Opinion ID: 2492898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Henry's prerecorded statement to police violated Corbin's constitutional right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.

Text: ¶ 12. The United States Supreme Court has said: [There] are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in the expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal. [12] ¶ 13. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. [13] Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution provides an almost identical safeguard. Thus, the admission of a testimonial statement of a witness who does not appear at trial is barred, unless that witness is unavailable, and the defendant has had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. [14] As noted in Crawford v. Washington , this bar only applies to statements that are testimonial. [15] And while the Supreme Court has declined to provide a definition of testimonial, it has said that `[t]estimony' . . . is typically `a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.' [16] This necessarily includes, among others, police interrogations and statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. [17] ¶ 14. Henry's statement to Castleberry implicating Corbin as the driver who hit the Expedition and the person responsible for the wreck certainly qualifies as testimonial under the core class of statements enumerated in Crawford. [18] The statement was such that an objective witness would reasonably believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Because Henry's statement was made for the purpose of assisting police with its investigation, the purpose was prosecutorial. Thus, the statement was testimonial, and should have been excluded. ¶ 15. Moreover, the exception prescribed in Crawford is barred, because Corbin did not have a prior opportunity to cross-examine Henry before his death. Confrontation and the ability to cross-examine witnesses are fundamental elements of a fair trial. Here, the jury was allowed to hear incriminating evidence as to Corbin's guilt, without it being tested in the crucible of cross-examination. [19] ¶ 16. Now we must determine whether this violation of Corbin's constitutional right was harmless error. [20] In Delaware v. Van Arsdall , the Supreme Court explained the parameters that should be considered by an appellate court when reviewing a Confrontation-Clause violation as harmless error. The correct inquiry is whether, assuming the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether such an error is harmless in a particular case depends upon a host of factors, all readily accessible to reviewing courts. These factors include the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. [21] ¶ 17. In order for the violation of Corbin's constitutional right to confrontation to be considered harmless, the admission must be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [22] Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7 provides: [a] person is guilty of aggravated assault if he . . . (b) attempts to cause or purposely or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm. [23] And Section 97-3-19 states that: [t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be murder in the following cases: [w]hen done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual. [24] Henry's recorded statement was the only piece of evidence at trial that accused Corbin of purposely or knowingly hitting the Expedition and causing the wreck. Such evidence was vitally important to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Corbin purposely or knowingly had used the car as a deadly weapon, [25] and that he had killed a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner. [26] No other witness provided similar testimony. And Corbin denied hitting the car and causing the wreck in his statement to Castleberry. Thus, we cannot say that the admission of the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 18. With regard to the charge of felony fleeing the scene of an accident, the error is harmless. Mississippi Code Section 63-3-401 requires that: The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident. . . but shall then forewith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 63-3-405. Section 63-3-405 states that the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury or death to any person, or damage to any vehicle, shall give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving, among other things. [27] Section 63-3-405 also states that the driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury shall render reasonable assistance to any person injured in such accident. [28] ¶ 19. Demarcus Lott testified that he had seen Corbin get out of the Marquis, walk to the passenger side of the Expedition, get a purse from the vehicle, and drive off. Lott testified that he had seen the man's face, and he gave a description to police. Lott's description of Corbin was corroborated by the testimony of Davenport, Haggard, and House. Lott made an in-court identification of Corbin as the person he had witnessed leaving the scene of the wreck. House also testified that he had seen a man get out of the Marquis, walk to the passenger side of the Expedition, take a dark-colored object with straps from the vehicle, and drive off. Thus, in light of this evidence, Henry's recorded statement was circumstantial evidence that Corbin fled the scene and was cumulative to the testimony of Lott and House. ¶ 20. Corbin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when Lott made the in-court identification. Corbin alleges that the in-court identification was based upon an impermissibly suggestive pre-trial identification procedure. This argument has no merit, as the record is clear that Lott was never shown a picture of Corbin prior to trial. The State showed Lott a picture of Corbin at trial, but only after Lott had identified Corbin as the man he had seen on the night in question. Lott testified that he had gotten a good look at Corbin, and that he was familiar with Corbin from seeing him around town. And his description of Corbin was corroborated by the testimony of Davenport, Haggard, and House. Accordingly, Corbin's conviction and sentence regarding this charge stand. ¶ 21. Lastly, we note that, in its brief, the State argues that Henry's statement was otherwise reliable, and its admission at trial should be deemed harmless error. When dealing with testimonial evidence, a finding of reliability does not create an exception to the Confrontation Clause. [W]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation. [29] Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation. [30] Thus, any notion that Henry's statement was admissible because it was reliable overlooks the undeniable fact that the Confrontation Clause is a procedural, rather than a substantive, guarantee. [31]