Opinion ID: 1563049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exceptions to the Mootness Doctrine

Text: Moreover, even if I were to concur that the case before us is moot, I nonetheless would contend that this dispute fits within that narrow class of cases that should be decided notwithstanding mootness because they are of extreme public importance, which are capable of repetition but which evade review. Arnold v. Lebel, 941 A.2d 813, 819 (R.I.2007) (quoting Morris v. D'Amario, 416 A.2d 137, 139 (R.I.1980)). In my opinion, this is a case of extreme public importance because it implicates matters concerning a person's livelihood. [9] Cicilline v. Almond, 809 A.2d 1101, 1106 (R.I.2002) (quoting Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc., 754 A.2d 89, 91 (R.I.2000)). There can be no question that the employment and livelihood of the crossing guards who formerly were employed by the city under the terms of this collective-bargaining agreement are at stake here. Further, I believe this dispute is one that is capable of repetition yet evading review. As a foundation for not applying the exception to the mootness doctrine in the instant matter, the majority relies primarily on two cases. In Town of Scituate v. Scituate Teachers' Association, 110 R.I. 679, 684, 296 A.2d 466, 469 (1972), this Court held that a controversy involving a town's failure to fund a teacher contract under a collective-bargaining agreement that had expired was moot. It is indisputable that the agreement in that controversy had lapsed by its own terms by the time the case came before this Court for argument. However, a second, and just as important, reason that the Court held that case moot was that a financial town meeting, conducted subsequent to the entry of the judgment appealed from, resulted in additional money being appropriated to the school committee. Id. at 683-84, 296 A.2d at 468-69. This enabled the school committee to meet its commitments both to the teachers and to the public school system. Id. In other words, the Court held that the real problem had been resolved because the teachers had been made whole; therefore, there was no need to apply the mootness exception. Id. at 684, 296 A.2d at 469. Town of Scituate differs starkly from the instant case because here, nothing between the city and Local 1033 has been resolved. If the parties reach a new agreement, but we do not reach the merits of the case, what would prevent the city from once again terminating employees in a claimed violation of its contractual obligations? In Sullivan v. Chafee, 703 A.2d 748 (R.I. 1997), five Warwick City Council members requested a declaratory judgment to determine the mayor's authority to veto a budget passed by the council, in favor of an earlier budget submitted by the mayor, but not adopted by the council. Id. at 749. By the time the dispute finally reached this Court, the budget year in question, 1997, long had passed and we denied the appeal as moot. Id. at 753. The majority sees an analogy between Sullivan and the case now before us because the no-restructuring clause set forth in the revised collective-bargaining agreement, like the 1997 municipal budget in Sullivan, has sailed off into the sunset. I would respectfully suggest, however, that the majority has overlooked other factors present in Sullivan that are not present in the instant matter and that render that case inapplicable to the considerations before us. Significantly, in Sullivan, this Court was struck by the fact that because plaintiffs are no longer asking us to invalidate the city's FY 1997 budget, our decision would rest upon a speculative future factual scenario that in whole or in part may never come to pass. [10] Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 751. This Court then detailed a convoluted set of hypotheticals that also could have occurred with respect to the city's budgeting, making the case far too abstract for this Court to tackle. Id. at 751-52. Here, however, there is but one discrete issue and, importantly, Local 1033 continues to ask for the same relief for which it has asked from the beginning: confirm the arbitrator's award that the actions of the city violated its collective-bargaining agreement. Moreover, in Sullivan, we noted that a reason that the mootness exception did not apply was because the case did not concern any person's livelihood, and, therefore, the extreme public importance part of the mootness exception did not apply, certainly not the case in this matter. Id. at 754. The majority notes that this Court rarely applies the mootness exception when dealing with a case concerning ordinary contract disputes    or to the binding effect of a collective bargaining agreement involving public school teachers. Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 753. This analysis, however, fails to recognize that the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has acknowledged that labor conflicts are the sort of disagreements that often remain live and are likely to be repeated in the future, necessitating reaching the merits of the underlying dispute. See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, 428 U.S. 397, 403 & n. 8, 96 S.Ct. 3141, 49 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1976) (Court noted that a strike might have been resumed at any time in the near future at the direction of the [union] and it found a live controversy despite the fact that the striking workers had returned to the job and the collective-bargaining agreement in effect when the dispute arose had expired when the parties stipulated that those agreements governed the resolution of the underlying dispute); see also Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen's Association, 457 U.S. 702, 704 n. 1, 102 S.Ct. 2672, 73 L.Ed.2d 327 (1982) (The Court adjudicated a dispute arising out of a work stoppage that had been voluntarily abandoned six months before the case reached the Court, but the Court held the case still presented a live controversy. It commented, [a]lthough the work stoppage is no longer in effect, there remains a live controversy over whether the collective-bargaining agreement prohibits politically motivated work stoppages, and the Union may resume such a work stoppage at any time. As a result, this case is not moot.); 13A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 3533.3 at 287 (2d 1984) (labor disputes    provide clear illustration of the private disputes that are preserved from mootness by the prospect of future repetition). In CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, 327 F.3d 1309 (11th Cir.2003), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that it was not precluded from deciding a classification dispute under the Railway Labor Act, even though the matter had been resolved prior to the court's decision. Id. at 1319-20. The court decided to rule on the case in spite of arguments that it had become moot because underlying labor disputes presumably remain `live,' although they might be abandoned by the parties in the meantime. Id. at 1319. The court took note of the Supreme Court's treatment of labor disputes and ruled that we will not refuse to adjudicate the case on mootness grounds because, not only does the issue remain relevant between the parties, but it is the exact type of issue that would recur on a regular basis and perpetually escape review. Id. at 1320. To support its view that the mootness exception does not apply to the matter before us, the majority contends that [a]lthough a similar legal question possibly may arise in the future concerning a conflict between a city charter and the provisions of a collective-bargaining agreement, we cannot conclude that this particular factual scenario is one that is capable of repetition but which evades review. Even though I believe that this same factual scenario is indeed capable of repetition yet evading review, I also would highlight that this Court has not always required that the same factual scenario be likely to recur or that the same plaintiff be involved in the recurrence before deciding a case despite its mootness. In my opinion, this Court has merged two, sometimes overlapping, yet distinct exceptions to the mootness doctrine: i.e. the public interest or extreme public importance exception and the capable of repetition yet evading review exception. See, e.g., State v. Lead Industries Association, Inc., 951 A.2d 428, 470 (R.I.2008) (pursuant to that exception, we will on occasion opine on moot questions that are `of extreme public importance [and] are capable of repetition but    evade review.') (quoting Morris, 416 A.2d at 139); Pelland v. State, 919 A.2d 373, 378 (R.I.2007) (we will review moot cases only when the subject matter is of `extreme public importance' and the circumstances that gave rise to the initial controversy are capable of repetition while evading review) (quoting Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 752). Although we apparently adhere to a merger of the two exceptions, other jurisdictions recognize the exceptions as distinct from one another. See, e.g., Sanford v. Murdoch, 374 Ark. 12 (2008) (highlighting two exceptions to the mootness doctrine as (1) issues that are capable of repetition, yet evading review and (2) issues that raise considerations of substantial public interest which, if addressed, might prevent future litigation); Doe v. Doe, 116 Hawai`i 323, 172 P.3d 1067, 1071 n. 4 (2007) (noting the public interest and capable of repetition yet evading review exceptions are `separate and distinct'); Koch v. Canyon County, 145 Idaho 158, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008) (acknowledging exceptions to mootness doctrine `(1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed on the person raising the issue; (2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review and thus is capable of repetition; and (3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of substantial public interest'); Smith v. Hannaford Brothers Co., 940 A.2d 1079, 1081 (Me.2008) (recognizing three exceptions to the mootness doctrine, including when `the appeal contains questions of great public concern that, in the interest of providing future guidance to the bar and the public we may address; or    the issues are capable of repetition but evade review because of their fleeting or determinate nature'); DeCoteau v. Nodak Mutual Insurance Co., 636 N.W.2d 432, 437 (N.D.2001) (Issues characterized as moot may nonetheless be decided by this Court if the controversy is capable of repetition, yet evading review, or if the controversy is one of great public interest and involves the power and authority of public officials. (emphasis added)); Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley, Inc., 369 S.C. 20, 630 S.E.2d 474, 478 (2006) (recognizing two exceptions where the court may address issues despite mootness). The critical factor here that warrants the application of an exception to the mootness doctrine and militates in favor of this Court reaching the merits of this case is the important difference between the public-interest exception and the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception. Under the former, the likelihood of recurrence upon which that exception depends need not involve the same plaintiff, or the same factual scenario. See In re Estate of Brooks, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435, 437-38 (1965). [11] Under the latter, however, the exception is typically limited to situations where (1) the challenged action was in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there was a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the same action again. Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 482, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S.Ct. 347, 46 L.Ed.2d 350 (1975) (per curiam)); see also In re S.N., 181 Vt. 641, 928 A.2d 510, 512 (2007) (applying the two elements for the capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review exception and ruling that the exception did not apply because there was no indication that a New York resident would return to Vermont such that the resident and the state would be involved in similar litigation in the future). The distinction between the two mootness exceptions is demonstrated in a number of cases in this jurisdiction in which this Court articulated the apparent merged exception to the mootness doctrine, but then, because the issues were matters of extreme public importance, declined to require a showing that the repetition would involve the same plaintiff, or the same factual scenario. In In re Paula G, 672 A.2d 872 (R.I. 1996), the Department of Children, Youth and Families sought the review of a Family Court decree, ordering a child in the department's care to be placed in a foster home in the State of Florida, without having first obtained the consent of the appropriate public authorities for the placement of children in Florida pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 40-15-1. [12] However, by the time