Opinion ID: 349533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Absence of the Informant at Trial

Text: 32 In the course of a pre-trial conference, Judge Lasker, exercising the discretion conferred by United States v. Cannone, 528 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1975), ordered the government to provide the defense with a list of its witnesses. On November 5, 1976, four days prior to the beginning of trial, the government forwarded to defense counsel a list of thirty-one potential government witnesses including the name of the informant. Neither appellant made any attempt to locate or interview the informant or any other potential government witness. During the trial, the government disclosed that the informant would not be called as a government witness since he had apparently disappeared. Judge Lasker offered to conduct a hearing on the issue of the informant's availability and the extent of the government's efforts to locate him. Aside from some preliminary questions, addressed to the prosecution outside the presence of the jury, neither appellant pressed for an examination of the government's attempts to find Hugo or requested that a hearing on his whereabouts be held. Nor did either appellant seek a continuance for the purpose of locating Hugo or request that the government assist the defense in conducting a search. Instead, trial counsel for each appellant merely objected in general terms to the prosecution's failure to call Hugo and commented at length on his absence in their summations. 33 Sansone now claims, in a somewhat diffuse fashion, that the government's proof at trial, when coupled with the absence of the informant, deprived him of his right to confrontation. Analogizing from Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957), he contends that the failure to produce Hugo at trial constituted error requiring a new trial, dismissal of the indictment or, at the very least, a remand for a hearing on the issue of Hugo's availability. 34 The claim is without substance. Appellant's citation of Roviaro lends no support to his present argument. The Supreme Court in Roviaro was concerned with the problem which arises when the government asserts a privilege as to the very identity of an informant and the informant is, in a real sense, unknown to the defendant. Accordingly, the rule established in Roviaro, requires no more than that the identity of an informant be disclosed when it is relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential to a fair determination of a cause. Id. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 628. To the extent that appellant seeks to extrapolate from Roviaro that the government has a duty to produce the informant at trial or to guarantee his availability, his contention is refuted by a long line of cases in this Circuit. See, e. g., United States v. Super, 492 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Ortega, 471 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Cimino, 321 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 974, 84 S.Ct. 491, 11 L.Ed.2d 418 (1964). See also United States v. D'Angiolillo, 340 F.2d 453, 455 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 955, 85 S.Ct. 1090, 13 L.Ed.2d 972 (1965), and the cases cited therein. 35 Sansone's somewhat incredible assertion that he was unfairly surprised by the prosecution's failure to call Hugo and that he had relied to his detriment upon the prosecution's potential witness list does not change matters substantially. The purpose of witness lists is to permit the defense to interview potential witnesses and seek information about them in preparation for trial. United States v. Cannone, supra, 528 F.2d at 301. The inclusion of a name upon such a list does not require the government to call all such witnesses and any defense reliance thereon for that purpose is unjustified. Furthermore, this Court is of the view that had the appellant any real interest in obtaining the informant Hugo's testimony he would, at the very least, have made some attempt to locate or interview him. In light of appellant's utter failure to undertake any such effort, appellant's present claim of surprise and detrimental reliance is not only unjustified, it is frivolous. 36 Appellant Sansone fares no better with his additional claim that since the informant would have been the linchpin to his defense of entrapment, his conviction should be reversed because of the prosecution's failure to call Hugo. There is simply no substantiation in the record for the assertion that Hugo was crucial to the appellant's entrapment defense. With respect to this contention as well as the other arguments addressed to the absence of the informant at trial, we are compelled to agree with the government's argument that the appellant has attempted to create a legal windfall from an event that actually benefited him at trial. As we said in United States v. Comulada, 340 F.2d 449, 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 978, 85 S.Ct. 1343, 14 L.Ed.2d 272 (1965): 37 We note that in case after case, in appeals from convictions for trafficking in narcotics, we hear arguments regarding the government's failure to call the informer or special employee. . . . It seems to be defense strategy to bring out facts from which it can be argued that the government or the court should have called the informer as a witness. Almost never is there a genuine effort to find the witness or to call him even when it is certain that he is available and subject to process . . . We think that this is another such case. (citations omitted).III. The Court's Failure to Charge on the Voluntariness of Fuentes' Confession 38 Following his arrest, Fuentes stated that he recognized two of the arresting agents from the street, that he had noticed them following him during the negotiations in May or June, that sometime prior to his arrest he went to the rooftop of a building near the New York City headquarters of the DEA to observe agents and their vehicles through binoculars to keep aware of what was going on in his business, and that although he had noticed agents following him, he went through with the present deal because he had to take a chance. He now contends that the voluntariness of this confession was raised at trial and that Judge Lasker was therefore required, under 18 U.S.C. § 3501 5 to instruct the jury on this issue. Because Fuentes neither requested such a charge nor objected to the failure to so charge he is compelled to assert further that the failure to charge was plain error, see United States v. Barry, 518 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1975), requiring reversal. We find no merit to this claim for two reasons. 39 First, an instruction of the kind required by 18 U.S.C. § 3501 is mandated only where an issue of voluntariness has in fact been raised at trial. United States v. Diop, 546 F.2d 484, 486 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lucchetti, 533 F.2d 28, 39 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Barry, supra, 518 F.2d at 346. The only evidence that Fuentes is able to muster in support of his claim that voluntariness in fact was raised is that during the cross-examination of one of the DEA agents who was present at the appellant's arrest, the agent admitted that Fuentes had at first stated that he did not wish to cooperate or make a statement but that the agent continued nonetheless to talk to Fuentes, finally eliciting the incriminating statements. We do not regard this single piece of evidence as sufficient to raise an issue of voluntariness and thereby invoke § 3501. 40 This conclusion is buttressed by Fuentes' trial tactics. At trial, Fuentes' counsel made no mention of the issue of voluntariness in his opening remarks to the jury and subsequently waived cross-examination of the other two DEA agents who testified to Fuentes' post-arrest statements. In this respect the instant case is readily distinguishable from United States v. Barry, supra, where the defendant squarely placed the issue before the jury by consistently claim(ing) that the statements had been extracted by means of verbal threats and physical intimidation. Id. at 345. Moreover, unlike Barry, Fuentes did not testify before the jury to his version of the interrogation. Finally, and significantly, Fuentes' counsel argued in summation not that the statements were coerced or involuntary, but that they had never been made and that the jury should reject the testimony of the government's witness as incredible and fabricated. Thus, it appears that Fuentes deliberately avoided the issue of voluntariness in his summation and throughout the trial so as not to undercut his position that the admissions had in fact not been made. See United States v. Diop, supra, 546 F.2d at 486. Accordingly, this Court concludes that the minor allusion during cross-examination to possible overbearing conduct of one of the agents was insufficient to raise an issue of voluntariness. 6 41 Second, even if the issue of voluntariness had been raised, Judge Lasker's failure to give a charge under § 3501 was not plain error, but was, at most, harmless error. See United States v. Lucchetti, supra, 533 F.2d at 40. In Barry, supra, aside from the defendant's admissions, the only evidence of his participation in the narcotics transactions was inconclusive testimony of surveillance agents and the testimony of another individual who was awaiting sentence on drug charges. By contrast, in the instant case the government adduced considerable proof of Fuentes' guilt, wholly independent of his post-arrest statements. 7 In light of the considerable evidence placing Fuentes in a central role in the narcotics transactions, we hold that the failure to charge with respect to such a minor part of the government's case did not constitute plain error requiring the setting aside of the jury's verdict. United States v. Lucchetti, supra, 533 F.2d at 40; United States v. Barry, supra, 518 F.2d at 348. 42