Opinion ID: 884360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The sump system permit.

Text: Lutes devotes considerable attention to his argument that the sump system did not have a proper permit and was, therefore, illegal. While admitting that the Houdashelts had obtained a general septic permit from the county when installing the system, Lutes claims that such a permit was not sufficient for industrial discharge. He argues that the District Court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous. In response, the Houdashelts assert that the question of whether the sump system had the proper permit is largely beside the point. We agree. We have stated that [r]elevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Peschke v. Carroll College (1996), ___ Mont. ___, ___, 929 P.2d 874, 881, 53 St.Rep. 1428, 1433 (citing Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.; Hansen v. Hansen (1992), 254 Mont. 152, 835 P.2d 748). We have also held that [f]or error to be the basis for a new trial, it must be so significant as to materially affect the substantial rights of the complaining party. Zeke's Distributing Co. v. Brown-Forman Corp. (1989), 239 Mont. 272, 278, 779 P.2d 908, 912 (citing Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P.; Giles v. Flint Valley Forest Products (1979), 179 Mont. 382, 588 P.2d 535). Common sense dictates that if an error is made in a finding of fact which only addresses some minor point largely irrelevant to the disposition of the case, that error cannot materially affect the substantial rights of the complaining party. It will not, therefore, be the basis for reversal of the district court's decision. In this case, the Houdashelts asserted that Lutes had breached and defaulted on the contract for sale. They further asserted that Lutes was responsible for damages consequent to his misuse and damage of the sump system, including the pollution damage which the Houdashelts claimed occurred once the sump system ceased to function. In denying their claims, Lutes argued that the Houdashelts should be held responsible for the pollution damage because the sump system had never worked correctly. Given these issues, the District Court properly concerned itself with the questions of whether the sump had in fact worked correctly and, if so, when it ceased to function, and why. The establishment of the existence or nonexistence of a permit for the sump does not serve to answer any of these questions. Provided the sump worked correctly (as the District Court found it did), the absence of a permit would not make the Houdashelts responsible for the damages caused by Lutes' misuse of the system. Therefore, we need not determine whether the District Court's finding of fact regarding the sump permit was erroneous; even if it were, such error would be harmless.