Opinion ID: 2581010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General adequacy of the jury selection voir dire

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights to a fair and impartial jury because it failed to conduct an adequate voir dire inquiry into various topics about which, defendant claims, the court should have been aware on the basis of the case file. These topics include the prospective jurors' attitudes concerning: (i) defendant's prior criminal record and status as a felon; (ii) the content of letters that defendant wrote while in prison referring, for example, to his near continuous incarceration since the age of sixteen; (iii) defendant's past drug use; (iv) defendant's apparent racial bias (he is White) against Blacks, and his repeated references to Terry Guillory (who is of both White and Black racial heritage) as cookie or Oreo; (v) defendant's use of a swastika to decorate two of his letter signatures; (vi) defendant's offer, in a letter, to perform oral sex on Donna Guthrie; (vii) defendant's general minimization of his own personal responsibility for his past crimes; (viii) the effect that gruesome crime-scene photographs might have on prospective jurors; (ix) the attitudes of prospective jurors concerning the killing of animals (as it related to the killing of the victims' dog); and (x) defendant's various social and political views, such as his support for the Chinese students' uprising at Tiananmen Square, and his criticism of governmental policies concerning confiscation of private property, interference with sexual relations, punishment of so-called victimless crimes, and inadequate compensation of prison laborers. In addition, defendant asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for having failed to request, or undertake, supplemental voir dire on these subjects. Contrary to defendant's view, we do not agree that the trial court erred by failing, on its own motion, to pose voir dire questions addressed to these specific topics. As explained above, the trial court conducted voir dire by having the prospective jurors complete a 13-page questionnaire that probed a number of issues relating to potential bias. Although the trial court did not conduct follow-up oral voir dire with respect to the five prospective jurors discussed in part II.A, ante, it did undertake significant follow-up voir dire examination as to other prospective jurors (including the jurors who actually sat on the case), consisting of individual examination of various jurors who asked for a private session, preinstructions to groups of prospective jurors, and examination, in open court, of numerous prospective jurors. Moreover, as to these jurors and prospective jurors, the court expressly invited follow-up voir dire examination by counsel for both parties. Viewing the voir dire record as a whole, we cannot say that the voir dire was inadequate and that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) We agree that many of the areas of inquiry proposed for the first time in defendant's appellate briefs, if reduced to questions on voir dire, might have assisted defense counsel in exercising challenges. But, as the high court observed in Mu'Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 425-426, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493, [t]o be constitutionally compelled, ... it is not enough that such questions be helpful. Rather, the trial court's failure to ask these questions must render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. Defendant, quoting Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 ( Turner ), notes that [b]ecause of the range of discretion entrusted to a jury in a capital sentencing hearing, there is a unique opportunity for racial prejudice to operate but remain undetected. ( Id., at p. 35, 106 S.Ct. 1683 (opn. of White, J.).) As an initial matter, we observe that Turner, like other cases relied upon by defendant, is distinguishable in that it involved a trial court's refusal  upon request by defense counsel  to probe possible race-related bias. ( Id., at pp. 30-31.) In the present case, by contrast, there was no such request, and defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to probe such a matter on its own. We also note that defendant and his victims were of the same race (Caucasian), and that, unlike the situation focused upon in Turner, supra, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27  that is, an effort to expose racial biases that prospective jurors may harbor due to the race of the victim or defendant  here defendant's concern appears to be related to how prospective jurors would react to his bigotry and use of a swastika. In any event, because the penalty judgment must be reversed for the reasons set out in part II.A, Turner provides no basis for additional relief inasmuch as that decision expressly does not implicate the remaining guilt and special circumstance determinations. (See Turner, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 37-38, 106 S.Ct. 1683 [vacating the penalty judgment but not the guilt judgment].) The trial court acted within its discretion by channeling the voir dire examination of the jurors within reasonable bounds and in a manner designed to expedite the jury selection process. ( People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 419, 276 Cal.Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221.) Trial counsel for defendant was given an opportunity to submit or ask additional voir questions of the prospective jurors who had not been excused for cause over objection, and yet declined to do so. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to ask, on its own motion, the more probing questions that defendant now advances. Nor do we agree that trial counsel performed in a constitutionally inadequate manner by failing to probe the issues framed by defendant's appellate counsel. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ( Strickland ); People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839 ( Ledesma ).) First, as we have long observed, if the record does not preclude a satisfactory explanation for counsel's actions, we will not, on appeal, find that trial counsel acted deficiently. (See People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134 ( Mendoza Tello ) [`[i]f the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] ... unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected], quoting People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; and People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859 ( Pope ).) On the record before us, we have no reason to question that counsel pursued a reasonable tactical choice by declining to highlight immediately to the prospective jurors the various unsympathetic aspects of defendant's personality and character described above, and by relying instead upon the subsequent voir dire that was conducted (including the court's extensive preinstructions, advising that each juror would be required to retain and keep your neutrality, make his or her determination based upon the evidence only, without the influence of passion and prejudice, and be impartial) and upon the court's subsequent instructions to the jury, limiting each juror's consideration to the evidence and precluding the jurors from being swayed by speculation, passion, prejudice, or conjecture, and directing each juror to focus upon whether there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of the crimes and special circumstance charged. Defendant fails to establish deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 687-691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) Second, defendant also fails to establish prejudice, that is, a reasonable probability of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 691-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.) As the court observed in Strickland, [a] reasonable probability [of a more favorable outcome in the absence of the assertedly deficient performance] is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052.) The evidence of defendant's guilt was very strong. He test-fired a gun shortly before the killings; the bullet fired from that gun bore markings consistent with the bullets taken from the victims. Defendant's letters from prison showed his alienation, anger, and despondency over the role played by his mother and Ardell in causing him to be sent back to prison. Defendant visited Shane Powell and Mary Perron shortly before the killings, complaining of the treatment by his family and asserting that having been jailed made him what he is today, and he's not responsible for his actions, whatever they may be, and that society would just have to deal with that. Powell and Perron heard the scream, No, Richard, no at the same time they heard the gunshots. Soon after the gunshots were fired, Terry Guillory saw defendant peek out from the front door of the Pillow home and make eye contact with him, heard defendant say something to the effect of Oh shit, and then saw defendant shut the door and retreat into the Pillow home. Defendant thereafter was missing for several days and did not attend his mother's funeral. After defendant was incarcerated following his arrest, defendant attempted to convince his cousin, Gary Beach, to alter his testimony concerning the type of gun defendant had test-fired, and defendant also attempted to keep Terry Guillory from testifying by having Jacqueline Coghlan transfer $1,000 to Maurice Solvang. In addition to this strong evidence of identity and motive, the prosecution presented strong evidence concerning the mental elements of the crimes. The close range and placement of the shots; the selection of the early morning of the Fourth of July (when gunshots in the neighborhood might be masked or made less noticeable by firecrackers or other celebratory gunshots) as the date for the crimes; the apparent effort to rid the crime scene of bullet cartridges; the killing of the dog (possibly to silence it); and the attempt to burn the house and the evidence it contained  all provide strong evidence of malice, premeditation, and deliberation. On the record before us, it is not reasonably probable that, had trial counsel probed the prospective jurors concerning the matters listed above, the jury selected would have entertained a reasonable doubt concerning defendant's guilt or would have concluded that the special circumstance allegation was not true. Counsel's alleged failings in this regard are insufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.