Opinion ID: 2978766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant’s Constitutional Challenges

Text: A - Due Process and Separation of Powers This court reviews de novo a constitutional challenge to a sentence. United States v. Crowell, 493 F.3d 744, 749 (6th Cir. 2007). The prosecution argues that we should review for plain error, asserting that Stonerock did not preserve his constitutional challenges. We do not agree, as Stonerock raised his constitutional challenges in a motion to stay sentencing, motion to vacate plea, and a sentencing memorandum. Stonerock argues that his sentencing violated constitutional principles of separation of powers and due process. He maintains that the Constitution limits Congress’s authority to mandate minimum sentences to three classes of cases: counterfeiting, piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, -5- No. 07-3739 United States v. Stonerock and treason. He asserts that the framers contemplated that a judge would freely fashion an offender’s sentence except in these three categories of cases, and that the Sentencing Guidelines on crimes other than thes are beyond Congress’s constitutional authority. Stonerock asserts that the Guidelines as a whole, or specifically as they relate to the crime for which he was sentenced, are unconstitutional. Stonerock also maintains that Executive branch control of the ability of the judiciary to exercise its power is an unconstitutional delegation of judicial power to the Executive branch. Stonerock points to the requirement of a § 5K1.1 motion from the prosecutor as a precondition for the sentencing judge to deviate below the otherwise minimum sentencing, asserting that it gives judicial authority to a member of the Executive branch. Stonerock asserts that the Sentencing Reform Act grants unfettered discretion to the Executive to act as the only effective advocate for the rights of the accused at sentencing by granting the prosecutor unlimited authority to permit the judicial officer to deviate downward from the sentencing guidelines. We perceive no constitutional violation. 1 “Congress. . . has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime, and the scope of judicial discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Following Mistretta, this court rejected separation-of-powers challenges to mandatory minimum sentencing in United States v. Odeneal, 517 F.3d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendant’s argument that statutory mandatory sentence violates the separation of powers doctrine because mandatory minimums unconstitutionally shift -6- No. 07-3739 United States v. Stonerock sentencing discretion from courts to prosecutors).1 Further, the courts that have addressed whether the separation of powers doctrine is violated by U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1's and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e)’s requirement of a government motion as a prerequisite to a reduced sentence based on a defendant’s cooperation, have held in the negative. See United States v. Spees, 911 F.2d 126, 127-28 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Huerta, 878 F.2d 89, 91-93 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. den. 493 U.S. 1046 (1990); United States v. Ayarza, 874 F.2d 647, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. den. 493 U.S. 1047 (1990); see also United States v. Severich, 676 F.Supp. 1209, 1210-11 (S.D. Fla. 1988), aff’d, 872 F.2d 434 (11th Cir. 1989). In United States v. Allen, 873 F.2d 963, 965-66 (6th Cir. 1989), this court held that the due process clause is not violated by a court’s sentencing pursuant to the Guidelines. This court and other 1 At argument, defense counsel asserted that Odeneal, supra, was distinguishable in that it involved an Eighth Amendment question, and that Mistretta did not address limitation of powers. We are not persuaded by this distinction. Odeneal did involve an Eighth Amendment challenge. The defendant Andres argued that application of a mandatory life sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it was grossly disproportionate to the offenses at issue, i.e., conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and possession of firearms in furtherance of a drugtrafficking crime. 517 F.3d at 413-14. However, Andres also argued “that a statutory mandatory sentence violates the separation of powers doctrine because mandatory minimums unconstitutionally shift sentencing discretion away from the courts to prosecutors.” Id. at 414. This court noted that it had “flatly” rejected that argument: We have flatly rejected this argument because “‘the scope of juridical discretion with respect to a sentence is subject to congressional control.’” United States v. Dumas, 934 F.2d 1387, 1389 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 364, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L. Ed. 2d 714 (1989)). See also id. (“Congress can constitutionally eliminate all discretion in sentencing judges by establishing mandatory sentences . . . .”) 517 F.3d at 414. -7- No. 07-3739 United States v. Stonerock circuit courts have also rejected claims that Congress’s enactment of minimum sentences violates a defendant’s due process right to an individualized sentence. See United States v. Dumas, 934 F.2d 1387, 1389 (6th Cir. 1990), see also United States v. Brownlie, 915 F.2d 527, 528 (9th Cir. 1990). B -Ineffective Assistance of Counsel § 5C1.2 safety valve and conflict of interest Stonerock asserts he was denied effective assistance of counsel because one of his attorneys, Arntz, had a clear conflict of interest created by his representation of Stephen Sammons, another alleged co-conspirator, in two separate criminal prosecutions, this case and another in Arizona. Without citing to the record, Stonerock states that Sammons inculpated Stonerock in Arizona. He further asserts that Arntz reassured him that he would receive the benefit of the sentencing safety valve under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, and that he relied on Arntz’s representation in his decision to accept the plea agreement. Stonerock maintains that Arntz’s “conflicted and incorrect advice” led him to plead guilty and, had he known application of the safety valve was not possible, he would have insisted on pursuing the motion to suppress the firearms, and/or a trial on the merits. Stonerock maintains that Arntz’s advice regarding the safety valve being available was due either to Arntz’s representation of Sammons or due to Arntz’s ineffective performance. Stonerock did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim below. Generally, this court will not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on direct appeal unless the record is adequately developed. United States v. Campbell, 549 F.3d 364, 376-77 (6th Cir. 2008). The record as developed does not establish Stonerock’s claim. Thus, his ineffective assistance -8- No. 07-3739 United States v. Stonerock claim is best addressed in a post-conviction proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 502-09 (2003); United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 338 (6th Cir. 2005). Conflict of Interest On appeal, Stonerock asserts that the district court recognized that Stonerock’s counsel, Arntz, had an actual conflict by simultaneously representing Stonerock and Sammons in two separate criminal prosecutions. Stonerock notes that the district court did not realize this until after Stonerock had pled guilty on Arntz’s advice. A review of the record establishes that it was co-defendant Mobley’s counsel that raised the possibility of a conflict of interest at one of the sentencing hearings, on April 1, 2004, during a discussion prompted by the district court’s inquiry into the status of the Arizona case. There was discussion between the court, counsel for Mobley, and counsel for Stonerock, Arntz and Katchmer, regarding delaying sentencing in this case until the Arizona matter was resolved. Apparently the Arizona defendants were Stonerock, Sammons, and several others. Arntz and Katchmer told the district court that attorney Jon Rion was representing Stonerock in Arizona, and that Arntz was representing Sammons in Arizona. The conflict issue never arose again. The record is thus inadequately developed to address this issue as well. See Campbell, 549 F.3d at 376-77.