Opinion ID: 2966246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Equal Protection and Due Process Claims

Text: As explained above, Kittery claims that Maine's Sunday closing laws violate constitutional guarantees of equal protection and substantive due process. (4) In making its claims, Kittery does not argue that an equal protection analysis differs in any way from a due process analysis. Indeed, the parties have, by and large, framed their arguments almost solely in terms of equal protection. Accordingly, we will analyze Kittery's claims solely in terms of equal protection. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co. , 449 U.S. 456, 470 n.20 (1981) (remarking that if statute does not violate equal protection, it follows a fortiori that [it] does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Montalvo-Huertas v. Rivera-Cruz , 885 F.2d 971, 976 n.7 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that the type and kind of scrutiny applied, and the result, would be no different on either theory). The Supreme Court has developed a tripartite rubric for evaluating equal protection challenges to legislation. When a statute burdens certain fundamental rights -- e.g., voting rights or the right to interstate travel -- a reviewing court will strictly scrutinize that statute, upholding it only if the government can clearly demonstrate a compelling interest incapable of being served by less intrusive means. See , e.g. , Atty. Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez , 476 U.S. 898, 906 (1986) (right to interstate travel); Storer v. Brown , 415 U.S. 724, 756 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (voting rights). Likewise, a reviewing court will apply strict scrutiny if a legislative distinction is based on a suspect classification such as race or national origin. See , e.g. , Shaw v. Reno , 509 U.S. 630, 643-45 (1993) (racial classifications). By the same token, the Supreme Court has identified other classifications, such as illegitimacy, which are less suspect and thus subject to a less exacting level of scrutiny, often characterized as intermediate scrutiny. In such cases, the government must demonstrate at a minimum that the challenged classification is substantially related to an important government objective. Clark v. Jeter , 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). All other regulations, including the statute under review in this case, are subject to the third and least exacting tier of scrutiny -- rational basis: Social and economic legislation . . . that does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld . . . when the legislative means are rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. Hodel v. Indiana , 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981). The parties do not dispute that Kittery's equal protection challenge to Maine's Sunday closing laws entails this lowest level of scrutiny. Kittery maintains, however, that even under this rational basis test, Maine's Sunday closing laws are unconstitutional as applied to automobile and motorcycle dealerships. Kittery faces an uphill battle. Under the rational basis test, the classifications in Maine's Sunday closing laws come[] to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, Beach Communications , 508 U.S. at 314. As another court has noted, [e]ven foolish and misdirected provisions will be upheld under this test. Craigmiles v. Giles , 312 F.3d 220, 223-24 (6th Cir. 2002). Kittery's task is made all the more difficult because the state, in order to defeat Kittery's claim, need only articulate some reasonably conceivable set of facts that could establish a rational relationship between the challenged laws and the government's legitimate ends. Montalvo-Huertas , 885 F.2d at 978. These proffered facts need not be supported by an exquisite evidentiary record. Craigmiles , 312 F.3d at 224. Indeed, they need not be supported by any evidentiary record at all. See Heller v. Doe , 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (A State, moreover, has no obligation to produce evidence to sustain the rationality of a statutory classification.); Beach Communications , 508 U.S. at 315 ([A] legislative choice is not subject to courtroom factfinding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data.). With these general constraints in mind, we now turn to the particulars of this case. Kittery first attacks the Sunday closing laws as they apply to motor vehicle dealerships, asserting that the myriad accumulated exceptions to the laws have rendered the scheme arbitrary and illogical. Thus, according to Kittery, the closing laws no longer bear a rational relationship to the statute's purported purpose[], the promotion of Sunday as a day of rest and relaxation. We soundly rejected an identical argument in Montalvo-Huertas . In that case, a convenience store owner filed suit in the district court in Puerto Rico, challenging the commonwealth's Sunday closing laws as unconstitutional. Montalvo-Huertas , 885 F.2d at 973. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court enjoined enforcement of the closing laws. Id. at 974. In defending the injunction on appeal, the plaintiff made the same argument Kittery now espouses, complaining that the Closing Law's coverage is so spotty, and its exemptions so prevalent, that it has become ineffectual, hence irrational. Id. at 980. We rejected that contention, noting that the legislature need not approach goals on an all-or-nothing basis: reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . . The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others. Id. at 981 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. , 348 U.S. 488, 489 (1955)); see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes , 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam) (States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathematical exactitude.). In considering the plaintiff's argument, we stated: To uphold the Closing Law, it is