Opinion ID: 795116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Mr. Jones' Prior Conviction

Text: 28 Mr. Jones submits that the district court erred in admitting his 1994 conviction into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). 5 We review a district court's decision to admit evidence under Rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion; we ask whether: 29 (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter in issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed the similar act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 30 United States v. Toro, 359 F.3d 879, 884 (7th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Kreiser, 15 F.3d 635, 640 (7th Cir.1994)). The third prong of the test is not at issue in this appeal; we have stated that a conviction is sufficient to support a jury finding that a defendant committed a similar act. See United States v. Best, 250 F.3d 1084, 1092 (7th Cir.2001). 31 Mr. Jones had filed a motion in limine requesting that his prior conviction not be entered into evidence. He contended that the conviction was not relevant to proving any fact in issue other than [his] propensity to commit the crime charged, that it was too remote in time to be admissible and that any probative value would be outweighed by the prejudice that it would cause him. R.20 at 3-4. In response, the Government argued that the prior conviction was admissible to that show Mr. Jones possessed the intent to distribute the crack because possession with intent to distribute is a specific intent crime. R.22 at 2 (citing Best, 250 F.3d at 1091). 32 In assessing this issue, the district court employed the four-part test set forth above and discussed each part of that test in reaching the conclusion that the 1994 conviction was admissible. As to the first prong, the district court stated that it is proper to admit this evidence on the issue of intent. Trial Tr.II at 319-20. Turning to the second prong, the district court held that an eight-year-old conviction is not too old to be admissible. It relied upon United States v. Tringali, 71 F.3d 1375, 1379 (7th Cir.1995), which upheld the admission of a nine-year-old conviction. The district court further held that, under the fourth prong, the conviction was not more prejudicial than probative. Nevertheless, the court agreed to give a cautionary instruction to the jury. 6 33 On appeal, Mr. Jones, relying on Toro, 359 F.3d at 883-84, submits that it would have been more appropriate to introduce the evidence if he had admitted possession but had denied the intent to distribute the drugs. Focusing on the second prong, Mr. Jones further contends that the prior conviction was too dissimilar to be admissible because it was for possession of cocaine, not crack. He also submits that the earlier conviction was too remote in time to be admissible. Finally, Mr. Jones argues that this evidence was more prejudicial than it was probative and that the limiting instruction was not sufficient to safeguard his right to a fair trial. 34 First, we must determine whether evidence of the previous conviction was relevant and probative on the issue of intent. Although we must give great deference to the district court's decision to admit the evidence, we pause to point out that our examination of the record in this case reveals that the district court's consideration of the matter does not appear to reflect the sort of critical evaluation of the issue that we believe ought to be undertaken in determining whether, in an exercise of discretion, such evidence ought to be admitted on the issue of intent. As far as we can ascertain from the cold record, in deciding the matter, the court recited the governing principles from our case law, but otherwise revealed little in the way of critical analysis as to how those principles ought to apply to the facts of this particular case. 7 This lapse well may be attributable, in part at least, to our own treatment of such matters on occasion; our cases have not always reflected a critical application of the principles reflected in the case law to the facts of the individual case. The district court also was not aided by the conclusory nature of Mr. Jones' motion in limine that simply claimed that admission of the evidence was sought simply to establish propensity to commit the charged offense. Similarly, the Government's reply added little to aid the court in its decision. 35 The most obvious justifiable situation in which prior convictions are admissible in drug prosecutions on the issue of intent are in those situations in which the defendant, while admitting possession of the substance, denies the intent to distribute it. See United States v. Jones, 389 F.3d 753, 757-58 (7th Cir.2004), vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2948, 162 L.Ed.2d 864 (2005) (remanding for resentencing in light of Booker ). In such a context, the matter of intent is placed squarely before the jury, and previous convictions generally are relevant and probative on the issue of intent. See United States v. Beasley, 809 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir.1987). Our case law also has recognized that evidence of earlier drug trafficking convictions also can be relevant and probative when the defendant flatly contests all elements of the charge of possession with intent to distribute. See, e.g., United States v. Chavis, 429 F.3d 662, 668 (7th Cir.2005) (allowing the admission of 404(b) evidence after a defendant claimed he was completely innocent and a clueless bystander); United States v. Brown, 34 F.3d 569, 573 (7th Cir.1994) (stating that our own cases are clear—a defendant cannot keep 404(b) evidence out of his case by denying all charges); United States v. Mazzanti, 888 F.2d 1165, 1171 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a blanket denial of any wrongdoing in a conspiracy to distribute drugs allows the Government to introduce prior acts to establish intent); United States v. Monzon, 869 F.2d 338, 344 (7th Cir.1989) (affirming the admission of 404(b) evidence and stating that [i]n cases involving specific intent crimes, intent is automatically in issue). Here too, the issue of intent must be established by the Government and evidence of prior convictions for drug trafficking may be helpful. As we pointed out in Jones, however, despite the general utility of this evidence to establish intent, it is incumbent on the Government to affirmatively show why a particular prior conviction tends to show . . . volition to commit the new crime. Id. at 757. See also Chavis, 429 F.3d at 672-73 (concurring opinion of Cudahy, J.). 36 The Government's argument before this court, had it been made to the district court, would have been of significant assistance to that court, as it has been to us. An examination of the record reveals that, at trial, counsel for the defendant argued to the jury that only a small amount of cocaine was near the defendant's identification card and that the remainder of the cocaine, a larger amount, was situated in another place in the house. Counsel also emphasized the presence of others at the scene at the time that the search warrant was executed. A fair reading of counsel's argument is that Mr. Jones did not control the larger amount and that the lesser amount was held for personal use rather than resale. In this context, an earlier conviction for drug trafficking was certainly relevant and probative on, among other things, the issue of Mr. Jones' intent. It evidenced his knowledge of the drug trade and the practices of drug dealers in selling their deadly wares. It also was relevant and probative with respect to the defendant's knowledge of the commercial value of even small amounts of the drug and therefore of his intent to sell the lesser amount. Accordingly, it certainly was in the sound discretion of the district court to determine, given the facts and circumstances presented by this case, that this evidence was relevant and probative on the issues placed into contention by Mr. Jones. 37 Next, the district court acted within its discretion in deciding that the prior conviction was close enough in time and sufficiently similar in circumstances to be relevant to the issue of intent. Mr. Jones' prior conviction occurred six years before the charged offense; the district court correctly noted that we have allowed similar prior convictions that were even more temporally distant from the charged conduct. 8 We also have held that a prior conviction for distribution of crack is admissible in a case where the charged act involves distribution of cocaine, as the distinction between the two drugs is a  distinction without substance  as [b]oth crimes involve the possession with intent to distribute a chemical composition of cocaine. United States v. Puckett, 405 F.3d 589, 597 (7th Cir.2005) (emphasis in original). 9 38 Finally, the district court certainly did not abuse its discretion in determining that the prior conviction was not more prejudicial than probative. Any probative evidence of prior convictions will be prejudicial; however, we must determine if it was unfairly prejudicial. See Best, 250 F.3d at 1093; Puckett, 405 F.3d at 598. Here, the trial court offered a limiting instruction, and we have held that such instructions are effective in reducing or eliminating any possible unfair prejudice from the introduction of Rule 404(b) evidence. Best, 250 F.3d at 1093. 10 After analyzing each of the relevant factors, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion.