Opinion ID: 2076541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the trial court commit error in denying defendant's motion for mistrial and his request for a cautionary instruction?

Text: At the close of the evidence in this case, both counsel argued to the jury. Counsel for defendant argued eloquently and zealously that the two principal state's witnesses, Frank Martellucci and William Ferle, were unworthy of belief. His argument in this respect emphasized the favorable plea arrangements both had received from the state, including minimal incarceration for serious crimes and support money for personal expenses. This favorable deal, counsel suggested, furnished a very compelling motivation to lie in order to secure their advantage at defendant's expense. In further support of his attack upon the credibility of these witnesses, counsel pointed up various inconsistencies in the testimony given at trial. In emphasizing these inconsistencies and pointing up inaccuracies, counsel was very properly attempting to raise in the jurors' minds a reasonable doubt in respect to the guilt of defendant. It is unnecessary here to outline all the inaccuracies and inconsistencies mentioned by defense counsel, but one was the unlikelihood of the commission of a murder at the Acorn Club, which looked out upon Atwells Avenue through a large picture window. He also emphasized the lack of explanation by the witnesses of the serious injuries received by Callei that he claimed could only have been produced, according to the medical examiner, by having been struck with a blunt object other than a fist or a foot. In response counsel for the state emphasized that the inconsistencies pointed to by defense counsel were unimportant and immaterial details. He suggested that some of the inconsistencies were nothing more than a smoke screen. He also suggested that the state's witnesses were no match in repartee on cross-examination for a skilled professional advocate such as counsel for defendant. He also mentioned that the principal state witnesses were credible because the one agreement they had with the state to be performed on their part was that they would testify truthfully. He argued that if they failed to testify truthfully, their entire plea agreements would become null and void. On three occasions during the course of the final argument of the prosecutor, defense counsel objected. The first portion to which objection was made centered on the inconsistencies raised by Richard Egbert: And at times Mr. Egbert very effectively and flamboyantly pointed out those inconsistencies, no question about it, but again what you have here is people of limited intelligence, even people who are very bright, who tell about an occurrence more than once, particularly after eight years originally and then twelve years now. Every time they tell that story to varying degrees they're going to tell it differently, and that's human nature, and that's what rings the bell of truth. There has been a suggestion that this is a case where the Rhode Island State Police, Department of the Attorney General, Frank Martellucci and Billy Ferle got together and conspired to fabricate and frame Mr. Marrapese, but those inconsistencies show you that's not the case. This is the way these people are recalling that event. This is not a script, this is not a t.v. show. This is not an Agatha Christie's `Murder She Wrote', this is murder that he committed, Frank Marrapese. Now, I'm not being critical of Mr. Egbert. He did the job that he was supposed to do, he was hired to do. If the roles were reversed and Billy Ferle was sitting over there, he'd be telling you that witness X   . Mr. Egbert: I object. In response to this objection, the trial justice stated, I think, Mr. Burns, we might avoid speculating as to other scenarios that are not before this jury. The next portion of the argument to which objection was raised involved the witness-protection program. You heard a lot about the deal, the Federal Witness Protection Program. Well, like it or not, this program exists because somewhere along the line decades ago, after years of frustration, somebody in law enforcement said to themselves   . Mr. Egbert: I object. This matter is not in evidence. In response to this objection, the trial justice made the following comment: I think we ought to take this opportunity to remind the jurors that it is your memory of what the testimony is that prevails. I said before that if counsel suggest certain facts and you don't remember them, it's your memory that prevails. You may move along Mr. Burns. It should be mentioned at this point that it is undisputed that the witness protection program in which the state's witnesses were involved was not a federal program but a state program. The next point of the argument to which objection was raised was as follows: Now, these suggest one of three things, three things only. Number one, that it's an incredible coincidence, an impossible coincidence that they just said to themselves, `Let me think in my mind what kind of a lie I can make up,' and that's what they both made up. That's impossible. Number two, there's a conspiracy between the Rhode Island State Police, the Department of the Attorney General, Frank Martellucci and Billy Ferle to frame poor Mr. Marrapese, the kindly tavern owner. Mr. Egbert: I object. In response to this objection the court took the following action: Mr. Burns, do you move to strike what you just said? Mr. Burns: No, Your Honor. The Court: I strike it, the way in which this defendant was characterized. There is no evidence to support that statement. I ask that you disregard it, please. After final argument had been completed, counsel for defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that some of the comments that had been made by the prosecuting attorney tended to inflame the jurors against defendant and his counsel. The court pointed out that the specific elements of the argument upon which counsel based the request for a mistrial were not objected to. The trial justice took the motion under advisement but allowed counsel to argue more fully after she had completed her charge to the jury. At that point the trial justice reviewed the prosecutor's argument in light of standards set by this court in State v. Mello, 472 A.2d 302 (R.I. 1984), and Standards of the American Bar Association for Criminal Justice relating to prosecutorial argument and conduct. At the conclusion of a lengthy and complete analysis, she made the following comment: You can't separate Mr. Burns' argument from the context of the Ferle/Martellucci testimony. While it may have sounded prejudicial and reaching for facts not in evidence, I think if you put the Ferle/Martellucci testimony together, there are permissible inferences that Mr. Burns could have drawn  asked the jury to draw, and could have argued to the jury that they should draw. The motion to pass the case is denied. We have stated in State v. Brown, 522 A.2d 208, 210 (R.I. 1987), that the decision concerning the declaration of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial justice. State v. Collazo, 446 A.2d 1006 (R.I. 1982); State v. Anil, 417 A.2d 1367 (R.I. 1980). In the event that the trial justice denies such a motion, his or her determination will be given great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong. Collazo, 446 A.2d at 1010; State v. Pailin, 114 R.I. 725, 339 A.2d 253 (1975). We went on to say in State v. Brown that the trial justice must evaluate the probable effect of the prosecutorial conduct on the outcome of the case by examining the remark or question in its factual context. 522 A.2d at 211 (citing State v. Pugliese, 117 R.I. 21, 362 A.2d 124 (1976)). The test essentially is whether the prosecutor's comment or question so inflames the passions of the jurors as to prevent their calm and dispassionate examination of the evidence. 522 A.2d at 211. We have examined the transcript of the prosecutor's argument with particular reference to defendant's motion for a mistrial and the trial justice's response thereto. We believe that each time counsel for defendant objected, the trial justice made a reasonable response thereto with an appropriate admonition to the jury. Examining the argument as a whole, we are in agreement with the trial justice that this argument would not be inclined to inflame the passions of the jury sufficiently to prevent their calm and dispassionate examination of the evidence. We conclude that the trial justice was not clearly wrong in denying the motion for a mistrial and that the instructions she gave to the jury and the response she made to the objections raised by defense counsel were adequate. No further cautionary instructions than those that she gave were required.