Opinion ID: 1510785
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: limited cross-examination

Text: The State called a rebuttal witness, Edward Grant, to show that Woodruff had made threatening comments about Bogan before the shooting in order to rebut Woodruff's testimony that there was no intent and that the shooting was merely an accident. In a nutshell, Grant testified that he heard Woodruff call Bogan into the street, and that Bogan got loud with him. Grant then said he asked Woodruff what the argument was about, and Woodruff said it was about a loan, and that, The next time I'm gonna call him out ... if he get loud, everybody gonna know about it. Grant further testified that he was outside with other parties when he heard Bogan say, Ya'll ain't going to do nothing to me. Grant then said he saw the gun in Woodruff's hand fire and Bogan fall to the ground. At trial, Woodruff claimed that it was error for the court to prevent him from cross-examining Grant on the fact that Grant was being held in jail pending trial on felony charges at the time he testified against Woodruff. The State replied generally that the witness should not be questioned on these issues unless there was a conviction going to his truth and veracity. The exchange in question reads as follows: (RECESS) (Whereupon, the following was held at the Bench out of the hearing of the jury.) MR. POPE (PROSECUTOR): The State anticipated calling Edward Grant as a rebuttal witness. He is presently in jail (inaudible). He had a conviction on that (inaudible). MR. COLVIN (DEFENSE COUNSEL): I object to being precluded from asking him what his present circumstances are and why he's charged. He is not the Defendant, and therefore he has no Constitutional rights protecting him (inaudible), and that goes to the credibility of his testimony. MR. POPE: No, sir, it's not a Constitutional issue. It's evidentiary issues and (inaudible) the Defendant should not the witness should not be questioned on those issues unless there is a conviction going to truth and veracity in this instance. It's notit's just a charge, it's not a conviction. THE COURT: Well, I'm gonnaexcuse me, Mr. Colvin, I'm gonna deny your motion. MR. COLVIN: Yes, sir, but, Your Honor, he is in jail, and, ah, he's testifying in a criminal case (inaudible), and that is an element of his credibility that the jury should know to determine how much, ah, weight to give his testimony as to credibility. THE COURT: No, sir I'm rulingI'm ruling against you. Save your exceptions. MR. COLVIN: On the basis of the witness, and he is not a Defendant in this cause. THE COURT: I understand, but you're overruled, save your exceptions. We'll be in session now. (Whereupon, the following was held in open court.) MR. COLVIN: I do save my exceptions, Your Honor, just to make sure. As a preliminary matter, Woodruff incorrectly argues that abuse of discretion is not the proper standard of review, but we repeat that it is indeed the correct standard. Sheridan v. State, 313 Ark. 23, 852 S.W.2d 772 (1993); Jarrett v. State, 310 Ark. 358, 833 S.W.2d 779 (1992). We have said that the use of cross-examination is an important tool in bringing the facts before the jury and wide latitude should be afforded by the trial court. Carmichael v. State, 296 Ark. 479, 757 S.W.2d 944 (1988); Hoback v. State, 286 Ark. 153, 689 S.W.2d 569 (1985); Trammell v. State, 193 Ark. 21, 97 S.W.2d 902 (1936). Even so, the trial court must determine when the matter has been sufficiently developed and the outer limits have been reached, and unless the trial court's discretion is abused, we will not reverse. McCorkle v. State, 270 Ark. 679, 607 S.W.2d 655 (1980). In examining the colloquy between court and counsel relating to defense counsel's desire to cross-examine Grant concerning Grant's present circumstances of being in jail and why he's charged, defense counsel said that this information is an element of his credibility that the jury should know to determine how much ... weight to give his testimony as to credibility, we can envision several different reasons why Woodruff's counsel would want to cross-examine Grant. However, it is not apparent from the context of his questions or his statements to the trial court as to why Grant was in jail, or what possible bearing his incarceration might have on Woodruff's trial. Counsel did not furnish or suggest to the trial court any of our rules of evidence or case law which would support his questions concerning Woodruff's incarceration. Furthermore, Woodruff's counsel did not claim or even make mention to the trial court that the information he sought could have a potential of showing bias or motive on the part of Grant. On appeal, Woodruff now states that the evidence of Grant's incarceration showed a compelling motive to slant his testimony and that impeachment for bias on the issue cannot be denied. This is a new argument, and we have long held that we will not consider arguments on appeal which were not raised below. Furman v. Holloway, 312 Ark. 378, 849 S.W.2d 520 (1993); Campbell v. State, 311 Ark. 641, 846 S.W.2d 639 (1993); Tisdale v. State, 311 Ark. 220, 843 S.W.2d 803 (1992). Granted, we have stressed the importance of allowing wide latitude with respect to the admission of evidence relevant to the bias of the witness, see Wilson v. State, 289 Ark. 141, 712 S.W.2d 654 (1986) and Simpson v. State, 274 Ark. 188, 623 S.W.2d 200 (1981); however, the argument must be properly raised and preserved for appeal. Woodruff further argues that his constitutional rights under the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution were violated in that the trial court had limited his cross-examination, citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986), Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624 (1931). U.S. Const. amend. VI. While there is a fundamental right to wide latitude in cross-examination to impeach a witness, we do not delve into the constitutional issues of confrontation since Woodruff failed to make this argument below. Again, we will not consider new arguments on appeal. Furman v. Holloway, supra ; Campbell v. State, supra ; Tisdale v. State, supra . In sum, it was Woodruff's responsibility to explain to the trial court the basis upon which he desired to cross-examine Grant concerning his incarceration. Although not required to do so, a proffer of testimony under our Ark.R.Evid. 103(a)(2) would have made known to the trial court the substance of the evidence that he was asking for and, of course, would have satisfactorily explained to the court his intentions. By not doing so, Woodruff cannot now be heard to complain.