Opinion ID: 6500414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cause of the Collision

Text: Hershey and Nagra brought their claims under the Federal Employers Liability Act (“FELA”) because they were Amtrak employees at the time of the accident. 7 FELA “provides the exclusive remedy for a railroad employee engaged in interstate commerce whose injury resulted from the negligence of 4 Raby v. Livingston, 600 F.3d 552, 561 (5th Cir. 2010). 5 James v. Tex. Collin Cnty., 535 F.3d 365, 373 (5th Cir. 2008). 6 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 7 45 U.S.C. § 51. 9 Case: 21-30379 Document: 00516395400 Page: 10 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 No. 21-30379 the railroad.” 8 Under FELA, the case should go to a jury if “employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury or death for which damages are sought.” 9 “This standard is highly favorable to the plaintiff, and recognizes that the FELA is protective of the plaintiff’s right to a jury trial.” 10 A FELA plaintiff nevertheless has the burden to “provide evidence of ‘all the same elements as are found in a common law negligence action.’” 11 “[A]warding summary judgment to the defendant railroad is appropriate ‘[o]nly when there is a complete absence of probative facts’ to support a jury verdict in the plaintiff’s favor.” 12 Under Louisiana law, a motorist approaching a railroad crossing marked by a stop sign must “stop” and may not “proceed until he can do so safely.” 13 When the crossing is marked by a cross buck, such a motorist must “listen and look in both directions along such track for any approaching train and for signals indicating the approach of a train.” 14 He must “yield the rightof-way to any approaching train and then shall proceed only upon exercising due care and upon being sure that it is safe to proceed.” 15 The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that, “[a]s a general rule, motorists approaching a railroad crossing must look and listen for possible oncoming trains before 8 Gray v. Ala. Great S. R.R. Co., 960 F.3d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 2020). 9 CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 692 (2011) (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957)). 10 Wooden v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 862 F.2d 560, 561 (5th Cir. 1989). 11 Gray, 960 F.3d at 215-16 (quoting Armstrong v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 752 F.2d 1110, 1113 (5th Cir. 1985)). 12 Id. at 216 (second alteration in original). 13 La. Stat. § 32:171(A). 14 Id. § 32:175(A). 15 Id. 10 Case: 21-30379 Document: 00516395400 Page: 11 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 No. 21-30379 traversing the crossing.” 16 A motorist’s failure to comply with these duties suffers legal consequences: “A motorist negotiating a railroad crossing is burdened with the responsibility of seeing and hearing that which he could have seen and heard, and he is presumed in law to have seen and heard what he could have seen and heard.” 17 Again, the railroad crossing in this case was marked with two stop signs and two cross bucks. The train’s video evidence shows that Jenkins neither stopped nor slowed as he approached the crossing. The district court did not err in holding that Jenkins was solely responsible for the collision. 18 Under FELA, a railroad is responsible for the wrongdoing of its agent. 19 Hershey and Nagra contend that Amtrak should have operated a safer railroad crossing. They allege that IC/CN is an agent of Amtrak because it controls the track at the crossing and is in a contractual agreement with Amtrak. Neither the district court nor we see any defect in the crossing. We assume therefore, without deciding, that IC/CN is an agent of Amtrak and that Amtrak is responsible for any defect in the crossing. 16 Lejeune v. Union Pac. R.R., 97-1843, p. 6 (La. 4/14/98); 712 So. 2d 491, 494. 17 Ryder v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 945 F.3d 194, 202 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Glisson v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 165 So. 2d 289, 291 (1964)). 18 See Alfaro v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 553 F. App’x 446, 447 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming summary judgment in an unpublished memorandum opinion when “[a] video camera on the train recorded the entire incident and showed that [the motorist] failed to stop, or slow, at the STOP sign before approaching the railroad tracks, driving straight into the path of the oncoming train”). 19 Armstrong, 752 F.2d at 1113 (“Under the Act, a railroad will be liable if its negligence or its agent’s negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the employee’s injury.”). 11 Case: 21-30379 Document: 00516395400 Page: 12 Date Filed: 07/15/2022 No. 21-30379 Hershey and Nagra admit that the crossing “was minimally marked,” but rely on the opinion of their expert that, if the crossing had been equipped with a gate and lights, the crash would not have occurred. They also claim that there have been other crashes and near misses at the same crossing, but the parties dispute whether there is evidence of such assertions in a form that would be admissible at trial to support this claim. At least one Louisiana appellate court has held that a railroad has a duty to operate a crossing “such that it can be safely traversed by motorists using reasonable care.” 20 “[A]ny extra warning device would be an ‘unusual precaution[]’ required only in exceptional circumstances.” 21 Amtrak has met that burden here by providing a crossing that can be traversed by a motorist who uses reasonable care. That is especially true in this case because Jenkins was familiar with the crossing: He had crossed it on a near-daily basis over several years.