Opinion ID: 2633509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 24

Heading: Admission of Wissel Victim Impact Evidence

Text: Over a defense objection, the trial court admitted evidence of the effect defendant's attack had on Clarence Wissel's physical and mental condition. Defendant contends the evidence was not properly admitted under section 190.3, factor (b) (violent criminal activity) because evidence of Wissel's condition does not bear on the question of whether or not a crime was committed. As we have held, however, the circumstances of the uncharged violent criminal conduct, including its direct impact on the victim or victims of that conduct, are admissible under factor (b). ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 143, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 185-186, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Because a penalty phase jury `may consider evidence of other crimes only when the commission of such crimes is proved beyond a reasonable doubt' ( People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279), defendant also contends the jury should have been instructed to decide whether the impact on Wissel had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. But he cites nothing suggesting that the penalty jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt every factual circumstance of an offense shown under section 190.3, factor (b), including its impact. The jurors here were properly instructed that they could consider defendant's assault on Wissel by force likely to cause great bodily injury as an aggravating circumstance only if they were persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant did in fact commit such criminal acts. (CALJIC No. 8.87 (1989 rev.).) No other instruction was required. [15]