Opinion ID: 2738874
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Likelihood of Success on the Merits on Section 2

Text: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (formerly codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)). “A violation of subsection (a) is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by” citizens of protected races “in that [they] have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). With Section 2, Congress effectuated a “permanent, nationwide ban on racial discrimination” because “any racial discrimination in voting is too much.” Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631. Accordingly, Section 2 “prohibits all forms of voting discrimination” that lessen opportunity for minority voters. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 n.10. “Both the Federal Government and individuals” may sue to enforce Section 2, under which “injunctive relief is available . . . to block voting laws from going into effect.” Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619. Thus, in two very recent cases, courts granted injunctive relief to plaintiffs with vote29 denial claims where state election laws less sweeping than North Carolina’s had recently been passed. Ohio State Conference of N.A.A.C.P. v. Husted, __ F. Supp. 2d __, 2014 WL 4377869 (S.D. Ohio 2014), aff’d, No. 14–3877, 2014 WL 4724703 (6th Cir. Sept. 24, 2014), stayed, No. 14A336, Order List 573 U.S., 2014 WL 4809069 (U.S. Sept. 29, 2014); Frank v. Walker, __ F. Supp. 2d. __, 2014 WL 1775432 (E.D. Wis. 2014), stayed, 2014 WL 4494153 (7th Cir. Sept. 12, 2014). Under Section 2 as it exists today, showing intentional discrimination is unnecessary. 4 Instead, a Section 2 violation can “be established by proof of discriminatory results alone.” Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991). Thus, the “right” Section 2 inquiry “is whether ‘as a result of the challenged practice or structure plaintiffs do not have an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.’” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44 (footnote omitted)(quoting S.Rep. No. 97–417, 97th Cong.2nd Sess. 28 (1982), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, p. 206). 4 The Supreme Court had previously read an intent requirement into Section 2, but Congress quickly amended the law to reject that interpretation. See, e.g., Gingles, 478 U.S. at 43-44 (noting that Congress “dispositively reject[ed] the position of the plurality in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490, 64 L.Ed.2d 47 (1980), which required proof that the contested electoral practice or mechanism was adopted or maintained with the intent to discriminate against minority voters”). 30 In other words, “[t]he essence of a [Section] 2 claim is that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Id. at 47. Section 2’s use to date has primarily been in the context of vote-dilution cases. “Vote dilution claims involve challenges to methods of electing representatives—like redistricting or at-large districts—as having the effect of diminishing minorities’ voting strength.” Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at . The district court in this case correctly noted that there is a paucity of appellate case law evaluating the merits of Section 2 claims in the vote-denial context. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 346. It may well be that, historically, Section 2 claims focused on vote dilution. But the predominance of vote dilution in Section 2 jurisprudence likely stems from the effectiveness of the now-defunct Section 5 preclearance requirements that stopped would-be vote denial from occurring in covered jurisdictions like large parts of North Carolina. Even the district court recognized as much. Id. The facts of this case attest to the prophylactic success of Section 5’s preclearance requirements. It appears that Section 5, which required covered jurisdictions to prove that a change in electoral law had neither “the purpose [nor] the 31 effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,” 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a), was the only reason House Bill 589’s sponsors did not reveal the “full bill” to the public until after the Shelby County decision came down. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 336. Nonetheless, despite the success of Section 5’s preclearance requirement at tamping down vote denial in covered jurisdictions, Section 2’s use to date has not been entirely dilution-focused. Rather, courts have entertained vote-denial claims regarding a wide range of practices, including restrictive voter identification laws (Frank, 2014 WL 1775432); unequal access to voter registration opportunities (Operation PUSH v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1245 (N.D. Miss. 1987), aff’d sub nom, Operation PUSH v. Mabus, 932 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1991)); unequal access to polling places (Brown v. Dean, 555 F. Supp. 502 (D.R.I. 1982)); and omnibus laws combining registration and voting restrictions (Husted, 2014 WL 4377869, aff’d, 2014 WL 4724703). Indeed, Section 2’s plain language makes clear that vote denial is precisely the kind of issue Section 2 was intended to address. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a). See 32 also Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 n.10 (“Section 2 prohibits all forms of voting discrimination, not just vote dilution.”). Further, the principles that make vote dilution objectionable under the Voting Rights Act logically extend to vote denial. Everyone in this case agrees that Section 2 has routinely been used to address vote dilution—which basically allows all voters to ‘sing’ but forces certain groups to do so pianissimo. Vote denial is simply a more extreme form of the same pernicious violation—those groups are not simply made to sing quietly; instead their voices are silenced completely. A fortiori, then, Section 2 must support vote-denial claims. Justice Scalia has provided a helpful illustration of what a Section 2 vote-denial claim might look like: If, for example, a county permitted voter registration for only three hours one day a week, and that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites, blacks would have less opportunity “to participate in the political process” than whites, and [Section] 2 would therefore be violated . . . . Chisom, 501 U.S. at 408 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Based on our reading of the plain language of the statute and relevant Supreme Court authority, we agree with the Sixth Circuit that a Section 2 vote-denial claim consists of two elements: • First, “the challenged ‘standard, practice, or procedure’ must impose a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that members of the protected class ‘have less 33 opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.’” Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at  (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)-(b)); • Second, that burden “must in part be caused by or linked to ‘social and historical conditions’ that have or currently produce discrimination against members of the protected class.” Id. (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47). “In assessing both elements, courts should consider ‘the totality of circumstances.’” Id. at  (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)). In evaluating Section 2 claims, courts have looked to certain “typical” factors pulled directly from the Voting Rights Act’s legislative history: • The history of voting-related discrimination in the pertinent State or political subdivision; • The extent to which voting in the elections of the pertinent State or political subdivision is racially polarized; • The extent to which the State or political subdivision has used voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the minority group, such as unusually large election districts, majority vote requirements, and prohibitions against bullet voting; • The exclusion of members of the minority group from candidate slating processes; • The extent to which minority group members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education, employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; • The use of even subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; • The extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction; • Evidence demonstrating that elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the minority group; and 34 • The extent to which the policy underlying the State’s or the political subdivision’s use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44-45. These factors may shed light on whether the two elements of a Section 2 claim are met. Notably, while these factors “may be relevant” to a Section 2 analysis, “‘there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or [even] that a majority of them point one way or the other.’” Id. at 45 (quoting S. Rep. No. 97–417, 97th Cong.2nd Sess. 29 (1982), U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, p. 207). This is not surprising, given that Congress intended to give the Voting Rights Act “the broadest possible scope.” Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 567 (1969). Instead, courts must undertake “a searching practical evaluation of the ‘past and present reality,’ [with] a ‘functional’ view of the political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (quoting S. Rep. at 30, U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1982, p. 208). Courts must make “an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of” electoral administration “in the light of past and present reality.” Id. at 78 (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769-70 (1973)). With this legal framework in mind, we turn now to the district court’s Section 2 analysis. 35
Misapplied the Law A close look at the district court’s analysis here reveals numerous grave errors of law that constitute an abuse of discretion. Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d at 188. First, the district court bluntly held that “Section 2 does not incorporate a ‘retrogression’ standard” and that the court therefore was “not concerned with whether the elimination of [same-day registration and other features] will worsen the position of minority voters in comparison to the preexisting voting standard, practice or procedure—a Section 5 inquiry.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 351-52 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Contrary to the district court’s statements, Section 2, on its face, requires a broad “totality of the circumstances” review. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). Clearly, an eye toward past practices is part and parcel of the totality of the circumstances. Further, as the Supreme Court noted, “some parts of the [Section] 2 analysis may overlap with the [Section] 5 inquiry.” Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003). Both Section 2 and Section 5 invite comparison by using the term “abridge[].” Section 5 states that any voting practice or procedure “that has the purpose of or will have the effect of diminishing the 36 ability of any citizens of the United States on account of race or color . . . to elect their preferred candidates of choice denies or abridges the right to vote.” 52 U.S.C. § 10304(b) (emphasis added). Section 2 forbids any “standard, practice, or procedure” that “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he term ‘abridge,’ . . . whose core meaning is ‘shorten,’. . . necessarily entails a comparison. It makes no sense to suggest that a voting practice ‘abridges’ the right to vote without some baseline with which to compare the practice.” Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 333– 34 (2000) (citations omitted). Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever held that, in determining whether an abridgement has occurred, courts are categorically barred from considering past practices, as the district court here suggested. In fact, opinions from other circuits support the opposite conclusion. For example, the Tenth Circuit, quoting directly from Section 2’s legislative history, has explained that “‘[i]f [a challenged] procedure markedly departs from past practices or from practices elsewhere in the jurisdiction, that bears on the fairness of its impact.’” Sanchez v. State of Colo., 97 F.3d 1303, 1325 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 207, n.117). And as the Sixth 37 Circuit recently held, under Section 2, “the focus is whether minorities enjoy less opportunity to vote as compared to other voters. The fact that a practice or law eliminates voting opportunities that used to exist under prior law that African Americans disproportionately used is therefore relevant to an assessment of whether, under the current system, African Americans have an equal opportunity to participate in the political process as compared to other voters.” Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at . In this case, North Carolina’s previous voting practices are centrally relevant under Section 2. They are a critical piece of the totality-of-the-circumstances analysis Section 2 requires. In refusing to consider the elimination of voting mechanisms successful in fostering minority participation, the district court misapprehended and misapplied Section 2. Second, the district court considered each challenged electoral mechanism only separately. See McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 344 (addressing same-day registration), at 365 (addressing out-of-precinct voting), at 370 (early voting), at 375 (identification requirements), at 378 (pre-registration of teenagers), and at 379 (poll challengers and elimination of discretion to keep the polls open). Yet “[a] panoply of regulations, each apparently defensible when considered alone, may nevertheless have the combined effect of severely 38 restricting participation and competition.” Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 607-08 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). By inspecting the different parts of House Bill 589 as if they existed in a vacuum, the district court failed to consider the sum of those parts and their cumulative effect on minority access to the ballot box. Doing so is hard to square with Section 2’s mandate to look at the “totality of the circumstances,” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b), as well as Supreme Court precedent requiring “a searching practical evaluation” with a “functional view of the political process.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). By looking at each provision separately and failing to consider the totality of the circumstances, then, the district court misapprehended and misapplied the pertinent law. Third, the district court failed to adequately consider North Carolina’s history of voting discrimination. Instead the district court parroted the Supreme Court’s proclamation that “‘history did not end in 1965,’” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 349 (quoting Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628) and that “‘[p]ast discrimination cannot, in the manner of original sin, condemn governmental action.’” Id. (quoting City of Mobile, Ala. v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 (1980)). 39 Of course, the history of voting discrimination in many states in fact did substantially end in 1965—due in large part to the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court’s observation that a state’s history should not serve to condemn its future, however, does not absolve states from their future transgressions. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her Shelby County dissent, casting aside the Voting Rights Act because it has worked “to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.” 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Immediately after Shelby County, i.e., literally the next day, when “history” without the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance requirements picked up where it left off in 1965, North Carolina rushed to pass House Bill 589, the “full bill” legislative leadership likely knew it could not have gotten past federal preclearance in the pre–Shelby County era. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 336. Thus, to whatever extent the Supreme Court could rightly celebrate voting rights progress in Shelby County, the post-Shelby County facts on the ground in North Carolina should have cautioned the district court against doing so here. Fourth, in analyzing the elimination of same-day registration, the district court looked to the National Voter Registration Act, which generally allows for a registration cutoff of thirty days before an election. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d 40 at 352. The district court then declared that “it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended that a State’s adoption of a registration cut-off before election day would constitute a violation of Section 2.” Id. In doing so, the district court lost sight of the fact that the National Voter Registration Act merely sets a floor for state registration systems. That North Carolina used to exceed National Voter Registration Act registration minimums does not entitle it to eliminate its more generous registration provisions without ensuring that, in doing so, it is not violating Section 2. Indeed, Congress made that quite clear by including in the National Voter Registration Act an express warning that the rights and remedies it established shall not “supersede, restrict, or limit the application of the Voting Rights Act.” 52 U.S.C. § 20510(d)(1). Fifth, also with respect to same-day registration, the district court suggested that because voting was not completely foreclosed and because voters could still register and vote by mail, a likely Section 2 violation had not been shown. See McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 356 (noting that “North Carolina provides several other ways to register” besides same-day registration that “have not been shown to be practically unavailable to African–American residents”). 41 However, nothing in Section 2 requires a showing that voters cannot register or vote under any circumstance. Instead, it requires “that a certain electoral law, practice, or structure interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters to elect their preferred representatives.