Opinion ID: 1386737
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel During the Pretrial Preparation and Plea Hearing

Text: Fautenberry argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance during their pretrial preparation and at the plea hearing. In his habeas petition, Fautenberry presents three subparts to this ineffective-assistance claim: (A) counsel tailed to engage in an adequate investigation, (B) counsel provided him with erroneous information regarding the implications of pleading no contest to the charges against him, and (C) counsel failed to hold the prosecution to its burden of proof at the plea hearing. The district court determined that each subpart of this ineffective-assistance claim had been procedurally defaulted. The court granted Fautenberry a certificate of appealability only on Subparts A and C, so we do not address the allegations asserted under Subpart B. The State argues that we should affirm the district court's conclusion that Fautenberry procedurally defaulted this claim. A habeas petitioner procedurally defaults a claim where a state procedural rule . . . prevents the state courts from reaching the merits of the petitioner's claim. Seymour, 224 F.3d at 549-50. Federal courts must consider four factors when determining whether a habeas petitioner has procedurally defaulted a claim. Gonzales v. Elo, 233 F.3d 348, 353 (6th Cir.2000); see also Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986). First, the court must determine that there is a state procedural rule that is applicable to the petitioner's claim and that the petitioner failed to comply with the rule. Second, the court must decide whether the state courts actually enforced the state procedural sanction. Third, the court must decide whether the state procedural forfeiture is an adequate and independent state ground on which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim. Jacobs v. Mohr, 265 F.3d 407, 417 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138) (alterations omitted). Once the court determines that a state procedural rule was not complied with and that the rule was an adequate and independent state ground, the court must move to the fourth factor. Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. The fourth factor allows a petitioner to avoid or excuse procedural default if he demonstrates that there was cause for him to not follow the procedural rule and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error. Id. (quotation omitted). Under Subpart A of this claim, Fautenberry contends that his counsels' performance was deficient because: (1) they did not interview a sufficient number of the prosecution's potential witnesses, (2) they did not object to venue in Hamilton County, and (3) they did not file a motion to suppress Fautenberry's confession to Agent Ott. Fautenberry presented this claim to the state court in his petition for post-conviction relief, but he alleged only that counsel were ineffective because they failed to object to venue; he did not challenge counsels' failure to interview a sufficient number of witnesses or to file a suppression motion. Because Fautenberry undeniably did not present these allegations to the state courts, we find that the district court correctly held that they were procedurally defaulted. See Seymour, 224 F.3d at 549-50. The state appellate court addressed the only allegation presented to it, namely, that counsel did not object to venue, and held, pursuant to State v. Cole, 2 Ohio St.3d 112, 443 N.E.2d 169 (1982), that this is a claim which could and should have been raised by Fautenberry on direct appeal and is, therefore, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Fautenberry, 1998 WL 906395, at . In Cole, the Ohio Supreme Court held that res judicata is a proper basis upon which to dismiss an ineffective-assistance claim in a petition for post-conviction relief where a defendant who is represented by new counsel on direct appeal fails to raise that claim and the basis for that claim could fairly be determined without examining evidence outside the record. 443 N.E.2d at 171. We have in the past recognized that Ohio's application of res judicata pursuant to Cole is an actually enforced, adequate and independent state ground upon which the Ohio state courts consistently refuse to review the merits of a defendant's claims. See Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 521-22 (6th Cir.2000) (Ohio state courts consistently invoke Cole and apply res judicata when a defendant, who is represented by new counsel on direct appeal, fails to raise at that stage of the litigation an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim appearing on the face of the record.); see also Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 421 (6th Cir.1999) (rejecting the habeas petitioner's attempt to demonstrate Ohio's wavering commitment to its procedural default rules). We therefore conclude that Fautenberry has procedurally defaulted the allegation that counsel failed to object to venue. In short, then, Fautenberry has procedurally defaulted all the claims of deficiency raised in Subpart A. [6] Even if we were to conclude that Fautenberry did not procedurally default Subpart A of this ineffective-assistance