Opinion ID: 380737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 27 On several important issues, the parties agree. The Secretary does not deny that in the case of the field sanitation standard he has departed from the timetables set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b). El Congreso does not contest the authority of the Secretary to set priorities for OSHA and to allocate the resources available to him. Finally, since the decision of our court in Hispanic I, 29 it has been clear that the timetables set forth in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) are not etched in stone, that they do not so circumscribe the discretion of the Secretary that his failure to act within their limits is, by itself, an abuse by him of his discretionary powers. So long as his action is rational in the context of the statute, and is taken in good faith, the Secretary has authority to delay development of a standard at any stage as priorities demand. 30 The issue before us, therefore, is whether the Secretary's action in the instant case was rational and taken in good faith. 28
29 The Secretary has delayed action on the field sanitation standards because he has given priority to the development of other standards. El Congreso argues that this setting of priorities was irrational. The district court agreed, concluding that the Secretary (had) not established any criteria which would enable the Court to determine that the agency (had) acted in a rational manner. 31 We disagree. 30 On this review, a court examines agency action to determine whether it was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 32 31 To make (such a) finding the court must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. 33 32 Here, the Secretary, both in his initial presentation to the district court and in his later responses to interrogatories, has outlined the criteria which he used in setting his priorities. 34 He has explained at length how the application of those criteria produced the set of priorities he developed. 35 The criteria selected by the Secretary adequately reflect the purposes and provisions of the statute, and are rational within that context. 36 Though other relevant criteria could be imagined, and though even given the Secretary's criteria a different set of priorities could be developed, it is not the function of a reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary, where the Secretary has reasonably exercised his discretion. In our view, the Secretary has acted reasonably in this instance, and the district court developed its own view of appropriate priorities for standards development 37 and this was error. 33 The district court's own view of appropriate priorities disregarded, without warrant, material findings made by the agency. For example, the Secretary specifically concluded that rulemaking concerning the field sanitation standard would be quite lengthy, involving the allocation of substantial resources (approximately 3600 man-hours). The Secretary also concluded that the greatest hazards to agricultural employees had already been remedied, and that other industries merited allocation of the available resources (the accident rate in the agricultural industry was fifth among eight major groupings). The district court emphasized almost exclusively the number of employees to be benefited, ignoring numerous other criteria considered by the Secretary such as the nature and the severity of the hazard exposure. 34 This court is of the view that greater respect is due the Secretary's judgment that promulgation of a cancer policy, a lead standard, an anhydrous amonia standard and the like, merited higher priority than a field sanitation standard. With its broader perspective, and access to a broad range of undertakings, and not merely the program before the court, the agency has a better capacity than the court to make the comparative judgments involved in determining priorities and allocating resources. The district court impermissibly substituted its judgment for that of the agency. 35 At another level, El Congreso indicts the Secretary's modus operandi in approaching problems of occupational health and safety. It argues that the Department is dissipating its energy by undertaking a myriad of entirely new ventures (in a) 'shot gun' approach (which) means that hundreds of standards are simultaneously 'being developed' but that few are ever finalized. 38 Such an approach, El Congreso argues, is so irrational a use of agency resources as to be an abuse of power. We cannot agree. 36 The Occupational Health and Safety Act represents an attempt by Congress to address wide-ranging, serious, and complicated problems. The Secretary already has promulgated standards addressing significant problems in a number of areas, 39 including some covering the most serious hazards in the agricultural industry. 40 The development of additional standards is proceeding. The Act clearly envisaged such a broad scope approach to the problem, with the informed discretion of the Secretary guiding decisions regarding the number of projects to be undertaken at one time. The 18-month plan submitted by the Secretary is a reasonable exercise of that discretion. 37
38 We have indicated here, as we did in our previous opinion, that any delay in the development of a standard beyond the time limits set in 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1)-(4) must be the result of a good faith ordering of priorities by the Secretary. In Hispanic I we acted on the assumption that the Secretary (was) acting honestly and fairly in the selection of priorities, an assumption we (adopted) since no claim (was) made to the contrary. 41 The district court did not say that the Secretary has not acted in good faith. Rather, the district court based its opinion on its perception that the Secretary (had failed) to articulate rationally his rulemaking priority, a perception which led that court to invoke its own view of appropriate priorities for standards development. 42 39 The Secretary's claim of a good faith effort to discharge his statutory obligations is supported by the fact that he has already promulgated standards addressing many significant hazards, including standards regulating the most hazardous aspects of the agricultural industry. 43 In so doing, he has demonstrated a willingness to face strong political opposition by promulgating standards which were strenuously, even bitterly, opposed by those to be regulated. Nothing in the record would lead us to conclude at this time that the Secretary has been insincere in setting priorities or in presenting his timetable to the district court. 40
41 Our opinion in Hispanic I made clear that the timetable of 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1)-(4) is not mandatory. But it also made clear that El Congreso was entitled to some timetable for the development of a field sanitation standard. Where the Secretary deems a problem significant enough to warrant initiation of the standard setting process, the Act requires that he have a plan to shepherd through the development of the standard that he take pains, regardless of the press of other priorities, to ensure that the standard is not inadvertently lost in the process. 42 It is not enough for the Secretary merely to state that the standard will not be issued over the next 18 months. If other priorities preclude promulgation of a field sanitation standard within that frame, then the Secretary must provide a timetable at least for the standard in question which covers a larger period. 43 Upon remand to the district court, the Secretary should be granted leeway to reconsider the timetable submitted on January 22, 1979, since it was developed without input from the official charged with responsibility for this area. In constructing the timetable, the Secretary need not be constrained, as he would have been under the district court order, to rearrange priorities that were rationally set. But, the Secretary must give due regard to the principle, presumed in the timetable of 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(1)-(4) and developed here, that once the process of developing a standard begins, a good faith effort must be made to complete it. 44 It is for the district court to review the timetable submitted not with regard to the Secretary's setting of priorities, which we have held in this instance to be a rational exercise of his discretionary powers, but with regard to the narrower concerns we have just delineated.