Opinion ID: 1997525
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: there is an evidentiary distinction between confessions as admissions and confessions as prior inconsistent statements

Text: The majority includes a very relevant quotation from WIGMORE: For matters properly not evidential until the rebuttal, the proponent has a right to put them in [at] that time, and they are therefore not subject to the discretionary exclusion of the trial court. Matters that should have been put in at first may by that discretion be refused later, because this is but the denial of a second opportunity. But matters of true rebuttal could not have been put in before, and to exclude them now would be to deny them their sole opportunity for admission. Hence, while the trial court's determination of what is properly rebutting evidence should be respected, yet, if its nature as such is clear, the proponent does not need the trial court's express consent to admit it as involving a departure from the customary rule. This will always be the case for evidence offered to impeach the opponent's witnesses by way of moral character, bias, self-contradiction, or the like. (Emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1873, at 678-79 (Chadbourn ed. 1976). Unfortunately, after this quotation, the majority seems to lose sight of the meaning of the quotation and confuse two separate concepts: 1) rebuttal evidence offered in contradiction to evidence offered by the defense; and 2) rebuttal evidence offered to impeach defense witnesses. See majority opinion, 349 Md. at 345-47 and n. 5, 708 A.2d at 321-22 and n. 5. Rebuttal evidence offered to contradict the defense's evidence is restricted to new issues raised by the defense, and the State cannot contradict the defense's evidence or testimony to the effect that the defendant is innocent by offering in rebuttal additional evidence that the defendant is guilty and that could have been admitted in the State's case-in-chief. Rebuttal by contradiction is limited to new matters brought out in the defense's case-in-chief. But there is a separate and distinct rule pointed out by the WIGMORE quotation and that rule is that rebuttal evidence is always proper to impeach the opponent's witnesses [including the defendant] by way of moral character, [which would include prior convictions for crimes affecting credibility, etc.], bias, self-contradiction, [which includes prior inconsistent statements], or the like. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra, at 678-79. I am in full agreement with the majority that, as a general rule, the State must put all of its substantive evidence in its case-in-chief and may not hold back substantive evidence for use as rebuttal. That general rule, however, was not violated in the instant case. What the majority fails to recognize is that a defendant's oral confession may be used in one of two ways. First, a confession is an admission by a party opponent which can be used by the State as substantive evidence in its case-in-chief. Second, if the defendant testifies in a manner inconsistent with the oral confession, the confession may be used as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the defendant. If used in this manner, the oral confession is only admitted for impeachment and not as substantive evidence. When a defendant is cross-examined about a confession and admits making the statement, the defendant may explain the inconsistencies. If, however, the defendant denies making the oral inconsistent statement or cannot remember the statement and if the statement is not collateral, then the State is permitted to put in extrinsic evidence of the confession, not as substantive evidence, but as impeachment of the defendant's testimony. See Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 729, 569 A.2d 1254, 1266 (1990). The purpose of the rebuttal testimony is, as McCORMICK states: The theory of attack by prior inconsistent statements is not based on the assumption that the present testimony is false and the former statement true but rather upon the notion that talking one way on the stand and another way previously is blowing hot and cold, and raises a doubt as to the truthfulness of both statements. (Footnote omitted). 1 JOHN W. STRONG, McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 34, at 114 (4th ed. 1992).