Opinion ID: 2575864
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conditional examinations in capital cases

Text: Defendant contends that conditional examinations are not permitted in capital cases. He relies on section 1335, subdivision (a), which provides: When a defendant has been charged with a public offense triable in any court, he or she in all cases, and the people in cases other than those for which the punishment may be death, may, if the defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel as provided by law, have witnesses examined conditionally in his or her or their behalf, as prescribed in this chapter. (Italics added.) Defendant argues that this provision bars the prosecution from conditionally examining any of its witnesses in a capital case. In ruling the conditional examination admissible, however, the trial court relied on subdivision (b) of the same section, which at the time of defendant's trial provided: When a defendant has been charged with a serious felony, the people may, if the defendant has been fully informed of his or her right to counsel as provided by law, have a witness examined conditionally as prescribed in this chapter if the people have evidence that the life of the witness is in jeopardy. (§ 1335, former subd. (b), as amended by Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 2, p. 2525.) [5] On first reading, subdivision (a) and former subdivision (b) of section 1335 appear inconsistent. Subdivision (a) appears to generally prohibit the prosecution from conditionally examining witnesses in cases for which the punishment may be death, whereas former subdivision (b) appears to allow the prosecution to conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy in any case in which the defendant is charged with a serious felony. To resolve this apparent inconsistency, we view the provisions in their statutory context as part of an overall statutory scheme for conditional examinations in criminal cases, seeking to harmonize the provisions in light of the apparent legislative purpose. ( Robert L. v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th 894, 901, 135 Cal. Rptr.2d 30, 69 P.3d 951; People v. Acosta (2002) 29 Cal.4th 105, 112, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 435, 52 P.3d 624; People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129.) The statutory scheme for conditional examinations includes section 1336. At the time of defendant's trial, subdivision (a) of that section provided: When a material witness for the defendant, or for the people, is about to leave the state, or is so sick or infirm as to afford reasonable grounds for apprehension that he or she will be unable to attend the trial, the defendant or the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined conditionally. (Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 3, p. 2525.) Subdivision (b) of section 1336 provided: When the people have evidence that the life of a prosecution witness is in jeopardy, the people may apply for an order that the witness be examined conditionally. (Stats. 1985, ch. 783, § 3, p. 2525.) [6] Reading sections 1335 and 1336 together, it appears that the Legislature may have intended to prohibit the prosecution in a capital case from taking a conditional examination of a witness for any of the reasons stated in subdivision (a) of section 1336illness, dependency, age, or impending departure from the statebut to permit the prosecution in a capital case to conditionally examine a witness whose life is in jeopardy. This reading would resolve the apparent inconsistency between subdivision (a) and former subdivision (b) of section 1335 and harmonize those provisions with section 1336. Arguing against this construction, defendant relies on Dalton v. Superior Court, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th 1506, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 248. The Court of Appeal there expressed the view that allowing the prosecution to conditionally examine a witnesses in a death penalty case only when the witness's life was in jeopardy would create a distinction in the use of preserved testimony which seemingly would have no justification in that the testimony of a witness who is to die before the death penalty trial because of natural causes could not be preserved, while that same witness's testimony could be preserved if the threat of nonattendance at trial were based upon possible kidnap or murder. ( Dalton, supra, at p. 1512, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 248.) We do not view this distinction as irrational, however. When a prosecution witness may die before trial from natural causes, the prosecution risks the loss of important evidence. This same interest is at stake when the witness's life is in jeopardy from criminal violence, but there is in addition the strong public interest in deterring criminal conduct in the form of an actual or attempted murder of the witness. Recognizing the presence of this additional interest, the Legislature could reasonably decide to authorize prosecutorial conditional examinations in capital cases when the witness's life is in jeopardy from criminal violence, to remove the incentive a capitally charged defendant or his or her allies might otherwise have to murder prosecution witnesses to prevent them from testifying. This construction is also consistent with the history of conditional examinations in criminal cases in California. As enacted in 1879, the California Constitution granted the Legislature power to authorize prosecutorial conditional examinations in criminal cases, other than cases of homicide. (Cal. Const., former art. 1, § 13, repealed Nov. 5, 1974.) In 1905, the Legislature exercised this constitutionally granted authority by providing, in section 1335, for conditional examinations of prosecution witnesses in cases other than homicide. (Stats.1905, ch. 540, § 1, p. 702.) In 1951, section 1335 was amended to permit conditional examinations of prosecution witnesses in cases other than those for which the punishment may be death. (Stats. 1951, ch. 96, § 1, p. 354.) In 1974, the state Constitution was amended to remove the prohibition on conditional examinations in capital cases. The relevant provision now reads: The Legislature may provide for the deposition of a witness in the presence of the defendant and the defendant's counsel. (Cal. Const., art. 1, § 15, cl.4.) In 1985, the Legislature amended section 1335 to permit the prosecution to take a conditional examination when the defendant has been charged with a serious felony and there is evidence the witness's life is in jeopardy. (Stats.1985, ch. 783, § 2, p. 2525.) We infer that, after the 1974 constitutional amendment removed the blanket prohibition on conditional examinations by the prosecution in capital cases, the Legislature used its new authority in 1985 to authorize the prosecution to take conditional examinations in capital cases in the limited situation where the witness's life is threatened. The 1985 amendment of sections 1335 and 1336 was included in Assembly Bill No.2059 (1985-1986 Reg. Sess.), which also added section 1350 to the Evidence Code. That provision establishes an exception to the hearsay rule for a statement by an unavailable declarant when, among other things, [t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the declarant's unavailability was knowingly caused by, aided by, or solicited by the party against whom the statement is offered for the purpose of preventing the arrest or prosecution of the party and is the result of the death by homicide or the kidnapping of the declarant. (Evid.Code, § 1350, subd. (a)(1).) Like the life in jeopardy provision for conditional examinations (§ 1335, subd. (b)), the hearsay exception of Evidence Code section 1350 applies in criminal proceedings in which a serious felony is charged ( id., subd. (a)), and serious felony is defined to include felonies listed in subdivision (c) of section 1192.7. (Compare Evid.Code, § 1350, subd. (d), with Pen.Code, § 1335, subd. (c).) Those listed felonies include any felony punishable by death . . . . (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(7).) Because they were packaged together, it is reasonable to infer that the adoption of the hearsay exception in Evidence Code section 1350 and the amendment of the conditional examination provisions of Penal Code sections 1335 and 1336 address a common problem and result from a common Legislative concerncriminal violence against prospective prosecution witnesses to prevent their testimony. The risk that this will occur likely increases in proportion to the potential punishment for the charged offense, and thus it is greatest in capital cases. Absent language expressly barring application of these provisions to capital cases, therefore, it is reasonable to infer that the Legislature intended to permit the prosecution to conditionally examine witnesses in capital cases when there is evidence that their lives are in serious danger. We conclude, therefore, that under subdivision (b) of section 1335, conditional examination of a prosecution witness is permitted in a capital case when the witness's life is in jeopardy. [7]