Opinion ID: 418124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FMC Jurisdiction Over the Dispute

Text: 16 Before addressing BSA's arguments on appeal we must first discuss the issue of FMC jurisdiction over Rule 10. NYSA argued before the ALJ that the first port rule falls within the labor exemption to the shipping laws. The theory behind this exemption is that labor laws and the NLRB, and not the shipping laws and the FMC, have been designed to handle collective bargaining issues. The Maritime Labor Agreements Act of 1980 resulted from a congressional attempt to clarify the jurisdictional boundary between these two areas of law. See infra p. 1236. After closely considering the issue of FMC jurisdiction the ALJ concluded that the factual and legal determinations necessary to decide the question overlapped the analysis required to dispose of the case on the merits; his resolution on the merits rendered a conclusion on the jurisdictional question unnecessary. 17 For several reasons our resolution of the issues presented on appeal likewise does not require a determination of whether or not the FMC has jurisdiction over this dispute. First, the parties have not emphasized the jurisdictional question on appeal. BSA takes the position that the FMC had jurisdiction over this case; the FMC maintains that the issue is not a simple one to resolve, but that its finding on the merits that there has been no shipping law violation obviates the need for a resolution; and the intervenors do not discuss the issue. Second, our review of the law concerning the labor exemption to the shipping laws leads us to conclude that, at the very least, this case could not be dismissed summarily for lack of FMC jurisdiction. The Maritime Labor Agreements Act of 1980 exempts maritime labor agreements except to the extent that such provisions provide for the funding of collectively bargained fringe benefit obligations on other than a uniform man-hour basis, and calls for FMC approval upon filing of assessment agreements providing for such funding. 46 U.S.C. Secs. 841c & 814 (Supp. IV 1980). The Second Container Royalty, and the first dollar of the First Container Royalty as administered in the Port of Boston, appear to fall within this provision and thus appear not to fall within the labor exemption to the shipping laws. As to the nonstatutory labor exemption which was in effect prior to the Maritime Labor Agreements Act, the D.C. Circuit has stated that the Rules on Containers would not qualify for such an exemption and that the FMC has jurisdiction to consider their legality under the shipping laws. 9 Council of North Atlantic Shipping Associations v. FMC, 672 F.2d 171, 183, 188 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 69, 74 L.Ed.2d 69 (1982). We merely conclude that the issue of FMC jurisdiction is a thorny one, and indeed perhaps more difficult to resolve than BSA's claims on the merits. Our affirmance on the merits renders a conclusion on the jurisdictional question unnecessary.