Opinion ID: 1058775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preemption and Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

Text: The first question we address is whether, after the Act, TCV can bring common law and statutory claims for conspiracy against Louis Latour. To preclude these claims, the Act must abrogate common law conspiracy and repeal expressly or by implication a claim for statutory conspiracy. A common law conspiracy consists of two or more persons combined to accomplish, by some concerted action, some criminal or unlawful purpose or some lawful purpose by a criminal or unlawful means. Commercial Business Sys. v. BellSouth Servs., 249 Va. 39, 48, 453 S.E.2d 261, 267 (1995) (citing Hechler Chevrolet v. General Motors Corp., 230 Va. 396, 402, 337 S.E.2d 744, 748 (1985) and Werth v. Fire Adjust. Bureau, 160 Va. 845, 855, 171 S.E. 255, 259 (1933)). When one party to a contract conspires with a third party to induce the breach of the contract, an action for conspiracy will lie. Worrie v. Boze, 198 Va. 533, 95 S.E.2d 192 (1956). The question whether a statute abrogates the common law is resolved by familiar principles: The common law will not be considered as altered or changed by statute unless the legislative intent is plainly manifested. A statutory change in the common law is limited to that which is expressly stated or necessarily implied because the presumption is that no change was intended. When an enactment does not encompass the entire subject covered by the common law, it abrogates the common-law rule only to the extent that its terms are directly and irreconcilably opposed to the rule. Couplin v. Payne, 270 Va. 129, 136, 613 S.E.2d 592, 595 (2005) (citing Boyd v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 346, 349, 374 S.E.2d 301, 302 (1988)). See also Schlegel v. Bank of America, 271 Va. 542, 553-55, 628 S.E.2d 362, 368 (2006) (only those common law claims fall[ing] squarely within the confines of an applicable statute are preempted thereby). Statutory conspiracy is defined in Code § 18.2-499(A), which states in pertinent part: Any two or more persons who combine, associate, agree, mutually undertake or concert together for the purpose of (i) willfully and maliciously injuring another in his reputation, trade, business or profession by any means whatever . . . . Code § 18.2-500 provides that a party aggrieved by a violation of Code § 18.2-499 may obtain civil relief in the form of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. The implied repeal of an earlier statute by a later enactment is not favored. There is a presumption against a legislative intent to repeal where the later statute does not amend the former or refer expressly to it. Sexton v. Cornett, 271 Va. 251, 257, 623 S.E.2d 898, 901 (2006) (citing Albemarle County v. Marshall, 215 Va. 756, 761, 214 S.E.2d 146, 150 (1975)). More specifically, a later act does not by implication repeal an earlier act unless there is such a clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, positive, unavoidable, and irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy, that the two acts cannot . . . be reconciled. Boulevard Bridge Corp. v. City of Richmond, 203 Va. 212, 218, 123 S.E.2d 636, 640 (1962). Therefore, even if the Act contained language that created an apparent conflict with the civil conspiracy statute, we would be bound, if reasonably possible, to give them such a construction as [would] give force and effect to each. Sexton, 271 Va. at 257, 623 S.E.2d at 901 (citing Scott v. Lichford, 164 Va. 419, 422-23, 180 S.E. 393, 394 (1935)). The provisions of the Act address specific conduct by which a winery or a wine wholesaler might unlawfully breach its franchise agreement; however, it does not expressly address the law of conspiracy. The Act is applicable only to agreements between wineries and wine wholesalers. Code § 4.1-402. It sets forth no rights or remedies concerning third parties, such as other wine wholesalers, that are not parties to a particular franchise agreement. In accordance with this distinction, the hearing panel dismissed any complaints pertaining to conduct by Virginia Distributing and Select Wines because they were not parties against which relief may be granted under the Act. Louis Latour argues that TCV's motion for judgment amounts to nothing more than garden variety violations of the Act that have been dressed up for a separate civil action. In this case, TCV's motion for judgment plainly alleges numerous violations of the Act which also are the basis for its conspiracy allegations. Most significantly, TCV conceded to the trial court that the illegality that is underlying this, Your Honor, is based upon specific provisions of the . . . Act. Louis Latour maintains that because the wrongful conduct supporting the conspiracy claims arose from the Act, there can be no remedies except those provided in the Act. The Act prohibits certain conduct and provides remedies for such violations. However, the Act does not address conspiracy to commit such violations. We noted the distinction between the conspiracy to commit a wrongful act and the act itself in Worrie: The cause of action against Worrie for the breach of his contract involved the acts and conduct of Worrie alone. No conspiracy with Baily, or anyone else, was necessary to maintain that action. Mere proof of the breach by Worrie was sufficient. On the other hand, the cause of action against Worrie in the present suit is based upon his alleged tort in conspiring with Baily to breach the Worrie contract. Here the plaintiffs were required to prove something more than the mere breach by Worrie. An essential element in the present case, absent in the first, is the alleged conspiracy between Worrie and Baily, as the result of which Worrie was induced to breach his contract. 198 Va. at 539, 95 S.E.2d at 197. TCV's administrative complaint against Louis Latour is limited to the question whether Louis Latour's conduct violated the Act. The civil action contains allegations that Louis Latour conspired with others to commit violations of the Act. TCV maintains that the Act does not address actions for conspiracy nor does it have the power to grant relief against the other wine wholesalers. The discrete question we must address is whether a conspiracy action based upon a wrong arising from the provisions of the Act may be maintained outside of and in addition to the administrative proceedings before the ABC Board. A legislative intent to supplant a common law action for conspiracy is not plainly manifested in the Act. Nothing in the Act explicitly or implicitly prohibits a statutory conspiracy action based upon conduct declared wrongful by the Act. As clearly exhibited in Worrie, the wrongful act and a conspiracy to commit the wrongful act are two separate causes of action. The violation of the Act is covered by the Act, but a conspiracy to violate the Act is not. We cannot say that there is clear, manifest, controlling, necessary, positive, unavoidable, and irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy between the Act and a civil action for statutory conspiracy such that the two cannot be reconciled. Boulevard Bridge, 203 Va. at 218, 123 S.E.2d at 640. The conclusion that the Act does not preempt a common law conspiracy claim or a statutory conspiracy claim is further supported by the language of the Act itself which define[s] certain rights and remedies, and establishes conditions for wine distribution to the full extent consistent with the laws and Constitutions of the Commonwealth and the United States. Code §§ 4.1-400(3) and (4) (emphasis added). Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred in holding that, on these facts, the Act preempted or abrogated a civil action for statutory conspiracy and common law conspiracy against Louis Latour.