Opinion ID: 2611914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Criteria for Variances Under the SMA

Text: [7] All development on the shorelines of this state undertaken after June 1, 1971, must conform to the SMA. [15] The SMA is to be broadly construed in order to protect the state shorelines as fully as possible. [16] The policy of the SMA was based upon the recognition that shorelines are fragile and that the increasing pressure of additional uses being placed on them necessitated increased coordination in their management and development. The SMA provides that it is the policy of the State to provide for the management of the shorelines by planning for and fostering all reasonable and appropriate uses. [17] This policy contemplates protecting against adverse effects to the public health, the land and its vegetation and wildlife, and the waters of the state and their aquatic life, while protecting generally the public right of navigation and corollary rights incidental thereto. [18] The SMA requires a combination of state and local planning. The SMA requires all local governments to develop regulations (shoreline master programs) to plan for the reasonable uses of the shorelines. [19] Local regulations must be approved and adopted by the Department. [20] The total of all approved shoreline management master programs constitute Washington State's Shoreline Management Master Program. [21] The Department has approved the Mason County Shoreline Master Program and adopted it as a state regulation. [22] The area of the shoreline involved in this case, Hood Canal, has been designated by the SMA as a shoreline of statewide significance. [23] The SMA applies to uplands lying within 200 feet inland from the high water mark. [24] Generally, a landowner who wishes to develop property within the shorelines must obtain a permit from the local government. [25] A permit for a substantial development shall only be granted when the development is consistent with the applicable master program and the provisions of the SMA. [26] Any permit for a variance granted by a local government under an approved master program must be submitted to the Department for its approval or disapproval. [27] Appeal from the denial of a permit is then to the Board. [28] The Board is a quasi-judicial administrative body with specialized skills in hearing shoreline cases. [29] The Board includes three members of the Pollution Control Hearings Board, one member appointed by the Association of Washington Cities, one by the Association of County Commissioners, and the Commissioner of Public Lands or his designee. [30] [8] Applicants for permits have the burden of proving that a proposed substantial development is consistent with the criteria that must be met before a permit is granted, and in any review of the granting or denial of an application for a permit as provided in RCW 90.58.180(1) and (2), the person requesting the review has the burden of proof. [31] Therefore, in this case, this burden of proof was on the landowner in the original application and also in the review of the denial. [32] [9] Any variance from an approved master program shall be allowed only if extraordinary circumstances are shown and the public interest suffers no substantial detrimental effect. RCW 90.58.100(5). A variance permit may be lawfully granted only within the guidelines set forth in the zoning ordinance. [33] The Department guidelines to obtain a variance from a shorelines master program are set out in WAC 173-14-150 which provides in relevant part: The purpose of a variance permit is strictly limited to granting relief from specific bulk, dimensional or performance standards set forth in the applicable master program where there are extraordinary or unique circumstances relating to the property such that the strict implementation of the master program will impose unnecessary hardships on the applicant or thwart the policies set forth in RCW 90.58.020. ... In all instances extraordinary circumstances should be shown and the public interest shall suffer no substantial detrimental effect. (2) Variance permits for development that will be located landward of the ordinary high water mark . .. may be authorized provided the applicant can demonstrate all of the following: (a) That the strict application of the bulk, dimensional or performance standards set forth in the applicable master program precludes or significantly interferes with a reasonable use of the property not otherwise prohibited by the master program. (Italics ours.) However, WAC 173-14-155 provides in pertinent part: the criteria contained in WAC ... XXX-XX-XXX for .. . variance permits shall constitute the minimum criteria for review of these permits by local government and the department [of Ecology]. Local government and the department may, in addition, apply the more restrictive criteria where it exists in approved and adopted master programs. (Italics ours.) In 1984, at the time of the landowner's application for a variance, Mason County did have a variance ordinance which differed from WAC 173-14-150. The former Mason County variance ordinance provided: Variances deal with specific requirements of this ordinance and the objective is to grant relief when there are practical difficulties or unnecessary hardships in the way of carrying out the strict letter of this ordinance. The property owner must show that if he complies with the provisions, he cannot make any reasonable use of his property. The fact that he might make a greater profit by using his property in a manner contrary to the intent of this ordinance is not a sufficient reason for a variance. A variance will be granted only after the applicant can demonstrate the following: ...[ [34] ] Former MCSMP § 7.28.020. Thus, at the time the landowner applied for a variance, Mason County had a stricter requirement to obtain a variance than did the State. The county ordinance required the owner to show that if he complied with the provisions, he could not make any reasonable use of the property while WAC 173-14-150 required that strict application of the standards precludes or interferes with a reasonable use of the property. [35] The Board used the Mason County variance ordinance rather than the variance rule contained in WAC 173-14-150. Because the local rule was more restrictive, the Board was correct to use the local ordinance. [36] The State contends that both the following questions are before this court: 1. Was the proposed development a reasonable use of the property? 