Opinion ID: 517635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Secs. 1985(3) and 1986

Text: 19 MWMC next contends that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3) authorizes this Court to issue the preliminary injunction. Section 1985(3) prohibits private conspiracies to deprive a person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985(3). The Supreme Court, interpreting the legislative history of Sec. 1985(3), has added that in order to maintain such a cause of action, plaintiffs must show a class-based, invidious discrimination--the central concern of Congress in enacting Sec. 1985(3). United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 835, 103 S.Ct. 3352, 3359, 77 L.Ed.2d 1049 (1983). In addition, the legislative history indicated that class-based, invidious discrimination, was to be evaluated by focusing on animus or motivation. 5 Id. at 834, 835, 103 S.Ct. at 3359. See also Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 100, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 1797, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971). In order to prove its claim under Sec. 1985(3), MWMC thus must show that the protestors were motivated by a (1) class-based (2) invidiously discriminatory animus. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. at 1798. 20 We have recently considered a similar situation in which, among others, two patients, two doctors, clinic staff, and the Dallas Medical Ladies Clinic brought a Sec. 1985(3) action against the Abortion Abolition Society and the city of Dallas. Roe v. Abortion Abolition Society, 811 F.2d 931 (5th Cir.1987). The plaintiffs claimed that the Society threatened, harassed, intimidated and assaulted them while they were seeking family planning or abortion services. Id. at 932. In denying relief, we held that the plaintiffs, defining themselves as those people who do not agree with the Society defendants' point of view, id. at 935, were not a class protected by Sec. 1985(3), any more than those who grouped themselves together as sharing a belief in using seat belts or in an ever-expanding universe. Id. The plaintiff's class was too diffuse to have any meaning under the statute. The court did offer a clarifying criterion for evaluating such class-based claims under Sec. 1985(3): The class protected by Sec. 1985(3) is thus defined by the characteristics of those at whom the conspiracy [was] aimed, not by the beliefs of the conspirators. Id. at 935. 21 MWMC maintains, perhaps learning from Abortion Abolition Society, that the relevant class being discriminated against is that consisting of women of childbearing age who seek medical attention from the MWMC. Assuming arguendo that this grouping constitutes a class, MWMC still has not shown that the protestors acted with an invidious discriminatory animus against that particular class. Rather, the record indicates that the protestors do not target their pro-life advocacy at any particular group. The protestors (who are made up of both men and women) confront and try to persuade to their point of view all groups--men, women of all ages, doctors, nurses, staff, the female security guards, etc. In fact, MWMC's introduction of William Conlee's letter written to a male doctor indicates that the animus of the protestors is to dissuade anyone who contributes to the incidence of abortions. It is useful to reiterate that the legislative history indicates that Congress wanted to evaluate class-based invidious discrimination through the lens of animus or motivation, not impact. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 610, 463 U.S. at 834-35, 103 S.Ct. at 3359. Thus, if the plaintiffs in Abortion Abolition Society identified themselves as a class that was so over-inclusive as to be meaningless, MWMC in this case has designated a class that is so under-inclusive as to mischaracterize the dispute. 22 Further, not only does the MWMC fail to meet the requirements for a claim under Sec. 1985(3), but the underlying theory of the claim is misplaced. As we noted in Abortion Abolition Society, 23 Section 1985(3) prohibits private conspiracies to deprive persons or classes of persons equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the law, but, as held by the Supreme Court, in United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 610 v. Scott, it does not itself provide any substantive rights. Instead, the rights, privileges, and immunities protected by Sec. 1985(3) must be found elsewhere. Section 1985(3) does not, therefore, protect individuals against private efforts to encroach on constitutional shields, such as the first amendment, that protect only against official conduct. 24 Roe v. Abortion Abolition Society, 811 F.2d 931, 933 (5th Cir.1987) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). MWMC ask us then, to issue a preliminary injunction against First Amendment activities of the protestors and to move the protestors 500 feet from the clinic under the theory of a time, place and manner restriction, despite the fact that there is no evidence of any local law restricting the expression of the protestors. 6 25 What then is the substantive right that MWMC is asking that we protect under the jurisdiction of Sec. 1985(3)? Pregnant women may still receive an abortion at the clinic--equal protection of that right is secure. What the clinic must be complaining about is that potential patients are being denied a supposed right not to hear speech that they do not wish to hear. Such a right, in a public forum, would be a most unusual one. 26 To argue any other theory of the case--such as that women are being denied the substantive right to an abortion because of the atmosphere created, (despite the fact that women are receiving abortions and that no one is being restrained)--would be to eviscerate the First Amendment. It would mean that any unregulated private group which argued against exercising a constitutional right--textual or fathomed--or against any law--statutory or common--would be in violation of Sec. 1985(3), so that those vested with the benefits of such a right, (and by definition there always will be some such beneficiaries) could redefine themselves as a class and claim insulation from such advocacy. For example, not long ago the law permitted child labor. If one took this hypothesis of MWMC's theory of the case, protestors against such labor would have to move away from any factory so that management and co-workers would not have to be intimidated by the atmosphere surrounding their choice to employ children. 27 Thus because MWMC has not shown that the protestors were motivated by a class-based invidiously discriminatory animus, it is not likely that MWMC will prevail on the merits of a Sec. 1985(3) claim and thus meet a prerequisite for the court to issue a preliminary injunction. Moreover, because jurisdiction under Sec. 1986 depends on finding a claim under Sec. 1985, it too is then excluded as a basis for jurisdiction in this case. 7 28