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47. In waiving off disproportionately high African American use of certain curtailed registration and voting mechanisms as mere “preferences” that do not absolutely preclude participation, the district court abused its discretion. See McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 351. Sixth, Section 2, on its face, is local in nature. Under Section 2, “[a] violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by citizens of protected races.” 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court has noted, in undertaking a Section 2 analysis, courts make “an intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of” electoral administration “in the light of past and present reality.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 78. Nevertheless, without any basis in the statute or binding precedent, the district court suggested that a practice must be discriminatory on a nationwide basis to violate Section 2 and 42 held that a conclusion it might reach as to North Carolina would somehow throw other states’ election laws into turmoil. For example, the district court stated that “a determination that North Carolina is in violation of Section 2 merely for maintaining a system that does not count out-of-precinct provisional ballots could place in jeopardy the laws of the majority of the States, which have made the decision not to count such ballots.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 367. The district court’s failure to understand the local nature of Section 2 constituted grave error. Cf. Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at  (“There is no reason to think our decision here compels any conclusion about the early-voting practices in other states, which do not necessarily share Ohio’s particular circumstances.”). Seventh, the district court minimized Plaintiffs’ claim as to out-of-precinct voting because “so few voters cast” ballots in the wrong precincts. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 366. The district court accepted evidence that “approximately 3,348 outof-precinct provisional ballots cast by [African American] voters were counted to some extent in the 2012 general election.” Id. Going forward under House Bill 589, a substantial number of African American voters will thus likely be disenfranchised. 43 Though the district court recognized that “failure to count out-of-precinct provisional ballots will have a disproportionate effect on [African American] voters,” it held that such an effect “will be minimal.” Id. Setting aside the basic truth that even one disenfranchised voter—let alone several thousand— is too many, what matters for purposes of Section 2 is not how many minority voters are being denied equal electoral opportunities but simply that “any” minority voter is being denied equal electoral opportunities. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a) (forbidding any “standard, practice, or procedure” that interacts with social and historical conditions and thereby “results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color”) (emphasis added). Eighth and finally, the district court rationalized election administration changes that disproportionately affected minority voters on the pretext of procedural inertia and underresourcing. For example, in evaluating Plaintiffs’ Section 2 challenge to the elimination of same-day registration, the district court noted that county boards of elections “sometimes lack[] sufficient time to verify registrants.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 353. But in detailing why that was so, the district court exposed that the problem’s roots lie largely in boards of elections’ own procedures. Id. at 353 and n.36. The district 44 court then noted that “a voter who registered before the ‘close of books’ 25 days before election day will have more time to pass the verification procedure than a voter who registered and voted during early voting.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 353. But more time alone guarantees nothing, and nothing suggests that a voter who registers earlier will therefore be verified before voting. The district court failed to recognize, much less address, the problem of sacrificing voter enfranchisement at the altar of bureaucratic (in)efficiency and (under-)resourcing. After all, Section 2 does not prescribe a balancing test under which the State can pit its desire for administrative ease against its minority citizens’ right to vote. The district court thus abused its discretion when it held that “[i]t is sufficient for the State to voice concern that [same-day registration] burdened [county boards of elections] and left inadequate time for elections officials to properly verify voters.” Id. at 354. These flaws in the district court’s Section 2 analysis make it clear that the district court both misapprehended and misapplied the pertinent law. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion. Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d at 188. 45
Properly applying the law to the facts, even as the district court portrayed them, shows that Plaintiffs are, in fact, likely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claims regarding the elimination of same-day registration and out-ofprecinct voting, contrary to the district court’s determination. In the first step of our Section 2 analysis, we must determine whether House Bill 589’s elimination of same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting imposes a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that members of the protected class “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. 10301. See also Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at  (identifying the two steps of the Section 2 vote-denial inquiry). There can be no doubt that certain challenged measures in House Bill 589 disproportionately impact minority voters. The district court found that Plaintiffs “presented unrebutted testimony that [African American] North Carolinians have used [same-day registration] at a higher rate than whites in the three federal elections during which [same-day registration] was offered” and recognized that the elimination of same-day registration would “bear more heavily on African-Americans than whites.