Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial on the Merits

Text: Mr. Tavares and Mr. Jones each have nicknames. Mr. Tavares’s is “Stallion” or “Young Stallion”; Mr. Jones’s is “Young Indian.” These nicknames were included on the docket sheet posted outside of the courtroom during jury selection. Voir dire of the prospective jurors lasted three days. At the beginning of the proceeding, the district court informed the jurors of the nature of the charges. The court then made some general inquiries to ascertain if any member of the venire had read or seen anything about the case or if any member was related to or knew the attorneys or witnesses. The court then pointedly admonished the prospective jurors that they were “under an order not to talk about the case” and not to “guess what the case is about beyond what” the court had told them.3 The court then undertook an individual examination of each prospective juror. Counsel were permitted an allotted time to question each prospective juror. During that questioning, defense counsel often inquired about the jurors’ views of pimps and prostitutes, and the relationship between the two. Defense counsel questioned some prospective jurors concerning their views about 3 R.292 at 23. -6- prostitutes who were minors. During this process, three prospective jurors reported that some members of the jury pool had discussed the district court’s instructions about the case and the significance of Mr. Tavares’s and Mr. Jones’s nicknames in the jury room. They also said that there had been speculation about the nature of the case. They reported that several prospective jurors had laughed and joked about the nicknames, including one comment that the nicknames might indicate gang membership. After listening to the jurors’ accounts and considering the argument of counsel, the district court denied Mr. Tavares’s motion to disqualify all jurors who had been in the jury room since the first report of discussion about the case and the nicknames. Mr. Tavares and Mr. Jones then asked to question prospective jurors who already had been preliminarily qualified. This request also was denied; the district court stated that it was not going to order the return of all preliminarily qualified jurors for additional questioning. It then explained that it was “fairly confident[] that all that was involved was speculation about what [the court’s] instructions were and speculation about what [the defendants’] nicknames meant.”4 The court also noted that, in any event, the nicknames would be revealed at trial and that the early revelation of the nicknames “pales [in comparison] to what [defense 4 R.294 at 75. -7- counsel] told the jurors” about the defendants’ work as pimps.5 When subsequent prospective jurors were called for examination, the district court asked each potential juror whether he or she had discussed the case. One prospective juror, who admitted to joking about the nicknames, was challenged for cause and dismissed. After empaneling the jury, the court gave a general instruction to the jurors not to discuss the case with anyone, including each other, until all evidence was presented. However, no specific instruction was given about the nicknames or the earlier discussions. Mr. Tavares and Mr. Jones submit that the district court’s response to the discussion of the defendants’ nicknames was inadequate. They maintain that the court committed reversible error when it refused to permit questioning of the entire jury pool. Alternatively, they contend that, upon learning of the discussion, the court should have dismissed the entire jury pool. The parties variously cast the problem presented here as one of juror taint on the theory that prospective jurors were exposed to material outside the record, or of premature deliberation because prospective jurors speculated among themselves about the significance of facts that eventually would be before them, if they were selected for service on the chosen jury. Neither of these characterizations is a precise description of the 5 Id. at 76. -8- rather unique situation that confronted the district court. In any event, choosing between these characterizations is not an essential part of the analytical task facing a district court, or this court, when dealing with juror misconduct. Our cases make clear that when faced with a non-frivolous allegation of any sort of juror misconduct, the district court must engage in a two-step analysis. See United States v. Diaz, 597 F.3d 56, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2007). First, the court must determine whether misconduct occurred. If no misconduct occurred, no further action is required. “[M]isconduct allegations that are frivolous . . . do not trigger any duty of inquiry and do not require that a hearing be held.” United States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, if any misconduct did occur, the court must proceed to “assess[] the magnitude and extent of any prejudice caused” and, if necessary, take remedial measures. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52. If no curative measures appear adequate, the court may grant a timely motion for mistrial. Id. