Opinion ID: 1988638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The applicability of (B).

Text: At the time that this case was tried, our neglect statute contained a general provision defining a neglected child as one without proper parental care or control... necessary for his or her physical, mental, or emotional health. D.C.Code § 16-2301(9)(B). This provision did not address or even mention the specific circumstances under which one child could properly be found to be neglected on the basis of the abuse of a different child. But the neglect statute also had a provision old (E)which focused directly on the foregoing problem. Old (E) provided that a finding of neglect under this theory may be made if, and therefore only if, the respondent is in imminent danger of abuse, and if [his or her] sibling has been abused. (Emphasis added.) We held in M.W., 756 A.2d at 915-16, that the word sibling must be accorded its plain and customary meaning, and that a cousin living under the same roof with the respondent was not a sibling. The District's attempt to apply (B) to the circumstances before us is replete with difficulties. As we reiterated only a few months ago, [t]his court has often recognized the well-settled rule of statutory construction that a special statute covering a particular subject matter is controlling over a general statutory provision covering the same and other subjects in general terms. George Washington Univ. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 831 A.2d 921, 943 n. 18 (D.C.2003). Here, it was old (E) that covered the particular subject matter and required that, in situations of this kind, the respondent may be found to be neglected only if he or she is a sibling of the abused child. It would be incongruous to suppose that by enacting a general provision like (B), the legislature intended to dispense with the sibling requirement and to authorize a finding of neglect even if the respondent was not a sibling of the victim of the abuse. Moreover, if we were to accept the District's contention that (B) covers the situation before us, then old (E) would become altogether superfluous. There would have been no need for the legislature to enact old (E), for according to the District's logic, (B) covered everything that was addressed by old (E) (as well as situations, such as this one, excluded from old (E)). But [a] basic principle of statutory construction is that each provision of the statute should be construed so as to give effect to all of the statute's provisions, not rendering any provision superfluous. Veney v. United States, 681 A.2d 428, 433 (D.C.1996) (en banc) (quoting Thomas v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 547 A.2d 1034, 1037 (D.C.1988)) (brackets omitted). We are not prepared to read [ (B) ] in a manner which treats [old (E)] as if [it] did not exist. Veney, 681 A.2d at 433. In this case, the District seeks to read old (E) out of the neglect statute. It is true that this statute is remedial and [is] thus to be liberally construed to achieve that end. M.W., 756 A.2d at 916 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The District's position that the general terms of (B) trump the specific limitations in old (E), however, is not liberal construction, but reconstruction. See Adjei v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 817 A.2d 179, 184 (D.C. 2003). It is not within the judicial function... to rewrite the statute, or to supply omissions in it, in order to make it more fair .... 1841 Columbia Rd. Tenants Ass'n v. District of Columbia Rental Hous. Comm'n, 575 A.2d 306, 308 (D.C. 1990). In M.W., the court stated that it is debatable in any case whether the District has only § 16-2301(9)(E) at its disposal when confronting neglect based primarily on abuse of other children in the household. 756 A.2d at 917. The court cited and summarized (B) immediately after the quoted observation. The court did not decide the question that it raised, so that M.W. does not constitute precedential authority with respect to the point under discussion. But even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the court in M.W. envisaged an affirmative answer to the question it characterized as debatable and such an assumption would indeed be a bold onethe court surely did not have in mind a case which was tried, as this case was, exclusively (and not just primarily) on an (E) theory. Unlike old (or new) (E), (B) focuses solely on the care and treatment of the respondent, and makes no mention at all of any other child. In the present case, on the other hand, the court's entire inquiry was directed at the abuse of Ch.H., and little or no testimony was heard or even permitted as to the treatment by Mr. and Mrs. L. of any of the respondent children. The judge heard nothing, for example, about the degree of bonding, if any, between the respondents and Mr. and Mrs. L., or regarding any emotional harm that separation from their parents might entail. The preferences of the two older children in the matter are likewise unknown. Indeed, the judge was emphatic in his insistence that any inquiry beyond the torment inflicted upon Ch.H. was outside the scope of the case, and he excluded testimony relating to the manner in which Mr. and Mrs. L. disciplined other children. Nothing in the M.W. opinion can fairly be construed as contemplating that a(B) case may be proved in this way. Our decision on this issue is fact-bound, and we need not and do not decide that (B) may never be invoked as a basis for finding that abuse of one child constitutes neglect of another. In situations such as this, we should rarely, if ever, say never, for the future may bring scenarios which prudence counsels against resolving anticipatorily. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989); see also Pope v. United States, 739 A.2d 819, 827 n. 19 (D.C.1999). If, for example, a father were to blind or maim a neighbor's child in front of his family, for the purpose or with the effect of terrifying and mentally torturing his own youngsters, the parent's treatment of his own children would surely constitute child abuse or neglect under any reasonable definition. But that hypothetical situation is not comparable to the circumstances before us. In the present case, the two oldest respondents were with their father and were not residing in Mr. and Mrs. L.'s home during much of Ch.H.'s stay there. There is no evidence that the four-year-old and the two-year-old witnessed the boy's abuse or even knew of it. The youngest respondent had not yet been born. On such a record, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the District, In re S.G., 581 A.2d 771, 774 (D.C.1990), we are constrained to hold that the District did not prove what it must prove in a(B) case, namely, that any of the individual respondents was without proper care and control within the meaning of (B).