Opinion ID: 771716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Reverse Confusion Claim

Text: 125 We recently recognized the doctrine of reverse confusion as a distinct basis for a claim under S 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 475. While the essence of a direct confusion claim is that a junior user of a mark is said to free-ride on the reputation and good will of the senior user by adopting a similar or identical mark, id., reverse confusion occurs when the junior user saturates the market with a similar trademark and overwhelms the senior user. Id. (quoting Ameritech, Inc. v. American Info. Techs. Corp., 811 F.2d 960, 964 (6th Cir. 1987)). The harm flowing from reverse confusion is that 126 [t]he public comes to assume the senior user's products are really the junior user's or that the former has become somehow connected to the latter. .. . [T]he senior user loses the value of the trademark--its product identity, corporate identity, control over its goodwill and reputation, and ability to move into new markets. 127 Ameritech, Inc., 811 F.2d at 964; see also Fisons, 30 F. 3d at 479; Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490-91 (2d Cir. 1988); Capital Films Corp. v. Charles Fries Prods, Inc., 628 F.2d 387, 393 (5th Cir. 1980); Big O Tire Dealers, Inc., v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 561 F.2d 1365, 1372 (10th Cir. 1977). As we explained in Fisons, reverse confusion protects smaller senior users . . . against larger, more e powerful companies who want to use identical or confusingly similar trademarks. 30 F.3d at 475. Absent reverse confusion, a company with a well established trade name and with the economic power to advertise extensively [would be immunized from suit] for a product name taken from a competitor. Big O Tire Dealers, Inc., 561 F.2d at 1372 (citation omitted). The doctrine of reverse confusion--or, at least, some of its applications--is not without its critics. See, e.g., Thad G. Long & Alfred M. Marks, Reverse Confusion: Fundamentals and Limits, 84 Trademark Rep. 1, 2-3 (1994); Daniel D. Domenico, Note, Mark Madness: How Brent Musburger and the Miracle Bra May Have Led to a More Equitable and Efficient Understanding of the Reverse Confusion Doctrine in Trademark Law, 86 Va. L. Rev. 597, 613-14, 621-24 (2000). 18 The chief danger inherent in recognizing reverse confusion claims is that innovative junior users, who have invested heavily in promoting a particular mark, will suddenly find their use of the mark blocked by plaintiffs who have not invested in, or promoted, their own marks. See Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 522 (C.C.P.A. 1980). Further, an overly-vigorous use of the doctrine of reverse confusion could potentially inhibit larger companies with established marks from expanding their product lines --for instance, had Victoria's Secret thought, at the outset, that it would not be permitted carry over its popular The Miracle Bra mark from lingerie to swimwear, it might have chosen not to enter the swimsuit market at all. 128 This would be an undesirable result; in fact, it is precisely to allow a certain amount of space for companies to expand their product lines under established marks that we allow infringement suits against suppliers of noncompeting goods. See Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 464 (3d Cir. 1983). This is not to say that the reverse confusion doctrine does not have its proper place; as has been recognized, without the existence of such a claim, smaller business owners might not have any incentive to invest in their marks at all, for fear the mark could be usurped at will by a larger competitor. See SK&F, Co. v. Premo Pharm. Labs., Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1067 (3d Cir. 1980) ([P]ermitting piracy of . . . identifying trade dress can only discourage other manufacturers from making a similar individual promotional effort.). However, these concerns do sensitize us to the potential untoward effects of an overenthusiastic enforcement of reverse confusion claims, although they cannot supersede our judicial recognition of the doctrine.
129 As in a direct confusion claim, the ultimate question in a reverse confusion claim is whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion as to the source or sponsorship of a product. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 475. Although it would seem somewhat counterintuitive to posit that the likelihood of confusion analysis changes from the direct confusion to the reverse confusion context, 19 there are differences between the two situations that bear mentioning. Therefore, to clarify the test for reverse confusion that has developed in our jurisprudence, we will walk through the factors that a district court should consider (where relevant) in assessing a such a claim.
