Opinion ID: 2107885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Cross-Appeal: Dismissal of Declaratory Judgment Action.

Text: The district court dismissed the instant declaratory judgment action. On cross-appeal, State Farm claims that this ruling was error and asks this court to reverse the district court's order of dismissal so that the permission issue can be resolved herein. In this regard, State Farm notes that the issue of whether Campbell was driving Harvey's vehicle with permission awaits resolution and that the district court's statement that there were no justiciable issues was error. We agree with State Farm that the permission issue remains viable. However, in view of the pendency of the underlying action between Steenson and State Farm, the resolution of this issue need not occur in the declaratory judgment action. Thus, for reasons other than those asserted by the district court, we reject State Farm's argument and affirm the district court's dismissal of this declaratory judgment action. See Dean v. Yahnke, 266 Neb. 820, 670 N.W.2d 28 (2003) (stating that when record adequately demonstrates that trial court's decision is correct, although such correctness is based on ground or reason different from that assigned by trial court, appellate court will affirm). Section 25-21,154 provides as follows: The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding. We have long stated that this provision indicates discretionary rather than mandatory power. Haynes v. Anderson, 163 Neb. 50, 77 N.W.2d 674 (1956). Under Nebraska appellate authority, whether to entertain an action for declaratory judgment is within the discretion of the trial court. Bosselman, Inc. v. State, 230 Neb. 471, 432 N.W.2d 226 (1988); Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 2 Neb.App. 527, 511 N.W.2d 559 (1994). We have said that actions for declaratory judgment are not to be entertained where another equally serviceable remedy has been provided by law, nor are they to be used to create new causes of action or cumulative remedies. Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771, 478 N.W.2d 548 (1992); Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Farm Bureau Insurance Co., supra . In Sim v. Comiskey, 216 Neb. 83, 85, 341 N.W.2d 611, 612 (1983), relying on Strawn v. County of Sarpy, 146 Neb. 783, 21 N.W.2d 597 (1946), we stated that the rule in declaratory judgment actions is that relief will not be entertained if there is pending, at the commencement of the declaratory action, another action or proceeding to which the same persons are parties and in which are involved, and may be adjudicated, the same issues involved in the declaratory action. In view of the failure of service on Campbell and the consequent relief afforded to Allstate in the underlying action, the controversy has been distilled to Steenson and State Farm involving the permission issue. Because the underlying action was pending at the commencement of this declaratory judgment action and the availability of witnesses is comparable in both cases, the permission issue can be adjudicated in the underlying action and the declaratory judgment action should not be entertained. See id. Accordingly, the district court's dismissal of the declaratory judgment action, albeit for different reasons, was correct and is affirmed.