Opinion ID: 1036439
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Under Fraser, schools may restrict

Text: ambiguously lewd speech only if it cannot plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a social or political matter. Although Fraser involved plainly lewd, vulgar, profane, or offensive speech that “offends for the same reasons obscenity offends,” Saxe, 240 F.3d at 213 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685), student speech need not rise to that level to be restricted under Fraser. We conclude that schools may also categorically restrict ambiguous speech that a reasonable observer could interpret as lewd, vulgar, profane, or offensive—unless, as explained below, the speech could also plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a political or social issue. After all, Fraser made clear that “the determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests with the school board.” 478 U.S. at 683. The Supreme Court’s three other student-speech cases suggest that courts should defer to a school’s decisions to restrict what a reasonable observer would interpret as lewd, vulgar, profane, or offensive. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 403 (explaining that, power to reasonably regulate school-sponsored speech under Kuhlmeier, yet we have always viewed Fraser and Kuhlmeier as separate exceptions to Tinker. See, e.g., J.S., 650 F.3d at 927. 32 under Tinker, courts determine whether school officials have “reasonably conclude[d]” that student speech will substantially disrupt the school); id. at 405 (explaining that, under Kuhlmeier, courts uphold a school’s reasonable, pedagogically related restrictions on speech that an observer could reasonably attribute to the school); id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining that schools may restrict student speech that could “reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use” and that could not plausibly be interpreted as commenting on a political or social issue). This makes sense. School officials know the age, maturity, and other characteristics of their students far better than judges do. Our review is restricted to a cold and distant record. And we must take into account that these same officials must often act “suddenly and unexpectedly” based on their experience. Id. at 409–10 (majority opinion); see, e.g., WalkerSerrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 416–17 (3d Cir. 2003) (“There can be little doubt that speech appropriate for eighteen-year-old high school students is not necessarily acceptable for seven-year-old grammar school students. Human sexuality provides the most obvious example of age-sensitive matter . . . .” (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683–84)); Sypniewski, 306 F.3d at 266 (“What is necessary in one school at one time will not be necessary elsewhere and at other times.”). It remains the job of judges, nonetheless, to determine whether a reasonable observer could interpret 33 student speech as lewd, profane, vulgar, or offensive. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 402 (taking the same approach with respect to the message of drug advocacy on Frederick’s banner); see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2988 (2010) (“This Court is the final arbiter of the question whether a public university has exceeded constitutional constraints, and we owe no deference to universities when we consider that question.”). Whether a reasonable observer could interpret student speech as lewd, profane, vulgar, or offensive depends on the plausibility of the school’s interpretation in light of competing meanings; the context, content, and form of the speech; and the age and maturity of the students. See, e.g., Chandler, 978 F.2d at 530 (analyzing the word “scab” on buttons worn by students during a teacher strike to determine whether it was a vulgar, offensive epithet or just “common parlance” and concluding that, at the motion-to-dismiss stage, Fraser did not apply). Although this is a highly contextual inquiry, several rules apply. A reasonable observer would not adopt an acontextual interpretation, and the subjective intent of the speaker is irrelevant. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 401–02 (explaining that Frederick’s desire to appear on television “was a description of [his] motive for displaying the banner” and “not an interpretation of what the banner sa[id]”); see also Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216–17 (noting that students’ intent to offend or disrupt does not 34 satisfy Tinker). And Fraser is not a blank check to categorically restrict any speech that touches on sex or any speech that has the potential to offend. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 401, 409 (refusing to “stretch[] Fraser” so far as “to encompass any speech that could fit under some definition of ‘offensive’ and rejecting the argument that the “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” message on Frederick’s banner could be banned under Fraser, even though it “is no doubt offensive to some”); accord Eugene Volokh, May ‘Jesus Is Not a Homophobe’ T-shirt Be Banned From Public High School As ‘Indecent’ And ‘Sexual’?, The Volokh Conspiracy (Apr. 4, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/04/may-jesus-was-not- a-homophobe-T-shirt-be-banned-from-public-highschool-as-indecent-and-sexual/ (“But Fraser . . . hardly suggested that all speech on political and religious questions related to sexuality and sexual orientation could be banned from public high school.”). After all, a school’s mission to mold students into citizens capable of engaging in civil discourse includes teaching students of sufficient age and maturity how to navigate debates touching on sex. 35