130 As an initial matter, there are several factors that should generally be analyzed in the same way for a reverse confusion claim as they are for a direct confusion claim. 20 First, the attentiveness of consumers does not change (factor (3)); in both direct and reverse confusion, the question is whether this is the kind of product that consumers will care enough about to notice the differences, or purchase hastily with only a limited impression. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476 n.12 (considering this factor in the same manner as it would for direct confusion). Second, and similarly, the degree to which the channels of trade and advertisement overlap (factor (7)) should be analyzed in the same fashion. See id. at 475-76 (analyzing the channels of trade in the same manner). Finally, Lapp factors (8) and (9), considering the similarity of the targets of the parties' sales efforts and the similarity of products, are also analyzed no differently in the reverse confusion context. See id. at 475, 481 (treating these factors in the same way for reverse confusion as they would have been treated for direct confusion).
131 Generally speaking, the similarity of the marks themselves is necessarily analyzed in the same way in direct and reverse confusion claims; the court looks to sight, sound, and meaning, and compares whether these elements combine to create a general commercial impression that is the same for the two marks. See, e.g., Fisons, 30 F.3d at 478-79 (analyzing the commercial impression of the marks in light of direct confusion principles). Therefore, a district court would not need to examine these in a different manner than it would in a direct confusion claim. 132 On the other hand, the direct confusion claim in this case was rejected by the District Court in considerable measure because the court felt that the Victoria's Secret housemark, coupled with the disclaimer, alleviated any confusion that might otherwise result. See A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 168-69. Yet in the reverse confusion context, the presence of housemarks or disclaimers must obviously be treated differently than in the direct confusion context. It is the essence of the reverse confusion claim that, when consumers come across the Miraclesuit in the stream of commerce, they will confuse it with The Miracle Bra and think that it is a Victoria's Secret product. Therefore, the weight of a disclaimer on the Victoria's Secret product is necessarily lessened. Because A&H puts no disclaimer on its product to distinguish it from The Miracle Bra, the consumer considering a purchase of the Miraclesuit will not have the same handy reminder that Miraclesuit is not associated with The Miracle Bra or Victoria's Secret. This is not to say that such a disclaimer may not, in fact, mitigate confusion in some cases; if consumers are faced with the disclaimer every time they flip through the Victoria's Secret catalogue, they are less likely to forget that Miraclesuit is unrelated to The Miracle Bra swimwear. 133 As to the presence of the housemark on the Victoria's Secret product, not only is there the possibility that consumers will fail to remember the mark when encountering A&H's swimwear, but there is also the possibility that the mark will aggravate, rather than mitigate, reverse confusion, by reinforcing the association of the word miracle exclusively with Victoria's Secret. See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 960 (7th Cir. 1992); Americana Trading Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 966 F.2d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1992). Of course, we do not suggest that this actually occurred in this particular case; after all, the District Court observed that A&H typically includes its own housemark on Miraclesuits, see A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 160, but, because the court only conducted a likelihood of confusion analysis for the direct confusion claim, it only briefly addressed the significance of the A&H housemark, see id. at 168 n.17. 134 Clearly, the proper significance to be accorded these facts is a matter best suited for the determination of the trial court. Instead, we merely highlight the questions raised by the use of the housemarks and disclaimers in order to emphasize that a district court must separately examine the similarity factor to determine whether there are any aspects of the analysis that should be different for a reverse confusion claim, and, if so, alter its examination accordingly.
