Opinion ID: 2363135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: business exceptions

Text: Lastly, summary judgment should not have been granted on the basis of the policy exclusion concerning an owned business, or the exclusion concerning an attorney's activities as an officer, director, employee, or trustee of a business enterprise. The owned business exclusion provides that the policy will not cover:       B. the performance of professional services for a business enterprise not named in this policy, owned by an insured or their spouse, a business enterprise in which an insured or their spouse is a partner, or a business enterprise which is controlled, managed or operated by an insured or their spouse. The other business exclusion denies coverage for: C. a claim arising out of the insured's activities as a lawyer and: 1. an officer, director, employee or trustee of a business enterprise not named in this policy, charitable organization, or a pension, welfare, profitsharing, mutual or investment fund or trust ... unless such entity is a client of the insured and the claim relates solely to such lawyer/client relationship. The pivotal question with regard to both of these exclusions is whether Mays was acting in the interests of the Mays-Connealy Corporation when he arranged the sale of the motel. We agree with the appellants that although the facts, on the surface, appear to fit within the language of these exclusions, the application of the exclusion depends on the real nature of the transaction. Was Mays acting on behalf of his company or was he arranging a deal for Morris as his attorney, or both? A determination of whether Mays was acting for the Mays-Connealy Corporation, and whether the claim arose out of his connection with that company, turns on the credibility of Morris' testimony that the whole transaction would not have occurred but for Mays' professional advice in connection with the divorce, versus the credibility of Mays' testimony that he assumed he was representing his company in drafting the lease papers. This is a matter for a trier of fact. We have said that exclusionary clauses in insurance policies are strictly interpreted, and all reasonable doubts are resolved in favor of the insured. Southern Title Ins. Co. v. Oiler, 268 Ark. 300, 595 S.W.2d 681 (1980). Again, we find that factual issues remain as to Mays' acts in connection with his company and that summary judgment in favor of Valley Forge on the basis of either of these exclusions was, therefore, improper. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for trial. BROWN, J., not participating.