Opinion ID: 2823854
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Criminal Defendantâs Right to Counsel of Choice

Text: Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â âA defendantâs right to be represented by counsel of choice is grounded in the jurisprudence of the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and is entitled to great deference.â Rodriguez v. Dist. Court, 719 P.2d 699, 705 (Colo. 1986). âThis guarantee reflects the substantial interest of a defendant in retaining the freedom to select an attorney the defendant trusts and in whom the defendant has confidence.â Id. at 705â06. A defendantâs right to select an attorney the defendant trusts is considered to be central to the adversary system and of substantial importance to the integrity of the judicial process. People v. Brown, 2014 CO 25, Â¶16, 322 P.3d 214, 219 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). âAs such, we afford this right great deference.â Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice is not absolute and must give way under certain circumstances. People v. Frisco, 119 P.3d 1093, 1095 (Colo. 2005) (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)). âIn some circumstances, fundamental considerations other than a defendantâs interest in retaining a particular attorney are deemed of controlling significance.â Rodriguez, 719 P.2d at 706. âThese considerations relate to the paramount necessity of preserving public confidence in theintegrity of the administration of justice.â Id. To that end, courts retain the discretion to disqualify attorneys from further representation. In re Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d 1023, 1025 (Colo. 2006). Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Although disqualification is a matter of trial court discretion, the court must take into account the importance of continued representation of a party by his or her counsel of choice. Nozolino, Â¶13, 298 P.3d at 919. This is particularly true in the criminal context, where the defendantâs Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his or her choice is at stake. âDisqualification of a partyâs chosen attorney is an extreme remedy and is only appropriate where required to preserve the integrity and fairness of the judicial proceedings.â Id.; accord Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d at 1025 (â[W]e have made clear that disqualification is a severe remedy that should be avoided whenever possible.â). We have noted that courts are âhighly cynicalâ of motions to disqualify opposing counsel in light of their potential use as dilatory or tactical devices. See Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1272 (Colo. 2005); Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d at 1025. A defendantâs choice of counsel will not lightly be denied, particularly where the courtâs concern lies not with protecting the defendant, but instead with protecting the interests of former clients, avoiding mistrial or reversal from later-materializing actual conflicts, or undermining public confidence in the impartiality and fairness of the process. Frisco, 119 P.3d at 1095. Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â The moving party has the burden of establishing that disqualification is proper. People v. Harlan, 54 P.3d 871, 877 (Colo. 2002). That burden is met only where the motion to disqualify sets forth specific facts showing a âclear danger that prejudice to aclient or adversary would result from continued representation.â Estate of Myers, 130 P.3d at 1025. âThe required showing of prejudice cannot be based on mere speculation or conjecture.â Nozolino, Â¶13, 298 P.3d at 919. Additionally, the trial court must determine that any remedy short of disqualification would be ineffective. Id.