Opinion ID: 1203801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of Gerstein Decision

Text: In Gerstein the United States Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of a pretrial detention following an arrest pursuant to a prosecutor's information when there was no judicial determination of probable cause for pretrial restraint of liberty. That case, which arose in the State of Florida, involved the arrest of one defendant on charges of robbery and of carrying a concealed weapon and of a second defendant on charges of breaking and entering and of assault and battery. The opinion does not indicate that there was an arrest warrant for either defendant. Bail was denied for both defendants. Under Florida procedures these offenses could be charged by information without a preliminary hearing. Furthermore, once an information was filed, the Florida courts had construed the applicable statute to mean that the filing of an information foreclosed the suspect's right to a preliminary hearing. ( Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 106 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 60].) A judicial determination of probable cause could only be obtained under a special statute allowing a preliminary hearing after 30 days ... and arraignment, which the District Court found was often delayed a month or more after arrest. [Citation.] As a result, a person charged by information could be detained for a substantial period solely on the decision of a prosecutor. ( Id. [L.Ed.2d pp. 60-61].) The Supreme Court noted initially that the standards and procedures for arrest and detention are derived from the Fourth Amendment and that the standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances `sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.' [Citations.] This standard, like those for searches and seizures, represents a necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime.... To implement the Fourth Amendment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy, the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible. ( Gerstein v. Pugh, supra, 420 U.S. 103, 111-112 [43 L.Ed.2d 54, 64].) The high court held that although warrantless arrests are often necessary, [o]nce the suspect is in custody ... the reasons that justify dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships. [Citation.] Even pretrial release may be accompanied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty. [Citation.] When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protections from unfounded interference with liberty. Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. ( Id., at p. 114 [L.Ed.2d at p. 65].) Noting that state systems of criminal procedure vary widely and that flexibility in those systems is desirable, the court held that adversary safeguards generally were not essential for the probable cause determination required by the Fourth Amendment. ( Id., at p. 120 [L.Ed.2d at p. 69].) It stated that the standard for determining probable cause to detain is the same as that for arrest ...  probable cause to believe the suspect has committed the crime  traditionally ... decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony.... (Id.) Such informal procedures were deemed to be justified not only by the lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a reasonable belief in guilt. ( Id., at p. 121 [L.Ed.2d p. 69].) The court held that although the confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses might improve the reliability of a probable cause determination, such formalities were not constitutionally required. The court further stated that [b]ecause of its limited function and its nonadversary character, the probable cause determination is not a `critical stage' in the prosecution that would require appointed counsel. ( Id., at p. 122 [L.Ed.2d at p. 70].) Gerstein concluded by acknowledging the rights of the states to adopt flexible procedures which could encompass any or all of the safeguards which are not constitutionally compelled and stated, [w]hatever procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest. ( Id., at pp. 124-125 [43 L.Ed.2d at pp. 71-72].) In an accompanying footnote, the court remarked, [w]e cannot define specifically those [restraints on liberty] that would require a prior probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint of liberty. ( Id., at p. 125, fn. 26 [L.Ed.2d at p. 72].)