Opinion ID: 2383635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent to Exercise Dominion and Control Over the Gun

Text: Even if we assume that M.I.W. knew that the gun was located under the front passenger seat and that M.I.W. had the ability to exercise dominion and control over it, there can be no conviction on the basis of constructive possession unless it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that M.I.W. intended to exercise dominion and control over the gun. The government maintains that M.I.W.'s case is identical to In re F.T.J., 578 A.2d 1161 (D.C.1990), where we found that the evidence was sufficient to show constructive possession. There, appellant was a passenger in the back seat of a vehicle which had gone through a red light and which had unlawfully high beams. After three persons were told to get out of the car, the police found a semi-automatic rifle partly concealed beneath the driver's seat behind which appellant had sat. Id. In F.T.J., [b]etween six and nine inches of the gun, including the stock and the trigger, protruded out from behind the driver's seat. Id. In addition to the rifle, two revolvers were found, one under the driver's seat, and one under the front passenger seat. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict appellant because (1) the machine gun was clearly visible, (2) appellant would have seen the gun upon entering the vehicle due to an interior dome light, (3) appellant had been in the car for fifteen or twenty minutes and at some point would have, virtually, kicked the machine gun, (4) since there were three guns in the car, it was reasonable to infer that there was one gun per person, and 5) appellant, by his own account, had been shot in the stomach a month earlier, ... [and] `had a motive to have some weapons on him.' Id. (footnote omitted). M.I.W. is a vastly different case, with a vastly different evidentiary record. The machine gun here protruded less than one inch into the rear corner of the car. There is no evidence that M.I.W. had been in the car for a substantial period of time before it stopped on O Street, or that the vehicle had a functional interior light. The officer had a flashlight when he searched the car. There was only one gun found and three occupants. The record reveals no evidence that M.I.W. had been shot or had any reason to possess a weapon out of fear for his life. In addition here, as in Taylor, supra, the government presented no evidence connecting [M.I.W.] to the car..... [N]o evidence was presented concerning the car registration or any other information showing that [M.I.W.] owned the car. Nor was there any evidence showing that [M.I.W.] regularly used the car (or that he had ever used it prior to the night of his arrest) even if he did not legally own it. 662 A.2d at 1373. Furthermore, large quantities of crack cocaine were found on the driver and the passenger, not on M.I.W. Even on the facts of Burnette, supra, where the feet of the passenger in the rear of the car had to have come into contact with the weapon, we held that intent to exercise dominion and control could not reasonably be inferred. First, we were unwilling to infer such intent based upon the plain feel doctrine, and further concluded that the inference of a car passenger's intent to exercise control drawn solely from evidence of the passenger's convenient access to contraband... in a car should not be extended beyond situations where the evidence shows the contraband was in plain view of that passenger defendant. 600 A.2d at 1084. Here it is not reasonable for the court to infer beyond a reasonable doubt that M.I.W. had the intent to exercise dominion and control over the gun based on the plain view doctrine, since the gun protruded less than one inch into a rear corner of the car. Second, in Burnette, we concluded that proof of constructive possession may be furnished `by evidence linking the accused to an ongoing criminal operation of which that possession is a part.' Id. (citing Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 44 (D.C.1989)). Burnette's conviction was reversed because there was no evidence of a criminal venture on the defendant's part centering around possession of the gun, Id. Here there was no evidence that M.I.W. was engaged in any criminal activity whatsoever. Although large amounts of crack cocaine were found on the driver and the front seat passenger, nothing of an untoward nature was found on M.I.W. Furthermore, as the court observed in Burnette, the government did not present any evidence as to the relationship between appellant and the other two occupants of the car. Id. [3] In sum, the record here does not contain the requisite evidence from which a reasonable mind might fairly infer guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Gayden v. United States, supra 584 A.2d at 579.