Opinion ID: 624266
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under The FTCA

Text: The FTCA provides a limited sovereign immunity waiver and subject matter jurisdiction for plaintiffs to pursue state law tort claims against the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The FTCA waives sovereign immunity where state law would impose liability against a private individual, Myers v. United States, 17 F.3d 890, 894 (6th Cir.1994), and the suit proceeds against the federal government in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2674; see Young v. United States, 71 F.3d 1238, 1241 (6th Cir.1995). The extent of governmental tort liability is determined in accordance with the law of the state where the event giving rise to liability occurred. Young, 71 F.3d at 1242. The FTCA, as a limited grant of jurisdiction, excludes certain tort claims from its sovereign immunity waiver. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Because the FTCA is a jurisdictional statute, [i]f a case falls within the statutory exceptions of 28 U.S.C. § 2680, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the case must be dismissed. Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222, 1225 (6th Cir.1984). The United States can be sued only to the extent that it has waived its sovereign immunity, so due regard must be given to the exceptions. . . . United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 814, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). Two of these exceptions, the discretionary function exception, § 2680(a), and the intentional tort exception, § 2680(h), are at issue in this case. The Milligans assert that the district court erroneously analyzed these two exceptions in granting the United States's motion to dismiss. This Court reviews the district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss de novo. Golden v. Gorno Bros., Inc., 410 F.3d 879, 881 (6th Cir.2005).
The discretionary function exception insulates the government from tort liability for claims arising from a federal actor's exercise . . . [of] a discretionary function or duty. . . . 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The district court found the discretionary function exception to bar the Milligans' tort claim and, on this basis, granted the United States's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Milligans, contending the district court erred, maintain that Metro's tortious conduct was not discretionary conduct that falls within the scope of § 2680(a). To determine whether allegedly tortious conduct falls within the discretionary function exception, this Court applies the Supreme Court's two-pronged Gaubert test. Rosebush v. United States, 119 F.3d 438, 441 (6th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991)). The first prong requires this Court to determine whether the challenged actions were discretionary, or whether they were instead controlled by mandatory statutes or regulations. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 328, 111 S.Ct. 1267. The focus of this inquiry is on whether the actor had any element of judgment or choice in taking his course of action. Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 441. The requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow, because the employee had no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the actions were made under a mandatory regulation or policy, leaving the actor no judgment or choice in his course of action, then § 2680(a) presents no obstacle to a claim under the FTCA. See Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267; Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 441. If, instead, discretionary conduct is involved, then this Court applies the second prong and inquires whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267 (quoting Berkovitz by Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988)). This second prong seeks to prevent judicial `second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. Id. at 323, 111 S.Ct. 1267. The crucial first step in deciding whether the conduct was discretionary is to determine exactly what conduct is at issue, Rosebush, 119 F.3d at 441, and identify which specific policies or regulations the plaintiff alleges were violated. The Milligans take issue with Metro's efforts to investigate and execute the Milligan/Staps warrant. They contend that Metro's warrant execution efforts did not involve discretionary acts, as Metro's Standard Operating Procedures (Procedures) created mandatory policies which were not followed during the Operation. Metro's Procedures state that [c]opies of warrants will be used to attempt service, and the Milligans interpret this procedure to require officers to have a copy of the arrest warrant in hand during every warrant execution. The Milligans read this section of the Procedures as a mandatory procedure, leaving the officers without the discretion to choose not to follow it. The Milligans' reading of this procedure is a misguided characterization of Metro's procedure and takes it out of context. The section immediately following the relevant provision demands that all original warrants remain in the warrants office and delineates the procedure for removal of an original warrant. When the procedure requiring that [c]opies of warrants will be used to attempt service is read in conjunction with this subsequent section, the procedure is more aptly construed as forbidding officers from using an original warrant during a warrant execution, and not as an affirmative requirement that officers have a warrant in hand during all arrests. Reading the procedure as a prohibition against using original warrants is also the most practical interpretation. A police department procedure forbidding arrests made without a physically present arrest warrant is implausible. This procedure would force officers to carry copies of all the outstanding warrants just in case the officer encounters a fugitive and it would hamper the police's ability to make legitimate arrests. As properly interpreted, this procedure does not create a mandatory requirement that Metro officers failed to follow, and so the Milligans cannot rely on it to preclude application of the discretionary function exception. The Milligans do not point to any other federal statutes, regulations, or policies that prohibit or prescribe officer conduct during the investigation and execution of a warrant. Therefore, Metro's actions during the execution of the arrest warrant were discretionary under the first prong of the Gaubert analysis. Finding Metro's actions discretionary, we next inquire, whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267. This step requires us to determine whether discretionary decisions made during police investigations and warrant execution are within the scope of conduct the discretionary function exception is intended to protect. In Mesa v. United States, the Eleventh Circuit addressed this particular issue in a case also involving an arrest based on mistaken identity. 