Opinion ID: 2622966
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Heading: Principles of Preemption

Text: As we have previously explained, [t]he basic rules of preemption are not in dispute: Under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (art. VI, cl. 2), Congress has the power to preempt state law concerning matters that lie within the authority of Congress. [Citation.] In determining whether federal law preempts state law, a court's task is to discern congressional intent. [Citation.] Congress's express intent in this regard will be found when Congress explicitly states that it is preempting state authority. [Citation.] Congress's implied intent to preempt is found (i) when it is clear that Congress intended, by comprehensive legislation, to occupy the entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the states to supplement federal law [citation]; (ii) when compliance with both federal and state regulations is an impossibility [citation]; or (iii) when state law `stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.' [Citations.] ( Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly (2004) 33 Cal.4th 943, 955, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422 ( Bronco Wine ); Viva! International Voice for Animals v. Adidas Promotional Retail Operations, Inc. (2007) 41 Cal.4th 929, 935-936, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569 ( Viva! International ).) It is well established that the party who asserts that a state law is preempted bears the burden of so demonstrating. ( Viva! International, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 936, 63 Cal.Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 956, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) The interpretation of the federal law at issue here is further informed by a strong presumption against preemption. (See Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240; see also Viva! International, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 938, 63 Cal. Rptr.3d 50, 162 P.3d 569; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 974, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) [B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state law causes of action. In all pre-emption cases, and particularly in those in which Congress has `legislated ... in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,' [citation] we `start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.' [Citations.] ( Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240; Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC (2005) 544 U.S. 431, 449, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 161 L.Ed.2d 687 ( Bates ); Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1139, 1150, fn. 7, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 21, 136 P.3d 821.) We apply this presumption to the existence as well as the scope of preemption. ( Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240.) There can be no doubt that the presumption applies with particular force here. (See Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 974, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) As the Court of Appeal acknowledged here, [c]onsumer protection laws such as the [UCL], false advertising law, and CLRA, are within the states' historic police powers and therefore are subject to the presumption against preemption. Laws regulating the proper marketing of food, including the prevention of deceptive sales practices, are likewise within states' historic police powers. ( Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul (1963) 373 U.S. 132, 144, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 10 L.Ed.2d 248; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 959-961, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422 [describing history of state regulation].) Indeed, as early as the 1860's, California was enacting laws regulating food marketing. (See, e.g., Stats. 1862, ch. 365, pp. 484-485 [prohibiting sale of adulterated and misbranded food]; Bronco Wine, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 961-963,17 Cal.Rptr.3d 180, 95 P.3d 422.) It is with these principles in mind that we consider whether it was the `clear and manifest purpose' of Congress ( Medtronic, supra, 518 U.S. at p. 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240) to preclude states from providing private remedies for the violations of the state statutes at issue here.