Opinion ID: 2091909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tortious Interference Claim

Text: [¶30] Currie argues that Ouellette, who controlled IFPI's contract with ISI, intimidated Johnson, who controlled Currie's contract with ISI, into discharging him. Currie specifically argues that Ouellette threatened that, if Currie was not discharged, IFPI would discontinue its contract with ISI or ISL.
[¶ 31] Tortious interference with a prospective economic advantage requires a plaintiff to prove: (1) that a valid contract or prospective economic advantage existed; (2) that the defendant interfered with that contract or advantage through fraud or intimidation; and (3) that such interference proximately caused damages. Rutland v. Mullen, 2002 ME 98, ¶ 13, 798 A.2d 1104, 1110. In Pombriant v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Maine, 562 A.2d 656 (Me.1989), we held that intimidation is not restricted to `frightening a person for coercive purposes,' but rather exists wherever a defendant has procured a breach of contract by making it clear to the party with which the plaintiff had contracted that the only manner in which that party could avail itself of a particular benefit of working with defendant would be to breach its contract with plaintiff. Id. at 659.
[¶ 32] The statements of fact reveal that ISI and IFPI had a contract whereby ISI provided security for various IFPI facilities. Ouellette, as a regional manager for IFPI, may have had some influence over IFPI's decisions regarding the contract with ISI. Although Ouellette had the authority to recommend that Currie be discharged, Johnson, who oversaw ISI's operations and directly supervised Currie, had the authority to discharge Currie. Although Johnson resisted for several months Ouellette's urgings that Currie be discharged, he ultimately discharged Currie in July 2001. Johnson would not tell Currie why he was being discharged, indicated he was opposed to doing so, and handed Currie a letter indicating that the decision was made after conversations with Ouellette. [¶33] Based on these statements, a jury could reasonably find that Ouellette intimidated Johnson. Currie alleges, essentially, that his firing was the result of a quid pro quo: if Johnson followed Ouellette's recommendation and fired Currie, Ouellette would not terminate ISL's contract with IFPI. This arrangement need not be overtly expressed to be made clear to Johnson. Acutely aware of the authority that Ouellette held over ISL, tacit suggestions, mere inferences, and recommendations may have intimidated Johnson. [¶34] Based on the material facts outlined above and despite the absence of direct evidence of intimidation, a jury could infer that Johnson fired Currie out of fear that ISI would lose its security contract with the mill if he did not follow Ouellette's recommendation. Such an inference would be sufficient to establish intimidation on summary judgment. Cf. Pombriant, 562 A.2d at 659. We have recognized that summary judgment is inappropriate when the fact-finder is required to resolve a factual dispute. See, e.g., Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575. [¶ 35] A jury may decide the tortious interference claim adversely to Currie based on the lack of any direct evidence of intimidation. However, the evidence, at the very least, creates a dispute as to the circumstances surrounding Currie's discharge. A fact-finder, after hearing all the evidence, should resolve the dispute assessing all the relevant facts surrounding Currie's discharge: Currie's repeated complaints concerning Ouellette, Ouellette's subsequent promotion, and Johnson's reluctant firing of Currie at the repeated and vocal behest of Ouellette, who had the authority to recommend the firing of personnel from the mill manager on down. The entry is: The judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.