Opinion ID: 1207983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Following the Supreme Court's determination in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), that the Sentencing Guidelines were to be considered advisory and not mandatory, this Court formulated the rule in Crosby for plain error review of pre- Booker sentences. See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 224-26 (2d Cir.2005) (discussing rationale and procedure for Crosby remand). Concluding that such a review requires a resolution of the issue of whether the sentence originally imposed is materially different from the sentence that would have been imposed under the Booker regime, we formulated the protocol now known as the Crosby remand to enable the District Court to decide the issue in the first instance. On such remand, District Judges are to re-examine sentences in light of the following: [A]ny of the errors in the procedure for selecting the original sentence ... would be harmless, and not prejudicial under plain error analysis, if the judge decides on remand, in full compliance with now applicable requirements, that under the post- Booker/Fanfan regime the sentence would have been essentially the same as originally imposed. Conversely, a district judge's decision that the original sentence would have differed in a nontrivial manner from that imposed will demonstrate that the error in imposing the original sentence was harmful and satisfies plain error analysis. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 118. Accordingly, the question to be resolved by the District Court is whether the challenged sentence is materially different from the one that the district court would have imposed with a correct understanding of federal sentencing law as now explained by the Supreme Court. Garcia, 413 F.3d at 224. If the District Court decides not to resentence, it should explain that decision on the record; if it decides that the sentence should be vacated, it must resentence in accordance with Booker, with an explanation. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 120. The explanation referred to in Crosby is required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), which provides in part that [t]he court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence. To sentence in compliance with Booker, the court is constrained to consider the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a): (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines... issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(1)] ... .... (5) any pertinent policy statement(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to [28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)] ...; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. However, all sentencing proceedings must commence with the District Court's calculation of the applicable Guidelines range, with the Guidelines as the starting point and the initial benchmark. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S.Ct. 586, 596, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). The court must then consider all the § 3553(a) factors and then undertake an individualized assessment based on the facts presented. Id. at 597. If a non-Guidelines sentence is indicated, the court must consider the extent of the deviation [from the Guidelines] and ensure that the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance. Id. Finally, [a]fter settling on the appropriate sentence, [the District Court] must adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing. Id. (citation omitted).
Following Booker, we are constrained to review sentences for reasonableness. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 260-61, 125 S.Ct. 738; see also United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 26-27 (2006). Reasonableness review requires an examination of the length of the sentence (substantive reasonableness) as well as the procedure employed in arriving at the sentence (procedural reasonableness). See United States v. Canova, 485 F.3d 674, 679 (2d Cir.2007). In our review of district court sentences, we are required to apply a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 591. We recently stated that [a]s to substance, we will not substitute our own judgment for the district court's on the question of what is sufficient to meet the § 3553(a) considerations in any particular case and that the substantive determination of a District Court will be set aside only in those special cases where the range of permissible decisions does not encompass the District Court's determination. See United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir.2008) (en banc). Accordingly, when conducting substantive review, we take into account the totality of the circumstances, giving due deference to the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion, and bearing in mind the institutional advantages of district courts. Id. at 190. However, the deference due the district court in sentencing requires that we first be satisfied that the procedural requirements for sentencing have been satisfied. Id. at 189. Procedural error occurs when the district court (1) fails to calculate the Guidelines range; (2) is mistaken in the Guidelines calculation; (3) treats the Guidelines as mandatory; (4) does not give proper consideration to the § 3553(a) factors; (5) makes clearly erroneous factual findings; (6) does not adequately explain the sentence imposed; or (7) deviates from the Guidelines range without explanation. Id. at 190. We have noted that a sentence is procedurally unreasonable if a district court committed an error of law in the course of exercising discretion, Crosby, 397 F.3d at 114 (emphasis supplied), erred in determining the applicable Guideline range or the availability of departure authority, United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis supplied), or misapprehended its ability to impose a non-Guidelines sentence, see United States v. Sanchez, 517 F.3d 651, 661-62 (2d Cir.2008). Our identification of significant procedural error may be a cause for remanding to the district court for explanation or correction. Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190. We undertake a reasonableness review even after a District Court declines to resentence pursuant to Crosby. United States v. Williams, 475 F.3d 468, 474 (2d Cir.2007). Such a review is precluded, however, where (1) the court determines that the discharge of its obligations under post- Booker procedures, treating the Guidelines as advisory only, would not result in a sentence materially different from the sentence imposed under the mandatory Guidelines procedure; or (2) the law of the case doctrine applies to bar challenges to sentencing rulings that were, or could have been, adjudicated in the initial appeal. Id. at 475. The law of the case doctrine will not, however, bar a defendant who is not resentenced after a Crosby remand from challenging the procedures used by the district court during the Crosby remand, and one not resentenced may therefore challeng[e] the manner in which the district court conducted the Crosby remand. Id. at 476.
