Opinion ID: 2995611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jerry Hallgren’s Conviction

Text: On appeal, Hallgren raises three trial errors that he argues warrant reversal of his conviction. He first contends that the district court should have ordered the government to produce an alleged statement from government witness Michael Shopa pursuant to the Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 3500. He next argues that the court should have allowed him to introduce bank records belonging to a Jerry Obie, which he argues would have supported a mistaken identity defense. He last contends that the court abused its discretion in allowing a transcript of Michael Shopa’s testimony to be read to the jury.
The Jencks Act requires that after a government witness testifies, and upon the defendant’s motion, the government must produce any prior statement the witness made that relates to the subject matter of the witness’s testimony. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3500(b); United States v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 529, 533 (7th Cir. 2000). The Jencks Act does not obligate the government to disclose investigative or trial preparation material; rather, it requires only the disclosure of pretrial statements a government witness signed, adopted, or otherwise approved. Johnson, 200 F.3d at 533. Hallgren argues that he did not receive Jencks material for government witness Michael Shopa and was therefore unfairly surprised by Shopa’s testimony. There is no question that counsel made a timely motion for the disclosure of Jencks material. However, the government asserted at trial, and continues to assert on appeal, that it possessed no pretrial statement for Shopa, and that there was therefore nothing to disclose. The district court accepted this representation and allowed the trial to go forward. Defense counsel did not request a hearing on the existence of any Jencks material, nor did he question Shopa on cross-examination about whether he had given a prior statement to law en forcement. On redirect examination by the government, Shopa testified that he was not subpoenaed until the Friday preceding trial and that no one had interviewed him prior to his pretrial meeting with prosecutors. Hallgren points out on appeal that when asked by the government whether prior to that had you been contacted or interviewed about this man? Shopa replied without elaboration, Yes, I had. This apparent contradiction notwithstanding, we find no error in the district court’s acceptance of the government’s representation that no Jencks material existed. If Hallgren wished to pursue this claim, he should have informed the district court about the potential contradiction created by Shopa’s testimony. See Johnson, 200 F.3d at 536. Because there is nothing in the record to definitively show that Shopa gave a prior statement covered by the Jencks Act, we will not speculate about the existence of such a statement on appeal. See id.; cf. United States v. Starnes, 644 F.2d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 1981) (holding that defendants forfeited their argument that the prosecutor failed to provide exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to explore the issue on cross- examination of government agents or by seeking a hearing in the district court). Hallgren did not properly develop the record on this point below, and we can find no error in the district court’s handling of this issue.
We need not tarry with Hallgren’s remaining challenges to his conviction. He first asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to admit bank records pertaining to a Jerry Obie, which he argues would have supported a mistaken identity defense. Hallgren asserts that it was Jerry Obie and not he who was William Crowley’s right hand man; the bank records purportedly showed that Obie had lived with the Crowleys during the conspiracy. We cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to admit these records. See Angle, 234 F.3d at 343. As the court observed, whether some other person was also involved in the conspiracy in no way related to Hallgren’s guilt. See United States v. Krankel, 164 F.3d 1046, 1048 (7th Cir. 1998) (district court properly excluded evidence that did not tend to prove or disprove an element of the crime charged). Moreover, the witnesses who testified to Hallgren’s direct involvement in the conspiracy knew him well and were not likely to be mistaken about his identity: Brenda Johnson was his live-in girlfriend for three years and the mother of his child; Michael Shopa testified that he knew Hallgren since 1989; and Kenneth Cowen testified that he and Hallgren had been friends since 1986. Accordingly, the district court’s refusal to admit the bank records was proper. Hallgren also contends that the court should not have allowed a transcript of Michael Shopa’s testimony to be read to the jury. We have held that such a determination is uniquely committed to the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Berry, 133 F.3d 1020, 1023-24 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 1991). The trial judge should consider the reasonableness of the request, the ease or difficulty in compliance, and what is likely to be gained or lost. United States v. Aubin, 961 F.2d 980, 983 (1st Cir. 1992) (citations and internal quotations omitted). Having reviewed the record, we cannot see how the court abused its discretion on this point. The court allowed the testimony to be read only after the jury, for the second time, raised a question about a critical aspect of Shopa’s testimony--his drug purchases from Hallgren. See Berry, 133 F.3d at 1023-24. The reading took less than 20 minutes, and the court instructed the jury not to give Shopa’s testimony undue weight. See Aubin, 961 F.2d at 983. Accordingly, we reject Hallgren’s argument.