Opinion ID: 2584108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Problem of Overlapping Benefits

Text: The preeminent workers' compensation treatise has addressed the possibility of cumulative wage loss benefits. Larson's treatise recognizes that duplication of benefits from different parts of the system of protecting workers against wage loss should not ordinarily be allowed. [11] The treatise recognizes that in reality, a worker experiences only one wage loss and in any logical system should receive only one wage-loss benefit. [12] Larson observes that some jurisdictions have permitted collection of both unemployment and workers' compensation benefits for the same period, in the absence of any statutory prohibition. [13] The treatise notes, however, that [t]he majority of unemployment statutes ... now specifically forbid benefits to anyone drawing workers' compensation. [14] The treatise cites AS 23.30.187 as an example of one such statutory provision. [15] Larson summarizes acts from other states and observes that state statutes vary considerably, some restricting eligibility under the unemployment compensation acts and some restricting eligibility under the workers' compensation acts. [16] Larson observes that a few compensation acts have recently added an offset for unemployment insurance benefits, and describes how some courts have struggled to coordinate inconsistent statutory systems. [17] Before 1982, the legislature offered no clear guidance for how to resolve this potential problem in Alaska. There were possible implicit inconsistencies in seeking both remedies. A worker is entitled to unemployment compensation benefits if the worker is able to work, [18] and a disabled worker is not necessarily able to work. Conversely, a worker who is able to work is not obviously disabled, and is therefore not obviously eligible for workers' compensation benefits. [19] It is at least arguable that applying for unemployment compensation benefits would be inconsistent with applying for temporary total disability benefits, whether or not the employee, as DeShong did here, indicated that she could only work at light duty tasks. If the two applications are inherently inconsistent, the worker has arguably misrepresented either her ability to work or her disability. Making a misrepresentation or false statement potentially disqualifies a worker from unemployment compensation. [20] A person making a false statement or representation to obtain workers' compensation benefits may be required to repay them. [21] Yet a worker who is only partially disabled may be able to return to work in some capacity. So in theory, a partially disabled employee who has been laid off is able to work in some capacity, and is thereby eligible for both unemployment compensation benefits under AS 23.20, and temporary partial disability or permanent partial disability workers' compensation benefits under AS 23.30.190 or AS 23.30.200. This theoretical dual eligibility is more problematic for a worker who, like DeShong, claims to be totally disabled for workers' compensation purposes. In 1982 the legislature addressed this problem by enacting AS 23.30.187. The concept behind section .187 is simple. It does only one thing: it precludes an otherwise eligible workers' compensation claimant from receiving temporary total or permanent total disability workers' compensation benefits for a week in which unemployment compensation benefits were received. It thus withdraws eligibility for workers' compensation benefits for those weeks. It does so unconditionally. It contains no words describing or implying a procedure for restoring a claimant's eligibility to recover workers' compensation benefits for those weeks. It contains no words offering an interpretative finger hold for finding such a procedure. There are many other possible ways to avoid overcompensation. For example, one way might make one scheme or the other the exclusive remedy. Another might permit an offset, reducing workers' compensation benefits by unemployment compensation received for the same period. Another might require pro rata apportionment of benefits under both schemes. And another might require the employee to repay the unemployment compensation benefits before receiving workers' compensation benefits for the same period. Each way allocates burdens and benefits differently. Some favor the worker; some favor the employer who purchases workers' compensation insurance; and some favor the state's employment security fund (which is in turn funded by employer contributions). Legislatures are best suited for making such choices, because they can decide how best to balance all the interests involved. Courts are ill-suited for choosing among so many possibilities. We have been provided with none of the facts bearing on which way is socially superior, which is the most efficient way to protect workers against wage loss, who best can bear that loss, and how best to apportion the loss if it is to be shared. [22] No doubt the legislature could have rationally chosen the method adopted by the board and this court (placing the entire loss on the workers' compensation insurer for the duplicate weeks and reimbursing the unemployment compensation fund). But the legislature did not choose that method. It enacted a statute that treats the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits as an event that disqualifies the worker from receiving workers' compensation benefits. These policy choices are for the legislature. Our job here is to determine what choice the legislature made. Because its choice is clear, we must adhere to it.