Opinion ID: 844220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voir Dire Implying Threat to Juror Safety

Text: During voir dire, a prospective juror who ultimately was not selected as a juror or an alternate said that he had been the victim of a crime, and that he had reported the crime but later “dropped the charges.” He explained: “I feel I did the right thing, because I was in a position where I was going to be hurt if I — if I kept on with it, you know. It was too close. I had a barber shop, and the young kids, you know, were — lived too close to the barber shop, and I was a target there.” The prosecutor followed up with this question: “Let me ask you something hypothetically, and I think you will see what my point is. Once again, this has absolutely — I cannot stress this enough. This has absolutely nothing to do with 21 this case. [¶] Let‟s say you sat on a jury, and you perceived — as you were sitting on the jury listening to evidence and everything, you perceived some danger to yourself in coming back with a verdict one way or the other. [¶] Would that affect your decision?” The defense promptly objected, and the trial court sustained the objection, stating: “That situation is not going to exist. There is no reason to feel it would exist. Therefore, it is not an appropriate inquiry in the context of this case, the fear that someone may have a result because of — in a neighborhood of being terrorized is completely divorced from what the situation is in this courtroom. There isn‟t a person on this jury who has the slightest reason to fear any consequence as a result of their jury service.” Defendant contends the prosecutor committed misconduct by asking a question that implied the existence of a threat to the safety of jurors in this case. “ „A prosecutor‟s conduct violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution when it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process.‟ [Citations.] Under California law, a prosecutor who uses reprehensible methods of persuasion commits misconduct even if such actions do not render the trial fundamentally unfair. [Citation.] Generally, a claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not cognizable on appeal unless the defendant made a timely objection and requested an admonition.” (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 444.) Because defense counsel objected, and the trial court admonished the prospective jurors who were present in the courtroom, the prosecutorial misconduct claim is cognizable, but it fails on the merits. Here, a prospective juror admitted that he had previously dropped criminal charges out of fear for his safety. Given that admission, the prosecutor was understandably concerned that the prospective juror‟s fears might in some way affect his ability to discharge his 22 duties as a juror. Seeking to explore the issue, the prosecutor couched her inquiry in terms of a hypothetical situation, saying she could not stress enough that it had nothing to do with this case. The trial court promptly sustained the defense objection and vigorously admonished the prospective jurors that no one had “the slightest reason to fear any consequence as a result of their jury service.” This was an isolated incident; the prosecutor did not pursue a similar line of inquiry with any other prospective juror. Considering all these circumstances, the risk of prejudice to defendant was insignificant, and therefore defendant has not shown prosecutorial misconduct. D. Voir Dire Affecting Jurors’ Sense of Responsibility Defendant contends that during voir dire the trial court and the prosecutor made comments that diminished the jurors‟ sense of responsibility for the sentencing decision. We disagree. Defendant relies on Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 (Caldwell). There, the prosecutor told the jurors during argument that if they returned a death verdict their decision would be reviewed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. The United States Supreme Court reversed the penalty determination, holding that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant‟s death rests elsewhere.” (Caldwell, at pp. 328-329.) The high court has since clarified that Caldwell error occurs only when the remarks to the jury concerning its role in the sentencing process are inaccurate or misleading in a way that allows the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. (Romano v. Oklahoma (1994) 512 U.S. 1, 9; see People v. Murtishaw (2011) 51 Cal.4th 574, 23 592; People v. Collins (2010) 49 Cal.4th 175, 232; People v. Avila (2009) 46 Cal.4th 680, 721.) The first incident of which defendant complains occurred during the voir dire of Prospective Juror E.L., who had written on her questionnaire that in an appropriate case she could vote for a death sentence, but who, when questioned by defense counsel during voir dire, said she could never do so. Seeking clarification, the trial court asked her: “Did you misspeak in the questionnaire, or have you changed your position?” E.L. replied: “I think is [sic] not my position to do that decision. I think is your — is the judge, you know. That‟s what I think about it.” Defendant faults the trial court‟s response, which was this: “Let me clarify that, as well. Nobody is going to have to impose the death penalty, but the jury has to make the decision. Nobody is going to tell you what to do. Nobody is ever going to tell you [that] you have to impose the death penalty or you have to impose life without the possibility of parole, or decide on the death penalty or decide on life without the possibility of parole. [¶] If the jury comes back with a sentence of death, then at a later time it would be my responsibility to actually impose a death sentence, to actually say the words, just as it would be my responsibility to say the words „life without possibility of parole.