Opinion ID: 895787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Enforceability

Text: [¶ 28] Lavilla contends these agreements were procedurally defective because she lacked independent counsel and because Emanuel induced her to sign it by falsely promising to take care of her anyway. Lavilla argues she could not have signed voluntarily unless she understood her rights fully, and that depends on whether she had been adequately represented by an attorney. Emanuel's failure to keep his anyway promise in a relationship of mutual trust and confidence where he benefited disproportionately, Lavilla contends, was constructive fraud that should prevent enforcement of these agreements. [¶ 29] Emanuel's children contend Lavilla had plenty of time to consult independent counsel between May 1987 when attorney Tschider sent out the prepared documents and February 1988 when they signed them. The children point out that Lavilla testified in her deposition that, during this time, she did not seek independent counsel nor consult with another attorney about the documents. The children summarized Lavilla's deposition testimony: (1) she read the marriage agreement before signing; (2) she understood the effect of the documents; (3) she was asked if she understood the documents by Morris Tschider; (4) she was asked if she had any questions by Morris Tschider; (5) she didn't ask any questions; (6) she was asked if she wanted to sign the document; and (7) she signed the document. The children dispute Lavilla's deposition testimony that Tschider did not advise her to seek separate counsel with Tschider's deposition testimony that he advised Lavilla that he could not represent her on the premarital agreement and consent to will and that she should obtain separate counsel. The children concede, however, that for summary judgment, Lavilla's version of these facts [is] assumed to be true. [¶ 30] A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the disadvantaged spouse did not execute it voluntarily. NDCC 14-03.1-06(1) directs: A premarital agreement is not enforceable if the party against whom enforcement is sought proves that ... [t]hat party did not execute the agreement voluntarily. In holding this premarital agreement was voluntary and valid as a matter of law, the trial court reasoned: Other than the inferences which [Lavilla] contends resulted from statements made by [Emanuel] prior to his death regarding `taking care of her,' the record is devoid of any basis on which to conclude that the premarital agreements of the parties should be cast aside. We disagree. The trial court failed to recognize the factual dispute about whether Lavilla was adequately advised to obtain independent counsel. [¶ 31] Although we have never decided whether a premarital agreement can be avoided for lack of counsel, several other states have. No state makes independent counsel an absolute requirement for validity. Randolph v. Randolph, 937 S.W.2d 815, 822 (Tenn.1996). Some states require at least an opportunity to consult with independent counsel, but do not require actual consultation. McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn.1989); Gant v. Gant, 174 W.Va. 740, 329 S.E.2d 106, 116 (1985). Many states, however, treat the absence or presence of independent legal counsel as a factual factor in assessing the voluntariness of a premarital agreement. Ex Parte Walters, 580 So.2d 1352, 1354 (Ala.1991); McHugh v. McHugh, 181 Conn. 482, 436 A.2d 8, 12 (1980); Matter of Estate of Benker, 416 Mich. 681, 331 N.W.2d 193, 199-200 (1982); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 68 Ohio St.3d 464, 628 N.E.2d 1343, 1348 (1994); Randolph, 937 S.W.2d at 822; Matter of Marriage of Matson, 107 Wash.2d 479, 730 P.2d 668, 671 (1986); Button v. Button, 131 Wis.2d 84, 388 N.W.2d 546, 550-51 (1986); see generally Robert Roy, Annotation, Enforceability of Premarital Agreements Governing Support or Property Rights Upon Divorce or Separation as Affected by Circumstances Surrounding ExecutionModern Status, 53 A.L.R.4th 85 (1987 & Supp.1996). Kahn v. Kahn, 756 S.W.2d 685, 695 (Tenn.1988), said it clearly: We hold that whether or not a wife should be explicitly advised about what she is giving up or should be urged and given full opportunity to seek independent counsel is a factual issue, in that it may be required in some circumstances and not in others. [¶ 32] Lack of opportunity to consult independent counsel may be a factor in a fiduciary relationship. A fiduciary relationship is something approximating business agency, professional relationship, or family tie impelling or inducing the trusting party to relax the care and vigilance ... ordinarily exercise[d]. Asleson v. West Branch Land Co., 311 N.W.2d 533, 539 (N.D.1981) (quoting 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 2, p. 213 (1943)). A fiduciary relationship develops when someone is under a duty to act for, or to give advice to, another person upon matters within the scope of the relationship. