Opinion ID: 1671948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: brady/giglio claims [10]

Text: At the outset, these issues appear to be procedurally barred since they should have been raised on direct appeal. Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567, 569 n. 1 (Fla.1996). As to the merits, Robinson must prove the following to substantiate his Brady claim: (1) that the Government possessed evidence favorable to the defendant (including impeachment evidence); (2) that the defendant does not possess the evidence nor could he obtain it himself with any reasonable diligence; (3) that the prosecution suppressed the favorable evidence; and (4) that had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, a reasonable probability exists that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Hegwood v. State, 575 So.2d 170, 172 (Fla. 1991) (quoting United States v. Meros, 866 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.1989)). From the facts before it, the trial court concluded that there was evidence that defense counsel Howard Pearl was provided with the State's Answer to the Demand for Discovery prior to trial and that the Answer listed Captain Porter and next to his name had the notation `statement of Fields.' The trial judge then attached the relevant portion of the hearing transcript to his order. In applying the Brady test to the facts, it is debatable whether this evidence was favorable to the defendant; it appears that Robinson either had or could have easily obtained this deposition, thus not satisfying the second prong; it does not appear that the prosecution suppressed the evidence; and, we conclude that no reasonable probability exists that the proceeding's outcome would have been substantially affected if Robinson had this information. Therefore, Robinson has not carried his burden in substantiating his Brady claim. The trial judge also concluded that Robinson did not prove that the State knowingly presented false testimony from Fields at trial in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). To establish a Giglio violation, Robinson must show, (1) that the testimony was false; (2) that the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) that the statement was material. Craig v. State, 685 So.2d 1224, 1226 (Fla.1996). We have observed that, [t]he thrust of Giglio and its progeny has been to ensure that the jury know the facts that might motivate a witness in giving testimony, and that the prosecutor not fraudulently conceal such facts from the jury. Id. at 1226-27 (quoting Routly v. State, 590 So.2d 397, 400 (Fla.1991)). In Craig, the prosecutor knew for a fact that Craig's co-defendant was in a work-release program with an imminent presumptive parole release date. Id. at 1228. The co-defendants each claimed that the other was more culpable, and their credibility with the jury was a critical factor in determining which one ultimately was found more culpable. Further, in reaching a sentencing decision, one of the factors the jury must consider and weigh was any disparity between their culpability and penalties. Id. Because the prosecutor falsely represented the severity of the co-defendant's penalty and convey[ed] to the jury that Craig's codefendant would never be released from prison, we found a Giglio violation had been established and accordingly required a new hearing. Id. at 1228. In this case, the facts are not so clear cut. The relevant passage in Porter's deposition is brief and somewhat ambiguous. While the deposition certainly does not include Fields' statement that Robinson told him he planned to kill the victim because she could identify them, neither does it say that the killing was an accident. Instead, it was a second-hand, unrecorded rendition of what Fields told Captain Porter. Therefore, we find no error in the trial court's determination that Robinson has not met the test required to establish a Giglio violation. Nevertheless, Robinson makes the alternative claim that if defense counsel received this information and for some reason decided not to use it to attack Fields' credibility, he may have rendered ineffective assistance. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must first demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient, and, second, that there was a reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the proceeding's outcome would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, the Supreme Court has afforded attorneys wide latitude in conducting the defense of a case and, accordingly, has placed a significant burden on those petitioners alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. To that end, the Court observed that: A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065. Therefore, in order to prevail, Robinson must demonstrate that Pearl's conduct fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, and, if it did, establish the resulting prejudice. Obviously, since Fields' trial testimony completely contradicted Robinson's version of the crimes, Robinson, 574 So.2d at 110, his credibility was a key issue in the case. Porter's deposition related that Robinson and Fields pulled up behind the victim's parked car and that Robinson got out of his car, walked up to the victim's car, and then pulled out a gun. This tracks Fields' trial testimony, although there was no mention in Porter's deposition that the victim was handcuffed after being brought to Robinson's car at gunpoint. Robinson, 574 So.2d at 110. Porter then stated that they drove to the cemetery and, in Fields' words, Robinson raped the victim. Again, this tracks Fields' trial testimony. However, Porter then stated that Fields told him he did not rape the victim, contrary to his testimony at trial where he said that Robinson ordered him to rape the victim and he complied. Eventually, Porter described what Fields told him about the shooting. He stated: Fields said something to the effect of, somehow or another in the conversation that Robinson had called her a bitch and at that point, she either pushed him or slapped at him or something like that and in turn, he slapped back at her or used his gun to threaten her with and that's when he shot her. That's when Robinson shot her. As the State notes, no mention of an accident appears in Porter's deposition. Yet, this rendition is at least somewhat inconsistent with Fields' trial testimony that Robinson expressed concern that she could identify them. He then walked up to her and put the gun on her cheek. Fields heard a shot, saw St. George fall, and watched Robinson stand over her and fire a second shot. Robinson, 574 So.2d at 110. Based on these facts, defense counsel Pearl's performance was arguably deficient if he had access to Porter's deposition but chose not to use it in attacking Fields' credibility. Assuming that was the case, Robinson still must prove to the trial court that he was prejudiced by Pearl's deficient performance. Here, the jury knew that Fields was a co-defendant testifying as a State witness and that he had an agreement with the State which was brought out in detail on cross-examination. The prosecutor had also described the agreement in detail during Fields' deposition taken April 24, 1986. Based on those known facts, the trial court could conclude that the jury had ample information from which to assess [Fields'] credibility and weigh [his] testimony accordingly, see Chandler v. State, 702 So.2d 186, 198 (Fla.1997), and, accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's conclusion that Robinson has failed to demonstrate sufficient prejudice to merit a new trial.