Opinion ID: 1826657
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The plaintiffs involvement in the controversy.

Text: Consideration of this prong involves the plaintiffs prominence in the public controversy, the plaintiffs access to channels of effective communication to counteract false statements, and whether the plaintiff voluntarily thrust himself or was drawn into the forefront of the public controversy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The court in Waldbaum stated: Once the court has defined the controversy, it must analyze the plaintiffs role in it. Trivial or tangential participation, is not enough. The language of Gertz is clear that plaintiffs must have `thrust themselves to the forefront' of the controversies so as to become factors in their ultimate resolution. . . . They must have achieved a `special prominence' in the debate. . . . The plaintiff either must have been purposely trying to influence the outcome or could realistically have been expected, because of his position in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution. In undertaking this analysis, a court can look to the plaintiffs past conduct, the extent of the press coverage, and the public reaction to his conduct and statements. 627 F.2d at 1297 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). The evidence does not support a conclusion that Cottrell and Williams tried to purposely influence the outcome of the public controversy; therefore, we must determine whether Cottrell and Williams realistically could have been expected, because of their positions in the controversy, to have an impact on its resolution. Thus, this factor rests upon their prominence in the public controversy, their access to channels of communication, and the voluntary injection of themselves into the public controversy.
This inquiry involves evaluating whether the plaintiffs actions have resulted in his being embroiled in the public controversy. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. 2997 (holding that the limited-purpose public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies). Perhaps the main question presented is would a reasonable person have expected Cottrell and Williams to play a significant role in determining the outcome of the controversy. In this case, the outcome of the controversy relates to whether the NCAA would find that The University and its football program fully cooperated with the NCAA's investigation into the alleged rule violations and engaged in adequate self-policing and self-enforcement so as to avoid the death penalty. Cottrell and Williams argue that they did not play a prominent role in the controversy because, they say, the major focus of the investigation involved Young and his improper conduct in recruiting Means and did not focus on their alleged violations of NCAA rules. They assert that because they were minor participants in the investigation, they should not be considered as having any influence on the outcome of the controversy. The evidence, however, established that Cottrell and Williams did play a prominent role in the public controversy. Newspaper articles focused on their conduct, their interviews with Johanningmeier, the violations alleged against them, and how their conduct would impact the COI's view of The University. Both Cottrell and Williams were charged with not providing full disclosure of information during an interview. Although the enforcement staff dropped the charge against Williams, it pursued the charge against Cottrell. The COI found that Cottrell had not complied with the rules in this regard. Therefore, the conduct of Cottrell and Williams did influence the way the NCAA viewed The University's compliance with the rules. Additionally, the record established that Cottrell and Williams both associated with Young, who was the major focus of the NCAA investigation and the main reason for the severity of the penalties imposed. Both Cottrell and Williams admitted violating certain NCAA rules, and, although no penalty was imposed against either Cottrell or Williams, The University was penalized for Cottrell's and Williams's violations of various NCAA rules. Although the evidence indicated that Cottrell and Williams were caught up in the controversy against [their] will, the evidence adequately established that they had assumed by their actions and their association with Young a prominent position in its outcome. Breland, 93 F.3d at 758.
In determining a plaintiffs involvement in the controversy, consideration must also be given to the extent to which the plaintiff had access to channels of effective communication to counteract any false statements. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-45, 94 S.Ct. 2997. The NCAA and Culpepper argue that Cottrell and Williams had adequate access to the media to effectively rebut the alleged defamatory statements. The NCAA and Culpepper submitted over 200 newspaper and Internet articles published over several years containing comments by Cottrell and Williams throughout their careers at The University. Additionally, the NCAA points out that at the time it published the false statements in the penalty-summary report neither Cottrell nor Williams were prohibited from talking with the press. Cottrell and Williams argue that although they did enjoy limited access to the press as assistant coaches who were questioned about various prospective student-athletes and enrolled student-athletes, the NCAA rules prohibited them from discussing the NCAA investigation with the press and prevented them from being able to defend their reputations in the press. They maintain that this gag order prevented them from having access to the media and precluded a finding as a matter of law that they were limited-purpose public figures. In Price v. Chaffinch, (No. 04-956, May 12, 2006) (D.Del.2006) (not reported in F.Supp.2d), the United States District Court addressed whether a gag order imposed by the defendant, which prevented the plaintiff from responding in the media to the defamatory statements made by the defendant, precluded a finding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure. In Price, the plaintiffs media access was nonexistent, in light of the defendant's imposition of a gag order. The federal district court held that although this fact cut against a finding that the plaintiff was a public figure, the plaintiff was aware that a public controversy existed, yet he voluntarily assumed a position