claim, we would find it to be without merit. First, Fautenberry argues that his counsel did not interview a sufficient number of the prosecution's potential witnesses. Noting that his attorneys billed most of their investigation time in one-hour increments, he surmises that they were not interviewing any of the out-of-state witnesses. This argument is based on sheer speculation; it does not account for the reasonable inference that counsel interviewed some of the witnesses (including out-of-state witnesses) via phone. Fautenberry does not indicate how many witnesses were actually interviewed or how many more should have been interviewed. Fautenberry has the burden of establishing his counsel's deficiency, and this speculative argument is insufficient to support an ineffective-assistance claim. Second, Fautenberry cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to raise the venue issue because the evidence over whelmingly indicated that the murder occurred in Hamilton County and, to the extent that the evidence was less than conclusive on this issue, venue was proper in the jurisdiction where Daron's body was found, which was Hamilton County. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2901.12(J). Finally, Fautenberry cannot establish prejudice from counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress the statements made to Agent Ott because he cannot prove that conversation was improper, as there is no evidence of an Edwards violation. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880. In Subpart C of this claim, Fautenberry alleges that his trial counsel should not have stipulated to the prosecution's evidence at the plea hearing. Fautenberry readily admits that he did not raise that portion of his claim on direct appeal or during post-conviction proceedings, but contends that he preserved this issue by raising it in his motion for reconsideration with the Ohio Supreme Court and his application for reopening with the Ohio Court of Appeals. Both Fautenberry's motion for reconsideration with the Ohio Supreme Court and his application for reopening with the court of appeals alleged ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. This claim, on the other hand, alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The district court correctly concluded that the allegations in Fautenberry's motions for reconsideration and reopening, which argued only ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, did not fairly present his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim to the state court, and that Fautenberry had defaulted Subpart C of this claim. E. Waiver of Right to a Jury Trial During the Penalty Phase of the Proceedings Fautenberry argues here that although he waived his right to a jury trial during the guilt phase of his proceedings, he did not waive his right to a jury trial during the penalty phase. The substance of this argument is entirely different from the waiver of jury trial argument he presented to the state trial court in his petition for post-conviction relief, in which he alleged that: (1) his attorneys failed to gain his trust and thus failed to provide him with the necessary information regarding his constitutional rights; (2) his attorneys provided him with incorrect information about the waiver; and (3) he was psychologically and mentally unable to waive his right to a jury trial. The state trial court made the following findings of fact: (1) [Fautenberry] was competent when the jury waiver occurred; (2) [Fautenberry] acknowledged discussing the [waiver] with both attorneys; and (3) [t]he court went over the law regarding the waiver and the proceedings before a three[-]judge panel with petitioner[,] and petitioner acknowledged that he fully understood what he was doing. The state trial court concluded that this claim could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal and therefore was barred by res judicata. The state appellate court, however, did not consider whether this claim was procedurally barred, but addressed the merits of the claim and rejected it because the record on review show[ed] that Fautenberry was engaged in a colloquy by the judge[ ] and indicated squarely that he understood that he was waiving his right to a jury trial and that no promises had been made to him. Fautenberry, 1998 WL 906395, at . In his habeas petition, Fautenberry argues that he did not waive his right to a jury trial on the penalty phase of his prosecution. This claim that he did not knowingly waive his right to be sentenced by a jury is, materially different from the claim he raised in the state court, which challenged his competence and knowledge in connection with the waiver of his right to a trial by jury and did not distinguish between the waiver of his right to a jury at the guilt phase and the waiver of his right to a jury at the penalty phase. The argument Fautenberry raises in these habeas proceedings, on the other hand, effectively concedes that he waived his right to a jury trial but contends that he did not knowingly or voluntarily waive his right to be sentenced by a jury. Before us, the State argues that Fautenberry's claim that he did not waive his right to a jury trial on the penalty phase has been procedurally defaulted