Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Effect of NGBRI Verdict

Text: ¶ 205 Finally, Moody argues that the trial court erred by refusing to give an instruction that would explain to the jury that a not guilty by reason of insanity (NGBRI) verdict would not result in Moody's release. Defense counsel twice requested such an instruction, once while settling jury instructions and once following the State's rebuttal argument, in which the prosecutor urged the jury not to cut [Moody] loose. Both times the court refused to give it, indicating that before the jurors began deliberating it would give a general instruction that the jury should not consider the punishment or consequences to which Moody might be subject if convicted. Moody contends that the failure to instruct the jury on the actual effect of an NGBRI verdict violated his rights to due process and a fair trial. ¶ 206 The failure to instruct the jury on the consequences of an NGBRI verdict is not, by itself, error. State v. Doss, 116 Ariz. 156, 161, 568 P.2d 1054, 1059 (1977) (citing State v. Jensen, 111 Ariz. 408, 531 P.2d 531 (1975), and State v. Peats, 106 Ariz. 254, 475 P.2d 238 (1970)). Rather, [t]he decision to refuse a jury instruction is within the trial court's discretion, and this court will not reverse it absent a clear abuse of that discretion. Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 309, 896 P.2d at 849. ¶ 207 We agree with Moody that an instruction regarding the effect of an NGBRI verdict might have helped mitigate the effect of the prosecutor's statement in closing argument. See supra ¶¶ 146-52. This court has previously held, however, that such an instruction is not required and we noted that the jury's understanding of the ramifications of guilty and not guilty verdicts is incomplete because a jury can never know whether a sentencing judge will give the maximum sentence possible or a lesser one, or whether he will suspend imposition of sentence and grant probation. Jensen, 111 Ariz. at 410, 531 P.2d at 533. We therefore concluded in Jensen that the jurors had an obligation of finding the defendant guilty, not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity.... What happened after their verdict was not their concern. Id. Because there was ample precedent in our case law for the trial court's decision not to give the NGBRI instruction, we find no abuse of discretion in failing to give the instruction generally. ¶ 208 Moody also alleges that the failure to give the instruction immediately after the prosecutor exhorted the jury not to cut [Moody] loose constituted error. The trial court sustained a defense objection to the statement and instructed the jury to disregard it. Before deliberations, the court instructed the jury not to consider or discuss the possible punishment or consequences that would flow from a verdict of guilt. We presume that jurors follow the court's instructions. State v. Ramirez, 178 Ariz. 116, 127, 871 P.2d 237, 248 (1994). Consequently, we find no reversible error in the failure to give an NGBRI instruction.
¶ 209 Moody was sentenced to death under a procedure found unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) ( Ring II ). In Ring II, the United States Supreme Court held that Arizona's former capital sentencing scheme violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. [17] In doing so, the Court held that defendants are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Id. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its decision. Id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. ¶ 210 Moody's case was one of several death penalty cases we consolidated on remand to determine whether Ring II required reversal or vacatur of the death sentences. State v. Ring, 204 Ariz. 534, 544, ¶¶ 5-6, 65 P.3d 915, 925 (2003) ( Ring III ). We review the sentence imposed under Arizona's superseded capital sentencing statute for harmless error. Id. at 555, ¶ 53, 65 P.3d at 936. ¶ 211 An aggravation/mitigation hearing in Moody's case was conducted over the course of three days in December 2001 and January 2002. In the special verdict, the court found the following aggravating factors with respect to both murders: (1) Moody had been convicted of a separate offense for which life imprisonment was imposable, A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(1) (1993); (2) he committed the murders in the expectation of pecuniary gain, id. § 13-703(F)(5); and (3) he committed the murders in an especially cruel, heinous or depraved manner, id. § 13-703(F)(6). ¶ 212 Moody alleged eleven mitigating circumstances. Of these, the trial court found four: (1) lack of a criminal record, (2) good character in his professional life, (3) military service, and (4) nonviolent character and lack of prior violent history. Weighing the four proven mitigating circumstances against the three aggravating circumstances, the court found the mitigators insufficient to call for leniency. The court imposed sentences of death for the murders of Michelle Malone and Patricia Magda. ¶ 213 In Ring III, we concluded that judicial fact-finding in the capital sentencing process may constitute harmless error if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that no reasonable jury would fail to find the aggravating circumstance. 204 Ariz. at 555, 565, ¶¶ 53, 102-04, 65 P.3d at 936, 946. We now examine whether the Ring II error was harmless with respect to the sentences imposed by the trial judge in Moody's case.

