Opinion ID: 1264811
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: application of the abuse of discretion standard

Text: The Court of Appeals also held that: [R]efusing parole based on denial of guilt after an offender has served his maximum standard range is not `reasonably consistent' with SRA standards. Under the SRA, a trial court cannot impose an exceptional sentence based on an offender's exercise of his or her constitutional rights.... Similarly, the Board cannot use denial of guilt to show lack of rehabilitation or future dangerousness. Ecklund, 91 Wash.App. at 450-51, 957 P.2d 1290 (citations omitted). The State contends that this decision was erroneous because by disregarding [the] nexus between rehabilitation and recognition of guilt, the Court of Appeals has improperly substituted its own judgment for that of the Board. Mot. for Discretionary Review at 16. The Court of Appeals was correct in observing the Board is to attempt to make its decisions reasonably consistent with the SRA. [7] That statutory mandate, however, is modified somewhat by RCW 9.95.009(3), which expressly states that [n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (2) of this section, the indeterminate sentence review board shall give public safety considerations the highest priority when making all discretionary decisions on the remaining indeterminate population regarding the ability for parole, parole release, and conditions of parole. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the Legislature has statutorily precluded the Board from releasing a prisoner, prior to the expiration of their maximum term, unless in its opinion [the prisoner's] rehabilitation has been complete and he is a fit subject for release. RCW 9.95.100. Furthermore, we have held that [i]t is self-evident that if the inmate is not parolable or there is not an acceptable plan of parole, then the minimum term is necessarily extended.  In re Personal Restraint of Ayers, 105 Wash.2d 161, 167, 713 P.2d 88 (1986) (emphasis added). As we have noted above, the Court of Appeals should have focused on whether the Board abused its discretion in concluding that Ecklund did not establish that he was parolable. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals' decision failed to acknowledge the high degree of discretion that the Board is endowed with when it makes parole decisions. [8] In regard to the Board's discretion, this court has held that a prisoner, who was sentenced prior to the enactment of the SRA, is subject entirely to the discretion of the Board, which may parole him now or never.  In re Personal Restraint of Powell, 117 Wash.2d 175, 196, 814 P.2d 635 (1991) (emphasis added). Moreover, this court has held that the Board may redetermine the minimum term [of a prisoner] at its discretion, for a variety of reasons, any time prior to an inmate's completion of his maximum term. King, 130 Wash.2d at 528 n. 4, 925 P.2d 606; see also RCW 9.95.052 (stating that [a]t any time after the board ... has determined the minimum term of confinement of any person subject to confinement in a state correctional institution .... the board may redetermine and refix [a] convicted person's minimum term of confinement). [9] The Court of Appeals also ignored the principle that the RCW 9.95.009(2) mandate for duration of confinement decisions `reasonably consistent' with the SRA does not `superimpose exactly' the SRA upon the indeterminate system. The rehabilitative aim still applies to the prison population sentenced under the indeterminate system. Locklear, 118 Wash.2d at 415, 823 P.2d 1078. As a result, the Board's practices and criteria need not mirror the SRA practices and criteria for imposing an exceptional sentence. Locklear, 118 Wash.2d at 414, 823 P.2d 1078. While certainly the Board's discretion is not unbridled, this court has also held that a prisoner's lack of rehabilitation is a sufficient reason to impose an exceptional new minimum term. See Locklear, 118 Wash.2d at 412-15, 823 P.2d 1078; Addleman v. Bd. of Prison Terms, 107 Wash.2d 503, 511, 730 P.2d 1327 (1986) (holding that examples of valid reasons for a decision by the Board to not conform with the SRA at parole hearings include insufficient rehabilitation and improper parole plans); see also Gollaher v. United States, 419 F.2d 520, 530 (9th Cir.1969) (It is almost axiomatic that the first step toward rehabilitation of an offender is the offender's recognition that he was at fault.). In light of the Board's considerable discretion and the fact that we have held that the SRA is not entirely superimposed on the indeterminate system, we cannot say that the Board abused its discretion in holding that Ecklund was not parolable. While we do not believe that it would have been appropriate for the Board to base an exceptional minimum term solely on Ecklund's refusal to admit that he was guilty of the offense which led to his sentence to prison, it is justified in considering his denial of guilt as a fact bearing on the question of whether he had been rehabilitated and presents a threat to community safety. In this regard, we agree with the Ninth Circuit's statement in Gollaher that the first step toward rehabilitation is the offender's recognition that he was at fault. Gollaher, 419 F.2d at 530. Furthermore, Ecklund's failure to confront guilt was not the only basis on which the Board concluded that he was not rehabilitated. It concluded, additionally, that Ecklund has minimized his problems with alcohol and consistently changed his story regarding the events surrounding the murder of Betty Jensen. The record supports those conclusions and we believe they are legitimate factors for the Board to consider. [10] While the Board may not demand that Ecklund confess to the murder in order to obtain parole, it was reasonable for the Board to require, for the purposes of therapy, that Ecklund come to grips with the fact that he was convicted of murder and acknowledge the possibility that he might have murdered Betty Jensen during an alcoholic blackout, even though he does not remember committing the crime. [11] In short, we believe that the Board did not abuse its discretion in denying Ecklund's parole on the basis of its conclusion that he was not rehabilitated and that he posed a threat to community safety. [12]