Opinion ID: 203924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Stolen Weapons Enhancement

Text: In the initial PSR, the Probation Office proposed a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(4), which instructs the court: [i]f any firearm was stolen, or had an altered or obliterated serial number, increase by two levels. Over defendant's objection, the district court applied this enhancement. However, Wallace did not challenge the enhancement on appeal, and it was reimposed at resentencing, subject only to the same summary objection as all of Wallace's initial objections to the PSR. At this stage in the litigation, Wallace's claim that the district court's imposition of the stolen weapons enhancement was inappropriate because it should not apply in cases where the firearm was stolen during the course of the instant offense is barred by the law of the case doctrine. Just as with the obstruction of justice enhancement, the district court's implicit invocation of the mandate rule was proper. Furthermore, his attempt to invoke an exception to the doctrine fails in light of United States v. Brown, 169 F.3d 89, 93 (1st Cir.1999). There, relying upon application note 12 to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, we rejected appellant's argument that the district court double counted the stolen nature of the firearm. Id. Here, as in Brown, Wallace's offense level was not determined under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(7) (the catch-all provision for crimes involving the unlawful receipt or possession of firearms), which already takes into account that the firearm ... was stolen. U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 cmt. n. 12. [7] Thus, there was no double counting, and the stolen weapons enhancement was properly applied in view of application note 12, Brown, and the case law from other circuits. [8] Accordingly, there is no error, let alone injustice, in the imposition of this enhancement that would preclude application of the law of the case doctrine.