Opinion ID: 4169602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lack of Mealtime Compensation Claim

Text: Silver Care argues that the plaintiffs’ second FLSA claim—that their meal breaks should be credited towards hours worked—depends on disputed practices under the CBA, which must first be resolved by an arbitrator.29 26 Walling, 325 U.S. at 424 (emphasis added). 27 Id. at 425. 28 29 C.F.R. § 778.109. 29 Contrary to the dissent’s characterization, the plaintiffs clearly state that their “claim for overtime wages due to unlawful meal break deductions is based only on their 12 Because we find that the alleged disputed practices enumerated by Silver Care are simply factual disputes, we hold that arbitration of the plaintiffs’ second claim is also not necessary. The FLSA itself does not define what are compensable work hours. Instead, the Wage and the Hour Division of the Department of Labor issued a number of regulations providing employers and employees alike guidance on how it would implement and enforce the law. One such regulation provides that employers need not compensate employees for bona fide meal periods because those are not considered to be compensable worktime.30 The regulation defines a bona fide meal period as rest periods during which “[t]he employee must be completely relieved from duty for the purpose of eating regular meals,” but “[t]he employee is not relieved if he is required to perform any duties, whether active or inactive, while eating.”31 As the dissent alludes, this regulation does not have the force of law, however, and merely “constitute[s] a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and statutory rights under the FLSA.” Appellees’ Br. at 17. They emphasized that they ”do not claim that [Silver Care] breached a contractual right provided by the CBA but instead violated the FLSA and DOL regulations, which require employers to pay employees 1.5 times their regular rates for all hours worked in excess of 40 hours including meal breaks that are not bona fide.” Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 207; 29 C.F.R. § 785.18) (emphasis in original). 30 29 C.F.R. § 785.19(a). 31 Id. 13 litigants may properly resort for guidance.”32 And we were so guided by it in Babcock v. Butler County, in which case we recognized that the FLSA does require employees to be compensated for meal periods if they are “primarily engaged in work-related duties during” those times, adopting the socalled predominant benefit test.33 We explained that the “predominant benefit test is necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry,” where the “essential consideration . . . is whether the employees are in fact relieved from work for the purpose of eating a regularly scheduled meal.”34 Furthermore, one of the factors we look to, as part of this predominant benefit test, is the characterization of the mealtime break in the CBA.35 In short, Silver Care is subject to a statutory obligation to compensate the plaintiffs for time spent during meal periods if the plaintiffs, as they allege, are primarily engaged in workrelated duties during these breaks. Silver Care does not argue that the plaintiffs’ mealtime compensation claim is a contractual dispute, as the dissent posits. It recognizes that the plaintiffs’ mealtime compensation claim is based on the FLSA and how compensable work time is defined under that statute. Instead, it relies on our consideration of the characterization of the meal break in the CBA in Babcock to support its contention that “[i]n order to determine . . . to whom the benefit of the meal break inures, there must be an interpretation of the 32 Babcock v. Butler Cty., 806 F.3d 153, 157 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 33 Id. at 156. 34 Id. at 157. 35 Id. at 158. 14 CBA.”36 Among the disputed “interpretations” that Silver Care seeks to arbitrate are: (1) the actual length of the meal breaks—Silver Care alleges that different sections within the nursing home sometimes combine the unpaid meal break with the paid breaks, extending meal breaks to 45 minutes or an hour, for which only 30 minutes are unpaid;37 (2) “the practices, customs and usages of the parties with respect to what happens if an employee allegedly is interrupted during a meal break”38—whether the interrupted time is normally “considered part of the paid portion of the break or the unpaid portion of the break?;”39 and (3) practices under the CBA regarding the types of restrictions, if any, placed upon the employees during their meal breaks, “what are considered interruptions of the meal breaks, and how interruptions are handled during the meal breaks.”40 All of these so-called disputed “interpretations” of the CBA, however, are factual questions—length of meal breaks, types of interruptions, how they were handled, and whether the plaintiffs ever received compensation due to these interruptions.41 Silver Care cannot rely on Babcock to 36 Appellant’s Br. at 48. 37 Id. 38 Id. at 49 39 Id. 40 Id. at 50. 41 Silver Care’s attempt to distinguish these inquiries from factual disputes is unpersuasive. In its reply brief, Silver Care states that “making simple factual determinations of whether the meal break was interrupted and whether the employee worked during the meal break” is not sufficient, because “there first has to be a determination made, whether, if there 15 transform these factual disputes inherent to any FLSA claim into disputes over provisions of the CBA subject to arbitration. In Babcock, we determined that the meal period at issue there inured primarily to the benefit of the employees by looking at both the facts and the CBA.42 First, we found that though the plaintiffs faced some restrictions during their meal breaks, “on balance, these restrictions did not predominantly benefit the employer,” particularly because the plaintiffs could “request authorization to leave [the workplace] for their meal period and could eat lunch away from their desks.”43 Second, we separately considered the CBA, which we thought was favorable for the employer’s position, because the CBA “provide[d] corrections officers with the benefit of a partially-compensated mealtime and mandatory overtime pay if the mealtime is interrupted by work.”44 Notably, our consideration of the CBA was limited to reading the text. We did not collapse the factual inquiry and the consideration of the CBA into one. Nor could we. To is an interruption, the interruption is considered part of the paid portion of the break or the unpaid portion of the meal break.” Appellant’s Reply Brief at 11. Silver Care never makes clear why it matters to an FLSA claim how the CBA would categorize the meal time interruptions. Either the plaintiffs received compensation for interruptions during their meal time, or they did not. The plaintiffs’ claim is based on the FLSA rather than the CBA. 42 Babcock, 806 F.3d at 158. 43 Id. at 157. 44 Id. 16 characterize an essentially factual inquiry as a dispute of practices or custom under the CBA such that arbitration is necessary would be to circumvent Supreme Court precedent that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to arbitrate his or her federal statutory claims without a clear and unmistakable waiver.45 Here, Silver Care has not pointed to any disputes over the text of the CBA, which provides that “meal periods and breaks shall be free and uninterrupted, and employees shall not be on call. However, in emergencies, employees are expected to respond.”46 Instead, Silver Care raises only disputes about what actually happens during these meal breaks. Thus, Silver Care’s reliance on Babcock, to transform its factual disputes into contractual ones subject to the arbitration clause, is misplaced.