Opinion ID: 2634842
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alternative Summary Judgment Theories

Text: Two alternative summary judgment grounds remain for us to consider: negligence and causation. The Guerreros claim that the department acted negligently in failing to provide two different kinds of warning signs: signs warning pedestrians against crossing C Street at 22nd Avenue and signs warning approaching motorists on C Street that pedestrians might be crossing the roadway at 22nd Avenue. They assert that this negligence caused Alexander's injuries. As the moving party, the department had the entire burden of proving its right to summary judgment; unless the department advanced prima facie evidence of non-negligence or lack of causation, the Guerreros had no duty to submit evidence supporting their allegations on these points. [107] On appeal, the department has not expressly argued that it established a prima facie case of non-negligence or lack of causation. But it indirectly raises these issues. A claim of non-negligence seems implicit in its argument that it had no duty to post signs at the accident site; and the department presented evidence on this point with its motion for summary judgment: state traffic safety expert Ron Martindale submitted an affidavit suggesting that there was no need for warning signs at the intersection. The department similarly raises an implied claim of lack of causation; it argues that the Guerreros' warning-sign claims are not factually related to Alexander Guerrero's accident, specifically contending that a No Pedestrian Crossing sign would have been useless because Alexander did not know how to read and that an advance School Crossing sign would have been futile because Alexander was not a student and the accident occurred outside the usual hours of school. For purposes of considering these points, we assume that the department made a prima facie showing of non-negligence and lack of causation; our inquiry thus centers on determining whether the Guerreros presented any rebuttal evidence raising genuine issues of material fact on negligence and causation.
The Guerreros rely partly on the Traffic Manual as evidence supporting their claim that the department acted negligently in failing to post warning signs. The Manual establishes three levels of recommendation for warning signs: shall, should, and may. It defines them as follows: 1. SHALL  a mandatory condition. Where certain requirements in the design or application of the device are described with the shall stipulation, it is mandatory when an installation is made that these requirements be met. 2. SHOULD  an advisory condition. Where the word should is used, it is considered to be advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory. 3. MAY  a permissive condition. No requirement for design or application is intended.[ [108] ] Although the Manual emphasizes that these recommendations are not legal requirements, [109] they nonetheless provide useful and authoritative guidance concerning the level of care that would generally be necessary to meet the department's operational duty to post adequate traffic signs. In a case where the Traffic Manual merely suggests that a sign may be posted, it simply describes a permissive condition. [110] This designation recognizes that installing a sign is generally an acceptable option under the specified conditions, but it gives no specific advice as to what choice the department should actually make. A may recommendation thus creates no inference that failing to install a sign amounts to negligence in any particular case. By contrast, the Manual does affirmatively give advice when it says that a sign should be installed, specifically declaring that, under the stated conditions, installing a sign is considered to be advisable usage. [111] This amounts to a qualified recommendation: it advises that due care would generally call for installing a sign, but also recognizes considerable leeway for individual exceptions. [112] The Manual's advice grows even stronger when it says that a sign shall be installed: by defining shall as a mandatory condition, the Manual unequivocally advises that when the specified conditions are met, due care requires installing a sign in all but extraordinary cases. [113] As applied to the two types of warning signs at issue here  No Pedestrian Crossing signs and Advance Crossing signs (that is, signs giving motorists advance warning that pedestrians may be crossing the roadway), the Traffic Manual produces different recommendations. As to no-crossing signs, the Manual takes the neutral position that posting may be appropriate: Pedestrian Crossing signs may be used selectively to aid in limiting pedestrian crossing to safe places.... The No Pedestrian Crossing sign may be used to prohibit pedestrians from crossing a roadway at a point which is considered to be hazardous, especially in front of a school or other public building where a crossing is not designated.