Opinion ID: 2748558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Qualified Immunity as to Myrdek

Text: We first consider the plaintiff’s argument that the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict on his section 1983 claim. Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Section 1983 provides: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party 10 injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . . 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to the plaintiff, the claim against Myrdek is “based on his unlawful and unreasonable seizure of the plaintiff in his office for the purpose of forcing the plaintiff to participate in an employment-related internal investigation.” The plaintiff asserts that his claim “is based on [Myrdek’s] refusal to recognize [his] right to discontinue [the] investigatory interview and leave based on (1) his right to union representation, and (2) his right to resign immediately.” Thus, he argues, “Myrdek’s demand that [he] submit to an interview prior to 3:00 p.m. . . . resulted in multiple instances of unlawful confinement . . . in violation of [his] constitutional rights.” The plaintiff acknowledges that his first two encounters with Myrdek – at 2:05 p.m., when he received the Garrity warning, and at approximately 2:30 p.m., when he returned to Myrdek’s office to report on his efforts to arrange union representation – “are not and never were part of [his] claim of false imprisonment.” Rather, he asserts that his “unlawful confinement started during his third meeting in Myrdek’s office, which began at 2:45 to 3:00 p.m., and then continued into the hallway.” (Emphasis omitted.) Thus, we limit our qualified immunity analysis to the third meeting beginning at approximately 2:45 p.m. “The doctrine of qualified immunity provides a safe harbor for public officials acting under the color of state law who would otherwise be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for infringing the constitutional rights of private parties.” Whitfield v. Melendez-Rivera, 431 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005). Qualified immunity protects police officers “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Mlodzinski v. Lewis, 648 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). The doctrine “balances two important interests – the need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “The protection of qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (quotation omitted). The doctrine “is a compromise that strives to balance the desire to compensate those whose rights are infringed by state actors with an equally compelling desire to shield public servants from undue interference with the performance of their duties and from threats of liability which, although unfounded, may nevertheless be unbearably disruptive.” Whitfield, 431 F.3d at 6 (quotation 11 and brackets omitted). Qualified immunity “provides ample protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). The qualified immunity inquiry is comprised of a two-part test. See Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 268-69. Pursuant to that test, a court must decide: (1) whether the facts alleged or shown by the plaintiff make out a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) if so, whether the right was “clearly established” at the time of the defendant’s alleged violation. It is clear from the Supreme Court’s description of the second, “clearly established” step of the qualified immunity analysis that the second step, in turn, has two aspects. One aspect of the analysis focuses on the clarity of the law at the time of the alleged civil rights violation . . . . The other aspect focuses more concretely on the facts of the particular case and whether a reasonable defendant would have understood that his conduct violated the plaintiff[’s] constitutional rights. Id. at 269 (citations omitted). “If even on plaintiff[’s] best case, there is no violation of [his] rights, or the law was not clearly established, or an objectively reasonable officer could have concluded (even mistakenly) that his or her conduct did not violate [the plaintiff’s] rights, then qualified immunity must be granted.” Mlodzinski, 648 F.3d at 28. “[W]hile it is frequently appropriate for courts to answer each step in turn, it is not mandatory that courts follow the two-step analysis sequentially.” Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269-70. Courts may exercise discretion in deciding which of the prongs “of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; see Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014). In some cases, “discussion of the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis will result in a substantial expenditure of scarce judicial resources on difficult questions that have no effect on the outcome of the case.” Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 270 (quotation omitted). “This expenditure of resources by the courts and the parties is difficult to justify in cases where the constitutional questions presented are heavily fact-bound, minimizing their precedential value.” Id. For purposes of its qualified immunity analysis, the trial court assumed that the plaintiff had established “a cognizable constitutional violation under the Fourth Amendment.” On appeal, Myrdek likewise assumes that the plaintiff has “satisfied the first prong of the test.” Accordingly, we will assume, without deciding, that Myrdek’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure. 12 Under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the trial court determined that the plaintiff’s right to be free from confinement under the circumstances in this case “was not clearly established,” and that “the officers had a reasonable basis to believe that their conduct was lawful.” The plaintiff asserts that because the jury rendered a verdict in his favor on the false imprisonment claim, it necessarily found: that his resignation was valid and not tainted by the defendants’ suggestion that it was “irrational”; that the circumstances presented “did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that [he] presented an immediate danger of bodily harm to himself or others prior to his detention”; and that “Myrdek did not have an objectively reasonable basis . . . to believe that there was any emergency at hand which necessitated restraining [his] liberty.” (Emphases and quotation omitted.) The plaintiff argues that the trial court “simply ignored” the jury’s findings that Myrdek’s conduct was not objectively reasonable. We disagree. The linchpin of qualified immunity is the objective reasonableness of the official’s conduct. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39 (1987). In Anderson, the plaintiffs argued that it was “inappropriate to give officials alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment – and thus necessarily to have unreasonably searched or seized – the protection of a qualified immunity intended only to protect reasonable official action” because, they asserted, it is impossible “to say that one ‘reasonably’ acted unreasonably.” Id. at 643. The United States Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating: “The short answer to this argument is that it is foreclosed by the fact that we have previously extended qualified immunity to officials who were alleged to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” Id. Thus, even if an officer is found to have acted unlawfully, “Anderson still operates to grant officers immunity for reasonable mistakes as to the legality of their actions.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001). “This test imposes an objective standard of reasonableness.” Mlodzinski, 648 F.3d at 33; see Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The plaintiff argues that, during his third meeting with Myrdek, which began at 2:45 to 3:00 p.m., “Myrdek did not have any objectively reasonable basis to confine [him] to his office,” and that Myrdek’s “only ‘purpose’ was to unlawfully compel [him] to submit to a no-notice interview without the union counsel he was legally entitled to.” The plaintiff asserts that he “simply refused to answer questions at 3 p.m. without his union representative being present which is lawful and appropriate behavior under the defendants’ own rules.” (Emphasis omitted.) Myrdek argues that the plaintiff “provides no legal support for his argument that [he] had an ‘absolute right’ to have the union attorney, as opposed to any other union representative, present at the administrative interview.” Myrdek asserts that “[b]ased on the information available to [him] at the time, he reasonably believed that the interview should not be delayed.” 13 The state police “Professional Standards of Conduct” (standards) set forth the procedures applicable to “internal affairs investigations concerning allegations of personnel misconduct.” Pursuant to section 26-E.4.5, C, “Division Member Rights and Responsibilities”: 1. Division members under administrative investigation shall have the right to association or union representation during an investigative interview, if so requested by the member, whenever the member reasonably believes that the interview may result in disciplinary action against him. The association or union representative’s role at the investigative interview is to consult with the Division member. The association or union representative shall not participate in the interview in any way unless requested to do so by the investigator and shall not convert the interview into an adversary proceeding. The Division is free to insist upon hearing the Division member’s own account of the matter(s) under investigation. 2. The Division member is solely responsible for making arrangements to have an association or union representative in attendance at the interview. Under no circumstances will the investigation be compromised or unreasonably delayed because of the Division member’s, association’s or union’s failure to obtain or provide an association or union representative in a timely manner. Thus, under section 26-E.4.5, C of the standards, assuming that the plaintiff reasonably believed that the interview with Myrdek might result in disciplinary action against him, the plaintiff had a right to “association or union representation” during the investigative interview. However, there is no mention in the standards of a right to specific representation by an individual of the member’s choosing, nor does the plaintiff cite any authority in support of his position that he was legally entitled to have the union attorney present at his interview. Cf. Appeal