Opinion ID: 844235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial Jury Screening Issues

Text: The jury commissioner prescreened prospective jurors for eligibility to serve on defendant's case based on whether they met the basic qualifications for jury service set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 203, [4] whether they were available to sit on a case that could last approximately 10 weeks, and whether they were entitled to be excused based on specific hardship grounds agreed upon during meetings between the trial court and the jury commissioner. Defendant sets forth four challenges to the preliminary jury screening. Defendant first contends the jury commissioner agreed to a process to prequalify jurors who would be available for a 10-week trial but ignored that plan and exceeded her official function by using her discretion to excuse potential jurors, effectively excus[ing] anyone who did not wish to serve, and engag[ing] in the kind of jury selection that is to be conducted by the trial court in the presence of all parties. Defendant claims the commissioner's wholesale excusal of prospective jurors resulted in a skewed jury pool [5] in violation of her rights to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, to have counsel, to be present at critical stages of her trial, to a public trial, and to the heightened reliability in proceedings governing a capital case under the Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, sections 7 and 15 of the California Constitution. Second, defendant contends the summons mailed to prospective jurors improperly asked recipients to identify their native language and effectively informed jurors whose primary language was not English, and who may have had some difficulty with the English language, that [they] could excuse themselves from jury service and, as a result, many people whose command of English was more than adequate were given the opportunity to avoid jury service. Defendant argues this impropriety dissuaded Hispanics from appearing and caused their underrepresentation in the venire, which violated her right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. Third, defendant contends that permitting self-excusal for those with imperfect English also violated her due process and equal protection rights, is unconstitutionally vague, and, in her case, was impermissibly discriminatory because Hispanic citizens reacted to the factor by not responding at all, thereby creating an imbalance between eligible Hispanic voters and those who answered the summons. Defendant's fourth contention is that the failure of a court reporter to record the trial court's discussions with the jury commissioner or record the hardship screening itself violated her rights to due process and a jury trial under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the applicable statutes. In response, the People contend defendant forfeited these four issues regarding the preliminary jury screening by failing to object in the trial court to the challenged procedures. For the reasons stated below, we conclude the People's position on forfeiture generally has merit.
The trial court mailed out 7,000 summonses to prospective jurors for defendant's pending trial. On June 9, 1999, 700 people answered those summonses and appeared before the jury commissioner. During the screening that ensued that day, the commissioner excused 481 individuals from jury duty. The trial court determined that it needed a larger panel and instructed the commissioner to qualify more prospective jurors from regular panels that would be assembled at the courthouse on Mondays and Tuesdays until July 21, 1999. [6] On that date, 29 individuals who had previously been qualified as prospective jurors on June 9 failed to return to the jury facility. The remaining jury panel was sworn in, and those jurors filled out questionnaires. On July 27, 1999, the trial court commenced voir dire of the jury panel. The defense was aware San Diego County utilizes jury commissioners to conduct prescreening of potential jurors for death penalty cases. In October 1998, defendant made a motion for a fair and impartial trial in which she asked the trial court to provide guidance by advising the jury commissioner to exclude (1) individuals who either request service on a death penalty case or seek to avoid service on a death penalty case, and (2) potential jurors who had been excused from another case during jury selection or had recently served on another trial. In December 1998, defense counsel explained to the trial court that, as to the categories of jurors included in its motion to ensure a fair and impartial trial, it was requesting that rather than go through the voir dire process and weed those jurors out, to just deal with them up front and exclude them from the panel during the preliminary screening that would be implemented by the jury commissioner on June 9, 1999. Defendant did not object to the fact that the jury commissioner would make initial decisions regarding exclusion of potential jurors; instead, she sought to use that procedure for her own benefit. During the hearing on her motion, defendant neither asked to be present during the jury commissioner's preliminary screening, nor for those proceedings or any conversations between the trial court and the jury commissioner to be recorded. On December 14, 1998, the prosecutor asked the trial court to deny the motion because Code of Civil Procedure section 203 sets forth those people [who] are ineligible to sit as jurors . . . and the request by the defense is not covered by that section. In denying the motion, the trial court agreed that the exclusions sought by defendant were not covered by the cited rules of procedure. The trial court then explained that it would instruct the jury commissioner not to provide prospective jurors with information regarding what case they would be sitting on or whether the case was civil or criminal. It was apparent from the court's ruling that the jury prescreening procedure, including the summons notices and the jury commissioner's prescreening, would eliminate individuals