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s handling of juror misconduct. Diaz, 597 F.3d at 62.6 The 6 We cannot accept Mr. Tavares’s contention that the standard of review is de novo under United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2010). Jadlowe involved review of the district court’s instruction to the jury, not its response to potential juror misconduct. Id. at 15. -9- fact-specific and often delicate task of assessing such situations, which often requires the assessment of witness credibility, counsels that a district court must “enjoy broad discretion in addressing potential juror misconduct.” Id. Therefore, “normally we will not reverse unless the judge’s choice among the various avenues available was patently unreasonable.” United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 591 (1st Cir. 2002). Here, our colleague in the district court followed the process of assessment prescribed by our case law. The court undertook an examination of the rather unique circumstances surrounding the incident. The court realized that the misconduct took place at a very early stage of the proceedings and also gave appropriate weight to the fact that the defendants’ nicknames would indeed be before the yet-to-be selected jury as evidence during trial. Finally, the court determined that any harm caused by the discussion of the nicknames had been negated significantly by defense counsel’s own statements to jurors about Mr. Tavares’s and Mr. Jones’s activities. Having made this assessment, the district court determined that admonishing the empaneled jury not to discuss the case or to form ultimate conclusions until all evidence had been presented was the appropriate course. On the basis of our study of the trial transcript, we cannot accept the contention that the district court was obliged to conduct a more extensive inquiry. While not protracted, the -10- inquiry here was measured but sufficiently thorough. The court observed and evaluated firsthand the potential jurors’ reports of the jury-room discussions. It took note of the conversations’ content, the point in the proceeding when they took place and the fact that the matter discussed by the prospective jurors would be covered thoroughly at trial. The court then concluded that any harm from the violation of its initial instruction not to speculate about the trial could be cured by an appropriate cautionary instruction. This approach was certainly well within the options from which a thoughtful district court could be expected to choose, and we shall not second-guess the course taken by the court here.
Mr. Tavares raises several challenges to his convictions. We address these count by count.
Count One of the indictment charged Mr. Tavares with conspiring to knowingly transport an individual in interstate commerce, intending that she engage in prostitution. In support, the indictment alleged twenty-six overt acts taken in furtherance of the conspiracy. Among these was Overt Act J, which alleged that “[i]n or about February 2004, after assisting in the assault of T.B. by covering her head with a garbage bag and securing it with duct tape, Darryl TAVARES negotiated with another male to have T.B. -11- return to work for him as a prostitute.”7 T.B., a young woman who worked as a prostitute at various times for Mr. Tavares and for another pimp named “Jungle,”8 was a witness at trial. She testified about an incident when Mr. Tavares brought her to her then-pimp, Jungle. She said Mr. Tavares was with Jungle when “they tied [her] hands behind [her] back with rope.”9 She further testified that while Jungle put the bag over her head, he asked Mr. Tavares for help, but, because of the bag, she could not hear or see who participated in her subsequent beating. After the assault, Mr. Tavares offered to take T.B. back, but Jungle refused because T.B. had to work for him first. Mr. Tavares’s counsel extensively cross-examined T.B.
Although Mr. Tavares does not appeal the admission of evidence concerning the other twenty-five overt acts, he does challenge the admission of T.B.’s testimony about Overt Act J. He challenges T.B.’s testimony only as irrelevant under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. We shall address these arguments in turn.10 7 R.1 at 3. 8 Jungle is an unindicted co-conspirator. 9 R.297 at 81. 10 At trial, Mr. Tavares grounded his objection to T.B.’s testimony in Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403 and 404(b). Before us, he has abandoned his Rule 404(b) objection. -12- We review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Upton, 559 F.3d 3, 15 (1st Cir. 2009). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, “evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make a fact more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence[] and the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Mr. Tavares objected at trial, and presses here on appeal, that T.B.’s testimony was not relevant and is therefore inadmissible because it primarily inculpated Jungle.11 The Government submitted at trial, and the district court agreed, that T.B.’s testimony was relevant because it explained the relationship between Mr. Tavares and T.B., a fact germane to whether Mr. Tavares transported T.B. for prostitution. Further, Mr. Tavares’s offering to take T.B. off Jungle’s hands suggests that she worked for him as a prostitute, also germane to whether Mr. Tavares trafficked her for sex (Count Ten). We certainly cannot discern any abuse of discretion in the district court’s ruling. The events to which T.B. testified certainly have “a tendency to make a fact [that Mr. Tavares transported T.B. and trafficked her for sex] more probable than it would be without the evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Furthermore, whether Mr. Tavares transported her and prostituted her “is of consequence in determining the action.” Id. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that although 11 See, e.g., R.297 at 4-5. -13- relevant, evidence may be excluded “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.” We do not disturb the district court’s balancing of probative value and risk of unfair prejudice absent “extraordinarily compelling circumstances.” Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir. 1988). We see no such extraordinary circumstances here. In Mr. Tavares’s view, even if T.B.’s testimony is relevant, it still should have been excluded because its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. According to Mr. Tavares, prostitution and sex trafficking of children are not violent crimes. Thus, he concludes, any mention of violence inherently poses a risk of prejudice substantially outweighing probative value and inviting jurors to decide the case purely on emotion. We accept neither Mr. Tavares’s premise nor his conclusion. Violence, abuse and other forms of human degradation are part and parcel of sex trafficking. It is not at all surprising that evidence of such acts is offered to establish a conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking. Moreover, evidence of these violent acts was particularly probative of the defendants’ relationship with the women because it directly demonstrated the control that the defendants exercised over the women in their prostitution operation. Specifically, with respect to Mr. Tavares, the evidence showed that the violent episode also entailed negotiations with Jungle to get T.B. back to work for him. The -14- testimony was also relevant to and probative of Mr. Tavares’s knowledge and intent with respect to Count Ten, charging him with recruiting and transporting T.B. to engage in a commercial sex act. Here, the district court considered Mr. Tavares’s arguments several times and concluded that the probative value of T.B.’s testimony was not substantially outweighed by any risk of unfair prejudice. That decision was certainly among the options from which a reasonable judge could be expected to choose. The record contains no basis that would justify our overturning the district court’s decision.
T.B.’s testimony concerning the incident with Jungle indisputably is at variance with the language of the indictment and the Government’s identical proffer to the district court. The Government expected T.B. to testify that Mr. Tavares put the plastic bag over her head. However, T.B. testified that Jungle, not Mr. Tavares, put the bag over her head. Her testimony otherwise conformed to the indictment; she indicated that Mr. Tavares “assist[ed] in [her] assault” and “negotiated with another male [Jungle] to have T.B. return to work for him as a prostitute.”12 “Not every variance calls for reversal.” United States v. Seng Tan, 674 F.3d 103, 110 (1st Cir. 2012). Mr. Tavares must 12 R.1 at 3. -15- show that the variance prejudiced him. Id. Prejudice in this context is found when, for example, “the variance . . . le[ft the defendant] so in the dark about the charge against h[im] that []he could not prepare a defense or plead double jeopardy to stop a second prosecution for the same crime.” Id. Here, Mr. Tavares faces an additional hurdle. Because he did not object in the district court to this variance, our review is for plain error. Id. Thus, Mr. Tavares “must demonstrate that (1) an error occurred which was (2) clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected his substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Savarese, 686 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2012). Mr. Tavares cannot establish any prejudice from the variance between the indictment’s language and T.B.’s testimony at trial. Mr. Tavares’s conspiracy conviction did not depend on Overt Act J being proven. Evidence was admitted concerning the twenty-five other overt acts charged in the indictment; the evidence supporting his (and Mr. Jones’s) conviction was overwhelming. Thus, any error in admitting T.B.’s testimony concerning Overt Act J was harmless. The variance between the indictment and T.B.’s testimony was not prejudicial and affords no basis for reversal. -16-
Mr. Tavares was convicted of knowingly transporting a minor, B.B., in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). A great part of the evidence on this count came from B.B.’s own testimony. In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, we construe the evidence “in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Alfonzo-Reyes, 592 F.3d 280, 289 (1st Cir. 2010). At trial, B.B. testified that, when she was seventeen, Mr. Tavares and Peeples, a co-defendant who pleaded guilty, picked her up at her high school in Maine. Mr. Tavares and Peeples then took her to her sister’s home. Mr. Jones was at the home. The group talked about “[g]oing to Boston to make money.”13 Mr. Tavares, Mr. Jones and B.B. then drove from Maine to Massachusetts with some other people. B.B. testified that in the car she was told to pick her future pimp from among Mr. Tavares, Mr. Jones and another man; she chose Mr. Tavares. During the ride, B.B. sat on Mr. Tavares’s lap while he explained the rules of prostitution, including forbidding her from talking to other pimps and dictating how she should speak to him. She testified that she did not speak with Mr. Jones at her sister’s apartment or on the drive to Boston. Immediately upon arrival in Boston, Mr. Tavares took B.B. to the streets to work as a prostitute. She worked there for a considerable period of time. 13 R.295 at 40. -17- Mr. Tavares raises two challenges to his conviction for transporting B.B.: insufficient evidence and an erroneous jury instruction. He contends that the Government did not prove that he transported B.B. with the intent that she engage in prostitution and that the Government failed to prove that he knew B.B. was under eighteen at the relevant time. Mr. Tavares’s assertion that the Government’s proof of his knowledge of B.B.’s underage status was insufficient is closely linked to his challenge of the jury instruction on this count.
