Opinion ID: 2599575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural standing is appropriate for cases alleging violations of HRS Chapter 343.

Text: Under the procedural injury framework, Sierra Club must show it (1) has been conferred a procedural right to protect a concrete interest under HRS  343-7(a), and (2) has a threatened concrete interest that underlies its basis for standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); see also Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1499 (9th Cir.1995). The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the first requirement as one bestowed by statute: Because some of our cases and some language in Lujan require that plaintiffs have a right conferred by the challenged statute, we require that showing in this case. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1501 n. 4; [2] see also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (We do not hold that an individual cannot enforce procedural rights; he assuredly can, so long as the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing.). The plurality reasons that Sierra Club does not have standing because it has no procedural right accorded to it by HRS Chapter 343 [hereinafter Hawai`i Environmental Procedural Act (HEPA)]. While I agree with this conclusion, I do not agree with the analysis employed by the plurality. In summary fashion, the plurality concludes that only parties specifically designated as having automatic standing may assert a procedural injury: As the parties listed in HRS  343-7(a) are the only ones who can enforce the lack of an EA statement, they are the only ones who may arguably assert a `procedural injury' via court action.... The distinction drawn in HRS  343-7(a) is between those named parties who could be said to have an unquestioned right of action and `others,' who must show that they are aggrieved in some way, in a court action. All others may be deemed aggrieved by demonstrating substantive standing in a quasi-judicial action, for example a contested case hearing: Thus, `others' [who seek standing] must show in a court action brought under  343-7(a) that they are aggrieved and must be adjudged aggrieved, in concert with a challenge to the lack of an EA statement. To be adjudged aggrieved, under our case law, it follows that such parties must satisfy the injury-in-fact test requirements. Therefore, under the plurality's analysis, the only means by which Sierra Club may prove it has a procedural right is to demonstrate it has substantive standing; [3] because Sierra Club did not demonstrate an actual or threatened injury in fact, it did not establish a so-called `procedural right' platform from which it could assert a `procedural injury[.]' Not only has the plurality failed to cite authority supporting its conclusion, its conclusion poses problems in the application of HRS  343-7. First, it is incongruous to require a prospective plaintiff to prove it has substantive standing in order to show it has a procedural right to allege a procedural harm. Second, the plurality's holding would effectively exclude review of agency action by those designated as others until an agency completes its project. Although this court has construed substantive standing broadly, it is inappropriate to stretch the borders of this limitation to encompass rights conferred that are inherently procedural. For this reason, I agree with the dissent that the federal courts' construction of procedural standing is appropriate as applied to HEPA because, similar to its federal counterpart, NEPA, HEPA sets forth various requirements that are inherently procedural. The plurality's decision misconstrues the nature of the right asserted and the standing requirements imposed upon the parties asserting the injury to that right. As the dissenting opinion notes, HEPA grants procedural, and not substantive, rights and remedies. Substantive laws are notably and manifestly different from procedural ones: Substantive rights are generally defined as rights which ... create a new obligation, impose a new duty ... as distinguished from remedies or procedural law which merely prescribed methods of enforcing or giving effect to existing rights. Clark v. Cassidy, 64 Haw. 74, 77, 636 P.2d 1344, 1347 (1981) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The main thrust of HEPA is to require agencies to consider the environmental effects of projects before action is taken. It does so by providing a procedural mechanism to review environmental concerns. HRS  343-1 (1993). The legislature explained that HEPA provides an environmental review process [that] will integrate the review of environmental concerns with existing planning processes of the State and counties and alert decision makers to significant environmental effects which may result from the implementation of certain actions. HRS  343-1. One of the procedural tools of HEPA is an EA, which is used to determine circumstances under which a particular action will have a significant effect on the environment. HRS  343-2 (Supp.2001). If the EA concludes that a significant impact is expected, an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), [4] among other things, must be prepared. HRS  343-2; HRS  343-5(b). If no significant effect is expected, the agency submits a draft EA that must be available for public comment and review. HRS  343-5(b). (Whenever an agency proposes an action in subsection (a), ... that agency shall prepare an environmental assessment for such action at the earliest practicable time to determine whether an environmental impact statement shall be required. For environmental assessments for which a finding of no significant impact is anticipated, a draft environmental assessment shall be made available for public review and comment for a period of thirty days.). Consequently, HEPA does not confer substantive rights or remedies. To insist that a prospective plaintiff demonstrate substantive standing pursuant to a statute that confers only procedural rights ignores the plain language of HRS  343-7(a). The procedural standing doctrine [5] was first adopted in Scientists' Inst. for Public Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 481 F.2d 1079, 1086 n. 29 (D.C.1973), to avoid such problems. The Scientists' Inst. for Public Info., Inc. court developed procedural standing to address environmental concerns before irreversible agency action could be completed. [6] Id. The circuit court noted that no other means of establishing standing would be sufficient because it would otherwise insulate administrative action from judicial review, prevent the public interest from being protected through the judicial process, and frustrate the policies Congress expressed in [the National Environmental Procedure Act (NEPA)], a result clearly inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach to standing. Id. For similar reasons, this court should also adopt the procedural standing doctrine in this case. In Lujan, the Supreme Court noted that the main objective of procedural standing is to allow prospective plaintiffs the ability to meet substantive standing requirements without all the normal standards for redressability and immediacy because [t]here is much truth to the assertion that `procedural rights' are special[.] Lujan, 504 U.S. at 572 n. 7, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Because claimants need not prove immediacy and redressability, they can invoke judicial review at each stage of a project, before completion. Substantive standing requires a prospective plaintiff to prove its concrete and particularized interest has been harmed or is in imminent harm. If Sierra Club were to be required to meet this test, it would have to wait until its concrete interests were injured by the completion or near completion of the marketing plan. This result would render HEPA meaningless. Therefore, the plurality's conclusion, that Sierra Club must prove it has substantive standing, would require judicial review of compliance with HEPA only after the necessary stages of a proposed project had been completed and, as a result, considerable expenses consumed. City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 670 (9th Cir.1975) (Thus, if a particular project does in fact entail serious but nonobvious environmental impacts, agency failure to prepare an EIS may mean that the last opportunity to eliminate or minimize these impacts, in accordance with NEPA's broad objectives, has been lost.). To preserve both the purpose and intent of HEPA, I would hold that Sierra Club may attempt to demonstrate that it is aggrieved by proving it has procedural standing.