Opinion ID: 1855618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF McCULLOUGH'S PRIOR BAD ACT?

Text: ¶ 6. McCullough claims that the trial court committed reversible error when it allowed evidence of a prior bad act in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). The evidence elicited from McCullough was evidence of a prior shooting that occurred when he was fourteen. Prior to admission of the testimony, the defense made a motion in limine to exclude the testimony from trial as it was extremely prejudicial and in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). The trial court denied the motion and ruled that it would allow the testimony. Before calling McCullough, the defense again objected to the admission of the evidence of the prior bad act. The court overruled the objection. Prior to presenting the evidence of the prior shooting, McCullough's attorney made clear upon the record first, that he objected to the admission of the evidence and, second, that he would introduce the evidence himself for the purpose of minimizing the damage that the testimony promised his client. The defense then elicited the evidence of the prior shooting on direct examination. The testimony was as follows: Q. Have you ever shot anybody before? A. Yes. Q. How old were you? A. Around 14 or 15. Q. Were you prosecuted? A. No, I didn't go to court or nothing for it, no. ¶ 7. The prior shooting was also briefly mentioned by the prosecution on cross-examination. That testimony was as follows: Q. When do you not carry your gun? A. I never did carry a gun. Q. You carried it when you shot the guy when you were 15. A. It wasn't my gun. ¶ 8. M.R.E. 404(b) states as follows: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ¶ 9. The admission of the prior shooting was clearly inadmissible character evidence in violation of M.R.E. 404(b). However, the general rule is that a defendant may not, himself, introduce evidence at trial and then assert on appeal that the admission of the evidence constituted reversible error. Hobson v. State, 730 So.2d 20, 24-25 (Miss.1998). Hobson involved the typical situation wherein the defendant elicits testimony that is otherwise inadmissible and then objects to subsequent allusion to or inquiry into that testimony by the prosecution. Id. Hobson elicited inadmissable hearsay testimony on cross-examination. Id. Subsequently, on re-direct the prosecution addressed that testimony. Id. Hobson then complained on appeal that the testimony should not have been allowed. Id. In finding that no error had been committed, the Court correctly stated the general rule as noted above and went on to state: If the defendant goes fishing in the state's waters, he must take such fish as he catches. Id. (citing Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 289 (Miss.1992). However, the facts surrounding the admission of the testimony in the case sub judice are unique. In Hobson, there was no motion in limine to exclude the evidence that was eventually brought out by Hobson himself. Hobson had no reason to believe that the prosecution was even going to attempt to introduce the hearsay testimony that Hobson ultimately elicited from the witness; therefore, Hobson had no excuse for his introducing testimony that would otherwise have been inadmissible. In the present case, McCullough made a motion in limine to have the evidence excluded. Once the trial court denied McCullough's motion, McCullough had to proceed according to the court's ruling; that is, McCullough and his attorney based their strategy on the knowledge that the prosecution was going to be allowed to introduce the evidence of the prior shooting. This strategy dictated that McCullough introduce the evidence himself to limit its effect. Therefore, the admissibility of the testimony in Hobson is distinct from the admissibility of the evidence in the case sub judice. ¶ 10. The evidence was obviously in direct violation of M.R.E. 404(b) as he argued in his motion hearing. However, the trial judge ruled that the evidence of the prior shooting, which took place when McCullough was fourteen or fifteen and which would have been prohibited by M.R.E. 609(d) as well had it been prosecuted to a conclusion, would be admissible to impeach because the defendant was going to take the witness stand to testify. And if the State wants to put his character into evidence at that point by asking him about it, I can't see how you can get arounduhthe admissibility under 404(b). McCullough's attorney replied, Your Honor, under 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrong , but was interrupted by the court as follows: Okay, I understand all of that, but that's what if you put him on the witness stand to testify and the State asks him about his character, under 404(b) then it becomes admissible. ¶ 11. There was obviously a great deal of confusion concerning M.R.E. 404(b) and when evidence of prior crimes is admissible. The dialogue continued as follows: MR. GOODSELL [attorney for McCullough]: Okay, is it proof of the motive, opportunity, intent? I mean what  MR. HOLMES [assistant district attorney]: Certainly proof of motive, Your Honor. That's exactly over and over and over again Mr. Goodsell has put in front of this jury, What's the motive? Why? Why did he do it? Why did he do it? This would be proof of motive. MR. GOODSELL: Well, Your Honor, how does, if he has been involved in a shooting when he was 14 years old and was not prosecuted, how does this make him any more or any less likely to have used self-defense than the shooting now? THE COURT: If we get to that point, the Court will give a cautionary instruction on what the jury is to use that evidence, how they are to consider that evidence. But once you put him on the witness stand, you open the door for 404(b). MR. GOODSELL: Okay. One other thing, Your Honor, in addition, we would ask for a continuance, because we'd like to find the victim of this first one, or alleged victim, it was not prosecuted, so we could call him to testify. Because what I understand from the facts, the guy pulled a knife on Larry, and Larry did shoot him. THE COURT: Objection is overruled. Anything further? (Pause) Bring in the jury. ¶ 12. Although the evidence was eventually admitted by McCullough, Goodsell, McCullough's attorney, made clear upon the record that his intent in entering the evidence himself was a strategic move exercised only due to the ruling of the court that the evidence would be admitted over objection. The strategy was to minimize the certain prejudice that would befall his client by the introduction of the prior shooting. Goodsell's explanation to the court was as follows: MR. GOODSELL: Your Honor, it is my understanding, like in the previous witness, that the State intends for, I suppose, impeachment purposes, to ask the defendant has he ever been involved in shooting someone before, which I believe he's going to answer in the affirmative. I am going to ask that on direct examination and, but for the ruling of the Court, I would not ask that. So I just want to make that clear, and I still object to the question being or that the evidence being put before the jury is not probative as to this guilt or innocence. ¶ 13. As previously stated a defendant generally cannot use as grounds for appeal the improper introduction of evidence which he, himself, introduced. Hobson v. State, 730 So.2d at 24-25. However, according to the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, it is an attorney's duty to zealously defend his or her client. Once the trial court put the defense counsel in that posture, this Court should not, by procedurally barring the issue, penalize the defense for attempting to minimize the damage done by the improper evidence. Therefore, we address the issue on the merits. ¶ 14. The trial court ruled that evidence of an identical prior bad act was admissible in direct violation of M.R.E. 404(b). In the case sub judice, McCullough was tried for shooting a man, and he alleged the shots were fired in self defense. The prior bad act introduced into evidence over objection in the trial court was a shooting that took place when McCullough was fourteen or fifteen years old. In that shooting McCullough also claimed the shots were fired in self defense. The evidence of the prior shooting plainly does not fit within an exception to the M.R.E. 404(b) bar on introduction of such evidence. ¶ 15. In addition to the fact that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 404(b), it is also readily apparent that the trial court committed error by not subjecting the evidence to scrutiny under Rule 403. Rule 403 states that: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.... The Court has stated: Evidence admissible under Rule 404(b) is subject to the prejudice test of Rule 403, and a trial court is required to consider whether the probative value of the questionable evidence is outweighed by undue prejudice. Rule 403 is an ultimate filter through which all otherwise admissible evidence must pass. Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 93 (Miss. 1987) (emphasis added). ¶ 16. In the case sub judice, the record does not disclose that the trial court judge considered whether the probative value of the prior shooting was substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice that might result if it were introduced. Therefore, we can only assume that the evidence was not filtered through Rule 403 before being ruled admissible. Since the evidence should not have been allowed under Rule 404(b) in the first place, it is an elementary conclusion that the evidence would not have been permitted under Rule 403. Therefore, the introduction of the evidence was reversible error.