Opinion ID: 2813644
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of the FMLA

Text: Huffman’s Amended Complaint alleges that Speedway used FMLA against Plaintiff in an unlawful manner (conditioning her employment on having to apply for FMLA leave when she did not need to), such as to cause her the loss of her job and the denial of the opportunity to use FMLA when she would have needed FMLA leave at a later time after the delivery of her child, in violation of the Act. Huffman further alleges that Speedway “violated [her] rights under the FMLA by terminating [her] employment for her refusal to take leave under the Act.” “The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to as many as twelve weeks of [unpaid] leave during any twelve-month period if the employee has a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee.” Chandler v. Specialty Tires of Am. (Tennessee), Inc., 283 F.3d 818, 825 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). A “period of incapacity due to pregnancy” can qualify as a “serious health condition.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(b). “An employee is unable to perform the functions of the 6 Nos. 14-1668/2468, Huffman v. Speedway position” if she is “unable to perform any one of the essential functions of the employee’s position.” Id. § 825.123(a). There are two theories of FMLA liability against employers: the interference theory and the retaliation theory. The interference theory arises from 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1), which states that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the attempt to exercise, any right provided in this subchapter.” The retaliation theory arises from § 2615(a)(2), which provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any employer to discharge or in any other manner discriminate against any individual for opposing any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.” The district court interpreted Huffman’s complaint to have alleged a claim under only the interference theory and dismissed that claim as being unripe. Huffman argues on appeal that she stated both an interference claim and a retaliation claim.
We turn first to Huffman’s interference claim. Huffman argues that Speedway violated her rights under the FMLA by forcing her to take involuntary FMLA leave. While being forced to take unpaid leave has an effect similar to being suspended without pay, the statute does not grant employees the right to be free from suspension. Several of our sister circuits have therefore held that involuntary FMLA leave does not directly injure an employee’s FMLA rights. See e.g., Walker v. Trinity Marine Products, Inc., 721 F.3d 542, 544–45 (8th Cir. 2013) cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1293 (2014); Foster v. New Jersey Dep’t of Transp., 255 F. App’x 670, 671 n.1 (3d Cir. 2007); Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 175 (2d Cir. 2006). We nonetheless recognize that involuntary FMLA leave has the potential to indirectly interfere with an employee’s FMLA rights. An employer who forces an employee who does not have a job-restricting serious health condition—i.e., an employee who remains capable of 7 Nos. 14-1668/2468, Huffman v. Speedway performing all essential job duties—to take FMLA leave may improperly exhaust the twelve weeks of leave to which the employee is statutorily entitled each year. See Wysong v. Dow Chem. Co., 503 F.3d 441, 449 (6th Cir. 2007); see also Hicks v. Leroy’s Jewelers, Inc., No. 98– 6596, 2000 WL 1033029, at –4 (6th Cir. July 17, 2000). But the injury to the employee’s FMLA rights would remain inchoate unless she develops a serious health condition within a year and requests FMLA leave. If the employer were to grant the employee the full twelve weeks of leave to which she is entitled—i.e., not counting the previous involuntary FMLA leave against her annual limit—the employee would not suffer a cognizable injury under the FMLA. Therefore, an involuntary-leave interference claim “ripens only when and if the employee seeks FMLA leave at a later date, and such leave is not available because the employee was wrongfully forced to use FMLA leave in the past.” Wysong, 503 F.3d at 449 (emphasis added); see also Latowski v. Northwoods Nursing Ctr., 549 F. App’x 478, 488 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Because Latowski never sought to take FMLA leave in 2009, her claim never ripened and she cannot prove a prima facie case of FMLA interference.”). In this case, Huffman never requested FMLA leave and so her involuntary-leave claim remains unripe. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Huffman’s involuntary-leave claim.
Huffman’s second appeal argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to address her FMLA claim under a retaliation theory. Though her Amended Complaint does not specifically allege retaliation, “a plaintiff ha[s] not waived a claim based on [either the retaliation or] the interference theory where the complaint alleged general violations of [the FMLA] that could apply both to interference and retaliation claims.” Morris v. Family Dollar Stores of Ohio, Inc., 320 F. App’x 330, 335 (6th Cir. 2009). Therefore, “ambiguity on a plaintiff’s [FMLA] 8 Nos. 14-1668/2468, Huffman v. Speedway complaint does not . . . ‘box plaintiffs into one theory or the other.’” Ibid. (quoting Wysong, 503 F.3d at 446). However, if the “essence” of a plaintiff’s FMLA claim falls under only one of the two theories, the district court does not err in confining its analysis to only that theory. Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2012). Huffman’s complaint was neither general nor ambiguous. She specifically stated an involuntary-leave claim under the interference theory, alleging “denial of the opportunity to use FMLA when she would have needed FMLA leave at a later time.” Though she also alleged that Speedway terminated her for her “refusal to take leave,” that allegation did not state a retaliation claim. Because involuntary leave cannot by itself violate the FMLA, opposing involuntary leave is not protected conduct under the statute. Therefore, termination for refusing involuntary leave is not retaliation. Huffman expressly articulated an interference claim and failed to allege a retaliation claim. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion denying Huffman’s Hirsch remand motion.