Opinion ID: 2246592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Prosecutorial Remarks at Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant next argues that several statements that the prosecutor made during the second stage of the sentencing hearing entitle defendant to a new sentencing hearing. We cannot agree. Defendant's first challenge relates to the following remark that the prosecutor made during his opening statement of the second phase of the sentencing hearing: And Detective Langston, one of the things that he will tell you, he questioned Walter Thomas as regarding the prior sexual offenses and he told Walter Thomas, one or both of these cases with young women, just like Nancy Tarnowski and both of those cases young white women and both of those cases involved knives. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's reference to the victims' race was impermissible. While we agree that this statement was improper in this case, we cannot say that it functioned to deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. We must note first that no objection to this remark appears in the record. As such, defendant has waived any challenge for the purpose of this appeal. We also must decline to notice this challenge under the plain error doctrine. While we agree that this remark was improper, it had no effect on defendant's substantial rights. We addressed a similar prosecutorial reference to race in People v. Johnson (1986), 114 Ill.2d 170, 199, 102 Ill.Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355. We found there, as we find here, that the statement was unnecessary and potentially offensive, but it was not intended to incite racial prejudice, nor did it have that effect. There are several reasons why we find this remark to have had no effect on the jury's determination. First, it was an isolated statement. The prosecutor did not dwell on the victims' race. Second, the jury could plainly see that one of the victims that the prosecutor referred to is white because she testified, and it could plainly see that defendant is black because he was in the courtroom. Third, the jury was instructed to consider only the evidence, not the attorneys' remarks. It was also instructed that it could not be influenced by race. We cannot, therefore, say that there is a likelihood that the result would have been different had the prosecutor not made the statement. As such, we decline to disturb the sentence because of the prosecutor's unfortunate remark. Defendant also challenges a statement that the prosecutor made during his closing argument of the sentencing hearing: As his honor will tell you, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion, public feeling should not sway you and have no bearing upon your decision in this case. There is also no objection to this statement in the record. As such, this too has been waived for the purpose of this appeal. We likewise decline to notice this challenge under plain error doctrine. While we agree, seen only in this context, the prosecutor's remark was not a full and correct statement of the law, the jury was properly instructed by the court that it should not be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. (Emphasis added.) It was also instructed that the remarks of the attorneys were not evidence. As such, we will not disturb defendant's sentence for this reason either. Defendant next contends that several other remarks that the prosecutor made misstated the law and functioned to deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. Defendant challenges the following remarks: Under the law, as his honor will tell you and based upon the facts that you have already heard, the defendant must be sentenced to death, unless you find that there is some mitigating factor to preclude you from following the law and from imposing the sentence of death. Not just some mitigation. Not just that defendant had done some odd jobs or fixed up church steps or videotaped some church proceedings. Not just some mitigation, ladies and gentlemen, but sufficient to preclude you, under the law, from following your obligation as jurors. Some of the things I would like you to remember, ladies and gentlemen, when you are considering whether or not there is sufficient mitigation to preclude you from following the law in this case, and that is, to impose the death penalty, consider LeMay Russell, who testified, doesn't really know the defendant. She knows that he doesn't rape his neighbors or burglarize his neighbors, but that's about it. He is 31 years old. What does that tell you about this defendant? The defendant took the life of Darlene Dudek. He hoped that he would completely destroy that structure so his crimes could be hidden forever, but it wasn't, ladies and gentlemen, and today is a day of reckoning for Walter Thomas. Today is the day for you to impose what the law requires. Return a verdict requiring his honor, Judge Kowal, to impose the sentence of death. We note first that no objection to these remarks appears in the record. As such, defendant has waived his challenge for the purpose of this appeal. We also decline to find that these statements amounted to plain error. In the context in which they appear, these remarks might have misinformed the jury of their proper role. We find no likelihood, however, that the jury was misled by these statements. A review of the record indicates that the entire context of the sentencing hearing provided the jury with a sufficient understanding of its duty. The mere fact that the prosecutor was overzealous does not provide this court with the opportunity to disturb defendant's sentence, unless those statements operated to deny defendant a fair sentencing hearing. We cannot find such a denial in this case. People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233.