Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory and Common Law Through 1976

Text: In this jurisdiction, the awarding of custody in the best interest of the child as the paramount consideration originated in Wells v. Wells, 11 App.D.C. 392, 395 (1897), a case in which each divorcing spouse, as a natural parent, had an equal claim to custody. See also Seeley v. Seeley, 30 App.D.C. 191, 193 (1907) (same), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 544, 28 S.Ct. 570, 52 L.Ed. 919 (1908). Five years after Wells, in a case where the father of eleven-year-old twins died and their mother remarriedand the children's maternal grandmother and aunt sought custodythe court, citing Wells, acknowledged once again that the paramount consideration was the permanent advantage and welfare of the children. Beall v. Bibb, 19 App.D.C. 311, 313 (1902). But, to that end, the court recognized the mother's preferential claim over any nonparent, absent a finding of unfitness based, for example, on abandonment or misconduct. Id. at 313-14 (citing cases from other state courts). In light of Beall, the guardianship statute has been construed over the years to give natural parents, including a surviving parent, priorityabsent a showing of unfitnessover a variety of nonparents who have contested the custody of minor children. See D.C.Code § 21-101 (1989); Shelton v. Bradley, 526 A.2d 579 (D.C.1987) (unwed father prevails over maternal grandmother); Davis v. Jurney, 145 A.2d 846 (D.C.1958) (mother prevails over husband's sister); Bell v. Leonard, 102 U.S. App.D.C. 179, 251 F.2d 890 (1958) (mother prevails over sister of child's alleged father); see also Johnson v. Lloyd, 211 A.2d 764 (D.C.1965) (mother prevails over married couple with whom four-year-old child had resided for over three years); Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724 (D.C.1962) (father prevails over maternal grandmother). [13] In another relatively old case, In re Stuart, 72 App.D.C. 389, 394, 114 F.2d 825, 832 (1940), the court similarly applied a parental preference in reversing a trial court ruling on a petition filed by the Probation Department of the Juvenile Court. The trial court found that a fifteen-year-old child living with her mother did not have adequate parental care, within the meaning of the Juvenile Court Act. 52 Stat. 596, ch. 309 (June 1, 1938). In contrast with the decisions discussed in the preceding paragraph, the trial court awarded custody to an unrelated person with whom the child, apparently, had never resided. The court of appeals reversed, ruling that the trial court's finding of inadequate parental care was without warrant in the evidence and thus violated the 1938 Act's incorporation of the natural parents' inherent constitutional right and liberty to direct the upbringing and education of their children, absent cruelty or neglect or unfit[ness] in character or mode of life. Stuart, 72 App.D.C. at 394, 396, 114 F.2d at 830, 832 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 533, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925)). In contrast with the cases in which parental preference was considered a rebutable presumption ( i.e., Beall, Seeley, Shelton, Davis, Bell, Johnson, Jackson, and Stuart ), later courts shifted to a best interests test, without regard to parental preference, in cases where a natural parent had earlier surrendered custody of her child to the welfare authorities (voluntarily or otherwise) or to an adoptive family and later sought to regain custody. See In re N.M.S., 347 A.2d 924 (D.C.1975) (foster parents, not mother, awarded custody in best interests of nine-year-old girl whom mother had voluntarily surrendered to Social Rehabilitation Administration when child was four days old); In re LEM, 164 A.2d 345 (D.C.1960) (mother permanently deprived of parental right to minor child, committed for two-and-one-half years to Child Welfare Division for lack of adequate parental care, whose best interests lay in Division's being in position to consent to adoption); Cooley v. Washington, 136 A.2d 583 (D.C. 1957) (custody determination reversed for application of best interests criteria to contest over thirteen-year-old boy between natural motherwho had surrendered child for adoption by her sister and brother-in-law, both now deceasedand child's stepmother, the brother-in-law's second wife); Holtsclaw v. Mercer, 79 U.S.App.D.C. 252, 145 F.2d 388 (1944) (foster parents of three-and-a-half year-old child retained custody in child's best interest when mother, who had relinquished child at birth, sought to regain custody on ground she had consented to arrangement under duress). [14] Three of these four cases reflect the court's view that in seeking to regain not retaincustody, N.M.S., 347 A.2d at 927, the natural parent by her earlier actions has put herself on an equal footing with the state, or with another nonparent, and thus, as a result, what is best for the child, rather than the natural right of the parent, is the controlling factor. Holtsclaw, 79 U.S.App.D.C. at 252, 145 F.2d at 388. Put another way, the probable welfare of the child is the controlling consideration[,] and all questions of superior rights are entirely subordinated. Cooley, 136 A.2d at 585 (footnote omitted). In sum, in a situation where there previously had been an acknowledgement or finding of unfitness resulting in a temporary withdrawal of custody from the natural parent, in a subsequent custody proceeding the fitness test yielded to a best interests test. Implicit in these rulings, with their language subordinating parental rights to a child's welfare, is the following understanding: although a child's interests ordinarily may be best served by granting custody to a fit parent, it is possible in some circumstances that the child's interests may be better served by someone other than a concededly fit parent. The fourth best interests case, LEM, added another dimension. It recognized that the prospect for adoption is an especially significant concern in evaluating the child's best interests. 164 A.2d at 347. As a consequence, the court authorized termination of parental rights with a view to facilitating adoption, although not in connection with an adoption proceeding itself. The opinion noted that [n]o attack is made on the court's statutory power to act as it did, and indeed none could be sustained in view of the court's plenary power in this area. Id., 164 A.2d at 349. Whatever the merits of this last observation at the time, it no longer applied to the statutory scheme adopted in 1970. See D.C.Code §§ 16-2301 to -2337 (1973) (incorporating Pub.L. 91-358, title I, § 121(a), 84 Stat. 535 (July 29, 1970)). In In re C.A.P., 356 A.2d 335 (D.C.1976), we stated that D.C.Code § 16-2320(a) (1973), while permitting the termination of parental rights, did so only in the context of an adoption proceeding.... [T]he sine qua non is that the adoptive parents petition the court for the child pursuant to D.C.Code §§ 16-301 to -315 (1973). C.A.P., 356 A.2d at 338; see White v. N.E.M., 358 A.2d 328 (D.C. 1976) (same). We held that Super.Ct. Neg.R. 18(c), which,in apparent implementation of a catchall provision, § 16-2320(a)(5) [15] expressly permitted termination of parental rights in the best interest of the child without regard to a pending adoption proceeding was, in essence, a nullity. See C.A.P., 356 A.2d at 336 & n. 1, 339 & n. 13, 344. As a result of C.A.P., parents enjoyed greater protection of their parental rights; a court could consider terminating parental rights only if an adoption petition was pending. Within the realm of adoption, however, the courts virtually ignored the parental rights of fathers of children born out-of-wedlock. In 1976, when C.A.P. was decided, the adoption statute did not require the consent of the father of a child born out-of-wedlock. See D.C.Code § 16-304(b)(2)(A), (C) (1973). Aside from constitutional considerations, any question of parental rights in an adoption proceeding as to a child born out-of-wedlock focused exclusively on the rights of the mother. But, even the rights of unwed mothers, as well as those of married parents, were statutorily limited. It is true that adoption was typically premised on consent, see id. § 16-304(b), or on an earlier relinquishment of parental rights, see id. § 16-304(a), coupled with a finding (among others) that the adoption will be for the best interests of the prospective adoptee, id. § 16-309(b)(3). The court, however, could grant the petition for adoption without a particular consent under certain circumstances: if the parent could not be located or had abandoned the child, id. § 16-304(d), or if the court found, after a hearing, that the consent was withheld contrary to the best interests of the child, id. § 16-304(e). Cf. D.C.Code § 16-202 (1951) (consent may be dispensed with when investigation has shown extraordinary cause). In this respect, the adoption statute reflected the same best interest test which had been applied for dispositions of neglected children whose natural parents had voluntarily or involuntarily surrendered custody. The caselaw development through 1976, therefore, reflects the following: 1. In a contest over custody of a minor child between a parent and a foster parent, or between a parent and the District of Columbia child welfare authorities, the natural parent would prevail absent a showing of unfitness (including neglect)with the following significant exception. 2. When there had been a surrender of custody to the child welfare authorities at the instance of the natural parent, or pursuant to court order upon a petition by the welfare authorities and a showing of neglect, any subsequent custody decision would be made exclusively with reference to the best interests of the child, and the parent would stand on no better footing than other participants (such as foster parents) seeking custody. Theoretically, therefore, a non-parent could obtain legal custody of the child in this situation without showing (current) parental unfitness. 3. After the C.A.P. decision in 1976, the courts could continue with a variety of dispositions for neglected children, such as foster care, in the best interests of the child, but they had no authority to terminate parental rights for neglect or otherwise, except in connection with an adoption proceeding. 4. As to children born out-of-wedlock, the court could approve an adoption in the child's best interests after the mother had relinquished her parental rights, or with the consent of the mother (or, when appropriate, by overriding her refusal to consent), without notice to, or consent of, the fathereven if he were known.