Opinion ID: 3011186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: AEDPA's New Procedure

Text: AEDPA established a new procedure governing second or successive petitions for federal habeas corpus relief under S 2244(b). It provides: Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application. 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(A). Minarik maintains that subjecting him to this new procedure is an impermissible retroactive application of the statute. Section 2244(b)(3)(A), however, is a change in procedural law which falls within thefirmly established procedural change category described in Landgraf that may be retrospectively applied. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 (Because rules of procedure regulate secondary rather than primary conduct, the fact that a new procedural rule was instituted after the conduct giving rise to the suit does not make application of the rule at trial retroactive.). Because AEDPA, as read by the Lindh Court in the light of normal principles of statutory interpretation, calls for the _________________________________________________________________ 4. We reject appellee's contention that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Calderon v. Thompson, 118 S.Ct. 1489 (1998) controls the issue of AEDPA's applicability in this case. In Calderon, the Court of Appeals had issued a mandate denying the petitioner's pre-AEDPA petition for habeas relief. Id. at 1496. Shortly before petitioner's scheduled execution, the petitioner filed a post-AEDPA motion to recall the mandate, which was granted by the Court of Appeals. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in revoking the mandate. Id. at 1506. In the course of its opinion, the Court rejected an argument that the recall of the mandate constituted a favorable action on a second or successive petition and was thus barred by S 2244(b)'s new standared. The Court found only that there had been no action on a successive petition. The issue of retroactive effect was not before the Court, and any suggestion that S 2244(b) is to be applied retroactively would have been dictum. 12 application of S 2244(b)(3)(A) to cases filed after April 24, 1996, and because it is a rule of procedure that does not attach new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment, petitioners in Minarik's position must seek permission of a Court of Appeals prior to proceeding on a second petition, even if their first petition wasfiled before the Act was adopted. See In re Hanserd, 123 F.3d 922, 934 (6th Cir. 1997) (Inmates who wish to file a second or successive petition should first file a motion in [the Court of Appeals] requesting permission under 28 U.S.C.SS 2244, 2255, regardless of when the first motion to vacate sentence was filed.).