Opinion ID: 2638434
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Beagle error

Text: Defendant had previously been convicted of rape in 1978, attempted grand theft from the person in 1982, grand theft from the person in 1984, and murder in 1986. Anticipating that the prosecution would introduce such evidence as impeachment should he testify, defendant moved to exclude evidence of these convictions pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. [11] His motion addressed the law both pre-Proposition 8 ( People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1 ( Beagle )) and post-Proposition 8 ( People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111 ( Castro )). [12] The trial court discussed the motion as a Castro motion and ruled all four convictions were admissible for impeachment purposes. [13] Defendant later sought reconsideration of the ruling, arguing that the case was governed not by Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111, but by pre-Proposition 8 law. The court agreed and, this time applying Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1, again ruled defendant's prior felony convictions would be available for impeachment. The court explained that it still believed witnesses should not be allowed to testify under a false aura of credibility, and, [w]ith that thinking, and on rebalancing in light of Beagle, the Court does reconsider its ruling, and nevertheless, rules similarly. Namely, that I feel the nature of the offenses, the time frame within which the prior convictions have occurred, does fairly and accurately give the jurors some guidance at least in terms of the issue of credibility of a person who has suffered such convictions. Defendant now argues the trial court erred, and the error, coupled with the court's earlier ruling permitting admission into evidence of a redacted recording of his June 17th interview with police, placed him in the dilemma of staying silent and allowing the People to present this truncated version of his statements, or testifying to clarify his statement and suffering impeachment with his prior felony convictions. He contends his prior convictions had little bearing on his truthfulness, were highly prejudicial due to their similarity to the crimes against Dolinka, and were remote in time. The People essentially concede error as to the prior rape and murder convictions. Although they note the prior convictions were not remote in time because defendant essentially was in prison during the time between the convictions, and thus his convictions had not `been followed by a legally blameless life' ( Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 453, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1), the People admit the rape and murder convictions did not bear directly on defendant's veracity as required by Beagle and its progeny. (See, e.g., People v. Rist (1976) 16 Cal.3d 211, 221, 127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833.) They also concede the murder and grand theft convictions are somewhat similar to the Dolinka crimes, but argue that conviction for grand theft from the person, being a larcenous crime, bears heavily on credibility. Assuming there was Beagle error, the People argue strenuously it was harmless. Dolinka was killed in May 1982, just prior to the passage of Proposition 8 in June 1982. Accordingly, defendant's case is governed by Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1, and not Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111. ( People v. Smith (1983) 34 Cal.3d 251, 262, 193 Cal. Rptr. 692, 667 P.2d 149; People v. Pickett (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 1042, 1047, 210 Cal. Rptr. 85.) Although the law before Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 301, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111, gave trial courts discretion to admit or exclude prior felony convictions for purposes of impeachment, this court, in a long line of cases, had developed guidelines for courts to follow. Thus, for example, prior convictions for crimes whose elements were relevant to a person's veracity (such as fraud or deceit) were more likely admissible than mere acts of violence or other assaultive behavior. ( People v. Barrick (1982) 33 Cal.3d 115, 122, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243.) The nearness or remoteness in time of the prior conviction was also a factor, as was whether the defendant had led a blameless life between the prior conviction and the present one. ( Ibid. ) Whether the defendant was charged with a crime substantially similar to that underlying a prior conviction, as well as the importance of hearing the defendant's version of events, were other relevant considerations. ( Id. at pp. 122-123, 187 Cal. Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243.) As the People concede, the trial court abused its discretion under Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d 441, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313, 492 P.2d 1, by ruling defendant's prior murder and rape convictions could be admitted to impeach him should he choose to testify. Defendant's conviction for murder was similar to the crime against Dolinka ( People v. Spearman (1979) 25 Cal.3d 107, 116, 157 Cal.Rptr. 883, 599 P.2d 74), and his convictions for murder and rape do not strongly suggest he was prone to dishonesty ( People v. Holt (1984) 37 Cal.3d 436, 456-457, 208 Cal.Rptr. 547, 690 P.2d 1207 [murder conviction does not indicate witness was disposed to falsify]; see People v. Rist, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 221, 127 Cal.Rptr. 457, 545 P.2d 833 [rape not relevant to lack of honesty]). On the other hand, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling defendant's grand theft conviction could be admitted to impeach him, for theft crimes necessarily involve an element of deceit. The crime[ ] of grand larceny ... [is] recognized as reflective of a person's honesty and integrity, and [is] therefore probative for purposes of impeachment. ( People v. Anjell (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 189, 196, 160 Cal.Rptr. 669.) Having determined the trial court abused its discretion in ruling defendant's prior convictions for rape and murder could be admitted for impeachment purposes, we turn to the question whether the error requires reversal. We agree with respondent it does not. As noted, had defendant testified, he properly would have been impeached with his 1984 felony conviction for grand theft from the person. Moreover, the evidence against defendant was quite strong, for his coperpetrator, Mark Garrison, testified against him and numerous aspects of Garrison's story were consistent with evidence already known to the police. Finally, although defendant did not testify, the jury heard his side of the story from Sergeant Quinn and Detective McCarthy, who recounted defendant's statements in the June 17th interrogation admitting having planned and executed the robbery but placing the blame for killing Dolinka squarely and solely on Garrison's shoulders. Although it is true, as defendant argues, that police had an incentive to inculpate him, he does not explain how his story would have been any different had he testified himself. Considering together the availability of the prior felony conviction for impeachment, the strong evidence of defendant's guilt, and the fact his version of the crime reached the jury, we conclude the trial court's error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243. (See People v. Barrick, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 130, 187 Cal.Rptr. 716, 654 P.2d 1243 [applying Watson ]; People v. Woodard (1979) 23 Cal.3d 329, 341, 152 Cal.Rptr. 536, 590 P.2d 391 [same].)