Opinion ID: 6113063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Legislature's Authority To Enter

Text: Into Legal Services Contracts Under Wis. Stat. § 16.74.
¶22 Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74(1), titled Legislative and judicial branch purchasing, states that [a]ll supplies, materials, equipment, permanent personal property and contractual services required within the legislative branch shall be purchased by the joint committee on legislative organization or by the house or legislative service agency utilizing the supplies, materials, equipment, property or services. The circuit court reasoned that, although the legislature could purchase some services under this agreement, because the legal services at issue were not related to other supplies, materials, equipment, [or] permanent personal property, the legal services fell outside the scope of the statute. ¶23 The circuit court misinterpreted Wis. Stat. § 16.74. The statute explicitly permits each house of the legislature to purchase contractual services that are required within the 13 No. 2021AP802 legislative branch. § 16.74(1). The text of § 16.74 does not state that purchase of services must be tied to other physical property purchases. In fact, Wis. Stat. § 16.70(3) defines contractual services under § 16.74 to include all services, materials to be furnished by a service provider in connection with services, and any limited trades work involving less than $30,000 to be done for or furnished to the state or any agency. (Emphasis added.) In § 16.74, the legislature did not enact a limited purchasing power. ¶24 Service is defined as [t]he action or fact of working or being employed in a particular capacity (irrespective of whom the work is done for). Service, Oxford English Dictionary (2021); see also service, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (Labor performed in the interest or under the direction of others.). The term contractual services includes the provision of work or labor to another in exchange for compensation, under an enforceable agreement. Unambiguously, this includes the provision of legal services under contract. ¶25 The circuit court's statutory interpretation appears to rely heavily on logic embodied in the noscitur a sociis canon. However, the canon does not alter our conclusion. Noscitur a sociis serves to read in context ambiguous terms that could be defined literally in a manner conflicting with the statute's plain meaning. Therefore, in the list tacks, staples, nails, brads, screws, and fasteners, the word staples should not be read to mean reliable and customary 14 No. 2021AP802 food items. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 196 (2012); see also Stroede v. Soc'y Ins., 2021 WI 43, ¶¶1, 19, 397 Wis. 2d 17, 959 N.W.2d 305 (interpreting a list of possessor[s] of real property, which included owner, lessee, tenant, or other lawful occupant of real property, to not encompass a patron at a bar who lacked possession or control over the property (citing Wis. Stat. § 895.529 (2017-18)). ¶26 The term contractual services under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 is unambiguous and includes attorney services. See Benson v. City of Madison, 2017 WI 65, ¶31, 376 Wis. 2d 35, 897 N.W.2d 16 (holding that the term corporation was unambiguous and thus there was no need to resort to the [noscitur a sociis] canon). Furthermore, the broad scope of contractual services is in harmony with the shared meaning of supplies, materials, equipment, [and] permanent personal property under § 16.74(1) as all items in the list must, by statute, be required within the legislative branch. See State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶35, 308 Wis. 2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447 (noting that, under the noscitur a sociis canon, a list of specific items indicated a general common meaning which permitted an expansive, not restrictive reading of the statute). ¶27 Confirming the plain meaning and statutory definition of contractual services, the official legislative annotation of Wis. Stat. § 16.70(3) states that '[c]ontractual services' 15 No. 2021AP802 include technical and professional services.10 Wis. Stat. § 16.70, historical note (citing 65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 251 (1976)); see Madison Metro. Sch. Dist. v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2011 WI 72, ¶65 n.12, 336 Wis. 2d 95, 800 N.W.2d 442 (stating that, although titles and histor[ical] notes are not part of statutes, they provide valuable clues to the meaning of statutory text (citing Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6) (2007-08))). Of course, attorneys are considered professionals. ¶28 The circuit court also held that the attorney services contracts at issue were not required within the legislative branch under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 because redistricting 10 The legislative annotation relies on an Attorney General opinion from 1976, which interpreted the meaning of contractual services under the version of Wis. Stat. § 16.70 that existed at the time. 65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 251 (1976); see Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. City of Milwaukee, 2012 WI 65, ¶41, 341 Wis. 2d 607, 815 N.W.2d 367 (The opinions of the Attorney General are not binding on the courts but may be given persuasive effect.). The definition in 1976 had no material differences to the current version. See Wis. Stat. § 16.70 (1975-76) (defining contractual services to include all materials and services). In the opinion, the Attorney General reviewed the legislative history of § 16.70 and explained that a prior version of the statute was amended to define contractual services to include all . . . services. 65 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. at 255-56. When making that change, the legislature was concerned that the prior version of the statute excluded technical and professional services. Id. Thus, the Attorney General concluded that § 16.70's definition of contractual services included professional services, such architectural and engineering consulting services. Id. at 252. This legislative history confirms the plain language of § 16.70. Teschendorf v. State Farm Ins. Co., 2006 WI 89, ¶14, 293 Wis. 2d 123, 717 N.W.2d 258 ([I]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we sometimes look to legislative history to confirm the plain meaning.). Contractual services under § 16.70 extends to all professional services, including legal services. 16 No. 2021AP802 litigation had not yet begun. Of course, in cases of complex litigation, legal advice to prepare clients for upcoming court proceedings, develop legal strategies, and mitigate litigation risk can be of material significance. Understanding the stakes and potential consequences of a given action——here, a redistricting map——may serve to ensure greater legal compliance, reduce the need for judicial intervention, and lower burdens on the court system. There is no support found in either the text of § 16.74 or in basic principles of litigation practice that counseling prior to the filing of a lawsuit is not worthwhile or helpful. In fact, it can be of equal or greater importance than representation in subsequent legal proceedings. This is especially true in an area such as redistricting, where multiple levels of law from both state and federal sources present substantial compliance difficulties to even the most astute legal mind, and litigation is extraordinarily likely, if not inevitable. Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶10 ([R]edistricting is now almost always resolved through litigation rather than legislation . . . .). ¶29 Furthermore, any distinction between the existence and nonexistence of a present lawsuit is largely unworkable. While the legislature may have authorization to purchase legal services under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 once a lawsuit was initiated, under the circuit court's reasoning, the legislature would be prohibited from hiring counsel to file a lawsuit on its behalf, as no lawsuit would exist prior to the lawsuit being filed. Such an interpretation is absurd. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 17 No. 2021AP802 ¶46 (stating that statutes must be interpreted reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results). ¶30 The parties do not dispute that Petitioners, on behalf of the legislature, contracted with Consovoy and Mortara to provide advice and strategic direction on redistricting litigation. BGSJ was contracted to review constitutional and statutory requirements and the validity of any draft redistricting legislation, as well as to assist the legislature in redistricting-related legal proceedings. ¶31 It strains credulity to conclude that the need for legal advice in this area was fictitious or somehow disconnected from legitimate legislative activities. Every ten years, the legislature is constitutionally responsible for drawing district boundaries in this state. See Jensen, 249 Wis. 2d 706, ¶6 (noting that the Wisconsin Constitution gives the state legislature the authority and responsibility to draw district boundaries); Wis. Const. art. IV, § 3 ([T]he legislature shall apportion and district anew the members of the senate and assembly . . . .). The legislature clearly has a constitutionally-rooted institutional interest in litigating redistricting disputes. ¶32 The undisputed facts show that, in line with decades of bipartisan precedent, the Senate and Assembly Committees on Organization determined that the hiring of legal counsel to assist with redistricting was needed. By taking these votes, the legislature rationally took steps to make more informed decisions in drawing maps, navigate extraordinarily complex 18 No. 2021AP802 legal issues, and prepare for related litigation. As a matter of law, there is no genuine dispute of fact that the attorney services contracts were required within the legislative branch under Wis. Stat. § 16.74. See Wis. Stat. § 802.08(2).
