Opinion ID: 220344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Procedural Objection to Sentence

Text: Marrero also challenges his sentence, arguing that the district court failed to appreciate its authority to disagree with the 100:1 crack[-to-powder-]cocaine sentencing ratio[] [3] incorporated in the Guidelines. [Appellant's Br. 23.] Marrero relies on Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), which held that a district court may vary a defendant's sentence upon concluding that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence `greater than necessary' to achieve § 3553(a)'s purposes, even in a mine-run case, id. at 110, 128 S.Ct. 558. See also Spears v. United States, 555 U.S. 261, 129 S.Ct. 840, 843-44, 172 L.Ed.2d 596 (2009) (per curiam) ([D]istrict courts are entitled to reject and vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement with those Guidelines.). Though Marrero was sentenced under the career-offender provisions of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 rather than the drug-quantity table of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1, the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses is implicitly incorporated in his career-offender enhancement. United States v. Michael, 576 F.3d 323, 327 (6th Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 819, 175 L.Ed.2d 574 (2009). Therefore, the logic of Kimbrough and Spears still applies, and a categorical disagreement with the [crack-to-powder-cocaine] ratio may ... support a district court's rejection of the career offender enhancement. United States v. Curb, 625 F.3d 968, 972 (6th Cir.2010). Marrero claims that the district court did not understand its authority to categorically disagree with the crack-cocaine Guidelines, making his sentence procedurally deficient. See Moore v. United States, 555 U.S. 1, 129 S.Ct. 4, 172 L.Ed.2d 1 (2008) (per curiam); United States v. Johnson, 553 F.3d 990, 996 (6th Cir.2009). In the proceedings below, Marrero repeatedly contested the application of the crack-cocaine disparity to his sentence. However, Marrero never argued to the district court that it should impose a downward departure based on a categorical disagreement with the Guidelines. Rather, he only argued for a downward departure based on his mistaken belief that Congress had eliminated the contested disparity. Additionally, Marrero responded negatively when, at the close of the sentencing hearing, the district court asked him whether he had any other objections to the sentence ... imposed. As a result, we review his request for remand under a plain-error standard. See United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 354-58 (6th Cir. 2009) (determining that plain-error review applied to defendant's procedural argument for remand in light of Kimbrough, even though defendant's counsel at sentencing had devoted much of her argument [at sentencing] to the idea that a downward variance was warranted ... because of the Guidelines' disparate treatment of crack and powder cocaine offenses and had, when asked if she had additional objections, raised a vague objection to the procedural, substantive aspects of defendant's sentence), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2116, 176 L.Ed.2d 741 (2010). See generally United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir.2008) (en banc); United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir.2004). As this Court previously held in Michael, the district court's error, if any, in failing affirmatively to recognize its discretion to reject the statutory 100:1 ratio as implicitly incorporated into U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 was not plain. 576 F.3d at 328 (citing United States v. Liddell, 543 F.3d 877, 885 (7th Cir.2008)). In this case, the district court explicitly recognized that the guidelines are advisory to the Court. It also discussed its consideration of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, explaining the basis for Marrero's sentence in light of the very serious nature of his offenses, his likelihood to recidivate and penchant for deceitful and exaggerating representations, his need for anger management help and drug education, and the necessity of deterrence and protection of the public. As in Simmons, [t]here is simply no indication whatsoever that the judge believed the Guidelines were mandatory, or that the court believed it was not free to vary downward based on both particularized circumstances of the crime and defendant or based on substantive disagreement with the crack Guidelines. 587 F.3d at 364; cf. Johnson, 553 F.3d at 996 & n. 1 (remanding so that the district court may impose a sentence with full awareness of its authority under Spears, when the district court stated at sentencing that it must apply the Guidelines and this Court had no way of ascertaining whether the district judge would have imposed the same sentence if he had known of his discretion to vary categorically from the crack-cocaine Guidelines based on a policy disagreement). But see Curb, 625 F.3d at 973 (distinguishing Simmons and remanding for resentencing under Johnson ). Under these circumstances, we cannot say the district court's explanation constitutes an error, let alone an error that `was obvious or clear,' affecting the defendant's substantial rights and calling into doubt `the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.' Simmons, 587 F.3d at 365 (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)).