Opinion ID: 2640200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Apprendi to Cunningham

Text: The Apprendi to Cunningham line of cases apply the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States by way of the Fourteenth Amendment, and its guarantee of the right to a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions. In Apprendi, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the Sixth Amendment to apply to the sentencing phase and to require that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. At issue in Apprendi was the constitutionality of a New Jersey hate crime statute that permitted a sentence enhancement beyond the standard sentencing range if the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the offense for which he or she was convicted for the purpose of intimidation based on race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity. The New Jersey court had found that Apprendi had acted with the intent to intimidate based on race and, thus, had enhanced his sentence according to the statute. Under its analysis, the United States Supreme Court held that the New Jersey statute was unconstitutional because it allowed (1) a judge (not a jury) (2) to impose an increased sentence (3) based on its finding of a particular fact (the intent to intimidate based on one of the listed factors) by a lower legal standard. 530 U.S. at 490, 496-97, 120 S.Ct. 2348. As we apply the analysis in Apprendi, the relevant inquiry [to determine the constitutionality of a sentencing scheme] is one not of form, but of effect  does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty verdict? 530 U.S. at 494, 120 S.Ct. 2348. If so, the statute is unconstitutional under Apprendi's reasoning. This court considered the scope of the Apprendi decision in State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 23 P.3d 801 (2001). In that case, the court reviewed the constitutionality of K.S.A.2000 Supp. 21-4716, which allowed for an upward durational sentencing departure if certain aggravating factors were found by the sentencing judge. Examining the facts, the Gould court found that Gould's jury verdict `authorized' a sentence of 31 to 34 months for each child abuse conviction. By imposing two 68-month sentences, the sentencing judge went beyond the maximum sentence in the applicable grid block and exposed Gould to punishment greater than that authorized by the jury's verdict. 271 Kan. at 410-11, 23 P.3d 801. This court held that, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, a judge may not impose a more severe sentence than the maximum sentence authorized by the facts found by the jury; thus, K.S.A.2000 Supp. 21-4716 was held unconstitutional on its face. 271 Kan. 394, Syl. ¶ ¶ 3, 4, 23 P.3d 801. In contrast, in this court's later decision in Bramlett, 273 Kan. 67, 41 P.3d 796, the defendant, like Johnson, was sentenced to the highest term in the grid block. He did not question the constitutionality of that determination but did challenge whether imposing consecutive sentences on multiple counts increased the sentences beyond that authorized by the jury. This argument was rejected, with the Bramlett court concluding, [I]t cannot be said that, as to any individual count, the court's findings resulted in the imposition of a greater punishment than was authorized by the jury's verdict. 273 Kan. at 70, 41 P.3d 796. In both Gould and Bramlett, we emphasized that the jury verdicts authorized the imposition of presumptive sentences, which are defined as any of the three terms in the applicable grid block. After these decisions, however, the United States Supreme Court decided three additional cases that focused upon the impact of Apprendi when a sentencing statute authorized a range of sentences for a particular conviction. We must determine whether these decisions require us to alter our conclusion it is the jury verdict that authorizes the imposition of presumptive sentences. First, in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the Court determined there was a violation of Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial when the judge imposed a sentence of 90 months for Blakely's class B felony rather than the standard range of 49 to 53 months provided by Washington's Sentencing Reform Act. The law provided that the judge, without a jury, may impose a sentence above the standard range if the judge finds `substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.' 542 U.S. at 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Washington law included a nonexhaustive list of aggravating facts upon which a court could increase a sentence above the standard range. In striking down Washington's provision for exceptional sentencing, the Blakely Court emphasized that the relevant `statutory maximum' for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and Apprendi is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. [Citations omitted.] 542 U.S. at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531. In other words, said the Court, the relevant `statutory maximum' is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Because Blakely's sentence was increased above the prescribed standard range based upon the judge's finding of deliberate cruelty, a fact that was neither admitted by Blakely nor found by a jury, the statutory scheme for exceptional sentencing violated Blakely's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 542 U.S. at 313-14, 124 S.Ct. 2531. Less that 6 months later, in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the Supreme Court held that the federal sentencing guidelines, as written, violated the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution because, like the Washington sentencing scheme addressed in Blakely, the federal sentencing rules are mandatory and impose binding requirements on all sentencing judges. 