in the controversy. The court balanced the gag order against the plaintiffs voluntary assumption of risk in the controversy and concluded that the plaintiff was a significant player in a controversy with high public interest. Consequently, the court held that the gag order imposed on the plaintiff was a factor to consider, but did not preclude a finding that the plaintiff was a limited-purpose public figure. A similar circumstance was also addressed in Sculimbrene v. Reno, 158 F.Supp.2d 8 (D.D.C.2001), in which a former FBI agent sued a media commentator, alleging that the commentator conspired with others to defame him. The commentator attacked the agent's credibility with regard to statements he had made to various congressional bodies. The agent was unable to respond in the media to the attack because the FBI refused to allow him access to the media. The court; when addressing whether the agent was a limited-purpose public figure who had been drawn into a public controversy, focused on the agent's role in the controversy. In conducting the analysis pursuant to the Waldbaum test, the court noted that the agent's access to the press, both prior to the relevant controversy and during the relevant controversy, was at all times, circumscribed by his employment by the FBI, and his employer prevented him from talking with the media. 158 F.Supp.2d at 23. Nevertheless, the court held that the agent was a limited-purpose public figure because his actions required the conclusion that the' agent had played a significant role in the outcome of the controversy. Therefore, although the gag order prevented the agent from having access to the media, this fact did not out-weigh the evidence indicating that the agent had played a prominent role in the controversy or preclude a finding that the agent was a limited-purpose public figure. We agree with the federal district courts that the imposition of a gag order does not necessitate a finding that an individual is not a limited-purpose public figure. It deserves weight in making the determination, but it does not prevent such a finding. Here, the gag order prevented Cottrell and Williams from discussing their role in the NCAA investigation with the press. However, the evidence that Cottrell and Williams played a prominent role in the public controversy significantly outweighs the effect of the gag order.

A private individual, however, is not automatically transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with a matter that attracts public attention. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. 2701. In general, to be a limited purpose public figure, the plaintiff must voluntarily thrust himself into the vortex of the dispute. From the voluntary act is derived the notion of assumption of the risk and the consequent fairness in labelling the person a public figure. Marcane v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1083 (3d Cir.1985). In Waldbaum, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia elaborated on a plaintiffs voluntary injection into a particular public controversy, noting that a person becomes a limited-purpose public figure if he attempts to have, or realistically can be expected to have, a major impact on the resolution of the public controversy. 627 F.2d at 1292. A person who voluntarily injects himself into a particular public controversy invites attention and comment. See Hunter v. Hartman, 545 N.W.2d 699 (Minn.Ct.App.1996)(holding that a team doctor for a college football program was a limited-purpose public figure because he voluntarily commented in a book and on national television about the public controversy over a former head coach's coaching style); Daubenmire v. Sommers, 156 Ohio App.3d 322, 805 N.E.2d 571 (2004)(holding that a coach voluntarily injected himself into a controversy by injecting religion into public schools); Chevalier v. Animal Rehab. Ctr., 839 F.Supp. 1224 (N.D.Tex.1993)(holding that a zoologist voluntarily injected himself into a controversy by appearing on television, giving interviews, and attempting to orchestrate a counter letter-writing campaign); James v. Gannett Co., 40 N.Y.2d 415, 353 N.E.2d 834, 386 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1976) (holding that a belly dancer voluntarily injected herself into controversy by taking affirmative steps in the press to attract attention); and Oaks v. City of Fairhope, 515 F.Supp. 1004 (S.D.Ala.1981)(holding that a librarian voluntarily injected herself into controversy by presenting her case in press). Additionally, a person can voluntarily inject himself into a public controversy by choosing a position that thrusts the person into the public controversy. In White v. Mobile Press Register, Inc., supra, this Court held that John C. White was a public figure because of his choice of career as a high level executive in an industry that is the subject of much public interest and concern. 514 So.2d at 904. The Court reasoned that his choice of career exhibited a voluntary decision to place himself in a situation where there was a likelihood of public controversy. Id. In Fiacco v. Sigma Alpha Epsilon Fraternity, 484 F.Supp.2d 158 (D.Me.2007), the district court held that David Fiacco, the director of judicial affairs at the University of Maine, was a limited-purpose public figure. With regard to the voluntariness factor of the determination, the court held that Fiacco, in light of his position, voluntarily injected himself into the public controversy. The court determined that newspaper articles in the record established that a public controversy existed concerning the student-disciplinary process at the University of Maine. The court observed that as director of judicial affairs, Fiacco had the capacity to investigate allegations of student misconduct, adjudicate cases, conduct hearings himself and proscribe sanctions or refer a case to a committee for its action. 484 F.Supp.2d at 163. The court reasoned that [t]he nature of the position thrust Fiacco into the public controversy surrounding the student disciplinary process. 