Opinion ID: 1435053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the constitutionality of the ex parte issuance of the temporary restraining orders in this case.

Text: Having decided that the granting of injunctive relief was proper in this case we must next determine whether the decision of the trial court invalidating the ex parte temporary restraining orders was constitutionally mandated. In holding the ex parte order invalid the circuit court relied on the Supreme Court decision, Carroll v. President and Commissioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 89 S.Ct. 347, 21 L.Ed.2d 325 (1968), which prohibited ex parte injunctions in the area of first amendment freedoms, in the absence of any showing that notice and an opportunity to participate were impossible. The plaintiffs contend that, since the defendants' conduct clearly did not raise any legitimate first amendment issues, the Carroll doctrine is inapplicable to the present case. We agree that the trial court misapplied the Carroll decision to this case. The Carroll case involved restraints of actual speech, not conduct. The petitioners in that case were restrained from holding public rallies because their militantly racist speeches constituted a clear and present danger of civil disturbance and riot. Carroll, supra at 177-178, 89 S.Ct. 347. In such circumstances, to be justified in restraining the petitioner's conduct the trial judge would have had to determine whether the speech was so interlaced with burgeoning violence that it is not protected by the broad guarantee of the First Amendment. Carroll, supra at 180, 89 S.Ct. at 351. The Supreme Court recognized that in such a situation the facts are difficult to ascertain and even more difficult to evaluate and therefore adversary proceedings are essential to insure a balanced analysis that does not excessively compromise first amendment rights. Carroll, supra at 183, 89 S.Ct. at 353. In this case, however, the defendants were engaged in conduct not speech. Their protest did not take the form of a public rally but instead involved the occupation of the private office of a university official. There could not be any good faith claim that this area was open to the public for the purpose of expressing dissident ideas. To hold that in such a situation the Carroll doctrine is applicable would be to abdicate the right of the judiciary to make any distinctions between speech and conduct. This would require a view of first amendment rights expressly rejected by the Supreme Court; that is, that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled `speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). See also, Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47-48, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966). We hold, therefore, that the continuing physical obstruction of the use of the facilities of plaintiff's office constituted conduct clearly outside the scope of first amendment rights and consequently the ex parte temporary restraining orders were not constitutionally invalid.