Opinion ID: 532961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the prosecution's closing arguments

Text: 45 During his closing argument at trial, Burnett's counsel stated: 46 But the problem with the Government's case is the wrong person is on trial here. Frank Parris--that's the man that should be here. That's the man that should be on trial here.... [I]t's too bad Frank Parris isn't here today. He is the guilty party. 47 Tr. II-18, 26 (Dec. 13, 1988). 12 In rebuttal, the prosecutor said: 48 You know, what do you think Frank Parris would, if he were on trial on another day by himself, would say in front of a jury--if he was just by himself. What do you think he would have to say about the fact that Mr. Burnett's clothes are in this bag with the drugs and cash? Mr. Burnett's wallet is in the bag with the drugs and cash? Mr. Burnett's fingerprints are on the bag with the drugs?--What do you think he would have to say about that? 49 Id. at II-27. Burnett contends that the prosecutor's statement amounted to an improper missing witness argument and thereby constituted reversible error. Burnett Br. at 37-41. 13 50 We find Burnett's contention meritless because it ignores the well-established principle that prosecutorial comment must be examined in context. United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 108 S.Ct. 864, 869, 99 L.Ed.2d 23 (1988) (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2960, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). We look at the entire proceeding to see whether the prosecutor manipulated or misstated evidence or otherwise violated rights of the accused. We are particularly chary of finding the prosecutor's statements unduly prejudicial when [m]uch of the objectionable content was invited by or was responsive to the opening summation of the defense. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2472, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986); see generally United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14-19, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1045-48, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). And, since defense counsel failed to object at trial to the prosecutor's statements, we can reverse Burnett's conviction only if plain error occurred. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 51 We think it apparent that the prosecutor's comments were invited by--and responded to--defense counsel's remarks about Parris' being the man that should be on trial here; they were not conceived--nor in context would they be perceived--as a missing witness argument. Indeed, it seems incongruous for Burnett's counsel to claim that the prosecutor was asking the jury to draw an improper inference about the testimony of a missing witness when it was he who first suggested that Parris' absence tainted Burnett's trial. The prosecutor's retort is most reasonably read as saying that Parris' absence had no bearing on the outcome of Burnett's trial; that the jurors should not shift blame from Burnett to Parris; and that justice required a guilty verdict against Burnett, regardless of Parris' presence or absence at Burnett's trial. 14