Opinion ID: 2631069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Employee Bears the Burden of Proving the Elements of Permanent Total Disability

Text: ¶ 46 We review the court of appeals' statutory interpretation of section 34A-2-413(1)(c) for correctness. See State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, ¶ 6, 150 P.3d 532. When interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute's plain language with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242. We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Statutes should be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions and statutes. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592. ¶ 47 When the language of the statute is plain, other interpretive tools are not needed. Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ¶ 8, 108 P.3d 725. However, if the language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond the statute to legislative history and public policy to ascertain the statute's intent. Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ¶ 59, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring). When viewed holistically, a statute is ambiguous if duplicative, yet plausible meanings are not eliminated from possibility. Id. ¶ 60. ¶ 48 Having acknowledged these rules, we consider the plain language of section 34A-2-413(1) of the Act, which outlines the threshold requirements an employee must meet to receive compensation for permanent total disability. Subsection (b) states that the employee has the burden of proving three subparts: (i) that the employee was significantly impaired as a result of an industrial accident or occupational disease; (ii) that the employee is permanently totally disabled; and (iii) that the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (2005). ¶ 49 We next turn to subsection (c), which states that [t]o find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall reach four necessary conclusions: (i) the employee is not gainfully employed; (ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; (iii) the . . . impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident . . . and (iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age; education; past work experience; medical capacity; and residual functional capacity. Id. § 34A-2-413(1)(c) (amended 2006). ¶ 50 Although subsection (c) does not explicitly allocate the burden of proof, a reading of the statute as a whole makes clear that it falls to the employee. Both subsections (b) and (c) include the same critical phrase: permanently totally disabled. Subsection (b)(ii) cursorily states that the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is permanently totally disabled. It is unclear, however, from the wording of subsection (b)(ii) what is required for the employee to prove permanent total disability. Subsection (c) simply enumerates those requirements. In short, subsection (c) imbues subsection (b)(ii) with meaning. ¶ 51 The court of appeals' interpretation, allocating subsection (c)'s burden of proof to the employer, renders meaningless the employee's responsibility to prove permanent total disability under (b)(ii). We avoid construing a particular provision of a statute so as to neutralize . . . other provisions if any other construction of the particular provision is at all tenable. Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990) (Howe, J., dissenting). ¶ 52 The plain language of subsection (c) further bolsters our interpretation that the employee bears the burden of proof. In each of subsection (c)'s four subparts, the employee must be in a particular posture in order to be found permanently totally disabled. These elements of proof turn on intimate facts about the employee's circumstanceshis unemployment or how his medical capacity or age affects his ability to do reasonably available work, for example. The fact that the employee is in the best position to proffer evidence relevant to these factual determinations further supports our interpretation that the employee bears the burden of proof under subsection (c). ¶ 53 The court of appeals' interpretation, on the other hand, mandates that the employer disprove the elements of subsection (c), which would require judicially created additions to and subtractions from the statute's plain language. For example, subsection (c)(i) requires proof that the employee is not gainfully employed. Under the court of appeals' reading, the employer would have to prove that the employee is gainfully employed. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, ¶ 9, 117 P.3d 1074. Although we concede that section 34A-2-413(1)(c) was not artfully drafted, we refrain from creating clarity by reading additional terms into the statute. ¶ 54 In conclusion, we reverse the court of appeals because we can find only one plausible reading of the statute based on its plain languagenamely, that the employee has the burden of proving the elements of subsection (c). [5]