Opinion ID: 1153757
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: payne and the right to access

Text: In Payne, after concluding that no state interest could be advanced in support of denial of access to the courts (17 Cal.3d at pp. 919-922), the court addressed the particular remedies that were available to secure the right. One possible solution  to accord prisoners the right to a personal appearance  was discounted as not feasible so long as prisoners are denied the access to free legal services accorded to other indigents and are thus unable to prepare a propria persona defense. Another solution  to defer trial of action until the prisoner's release  was approved, bounded only by legal prohibition or substantial prejudice to the rights of plaintiffs. We recognized that, in some instances, the only solution  the only way to secure access  was the appointment of counsel. (3a) We provided guidelines: The access right ... comes into existence only when a prisoner is confronted with a bona fide legal action threatening his interests.... [T]he trial court should determine first whether the prisoner is indigent. If he is indigent and the court decides that a continuance is not feasible, it should then ascertain whether the prisoner's interests are actually at stake in the suit and whether an attorney would be helpful to him under the circumstances of the case.... [I]f the prisoner is not contesting the suit against him, or any aspect of it, there is no need for counsel; but if he plans to defend the action and an adverse judgment would affect his present or future property rights, an attorney should be appointed. (17 Cal.3d at p. 924.) The proceedings to implement Yarbrough's access to the courts were extremely cursory insofar as the Payne guidelines were concerned. The findings of the trial court, prepared by counsel, are in large part a verbatim recitation of the Payne requirements. No one challenges them. Yarbrough got what he wanted  a declaration of entitlement to appointed counsel  although, in seeming contradiction to the dictates of Payne, he received no actual appointment. And for its part, the county received all that it wanted in the trial court's conclusion that it had no power to order the county to compensate counsel. In view of the nonadversary nature of the proceedings in the trial court and because the matter is before us on extraordinary writ, we are not compelled to accept the findings. (See generally Code Civ. Proc., § 909.) (4a) We examine the entire proceedings to determine whether the court applied the proper standards in exercising its discretion on the motion before it. Preliminarily, several amici suggest that the ruling on the need for appointment of counsel should follow a formal hearing at which the plaintiff in the civil case is required to appear and establish that if successful in the civil suit the prisoner could in fact respond in damages. We see no need to establish rigid requirements in this regard and merely note that if the court has reason to believe the plaintiff can and will provide information as to the prisoner's ability to respond in damages, attendance of the plaintiff should be sought. However, in one instance at least  when abatement or stay of the litigation is contemplated  the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to be heard. (5), (3b) One of the criteria for appointment of counsel is that an adverse judgment will affect property rights. If the indigent presently has no property  and by definition he is not likely to have much  some assessment must be made as to the indigent's assertion that his interests are actually at stake. If the guideline is read to encompass an incarcerated indigent no matter how remote his expectation of future property interests, it is, for all intents and purposes, no guideline at all, for every incarcerated defendant, viewing his world through rose-colored glasses, can anticipate release or commutation in time to return to the job market. The court itself should evaluate the potential for loss to the prisoner, weighing such factors as age, term of incarceration, employment history, education, skills, family background and the likelihood of inheriting or otherwise obtaining property. The court may also consider the prisoner's prospects for earning money while in prison and accumulating sums to satisfy a civil judgment  royalties from books and songs come to mind. Undoubtedly there are other sources that might prove fruitful. (4b) Here the court considered the issue of Yarbrough's present indigency, but, despite speculation that a judgment for damages would be useless to plaintiffs, no evidence whatever was received to permit an assessment of whether or how Yarbrough's future economic fortunes would be affected by a judgment against him. (3c) In addition to finding a potential for loss that is not wholly ephemeral, the trial court must determine that counsel will be helpful to the prisoner under the circumstances of the case. The court should consider whether there are new questions of fact to be determined. The conviction itself will, of course, be admissible at the civil trial as an exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1300.) (6) Further, the doctrine of collateral estoppel will preclude relitigation of the issues decided in the criminal prosecution. ( Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601 [25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439].) We stated in Teitelbaum: Although [Teitelbaum] ... did not have the initiative in his criminal trial, he was afforded a full opportunity to litigate the issue of his guilt with all the safeguards afforded the criminal defendant, and since he was charged with felonies punishable in the state prison ... he had every motive to make as vigorous and effective a defense as possible. Under these circumstances, we hold that any issue necessarily decided in a prior criminal proceeding is conclusively determined as to the parties if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.  ( Id., at p. 606, italics added.) (4c) In this case, the doctrine will preclude the relitigation of the issue of Yarbrough's state of mind at the time of the homicide as well as the theory of an accidental killing because of the alleged defectiveness of the weapon as the proximate cause of Cantrell's death  the main theory of the defense in the criminal action. [5] A determination by the trial court that counsel will not be helpful on the question of liability does not, however, foreclose the need for counsel on the issue of the amount of damages. Assuming that consideration of that issue is not preempted by a determination that no interests of the prisoner are actually at stake, there remains the problem of minimizing the damage award. In that respect, one circumstance to consider is the multiplicity of defendants. Thus, in this case, the court should not ignore that the codefendants, jointly and severally liable, will undoubtedly defend on the question of damages despite their position that Yarbrough alone is responsible for the death of Cantrell. (7a), (4d) One important guideline was ignored by the trial court entirely  whether access can be provided by abating the matter until the prisoner is released from custody and therefore better able to make his own arrangements. The feasibility of such abatement cannot be dismissed out of hand. In many instances it would seem a reasonable way of securing the civil defendant's access to the courts, requiring only the tolling of the statutory time prescriptions for prosecution on the obvious ground of impracticability. We are aware that justice delayed may be no justice at all, but postponement as a solution is not unknown to the law. [6] (7b) As stated in Payne, postponement of the trial is not a reasonable alternative when the plaintiff may suffer substantial prejudice. (4e) When, as here, the issue of liability is a foregone conclusion absent a reversal of the judgment on appeal, the potential for prejudice is minimal. With the passage of time, damages  the only issue which realistically remains to be litigated  will become more, not less, certain. It must be remembered that, however soon liability and damages are litigated, plaintiff's hope of recovery from an incarcerated indigent defendant cannot possibly take wing until his release from prison. [7] By the preceding discussion we seek to impress on the trial courts the need to exercise their discretion in as informed a manner as possible. At a minimum, then, the court is required to conduct the inquiry we outlined in Payne and clarified here: to consider the defendant's indigency, the feasibility of a continuance, whether defendant's interests are actually at stake, and whether counsel would be helpful under the circumstances of the case. The record reveals that the court here did not seriously consider any factor other than indigency. Several of the findings  relating to defendant's interests and the usefulness of counsel  are unsupported by the evidence. We conclude, therefore, that the matter must be returned to the trial court for further proceedings in which the court, exercising its discretion in accord with the guidelines outlined above, reconsiders the question of how to effectuate Yarbrough's right of access to the courts. We are fully aware that we have not dealt with the issues which have triggered the flood of amicus briefs mentioned in footnote 1: the power of the trial court to appoint an unwilling attorney to represent an incarcerated civil defendant, as well as its power and duty to provide funds for counsel's services and costs and, of course, the source of such funds. The fact that we find that it would be premature to discuss these issues in this particular case should not be interpreted to mean that we find that courts are powerless in those regards. The problem is, however, primarily a legislative one. It is our hope that the Legislature, working closely with the State Bar and other interested groups, will use the respite afforded by our disposition on this case to enact a fair legislative solution to the vexing problems which, for the time being, have been placed on the judicial backburner. Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue, directing respondent court to conduct further proceedings in a manner consistent with this opinion.