Opinion ID: 3133677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony Regarding the Gun and Neighborhood

Text: The second and third portions of disputed testimony came out during the government’s direct examination of Agent Beliveau. In the course of explaining why he terminated the surveillance operation when he did, Beliveau explained that Grinston appeared to have a gun. Defense counsel objected on grounds of irrelevance, but the court overruled the objection. The transcript reads in pertinent part: Q. Your Honor, may we play the video again? Stop, please. Okay, at this point what did you see? A. At this point agents exited their vehicles and placed Mr. Grinston and Mr. Addison in custody. Q. Is it fair to say by placing them into custody the surveillance ended? No. 14–2515 9 A. Yes, it did. Q. Who made that call? A. I made the call. Q. Why did you make that call? A. When Mr. Grinston returned to the resi- dence and exited his vehicle, I immediately noted that— [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Objection, Your Honor. Mr. Grinston is not on trial here. What this officer may or may not, or some other officer may or may not have found on Mr. Grinston is not relevant in terms of my client. THE COURT: Your response? [PROSECUTION:] What was found on Mr. Grin- ston was the reason why this investigation came to a halt, otherwise they would have continued with the surveillance and it would explain why they de- cided to end at this point. THE COURT: Okay, objection is overruled. He can testify as to what he personally observed. A. As Mr. Grinston exited his vehicle upon re- turning to the residence, I immediately not- ed that he had what appeared to be a hand- gun in his waistband. While watching the next couple of minutes, it appeared to me that Mr. Grinston was extremely unhappy and I was fearful someone was going to get hurt or blamed for taking the crack cocaine from that residence. Beliveau then provided the third piece of challenged testimony, this time concerning the neighborhood surrounding 10 No. 14–2515 the drug house where Addison was arrested. The government’s direct examination continued: Q. Sergeant, were there other houses on this street that were not drug houses or aban- doned buildings? A. Yes, many. Q. Were people living in the other houses? [DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Objection, Your Honor. There is no relevance to this. THE COURT: Overruled. A. Can you repeat the question? Q. Sure. Were people living in the other hous- es? A. Yes, they were. Q. As far as you know, were the residents in the other houses selling drugs or buying drugs? A. No, they were not to my knowledge. Addison argues on appeal that the gun and neighborhood testimony not only were irrelevant but also infringed on his right to a fair trial. According to Addison, this testimony was “used to improperly arouse the jurors’ emotions” and may well have caused them to decide the case “on an improper basis.” Addison did not raise this constitutional objection below, and his relevance objections were insufficient to preserve the issue. See United States v. Wynn, 845 F.2d 1439, 1442 (7th Cir. 1988) (“To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a proper objection at trial that alerts the court No. 14–2515 11 and opposing party to the specific grounds for the objection.”). We therefore review for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Under that exacting standard, Addison must show (1) that there was an error; (2) that it was plain; and (3) that it affected his substantial rights. United States v. Irby, 558 F.3d 651, 655 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). Even then, we will exercise our discretion to correct the error only if staying our hand would result in a “miscarriage of justice.” Id. It is a fundamental principle of our criminal law that a defendant is presumed innocent. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 483 (1978). The burden is on the government to overcome that presumption by producing evidence and convincing the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 483 n.12. Moreover, the defendant is “entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial.” Id. at 485. Thus, we have held that the presumption of innocence is violated “when presentation of evidence at trial affects the quantum of proof required for conviction or when the jury is encouraged (or allowed) to consider facts which have not been received in evidence.” United States v. Garcia, 439 F.3d 363, 367 (7th Cir. 2006). In Taylor, the trial court refused to instruct the jury on the presumption of innocence and the indictment’s lack of evidentiary value. 436 U.S. at 479. In addition, the prosecutor in his closing argument asked the jury to draw inferences from “facts” not in evidence. The prosecutor commented, for example, that the defendant “like every other defendant who’s ever been tried who’s in the penitentiary or in the reformatory today” is entitled to a presumption of innocence. Id. at 486. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction because it found 12 No. 14–2515 a “genuine danger” that the jury convicted the defendant based on extraneous considerations such as his indictment or his status as a defendant, rather than on the basis of the evidence at trial. Id. at 487–88. The Supreme Court has since emphasized that its decision in Taylor was “expressly limited to the facts.” Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979). Whether a trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction or to take some other action in a given case undermines the defendant’s right to a fair trial depends on the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 788–89. In general, errors at trial do not rise to constitutional dimensions where the evidence weighs strongly against the defendant and the trial court properly instructed the jury. See United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 846 (7th Cir. 2006); Garcia, 439 F.3d at 368; United States v. Cornett, 232 F.3d 570, 575 (7th Cir. 2000). Applying these principles, we find no plain error in Addison’s case. As an initial matter, we note that the district court properly instructed the jury regarding Addison’s presumption of innocence and the government’s burden to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. While there is a possibility that the jury considered the gun and neighborhood testimony in its decision to convict, the fact remains that the evidence against Addison was overwhelming. Agents personally witnessed him selling drugs and caught the transactions and other incriminating behavior on video. One of his own buyers (James Robinson) testified against him. A plain error “affects substantial rights” under Rule 52(b) only if it affected the outcome of the trial proceedings. See United States v. Baker, 655 F.3d 677, 681 (7th Cir. 2011). The challenged testimony here did not—Addison would No. 14–2515 13 have been convicted even without it. For the same reason, leaving his conviction in place will cause no miscarriage of justice. See United States v. Patterson, 241 F.3d 912, 913 (7th Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen the evidence of guilt is overwhelming a miscarriage of justice is very hard to demonstrate.”).