Opinion ID: 1159635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Liberal construction if ambiguity is found

Text: Although I find no ambiguity in this statute, even if there were one the result would be no different. First, this chapter of the revised code is intended to be remedial and shall be liberally construed.... RCW 42.17.945; see also RCW 42.17.010(11). This liberal construction mandate means the coverage of the Act's provisions must be liberally construed and its exceptions narrowly confined. Vogt v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 117 Wash.2d 541, 552, 817 P.2d 1364 (1991). The intent of the people in enacting Initiative 134, which we must effectuate, is found in the statute itself. Senate Republican Campaign Comm. v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 133 Wash.2d 229, 247-48, 943 P.2d 1358 (Johnson, J., dissenting). I think a liberal construction of the statute is inconsistent with the employers' position because in effect the employers' view would allow an employee's money to be put to a political use without his consent and against his wishes so long as the contribution to a political campaign is washed through a middleman. Based on the text at issue I think the electorate was attempting to achieve that noble principle well stated by no less than Thomas Jefferson: [T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical.... [4] But this principle is defeated by a money laundering scheme such as we have here. The majority puts weight on the administrative regulation adopted by the Public Disclosure Commission to support its view. However read literally the regulation requires a written authorization prior to a wage deduction [f]or use, specifically designated by the contributing employee, for political contributions to candidates for state or local office.... WAC 390-17-100(1)(b). [5] Therefore if money from a mandatory wage deduction is applied for use as a political contribution without the employee's consent, then we are back where we started in our analysis. On the other hand, if we construe the regulation to mean unauthorized deductions may be used for political contributions without any legal liability (even with employer knowledge of the ultimate intended political recipient), then the regulation narrows the scope of the statute even as construed by the majority. In such a situation the statute must control because it is axiomatic that administrative rules or regulations cannot amend or change legislative enactments. See, e.g. Department of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wash.2d 582, 600, 957 P.2d 1241 (1998).