‟ But in order to prompt the words that I say, it’s your decision.” (Italics added.) In arguing that this remark by the court improperly diminished the jury‟s sense of responsibility for the sentencing decision, defendant ignores the words that we have italicized. The prospective jurors present in the courtroom would understand from the quoted remarks that although it was the responsibility of the court, and not the jury, to actually pronounce the sentence, it was indeed the jury‟s responsibility to determine which sentence — death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole — the court would pronounce. The court‟s remark was neither inaccurate nor misleading, much less was it misleading in a way likely to 24 diminish the jurors‟ sense of responsibility for the sentencing decision. Consequently, there was no Caldwell error. The other voir dire incident on which defendant bases his Caldwell error claim occurred later the same day. Prospective Juror K.T. had written on her questionnaire, in response to a question asking for her opinion about the death penalty, that it “must not be based on circumstantial evidence.” The prosecutor told her that if she were selected to be on the jury, the trial court would instruct her that “circumstantial evidence is just as good as direct evidence,” and asked K.T. what she thought of that. K.T. answered that around 12 or 14 years before, when she was in college, she had performed research on the death penalty and had found “numerous cases where people had been put to death” but later “they found they weren‟t guilty.” The prosecutor responded: “Let me tell you here, because you‟re addressing a concern that the judge is going to tell you now we have laws set up, and we have all these safeguards and procedures in place. [¶] We have this kind of a system, things that have developed and evolved over the last 20, 30, 40 years that weren‟t in place possibly when you did these studies and did all of that. [¶] And these are all things — this is why we‟re going through all of this, and this is why the People have a certain burden. This is why the burden is on the People, and all these things. And in the State of California you‟ll find that the laws are different than in other states, where maybe they don‟t have as many safeguards as they do here.” Defense counsel objected that the prosecutor was “sort of preinstructing and making a personal statement.” The trial court replied: “Well, I think the whole problem is a misunderstanding about circumstantial evidence. [¶] Because sometimes people say, well, it‟s only circumstantial evidence, and they don‟t — they don‟t realize how much circumstantial evidence is used and relied on all the 25 time. [¶] To give you a very homely example, if you look at your gas gauge and it says you have a quarter tank of gas, that‟s circumstantial evidence. You haven‟t smelled the gasoline or stuck a stick in to see what you really have in the tank. You just accept the gauge. The gauge may or may not be right. [¶] We have all these cautionary things about circumstantial evidence. We say if the evidence is equally susceptible to two interpretations, one of which points to innocence and the other to guilt, you have to adopt that interpretation which points to innocence and reject the one that points to guilt; but if the interpretation of circumstantial evidence is unreasonable, then you reject the unreasonable and accept the reasonable. [¶] We do have many safeguards in place; and as far as the evidence [is] concerned, that‟s what my job is, to screen the evidence so that all you hear in a trial is what is competent and what is acceptable evidence from both sides. Regardless who presents it, the same rules obtain. [¶] I don‟t want you to be fooled that in making determinations in this case that you have to be concerned about some remote possibility, because this was mentioned earlier. Even in our definition of beyond a reasonable doubt, we have to set some sort of limits. We have to say the law does not require the People to prove a case beyond all possible doubt because that degree of proof is rarely possible. [¶] But what is required is evidence that is so convincing that it leaves your mind in that condition that you can say you feel an abiding conviction to a moral certainty of the truth of the charge. That‟s a reasonable doubt. And if the proof doesn‟t come up to that point, then you find the defendant not guilty or find the point to be proved not true. [¶] So I really don‟t think that is a concern that you have to be worried about in this courtroom.” Defendant argues that the prosecutor and the trial court committed Caldwell error by telling the prospective jurors, some of whom were later selected, that “California has special safeguards that prevent the system from executing an 26 innocent person” and by “instilling the false belief that an innocent man cannot be executed in California.” We disagree. The trial court correctly informed the jury about the rules governing circumstantial evidence and correctly informed the jury about the governing standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and it assured the prospective jurors that the rules of evidence and the standard of proof provided adequate safeguards against conviction and execution of the innocent. Defendant identifies nothing in these remarks that was inaccurate or misleading in a way that would allow the jury to feel less responsible than it should for the sentencing decision. (See Romano v. Oklahoma, supra, 512 U.S. 1, 9.) E. Prosecution’s Use of Peremptory Challenges Defendant, who is African-American, contends that the prosecutor violated his federal constitutional right to equal protection (see Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79) and his state constitutional right to a representative jury (see People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258) by exercising peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans and female Hispanics from the jury. During jury selection, defendant‟s counsel raised this issue by making four Batson/Wheeler objections, each of which the trial court overruled. Such an objection, when raised at trial, is governed by these procedures and standards: “First, the defendant must make out a prima facie case „by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.‟ [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the „burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion‟ by offering permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, „[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial discrimination.‟ [Citation.]” (Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 168, fn. omitted.) On 27 appeal, when reviewing a trial court‟s third-step determination on the ultimate issue of purposeful discrimination, we apply the deferential substantial evidence standard. (People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 470.) We examine each of the four Batson/Wheeler objections that defendant raised in the trial court.