enough if each exemption is rationally related to some legitimate legislative aim, and if the exemptions, collectively, do not erode the rationality of the legislative scheme as a whole. Montalvo-Huertas , 885 F.2d at 981 (original emphasis). We then inspected the exemptions one by one and were satisfied they [did] not defeat the Closing Law's constitutionality. (5) Id. Apparently recognizing the precedential hurdle of Montalvo-Huertas , Kittery does not argue that each and every one of section 3204's listed exemptions fails to have a rational basis. Nor does Kittery argue that the promotion of Sunday as a day of rest is an illegitimate government purpose. Rather, Kittery tries to circumvent Montalvo-Huertas by arguing that Maine's Sunday closing laws, in effect, single out motor vehicle sales for prohibition. Kittery points out that the provisions of sections 3203 and 3204, read together, permit any retail business to open on Sundays except for motor vehicle dealerships. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 3203-3204 (West Supp. 2002). This singling out of motor vehicle sales, according to Kittery, is utterly irrational. (6) In reply, the state claims that the legislature could have reasonably assumed that sales commissions form a substantial portion of the compensation of most motor vehicle salespersons. The legislature could have therefore reasonably concluded that motor vehicle salespersons would feel compelled to work on Sundays in order to earn commissions, regardless of whether their employers actually required them to work, thereby undermining the state's legitimate goal of promoting Sunday as a day of rest. Kittery responds by pointing out that real estate brokers and motor home salespersons can work on Sundays, see Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 17, §§ 3203-A, 3204 (West Supp. 2002), even though they typically work on a commission basis. Thus, Kittery maintains, it is arbitrary and irrational for the state to treat motor vehicle dealers any differently. The difficulty with Kittery's response is twofold. First, it assumes that there must be a precise, mathematical fit between the classification and the legitimate government purpose the classification serves -- an altogether insupportable assumption given the unexacting nature of rational basis review. See Dukes , 427 U.S. at 303; Montalvo-Huertas , 885 F.2d at 980. Second, as the state argues, the legislature could have reasonably concluded that the people of Maine are more fundamentally in need of shelter and housing than simple transportation, thereby justifying an exemption for the sale of homes, including motor homes. Or the legislature could have reasonably determined that it would be impractical to enforce a Sunday prohibition on home sales because much of a real estate broker's work takes place in the properties being shown (thus making the policing of such a prohibition overly burdensome). (7) Or the legislature could have reasonably concluded that motor homes are used almost exclusively for recreational purposes (i.e., no one drives a motor home to work), and that the Sunday sale of motor homes therefore actually promotes Sunday as a day of rest, relaxation, and recreation. (8) Regardless of the underlying justifications and rationales, this court is not the forum in which to weigh their respective merits. Suffice it to say that they are not so spurious as to render the statute palpably arbitrary. Nordlinger v. Hahn , 505 U.S. 1, 18 (1992). Thus Kittery's attack against Maine's Sunday closing scheme -- as it applies to motor vehicle dealerships -- must fail. (9) In addition to challenging the state's decision to treat motor vehicle dealerships differently from other retail establishments, Kittery also challenges the state's decision to classify motorcycles as motor vehicles. (10) See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 29-A, § 101(38) (West 1996 & Supp. 2002). According to Kittery, motorcycles are recreational vehicles, and as such are similarly situated with other recreational vehicles and equipment that can be sold on Sundays. Hence, Kittery maintains, the legislature's decision to classify motorcycles as motor vehicles is arbitrary and irrational. We disagree. In its brief, Kittery states that, [i]n Maine, one purchases a motorcycle not as a mode of transportation, but as a form of recreation akin to snowmobiles, boats, motor homes, jet skis, or all-terrain vehicles. In support of this pronouncement, Kittery points us to affidavits and deposition testimony of Kittery's vice-president and its general manager. With all due respect to Kittery and its staff, reasonable minds can differ, and the legislature could have reasonably concluded that, weather permitting, many people in Maine would use motorcycles as a mode of general transportation (for example, to go to and from work or school). And the legislature could have just as reasonably concluded that not many people in Maine would use snowmobiles, boats, motor homes, jet skis, or all-terrain vehicles for such routine transportation purposes. Buttressing this conclusion is the fact that motorcycles, like other motor vehicles, can be operated on roads and highways, whereas all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles cannot. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, §§ 7827, 7857 (West 1994 & Supp. 2002). Similarly, motorcycle operators, like motor vehicle operators, must be licensed, whereas operators of all-terrain vehicles and snowmobiles need not. Id. §§ 7823, 7853. In sum, we are not led to the inescapable conclusion that the legislature acted irrationally when it chose to classify motorcycles as motor vehicles rather than recreational vehicles. We agree with the observation of amicus that [n]o doubt, the Legislature could have treated motorcycles the way it treats recreational (off road) vehicles for Sundays sales purposes. To Kittery's detriment, however, the legislature chose not to, and we will not disturb that decision.