Opinion ID: 834828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: interpretation of exigency exception of ors 133.726(7)

Text: On review, defendants again challenge the denial of their motion to suppress and again rely on ORS 133.726 and Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. As is our ordinary practice, we consider the statutory argument first. State v. Lowry, 295 Or. 337, 343, 667 P.2d 996 (1983). ORS 133.726 is part of a larger statutory scheme that governs the interception and recording of private conversations. At the center of the scheme is ORS 165.540, a statute that, with certain relevant exceptions, prohibits the interception of such conversations unless all of the parties to the conversation are specifically informed that their conversation is being obtained. ORS 165.540(1)(c). [3] By statute, evidence obtained in violation of the prohibition set out in ORS 165.540 is inadmissible in court, except as evidence of unlawful interception. ORS 41.910(1). ORS 133.736(1) provides the mechanism for challenging a violation of the statutory court order requirement set out in ORS 133.726: Any aggrieved person in any trial, hearing or proceeding in or before any court    may move to suppress recordings of any oral communication intercepted in violation of ORS 133.726 or testimony or other evidence derived solely from the unlawful interception. There are several exceptions to the prohibition set out in ORS 165.540, which the statute expressly recognizes in the introductory phrase: Except as otherwise provided in ORS 133.724 and ORS 133.726 or subsection (2) to (7) of this section   . The two exceptions that are relevant in this case, ORS 133.724 and ORS 133.726, are statutes that provide for the issuance of two different kinds of court orders authorizing law enforcement personnel to intercept or record communications without violating ORS 165.540. ORS 133.724 provides a process for obtaining a court order permitting wiretapping or other forms of interception of a wire, electronic, or oral communication in which no party to the communications is aware of the interception. That statute requires a detailed, written application, made upon oath or affirmation of the individual who is the district attorney or a deputy district attorney    for the county in which the order is sought, and authorizes a court order only if the court finds probable cause to believe that the person targeted is involved in certain specified crimes and that normal investigative procedures would not succeed or would be too dangerous. ORS 133.724(1), (3). ORS 133.724 does not provide an exigency exception, or any other exception, to the court order requirement. ORS 133.726, on the other hand, provides for an ex parte order that is considerably less difficult to obtain than the order described in ORS 133.724. Such an order is authorized when a law enforcement officer wishes to wear a body wire in a sting operation or to otherwise intercept an oral communication to which the officer or a person under the direct supervision of the officer is a party. ORS 133.726(1), (3). In other words, ORS 133.726 applies when at least one party to the communicationeither an officer or a policesupervised informantis aware of the interception. ORS 133.726 is the relevant statute in this case. It provides, in part: (1) Notwithstanding ORS 133.724, under the circumstances described in this section, a law enforcement officer is authorized to intercept an oral communication to which the officer or a person under the direction supervision of the officer is a party, without obtaining an order for the interception of a wire, electronic or oral communication under ORS 133.724 ; (2) For purposes of this section and ORS 133.736, a person is a party to an oral communication if the oral communication is made in the person's immediate presence and is audible to the person regardless of whether the communication is specifically directed to the person; (3) An ex parte order for intercepting an oral communication    under this section may be issued by any judge as defined in ORS 133.525 upon written application made    upon oath or affirmation of any peace officer as defined in ORS 133.005. The application shall include: (a)-(e) [setting out application requirements]; (4) [setting out court's authority to require further evidence in support of application for ex parte order]; (5) [setting standards for issuance of the described ex parte order]; (6) [setting out required contents of ex parte order]; (7) An order under ORS 133.724 or this section is not required when a law enforcement officer intercepts an oral communication to which the officer or a person under the direct supervision of the officer is a party if the oral communication is made by a person whom the officer has probable cause to believe has committed, is engaged in committing or is about to commit: (a) A crime punishable as a felony under [specified drug crime statutes] or as a misdemeanor under [specified prostitution statutes]; or (b) Any other crime punishable as a felony if the circumstances at the time the oral communication is intercepted are of such exigency that it would be unreasonable to obtain a court order under ORS 133.724 or this section [.] (Emphasis added.) Thus, to intercept