Opinion ID: 2174563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility of previous assaults on the complainant

Text: Gefroh's first issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed reversible error by allowing Kim to testify regarding a previous assault on her by Gefroh. We hold that it was not reversible error and affirm the trial court on this issue. At pretrial conference on the day of trial, the State alerted the trial court and opposing counsel that it intended to question Kim about previous assaults on her by Gefroh. Gefroh's counsel objected to the introduction of such evidence as violative of Rules 402 and 403, N.D.R.Ev. [2] He asserted that the evidence was too stale, highly prejudicial, and not relevant to the case. The State countered by citing Rule 404(b), N.D.R.Ev., which allows the limited use of prior bad acts for purposes other than proof of the present charge. [3] After hearing arguments from both parties, the trial court decided to allow the testimony, but limited it to only one instance, in the summer of 1990, in which the authorities were involved and Gefroh was criminally charged: So I'm going to permit the witness, Kim Getzlaff, to testify, but in a limited manner, Mr. Olson. I don't want any testimony as to any criminal charge. I don't want any testimony of the sentence of the disposition of that charge. She may testify that she had been struck or he had made prior threats in the relationship, that, in fact, she reported that to authorities if, in fact, she did or it came to the attention of authorities. On appeal, Gefroh continues to assert that the evidence is highly prejudicial, irrelevant, and stale under Rules 402 and 403, N.D.R.Ev. We disagree. The standard for appellate review of trial court rulings admitting evidence under Rules 402 and 403 is well-established. The determination of whether or not evidence is relevant, and the balancing of the evidence's probative value against its prejudicial effect are also matters for the trial court to resolve in the exercise of its sound discretion. See [ State v. ] Huwe, [413 N.W.2d 350 (N.D.1987)]; State v. Schimmel, 409 N.W.2d 335 (N.D.1987); State v. Kringstad, 353 N.W.2d 302 (N.D.1984). On appeal, we will not overturn a trial court's decision regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence on the ground of relevancy unless the trial court abused its discretion. See [ State v. ] Haugen, [448 N.W.2d 191 (N.D.1989)]; State v. Newnam, 409 N.W.2d 79 (N.D.1987); State v. Olson, 290 N.W.2d 664 (N.D.1980). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable manner. State v. Kunkel, 452 N.W.2d 337 (N.D.1990); State v. Erban, 429 N.W.2d 408 (N.D.1988). State v. Haugen, 458 N.W.2d 288, 291 (N.D.1990). See also First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Brakken, 468 N.W.2d 633, 636 (N.D.1991); State v. Martinsons, 462 N.W.2d 458, 460 (N.D.1990). We find no abuse of discretion in this instance. The trial court considered the arguments of both parties before ruling on the admissibility of the previous assaults on Kim by Gefroh. Furthermore, it limited the evidence to one incident, even though Kim claimed there were several. The trial court did not allow the State to delve into graphic details of the assault, but only to use the evidence as a brief background of the relationship between Kim and Gefroh. [4] The decision to allow the previous assault was not arbitrary, unconscionable, or unreasonable. Additionally, the trial court based its decision to admit the evidence on Rule 404(b). The testimony of Gefroh's previous assault on Kim is admissible under the standards of that rule as well. In State v. Stevens, 238 N.W.2d 251 (N.D.1975), this Court scrutinized the admissibility of prior crimes or bad acts under Rule 404(b). At the outset, we stated that evidence of prior acts or crimes cannot be received unless it is substantially relevant for some purpose other than to show a probability that a defendant committed a crime charged because he is a man of criminal character. Id. at 257. The analysis went on to recognize exceptions to the general rule, allowing proof of other acts and offenses to show motive, intent, identity, scheme, or plan, and to show absence of mistake or accident. Id. The Stevens opinion continued by enumerating criteria to be considered whenever Rule 404(b) is invoked. First, a much stricter showing of relevancy is required to prove identity or the doing of the criminal act by the accused, than when it is offered to prove knowledge, intent, or state of mind. Id. Next, there must be substantial evidence of prior similar acts, and the evidence must be clear and convincing. Id. Third, there must be proof of commission of the crime charged. Id. Finally, the question is one of balancing the aims of full disclosure and fairness to the defendant where they are in conflict. The basic question is fundamental fairness.... [T]he problem is not one of pigeonholing, but of balancing, of discretion rather than following a rule. Id. at 257-58. Under these criteria, admission of Gefroh's previous assault on Kim was proper. Evidence of the prior bad act was clear and convincing because Gefroh had been criminally convicted for the assault. Furthermore, proof of the terrorizing charge itself was abundant. Lastly, the trial court balanced full disclosure with fairness to Gefroh and found disclosure of the charged assault to be the best alternative under the rule. The evidence of a previous assault was properly admitted to show Gefroh's intent or state of mind, and to give meaning to his threatening words. The evidence provided a more complete story of the crime by putting it in context of happenings near in time and place. State v. Biby, 366 N.W.2d 460, 463 (N.D.1985) (quoting State v. Frye, 245 N.W.2d 878, 883 (N.D.1976)).