Opinion ID: 171981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, this court must review the record de novo and ask only whether taking the evidence  both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom  in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Hanzlicek, 187 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the evidence supporting the conviction must be substantial and do more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt, it need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt. United States v. Burkley, 513 F.3d 1183, 1188 (10th Cir.2008) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The Defendants were convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1503, which prohibits corruptly ... influenc[ing], obstruct[ing], or imped[ing], or endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice. We have identified three core elements of this offense: (1) there must be a pending judicial proceeding; (2) the defendant must have knowledge or notice of the pending proceeding; and (3) the defendant must have acted corruptly with the specific intent to obstruct or impede the proceeding in its due administration of justice. United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 695 (10th Cir.1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). In construing the elements of the offense, the Supreme Court has endorsed a nexus test, requiring that [t]he action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the court's or grand jury's authority.... [T]he act must have a relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceedings. In other words, the endeavor must have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice.... [I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The nexus limitation is best understood as an articulation of the proof of wrongful intent that will satisfy the mens rea requirement of `corruptly' obstructing or endeavoring to obstruct. United States v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 170 (2d Cir.2006). Ms. Erickson and Mr. Mitchell concede that the first two elements of the offense are not at issue: a grand-jury proceeding was pending at the time of the charged conduct and both Defendants knew of it. Moreover, although Defendants' briefs occasionally speak in general terms of the absence of evidence of intent, their specific arguments focus on the issue of nexus. (They do not address, for example, the evidence regarding their hostility to the grand-jury investigation or their concern about their own exposure.) The essence of their various arguments is that the government failed to show how their conduct affected the grand-jury investigation. We are not persuaded. Indeed, the Supreme Court opinion adopting the nexus requirement described a circumstance very much like the one before us to exemplify how the nexus requirement could be satisfied. Aguilar distinguished the conduct of the defendant in that case  lying to FBI agents who were not acting as an arm of the grand jury and had not been summoned to testify before it  from that of a defendant who submits false documents to the grand jury itself: [T]he evidence goes no further than showing that [the defendant] testified falsely to an investigating agent. Such conduct, we believe, falls on the other side of the statutory line from that of one who delivers false documents or testimony to the grand jury itself. Conduct of the latter sort all but assures that the grand jury will consider the material in its deliberations. 515 U.S. at 601, 115 S.Ct. 2357. As the Second Circuit has said: A defendant's awareness that a subpoena seeks documents, coupled with his actions taken to place those documents beyond the grand jury's reach clearly would meet the ... nexus requirement.... [I]t is enough if he knows that a subpoena calls for a category of documents, or even one particular document, and then takes steps to place those documents beyond the reach of the grand jury. Quattrone, 441 F.3d at 171; see also United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843, 852 (9th Cir.1981) (the [petit] jury must find that ... knowing that the particular documents were covered by the subpoena, [the defendant] willfully concealed or endeavored to conceal them from the grand jury). Here, the Defendants created false documents to deliver to the grand jury in response to its subpoena. The evidence was sufficient to satisfy the nexus requirement. Defendants' arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. Both Defendants insist that the government failed to present evidence that the grand jury was misled or otherwise affected by their submission of falsified change orders. But the required nexus is only that the charged conduct have the natural and probable effect of interfering with the due administration of justice. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (internal quotation marks omitted). Success is not necessary; an `endeavor' suffices. Id. Ms. Erickson also asserts that the backdated change orders did no more than memorialize the reality of what had happened during 1999 and 2000; that reality, she says, was that Mitchell Construction continued to do work for USSD and to submit invoices that its board duly paid. But a reasonable jury could reject this innocent explanation for the change orders. USSD board member Merlin Sinfield testified that the board trusted Ms. Erickson and did not scrutinize the paperwork she presented to it, which typically included multiple invoices for each check. Sinfield also testified that the board had not known of the change orders and that he now recognized that it was improper for USSD to pay Mitchell Construction after the Hamaker Bottoms and small-paving contracts had run. In any event, the fraudulent documents compromised the grand jury's ability to make its own determination whether the work in 1999 and 2000 was authorized. A grand jury is obstructed whenever it is presented with manufactured evidence, even if the manufacturer thinks that the evidence supports reality. Ms. Erickson's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on this ground fails. Ms. Erickson further contends that the requirement of § 1503 that she acted corruptly was not satisfied because [t]here is no evidence the change orders resulted in any advantage to anyone, influenced any witness or had any impact with the official duties or rights of anyone. Erickson Aplt. Br. at 33. She draws her argument from United States v. Ogle, 613 F.2d 233 (10th Cir.1979), in which the definition of corruption that we quoted from a legal dictionary included, `An act done with an intent