Opinion ID: 2395051
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Quashing of the Subpoena to Testify

Text: We turn now to the defendant's contention that the trial justice deprived him of his constitutional right to compel the attendance of witnesses by quashing the subpoena ad testificandum for the prosecutor in the earlier trial of David Willoughby. We agree that the justice erred in quashing the subpoena but reject the defendant's contention that his constitutional right to compulsory process was infringed; therefore, we find the error to be harmless. Near the end of David Willoughby's trial, the prosecutor indicated that he did not plan to Call David as a witness in this stepbrother's trial because he was not going to make use of what he felt would be perjured testimony. After a new chief prosecutor was appointed just prior to the Philip Willoughby trial, counsel for Philip subpoenaed the original prosecutor for the purpose of having him testify to impeach David in the event the State called David as a witness. The prosecution immediately filed a motion to quash the subpoena pursuant to Rule 17 of the Maine Rules of Criminal Procedure. After a hearing, the justice quashed the subpoena on the ground that the prosecutor's opinion of David's character for truthfulness would be inadmissible under Rule 405 of the Maine Rules of Evidence. We note initially that Rule 17 provides no procedure for the quashing of a subpoena ad testificandum on the grounds that the testimony sought might be inadmissible. [3] Rule 17 sets forth guidelines only for the quashing of a subpoena duces tecum, similar to those in its federal counterpart that are in part intended to protect against unreasonable search and seizure. See 8 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 17.07, at 17-22 (1985). As we stated in State v. Nichols, 325 A.2d 28, 32 (Me.1974), there is no language in Rule 17 that allows a justice to order a pretrial hearing to permit the State to learn what testimony a witness would give if presented at trial. [4] We expressed therein our disapproval of any attempt by the State to compel the pretrial production of evidence by a defendant. If the State were permitted a hearing on its motion to quash a subpoena to testify, a defendant would be compelled to reveal information about his defense in order to secure the attendance of a witness. This approach was rejected when the drafters of Rule 17 dispensed with the prior federal practice of requiring that an indigent defendant file an affidavit in support of a request for the issuance of a subpoena. See Rule 17 reporter's notes, reprinted in Cluchey & Seitzinger, at 17-3. [5] Absent such disclosure by the defendant, the court may not prematurely determine that a potential defense witness will not be allowed to testify where that determination is based on speculation by the prosecution or the court regarding the nature and content of the witness's anticipated testimony. Such a decision to quash a subpoena, predicated on assumptions as to the nature of some portion of the witness's testimony, would deprive a defendant of the means or opportunity to adduce admissible evidence in other areas of inquiry. [6] We recognize that other jurisdictions permit the quashing of a subpoena ad testificandum. See, e.g., United States v. Kember, 648 F.2d 1354 (D.C.Cir.1980); United States v. Pitts, 569 F.2d 343 (5th Cir.1978); People v. Dunigan, 96 Ill.App.3d 799, 52 Ill.Dec. 427, 421 N.E.2d 1319 (1981); People v. Crown, 75 Mich.App. 206, 254 N.W.2d 843 (1977). However, the better practice is to require the witness to appear and claim any privilege or immunity he may have or raise an objection to particular questions put to him. See 8 J. Moore at 17-18; 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal 2d § 273 (1982). Moreover, some of these courts authorize quashing of a subpoena requested by an indigent defendant where relevancy of the witness's testimony is not shown in accordance with the relevancy standard set forth in Rule 17(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See, e.g., United States v. Pitts, 569 F.2d at 349 n. 10. Maine Rule 17(b), however, no longer requires an indigent defendant to show necessity for an adequate defense before the State will pay the costs of a subpoena for an in-state witness. M.R.Crim.P. 17 advisory committee's note to 1979 amend, Cluchey & Seitzinger at 17-4 to 5. Therefore, the cases in which one alternative result of such a balancing test permits the quashing of a subpoena for a defense witness do not persuade us of the validity of that procedure in this case. Nevertheless, we conclude that the court below did not deprive the defendant of his constitutional right to compulsory process by quashing the subpoena. The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 6 of the Maine Constitution guarantee to a defendant in a criminal prosecution, the right to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment does not by its terms grant to a criminal defendant the right to secure the attendance and testimony of any and all witnesses, but only the right to obtain those in his favor. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). To show a violation of his constitutional right, the defendant must demonstrate how the testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense. Id. ; see also Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967); State v. Rabe, 687 P.2d 554, 563 (Hawaii Ct.App.1984) (no constitutional violation unless witness denied to defendant could have produced testimony both material and favorable to defendant). A review of the record reveals no showing by the defendant that the testimony sought from the prosecutor would have satisfied the Valenzuela-Bernal test. He contends on appeal only that the former prosecutor should have been allowed to testify as to his opinion of David's truthfulness, testimony that clearly would not be admissible under Rule 405 of the Maine Rules of Evidence because it is not evidence of reputation. See State v. Arnold, 421 A.2d at 938. The defendant was therefore not deprived of his constitutional right to compulsory process by the quashing of the subpoena. See Commonwealth v. Blaikie, 375 Mass. 601, 378 N.E.2d 1361, (1978) (defendant not denied constitutional right to compulsory process by court's denial of right to call prosecutor whose expected testimony had no impeachment value); see also Darby v. State, 47 Md.App. 1, 421 A.2d 108 (1980) (defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process not infringed by denial of writs of habeas corpus ad testificandum when witnesses incompetent to testify even though Maryland rule does not require showing of necessity before right to process attaches). In the case before the court, the defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecutor would have furnished admissible testimony if called as a witness. It is undisputed that both the State and the defendant made the court aware that the prosecutor's testimony would have consisted solely of his opinion regarding David Willoughby's credibility, and that he would have been called for the purpose of eliciting that opinion and nothing more. Because that opinion is inadmissible, M.R.Evid. 405, the defendant in these circumstances was not deprived of the opportunity to adduce admissible testimony from this witness. We therefore conclude that because it is highly probable that the quashing of the subpoena did not affect the judgment, it was harmless error. See State v. Reeves, 499 A.2d at 137; State v. True, 438 A.2d at 467.