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 348-49. The district 46 court also “accept[ed] the determinations of Plaintiffs’ experts that” African American voters disproportionately voted out of precinct and that “the prohibition on counting out-of-precinct provisional ballots will disproportionally affect [African American] voters.” Id. at 366. Second, we must determine whether this impact was in part “caused by or linked to ‘social and historical conditions’ that have or currently produce discrimination against members of the protected class.” Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at  (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47). Here, when we apply the proper legal standard to the district court’s findings, the disproportionate impacts of eliminating same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting are clearly linked to relevant social and historical conditions. In making this determination, we are aided by consideration of the “typical” factors that Congress noted in Section 2’s legislative history. However we recognize that “there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Regarding the history of voting-related discrimination in the pertinent State, the district court found that “North Carolina . . . has an unfortunate history of official discrimination in voting and other areas that dates back to the 47 Nation’s founding. This experience affects the perceptions and realities of [African American] North Carolinians to this day.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 349. One of Plaintiffs’ witnesses testified, for example, that at around age 19—in the 1940s—she was required to recite the Preamble to the Constitution from memory in order to register to vote. Id. at 349 n.29. As of 1965, 39 counties in North Carolina were considered covered jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act, having “maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and [having] had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election.” Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. And in 1975, when the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance formula was extended to cover jurisdictions that provided “English-only voting materials in places where over five percent of voting-age citizens spoke a single language other than English,” several additional North Carolina counties became covered jurisdictions. Id. The district court recognized that the legacy of overtly discriminatory practices such as these and the concurrent “struggle for African-Americans’ voting rights” justifies North Carolinians’ skepticism of changes to voting laws. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 349. The fact that the Supreme Court struck down the Voting Rights Act’s “covered jurisdictions” formula in 48 Shelby County does not allow us to simply ignore Congress’s directive to view current changes to North Carolina’s voting laws against the mire of its past. Regarding effects of past discrimination that hinder minorities’ ability to participate effectively in the political process, the district court pronounced that “Plaintiffs’ expert testimony demonstrates that [African American] citizens of North Carolina currently lag behind whites in several key socioeconomic indicators, including education, employment, income, access to transportation, and residential stability.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 348. To this end, Plaintiffs presented the following unchallenged statistics: (1) as of 201112, 34% of African American North Carolinians live below the federal poverty level, compared to 13% of whites; (2) as of the fourth quarter of 2012, unemployment rates in North Carolina were 17.3% for African Americans and 6.7% for whites; (3) 15.7% of African American North Carolinians over age 24 lack a high school degree, as compared to 10.1% of whites; (4) 27% of poor African American North Carolinians do not have access to a vehicle, compared to 8.8% of poor whites; and (5) 75.1% of African Americans in North Carolina live in owned homes as compared to 49.8% of whites. Id. at n.27. Finally, as to the tenuousness of the reasons given for the restrictions, North Carolina asserts goals of electoral 49 integrity and fraud prevention. But nothing in the district court’s portrayal of the facts suggests that those are anything other than merely imaginable. And “states cannot burden the right to vote in order to address dangers that are remote and only ‘theoretically imaginable.’” Frank, 2014 WL 1775432, at  (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968)). Indeed, the best fact for North Carolina in the district court’s opinion—the only specific problem cited, beyond naked statements of bureaucratic difficulty attributable at least as much to under-resourcing of boards of elections—is that a thousand votes that had not yet been properly verified had been counted in an election. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 353. But nothing in the district court’s opinion suggests that any of those were fraudulently or otherwise improperly cast. Thus, even the best fact the State could muster is tenuous indeed. At the end of the day, we cannot escape the district court’s repeated findings that Plaintiffs presented undisputed evidence showing that same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting were enacted to increase voter participation, that African American voters disproportionately used those electoral mechanisms, and that House Bill 589 restricted those mechanisms and thus disproportionately impacts African American voters. To us, when viewed in the context of relevant “social and historical conditions” in North Carolina, Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 47, this looks precisely like the textbook example of Section 2 vote denial Justice Scalia provided: If, for example, a county permitted voter registration for only three hours one day a week, and that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites, blacks would have less opportunity “to participate in the political process” than whites, and [Section] 2 would therefore be violated . . . . Chisom, 501 U.S. at 408. Further, even if we were to accept North Carolina’s purported non-discriminatory basis for keeping the full bill a secret until the federal preclearance regime had been thrown over in Shelby County, we cannot ignore the discriminatory results that several measures in House Bill 589 effectuate. Section 2’s “‘results’ criterion provides a powerful, albeit sometimes blunt, weapon with which to attack even the most subtle forms of discrimination.