Opinion ID: 2197178
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Death Sentence

Text: Appellant next claims that the evidence presented at his sentencing hearing was insufficient to support the jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(2). We agree. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(2) states: (d) Aggravating circumstances.  Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following: (2) The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of the victim. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that appellant contracted with at least three men  Wayne Shackleford, Edward Lau (through Gerald McCarthy), and Earl Span  to have his wife killed. In addition, appellant admitted on the stand at his sentencing hearing that he had paid Wayne Shackleford to kill his wife. The evidence also showed, however, that none of these individuals ever fulfilled their contractual duties, and that appellant himself committed the murder. Thus, we are now faced with an issue of first impression, namely, whether a contract to kill must be fulfilled by the offeree in order to support a finding of an aggravating circumstance under § 9711(d)(2). In arguing that § 9711(d)(2) does not necessitate a finding of causation, the Commonwealth asserts that the plain language of § 9711(d)(2) is unambiguous in that it requires only that a defendant pay or contract to pay another person (the offeree) for the killing of the victim, not that the offeree actually commit the murder. The Commonwealth contends that in light of such plain language the letter of the law is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit. While we have never directly dealt with this issue, we addressed it indirectly in our recent holding in Commonwealth v. Hackett, 534 Pa. 210, 627 A.2d 719 (1993), and its companion case Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233, 627 A.2d 1176 (1993). In each of these cases, we were presented with an automatic appeal from a judgment of sentence of death following Hackett and Spence's convictions for murder of the first degree. The murder in question arose from a conspiracy between Hackett and Spence to kill the victim's boyfriend (Gregory Ogrod). This conspiracy culminated in an attack perpetrated by Hackett and Spence upon the victim and Ogrod, which Ogrod managed to survive. Two days prior to the attack, Spence offered an individual named David Carter $5000 to do a hit job. Carter accepted. However, when Spence and Carter met on the evening of July 30, 1986, to carry out the deed, Carter disagreed with the plan Hackett and Spence had concocted, stating I'm out of this, and left. Hackett and Spence then took it upon themselves to commit the murder. The two were convicted and sentenced to death when the jury found the aggravating circumstances of contract to kill, § 9711(d)(2), and placing another in grave risk of death. § 9711(d)(7). On direct appeal the two defendants argued, inter alia, that as a matter of law there could be no aggravating circumstance for a contract killing since the victim was never the subject of such a contract. We subsequently rejected this claim on the ground that the victim had indeed been one of the subjects of the contract since Carter had been instructed to kill her if she was present at the scene. Although the defendants did not raise the causation claim now before us, we noted in dicta that the plain meaning of § 9711(d)(2) is that once a contract for killing of the victim has been entered, § 9711(d)(2) is triggered provided causation exists. Spence, 534 Pa. at 233 n. 9, 627 A.2d at 1184 n. 9; Hackett, 534 Pa. at 225 n. 8, 627 A.2d at 727 n. 8. We now adopt this interpretation of § 9711(d)(2) for three reasons. First, we agree with Justice Cappy's concurring opinion in Hackett, that at a minimum, causation is implied from the words of § 9711(d)(2), i.e., a contract for the killing of the victim. Hackett, 534 Pa. at 225, 627 A.2d at 727 (Justice Cappy concurring). In addition, we find such an interpretation to be in accord with a contextual reading of § 9711(d)(2). It is well established that whenever a court construes one section of a statute, it must read that section not by itself, but with reference to, and in light of, the other sections. Consulting Engineers of Pa. v. State Architects Licensure Board, 522 Pa. 204, 560 A.2d 1375 (1989). In the present case, the plain meaning argument put forth by the Commonwealth fails to undertake such a reading. Examination of the remaining fifteen aggravating circumstances listed under § 9711(d) reveals that each concerns a circumstance arising from or surrounding the actual transaction which resulted in the victim's death, i.e., the killing act. [15] In light of this fact we find it doubtful that the legislature intended § 9711(d)(2) to be the only circumstance which could arise completely independently of the killing of the victim. Rather, we find the requirement of a causal link between the contract to kill and the death of the victim is clearly mandated by a contextual interpretation of § 9711(d)(2). Finally, we find that a requirement of causation under § 9711(d)(2) is in accord with the well established principle that causation constitutes an essential element of the offense of murder which the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, and which cannot be established in the criminal context on a `but for' or civil law proximate cause basis. Hackett, 534 Pa. at 225, 627 A.2d at 727 (Justice Cappy concurring) (citing Burkoff, Criminal Offenses and Defenses in Pa. (2d ed.), p. 196. See also, Commonwealth v. Root, 403 Pa. 571, 170 A.2d 310 (1961); Commonwealth v. Stafford, 451 Pa. 95, 301 A.2d 600 (1973). Under the present facts, none of the three contracts to kill caused any harm whatsoever to the victim. All of their agreements had clearly been breached and abandoned months before Mrs. Mayhue was murdered. Rather, the sole cause of this brutal crime was appellant's intent to kill his wife. Thus, the evidence in the present case is insufficient to support the finding of an aggravating circumstance under § 9711(d)(2). Since this issue is dispositive of appellant's remaining death sentence claims, we need not address them. Accordingly, the sentence of death is vacated and the case is remanded for imposition of a life sentence pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(h)(4). LARSEN, J., did not participate in the decision of this case. MONTEMURO, J., who was an appointed Justice of the Court at the time of argument, participated in the decision of this case in his capacity as a Senior Justice.