to give some advantage inconsistent with official duty and the rights of others.' Id. at 238 (quoting Bouvier's Law Dictionary). But another part of the quoted definition was, `Something against law.' Id. And we approve[d] fully the district court's view that an endeavor to influence a juror in the performance of his or her duty or to influence, obstruct or impede the due administration of justice is per se unlawful and is tantamount to doing the act corruptly. Id. In other words, an act is done `corruptly' when done with the purpose of obstructing justice. Rasheed, 663 F.2d at 852. Thus, the proof in this case of intent to obstruct necessarily established corrupt intent. Finally, Mr. Mitchell argues that relevance to the grand-jury investigation is an element of obstruction under § 1503, and he contends that the falsified change orders were not relevant and that the district court improperly excluded background evidence that would have shown the irrelevance. We disagree. To begin with, there is no real question of relevance in this case. A federal grand jury has broad inquisitorial powers. As the Supreme Court has explained: The grand jury occupies a unique role in our criminal justice system. It is an investigatory body charged with the responsibility of determining whether or not a crime has been committed. Unlike this Court, whose jurisdiction is predicated on a specific case or controversy, the grand jury can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. The function of the grand jury is to inquire into all information that might possibly bear on its investigation until it has identified an offense or has satisfied itself that none has occurred. As a necessary consequence of its investigatory function, the grand jury paints with a broad brush. A grand jury investigation is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed. United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297, 111 S.Ct. 722, 112 L.Ed.2d 795 (1991) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a grand-jury subpoena is invalid for lack of relevance only if there is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation. Id. at 301, 111 S.Ct. 722. Defendants have not suggested the existence of any evidence that was admitted at trial, or that could have been presented to the district court, that would have shown no such reasonable possibility. See id. at 301-02, 111 S.Ct. 722 (burden is on party opposing grand-jury subpoena to overcome presumption of relevance). Moreover, even if the subpoenaed documents were not within a category of relevant records, one who falsifies documents provided in response to a subpoena may well be endeavor[ing] to influence, obstruct, or impede the grand jury. 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Indeed, it is difficult to imagine why one would falsify documents to be presented to a grand jury if one did not believe that the documents were relevant to the grand jury's investigation (and would affect that investigation). We see no policy reason to protect a defendant from prosecution under § 1503 just because he or she misjudged the scope or purpose of the grand jury's investigation and submitted fraudulent information that could not have affected the actual investigation. As previously noted, an `endeavor' suffices. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. One might argue that if the fraudulent documents were irrelevant to the grand jury's investigation, it would have been impossible to influence or impede the investigation by submitting the documents. But impossibility is not a defense under § 1503. See Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966). But cf. Aguilar, 515 U.S. at 610 n. 1, 115 S.Ct. 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (impossibility defense may be available when there is no pending judicial proceeding). Thus, we agree with the Sixth Circuit's holding that the government need not prove, as an element of [§ 1503], that... alterations [of documents] made in response to a grand jury subpoena were relevant to the grand jury's investigation. United States v. Mullins, 22 F.3d 1365, 1370 (6th Cir.1994). Mullins arose from a grand-jury investigation of the Detroit Police Department's use of a `secret service fund.' Id. at 1367. The grand jury subpoenaed the flight logs of officers in the department's aviation section, including that of Mullins. Mullins told fellow officers to delete flights to questionable destinations such as Las Vegas before turning over their logs, and he altered his own log. Id. He was later convicted of violating § 1503. The Sixth Circuit rejected Mullins's argument that because the grand jury's focus was not aviation-section abuses, his conduct had no `reasonable relationship' to the investigation. Id. at 1369. It explained: [T]he evidence conclusively showed that what Mullins did, he did in response to the grand jury's subpoena. The alterations Mullins made and ordered were intended to deprive the grand jury of evidence that it had decided was relevant to its investigation. There is no authority requiring this court to second-guess the scope of the grand jury's investigation... simply because the abuses Mullins now contends he sought to hide may not have been precisely the abuses that he asserts the grand jury sought to expose. Id. at 1370. We recognize that there is language supporting Mr. Mitchell's relevance argument in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United States v. Ryan, 455 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1971). But to the extent that Ryan requires the government to prove that subpoenaed documents were relevant to the grand-jury investigation, we simply disagree, for the reasons stated above. In any event, the result in Ryan may be defended on a narrower ground. The thrust of the opinion is that the IRS had improperly commandeered a grand jury's subpoena power for its own purposes. See id. at 730-32, 734-35. As the Sixth Circuit has said, The issue in Ryan, we believe, was whether the investigation was being conducted by the IRS, in which case § 1503 did not apply, or by the grand jury. Mullins, 22 F.3d at 1370. There is no evidence, or even a suggestion, of such misuse of a grand jury in this case. Therefore, we need not decide whether we would embrace the result in Ryan based on this narrower theory. In brief, we hold that knowingly submitting fraudulent documents in response to a grand-jury subpoena constitutes obstruction of justice, when, as here, a grand-jury proceeding is underway and the defendant knows of it. The evidence was therefore sufficient to convict Defendants of violating § 1503.