Opinion ID: 2061056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Timeliness of Mrs. Whitten's appeals.

Text: As we have noted, on March 19 a judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff Mrs. Packard against Defendant Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola for $90,000. Her complaint against Fern's was ordered dismissed and no order was made on the cross-claims. This was the first of a confusing series of judgments the validity of which will determine the timeliness of Mrs. Whitten's appeals. From which should Mrs. Whitten's time for appeal run? Time periods for appeals, for motions, for new trials and for relief from a judgment (M.R.C.P. Rules 73(a), 59 (b) and (e) and 60(b)) are tied to the time of entry of the judgment. (Future references to rules by number refer to the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure). The verdicts of the jury were special verdicts in the nature of answers to interrogatories. Rule 49(a). In such cases it becomes the duty of the Presiding Justice to direct judgments to be entered which are in accord with the jury's answers to the interrogatories. Rule 58; Field, McKusick and Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 58.4. The Clerk is authorized to enter judgment only in cases where general verdicts were returned. Field, McKusick and Wroth, supra, § 58.3. The March 19 judgment was entered by the Clerk and not ordered by the Justice and was thus invalid. On April 9 judgmentssimilarly invalid were entered by the Clerk in favor of Fern's against the Plaintiffs Tappers and Louries and the other two cross-claimants and for Mrs. Packard against Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola in the amount of $90,000. On April 17 the Justice ordered judgment for Mrs. Packard against Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola and for Coca-Cola against Mrs. Whitten for contribution in accordance with the decree with which this judgment was filed. In this decree (labelled Facts) the Justice stated that he had concluded that he should reverse his position at trial and adopt the principle of comparative contribution and so he ordered judgment for Coca-Cola on its cross-claim for contribution in the amount of $67,500 plus 75% of the costs. This was the first validly ordered judgment for Mrs. Packard and on apportionment of contribution and Mrs. Whitten's time for appeal started running at this pointApril 17and Mrs. Whitten's appeal was not filed within 30 days from this date. However, on May 9 the Justice filed amendments to these Findings of Fact and to this judgment in which he repeated the judgment for Coca-Cola against Mrs. Whitten for $67,500 plus 75% of the costs on its cross-claim and added a judgment for Mrs. Whitten against Coca-Cola for $22,500 on its cross-claim. On May 9 he also ordered filed an amended judgment for Fern's against the three Plaintiffs and against Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola on contribution. It is agreed that Mrs. Whitten's appeal, although filed on June 9, is (for reasons which do not concern us here) to be considered as filed within 30 days of May 9. But was the May 9 judgment valid? The importance of achieving finality in litigation is recognized by the Rules. Rule 59(e) authorizes a Justice to amend his judgment on motion brought within 10 days, a time limitation which was not met here. Rule 60(a) makes provision for correction of clerical mistakes in judgments at any time by the court on its own initiative but this amendment could not be considered the correction of a clerical mistake. Rule 60(b) authorizes the court on motion brought within a reasonable time to relieve a party from a judgment for certain enumerated reasons and (subsection (6)) for any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. We consider that the Rule is not intended to prohibit the court from acting on its own motion in some appropriate situations but requires notice and hearing in cases where the invalidating of the judgment depends upon determination of facts. Willette v. Umhoeffer, Me., 245 A.2d 540 (1968). No such notice and hearing were necessary here. In his April 17 findings and judgment the Justice had carefully and thoroughly explained the reasoning from which he had concluded that although each Defendant was liable to Mrs. Packard for the full amount of the verdict, the one who paid the full amount of the verdict or more than his proportional part (if one did) should be entitled to contribution from the other in the amount represented by that other's percentage of the total causal negligence of the Defendants. The amended finding was structured to achieve this result and it was within the discretionary power of the Justice to add it to his previous judgment. Sleek v. J. C. Penney Company, Inc., (3rd Cir. 1961) 292 F.2d 256; Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1329. (At the time the Justice filed the May 9 amended judgment just discussed he also filed the first valid judgmentalso called an amended judgmentfor Fern's against Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola on their cross-claims for contribution.) Mrs. Whitten's appeal of June 9 is addressed to the judgment of May 9 (There were two. Both referred to contribution as to Mrs. Packard) but the appeal recited arguendo that this judgment incorporates all prior judgments and findings of fact in civil docket nos. 3841, 3900, 3901 and 4037 and the judgments incorporated therein by reference in all cross-claims and counterclaims. The judgment itself made no such reference. The three Plaintiffs argue that this judgment in no way concerned their interests which had been determined in the previous judgment, the appealable time as to which had long since expired. Did the Justice's May 9 judgments result in a new running of Mrs. Whitten's 30 days for appeal? We find no helpful authority on the point and counsel have suggested none. Rule 73(a) permits the Justice to extend the time for appeal 30 days upon a showing of excusable neglect. If Mrs. Whitten's counsel had sought such an extension based upon a claim that he had considered the amended decree to have supplanted the earlier one, the Justice would have been justified in granting the extension, in view of the novelty of the issue. Mrs. Whitten's appeal would then have been within such a 30 day extension. Certainly the better practice would have been for Mrs. Whitten to have filed a notice of appeal from the previous (April 17) judgment rather than to rely on the amendment. However, the situation is novel under our rules and we are constrained to resolve this issue in favor of the appellant. Mrs. Whitten's appeal was timely as to Mrs. Packard's judgment, as to the judgment for contribution on Mrs. Packard's damages and as to Fern's judgment of May 9 concerning contribution. On March 26 the Justice did order a judgment entered for the Louries and Tappers against Mrs. Whitten and Coca-Cola on liability only and for Fern's against the Louries and Tappers. This was a valid judgment. The Justice's amended judgment of May 9 in no way affected this March 26 judgment. Mrs. Whitten's appeal of June 9 was too late as to this March 26 judgment in favor of the Louries and Tappers.