Opinion ID: 697759
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Punishment for Desertion as Persecution

Text: 13 Because the BIA majority found Ramos-Vasquez not credible, it did not explicitly consider whether his testimony regarding treatment of military deserters constituted evidence establishing his eligibility for withholding of deportation or for asylum. The Board implied its dissatisfaction with the substance of Ramos-Vasquez's appeal by stating at the end of the decision, [m]oreover, we do not find the punishment meted out to the respondent to be persecutory in nature.... If the Honduran army desires to punish its soldiers by placing them in water-filled tanks for 24 hours, this Board is in no position to pass judgment. However, when the BIA introduces reasons with words like moreover or in addition, this court does not presume that those reasons constitute an independent basis for dismissal. See Kotasz v. INS, 31 F.3d 847, 855 n. 13 (9th Cir.1994); Sarria-Sibaja v. INS, 990 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir.1993). 14 In the absence of substantial evidence supporting a finding of adverse credibility, the BIA is required explicitly to consider a petitioner's claims for asylum and withholding of deportation. It must consider the two forms of relief separately. See Arteaga v. INS, 836 F.2d 1227, 1233 (9th Cir.1988); Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS, 767 F.2d 1277, 1283 (9th Cir.1984). Both the BIA and the INS here failed to distinguish between the two distinct forms of relief provided by 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h), section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act) (withholding of deportation) and 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1158(a), section 208(a) of the Act (asylum). INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1211 n. 6, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987). The Board's failure to be explicit about which standard it is applying constitutes reversible error. Ghebllawi v. INS, 28 F.3d 83, 86 (9th Cir.1994). 15 To qualify for withholding of deportation, an alien must show that he faces a clear probability of persecution upon return to his native country, or that he will more likely than not be subjected to persecution there on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 1208-09 (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 429-30, 104 S.Ct. 2489, 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 321 (1984); 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253(h), section 243(h) of the Act). 16 The evidentiary standard required for asylum is considerably less stringent, requiring only a showing by the alien that  'persecution is a reasonable possibility.'  Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440, 107 S.Ct. at 1217 (quoting Stevic, 467 U.S. at 424-25, 104 S.Ct. at 2498). To qualify for asylum, the alien must show he is a statutory refugee, by providing evidence of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Id. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 1209 (quoting 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42)). If he meets this definition, [n]o further showing, that he or she 'would be' persecuted is required. Id. at 441, 107 S.Ct. at 1218. Thus, for example, he need not show the government is presently looking for him. Blanco-Comarribas, 830 F.2d at 1043. 17 The well-founded fear test consists of a subjective and an objective component: [t]he subjective component requires that the fear be genuine, while the objective component requires a showing by credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear that the petitioner faces persecution. Rodriguez-Rivera v. INS, 848 F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir.1988) (citations and quotations omitted). 18 While both prongs require credible testimony on the part of the alien, the objective prong further requires the alien to substantiate his claim of past or anticipated future persecution with objective facts. These may be established through documentary evidence, or lacking that, the alien's own testimony, if it is credible, persuasive, and refers to specific facts that give rise to an inference that [he] has been or has a good reason to fear that he ... will be singled out for persecution on one of the specified grounds listed in section 208(a). Blanco-Comarribas, 830 F.2d at 1042-43 (citations and quotations omitted). 19 Because [p]ersecutors are hardly likely to provide their victims with affidavits attesting to their acts of persecution, Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1285, an alien's own testimony, if unrefuted and credible, is also sufficient for withholding of deportation, though the alien must further show that the threat is a serious one.... What matters is whether the group making the threat has the will or the ability to carry it out. Id. 20 Ramos-Vasquez asserts that [n]ewspaper accounts, Amnesty International Reports and the House and Senate Reports on Human Rights Conditions in Honduras show the blatant disregard for human rights in Honduras. For unknown reasons, he never submitted any of these reports to the IJ. While Ramos-Vasquez's failure to provide background evidence detracts from his claim, as the BIA notes, his testimony, if taken as credible, likely supports a claim for asylum if not for withholding of deportation. 