Opinion ID: 498417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the District Court Properly Considered Laws' Vietnam Experience.

Text: 42 We find the district court erred in another significant respect. In his habeas corpus petition, Laws argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence relating to his time spent in Vietnam and its effect on him. The State argued before the district court, and argues here, that Laws may not raise his Vietnam experience argument in federal court. The State maintains that because Laws failed to raise an issue concerning Vietnam either during his Rule 27.26 litigation in Missouri state court or on appeal from the denial of Rule 27.26 relief, this claim is subject to procedural default and alternatively, that the claim is unexhausted because the Missouri courts have not been provided with a fair opportunity to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his claim of ineffective counsel. 43 The district court found, however, that the exhaustion rule was not a bar to consideration of Laws' claims. 9 Although the court noted that Laws had not raised an argument concerning his Vietnam experience before the state courts, it nonetheless found that argument to be part and parcel of Laws' claims concerning mental health and family testimony. The court concluded that [e]ither type of evidence [mental health evidence or the testimony of relatives] could have elicited information regarding petitioner's military service or his pre-service and post-service well-being. Mem.Op. at 19-20. The district court, in sum, held that because evidence regarding Laws' military service and its effect on him could have surfaced through evidence as to his general mental health or through the testimony of family members, that the Vietnam claim was part and parcel of both the mental health and family testimony claims, and thus the claim had been exhausted and was properly before the district court. 44 We believe this issue requires a more thorough examination. The total exhaustion rule was first announced in Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). Under this rule, every claim raised in the petitioner's federal habeas corpus petition must be exhausted before the federal court can review the merits of any claim in the petition. There are two independent steps to exhausting a claim. First, the petitioner must have fairly presented the federal constitutional dimensions of his federal habeas corpus claim to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b). If the petitioner has not fairly presented the federal constitutional dimensions of his claim to the state courts, he will still meet the exhaustion requirement if there are no currently available, non-futile state remedies through which he can present the federal constitutional dimensions of his claim to the state courts. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) and (c). Thus, the question with respect to exhaustion is not merely whether [the petitioner] has in the past presented his federal claim to the state courts, but also whether there is, under the law of Missouri, any presently available state procedure for the determination of the merits of that claim. Thomas v. Wyrick, 622 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir.1980). 45 With this background in mind, we must determine whether Laws' Vietnam experience argument is indeed part and parcel of the mental health claim he properly raised in the state courts. In other words, we must decide whether his Vietnam experience claim has been fairly presented to the state courts. This issue must be resolved as a matter of federal law, not state law. Rodgers v. Wyrick, 621 F.2d 921, 927 (8th Cir.1980). 46 The purpose of the fair presentation component of the exhaustion requirement is to give the state courts the first opportunity to review federal constitutional issues and to correct federal constitutional errors made by the state's trial courts. Thus, a petitioner need give only the substance of his claim to the state courts. But to do so, the petitioner must include the same facts and legal theories to the state court that he seeks to present to the federal court so that the state court can apply the controlling legal principles to the facts bearing upon his federal constitutional claim. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277, 92 S.Ct. 509, 513, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). To reiterate, the petitioner must have informed the state court of both the factual and the legal premises of the claim he asserts in federal court. Daye v. Attorney General of State of New York, 696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir.1982) (en banc). (Emphasis added.) 47 We accept that the legal basis for Laws' Vietnam experience claim is the same as was before the state courts. Throughout the Rule 27.26 litigation and in the federal courts, Laws has claimed a denial of effective assistance of trial counsel, in contravention of the sixth amendment, as a result of inadequate effort by counsel to investigate his mental state. In this respect, a claim that Laws' psychiatric condition was heavily influenced by his time in Vietnam is indeed part and parcel of his claim as to ineffective assistance of counsel. 