Opinion ID: 877415
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Legality - - -

Text: of the Death Sentence Petitioner contends he was unconstitutionally sentenced to death in that: (a) his death sentences were imposed in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal constitution, in that there were no standards to channel and guide the sentencing discretion of the trial court or to provide safeguards against arbitrary and dis- ' criminatory impositions of the sentence of death; (b) his sentence was disproportionate to the sentence imposed in similar cases and he was given no opportunity to show the disproportionality of his death sentence; (c) his sentence of death for aggravated kidnapping which resulted in the death of the victim was constitutionally disproportionate because the jury was not required to find that he deliberately took the life of another; (d) expert testimony agreed that petitioner suffered from a psychiatric disorder which should have been a mitigating circumstance; (e) the sentencing court's findings of aggravating factors are unconstitutionally vague and no standards existed by statute or case law to guide the sentencing discretion; and, (f) this Court improperly upheld his sentence based on aggravating factors which were not listed by statute. Petitioner further contends that he should not be required to bear the burden of establishing mitigating circumstances; that he is entitled to a jury trial on the mitigating facts and the sentences; that his sentences were based on erroneous factual findings drawn from incompetent, unreliable evidence, with no opportunity to rebut; that the plea agreement was breached to his disadvantage; that he is the only person sentenced to death under the 1974 Montana capital punishment law; and, that the death penalty is discriminatorily applied in Montana against impoverished male defendants accused of killing caucasians, solely upon the grounds of race, poverty and sex. He asserts no legitimate state interest is served by the death sentence, that hanging is cruel and unusual punishment. In McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 448-451, we held that the statute under which petitioner was sentenced to death was constitutional when considered in the light of Furman v. Georgia (1972), 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, and Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859. The constitutionality of the statute has been fully considered and decided by us. We turn now to consider the attacks made by McKenzie with respect to the sentence imposed upon him, the death penalty. (I) McKenzie states again that the death penalty laws applicable in his case are arbitrary and unconstitutional in that his sentence was imposed under a statute which explicitly permitted discretionary death sentencing, without standards to channel and guide sentencing discretion or any other safeguard against arbitrary and discriminatory imposition of the sentence of death . . . In McKenzie 111, this Court discussed these claims by the petitioner, and we found that the Montana statutory scheme in existence at the time of the crimes herein afforded defendant the procedural safeguards necessary to protect his substantive rights to be sentenced without arbitrariness or caprice, and in accordance with the United States Supreme Court cases of Jurek v. Texas (1976), 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed.2d 929, Proffitt v. Florida (1976), 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed.2d 913; and Gregg v. Georgia, supra. The issue therefore of the constitutionality of the sentencing statutory scheme has been fully litigated and decided. McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 448-451. (2) McKenzie claims there is no meaningful review provided in the Montana statutory scheme to guard against passion and prejudice, arbitrariness, or disproportionality in his sentencing. In McKenzie 111, we pointed out that prompt judicial review of his death sentence was provided both by appeal to this Court and by review in the sentence review division of this Court. This issue has been fully considered, litigated and decided. McKenzie - 608 P.2d at 450. 111, (3) McKenzie claims that in his review before the Sentence Zeview Division, he was given no opportunity to offer evidence and the Sentence Review had no standards to make such a review. It is clear from the record that when he was before the sentence review division, McKenzie presented no evidence, nor offered to present any evidence with respect to the proportionality or arbitrariness of his sentence. Instead, he attacked the legality, rather than the appropriateness of his sentence. The function of the Sentence Seview Division was to consider the appropriateness of his sentence with respect to him as an individual offender, and as to the particular offense involved. McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 450. Under section 46-18-904, MCA, the sentence review division is given full authority to review the judgment so far as it relates to the sentence imposed, to either increase or decrease the penalty. In reviewing the judgment, the division may consider other records, documents or exhibits relevant to such review proceedings. When McKenzie appeared before the Sentence Review Livision, he requested only that the division obtain from all 56 District Court clerks the records of sentencing in every deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnapping case since 1972. The Sentence ~ e v i e w Division denied this request. The ~istrictCourt, in considering the application for post-conviction review, held that a proportionality review is sufficient if the Sentence Review Division considers the records of appealed cases. The review division did so consider and we agree with the District Court's conclusion. (4) McKenzie attacks his sentence on the ground that it is disproportionate to the crimes for which he was convicted and upon the further ground that the jury did not find that he had deliberately caused the death of another. McKenzie contends that the death penalty is disproportionate to the offense of aggravated kidnapping. In State v. Coleman (1979), , Mont. - 605 P.2d 1000, 1017, 36 St-Rep. 1134, 1150, cert.denied, 446 U.S. 970, 100 S.Ct. 2952, 64 L.Ed.2d 831, we pointed out that the United States Supreme Court in Gregg, made it clear that when a life has been taken by an offender [it cannot be said] the punishment [of death] is invariably disproportionate to the crime. 