Opinion ID: 1390030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Alternative Habeas Standards under Schlup and Herrera

Text: Finally, if AEDPA does not apply to this successive petition, then the gateway claims presented by Petitioner are governed by Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995) and the claims of actual innocence are governed by Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993). The United States Supreme Court has held that a claim of actual innocence can be raised to avoid a procedural bar to the consideration of the merits of [the petitioner's] constitutional claims. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326-27, 115 S.Ct. 851. To make a successful claim under Schlup, a petitioner must show that in light of all the evidence, including new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Cooper, 358 F.3d at 1119 (citation omitted.) To be reliable, a claim of actual innocence must be based on new reliable evidence  whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence  that was not presented at trial. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. The Ninth Circuit did not decide whether the Schlup standard of actual innocence applies. The Schlup standard requires a showing that it in light of all the evidence, including new evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, or whether the more stringent standard under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B) applies, which requires a factual claim [] not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence that establishes by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. Cooper, 358 F.3d at 1119-20(citation omitted, emphasis in original). In Petitioner's previous request to file a successive petition, the Ninth Circuit held that AEDPA governs a successive petition filed after the effective date of AEDPA. Therefore, the Court concludes that AEDPA applies to this successive petition. But even if Schlup applies, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not established in light of all the evidence, including new evidence, that it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Under Schlup, if Petitioner meets his burden of establishing actual innocence, then the Court is to evaluate the alleged violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) or under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As stated by the Supreme Court in Schlup, it is only after a sufficient showing of actual innocence that the court is permitted to consider the other constitutional claims on the merits: Schlup's claim of innocence does not by itself provide a basis for relief. Instead, his claim for relief depends critically on the validity of his Strickland and Brady claims. Schlup's claim of innocence is thus not itself a constitutional claim, but instead a gateway through which a habeas petitioner must pass to have his otherwise barred constitutional claim considered on the merits. . . . [I]f a petitioner such as Schlup presents evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error, the petitioner should be allowed to pass through the gateway and argue the merits of his underlying claims. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 315-16, 115 S.Ct. 851. The actual innocence exception should remain rare and only be applied in the extraordinary case. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321, 115 S.Ct. 851. If AEDPA does not apply to Petitioner's claims of actual innocence, then Petitioner must meet the test of Herrera, which requires a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence . . . [and] because of the very disruptive effect that entertaining claims of actual innocence would have on the need for finality in capital cases, and the enormous burden that having to retry cases based on often stale evidence would place on the States, the threshold showing for such an assumed right would necessarily be extraordinarily high. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417, 113 S.Ct. 853. This contemplates a stronger showing than insufficiency of the evidence to convict or doubt about his guilt. Carriger v. Stewart, 132 F.3d 463, 476 (9th Cir. 1997). Under these standards, a petitioner must affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent. Id. Moreover, Herrera requires that there is no state avenue open to process such a claim. Id. In this case, the California Supreme Court denied Petitioner's actual innocence claims on the merits, ( see Sixth State Habeas Pet. at 12-37; Answer, Ex. 13), and the Governor of California denied Petitioner's application for clemency. But even if upon an evaluation of the merits of Petitioner's claims of actual innocence, the Court concludes that Petitioner has not meet his burden under AEDPA, which requires among other things, a factual claim [] not discoverable through the exercise of due diligence that establishes by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). For the same reasons, the Court also concludes that Petitioner has not met the requirements of Herrera, which requires an extraordinarily high showing of a truly persuasive demonstration of `actual innocence.' Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417, 113 S.Ct. 853. Title 28 U.S.C. section 2244(b)(3)(B) directs that [a] motion in the court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider a second of successive application shall be determined by a three-judge panel of the court of appeals. According to the statute, only a three-judge panel is allowed to review an application for a successive petition. However, in this case, the en banc panel sua sponte granted Petitioner's application to file a successive petition under the authority of Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 922 (9th Cir. 1998).