Opinion ID: 4471851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ARM’s ’320 Patent

Text: ARM argues that the jury verdict that claims 8 and 19 of the ’320 patent were invalid for obviousness should be set aside because the district court erred in its claim construction, and that under the proper construction, U.S. Patent No. 3,878,722 to Nordskog (“Nordskog”) does not disclose a fully enclosed space and the obviousness verdict cannot stand. The district court construed the term “brewing chamber” in claims 5 and 18, which claims 8 and 19 depend from, to mean “a compartment in which brewing occurs.” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2016), ECF No. 42 at 10 (“Claim Construction Order”). The district court explained that “[w]hile the plain and ordinary meaning of the word ‘chamber’ certainly conveys the idea of a compartment or defined area, it does not necessarily have to be sealed or fully-enclosed.” Id. ARM contends that the district court erred when it rejected ARM’s proposed construction of “brewing chamber.” That construction required a “sealed or fully-enclosed” space. ARM makes several arguments in favor of its more limited construction. First, ARM directs us to two patents assigned to Keurig that are incorporated by reference into the ’320 patent: U.S. Patent No. 5,325,765 (“the Keurig ’765 patent”) and 6 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. U.S. Patent No. 6,606,938 (“the Keurig ’938 patent”). 1 ARM argues that because these prior art references depicted enclosed brewing chambers, the term brewing chamber in the ’320 patent must also be enclosed. Unlike the claims of the ’320 patent, the claims of the Keurig ’765 patent specifically describe the brewing chamber as being sealed. Keurig ’765 patent, col. 4, ll. 35–42 (describing the brewing chamber as being defined by two “components,” wherein one “component which may be . . . closed to coact in sealing engagement with [the other component defining the brewing chamber]”). The Keurig ’938 patent includes a “brewing chamber 44,” but Figures 3 and 4 show that the “brewing chamber” is not a fully-enclosed space. Thus, nothing in the incorporated patents requires that the term “brewing chamber,” standing alone, be fully sealed. In fact, they suggest the opposite—that the term “brewing chamber” standing alone does not require sealing. Second, ARM argues that certain embodiments in the specification require us to apply ARM’s proposed construction. ARM points to passages of the patent specification that describe specific embodiments that have fully-enclosed structures. But ARM ignores other embodiments in the specification, which clearly show that a “brewing chamber” is not fully enclosed. For example, Figure 6, “a schematic illustration of a cross-sectional view of a pod brewing chamber of one preferred embodiment of the present invention,” ’320 patent, col. 3, ll. 37–39, depicts a “lower opening 614,” id. at col. 7, ll. 46–47. Accepting ARM’s construction would exclude such a preferred embodiment from the scope of the claim. SynQor, Inc. v. Artesyn Tech., Inc., 709 F.3d 1365, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“A claim construction that ‘excludes the preferred embodiment is rarely, if ever, 1 ARM also directs us to U.S. Patent No. 5,840,189. Since that patent does not use the term “brewing chamber,” it is irrelevant here. EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 7 correct and would require highly persuasive evidentiary support.’” (quoting Adams Respiratory Therapeutics, Inc. v. Perrigo Co., 616 F.3d 1283, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). The specification thus supports the district court’s construction. Third, ARM suggests that because the specification of the ’320 patent notes that the brewing chamber must “trap” hot water, it must be a fully enclosed chamber. As the patent makes clear, it is the “beverage packet” or “pod,” not the brewing chamber, that traps hot water. ’320 patent, col. 1, ll. 14–17 (“Once the beverage packet is placed in the brewing chamber, the machine injects hot water into the packet . . . .”). The district court correctly determined that the term “brewing chamber” in the ’320 patent does not require a fully-enclosed space. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). B. Jury Finding that Prior Art Disclosed Sealing Engagement The jury found claims 8 and 19 to be invalid as obvious in light of Nordskog, standing alone, and in combination with U.S. Patent No. 6,079,315 to Beaulieu (“Beaulieu”) or U.S Patent No. 5,840,189 to Sylvan (“Sylvan”). Independent claims 5 and 18 of the ’320 patent, which claims 8 and 19 depend from, require a “cover [of the brewing chamber that] is adapted to sealingly engage with a top edge of the at least one sidewall.” ’320 patent, col. 9, ll. 12–13, col. 11, ll. 4–5. ARM argues that the jury’s findings of obviousness were not supported by substantial evidence because the cited references do not disclose this claim limitation. Claim 1 of the Beaulieu patent discloses a “chamber for a cartridge . . . including a bottom, sidewall and top sealed to the sidewall along a peripheral rim, said chamber comprising . . . a cup shaped housing having a sidewall . . . [and] a lid overlaying said housing.” Beaulieu, col. 5, ll. 24– 44. Beaulieu’s specification also contains detailed 8 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. descriptions of the operation of the lid in conjunction with the cartridge holder. Id. at col. 4, ll. 19–59. Thus, the jury could have reasonably found that Beaulieu discloses this claim limitation when it described a cartridge holder with a cover sealingly engaged with the top of the cartridge holder sidewall. Under these circumstances, we need not address whether Sylvan discloses the same limitation. Substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. C. Attorney’s Fees for Noninfringement ARM argues that the district court erred in granting Eko attorney’s fees related to its noninfringement of claims 8 and 19 of the ’320 patent. The district court construed the term “passageway” in these claims as (1) “a narrow space of some depth or length connecting one place to another,” and (2) not “encompass[ing] a receptacle that had no bottom or that utilized a broad, thin mesh.” Claim Construction Order at 12. The district court concluded that a fee award was appropriate because of ARM’s unreasonable pursuit of its infringement claims. ARM’s sole contention here is that Eko should not have been the prevailing party on this issue because the district court’s construction of the term “passageway” in claims 8 and 19 was erroneous. 