Opinion ID: 1161511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Evidence of abandonment: general principles.

Text: We now consider the propriety of the trial court's finding that all plaintiffs or their predecessors had abandoned their interests in the fugacious minerals underlying section 31. We initially point out that the dominant owner cannot extinguish a profit a prendre by abandonment without the concurrence of two elements, his nonuser and his intent to abandon. We then explain that the trier of fact, before decreeing an abandonment, must find that the owner's conduct clearly and convincingly demonstrates the necessary intent. Following the appropriate precedents, we hold that the evidence does not sufficiently support the trial court's finding that the Gerhard, Solomon, and Mettler plaintiffs had abandoned their interests; we explain that under the circumstances the trial court could not reasonably infer from their conduct in not making use of their property that they intended to abandon it. We affirm the trial court's finding as to the Weber plaintiffs; additional circumstances make reasonable the trial court's inference. [8] We have pointed out, supra, that we cannot differentiate profits a prendre and easements in terms of the legal consequences stemming from ownership. Accordingly, in determining whether defendants have established an abandonment, we may with propriety consider the cases that discuss abandonment of perpetual [24] easements created by grant. [25] [9] `As a general rule, in order to constitute an abandonment of an easement ... there must be a nonuser accompanied by unequivocal and decisive acts on the part of the [dominant tenant], clearly showing an intention to abandon.' ( People v. Southern Pac. Co., supra, 172 Cal. 692, 700.) [26] As other cases point out, however, the owner's nonuser itself may under some circumstances constitute such an act. [10] Where nonuser is evidence of an abandonment of a right, the question is one of intention, depending on the circumstances.... ( Smith v. Worn, supra, 93 Cal. 206, 213.) [27] And while nonuser alone does not extinguish the easement, a long continued nonuser is some evidence of an intent to abandon. ( Home Real Estate Co. v. Los Angeles Pac. Co., supra, 163 Cal. 710, 714 [126 P. 972]; see, e.g., Lake Merced Golf & Country Club v. Ocean Shore R.R. Co., supra, 206 Cal. App.2d 421, 436-437; Ocean Shore R.R. Co. v. Doelger, supra, 179 Cal. App.2d 222, 232; Flanagan v. San Marcos Silk Co., supra, 106 Cal. App.2d 458, 463.) [28] [11] Although [t]he acts of the owner of the dominant tenement, to prevent him from [enjoying] an easement acquired by grant, must be of a character so decisive and conclusive as to indicate a clear intent to abandon the easement ( Smith v. Worn, supra, 93 Cal. 206, 213), the question of abandonment is one for the trier of fact. ( Smith v. Worn, supra, 93 Cal. 206, 213.) It is no doubt true, as claimed by appellant, that mere nonuser, not accompanied by an intent to abandon, will not divest the right of the railroad company to the easement. [Citations.] But in this class of cases as in others, the intention with which an act is done is a question of fact, to be determined by the trial court or jury from a consideration of the conduct of the party and the surrounding circumstances. Where the evidence is such that a finding either way might reasonably be made, the conclusion of the trial court must be upheld under the familiar rule protecting from review on appeal findings based on conflicting evidence. ( Home Real Estate Co. v. Los Angeles Pac. Co. supra, 163 Cal. 710, 714.)