Opinion ID: 775759
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Transfer of Weeks' Cases; Seizure of Files; Removal from Office

Text: 37 The complaint in ¶¶ 21(ii) and 23 alleges a variety of incidents relating to the shifting of Weeks' responsibilities. She alleges that she was transferred from the Queens Field Office to the Metro II Regional Office at 350 Livingston Street. See Amended Complaint ¶ 23. There is no allegation that the reassignment constituted a demotion or otherwise. See Galabya, 202 F.3d at 641 (citing Williams v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 274 (7th Cir. 1996)). For all the amended complaint reveals, her new post at the Regional Office was advantageous. Similarly, Weeks' allegation that her cases were transferred to other officers is insufficient. See Amended Complaint ¶ 21(ii); see also Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640 ([M]aterially adverse means a change in working conditions [that is] `more disruptive than a mere... alteration of job responsibilities.'). It is unremarkable that work left behind following a transfer is assigned to someone else. 38 Weeks alleges that she was physically removed from the Field Office. See Amended Complaint ¶ 23(i). An action that is not adverse to begin with does not become adverse because the employee resists it and the employer meets the resistance. But even assuming that the physical removal was unprovoked by Weeks, the allegation still fails because Weeks does not allege what tangible adverse effect this incident had on the terms and conditions of her employment. Cf. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997) (feeling frightened or intimidated is irrelevant if there is no materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment). 39 Finally, Weeks alleges that after the transfer, her files at the Queens Field Office were seized and reviewed and that the parolees she formerly supervised were interviewed. See Amended Complaint ¶ 23(ii), (iii). However, this is precisely what a well-run office should do. A transferred employee cannot insist that her files in the old location be left untouched or her old office be treated as a shrine. 40 Again, Weeks does not allege how these actions effected a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment. Galabya, 202 F.3d at 640. To the extent Weeks claims retaliation in connection with these charges, the claim fails, absent allegations sufficient to establish that Weeks suffered an adverse employment action. See Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 79 (2d Cir. 2001). 41 Weeks had no opportunity to take discovery before certain of her claims were dismissed. But the allegations contained in Weeks' complaint, even read in a light most favorable to Weeks, are wholly consistent with the businesslike conduct of DOP's affairs, without hostility or retaliation directed against anyone (except possibly Hoy). To preserve these claims, we would have to do more than read them in a light favorable to her claim; we would in effect have to invent that portion of her complaint explaining why those actions are adverse to her. See Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 1996) (While the pleading standard is a liberal one, bald assertions and conclusions of law will not suffice.); cf. Dawes v. Walker, 239 F.3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2001) (expressing unwillingness, in the context of a prisoner complaint of retaliation, simply to assume that bald allegations were sufficient to deter a reasonable prisoner in the exercise of his constitutional rights); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Hansa World Cargo Serv., Inc., 170 F.R.D. 361, 385 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (While this Court recognizes its duty to construe [plaintiff's] well-pleaded allegations in the light most favorable to [her], this Court is not obliged to judicially reconstruct [the complaint] so that it may state a viable cause of action.); Bernheim v. Litt, 79 F.3d 318, 327 (2d Cir. 1996) (Jacobs, concurring) (We should seek [a] balance even at the Rule 12(b)(6) pleading stage, treating retaliation as actionable only if, measured by a standard of reasonableness, it affects employment in a way that is both detrimental and substantial.). A pleading that omits facts to show that an employment action is adverse in character is plainly insufficient. Even on a motion addressed to the pleadings, every plaintiff is deemed to know where her own shoe pinches. 42