[ [114] ] As noted above, because this recommendation is merely permissive it does not imply the existence of negligence or non-negligence in any particular case. As to Advance Crossing signs, the Manual takes a stronger position, recommending that Advance Crossing signs should be used to alert vehicle operators to unexpected entries into the roadway by pedestrians, trucks, bicyclists, animals, and other potential conflicts. [115] Because should affirmatively advises installing a sign in specified situations, this recommendation alone, if shown to apply to the disputed intersection, would raise a triable question of fact on the issue of negligence. [116] Here, the required showing was made. The Guerreros submitted an affidavit signed by their own traffic expert, Edward M. Stevens, who concluded that crossing C Street at 22nd Avenue on foot in times of heavy traffic would be inherently unsafe, especially for young children. According to Stevens, [w]arning signs, such as an advance pedestrian crossing sign, a pedestrian crossing sign, or a no pedestrian crossing sign, were appropriate with the intersection of 22nd avenue and C street. Stevens based his opinion on gap and traffic-volume studies of the specific intersection. These studies reveal that: (1) [t]he location nearly meets gap warrant criteria for a grade-separated pedestrian over-crossing; and (2) [t]here were several 15 minute periods when no acceptable [time delays sufficient for a pedestrian to cross] were recorded. Stevens's expert opinion could support a reasonable inference that conditions at the intersection triggered the Manual's recommendation that advance warning signs should be installed. Therefore, Stevens's affidavit, coupled with the Manual's recommendation, raises a triable issue of fact as to the department's negligence in failing to install an advance-warning sign. To be sure, as already mentioned, the department offered opposing evidence from its own traffic safety expert, Martindale, who emphasized that unnecessary use of warning signs can be counterproductive because it breeds disrespect for all signs. [117] Yet the general proposition that signs should not be overused fails to address the specific conditions at the intersection of 22nd Avenue and C Street. The Guerreros presented evidence showing that a heavily used footpath led from the Loussac Manor housing complex to C Street and 22nd Avenue and that this intersection, in turn, provided the most direct route to a nearby elementary school on the far side of C Street. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Guerreros, this evidence would tend to refute Martindale's implied assertion that the intersection at C Street and 22nd Avenue was no more dangerous than other unmarked intersections along the A/C couplet, so a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the need for an advance-warning sign. The Guerreros' evidence similarly raises a genuine issue of fact concerning potential negligence in failing to install a No Pedestrian Crossing sign. Stevens's affidavit could support a finding that the department violated its duty of due care in failing to install a No Pedestrian Crossing sign; this evidence thus independently tends to show negligent conduct, despite the Manual's neutral may recommendation as to the general advisability of posting No Pedestrian Crossing signs. The conflicting evidence in the record concerning these points thus precludes the department from claiming that it was entitled to summary judgment because of unrebutted evidence showing that it acted non-negligently in failing to post warning signs.
The record similarly contains conflicting evidence precluding the department from prevailing on the alternative theory that its failure to post warning signs could not have caused Alexander's injury. As already mentioned, the department reasons that a sign prohibiting pedestrians from crossing C Street would have been futile because Alexander was too young to know how to read, and that a sign warning motorists that the intersection was a school crossing would have been useless because Alexander was not a student and the accident occurred outside the usual hours of school. These arguments mistakenly assume that the Guerreros limited their claim to the department's failure to post signs warning motorists to beware of students crossing C Street or signs warning in writing that pedestrians should not cross the street. The Guerreros' negligent signing claim and their supporting evidence asserted broader positions. Because the criteria specified in the Traffic Manual for Advance Crossing signs broadly include all potential conflicts between pedestrians and motorists [118]  not just conflicts between student pedestrians and motorists  we see no basis for assuming that the department would only have needed to post advance-warning signs that alerted motorists to the danger of students crossing C Street during normal school hours. Neither the Guerreros' negligent warning sign claim nor their expert's affidavit was confined to this narrow theory. Furthermore, insofar as the Guerreros asserted that the department was negligent in failing to install No Pedestrian Crossing signs, we find little reason to assume that Alexander's inability to read would necessarily rule out causation. The sample No Pedestrian Crossing sign set out in the Traffic Manual consists of a non-textual warning: it uses no words and simply depicts the figure of a pedestrian in the middle of a red circle with a diagonal slash drawn through the figure. [119] The Manual expressly points out that either this pictorial warning or a word message sign may be used when a No Pedestrian Crossing sign is installed. [120] Neither Alexander's illiteracy nor his parents' prior warnings would necessarily preclude a finding that he might have understood and heeded a simple, clear, and immediate picture warning like the one in the Manual. Since the state failed to produce any evidence establishing that a pictorial sign could not have been posted or that Alexander could not have understood and heeded such a sign, we conclude that the record fails to reveal undisputed evidence demonstrating that it was entitled to summary judgment based on lack of causation.