Opinion ID: 2178015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: refusal to strike the testimony of milzoff

Text: We now turn to the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly refused to strike the testimony of Milzoff, the state's expert in toxicology. We reject this claim. The following additional facts are necessary to resolve this issue. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to preclude all expert testimony relating to the issue of intoxication, and argued that such evidence was subject to an analysis under State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1058, 118 S.Ct. 1384, 140 L.Ed.2d 645 (1998). The trial court denied this motion. In addition, the defendant moved in limine to preclude evidence that he was intoxicated in the absence of blood alcohol data or an expert opinion. The trial court reserved decision on this motion should the state attempt to introduce such evidence, and indicated that the state would be required to conduct a full proffer outside the presence of the jury. Accordingly, before the state presented the testimony of Milzoff in its case-in-chief with respect to the issue of alcohol consumption, a proffer was held outside the presence of the jury. During the proffer, and after asking Milzoff some general questions about alcohol, the state presented to Milzoff the following hypothetical: Assuming that an individual has six ounces of alcohol over a one and one-half hour period of time, what effect would that have on his or her central nervous system one hour later? Milzoff replied: The central nervous system would be depressed to some extent. On cross-examination during the proffer, Milzoff was asked to build upon the state's hypothetical, and estimate the blood alcohol content of an individual, with further assumptions that the individual in question weighed 210 pounds, that the alcohol was consumed between 9 and 10:30 p.m., and that the blood alcohol content was measured at 11 p.m. Milzoff replied that the blood alcohol content would be between approximately 0.02 and 0.07. The defendant argued that Milzoff should not be permitted to testify because he could not say with any certainty whether the defendant was drunk or impaired. The trial court eventually allowed Milzoff to testify as an expert, stating: [W]hen I consider ... the combined proffer of the state and the defendant ... there is enough for the jury to hear, certainly with respect to the misconduct count. The state then asked the trial court if it would be required to ask the same hypothetical in front of the jury that it had asked during the proffer. The trial court replied: Well, I think you have relevance and materiality problems if you don't. But that's for [the defendant's counsel] to rise to the occasion on. Thereafter, in the presence of the jury, Milzoff testified on direct examination that alcohol is a depressant, which inhibits reflexes, the ability to respond to situations, the ability to operate machinery, and the ability to perform complex tasks. Milzoff also testified that a single dose of alcohol, i.e., twelve ounces of beer or one ounce of eighty proof scotch, affects an individual to a slight degree, and that as alcohol consumption increases, so do the resulting effects from the alcohol. The state, however, never asked Milzoff the hypothetical that it had asked during the proffer. At the conclusion of Milzoff's direct examination, and outside the presence of the jury, the defendant's counsel moved to strike Milzoff's testimony, arguing that the testimony was irrelevant because it was within the general knowledge of laypersons and that the state did nothing to tie Milzoff's testimony into the facts of the present case, i.e., by failing to ask the hypothetical. With regard to whether the state had been required to ask the hypothetical, the trial court stated: I think I said in sum and substance that I think that there are relevance and materiality problems, but [the defendant's counsel] would rise to the occasion on that if he felt it were necessary. I think that's what I said. The trial court then stated that it viewed the evidence as marginally relevant, even if the state goes about doing it in a circumstantial way, as opposed to hitting the nail on the head the direct way, [but] ... it's still likely to aid the trier in tending or not tending to prove a fact in issue, [then] why does it not come in? The state also stated that it did not ask the hypothetical because it was trying to prevent the issue of blood alcohol content from coming before the jury. The trial court decided to consider the matter over-night, and, the next morning, it denied the defendant's motion to strike Milzoff's testimony. The defendant requested that the trial court allow him to test the reliability of Milzoff's testimony under State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. at 57, 698 A.2d 739, and the trial court denied that request. The defendant's counsel, thereafter, cross-examined Milzoff in the presence of the jury. Milzoff indicated that he could not say whether the defendant was slightly effected by alcohol, or whether the defendant lacked to an appreciable degree the ability to function in relation to the operation of a motor vehicle. We first set forth the standard that governs our review of this issue, and reiterate that [t]he trial court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to great deference. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. William C., supra, 267 Conn. at 700, 841 A.2d 1144. Concerning expert testimony specifically, we note that the trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony and, unless that discretion has been abused or the ruling involves a clear misconception of the law, the trial court's decision will not be disturbed.... Expert testimony should be admitted when: (1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3) the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in considering the issues. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hayes v. Decker, 263 Conn. 677, 683, 822 A.2d 228 (2003); see State v. Rizzo, supra, 266 Conn. at 302, 833 A.2d 363. Finally, and as previously discussed, in order for evidence to be relevant, it need not exclude all other possibilities; it is sufficient if it tends to support the conclusion [for which it is offered], even to a slight degree.... [See] Conn.Code Evid. ง 4-1 (defining relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is material to the determination of the proceeding more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence). (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Peeler, 267 Conn. 611, 635, 841 A.2d 181 (2004). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to strike Milzoff's testimony. First, Milzoff's testimony was relevant, at the very least, as the trial court suggested, to the charge of misconduct with a motor vehicle. See State v. Ortiz, 29 Conn.App. 825, 836, 618 A.2d 547 (1993) (risks associated with operating vehicle with elevated blood alcohol content may constitute criminal negligence under ง 53a-57). Milzoff's testimony indicating that alcohol inhibits one's reflexes, coupled with the evidence that the defendant was driving thirty miles per hour above the speed limit immediately before the crash, could have aided the jury in concluding that the defendant's conduct constituted a gross deviation from the ordinary standard of care. See id., at 836-37, 618 A.2d 547. In addition, Milzoff's testimony that the effects of alcohol are dependent on how much an individual consumes was helpful to establish how much the defendant may have been effected. As previously discussed, the state was required to show that the defendant lacked, to an appreciable degree, the ability to function properly in relation to the operation of his motor vehicle. It cannot be said that Milzoff's testimony did not aid the jury in this regard. We are not persuaded that, as the defendant suggests, Milzoff's testimony should have been excluded because it was not beyond the knowledge of an average layperson. The short answer to this contention is that, although some of Milzoff's testimony could be classified as common knowledge, some of his testimony was likely beyond the knowledge of the average juror, particularly his testimony regarding the specific effects of alcohol and how much alcohol constitutes a dose. By the same token, we are not persuaded by the defendant's reliance on State v. McNally, supra, 39 Conn.App. at 425, 665 A.2d 137, for the proposition that Milzoff's testimony should have been stricken because it was `a superfluous attempt to put the gloss of expertise, like a bit of frosting, upon inferences which lay persons were equally capable of drawing from the evidence.' McNally is distinguishable from the present case. First, the Appellate Court in McNally affirmed the trial court's ruling to exclude expert testimony. Simply because it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court in that case to exclude expert testimony does not necessarily mean that it would have been an abuse of discretion if the court had allowed it. Second, the defendant in McNally, a police officer who observed the victim on the evening in question, sought to give an expert opinion that the victim was intoxicated on the basis of his training as a police officer. Id. The Appellate Court concluded a determination of a person's intoxication based solely on observation and not on an interpretation of sobriety tests is within the general knowledge of the jury. (Emphasis in original.) Id., at 424, 665 A.2d 137. Thus, McNally merely stands for the proposition that, unless the witness can provide something more than merely his observation of a particular individual, expert testimony on the issue of intoxication ordinarily is not appropriate. In the present case, Milzoff expressly did not offer any opinion as to whether the defendant was intoxicated; rather, he testified only as to the typical effects of alcohol on the central nervous system on the basis of his background in toxicology. Finally, we reject whatever claims the defendant makes regarding the trial court's failure to hold a hearing pursuant to State v. Porter, supra, 241 Conn. at 57, 698 A.2d 739, before it received the testimony of Milzoff. Aside from the defendant's inadequate briefing of this contention, it suffices to say that a Porter hearing is not required for an expert to testify, in essence and in general terms, that alcohol affects one's central nervous system. See Maher v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., 269 Conn. 154, 169, 847 A.2d 978 (2004) ([S]ome scientific principles have become so well established that [a threshold admissibility] analysis is not necessary for admission of evidence thereunder.... Evidence derived from such principles would clearly withstand [such an] analysis, and thus may be admitted simply on a showing of relevance. [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).