Opinion ID: 835833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dr 7-110(b)(1)-(4)

Text: DR 7-110(B) provides, in part: In an adversary proceeding, a lawyer shall not communicate, or cause another to communicate, as to the merits of the cause with a judge or an official before whom the proceeding is pending except: (1) In the course of official proceedings in the cause. (2) In writing if the lawyer promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel   . (3) Orally upon adequate notice to opposing counsel   . (4) As otherwise authorized by law or by Judicial Rule 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In its amended complaint, the Bar alleged that the accused had violated DR 7-110(B)(2) and (3) when he had presented both his ex parte motions. Similarly, the Bar argues on review that the accused failed to give Kosydar either prompt[ ] or adequate notice when he notified her by facsimile at the eleventh hour. The trial panel appears to have agreed with the Bar. [13] As to DR 7-110(B)(2), the accused argues that he satisfied the prompt [ ] deliver[y] requirement of that rule when he transmitted copies of his ex parte motions to Kosydar by facsimile immediately upon completing them. As to DR 7-110(B)(3), the accused argues that that rule is inapplicable to his ex parte motions because those motions constituted written  not oral  communications with the trial court. [14] We begin with DR 7-110(B)(2), which provides that a lawyer may communicate in writing as to the merits of the cause to the judge before whom the proceeding is pending, if the lawyer promptly delivers a copy of the writing to opposing counsel. (Emphasis added.) Viewed more narrowly, the rule requires prompt [ ] deliver[y] of  the writing (emphasis added) to opposing counsel. Here, the record establishes that the accused transmitted to Kosydar by facsimile copies of both his ex parte motions  the writings at issue that constituted communications with the trial court as to the merits of the cause  immediately upon completing them. He therefore satisfied the prompt [ ] deliver [y] requirement set out in DR 7-110(B)(2). The Bar argues that the accused's eleventh-hour facsimile transmissions to Kosydar violated DR 7-110(B)(2) because they contravened the purpose of DR 7-110(B), which is to prevent the effect or the appearance of granting undue advantage to one party. In re Smith, 295 Or. 755, 759, 670 P.2d 1018 (1983) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). The Bar is correct that the accused's eleventh-hour transmissions of his ex parte motions to Kosydar ( i.e., his deliver[y] of the written communications at issue) likely contravened that general purpose. However, contrary to the Bar's assertion, the wording of DR 7-110(B)(2) does not require prompt notice of a written communication on the merits with a judge; rather, it requires prompt delivery of a written communication of that type. At bottom, the Bar essentially complains of an aspect of the accused's conduct that DR 7-110(B)(2) does not prohibit. [15] We turn to DR 7-110(B)(3), which requires adequate notice to opposing counsel of an oral communication with a judge as to the merits of a cause. The Bar contended at oral argument before this court that, although the accused technically had submitted both his ex parte motions in written form, those motions properly should be viewed as oral communications because they had not consisted of the type of communication that a lawyer ordinarily would submit in writing and deliver to a judge via messenger, to be acted upon in due course. Rather, the Bar argues, the accused purposely crafted his emergency motions in writing, so as to avoid the adequate notice requirement of DR 7-110(B)(3), but then submitted them personally to the trial court for immediate action. [16] In the Bar's view, the accused cannot rely upon the form of his motions to circumvent the disciplinary rules, and, to avoid that result, this court should treat the accused's written ex parte motions as if they had been oral motions. As with the alleged violations of DR 7-110(B)(2), the Bar's argument respecting DR 7-110(B)(3) misses the mark. Although we agree that a lawyer purposefully should not seek to circumvent the disciplinary rules, and although we further agree that the accused's eleventh-hour facsimile transmissions respecting both his ex parte motions were insufficient to provide meaningful notice to Kosydar, we cannot disregard the fact that the accused submitted his ex parte communications to the court as to the merits of the cause in writing, not orally. That form of communication falls within the prompt[] deliver[y] requirement of DR 7-110(B)(2)  which the accused satisfied by immediately transmitting his motions by facsimile to Kosydar upon completing them  not the adequate notice requirement of DR 7-110(B)(3). We acknowledge that this proceeding presents an unusual factual scenario in that, notwithstanding the accused's eleventh-hour notice to Kosydar of both his ex parte motions, the form of those motions effectively assisted the accused in avoiding violations of either DR 7-110(B)(2) or (3). We further note that, in the context of the facts at issue here, we generally view the accused's conduct as unprofessional, because the accused crafted his ex parte motions so as to conform with DR 7-110(B)(2) while avoiding the reach of DR 7-110(B)(3) and because his actions effectively denied Kosydar the opportunity to prepare any meaningful response. Nevertheless, to constitute unethical conduct, the accused's actions must have contravened the wording of the disciplinary rules at issue, and, as discussed, the Bar has not proved that the accused's actions did so.