Opinion ID: 754090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Combined Retaliation Instruction

Text: The Board Members' second ground for appeal is that the trial court erred in submitting both Cross's state and federal retaliation claims in a combined instruction. As we held above, this issue can be reviewed only for plain error, because the Board Members failed to make adequate, timely objections to the joint verdict director before the instructions were submitted to the jury. On appeal, the Board Members assert that it was error to submit the MHRA retaliation claim on the basis of the same elements as the Title VII retaliation claim, because the MHRA contains much broader language than the comparable provisions of Title VII, citing Williamson v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 975 F.Supp. 1235 (E.D.Mo.1997), and because the Missouri Supreme Court held in Keeney v. Hereford Concrete Prods., Inc., 911 S.W.2d 622 (Mo.1995) (en banc ), that the difference in the language employed by the two statutes is sufficiently stark to render interpretations of the federal law inapposite for purposes of assigning meaning to section 213.070 [of the MHRA]. Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 624. Cross counters that the MHRA is broader in respects that do not matter here and that the elements of the two retaliation claims, in this case, were indeed identical. 1 Retaliation under Missouri law The portion of the MHRA prohibiting retaliation, codified at MO.REV.STAT. § 213.070(2), makes it an unlawful discriminatory practice [t]o retaliate or discriminate in any manner against any other person because such person has opposed any practice prohibited by this chapter or because such person has filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant to this chapter. The Missouri Supreme Court recently discussed this statute in Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 622. In Keeney, the Missouri Supreme Court was asked, first, to consider whether a former employee is a person under § 213.070(2). Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 622. The employer argued that the Missouri statute must be read in a manner consistent with federal law, and hence could only protect a person who is an employee of the company charged with retaliation. Id. at 624. Comparing the language of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), 7 with the language of the MHRA, the Missouri Supreme Court wrote, It is immediately obvious that the language employed by Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) is considerably more limited than the exceedingly broad in any manner against any other person language adopted by the Missouri legislature in section 213.070. Indeed, the difference in the language employed by the two statutes is sufficiently stark to render judicial interpretations of the federal law inapposite for purposes of assigning meaning to section 213.070. The language of section 213.070(2) is clear and unambiguous. The statute renders retaliation in any manner against any other person an unlawful discriminatory practice. Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 624. Consequently, the Missouri court held that the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiff could not prevail on his MHRA retaliation claim, because no employer-employee relationship existed between the plaintiff and the defendant, was erroneous. Id. at 625. More to the point here, however, is the Missouri Supreme Court's comparison of the elements of a retaliation claim under the MHRA with those of such a claim under Title VII. The Missouri court held that the trial court had erroneously impose[d] federal interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) on section 213.070, because the trial court had ruled that the plaintiff's evidence d[id] not demonstrate that the alleged retaliatory action had any impact on Plaintiff's future employment or employability. Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 625. The Missouri Supreme Court rejected the intimation in Sweeney v. City of Ladue, 25 F.3d 702, 703 (8th Cir.1994), that 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) and § 213.070 are identical in scope and purpose. Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 625 n. 1. Instead, the Missouri court compared the elements of a retaliation claim under the two statutes as follows: Federal judicial interpretations of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) require (1) that the employee engaged in an activity protected by the statute, (2) that adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal connection existed between the two. Sweeney v. City of Ladue, 25 F.3d 702, 703 (8th Cir.1994). An adverse employment action occurs where a former employee suing for retaliation, demonstrates that the retaliatory action adversely affects his/her future employment or employability. Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1508 (11th Cir.1988); Pantchenko v. C.B. Dolge Co., Inc., 581 F.2d 1052, 1053 (2d Cir.1978). Under section 213.070, retaliation must be given broader meaning; this is because section 213.070 does not limit itself to the employer-employee relationship. Thus, retaliation exists under section 213.070 when (1) a person files a complaint, testifies, assists or participates in an investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant to chapter 213 and (2) as a direct result, he or she suffers any damages due to an act of reprisal. This Court cannot judicially impose a requirement outside of the plain language in section 213.070. Here, the trial court applied the wrong legal standard for determining if retaliation occurred under that section. Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 625-26. 