135 An important difference between reverse and direct confusion manifests in the analysis of the strength of the marks. As we explained supra, this factor requires consideration both of the mark's commercial and conceptual strength. For ease of understanding, we will explain the appropriate treatment of commercial strength first, and the treatment of conceptual strength second. 136
137 It has been observed that a consumer first encountering a mark with one set of goods is likely to continue to associate the mark with those goods, and whether any subsequent confusion is direct or reverse will depend on whether the consumer's first experience was with the junior or the senior user of the mark. See Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1988) (acknowledging such a possibility); Long & Marks, supra, at 5. The greater the commercial disparity between the manufacturers, the more likely it is that a consumer's first experience with a mark will be with one particular manufacturer. That is, if one manufacturer--junior or senior--expends tremendous sums in advertising while the other does not, consumers will be more likely to encounter the heavily advertised mark first. Where the greater advertising originates from the senior user, we are more likely to see a case of direct confusion; if the greater advertising originates from the junior user, reverse confusion is more likely. See 3 McCarthy, supra, S23:10, at 23-32; cf. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 479 (observing that direct confusion involves a junior user trad[ing] on a senior user's name and thus expending less on advertising, whereas reverse confusion involves the opposite pattern). 138 Logically, then, in a direct confusion claim, a plaintiff with a commercially strong mark is more likely to prevail than a plaintiff with a commercially weak mark. Conversely, in a reverse confusion claim, a plaintiff with a commercially weak mark is more likely to prevail than a plaintiff with a stronger mark, and this is particularly true when the plaintiff's weaker mark is pitted against a defendant with a far stronger mark. McCarthy has written that the relatively large advertising and promotion of the junior user . . . is the hallmark of a reverse confusion case. 3 McCarthy, supra, S23:10, at 23-37.[T]he lack of commercial strength of the smaller senior user's mark is to be given less weight in the analysis because it is the strength of the larger, junior user's mark which results in reverse confusion. Commerce Nat'l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 444 (3d Cir. 2000). As we explained in Fisons, the evidence of commercial strength is different from what we expect in a case of forward confusion, where the junior user tries to palm off his goods as those of the senior user. 30 F.3d at 479. 139 Therefore, in a reverse confusion claim, a court should analyze the commercial strength factor in terms of (1) the commercial strength of the junior user as compared to the senior user; and (2) any advertising or marketing campaign by the junior user that has resulted in a saturation in the public awareness of the junior user's mark. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 474, 479. 140
141 In Fisons we remanded the case for the district court to reevaluate[ ] . . . distinctiveness as well as [the mark's] commercial strength for the reverse confusion claim. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 479. Although we explained that the evaluation of commercial strength would have to be altered for reverse confusion claims, we did not discuss how distinctiveness, or conceptual strength, should be re- weighed in light of our adoption of the reverse confusion doctrine. Nor did we clarify this aspect of our jurisprudence in Commerce National Insurance Services, Inc. v. Commerce Insurance Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2000), where we referred to the different test for commercial strength, in a reverse confusion context, without reference to conceptual strength. 142 As stated above, in the paradigmatic reverse confusion case, the senior user has a commercially weak mark when compared with the junior user's commercially strong mark. When it comes to conceptual strength, however, we believe that, just as in direct confusion cases, a strong mark should weigh in favor of a senior user. Our decision is supported by the fact that those courts that have clearly distinguished conceptual from commercial strength in the reverse confusion context have weighed a conceptually strong mark in the senior user's favor, in the same manner as they would in direct confusion cases. See, e.g., Worthington Foods, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 732 F. Supp. 1417, 1456 (S.D. Ohio 1990). 143 In H. Lubovsky, Inc. v. Esprit de Corp., 627 F. Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), the court explained that conceptual distinctiveness was relevant in the same way for a reverse confusion claim because if a customer saw a doll in a toy store bearing a strong familiar trademark like `Exxon,' he might well assume that the oil company had gone into the toy business; if, on the other hand, he saw a doll bearing a familiar but weak laudatory trademark like Merit, he would be unlikely to assume that it is connected with the similarly named gasoline or cigarettes. Id. at 487; see also Long & Marks, supra, at 22. 144 The H. Lubovsky logic resonates, for it makes more sense to hold that conceptual strength, unlike commercial strength, works in the plaintiff's favor. That is, if we were to apply the rule stated above for commercial strength, i.e., weighing weakness in the plaintiff's favor, we would bring about the perverse result that less imaginative marks would be more likely to win reverse confusion claims than arbitrary or fanciful ones. We therefore hold that, as in direct confusion claims, a district court should weigh a conceptually strong mark in the plaintiff's favor, particularly when the mark is of such a distinctive character that, coupled with the relative similarity of the plaintiff's and defendant's marks, a consumer viewing the plaintiff's product is likely to assume that such a mark would only have been adopted by a single source--i.e., the defendant.
