Opinion ID: 2637928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Motion for Mistrial After Evidence of Other Crimes Admitted in Violation of K.S.A. 60-455

Text: Tatum argues that evidence of selling drugs in the past and involvement in other homicides was evidence of other crimes inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-455, and, therefore, the erroneous admission of that evidence required a mistrial. K.S.A. 22-3423(1)(c) provides that the trial court may terminate the trial and order a mistrial at any time if the trial court determines termination is necessary because `[p]rejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution.' State v. Humphery, 267 Kan. 45, 60, 978 P.2d 264 (1999). A trial court's decision on a motion for mistrial is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Daniels, 278 Kan. 53, 66, 91 P.3d 1147 (2004). The defendant's argument is based on two instances in which he claims evidence of other crimes was erroneously admitted by the trial court requiring a mistrial. The first instance occurred during Detective Babcock's testimony about when he first encountered Tatum's nickname: Q.: [Prosecutor]: And as far as Hilltop goes, are you familiar with someone with the nickname Edie? A.: [Detective Babcock]: Yes. Q.: When did that name first appear? A.: I first started dealing with the first homicide case that got assigned to me   Tatum objected, arguing that testimony about his involvement in other crimes violated K.S.A. 60-455. The court expressed some concern over the comment and ordered the State to rephrase the question and in effect to stay away from other crimes evidence. The State counters that this testimony by Detective Babcock did not indicate that Tatum was involved in criminal activity. According to the State, the fact that someone is mentioned as part of an investigation is not evidence of criminal activity in violation of K.S.A. 60-455. We agree. The fact that someone's name was mentioned in the course of a police investigation, without more, is not evidence of a prior crime. K.S.A. 60-455 provides that evidence that a person committed a crime on a specified occasion is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit crime as the basis for an inference that the person committed the crime charged. The statute was intended to prohibit usage of a previous crime in another trial to imply the disposition to commit the crime currently being charged. [Citation omitted.] State v. Mims, 264, Kan. 506, 511, 956 P.2d 1337 (1998). Cf. State v. DeMotte, 222 Kan. 206, 207, 563 P.2d 476 (1977) (K.S.A. 60-455 does not apply to evidence that defendant dropped a gun at the scene of the burglary where possession of gun not a crime or civil wrong); State v. Blue, 221 Kan. 185, 188, 558 P.2d 136 (1976) (rebuttal evidence contradicting defense witnesses that showed the defendant had visited other pharmacies on the day he had presented forged prescription at a pharmacy was not evidence of other crime under K.S.A. 60-455). Assuming for the sake of defendant's argument that some prejudice may have attached with the above testimony of Detective Babcock, the question is whether the admission of this evidence was harmless or prejudicial error. The erroneous admission of other crimes evidence will not require reversal if it did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant. See State v. Kendall, 274 Kan. 1003, 1010, 58 P.3d 660 (2002); see also State v. Edwards, 264 Kan. 177, 202, 955 P.2d 1276 (1998) (citing State v. Bornholdt, 261 Kan. 644, 660, 932 P.2d 964 [1997]); State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, Syl. ¶ 7, 44 P.3d 466 (2002) (Normally, the admission or exclusion of evidence is measured by the harmless error rule. In determining if the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence is harmless, this court must consider if it is inconsistent with substantial justice, i.e., affects the substantial rights of a defendant and, if not, whether this court can declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial.). Applying this test, the admission of Detective Babcock's statement that he first came across Tatum's name during a homicide investigation did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant and had little, if any, effect of changing the result at trial. First, the statement did not specifically implicate Tatum in prior criminal activity. Second, the evidence of Tatum's motive for this crime was abundant. Further, the victim and another eyewitness, both of whom knew Tatum from the mall incident, identified him as one of the shooters. Thus, the admission of this testimony was harmless. The second incident prompting the motion for mistrial occurred when Detective Babcock was testifying about his interrogation of Tatum: Q.: [Prosecutor]: Detective, did you ever talk to Mr. Tatum about his involvement with Hilltop? A.: [Detective Babcock]: I'm sure that I did. Q.: Would your  your report refresh your memory? A.: Yes. Yes, sir. Q.: And what did he tell you about his involvement with Hilltop? A.: He claimed that he was misunderstood, that back in 2000 he saw another homicide victim get killed. He stated prior to that he had sold drugs at Hilltop, but since the day of that homicide   Defense counsel objected that Tatum's statements about selling drugs in the past and witnessing a homicide were inadmissible evidence of other crimes under K.S.A. 60-455. The court agreed and sustained the objection. Tatum's counsel then asked for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion but offered to instruct the jury to disregard the testimony. Tatum's counsel expressed concern that there was no effective cure but agreed to a curative instruction. The trial court instructed the jury: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you should disregard the last statement that the detective made at one point Mr. Tatum indicated to him that he had sold drugs at sometime in the past. You should disregard that, you should not consider that in your deliberations in this case. Tatum argues that evidence of selling drugs in the past and involvement in other homicides was evidence of other crimes inadmissible under K.S.A. 60-455, and, therefore, the erroneous admission of that evidence required a mistrial. As indicated above the trial court may terminate the trial and order a mistrial at any time if the trial court determines termination is necessary because `[p]rejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either the defendant or the prosecution.' K.S.A. 22-3423(c)(1); Humphery, 267 Kan. at 60. The trial court sustained counsel's objection to the testimony and offered a curative instruction, to which counsel agreed. Generally, an admonition to the jury cures the prejudice from an improper admission of evidence. State v. Navarro, 272 Kan. 573, 582, 35 P.3d 802 (2001). Accordingly, where the trial court sustains an objection and admonishes the jury to disregard the objectionable testimony, reversal is not required unless the remarks are so prejudicial as to be incurable. State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 642, 88 P.3d 218 (2004). The defendant's argument on this issue is conclusory. He merely argues [t]here was no way to sufficiently cure the prejudice from the detective's remarks. It is the defendant's burden to prove that he was substantially prejudiced by the remarks. See State v. Navarro, 272 Kan. at 582. Given the curative instruction, the overwhelming evidence against Tatum, and his failure to show how the remarks caused substantial prejudice, it cannot be said the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial was an abuse of discretion. Affirmed.