Opinion ID: 8487230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Trial Court’s Actions

Text: Next, in determining whether the trial court’s actions “exacerbated, alleviated or were neutral with respect to coercive potential,” Leake, supra, 77 A.3d at 977 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), we consider the following factors: [W]e look to (1) whether the judge made any affirmative efforts .to dispel the coercive potential, (2) whether' the judge’s actions took a middle ground, (3) whether the judge’s actions exacerbated the 'problem by 'effectively contributing to the potential for jury coercion, and (4) whether the judge’s reaction independently created a coercive atmosphere for the jury. Id. Given the low coercive potential of the juror’s note, it was incumbent on the trial court to give a neutral, even-“bland,” instruction. The court followed the rule- in this case, so we cannot say the' court’s answer was an abuse of its broad discretion. Cf. Gray v. United States, 79 A.3d 326, 336-37 (D.C, 2013) (concluding that where the jury’s note exhibited confusion, the trial court’s general statements ■ failed to bring adequate clarity). The court’s response to the juror’s note, in open court, was for the jury to resume deliberations, to recognize that heated discussions during deliberations were natural, but also, to emphasize the need for civility and mutual respect! The trial court’s jury instruction was not coercive. In fact, the instruction reduced any coercive potential by reminding jurors to respect each other’s viewpoints during deliberations and to focus on the evidence presented. Contrary to Bost’s claim, an anti-deadlock instruction admonishing the jury not to “surrender [their] honest conviction[s]” would have been premature as there was no indication that the jury was deadlocked at.the time of the note. We -have consistently cautioned that an anti-deadlock instruction should not “be used prematurely or without evident cause,” and that an anti-deadlock instruction is more of an “ultimate judicial attempt, not a preliminary attempt, to secure a verdict.” Barbett v. United States, 54 A.3d 1241, 1245 (D.C. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons stated, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial or to issue an anti-deadlock instruction.