Opinion ID: 2150112
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: These Conflicting Causes

Text: We conclude that the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over substantially the same action when Mrs. Levett petitioned the Superior Court for the permanent protective order. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-4-5.1-3 (West Supp. 1993) (repealed and replaced 1994). [1] The Circuit Court acquired jurisdiction over the Meade/Levett dissolution in 1991, and that jurisdiction continues until the Levett children reach maturity. See State ex rel. Werthman v. Superior Court (1983), Ind., 448 N.E.2d 680. The Superior Court must defer to this authority because Mrs. Levett's petition affects the same subject which is under the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court: the circumstances under which Meade could exercise her visitation rights. For example, the Circuit Court established the time and conditions under which Whitney and Adam could see their mother, including reasonable telephone contact, in its visitation order. The Superior Court's protective order, whether raised under the name of Mr. or Mrs. Levett, directly conflicted with the Circuit Court's continuing jurisdiction over these visitation arrangements. Mrs. Levett's petition makes clear that the protective order could even have eviscerated the visitation order, prohibiting Meade from having any contact with her children. Ultimately, the TPO and protective order seek to usurp the Circuit Court's jurisdiction. Such an expropriation will not be allowed. The Levetts may not circumvent the comprehensive statutory framework for child custody and visitation orders through this collateral attack. The prohibition against collateral attacks is long-standing. See State ex rel. McClure v. Marion Superior Court (1959), 239 Ind. 472, 158 N.E.2d 264 (vacating collateral injunction in favor of prior action involving appointment power of governor); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Superior Court (1958), 238 Ind. 664, 154 N.E.2d 375 (vacating collateral injunction in favor of pending action to establish possession of business). Such machinations are especially egregious in this context because the interests of children require stability and continuity in the legal process. [2] Cf. In re Lemond (1980), 274 Ind. 505, 413 N.E.2d 228 (holding judges and attorneys in criminal contempt for permitting father to attack collaterally mother's custody of child through sham Child in Need of Services action). We emphasize that all courts must be open to entertain requests for temporary or emergency protective orders against a threatening parent where the facts of the situation demonstrate good cause for not petitioning the court where the dissolution was heard. Situations will arise in which the custodial parent fears for his or her safety or the safety of the children and, due to the imminence of the threat or distance from the court of first jurisdiction, must seek protection from another court. Such was not the case here. Mrs. Levett waited a month after the allegedly provoking incident to petition for the protective order. Moreover, she sought the order from a different court in the same courthouse. Finally, Mrs. Levett originally requested a hearing for a permanent protective order, rather than seeking an immediate temporary or emergency order. Her decision was not motivated by considerations of distance or time. She was just looking for a way to avoid the regular procedure. We hold that where no emergency situation exists, as it did not in this case, the court where the divorce, custody, and visitation matters were heard retains continuing jurisdiction over the case. A party should go to that court to secure a protective order, absent some extraordinary circumstance.