428 U.S. at 187, 96 S.Ct. at 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d at 882. We distinguished Coker v. Georgia (1977), 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982, as being relevant only to crimes for which the penalty has been imposed which did not result in the loss of a life. In McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 459, as the District Court noted in considering petitioner's application for post-conviction relief, we found the evidence on the issue of intent to be overwhelming, uncontradicted, and permitting of but one rational conclusion-that McKenzie intended to kidnap and kill the victim. (5) McKenzie claims that his sentence of death is disproportionate to sentences imposed in similar cases. In Coleman, 605 P.2d at 1021, we noted that the crime of aggravated kidnapping has been a part of our statutory law only since 1973 and that we were necessarily confined to a review of cases since that time, which we found sufficient, though not large in number. This case was used in Coleman as a comparative case and we look to Coleman in this case as a comparative case. We also find State v. Fitzpatrick (1980) - Mont. , 606 P.2d 1343, 37 St.Rep. 194, cert.denied, 449 U.S. 891, 101 S.Ct. 252, 66 L.Ed.2d 118, to be suitable for comparison. Again, in Fitzpatrick, 606 P.2d at 1361, this case was used as a comparative case in discussing the Fitzpatrick sentence of death. Our discussions of the similarity of these cases and the proportionality of the death sentence imposed as to Coleman and Fitzpatrick, as well as to McKenzie, and our discussion of State v. Buckley (1976), 171 Mont. 238, 557 P.2d 283, appearing in Fitzpatrick, 606 P.2d at 1362, indicate that McKenzie is under a sentence that is not disproportionate to sentences that have been imposed in similar cases. (6) McKenzie attacks his death sentence on the ground that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect denominated a psychiatric disorder which he claims to be a mitigating circumstance. The District Court in considering the post-conviction application, stated: The presence of a personality disorder does not automatically immunize a defendant from the death penalty.  The overweighing factor against the petitioner on this contention is that the jury did not find that he had suffered from a mental disease which prevented him from forming the specific intent necessary for the charged offenses. Even the District Court's sentencing order in the criminal proceedings shows that the factor was considered and found to be insufficient. (7) McKenzie attacks his death sentence upon the ground that it is based on findings of aggravating factors which are unconstitutionally vague and open-ended with no channel or guide to the sentencing discretion. This is simply another way of attacking the constitutionality of the Montana sentencing statutory scheme which as we have indicated above is constitutionality sound. The crime of homicide by torture as defined by the court's instructions and approved by us in McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 445, is sufficiently definite to prevent an overbroad application of the factors. Substantial evidence showed that the victim died as a result of an aggravated kidnapping. McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 447-48. There is no merit in this contention. (8) McKenzie attacks the sentence upon the ground that the sentencing judge relied on the aggravating factors other than those found in our statutes. The District Court, in considering the post-conviction application, stated that the jury had found two specific statutory aggravating factors and saw no reason why the sentencing court is required not to consider a wide range of factors in determining whether the aggravating circumstances are outweighed by mitigating factors. For this reason, the District Court determined, in denying McKenziels application for post-conviction relief, that it was not improper for the District Court to consider: (1) the petitioner's failure to present evidence to mitigate his conduct, (2) his conviction for rape, (3) his purported dangerousness, (4) his antisocial behavior, (5) the small number of years he would be required to serve if a 100 year sentence were given, (6) whether rehabilitation of petitioner was not possible; and, (7) whether he must be executed for the protection of society. We agree with the District Court. All of these factors considered by the sentencing court bear on the aggravating factors found by the jury and properly relate to the propriety of the sentence of death. (9) McKenzie claims that his sentence of death is based on findings from incompetent evidence, some of which was not revealed to him before trial, and against which he had no opportunity for rebuttal. In McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 441, 442, we rejected these contentions as to the validity of his conviction. We similarly reject these contentions with respect to the validity of his sentence. (10) McKenzie attacks his sentence upon the ground that the District Court ignored or violated a plea agreement for a lesser sentence. In McKenzie 111, 608 P.2d at 439, we found that no plea bargain or agreement existed. This issue has been fully litigated and decided and is not a bar to the sentence imposed upon McKenzie. (11) McKenzie attacks his death sentence because of his claim that he will be the only person executed under the 1974 capital punishment law, and that there is no rational basis to distinguish his case from others. Again we have repeatedly stated that the statutory scheme for capital punishment as applied to McKenzie was valid, and that his sentence is not disproportionate as to the facts, the crime or his character, and we therefore reject this contention. (12) McKenzie's contention that the Montana legislature has subsequently amended the capital punishment provision so as to provide consideration of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and that no such provisions existed for his benefit, is again an attack upon the constitutionality of the statutory sentencing scheme in effect with respect to him which we have previously rejected. (13) McKenzie attacks the death sentence upon the ground that it is being imposed both in Montana and the United States against impoverished male defendants accused of killing caucasians upon the grounds of race, poverty and sex, in a discriminatory pattern and practice. In Fitzpatrick 111, 38 St.Rep. 1448, 1454, we discussed this issue. We find no basis for this contention and petitioner has alleged none. Nor has petitioner offered any proof of such contention. (14) McKenzie further attacks his sentence upon the ground that no valid state purpose is served in imposing the penalty upon him. In Gregg, 428 U.S. at 183, two justifications for capital punishment were noted: retribution and deterrence. The applicability of these as justifications present complex issues, properly left for legislative determination, and it is with the legislature that this Court will leave that determination. There is no basis on that ground for postconviction relief. (15) McKenzie attacks the imposition of a death penalty by hanging as cruel and unusual punishment. We discussed this issue in Coleman - 605 P.2d at 11, 1058-59. The issue has been fully decided by this Court. We come finally to conclude in this case that petitioner's application for post-conviction relief in the District Court was properly denied, and that on appeal to this Court, the decision of the District Court is hereby affirmed. We remand this cause to the District Court in which the sentence upon the defendant was imposed, for such further proceedings as are necessary to execute the sentence imposed upon the petitioner. -29-