Opinion ID: 42300
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Presentence Investigation and Sentencing

Text: The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) recommended a base offense level of 33.1 The PSI also noted that the career offender provision, U.S.S.G. §4B1.1, applied because Pyne had two previous, unrelated felony convictions involving crimes of violence, specifically attempted home invasions. Career offender status increased Pyne’s offense level from 33 to 37 and his criminal history category from IV to VI. See U.S.S.G. §4B1.1(b) . The PSI also recommended a three-point offense level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. §3E1.1. With a total offense level of 34 and a criminal history category of VI, 1 The relevant Guidelines are those in effect at the time of Pyne’s sentencing hearing, unless a more lenient punishment would result under the Guidelines effective on the date of Pyne’s offenses. 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(4)(A); United States v. Wilson, 993 F.2d 214, 216 (11th Cir. 1993). The PSI does not mention which Guidelines version was used; however, because Pyne was sentenced on August 19, 2004, he should have been sentenced under the 2003 Guidelines. All Guidelines citations herein are to the 2003 Guidelines. 4 Pyne’s Guidelines range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. Pyne filed no objections to the PSI but moved for a finding that the Guidelines were unconstitutional, based on Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), and seeking to be sentenced without regard to the Guidelines. At sentencing, the district court overruled Pyne’s Blakely objection and found that the attempted home invasions were related, but that the career offender provision still applied because the second offense involved a crime of violence. The district court then effectively granted a downward departure from criminal history category level VI to category IV, finding Pyne’s criminal history was overstated, as follows: Despite my finding of a career offender status in Mr. Pyne’s case, I find that the sentence range of 262 to 327 months overrepresents Mr. Pyne’s criminal history. . . . Mr. Pyne has several incidents of criminal history, but they do not rise to the level in my opinion to support a sentence in that guideline range. We have stolen property less than $100, disorderly conduct, misdemeanor, first one was a misdemeanor, attempted home invasion, and both of the attempted home invasions. . . involved Mr. Pyne entering into a residence that was owned by some family friend or someone that he was close to and knew and that no one was home during either incident. . . . And the first home invasion, he took $255 and a . . . bicycle, and the second he took $85 and a backpack. I can’t find that this rises to the level to support a career offender sentence. . . . And I can’t, in good conscience, sentence someone to even 262 months with that criminal history. So I am going to depart downward from the guideline range in this case, and I do so for those reasons. However, I am guided in the sentence that I am going to impose by the offense level and criminal history category that would apply if Mr. 5 Pyne was not found to be a career offender and that would be an offense level of 33 with a criminal history category of four, sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. Although the government objected to the grant of a downward departure, the district court responded that it was “floored” that the attempted home invasion would qualify as a crime of violence for purposes of Pyne’s criminal history and, when considering that crime and Pyne’s “other criminal history, which consists of nothing but misdemeanors,” the court could not “in good conscience sentence this man to 262 months, and [was] not going to do so.” The district court sentenced Pyne to concurrent sentences of 200 months’ imprisonment for his drug conspiracy offense and 120 months’ imprisonment for his firearms offense. The district court noted that it had “carefully considered the factors set out in 18 U.S.C. [§] 3553[(a)], including the applicable guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” The district court stated that the imposed sentences would sufficiently punish Pyne for his “criminal conduct while also serving as a general and specific deterrent to others who might engage in similar-type conduct.” Pyne and the government appealed. On appeal, Pyne requests that we remand for resentencing, arguing that the district court erred by relying on the 6 Sentencing Guidelines because they were rendered unconstitutional by Booker.2 The government argues that any Booker error was harmless, but maintains that the district court erred by refusing to sentence Pyne as a career offender and by granting the downward departure from criminal history category VI to category IV.