Opinion ID: 1305010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Law in Cases of Juror Misconduct

Text: Orkin first argues that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard of law by applying a general standard of fundamental fairness rather than the more specific standard of actual prejudice. [1] Although considerations of fundamental fairness are relevant to analyses of jury misconduct, we agree that the court of appeals failed to grant due deference to the trial judge's factual finding that Holy Cross did not suffer actual prejudice. This Court has, in the past, used the language of fundamental fairness to describe the constitutional implications of juror misconduct. See Shumpert v. State, 378 S.C. 62, 661 S.E.2d 369 (2008) (holding that juror testimony involving internal misconduct may be received only when necessary to ensure fundamental fairness); State v. Aldret, 333 S.C. 307, 509 S.E.2d 811 (1999) (holding that premature jury deliberations involve a matter of fundamental fairness.). However, not all juror misconduct impinges upon the fundamental fairness of a trial: A defeated party is not entitled to a new trial for every act of misconduct by or affecting the jury, as such misconduct. . . does not ipso facto justify the grant of a new trial; but in order that a new trial may be granted on such ground the misconduct of the jury must relate to a material matter in dispute and must be such as to indicate an influence of bias or prejudice in the minds of the jurors. C.J.S. New Trial § 54 (1998). See also State v. Grovenstein, 335 S.C. 347, 352, 517 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1999) (holding that misconduct does not entitle a party to mistrial unless it affects the verdict). The court of appeals was thus entirely correct to discuss fundamental fairness in the context of jury misconduct. The court erred, however, by invoking the premise of fundamental fairnessin the face of the trial judge's determination that there was no evidence of actual prejudiceto support its conclusion that Abrams' misconduct was so egregious as to ipso facto justify the grant of a new trial. The majority's error is most evident from this passage: Although [Abrams] may not have learned anything from her visit to the site that she did not already know and her report to the other jurors of her actions may not have had any impact on them, [her] attempt to conduct an unsanctioned investigation into the facts of this case, when viewed with her other acts and comments, shows a juror unconcerned about granting Holy Cross the fair and impartial trial to which it was entitled. 373 S.C. at 207, 644 S.E.2d at 737. The dissent correctly observed that the majority placed too much emphasis on the nature of Abrams' undoubtedly improper conduct and neglected the determinative question of whether this conduct deprived Holy Cross of a fair trial. Id. Indeed, in order to receive a mistrial, Holy Cross bore the burden of showing that Abrams' conduct deprived it of a fair and impartial trial, not merely that Abrams was unconcerned about granting it a fair and impartial trial. The trial judge conducted an extensive inquiry and concluded that, although improper, Abrams' misconduct did not actually influence the jury's verdict. To the extent that the majority of the court of appeals reversed this determination because Abrams' lack of concern for her role as an impartial juror violated fundamental fairness, it was in error.