Opinion ID: 795431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Post-SARA Liability: Cost Recovery and Contribution Actions

Text: 24 Following the passage of SARA and the inclusion of § 113 in CERCLA (which specifically provides contribution rights), courts retreated from implied causes of action for PRPs to seek contribution under § 107(a). Instead, they interpreted §§ 107 and 113 as establishing two clearly distinct remedies: cost recovery under § 107(a), and contribution under § 113(f). See, e.g., Cooper Indus., 543 U.S. at 163 & n. 3, 125 S.Ct. 577; Morton Int'l, 343 F.3d at 675 (Accordingly, CERCLA and SARA together create two legal actions by which parties that have incurred costs associated with cleanups can recover some or all of those costs: (1) Section 107 cost recovery actions; and (2) Section 113 contribution actions.). 25 In New Castle County, we determined that a cost recovery action under § 107 is not available to a PRP. 4 Rather, a section 107 action brought for recovery of costs may be brought only by innocent parties that have undertaken clean-ups. An action brought by a potentially responsible person is by necessity a section 113 action for contribution. New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1120 (second emphasis added). We based our conclusion on the understanding that, although § 107 is not limited by its terms to innocent parties, the section was designed to enable innocent persons who incur expenses cleaning up a site to recover their costs from potentially responsible persons, and thus a potentially responsible person does not experience section 107 injury and cannot obtain section 107 relief. Id. at 1122. 5 Indeed, because § 107 imposes strict, joint, and several liability on all PRPs for the costs of cleanup, a PRP allowed to bring a cost recovery action under § 107 against another PRP could recoup all of its expenditures regardless of fault — which, we noted, strains logic. Id. at 1120-21 (emphasis in original). Moreover, we concluded that it made little sense to allow a PRP the choice of proceeding under either § 107 or § 113, because parties would always choose § 107 (which allows recovery based on joint and several liability with a six-year statute of limitations) over § 113 (which allows recovery based on equitable apportionment of costs with a three-year statute of limitations), thus render[ing] section 113 a nullity. Id. at 1123. 6 26 In Reading, decided a few weeks after New Castle County, we held that a PRP also may not invoke the pre-SARA implied cause of action for contribution under § 107. 7 Examining the legislative history of § 113, we noted that the section was intended to `clarif[y] and confirm[ ] the right of a person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek contribution from other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances.' Reading, 115 F.3d at 1119 (quoting S.Rep. No. 99-11, at 44 (1985)) (alterations in original); see also New Castle County, 111 F.3d at 1122 (same, quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-253(I), at 79 (1985), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1986 pp. 2835, 2861). Based on the statute's language, the legislative history, relevant case law, and the fact that § 113(f)(1) specifically permits an action for contribution to be brought `in the absence of a civil action under ... section [107],' Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120 (alterations in original), 8 we held that, [i]n passing § 113(f), Congress acted to codify existing federal common law and to replace the judicially crafted measure with an express statutory remedy. Id. at 1119. 27 Thus we concluded that Congress intended § 113 to be the sole means for seeking contribution. Id. at 1120 (emphasis added). It replaced the judicially created right to contribution under § 107(a)(4)(B) with an express (and exclusive) statutory remedy, id. at 1119, and also superseded common law remedies: 28 [W]hen Congress expressly created a statutory right of contribution in CERCLA § 113(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f), it made that remedy a part of an elaborate settlement scheme aimed at the efficient resolution of environmental disputes. Permitting independent common law remedies would create a path around the statutory settlement scheme, raising an obstacle to the intent of Congress. We conclude therefore that [the plaintiff's] common law claims are preempted by CERCLA § 113(f). 29 Id. at 1117. 30 In so holding, we acknowledged dicta in the Supreme Court's decision in Key Tronic that § 107 unquestionably provides a cause of action for private parties to seek recovery of cleanup costs, 511 U.S. at 818, 114 S.Ct. 1960, and that CERCLA expressly authorizes a cause of action for contribution in § 113 and impliedly authorizes a similar and somewhat overlapping remedy in § 107, id. at 816, 114 S.Ct. 1960. See Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120. We determined, however, that the overlap consisted of the fact that (as New Castle County held) an innocent private party (most likely a landowner who purchased land that had been contaminated by others) may bring a cost recovery action under § 107 holding a PRP jointly and severally liable for the full cost of the cleanup. Reading, 115 F.3d at 1120. The fact, however, that a direct action might be brought under § 107(a) [by an innocent landowner against a PRP] does not open the door for [the] PRP to bring an action for contribution [against other PRPs] under that same section. Id. 31 In sum, after SARA introduced the § 113 contribution provision, our Court and other courts concluded that §§ 107 and 113 were complementary (but not really overlapping, as the Supreme Court had suggested in Key Tronic ) remedies. Section 107 allowed the Government or an innocent landowner to recover the full cost of cleanup from a PRP on the basis of strict, joint, and several liability. The PRP could then seek contribution from other PRPs under § 113(f)(1). Moreover, according to the understanding at that time (as intimated in Reading ), § 113(f)(1) allowed a PRP to seek contribution even in the absence of an action under § 106 or § 107; in other words, a PRP that voluntarily cleaned up a contaminated site sua sponte could seek contribution from other PRPs without waiting for an enforcement action, a Government or innocent-landowner cost recovery suit, or a settlement of liability.