Opinion ID: 2214297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Community Caretaker Function Exercised in a Residence

Text: ¶ 13 The federal and state constitutions do not protect against all searches and seizures, but only unreasonable searches and seizures. Arias, 311 Wis.2d 358, ¶ 25, 752 N.W.2d 748 (citing U.S. Const. amend. IV; [4] Wis. Const. art. I, § 11). [5] The ultimate standard set forth in the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973). Subject to a few well-delineated exceptions, warrantless searches are deemed per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Faust, 2004 WI 99, ¶ 11, 274 Wis.2d 183, 682 N.W.2d 371; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980) (It is a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.) (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 14 The United States Supreme Court and courts of this state have recognized that a police officer serving as a community caretaker to protect persons and property may be constitutionally permitted to perform warrantless searches and seizures. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 448, 93 S.Ct. 2523; State v. Ziedonis, 2005 WI App 249, ¶ 14, 287 Wis.2d 831, 707 N.W.2d 565. Because we interpret the provisions of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Section 11 as equivalent in regard to community caretaker analyses, we look to the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the community caretaker exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. Kramer, 315 Wis.2d 414, ¶ 18, 759 N.W.2d 598. ¶ 15 The community caretaker exception has its origins in Cady. In Cady, Dombrowski's car was disabled on the side of the road as the result of an accident. Cady, 413 U.S. at 443, 93 S.Ct. 2523. Because the officers knew Dombrowski was a Chicago police officer and believed he was required to carry a service revolver at all times, the officers conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands. Id. at 436, 443, 93 S.Ct. 2523. ¶ 16 The Court upheld the warrantless search, concluding that [l]ocal police officers ... frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of criminal liability and engage in ... community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal statute. Id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523. In so concluding, the Court noted that `for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses and cars,' explaining that a warrantless search of a car deemed reasonable may be unreasonable in the context of a search of a home. Id. at 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523 (quoting Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970)). ¶ 17 In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976), an officer conducted a warrantless routine inventory search of an automobile lawfully impounded by police. Id. at 365, 96 S.Ct. 3092. The Court upheld the warrantless inventory search, explaining that the officers were exercising a `community caretaking function[ ]' in the interest of public safety. Id. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 3092 (quoting Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523). The Court explained that it has consistently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or protecting the car and its contents. Id. at 373, 96 S.Ct. 3092. As in Cady, the Court in Opperman relied on the diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles as part of its rationale for permitting the officers' search to secure the car's contents. Id. at 368-69, 96 S.Ct. 3092. ¶ 18 Officers may exercise two types of functions: law enforcement functions and community caretaker functions. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523; see also Kramer, 315 Wis.2d 414, ¶ 32, 759 N.W.2d 598. An officer exercises a community caretaker function when the officer discovers a member of the public who is in need of assistance. Kramer, 315 Wis.2d 414, ¶ 32, 759 N.W.2d 598. ¶ 19 Pinkard's interpretation limits law enforcement's community caretaker function to automobiles. Pinkard argues that Cady and Opperman's emphasis on the distinction between automobile searches and home searches and the heightened expectation of privacy in one's home suggests that a community caretaker function is not sufficient to support a warrantless home intrusion. ¶ 20 First, we note that there is no language in Cady or Opperman that limits an officer's community caretaker functions to incidents involving automobiles. [6] We read Cady not as prohibiting officers from entering a residence without a warrant while exercising a community caretaker function, but instead as counsel[ing] a cautious approach when the exception is invoked to justify law enforcement intrusion into a home. South Dakota v. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d 221, 239 (S.D.2009); see also United States v. Gillespie, 332 F.Supp.2d 923, 929 (W.D.Va.2004) (citing Cady, the court explained that relying on the community caretaker exception to support a warrantless entry into a home is more suspect than when a community caretaker function is involved in the search of an automobile). Although a multitude of activities fall within the community caretaker function, not every intrusion that results from the exercise of a community caretaker function will fall within the community caretaker exception to permit a warrantless entry into a home. Whether a given community caretaker function will pass muster under the Fourth Amendment so as to permit a warrantless home entry depends on whether the community caretaker function was reasonably exercised under the totality of the circumstances of the incident under review. ¶ 21 Second, Wisconsin case law, dating back to our very first discussion of the community caretaker exception to the warrant requirement, supports our conclusion that the community caretaker exception may be