Opinion ID: 441810
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretionary waiver provision

Text: 11 The challenge to Richmond's discretionary waiver provision, by contrast, is solely anticipatory. The City Council did not exercise its discretion to refuse to waive the notice requirement, but simply failed to convene. Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2201, federal courts may declare the rights and duties of litigants before a law is violated. See 10A Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2757 at 582-83 (Wright & Miller). For his anticipatory claim to satisfy the case or controversy requirement, however, the plaintiff is required to show that he is seriously interested in subjecting himself to, and the defendant seriously intent on enforcing, the challenged measure. See, e.g., J.N.S., Inc. v. Indiana, 712 F.2d 303, 305 (7th Cir.1983); Stoianoff v. Montana, 695 F.2d 1214, 1223 (9th Cir.1983); Internat'l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 817 (5th Cir.1979). 3 12 The NAACP has displayed the requisite interest in subjecting itself to the discretion vested by the ordinance. It has already attempted to bring one application before the Council, and was spared the exercise of the Council's discretion only by the unexpected absence of a few Council members. See Reeves v. McConn, 631 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir.1980). Similarly, the Council has displayed an intent to use its discretion. It has never indicated that it considers the waiver provision moribund. See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89, 93 S.Ct. 739, 745-46, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). In fact, the district court found that this case would not recur precisely because the Council's policy is to hear such requests. 4 The NAACP's fear that the Council will exercise uncircumscribed discretion, therefore, is far from hypothetical or abstract. See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297-98, 99 S.Ct. 2301, 2308-09, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 458-59, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 1215-16, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974). This being so, the NAACP has standing to challenge the discretionary waiver provision. 13 In addition to the restrictions on standing imposed by Article III, federal courts also limit for prudential reasons the claims which litigants may bring. In Valley Forge, supra, the Supreme Court identified three prudential considerations: (1) the plaintiff must ordinarily assert his own interests, and cannot base his claim on the rights of third parties, (2) his asserted harm must not be merely a generalized grievance shared in similar measure by all or a large class of citizens, and (3) his interest must arguably be within the zone of interests regulated by the statute. See 454 U.S. at 474-75, 102 S.Ct. at 759-60; Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263, 1267-68 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1439, 79 L.Ed.2d 760 (1984). 14 We find all of these concerns satisfied here. First, the NAACP asserts its own interest in conducting spontaneous parades. It does not base its claim solely on the putative free speech rights of a third party. Second, it is self-evident that the NAACP's particular desire to hold public demonstrations against allegedly racist policies is not shared in similar measure by the community at large. Third, the ordinance by its terms regulates parade permits. The NAACP's application of October 18 evinced an interest which falls within this statutory zone. In short, neither Article III requirements nor prudential factors undercut the NAACP's standing to bring this lawsuit.