Opinion ID: 2017264
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: informing the witness of the subject matter of the grand jury investigation.

Text: In order to safeguard his constitutional rights, a witness summoned to testify or produce records before the grand jury must be advised of the general nature of the grand jury inquiry. See People v. Ryan (1951), 410 Ill. 486, 103 N.E.2d 116. We require that such information be contained in the subpoena. When a witness receives a subpoena duces tecum advising him of the subject matter of the grand jury investigation, he may then determine whether he should file a motion to quash the subpoena for the reason that the demand for production is unreasonable under the fourth amendment because such papers are not related to the purpose of the investigation. Knowledge of the general nature of the grand jury investigation is beneficial to the timely assertion of fifth amendment rights. With regard to the right against self-incrimination, a witness who is apprised of the subject matter of investigation prior to being ushered into the grand jury room will be able to contemplate his knowledge of the subject unhampered by the nervousness and excitement which accompany an appearance before the grand jury. When the witness responds to the subpoena and is advised of his privilege against self-incrimination, he will be prepared to claim the privilege in a more timely fashion, since he will already have in mind the facts upon which the claim of privilege could rest. When a witness stands charged by affidavit, and the grand jury calls the witness for the purpose of returning an indictment on that charge, knowledge of the nature of the grand jury investigation is imperative so that the witness may consult with counsel and determine whether he desires to appear and testify. The decision to appear and testify is wholly optional with an accused, because, procedurally, it has been decided that the best way to maintain inviolate his fifth amendment rights is to provide him with the simple expedient of refusing to assist in any way in the procurement of his conviction, rather than requiring him to claim the privilege as a witness must, i.e., in regard to specific questions. See Malloy v. Hogan, supra ; Boyd v. United States (1886), 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746; cf. Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908. Hence, an accused who refuses to comply with either a subpoena duces tecum or a subpoena ad testificandum may not be held in contempt. We believe this same broad protection is available when the purpose of the grand jury investigation is to gather evidence to indict a particular witness, whether by his testimony or through production of his papers. See People v. Laino (1961), 10 N.Y.2d 161, 218 N.Y.S.2d 647, 176 N.E.2d 571, appeal dismissed, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 104, 83 S.Ct. 1687, 10 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1963); McCormick On Evidence (2d ed., 1972) § 130. A witness so informed of the purpose of the investigation by his subpoena will be able to exercise his sixth amendment right to counsel and decide whether to participate in the grand jury proceeding. The subpoena must necessarily advise such witness of his right to counsel, either retained or appointed. Of course, the duty to determine and advise a particular witness that he is to be indicted if sufficient evidence is adduced falls upon the prosecutor or grand jury foreman. In most cases, there will be no difficulty in determining the appropriateness of these additional warnings. When the prosecutor or grand jury foreman elicits testimony by intentionally failing to advise a witness that he is the subject of the investigation, any indictment returned against him would be subject to a motion to quash.