2 Cross's state-law retaliation claim However, in this case, there is no dispute that Cross was an employee of the Board at the time she alleges she was retaliated against, not a former employee, so the broader scope of the MHRA anti-retaliation provision, as compared to the Title VII provision, is not called into play. See Keeney, 911 S.W.2d at 625-26. Of the pertinent elements, we can perceive no effective difference in this case between proof that the employee engaged in an activity protected by the statute, the first element of a Title VII retaliation claim, and proof that a current employee file[d] a complaint, testifie[d], assist[ed] or participate[d] in an investigation, proceeding or hearing conducted pursuant to chapter 213, the first element of a retaliation claim under the MHRA. Nor can we see any effective difference between proof that there was a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and adverse employment action, the remaining elements of a Title VII retaliation claim, and proof that as a direct result [of protected activity], [the employee] suffer[ed] any damages due to an act of reprisal, the second element of a retaliation claim under the MHRA. In this case, we cannot find that the trial court committed any plain error in instructing on the two retaliation claims in a combined instruction stating elements drawn from Title VII cases. Westcott, 133 F.3d at 662; Dupre, 112 F.3d at 334; Ryther, 108 F.3d at 847. Furthermore, to the extent the Missouri statute would provide for relief in a broader set of circumstances, because the jury verdict here was rendered on the narrower statement of elements of a Title VII retaliation claim, there can be no doubt that the verdict was rendered on the Title VII claim, the claim permitted by the trial court here. The Board Members' argument that there is confusion over the claim upon which the verdict was rendered, the state or federal one, could only have merit if the verdict had been rendered on the broader elements, and the court had then stricken the broader claim, leaving in doubt whether the proof was adequate to sustain the narrower claim. Thus, there was no plain error in the combined instruction that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings or that would result in a miscarriage of justice if left uncorrected. Westcott, 133 F.3d at 662; Dupre, 112 F.3d at 334; Ryther, 108 F.3d at 847. Rather, the combined instruction fairly and adequately stated the applicable law, when read as a whole in the circumstances of this case, and the Board Members can demonstrate no prejudice from the combined instruction. Stockmen's Livestock Mkt., Inc., 135 F.3d at 1245; Dupre, 112 F.3d at 335.III. CONCLUSION We conclude that appellants failed to preserve either of the errors they assert on appeal. Having reviewed the trial court's rulings for plain error, we hold, first, that where a supervisory employee with the power to hire, fire, demote, transfer, suspend, or investigate an employee is shown to have used that authority to retaliate for the filing of a charge of sexual harassment, the plaintiff need not also prove that the employer participated in or knew or should have known of the retaliatory conduct to hold the employer liable, and the trial court properly denied a post-trial motion for JAML or new trial based on the assertion that the knew or should have known standard had not be satisfied. Second, we hold that the trial court did not plainly err in giving a combined instruction on the plaintiff-appellee's retaliation claims under the MHRA and Title VII, because, in the circumstances of this case, the elements of the two claims were essentially identical. Finding no error, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.  The HONORABLE MARK W. BENNETT, United States District Judge for the Northern District of Iowa, sitting by designation 1 The HONORABLE JOHN T. MAUGHMER, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE, who tried the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 2 The Board Members also asserted that the verdict on the retaliation claim was excessive, but they do not press that point on appeal 3 The Board Members moved, in the alternative, for a new trial. As this court recently explained, We review the district court's denial of [a] motion for a new trial for an abuse of discretion. Keenan v. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc., 13 F.3d 1266, 1269 (8th Cir.1994). Where, as here, the basis of the motion for a new trial is that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the district court's denial of the motion 'is virtually unassailable on appeal.'  Id. (quoting Peterson v. General Motors Corp., 904 F.2d 436, 439-40 (8th Cir.1990)). The key question is whether a new trial should have been granted to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Id. Keeper v. King, 130 F.3d 1309, 1314 (8th Cir.1997); accord Schultz v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 105 F.3d 1258, 1259 (8th Cir.1997) (We review the denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard, citing McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1400 (8th Cir.1994)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 56, 139 L.Ed.2d 20 (1997). 4 The court finds this last argument unconvincing at best, because it would require an incredible stretch of language and conception to make an argument that an instruction is overbroad, because it would tend to cause the jury to believe that the defendants would be responsible for rumors, into an argument that the standard applicable to employer liability for retaliation in violation of Title VII was that the employer knew or should have known of the retaliation. Nonetheless, there are more fundamental flaws to the Board Members' arguments upon which this court's conclusions are based 5 Rule 50(b) provides, in pertinent part, as follows: If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment--and may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for a new trial under Rule 59. 6 Furthermore, in light of this court's determination of the applicable standard for employer liability and the nature of the record below, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the Board Members' alternative motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, see Keeper, 130 F.3d at 1314; Schultz, 105 F.3d at 1259, where that alternative motion was also based on an alleged failure to adduce any evidence meeting the knew or should have known requirement 7 The federal provision states, It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).