Opinion ID: 2976344
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims relating to procedural reasonableness

Text: We review a district court’s sentencing determination for reasonableness, which has both a procedural and a substantive component. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007); United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 339 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, when reviewing a district court’s sentencing determination, we must “first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597. a. Two-level enhancement of Wheaton’s base level offense pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) At the sentencing hearing, the district court increased Wheaton’s base offense level pursuant to USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level increase “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” during the commission of a drug offense. Wheaton claims that this calculation was in error, making his sentence procedurally unreasonable. A district court’s determination that the defendant possessed a firearm during a drug offense is a factual finding that this court reviews under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. No. 06-4080 United States v. Wheaton Page 12 Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when, although there may be some evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Before a district court can apply a sentencing enhancement under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), the government must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant either actually or constructively possessed the weapon.” Darwich, 337 F.3d at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Constructive possession of an item is the ownership, or dominion or control over the item itself, or dominion over the premises where the item is located.” United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). If the government establishes that the defendant possessed a weapon, a presumption arises that “the weapon was connected to the offense. The defendant must then show that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the crime.” United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). The evidence in the record supports the finding that Wheaton had constructive possession of the gun at 926 Sherwood. Both McDowell and another witness testified that the house had been used to conduct drug transactions. McDowell recalled that, on one occasion, he observed two kilograms of cocaine at 926 Sherwood when Wheaton was present, and the latter making a joke about cutting out Anderson as a middle man. Witnesses also saw Wheaton parking in front of the residence on numerous occasions. In addition, Wheaton himself stated that he had lived at 926 Sherwood, an admission that reinforces the conclusion that he had “dominion over” the house where the gun was found. See Hill, 79 F.3d at 1485. That other people, including Anderson, may also have had access to or control over 926 Sherwood is of no moment because, as the district court properly noted, the law recognizes joint possession. See United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1334 (6th Cir. 1973), abrogated on other grounds by Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (“Possession [of a firearm] . . . need not be exclusive but may be joint.”). A review of the evidence thus demonstrates that the district court’s finding that Wheaton had constructive possession of the gun because he had stayed at the house “for an extended period of time” and had access to the handgun found under the couch cushion was not clearly erroneous. The district court also had reason to conclude that the gun was related to the charged conspiracy. As the court noted, no drugs were found at 926 Sherwood, but there was substantial evidence that the three Sherwood residences were “tied together.” The court also correctly pointed out that “[t]he drugs and the gun do not have to be in the same location” in order for the gun to be attributable to Wheaton, because the residence itself was associated with the drug conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Bartholomew, 310 F.3d 912, 924 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that the connection of a shotgun, which was found in a closet near a stairway leading to a basement where drugs were sold, to the drug offense was not clearly improbable). Furthermore, Wheaton never provided the district court with a nondrug-related reason for why a loaded gun was under a couch cushion, which is a “place indicating purposeful concealment rather than a place indicating possession for a legal purpose.” See United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1217 (6th Cir. 1992) (affirming a USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement based on the defendant’s constructive possession of a firearm found in the basement rafters of her apartment). The bare assertion of Wheaton’s counsel that the gun might simply have been for the lawful purpose of defending the residence is insufficient to sustain Wheaton’s burden of showing that it was “clearly improbable” that the gun was related to the drug conspiracy. See Hough, 276 F.3d at 894. For these No. 06-4080 United States v. Wheaton Page 13 reasons, we conclude that the district court’s decision to apply the two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(1) was not clearly erroneous. b. Increase of Wheaton’s criminal history category under USSG § 4A1.1(e) Wheaton next argues that the district court erred by increasing his criminal history category pursuant to USSG § 4A1.1(e), which adds two criminal history points where “the defendant committed the instant offense less than two years after release from” custody for a prior offense. As with determinations relating to enhancements under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1), we review a district court’s factual findings concerning a defendant’s criminal history category, which must be based on a preponderance of the evidence, under the clearly erroneous standard of review. See Hough, 276 F.3d at 896. The key issue here is whether there is evidence in the record to support the district court’s finding that Wheaton entered the conspiracy before December 2, 2000, which was two years from the date that he was released from custody for his prior offense. Wheaton contests the court’s finding on the basis that, as he set out in his objections to the PSR and at the sentencing hearing, there is no evidence, other than Poole’s testimony, that he participated in the conspiracy before January of 2001. In defense of the district court’s ruling, the government argues that corroborating evidence is not required for USSG § 4A1.1(e) to apply. It contends that Poole’s testimony alone was sufficient for “the district court [to] reasonably conclude[] that Wheaton joined the conspiracy less than two years after his December 2, 1998, release from imprisonment.” The government, moreover, urges us to conclude that because the district court’s finding was “one of ‘two permissible views of the evidence,’” the court’s choice between them “cannot be clearly erroneous.” See United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003). At the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged that Wheaton’s involvement in the conspiracy was not “corroborated . . . until probably January of 2001.” Nevertheless, the court also said that, according to its “recollection,” there had been testimony that Anderson and Love had approached Lynn about transporting cocaine from Los Angeles in November of 2000, and that “Wheaton’s name came up as Kev, i.e., he had already been supplying Love and Anderson prior to that time.” The court further reasoned that “[i]f the jury found that [Wheaton] was involved in the conspiracy they would have had to find that he was involved when the initial contacts were made, . . . and the jury found that he was.” It therefore found that Wheaton had entered the conspiracy in late November of 2000, resulting in the additional two points pursuant to USSG § 4A1.1(e). Contrary to the district court’s