Opinion ID: 1843613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penalty-Phase

Text: Jordan contends that the trial court improperly allowed the prosecution to present, through the testimony of two witnesses, irrelevant, prejudicial, and incompetent evidence at the penalty-phase proceeding. We find merit in this claim and determine that a resentencing is needed. At issue is the testimony of Carol Brown and Samuel Strang. Both witnesses were allowed to testify after a proffer and over the strenuous and repeated objections of the defense. Their testimony was presumably offered to support an instruction for the heinous, atrocious, or cruel statutory aggravating circumstance. No such instruction was eventually given to the jury. The witness Brown is a therapist with a bachelor's degree in psychology and a master's degree in counseling. The general tone of Brown's testimony is exemplified by the following exchange that took place after the jury heard a description of the environment in which Jordan was raised. Brown stated: Q [Ashton]: Is there literature, studies to document whether at some point persons who have grown up in that environment actually begin to take some pleasure from acts of violence? A [Brown]: Yes, there is. Q: Explain that to the jury, how is that possible, how does that work? A: There are various theories, but it would be akin to a parachutist who likes to sky dive, who turns the fear into a pleasurable event so that the excitement and the adrenaline they receive from committing the violent act is turned over into a drug like substance in the brain, like opium, so they become addicted to the adrenaline flow, raises the endorphins in the mind to produce a calmness following the act. Mr. West: I would object to this testimony on the basis that notwithstanding Miss Brown's expertise as determined by the court, there's been no showing that she is an expert in brain chemistry, as a neurologist, is in any way competent to talk about the chemical activity of the brain. Mr. Ashton: I agree, and Mr. West: How it affects motions. [Brown]: I was quoting from Mr. Ashton: I agree. I don't think she's giving that opinion, and I'll have her specify she's relating literature. Mr. West: I would like it to be relevant to this case rather than just quoting from literature. The Court: Objection overruled. By Mr. Ashton: Regardless of the reason for that relationship, is that a documented relationship between the environment and [actually] getting pleasure from violence? A [Brown]: Yes. Q [Ashton]: In looking at Mr. Jordan'sall the information you've been given, does he appear to fit that profile of offender who has come to gain pleasure from violence? A [Brown]: Yes. Presumptively, Brown's testimony was presented to [prove] Jordan's `perception' when he chased a 76-year-old woman. We find that Brown's testimony did little to accomplish that feat. In fact, she stated in the recross examination during the proffer that she was unable to particularly say that Jordan enjoyed committing this crime. Her testimony was only aimed at relaying the profiles described by scientific literature. Based on those profiles, she opined, in front of the jury, that Jordan is a sociopath without conscience and experiences a euphoria from his aggressive behaviors. The prosecutor reiterated these characterizations during closing argument. He stated that giving pain and giving horror is what [Jordan] likes. Further, he added that to [Jordan], making someone suffer is the most important thing. We again note that the trial judge refused to give an instruction on the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance. A witness may not testify to matters that fall outside her area of expertise. Hall v. State, 568 So.2d 882, 884 (Fla.1990). While a trial court has broad discretion in admitting expert testimony, such discretion is not boundless. Id. In this case, Brown's area of expertise was presented as follows: BY MR. ASHTON: Q State your name. A Carol Brown. Q How are you presently employed? A I'm in private practice as a therapist. Q What is your educational background? A I have a bachelor's in psychology and the master is in counseling. Q And during the years you've worked since getting your degrees, or while getting your degrees, what type of occupation do you have related to what you do today? A During the years I got my degree? Q Yes. A I worked in domestic violence, spouse abuse, I worked in alcohol and drug rehabilitation and I worked for a couple of years with spousal abuse prevention in developing programs for abused children who had been sexually abused, those kinds of things. I work in the prison system. Q What do you do today? A Primarily focus on sex offender treatment, domestic violence, treating the survivor of sexual abuse and adolescent juvenile sex offenders and small children who have been abused. The defense objected to the State's motion that Brown be qualified as an expert. The defense stated: MR WEST: We object. Initially, on the grounds that it's notthis court has not been asked to identify any area within the broad spectrum of mental health issues for which this witness may be called to render an opinion. THE COURT: Would the attorneys approach the bench. (The following proceedings were had at the bench.) THE COURT: I understand your initial objection. Would you state all of your objections. MR WEST: I won't know what they are until the court rules on that, because on these issues I would assume there would be a very specific area for which this person would be called upon to render an opinion, an area within the broad spectrum of the mental health issues, all the way from marital and family counseling to insanity for the purposes of defenses or competence to stand trial, simply too broad at this point. THE COURT: Mr. Ashton? MR. ASHTON: I've proffered the opinion I'm going to ask her. I don't know what label to put on that opinion. I don't think I have to put a label on it. But she is sufficiently