Opinion ID: 1871258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: radford's jurisdiction to search voichahoske

Text: Voichahoske argues that Radford illegally searched him because Radford was outside his primary jurisdiction when conducting the search and thus had no authority to act. Section 29-215 defines the jurisdiction and powers of law enforcement officers. The pertinent portions of § 29-215 provide: (1) A law enforcement officer has the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state and of the political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer or otherwise perform the functions of that office anywhere within his or her primary jurisdiction. (2) Any law enforcement officer who is within this state, but beyond his or her primary jurisdiction, has the power and authority to enforce the laws of this state ... or otherwise perform the functions of his or her office, including the authority to arrest and detain suspects, as if enforcing the laws or performing the functions within his or her primary jurisdiction in the following cases: .... (c) Any such law enforcement officer shall have such enforcement and arrest and detention authority when responding to a call in which a local, state, or federal law enforcement officer is in need of assistance. A law enforcement officer in need of assistance shall mean (i) a law enforcement officer whose life is in danger or (ii) a law enforcement officer who needs assistance in making an arrest and the suspect (A) will not be apprehended unless immediately arrested, (B) may cause injury to himself or herself or others or damage to property unless immediately arrested, or (C) may destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of a crime; and .... (4) For purposes of this section: .... (b) Primary jurisdiction means the geographic area within the territorial limits of the state or political subdivision which employs the law enforcement officer. (Emphasis supplied.) Voichahoske argues first that Radford lacked jurisdiction under § 29-215(2) because Reilly never told ... Radford that Voichahoske needed to be searched or they would lose evidence. Brief for appellant at 13. The trial court found that [a]s contended by the defendant, it does not appear that any of these factors [under § 29-215(2)(c)] are applicable to the facts at hand. Voichahoske's argument initially appears to have traction, but bogs down under further scrutiny. Voichahoske argues that Radford testified that ... Reilly never advised that he was concerned about losing evidence[;] Reilly never told ... Radford that Voichahoske needed to be searched or they would lose evidence. Brief for appellant at 13. Voichahoske essentially argues that Reilly never explicitly told Radford that he was concerned that evidence would be lost. But § 29-215(2)(c)(ii)(C) does not call for such specificity. Subsection (2)(c)(ii)(C) does not require that an officer requesting assistance tell the responding officer that he or she fears evidence will be lost. It asks (1) whether the suspect may destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of a crime, § 29-215(2)(c)(ii)(C), and (2) whether an officer needs assistance in making an arrest, § 29-215(2)(c)(ii). The statute fails to specify whether these questions are answered subjectively  what the requesting officer believed, or objectively  what a reasonable person under the circumstances could believe. But we need not decide this because both standards are met.