Opinion ID: 1959684
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Stand Trial

Text: Likewise we find no error with respect to the trial justice's consideration of defendant's exercise of his right to stand trial or his corollary right to hold the state to its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through the presentation of testimony from the child victim. In considering defendant's motion to reduce his sentence, the trial justice remarked that defendant had required [the child] to testify by exercising his right to stand trial, after which defendant indicated his intention to appeal while knowing full well that what that little girl said from the stand was absolutely true. The defendant claims that these remarks evidence an intent to penalize him for standing trial. We cannot agree. At the outset we are compelled to point out that the right guaranteed to defendant by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, section 10, of the Rhode Island Constitution is the right to stand trial and truthfully testify in his own behalf. See Grayson, 438 U.S. at 54, 98 S.Ct. at 2617, 57 L.Ed.2d. at 592 (the guaranteed right is narrowly the right to testify truthfully in accordance with the oath). This defendant did not do. Rather defendant exercised his right and took the opportunity to present false testimony to the court in the hopes of escaping conviction and punishment. The trial justice's remarks clearly related to the fact that defendant had, while under a solemn oath and in a court of law, knowingly and intentionally perpetrated a falsehood. The trial justice proceeded to identify the impact upon the victim of defendant's decision to stand trial and tell a falsehood  namely, that she was forced to endure the trauma of testifying about embarrassing and intimate sexual details and to undergo an intense cross-examination. In the face of defendant's plea for leniency, the trial justice's consideration of defendant's false testimony and the impact of the trial upon the victim was proper as these factors related to his prospects for rehabilitation. With respect to defendant's falsehood, we stated in State v. Bertoldi , that a defendant's willingness to take the stand and lie not only demonstrates a disrespect for the law and the judicial system, but also evidences an important character trait. It reveals that the defendant is perfectly willing to commit a crime in an attempt to conceal an earlier crime. It is most assuredly a probative and important piece of information to consider when evaluating a defendant's prospects for rehabilitation. 495 A.2d at 253. The fact that defendant claimed to have lied because of an event he endured in his childhood does not cast a different light onto his falsehood or justify in any way, shape, or form his decision to give false testimony while under a solemn judicial oath to tell the truth. Likewise, consideration of the impact of the trial upon the child victim, especially in the face of a posttrial confession, is proper as it reflects a defendant's attitude toward his victim and society. In State v. Farnham , the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine upheld consideration of this factor in circumstances very similar to those in the case at hand, noting that defendant's criminal conduct, involving as it did the sexual abuse of a young girl, imposed substantial suffering on another. The certain consequence of his insistence on trial was that her suffering would be exacerbated in a public forum with the young prosecutrix, as inevitably the only witness, recounting defendant's violation of her person on direct examination and defense counsel attacking her credibility on cross-examination. Although defendant had an absolute right to a trial and to conduct vigorous cross-examination in connection with a crime for which he soon after admitted his guilt, he cannot escape the fact that his exercise of those rights are probative of his attitude towards the victim and society. 479 A.2d at 892. The defendant argues that Farnham is distinguishable because the defendant there admitted his guilt posttrial but prior to sentencing. We deem this to be a distinction without a difference because the trauma to the victim of testifying about the intimate, and often repulsive, details relating to the violation of one's person remains the same whether a defendant confesses to the violative act one minute or one year after the victim leaves the witness stand. We note that this was not a case in which the trial justice threatened pretrial to impose a harsher sentence if defendant opted to stand trial, see United States v. Stockwell, 472 F.2d 1186, 1187 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 948, 93 S.Ct. 1924, 36 L.Ed.2d 409 (1973), or one in which the trial justice stated posttrial that a more severe sentence was warranted because defendant wasted time, public funds, and resources by insisting on a trial, see United States v. Hutchings, 757 F.2d 11, 13-14 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1031, 105 S.Ct. 3511, 87 L.Ed.2d 640 (1985); United States v. Sales, 725 F.2d 458, 460 (8th Cir.1984). Finally we point out that under the holdings of Simpson and Bertoldi, the trial justice could have enhanced defendant's sentence with additional time to serve for intentionally giving what was, by defendant's own admissions, false testimony. However, the trial justice chose not to do so, and we do not interfere with the exercise of his discretion in that respect. The length of the sentence imposed was well within the parameters set forth by the Legislature in G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) § 11-37-8.4, as enacted by P.L. 1984, ch. 59, § 2 ([e]very person who shall commit second degree child molestation sexual assault shall be imprisoned for not less than six (6) years nor more than thirty (30) years). Given our limited scope of review, we hold that the trial justice remained soundly within the bounds of his discretion. Gordon, 539 A.2d at 529. For the reasons stated above, the appeal of the defendant is denied and dismissed and the order of the trial justice is affirmed. The papers of this case may be remanded to the Superior Court.