Opinion ID: 842329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: cunningham v. california

Text: The final link in the `sentencing factor'/ `statutory maximum' chain is Cunningham. Cunningham was convicted of `continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14.' Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 860. California's determinate sentencing law (DSL) created a three-tiered sentencing system for most crimes. The statute defining a defendant's offense provided a lower, a middle, and an upper sentence. Cal Penal Code 1170 mandated that the trial court impose the middle term, unless circumstances in mitigation or aggravation existed. The trial court made factual findings under a preponderance of the evidence standard regarding whether aggravating circumstances existed. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 861-863. In Cunningham's case, the DSL provided for sentences of 6, 12, or 16 years. The sentencing court found by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of one mitigating factor and six aggravating factors. It found that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor and imposed the 16-year sentence. Id. at 860-861. As in the cases preceding Cunningham, the United States Supreme Court found that the judicial fact-finding that increased the maximum sentence violated the Sixth Amendment. Despite California's arguments to the contrary, the Supreme Court found nothing to distinguish the DSL from the sentencing that occurred in Blakely and Booker: California's DSL, we note in this context, resembles pre- Booker federal sentencing in the same ways Washington's sentencing system did: The key California Penal Code provision states that the sentencing court  shall order imposition of the middle term absent circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime, [Cal. Penal Code] 1170(b) (emphasis added), and any move to the upper or lower term must be justified by a concise statement of the ultimate facts  on which the departure rests, [Cal. Ct. R.] 4.420(e) (emphasis added). [ Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 866 n. 10 (emphasis in original).] Quite simply, the Supreme Court viewed Cunningham as a continuation of its earlier precedent. It broke no new ground. But for the first time, the Supreme Court characterized its often-repeated holding as a bright-line rule: Under California's DSL, an upper term sentence may be imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating circumstance. An element of the charged offense, essential to a jury's determination of guilt, or admitted in a defendant's guilty plea, does not qualify as such a circumstance. Instead, aggravating circumstances depend on facts found discretely and solely by the judge. In accord with Blakely, therefore, the middle term prescribed in California's statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum. 542 U.S., at 303, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (The `statutory maximum' for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.  (emphasis in original)). Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, the DSL violates Apprendi's bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  [ Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (citations omitted; second emphasis added).] Again, it was irrelevant that there existed the possibility of an absolute maximum sentence of 16 years. The Supreme Court stressed that the only concern was whether the bright-line rule laid down in Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker was violated. The Court expressed frustration at the state's inability or unwillingness to follow this precedent. Id. at 869-870. The Supreme Court left to California how to eliminate the constitutional violation. Id. at 871. In summary, the Supreme Court established a consistent precedent from McMillan to Cunningham. The bright-line rule established was the same before and after Cunningham. And the Court's decision to remand this case must be considered in light of this fact. V. THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE AND MICHIGAN'S GENERAL SENTENCING SCHEME As discussed earlier, Michigan's sentencing guidelines generally focus on a defendant's minimum sentence. The average defendant's criminal history, the admitted facts, and the jury's verdict alone would allow the sentencing court, without recourse to judicial fact-finding, to impose the maximum sentence provided by law. Because of this, the judicial fact-finding necessary to score the OVs moves the typical defendant within a predetermined range of possible sentences. And the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are not implicated, because all the facts necessary to support the maximum sentence have been proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Such situations do not threaten the basic principles undergirding this country's jury-driven legal system. A defendant knows what maximum sentence he or she is facing regardless of judicial fact-finding. Apprendi noted that judicial fact-finding is acceptable when it does not increase the maximum penalty for a crime or create a separate offense calling for a separate penalty. `[Judicial fact-finding] operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding[s]. . . .' