Opinion ID: 3050500
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CPLC Failed To Present Sufficient Admissible

Text: Evidence To Raise An Issue Of Material Fact. CPLC contends that its amended verified complaint qualifies as an affidavit for summary judgment purposes.1 We disagree. [2] “[A] verified complaint may serve as an affidavit for purposes of summary judgment if [1] it is based on personal knowledge and if [2] it sets forth the requisite facts with specificity.” Moran v. Selig, 447 F.3d 748, 760 n.16 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The verified complaint in this case was signed by Brian Johnston, the Executive Director of CPLC. During his deposition, Johnston’s lack of personal knowledge regarding CPLC was apparent. A series of questions was asked regarding CPLC’s PACs and Johnston responded that he did not know to nearly every inquiry. His knowledge regarding how CPLC funds are spent was also scant. As could be expected in view of Johnston’s lack of personal knowledge, the verified complaint was impermissibly heavy on legal conclusions and light on “facts relevant to the summary judgment motion.” Lew v. Kona Hospital, 754 F.2d 1420, 1424 (9th Cir. 1985), as amended. 1 CPLC also submitted a “Supplemental Affidavit in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction,” detailing CPLC’s prospective plans for the November 2000 election. 14806 CALIFORNIA PRO-LIFE COUNCIL v. RANDOLPH 3. CPLC’s Failure To Present Sufficient Evidence To Raise An Issue Of Material Fact Is Not Fatal To Its Appeal. [3] Even though we conclude that CPLC failed to present sufficient admissible evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment or in opposition to California’s motion for summary judgment to raise a material question of fact, this determination is not dispositive. We must still determine whether the undisputed facts entitle California to summary judgment as a matter of law. See Tellis v. Godinez, 5 F.3d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1993). This leads us to an examination of the remand order. 4. A District Court Is Bound To Follow The Instructions Of An Appellate Court Upon Remand. “A district court, on remand, has a duty to follow this court’s instructions as to how the case is to proceed.” United States v. Montgomery, 462 F.3d 1067, 1072 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). “[C]lear direction to the district court on how to proceed continues to be binding precedent . . .” Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Charles Minor Equip. Rental, Inc., 766 F.2d 1301, 1304 (9th Cir. 1985). [4] The district court was bound by the Getman panel’s instructions: “On remand, the district court should determine whether California’s informational interest is sufficiently compelling to justify its regulation of groups like CPLC and, if so, whether the PRA regulations are closely tailored to advance this interest.” Getman, 328 F.3d at 1101. The Getman panel described CPLC as a group “whose major purpose is not campaign advocacy, but who occasionally make[s] independent expenditures.” Id. at 1101 n.21 (citation omitted). CALIFORNIA PRO-LIFE COUNCIL v. RANDOLPH 14807 5. In The Specific Context Of A FRCP 12(b)(6) Motion, No Factual Determinations Were Made That Would Bind The District Court On Remand. In reviewing a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6),2 “we assume all facts alleged in the . . . Complaint are true . . .” Sacks v. Office of Foreign Assets Control, 466 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Because of the assumption that all facts in the Complaint are true, there is no need for judicial factfinding. See FRCP 52(a) (“Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rule 12 . . .”). Indeed, the court is not “faced [with any] factual issue.” Adams v. United States, 225 F.3d 787, 797 (9th Cir. 2001). As the Getman panel was not faced with any factual issues, its passing statement regarding CPLC’s “major purpose” could not reasonably be construed as making a factual determination.3 [5] Therefore, although CPLC had a duty to present evidence, its failure to present relevant admissible evidence is not fatal to its appeal because we must still consider whether the undisputed facts entitle California to summary judgment as a matter of law. Moreover, because in a motion to dismiss under FRCP 12(b)(6), we assume all facts to be true, the district court was not bound by our passing statement regarding CPLC’s “major purpose.”