Opinion ID: 223162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud Convictions (Counts 58-61, 66, 68-69, 74, 76, 78-79, 83, 87-88, 91-93)

Text: Next, Mr. Cooper argues that the government failed to prove its contention that the Renaissance business was a scheme or artifice to defraud customers and [IMAs], Aplt. Opening Br. at 39  in other words, he contends that the evidence it presented regarding the mail and wire fraud charges (Counts 58 through 104) was insufficient. The elements of federal mail fraud as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1341 are (1) a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, (2) an intent to defraud, and (3) use of the mails to execute the scheme. United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1104 (10th Cir.2003). The first and second elements of federal mail and wire fraud are identical. The third element of wire fraud as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1343 is the use of interstate wire or radio communications to execute the scheme  that is, the use of interstate wire or radio communications, instead of the mails, to execute the scheme. Id. (footnote omitted). One may `defraud' another within the meaning of §§ 1341 and 1343 by depriving another of property or `the intangible right of honest services.' Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1346). Mr. Cooper insists that the first element of the mail and wire fraud charge  a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises  was not satisfied here. Instead, he contends that the evidence adduced at trial overwhelmingly established that Renaissance not only was a legitimate company, but one dedicated to achieving both excellence in its product and consistency and professionalism in its IMA sales force and affiliate network. Aplt. Opening Br. at 39. 1. Forfeiture [I]f a defendant files a general motion for acquittal that does not identify a specific point of attack, the defendant is deemed to be challenging the sufficiency of each essential element of the government's case .... United States v. Kelly, 535 F.3d 1229, 1234-35 (10th Cir.2008). On the other hand, [w]hen a defendant challenges in district court the sufficiency of the evidence on specific grounds, all grounds not specified in the motion are waived, id. at 1234 (quoting United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 681 (10th Cir.2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted)  or, to be more precise, forfeited, see Goode, 483 F.3d at 681 (When a defendant challenges in district court the sufficiency of the evidence on specific grounds, `all grounds not specified in the motion are waived.' Although we have described the failure to raise a challenge in district court as a `waiver,' it is more precisely termed a forfeiture when there is no suggestion of a knowing, voluntary failure to raise the matter. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1141 (10th Cir.2003))); 2A Charles Alan Wright & Peter J. Henning, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 469 at 388 (4th ed. 2009) ([I]f the defendant has asserted specific grounds in the trial court as the basis for a motion for acquittal, he or she cannot assert other grounds on appeal.); see also Richison v. Ernest Group, Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1127-28 (10th Cir.2011) (If the theory was intentionally relinquished or abandoned in the district court, we usually deem it waived and refuse to consider it. By contrast, if the theory simply wasn't raised before the district court, we usually hold it forfeited. (citations omitted)). The rigorous plain-error standard governs our review of such forfeited claims. That is, we review for plain error where a defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence based upon an argument that he failed to make or reaffirm before the district court. United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1223 (10th Cir.2008) (emphasis added); see also Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1141 ([B]ecause Kimler is deemed to have waived this issue, we will not address it on appeal `except for a review for plain error resulting in manifest injustice.' (quoting United States v. Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d 259, 261 (10th Cir. 1995))). Under the plain error standard, Mr. Cooper must demonstrate: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, which means clear or obvious under current law, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If he satisfies these criteria, this Court may exercise discretion to correct the error if [4] it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Goode, 483 F.3d at 681 (quoting Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1141) (internal quotation marks omitted). As previously discussed, Mr. Cooper renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal post-verdict, asserting that [w]ith respect to each count of conviction in this case, the government failed to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. R., Vol. 1, at 403. This post-verdict general motion for judgment of acquittal was filed without a brief. In Mr. Cooper's reply brief in support of his post-verdict motion, however, he specifically limited the motion to challenging the sufficiency of the evidence only as to the count for conspiracy to defraud (Count 1), arguing that the government failed to prove a criminal conspiracy as alleged in Count One, and that if the evidence was insufficient to convict [Mr.] Cooper on Count One, all of the other convictions must be vacated as well. R., Vol. 1, at 435, 446. That is, his reply brief made clear that his motion  which previously purported to serve as a general motion challenging all counts of conviction  was focused solely upon the count for conspiracy to defraud. Id. at 434-35. Although he asserted in his reply brief that the remaining counts depend[ed] upon the validity of the guilty verdict on Count One, id., and therefore would fail if Count 1 failed, Mr. Cooper did not raise or reaffirm any independent challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on the remaining counts. Under these circumstances, Mr. Cooper has arguably forfeited his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on his remaining counts of conviction  that is, forfeited any independent challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence regarding his mail and wire fraud counts. Despite the fact that he had previously filed a general motion for judgment of acquittal, Mr. Cooper's restrictive representations in his reply brief could be construed, at least arguably, as transforming his general motion into a specific one, focused only on Count 1. If we were to conclude that Mr. Cooper has forfeited any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on his mail and wire fraud convictions, we w[ould] not address [those convictions] on appeal `except for a review for plain error resulting in manifest injustice.' Kimler, 335 F.3d at 1141 (quoting Chavez-Marquez, 66 F.3d at 261). However, we need not definitively opine on whether Mr. Cooper's challenges to his mail and wire fraud convictions should be assessed under the stringent plain-error standard, because even under the more-lenient de novo standard, we conclude that there was no error. That is, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to satisfy the only challenged element of the mail and wire fraud charges  i.e., a scheme to defraud. 2. Sufficiency of the Evidence Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence presented at trial is sufficient to support Mr. Cooper's mail and wire fraud convictions. First, the testimonial evidence supporting the existence of a conspiracy to defraud under Count 1, discussed supra, supports the existence of a scheme or artifice to defraud Renaissance customers and the IRS. Furthermore, the government points to additional evidence that Mr. Cooper transmitted false, fraudulent, or misleading information by mail and wire to recruit IMAs or encourage IMAs to continue their participation in Renaissance, which meant the defendant ultimately continued to receive their $100 monthly payments [from IMAs]. Aplee. Br. at 17; see id. at 16-17 (citing documentary evidence presented at trial  such as a 1998 version of the TRS containing all of the misleading information on the audio-cassette tapes about the application of the [fraudulent] deductions for the home-based business and other promotional materials used to further the fraudulent scheme  which were sent through the mail or interstate wire communication facilities); id. at 14 (providing an overview of the Renaissance Info Pak  a promotional tool distributed through the mail  which contained several false, fraudulent, or misleading statements aimed at bringing in new IMAs). Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence (among other evidence presented at trial) was sufficient to support a finding of a scheme or artifice to defraud. Accordingly, even assuming, arguendo, that the issue is not forfeited, we nevertheless conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence supporting Mr. Cooper's convictions of mail and wire fraud.