¶33 The Respondents' arguments on appeal move away from the circuit court's legal reasoning. Instead, they claim that Wis. Stat. § 16.74 contains no conferral of purchasing authority at all. According to Respondents, some other statutory provision must provide authority to the legislature to make basic purchasing decisions. Under Respondents' theory, § 16.74 simply identifies which entities may make purchases for the legislature and the procedure by which those purchases are completed. ¶34 Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74(1) confirms that supplies, materials, equipment, permanent personal property and contractual services, must be purchased by the joint committee on legislative organization, a house of the legislature, or a legislative service agency to the extent that the purchases are required within the legislative branch. By the very operation of this provision, those entities entitled to make purchases must have, under the statute, the legal authority to do so. If no authority exists, the responsibility to make purchase[s] under the statute would have little applicability or utility. The statute includes no indication, explicit or implicit, that purchasing authority is vested, defined, or limited by other statutory provisions. For example, § 16.74(1) does not state, 19 No. 2021AP802 If authorized under a different statute, [a]ll supplies, materials, equipment, permanent personal property and contractual services shall be purchased. Instead, the provision states, without ambiguity, that such goods and services shall be purchased to the extent they are needed by the legislature. Respondents fail to cite a conflicting provision in the Wisconsin code that ties purchases under § 16.74 to separate statutory provisions. ¶35 In other words, for the plain text of Wis. Stat. § 16.74(1) to have effective meaning, the legislature must have the authority to make purchases under the provision. This basic principle is not foreign to our jurisprudence. For example, in Bank of New York Mellon v. Carson, we interpreted a foreclosure statute which stated, upon a court's finding of abandonment, a judgment shall be entered which indicates that the sale of such mortgaged premises shall be made upon the expiration of 5 weeks from the date [of judgment]. 2015 WI 15, ¶20, 361 Wis. 2d 23, 859 N.W.2d 422 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 846.102 (201112)). We interpreted the statute to provide the circuit court the authority to order a bank to sell the property. Id. Further, Wis. Stat. § 808.03(2) states that a civil judgment or order [of a circuit court] . . . may be appealed to the court of appeals in advance of a final judgment or order if certain conditions are met. Naturally, we have read § 808.03(2) to provide litigants with the ability to appeal[] by permission. Heaton v. Larsen, 97 Wis. 2d 379, 397, 294 N.W.2d 15 (1980). 20 No. 2021AP802 ¶36 When interpreting Wis. Stat. §§ 846.102(1) and 808.03(2), we did not demand separate statutory authority for a court to order a foreclosure sale or for a litigant to appeal by permission of the court. Such authority was inherent in the plain meaning and operation of the statutes. We did not read § 846.102(1) as solely describing the content of foreclosure judgments, and we did not read § 808.03(2) as merely explaining conditions precedent to appeal. Contrary to Respondents' claims, Wis. Stat. § 16.74, like §§ 846.102(1) and 808.03(2), does not only identify the individuals or entities who may have legal authority to make legislative branch purchases if another statute says as much, nor does the provision serve only to clarify procedure for making such purchases. Instead, § 16.74 is an independent grant of legal authority by which the legislature can buy the goods and services it needs.11 ¶37 The context of Wis. Stat. § 16.74 confirms this plain meaning. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 ([S]tatutory language 11 Similarly, Article I, Section 4 of the United States Constitution states that, The times, places and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof. (Emphasis added.) Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74(1), which states [a]ll . . . contractual services required within the legislative branch shall be purchased by . . . the house or legislative service agency utilizing [the services], uses an almost identical linguistic structure. It is not seriously disputed that, under the text of Article I, Section 4, states are vested the authority to regulate the manner of federal elections. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 805 (1995) (explaining that the provision is an express delegation[] of power to the States to act with respect to federal elections). 21 No. 2021AP802 is interpreted in the context in which it is used . . . .). Section 16.74(3) states that the individuals authorized to make purchases or engage services under this section [16.74] may prescribe the form of . . . contracts for the purchases and engagements. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, § 16.74(4) states that bills and statements for purchases and engagements made under this section must be submitted to the DOA. (Emphasis added.) These provisions heavily imply that § 16.74 provides an independent basis by which the legislature can make purchases. It would be deeply counterintuitive for § 16.74 to specify that purchases are made under its own terms when, in fact, a completely separate, unidentified statute confers the needed legal authority to make the purchases. By stating that purchases are made under § 16.74, the legislature confirmed that, indeed, purchases can be made under the statute. Respondents' arguments are not supported by the text of § 16.74 and cannot be accepted. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶45 (If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry. (quotations omitted)).12 12It is noteworthy that Wis. Stat. § 16.74 also provides the statutory basis for making judicial branch purchases. See § 16.74(1) (All supplies, materials, equipment, permanent personal property and contractual services required within the judicial branch shall be purchased by the director of state courts . . . .). An almost identically worded statute provides the DOA with the authority to complete necessary purchases for all [executive branch] agencies. Wis. Stat. § 16.71(1); see, e.g., Glacier State Dist. Servs. v. DOT, 221 Wis. 2d 359, 362, 585 N.W.2d 652 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting that all purchases for the de-icing of state highways in Wisconsin were made under § 16.71). If Respondents' interpretation were correct, legal uncertainty would surround basic purchases by the legislative, 22 No. 2021AP802 ¶38 Putting aside the question of purchasing authority under Wis. Stat. § 16.74, Respondents claim that a more specific statute for hiring attorneys applies and thus, Petitioners cannot rely on § 16.74 to enter into the contracts with Consovoy, Mortara, and BGSJ. Wisconsin Stat. § 13.124 states that the senate majority leader or the assembly speaker, or both, may at their sole discretion, obtain legal counsel other than from the department of justice . . . in any action in which the [senate or assembly] is a party or in which the interests of the [senate or assembly] are affected, as determined by the [senate majority leader or speaker]. § 13.124(1)(b), (2)(b). It is true that where two conflicting statutes apply to the same subject, the more specific statute controls. Lornson v. Siddiqui, 2007 WI 92, ¶65, 302 Wis. 2d 519, 735 N.W.2d 55; see also Scalia & Garner, supra ¶25, at 183 (The general/specific canon . . . deals with what to do when conflicting provisions simply cannot be reconciled . . . .). However, conflicts between different statutes, by implication or otherwise, are not favored and will not be held to exist if they may otherwise be reasonably construed. State ex rel. Hensley v. Endicott, 2001 WI 105, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 607, 629 N.W.2d 686. ¶39 Here, there is no statutory conflict that bars the use of Wis. Stat. § 16.74 to purchase attorney services. Under a judicial, and executive branches. Under what authority, for instance, would courts be able to buy note pads on which judges and clerks write? 23 No. 2021AP802 plain reading of Wis. Stat. § 13.124, the provision applies only where there is an action in which the senate or assembly are parties, or their interests are affected. The provision also vests authority solely in the discretion of the senate majority leader and assembly speaker. By contrast, § 16.74 grants the legislature authority to purchase attorney services, but only if approved by the joint committee on legislative organization or by the house or legislative service agency using the services. There is no limitation in § 16.74 that the purchase be made for an action like in § 13.124. Thus, § 13.124 provides a quick, streamlined basis for the legislature's leadership to obtain counsel for the legislature in any action. By contrast, § 16.74 allows each house of the legislature to obtain counsel as needed, irrespective of whether an action exists. Sections 13.124 and 16.74 are different statutes that apply in distinct circumstances. They provide separate statutory authority for the hiring of attorneys, and the general/specific cannon does not apply.13 See Lornson, 302 Wis. 2d 519, ¶65 (requiring conflicting statutes); Endicott, 245 Wis. 2d 607, ¶19 (noting that interpretations rendering statutes in conflict are disfavored in the law). ¶40 In addition, Respondents claim that, even if Wis. Stat. § 16.74 provides the legislature authority to contract for We reserve, without deciding, the question of whether 13 Wis. Stat. § 13.124 provided the Petitioners authority, independent of Wis. Stat. § 16.74, to enter into attorney services contracts prior to the initiation of a redistricting lawsuit. 24 No. 2021AP802 attorney services, Petitioners did not comply with procedural requirements. Under § 16.74(1), purchases must be made by the joint committee on legislative organization or by the house or legislative service agency utilizing the goods or services. Contracts for purchases by the senate or assembly shall be signed by an individual designated by the organization committee of the house making the purchase. § 16.74(2)(b). ¶41 Here, the undisputed facts show that the Senate and Assembly Committees on Organization, who were designated by their respective houses to review and complete purchases for attorney services, vested the Petitioners with authority to enter into the contracts with Consovoy, Mortara, and BGSJ. On January 5, 2021, the Committee on Senate Organization approved the hiring of attorneys for redistricting and explicitly granted Senator LeMahieu authority to enter into contracts. Further, on March 24, 2021, the Committee on Assembly Organization vested Speaker Vos with the authority to hire counsel for redistricting, noting that Speaker Vos had always [been] authorized to contract for attorney services. ¶42 Respondents