a conversation involving a police officer or a police-supervised informant, the police generally must obtain an ex parte order as described in ORS 133.726(3) to (6), but need not meet the stringent requirements described in ORS 133.724. Moreover, the police are excused from obtaining an order under ORS 133.726 if (of particular relevance here) they have probable cause to believe that their target has committed, is committing, or is about to commit, a felony, and that the circumstances at the time of the interception are of such exigency that it would be unreasonable to obtain a court order. ORS 133.726(7). The state relies here on that exigency exception to the otherwise applicable court order requirement of ORS 133.726. The issue here is: what did the legislature intend to convey by the phrase circumstances    [that] are of such exigency that it would be unreasonable to obtain a court order? ORS 133.726(7)(b). Defendants contend that the wording is an obvious reference to the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement under both 25 the Oregon and federal constitutionsand thus that exigent circumstances are limited to the kinds of circumstances that, in the words of this court, require[ ] the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect's escape or the destruction of evidence. State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 126, 806 P.2d 92 (1991). [4] Defendants assert that those circumstances were not present here, that the interception thus did not come within the exception to ORS 133.726(7), and that the recording that resulted from the interception was obtained in violation of ORS 165.540 and was inadmissible under ORS 41.910(1). The state contends, on the other hand, that the words have no connection to the exigent circumstances concept that courts have used in analyzing the constitutionality of warrantless searches, and that, in fact, the words encompass a range of law enforcement exigencies or needsincluding the simple need to collect evidencethat might make obtaining a court order prior to intercepting a conversation unreasonable. The intercepted communications, the state argues, were thus lawfully obtained and admissible. Looking solely at the words that are at issue does not resolve the controversy. As the state points out, the word exigency, in ordinary parlance, may simply serve as a synonym for need or requirement, and, at most, refers broadly to an immediate or urgent need. [5] But, particularly when exigency modifies the term circumstances (circumstances    of such exigency), and appears in a portion of the statute that is concerned with whether the circumstances make it unreasonable to obtain a court order to acquire a certain kind of evidence, it is arguable, at the very least, that the legislature intended the term to convey the specialized legal concept associated with the warrant requirement and the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Although the state insists that possibility is foreclosed by the legislature's failure to employ what the state deems to be the standard phraseology (exigent circumstances) for referring to that concept, even a cursory examination of this court's constitutional cases shows that exigency often is used to refer to the widely understood exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Stevens, 311 Or. at 130, 806 P.2d 92 (The scope of the first warrantless search was properly limited to the exigency that justified it.); State v. Campbell, 306 Or. 157, 163, 759 P.2d 1040 (1988) (A search or seizure to obtain evidence of a crime is unconstitutional if no warrant authorized the search or seizure and there is no exigency that would obviate the need for a warrant.); State v. Hawkins, 255 Or. 39, 42, 463 P.2d 858 (1970) (There may be circumstances where an application for another warrant is impossible or impractical and, therefore, the exigencies justify such a search and seizure). Another aspect of the provision's wording supports defendant's contention that the legislature had in mind the well-known constitutional doctrine of exigent circumstances that obviate the need for a warrant. Law enforcement officers who wish to proceed without a court order under ORS 133.726(7)(b) must be able not only to point to circumstances of such exigency that it would be unreasonable to obtain a court order, but also must have  probable cause to believe that [the person whose communication is to be intercepted] has committed, is engaged in committing or is about to commit a felony. The phrase probable cause inescapably alludes to a specialized legal concept associated with the constitutional prohibition (in both the Oregon and United States constitutions) against unreasonable searches and seizures, [6] and its use in ORS 133.726(7)(b) appears to confirm that the entire provision, including the exigency wording, was intended as a reference to the familiar probable cause plus exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Meharry, 342 Or. 173, 177, 149 P.3d 1155 (2006) (warrantless search permitted if police could show probable cause and exigent circumstances). The state contends that, in light of the fact that ORS 133.726(7)( a ) allows police to intercept communications in certain drug or prostitution