Opinion ID: 202936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trust Obligation Claim

Text: The district court also dismissed Plaintiffs' claim of breach of fiduciary duty to the extent that it was a separate cause of action from the Leasing Act claim. [16] Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon, 462 F.Supp.2d at 111 ([A] generalized claim of violation of a fiduciary duty, which is not tethered to any statute or regulation, cannot stand.). On appeal, Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred because the Indian Leasing Act is a codification of the trust duty, citing Brown v. United States for the proposition that `[t]he scope and extent of the fiduciary relationship . . . is established by the regulation[s]' that control this type of leasing . . . [and] `define the contours of the United States' fiduciary responsibilities.' 86 F.3d 1554, 1563 (Fed.Cir.1996) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Pawnee v. United States, 830 F.2d 187, 192 (Fed.Cir.1987), and United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 224, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 77 L.Ed.2d 580 (1983)). Although the district court and the parties addressed this issue in their discussions on standing, we construe the court's dismissal as one for failure to state a claim, and accordingly review de novo. See Palmer v. Champion Mortgage, 465 F.3d 24, 27 (1st Cir.2006). We agree with the district court that Plaintiffs' Trust Obligation claim cannot stand alone. Despite Plaintiffs' vague assertions to the contrary, we can find no law in support of an enforceable fiduciary duty owed by the federal government to Plaintiffs qua individuals who are not landowners. As Plaintiffs acknowledge, the general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people is insufficient to establish specific fiduciary duties. United States v. Navajo Nation, 537 U.S. 488, 506, 123 S.Ct. 1079, 155 L.Ed.2d 60 (2003). Substantive statutes and regulations must expressly create a fiduciary relationship that gives rise to defined obligations. See id.; United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465, 474, 123 S.Ct. 1126, 155 L.Ed.2d 40 (2003). Brown found a fiduciary relationship between the government and Indian land owners who could lease their lands only subject to the Secretary's approval under the Long-Term Leasing Act precisely because the Secretary was acting in part to protect the land owners' financial interests, a traditional fiduciary capacity. Id. at 1562-63. In other cases finding enforceable fiduciary duties, too, the government had extensive management control over Indian-owned resources, and the duties arising from the government's fiduciary responsibilities were owed to the owners of the resources being managed. Compare Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 224, 103 S.Ct. 2961 (finding fiduciary relationship between government and Indian allottees where Secretary had full responsibility to manage Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians); Pawnee, 830 F.2d at 190 ([T]he United States has a general fiduciary obligation toward the Indians [who own the oil and gas leases in question] with respect to the management of those oil and gas leases.), with United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I), 445 U.S. 535, 542, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980) (finding no fiduciary duty to Indian allottees where [t]he Act [in question] does not unambiguously provide that the United States has undertaken full fiduciary responsibilities as to the management of allotted lands). Here, Plaintiffs are not land owners and the BIA does not manage their interests in a fiduciary capacity. While Plaintiffs have standing to complain of the BIA's failure to comply with federal law because they fall within the zone of interests protected by the Leasing Act, they cannot claim a specific trust relationship created by the Secretary's general obligation to consider their interests before approving a lease. See Brown, 86 F.3d at 1562 ([T]he statutory criteria that constrain the Secretary's exercise of his or her approval power are . . . in the nature of zoning, safety, or environmental concerns, which are the traditional general welfare concerns of government when acting in a non-fiduciary capacity. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although Plaintiffs have no fiduciary duty claim, their Leasing Act claim generally encompasses the same allegations, and the dismissal of the separate Trust Obligation claim in no way impairs their claimed right to the relief requested. The district court should therefore treat their references to the Trust Obligation as commensurate with the Leasing Act, which, as Plaintiffs explain, derives from the general trust obligation assumed by the federal government toward the Indian people. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974) (Literally every piece of legislation dealing with Indian tribes and reservations, and certainly all legislation dealing with the BIA, [are] derived from historical relationships and explicitly designed to help only Indians.); see also Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97, 62 S.Ct. 1049, 86 L.Ed. 1480 (1942) (Under a humane and self imposed policy which has found expression in many acts of Congress and numerous decisions of this Court, [the government] has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. (footnote omitted)). To the extent that the Trust Obligation claim is one and the same as the Leasing Act claim, Plaintiffs have established standing for the same reasons.