Opinion ID: 2037670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the california crime was a felony in south dakota

Text: In the next two issues raised by Petrilli, which we treat as one, Petrilli argues the record of the California conviction fails to show Petrilli was convicted of anything that would have constituted a felony in South Dakota. SDCL 22-7-7 (1988) provides in pertinent part: When a defendant has been convicted of one or two prior felonies under the laws of this state or any other state or the United States, in addition to the principal felony, the sentence for the principal felony shall be enhanced by changing the class of the principal felony to the next class which is more severe. The determination of whether a prior offense is a felony ... shall be determined by whether it is a felony under the laws of this state or under the laws of the United States at the time of conviction of such prior offense. (Emphasis added.) Petrilli correctly points out a crime committed in another state may be considered a felony in South Dakota for the purposes of enhancing punishment only if the minimal elements of the prior crime are substantially similar to the minimum elements of a crime in this state. State v. Clothier, 391 N.W.2d 197, 198 (S.D.1986). Accord State v. Krana, 272 N.W.2d 75, 80 (S.D.1978).
The California Information which led to Petrilli's guilty plea charged Petrilli with ... a felony, to wit: Burglary, a violation of Section 459 of the Penal Code of California, in that on or about the 17th day of September, 1979, in the County of Alameda, State of California, said defendants did then and there enter a building, to wit: The residence of MARGARET NICOLAUS ..., with intent to commit theft. The first count of the California Information charged Petrilli with robbing the same individual of money, purse and credit cards. The third count charged Petrilli with false imprisonment of the same individual by violence, menace, fraud and deceit. Petrilli pled guilty, as part of a plea bargain, to being an accessory to the burglary. No facts are set out to detail what specific things Petrilli did to render him guilty as an accessory. However, Petrilli stipulated being an accessory was a lesser included offense of the crime charged. Moreover, at the South Dakota sentencing hearing, Petrilli told the court he had pled guilty to being an accessory to a strong-armed robbery. Petrilli first argues because no factual basis was developed on the record, we must compare the California accessory statute with the South Dakota accessory statute which was in effect in 1980 to determine whether they are substantially similar. Secondly, Petrilli argues, because situations can be hypothesized which would constitute being an accessory in California but not in South Dakota, the two statutes are not substantially similar. Specifically, Petrilli claims if a defendant bribes a court official or provides a getaway car to a defendant out on bail, he is an accessory in California but not in South Dakota. In Krana, we noted the circuit court was furnished with a copy of the indictment which contained the pertinent facts which were alleged and to which Krana had pled guilty. Krana, 272 N.W.2d at 80. By comparison, in Clothier, where no facts were available on which the underlying offense was based, we compared the language of the South Dakota and Oklahoma statutes. Id., 391 N.W.2d at 199. We then engaged in analyzing hypothetical situations to determine whether acts could be conceived which might violate the out-of-state provision but would not violate our own statute. Here, we need not look at the two statutes in a factual vacuum as was the case in Clothier. Petrilli was indicted for his involvement in a robbery, burglary, false imprisonment scenario. As part of a plea bargain, Petrilli pled guilty to being an accessory to burglary committed by entering a residence with the intent to commit theft. He also stipulated it was a lesser included offense to the burglary charge. This factual predicate precludes us from looking for hypothetical situations as we did in Clothier and which Petrilli urges us to do now. See State v. Stuck, 434 N.W.2d 43, 48-49 (S.D.1988). SDCL 22-3-5 provides: A person is an accessory to a crime, if, with intent to hinder, delay or prevent the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of another for the commission of a felony, he renders assistance to the other person. There are no accessories to misdemeanors. Render assistance means to: (1) Harbor or conceal the other person; (2) Warn the other person of impending discovery or apprehension, except that this does not apply to a warning given in an effort to bring the other person into compliance with the law; (3) Provide the other person with money, transportation, a weapon, a disguise or any other thing to be used in avoiding discovery or apprehension; (4) Obstruct anyone by force, intimidation or deception in the performance of any act which might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of the other person; or (5) Conceal, destroy or alter any physical evidence that might aid in the discovery, detection, apprehension, prosecution, conviction or punishment of the other person. A violation of this section is a Class 5 felony. Cal.Penal Code § 32 provides: Every person who, after a felony has been committed, harbors, conceals or aids a principal in such felony, with the intent that said principal may avoid or escape from arrest, trial, conviction or punishment, having knowledge that said principal has committed such felony or has been charged with such felony or convicted thereof, is an accessory to such felony. Petrilli has not proven Cal.Penal Code § 32 is not substantially similar to SDCL 22-3-5; we find that it is. The California statute defines an accessory to a felony as a person who with intent aids a principal to avoid conviction. Cal.Penal Code § 32 (West 1992). The South Dakota statute defines an accessory to a crime of a felony as a person who with intent to prevent a conviction renders assistance. SDCL 22-3-5. The two statutes have similar, if not identical, meaning. Further, contrary to Petitioner's argument, factual information in the indictment which led to the California guilty plea precludes any conclusion the plea resulted from an act which would be a felony under California's accessory statute but not under South Dakota's. Moreover, even if the accessory conviction was improperly used to enhance Petrilli's sentence initially, any prejudice which might have existed was removed when the trial court modified his sentence from twenty to fifteen yearsthe sentence to which Petrilli agreed and a sentence within the authorized punishment for aggravated assault alone. See Krana, 272 N.W.2d at 81; State v. Provost, 266 N.W.2d 96, 102 (S.D.1978).
The underlying offense for which Petrilli was convicted of being an accessory was burglary under section 459 of the California Penal Code. Petrilli again argues we must ignore the language contained in the information and look only at the statutory language. Petrilli argues it is possible what was felony burglary in California in 1979/1980 may have been only a misdemeanor under South Dakota's unlawful entry statute which provided: Any person who, under circumstances not amounting to burglary, enters a structure with intent to commit any crime is guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. SDCL 22-32-16 (repealed by 1984 S.D.Laws, ch. 170, § 1). Petrilli then claims it is possible an entry punishable as a felony in California could be a misdemeanor in South Dakota. He carries this argument a step further by pointing out, under South Dakota law, there is no such thing as an accomplice to a misdemeanor. Again, to accept Petrilli's argument, one would have to ignore the California indictments setting out the crimes with which Petrilli was actually charged and Petrilli's admission in the South Dakota sentencing hearing that he had pled guilty to being an accessory to a strong armed robbery. Looking at the burglary charge alone, entering a residence with intent to commit theft constitutes either the felony of first, second or third degree burglary under SDCL 22-32-1, -3, or -8 (1988), all of which were in effect in 1979-80. [3] Thus, the California felony would also have been a felony under SDCL 22-3-5.