Opinion ID: 2517375
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Compulsory Joinder Statute in this Case

Text: On direct appeal before the ICA, the prosecution argued that the circuit court correctly determined that there was no basis upon which to conclude that the distribution offenses in the [drug buy case] and the search warrant . . . case arose `from the same episode.' Specifically, the prosecution asserted: Here, the circuit court was correct [that] the distribution offenses and the search warrant case did not arise from the same episode or conduct. [12] The drug buys were conducted at times separate and apart from the execution of the search warrant. There were entirely different witnesses involved in each offense. The offenses were discovered under different circumstances and were not related in time, place and circumstances. The fact that the buys were used as a basis to support the search warrant did not require the offenses be charged together. Id. at 13. In affirming Akau's conviction, the ICA agreed with the prosecution and rejected Akau's arguments that all of the charged offenses were required to be joined in a single prosecution. Specifically, the ICA explained that: Akau's case is similar to [ Servantes ] because the [prosecution's drug buy case] against Akau provided the [prosecution] with probable cause to search his person and personal effects. The [prosecution's] search warrant, in turn, gave rise to the [search warrant case]. However, Akau's case is distinguishable from Servantes because the search warrant for Akau was based on three separate buys/sales for crystal methamphetamine from/to him conducted on three separate buys/sales of crystal methamphetamine from/to him conducted on three separate dates (October 8 and 22 and November 21, 2002)  all made before the police department executed its search warrant on Akau and his personal effects on November 26, 2002. The dates and circumstances involved in the [drug buy case] and [the search warrant case] were more disparate than were the dates and circumstances in the two cases involved in Servantes. Hence, we do not agree that the [search warrant case] and [the drug buy case] were part of the same episode and, as such, should have been consolidated into one trial. Akau's case is more like [ Keliiheleua ] in that the criminal offenses were not closely related in time, place, or circumstances. The Supreme Court of Hawai`i explained in [ Carroll ] that HRS § 701-109(2) was designed to prevent the State from harassing a defendant with successive prosecutions where the State had failed to convict the defendant or was dissatisfied with the punishment previously ordered. However, the State's conviction of Akau in the [search warrant case] was successful, as Akau was convicted of [p]romoting a [d]angerous [d]rug in the [t]hird [d]egree and [u]nlawful [u]se of [d]rug [p]araphernialia and sentenced to a term of five years of probation and one year of incarceration. There is no evidence in the record on appeal that the [prosecution] attempted to harass Akau by prosecuting the [search warrant case] separately from the [drug buy case]. ICA SDO at 3-4. Akau, however, contends that the ICA committed grave error in being too mechanical and rigid in its approach to the facts of this case and interpretation of case law. Specifically, Akau argues that [t]his is evidenced in the [ICA's] own language found on page [three] of the [SDO] . . . second full paragraph[,] wherein the [ICA] at first state[d] that the present case is similar to State v. Servantes, 72 Haw. 35, 804 P.2d 1347 (1991) and then in the same breath distinguishes Akau from Servantes by invoking the . . . so closely related in time, place and circumstances . . . language from Carroll to point out the obvious that the three buys/sales occurred on different dates[]  ignoring the commonality of purpose of each buy/sale. Even though this case might constitute an anomalous situation (referred to [in] the [o]pening [b]rief as the Akau anomaly), this court, nevertheless, should be concerned with the administration of justice, [c]f., State v. Wong, 97 Hawai`i 512, 40 P.3d 914 (2002)[.] (Ellipses in original.) Id. As previously stated, criminal offenses that are based on the same conduct or aris[e] from the same episode must be joined in a single prosecution if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court. HRS § 701-109(2). If the prosecution fails to bring such cases together, the subsequent charges are barred. HRS § 701-111(1)(b). Here, the evidence demonstrates (1) that at the time Akau entered his plea of no contest in the search warrant case the appropriate prosecuting officer was aware of the existence of the three undercover drug buys inasmuch as they served as the bases for the search warrant that ultimately led to the charges levied against Akau in the search warrant case and (2) that both cases were within the jurisdiction of a single court  the Circuit Court of the First Circuit. Additionally, the parties do not dispute, and we agree, that the search warrant case and the drug buy case were not based on the same conduct. Accordingly, the relevant inquiry before us narrows to whether both cases [arose] from the same episode. In Carroll, this court announced that the test for determining the singleness of a criminal episode should be based on whether the alleged conduct was so closely related in time, place and circumstances that a complete account of one charge cannot be related without referring to details of the other charge. 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780 (emphasis added). The time and place factors of the Carroll test are easily determined and straightforward to apply. However, as discussed more fully infra, the circumstances factor of the test is more difficult to define and apply. With respect to the time factor, the evidence in the instant case indicates that the undercover drug buys occurred on three separate occasions  October 8, 22, and November 21, 2002. The search warrant was executed on November 26, 2002  five days after the last drug buy. Thus, the facts unequivocally establish that the drug buy offenses and the search warrant offenses did not occur on the same day or at exactly the same time. However, in Servantes, this court determined that the lapse of several days between the discovery of the first criminal offense and the second offense was not fatal to the defendant's argument that the two criminal offenses [arose] from the same episode. Servantes, 72 Haw. at 37, 804 P.2d at 1348. In our view, the span of five days between the last undercover drug buy and the execution of the search warrant, or even the forty-nine days between the first drug buy and the execution of the search warrant, is not so disparate as to render the drug buy offenses and the search warrant offenses separate episodes. Thus, because the drug buy offenses and the search warrant offenses were closely related in time, we believe the time factor has been met. With respect to the place factor, we expressed concern in Keliiheleua, that defining `place' as broadly as the entire City and County of Honolulu would unduly hamper the administration and application of HRS § 701-109(2). 