Opinion ID: 221232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Credibility Assessments

Text: Next, Buckner argues that the ALJ erred by not properly assessing his credibility and by not expressly addressing the credibility of his girlfriend's written statement. First, Buckner asserts that the ALJ improperly evaluated his credibility by (1) failing to evaluate the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of Buckner's prescription medications; (2) improperly assessing Buckner's daily activities; and (3) failing to consider that another agency found ... Buckner disabled. Second, Buckner asserts that the ALJ must specifically discuss and express the credibility of any third-party statements regarding a claimant's condition. Smith v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 312, 317 (8th Cir.1984); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). He maintains that the ALJ's failure to discuss his girlfriend's statement was clear legal error requiring a remand. See Willcockson v. Astrue, 540 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir.2008).
This court has long required an ALJ to consider the following factors when evaluating a claimant's credibility: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, intensity, and frequency of pain; (3) the precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) the dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of medication; (5) any functional restrictions; (6) the claimant's work history; and (7) the absence of objective medical evidence to support the claimant's complaints. Moore v. Astrue, 572 F.3d 520, 524 (8th Cir.2009) (citing Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir.2008); Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.1984)). ALJs need not explicitly discuss each Polaski factor. Goff v. Barnhart, 421 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir.2005) (quotation and citation omitted). Although an ALJ may not discount a claimant's allegations of disabling pain solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them, the ALJ may find that these allegations are not credible if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole. Id. at 792 (internal quotations and citations omitted). We will defer to the ALJ's credibility finding if the ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and gives a good reason for doing so. Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 (8th Cir.2010) (quotation and citation omitted). Here, the ALJ expressly found that Buckner's statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of his symptoms were not credible. Although the ALJ did not explicitly cite Polaski, he clearly considered the following factors: Buckner's daily activities, the effectiveness of his medication and other treatments, his work history, and the absence of objective medical evidence to support his complaints. Regarding Buckner's daily activities, the ALJ noted that in Buckner's disability questionnaire and his hearing testimony, Buckner stated that he was able to care for his son and his girlfriend (who was frequently ill), do house-cleaning, do some yard work, leave his residence nearly every day, ride in a car, go out alone, go shopping in stores, manage his finances, use a computer, play sports occasionally, socialize and play games with friends or family members and attend religious services. The ALJ found these statements to be inconsistent with Buckner's claims of disabling pain. Next, regarding Buckner's medication and treatment, the ALJ stated that Buckner's hypertension is not always controlled by medication, but [he] has apparently made no effort to improve his blood pressure reading by losing weight or eliminating tobacco use. Additionally, the ALJ found that Buckner's sporadic work history prior to his alleged disability date indicates that he was not strongly motivated to engage in meaningful productive activity even prior to the alleged onset of disability and weighs against his credibility in assigning reasons for not working. Finally, the ALJ found that Buckner's complaints were not supported by objective medical evidence. The ALJ noted that (1) Buckner's back problems were diagnosed as mild and did not warrant further testing or treatment; (2) his depression and headaches never required regular psychiatric or psychological treatment[,] ... and the record contains minimal documentation of complaints of headaches; and (3) Dr. Hwang's examination report indicated that Buckner had full range of motion in all extremities, no sign of arthritis, full grip strength, and the ability to lift up to 50 pounds occasionally. The ALJ did not err by failing to discuss expressly some of the other factors, including any side effects from Buckner's medication. See Moore, 572 F.3d at 524. Our review of the ALJ's decision, in light of the entire administrative record, shows that there were inconsistencies between Buckner's allegations of pain and the evidence as a whole. See Goff, 421 F.3d at 792 (explaining that [t]he ALJ may disbelieve subjective complaints if there are inconsistencies in the evidence as a whole (quotation and citation omitted)). As a result, the ALJ did not err in evaluating Buckner's credibility. [8]
The regulations also provide that the ALJ will carefully consider any other information you may submit about your symptoms, including statements other persons provide about your pain or other symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). The regulation, however, does not define what is meant by careful consideration. When considering the issue, this court has not always insisted that the ALJ explicitly explain its reasons for discrediting a third-party's statements about the claimant's condition. In Robinson v. Sullivan, the ALJ explicitly discredited testimony from the claimant's wife but failed to discuss the reasons for doing so. 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992). We noted that it is clear that the ALJ specifically addressed [the wife's] testimony and found it not credible and that [t]his finding is supported by the same evidence that proved [the claimant's] claims not credible. Id. Ultimately, we affirmed the ALJ, explaining that [w]hile it is preferable that the ALJ delineate the specific credibility determinations for each witness, an arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique does not require us to set aside an administrative finding when that deficiency had no bearing on the outcome. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). Three years later, in Lorenzen v. Chater, we again considered an argument that the ALJ erred by fail[ing] to list specific reasons for discrediting the testimony of a third party. 71 F.3d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1995). Nonetheless, we affirmed the ALJ because it is evident that most of [the third party's] testimony concerning [the claimant's] capabilities was discredited by the same evidence that discredits [the claimant's] own testimony concerning his limitations. Id. Finally, in Willcockson, we considered an ALJ's failure to consider statements submitted by the claimant's mother, daughter, and sister. 540 F.3d at 880. We noted that we could not determine from the record whether the ALJ overlooked these statements, gave them some weight, or completely disregarded them. Id. Moreover, we question[ed] whether witness statements corroborating a claimant's subjective complaints can logically be treated as cumulative by assuming that they would have been rejected for the same reasons that the claimant statements were rejected. Id. at 881. This failure to address the third-party statementscombined with the ALJ's failure to explain the weight given to a nonexamining consultant's report and his insufficient assessment of the claimant's own statements compelled us to remand the case. Id. at 880-81. In the present case, although the ALJ did not expressly address the girlfriend's statement in his decision, the ALJ's error does not require remand. Unlike the statements in Robinson, the ALJ did not explicitly address the claims that Buckner's girlfriend made about Buckner's conditions. Rather, as in Willcockson, we cannot determine from the record whether the ALJ considered her statements at all. At the same time, much like the third-party statements Robinson and Lorenzen, the same evidence that the ALJ referred to in discrediting Buckner's claims also discredits the girlfriend's claims. Specifically, Buckner's girlfriend stated that Buckner cannot watch the children when she leaves the house. As noted above, the ALJ observed that Buckner, in his disability questionnaire and his hearing testimony, stated that he was able to care for his son. Buckner's girlfriend also claimed that Buckner could not work, would run out of breath easily, and had no energy. Although the ALJ did not address all of these specific claims, the ALJ did find that Buckner's own statements and hearing testimony show that he engages in a range of daily activities inconsistent with his allegation of disabling hypertension, headaches, back pain, hand cramps, shortness [of] breath, chest pains, depression and anxiety. Finally, the decision here did not suffer from the other deficiencies noted in Willcockson; most notably, as discussed supra, the ALJ here did sufficiently assess Buckner's credibility. Thus, we hold that the ALJ's arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique, Robinson, 956 F.2d at 841 (quotation and citation omitted), had no bearing on the outcome of Buckner's case and does not require remand.