Opinion ID: 775226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonable Doubt at Sentencing

Text: 81 Petitioner argues that the trial judge's reasonable doubt instruction at the penalty phase of the trial violated due process. The district court held this claim to be procedurally barred because it had not been presented on direct appeal and the Ohio courts had relied on adequate and independent state grounds in barring post-conviction consideration of the claim. 82 Even assuming the claim is not barred, the jury instruction was not improper. We review jury instructions at the selection phase of the capital sentencing portion of a trial to determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275 (1998)(citations omitted). The jury instruction at issue was as follows: 83 The State of Ohio seeks recommendations from you of a death sentence. In order to be entitled to this recommendation the State has the burden of proving by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances which the defendant was found guilty of committing is sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation. The defendant has no burden of proof and is given great latitude in the presentation of the mitigating factors. In reaching your verdicts you are instructed that you will consider all evidence presented in the first trial, which you deem to be relevant as fully presented again in this proceeding, along with all additional evidence presented in this proceeding. To outweigh means . . . to be more important than . . . . Remember that reasonable doubt is present when after you carefully consider and compare all evidence, you can not say you are firmly convinced of the truth of the charge. Reasonable doubt is doubt based on reason and common sense. Reasonable doubt is not mere possible doubt because everything relating to human affairs or depending upon moral evidence is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such character that an ordinary person would be willing to rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs. If, after a full, fair and impartial consideration of all relevant evidence from both trials you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances which the defendant was found guilty of committing is sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation then the State has proven its right to be entitled to the recommendation of the death penalty. 84 (J.A. at 2503-2504). 85 Petitioner argues that this instruction was doubly flawed. First, the court's characterization of reasonable doubt as not being firmly convinced refers to the clear and convincing evidence standard, not reasonable doubt. Second, instructing the jury that they were to consider whether they had reasonable doubt as to the charge, rather than whether aggravating evidence outweighed mitigating evidence, misdirected the jury toward a conclusion that had already been determined at the guilt phase of the trial. 86 The Supreme Court has discussed trial court definition of the reasonable doubt standard: 87 The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a requirement of due process, but the Constitution neither prohibits trial courts from defining reasonable doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of course . . . so long as the court instructs the jury on the necessity that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt . . . the Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. 88 Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 5 (1994)(citations omitted). Rather, the Constitution requires, taking the instructions as a whole, that there not be a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to allow conviction based on evidence falling below the reasonable doubt standard. Id. Characterizing reasonable doubt as substantial doubt or not a mere possible doubt does not violate due process. Id. 89 In this case, the court described reasonable doubt in several ways, including not a mere possible doubt, which was specifically upheld in Victor. Petitioner has not articulated how firmly convinced, taken together with the court's various descriptions of reasonable doubt, created a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instructions as establishing a clear and convincing evidence standard for determining whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors. The jury instructions actually provided, both at the beginning and the end of the particular instruction at issue, that the State has the burden of proving by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances which the defendant was found guilty of committing is sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation. (J.A. at 2503-04.) We find, both under Victor and its own language, that the penalty phase instruction did not violate due process.