Opinion ID: 2427342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is the minimum coverage provision a constitutional exercise of congress's commerce power?

Text: The question squarely presented here is whether the minimum coverage provision is consistent with the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. We review de novo plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to the provision. See United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 527 (6th Cir.2010). At the outset, it is important to note that our elected officials and the public hotly debated the merits and weaknesses of the Act before Congress voted, and will undoubtedly continue to in the future. However, it is not this Court's role to pass on the wisdom of Congress's choice. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824) (The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents possess at elections[] are ... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them from its abuse.). We consider only whether the Constitution grants Congress the power to enact this legislation. The minimum coverage provision, like all congressional enactments, is entitled to a presumption of constitutionality, and will be invalidated only upon a plain showing that Congress has exceeded its constitutional bounds. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000). The presumption that the minimum coverage provision is valid is not a mere polite gesture. It is a deference due to deliberate judgment by constitutional majorities of the two Houses of Congress that an Act is within their delegated power.... United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441, 449, 74 S.Ct. 190, 98 L.Ed. 179 (1953).
In our dual system of government, the federal government is limited to its enumerated powers, while all other powers are reserved to the states or to the people. U.S. Const. amend. X. States have authority under their general police powers to enact minimum coverage provisions similar to the one in the Affordable Care Act. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 111M, § 2 (West 2011). However, the federal government has no police power and may enact such a law only if it is authorized by one of its enumerated powers. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995). Our task is to review the district court's conclusion that Congress properly relied on its authority under the Commerce Clause to enact the minimum coverage provision. Recognizing that uniform federal regulation is necessary in some instances, the Commerce Clause of the Constitution grants Congress the power [t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Supreme Court has held that Congress has broad authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause. From 1937 to 1994 it did not invalidate a single law as unconstitutional for exceeding the scope of Congress's Commerce Power. The Court has explained that Congress's Commerce Clause power encompasses three broad spheres: (1) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, ... i.e., those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Because the United States does not contend that the minimum coverage provision falls within either of the first two categories, we proceed to consider whether the provision falls within Congress's power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Current Supreme Court jurisprudence reveals that Congress may use this category of its Commerce Power to regulate two related classes of activity. First, it has long been established that Congress may regulate economic activity, even if wholly intrastate, if it substantially affects interstate commerce. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610, 120 S.Ct. 1740; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560, 115 S.Ct. 1624. Second, Congress may also regulate even non-economic intrastate activity if doing so is essential to a larger scheme that regulates economic activity. For example, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 63 S.Ct. 82, 87 L.Ed. 122 (1942), the Court upheld regulations limiting the amount of wheat that farmers could grow, even for non-commercial purposes. Even though producing and consuming home-grown wheat is non-economic intrastate activity, Congress rationally concluded that the failure to regulate this class of activities would undercut its broader regulation of the interstate wheat market. Id. at 127-28, 63 S.Ct. 82. This is because individuals would be fulfilling their own demand for wheat rather than resorting to the market, which would thwart Congress's efforts to stabilize prices. Id. at 128-29, 63 S.Ct. 82. Similarly, in Gonzales v. Raich , the Court held that the federal Controlled Substances Act could be applied to prohibit the local cultivation and possession of marijuana authorized under California law. 545 U.S. at 19, 125 S.Ct. 2195. Leaving home-grown and home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would undercut Congress's broader regulation of interstate economic activity. Id. Thus, Wickard and Raich establish that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself `commercial,' in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity. Id. at 18, 125 S.Ct. 2195. Despite the Supreme Court's broad interpretation of the Commerce Power, it has emphasized in two recent cases that this power is subject to real limits. In United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison , the Court struck down single-subject criminal statutes as beyond Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court held that the statutes at issue in these cases, the Gun Free School Zones Act and the Violence Against Women Act, exceeded Congress's Commerce Clause power based on four main factors: (1) the statutes regulated non-economic, criminal activity and were not part of a larger regulation of economic activity; (2) the statutes contained no jurisdictional hook limiting their application to interstate commerce; (3) any Congressional findings regarding the effects of the regulated activity on interstate commerce were not sufficient to sustain constitutionality of the legislation; and (4) the link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce was too attenuated. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601-15, 120 S.Ct. 1740; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561-67, 115 S.Ct. 1624. The Court found that accepting Congress's proffered reasons for the statutes would have paved the way for Congress to regulate those quintessentially local actions that the Constitution left within the purview of the states. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16, 120 S.Ct. 1740.