Opinion ID: 78342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: Our review of Kimbrough's final state habeas petition is governed by the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. For any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court, § 2254(d) allows federal habeas relief only where the state court adjudication (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Because the state court adjudicated Kimbrough's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on the merits, we review whether that decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. A decision contrary to federal law contradicts the United States Supreme Court on a settled question of law or holds differently than did that Court on a set of materially indistinguishable factsin short, it is a decision substantially different from the [Supreme Court's] relevant precedent .... Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A decision that unreasonably applies federal law identifies the correct governing legal principle as articulated by the United States Supreme Court, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the petitioner's case, unreasonably extends [the] principle ... to a new context where it should not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend [it] to a new context where it should apply. Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495.