Opinion ID: 2521294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Majority's Reliance On Precedent Is Unpersuasive

Text: The primary justification that the majority provides for the rule that it adopts is that the rule is consistent with out-of-state precedent. I find the majority's reliance on and characterization of the cited precedents to be unpersuasive. Although there exists some case law support for the majority's position, rarely do those cases reach the question of whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned as a result of her former employment at the district attorney's office. While the federal statute relating to disqualification of judges is similar to Colorado's Canon 3(C), the two are not identical. Like Canon 3(C), the federal statute provides a general rule that a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2002). And like Canon 3(C), the statute then lists specific circumstances where disqualification is required. Under the federal statute, one of those circumstances is when the judge has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(3) (2002). Thus, federal courts, when analyzing a case under § 455(b)(3), consider whether the judge participated as counsel [or] adviser, and not whether the judge's association with a government office might lead a reasonable person to question that judge's impartiality. I consider this distinction to be crucial and thus find federal cases that consider only § 455(b)(3), and not § 455(a), to be inapplicable here. Hence, the majority's reliance on United States v. Gipson, 835 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1988), and Jenkins v. Bordenkircher, 611 F.2d 162 (6th Cir.1979), is misplaced. Neither of those two cases contain any discussion of the appearance of bias or what factors might lead a reasonable person to question the impartiality of a judge. Indeed, the court in Gipson specifically noted that it was not considering § 455(a)'s appearance of partiality standard since the petitioner had not preserved that argument for appeal. Gipson, 835 F.2d at 1325. The majority cites three federal cases for the proposition that under § 455(a), the federal statute requiring disqualification when a reasonable person might question a judge's impartiality, a former association with the prosecutor's office by itself does not create a reasonable question as to the judge's impartiality: United States v. Ruzzano, 247 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d 271 (3d Cir.1988); and Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50 (1972). I do not find these cases persuasive. In Ruzzano, the court held that the § 455(a) recusal argument had been waived by the petitioner and concludes, in dicta, without analysis, and with citation to only Di Pasquale, that [i]n any event, the fact that [Judge Conlon] was an AUSA [Assistant United States Attorney] during the prosecution, standing alone, does not require recusal under § 455(a). Ruzzano, 247 F.3d at 694-95. Such limited analysis should not be considered persuasive. In Di Pasquale, the Third Circuit based its rejection of the defendant's § 455(a) argument on the fact that the defendant failed to offer evidence to show that a reasonable person knowing all the circumstances would have harbored doubts concerning the judge's impartiality. Di Pasquale, 864 F.2d at 279. However, Colorado Canon 3(C)(1)(b), the canon relevant to these proceedings, does not place the burden of proof upon the defendant. Indeed, the judge must sua sponte disqualify himself if the requirements of the canon are met. Thus, it cannot seriously be contended that Di Pasquale supports the majority's holding. Finally, the majority relies on Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50. In Laird, Justice Rehnquist explained his decision not to disqualify himself from that case. Nowhere in his discussion does he consider when a judge must recuse himself based on the appearance of bias; nor does he discuss what factors would lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality. The word reasonable does not even appear in the case. Laird is essentially Justice Rehnquist's subjective explanation of why he was not, in actuality, biased and does not support the majority's argument that a judge must have personal knowledge about a case before a reasonable person could doubt the judge's impartiality. The majority also states that a majority of states hold that a former association with the prosecutor's office, by itself, is not a sufficient basis for disqualification. Maj. op. at 1200. In large part, the state cases cited by the majority do not hold that there is no appearance of bias when a former prosecutor presides over a case that was pending during her tenure at the prosecutor's office, or that such facts could not lead a reasonable person to question such a judge's impartiality. Instead, the cases cited either employ different standards or ignore appearance questions and focus on whether actual bias was present. [5] Thus, I do not believe that the precedent on which the majority relies is as compelling or as clear-cut as the majority implies. Further, the majority fails to discuss how this case differs from cases that have required a judge who was formerly a district attorney to recuse himself because his impartiality could reasonably be questioned. [6] Some of those cases rely on the fact that the district attorney played a pro forma role in the prosecution of the case. See, e.g., United States v. Arnpriester, 37 F.3d 466, 467 (9th Cir.1994). The majority does not analyze these cases, instead choosing to adopt a rule that recusal is not required if the judge does not have personal knowledge of a case or actual participation in its prosecution. As explained above, I believe that Canon 3(C) demands consideration of all factors that might lead a reasonable person to question a judge's impartiality, including her level of involvement in a particular case as prosecutor.