Opinion ID: 1256193
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Kidnapping, Attempted CSP and Murder are Factually Distinct

Text: {67} We next address Defendant's argument that there is insufficient evidence of kidnapping because the force used to accomplish the kidnapping was the same force used to accomplish or attempt the sexual penetration or the murder. The Court of Appeals has reversed a kidnapping conviction when there was no evidence of a kidnapping that was factually distinct from a murder or a sex offense. See Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, ¶ 21, 124 N.M. 84, 946 P.2d 1095 (concluding that kidnapping cannot be charged out of every CSP [in the third degree] without some force, restraint, or deception occurring either before or after the sexual penetration). When there is evidence that the perpetrator forcibly abducted the victim before attempting sexual penetration or continued to use force or restraint after the sex act was completed, however, we have rejected the proposition that the kidnapping is indistinguishable from the sex offense. See McGuire, 110 N.M. at 307-09, 795 P.2d at 999-1001 (concluding that there was substantial evidence to support independent factual bases for kidnapping and CSP convictions when the incident began as a forcible abduction and the use of force continued after the victim was sexually assaulted). We also have rejected the proposition that kidnapping and murder are unitary conduct when the force used to complete the kidnapping was not the same as the force used to kill the victim. See Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 30, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140. We are not certain that Defendant's argument has support in our cases. We are persuaded, however, that in this case there was sufficient evidence of a kidnapping factually distinct from both the attempted CSP and the murder. {68} In this case, there is sufficient evidence of a kidnapping that is factually distinct from the attempted CSP because strangling a victim with a rope in the manner described above is not the kind of force or restraint that is necessarily involved in every sexual penetration without consent, Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, ¶ 21, 124 N.M. 84, 946 P.2d 1095 or inherent in almost every CSP, Pisio, 119 N.M. at 259, 889 P.2d at 867. In addition, there was evidence from which the jury could find that Defendant restrained the victim when he drove away from her house toward a remote location in the hills beyond Flora Vista; consequently, the jury also could have found that the kidnapping and the attempted CSP were factually distinct on a second and different ground. The jury could have determined Defendant restrained the victim as a passenger within the pickup prior to strangling her with the rope. {69} There is also sufficient evidence of a kidnapping that is factually distinct from the murder because the jury could reasonably infer that all of the elements of the crime of kidnapping in the first degree were satisfied by the time Defendant tied up the victim in order to make love to her. Cf. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 33, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140. Based on Defendant's statements, the physical evidence, and the forensic pathologist's testimony that a victim of strangulation may lose consciousness several minutes before he or she dies, the jury also could reasonably infer that the murder did not occur until the victim limped down and Defendant tied the rope around her neck another time. In addition, there was evidence from which the jury could infer that the relationship became involuntary when Defendant drove away from the victim's home. Thus, on a second and different ground, the jury had a factual basis for finding a kidnapping that was distinct from the murder, because the jury could have found the kidnapping occurred when Defendant restrained the victim prior to strangling her with a rope. {70} Defendant has asserted that his convictions for kidnapping, attempted CSP, and first degree murder violate his right to be free from double jeopardy. We understand him to argue that, properly analyzed, his right to be free from double jeopardy precludes separate convictions for kidnapping, attempted CSP, and first degree murder. Under Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 14, 810 P.2d 1223, 1234 (1991), however, if there was a basis for the jury to find factually distinct bases for kidnapping, attempted CSP, and murder, then the conduct is considered non-unitary. [S]imilar statutory provisions sharing certain elements may support separate convictions and punishments where examination of the facts presented at trial establish that the jury reasonably could have inferred independent factual bases for the charged offenses. Id. In this case, the jury could have reasonably inferred that the kidnapping, attempted CSP, and murder were factually distinct. Under these circumstances, separate convictions are possible; the protection against double jeopardy is not applicable. {71} We acknowledge that double jeopardy principles may require reversal of a conviction when the jury instructions allow the jury to return a guilty verdict based on a legally inadequate alternative and the record contains no indication of whether or not the jury relied on that alternative. See Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 27, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140. We also acknowledge that in this case there were at least two different times at which the jury might have determined the kidnapping was complete: when Defendant drove away from the victim's house toward a remote location in the hills above Flora Vista and when he began to restrain her with the rope. We believe the jury could have relied on either time in order to satisfy its obligation to find a kidnapping factually distinct from attempted CSP.