Opinion ID: 2161807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ownership of the Plymouth.

Text: The issue of whether American's policy covered the 1953 Plymouth at the time of the accident hinges on the underlying question of whether ownership of the vehicle had passed by then from Winnebagoland Motors to Robert Klapps and his father. Ownership in property passes according to the intent of the parties. [1] Although all the conduct of the parties in this case does not support the plaintiffs'-respondents' position, we are satisfied that the trial court's determination that ownership remained in Winnebagoland Motors as of the time of the accident is not against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. [2] The most-significant fact in arriving at the intention of the parties is the accumulation of evidence supporting the proposition that the consummation of the sale was conditional upon obtaining Reuben Klapp's signature on the contract. (1) Young Klapps testified to this effect. (2) Testimony of Winnebagoland's salesman Joseph Merkes, taken at an adverse examination, was read into the record at the trial. When asked whether there would have been a deal even if Klapp's father refused to sign, Merkes in essence said that he did not know what would have happened. Merkes' uncertainty at least indicates his doubt as to whether a contract was entered into on February 28th, since if there was a valid contract it would not have been necessary for Reuben to join in the signing. (3) That Winnebagoland placed major reliance on making an adult a party to such a contract with a minor is revealed by the fact that Reuben cosigned on two previous occasions when Robert purchased automobiles from Winnebagoland. (4) Although Robert Klapps signed a conditional sales contract and a car-order form on February 28th, he and his father both signed identical papers (even as to the date) on March 3d. If the earlier contract was in force, the only conceivable justification for the re-execution would be to bind Reuben Klapps as a guarantor. But this could have been accomplished by having him sign either the original contract, or if that was somehow misplaced, the original copy. The second signing not only indicates that the parties did not mean to be bound on February 28th, but also tends to support the trial court's decision that the contract was actually contingent upon Reuben's signing. (5) At the time of the collision, the car carried dealer's license plates. It would be persuasive evidence that Klapps intended to take title to the car on February 28th if he had applied for his own plates on that day as required by law. [3] That he failed to apply until March 2d or 3d, while not being conclusive evidence of exactly when the transaction was completed, at least casts doubt as to whether title passed on February 28th. Appellant relies on the fact that Klapps described himself as the owner of the Plymouth in the insurance application he filled out February 28th. A similar contention was met in Liner v. Mittelstadt , [4] where this court said: In our view this shows no more than precaution on Hinshaw's part that there should be insurance which would go into effect immediately upon his becoming the owner; it does not show that he became owner [at one time] . . . rather than at some other time. However, if any inference is to be drawn from this signed application the trial court certainly could have reasoned that since Klapps realized the policy would not become effective until 12:01 a. m. on March 1st, it would be doubtful that he would intend to take title on February 28th to an automobile which he knew would not be covered by insurance until the next day. The fact that Klapps drove the car home has little bearing on the question of ownership since it was customary for Winnebagoland to permit potential customers to try out vehicles. The fact that Klapps signed the title to the 1951 Studebaker over to Winnebagoland on February 28th is evidence that the contract was entered into on that date. However, this is countered by the fact that the agreed cash payment was not made until March 3d. Considered as a whole, the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence points inescapably to the conclusion that the ownership of the Plymouth had not changed hands at the time the accident occurred on February 28th. It is thus unnecessary to consider whether the trial court was correct in determining that the deal was actually closed March 3d. Because of our assessment of the evidence received at the trial on the question of ownership it is not necessary for us to consider in any way the certified copy of the motor vehicle title submitted to this court with the request that we take judicial notice of the document in support of the position taken by plaintiffs-respondents. By the Court. Orders affirmed.