applied to residences. In Bies v. State, 76 Wis.2d 457, 251 N.W.2d 461 (1977), our first discussion of the community caretaker exception, a police officer received a radio message directing him to investigate a noise complaint near Bies' garage. Id. at 461, 251 N.W.2d 461. The officer walked around the garage and saw in plain view through the open rear doorway what he believed was stolen telephone cable. Without permission or a warrant, the officer seized the cable from inside the garage. Id. at 461-62, 251 N.W.2d 461. We noted that Bies' garage was located on the curtilage of his dwelling, and it was not in any sense a semi-public area and, therefore, was within the Fourth Amendment's protection. Id. at 462, 251 N.W.2d 461. In concluding that the officers' observation and seizure of the cable from Bies' garage were constitutionally permissible because the officer was exercising a bona fide community caretaker function, id. at 474, 251 N.W.2d 461, we explained that: Checking noise complaints bears little in common with investigation of crime. As a general matter it is probably more a part of the community caretaker function of the police.... The officer was clearly justified in proceeding to the alley in question and conducting a general surveillance of the area to determine whether some noise or other disturbance was present. Id. at 471, 251 N.W.2d 461. ¶ 22 While Bies did not explicitly state that a bona fide community caretaker function may support a warrantless home entry, it necessarily implies such an interpretation. This is so because Bies involved an officer's warrantless entry of the curtilage of the defendant's residence, id. at 462, 251 N.W.2d 461, which is actually `considered part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes,' State v. Martwick, 2000 WI 5, ¶ 26, 231 Wis.2d 801, 604 N.W.2d 552 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984)). [7] It is well-settled that [t]he protection provided by the Fourth Amendment to a home also extends to the curtilage of a residence. Id. (citing Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180, 104 S.Ct. 1735). ¶ 23 In State v. Horngren, 2000 WI App 177, 238 Wis.2d 347, 617 N.W.2d 508, the court of appeals applied a community caretaker analysis to Horngren's motion to suppress evidence obtained in a warrantless entry of his home. Id., ¶ 7. The police were dispatched to Horngren's apartment based on a reported suicide threat. Id., ¶ 11. The court of appeals determined that police response based on their concern for the safety of an individual threatening suicide was a bona fide community caretaker function, reasonably undertaken. Id., ¶ 14. ¶ 24 In State v. Ferguson (Shane Ferguson), 2001 WI App 102, 244 Wis.2d 17, 629 N.W.2d 788, the court of appeals again applied a community caretaker analysis to the search of a residence. A 911 call that reported a fight at Ferguson's residence brought the police to the scene. Id., ¶ 2. Upon their arrival, they encountered a teenage woman who was highly intoxicated. Id. The young woman unlocked her apartment and the police followed her inside where they observed two other teenagers who were also intoxicated. Id., ¶¶ 3-4. They also saw several empty gallon containers for hard liquor and empty beer bottles, from which they surmised that the underage occupants had consumed a significant amount of alcohol. Id., ¶ 4. During their review of the apartment, the police came upon a locked bedroom door. Id., ¶ 5. They called out repeatedly, but received no response. Id. Based on their concern that someone inside may need assistance, they jimmied the lock and found Ferguson and marijuana plants. Id. ¶ 25 In applying the community caretaker analysis, the court of appeals explained that police presence at Ferguson's apartment was occasioned by a 911 call to report a fight, and that while at his apartment, they encountered underage drinking, which is not a crime. Id., ¶ 13. Their concern in entering Ferguson's bedroom was that an underage person may have passed out inside and was in need of assistance. Id., ¶ 14. In concluding that the community caretaker function had been reasonably undertaken, the court of appeals balanced the public interest in providing assistance with Ferguson's interest in preventing the intrusion given the facts and circumstances presented. Id., ¶ 20. ¶ 26 As the above examples show, where the community caretaker function has been held to have supported a warrantless home entry, Wisconsin courts have carefully examined the expressed concern for which the community caretaker function was undertaken to determine if it was bona fide. Id., ¶ 14; Horngren, 238 Wis.2d 347, ¶ 11, 617 N.W.2d 508. Then, the courts balanced the public interest in acting on the stated concern with the Fourth Amendment right to preclude unreasonable searches or seizures in one's home. See Shane Ferguson, 244 Wis.2d 17, ¶ 20, 629 N.W.2d 788; Horngren, 238 Wis.2d 347, ¶ 14, 617 N.W.2d 508. This analysis is consistent with the approach we took in Bies where entry into the curtilage was made without a warrant. See Bies, 76 Wis.2d at 462, 474, 251 N.W.2d 461. We shall employ a similar analysis of the community caretaker function [8] currently under review. ¶ 27 Furthermore, the analysis of Wisconsin courts is also consistent with the approach taken by courts in other jurisdictions. See Michigan v. Davis, 442 Mich. 1, 497 N.W.2d 910, 919-20 (1993); Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 239. Assisting members of the public in the context of automobiles is only one of many circumstances in which police officers may exercise their community caretaker function. We agree with the Supreme Court of South Dakota's recent statement that homes cannot be arbitrarily isolated from the community caretaking equation. The need to protect and preserve life or avoid serious injury cannot be limited to automobiles. Deneui, 775 N.W.2d at 239.