Opinion ID: 2078512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impeachment on a Collateral Issue

Text: Hudson argues that the trial court allowed improper impeachment by permitting the State to cross-examine Martin on his filing of a petition for post-conviction relief. He maintains that Martin's filing of a post-conviction petition was a collateral issue and irrelevant for purposes of impeaching Martin's credibility. During direct examination, Martin testified about the events which occurred on the morning of the burglary. He said that appellant came to his house that morning seeking repayment for credit extended. Martin and McDougall had planned to commit a burglary that morning. They told appellant that they were merely going to collect money from a friend in order to repay Hudson and invited appellant to accompany them. Martin testified that he and McDougall committed the burglary by themselves while appellant waited outside in the car. Martin acknowledged that he had not mentioned McDougall's role in the burglary when he testified at his guilty plea hearing because he feared that McDougall might harm his family. The State cross-examined Martin about discrepancies between testimony he gave while pleading guilty to the offenses which arose from this burglary and his testimony during direct examination. Appellant argues that the following colloquy between the prosecutor and Martin indicates that the State's questioning focused on a matter collateral to this case: Q. And, on that date did you know what your legal rights were? A. I was told what they were, yes, Sir. Q. Mm-hmm. Did you know what your legal rights were when the Judge told them to you? A. I mostly understood them, yes, Sir. Q. Okay. Did you know that you were entering a plea of guilty to robbery, burglary and theft? A. Yes, Sir. Q. At a later date did you appear here and enter your plea of guilty to habitual offender? A. Yes, Sir. Q. And, on that date did you know what was going on? A. Yes, Sir. Q. Did you know what your rights were? A. I understood them mostly, yes, Sir. Q. Okay. And, did you know that you were saying, in fact, that you were a habitual offender? A. Yes, Sir. Q. Did you believe that anyone violated your rights at that time? A. No, Sir. Q. You ever made any statements to the contrary? A. No, Sir. Q. Going to have you look at this document that's been filed in your case. Seen that? A. Post Conviction Relief, yes, sir. Q. Mm-hmm. Did you make that statement, your plea was not entered knowingly and intelligently? A. I haven't had too much of occasion to talk to the lawyer that filed this. Q. Well, I'm not asking you that. I'm asking you whether you made that statement? A. My lawyer made that statement, yes, she did. Q. Is this your signature at the end of that document? A. Yes, Sir. Q. So, didn't you, in fact, make that statement? A. Yes, sir. Q. So, you're telling this Jury right now that what you said back on February 27th was  should all be thrown out because you didn't know what you were doing that day? [Defense counsel's objection to this line of questioning was overruled. The trial court instructed jury that the witness could answer the question for sole and limited purpose of testing his credibility as to whether or not he has or has not made inconsistent statements.] Q. Could you answer my question, please? A. Would you repeat it, please? Q. Are you telling this Jury you didn't know what you were doing on February 27th when you were here in Court or on any of the other times you were here in Court? A. I'm telling this Jury that I don't feel like I knowed it as well as I should have because there was some things I didn't understand, yes, Sir. Q. Is that why you didn't tell the whole truth on that date? A. I had my reasons for not telling the whole truth that day. The State argues that the prosecutor's cross-examination served as a foundation for impeachment of the witness by showing his prior inconsistent statements about the crime, particularly the participation of a third person, made at his guilty plea hearing. We view the questioning as unnecessary. The prosecutor may question a witness to establish the foundation for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements. However, a post-conviction petition filed on the basis that the guilty plea was not entered intelligently and voluntarily has no relevance to whether Martin gave prior inconsistent statements at the guilty plea hearing when establishing the factual basis for the plea and the events surrounding the crime. Collateral matters cannot be made the basis for impeachment. Smith v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 346. A party is generally bound by the witness' answer on cross-examination to a question relating solely to a collateral matter. Therefore, the prosecutor should have ceased questioning on this subject when Martin stated that he had not made any statements to the contrary. Pollard v. State (1950), 229 Ind. 62, 94 N.E.2d 912; Fleenor v. State (1928), 200 Ind. 165, 162 N.E. 234. However, appellant has not shown how his substantial rights were prejudiced. Rebstock v. State (1983), Ind., 451 N.E.2d 1083. We conclude that only harmless error arose from this questioning.