Opinion ID: 2197835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Complainant's Prior Sexual History

Text: First, appellant argues that he was improperly precluded from exploring C.M.'s proclivity for rough sex, and that he should have been able to explore the possibility that C.M.'s injuries resulted from consensualbut roughsex with Turner and not from the alleged assault by appellant. The trial judge conducted voir dire, during which C.M. testified that she did not sustain any injuries when she had sex with Turner, and ruled that because there was no evidentiary foundation that C.M. had a previous injury, appellant's proposed inquiry into C.M.'s consensual sexual activities was impermissible under the Rape Shield Law. [5] The trial judge informed defense counsel, however, that he would be willing to voir dire Turner or accept any other evidence that would lay a foundation for the claim that C.M.'s injuries were not inflicted by appellant but were sustained as a result of C.M.'s and Turner's consensual sex. Defense counsel did not proffer any such evidence or request that Turner be called for voir dire. Under the Rape Shield Law, D.C.Code §§ 22-3021 to -3022 (2001), [i]n a sex offense case, evidence of a victim's sexual history with someone other than the defendant is generally inadmissible. Bryant v. United States, 859 A.2d 1093, 1104 (D.C. 2004). There are, however, limited exceptions, including for evidence of [p]ast sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not . . . the source of . . . bodily injury. D.C.Code § 22-3022(a)(2)(A). [6] The law provides a procedure for an in limine motion, accompanied by a written offer of proof, and, [i]f the court determines that the offer of proof contains evidence admissible under the exceptions, the court shall order a hearing in chambers to determine if such evidence is admissible. Id. § 22-3022(b)(1)-(2). If the relevancy of the evidence which the accused seeks to offer in the trial depends upon the fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court . . . shall accept evidence on the issue of whether such condition of fact is fulfilled and shall determine such issue. Id. § 22-3022(b)(2). In other words, in order to present evidence under one of the exceptions, the defendant must have an evidentiary foundationin this case, for the proposition that a prior sexual encounter could have caused the injuries in question. See Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 92 (D.C.2004) (Evidence of prior sexual activity by the victim in a sexual abuse case `should not be admitted except in the most unusual cases where the probative value [of the evidence] is precisely demonstrated.') (quoting McLean v. United States, 377 A.2d 74, 79 (D.C.1977)); see also State v. Harris, 360 N.C. 145, 622 S.E.2d 615, 620 (2005) (no error in excluding evidence of consensual sex with someone other than defendant where there was no evidence to support the inference that the victim's prior sexual activity was forced or caused any injuries); State v. Green, 55 Conn.App. 706, 740 A.2d 450, 455 (1999) (no error in excluding evidence of prior consensual sex act where no medical foundation for how consensual intercourse could be the source of the injuries); State v. Devers, 2005 WL 724081, , 2005 Iowa App. Lexis 209, -17 (Iowa Ct.App.2005) (no error in excluding evidence of victim having sex with somebody other than defendant twelve hours prior to alleged assault because there was no evidence presented that the prior sexual activity was rough, resisted, anything other than consensual, or that any injury resulted from such activity). It is only after that threshold determination of relevance is made, that the trial court considers whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial impact and should be admitted. See D.C.Code § 22-3022(b)(3). The trial court followed the procedure set out in the statute and held a hearing on appellant's motion to introduce evidence of C.M.'s alleged preference for rough sex with Turner as the cause of the injuries she blamed on appellant's assault. During voir dire, C.M. denied that she sustained injury from her consensual sex with Turner, a necessary precondition to its relevance to the accusation against appellant in this case. The trial court recognized the potential relevance of the proffer and expressed willingness to voir dire Turner and consider other evidence that might provide the necessary foundation. Defense counsel did not seek to voir dire Turner to establish that his sexual encounters with C.M. were particularly rough, however, and appellant did not offer any evidence to support his claim that C.M.'s injuries were the result of her having engaged in rough sex with someone else. [7] The Rape Shield Law was enacted as a safeguard against unwarranted invasions of privacy and also serves to exclude legally irrelevant evidence that may distract the jury or lead it to discount the complainant's injury because of societal stereotypes and prejudices. Cf. Bryant, 859 A.2d at 1104; see also Anderson v. Morrow, 371 F.3d 1027, 1030 (9th Cir. 2004) (A state passing a rape shield law makes a valid legislative determination that rape victims deserve heightened protection against surprise, harassment, and unnecessary invasions of privacy.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The evidentiary foundational requirement is the bedrock of the protection of victims of sexual assault because it ensures that accounts of a complainant's prior sexual history are not admitted on tenuous or unjustified claims of relevance. Without any evidentiary foundation that C.M.'s injuries could have resulted from her consensual acts, the Rape Shield Law precludes inquiry into C.M.'s sexual relationship with Turner. Nonetheless, defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine C.M. about her relationship with Turner. C.M. acknowledged she had sex with him the week before the charged assaults and said that Turner had beat [her] up, a point defense counsel stressed to the jury during closing argument. There was no medical testimony, however, that the rough sex C.M. admitted having had with Turner could explain the significant fresh bruises and contusions that were observed all over her body by the examining doctor immediately after the charged assault. Whatever the jury may have thought of C.M.'s sexual preferences, or her prior beating by Turner, it obviously concludedin the face of that evidencethat appellant assaulted her in the manner that she and her son Michael described. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse discretion in limiting appellant's cross-examination. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 367 (D.C.1979) (noting that it is only when an error in the exercise of discretion requires reversal because of prejudicial impact on the defendant, that we hold that the trial court `abused' discretion).