who fit within the exceptions to juror eligibility set forth in section 203 of the Code of Civil Procedure, including the exception for those who are not possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language. (Code Civ. Proc., § 203, subd. (a)(6).) Nevertheless, at no time during this hearing or thereafter did defendant object in the trial court to any language in the summonses sent to prospective jurors, including the sentence My native language is ________, which was to be filled out if the person summoned had checked the box indicating he or she was not qualified to serve as a juror because I DO NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE to act as a juror. Similarly, defendant did not object to the role of the jury commissioner in eliminating those not eligible for jury service under Code of Civil Procedure section 203. Furthermore, at the hearing on the motion, defendant did not request that the jury commissioner's prescreening with prospective jurors or the commissioner's conversations with the trial court be recorded. On February 9, 1999, in the course of discussing the proposed jury questionnaire, the trial court noted that it would need to send out juror notices . . . in the thousands to get enough folks to appear for the jury duty and that those notices would need to include an estimate of time that the trial would take. [7] On March 1, during a hearing on defendant's motion for a continuance, the trial court commented that it would be summoning 7,000 jurors in anticipation of defendant's case. Later that day, while discussing the mechanics of jury selection, the trial court said it was hoping to have at least 500 fill out the questionnaire. On May 6, the court indicated that the 7,000 summonses had been sent in April and that it was anticipating eventually working with 500 questionnaires. Over the months during which jury screening and selection was discussed, defendant never questioned why only 500 prospective jurors would be filling out questionnaires if 7,000 had been sent summonses. On May 26, the trial court mentioned it was conducting meetings with the jury commissioner regarding the jury screening in defendant's case. Defendant raised no objection at that time; she did not request that those meetings be recorded or that she attend them. Thereafter, the trial court explained that the jury commissioner would screen prospective jurors regarding whether they were able to serve on a lengthy trial based on the following criteria: financial hardship, prepaid vacation; medical appointments that cannot be changed, or full-time school enrollment. Defendant did not request more detailed information regarding the proposed time qualification or hardship process, although the trial court offered to show counsel such information if you're interested at all. Similarly, at no point did defendant object to the portion of the summons notices sent to potential prospective jurors that included a REQUEST FOR EXCUSE SECTION that listed claimed hardships. At that same May 26 hearing, defendant, through counsel, did insist that she wanted to be present when the information was read to the prospective jurors and when those prospective jurors would be told that they would need to fill out a lengthy questionnaire. At that time, defendant did not ask to be present at any of the other prescreening procedures, including those that involved the jury commissioner's preliminary screening of potential jurors. Defendant had surgery on May 29, and was not present at the next hearing on June 2. The trial court suggested continuing the trial to July to give defendant time to recuperate. The court then suggested a complicated plan to preserve some of the prospective jurors from the summonses sent in April and to pick up additional prospective jurors on Mondays and Tuesdays when they have their normal jury pool. The court explained that its plan would allow the jury commissioner to start qualifying people for the July trial date and would save the expense of sending out new summons notices. The trial court then commented that the beauty of its proposal was that by the end of Wednesday, there would be a nice random list of time qualified jurors. Based on his misunderstanding of the proposal, William Rafael, one of defendant's attorneys, interjected, I know the court noted the beauty of it. The ugly of it is that our client won't be present. That's a problem in a capital case. The following exchange ensued: THE COURT: [¶] Present for what? [¶] MR. RAFAEL: For the time qualifying of the jury. Last week the court spoke when we talked about coming in on the 9th, and the conversation dealt with having our client, Mr. Garcia [(defendant's other attorney)], and Ms. Regan [(the prosecutor)] present in the jury assembly room[¶] THE COURT: Right. [¶] MR. RAFAEL: so that introductions can be made.  (Italics added.) The trial court then clarified that the previously requested introductions were scheduled to occur before we do the questionnaire, though. So, see, [defendant] would be present. It would be exactly like we were going to do it. Acknowledging his prior confusion, Rafael withdrew his objection to defendant's absence: MR. RAFAEL: So we're just going to do the time qualifying next week? [¶] THE COURT: . . . What we were going to do next week is they time qualify. . . . Then we would have all come down, introduced ourselves, read the information and give them the juror questionnaires. I anticipate [defendant] would be present whatever date we're going to start this at. We do it the exact same way we [were] going to do it. . . . And we're all down there, then, with your client, and we do the questionnaires. [¶] MR. RAFAEL: Okay. So I understand the step of introduction is not going to take place [during the prequalifying of the jury], the questionnaires will not be distributed at that point? [¶] THE COURT: Right. As promised, defendant and her counsel were present in the jury assembly room when the clerk swore the venire on July 21. The trial court introduced defendant and all counsel, read the information, and explained the process of filling out the questionnaire.
