Opinion ID: 1965052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kinney's Statement

Text: Tovar made an offer of proof into evidence of portions of a statement made by Kinney during Kinney's plea negotiations relating to Kinney's role in Christenson's death. In this statement Kinney admitted to stabbing Christenson. Subsequently, Kinney's plea negotiations broke down. Kinney, also facing trial for Christenson's murder, refused to testify at Tovar's trial, invoking his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Tovar claimed that Kinney's out-of-court statements were admissible under the statement against interest exception to the hearsay rule contained in Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The district court reviewed the entire tape of the police interview with Kinney. The district court then ruled that the entire tape was inadmissible as a withdrawn plea agreement under Minn. R. Evid. 410. The court also found that the statements were inherently unreliable and that as such were more prejudicial than probative of any issue in this trial. Tovar claims that the court misapplied Rule 804(b)(3), and in doing so denied him the opportunity to present a complete defense. We have stated that a criminal defendant has the right to be treated with fundamental fairness and `afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' State v. Richards, 495 N.W.2d 187, 191 (Minn.1992) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)); accord U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Minn. Const. art. I, § 7. However, criminal defendants must still comply with established rules of evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in ascertaining guilt or innocence. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); accord State v. Profit, 591 N.W.2d 451, 463 (Minn.1999). Thus, even when a defendant alleges that his constitutional rights were violated, evidentiary questions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. Gustafson, 379 N.W.2d 81, 84 (Minn.1985). The district court is given great latitude in its evidentiary rulings. `[R]ulings on evidentiary matters rest within the sound discretion of the trial court,' and therefore we will only overturn a lower court's evidentiary ruling if that court abused its discretion. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 742-43 (Minn. 1998) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 101 (Minn. 1980)). Despite the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible, the [s]tatement against interest exception contained in Rule 804(b)(3) allows the admission of certain out-of-court statements against interest, if the declarant is unavailable to testify at trial. See generally Minn. R. Evid. 802 and 804. A statement that would tend to expose a declarant to criminal liability and that is offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The district court reviewed not only the excerpts offered by Tovar, but Kinney's entire interview tape because the court believed that if those excerpts were admitted, the rule of completeness would then allow the state to offer other parts of the statement that ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with [them]. Minn. R. Evid. 106. Tovar's counsel conceded that Rule 106 would likely allow the prosecution to then introduce those parts of Kinney's statement that directly inculpated Tovar in Christenson's murder. Kinney admitted in his statement to stabbing Christenson once in the stomach. This is one of the key statements that Tovar would like admitted as being exculpatory to Tovar. However, Christenson had been stabbed three times, and just before Kinney inculpated himself, he inculpated Tovar by stating that Tovar stabbed Christenson first. If Tovar was allowed to offer the alleged exculpatory statement, then the district court reasoned that in fairness the inculpatory portions of the statement may have also been allowed into evidence to put Kinney's entire interview in proper context. In doing so, the court would then have to consider issues raised by the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution in permitting an out-of-court statement of an unavailable witness that inculpates a criminal defendant. See generally U.S. Const. amend. VI; State v. Ford, 539 N.W.2d 214, 227 (Minn.1995) (holding that invocation of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination establishes unavailability under Minn. R. Evid. 804(a)). As a general rule, the admission of hearsay evidence by co-defendants not testifying at trial against a criminal defendant will implicate the Confrontation Clause. See State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903, 908 (Minn.1996); see generally U.S. Const. amend. VI. Though hearsay statements may appear to violate the Confrontation Clause on their face, they nonetheless may be admissible. See Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 908. In Jones, we determined that the admissibility of declarations against penal interest under Rule 804(b)(3) in a criminal trial requires three steps. See Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 908. First, the court must determine if the declarant was unavailable to testify at trial. See id.; see generally Rule 804(a). Second, the court must determine that the statement must at the time of its making    so far [tend] to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability    that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. See Jones, 556 N.W.2d at 908 (alteration in original) (citing Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(3)). Third, the court must scrutinize the statements to avoid violating the Confrontation Clause. See id. This analysis requires the court to construe the term statement narrowly and allow only those statements that directly inculpate the declarant and not admit a larger narrative that merely contains some inculpating statements. See id. (discussing Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994)). We have adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning in Williamson and have used this method to evaluate the admissibility of declarations against penal interest in criminal trials. See, e.g., Ford, 539 N.W.2d at 227 (holding it was error to admit statements that were non-self-inculpatory but contained within a largely self-inculpatory narrative). In this case, excerpts of Kinney's interview that Tovar desired to introduce generally inculpated Kinney in Christenson's murder. However, when read in context with those portions of the tape that the state could introduce, that Tovar stabbed Christenson first, it inculpates both Tovar and Kinney. Furthermore, Tovar was charged with aiding and abetting. Thus, Kinney's admission relating to his involvement in the stabbing itself, with Tovar's presence and participation, may have inculpated Tovar on that charge. As such, to allow this hearsay statement directly inculpating Tovar in the murder would have implicated Tovar's right to confront witnesses against him. In light of the aspects of Kinney's statements that inculpated Tovar, the district court had to weigh the relevant rules of evidence and their competing objectives along with the requirements of the Confrontation Clause to determine the admissibility of Kinney's statements. We conclude it did so correctly. After reviewing the tape, the district court found that the statements made by Kinney were in furtherance of his own self-interest because they were made in an attempt to obtain a plea bargain and that Kinney appeared to downplay his own involvement in Christenson's murder and exaggerate the involvement of others. The court concluded that the statement was inherently unreliable, certainly more prejudicial than probative of any facts for which it may be submitted. Accordingly, the district court ruled that Kinney's statements were not admissible by either party. The court did not use the specific language of Rule 804(b)(3) in determining if circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. However, its observations about the statements and finding of inherent unreliability clearly indicate that circumstances of trustworthiness were not present. The court's finding of inherent unreliability supports its conclusion that the statements were inadmissible under Minn. R. Evid. 403 as well. Rule 403 allows the court to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury or considerations of time. See Minn. R. Evid. 403. While perhaps redundant after the court's analysis under Rule 804(b)(3), it is not clear error for the district court to consider Rule 403. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the entire statement. Tovar also claims that the district court misapplied Minn. R. Evid. 410. See generally id. (stating that plea agreements, later withdrawn, or any statements made in connection therewith, are inadmissible in any criminal or civil proceeding, whether offered for or against the person who made the plea or offer). Because the court found that the statements were inherently unreliable as well as inadmissible under Rule 403, the statements were properly excluded. Accordingly, we need not reach the issue of the applicability of Rule 410.