Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Excluding Other Items of Proposed Mitigating Evidence

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court erred under state law and acted unconstitutionally by ruling against defendant on several occasions in which he sought to introduce mitigating evidence. He did not invoke constitutional guaranties at trial and has forfeited his constitutional claims ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765) on appeal, except for his due process claim ( id. at pp. 433-439, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765). We turn to each item of evidence at issue.
The trial court sustained, on relevance grounds, the prosecutor's objections to questions about the types of drugs Steve Miller abused and Miller's reputation for violence. As will be recalled, Miller was defendant's biological father. Miller died when defendant was four years old, having seen little of him since his birth. There was little connection between the two individuals. Defendant's mother testified that Miller abused drugs. She was describing conduct that Miller apparently engaged in before defendant's birth. Defense counsel inquired, What types of drugs was Steve taking while you were dating him? The prosecution objected to the question on relevance grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection. We review a trial court's ruling excluding evidence on grounds of irrelevance (Evid.Code, § 350) for abuse of discretion. The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence [citations] but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence. ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476.) The court acted within its discretion in concluding that evidence of the precise nature of the substances consumed, apparently before defendant's birth, by a figure who played essentially no role in defendant's upbringing, did not have any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action (Evid.Code, § 210); i.e., it was irrelevant to the sentence that defendant should receive. Excluding irrelevant evidence did not deprive defendant of his right to present a defense. (See People v. Lewis and Oliver (2006) 39 Cal.4th 970, 996-997, 47 Cal. Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775.) We turn to defendant's next claim, regarding exclusion of reputation evidence. Danny Montgomery testified briefly for the defense. He stated that he worked in a bar in his late teens, and met Markita Thornton, defendant's mother, who worked for the same employer as a coat-checker. She was about two years younger than Montgomery. Montgomery testified that he would acquire illegal drugs and provide one type, reds, to Markita Thornton. Defense counsel asked Montgomery if he had ever met Steve Miller, and he replied no. Counsel then asked, Did you know him by reputation? and Montgomery replied yes. Counsel asked, What was his reputation? The prosecution objected on grounds of relevance and hearsay. The trial court noted that Miller was not a party or a witness and sustained the objection on relevance grounds. On appeal, defendant argues that the question did not call for irrelevant evidence. Respondent comments that the question was vague and, although the jury already knew that Miller had been a violent man, counsel could have been seeking an answer based on Miller's reputation for anything. Defendant's claim is without merit. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the objection, nor was there any due process violation. As stated, the links between defendant and Miller were attenuated â defendant had seldom met his biological father, their approximately seven encounters occurred when defendant was very young, and Miller died when defendant was four. In essence, defendant had no ties to Miller. Under those circumstances, the court could reasonably rule that Miller's reputation in the community was not relevant to the penalty that defendant should receive.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution's objection to evidence in a psychiatrist's report that his mother was aware, from the time defendant was a young child, that he had been diagnosed with an attention deficit disorder. As noted, a psychiatrist, Dr. Jacks, treated defendant following a dog bite. Dr. Jacks's treatment lasted for a year and a half and began in January of 1980. Dr. Jacks diagnosed defendant with, among other syndromes, ADHD. On two occasions in September of 1981, soon after discontinuing treatment with Dr. Jacks, defendant saw another psychiatrist, Robert A. Solow, M.D., who was deceased at the time of trial. On September 25, 1981, Dr. Solow wrote a diagnostic report to an attorney in which he opined that defendant did suffer a post-traumatic stress disorder after being bitten by the dog.... [ķ] It is my opinion that this condition has become ameliorated so that Mark at the present time has returned to his basic premorbid personality and condition which probably was an attention deficit disorder. Defense counsel attempted to have Markita Thornton, defendant's mother, testify about the content of Dr. Solow's report, which the witness had in her hand in the witness chair. [9] The prosecution objected without stating a basis. Defense counsel interpreted the objection as resting on hearsay grounds and argued that the report was not being offered for the truth of the allegation that defendant had a psychological impairment in 1981, but rather for the witness's state of mind, i.e., Markita Thornton's knowledge of the report's content. I'm not offering this for the truth that he had attention deficit, merely that she was aware of that and the school should have been aware of it as well, counsel explained. In other words, counsel intended to offer evidence to buttress the defense theory, which would later be fleshed out through the testimony of Carol Horwich Luber, that many of defendant's problems stemmed from inadequate attention the school paid to his needs during his formative years. Counsel offered to accept a limiting instruction to the jury that it was not to consider the report's contents as evidence that defendant had an attention deficit disorder in 1981. The