Opinion ID: 393800
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violent Acts

Text: 61 Unlike the evidence of sexual relationships, the evidence offered at trial describing certain violent acts committed by Mr. Lynch clearly calls into play Rules 403 and 404(b). We find, however, that the district court properly admitted the evidence. 62
63 There can be little serious doubt that this evidence was relevant. As evidenced by Lynch's own summary, Brief of Carl Lynch at 13-14, most of the violent acts followed accusations that the victim had either stolen money or drugs intended for Lynch. The evidence was clearly probative of Lynch's leadership role in the conspiracy, as well as the roles of the victims, many of whom continued to participate in the conspiracy even after the physical abuse. 64
65 We next turn to the second factor in applying the rule whether the testimony should nonetheless have been excluded because danger of unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value. After carefully reviewing the incidents of violence cited by Lynch in his brief, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence. The court stated its position on the evidence of violent acts when it denied Lynch's motion to limit the number of witnesses testifying on the subject: 66 The Court has reviewed carefully defendant's motion and has stated on the record on several occasions its sensitivity to the possible prejudice which may result from proof of violent or otherwise sensational acts. Its review of the transcripts convinces the Court that the Government has acted to limit very carefully such events to avoid prejudicial description, questioning witnesses as to only the occurrence of a limited number of events; the Court is also aware, from the Government's proffer, of a number of incidents which have not been introduced. Rather than adopting a blanket rule, the Court will continue its policy of considering carefully the admission of such evidence when proffered; the Court again solicits the assistance of the parties in that regard. On that basis the motion is denied. 67 Tr. at 5312-13. 68 Most of the testimony of violent acts was elicited by the Government asking the witness a leading question, pursuant to an agreement between the Government and Lynch's lawyer. The following exchange is a representative example: 69 Q. While you were there, did Mr. Lynch have occasion to beat Gail and Jean? 70 A. Yes. 71 Tr. at 7441-42. We believe the trial court took the necessary precautions to insure that the evidence was not presented in a way that would unfairly prejudice Lynch. 72 Lynch argues that error resulted from the failure of the Government to conduct its presentation of such evidence in a manner likely to make clear to the jurors the limited purpose for which it is properly admissible. United States v. DeLoach, 654 F.2d 763 (D.C.Cir. 1980) (Tamm, J., concurring). Although the Government does not suggest that it argued its purpose for presenting the evidence of violent acts to the jury, we note that it did not have the benefit of this court's direction in Foskey and DeLoach. More importantly, Lynch has not contended that the Government argued the evidence to the jury in an impermissible manner. Our review of the record persuades us that given the method by which this evidence was presented at trial, it would not result in the jury believing Lynch was more likely to have committed the crimes with which he was charged because he was a bad man. Rather the testimony, to the extent that it encompassed bad acts, had a legitimate probative effect in that it tended to prove the nature of Lynch's management role in the conspiracy to show his particular relationship to the conspiracy and to the other conspirators. This was an essential element of the Government's case, the probative value of the evidence thereon outweighed any unfair prejudice, and the Government was entitled to prove that feature of its case by the best available evidence. No error was committed by its introduction.