2. Was there any reasonable use for the property if used in conformity with the Shoreline Master Program? Because of the way the Board resolved this case, only the second question is before this court. The State argued to the Board that the construction of a 2-story house on a lot less than 10 percent of the minimum size requirement, with no setback from a deteriorating bulkhead, is an unreasonable use of the property, [37] and that it is unreasonable to build a residence up to the bulkhead when high tides frequently overtop the bulkhead and cause erosion of the fill upon which the house would be built. However, the Board failed to make a factual determination on this issue, finding it unnecessary to decide the question whether the proposed development is itself a reasonable use. The Board merely concluded as follows: Given the extremely small buildable area on this lot, substantially confined to fill on a shoreline of statewide significance, it is questionable that the construction of a two-story dwelling is itself a reasonable use of the property under the policy of the SMA, absent the setback and lot size restrictions of the master program. (Italics ours.) Clerk's Papers vol. 2, at 30-31. Instead, the Board's decision is based upon the then-existing threshold requirement for a variance under the former Mason County ordinance, that is, if the owner conforms to the regulations, whether he has any reasonable use of his property. Therefore, the question before this court is whether the Board was clearly erroneous or acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner when it concluded that the landowner did not prove that he had been deprived of any reasonable use of his property. The Board concluded that clearly these restrictions do not deprive appellant of any reasonable use of his property. Recreational use of small shoreline parcels without the presence of homes is being made on Hood Canal in the vicinity of appellant's lot. Such use is available to appellant, and this situation, we conclude prevents him from meeting the threshold requirement for a variance under the MCSMP [Mason County Shoreline Master Program]. Clerk's Papers vol. 2, at 31. This conclusion is supported by the Board's finding: Nearby waterfront parcels are used for recreational purposes, involving docks, floats, decks or boat houses, but without homes on the properties. Clerk's Papers vol. 2, at 27. This finding is supported by the record before the Board. In fact, the landowner testified that a residence would be more aesthetically pleasing to him than a trailer site for a mobile home or a recreational vehicle park or a boat shed. The landowner made no showing that he had no reasonable use of the property if he complied with the existing land use regulations. [10, 11] We cannot conclude on this record that the Board's decision that the landowner had some reasonable uses for this particular piece of property when used in conformity with the building regulations is clearly erroneous. The Board's finding that water dependent recreational uses do constitute a reasonable use of this small sliver of property finds support in this record and in case law which holds that land may have some economic value where the uses allowed are recreational. [38] The size, location, and physical attributes of a piece of property are relevant when deciding what is a reasonable use of a particular parcel of land. The landowner argues that recreational use is unreasonable because residential use must be given priority under the SMA. This is inaccurate. The landowner relies on the SMA which states that [a]lterations of the natural condition of the shorelines of the state, in those limited instances when authorized, shall be given priority for single family residences and ... ports, shoreline recreational uses. (Italics ours.) RCW 90.58.020(7) (part). However, in this case the residential use was not authorized; in fact, it was prohibited by the regulations in existence at the time the landowner made his application for a variance and at the time he had purchased this property. [12] To some extent the reasonable use of property depends on the expectations of the landowner at the time of purchase of the property. If existing land regulations limit the permissible uses of the property at the time of acquisition, a purchaser usually cannot reasonably expect to use the land for prohibited purposes. [39] Although not necessarily determinative, courts may look to the zoning regulations in effect at the time of purchase as a factor to determine what is reasonable use of the land. Presumably regulations on use are reflected in the price a purchaser pays for a piece of property. This landowner knew when he purchased this lot that it did not satisfy either the minimum lot size or the setback requirements of the MCSMP. [13] Reasonable setback requirements are an accepted land use tool and all property tends to benefit from their enforcement. [40] In the granting of all variance permits in shorelines cases, consideration shall be given to the cumulative impact of additional requests for like actions in the area. [41] The Board may consider the cumulative environmental impact of development. [42] Therefore, it is reasonable for the Board to consider what the cumulative effects would be of allowing structures to be built on the shoreline with no setback from the high water line. The landowner also asserts that the Board's decision was arbitrary and capricious because, in 1980, a neighbor had been allowed to build a small home on an adjacent bulkheaded piece of property. The Board stated that the earlier approval by Mason County and the Department of the variance for the neighbor's property was not appealed to the Board, nor adjudicated by it under the standards of the Master Program. The Board concluded that past inconsistent administration never brought to the Board for review cannot alter the plain meaning of the Master Program as applied to the case before it. [14] We agree. The proper action on a land use decision cannot be foreclosed because of a possible past error in another case involving different property. No authority is cited for the proposition that the Board can be estopped from enforcing existing regulations by prior decisions not ever even considered by the Board. In Mercer Island v. Steinmann, 9 Wn. App. 479, 483, 513 P.2d 80 (1973), the court stated that a municipality is not precluded from enforcing zoning regulations if its officers have failed to properly enforce zoning regulations. That court explained that the elements of estoppel are wanting. The governmental zoning power may not be forfeited by the action of local officers in disregard of the statute and the ordinance; the public has an interest in zoning that cannot be destroyed. [43] Therefore, the landowner's argument that the action of the Board is arbitrary or capricious is not well taken. First, the Board never reviewed the 1980 neighbor's variance decision and its review would have been de novo. Second, the Department is not estopped from attempting to enforce zoning law because of a prior decision regarding other property. Given the variance criteria in effect at the time the variance application was made, the standard of review, the deference that we accord to the Board's decisions, and the failure on the part of the landowner to carry his burden to show that water dependent recreational uses of his very small piece of property are not reasonable under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the Board's decision was clearly erroneous, or arbitrary or capricious. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed and the case remanded to the Superior Court for reinstatement of the decision of the Shorelines Hearings Board. UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DURHAM, SMITH, GUY, JOHNSON, and MADSEN, JJ., concur.