Opinion ID: 608088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Appropriate Jurisdictional Standard to Brow's Petitions

Text: 36 To the extent that Brow brings a mandamus action, we agree that the District Court was correct in dismissing his petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but we disagree with the District Court's rationale on two principal grounds. First, the District Court partially relied on 4 V.I.Code § 32(a) to define the jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands District Court. This reliance was incorrect because, under the present state of the civil jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands courts, as set forth by this court in Part II.A., supra, the current form of 4 V.I.Code § 32(a) is inconsistent with the 1984 amendments to section 1612 of the Revised Organic Act. 6 37 Title 4, section 32, subsection (a) of the Virgin Islands Code provides: 38 Under section [1612] of the Revised Organic Act, approved July 22, 1954, the district court has the original jurisdiction of a district court of the United States in all causes arising under the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States, regardless of the sum or value of the matter in controversy, and has general original jurisdiction in all other causes in the Virgin Islands, where exclusive jurisdiction is not conferred upon the territorial court, as the inferior court of the Territory, by section [1613 ] of the Revised Organic Act. When it is in the interest of justice to do so the district court may on the motion of any party transfer to the district court any action or proceeding brought in the territorial court, and the district court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine such action or proceeding. 39 4 V.I.Code § 32(a) (Supp.1991) (emphasis added). The emphasized portion of section 32(a) is inconsistent with the Revised Organic Act because it confers power upon the District Court to transfer and to hear any action, even in instances when the District Court does not have the jurisdiction to hear it initially. For example, according to 4 V.I.Code § 32(a), the District Court may, in the interests of justice, agree to accept a civil case transferred from the Territorial Court whose amount in controversy is less than $500. Once transferred, the District Court shall have jurisdiction to hear the case, even though the Revised Organic Act specifically vests the Territorial Court with exclusive jurisdiction over such actions pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 1612(b) (1988). This award of jurisdiction to the District Court is therefore contrary to sections 1574 and 1612 of the Revised Organic Act, and Article IV, Section Three of the United States Constitution. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1574(a)-(c), 1612(b) (1988). 7 40 The emphasized portion of section 32(a) is also now obsolete because it confers upon the District Court general original jurisdiction over all local actions, excluding those actions in which section 1613 of the Revised Organic Act vests the Territorial Court with exclusive jurisdiction. This grant of jurisdiction is incompatible with the Revised Organic Act because section 1613 no longer confers jurisdiction upon the Territorial Court. Congress' 1984 amendment of section 1613 of the Revised Organic Act effectively repealed the section referred to in 4 V.I.Code § 32(a) (Supp.1991). As currently enacted, section 1613 governs relations between the courts and provides for appellate review. 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1988). 8 41 Second, the District Court incorrectly interpreted the nature of the relief Brow requests in this mandamus petition. While Brow may have entitled his first action Petition for Writ of Mandamus, if read liberally, we are satisfied that Brow merely seeks enforcement of the Territorial Court's December 22, 1989 judgment. 9 (Appellant's Br. at 3); see Riley v. Jeffes, 777 F.2d 143, 147 (3d Cir.1985) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 595-96, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)) (pro se pleadings are read liberally and are not held to the same stringent standards as pleadings prepared by an attorney). 42 Sections 471-79 of Title 5 of the Virgin Islands Code govern the enforcement of judgments through the issuance of a writ of execution. 5 V.I.Code §§ 471-79 (1967 & Supp.1991). Both the Territorial Court and the District Court command the authority to enforce the judgments issued in their respective courts. 5 V.I.Code § 471 (Supp.1991). The mechanics of this procedure are elementary--the party recovering the judgment brings an enforcement action in the court whose order the party seeks to enforce. See, e.g., 5 V.I.Code app. IV, Rule 51 (1982) (all requests for issuance of writ of execution shall be made in writing to the clerk of the court for the judicial division in which the judgment was entered); see also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 585 (1947) (As a general rule, a party recovering judgment has the right to proceed to enforce it, and the court rendering judgment has inherent power to enforce it and to make such orders and issue such process as may be necessary to make it effective.). 43 In Brow's case, that court is the Territorial Court because it issued the order to retroactively reinstate Brow's wages and benefits. See, e.g., 4 V.I.Code § 77(a) (Supp.1991) (all civil cases originally filed in the Territorial Court shall be tried and concluded in that court). Accordingly, the District Court did not have subject matter jurisdiction to enforce the order issued by the Territorial Court. Therefore, insofar as Brow requested an enforcement of the Territorial Court's order, we agree that the District Court was correct in dismissing the mandamus portion of Brow's action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 10
