Opinion ID: 701292
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expert Testimony Regarding Drug Trafficking

Text: 37 Over Kearns' objection, DEA Agent Al Reilly testified as an expert that: 38
39 2. Drug traffickers attempt to put someone between them[selves] and the [drug] buyer, for fear that the buyer may be the police; 40 3. Informants are critical to investigation of drug crimes, because they allow law enforcement personnel to find out what's happening inside and they are necessary to introduce an undercover agent; 41 4. Drug traffickers try to visit the source of the drugs and make sure they are not the police; and 42 5. Drug transactions usually involve cash because cash leaves no tracks, no records. 43 Kearns does not dispute that Reilly was qualified to testify as an expert. She argues, however, that his testimony is inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 702 because it related to matters within jurors' common knowledge, and therefore was not necessary to assist the trier of fact. She also claims that Reilly's testimony amounted to improper vouching for a government witness and informant, Rosemary Teran. We reject both arguments. 44 Reilly's testimony regarding the modus operandi and characteristics of criminal activity is similar to expert testimony that this court has held admissible under Rule 702 in prior cases. See, e.g., United States v. Alonso, 48 F.3d 1536, 1540 (9th Cir.1995) (citing cases). The district court was well within its discretion to conclude that Reilly's testimony would assist the trier of fact, as required by Rule 702. 45 Reilly's testimony also did not amount to vouching for Rosemary Teran. Reilly merely noted the importance of informants to drug investigations generally. He made no specific mention of Teran, or of her role, usefulness, or credibility as an informant. In fact, he stated on cross-examination that he was not involved in this case at all. Reilly did not plac[e] the prestige of the government behind the testimony of Rosemary Teran. See United States v. Necoechea, 986 F.2d 1273, 1276 (9th Cir.1993).