Opinion ID: 2610257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The appeals board decision lacks the support of substantial evidence.

Text: As we have stated, the referee, after a complete and full hearing, determined that applicant had incurred a 57 percent permanent disability; this award was set aside by the appeals board solely upon the basis of the motion picture of the ride and the medical reports of Drs. Crandall and Perlson that were predicated upon that film. (9) We shall point out that the board's decision lacks the support of substantial evidence on either of two hypotheses: that the board could rely upon the tainted motion picture and the resultant reports or that the board could not do so. Assuming the prior supposition we cannot find in the film or the reports substantial evidence to support the board's conclusion that applicant incurred no permanent disability. Turning to the film, we note that it does not refute the referee's finding that applicant could perform light work only and not heavy work. First, not even the carrier's attorney contended that the film showed anything more than that Applicant is not precluded to light work. The carrier's attorney admitted, I don't think the activity was strenuous or severe, but it did show that the applicant is willing to move. The applicant could work; if he could be as active as the pictures depict.... Applicant, however, did not deny that he could perform light work and testified as to the kinds of light work in which he had engaged since the accident. Second, Dr. Shear, one of applicant's doctors, wrote that applicant is unable to resume employment of a strenuous nature including driving a truck which also necessitates loading and unloading of heavy merchandise and equipment.... This patient should not attempt to lift weights in excess of 15 to 20 pounds.... Nothing in the film contradicts Dr. Shear's report, which the referee accepted. Third, applicant engaged in riding while under the influence of alcoholic beverages, a condition that might well have temporarily reduced his back pain so to permit activity more arduous than usual. As the appeals board observed in refusing to rely upon motion picture evidence in another case, It should be noted that motion picture films, such as the ones we viewed in this matter are often deceptive in that they depict a person on his good days, but fail to reveal his activities on those days when he might have trouble. ( Cypress Ins. Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1967) 32 Cal.Comp.Cases 458, 460.) [14] Clearly, the motion picture evidence does not constitute substantial evidence to support the appeals board's conclusion that applicant had incurred no permanent disability. It might have supported a conclusion that applicant was not disabled from performance of light work, but this conclusion would have been completely consistent with the referee's decision. In like fashion, the two medical reports, which the board followed, constitute no more substantial evidence than the film on which they were founded. Expert medical opinion ... does not always constitute substantial evidence on which the board may rest its decision. Courts have held that the board may not rely on medical reports ... based upon inadequate medical history or examinations ( West v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 711....) or upon surmise, speculation, conjecture, or guess. ( Place v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 372, 378 [90 Cal. Rptr. 424, 475 P.2d 656]; see Garza v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 3 Cal.3d 312, 318-319.) The September 1968 medical reports disclose the enumerated badges of unreliability. [15] In the instant case, the physicians knew nothing of the conditions under which applicant took the ride, the conditions that followed it, or whether the ensuing pain would preclude applicant from ever pursuing such activities again. In addition, the film did not indicate that the applicant could perform heavy work and thus had completely recovered from his industrial injury. The medical reports, therefore, do not constitute substantial evidence that applicant suffered no permanent disability. Assuming that because of the reasons above stated, the board could not properly rely upon the film and the related medical reports, we find that the board clearly lacked substantial evidence to support its decision. The board based its conclusion that applicant had suffered no permanent disability solely upon the motion picture and the September 1968 medical reports. Since the board could not justifiably rely upon the film and related medical reports and since no substantial evidence remains to support the decision, we must conclude that the holding that applicant had incurred no permanent disability should be annulled. (Lab. Code, §§ 5952, subd. (c), 5952, subd. (d); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com., supra, 178 Cal. 491, 493; see LeVesque v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., supra, 1 Cal.3d 627, 637.) We conclude with the observation that we cannot sanction the carrier's attempt to profit by its deceitful inducement of applicant to engage in activity which he would not otherwise have undertaken. The legal process cannot be stultified by crowning such amoral maneuvers with apparent success. In the instant case the procedure becomes even more aggravated by the late reliance upon introduction of the ill-gotten film at a hearing on reconsideration although that film had not been previously produced and although on reconsideration applicant was denied the rights of cross-examination and presentation of rebuttal evidence. The procedure here is thus doubly dubious. The order is annulled with directions to the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board to reinstate the referee's award initially made, in accordance with the views expressed.