Opinion ID: 3064748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Work conducted at the JPL facilities

Text: JPL is a NASA facility that the California Institute of Technology (“Caltech”) operates pursuant to a contract with NASA, and its facilities are an integral part of the nation’s space program. JPL is the lead center for NASA’s deep space robotics and deep space communications missions, which require broad access to many NASA physical and logical facilities. These missions entail “extensive and detailed parallel planning, research, and development, often spanning years, scores of persons, and hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars.” JPL’s discoveries have provided new insights into studies of the Earth, its atmosphere, climate, oceans, geology, and the biosphere; created the most accurate topographic map of the Earth; provided insight into global climate and ozone depletion; launched an oceanographic satellite to provide new details about the ocean seafloor; and provided space-based operational, communication, and information processing for the Defense Department. JPL operates a number of high profile projects including the Phoenix Mars Lander Mission, the Mars Exploration Rovers Mission, the Cassini Equinox Mission to Saturn, and the Voyager Mission to Jupiter, Saturn and beyond. The command center for the Mars Rovers, the Space Flight Operations Center for JPL missions, and JPL’s Space 6984 NELSON v. NASA Craft Assembly building are located on the JPL campus. JPL also partially manages the Deep Space Network, which is responsible for monitoring and communicating with numerous satellites and other space missions, and is involved in other highly confidential projects. All positions at JPL, from administrative support to engineers, scientists, and JPL’s Director, are filled by contract employees.1 Plaintiffs are scientists and engineers employed in some of the most important positions at JPL, including the remote operator of the Spirit and Opportunity Rovers that explore the surface of Mars and a navigation team member for the Phoenix Mars Lander Mission. B. Implementation of Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 The 9/11 Commission found that “[a]ll but one of the 9/11 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification document, some by fraud,” and recommended that the federal government set standards for the issuance of identification because identification fraud is a concern at “vulnerable facilities.” THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 390 (2004). On August 27, 2004, the President of the United States issued Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 (“HSPD-12”) in response to security concerns identified by the 9/11 Commission Report and mandated that the Commerce Department develop a uniform federal standard, applicable to federal employees and contractors alike, for secure and reliable forms of identification. The order emphasized that the Commerce Department should act to eliminate the “[w]ide variations in the quality and security of forms of identification used to gain access to secure Federal and other facilities where there is potential for terrorist attacks . . . .” HSPD-12 ¶ 1. 1 Caltech has filled JPL positions with about 5,000 of its own employees and with over 4,000 “affiliates” and contractors. NELSON v. NASA 6985 Acting pursuant to this directive, the Commerce Department promulgated Federal Information Processing Standards (“FIPS”) 201 and 201-1, which required security measures for contract employees commensurate with those applicable to comparable federal employees. FIPS 201-1 sets forth a standard for “identification issued by Federal departments and agencies to Federal employees and contractors (including contractor employees) for gaining physical access to federally-controlled facilities and logical access to Federally controlled information systems.” Since 1953, federal civil service employees have been subject to mandatory background investigations, with the scope varying based on the potential for adverse security consequences associated with a particular position. See Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (Apr. 29, 1953), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (2007). Thus, for over fifty years, Executive Order 10,450 has required that “in no event shall the investigation [of civil service employees] include less than a national agency check (including a check of the fingerprint files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation), and written inquiries to appropriate local law-enforcement agencies, former employers and supervisors, references, and schools attended by the person.” Id. § 3(a). Now, under FIPS 201-1, federal contractors in non-sensitive positions must meet these same minimum security guidelines. In 2001, before the promulgation of FIPS 201, NASA conducted an internal review of contractor security requirements and concluded that the failure of contractors to undergo background checks posed a vulnerability. NASA, acting pursuant to its statutory authority under the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (the “Space Act”) to conduct “personnel investigations,” revised NASA Procedural Requirement (“NPR”) 1600.1, to require application of security requirements for contract employees parallel to those of federal employees. On November 8, 2005, NASA updated NPR 1600.1 to incorporate FIPS 201 and require that all low risk 6986 NELSON v. NASA contractors be subject to a National Agency Check with Inquiries (“NACI”) prior to the issuance of permanent NASA photo-identification. NASA explained that these requirements would “assist NASA Centers and component facilities in executing the NASA security program to protect people, property, and information” by establishing “security program standards and specifications necessary to achieve Agencywide security program consistency and uniformity.” NPR 1600.1, § P.1. Meanwhile, on August 5, 2005, the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”) provided guidance on the implementation of HSPD-12, requiring agencies “develop a plan and begin the required background investigations for all current contractors who do not have a successfully adjudicated investigation on record . . . no later than October 27, 2007.” Memorandum from OMB on Implementation of Homeland Sec. Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 — Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Fed. Employees and Contractors 6 (Aug. 5, 2005). OMB stated that the completion of a NACI would be a prerequisite to the issuance of any identification. Id. at 5. Across all NASA facilities, over 57,000 individuals are subject to these new requirements, over 46,000 had applied as of August 31, 2007, and approximately 39,000 NASA contractors had completed the background investigation as of September 21, 2007. C. The SF-85 Questionnaire and the Form 42 inquiries The NACI requires the completion of a SF-85 Questionnaire, which asks the applicant to answer basic questions regarding citizenship, previous residences over the past five years, educational background, employment history over the past five years, selective service record, military history, and illegal drug use over the past year.2 The panel took issue with Question #14, which asks: 2 The SF-85 also includes an “Authorization for Release of Information,” which may be used only for purposes of the SF-85 and is limited by the Privacy Act. NELSON v. NASA 6987 In the last year, have you used, possessed, supplied, or manufactured illegal drugs? When used without a prescription, illegal drugs include marijuana, cocaine, hashish, narcotics (opium, morphine, codeine, heroin, etc.), stimulants (cocaine, amphetamines, etc.), depressants (barbiturates, methaqualone, tranquilizers, etc.), hallucinogenics (LSD, PCP, etc.). (NOTE: Neither your truthful response nor information derived from your response will be used as evidence against you in any subsequent criminal proceeding.) If you answered “Yes,” provide information relating to the types of substance(s), the nature of the activity, and any other details relating to your involvement with illegal drugs. Include any treatment or counseling received. The SF-85 also asks for three references who know the applicant well. Form 42 written inquiries are then sent to educational institutions, former employers, landlords, and the designated references in order to verify the information on the SF-85 and confirm the applicant’s trustworthiness and compliance with the law. Question #7 on Form 42 asks references to indicate either “Yes” or “No” as to whether they “have any adverse information about this person’s employment, residence or activities concerning:” “Violations of the Law,” “Financial Integrity,” “Abuse of Alcohol and/or Drugs,” “Mental or Emotional Stability,” “General Behavior or Conduct,” or “Other Matters.” References are then asked whether they “wish to discuss the adverse information [they] have.” If so, they can provide “additional information which [they] feel may have a bearing on this person’s suitability for government employment or a security clearance. This space may be used for derogatory as well as positive information.” Form 42 written inquiries are sent to roughly 980,000 recipients annually. 70 Fed. Reg. 61,320 (Oct. 21, 2005). 6988 NELSON v. NASA D. Procedural History Plaintiffs filed suit on August 30, 2007, and subsequently moved for a preliminary injunction. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion on a number of grounds, rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims that NASA lacked the statutory authority to conduct these investigations, and that the NACI violated plaintiffs’ informational privacy rights. The district court found that the NACI served a legitimate governmental interest, i.e., to enhance security at federal facilities. Finding the NACI narrowly tailored with adequate safeguards in place, the court concluded that the government must be given some leeway in conducting its investigation to verify that applicants are not connected to activities that pose a security threat. Plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for a stay of the district court’s order. A panel of this court granted a temporary stay pending appeal. Nelson v. NASA, 506 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 2007). Following an expedited briefing schedule and argument, a merits panel held that the district court abused its discretion and reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction. Nelson v. NASA, 512 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2008). Subsequently, the panel vacated its opinion and filed a superseding opinion. Nelson v. NASA, 530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Nelson II“). The panel’s opinion concludes that “the Space Act appears to grant NASA the statutory authority to require the [background] investigations,” id. at 875, and that the portion of SF-85’s Question #14 requiring disclosure of prior drug use, possession, supply, and manufacture does not violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to informational privacy. Id. at 878-79. However, the panel held that the portion of SF-85’s Question #14 requiring applicants to disclose “any treatment or counseling received” for illegal drug use, id. at 879, and Form 42’s written inquiries violate the plaintiffs’ constitutional right to informational privacy. Id. at 879-81. Accordingly, the panel concluded that “[t]he district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction was based on errors of NELSON v. NASA 6989 law and hence was an abuse of discretion” and ordered the district court to issue an injunction. Id. at 883.