because the state court applied res judicata and refused to address the merits. In determining whether state courts have relied on a procedural rule to bar review of a claim, we look to the last reasoned opinion of the state courts . . . Mason v. Mitchell , 71, 320 F.3d 604, 635 (6th Cir.2003). Because the state appellate court's decision is the last reasoned opinion of the state courts, we must look to that decision. That decision, however, did not mention res judicata but addressed the merits of the waiver claim that Fautenberry raised in his post-conviction proceedings. But that decision did not address at all the claim that Fautenberry makes in his habeas petition and in this appeal, because Fautenberry never presented that claim to the state post-conviction courts. We therefore conclude that although the State's reason for claiming procedural-default argument is incorrect, this claim is nonetheless defaulted. See Seymour, 224 F.3d at 549-50. Even if we were to reach the substance of this claim, we would find it to be without merit. Fautenberry has not presented, and we have not discovered, any Supreme Court precedent establishing that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to be sentenced by a jury in state court. Fautenberry argues, relying on Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980), that Ohio statutory law creates a right to be sentenced by a jury and that the Fourteenth Amendment protects that right. Fautenberry's reliance on Hicks is misplaced. In Hicks, it was undisputed that the defendant had a statutory right to be sentenced by the jury; the issue in that case was whether the state court violated the defendant's due process rights by restricting the jury's discretion through a habitual-offender statute that was later declared to be unconstitutional. Id. at 345-46, 100 S.Ct. 2227. Here, however, Fautenberry did not have a statutory right to be sentenced by a jury. The applicable Ohio statute states: [I]f the offender is found guilty of both the [aggravated murder] charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender . . . shall be determined by one of the following: (a) By the panel of three judges that tried the offender upon the offender's waiver of the right to trial by jury; (b) By the trial jury and the trial judge, if the offender was tried by jury. Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.03(C)(2) (1981). [7] See also Ohio R.Crim. Pro. 11(c)(3). Fautenberry clearly and expressly waived his right to a jury trial. His waiver stated: I, John Fautenberry, . . . hereby knowingly, intelligently[,] and voluntarily waive and relinquish my right to a trial by Jury, and elect to be tried by a Judge of the Court in which the said cause be pending. The trial court explained Fautenberry's rights and asked him if it was his desire to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily relinquish his right to a jury trial; he responded in the affirmative. The trial court also informed Fautenberry that if his waiver were accepted and if he pleaded, guilty to the charges against him, he would be sentenced by a three-judge panel (rather than a jury). We find, as did the state court, that Fautenberry knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial. We conclude further that he did not have a statutory right (let alone a constitutionally protected right) to be sentenced by a jury. This case, therefore, is distinguishable from Hicks, and we find no basis upon which to grant habeas relief. F. Knowing and Voluntary Nature of the No-Contest Plea Fautenberry next argues that he did not knowingly or voluntarily enter his no-contest plea. The state trial court, in resolving Fautenberry's petition for post-conviction relief, made the factual finding that the plea was properly accepted, and arrived at the legal conclusion that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The state appellate court, in affirming the trial court's decision, evaluated Fautenberry's three evidentiary bases for this claim: (1) the affidavit of mitigation specialist, Dr. Shorr, which stated that defense counsel failed to maintain a positive, working relationship with . . . Fautenberry; (2) documents concerning Fautenberry's psychological condition prior to his plea; and (3) Fautenberry's own affidavit stating that his attorneys did not adequately apprise him of the consequences of his plea. Fautenberry, 1998 WL 906395, at . The court concluded that Dr. Schorr's opinion was insufficient to rebut the abundant evidence in the record demonstrating that his plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered. Id. at . The court found the documents concerning his psychological condition to be unpersuasive because he was twice found competent to stand trial. Id. And the court refused to give much weight to Fautenberry's self-serving affidavit. Id. A guilty or no-contest plea involves a waiver of many substantial constitutional rights, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), and a court may accept a guilty or no-contest plea only where it is a voluntary[,] . . . knowing, intelligent act[ ] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences, see Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). On appeal, Fautenberry asserts that