Opinion ID: 1181110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Mitigation.

Text: The court instructed the jury in terms of former CALJIC No. 8.84.1 without clarifying that factor (k) of section 190.3 permits the jury to consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record as mitigating evidence. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) (32a) Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to give his proposed clarifying instruction on mitigation [21] deprived him of the opportunity to have the jury consider all his mitigating evidence as required by Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586. (33) Pursuant to Lockett v. Ohio, supra , a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. (438 U.S. at p. 604 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 990], fn. omitted.) We have determined that section 190.3, factor (k) satisfies the Lockett directive. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], revd. on other grounds, California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], see People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, 878.) However, in order to avoid any potential misunderstanding, in People v. Easley, supra , we imposed the prospective requirement that trial courts expressly inform the jury that it may consider character and background evidence as well as mitigating evidence that relates to the crime. (34 Cal.3d at p. 878, fn. 10.) Failure of trial courts prior to Easley to give the clarifying instruction does not necessarily invalidate a death penalty verdict. Rather, our task is to review each such prior case on its own merits to determine whether in context the jury may have been misled concerning the scope of the evidence to be considered in its sentencing determination. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17; see People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 786-787; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 102-103 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; see also People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 777-778 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250] [1977 law].) (32b) In the instant case nothing in the court's instructions or the prosecutor's argument suggested to the jury that it should not consider defendant's mitigating evidence. To the contrary, the prosecutor, as discussed previously, expressly informed the jury that it could consider defendant's general background, character, [and] history, and noted that defense counsel would argue that these considerations were mitigating factors. Implicitly recognizing the potential mitigating effect of the evidence, the prosecutor sought to rebut it. Addressing the testimony of defendant's family that he was a loving person, the prosecutor asserted that theirs was a distorted picture โ defendant had been on his best behavior in his contacts with his family. Addressing defense counsel's anticipated reference to defendant's combat service in Vietnam, the prosecutor stated that this would be a way of diverting attention, trying to make you feel bad, trying to make you feel responsible for the death of Leah Schendel, ... He pointed out that the war happened a long time ago and urged the jury to remember that its task was to assess the criminal responsibility of one Manuel Babbitt, and not his conduct in the Vietnam War. Is this the kind of murder where we ought to be sensitive to the needs of the person who committed it? he asked rhetorically. Is this the kind of murder where we have to be understanding about the circumstances under which it was committed? In sum, the prosecutor's argument was premised on the relevance of defendant's background and character evidence. Defense counsel's argument reinforced the premise. Factor (k), counsel argued, was the most important consideration in the weighing process. Fulfilling the prosecutor's expectation, defense counsel cited as factors in mitigation within the ambit of factor (k) that defendant's family believed him to be a loving, caring person and that starting when he was only 17 years old defendant served two tours of duty in Vietnam, earning several medals and citations. Counsel further argued that defendant is a religious person, that he loves his children and his ex-wife, and that he got Theresa Babbitt off of drugs. On this record, we conclude that there exists `no legitimate basis' for believing that the jury was misled concerning its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777, citing California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 546 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 943] (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).)