Opinion ID: 1655515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in failing to allow jones 10 days for consideration of escude's motion to dismiss under m.r.c.p. 56?

Text: ¶ 6. Jones asserts that the trial court committed reversible error in granting summary judgment when she was not given ten (10) days' notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, as contemplated under M.R.C.P. 56(c). While the conversion was proper, the trial court failed to continue the hearing in order to allow Jones the opportunity to present any evidentiary material she felt pertinent to survive the Rule 56 motion. Rule 12(b) provides that, upon the motion being converted to one under Rule 56, all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. Frequently, this will necessitate a continuance of the hearing on the motion. See Hudson v. Parvin, 511 So.2d 499, 500 (Miss.1987). ¶ 7. Where a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is converted into one for summary judgment, we have held that the trial court must give ten days' notice for such a hearing: Whenever a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is converted into a motion for summary judgment, the requirements of Rule 56 become operable. It is important that the court give the parties notice of the changed status of the motion and a reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. ... It is within the judge's discretion to decide whether to consider matters outside the pleadings that are presented to the court. If the judge considers matters outside the pleadings, Rule 12(b) requires that the judge comply with the requirements of Rule 56. Rule 56(c) states, in part, that a motion [for summary judgment] shall be served at least ten days before the time fixed for the hearing. Therefore, the trial court must give the parties ten days notice that it is converting the moving party's motion for summary judgment.... The requirements of Rule 56(c), far from being a mere extension of our liberal procedure exalting substance over form, represents a procedural safeguard to prevent the unjust deprivation of a litigant's constitutional right to a jury trial.... Palmer v. Biloxi Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 649 So.2d 179, 182-84 (Miss.1994) (citations omitted). Accord, City of Gulfport v. Orange Grove Utilities, Inc., 735 So.2d 1041, 1047 (Miss.1999). ¶ 8. The motion to dismiss became a motion for summary judgment when Escude filed documents containing factual assertions outside the pleadings. The problem is Jones did not receive ten days' notice as contemplated by M.R.C.P. 56(c).