Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of continuance before the preliminary hearing

Text: After numerous continuances obtained by or concurred in by the defense, defendant's preliminary hearing was scheduled approximately five months after his arrest. At that time he moved for continuance of the preliminary hearing on the ground that the prosecution had not yet provided specified items of discovery and other items had been provided very recently, and on the further ground that the recently filed complaint charging two additional codefendants with conspiracy to commit murder would require substantially more preparation. The court denied the motion. Defendant sought writ review of this decision in the Court of Appeal without avail, and this court denied his petition for review. Defendant filed a motion to set aside the information on the ground the denial of a continuance deprived him of various constitutional rights, including the right to the effective assistance of counsel, but the trial court denied the motion on the ground that defense counsel appeared to be very prepared for the preliminary hearing and conducted superb examination of the witnesses. The court also noted that defense counsel had called 52 witnesses at the preliminary hearing while the prosecution had called 33. Defendant again unsuccessfully sought to overturn this ruling by way of a petition for writ of mandate or prohibition. Defendant contends the denial of a continuance deprived him of a meaningful preliminary hearing, in violation of what he characterizes as a federal constitutional right to the evenhanded application of state law. He also appears to contend that denial of his motion for a continuance deprived him of the right to the effective assistance of counsel, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to present an affirmative defense. He contends his claim cannot be rejected on the ground that counsel conducted the preliminary hearing in a competent manner, because the crux of his claim is that counsel was deprived of crucial evidence and time to prepare in the face of matters that developed shortly before the preliminary hearing. Defendant may prevail in this claim only if he can demonstrate that the denial of a continuance before the preliminary hearing resulted in the denial of a fair trial or otherwise affected the ultimate judgment. ( People v. Pompa-Ortiz, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 529-530, 165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941; see also People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 855, 251 Cal. Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423.) Defendant is unable to demonstrate that failure to grant him a continuance before the preliminary hearing had any effect on the trial or the judgment. He is unpersuasive in contending that the requested continuance would have afforded him time and ability to develop information regarding his defense that the case against him was invented by the police. One year and nine months elapsed between the preliminary hearing and the evidentiary portion of the trial, allowing defendant ample time to investigate, to examine the discovered material that had been provided by the prosecution, and to prepare to meet the case against him. His inability to secure the dismissal of the charge that he attempted to murder George Carpenter, even in the unlikely event the failure to grant him a pre-preliminary-hearing continuance was the cause, is not a basis for reversal of the ensuing conviction as long as the denial of a continuance did not deprive him of a fair trial on that charge or otherwise affect the ultimate judgment. Defendant has made no showing that the denial of a continuance had such an effect as to any of the charges, or that the denial of a continuance had any impact at subsequent trial proceedings on his rights to counsel, to confront the witnesses against him, or to present a defense. Accordingly, we reject these claims.