Opinion ID: 204669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Vallar's Sentencing Enhancement for Obstruction of Justice

Text: Vallar appeals the district court's application of a two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Section 3C1.1 permits courts to increase a defendant's offense level if he willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Perjury is a well-settled example of conduct that warrants an obstruction enhancement. United States v. Bermea-Boone, 563 F.3d 621, 626-27 (7th Cir.2009). A witness commits perjury if, while under oath, he `gives false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, or faulty memory.' Id. at 627 (quoting United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993)). On appeal, [w]e review the factual findings underlying the district court's application of the obstruction enhancement for clear error, and we review de novo whether those findings adequately support the enhancement. United States v. Anderson, 580 F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir.2009). The district court found that Vallar committed perjury when he testified that he signed the Miranda waiver because the agents tricked him by presenting the waiver form as a property receipt. In light of testimony from agents present when Vallar signed the waiver indicating that he freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, the district court concluded that Vallar's testimony was false and that he knew it was false. Vallar raises two challenges. First, he cites United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993), to argue that the district court erred by failing to make sufficient findings that Vallar committed perjury. 507 U.S. at 95, 113 S.Ct. 1111 ([I]f a defendant objects to a sentence enhancement resulting from her trial testimony, a district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out. When doing so, it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding. The district court's determination that enhancement is required is sufficient, however, if . . . the court makes a finding of an obstruction of, or impediment to, justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury.); see also United States v. Woody, 55 F.3d 1257, 1273 (7th Cir.1995). Second, he claims that there is no evidence in the record that would permit the court to conclude that he willfully provided false testimony. He asserts that he subjectively may have felt tricked, and that testifying to that effect does not constitute willfulness. We disagree. First, the district court adequately determined that Vallar committed perjury at the suppression hearing. It explicitly found that Vallar's testimony was false. It also expressly concluded that Vallar intended to provide false testimony, stating that Vallar's explanation of how his name happened to appear on a Miranda waiver, frankly, is not credible and not credible to the point where I find that it manifested an intent by Mr. Vallar to deceive the court. Further, the testimony undoubtedly concerned a material matter because it came during a suppression hearing at which Vallar argued that his Miranda waiver was not voluntary, claiming that it resulted from coercive tactics. Bermea-Boone, 563 F.3d at 627 (quoting Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 94, 113 S.Ct. 1111); see United States v. Carrera, 259 F.3d 818, 831-32 (7th Cir.2001) (affirming an obstruction enhancement where the district court merely concluded that testimony was false, but did not indicate its findings for each element of perjury, because concluding that the testimony was untruthful encompassed materiality where there was no doubt that the district court considered [the subject of the false testimony] to be material). Had the district court believed Vallar's testimony, it may have suppressed his confession. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 6 (`Material' evidence, fact, statement, or information, as used in this section, means evidence, fact, statement, or information that, if believed, would tend to influence or affect the issue under determination.); see also United States v. Bedolla-Zavala, 611 F.3d 392, 396 (7th Cir.2010). Second, it was not clear error to conclude that Vallar willfully testified falsely. The district court weighed Vallar's testimony against the government agents' and concluded that Vallar lacked credibility. We find no clear error in this conclusion. See United States v. Ofcky, 237 F.3d 904, 910 (7th Cir.2001) (affirming the application of an obstruction enhancement where the trial judge weighed the testimony of the defendant against that of others and determined that the defendant's testimony lacked credibility.); see also United States v. Pedigo, 12 F.3d 618, 628-29 (7th Cir.1993). We affirm the district court's application of the obstruction enhancement.