Opinion ID: 1994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Motion to Suppress Evidence Obtained Through Wiretapping

Text: Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq., permits a district court to approve an application for the interception of certain wire, oral, or electronic communications. Id. § 2518. On the basis of facts submitted in the Government's application to wiretap, the district court may authorize a wiretap upon finding that (1) probable cause exists to believe that an individual has committed or is about to commit one of certain enumerated offenses; (2) probable cause exists to believe that particular communications concerning that offense will be obtained through an interception; (3) normal investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried; and (4) probable cause exists to believe that the communication facility sought to be wiretapped [is] being used, or [is] about to be used, in connection with the commission of [the] offense. United States v. Carter, 449 F.3d 1287, 1292 (D.C.Cir.2006) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a-d)). An aggrieved person any person who was a party to any intercepted wire ... communication or a person against whom the interception was directed, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11)may move to suppress the contents of the wire communication. Id. § 2518(10)(a). Becton, an aggrieved person, now appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained through wiretapping.
Appellant first argues that the District Court abused its discretion in finding that the Government satisfied the necessity requirement for wiretapping in its September 2005 application. In particular, he asserts that the Government (1) failed to exhaust conventional investigative techniques before seeking authorization to wiretap, and (2) failed to disclose three informants who were working with the Government when it submitted its first wiretap application. We find neither argument persuasive. We therefore hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Government met the necessity requirement of Title III. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). This court has previously held that the District Court may authorize a wiretap on the phone of a member of a suspect operation if traditional investigative techniques have proved inadequate to reveal the operation's `full nature and scope.' See, e.g., Carter, 449 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Sobamowo, 892 F.2d at 93); United States v. Brown, 823 F.2d 591, 598 (D.C.Cir.1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). As in Carter, where law enforcement infiltration by normal investigative techniques was unlikely to succeed because the defendant dealt with a small circle of street-level drug dealers, 449 F.3d at 1294, Agent Counts' affidavit in this case likewise explained that Becton and Best's drug redistribution operation was extremely close-knit, involving close associates and family, and ... very carefully managed, compartmentalized, and operated so as to minimize [the target's] contacts with other co-conspirators. Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 71, 1 A.A. 299. Agent Counts also averred that physical surveillance had been conducted but yielded little valuable information ... other than confirming that some of the identified members of the conspiracy associate with one another. Id. ¶ 74, 1 A.A. 300; see also Carter, 449 F.3d at 1294 (describing the failure of physical surveillance). Although normal investigative procedures ha[d] been probative in proving that an ongoing illegal narcotics business [wa]s operating, the FBI had been unable to determine the identities of other coconspirators who supplied and transported drugs into D.C. and who assisted in local redistribution using these methods. Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 69, 1 A.A. 296-97. The FBI additionally could not determine through normal investigative procedures the manner and frequency with which coconspirators transported drugs into the District of Columbia, the quantities and prices of those drugs, and the location where the contraband was stored, among other information. See id. Like the affidavit in Brown, Counts' affidavit demonstrated that traditional investigative techniques had yielded some evidence against the co-conspirators but did not disclose and would likely continue to fail to disclosethe full nature and extent of the conspiracy. Brown, 823 F.2d at 598. Counts' affidavit stated that further controlled drug purchases, either by the one confidential informant not incarcerated or by an undercover officer, would not lead to sufficient evidence as to (1) the manner by which co-conspirators redistributed large quantities of illegal drugs in D.C.; (2) the identities of all members of the organization assisting Mercer, Becton, and the others; and (3) the manner in which the coconspirators disposed of the proceeds of the operations. Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 71, 1 A.A. 298-99. Specifically, the affidavit stated that even if S-1, the unincarcerated informant, made additional controlled buys, S-1 would not be able to find out the organization's source of supply. Id. We disagree with Becton's claim that various omissions from the wiretap affidavits undermined the Government's necessity showing. The Government's omission of information that a previous search had yielded incriminating information did not make its affidavit infirm. The affidavit explained in detail why searches were inadequate to penetrate [the] conspiracy, so the contested information was not material. Carter, 449 F.3d at 1294; see also Counts Sept. Aff. ¶¶ 76-77, 1 A.A. 301-02. Furthermore, the omission of this information did not undercut the fact that the government had `engaged in an adequate range of investigative endeavors,' Carter, 449 F.3d at 1294 (quoting Sobamowo, 892 F.2d at 93), including at least three previous searches that yielded limited to no evidence, see Counts Sept. Aff. ¶ 76, 1 A.A. 301-02. The disputed omission of three cooperating witnesses from the Government's first affidavit was not material, because it did not undermine the government's ability to prove the need for the ... wiretap. United States v. Gonzalez, Inc., 412 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir.2005). Agent Counts' affidavit demonstrated that additional controlled buys were inadequate to reveal the full nature and scope of the conspiracy. Sobamowo, 892 F.2d at 93 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Counts Sept. Aff. ¶¶ 70-71, 1 A.A. 298. More significantly, the additional informants could not have made controlled buys, as they were incarcerated at the time when the FBI submitted the September and October 2005 applications for wiretaps. Becton also asserts that the evidence gained from these wiretaps should have been disregarded for failure to meet the necessity requirement and that the later affidavits do not support probable cause without that information. See Appellant's Br. at 52. For the reasons already explained, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing the September and October wiretaps, so the information from those wiretaps need not have been disregarded. Because the Government's affidavits adequately demonstrated the failure of normal investigative techniques to reveal the full nature and scope of the conspiracy, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the Government had met the necessity requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
Becton also argues that the District Court erred when it refused to grant a Franks hearing with respect to the Government's failure to disclose certain information bearing on the credibility of two confidential sources, S-4 and S-6, who were cited in the January and February 2006 affidavits supporting wiretap applications. See Appellant's Br. at 52-54. We agree with Becton that his claim was raised and preserved when he requested a Franks hearing as part of the motion to suppress and the District Court denied that motion without holding such a hearing. However, because Becton failed to demonstrate that the omitted information was material, we hold that the District Court did not err in failing to hold a Franks hearing. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. 2674; see also Richardson, 861 F.2d at 293, 294. The inclusion of additional information bearing on the credibility of S-4 and S-6 would not have defeat[ed] probable cause for the wiretap. See United States v. Spencer, 530 F.3d 1003, 1007 (D.C.Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Agent Counts had already disclosed that these sources had extensive criminal histories, so the District Court was aware of information undercutting their credibility when it approved the wiretaps. Furthermore, even if the omitted information concerning S-4 and S-6 completely undermined their credibility such that the information relating to them was deemed unreliable and struck entirely from the affidavit, Becton does not show that probable cause would have been defeated. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. 2674. Counts' January 2006 affidavit contained information from four other confidential informants and described undercover operations involving consensually recorded conversations and controlled purchases, all of which demonstrated probable cause that the targeted individuals were involved in a drug-trafficking conspiracy. On this record, we hold that the District Court did not err when it refused to grant a Franks hearing.