Opinion ID: 2831116
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the probable veracity and basis of

Text: knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information; (2) whether an informant's statements reflect first-hand knowledge; (3) whether some or all of the informant's factual statements were corroborated wherever reasonable and practicable (e.g., through police surveillance); and (4) whether a law enforcement [officer] assessed, from his professional standpoint, experience, and expertise, the probable significance of the informant's provided information. United States v. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2011) (citations, internal quotations marks, and alterations omitted). Applying these factors to the instant case, we find that there is simply no indication on this record that the police explored the Informant's basis of knowledge for the information he relayed, or that the police bothered to corroborate any of the information that actually suggested that criminal activity was afoot at Cruz-Ramos's home. Even if we were to agree with the district court that the information the Informant provided was detailed, we find that because the police did not sufficiently - 42 - test the reliability of the detailed information, the denial of the motion to suppress cannot stand. Specifically, nothing in the district court's factual findings indicates the informant's basis of knowledge, such as whether the informant had firsthand knowledge of Bernard's whereabouts (i.e., he had seen Bernard at the house), or just heard about it as hearsay or through rumor. See Gifford, 727 F.3d at 100; cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 234 (1983) ([An informant's] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case.). Notably, the only basis Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz articulated for trusting the Informant was that because he came from the same housing project as Bernard, [h]e could form a part of [Bernard's] close-knit group. That inference could implicate every resident in the complex, yet Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz apparently never bothered to ask the Informant whether he actually was part of Bernard's crew. The Informant could have been relaying a rumor he overheard on the street, or even fabricating the information. It is also undisputed that the police here had no past history with the informant to establish that informant's credibility. See Gifford, 727 at 100; cf. United States v. Dixon, 787 F.3d 55, 59 (1st Cir. 2015) (that informant had given police fruitful tips in the past and police had met with the informant - 43 - before in person on several occasions supported the informant's reliability). Furthermore, while the district court credited the police for corroborating the Informant's tips, our review shows that the only information the police actually corroborated before they entered the premises was the Informant's (very general) outside description of the house. Indeed, all the police did here before entering the premises was drive by the home and confirm the readily apparent details the Informant described -- that the home was in the gated community the Informant identified and had a flower box. But this kind of information, indeed, the kind that is immediately visible to anyone who passes the house, is not -- without more -- useful information when it comes to making a probable cause determination. True, corroboration of even innocent activity reported in [a] tip may support a finding of probable cause, at least when [c]orroboration of apparently innocent activity can establish the reliability of the informant because the activity might come to appear suspicious in light of the initial tip. Tiem Trinh, 665 F.3d at 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). But the information must be at least marginally useful in establishing that criminal activity is afoot. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 332 (1990) (noting that it is also important that . . . 'the anonymous tip contained a range of - 44 - details relating not just to easily obtained facts and conditions existing at the time of the tip, but to future actions of third parties ordinarily not easily predicted.' (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 245)). Here, the police did not corroborate any of the information that might actually have suggested suspicious activity. For instance, one could find it curious to see multiple adults (at least one the Informant even identified by name) coming in and out of a single-family home. Or perhaps if the police had staked out the house, they might have seen someone protectively guarding or manipulating the flower box in an unusual way. Cf. id. at 11 (police conducted surveillance to corroborate much of the informant's information, including the fact that the informant had, multiple times, been in and out of the house where the purported drug operation was going down). In sum, we find that the police did not do enough to confirm the unknown Informant's story such that probable cause could issue.21 21 The fourth Tiem Trinh factor, whether the police officer assessed from his professional standpoint the probable significance of the tip, 665 F.3d at 10, is arguably met here because Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz did surmise that the Informant was reliable. However, we give his assessment little weight because the police knew nothing about the Informant other than his affiliation with Las Dalias and still did not inquire into the Informant's source of knowledge. Thus, the officer had no real basis for making his assessment. The district court, relying on an out-of-circuit case, also emphasized that the Informant put himself in danger by providing the tip. See United States v. One 56-Foot Yacht Named Tahuna, 702 F.2d 1276, 1287 (9th Cir. 1983) (considering as a factor in the reliability analysis that [t]he information was given to the - 45 - Our outcome should be no surprise, given our precedent. In addition to the test we laid out in Tiem Trinh, we have emphasized on multiple occasions that an informant's reliability must be vetted. For instance, in United States v. Jordan, we carefully weighed the police's efforts to corroborate a hearsay tip, and specifically noted some of the various means by which an informant could be