Opinion ID: 4534315
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cause and Prejudice

Text: Appellant may overcome a trial court’s procedural bar and still raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim by showing both cause for failure to raise such claim in direct appeal and “actual prejudice resulting from the errors of which [appellant] complains.” United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167-68 (1982). When appellant claims ineffective assistance of counsel, our analysis of a procedural bar is inextricably linked to the merits of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986); see also Washington v. United States, 834 A.2d 889, 904 n.10 (D.C. 2003). However, it is “unnecessary to determine whether [appellant] has shown cause” if this court finds no prejudice to appellant. Frady, 456 U.S. at 168 (finding no need to determine whether appellant had shown cause where there was no actual prejudice from alleged ineffective assistance of counsel). When an alleged unconstitutional error by counsel is failure to investigate and discover favorable evidence to defense, our analysis of the prejudice part of Strickland is twofold: (1) 7 “whether there is a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of the favorable evidence, would have introduced it at trial in an admissible form,” and (2) “whether, had the jury been confronted with this . . . evidence, there is a reasonable probability that it would have returned with a different verdict.” Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1132 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotations and brackets omitted); see also Brown v. United States, 181 A.3d, 164 (D.C. 2018). A “reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Frady, 456 U.S. at 170. In general, negligent medical treatment of a “dangerous wound” – a wound from which a victim would die if untreated – is deemed a foreseeable consequence of appellant’s crime and is not a defense to a charge of homicide. Baylor v. United, 407 A.2d 664, 668-69 (D.C. 1979) (holding that two-hour delay in treatment of victim and negligent lacerations of victim’s pancreas were not defense to charge of involuntary manslaughter because such negligence was still foreseeable consequence of appellant’s crime); see also McKinnon v. United States, 550 A.2d 915, 917-18 (D.C. 1988) (holding that victim’s contraction of uncommon type of hepatitis from surgery to treat stabbing wounds was reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant’s criminal assault, and, thus, was not intervening cause). Ordinarily, this court requires expert medical testimony to 8 show that a wound was not in itself dangerous. Baylor, 407 A.2d at 669. Gross negligence in medical treatment may exculpate appellant, but it must have been a sole cause of a victim’s death. Id. Here, we hold that the trial court did not err by finding no prejudice to appellant under Strickland. In view of our precedent discussed below, there is less than a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of the wrongful death suit against Dr. Daee, would have introduced Dr. Daee’s negligence as exculpatory or impeachment evidence at trial. Although we did not reach the prejudice part of Strickland in Brown, the decision is instructive. In Brown, this court held that the failure by four counsel to investigate the mental condition of and to plead an insanity defense for appellant, who was serving a life sentence for the three convictions including a first degree murder from 1990’s, was not objectively unreasonable. To highlight the ineffective assistance of the four counsel from 1990’s to observe his mental condition, appellant in Brown raised the testimony of a psychiatric expert from his California criminal trial in 2008, for assault on a prison guard, that appellant suffered post-traumatic stress disorder. However, this court squarely refuted that the expert’s 2008 insanity diagnosis of appellant was not evidence of his mental 9 state in the 1990’s, and thus held the four counsel’s performance was not ineffective. Like appellant in Brown, appellant here raised the testimony of Dr. Wingate to highlight the asserted ineffective assistance of the trial counsel to plead an intervening-cause defense. We hold not only that it was temporally impossible for the trial counsel to introduce—or the government to withhold from appellant—Dr. Wingate’s testimony in appellant’s criminal trial, but also that even if appellant’s trial counsel somehow foresaw Dr. Wingate’s testimony and still decided not to pursue an intervening-cause defense, the decision would not have rendered the trial counsel’s performance ineffective under Strickland. Under our precedent, there is certainly less than a reasonable probability that a jury would have found—or a competent attorney would have introduced—Dr. Daee’s negligence as an intervening cause. Both Dr. Daee and Dr. Wingate testified that the bullet appellant shot damaged Lucas’s pancreas, from which the complications arose; therefore, Dr. Daee’s alleged gross negligence was certainly not a sole cause of Lucas’s death. Even if appellant had introduced Dr. Wingate’s testimony during his criminal trial—which was temporally impossible because Dr. Wingate testified in the wrongful death suit after the guilty verdict against 10 appellant in his criminal trial—Dr. Daee’s alleged gross negligence would not have exculpated appellant. In Baylor, this court affirmed that a two-hour delay in treatment of the victim and negligent laceration by a doctor during an operation on the victim were not an intervening cause, and, thus, did not relieve appellant of responsibility for the victim’s death. Baylor, 407 A.2d at 670. In McKinnon, we affirmed that the rare type of hepatitis the victim contracted from surgery to cure stabbing wounds was not an intervening cause. McKinnon, 550 A.2d at 917-18. Similarly, here, we see no error in the trial court’s conclusion that Dr. Daee’s treatment was not an intervening cause of Lucas’s death. Because appellant has failed to show “prejudice,” we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying, without a hearing, appellant’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel 1 claim under D.C. Code § 23-110. 1 We do not reach the merits of appellant’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim because a claim of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel “must be litigated as an independent claim, which requires a recall of the mandate of the direct appeal.” Wu v. United States, 798 A.2d 1083, 1091 (D.C. 2002) (citation omitted). 11
We also affirm the trial court’s determination of a procedural bar on appellant’s Brady claim under D.C. Code § 23-110 because appellant simply cannot show “cause and prejudice” from the government’s alleged Brady violations. Violation of due process under Brady occurs (i) “when the prosecution fails to disclose, before or during trial, evidence favorable to the defense,” and (ii) “there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different,” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985). “[N]on-disclosure of evidence affecting credibility” falls within the purview of the Brady rule. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972). Here, not only did the government disclose the pending wrongful death suit against Dr. Daee before appellant’s criminal trial, but it was temporally impossible for the government to withhold or suppress Dr. Wingate’s testimony against Dr. Daee’s negligence because Dr. Wingate testified in the wrongful death suit against Dr. Daee on September 15, 2009, after the jury verdict against appellant on 12 February 19, 2009. Thus, we hold that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in procedurally barring appellant’s Brady and Giglio claims.