Opinion ID: 682770
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Fourth Amendment Violation

Text: 48 The majority opinion discusses at great length Bloomfield's argument that his seizure was a de facto arrest executed without probable cause. By contrast, it only briefly discusses whether the trooper had reasonable suspicion to detain and question Bloomfield beyond the scope of the initial traffic stop. This portion of its opinion, however, is most injurious to the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Though the majority opinion significantly lowers the standard for facts sufficient to allow expanded police inquiry beyond questions reasonably related to the purpose of the initial stop, the majority fails to address adequately recent cases from this circuit which directly consider the issue of what circumstances permit expanded questioning. The majority opinion concedes: Bloomfield and his truck were seized at the time of the initial stop, and that seizure extended throughout the waiting period until the dog 'alerted' to the truck. Maj. op. at 916. Therefore, the relevant question is whether Trooper Roberts had a reasonable suspicion which would justify the expansion of the investigation beyond the scope of the original traffic stop. Because the majority opinion finds that Officer Roberts had a reasonable suspicion that Bloomfield was transporting drugs when Bloomfield exited his rental truck, I will not discuss the events after that point because they cannot properly inform the reasonable suspicion analysis in this matter. Maj. op. at 918. 49 In United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412 (8th Cir.1993), the defendant, like Bloomfield, was pulled over for changing lanes without signalling. At the commencement of the analysis, the court stated: For a detention to be reasonable, an officer's questions must relate to the purpose of the stop. However, if the response of the detainee and the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry and satisfy those suspicions. Id. at 416. After summarizing the nature of the trooper's investigation relating to the initial stop, the court recited those factors which justified an investigation beyond the initial traffic stop: [A] customary computer check of Barahona's license failed to verify its validity. Moreover, from reading the car contract, [the trooper] discovered that the car was rented under another name and was to be returned to Los Angeles in a few days, leaving Barahona only one or two days in St. Louis--an unusually short time for a long-distance vacation by car [Barahona's stated reason for travel]. Id. The court concluded from these factors that the trooper had justification for a greater intrusion unrelated to the stop: The totality of circumstances known to the trooper met the requisite level of reasonable suspicion under Terry and entitled him to detain Barahona until he had satisfied his suspicions [of drug trafficking]. Id. 50 The factors allowing expanded questioning in Barahona are significantly stronger than those cited by the majority opinion in the present case. All of the factors giving rise to reasonable suspicion in Barahona were premised on concrete facts which were not susceptible to the subjective perceptions of the trooper. Barahona's name was not the name stated on the rental agreement. His license could not be verified. He said he was on vacation in St. Louis, but the rental agreement required that the car be returned to Los Angeles in two days at the most. These factors do not require the trooper to make a subjective evaluation of the detainee's appearance. They are objectively suspicious. The majority opinion today concludes that red eyes, shaky hands, heavy breathing, radar detectors, a pager, a partially open window, and the strong scent of deodorant likewise create a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. (As noted above, the only factor relied upon by the district court was the deodorant smell.) This type of evidence almost always comes in through testimony and is often contested. The district court has the job of hearing conflicting testimony, weighing credibility, and ultimately deciding whose version to believe. Such determination is especially critical in a case which rests in large part on the trooper's evaluation of the appearance and demeanor of the detainee. Yet, in precisely the matter which most needs explicit findings, we have a conspicuous and irremediable absence of them. 51 However, even with such findings, I would not conclude that these facts rose to the level of reasonable suspicion. The objective factors which Trooper Roberts recounted--the presence of radar detectors, a pager, and the partially rolled-down window--are readily susceptible to myriad innocent explanations. This is especially true of the one fact found by the district court--the car deodorant. Furthermore, these factors and the majority's heavy reliance upon the trooper's subjective impressions of Bloomfield do not reach the level of evidence of a reasonable suspicion which we have required in prior precedent. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 23 F.3d 1331, 1334-35 (8th Cir.1994) (Garcia ) (holding that the factors cited by the trooper as the basis for a reasonable suspicion were insufficient in part because many of the factors were susceptible to an innocent explanation); cf. United States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 501 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that expanded questioning after a traffic stop was reasonable in part because defendant lied about the name of his passenger). 52 The majority opinion also fails to discuss the inconsistency of its approach in the present case to the Fourth Amendment approach we took in Garcia. The majority opinion cites Garcia to support the following proposition: If an officer can cite only one or two factors such as nervousness, hesitation in answering questions or out-of-state license plates, he may not have a reasonable suspicion to seize a person pending investigation. Maj. op. at 918 n. 9. The majority opinion attempts to distinguish the present case by noting that Trooper Roberts cited at least six factors which excited his suspicion, but it fails to mention that in Garcia, the trooper relied on eight factors which excited his suspicion. 23 F.3d at 1334-35. Despite these eight factors, the court found the seizure to be unreasonable. As the court in Garcia addressed each factor, it noted the difference between unusual behavior and behavior indicative of criminal activity, and recognized the innocent explanations which could have dismissed the various factors upon which the trooper relied. Id. 53 The precedents cited above manifest a serious and appropriate concern for the protection of innocent activity. Today the majority opinion shows little regard for the protection of innocent activity, and cavalierly denies Bloomfield protection under the Fourth Amendment. In some sense, the Fourth Amendment provides a right to be left alone. This understanding is consistent with our foundational principles of liberty and the pursuit of happiness. When examining a search and seizure question against this historical and constitutional background, courts must be Argus-eyed in the protection of innocent activity from unreasonable intrusion. The majority opinion does not demonstrate such vigilance. 54 The majority opinion finds that there was no Fourth Amendment violation because even though Trooper Roberts' investigation went beyond the scope of the initial stop, he had a reasonable suspicion that Bloomfield was transporting drugs when Bloomfield exited his rental truck to accompany Roberts to the patrol car. The majority opinion attempts to bolster this conclusion with facts from the PSR. The first factor is the act of fidgeting, and with regard to this incriminating action, the majority opinion observes: Although it is customary for people to be 'somewhat nervous' when Roberts pulls them over, it is unusual for people to 'fidget' as Bloomfield did when the stop is a 'normal routine' traffic stop. Maj. op. at 918-19. The fact that the distinction between somewhat nervous and fidgeting is cited in the majority opinion to support its conclusion as to reasonable suspicion eloquently exposes the weakness of the foundation underlying its result. At the point when Bloomfield exited the vehicle, I reiterate that the only relevant factual finding was that Roberts detected a strong odor. (Such odor is pejoratively referred to as a masking odor, but, of course, all deodorants mask other less desirable smells.) Beyond this fact, we have only the trooper's disputed testimony. Even accepting the majority's assumption that the facts gleaned from the PSR formed the basis of the district court's ruling, I do not believe that there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the moment Bloomfield exited the vehicle. Once Bloomfield's license and rental agreement had been verified, he should have been allowed to go on his way. Viewing the totality of the circumstances up to the point where the majority opinion finds a reasonable suspicion, a large group of innocent motorists could also be called into suspicion. Even the masking odor factor could apply to the millions of motorists who use car deodorizers. 55 From the evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, we learned that Bloomfield was transporting marijuana, but that is irrelevant to the exclusionary rule. The Fourth Amendment is still part of the Constitution. The police cannot be allowed to engage, without reasonable suspicion, in intrusive practices likely to invade the privacy of a large number of innocent citizens in the name of drug interdiction. See Garcia, 23 F.3d at 1336 (We are not empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the government can more effectively fight the war on drugs.); see also United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1433 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (Lay, J., dissenting) (Courts remain a bulwark against the erosion of civil liberties brought on by the war on drugs.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 593, 116 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991). The majority opinion gets the bad guy, but it also sacrifices the privacy of interstate motorists who now have cause to be even more wary of the patrol car in the rear view mirror. 56 Because I believe the majority opinion conveniently, but wrongly, disregards the long-established principles of appellate review in its haste to uphold a seizure which was unreasonable under the still extant Fourth Amendment, I respectfully dissent. 57