Jury selection began with the excusal of prospective jurors who established that service would cause an unusual hardship. The prospective jurors remaining in the jury panel completed a 27-page questionnaire by answering 125 questions, one of which asked them to state their “race and ethnic origin.” The prospective jurors were then divided into groups and examined on voir dire, during which the parties exercised challenges for cause. In the final phase, the names of the remaining prospective jurors were placed in a random order on a computer-generated list that was provided to counsel. After the first 12 prospective jurors on the list were seated in the jury box, both parties proceeded to exercise peremptory challenges against the seated jurors, with each side having 20 challenges. As each challenge was exercised, another juror was called in order from the list to occupy the seat of the juror removed by challenge. When the defense had exhausted its peremptories, and the prosecution had accepted the jury as then constituted (after exercising 17 of its 20 peremptories), the 12 jurors seated in the box were sworn to try the case. Four alternate jurors were then selected in the same manner, with each side receiving four peremptory challenges. The prosecutor used her 10th peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror P.J., an African-American woman. The defense raised a Batson/Wheeler objection, noting that P.J. was the “only Black juror who has been called” into the jury box. The trial court asked the prosecutor to state her reason for the challenge. 28 The prosecutor answered: “May I see her questionnaire, and I‟ll tell you exactly why. [¶] I remember her. Because I felt that she was weak on death when I first read her. And I‟m kicking off everybody that I feel — that I perceive as being weak on death from the questionnaire. [¶] And since we didn‟t — I realize I didn‟t get a chance to really talk to her because we were running at the end of the day. She appeared at the end of the day when we were talking to her. The defense never talked to her about death. [¶] So from — all we have as to her feelings on death is what she wrote in this questionnaire. And it‟s apparent from the questionnaire she‟s weak on death.” Defense counsel did not dispute the prosecutor‟s statements, and the trial court overruled the defense objection, stating: “I think counsel is entitled to exercise her discretion in exercising the peremptories. And I‟m satisfied from [the prosecutor]‟s explanation that she is not excluding her because of race, but because of her answers to the questionnaire.” Because the prosecutor explained her reason for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror P.J., and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing is moot. (Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359; People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 165; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 471.) We therefore proceed directly to the third step of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s finding that the prosecutor did not engage in purposeful discrimination by peremptorily challenging Prospective Juror P.J. On her questionnaire, when asked to describe her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” P.J. wrote: “I feel a little uneasy with the death penalty, never really gave it a deep thought.” Asked to describe her “opinion regarding life in prison without the possibility of parole,” she wrote: “A little more comfortable with that . . . as it is not taking a life.” In answer to another question, she wrote that she thought that life without parole was “worse for a 29 defendant” than death because “with death it‟s over — life in prison is like a living death.” During voir dire, neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor directed any questions to P.J. Given the questionnaire answers just quoted, the prosecutor could reasonably conclude that Prospective Juror P.J. would be reluctant to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. P.J.‟s written answers revealed that she was “uneasy” with the death penalty because it involved taking a life, while she would be “more comfortable” voting for life without parole because it did not involve taking a life. Moreover, she might vote for the penalty of life without parole on the rationale that it was actually more severe than the death penalty. A prospective juror‟s reluctance to vote for a penalty verdict of death is a permissible, race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 472.) Defendant argues that a comparison of Prospective Juror P.J.‟s questionnaire answers with those of non-African-American prospective jurors whom the prosecutor did not peremptorily challenge demonstrates that the prosecutor‟s stated reason for striking P.J. was pretextual. Defendant‟s failure to make this argument in the trial court does not preclude our consideration of it on appeal, but “we are mindful that comparative juror analysis on a cold appellate record has inherent limitations.” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 622.) “One of the problems of comparative juror analysis not raised at trial is that the prosecutor generally has not provided, and was not asked to provide, an explanation for nonchallenges. When asked to engage in comparative juror analysis for the first time on appeal, a reviewing court need not, indeed, must not turn a blind eye to reasons the record discloses for not challenging other jurors 30 even if those other jurors are similar in some respects to excused jurors.” (People v. Jones (2011) 51 Cal.4th 346, 365-366.) Defendant asserts that Prospective Juror P.J.‟s questionnaire responses indicating reluctance to impose the death penalty were “substantively indistinguishable” from those of Jurors S.S., S.G., R.L., and C.G., none of whom were challenged by the prosecutor. S.S., S.G., and R.L. were impaneled on the trial jury; C.G. was selected as an alternate juror. When asked by the questionnaire to express her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” Juror S.S. wrote: “I don‟t know if I could sentence someone to the death penalty. I would have to weigh all the circumstances presented.” Asked for her “opinion regarding life in prison without the possibility of parole,” she wrote: “I am in favor of this, I believe this would be a lesser sentence than the death penalty.” We agree that these answers imply a reluctance to impose the death penalty comparable to that implied by Prospective Juror P.J.‟s answers to the same questions. Unlike P.J., however, S.S. viewed punishment by death as “worse for a defendant” than life imprisonment without the possibility of parole because “with life in prison they will continue to live the rest of their life behind bars.” She affirmed that she would not automatically vote against the death penalty, and that she would “listen to all the facts.” Asked again by defense counsel whether “there are some instances when you could vote for the death penalty,” S.S. answered, “Yes.” She also said that she had never thought about the death penalty before she came to court that week. During voir dire by the prosecutor, when asked whether she thought she could impose the death penalty if she “felt it was appropriate,” S.S. answered, “Yes, yes, I do.” Asked whether she thought that, with regard to penalty, “anybody is at a disadvantage with your frame of mind, someone with your frame of mind being on the jury,” she answered, “No.” 31 These voir dire responses, during which the prosecutor was able to evaluate Juror S.S.