Opinion ID: 545173
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The UAW as an Authorized or Associational Representative

Text: 24 Federal courts have long recognized that individual members of labor unions and other unincorporated associations can be bound by judgments in suits brought by the union or association in their representative capacity. See Acree v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 390 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir.) (union held proper party to bring claims on behalf of individual members), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 852, 89 S.Ct. 88, 21 L.Ed.2d 122 (1968); Panza v. Armco Steel Corp., 316 F.2d 69, 70 (3d Cir.) (union was duly constituted representative of its members), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 897, 84 S.Ct. 174, 11 L.Ed.2d 125 (1963). The question in this case, however, is not whether the UAW was duly authorized to represent its members in the original suit against Appellees. Rather, the question is whether the UAW was authorized to represent Meza--who was neither an employee nor a Union member at the time of the original UAW suit. 25 Appellees rely heavily on Acree, supra, and on Local 117, UAW v. Acme Precision Prods., Inc., 515 F.Supp. 537 (E.D.Mich.1981) for the proposition that union representation is binding on former members. Acree is readily distinguishable from the case at bar. In Acree, this court decided that an action by a union on behalf of striking members who had been permanently replaced by their employer precluded a subsequent suit brought by the replaced employees as a class. 5 The case does not address the issue of a union's authority to represent former members; in fact, the union was striving mightily to force the employer to reinstate its current members. Moreover, even though the represented individuals were not active employees at the time of union lawsuit, the union's representation was based on claims that the individuals had been wrongly discharged. This is the classic context in which a union is the proper representative of individuals who are no longer actively employed. 6 By comparison, Meza is not a member of the UAW, nor has he been since his employment with GBC terminated in 1983. He was not a member when the UAW instituted its lawsuit against Appellees in 1985. Furthermore, there has been no allegation whatever that Meza's status as an ex-employee is due in any part to wrongful actions on the part of GBC. Neither Meza nor the UAW alleged that Meza was the victim of a wrongful discharge. The Union did not seek Meza's reinstatement, nor could it have done so; as a totally disabled person, Meza seems to fall squarely in the category of persons who have ceased work without expectation of further employment. See Allied Chemical & Alkali Workers v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 168, 92 S.Ct. 383, 392, 30 L.Ed.2d 341 (1971) (for purpose of determining union representation, definition of employee includes members of the active work force available for hire but not individual who has ceased work without expectation of further employment). Thus, the reasoning in Acree is inapposite to the factual situation in this case. 26 Appellees' reference to Acme is more closely on point. In Acme, a union brought suit to enforce, inter alia, collective bargaining agreement rights to health insurance premiums for retirees. The employer moved to dismiss this claim because the union had not joined individual retirees as party plaintiffs. The court denied the motion, holding that the union had standing to represent the retirees' interests. Furthermore, the court stated that a judgment on the health insurance premiums claim would be res judicata to any subsequent claims brought by individual retirees, even though they were not individually notified of or represented in the original suit. The Acme court followed the logic of United Steelworkers of America v. Canron, Inc., 580 F.2d 77, 80-81 (3d Cir.1978), a case in which the court upheld a union's standing to represent retirees in seeking arbitration under collective bargaining agreement. 27 We note the similarities between these cases and the case at bar. Meza claims that the UAW did not represent him because he was no longer an employee of GBC or a member of the UAW when the Union brought its original action. However, in both Acme and Canron, the union purported to sue on behalf of individual claimants (retirees) who did not fall within the statutory definition of employees that a union is ordinarily authorized to represent. See Allied Chemical, supra, 404 U.S. at 170, 92 S.Ct. at 393 (retirees not employees for collective bargaining purposes within meaning of National Labor Relations Act). Meza also argues that his claim is not barred by res judicata because he had no notice of the UAW's prior suit. However, in Acme, the court concluded that the union could represent retirees even though they were without notice of the lawsuit. 7 28 Additionally, the unions in Acme and Canron were not attempting to bargain for any new rights on behalf of their former members. Rather, the issue was whether the employer had contractually committed itself to paying the benefits in question. A similar issue is raised in this case, namely, whether Appellees are contractually committed by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement to pay occupational disability benefits to Meza. In both Acme and Canron, the court found that the union was a proper representative of the retirees' interests. Moreover, in Acme, the court specifically stated that a judgment in the union's suit would preclude any subsequent claims by represented individuals. Appellees argue by analogy that the UAW properly represented Meza, and that the judgment in the UAW's suit is res judicata to Meza's action. 29 Despite these notable similarities, the above-cited cases do not control the outcome here. In Canron, the court merely upheld the union's standing to sue on behalf of retired employees. It did not address the issue of res judicata, nor did it inquire into the adequacy of representation provided by the union to its former members. The Acme court similarly upheld the standing of a union to sue on behalf of retirees. The court went on to state that the union's action would preclude subsequent suits by represented individuals, but only after finding that the suit was a de facto class action, 8 that the union vigorously asserted the retirees' rights, and that the union was qualified, experienced, and well able to conduct th[e] litigation. 