Opinion ID: 1133476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Was the failure to give a sua sponte limiting instruction reversible error?

Text: ¶ 14. Finally, Webster argues that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his conviction in that the trial court admitted evidence of a prior bad act without making an on-the-record determination that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect of the evidence. Specifically, he argues that the trial court should not have allowed testimony regarding a fight that took place approximately one year earlier between him and the victim because it was too prejudicial. In addition, he argues that the trial court did not sua sponte give the required limiting instruction, and therefore the Court of Appeals' opinion is in conflict with Eubanks v. State, 419 So.2d 1330 (Miss.1982). ¶ 15. In Eubanks, supra, Jeffrey Glenn Eubanks was convicted of simple assault upon a conservation officer after he was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant stemming from an incident a couple of weeks earlier. Eubanks at 1330-31. Over the objection of Eubanks, the State was allowed to present evidence concerning the prior incident which resulted in the issuance of the arrest warrant. Id. at 1331. We found the admission of the evidence to be reversible error, and in so doing we stated: We reverse and remand this case for the reasons enumerated in Spears v. State, 253 Miss. 108, 175 So.2d 158, 167 (1965), wherein we quoted from Scarbrough v. State, 204 Miss. 487, 37 So.2d 748 (1948), stating: This is not one of those cases for the application of the rule that a conviction will be affirmed unless it appears that another jury could reasonably reach a different verdict upon a proper trial than that returned on the former one, but rather it is a case where the constitutional right of an accused to a fair and impartial trial has been violated. When that is done, the defendant is entitled to another trial regardless of the fact that the evidence on the first trial may have shown him to be guilty beyond every reasonable doubt. The law guarantees this to one accused of crime, and until he has had a fair and impartial trial within the meaning of the Constitution and Laws of the State, he is not to be deprived of his liberty by a sentence in the state penitentiary. 204 Miss. at 497, 37 So.2d at 750. Excluding the prejudicial testimony complained of we are aware there was ample evidence to convict Eubanks for simple assault. However, the State, by continuously placing before the jury throughout the trial evidence designed to show Eubanks guilty of other and former misconduct, constituted prejudicial error. The combination of all this prejudicial testimony being introduced before the jury in a prosecution for simple assault, in our opinion, precluded the possibility of a fair trial upon the charge in the indictment. Sumrall v. State, 272 So.2d 917 (Miss.1973). Eubanks at 1332. ¶ 16. On this issue in the present case, as will be shown infra, the Court of Appeals properly found: It is this Court's finding that the trial court properly admitted the testimony under Rule 404(b) because it indicated both a possible motive and showed intent. Furthermore, the trial court did make an adequate on-the-record finding regarding relevancy under Rule 403. Lastly, Webster is correct; no limiting instruction was sought or given by the court sua sponte. Although Smith held it reversible error for the court not to give a limiting instruction sua sponte, neither Smith or any other case on point that had this type of error held that this oversight is not subject to a harmless error analysis. Moss v. State, 727 So.2d 720 (¶ 23)(Miss.Ct.App.1998). In Givens v. State, 96-KA-00650-COA, 730 So.2d 81 (¶ 33)(Miss.Ct.App.1998), this Court cited Forrest v. State, 335 So.2d 900, 903 (Miss.1976), where the supreme court stated, An error is harmless only when it is apparent on the face of the record that a fair minded jury could have arrived at no verdict other than that of guilty. (citations omitted). Webster v. State, 755 So.2d at 459-60 (Miss.Ct.App.1999). After reciting the evidence against Webster, the Court of Appeals found that the failure of the trial court to sua sponte give a limiting instruction regarding Webster's prior bad acts was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence against him. Id. The Court of Appeals went on to add: However, we find it necessary to repeat what Judge Coleman stated in Givens, Lower courts and prosecuting attorneys must not commit errors on the speculation that the Supreme Court [or the Court of Appeals] will affirm on the ground of harmless error. ( Givens, 730 So.2d at 85) (quoting Townsend v. State, 605 So.2d 767, 771 (Miss.1992)). This issue is without merit. Webster at 460. ¶ 17. In Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95 (Miss.1995), Smith was indicted for possession of crack with the intent to distribute. The State, allegedly for the purpose of proving intent to distribute, introduced evidence of