Opinion ID: 1965352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timeliness of the school district's certiorari action.

Text: We believe the controlling issue here is whether the school district's petition for writ of certiorari was filed in a timely manner pursuant to Iowa rule of civil procedure 307(c). The city contends that the certiorari petition was not filed in a timely manner after the city's decision to include Virginia Meadows in the urban renewal project and that the district court therefore should have dismissed the petition for certiorari and declaratory judgment based thereon.
Certiorari under rule 306 of our Iowa rules of civil procedure is an action at law to test the legality of an action taken by a court or tribunal. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Sch. Dist. I, 562 N.W.2d at 156. A city exercising a governmental function is a tribunal within the meaning of rule 306. Id. Iowa rule of civil procedure 307(c) provides: The petition [for writ of certiorari] must be filed within thirty days from the time the tribunal, board or officer exceeded its jurisdiction or otherwise acted illegally. An extension of such time, however, may be allowed by the reviewing court upon a showing that failure to file the petition within the time provided was due to a failure of the tribunal, board or officer to notify the petitioner of the action complained of. Any motion for extension of time shall be filed with the clerk of the court in which the writ of certiorari is sought within 90 days of the action complained of. The motion and any resistance may be supported by copies of relevant portions of the record of the proceedings complained of, and by affidavits, and no other form of evidence will be received. For purposes of rule 307(c), the time at which a tribunal acted illegally occurs when the underlying proceeding becomes final. Rater v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 548 N.W.2d 588, 590 (Iowa App.1996). An untimely petition for writ of certiorari deprives the reviewing court of subject matter jurisdiction. Madyun v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 544 N.W.2d 441, 443 (Iowa 1996); accord Greene v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 312 N.W.2d 915, 919 (Iowa 1981).
Having set out the applicable law, we must now determine the date from which the 30-day time period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari by the school district began to run. As noted above, certiorari is an action to test the legality of an action taken by a tribunal, here the city. Sergeant Bluff-Luton Sch. Dist. I, 562 N.W.2d at 156. It would therefore seem that to determine when the 30-day period began to run, we must identify the action taken by the city that the school district alleges was illegal. In the present case, the school district filed a petition for writ of certiorari against the city on August 16, 1996, shortly after the taxes (based on Virginia Meadows' inclusion in the urban renewal project) were actually levied. In substance, the petition for writ of certiorari alleged that the city did not make the necessary findings required under Iowa Code chapter 403 concerning whether Virginia Meadows was properly designated as an urban renewal area. The petition also alleged that the tax levy was illegal to the extent it levied taxes pursuant to the city's general budget, which in part purported to levy and apportion tax funds in accordance with the 1994 resolution including Virginia Meadows in the urban renewal project. Upon our review, we believe that the gist of the school district's challenge is, and always has been, to the city's decision on December 19, 1994 to include Virginia Meadows in the Donner Park Urban Renewal Project. Had the city not designated Virginia Meadows as urban renewal property, the school district would not have been affected by the TIF tax plan levied therefrom. While it may be true that the interests of the school district were not affected until the date the tax was actually levied, we believe the relevant date for purposes of rule 307(c) is the date of the alleged illegal decision or act by the city, not the date of the alleged injury to the school district. Stated another way, the legality of the tax levy is dependent upon the legality of the classification of the property from which the levy flows. The city's decision to include Virginia Meadows in the urban renewal project was made December 19, 1994. Because this is the action challenged by the school district in the certiorari proceeding, this is the date from which the 30-day time period under rule 307(c) began to run. The school district, however, did not file its petition for writ of certiorari until August 16, 1996, much more than thirty days from December 19, 1994. It therefore seems clear that the school district's petition for writ of certiorari does not comply with rule 307(c)'s 30-day time period. The district court therefore should have dismissed the writ and declaratory judgment request based thereon. As to the school district's request for declaratory judgment, we conclude that the district court erred in deciding that the taxes levied were illegal. This is because the legality of the taxes levied does not exist independent from the city's 1994 decision to include Virginia Meadows in the urban renewal project, which is the alleged illegal action that is the subject of the school district's certiorari petition. Therefore, the authorities relied upon by the school district as support for its argument that the relevant limitations period began to run from the date the taxes were levied, see Polk v. McCartney, 104 Iowa 567, 73 N.W. 1067 (1898), and Sheppard v. Johnson County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 Iowa 258, 33 N.W. 770 (1887), are not controlling. Those cases involved special assessment taxes whereas the taxes involved in this case involve general assessment taxes as a regular levy of property taxes for a budget or fiscal year. We also note that there are important public policy reasons for limiting the time during which a party can challenge city decisions and resulting regular tax levies. City officials must be able to prepare budgets and levy taxes for an appropriate time period, based upon established figures and past decisions, without the threat of later challenges to the legality of such decisions that are made after statutory and rule limitation periods have run. Finally, we also disagree with the school district's contention that the petition for writ of certiorari was filed in a timely manner because the alleged illegality of the city's decision is a continuing act. See City of Des Moines v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 428 N.W.2d 292, 295 (Iowa 1988) (defense that party should have pursued its remedy of certiorari within 30-day time period is not available when alleged illegal act is continuing in nature). This is because, as we noted above, the legality of the tax levy in this case is based upon a single decision, the city's decision on December 19, 1994 to include Virginia Meadows in the urban renewal project. Thus, the alleged illegal action is not a continuing one. Because we conclude that the school district did not comply with rule 307(c)'s 30-day time requirement for filing a petition for writ of certiorari, we need not address the other issues raised on appeal. The decision of the district court must be reversed.