the dispute reached this Court, the case was moot because a Family Court justice had vacated the portion of the judgment that ordered the child's placement in the foster home. In re Paula G, 672 A.2d at 874. This Court addressed the mootness exception but, importantly, we did not hold that this particular factual scenario was one that was capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review; instead we said: The issue before us is certainly capable of repetition, and we find it a matter of extreme public importance to clarify the obligation of the Family Court in similar situations in the future. Id. (Emphasis added.) The Court concluded: Although the facts of this specific case are moot, we shall remind the Family Court of its responsibility to observe and to fulfill the purpose and the policy of the [Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children] by ensuring that its procedural provisions are effectively adhered to in the future. Id. at 875. Similarly, in State v. Cosores, 891 A.2d 893, 893 (R.I.2006) (mem.), a defendant appealed from a Superior Court adjudication of probation violation that resulted in a one-year term of imprisonment. The defendant previously had pled nolo contendere to a second offense of possession of marijuana and had been sentenced to a one-year suspended sentence, with two years of probation. Id. When he failed to report to his probation officer, a warrant was issued for his arrest; however, he was not apprehended for over a year. Id. After the defendant failed multiple drug tests, a hearing justice sentenced the defendant to one year imprisonment. Id. The defendant contended that his probationary term had expired before the hearing justice found a probation violation and that therefore the hearing justice lacked the authority to impose a prison sentence on him. Id. at 894. The defendant appealed, but by the time the case reached this Court the defendant already had served his jail sentence. Id. This Court said that [a]lthough the completion of a prisoner's sentence renders his or her appeal from the revocation of a term of supervised release moot,    we deem the issue of whether a defendant can be found in violation after his probation has expired and ordered incarcerated to be of extreme public importance and capable of repetition, yet evading review. Thus, we decline the state's invitation to declare defendant's appeal moot. [13] Id. (Emphasis added.) Similar to Paula G, the Court in Cosores did not rule that this particular factual scenariothat this specific defendant would plead nolo contendere to possession of marijuana and then violate his probation that would result in the imposition of a sentence of a year in prison, but the sentence would be imposed after the probation period expiredwas capable of repetition, yet likely to evade review. See Cosores, 891 A.2d at 894. Nor did the Court hold that reaching the merits of Cosores's appeal would likely require the Court to base its decision upon a speculative future factual scenario that in whole or in part may never come to pass, as we said in Sullivan. Sullivan, 703 A.2d at 751; see Cosores, 891 A.2d at 894. Instead, the Court in both Paula G and Cosores chose to apply the exception to the mootness doctrine and reach the merits because each case involved issues of extreme public importance. See Cosores, 891 A.2d at 894; In re Paula G, 672 A.2d at 874. We are not alone in our apparent merger of these two exceptions to the mootness doctrine; our sister state of Connecticut has a similar formulation of its mootness exception. In Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 289 Conn. 362, 957 A.2d 821 (2008), the Connecticut Supreme Court said: The mootness doctrine does not preclude a court from addressing an issue that is `capable of repetition, yet evading review.'    `[F]or an otherwise moot question to qualify for review under the capable of repetition, yet evading review exception, it must meet three requirements. First, the challenged action, or the effect of the challenged action, by its very nature must be of a limited duration so that there is a strong likelihood that the substantial majority of cases raising a question about its validity will become moot before appellate litigation can be concluded. Second, there must be a reasonable likelihood that the question presented in the pending case will arise again in the future, and that it will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate. Third, the question must have some public importance. Unless all three requirements are met, the appeal must be dismissed as moot.' Id. at 826-27 (quoting Loisel v. Rowe, 233 Conn. 370, 660 A.2d 323, 328, 330 (1995)). The important aspect of the Connecticut articulation of the mootness exception with respect to this case is its second part. By requiring that the legal issue before the court will affect either the same complaining party or a reasonably identifiable group for whom that party can be said to act as surrogate, the court has required a nexus between the litigating party and those people who may be affected by the court's ruling in the future. Id. at 828 (quoting Loisel, 660 A.2d at 330, 331). This rationale allows the court to reach the merits of cases in which the specific legal question probably will recur without a `strict rule that the identical party must be likely to be affected in the future.' Id. (quoting Loisel, 660 A.2d at 331). Although this Court has never explicitly held as such, Paula G and Cosores demonstrate that we employ similar reasoning in cases that are of extreme public importance. In conclusion, it is my opinion that there is not always a requirement that the same factual scenario be likely to recur and that since we are confronted with a matter of extreme public importance, i.e. the livelihood of the crossing guards and the sanctity of governmental contractual obligations, this case should be decided on the merits because similar issues may arise in the future. By failing to address the merits of this case, I respectfully suggest that we are approaching the slippery slope of establishing troubling precedent. Because this Court declines to decide the dispute between the parties, what would prevent the city, or any other municipality in this state, from terminating any contract, be it labor or otherwise, and then arguing that the matter has become moot as the controversy made its long route to this Court? In my opinion, and with great respect for the majority's opinion, this case should be decided on its merits.