Opinion ID: 1264824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Elmore's Guilty Plea Was Valid

Text: Elmore argues he was not advised of the constitutional rights he would forfeit or the direct sentencing consequences that would result from a guilty plea at the time he pleaded guilty; thus, his plea is invalid because it was not knowingly and intelligently made. He additionally asserts when the trial court accepted his plea at the July 6, 1995 hearing, the State presented no factual basis to establish he killed Kristy to conceal the prior molestation or to protect or conceal the identity of the person who committed the prior molestation. Elmore asserts his guilty plea to aggravated murder was not knowingly and intelligently made under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in United States v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir.1990). Boykin identified reversible error in a trial court's acceptance of a guilty plea without having created a record that affirmatively showed the plea to be knowing and voluntary. Id. at 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709; United States v. Mulloy, 3 F.3d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir.1993). Such record must show that in pleading guilty, the defendant understood he was giving up three important constitutional rights: the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709; Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992). Contrary to Elmore's assertions, the record here clearly shows that before accepting Elmore's pleas at the July 6, 1995 hearing, the trial court, in a thorough colloquy on the record, explained these rights and others Elmore would forfeit by pleading guilty. Elmore was adamant about pleading guilty from the start, as his actions at the first appearance hearing indicated. A fair reading of the record shows that although Elmore was arraigned on June 29, 1995, and initial pleas were entered for arraignment purposes, the trial court did not accept those pleas until his rights and the consequences of such pleas were thoroughly explained to him on July 6. At the July 6 hearing, upon explaining each right that would be forfeited, the judge asked Elmore if he understood and Elmore acknowledged he did. Elmore's trial attorney also verified to the court the validity of Elmore's pleas. When asked, Elmore's attorney attested to Elmore's mental competence and stated: I might indicate to Your Honor as well that we reviewed the [Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty] in its entirety with Mr. Elmore prior to coming to court this morning. I'm convinced that it's a voluntary plea on Mr. Elmore's behalf. ... Mr. Elmore wishes to admit; I'm convinced that he did the crimes. I'm convinced that with full knowledge of the consequences he wishes to admit his guilt here today, that it's a knowing, voluntary and intelligent plea. Hearing (7-6-95) at 28-29. Moreover, the trial court questioned Elmore regarding his CrR 4.2(g) Statement of Defendant on Plea of Guilty. The record shows the direct sentencing consequences of his guilty plea were explained to and accepted by Elmore. Hearing (7-6-95) at 15-16, 26. Only at the conclusion of the hearing, after this lengthy colloquy, did the trial court finally accept Elmore's pleas and enter findings. Id. at 29. [1] Elmore's guilty pleas were valid. State v. Branch, 129 Wash.2d 635, 642 n. 2, 919 P.2d 1228 (1996) (presumption of voluntariness regarding signed plea statement is well nigh irrefutable where defendant acknowledged reading, understanding the truth of plea statement he signed, and judge takes further step of colloquy on record to verify voluntariness). Elmore also asserts he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him at the July 6, 1995 plea hearing, arguing the factual basis for his guilty plea for aggravated murder was not sufficiently developed on the record. The prosecutor's statement, acknowledged by the defendant, may provide the necessary factual basis for a guilty plea. State v. Osborne, 102 Wash.2d 87, 95, 684 P.2d 683 (1984) (factual basis for defendant's guilty plea may be any reliable source of information, including prosecutor's factual statement, so long as such source is made part of the record); In re Personal Restraint of Keene, 95 Wash.2d 203, 210, 622 P.2d 360 (1980) (factual basis of plea must be developed on the record at the time the plea is taken). Just prior to describing Kristy's rape and murder, the prosecutor read this statement: He [Elmore] indicated that he molested Kristy when she was about five years old. She had threatened him many times with disclosing this. He indicated that he thought of killing her on other occasions when she had threatened to disclose the abuse. He stated that he drove her to school Monday morning, April 17th, but didn't really intend to take her there. He became angry with her as they were driving towards the school. He told her to shut up and drove to Nulle Road, parked on an undeveloped dirt roadway. He told Kristy to do as he said or she would get seriously hurt. He took her in the back of the van, told her to take her clothing off. When she didn't comply, he took her pants and panties and lifted up her shirt and bra. He indicated that Kristy was crying and was trying to talk her way out of this. She reminded him that he promised that he would never do this again. Hearing (7-6-95) at 21-22. While the prosecutor could have made clearer in his statement of facts that, as Elmore confessed, the threat of disclosure of the prior molestation served in part as a catalyst for the murder, a jury hearing the prosecutor's statement could have concluded as much. State v. Saas, 118 Wash.2d 37, 43, 820 P.2d 505 (1991) (In determining whether a factual basis exists for a plea, the trial court need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is in fact guilty.... Rather, a factual basis exists if there is sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the defendant is guilty.); State v. Newton, 87 Wash.2d 363, 370, 552 P.2d 682 (1976). Based on the evidence presented, a jury could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt that Elmore, tired of Kristy's constant threats of disclosure, succumbed to one of his many thoughts of killing her. Cf. State v. Norval, 35 Wash.App. 775, 782-83, 669 P.2d 1264 (1983) (on the evidence presented, jury could rationally find beyond a reasonable doubt defendant intended to assault the victim). [2]