Opinion ID: 1748010
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Testimony Regarding the Victim's Sexual Behavior

Text: For his second point on appeal, Mr. Short argues that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of A.L.'s sexual behavior and statements that occurred on the day of the offense. He claims first that the proffered evidence was not prior sexual conduct and, therefore, was not barred by the rape-shield statute. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-42-101(b) (Repl.1999). This argument is without merit. The phrase prior sexual conduct does not have the narrow meaning suggested by Mr. Short. For purposes of the rape-shield statute, we have interpreted the phrase broadly enough to encompass sexual conduct that occurs prior to the trial. Laughlin v. State, 316 Ark. 489, 872 S.W.2d 848 (1994); Flurry v. State, 290 Ark. 417, 720 S.W.2d 699 (1986); Kemp v. State, 270 Ark. 835, 606 S.W.2d 573 (1980). [3] In a related argument, Mr. Short also suggests that the rape-shield statute should only apply to jury trials. We disagree. The purpose of the rape-shield statute is to shield victims of sexual offenses from the danger of public humiliation. See Graydon v. State, 329 Ark. 596, 953 S.W.2d 45 (1997). Even a bench trial is open to the public and is a matter of public record. Finally, Mr. Short claims the proffered evidence was relevant to support his reasonable belief that the victim was fourteen years of age or older. We reject this proposition for the reasons already stated under the first point. Affirmed. HANNAH, J., concurs.