Opinion ID: 2299614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Ordered Sale of the Middlebrook Lane Property

Text: Brian further argues that for his home to be    sold, at a significant loss and significantly below market, is unreasonable, unfair, and unethical. Specifically, Brian contends that there was no order giving the commissioner permission to sell his home; rather, he maintains that he was selling his home on his own volition, for a price he determined, and the commissioner was merely to look into what [Brian] was doing regarding the marketing and listing of the property. In addition, Brian argues that the amount of his child-support arrearage should have been calculated before determining what assets should be liquidated. Lastly, Brian states that his home should not be sold because other significant assets remain available to satisfy his child-support arrearage. The Family Court is given broad jurisdiction to hear and determine    all motions for    support and custody of children, all other matters arising out of petitions and motions relative to real and personal property   , and such other equitable matters arising out of the family relationship, wherein jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of petitions for divorce, bed and board and separate maintenance   . G.L.1956 § 8-10-3(a). Further, any child-support orders that go unpaid shall be regarded as a judgment for debt so that suits may be brought or executions may issue on it for amounts due and unpaid,    the executions to run against the goods and chattels of the husband or wife, and the court may make all necessary orders and decrees concerning the suits or executions. G.L.1956 § 15-5-16.3. Brian contests the manner in which the Family Court sought to satisfy his arrearage. However, Brian agreed to list and sell his Middlebrook Lane property. This much is shown through his marked assent to the November 17, 2009 order of the Family Court. See Vanderheiden v. Marandola, 994 A.2d 74, 78 (R.I.2010) (stating that parties are bound to the terms of a consent order because [a]lthough [a consent order] `receives a court's imprimatur,' [it] is `in essence a contract' and therefore must `be construed as a contract   ' (quoting Now Courier, LLC v. Better Carrier Corp., 965 A.2d 429, 435 (R.I.2009))). Thus, because Brian clearly assented to the sale of the Middlebrook Lane property, he will be held to his agreement. Nevertheless, Brian asserts that he agreed to sell his home at his own direction, and not that of the Family Court or the commissioner. This argument is also unavailing. The Family Court was well within its authority to order the sale of the Middlebrook Lane property. See § 15-5-16.3; Cardenas v. Cardenas, 478 A.2d 968, 970 (R.I.1984) (stating that the Family Court has broad authority to assign property or issue execution against the estate of either party in order to secure the payment of all past and present support orders); Brierly v. Brierly, 431 A.2d 410, 416 (R.I.1981) (stating that the Family Court has authority in a divorce proceeding to assign or attach the estate of either party to secure payment of child support and alimony). Further, it was entitled to facilitate such a sale through the use of a commissioneras was assented to by both parties. See Duke v. Duke, 675 A.2d 822, 824 (R.I.1996) (holding that if the defendant declines to assign ordered pension funds to the plaintiff, the Family Court may appoint a special master, and the administrator of the fund may be required to honor an assignment of the defendant's pension funds when executed either by the defendant or by the special master). Thus, we find no error in the Family Court's July 9, 2010 order authorizing the commissioner to execute a purchase and sale agreement in the amount of $570,000 for the Middlebrook Lane property, nor in its August 19, 2010 order scheduling such property's closing. It is without question that Brian was, as of the date of oral argument before this Court, in substantial child-support arrears. At a hearing on May 21, 2010, he candidly acknowledged that he would owe [Jo-An] about $20,000 in child support if his challenge of the child-support modification order was dismissed by this Court. Thereafter, we denied and dismissed Brian's petition for certiorari, thereby letting stand Brian's obligation to pay Jo-An $250 per week in child support. Accordingly, by Brian's own concession he is thousands of dollars in arrears. The defendant, of course, remains free to liquidate any asset he may own to satisfy his child-support arrearage. In light of his nonpayment, however, the Family Court possesses the authority to order the sale of his property to satisfy that obligation. Under the circumstances of this case, we are more than satisfied that the Family Court did not abuse its broad discretion by appointing a commissioner to facilitate the marketing and sale of defendant's Middlebrook Lane property at a reasonable price. However, the precise amount of the arrearage necessarily will have to be determined before plaintiff is paid from the proceeds of the sale.