Opinion ID: 3010735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: SEPTA's policies

Text: We will look first at the purpose for which SEPTA uses the space in question. The main function of the advertising space at issue is to earn a profit for SEPTA. Although SEPTA generates approximately 99.5% of its revenues through the operation of the public transit system, it does derive about one half of one percent of its operating budget from the leasing of advertising space in its stations and in and on its vehicles. The contract between TDI and SEPTA states that it is understood that it is Licensee's obligations [sic] under the terms of this contract to produce revenues . . ..3 _________________________________________________________________ 3. That the generation of income is a goal of the advertising space is also reflected in the manner in which SEPTA is paid by TDI under the 11 The record shows that TDI and SEPTA also had a secondary goal in using the space: promoting awareness of social issues and providing a catalyst for change. These objectives are stated in the TDI Cares brochure. The TDI Cares program, in which SEPTA participates, seeks to  `give back' to the communities which[TDI] serve[s] in many ways . . .. In this program TDI picks an issue of public concern and then pays for the materials and labor involved in creating the advertisements. The purpose of the program, in TDI's words, is to assail TDI markets with images, both poignant and creative, which are designed to elevate awareness and provide a catalyst for change. This page of the brochure is headed consciousness and states that the program tries to focus consciousness on an issue of pressing human concern. The testimony at trial was that SEPTA participated in TDI's annual campaign by donating unsold advertising space. SEPTA and TDI jointly agree on what initiatives will run in the Philadelphia area, but it is not clear from the record which ads ran on SEPTA property under this program.4 SEPTA argues that where the government runs a commercial operation, a bright-line rule directs that no public forum has been created. For this proposition, SEPTA _________________________________________________________________ contract. TDI guarantees a minimum annual payment to SEPTA, one twelfth of which is due at the beginning of each month, but SEPTA receives fifty-five percent of all net sales in any given month if that amount is greater than one twelfth of the guaranteed annual payment. In the first agreement year, the guaranteed annual payment was $2,000,000. This rose to $2,950,000 for the fifth and final agreement year. 4. SEPTA contends that we should not consider the TDI Cares brochure because it is hearsay. The brochure was, however, admitted into evidence without objection by SEPTA. Moreover, it was offered not for the truth of the matter asserted but for the fact that the assertions were made -- which is not hearsay. In addition, the brochure plays little role in our decision. There is no evidence on the record of which ads actually ran in the campaigns described in the brochure or of how much advertising space SEPTA and/or TDI actually donated to those campaigns. Considered with the other evidence in the record, the brochure demonstrates, however, that the forum in question is suitable for speech concerning social problems and issues. 12 cites International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). In Lee, the Court considered restrictions on solicitation and leafleting in airport terminals. The Court began by noting that the government owned and operated the airport terminals and that: Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than acting as a lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its actions will not be subjected to the heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject. 505 U.S. at 678 (quoting United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 725 (1990) (plurality opinion) (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 866, 896 (1961))). In Lee, the Court went on, however, to apply the factors identified in Cornelius to determine whether the airport terminals were public fora. The Court reasoned that the city's purpose in operating the airport was to generate a profit by serving the air-traveling public. The goal of the terminal was the facilitation of passenger air travel and not the promotion of expression. 505 U.S. at 682. The Court distinguished the restricted access in air terminals from other transportation nodes, such as rail and bus stations. Id. at 681. We do not read Lee, as SEPTA suggests, to mean that every time the government runs a commercial enterprise it has, by definition, decided not to create an open forum. To the contrary, it is the commercial and restricted nature of an airport concourse which suggested that the government did not intend the concourse to be primarily a forum for expression. See also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 799-800. Here, we have determined that the forum is not the SEPTA stations, but only the advertising space within the stations. We need not concern ourselves with solicitation or leafletting of the public within the stations but only with the use of the ad space itself. The nature of this forum is partly commercial, consistent with the goal of SEPTA to earn a profit on its advertising space and with CBM's