Opinion ID: 1227815
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appeal from denial of the motion to dissolve the ACC

Text: We now turn to the arguments of the remaining appellants, all of whom appeal the denial of their motion to dissolve the ACC. The district court disposed of Bricker's appeal based on a perceived technical problem and declared that the remaining appellants did not have standing to appeal from the denial of their motion.
These appellants argue that the district court erred in dismissing their appeal for lack of standing. For the same reasons set forth above in relation to Moran's appeal of the Standing Order, however, they are not persons aggrieved and do not have standing to appeal the order dismissing their motion to dissolve the ACC. This result is even more obvious here than in Moran's case because, even if these appellants' status as defendants in the ACC's lawsuit were sufficient to confer standing upon them, that status did not flow directly from the order denying their motion to dissolve the ACC. See Marlow, 146 F.3d at 423. Their status as defendants instead resulted from the Standing Order that authorized the lawsuit, an order that they did not appeal.
This leaves us with the separate appeal by Bricker. According to the district court, Bricker's appeal was premature because he filed his notice after the date of the bankruptcy court's oral ruling but before the corresponding written order was entered. Bricker now asserts that his notice of appeal was saved by the operation of Rule 8002(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, which states that [a] notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a decision or order but before entry of the judgment, order, or decree shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. We note that even the United States Trustee concedes that Rule 8002(a) controls and that Bricker's appeal to the district court was therefore timely filed. Both the Trustee and the ACC, however, argue that Bricker's appeal should suffer the same fate as that of the other appellants because, like them, he is not a person aggrieved and does not have standing to pursue the appeal. The district court did not consider whether Bricker is a person aggrieved. Despite that, we may appropriately consider this issue because all of the relevant facts and evidence are before us. See Fid. Bank, 77 F.3d at 882 (considering whether appellants were persons aggrieved on the basis of the record on appeal). Because Bricker's situation is identical to that of the Babcock group of appellants, he lacks standing to appeal the district court's order for the same reasons articulated above relating to both that group of appellants and to Moran. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Bricker's appeal.