Opinion ID: 4564881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Panel Improperly Addressed an Unraised

Text: Claim. The panel should not have addressed the merits of the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision because Joseph Anderson never challenged it. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (observing the court cannot resolve claims that were not properly raised in the habeas petition). Anderson conceded in his appellate brief that “[t]he Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling on the direct ANDERSON V. NEVEN 23 appeal is irrelevant.” As recently as oral argument, Anderson’s appellate counsel continued to deny that Anderson was challenging the merits of the underlying state supreme court decision. That eliminated our ability to grant habeas relief predicated on that decision being incorrect. Paradis v. Arave, 20 F.3d 950, 954 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Because this issue was not presented to the district court, we will not review it.”). That should have made this an easy case—for the State. But the panel’s disposition turns on a sua sponte perceived error in the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision, even though neither Anderson nor the State actually presented that issue. The panel in its concurrence now claims that “[i]t was the State that injected double jeopardy into this ineffective assistance of counsel case . . . .” Not true. The State did discuss the Nevada Supreme Court’s merits decision in its appellate briefing for two reasons, but neither justified the panel raising and deciding a claim that, even in its concurrence, the panel acknowledges was never “before our panel.” First, the State had to address the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision because the federal district court erroneously held in its first order that Anderson’s guilty plea resulted in a premature double jeopardy claim. The State explained in its briefing for rehearing before the district court that this was simply factually wrong because the Nevada Supreme Court squarely addressed (and rejected) Anderson’s double jeopardy claim on the merits. Anderson, 129 Nev. at 1095. Second, the State discussed the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision to rebut the district court’s false notion that Anderson was prejudiced by his counsel not going to trial because Anderson may have prevailed on his 24 ANDERSON V. NEVEN double jeopardy claim in trial court. Because the Nevada Supreme Court rejected Anderson’s double jeopardy claim on the merits, it would have made no difference if he had gone to trial and the trial court had dismissed his claim on double jeopardy grounds. If that had happened, the Nevada Supreme Court would have just reversed the trial court’s double jeopardy ruling and sent the case back. As the State explained in its opening brief: Even if Anderson had proceeded to trial on his felony DUI claim causing death, he would not have prevailed on his double jeopardy challenge on appeal. The federal district court’s assumption that going to trial would have created a complete defense to DUI causing death or resulted in a different analysis from the Nevada Supreme Court was wrong. . . . [A]s the Nevada Supreme Court specifically rejected the double jeopardy challenge on Anderson’s direct appeal, there would have been no difference on appeal had Anderson proceeded to trial rather than enter his guilty plea.” Contrary to the panel’s revisionist history, the State didn’t bring the Nevada Supreme Court’s merits decision into the case; the federal district court did, when it (1) erroneously ruled that Anderson’s guilty plea resulted in a premature double jeopardy claim, and (2) erroneously focused on whether Anderson might have prevailed on his double jeopardy claim in trial court. The State can hardly be faulted for responding and explaining why the district court’s decision was wrong. The State’s reliance on the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision as dooming Anderson’s chances of prevailing on that claim, ANDERSON V. NEVEN 25 whether or not he went to trial, cannot be weaponized as a legitimate reason for the panel to attack that decision when Anderson himself didn’t. See Ahlswede v. Wolff, 720 F.2d 1108, 1109 (9th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“[T]he only issues properly before this court are those in the petition.”). 3 Moreover, even if the State had gratuitously and needlessly defended the merits of the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision, that still would not justify the panel reaching out to decide an issue that Anderson never raised. Federal habeas review requires the petitioner to frame the review through his claims. See Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1316 n.6 (9th Cir. 1992) (declining 3 While the panel’s concurrence erroneously claims that it was “the State that injected double jeopardy into this . . . case,” it is notable that neither the panel’s original decision nor its concurrence ever confronts the actual reason the State talked about the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision. That argument, block-quoted above, was that whether he went to trial or pled-and-immediately-appealed, Anderson’s double jeopardy claim was ultimately doomed because the Nevada Supreme Court was going to reject Anderson’s double jeopardy claim on the merits either way. As the State explained, “[t]he Nevada Supreme Court’s [double jeopardy] determination was not premised specifically upon a conviction pursuant to a guilty plea versus a jury trial.” Thus, Anderson could not have been prejudiced by his counsel’s decision to appeal immediately versus go to trial—the ultimate result at the Nevada Supreme Court would be identical. Like Anderson, the State’s arguments to the panel all assumed that the merits of the Nevada Supreme Court’s decision were not on the table because Anderson never challenged that decision. As the State explained in its opening brief to the panel: “[T]he Nevada Supreme Court rejected Anderson’s argument that the two crimes violated double jeopardy. Anderson conceded the truth of this point in . . . his federal habeas petition . . . .” It was only the panel that felt the need to reach out and “explain[] that the Nevada Supreme Court incorrectly decided” Anderson’s double jeopardy claim in order to justify its decision. 26 ANDERSON V. NEVEN to consider on appeal a double jeopardy claim that the petitioner did not raise in the original state or federal habeas petition). As the Supreme Court has made clear, we are barred from reviewing claims not included in a federal habeas petition. See, e.g., Davila v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 2058, 2064 (2017); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 745 (1991). The panel had no business reaching out and deciding whether the Nevada Supreme Court’s double jeopardy decision was correct. 4