Opinion ID: 764916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of 29 C.F.R. 1926.550(a)(1)

Text: 14 NECCO contends that the Commission's conclusion that NECCO violated 29 C.F.R. 1926.550(a)(1) is arbitrary and capricious. In support, NECCO asserts that the Commission reached this conclusion because it desired to avoid addressing the issue of whether NECCO violated subsection 1926.550(b)(2) as concluded by the ALJ. Essentially NECCO contends that neither subsection (a)(1) nor (b)(2) by definition applies to its boom truck. 15 With respect to applicability of subsection (a)(1), NECCO contends that 16 In all of its past decisions, the Review Commission has consistently determined that a crane under any part of Section 1926.550 is a machine which meets the scope, definitions, and illustrations set forth in ANSI B30.5-1968. Now, however, without explanation, the Review Commission executes a radical about-face and holds that subsection 550(a)(1) of the standard clearly applies to the cited boom truck . . . even though by virtue of its past decisions, a crane forthe purposes of 550(a)(1) is limited to the type encompassed by ANSI B30.5-1968, which does not include boom trucks. 17 (NECCO Br. at 24). 18 The Secretary responds by asserting that NECCO is precluded from raising this issue on appeal because NECCO failed to raise a coverage argument with respect to either (a)(1) or (b)(2) in the first instance to the ALJ. According to the Secretary, NECCO challenged the designation of the violation of (b)(2) as willful by asserting an unpreventable employee misconduct defense, but it did not challenge the scope or applicability of either of the regulations to its boom truck. NECCO first argued that subsection (b)(2) of section 1926.550 did not apply to the boom truck's crane in its brief on the merits to the Commission. However, the Commission declined to review such an argument because NECCO failed to assert it in the first instance to the ALJ, the Secretary did not have the opportunity to contest such a claim, and the issue was not jurisdictional. Instead, the Commission determined that subsection (a)(1) applied and held NECCO liable for the violation. 19 The Court agrees with the Secretary to the extent she contends that NECCO waived its right to challenge the applicability of subsection (a)(1). Section 11(a) of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act, 29 U.S.C. 660(a) specifically provides: No objection that has not been urged before the Commission shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. 29 U.S.C. 660(a). NECCO did not challenge the scope or applicability of subsection (a)(1) of section 1926.550 before the Commission, or even before the ALJ 5 . 20 NECCO's attempt to challenge the applicability of subsection (a)(1) for the first time on appeal to this Court must be rejected. Review by the Commission is a necessary prerequisite to review by this Court. Globe Contractors, Inc. v. Herman, 132 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 1997); D.A. Collins Constr. Co., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 117 F.3d 691, 695 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that failure to raise defect in Secretary's prima facie case in petition to the Commission for review resulted in a waiver of the ability to present this defense). NECCO was originally cited for a violation of subsection (a)(1) or (b)(2) in the alternative. In the proceeding before the Commission, NECCO did not dispute the applicability of (a)(1). In fact, NECCO conceded that its operation of the boom truck on the night in question did not comport with the operation manual standards. (JA 16). Thus, to the extent NECCO argues on appeal to this Court for the first time that subsection (a)(1) is inapplicable, we conclude that NECCO is precluded from challenging the applicability of subsection (a)(1) for the first time on appeal to this Court.