Opinion ID: 3063883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pritchett’s Testimony

Text: At the hearing before the ALJ, Pritchett testified as follows. Because of his medical problems, he could not work. He took two or three naps per day. The only activities he did were grocery shopping once a week, daily cooking, house cleaning, laundry, and taking out the garbage twice a week. In carrying the 10 to 15 pounds of garbage 150 yards to the street, he experienced symptoms associated with angina. He likely could walk a city block, but would have to “sit [] for two hours to catch [his] breath” afterward and would have to “call somebody to come and get [him]” rather than walk back. He was not sure if he even could do a job that required merely “sit[ting] all day and push[ing] paper” because he could not 6 sit in one position all day, because of arthritis in his knees, and getting up to stretch and walk around wore him out. In finding that Pritchett was not disabled, the ALJ concluded that, while Pritchett’s severe impairments, in the form of coronary artery disease and hypertension, could reasonably be expected to produce the loss of stamina and strength and shortness of breath of which Pritchett complained, Pritchett’s statements on the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of these symptoms were “not entirely credible.” The ALJ reasoned that the record did not contain objective signs or findings that could reasonably be expected to produce, or any other reason to believe that Pritchett was suffering, the degree of pain and limitation claimed. The ALJ cited an RFC Assessment prepared by the Disability Determination Service (“DDS”), a Graded Exercise Test (“GXT”) administered by Dr. David Gordon, and the medical records from Dr. Pava, noting that these demonstrated that Pritchett retained many physical abilities. The ALJ must consider a claimant’s subjective testimony if he finds (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence to confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or (b) that the medical condition was of such severity as to reasonably give rise to the alleged pain. Mason v. Bowen, 791 F.2d 1460, 1462 (11th Cir. 1986). If the ALJ decides to discredit the claimant’s testimony, he must clearly 7 articulate explicit and adequate reasons for his decision. Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). In articulating its reasons, the ALJ need not specifically refer to every piece of evidence “so long as [his] decision . . . .is not a broad rejection which is not enough to enable the district court or this Court to conclude that the ALJ considered her medical condition as a whole.” Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1211. Also, the ALJ may cite the claimant’s daily activities. See Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996) (finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that the claimant’s complaints of disabling pain were not credible because the record contained evidence that the claimant had lifted rocks and had worked washing mobile homes during the period of his alleged disability). We will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding that is supported by substantial record evidence. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562. The ALJ did not err in partially discrediting Pritchett’s testimony, as the ALJ clearly articulated its decision and as the record did not confirm, and the severity of the medical condition did not suggest, the alleged extent of the pain and limitation suffered. See Mason, 791 F.2d at 1462; Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210. First, in rejecting Pritchett’s testimony on the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his loss of stamina and strength and shortness of breath, the ALJ clearly explained that the records did not support Pritchett’s claims because the RFC Assessment, GXT, and 8 medical records from Dr. Pava demonstrated that Pritchett retained many physical abilities despite these symptoms. See Dyer, 395 F.3d at 1210-11. Also, Pritchett testified that he did the grocery shopping once a week, cooked daily, did the house cleaning and laundry, and took out the garbage twice a week. The DDS’s RFC Assessment also revealed, similarly to the above-discussed disability examination by Dr. Pava, that Pritchett could stand, walk, and sit for relatively significant amounts of time; lift and carry objects of relatively significant weights; constantly handle, talk, and hear; occasionally climb, balance, stoop, or kneel; and withstand certain conditions commonly found in workplaces. A GXT likewise revealed that Pritchett did not experience chest pain or shortness of breath or sinus tachycardia depression or arrhythmia during physical exercise. Because the medical record evidence demonstrated that Pritchett could perform normal daily and weekly household activities, retained the ability to perform the above physical activities, and could perform physical exercise without shortness of breath, it did not support Pritchett’s claims that he experienced his symptoms so frequently and to such an extent that he could not work and must nap three times per day. See Mason, 791 F.2d at 1462; Wolfe, 86 F.3d at 1078. We also note that, on January 24, 2005, Pritchett told Dr. Pava that his pain was “rare[].” Because Pritchett expressed that the chest pain did not occur as 9 frequently as he otherwise claimed, his own prior statements do not support his testimony. Likewise, on two occasions, namely, when Pritchett presented to the Gulf Breeze Hospital ER with chest pain on November 11, 1999, and to the Summit Medical Center ER with chest pain on March 1, 2005, records show that his pain subsided entirely with medication. Because the medical record evidence demonstrated that medication could completely treat Pritchett’s pain, it does not suggest that his medical condition was of such severity that he could not work. See Mason, 791 F.2d at 1462. Accordingly, we affirm as to this issue.