempt here to mislead the jury. The prosecutor, as shown above, carefully cautioned the jury that his memory could be wrong. He told them not to rely on him, but rather to rely on what they had heard. He also conceded that the appellant was twenty. When the entire statement is read, no prejudice or misstatement is perceived. At the penalty phase of the trial a psychologist testified that appellant had a borderline personality disorder with antisocial traits. He stated that people who have this disorder, as a group, have relatively poor prospects for improvement, but he declined to say that any single person, e.g., the appellant, could not improve. In closing argument, the prosecutor seized on this testimony and quoted the psychologist as having said that appellant's prospect for rehabilitation was very, very poor. He said: Rehabilitation. I am not going to belabor or stay with that very long at all. Just take a look at the information which has been received by or from the psychologist, that under that circumstance the likelihood of rehabilitating this man is very, very poor. Appellant argues that this argument was a flagrant misstatement of the evidence. We disagree. It is clearly a reasonable inference from the doctor's original statement, that as a group, the chances of improvement were very poor. The jury heard the testimony of the doctor, and regardless of the argument of counsel, (on either side of the case) they can determine the truth. There is no error here. Appellant also objects to part of the prosecutor's closing argument in which he quotes the Bible. We have examined the argument and find that although it was improper, it was not prejudicial. Finally, during his cross-examination of appellant, the prosecutor stated that appellant was telling a lie now about not being the person who stabbed the lady to death. He ended his cross-examination by stating: This is the classic example of what you indicated to the psychologist; you tell these people any damn thing. I have no further questions of you. It is argued that this expresses an improper personal opinion of the prosecutor. Appellant, under cross-examination, had previously admitted to lying to the police about Red leaving a knife on the seat of the car. The comment, and that is precisely what it is, a comment, acknowledges a previous lie told by appellant. The comment of the prosecutor, a parting shot at appellant, was rhetoric, based on what the jury had already heard, viz., that the appellant had admittedly lied once, and arguably, would lie again. We find no error or prejudice here.