Opinion ID: 1318727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the court's jury instructions

Text: The defendant objected to the court instructing the jury concerning the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: In any event, our objection to Res Ipsa Loquitur is that it's not pleaded, number one; and, number two, that it has no application to this case in any event, when we talk about exclusive control in the context of the cases cited, among others, in the ALR 3d citation [32 ALR 3rd 1169] which I referenced. There is a split in the application of these types of case, depending on whether there is any element of causation attributable to anyone other than the party delivering the gasoline. And in this case, there is certainly an element of causation attributable at least factually to the Plaintiffs by virtue of possible Code violations. The exclusive control aspect of it, therefore, is not present in this case and Res Ipsa should not therefore apply. After remarks by the court concerning the relaxation of the requirement of control by a defendant, counsel continued his objection: There are other aspects that isthis is the type of situation that doesn't happen in the absence of someone's negligence. We have a rather unique set of circumstances here in which wind contributed apparently, according to the testimony, at least to the vent coming down into the engine and the engine running away. The engine running away increasing pump pressure, popping the nozzle out, gasoline spewing around. I don't agree that this is the type of situation that necessarily or even impliedly happens through someone else's negligence, and it's another reason why Res Ipsa, I believe, would not apply in the facts of this case.     Again I draw the Court's attention to the fact that we are talking about the standard of care of someone who is in the field, not known in general to the jury, and that in such cases such as medical malpractice or lawyer malpractice, whatever the field of specialty may be, but there is a requirement in our law that there be an expert in that field who can come in and testify that the individual concerned did something which was not within the recognized standard of that particular provision. The trial court informed the defendant's counsel that the court did not believe that it was necessary to plead res ipsa loquitur. After a recess, the defendant's counsel cited to the court Thorp v. Corwin, 260 Or. 23, 488 P.2d 413 (1971), stating that the case stood for the proposition that where specific allegations of negligence are pleaded, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is limited to those specific allegations. Counsel continued: Now, I don't know what the Court's intent was. If the Court's intent was to simply say that Res Ipsa may apply to the specific allegations of this case as they are left in the case, then I think Thorp vs. Corwin could be consistent with that. I had some trouble framing the language, but that's my intent, and I believe that's the current state of the law. That the Res Ipsa Loquitur, for a specific act of negligence to be pled, the Res Ipsa Loquitur has to arise out of those acts of conduct. Counsel then renewed his argument that expert witness opinion evidence was necessary to make a jury question on negligence in this case and for the doctrine to apply. After the lawyers had argued to the jury, the trial court instructed in part as follows: The fact that there was this explosion and this fire or that a person was injured or damaged is no indication that anyone was at fault. However, you may find that the Defendant was at fault if you find all the four elements are provenexcuse me, all of the four following elements are proven. First, that the fire damage was caused by igniting spilled gasoline. Secondly, at the time of the incident, the delivery truck and discharge of gasoline was under the control or management of the Defendant. Third, the Plaintiff's contribution to the incident did not preclude negligence on the part of the Defendant as alleged in Plaintiff's complaint. Fourth, in the normal course of events, the incident would not have occurred unless the Defendant was at fault. In this case, in order for either party to prevail on their claim for money damages, that party must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the other party was at fault in at least one of the ways alleged in their pleadings which was a cause of damage to that party, and that such fault upon the part of that party was at least equal to or greater than any fault of the other party.    Now, that applies to the specific acts of negligence which are contained in pleadings and which I'll review with you shortly. [Emphasis added.]         Well, you might say to yourselves: If they [the pleadings] are not in evidence, why is the Judge going to take our time to review the pleadings. Well, jurors, the pleadings do play a very important function in a trial, and that is that in your deliberations you may not go outside of the issues raised in the pleadings. The trial court then went on to review the claims of the plaintiff that were being submitted to the jury, telling the jury that the plaintiff contended that the negligence of the defendant consisted of the four specifications set forth above (slip op at 4). The trial court concluded this aspect of the instructions as follows: Now, it's the Plaintiffs' contention that those acts of negligence caused the damage that the Plaintiffs complain of. The defendant's counsel excepted as follows: We would except to the instruction based on our belief that this is not a case drawing into applicability the Doctrine of Res Ipsa, particularly as related in the fourth of the elements of the instructions as given to the jury that this is the type of accident that wouldn't have happened except for Defendant's fault. And based upon the absence of any negligence, any proof in this case that is in fact the situation, any expert witness to that effect.