Opinion ID: 2826102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [¶16] Before considering the substantive issues in this case, we must first address the threshold question of subject matter jurisdiction. While the parties have not briefed jurisdiction in this Court, whether it exists “may be asserted at any time by any interested party or sua sponte by the court at the trial or appellate level.” In re AGS, 2014 WY 143, ¶ 15, 337 P.3d 470, 476 (Wyo. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). “The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.” Harmon v. Star Valley Med. Ctr., 2014 WY 90, ¶ 14, 331 P.3d 1174, 1178 (Wyo. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). [¶17] In her complaint, Holloway sought to invoke subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-23-101 and 22-24-122.5 The former, which resides in the chapter on municipal elections, states that “[u]nless otherwise specifically provided, a municipal election shall be governed by laws regulating statewide elections.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-101. Based upon this provision, she asserted that the statute providing for judicial review of determinations relating to statewide initiatives and referenda conferred jurisdiction to consider her case: 5 In their answer, Appellants included as an affirmative defense that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the case. 5 Any person aggrieved by any determination made under this article, by the secretary of state or by the attorney general, may bring an action in the district court of Laramie county to have the determination reviewed by filing application within thirty (30) days of the date on which notice of the determination was given. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122. [¶18] The district court, in accepting jurisdiction on this basis, concluded that there were no other alternatives for judicial review. Therefore, expanding the statute governing statewide initiatives and referenda to municipal referenda seemed appropriate. It reasoned as follows: The Court does not see why the plaintiff should not at a minimum be entitled to have the Court review the City Clerk’s determination in this matter in the same way that the Secretary of State’s determinations are reviewed as to statewide initiatives and referendums pursuant to the Wyoming Election Code. Section 22-24-122 provides that any person aggrieved by any determination made under the article of the statutes that apply to statewide initiatives and referendums may bring an action in the District Court of Laramie County as more specifically set forth in the statute. I would also refer generally to [Thomson v. Wyoming In-Stream Flow Committee, 651 P.2d 778 (Wyo. 1982)]. There is no similar provision contained in the article of the statutes that applies to municipal initiatives and referendums; yet, the article on municipal initiatives and referendums appears in the Wyoming Election Code in the chapter on municipal elections, which precedes the chapter on statewide initiatives and referendums. Due process and equal protection require that the plaintiff have some ability to seek relief from or a review of the City Clerk’s determination as to the petitions that were submitted in this case. The City Clerk’s determination is functionally no different that the Secretary of State’s determination on statewide initiatives or referendum petitions. The District Court is clearly the proper court to perform such a review; and by analogy and considering the policies behind venue, this Court is the proper court to perform such a review of the City of Casper Clerk’s determination in this case. 6 [¶19] We must disagree with the district court’s finding of jurisdiction through this avenue. Section 22-24-122 specifically states that a person aggrieved by a determination made by the “secretary of state or by the attorney general” relating to statewide initiatives and referenda “may bring an action in the district court of Laramie county to have the determination reviewed.” We find the language of this statute to be clear. Stutzman v. Office of Wyoming State Eng’r, 2006 WY 30, ¶ 14, 130 P.3d 470, 475 (Wyo. 2006) (“Where the language is clear, we look to its ordinary and obvious meaning, are bound to the results so expressed and do not resort to rules of construction.”). This Court concludes that the legislature’s intent in enacting § 22-24-122 was for a very narrow purpose relating to statewide initiatives and referenda. Id. (“In interpreting and construing statutory language, our primary purpose is to determine the legislature’s intent.”). [¶20] The level of detail that the legislature used in drafting this provision leaves no room for us to broaden its application to municipal initiatives and referendums. As this Court has often stated: We will not insert language into a statute that the legislature omitted. A basic tenet of statutory construction is that omission of words from a statute is considered to be an intentional act by the legislature, and this court will not read words into a statute when the legislature has chosen not to include them. At the same time, however, we will not interpret a statute in a way that renders any portion meaningless or in a manner producing absurd results. Id., ¶ 16, 130 P.3d at 475 (citations omitted). We must abide by our dictates of statutory interpretation, and therefore can only conclude that § 22-24-122 provides jurisdiction in the narrow circumstance of reviewing determinations made under Title 22, Chapter 24, Article 1 of the Wyoming statutes. See Thomson, 651 P.2d at 780. [¶21] However, there are two other avenues for Holloway to seek judicial review of the City Clerk’s interpretation of the relevant statutes and his ultimate conclusion concerning the petitions that were submitted. [¶22] The City Clerk’s decision to disqualify signatures can be considered agency action, falling under W.R.A.P. 12 and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-3-101 et seq. Rule 12.01 states: To the extent judicial review of administrative action by a district court is available, any person aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by a final decision of an agency in a 7 contested case, or who