Opinion ID: 788549
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tolling for Attorney Incompetence

Text: 93 Doe next argues that the limitations period should be tolled between February 1999 and February 2000 because Patrick Wall, the attorney who represented him during that time period, incompetently failed to file Doe's state post-conviction motion. 25 The district court dismissed this argument in its February 2002 order, finding that Wall's alleged incompetence did not rise to the level of extraordinary circumstances necessary to invoke equitable tolling, see Smaldone v. Senkowski, 273 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.2001). The court also found that Doe did not exercise reasonable diligence during this period, because he should have realized that Wall was incapable of filing the petition at least ten months before he finally fired him and hired new counsel. We declined to review these conclusions in Doe I, and Doe now argues that Baldayaque v. United States, 338 F.3d 145 (2d Cir.2003), which clarified that egregious misconduct on the part of an attorney can, in some circumstances, be sufficiently extraordinary to toll the limitations period, dictates that Wall's conduct is sufficient to entitle Doe to tolling. We need not reach this argument, however, because Doe has not established that he acted with reasonable diligence in attempting to file his federal habeas petition during the period that he seeks to toll. 94 In order to equitably toll AEDPA's limitations period, a petitioner must show that extraordinary circumstances prevented him from filing his petition on time. Smith v. McGinnis, 208 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.2000). This formulation requires the petitioner to demonstrate a causal relationship between the extraordinary circumstances ... and the lateness of his filing. Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 133 (2d Cir.2000). As one component of the causation showing, the petitioner must establish that he diligently pursued his application during the time that he seeks to have tolled. See id. at 134. If the petitioner is unable to establish that he diligently attempted to file his petition, the extraordinary circumstances on which his tolling claim is based cannot be said to have caused the lateness of his petition. See Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir.2001). 95 Even where the extraordinary circumstances on which the petitioner rests his claim involve attorney incompetence, the petitioner must still demonstrate that he himself made reasonably diligent attempts to ensure that his petition was filed on time. See Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 153. In other words, the act of retaining an attorney does not absolve the petitioner of his responsibility for overseeing the attorney's conduct or the preparation of the petition. Particularly because petitioners often are fully capable of preparing and filing their habeas petitions pro se, and pro se status does not in itself constitute an extraordinary circumstance meriting tolling, see Smith, 208 F.3d at 18, it would be inequitable to require less diligence from petitioners who are able to hire attorneys than from those who are forced to proceed pro se. In the attorney incompetence context, therefore, the reasonable diligence inquiry focuses on the purpose for which the petitioner retained the lawyer, his ability to evaluate the lawyer's performance, his financial and logistical ability to consult other lawyers or obtain new representation, and his ability to comprehend legal materials and file the petition on his own. See Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 153 (listing factors relevant to reasonable diligence that district court should consider on remand). 96 The district court issued its decision with respect to the attorney incompetence issue before Baldayaque was decided, and therefore did not have the opportunity to consider the egregiousness of Wall's conduct in light of Baldayaque 's holding that at some point, an attorney's behavior may be so outrageous or so incompetent as to render it extraordinary, id. at 152. The court ruled not only that Wall's conduct was not sufficiently outrageous, but also that Doe was not reasonably diligent. In so doing, the district court nevertheless considered the factors that Baldayaque establishes as relevant to the reasonable diligence determination. After determining that Doe should have been aware of Wall's incompetence as early as April 1999, had both the financial wherewithal to hire another lawyer and his brother's logistical assistance, and could have filed pro se at any point, the court concluded that [t]he facts submitted, viewed most favorably to Petitioner, do not suggest a finding of ... prevention by ... misconduct which is at the core of most equitable tolling cases. In light of the district court's consideration of the Baldayaque factors, as well as Doe's opportunity to present evidence of his asserted diligence both in his initial submissions to the district court and during the hearing on remand, 26 we find no need to remand to the district court once again to consider Doe's claim in light of Baldayaque. Rather, we find that as a matter of law, Doe cannot establish that he acted with reasonable diligence during the period in which he was represented by Wall. 97 An examination of the circumstances under which Doe hired Wall, the scope of the representation, Doe's instructions to Wall, and Doe's capability of filing his habeas petition himself, indicates that Doe did not exercise reasonable diligence. The district court found, and the record supports, that Doe became interested in collaterally challenging his conviction shortly after he was arrested on federal child pornography charges in November 1998, when he realized that his second-degree sodomy conviction would mandate a significantly higher sentencing range under the federal Sentencing Guidelines and the relevant child pornography statute. To this end, Doe hired Patrick Wall for the stated purposes of filing a state post-conviction motion pursuant to New York Penal Law § 440.10, and representing Doe with respect to any sentencing issues that might arise in connection with the federal charges. 