Opinion ID: 3171163
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Record on Appeal of Tax Abatement Decision

Text: [¶15] Neither the applicable statutes nor Rule 80B requires that the board of assessment review or the county commissioners be made a party to a Superior Court appeal. See id. §§ 844(1), 844-M(6); M.R. Civ. P. 80B(a).7 Nonetheless, because a reviewing court must understand what evidence the adjudicator considered, the record on review by the Superior Court must be the record created with the board of assessment review or the county commissioners. See 36 M.R.S. §§ 844(1), 844-M(2)-(5); see also M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)(2). [¶16] When appealing from the factual, discretionary, and legal determinations of a government entity, “it is generally the responsibility of the appellant to see that a proper record is preserved for appeal.” Ram’s Head Partners, LLC v. Town of Cape Elizabeth, 2003 ME 131, ¶ 18, 834 A.2d 916; see M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e). This rule applies unless the lack of minutes or a transcript of the proceedings resulted from the decision maker’s failure to keep a proper record of the proceedings. Cf. Ram’s Head Partners, LLC, 2003 ME 131, ¶ 18, 834 A.2d 916 (requiring a town’s board of assessment review to “hold a new evidentiary 7 See Chase v. Town of Machiasport, 1998 ME 260, 721 A.2d 636 (including Washington County Commissioners as parties in a Rule 80B appeal). 9 hearing to provide a reviewable record” when it failed to record the proceedings properly); Sanborn v. Town of Eliot, 425 A.2d 629, 631 (Me. 1981) (requiring a new hearing to create a complete administrative record). In sum, to ensure that complete appellate review of a decision is possible, an applicant for abatement who appeals from a municipal abatement decision must obtain and provide to the Superior Court a record of all evidence—both documentary and testimonial, to the extent that the testimony was recorded—that was presented to the board of assessment review or county commissioners.8 C. Review of Penkul’s Appeal on the Record Presented [¶17] Here, Penkul has failed to supply us with a complete and defined record of the evidence and arguments presented to the York County Commissioners. Neither we nor the Superior Court were supplied with a definitive record of the precise documents that were presented to the Commissioners.9 See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(f). Even if we had been presented with all of the documents that 8 Although in a county with a board of assessment review, the authorizing statute requires the board to “maintain a permanent record of the board meetings,” 36 M.R.S. § 844-M(2) (2015), no such requirement is included for purposes of the Commissioners’ direct review of a municipality’s decision on an application for real property tax abatement, see 36 M.R.S. § 844 (2015); see also 30-A M.R.S. §§ 101-108 (2015) (outlining the powers and duties of county commissioners). Nonetheless, the Freedom of Access Act requires that records of county agents’ public proceedings be maintained. See 1 M.R.S. §§ 402(2)(C), 403(2)-(3), 406 (2015). Penkul’s obligation as appellant was to provide a verbatim transcript of the recording of the hearing, if the hearing was recorded, or to provide the minutes if no recording occurred. She did neither. 9 Although the Superior Court was authorized to resolve disputes about the contents of the administrative record, see M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e)(2), it did not specify which documents it considered to have been presented to the Commissioners. 10 the Commissioners considered, however, we lack any record of the testimony and arguments that the Commissioners heard. [¶18] Because Penkul did not satisfy her obligation to obtain and file with the court a complete and accurate record of what testimony and documents the Commissioners considered, we cannot review Penkul’s argument that the Commissioners were compelled to authorize an abatement. See 36 M.R.S. §§ 841(2), 844(1); M.R. Civ. P. 80B(e); Ram’s Head Partners, LLC, 2003 ME 131, ¶ 18, 834 A.2d 916; Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 604 A.2d at 909. Similarly, without a record of the arguments that Penkul made orally to the Commissioners, we have no indication that she preserved her argument that the denial of tax abatement violated her constitutional rights. See Clark v. Hancock Cty. Comm’rs, 2014 ME 33, ¶ 22, 87 A.3d 712 (holding that an issue not raised to the government agency could not be raised for the first time on appeal). Absent a record indicating that Penkul raised this issue with the Commissioners, we may review the unpreserved issue only for obvious error affecting the applicant’s substantial rights. See Mallinckrodt US LLC v. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 2014 ME 52, ¶ 29, 90 A.3d 428. Without a proper record, however, we cannot determine that the Commissioners committed any error—much less obvious error—of constitutional dimension by determining that the Town’s assessed taxes should not be abated. 11 [¶19] On the record before us, we can discern no legal error, factual error, or abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the judgment of the Superior Court affirming the Commissioners’ decision. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. On the briefs: Linda Penkul, appellant pro se Kenneth D. Keating, Esq., Roberts & Shirley Law Offices, Springvale, for appellee Town of Lebanon York County Superior Court docket number AP-2013-16 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY