Opinion ID: 106288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the rail unions and union security.

Text: The history of union security in the railway industry is marked first, by a strong and long-standing tradition of voluntary unionism on the part of the standard rail unions; [6] second, by the declaration in 1934 of a congressional policy of complete freedom of choice of employees to join or not to join a union; third, by the modification of the firm legislative policy against compulsion, but only as a specific response to the recognition of the expenses and burdens incurred by the unions in the administration of the complex scheme of the Railway Labor Act. When the question of union security in the rail industry was first given detailed consideration by Congress in 1934 [7] only one of the standard unions had security provisions in any of its contracts. The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen maintained a number of so-called percentage contracts, requiring that in certain classes of employees represented by the Brotherhood, a specified percentage of employees had to belong to the union. These contracts applied only to yard conductors, yard brakemen and switchmen, and covered no more than 10,000 workers, about 1% of all rail employees. See letter from Joseph B. Eastman, Federal Coordinator of Transportation, to Chairman of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, June 7, 1934, H. R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 14-16; testimony of James A. Farquharson, legislative representative of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, Hearings on H. R. 7650, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 94-105. During congressional consideration of the 1934 legislation, the rail unions attempted to persuade Congress not to preclude them from negotiating security arrangements. By amendments to the original proposal, they sought to assure that the provision which became § 2, Fifth should prevent the carriers from conditioning employment on membership in a company union but should exempt the standard unions from its prohibitions. The Trainmen, the only union which stood to lose existing contracts if the section was not limited to company unions, especially urged such a limitation. See statement of A. F. Whitney, president, S. Rep. No. 1065, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, p. 2; see also 78 Cong. Rec. 12372, 12376. The unions succeeded in having the House incorporate such a limitation in the bill it passed. See H. R. Rep. No. 1944, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 6; 78 Cong. Rec. 11710-11720. But the Senate did not acquiesce. Eastman, a firm believer in complete freedom of employees in their choice of representatives, strongly opposed the limitation. He characterized it as vicious, because it strikes at the principle of freedom of choice which the bill is designed to protect. The prohibited practices acquire no virtue by being confined to so-called `standard union.' . . . Within recent years, the practice of tying up men's jobs with labor-union membership has crept into the railroad industry which theretofore was singularly clean in this respect. The practice has been largely in connection with company unions but not entirely. If genuine freedom of choice is to be the basis of labor relations under the Railway Labor Act, as it should be, then the yellow-dog contract, and its corollary, the closed shop, and the so-called `percentage contract' have no place in the picture. Hearings on S. 3266, Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 157. [8] Eastman's views prevailed in the Senate, and the House concurred in a final version of § 2, Fifth, providing that [n]o carrier. . . shall require any person seeking employment to sign any contract or agreement promising to join or not to join a labor organization. See 78 Cong. Rec. 12369-12376, 12382-12388, 12389-12398, 12400-12402, 12549-12555. During World War II, the nonoperating unions made an unsuccessful attempt to obtain union security, incidental to an effort to secure a wage increase. Following the failure of negotiations and mediation, a Presidential Emergency Board was appointed. Two principal reasons were advanced by the unions. They urged that in view of their pledge not to strike for the duration and their responsibilities to assure uninterrupted operation of the railroads, they were justified in seeking to maintain their positions by union security arrangements. They also maintained that since they secured benefits through collective bargaining for all employees they represented, it was fair that the costs of their operations be shared by all workers. The Board recommended withdrawal of the request, concluding that the union shop was plainly forbidden by the Railway Labor Act and that in any event the unions had failed to show its necessity or utility. Presidential Emergency Board, appointed Feb. 20, 1943, Report of May 24, 1943; Supplemental Report, May 29, 1943. The Report said: [T]he Board is convinced that the essential elements of the union shop as defined in the employees' request are prohibited by section 2 of the Railway Labor Act. The intent of Congress in this respect is made evident, with unusual clarity. Supplemental Report, supra, p. 29. [9] On the merits of the issue, the Board expressly rejected the claim that union security was necessary to protect the bargaining position of the unions: [T]he unions are not suffering from a falling off in members. On the contrary, . . . membership has been growing and at the present time appears to be the largest in railroad history, with less than 10 percent nonmembership among the employees here represented. Supplemental Report, p. 31. [T]he evidence presented with respect to danger from predatory rivals seemed to the Board lacking in