Opinion ID: 2766194
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of Double Counting

Text: Walters asserts that the challenged sentence enhancements constitute unconstitutional double counting. By penalizing him twice for the same conduct, he argues, the sentence imposed by the district court violates his right to due process and his right not to be subject to double jeopardy. U.S. CONST. amends. V and XIV, § 1. Walters’ constitutional argument is unpersuasive. It is well-established in this Circuit that double counting—even impermissible double counting—does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Double counting “occurs when ‘precisely the same aspect of a defendant’s conduct factors into his sentence in two separate ways.’” United States v. Wheeler, 330 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Farrow, 198 F.3d 179, 193 (6th Cir. 1999)). “[N]o double counting occurs if the defendant is punished for distinct aspects of his conduct.” Battaglia, 624 F.3d at 351 (citing United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 542 (6th Cir. 2008)). Where double counting does occur, however, it may be permissible. Id. Where it “appears that Congress or the Sentencing Commission intended to attach multiple penalties to the same conduct,” double counting is permitted. Id. (quoting Farrow, 198 F.3d at 194). Indeed, the Guidelines explicitly state that “[t]he offense level adjustments from more than one specific offense guideline are applied cumulatively (added together) unless otherwise noted.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n. 4(A). It is settled law in this Circuit that double counting does not violate the Constitution’s prohibition on double jeopardy. Wheeler, 330 F.3d at 413 (“In asserting a double jeopardy violation, Defendant unsuccessfully attempts to transform what constitutes at most a double counting issue under the sentencing guidelines into a constitutional concern.”). In Wheeler, we concluded that [a]lthough the Constitution prohibits multiple criminal punishments for the same offense, double jeopardy principles generally have no application in the sentencing context “because the determinations at issue do not place a defendant No. 14-3097 United States v. Walters Page 6 in jeopardy for an ‘offense.’” This rule also applies to sentencing enhancements, which constitute increased penalties for the latest crime, rather than “‘a new jeopardy or additional penalty for the earlier crimes.’” Id. (quoting Monge v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 728 (1998)). Thus, when a district court applies multiple sections of the Guidelines to determine the proper sentence for an offense, there is no constitutional violation for double jeopardy. Id. Walters also argues that the alleged double counting in this case violates his right to due process. However, he fails to articulate a connection between double counting and a violation of due process. He argues the sentence is “unfair,” but then repeatedly engages in an analysis of whether the sentence enhancements constitute impermissible double counting—a separate inquiry with different implications. Even though the government directly challenges him on this point, Walters again asserts only that the sentence is “unfair,” and requests a downward adjustment. As Walters presents no legal argument for this Court to evaluate with regards to his due process claim, it is unnecessary to consider it further. Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8) (requiring appellant to set forth both his contentions on appeal and arguments supporting them). Properly construed, Walters’ appeal largely contends that the challenged sentence enhancements are impermissible double counting. The relief requested—that the enhancements be removed and the case remanded for re-sentencing—would be properly granted if he demonstrates that the enhancements are impermissible. We therefore evaluate whether that is the case.