Opinion ID: 29312
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Civil Suit for Malicious Prosecution

Text: 15 On September 23, 1994, Castellano filed the instant civil action in the District Court of the 288th Judicial District, Bexar County Texas for malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Fragozo, individually and in his capacity as a San Antonio Police Officer, Sanchez, Castro, and others. Castellano claimed that the defendants maliciously prosecuted him in violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and contended that he had suffered a myriad of damages, including injury to his feelings, reputation, mental health, and character. Castellano also complained that he had been severely impaired in his social and mercantile standing and continued to suffer great embarrassment, humiliation, and anguish. Finally, Castellano asserted that his business had lost clientele, profits, and good standing as a direct and proximate result of the criminal prosecution. 16 The case was subsequently removed to federal court where it was referred to a magistrate judge. Thereafter, on Sanchez's motion for summary judgment, the court dismissed Castellano's malicious prosecution claims based on the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying on Albright v. Oliver 6 and Johnson v. Louisiana Department of Agriculture, 7 however, the court sustained Castellano's malicious prosecution claims based on alleged violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights. The court also determined that Castellano's third amended complaint contained sufficient allegations to support his malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment. 8 17 The trial was held in April of 2000. As to his individual damages, Castellano testified that he: (1) was embarrassed from the exposure his case received in the media — even after his conviction was overturned, (2) was asked to resign from his civil service position, (3) was unable to obtain loans to expand his business, and (4) was denied coverage for fire insurance. Castellano also stated that at the time of the fire, he was attempting to franchise his business. He had started a construction company, developed a concept of constructing inexpensive prefabricated buildings, and expended resources hiring legal counsel, preparing literature, and obtaining a license in California. However, Castellano explained that since his conviction for arson, he had been unable to franchise his business and stated that his personal losses stemming therefrom could have been in the millions. 18 Also testifying at trial was Castellano's economist, Gene Trevino (Trevino), who opined as to the measure of damages Castellano suffered, individually, as a result of his failure to franchise his business after the arson conviction. 9 Specifically, Trevino testified that Castellano's personal economic loss as a result of his inability to franchise his business was $1,200,000. He further explained that this amount was based on the assumption that Fred's would have been able to franchise at a rate of one restaurant a year for twelve years and, as such, Castellano could have increased his personal salary by an additional $100,000 per year for each of those years. 10 19 Jiminez and Louis Cantu (Cantu), both employees of Fred's, also testified at the trial. Jiminez testified that (1) Sanchez and Fragozo attempted to enlist her to be on their side during the criminal trial and testify against Castellano and (2) after Castellano's conviction Sanchez stated that she had done what she set out to do. Cantu testified, inter alia, that Fragozo and Castro had come to his home, ordered him into Fragozo's car, and attempted to persuade him to alter the statement he had given previously to the police so as to implicate Castellano in the arson of Fred's. Cantu further explained that Fragozo pointed a gun at him when he refused to change his statement as they requested. 20 At the close of Castellano's case, Sanchez, Fragozo, and Castro each moved for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), arguing, in part, that the law surrounding § 1983 malicious prosecution claims was unsettled. 11 In her Rule 50(a) motion, Sanchez also argued that (1) Castellano had not proved a lack of probable cause with respect to the criminal proceedings or her actions, (2) Castellano's complaint did not specify that he was seeking personal damages derivative from his business losses after his conviction, and (3) there was insufficient evidence that she conspired with Castro or Fragozo. Fragozo argued that there was insufficient evidence to prove that his actions were not objectively reasonable for purposes of qualified immunity. Both motions were denied. 21 At the close of all the evidence, but before the case went to the jury, the defendants renewed their JMOL motions for the same reasons articulated at the close of Castellano's case. The motions were denied. 22 Thereafter, the jury instructions and interrogatories were presented to the magistrate judge and discussed at a charge conference before they were read to the jury. At that time, no one objected to the instructions or interrogatories as they related to malicious prosecution. 