Opinion ID: 748364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grullon's and Mendez's Motions to Withdraw Guilty Pleas

Text: 25 Motions to withdraw guilty pleas before sentencing are governed by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(e). See United States v. Reyes, 13 F.3d 638, 639 (2d Cir.1994). Although Rule 32(e) provides that a defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea upon a showing of a fair and just reason, it is basic that [a] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. United States v. Williams, 23 F.3d 629, 634 (2d Cir.1994). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating valid grounds for relief. See United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1529 (2d Cir.1997). In determining whether a fair and just reason exists to justify withdrawal of a guilty plea, a district court should consider: (1) the time lapse between the plea and the motion; and (2) whether the government would be prejudiced by a withdrawal of the plea. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(e), Advisory Committee Notes. However, the government need not demonstrate prejudice where the defendant fails to show sufficient grounds to justify withdrawal of the plea. Maher, 108 F.3d at 1529. 26 To get permission to withdraw a guilty plea, a defendant must raise a significant question about the voluntariness of the original plea. See Id. A defendant's bald statements that simply contradict what he said at his plea allocution are not sufficient grounds to withdraw the guilty plea. Id. 27 The decision to allow a guilty plea to be withdrawn is committed to the discretion of the district judge, see United States v. O'Hara, 960 F.2d 11, 14 (2d Cir.1992), and is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Williams, 23 F.3d at 635. 28 A motion to withdraw a guilty plea may be denied without a hearing where the defendant's allegations merely contradict the record, are inherently incredible, or are simply conclusory. United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095, 1100 (2d Cir.1992). Grullon's First Motion to Withdraw 29 Grullon argues that his first motion to withdraw the guilty plea should have been granted because he was coerced by his attorney into pleading guilty and because his attorney was ineffective when she failed to call witnesses at a pretrial suppression hearing. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Grullon's first motion. 30 A review of the record indicates that Grullon's plea was completely voluntary and knowing. During his plea, he was explicitly asked by the district court judge whether anyone forced him to accept this arrangement, to which he responded no. Grullon was given every chance by the district court to raise any concerns, questions or anxieties about the plea. Grullon also waited over seven months to move formally to withdraw his plea. Considering that statements at a plea allocution carry a strong presumption of veracity, see Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.Ct. 1621, 1629, 52 L.Ed.2d 136 (1977), and that his unequivocal admissions under oath contradict his unsupported assertions of pressure, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Grullon's motion. See Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1101. 31 We decline to address Grullon's argument that his counsel was constitutionally ineffective by failing to interview and call certain witnesses at a pretrial suppression hearing. A defendant who pleads guilty unconditionally while represented by counsel may not assert independent claims relating to [the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred] prior to the entry of the guilty plea. United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 497 (2d Cir.1996). Rather, a defendant may only attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the guilty plea by showing that the advice he received from counsel was not within [acceptable] standards ...  Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 1608, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). 32 In addition, the district court's decision to deny Grullon's motion without an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion. We discern no reason to disturb the district court's conclusion that Grullon's clear and knowing plea allocution and his extreme delay in making the motion demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. See United States v. Clements, 992 F.2d 417, 419 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Saft, 558 F.2d 1073, 1082 (2d Cir.1977). Additionally, Grullon's allegations merely contradicted the record, and this does not require an evidentiary hearing. See Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1100. Grullon's Second Motion 33 Grullon argues that the district court again abused its discretion when it denied his second motion to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his third attorney was constitutionally ineffective. Specifically, Grullon is dissatisfied with an affidavit that counsel filed in support of his motion. Grullon cavils that the affidavit was not as detailed as those submitted by Grullon himself. Again, this claim is without merit. 34 To allege a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim a defendant must show that: (1) counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient under prevailing professional standards, and, (2) but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there exists a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 35 Grullon cannot satisfy either of these requirements. Grullon's counsel's actions did not fall below a reasonable level of competence. The district court found that counsel's papers on the first motion were competent and well drafted. Grullon's counsel submitted motion papers in support of Grullon's motion to withdraw his guilty plea that included (1) a four-page declaration by counsel; (2) a 20-page affidavit by Grullon prepared by counsel; (3) a 16-page supplemental affidavit by Grullon prepared by Grullon and (4) a 12-page Memorandum of Law prepared by counsel. Grullon's counsel's papers in support of the motion were thorough, well written and sufficiently detailed. Even if counsel's performance were unreasonably deficient, Grullon has offered no evidence that, but for counsel's deficiency, the result would have been different. Grullon fails to demonstrate that his plea was not knowing and voluntary and fails to allege any other grounds justifying withdrawal of his plea. Mendez's Motion 36 Mendez argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Mendez contends that his plea was involuntary because he decided to plead guilty out of fear his counsel was unprepared to go to trial. By the standards set out above, Mendez's claim also fails. 37 Judge Keenan correctly refused to credit Mendez's claim of involuntariness in light of Mendez's statements at the plea hearing that he faced no pressure or force, coupled with his complete failure to raise any concerns with the Court about the quality of his counsel or his counsel's preparedness for trial. During his plea allocution, Mendez answered no when specifically asked whether he had been coerced, pressured, or forced to plead guilty. The district court explicitly told Mendez to take his time, that the court was in no hurry and that he should not hesitate to raise any questions or concerns with the court. There is also no evidence that Mendez's counsel was unprepared for trial. Before Mendez's plea, his counsel had filed motions seeking to dismiss the charges, to suppress Mendez's post-arrest statement, for a severance and for a bill of particulars. At Mendez's suppression hearing, his counsel thoroughly cross-examined government witnesses. 38 In addition, Judge Keenan's decision to rule on Mendez's motion to withdraw his plea without an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion. Like his codefendants, Mendez offered merely contradictory statements to his plea allocution and no further support, hardly enough to require an evidentiary hearing. See Gonzalez, 970 F.2d at 1100. 39 Lastly, Mendez argues that the district court committed error by refusing to order the government to produce 16 recorded telephone conversations made by Mendez. Mendez argues that these tapes may have contained exculpatory statements made by Mendez that might have led his counsel to further witnesses. This argument is without merit. 40 The tapes requested by Mendez had already been provided to Mendez's former attorney; and there is no evidence that the tapes contained any exculpatory material. Moreover, even if the tapes might have led counsel to discover additional witnesses, Mendez, as a participant in the conversations, would have already known of such witnesses. It is well settled that evidence is not considered to have been suppressed within the meaning of the Brady doctrine if the defendant or his attorney either knew, or should have known of the essential facts permitting him to take advantage of [that] evidence. United States v. Gonzalez, 110 F.3d 936, 944 (2d Cir.1997).