Opinion ID: 501762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was Deering's refusal compelled?

Text: 16 Even were we to find Deering's refusal to be in some respects testimonial with respect to the charge of refusal, we nonetheless conclude that it was not compelled for purposes of fifth amendment analysis. In Neville the Court relied on two related factors in finding that the state did not compel the defendant to incriminate himself when it gave him a choice between submitting to a blood-alcohol test or having the refusal used against him in court. 5 First, the Court noted that the state could legitimately compel a suspect to take a blood-alcohol test against the suspect's will. Neville, 459 U.S. at 563, 103 S.Ct. at 922; See also Schmerber 384 U.S. 757, at 760-65, 86 S.Ct. at 1830-33. The Court then concluded that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Neville, 459 U.S. at 563, 103 S.Ct. at 922 (emphasis in original). 17 The choice faced by Deering was identical to the choice treated in Neville, with the notable exception that Deering faced criminal charges for his refusal. Deering suggests that, where refusal is criminalized, the choice offered by the state is illusory, because he faced either submitting to the breathalyzer test, thereby incriminating himself under Alaska's DWI statute, or of refusing to take the test, and incriminating himself under Alaska's criminal refusal statute. 18 It is true that, as the Court stated in Neville, the mere presence of choice does not always settle the compulsion issue. Id. at 562-63, 103 S.Ct. at 922. The legitimacy of a choice largely depends on the coerciveness of the proffered alternatives; certain cruel choices, and choices made in highly coercive circumstances, are proscribed by the fifth amendment even though the state, strictly speaking, does not compel an incriminating statement. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450, 459, 99 S.Ct. 1292, 1297, 59 L.Ed.2d 501 (1979) (proscribing choice between testifying or facing contempt charges); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765 n. 9, 86 S.Ct. at 1833 n. 9 (fifth amendment may bar use of testimony obtained when the proffered alternative was to submit to a test so painful that a person almost inevitably would prefer confession); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1619, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (unless coercion inherent in custodial surroundings is dispelled, no statement is truly a product of free choice); Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 55, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596-97, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964) (proscribing choice between self-accusation, perjury for false testimony, and contempt for declining to testify). 19 Although we acknowledge that the choice in this case appears more coercive than that in Neville, we nonetheless conclude that the Supreme Court's analysis in that case is controlling, and applies equally to Deering's choice despite the criminal penalties attendant upon it. Where, as here, the state could have taken Deerings' blood by force, 6 it does not compel a defendant to testify against himself when it allows him the choice of either producing the evidence or facing criminal charges--and even a mandatory prison sentence of three days--for withholding it. Such a choice is no more impermissibly coercive than any order to produce physical evidence which is backed with the sanction of criminal contempt. As the Court noted in Neville, the choice to submit or refuse to take a blood-alcohol test will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make. But the criminal process often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices. 459 U.S. at 564, 103 S.Ct. at 922-23. 20 Equally important, we note that the Court's analysis in Neville placed great weight on the fact that the state did not directly compel a refusal. Rather, the Court noted, the state wants suspects to take the blood-alcohol test. Id. at 563-64, 103 S.Ct. at 922-23. See also People v. Ellis, 65 Cal.2d 529, 537, 55 Cal.Rptr. 385, 389, 421 P.2d 393, 397 (Cal.1966) (Traynor, C.J.) (refusal to take voice identification test in rape case: [a] guilty party may prefer not to find himself in a situation where consciousness of guilt may be inferred from his conduct, but it can scarcely be contended that the police, who seek evidence from the test itself, will tend to coerce parties into refusing to take tests in order to produce this evidence) (footnote omitted). 21 We find this observation equally persuasive here. In fact, a criminal penalty for refusal arguably compels a refusal less than the civil penalty present in Neville did. Although the imposition of a criminal penalty for refusal may create an inherently more coercive situation than imposition of a civil penalty for the same behavior, the compulsion it increases is the compulsion to submit to the breathalyzer test, not the compulsion to refuse, and refusal is the conduct made criminal in the statute. Because increasing the penalty attendant upon refusal only reduces the likelihood of refusal, cf. Neville, 459 U.S. at 560, 103 S.Ct. at 920-21 (allowing use of refusal at trial discourages choice of refusal), Deering's refusal was even less compelled than the refusal in Neville. 22 In short, Deering's refusal in this case was neither testimonial nor compelled. The Court held in Neville that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. As our discussion shows, that conclusion is not altered by the imposition of criminal penalties upon the choice of refusal. The analysis proferred in Neville is controlling here, and Deering's fifth amendment challenge must therefore fail. 23