Opinion ID: 2549762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Sealed materials

Text: In 2009, after Conahan and Ciavarella's corruption was exposed, a complaint was filed with the Board indicating Conahan wanted appellant removed from her judicial proceeding and took steps accordingly. After an investigation, the Board dismissed this complaint. The Court of Judicial Discipline ordered all filings related to this 2009 complaint be placed under seal. After a hearing, the court found these materials did not qualify as after-discovered evidence; thus, appellant was not entitled to relief. Further, during the course of remand, it was discovered the Board failed to turn over the report of a 2004 interview it conducted with the person who filed the initial complaint against appellant. Appellant argues the Board's investigation was inadequate and the court erred in not permitting her to use the 2009 complaint on remand. She claims the 2009 complaint supports her argument that Conahan exercised undue influence over Luzerne County courthouse personnel. Appellant argues she was prejudiced by the Board's failure to disclose evidence she claims shows Conahan orchestrated the charges against her. She also contends it engaged in prosecutorial misconduct by failing to correct Conahan's purported false testimony with the Anonymous Complaint and ignoring Conahan's misconduct while pursuing her. The Board argues the complaint does not qualify as after-discovered evidence because it was cumulative of Conahan's known animus towards appellant. The Board further contends this complaint could only be used to attack the witnesses' credibility, and could not mitigate the overwhelming evidence of appellant's judicial misconduct. The Board, conceding it should have disclosed the 2004 interview report, maintains there was not a reasonable probability the case would have been different had it disclosed the report. The Board asserts appellant cannot show its failure to pursue Conahan's misconduct constituted prosecutorial misconduct depriving her of a fair trial. To prevail on her after-discovered evidence claim, appellant must show (1) the evidence has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3) it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel a different verdict. Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698, 927 A.2d 586, 595-96 (2007) (citing Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 579 Pa. 490, 856 A.2d 806, 823 (2004)). Here, appellant cannot prove the 2009 complaint satisfies the requirements for after-discovered evidence. Appellant may have used material from the 2009 complaint to question the credibility of two witnesses against her; however, after-discovered evidence must be used for more than impeachment. Evidence regarding Conahan's animus towards appellant is cumulative, as the discord between appellant and Conahan was well established at trial. Conahan's purported attempts to assure appellant's removal from office are irrelevant because appellant cannot show they occurred at a relevant time. Thus, appellant is not entitled to relief based on the 2009 complaint. As for appellant's allegation regarding the Board's failure to disclose the 2004 interview report, the Board correctly notes appellant raises a Brady claim. To obtain relief on a Brady claim, the non-disclosed evidence must be material. Evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the trial would have been different. Bond, at 821 (citing Lambert, at 854). The interview report does not contain exculpatory information. Even if the report was used to impeach the complainant, it still would not have impeached the testimony of the 29 other witnesses. Because appellant cannot show there is a reasonable probability the outcome of her trial would have been different had this interview report been disclosed, she cannot prove her entitlement to relief. Appellant's prosecutorial misconduct claims are likewise unpersuasive. In addressing prosecutorial misconduct claims, [t]he touchstone is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Tedford, at 28 (citing Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982)). We have already rejected appellant's Brady claim based on the Anonymous Complaint, as appellant failed to show it was material to her case. The Anonymous Complaint mentions appellant only in passing, does not refer to any conspiracy or plot against her, and would not have impeached 27 credible witnesses who testified against her; thus, it would not have undermined the fairness of appellant's trial. Accordingly, appellant cannot prove she was denied a fair trial because of the Board's failure to disclose the Anonymous Complaint. Appellant next claims Conahan, with the Board's acquiescence, corralled witnesses to testify against her. While there is no doubt Conahan disliked appellant, even now that he and Ciavarella have been exposed, appellant cannot prove he persuaded witnesses to testify against her. During trial, the court found the testimony of Conahan and other witnesses credible when they said they did not collude against her. Appellant offers only rank speculation to show the Board knew Conahan colluded against her. Such speculation is insufficient to prove she received an unfair trial. As for appellant's selective prosecution claim, she must show first, others similarly situated were not prosecuted for similar conduct, and, second, the Commonwealth's discriminatory selection of them for prosecution was based on impermissible grounds such as race, religion, the exercise of some constitutional right, or any other such arbitrary classification. Mulholland, at 1034 (citing Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985)). Appellant suggests Conahan was similarly situated to herself, and the Board did not prosecute him because it was selectively prosecuting her. She fails to show any arbitrary classification, such as race, religion, or the exercise of a constitutional right, motivated the Board to pursue her. Therefore, her selective prosecution claim fails. For the above reasons, appellant is not entitled to relief based on the sealed materials.