corroborated, such as direct surveillance or circumstantial evidence, vouchsaf[ing] by a highly experienced law enforcement officer, independent corroboration (i.e., conducting controlled drug buys), and most particularly, the informant's history of providing reliable information and investigative assistance to the police in the past. 999 F.2d 11, 13-14 (1st Cir. 1993). We found that on balance, all of these efforts on the part of the police sufficed to corroborate the informant's tip. In Dixon, the police officer took similar measure, meeting with the informant face-to-face on several occasions, independently corroborat[ing] facts, including not government in circumstances subjecting the informants to possible personal or penal risk (alterations omitted)). But even if we took into account the risk of retaliation the Informant faced, the record does not reflect that La ONU knew or would have been able to figure out that the (confidential) Informant was the one talking to police. If the Informant had heard the information through a rumor or eavesdropping, there would be no reason -- at least not one we can discern from this record -- to think the gang would suspect him. And we reiterate that the officers here did not probe the Informant's basis of knowledge (e.g., whether the Informant knew the information because he was in the gang and thus would be in danger because he cooperated). - 46 - only innocent facts like the defendant's phone number and cartype, but also by conducting controlled drug buys that were carefully monitored and regulated to minimize the chance that the [informant] could have falsely implicated the defendant. 787 F.3d at 59. Further, the informant in that case also had given fruitful tips in the past. Id. In contrast, anyone driving by Cruz-Ramos's home could parlay the generic description the Informant gave, and confirming only those innocuous details is not, on its own, sufficient to corroborate a tip from an unknown confidential informant. The Informant did not even say that the house was the only one in the area with a flower box, meaning that the flower box's existence did not make for a distinguishing characteristic. Given the lack of other indicia of the Informant's reliability, the police had an obligation to corroborate something of the tip before entering Cruz-Ramos's home without a warrant. See Recznik, 393 U.S. at 169 (finding that police did not have probable cause to enter a home when no effort was made to show that either the petitioner or the apartment was at that time connected with criminal activity, and the police did not even attempt to establish that the informers were reliable). In sum, there was no probable cause to search Cruz-Ramos's home. Cruz-Ramos further asserts that the search of his car was also illegal for lack of probable cause. As we discussed - 47 - above, the Informant's tip was not sufficiently reliable on its own, and we agree with Cruz-Ramos that the same reasoning extends to the search of the Expedition. See United States v. Dickerson, 514 F.3d 60, 66 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that police may only conduct a warrantless search of a car if there is probable cause to believe the car has contraband or evidence of a crime (emphasis added)). Contrary to the district court's decision, we conclude that the initial entry into the home was illegal, and so the police could not form probable cause from what illicit activity they observed once they entered the home. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) (The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.). Thus, there was no basis for probable cause to search the Expedition. For the same reason, the so-called automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment does nothing to save the search of Cruz-Ramos's car (assuming the exception even applies to a car parked within the curtilage of a defendant's home, as was the case here). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 460-62 (1971). Sure, the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home, such that warrantless examinations of automobiles have been upheld in - 48 - circumstances in which a search of a home . . . would not.22 South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). However, police still need probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband before conducting a warrantless search. United States v. Silva, 742 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2014). As with a home-search, in this context [p]robable cause exists when the facts and circumstances as to which police have reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that evidence of a crime will be found. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis added). As we discussed, the police did not probe the Informant's basis for his claims that weapons and drugs were in the car and therefore had no reasonable basis for believing the Informant's tip, such that probable cause could issue on the tip alone. One final point on probable cause -- that the police actually did end up finding guns, drugs, and, of course, Bernard in Cruz-Ramos's home cannot enter our calculus, as [a] search unlawful at its inception may [not] be validated by what it turns up. United States v. Mercedes-De La Cruz, 787 F.3d 61, 69 (1st The logic behind this automobile exception is that [o]ne 22 has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as the repository of personal effects. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976) (internal quotation mark omitted). - 49 - Cir. 2015) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Based on these facts,23 we conclude that there was no probable cause to enter Cruz-Ramos's home or car. Thus, while we certainly understand (though we do not address whether) exigency may have been a legitimate concern here because of Bernard's status as a dangerous fugitive, the Constitution does not permit the police to forego a search warrant in situations like this based on exigency alone. Rather, as we have discussed, they also need probable cause. See Hegarty, 53 F.3d at 1373-74. The Seized Physical Evidence We must next consider whether the evidence seized as a result of the illegal search should also have been suppressed at trial. It is well established under the exclusionary rule that generally, evidence seized during an unlawful search [can]not constitute proof against the victim of the search. