Opinion ID: 661489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Upward Departure Sentencing Issue

Text: 29 Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the calculation of a defendant's Criminal History Category is a rule-bound process for which there is less deference to the factfinder than in role-in-the-offense determinations. Criminal History Category calculations may include only (1) those convictions for which a sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month was imposed, or for which any prison time was served, within fifteen years of the new offense; and (2) any other convictions imposed within ten years of the new offense. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(e). In his Presentence Report, Officer Cole calculated that Schultz's criminal history score was 5, which put him in Criminal History Category III. This calculation assigned points for two drug convictions and a drunken driving offense, but properly excluded two other convictions that were out of time. 30 In the first excluded case, Schultz was charged on October 30, 1974, with buying hashish oil from an undercover agent. He was sentenced on June 6, 1975, to five years' probation, and was discharged on July 1, 1976. This conviction could not count for criminal history purposes because the sentence did not include imprisonment and was more than ten years old. In the second excluded case, Schultz jumped bond and on May 20, 1977, was given a sentence of two years, suspended, and two years' probation. Again, no points were assessed on this conviction because the sentence included no imprisonment and was more than ten years old. 31 Using the total offense level of 17 and Criminal History Category of III, the guideline range for Schultz's sentence would have been 30 to 37 months' imprisonment and a fine of $5,000 to $1,000,000. 32 The court decided, however, to depart upward in the Criminal History Category. Pointing to the Adequacy of Criminal History Category Policy Statement, U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3., the court noted that 33 if reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range. Such information may include prior sentences not used in computing the criminal history category. 34 (Emphasis added). Indicating that Category III did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Schultz's conduct, the court then took note of the two out-of-time convictions discussed above and stated that if they had been included in the calculation, each receiving one point under Sec. 4A1.1. (c), Schultz's criminal history score would have been raised from 5 to 7, and his Category from III to IV. 35 The court went on to conclude that if the out-of-time convictions had not been excluded, Schultz could be considered a career criminal or a career offender under 4B1.1.... This, in turn, would have resulted in a criminal history category of VI. Under Sec. 4B1.1, a defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. The third of these provisions would be active if the two out-of-time convictions were figured in. A career offender's Category is automatically VI, and Sec. 4B1.1 also provides for an increase in the offense level attributed to a crime committed by a career offender. The court pointed to this provision to indicate that it would be entitled to impose a sentence of up to 188 (rather than 30 to 37) months, but would settle on a range of 51 to 63 months: 36 Pursuant to the career offender guideline in Section 4B1.1, the offense level is increased based upon the statutory maximum penalty for the offense of conviction. Mr. Schultz pled guilty to an offense with the maximum penalty of 20 years. Therefore, if he were a career offender, his offense level would be 32, and allowing for a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The total offense level would be 29. With an offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI, the defendant would face the guideline range of 151 to 188 months. 37 The Court does not intend to increase the offense level in accordance with the career offender guideline because of its previous rulings regarding the ambiguity of the guideline and the statute, as they relate to the sentence involved. However, the Court does find that the Criminal History Category of VI reflects the actual criminal history of the defendant inasmuch as he has been convicted on three occasions over the past 17 years for essentially the same conduct. Therefore, the court intends to make an upward departure using criminal history of VI and an offense guideline of 17 which results in the guideline range of 51 to 63 months. 38 At a subsequent hearing on this proposed departure, the judge explained his reasons. These included the fact that, on the question of whether the substance was hashish or hashish oil, We followed the Rule of Lenity reluctantly which benefited the defendant. The judge continued: 39 [T]he defendant has persisted in smuggling, selling and possessing the same illegal material for over a lengthy period of time, and apparently his prior sentencings in these materials has had no deterring effect on him. 40 It is obvious to this Court that the defendant is a recidivist, one who repeats crimes and apparently does not learn from experience, and based on his past conduct we have no assurance that he won't violate them in the future. 