543 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Booker Court observed: If the Guidelines as currently written could be read as merely advisory provisions that recommended, rather than required, the selection of particular sentences in response to differing sets of facts, their use would not implicate the Sixth Amendment. We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. [Citations omitted.] Indeed, everyone agrees that the constitutional issues presented by these cases would have been avoided entirely if Congress had omitted from the [Sentencing Reform Act] the provisions that make the Guidelines binding on district judges.... [W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant. 543 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Stevens, J., opinion of the Court in part). As a remedy, the Court excised the provisions that made the federal guidelines mandatory. This had the effect of making the federal guidelines advisory only. 543 U.S. at 245-46, 125 S.Ct. 738 (Breyer, J., opinion of the Court in part). In the third case, Cunningham, 549 U.S. 270, 127 S.Ct. 856, the defendant challenged California's determinate sentencing law (DSL). The applicable provisions of the DSL provided that Cunningham's offense was punishable by a lower-term sentence of 6 years, a middle-term sentence of 12 years, or an upper-term sentence of 16 years. See Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 288.5(a) (West 1999) (Penal Code). During Cunningham's sentencing hearing, the judge found six additional aggravating factors by a preponderance of the evidence and sentenced the defendant to the upper term authorized by Penal Code § 288.5(a)  16 years in prison. The sentencing judge's decision as to which of the three sentences it should apply was governed by Penal Code § 1170(b) (West Supp.2006), and the corresponding rules adopted by California's Judicial Council. Section 1170(b) provided that `the court shall order imposition of the middle term, unless there are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.' 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 861, 166 L.Ed.2d at 866. The accompanying rules described the applicable aggravating circumstances to be considered as `facts which justify the imposition of the upper prison term' and required that these facts `be established by a preponderance of the evidence' and `stated orally on the record.' 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 862, 166 L.Ed.2d at 866-67 (quoting Judicial Council Rules 4.405[d], 4.420[b], and 4.420[e]). The majority again emphasized the fact-finding requirement in responding to Justice Alito's argument in dissent (549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 878, 166 L.Ed.2d at 884-85) that an aggravating circumstance may reflect a policy judgment, or even a judge's `subjective belief' rather than a fact. The majority rejected the argument because California's Rules ... constantly refer to `facts.' 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 862, 166 L.Ed.2d at 867. Summarizing the effect of the California statutes and rules, the Cunningham majority concluded the provisions direct the sentencing court to start with the middle term, and to move from that term only when the court itself finds and places on the record facts  whether related to the offense or the offender  beyond the elements of the charged offense. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 862, 166 L.Ed.2d at 867. Under this procedure, the `statutory maximum' sentence, as described by Apprendi, was actually the middle-term sentence in California's DSL  not the upper term applied by the sentencing judge in that case. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 868, 166 L.Ed.2d at 873. The Court reasoned that an upper term sentence may be imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating circumstance, and [a]n element of the charged offense, essential to a jury's determination of guilt, or admitted in a defendant's guilty plea, does not qualify as such a circumstance. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 868, 166 L.Ed.2d at 873. Thus, the Court found that the DSL was facially unconstitutional. 549 U.S. at ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. at 868, 871, 166 L.Ed.2d at 873, 876. In reaching this decision, the Cunningham Court relied heavily on its opinion in Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, as well as its opinions in Blakely, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, and Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738. The Supreme Court specifically distinguished California's DSL from the now-advisory federal sentencing guidelines, which allow judges to impose any reasonable sentence within the statutory range, with or without additional findings. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 870, 166 L.Ed.2d at 875. The Cunningham Court reemphasized that in Booker, all justices agreed judicial fact-finding would be constitutionally permissible under an advisory sentencing system. 549 U.S. at ___ - ___, ___, 127 S.Ct. at 866-67, 870, 166 L.Ed.2d at 871-72, 875. In contrast, the DSL was constitutionally infirm because the sentencing judge had no discretion to select a sentence within a range of 6 to 16 years. His instruction was to select 12 years, nothing less and nothing more, unless he found facts allowing the imposition of a sentence of 6 or 16 years. Fact-finding to elevate a sentence from 12 to 16 years, our decisions make plain, falls within the province of the jury employing a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, not the bailiwick of a judge determining where the preponderance of the evidence lies. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 870, 166 L.Ed.2d at 875. In reaching its holding, the Cunningham Court recognized, in a footnote, that Kansas is one of several states that have modified their systems in the wake of Apprendi and Blakely to retain determinate sentencing. 549 U.S. at ___ n. 17, 127 S.Ct. at 871 n. 17, 166 L.Ed.2d at 876 n. 17. Other States have given their sentencing judges genuinely broad discretion to sentence within a sentencing range, which the Court stated encounters no Sixth Amendment shoal. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 871, 166 L.Ed.2d at 876-77. Appearing to approve both types of modifications, the Court urged California to likewise alter its laws in some manner. Ultimately, Cunningham does nothing more than reaffirm the holding of Booker, allowing a judge to sentence within a range if based upon an exercise of discretion rather than upon facts that must be found by the judge. See also Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203, 214-15 (2007) (explaining judicial fact-finding only violates Sixth Amendment if judge is forbidden from increasing defendant's sentence in the absence of the judge-found facts); People v. Harper, 479 Mich. 599, 739 N.W.2d 523 (2007) (declined to follow Cunningham on state law grounds; indeterminate sentencing scheme did not offend Sixth Amendment); State v. Garner, 177 P.3d 637, 643 (Utah App.2008) (indeterminate sentencing scheme involving three ranges of sentences, with middle minimum term as default, did not run afoul of Sixth Amendment).