Opinion ID: 2625738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Addicted Offender Accountability Act

Text: [¶ 33] Mr. Duke contends that the district court erred by imposing a sentence of imprisonment. For support, he relies upon a provision of the Addicted Offender Accountability Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303. That provision states, in full: (a) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, notwithstanding any other provision of law, qualified offenders may be placed on probation under W.S. 7-13-301, receive a suspended sentence under W.S. 7-13-302(a) or placed on probation under W.S. XX-X-XXXX. The sentence or probation order shall set forth the terms of a treatment program based upon the substance abuse assessment and any other terms and conditions as the court may deem appropriate under the circumstances, and require the offender to satisfactorily complete the treatment program. The court shall include in the sentence or probation order any provisions necessary to reasonably protect the health of the offender. (b) The treatment provider shall be required to report to the court, the prosecuting attorney, probation officer and counsel representing the offender not less than once per month on the offender's progress in meeting the requirements of the sentence and the program. (c) A qualified offender or person sentenced under this act may be incarcerated if the court concludes on the basis of the evidence that: (i) No adequate treatment alternative exists; (ii) Under the facts of the case, the interests of justice require a period of incarceration; provided however, under the circumstances, a portion of the sentence may be suspended under the conditions set forth in subsection (a) of this section; (iii) The offender refuses to agree to participate in the court ordered treatment program or fails to satisfactorily complete the court ordered treatment program; or (iv) The offender commits a felony, sells or otherwise delivers controlled substances while in a program pursuant to this section, or engages in other behavior that poses an unreasonable risk to public safety while in the program. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in the absence of the commission of these acts, those programs and sanctions set forth in W.S. X-XX-XXXX and X-XX-XXXX(b) may be used at the discretion of the probation officer or court to address other violations of the sentencing or probation order. (d) In the event probation is revoked, the court may impose one (1) or more of the sanctions set forth in W.S. X-XX-XXXX or X-XX-XXXX(b) unless the court, in its sole discretion, finds that another disposition, including imprisonment, is necessary under the facts of the case. Mr. Duke interprets the statute to require that sentencing courts, absent one of the conditions appearing in subsection (c), sentence qualified offenders to probation. [4] We disagree. [¶ 34] The plain text of the statute does not limit the discretion of the trial courts to make sentencing decisions. Subsection (a) specifically states that qualified offenders may be placed on probation. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303(a) (emphasis added). As a general matter, the word may when used in a statute, is permissive. Mayor v. Board of Land Comm'rs, 64 Wyo. 409, 192 P.2d 403, 411 (1948). Nothing in the statutory text suggests that the legislature intended any other interpretation. [¶ 35] The only decision cited by Mr. Duke to support his position is People v. Murillo, 102 Cal.App.4th 1414, 126 Cal. Rptr.2d 358 (2002). In Murillo, the California Court of Appeals determined that it was error for the trial court to sentence the qualifying offender to incarceration rather than one of the alternatives specified by the statute. 126 Cal.Rptr.2d at 363. Murillo, however, involved a California statute that differs markedly from Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303. The California law states that any person convicted of a nonviolent drug possession offense shall receive probation. Cal.Penal Code § 1210.1(a) (West 2008) (emphasis added). See Murillo, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d at 360. Given the different statutory language upon which Murillo is premised, its conclusion is not relevant to our interpretation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-13-1303. In light of the clear discretionary language in Wyoming's statute, we find no indication that the court violated a clear and unequivocal rule of law when it ordered a sentence of imprisonment. [¶ 36] Affirmed.