Opinion ID: 78425
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count Three.(State Law Claims)

Text: 53. [Appellants] adopt and incorporate the allegations set forth in this Complaint. 54. Assault and Battery: The conduct of Home Depot's agent, Cavaluzzi, constituted assaults and batteries against the [Appellants] and invasions of the [Appellants'] privacy. 55. The assaults and batteries of Cavaluzzi were conducted in rudeness and in a hostile manner. Home Depot condoned or ratified such assaults and batteries. 56. Outrage: The Defendant recklessly and/or intentionally caused the [Appellants] to suffer severe emotional distress through the Defendant's extreme and outrageous conduct. 57. Negligent and Wanton Hiring, Retaining, Training and Supervision: Defendant Home Depot negligently and wantonly hired, retained, trained, and supervised Cavaluzzi thereby causing the [Appellants] to suffer severe emotional distress. 58. Invasion of Privacy: The conduct of Home Depot's agent, Cavaluzzi, constituted a wrongful intrusion and invasion of the [Appellants'] privacy. Cavaluzzi's wrongful acts were committed in the line and scope of the [sic] his employment with Home Depot; or Cavaluzzi's wrongful acts were committed in furtherance of the business of the Home Depot; or Home Depot participated in, authorized, or ratified such wrongful acts. 59. As a proximate consequence of the aforedescribed conduct of Defendant, [Appellants] have incurred great mental and emotional distress and have lost earnings from their employment. [Appellants] claim punitive damages. (R.1 at 14-15.) Thus, paragraph 53 of Count Three incorporates all allegations in the Complaint, including those relevant only to Count One, a federal harassment and hostile work environment claim, and Count Two, a federal retaliation claim. The Complaint is a classic example of shotgun pleading. First, it alleges all state law claims in a single count. See Cesnik v. Edgewood Baptist Church, 88 F.3d 902, 905 (11th Cir.1996) (lamenting that a Complaint was framed in complete disregard of the principle that separate, discrete causes of action should be plead in separate counts) (citation omitted); Anderson v. Dist. Bd. of Trs., 77 F.3d 364, 366-67 (11th Cir.1996) (finding that failure to present each claim for relief in a separate count, as required by Rule 10(b), constitutes shotgun pleading and undermines the ability of a court to administer justice). Second, each count incorporates by reference all allegations of the previous counts. As a consequence, it is impossible to determine the factual basis for each claim. We have roundly condemned this type of pleading. Strategic Income Fund, L.L.C. v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir.2002) (The typical shotgun complaint contains several counts, each one incorporating by reference the allegations of its predecessors, leading to a situation where most of the counts ... contain irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions.). Finally, pleading multiple assaults and batteries as one claim violates Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 10(b)'s clear command that, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence ... must be stated in a separate claim or defense. The district court granted summary judgment on the Appellants' claims of assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and outrage on the basis that the Appellants had not shown that Home Depot could be vicariously liable for the conduct of Cavaluzzi. [20] Under Alabama law, [21] an employer can be held vicariously liable for the intentional torts of its employee if it ratifies its employee's torts. Machen v. Childersburg Bancorporation, Inc., 761 So.2d 981, 984-85 (Ala.1999). To show that an employer ratified its employee's torts, a plaintiff must show, among other things, that the employer had actual knowledge of the tortious conduct of the offending employee .... Id. ( quoting Potts v. BE & K Constr. Co., 604 So.2d 398, 400 (Ala.1992)). The district court concluded that Home Depot did not have actual knowledge of the tortious conduct of Cavaluzzi until November of 2005, and that at that point it took adequate steps to remedy the situation. Accordingly, the district court concluded that summary judgment was appropriate for the assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and outrage claims because Home Depot was not vicariously liable for Cavaluzzi's conduct under Alabama law. The district court additionally held that summary judgment was appropriate on the invasion of privacy and outrage claims because the conduct alleged was not severe enough to constitute either invasion of privacy or outrage under Alabama law. The Appellants make only two arguments on appeal in support of their contention that summary judgment on its Alabama tort claims was inappropriate. First, the Appellants argue that Home Depot had actual knowledge of the tortious conduct when Raya and Corbitt told Calhoun of Cavaluzzi's conduct in April and June of 2005, respectively. The Appellants argue that, because Home Depot had actual knowledge of Cavaluzzi's tortious conduct, it ratified the torts under Alabama law, and summary judgment was inappropriate for the assault and battery, invasion of privacy, and outrage claims. Second, Appellants argue that the tortious conduct at issue was severe enough to constitute an invasion of privacy and outrage under Alabama law. [22] We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the assault and battery claims because there is no record evidence to support the only argument that Appellants make on appeal. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the invasion of privacy claim because we are not able to discern the factual basis for the invasion of privacy claim. Thus, the Complaint fails to state a claim. And we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the outrage claim because there is no record evidence of one element of the claim. We have no occasion to decide whether shotgun pleading is in and of itself an appropriate basis for affirming the grant of summary judgment on any of the claims. By the same token, we have no occasion to decide whether Wagner v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir.2002) (en banc) abrogates the remand-for-repleading remedy for shotgun pleading that we applied in Magluta v. Samples, 256 F.3d 1282, 1284-85 (11th Cir.2001). We consider in turn each of the three state law claims before us. 1. Assaults and Batteries First, we seek to determine what tortious conduct underlies the assault and battery claims. Second, we determine whether there is record evidence that Home Depot had actual knowledge of Cavaluzzi's tortious conduct, as the Appellants contend, from the Appellants' discussions with Calhoun in April and June of 2005. The only argument Appellants make on appeal that Home Depot had actual knowledge of the assaults and batteries is