trial court asked what the relevance of the evidence would be if it were not offered for the truth of its contents, and defense counsel again stated the question was meant to adduce evidence of the witness's state of mind, i.e., she had been alerted to the psychiatrist's conclusion that her son had a psychological problem. Ultimately, the court sustained the objection, without specifying the precise ground. `Whenever an utterance is offered to evidence the state of mind which ensued in another person in consequence of the utterance, it is obvious that no assertive or testimonial use is sought to be made of it, and the utterance is therefore admissible, so far as the Hearsay rule is concerned.' ( People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 295, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, italics omitted.) Such evidence is not hearsay. ( People v. Lo Cicero (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1186, 1189-1190, 80 Cal.Rptr. 913, 459 P.2d 241.) But the trial court was concerned with more than hearsay. It asked about relevance and did not specify the ground on which it ruled. On this record, it is more likely that it ruled on the basis of the proffered evidence's relevance than on its hearsay or nonhearsay character. The court's question was directed to the evidence's relevance, and the court did not ask about or mention hearsay. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence. ( People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476.) Defendant had already presented evidence that his mother, on learning of Dr. Jacks's evaluation of him, knew of his attention deficit disorder (and had alerted defendant's school). Once the evidence that Dr. Jacks had alerted her to defendant's infirmity was introduced, further testimony that the report of another psychiatrist, Dr. Solow, later alerted Markita Thornton to defendant's condition would not have been of consequence to the determination of the action (Evid.Code, § 210.)
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining, on relevance grounds, the prosecution's objections to evidence that his stepfather, Pierre Sarrazin, struck Markita Thornton, his mother, on occasions when defendant was not present, allowing evidence only of the incidents when he was present. Sarrazin, Markita Thornton's husband at the time of trial, was called as defendant's witness. He testified that he hit Markita Thornton on five distinct occasions. Defense counsel asked about the second occasion on which the violence occurred, and the prosecution objected on grounds of lack of foundation and irrelevance. The prosecutor explained that defendant was not present at the time. The trial court agreed that under those circumstances the evidence was irrelevant and sustained the objection on that ground. It rejected defense counsel's argument that in her opinion spousal abuse affects children in a household who are being raised there whether or not they are aware of particular incidents. Shortly afterward, the court sustained a relevance objection to another question that asked Sarrazin about a hitting episode when defendant was home but did not hear or see it. It rejected defense counsel's argument that, also in her opinion, an incident of spousal abuse affects children who are home at the time regardless of whether they witness it. Despite these two rulings, defendant was able to introduce considerable evidence of Sarrazin's violence toward Markita Thornton. Sarrazin candidly described two of the five incidents in detail and explained that they arose from disputes over drugs. He also testified about a third incident without prosecution objection even though the record is not clear that defendant was present. Sarrazin also admitted striking defendant on one occasion when defendant was 17 years old. Defendant argues that the excluded evidence of the two incidents was relevant because such episodes generate negative effects on a child whether or not the child observes them. `Studies show that violence by one parent against another harms children even if they do not witness it.' ( In re Sylvia R. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 559, 562, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, quoting Fields, The Impact of Spouse Abuse on Children and Its Relevance In Custody and Visitation Decisions in New York State (1994) 3 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Poly. 221, 228.) At trial, however, defendant presented no independent authority for the view he now expresses. Counsel simply ventured her own opinion that living in a household in which abuse occurred affected defendant even if he did not observe it, and even if he was not in the house at the time. Counsel made no offer of proof, did not attempt to lay any factual foundation for the view she expressed, and was not speaking on a subject on which judicial notice could be taken. This was insufficient to establish the relevance of the evidence. The trial court was not required to accept counsel's mere speculation about the psychological consequences of spousal violence in ruling on the proffered evidence's relevance. (See People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 552, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 (lead opn. of Kennard, J.); accord, id. at pp. 576-577, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171 (cone, opn. of Panelli, J.); People v. Medina (1990) 51 Cal.3d 870, 890, 274 Cal.Rptr. 849, 799 P.2d 1282.) We find no abuse of discretion.