Opinion ID: 1155936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: the argument and fair trial

Text: The prosecutor in his opening statement, after telling the jury that Kay Schmunk enjoyed the status and elegance of being a doctor's wife in what appeared to be a happy marriage, stated: Ladies and gentlemen, there will be a dark counter-current to all of this. The real story.    [What] we are going to present is what was known to the family members and what appeared from time to time on the surface of the marriage, this dark counter-current   .       We have the three of them living alone in their underground home.       Why did he kill her?    [I]t's not important as to guilt or innocence. It has nothing to do with it, but there is a motive. Remember, motive is a fun thing to play with in the back of your heads. I want you to listen for it. I want you to hear the bits and pieces. I'm not going to tell you what it is now. I'll tell you what I think it is in closing.  (Emphasis added.) During examination of the State's witnesses, the prosecutor suggested possible motives. He insinuated that Dr. Schmunk bought a rifle for his girlfriend. He suggested that Dr. Schmunk killed for money, property or the proceeds of an insurance policy. Witnesses testified that Kay Schmunk was planning to leave. Witnesses stated that they believed Dr. Schmunk had killed Kay Schmunk. Then, in closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury, I don't think there is a girlfriend. He said he had not proven that the killing was for money or for revenge or because of jealousy. Then, as promised in his opening statement when he said I'll tell you what I think it is in closing, he said it was his belief that Dr. Schmunk killed his wife because he was a man with a mysterious dark side, a split personality, who because of some mental aberration, put to sleep what was real and imperfect. Appellant contends that the State lifted this theory of the case from a movie, stating in his brief: In the classic 1946 film, The Spiral Staircase, the mystery behind a series of senseless, apparently motiveless, murders is solved for the audience when it is discovered that the murders are not unrelated. Connecting them, explaining them, was the sick logic of their perpetrator, a seemingly gentle professor whom no one would suspect of murder. As he tries to kill the mute girl who attends his invalid mother, the man admits that he is driven by a demented calling. It is not profit that spurs him to murder, nor revenge, nor jealousy: he hates imperfection in the world, and he will kill to eliminate it. The manner in which the State arrived at a theory of the case does not concern us as much as the necessity that there be evidence to support the theory. Here there was none. Not a single witness testified that Dr. Schmunk had a split personality, that there was a dark, mysterious side to him or that he was sick or demented. It was contended, nevertheless, that there was evidence from which inferences could be drawn which would support the argument. We recognized that the prosecuting attorney may draw all legitimate inferences from the evidence when we said: Closing arguments are meant to be just that, arguments premised upon the evidence already submitted to the jury. Prosecutors are no more limited in their closing than defense counsel. They may review the evidence and suggest to the jury inferences based thereon. The purpose of closing arguments is to allow counsel to offer ways of viewing the significance of the evidence. However, there are limits, not only on prosecutors, but on all attorneys. (Citations omitted.) Browder v. State, supra, 639 P.2d 889, 893. See also, Hopkinson v. State, supra, 632 P.2d at 145; 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 337. We look to see if there was evidence from which the jury could infer that there was a dark, mysterious side to Dr. Schmunk and that he was a man with a split personality who could not accept, and therefore killed, what was imperfect. Perhaps that inference could be drawn from the charge by his daughter against Dr. Schmunk in the state of Michigan. The jurors knew that the prosecutor had information about something occurring in Michigan, but they were never told what it was. When the prosecutor said I think he did it because this man has got two diametrically opposed personalities, the jurors could not help but wonder whether the source of the prosecutor's information was this unknown Michigan matter. But we have held it error to have admitted this evidence. Perhaps when the jury learned that he refused, under all circumstances, to take a lie detector test, such inference might be drawn. But we have held it error to have admitted that evidence. Perhaps when Billy said he suspected Dr. Schmunk of having killed his mother, that would support an inference of his dark side. But it was error to admit that evidence. And, when Mrs. Schmunk's relatives testified that Kay was leaving him to return to Michigan, the jury might infer that she was leaving because of his dark, mysterious side; but that evidence we have held also inadmissible. The above evidence was admitted and was before the jury at the time of argument. The prosecutor could not know that it would later be held by us to have been erroneously admitted. Where improperly admitted hearsay evidence is commented upon in argument, it cannot be said to be improper because it was based on the evidence [citation] but seriously aggravated the error committed in admitting the evidence. State v. Perelli, 125 Conn. 321, 5 A.2d 705, 707, 121 A.L.R. 1357 (1939). Perhaps his argument was proper at the time, although we doubt that this evidence would support an inference that Dr. Schmunk had a split or dual personality and, therefore, killed what was imperfect. It is generally held that an expression of knowledge, opinion or belief, not based upon or shown by the evidence at trial, either expressly or inferentially is improper and prejudicial error. 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 261; 50 A.L.R.2d 773. The policy and reasons for the rule are that the statement complained of injects into the case irrelevant and inadmissible matter or a fact not legally produced in evidence, and adds to the probative force of the testimony adduced upon the trial the weight of the prosecutor's personal influence or knowledge, or of his professional opinion, or the influence of his official position. (Footnotes omitted.) 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial § 261. There was no other evidence from which these inferences could be drawn or which would support the argument of the prosecutor. The prosecuting attorney is the representative of the state of Wyoming. Thus we have said: The role of the prosecuting attorney in a criminal case `differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict.' ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-13 (1980). Browder v. State, supra, 639 P.2d at 893. And, in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), the court said a state is the representative of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor  indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or less degree, has confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insinuations, and, especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much weight against the accused when they should properly carry none. Appellant did not object to the prosecutor's argument. An objection, however, is not necessary where the transgression is plain error. In Browder v. State, supra, 639 P.2d at 895, we said: In determining whether plain error has occurred, the facts of the case must be viewed in light of the trial record as a whole and not as to whether any one single incident standing alone would be reversible. United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2nd Cir.1970). This cumulative-effect approach has been applied in numerous cases. In particular, it was used by the United States Supreme Court in Berger, supra. Reviewing the entire record in this case, it is clear that the fairness of appellant's trial was called into question by the prosecutor's conduct. (Emphasis added.) We have previously discussed the doctrine of plain error. The cumulative effect of error in admission of evidence and testimony utilized in the prosecutor's argument and the argument itself makes clear that it was plain error. We believe that sending the edited videotape to the jury room with Dr. Schmunk's adamant refusal to submit to a lie detector test and the admission of the hearsay statements of Kay Schmunk were prejudicial error in themselves sufficient to require reversal. We are convinced that the cumulative effect of putting before the jury inadmissible evidence of an unknown charge against Dr. Schmunk from Michigan, his refusal to take a lie detector test, testimony of witnesses that they suspected Dr. Schmunk had killed Kay Schmunk, testimony of Kay Schmunk's uncommunicated thoughts of leaving Dr. Schmunk, and then capping it all with the argument here presented, was to deprive Dr. Schmunk of a fair trial. Thus, our deep and abiding conviction that loyalty to our constitution and its provisions guaranteeing to everyone a fair trial, requires reversal of this case.