Opinion ID: 740712
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Family Separation

Text: 12 As a consequence of an amnesty provision, Mrs. Palafox is now a lawful permanent resident of the United States. The Palafoxes' youngest child was born in the United States and is, therefore, a U.S. citizen. Their other child is a citizen of the Philippines, and has been granted voluntary departure status. The Palafoxes represent that should Mr. Palafox be deported, Mrs. Palafox and the American citizen child will remain in the United States. The BIA accepted this representation as true for purposes of rendering its decision. The deportation of Palafox will, therefore, result in the separation of a family that includes a United States citizen and a lawful permanent resident. 13 The BIA acknowledged that Palafox will certainly suffer emotional hardship upon being separated from family members in the United States, including his two children, his wife and his siblings. Nonetheless, the BIA continued, Palafox has not demonstrated that he or his family will suffer more than the ordinary pain that is generally experienced by aliens who are deported from the United States and leave family members behind. 14 Palafox argues not from case law but from assertions about common human experience that separation from his wife and children is sufficient to constitute extreme hardship under the statute. Although it is beyond cavil that separation from one's family generally represents a real hardship, more is required to show that the BIA abused its discretion in denying Palafox's application to suspend deportation. Indeed, in keeping with the exceptional nature of the suspension remedy, Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 145, 101 S.Ct. at 1031, the common results of deportation or exclusion are insufficient to prove extreme hardship. Hassan v. INS, 927 F.2d 465, 468 (9th Cir.1991); Shooshtary v. INS, 39 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir.1994). 15 Family separation is a factor to be considered by the BIA in § 1254 proceedings. It is well-settled, however, that the mere fact that an alien has a child born in the United States does not of itself require suspension of deportation. An alien illegally present in the United States cannot gain a favored status by the birth of a citizen child. Ramirez-Durazo v. INS, 794 F.2d 491, 498 (9th Cir.1985). See also Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 145, 101 S.Ct. at 1031 (the INS may properly reject an interpretation that would lead practically to a situation in which foreign visitors could easily change their immigration status from that of tourist or student to that of permanent resident without the inconvenience of immigration quotas). This is true even though deportation of the parent may in fact necessitate the departure of the citizen child to far less advantageous circumstances in the parent's country of origin. Ramirez-Durazo, 794 F.2d at 499. 16 Palafox does not demonstrate that the suffering caused by his deportation would be anything other than that which must attend the broad run of deportations. Upon appeal, he argues principally that the IJ erroneously concluded that the separation of the family would cause no suffering. Neither the IJ nor the BIA, however, ever asserted that the Palafoxes would not experience real suffering or hardship due to separation, but rather that Palafox had not shown the requisite extreme hardship. In requiring a showing of emotional suffering beyond the ordinary, the BIA did not abuse its discretion. As the court explained in Ramirez-Durazo, requiring a showing of unique extenuating circumstances necessary to demonstrate 'extreme hardship' [is] consistent with the 'exceptional nature of the suspension remedy.'  794 F.2d at 499 (quoting Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. at 145, 101 S.Ct. at 1031). Palafox's argument is directed not to the BIA's factual findings, but to a misplaced attack on the statutory standard as permissibly construed by the BIA.