Opinion ID: 2638762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indicia of trustworthiness

Text: While redaction, when properly employed, can help ensure that only the specifically disserving ( Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296) and, hence, most reliable, portions of a particular hearsay declaration are actually admitted into evidence, redaction cannot enhance the underlying or general trustworthiness of a declaration as a whole. By its nature an after-the-fact process employed with respect to a previously existing declaration, redaction as a logical matter simply cannot bear on, let alone alter, the declarant's motives or any other circumstance that might affect a given declaration's fundamental reliability and inform a court's assessment thereof. Thus, even when a hearsay statement runs generally against the declarant's penal interest and redaction has excised exculpatory portions, the statement may, in light of circumstances, lack sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to qualify for admission. (See People v. Shipe, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 354, 122 Cal.Rptr. 701 [to satisfy the requirements of § 1230, a declaration must be distinctly against the declarant's penal interest and must be clothed with indicia of reliability]; see generally 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Hearsay, §§ 150, 151, pp. 861-864 [same].) To determine whether [a particular] declaration [against penal interest] passes [section 1230's] required threshold of trustworthiness, a trial court `may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant's relationship to the defendant.' ( People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 607, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635.) We have recognized that, in this context, assessing trustworthiness `requires the court to apply to the peculiar facts of the individual case a broad and deep acquaintance with the ways human beings actually conduct themselves in the circumstances material under the exception.' ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197.) Several factors persuade us that, redaction aside, Billy Morris's postarrest statements implicating defendant, in light of the circumstances under which they were uttered and the possible motivation of the declarant ( People v. Frierson, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 745, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197), simply were not sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite [their] hearsay character ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 607, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635). First, examination of the full, unredacted version of Morris's postarrest statements implicating defendant reveals that, however incriminating of Morris himself the statements may in a general sense have been, they unmistakably also were attempts to shift blame or curry favor ( Williamson v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431) with the authorities. [3] As defendant points out, in his unredacted postarrest statements to Sergeant O'Hanlon, Morris claimed that the idea of doing the drive-by shooting was not his, but his friend's, i.e., Danny[`s], and that the motive was retaliatory; the idea came up because . .. Danny, was telling me that some guy, you know, was all trying to shoot him in a earlier drive-by shooting that had occurred within the previous month. Morris asserted that Danny had problems with this guy for a long time and that this guy was a gang member. Morris claimed he had no idea how the guns for the shooting had been obtained, that he had no firearms training and that he was not a marksman. Morris further claimed that, while Danny had the idea for the shooting and, having been goaded, thought he had to prove himself, Morris himself had just been drunk. In fact, as defendant points out, Morris claimed he had been very drunk because he had consumed a great deal of 151-proof rum. Morris blamed the targeting of the Sullivan residence on wrong directions given by a [s]tupid idiot at the time, [s]ome Mexican guy who drove the car and persuaded Morris and Danny, over Morris's doubts, into believing the Sullivan house was the residence of the gang member who previously had shot at Danny. According to Morris, he and Danny didn't want to hurt anybody that was innocent, but the person who was supposed to point out where the gang member lived deliberately gave us the wrong house on purpose. In describing the shooting itself, Morris stated that Danny's shots did not sound like they were automatic and that Danny used an assault rifle, pulling the trigger one at a time. For his own part, Morris (as noted earlier) claimed, I didn't, didn't want to kill nobody. I didn't want to take that chance of hurting anyone, so I didn't fire directly, you know, I fired from a point to where nobody can get hurtat the roof. After the shooting, according to Morris, he and Danny sat and talked about their [h]ope that we got the right house. In fact, neither in the police car at the time of his arrest nor at the police station thereafter did Morris utter a single simple statement confirming his own culpability without alluding to the culpability of others or to circumstances he apparently thought might elicit sympathy or be considered mitigating. Morris's statement that he fired at the roof plainly implied that Dannyas the only other shooterwas the person who actually wounded Ms. Sullivan. [4] Moreover, having identified Danny as the originator of the shooting plan and the one who shot the assault rifle, Morris also provided information sufficient to enable the authorities to confirm that defendant was the Danny of whom he spoke. Morris at one point pretended not to know defendant's name, but assented when specifically asked if Danny was indeed the name of the person he earlier had identified as having had the idea of the shooting and if Danny's name and telephone number could be found on lists police had found in Morris's apartment. At another point, Morris noted he knew a couple of Dannys and asserted (after Sergeant O'Hanlon gave defendant's full name and suggested he rode a bicycle) that it isn't the same guy. However, after confirming that this thing ain't gonna come out that I told you anything about Danny, Morris identified the one Danny that I'm talking about as coming from Los Angeles, driving a motorcycle and attending both Conejo Valley Continuation High School and a night school in Thousand Oaks. Morris also claimed one of his [i.e., Danny's] friends retrieved the weapons used in the shooting from the ditch where he and Danny had