Opinion ID: 170798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent to search the entire house

Text: The second issue is whether the officers' search of rooms off the main hallway exceeded the scope of Pikyavit's consent. We conclude a typical reasonable person would have believed the consent extended to these rooms. The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object. Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801. Although Pikyavit asserts he limited his consent to the living room and kitchen, there is ample evidence he consented to a search of the entire home. Indeed, the officers and Pikyavit agreed the express object of the search was to find evidence of a fight inside the home which would exculpate Pikyavit, evidence that could be found in any room of the house. Detective Jacobson testified Pikyavit asked him to search inside the entire home for the evidence he desired to be preserved. Jacobson said Pikyavit told him there was potentially a crime scene inside of the home being indicated by blood inside of the house, a weapon of some kind on the outside. R., Vol. V at 42. Thus, any room in which blood indicative of a fight could be found was encompassed within the scope of the consent. Deputy Carter's testimony corroborated the conclusion Pikyavit consented to a search of the home's general living quarters. Carter testified that Pikyavit said his home was really a bad blood bath, bad crime scene, [and] said that the whole house was turned up and the fight actually had taken place there. Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). Carter also explained that Pikyavit had said, it was just a complete disaster there. That there is blood covering the house. His hair was all over the house. ... That, you know, it was just really a bad scene. Id. at 18 (emphasis added). Additionally, Deputy Carter testified he looked into rooms other than the kitchen and living room because he thought Pikyavit may have relayed information incorrectly from his brother. Pikyavit did not know exactly where the evidence was located in the home, as he received the information from his brother. Jacobson testified, I recall him telling me that his brother had told him that there was blood in the kitchen. Id. at 41. When the officers originally arrived at the scene, they looked in the kitchen and living room, but found no evidence of a fight in either. The furniture was not overturned and there was no blood or hair to be seen. Finding no evidence of the fight in these two main rooms, the officers proceeded to open doors off of the main room. Carter recalled his thinking: [Pikyavit] may have been not understanding the description exactly so we did open the door to the first room right offoff of the living room area there. R., Vol. II at 38-39. In that first room, ammunition was found. The burden was on Pikyavit to limit the scope of the search if he desired to do so. [A] defendant's failure to limit the scope of a general authorization to search, and failure to object when the search exceeds what he later claims was a more limited consent, is an indication the search was within the scope of consent. Gordon, 173 F.3d at 766 (citing cases). In this case, of course, Pikyavit was not present at his home when the officers arrived to search. He therefore could not have objected at that time if the officers were exceeding the scope of his consent. But Pikyavit knew he would not be present, and the onus was on him to carefully delimit the scope of the search. E.g., Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801; Kim, 27 F.3d at 957. An objectively reasonable interpretation of Pikyavit's statements was that he wanted the police to find exculpatory evidence throughout the house. He did not limit his search to any particular room or rooms. As the officers were looking for evidence of a fight, it was reasonable to look into a room off of the main hallway. Cf. Kimoana, 383 F.3d at 1223 (Consent to search for specific items includes consent to search those areas or containers that might reasonably contain those items.); United States v. Santurio, 29 F.3d 550, 553 (10th Cir.1994) (noting general consent to search includes closed containers within the vehicle); United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814-15 (10th Cir.1997) (The scope of a search is generally defined by its expressed object, and is limited by the breadth of the consent given. (internal marks omitted)). The expressed object of this search was categorical  evidence of a fight  not spatial. The officers carefully limited the scope of their search to this expressed object. They did not conduct a detailed search of the adjacent rooms, but rather merely opened doors in search of evidence of a fight. To do less would have subjected them to a claim of failure to thoroughly look for exculpatory evidence. Ammunition was found in plain view in the first room off the main hallway. When it appeared an expanded and more detailed search was necessary, the officers appropriately sought and obtained a search warrant.