Opinion ID: 2655544
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The fifth delay

Text: ¶47 The fifth period of delay totaled 119 days, and ran from the second trial date of May 29, 2012, to the actual trial date of September 25, 2012. The District Court attributed this delay to Redlich, as it was initiated by Redlich’s motion to continue. The court rejected Redlich’s argument that only a portion of the 119 days should be attributed to him, because he cited no authority for a pro rata apportionment of fault for the delay. Considerable authority exists, however, to support the idea that a court may apportion a period of delay to the parties it deems responsible, or that responsibility for a period of delay may be shared by both parties. See Morrisey, ¶¶ 58-60, 64; Couture, ¶¶ 80-97; State v. Charlie, 2010 MT 195, ¶¶ 51-52, 357 Mont. 355, 239 P.3d 934; Billman, ¶¶ 24-27. The District Court, therefore, was not required to attribute this entire period of delay to either Redlich or the State. ¶48 Nevertheless, Redlich’s argument with regard to this period of delay is that he “is not responsible for turnover in the [Office of the Public Defender] staff.” This contention, for which Redlich cites no authority, is incorrect for purposes of speedy trial analysis. As a general rule, “[d]elay caused by defense counsel is charged against the defendant.” Morrisey, ¶ 55 n. 10. We have acknowledged Supreme Court authority which states that delay resulting from a “systemic breakdown” in the public defender system could be charged to the State. Morrisey, ¶ 55 n. 10 (citing Vermont v. Brillon, 556 U.S. 81, 94, 129 S. Ct. 1283, 1292 (2009)). But Redlich has failed to demonstrate that any delay in this case was due to a systemic breakdown in the public defender system. 19 ¶49 After considering the facts and reasons for each discrete time period, the District Court allotted to the State the responsibility for 363 days. Much of the time allocated to the State was institutional delay, and thus does not weigh heavily against the State. Blair, ¶ 19. While Redlich requests that this Court re-allocate a portion of the fifth period of delay to the State, it is clear that the District Court thoroughly considered the facts, both as to the discrete time periods involved, and the reasons for each of them. The District Court’s factual decision was not clearly erroneous.