¶ 214 Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-703(F)(1) lists as an aggravating circumstance that the defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable. In this case, the trial court found that the jury's verdict of guilt as to Michelle Malone's murder satisfied this aggravating factor for the Patricia Magda conviction, and that the jury's verdict of guilt as to the Magda murder satisfied the factor for the Malone conviction. Moody argues that because the convictions occurred at the same time, neither of these convictions can serve as an historical prior conviction for the other. ¶ 215 This court has held that the order of the crimes or convictions themselves is not important. See State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 604, 944 P.2d 1204, 1218 (1997). The relevant inquiry is whether the convictions were entered before the sentencing hearing. Id. Moody's convictions were entered before his sentencing hearing. Consequently, there was no error in allowing each murder to be used as a prior serious offense with respect to the other murder. ¶ 216 We have also affirmed the legal conclusion that a murder conviction is one for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable without remanding for a jury finding. State v. Nordstrom, 206 Ariz. 242, 245, ¶ 7, 77 P.3d 40, 43 (2003). Moody concedes that this court has held that the (F)(1) factor falls outside the Ring mandate and does not require a jury finding. See Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 556, ¶ 55, 65 P.3d at 937; see also State v. Lehr, 205 Ariz. 107, 109, ¶ 6, 67 P.3d 703, 705 (2003). We decline to reexamine the issue. Moody raises no other basis upon which we might disturb the trial court's finding that the (F)(1) aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt as to both murders. We therefore affirm this ruling.
¶ 217 It is a statutory aggravating factor in Arizona that the defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5). This factor is satisfied only if the expectation of pecuniary gain is a motive, cause, or impetus for the murder and not merely a result of the murder. State v. Hyde, 186 Ariz. 252, 280, 921 P.2d 655, 683 (1996). It is not enough merely to show that a defendant took property or money after a murder occurred. State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 368, 728 P.2d 232, 238 (1986) (citing State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 512, 662 P.2d 1007, 1019 (1983)); see also State v. Armstrong, 208 Ariz. 360, 363, ¶ 7, n. 2, 93 P.3d 1076, 1079 n. 2 (2004) (confirming this court's application of the Hyde and Wallace standards). The (F)(5) inquiry is highly fact-intensive and requires the state to establish the connection between the murder and motive through direct or strong circumstantial evidence. Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 560, ¶ 76, 65 P.3d at 941 (citing State v. Canez, 202 Ariz. 133, 159, ¶ 94, 42 P.3d 564, 590 (2002)). ¶ 218 In this case, the trial court found the pecuniary gain factor based on three considerations: at the time of the murders, Moody was suffering severe financial difficulty; Moody entered the Malone and Magda homes for the purpose of obtaining property of value; and the property obtained from those homes was used shortly after each of the murders... to obtain cash. ¶ 219 In response, Moody notes that these are all questions of fact that a jury could resolve differently than did the trial judge. The defense team presented evidence at trial that Moody was suffering from brain dysfunction, psychosis, and dissociative identity disorder, and that he was in a dissociative state at the time of the murders. Additionally, there was substantial evidence at trial that Moody had used massive amounts of cocaine at some time before the murders and that heavy cocaine use can lead to violent behavior. Finally, there was evidence that a small television, a microwave, jewelry, and cocaine were left behind at one of the murder scenes. ¶ 220 We will not deem harmless the finding of an (F)(5) aggravating factor if circumstantial evidence and witness credibility could be weighed differently by a reasonable jury than they were by the sentencing judge. State v. Hoskins, 204 Ariz. 572, 574, ¶ 6, 65 P.3d 953, 955 (2003); see also State v. Rutledge, 206 Ariz. 172, 175, ¶ 14, 76 P.3d 443, 446 (2003). That Moody had a pecuniary motive to murder Malone and Magda is a plausible inference that may be drawn from the circumstantial evidence, but it is not the only reasonable inference that may be drawn. Because a reasonable jury could differently assess the evidence upon which the trial judge based his pecuniary gain finding, we cannot conclude that the trial court's finding of the (F)(5) factor was harmless.