In order to convict Mr. Tavares of transporting B.B., the Government was required to prove, among other things, that he had the “intent that [she] engage in prostitution.” 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). This element requires proof that “criminal sexual activity [was] one of the several motives or purposes . . . not a mere incident of the trip or trips, but instead was at least one of the defendant’s motivations for taking the trip in the first place.” United States v. Ellis, 935 F.2d 385, 390 (1st Cir. 1991) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we reverse only if “the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could not have persuaded any trier of fact of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir. 1986). We do not weigh -18- evidence or assess credibility. See United States v. Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d 253, 261 (1st Cir. 2003). Mr. Tavares maintains that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he transported B.B. with the requisite intent. According to Mr. Tavares, a jury could not draw a reasonable inference that he intended that B.B. engage in prostitution until they had arrived in Boston, i.e., after transportation was completed. In support, he relies on the fact that only B.B.’s participation in an escort service, not prostitution, was discussed explicitly in Maine. The record shows that the Government met its burden at trial. The jury reasonably could infer from B.B.’s testimony that Mr. Tavares’s purpose in bringing her from Maine to Boston was that she work for him as a prostitute. The discussion about “[g]oing to Boston to make money” reasonably can be understood as relating to prostitution. This interpretation is especially justifiable because Mr. Tavares is an admitted pimp, he picked B.B. up with another pimp (Peeples) and took her to discuss “mak[ing] money” with a third pimp (Mr. Jones). Even disregarding this statement, Mr. Tavares’s conduct during the ride from Maine to Boston clearly evidenced his intent in taking the trip. En route from Maine to Boston, Mr. Tavares instructed B.B. to choose a pimp for whom to work and told her his rules for the prostitutes working for him. Furthermore, the jury -19- was not limited to considering B.B.’s testimony in assessing Mr. Tavares’s intent. For example, an FBI agent testified that Mr. Tavares told him that Peeples was B.B.’s sister’s pimp but Peeples “couldn’t handle both sisters and so they [Mr. Tavares and Peeples] had made arrangements . . . to bring [B.B.] down to the Boston area.”14 Mr. Tavares’s contention that no intent reasonably could be inferred from this evidence is unavailing. The evidence produced at trial was more than sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Tavares had the requisite intent at least during, if not before, transportation.
