Opinion ID: 219821
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alexander’s Retaliation Claims

Text: Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because the employee “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). We analyze Alexander’s retaliation claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework. A prima facie case of retaliation requires Alexander to “establish that (1) he . . . engaged in protected activity, (2) the employer knew of the exercise of the protected right, (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against [him], and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008). To establish causation, Alexander must “proffer evidence sufficient to raise the inference that [his] protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.” EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). If he meets this showing, the burden shifts to Defendants to “articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. If they do so, Alexander must “demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was a mere pretext for [retaliation].” Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., Inc., 348 F.3d 537, 542 (6th Cir. 2003). - 11 - No. 10-3358 Alexander v. Ohio State University College of Social Work, et al.
Alexander alleges that he was removed as BSSW Director in retaliation for requesting salary information that might reveal sex discrimination. We assume without deciding that this request constituted protected activity. See Niswander, 529 F.3d at 719–20, 725 (stating that Title VII’s opposition clause protects an employee’s “reasonable” opposition to unlawful discrimination). Defendants give various reasons for Alexander’s removal from the position, citing his lack of progress in developing an undergraduate honors program, a social justice minor, and new courses, tasks that Alexander acknowledges were priorities for the dean. Alexander argues that these reasons were pretextual and challenges the Dean’s judgment that he was an ineffective administrator. He contends that he missed no required deadlines and was given no written warning of performance problems. He also argues that the dean gave “shifting reasons” for Alexander’s dismissal—further evidence that those reasons were pretextual. See Cicero v. Borg-Warner Auto., Inc., 280 F.3d 579, 592 (6th Cir. 2002) (“An employer’s changing rationale for making an adverse employment decision can be evidence of pretext.”). Alexander has failed to raise an issue of material fact as to whether the proffered reasons for his removal were a pretext for retaliation. He has not shown that they “had no basis in fact,” “did not actually motivate” the dean’s decision, or were “not sufficient to motivate” that decision. Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. Rather, his own deposition testimony indicates that he had made little progress on the dean’s prioritized tasks at the time of his removal. Although Alexander was given no written warning, the University Handbook does not indicate that prior written warning is required before removing a professor from an administrative position. Alexander’s “shifting reasons” - 12 - No. 10-3358 Alexander v. Ohio State University College of Social Work, et al. argument also fails. The fact that a defendant offers “shifting justifications” for an adverse employment action may sometimes be evidence of pretext. Cicero, 280 F.3d at 592. “When the justification for an adverse employment action changes during litigation, that inconsistency raises an issue whether the proffered reason truly motivated the defendants’ decision.” Ibid. But an inference of pretext is not warranted here. At the time of Alexander’s removal, the dean cited his failure to make progress on the prioritized tasks as the reason he was being replaced. In his deposition, the dean listed a litany of additional reasons for his dissatisfaction with Alexander’s performance as BSSW Director. Even so, the dean consistently emphasized Alexander’s failure to make progress on the tasks. In other words, the proffered reasons did not change during the course of this litigation.
Alexander contends that he received a poor annual evaluation in 2006 in retaliation for opposing the dean’s suggestion that students sign a pledge not to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation and for requesting information regarding faculty salaries. He asserts that he was given only a small 2007 salary adjustment in retaliation for filing an EEOC charge in December 2006. With respect to the 2006 evaluation, Alexander has failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation because he has not “proffer[ed] evidence sufficient to raise the inference that [his] protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.” Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d at 861. Retaliation may be inferred from “temporal proximity” if “an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity.” Mickey v. Zeidler Tool - 13 - No. 10-3358 Alexander v. Ohio State University College of Social Work, et al. & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008). “But where some time elapses between when the employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action, the employee must couple temporal proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality.” Ibid. Here, Alexander’s alleged protected activity occurred in July and August of 2005. His 2005–06 annual evaluation did not occur until May 2006. This court has held that an inference of retaliation may be established based on temporal proximity of two or three months. See Sanford v. Main St. Baptist Church Manor, Inc., 327 F. App’x 587, 600–01 (6th Cir. 2009) (two months); Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 556 (2004) (three months). The nine-month gap here is too long to permit the inference, absent some other evidence. That additional evidence of retaliatory conduct could include more favorable treatment of similarly-situated professors who did not engage in protected activity. See Hill v. Air Tran Airways, 2011 WL 1042178, at  (6th Cir. March 23, 2011). As discussed above, however, Alexander has not demonstrated that he was treated differently from other faculty during the 2006 evaluation. With respect to the 2007 evaluation, Alexander has failed to raise an issue of fact as to whether the reasons Defendants supplied for Alexander’s low raise were pretextual. See Abbott, 348 F.3d at 542. As previously discussed, he has not demonstrated that he was treated differently from other full professors, nor has he established that he deserved a better evaluation.
Alexander contends that Dean Meezan filed an internal complaint against him in retaliation for filing charges with the EEOC. The district court held that Alexander failed to establish a prima - 14 - No. 10-3358 Alexander v. Ohio State University College of Social Work, et al. facie case of retaliation with respect to Dean Meezan’s complaint, because the complaint did not constitute an adverse employment action. The scope of Title VII’s retaliation provision is broader than that of the discrimination provision and protects employees from any actions that would have “dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006) (quotation marks and citations omitted). A plaintiff must show that the action was “materially adverse” from the standpoint of a “reasonable employee.” Id. at 68–69. The Supreme Court has limited “adverse employment actions” to something more than “petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.” Id. at 68. We assume without deciding that the lodging of a complaint to OSU’s Human Resources Office can constitute a “materially adverse” employment action. We nonetheless affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on this claim because Alexander has presented no evidence that the dean’s proffered motive for filing the complaint was a pretext for retaliation. Based on facts that Alexander admitted in his deposition, the dean had a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for filing a complaint alleging that Alexander was harassing him based on his sexual orientation and HIV-positive status. Alexander told a classroom of students that the dean was racist, gay, and a “leprechaun.” Alexander also told a provost and a fellow professor that the dean had AIDS and that people feared he “might accidentally head butt them or scratch their faces.” He sent emails to university administrators and faculty calling the dean a racist and a liar who favored gay and white faculty members. These undisputed facts were sufficient to motivate the dean’s - 15 - No. 10-3358 Alexander v. Ohio State University College of Social Work, et al. actions—the dean had the right to seek assistance from OSU in preserving his reputation and keeping his health condition private.