Opinion ID: 2509046
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: part ii. propriety of assuming original jurisdiction.

Text: ś 10 When a matter involves a controversy over which both this Court and the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction (as here), the determination whether to assume original jurisdiction in a particular case is discretionary with this Court. See Keating v. Johnson, 1996 OK 61, 918 P.2d 51, 55. Also, we have recognized that the framers of the Oklahoma Constitution intended this Court primarily as an appellate court. Id. at 56; Jarman v. Mason, 1924 OK 722, 229 P. 459, 464. It was stated in Kitchens v. McGowen, 1972 OK 140, 503 P.2d 218, Syllabus by the Court: The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, when concurrent with that of the district court, is intended primarily as a `stand by' service which it will exercise only when, from the exigencies of the case, great injury will be done by its refusal so to do. A different rule would so flood this court with original actions as to destroy its efficiency as an appellate court. ś 11 Two central themes run through most of our cases where original jurisdiction has been assumed in the context of concurrent district court jurisdiction. Keating, 918 P.2d at 55. One, the matter must concern the public interest, i.e., the case is publici juris in nature, which essentially means affecting the people or community at large. Id. Two, there must be some urgency or pressing need for an early decision. Id. Also, it is the rare case that will be entertained on original jurisdiction that requests declaratory relief. Keating, 918 P.2d at 57; Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, 850 P.2d 1069, 1072. Here, petitioners request such relief in the form of a declaration of the Act's constitutionality. ś 12 There appears little question the matter is publici juris in nature, dealing as it does with the constitutionality of an Act banning cockfighting and related activities that was recently passed through the initiative process by a statewide vote of Oklahoma's electorate. The first prong of the Keating test for this Court assuming original jurisdiction is met. The second prong, immediacy, is admittedly more problematic and difficult to detect. However, we believe there is a pressing need to rule on the matter at the present time in view of the nature of the controversy before us and, thus, we exercise our discretionary authority to assume original jurisdiction to rule on the constitutional challenges raised by respondents. ś 13 In that numerous district courts have enjoined enforcement of the Act (either by TROs or temporary injunctions) in over twenty-five (25) counties and there was a lack of equitable authority to do so, assumption of original jurisdiction is necessary to advise the district courts as to the propriety of enjoining enforcement of a criminal enactment in the exercise of their equitable power. Secondly, but relatedly, respondents' challenges to the Act, as a facial matter, are unavailing and without merit because no legitimate property right of theirs has been unconstitutionally impinged upon or taken, nor has any fundamental right of theirs been violated by the Act under review. ś 14 The parameters for enjoining enforcement or prosecution under a criminal statute were set forth in Anderson v. Trimble, 1974 OK 2, 519 P.2d 1352, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 995, 95 S.Ct. 308, 42 L.Ed.2d 269 (1974), as well as numerous other cases. The general rule as to when it is appropriate for a civil court in an equity proceeding to enjoin prosecution or enforcement under a criminal statute or municipal ordinance, is as follows: 1) the statute or ordinance is void or unconstitutional; 2) if a criminal proceeding is allowed to proceed property rights would be destroyed; and 3) irreparable injury would be inflicted without an injunction. See e.g., Whitson v. City of Cherokee, 1935 OK 650, 46 P.2d 907; Allen v. Oklahoma City, 1935 OK 1143, 52 P.2d 1054; Oklahoma City v. Norton-Johnson Buick Motor Co., 1934 OK 425, 36 P.2d 278; City of Blackwell v. Griffith Amusement Co., 1932 OK 320, 16 P.2d 233; see also Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 25 S.Ct. 18, 49 L.Ed. 169 (1904)(criminal proceedings may be enjoined when arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of police power under Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis, if property rights will be destroyed by enforcement of law or ordinance). All three prerequisites must coincide for an injunction to be appropriate. See Whitson, 46 P.2d at 908; State ex rel. Hensley v. Eubanks, 1962 OK CR 2, 368 P.2d 253, 255. ś 15 One of the main reasons for the restrictive rule as to when it is appropriate for equity to enjoin pending or threatened prosecution under a criminal statute is based on the separation of powers doctrine, i.e., the judiciary should be reluctant to unnecessarily interfere in the workings of the other two branches of government, the executive and legislative, in the exercise of their authority/power. See Rathke v. MacFarlane, 648 P.2d 648, 651-652 (Colo.1982). Before a court may enjoin the enforcement of a criminal statute, exceptional circumstances must be shown. Id. at 653. Injunctive relief must be necessary to protect existing legitimate property rights or fundamental constitutional rights. Id. As noted above, the Act under consideration does not unconstitutionally impinge on legitimate/recognized property interests or violate any fundamental right of respondents. [10] ś 16 The immediacy or pressing need prong of the two-part test for deciding whether original jurisdiction should be assumed is satisfied because, in effect, the TROs and/or temporary injunctions, have made it impossible for law enforcement officials in over twenty-five (25) counties to carry out their duties under the Act, even though no valid basis has been espoused by respondents to enjoin enforcement or prosecution under the Act. Without involvement of this Court to remedy this frustration of a valid criminal enactment, the present state of affairs