offer to pay the commercial rate to lease that space. See Airline Pilots Assoc. v. Dept. of Aviation of the City of Chicago, 45 F.3d 1144, 1157 (7th Cir. 1995); Stewart v. District of 13 Columbia Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1019 (D.C. Cir. 1988). However, SEPTA has also used the advertising space to generate a profit through expressive activity. This expressive use has not interfered with providing rail transportation facilities to the public. Thus, the nature of the forum suggests, but by no means establishes, see Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974), that the government has dedicated the space to expression in the form of paid advertisements. See Southeastern Promotions, Limited v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (holding municipal theaters were public forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities). With these goals in mind, we next consider SEPTA's written policy governing permissible advertising. The contract between TDI and SEPTA provides that it is SEPTA's strong preference that [TDI] concentrate on securing advertising other than that which is tobacco and alcohol related. The contract directs that TDI use its best efforts to fill the space with other advertisements. Recognizing that TDI's responsibility under the contract is to produce revenues, the contract permits the combined sale of alcohol and tobacco advertising of up to twenty percent of the annual dollar value of the advertising. TDI also, however, has an obligation to pursue qualified public health groups, as identified by SEPTA and to make advertising space available to them on a one to one ratio to the tobacco and alcohol related advertising at that time, subject to space availability. In addition, the contract reserves for SEPTA the right to reject advertisements that it does not like: All advertising displays at any time inserted or placed by the Licensee in any display devices in any vehicle and /or locations shall be of an appropriate character and quality, and the appearance of all displays shall be acceptable to SEPTA. No libelous, slanderous, or obscene advertising maybe accepted by the Licensee for display in the Authority's transit and railroad vehicles and facilities. All advertising determined by the[sic] SEPTA, in its sole discretion, as objectionable within the meaning of this subsection must not be utilized on any SEPTA vehicle or facility. SEPTA shall have the 14 right to immediately remove any advertising material which has already been applied, in the event that the [sic] SEPTA deems material objectionable for any reason, at the expense of the Licensee. SEPTA argues that because it retained the right in its sole discretion to reject or to remove any advertisement that it deems objectionable, it did not create a public forum of any sort. The authority's own statement of its intent, however, does not resolve the public forum question. Gregoire v. Centennial School District, 907 F.2d 1366, 1374 (3d Cir. 1990) (reasoning that intent, as evidenced by a government's statements, is a factor to be considered, but that the forum inquiry does not end with the government's statement of intent); see also Air Line Pilots Association, Int'l. v. Dept. of Aviation, 45 F.3d 1144, 1153-1154 (7th Cir. 1995); Stewart v. Dist. of Columbia Armory Bd., 863 F.2d 1013, 1016-1017, 1020 (D.C.Cir. 1988). Furthermore, the fact that SEPTA has reserved for itself the right to reject ads for any reason at all does not signify, in and of itself alone, that no public forum has been created. See Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1375. In Gregoire, we warned that standards for inclusion and exclusion in a limited public forum must be unambiguous and definite if the concept of a designated open forum is to retain any vitality whatever. 907 F. 2d at 1375. We do not hold that the government could never, pursuant to an open-ended policy of excluding speech as it sees fit, effectively close the forum to certain speech (or maintain an entirely closed forum) through a consistent practice of so doing. But the fact that the government has reserved the right to control speech without any particular standards or goals, and without reference to the purpose of the forum, does not necessarily mean that it has not created a public forum. If anything, we must scrutinize more closely the speech that the government bans under such a protean standard. See Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1375; id. at 1386 (Stapleton, J., dissenting); Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2414-2415 (1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lebron, 69 F.3d at 661-662 (Newman, C.J., dissenting). 