Opinion ID: 19557
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: challenges to judicial and prosecutorial conduct

Text: A. Judge's Comments and Questions 24 Lankford asserts that the court's questioning of the witnesses and other comments before the jury prejudiced him and denied him the right to a fair trial. He alleges that the judge's conduct during the trial evidenced his view that the defendant was guilty of the crimes charged, and that this conduct influenced the jury's verdict. In support of this contention, he points out that the judge interrupted the defendant's cross-examination and recross of the prosecution's primary witness, Joanie Lankford, twenty-four times, but interrupted the Government's direct and redirect of the same witness only five times. Similarly, the defense's direct examination of Lankford was interrupted thirty-three times, and the prosecution's cross and recross of the defendant was interrupted only fifteen times. Lankford also insists that the court assisted the Government is its opening statement in jury voir dire, and that prejudice resulting from the judge's behavior was such that it could not be cured by jury instructions. 25 When, as here, no objections were raised at trial, we review challenges to judicial conduct for plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Saenz, 134 F.3d 697, 701 (5th Cir. 1998). We must determine whether constitutional error was committed - i.e., whether the district judge's actions, viewed as a whole, . . . amount[ed] to an intervention that could have led the jury to a predisposition of guilt by improperly confusing the functions of judge and prosecutor. United States v. Bermea, 30 F.3d 1539, 1569 (5th Cir. 1994). In making this determination, we consider the totality of the circumstances, see United States v. Lance, 853 F.2d 1177, 1182 (5th Cir. 1988), which must show that the trial judge's intervention was 'quantitatively and qualitatively substantial'. Saenz, 134 F.2d at 702 (quoting Bermea, 30 F.2d at 1569)). 26 Although Lankford sees Saenz as similar to his own case, we do not find that the exchanges he identifies approach the nature, or the level of misconduct found in that case. Cf. United States v. Cantu, 167 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir.) (stressing the unique circumstances involved in Saenz), cert. denied,___ U.S. ___, 120 S. Ct. 58, ___ L.Ed.2d (1999). Thevast majority of the exchanges occurred because the court legitimately sought clarifications and attempted to move the proceedings along. The mere fact that there were more interruptions on one side or the other does not suggest, without more, that the judge has predetermined the guilt of the defendant or is assisting the prosecution. See Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1570 ([A]lthough the frequency of a court's interruptions of defense counsel is significant, the nature of those interruptions is more pertinent to our inquiry.); United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1086-87 (5th Cir. 1987). The judge's elicitation of damaging information in the course of questioning witnesses is also, by itself, insufficient to demonstrate that the judge was engaged in misconduct. As we have previously noted, 27 a federal judge . . . may comment on the evidence, may question witnesses and elicit facts not yet adduced or clarify those previously presented, and may maintain the pace of the trial by interrupting or cutting off counsel as a matter of discretion. Only when the judge's conduct strays from neutrality is the defendant thereby denied a constitutionally fair trial. 28 Moore v. United States, 598 F.2d 439, 442 (5th Cir. 1979) (citations omitted). A review of the entire record, including statements made in voir dire, does not demonstrate that the judge stray[ed] from neutrality during Lankford's trial. Moreover, the judge explicitly instructed the jury to disregard anything he may have said during the trial in their determinations of witness credibility, of the weight to be given testimony, and in their findings of fact. 5 Such curative instructions can operate against a finding of constitutional error. See Bermea, 30 F.3d at 1571-72. B. Prosecutor's Closing Argument 29 Lankford points to several statements made by the prosecutor in his closing argument as operating to deprive him of a fair trial. He argues that the lower court erred in overruling a defense counsel's objection to the following statements: 30 The psychologist thinks Joanie's manipulating him because I guarantee you he goes in there July 31st - July 28 - I'm getting the date wrong, I'm sorry. The duct tape, she spent the night last night, Doctor, she said she loved me. She came home. Well, that's not what happened. 6 31 According to Lankford, in making these statements, the prosecutor guaranteed theexistence of a fact and described a meeting between the psychologist and Lankford that was not reflected in the record. As a result of the court's error, he argues, the Government was able to destroy the psychologist's testimony, which itself was detrimental to the testimony of Joanie Lankford. 32 Lankford also objects to the prosecutor's twice referring to him as this psycho, to his statements that Lankford was seeing a psychologist, one of which suggested reasons he was seeing a psychologist, and to his description of Lankford as too obsessed to leave his wife alone. These statements, Lankford contends, reflected the prosecutor's improper assumption of the role of an expert able to diagnose his mental state. There were no objections to these statements at the time of trial. 33 In general, we apply a two-step analysis to charges of prosecutorial misconduct. We first decide whether the prosecutor's comments were improper. See United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 320 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 414 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 119 S. Ct. 887 (1999). If the comments are found to be improper, we next assess whether they prejudiced Lankford's substantive rights. See Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d at 320; Munoz, 150 F.3d at 415. Here, we consider (1) the magnitude of the statement's prejudice, (2) the effect of any cautionary instructions given, and (3) the strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1389 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Simpson, 901 F.2d 1223, 1227 (5th Cir. 1990)). 34 Even if we were to find that each of the statements to which Lankford objects was improper, he would not be entitled to reversal or other correction because the prosecutor's statements did not affect Lankford's substantial rights. 7 First, a review of the remarks in context of the trial, see Munoz, 150 F.3d at 415, suggests that the comments' prejudicial effects, if there were any, were insubstantial. Second, the cautionary instructions given to the jury were sufficient to negate any prejudicial effects the statements may have had. Finally, substantial evidence of defendant's guilt exists in the record. This is simply not a case in which improprieties were such as to cast serious doubt upon the correctness of the jury's verdict, see United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 874 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1375 (1999), and thus we see no reason to reverse. 8