Opinion ID: 657321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cosgrove's Retaliatory Discharge Claim

Text: 14 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits retaliatory termination of employees for opposing alleged discriminatory practices. Section 704(a) of the statute, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-3(a) (1988), provides that: 15 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment ... because [s]he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because [s]he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 16 This Court has previously held that the distribution and allocation of burdens of proof in retaliatory discharge claims follow the general disparate treatment analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) and Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). See Sumner, 899 F.2d at 208. The plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of discrimination, by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. This test has been further refined by the Supreme Court's holding in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993), which, pursuant to Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993), must be applied retroactively to the instant case. See Saulpaugh v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 140-41 (2d Cir.1993). In Hicks, the Supreme Court held that a fact finder's rejection of an employer's asserted reason for its actions does not entitle a plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law because the plaintiff at all times retains the ultimate burden of persuasion. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2747. Thus, once the defendant has succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the McDonnell Douglas framework--with its presumptions and burdens--is no longer relevant. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749. The ultimate question is whether plaintiff has proven 'that the defendant intentionally discriminated [or retaliated] against [her]'  because, as in the instant case, she engaged in a protected activity. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093). 17 For purposes of establishing a prima facie case, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act is violated when a retaliatory motive plays a part in adverse employment actions toward an employee, whether or not it was the sole cause. In addition, Title VII is violated when an employer is motivated by retaliatory animus, even if valid objective reasons for the discharge exist. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209; see also Davis, 802 F.2d at 642; DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 821 F.2d 111, n. 8 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 965, 108 S.Ct. 455, 98 L.Ed.2d 395 (1987). Once a prima facie case is established by a plaintiff, the burden of production shifts to the employer to demonstrate that a  'legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason'  existed for its action, Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209 (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253, 101 S.Ct. at 1093), although the ultimate burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff. Hicks, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2749; Saulpaugh, 4 F.3d at 142. The critical question is whether a plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant intentionally discriminated or retaliated against the plaintiff for engaging in protected activity. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209 (quoting Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hosps., Inc., 726 F.2d 1346, 1354 (9th Cir.1984)). 18 A plaintiff in a section 704(a) retaliation claim must demonstrate, for the purposes of a prima facie case, that: (1) she was engaged in an activity protected under Title VII; (2) the employer was aware of plaintiff's participation in the protected activity; (3) the employer took adverse action against plaintiff based upon her activity; and (4) a causal connection existed between the plaintiff's protected activity and the adverse action taken by the employer. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 208-09 (citation omitted); Lambert v. Genesee Hosp., 10 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir.1993). To establish that an activity was protected, a plaintiff need only prove that she was acting under a good faith belief that the activity was of the kind covered by the statute. Sumner, 899 F.2d at 209. Finally, a plaintiff may establish a causal connection indirectly by showing that the protected activity was followed by discriminatory treatment ... or directly through evidence of retaliatory animus. Id. The facts established at trial show that Cosgrove has met all prongs of the test: (1) Cosgrove filed an EEOC complaint against Sears; (2) Sears was aware of this, as early as November 1, 1977; and (3) Sears did not follow its own procedures for addressing employee performance deficiencies in terminating Cosgrove's employment. Thus, we are persuaded that Cosgrove has made a prima facie showing that Sears discharged her--retaliated--because she engaged in a protected activity--i.e., because she filed an EEOC complaint against Sears. 19
