Opinion ID: 1560190
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Tenant Opportunity to Purchase Act

Text: The District of Columbia Council passed TOPA with the aim of discourag[ing] the displacement of tenants through conversion or sale of rental property and strengthen[ing] the bargaining position of tenants toward that end without unduly interfering with the rights of property owners to the due process of law[.] D.C.Code § 42-3401.02(1). TOPA provides that [b]efore an owner of a housing accommodation may sell the accommodation . . . the owner shall give the tenant an opportunity to purchase at a price and terms that represent a bona fide offer of sale. D.C.Code § 42-3404.02(a). The owner must provide each of the building's tenants and the Mayor of the District of Columbia with a written copy of an offer of sale. If the property has more than one unit, the offer of sale must be posted in a common area of the building. D.C.Code § 42-3404.03. Once the owner has provided the tenant with a written offer of sale, the tenant's rights with respect to purchasing the property are dictated by the number of units in the building. See D.C.Code §§ 42-3404.09, -3404.10, -3404.11. However, the owner shall not require that a tenant waive any right under TOPA except in exchange for consideration which the tenant, in the tenant's sole discretion, finds acceptable. D.C.Code § 42-3404.07 (2001).
Linen argues that the trial court should not have granted summary judgment in favor of the landlord because a material fact remained in dispute, specifically whether the property is a single-family or two-unit dwelling. He contests the trial court's reliance on language in an August 2002, Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs decision and order stating that the property is a single-family dwelling on the ground that this portion of the decision is dicta. The order was entered in a DCRA proceeding initiated by Linen in which it was established that although the residence was in form a single-family home, it was being used as a two-unit rental property without the required certificate of occupancy. He argues that the property's status as a single-family or two-unit accommodation was not sufficiently considered by the DCRA to have precedential value for the trial court. In its decision and order, the DCRA awarded Linen a rent refund in excess of $24,000. Further, the tenant disputes the trial court's reliance in part on the landlord's filing in February 2002, of an amended registration form that describes the property as a single-family home. The tenant states that he filed his petition with the Rental Accommodations and Conversion Division of the DCRA in June of 2001, that the apartment became vacant in August of 2001, and that the landlord did not file the amended registration until February of 2002, after the DCRA hearing had taken place. The tenant suggests that this sequence of events indicates that the landlord did not intend to permanently remove the basement apartment from the rental market, but rather that the basement apartment was merely vacant, or temporarily removed from the rental market, or taken off the market in bad faith. We are not convinced that this sequence of events lends appellant's position any support at all. Linen also argues that the property's location in the R-3 zoning district, an area where only single-family homes are permitted, does not support the trial court's conclusion that the property is a single-family home. He contends that the landlord illegally maintained a two-unit dwelling in violation of the applicable zoning regulations, and that the landlord's conduct in this respect dictates the status of the property for TOPA purposes. In addition, Linen argues that the language in the 2005 Superior Court order [2] describing the property as a single-family home did not have any precedential value for the trial court because the property's status as a single-family or two-unit dwelling was not sufficiently considered by the Landlord and Tenant Branch in the 2005 proceeding. To affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment we must find, on the basis of our independent review of the record, that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c). The Supreme Court has explained that under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(c), [3] entry of summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). The substantive law applicable to an individual case determines when a fact is material, and only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Genuine factual issues for trial are those that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In the case at bar, whether the property is a single-family or two-unit dwelling will affect the outcome of Linen's TOPA-based claim, and thus the status of the property is a material fact under Anderson. However, on the record before us, there is no genuine issue concerning this material fact. Any finding by a judge or a jury that Lanford had failed to establish that the property is a single-family dwelling would be insupportable. As the trial court correctly pointed out in its order granting summary judgment, Linen prevailed before the DCRA because the property is a single-family home that Lanford had illegally rented as a two-unit dwelling. The amended registration filed by Lanford in February 2002, following the DCRA proceeding identified the property as a single-family home, and DCRA records describe the property as a two bedroom single family home. Moreover, the property is situated in district R-3 and the applicable zoning regulations prohibit two-family homes. Linen has not set forth any specific facts indicating that a genuine factual issue remains for trial. Instead, he has made conclusory allegations in opposition to Lanford's evidence that are insufficient to create a genuine factual issue requiring a trial. See Beard v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 587 A.2d 195, 198 (D.C.1991) (explaining that [c]onclusory allegations by the non-moving party are insufficient . . . to defeat the entry of summary judgment[.]) (internal citations omitted). We conclude that the trial court was correct in ruling that the property is a single-family home.
Linen's second argument challenging the order granting summary judgment is that the trial court erred in ruling that the landlord provided him with at least the minimum time period for settlement required by TOPA. Based on his contention that the property is a two-family home, the appellant asserts that under TOPA he was entitled to a minimum of ninety days to settle. However, as we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the property at issue is a single-family dwelling, we apply the TOPA provisions governing the sale of single-family homes to the facts of this case. Lanford provided Linen with the offer of sale required by TOPA on August 25, 2005. The parties entered into a contract of sale for the property on October 3, 2005, and to avoid any dispute that his offer did not match the third-party contract, Linen merely changed the name on the contract, initialed, and signed it. The copy of the regional sales contract signed by Linen that appears in the appellant's appendix is in large part illegible. However, a handwritten notation appearing on the third page of the signed regional sales contract indicates that settlement was to take place on or before December 1, 2005. It is unclear which party is responsible for the inclusion of this handwritten notation and Linen denies having signed or initialed the provision of the contract calling for settlement by December 1, 2005. Linen brought suit a day later on December 2, 2005, alleging that his rights under TOPA had been violated. TOPA specifies that once a single-family home tenant provides the owner with a written statement of interest pursuant to D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(1), the owner must allow the tenant sixty days to negotiate a contract of sale. D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(2). Then, if the parties are able to negotiate a contract of sale, the owner shall afford the tenant a reasonable period prior to settlement in order to secure financing and financial assistance, and shall not require less than 60 days after the date of contracting. D.C.Code § 42-3404.09(3). The owner shall grant the tenant an extension of time to proceed to settlement if a lending institution or agency estimates in writing that a decision with respect to financing or financial assistance will be made within 90 days after the date of contracting[.] Id. Any extension of time the owner provides the tenant is to be consistent with the written estimate by the financial institution. Id. TOPA protects owners from liability under a third party contract if they provide tenants with reasonable extensions of time to negotiate a contract or proceed to settlement. D.C.Code § 42-3404.04. The owner cannot compel a tenant to waive his rights under the statute unless consideration is provided and any decision on waiver is committed to the tenant's discretion alone. See D.C.Code § 42-3404.07. The portions of TOPA cited above provide that Linen had a minimum of sixty days from October 3, 2005, to proceed to settlement. December 1, 2005, the settlement date identified in the signed regional sales contract, is sixty days from October 3, 2005, if one includes both the start and the end dates in the calculation. [4] In addition, nothing in the record indicates that the landlord did anything further to schedule or insist upon a settlement date of December 1, 2005, or a specific later date. Nor does the record indicate that prior to filing his complaint Linen requested that Lanford grant him an extension of time to proceed to settlement. Instead, he immediately filed suit and he claims in his appellate brief that it was certain that the landlord never intended to allow the tenant the proper time to secure financing and financial assistance. As Linen was afforded the minimum sixty-day time period to proceed to settlement that TOPA requires when an owner sells a single-family home, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment.