Opinion ID: 4031017
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Records from February through April

Text: Baker first cites Giles’s billing records from February through April of 2000: 02/16/00 Legal Work. Review release proposed by Baker 0.25 Petrolite. Email client re same. 125.00/hr 0.25 02/25/00 Teleconference – Billable. Teleconference with client re proposed releases. RWG to redraft and 125.00/hr circulate to opponent for comments. Teleconference – Not Billed. Call Mr. Broussard 03/08/00 re changes requested by RWG. New document 0.25 drafted and to be faxed to RWG. 125.00/hr Relay same to client. Teleconference – Billable. Teleconference with Mr. 0.25 03/24/00 Broussard re final changes. Made them and faxed to 125.00/hr RWG late afternoon. Fax copy to client. Legal Work. Review final draft of Settelment [sic] 0.25 Agreement and Full anf [sic] Final Release of 125.00/hr 03/30/00 Claims. All Changes made. 0.25 Legal Work. Receive, review and approve last draft 125.00/hr of release. 03/31/00 Legal Work. Review final changes to release. 0.25 Legal Work. Review and approve last changes to 0.25 04/07/00 release. [F]ax to Attorney for Baker. 125.00/hr Legal Work. Fax Mr. Broussard prompter re status of 0.25 04/14/00 settlement. 0.25 04/15/00 Legal Work. Draft Motion to Dismiss. 125.00/hr Legal Work. Approve Motion to Dismiss with minor 0.25 change as requested by Mr. Broussard. 125.00/hr 04/18/00 Legal Work. Exchange documents and receive 0.25 check. 125.00/hr No. 15-2413 Baker Hughes, et al. v S&S Chemical, et al. Page 14 Baker notes that, based on these records, Giles received the Settlement with “All Changes made” on March 30, 2000. The following day, however, Giles allegedly made additional changes, as indicated by the reference to “[r]eview final changes to release” on March 31. Likewise, Baker contends that Giles made further changes to the Settlement on April 7, 2000, relying on the notation that he “[r]eview[ed] and approve[d] last changes to release.” Baker thus argues, based solely on Giles’s billing records, that the parties were engaged in ongoing settlement negotiations. The district court, according to Baker, therefore erred in concluding that the Settlement was a valid contract because the parties’ continuing negotiations might have resulted in alterations to the terms of the parties’ agreement that were not reflected in the March 30 Settlement. We find this argument unpersuasive. Baker speculates that the parties might have entered into a contract different than the Settlement, but offers no documentary evidence of either a draft or finalized version of another purported contract. In addition, the district court specifically noted that Baker’s in-house counsel admitted during his deposition that he did not have “any factual support” for the contention that the Oklahoma lawsuit was resolved on terms different than those set forth in the Settlement. Baker accordingly failed to come forward with “significant probative evidence,” see Ondo v. City of Cleveland, 795 F.3d 597, 603 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), indicating that there exists a genuine dispute of material fact with regard to the Settlement’s validity. Moreover, the billing records that Baker cites do not support the inferences that Baker draws. Baker relies on the entries for March 31 and April 7: “Review final changes to release” and “Review and approve last changes to release.” These entries, according to Baker, indicate that additional changes were made to the Settlement after Giles received it from Baker’s attorney. The timing of relevant events, however, does not support Baker’s argument. Giles received the Settlement on March 30, 2000. One day later, Giles and Stevens signed it. Giles’s statement that he “[r]eview[ed]” the final changes on March 31 thus reflects nothing more than Giles discussing the March 30 draft with his client before he and Stevens both signed the draft. The entry does not indicate that any new or additional changes were made. No. 15-2413 Baker Hughes, et al. v S&S Chemical, et al. Page 15 One week then passed before Giles faxed the signed copy of the Settlement to Baker. During this time, there are no entries in Giles’s records showing that Giles was communicating with opposing counsel or actively altering the Settlement. Giles’s entry for April 7 thus does not refer to any new or additional changes to the Settlement as received from Baker on March 30, 2000. Instead, the entry indicates only that Giles reviewed the changes that had previously been made one last time before his client accepted Baker’s offer by returning the signed copy of the March 30 final draft. Giles’s records, in other words, simply reflect his caution in reviewing and approving the March 30 final draft before he committed himself and his client to its terms. Indeed, if Giles had been actively adding or negotiating new terms, the record indicates that he would have written as much. Giles’s entries in December 1999 and January 2000 include the following: (1) “Work on settling case. . . . relay same to client and discuss same,” (2) “Teleconference with Steve [Broussard] re client’s counter offer. Discuss same,” and (3) “Talk to defense re their counter offer.” These records show that, when Giles was actively involved in settlement negotiations, he recorded his communications about those negotiations. That Giles did not record any such communications in the period from March 30 to April 7 of 2000 thus supports the conclusion that there were no continuing negotiations or other changes to the Settlement during that time. As a result, Giles’s references to the “changes” in his March 31 and April 7 billing entries can best be interpreted as referring only to his review of changes that were previously made. The entries do not indicate that Giles changed the terms of the March 30 draft before he accepted those terms by faxing the signed copy of the Settlement to Baker. In addition, even if Giles had made subsequent changes to the Settlement, the changes would have been immaterial. This is because, as noted above, a response to an offer that contains different or additional terms functions as a counteroffer that the original offeror may either accept or reject. Midwest Eng’g & Constr. Co. v. Elec. Regulator Corp., 435 P.2d 89, 96 (Okla. 1967). Thus, even if the draft of the Settlement that Giles faxed to Baker on April 7, 2000 contained new or additional terms as compared to the draft of the Settlement that Giles received on March 30, 2000, the later draft functioned as a counteroffer. See id. Baker then accepted that counteroffer by performing according to the terms of the contract, with the result that the April 7, 2000 draft of the Settlement became a binding contract between Baker and Stevens. That draft, No. 15-2413 Baker Hughes, et al. v S&S Chemical, et al. Page 16 moreover, undisputedly includes the Release Provision, so even if we accept Baker’s contention that Giles’s records reflect continued settlement negotiations, Baker is still bound by the Release Provision. The district court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment on the ground that Baker had released Stevens from his confidentiality obligations.