Opinion ID: 164589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Against the FOP

Text: 67 Mr. Montgomery appears to have raised a breach of the duty of representation claim against the FOP, asserting that the Union (1) failed to ensure that Mr. Montgomery received due process, (2) failed to ensure his safety, (3) failed to uphold the CBA's covenant of good faith and fair dealing through its failure to take any corrective action in the aftermath of the continued violation of Mr. Montgomery's constitutional rights; and, (4) through the above actions intentionally caused severe emotional distress through its failure to uphold its duties under the CBA. 68 The district court rejected Mr. Montgomery's claims finding that (a) the claims allege the breach of the duty of fair representation and are time-barred; (b) the FOP is not a state actor acting under the color of law; and (c) Mr. Montgomery's state law claims fail for the same reasons they failed against the City. 69
70 We agree with the district court that the bulk of Mr. Montgomery's claims allege the breach of the duty of fair representation. Where a plaintiff's allegations fall within the scope of the duty of fair representation, federal labor law governs and ordinarily preempts any state-law claims based on those allegations. Thomas v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 225 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir.2000). Accordingly, these claims are preempted by federal labor law. 71 In support of his argument that his claims are not preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), Mr. Montgomery relies on Marshall v. TRW, Inc., 900 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir.1990). In Marshall, we held that plaintiff's state tort claim for retaliatory discharge for filing a workers compensation claim was not preempted by the LMRA, although the employer argued that the plaintiff was terminated pursuant to a just cause clause under the collective bargaining agreement. The plaintiff responded that the employer's reliance on the just cause provision was pretextual. We held that a court could determine whether the plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for a workers compensation filing without interpreting the just cause provision. Id. at 1521. Because the plaintiff's claim turned on whether the employer's motivation for terminating the plaintiff was the rule violation or retaliation for engaging in protected activity, we concluded that the claim was not preempted by the LMRA, 72 Mr. Montgomery suggests that because he does not reference the CBA and because no interpretation of the CBA is needed, that the CBA is not at issue. He maintains that he has challenged the FOP's conduct and motivation, but not the CBA. We disagree with Mr. Montgomery's narrow characterization of his claims. Unlike the claims of the plaintiff in Marshall, Mr. Montgomery's claims require us to consider the provisions of the CBA, particularly its covenant of good faith and fair dealing. In order to assess any arbitrary or discriminatory treatment by the FOP, we must consider the terms of the CBA. Mr. Montgomery's claims are thus governed by the LMRA. 73 Under the LMRA, a union breaches its duty [of fair representation,] when its conduct is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 47, 99 S.Ct. 2121, 60 L.Ed.2d 698 (1979) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Montgomery cannot advance such a claim without demonstrating that he filed his claim within six months of the alleged breach, see Hagerman v. United Transp. Union, 281 F.3d 1189, 1197 (10th Cir.2002) (A six-month statute of limitations applies to duty of fair representation claims.), and that he sought the FOP's aid. See Volkman v. United Trans. Union, 73 F.3d 1047, 1054 (10th Cir.1996). 74 As to the timeliness of Mr. Montgomery's action as noted above, Chief Garrett informed Mr. Montgomery that his position had been done away with during the August 24, 1998 telephone call. However, the Personnel Action Form documenting this action was dated September 28, 1998, with an effective date of August 15, 1998. Aple's Supp.App. at 157. Mr. Montgomery filed suit on March 22, 1999. Viewing the facts and inferences in the light most favorable to Mr. Montgomery, the September 28, 1998 date suggests that Mr. Montgomery's suit was timely. 75 Nevertheless, there is another obstacle to Mr. Montgomery's fair representation claim. An employee can bring suit under § 301 of the LMRA only if he or she has exhausted the contractual remedies provided in the collective bargaining agreements. Aguinaga v. United Food & Comm'l Workers Int'l Union, 993 F.2d 1463, 1471 (10th Cir.1993). Although Mr. Montgomery contends that he left one telephone message for the FOP's President, he has presented no colorable evidence that he exhausted the CBA's grievance procedures. 76 Although there is an exception to the exhaustion requirement when an employee proves that the union breached its duty of fair representation in its response to an employer's contract breach, id., Mr. Montgomery has presented no evidence in support of this proposition. His conclusory assertions that the FOP was colluding with the City to deny him his constitutionally protected rights are not sufficient to establish the exception to the exhaustion requirement. 77 Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment on these claims. 78
79 To the extent Mr. Montgomery attempts to advance his claims under § 1983, he must demonstrate that the FOP is acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988). Labor unions such as the FOP are generally not state actors, but Mr. Montgomery argues that the FOP conspired with the City to take an adverse employment action against him. A private actor acts under color of state law when the private actor is a willful participant in joint activity with the State or its agents. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). 80 We agree with the FOP that Mr. Montgomery's conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a § 1983 claim. There is no evidence that the FOP acted in concert with the City. As established above, there is no evidence the City committed an unconstitutional act, nor are there any specific factual allegations suggesting that FOP conspired with the City. Cf. Hughes v. Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n of the City of N.Y., Inc., 850 F.2d 876, 880-81 (2d Cir.1988) (holding that complaint alleged sufficient facts to support conclusion that private-actor PBA had acted under color of state law, where complaint alleged, inter alia, that PBA had hired private investigators and placed plaintiff under surveillance with knowledge and consent of a state-actor, the New York City Police Department). Indeed, we note, as did the district court, that Mr. Montgomery's conclusory allegations of conspiracy ring especially hollow in light of the adversarial relationship between the City and the FOP. 81
82 Mr. Montgomery suggests that the FOP's actions amounted to intentional infliction of emotional distress. Under Oklahoma law, a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires a showing of conduct 83 so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to be beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous! 84 Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1218 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Frank v. Mayberry, 985 P.2d 773, 776 (Okla.1999) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46, cmt. d)). We agree with the district court that [n]o circumstance alleged by Plaintiff in this action remotely approaches the extreme conduct required to prevail on an intentional infliction claim. Rec. vol. II, at 424.