Opinion ID: 2377073
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We Reject Marvin's Arguments Challenging the Form of the Trial Court's Judgment and the Procedures the Trial Court Followed When It Resolved the Attorney Fees Issue

Text: ¶ 60 Marvin argues that errors of form and procedure require remand for additional reconsideration of the attorney fees issue. We disagree with Marvin's arguments. ¶ 61 First, Marvin argues that the trial court entered insufficient findings to support its conclusions regarding Marvin's motion for attorney fees. When determining whether a trial court has entered sufficient findings of fact to justify its award of attorney fees, the touchstone is whether the findings of fact are thorough enough that they enable meaningful appellate review. [35] Two inquiries are central to this review. First, the reviewing court must be able to determine whether the fee awarded is supported by the evidence. [36] Second, the reviewing court must be satisfied that the trial court has made a meaningful appraisal of the reasonableness of the request for attorney fees. [37] The sufficiency of findings of fact is a function of these two questions; so long as a court reviewing the findings of fact can determine whether the trial court made a meaningful appraisal of the value of attorney fees and so long as that value is based on evidence presented to the trial court, the trial court's findings will be sufficient to support appellate review. [38] ¶ 62 Subsumed within these broad inquiries are the myriad factors set forth in our case law regarding when attorney fees should be awarded and how fees should be calculated. Thus, as long as a court's findings of fact permit an appellate court to evaluate the reasonableness of the trial court's decision in the light of the rules we have set forth for determining attorney fees awards, the trial court's conclusion will not be vacated as a result of an alleged formal shortcoming. For instance, in a case where the trial court neglected to enter findings of fact and opted instead to set forth its reasoning in its order and judgment, [39] we noted that [a]s a matter of form, it would have been preferable for the trial court to have entered separate findings of fact and conclusions of law in addition to the order and judgment ... but the order and judgment are not defective because they are combined with findings and conclusions. [40] ¶ 63 As will be made clear by our discussion, the trial court's memorandum decision and order denying Marvin's request for attorney fees contains sufficient reasoning for us to determine the basis for, and reasonableness of, its decision. It adequately sets forth reasoning that accounts for the various factors we require courts to examine when awarding attorney fees in cases, like this one, where opposing parties obtain mixed results. There may have been a more preferable method that the trial court could have used to set forth its findings. But that is a matter of form that does not preclude us from engaging in meaningful review of the trial court's decision. Accordingly, we reject Marvin's contention that the attorney fees issue must be remanded for additional findings of fact. ¶ 64 Second, Marvin argues that the trial court committed reversible error when it precluded him from filing his motion for attorney fees related to the trust issues. As mentioned, Marvin indicated to the court that he would submit an updated request for attorney fees once all issues regarding the family trust were resolved. But because the trial court order resolving these issues also directed the parties to seek any further relief on appeal, Marvin claims he was denied the opportunity to seek these additional fees. We reject this claim because we find it was inadequately briefed. ¶ 65 Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24 sets forth the content requirements for the brief of a party seeking relief on appeal, and permits this court to disregard or strike briefs that fail to comply with those requirements. [41] Under this rule, a party's argument may be disregarded if it offers little more than a disjointed array of facts selected because they aid his cause coupled with conclusory statement[s] unsupported by analysis or authority. [42] We do not strike Marvin's brief altogether because it is in most respects adequate. But his argument regarding whether he was entitled to an opportunity to update his request for attorney fees is not. ¶ 66 Marvin's argument appears to proceed in three steps. First, he notes, Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2) provides a prevailing party in litigation with an opportunity to move for costs within five days after entry of judgment. [43] Second, his claim for attorney fees with regard to the family trust issues is based on Utah Code section 75-7-1004, which permits a prevailing party in cases involving the administration of a family trust to recover costs and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees. [44] Third, because the statutory provision on which his request is based lumps attorney's fees into costs, the provisions of rule 54 related to the appropriate time to file postjudgment motions for cost necessarily apply to attorney fees in this case. ¶ 67 Marvin provides no case law or legal analysis in support of this conclusion. He essentially argues that the statutory language makes it self-evident that the statutory provision and the rules of civil procedure are intertwined, such that rule 54's timing provision for seeking costs applies to a motion for attorney fees under section 75-7-1004. But it clearly is not self-evident. For instance, Marvin ignores the fact that the statutory provision on which he relies states that a court may, as justice and equity may require, award costs and expenses. [45] Given this apparently discretionary language, there may be cases where the statute does not require a court to entertain a motion for attorney fees at allwithin five days of entry of judgment or otherwise. ¶ 68 Further, when Marvin argued to the trial court that he would not know the amount of attorney fees to request until the case was finally resolved, the trial court asked Marvin to prepare a motion for attorney fees incorporating the attorney fees accrued to that point and an estimation of the attorney fees that would be needed to bring the case to resolution. The trial court's request clearly anticipated that Marvin file his motion before the trial court's resolution of the case, not within five days of entry of judgment. Marvin did not argue to the trial court then, nor does he adequately argue to us now, why the trial court's view of the appropriate time to file for attorney fees was incorrect. ¶ 69 To be clear, Marvin has included a scattershot collection of facts in support of the alleged unfairness of the trial court's decision. But merely raising concerns is not sufficient. An adequate appellate brief must provide the reasoning and legal authority that will assist this court in resolving those concerns. With regard to his argument that the trial court committed reversible error by denying the opportunity to update his request for attorney fees, Marvin has not complied with the requirements of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 24. We therefore disregard this argument.