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining, on relevance grounds, the prosecution's objections to the testimony of his pediatrician that his academic development was set back by a long trip to Canada the family took when he was in fifth grade, causing him to leave school on March 31, 1986. As described, defendant's pediatrician, Carter R. Wright, M.D., testified on defendant's behalf, explaining that defendant would not breast-feed and failed to gain weight normally. Undertaking direct examination of Dr. Wright on later events in defendant's life, defense counsel asked broadly, What were you[r] impression[s]? about the then-pending trip to Canada and, more narrowly, Did you have some sense of whether ... this was a wellplanned out trip to Canada? and Did Markita tell you whether she was planning to stay in Canada or just visit? The prosecutor objected to all three questions on the ground that they were irrelevant and did not call for a medical opinion. He also objected to the third question on hearsay grounds. After the third question, the trial court asked counsel for the purpose of the proffered testimony. Defense counsel argued that the questions called for admissible testimony about his observation of the ... instability in the family and this plan that they had. The court, which had already sustained objections to the first two questions, sustained the objection to the third as well. It appears that the court's rulings were based on the irrelevance of the proffered evidence. On appeal, defendant states that he intended to prove that the trip to Canada disrupted his education and harmed his later performance in school, setbacks that could have generated sympathy among the jurors. He argues that the testimony would have been admissible as an expert medical opinion and a proper lay opinion, and that it was relevant as mitigating evidence. Defendant's claim that the trial court improperly failed to allow Dr. Wright's expert medical testimony is without merit. If a witness is testifying as an expert, his testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to such an opinion as is: [ķ] (a) Related to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. (Evid.Code, § 801.) Counsel's questions of Dr. Wright did not call for a expert opinion. Counsel asked Dr. Wright about his impressions and his sense about the pending trip to Canada, and explained to the court that counsel was seeking Dr. Wright's observation. These questions were not directed toward medical expertise. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion (see People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1172, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353) in ruling that the questions did not call for a expert medical opinion. Nor did the trial court abuse its discretion ( People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476) in ruling that the questions were irrelevant insofar as they called for Dr. Wright's lay opinion, i.e., the answers would not have been helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony (Evid. Code, § 800), and would not have had any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action (Evid. Code, § 210). As a lay witness, testimony from Dr. Wright that a trip to Canada must have been disruptive to defendant's educational development would have amounted to little more than conjecture, and would not have been helpful to understand his testimony about defendant's childhood difficulties. We cannot say that the court was unreasonable in concluding that counsel's questions called for irrelevant answers. We find no basis to disturb its rulings.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining, on grounds of cumulativeness, the prosecution's objection to the introduction of a number of letters Erika S. wrote to him. As noted, in cross-examining Erika S. at the guilt phase, defendant elicited testimony that their relationship was affectionate as well as tumultuous. The jury saw photographic evidence of this and heard passages from two love letters Erika S. sent to defendant. The two letters were received into evidence. Erika S. also testified that at the time she wrote them she was passionate about defendant. During the penalty phase, defendant sought to introduce into evidence 17 love letters written by Erika S., 16 of them to him and one to a third party named Russell in which she said she thought defendant was attractive. The prosecutor objected, arguing that the letters were cumulative evidence on a nonissue; it's a nonissue that she loved him. The prosecutor clarified thereafter that his objection regarding the letters to defendant rested on cumulativeness (see Evid.Code, § 352); the objection to the letter to Russell rested on relevance ( id., § 350). Defense counsel noted that the jury had heard evidence of defendant's violent and threatening conduct toward Erika S. around the time of the high school homecoming dance of October 10, 1992, and said that counsel wanted to remind the jury of the context of the relationship. The court asked, Hasn't she stated all this on the stand already? and counsel conceded that the witness had, but argued in effect that the letters would flesh out the testimony. The court excluded the letters as cumulative in light of Erika S.'s prior testimony. On appeal, defendant contends the court erred in excluding the letters. However, we will normally not second guess a trial court's ruling under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 109, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.) In light of Erika S.'s own testimony, the trial court could reasonably have excluded the letters as cumulative. Defendant also argues that the trial court should not be permitted to rule against admitting the love letters simply because the prosecution said it did not dispute the evidence (and presumably would be willing to stipulate) that Erika S. loved him. (See Old Chief v. United States (1997) 519 U.S. 172, 186-189, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574.) However, the court did not do so. It excluded the evidence solely on the ground that the evidence was cumulative under Evidence Code section 352.