Opinion ID: 1551205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Crawford Issues with Respect to Statements Made to Knapp

Text: The defendant does not contest the admissibility of the complainant's statements to Knapp under the medical treatment exception to the hearsay rule, specifically § 8-3 (5) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, [21] but asks us to conclude that the trial court should have excluded the portions of Knapp's testimony repeating the complainant's statements that she had been  `kidnapped,'  which he considers accusatory and, therefore, testimonial under Crawford. The defendant also argues that the complainant's statement to Knapp was testimonial because of the involvement of the police at the scene. The state argues in response that these statements were not testimonial because they were part of Knapp's immediate response to and medical assessment of the complainant at the scene. We agree with the state. We begin with a review of Knapp's testimony before the trial court at the motions hearing and before the jury. At the motions hearing, Knapp testified about the complainant's distraught and shak[en] appearance and about her visible injuries and complaints, including chest and stomach pain, swollen wrists from having her hands tied, and numerous abrasions and lacerations. Knapp and his partner photographed her injuries, and those photographs were admitted at trial. In accordance with his usual medical assessment procedure, Knapp questioned her about the source of her injuries. The complainant told Knapp that she had been thrown down and taken for several hours, but said nothing else other than that she had been to the kidnapper's home before she broke free. Knapp then testified about the first aid and transportation process to Lawrence and Memorial Hospital in New London. The complainant did not tell Knapp who had abducted her, or about the use of a stun gun. At the house, Thornton listened to Knapp's questioning, but did not himself participate in that questioning. Knapp testified consistently at trial. See footnote 8 of this opinion. We note at the outset that, as with Gomes and Thornton, our review of the trial court's determination as to the testimonial nature of the complainant's statements to Knapp is plenary. See part I B of this opinion. The defendant's claim with respect to the complainant's statements to Knapp implicates the third formulation of testimonial statements under Crawford, namely, statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. . . . (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 52. Most courts considering statements made for medical treatment, in cases that generally have arisen in the assessment and treatment of sexual assault victims, have concluded that, if an interview is done strictly for medical purposes, and not in anticipation of criminal proceedings, the statement would be considered nontestimonial. . . . [I]f a statement is made as part of an investigation by government officials the statement is generally considered testimonial. (Citations omitted.) State v. Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 563 (N.D. 2006); id., 564 (videotaped interview of child sex abuse victim by forensic examiner, taken one week after alleged assault, was testimonial when directed and witnessed by police detective); see also People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 926 (Colo. 2006) (With no police officer present, an objective witness in a child's position would not see the statements as testimonial because that child would reasonably be interested in feeling better and would intend his statements to describe the source of his pain and his symptoms. In addition, an objectively reasonable seven-year-old child would expect that a doctor would use his statements to make him feel better and to formulate a medical diagnosis. He would not foresee the statements being used in a later trial.); In re T.T., 351 Ill. App. 3d 976, 992, 815 N.E.2d 789 (2004) (The child victim's statements to a pediatrician describing the cause of symptoms or pain or the general character of the assault were not testimonial in nature. . . . However, [the victim's] statement identifying [the] respondent as the perpetrator was testimonial. . . . [Citation omitted.]); Commonwealth v. DeOliveira, 447 Mass. 56, 64, 849 N.E.2d 218 (2006) (child victim's statements cannot persuasively be said to have been made in response to police interrogation when police were present at hospital, but not for examination, and they had not instructed the doctor on the manner in which his examination should proceed); Foley v. State, 914 So. 2d 677, 685 (Miss. 2005) (child victim's statements to physicians not testimonial because they were made as a part of neutral medical evaluations and medical professionals did not contact and were not being used by police); State v. Moses, 129 Wash. App. 718, 730, 119 P.3d 906 (2005) (Domestic violence victim's explanation to an emergency room physician of how her jaw was injured was not testimonial because the purpose of [the physician's] examination was for medical diagnosis and treatment of [the victim's] significant injuries. [The physician] had no role in the investigation of the assault and he was not working on behalf of or in conjunction with the police or governmental officials to develop testimony for the prosecution.), review denied, 157 Wash. 2d 1006, 136 P.3d 759 (2006). The key to the inquiry is whether the examination and questioning were for a diagnostic purpose and whether the statement was the by-product of substantive medical activity. In re T.T., supra, 351 Ill. App. 3d 992; id., 993 (pediatrician's primary investment in cooperating with law enforcement agencies was in facilitating the least traumatic method of diagnosis and treatment for the alleged victim, rather than a specific interest in enforcing sexual abuse laws). Also significant to whether the statement is testimonial is whether such statements . . . accuse or identify the perpetrator of the assault. Id.; but see Wallace v. State, 836 N.E.2d 985, 996 (Ind. App. 2005) (dying victim's statements to emergency medical technician and emergency room nurse identifying defendant as shooter not testimonial because record contained no indication that inquiries were taken in significant part for purposes of preserving it for potential future use in legal proceedings, i.e., with an eye toward trial [internal quotation marks omitted]). We conclude that the complainant's statements to Knapp were not testimonial under Crawford, and, therefore, properly were admitted under the firmly rooted medical treatment hearsay exception, which satisfied the applicable rule of Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. 66. The statements did not identify the defendant as the assailant, and the complainant's statements about her kidnapping and assaults were relevant to Knapp's determination of the origin of her injuries. They were, therefore, germane to describing the complainant's need for medical treatment, and were not testimonial. Moreover, Knapp's questioning of the complainant was secondary to the more detailed interview and statements taken by Thornton at the scene, which we have concluded were testimonial under Crawford. See part I B 2 of this opinion. Accordingly, the trial court properly admitted into evidence Knapp's testimony about the complainant's statements to him.