Opinion ID: 4536870
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: complete the interview within

Text: developmentally-appropriate time limits, which will never exceed 60 minutes. McCann asked a school assistant to bring L to the administrative office. L was willing to talk with McCann. McCann told L that a school official could remain in the room, L could stop the interview at any time, and if L had any questions, McCann would try to answer them. L did not want a school official in the room during the interview and never indicated that she wanted to stop talking to McCann. The interview lasted five minutes. McCann asked L whether Robert, despite agreeing to remain out of the house DEES V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 9 during the pendency of the investigation, was, in fact, back in the house. McCann did not ask L directly if Robert had taken nude photos of her but understood from the conversation that no such photos existed. The interview ended “naturally” when McCann finished her questions and L indicated she did not have any questions for McCann. A school official then escorted L back to her classroom. L’s emotional state during and after the interview is disputed. According to McCann, L was “diplomatic” during the interview and was not upset immediately after the interview. Sara, who happened to be in the school when L was interviewed, disputes McCann’s assessment of L’s emotional state. According to Sara, L was upset after the interview, screaming “CPS is here, CPS is here.” Two days later, McCann was unambiguously informed by the police that their investigation was closed. A week later, McCann closed her own investigation, finding any allegation that L was being abused “unfounded”—meaning that she concluded, under Agency policy, there had “been no shown abuse, and there [was] no basis for the allegation.” That same day, McCann sent a letter, signed by Gloria Escamilla-Huidor and Alberto Borboa (McCann’s supervisors), to the family court overseeing the custody dispute between Sara and Gil. The letter stated that “[a] decision has been made to remove the child(ren) [L and G] from the custodial parent [Sara] and place [them] with the non-custodial parent [Gil] to avoid placing the child(ren) into Polinsky Children’s Center, foster home or adjunct.” The statement in the letter was false because L and G were never removed from Sara’s custody. At trial, the County’s own expert testified that the letter was “not correct” and “ma[de] no sense.” McCann testified that the quoted language was “standard language . . . [that she] couldn’t 10 DEES V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO have edited . . . if . . . [she] wanted to” and that the letter “was sent on behalf of . . . [Gil], who was concerned about his children and was looking for custody.” The letter was received by the family court, but the family court never acted on it. L and G have remained in Sara’s primary custody since February 13, 2013. Sara and L brought multiple claims against the County and various County employees alleging, among other things, violations of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In particular, Sara and L brought claims against the County employees alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment right to familial association by sending the false letter to the family court. The County employees moved for summary judgment on those claims. Despite noting that “McCann’s conduct in preparing the March 7 letter . . . [was] alarming,” the district court concluded “the letter caused no harm to Plaintiffs.” Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment to McCann, Huidor, and Borboa on Sara and L’s Fourteenth Amendment claims related to the false letter. A jury trial was subsequently held on the remaining claims. At the close of the County’s case, Sara and L moved, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 50(a), for judgment as a matter of law on their respective Fourteenth and Fourth Amendment claims regarding McCann’s alleged seizure of L. The district court took the motion under advisement and submitted the case to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the County on all counts. The jury answered “No” to the question, “Did Caitlin McCann violate the 4th Amendment Constitutional rights of . . . [L] when she conducted the school interview[]?” The jury also answered “No” to the question, “Did Caitlin McCann violate the 14th Amendment Constitutional right of Sara Dees when she conducted the – DEES V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 11 ?” Because the jury concluded no constitutional violations occurred, it did not reach whether McCann was acting pursuant to an official County policy, whether that policy caused the constitutional violations, or whether L or Sara were damaged by the constitutional violations. L and Sara subsequently renewed their Rule 50(a) motion under Rule 50(b) and, in the alternative, sought a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. The district court granted L and Sara’s renewed Rule 50 motion and conditionally granted a new trial pursuant to Rules 59 and 50(c)(1). It made the following findings: 1. McCann seized L during the school interview; 2. McCann’s seizure of L was unreasonable because there was no “warrant, court order, parental consent, exigency, or at the very least, reasonable suspicion to seize and interview L”; 3. McCann’s unreasonable seizure of L violated Sara’s Fourteenth Amendment familial association right; 4. McCann interviewed L pursuant to a County policy; and 5. the County’s policy of allowing social workers to interview children caused the constitutional violations. The County, Sara, and L filed timely notices of appeal. Accordingly, the following claims are now before us: 1. Sara and L’s Fourteenth Amendment claim for familial interference regarding the false letter; 12 DEES V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO 2. Sara’s Fourteenth Amendment claim against the County regarding McCann’s seizure of L; and 3. L’s Fourth Amendment claim against the County regarding her seizure by McCann.