discarded them on the night of the crime. Thus, from start to finish, in his postarrest statements to Sergeant O'Hanlon, Morris evidently was trying to fasten guilt on others, including defendant, while keeping his own skirts as clean as possible ( People v. Coble, supra, 65 Cal.App.3d at p. 191, 135 Cal.Rptr. 199) under the circumstances. The People concede that Morris's statements that he did not want to kill or hurt anyone do not, upon initial review, appear disserving. However, the People suggest, they demonstrate Morris was attempting to explain his criminal action and are disserving to the extent they acknowledge he was involved in the criminal act. Perhaps so, but such would be true of any attempt to shift blame ( Williamson v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 603, 114 S.Ct. 2431) without completely denying involvement. The People's attempt in their briefing to parse Morris's postarrest statements to isolate portions that facially incriminate him misses the point, as it runs contrary to the principles both of Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d 419, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296, where we recognized that collateral statements are not made trustworthy by proximity to incriminating statements, and Williamson v. United States, supra, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476, where the high court stated that whether a statement is truly self-inculpatory can only be determined by viewing it in context. Second, Morris's statements implicating defendant were made to police shortly after he had been apprehended, arrested, and taken into custody. Thus, they were made in the coercive atmosphere of official interrogation. ( Dutton v. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74, 87, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213.) The police officer who arrested Morris initially indicated that the authorities already knew what had happened and who was involved, and that police were in the process of serving warrants at the residences of Morris's friends. The officer further suggested that if Morris cooperated he might avoid spending the rest of his life in jail. In addition, Morris knew that physical evidence linking him to the crime was discovered when the police searched his residence. Under these circumstances, Morris may have believed that the police had sufficient evidence to link him to the crimes, and that he had little to lose and perhaps something to gain by admitting his role while attempting to minimize his participation and shift primary responsibility to others. Eventually, as discussed, Morris provided sufficient information to identify defendant as the other shooter who first had the idea to attack the residence and who likely fired the bullet injuring Ms. Sullivan. The transcript of Morris's confession suggests that Morris actually identified a photograph of defendant. Morris also claimed that the physical evidence discovered at his residence was left there by defendant the morning after the shooting. As we previously have observed, there is a vast difference between an informant who comes in off the street to confess complicity in a crime and identify his confederate, and one who, caught with inculpatory evidence, identifies someone else as the principal culprit, [¶] Information received from sources who are themselves the focus of pending criminal charges or investigations is inherently suspect. `All familiar with law enforcement know that the tips they provide may reflect their vulnerability to police pressure or may involve revenge, braggadocio, self-exculpation, or the hope of compensation.' ( People v. Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 882, 206 Cal.Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634.) The People suggest that because Morris's postarrest statements were redacted to delete express references to anyone except Morris, the inference drawn from custodial questioning [i.e., that it tends to elicit unreliable answers] should be neutralized. As previously discussed, however, redaction by its nature cannot add to a statement's circumstantial trustworthiness. This is not to say that a well-redacted statement in a future case inevitably should be excluded as untrustworthy merely because the original unredacted statement was custodial or contains some self-serving remarks. Courts applying section 1230 to determine the basic trustworthiness of a proffered declaration are, rather, to consider all the surrounding circumstances to determine if a reasonable person in [the declarant's] position would have made the statements if they weren't true. ( People v. Rios (1985) 163 Cal. App.3d 852, 867, 210 Cal.Rptr. 271.) Our concurring and dissenting colleagues deem only minor (cone. & dis. opn., post, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 715, 12 P.3d at p. 1122) the exculpatory aspects of the hearsay that was admitted against defendant. As we have explained in detail, we do not share that assessment. Accordingly, we disagree our holding will cause courts in future cases to exclude most police confessions by nontestifying accomplices out of hand, even those portions so clearly and strictly self-incriminatory when uttered that they are almost certain to be true ( id. at p. 717, 12 P.3d at p. 1124, italics in original). We have observed that the entire rationale underlying the against penal interest hearsay exception breaks down in a situation where a declarant in police custody seeks to exculpate himself by implicating another suspect. ( People v. Campa, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 882, 206 Cal.Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634; see also People v. Shipe, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 354, 122 Cal. Rptr. 701 [postarrest statement admitting some complicity but ascribing greater culpability to coparticipant lacks indicia of reliability].) For these reasons, we conclude that, as a matter of state evidentiary law, the trial court erred in admitting into evidence Sergeant O'Hanlon's testimony relating Morris's postarrest statements implicating defendant. Morris's statements, even as redacted, contained assertions that were not themselves specifically disserving to the interests of the declarant ( Leach, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 441, 124 Cal.Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296) and, redaction aside, lacked sufficient indicia of trustworthiness ( People v. Cudjo, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 607, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635) to qualify for admission under section 1230's exception to the hearsay rule.