23 Following its general jury instructions as to the types of evidence, credibility of witnesses, burdens of proof, etc., the court provided the following charge for malicious prosecution: 24 ... Castellano claims that Alfred Castro and Chris Fragozo, while acting under color of law, intentionally violated his constitutional right to due process by maliciously prosecuting him for the criminal offense of arson. Castellano further claims that Maria Sanchez, as an individual, intentionally violated the same constitutional right. 25 To prove such violation, Castellano must prove each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence: One, the defendants intentionally committed the acts that deprived him of due process; two, in so doing, the defendants acted under color of law of the State of Texas; and three the defendants' acts caused his damages. 26 First, to prove the defendants intentionally committed acts depriving him of due process, Castellano must prove they maliciously prosecuted him for the criminal offense of arson. To prove this claim, Castellano must establish by a preponderance of the evidence each of the following: 27 One, the defendants caused or commenced or aided a criminal proceeding against him; 28 Two, the defendants acted without probable cause; 29 Three, the criminal action terminated in his favor; 30 Four, he was innocent of arson; 31 Five, the defendants acted with malice by prosecuting him for arson; 32 And six, he was damaged by the criminal proceeding. 33 . . . . 34 To determine whether Maria Sanchez committed malicious prosecution you must also determine whether she conspired with another while the other was acting under color of law, and they conspired with the intent to commit malicious prosecution.... 35 In instructing the jury as to the potential damages that they could award, the court explained: 36 If you find that Castellano was maliciously prosecuted by any of the defendants, then you must determine an amount that is fair compensation for all of Castellano's damages. The purpose of these compensatory damages is to make Castellano whole — that is, to compensate Castellano for the damage that Castellano has suffered. Compensatory damages are not limited to just out-of-pocket expenses that Castellano may have incurred because of his injury. You may award damages for any injury that Castellano sustained, including any mental anguish, loss of earning potential, and/or loss of capacity for enjoyment of life that Castellano has experienced in the past. However, Castellano's compensatory damages may not include actual damages to Fred's Fish Fry, Inc. as a result of the fire or any malicious prosecution. Castellano's damages in relation to Fred's Fish Fry may only include his own damages you find resulted from any damages to Fred's Fish Fry, Inc. as a consequence of any of the defendants' malicious prosecution. 37 If the plaintiff has proved that the defendants acted with malice or willfulness or with callous and reckless indifference to the safety or rights of others, you may also award punitive damages against them.... The amount of an award of punitive damages must not reflect bias, prejudice, or sympathy toward any party. However, the amount can be as large as you believe necessary to fulfill the purposes of punitive damages. 38 Similarly, the jury interrogatories directed the jury to consider whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the defendants deprived Castellano of his constitutional rights by committing malicious prosecution as defined in the court's instruction. As to damages, the jury interrogatories queried: Interrogatory No. 4: 39 What sum of money will fairly and reasonably compensate Castellano for his actual damages, if any, that he proved were the cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the defendants' violation of his constitutional rights? Provide the amount, if any in dollars and cents. Interrogatory No. 5.: 40 Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the listed defendants acted with malice or wilfulness or with callous and reckless indifference to the rights of Castellano, as defined in the court's instruction? And, Interrogatory No. 6: 41 What sum of money will fairly and reasonably compensate the plaintiff for his punitive damages, if any, that he proved resulted from the violation of his constitutional rights by the listed defendants? 42 Damages were submitted globally to the jury. 43 On April 17, 2002, the jury rendered its verdict and found that Fragozo, but not Castro, had acted under color of law to deprive Castellano of his constitutional rights by committing malicious prosecution. As to Sanchez, the jury concluded that she had conspired with Fragozo, while he was acting under color of law, with the specific intent to deprive Castellano of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the jury awarded $3,000,000 in compensatory damages and $500,000 in punitive damages — to be divided evenly between Sanchez and Fragozo.