his plea was not knowing and voluntary for four reasons: (1) his trial counsel incorrectly informed him that if he pleaded no contest, the three judge panel would not learn that he committed other murders, the three judge panel would perceive his no-contest plea as mitigating, and he would preserve his right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motions; (2) he was unaware of exculpatory evidence impermissibly withheld by the prosecution (i.e., the alleged Brady evidence); (3) he suffered from serious mental illnesses at the time of his plea; and (4) during the plea colloquy, the court was disorganized[,] . . . failed to [engage] in a meaningful dialogue, and failed to correct the misinformation provided by trial counsel. Each asserted basis for this claim is without merit. First, aside from Fautenberry's unsubstantiated, self-serving affidavit, there is no evidence in the record indicating that trial counsel incorrectly advised him of the implications of entering a no-contest plea. During the plea colloquy, trial counsel indicated that they explained to [Fautenberry] in detail what the plea of no contest means and that he underst[ood] . . . that by pleading no contest he [was] in essence giving up [a] substantial number of rights, particularly those that may be available to him at the appellate level if he were to go to trial. We agree with the state courts that Fautenberry's own self-serving affidavit is insufficient to rebut the contrary evidence in the record or to undermine the knowing and intelligent nature of his plea. Second, we have already concluded, in the context of the Brady claim, that there is no reasonable likelihood that the disclosure of the undisclosed evidence would have altered Fautenberry's decision to enter his plea because that evidence was not material to his defense. Third, none of the psychological evidence indicates that Fautenberry was mentally incapable of understanding, appreciating, and waiving his constitutional rights, and he does not challenge the state court's finding that he was twice found competent to stand trial. Fourth, and most importantly, the state court's plea colloquy was methodical and thorough, not disorganized or failing to result in a meaningful dialogue as alleged by Fautenberry. And, at the plea hearing, Fautenberry indicated that he did not have any questions about his rights. In sum, we reject this claim as unfounded, and instead agree with the state court that Fautenberry knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights during the entry of his guilty plea. G. Admission of Victim Impact Evidence Fautenberry argues that the state court violated his Eighth Amendment rights by admitting victim-impact evidence. Fautenberry specifically challenges the admission of statements from Daron's friends and family recommending that he receive the maximum available sentence: (1) Daron's ex-wife stated that Fautenberry should receive the maximum possible sentence; (2) Daron's father stated that Fautenberry is an animal with no conscience and that the maximum possible sentence is the only appropriate punishment; and (3) Daron's supervisor at work stated that Fautenberry committed an extremely brutal offense and he should receive a maximum penalty. The Ohio Supreme Court addressed this argument on direct appeal and found error in the admission of . . . the victim-impact statements [that] relate to sentencing recommendations. Fautenberry, 650 N.E.2d at 882. The court nevertheless was not persuaded that such error warrant[ed] reversal because there was no indication that the three judges who sentenced Fautenberry contemplated or relied upon the victim-impact evidence which was available to them. Id. In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 509, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), the Supreme Court held that the introduction of victim-impact evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial violates the Eighth Amendment. Id. Just a few years later, however, the Court retreated from this holding, declaring that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence . . ., the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). The Payne Court noted that it overturned only that part of Booth that disallowed evidence . . . relating to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the victim's family. Id. at 830 n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597. The Court did not disturb that portion of Booth that forbids a victim's family members' characterization and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence. Id.; see also Welch v. Simons, 451 F.3d 675, 703 (10th Cir.2006) (recognizing that many circuits have found that this portion of Booth' s holding survived the holding in Payne and remains valid). We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that the state trial court erred in admitting this evidence. The issue, then, is whether the Ohio Supreme Court's reasoning that this error did not warrant reversal was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Fautenberry argues that the Ohio Supreme Court's decision was an unreasonable application of Booth because it employed a sort of harmless error analysis, whereas Booth did not require the defendant