Opinion ID: 1822353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Second-degree Unintentional Felony Murder

Text: Near the close of trial, Stiles requested that the jury receive instructions on second-degree unintentional felony murder. Unintentional felony murder is defined in Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 2(1) (2002), as causing the death of a human being, without intent to effect the death of any person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence or a drive-by shooting (emphasis added). The trial court ruled that there was no rational basis for the jury to convict on unintentional second-degree murder and acquit on first-degree murder and intentional second-degree murder. The postconviction court found that the circumstantial evidence supported a finding that Stiles shot Moorman intentionally, which justified the conviction. Stiles argues that a charge on unintentional second-degree murder was appropriate because a finding that [Stiles] intended to shoot and kill [Moorman] was only one possible inference from the evidence. Stiles emphasizes that intent to shoot is not the same as the intent to kill required by the statute. Stiles posits that a rational jury could have believed he shot in a panic, without any specific intent to kill Moorman. We disagree. A finding of criminal intent is not limited to situations in which a defendant has stated his or her intent to kill the victim. Intent can be inferred from the words and acts of the shooter before and after the incident, and from the idea that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions. State v. Johnson, 616 N.W.2d 720, 726 (Minn.2000); CRIMJIG 11.26 (noting that intent    is not always susceptible to proof by direct evidence, but may be inferred from all the circumstances surrounding the event). In a number of cases, we have noted that pointing a loaded gun at a person and firing it is likely to cause death, and leads to an inference of intent. [1] The present case is factually very similar to State v. Dukes , in which we concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to instruct on second-degree felony murder (unintentional) because the evidence of intent was too strong for a rational jury to acquit on the intentional felony murder charge. State v. Dukes, 544 N.W.2d 13, 20 (Minn.1996). The evidence supporting an inference of intent in Dukes consisted of Dukes planning the robbery, arming himself with a loaded gun, attempting to rob two people, and driving his car to and from the location where his accomplice shot a victim at close range in the course of a robbery. Id. One of Dukes' accomplices testified that he did not intend to kill the victim, just scare him. Id. at 17, 20. Dukes attempted to use that testimony to argue that a charge of unintentional killing was appropriate. Id. at 20. However, the accomplice testimony in Dukes was rejected as insufficient to raise a rational basis to acquit on the intentional murder charge in light of all the other evidence of intent. Id. Stiles similarly argues he lacked intent to kill based on Seepersaud's testimony that the group did not intend to kill Moorman. However, the evidence of intent in this case is just as inculpatory as the evidence in Dukes Stiles assisted in planning the robbery, armed himself with a loaded gun, attempted to rob Moorman, and shot him three times in the course of the robbery. In light of this evidence, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial based on the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on second-degree unintentional felony murder.