48 Whether the factual basis for this claim was before the state courts is a different matter, however. It is well-settled that a petitioner must present the state courts with precisely the same factual underpinnings of his federal constitutional argument that the petitioner wishes to use to support his claim in his federal habeas corpus petition. Thus, if in federal court the petitioner relies on facts that give the case a significantly different and stronger evidentiary posture than it had when the state courts considered it, the state courts must be given an opportunity to consider the evidence. Joyner v. King, 786 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 653, 93 L.Ed.2d 708 (1986). 49 The Sixth Circuit undertook an extensive survey of cases on this subject in Sampson v. Love, 782 F.2d 53 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 159, 93 L.Ed.2d 98 (1986). The court found cases from the First, Second, Fifth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits, all holding that where a habeas corpus petitioner presents new facts to the federal court that were not presented to the state courts, the petition should be dismissed to give the state courts the first opportunity to consider the claim in light of the new facts. Domaingue v. Butterworth, 641 F.2d 8 (1st Cir.1981) (petitioner's 'ineffective assistance of counsel' claim depended in large measure on factual allegations outside the record on direct appeal to the state courts); United States ex rel. Boodie v. Herold, 349 F.2d 372 (2d Cir.1965) (The state courts have not been given any opportunity to pass upon these important [constitutional] questions in the light of all the relevant facts); Brown v. Estelle, 701 F.2d 494 (5th Cir.1983) (The state courts must have had an opportunity to pass on the claim in light of a full record and where the factual basis for a claim was not presented to the state courts, the claim is unexhausted); Schiers v. People of State of California, 333 F.2d 173 (9th Cir.1964) (state remedies had not been exhausted because petitioner's contention rests upon a cumulation of many asserted delinquencies not heretofore presented to the state courts); Jones v. Hess, 681 F.2d 688 (10th Cir.1982) (A federal claim is unexhausted where it presents 'a materially different claim and stronger evidentiary case' than was before the state court). 50 This court reached the same conclusion in Stranghoener v. Black, 720 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir.1983). In Stranghoener, the petitioner claimed that his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and alleged several factual reasons why it was not voluntary; e.g., drugs and ineffective assistance of counsel. Some of these factual reasons were not presented to the state courts. The Stranghoener court held that the petitioner had not fairly presented the involuntary guilty plea claim to the state courts because of the different factual basis for the claim. The court ruled: we hold that a federal claim is not 'fairly presented' to the state courts when factual allegations significantly affecting the determination of that claim are raised for the first time in federal court. Stranghoener, 720 F.2d at 1007. See also Tyler v. Wyrick, 730 F.2d 1209, 1210 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 838, 105 S.Ct. 138, 83 L.Ed.2d 78 (1984). 51 Laws' argument concerning his Vietnam experience falls squarely within the reasoning of these cases. The argument concerns Laws' service record, including in its scope facts about his combat experience, his citations received for duty, and his discharge record. As the State points out, the argument also opens the door to cross-examination as to facts about Laws' drug usage while in the service, an auto theft charge, and an AWOL conviction. The argument also concerns Laws' mental state, including in its scope facts about his personality before and after his military service, revealed through psychological tests and family perceptions. Introduction of these facts opens the door to cross-examination as to whether Laws' disturbed mental state resulted not from his time in Vietnam but from his more than six years in prison. None of these facts were before the state courts. The state courts were never presented with or given the opportunity to consider a Vietnam experience claim. Accordingly, Laws' many factual allegations concerning Vietnam make his claim a different one from that presented to the state courts. We therefore hold that Laws has not properly exhausted this claim in the state court system. 52 The next step in our analysis is to determine whether there are any currently available, non-futile state remedies through which Laws can present his claim to the state courts. If such avenues exist, we must dismiss Laws' petition. He would then have the option of either returning to state court to present his unexhausted claims, or amending his petition to delete the unexhausted claims, then resubmitting to the federal court the fully exhausted petition. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982). Our study of Missouri law leads us to conclude that such a state remedy is not available to Laws. In Eaton v. Wyrick, 528 F.2d 477, 482 (8th Cir.1975), this court stated that [o]nly after some clear manifestation on the record that a state court will not entertain petitioner's constitutional claims even if fairly presented will the exhaustion requirement be disregarded as futile. Accord, Smallwood v. Missouri Board of Probation and Parole, 587 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.1978); Rodgers v. Wyrick, 621 F.2d 921, 925 (8th Cir.1980). 