Opinion ID: 2251602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Habitual Offender Documentation: Identity

Text: Appellant argues that the documentation presented to establish that he was an habitual offender was deficient because the State never established that Trice was the same person who was named in the documents. The State submitted as exhibits certified prison records from the Department of Corrections in support of its claim that Trice had been convicted and imprisoned for two prior unrelated felonies. Each exhibit consisted of a commitment order for William Trice, the fingerprints of the William Trice who was incarcerated pursuant to the order, and the photograph and description of the William Trice who was incarcerated. Appellant cites Smith v. State (1962), 243 Ind. 74, 181 N.E.2d 520, for the proposition that records similar to these are inadequate to sustain an habitual offender determination, that there must be testimony that they were the photographs of the defendant-appellant. Smith, 181 N.E.2d at 525. In Smith, the Court voted 3-2 to reverse convictions based on similar documents. In the majority opinion, on rehearing, Justice Bobbitt cited Kelley v. State (1933), 204 Ind. 612, 185 N.E. 453, in which the State had presented a confusing series of exhibits-judgments, commitment orders, indictments, transcripts, photographs  showing cases involving defendants of differing names from proceedings in three different states. Some of the exhibits contained information with no identifiable source. The Court concluded that this melange of documents furnished no legal evidence that the appellant was the same person referred to in the judgments. Kelley, 185 N.E. at 456. Dissenting in Smith, supra, Justice Arterburn, with whom Justice Achor concurred, found Kelley distinguishable on the basis that some of the documents did not indicate who was the source of the information. More importantly for the case at bar, Justice Arterburn wrote: These exhibits not only establish the fact that the person convicted of such felonies was known by the name of Joseph G. Smith (which attorney for appellant admits in his objection thereto is the name of the defendant-appellant in this case) and that the pictures of defendant in each case attached thereto are those of the defendant charged and found guilty of the offenses specified in that particular action. Certainly the court trying this case and examining the photographs of Joseph Smith in prison, could conclude and did conclude that it was the same defendant sitting in the court room that was being tried in the case now before us. 181 N.E.2d at 526. This view is consistent with the Chief Justice Givan's more recent description of the kind of evidence which is adequate to sustain an habitual offender determination. Coker v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 319. In that case the appellant argued that the State should be required to submit judgments and commitment papers with fingerprints and photographs attached to show that the individual involved in the earlier proceedings was the same person as the one on trial. The Chief Justice concluded that such evidence would be sufficient but that other forms would also suffice. In Coker, the other evidence included testimony by a court reporter who had been present in Coker's earlier trials. The exhibits here are quite straightforward, all issued and authenticated by the same official; the photographs of William Trice are clear. Counsel for Trice did not argue at trial, nor has he argued on appeal, that the photographs or the other items in the exhibit are really those of someone other than his client. This would have been a difficult argument to make in front of the trial judge, since Trice testified during the trial of the underlying felonies and admitted his earlier convictions. The State has urged us to overrule State v. Smith, supra, and hold that the finder of fact may make an habitual offender determination without the benefit of any testimony linking the defendant to earlier crimes. The State argues that the jury or the trial judge should be permitted simply to compare the photographs contained in the certified records with the defendant sitting in court and reach a conclusion of about identity. While this invitation to overrule Smith is not without appeal, an appellate tribunal does not overrule precedent unless the overruling opinion is so inconsistent with earlier opinion that both cannot stand together. Department of Treasury v. City of Linton (1945), 223 Ind. 363, 372, 60 N.E.2d 948, 952. We conclude that this case differs from Smith in that there was explicit testimony here linking the defendant to the records of the earlier felonies; that testimony was the defendant's own. The trial judge adopted the defendant's prior testimony as a basis for admitting the certified documents which memorialized the prior felonies and specifically incorporated the defendant's earlier admissions as a part of the evidence upon which he based his finding on the habitual offender question. The evidence identifying Trice as the same individual who had been convicted of the prior felonies was more than adequate.