Opinion ID: 220657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: District court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Donald Bowers

Text: In his second issue on appeal, Donald Bowers argues that the district court could not, at any point during the litigation, legally exercise personal jurisdiction over him because he was a nonresident and nonparty. We review de novo questions of personal jurisdiction. [6] See Benton v. Cameco Corp., 375 F.3d 1070, 1074 (10th Cir.2004). This court has not previously addressed the question of whether a district court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident nonparty who, in active concert or participation with a party, has violated an injunction. But other circuits have done so. Most notably, the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have held that [n]onparties who reside outside the territorial jurisdiction of a district court may be subject to that court's jurisdiction for purposes of contempt proceedings if, with actual notice of the court's order, they actively aid and abet a party in violating that order. Waffenschmidt v. MacKay, 763 F.2d 711, 714 (5th Cir.1985); see also Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Homa, 514 F.3d 661, 673-75 (7th Cir.2008). The rationale for this holding was succinctly explained by the Seventh Circuit in Homa. There, the Seventh Circuit was faced with the question of whether a district court had personal jurisdiction over two nonparty individuals who resided outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, but who had nevertheless knowingly violated an asset freeze order and actively aided and abetted a party in violating that order. In concluding that the district court properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the nonparties for purposes of contempt proceedings, the Seventh Circuit began by noting that a court possesses the independent authority to enforce its own injunctive decrees. Id. at 673. In this respect, the Seventh Circuit emphasized, [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 65(d), which governs the contents and scope of injunctions, must be regarded as a codification rather than a limitation on a federal court's inherent power to protect its ability to render a binding judgment. Id. at 673-74. In turn, the Seventh Circuit noted that the injunctive mandate of a federal court runs nationwide, and the issuing court has the authority to deal with defiance of its orders regardless of where that defiance occurs. Id. at 674. The Seventh Circuit further noted, citing Rule 65(d), that an injunction binds not only the parties to the injunction but also nonparties who act with the named party. Id. [I]f courts did not have the power to punish those who cooperate with those named in an injunction, the Seventh Circuit stated, the named parties could easily thwart the injunction by operating through others. Id. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit held that a person who knowingly circumvents a freeze order is subject to a show cause order and contempt and thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the court for contempt proceedings.... Id. Jurisdiction over persons who knowingly violate a court's injunctive order, the Seventh Circuit emphasized, even those without any other contact with the forum, is necessary to the proper enforcement and supervision of a court's injunctive authority and offends no precept of due process. Id. at 675 (internal quotation marks omitted). The only contrary authority we have found is a 1989 decision from the Second Circuit, Canterbury Belts Ltd. v. Lane Walker Rudkin, Ltd., 869 F.2d 34 (2d Cir. 1989). In that case, the Second Circuit held that [a] district court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonparty to a litigation, for purposes of civil contempt proceedings, on the basis that the nonparty is acting `in active concert or participation,' within the meaning of Fed. R.Civ.P. 65(d), with a party who is subject to an injunction, unless personal jurisdiction is established over the nonparty. Id. at 40. In our view, however, the Second Circuit arrived at this conclusion only by erroneously relying on one of its earlier decisions, i.e., Heyman v. Kline, 444 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.1971). Heyman was distinguishable, both from Canterbury and the case at hand, because the nonparty at issue therein was not found to have acted in concert with the party in the case. 444 F.2d at 65-66. Consequently, and understandably, the Heyman court, in the absence of active concert or participation by the nonparty, required typical proof of personal jurisdiction over the nonparty. Because we find the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Homa persuasive, we adopt its rule and hold that a district court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonparty for purposes of entering contempt orders, when the nonparty, with actual notice of an injunctive order issued by the district court, and in active concert or participation with a party, violates that order. Applying that rule to the facts presented in the instant appeal, we in turn conclude that the district court in this case properly exercised personal jurisdiction over Donald Bowers for the purpose of entering contempt orders. The record on appeal firmly establishes that Donald Bowers had actual notice of the district court's injunctive orders. Further, the district court expressly found, and the record on appeal amply supports the district court's findings, that Donald Bowers, in active concert or participation with the WideBand defendants, particularly his son, Lonny Bowers, violated those injunctive orders. By doing so, Donald Bowers submitted himself to the district court's jurisdiction. [7]