of Exeter Police Assoc., 154 N.H. 61, 64 (2006) (declining to express opinion on whether New Hampshire law affords an employee the right to request the union representative of one’s choice); see Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639 (explaining that application of qualified immunity “turns on the objective legal reasonableness of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time it was taken”) (quotations and citations omitted). Further, the policy expressly provides that the investigation not be “compromised or unreasonably delayed” because of the member’s failure to obtain “an association or union representative in a timely manner.” At the time of the third meeting with the plaintiff on November 28, Myrdek was: aware of the events that had taken place in September regarding the plaintiff’s actions 14 involving the Meredith Police Department; aware of events that had resulted in the plaintiff being placed on administrative leave in October; aware that two days before, the plaintiff’s wife had called the Laconia Police Department after arguing with her husband, requesting additional patrols by her home; aware that the plaintiff’s wife had expressed concern that the plaintiff had been in her home in violation of a temporary order; and aware that the plaintiff had told his wife he knew where her attorney lived. Based upon the facts known to him at the time, it was objectively reasonable for Myrdek to conclude that insisting that the investigatory interview take place that day, and that the plaintiff arrange for union representation other than Donchess, did not violate the plaintiff’s rights. The plaintiff further argues that “any reasonable officer in Myrdek’s position . . . would have recognized that he had no reasonable, lawful basis to compel [him] to participate in a Garrity internal investigatory interview contrary to . . . his right to resign his employment and leave.” We disagree. When Myrdek informed the plaintiff that the investigatory interview was going to take place that day, the plaintiff became enraged and tried to hand Myrdek a resignation letter. When Myrdek refused to accept it, the plaintiff responded, “Well, F you . . . I’m leaving, I quit.” Myrdek testified that he didn’t accept the plaintiff’s resignation “because [he] felt that in [the plaintiff’s] state of rage that he . . . seemed to be . . . going out of control, and [he] didn’t think that [the plaintiff] was at that point making a rational decision.” Faced with the fact that the plaintiff’s behavior had rapidly escalated to an enraged state, it was objectively reasonable for Myrdek to consider the plaintiff’s offer to resign as not the product of a rational act. We reject the plaintiff’s contention that prior to 3 p.m. Myrdek was not acting as a “police officer,” but rather “was acting solely in his capacity as the employer.” Such a characterization ignores that, at all times relevant to the issues before us, both Myrdek and the plaintiff were armed, on-duty law enforcement officers, a factor that necessarily informed Myrdek’s actions. For example, explaining why he declined to accept the plaintiff’s offer to hand over his gun during the “very quick” third meeting in his office, Myrdek testified: [I was] concerned about . . . taking . . . [the plaintiff’s] weapon away from him. But I was contemplating maybe just disarming that weapon by just removing the magazine, which would make the weapon unserviceable. In other words, you couldn’t fire the weapon if I had just removed the magazine. And I was contemplating, at what point do I do this? Is this going to excite him even more? Will I be able to calm him down? So I was going through a number of scenarios that I was trying to determine what to do. .... 15 I had concerns the entire time as to what point do I try to remove that weapon from him without exciting him any further? And trying to calm him down at the same time. And I was trying to balance out how to do that and when to do that. “The calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second judgments – in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving[.]” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989). An officer who makes “a reasonable judgment call” is entitled to qualified immunity. Buchanan v. Maine, 469 F.3d 158, 170 (1st Cir. 2006); see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205 (cautioning against “the 20/20 vision of hindsight in favor of deference to the judgment of reasonable officers on the scene” (quotation omitted)). We conclude that an objectively reasonable officer could have believed that refusing to postpone the plaintiff’s investigatory interview and refusing to accept the plaintiff’s resignation were lawful. Thus, “even on plaintiff[’s] best case . . . an objectively reasonable officer could have concluded (even mistakenly) that his . . . conduct did not violate [the plaintiff’s] rights.” Mlodzinski, 648 F.3d at 28. Accordingly, we hold that Myrdek was entitled to qualified immunity. The plaintiff further argues that the trial court erroneously concluded that he was not entitled to a jury trial on his section 1983 claim. However, given our conclusion that the trial court correctly determined that Myrdek was entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claim, we need not address this argument.