Opinion ID: 2632630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial review of UNLV's decision

Text: UNLV contends alternatively that Sutton was limited in the district court to judicial review of UNLV's administrative procedure's conclusions only, and that the trial court erred by allowing Sutton to proceed to trial on his breach-of-contract claims. We disagree. We are mindful of the precedent that decisions made at the university level are generally limited to judicial review. [14] In Stacey, we stated: [W]e are not unaware of the long-standing precedent recognizing that faculty appointment at the university level is an area poorly suited for judicial supervision, and thus one where judicial restraint must be exercised. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir.1980); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir.1974). Indeed, other jurisdictions have held that a university's decision to grant tenure is a discretionary exercise of judgment that should not be actionable unless arbitrary or unconstitutional. See Harrison v. Goldstein, 204 A.D.2d 451, 611 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y.App.Div.1994); Coe v. Board of Regents, 140 Wis.2d 261, 409 N.W.2d 166 (Ct.App.1987); Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818 (9th Cir.1984). [15] We have further emphasized the importance of academic freedom in our society by reaffirming our commitment to protect a university's inherent right to govern itself within constitutional limitations. [16] In the present case, however, Sutton did not simply challenge UNLV's hearing process or the results of that process. His complaint alleged that, based on his 1999 employment contract, UNLV had no authority to hold the hearing. The 1999 contract contained an integration clause [17] and further included the provisions of the UCCSN code, which also contain an integration clause. [18] The UCCSN code requires UNLV to hold a hearing and make a recommendation to the university president within six months of the administrative complaint's filing. The code does not allow the parties to waive the six-month requirement. Here, UNLV held the hearing almost seven years after the unsatisfactory evaluations in 1990 and 1991, and the 1999 hearing related only to Sutton's conduct and evaluations in 1990 and 1991. If the contract did not allow the hearing, then UNLV breached the contract by proceeding with the hearing, and the result of the hearing and any decision rendered is of no effect. Thus, the question before the district court was not judicial review of a decision terminating a tenured faculty member's employment, but whether a court-ordered contract allowed UNLV to proceed with the hearing. If the district court were limited to judicial review of UNLV's administrative decision in this case, then one party to the contract  UNLV  would be in a position to determine whether the contract had been breached. Factual disputes regarding breach of contract are questions for a jury to decide. After such questions are first decided by the jury, judicial review of UNLV's decision would then be appropriate but only if UNLV did not violate the terms of the 1999 contract by proceeding with the code hearing. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err by allowing the breach-of-contract claims to proceed to trial.