Opinion ID: 795796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Initial Terry Stop

Text: 11 The district court held that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop and briefly detain McCargo, short of patting him down, because of his close physical and temporal proximity to the crime scene in a high-crime area. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (police may detain a suspect for further investigation upon reasonable suspicion of criminal wrongdoing). McCargo argues that the officers point to no aspect of McCargo's behavior that itself indicated criminal wrongdoing: he did not act nervous or evasive; he did not match a description of the perpetrator (in fact none existed); and, because he was crossing Berkshire with 501 Berkshire to his right, he was not walking away from the crime scene when the officers approached him. 12 We agree with the district court. Terry requires that a police officer have only reasonable suspicion, United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 781 (2d Cir.1994), that criminal activity may be afoot to justify an investigatory stop, Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Reasonable suspicion requires considerably less of a showing than probable cause. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002). Here, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers had a reasonable suspicion that McCargo had been involved in a crime. Responding to a 911 call at close to 1:00 a.m., the officers spotted McCargo walking alone in a high-crime area where no other pedestrians were about. Cf. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000) (a high-crime area is a relevant factor in evaluating whether police have reasonable suspicion). McCargo was 200 feet west of the crime scene, just a few minutes after the reported burglary attempt, and he was staring so intently at the police cruiser at the scene of the crime that he did not notice the officers' cruiser as it approached him. 13 Finally, the officers knew, based on the computer system in their car, that one of the suspects had gone to the rear of 501 Berkshire during the burglary attempt. If such a suspect had been heading north, going away from the scene of the crime, one route would have been north along Suffolk Street, the direction McCargo was walking. Thus, we believe McCargo's location supports the officers' claim of reasonable suspicion and does not detract from it, as McCargo argues. 14 Considering these facts in the aggregate and not in isolation, see United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981) ([T]he assessment must be based upon all the circumstances. . . . and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.), we conclude that Sterlace and White had a reasonable suspicion that McCargo was involved in criminal activity and, therefore, the initial Terry stop was constitutional.