Opinion ID: 186088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motivational Test

Text: 97 The final test of legislative punishment is strictly a motivational one: inquiring whether the legislative record evinces a congressional intent to punish. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478, 97 S.Ct.at 2808. Under this prong, a court must inspect legislation for a congressional purpose to encroach[] on the judicial function of punishing an individual for blameworthy offenses. Id. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09. Courts conduct this inquiry by reference to legislative history, the context or timing of the legislation, or specific aspects of the text or structure of the disputed legislation. See Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 855 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. at 3357 n. 15; Nixon, 433 U.S. at 478-82, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-10. 98 Given the obvious constraints on the usefulness of legislative history as an indicator of Congress's collective purpose, this prong by itself is not determinative in the absence of unmistakable evidence of punitive intent. Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. at 3356 n. 15 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 619, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1377, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). `[S]everal isolated statements' are not sufficient to evince punitive intent, BellSouth II, 162 F.3d at 690 (quoting Selective Serv. Sys., 468 U.S. at 856 n. 15, 104 S.Ct. at 3357 n. 15), and cannot render a statute a bill of attainder without any other indicia of punishment. Evidence in the legislative history can bolster our conclusion, however, where other factors suggest punitiveness. See Lovett, 328 U.S. at 312, 314, 66 S.Ct. at 1077, 1078 (finding an employment ban to constitute a bill of attainder where committee reports characterized the affected persons as subversive and unfit for government service); cf. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 479, 97 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (finding no bill of attainder where the relevant committee reports cast no aspersions on appellant's personal conduct and contain[ed] no condemnation of his behavior as meriting the infliction of punishment). 99 In this case, the legislative history is replete with evidence that the statutory purpose of the Elizabeth Morgan Act was to correct an injustice and take sides in a notorious custody dispute. Hearing at 8, J.A. 41 (statement of Rep. Molinari). The focus of the Act and the unusual committee hearing in consideration of the bill demonstrate that the legislative process in this case amounted to precisely that which the Bill of Attainder Clause was designed to prevent: a congressional determination of blameworthiness and infliction of punishment. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 468, 97 S.Ct. at 2802-03; Brown, 381 U.S. at 449 n. 23, 85 S.Ct. at 1715 n. 23; DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160, 80 S.Ct. 1146, 1155, 4 L.Ed.2d 1109 (1960). For example, the chairman of the subcommittee spoke with apparent passion and sympathy for Hilary Foretich and stated that he sponsored the bill because he knew how it feels to be filled with pain as a child. Hearing at 1, J.A. 37 (statement of Rep. Davis). Other members agreed that the Act was necessary to bring justice and satisfaction to one little girl who can only be claimed as a victim. Hearing at 8, J.A. 41 (statement of Rep. Molinari). Members of the subcommittee also expressed contempt for the D.C. Superior Court's handling of the Morgan-Foretich case. The Act would provide a way of deal[ing] with the inadequacies of the court system, so that by bringing justice to this family, [Congress] can send an inspiring wake-up call to judges all over this country. Id. ; see also Hearing at 5, J.A. 39 (statement of Rep. Wolf) (I don't know why [Superior Court] Judge Dixon didn't do anything.... What is wrong with them?); Hearing at 7, J.A. 40 (statement of Rep. Morella) (The original court order on this case is ... clearly outdated, and no longer addresses Ellen's best interest, if it ever did.). 100 The Government invites us to conclude that Congress's purposes were entirely benign on the basis of statements in the legislative record disclaiming any judgment as to whether Dr. Foretich had indeed abused his daughter. See, e.g., Hearing at 3, 5, 6, J.A. 38-40. Aside from the fact that these statements appear conveniently self-serving, the Supreme Court has made clear that a formal legislative announcement of moral blameworthiness or punishment is not necessary to an unlawful bill of attainder. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 480, 97 S.Ct. at 2809. All that is necessary is that the legislative process and the law it produces indicate a congressional purpose to behave like a court and to censure or condemn. See Brown, 381 U.S. at 453-54, 85 S.Ct. at 1717-18. 101 The attempt by the Act's sponsors to broker a deal with Dr. Foretich for him to relinquish his parental rights removes any doubt that Congress's purpose in this case was to assume the role of a judicial tribunal and impose its own determinations of who was or was not a fit parent. See Hearing at 65, J.A. 69 (statement of Rep. Davis) (Would you agree to vacate the order? If you do that, there's obviously no need for a bill.); see also Hearing at 59-61, 66-67, 84, J.A. 66-67, 70, 79. That Congress would not have enacted the Act if Dr. Foretich had voluntarily vacated the visitation orders reveals the true purpose behind the Act. Whether through negotiation or legislation, Congress's purpose was to overturn the Superior Court's orders so that Dr. Foretich could have no contact with his daughter. This legislative history alone cannot provide conclusive evidence as to the statutory intent behind the Elizabeth Morgan Act. It does suggest a congressional intent to punish, however. And, in combination with the absence of any plausible nonpunitive purpose, it reinforces our conclusion that the Elizabeth Morgan Act inflicts punishment within the meaning of the Bill of Attainder Clause.