may be allowed to continue for a lengthy period of time, even though no valid equitable basis has been put forward by respondents to thwart enforcement of the Act. We, thus, believe the instant situation involves one of those rare circumstances appropriate for the assumption of original jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. PART III. GENERAL STANDARD OF REVIEWâ CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE. ś 17 The general rules concerning the standard of review applicable when a statutory enactment is attacked on constitutional grounds were spelled out in Fent v. Oklahoma Capitol Improvement Authority, 1999 OK 64, śś 3-4, 984 P.2d 200, 204, cert denied, 528 U.S. 1021, 120 S.Ct. 531, 145 L.Ed.2d 411 (1999). In Fent, this Court said: In considering a statute's constitutionality, courts are guided by well established principles. A heavy burden is cast on those challenging a legislative enactment to show its unconstitutionality and every presumption is to be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. If two possible interpretations of a statute are possible, only one of which would render it unconstitutional, a court is bound to give the statute an interpretation that will render it constitutional, unless constitutional infirmity is shown beyond a reasonable doubt. A court is bound to accept an interpretation that avoids constitutional doubt as to the legality of a legislative enactment. It is also firmly recognized that it is not the place of this Court, or any court, to concern itself with a statute's propriety, desirability, wisdom, or its practicality as a working proposition. [T]he judiciary cannot challenge the wisdom, need or desirability of any constitutionally valid legislation. Such questions are plainly and definitely established by our fundamental law as functions of the legislative branch of government. Respect for the integrity of our tripartite scheme for distribution of governmental powers commands that the judiciary abstain from intrusion into legislative policymaking. A court's function, when the constitutionality of a statute is put at issue, is limited to a determination of the validity or invalidity of the legislative provision and a court's function extends no farther in our system of government. Id. (citations omitted). That the Act under review was promulgated by the people via the initiative process in the exercise of their retained legislative power (rather than by the Legislature) makes the above-delineated tenets no less applicable. In other words, a statutory enactment passed by the people through the initiative is entitled to the same presumption of constitutionality as one passed by the Legislature. [11] With this general review standard in mind, we now turn to consider respondents' particularized constitutional challenges. PART IV. THE ACT DOES NOT TAKE OR DAMAGE PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE WITHOUT JUST COMPENSATION. ś 18 In essence, respondents argue that the terms of the Act, i.e., prohibiting the use of birds (including gamecocks) for fighting purposes, constitute a regulatory taking or damaging of their property for public use without just compensation. [12] Respondents' argument in such regard (as with their assertions concerning impairment of contracts and their inherent rights to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness and to the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry), present a classic example of the tension between the freedom of an individual to do as he/she will with his/her property and the interest of society or the community at large, acting through the legislative process (here by initiative), to place reasonable restrictions on the use of property to promote or protect the public good by the passage of laws. In the circumstances of this case, the interests of society and the community at large prevail. [13] ś 19 Although respondents seem to assume using birds for fighting is a cognizable or recognized property right or interest subject to protection under takings analysis, something we deem questionable, even if we assume the use of birds for such a purpose was considered a recognized property interest prior to passage of the Act, the outlawing of that one use does not constitute a regulatory taking or damaging of property for which compensation must be paid. [14] Instead, the prohibition against using birds for fighting purposes is a reasonable and proper exercise of the police power by the electorate acting in its legislative capacity to promote public morals and to ban an activity deemed injurious thereto, rather than a regulatory taking for which compensation must be paid. At a minimum, the Act serves the significant and legitimate public purpose of preventing cruelty to animals and prohibiting human involvement in bird fighting, obviously out of compassion for avian creatures. [15] ś 20 In Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 668-669, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887), the United States Supreme Court stated: A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that its use by anyone, for certain forbidden purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests. Nor can legislation of that character come within the Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent that its real object is not to protect the community, or to promote the general well being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process of law. The power which the States have of prohibiting such use by individuals of their property as will be prejudicial to the health, the morals, or the safety of the public, is notâ and, consistently with the existence and safety of organized society, cannot beâ burdened with the condition that the State must compensate such individual owners for pecuniary losses they may sustain, by reason of their not being permitted, by a noxious use of their property, to inflict injury upon the community. At the outset we acknowledge that takings analysis has undergone change and refinement since Mugler was decided. The Mugler decision preceded Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922), the Supreme Court case generally thought to have given birth to the field of regulatory takings jurisprudence. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014-1015, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 120 L.Ed.2d 798 (1992). Before Pennsylvania Coal Co., it was generally thought the Takings Clause only reached a direct appropriation of property or a practical ouster of the owner's possession. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014, 112 S.Ct. 2886. Plainly, Pennsylvania Coal Co. ushered in a new era recognizing there are limits to the exercise of the police power in regard to the regulation of property and that if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. Id., 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S.Ct. 158. Notwithstanding the changes and refinement in takings jurisprudence, it was made clear in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 488-492, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 94 L.Ed.2d 472 (1987), that the basic thought expressed in Mugler is still sound and we are convinced that case and more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence clearly supports the determination that the Act before us for review withstands respondents' takings challenge. ś 21 To uphold the Act over respondents' takings challenge does not require us to express our condemnation of the activity of cockfighting. That is not our responsibility, but the responsibility of the electorate, which passed the Act in its legislative capacity. Our responsibility is only to gauge the legislation for constitutional flaw or infirmity and it is plain to us the Act passes constitutional muster as a reasonable exercise of the police power. This is so, notwithstanding that the Act may have the effect of substantially reducing the value of game fowl or gamecocks or the value of certain property used in cockfighting, or that it may have the effect of prohibiting the most beneficial use (from an economic standpoint) of such property. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S.Ct. 318, 62 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). ś 22 In Andrus the Supreme Court grappled with whether certain federal enactments authorizing the prohibition of commercial transactions in pre-existing avian artifacts violated the Fifth Amendment property rights of owners of such artifacts because the prohibition wholly deprived them of the opportunity to earn a profit from the relics. Id. at 64, 100 S.Ct. 318. In ruling against them, Andrus stated: Suffice it to say that government regulationâ by definitionâ involves the adjustment of rights for the public good. Often this adjustment curtails some potential for the use or economic exploitation of private property. To require compensation in all such circumstances would effectively compel the government to regulate by purchase. Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general law. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922); see Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S., at 124, 98 S.Ct., at 2659. The Takings Clause, therefore, preserves governmental power to regulate, subject only to the dictates of `justice and fairness.' Ibid.; 98 S.Ct., at 2659; see Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 82 S.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). There is no abstract or fixed point at which judicial intervention under the Takings Clause becomes appropriate. Formulas and factors have been developed in a variety of settings. See Penn Central, supra, 438 U.S., at 123-128, 98 S.Ct., at 2659-2662. Resolution of each case, however, ultimately calls as much for the exercise of judgment as for the application of logic. The regulations challenged here do not compel the surrender of the artifacts, and there is no physical invasion or restraint upon them. Rather, a significant restriction has been imposed on one means of disposing of the artifacts. But the denial of one traditional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a full bundle of property rights, the destruction of one strand of the bundle is not a taking, because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety. Compare Penn Central, supra, at 130-131, 98 S.Ct., at 2662-2663 and United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 76 S.Ct. 259, 100 L.Ed. 240 (1956), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra , and United States v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 81 S.Ct. 784, 5 L.Ed.2d 838 (1961). See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law, 80 Harv.L.Rev. 1165, 1230-1233 (1967). In this case, it is crucial that appellees retain the rights to possess and transport their property, and to donate or devise the protected birds. It is, to be sure, undeniable that the regulations here prevent the most profitable use of appellees' property. Again, however, that is not dispositive. When we review regulation, a reduction in the value of property is not necessarily equated with a taking. Compare Goldblatt v. Hempstead, supra, 369 U.S., at 594, 82 S.Ct., at 990, and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915), with Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra . In the instant case, it is not clear that appellees will be unable to derive economic benefit from the artifacts; for example, they might exhibit the artifacts for an admissions charge. At any rate, loss of future profitsâ unaccompanied by any physical property restrictionâ provides a slender reed upon which to rest a takings claim. Prediction of profitability is essentially a matter of reasoned speculation that courts are not especially competent to perform. Further, perhaps because of its very uncertainty, the interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other property-related interests. Cf., e.g., Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 Yale L.J. 52 (1936). Regulations that bar trade in certain goods have been upheld against claims of unconstitutional taking. For example, the Court has sustained regulations prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages despite the fact that individuals were left with previously acquired stocks. Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 44 S.Ct. 628, 68 L.Ed. 1174 (1924), involved a federal statute that forbade the sale of liquors manufactured before passage of the statute. The claim of a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment was tersely rejected. Id., at 563, 44 S.Ct., at 633. Similarly, in Jacob Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 40 S.Ct. 141, 64 L.Ed. 260 (1920), a federal law that extended a domestic sales ban from intoxicating to nonintoxicating alcoholic beverages on hand at the time of the passage of the act, id., at 302, 40 S.Ct., at 150, was upheld. Mr. Justice Brandeis dismissed the takings challenge, stating that there was no appropriation of private property, but merely a lessening of value due to a permissible restriction imposed upon its use. Id., at 303, 40 S.Ct., at 151. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887). It is true that appellees must bear the costs of these regulations. But, within limits, that is a burden borne to secure the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, supra, 260 U.S., at 422, 43 S.Ct., at 163 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). We hold that the simple prohibition of the sale of lawfully acquired property in this case does not effect a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 65-68, 100 S.Ct. 318 (footnotes omitted). ś 23 As the Supreme Court recognized in Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027-1028, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (a case involving land use regulation), a distinction exists between personal and real property for takings analysis. [16] There it was said, [a]nd in the case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high degree of control over commercial dealings, [a person] ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even render his property economically worthless (at least if the property's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale). Id., citing Andrus, 444 U.S. at 66-67, 100 S.Ct. 318. ś 24 Here we have a regulation of personal property that prohibits one use thereof. Respondents or others similarly situated retain the rights to possess, sell, trade, donate, devise or use their gamecocks or game fowl, or any property related thereto, in any lawful manner or for any lawful purpose. Although their ability or opportunity to earn future profit from fighting such birds or raising or selling them for fighting may be eliminated, that is a slender reed upon which to base a takings claim, given their retention of full rights to use or sell their birds for other purposes. Although there was apparently evidence presented by plaintiffs in the McCurtain County case that there is no market for gamecocks and game fowl if the prohibition against fighting is upheld, given the above jurisprudence and in light of the application of judgment, logic and fairness, we do not believe the prohibition at issue here can rightfully be considered a taking or damaging of property for public use for which compensation is due. [17] Instead, the Act under review represents a non-compensable and valid exercise of the police power to outlaw one use of property which amounts to animal cruelty. We reject respondents' takings challenge to the Act. PART V. THE ACT DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIR THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. ś 25 Respondents also assert the Act violates the Contract Clauses of both the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions because contracts entered into prior to its passage cannot now be legally performed. [18] They give as one example, individuals having contracts to sell certain birds that will eventually be used for cockfighting. Respondents misinterpret the scope and sweep of the two Contract Clauses and it is plain the Act's provisions do not unconstitutionally impair the obligation of contracts as alleged by respondents. ś 26 It is well settled that the federal Contract Clause concerning no State passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts, is not to be read or understood literally. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, supra, 480 U.S. at 502, 107 S.Ct. 1232. Although the clause's language is facially absolute, its prohibition must be accommodated to the inherent police power of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power and Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410, 103 S.Ct. 697, 74 L.Ed.2d 569 (1983). The clause had as its primary focus legislation designed to repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor relationships that obligors were unable to satisfy. Keystone Bituminous Coal Association, 480 U.S. at 502-503, 107 S.Ct. 1232. The Supreme Court has stated concerning the federal Contract Clause: [I]t is to be accepted as a commonplace that the Contract Clause does not operate to obliterate the police power of the States. `It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.' Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480, 26 S.Ct. 127, 130, 50 L.Ed. 274. As Mr. Justice Holmes succinctly put the matter in his opinion for the Court in Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 357, 28 S.Ct. 529, 531, 52 L.Ed. 828: `One whose rights, such as they are, are subject to state restriction, cannot remove them from the power of the State by making a contract about them. The contract will carry with it the infirmity of the subject matter.' Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241-242, 98 S.Ct. 2716, 57 L.Ed.2d 727 (1978). ś 27 In other words, the substance of the above quote is the long-held understanding that not every impairment of a contractual right is unconstitutional under the Contract Clause. In fact, the Supreme Court has recognized that, [s]tates must possess broad power to adopt general regulatory measures without being concerned that private contracts will be impaired, or even destroyed, as a result. Otherwise, one would be able to obtain immunity from the state regulation by making private contractual arrangements. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22, 97 S.Ct. 1505, 52 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). In Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 26 S.Ct. 127, 50 L.Ed. 274 (1905), the Supreme Court provided examples of contracts that must appropriately yield to the police power in the form of laws intended for the public good and welfare. It said: [C]ontracts, perfectly lawful at the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or distillery, or carry on a lottery ... are subject to impairment by a change of policy on the part of the state, prohibiting the establishment or continuance of such traffic; in other words, that parties, by entering into contracts, may not estop the legislature from enacting laws intended for the public good. Id. at 480, 26 S.Ct. 127. ś 28 Although police power regulation which detrimentally acts on contracts is certainly subject to limitation ( Adolph Coors Co. v. Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 1978 OK 119, 584 P.2d 717, 719), this Court has also recognized that the right of the legislative branch to act under the police power is part of the existing law at the time of the execution of every contract, and as such becomes in contemplation of law a part of the contract. State ex rel. Roth v. Waterfield, 1933 OK 546, 29 P.2d 24, Third Syllabus. Simply put, an individual or company by entering into a contract reaching into the future concerning an activity lawful when the contract was made, may not foreclose the Legislature (or the people acting in their legislative capacity) from prohibiting the activity under a reasonable exercise of the police power for the public good. We believe the Act is such a reasonable police power regulation. ś 29 A three-part test has been employed when a state law has been alleged to fail to pass constitutional muster under the Contract Clause in regard to a contract between private contracting parties. See Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 411-413, 103 S.Ct. 697. The first inquiry is whether the law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship. Id., at 411, 103 S.Ct. 697, quoting Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 244, 98 S.Ct. 2716. Second, if the law constitutes a substantial impairment, the State must have a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the law, such as remedying a broad and general social or economic problem. Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 411-412, 103 S.Ct. 697, citing United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22, 97 S.Ct. 1505 and Allied Structural Steel Co., 438 U.S. at 247, 98 S.Ct. 2716. The requirement of a legitimate public purpose guarantees the State is exercising its police power, rather than providing a benefit to some special interest. Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 412, 103 S.Ct. 697. Finally, assuming a legitimate public purpose has been identified, the inquiry turns to whether the adjustments of the rights and responsibilities of the contracting parties is based on reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose behind the law's adoption. Id., quoting United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22, 97 S.Ct. 1505. When the State is not itself a contracting party, courts properly defer to legislative judgment as to the need and reasonableness of any specific law. Energy Reserves Group, Inc., 459 U.S. at 412-413 and n. 14, 103 S.Ct. 697, citing and quoting United States Trust Co., 431 U.S. at 22-23, 97 S.Ct. 1505. [19] ś 30 We have not been provided with any particular contract alleged to have been retroactively impaired by the Act. However, we assume one or more respondents (or others) have contractsâ e.g., to sell birds to be used for fighting purposesâ that were in existence prior to passage of the Act and that said contracts will be substantially impaired by the legislation because they will no longer be subject to legal performance without running afoul of the prohibitory terms of the Act. In our view, however, such impairment does not constitute a violation of the Contract Clause of either the United States or Oklahoma Constitutions. ś 31 Unquestionably, the people acting in their legislative capacity, were acting in furtherance of a legitimate and reasonable exercise of the police power to prevent animal cruelty and to end human involvement in such cruelty, by enacting the ban on cockfighting and related activities. This is a significant and legitimate public purpose meant to remedy a broad and general societal problem and to outlaw an activity deemed injurious to public morals. [20] We also perceive no deficiency in the terms of the Act as being of an appropriate character to carry out or implement the purpose behind the Act, particularly given the deference to which the legislative judgment is entitled as to the need and reasonableness of a particular measure. It seems to us that only by banning cockfighting and the related activities intended to lead to it can the purpose of the Act be achieved. ś 32 Furthermore, we believe it could not reasonably be expected by respondents or anyone else that cockfighting, simply because it was lawful prior to the Act's passage would always remain so. As set forth in PART IV, supra note 14, criminal statutes prohibiting cruelty to animals or instigating fights between animals have been part of Oklahoma law since at least the early 20th Century. See Maloney v. State, 1975 OK CR 22, 532 P.2d 78; Rev. Laws Okla.1910, § 2746 (cruelty to animals); Rev. Laws Okla.1910, §§ 2743-2744 (instigating fights between animals; keeping place for fighting animals). [21] Though in Lock v. Falkenstine, 1963 OK CR 32, 380 P.2d 278, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held the criminal statute prohibiting the instigation of animal fighting inapplicable to the fighting of gamecocks because that court held gamecocks were not animals within the contemplation of the statute, the Court of Criminal Appeals