‟s demeanor, together with her questionnaire response stating that she regarded death as a more severe punishment than life imprisonment without possibility of parole, sufficiently distinguish S.S. from Prospective Juror P.J. Juror S.G., when asked for her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” wrote on her questionnaire: “I don‟t think it serves its purpose — it is no punishment for the criminal, but for the people he leaves behind.” Her opinion of life imprisonment without parole was that it “is more a punishment knowing you have to [spend] the rest of your life behind bars.” Asked whether “death in the gas chamber is a severe punishment,” she checked the box “No,” adding, “I believe the person is punished while waiting to be put to death — but once dead there is no punishment.” She thought life without parole would be “worse for a defendant” because “a person would hurt more by knowing he-she would never be free.” These questionnaire responses by Juror S.G. are similar in some ways to those of Prospective Juror P.J. Unlike P.J., however, S.G. did not express discomfort with the death penalty on the basis that it involved “taking a life.” Rather, she expressed her reluctance entirely in terms of her view that death was less severe than life without parole because punishment would cease at the time of death. The prosecutor could reasonably regard that view, which S.G. reiterated on voir dire, as more favorable to the prosecution than the view of Prospective Juror P.J. Moreover, unlike P.J., who did not indicate on her questionnaire that she had any friends or relatives in law enforcement, S.G. wrote on her questionnaire that her husband was a detective employed by the Los Angeles Police Department, that she had “seen pictures on homicide cases my husband brough[t] home to work on,” and that one of the “most important problems in the current criminal justice system” was that “some punishments are not severe enough.” These responses 32 also distinguish S.G. from P.J. and provide a race-neutral explanation for the prosecutor‟s nonchallenge of S.G. Juror R.L., on her questionnaire, described her “opinion regarding the death penalty” as “unsure.” She provided the same one-word description of her opinion regarding life without parole. She considered life without parole “worse for a defendant” than death, but she provided no explanation for that view. These questionnaire responses differ significantly from those of Prospective Juror P.J. They do not indicate a reluctance to vote for the death penalty on the basis that it involves “taking a life.” On voir dire, moreover, when asked why she wrote that she was “unsure” about her views on the death penalty and life without parole, R.L. gave this explanation: “I meant at this time I couldn‟t give you an answer as to would I or wouldn‟t I. I would have to hear all the facts before I could answer that question.” When the prosecutor asked whether the questionnaire response meant that R.L. was unsure whether she “believed in the death penalty,” R.L. answered, “Oh, no, no, no, no.” She added: “I mean I could vote for the death penalty. I can vote against it. I could go either way depending on the circumstances and facts and the evidence.” On further questioning, she said she “wouldn‟t favor one [penalty] over the other” and that she “look[ed] at them equally.” These responses dispel any inference that R.L. would be disinclined to vote for the death penalty. We consider, finally, Alternate Juror C.G. To describe her “opinion regarding the death penalty,” she wrote: “I am not sure, never had to really think about it, depends on case.” To describe her opinion of life without parole, she wrote: “Justice has been served.” She indicated that she regarded death as “worse for a defendant” than life without parole, but she did not explain that answer. Unlike the corresponding questionnaire responses of Prospective Juror P.J., C.G.‟s responses do not indicate discomfort with the death penalty because it involves 33 “taking a life.” On voir dire, moreover, C.G. was able to clarify her views. She affirmed that, if called upon to do so, she would “feel comfortable in deciding” the penalty question, and that nothing about the case made her “feel one way or the other now.” She said she regarded death as the “ultimate” punishment and that she would “look at the facts, the circumstances” and “read the testimony, everything.” The prosecutor asked: “Could you ever see yourself voting to impose the death penalty in a case where you have been convinced of a defendant‟s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but you haven‟t been convinced of his guilt beyond all possible doubt?” C.G. answered, “Yes.” Asked whether she felt “comfortable about that,” she again answered, “Yes.” These responses sufficiently distinguish Alternate Juror C.G. from Prospective Juror P.J. Also, C.G. wrote that her brother was a police officer in Los Angeles. This provided another reasonable basis for the prosecutor to regard C.G. as a more favorable juror than P.J.
Immediately after overruling the defense Batson/Wheeler objection to the prosecution‟s peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror P.J., the trial court made this comment to the prosecutor: “I would, while we‟re here, sound a note of caution. I was a little alarmed that you exercised the first several peremptories on Hispanics. And it seemed to me there was a pattern developing there that you might have to explain somewhere along the line. [¶] But the same thing. The defense hasn‟t raised it. I just sound it as a note of caution. And I think that we should watch that.” Thus alerted, the defense raised another Batson/Wheeler objection when, shortly thereafter, the prosecutor used her 14th peremptory challenge against a Hispanic woman, Prospective Juror Mary G. Defense counsel noted that Mary G. 34 was the fifth Hispanic woman that the prosecutor had removed by peremptory challenge. Without stating whether it had found a prima facie case, the trial court asked the prosecutor why she had excused Mary G. The prosecutor replied: “Your Honor, [Mary G.], as I recall, from when she was on the stand yesterday, came very close to being a challenge for cause. [¶] She was sitting here — in fact I tried to challenge her for cause. She was sitting next to [F.R.], as I recall. And she — I thought I had her originally down for my questionnaire as a challenge for cause. If she had stuck to the answers when she was talked to, it would have gotten her kicked. But she changed her tune as soon as [F.R.] changed hers. So unless I got my people mixed up . . . .” Without disputing the accuracy of the prosecutor‟s description of Prospective Juror Mary G.‟s questionnaire answers and voir dire responses, defense counsel asked for an explanation of the prosecutor‟s previous challenges to Hispanic women. The trial court denied that request and overruled the objection. The trial court explained: “I think that counsel at this time has a very logical explanation. I remember the colloquy well with [Mary G.]