Opinion ID: 741731
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ms. Ohlander's Contempt

Text: 43 Certainly, the court's interest in ensuring a party's compliance with its orders is a great one, enforceable by fines or imprisonment. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276, 110 S.Ct. 625, 632-33, 107 L.Ed.2d 644 (1990). However, a court is obliged to use the  'least possible power adequate to the end proposed.'  Id. at 276, 110 S.Ct. at 632 (quoting United States v. Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444, 454 (2d Cir.1988), and Anderson v. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204, 231, 5 L.Ed. 242 (1821)). Here, certainly other measures were available to compel compliance, such as personal sanctions against the mother, or possibly staying a decision pending the child's return. 44 Under the provisions of the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, the district court has the authority to implement measures to prevent the child's further removal or concealment before the final disposition of the petition. 42 U.S.C. § 11604. Given Ms. Ohlander's history of removing Julia from the United States, to prevent Ms. Ohlander from repeating this behavior, perhaps the district court should have imposed more rigid measures, such as requiring Ms. Ohlander to surrender both her and Julia's passports to the clerk of court prior to receiving physical custody of Julia, or leaving custody with Mr. Larson pending the petition's outcome. See Currier v. Currier, 845 F.Supp. 916, 923 (D.N.H.1994) (district court requiring petitioner surrender her and her children's passport to the court's clerk pending appeal). However, if such measures are not imposed, or if they fail, the court is not thereby released of its duty to consider the merits of the parties' cases when considering how best to enforce compliance. In sum, there is no doubt Ms. Ohlander's actions were contemptible, for she brazenly thumbed her nose at the United States district court's order not to remove Julia from Utah; nevertheless, such conduct does not warrant a court denying a motion to dismiss solely on that ground. 45 In sum, we hold it necessary to dismiss this action. Mr. Larson does not suffer legal prejudice from such a dismissal, and the balance of relevant factors, along with the intent of the Convention, weigh in favor of dismissal. 46 We REVERSE the district court and REMAND with instructions to dismiss the petition without prejudice. 47