145 In the direct confusion context, the intent of the defendant is relevant to the extent that it bears on the likelihood of confusion analysis. As we have said: 146 In the likelihood of confusion inquiry . . . we do not focus on a defendant's bare intent to adopt a mark . . . substantially identical to a plaintiff's mark . . ., since there is little basis in fact or logic for supposing from a defendant's intent to copy without more that the defendant's actions will in fact result in confusion. Thus, what we have held is that a defendant's intent to confuse or deceive consumers as to the product's source may be highly probative of likelihood of confusion. 147 Versa Prods. Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 205 (3d Cir. 1995) (emphasis omitted). 148 When reverse, rather than direct, confusion is alleged, intent to confuse, is unlikely to be present. Cf. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 480. However, though perhaps unusual, should an intent to confuse exist, it would be relevant to the likelihood of confusion analysis in the same manner as it would for a direct confusion claim. For instance, in Commerce National Insurance Services, Inc. v. Commerce Insurance Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2000), we were confronted with a situation in which the litigants had used very similar marks in noncompetitive industries for a number of years, each fully aware of the other and with no incidents of actual confusion. Eventually, however, the larger company expanded into the smaller company's line of business, deliberately choosing to promote its services under an almost identical mark. In holding that the smaller company could maintain its claim against the larger for reverse confusion, we specifically highlighted the possibility that the larger company had adopted the mark with the deliberate intent of pushing its rival out of the market, and that it was this sort of usurpation of business identity that the reverse confusion doctrine was designed to prevent. See id. at 445. 149 As we have noted in our two prior cases on this issue, the defendant's intent may be discovered through such inquiries as whether the defendant was aware of the senior user's mark when it adopted its own mark, and whether the defendant considered that its adoption of the mark might result in confusion. See id. at 444; Fisons, 30 F.3d at 480. If such an intent to confuse does, in fact, exist in a reverse confusion case, it should weigh against the defendant in the same manner as it would in a direct confusion case. Cf. W. W. W. Pharm. Co., Inc. v. Gilette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1993) (weighing the intent factor in a reverse confusion case in the defendant's favor because the plaintiff had not demonstrated an intent to confuse). 150 Although we recognize that our opinion in Fisons perhaps implied that mere carelessness, as opposed to deliberate intent to confuse, would weigh in a plaintiff's favor in a reverse confusion case, we are reluctant to adopt such an interpretation, as it would be manifestly out of step with our prior holdings regarding the relevance of intent in trademark infringement claims. Cf. O. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 659 F.2d 340, 354 (3d Cir. 1981). Ultimately, all of the Lapp factors are meant only to determine whether confusion is likely; mere carelessness, like deliberate copying, does not shed any light on this inquiry. Further, to the extent that the intent inquiry in the likelihood of confusion analysis carries with it the attribution of fault, there is no reason to ascribe higher penalties to a lower degree of fault because a particular case involves reverse, rather than direct, confusion. Finally, in light of the policy concerns implicated by the reverse confusion doctrine, it would be troubling indeed to hold that a lesser degree of culpability would weigh in the plaintiff's favor for a reverse confusion claim than it would for a direct confusion claim.
151 As a matter of intuition, one would expect that in a reverse confusion claim, evidence of actual confusion would be as important as in a direct confusion claim, though the nature of the confusion that would be probative would be quite different. See Lang v. Retirement Living Publ'g Co., 949 F.2d 576, 583 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that evidence of actual confusion in which the public thought the senior user was the origin of the junior user's products was irrelevant for a reverse confusion claim). As applied to this case, for example, evidence that consumers thought that The Miracle Bra was an A&H product would be probative on a direct confusion claim, but not on a reverse confusion claim. Conversely, evidence that consumers thought that Miraclesuit was a Victoria's Secret product would support a reverse confusion claim, but not a direct confusion claim. This was apparently the District Court's intuition; although it declined to consider A&H's reverse confusion claim, it did observe that most of the evidence A&H had put forth with regard to actual confusion related to direct, rather than reverse, confusion. See A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 178 n.32. 