Opinion ID: 772819
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Timing of Acceptance of Responsibility

Text: 16 According to the Sentencing Guidelines, a district court may grant a defendant a two-level downward adjustment to his base offense level if the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(a). A defendant may be eligible for an additional one-level adjustment if the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct and his offense level, prior to the application of §3E1.1(a), was greater than level 16. U.S.S.G. §3E1.1(b). Application note 4 to this section states that conduct resulting in an enhancement under §3C1.1 for obstruction of justice 3 ordinarily indicatesthat the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§3C1.1 and 3E1.1 may apply. U.S.S.G. §3C1.1, comment. (n.4). We are asked to review the district court's determination that the defendants did not present an extraordinary case such that they deserved the downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility despite their obstructive conduct. 17 Recently, in United States v. Jeter, 191 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 1999), we clarified when we begin to examine the defendant's conduct for evidence that he has accepted responsibility for his offense. We noted in Jeter that while district courts have discretion in determining the time period for acceptance of responsibility, we do not believe they have unbridled discretion. Jeter, 191 F.3d at 640. Thus, we determined that the district court could not use Jeter's preindictment state crimes as a basis for denying him a reduction for acceptance of responsibility on the federal charges. Id. at 639. We held, as a matter of law, that the defendant must be on notice that the federal government has an interest in his or her affairs before §3E1.1 comes into play. Id. at 639-40. In United States v. Tilford, we refined Jeter's holding and concluded that, despite the fact that Tilford was alerted to IRS agents' interest in his affairs in 1993 when the agents informed him they were investigating his tax returns, the relevant time period for measuring Tilford's acceptance of responsibility began with the entry of Tilford's guilty plea on February 26, 1998, which was, importantly, the date of his indictment. Tilford, 224 F.3d at 868. 18 Conversely, in United States v. Roberts, 243 F.3d 235, 239-40 (6th Cir. March 6, 2001), a panel of this court upheld a district court's upward adjustment for obstruction of justice based on a defendant's obstructive behavior which occurred prior to his federal indictment. In Roberts, the defendant was indicted in state court in January 1997 for felony rape and kidnaping. Roberts subsequently escaped from state custody where he was being held for the state offenses. He was then, on June 18, 1998, indicted by a federal grand jury for the same underlying conduct that led to his state indictment. Roberts challenged the upward adjustment of his sentence under §3C1.1, arguing that the Guideline did not apply because the obstructive behavior did not occur during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction. U.S.S.G. §3C1.1 (emphasis added). Affirming the district court's adjustment of the defendant's sentence, the Roberts court reasoned that the defendant's obstruction as to his state charges was connected to the instant offense of conviction in federal court because both sets of charges, and the obstruction activity, were related to the same underlying activity. Roberts, 243 F.3d 235, 240. The Roberts court also affirmed the district court's denial of the defendant's request for a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, concluding that there was nothing extraordinary about the defendant's case. See id. at 241. 19 As Tilford and Jeter make clear, a district court may at least consider the defendant's behavior following his initial indictment in federal court for purposes of measuring whether the defendant has accepted responsibility because the defendantis certainly on notice that the federal government has an interest in his ... affairs at the time of indictment.Jeter, 191 F.3d at 639-40. Roberts, however, teaches that obstructive behavior can occur prior to the moment at which courts may consider whether the defendant's conduct conforms with his acceptance of responsibility. Thus, a district court's evaluation whether the defendant has accepted responsibility is distinct from the court's determination whether the defendant has obstructed justice. 20 In this case, we believe the district court properly began evaluating the defendants' conduct for purposes of the §3E1.1 adjustment as of the time the defendants were first indicted on January 20, 1999. We reject Garcia's argument that we begin to measure acceptance of responsibility subsequent to the date of his attempted obstruction of justice. It is clear that Garcia knew of the government's interest in his criminal activity, not simply after he wrote the obstructive letter at the end of March, but, at the latest, when he was first indicted in January 1999. Therefore, the district court did not err by considering all post-indictment behavior when assessing whether to grant a downward adjustment under §3E1.1