Opinion ID: 1399473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Voir Dire Issue

Text: Prior to voir dire, the district court mailed prospective jurors 113 questions prepared by counsel. One question, proposed by Wright, asked: If an individual has been identified as a member of any group that might be called a street gang, do you believe that this person is more likely to be prone to violence or to crime than an individual who is not a member of a street gang? Of the 134 prospective jurors who responded, 106 answered yes to this question. Wright moved to strike all 106 for cause, arguing that the affirmative answer clearly indicates a presumption of bias and prejudice against the Defendant who will be identified as a member of a street gang. The magistrate judge [2] recommended that the 106 not be struck because their answers did not establish inability to render a fair and just verdict, and recommended that the district court at voir dire inquire whether each of the 106 would be able to follow the law as instructed and render a verdict based on the law and the facts as found. Wright objected, arguing that all 106 should be struck for cause. The district court overruled this objection, advised that the court would conduct voir dire limited to follow-up questions based on the jurors' prior responses, and invited counsel to submit proposed follow-up voir dire questions. In response, Wright requested that the court ask 43 supplemental voir dire questions, 25 of which related to street gangs, and conduct individual and separate voir dire of each prospective juror. Before the start of voir dire, the district court advised that follow-up questions would be limited to those recommended by the magistrate judge and invited counsel to request more or otherwise make a record after this questioning. At the start of each day of the two-day voir dire, the court asked the entire panel whether any member's judgment would be affected by the race of the defendant; none responded. The court then separated the panel into groups of six or seven and asked each potential juror who answered the street gang question affirmatively whether he or she could keep an open mind and wait until all the evidence was presented before deciding whether the government met its burden of proof. The court refused defense counsel's requests that particular panel members be asked additional questions concerning gang membership. All jurors whose answers evidenced even the slightest possible anti-gang bias were stricken for cause. On appeal, Wright argues that the court deprived him of the right to obtain a fair and impartial jury when it refused to ask prospective jurors who answered the gang question affirmatively extensive follow-up questions regarding possible gang-related bias. Wright does not challenge the fairness of any person selected as a juror. He does not argue that any specific prospective juror was not asked particular questions. And he does not argue that he lacked information needed in exercising his peremptory challenges as to specific jurors. Compare United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 804-06 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 880, 122 S.Ct. 184, 151 L.Ed.2d 128 (2001). Absent substantial indications of the likelihood of racial or ethnic prejudice affecting the jurors in a particular case.... the Constitution leaves it to the trial court, and the judicial system within which that court operates, to determine the need for voir dire questions probing possible juror bias or prejudice. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion); see Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422-27, 111 S.Ct. 1899, 114 L.Ed.2d 493 (1991). In general, a district court should, if requested, ask voir dire questions designed to detect a prejudice that may be relevant to the impending trial, but the extent and nature of that inquiry is left to the court's discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Spaar, 748 F.2d 1249, 1252-54 (8th Cir.1984). Here, the district court adopted procedures for the lengthy jury selection process that we approved in a recent capital case from this District, United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 888-89 (8th Cir.2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1042, 123 S.Ct. 2095, 155 L.Ed.2d 1078 (2003). By including a gang-related question in the initial questionnaire, the court honored Wright's request to inquire into that possible prejudice. No such inquiry was made in People v. Jimenez, 284 Ill. App.3d 908, 220 Ill.Dec. 97, 672 N.E.2d 914, 916-17 (1996), the case on which Wright primarily relies. Moreover, at voir dire, the district court was careful to ask the kind of follow-up question that the dissenters concluded should have been asked in Gardner v. Barnett, 199 F.3d 915, 924 (7th Cir.1999) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1079, 120 S.Ct. 1699, 146 L.Ed.2d 504 (2000). There was no abuse of discretion.