. She was — waffled back and forth. And we had to go into great detail with her. And finally she qualified — I mean she passed cause by changing her position back again. [¶] And I‟m sure you remember the same thing. We had to go back and forth with her. And I finally had to get into it. So I can‟t fault [the prosecutor] for having — since she said that she is exercising her challenges for people that she perceives to be weak on death, certainly this is a person that would be a loose cannon in the jury room as far as the prosecution is concerned.” In this instance, as with Prospective Juror P.J., the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing is moot because the prosecutor explained her reason for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Mary G., and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. (Hernandez v. 35 New York, supra, 500 U.S. 352, 359; People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141, 165; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 471.) We therefore proceed to step three of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. We acknowledge that, as defendant asserts, both the prosecutor and the trial court made statements that the record does not support. The prosecutor was mistaken in stating that during voir dire Prospective Juror Mary G. “was sitting next to” Prospective Juror F.R., while the court was mistaken in stating that it “finally had to get into” the voir dire questioning of Mary G. The record shows, instead, that Mary G. and F.R. underwent voir dire on the same day but at different times, and that the trial court did not participate in the voir dire of Mary G. But factual mistakes of this sort are usually the result of faulty memory and “are not necessarily associated with impermissible reliance on presumed group bias.” (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 189; accord, People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th 346, 366.) Moreover, as the record shows, the prosecutor was correct that Mary G. had “changed her tune” regarding her willingness to vote for death, and the trial court was correct that Mary G. had “passed cause by changing her position.” During voir dire, when defense counsel asked whether there was “anyone sitting here that would never vote for death,” Prospective Juror Mary G. raised her hand. Before asking Mary G. to explain her position, defense counsel questioned other prospective jurors who had also raised their hands. One of those jurors, when asked whether she could vote for death for “the worst criminal you could ever think about,” said she “couldn‟t do it.” At this point, defense counsel invited Mary G. to comment. Mary G. said: “I would say no, but it would be according to what the case is.” Asked by defense counsel whether she “could think of an instance or a situation and — where you would vote for the death penalty,” Mary G. answered, “Yes.” 36 Later, when the prosecutor‟s turn for questioning arrived, the prosecutor asked: “I am not quite sure what your position is — why don‟t you tell me a little bit about it — with regards to the death penalty.” Prospective Juror Mary G. replied: “I am for it. Of course, depending on the case and the circumstances.” Asked how she “would feel about having to judge somebody,” Mary G. replied, “I would be judgmental.” The prosecutor continued: “When you filled out your form, you left blank what your feelings were on the death penalty; but under the life without possibility of parole, you felt it was the most severe punishment due to the fact no one knows how long you will live. Do you still believe life without the possibility of parole is the more severe punishment of the two?” Mary G. replied: “I would say it would depend on each individual.” The prosecutor said that “the law, it would appear, views death as a more severe sort of thing.” Asked whether she understood that, Mary G. said, “Yes.” Asked how she felt “about being told to do that,” Mary G. replied, “I would say death.” These responses support the trial court‟s observation that Prospective Juror Mary G. was “a person that would be a loose cannon in the jury room as far as the prosecution is concerned.” On her questionnaire, Mary G. had given no response at all when asked for her opinion about the death penalty. During voir dire, she raised her hand when defense counsel asked if any juror would never vote for death. That action alone would cause any reasonable prosecutor to question a prospective juror‟s willingness to vote for death in a case such as this one. Although Mary G. later said she could think of a situation in which she would vote for death, she did not say what that situation was. Mary G.‟s responses were sufficient to avoid a challenge for cause, but the prosecutor had valid grounds for concern that Mary G. would not be a favorable juror for the prosecution on the penalty issue. The inconsistency and ambiguity of her responses also suggested she might have difficulty performing her duties as a juror. (See People v. Taylor 37 (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 893.) Substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s finding that the prosecutor‟s peremptory challenge of Mary G. was not racially motivated.
The prosecutor used her 15th peremptory challenge to remove Prospective Juror Myron G., an African-American man. The defense renewed its Batson/Wheeler objection “based on the exclusion of Blacks from the jury.” After remarking that it had no control over the number of African-Americans on the jury panel, the trial court asked the prosecutor to give her reasons for the challenge. The following colloquy ensued. The prosecutor: “As to [Myron G.], first I wanted to take notice of — it can‟t be put on the record because it‟s a visual observation, which is [Myron G.] came into this courtroom each day dressed in T-shirts and jeans. He has his hair — Williams, I believe, one of the latest cases, talks about you can discuss the appearance of the jurors before even getting into the . . . . [¶] The man had his hair, which is an Afro, cut into a bun in the back. I couldn‟t make heads or tails of what kind — and he had his hair cut in little rows that went around his head. [¶] When he was up there, he wouldn‟t make eye contact with me. He wouldn‟t make eye contact with anybody. He wasn‟t paying attention.” Defense counsel: “I would take heed [sic] with her statement that he wasn‟t paying attention when he was in the box. I don‟t think the record indicates that. [¶] I paid close attention to him because I anticipated this man being preempted because he was the only [B]lack male in this venire, of these 75 people. I paid close attention to his answers to her where he said he could impose the death penalty. [¶] If she‟s telling us the way people dress, and then basically she‟s saying if someone is poor and can‟t afford a suit and tie . . . .” 