Opinion ID: 889185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rose's Motion to Continue and Waiver

Text: ¶ 142 Through a series of letters sent to the District Court in April, May, and June 2002, Rose expressed dissatisfaction with court-appointed counsel Larry Mansch. At a status hearing held June 19, Rose stated that he wanted a different attorney, and Mansch indicated that his ability to communicate with Rose had been compromised. Mansch advised the court that he had spoken with Dustin Gahagan about assuming the case, and the County Attorney concurred with this suggestion, stating that the best thing we could do at this point is relieve Mr. Mansch, appoint Mr. Rose another attorney, with the understanding that trial is set for July 31st [sic]. I think that gives the other attorney time to come up to speed on the case. Accordingly, the court appointed Gahagan to replace Mansch and instructed Gahagan to advise the court if a trial postponement was needed. ¶ 143 On July 11, Gahagan filed the motion to continue, explaining as follows: The undersigned has not been on this case very long and needs additional time to review the evidence and prepare a defense. Defendant has signed a handwritten waiver of his right to a speedy trial and the undersigned will execute and file a more formal waiver in the near future.[ [2] ] Another reason for the request is that the undersigned is no longer a part of the conflict public defender contract with Ravalli County. Because the undersigned is currently extremely busy, the new conflict public defenders have been contacted about taking over this case and they have indicated that they would also need additional time to prepare for trial. County Attorney George Corn has been contacted and does not oppose a continuance. Attached to the motion was a piece of paper on which a single handwritten statement appeared: I Robert L. Rose here by wave [sic] my Right to a Quick and Speedy Trial. This statement was dated July 10. ¶ 144 On July 12, Rose sent a letter to the District Court in which he explained, on one hand, that I was hoping not to have to wave [sic] my Right to a speedy trial, but on the other hand, that I do not feel it is possible for me to have a fair trial if it is not postponed. According to Rose, Gahagan had told him that he (Gahagan) would not have time to prepare for trial. ¶ 145 On July 19, the District Court sent Rose a letter stating that the motion to continue would be granted. In addition, the court informed Rose that Gahagan is no longer a contract public defender which may require reassignment of your defense to the new conflict public defenders in the immediate future. Also on July 19, Gahagan filed a motion to substitute Kelli Sather as defense counsel for the reason that Kelli S. Sather and Sasha Brownlee now have the conflict contract with Ravalli County and all cases need to be transferred to new counsel. The court granted this motion on July 22. On July 29, the District Court entered an order resetting trial for November 18. ¶ 146 Without citation to any authority, the Court asserts that in most cases, once the defendant waived his right to a speedy trial, it is unnecessary to continue with an analysis of whether that right has been violated. Opinion, ¶ 53. This statement is patently incorrect. Assuming for the moment that Rose's one-sentence waiver is valid, it was attached to a specific motion to continue, and nothing in the waiver indicates that Rose intended to waive his right to a speedy trial for all pretrial delays. The waiver, rather, was intended (as Rose later confirmed in his July 12 letter) to secure a continuance of the July 29 trial date. The Supreme Court has said that courts should indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver and not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Barker, 407 U.S. at 525-26, 92 S.Ct. at 2189 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court errs in suggesting that Rose's supposed waiver applied to all of the delays in this case. See United States v. DeLongchamps, 679 F.2d 217, 219 (11th Cir.1982) (The defendants' waivers were manifestly intended to secure a continuance and were submitted for no other purpose. Indulging every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to a speedy trial, we decline to hold that the waivers extended to other delays in this case. (citations omitted)). ¶ 147 At a more fundamental level, however, I question the validity of this waiver. It is well-established that any waiver of one's constitutional rights must be made specifically, voluntarily, and knowingly. State v. Tapson, 2001 MT 292, ¶ 25, 307 Mont. 428, ¶ 25, 41 P.3d 305, ¶ 25 (citing Park v. District Court, 1998 MT 164, ¶ 36, 289 Mont. 367, ¶ 36, 961 P.2d 1267, ¶ 36, in turn citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), and State v. Lucero, 151 Mont. 531, 538, 445 P.2d 731, 735 (1968)). The Supreme Court has placed the entire responsibility on the prosecution to show that the claimed waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. The State, however, has made no effort in the present case to show that Rose's waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily. ¶ 148 In this connection, Rose contends that he was forced to choose between his right to effective assistance of counsel and his right to a speedy trial. He cites Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968), in which the Supreme Court observed: [The defendant] was obliged either to give up what he believed, with advice of counsel, to be a valid Fourth Amendment claim or, in legal effect, to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In these circumstances, we find it intolerable that one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 88 S.Ct. at 976. Rose also relies on State v. Blair, 2004 MT 356, 324 Mont. 444, 103 P.3d 538, in which we agreed with the following argument by defense counsel in support of Blair's speedy trial motion: [R]egardless of the fact that I am in fact Mr. Blair's third attorney and that he had two before, he is in no way responsible for that. He's not accountable for that, and certainly is entitled, regardless of personnel changes in the Yellowstone County Public Defender's Office, to a timely and effective representation. Blair, ¶ 22. ¶ 149 In the present case, according to the report filed by Sasha Brownlee in May 2003, Gahagan asked Rose to sign the purported waiver as Gahagan was no longer going to work for the county and [Rose] would be assigned new counsel. A defendant, however, cannot be required to waive his right to a speedy trial simply because the public defender contract is changing hands and his new counsel will not be prepared for trial. It is doubtful that such a waiver is voluntary. Moreover, the defendant certainly should not be blamed for delay caused by personnel changes within the public defender system. ¶ 150 I accept that Rose's objections to Mansch's representation, which ultimately led to Mansch's replacement on June 19, contributed to the need for a continuance of the July 29 trial date. On the other hand, Rose could not be required to choose between his right to effective assistance of counsel on one hand and his right to a speedy trial on the other. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394, 88 S.Ct. at 976.