to demonstrate actual prejudice. We find helpful the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hain v. Gibson, 287 F.3d 1224, 1239-40 (10th Cir.2002), and our unpublished decision in Brewer v. Anderson, 47 Fed.Appx. 284, 287-88 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished case). In Hain, the Tenth Circuit noted that [t]he decision in Booth does not expressly indicate whether the Court believed such errors to be trial errors subject to harmless error review, or structural error[s] requiring automatic reversal. Hain, 287 F.3d at 1239 n. 11. The Hain court thus concluded that the state court in its case did not unreasonably appl[y] Booth in concluding that such errors [were] subject to harmless error review. Id. In Brewer, we reviewed, as we do here, the admission of victim-impact evidence before a three judge panel. The Ohio Supreme Court, both in Brewer and in the present case, relied on State v. Post, 32 Ohio St.3d 380, 513 N.E.2d 754, 759 (1987), which states: Absent an indication that the panel was influenced by or considered the victim impact evidence in arriving at its sentencing decision, the admission of the victim impact statement . . . did not constitute prejudicial error. Id. Arid both here and in Brewer, the Ohio Supreme Court found no indication that the three-judge panel considered or contemplated the victim-impact evidence available to them. [8] We concluded in Brewer, 47 Fed. Appx. at 288, that the state court's application of Booth was not unreasonable and we reach the same conclusion here. An unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law, Woodford, 537 U.S. at 25, 123 S.Ct. 357 (quotation marks omitted); in order to grant habeas relief under the unreasonable application clause, we must determine that the state court's application of clearly established federal law [was] objectively unreasonable, Cone, 535 U.S. at 694, 122 S.Ct. 1843. Contrary to Fautenberry's argument, Booth does not indicate whether the erroneous admission of victim-impact evidence warrants automatic reversal or whether such errors are subject to harmless-error review. See Hain, 287 F.3d at 1239 n. 11. Therefore, the Ohio Supreme Court's decision to engage in a form of harmless-error analysis does not constitute an unreasonable application of Booth because Booth did not address that issue. Moreover, we question whether Booth even applies here. Booth involved the improper admission of victim-impact evidence to a jury, whereas this case involves the improper admission of victim-impact evidence to a three-judge panel. The Court in Booth was greatly concerned that the victim-impact evidence might (1) distract the sentencing jury from its constitutionally required task [of] determining whether the death penalty is appropriate in light of the background and record of the accused and the particular circumstances of the crime, Booth, 482 U.S. at 507, 107 S.Ct. 2529, (2) divert the jury's attention away from the defendant's background and record[ ] and the circumstances of the crime, id. at 505, 107 S.Ct. 2529, or (3) create an impermissible risk that the capital sentencing decision will be made in an arbitrary manner. Id. Those considerations are severely diminishedif not entirely obviatedwhen the sentencer is a judge or a three judge panel, rather than a lay jury. We conclude that Booth has minimal relevance when the victim-impact evidence is presented to a three judge panel, see Brewer, 47 Fed.Appx. at 287-88 (affirming, as a reasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that  Booth does not apply to situations where a defendant is tried by a three judge panel rather than a jury), and hold that the Ohio Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent. H. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel Fautenberry contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during his direct appeal to the state court of appeals. The district court found that this claim had been procedurally defaulted because Fautenberry did not present it to the state appellate court in a timely application for reopening, which is the proper procedure in Ohio for raising ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. The State urges us to affirm the district court's conclusion that this claim has been procedurally defaulted. Under Ohio law, a criminal defendant must raise his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in an application for reopening (i.e., a motion for delayed reconsideration) filed in the court of appeals where the alleged error took place. State v. Murnahan, 63 Ohio St.3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (1992). Ohio App. R. 26(B)(1) states that an application for reopening shall be filed in the court of appeals where the appeal was decided within ninety days from journalization of the appellate judgment unless the applicant shows good cause for filing at a later time. The state court of appeals rejected Fautenberry's direct appeal in February 1994, and the Ohio Supreme Court denied his appeal in 1995. In January 1996, after the conclusion of Fautenberry's direct appeal, the state court appointed new counsel to represent Fautenberry during his post-conviction proceedings. In March 1996, Fautenberry, through his new counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration with the Ohio Supreme Court, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel during his direct appeal to that court; the motion was denied in May 1996. In July 1996, Fautenberry filed an application for reopening with the state court of appeals, asserting ineffective assistance of appellate counsel during his direct appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals denied that application because Fadtenberry failed to demonstrate that there [was] good cause for filing [ This application more than two years after th[e] court's judgment was journalized. The court further reasoned that Fautenberry could have raised the issue of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in his previous application for reopening in the Supreme Court and provided no explanation as to why the application of res judicata would be unjust. The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this decision in April 1997 for the same reasons articulated by the court of appeals. Fautenberry, 677 N.E.2d at 1195. We hold that Fautenberry has procedurally defaulted this claim. The state appellate court denied his direct appeal in February 1994, and Fautenberry waited more than two years to file his application for reopening with that court. Fautenberry demonstrated good cause for not filing his application prior to January 1996, because until that point he was represented by the same counsel on appeal and we conclude that it would be unreasonable to expect counsel to raise an ineffective assistance, claim against himself. But Fautenberry did not show good cause for failing to file his application until July 1996, six months after the appointment of new counsel. Additionally, he did not explain why he failed to raise this claim in his motion for reconsideration filed with the Ohio Supreme Court in March 1996. We conclude that Fautenberry did not comply with the timeliness requirements in Ohio App. R. 26(B) and that those time constraints are an actually enforced, adequate and independent state ground upon which the Ohio courts consistently refuse to address ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims. See Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 539-40 (6th Cir.2001) (finding that the petitioner procedurally defaulted his claim because he failed to comply with the requirements in Ohio App. R. 26(B)); Wickline v. Mitchell 319 F.3d 813, 823 (6th Cir.2003) (finding that the petitioner's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were procedurally defaulted because he failed to comply with the rule set forth in Murnahan ). Fautenberry argues that the timeliness requirements in Ohio App. R. 26(B) are not adequate and independent state grounds upon which to find that his claims have been procedurally defaulted. Maupin, 785 F.2d at 138. To be adequate, a state procedural rule must be firmly established and regularly followed . . . Hutchison v. Bell, 303 F.3d 720, 737 (6th Cir. 2002) (quotation marks omitted). Fautenberry relies on our decision in Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 418-21 (6th Cir. 2006), to argue that an untimely application for reopening pursuant to. Ohio App. R. 26(B) is not a firmly established and regularly followed procedural rule, id. at 418, particularly emphasizing the Franklin court's statement that [a] review of the relevant case law reveals that the Ohio Supreme Court has been erratic in its handling of untimely Rule 26(B) applications, in capital cases. Id. at 420. Fautenberry wishes to elevate this statement to an all-encompassing, ever-applicable legal proposition that will forever (or at least for a very long time) bar the federal courts from finding that an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim has been procedurally defaulted where the state court refused to address the merits of that claim because of the time constraints in Ohio App. R. 26(B). But the firmly established and regularly followed inquiry cannot be made once and for all. Instead we must consider whether the adequate and independent state procedural bar . . . [was] `firmly established and regularly followed' by the time as of which it [was] to be applied. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991) (emphasis added). Cf. Rogers v. Howes, 144 F.3d 990, 994 n. 5 (6th Cir.1998) ([T]he question is not whether the state courts consistently apply the procedural bar in the present.). Put differently, we ask whether, at the time of the petitioner's actions giving rise to the default, the petitioner could . . . be deemed to have been apprised of the rule's existence. Hutchison, 303 F.3d at 737 (quotations and alterations omitted). We find that, as of the time that Fautenberry should have filed his application for reopening (i.e., when he acquired new counsel in January 1996), the time constraints in Ohio App. R. 26(B) were firmly established and regularly followed, and he was or should have been apprised of the rule's existence. The Franklin decision is not to the contrary. To begin with, the facts in that case are materially different from those here. In Franklin, the defendant had filed his application for reopening with the court of appeals one year after the Ohio Supreme Court issued its