Opinion ID: 848615
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principles of the WDCA

Text: As we have discussed frequently in the past, by enacting Michigan's Worker's Disability Compensation Act, the Legislature replaced common-law liability for negligence in the workplace, and its related defenses, with a comprehensive, statutory compensation scheme that requires employers to provide compensation to employees for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment without regard to fault. MCL 418.301; Hoste, supra at 570, 592 N.W.2d 360; Clark v. United Technologies Automotive, Inc., 459 Mich. 681, 686-687, 594 N.W.2d 447 (1999); Farrell v. Dearborn Mfg. Co., 416 Mich. 267, 274-275, 330 N.W.2d 397 (1982). In exchange for this almost automatic entitlement to compensation, the WDCA limits the amount of compensation that an employee may collect and, moreover, prohibits the employee from bringing a tort action against the employer except in limited circumstances. [12] This principle is expressed in MCL 418.131(1), which provides, The right to the recovery of benefits as provided in this act shall be the employee's exclusive remedy against the employer for a personal injury or occupational disease. As we have explained: Th[is] language expresses a fundamental tenet of workers' compensation statutes that if an injury falls within the coverage of the compensation law, such compensation shall be the employee's only remedy against the employer or the employer's insurance carrier. The underlying rationale is that the employer, by agreeing to assume automatic responsibility for all such injuries, protects itself from potentially excessive damage awards rendered against it and that the employee is assured of receiving payment for his injuries. [ Farrell, supra at 274, 330 N.W.2d 397.] Accordingly, the threshold question in this case is whether Reed is an employee under any of the definitions in MCL 418.161 of the WDCA and, therefore, has traded his right to bring a tort action for the assured payment of benefits without regard to fault. Hoste, supra at 570-571, 592 N.W.2d 360. As in Hoste, several of the definitions set forth in MCL 418.161 do not apply in this case and, therefore, the resolution of this issue requires us to focus only on subsections 161(1)( l ) and 161(1)(n). [13] As we explained in Hoste, these subsections must be read together as separate and necessary qualifications in establishing employee status. Hoste, supra at 573, 592 N.W.2d 360. In other words, our first task is to determine whether Reed was an employee under the definition set forth in subsection 161(1)( l ). If he was, we must then determine whether he meets the requirements of subsection 161(1)(n). Id.