Opinion ID: 2382536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Duty to Warn of Post-Manufacture Defects

Text: Brown II additionally discusses the effect of the government contract defense in a strict products liability action premised on the failure to warn. This type of warning is distinct from the pre-manufacture warning discussed above. In Pennsylvania, a duty to warn is non-delegable and runs to the ultimate user of the product, Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (plurality opinion), even if the user is a thief Pegg v. General Motors Corp., 258 Pa.Super. 59, 391 A.2d 1074 (1978). Brown II, 741 F.2d at 659. In the instant case, this fact raises the questions of whether appellee's duty to provide warnings (if there is such a duty under the facts of the case), (1) runs to each user of an M60 or (2) the duty is merely to warn the purchaser, the United States Army, or, (3) the government contract defense obviates the duty entirely where the United States Army contractually provides all instruction and training in the use of the M60 machine gun. The military aspects of this case are critical to the determination of this issue. In the context of a municipal contract, the duty to warn (if present under the facts), would clearly run to the ultimate user of the product. See, e.g. Hammond v. International Harvester, supra , and Brown II at 659. However, separation of powers concerns compel the conclusion that this is not so in the military context. Captain Mackey's complaint alleges that he received inadequate instructions or inadequate warnings about disassembling the M60. Assuming these allegations to be true, as we must in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, neither charge can be laid at the door of appellee under the facts stipulated. The United States Government originated the design of the M60 and provides all training in its use. Alleged inadequacies in the training Captain Mackey received from the Pennsylvania National Guard are not justiciable. The contract precludes Maremont providing instructions on the use of the M60. Thus, the government contract defense  in the military context  shields the contractor from liability for failure to providing instructions or warnings on the use of the product if the contract specifically provides that the military will provide instructions and training in the use of the product, and such training would have prevented the accident which caused the plaintiff's injury. We hold, therefore, that the government contract defense in Pennsylvania entitles a strict products liability suit defendant to judgment dismissing all claims against it if it is established that: [4] (1) The government established the specifications for the portion of the product which proximally caused the plaintiff's injury. (2) The product met the government's specifications in all material aspects. [5] (3) The defendant warned the government about patent errors or patent design defects in the government's specifications or about dangers involved in the design or use of the product that were known to or should have been known to the defendant. [6] (4) The defendant has provided any necessary instructions or warning unless the contract provides that the military will provide such instructions or warnings. Turning now to the facts of the case before us, we find that the stipulations of the parties indicate that appellee has successfully shouldered the burden of proving the first element of the defense. The United States Government supplied the design of the M60 machine gun to appellee without appellee's participation in the design process. The parties also have stipulated that the particular M60 which allegedly caused Captain Mackey's injuries met the government's specifications in all material aspects  satisfying the second element. The third element of the defense listed above is satisfied in this case because appellee had no duty to inform the military about the operation of a weapon previously in use. In the military context, a supplier of weapons of war must not be asked to second-guess the requirements of the government  so long as the supplier provides the government with the information specified in element (3). The fourth element is also met because there is no factual dispute that the instant contract provided that all training materials were the government's responsibility. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant Maremont Corporation on the basis of the government contract defense is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. ROWLEY, J., concurs in the result.