sufficiency; especially so in the light of the evidence concerning membership growth. Ibid. [N]o evidence was presented indicating that the unions stand in jeopardy by reason of carrier opposition. A few railroads were mentioned on which some of the unions do not represent a majority of their craft or class, and do not have bargaining relationships with the carrier. But the exhibits show that these unions are the chosen representatives of the employees on the overwhelming majority of the railroads, and that recognition of the unions is general. The Board does not find therefore that a sufficient case has been made for the necessity of additional protection of union status on the railroads. Id., p. 32. The unions acceded to the Board's recommendation. The question of union security was reopened in 1950. [10] Congress then evaluated the proposal for authorizing the union shop primarily in terms of its relationship to the financing of the unions' participation in the machinery created by the Railway Labor Act to achieve its goals. The framework for fostering voluntary adjustments between the carriers and their employees in the interest of the efficient discharge by the carriers of their important functions with minimum disruption from labor strife has no statutory parallel in other industry. That machinery, the product of a long legislative evolution, is more complex than that of any other industry. The labor relations of interstate carriers have been a subject of congressional enactments since 1888. [11] For a time, after World War I, Congress experimented with a form of compulsory arbitration. [12] The experiment was unsuccessful. Congress has since that time consistently adhered to a regulatory policy which places the responsibility squarely upon the carriers and the unions mutually to work out settlements of all aspects of the labor relationship. That policy was embodied in the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577, which remains the basic regulatory enactment. As the Senate Report on the bill which became that law stated: The question was . . . presented whether the substitute [for the Act of 1920] should consist of a compulsory system with adequate means provided for its enforcement, or whether it was in the public interest to create the machinery for amicable adjustment of labor disputes agreed upon by the parties and to the success of which both parties were committed. . . . The committee is of opinion that it is in the public interest to permit a fair trial of the method of amicable adjustment agreed upon by the parties, rather than to attempt under existing conditions to use the entire power of the Government to deal with these labor disputes. S. Rep. No. 606, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. The reference to the plan agreed upon by the parties was to the fact that the Railway Labor Act of 1926 came on the statute books through agreement between the railroads and the railroad unions on the need for such legislation. It is accurate to say that the railroads and the railroad unions between them wrote the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and Congress formally enacted their agreement. Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, supra, p. 240 (concurring opinion). See generally Murphy, Agreement on the RailroadsThe Joint Railway Conference of 1926, 11 Lab. L. J. 823. All through the [1926] act is the theory that the agreement is the vital thing in life. Statement of Donald R. Richberg, Hearings on H. R. 7180, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 15-16. The Act created affirmative legal duties on the part of the carriers and their employees to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise . . . . § 2, First. See Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548. The Act also established a comprehensive administrative apparatus for the adjustment of disputes, in conferences between the parties, § 2, Second, Third and Fourth (now Sixth), and if not so settled, in submissions to boards of adjustment, § 3, or the National Mediation Board, § 4. And the legislation expanded the already existing voluntary arbitration machinery, §§ 7, 8, 9. A primary purpose of the major revisions made in 1934 was to strengthen the position of the labor organizations vis-a-vis the carriers, to the end of furthering the success of the basic congressional policy of self-adjustment of the industry's labor problems between carrier organizations and effective labor organizations. The unions claimed that the carriers interfered with the employees' freedom of choice of representatives by creating company unions, and otherwise attempting to undermine the employees' participation in the process of collective bargaining. Congress amended § 2, Third to reinforce the prohibitions against interference with the choice of representatives, and to permit the employees to select nonemployee representatives. A new § 2, Fourth was added guaranteeing employees the right to organize and bargain collectively, and Congress made it the enforceable duty of the carriers to treat with the representatives of the employees, § 2, Ninth. See Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U. S. 515. It was made explicit that the representative selected by a majority of any class or craft of employees should be the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of that craft or class. The minority members of a craft are thus deprived by the statute of the right, which they would otherwise possess, to choose a representative of their own, and its members cannot bargain individually on behalf of themselves as to matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192, 200. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents. . . . Id., p. 202. In addition to thus strengthening the unions' status in relation to both the carriers and the employees, the 1934 Act created the National Railroad Adjustment Board and provided that the 18 employee representatives were to be chosen by the labor organizations national in scope. § 3. This Board was given jurisdiction to settle what are termed minor disputes in the railroad industry, primarily grievances arising from the application of collective bargaining agreements to particular situations. See Union Pacific R. Co. v. Price, 360 U. S. 601. In sum, in prescribing collective bargaining as the method of settling railway disputes, in conferring upon the unions the status of exclusive representatives in the negotiation and administration of collective agreements, and in giving them representation on the statutory board to adjudicate grievances, Congress has given the unions a clearly defined and delineated role to play in effectuating the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations in the industry. It is fair to say that every stage in the evolution of this railroad labor code was progressively infused with the purpose of securing self-adjustment between the effectively organized railroads and the equally effective railroad unions and, to that end, of establishing facilities for such self-adjustment by the railroad community of its own industrial controversies. . . . The assumption as well as the aim of that Act [of 1934] is a process of permanent conference and negotiation between the carriers on the one hand and the employees through their unions on the other. Elgin, J. & E. R. Co. v. Burley, 325 U. S. 711, 752-753 (dissenting opinion). Performance of these functions entails the expenditure of considerable funds. Moreover, this Court has held that under the statutory scheme, a union's status as exclusive bargaining representative carries with it the duty fairly and equitably to represent all employees of the craft or class, union and nonunion. Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U. S. 192; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U. S. 210. The principal argument made by the unions in 1950 was based on their role in this regulatory framework. They maintained that because of the expense of performing their duties in the congressional scheme, fairness justified the spreading of the costs to all employees who benefited. They thus advanced as their purpose the elimination of the free ridersthose employees who obtained the benefits of the unions' participation in the machinery of the Act without financially supporting the unions. George M. Harrison, spokesman for the Railway Labor Executives' Association, stated the unions' case in this fashion: Activities of labor organizations resulting in the procurement of employee benefits are costly, and the only source of funds with which to carry on these activities is the dues received from members of the organization. We believe that it is essentially unfair for nonmembers to participate in the benefits of those activities without contributing anything to the cost. This is especially true when the collective bargaining representative is one from whose existence and activities he derives most important benefits and one which is obligated by law to extend these advantages to him. Furthermore, collective bargaining to the railroad industry is more costly from a monetary standpoint than that carried on in any other industry. The administrative machinery is more complete and more complex. The mediation, arbitration, and Presidential Emergency Board provisions of the act, while greatly in the public interest, are very costly to the unions. The handling of agreement disputes through the National Railroad Adjustment Board also requires expense which is not known to unions in outside industry. Hearings on H. R. 7789, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 10. This argument was decisive with Congress. The House Committee Report traced the history of previous legislation in the industry and pointed out the duty of the union acting as exclusive bargaining representative to represent equally all members of the class. Under the act, the collective-bargaining representative is required to represent the entire membership of the craft or class, including non-union members, fairly, equitably, and in good faith. Benefits resulting from collective bargaining may not be withheld from employees because they are not members of the union. H. R. Rep. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., p. 4. Observing that about 75% or 80% of all railroad employees were believed to belong to a union, the report continued: Nonunion members, nevertheless, share in the benefits derived from collective agreements negotiated by the railway labor unions but bear no share of the cost of obtaining such benefits. Ibid. [13] These considerations overbore the arguments in favor of the earlier policy of complete individual freedom of choice. As we said in Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, supra, p. 235, [t]o require, rather than to induce, the beneficiaries of trade unionism to contribute to its costs may not be the wisest course. But Congress might well believe that it would help insure the right to work in and along the arteries of interstate commerce. No more has been attempted here. . . . The financial support required relates . . . to the work of the union in the realm of collective bargaining. [14] The conclusion to which this history clearly points is that § 2, Eleventh contemplated compulsory unionism to force employees to share the costs of negotiating and administering collective agreements, and the costs of the adjustment and settlement of disputes. [15] One looks in vain for any suggestion that Congress also meant in § 2, Eleventh to provide the unions with a means for forcing employees, over their objection, to support political causes which they oppose.