Opinion ID: 614801
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Overtime Denial

Text: Denial of overtime pay is an adverse employment action because it relates to Johnson’s compensation. Peagram, 361 F.3d at 282; cf. Shannon v. Bell Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that denial of the opportunity to work overtime is an adverse employment action sufficient to make out a priam facie case under Title VII). Moreover, when using LaSalle, a Caucasian female who did receive overtime pay, as the comparator, Johnson has made out a prima facie case for discrimination. Because of this, we are required to determine who Johnson’s employer was.3 Both Manpower and Air Liquide meet the statutory definition of an employer under Title VII so resolution of this question turns on the application of the hybrid economic realities/right to control test. The staffing arrangement agreement sets out the respective responsibilities of Manpower and Air Liquide. Manpower’s responsibilities after it placed a worker at Air Liquide were: 1) Maintaining personnel and payroll records; 2) Paying, withholding, and transmitting payroll taxes; 3) Making unemployment contributions; 4) Handling unemployment and workers' compensation claims involving Assigned Employees with respect to compensation that [Manpower] has agreed to pay; 5) and removing any Assigned Employee at the request of [Air Liquide], provided there is a valid legal reason for doing so. We consider first the factors that go towards the more important assessment of right to control. Manpower, while technically in charge of hiring and firing, does so only at Air Liquide’s approval with respect to hiring and at Air Liquide’s request with respect to firing. Moreover, while Johnson had supervisors at both Air Liquide and Manpower, it seems that Murphy, Johnson’s 3 The district court did not analyze who Johnson’s employer was because it found that both Air Liquide and Manpower had provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying Johnson overtime. 8 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199 Manpower supervisor, merely responded to the requests of Johnson’s Air Liquide supervisors—Schwartz, Mayes, and Andresen. Additionally, Johnson’s job performance was reviewed by Air Liquide. To be sure, almost all of the factors under the economic realities test point to Manpower being Johnson’s employer, as Manpower paid Johnson and withheld taxes on his behalf. Nonetheless, because the majority of the more important right to control factors point to Air Liquide as Johnson’s employer, we conclude that Air Liquide and not Manpower is Johnson’s employer for the purposes of his overtime denial claim. See Deal, 5 F.3d at 119. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Manpower as to Johnson’s overtime denial claim against it. Reviewing the summary judgment record reveals that Air Liquide offered no reason for changing Johnson’s status to overtime exempt. Although, as the district court concluded, there does not appear to be any evidence that Air Liquide’s decision was based on Johnson’s race, Johnson has raised an inference of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Lee, 574 F.3d at 259 (footnote omitted). Such a showing requires the employer to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, and where no such reason is given the employer cannot be awarded summary judgment. See Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 617 (5th Cir. 2007). Therefore, we reverse the district court with respect to Johnson’s overtime denial claim against Air Liquide.