Opinion ID: 715713
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: validity of instruction

Text: 10 The instruction given by the district court on the knowledge element of the crime was as follows:[Section 2232(c) of Title 18] has a number of elements that must be proven before the defendant can be found guilty. The first is that the defendant had knowledge that authorizations to conduct electronic surveillance of Abe Chapman had been applied for. 11 Knowledge of a fact, members of the jury, means that you're satisfied from the evidence that he knew it or knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance may be satisfied by proof that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of that circumstance. Unless you find from the evidence that the defendant actually believed that the circumstance did not exist. 12 So in order to determine whether or not the evidence has satisfied the element that the defendant had knowledge of an alleged--and that, of course, must be proven there was an application for electronic surveillance on Abe Chapman's conversations, you should determine from the evidence whether you believe that an application had been applied for and whether or not you believe that defendant was aware, actually knew, or was aware of a high probability that it existed. Or to the contrary whether you find it was his belief, in fact, that the application had not been applied for. 13 (emphasis added). The it in the underlined sentence plainly refers to an application for electronic surveillance on Abe Chapman's conversations. 14 The district court is not necessarily required to define knowledge for the reason that it is a common word which an average juror can understand and apply without further instruction. See United States v. Chambers, 918 F.2d 1455, 1460 (9th Cir.1990); accord. United States v. Brown, 33 F.3d 1014 (8th Cir.1994) ( 'Knowingly' is not a term of art.). Although a correct instruction may assist jurors in understanding knowledge, an incorrect instruction may dilute its meaning and permit a conviction without proof of guilt. Because the distinction between knowledge and lesser mental states such as recklessness and negligence is subtle, we have reviewed knowledge instructions carefully. 15 In offering its instruction that it was only necessary to establish a high probability of the existence of the fact in question in order to satisfy the knowledge requirement, the Government cited United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951, 96 S.Ct. 3173, 49 L.Ed.2d 1188 (1976). In that case, we approved an exception to the requirement of actual knowledge when there is evidence that the defendant has his suspicion aroused, but then he deliberately omits making an inquiry in order to avoid having actual knowledge. A deliberate ignorance instruction was given as an alternative to finding actual knowledge. We stated that [t]he substantive justification for the rule is that deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge are equally culpable. Jewell, 532 F.2d at 700. 1 16 We quoted several learned treatises and noted: 17 This is the analysis adopted in the Model Penal Code. Section 2.02(7) states: When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist. As the comment to this provision explains, Paragraph (7) deals with the situation British commentators have denominated 'wilful blindness' or 'connivance,' the case of the actor who is aware of the probable existence of a material fact but does not satisfy himself that it does not in fact exist. 18 Id. (footnote omitted). We thereupon affirmed the conviction of the defendant who was paid for driving 110 pounds of marijuana across the border in a concealed secret compartment between the trunk and the rear seat of the car that he was aware of but chose not examine the contents. 19 Then-Circuit Judge Kennedy, joined by three members of the court, stated in dissent:[T]he jury instruction clearly states that Jewell could have been convicted even if found ignorant or not actually aware that the car contained a controlled substance. This is unacceptable because true ignorance, no matter how unreasonable, cannot provide a basis for criminal liability when the statute requires knowledge. A proper jury instruction based on the Model Penal Code would be presented as a way of defining knowledge, and not as an alternative to it. 20 Id. at 707 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 21 The serious defect in the instruction given by the district court in this case is that high probability of the awareness of the circumstance was given as an alternative to actual knowledge without the requirement that there be evidence of willful blindness. It is apparent that the district judge gave two alternatives by which it could find the element of knowledge. One alternative was whether the defendant was aware, actually knew, that an authorization to conduct surveillance of Abe Chapman had been applied for. The other alternative was that the defendant was aware of a high probability of the existence of that circumstance. These two alternatives were connected by the disjunctive or. Thus, the jury was able to find that the element of knowledge was satisfied not only if it found that the appellant was aware of the circumstance, that he actually knew it, but also if it found that he did not actually know it, but he was aware of a high probability that it existed. This allowed the jury to convict the appellant on a finding of less than actual knowledge or awareness. 22 The Government concedes that no evidence was presented or argument made that there was willful blindness in this case. The instruction given was contrary to the majority opinion in Jewell in that the requirement of willful blindness was omitted from the instruction and there was no evidence of willful blindness. The instruction is also contrary to the dissent in that high probability of awareness was offered as an alternative to actual knowledge. 23 Our circuit has continued to follow the majority opinion in Jewell, utilizing Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) only in situations where the evidence justifies an argument of willful blindness. It has never been used in this circuit as a definition of actual knowledge. 24 In United States v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc., 768 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir.1985), an instruction had been given utilizing the wording of Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) with the deliberate avoidance language included. The opinion of the court, written by then-Circuit Judge Kennedy, provided an extensive review of the case law of our circuit and stated: 25 The use of the so-called Jewell, or deliberate avoidance instruction, on the facts of this case was erroneous and requires reversal. 26 We first authorized the use of a deliberate avoidance instruction in the context of a prosecution of importation of controlled substances, and subsequent cases approving its use have presented similar factual patterns. We have also permitted the use of a Jewell instruction outside the context of a drug prosecution. 27 In light of the evidence adduced by the prosecution in this case, however, the district court's decision to instruct the jury on the doctrine of deliberate avoidance was error. A Jewell instruction is properly given only when defendant claims a lack of guilty knowledge and the proof at trial supports an inference of deliberate ignorance. It is not enough that defendant was mistaken, recklessly disregarded the truth, or negligently failed to inquire. Instead, the government must present evidence indicating that defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning all of the facts in order to have a defense in the event of subsequent prosecution. Absent such evidence, the jury might impermissibly infer guilty knowledge on the basis of mere negligence without proof of deliberate avoidance. 28 In the case before us, the government has presented insufficient evidence of willful blindness on the part of defendants to warrant a Jewell instruction. 29 Pacific Hide, 768 F.2d at 1098-99 (citations omitted). 30 It is clear from our circuit authority that Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) has been utilized only when there is evidence of deliberate blindness and only when that aspect is incorporated into the instruction. In this case, the authority offered by the Government for the instruction was United States v. Jewell. It is clear that the instruction given is contrary to Jewell. The Government no longer relies on that authority. In earlier briefs, the Government also relied on the legislative history of section 2232(c) as justification for the instruction. It has also abandoned that argument. The Government now rests its argument solely on the proposition that Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) can be used to define actual knowledge even when there is no proof of willful blindness. 31 Even if we were to accept the Government's argument, it does not apply in this case. Section 2.02(7) was given as an alternative to actual knowledge, not a definition of actual knowledge. 32 The jury could reasonably have construed the instruction as telling them that something less than actual knowledge satisfies the requirement. As we have discussed, there is no authority for giving a section 2.02(7) high probability instruction as an alternative to actual knowledge. Indeed, it directly conflicts with both the majority and the dissent in Jewell and with the subsequent authority of this circuit. We conclude that the instruction is erroneous.