Opinion ID: 2507169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suspicionless, Random Drug Testing Disturbs a Student Athlete's Private Affairs.

Text: ¶ 19 When inquiring about private affairs, we look to `those privacy interests which citizens of this state have held, and should be entitled to hold, safe from governmental trespass absent a warrant.' State v. Young, 123 Wash.2d 173, 181, 867 P.2d 593 (1994) (quoting State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506, 511, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)). This is an objective analysis. ¶ 20 The private affair we are concerned with today is the State's interference in a student athlete's bodily functions. Specifically, does it intrude upon a privacy interest to require a student athlete to go into a bathroom stall and provide a urine sample, even against that student's protest? Federal courts and our court both agree the answer is an unqualified yes, such action intrudes into one's reasonable expectation of privacy. Robinson v. City of Seattle, 102 Wash.App. 795, 813 n. 50, 10 P.3d 452 (2000) (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d 80, 90, 847 P.2d 455 (1993); State v. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73, 83, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993); State v. Meacham, 93 Wash.2d 735, 738, 612 P.2d 795 (1980); State v. Curran, 116 Wash.2d 174, 184, 804 P.2d 558 (1991)). Indeed, we offer heightened protection for bodily functions compared to the federal courts. Robinson, 102 Wash.App. 795, 10 P.3d 452. ¶ 21 But the school district claims student athletes have a lower expectation of privacy. Certainly, students who choose to play sports are subjected to more regulation. For example, RCW 28A.600.200 provides, Each school district board of directors is hereby granted and shall exercise the authority to control, supervise and regulate the conduct of interschool athletic activities. [8] And certainly there is generally less privacy in locker rooms than in other parts of a school. But the district does not link regulations and the communal atmosphere of locker rooms with a student's lowered expectation of privacy in terms of being subjected to suspicionless, random drug testing. We do not see how what happens in the locker room or on the field affects a student's privacy in the context of compelling him or her to provide a urine sample. [9] A student athlete has a genuine and fundamental privacy interest in controlling his or her own bodily functions. The urinalysis test is by itself relatively unobtrusive. Nevertheless, a student is still required to provide his or her bodily fluids. Even if done in an enclosed stall, this is a significant intrusion on a student's fundamental right of privacy. See Robinson, 102 Wash.App. at 822, 10 P.3d 452. ¶ 22 This analysis should in no way contradict what we have previously said about students' privacy interests. Generally we have recognized students have a lower expectation of privacy because of the nature of the school environment. Courts have held a school official needs some reasonable or individualized suspicion in order to protect students from arbitrary searches, yet still give officials sufficient leeway to conduct their duties. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733; State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977). Our court discussed student searches and student rights under the Fourth Amendment prior to the United States Supreme Court's holding in T.L.O. In McKinnon, we said: Although a student's right to be free from intrusion is not to be lightly disregarded, for us to hold school officials to the standard of probable cause required of law enforcement officials would create an unreasonable burden upon these school officials. Maintaining discipline in schools oftentimes requires immediate action and cannot await the procurement of a search warrant based on probable cause. We hold that the search of a student's person is reasonable and does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, if the school official has reasonable grounds to believe the search is necessary in the aid of maintaining school discipline and order. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d at 81, 558 P.2d 781. And in Kuehn, we also opined in dicta that although a warrant or probable cause might be unnecessary to search a student's backpack, the school nevertheless needed to articulate some reasonable suspicion to justify a search of a student under both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7. Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 103 Wash.2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985); State v. Slattery, 56 Wash.App. 820, 823, 787 P.2d 932 (1990) (Under the school search exception, school officials may search students if, under all the circumstances, the search is reasonable.); State v. B.A.S., 103 Wash.App. 549, 554 n. 8, 13 P.3d 244 (2000). [10] ¶ 23 We decided these cases before the United States Supreme Court decided T.L.O., which cited McKinnon when it also held reasonable suspicion was necessary to search a student. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 733. Nevertheless, in State v. Brooks, 43 Wash.App. 560, 568, 718 P.2d 837 (1986), the Court of Appeals analyzed McKinnon and Kuehn and said, Accordingly, since the holding in T.L.O. is consistent with our Supreme Court's holding in McKinnon, we conclude that article 1, section 7 affords students no greater protections from searches by school officials than is guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. The school district points to this one sentence to say we should adopt whole cloth the federal analysis with regards to both student searches and student drug testing. But Brooks did not involve drug testing and was decided before Acton. Nor are we bound to the Court of Appeals' broad language. ¶ 24 Because we determine that interfering with a student athlete's bodily functions disturbs one's private affairs, we must address the second prong of the article I, section 7 analysis: does the school district have the necessary authority of law to randomly drug test student athletes?