decision in Murnahan and just prior to the effective date of Ohio App. R. 26(B). The Ohio procedural rule in effect at the time Murnahan Was decided required that such an application be filed within ten days from the entry of the opinion for which reconsideration was sought; Murnahan itself did not set any time frame within which such an application was required to be filed, but opined that courts should take a more lenient approach with regard to the time for filing. Ohio App. R. 26(B) was then created to provide the time frame for these applications. As we observed in Franklin, at the time Franklin filed his application for delayed reconsideration, the law regarding the time period within which ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claims were required to be filed was un clear. But we specifically noted in Franklin that [nor several years following the enactment of amended Rule 26(B) [in July 1993], the Ohio Supreme Court regularly enforced the rule's timeliness requirements. Franklin, 434 F.3d at 420 (citing a string of Ohio Supreme Court cases). Fautenberry's circumstances are significantly different from those in Franklin. Fautenberry did not obtain new counsel (and thus cannot be held responsible for failing to file an application for reopening) until January 1996, which is almost four years after Murnahan was decided, and two-and-a-half years after Ohio App. R. 26(B) became effective. By that time, the 90-day time limit in Ohio App. R. 26(B) was clearly established and Fautenberry was or should have been apprised of its existence. Nevertheless, after obtaining his new counsel, Fautenberry waited six monthsduring which he filed a motion for reconsideration with the Ohio Supreme Court in which he could have raised this claim but did notbefore filing his application for reopening. We conclude that the holding of Franklin in which the court stated that Rule 26(B) is not an adequate and independent state rule that can preclude consideration of Franklin's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, id. at 421is inapplicable here. Fautenberry has procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim. But even if this claim was not procedurally defaulted, it must fail because it is meritless. A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel during his first appeal of right, Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), but effective assistance does not require counsel to raise every nonfrivolous argument on appeal, Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983). [O]nly when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of [appellate] counsel be overcome. Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 579 (6th Cir.2002). Fautenberry argues that his appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance because they raised only seven issues on direct appeal, and, more specifically, they failed to present four allegedly meritorious claims on appeal: (1) the trial court's failure to review evidence as required by Ohio Crim. R. 11(C)(3); (2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (3) Ohio's discriminatory method for selecting grand-jury forepersons; and (4) the fact that. Fautenberry was forced to wear shackles in the presence of the trial court. The mere fact that appellate counsel confined their appeal to seven issues does not establish that counsel were ineffective; it is often best to filter out less meritorious issues so that counsel can emphasize those that present the best opportunity for relief on appeal. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 752, 103 S.Ct. 3308 (There can hardly be any question about the importance of having the appellate advocate examine the record with a view to selecting the most promising issues for review.). And the four ignored issues were not clearly stronger than those presented. The first of the four appears to be baseless. Contrary to Fautenberry's argument, the trial court did in fact review evidence as required by Ohio Crim. R. 11(C)(3); most notably, the prosecutor introduced and the trial court reviewed the transcripts of Fautenberry's confessions to Agent Ott, Officer Nelson, and Ms. Priest-Herndon. We have already concluded that the second omitted issuei.e., ineffective assistance of trial counselis baseless. The third omitted claim, which alleges the impropriety of Ohio's selection of grand-jury forepersons, was not apparent from the record on direct appeal, and thus we do not fault appellate counsel for failing to raise that claim. Moreover, the case upon which Fautenberry relies to challenge Ohio's grand jury foreperson selection process, Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 398, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998), was not decided until 1998, long after Fautenberry's direct appeal had concluded. Finally, the fourth omitted claimthat Fautenberry was prejudiced by the wearing of shackles before the trial courtwould not have had any merit on direct appeal because under Ohio law the appellate court presum[es] that in a bench trial in a criminal case[,] the court consider[s] only the relevant, material, and competent evidence in arriving at its judgment unless it affirmatively appears to the contrary. Post, 513 N.E.2d at 759.