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484. That is, the government may make no use of evidence illegally seized. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961). It's clear, then, that per the plain language of the exclusionary rule, 23To the extent additional facts came out during the two-day evidentiary hearing that the district court did not address in its decision, the government did not point them out to us. Indeed, the government's curiously scant brief did not provide any developed argument as to the motion to suppress (as well as several other issues the Defendants raised), instead choosing to simply regurgitate large chunks of the district court's factual findings. - 50 - the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home (including the car and flower box), should have been suppressed. The district court said as much when it determined that if the initial entry into Cruz-Ramos's home was illegal, then everything subsequently discovered by the [police] would be subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree.24 Like most rules, however, the exclusionary rule has exceptions. We examine their applicability next. Good-Faith Exception Police practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield meaningful deterrence, and culpable enough to be worth the price paid by the justice system. Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). This good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule dictates, then, that even when the seizure of evidence results from a Fourth Amendment violation, that evidence should only be suppressed if it can be said that the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49 (internal quotation marks omitted). 24 The government does not dispute this conclusion in its briefing. - 51 - We conclude that the good-faith exception does nothing for the government here. For one, the government did not ask us to invoke the exception. Cf. United States v. Wurie, 728 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2013) (finding that a good-faith argument can be waived, at least when the government fails to raise it below); United States v. Archibald, 589 F.3d 289, 301 n.12 (6th Cir. 2009) (declining to address the good-faith exception where it had not been raised, preserved, or argued by the government). In fact, the government makes no argument concerning the good-faith exception at all, even though it bears the heavy burden of proving that the good-faith exception applies. Wurie, 728 F.3d at 13 (internal quotation marks omitted). Regardless, the good-faith exception would not help the government in this case. Lieutenant Flores-Ortiz admitted at the evidentiary hearing that the reason the police did not try to get a warrant was because to get a warrant, PRPD must 'conduct several surveillances over a period of days, a lot of photographs, videos; and the process gets complicated. It's a process that takes a great deal of time.' Cruz-Ramos urges us to interpret this testimony as an admission that the police specifically knew that corroboration was generally necessary for probable cause, did not want to put in the work required to get it, and decided to barge into Cruz-Ramos's home anyway. And the government makes no argument that we should interpret the testimony differently. Based - 52 - on Cruz-Ramos's interpretation of the testimony (which is not contradicted by the district court's findings, and, again, importantly, was not disputed by the government), the officers' disregard of the lack of probable cause was certainly deliberate, such that excluding the evidence would have [r]eal deterrent value, Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2427-28, in discouraging future intentional and unlawful police practices. See Krull, 480 U.S. at 348-49; Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009) (noting that the primary purpose of the exclusionary rule is deterring Fourth Amendment violations in the future).25 The Supreme Court has also said, however, that [f]or exclusion to be appropriate, the deterrence benefits of suppression must outweigh its heavy costs. Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 25We note that the record in this case, as it was presented to us, reflects that the good-faith exception does not apply because the police acted in deliberate disregard of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, we need not address today the full extent of the exception's applicability to warrantless searches in general. See Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 2439 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (listing scenarios where the good-faith exception has been applied and noting that the good-faith exception has not generally been applied to warrantless searches). Nor need we address whether the exception applies to negligent police mistakes. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 146 (2009) (stating that negligent police mistakes could also be sufficiently culpable to bar application of the good-faith exception, at least [i]n a case where systemic errors were demonstrated, such that it might be reckless for officers to rely on an unreliable . . . system); see also Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2439 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (noting that if courts apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth Amendment violation was deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent, then the good faith exception will swallow the exclusionary rule (internal quotation marks omitted)). - 53 - 2427. We recognize (indeed, regret) the substantial social costs that might come to bear as a result of the vacation of Cruz-Ramos's conviction and his resulting re-trial. See id. As we noted above, the police found several guns in the car, along with an extraordinary amount of drugs (specifically, more than 1,000 decks of heroin, 80 baggies of cocaine, 21 containers of marijuana, 740 vials of crack, and almost 1,000 vials of crack), and it's a hard pill to swallow that none of that evidence can be introduced at Cruz-Ramos's trial. But the law instructs us that [w]hen the police exhibit deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent disregard for Fourth Amendment rights, the deterrent value of exclusion is strong and tends to outweigh the resulting costs. