Opinion ID: 78287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Circuits' Approaches

Text: The circuits are split on how to apply St. Cyr to aliens outside of the guilty plea context. The majority of circuits to address the issue have held that IIRIRA does not have an impermissible retroactive effect on aliens who relied on § 212(c) relief in deciding to go to trial. See Hernandez-Castillo v. Moore, 436 F.3d 516, 520 (5th Cir.2006); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1036-37 (7th Cir.2004); Rankine v. Reno, 319 F.3d 93, 102 (2d Cir. 2003); Chambers v. Reno, 307 F.3d 284, 290-93 (4th Cir.2002); Dias v. INS, 311 F.3d 456, 458 (1st Cir.2002) ([A]pplication of the new statutory limitations on discretionary relief does not have an impermissible retroactive effect on those aliens who would have been eligible for discretionary relief when they were convicted of a felony after trial.); see also Saravia-Paguada v. Gonzales, 488 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2499, 171 L.Ed.2d 785 (2008) (indicating that, [i]n our circuit, we have generally limited St. Cyr to the factual context of a guilty plea, and [o]utside of the plea bargain context ... we have declined to invalidate retroactive elimination of § 212(c) relief); Armendariz-Montoya v. Sonchik, 291 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.2002) (stating that unlike aliens who pled guilty, aliens who elected a jury trial cannot plausibly claim that they would have acted any differently if they had known about [AEDPA's] § 440(d)). [15] [A]liens who chose to go to trial are in a different position with respect to IIRIRA than aliens like St. Cyr who chose to plead guilty because none of [them] detrimentally changed his position in reliance on continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 99. Such aliens have pointed to no conduct on their part that reflects an intention to preserve their eligibility for relief under § 212(c) by going to trial. Id. at 100; Hernandez-Castillo, 436 F.3d at 520 (quoting Rankine ); [16] Chambers, 307 F.3d at 291 ([I]n contrast to aliens who plead guilty, Chambers [in proceeding to trial] made no decision that adversely impacted his immigration status.). As the [Supreme] Court made clear, it was that reliance, and the consequent change of immigration status, that produced the impermissible retroactive effect of IIRIRA. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 100; see Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290 (The key event in terms of St.Cyr 's analysis ... was the alien's decision to abandon his constitutional right to a trial and plead guilty to a deportable offense in reliance on prior law.); Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037 (But this exception does not apply to aliens like Montenegro who chose to go to trial; such aliens did not abandon any rights or admit guilt in reliance on continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief.); [17] Mbea v. Gonzales, 482 F.3d 276, 281 (4th Cir. 2007) (We held that IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) did not produce an impermissibly retroactive effect as applied to an alien convicted after trial.). [18] As noted, the Second Circuit has expressly refused to extend St. Cyr to aliens who proceeded to trial. Rankine, 319 F.3d at 102 (Because we have not found a persuasive argument that the holding in St. Cyr can be extended to cover those aliens who were convicted at trial rather than pursuant to a plea, we conclude that the repeal of § 212(c) relief does not have an impermissibly retroactive effect when applied to petitioners.); Chambers, 307 F.3d at 290-93. Subsequently, in Restrepo v. McElroy, 369 F.3d 627, 634 (2d Cir. 2004), the Second Circuit fine-tuned its St. Cyr-Rankine jurisprudence and held that under certain limited circumstances, an alien-defendant who was convicted pursuant to a jury trial prior to the enactment of AEDPA could still potentially be eligible for § 212(c) relief. See Wilson v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir.2006). In Restrepo, the Second Circuit concluded that an alien may show detrimental reliance when he decides to forgo the immediate filing of a 212(c) application based on the considered and reasonable expectation that he would be permitted to file a stronger application for 212(c) relief at a later time. 369 F.3d at 634-35. The Second Circuit noted that the undermining of this settled expectation represents a prototypical case of retroactivity. Just like the aliens in St. Cyr, who sacrificed something of valuetheir right to a jury trial, at which they could obtain outright acquittalin the expectation that their guilty pleas would leave them eligible for 212(c) relief, an alien like Petitioner also sacrificed somethingthe shot at obtaining 212(c) relief by immediately filing an applicationin order to increase his chances of obtaining such relief later on. Such an alien conformed his or her conduct according to the availability of relief, and therefore had settled expectations that would be severely upset, were the AEDPA to be applied retroactively. Id. (quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). In other words, aliens in the Second Circuit can prove detrimental reliance, under the St. Cyr framework, by showing that they