Opinion ID: 612156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Denial of the Acceptance of Responsibility Reduction

Text: 19 Finally, Cedano argues that he was improperly denied an acceptance of responsibility reduction because he did not accept responsibility for the uncharged conduct. He contends that he accepted responsibility for the conduct underlying the offense of conviction, i.e., possession with intent to distribute one kilogram of cocaine. But he argues that the court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by denying him the reduction because he refused to accept responsibility for the nine kilos under negotiation at the time of arrest. 5 20 At the time of Cedano's sentencing, Application Note 1(c) of § 3E1.1(a) required a defendant, in order to receive a reduction, to accept responsibility for his criminal conduct, including the offense and related conduct. (Emphasis added). A number of circuits have held that requiring the defendant to accept responsibility for uncharged related conduct violates the defendant's right against self-incrimination. See United States v. Piper, 918 F.2d 839, 840-41 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Oliveras, 905 F.2d 623, 628-29 (2d Cir.1990); United States v. Perez-Franco, 873 F.2d 455, 458-59 (1st Cir.1989). The majority rule, however, is that a defendant may be required to accept responsibility for related conduct beyond the scope of his or her conviction in order to obtain the acceptance of responsibility reduction. See United States v. Kinder, 946 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2290, 119 L.Ed.2d 214 (1992); United States v. Ruth, 946 F.2d 110, 113 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1189, 117 L.Ed.2d 431 (1992); United States v. Herrera, 928 F.2d 769, 774-75 (6th Cir.1991); United States v. Munio, 909 F.2d 436, 439-40 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 938, 111 S.Ct. 1393, 113 L.Ed.2d 449 (1991); United States v. Gordon, 895 F.2d 932, 936-37 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 846, 111 S.Ct. 131, 112 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990). Apparently, we have recently accepted the majority view. In United States v. Cojab, 978 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir.1992), a criminal defendant was denied an acceptance of responsibility reduction because he refused to provide financial information to the probation office for purposes of the Presentence Report. We held that this refusal was permissible because denial of the reduction was not a penalty for Fifth Amendment purposes, but simply a denied benefit. 21 Cojab may well end the inquiry. However, recent amendments to § 3E1.1, effective as of November 1, 1992, add a new twist to Cedano's claim. 6 As amended, Application Note 1(a) now provides in relevant part: 22 Note that a defendant is not required to volunteer, or affirmatively admit, relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction in order to obtain a reduction under subsection (a). A defendant may remain silent in respect to relevant conduct beyond the offense of conviction without affecting his ability to obtain a reduction under this subsection. However, a defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true has acted in a manner inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. 23 Under the amended version, a defendant need only accept responsibility for the conduct underlying his offense of conviction and should not be required to affirmatively come clean on relevant conduct in order to obtain the reduction. See United States v. White, 993 F.2d 147, 150-51 (7th Cir.1993). The defendant's sentence is generally determined by the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing and thus amendments taking effect after the sentencing hearing generally are not applicable on direct review. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4); United States v. Windham, 991 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir.1993). However, amendments to the Guidelines and its commentary are applicable on direct appeal and may change prior guideline interpretations if the amendments in question were meant to clarify, as opposed to substantively change, the earlier version of the provision. See United States v. Chong Won Tai, 994 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir.1993) (commentary amendment prevails over a previous decision to the contrary, as long as the amendment clarifies, but does not substantively change, the applicable guideline); United States v. Thompson, 944 F.2d 1331, 1347 (7th Cir.1991) (same), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1177, 117 L.Ed.2d 422 (1992). Thus, the issue is, given the amendments, whether the version of § 3E1.1 in effect at the time of sentencing is properly interpreted to require the defendant to accept responsibility for uncharged conduct. In United States v. White, 993 F.2d at 150-51, we characterized the amendment as a clarification, but did not resolve the issue whether the new version applied retroactively on direct appeal. We concluded that, even under the amended version of § 3E1.1, the defendant there would not have been entitled to the reduction because he falsely denied the relevant conduct. See also United States v. Corbin, 998 F.2d 1377, 1393 n. 27 (7th Cir.1993). 24 For identical reasons, we again need not resolve the issue. As in White, Cedano vigorously denied accepting the nine kilos and taking part in the transactions to which Rios testified. He contested these issues at trial, 7 objected to the Presentence Report with respect to these matters and outright denied them in his sentencing memoranda to the court. Indeed, Cedano went so far as to attach affidavits to his sentencing memoranda in an attempt to show that Rios' testimony was incredible. Contesting the veracity of the alleged relevant conduct is no doubt permissible and often perfectly appropriate. However, if a defendant denies the conduct and the court determines it to be true, the defendant cannot then claim that he has accepted responsibility for his actions. Consequently, even if we were to give Cedano the benefit of the recent amendment, he would not be entitled to the acceptance of responsibility reduction.