On a Crosby remand, the district court must determine whether its sentence under the Booker regime would have been materially different from the sentence originally imposed; if the answer is no, nothing further is required; if the answer is yes, there must be a resentencing. See United States v. Ferrell, 485 F.3d 687, 688-89 (2d Cir.2007). The District Court here did not respond directly to the required inquiry. Indeed, the court and counsel immediately began to discuss whether a more lenient sentence should be imposed in light of the sentencing disparities identified by counsel. This was procedural error because [o]nly if the district court answers the threshold [ Crosby ] determination in the affirmative does a resentencing occur. Id. We are unable to conclude that the District Court's Crosby error was harmless. See United States v. Williams, 524 F.3d 209, 214 (2d Cir.2008) (recognizing that procedural error at sentencing can be reviewed for harmlessness). First, the District Court adhered to its original sentence after it took ... into account what the court perceived to be the government's customary practice of voiding plea agreements where a defendant violates the terms of the agreement. That such a customary practice exists is unsupported by the record before the District Court. See Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190 (noting that a district court commits procedural error when it rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of fact). Second, although a district court alone may determine what effect to give to a 5K1.1 letter, in so doing may consider the extent of downward departures or variances received by other similarly situated defendants who have cooperated, and may even decline a reduction from the Guidelines altogether, the court here erred in the course of exercising its discretion by (1) substantially increasing Timewell's sentence from what it otherwise would have been and (2) giving as a reason for the increase the government's failure to comply with the purported customary prosecutorial practice of voiding cooperation agreements upon breach by the defendant. The 5K1.1 letter, which the government saw fit not to revoke in Timewell's case despite his breach of the cooperation agreement, allows a downward departure from the Sentencing Guidelines in cases where a defendant provides substantial assistance to the government. Whether such a letter is merited is confided to the sole determination of the government, subject only to constitutional limitations. See Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992). That the government usually voids cooperation agreements upon a breach by the defendant should not be reason to constrain a district court from giving proper effect to a 5K1.1 letter if the government decides to submit a 5K1.1 letter notwithstanding the defendant's breach of the cooperation agreement. In addition, the government indicated, and the District Court appeared to accept, that, absent a downward departure for substantial cooperation, the Guidelines would have recommended that Timewell serve a life sentence. As previously discussed, however, the pre-sentence report, to which the District Court adhered when calculating the Guidelines recommendation at Timewell's initial sentencing, established a total offense level of 41 carrying a sentencing range of only 324 to 405 months. The description of the sentencing range to which Timewell would have been subject absent his substantial cooperation therefore substantially overstated Timewell's actual Guidelines range. See Cavera, 550 F.3d at 190 (indicating that a District Court errs when it makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation). Because we cannot determine the extent to which these errors affected the District Court's analysis, we are unable to discern how the District Court would have answered the threshold Crosby question in the absence of these errors. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 115 (noting that procedural error is cause for concern because, in many cases, it will be impossible to tell whether the judge would have imposed the same sentence had the judge not felt compelled to impose a Guidelines sentence). The District Court also erred in its written opinion by mischaracterizing the unwarranted disparities argument made by defense counsel. The District Court wrote that counsel for Timewell argued that Timewell received a disparate sentence as compared to Michael Vondette, Stephen Johnson, Patrick Bowler, and Thomas Sherrett. However, Timewell's application listed only Sherrett and Johnson as comparators. Indeed, a determination of whether to be resentenced on a Crosby remand must be based only on the circumstances existing at the time of the original sentence. See Ferrell, 485 F.3d at 688; Crosby, 397 F.3d at 118, n. 19. Under this rule, the court could not, in the course of its threshold Crosby analysis, consider the sentence of Bowler or Johnson, both of which were imposed after Timewell's original sentence was pronounced. Notably, the District Court also erred in stating that Johnson testified against Vondette in this Court. Accordingly, we find that the District Court erred in neglecting to answer the question posed by the Crosby remand of Timewell's original sentence, namely, whether, based on the circumstances at the time of the original sentence, the District Court would have imposed a materially different sentence under the post- Booker sentencing regime, and that this error was not harmless. See Crosby, 397 F.3d at 118. The law of the case does not bar Timewell from challenging the manner in which the Crosby remand was conducted despite the Court's adherence to the original sentence. We are therefore constrained to remand the case once more to enable the District Court to formulate a proper response to the Crosby inquiry. The District Court should state the reasons for the response without consideration of past practices of the government in regard to the rescission of cooperation agreements. Such consideration was error. Should the court determine to revisit its original sentence, we ask it to consider: (1) that a district court maybut is not required toconsider sentencing disparity among co-defendants under 18 U.S.C § 3553(a)(6); United States v. Frias, 521 F.3d 229, 236 n. 8 (2d Cir.2008); (2) that the United States Attorney's Office recommended a substantial departure from the Guidelines sentence in view of Timewell's excellent cooperation and asserted that a significant disparity in the sentences imposed upon Timewell, Johnson and Sherrett was not warranted; (3) that the appropriateness of any reduction of sentence below the Guidelines should be governed by the provisions set out in U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1: (a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following: (1) the court's evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant's assistance, taking into consideration the government's evaluation of the assistance rendered; (2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or testimony provided by the defendant; (3) the nature and extent of the defendant's assistance; (4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his family resulting from his assistance; (5) the timeliness of the defendant's assistance. In the absence of a showing of any unfairness or the appearance of any unfairness on the part of the District Judge, we reject Timewell's claim that the case should be reassigned to another judge on remand. See United States v. Bradley, 812 F.2d 774, 782 n. 9 (2d Cir.1987).