Opinion ID: 2302675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Standard for Judicial Review of a Consent Decree

Text: [¶ 20] Artel challenges the standard that the court applied in reviewing the decree, arguing that the court abused its discretion by failing to ascertain whether the consent decree was fair, reasonable, adequate, and lawful. [¶ 21] The court, when explaining the standard it employed in conducting its review, noted that [a]s a matter of policy, our system and rules encourage the settlement of disputes, particularly agreements that parties have arrived at without court intervention. The court further observed that consent decrees have attributes of both contracts and judicial decrees  contracts because they are reached through agreement of the parties, and judicial decrees because they are judicially enforceable as a judgment of the court. The court ultimately described the standard it would employ as one focused on ensuring the parties' actual consent to the agreement and the agreement's lawfulness. [¶ 22] The consent decree at issue in this case is distinguishable from a settlement agreement by which parties settle a purely private dispute that affects only the rights of the immediate parties to the litigation, as in a divorce settlement, for example, or a consent agreement with an agency of the State intended to redress a statutory or regulatory violation. Here, the consent decree results in an exercise of judicial authority that supersedes the otherwise applicable requirements of a validly enacted municipal zoning ordinance, thereby having an impact on the broader public within the municipality. We have not previously addressed the standard by which such consent decrees  those between municipalities and property owners that attempt to supplant a zoning ordinance  should be reviewed by the trial court, but we are mindful that [j]udgmental decisions evaluating remedies in areas where the court has choices will be reviewed for sustainable exercise of the court's discretion. Bates v. Dep't of Behavioral & Developmental Servs., 2004 ME 154, ¶ 38, 863 A.2d 890. [¶ 23] We begin with a self-evident proposition: consent decrees that affect public rights should be subject to closer scrutiny than those that resolve purely private disputes, particularly where the consent decree is premised on an exercise of a court's equitable authority. Guidance in articulating the required level of scrutiny is provided in Durrett v. Housing Authority of the City of Providence, 896 F.2d 600 (1st Cir.1990). The standard Judge Coffin articulated in Durrett accounts for the clear policy in favor of encouraging settlements, but also considers the broader policy considerations at play and the interests of third parties who will be affected by the decree. Id. at 604 (quotation marks omitted). As he explained: [A] court must assure itself that the parties have validly consented; that reasonable notice has been given possible objectors; that the settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable; that the proposed decree will not violate the Constitution, a statute, or other authority; that it is consistent with the objectives of [the legislature]; and, if third parties will be affected, that it will not be unreasonable or legally impermissible as to them. Id. [¶ 24] We thus clarify that when a court is asked to approve a consent decree arising under the court's equitable jurisdiction that will affect the enforcement of a land use ordinance, it should ensure that the following five elements are met and that entering the decree is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and an appropriate exercise of the court's equitable authority: (1) the parties have validly consented; (2) reasonable notice has been given to possible objectors and they have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to present their objections; (3) the consent decree will not violate the United States or Maine Constitutions, a statute, or other authority; (4) the consent decree is consistent with express legislative objectives and other zoning-related public policy considerations; and (5) the consent decree is reasonable and is not legally impermissible in its effects on third parties. [4] [¶ 25] When considering these elements, courts should uphold the public policy favoring the settlement of disputed claims by deferring to the reasonable judgments and compromises made by the settling parties. However, the court's deference should be tempered by the separate public policy favoring the uniform applicability and enforcement of zoning ordinances. These considerations are encompassed by the fifth factor, which calls upon the court to consider, among other things, whether the extent to which a consent decree will interfere with a municipality's land use regulatory scheme is no greater than that reasonably needed to achieve the consent decree's objectives. [¶ 26] In this case, the court could not have anticipated our adoption of the preceding factors and, therefore, it did not err by failing to address them. Further, we are satisfied that the court implicitly considered the factors in conducting its review. Contrary to Artel's argument, the court did not abuse its discretion by failing to explicitly determine that the consent decree is fair, reasonable, and adequate, in addition to determining its lawfulness.