Opinion ID: 1873049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Tape-Recorded Telephone Conversations

Text: At the pretrial hearing on Montgomery's motion to suppress, Officer Volner testified that he recorded several telephone conversations between Montgomery and Sheridan. The deputy prosecutor stated that a subpoena had been issued for Sheridan, but that his whereabouts were unknown and the subpoena had not been served. He further stated that Volner would testify that Sheridan had agreed to help arrange a drug buy with Montgomery by using Sheridan's cell phone while he was at the police department. At trial, the State called Jerome Lewis, who was in the car with Montgomery at the time of the phone calls' with Sheridan. Lewis testified that he did not know Sheridan prior to that day, but that he had previously heard Sheridan's voice. He stated that he recognized Sheridan's voice on the tape, adding, I never forget a voice. Lewis further testified that, as they drove to Paragould, Montgomery spoke to Sheridan on his cell phone about getting some money. Lewis stated that he had listened to the recordings of the telephone conversations and that both Montgomery's and Sheridan's voices were on the tapes. At that point, the tapes were played for the jury. After listening to the tapes, Lewis identified the voices on the tapes as those of Montgomery and Sheridan. On appeal, Montgomery argues that the circuit court erred in admitting the tapes in violation of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. The following section of the Act is pertinent to this issue: It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication, where such person is a party to the communication or one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c). Montgomery argues that, because neither he nor Sheridan testified at trial, there is no evidence that either of them consented to having their telephone conversations recorded. As such, he contends that the recordings were inadmissible. We disagree with Montgomery's assertion that there was no evidence of consent. Volner testified that Sheridan agreed to cooperate and initiate phone calls to Montgomery in an attempt to set up a controlled delivery of methamphetamine. It appears that Montgomery is arguing that a recording is admissible only if one of the parties to the communication expressly testifies that he or she consented to the recording. No appellate court in this state has specifically addressed the issue. In Mock v. State, 20 Ark.App. 72, 723 S.W.2d 844 (1987), the court of appeals rejected the appellant's argument that the trial court improperly admitted the transcripts of telephone conversations into evidence because the interception of those conversations was unlawful under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982). The appellant contended that neither he nor the police informant consented to the taping of their conversations. The court of appeals noted that the evidence on the issue of consent was conflicting: at the suppression hearing a police officer testified that the informant had consented to the taping, but at trial the informant stated that his consent was not voluntarily given. Concluding that the question of consent turned upon the credibility of witnesses, the court of appeals deferred to the superior position of the trial judge and held that the transcripts were properly admitted into evidence. In Fields v. State, 81 Ark.App. 351, 101 S.W.3d 849 (2003), the court of appeals inferred that a prosecutor who was investigating a crime consented to the recording of his telephone conversation because the other party to the conversation testified that he, entered the conversation with knowledge that he was speaking with an official investigating a crime, and that he assumed that such a conversation would be recorded. Therefore, the court of appeals held that consent can be inferred from circumstances surrounding the communication. Some courts have held that the unavailability of a consenting party to a conversation does not prevent proof of consent from being demonstrated by other means. See, e.g., United States v. Gladney, 563 F2d 491 (1st Cir.1977) (holding that absent any indication of coercion, a government agent's testimony that an informer who was unavailable for trial had consented to having a telephone conversation recorded was sufficient for the recording to be admitted); United States v. Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654 (2d Cir.1973) (holding that an informer's consent to the monitoring or recording of a telephone conversation is incidental to his decision to cooperate with law-enforcement officers and that it will normally suffice for the government to show that the informer went ahead with a call knowing that the officers were present); United States v. Traficant, 558 F.Supp. 996 (N.D.Ohio 1983) (finding that the testimony of an FBI agent was sufficient to show that an unavailable informant consented to the recording). In United States v. Edmond, 718 F.Supp. 988 (D.C.1989), where consent to recording was shown via the testimony of police officers and agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration regarding circumstances surrounding the taping of conversations, the court rejected the defendants' contention that the court could not evaluate the question of consent in a meaningful way without hearing from the informants themselves. The defendants argued that, because the court heard only from the law enforcement officers who supervised the recordings, the court could not appreciate the pressures which led to the informants' consent. The court disagreed, stating: This argument misunderstands the test for consent in the wiretap context, and the evidentiary principles that flow from that standard. The substantive test for consent is not, as the defendants' argument would suggest, similar to that used to gauge a defendant's waiver of a constitutional right. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (test for consent in the constitutional context). Rather, the test for consent in the wiretap context is considerably less rigorous: an individual need only proceed despite his or her understanding that the conversation is being recorded. See United States v. Fuentes, 563 F.2d 527, 533 (2d Cir.1977) ([i]t will normally suffice [to prove consent] for the government to show that the informer went ahead with a [conversation] after knowing what the law enforcement officers Were about) (quoting United States v. Bonanno, 487 F.2d 654, 658-59 (2d Cir.1973))..... This substantive standard both informs the nature of the evidence that will be adequate to address a motion to suppress, and, as applied in this case, makes clear that the defendants' motion should be denied. The lenient substantive standard permits proof by circumstantial evidence. As articulated by Judge Friendly in Bonanno, the lower substantive standard reflects the fact that, unlike consent to a search, an informer's consent to a wiretap does him or her no additional harm: it is merely an incident to a course of cooperation with law enforcement officials on which he has ordinarily decided some time previously and entails no unpleasant consequences to him. 487 F.2d at 658. Thus, testimony regarding consent is sufficient if it shows that, in fact, the informer's actions were taken in furtherance of the course of cooperation. Testimony of this type is nearly analogous to the testimony of a witness to a physical event, such as an automobile accident. In this Context, the occurrence of that event the perpetuation of the course of cooperationcan easily be shown by circumstantial evidence from the agents who witnessed the consent. Testimony from the informants themselves, while perhaps helpful, is not required. Edmond, 718 F.Supp. at 992-93. Here, even though Sheridan could not be located by the time of Montgomery's trial, Volner testified that Sheridan had agreed to cooperate with the officers and called Montgomery at Volner's discretion and in his presence. While it is clear that 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et seq. requires proof of consent, nothing in the statute indicates that consent can be shown only by the direct testimony of one of the parties to the recorded communication. We agree with the State's contention that Sheridan's decision to make the calls in the presence of officers, while obviously aware that the calls were being recorded, is sufficient evidence that he consented to have them recorded. Under the facts of this case, it was not necessary for either Sheridan or Montgomery to testify in order to show that either of them consented to the recordings. Thus, Montgomery fails to provide a basis for excluding the recordings pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2511. Montgomery also argues that the recorded conversations were inadmissible as hearsay and that the admission of the tapes violated his constitutional right to confront witnesses as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As pointed out by the State, Montgomery does riot explain how the conversations are hearsay or cite any provision of the, hearsay rules that the tapes violated. Nor does he explain how his right to confront witnesses was violated by the admission of the tapes. This court does not address arguments that are not supported by authority or convincing argument. See, e.g., Hathcock v. State, 357 Ark. 563, 182 S.W.3d 152 (2004).