expressly presaged the potential for future prohibition of the activity by legislative action. See id. at 284. In other words, the prohibition against and criminalization of cruelty to animals generally has long been part of our State's history and over forty (40) years ago our Court of Criminal Appeals foreshadowed the potential for specifically outlawing cockfighting. Thus, regulation of this type, which the Act has now conclusively extended to birds, has long been recognized as the type of enactment (passed by either the Legislature or the people through the initiative), that would be understood as a valid police power regulation, notwithstanding its technical previous legality. Given this historical perspective, it is simply not a reasonable expectancy that an existent contract at the time of passage of the Act, which contains terms extending into the future concerning the use or sale of game fowl or gamecocks, would be immune from being overridden by valid police power regulation outlawing or prohibiting cockfighting. Therefore, we reject respondents' Contract Clause challenges. PART VI. THE ACT DOES NOT VIOLATE OKLA.CONST. ART 2, § 2. ś 33 Respondents also challenge the Act under OKLA.CONST. art. 2, § 2, which provides, [a]ll persons have the inherent right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own industry. In the McCurtain County petition it is alleged, in effect, that the Act is unconstitutional in that it, destroys [respondents'] inherent rights of life, liberty, pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the gains of their industry without due process of law. We hold the Act does not violate OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2. [22] ś 34 In the first instance, respondents have cited no case that stands for the proposition that they or anyone else has the absolute inherent right to liberty, happiness or to enjoy the gains of their own industry through an activity that amounts to animal cruelty and we do not read their submissions to so argue. We are certainly aware of no such absolute right. Second, it has long been recognized that art. 2, § 2 was never intended to be viewed as protecting a right to do whatever one chooses or has the power to do, or that restrictions on an individual are valid only if necessary to protect the safety of others. See One Chicago Coin's Play Boy Marble Bd. v. State, 1949 OK 251, 212 P.2d 129, 132. It is well settled that the legislature may, in the proper exercise of the police power, define and declare what is to be deemed injurious to public health, morals, safety and general welfare. And, the legislature is primarily the judge of whether certain facts or conditions justify regulation of a particular business for the public welfare. Id. (citations omitted); See also Cotton Club v. Oklahoma Tax Commission, 1945 OK 146, 158 P.2d 707, 708, Second Syllabus (police power is an inherent attribute of State sovereignty, under which the State, within constitutional limitations, may decide what is dangerous to public order, safety, health, morals and the general welfare of society). In other words, the rights guaranteed in OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2 are qualified. They are not absolute. ś 35 Here, the people acting in their legislative capacity have determined that cruelty to birds is injurious to public morals and the general welfare and it is not our place to second-guess that judgment, only to review the Act for constitutional infirmity. This Court has said concerning substantive due process and the rights protected by OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2: The Legislature is primarily the judge of whether facts and conditions exist that make it advisable that any certain business be regulated for the public good, under the police power, and as to what means are best adapted to regulate it, and every possible presumption is to be indulged in favor of the correctness of such finding, and though the courts may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of such legislation, they may not annul it as being in violation of substantive due process unless it is clearly irrelevant to the policy the Legislature may adopt or is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory. The inherent right to life, liberty, the pursuit of happiness, and the enjoyment of the gains of their own labor guaranteed to the people by Sec. 2, Art. 2, of the state constitution, is subject to reasonable regulation in the exercise of the police power. Jack Lincoln Shops, Inc. v. State Dry Cleaners' Board, 1943 OK 28, 135 P.2d 332, 333, First and Second Syllabi, appeal dismissed, 320 U.S. 208, 63 S.Ct. 1448, 87 L.Ed. 1847 (1943). [23] ś 36 We conclude the Act before us is not irrelevant to the policy sought to be accomplished nor is it arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious or discriminatory. In fact, as we noted in PART V, enactments of this type (i.e., banning cruelty to animals) seem to have long been recognized to fall within the scope of a legitimate exercise of the police power. The Act also does not unconstitutionally discriminate. All our people are forbidden from engaging in the activities prohibited by the Act. Although we acknowledge the Act has a greater impact on those engaged in cockfighting or related activities, than on those who have not pursued such activities, no constitutional doctrine of which we are aware requires that alone to doom the enactment. The bottom line is that under our form of government, a person's right to do as he or she chooses must yield to the reasonable laws of society. We are convinced the Act under review is a valid and reasonable law enacted by the people through their reserved power of initiative; an enactment that plainly falls within the ambit of a proper, reasonable and constitutional exercise of the police power. Respondents' challenge to the Act under OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 2 is rejected. PART VII. THE ACT DOES NOT UNCONSTITUTIONALLY IMPAIR THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO TRAVEL. ś 37 Respondents challenge § 1692.5 of