38 The trial court: “No, no. That‟s not it at all. His general appearance and demeanor had nothing to do with money. He could be the wealthiest person in the room. [¶] And that is, his style of hair, and so on, as far as the mainstream is concerned, is bizarre. So we all know that. Whether it‟s a cause for challenge or not — but then for peremptories, there are hunch peremptories. And I think that . . . .” The prosecutor: “May I also — and I can shore up the record a little bit. His feeling as to the worst problem in the criminal justice system is, „Sometimes people are tried with lack of evidence; innocent people being convicted. Guilty, known fact, getting away easy.‟ [¶] And people with attitudes like that are not going to be open-minded.” Defense counsel: “Well, all I would say, your Honor, his clothing was neat. I take heed [sic] with the description. He was here every day. His hair was very neat. We‟re not talking about someone who was dirty and messy. His T- shirts were tucked in. [¶] I don‟t think there‟s anything about his general appearance that‟s been fairly characterized. He wore a T-shirt. It was tucked in and clean every day.” The prosecutor: “He looked bizarre.” Defense counsel: “In addition, his haircut is not an unusual haircut in the Black population.” The trial court: “Oh, I don‟t think you can justify that . . . .” Defense counsel: “Your Honor, ponytails are in style, not just with White people.” The trial court: “No, no, no. I would take note of the fact that his appearance was bizarre enough that court personnel, long before there was any challenge posed, commented about it. People on the staff commented about his odd appearance. So it‟s something that I just take notice of.” 39 Defense counsel: “In Norwalk, in this courthouse, it may be an odd appearance. In Central Los Angeles, if that man walked in on a jury panel, I would take heed [sic] that he would stand out. [¶] We‟re entitled to a crosssection of the community. And we‟re not getting it. We‟re not getting a crosssection of the community here because based upon her exercising five peremptories against Hispanic women, two of the peremptories against Black people, we‟re not getting a cross-section of the community here. [¶] This community is 49 percent Hispanic. And we‟re not getting a representative panel here. Look at that. That panel doesn‟t represent — the 11 in the box don‟t . . . .” The trial court: “Would you suggest that in order to make things fair that we should abandon our random selection and start calling the only other Black people out of order just to get them on the panel?” Defense counsel: “There‟s no such suggestion, Your Honor. What we‟re saying is mathematically they were excluded. They‟re no part of the venire.” The trial court: “Counsel have a right to exercise peremptory challenges without stating reasons. And Wheeler says that if there is a pattern of systematic exclusion — and one doesn‟t make a pattern. We took it up, the very first one that came up. And she justified it. [¶] Now you take it up with the second one that‟s come up. And the court believes she‟s justified her feeling about it. And I would venture to say that because of his appearance, his general appearance, that most attorneys in a civil or criminal lawsuit, one side or the other would exercise a peremptory of a person who had this unusual appearance. [¶] And based on answers to the questionnaire, I do not feel that there‟s any showing that she excused him because — that he happened to be Black. I think if he were White and had exactly the same demeanor and hair style and answers, that she would have the same basis for excusing him.” 40 Here also, as with Prospective Jurors P.J. and Mary G., the issue of whether defendant made a prima facie showing is moot because the prosecutor explained her reasons for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Myron G., and the trial court ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination. (Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. 352, 359; People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141, 165; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 471.) We therefore proceed to step three of the Batson/Wheeler analysis. Arguing that the trial court erred in denying the defense objection to the prosecution‟s peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Myron G., defendant asserts that the prosecutor‟s stated reasons were “specious at best” and that her characterizations of his appearance “are belied by the record.” We disagree. As we have explained, “[a] prospective juror may be excused based upon facial expressions, gestures, hunches, and even for arbitrary or idiosyncratic reasons.” (People v. Lenix, supra, 44 Cal.4th 602, 613.) The prosecutor stated, first, that Prospective Juror Myron G. “came into this courtroom each day dressed in T-shirts and jeans.” The defense did not dispute that statement, nor did the defense assert that other prospective jurors had been similarly dressed. Defense counsel noted that Myron G.‟s clothes were clean and neat, but the prosecutor had not stated otherwise. The prosecutor noted, second, that Prospective Juror Myron G.‟s hairstyle was unusual and that he “looked bizarre.” Defense counsel conceded that “it may be an odd appearance” in the courthouse where the case was tried, although defense counsel asserted that it would not be unusual in Central Los Angeles. The trial court agreed that Myron G.‟s hairstyle was “bizarre,” noting that trial court personnel had commented on his unusual appearance. The prosecutor stated, third, that during voir dire Prospective Juror Myron G. “wouldn‟t make eye contact with anybody” and “wasn‟t paying attention.” 41 Defense counsel did not deny that Myron G. had failed to make eye contact, although counsel did deny that Myron G. had failed to pay attention. The trial court did not comment on this reason, but we may infer that it agreed with the prosecutor‟s characterization of Myron G.‟s demeanor. The prosecutor stated, fourth and finally, that certain questionnaire answers by Prospective Juror Myron G. indicated that he was “not going to be openminded.” In particular, the prosecutor noted that, when asked to describe the “most important problems in the current criminal justice system,” Myron G. had written: “Sometimes people are tried with lack of evidence. Innocent people being convicted. Guilty (known fact) people getting away easy.” When asked to list “any biases you might have,” he had written: “If justice is not served correctly I tend to be biased against the judicial system.” The prosecutor‟s stated reasons are permissible and race neutral, and they provide a plausible explanation for the peremptory challenge. We have no reason to question the trial court‟s implied findings that Prospective Juror Myron G.