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining, on relevance grounds, the prosecution's objections to the testimony of Sydnie Goldfarb that defendant's sister Chantal was upset by their mother's suicide attempt. In April 1993, about five months before defendant committed his crimes, his mother, Markita Thornton, attempted suicide. Sydnie Goldfarb, an acquaintance who was studying to become a marriage and family counselor, went to defendant's house and found defendant crying and his sister distraught. Defendant asserts error because the jury was not allowed to learn whether Chantal was upset by Markita Thornton's suicide attempt. The court permitted the witness to testify that defendant was very distraught and he was crying, but it sustained a relevance objection to a question whether Chantal was also upset. We see no abuse of discretion. ( People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476.) The court's ruling that it was irrelevant whether Chantal was upset by Markita Thornton's suicide attempt did not fall outside the bounds of reason. We cannot say the court was unreasonable in concluding that the emotional impact of the suicide attempt on someone other than defendant was not of consequence. (Evid.Code, § 210.) Defendant also claims error in the trial court's sustaining objections on relevance grounds to questions about (1) where Sydnie Goldfarb took Chantal following the suicide attempt, and (2) Chantal's whereabouts when the police arrived in response to the attempt. We find these rulings also within the court's discretion. We cannot say that the court was unreasonable in concluding that where Goldfarb may have taken Chantal and Chantal's exact location (the jury already knew she was present) when the police arrived following the suicide attempt was not of consequence to the sentence defendant should receive for murdering Kellie O'Sullivan.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining, on relevance grounds, the prosecution's objection to a question defense counsel put to Berta Siy about her response to defendant's request that the Siy family adopt him. As noted, when defendant was 16 years old and in tenth grade, he lived with the family of Berta Siy on weekdays in order to be eligible to spend the 1990-1991 academic year at Hoover High School. He liked the Siys and asked the Siy family to adopt him. On direct examination, defense counsel established the fondness of the Siy family and defendant for each other. The trial court sustained an objection to a question about Berta Siy's response to defendant's request to be adopted by the Siys: Were you ever asked by Mark [defendant] to adopt him? Yes, he did couple times. What was your response? [The prosecutor]: Irrelevant. THE COURT: Sustained. BY [defense counsel]: Did you ever talk to the parents about that? I wish I could have adopted him then. I'm sorry. It's all right. It's okay. [ķ] Are you all right, Mrs. Siy? The question whether the trial court abused its discretion in this instance is close. Plainly, defense counsel was trying to elicit from the witness whether the Siy family was unable or unwilling to adopt defendant when he asked. But we need not decide the question. In light of the witness's follow-up statement that she wished she could have adopted him them, and the rest of her testimony, we find no prejudice in this narrow ruling. Excluding the evidence did not appreciably weaken defendant's case in mitigation. Through the substance of Berta Siy's testimony and her apparently tearful demeanor on the stand, defendant and the Siy family's fondness for each other was apparent, and we discern no reasonable possibility of a different sentence if she had been allowed to answer the question. ( People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 901, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135.) Defendant also claims that the ruling denied him his constitutional right to present a defense. We disagree. The complete exclusion of defense evidence could `theoretically could rise to [the] level' ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 428, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391) of a due process violation. But short of a total preclusion of defendant's ability to present a mitigating case to the trier of fact, no due process violation occurs; even `[i]f the trial court misstepped, [its] ruling was an error of law merely; there was no refusal to allow [defendant] to present a defense, but only a rejection of some evidence concerning the defense.' ( Ibid. ) Limiting Berta Siy's testimony in this minor fashion, even if an abuse of discretion under state law, fell well short of constituting a due process violation.
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in sustaining, on relevance grounds, the prosecution's objection to a question he put to a family friend, Paul Roelen, whether he was concerned about defendant's welfare based on his knowledge of conditions in defendant's household in early 1993. Witnesses testified at the penalty phase that defendant's home life was difficult. Roelen testified that defendant had no bed or bedroom and slept on the floor. He also testified about the unpleasant conditions in defendant's residence: Pierre Sarrazin was arrogant, drug usage was rife, defendant and his sister had to tend to their own welfare, and life in the house was generally chaotic and tense. During a brief redirect examination, defense counsel asked, Based upon your time there at the Sarrazin house and your observations, were you concerned about Mark [defendant]? When the prosecutor objected on relevance grounds, the trial court sustained the objection. On appeal, defendant argues that the evidence was relevant lay opinion testimony. We disagree. The trial court did not abuse its discretion ( People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1166-1167, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476) in ruling that the question was irrelevant. It could reasonably rule that inasmuch as it called for Roelen's lay opinion, the answer would not have been helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony (Evid.Code, § 800). The jury had just heard Roelen's testimony about conditions in defendant's house in 1993. His testimony was clear and detailed, and there was no need to elicit an opinion to clarify testimony that was already perfectly understandable to the trier of fact.
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of the trial court's rulings sustaining the prosecutor's objections to his proffered mitigating evidence was prejudicial. However, we have found only one assumed error â sustaining an objection to a question about Berta Siy's response to defendant's request to be adopted by the Siys. We have found no prejudice from that single ruling. Accordingly, there was no error to cumulate.