Opinion ID: 614801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII and Section 1981

Text: Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Additionally, section 1981 affords all persons within the United States the “same right . . . to make and enforce contracts” without respect to race. Id. § 1981. Here, Johnson does not offer any direct evidence of discrimination but rather brings a claim based on disparate treatment. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Supreme Court first established a framework for adjudicating Title VII discrimination claims where the plaintiff lacks such direct evidence. 2 Johnson failed to specify in his complaint under what law he is bringing his retaliation claim. The district court treated Johnson’s claim as one under the FLSA, and we do the same as Johnson has admitted in his brief to this court that his claim arises under the FLSA. 5 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 6 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199 This is the same standard used to analyze claims of disparate impact discrimination brought under § 1981. Payne v. Travenol Labs., 673 F.2d 798, 818 (5th Cir. 1982); compare Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 2009) (setting out the elements of a prima facie case under Title VII) with Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5th Cir. 2004) (setting out the elements of a prima facie case under § 1981). Under that framework, an employee establishes a prima facie case of racial discrimination if he can demonstrate that (1) he is a member of a protected class, (2) he was qualified for the position at issue, (3) he was the subject of an adverse employment action, and (4) he was treated less favorably because of his membership in that protected class than were other similarly situated employees who were not members of the protected class, under nearly identical circumstances. Lee, 574 F.3d at 259. Adverse employment actions under this test are limited to “ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating” and do not include employment actions that do not “affect job duties, compensation, or benefits.” Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 282 (5th Cir. 2004). In establishing the similarly situated element, a plaintiff must identify an employee under “nearly identical” circumstances who did not have adverse employment action taken against him. Okoye v. Univ. of Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 245 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2001). Our cases do recognize that the comparator can be someone employed at a different time than the plaintiff. Uviedo v. Steves Sash & Door Co., 738 F.2d 1425, 1431 (5th Cir. 1984). If the plaintiff proves his prima facie case, then “the inference of intentional discrimination is raised, and the burden of production shifts to the employer” to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Lee, 574 F.3d at 259 (footnotes omitted). If the employer 6 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 7 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199 provides such a reason, then the inference “drops out and the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s explanation is merely a pretext for racial bias.” Id. (citing Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255–56 (1981)). To prove pretext, plaintiff must rebut the nondiscriminatory reason with “substantial evidence.” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003). In determining whether a given defendant is an employer, we use the standards laid out in Deal v. State Farm Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 1993) and summarized in Muhammed v. Dall. Cnty. Cmty. Supervision & Corrections Dep’t: Determining whether a defendant is an “employer” under Title VII involves a two-step process. First, the court must determine whether the defendant falls within Title VII’s statutory definition of an “employer.” Title VII defines an “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees . . . , and any agent of such a person . . . .” If the defendant meets this definition, the court must then analyze whether an employment relationship exists between the plaintiff and the defendant. To determine whether an employment relationship exists within the meaning of Title VII, we apply a hybrid economic realities/common law control test. The most important component of this test is the right to control the employee’s conduct. When examining the control component, we have focused on whether the alleged employer has the right to hire, fire, supervise, and set the work schedule of the employee. . . . The economic realities component of the test focuses on whether the alleged employer paid the employee’s salary, withheld taxes, provided benefits, and set the terms and conditions of employment. 479 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 7 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 8 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199
Denial of overtime pay is an adverse employment action because it relates to Johnson’s compensation. Peagram, 361 F.3d at 282; cf. Shannon v. Bell Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that denial of the opportunity to work overtime is an adverse employment action sufficient to make out a priam facie case under Title VII). Moreover, when using LaSalle, a Caucasian female who did receive overtime pay, as the comparator, Johnson has made out a prima facie case for discrimination. Because of this, we are required to determine who Johnson’s employer was.3 Both Manpower and Air Liquide meet the statutory definition of an employer under Title VII so resolution of this question turns on the application of the hybrid economic realities/right to control test. The staffing arrangement agreement sets out the respective responsibilities of Manpower and Air Liquide. Manpower’s responsibilities after it placed a worker at Air Liquide were: 1) Maintaining personnel and payroll records; 2) Paying, withholding, and transmitting payroll taxes; 3) Making unemployment contributions; 4) Handling unemployment and workers' compensation claims involving Assigned Employees with respect to compensation that [Manpower] has agreed to pay; 5) and removing any Assigned Employee at the request of [Air Liquide], provided there is a valid legal reason for doing so. We consider first the factors that go towards the more important assessment of right to control. Manpower, while technically in charge of hiring and firing, does so only at Air Liquide’s approval with respect to hiring and at Air Liquide’s request with respect to firing. Moreover, while Johnson had supervisors at both Air Liquide and Manpower, it seems that Murphy, Johnson’s 3 The district court did not analyze who Johnson’s employer was because it found that both Air Liquide and Manpower had provided legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for denying Johnson overtime. 8 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 9 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199 Manpower supervisor, merely responded to the requests of Johnson’s Air Liquide supervisors—Schwartz, Mayes, and Andresen. Additionally, Johnson’s job performance was reviewed by Air Liquide. To be sure, almost all of the factors under the economic realities test point to Manpower being Johnson’s employer, as Manpower paid Johnson and withheld taxes on his behalf. Nonetheless, because the majority of the more important right to control factors point to Air Liquide as Johnson’s employer, we conclude that Air Liquide and not Manpower is Johnson’s employer for the purposes of his overtime denial claim. See Deal, 5 F.3d at 119. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Manpower as to Johnson’s overtime denial claim against it. Reviewing the summary judgment record reveals that Air Liquide offered no reason for changing Johnson’s status to overtime exempt. Although, as the district court concluded, there does not appear to be any evidence that Air Liquide’s decision was based on Johnson’s race, Johnson has raised an inference of discrimination by establishing a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas. Lee, 574 F.3d at 259 (footnote omitted). Such a showing requires the employer to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action, and where no such reason is given the employer cannot be awarded summary judgment. See Alvarado v. Tex. Rangers, 492 F.3d 605, 617 (5th Cir. 2007). Therefore, we reverse the district court with respect to Johnson’s overtime denial claim against Air Liquide.
As stated above, for an employment action to form the basis of either a Title VII or a § 1981 claim, it must be an “ultimate employment decision,” which includes those affecting “job duties, compensation, or benefits.” Pegram, 361 F.3d at 282. Although Johnson did show that LaSalle, his replacement, did not undergo these pre-hire screening procedures, these are not the type of actions that give rise to a disparate treatment claim, as neither the background check 9 Case: 11-20199 Document: 00511623179 Page: 10 Date Filed: 10/05/2011 No. 11-20199 nor drug test affected Johnson’s duties, compensation, or benefits. Johnson admitted in his surreply to Manpower’s motion for summary judgment that these pre-hiring screening procedures are not actionable under the standard set forth in Pegram. Therefore, we affirm the district court on this ground.