Opinion ID: 420816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The convicted appellants: Moore and Henry Mulherin

Text: 9 a. Government misconduct 10 Moore and Henry Mulherin challenge the district court's refusal to dismiss the indictment for alleged government misconduct in investigating and prosecuting the case; i.e., there was no basis for Peacock's beginning the investigation since none of the defendants was suspected of criminal activity; appellants were unwary innocents seduced by Peacock into crimes so he could collect reward money; Peacock lied on the witness stand about paying his income taxes in previous years; an investigatory agent threatened a defense witness; and an agency witness lied about Peacock's financial incentives from the agency. 11 Government involvement in criminal schemes can be so outrageous that it offends due process. See U.S. v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381 (5th Cir.1981) (Unit B), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108, 102 S.Ct. 2908, 73 L.Ed.2d 1317 (1982) 4 ; see also Hampton v. U.S., 425 U.S. 484, 492-93, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 1651, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring); U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 431, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1642, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). To amount to a constitutional violation the law enforcement techniques must be so outrageous that they are fundamentally unfair and  'shocking to the universal sense of justice,' mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. U.S. v. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 93 S.Ct. at 1643 (quoting Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246, 80 S.Ct. 297, 303, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960)). 12 The government maintains these appellants have no standing to assert a due process violation based on alleged outrageous government conduct because neither Moore nor Henry Mulherin was first introduced into the scheme by a government agent. Because the conduct complained of here falls far short of a due process violation, we need not explore the question of standing to assert this defense. In Tobias, supra, the court rejected a claim of outrageous government conduct where the government suggested to the defendant that he manufacture the controlled substance PCP, provided him with the formula, chemicals, and equipment necessary for manufacturing PCP, and continued to give technical advice to him during the manufacturing process. While Peacock may have suggested the illegal activity here and given advice on converting weapons and manufacturing silencers, it was the defendants themselves who obtained the equipment and supplies for their activities. In U.S. v. Savage, 701 F.2d 867 (11th Cir.1983), a claim of outrageous government conduct was rejected where DEA agents posed as sellers of large quantities of marijuana, put the word out through undercover agents and confidential informants that marijuana was for sale, and arrested persons who bought marijuana from them once the sale was consummated. Here as in Savage there was no reason for the government to suspect the particular defendants of criminal behavior at the outset of the undercover operation, and the confidential informants used, like Peacock, had a financial stake in netting as many people in the sting as they could. In U.S. v. Struyf, 701 F.2d 875 (11th Cir.1983), the contention of a due process violation was rejected where, in a Savage -type operation, the government informant solicited a close friend who was his former brother-in-law. 13 The assertions that Peacock and others lied about financial matters are based upon inconsistencies that were explored during trial. The jury had full opportunity to assess the conduct and credibility of the government's witnesses and also had overwhelming and essentially undisputed evidence of appellants' participation through some 50 hours of recorded conversations. 14 b. Severance and joinder 15 Moore and Henry Mulherin contend the district court abused its discretion by denying their motions for severance. The district court may order severance where it determines prejudice will result from joinder, Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 14, but the decision to sever is in the discretion of the district judge, and will not be overturned in the absence of abuse of that discretion. U.S. v. Riola, 694 F.2d 670, 672 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1532, 75 L.Ed.2d 953 (1983). Appellants do not show an abuse. 16 Moore and Henry Mulherin maintain that they were prejudiced by Hornsby's, Holliday's, and Tony Mulherin's use of the entrapment defense. They argue that as minor actors they were prejudiced by a spillover of the evidence against Hornsby, Holliday and Tony Mulherin. They urge that the jury's verdict was inconsistent, showing an inability to compartmentalize the evidence against each defendant. Henry Mulherin also contends that the jury confused him with his brother Tony. 17 A codefendant's reliance on the entrapment defense does not of itself require severance for a defendant not asserting that defense. U.S. v. Salomon, 609 F.2d 1172, 1175 (5th Cir.1980). To require severance the defenses must be so antagonistic that they are mutually exclusive. Id. Here the use of the entrapment defense by codefendants added little to the government's case against Moore and Henry Mulherin. Appellants' participation was amply proved by the undercover tape recordings. The core defense used by Moore and Henry Mulherin was government misconduct in the investigation. This is akin to entrapment, not antagonistic. 