that there is record evidence that Appellants told Calhoun about them in April and June of 2005. (Appellant's Br. at 28.) We limit our review to the merits of this one argument. See Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228 n. 2 (11th Cir.2005) (When an appellant fails to offer argument on an issue, that issue is abandoned.) (citations omitted). The Complaint indicates that the Appellants claim more than one assault and battery because Count Three speaks of assaults and batteries in the plural. But, there is no indication in the Complaint of how many or when they occurred. We turn to the Second Amended Pretrial Order for clarification. There we find only the following as the factual basis for the assault and battery claims: All admissible facts relevant to whether Mr. Cavaluzzi touched the [Appellants] or their clothes in rudeness, in anger, or in a hostile manner. (R.135 at 26.) In the Appellants' Opposition to Summary Judgment in the district court, however, the Appellants asserted three assault and battery claims under Alabama law. [23] (R.92 at 60.) First, Cavaluzzi massaged Corbitt's belly at the Mobile Montlimar store in August of 2005. ( Id. at 6, 60.) Second, Cavaluzzi massaged Raya's leg at the Daphne store in March of 2005. ( Id. at 7, 60.) And third, he massaged Raya's neck and shoulder at the Lake Forest Country Club on August 26, 2005. ( Id. at 9, 60.) Having identified the tortious conduct underlying the Appellants' three assault and battery claims, we next look to see whether there is record evidence that Home Depot had actual knowledge of the tortious conduct. We need not reach the issue of whether Calhoun was the correct person to notify about this conduct, as there is no evidence in the record that the Appellants actually told Calhoun about the tortious conduct now underlying the assault and battery claims. The conduct underlying two of the claims, Cavaluzzi's belly rub of Corbitt, and the neck and shoulder massage of Raya at Lake Forest Country Club, occurred in August 2005. The Appellants argue that their April and June 2005 discussions with Calhoun gave Home Depot actual knowledge of Cavaluzzi's August 2005 conduct. Home Depot, however, could not have had actual knowledge of Cavaluzzi's August 2005 tortious conduct based on the Appellants' discussions with Calhoun at least two months prior to the tortious conduct. Additionally, there is no evidence that Raya ever told Calhoun during his April 2005 conversation with her about the March 2005 leg rub. In his deposition, Raya does not say that he told Calhoun about the leg rub. ( See R.111 at 23.) And, Calhoun, when discussing what Raya told her in April 2005, says nothing of the leg rub. ( See R.93 at 17-18.) There is no evidence, therefore, that either Raya or Corbitt told Calhoun in April or June of 2005 about the conduct underlying their assault and battery claims. Because there is no evidence in the record that the Appellants actually told Calhoun in April and June of 2005 about the tortious conduct underlying their assault and battery claims, we conclude that the Appellants have not shown that Home Depot had actual knowledge of the tortious conduct, and thus ratified the alleged assaults and batteries of its employee, Cavaluzzi. Accordingly, the district court properly granted Home Depot summary judgment on the assault and battery claims. 2. Invasion of Privacy The court granted summary judgment on the invasion of privacy claim on the ground that the alleged conduct did not rise to the level of an invasion of privacy tort under Alabama law. When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we may affirm on any legal ground supported by the record, regardless of whether the district court relied on that ground. McCabe v. Sharrett, 12 F.3d 1558, 1560 (11th Cir.1994) (citing Davis v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 525 F.2d 1204, 1207 (5th Cir.1976)). Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the ground that the Appellants have failed to state a claim for invasion of privacy. Indeed, the parties and district court have hinted that the true dispute at the summary judgment stage was whether the Appellants had failed to state a claim. (R.86 at 46) (Home Depot's Motion for Summary Judgment argues that Plaintiffs' allegations fail to constitute an invasion of privacy.) (emphasis added); (R.141 at 35) (District court's Order holding that  alleged conduct is insufficient and so the claim is dismissed on this basis.) (emphasis added); (Appellee's Br. at 44) (District court properly found that the Plaintiffs' allegations failed to constitute an invasion of privacy.) (emphasis added). [24] We have held that a Complaint requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 958 (11th Cir.2009) ( quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Dismissal for failure to state a claim is proper if the factual allegations are not enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Watts v. Fla. Int'l Univ., 495 F.3d 1289, 1295 (11th Cir.2007) ( quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. at 1965). In this case, the Appellants have not alleged any factual support for their invasion of privacy claim, and therefore dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate. The Appellants' Complaint merely states: 58. Invasion of Privacy: The conduct of Home Depot's agent, Cavaluzzi, constituted a wrongful intrusion and invasion of the [Appellants'] privacy. Cavaluzzi's wrongful acts were committed in the line and scope of the [sic] his employment with Home Depot; or Cavaluzzi's wrongful acts were committed in furtherance of the business of the Home Depot; or Home Depot participated in, authorized, or ratified such wrongful acts. (R.1 at 15.) The Second Amended Pretrial Order is no more helpful than the Complaint, as it provides as the factual basis for the invasion of privacy claim: All admissible facts relevant to whether Mr. Cavaluzzi intentionally intruded physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of the Plaintiffs or their private affairs or concerns. (R.135 at 27.) Because the Appellants have failed to allege what the factual basis is for their invasion of privacy claim, we conclude that they have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and thus their claim should have been dismissed. On that basis, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment. 3. Outrage The outrage claim suffers from the same pleading deficiencies as the invasion of privacy claim. In addition to failing to allege a factual basis for the claim, the Appellants have failed to present any evidence of one necessary element of this tort: severe emotional distress. Absent evidence of severe emotional distress, summary judgment must be granted. McIsaac v. WZEW-FM Corp., 495 So.2d 649, 651 (Ala.1986). Therefore, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to Home Depot on the Appellants' claim of outrage.