investigations solely on a showing of probable cause, it is illogical to read ORS 133.726(7)(b) as codifying a constitutionally based exigent circumstances exception to the court order requirement: It is unlikely that the legislature intended to allow the interception of future oral communications without any court order, and without any proof of exigency, yet also codify an `exigent circumstances' exception with respect to the interception of future oral communications for other crimes under a theory that those communications are `evidence' subject to destruction or dissipation. But we see nothing illogical or unlikely about such a choice. The legislature may have attempted, in subsection (7)(b), to ensure that the use of electronic interception and recording devices by police generally remains within what it deemed to be a constitutional safe haven, but at the same time, decided (correctly or incorrectly) that the typical use of such devices in investigating certain types of drug and prostitution crimes did not present any significant constitutional issue, justifying a blanket exception from the court order requirement in such investigations. Whether or not such a line of thinking was or would have been constitutionally sound is not the issue: We are concerned here with what the legislature intended, and the existence of an exception for drug and prostitution investigations does not logically foreclose the possibility that it intended, in ORS 133.726(7)(b), to speak to a familiar constitutional paradigm, i.e., exigent circumstances that obviate the necessity of obtaining a judicial order before proceeding with a search or seizure. Although we are persuaded that the most likely meaning of exigency in ORS 133.726(7)(b) can be divined from text and context alone, we may also consider the provision's legislative history. State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 165-73, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009) (in interpreting statute, even if court does not perceive an ambiguity in the statute's text and context, it may consider a statute's legislative history that is useful to the court's analysis). A full discussion of that history, which involved successive amendments to the statutes regarding police interception of communications over a period of years, is unnecessary here, but several relevant points emerge. First, it is notable that the first conceptual ancestor to the exigency wording in ORS 133.726(7)(b) employed the more standard constitutional phraseology. Specifically, a 1983 amendment to the Interception of Communications statutes introduced the less stringent requirement for an order permitting police interception of communications to which a law enforcement officer or an informant is a party, but then provided that such orders shall not be necessary    if exigent circumstances make it unreasonable to obtain the order. Or. Laws 1983, ch. 824, § 1. Although that wording was changed to the present circumstances of such exigency wording in a later amendment, Or. Laws 1989, ch. 1078, § 1, the history of the adoption of that amendment suggests that the legislators understood the phrases to be interchangeable: Throughout the committee discussions of the amendment, legislators and advocates referred to the provision as an exigent circumstances provision. See, e.g., Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 2252, June 5, 1989, Tape 218, Side B (statements of Senator Shoemaker, Committee Counsel Morris, and Dale Penn of the Oregon District Attorney's Association, all referring to exigent circumstances). The same pattern (of legislators referring to the provision in terms of exigent circumstances) occurred in 2001, when the legislature expanded and reorganized ORS 133.726 and readopted the circumstances of such exigency wording. See, e.g., Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 654, May 24, 2001, Tape 71, side B (statement of Mark McDonnell that police may lawfully employ body wires when there are  exigent circumstances that ma[k]e it unreasonable to obtain an ex parte order); Testimony, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 654, Mar 12, 2001, Exhibit K (statement of Erik Wasmann, Department of Justice, that the amendments would reenact the authority of law enforcement officers to use a body-wire without a court order in drug investigations or when the officer is investigating some other felony and there are exigent circumstances ); Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 654, Apr 16, 2001, Tape 97, side B (statement of Committee Counsel Prins that the provision under consideration allows police to use a body wire without a court order if there is probable cause of a felony and what is called exigent circumstances ). Thus, even if the state is correct that the present circumstances of such exigency wording is not as closely associated with the familiar constitutional doctrine as are the words exigent circumstances, the legislators who adopted the wording do not appear to have recognized any difference. Another significant point can be drawn from the legislative history of ORS 133.726(7)(b). As noted, in 2001, the legislature reorganized ORS 133.726 and made significant changes to subsection (7), where the exceptions to