21 In rejecting Ramos-Vasquez's claim of persecution, the BIA focused on the punishment he was allegedly forced to undergo when he refused to execute deserters. It appears to have adopted the IJ's conclusion that being ordered to summarily execute deserters in the first place was merely an unpleasant military duty, and to have ignored entirely Ramos-Vasquez's fear that he, too, will be executed for desertion should he return to Honduras. The BIA majority characterized Ramos-Vasquez's claim as follows: in essence, the respondent maintains that while a sovereign nation has the right to punish deserters from its military forces, he should not be expected to carry out repugnant acts. 22 Like the BIA dissent, we would characterize being illegally ordered to execute someone [as] something more than an 'unpleasant' duty, or even a repugnant one as the BIA majority suggests. We perceive such orders to be contrary to the basic rules of human conduct, and are inclined to agree with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, section 171 (1979), which advises that 23 [w]here ... the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion ... could, in light of all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution. 24 While the United Nations Handbook is not binding on the INS, the Supreme Court has observed that it provides significant guidance in construing the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, to which the United States acceded in 1968, and which Congress sought to follow in enacting United States refugee law. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 437-39 and 439 n. 22, 107 S.Ct. at 1216-17 and 1217 n. 22. If the Honduran military regularly tortures and summarily executes deserters, as Ramos-Vasquez claims, he would seem to have established a well-founded fear of persecution if he can show that he would be persecuted for one of the five grounds listed in the Act. 25 Ramos-Vasquez bases his claim on persecution for his political neutrality. Under the case law of the Ninth Circuit, political neutrality constitutes political opinion for purposes of asylum. See, e.g., Arriaga-Barrientos v. INS, 937 F.2d at 413; Arteaga, 836 F.2d at 1231-32; Bolanos-Hernandez, 767 F.2d at 1286-87. The petitioner must not merely avow his political neutrality, however, but must also show that this opinion was articulated sufficiently for it to be the basis of his past or anticipated persecution. Arriaga-Barrientos, 937 F.2d at 414. 26 Both this court and the BIA have recognized conscientious objection to military service as grounds for relief from deportation, where the alien would be required to engage in inhuman conduct were he to continue serving in the military. Id.; In re A-G-, 19 I & N Dec. 502, 1987 BIA Lexis 16 -11 (1987) (citing the U.N. Handbook at 39-41 (1979)), aff'd, M.A. v. INS, 899 F.2d 304 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc). 27 This court held in Barraza Rivera v. INS that punishment based on objection to participation in inhuman acts as part of forced military service is 'persecution' within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1101(a)(42)(A). 913 F.2d 1443, 1453 (9th Cir.1990). Like Ramos-Vasquez, Barraza alleged he was forcibly recruited into the military, and abandoned service because he did not want to participate in illegal killings. Id. at 1446, 1450. This court observed that because it found Barraza does not object to military service in general but to being forced to perform inhuman acts under military orders, he could be classified as a conscientious objector. Id. at 1450. While Barraza based its conclusion in part on a theory of religious objection which has since been discredited, [i]mputed political belief is still a valid basis for relief. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 970 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir.1992). Ramos-Vasquez is clearly not a draft evader; he served in the military for thirteen years and hoped for, but was repeatedly denied, an opportunity to leave the service honorably. He credibly testified that he deserted the military to avoid engaging in inhuman conduct, and now appears reasonably to fear disproportionately severe punishment--torture and summary execution--for desertion should he return to Honduras. 28 Honduras holds itself out as a democratic nation. Its constitution provides, inter alia, for the inviolability of human life and due process of law; it explicitly forbids torture and capital punishment. See Constitution of the Republic of Honduras 1982 (Decree No. 131 of January 11, 1982) (Washington, Organization of American States, 1982), Title III, Chapters I-II, Articles 59-94. Because Ramos-Vasquez deserted in 1982, this version of the Constitution would apply to his case. 2 While, as the BIA observes, Honduras is not bound by the United States' constitutional notions of due process in relation to cruel and unusual punishment, it is legally bound by its own. 29 Where a nation espouses democracy and the rule of law, desertion may be the most practical way of politically dissenting from military practices which do not conform to the stated national policy. If a soldier deserts in order to avoid participating in acts condemned by the international community as contrary to the basic rules of human conduct, and is reasonably likely to face persecution should he return to his native country, his desertion may be said to constitute grounds for asylum based on political opinion. 3