¶ 221 A murder may also be aggravated if a defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). To establish this factor, the state must prove at least one of these three components beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cropper, 206 Ariz. 153, 156, ¶ 11, 76 P.3d 424, 427 (2003). The trial judge found that both murders were especially cruel and that both demonstrated especial heinousness or depravity.
¶ 222 The trial judge first found that Moody committed both murders in an especially cruel manner. In State v. Knapp, we defined cruel as disposed to inflict pain esp. in a wanton, insensate or vindictive manner: sadistic. 114 Ariz. 531, 543, 562 P.2d 704, 716 (1977) (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary). Physical cruelty exists if the victim consciously experienced physical or mental pain prior to death, and the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur. State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 18, 951 P.2d 869, 883 (1997) (citations omitted). ¶ 223 As to the Malone murder, the trial judge found evidence of a defensive wound to her hand, a broken fingernail, a lost contact lens, blood throughout the house, and Moody's admissions to establish that there was a violent struggle before Mr. Moody subdued Ms. Malone by tying her into a chair. The trial judge also considered the fact that Malone knew Moody and he knew she could identify him if she survived, that the evidence suggested she suffered multiple injuries inflicted before her death, and that she raised her hand in a defensive gesture to defend against the first bullet. The court concluded that Michelle Malone was clearly conscious until at least that point, and that [t]he murder of Michelle Malone was especially cruel, because she consciously suffered physical pain and mental anguish for a fairly prolonged period of time, and clearly the Defendant knew of her suffering. ¶ 224 As evidence that Magda suffered pain, the trial judge found that Moody tied her up with neckties and cords tightly enough to leave marks on her arms and wrists. Further, because Moody went to the bank twice and communicated with Magda both times after returning, the trial court concluded that Magda must have been conscious and suffering for some period of time. Ultimately, the court concluded that [t]he prolonged ordeal ... surely caused her anguish: physical anguish due to the restraints and her immobility and mental anguish due to the uncertainty of her fate and the knowledge that the defendant was aware she could identify him as her attacker if she survived. [18] ¶ 225 Based on these facts, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Malone did not experience[ ] physical or mental pain prior to death. See Trostle, 191 Ariz. at 18, 951 P.2d at 883. The same could be said for Magda. ¶ 226 However, Trostle contains an additional requirement: that the defendant knew or should have known that suffering would occur. Id. Because evidence was presented that Moody was in a dissociated state due to psychosis, drug impairment, or both, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a reasonable jury could not find other than the trial court did on this issue. Consequently, we cannot affirm the trial court's finding of special cruelty as to either count.
