Opinion ID: 1172266
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of ANI's Motions for a Continuance

Text: Twice ANI moved for a continuance. The trial court denied both motions. ANI appeals these denials. ANI advances five reasons why the trial should have been continued. [8] We address each in turn.
ANI's best argument is that it had insufficient time to conduct discovery on the last four transactions added by the second amended complaint. It points out that the State moved for trial only one week after the court granted the State leave to file the second amended complaint. ANI's argument, however, overstates the prejudice ANI suffered. The State was granted leave to amend the complaint on June 7, 1994, but the State mailed a copy of the second amended complaint to ANI on May 12. The State moved for trial on June 14, but trial was set for December 28, with discovery to be completed by October 1. Thus, ANI had over four months to conduct discovery on the four new transactions. This should have been more than enough time. The addition of the four new transactions did not oblige the trial court to continue the trial. [9]
In opposing ANI's motion to remove the case from the fast-track calendar, [10] the State wrote that, [a]lthough the state has identified 48 witnesses on its preliminary witness list, that list was furnished to facilitate [ANI's] opportunity to complete discovery.... The state will likely call fewer than 20 witnesses, since many of those listed on the state's Preliminary Witness List would offer cumulative testimony. ANI argues that the State's subsequent submission of a list of fifty-five witnesses, including nineteen experts, was a surprise and grounds for continuance. ANI's argument is misleading. The State made it clear that many of the witnesses on its list were cumulative and would not be called. This practice is not uncommon. Of the nineteen experts listed, sixteen were listed as percipient[s] and expert[s] while only three were listed as expert[s]. In its August 31, 1994, response to ANI's expert witness interrogatories, the State made it clear that Scotty Dawkins was to be its primary expert and that those listed as percipients and experts were primarily auto mechanics. Although they would be fact witnesses because of their exposure to given vehicles, they might be asked to give expert opinions about the vehicles' condition. We also note that when the superior court denied ANI's September 2 motion for a continuance it also ordered the State to pare its witness list to thirty-five names, and the State did so. [11] The length of the State's witness list did not require a continuance.
ANI argues that it could not adequately conduct discovery on its counterclaim. Because the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the State on the counterclaim, the issue is moot unless ANI was prejudiced in its ability to oppose summary judgment. In denying ANI's second motion for a continuance, the superior court wrote: The counterclaim which forms the basis for the motion to continue arises out of allegations set forth in the original complaint. The fact that defendants brought the counterclaim only in their answer to the second amended complaint and have run into alleged delays in conducting discovery on this claim does not warrant delay of this trial. The superior court believed that ANI did not deserve a continuance because its counterclaim was untimely and because it had delayed in conducting discovery. In fact, ANI's counterclaim to the State's first amended complaint was substantially the same as its original counterclaim. [12] Nevertheless, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance. ANI primarily complains that it had unsuccessfully sought documents relating to the supposed secret agreement. As seen in Part III.A above, ANI has not been able to demonstrate that this was a result of State chicanery rather than the simple non-existence of facts supporting the counterclaim.
ANI argues that the State was late in supplementing the opinions of Dawkins, the State's primary expert witness, concerning his inspections of several of the vehicles. In the superior court, ANI raised the State's failure when ANI moved to limit Dawkins's testimony. [13] ANI now argues that the State's failure required a continuance. The State answers that the delay was attributable to ANI. In response to the State's request for production, ANI wrote: Vehicles are available for inspection at mutually convenient time during the two week period of September 27-October 7, at ANI. However, when Dawkins tried to inspect the vehicles, he found that the Datsun had been sold. Furthermore, the 1992 Blazer was made available to Dawkins only in late October, and Dawkins had some problems coordinating the inspection of the Subaru with one of ANI's experts. Dawkins further affied that he was in close contact with ANI's experts and that they were well aware of his opinions virtually from the time he formed them.
ANI complains that only eight days before trial the State announced it would call a wholly new expert, Gerald Levy from Cal Worthington Ford, to testify to issues concerning Ford Motor Company's warranty coverage. We conclude from the following circumstances that ANI was either not prejudiced, or was given a reasonable opportunity to protect itself. ANI's August 26, 1994, witness list listed Ray Jaeger or designee (expert), Cal Worthington Ford, to testify on warranty issues. The State's final witness list listed a Designated Expert on Warranty Coverage from Cal Worthington Ford who would testify that the 1991 Ford Escort was not eligible for complete factory warranty coverage when ANI sold it to the McCormick family. Further, ANI's attorney complained at trial that he might have deposed Levy if he had known Levy's name and the subject of his proposed testimony. The trial court found that the State may have erred in not listing Levy's name earlier, but found no prejudice and offered ANI the opportunity to question Levy outside the presence of the jury. Had it accepted that offer, ANI could have prepared for trial or demonstrated prejudice to the court. In any event, there is no indication that ANI was not completely familiar with the issues and the substance of the testimony to be offered. We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying ANI's motions to continue.