Opinion ID: 811108
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Incorrect Legal Standard

Text: The final ground for granting a stay of execution was the district court’s determination that the state court twice appeared to apply incorrect legal standards. First, the district court held that the state court appeared to apply an incorrect state standard by looking to the statutory framework contained in Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, as opposed to that under Article 46.05.9 Second, the district court held that the state court applied an 8 We further note that we have ourselves upheld the practice. See Trevino v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 1999); Nichols v. Scott, 69 F.3d 1255, 1277 (5th Cir. 1995). 9 Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “establishes the procedures for an application for a writ of habeas corpus in which the applicant seeks relief from a judgment imposing a penalty of death.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.071 § 1. Section 5 further provides that: If a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus is filed after filing an initial application, a court may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent application unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing that: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; or 17 No. 12-70031 overly narrow definition of “rational understanding” to Green’s awareness for the reasons of his execution. The State challenges both findings, arguing that the CCA concluded that the state court applied the correct standard and that there is no ground on which to question the state court’s clarification of what standard it applied. (Resp’t Appellant Br. at 29-30.) As to the state court’s application of Panetti, the State argues that the state court’s reasoning on the record supports finding that the standard was correctly applied. (Resp’t Appellant Br. at 33, 35-36.) Addressing first the state court’s alleged application of the incorrect Texas law standard, the district court found it unclear what standard the state court applied. The district court was particularly alarmed by the fact that the CCA required clarification from the state court as to what standard it had applied in rendering its competency ruling. The district court appears to have been concerned about the following passage, referring to the state court judge, contained in the CCA’s request for clarification to the state court: [The state court] further stated that it was her ‘understanding we’re here on the first section [of Article 11.071 § 5] because of a change in [appellant’s] mental capacity from the time that [appellant was] committed in 2002 to the present.’ She said again later that ‘this is the subsequent writ.’ Finally, in Volume 3, pages 194-95 of the report’s record of the hearing, the judge explained that she ‘talked about the three different types of subsequent writs just to show that [she] had an understanding of the statute[.]’ On the same pages, she also stated that she followed ‘the Panetti standard’ and applied ‘the Ford [v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)] standard’ and ‘after applying all of those standards,’ it (3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state’s favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant’s trial . . . . 18 No. 12-70031 was her ruling not to grant a stay in the case. Because some of the standards mentioned are not applicable in this instance, we order the trial judge . . . to file with the Clerk of this Court a written clarification of the standard she followed . . . . Ex parte Green, 2010 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub. LEXIS 407, at  (alterations in original). But the district court ignores that the CCA later determined that the state court applied the correct standard under Article 46.05. See Green, 2012 WL 2400651, at , .10 In its clarification, the state court also referred to its own handwriting on Green’s request for the appointment of an expert that “this exam is to determine whether defendant is competent under 46.05.” At the competency hearing, the state court also explicitly stated that “I knew that we 10 Article 46.05 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure codifies the Ford standard. It provides, in relevant part, that: (a) A person who is incompetent to be executed may not be executed. ... (f) If the trial court determines that the defendant has made a substantial showing of incompetency, the court shall order at least two mental health experts to examine the defendant using the standard described by Subsection (h) to determine whether the defendant is incompetent to be executed. (g) If the trial court does not determine that the defendant has made a substantial showing of incompetency, the court shall deny the motion and may set an execution date as otherwise provided by law. (h) A defendant is incompetent to be executed if the defendant does not understand: (1) that he or she is to be executed and that the execution is imminent; and (2) the reason he or she is being executed . . . . (k) The trial court shall determine whether, on the basis of reports provided under Subsection (i), the motion, any attached documents, any responsive pleadings, and any evidence introduced in the final competency hearing, the defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is incompetent to be executed. 19 No. 12-70031 were here on the incompetence claim. I did listen to both sides. I did follow the Panetti standard . . . and I did also apply the Ford standard in this case.” Green, 2012 WL 2400651, at . Unlike the district court, we do not see this as “rais[ing] questions about whether [the state court judge’s] post hoc clarification accurately describes the standards she applied in reaching her decision.” Green, No. H-07-827, at 14 n.8. After reviewing the state court’s bench ruling, we are further persuaded that it applied the correct standard. The court stated: [F]or the record, I’m going to state that the most compelling evidence of all was from your own expert . . . which shows that you know you are to be executed by the State, you know you are convicted of killing the victim . . . you know the execution date, and then you proclaimed your innocence which shows a rational understanding of your imminent date and you know the charges that were against you. Green, 2012 WL 2400651, at  (second alteration in original). This closely follows the requirements laid out in Ford and Panetti that a prisoner: 1) “know the fact of [his] impending execution and the reason for it,” Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), and 2) “[have a] rational understanding of the reason for the execution,” Panetti, 551 U.S. at 958. We conclude that the state court applied the correct standard and the district court abused its discretion in finding otherwise. See Green, 2012 WL 2400651, at  (noting that state court correctly applied Article 46.05). We arrive at the same conclusion as to the state court’s application of the “rational understanding” requirement under Panetti. The district court draws a comparison between Green’s statement that he believed he was to be executed “as a result of the war between the ‘good and evil personalities constantly fighting for control of his body in order to kill him’” and the Panetti petitioner’s 20 No. 12-70031 belief that the reasons for his execution were a sham and that he was actually to be executed as a result of “spiritual warfare” between demons and God. Green, No. H-07-827, at 15. But the petitioner in Panetti also believed that “the stated reason [for his execution] is a ‘sham’ and the State in truth wants to execute him ‘to stop him from preaching.’” 551 U.S. at 955. On that petitioner’s appeal, this court had also restricted its analysis to “whether [the] prisoner is aware that he [is] going to be executed and why he [is] going to be executed.” Id. at 956 (quotation marks omitted). Here, by contrast, the state court made a specific finding as to Green’s rational understanding. Green, 2012 WL 2400651, at . As with other factual determinations, the district court could only reject that finding on a showing of clear and convincing evidence. We do not find any indication in the state court’s decision that its interpretation of what was required for a “rational understanding” was “too narrow,” Green, No. H-07-827, at 13 n.7, and conclude that a stay was not warranted on this ground.