‟s clothing stood out in its informality, that his hairstyle was unusual, and that he failed to make eye contact during voir dire, while the record supports the prosecutor‟s description of his questionnaire answers. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the trial court‟s finding that the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Myron G. was not racially motivated. Defendant argues on appeal that a comparative juror analysis shows the prosecutor‟s stated reasons were pretextual rather than genuine. But defendant identifies no other juror who came to court every day dressed in jeans and a T- shirt, who had a hairstyle so unusual that court personnel had commented on it, or who failed to make eye contact with anyone during voir dire. Defendant asserts, however, that four prospective jurors gave answers similar to those of Prospective Juror Myron G. when asked by the questionnaire to state what, in their opinion, 42 were the most important problems with the current criminal justice system. We disagree that their answers were similar to Myron G.‟s. Juror J.B., who sat on the jury, wrote: “Too many people waiting to be tried. Criminals set free.” Juror B.M., who also sat of the jury, wrote: “Convicted criminals get out before their sentence is over.” Prospective Juror F.P., who was removed by defense peremptory challenge, wrote: “Overcrowded courts; system allows too much leniency for technical violations resulting in reversals; unequal access to legal representation.” Finally, Prospective Juror L.C., who was also removed by defense peremptory challenge, wrote: “Lack of jail space; sentencing rules.” Unlike the response of Prospective Juror Myron G., none of these responses reflects a belief that cases were being brought to trial with a lack of evidence or that innocent people were being convicted. The prosecutor could reasonably regard these responses more favorably than the response of Myron G. and might reasonably prefer jurors who did not hold the views that only Myron G. had expressed. (See People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th 850, 896.) We therefore reject defendant‟s comparative juror analysis.
During the selection of alternates, the prosecutor used the second of her four peremptory challenges to remove Prospective Juror A.O., a Hispanic woman. Defense counsel renewed the Batson/Wheeler objection, saying: “Your Honor, again, we see a pattern of excusing female Hispanics from the jury panel, even as an alternate.” The following exchange occurred: The trial court: “Look at the questionnaire. [¶] She says, „I don‟t believe in the death penalty.‟ ” 43 Defense counsel: “Your Honor, we had a chance to clear that up in voir dire. Everybody that was up on the panel had a chance to explain their answers. She did and said she could and she would in the right case. [¶] It‟s submitted with the court. The court can make the call.” The trial court: “All right. [¶] But in view of the answer in the questionnaire, and changing of the position, I think counsel is justified; and I think based on that showing, I would have to find it‟s coincidental that she happens to be Hispanic in the case.” Because the trial court overruled the defense objection without asking the prosecutor to state her reasons for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror A.O., we construe the trial court‟s ruling as a finding that the defense failed to make a prima facie case. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant‟s “ „burden is simply to “produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” ‟ ” (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 486, quoting Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 162, 170.) As in other recent cases where we cannot be sure the trial court used the correct standard, “we review the record independently to resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.” (People v. Hartsch, supra, at p. 487.) To determine here whether defendant has established a prima facie case, we may consider whether the record discloses neutral, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenges. (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 749; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 346.) This approach seems particularly appropriate here because the prosecutor had previously indicated, when explaining her peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror P.J., that she intended to peremptorily challenge prospective jurors whose questionnaire responses indicated they were “weak on death.” As the trial court correctly observed, when asked for her “opinion 44 regarding the death penalty,” Prospective Juror A.O. had written on her questionnaire, “I don‟t believe in death penalty.” She wrote the same answer when asked why she “might or might not want to sit on this particular case.” On voir dire, she avoided a challenge for cause by stating that she could vote for the death penalty “depending on the situation, you know, depending on if it‟s a heinous crime or premeditated.” Nevertheless, her questionnaire answer put A.O. squarely in the category of being “weak on death” and provides a valid and persuasive explanation of the prosecutor‟s peremptory challenge. We therefore agree with the trial court that the defense failed to establish a prima facie case that discrimination had occurred. F. Alleged Bias of Trial Judge Defendant contends that the trial court‟s acts and omissions during the jury selection process exhibited racial bias requiring reversal of his conviction and death sentence. By failing to raise at trial a claim of judicial bias, defendant has forfeited it. (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1110; People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 114.