105 Hawai`i at 181, 95 P.3d at 612. However, such concern is not present in the case at bar inasmuch as the evidence established that the place where two of the three drug buys occurred and the place where the search warrant was executed were the same or similar  i.e., in an area fronting 825 and 835 Keeaumoku Street. The third drug buy occurred inside the men's restroom of the Daiei store on Kaheka Street. We take judicial notice that the distance between the Daiei store and the place where the search warrant was executed is approximately .25 miles or about three blocks. See State v. Puaoi, 78 Hawai`i 185, 191, 891 P.2d 272, 278 (1995) (holding that geographical facts, such as whether a particular address is within a certain city and county of the state, is a proper matter subject to judicial notice (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Thus, inasmuch as (1) the place where the first two drug buys occurred and where the search warrant was executed was the same or similar and (2) the third drug buy occurred within close proximity of the place where the search warrant was executed, we likewise believe the place factor has also been met. With respect to the circumstances factor of the Carroll test, a close reading of our relevant case law reveals that a common thread runs throughout these cases  that is, an examination of whether the facts and circumstances of the first discovered offense provided sufficient probable cause to suspect that the defendant had committed or would commit the second discovered offense. For example, in Carroll, this court determined that the two charged offenses  attempted criminal property damage in the second degree and possession of an obnoxious substance (mace)  were not part of the same episode because, prior to the identification [of the mace], the facts and circumstances within the first arresting officer's knowledge did not afford probable cause to believe that an offense other than [a]ttempted [c]riminal [p]roperty [d]amage in the [s]econd [d]egree had been committed. 63 Haw. at 352, 627 P.2d at 781 (emphases added). Likewise, in utilizing a probable cause analysis, this court in Servantes determined that the defendant's marijuana possession offenses and cocaine possession offenses [arose] from the same episode, reasoning that, [m]ost importantly, [the] police had probable cause at the time of [the defendant's] arrest on the marijuana offense to suspect [the defendant] of possession of additional illegal drugs[, i.e., cocaine]. 72 Haw. at 39, 804 P.2d at 1349. Finally, in Keliiheleua, this court held that the negligent injury charge and the charges in the fraud case did not arise from the same episode because, inter alia, there was no reason to suspect that[,] subsequent to causing the motor vehicle accident, [the d]efendant would obtain an insurance policy and then file a fraudulent insurance claim. 105 Hawai`i at 182, 95 P.3d at 613. Based on the foregoing, we believe that the relevant case law in this jurisdiction establishes that, when examining the circumstances of offenses alleged to be part of the same episode, this court has focused primarily on whether the facts and circumstances of the first discovered offense provided sufficient probable cause to suspect that the defendant had committed or would commit the second discovered criminal offense. In this case, the undisputed facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom establish that: (1) Akau sold drugs to undercover police officers on three separate occasions, each of which was sufficient to charge him with promoting a dangerous drug in the second degree; (2) the three drug buys, however, also provided sufficient probable cause to suspect that Akau would commit additional drug offenses; (3) rather than refer the drug buy evidence to the prosecutors, the police opted to obtain a search warrant based upon the drug buys; (4) the three previous drug buys provided sufficient probable cause for the search warrant; (5) the execution of the search warrant ultimately led to the possession and paraphernalia charges; and (6) the prosecutors were clearly aware of the distribution offenses at the time they made the decision to charge Akau in the search warrant case. Additionally, we observe that the circumstances involved in the three undercover drug buys were also similar to the circumstances involved in the execution of the search warrant inasmuch as all the offenses were drug related, i.e., they involved the sale and/or possession of crystal methamphetamine or crystal methamphetamine paraphernalia. Because the circumstances of the drug buy case and the search warrant case are closely related, we believe the circumstances factor has been met. Accordingly, we hold that the charged offenses in the search warrant case and the drug buy case arose from the same episode inasmuch as Akau's conduct was so closely related in time, place and circumstances that a complete account of one charge [could not have been] related without referring to the details of the other charge. Carroll, 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780. The dissent, however, disagrees, contending that the offenses allegedly committed in the drug buy case and the possession case [were] not so `closely related in time, place, and circumstances,' that a `substantial factual nexus' exists between the two cases, [ People v.] Miranda , 754 P.2d [377,] 381 [(Colo.1988) ( en banc )], whereby `a complete account of one charge cannot be related without referring to details of the other charge[.] [13] Dissenting Op. at ___ _ ___, 185 P.3d at 251-252 (bold emphasis added) (underscored emphases provided by dissent) (citations to Carroll omitted). The dissent's belief that a substantial factual nexus must be present misconstrues the Carroll test. First, under the compulsory joinder statutes, multiple offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstances must be known to the prosecuting officer. See HRS § 701-109(2) (stating in part that a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer). And, second, such knowledge must be known at the time of the commencement of the first trial[.] Id. (emphasis added). In other words, because a defendant shall not be subjected to multiple trials, prosecutors  at the time they review evidence submitted by the police that involve multiple offenses committed by the defendant, or at least by the time of trial (if those offenses were charged in separate cases)  must necessarily consider whether the offenses involve the same conduct or whether the alleged conduct constitutes a single episode. Third, in deciding the singleness of a criminal episode, the prosecutor must, as indicated by our case law, consider whether the alleged conduct was so closely related in time, place and circumstances that a complete account of one charge cannot be related without referring to details of the other charge. 