Opinion ID: 2770336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did D.J. Refuse to Testify?

Text: In this case we do not decide the more abstract question of inconsistency because we conclude that the government did not lay a sufficient foundation for admitting the video. Even if we assume in the government‟s favor that an outright refusal to testify about an event may be deemed to be inconsistent with a prior statement discussing the same topic, we are not convinced on this record that the government and the trial court made sufficient efforts to determine whether D.J. could be persuaded to testify. In other words, faced with a difficult witness, the government resorted too quickly to playing the video. As the trial unfolded, this video statement, rather than live testimony, provided the only substantive evidence supporting count nine of the indictment. 2 Comparison to the federal rule is appropriate when interpreting D.C. Code § 14-102 (b)(2) because the statute “duplicates the almost identically worded Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(1)(B).” Worthy v. United States, 100 A.3d 1095, 1097 (D.C. 2014). 12 At trial, D.J. initially testified as follows: Q: Do you know kind of what we‟re going to ask you to talk about today? A: Yes. Q: How do you feel about talking about those things? A: I don‟t want to talk about it. Q: Why don‟t you want to talk about it? A: It‟s disturbing. I don‟t want to talk about it. Q: Did those things happen to you? A: Yes. .... Q: Okay. Could you tell us what happened the first time it happened? A: (Shakes head) Q: You‟re shaking your head no. Now, when you‟re shaking your head no, why can‟t you tell us? A: Because I don‟t want to talk about it. Q: Okay. Did you – you don‟t want to talk about it. You don‟t want – but did it happen? 13 A: Yes. Q: And why don‟t you want to talk about it? A: Because I don‟t want to keep bringing it back up. Q: Okay. Were you asked about the very first time when you went and spoke to the lady in 2010? All you have to do is say yes or no to that. A: Yes. Q: Did you tell her the truth? A: Yes. The government then introduced the portion of D.J.‟s CAC interview where she discussed the first instance of abuse, which occurred in 2005. The government contends that D.J. was refusing to testify because she said four times that she did not want to talk about the abuse. However, each time she did so, her answer responded to the question posed. The first question was, “How do you feel about talking about those things?” The second question was, “Why don‟t you want to talk about it?” The third question was, “Now, when you‟re shaking your head no, why can‟t you tell us?” And the last question was, “And 14 why don‟t you want to talk about it?” On one occasion the government asked D.J. to describe the first instance of abuse, and she shook her head in response. However, she was not again asked (much less directed) to describe that particular abuse. Neither the government nor the court made additional efforts to persuade D.J. to testify before the video was introduced. A litigant has several options when faced with a reluctant or recalcitrant witness. For example, an attorney can urge the witness to testify. The attorney may also remind the witness that she is required to answer the questions, or ask the court to do so. Often an admonition from the trial judge will have a greater impact than the efforts of an attorney to coax testimony from a witness. As more serious leverage, the attorney may ask the court to hold the witness in contempt if she continues to refuse to answer questions. See, e.g., Martin v. United States, 756 A.2d 901, 904 (D.C. 2000) (describing situation where trial court found witness in contempt for refusing to testify). If a party does not exhaust at least some of those options, it cannot fairly be said that the witness is refusing to testify. Moreover, the government may too readily (and happily) resort to the more convenient option of substituting a prior statement for in-court testimony if we do not require a record that firmly establishes that the witness is refusing to answer the questions. 15 Eliciting details of sexual abuse is a very delicate matter, and courts have given the government great leeway in presenting the testimony of a child victim. For example, as this record illustrates, leading questions are tolerated more readily, and lawyers customarily adopt a gentler tone. In the present context, moreover, we might not insist on all the coercive measures that would be appropriate if an adult was reluctant to testify. In this case, however, the government too quickly abandoned its examination of D.J. in favor of playing the video of her CAC interview. We have no doubt that D.J. did not want to testify, at least about the first instance of sexual abuse. But the record discloses little effort to coax her to testify (and none to force the issue) before the video was introduced. And we are not persuaded that such efforts would have been futile. The initial questioning of D.J. starkly contrasts with the government‟s efforts to cajole her into testifying after the video was played. For example, when D.J. later gave an inaudible response, the prosecutor said, “We‟re going to get through this, I promise, but you need to help me. Okay? Okay? Because we‟re going to try and get you on and off today. Alright, [D.J.]? But we need your help. Okay?” At one point, the prosecutor approached the witness stand and urged, “I need you to answer me, I really do, 16 because otherwise we‟re just going to sit here, okay, and we promised you you‟re getting out today.” Appellant‟s trial counsel used similar techniques to persuade D.J. to answer questions, such as moving closer to D.J. and telling her to speak up. The court also became involved, instructing D.J. to answer questions or to raise her voice when appropriate. These efforts by the attorneys and the court succeeded, as D.J. eventually answered all the remaining questions posed to her on direct and crossexamination. We therefore conclude that the record does not establish D.J‟s outright refusal to testify. Our reasoning aligns with the cases outside this jurisdiction where a witness‟s recalcitrance was found to be inconsistent with a prior statement. In those cases, the witness had firmly refused to testify. In Homick, for example, a witness refused to answer questions at trial as part of a “disruptive pattern of interjecting irrelevancies, . . . claiming lack of memory, sitting mute, and once in a while providing a responsive answer.” 289 P.3d at 827. The trial court told the witness that “he had no right to refuse to answer questions and would be held in contempt for every question he refused to answer.” Id. Only after the witness continued to refuse to testify did the court allow the government to impeach him 17 with his prior statements. Id.; see also Truman, 688 F.3d at 142 (allowing impeachment where witness explicitly refuses to answer questions at trial); State v. Portee, 740 A.2d 868, 874 (Conn. App. Ct. 1999) (allowing impeachment when witness continued to refuse to answer questions after twice being held in contempt). In sum, even if we assume that a prior statement may be treated as inconsistent with a refusal to testify, this record does not establish that D.J. was adamantly refusing to testify. Thus, the government failed to meet the threshold requirement for admission, and allowing the government to play the video recording of D.J.‟s statement at the CAC was an erroneous exercise of discretion. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 364 (D.C. 1979) (“An informed choice among the alternatives requires that the trial court‟s determination be based upon and drawn from a firm factual foundation.”).