Opinion ID: 654570
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Facts and Circumstances Leading to the Violation

Text: 14 Mr. Wright argues that the district court abused its discretion by treating the failure to bring Mr. Wright to trial as a neutral factor, rather than as a point against the Government. According to Mr. Wright, the Government has the burden of bringing a defendant to trial on time; any failure to do so is the Government's failure and supports a dismissal with prejudice. But Mr. Wright's argument obfuscates the issue. Carried to its logical extreme, its implication is contrary to the language of the statute, to precedent, and to the policies behind the Speedy Trial Act. 15 The statute clearly does not presume that every violation of the Act ought to trigger a dismissal with prejudice. On the contrary, it explicitly grants discretion to the district court to decide what form of dismissal is appropriate, based partly on the facts and circumstances that led to the violation. As Taylor states, an important part of the facts and circumstances inquiry is whether the Government has engaged in a pattern of neglect, or, in contrast, whether the violation represents an isolated unwitting violation. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 339, 108 S.Ct. at 2420-21. Several circuit courts have emphasized this distinction in evaluating prejudice decisions under the Act. See, e.g., United States v. Kottmyer, 961 F.2d 569, 572-73 (6th Cir.1992) (dismissing without prejudice because no pattern or intentional dilatory conduct was shown); United States v. Giambrone, 920 F.2d 176, 180-82 (2d Cir.1990) (finding a pattern of neglect in a particular United States Attorney's Office); see also United States v. Arango, 879 F.2d 1501, 1508 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210, 214-15 (2d Cir.1989). Similarly, in the present case the district court ruled explicitly that this was an isolated unwitting violation, and that there was no abuse whatsoever by the Government; this case simply inadvertently was overlooked. Moreover, the district judge himself accepted much of the blame for the delay. Apparently relying on Taylor, the court took these facts as militating in favor of dismissal without prejudice. 16 We agree with that approach. While the Government bears a large part of the responsibility for bringing a defendant to trial within the statutory period, the Act does not require the court to consider the Government's burden in the prejudice inquiry. On the contrary, that burden is embodied in the requirement of dismissal if the Government fails to meet the deadline. In contrast, the decision of whether to dismiss with or without prejudice already assumes the Government's failure; the inquiry becomes why the Government failed. The district court held that the Government failed for relatively [303 U.S.App.D.C. 356] unobjectionable reasons. Thus, far from treating the facts and circumstances factor as neutral, the court correctly regarded this factor as militating against the defendant. 17 Indeed, as the Supreme Court has observed, Mr. Wright's approach would require dismissal with prejudice in virtually every case. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 342, 108 S.Ct. at 2422 (If the greater deterrent effect of barring reprosecution could alone support a decision to dismiss with prejudice, the consideration of the other factors identified in Sec. 3162(a)(2) would be superfluous, and all violations would warrant barring reprosecution.). This result would contradict both the plain terms and legislative history of the Speedy Trial Act, which grant the district court discretion to choose between the two dismissal options, and which accord these options equal weight. Id. at 334-35, 108 S.Ct. at 2418-19. We therefore affirm the district court's resolution of the facts and circumstances factor. 18 Before leaving this issue, though, we must note that the facts of this case indicate that the United States Attorney's Office may need to rethink its scheme for complying with the Speedy Trial Act. At oral argument, the Government was asked to explain how Mr. Wright's case managed to escape its attention. The Government had no ready answer, but noted that the Speedy Trial Plan for the district court places the responsibility for monitoring compliance with the clerk of the court. Speedy Trial Plan of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Local Rule 306 at 22. Beyond that, the Government noted that the responsibility for complying with the Act within the U.S. Attorney's Office itself lies with the individual Assistant U.S. Attorney handling the case. 19 Although this court is aware of no data on the number of cases dismissed as a result of this policy, we are troubled by the Government's ad hoc approach. Congress has directed that all federal criminal defendants be brought to trial within a specified period. It is up to the United States Attorney's Office, as well as the district court, to ensure that Congress's demands are met. The existence of a Speedy Trial Plan giving the clerk of the district court authority to monitor compliance does not relieve the U.S. Attorney's Office of its own responsibility. The U.S. Attorney risks failure in discharging that responsibility when his office lacks any centralized mechanism to monitor compliance. 20 Although the decision whether to dismiss with or without prejudice remains within the discretion of the trial court, we remind the Government that one of the determining factors in the analysis guiding that discretion is whether the violation of the Act represents an isolated unwitting violation or, alternatively, whether it evidences a pattern of neglect on the Government's part. Taylor, 487 U.S. at 339, 108 S.Ct. at 2420-21; see supra page 814. The district court in this case found an isolated violation, and we have no cause to question that decision based on the facts before us. But we note that if the United States Attorney's Office persists in its ad hoc method of compliance, and if that method leads to more violations of the Act, the Government's lackadaisical attitude toward enforcing Congress's directives could well be used as evidence of a pattern of neglect. See Taylor, 487 U.S. at 338, 108 S.Ct. at 2420.