is aggrieved or adversely affected in fact by any other agency action or inaction, or who is adversely affected in fact by a rule adopted by that agency, may obtain such review as provided in this rule. All appeals from administrative agencies shall be governed by these rules. W.R.A.P 12.01 (emphasis added). Holloway could have obtained judicial review by filing a petition for review in accordance with W.R.A.P. 12.6 However, she did not file a petition for review, but instead opted to file a declaratory judgment action.7 [¶23] Rule 12.12 recognizes that review of agency action can also be available by way of a declaratory judgment action: The relief, review, or redress available in suits for injunction against agency action or enforcement, in actions for recovery of money, in actions for a declaratory judgment based on agency action or inaction, in actions seeking any common law writ to compel, review or restrain agency action shall be available by independent action notwithstanding any petition for review. 6 In administrative proceedings not conducted as trial-type adjudications or contested cases, such as those taken by the City Clerk here, the arbitrary and capricious standard of review would apply. N. Laramie Range Found., ¶ 18, 290 P.3d at 1072; W.R.A.P. 12.09(a). 7 In her complaint, Holloway sporadically mentions injunctive relief, asking the district court to compel the City Clerk to revisit the disallowed signatures and confer with her to determine validity of the signatures. The district court did not rule on, or even acknowledge, this faint aspect of Holloway’s complaint, nor could it have based upon what was, and was not, included in the pleading. We have explained: The Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure permit “notice pleading,” and pleadings are to be liberally construed to do substantial justice. However, even notice pleading requires fair notice to opposing parties of the nature of a party’s claim. Liberal construction of pleadings does not excuse omission of that which is material and necessary in order to entitle one to relief. Excel Const., Inc. v. HKM Eng’g, Inc., 2010 WY 34, ¶ 35, 228 P.3d 40, 49 (Wyo. 2010) (citations omitted). There is no cognizable claim for injunctive relief included in Holloway’s complaint because there is a clear omission that exists which is material and necessary in order to entitle her to such relief. See Operation Save America v. City of Jackson, 2012 WY 51, ¶ 51, 275 P.3d 438, 455 (Wyo. 2012) (pleading seeking an injunction should state the grounds for doing so, quoting 11A Wright, et al. Fed. Practice & Procedure § 2949); see also CBM Geosolutions, Inc. v. Gas Sensing Tech. Corp., 2009 WY 113, ¶ 8, 215 P.3d 1054, 1057 (Wyo. 2009). We consider Holloway’s complaint to only seek declaratory judgment, as the insufficiently pled request for injunctive relief cannot honestly be contemplated as part of this action. 8 W.R.A.P. 12.12 (emphasis added). [¶24] This Court has on several occasions examined the applicability of declaratory judgment in the context of administrative proceedings. See, e.g., Voss v. Goodman, 2009 WY 40, ¶ 5, 203 P.3d 415, 418 (Wyo. 2009); Wyoming Cmty. Coll. Comm’n v. Casper Cmty. Coll. Dist., 2001 WY 86, ¶¶ 13-14, 31 P.3d 1242, 1248 (Wyo. 2001); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Catchpole, 6 P.3d 1275, 1283 (Wyo. 2000); Hirschfield v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Cnty. of Teton, 944 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Wyo. 1997); Rocky Mtn. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. State, 645 P.2d 1163, 1166-69 (Wyo. 1982). In accord with the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, our previous decisions have liberally construed the availability of a declaratory judgment proceeding to consider certain issues arising from agency action. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-114; Hirschfield, 944 P.2d at 1142. We have explained: The purpose of declaratory judgment actions is to render disputes concerning the legal rights and duties of parties justiciable without proof of a wrong committed by one party against another, and thus facilitate the termination of controversies. Wyoming’s declaratory judgment statute states that it is remedial and should be liberally construed and administered. We do not interpret it in a narrow or technical sense, and there remains the prerequisite that the party seeking declaratory relief present the court with an actual controversy. Trial judges may not dispense with the traditional rules prohibiting them from rendering advisory opinions or adjudicating hypothetical issues. An action for declaratory judgment cannot be a substitute for an appeal from administrative decisions but is available even though there is a statutory method of appeal if it concerns the validity and construction of agency regulations, or if it concerns the constitutionality or interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be based. Voss, ¶ 5, 203 P.3d at 418 (quoting Hirschfield, 944 P.2d at 1142); see also Torres v. State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Safety & Comp. Div., 2004 WY 92, ¶ 6, 95 P.3d 794, 795 (Wyo. 2004). [¶25] Because the district court erred in finding that it had jurisdiction to consider the case under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-24-122, its decision was not limited to the appropriate legal issues—interpretation of statutes upon which the administrative action is, or is to be based. In addition to interpreting the controlling statutes, the decision went beyond the 9 realm of declaratory judgments by finding that the City Clerk acted arbitrarily and capriciously in rejecting certain signatures as he did. [¶26] We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to consider Holloway’s declaratory judgment action through W.R.A.P. 12.12 and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-101 et seq.8 As a result, this Court also has jurisdiction to consider certain issues on appeal. Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm’n, ¶ 12, 31 P.3d at 1248) (“This court can have no greater jurisdiction of the subject matter than the district court.”). The narrow issues of law that this Court has jurisdiction to consider fall into the category of an “interpretation of a statute upon which the administrative action is, or is to be based.” See Voss, ¶ 6, 203 P.3d at 418. Summary Judgment—Interpretation of the Municipal Referendum Statutes [¶27] The district court decided the matter by grant of summary judgment, which we have held “may be an appropriate resolution of a declaratory judgment action.” Cheyenne Newspapers, Inc. v. Bldg. Code Bd. of Appeals of City of Cheyenne, 2010 WY 2, ¶ 8, 222 P.3d 158, 161 (Wyo. 2010); see also State ex rel. Arnold v. Ommen, 2009 WY 24, ¶ 23, 201 P.3d 1127, 1134 (Wyo. 2009) (“Summary judgment is appropriate in a declaratory judgment action so long as there are no genuine issues of material fact.”). [¶28] We review a grant of summary judgment entered in response to a declaratory judgment action through our usual standard for review of summary judgments. Arnold, ¶ 13, 201 P.3d at 1132; Voss, ¶ 9, 203 P.3d at 419. Our review of a district court’s summary judgment ruling is de novo, using the same materials and following the same standards as the district court. Arnold, ¶ 13, 201 P.3d at 1132; W.R.C.P. 56(c). No deference is accorded to the district court on issues of law, and we may affirm the summary judgment on any legal grounds appearing in the record. Voss, ¶ 9, 203 P.3d at 419. “The summary judgment can be sustained only when no genuine issues of material 8 We have examined the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, which defines the rights that may be subject to declaration under the act and the parties who may seek a declaration of their rights: Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writings constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the Wyoming constitution or by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may have any question of construction or validity arising under the instrument determined and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-37-103. Thus, “in order for a court to have jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action, the ‘right’ to be declared must fall within the scope of the act and the plaintiff must be an ‘interested’ person.” See William F. West Ranch, LLC v. Tyrrell, 2009 WY 62, ¶¶ 11-12, 206 P.3d 722, 727 (Wyo. 2009) (applying four-part test for determining whether there is a justiciable controversy); see also Voss, ¶ 7, 203 P.3d at 418-19 (same). We are convinced Holloway’s case meets these requirements. 10 fact are present and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Wyo. Cmty. Coll. Comm’n, ¶ 11, 31 P.3d at 1247). [¶29] The parties agree, and the district court’s ruling confirms, that there are no questions of material fact in this case. Our review is confined to questions of law; namely the district court’s interpretation of § 22-23-1005, which states: § 22-23-1005. Ordinance adopted by governing body subject to referendum vote. An ordinance adopted by a municipal governing body shall be subject to a referendum vote if a petition signed by ten percent (10%) of the qualified electors registered in the city or town is filed with the municipal clerk not later than twenty (20) days after the ordinance is first published after adoption as provided by law. To be counted the electors shall be registered voters when the completed petition is submitted for verification. The referendum petition shall set forth the ordinance in full and shall contain the signatures and residence addresses of persons signing the petition. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-1005. [¶30] Guided by our rules of statutory interpretation, see Aland v. Mead, 2014 WY 83, ¶ 11, 327 P.3d 752, 758-59 (Wyo. 2014), we find the legislature’s intent is evident when this statute is construed in pari materia. As the district court pointed out, the linchpin in this case can best be said to be who was, or was not, a qualified elector registered to vote in the City of Casper at the time the municipal referendum petitions were submitted to the City Clerk. Ingrained is the issue of whether a signatory remains a qualified elector registered to vote when his or her residence address within the City of Casper as stated on the petition is different than the one on the voter registration list. [¶31] We begin our analysis by reviewing the definitions of certain terms provided by the legislature. Several of the terms contained in § 22-23-1005 are defined by § 22-1- 102, which also defines additional ones relevant to our review:  “Qualified elector” includes every citizen of the United States who is a bona fide resident of Wyoming, has registered to vote and will be at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of the election at which he may offer to vote;  “Registration” is the entry and verification of the name and voter information of a qualified elector on the official registry list, as provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-3-104(f) and 22-3-108; 11  “Registry list” is the list by precinct of the names, addresses, party affiliations and precinct and district numbers of the registered electors in the county prepared by the secretary of state or county clerks for distribution as provided in Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-2-113;  “Residence” is the place of a person’s actual habitation. The construction of this term shall be governed by the following rules: (A) Residence is the place where a person has a current habitation and to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of returning. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-1-102(xxvi), (xxvii), (xxix), (xxx); see Thomson, 651 P.2d at 78991 (finding that the term “qualified voters” within Art. 3, § 52(c), of the Wyoming Constitution governing initiative and referendum is synonymous with term “qualified registered voters” within related statutory provisions). [¶32] With these definitions in mind, we turn to how a qualified elector becomes registered to vote. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-3-104 provides in pertinent part: (d) An applicant may only register to vote in person or by mail at which time he shall provide the information required by W.S. 22-3-103(a) and sign the registration oath as required by W.S. 22-3-103(b).