18 As for overspill of evidence, appellants have not shown compelling prejudice. As in most joint trials, some participants were more involved than others. Inconsistent verdicts can stand if supported by the evidence. See U.S. v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 361 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 2316, 68 L.Ed.2d 840 (1981). The possibility of jury confusion over the complicity of the two Mulherin brothers was slight since they played vastly different roles in the enterprise. 19 c. Sufficiency of the evidence 20 Moore and Henry Mulherin challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions. In evaluating a sufficiency challenge we view the evidence presented and the inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government. 21 Applying the standards of Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), the evidence is compelling that a conspiracy was afoot, that Moore knew of the conspiracy, and that she voluntarily became part of it. See U.S. v. Lippner, 676 F.2d 456, 466 (11th Cir.1982). Tony Mulherin told Peacock and Agent Gleffe that he would send a woman to the airport to meet them and inspect the quality of a sample of the expected cocaine. Moore appeared at the specified time and place and introduced herself as Tony Mulherin's friend. She told Gleffe that she and Tony had dealt together in cocaine and marijuana for some time. When shown bogus cocaine she inquired about the price. She said she would report the results of her inspection to Tony Mulherin. Later Tony gave her marijuana to evaluate that he had received as a sample from Peacock. She was present during meetings between Peacock and the ringleaders where the scheme was discussed. She commented during a recorded meeting that she had previously been involved in a large marijuana deal. According to Tony Mulherin, Moore introduced him to a man named Layton who could price the expected cocaine for the group. The following notation appeared in Tony Mulherin's appointment book underneath what appeared to be a price list for drugs: 22 Liz can get rid of 1 lb [pound] of coke [cocaine] in first week in Atlanta plus a few oz [ounces of cocaine] in Ags [Augusta] plus 1,000 ludes [quaaludes], plus 20-25 lbs [of marijuana.] Probably can double with Laytons help. 23 Government's exhibit 17-D. At Mulherin's direction Moore obtained various paraphernalia useful for cutting cocaine. 24 Moore contends, however, that because the same evidence was used to prove the firearms conspiracy as was used to prove the drug conspiracy, and the jury acquitted her on the former count, she must be acquitted on the drug conspiracy count. This misapprehends both the different elements of proof required under the two conspiracy statutes involved and the significance of a jury acquittal. While no overt act is required to prove a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. Section 846, there is an overt act requirement under 18 U.S.C. Section 371, under which the firearms conspiracy was prosecuted. Criminal juries are free to render not guilty verdicts based on compromise, confusion, mistake, leniency, and a variety of other legally and logically irrelevant considerations. U.S. v. Espinosa-Cerpa, 630 F.2d 328, 332 (5th Cir.1980). The relevant inquiry is whether the conviction Moore received is supported by the evidence. See U.S. v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d at 361. It is. 25 Moore also contends that she is entitled to judgment of acquittal or new trial because the jury found no one else guilty on the drug conspiracy count. U.S. v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 991, 102 S.Ct. 1617, 71 L.Ed.2d 852 (1982); U.S. v. Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023, 94 S.Ct. 447, 38 L.Ed.2d 315 (1973). Not all other alleged co-conspirators were acquitted. There was a mistrial as to Tony Mulherin because the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The indictment alleged participation of unknown co-conspirators and known, but unnamed, co-conspirators. Clayton was named as a co-conspirator in the drug conspiracy count and not tried with Moore because he pleaded guilty. If the evidence supports the charge that Moore conspired with unknown persons, known but unnamed persons, or Clayton, her conviction will stand regardless of the disposition of the charges against the co-indictees with whom she was tried. See U.S. v. Klein, 560 F.2d 1236, 1242 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1073, 98 S.Ct. 1259, 55 L.Ed.2d 777 (1978); U.S. v. Lance, 536 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir.1976). As discussed above, there was evidence presented about a man named Layton whom Moore introduced to Tony Mulherin to price the expected cocaine. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could have concluded that Moore and Layton, a known but unindicted person, conspired, or that Moore and Clayton, an admittedly guilty person, conspired. 