20 After reviewing the evidence of Cosgrove's conversation with the office manager, the resulting low evaluation ratings, the December 2, 1977 letter informing her that she had thirty days to improve her performance, which was extended to sixty days, the violation of the company's employment policy regarding termination of employees and counselling sessions, and, finally, the preparation of her termination letter prior to the end of the sixty day improvement period, the district court determined that it was more likely than not that Brumfield and Hegwood knew Cosgrove had filed a sex discrimination claim against Sears, and that knowledge influenced the manner and timing of Cosgrove's discharge. Cosgrove, 81 Civ. 3482, 1992 WL 8718 at  15 (emphasis added). 21 Despite this finding, however, the district court concluded that Sears was not liable because it had proved that it would have discharged Cosgrove anyway. Id. at  18. This conclusion was reached by applying Price Waterhouse, which held that the defendant [in an employment discrimination case] may avoid a finding of liability only by proving that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed [the discriminatory factor] to play such a role. 490 U.S. at 244-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1787-88 (footnote omitted). The court concluded that Brumfield and Hegwood became dissatisfied with Cosgrove's performance and personality flaws, and that those reasons, standing alone,  'would have induced [Sears] to make the same decision.'  Cosgrove, No. 81 Civ. 3482, 1992 WL 8718 at  18 (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252, 109 S.Ct. at 1792). 22 In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court stated that [a]n employer may not ... prevail in a mixed-motives case by offering a legitimate and sufficient reason for its decision if that reason did not motivate it at the time of the decision. 490 U.S. at 252, 109 S.Ct. at 1791 (emphasis added). In the case before us, it is undisputed that Cosgrove was denied an opportunity--the opportunity to have the follow-up counselling and performance evaluations described in the company's manual that was open to all other employees, after she had filed sex discrimination charges with the EEOC against Sears. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a discriminatory factor play[ed] a motivating part in an employment decision, the defendant must demonstrate that it would have made the same decision based upon the legitimate factor alone. Id. at 244-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1787-88. It is reasonable that the employer  'bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing.'  Id. at 250, 109 S.Ct. at 1790 (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 2475, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983)). 23 It is clear that there were personality differences between Cosgrove and her supervisors after she transferred to Department 618 as far back as 1974. Nevertheless, given Sears' failure to provide follow-up interviews and counselling, the fact that Sears jumped the gun in its preparation of relevant termination papers, and the district court's finding that Sears' supervisors knew appellant had filed a sex discrimination claim, which knowledge influenced the manner and timing of her discharge, we believe that, as a matter of law, Sears' decision to terminate Cosgrove's employment on February 6, 1978, was motivated, at least in part, by an illegitimate reason. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 252, 109 S.Ct. at 1791-92. The district court erred in finding that Sears would have made the same decision even absent the discriminatory motive, since one cannot know whether the follow-up steps would have improved Cosgrove's performance. See Simpson v. Diversitech Gen., Inc., 945 F.2d 156, 160 (6th Cir.1991) (Title VII was violated where the employee was discharged due to poor employment record, but the employment record was infected by the employer's racial bias), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1072, 117 L.Ed.2d 277 (1992). In short, it cannot be determined whether Sears would have discharged Cosgrove if she had received the manual-mandated follow-up counselling and further evaluation. In Vaughn v. Edel, 918 F.2d 517 (5th Cir.1990), the plaintiff, who had a record of low work product and excessive office visits, was denied formal criticism of her work because of her race. Id. at 520. The Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff was the victim of discriminatory discharge because the same opportunity to improve her performance, and perhaps her relative ranking, which was open to all other employees, was denied to her. Id. at 522. In Vaughn, the court concluded that the employer must bear the cost of its lost opportunity to determine whether [the employee discriminated against] might have remained one of the two 'lowest ranked' contract analysts had it not made decisions based on race. Id. at 523. Herein, Sears must bear the cost of its lost opportunity. 24 An important purpose behind the remedial scheme of Title VII is to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). There is a presumption that victims of discrimination are entitled to make-whole relief. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 and n. 21, 766, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1264, and n. 21, 1265, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). Here, the district court determined that Cosgrove's filing of the EEOC complaint affected both the timing and manner of her discharge. We conclude that appellant is entitled not only to prevail on her retaliatory discharge claim but also is entitled to remedial relief for the period between when she was discharged based upon the discriminatory factor, and when she would have been discharged based upon her performance alone. Accordingly, we reverse the determination of the district court as to Cosgrove's retaliatory discharge claim, and remand for a calculation of her damages. 4