Opinion ID: 1901509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Issue 7 Evidence of Early Childhood Abuse

Text: May posits that appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to challenge the decision of the trial court during the 1995 re-sentencing proceeding that the mitigation evidence May wished to present regarding the abuse perpetrated on him by his father was irrelevant and inadmissible. Specifically, May wanted to present evidence that his father physically and sexually abused him, and forced him to watch as his father physically and sexually abused his sisters and mother. In fact, the Commonwealth conceded before the PCRA court that May had been physically struck or threatened with physical harm by his father and that his father was a cruel and abusive man who controlled his family by keeping them isolated and by keeping them at his mercy financially. Commonwealth's Response to Appellant's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law at 1-2 (Original Record No. 273). May wished to present this evidence regarding his father pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8) (subsection (e)(8)), which includes as a mitigating circumstance any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense. This mitigating circumstance is often called the catchall mitigator. The Commonwealth asserted that the use of a conjunctive by the legislature in subsection (e)(8) [19] limited the admissible mitigation evidence to that which addressed both character and record. The Commonwealth believed that this interpretation rendered May's proffered evidence irrelevant and objected to its admission. The trial court doubted whether the proposed evidence fit into one of the mitigating factors set forth in the statute, and sustained the Commonwealth's objection to admission of any such evidence. N.T., Dec. 1, 1995, at 30-31. We disagree with the ruling of the trial court. Not only is such evidence relevant, its presence is a necessary component of a fair and complete sentencing proceeding. We hold that the failure of trial counsel to object to such an egregious mistake by the trial court constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel from which May suffered prejudice. As discussed, supra, at 6, in order to prove counsel ineffectiveness, a defendant must establish that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his choice; and (3) but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987). In order to analyze properly May's ineffectiveness claim, however, we must first review the history of mental and physical abuse as a mitigating factor. The United States Supreme Court has long held that ensuring justice involves the presentation of evidence detailing the childhood of a defendant as a mitigating factor in the process of determining whether to impose the death penalty. Pennsylvania v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55, 58 S.Ct. 59, 82 L.Ed. 43 (1937) (justice generally requires consideration of more than the particular acts ... [it also necessitates] tak[ing] into account the circumstances of the offense together with the character and propensities of the defendant). In Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), the United States Supreme Court explained that the entity charged with sentencing the defendant should not be precluded from considering, in mitigation, evidence of a defendant's childhood, upbringing, and emotional disturbances. See id. at 113-15, 102 S.Ct. 869. Evidence of a difficult family history and of emotional disturbance is typically introduced by defendants in mitigation. Id. at 115, 102 S.Ct. 869; accord McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 187-188, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). While the Court recognized that in certain circumstances, such evidence properly may be given little weight, specifically dependent upon the age of the defendant at the time of the offense, [20] nevertheless evidence of a turbulent family history, of beatings by a harsh father, and of severe emotional disturbance is relevant. Id. See also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death). Further, a unanimous court stuck down a death sentence where the jury was precluded from considering mitigation evidence that did not fall within the elements of mitigation specifically set forth in the state statute at issue. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). In Hitchcock, the defense presented evidence of the defendant's inhalation of gas fumes, the poverty of his family, and unfortunate circumstances of his upbringing. Id. at 397, 107 S.Ct. 1821. The trial court, however, limited the evidence available to the jury for consideration to the statutorily defined mitigating circumstances, which did not include this type of evidence. The United States Supreme Court ruled that this functional exclusion of evidence did not comport with the requirement of Eddings. The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534-37, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003), adds further support to this line of cases. In Wiggins, the United States Supreme Court held that inadequate investigation of the history of the defendant for the purposes of developing mitigation evidence for the penalty phase of a capital murder trial prejudiced the defendant; had counsel done his research, he would have uncovered that the defendant experienced severe privation and abuse in the early years of his life while in the custody of his alcoholic, absentee mother, and had suffered physical torment, sexual molestation, and repeated rape during years of foster care. C.f. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). This Court has also long recognized that it is of paramount importance that juries have knowledge of a defendant's childhood when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. See Commonwealth v. Moody, 476 Pa. 223, 382 A.2d 442 (1977); Commonwealth v. Green, 396 Pa. 137, 151 A.2d 241 (1959). Not only have we focused on the availability of such mitigation evidence to the jury, we have also held that the breadth of such evidence is almost unlimited. Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833, 856 (1985) (ruling that our statute steers a course between the rock of draconian imposition and the whirlpool of discrimination by requiring death for narrowly defined aggravating circumstances, but allowing an almost unlimited presentation and consideration of mitigation circumstances ...). These series of federal and state cases make abundantly clear that mitigation evidence is not merely admissible, but rather is vital to a fair sentencing procedure. Further, state and federal case law demonstrate that the scope of such evidence is not limited to those examples detailed within the relevant statute. In the case before us, May had a right as a matter of both state and federal law to present the evidence of his abusive and traumatic childhood as mitigation at his sentencing hearing. [21] Therefore, his underlying claim has arguable merit. We now look at the second prong, in which we decide if counsel's decision to forego bringing this claim was reasonable. May contends that trial counsel's strategy not to raise too many issues was unreasonable. May notes that trial counsel stated at the PCRA hearing that he would raise as many as five issues that had merit, but that in the end he deemed only two issues worthy of appeal. N.T. April 9, 2002, at 25. Thus, as a matter of strategy, trial counsel did not choose to forego some claims that he believed had merit. Instead, May avers, trial counsel's failure to raise this issue is evidence that his representation of May was incompetent. According to a plurality of this Court, appellate counsel is not constitutionally obliged to raise every conceivable claim for relief. Counsel may forego even arguably meritorious issues in favor of claims which, in the exercise of counsel's objectively reasonable professional judgment, offered a greater prospect of securing relief. Commonwealth v. Jones, 572 Pa. 343, 815 A.2d 598, 613 (2002) (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court per Castille, J., joined by Eakin, J.). Others have expressed a belief that counsel can never be effective in failing to raise a meritorious claim: When appellate counsel fails to advance an issue that would, if raised, have entitled his or her client to a new trial, or a new sentencing hearing in a capital case, I simply cannot see how this strategy would ever be reasonable. Although I realize that trial lawyers, in arguing a case to a jury, often forego meritorious objections for a variety of strategic reasons (for example, not wishing to confuse the jury on a technical issue, the possibility of defense theories appearing to conflict, credibility with the jury, etc.), appellate litigation presents entirely different considerations.    In brief, if the underlying claim of error is of such an important magnitude that it would have entitled a defendant to relief had it been raised on appeal, there can be no justification for the failure of appellate counsel to pursue the claim that would ever qualify as a reasonable professional judgment. Id. at 619 (Newman, J., concurring). However, because the majority of our Court has not accepted either position, we continue to analyze this claim for the reasonableness of counsel's decision to forego raising this claim. [22] As May correctly observes, trial counsel's testimony at the PCRA hearing demonstrates that his failure to present evidence of May's childhood abuse was either a failure to identify the trial court's error or a failure to recognize the merit in objecting to the trial court's determination. There was no strategy involved. As trial counsel himself admitted, he had no strategy regarding this issue. N.T. April 9, 2002, at 25. We are therefore constrained to reason that a complete lack of strategy cannot constitute a reasonable basis for a decision not to raise a claim. Thus, we conclude that May has established the second component of ineffective assistance of counsel. Turning to the prejudice prong of the ineffective assistance of counsel test, the defendant must demonstrate that but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different. Pierce, supra. This Court has previously held that the failure to present a history of abuse is prejudicial. See Commonwealth v. Ford, 570 Pa. 378, 809 A.2d 325, 334 (2002) (holding that defendant was prejudiced by failure to present history of abuse and mental illness); Commonwealth v. Perry, 537 Pa. 385, 644 A.2d 705, 709 (1994) (failure to present evidence in mitigation prejudiced defendant). C.f. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537, 123 S.Ct. 2527. [23] In the case sub judice, it is this Court's judgment that May suffered prejudice. The jury in May's second sentencing hearing found only one aggravating circumstance  a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person. The jury was bound to impose the death penalty because it found no mitigating circumstances. [24] See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). Had May established this catch all mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury would have been free to award a sentence of life imprisonment rather than death. Had trial counsel presented evidence of mitigation, the jury would have weighed the contested aggravating factor against the strong evidence of abuse suffered by May. Keeping in mind the recent instances where this Court has found prejudice in similar cases, we are satisfied that the likelihood of a different outcome is reasonable, and that May therefore suffered prejudice where trial counsel failed to object when the trial court would not admit such evidence. Accordingly, May has established that his counsel was ineffective. He is therefore entitled to relief on this claim.