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). So is the case here, as we cannot overlook the egregious Fourth Amendment violation that occurred. At the end of the day, law enforcement simply cannot cut corners at the cost of a person's constitutional privileges. We conclude that the exclusionary rule bars the admission of evidence obtained from the illegal search of CruzRamos's house and car. Harmless Error Even if the evidence was illegally obtained (and even if the police had no good-faith reason to seize it), we will only remand for a new trial if letting in the evidence was not harmless. - 54 - United States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 114 (1st Cir. 2015). While the government does not address this issue in its brief,26 we conclude that the introduction of the seized evidence in this case was not harmless. Since the error here rises to the level of constitutional, we must assess whether we can consider the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 60 n.22 (1st Cir. 1995). We must find, then, that beyond a reasonable doubt, it is highly probable that the result would have been the same if the error had not occurred. United States v. Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d 103, 112 (1st Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). We are not concerned here with whether there was sufficient evidence on which the petitioner could have been convicted without the evidence complained of. United States v. Argentine, 814 F.2d 783, 789 (1st Cir. 1987). Instead, [t]he question is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction. Id. We have the discretion to address harmless error sua sponte 26 in certain situations, but we remind the government that it bears the burden of persuasion with respect to showing that the error was harmless. United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir. 1997). We will not fret over whether it is appropriate to exercise our discretion to address harmlessness here despite the government's failure to raise it because the argument would have failed anyway. - 55 - Cruz-Ramos points out (and the government does not dispute) that the evidence seized from Cruz-Ramos's car -- seven guns, and more drugs than we care to recount -- was the only physical evidence at trial that directly connected Cruz-Ramos to La ONU activities (or to any drug trafficking). As far as we can tell, without this physical evidence the only other evidence connecting Cruz-Ramos to anything illegal was the testimony of the cooperators, which they provided in exchange for leniency in their own cases. Further, as Cruz-Ramos points out, even if we take the witnesses at their word, their testimony did not make for a slamdunk for the government by any means -- for instance, while Gutierrez-Santana initially said that Cruz-Ramos was at the planning meeting for Pequeque's murder, he later (unequivocally) testified on cross that Cruz-Ramos was not there. See United States v. Bosch, 584 F.2d 1113, 1123 (1st Cir. 1978) (considering that the government's case consisted primarily of the testimony of admitted accomplices, whose credibility was attacked in finding that a constitutional error was not harmless); United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 27-28 (1st Cir. 2008) (in harmless beyond a reasonable doubt analysis, considering that no physical evidence tied defendant to drug activity); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1571 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that there was no conclusive evidence that tie[d] petitioner tightly to the crime, and that it did not suffice that it [was] probable that - 56 - petitioner committed the crime). Thus, we simply cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt it is highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict without the wrongly admitted physical evidence. See Leon-Delfis, 203 F.3d at 112; cf. United States v. Jiménez, 419 F.3d 34, 42 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding harmless error when erroneously admitted evidence pale[d] in light of the other evidence introduced at trial); United States v. Crooker, 688 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding harmless error where drug residue was illegally obtained, but the government presented a wealth of other evidence, including bags of drugs, drug paraphernalia, and the defendant's confession that he used and possessed drugs). All in all, neither the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule nor the harmless-error doctrine apply here. Therefore, Cruz-Ramos is entitled to a new trial, and the evidence that was illegally seized from his home cannot be introduced. Cruz-Ramos's Statement We are left with one unresolved issue concerning the motion to suppress. While, as we discussed above, it's clear that the physical evidence seized during the illegal search of CruzRamos's home should have been suppressed, whether Cruz-Ramos's statements to the police should have been too is a tad trickier since the statement was provided after the search of the house. - 57 - In examining this more complicated question, we generally look at whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not undertake this inquiry, given its finding that the search was legal. Further, the government does not address this issue (along with numerous others) at all in its brief (meaning it is likely waived). However, because this question depends primarily upon weighing the facts in the particular case, . . . and is thus a matter especially suitable for resolution by the district court in the first instance, United States v. AcostaColon, 157 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), we think it appropriate that the district court address this issue on remand. See id.; United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d 64, 78 (1st Cir. 2015). For the reasons discussed, we must reverse in-part the district court's denial of the motion to suppress, vacate CruzRamos's conviction, and remand his case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Because we find that Cruz-Ramos is entitled to a new trial based on suppression error, we need not address his other allegations of reversible trial or sentencing errors. - 58 - We move on to the grievances pressed by his cohorts.