Opinion ID: 883677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Parasitic Damages

Text: This Court upheld an award for damages for pain and mental anguish in a case with a host cause of action involving real property in the form of nuisance, trespass and negligence claims in French v. Ralph E. Moore, Inc. (1983), 203 Mont. 327, 661 P.2d 844. Gasoline from the neighboring Texaco station contaminated and polluted the Frenchs' home and restaurant, forcing the closure of the restaurant and forcing the French family to live under uninhabitable conditions. Noting that previous Montana cases had allowed for the recovery of damages for emotional distress when the underlying action was injury to real property, the Court [held] that damages for mental anguish are recoverable in a negligence action where the claim is that the defendant has interfered with the use and enjoyment of plaintiff's land. No sound reason exists to hold otherwise. French, 661 P.2d at 848. Damages for emotional distress in a wrongful death action, were allowed for the first time in Dawson v. Hill and Hill Truck Lines (1983), 206 Mont. 325, 671 P.2d 589. In Dawson, parents brought suit when their son was killed in a traffic accident. This Court held that damages for the sorrow, mental distress or grief of the parents of a deceased minor [child are] recoverable in a wrongful death action... . Dawson, 671 P.2d at 590. The Dawson court addressed the argument that mental distress damages are difficult to allocate by stating: Montana allows the estate of a decedent to recover damages for the decedent's pain suffered prior to death. Surely a jury which can lawfully weigh such intangible damage can be trusted to fairly compensate for the grief suffered by the survivors. Dawson, 671 P.2d at 593. The Dawson Court then limited the mental distress damages in a wrongful death action by stating that [t]he mental distress for which recovery can be sought under the rationale of Dawson, is limited to mental anguish, sorrow or grief resulting from the death ... damages which are caused by the loss of decedent's life. Dawson, 671 P.2d at 593. The leading case involving emotional distress recovered as parasitic damages is Johnson v. Supersave Markets, Inc. (1984), 211 Mont. 465, 686 P.2d 209. In Johnson, plaintiff's wife had written a check at the Supersave Market which was subsequently returned for insufficient funds. Plaintiff's wife had signed his name on the check. After Supersave made a series of efforts to collect the funds, it assigned the debt to a collection agency and then the debt was assigned to the Missoula County Attorney's office for prosecution. At a later date, Johnson made restitution on the delinquent draft, receiving a receipt for full payment. At about that same time, the county attorney's office, which had never been able to contact Johnson, attempted to verify restitution. Supersave could not confirm or deny restitution but the collection agency denied restitution, and a warrant was issued for Johnson's arrest. Johnson was stopped in December of 1979, on an unrelated charge and ultimately, arrested, booked and fingerprinted for the bad check charge. He was able to post bond and was released two and one-half hours later. The charges were subsequently dismissed. Johnson brought an action for unlawful arrest and negligent imprisonment. We concluded that Supersave had acted negligently in two ways  first, in cashing the check without proper identification and second, in failing to terminate the collection process upon Johnson's payment of the delinquent draft. Although we were reluctant to permit damages for specious emotional upset, we discussed cases such as Versland v. Caron Transport (1983), 206 Mont. 313, 671 P.2d 583, and Dawson where we had allowed recovery for emotional distress, as well as other case law wherein recovery was allowed when the emotional distress was intentionally inflicted. We then held that we would adopt a species of case approach which [would require] a factual analysis of each case to determine whether the alleged `emotional distress' merits compensation. We stated, [i]n determining whether the distress is compensable absent a showing of physical or mental injury, we will look to whether tortious conduct results in a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and causes a significant impact upon the person of plaintiff. Johnson, 686 P.2d at 213. We then applied the test to Johnson and held that Johnson's right to liberty was violated when he was arrested, booked and charged for issuing a bad check for which he had already made restitution. Respondent's right to liberty is legally protected from such invasion and his humiliation, embarrassment and other `emotional distress' proximately caused by such intrusion can certainly be considered substantial. Johnson, 686 P.2d at 213. Johnson was followed by First Bank (N.A.)  Billings v. Clark (1989), 236 Mont. 195, 771 P.2d 84, wherein this Court followed the rule set forth in Johnson which stated that [a] jury instruction about damages for emotional distress is warranted, in the absence of any physical or mental injury, only if the defendant introduced some proof that [tortious conduct] resulted in `a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest and ... [caused] a significant impact on the person.' First Bank, 771 P.2d at 91. We noted, circuitously, that the legally protected interest in the instant action was the interest in freedom from emotional distress. First Bank, 771 P.2d at 91. We ultimately held that: 1. The requirement of a significant impact indicates that the emotional distress suffered by the victim must be severe. ..... 2. A district court has the duty of determining the threshold question of whether any proof of such severe emotional distress exists sufficient to raise a question of fact for the jury. Absent any such proof, a jury instruction on damages for emotional distress is improper. First Bank, 771 P.2d at 91. (Citations omitted.) The First Bank Court concluded that the district court had erred in instructing the jury on emotional distress damages because the evidence introduced during trial was insufficient to raise a question of fact about the existence of severe emotional distress, and therefore, the question of emotional distress damages should not have reached the jury. First Bank, 771 P.2d at 91. In Day v. Montana Power Co. (1990), 242 Mont. 195, 789 P.2d 1224, we disallowed recovery of damages for emotional distress associated with the defendant's negligent damage to real property. Days claimed that their restaurant was destroyed by fire when natural gas migrated along an underground service line, accumulated in the restaurant and was ignited by a pilot light. We recounted other parasitic damages cases and stated that this was not such a case. We stated that French, although it concerned a host cause of action as damage to real property, was really a trespass to property action, which is a legally protected interest. We reversed the award of damages for emotional distress and held that [w]e decline to extend recovery for emotional distress damages to cases where the defendant negligently damages or destroys real property and the plaintiff suffers no physical injury. MPC negligently destroyed the Days' restaurant and Days received adequate compensation for that destruction. Day, 789 P.2d at 1227.