Opinion ID: 2709690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: In this petition, Ruptash challenges only the adverse credibility finding relied upon by the IJ (and the Board) to deny her application. She argues principally that her misrepresentations were not sufficiently material to doom her claim. See Adekpe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 2007). She does not expound on this point, however, beyond noting that her misrepresentations do not relate to her narrative about the persecution she suffered in Ukraine. This court will disturb an IJ's credibility assessment only in “extraordinary circumstances.” Rama v. Holder, 607 F.3d 461, 465 (7th Cir. 2010); Krishnapillai v. Holder, 563 F.3d 606, 617 (7th Cir. 2009). The IJ here appropriately relied on Ruptash’s repeated misrepresentations about her dates of persecution and entry to ground her adverse credibility finding, because these misrepresentations were material rather than trivial. See Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 617; Kadia v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 817, 822 (7th Cir. 2007). These falsehoods bore directly on Ruptash’s ability to establish eligibility for asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B); Patel v. Holder, 581 F.3d 631, 634 (7th Cir. 2009). Because Ruptash was willing to deliberately lie to avoid the consequences of her untimely filing and remain in the United States, it was within the IJ’s discretion to conclude that she would also have been willing to fabricate her account of mistreatment at the hands of the Ukrainian police. See Pavlov v. Holder, 697 F.3d 616, 617, 619 (7th Cir. 2012); Alsagladi v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 700, 701 (7th Cir. 2006). Given that even a single, significant falsehood can ground an adverse credibility finding, see Long-Gang Lin v. Holder, 630 F.3d 536, 544 (7th Cir. 2010); Huang, 453 F.3d at 945, 947, the IJ did not err by disbelieving Ruptash’s account of persecution. Because the IJ appropriately disbelieved Ruptash’s account, she was required to present a “convincing explanation” for the falsehoods in her asylum application. See Torres v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 2008); Capric v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1075, 1086 (7th Cir. 2004). Ruptash contends that she did just that by explaining that Vardan supplied the false dates and threatened to harm her if she did not go along with the lies. Though the IJ could not have discredited Ruptash if she were an unknowing or unwilling participant in Vardan’s fraud, see Chen v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 707, 710 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Alvarez- Santos No. 12-2683 Page 5 v. INS, 332 F.3d 1245, 1254 (9th Cir. 2003)), the record did not compel the IJ to accept such a conclusion. As the IJ noted, Ruptash admitted that she was aware, long before submitting her application, that it would be untimely, and repeated her lies until confronted by the immigration officer with proof that she had years earlier obtained a driver’s license and social security number. Thus, the IJ could reasonably conclude that Ruptash’s story about Vardan was simply her attempt to fabricate an excuse to escape the consequences of her earlier falsehoods. See Pavlov, 697 F.3d at 619. Ruptash also generally asserts that the IJ erred by not explicitly discussing her demeanor or the inherent plausibility of her account—two of the factors upon which an IJ “may base” a credibility finding. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). But, having spotlighted the significance of Ruptash’s misrepresentations, the IJ was not required to specifically comment on every other factor listed in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). See Boadi v. Holder, 706 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2013); Mitondo v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir. 2008). Ruptash last contends that her failure to provide testimony or an affidavit from her husband should not have been “held against her” by the IJ, because the IJ never requested such corroboration before issuing a decision. But the IJ could reasonablely have expected corroborating testimony from Ruptash’s husband: he could provide a firsthand account of Ruptash’s beatings, which are nowhere mentioned in the corroborating documents Ruptash did submit. See Krishnapillai, 563 F.3d at 619 (corroboration could reasonably be expected from applicant’s wife who had witnessed many of the otherwise uncorroborated events described in asylum application). Moreover, the REAL ID Act informs applicants that an IJ may require corroboration even if they testify credibly. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Because the REAL ID ACT itself put Ruptash on notice that she should provide all the corroborating evidence available, the IJ was not required to independently ask her for her husband’s affidavit, or give her a second chance to supply that evidence before ruling against her. See Abraham v. Holder, 647 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2011); Rapheal v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 521, 530 (7th Cir. 2008). Accordingly, we DENY Ruptash’s petition for review.