Opinion ID: 2056811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Interpreting the Child Wrongful Death Statute

Text: When interpreting a statute, appellate courts independently review a statute's meaning and apply it to the facts of the case under review. If a statute is unambiguous, that is, susceptible to but one meaning, we must give the statute its clear and plain meaning. See Elmer Buchta Trucking, Inc. v. Stanley, 744 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ind.2001). If a statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations, however, we must try to ascertain the legislature's intent and interpret the statute so as to effectuate that intent. Id. (citing Whitacre v. State, 629 N.E.2d 1236 (Ind.1994)). We presume the legislature intended logical application of the language used in the statute, so as to avoid unjust or absurd results. Sales v. State, 723 N.E.2d 416, 420 (Ind.2000). We begin by mentioning what this case is not. It does not call for any moral, philosophical or theological determination[s] of what constitutes a person or a life. Wade v. United States, 745 F.Supp. 1573, 1577 (D.Haw.1990). While the larger, more politically charged issues in this field are quite apparent, our sole task is to determine the scope of the word child in the Wrongful Death Statute. In the absence of clear legislative guidance, the challenge is where to draw the line against otherwise open-ended liability. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 287 (5th ed.1984). While this is not always an easy task, we bear in mind Justice Holmes' words: Neither are we troubled by the question where to draw the line. That is the question in pretty much everything worth arguing in the law. Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U.S. 161, 168, 45 S.Ct. 475, 69 L.Ed. 897 (1925) (citation omitted). Our research reveals a wealth of court opinions and scholarship on the subject of wrongful death and the unborn child. See, e.g., Sheldon R. Shapiro, Right to Maintain Action or to Recover Damages for Death of Unborn Child, 84 A.L.R.3d 411 (1978 & Supp.2001). Although each state has a uniquely drafted wrongful death statute, courts have generally resolved this question in one of four ways: (1) permit recovery only for the death of children born alive, [4] (2) permit recovery only for the death of viable unborn children, [5] (3) permit recovery for the death of unborn children that are quick, [6] and (4) permit recovery for the death of any unborn child. [7] See, e.g., Mamta K. Shah, Inconsistencies in the Legal Status of an Unborn Child: Recognition of a Fetus as Potential Life, 29 Hofstra L.Rev. 931, 938-51 (2001); Daniel S. Meade, Wrongful Death and the Unborn Child: Should Viability Be a Prerequisite for a Cause of Action?, 14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 421, 426-44 (1998). Although this scholarship is helpful, we must focus on the language of Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Statute. While the legislature has clearly set upper limits on the definition of child, it is not as plain that it has placed a lower limit on the definition of child. A. The Wrongful Death Statute's Express Language. In Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind.App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971), the Court of Appeals addressed a prior version of Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Statute that lacked a definition of child. [8] The Court of Appeals provided the following thoughtful analysis: [W]e find no objective reason for saying that the 1881 Legislature which gave the father the right to maintain an action for the injury or death of a child did not intend child to include a stillborn child. Whatever was in their minds is not recorded and is, at best, a matter of mere supposition. But if we may, arguendo, indulge in our own supposition it would be this: That since actions for pre-natal injuries and deaths were then unknown in Indiana jurisprudence our lawmakers very probably gave no thought to whether they were creating an action for pre-natal injury or pre-natal death, or whether their word child was the same word child so often used in referring to a pregnant woman as being with child. 150 Ind.App. at 494, 277 N.E.2d at 24-25. [9] Without a definition of child for guidance, the court concluded that a full term healthy male capable of independent life was a child within the meaning of the statute. 