Mr. Tavares also challenges the sufficiency of his conviction on Count Nine by contending that the Government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knew B.B. was under eighteen at the time he transported her. This claim is linked closely to his contention that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could convict him on this count15 without finding that he knew B.B. was under eighteen. Therefore, we address the instructional issue first. 14 R.299 at 78. 15 Mr. Tavares also challenges the district court’s instruction for Count Twelve, which involved the same offense with a different victim and an identical jury instruction. However, Mr. Tavares was acquitted of Count Twelve, and so we do not address this claim. -20- Title 18 of the United States Code, Section 2423(a) criminalizes “transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity.” It provides that [a] person who knowingly transports an individual who has not attained the age of 18 years in interstate or foreign c om m e r ce, or in any commonwealth, territory or possession of the United States, with intent that the individual engage in prostitution, or in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. Id. The district court instructed the jury that, in order to convict Mr. Tavares, it had to find that the Government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) Mr. Tavares knowingly transported B.B. in interstate commerce, (2) with the intent that B.B. engage in prostitution and (3) B.B. was under eighteen years old at the time of the transportation. The district court applied the “knowingly” requirement only to the act of transportation, not to the age of the individual transported. We review de novo claims of legal error in jury instructions. Figueroa v. Alejandro, 597 F.3d 423, 434 (1st Cir. 2010). Although we have not addressed whether § 2423(a) requires knowledge of the victim’s underage status, all six circuits to -21- consider the issue have concluded that it does not.16 Mr. Tavares, relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009), urges that we break with our sister circuits and extend the knowledge requirement to the victim’s underage status. In Flores-Figueroa, the Court construed 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), which penalizes a person who “knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.” The Court found that the statutory language required applying “knowing” to two elements: the “means of identification” and “of another person.” Id. at 652-57. Mr. Tavares contends that Flores-Figueroa represents an emerging trend in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence of applying the scienter requirement to every statutory element. Thus, he concludes, this court should extend “knowingly” to the victim’s underage status. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits have considered and rejected this argument. See United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2009). These circuits agree that “the context of § 2423(a) compels a reading of the statute that does not require 16 See, e.g., United States v. Daniels, 653 F.3d 399, 410 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Cox, 577 F.3d 833, 837-38 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 535, 539 (4th Cir. 2006); United States v. Griffith, 284 F.3d 338, 350-51 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Taylor, 239 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hamilton, 456 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir. 1972). -22- ‘knowingly’ to be applied to the victim’s age.” Daniels, 653 F.3d at 410. The court in Daniels held that this reading “is consistent with congressional intent that minors need special protection against sexual exploitation.” We agree that this context justifies requiring a defendant--who would presumably know he is treading close to the line in transporting a young person to engage in illicit sexual activity--to bear the risk that the person transported is underage. Id. (quoting Cox, 577 F.3d at 837). In addition to context, the court noted that under the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421, a defendant commits a crime any time he transports an individual for the purpose of prostitution. Therefore, age in § 2423(a) is not a factor that distinguishes criminal behavior from innocent conduct, but rather serves to justify a harsher penalty when a victim is underage. In contrast to the aggravated-identity-theft statute [at issue in Flores- Figueroa], when a defendant violates the Mann Act, he knows a real victim is involved, even if he does not know that victim is a minor. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is further reason to doubt that the Supreme Court intended such a modification of existing case law interpreting § 2423(a). In Flores-Figueroa, Justice Alito, noting the -23- importance of context in legislative interpretation, suggested in a concurring opinion that the majority’s principles of interpretation would not extend the scienter requirement in § 2423(a) to the underage status of the victim. 556 U.S. at 660 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).17 As the Seventh Circuit noted in Cox, 577 F.3d at 838, the majority in Flores-Figueroa did not take explicit issue with Justice Alito’s caution and, indeed, appeared to endorse it. See Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 652. For these reasons, we are persuaded by the reasoning of our sister circuits, and we see no need to depart from it. Our construction of the term “knowingly” in the statutory language is fatal to Mr. Tavares’s second sufficiency challenge and to his claim that the jury instruction was infirm. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that the Government had not produced sufficient evidence of Mr. Tavares’s knowledge of B.B.’s age, such a failure is irrelevant. The Government was under no obligation to prove that Mr. Tavares knew B.B. was underage. 17 “In interpreting a criminal statute . . . it is fair to begin with a general presumption that the specified mens rea applies to all the elements of an offense, but it must be recognized that there are instances in which context may well rebut that presumption.” Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 660 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Justice Alito then specifically mentioned § 2423(a) as an example of such a situation and noted that “[t]he Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that a defendant need not know the victim’s age to be guilty under this statute.” Id. -24-
Mr. Jones challenges his convictions on Counts Nine and Fourteen. We address these challenges in turn.