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874, cmt. a (1979). A fiduciary relationship generally arises from an unequal relationship between the parties. Compare Land Office Co. v. Clapp-Thomssen Co., 442 N.W.2d 401, 406 (N.D.1989) (fiduciary relationship ordinarily does not exist when business persons deal at arm's length). For a fiduciary relationship, the superior party must have a duty to act in the dependent party's best interest. As Production Credit Ass'n v. Ista, 451 N.W.2d 118, 121 (N.D.1990), explained, whether a fiduciary relationship exists is generally a question of fact. [¶ 33] An agreement to marry can create a fiduciary relationship between individuals if they do not deal at arms length. Persons contracting about marriage are sometimes mismatched in bargaining power and sophistication. See Weber v. Weber, 548 N.W.2d 781, 783 (N.D.1996) (Property settlement agreements in divorce cases must be scrutinized for unconscionability. The review for unconscionability is not ended by finding a lack of a trust relationship between the parties.); Crawford v. Crawford, 524 N.W.2d 833, 836 (N.D.1994) (Marriage involves a confidential relationship, and the law should not permit one marital partner to take `unconscientious advantage' over the other through the trust which is part of that relationship.); Syllabus by the Court in Barker v. Barker, 75 N.D. 253, 27 N.W.2d 576, 577 (1947): Ordinarily, and presumptively, a confidential relation exists between husband and wife, and generally business transactions between them will be deemed to be within the rule of confidential relations. [¶ 34] Unlike many private contracts, the state has an interest in every marriage contract. We agree with the view that lack of adequate legal advice to a prospective spouse to obtain independent counsel is a significant factual factor in weighing the voluntariness of a premarital agreement. [¶ 35] Indeed, adequate legal representation will often be the best evidence that a spouse signed a premarital agreement knowledgeably and voluntarily. Here, the evidence conflicts on whether Tschider actually advised Lavilla to obtain independent counsel. [2] Tschider testified he did. Lavilla, however, disputes this and testified she believed Tschider was her attorney and relied on him as an advisor. [3] Her belief is understandable since Tschider also prepared her will. [4] Whether Tschider adequately advised Lavilla about his potential conflict of interest, her need to have independent counsel, and the effect of her consent to his dual representation are disputed material facts that preclude summary judgment. [¶ 36] Emanuel's children contest Lavilla's claim of his constructive fraud for failing to fulfill his oral promise to take care of her anyway. Any amendment to a premarital agreement must be in writing, they argue, citing NDCC 9-06-07 (a written agreement supersedes any oral negotiations), and NDCC 14-03.1-05 (a premarital agreement may only be amended or revoked by a signed written agreement). They argue, if an intent to deceive is absent, a promise to do something in the future cannot be considered fraud. Urging that Lavilla does not allege that Emanuel made any misrepresentations about past or existing facts, Emanuel's children contend he did not mislead Lavilla by promising to take care of Lavilla outside of the marital agreement and then failing to do so. [¶ 37] However, parol or extrinsic evidence can be used to show that a contract has no effect because of fraud, illegality, or mistake, or to show that the contract was only partially integrated because essential elements were not reduced to writing. Mau v. Schwan, 460 N.W.2d 131, 134 (N.D.1990). The factual circumstances of an unfulfilled oral promise would be additional evidence on the voluntariness of the premarital agreements, and leaves an additional factual dispute for trial. See NDCC 9-03-08(2)(fraud by a contracting party who makes a positive assertion, in a manner not warranted by the information of the person making it, of that which is not true though he believes it to be true to induce another to enter into the contract); Barker, 27 N.W.2d 576 (husband abused confidential relation with spouse by secretly acquiring title to home in his name alone); Bourgois v. Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 466 N.W.2d 813, 818 (N.D.1991)(recognizing a statutory claim for relief based on negligent misrepresentation). [¶ 38] We reverse the summary judgment and remand for trial of the factual questions on the voluntariness and enforceability of these premarital agreements.