Opinion ID: 884034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A person commits the offense of tampering with public records or information if he:

Text: (a) knowingly makes a false entry in or false alteration of any record, document, legislative bill or enactment, or thing belonging to or received, issued, or kept by the government for information or record or required by law to be kept by others for information of the government; (b) makes, presents, or uses any record, document, or thing knowing it to be false and with purpose that it be taken as a genuine part of information or records referred to in subsection (1)(a); or (c) purposely destroys, conceals, removes, or otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such record, document, or thing. (2) A person convicted of the offense of tampering with public records or information shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed 10 years or be fined an amount not to exceed $50,000, or both. Kelman argues that he acted in good faith and on the advice of his counsel. He maintains that Robinson completed the application form and Losleben completed the investigation report. Thus, Kelman claims he did not knowingly falsify the information contained in the application documents. He claims he made an honest effort to comply with the requirements of the application which he contends were confusing and ambiguous. Kelman goes on to argue that the funds sent by Ransome were personal in nature and that Flynn and Losleben indicated they were not interested in knowing the source of the funds he was personally investing in the business. Kelman further claims that at the time the application forms were submitted neither his partnership with Ransome nor a loan agreement had been consummated. Thus, he claims he was put into a Catch-22 situation in that the funds could not properly be characterized as either an investment in the business or a loan obligation. The State argues that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial of every element of the crime, including the requisite mental state necessary to convict Kelman. The State contends that the $90,000 Kelman received from Ransome was either an investment in Boxcars or a financial obligation of the business, which in either case should have been reported on the application and investigation report. The State maintains that Kelman's contention that the loan was personal rather than a loan of money for the Boxcars business venture is not credible and raises the inference that he was not telling the truth about how the $90,000 was omitted from the application materials. The jury was instructed that the existence of a mental state may be inferred from the acts of the accused and the facts and circumstances connected with the offense. Section 45-2-103(3), MCA. The jury was presented with evidence concerning Kelman's acts and the circumstances surrounding the case. Although Robinson initially signed the gambling operator application form, he testified that at that point in time he was not aware that Kelman had received money from Ransome for the Boxcars project. When Flynn and his supervisor met with Kelman and Robinson in March 1992, Flynn explained the definition of a noninstitutional source of funding. Flynn sent Kelman a follow-up letter after the meeting emphasizing the importance of disclosing noninstitutional funding. When Kelman completed the NIL form later that month he indicated he had received two noninstitutional loans, one from American Music and one from BTE. He failed to disclose the $70,000 he had already received from Ransome. By the time Kelman met with Losleben, Kelman had received $90,000 from Ransome. Losleben and Kelman together reviewed the pending application and the investigation report. Losleben filled out the report but Kelman acknowledged he was present at the time and read through the document before he signed it. Both forms clearly indicated above the signature lines that the information was true and correct and that false information could result in denial of the license and criminal prosecution. Nowhere on either the application form or the investigation report did Kelman disclose the funds received from Ransome. At no point during his conversations with Flynn or Losleben did Kelman mention the Louisiana funding for the project. Kelman claims he did not list the Ransome money because he and Ransome had not yet executed a formal partnership or loan agreement. However, the record indicates that Ransome sent the money to Kelman specifically for the Boxcars project and that the money went directly into an account used to pay for Boxcars' expenses. Kelman nevertheless made a conscious choice not to disclose to the Division the funds sent by Ransome when disclosure of such noninstitutional funding sources was required. The jury did not find credible Kelman's contention that Ransome's money was neither an investment in Boxcars nor a loan for the business venture. We have stated that the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be assigned to their testimony are to be determined by the trier of fact and disputed questions of fact and credibility will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Graves (1995), 272 Mont. 451, 457, 901 P.2d 549, 553. The jury decides the facts and who to believe. Graves, 901 P.2d at 553. We conclude, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. We hold that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury verdict, and therefore, affirm the District Court on this issue.