Opinion ID: 2101774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of the Analytical Report

Text: The person who drew the blood sample from Hanson was not present at trial to testify. Instead, the State elicited the following testimony from Officer Andersen: Q. Was a blood test then taken or blood sample taken? A. After he immediately made contact with a lawyer, yes one was taken. Q. Were you present at the time that it was taken? A. Yes, I was. Q. Would you describe the situation as it was taken, was it a hospital room and laboratory conditions? A. It was in a hospital emergency room at Turtle Lake, under very sterile, clean conditions. Q. Who took the blood sample? A. The registered nurse on duty took MR. VINJE: Objection to that as being a conclusion on a lack of foundation for the conclusion drawn. THE COURT: Overruled. MS. TORKELSON CONTINUES: Q. Who took the blood sample? A. The registered nurse on duty at that time. Q. Do you recall what her name was? A. No, I do not. Defense counsel later objected to the introduction of the analytical report on grounds there was an insufficient foundation laid concerning whether or not the individual who drew the blood sample was a registered nurse. The trial court sustained the objection. Additional testimony from Officer Andersen was then heard: Q. Officer Andersen, I'm going to back up a little bit to the testimony earlier about the registered nurse taking the blood sample, how do you know she was a registered nurse? A. She was wearing the name tag which gave her name and the RN behind it and then I asked her if she was a registered MR. VINJE: I object to that being hearsay. I object to both the tag and the statement of the individual he refers to. THE COURT: Overruled. MS. TORKELSON CONTINUES: Q. Go on, Officer Andersen. A. By her name tag and conversing she did state. Q. Can you describe what she was wearing? A. A totally white uniform and white shoes, hospital uniform. The trial court then admitted the analytical report on the basis that [Officer Andersen] made a determination that she was a registered nurse, that he is capable of observing it and making a determination ... based upon the entire procedure, from the function that she performed, from her appearance, from her name tag. The trial court concluded the evidence was sufficient to establish that the blood sample was drawn by a registered nurse. Hanson argues that Officer Andersen's testimony to the effect that the registered nurse on duty took the blood sample was hearsay, and therefore inadmissible to prove the person was authorized by Section 39-20-02 to withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content therein. It is true that portions of Officer Andersen's testimony concerning the basis for his conclusion that the person who drew the blood sample was a registered nurse were hearsay. Hanson does not dispute the fact, however, that Officer Andersen was present when the blood sample was taken in the emergency room of the hospital. Officer Andersen had personal knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the drawing of the blood sample. [1] The inference drawn by Officer Andersen that the individual who withdrew the blood was a registered nurse was rationally based upon his perception of events which took place at the hospital. See Harbin v. City of Huntsville, 333 So.2d 625, 626-27 (Ala.Cr.App.1976) [Under a similar statute, officer's testimony was sufficient evidence to support inference that person who drew blood sample was a registered nurse; officer testified that blood drawer had on `a white uniform with a name tag on as a Registered Nurse']. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Officer Andersen's testimony constituted sufficient evidence to establish that the person who drew the blood sample was a registered nurse. [2] Hanson asserts he did not have an opportunity to examine the person who drew the blood sample to determine if the test was fairly administered. He argues that he was not able to ascertain if the blood sample was drawn with a non-sterile syringe or if his arm was swabbed with alcohol prior to the blood being drawn. Our case law recognizes the possibility that a blood sample may become contaminated before it reaches the laboratory for chemical analysis. See Wanna v. Miller, 136 N.W.2d 563 (N.D.1965); Erickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, 123 N.W.2d 292 (N.D.1963). In Wanna v. Miller, supra , the plaintiff sued the owner of a tavern under the Dram Shop Act for serving liquor to an intoxicated customer who later was involved in an automobile collision with the plaintiff. The State Toxicologist testified at trial concerning the results of a chemical analysis of a blood sample taken from the customer. In response to the defendant's contention that there was no foundation for the State Toxicologist's testimony and that the blood sample was not administered as directed by law pursuant to Chapter 39-20, we said: The blood specimen was extracted from [the customer's] vein near the elbow by ... an x-ray technician and assistant laboratory technician at the Good Samaritan Hospital at Rugby. Although he did not remember specifically taking the specimen of blood, he said that he had checked the hospital records and found that he had done so. He explained the usual procedure by which blood for this purpose is extracted, marked, and mailed to the State Toxicologist. The procedure appeared proper, and our attention has not been drawn to any irregularity. The extraction of blood having been voluntary and proper safeguards having been taken in the extraction, marking, handling, mailing, receiving, and analysis of the specimen, we find no merit in the objection of no foundation for [the State Toxicologist's] testimony in regard to the alcohol content of the specimen.... [Emphasis added.] 136 N.W.2d at 570. Officer Andersen testified that the blood sample was withdrawn from Hanson under very clean and sterile conditions. He testified further as to the procedures utilized in the handling and mailing of the blood sample to the Office of the State Toxicologist. We believe there were sufficient indicia of reliability in the withdrawal of the blood sample in this case so as to permit the receipt of the results of the blood-alcohol test. There is no doubt the restrictive provision of Section 39-20-02, limiting the procurement of blood samples to certain qualified persons, serves to protect not only the health of the person from whom the blood sample is taken but also the reliability of the blood sample itself. The blood sample was drawn in a hospital environment by a registered nurse. There is nothing in the record to indicate and no argument is made by the defendant that it was improperly performed. When the results of the blood-alcohol test were offered, the only objection made by the defendant was that there was no showing the sample was drawn by a registered nurse. On appeal, the defendant adds to his assertion that proof is lacking that the nurse was registered to suggest that the blood sample might have been drawn with a non-sterile needle or that alcohol might have been used to swab his arm. We do not believe bare speculation is sufficient to destroy the integrity of the blood sample. There is no suggestion that anyone tampered with the sample or that the chain of custody was not established. See Erickson v. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, supra, 123 N.W.2d at 295-96 [Evidence of alcohol content of blood in workmen's compensation proceeding properly excluded where blood sample was not shown to be in substantially the same condition at the time the blood analysis was performed as it was when the blood was drawn]. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the State established adequate proof of the reliability of the blood sample. The analytical report indicated that Hanson's blood sample contained alcohol in the concentration of .11 percent by weight. Hanson contends an insufficient foundation was laid for admitting the results of the blood-alcohol test because there was no showing this measurement was based on grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. It is true Section 39-20-07(4), N.D.C.C., requires that [p]ercent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. There is no statutory provision requiring, however, that such language be incorporated into the analytical report. The certified copy of the analytical report signed by the State Toxicologist was prima facie evidence of the results of the chemical analysis of the sample. Section 39-20-07(6), N.D.C.C. It can be assumed, when there is no evidence to the contrary, that the chemical analysis was performed according to the law. Section 31-11-03(32), N.D.C.C. In State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 865 (N.D.1976), we said that a laboratory technician performing a service under the supervision and direction of the State Toxicologist is performing an official act which is entitled to a disputable presumption of regularity pursuant to Section 31-11-03(15), N.D.C.C. Hanson did not subpoena the State Toxicologist or any of his employees for examination at trial to determine compliance with Section 39-20-07(4). This he had a right to do at no cost to himself pursuant to Section 39-20-07(7). [3] No contradictory evidence was introduced to rebut the presumption that the .11 percent by weight result of the chemical analysis of the blood sample was based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood. Accordingly, the presumption stands.