¶ 227 The trial judge also found that both murders were especially heinous and depraved. Our case law sets forth five factors that should be considered in determining heinousness and depravity: (1) whether the defendant relished the murder, (2) whether he inflicted gratuitous violence, (3) whether he needlessly mutilated the bodies, (4) whether the crimes were senseless, and (5) whether the victims were helpless. State v. Gretzler, 135 Ariz. 42, 52, 659 P.2d 1, 11 (1983). ¶ 228 In this case, the trial court based its findings of heinousness and depravity on the use of gratuitous violence, the senselessness of the murders, and the helplessness of the victims. The court found that both murders involved more violence than was necessary to cause death: four gunshot wounds and multiple injuries to Malone's body, and twenty-four blunt force injuries and nine to fourteen sharp force injuries to Magda's body. The trial judge found both murders senseless because it was not necessary to kill the victims to accomplish the theft of their property, and he found the victims helpless because they were bound and restrained. ¶ 229 Regarding the gratuitous violence finding, in this case no expert was able to pinpoint exactly which injuries caused the death of each victim, and the State never attempted to establish that Moody knew which shots or blows caused each death. Consequently, we conclude that a reasonable jury might arrive at a different conclusion than the trial judge did on whether the State established that Moody inflicted gratuitous violence. ¶ 230 Even if we could conclude that no reasonable jury could fail to find the senselessness and helplessness factors, without the gratuitous violence factor the other factors are substantially less weighty: Senselessness and helplessness are less probative of the defendant's state of mind than are relishing, gratuitous violence, and mutilation. Hyde, 186 Ariz. at 281, 921 P.2d at 684. Therefore, senselessness and helplessness, without the presence of other factors, are usually insufficient to establish depravity beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Prince, 206 Ariz. 24, 27, ¶ 10, 75 P.3d 114, 117 (2003). ¶ 231 As was true regarding the intentionally cruel component, we cannot affirm an (F)(6) finding based on findings of intentionally heinous or depraved acts unless we can conclude that no reasonable jury could arrive at a different conclusion than the trial judge did. See, e.g., id. at 28, ¶ 12, 75 P.3d at 118. Ultimately, the cruel, heinous, and depraved aggravator depends on the defendant's state of mind and the assessment of sometimes conflicting facts. See, e.g., id. at 27, ¶ 9, 75 P.3d at 117; Cropper, 206 Ariz. at 156, ¶ 11, 76 P.3d at 427 (analyzing cruelty factor). Because Moody's mental state was hotly contested throughout trial and sentencing, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that no jury would accept the defense's argument that Moody lacked the requisite state of mind to satisfy this aggravator.
¶ 232 Our harmless error inquiry does not end with an examination of the aggravating circumstances. Because we can affirm a capital sentence only if we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that no rational trier of fact would determine that the mitigating circumstances were sufficiently substantial to call for leniency, we must also consider whether reversible error occurred with respect to the mitigating circumstances. Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 565, ¶ 104, 65 P.3d at 946. ¶ 233 At his sentencing hearing, Moody offered eleven mitigating circumstances for the court's consideration. One of these was statutory  that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). The remainder were non-statutory: his lack of any prior criminal history, good character for parenting, good character in his professional life, military service, psychosocial stressors, cocaine use and addiction, nonviolent character and lack of prior violent history, correlation between physical abuse as a child and subsequent substance abuse as an adult, the inability to appreciate the nature and consequences of his actions, and a nonviolent, law-abiding character. ¶ 234 The trial judge found four of the mitigating factors: lack of criminal record, good character in his professional life, military service, and lack of prior violent history. He gave little weight to them, however, and concluded that they were insufficient to call for leniency. ¶ 235 Based on the conflicting evidence in this record on these issues, we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that no rational jury would find other than as the trial judge found. A reasonable jury might have found additional mitigating factors or weighed differently the mitigating factors that were found. We also cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that if a jury had found additional mitigating circumstances or weighed the mitigating circumstances differently, it would not have found them sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. A.R.S. 13-703(E). Therefore, we conclude that the Ring II error was not harmless in this case.
¶ 236 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Moody's convictions for the first degree murders of Michelle Malone and Patricia Magda. However, because we cannot find harmless error in his sentencing procedure, we vacate Moody's death sentence and remand this case for jury resentencing pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 13-703 and -703.01.