15 SEPTA's purpose in operating the forum and its written policies governing access provide no conclusive answer as to whether the forum is intended to be closed or open. The goal of generating income by leasing ad space suggests that the forum may be open to those who pay the requisite fee. SEPTA has specified a few areas in which it will not freely accept advertising: alcohol and tobacco advertising beyond a specified limit and ads deemed libelous or obscene. These restrictions do not apply to the CBM posters. Beyond these limitations, there are no specific restrictions on the type of advertising that SEPTA will accept. In effect, SEPTA's reservation of the right to reject any ad for any reason does not conclusively show that it intended to keep the forum closed. We turn now to SEPTA's past practice in using the advertising space, and the suitability of the forum to the speech in question. B. SEPTA's Past Practice and the Suitability of th e Forum for CBM's Ad SEPTA has accepted a broad range of advertisements for display. These include religious messages, such asFollow this bus to FREEDOM, Christian Bible Fellowship Church; an ad criticizing a political candidate; and explicitly worded advertisements such as Safe Sex Isn't and an advertisement reminding viewers that Virginity-It's cool to keep and Don't give it up to shut `em up. Indeed, many ads address topics concerning sex, family planning, and related topics. Other examples include a controversial ad campaign on AIDS education and awareness, posters stating The Face of Adoption Consider Adoption and Every child deserves a family, and another ad reading Pregnant? Scared? Confused? A.R.C. Can Help Call 1-800884-4004 or (215-844-1082.) On the topic of abortion, SEPTA has accepted two ads. One read Choice Hotline, For Answers to Your Questions About: Birth Control  Pregnancy  Prenatal Care  Abortion  Adoption  HIV/AIDS  Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs) Abortion - Making A Decision, Call State Health Line 1-800-692-7254 For Free Booklet on Fetal Development, 16 Fetus is Latin for Little one - A Little Human is a Baby, Confidential  Free. The other one addressed the health benefits of legalizing abortion: When Abortion Was Illegal, Women Died. My Mother Was One of Them. Keep Abortion Legal and Safe. Support the Clara Bell Duvall Education Fund. 471-9110. From the broad range of ads submitted, SEPTA has requested modification of only three. One was the large wrap-around bus ad for Haynes hosiery, which would have covered the entire bus with the picture of a scantily clad woman; it was too risque. The same ad was accepted as a smaller poster ad on the sides of buses. SEPTA also asked for modification of an ad depicting a gun with a condom stretched over it. The text of the ad, Safe Sex Isn't, ultimately ran without the graphics. SEPTA also requested that an advertisement for a personal injury law firm delete references to rail accidents. We conclude then, based on SEPTA's written policies, which specifically provide for the exclusion of only a very narrow category of ads, based on SEPTA's goals of generating revenues through the sale of ad space, and based on SEPTA's practice of permitting virtually unlimited access to the forum, that SEPTA created a designated public forum. Moreover, it created a forum that is suitable for the speech in question, i.e., posters which presented messages concerning abortion and health issues. CBM paid for advertising space which had previously been used for ads on those topics. We need not define the precise boundaries of the forum, particularly concerning visual images that could be considered explicit. The topic of abortion and its health effects were, however, encompassed within the purpose of the forum. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. SEPTA argues, however, and the district court concluded, that the instances in which SEPTA requested modification of ads demonstrate that SEPTA maintained tight control over the forum. This reasoning is consistent with a number of cases, holding that generally when permission is necessary before ads are posted, the government has not created a public forum. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 47. In this case, however, at least 99% of all ads are posted without 17 objection by SEPTA. As we note above, SEPTA has exercised control over only three ads, two of which had graphics to which SEPTA objected, and one of which solicited personal injury cases that could be directed against SEPTA. In one case, the concern with the graphics was unique to the wrap-around type bus ad -- concerns not implicated here. In all three cases, after negotiation with the sponsor, the ads were permitted to run with some modification. Because of SEPTA's policy in accepting ads, including two on the specific topic in question, the argument that SEPTA has tight control over the forum may apply to ads which are similar to the ones for which SEPTA has required modification. That does not mean, however, that such control applies to subject matter over which SEPTA has never before exercised any restrictions. Because the forum may be limited in one way does not foreclose its status as a public forum with respect to other categories of speech. If it did, there would have been no limited public forum in Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267, or in Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2510. Both cases involved designated fora which excluded non-student groups. Nor would there have been a limited public forum in Kreimer, where the library constituted a public forum although it was open only to certain kinds expression.5 _________________________________________________________________ 5. In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 116 S.Ct. 2374, 2388 (1996) (plurality opinion), the Court was troubled by how to characterize the government's decision to limit a forum to exclude certain speech. Does strict scrutiny apply, Justice Breyer asked for the plurality, if the government builds a band shell