Opinion ID: 2567455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: procedural history of the state's motion to disqualify mr. maughan's lawyers

Text: ¶11 In short order, the State filed a motion to disqualify Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams. The State contended that the conduct of Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams created an actual conflict of interest or presented a serious potential conflict that could only be avoided through disqualification. ¶12 The State described several conflicts. Regardless of whether the lawyers would ever find themselves facing prosecution for an offense stemming from their conversations with the Spokane witnesses, the State contended that the focus of the lawyers' energies would shift from Mr. Maughan to themselves to a degree that might result in leaving Mr. Maughan without effective counsel. The State also advanced the prospect that prosecutors might be compelled to explore the substance of the lawyers' conversations with the witnesses during redirect examination. The State notes that it would have an interest in exposing the bias of Mr. Maughan's friend, Mr. Wagar. Mr. Wagar's willingness to comply with the alleged admonition of Mr. Mauro to refuse to talk to the Spokane detectives would, in the State's view, reinforce the case that Mr. Wagar's testimony would likely be tainted by his allegiance to Mr. Maughan. Once the conversation with Mr. Mauro was disclosed, the State conjectured, disclosure of Mr. Mauro's arrest would not be far behind. That would create, as the State's counsel stated during the hearing before the district court, an impossible position for [Mr. Mauro]. ¶13 As for Mr. Williams, the State saw a conflict of interest lurking in the statements made by the Spokane witnesses after their meeting with Mr. Williams that their confusion caused their belief that Mr. Mauro had instructed them not to talk to the police. And in the event that the subject of Mr. Mauro's statements might arise during the redirect examination of any of the Spokane witnesses, the State contends that the circumstances giving rise to the witnesses' change of heart might also surface. To the extent that Mr. Williams' meeting with Mr. Wagar contributed to his decision to talk to the police and to the extent that Mr. Williams persuaded Mr. Wagar that he was confused, the State argues that Mr. Williams' effectiveness as counsel might be called into question. Even if Mr. Williams' statements to Mr. Wagar were intended to clear up a misunderstanding about the nature and scope of Mr. Mauro's admonition rather than to persuade Mr. Wagar that he was confused about Mr. Mauro's instructions to bar communicating with the police, Mr. Williams' representation would still, in the view of the State, constitute an existing or potential conflict. ¶14 Finally, the State offered up as a ground for the lawyers' disqualification the unsubstantiated claim by a female friend of Mr. Griffin that Mr. Mauro had come to her home on the morning of his first appearance as Mr. Maughan's lawyer and falsely represented himself to be a television reporter. The State suggested in its motion that Mr. Williams might have also been involved in the alleged ruse as the driver of the SUV that transported the person identified as Mr. Mauro to the woman's home. This story proved to be a complete fabrication, and, to the State's credit, its counsel acknowledged as much at the hearing on the motion to disqualify the lawyers. ¶15 Throughout these proceedings, Mr. Maughan expressed his desire to retain both Mr. Mauro and Mr. Williams as counsel. As Mr. Mauro explained to the district court, Mr. Maughan recognized that he had formed a relationship with the two attorneys, they had worked extensively on his case, and they had established a rapport with members of his family. Mr. Mauro explained that to the extent there is a conflict or potential conflict[,] [Mr. Maughan] would waive both of those as to both lawyers. ¶16 The district court did not expressly speak to the issue of waiver in its memorandum decision. Considerations of waiver are, however, at the heart of the court's decision to permit Mr. Maughan to retain one of his two lawyers. In this appeal, we decide (1) whether it was proper for the district court to allow Mr. Maughan to waive a conflict at all, and (2) if it was within the court's discretion to permit waiver, whether Mr. Maughan's authority to waive the conflict was properly restricted to one and not both of his lawyers. Instead of framing its analysis of the State's motion to disqualify Mr. Maughan's lawyers in waiver nomenclature, the district court, in a memorandum decision, approached its task by applying a test it borrowed from State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484, 490 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). The test balanced a [d]efendant's right to be represented by an attorney of his choice against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the public concern in the integrity of the judicial process and the orderly administration of justice. ¶17 The district court cited the presence of at least the reasonable possibility that Mr. Maughan's lawyers committed a serious violation of law or ethical standards as its primary justification for disqualification. That the district court had misgivings over just how reasonable this possibility might be and about what the actual gravity of their transgressions were became evident when the court decided that Mr. Maughan's Sixth Amendment right to continue his association with his appointed counsel was important enough to save one, but not both, of his lawyers from disqualification despite their Spokane misadventures. Based upon the judge's ruling, Mr. Maughan decided to retain Mr. Mauro, and thus Mr. Williams was disqualified.