Smith's prior sales of cocaine. There we stated: In this crack cocaine case we are compelled to consider the proper handling and import of evidence of prior sales admitted for the purpose of showing intent to distribute. We conclude that such evidence is admissible for the purpose described if the trial court concludes that, under the circumstances, its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. A limiting instruction should and, if sought, must be given. We also conclude that such evidence, without more on the issue of intent, is insufficient to support a conviction for the offense of possession with intent. We, therefore, reverse and remand for sentencing on the offense of possession of cocaine. Id. at 97. ¶ 18. In our analysis of the admissibility of Smith's prior cocaine sales, we found that the trial court properly admitted the evidence of Smith's prior crack sales under the Rule 404(b) exception for acts offered to prove intent, and the trial court properly conducted a balancing analysis under Rule 403. We did, however, find that the trial court committed error by failing to give a limiting instruction: We hold that evidence of prior acts offered to show intent to distribute is not barred by M.R.E. 404 and is properly admissible if it passes muster under M.R.E. 403 and is accompanied by a proper limiting instruction. . . . . . . . . The defense did not request, and the jury was not given, an instruction as to the limited purposes for which the other-crimes evidence could be considered. On appeal, Smith argues that it was error for the lower court not to grant a cautionary instruction, sua sponte. Id. at 99. ¶ 19. We went on to say: Nevertheless, we must be mindful of our rules. We have promulgated M.R.E. 105 which clearly contemplates that restrictive instructions be given upon request and as the Comment acknowledges, that in the absence of a request, there is no error.... We are loath to reverse for plain error in the face of a rule so clear. We say for the future, however, that wherever 404(b) evidence is offered and there is an objection which is overruled, the objection shall be deemed an invocation of the right to MRE 403 balancing analysis and a limiting instruction. The court shall conduct an MRE [403] analysis and, if the evidence passes that hurdle, give a limiting instruction unless the party objecting to the evidence objects to giving the limiting instruction. Id. at 100. The foregoing clearly establishes that if an accused objects to Rule 404(b) evidence and the trial court, after conducting a Rule 403 analysis, finds that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect, the trial court must treat the objection to the admissibility of Rule 404(b) evidence as a request for a limiting instruction. ¶ 20. The question remains, however, as to whether such an error is subject to harmless error analysis as was found by the Court of Appeals. Puckett v. State, 737 So.2d 322 (Miss.1999), is helpful. In that case the prosecution put on evidence that Puckett had been fired by, his previous employer. Puckett at 351. We found that the evidence was admissible pursuant to M.R.E. 404(a) because Puckett had opened the door to character evidence, and in so doing stated: Puckett further alleges that he is entitled to reversal because of the failure of the Court to follow the requirements set forth by this Court in Bounds v. State, 688 So.2d 1362, 1373 (Miss. 1997). In Bounds, this Court cited Smith v. State, 656 So.2d 95 (Miss.1995), for the proposition that in the future whenever 404(b) evidence is offered, and there is an objection which is overruled, the objection shall be deemed an invocation of the right to a MRE 403 analysis and a limiting instruction. Bounds, 688 So.2d at 1372 (citing Smith, 656 So.2d at 100). Puckett's argument would be correct had the testimony been admitted under Rule 404(b). However, since we find the testimony admissible under Rule 404(a), the trial court's failure to issue a limiting instruction sua sponte is harmless error. Puckett at 352 (emphasis added). ¶ 21. In addition, we have previously held harmless error analysis applies to questions of the admissibility of evidence pursuant to M.R.E. 404(b). See Baldwin v. State, 732 So.2d 236 (Miss.1999) (holding allowing confidential informant to testify as to other alleged drug sales by the defendant harmless error); Carter v. State, 722 So.2d 1258 (Miss.1998) (holding evidence of defendant engaging in a previous shoot-out harmless error in a trial for murder). ¶ 22. In light of the fact that we found the error in Puckett, supra, to be harmless, and we have previously applied harmless error analysis to the question of admissibility of M.R.E. 404(b) evidence, we hold that harmless error analysis is applicable in cases where the trial court does not sua sponte give the required limiting instruction when M.R.E. 404(b) evidence is admitted. In the present case the evidence of Webster's guilt, as recited by the Court of Appeals in its opinion, was overwhelming, and therefore we affirm on this issue.