Opinion ID: 2127567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions: Self-Defense

Text: Appellant does not dispute that he killed Elmore and Stump. Instead, Appellant hoped to justify the shootings as a matter of self-defense. In fact, during opening statements, defense counsel asserted that Appellant was not guilty because this was self-defense. The trial judge, however, found no basis from the evidence introduced at trial to support a self-defense instruction, but did allow the jury to consider whether Appellant acted under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance. This issue arose shortly before the close of evidence, in the context of whether or not Appellant's testimony was required in order to submit instructions on self-defense to the jury. In denying the requested instructions, the trial judge reasoned that the self-defense statute, KRS 503.050 is based on the subjective belief of the defendant and the defendant is the only one who can testify. In chambers, the trial judge further explained: [I]t says the defendant must believe. I'm not saying there is not evidence from which he could believe that. But he's the onlythe jury cannot assume that he believes it because he's theit's subjective and the case law says that it is subjective. It is what he believes. Appellant claims the trial judge has misinterpreted the relevant law regarding the availability of self-defense instructions for defendants who choose not to testify. The Kentucky Penal Code allows a defendant to justify the use of deadly physical force upon another person when the defendant believes that such force is necessary as protection against an imminent threat of death or serious physical injury. Specifically, subsections (1) and (2) of KRS 503.050 provide: (1) The use of physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by the other person. (2) The use of deadly physical force by a defendant upon another person is justifiable under subsection (1) only when the defendant believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious physical injury, kidnapping, or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat. (emphasis added). In evaluating this statute, the trial judge was correct insofar as the focus of the penal code is on the defendant's actual subjective belief in the need for self-protection and not on the objective reasonableness of that belief. Elliott v. Commonwealth, 976 S.W.2d 416, 419 (Ky.1998). However, the question here is not whether the defense of self-protection is based upon a defendant's subjective state of mind, but whether a defendant must testify in order to establish such a personally held belief. Kentucky courts have long held that a defendant need not testify in order to receive an instruction on self-defense. See Hasty v. Commonwealth, 272 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Ky.1954); Benson v. Commonwealth, 290 Ky. 713, 162 S.W.2d 538 (1942); Rutherford v. Commonwealth, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 608 (1878). In Hasty, supra , the predecessor to this Court opined: Concerning the question of whether or not the appellant was entitled to an instruction on self-defense, we find that in cases of this character the court is required to give such an instruction where the evidence is wholly circumstantial, there is evidence of a struggle, and the accused fails to testify, or, although he does become a witness, he does not testify as to any facts indicating the manner in which the deceased met death. Among the evidence we find: Appellant's statement to police indicating an altercation between the victims and himself; Appellant's statement that the victims kept coming and he didn't know what to do; a welt on Appellant's head, attributable either to the altercation or to an automobile wreck later that evening; and finally, evidence that in an unrelated incident several years earlier, Appellant had been severely beaten during a mugging, after which he bought a gun and became more reserved. Admittedly, the evidence supporting Appellant's belief in the need for the use of force was not strong, nor free from contradiction. However, such evidence need only raise the issue, for an instruction on self-defense is necessary once sufficient evidence has been introduced at trial which could justify a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's guilt. Estep v. Commonwealth, 64 S.W.3d 805, 811 (Ky.2002); Commonwealth v. Day, 983 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Ky.1999); Jewell v. Commonwealth, 549 S.W.2d 807, 812 (Ky.1977), overruled on other grounds, Payne v. Commonwealth, 623 S.W.2d 867 (Ky.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 909, 102 S.Ct. 1758, 72 L.Ed.2d 167 (1982). In addition, we hardly need to repeat that a criminal defendant is entitled to jury instructions on any defense supported by the evidence. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534 (Ky.1988); Curtis v. Commonwealth, 169 Ky. 727, 184 S.W. 1105, 1107 (1916). In this regard, we note that the evidence which tended to show Appellant's belief in the need for self-defense may also be interpreted as evidence of a mistaken belief in that need. Therefore, the full range of self-defense instructions, including the wanton and reckless belief qualifications, as provided by KRS 503.120(1), are appropriate in this matter. See generally Commonwealth v. Hager, 41 S.W.3d 828 (Ky.2001). Intertwined with Appellant's argument that he was improperly denied instructions on self-defense, Appellant asserts that the trial judge's ruling deprived him of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Caught in the proverbial Catch-22, Appellant claims he was forced to choose between taking the witness stand or forgoing a valid defense. In general, where circumstantial or indirect evidence fails to raise the issue of self-protection, the fact that a defendant must testify or forgo this defense does not implicate the Fifth Amendment. The defendant's choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 759, 103 S.Ct. 1548, 75 L.Ed.2d 521 (1983), quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1897-98, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970). Although we are not prepared to say that the trial court's actions infringed on Appellant's privilege against self-incrimination, particularly since Appellant chose not to testify, we note that at least one jurisdiction has ruled otherwise. In People v. Hoskins, 403 Mich. 95, 267 N.W.2d 417, 419 (1978), the Michigan Supreme Court stated: A defendant need not take the stand and testify in order to merit an instruction on self-defense.... A ruling to the contrary compromises a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, Appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his requested instruction on the duty to retreat, or more specifically, that Appellant had no duty to retreat. Appellant claims the prosecution raised this issue by repeatedly telling the jury that Appellant could have simply fled instead of shooting the victims. An instruction on retreat, according to Appellant, was necessary to counter the inference that Appellant was under a duty to avoid, if at all possible, the altercation with the victims. In Gibson v. Commonwealth, 237 Ky. 33, 34 S.W.2d 936 (1936), the High Court stated: [I]t is the tradition that a Kentuckian never runs. He does not have to. As professors Lawson and Fortune note, [a] proposal by the drafters of the Kentucky Penal Code to change this rule was rejected by the General Assembly and the right of a defender to stand his ground against aggression was left intact. Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune, Kentucky Criminal Law § 4-2(d)(2) (1998) (footnotes omitted). Despite the defiant attitude toward retreat exhibited by the Gibson opinion, Kentucky decisions have generally not adhered to such an absolute interpretation of the no duty to retreat rule, nor did our predecessor court require jury instructions describing the same. For example, in Bush v. Commonwealth, 335 S.W.2d 324 (Ky.1960), the Court of Appeals found no error in the failure to give an instruction on retreat, particularly since the jury was otherwise fully instructed on self-defense. [A]n instruction on self-defense should be in the usual form, leaving the question to be determined by the jury in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the case, rather than in the light of certain particular facts. Id. at 326. Accord, Crawford v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 557, 136 S.W.2d 754 (1940); Greer v. Commonwealth, 164 Ky. 396, 175 S.W. 665 (1915); Connor v. Commonwealth, 118 Ky. 497, 81 S.W. 259 (1904). See also James M. Roberson, New Kentucky Criminal Law and Procedure § 313 (2d ed.1927) (stating that the rule now is that whether the assailed should stand his ground or give back is a question for the jury, and that he may properly follow that course which is apparently necessary to save himself from death or great bodily harm). Appellant argues that when the jury is correctly instructed on the law of self-defense, it should be clear from the instructions that the defendant has no duty to retreat. Furthermore, although some jurisdictions require specific jury instructions detailing a defendant's right to stand his or her ground when the facts of the case instead suggest a duty to withdraw, see Cassels v. State, 92 P.3d 951 (Colo. 2004); McDonald v. State, 717 So.2d 715 (Miss.1998); People v. Redmond, 150 Wash.2d 489, 78 P.3d 1001 (2003), other jurisdictions, like Kentucky, follow the principle that when the trial court adequately instructs on self-defense, it need not also give a no duty to retreat instruction. State v. Ottman, 144 Ariz. 560, 562, 698 P.2d 1279, 1281 (1985). Accord, State v. Brown, 414 So.2d 726 (La.1982).