Opinion ID: 753713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The ADA and Rehabilitation Act Claims: Because of Disability

Text: 40 Having determined that all of the appellants have met the threshold qualified individual requirement with respect to their Title I ADA challenge, we turn to the question of whether the VSF statutory scheme discriminates on the basis of disability. 41
42 Some of the Castellano, Graboski, Adornetti, and Clifford appellants served less than twenty years but nevertheless claim entitlement to the VSF benefits under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. These Class I retirees assert in substance that the ADA entitles a disabled person who retires after ten, or even two, years to receive the same pension as a twenty-year retiree. Titles I and II of the ADA and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, however, prohibit discrimination only on the basis of disability. See ADA Title I, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual); ADA Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (prohibiting discrimination against a qualified individual with a disability ... by reason of such disability); Rehabilitation Act § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (prohibiting discrimination against an otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... solely by reason of her or his disability.). 43 The Class I retirees are similarly situated not with twenty-year for service retirees, but with non-disabled retirees who retire after an equivalent period of service. Because the latter group is not entitled to VSF benefits, there is no unlawful discrimination. As noted by the EEOC, [w]here an employer offers ... a service retirement plan, there is no ADA violation as long as the service retirement plan treats persons who are covered by the ADA the same as other employees. EEOC Notice No. 915.002 Questions and Answers About Disability and Service Retirement Plans Under the ADA, May 11, 1995, at 2. In rejecting an ADA, Title II challenge to the VSF scheme by retired New York City Housing and Transit police officers, the New York Court of Appeals has also stated: 44 Eligibility for the benefits of VSF membership require [sic] a minimum of 20 years accredited service. Such a requirement precludes from benefits only officers with less than 20 years of credited service, not those who retired because of a disability. Consequently, the for service eligibility requirement does not discriminate against or burden disabled individuals in a manner different from or greater than the burdens it places on nondisabled individuals. 45 Gagliardo v. Dinkins, 89 N.Y.2d 62, 651 N.Y.S.2d 368, 674 N.E.2d 298, 304 (1996). This analysis applies to the Class I retirees' Rehabilitation Act claims. See Lyons v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 68 F.3d 1512, 1515 (2d Cir.1995); 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (The standards used to determine whether [section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act] has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination ... shall be the standards applied under title I of the [ADA]....). Because VSF payments are available equally to persons with and without disabilities who retire after twenty years of service, Class I retirees have failed to state a claim of discrimination on the basis of disability under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. 46 Nor, as noted by the EEOC, does the ADA require that service retirement plans and disability retirement plans provide the same level of benefits, because they are two separate benefits which serve different purposes. EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 2. The ADA requires only that persons with disabilities have the opportunity to receive the same benefits as non-disabled officers who have given an equivalent amount of service. Cf. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). 47 B. Retirees With Twenty Years of Service Who Retired Under a Disability Plan (Class II Retirees) 48 The Class II disabled retirees served for twenty years as police officers, transit police officers, firefighters, or fire officers and elected, under the statutory scheme, to retire under the disability and not the for service plan. All of the Class II retirees concede that they chose voluntarily to forego for service in favor of disability retirement, but nevertheless argue that they are entitled under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act to for service benefits in addition to their disability benefits. We disagree. 49 Although the ADA is violated where persons covered by the ADA who qualify for both a service retirement and disability retirement plan are required to take a disability benefit which is less advantageous, EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 3, nothing in the ADA requires an employer to provide to disabled employees the VSF benefits of a service plan in addition to freely-chosen disability benefits under a disability plan. See Felde v. City of San Jose, 839 F.Supp. 708, 710 (N.D.Cal.1994), aff'd mem., 66 F.3d 335 (9th Cir.1995) (employee afforded choice of regular and allegedly inferior disability retirement plans was given additional option of disability plan and not excluded from any retirement plan on the basis of disability); cf. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301, 105 S.Ct. 712, 720, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (no discrimination under Rehabilitation Act where state provides equal access to health care for all individuals). C. Deferred Compensation and the ADA Claim 50 The Graboski appellants point to an isolated statement in the New York Court of Appeals opinion in Gagliardo for the proposition that the statutory scheme entitles police officers and firefighters to VSF benefits regardless of disability status. In rejecting a claim that the VSF benefits constituted an unconstitutional gift under Article VIII, § 1 of the New York State Constitution, the New York Court of Appeals in Gagliardo stated: 51 The [VSFs] were created through collective bargaining as additional future compensation for services actually rendered by police officers within the bargaining unit during the life of the agreement. In addition, these supplemental benefit payments also serve the important purpose of attracting and retaining qualified candidate-officers and providing an inducement to remain in active police service. 52 Gagliardo, 651 N.Y.S.2d 368, 674 N.E.2d at 303 (emphasis added). Because VSF payments are not retirement benefits but rather deferred compensation under New York law, appellants argue, the statutory scheme denies this earned but deferred compensation only to disabled employees who are unable to complete twenty years of service. The above statement in Gagliardo, however, disposed of a claim that the VSFs violated the gift ban of the New York Constitution and did not address an ADA claim. The court's further characterization of the VSFs as inducement[s] to remain in active ... service undermines appellants' position that the benefits constitute deferred compensation. Id. The fact that the level of VSF benefits does not vary by years served is a further indication that the VSF is not bargained-for compensation for services rendered. In light of Gagliardo's ultimate holding that the VSF program does not violate Title II of the ADA, the above statement taken in context does not support appellants' ADA claim. D. Velardi's Title I ADA Claim 53 Velardi is neither a Class I nor Class II retiree. Seen in the light most favorable to Velardi, Velardi's complaint alleges that he served twenty years as a firefighter and that the NYFD Pension Fund discriminated as between twenty-year retirees on the basis of disability, denying additional [VSF] benefit[s] only to himself and other disabled firefighter retirees. ROA No. 96-9237, doc. 1 at 5. The NYFD moved to dismiss Velardi's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), claiming (i) that Velardi was not a qualified individual with a disability within Title I because he could no longer perform the essential functions of his former employment, and (ii) that the VSF scheme discriminates only on the basis of years served, not on the basis of disability. The motion to dismiss failed to address Velardi's factual allegation that after twenty years of service he had been forced to retire with disability rather than for service. 54 Velardi's response to NYFD's motion again claimed that, unlike Class II retirees, he was required to retire on an ordinary disability, ROA No. 96-9237, doc. 11 at 5, and that it was wrong for a disabled person to receive far less benefits than what is given to a service retiree with the same time served. ROA No. 96-9237, doc. 10 at p 20. At oral argument before the district court, Velardi stated that he did not apply for for service retirement because it was never offered to him and he was unaware of the option. ROA No. 96-9237, doc. 46 at 35. Judge Kaplan then consolidated Velardi's case with the Graboski case and, finding Velardi on equal footing with the Graboski appellants, Graboski, 937 F.Supp. at 268, granted NYFD's Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss Velardi's complaint. 55 Velardi's complaint alleges a valid cause of action under Title I of the ADA. First, we have now held that Velardi is a qualified individual with a disability within Title I of the ADA. Second, unlike the Class II retirees who knew of and freely chose for service retirement, Velardi's complaint alleges that the NYFD required him to retire on ordinary disability, even though as a twenty-year retiree he was qualified to receive benefits under the for service plan. The ADA is violated where persons covered by the ADA who qualify for both a service retirement and disability retirement plan are required to take a disability benefit which is less advantageous. EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 3. It is unclear on the record before us whether in fact Velardi was forced by NYFD to forego for service benefits, in that the NYFD failed to inform Velardi of the for service retirement option. If such a failure occurred, it would be sufficient to establish Velardi's Title I ADA claim. At the pleading stage when events are seen in the light most favorable to Velardi, see Jackson, 32 F.3d at 699-700, we cannot equate Velardi with the Class II Graboski appellants, who chose to retire with disability and who now request for service benefits as well. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court insofar as it dismissed Velardi's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).