Opinion ID: 514272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: authority of dea agent regarding plea agreement

Text: 9 Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the negotiation process between the federal government and a defendant known as plea bargaining. The United States Supreme Court considers plea bargaining an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be encouraged. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260, 92 S.Ct. 495, 498, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). Generally, promises made during plea bargaining must be respected by the government. Id. at 262, 92 S.Ct. at 499. Moreover, when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Id. 10 Kettering asserts that these principles control the negotiations undertaken with Agent Dickey, and render the agreement enforceable because Dickey had the authority to bind the government to the five year maximum incarceration agreement. We disagree. Although the government must fulfill its promises pursuant to a valid plea agreement, if no binding agreement is ever reached initially, the government is free to fully prosecute the case. We addressed this issue in United States v. Pleasant, 730 F.2d 657 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 869, 105 S.Ct. 216, 83 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984). There we stated that: 11 [a prosecutor has no duty] either to plea bargain at all or to keep a plea bargain offer, once made, open. A defendant has no right to engage in plea bargaining in the first place. The offer, once made, is still in the discretion of the prosecutor. Like any offeror, he can withdraw his offer at any time, unless, perhaps, the defendant has relied on the offer and the prosecutor should be estopped from withdrawing it. 12 Id. at 664. 13 The Ninth Circuit in Johnson v. Lumpkin, 769 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.1985), expanded this point and stated that the general rule requiring governmental adherence to promises made during plea negotiations is subject to two conditions. First, the agent making the promise must be authorized to do so, and second, the defendant must detrimentally rely on the promise. Id. at 633. If either condition is lacking, then the agreement is unenforceable and the government may withdraw its offer. In Lumpkin, the court held that a promise made by federal agents that the defendant would serve no time on state charges if he cooperated in the federal investigation was unauthorized. Id. at 634. Consequently, the court found that the defendant was not denied due process when he was convicted in state court. Id. 14 Similarly, in United States v. Hudson, 609 F.2d 1326, 1329 (9th Cir.1979) the court held that fundamental fairness concerns did not require the United States Attorney to abide by a secret service agent's promise to a defendant to drop federal counterfeit charges in exchange for his cooperation in the case. The court stated that the United States Attorney never sanctioned the agreement and the promise was clearly outside the agent's authority. Id. In the present case, the district court relied on the testimony of the AUSA and several other witnesses, pursuant to its hearing on the motion to enforce the plea agreement, that Agent Dickey was never authorized to accept the plea proposal. Our review of the record supports the district court's finding that the DEA agent lacked authority. 15 In her stipulation before the court, the AUSA stated that I had no recollection of any conversation with Agent Dickey in which I authorized him to enunciate a plea to a one-count information with a five-year count. Transcript Vol. 2 p. 25. The AUSA also said that [w]hat I told Mr. Johnson when he called ... was ... that I never authorized Agent Dickey to let this Defendant plead to a five-year maximum exposure. Id. In addition, she testified that [Mr. Johnson] told me, in that conversation, that he knew that Agent Dickey didn't have the authority to negotiate a plea agreement; and that's why he mentioned it to [another AUSA].... Id. at 28. 16 Agent Dickey also testified at the hearing on the motion to enforce the plea agreement. He stated that at the time he went to debrief Kettering, defense counsel Johnson told Kettering that Agent Dickey had no authority to make an agreement. Transcript Vol. 2 p. 18. Mr. Johnson himself stipulated at the hearing that he knew that Agent Dickey did not have the authority to accept the agreement but that he understood the AUSA to have approved the deal. 1 Id. at 29. Thus, ample evidence in the record exists to support the district court's finding that Agent Dickey was not authorized to enter into the plea agreement. 2 We therefore refuse to override the court's determination on this issue.