Opinion ID: 612147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Additional Defendants

Text: 9 The proposed amended complaint seeks to assert, for the first time, damages claims against the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Correction, the Superintendent of Indiana State Farm, and eleven other individuals, who apparently are either correctional officers or employees at ISF or IYC. All the defendants are sued in both their individual and official capacities. For reasons set forth above, the Eleventh Amendment would bar the claims for damages against the defendants in their official capacities, leaving us to decide only whether the individual capacity claims could survive a motion to dismiss. 10 The district court found that the statute of limitations would bar these claims, which allege the deprivation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights through actions that could not have occurred any later than May 3, 1988, the date on which he filed his habeas corpus motion. In considering the timeliness of a § 1983 action, the court shall look to the state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 278, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1948, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), in this case the two-year limitation found in Ind.Code § 34-1-2-2(1). Loy v. Clamme, 804 F.2d 405, 407-08 (7th Cir.1986). [W]hen a federal court borrows a state statute of limitations for use in a federal question case the court is to use the federal rule on commencement, not the state rule. Del Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 706-707 (7th Cir.1987). See also West v. Conrail, 481 U.S. 35, 107 S.Ct. 1538, 95 L.Ed.2d 32 (1987). Fed.R.Civ.P. 3 provides that the filing of a complaint commences a civil action, and thus it is this act that tolls the running of the statute of limitations applicable to this action. 2 As the plaintiff did not file his proposed amended complaint with the district court until September 18, 1990, over two years after the alleged constitutional violations, the statute of limitations bars his action against the putative defendants. 11 The plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations does not bar his claims against the putative defendants because the proposed amended complaint relates back to the date of the original habeas corpus petition. In a federal-question case borrowing a state statute of limitations, federal law provides the requirements for the relation back of an amendment, while state law determines the more basic question of whether the substance of the amendment mandates that it relate back in order to avoid the applicable statute of limitations. Diaz v. Shallbetter, 984 F.2d 850, 853-54 (7th Cir.1993). Under Indiana law, after the statute of limitations has run, the plaintiff may add a new defendant only after demonstrating that the amendment relates back to the original complaint. Hupp v. Hill, 576 N.E.2d 1320, 1327 (Ind.App.1991). 12 Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c) contains the federal standard for the relation back of an amended complaint, providing as follows: 3 13 Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the party to be brought in by amendment that party (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining his defense on the merits, and (2) knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party. 14 While the claims in the proposed amended complaint arise out of the same conduct set forth in the habeas corpus petition, for Rule 15(c) to apply, the thirteen putative defendants must have received actual notice of those claims within the period of limitations. We have often stated that the consequence of allowing a plaintiff to add a defendant after the limitations period has run, where there has been no actual notice to the defendant, would unfairly prejudice the defendant by depriving him of the complete defense of the statute of limitations, and certainly prejudice his defense on the merits. Williams, 873 F.2d at 1073 (citations omitted). 15 The plaintiff does not assert that the putative defendants received timely, actual notice of the § 1983 claims, but instead argues that the service of the habeas petition on the Attorney General, potentially counsel for both the original and putative defendants, constructively notified them of the action. The plaintiff technically waived this argument by failing to present it to the district court. However, even if he had preserved the issue, we conclude, as a matter of law, that the putative defendants' knowledge of the § 1983 action against them in their personal capacities can not be imputed from the service of process on the Attorney General in a drastically different type of action, the original habeas corpus proceeding. See Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 694 (2nd Cir.1989) (notice of action against municipality did not notify municipality's employees of possible inclusion as co-defendants, despite existence of shared counsel); Moore v. Long, 924 F.2d 586 (5th Cir.1991) (notice of § 1983 suit against court clerk not imputed to deputy clerk). Furthermore, even if we could impute knowledge from the Attorney General to the putative defendants, the plaintiff's general request for leave to amend the complaint to conform with § 1983, while possibly leading one to wonder if other defendants would be added, in no way conveyed to the Attorney General that the plaintiff intended to include the particular putative defendants, in either their official or individual capacities. See, e.g., Doe v. Sullivan County, Tenn., 956 F.2d 545, 552 (6th Cir.1992) (Although as jailers the three defendants reasonably could be expected to have known of the [§ 1983 suit based on a prison assault], this alone is insufficient to impute to them knowledge of their future status as defendants). Consequently, we hold that the proposed amended complaint, if permitted, would not relate back to the date of the filing of the habeas corpus petition. 16 Finally, in requesting that we reverse the district court's dismissal of his case, the plaintiff relies heavily on the fact that he timely requested leave from the court to amend his complaint and that the statute of limitations expired while that motion was pending. In doing so, the plaintiff fails to recognize that he did not submit a proper request for leave to amend until after the statute of limitations had expired. 17 All motions, including a proper request for leave to amend a complaint, must set forth with particularity the relief or order requested and the ground supporting the application. Fed.R.Civ.P. 7(b). In addressing the sufficiency of a motion for leave to amend, courts may require the submission of a copy of the proposed amended complaint, Clayton v. White Hall School Dist., 778 F.2d 457, 460 (8th Cir.1985), although the motion itself may be acceptable so long as it puts the opposing party on notice of the content of the amendment. 6 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1485 (2d ed. 1990). As a party has no control over when a court renders its decision regarding the proposed amended complaint, the submission of a motion for leave to amend, properly accompanied by the proposed amended complaint that provides notice of the substance of those amendments, tolls the statute of limitations, even though technically the amended complaint will not be filed until the court rules on the motion. Mayes v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., 867 F.2d 1172 (8th Cir.1989) (per curiam); Sheets v. Dziabis, 738 F.Supp. 307, 313 (N.D.Ind.1990). 18 Here, before the expiration of the statute of limitations, the plaintiff's only action remotely related to the putative defendants was the submission of a request for leave to amend, stating: That because the court has deemed it appropriate to construe Plaintiff's action under § 1983, Plaintiff would now seek to amend his original complaint to conform with the requirements of § 1983. This cursory motion fails to convey to the court or the defendants the plaintiff's intention to add thirteen new defendants and to change the nature of the claim from one for injunctive relief to one for damages. The plaintiff did not notify either the putative defendants or the court that he intended to add those claims until his submission of a proposed amended complaint on September 18, 1990. Even if the court allowed the proposed amendments, the plaintiff's action against the putative defendants would not commence until that date and, as a result, would be barred by the statute of limitations.