Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prosecution by attorney general's office (# 41)

Text: We find no merit in Appellant's unpreserved allegation that the Office of the Attorney General improperly prosecuted his indictment. Section 93 of the Kentucky Constitution provides that the duties and responsibilities of Constitutional State Officers, including the Attorney General, shall be prescribed by law. Accordingly, our statutes make the Attorney General the chief law officer of the Commonwealth[.] KRS 15.020. And, [t]o encourage cooperation among law enforcement officers [,] ... to provide for the general supervision of criminal justice [,] ... and ... to maintain uniform and efficient enforcement of the criminal law and the administration of criminal justice throughout the Commonwealth, Commonwealth v. Wilson, Ky., 622 S.W.2d 912, 914 (1981), the General Assembly has enacted KRS 15.700, which establishes a unified integrated prosecutor system in Kentucky with the Attorney General as chief prosecutor of the Commonwealth. Given that the Attorney General may act as prosecutor ... when so directed by statute, Graham v. Mills, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 698, 701 (1985), the General Assembly has enacted a number of statutory provisions that authorize the Attorney General to prosecute criminal actions under certain circumstances. See, e.g. KRS 15.190 (when requested to do so in writing by a County or Commonwealth Attorney); KRS 15.200 (when requested to do so in writing by other identified officers); KRS 15.225 (prosecution of county financial administration); KRS 15.231 (theft of identity and trafficking in stolen identity cases); KRS 15.240 (violations by abortion facilities); KRS 15.242-15.243 (enforcement of election laws); KRS 15.715 (when authorized to do so by the Prosecutors' Advisory Council). By authorizing the Attorney general to direct the investigation and prosecution of criminal actions only in given, limited situation[s], Hancock v. Schroering, Ky., 481 S.W.2d 57, 61 (1972), [t]he legislature has provided a check to prevent the Attorney General from usurping and pre-empting the office of Commonwealth's attorney[.] Id. Although Appellant is correct that the record in this case does not demonstrate the means by which the Attorney General assumed the prosecution of this indictment, the record is equally clear that neither Appellant nor any local prosecuting authority raised any objection to the Attorney General's role in this prosecution. Of course, the issue concerns the Attorney General's authority to prosecute this indictment would have been resolved conclusively in the trial court if Appellant had voiced any objection because the Attorney General's office could have identified its authority on the record (and, if prosecution was assumed pursuant to KRS 15.190 or KRS 15.200, included within the record the written request that they do so). Accordingly, while we observe that in future cases where the Attorney General assumes the role as lead prosecutor it would be a better practice for the Attorney General's office to make a record of its authority to prosecute an indictment, we hold that a presumption of regularity attaches in such cases  particularly when no objection is raised  and we are unwilling to assume wrongdoing from the silent record in this case. As such, we hold that the office of the Attorney General properly prosecuted this case against Appellant.