Opinion ID: 2614001
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether defendant's failure to renew his motion at trial precludes appellate review of his Miranda claim

Text: (10a) As an initial matter, the Attorney General contends that, by failing to renew the Miranda motion in Placer County, defendant waived the issue. Defendant unsuccessfully moved, during his preliminary hearing in 1987, to exclude his statements on the ground they were obtained in violation of Miranda. In March 1988, prior to the commencement of trial in Butte County, defendant renewed his motion to exclude the statements on Miranda grounds. The court denied the motion. In March 1989, following the change of venue to Placer County, defendant again moved to suppress these statements, this time on the ground that the probability that their admission would prejudice defendant substantially outweighed their probative value. (Evid. Code, § 352.) Although at that time defendant did not renew his objection expressly on the basis of Miranda, the Placer County judge observed, after the prosecutor advised him that the judge in Butte County already had ruled upon the admissibility of the statements, that the Butte County court expressly had ruled that Miranda did not bar admission of the statements. The Placer County judge then stated that the only remaining questions were whether the statements were relevant and whether they should be sanitized, and defense counsel agreed with this assessment. [6] Defendant did not specifically renew his objection at the time the statements were admitted into evidence. We conclude that, under the circumstances described above, defendant did not waive the Miranda issue. (11) It is true that a judgment will not be reversed on the ground that evidence has been admitted erroneously, unless `there appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the objection or motion. ...' ( People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 853-854 [268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983], italics in Mattson, quoting Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Specificity is required both to enable the court to make an informed ruling on the motion or objection and to enable the party proffering the evidence to cure the defect in the evidence. [Citations.] ( People v. Mattson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 854.)  Miranda -based claims are governed by this rule. `The general rule is that a defendant must make a specific objection on Miranda grounds at the trial level in order to raise a Miranda claim on appeal.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 236 [246 Cal. Rptr. 713, 753 P.2d 669] [pretrial motion was not pursued to obtain a ruling]; People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048]; see also People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 54 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388]; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 519 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) (12) In addition, we have held that a pretrial ruling on a claimed violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights is subject to reconsideration by the trial court, and an objection on Fifth Amendment grounds to the admissibility of the evidence is waived if not made at trial when the evidence is offered. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1005 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]; cf. People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 975-976 [251 Cal. Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475] [issue preserved through stipulation that earlier ruling would be binding at new trial]; People v. Boyer (1989) 48 Cal.3d 247, 270-271, fn. 13 [256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610] [issue preserved because Miranda claim tied to binding ruling, pursuant to § 1538.5, that no detention occurred, so that objection at trial would have been futile].) (10b) Nonetheless, in People v. Morris, supra, 53 Cal.3d 152, 189-190, we concluded that if a motion to exclude evidence is made raising a specific objection, directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence, at the beginning of or during trial at a time when the trial judge can determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context, the issue is preserved for appeal without the need for a further objection at the time the evidence is sought to be introduced. In the present case, all three criteria are met, although the motion was made prior to trial. Moreover, as was the case in Morris, no event occurred after the in limine ruling and before the evidence was received at trial that so changed the context as to constitute a basis for reconsideration of the ruling. ( Id. at p. 189.) In addition, in People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 549-550 [280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290], we relied upon Morris to conclude that, because the three criteria outlined in Morris were met, the defendant had not waived the issue in question for purposes of appeal where, in a pretrial motion, the defendant had moved to exclude evidence based upon the psychotherapist-patient privilege and did not object at trial to admission of the evidence on that ground. Further, in People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561], we considered whether the defendant, having made a motion and having obtained a hearing pretrial on the issue whether to exclude his statements pursuant to Miranda, was entitled to another hearing on the Miranda issue during the trial. We concluded the defendant was not entitled to a second hearing, based in part upon the reasoning of Morris that such in limine hearings concerning the admissibility of evidence should be conducted separately, prior to the introduction of evidence at trial. ( Id. at p. 119.) In the present case, the comments of the Placer County judge suggest he considered the ruling of the earlier judge to be binding. Moreover, it would appear inconsistent to require that defendant renew his objection to such evidence at trial or lose his right to raise the issue on appeal, while concluding, nevertheless, that he is not entitled to any further hearing on the objection. (See People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 119.) Because we have held a defendant is not obligated to renew a pretrial motion that is based upon a statutory privilege, it would be anomalous to subject a defendant raising a claim arising under the Constitution to a different rule. Accordingly, we conclude defendant preserved this issue for appeal.