Opinion ID: 901426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Licensure for Multiple Felony Convictions-Abuse of Discretion

Text: [¶ 16.] Benton raises two arguments in support of her contention that the Board abused its discretion in denying her application. She first argues that, based on the Board's conclusions of law, the Board believed that it was required to deny a felon's license application regardless of all subsequent professional conduct and evidence of good moral character. [¶ 17.] We first note that SDCL 36-4B-31 [8] and 36-4-30 [9] expressly authorize the denial of licensure for the conviction of a felony. Furthermore, our prior decision on this question indicated that felony convictions may be considered conclusive evidence of the absence of good moral character. See Katz v. South Dakota State Bd. of Medical and Osteopathic Examiners, 432 N.W.2d 274, 280 (S.D.1988). In fact, Benton's identical argument was rejected in Katz. In that case, Katz argued that the Board abused its discretion in focusing on [other] acts instead of Katz's good medical record over the last fourteen years. Id. Katz also argued that the proper inquiry when determining one's moral character for professional licensure is the applicant's character at the time of the application rather than past conduct. Id. This Court rejected these arguments stating that: One who has violated a criminal law may thereafter reform and, in fact, become possessed of good moral character. The legislature, however, has power in cases of this kind to make a rule of universal application, and no inquiry is permissible back of the rule to ascertain whether the fact of which the rule is made the absolute test does or does not exist. Although, in a certain sense, such a rule is arbitrary in determining what shall be evidence of good moral character, the legislature can make a test such as the conviction of a crime conclusive. Evidence of current good moral character does no more than raise a conflict in the evidence upon such an issue. Id. (internal citations omitted). Therefore, were we to apply Katz, the Board would have been authorized to deny Benton's application based on the felony convictions alone. However, we also acknowledge that other, perhaps better reasoned decisions would not support consideration of the conviction alone. [10] [¶ 18.] We need not, however, resolve this conflict of views in this case because Benton has provided insufficient evidence to support her assertion that this Board was under the impression that a finding of conduct listed in SDCL 36-4-30 requires denial of an application. On the contrary, two parts of the record reflect that the Board was not under the impression that it was required to deny her application based on her convictions alone. [¶ 19.] First, this is not a case where the Board refused to consider Benton's current moral character and professional conduct. On the contrary, almost all of the two-hour administrative hearing was devoted to the Board's receipt of such evidence. [¶ 20.] Moreover, the Board's written decision reflects that it understood that it had discretion to consider Benton's evidence of good character and conduct. Conclusion of law two states in two places that a license may be denied for conviction of a felony. [11] Because the term may means that an act is discretionary, Farmland Ins. Companies of Des Moines, Iowa v. Heitmann, 498 N.W.2d 620, 625 (S.D.1993), the Board's use of that discretionary term in describing the law that it was applying reflects that it had knowledge of, and applied its discretion in making its decision. [¶ 21.] Benton's second argument is that she had the good moral character and absence of dishonorable or unprofessional misconduct to be licensed. Benton begins by emphasizing that the use of the word `may' in SDCL 36-4B-13, 36-4B-6, and 36-4B-31 indicates that the Board must exercise its discretion and judgment when evaluating the entire application. [12] Benton then argues that consideration of her entire application requires the conclusion that the denial of her application was clearly erroneous in light of the overwhelming evidence of her good moral character. Benton specifically relies upon evidence that she: volunteered at the senior citizen center, supervised the street painting for the Kimball homecoming each year, chaired the local emergency planning commission for Brule and Buffalo Counties, coordinated the Kimball Ambulance Service (which included check writing authority), taught at Sinte Gleska University, gave away bike helmets in Kimball, and served as past president of the library board and Kimball in Progress, a service oriented women's organization. Benton finally points out that eleven character witnesses testified to her good moral character at the Board hearing. [¶ 22.] However, the existence of mitigating evidence does not require the conclusion that the Board must exercise its discretion in any particular manner. The Board was free to consider the mitigating evidence, yet impose a sanction permitted by statute. See Arneson v. Arneson, 2003 SD 125, ¶ 14, 670 N.W.2d 904, 910 (stating that abuse of discretion is a fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which, is arbitrary or unreasonable); Schlumbohm v. City of Sioux Falls, 2001 SD 74, ¶ 14, 630 N.W.2d 93, 96 ([a]n abuse of discretion is discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and against, reason and evidence'). [¶ 23.] Here, the record indicates that the Board considered Benton's multiple felony convictions along with extensive evidence of her current conduct. Considering our deferential standard of review and Benton's six felony convictions, we cannot say that the Board was arbitrary and capricious in concluding that Benton did not meet her burden of proving good moral character and an absence of unprofessional or dishonorable conduct. We therefore hold that the Board did not err in denying Benton's application based on the information available at the hearing. [13] [¶ 24.] However, we were also advised by counsel at oral argument that Benton has recently received a pardon for her convictions and that she has completed paramedic training in Nebraska. The Board did not have the benefit of that information at the time it heard the matter, and those facts are not in the record. It is elementary that ... this [C]ourt will only deal with matters properly presented by the record. State ex rel. Scott v. Rooney, 65 S.D. 510, 275 N.W. 349, 350 (1937). Therefore, we cannot consider the effect of these facts on this appeal. However, when an actual fact is not presented in the record, but is disclosed on appeal, we have affirmed and remanded to conduct further proceedings on the actual facts. Id. We therefore remand this matter to the circuit court with directions to remand to the Board for further proceedings. [¶ 25.] Affirmed and remanded. [¶ 26.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and SABERS, KONENKAMP, and MEIERHENRY, Justices, concur.