Opinion ID: 612655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reversal of the order granting discovery

Text: Petitioner asserts that the District Court erred in reversing the magistrate judge‟s order granting forensic testing of certain crime scene items. We review the District Court‟s order for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 281 (3d Cir. 2010). Habeas petitioners are not automatically granted discovery. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997). Under the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases, a party must specify the discovery sought and “provide reasons for the request.” Rule 6(b), 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. Leave of court is required for such discovery to proceed, see Rule 6(a), and should be granted only “„where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is . . . entitled to relief,‟” Bracy, 520 U.S at 908-09 (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 300 (1969)). The magistrate judge found that good cause existed because the test “results could undermine the . . . theory on which the petitioner‟s conviction was secured.” Specifically, he reasoned, the jury might have been less inclined to “convict if the 8 forensic evidence contradicted or, at least, did not support” the eyewitness testimony indicating petitioner‟s guilt. The District Court observed that, whatever their results, the scientific tests could not show “that trial counsel was unreasonable for failing to” pursue them. His attorney‟s strategy had been to “argue that there was no physical evidence linking Petitioner to the crime,” and he “could have reasonably concluded that it was better to criticize the Commonwealth‟s case for lack of evidence than to risk obtaining proof of Petitioner‟s guilt.” Stated another way, the question was not whether counsel was correct in concluding that the forensic evidence might have inculpated petitioner, but rather, whether counsel‟s decision not to seek the evidence was defensible as a matter of trial strategy. In Toney v. Gammon, 79 F.3d 693 (8th Cir. 1996), petitioner alleged that counsel had been ineffective for, among other things, failing to request certain forensic tests. Id. at 696-97. The Court of Appeals held that an evidentiary hearing was required, because none of the state‟s courts had considered the petitioner‟s arguments and, therefore, the state court record “d[id] not conclusively establish that Toney‟s claims [we]re either barred from review or without merit.” Id. at 697. That sharply distinguishes 9 the case before us and makes further discussion unnecessary.6 Nor do we find that Showers v. Beard, 635 F.3d 625 (3d Cir. 2011), issued after briefing in this case was completed, requires reversal here. Showers did not involve a discovery request. We held that trial counsel was ineffective because he had not only failed to investigate “readily available” expert testimony that supported the defense‟s theory, but also “failed to . . . make a reasonable decision that [such] investigation was unnecessary.” 635 F.3d at 632. Chambers has not shown, either here or in the state courts, that trial counsel failed to make a reasonable determination that forensic testing was not needed in his case. We are persuaded by the logic of Rice v. Hall, supra, 564 F.3d 523. There, as here, petitioner asserted ineffective assistance because his lawyer did not “test and present „potentially exculpatory forensic evidence [from] the crime scene[,]‟” id. at 524, including fingerprints, hair, and other DNA-containing materials, but instead emphasized the prosecution‟s failure to test those items, see id. at 525. Rejecting the ineffective assistance claim, the First Circuit observed that “[d]efense counsel had to consider the likelihood that further forensic testing . . . would have provided a link” between defendant 6 In addition, petitioner relies on Yarris v. County of Delaware, 465 F.3d 129 (3d Cir. 2006). We are not persuaded that that case controls. In Yarris, there was evidence that police officers and, perhaps, the prosecutor, had actually tampered with evidence in an effort to “frame” defendant. While Yarris was ultimately granted permission to get DNA testing, it apparently was not requested or granted for the purpose of supporting his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 10 and the murder, and “[c]ounsel‟s judgment in situations like this is accorded great respect.” 7 Id. The same reasoning applies in this case. The District Court here carefully and painstakingly reviewed the record and explained why good cause did not exist for any of the items requested by petitioner. For example, defense counsel at trial established through cross-examination of the medical examiner that, if the axe handle had been the murder weapon, it would have contained blood residue, but no such residue had been found on it. As the District Court observed, the ALS testing petitioner requested would do one of two things. It would either reveal blood on the handle that was not detectable with the testing methods employed in 1986 -- further implicating petitioner -- or it would show that no blood was present on the stick, which is precisely the information the jury that convicted petitioner was given. The test could not, and would not, demonstrate that counsel was ineffective for not seeking to perform it. Similarly, with respect to the hair and clothing at the crime scene, all but one of the hairs found at the crime scene was shown to be consistent with that of the victim or a dog.8 The other strand of hair was found in a hat, and neither the hat nor the 7 Rice‟s DNA was found on the victim‟s body; after initially denying to police that he knew the woman, he testified that they had been having an affair and that he had been intimate with her during the afternoon preceding her murder. Rice, 564 F.3d at 524-25 & n.1. 8 The victim was discovered by a young man walking his dog; the presence of dog hairs at the scene was therefore unremarkable. 11 hair found in it was tied to petitioner at trial. We agree with the District Court that petitioner failed to show that trial counsel was unreasonable for attempting to avoid a comparison test that might have provided the prosecution with damning evidence placing Chambers at the crime scene. Likewise, nothing on the victim‟s clothes tied petitioner to the crime, and there was no evidence that the police failed to thoroughly inspect the victim‟s attire for traces of hair, blood or other fluids. A more extensive DNA test today would add nothing to the case beyond what the convicting jury already knew. Petitioner has not shown that such testing would support his ineffectiveness claim, nor that of actual innocence. Stated more pithily, we agree with the District Court that “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” With respect to the petitioner‟s request for fingernail clippings and oral and vaginal swabs, there was no evidence put forth at trial that the victim had scratched her assailant, nor that she had been sexually assaulted. Accordingly, forensic testing of these items would demonstrate neither the petitioner‟s actual innocence nor trial counsel‟s ineffectiveness. Along the same lines, petitioner has asked for forensic testing of the small sapling stick found at the crime scene with a drop of blood so tiny, available tests at the time could not determine whether it came from a human or animal. There was no indication, however, that the stick was used as the murder weapon; it was too small and 12 contained too little blood to have been used for that purpose. As the District Court noted, testing this stick today would not reveal anything that the jury did not already know (or not know), and trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to request a test not available at the time. Finally, the District Court rejected the petitioner‟s request for all crime scene photographs, charts, diagrams, et cetera, as precisely the type of fishing exhibition prohibited by the restrictive discovery rules for habeas cases. We agree. Petitioner has failed to specify what information he believes those items would reveal, or how they would demonstrate his actual innocence or trial counsel‟s ineffectiveness. Because the results of the scientific tests would not shed light on the reasonableness of the decision to forego such testing, nor on any of the petitioner‟s other habeas claims, the district judge‟s reasoning was supported by the law and solid logic. The ruling was not clearly erroneous. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the magistrate judge‟s order granting discovery. Chambers alleged that his trial counsel was incompetent and that the discovery he sought would prove such incompetence. He has shown neither. An argument that “rests almost entirely upon „mays‟ and „could haves‟” does not satisfy the 13 requirements for habeas relief. Rice, 564 F.3d at 526.9 Accordingly, the District Court‟s order will be affirmed. 9 We have carefully reviewed Skinner v. Switzer, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (March 7, 2011), and its discussion of the interplay between habeas corpus petitions and actions filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because we are satisfied that Skinner does not affect directly the issues presented here, we need not address it further. 14