Opinion ID: 6155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Barrow's Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) Claims

Text: 8 The district court granted summary judgment for NOSSA on the basis that NOSSA was neither Barrow's employer nor an agent of his employer, and was therefore not covered by the ADEA. We agree with the district court's conclusion. 9 We recently discussed the meanings of the terms employer and agent in the ADEA context in Deal v. State Farm County Mutual Insurance Co. of Texas. 10 The plaintiff in State Farm was an employee of an independent insurance agency who sued her employer and State Farm, the company whose policies her agency sold. We affirmed the district court's holding that State Farm was not Deal's employer under the ADEA. We explained the test our Circuit applies: 10 In determining whether an employment relationship exists within the meaning of Title VII and the ADEA, we apply a hybrid economic realities/common law control test. ... The right to control an employee's conduct is the most important component of this test.... When examining the control component, we have focused on whether the alleged employer has the right to hire and fire the employee, the right to supervise the employee, and the right to set the employee's work schedule.... The economic realities component of our test has focused on whether the alleged employer paid the employee's salary, withheld taxes, provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of employment. 11 11 Neither part of our test supports a conclusion that NOSSA was Barrow's employer. 12 First, NOSSA had no meaningful right to control Barrow's conduct. The stevedoring company foremen, not NOSSA, had the right to hire and fire Barrow, to supervise him, and to set his work schedule. Second, Barrow has produced no evidence that NOSSA paid his wages, withheld his taxes, provided benefits to him, or set the terms and conditions of his employment. 12 Barrow next contends that NOSSA was an agent of his employer under the ADEA. NOSSA was an agent of the stevedoring companies in one sense--it represented them in negotiations with the Union. But one can be another's agent for some purposes and not for others. The key question is whether NOSSA was the stevedoring companies' agent with respect to employment practices. 13 We agree with the Sixth Circuit's opinion in York v. Tennessee Crushed Stone Ass'n 14 that an agent of an employer under the ADEA is generally a supervisory or managerial employee to whom employment decisions have been delegated by the employer. 15 Under that standard, NOSSA is not an agent of Barrow's employer.
13 Although the Union was not Barrow's employer, it is covered by the ADEA as a labor organization. 16 Cooper was Barrow's employer within the meaning of the ADEA. 14 Barrow must show, as part of his prima facie case, that he was discharged. 17 When an employee resigns, as Barrow did, he may satisfy the discharge requirement by proving constructive discharge. 18 To show constructive discharge, an employee must offer evidence that the employer made the employee's working conditions so intolerable that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign. 19 Stated more simply, Barrow's resignation must have been reasonable under all the circumstances. Whether a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign depends on the facts of each case, but we consider the following factors relevant, singly or in combination: (1) demotion; (2) reduction in salary; (3) reduction in job responsibilities; (4) reassignment to menial or degrading work; (5) reassignment to work under a younger supervisor; (6) badgering, harassment, or humiliation by the employer calculated to encourage the employee's resignation; or (7) offers of early retirement on terms that would make the employee worse off whether the offer was accepted or not. 20 15 Barrow has not shown the constructive discharge element of his prima facie case. He has introduced no evidence on any of the seven factors listed above. That list is not exclusive, but Barrow has introduced no evidence sufficient to raise a genuine dispute on any other basis for constructive discharge. Barrow asserts that a reasonable employee would feel compelled to resign after being unable to obtain regular work on a gang. We disagree. A longshoreman's inability to obtain a regular gang position is insufficient, without more, to constitute constructive discharge under the ADEA. 16 Indeed, the record reveals that the number of hours Barrow worked, as a percentage of all hours worked by all union longshoremen of Barrow's seniority, remained roughly constant or even increased slightly from 1984-85 to 1989-90. 21 These statistics also reveal that the total number of hours worked by longshoremen on the New Orleans waterfront dropped substantially in the late 1980s. The general economic downturn that struck the waterfront at that time constitutes a reasonable factor other than age which explains the decline in Barrow's hours. 22 For the same reason, Barrow's allegation that he was denied employment opportunities (specifically, a regular gang position) must fail. Barrow's employer and the Union have produced a reasonable factor other than age to explain Barrow's inability to get a regular gang position. 23