Opinion ID: 2627867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Woodfall's Motion To Dismiss Count I

Text: Woodfall filed a motion to dismiss count I of the complaint, identity theft in the second degree (motion to dismiss), on December 27, 2006. Woodfall argued that, based on Hawai`i case law and the HRS § 701-118(8) (Supp.2006) definition of another, the statutory language of HRS § 708-839.7 prohibiting a transmission of any personal information of another, refers to the transmission of any personal information of an actual person. Woodfall reasoned that he attempted to assume a fictitious identity but did not attempt to transmit the personal information of another. Therefore, he urged the court to dismiss this count. The prosecution filed an objection to this motion on January 17, 2007, highlighting HRS § 708-839.7's phrase personal information. The prosecution pointed out that for purposes of Chapter 708, personal information is defined as information associated with an actual or a fictitious person ... that is used ... to confirm the identity of an actual or a fictitious person. HRS § 708-800. It concluded that the elements a transmission of any personal information of another include a transmission of personal information of a fictitious person.  (Emphasis added.) At the January 17, 2007 hearing on this motion, Woodfall argued that the `personal information' [of HRS § 708-839.7] is now qualified by the words `of another.' The definition `of another' by statute or by case law is a human being who was born and alive. Woodfall's counsel reiterated that under the plain language of the statute, Woodfall cannot legally be found guilty of identity theft when he did not use the identity of an actual real person. The prosecution countered that the statute and the statutory definitions of personal information and another provide adequate notice that the conduct requirement of HRS § 708-839.7 prohibits the transmission of personal information of an actual or fictitious person. In an order dated February 23, 2007, the circuit court denied Woodfall's motion, concluding that the phrase in question prohibits the transmission of any personal information of an actual or fictitious person. The court rejected Woodfall's narrow interpretation of HRS § 708-839.7, noting that it would be directly at odds with the HRS § 708-800 definition of personal information. It further held that it certainly is not clear especially in light of [HRS §]708-800's definition of `personal information'that the legislature's use of `another' was meant to exclude fictitious persons. In denying Woodfall's motion, the court constructed another as follows: A construction of the term another that would give force to and preserve both the legislature's intent to exclude the transmission of one's own personal information from the application of [HRS §]708-839.7 and the information associated with a fictitious person language of [HRS §]708-800's definition of personal information is simplyany real or fictitious person other than the person transmitting the information. On January 17, 2007, Woodfall pled no contest to forgery in the second degree and attempted theft in the second degree. After the court denied Woodfall's motion to dismiss, on June 15, 2007, Woodfall pled guilty to the charge of identity theft in the second degree. The court agreed to follow the plea agreement between the prosecution and Woodfall, which included the following terms: (1) Woodfall must serve an open ten year term to run concurrently with counts II (open five year sentence) and III (open five year sentence) and with any other sentence he is serving, and (2) Woodfall's guilty plea in count I is conditional, [6] and Woodfall preserved the right to appeal the circuit court's ruling denying his motion to dismiss. The court entered final judgment on October 10, 2007. Woodfall filed a notice of appeal on November 8, 2007.