affirmatively chose to forego filing their § 212(c) application for discretionary relief in order to build up a better record and boost the odds that their applications would be granted. Id. In Restrepo, the Second Circuit remanded for the district court to determine in the first instance: (1) whether Restrepo must make an individualized showing of reliance instead of reaping the benefit of a categorical presumption of reliance; and (2) if so, whether Restrepo could make that showing. Id. at 638-39. Since Restrepo, the Second Circuit has required an individualized showing of reliance to prove such claims. Wilson, 471 F.3d at 122. Merely knowing of the continued availability of § 212(c) relief is not the equivalent to affirmative reliance in its continued availability. Id. The Fifth Circuit follows the Restrepo approach. See Carranza-De Salinas v. Gonzales, 477 F.3d 200, 208-09 (5th Cir. 2007) (We find the reasoning of the Restrepo Court persuasive and see no need to create a circuit split on this issue.). But outside of the guilty plea context, the Fifth Circuit, like the Second, requires a showing of individualized reliance as opposed to a categorical presumption of reliance. Id. at 205 (After Hernandez-Castillo, this circuit requires an applicant who alleges continued eligibility for § 212(c) relief to demonstrate actual, subjective reliance on the pre-IIRIRA state of the law to be eligible for relief from its retroactive application.). Under this approach, [b]ecause the reliance demonstrated must be actual, the determination of retroactive effect is made as to the individual applicant, not as to a group of similarly-situated applicants. Id. The Tenth Circuit extends St. Cyr beyond the guilty plea context and rejects a requirement of actual, subjective reliance. See Hem v. Maurer, 458 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir.2006). In Hem, the Tenth Circuit found that an alien shows objectively reasonable reliance on § 212(c) relief where she gives up her right to appeal her criminal conviction. [19] Id. But its approach is not limited to those who gave up their appeals. Its general approach is to determine whether the class of persons affected by retroactive application of a statute had an objectively reasonable interest in the previous state of the law. Id. at 1200. Aliens, like Hem, who were in a position in which the availability of § 212(c) relief would reasonably inform their decision to forego a constitutional right, would suffer `new legal consequences to events completed before [the statute's] enactment,' Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70, 114 S.Ct. 1483, under IIRIRA § 304(b). Id. at 1200-01. [20] Therefore, such aliens are eligible for § 212(c) relief. The Third Circuit, on the other hand, does not require aliens to show reliance or a reliance interesteither objective or subjectiveon § 212(c) relief and has concluded that IIRIRA's repeal of § 212(c) is impermissibly retroactive in that it attaches new legal consequences to an alien's criminal conviction. See Atkinson v. Att'y Gen., 479 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir.2007). Because the Third Circuit's approach substantially differs from that of the other circuits, and because Ferguson urges us to adopt it, we discuss it in some detail. In the Third Circuit's view, the Supreme Court has never held that reliance on the prior law is an element required to make the determination that a statute may be applied retroactively. Id. at 227-28. [R]eliance is but one consideration in assessing whether a statute attaches new legal consequences to past events. Id. at 231. The Third Circuit reads Supreme Court precedent not as requiring that the alien must have relied on the old § 212(c), but rather as undertaking a general analysis of the impact of the amendment, finding retroactivity improper because the amendment instituted a legal change that attached a new legal burden to the proscribed conduct. Id. at 228. Impermissible retroactivity, as defined in Landgraf, does not require that those affected by the change in law have relied on the prior state of the law. Id. at 229. Therefore, based on its interpretation of St. Cyr and Landgraf, the Third Circuit phrased the relevant question as only: Does applying IIRIRA to eliminate the availability of discretionary relief under former section 212(c) attach new legal consequences to events completed before the repeal? Id. at 230. It answered that question by using Atkinson's conviction as the event completed, noting that Atkinson's case presents a straightforward application of the retroactive effect test. IIRIRA has plainly attached new legal consequences to Atkinson's conviction. Prior to IIRIRA's enactment, Atkinson remained free to apply for a waiver under section 212(c) despite his conviction of an aggravated felony. After IIRIRA, he lost that right; applying basic principles of retroactivity, IIRIRA attached a new legal consequence to Atkinson's conviction: the certaintyrather than the possibilityof deportation. Such a change in legal consequences based on events completed before IIRIRA's enactment constitutes an impermissible retroactive effect. Id. (citation omitted). [21] While the law of the circuits is not uniform, none of the other circuits has adopted the Third Circuit's approach.