Opinion ID: 1269334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Victim identification

Text: The defendants next contend that the trial judge erred in refusing to allow cross-examination and the presentation of evidence at the voir dire hearing on admissibility of the victim's in-court identification and in failing to make sufficient findings of facts and conclusions of law to support his order allowing the identification. The basis of defendant Paige's objection to the victim's in-court identification was that she did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her abductors, thereby making her identification inherently unreliable. No claim was made that the in-court identification was tainted by an impermissibly suggestive or unconstitutionally conducted pre-trial identification procedure. During direct examination by the State at a voir dire hearing, the victim said that the only time she really got a good view of her abductors was when she saw them coming toward her in the parking lot. In response to a question by the trial judge, she said she was in close proximity to her abductors for 30 to 45 minutes after they put her in the car, but stated that she did not look directly at their faces because of their threats. Later she stated that she looked at their faces when they put her into the trunk, and she saw their faces when they took her out of the trunk in Charlotte. On cross-examination of the victim by counsel for defendant Paige, the following exchange occurred regarding the victim's view of the abductors in the parking lot when they first accosted her: Q.... How long did you look toward them? A. Few seconds. Q. 10 seconds, 15 seconds, 5 seconds, 2 seconds? Mr. Lowder: We object to that type of question. Court: You didn't give her time to answer. Q. How many seconds? Court: She said a few seconds. Later the trial judge did not allow the victim to answer Mr. Drake's question: By the way, who told you to refer to Mr. Paige as Defendant Paige? Both defense counsel conducted extensive cross-examination of the victim on voir dire, and they point only to these two rulings as impinging upon the defendants' right of cross-examination. The scope of cross-examination rests largely within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Ziglar, 308 N.C. 747, 304 S.E.2d 206 (1983). We hold that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by these two rulings on voir dire, nor did the rulings, singly or together, amount to a denial of the right of cross-examination. Defendant Paige also contends that the trial court committed reversible error by not allowing him to put on evidence relating to the identification. The record discloses that after the defendant Paige had testified and counsel had conceded that a pre-trial lineup and a photographic display had been not impermissibly suggestive, the Court denied counsel's request to call a witness to testify about the lineup and the fact that the victim had not identified defendant Paige in the lineup. In support of his ruling, the trial judge concluded that, based upon the victim's testimony regarding her opportunities to observe the defendants, her identification was not totally unreliable. This ruling was not error. As this Court said in State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 188, 250 S.E.2d 197, 200-201 (1978): The credibility of a witness's identification testimony is a matter for the jury's determination, State v. Orr, 260 N.C. 177, 132 S.E.2d 334 (1963); State v. Bowman, 232 N.C. 374, 61 S.E.2d 107 (1950), and only in rare instances will credibility be a matter for the court's determination. In Green, Justice Moore analyzed the case of State v. Miller, 270 N.C. 726, 154 S.E.2d 902 (1967) in which this Court had found the identification of the defendant by the sole eye-witness inherently incredible and insufficient to justify submission of the question of defendant's guilt to the jury. The witness in Miller testified that he had gotten only a momentary look at the perpetrator, a stranger to him, from 286 feet away, at night, aided by lights around a building and the headlights of a passing automobile. Following his analysis of the cases, Justice Moore said: [o]nly if there is a finding that the identification testimony `is inherently incredible because of undisputed facts ... as to the physical conditions under which the alleged observation occurred,' State v. Miller, supra , should defendant's motion to supress be allowed. 296 N.C. at 189, 250 S.E.2d at 201. Given the victim's testimony in this case concerning her opportunity to observe her abductors, her identification of the defendants was not inherently incredible. Thus, even if some other witness had presented evidence which cast doubt on the victim's identification, the only effect would have been to make the facts surrounding her observation disputed, thereby presenting a jury question of credibility. Finally, defendants contend that the trial judge failed to make adequate findings of facts and conclusions of law on the admissibility of the victim's identification testimony. Since no contention was made that pretrial procedures were unlawfully conducted or tainted the in-court identification, findings of facts and conclusions of law regarding the independence of the identification were not required. State v. Green, 296 N.C. 183, 250 S.E.2d 197. Nevertheless, the trial judge made findings which fully supported his conclusion that the prosecuting witness' identification of these two defendants as her attackers was not so inherently incredible as to require the court to supress it. Objection to the victim's identification of the defendants in court was properly overruled.