41 The main problem in this Court's mind is that this defendant is at the highest level of the drug distribution system in this country. He is a source of the material who supplies and provides material to suppliers who corrupt their distributors and customers and untold addicts on the street. We haven't any idea how many children and young adults may have been corrupted and destroyed by the defendant's supply of materials he was bringing into the country, nor do we have any idea how many people who may have graduated, or descended--whatever term you want to use--from the use of marijuana to high-powered marijuana to cocaine, heroin, and other kinds of drugs which destroy minds and destroy bodies. 42 I conclude that this defendant is a serious menace to society and that's the reason for the upward departure in this case. 43 Using the total offense level of 17 and Criminal History Category of VI, the judge thereupon sentenced Schultz to 63 months' imprisonment, 5 years' supervised release, a fine of $25,000, and a $50 assessment. 44 Schultz appeals the upward departure as improperly counting the excluded convictions. He maintains that, even if the convictions were counted, his Category would be IV, not VI. Accordingly, he suggests, his sentencing range should be 30-37 months (for Category III) or, at most, 37-46 months (for Category IV), not the 51-63 months chosen by the judge. 45 As noted by the district court, the Sentencing Guidelines permit upward departure if the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. Departure may be based on information concerning ... prior sentence(s) not used in computing the criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3. (a). 46 Application Note 8 under Sec. 4A1.2. also supports departure based on out-of-time convictions: 47 Applicable Time Period. Section 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e) establishes the time period within which prior sentences are counted.... If the court finds that a sentence imposed outside this time period is evidence of similar, or serious dissimilar, criminal conduct, the court may consider this information in determining whether an upward departure is warranted under Sec. 4A1.3 (Adequacy of Criminal History Category). 48 The court was thus entitled to use the two out-of-time convictions to depart upward from Category III. However, it was not entitled to use those out-of-time convictions to establish Career Offender status and reach Category VI. 49 Sixth Circuit precedent establishes that The district court cannot arbitrarily change the requirements for career offender status established by the Sentencing Commission. U.S. v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 372-73 (6th Cir.1990). In Robison, the defendant's Criminal History Category was increased to VI on the basis of a 12-year-old out-of-time conviction, because the trial judge believed the defendant had received a real break from the sentencing judge in that case. Id. at 372. The record shows that in the instant case the judge was similarly motivated by his belief that the defendant had received a break, this time from his own court and in the very case at hand: his ruling that, for sentencing purposes, the substance was hashish and not hashish oil. 50 As the Robison court notes, Application Note 4 in the Commentary to Sec. 4B1.2 specifically states that The provisions of Sec. 4A1.2 (Definitions and Instructions for Computing Criminal History) are applicable to the counting of convictions under Sec. 4B1.1. See Robison, 904 F.2d at 372. Sec. 4A1.2(e) is the provision excluding out-of-time convictions; Sec. 4B1.1 is the provision for determining career offender status. As a result, under the Guidelines and Robison, out-of-time convictions excluded from calculating Criminal History Category may not be used to find career offender status. 51 Since the district court's departure to Category VI cannot be grounded on the assignment to Schultz of career offender status, we must now determine whether it is supported by the court's explanation for the appropriateness of an upward departure from Category III. 52 A court departing upward from a defendant's calculated Criminal History Category must satisfy two requirements: 53 (1) The court must articulate its reasons for departing from the guidelines in language relating to the guidelines.(2) Where the court depart[s] beyond the next higher criminal category it must demonstrate either that it first looked to the next higher criminal history category for guidance or that it found the sentence under the next higher criminal history category too lenient. 54 United States v. Kennedy, 893 F.2d 825, 829 (6th Cir.1990); see also Robison, 904 F.2d at 372. 55 As described and quoted above, the trial court did explain, in language relating to the Guidelines, why it was departing from Category III (Schultz's recidivism), and it did mention Category IV as a reasonable stopping point. However, after mentioning Category IV in an approving way, it then reached Category VI without explaining why Category IV was inadequate, and without even mentioning Category V. 56 For both of these reasons, therefore--the use of out-of-time convictions to find career offender status, and the failure to explain why Category IV was not an adequate level--we vacate the upward departure. We remand the case to the district court for resentencing in accordance with the rules established in Kennedy, supra: in any upward departure, the court must move stepwise up the ladder of criminal history categories and must make specific findings, articulated in language relating to the guidelines, concerning the inadequacy of any sentencing categories passed over.