Opinion ID: 6343413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Step-Five Challenge

Text: At Step Five, the burden shifts to SSA to establish from the administrative record that the applicant can adjust to other work. See Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010). To satisfy that burden, SSA must demonstrate that three characteristics of the applicant – education, work experience, and residual functional capacity – allow him or her to perform jobs that exist in significant numbers in the 7 See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1 Listing 5.02 (gastrointestinal hemorrhaging requiring a blood transfusion), Listing 5.05 (chronic liver disease), Listing 5.06 (inflammatory bowel disease), Listing 5.07 (short bowel syndrome), Listing 5.08 (weight loss caused by a digestive disorder), and Listing 5.09 (liver transplantation). 8 national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1560(c), 404.1569(a); id. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 2. Here, the ALJ determined that Anderson was not disabled under Step Five because his residual functional capacity allowed him to perform light work. Anderson argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s assessment of his residual functional capacity because the ALJ improperly discounted three pieces of evidence: the opinion of his treating podiatrist, his subjective accounts of pain, and the statements of his live-in companion. See generally Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154 (explaining that the substantialevidence standard requires only that the administrative record contain sufficient evidence for a reasonable mind to “accept as adequate to support a conclusion” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). In reviewing an ALJ’s social security disability determination, a court cannot “re-weigh the evidence” or “substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder,” and each of Anderson’s arguments is premised on those impermissible actions. Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359; Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992). First, Anderson complains that the ALJ improperly discounted the opinion of his treating podiatrist. According to that podiatrist, Anderson’s neuropathy and radiculopathy made it dangerous for him to work as working with those conditions could render him permanently disabled. But an ALJ is “free to accept some medical evidence and reject other evidence” as long as the ALJ “provides an explanation for discrediting the rejected evidence.” Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 614 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 2000). In giving little weight to the podiatrist’s opinion, the ALJ explained that it was vague and failed to identify “any specific work related functional limitations linked to [Anderson’s] 9 impairments.” SSA Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, ALJ Decision at 7 (July 31, 2017) (App. 39). That explanation suffices under the substantial-evidence standard. See Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182 (explaining that federal courts, on substantialevidence review, may not “weigh the evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder”). Anderson’s second argument attacks the reduced weight the ALJ afforded to Anderson’s subjective complaints of pain. The ALJ explained the reason for discount: Anderson’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of his symptoms were not entirely credible because they were inconsistent with medical and other evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2), (3). That explanation also suffices under the substantial-evidence standard. See Chandler, 667 F.3d at 359; Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182. Finally, Anderson contends that the ALJ improperly discounted a report that Anderson’s live-in companion submitted to SSA. Under then-applicable SSA policy, ALJs could consider “the relationship between the source and the individual” and “whether the opinion is consistent with other evidence,” among other factors. Social Security Ruling, SSR 06-03p, 71 Fed. Reg. 45593, 45596 (Aug. 9, 2006), rescinded by 82 Fed. Reg. 15263, 15263 (Mar. 27, 2017); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(f) (requiring the ALJ to “explain the weight given to opinions from [non-medical] sources or otherwise ensure that [his] discussion of the evidence . . . allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s reasoning”). Consistent with that policy, the ALJ afforded some weight to that report but recognized that it “cannot be considered wholly objective” because it was prepared by “a close friend of the claimant.” SSA Office of Disability Adjudication and Review, ALJ Decision at 8 (July 31, 2017) (App. 40). Thus, 10 the ALJ supported his credibility determination with permissible reasons for assigning the statements less weight than other pieces of evidence.