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Neither North Carolina nor any other jurisdiction can escape the powerful protections Section 2 affords minority voters by simply “espous[ing]” rationalizations for a discriminatory law. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 357. While plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions must demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits, they “need not show a certainty of success.” Pashby, 709 F.3d at 321. For the reasons set out above, Plaintiffs here have shown that with respect to the challenged provisions of House Bill 589 51 affecting same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting, they are likely to succeed with their Section 2 claims. In deciding otherwise, the district court abused its discretion. B. Irreparable Harm, the Public Interest, and the Balance of Hardships Having concluded that Plaintiffs have met the first test for a preliminary injunction, likelihood of success on the merits, as to their same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting challenges, we must consider whether the other elements have similarly been met. In other words, we must analyze whether Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm; the balance of the hardships; and whether the injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Courts routinely deem restrictions on fundamental voting rights irreparable injury. See, e.g., Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1986); cf. Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876 (3d Cir. 1997). And discriminatory voting procedures in particular are “the kind of serious violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act for which courts have granted immediate relief.” United States v. City of Cambridge, 799 F.2d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 1986). This makes sense generally and here specifically because whether the number is thirty or thirty-thousand, surely some North Carolina minority voters will 52 be disproportionately adversely affected in the upcoming election. And once the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress. The injury to these voters is real and completely irreparable if nothing is done to enjoin this law. 5 By definition, “[t]he public interest . . . favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as possible.” Husted, 697 F.3d at 437. See also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (The public has a “strong interest in exercising the fundamental political right to vote.” (citations omitted)). And “upholding constitutional rights serves the public interest.” Newsome v. Albermarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003). The election laws in North Carolina prior to House Bill 589’s enactment encouraged participation by qualified voters. But the challenged House Bill 589 provisions stripped them away. The public interest thus weighs heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor. 5 The district court seemingly failed to understand this point. For instance, in ruling that reduction in early voting was unlikely to cause irreparable harm to African American voters, the district court noted that during the 2010 midterm election, “the racial disparity in early-voting usage that was observed in 2008 and 2012 all but disappeared.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 372. In fact, the disparity was reduced from twenty percent to three percent. Thus, the district court seemed to believe that the injury to a smaller margin of African American voters that would occur during a midterm election year would be somehow less “irreparable.” That conclusion misapprehends the irreparable harm standard and constituted an abuse of discretion. 53 By contrast, balancing the hardships is not wholly unproblematic for Plaintiffs. North Carolina will have little time to implement the relief we grant. But for some of the challenged changes, such as the elimination of same-day registration, systems have existed, do exist, and simply need to be resurrected. Similarly, counting out-of-precinct ballots merely requires the revival of previous practices or, however accomplished, the counting of a relatively small number of ballots. 6 In conclusion, Plaintiffs have satisfied every element required for a preliminary injunction as to their Section 2 claims relating to same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting. 7 Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion 6 In Purcell, 549 U.S. 1, on which the dissenting opinion relies, the Supreme Court seemed troubled by the fact that a two-judge motions panel of the Ninth Circuit entered a factless, groundless “bare order” enjoining a new voter identification provision in an impending election. At the time of the “bare order,” the appellate court also lacked findings by the district court. By contrast, neither district court nor appellate court reasoning, nor lengthy opinions explaining that reasoning, would be lacking in this case. 7 By not addressing Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, we do not mean to suggest that we agree with the district court’s analysis. But because we find that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits under the Voting Rights Act, we need not, and therefore do not, reach the constitutional issues. 54 in refusing to grant the requested injunctive relief as to those provisions. 8