As noted, above, the People contend that defendant waived her right to raise preliminary jury screening procedural issues by failing to assert them in the trial court. We agree. A defendant generally is barred from raising on appeal defects in the [preliminary jury screening] procedure in which [she] acquiesced. ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 73 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506].) [I]mportant policies mandate that criminal convictions not be overturned on the basis of irregularities in jury selection to which the defendant did not object or in which he has acquiesced. [Citations.] ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 38 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) Here, defendant bases her claim that the jury pool screening procedural issues were not forfeited solely on Rafael's statement informing the trial court of [defendant's] right to be present for the juror hardship screening. However, that claim is not supported by the record because, as discussed above, Rafael abandoned his statement objecting to the proposal when the court explained that defendant would be present before prospective jurors filled out their questionnaires, as they had agreed. Defendant argues that the discussion then shifted to a different issue of whether the parties would be present later . . . before questionnaires were distributed. But the discussion never shifted; it always involved the trial court's explanation that it was honoring defendant's request to be present when the information would be read to prospective jurors. Defendant did not object to the language in the summons notices [8] or to the composition of the venire or jury panel. She did not object when she learned the jury commissioner would time qualify prospective jurors. She also did not object when it became apparent that the prescreening would be used to eliminate persons who did not qualify to become prospective jurors under the exceptions to eligibility set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 203. Similarly, defendant did not object when she learned the trial court expected the jury commissioner to excuse potential jurors based on hardship grounds such as childcare concerns or nonvital medical issues. Defendant did not even request to look at the detailed information regarding the hardship excuses the jury commissioner would consider despite the trial court's offer to share that information with the defense. Because defendant did not accept the trial court's offer to review the detailed information regarding the hardship excuses the jury commissioner would consider, she forfeited any claim that she was not informed the commissioner would prescreen prospective jurors for reasons other than those specified on the record. Defendant did not object to, or question, the disparity between the number of summonses sent and the number of prospective jurors expected to appear and fill out questionnaires. She also did not object that additional venire members were added after the initial screening by the jury commissioner. Defendant did not object that prescreening violated her equal protection rights because it excluded a disproportionate number of Hispanics and treated those with language difficulty differently from those with sight or hearing impairments. Defendant also did not object that the screening was vague, and thus violated due process, because there was no standard for determining language proficiency and because the standard applied, namely Code of Civil Procedure section 203, subdivision (a)(6), was unconstitutionally vague on its face and as applied. Despite defendant's claim to the contrary, defendant did not ask to be present during the jury commissioner's prescreening. She also did not make a motion to strike the jury venire or panel in the trial court. Defendant never made a contemporaneous request for the jury commissioner to maintain records of the screening, and she never asked for the jury commissioner's conversations with the trial court or the preliminary screening to be recorded. At the time of trial, subdivision (a)(1) of section 190.9 provided, in pertinent part, that [i]n any case in which a death sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the municipal and superior courts, including all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present. (Stats. 1996, ch. 1086, § 4, p. 7657.) Nothing in the record suggests that the trial court's conversations with the jury commissioner took place in the courtroom or in chambers, and, absent an objection to the trial court meeting informally with the jury commissioner, defendant has forfeited her claim that the lack of a record of its discussions with the jury commissioner deprived her of her constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial as well as other statutory rights. (1) While subdivision (a) of section 207 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that [t]he jury commissioner shall maintain records regarding selection, qualification, and assignment of prospective jurors, that statutory language does not support defendant's claim that the time-qualification process by the commissioner should have been reported by a court reporter. In People v. Basuta (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 370, 396 [114 Cal.Rptr.2d 285], the court held that where there is a request, the trial court must require the jury commissioner to maintain a record of the hardship screening procedure. No such request was made here. The jury commissioner maintained some records, which are contained in five volumes of the clerk's transcript. Here, as in People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 667 [286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84], defendant finds the state of the record unsatisfactory. But having made no relevant objection below, [she] may not be heard to complain in that regard. Defendant has forfeited her claim that the jury commissioner's failure to maintain a more complete record regarding selection, qualification, and assignment of prospective jurors deprived her of her constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial. In any event, we will not overturn defendant's conviction on the basis of these alleged irregularities in the jury selection process to which [she] did not object or in which [she] has acquiesced. [Citations.] ( People v. Visciotti, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 38.) The jury commissioner was entitled to inquire as to the qualifications of persons on the master list or source list who are or may be summoned for jury service. (Code Civ. Proc., § 196, subd. (a).) The jury commissioner had authority to establish policies and procedures necessary to fulfill [the] responsibility of managing the jury system . . . in conformance with the purpose and scope of the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 190 et seq. (Code Civ. Proc., § 195, subd. (c).) The Trial Jury Selection and Management Act includes Code of Civil Procedure section 203, regarding persons qualified to be trial jurors and exceptions to qualification. `Excused jurors' are those prospective jurors who are excused from service by the jury commissioner for valid reasons based on statute, state or local court rules, and policies. (Code Civ. Proc., § 194, subd. (d).) Here, in light of the information defendant received during the multiple hearings covering the issuance of summonses and the proposed duties of the jury commissioner, defendant was made aware that the jury commissioner would be involved in ensuring that prospective jurors were time qualified to sit through a 10-week jury trial, were eligible for jury trial service within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 203, and did not have a valid reason to be excused from jury service based on any hardship agreed upon by the trial court and jury commissioner. Nothing in the record supports defendant's claim that the jury commissioner exceeded her official function as described by the trial court in defendant's presence or her claim that procedures the jury commissioner followed during the preliminary jury screening were unanticipated by defendant or the trial court. We conclude defendant has forfeited all four of the preliminary jury screening procedural issues she raises in this court by having failed to object on those grounds in the trial court.
Defendant cannot prove the merit of her challenges to the preliminary jury screening procedure. On the present record, defendant cannot show that she was improperly denied a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, [9] that the jury commissioner excused jurors for unauthorized reasons, [10] that she was denied counsel or the right to be present during a critical stage of the proceedings, that she was denied the right to a public trial, or that the challenged language in the summons notices impermissibly altered the composition of the venire. However, on the present record, we are able to address defendant's claim that the provision in Code of Civil Procedure section 203 that permits the excusal of prospective jurors with insufficient knowledge of the English language is unconstitutionally vague and violates both the due process and equal protection principles as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. We find this third challenge to the pretrial jury screening lacking in merit. (2) As discussed above, persons cannot serve as prospective jurors in California unless they are possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language. (Code Civ. Proc., § 203, subd. (a)(6).) We conclude the challenged phrase is not unconstitutionally vague. Our state trials are conducted entirely in English, with translation into English provided only for those defendants and witnesses who do not speak English. There can be no doubt that, in context of deciding who is eligible and qualified to be a prospective juror within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure section 203, subdivision (a)(6), the phrase possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language means sufficient knowledge of the English language to understand the legal proceedings and the evidence upon which a juror would base his or her decision in any given case. Defendant's speculative claim to the contrary, there is nothing in the record that suggests that individuals who received a jury summons in defendant's case improperly determined that they possessed insufficient knowledge of the English language to sit as jurors in a trial conducted in English. (3) We find meritless defendant's claim that section 203, subdivision (a)(6) of the Code of Civil Procedure violated her right to equal protection by excluding Hispanics from the jury selection process. Limiting jury service to those who are possessed of sufficient knowledge of the English language (Code Civ. Proc., § 203, subd. (a)(6)) is a permissible racially neutral selection criteri[on] ( Alexander v. Louisiana (1972) 405 U.S. 625, 632 [31 L.Ed.2d 536, 92 S.Ct. 1221]) that serves a significant state interest ( Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 367 [58 L.Ed.2d 579, 99 S.Ct. 664]) in ensuring the uniform and efficient administration of the justice system and avoiding possible translation distortions. (See, e.g., U.S. v. Benmuhar (1st Cir. 1981) 658 F.2d 14, 18-20 [English proficiency requirement for jury qualification advances a significant state interest in a national language].) For the same reason, we find meritless defendant's claim the challenged language requirement violates defendant's right to equal protection of the law because courts will provide accommodations for the hearing [or sight] impaired but not for jurors who need assistance with English. The People correctly argue that the requirement of knowing the English language is a neutral factor. (See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 405 U.S. at pp. 631-632 [permissible racially neutral selection criterion does not violate equal protection guarantees].) Defendant additionally claims that publication to potential jurors of this vague standard reasonably explains the low Hispanic turnout because it provided an excuse for Hispanic people to ignore the summons. Defendant has presented no evidence to support this claim, and [e]rrant speculation of impropriety does not meet defendant's burden of proof on this issue. ( Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1157.) In summary, we conclude defendant is not entitled to a reversal of the guilt or penalty verdict in her case based on her preliminary jury screening claims.