Opinion ID: 1806207
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Renee's Instructions

Text: Once again, Northpointe mischaracterizes the evidence. It suggests that Renee specifically instructed Northpointe to remove, and dispose of, Keith's personalty. However, the only evidence offered in support of this suggestion is a hearsay statement advanced by Jacobs. Specifically, Jacobs said: Renee had told me, `here are my keys, I got everything I want, I don't care what you do with the rest of it. Record, at 48. In other words, assuming the validity and admissibility of this statement, Renee neither purported to sell, nor give, the remainder of the Johnson property to anyone. At most, it suggests that Renee was content to abandon the items she did not take with her. To be sure, abandonment is a defense to an action for conversion. Shabazz v. Payne, 607 So.2d 238, 239 (Ala.Civ. App.1992); Wirth v. Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 267 (Mo.Ct.App.1974). However, in Alabama, there is a presumption that one does not intend to abandon property of value. Milford v. Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co., 355 So.2d 687, 689 (Ala.1978). Abandonment of property requires intent plus an act. A sufficient act is one that manifests a conscious purpose and intention of the owner of personal property neither to use nor to retake the property into his possession. Wirth, 508 S.W.2d at 267; see also Milford, 355 So.2d at 689. Obviously, [a] determination of abandonment is a finding of fact. Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 317 N.W.2d 810, 817 (N.D. 1982). Northpointe has cited no authority for the proposition that a wife, in prematurely vacating a leasehold held jointly with her husband, may unilaterally, without the knowledge or acquiescence of her husband, effect the abandonment of jointly owned personalty remaining on the leasehold premises. Even if such a rule should exist in Alabamaand we do not now hold that it shouldit would be fact-specific and, therefore, not likely to be subject to a motion for summary judgment. In this connection, we quote once again from Renee's affidavit: I stayed at Northpointe because I did not have any other place to go. I moved things such as a TV, microwave, mattresses off our bed and clothes belonging to me and the kids and moved them to the one bedroom apartment. I did not tell Keith that I was moving out. I left/did not move out the dining room set, living room set, living room TV, desk, dresser, end tables, frames of our kids' bunk beds, two dressers of the kids, mirrors and Keith's personal property, including his large collection of tools, other personal property and his memorabilia. Peggy told me that she would give Keith through that weekend to get his property out. Peggy called me more than once to see if I had gotten everything out that I wanted out.  On Friday of that week I saw a pickup truck being loaded with Keith's belongings by apartment employee John Vaughn and others. I figured that they were helping Keith move his stuff out. After the weekend, I talked to Peggy who said that Keith had come and picked up his stuff after she, her husband and Anthony [Sims] (Northpointe's maintenance man) had moved it out into the breezeway because they had to get it out for the other tenant. About one month later I saw my porch swing on Anthony's porch. I knew it was mine because I had painted the front white, but had not painted the back. I also saw grease on the armrest from the barbecue grill which had been placed next to it on my porch. The chain and the way the chain was secured also indicated to me that it was my swing. I never said anything to Peggy, Anthony or anyone else about the swing, because I had no other place to go and was afraid I would be kicked out. I was working two gas station jobs and had no family in Mobile. The porch swing later disappeared from Anthony's front porch. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized portions of this excerpt illustrate two elements particularly detrimental to Northpointe's abandonment defense. First, some of the property was not jointly owned, but was Keith's separate property. Thus, even if we did recognize that, under some circumstances, a wife could unilaterally effect the abandonment of jointly owned personalty remaining on a jointly held leasehold, that principle would not apply in this case, in which the plaintiff indisputably alleges the conversion of some separately owned personalty. Second, Renee's affidavit provides strong evidence against the argument that she intended to abandon even the jointly owned personalty. Specifically, regarding the porch swing she identified as being used by Anthony Sims, a Northpointe employee, she said: I never said anything to Peggy, Anthony or anyone else about the swing, because I had no other place to go and was afraid I would be kicked out. It is clear from this statement that she harbored questions about why and how a swing, apparently belonging to her and Keith jointly, had come into the possession of a Northpointe employee. Logically, if she had intended to abandon the swing, as Northpointe asserts she did, she would not have been disturbed by the notion that Northpointe or its employee had taken her swing. Significantly, Northpointe does not deny that some of the Johnson personalty ended up in the possession of its employees. In short, Northpointe has not carried its burden of production on the defense of abandonment. Because there are numerous issues of fact for a jury to resolve, the trial court erred in disposing of the conversion claim by a summary judgment.