Opinion ID: 1144098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the manslaughter instructions

Text: The trial court gave the following manslaughter instructions: [If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was unlawful, but you have a reasonable doubt whether the crime is murder or manslaughter, you must give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and find it to be manslaughter rather than murder.] Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice aforethought. It is not divided into degrees but is of two kinds, namely, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter. As applied to this case, voluntary manslaughter is the intentional and unlawful killing of a human being by another where the mental capacity of the defendant was so affected by mental disease or from some other cause as he was not able to harbor malice as has been heretofore defined for you in these instructions. As applied to this case, involuntary manslaughter is the unlawful killing of one human being by another due to diminished capacity, the defendant  by another if, due to diminished capacity, the defendant had neither malice as heretofore defined for you nor an intent to kill. (13a) Cantrell contends the instructions erroneously limited the basis for a manslaughter verdict to a consideration of diminished capacity. The instructions were proper. Under the evidence the only possible basis upon which the jury could have found Cantrell guilty of manslaughter was under the theory of a diminished capacity. Defense evidence presented at the guilt phase of the trial consisted entirely of the testimony of character witnesses and psychiatrists. No evidence was presented at the guilt phase, by either the People or the defense, from which it could have been inferred that Danny [ ] [W.] provoked the attack which caused his death or that Cantrell acted upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion. (Voluntary manslaughter, Pen. Code, § 192.) Likewise, no evidence was presented from which it could be inferred the death came about in any manner described in the statutory definition of involuntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192). The manslaughter instructions were not required in this case because the evidence was [not] susceptible of an interpretation that the homicide came within the statutory definition of manslaughter contained in Penal Code section 192. If the homicide was manslaughter, and not murder, it was [ ] manslaughter [ ] solely because of the existence of a diminished capacity (see People v. Castillo [(1969)] 70 Cal.2d 264, 270 [74 Cal. Rptr. 385, 449 P.2d 449]). (14) The rule requiring the court to instruct the jury upon every material question upon which there is any evidence whatsoever deserving of consideration ( People v. Modesto [(1963)] 59 Cal.2d 722, 727 [31 Cal. Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33]), does not imply instructions should be given on issues and questions not raised by the evidence. (13b) Here, the court's instructions properly limited the jury's consideration of manslaughter to a consideration of diminished capacity.