Opinion ID: 2598779
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Other Prosecution Evidence

Text: One of the other crimes the prosecution proved was that defendant stabbed Cynthia B. in the abdomen on April 14, 1989, and that her injury required surgery. As part of the proof, the prosecution offered a single photograph of her scarred abdomen, which showed both the original stab wound and the surgical incision. Over objection, the court admitted the photograph, finding it not unduly gruesome, and that its probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. The victim testified as to which portion of the scar was due to the stab wound and which portion to the surgery. Defendant contends the court erred in admitting the photograph. We disagree. The evidence was relevant to show precisely what defendant did to this victim, which was relevant to the penalty determination. ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 655, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80.) Although witnesses orally described the wound, a photograph is also admissible to illustrate that testimony. ( People v. Scheid (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1, 15, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 348, 939 P.2d 748.) The victim's testimony enabled the jury to evaluate to what extent the photograph in question reflected the trauma of the assault rather than the effects of the surgery. ( People v. Wader, supra, at p. 656, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80.) Moreover, the surgery and its effects were part of the injury defendant inflicted, albeit indirectly. We see no abuse of discretion in admitting the photograph. ( Id. at p. 655, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80.) Over objection, the court permitted four of defendant's victims to testify about racial remarks defendant made to them while he committed the crimes. Defendant contends the court erred because the remarks were irrelevant to the penalty determination, were unduly prejudicial, and were constitutionally protected speech. We disagree. Although the remarks themselves were not criminal, they occurred in the course of violent criminal behavior, and they were thus admissible under [section 190.3,] factor (b) to demonstrate the aggravated nature of defendant's unlawful conduct. ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 916-917, 21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) Specifically, racial epithets from a defendant's own mouth are admissible to show the facts surrounding the crimes. ( People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 627-631, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788; People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188, 1219, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354; People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1189, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Contrary to defendant's contention, based on Dawson v. Delaware (1992) 503 U.S. 159, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309, admission of the evidence, relevant to actual criminal conduct, does not violate his constitutional free speech rights. ( People v. Quartermain, supra, at pp. 629, 631, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788.) Finally, because the remarks were properly admitted, the prosecutor properly mentioned them in his opening statement and closing argument. ( People v. Scott, supra, at p. 1219, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.)