in the park and dedicates it solely to classical music (but not to jazz)? Justice Kennedy responded that the correct analogy to the cable system at issue was the Government's creation of a band shell in which all types of music might be performed except rap music, and went on to say that the provisions here are content-based discriminations in the strong sense of suppressing a certain form of expression that the Government dislikes, or otherwise wishes to exclude on account of its effects, and there is no justification for anything by strict scrutiny here. 116 S.Ct. at 2374 (Justice Kennedy, concurring and dissenting). In this case, the past practice of permitting much speech, particularly that on the topic of abortion, makes Justice Kennedy's analogy apt. 18 But we reiterate that the government's exercise of some restrictions on speech does not foreclose a public forum. We do not hold that merely because the government may have had a past practice of permitting some expressive activity, it has created a public forum. Standing alone, a past practice of permitting some expressive activities or limited discourse does not mandate that the government intended the forum as public. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 720; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.6 We must look at the past practice in conjunction with the purpose of the forum. In Cornelius, although the government permitted speech in the forum, the extensive criteria for admission to the forum and the government's purpose in creating the forum demonstrated that the government intended the forum to be closed. 473 U.S. at 804-805; see also, Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730; Perry, 460 U.S. at 47-48. Here, on the other hand, the purpose of the forum does not suggest that it is closed, and the breadth of permitted speech points in the opposite direction. Moreover, there is no evidence that SEPTA rejected the ad pursuant to a new or previously existing policy to close the forum to debatable or misleading speech generally, or _________________________________________________________________ Our consideration of the similarity of the speech in question to speech permitted in the past is related to a determination of whether the limitation constitutes viewpoint discrimination, although here we make that inquiry only in conjunction with the other factors in the public forum analysis. We do not reach the viewpoint discrimination issue in this case. Even if we concluded that no viewpoint discrimination took place, however, this would not make the past use of the space irrelevant in determining whether the forum is public. How the forum has been used in the past is a core component of the public forum inquiry. See, e.g., Cornelius at 803-805; see also Denver Area Consortium, 116 S.Ct. at 2415 (Kennedy, J. concurring and dissenting) (It contravenes the First Amendment to give Government a general license to single out some categories of speech for lesser protection so long as it stops short of viewpoint discrimination.). 6. In Kokinda, only four Justices concluded that no public forum had been created. Four Justices reached exactly the opposite exclusion -- a limited public forum had been created -- based in large part on the past practice of permitting speech in the forum. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 750. 19 closed it to such speech on any particular topic of health. To the contrary, SEPTA simply argues that the forum was closed, and will be closed, to any speech that SEPTA wishes to exclude for any reason. In other words, SEPTA does not argue that the forum is closed to this particular type of speech because SEPTA views it differently from the speech it has permitted in the past. Instead, SEPTA claims the forum is closed to all speech, and that short of viewpoint discrimination, SEPTA can make any content-based restrictions it chooses. SEPTA's prior acceptance of a broad range of advertisements cuts particularly strongly against this claim. Cf. Gregoire, 907 F.2d at 1373. As Justice Kennedy reasoned in Denver Area Consortium,[t]he power to limit or redefine forums for a legitimate purpose [citation omitted] does not allow the government to exclude certain speech or speakers from them for any reason at all. 116 S.Ct. at 2414 (Kennedy, J.) (concurring and dissenting). The Seventh Circuit has also concluded, in a case similar to this one, that a transportation authority created a limited public forum. Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Chicago Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1985). In Planned Parenthood, the Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) refused to lease advertising space to Planned Parenthood for display of abortion-related advertisements. Although CTA had rejected an anti-Vietnam war ad (later displayed as part of a settlement agreement), and an Impeach Nixon placard (later displayed pursuant to court order), CTA had accepted an anti-war ad depicting large bombs falling on a child releasing a dove with an olive branch in its beak. 767 F.2d at 1230. The court concluded that CTA had created a limited public forum, reasoning that CTA maintains no system of control over the advertisements that it accepts ... other than the general contractual directive .... to refuse vulgar, immoral, or disreputable advertising and that CTA has allowed its advertising space to be used for a wide variety of commercial, public-service, public-issue, and political ads. Id. at 1232-1233. Noting as well that CTA had no policy pursuant to which the ad was excluded, the court concluded that the transportation authority had created a public forum. We are confronted with a similar factual situation in this case, and we reach the same conclusion. 