Opinion ID: 8414537
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendants’ Alternative Explanations

Text: Had McGreal made the initial showing that the defendants were aware of his protected speech and that his speech was a motivating factor in his firing, the burden would have shifted to the defendants to provide a legitimate and nonretaliatory explanation for the firing. But because the defendants provided several alternative explanations for McGreal’s firing- — -that he (1) lied under oath during several formal interrogations, (2) committed numerous acts of insubordination, and (3) engaged in reckless conduct while on duty — the burden would have again shifted back to McGreal to show that these explanations were pretextual. See Thayer, 705 F.3d at 252. To show pretext and to survive summary judgment, McGreal must “produce evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could infer that the defendant[s’] proffered reason[s] [are] lie[s].” Zellner v. Herrick, 639 F.3d 371, 379 (7th Cir. 2011). Again, McGreal has failed to meet his burden: he has offered no admissible evidence to show that the defendants’ non-retaliatory explanations for his firing were anything but true. Although he does cite a few documents to bolster his pretext argument, none of these are sufficient to withstand summary judgment. For instance, he cites his own unsigned affidavit (R. 220-14), his Second Amended Complaint (R. 89 at ¶ 14), his statement of undisputed material facts (R. 220-2 at ¶¶ 39, 41), and a spreadsheet that he created based largely on his own experiences (R. 220-21 at 45-47). He also tries to bolster his argument with irrelevant citations to portions of the record that have nothing to do with his firing. In short, the documents he references are not admissible evidence showing that the defendants’ explanations are pre-textual. McGreal also largely relies on the suspicious timing of events to show pretext. But as we have repeatedly held, suspicious “timing alone does not create a genuine issue as to pretext if the plaintiff is unable to prove, through other circumstantial evidence, that he was terminated for a reason other than that proffered by the employer.” Pugh v. City Of Attica, 259 F.3d 619, 629 (7th Cir. 2001). “The reason is obvious: ‘[s]uspicious timing may be just that — suspicious—and a suspicion is not enough to get past a motion for summary judgment.’ ” Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966 (quoting Loudermilk v. Best Pallet Co., 636 F.3d 312, 315 (7th Cir. 2011)). Because McGreal has cited no evidence apart from suspicious timing that the defendants’ alternative explanations are untrue, he has failed to meet his burden. The district court thus did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to McGreal’s First Amendment retaliation claim.