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 486, 120 S.Ct. 2348, quoting McMillan, 477 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Because the right to a trial by jury is completely protected in such situations, there are no Sixth Amendment concerns. The typical application of the Michigan sentencing guidelines more readily relates to McMillan. The score given to the OVs merely shifts a defendant's sentence within the minimum sentence range under the guidelines. It does not increase the defendant's maximum sentence. A defendant whose criminal history and jury verdict do not place him or her in an intermediate sanction cell always knows what the potential maximum sentence will be: it is the maximum penalty prescribed by Michigan law. All of this changes, however, when an intermediate sanction cell is involved. VI. THE BRIGHT-LINE RULE AND MICHIGAN'S INTERMEDIATE SANCTION CELLS When a defendant is entitled to a sentence that is within the range specified in an intermediate sanction cell, MCL 769.34(4)(a) sets his or her maximum sentence. That maximum sentence is a jail term of either the upper limit of the recommended minimum sentence range or 12 months, whichever is shorter. Under the guidelines, the court must impose this maximum sentence, unless it can state substantial and compelling reasons to increase the sentence. Therefore, the process is no longer concerned with the defendant's minimum sentence. Under the Supreme Court's bright-line rule, this alteration in focus changes the defendant's statutory maximum. The new maximum sentence set under MCL 769.34(4)(a) becomes the defendant's statutory maximum. This is true because it is the longest sentence the court can give a defendant solely on the basis of the defendant's criminal record and admissions and the jury's verdict. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868; Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301, 124 S.Ct. 2531; Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348; Jones, 526 U.S. at 251-252, 119 S.Ct. 1215. And if the court makes findings of fact moving the sentence to a higher statutory maximum, the defendant faces either (1) a different criminal charge or (2) the increased stigma of an extended sentence. This is specifically what the Supreme Court sought to avoid. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Any judicial fact-finding that shifts a defendant's sentence above the statutory maximum is unconstitutional and violates Jones and its progeny. A court engages in judicial fact-finding by scoring the OVs or stating substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the sentencing guidelines range. The sentencing court makes its own findings of fact by a preponderance of the evidence. These findings are separate and distinct from the findings establishing the elements of the crime, which must be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Such sentencing mirrors the sentencing in Cunningham, in which the Supreme Court held: Because circumstances in aggravation are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . [this] violates Apprendi's bright-line rule: Except for a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [ Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (emphasis added).] As in Cunningham, any judicial fact-finding that increases a defendant's maximum sentence crosses the Supreme Court's bright line. And in doing so, it violates the constitution. To fully analyze Michigan's sentencing system, it must be determined who is entitled to an intermediate sanction cell sentence. The Supreme Court's bright-line rule provides the answer to this question. Except for a prior conviction, `any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Hence, a defendant is entitled to a sentence based solely on (1) the defendant's prior convictions and (2) any facts that he or she admitted and any facts that were specifically found by the jury. This requires a conclusion that, in order to determine a defendant's appropriate maximum sentence, a sentencing court should score only the PRVs. They reflect the defendant's prior convictions and relations to the criminal justice system. The sentencing court is free to score these because they fall under one of the exceptions noted in the bright-line rule: the defendant's prior convictions. Scoring the OVs, on the other hand, requires factual determinations that are made by the trial court using a preponderance of the evidence standard. They are judicial determinations that occur only after the jury's verdict. Such findings of fact fall directly in line with the Cunningham decision. Because [OVs] are found by the judge, not the jury, and need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, . . . [scoring them] violates Apprendi 's bright-line rule[.] Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868. [13] The only time the court should score an OV is when the defendant admitted the fact justifying the score or a jury found its existence beyond a reasonable doubt. This occurs only in rare cases, and it did not occur in this case. Under the bright-line rule, a Michigan defendant is entitled to an intermediate sanction as a sentence when his or her PRV level alone supports such a sentence. On the other hand, a defendant whose PRV level is too high to place him or her in an intermediate sanction cell is not entitled to an intermediate sanction cell sentence. The latter defendant falls under the general sentencing scheme and is subject to the absolute maximum sentence set by law. In that case, the trial court is free to make the judicial findings of fact necessary to score the OVs.