Opinion ID: 2118255
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense Counsel's Alleged Failure to Investigate

Text: In a related argument, defendant contends that his defense counsel was ineffective for failing to use Szumigala's medical records to challenge Szumigala's testimony at the second sentencing hearing. Defendant asserts that these records were readily available by subpoena, and he argues that if counsel had properly investigated, he would have obtained them and could have used them to attack Szumigala's testimony. According to defendant, this failure to investigate and present a readily available defense was professionally unreasonable. He argues in addition that if this defense had been presented, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been sentenced to death. As noted, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is evaluated according to the two-prong test set forth in Strickland, which requires a showing that counsel's performance was deficient and that defendant suffered prejudice as a result. Both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied before a defendant can prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d at 397, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063. In order to satisfy the first element of this test, a defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. Regarding the application of this standard to an alleged failure to investigate, the Court in Strickland stated: These standards [for determining whether counsel's performance was deficient] require no special amplification in order to define counsel's duty to investigate   .    [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695. Thus, any decision by counsel to conduct a less-than-complete investigation would fall within the wide range of professionally competent assistance, so long as the decision were supported by a reasonable professional judgment. At defendant's first sentencing hearing, which took place in 1984, Szumigala did not testify. The evidence presented with reference to Szumigala consisted of a certified copy of defendant's conviction for the 1971 robbery of Szumigala; the testimony of Chicago police detective Bernard Stahl, who investigated the robbery and whose testimony comprised about six transcript pages; and a stipulation to the testimony of the physician who treated Szumigala in the hospital on the night of the robbery. The injuries described in this stipulation, which was read into the record by the prosecutor, correspond fairly closely to the injuries mentioned in Szumigala's medical records. According to the stipulated testimony, Szumigala suffered contusions of the right eye, nose, upper lip and chest, as well as a laceration to the right upper eyelid. In addition, he had a possible cerebral concussion. X rays of Szumigala's chest, jaw, shoulder, skull and other areas were negative with respect to fractures. According to the stipulation, the injuries were confined to the tissues themselves. The stipulation makes no mention of any dislocation of Szumigala's shoulder or any other joint or of his eye being out of place. Defendant acknowledges that [a]t Mr. Harris' first sentencing hearing, the State presented a relatively accurate account of Mr. Szumigala's rather minor injuries. However, defendant argues that because the State introduced such evidence at the first sentencing hearing, defense counsel should have anticipated that Mr. Szumigala would be a witness or at least that the State would attempt to introduce evidence of his injuries at the second sentencing hearing. According to defendant, counsel's failure to follow up and obtain Szumigala's medical records so that he could use them to challenge Szumigala's testimony constituted deficient performance on counsel's part. As Strickland instructs, we evaluate the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct from counsel's perspective at the time, taking all of the circumstances into consideration. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694, 695. Prior to the second sentencing hearing, defense counsel filed two motions for discovery pertaining to this matter. As defendant asserts in his amended post-conviction petition, one of these motions specifically requested discovery regarding the testimony of aggravation witnesses, and the other included a request for any reports of experts made in connection with the case, including the results of physical examinations. In response to counsel's discovery requests, the State turned over a copy of Szumigala's 1971 testimony in the robbery trial, and defense counsel used this testimony to cross-examine Szumigala in the second sentencing hearing. However, as indicated previously, the State did not disclose Szumigala's medical records. Given that these records were not disclosed, and given the rather minor nature of the injuries described in the stipulation in the first sentencing hearing, it would be professionally reasonable for counsel to conclude that further investigation regarding Szumigala's injuries was unnecessary and that counsel's investigative energies would be more profitably directed elsewhere. As noted, counsel presented extensive mitigation evidence at the second sentencing hearing, including the testimony of seven witnesses. In addition, a report prepared by a mitigation specialist was admitted into evidence. Applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695), and taking all of the circumstances into consideration ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695), we conclude that defendant has failed to establish that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The failure to obtain Szumigala's medical records was not an error so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693). Because defendant has not shown that his counsel's performance was deficient, he has failed to satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must fail. Morgan, 187 Ill.2d at 530, 241 Ill.Dec. 552, 719 N.E.2d 681. The trial court correctly dismissed this post-conviction claim without an evidentiary hearing.