484 F.Supp.2d at 172. The court concluded that because Fiacco voluntarily accepted the position of director of judicial affairs and that position placed him at the center of a public controversy, he had injected himself into the public controversy. We conclude that Cottrell and Williams also injected themselves into the public controversy. When Williams accepted his coaching position in 1994 and Cottrell accepted his position in 1997, both men knew that The University was a member of the NCAA, that they were expected to comply with NCAA rules in a highly competitive environment, and that their actions would come under close scrutiny. Cottrell and Williams were both responsible for recruiting prospective student-athletes to sign scholarships to play football for The University. Both coaches were expected to abide by NCAA rules when recruiting prospective student-athletes. The nature of their positions at The University and the responsibilities of their positions thrust them into the public controversy concerning The University's compliance with NCAA rules. Like White and Fiacco, Cottrell and Williams made career choices that thrust them into positions involving much public interest and concern. The public controversy surrounding The University's compliance with NCAA rules began in 1995. Thus, by accepting their coaching positions, Cottrell and Williams show[ed] a voluntary decision to place [themselves] in a situation where there was a likelihood of public controversy. Therefore, because Cottrell and Williams voluntarily accepted positions with The University's football program under such circumstances, we conclude that they injected themselves into the public controversy. [12]
A plaintiff is drawn into a public controversy when his actions invite comment and attention, despite the fact that the plaintiff does not actively try or even want to attract the public's attention. See, e.g., Rosanova v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 411 F.Supp. 440 (S.D.Ga.1976), aff'd, 580 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.1978)(holding that Rosanova was a limited-purpose public figure because he consistently associated with underworld contacts and voluntarily engaged in a course of activity that was bound to invite attention and comment). Therefore, a person can be drawn into a public controversy based on his status, position, or association to the public controversy. See Swate v. Schiffers, 975 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.App.1998)(holding that a doctor was drawn into public controversy about the quality of his medical practice in light of the 24 articles written over 10 years describing the atrociousness of the doctor's medical practice). The NCAA and Culpepper argue that Cottrell and Williams were drawn into the controversy because they played a role in the conduct that resulted in The University's being charged with various NCAA rule violations, they participated in the NCAA's investigation into those alleged rule violations, and they were the subject of numerous newspaper articles about the alleged rule violations. According to the NCAA and Culpepper, this evidence established that Cottrell and Williams were in positions that invite[d] attention and comment with respect to their participation in the controversy. The evidence unequivocally established that by their actions Cottrell and Williams invited public scrutiny and should have expected public and media attention with regard to their conduct and involvement in the NCAA investigation of alleged rule violations and the surrounding public controversy. Articles detailed Cottrell's and Williams's conduct throughout the controversy, including their close association with Young, their interviews with Johanningmeier, the alleged rule violations made against them and their responses, and the penalties, or lack thereof, imposed against them. Additionally, the evidence established that Cottrell and Williams proactively engaged in the conduct that was the subject of alleged rule violations and admitted certain violations. Furthermore, their close association with Young, who was the central focus of the investigation, indicated that their conduct invited public attention and comment. Without question, the evidence established that Cottrell and Williams engaged in a course of conduct with respect to the investigation and the surrounding controversy that was bound to invite attention and comment; therefore, Cottrell and Williams were drawn into the public controversy. Indeed, it appears that there are similarities between Cottrell and Williams's being drawn into the public controversy by virtue of their alleged commission of violations of various NCAA rules and a defendant who has been drawn into a public controversy by virtue of being accused of a crime. In Wolston, the United States Supreme Court held that a person who engages in criminal conduct does not automatically become a public figure. The Court noted that the status of the criminal defendant should be determined by focusing on the `nature and extent of an individual's participation in the controversy giving rise to the [alleged] defamation.' 443 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. 2701 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352, 94 S.Ct. 2997). In Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 241 Kan. 595, 600-03, 738 P.2d 1246, 1251-53 (1987), the Kansas Supreme Court held that Ruebke, a criminal defendant, was a limited-purpose public figure because of the intense media coverage of the investigation into the triple murders Ruebke had been charged with; Ruebke's voluntary act of turning himself in to the police to seek protective custody; and his arrest and indictment for the three murders. The court held that although no one factor standing alone would be sufficient to convey limited-purpose public-figure status on Ruebke, the factors considered as a whole sufficiently established that Ruebke was drawn into a situation that invited comment. The court stated: Individuals who do not seek publicity or consent to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise become a subject of public interest, may become limited public figures. Those who commit crime or are accused of it may wish to avoid publicity, but are nevertheless persons of public interest, concerning whom the public is entitled to be informed. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D, comment f (1976). 241 Kan. at 600, 738 P.2d at 1251. Although Cottrell's and Williams's conduct did not involve criminal activity, it did involve violations of NCAA rules, which impacted The University, its alumni, and the citizens of this State. Given the public nature of the conduct at issue here and the widespread media attention given the controversy, we hold that the evidence established that Cottrell and Williams were drawn into the public controversy.