Opinion ID: 781943
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Koerner's first two state post-conviction petitions.

Text: 32 The briefs filed by Koerner's former appellate counsel argue that each of the first and second state post-conviction petitions adequately raised the issue that Koerner was denied a direct appeal due to the ineffective assistance of his counsel. Although we recognize that the Nevada courts did have the power to rule on this issue, we conclude that the references to the denial of a direct appeal in the first two post-conviction petitions were not sufficiently clear to fairly present the issue. 33 The Nevada Supreme Court has long regarded as well established its power to consider constitutional errors sua sponte, even when not properly raised by the parties. See, e.g., Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev. 860, 34 P.3d 519, 533 (2001) (en banc) (per curiam) ([T]he power of this court to address plain error or issues of constitutional dimension sua sponte is well established.); see also Kirkpatrick v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 64 P.3d 1056, 2003 WL 1192883, at  n. 8 (Nev.2003) (noting that the rule that issues not raised before that district court are waived on appeal yields to the rule that the court may consider constitutional issues sua sponte ); McNair v. Rivera, 110 Nev. 463, 874 P.2d 1240, 1244 n. 6 (1994) (per curiam); Emmons v. State, 107 Nev. 53, 807 P.2d 718, 723 (1991) (holding that we may address plain error or issues of constitutional dimension sua sponte ), abrogated on other grounds by Harte v. State, 116 Nev. 1054, 13 P.3d 420, 432 n. 6 (2000) (en banc) (per curiam); McCullough v. State, 99 Nev. 72, 657 P.2d 1157, 1158 (1983) (per curiam). Ineffective assistance of counsel is quite obviously an issue of constitutional dimension, and therefore the Nevada Supreme Court had the power to consider at any time Koerner's claim that his trial counsel failed to file a direct appeal. 34 Nonetheless, we cannot assume that the Nevada Supreme Court did in fact consider any claim that it had the power to decide; we must still inquire as to whether Koerner fairly presented the direct appeal claim. We find that he did not. 35 In the first petition, the denial of a direct appeal appears nowhere in Koerner's statement of claims; it is mentioned only by way of explanation as to why he did not previously raise his other claims on direct appeal. At the evidentiary hearing, Koerner also described the facts underlying his direct appeal claim, and in his petition, he raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Ordinarily, the presentation of these facts along with ineffective assistance claims might be enough to put the reviewing court on notice that Koerner was raising an ineffective assistance claim for failing to file a direct appeal. See Wells v. Maass, 28 F.3d 1005, 1008 (9th Cir.1994). In this case, however, because these facts also were relevant to show why Koerner's other claims should not be defaulted for failing to raise them on direct appeal, we cannot say that the first petition fairly presented the claim for the denial of a direct appeal. 36 In the supplement to the second petition, Koerner asserted that his first post-conviction counsel had been ineffective for failing to assert a claim for the denial of a direct appeal. This supplement specifically requested that the court allow... the exhaustion of the issue of why no direct appeal was taken. The use of the term exhaustion indicates that Koerner wanted the court to address the merits of his direct appeal issue. Furthermore, Koerner attached a letter that set forth the operative facts underlying this claim, and raised the federal legal theory of ineffective assistance of counsel throughout the supplement. See Kelly, 315 F.3d at 1066. 37 If this were the last mention of this claim in the record, we very well might conclude that it had been fairly presented to the Nevada courts. A few months after filing this supplement, however, Koerner filed a Motion for Adjudication in which he requested that the Nevada district court decide the merits of his second post-conviction petition. In that motion, Koerner asserted that the only issue raised by his second petition was if Mr. Specchio [Koerner's post-conviction counsel] was ineffective. He further argued that it was not his choice to have Mr. Specchio put up such a weak argument as to why Petitioner did not file a direct appeal in this matter, that the Nevada Supreme Court did not even recognize such an argument and dismissed Petitioner's appeal accordingly. Thus Koerner's Motion for Adjudication characterized this claim as challenging only the effectiveness of his post-conviction counsel, not his trial counsel. The issue of the effectiveness of Koerner's trial counsel in failing to file a direct appeal was thus not fairly presented to the Nevada courts. Furthermore, the second petition was dismissed in an order that failed to mention the direct appeal issue at all, and so the record on the second petition does not allow for the conclusion that the Nevada courts actually considered this issue. As noted above, however, the Nevada Supreme Court certainly had the power to consider the issue sua sponte, and the record before the Nevada Supreme Court on the second petition contained substantial factual development on this issue. 38