Opinion ID: 1389162
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Michael Page Jones's Statements to Police

Text: Michael Jones was the state's star witness against defendant. Before he testified, defense counsel attempted to get a ruling on the admissibility of Jones's statements made to Detective Armando Saldate when Saldate first questioned him. Because defense counsel anticipated that Jones would claim that he could not remember the events of that evening, she requested a ruling prohibiting the state from using Jones's earlier statements for impeachment. The state argued that the statements were admissible to impeach Jones if his memory loss was feigned, and, in the alternative, the state could lay the proper foundation to show that the statements were admissible as past recollection recorded. The trial court delayed its ruling until hearing Jones's testimony; afterward, the trial judge concluded, over defendant's hearsay objections, that Jones's statements to Saldate were admissible under rules 803(5), Arizona Rules of Evidence (past recollection recorded) and 801 (prior inconsistent statements). Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting Saldate's testimony about Jones's earlier statements and, in doing so, violated defendant's right to confront his accusers, guaranteed to him by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, § 24, of the Arizona Constitution. The State counters by arguing that Saldate's testimony concerning Jones's earlier statements was admissible (1) as prior inconsistent statements under rule 801(d)(1); (2) as Jones's past recollection recorded under rule 803(5); or (3) under the residual hearsay exception, rule 804(b)(5). Alternatively, the state argues that any error in admitting Saldate's testimony concerning Jones' earlier statements was harmless.
Admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Williams, 132 Ariz. 153, 157, 644 P.2d 889, 893 (1982) (citations omitted); see also State v. Robinson, 165 Ariz. 51, 58, 796 P.2d 853, 860 (1990) (applying abuse of discretion standard to trial court's ruling allowing state to use extrinsic evidence to impeach witness who claimed memory failure). After concluding that Jones was feigning his memory loss, the trial court ruled that Detective Saldate's testimony was admissible under rule 801(d)(1) as a prior inconsistent statement. Rule 801(d) provides in part: A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is (A) inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, .... The only dispute concerning admissibility of Saldate's testimony under rule 801(d)(1) is whether Jones's earlier statements were inconsistent with his testimony at trial. Defendant argues that Jones's statements at trial  i.e., that he did not remember various events or conversations  were not inconsistent with his prior statements describing the event. A statement's inconsistency ... is not limited to cases in which diametrically opposite assertions have been made. United States v. Rogers, 549 F.2d 490, 496 (8th Cir.1976). A claimed inability to recall, when disbelieved by the trial judge, may be viewed as inconsistent with previous statements.... Rogers, 549 F.2d at 496; see also State v. Lenarchick, 74 Wis.2d 425, 247 N.W.2d 80, 87 (1976) (adopting similar rule); People v. Green, 3 Cal.3d 981, 92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998, 1002 (1971) (same). This court recognized this rule in a case factually similar to defendant's case, State v. Robinson, 165 Ariz. 51, 796 P.2d 853 (1990). In Robinson, a state witness testified that he could not remember various details of a crime. 165 Ariz. at 58, 796 P.2d at 860. The trial court permitted the state to question the witness regarding prior statements that the witness made to law enforcement officers about forgotten details and then allowed the officers to testify about the witness's earlier statements. Robinson, 165 Ariz. at 58-59, 796 P.2d at 860-61. After discussing possible motives for the witness's memory loss, this court upheld the trial court's ruling and found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the state to impeach its witness with extrinsic evidence. Robinson, 165 Ariz. at 59, 796 P.2d at 861. The record in this case reflects that the trial judge concluded that Jones was feigning his lack of memory. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in reaching this conclusion. [3] Accordingly, we find that Jones's statements to Detective Saldate were admissible under rule 801(d)(1), Arizona Rules of Evidence. [4] Despite having determined that this evidence was admissible under Arizona Rules of Evidence, our inquiry does not end here. We now turn to whether the admission of this evidence violated defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
The confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right to confront their accusers. State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 203, 735 P.2d 801, 813 (1987); see Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24; U.S. Const. amend. VI. This right has long been read as securing an adequate opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 557, 108 S.Ct. 838, 841, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988) (citations omitted); see Robinson, 153 Ariz. at 203 n. 15, 735 P.2d at 813 n. 15 (citations omitted). And, as the United States Supreme Court explained: The Confrontation Clause guarantees only an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. [citations omitted].... It is sufficient that the defendant has the opportunity to bring out such matters as the witness' bias, his lack of care and attentiveness, his poor eye-sight, and even (what is often a prime objective of cross-examination, ...) the very fact that he has a bad memory. Owens, 484 U.S. at 559, 108 S.Ct. at 842 (emphasis supplied). In this case, the hearsay declarant, Jones, testified at trial and was subjected to unrestricted cross-examination. And, the fact that Jones testified that he could no longer remember certain details of the crime, even assuming his claim were true, does not result in a violation of the confrontation clause. Cf. Owens, 484 U.S. at 557-60, 108 S.Ct. at 841-43 (allowing introduction of witness's earlier out-of-court identification of defendant despite fact that witness testified he could not remember any events surrounding attack). Defendant's opportunity to cross-examine Jones before a jury satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause. [5] Thus, we find that the admission of Jones's out-of-court statements to Detective Saldate did not violate defendant's confrontation clause rights.