Opinion ID: 2543464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bowlands Would Be Estopped From Challenging The Validity Of The Vacation Ordinance.

Text: As this Court has explained, The doctrine of quasi-estoppel has its basis in acceptance of benefits; it precludes a party from asserting to another's disadvantage a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him or her. The doctrine applies where it would be unconscionable to allow a person to maintain a position inconsistent with one in which he acquiesced or of which he accepted a benefit. Mitchell v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709, 715, 874 P.2d 520, 526 (1994). Quasi estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does not require misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other. Lunders, 131 Idaho at 695, 963 P.2d at 378; see also, e.g., Willig v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 127 Idaho 259, 261, 899 P.2d 969, 971 (1995). However, to apply the doctrine of quasi-estoppel in the absence of reliance, it must be shown that the act of the party against whom the estoppel is sought must have gained some advantage to himself or produced some disadvantage to another. Tommerup v. Albertson's, Inc., 101 Idaho 1, 7, 607 P.2d 1055, 1061 (1980); see also KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 281, 486 P.2d 992, 994 (1971). In applying the doctrine of quasi-estoppel, this Court must weigh the equities of the particular case at hand, considering all the circumstances presented, rather than engage in the application of strict standards or of strained analogies to the facts of prior estoppel decisions. See Williams Lake Lands, Inc. v. LeMoyne Dev., Inc., 108 Idaho 826, 830, 702 P.2d 864, 868 (1985) (Because quasi-estoppel is an equitable doctrine, its application depends upon a case by case analysis of the equities involved, rather than upon precise definitional standards.); KTVB, Inc., 94 Idaho at 282, 486 P.2d at 995 ([T]he essence of the proper application of the doctrine of quasi estoppel is the focus of the Court's attention upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case at bar.). Here, the inquiry should begin with determining whether the Bowlands, the predecessors in interest to the Infangers, gained some advantage for themselves in soliciting and supporting the City's decision to vacate the Edwards Street property and in subsequently accepting the validity of the vacation ordinance once it was adopted. Assuming that the street was properly vacated, the effect was to incorporate one half of the width of the vacated street into the abutting properties on each side. See I.C. § 50-3011; Carney v. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 278, 985 P.2d 1137, 1140 (1999). Thus, the Bowlands, in their capacities as owners of Lots 6 and 7, received the benefits of the vacation ordinance. Specifically, the Bowlands received a substantial enhancement in the value of Lots 6 and 7, as was testified to by Mr. Bowland, and an increase in potential uses to which the lots could be put, due to their increased size. Additionally, the Bowlands suggested the vacation of Edwards Street to the City, acquiesced in the City's passage of an ordinance aimed at vacation, and accepted the City's conveyance of the property. Consequently, the Bowlands received a benefit from their encouragement of and acquiescence in the vacation ordinance, and a later challenge to that same ordinance would most surely be inconsistent with their prior position. Next, the inquiry should turn to whether it would be unconscionable to allow this challenge. Notably, the record indicates that the Infangers failed to voice any objection to the Benders' construction of a $121,000 structure on the Edwards Street property until approximately one year after it was completed. They acquiesced without comment as the Benders constructed an expensive building on property the Infangers now claim to be their own. While it is unnecessary to reach the issue of whether the Infangers are estopped by their own inequitable conduct, their acquiescence warrants mention in this equitable analysis, because it makes the situation unconscionable from the Benders' perspective, regardless of whether it was the predecessor or successor who encouraged the City to vacate the street. The Benders have expended over $121,000 and constructed a permanent structure on the contested portion of the vacated street as an ultimate result of the vacation ordinance in which the Bowlands acquiesced. It would be unconscionable to allow this challenge to the ordinance, the validity of which went unchallenged for nearly ten years, and the creation of which was encouraged by the Bowlands. To do so could result in the Benders being thrust into the position of owning an expensive structure, the construction of which was acquiesced in by the party challenging their ownership of the property, situated on land for which they have paid consideration, but do not own. The Bowlands would be estopped if they were the party attempting to challenge the vacation ordinance.