Opinion ID: 2351490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extrajudicial Statements of Co-defendants

Text: Appellant next contends that it was reversible error to allow two witnesses to testify, over objection, as to extrajudicial statements of others involved in the murder. The first witness stated that all the youths had related to him how they beat up some white man, and the second testified that one boy said he had taken a dime from the victim's pocket. The rule with reference to declarations of co-conspirators as exceptions to the hearsay rule, as long recognized in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, has most recently been reiterated by us as follows: The declarations or acts of one co-conspirator made to third parties in the absence of his co-conspirator are admissible in evidence against both provided that such declarations [or acts] were made during the conspiracy and in furtherance of the common design: [citations omitted]. Commonwealth v. Ellsworth, 409 Pa. 505, 509, 187 A. 2d 640 (1963), quoting from Commonwealth v. Wilson, 394 Pa. 588, 607, 148 A. 2d 234 (1959). Cf. Rule 508, Vicarious Admissions, Model Code of Evidence, Am. Law Inst. 1942; McCormick, Evidence, § 244, p. 521 (1954). See Note, Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 984-990 (1959). The out-of-court statements here involved were admitted into evidence for the reason, presumably, that they qualified under this exception, [6] and the trial court's rulings in this respect are not now disputed. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ransom, 446 Pa. 457, 463, 288 A. 2d 762 (1972). To allow the introduction of hearsay in criminal trials, however, may run afoul of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which guarantees, inter alia, that the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . ., a fundamental right made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403, 13 L. Ed. 2d 923, 926 (1965). The exceptions to the rule against hearsay do not necessarily, by virtue of being exceptions, obtain immunity from attack under the confrontation clause. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-156, 26 L. Ed. 2d 489, 495-96 (1970). [7] The appellant contends that the extrajudicial statements described above violated his right to confront the declarants, and relies on Bruton v. U.S., 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1968). A similar challenge to hearsay evidence was considered and rejected in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 443 Pa. 234, 279 A. 2d 20 (1971). As in that case, so here we find the decision in Bruton to be inapposite. The distinctions made in the Thomas opinion are equally pertinent here: We believe Bruton to be inapposite in the instant case. Appellant was not tried at a joint trial, and the hearsay evidence introduced against him was in no way comparable to the `. . . powerfully incriminating extra-judicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant. . . .' Id. at 135-36, 88 S. Ct. at 1628. Furthermore, `. . . [t]here was not before us in Bruton any recognized exception to the hearsay rule, and the Court was careful to emphasize that we intimate no view whatever that such exceptions necessarily raise questions under the Confrontation Clause. 391 U.S. at 128 n.3, 88 S. Ct. at 1624.' Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 76, 86, 91 S. Ct. 210, 218 (1970). 443 Pa. at 238, 239. Pointer v. Texas, supra , is closer in point, for no joint trial of co-defendants was there involved. But the court there, as we construed its decision in Thomas, did not hold that the right to confrontation forbids the introduction of hearsay evidence in all cases. Employing the test advanced in Mr. Justice STEWART'S concurring opinion in Bruton, we discerned our task to be, in the words of Mr. Justice ROBERTS' opinion, to reassess the hearsay testimony introduced against appellant to determine whether it was `. . . at once so damaging, so suspect, and yet so difficult to discount, that jurors cannot be trusted to give evidence the minimal weight it logically deserves, whatever instructions the trial judge might give.' Bruton v. U.S., supra, at 138, 88 S. Ct. at 1629 (concurring opinion). Commonwealth v. Thomas, supra, at 240. In Commonwealth v. Ransom, supra , we ruled that recognized hearsay exceptions do not present confrontation problems if the circumstances of their utterances guarantee sufficient indicia of reliability. In so holding, we were relying upon another opinion by Mr. Justice STEWART, speaking for four members of the United States Supreme Court (there was no majority opinion) in Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 87, 27 L. Ed. 2d 213 (1970). Mr. Justice STEWART noted that the declarant's statement in that case was spontaneous and also against his penal interest. These attributes, said Mr. Justice STEWART, are indicia of reliability which have been widely viewed as determinative of whether a statement may be placed before the jury though there is no confrontation of the declarant. 400 U.S. at 89. In Commonwealth v. Ransom, the co-conspirator's statement was held not to qualify under the Pennsylvania co-conspirator rule, since the robbery had been accomplished and the proceeds divided at the time the statements were made. Indeed, the statements were given to the police at a time when both accomplices were under arrest and in custody. The statements thus did not qualify as hearsay exceptions, and we had no occasion to explore the circumstances which would guarantee sufficient indicia of reliability under the test we announced. In the case at bar, the testimony that all the youths admitted beating the deceased was merely cumulative, as was that in Thomas and also in Dutton v. Evans, supra . Appellant's complicity in the homicide was firmly established by appellant's out-of-court confession, his in-court testimony, and the testimony of two eyewitnesses who saw appellant strike the victim on the head with a wine bottle. To this may be added Porter's own confession to the witness who gave the testimony under review, that all the youths had admitted participating in the beating. The challenged testimony cannot, in this context, be categorized as damaging or suspect. In addition, as in Dutton v. Evans, supra , the statements here in question possessed the indicia of reliability which derived from being spontaneous and against the penal interest of the declarants. We conclude, therefore, that the recognition of the hearsay exception did not here contravene the Sixth Amendment. Moreover, even were we to hold that the right to confrontation was violated, our review of the record indicates that the Commonwealth's case would not have appeared significantly less persuasive to the jury had the admissions of the other participants in the beating of Specht been excluded. Thus the admission into evidence of the statements was at most harmless error. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 432, 31 L. Ed. 2d 340, 345 (1972). The statement by a non-witness that money, albeit only a dime, was taken from the person of the victim stands in different light. It could be characterized as damaging because, if believed, it was the only evidence establishing an aggravated robbery and thus murder in the first degree under the felony-murder rule. As it turned out, however, the introduction of the statement did not have damaging effect; the jury returned a verdict of acquittal on the aggravated robbery charge and of guilty of second degree murder only. We thus conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1967); Commonwealth v. Pearson, 427 Pa. 45, 233 A. 2d 552 (1967).