Opinion ID: 2144187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Post-Sentencing Hearing

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in ruling that the testimony of the defense's clinical psychologist at the post-sentencing hearing was not credible where that ruling was based solely on the fact that the clinical psychologist was not a medical doctor. The record shows that defendant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea after she had been sentenced to death. The trial court conducted a hearing to determine whether defendant's guilty plea was intelligent, knowing, and voluntary. At the hearing, defendant's trial counsel testified that he talked to defendant three or four times about the plea and explained the advantages and disadvantages of pleading guilty. Trial counsel stated that he did not coerce defendant into pleading guilty. Rather, it was defendant's decision to plead guilty. In fact, according to trial counsel, defendant directed him to enter her plea of guilty. Defendant also testified at the post-sentencing hearing and contradicted trial counsel's testimony. Defendant insisted that it was trial counsel's idea for her to plead guilty. According to defendant, she pled guilty because trial counsel did not give her much of a choice. In addition to defendant, the defense called Dr. Michael Kovar, a clinical psychologist, to testify at the post-sentencing hearing. Dr. Kovar testified that he conducted several psychological tests on defendant. In his opinion, these tests showed that defendant was highly suggestible and easily misled. Dr. Kovar believed that defendant was confused about her guilty plea and did not know the basic facts. Dr. Kovar opined that defendant was not competent to understand the language used by the judge regarding the relinquishment of her rights. For example, Dr. Kovar stated that defendant did not have a clue what reasonable doubt meant, did not understand the burden of proof, and was unsure exactly what the jury would be selected to hear. Dr. Kovar attributed defendant's lack of understanding to defendant's deficiencies in the fund of information, vocabulary, and commonsense reasoning. Based on his test findings, her mental status, her history and her overall presentation, Dr. Kovar concluded that defendant's plea of guilty was not knowingly and intelligently made, given defendant's lack of competence at the time she pled guilty. Dr. Kovar diagnosed defendant as having a depressive disorder, a general anxiety disorder, and presently manifesting borderline intellectual functioning. After considering all of the evidence, the trial judge found Dr. Kovar's testimony to be incredible. The trial judge commented, He's not a psychiatrist. He's not a medical doctor. The trial judge then proceeded to explain that Dr. Kovar's testimony was not credible based on the fact that he witnessed defendant when she pled guilty, and he believed trial counsel's testimony that it was defendant's idea to plead guilty. More specifically, the trial judge made the following findings: That [the plea] was her choice. She entered that plea in front of me. She was admonished as to what the penalties were, what her rights were. She indicated to me that she understood and I believed her, and I've been talking to defendants for a long time, that she did it knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. The trial judge ultimately denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Defendant contends that the trial court was improper in its ruling regarding Dr. Kovar's credibility as an expert witness. It is defendant's position that the trial court rejected Dr. Kovar's testimony for the sole reason that Dr. Kovar was only a clinical psychologist as opposed to being a psychiatrist and a medical doctor. Defendant argues that it was irrelevant that Dr. Kovar was neither a psychiatrist nor a medical doctor. Because Dr. Kovar was a registered clinical psychologist, defendant insists that he was qualified by law to testify as to defendant's state of mind and menial impairments at the time of her guilty plea. In view of the trial court's improper basis for finding Dr. Kovar to be incredible, defendant contends that she is entitled to a new hearing on her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Initially, we note that a clinical psychologist is qualified to render an expert opinion as to a defendant's fitness to plead guilty, stand trial, be sentenced or be executed. 730 ILCS 5/5-2-5 (West 1992). In fact, the testimony of a clinical psychologist should not be disregarded merely because that witness is not a psychiatrist or a medical doctor. See People v. Noble, 42 Ill.2d 425, 248 N.E.2d 96 (1969). Although a clinical psychologist's testimony should not be disregarded on this basis, the trial court is not required to accept the psychologist's opinion that the defendant was not competent. See People v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 525, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995); People v. Pugh, 157 Ill.2d 1, 24, 191 Ill.Dec. 10, 623 N.E.2d 255 (1993). It is the trial court's function to assess the credibility and weight to be given to psychiatric expert testimony. See Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 525, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919. After considering the trial judge's ruling, we find that the trial judge's determination that Dr. Kovar's testimony was incredible was not improper. We acknowledge that the trial judge improperly commented about the witness not being a medical doctor or a psychiatrist. The record, however, demonstrates that the trial judge did not reject Dr. Kovar's credibility because he was not a medical doctor or a psychiatrist. Rather, the trial judge did not agree with Dr. Kovar's conclusions because of his own observations of defendant while presiding over the proceedings in this case, and because he found trial counsel to be credible. As stated, the trial court is not required to accept the expert's finding. Instead, it is the function of the trial court to assess the credibility of the expert's testimony. See Coleman, 168 Ill.2d at 525, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919. Consequently, the trial judge properly rejected Dr. Kovar's credibility in light of other evidence. We therefore conclude that the trial judge's comment regarding Dr. Kovar does not warrant the granting of a new hearing on the motion to withdraw defendant's guilty plea.