Opinion ID: 2669787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inferring Causation

Text: The district court also granted judgment as a matter of law to defendants because plaintiff failed to establish that defendants’ negligence caused Knowlton’s 10 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 11 of 18 death without relying on an “impermissible stacking of inferences” by the jury. “Inferences may be pyramided only if the initial inference is established to the exclusion of any other reasonable theory.” Hurst v. Astudillo, 631 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). In the district court’s view, the initial inference for plaintiff’s case—that Knowlton encountered a danger on the Point about which defendants had superior knowledge—was not established to the exclusion of other theories. Impermissible inferences only exist, however, when no direct evidence is presented on negligence or causation and a jury infers causation based on an inference of negligence. See McCormick Shipping Corp. v. Warner, 129 So. 2d 448, 449 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961) (finding impermissible stacking of inferences where the “jury was required under the circumstances to infer that there was negligence on the part of the appellant in providing a defective or inadequate ladder and upon that inference, to infer further that such negligence was the proximate cause of the fall”). In another ladder case, Hurst v. Astudillo, the plaintiff was injured while climbing defendant’s ladder. 631 So. 2d at 381. Although there was no evidence that the ladder was defective, that its placement created a dangerous condition, or why the ladder slipped, the trial judge found negligence and proximate cause. Id. This was an impermissible pyramid of inferences because it required the trial court to infer negligence and that such negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury. Id. (citing McCormick Shipping Corp., 129 So. 2d at 449-50). The Hurst court 11 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 12 of 18 concluded: “Simply stated, [plaintiff’s] fall, standing alone, cannot support a finding of [defendant’s] liability.” Id. at 381. This is not the case here. As discussed in the preceding section, defendants owed Knowlton a duty of reasonable care to protect him against the foreseeable zone of risk that the parties do not dispute existed on the Point. Once the jury finds a breach of that duty, i.e., negligence, there is only one inference required of the jury: that Knowlton was killed by conditions on the Point. Plaintiff submitted evidence that allowed the jury to find that it was more likely than not that this was the case: that Knowlton’s friends were unable to find him minutes after he walked onto the Point and that the following day his damaged body was found in a cove some distance away. Based on this evidence, the jury was free to infer a causal nexus between the negligence and the harm. Thus, the district court erred in granting to defendants judgment as a matter of law following the trial. II. Toxicology Evidence Evidentiary rulings are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Haygood v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th Cir. 1993). In order to justify granting a new trial, an error must have affected “substantial rights”; otherwise, the error is harmless. Id. Dr. William Hearn of the Miami-Dade Medical Examiner’s Office testified at trial that a sample of Knowlton’s urine received from authorities in the Bahamas 12 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 13 of 18 contained 0.22% alcohol. The plaintiff contends that this evidence should have been excluded because it was irrelevant and it incorrectly suggested that urine alcohol levels are the same as blood alcohol levels, which would imply that Knowlton was severely intoxicated when he died. This evidence was properly admitted because it had probative value and was not unduly prejudicial. Evidence of plaintiff’s intoxication is normally relevant in tort cases, particularly when the law uses a comparative negligence standard for apportionment of liability. See Garay v. Carnival Cruise Line, Inc., 904 F.2d 1527, 1531 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Collins, No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op at 25 (“Plaintiff fails to recognize that Defendants used the measurement only to corroborate their contention that Knowlton’s own negligence contributed to his death because he had been drinking before his fall—not to prove any particular level of intoxication associated with a legal standard.”). The urine alcohol level evidence was not unduly prejudicial because there was little risk that it could be mistaken for evidence of the more familiar blood alcohol level. The district court correctly found, and the plaintiff ignores on appeal, that “neither Plaintiff’s expert . . . nor Dr. Hearn . . . testified that 0.22% urine alcohol concentration rendered Knowlton intoxicated. And both of these witnesses testified that urine alcohol content cannot be correlated to blood alcohol concentrations.” Collins, No. 1:09-cv-22423, slip op at 25. Of course, the plaintiff 13 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 14 of 18 could have requested an instruction to the jury on the difference between alcohol levels in blood and urine, but he did not do so. Admitting the evidence was not error. III. Compromise Verdict The plaintiff argues that the jury’s verdict in this case was a compromise verdict that conflated liability and damages. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a motion for a new trial based on the verdict being an improper compromise. Mekdeci ex rel. Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat’l Labs., 711 F.2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir. 1983). Federal law governs the decision whether or not to grant a new trial, but an issue of the sufficiency of damages awarded for a state claim is decided under state law. Hattaway v. McMillian, 903 F.2d 1440, 1451 (11th Cir. 1990). A motion for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 must be granted “when the issues of liability and damages were tried together and there are indications that the jury may have rendered a compromise verdict.” Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1513 (quoting Lucas v. Am. Mfg. Co., 630 F.2d 291, 294 (5th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A compromise verdict results when jurors resolve their inability to make a determination with any certainty or unanimity on the issue of liability by finding inadequate damages. However, an insufficient damages verdict, standing alone, does not necessarily indicate a compromise. Ordinarily there must 14 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 15 of 18 be other evidence demonstrating that the deficient monetary award resulted from an impermissible compromise.” Id. at 1513-14 (internal citations omitted). The jury found zero dollars in damages despite being instructed by the district court to determine the total amount of loss suffered by Knowlton’s estate without adjusting for any percentages of comparative fault it may have found. The plaintiff’s expert estimated a total loss to Knowlton’s estate of $10.6 million. Further, there was significant evidence of Knowlton’s close relationship with Grace, even though she lived with her mother, in support of non-economic damages. Defendants submitted no evidence related to damages. It was the jury’s job to find the total damages and the percentage of defendant’s contribution to the loss. It was for the court to then apply that percentage to the total damages. Plainly, the jury’s finding of zero dollars in damages resulting from Knowlton’s death is drastically deficient. See Miami-Dade Cnty. v. Merker, 907 So. 2d 1213, 1215 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (noting that “where the evidence is undisputed or substantially undisputed that a plaintiff has experienced and will experience pain and suffering as a result of an accident, a zero award for pain and suffering is inadequate as a matter of law”); see also Westminster Cmty. Care Servs., Inc. v. Mikesell, 12 So. 3d 838, 842 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009) (holding “the damages award of zero dollars was clearly inadequate in light of the substantial evidence at trial of economic and noneconomic damages” resulting from husband’s wrongful death); 15 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 16 of 18 Snoozy v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 695 So. 2d 767, 768 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (holding zero-damages award inadequate because “substantial, undisputed, and unrebutted testimony” showed that deceased father “had a close relationship with his children, and that [the children] suffered a great loss as a result of their father’s death”). The district court stated that the jury’s award of damages was not inadequate as a matter of law because the parties did not stipulate to a minimum amount of damages and the evidence at trial did not indisputably set a range of monetary recovery. But there need not be an agreed-upon damages range for an award to be inadequate. See Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1514 (finding that the zero dollars in damages awarded by the jury to an injured child was inadequate because defendant never disputed the child’s damages and the evidence was uncontroverted). The other required indicia of a compromise verdict are also present here. See Westminster, 12 So. 3d at 842 (holding that there was an impermissible compromise where the damages award was inadequate, liability was “hotly contested” at trial, the jury was deadlocked, the court charged the jury to continue deliberating to reach a decision, and less than one hour later the jury returned a verdict); Newalk v. Florida Supermarkets, Inc., 610 So. 2d 528, 529 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding that there was an impermissible compromise because the damages award was inadequate and “liability was hotly disputed by the parties and struggled over by the jury”); see also Burger King Corp. v. Mason, 710 F.2d 1480, 1488 (11th Cir. 1983) 16 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 17 of 18 (finding no compromise verdict because the jury consistently rejected the defendants’ affirmative defenses, was not deadlocked, and did not attempt to qualify its verdict or request additional instructions). Liability was hotly contested by the parties at trial. The jury, in a note to the district judge, stated that it was unable to come to an agreement. After being told to keep deliberating, and only forty five minutes later, the jury asked whether it could find defendants negligent but award zero dollars to the plaintiff. Seventeen minutes after the judge responded by telling it to find a verdict that is “fair and reasonable,” the jury rendered its verdict. In Mekdeci, the Eleventh Circuit found the verdict to be an impermissible compromise and remanded for a new trial because the jury’s award was inadequate, liability was “strongly contested,” the jurors made clear that they could not reach agreement on liability, and the jury attempted to qualify its verdict by asking to explain its reasons to the parties. 711 F.2d at 1514-15. Most importantly, the jury stated to the judge that it was “hopelessly deadlocked,” yet returned a verdict shortly after receiving an Allen charge. Id. at 1515. As in Mekdeci, the jury here professed to be deadlocked shortly before returning a verdict finding defendants negligent and making a damages finding that was not supported by the evidence. Moreover, liability was strongly contested at trial. Contrary to the district court’s suggestion, the contest over liability need not be “exceptional” to support a finding 17 Case: 12-15739 Date Filed: 04/14/2014 Page: 18 of 18 that the jury reached an impermissible compromise, and the fact that the jury found the defendants only 1% liable does not show that there was a lack of contest over liability. Indeed, the jury’s question to the judge—asking whether it could find liability but award zero damages—suggests that some members of the jury may have gone along with a finding of liability only if accompanied by an award of zero damages. The district court abused its discretion here in not finding that the verdict was the result of an impermissible compromise. Defendants argue that if a compromise verdict is found, any new trial should be limited to damages only. Defendants, however, misread our case law on compromise verdicts. “[A] jury verdict influenced by an improper compromise cannot stand and a complete new trial is required because liability and damages are inseparable. Hence, if there is a compromised finding on liability, a separate trial on damages alone will not suffice—both liability and damages must be relitigated in a new trial.” Burger King Corp., 710 F.2d at 1486 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial on both liability and damages.