Opinion ID: 1822334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Name/Address

Text: ¶ 80. When questioned why she struck Bell, Bollendorf explained that the prosecutor's office, as well as the federal prosecuting attorney's office, had prosecuted a number of Bells who live in Beloit. According to Bollendorf, Bell is a well-known criminal name in Beloit. Next, the State noted Bell's address is in a high crime area in Beloit and that the State obtained police reports evidencing police contacts at that address. These contacts ranged from civil processes to stolen vehicles. The State argued that the Bell in the venire may be related to the people at that address and that there were a number of police contacts at Bell's address, yet Bell did not answer the State's question regarding contact with the district attorney's office or with law enforcement officers. Furthermore, he did not mention anything about relatives who may have had contacts, even though, in Exhibit 1, Bells are listed at his address. [16, 17] ¶ 81. The Federal Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held in Davidson v. Gengler, 852 F.Supp. 782, 788 (W.D. Wis. 1994) that a prosecutor's knowledge that a challenged juror possessed the same name as known criminals in the area was a race-neutral explanation. Similarly, striking an African-American juror because of a familial relationship to individuals involved in the criminal justice system is a neutral reason to strike a juror. Id. ¶ 82. In reaching its decision the Gengler court relied on a number of cases. First, the court relied on United States v. Johnson, 941 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1991), which held that striking a potential juror, who was African-American, because his brother was once convicted of a crime and because his family history suggested anti-government bias, were race-neutral reasons for a peremptory strike. Id. at 1109. Prior family involvement with drug offenses is a race-neutral basis to strike such a potential juror. United States v. Bennett, 928 F.2d 1548, 1551 (11th Cir. 1991) superseded by statute as stated in United States v. Smith, 127 F.3d 1388, (11th Cir. 1997). See also United States v. Hughes, 911 F.2d 113, 114 (8th Cir. 1990) (incarceration of nephew of African-American potential juror is a race-neutral reason for a strike). [18] ¶ 83. Additionally, when a potential juror has the same last name as someone previously convicted by the prosecutor, courts have accepted it as a race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike. Terrazas-Carrasco, 861 F.2d at 94-95 n.1. ¶ 84. In Terrazas-Carrasco the court of appeals held that the district court was not clearly erroneous in determining that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude Hispanic veniremen from the jury did not violate defendant's equal protection rights. With respect to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to exclude the Hispanic veniremen, the Fifth Circuit said: We must accept the [inquiring] judge's credibility choice with respect to the prosecutor's reasons. Valid reasons for exclusion may include intuitive assumptions upon confronting a venireman. In Lance, we upheld such factors as eye contact, demeanor, age, marital status, and length of residence in the community as valid grounds for peremptory challenge. In this case, the reasons articulated are of the same variety. Id. at 94-95 (citing United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1181 (5th Cir. 1988)). In footnote one of Terrazas-Carrasco the court stated that the valid, race-neutral reasons articulated for the peremptory strike in that case include having the same last name as someone previously convicted by the prosecutor; age; eye contact; and body language. Id. at 95 n.1 (emphasis added). [19] ¶ 85. Along with names, addresses may provide an acceptable race-neutral justification for a peremptory strike. As noted by the State in its brief, case law is quite clear that location of a venireperson's residence provides a race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike when a residential location has some relationship to the facts of the case. (Resp't Br. at 22 n.3). For example, in United States v. Briscoe , the court upheld a peremptory strike where prosecutor's explanation went well beyond a cursory statement that Mr. Jeffries resided on the west side of Chicago. United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1488 (7th Cir. 1990). However, courts have recognized that allowing the exclusion of African-American venirepersons simply because they live or work in an area frequented by gangs has an enormous potential to disproportionately exclude black jurors in most cases involving black gang members. Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 1992). With respect to the issue of resident location, the Ninth Circuit said: [w]hat matters is not whether but how [a] residence is used. United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 826 (9th Cir. 1992). ¶ 86. In support of the proffered race-neutral reasons for the peremptory strike the State introduced Exhibit 1 during the Batson hearing. Exhibit 1 listed several law enforcement contacts at the address that Bell had listed in his juror questionnaire. One of those contacts involved a complaint about a stolen vehicle and parties who were named Bell. Accordingly, Exhibit 1, like the case in Briscoe, explained the nature and previous use of the residence, which went beyond a cursory statement that Bell simply lived in a high crime area. Id.