Opinion ID: 896069
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: valid obligation

Text: [¶ 26] On appeal we review the decision of the Bureau, not the district court's decision, and we limit our review to the record before the Bureau. Loberg v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 1998 ND 64, ¶ 5, 575 N.W.2d 221; Flink v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 1998 ND 11, ¶ 8, 574 N.W.2d 784. Both sides agree this appeal presents only questions of law. Therefore, we affirm the Bureau's decision unless its decision is not supported by its conclusions of law, its decision is not in accordance with the law, or its decision violates the worker's constitutional rights. Loberg, 1998 ND 64, ¶ 5, 575 N.W.2d 221. As we explained in Flink, 1998 ND 11, ¶ 9, 574 N.W.2d 784, questions of law, including interpretation of a statute, are fully reviewable on appeal. [¶ 27] Gregory raised numerous constitutional challenges to N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09.3(2), asserting the statute violated equal protection and impaired vested, valid, and contractual rights. Courts in other jurisdictions that have addressed similar statutes that end or reduce workers compensation disability benefits at a presumptive retirement age are divided over their constitutionality. Some courts have held such statutes violated equal protection, see Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo.1996) [10] and State ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 198 W.Va. 545, 482 S.E.2d 162 (1996), [11] while other courts have upheld their constitutionality. See Golden v. Westark Community College, 58 Ark.App. 209, 948 S.W.2d 108 (1997); Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So.2d 204 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.1983), aff'd, 452 So.2d 932 (Fla.1984); Tobin's Case, 424 Mass. 250, 675 N.E.2d 781 (1997); Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, 937 S.W.2d 856 (Tenn.1996). For a discussion of the constitutional problems raised by the North Dakota statute, see Susan J. Anderson & Gerald (Jud) DeLoss, Are Employees Obtaining Sure and Certain Relief Under the 1995 Legislative Enactments of the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Act?, 72 N.D.L.Rev. 349, 361-366 (1996). [N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09.3] would likely be found unconstitutional, therefore, because it deprives elderly workers of an adequate statutory remedy to replace their common law rights which were originally abolished by the Workers Compensation Act. Id. at 366. As these sources indicate, the Bureau's application of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09.3(2) to cancel Gregory's disability benefits upon his 65th birthday produces profound constitutional conflicts. [¶ 28] We interpret statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts if possible. E.g., Kasprowicz v. Finck, 1998 ND 4, ¶ 11, 574 N.W.2d 564; McCabe v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 1997 ND 145, ¶ 10, 567 N.W.2d 201. If a statute is open to divergent constructions, one that would make it of doubtful constitutionality and one that would not, this court must adopt the construction that avoids a constitutional conflict. McCabe, 1997 ND 145, ¶¶ 10, 16, 567 N.W.2d 201; Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, ¶ 12, 563 N.W.2d 384; Peterson v. Peterson, 1997 ND 14, ¶ 26, 559 N.W.2d 826. In this case, we interpret the 1995 enactment of N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09.3(2) to avoid any constitutional conflict. [¶ 29] In construing N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09.3(2), the district court applied the rule of statutory construction in N.D.C.C. § 1-02-30: No provision contained in this code may be so construed as to impair any vested right or valid obligation existing when it takes effect. The Bureau has focused its argument upon attempting to show Gregory did not have a vested right to continue receiving disability benefits past his 65th birthday. The district court did not rest its ruling on whether Gregory had a vested right, but concluded the Bureau had a valid obligation to pay disability benefits as long as Gregory remained totally disabled. [¶ 30] In determining whether a valid obligation existed when the 1995 amendment to N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09.3(2) took effect, we look to our prior precedents where we have concluded a worker currently receiving benefits had a significant property right in continuation of those benefits, and an expectation those benefits would continue. We have held the right to receive continuing workers compensation disability benefits by a worker already receiving them is a property right subject to due process protection, and that the claimant has a right to rely upon continuing, regular, ongoing payments. Nemec v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 543 N.W.2d 233, 237-238 (N.D.1996); see also Beckler v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 418 N.W.2d 770, 772-773 (N.D.1988). In Kallhoff v. North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau, 484 N.W.2d at 512-514, we repeatedly stressed the reliance interest of a worker to continued disability benefits when we held that the 1989 retirement offset directive did not apply to one who was receiving disability benefits before 1989 but who turned 65 after the effective date of the statute. We reasoned: The Bureau wants us to interpret the statute to interfere with Kallhoff's expectation that his benefits would continue as he had anticipated. Kallhoff makes no claim that his benefits are vested, only that he and others similarly situated have relied on receiving unreduced retirement benefits. We agree that offsetting his post-July, 1989 social security benefits would impact on his expectation, something the legislative history suggests the legislature wanted to avoid. Id. at 514; see also Heddon v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 189 N.W.2d 634, 637 (N.D.1971) (statutory amendment would not be construed to adversely affect the rights of persons who had previously had their claims determined). [¶ 31] Applying administrative res judicata, we explained in Cridland v. North Dakota Workers Compensation Bureau, 1997 ND 223, ¶ 29, 571 N.W.2d 351, there must be some finality to administrative decisions absent new evidence or a change in medical condition. We thus said statutes allowing the Bureau to review awards must be considered in light of the doctrine of administrative res judicata, the importance of finality of agency decisions, and the purpose of the workers compensation law to provide injured workers with `sure and certain relief' to preclude the Bureau, in the absence of new evidence or a change in medical condition, from relitigating claims previously decided. Id. [¶ 32] All of these precedents support the conclusion that a worker already receiving disability benefits has a significant reliance interest in, and expectation of, continuation of those benefits. In this case, in addition to a general expectation in continuation of his disability benefits, Gregory had a specific expectation from the language of the Bureau's original order awarding permanent total disability benefits that decided Gregory would receive them for as long as you remain totally disabled. [12] The Bureau has not sought to adjust Gregory's benefits for a change in his medical condition or for other evidence he is no longer disabled. See Cridland, 1997 ND 223, ¶ 29, 571 N.W.2d 351. He had a clear reliance interest that his disability benefits would therefore continue. [¶ 33] We conclude, in this case, there was a valid obligation to pay continued disability benefits in existence when the 1995 amendment took effect. The Bureau's attempt to wholly cancel Gregory's receipt of disability benefits past age 65 impaired that valid obligation. Thus, as directed by N.D.C.C. § 1-02-30, we construe the statute in a way that does not impair that valid obligation. We therefore hold N.D.C.C. § 65-05-09.3(2) does not apply to terminate the disability benefits of Gregory or other workers who were already receiving permanent total disability benefits before the 1995 statute took effect, and he is entitled to reinstatement of full disability benefits since August 13, 1996. [¶ 34] We affirm the judgment of the district court reversing the Bureau's order and ordering reinstatement of disability benefits to Gregory. [¶ 35] VANDE WALLE, C.J., and MARING, NEUMANN and SANDSTROM, JJ., concur.