Opinion ID: 2301462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nader's Challenge to Enforcement of the Pennsylvania Judgment

Text: Nader challenges the denial of his 60(b) motion, [14] contending that the trial court erred in not allowing him to present newly discovered evidence that the Pennsylvania judgment that the voters enforced against him in the District of Columbia was unlawfully procured, and in placing the burden on him to discover facts Reed Smith allegedly concealed. [15] The trial court denied Nader's motion under 60(b)(2) because the evidence Nader proffered was not newly discovered as it was publically available before the entry of the cost judgment in Pennsylvania in April 2007 and could have been the subject of a new trial motion in Pennsylvania. The trial court also ruled that Nader was not entitled to relief under Rule 60(b)(3), (4), or (6) because none of Nader's allegations concerning the campaign contributions to the Pennsylvania justices or their failure to recuse raised due process concerns, citing Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009), or were in violation of Pennsylvania law or applicable ethical rules. Finally, the trial court took judicial notice of Nader's petition to vacate the judgment filed in Pennsylvania and of the denial of that petition. Once the foreign judgment was duly filed in Superior Court, see D.C.Code § 15-352, note 3, supra; Super. Ct. Civ. R. 72, [16] and the court took judicial notice of Nader's challenge to the judgment in Pennsylvania, the Superior Court, as the receiving court, was constitutionally required to defer to the Pennsylvania court's denial of his challenge. Nader's 60(b) motion in D.C. Superior Court challenged the validity of a judgment on the basis of claims that were either fully litigatedand rejectedin the Pennsylvania courts, or that could have been brought in those courts. We recognize that, as discussed earlier, D.C.Code § 15-352 provides that fraud in the procurement of a judgment can be a defense to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. Even if we assume that Nader's claims, if proven, would constitute fraud in the procurement of the cost judgment, [17] however, challenges in the receiving court are generally not permitted because of the strong presumption of the validity of a final decision by a sister state which resolved the merits of the controversy. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally requires every State to give a judgment at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be accorded in the State which rendered it. Durfee, 375 U.S. at 109, 84 S.Ct. 242. Nader does not contend that the Pennsylvania judgment does not have res judicata effect in that state, and he is now precluded from mounting a second collateral attack under the guise of a 60(b) motion in D.C. Superior Court challenging a foreign judgment. See Carr v. Rose, 701 A.2d 1065, 1074 (D.C.1997) (holding that affirmance by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania precluded claim in District of Columbia that could have been brought against same party in lawsuit filed in Pennsylvania). The same principles of res judicata that bar claims that have beenor could have beenaired and resolved in previous litigation against the same party have even greater force when the litigation has taken place in another state. Anything less would run afoul of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Nader appropriately sought recourse by filing a petition in the Pennsylvania courts and the Superior Court was bound to defer to that state's final judgment. [18] The Superior Court, accordingly, did not err in denying Nader's 60(b) motion to set aside the Pennsylvania judgments. [19]
Nader also challenges the trial court's denial of his 41(b) motion to dismiss the voters' enforcement action and for restitution of the funds disbursed from his PNC bank account. He argues that 1) Reed Smith violated the automatic stay provision in Superior Court Civil Rule 62(a) by executing on the judgment against the garnishee banks less than ten days from their entry in Superior Court, 2) the 60(b) motion, filed within 10 days of the judgment against the garnishee banks, rendered those judgments non-final, and 3) by failing to oppose Nader's 41(b) motion for restitution of the garnished funds, Reed Smith has not denied involvement in the alleged criminal conspiracy that led to the Pennsylvania cost judgment against Nader that appellees enforced in Superior Court. The same reasoning we have applied for denying Nader's 60(b) motion, also defeats this last point: Nader either has raised, or has had the opportunity to raise, those claims in Pennsylvania; he is precluded from raising them in the District of Columbia. We, therefore, turn to the first two procedural issues, which in essence go to whether appellees' execution on the judgments against the garnishee banks was premature. Rule 62(a) provides that no execution shall issue upon a judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for its enforcement until the expiration of 10 days after its entry. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 62(a). Appellees executed on the judgments against the garnishee banks on November 2, 2007. Nader argues this was premature because it was less than ten days after October 25, 2007, when the trial court granted the voters' motion to condemn assets in Nader's bank accounts and issued judgments against the garnishee banks. He also contends that the October 25, 2007 judgments against the garnishee banks were not final because they had been stayed by his November 7, Rule 60(b) motion for relief from judgment. Nader argues that the trial court erred in two respects: First, because it considered that for purposes of Rule 62(a)'s 10-day period, the judgment being enforced was the one that entered the Pennsylvania judgment on May 16, 2007, whereas he contends the relevant judgments were the two entered against the garnishee banks on October 25, 2007, and, second, because Nader's Rule 60(b) motion rendered the judgment against the garnishee banks non-final. These arguments are now moot. The purpose of the automatic 10-day grace period is, as Nader argues, to permit the filing of motions for relief from the underlying judgment and to request a stay, pursuant to Rule 62(b), while such motion is pending. The trial court considered and denied Nader's Rule 60(b) motion on the merits, and, as discussed in the previous section, we uphold that denial. Therefore, even if we assume, arguendo, that Rule 62(a)'s 10-day period applies to the judgments entered against the garnishee banks, Nader has not been harmed. Moreover, the filing of his Rule 60(b) motion on November 7, 2007, did not affect the finality of the October 25, 2007 judgments against the garnishee banks. [20] There is, therefore, no cause to grant relief on this ground. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is Affirmed.