Opinion ID: 1859798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Death Sentence Disproportionate?

Text: Worthington contends that the trial court erred in that: (1) the statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court were unconstitutional because they were duplicative and did not narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, (2) the trial court did not consider evidence that supported statutory mitigating circumstances, and (3) the victim impact evidence was improper. Worthington also contends that his sentence is disproportionate to similar cases. (1) Are the Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Unconstitutional? a. Are Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Duplicative? Defense counsel did not attack the constitutionality of the statutory aggravating circumstances; therefore, the issue is not subject to review except for plain error. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 769-70 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 933, 117 S.Ct. 307, 136 L.Ed.2d 224 (1996). In this appeal, Worthington requests plain error review on numerous points. Under the plain error rule, Appellant must make a demonstration that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice will occur if the error is not corrected. Id. Worthington contends that the state submitted in the course of a felony aggravating circumstance as two circumstances and as such it is duplicative. This allowed the judge to count the same conduct twice and, therefore, the balance between aggravating and mitigating circumstances was skewed toward death. Under section 565.032, in cases where the death penalty is imposed, the jury, or in this case where the jury is waived, the judge must determine whether a statutory aggravating circumstance is established beyond a reasonable doubt. Where there is a finding of one valid aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, we will affirm the death sentence. State v. Jones, 979 S.W.2d 171, 185 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 886, 142 L.Ed.2d 785 (1999); State v. Smith, 944 S.W.2d 901, 921 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 954, 118 S.Ct. 377, 139 L.Ed.2d 294 (1997). Here, the judge found two statutory aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, and the record supports these findings: (1) Worthington committed the offense of murder for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value from the victim of the murder, and (2) the murder was committed while Worthington was engaged in the perpetration of forcible rape and burglary. See section 565.032.2(4)(11). Appellant stated at his guilty plea hearing that he murdered Ms. Griffin while in the process of burglarizing her house and raping her, and that he took her money and other property afterward. Other evidence of these findings includes: Worthington was pulled over by a police officer while driving Ms. Griffin's car. He was wearing a fanny pack containing Ms. Griffin's jewelry and credit cards at the time of his arrest. Further, Ms. Griffin had been violently raped and Worthington's DNA matched that of the semen found on her body. The finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance serves the purpose of determining which defendants are eligible for the death penalty. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d at 771. See also, State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 497 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 957, 118 S.Ct. 2379, 141 L.Ed.2d 746 (1998). Once the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, then the judge can decide whether to impose the death penalty. Id. At this point, the judge no longer considers individual statutory aggravating circumstances but, rather, all the evidence in aggravation or mitigation of punishment in order to determine whether to sentence the defendant to death. Section 565.032.1(2); State v. Shaw, 636 S.W.2d 667 (Mo. banc 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 928, 103 S.Ct. 239, 74 L.Ed.2d 188 (1982). State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 116-117 (Mo. banc 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 222, 142 L.Ed.2d 182 (1998); State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206, 232 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 968, 118 S.Ct. 416, 139 L.Ed.2d 318 (1997); State v. Hall, 955 S.W.2d 198, 209 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1053, 118 S.Ct. 1375, 140 L.Ed.2d 523 (1998). Here, the judge found at least one statutory aggravating circumstance, and that is sufficient to support imposition of the death penalty, if after reviewing all of the evidence, the judge determines that is the appropriate punishment. b. Do Statutory Aggravating Circumstances Fail to Narrow Class to which They Apply? Worthington contends that the duplication of the statutory aggravating factors did not channel and limit the judge's discretion to minimize the risk of arbitrary and capricious sentencing, relying on Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). We have already addressed the duplication issue above, noting that Missouri weighs all the evidence to determine if the death penalty is an appropriate sentence, thus minimizing the risk of capriciousness. The record supports both aggravating circumstances found by the judge. In addition, Worthington contends there does not exist a principled means to distinguish those who are made subject to the death penalty from those who are not. He essentially claims that his crime is no different than felony murder in which death would not be imposed. We disagree. Felony murder is distinguishable in that felony murder does not require deliberation. Section 565.021.1(2). Further, Worthington pleaded guilty and was sentenced by a judge, thus the judge properly considered in the sentencing phase the aggravating circumstance of murder during a robbery. See State v. Hunter, 840 S.W.2d 850 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 3047, 125 L.Ed.2d 732 (1993). For a statutory aggravating circumstance to narrow the class of persons to whom the death penalty may be applied, that circumstance must satisfy two tests: (1) it may not apply to every defendant convicted of murder, and (2) the circumstance must not be unconstitutionally vague. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 (1994). Here, Worthington does not assert that the aggravating circumstance applies to all who commit murder, since not all murderers kill for money or while committing rape. Moreover, Worthington does not assert that the aggravating circumstance was vague. His argument fails. (2) Were the Mitigating Circumstances Ignored? Worthington contends that the trial court's findings were erroneous because they were against the weight of the evidence and the court did not follow the law since the judge did not consider the statutory mitigating circumstances submitted and supported by the evidence. Worthington presented the following as mitigating circumstances pursuant to subsection 3 of section 565.032:(1) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; (2) the defendant acted under extreme duress; (3) the defendant's age at the time of the offense; and (4) his capacity was substantially impaired due to drug and alcohol intoxication. Evidence presented supporting these factors was that he was 24 years old at the time he committed the offense, and he testified that he drank all day, went to a bar with a friend, and took drugs. He testified that his friends, Anthony and Darick, proposed the burglary. Worthington also presented non-statutory mitigating circumstances that he was abused and neglected as a child and he suffers from chemical dependency. The record does not support Worthington's contention that the trial judge did not consider the mitigating factors: THE COURT: ... The Court has considered all of the non-statutory mitigating circumstances and factors that have been offered to this court, and any other facts or circumstances which may be found from the evidence presented, and finds that defendant was raised in a dysfunctional family, and was neglected and abused as a child and further, that the defendant is a long-term drug abuser. Having considered all of the evidence and the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the non-statutory mitigating circumstances... While the judge's comment quoted above does not mention statutory mitigating circumstances, it is clear from the entire record that the trial court did consider all of the evidence in imposing the death penalty. Worthington's claim is without merit. (3) Was the Victim Impact Evidence Improper? Worthington contends the victim impact evidence was unduly inflammatory and violated his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, to a fundamentally fair trial to confront the witnesses against him, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. No objection was raised regarding this evidence and plain error review is requested. [2] Rule 30.20. We disagree with Worthington that the evidence violated his constitutional rights by being unduly prejudicial. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991); State v. Roberts, 948 S.W.2d 577, cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1056, 118 S.Ct. 711, 139 L.Ed.2d 652 (1998). Victim impact evidence is designed to show each victim's uniqueness as an individual human being. It is simply another form or method of informing the court about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities. See Payne and Roberts, supra ; State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759 (Mo. banc 1999), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 1814, 143 L.Ed.2d 1017 (1999). During the penalty phase, thirteen witnesses [3] read prepared statements and asked that a message be sent to the community and that justice be served through the sentence imposed. Pictures of Ms. Griffin and her family, as well as awards and other evidence about her life were introduced at the hearing. This Court has rejected the notion that the state is only allowed to present a brief glimpse of the victim's life. State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759. No manifest injustice occurred in allowing the judge, who was sentencing Worthington, to hear this victim impact evidence.