Opinion ID: 4532144
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impact of Rehaif v. United States

Text: During the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019), which held that in a felon-in-possession prosecution, “the Government must prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Id. at 2200. Supplemental briefing was submitted, and McLellan now makes two additional arguments based on Rehaif. First, he contends that his superseding indictment failed to charge an offense because it did not include a knowledge-of-status element, thus depriving the district court of jurisdiction over his case. Second, he contends that both of his convictions must be overturned because his jury instructions at trial on count one, and his plea colloquy on count two, failed to include the knowledge-of-status element.
For each count against McLellan, his superseding indictment stated, in relevant part, that “having been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one (1) year, to-wit: Burglary, First Degree, on September 23, 1999, in the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Alabama . . . [McLellan] did knowingly possess, in and affecting commerce, a firearm . . . [i]n violation of Title 14 Case: 18-13289 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 15 of 20 18, United States Code, Section 922(g)(1).” McLellan argues that, because the indictment failed to include the knowledge-of-status element, as discussed in Rehaif, it failed to charge a crime and thus deprived the district court of jurisdiction over his case. However, this argument is squarely precluded by our recent holding in United States v. Moore, ___F.3d___, 2020 WL 1527975 at  (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2020), which held that a district court has jurisdiction over a felon-in-possession indictment that was filed before Rehaif even if it did not charge the knowledge-of-status element. This holding squarely follows the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002), as well as our earlier holding in United States v. Brown, 752 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir. 2014), both of which held that an indictment’s failure to charge an element of the offense was a non-jurisdictional defect that did not affect the rights of the accused. The defendants in Cotton had argued that because their indictment failed to charge the quantity of drugs they were accused of trafficking—a sentence-enhancing element under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)—then the district court did not have jurisdiction over their case. But the Supreme Court rejected that argument, holding that “defects in an indictment do not deprive a court of its power to adjudicate a case.” Cotton, 535 U.S. at 630. We built upon that foundation in Brown, which involved a defendant who had pleaded guilty to receiving counterfeit 15 Case: 18-13289 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 16 of 20 money, but whose indictment failed to expressly allege that she had knowingly violated the statute. On appeal, the defendant argued that her conviction should be overturned because the omission of the mens rea element deprived the district court of jurisdiction. We rejected the argument, noting that the omission of a mens rea element does not render the indictment incapable of charging a crime, which is all that is necessary to vest the district court with jurisdiction. See Brown, 752 F.3d at 1353–54. We noted that the proper question to ask in determining whether an indictment is jurisdictionally defective is “whether the indictment charged the defendant with a criminal ‘offense[] against the laws of the United States.’” Id. at 1353 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3231). For example, if an indictment charges that the defendant violated a regulation that carried only civil penalties, but does not allege any corresponding criminal violation, that indictment would fail to charge a crime against the United States and would thus be jurisdictionally defective. See United States v. Izurieta, 710 F.3d 1176, 1184 (11th Cir. 2013). But there is no jurisdictional defect if an indictment merely fails to include that the defendant knowingly committed the crime but otherwise clearly alleges the unlawful conduct that the defendant is accused of committing. Here, the indictment unquestionably charged McLellan with violating the felon-in-possession statute, and even included one of the predicate felonies that formed the basis of the accusation. The specific prohibited conduct—the possession 16 Case: 18-13289 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 17 of 20 of the firearm as a felon—was clearly described in the indictment, and thus the indictment did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction. 2. Challenges to Jury Instructions and Plea Colloquy Having concluded that the district court had jurisdiction over McLellan’s case, we next review McLellan’s substantive challenges to his jury instructions and plea colloquy. McLellan failed to raise either challenge before the district court, and thus we review for plain error. See United States v. Reed, 941 F.3d 1018, 1020 (11th Cir. 2019); Moore, 2020 WL 1527975 at . To overturn a conviction on plain-error review, the defendant “must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected his substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has since clarified that for an error to have affected a defendant’s substantial rights, there must be “‘a reasonable probability that, but for the error,’ the outcome of the proceeding would have been different[.]” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1343 (2016) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76, 82 (2004)). McLellan contends that his conviction at trial on his first felon-in-possession count should be overturned because the jury instructions failed to include the knowledge-of-status element. However, this error, although now plain—thus 17 Case: 18-13289 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 18 of 20 meeting the first two parts of the plain-error analysis—did not affect McLellan’s substantial rights or the fairness of the judicial proceedings. It is undisputed that McLellan is a felon, and he stipulated to that fact at trial. Because of this stipulation, made pursuant to Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191–92 (1997), the government was prohibited from introducing any evidence of McLellan’s prior felonies. But that does not mean that the government would have been similarly prohibited had McLellan actually contested the knowledge-ofstatus element at trial. McLellan has multiple prior felonies, for which he served approximately ten years in prison. If McLellan is retried, he would not be entitled to have simply a different jury instruction but with the same evidence that was presented at trial. He would instead be confronted with the evidence of his knowledge of his felonies. Indeed, it is inconceivable that McLellan did not know that he was a felon when he possessed the gun. The record shows that McLellan has served approximately ten years in prison, on and off, including an almost eight-year long sentence between 2003 and 2011 for a probation violation on a first-degree burglary conviction.5 At his sentencing, McLellan acknowledged that he “was sent to prison for 10 years” for prior burglaries. McLellan also made a statement to the judge 5 We are permitted to “consult the whole record when considering the effect of any error on [McLellan’s] substantial rights.” Reed, 941 F.3d at 1021 (quoting United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 59 (2002)). 18 Case: 18-13289 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 19 of 20 indicating that, before the time of these offenses, he knew that he was not permitted to possess a firearm due to his prior convictions. Referring to an earlier occasion, he recounted that: “Me and my mother got in an argument because she had my uncle come in there with the shotgun. . . . And I remember saying if I get caught with one of these––and I made a comment about going to prison because I just wanted the shotgun put back in place to have something to protect us with.” In short, this is not a situation in which McLellan’s felony status was “hotly contested.” See United States v. Balde, 943 F.3d 73, 97 (2d Cir. 2019). We have held that, where the record clearly demonstrates that it would be implausible for the defendant to not have been aware of his felony status, a Rehaif error does not affect his substantial rights. Reed, 941 F.3d at 1022. The fairness of the proceedings takes on additional importance here as well, as “[w]e will not penalize the government for its failure to introduce evidence that it had but that, prior to Rehaif, it would have been precluded from introducing.” United States v. Miller, ___F.3d____, 2020 WL 1592254 at , (2d Cir. Apr. 2, 2020). Indeed, it would negatively affect the fairness and reputation of the judicial proceedings to remand this case for retrial when there is clear evidence that McLellan was aware of his felony status. There was thus no plain error in the district court’s failure to instruct the jury of the knowledge-of-status element. Finally, McLellan argues that even if his conviction at trial on count one is upheld, that his guilty plea on count two should still be overturned because his plea 19 Case: 18-13289 Date Filed: 05/06/2020 Page: 20 of 20 colloquy omitted the knowledge-of-status element. In effect, McLellan is arguing that he never pleaded guilty to a crime, because the government did not proffer, and he did not admit, that he knew he was a felon when he possessed the gun in the circumstances described by his plea colloquy. However, this argument is unavailing because McLellan cannot demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 76. There was no contemporaneous evidence to suggest that, had the indictment included the knowledge-of-status element, McLellan would have changed his plea and proceeded to trial on the second count. Proceeding to trial would have deprived McLellan of any benefit of his guilty plea, and he would have risked an additional conviction on his third felon-in-possession count, which had been dismissed pursuant to the plea. And as discussed above, if McLellan had proceeded to trial, the record reveals no basis for concluding that the government would have been unable to able to prove that McLellan knew he was a felon when he possessed the gun. We thus hold that any error from the lack of a knowledge-of-status element in McLellan’s plea colloquy did not affect his substantial rights.