Opinion ID: 1494221
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Shelton Jurisprudence

Text: On June 25, 1999, while Capano's direct appeal to this Court was pending, we released an opinion in Shelton v. State. [446] In Shelton, the defendant was instructed by the trial judge that he could not use his allocution to talk about the facts surrounding the murder. [447] The trial court instead limited Shelton's allocution to asking the sentencing authority ... to give you mercy, spare your life in this case, and sentence you to life. Shelton acquiesced in that limitation because he did not want to discuss the facts in any event. Speaking briefly in allocution, Shelton did not discuss any evidence. [448] Shelton was sentenced to death for first degree murder and his death sentence was affirmed by this Court on direct appeal. [449] In his motion for post-conviction relief, Shelton argued for the first time that the trial court had infringed his right to present mitigating evidence to the jury in allocution. Shelton argued that this right was guaranteed under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32 as well as the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. According to Shelton, his counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the limitations placed on his allocution. [450] Despite Shelton's clear assent to the limits placed on allocution, we reached the merits of his claim under a plain error standard of review. [451] We concluded that the limitations placed on Shelton's allocution did not reflect the full scope of allocution under Delaware law. [452] We defined the scope of allocution as follows: [T]here is no blanket rule that would preclude a defendant who wished to do so from discussing or arguing in allocution facts already in evidence either in the guilt phase or the penalty phase.    In our view, Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(C) and 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(2) provide a defendant in the penalty phase of a capital case the opportunity to argue in allocution from the facts already in evidence in the guilt phase or the penalty phase why those facts should not result in the death penalty. This is true whether the argument is to assert diminished responsibility, reduced culpability in comparison to other defendants, mistaken identity, mistake by the jury in finding guilt or any other reason. [453] Thus, the Shelton holding allows a defendant to discuss in allocution facts already in evidence, but requires that the defendant be sworn and subject to cross-examination before making a statement of new evidence. [454] We indicated that this limitation on the presentation of new evidence achieved a balance of the important purposes served by allocution, considerations of fairness toward the defendant as well as the State and the truth-seeking function of the jury. [455] In Shelton, we explained the purposes served by allocution: Presently, allocution serves two purposes: First, it reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity to ask for mercy. Second, it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her feelings of remorse. Put another way, allocution is necessary because it affords an opportunity for the jury to learn about the `whole person' and it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury `which has never heard the sound of his voice.' [456] The importance of allowing a defendant to discuss evidence in his allocution must be measured in light of these purposes. In some cases, such as the Shelton case itself, the defendant may have no wish to refer to the facts of the crime for which he was found guilty. In other cases, however, discussing the evidence presented at trial may be a crucial part of the defendant's plea for mercy. Although this evidence may have been before the jury in the guilt phase, the purpose of allocution is for the defendant to be heard under procedures that allow him to speak directly to the jury. In fact, the Delaware death penalty statute expressly permits the defendant as well as his counsel to present argument and summation, [457] and the Superior Court Rule permits the defendant to present any information in mitigation. [458] In Shelton, we quoted with approval Justice Frankfurter's observation that [t]he most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. [459] This policy is a key factor in analyzing the right of allocution and its application to this case. The issue in Shelton was first raised in a post-conviction proceeding in that case. The question at that stage of the proceedings was whether Shelton was entitled to a new penalty hearing because of the alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in failing either to object to the overbroad and erroneous limits the trial court had placed on his allocution or to raise the issue on direct appeal. We held that he was not entitled to a new penalty hearing because he was unable to show that that he was prejudiced by the erroneous limitations. [460] This was because Shelton's considered strategy [461] was to avoid discussing in allocution the facts of the case. Not only had he made no proffer of what facts he would argue in allocution if allowed, his wish not to discuss the facts surrounding the murder had been made unusually clear through extensive colloquy among the judge, Shelton and counsel. [462] Shelton's strategy was carried out in his actual allocution, during which Shelton did not discuss the facts or express remorse. Twice he stated in his allocution that he was not pleading for his life. Therefore, the limits placed on allocution and trial counsel's failure to object to those limits became a moot point that resulted in harmless error, and thus were not grounds for overturning the sentence.