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780. In making charging decisions, prosecutors shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when . . . it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause. Hawaii Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.8(a) (2004) (emphases added). In the instant case, the prosecutor, in making a determination of the specific charges to be brought against Akau, would necessarily have been required to review the police affidavit in support of the search warrant  that included a factual accounting of the undercover drug buys, i.e., whether there was probable cause to sustain criminal charges. In conducting such review and evaluating probable cause, it is apparent that a complete account of the search warrant offenses could not be made without reference to the details of the undercover drug buys. Consequently, we also hold that all of the offenses brought against Akau should have been joined in a single prosecution. [14] Finally, our holding today is consistent with and promotes the policies underlying Hawaii's compulsory joinder statutes, HRS §§ 701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2), i.e., fairness to the defendant and society's interest in efficient law enforcement. Carroll, 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780. As stated by this court in Carroll: Compulsory joinder of offenses which share a proximity in time, place and circumstances would not only protect the defendant from successive prosecutions based on the same conduct or episode, but it would also save the defendant and the [prosecution] time and money[.] Id. Likewise, the commentary to HRS § 701-109(2) states that [t]hese rules reflect a policy that defendants should not have to face the expense and uncertainties of two trials based on essentially the same episode. Commentary to HRS § 701-109. As more aptly stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, where two criminal cases arise from the same episode but are not joined, the criminal defendant is forced to run the gauntlet repeated times and confront the awesome resources of the state. Commonwealth v. Nolan, 579 Pa. 300, 855 A.2d 834, 839 (2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hude, 500 Pa. 482, 458 A.2d 177, 180 (1983)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Akau was potentially facing the expense and uncertainties of two [criminal prosecutions] based on essentially the same episode. Commentary to HRS § 701-109. At the time Akau entered his no contest plea and was sentenced in the search warrant case  in February and April 2003, respectively  he was unaware that law enforcement officials, who had knowledge of the drug buy offenses, would be indicting him in the drug buy case. Having such awareness would presumably have had some impact on Akau's trial strategy, including his decision to plead no contest to the charges in the search warrant case. Moreover, we observed in Carroll that HRS § 701-109(2) was designed to prevent the [prosecution] from harassing a defendant with successive prosecutions where the [prosecution] is dissatisfied with the punishment previously ordered or where the [prosecution] has previously failed to convict the defendant. Carroll, 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780 (citation omitted). Inasmuch as law enforcement officials had knowledge of the drug buy offenses at the time the search warrant offenses were charged, but, nevertheless, choose to bring two separate cases at different times, Akau was subjected to harassment with successive prosecutions. Additionally, society's interest in efficient law enforcement, Carroll, 63 Haw. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780, lies in judicial administration and economy, Hude, 458 A.2d at 180. As such, we believe that, under the circumstances of the case at bar, this policy consideration also weighs in favor of compulsory joinder because the prosecution could have charged all of the offenses together in a single prosecution, which would have saved the judiciary the expenses associated with having to deal with the two cases separately, including the potential of holding two trials. To hold otherwise would unduly encourage pursuit and surveillance for lengthy periods of time and multiple prosecutions from the eventual arrest, Morgan v. State, 220 Ga. App. 198, 469 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1996), a result surely not supported by either the plain language or purpose of HRS §§ 701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2). Although the prosecution claims that it could not bring all the charges in a single prosecution because one of the undercover officers involved in the drug buys had not yet surfaced, the prosecution's claim is weakened by Officer Silva's testimony that, even after Akau was indicted in the drug buy case, one of the undercover officers involved in the drug buys had not yet surfaced. In other words, it appears that the surfacing of undercover officers does not necessarily affect the prosecution's ability to bring charges based on undercover drug buys. As such, the policies expressed by HRS §§ 701-111(1)(b) and 701-109(2) further compel this court to conclude that the offenses contained in the search warrant case and the offenses contained in the drug buy case should have been joined in a single prosecution. Based on the foregoing discussion, we hold that the circuit court erred in denying Akau's motion to dismiss based upon the prosecution's failure to join the search warrant offenses and the drug buy offenses in a single prosecution. As such, we also hold that the ICA erred in affirming the circuit court's erroneous denial.