the Act as being unconstitutional based on the assertion it unnecessarily infringes on the right to travel. Section 1692.5 provides in pertinent part, [e]very person who owns, possesses, keeps, or trains any bird with the intent that such bird shall be engaged in a cockfight, upon conviction, shall be guilty of a felony. Respondents' argument is as follows: Section [1692.5] ... infringes the fundamental right to travel because it deters travel through Oklahoma by making the possession of birds to be used for fighting, which is perfectly legal in other states and countries, unlawful merely by passing through Oklahoma on a cross-country trip.... As written, [§ 1692.5] makes it a felony to possess any bird with the intent that the bird engage in a cockfight. A person traveling through, or flying over, Oklahoma to a cockfight in another state or country where cockfighting is legal could be convicted of a felony under [§ 1692.5]. Thus, [§ 1692.5] deters individual's [sic] from traveling through Oklahoma to another destination for a legitimate purpose. [Section 1692.5] therefore unnecessarily infringes on the right to travel and is unconstitutionally overbroad. [24] There is no question a right to travel from one State to another is protected by the United States Constitution [ Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 119 S.Ct. 1518, 143 L.Ed.2d 689 (1999)] and also a constitutionally protected right to travel abroad/internationally. See United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d 200, 209-210 and n. 12 (5th Cir.2003). ś 38 The United States Supreme Court has made it quite clear that the right to travel from one State to another is firmly embedded in this country's jurisprudence and that the right, depending on the context in which it is asserted and the law challenged, may emanate from more than one federal constitutional source. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500-504, 119 S.Ct. 1518 (U.S.CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 and Fourteenth Amendment, § 1, the privileges and immunities clauses concerning state and national citizenship, respectively). The federal right of interstate travel has also been based upon the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (U.S.CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 [25] ). United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758-759, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966); Edwards v. People of the State of California, 314 U.S. 160, 62 S.Ct. 164, 86 L.Ed. 119 (1941). ś 39 The right to travel interstate embraces at least three different components: 1) the right of a citizen of one State to enter and leave another State; 2) the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State; and 3) for travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State. [26] Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500, 119 S.Ct. 1518. The right to travel abroad/internationally is also a protected and valued right, and is an important aspect of a citizen's liberty under the Fifth Amendment. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 125-127, 78 S.Ct. 1113, 2 L.Ed.2d 1204 (1958). However, the right to travel abroad is accorded less stature than the right to travel interstate [ Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 306-307, 101 S.Ct. 2766, 69 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981) ] and is plainly subject to reasonable federal governmental regulation. Id. at 306, 101 S.Ct. 2766. There is also no question the right to travel is subject to protection from improper State interference, but a State is not wholly ousted from exercising its police power in matters of local concern even though the right to travel may be affected. See Edwards v. People of the State of California, 314 U.S. at 172-173, 62 S.Ct. 164. In our view, respondents' challenge to § 1692.5 based upon the right to travel, either interstate or abroad, is devoid of any firm foundation and is without merit. [27] ś 40 Although it is somewhat difficult to understand exactly the contours of respondents' assertions in regard to their travel argument, to the extent they are claiming it would be a violation of § 1692.5 for a person to pass-through Oklahoma in possession of birds intended to be fought in a State or country where cockfighting is legal, even assuming that § 1692.5 has sufficient reach to criminalize the mere passing-through Oklahoma with birds intended to be fought in another State or country where bird fighting is legal, the right to travel protected by the United States Constitution would not be impinged. [28] This is so because a federal law exists (obviously passed under Congressional authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce under the Commerce Clause) that, among other things, bans and criminalizes the interstate and foreign transport of birds (as with other covered animals) for participation in an animal fighting venture, even in circumstances where animal (including bird) fighting is lawful in the ultimate destination State or country. 7 U.S.C. § 2156 (2000), as amended by Pub.L. No. 107-171, §§ 10301-10302, the amendments printed in 2002 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS (Vol.1). [29] ś 41 Though the right to travel interstate and internationally is protected by the United States Constitution, the right is not absolute and it has been recognized there is no fundamental right to travel for an illicit purpose. United States v. Bredimus, 352 F.3d at 210; see also Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 320-323, 33 S.Ct. 281, 57 L.Ed. 523 (1913); United States v. Burton, 475 F.2d 469, 471 (8th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835, 94 S.Ct. 178, 38 L.Ed.2d 70 (1973)(citizen's right to travel is subordinate to the Congressional right to regulate interstate commerce when the travel involves use of interstate facility for illicit purpose). In the instant case, the right respondents seek to vindicate and allegedly protect from improper State intrusion has already been curtailed by federal enactment under Congressional Commerce