Opinion ID: 2625630
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's challenge to the admissibility of his confessions

Text: Defendant asserts his initial confession to Sergeants Madarang and Chenault was obtained in violation of Miranda because it was elicited from him after his unequivocal request for counsel. Defendant also asserts his second confession to Deputy District Attorney O'Connor was the tainted product of his initial confession. We conclude the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress these two confessions. (1) Pursuant to Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, a suspect [may] not be subjected to custodial interrogation unless he or she knowingly and intelligently has waived the right to remain silent, to the presence of an attorney, and, if indigent, to appointed counsel. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 992 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519]; see also People v. Rundle (2008) 43 Cal.4th 76, 114 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 454, 180 P.3d 224], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22 [87 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 198 P.3d 11].) After a knowing and voluntary waiver, interrogation may proceed `until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.' ( People v. Gonzalez (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1111, 1124 [23 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 104 P.3d 98].) The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating the validity of the defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1034 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544], citing Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 168 [93 L.Ed.2d 473, 107 S.Ct. 515].) In considering a claim on appeal that a statement or confession is inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a defendant's Miranda rights, we review independently the trial court's legal determinations . . . . We evaluate the trial court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the defendant's statements and waivers, and `accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.' ( People v. Rundle, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 115.) The trial court in the present case was aware that the prosecution's burden was to establish the validity of defendant's waiver by a preponderance of the evidence but, apparently to demonstrate its confidence in its conclusion, applied the stricter beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The court stressed that it credited the officers who testified that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights in a timely manner and that he never requested counsel. The two tape-recorded interviews, the first with the officers and the second with the deputy district attorney, further corroborate the officers' version of the events. In the tape-recorded interviews, defendant acknowledged that he had been advised of his rights at the commencement of the prior interrogation, that he initialed the waiver form, and that he wished to speak to the authorities. We accept the trial court's resolution of the factual dispute that existed between the defense and the prosecution witnesses, along with its credibility determination, because both findings were amply supported by the evidence. Defendant's attack on the credibility of all of the police officers, unsupported by the record of the suppression hearing, is insufficient to provide a basis for rejecting the trial court's findings. Defendant urges that the very comprehensiveness of the officers' denials that they urged defendant to confess undermines the officers' credibility. We are persuaded, however, that the trial court's determination that the officers were credible witnesses is supported by substantial evidence. In sum, defendant's Miranda claim lacks merit. Having concluded that defendant's initial confession to the officers was not obtained in violation of Miranda, we reject defendant's related claim that his second confession to the deputy district attorney was the tainted product of his initial confession. (2) Defendant also challenges the admission of the statements on the ground they were involuntary. Any involuntary statement obtained by a law enforcement officer from a criminal suspect by coercion is inadmissible pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 267 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433]; People v. Neal (2003) 31 Cal.4th 63, 67 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 650, 72 P.3d 280].) To determine the voluntariness of a confession, courts examine `whether a defendant's will was overborne' by the circumstances surrounding the giving of a confession. ( Dickerson v. United States (2000) 530 U.S. 428, 434 [147 L.Ed.2d 405, 120 S.Ct. 2326].) In making this determination, courts apply a totality of the circumstances test, looking at the nature of the interrogation and the circumstances relating to the particular defendant. ( People v. Haley (2004) 34 Cal.4th 283, 298 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 877, 96 P.3d 170]; People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576 [79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29].) With respect to the interrogation, among the factors to be considered are `the crucial element of police coercion [citation]; the length of the interrogation [citation]; its location [citation]; its continuity . . . .' ( People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576.) With respect to the defendant, the relevant factors are `the defendant's maturity [citation]; education [citation]; physical condition [citation]; and mental health.' ( Ibid. ) A statement is involuntary [citation] when, among other circumstances, it `was `extracted by any sort of threats . . ., [or] obtained by any direct or implied promises . . . .'' ( People v. Neal, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 79.) As with Miranda claims, the trial court's legal conclusion as to the voluntariness of a confession is subject to independent review on appeal. ( People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 298; People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576.) The trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, its evaluation of credibility, and its findings as to the circumstances surrounding the confession are upheld if supported by substantial evidence. ( People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 298; People v. Massie, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 576.) The state bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Haley, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 298.) In the present case, again applying the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the trial court concluded that there [were] no circumstances of coercion or force, and that the totality of the circumstances indicates that these statements were voluntarily given. The interrogating officers specifically denied defendant's claims, including that they offered him benefits for confessing, issued threats, or misled him concerning the potential punishment he faced. The trial court credited the officers' testimony, and its credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. Under all the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that defendant's statements were made voluntarily. Although defendant was required to wait approximately two hours before the interrogation began, the delay was not the result of improper police conduct. Rather, it arose because the police had not planned to arrest or interview defendant prior to his own telephone call to the police; Sergeant Madarang, the lead investigator, was in Sacramento and was required to travel to Oakland to interview defendant. During defendant's interrogation, the officers provided defendant with soft drinks and cigarettes, allowed him to use the restroom, and offered him food. Most important, as the trial court found, the officers did not engage in any impermissibly coercive tactics in procuring defendant's confession. Defendant contends his own unbalanced mental state rendered him susceptible to coercion. His claim that he was mentally disturbed is based primarily upon the circumstance that he telephoned the police dispatcher and that he spoke in a rambling manner in the police vehicle while being transported to the police station. This conduct, however, may be explained by the stress and emotion felt by defendant after recognizing that he would face responsibility for the crime. In any event, his own vulnerability does not demonstrate official coercion. Insofar as a defendant's claims of involuntariness emphasize that defendant's particular psychological state rendered him open to coercion, this court has noted that `[t]he Fifth Amendment is not concerned with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion. ' ( People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 502 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 245, 150 P.3d 1224], italics added.) Although defendant may have felt vulnerable, there is no indication of police coercion during his initial contacts with the police or during the subsequent interrogations. Similarly, although defendant claims his decision to confess was based upon his youth and his absence of experience with the criminal justice system, there was no indication of police exploitation of these circumstances. On the contrary, during his tape-recorded interviews, defendant expressly stated that he was speaking freely and voluntarily. Consequently, the trial court properly concluded that defendant's confession was made voluntarily.