152 However, marshalling evidence of actual confusion is often difficult. See, e.g., Liquid Glass Enters., Inc. v. Dr. Ing. h.c.F. Porsche AG, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398, 403 (D.N.J. 1998). In our view, if we were to create a rigid division between direct and reverse confusion evidence, we would run the risk of denying recovery to meritorious plaintiffs. For example, if a plaintiff alleged theories of both direct and reverse confusion and was able to prove a few instances of actual confusion in each direction, we might conclude that the plaintiff did not have enough evidence of either type to succeed on either of its claims, even though, taken together, all of the evidence of actual confusion would be probative of a real problem. As we explained in Part V.B.3, supra, the manifestation of consumer confusion as direct or reverse may merely be a function of the context in which the consumer first encountered the mark. Isolated instances of direct confusion may occur in a reverse confusion case, and vice-versa. See Long & Marks, supra, at 5. Though we might expect that, in most instances, the consumer's first encounter will be with the mark that has greater commercial strength, this will not invariably be the case. 153 Given the problems litigants typically encounter in locating evidence of actual confusion, then, we decline to create a strict bar to the use of direct confusion evidence in a reverse confusion case, or vice versa. However, evidence working in the same direction as the claim is preferred, and misfitting evidence must be treated carefully, for large amounts of one type of confusion in a claim for a different type may in fact work against the plaintiff. For instance, the existence of reverse confusion might disprove a plaintiff's claim that its descriptive mark has secondary meaning, thus resulting in no recovery at all. See Jefferson Home Furniture Co, Inc. v. Jefferson Furniture Co., Inc., 349 So.2d 5, 8 (Ala. 1977). 154 It follows that the other factor relating to actual confusion, Lapp factor (4), examining the time the mark has been used without evidence of actual confusion, should be approached similarly.
155 The final factor of the Lapp test directs courts to look at other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture both products, or expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market, or expect that the prior owner is likely to expand into the defendant's market. This factor is necessarily transformed in the reverse confusion context to an examination of other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the larger, more powerful company to manufacture both products, or expect the larger company to manufacture a product in the plaintiff's market, or expect that the larger company is likely to expand into the plaintiff's market. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 480 (directing the district court to examine facts suggesting that the public might think that the junior user would expand into the senior user's market). 156
157 In sum, in the typical case in which there is a claim of reverse confusion, a court should examine the following factors as aids in its determination whether or not there is a likelihood of such confusion: 158
159 (2) the strength of the two marks, weighing both a commercially strong junior user's mark and a conceptually strong senior user's mark in the senior user's favor; 160 (3) the price of the goods and other factors indicative of the care and attention expected of consumers when making a purchase; 161 (4) the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising; 162 (5) the intent of the defendant in adopting the mark; 163 (6) the evidence of actual confusion; 164 (7) whether the goods, competing or not competing, are marketed through the same channels of trade and advertised through the same media; 165 (8) the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same; 166 (9) the relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers, whether because of the near-identity of the products, the similarity of function, or other factors; 167 (10) other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the larger, more powerful company to manufacture both products, or expect the larger company to manufacture a product in the plaintiff's market, or expect that the larger company is likely to expand into the plaintiff's market. 168 As with the test for direct confusion, no one factor is dispositive, and in individual cases, particular factors may not be probative on the issue of likelihood of confusion. The weight given to each factor in the overall picture, as well as its weighing for plaintiff or defendant, must be done on an individual fact-specific basis. Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476 n.11.