27 98 The evidence demonstrates that the scope of Wall's representation was limited to vacating the sodomy conviction for the purpose of favorably impacting Doe's federal sentencing. After Doe pled guilty to the federal charges on April 9, 1999, his sentencing was initially scheduled for January 7, 2000. Although the AEDPA limitations period was to expire in November 1999, Doe and Wall treated their operative deadline for filing the § 440 motion as January 2000, as Wall promised to have the motion prepared by New Years' Day 2000. The November 19 expiration of the statute of limitations came and went without notice, apparently, as Doe and his brother made a payment of $10,000 in legal fees to Wall around December 15, 1999. Moreover, Doe's account of his conversations with Wall demonstrates that Doe was concerned only with his sentencing. Wall assured Doe that he would file the § 440 motion well before the sentencing, but neither mentioned the approaching November 19 AEDPA deadline. Even more tellingly, Doe testified that he understood Wall's desire to postpone filing the § 440 motion until they received the federal pre-sentence report as based at least in part on the assumption that if the pre-sentence report did not award criminal history points for the sodomy conviction, it would not be worth filing the § 440 motion at all. The fact that Doe understood this to be Wall's thinking on the issue, and did not correct him or ask him to file the § 440 motion regardless of Doe's federal sentencing outlook, indicates that Doe himself was concerned only about his sentencing, and Wall acted accordingly. 99 Thus, although Wall might have accomplished the filing of the § 440 motion in time to toll the AEDPA limitations period if not for his alleged incompetence, it cannot be said that Wall's incompetence prevented Doe from filing a federal petition or filing the § 440 motion before November 19. Wall was not retained for the purpose of filing a federal habeas petition or exhausting Doe's claims in preparation for the federal petition, and apparently was not instructed to preserve Doe's federal habeas rights. Rather, Doe's focus on his federal sentencing and the goal of avoiding heightened sentencing exposure led him to overlook the expiration of the AEDPA statute of limitations, and to define the scope of his agent's duties accordingly. Given that we expect pro se petitioners to know when the limitations period expires and to understand the need to file a state post-conviction motion within that limitations period, see Smith, 208 F.3d at 18, such inadvertence on Doe's part cannot constitute reasonable diligence. 28 100 Moreover, although Doe testified that in April 1999 he asked Wall to file the § 440 motion as soon as possible, Doe did nothing even as it should have become evident that Wall was not actually working on the motion. During the spring of 1999, Doe, a self-professed lay student of the law, repeatedly asked Wall why it was necessary to wait for the federal pre-sentence report before filing the § 440 motion, but Wall refused to answer him. Given Doe's extensive experience with legal representation and the legal system, this unresponsiveness in the face of a client's questioning should have been ample evidence of Wall's dereliction. Even earlier, however, there were indications that Wall was not actually maintaining a viable law practice, as Wall asked Doe to wire the retainer fee to his wife's bank account, had no proper office, and repeatedly remained unreachable for extended periods of time. Although Doe states that he had no way of knowing about the deterioration of Wall's practice because he was incarcerated, Doe's brother was in constant contact with Wall, and was fully capable of evaluating the status of Wall's practice for himself. 101 Had Doe been concerned with meeting the AEDPA deadline, he would have realized earlier that Wall's unresponsiveness was jeopardizing his ability to file the § 440 motion in time to toll the AEDPA limitations period. Doe then would have had a number of choices as to how to proceed. See Villanueva v. United States, 346 F.3d 55, 63 (2d Cir.2003) (rejecting petitioner's claim that he detrimentally relied on a potential attorney, where petitioner was aware of the AEDPA deadline and capable of taking other steps to meet it). He could have filed a federal habeas petition or the § 440 motion pro se at any point during the summer and fall of 1999. As discussed below, the purported inadequacies in the federal prison library should not have prevented Doe from so doing. Doe was obviously fully capable of acting pro se, as his personal submissions to the court are well-written, articulate, and clearly the product of someone both fluent in English and highly educated. Doe's testimony in this and other proceedings evidences his legal sophistication, and there is no reason that he could not have harnessed his legal abilities and experience in filing a challenge to his conviction. Alternatively, Doe could have hired another lawyer, as he proved he was capable of doing in February 2000. Doe was at the time represented in connection with the federal charges by Murray Richman, who could have helped him obtain another lawyer, and Doe's brother was clearly willing and able to provide assistance as well. 102 Doe's exclusive focus on obtaining the most favorable federal sentence possible, and his consequent inattention to the AEDPA deadline and Wall's incompetence, compel the conclusion that he failed to act with reasonable diligence. It is important to note, however, that because the standard is reasonable diligence, the amount of diligence required necessarily varies according to the petitioner's abilities and circumstances. See Baldayaque, 338 F.3d at 153 (noting that reasonable diligence is considered in light of the petitioner's circumstances). Despite his incarceration, Doe was in a privileged position relative to most habeas petitioners, as he possessed the education, skills, and financial and logistical ability capably to evaluate his lawyer's performance and act to remedy any problems. In contrast, many prisoners may be forced to rely on incompetent lawyers because their lack of English skills, education, funds, or familiarity with the legal system, as well as their inability to obtain access to other lawyers or sources of assistance, leaves them unable to evaluate their lawyer's performance or hire new counsel. Despite these advantages, Doe did not demonstrate any desire to file the § 440 motion before the AEDPA deadline, did not instruct Wall to preserve his habeas rights, and failed to fire Wall after it became clear that his performance was incompetent. 103 This failure is inexcusable in light of Doe's abilities, and renders his situation distinguishable from that at issue in Baldayaque. There, we found that a remand was warranted to allow the district court to consider whether petitioner had exercised reasonable diligence, on the basis of ample evidence suggesting that Baldayaque had no choice but to rely on his attorney. The evidence indicated that Baldayaque had hired his attorney specifically to file his § 2255 motion, and he and his wife spoke little or no English, had little education, and were incapable of raising the funds necessary to retain another lawyer. See id. (suggesting that Baldayaque's difficulties might lead to a finding of reasonable diligence). Although we do not suggest that a petitioner's situation must be as extreme as Baldayaque's in order to demonstrate reasonable diligence, we also do not hold that all petitioners alleging attorney incompetence should be held to the qualitative standard of reasonable diligence to which we hold Doe. 104