recollection of the evidence, Lynn actually testified that Anderson and Love originally approached him about the California cocaine connection at the beginning of 2001. Wheaton therefore correctly points out that the only evidence in the record that supports the district court’s finding is Poole’s testimony about when she first made contact with “Kev.” Indeed, the district court properly recalled that phone records, plane tickets, and other documents corroborating Poole’s trips to California do not appear until January of 2001. The question thus remains whether Poole’s testimony, standing alone, was sufficient to implicate Wheaton in the conspiracy prior to December 2, 2000. We acknowledge that this presents an extremely close factual question, and that the evidence in the record linking Wheaton to the conspiracy before December of 2000 is thin. The government correctly points out, however, that Poole’s testimony “places Wheaton’s participation in the conspiracy as early as November 2000, but before December 13, 2000.” Poole testified that she was released from jail on an unrelated matter just prior to Thanksgiving of 2000, and that she made the No. 06-4080 United States v. Wheaton Page 14 trip to California during which she met Kev soon after her release. She further explained that she made a second roundtrip by car to pick up marijuana in San Diego before the third trip to California that culminated in her car accident on December 13, 2000. This testimony supports the logical conclusion that—based on the timeline that Poole provided and taking into account the time required to travel back and forth between Ohio and California by car—it was more likely than not that she first met Wheaton at least 12 days before she wrecked her car in Arkansas (i.e., before December 2, 2000). Moreover, we note that Lynn’s testimony that he thought he had not made the cocaine arrangement with Anderson and Love until early 2001 does not unequivocally refute Poole’s more detailed recollections about her first and second meetings with Wheaton. And although the district court incorrectly recalled and described the evidence underlying its finding that Wheaton entered the conspiracy before December 2, 2000, the fact that there is evidence in the record to support that finding is sufficient to preclude us from second guessing the court’s determination. Cf. Hammon v. DHL Airways, Inc., 165 F.3d 441, 445 (6th Cir.1999) (explaining that we may affirm the district court where the court reached the right result for the wrong reason). In short, we are unable to say that we are “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed” in finding that Wheaton entered the conspiracy before December 2, 2000. See Darwich, 337 F.3d at 664. We therefore conclude that the district court properly increased Wheaton’s criminal history category pursuant to USSG § 4A1.1(e). c. Wheaton’s request for a downward departure Wheaton further attacks his sentence by arguing that the district court erred in not granting him a downward departure. This claim, however, suffers from two fatal flaws. First, as the government points out, Wheaton did not seek a downward departure from the district court. Wheaton has therefore waived this claim. See United States v. Ware, 282 F.3d 902, 907 (6th Cir. 2002) (concluding that a defendant had waived his claim for a downward departure by failing to seek one from the district court). Moreover, even if Wheaton had requested a downward departure from the district court, any denial of a downward departure would be unreviewable so long as the district court understood that it had the authority to depart. See United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2006). The record clearly reflects that the court below was aware of such authority. This court’s precedents, of course, do not prevent Wheaton from challenging either the district court’s failure to grant a request for a non-Guidelines variance or the overall reasonableness of his sentence based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See id. Because Wheaton makes both of these arguments, a consideration of their merits is taken up below. d. Wheaton’s request for a downward variance In the district court, Wheaton argued for a downward variance based solely on the assertion that there was little evidence linking him to the gun at 926 Sherwood. His brief on appeal, by contrast, is replete with reasons why he should have received a below-Guidelines variance. Indeed, Wheaton now makes a variety of arguments based on the § 3553(a) factors—relating to his family background, lack of a violent history, relative lack of culpability in the present offense, and the low likelihood of recidivism—to support a variance below the Guidelines range. To the extent that Wheaton failed to make any of these specific arguments to the district court, we would review them for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 51(b); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2004). This analysis is unnecessary, however, because the district court’s explanation of Wheaton’s sentence belies his contention that the court failed to address his belated arguments. No. 06-4080 United States v. Wheaton Page 15 e. The district court’s explanation of Wheaton’s sentence Wheaton claims that the court did not provide a sufficient explanation for the sentence it imposed. But the Supreme Court in Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007), explained that although a district judge must “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority,” the judge may exercise discretion in determining how much explanation is necessary in a given case. Id. at 2468. Thus “when a judge decides simply to apply the Guidelines to a particular case, doing so will not necessarily require lengthy explanation.” Id. Wheaton claims that the district court failed to adequately explain the sentence, but he fails to provide any argument or explanation of what, precisely, the court failed to mention. As noted above, Wheaton’s only argument before the district court was based on the alleged lack of evidence linking him to the gun found at 926 Sherwood. A review of the record, however, establishes that the court’s discussion of the § 3553(a) factors accounted for most if not all of the arguments Wheaton failed to make but now argues that the court should have considered. The district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors focused primarily on Wheaton’s personal history and characteristics and the need to protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)&(2). It discussed Wheaton’s background and past involvement with violence, discussed his family history, and surmised that his lack of a substance-abuse problem likely “added to his effectiveness as a higher level dealer.” Moreover, the court explained that “the Court is convinced Mr. Wheaton is intelligent, and is careful, and he went about his drug business with foresight and caution. And in a sense, that makes him all the more dangerous to society.” The court further stated that “the defendant helped dump a huge amount of cocaine in the Youngstown area, poisoning an already struggling community. Mr. Wheaton needs to be removed from society to protect the public and give him an opportunity to redirect his life after given time to reflect in prison.” See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In sum, the district court’s explanation of the sentence it imposed demonstrated its awareness of the § 3553(a) factors and how those factors should apply in Wheaton’s case. See, e.g., United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 667 (6th Cir. 2006) (upholding a sentence as reasonable where “the record amply demonstrate[d] that the court evaluated all of [the statutory factors]” and “balanced the relevant considerations”); see also Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2469 (noting that the requirements of procedural reasonableness are met where “the record makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and arguments”). We therefore conclude that the district court adequately explained its reasons for imposing Wheaton’s sentence.