Opinion ID: 781722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Failure to Dismiss the Alternate Jurors

Text: 428 Ismoil next contends that the District Court erred in not dismissing the alternate jurors when the jury retired to deliberate, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 24(c), which at the time of trial required alternates to be discharged upon the commencement of deliberations. 72 Because Ismoil did not object when the District Court announced it would keep the alternate jurors, we review this claim, as well, for plain error. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 429 Ismoil cannot establish that retaining the alternates resulted in any prejudice or affected his substantial rights because the District Court kept the alternates segregated and assigned a separate marshal to oversee them. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (retention of alternates in deviation from Rule 24(c) did not mandate reversal under plain error standard because defendants did not make a specific showing of actual prejudice and prejudice would not be presumed); see also United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950-51 (2d Cir.1968) (holding that keeping alternates in a separate room and assigning a separate marshal eliminated any potential prejudice). Ismoil's speculation that the alternates may have communicated with jurors in transit to and from the courthouse is insufficient to establish prejudice. See Hayutin, 398 F.2d at 950 (finding no prejudice to defendant despite contact between alternates and jury because nothing in the trial record ... indicates that there was any communication between the regular and alternate jurors); see also United States v. Houlihan, 92 F.3d 1271, 1286-87 (1st Cir.1996) (finding no risk of prejudice despite sporadic[] contact between alternates and jury at the start of each day and at lunch recess). Accordingly, we reject this claim. 430