note that the agreement with Consovoy and Mortara was signed on December 23, 2020, and the Senate and Assembly Committees on Organization approved the hiring of counsel after that date, on January 5 and March 24, 2021, respectively. Therefore, the legislature indisputably approved the attorney agreements signed by Petitioners in January and March 2021. It is well established that a contract is valid, even if originally signed by an agent without authority, when 25 No. 2021AP802 the principal subsequently ratifies the agreement and agrees to be bound by its terms. See M&I Bank v. First Am. Nat'l Bank, 75 Wis. 2d 168, 176, 248 N.W.2d 475 (1977) (explaining that [r]atification is the manifestation of intent to become party to a transaction purportedly done on the ratifier's account); Restatement (Second) of Contracts §380 cmt. a (1981) (A party who has the power of avoidance may lose it by action that manifests a willingness to go on with the contract.); see, e.g., Milwaukee J. Sentinel v. DOA, 2009 WI 79, 319 Wis. 2d 439, 768 N.W.2d 700 (reviewing a public records law challenge to a statute enacted by the legislature to ratify a previously negotiated collective bargaining agreement). The legislature adopted the contracts at issue, even given the fact that it did so after the agreements were signed. The agreements are valid and enforceable. ¶43 Respondents also claim that the contracts are void because the legislature failed to provide adequate information to the DOA, and the payments to Consovoy, Mortara, and BGSJ were not properly audited. Wisconsin Stat. § 16.74(4) states that [e]ach legislative and judicial officer shall file all bills and statements for purchases and engagements made by the officer under this section with the secretary [of the DOA], who shall audit and authorize payment of all lawful bills and statements. ¶44 It is undisputed that the legislature submitted information on bills from the relevant attorney services contracts to the DOA. Petitioners submitted undisputed evidence that, as with all purchases for the legislature, including 26 No. 2021AP802 attorney services, information from the bills was inputted into a software program, PeopleSoft. A business manager submitted basic accounting details, such as the name of the billing entities, transaction-specific invoice codes, invoice dates, the amount of funds needed, and the general accounting code describing the subject matter of the transaction, i.e., legal services. The information was reviewed by at least two employees at the legislature, including the chief clerks, and was then transferred to the DOA for review. The DOA received the information and issued payments. The uncontested facts show that the legislature properly allowed the DOA to audit and review bills and statements for the attorney services at issue. Wis. Stat. § 16.74(4). ¶45 Respondents cite a response to a public records request provided by DOA's Chief Legal Counsel, Ann Hanson, which stated that the DOA did not have access to bills and statements that originated from Consovoy and BGSJ. However, DOA's response also indicated that the DOA was given payment requests and, in fact, issued payments. Clearly, at the time of the payments, DOA believed the legislature had provided sufficient information to review the requests and comply with Wis. Stat. § 16.74's procedural requirements. As with all purchasing requests submitted by the legislature, DOA had online access to the information taken from the attorney services bills submitted through PeopleSoft. The fact that the legislature, working with the DOA, streamlined the acquisitions process and transitioned to software programs in lieu of submitting original billing 27 No. 2021AP802 statements is of no legal significance. As required by § 16.74, the DOA had access to basic accounting information for the purchases at issue, and, predictably, the DOA issued payments. ¶46 To the extent that DOA failed to perform a proper audit under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 of the legislature's purchasing requests, Respondents must direct their complaint toward the DOA, not the legislature. Section 16.74(4) unambiguously vests the duty to audit and authorize payment[s] with the DOA. Respondents cite no legal authority that the legislature had the obligation or responsibility to oversee DOA's internal auditing process. In this case, DOA received billing requests and information, responded to the legislature, and issued payments. If, in doing so, DOA failed to fully perform its administrative duties, purchasing by the legislature under § 16.74 cannot be ground to a halt.14 ¶47 In all, the legislature complied with Wis. Stat. § 16.74 and received the payments it properly approved, validated, and requested. Consequently, as a matter of law, summary judgment in Petitioners' favor is warranted.15 Furthermore, any failure of those authorized to make 14 purchases under Wis. Stat. § 16.74 to provide information to the DOA for audit would implicate the legality of payments for the legal services contracts, not the legality of the contracts themselves. There is no substantiated argument that failing to send proper documentation to the DOA would render the contracts unenforceable. While Respondents filed this lawsuit in part to bar payments under the contracts, if Petitioners violated § 16.74's audit procedures as Respondents allege, the separate remedy of declaring the contracts void ab initio would not be appropriate. 15 The dissent does not dispute that attorney services 28 No. 2021AP802