Opinion ID: 185484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the EAJA and the Hyde Amendment

Text: 8 In the United States, under what is known as the American Rule, each party to a lawsuit usually bears its own attorney's fees unless there is express statutory authorization to the contrary. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240 (1975)). See generally In re Turner, 14 F.3d 637, 640 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (discussing attorney's fees and sovereign immunity). Even if a fee award is otherwise authorized, sovereign immunity protects the United States from attorney's fees liability except to the extent it has waived its immunity. Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 685 (1983) (citing Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 267268 & n.42). Any waiver of immunity, however, must be 'construed strictly in favor of the sovereign,'  Sierra Club, 463 U.S. at 685 (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)), and the court may not find a waiver unless Congress' intent is ' unequivocally expressed ' in the relevant statute. Hubbard v. EPA, 982 F.2d 531, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969))). 9 Of relevance here, the Congress has elected to waive sovereign immunity for attorney's fees in two circumstances: under the EAJA and under the Hyde Amendment. The two statutes respectively provide: 10 Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, in addition to any costs awarded pursuant to subsection (a), incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. 11 EAJA, 28 U.S.C.A. 2412(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 12 During fiscal year 1998 and in any fiscal year thereafter, the court, in any criminal case (other than a case in which the defendant is represented by assigned counsel paid for by the public) pending on or after the date of the enactment of this Act [Nov. 26, 1997], may award to a prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the court finds that special circumstances make such an award unjust. 13 Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C.A. 3006A, historical and statutory notes. 14 The appellants contend the district court erred in concluding their fee petition is governed by the Hyde Amendment rather than the EAJA. We are not persuaded. The EAJA by its terms authorizes the award of attorney's fees to a prevailing party in any civil action. The statute does not define a civil action but, however else that phrase may be defined, one definition that is always correct is that civil actions are those that are not criminal. United States v. Soueiti, 154 F.3d 1018, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 245 (6th ed. 1990); Ballentine's Law Dictionary 202 (3d ed. 1969)). Here, the action against Charles and Eugene Wade was plainly criminal. The proceeding was instituted in order to punish an infraction of the criminal laws. See Black's Law Dictionary 372 (6th ed. 1990). They were charged with a crime, brought to court, found guilty based on their pleas and sentenced. See Black's Law Dictionary 372 (defining criminal action as [p]roceeding by which person charged with a crime is brought to trial and either found not guilty or guilty and sentenced). The appellants intervened in the proceeding before the district court to challenge part of Charles's and Eugene's sentence. Their intervention did not change the nature of that proceeding. It was and remained criminal. Because the appellants were party to a criminal action and because the EAJA applies only to civil actions, they cannot recover under the EAJA. Rather, their fee petition is governed by the Hyde Amendment. 15 The appellants point to cases that treat criminal forfeiture proceedings as civil actions under EAJA. See Brief of Appellants at 10-11 (citing cases). They contend a similar conclusion is warranted with regard to an abatement order. We do not agree. A third party asserting an interest in a forfeiture proceeding is expressly barred by 21 U.S.C. 853(k)(2) from 'commenc[ing] an action at law or equity against the United States concerning the validity of [its] alleged interest in the property.'  United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 586 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting 21 U.S.C. 853(k)(2)); accord United States v. Gilbert, 244 F.3d 888, 907 (11th Cir. 2001). A third party's only avenue for protecting his interest is the procedure set forth in 18 U.S.C. 853(n), which provides that [a]ny person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in property which has been ordered forfeited to the United States pursuant to this section may petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. In establishing this statutory system, Congress intended that third-party petitions ancillary to a criminal forfeiture take the place of civil cases, and that such a procedure would enable innocent parties to adjudicate their property interests swiftly instead of having to file separate civil suits. Gilbert, 244 F.3d at 907 (describing conclusion of Douglas court); see also H.R. Rep. No. 98-1030, at 206-07 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 338990 ([O]nce the indictment or information is filed, a third party is not to commence a civil suit against the United States; instead the third party should avail himself of the ancillary hearing procedure.... This provision assures a more orderly disposition of both the criminal case and third party claims. Indeed, it is anticipated that the new hearing procedure should provide for more expedited consideration of third party claims than would the filing of separate civil suits.). It is for these reasons that courts have treated a third-party proceeding ancillary to a criminal forfeiture prosecution as a civil action under the EAJA. But these reasons do not apply to the appellants' intervention. The appellants were not prohibited by statute or otherwise from bringing a civil action against the government in order to protect their interest in the property subject to the abatement order. Had they done so, they would have been eligible to recover their attorney's fees under the EAJA. But that is not what they did. They chose instead to intervene in a criminal action. And their choice forecloses their fee request under EAJA.