Opinion ID: 2019723
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: De Facto Natural Life Imprisonment

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court denied him a fair death sentencing hearing by giving the jury misinformation through comments during voir dire and through written jury instructions. The court told the jury that if the jury found that death was not an appropriate sentence, the court would impose a sentence other than death. Defendant characterizes this information as incomplete and misleading. According to defendant, the trial court should have instructed the jury that his convictions subjected him to a mandatory minimum prison term of 107 years, which for defendant, who was 36 years old at the time of trial, was effectively  de facto natural life imprisonment. The State initially responds that this contention is procedurally forfeited. The record shows that defendant failed to object to the trial court's comments during voir dire, failed to offer an alternative jury instruction, and failed to include this issue in his posttrial motion. To preserve this issue for appeal, defendant was required to make a contemporaneous objection at the sentencing hearing and to raise the issue in a postsentencing motion. See Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 352, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521; Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124. Likewise, a defendant generally forfeits review of any purported jury instruction error if the defendant does not object to the instruction, or tender an alternative instruction at trial, and does not raise the instruction issue in a posttrial motion. People v. Herron, 215 Ill.2d 167, 175, 294 Ill.Dec. 55, 830 N.E.2d 467 (2005); People v. Simpson, 172 Ill.2d 117, 150, 216 Ill.Dec. 671, 665 N.E.2d 1228 (1996). Accordingly, this contention is procedurally forfeited. Seeking our review, defendant invokes the plain-error doctrine. See 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a); Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d at 565, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403; Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 352, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521. Supreme Court Rule 451(c) (177 Ill.2d R. 451(c)) likewise provides a limited exception to the procedural forfeiture of purported jury instruction error in criminal cases and is construed identically with Rule 615(a). Piatkowski, 225 Ill.2d at 564, 312 Ill.Dec. 338, 870 N.E.2d 403; People v. Durr, 215 Ill.2d 283, 296-98, 294 Ill.Dec. 115, 830 N.E.2d 527 (2005). However, in addressing defendant's plain-error contention, it is appropriate to determine whether error occurred at all. Harris, 225 Ill.2d at 31, 310 Ill.Dec. 351, 866 N.E.2d 162; People v. Durr, 215 Ill.2d 283, 298-99, 294 Ill.Dec. 115, 830 N.E.2d 527 (2005); Sims, 192 Ill.2d at 621, 249 Ill.Dec. 610, 736 N.E.2d 1048. The trial court told jurors during voir dire that if the jury did not conclude that death was an appropriate sentence, the court would go on to sentencing other than the death penalty or [i]t will be a sentence of years in the penitentiary, and the death sentence will be off the table. Correspondingly, the court informed the jury in written jury instructions that if the jury found that defendant was ineligible for the death penalty, or subsequently concluded that death was not an appropriate sentence, then the court will impose a sentence other than death. See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, Nos. 7B.01, 7C.05 (4th ed.2000) (hereafter IPI Criminal 4th). According to defendant, this information was incomplete and misleading because his convictions subjected him to a mandatory minimum prison term of 107 years, which for defendant, was  de facto natural life imprisonment. Defendant invokes People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146 (1988), in which this court held that, in a multiple-murder case, the trial court should instruct the jury that, if the jury does not sentence the defendant to death, the defendant will be sentenced to natural life imprisonment, and that no person serving a natural life term can be paroled or released, except through executive clemency. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d at 262, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146. Indeed, a plurality in Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), observed that in assessing future dangerousness, the actual duration of the defendant's prison sentence is indisputably relevant to the sentencing determination. Holding all other factors constant, it is reasonable for a sentencing jury to view a defendant who is eligible for parole as a greater threat to society than a defendant who is not. According to the plurality, there may be no greater assurance of a defendant's future nondangerousness to the public than the fact that the defendant never will be released on parole. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 163-64, 114 S.Ct. at 2194, 129 L.Ed.2d at 142 (plurality op.). The plurality opinion notes that, based on Gacho, Illinois is in accord with a large majority of States. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 166-67 & n. 7, 114 S.Ct. at 2195 & n. 7, 129 L.Ed.2d at 144 & n. 7. Defendant argues that the sentencing jury could have believed that he could be sentenced to probation or to a minimal term of imprisonment, which would lead the jury to vote for death to protect the public. According to defendant, the trial court should have instructed the jury that defendant was subject to a prison term that was so long that it was effectively  de facto natural life imprisonment. Had the jury been so informed, it might have found that death was not appropriate. This contention lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court and this court have already rejected this functional approach and have limited the protection recognized in Gacho and Simmons to cases where defendants are ineligible for parole as a matter of law. Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 169, 181, 120 S.Ct. 2113, 2121, 2128, 147 L.Ed.2d 125, 138, 145 (2000) (plurality op.) ( Simmons applies only to instances where, as a legal matter, there is no possibility of parole if the jury decides the appropriate sentence is life in prison); Ramdass, 530 U.S. at 181, 120 S.Ct. at 2128, 147 L.Ed.2d at 145 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ( Simmons entitles the defendant to inform the capital sentencing jury that he is parole ineligible where the only alternative sentence to death is life without the possibility of parole); Turner v. Quarterman, 481 F.3d 292, 296-97 (5th Cir.2007); Campbell v. Polk, 447 F.3d 270, 286-89 (4th Cir.2006); Simpson, 172 Ill.2d at 150-51, 216 Ill.Dec. 671, 665 N.E.2d 1228 (A defendant is not entitled to have the jury informed that if defendant is not sentenced to death, he is eligible for a range of possible alternate sentences, including natural life imprisonment). To accept defendant's contention, in a single-murder case, the jury would have to be informed of all the sentencing alternatives possible under the determinative sentencing system in Illinois. Such information would divert the jury's attention from the defendant's character and the circumstances of the offense and would invite the jury to speculate on possibilities that may or may not occur. People v. Williams, 161 Ill.2d 1, 70-71, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994); People v. Simms, 143 Ill.2d 154, 180-82, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947 (1991). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's failure to inform the jury that defendant was subject to a  de facto natural life term of imprisonment. Having found no error, there can be no plain error. See, e.g., Harris, 225 Ill.2d at 31-32, 310 Ill.Dec. 351, 866 N.E.2d 162. Defendant alternatively contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to preserve this issue for review. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at a death sentencing hearing are reviewed pursuant to the two-prong Strickland standard. Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 354, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521. To demonstrate ineffective assistance, a defendant must show that: (1) the attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the attorney's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant in that, absent counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the sentencer would have concluded that death was not an appropriate sentence. Because the defendant must satisfy both prongs of this test, the failure to establish either is fatal to the claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693, 699. In the present case, we have already found no error in the information that the trial court gave to the jury. Therefore, trial counsel's failure to object to such information cannot be deemed deficient in terms of Strickland. See, e.g., Hall, 194 Ill.2d at 354, 252 Ill.Dec. 653, 743 N.E.2d 521; People v. Alvine, 173 Ill.2d 273, 297, 219 Ill.Dec. 546, 671 N.E.2d 713 (1996).