169 The District Court approached the reverse confusion claim in a different manner from that described in the foregoing section. It held that before engaging the reverse confusion factors, A&H needed to demonstrate, as a threshold matter, that Victoria's Secret used their economic power to overwhelm the market with advertising of their product. A&H IV, 57 F.Supp. 2d at 178. The opinion therefore focused only on a comparison between the commercial strengths of the Miraclesuit and The Miracle Bra, i.e., only on one aspect of the mark strength inquiry. The District Court found that Victoria's Secret had saturated the market with $13 million in The Miracle Bra advertising, and that a meaningful portion of the advertising went towards promoting The Miracle Bra swimwear. It then compared Victoria's Secret's effort to A&H's effort to promote Miraclesuit swimwear; A&H spent over $1.2 million on advertising, and received $1.5 million in free publicity. 21 170 The court noted that A&H did not dispute--even heralded --the fact that its campaign was widely successful. Therefore, it found that [p]laintiffs' [sic] are not entirely without market power in the swimwear industry and that [i]n light of Plaintiffs' advertising campaign, we find that, in comparison, Defendants did not saturate the marketplace with its advertising to promote The Miracle Bra swimwear. Id. at 177. Consequently, the District Court concluded that the doctrine of reverse confusion was not even implicated, and decline[d] to examine whether a likelihood of reverse confusion exists. Id. at 178. 171 In A&H III, we began our discussion of reverse confusion with an explanation of the phenomenon: Reverse confusion occurs when a larger more powerful company uses the trademark of a smaller, less powerful senior owner and thereby causes likely confusion as to the source of the senior user's goods or services. 166 F.3d at 207 (quoting Fisons, 30 F.3d at 474.). In Fisons, we stated that it would be necessary to recognize the reverse confusion doctrine to provide protection to smaller, senior users against larger, more powerful companies. 30 F.3d at 475. While these are accurate statements about the doctrine of reverse confusion, the District Court appears to have interpreted them as establishing a separate, threshold step that must be examined prior to engaging the Lapp test, and, finding the threshold not met, concluded that A&H's power to advertise extensively precluded it from bringing a reverse confusion claim. The District Court was correct to note that commercial disparity is, in fact, a factor to consider (factor (2), to be specific); however, it erred in applying a threshold commercial disparity requirement, in effect making this sole factor determinative and treating the reverse confusion inquiry as requiring a two-step process. 172 The quoted statements are understandably confusing, and the method of applying the doctrine of reverse confusion is admittedly still developing. However, a close examination of Fisons, from which the quotes hail, reveals that they are nothing more than descriptions of the phenomenon of reverse confusion, and do not establish an initial inquiry that a court needs to make in order to apply the reverse confusion analysis. In Fisons we held that the Lapp factors constitute the method courts should use in order to determine if a likelihood of reverse confusion exists. We made no mention of a threshold requirement, nor did we direct the District Court, on remand, to use one. 173 The District Court further explained its choice not to apply the reverse confusion factors by reference to the fact that several reverse confusion cases involve enormous junior companies pitted against tiny senior companies; it cited these cases and concluded that the same degree of economic disparity was non-existent in this case. See A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 178. The difficulty with this conclusion is that in Fisons itself, in which we found a viable reverse confusion claim, Fisons had fully 25% of the peat moss market, greater than A&H's 10% of the swimwear market. This suggests that a company need not be all that weak within its market in order to bring a viable reverse confusion claim. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 479; see also Fuji Photo Film v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki, 754 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding a viable reverse confusion claim where the plaintiff had spent millions of dollars). In fact, in stating that [i]n reverse confusion, the junior user is typically a wealthier, more powerful company who can overwhelm the market with advertising, 30 F.3d at 479 (emphasis added), we implied that there might be the rare case in which reverse confusion exists where the junior company overwhelms the senior user with advertisements although it is not wealthier and more powerful. 174 In short, we hold that, although economic disparity between the companies and the marks is an important consideration in the evaluation of the marks' commercial strength, the District Court legally erred in fashioning a threshold economic disparity requirement before a reverse confusion claim will even be considered. Because the District Court failed to undertake the Lapp analysis with respect to A&H's reverse confusion claim, we must vacate the judgment with respect to that claim and remand to the District Court for a redetermination of those factors that receive different treatment under direct and reverse confusion theories, and for a reweighing of all of the factors once those redeterminations have been made.

175 If the record suggested that, under the test we have set forth, A&H could not succeed as a matter of law in a reverse confusion claim, we would be bound to explicate our reasoning and affirm the judgment of the District Court. However, we do not so conclude, and hence vacatur and remand is necessary. Inasmuch as we have clarified the law of reverse confusion in this circuit by filling the gaps left in Fisons, it will be useful to the District Court if we comment on the extent to which it needs to revisit the various issues. 176 As explained supra, the factors concerning the market, sales, and function similarity (factors (3), (7), (8) & (9)) need not be reexamined for the reverse confusion claim because the District Court has already discussed them in connection with direct confusion and there is typically no difference in the analysis of these factors for reverse and direct confusion claims. As for the actual confusion factors ((4) & (6)), the District Court did not credit the evidence proffered by A&H and, in its best light, regarded it as de minimis. A&H's evidence of actual confusion primarily supported its claim for direct, rather than reverse, confusion, see supra Section IV. G., with the only exception being the Women's Wear Daily article mentioning the introduction of the Miracle Swimsuit in the upcoming Victoria's Secret catalog. Because these incidents, though relevant to reverse confusion, are more probative of direct confusion but the District Court felt that they were too weak to support even that claim, the court may, but need not, re-examine this factor on remand.