150 Ind.App. at 498, 277 N.E.2d at 27. The 1987 revisions of the Child Wrongful Death Statute present us with a very different situation today. Rather than relying exclusively upon policy and logic, as the Britt court was forced to do, we are now able to consider the evident intent of the legislature as expressed by the provisions it added to the Indiana Code. These provisions do not support the conclusion the Bolins seek. We look first to the legislature's basic definition of child: an unmarried individual without dependents who is less than twenty (20) years of age. Ind.Code Ann. § 34-1-1-8(a) (West 1996). This definition contains four concepts: an (1) unmarried, (2) individual, (3) without dependents, (4) who is less than twenty years of age. The first three concepts tend to indicate the legislature contemplated that only living children would fall within the definition of child. Unmarried and without dependents involve activities in which only living persons engage. While very young children cannot marry or have dependents, the vocabulary suggests a desire to define persons who have been born. It would strain this rather express language to read unmarried individual without dependents to encompass an unborn child. A foremost precept of statutory interpretation is avoiding illogical and absurd results. See Mayes v. State, 744 N.E.2d 390, 393 (2001). The words chosen by the legislature to define child have accepted public meanings that point in a similar direction. Black's Law Dictionary defines individual as [e]xisting as an indivisible entity. Black's Law Dictionary 777 (7th ed.1999). Webster's Dictionary says among other things that an individual is a being referred to by a proper name. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1152 (1993). This is language human beings use to describe other independently living human beings. In contrast to the apparent meaning of the express language used in the statute at issue in this case, in other contexts the legislature has enacted protections for unborn children using explicit language. For example, Indiana Code § 35-42-1-6, enacted in 1979, imposes criminal liability for the knowing or intentional termination of a human pregnancy. [10] See P.L. 153-1979, Sec. 3; Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-6 (West 1998). In addition, the legislature has made it a crime to traffic in fetal tissue. [11] See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-46-5-1 (West 1998). From these statutes, it is apparent that the legislature knows how to protect unborn children. The fact that the legislature did not expressly include unborn children within the definition of child in the Child Wrongful Death Statute lends further credence to our conclusion that an eight- to ten-week-old fetus does not meet the statute's definition of child. As we observed above, the wrongful death action is entirely a creature of statute. Durham v. U-Haul Int'l, 745 N.E.2d 755 (Ind.2001). Because this statute is in derogation of the common law, we construe it strictly against the expansion of liability. Ed Wiersma Trucking Co. v. Pfaff, 643 N.E.2d 909, 911 (Ind.Ct. App.1994), opinion adopted by 678 N.E.2d 110 (Ind.1997). The express language of the statute and the fact that it is to be narrowly construed lead us to conclude that the legislature intended that only children born alive fall under Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Statute. The legislature can certainly expand the scope of protection under the Child Wrongful Death Statute if it so chooses. B. A Mother's Remedy. The exclusion of unborn children from Indiana's Child Wrongful Death Statute does not mean that negligently injured expectant mothers have no recourse. As the Missouri Supreme Court has observed, [T]he mother has her own action for negligently inflicted injury, in which the circumstances of her pregnancy and miscarriage may be brought out and considered as part of the intangible damages. Rambo v. Lawson, 799 S.W.2d 62, 63 (Mo.1990), superseded by statute as stated in Connor v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo.1995). It is well established in Indiana law that damages are awarded to compensate an injured party fairly and adequately for her loss, and the proper measure of damages must be flexible enough to fit the circumstances. Bader v. Johnson, 732 N.E.2d 1212 (Ind.2000). In tort actions generally, all damages directly related to the wrong and arising without an intervening agency are recoverable. Erie Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515 (Ind.1993). It is hornbook law that a tortfeasor takes the injured person as he finds her, and the tortfeasor is not relieved from liability merely because an injured party's pre-existing physical condition makes him or her more susceptible to injury. When some injury was foreseeable and the defendant's negligence proximately caused the aggravated injury, this rule allows recovery for an injury even if its ultimate extent was unforeseeable. Morton v. Merrillville Toyota, Inc., 562 N.E.2d 781 (Ind. Ct.App.1990). Count I of the Bolins' complaint seeks compensation for the pain and suffering Rebecca incurred as a result of the accident. (R. at 7.) [12] It is foreseeable that pregnant mothers may be driving on the roadway and that negligent operation of a vehicle may injure these expectant mothers. Rebecca may claim damages to compensate her for her miscarriage.