qualified to give an opinion in the area she did in the proffer. In essence, that's what I'm asking for. I think she is qualified to mental health evaluations, if you will. It's difficult to put labels on this type of thing. THE COURT: I left my book in the other room. I find that Carol Brown meets the standard set forth in the Evidence Code for evidence qualification to testify as [an] expert witness. MR. WEST: In what area? THE COURT: I find that she is able tobetter able than a lay person to testify in the area of mental health, and that hershe is qualified to render the opinions that we heard in the proffer. MR. WEST: I asked her [a] specific question, whether she was in a position to state an opinion thatto a degree of reasonable psychological or therapeutic certainty, or what have you, that Keydrick Jordan enjoyed the act of killing Ann Mintner, and she said, no, she was not in a position to do that. That's the ultimate issue for which she would be required to give an opinion, and the only conceivably relevant issue, and she's already answered that she can't do that. THE COURT: I understand your objection. I overrule and qualify her as [an] expert. Brown's area of expertise was never clearly defined by the trial judge. Her education was not definitively focused in the areas to which she testified. Degrees in psychology and counseling do not necessarily qualify one to testify to complicated profile evidence [8] taken from scientific literature. Here, it seems to us, Brown cannot reasonably be considered an expert in offender profile evidence. Her experiences confirm our finding. She was not, at the time of her testimony, working with either compiling or studying profile evidence. Her opinion as to the inner workings of Jordan's mind at the time of the killing was based heavily on literature she had read. [9] There is no absolute prohibition against qualifying an expert based upon his or her study of authoritative sources without any practical experience in the subject matter. Ehrhardt, § 702.1, at 512. The problem in this case is that Brown did not demonstrate, in the record, a sufficient study of the scientific literature. Simply reading large amounts of scientific literature, all of which falls well outside a person's area of educational expertise, cannot serve to create an expert out of a non-expert. In this case, Brown testified to matters that were demonstrably outside of her areas of expertise. It was clearly an error for the trial judge to qualify her as an expert. We find that the error cannot be considered harmless in this case. Jordan was labeled a sociopath without conscience in front of the jury. The jury recommendation of death was only by an eight-to-four margin. The error in qualifying Brown as an expert necessitates a new sentencing proceeding. This is especially true insofar as this error was compounded by the inappropriate testimony offered by Strang. Strang is a clinical gerontologist. His testimony is exemplified by the following excerpt: A [Strang]: The most recent research indicates that elderly people are probably not any more prone to the concern of crime than the other segments of the population. Q [Ashton]: Are there exceptions to that general rule? A [Strang]: Yes, the three exceptions generally are elderly women, elderly women that are approached in the street and elderly women that have a predisposition, presensitization by having been victimized previously. .... Q [Ashton]: What is your opinion as to the level of anxiety that Miss Mintner would have experienced from the beginning of the crime until she fell unconscious, can you describe it for us? .... A [Strang]: I would assume she was in abject terror, that this was probably her worst nightmare come true. We have stated that expert testimony should be excluded where the facts testified to are of such a nature as not to require any special knowledge or experience in order for the jury to form conclusions from the facts. Johnson v. State, 393 So.2d 1069, 1072 (Fla.1980). In this case, there was certainly no need for an expert to testify as to the fear Mintner was feeling in her confrontation with Jordan. Our common experiences dictate that an elderly woman approached in public by a man with a gun will be terrified. When a fact is so basic that an expert opinion will not assist the jury, an expert should not be allowed to testify. Ehrhardt, § 702.2 at 518. See also Lewis v. State, 572 So.2d 908, 911 (Fla.1990)(finding no error in exclusion of expert testimony to matters well within the common understanding of jury). Here, Strang's testimony served only to build sympathy within the jury for the victim. The trial judge erred in allowing such testimony. See generally Smith v. State, 674 So.2d 791 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996), review denied, 684 So.2d 1352 (Fla.1996)(finding improper expert testimony irrelevant to the proper jury role); Florida Power Corp. v. Barron, 481 So.2d 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)(finding improper expert testimony to matters of common understanding). In light of the highly prejudicial testimony offered by Brown and the improper testimony offered by Strang, we conclude that Jordan was denied a fair and constitutional sentencing proceeding. We need not address Jordan's three other penalty-phase claims [10] in view of our determination that a resentencing is warranted. Accordingly, we affirm Jordan's convictions of first-degree murder and attempted robbery but vacate his death sentence because of the admission of clearly improper expert opinion evidence in the penalty-phase proceeding. We remand for a new penaltyphase proceeding before a new jury and direct that this proceeding be held within 120 days of this opinion becoming final. It is so ordered. KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, GRIMES, HARDING and WELLS, JJ., concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in conclusion only as to guilt phase and concurs in penalty opinion.