Opinion ID: 1245205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The West Virginia Human Rights Act

Text: The purpose of the WVHRA [7] is, among other things, to assure equal employment opportunities to individuals with certain disabilities by making certain discriminatory practices unlawful. W. Va.Code § 5-11-9 (1998). [8] The term `discriminate' or `discrimination' means to exclude from, or fail or refuse to extend to, a person equal opportunities because of ... disability .... W. Va. Code § 5-11-3(h) (1998). Disability means a mental or physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of a person's major life activities. W. Va.Code § 5-11-3(m) (1998). [9] Effective May 19, 1994, the HRC adopted legislative Rules Regarding Discrimination Against Individuals With Disabilities, which appear in W. Va.C.S.R. § 77-1-1 et seq. W. Va.C.S.R. § 77-1-4.5 obligates an employer to make reasonable accommodation to the known physical or mental impairments of qualified individuals with disabilities where necessary to enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of the job. In Skaggs v. Elk Run Coal Company, Inc., 198 W.Va. 51, 64, 479 S.E.2d 561, 574 (1996), this Court acknowledged that although the WVHRA does not have an explicit provision obligating employers to provide reasonable accommodation for disabled individuals, the West Virginia [HRC] and this Court have inferred that our [HRA] imposes this duty of reasonable accommodation. In support of this observation, the Skaggs Court referenced 77 W. Va.C.S.R. 1, § 4.4 (1994) and Morris Mem. Convalescent Nursing Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n., 189 W.Va. 314, 431 S.E.2d 353 (1993), and Coffman v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 182 W.Va. 73, 386 S.E.2d 1 (1988). This Court's decision in Coffman is remarkable in three respects: It was this Court's first disability discrimination case under the WVHRA, it was later overruled, and it foreshadowed the issue on appeal in this case. Coffman, while employed as a Custodian I at the West Virginia University Hospital, injured her back in emptying garbage cans. She missed a month's work because of her injuries during which time she received temporary total disability benefits from workers' compensation. Upon returning to her position as Custodian I, her back continued to be painful and an orthopedist who examined her recommended that Coffman no longer work in either the housekeeping or dietary departments and that she not be placed in a position that required prolonged sitting. Some two months later, her employment was terminated by her employer. She thereupon filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of Monongalia County charging that she had been wrongfully discharged because of her disability. A jury returned a verdict in her favor in the amount of $55,600. The Board of Regents appealed and this Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court, set the verdict aside, and remanded the case with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the employer. The basis of this Court's decision was that reasonable accommodation requires only that an employer make reasonable modifications or adjustments designed as attempts to enable a handicapped employer to remain in the position for which he was hired. Where a handicapped employee can no longer perform the essential functions of that position, reasonable accommodation does not require the employer to reassign him to another position in order to provide him with work which he can perform. Id. at 78, 386 S.E.2d at 6. Skaggs overruled Coffman and in doing so stated that  Coffman was flat out wrong, both on its facts and in its dicta ruling out transfers as a reasonable accommodation. 198 W.Va. at 69, 479 S.E.2d at 579. However, Coffman is of interest to our consideration of the issues in the present matter. In its footnote 16, the Coffman Court stated: No party has challenged the fact and we, therefore, acknowledge that Coffman was handicapped by West Virginia law. We, however, note that she became handicapped as a result of an injury sustained on the job during the course of her employment. In this regard, we are concerned as to why Coffman did not pursue a claim for workers' compensation benefits beyond the 30-day period of temporary total disability. The appellants do not raise the issue of workers' compensation and we, therefore, do not address it. We note that the intent of the legislature inherent in the enacting of the handicapped provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act was to assure equal opportunities for the handicapped in housing and employment. W. Va.Code § 5-11-2. Thus, we cannot conclude that the legislature intended the handicapped provisions of the West Virginia Human Rights Act as an alternative source of compensation for injuries sustained on the job. Coffman, 182 W.Va. at 79, 386 S.E.2d at 7. (Emphasis added.) In a dissenting opinion to the Coffman decision, Justice Miller stated that he was at a loss to understand footnote 16 of the majority's opinion [for][i]t seems to suggest that the legislature did not intend to accord handicapped workers any right if they were injured on the job. Id. at 85, 386 S.E.2d at 13. Justice Miller went on to observe that workers' compensation benefits [both awards for temporary and permanent disability] relate to the employee's injuries and have nothing to do with his status under the handicap law. This latter provision is designed to prevent discrimination against a person who has a handicap. Id. at 85-86, 386 S.E.2d at 13-14. Nor, he said, is it possible to ascribe any legislative intent that employees handicapped as a result of occupational injuries were to be excluded from the coverage of the handicap discrimination law. Id. at 86, 386 S.E.2d at 14. Justice Miller concluded his dissent with these statements: This type of issue has been raised in several cases, and the courts have had no difficulty in rejecting it on the basis that each statute is designed to accomplish distinctly different purposes. The Workers' Compensation Act affords compensation for a worker's injuries and permanent disabilities. The handicap provisions of the Human Rights Act enables him to continue in employment if his injuries do not prevent him from performing the essential functions of his job with the help of reasonable accommodation. E.g. Boscaglia v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 420 Mich. 308, 362 N.W.2d 642 (1984); Reese v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 107 Wash.2d 563, 731 P.2d 497 (1987) (En Banc); cf. Jones v. Los Angeles Community College Dist., 198 Cal. App.3d 794, 244 Cal.Rptr. 37 (1988). Id. at 86, 386 S.E.2d at 14. In the sixteen years since Justice Miller's dissent in Coffman, there have been a number of decisions in other jurisdictions where alleged employer disability discrimination against an employee has resulted from a workplace physical injury. In those decisions, the courts have had to reconcile the exclusivity provisions of their states' workers' compensation statutes and their human rights, civil rights and fair employment acts. D.