177 When addressing the direct confusion claim, the District Court placed great weight on the presence of Victoria's Secret's housemark and disclaimer when it concluded that the marks were not confusingly similar. See A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 168-69. However, as we explained supra, although such embellishments of the junior user's mark may still have relevance in the reverse confusion context, their weight must necessarily be reevaluated. Therefore, on remand, the District Court should reconsider the similarity of the marks in light of A&H's reverse confusion claims.
178 The District Court did not consider the commercial strength of the marks within the ambit of the reverse confusion Fisons analysis, but it functionally did as much in its threshold determination that A&H lacked sufficient economic disparity relative to Victoria's Secret to advance a reverse confusion claim. Therefore, the District Court essentially demonstrated that it weighed this factor in favor of Victoria's Secret. However, in comparing the relative commercial strengths of the products, the District Court committed clear error: Although it considered the free publicity received by A&H in determining its commercial strength, it did not consider the free publicity received by Victoria's Secret. This led to an inaccurate comparison of their relative commercial vitality. Had the court used the same calipers to measure the commercial strength of each, it might have determined that the Miraclesuit had less commercial strength relative to The Miracle Bra. Of course, the court might well deem the difference unimportant, but we cannot say that either Victoria's Secret or A&H should have this factor weighed in its favor as a matter of law. 179 Furthermore, the court should have also considered the conceptual strength of the Miraclesuit mark, according to the standards for conceptual strength set forth in Sections IV. B and V.B.3, supra. In so doing, the court must gauge the strength of the Miraclesuit mark and must consider whether--as with the example set forth supra involving a doll with the mark Exxon--the Miracle Bra/Miraclesuit marks are so distinctive that, when considered simultaneously with the court's determination as to their similarities, consumers with a general awareness of The Miracle Bra swimsuit are likely to assume that the Miraclesuit is a Victoria's Secret product.
180 In its evaluation of A&H's direct confusion claim, the District Court concluded that Victoria's Secret's choice to extend The Miracle Bra mark to swimwear was for legitimate reasons, rather than out of bad faith. A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 172. However, because it decline[d] to examine whether a likelihood of reverse confusion exists, id. at 178, the District Court focused on whether Victoria's Secret had intended to profit[ ] from the notoriety of Plaintiffs' Miraclesuit mark, A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 173-74. The court did not specifically address the question whether Victoria's Secret, rather than intending to free ride on A&H's goodwill, instead intended to usurp it by deliberately undertaking to cause consumer confusion (and thereby destroy A&H's business identity). On remand, the District Court should consider whether its previous finding of Victoria's Secret's good faith is dispositive of the reverse confusion intent analysis, or whether further examination of this issue is warranted.
181 Although we believe that the District Court's evaluation of individual factors relating to market, sales, and functionality would have remained unchanged had it examined A&H's reverse confusion claim in light of the Lapp factors, we simply do not know how it would have treated the commercial strength and mark similarity factors had it considered the free advertising The Miracle Bra received, or the effect of the housemark and disclaimer in the reverse confusion context. We also cannot predict what the result would have been had the District Court examined the intent factor in light of A&H's reverse confusion claim, or how the District Court would have weighed the various factors had it not determined that there was a threshold commercial disparity requirement. 182 The question of likelihood of confusion is ultimately one of fact, and we cannot roll up our sleeves and engage in the balancing ourselves. In its balancing on the direct confusion claim, the District Court found that the case was close, holding that no likelihood of confusion existed solely based on the presumption that Defendants will continue to use the disclaimer when marketing The Miracle Bra swimwear, A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 169. As we have explained, we believe that Victoria's Secret's disclaimer has a lessened significance for reverse confusion. We also believe that the conceptual strength of the Miraclesuit mark must be reevaluated. Under these circumstances, we cannot say as a matter of law that a different weighing of the factors could not have influenced the District Court to make a different finding of ultimate fact, thus necessitating a remand.