Opinion ID: 1728668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: testimony of widow

Text: The circuit judge was correct, in my view, in permitting the widow to testify. Even though the defendant had pleaded guilty to capital murder, in the sentencing hearing the jury is entitled to know the victim beyond a statistic. In an ordinary criminal case the circuit judge in his discretion allows an accused to relate a few essential facts about his life, usually limited to his age, occupation, marital status, children, religion, and military service, if any. A circuit judge should also have the discretion to permit testimony within this limitation about a murder victim. It is improper and erroneous to go beyond this, in my opinion. The widow in this case was asked many more questions, and testified more about the life of her husband and herself than was necessary or proper. Upon specific questioning, she testified about the years her husband had been in business, his occupation, the activities of her husband and herself that day prior to the tragedy, what they had for lunch, what she always prepared him for his Wednesday dinner, and the time she usually picked him up. There then followed upon further questions the events of that day after she got the terrible news, the condition she found her husband, her tragic thoughts, her trip to the hospital, where her husband was buried. She was also asked if she and her husband were very close, as well as his general health. Defense counsel objected to the widow testifying at all. He made no further motion to limit her testimony to essential information. He made no objection to any question asked. On his motion for a new trial, he assigned as error that the widow should not have been permitted to testify at all. While the circuit judge was correct in over-ruling the defense objection to the widow even testifying, in chambers, and before the widow ever took the witness stand he should have ascertained what the state intended to prove by her, and given defense counsel an opportunity to object to testimony exceeding proper limits. This broad examination should not have been permitted, and the majority has set a radical precedent, in my view, in failing to find anything improper about it. While I filed no dissent in Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737 (Miss. 1982) p. 743, our holding there troubled me. Evans had pleaded guilty to capital murder, as Booker did in this case. In Evans, however, the testimony of the victim's brother was limited to identifying his brother's corpse from a photograph. We justified our holding in Evans as proper for identification. No such justification exists for the latitude of examination of the widow in this case.