20 In arguing to the contrary, SEPTA relies primarily on Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund , 473 U.S. 788,902 (1985) and Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School, 776 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1985). In Cornelius, however, the government had a consistent policy, spanning more than two decades, of limiting the charity drive to organizations that provided direct health and welfare services to individuals . . ..7 473 U.S. at 793. The purpose of the charity drive, moreover, was to limit the disruptive effects of individual charity drives throughout the year, by lessening the amount of expressive activity occurring on public property. Id. at 805. Here, there is no comparable policy and practice demonstrating that the government intended that the forum be closed to the speech at issue in this case. Indeed, the record points exactly the other way. In its efforts to generate advertising revenues, SEPTA permitted abortion-related and other controversial advertisements concerning sexuality. In Student Coalition for Peace v. Lower Merion School, 776 F.2d 431, 436 (3d Cir. 1985), we considered the refusal of a school board to permit a Peace Fair on the school's athletic field or inside the boys' gymnasium. A student organization, not sponsored by the school, which advocated a bilateral nuclear freeze, sought to conduct the fair at the school. The school had permitted use of the athleticfield for a Special Olympics, for a Memorial Day service, for a Bike Hike, and for jogging, picnics, and similar activities. 776 F.2d at 434. The board rejected the request pursuant to an unwritten, but long-standing policy of reserving the athletic field for athletic and governmental purposes. The board noted that use of the gym could cause damage to thefloor, and offered the use of the auditorium, which the group _________________________________________________________________ 7. This policy was in effect from 1963 until 1982. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 792. During 1982 and 1983, some legal defense funds participated in the charity drive under court order. An Executive Order issued in 1983 limited participation to voluntary, charitable, health and welfare agencies that provide or support direct health and welfare services to individuals or their families, excluding [a]gencies that seek to influence the outcomes of elections or the determination of public policy through political activity or advocacy, lobbying, or litigation on behalf of parties other than themselves. 473 U.S. at 795. 21 rejected. We concluded, because permission to use the facilities in question was not granted as a matter of course and because the nature of the property suggested the facilities did not have as their primary purpose expressive activities, that the government had not created a limited public forum. Id. at 436-437. The property at issue here, on the other hand, has been dedicated to expressive activity of exactly the sort in which petitioners seek to engage. Moreover, as to the subject of abortion specifically, and family planning issues generally, permission to post advertisements has been granted as a matter of course. There is no policy, written or unwritten, pursuant to which CBM's ads were removed. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) is similarly inapposite. In Lehman, the Court considered a ban on political advertising in the city's transit vehicles. A candidate for city council challenged the city's rejection of his ad pursuant to the city's policy, which had been in effect for 25 years. The card space, the Court reasoned, was a commercial venture, and the city was free to limit the space to enhance commercial revenues, and to protect riders from the blare of political propaganda. Id. at 303304. As we have made clear, however, SEPTA has no longstanding practice of prohibiting ads like CBM's; nor does it have any policy pursuant to which the ads were removed. SEPTA's past practice is, instead, to include such ads. Because we find that SEPTA has created a designated public forum, content-based restrictions on speech that come within the forum must pass strict scrutiny to comport with the First Amendment. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. As the Supreme Court explained in Police Dept. of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 92, 95, above all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content. Thus the government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views. And it may not select which issues are worth discussing or debating in public facilities. Id. at 96. The prohibited expression in this case, CBM's ad, falls within the scope of the forum created by 22 SEPTA. Thus, SEPTA's restriction is subject to heightened review. SEPTA has not argued that its actions survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, we conclude that CBM's First Amendment rights were violated when SEPTA removed CBM's ads.