Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Unconsciousness as complete defense.

Text: The jury received instructions, among others, on robbery, both the premeditated and felony-murder forms of first degree murder, express- and implied-malice second degree murder, and voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Defendant requested, and received, an instruction that if, while unconscious as the result of voluntary intoxication, he killed without malice or intent to kill, the crime was not murder, but involuntary manslaughter. The jury was also instructed, as to crimes requiring specific intent, that it must consider the effect of defendant's voluntary intoxication, if any, when determining whether he formed such intent. Finally, the jury heard it could convict defendant of voluntary manslaughter if he killed in the honest, though unreasonable, belief in the need for self-defense. [39] Defendant now urges that the court erred by failing to instruct, sua sponte, on the complete defense of unconsciousness. He asserts that the error violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to have the jury consider every material fact presented by the evidence. As the basis of his claim, defendant cites the California rule that, as a corollary of its duty to instruct on all principles closely and openly connected with the facts of the case, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case ( People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 681, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1; People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531, 83 Cal. Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390), the court must instruct on an affirmative defense, specifically including unconsciousness, even in the absence of a request, if it appears the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. ( People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) One cannot be guilty of a crime if he or she committed the act charged without being conscious thereof. (§ 26, par. Four.) On the other hand, voluntary intoxication, even if it induced unconsciousness, is not a defense to crime as such, though it may be relevant to whether the defendant formed a specific intent necessary for its commission. (§ 22; see, e.g., People v. Kelly (1973) 10 Cal.3d 565, 572-573, 111 Cal.Rptr. 171, 516 P.2d 875 ( Kelly ); People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310, 323, 49 Cal.Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911.) Voluntary intoxication can prevent formation of any specific intent requisite to the offense at issue, but it can never excuse homicide. Hence, at the time defendant committed his crimes, where voluntary intoxication rendered the defendant unconscious, `criminal negligence [was] deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness,' and the offense was involuntary manslaughter. ( People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 82, 86, 89 Cal.Rptr. 58, 473 P.2d 762.) [40] As noted above, the trial court instructed in accordance with these principles. However, defendant urges there was substantial evidence, i.e., evidence from which a rational jury could conclude, that he killed the Harbitzes while hallucinating, and thus unconscious, for reasons not related to the immediate effects of voluntary intoxication  including the lingering effects of chronic drug abuse [41] and past head injuries. He points to expert testimony that he was a chronic drug abuser, that the substances he habitually ingested could produce long-term mental effects, including delusions and hallucinations, and that he had hallucinated on a previous occasion after suffering a motorcycle accident in which he hit his head. Defendant also notes John Kennedy's testimony that defendant seemed sober both immediately before and immediately after the Harbitz killings  thus suggesting, in defendant's view, that, while he was in the Harbitz home, he had a momentary flashback not related to the immediate intoxicating effects of recently ingested drugs. We need not address whether the trial court erred by failing, sua sponte, to instruct on the complete defense of unconsciousness. We find that if error occurred, it was harmless by any applicable standard. In the first place, very strong evidence suggested that defendant killed the Harbitzes, while conscious, in the course of a robbery. As Kennedy noted, defendant seemed mentally normal at all times during the evening of December 7, 1982. In particular, his activity following the homicides appeared entirely rational and goal-directed. When he saw a patrol car, he tried to deflect suspicion by pretending to wipe the rear window of Kennedy's vehicle. Defendant told Kennedy to drive away without attracting attention, directed Kennedy, who was in unfamiliar territory, back to the freeway, and began going through wallets he had retrieved from the Harbitz residence. There is no evidence defendant told either Kennedy or Cynthia Cornwell, while the experience was still fresh, that he suffered hallucinations, delusions, or a temporary blackout while inside the house. Instead, to explain his knee wound, defendant lied to Kennedy that he had encountered dope dealers that don't have no dope and had to hurt `em. Defendant similarly lied to Cornwell that he had gotten into a fight with a loan shark. Defendant's own experts were hardly enthusiastic in their support for his hallucination theory. Indeed, they carefully refrained from expressing any opinions that defendant actually hallucinated at the Harbitz residence. Dr. Klatte, the principal defense expert, indicated considerable skepticism on the issue, for multiple reasons. He acknowledged that defendant, who exhibited an antisocial personality, had a loud and clear capacity for malingering when it suited his purposes. Dr. Klatte's suspicions were further aroused by defendant's failure to mention hallucinations to him until many years after their initial interviews. Finally, Dr. Klatte conceded that much of defendant's activity on the night of the murders appeared goal-directed, i.e., to obtain money for drugs. The premise that hallucinations may have stemmed from a prior head injury was particularly flimsy. Dr. Klatte testified that, while defendant had hallucinated shortly after his motorcycle accident, it was not known whether the hallucinations were the result of the accident or of drug ingestion. Finally, as noted above, the jury was instructed that voluntary intoxication warranted a verdict of involuntary manslaughter, rather than murder. While the instructions did not specify what the jury should do if it found he was unconscious for reasons beyond his control, such as brain damage, it is inconceivable the jury would believe that, in such a circumstance, it should (1) convict him of murder, a crime greater than manslaughter, then (2) find true special circumstances rendering him death-eligible, then (3) sentence him to death. (See People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 692-693, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887.) The only logical inference is that the jury rejected defendant's claim of unconsciousness entirely. Hence, an instructional failure to explain the jury's duty in the event it found involuntary unconsciousness can have caused no prejudice. [42]