(Count Nine) Mr. Jones was convicted of aiding and abetting Mr. Tavares’s transportation of B.B., in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). He contends that the Government did not prove that he participated in Mr. Tavares’s transportation of B.B. Rather, he maintains, the Government established that he was merely present while Mr. Tavares committed a crime. To convict Mr. Jones of aiding and abetting, the Government was required to prove that he “participated in the illegal venture and sought by his actions to make it succeed.” Downs-Moses, 329 F.3d at 261. “[P]roof of sufficient participation in the crime, as well as knowledge of it, is required to convict.” United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 342 (1st Cir. 1997). Mere presence at the scene of the crime, even “with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is generally insufficient.” United States v. Campa, 679 F.2d 1006, 1010 (1st Cir. 1982). We conclude that the evidence produced at trial was sufficient to convict Mr. Jones of aiding and abetting the transportation of B.B. The Government established that Mr. Jones was a pimp and that he worked as one with Mr. Tavares. It also established that Mr. Jones was party to the discussion at B.B.’s -25- sister’s home about “[g]oing to Boston to make money,” which a jury reasonably could infer was a discussion about prostitution and one in which Mr. Jones participated. A jury could conclude that Mr. Jones’s participation in such a discussion was part of an effort to recruit B.B. to be a prostitute, either for him or for Mr. Tavares. Given that the group left for Boston soon after, a jury further reasonably could infer that Mr. Jones accompanied them as part of the scheme to bring B.B. into the prostitution ring. B.B. also testified that she was instructed on the ride to Boston to choose a pimp for whom to work from among the men in the car, including Mr. Jones. A jury could draw at least two reasonable inferences from this testimony, both supporting Mr. Jones’s conviction. First, a jury reasonably could infer that Mr. Jones stood to benefit financially from transporting B.B. because there was a chance she would work for him. Second, it could infer that Mr. Tavares’s indication of Mr. Jones as a potential pimp for B.B. demonstrates Mr. Jones’s association with Mr. Tavares’s plan to transport B.B. for prostitution. Indeed, had B.B. chosen differently, Mr. Jones could have been principally liable. Mr. Jones stresses B.B.’s testimony that she did not speak to him either at her sister’s home or during the car ride. This argument is unavailing. Considering B.B.’s testimony as a whole and Mr. Jones’s working relationship with Mr. Tavares, such -26- lack of conversation between Mr. Jones and B.B. does not raise a reasonable doubt about Mr. Jones’s aiding and abetting liability. Mr. Jones’s presence at the discussion about making money in Boston and on the subsequent car ride permitted the jury to conclude that Mr. Jones had more than a coincidental association with Mr. Tavares’s criminal venture and, indeed, had joined the illegal enterprise. We therefore conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient to justify Mr. Jones’s conviction on Count Nine.
Testimony (Count Fourteen) Mr. Jones also was convicted of knowingly transporting a minor, K.S., in interstate commerce with the intent that she engage in prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a). Mr. Jones alleges that K.S.’s testimony was coerced and that its admission into evidence violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process. He also claims, in the alternative, that the district court erred by failing to investigate sua sponte allegations of coercion. K.S. was a Government witness. She testified that she met Mr. Jones when she was sixteen and began working for him as a prostitute. In this capacity, she worked for Mr. Jones in Boston and traveled with him on several occasions to work as a prostitute in other cities. In addition to Boston, Mr. Jones prostituted K.S. in Atlantic City, New Jersey, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania and in Washington, D.C. After ending her relationship with Mr. Jones, -27- K.S. worked as a prostitute for Mr. Tavares. On direct examination, K.S. admitted that she did not want to testify, but was doing so under a subpoena. Mr. Jones’s counsel conducted a full cross-examination of K.S. During that cross-examination, she agreed with defense counsel that she had been threatened by FBI agents and a federal prosecutor with remaining in jail after she was arrested for failing to appear as required by a summons and with losing custody of her daughter if she did not “do what [they] wanted [her] to do.”18 She also agreed she was just going to tell the prosecution what they wanted to hear so she could move on with her life. On redirect, K.S. stated that she had been threatened by the FBI and federal prosecutors when she had been required to appear before the grand jury four years earlier and admitted that she had not told the district court that she had been threatened. Mr. Jones did not object to K.S.’s testimony at trial. Accordingly, we review his challenges to K.S.’s testimony for plain error. United States v. Matos-Quiñones, 456 F.3d 14, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2006). Mr. Jones’s