123 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir.1997). Similar to Milligan's case, in Mesa federal agents executed an arrest warrant for Pedro Pablo Mesa, and because the plaintiff and suspect share the same name, mistakenly arrested the plaintiff rather than the intended suspect. Id. at 1437. The plaintiff filed suit under the FTCA, alleging that the federal agents failed to properly ascertain the identity of the inhabitants of the Mesa residence prior to service of the arrest warrant. Id. at 1438. Finding that the decisions regarding how to locate and identify the subject of an arrest warrant and regarding whether the person apprehended is in fact the person named in the warrant are discretionary in nature, the court analyzed the policy considerations behind police investigation and warrant execution. Id. The court noted that police investigations often involve difficult considerations such as the desire to keep the investigation secret, allocation of police resources, and the urgency of criminal investigations. Id. The court further concluded: [T]he decision regarding how to locate and identify the subject of an arrest warrant is fundamentally rooted in policy considerations, and that judicial second-guessing of this decision thus is not appropriate. . . . [Therefore,] the investigation of the whereabouts and identity of the subject of an arrest warrant . . . is conduct that falls within the discretionary function exception. Id. The Mesa court further concluded that the process of determining whether the person apprehended is actually the person named in the arrest warrant is grounded in considerations of public policy. Id. When faced with verifying the arrestee's identity, police must consider the potential danger to public safety of letting the suspect go as well as the possibility that the suspect will destroy evidence or flee. Id. All of these considerations are rooted in policy considerations. Accordingly, we conclude that the discretionary function exception applies to the process of determining whether the person apprehended is actually the person named in the arrest warrant. Id. We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that the process of verifying whether the apprehended person is actually the suspect named in the warrant is grounded in considerations of public policy, id., and that these policy considerations are of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322-23, 111 S.Ct. 1267. As Metro's conduct in investigating and apprehending Milligan was discretionary conduct that § 2680(a) intended to protect, under the Gaubert test, it is evident that the discretionary function exception bars subject matter jurisdiction for the Milligans' claims.
The intentional tort exception insulates the government from intentional tort liability. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). However, there is an exception to this exception. If a federal law enforcement or investigative officer engages in assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution, sovereign immunity is waived and courts have subject matter jurisdiction under the FTCA. [2] Id. The district court determined that the federal law enforcement carve out to the intentional tort exception did not provide subject matter jurisdiction to the Milligans' claims because Metro's actions were not intentional torts. In determining whether the plaintiff's claim falls within the law enforcement exception to the intentional tort exception, we must look to the substance of the claim and not limit our review to how the plaintiff pleaded the cause of action. See Satterfield v. United States, 788 F.2d 395, 399-400 (6th Cir.1986); cf. Jackson v. United States, 24 F.Supp.2d 823, 831 (W.D.Tenn.1998). A plaintiff may not use semantics to recast the substance of the claim so as to avoid a statutory exception. See Satterfield, 788 F.2d at 399-400. In Satterfield, the plaintiff framed an intentional assault and battery claim as a wrongful death cause of action, attempting to sidestep the § 2680(h) jurisdictional bar to intentional tort lawsuits against non-law enforcement and investigative federal officers. Id. The court viewed the [p]laintiff's wrongful death claim predicated on a negligence theory [as] merely obsfucat[ing] the fact that it really was an assault and battery claim. Id. at 399. The court refused to permit the plaintiff's mischaracterization to dictate the boundaries of sovereign immunity. Id. at 399-400. (Respondent cannot avoid the reach of § 2680(h) by framing her complaint in terms of negligen[ce]. . . . Because plaintiff's complaint set forth an intentional tort claim merely sounding in negligence, such claim falls within the exception embodied in § 2680(h). . . .); see also Reed v. U.S. Postal Service, 288 Fed.Appx. 638, 640 (11th Cir.2008) ([A] plaintiff cannot avoid the § 2680(h) exclusions by recasting a complaint in terms of a negligent failure to prevent assault or battery. . . . It is the substance of the claim and not the language used in stating it which controls.); Lambertson v. United States, 528 F.2d 441, 443 (2d Cir.1976) (In determining the applicability of the [§ ] 2680(h) exception, a court must look, not to the theory upon which the plaintiff elects to proceed, but rather to the substance of the claim which he asserts.). This same logic applies in the opposite direction to a plaintiff's attempt to recast a negligence tort as an intentional tort to take advantage of the law enforcement exception to § 2680(h). Yet, the Milligans attempt precisely this move by cloaking what is fundamentally a negligence suit in intentional tort suit language. Even though the Milligans frame their lawsuit as an intentional false arrest claim, they fail to provide even a shred of evidence suggesting law enforcement officers' intent to falsely arrest Milligan. The facts demonstrate that Milligan's arrest was the product of three negligent acts committed by separate law enforcement actors. First, the Warrants Division clerk entered the warrant using the automatic fill-in option and, by not cross-referencing the identifying information, mistakenly tied Milligan to the warrant. Second, Metro sent this data to the Marshals without removing the out-of-state addresses, and this list was forwarded to the Bureau to prepare arrest files. Third, immediately prior to Milligan's arrest, another Warrants Division clerk erroneously verified the warrant's validity without actually inspecting it. At any point, a closer inspection of the warrant may have alerted authorities to their mistakes, preventing Milligan's arrest; however, this failure to use reasonable care may give rise to an action in negligence, not in intentional tort. The Milligans may not seek the § 2680(h) safe harbor by recasting law enforcement's negligent acts as an intentional tort. As the law enforcement exception § 2680(h) provides no basis for the Milligans' negligence suit against federal officers, the district court properly granted the United States's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.