Opinion ID: 395139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: arbitrary & capricious imposition of death penalty

Text: 33 Smith next contends that his sentence was imposed pursuant to a pattern and practice of wholly arbitrary and capricious infliction of the Georgia death penalty in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments. The district court properly found Spinkellink controlling on this issue. 30 34 In Spinkellink this court observed that if a state follows a properly drawn statute in imposing the death penalty, then the arbitrariness and capriciousness and therefore the racial discrimination condemned in Furman (Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346) have been conclusively removed. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 613-14 (5th Cir. 1978) (footnotes omitted). Smith construes Spinkellink as precluding constitutional challenges to the application of a death penalty statute and argues that Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), 31 overrules Spinkellink on this point. Spinkellink, however, effected no such broad prohibition. It merely established that in the absence of proof of some specific act or acts evidencing intentional or purposeful ... discrimination against (the petitioner)  on the basis of race, sex, or wealth, a petitioner is not entitled to relief on habeas corpus. 578 F.2d at 614 n.40 (emphasis added). 32 As in Spinkellink, we find Smith's claim brimming with (m)ere conclusory allegations of discrimination, id., and wanting in proof of intentional discrimination against him in this particular case. 35 The equal protection aspect of Smith's attack on the constitutionality of the application of Georgia's death penalty suffers from a similar deficiency. Smith has adduced evidence that racial factors (are) evident in Georgia capital sentencing patterns. Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 40. Even if this evidence were sufficient to prove a racially disproportionate impact and we do not decide that it is such evidence alone cannot establish an equal protection violation. To trigger strict scrutiny of a statute, proof of intentional or purposeful discrimination is necessary. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 265, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2059, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 615 (5th Cir. 1978). Without such proof, 33 any discriminatory impact may be explained on nonracial grounds. Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d at 615. As we have already observed, the state has a legitimate interest in prescribing relevant qualifications for jurors to protect against jurors with pro-defendant biases. Having failed to prove a racially discriminatory intent or purpose in the application of Georgia's death penalty, Smith has not established a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 36