Opinion ID: 42426
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other relevant information regarding

Text: conditions in the country of removal. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(3). The IJ did not reach this issue because he concluded that because Petitioner failed to meet the lower burden with regard to her application for asylum, it followed that she would fail to satisfy the higher burdens for withholding of removal and relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture. See Dika v. Ashcroft, 85 F. App’x 374, 375 (5th Cir. 2004)(“The burden of proof for withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act and under the Convention Against Torture is a higher standard than asylum. Failure to satisfy the less demanding asylum standard is, a fortiori, a failure to demonstrate eligibility for withholding of removal.”). However, we will still analyze this claim separately because Petitioner need only prove torture–not persecution based on one of the five enumerated categories. See Zhang, 432 F.3d at 345. The IJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. While the 1992 beating might constitute past torture for purposes of the Convention, Petitioner fails to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that she will be tortured if she returns to Cameroon. Moreover, the existence of this evidence alone does not compel us to disturb the IJ’s factfinding. The long time span between the 14 incidents discussed at the hearing suggests that the government is not likely to torture Petitioner. Moreover, as previously noted, both the SDF and SCNC have a multitude of members, including Petitioner’s own relatives, who participate in political activities without incident or persecution. Hence, the IJ’s denial of Mbeng’s application for relief pursuant to the Convention Against Torture is supported by substantial evidence.