Opinion ID: 1141292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: controverted material facts exist concerning the alleged breach of the credit agreement which must be resolved by the trier of fact.

Text: Buck's insists that there are controverted material facts concerning the 1987 credit agreement and the conduct between itself and First Tulsa's loan officer which militate against the grant of summary judgment. It argues that: 1) once Beard told Duncan by telephone on October 7 that it would be no problem to advance the maximum credit limit that an agreement was reached; and 2) First Tulsa's refusal to advance the funds on October 8 constituted a breach of the credit agreement. First Tulsa relies upon the express language of paragraph 2.1 of the contract providing that the Bank is under no obligation to make any loan or advance [10] for the proposition that there was no breach. The bank asserts that there was no breach, because there was no obligation to make the advance. Pursuant to Rule 13, 12 O.S. 1991, Ch. 2 App., Rules for the District Courts, a motion for summary judgment may be filed if the pleadings, depositions, interrogatories, affidavits, and other exhibits reflect that there is no substantial controversy pertaining to any material fact. [11] Even when basic facts are undisputed, motions for summary judgment should be denied, if from the evidence, reasonable persons might reach different inferences or conclusions from the undisputed facts. [12] Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, admissions, or other evidentiary materials establish that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [13] All conclusions drawn from the evidentiary material submitted to the trial court are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. [14] A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action. [15] Contractual intent is determined from the entire instrument. Whenever possible, an interpretation will be adopted which gives effect to all provisions of the contract. [16] The 1987 Agreement between Buck's and First Tulsa contains at least three clauses which appear to limit the circumstances under which an advance will be made. As First Tulsa notes, paragraph 2.1 provides that First Tulsa was not required to make any loans. [17] Paragraph 4.1 indicates that First Tulsa was not required to make advances unless there shall remain in full force and effect unconditional written guaranties. [18] Finally, paragraph 6.1 provides that First Tulsa had no further obligation to make any loan after notice of default. [19] However, paragraph 2.6 specifically states that: ... The bank may, in its discretion, agree to make one or more advances of loan funds requested by telephone by Borrower and on a date other than a Weekly Settlement Date. In any instance where an advance of loan funds shall be made by the Bank to the Borrower on a telephonic request the Borrower shall furnish a Loan Request to the Bank for such advance on the next ensuing banking day ... It is unnecessary to strike any one of these provisions to give effect to all. First Tulsa does not assert that there was some defect in the guaranties in place for the line of credit, [20] and the bank never gave notice of default. Even if paragraph 2.1 is given the strictest interpretation argued for  i.e., First Tulsa had no obligation to make any loan to Bucks, paragraph 2.6 outlines a circumstance in which a loan may, in the bank's discretion, be advanced. Paragraph 2.6 gave Beard the authority to make a telephonic advance. This is precisely what Buck's asserts occurred. Construing the provisions together, we find no conflict. This Court will not diminish a borrower's right clearly and specifically provided in a contract. [21] One of the material unresolved factual disputes between First Tulsa and Buck's involves circumstances surrounding the alleged telephonic approval of the loan on October 7. [22] Buck's claims that First Tulsa orally agreed to give the advance in a telephone conversation. [23] Duncan's deposition stating that the advance would be no problem directly conflicts with Beard's testimony that he doesn't recall discussing the borrowing base at all with Buck's before the October 8 meeting. [24] According to the agreement, the bank could make advances of loan funds requested by telephone. [25] If First Tulsa agreed to make the loan, a breach may have occurred when it reneged the following day. The material facts surrounding a possible breach of the credit agreement are in dispute. These conflicting facts present a question for resolution by the trier of fact. [26]