30 Appellees urge this court to adopt a general rule of law that, in essence, would extend the preclusive effect of res judicata to any case in which a union purported to represent its former members. This we are reluctant to do. Whether a union has standing to represent past members is a different question from whether the union adequately represents them. Cf. International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 290, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 2533, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986) (where association does not adequately represent its members, judgment against association might not preclude subsequent individual claims without offending due process). When an individual terminates his relationship with both employer and union, the union ceases to be his exclusive representative in disputes with the former employer. Such an ex-employee/ex-union member is free to pursue his own claims and make his own settlements with the former employers. See Allied Chemical, supra, 404 U.S. at 181 n. 20, 92 S.Ct. at 398 n. 20 (retirees' remedy is individual claim for breach of collective bargaining agreement); Anderson v. Alpha Portland Indus., 752 F.2d 1293, 1297 (8th Cir.) (union is not exclusive bargaining representative for retirees) (citing Allied Chemical, supra, 404 U.S. at 157, 92 S.Ct. at 383), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1102, 105 S.Ct. 2329, 85 L.Ed.2d 846 (1985); Local 184, UAW v. Yard-Man, 716 F.2d 1476, 1484-85 (6th Cir.1983) (Unlike active employees, retirees face no restrictions whatever in seeking fulfillment of contractual benefits directly from their former employer), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1007, 104 S.Ct. 1002, 79 L.Ed.2d 234 (1984); Toth v. USX Corp., 693 F.Supp. 693, 700-01 (N.D.Ill.1988) (retirees and other former members are outside the union's exclusive representation authority), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 544, 107 L.Ed.2d 541 (1989); see also Cooper v. General Motors Corp., 651 F.2d 249, 250 (5th Cir.1981) (non-members of collective bargaining unit cannot be represented by union). As Judge Easterbrook recently observed: 31 [U]nions may bargain on behalf of [former employees] if the employer is willing, although the [former employees] need not accept the offer of representation. Former employees might choose the union as their agent for purposes of implementing or compromising claims arising under a collective bargaining agreement. It is even possible that employees may assent through the agreement itself to make the union their agent to resolve all disputes arising out of the implementation of that agreement--disputes that by definition arise during the employment relation--even if they leave work before its end. Such a consent would enable the union and the employer to administer the agreement without the complications caused by a proliferation of parties as employees quit or leave. 32 Merk v. Jewel Companies, 848 F.2d 761, 766 (7th Cir.) (emphasis added) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 956, 109 S.Ct. 393, 102 L.Ed.2d 382 (1988). We generally agree with this characterization of the relation between a union and its former members. 9 A union's representative authority does not automatically extend to its former members. Employees who are not exclusively represented by a union are free to choose whether they want the union to represent them. Implicit in this freedom to choose is the freedom to decline such representation. See Merk, supra, 848 F.2d at 761; cf. Clark Equip. Co. v. International Union, Allied Industrial Workers of America, 803 F.2d 878 (6th Cir.1986) (in dispute over transfer and seniority rights involving union and non-union shops, non-union employees had choice of independent action or union representation), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 934, 107 S.Ct. 1574, 94 L.Ed.2d 765 (1987); Local 194, Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Union v. Standard Brands, Inc., 540 F.2d 864 (7th Cir.1976) (because union is not exclusive representative in civil rights suits, union members could choose or decline union representation in Title VII action). Absent some evidence that past members expressly or impliedly authorized the union to proceed in their behalf, there can be no presumption that the Union had authority to act in a representative capacity. 33 In the instant case, no evidence was presented to show that Meza chose the UAW to represent him. Quite the contrary, Meza was completely unaware of the UAW action purportedly undertaken on his behalf. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that Meza expressly consented to being represented by the UAW, or implied his consent by acquiescing in the original UAW action. Again, one cannot acquiesce to something of which one is unaware. The district court stated in its memorandum opinion that the UAW had the authority to bind the Union members and fully intended to represent Meza's interest in the prior suit against GBC, even though Meza was no longer employed by GBC at the time of the prior litigation (emphasis added). The court also stated that where the Union brought suit solely as the representative of its employee-members, and where the Union had no beneficial interest in any recovery, individual employees must be precluded from relitigating the cause of action (emphasis added). However, it seems clear to us (as it apparently did to the district court) that the UAW's authority to bind extended only to its members. The Union's intent to bind a former member cannot substitute for consent or a specific grant of authority. 10 Thus, we reject Appellee's argument that the UAW's intent to bind Meza automatically established the Union as Meza's representative, even though Meza claims benefits under a collective bargaining agreement. 34