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. The first incident of which defendant complains occurred during a discussion of the contents of the juror questionnaire. The defense had proposed a series of questions for the purpose of revealing racial prejudice. The court stated that was “a very difficult and sensitive issue” and that “both sides are entitled to inquire into and to try to probe for possible prejudices that people have . . . .” In the course of this discussion the court stated: “I just had occasion to see the Martin Luther King Museum in Memphis, Tennessee, a very moving and powerful experience; and I have very strong feelings about the progress of Afro-Americans in the country based on the exhibits there and what happened in the Deep South, contrasted, I think with California to a certain extent.” (Italics added.) Defendant 45 asserts that the italicized words are evidence that the “trial court apparently believed that racism is confined to the South and the 1950‟s.” We draw no such inference. Had the trial court held such a belief, it would have prohibited all questions regarding race and racial prejudice. Instead, it allowed the parties ample opportunity to question prospective jurors on that subject. The trial court‟s remark that the visit to the civil rights museum was a “very moving and powerful experience” suggests an absence of racial bias against African-Americans. During the same discussion, the trial court also stated: “I think that on this subject you just got too much in there that you are putting emphasis where it isn‟t really called for. Because it isn‟t as though this were some — if the theory of this case were some kind of hate crime that was racially motivated, or there were particular racial overtones that caused this crime to be committed that would not have been committed before, for racial aspects, then I think you would be entitled to probe into that in great detail.” We find nothing objectionable in this comment. Recognizing that this case involved an interracial killing — because defendant is African-American and the armored car guard who was killed happened to be White — the trial court permitted extensive inquiry into the issue of racial prejudice. (See People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 539 [in a case involving an interracial killing, a trial court must grant a defense request to question prospective jurors about racial bias].) Indeed, defendant makes no claim that voir dire on this issue was inadequate. That the trial court would have permitted an even more extensive inquiry had there been an allegation that the killing was racially motivated is not evidence of judicial bias. Next, defendant complains about the trial court‟s remarks during a discussion about a defense challenge for cause to Prospective Juror T.K. The defense argued that T.K., who identified his race as White, was racially biased 46 because on the juror questionnaire he had answered “Yes” to this question: “Do you think Afro-Americans are more likely to commit crimes than other racial groups?” The trial court stated: “There have been statistical studies that would back that up. So let‟s leave the race part out of it, and let‟s just talk about how many people there are in a statistical group in the community, and what‟s the proportion of crime. And he can say that without being a racist at all.” We do not agree that the trial court‟s comment demonstrates racial bias. In stating that someone could believe, “without being a racist at all,” that “a statistical group in the community” committed a disproportionate number of crimes, the trial court‟s point, we infer, is that interpreting statistical data about race and crime is controversial and subject to debate. For example, one commentator, while stating that there are “some crimes that [B]lacks do commit disproportionately,” argues that “Blacks do not commit crimes because they are [B]lack.” Rather, “[t]heir overrepresentation among some classes of offenders is attributable to social and environmental conditions such as poverty, miserable schools, broken families, lack of access to health care, and even lead poisoning.” (Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and Crime (2010) 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1043, 1058-1059, fns. omitted; see also Peterson & Krivo, Race, Residence, and Violent Crime: A Structure of Inequality (2009) 57 U. Kan. L.Rev. 903.) Immediately after the trial court made that remark, defense counsel stated: “Your Honor, my client is a Black man. He‟s accused of killing a White man. We have no Black — we‟re going to lose one of the only two male Black jurors in the entire panel.” Defense counsel was referring to Prospective Juror R.M., an African-American man whom the prosecutor had successfully challenged for cause. The trial court responded with these statements: “[R.M.] has nothing to do with [T.K.]. . . . [¶] . . . If all of the other people in this whole panel were Black — 47 we‟re talking about [T.K.] now. And — so I can‟t be concerned with the racial make-up of this jury because you are losing a Black person for cause, therefore, I should lean over backwards and excuse White people just on that basis.” We do not agree with defendant that by this remark the trial court was “claiming a strange impotence to remedy the situation” or was improperly refusing to “take any responsibility for the likelihood that the venire was going to be completely lacking in African-American jurors.” What the remark showed, rather, was that the trial court was properly considering each challenge for cause separately, on its legal merits, without allowing its rulings to be improperly influenced by how they might affect the racial composition of the jury ultimately selected. Next, defendant cites remarks by the trial court when ruling on the defense Batson/Wheeler objection to the prosecution‟s peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Mary G. (See, ante, at pp. 34-37.) In denying a defense request to require the prosecutor to explain the reasons for earlier peremptory challenges to Hispanic women, the court said: “Because I sounded a note of caution before and said that I had noticed a pattern, that there were systematic Hispanic names, although a couple of them I noticed appeared to be Hispanic by marriage rather than Hispanic because they were not Hispanic coloring. . . .” Defense counsel objected “to the court‟s classification of these women as being possibly Hispanic by marriage,” adding that “Hispanic names come in all colors just as any other names.” The court responded: “Well, all right. That was simply my observation. And I stand corrected on that because without going into what maiden names were, why, obviously that isn‟t a warranted conclusion.” Defendant complains that the quoted remarks show that the trial court “denied a pattern of removing five Hispanic people for the fatuous reason that they were „Hispanic by marriage‟ rather than „Hispanic coloring‟ — a justification that 48 has no basis in law or fact.” We disagree. Insofar as the trial court suggested it could identify a Hispanic person solely by appearance or “coloring,” the court immediately acknowledged its mistake. Insofar as the trial court remarked that a Hispanic surname did not prove Hispanic ancestry because many women assume their husband‟s surname at the time of marriage, the court‟s point was valid. Here, the most reliable guide was the prospective jurors‟ own descriptions of their race and ethnicity on the juror questionnaires. Examination of those questionnaires show examples of women with Hispanic surnames who identified themselves as “White” or “Caucasian” without indicating any Hispanic or Latino ancestry. Viewed in context, the court‟s remarks do not establish any disqualifying racial or ethnic bias.