44 In his Petition for Temporary Restraining Order, Brow attempts to advance a claim for injunctive relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to prevent the Virgin Islands government and its officials from further depriving him of his property without due process of law. (Appellant's Pet. for T.R.O. at pp 12-14.) According to section 1612(a) of the Revised Organic Act, the District Court presently exercises original jurisdiction over civil actions brought pursuant to federal statutes. See supra Part II.A. Therefore, 4 V.I.Code § 76(a) did not divest the District Court of its subject matter jurisdiction to hear Brow's action. 11 45 The dismissal of Brow's petition was ultimately appropriate, however, because neither the Territory of the Virgin Islands nor its officers acting in their official capacities are persons under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Ngiraingas v. Sanchez, 495 U.S. 182, 192, 110 S.Ct. 1737, 1743, 109 L.Ed.2d 163 (1990). Thus, Brow's action for injunctive relief to prevent further violation of his civil rights failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted and was properly dismissed. 12 46 III. Propriety of the Order Enjoining Brow from Filing Further Actions in the District Court 47 In its order dismissing Brow's mandamus and injunctive petitions, the District Court also issued the following order, sua sponte: 48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that petitioner, Ronald A. Brow, is enjoined from filing any further lawsuits in the United States District Court of the Virgin Islands regarding the Government of the Virgin Islands, its departments, commissioners, and other employees acting in their professional capacities; and 49 FINALLY ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall not, effective this date, file or accept for filing any future pleadings, motions or other papers or documents from or on behalf of Ronald A. Brow, unless the same are accompanied by an application for leave of Court to file such new pleadings, motion or other papers or documents, in which application it is certified by petitioner that the matters to be raised are new and never before considered or determined by a federal court or by the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands; provided, however, that the Clerk may accept for filing a notice of appeal from this order without petitioner's having to comply with the foregoing application and certification procedure. 50 Brow v. Farrelly, Nos. 1992-0040, 1992-0049 (D.V.I. June 19, 1992) (emphasis in original). 51 The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), made applicable to the District Court of the Virgin Islands through 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a), enables the District Court to issue such injunctions to preclude abusive, groundless and vexatious litigation. See In re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir.1982). The broad scope of the District Court's power, however, is limited by two fundamental tenets of our legal system--the litigant's rights to due process and access to the courts. 52 To ensure these rights, we have held that the District Court must comply with the following requirements when issuing such prohibitive injunctive orders against pro se litigants. At the outset, the District Court should not restrict a litigant from filing claims absent exigent circumstances, such as a litigant's continuous abuse of the judicial process by filing meritless and repetitive actions. Matter of Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d 745, 747 (3d Cir.1989); Chipps v. United States Dist. Ct. for the Middle Dist. of Pa., 882 F.2d 72, 73 (3d Cir.1989); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446. If the circumstances warrant the imposition of an injunction, the District Court must give notice to the litigant to show cause why the proposed injunctive relief should not issue. Gagliardi v. McWilliams, 834 F.2d 81, 83 (3d Cir.1987); In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446. This ensures that the litigant is provided with the opportunity to oppose the court's order before it is instituted. Likewise, the scope of the injunctive order must be narrowly tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case before the District Court. See Chipps, 882 F.2d at 73; Matter of Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d at 746, 748; see also In re Oliver, 682 F.2d at 446; Gagliardi, 834 F.2d at 83. 53 The proscription placed on Brow by the District Court of the Virgin Islands violates each of these requirements and constitutes an abuse of the District Court's discretion. First, the District Court offered no justification for its imposition of the order. There is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that Brow is an abusive litigant who repeatedly files baseless actions. There is also no evidence supporting any determination that Brow continually has attempted to relitigate adjudicated claims. Hence, there appear to be no exigent circumstances to warrant the imposition of the injunction. 13 54 Second, the record does not indicate that the District Court provided Brow with an order to show cause why the injunction should not issue, or an opportunity to be heard on the matter. Consequently, Brow could not foresee that the District Court contemplated the imposition of such a restrictive order and could not defend against it. 55 Finally, the District Court's injunctive order is not narrowly tailored. The initial portion of the order, which enjoins Brow from filing any further lawsuits in the District Court against the Government of the Virgin Islands, or its employees in their official capacities, is patently overbroad on its face. 14 The District Court's inclusion of a certification procedure in its order cannot offset the extreme restriction of Brow's access to the courts. There is simply no support in the law for permitting an injunction prohibiting a litigant from ever again filing a document in federal court. Matter of Packer Ave. Assoc., 884 F.2d at 748. Accordingly, the District Court's sua sponte order cannot be allowed to stand.