the ex parte order requirement were codified. In amending subsection (7), the legislature readopted the circumstances of such exigency wording that appeared in the existing statute and added a requirement that the police have probable cause to believe that the person targeted has committed, is engaged in committing or is about to commit a felony. We already have indicated that the simple fact that the legislature chose to combine references to probable cause and exigenc[ies] that makes it unreasonable to obtain an order strongly suggests that it had constitutional search and seizure concepts in mind. 351 Or. at 691-92, 277 P.3d at 529. The history of the legislature's consideration of the 2001 changes confirms that point. During the consideration of the 2001 amendments, legislators and advocates devoted much of the debate to the constitutionality of a proposal to expand a preexisting blanket exception from the judicial order requirement that applied to certain drug investigations to include certain prostitution investigations as well. The proposed blanket exception was included as a subsection of the same section of the bill that contained the exigency exception. During the debates, the concept of exigent circumstances was repeatedly raised, with one legislator even suggesting that, in the context of drug and prostitution investigations, he might be inclined to say that exigent circumstances can be based on the safety of an officer and an ACLU representative responding that police officers cannot create their own exigency. Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 654, May 24, 2001, Tape 71, side B (comments of Rep Robert Ackerman, ACLU representative David Fidanque). Although those discussions were specifically about the closely related blanket exception for interceptions related to drug and prostitution offenses, they show that the legislators had the constitutional concept of exigent circumstances very much on their minds when they were considering the 2001 amendments that included the wording under consideration. The state draws our attention to a suggestion made by one legislator, Representative Kathy Lowe, and her committee's failure to act on that suggestion. Lowe commented: We have a great body of law that talks about probable cause and exigent circumstances and why don't we just incorporate that into the statute and say `if you have probable cause and exigent circumstances, you may use a body wire, then you've got to justify after the fact and if it doesn't meet the smell test, you're out of there.' Meanwhile, you've gotten your body wire, and you can also carve out an exception to use a body wire strictly for officer safety but not usable otherwise. Tape Recording, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 654, May 25, 2001, Tape 77, side A (statement of Rep Kathy Lowe). The state contends that Lowe was referring to the circumstances    are of such exigency wording of the bill under consideration when she suggested that the legislature adopt the body of law that talks about probable cause and exigent circumstances, and that the committee's failure to amend the bill in response to that suggestion demonstrates that the legislature did not intend to adopt the constitutional exigent circumstances construct. However, when considered in the context in which they were spoken, it is evident that Lowe's words were directed at the bill's proposal to continue the blanket exception from the ex parte order requirement for drug investigations and to add a similar blanket exception for prostitution investigations. Understood in that light, Lowe's comment appears to support defendants ' contention that the legislature understood the 25 exigency wording in the bill as incorporating the body of law that talks about probable cause and exigent circumstances. We conclude that, in ORS 133.726(7)(b), the phrase circumstances   of such exigency that it would be unreasonable to obtain a court order, refers to exigent circumstances in the specialized legal senseas it has been used by this court in discussing exceptions to the search warrant requirement under Article I, section 9, and by the federal courts in discussing exceptions to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. As noted, this court has summarized the concept in terms of circumstances that require[ ] the police to act swiftly to prevent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall a suspect's escape or the destruction of evidence, Stevens, 311 Or. at 126, 806 P.2d 92, while the federal courts have similarly stated that exigent circumstances are present when a reasonable person [would] believe that entry    was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other persons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other consequence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts. United States v. Alaimalo, 313 F.3d 1188, 1192-93 (9th Cir.2002), cert. den., 540 U.S. 895, 124 S.Ct. 242, 157 L.Ed.2d 172 (2003). Although neither of those statements purports to catalog every kind of circumstance that would qualify as exigent, they limit the concept of exigent circumstances to those that, without swift action, likely would have immediate consequences to persons, property, or law enforcement operations.