Opinion ID: 2798272
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Status of Forces Agreement

Text: Patterson next argues that the Status of Forces Agreement (“SOFA”) governing American military personnel and their dependents in South Korea prohibits his extradition. Specifically, he argues that his extradition to Korea would expose him to double jeopardy in contravention of the SOFA, and that the SOFA confers a judicially enforceable right not to be extradited. The premise of Patterson’s argument is that PATTERSON V. WAGNER 15 rights conferred by the SOFA may be enforced by the judiciary to block extradition. We disagree with this premise. The United States and South Korea entered into the SOFA in 1966 pursuant to the mutual defense treaty between the two countries. Under the agreement, U.S. military personnel and their dependents in Korea are entitled to enumerated rights, including, as relevant here, the right “not [to] be prosecuted or punished more than once for the same offense.” Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., July 9, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 1677, 1780 (“SOFA”). The parties agree that the SOFA applies to Patterson, as he was the dependent of an American serviceman stationed in South Korea at the time of the murder. Patterson argues that his prosecution in South Korea for murder would violate the SOFA provision protecting against double jeopardy. He argues that his conviction for destruction of evidence required a finding by the South Korean court in that proceeding that he did not commit the murder for which extradition is now sought. This is so, he argues, because the statute under which he was convicted prohibits the destruction of evidence in connection with “a criminal . . . case against another.” Criminal Act, Act No. 293, Sept. 18, 1953, art. 155(1), amended by Act No. 5057, Dec. 29, 1995 (S. Kor.) (emphasis added). Thus, Patterson argues, the South Korean court was required to find in his earlier criminal trial that he was not the person who murdered Cho. We need not reach the question whether the SOFA forbids Patterson’s prosecution for murder in South Korea. A threshold question is whether, even if the double jeopardy 16 PATTERSON V. WAGNER provision of SOFA forbids the prosecution, we can enforce that provision by blocking his extradition. We conclude that the answer to this question is “no.” For purposes of our decision, we assume that there is no categorical prohibition against a federal statute, or a treaty or other international agreement to which the United States is a party, providing a basis for a judicial order blocking extradition. Cf. Trinidad y Garcia, 683 F.3d at 956–57. But it is clear that the SOFA is not such an international agreement. We agree with the Seventh and D.C. Circuits that a relator seeking to block extradition by relying on an international agreement must show, at a minimum, that the agreement upon which he relies establishes a judicially enforceable right. See In re Burt, 737 F.2d 1477, 1487–88 (7th Cir. 1984); Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf. Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (a treaty, though primarily “a compact between independent nations,” may contain “provisions which confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one of the nations . . . which are capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country”). Though the SOFA appears to establish individual rights, we conclude that they are not judicially enforceable. Confronted with a similar question regarding the NATO status of forces agreement, the Seventh and D.C. Circuits looked to whether the agreement established judicial or diplomatic mechanisms for adjudicating disputes. Burt, 737 F.2d at 1487–88; Holmes, 459 F.2d at 1222. In Burt, the Seventh Circuit held that recourse for a violation was “diplomatic, not judicial,” and on that basis rejected the relator’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 737 F.2d at PATTERSON V. WAGNER 17 1488. Similarly, in Holmes, the D.C. Circuit held that because the agreement required the parties to negotiate disputes “relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement,” the “enforcement mechanism” for the assertion of individual rights under the agreement was “diplomatic recourse only.” 459 F.2d at 1222. Here, as in Burt and Holmes, the U.S.-Korea SOFA establishes diplomatic procedures for resolution of matters arising under its provisions. It provides that “[a] Joint Committee shall be established as the means for consultation between [the United States and South Korea] on all matters requiring mutual consultation regarding the implementation of this Agreement except where otherwise provided.” SOFA at 1704. Amendments adopted in 2001 specify a procedure by which the Joint Committee’s jurisdiction is invoked: the state parties have ten days to resolve any complaint at the local level; the matter is then referred the Joint Committee, which has 21 days to resolve it; if the Committee cannot do so, the matter is referred to the two governments. Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces, U.S.-S. Kor., art. XXII, ¶¶ 5(c), 9, Jan. 18, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 13,138. Like the NATO agreement, the SOFA establishes an enforcement mechanism that is “diplomatic, not judicial.” Burt, 737 F.2d at 1488. The SOFA’s provisions thus establish a diplomatic conflict resolution scheme with no role for the judiciary. Even if prosecution of Patterson for murder violates the SOFA’s provision protecting against double jeopardy (a question we do not decide), that provision does not provide a basis for a court to bar his extradition. 18 PATTERSON V. WAGNER