claim is very similar to the one we rejected in United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2006), and that case provides substantial guidance. According to the testimony in that case, agents told one witness that she faced prosecution if 18 R.296 at 32. -28- she did not tell them “what they wanted to hear.” Id. at 57 (internal quotation marks omitted). Another witness testified that an agent told him that if he did not cooperate, the Government would take his home. In light of this testimony, the defendant in Hall contended that the Government had violated his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights by “threatening certain witnesses with severe consequences if they did not testify on the government’s behalf.” Id. In assessing this claim, we noted that a due process violation can occur when witnesses are discouraged from testifying through threats or other coercion. Notably, we distinguished those cases from situations where “the government has to press unwilling witnesses . . . to provide testimony that they are reluctant to give.” Id. at 57-58. Therefore, unlike Government efforts to prevent the testimony of certain witnesses, “[t]here is no blanket rule against inducements by the government to witnesses to produce truthful testimony.” Id. at 58. While making this distinction, we nevertheless recognized the possibility that, “in extreme circumstances, government misconduct[] could occur through improper efforts to shape testimony to the government’s liking.” Id. However, we determined that Hall presented no such circumstances, and, in any event, no constitutional violation had occurred because “there was conflicting testimony as to whether the government actually threatened [the witnesses] and defense counsel was allowed to cross-examine on the issue, leaving it to the jury to evaluate -29- witness credibility in light of the evidence concerning the alleged threats.” Id. Upon examination of the circumstances here, we must reach the same conclusion as the one that we reached in Hall: There is no constitutional violation. To be sure, K.S. did not want to testify against Mr. Jones. Indeed, she threw away a summons to appear before the grand jury and subsequently failed to appear as required.19 She testified at trial only because she had been subpoenaed,20 and she stated several times that she did not want to testify against Mr. Jones.21 What Mr. Jones’s counsel characterized as the Government’s “threats,” are more accurately viewed as lawful coercion of a reluctant witness to testify as required by law. Such “threats” are the legal consequences for failing to appear pursuant to a summons. Additionally, as in Hall, Mr. Jones’s counsel fully cross-examined K.S. on this issue. There was ample testimony in the record to permit the jury to evaluate K.S.’s credibility in light of all these circumstances. Nor can we say, as suggested by Mr. Jones, that the district court committed plain error in not conducting an evidentiary hearing prior to admitting the testimony. Mr. Jones contends that these “threats” trigger the analysis set forth in 19 R.296 at 34. 20 R.295 at 104. 21 See, e.g., R.296 at 23-24, 27. -30- LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1974). In that case, we determined that the circumstances surrounding a witness’s statement were so indicative of its involuntariness as to require a hearing. Specifically, a witness had recanted a prior sworn statement while testifying; he claimed that the prior statement was a police fabrication that he had been forced to sign while under the influence of drugs. Id. at 31. There, we stated that “[i]t is unthinkable that a statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging only in a police state should be admitted at the government’s behest in order to bolster its case.” Id. at 34. Because the surrounding circumstances raised a substantial claim that the statement was legally involuntary, see Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 480 (1972); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 372 (1964), we held that the trial court had an obligation to investigate, through an evidentiary hearing, whether the testimony was voluntary. LaFrance, 499 F.3d at 35. There is a material and qualitative distinction between the prosecutorial misconduct at issue in LaFrance and the situation before us today. LaFrance dealt with police extraction of a statement from a drug-impaired witness, by means which we described as “police threats and other blatant forms of physical and mental duress.” Id. In her testimony, K.S. related on cross-examination instances of lawful pressure. She was apprised of the lawful consequences of her failing to testify, which she was legally -31- required to do. The purpose of informing her of those legal consequences, moreover, was to ensure that she fulfilled her obligation to testify, not to ensure that she give particular testimony. Given the nature of the Government’s pressure and the full picture of the surrounding circumstances rendered by the robust cross-examination to which K.S. was subject, we conclude that the district court had no duty to inquire further into the voluntariness of K.S.’s testimony. There was no error, and certainly no plain error, in the district court’s admission of this testimony.