2 ARM urges that requiring “a 2 Claim 8 recites: [A beverage brewer, comprising: a brewing chamber; a container, disposed within the brewing chamber and adapted to hold brewing material while brewed by a beverage brewer, the container comprising: a receptacle configured to receive the brew- ing material; and EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 9 a cover; wherein the receptacle includes a base, having an interior surface and an exterior surface, wherein at least a portion of the base is dis- posed a predetermined distance above a bottom surface of the brew- ing chamber, and at least one sidewall extending up- wardly from the interior surface of the base, wherein the receptacle has at least one passageway that provides fluid flow from an interior of the recep- tacle to an exterior of the recepta- cle; wherein the cover is adapted to sealingly engage with a top edge of the at least one sidewall, the cover including an opening, and wherein the container is adapted to accept input fluid through the opening and to pro- vide a corresponding outflow of fluid through the passageway; an inlet port, adapted to provide the input fluid to the container; and a needle-like structure, disposed below the base; wherein the predetermined distance is selected such that a tip of the needle-like structure does not penetrate the exterior surface of the base]; 10 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. narrow space of some length connecting one place to another” (1) improperly reads limitations of “length” and “narrowness” into the claim language, (2) excludes an embodiment in the specification, and (3) is inconsistent with constructions adopted by the ITC and the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which both construed the term “passageway” to mean a “path, channel, or course by which something passes.” But whether or not the first part of the district court’s claim construction (requiring a “narrow space,” Claim Construction Order at 12) was correct, we think the second part of the construction (that “passageway” does not “encompass a receptacle that [has] no bottom or utilized a broad-thin, mesh,” id.) was correct, and that the district court properly granted summary judgment based on its construction. ARM makes no claim that the receptacle (cup) itself constitutes a passageway. As the district court found, “[Eko]’s products utilize a broad, thin mesh or micropunched steel filter to allow the brewed beverage to exit the receptacle,” and it is “patently obvious” that Eko’s products could not infringe on the claims of the ’320 patent because “[n]o reasonable person looking at the cut-out openings on the side of [Eko’s] devices would describe them as passageways.” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. Nov. 3, 2016), ECF No. 130 at 1–2; Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2016), ECF No. 42 at 4 (“Summary Judgment Order”). wherein the container is reusable. ’320 patent, col. 8, ll. 60–67, col. 9, ll. 1–23, 31–32 (emphases added). EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. 11 D. Attorney’s Fees for Obviousness ARM’s final argument is that the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to Eko as to the issue of obviousness with respect to the ’320 patent. The district court awarded these fees because ARM’s conduct as to the issue of obviousness was “exceptional.” See 35 U.S.C. § 285. ARM suggests that the district court’s denial of summary judgment conclusively established the reasonableness of its litigation position. Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. All-Tag Security, S.A. held that “[a]bsent misrepresentation to the court, a party is entitled to rely on a court’s denial of summary judgment . . . as an indication that the party’s claims were objectively reasonable and suitable for resolution at trial.” 858 F.3d 1371, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (second alteration in original) (quoting Medtronic Navigation, Inc. v. BrainLAB Medizinische Computersysteme GmbH, 603 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2010)). But Checkpoint did not hold that the denial of summary judgment conclusively establishes objective reasonableness. Our cases require only that the district court considers the denial of summary judgment, not that the district court always gives that denial decisive weight. Further, under Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., “[t]here is no precise rule or formula” for deciding whether a case is “exceptional.” 572 U.S. 545, 554 (2014) (alteration in original). The district court must consider the “totality of the circumstances” on a “case-bycase” basis. Id. An “exceptional” case is “simply one that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating position (considering both the governing law and the facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case was litigated.” Id. Here, the district court carefully explained why it did not give its denial of summary judgment decisive weight. In its order awarding attorney’s fees, the court noted that at the pretrial conference, ARM “offered no . . . explanation 12 EKO BRANDS, LLC v. ADRIAN RIVERA MAYNEZ ENTERS. to the [district court] for its [obviousness] position,” except to assert that the ITC’s limited exclusion order and cease and desist order remained valid and that ARM was not willing to “write that off,” and “it was not until the trial was well underway that it became apparent that ARM was not seriously trying to defend the obviousness of the claims at issue.” Eko Brands, LLC v. Adrian Rivera Maynez Enters., Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00522-JPD (W.D. Wash. July 13, 2018), ECF No. 271 at 12–13 (“Post-Trial Order”); see also Summary Judgment Order at 3 (noting that denial of summary judgment was based on “[ARM’s expert’s] explanations for why [ARM’s] invention would not have been obvious” and noting that while those explanations were “questionable,” they gave rise to “clearly disputed issues of fact”). The court observed that at trial, “[i]n addition to failing [to prove] the primary indicators of [non]obviousness, ARM did not bother to try to show secondary factors of non-obviousness.” Post-Trial Order at 14 n.5. The court concluded that “ARM’s insistence on trying [the issue of obviousness] was largely a charade used for the purpose of extending the life of the earlier ITC . . . order.” Id. at 13. The district court properly considered its denial of summary judgment and provided a reasonable explanation for why ARM’s position warranted a fee award. The district court did not abuse its discretion.