Opinion ID: 1059146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: dismissal of indictments

Text: Jackson assigns error to the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the capital murder indictments on the basis that Code § 19.2-264.4(B) is unconstitutional. The defendant raised this claim in a pre-trial motion and supporting memorandum. The circuit court denied the motion. Jackson now argues that Code § 19.2-264.4(B) contains a relaxed evidentiary standard that leads to inherently unreliable determinations of aggravating factors and unreliable death sentences. Citing the decisions in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), Jackson also seems to suggest that, in Virginia, the aggravating factors of future dangerousness and vileness are not decided by a jury based on proof of those factors beyond a reasonable doubt. [5] We find no merit in the defendant's arguments. First, before the sentence of death may be imposed, the Commonwealth must prove at least one of the statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Code § 19.2-264.4(C). Pursuant to Code § 19.2-264.3, a jury makes that determination, unless a jury trial is waived. Code § 19.2-257. Thus, to the extent Jackson suggests otherwise, he is incorrect. Next, Code § 19.2-264.4(B) does not contain a relaxed evidentiary standard or produce unreliable determinations of aggravating factors. Evidence relevant to sentencing in the penalty phase of a capital murder trial is admissible, subject to the rules of evidence governing admissibility. Id. We have held that this statute does not permit admission of irrelevant evidence. See Powell v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 107, 121, 590 S.E.2d 537, 546 (2004) (decided this day); Remington v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 333, 357, 551 S.E.2d 620, 634-35 (2001). Presentence reports from probation officers are specifically not admissible. Id. And, in Virginia, hearsay evidence also is not admissible during a penalty phase proceeding. Lovitt v. Warden, 266 Va. 216, 259, 585 S.E.2d 801, 826 (2003). Finally, we note that, although the defendant argues that the full procedural safeguards employed during the guilt phase of a capital murder trial must also be provided in the penalty phase, he never identifies what procedural safeguards were missing in his penalty phase proceeding. He also fails to enunciate what unreliable information was admitted into evidence during the penalty phase of his trial as a result of the supposed relaxed evidentiary standard. In other words, Jackson's complaints about the provisions of Code § 19.2-264.4(B) are merely hypothetical in nature. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in refusing to dismiss the indictments.