53 In Lindner v. Wyrick, 644 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 872, 102 S.Ct. 345, 70 L.Ed.2d 178 (1981), this court examined this issue under Missouri law in the context of a successive Rule 27.26 motion. The court noted that Missouri courts have strictly construed the provision in Rule 27.26 that a second motion to vacate a sentence shall not be entertained when the grounds in the second motion could have been raised in the original motion. Lindner, 644 F.2d at 726-27. Under Missouri law, the result of the proceeding on the first post-conviction motion forecloses both those claims which were alleged and those claims which could have been alleged but were not. Furthermore, where the defendant possessed information upon which the second motion was based at the time when he filed the first motion, an allegation as to ineffective assistance of counsel in preparing the first post-conviction motion will not afford a basis for a second post-conviction motion. Id. at 727 n. 4. The Lindner court, however, recognizing that Rule 27.26 does not necessarily and absolutely foreclose a state court from entertaining a second or successive post-conviction motion, reaffirmed the Eaton rule requiring a clear indication in the state record that further state proceedings would be futile before abandoning the exhaustion requirement. Because Missouri law governing successive Rule 27.26 motions is clear, and because we find an equally clear indication in the state record that such a motion would not be heard in this case, we conclude that no point would be served by sending Laws back to state court to attempt to gain a hearing on this issue. 54 As we read the record, it is indisputable that Laws' argument relating to Vietnam was available to him and his counsel when he made his Rule 27.26 motion. In an affidavit prepared in support of his federal habeas petition, Laws stated: During my trial preparation for the Williams case, [trial counsel] and I discussed very briefly my service in the army and in Vietnam from 1967 to 1970. I told him I had an honorable discharge. He never asked me about it again. During his closing argument of the punishment phase of Laws' trial, Laws' counsel mentioned that Laws had spent time in Vietnam: when I was in Vietnam, I killed somebody. Okay, I killed somebody. I had to. Leonard Laws was in Vietnam. I killed somebody in those circumstances and I can remember the day, March 17th. Tr. Vol. II at 808. We also note that the Missouri trial judge who sentenced Laws was aware that Laws had been in Vietnam. The trial judge had before him the report of the presentence investigation on Laws, which revealed that Laws had spent time in Vietnam and had been honorably discharged from the United States Army. 55 The foregoing leads us to conclude that Laws had available to him the Vietnam experience claim at the time of his first Rule 27.26 motion, and that under Missouri law, a successive Rule 27.26 motion on this ground would not be granted and is therefore futile. 56 Because we conclude that Laws has no currently available state remedies, we proceed to the next step in the analysis. Because Laws' Vietnam experience claim was not fairly presented to the state courts, nor can it now be, we examine whether Laws can demonstrate (1) adequate cause to excuse his failure to raise the claim in state court properly, and if he can show such cause, then he must also show (2) actual prejudice to his defense resulting from the state court's failure to address the merits of the claim. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). 57 The fact that defense counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it does not constitute cause. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986). Attorney error or inadvertence short of ineffective assistance of counsel does not constitute cause. Instead, the existence of cause must ordinarily turn on whether the petitioner can show that some objective factor external to the defense impeded counsel's efforts to comply with the state procedural rule. Id. 106 S.Ct. at 2645-46. A defendant represented by an attorney whose performance is not constitutionally ineffective under Strickland bears the risk of attorney error that results in a procedural default. The cause recognized by the Murray Court was cause that would be in itself an independent ground for relief, justifying habeas corpus relief. 10 In summary, allegations and proof of cause must rise to the level of constitutionally-cognizable ineffective assistance of counsel before the cause prong of Wainwright v. Sykes is met. Murray v. Carrier, 106 S.Ct. at 2644-46; Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). Such a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must be first presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default. Murray v. Carrier, 106 S.Ct. at 2646. 58 Laws has presented no reasons whatsoever for his failure to raise the Vietnam experience claim in state court. Moreover, he has made no allegations of ineffectiveness of counsel against any of his appellate counsel. We therefore conclude that Laws has not shown cause for his failure to raise his Vietnam experience claim in state court. In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary for us to examine whether Laws suffered prejudice to his defense as a result of that failure. 59 To summarize, we hold that because Laws failed to raise his Vietnam experience claim before the state courts, and cannot demonstrate adequate cause for that failure, that claim was not cognizable on federal habeas corpus review, and it was error for the district court to consider it. 60