26 Appellant Henry Mulherin's sufficiency challenge centers on his contention that he lacked the requisite knowledge of the nature of the scheme to have joined the conspiracy. Mulherin maintains the credible evidence showed that his brother Tony and the others deliberately kept him in the dark about the objectives of the conspiracy. 27 As to each alleged firearms conspirator the prosecution must prove that a conspiracy existed, that the defendant knew the essential objectives of that conspiracy, and that armed with that knowledge he participated, and must prove an overt act by one of the conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy. See U.S. v. Bankston, 603 F.2d 528, 531 (5th Cir.1976). While mere presence or association with others involved in a criminal scheme is not sufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy, U.S. v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970, 102 S.Ct. 516, 70 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981), the essential elements of a conspiracy can be proved by inference from the actions of the parties or by circumstantial evidence. U.S. v. Alvarez, 625 F.2d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938, 101 S.Ct. 2017, 68 L.Ed.2d 324 (1981). Direct evidence of an agreement to join a criminal conspiracy is rare, so a defendant's assent can be inferred from acts furthering the conspiracy's purpose. U.S. v. Middlebrooks, 618 F.2d 273 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds, 624 F.2d 36, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 984, 101 S.Ct. 401, 66 L.Ed.2d 247 (1980). The government is not required to prove that each alleged conspirator knew all the details of the conspiracy; it is enough to establish that a defendant knew the essentials of the conspiracy. Alvarez, 625 F.2d at 1198. 28 We hold the evidence was sufficient to sustain Henry Mulherin's conviction. There was evidence that he was not to be told that Peacock was paying for the goods in marijuana and cocaine because he would not participate if he found out drugs were involved. But Henry was not charged in the drug conspiracy, only in the firearms conspiracy. In a sufficiency challenge it is his knowledge of only that conspiracy with which we are concerned. Cf. U.S. v. Colson, 662 F.2d 1389 (11th Cir.1981); U.S. v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir.1978), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 906 (1980) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. U.S. v. Albernaz, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); U.S. v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.1980). 29 The evidence showed that Henry personally delivered some 300 pounds of dynamite plus blasting caps and detonation cord to Peacock and was prepared to personally deliver another 1,000 pounds when he was arrested. These deliveries were made at the direction of Tony Mulherin, who paid Henry more than five times as much as the goods would be worth in a legal sale. Henry also supplied Holliday and Hornsby with 300 pounds of dynamite, which they delivered to one of Peacock's supposed business associates. Henry was told that the dynamite was being sent to South America. He was concerned that the dynamite not be used in this country lest it be traced to him. He made delivery of the explosives in a secluded area. When the goods were delivered, all markings had been removed from the boxes. This is ample evidence from which the jury could infer that Henry knew the essential purposes of the firearms conspiracy and voluntarily undertook to participate in it. The district court did not err in refusing his motion for acquittal or in the alternative for a new trial. 30 d. Moore's remaining contentions 31 Moore's other issues may be disposed of briefly, some without comment. 32 She challenges the admissibility of an incriminating statement she made to an ATF agent shortly before her arrest: 33 She [Moore] said that the police are everywhere in town. That a lot of people are getting arrested. She said they know everything, they even know the name Operation Flying Circus. She stated a location in Augusta, Georgia, that was the location where all of the cut and mixing bowls were. 34 Testimony of ATF Agent Penny, Supp.Rec. at 951. Moore contends she was in custody at the time the statement was made and should have been advised of her rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 35 Moore and Peacock had arranged to meet at the airport on April 6, the day after the arrests in this case began. Agent Penny testified that when he and Agent Reese, whom Moore had met in his undercover pose as Peacock's pilot, came into the airport lobby, Moore approached them in an excited manner. She began rambling on about the recent arrests and blurted out the statement without being asked any questions. Then she was arrested. 36 Moore's statement was not the fruit of interrogation. It was admissible as a spontaneous, unsolicited statement. 37 There is no merit to Moore's contention that the overt acts alleged against her in the indictment were insufficient. Under the drug conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. Section 846, an overt act is not required to be either alleged or proved. U.S. v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906, 919 n. 37 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. U.S. v. Albernaz, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). 38 Her assertion that the statements made by her alleged co-conspirators against her were improperly admitted into evidence is also meritless. 39