Clause authority, a federal enactment unchallenged on any ground by respondents here. [30] ś 42 Section 2156(h) of the federal law expressly provides: [t]he provisions of this chapter shall not supersede or otherwise invalidate any such State, local, or municipal legislation or ordinance relating to animal fighting ventures except in case of a direct and irreconcilable conflict between any requirements thereunder and this chapter or any rule, regulation, or standard hereunder. Although respondents have not raised any conflict between the Oklahoma Act and § 2156, we perceive of no conflict. In fact, the two regulatory regimes appear to be congruent and harmonious: in the case of the federal law, denying the channels of interstate and foreign commerce for use in animal (including bird) fighting ventures; in the case of Oklahoma's Act, outlawing human involvement in bird fighting and related activities in the State. In essence, in view of the terms of § 2156, to uphold respondents' claim of unconstitutionality of the Oklahoma Act would mean nothing less than a holding there is a right to travel interstate and/or internationally, when such travel would be in violation of federal law and for an illicit purpose. There is no protected right to travel for an illicit purpose and there is no protected right to travel in violation of a federal law passed under authority of the Commerce Clause. Thus, we hold § 1692.5 does not unconstitutionally impinge upon the right to travel as argued by respondents. [31] PART VIII. THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF OKLA.CONST. ART. 5, § 57. ś 43 OKLA.CONST. art. 5, § 57 provides in relevant part, [e]very act of the Legislature shall embrace but one subject, which shall be clearly expressed in its title.... Section 57 applies to legislative acts promulgated by the people through the initiative process, as well as to those passed by the Legislature. In re Initiative Petition No. 347 State Question No. 639, 1991 OK 55, 813 P.2d 1019, 1026-1027. The purposes behind § 57 are essentially two-fold, 1) to insure that individual legislators and people are put on notice as to the effect of the legislation ( id., 813 P.2d at 1027) and 2) that... a single subject be included in a legislative bill ... to make impossible by log-rolling devices the enactment of unpopular legislation by including it with popular legislation on an entirely different subject. Johnson v. Walters, 1991 OK 107, 819 P.2d 694, 697, quoting Bond v. Phelps, 1948 OK 76, 191 P.2d 938, 950. ś 44 Section 57's purposes then are to forestall two abuses of the legislative process: 1) guarding against the enactment of legislation by surreptitious means (accomplished by having the title clearly express the subject of a proposed law) and 2) prevention of log-rolling. See Johnson v. Walters, 819 P.2d at 707 and n. 2 (Lavender, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). It is not constitutionally required, however, that the title contain a complete index of all details in the act. In re Initiative Petition No. 347 State Question No. 639, 813 P.2d at 1027. It is sufficient that matters in the act's text are germane to the title and that the title call attention to the general subject matter of the act. Id. The prevention of fraudulent and surreptitious legislation is the goal without unreasonably calling into question or annulling valid legislation. Id. Further, legislation containing provisions which are germane, relative and cognate to one another are sufficient to meet the unity-of-subject requirement. See Campbell v. White, 1993 OK 89, 856 P.2d 255, 260; see also Rupe v. Shaw, 1955 OK 223, 286 P.2d 1094, 1098-1101 (legislation is not multi-subject merely because it contains many details as long as the details are incidental to accomplishing the general object of the enactment). ś 45 Respondents argue the Act contains more than one subject and that its provisions were not clearly expressed in the title voted on by the electorate. The arguments are without merit. The Act is unequivocally concerned with one subject and it is a unified, germane whole, having as its central purpose the prevention of cruelty to birds by outlawing cockfighting and related activities and providing, after a criminal conviction, for the forfeiture of birds or equipment used in any cockfighting endeavor. It also criminalizes being a knowing spectator at a cockfighting event. The ballot title of the Act as submitted to and voted on by the people follows: This measure adds a new section to Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes. The measure makes cockfighting illegal. It defines cockfight or cockfighting as: 1. A fight between birds. 2. Whether or not fitted with spurs, knives, or gaffs. 3. Whether or not bets or wagers are made on the outcome of the fight. The definition includes training fights. The measure defines equipment used for training or handling a fighting bird. Under the measure: 1. It is a felony to instigate or encourage cockfighting. 2. It is a felony to keep places, equipment or facilities for cockfighting. 3. It is a felony to aid or assist in cockfighting. 4. It is a felony to own, possess, keep or train birds for cockfighting. Under the proposal it is a misdemeanor to knowingly be a spectator at a cockfight. The measure provides for the forfeiture of birds and equipment use[d] in cockfighting. ś 46 As we read the title in conjunction with the Act, it is plain the above language submitted to the voters quite clearly spelled out the general subject of the Act and put the people on notice of the Act's provisions. Also, although the Act itself is somewhat detailed, all of its provisions are germane to its central purpose, i.e., prohibiting cockfighting and related conduct associated with this type of animal fighting. Notwithstanding respondents' arguments to the contrary, we conclude the ballot title adequately described the proposed legislation that was voted on and that the Act covers but one subject. No violation of OKLA.CONST. art. 5, § 57 has been shown. [32] PART IX. RESPONDENTS' VAGUENESS AND OVERBREADTH CHALLENGES ARE WITHOUT MERIT.