Opinion ID: 3065484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ramirez-Esqueda’s Statements

Text: We now consider Ramirez-Esqueda’s argument that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress both of his confessions on the grounds that he was not given the Miranda warnings to which he was entitled before his first alleged confession, which also tainted his second, videotaped confession. The district court concluded that because Ramirez-Esqueda was not in custody when he first confessed to Perez, there was no Miranda violation. “A district court’s ‘in custody’ determination is a ‘mixed question of law and fact warranting de novo review.’ ” United States v. Bassignani, 575 F.3d 879, 883 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 973 (9th Cir. 2002)). However, because the district court properly admitted RamirezEsqueda’s second confession and any improper admission of the first statement was harmless error, we need not decide whether he was in custody at the time of his first confession.5 [9] In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court adopted prophylactic procedural measures— the requirement that officers give the four Miranda warnings —to ensure a suspect is apprised of his Fifth Amendment rights before custodial interrogations. Id. at 444-45. Although a failure to issue the Miranda warnings to a suspect who is in custody typically makes any statement made by the suspect 5 Ramirez-Esqueda also argues that we should suppress his statements as “fruit of the poisonous tree” resulting from the illegal entry into Unit 3. But as discussed in part III.A, supra, Ramirez-Esqueda does not have standing to challenge this search, and therefore cannot make the “fruit of the poisonous tree” argument. UNITED STATES v. REYES-BOSQUE 3221 inadmissible, the Supreme Court has twice addressed the admissibility of a confession obtained after the Miranda warnings, but preceded by an earlier, unwarned confession. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court held that a “suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Id. at 318. However, in Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), a plurality opinion, the Court distinguished Elstad, and concluded that “when interrogators question first and warn later,” the issue “is thus whether it would be reasonable to find that in these circumstances the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires. Could the warnings effectively advise the suspect that he had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture?” Id. at 611-12. [10] In United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2006), however, we interpreted the holding in Seibert to be the narrower holding reached by Justice Kennedy. Id. at 115758 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). Thus, where officers deliberately use a two-step interrogation technique in which they elicit an unwarned confession, administer the Miranda warnings and obtain a waiver of Miranda rights, then elicit a repeated confession, “the district court must suppress post-warnings statements unless the interrogators take curative measures to apprise the defendant of his rights.” United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Seibert, 542 U.S. at 622; Williams, 435 F.3d at 1157-58). If the use of the two-step method is not deliberate, however, the post-warning statements are admissible if they were voluntarily made. Id. [11] Ramirez-Esqueda never contends that the officers deliberately used the two-step method or that his postwarnings statements were involuntary. Instead, he argues that even if we conclude that the first, but not the second, confession should have been excluded, we must reverse his convic3222 UNITED STATES v. REYES-BOSQUE tion because the error was not harmless. We disagree. In Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), a case upon which Ramirez-Esqueda relies for this argument, the Supreme Court declined to find that the admission of one of the defendant’s two confessions was harmless error because “the transcript disclose[d] that both the trial court and the State recognized that a successful prosecution depended on the jury believing the two confessions.” Id. at 297. This is not the case here. The evidence supported Ramirez-Esqueda’s conviction, even without his first confession. As noted by RamirezEsqueda, the jury seemed to rely heavily on his subsequent, taped confession, evidenced by the fact that they sought and received permission to view the tape during deliberations. Because there is nothing to suggest that the officers deliberately used the two-step method or that his post-warning statement was not made voluntarily, the court properly admitted his second confession. Moreover, even if the district court erred in admitting his first statement, the error was harmless, because the other evidence presented against him was sufficient to support the jury’s finding of guilt.