Opinion ID: 2032138
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: submitting contributory negligence to jury

Text: Dolberg assigns that the court erred in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. As Dolberg asserts, when contributory negligence is pled as a defense and there is no competent evidence to support it, it is prejudicial error to submit to the jury issues involving contributory and comparative negligence. Center State Bank v. Dana, Larson, Roubal & Assoc., 226 Neb. 408, 411 N.W.2d 635 (1987). Dolberg essentially claims that there was no possibility that she was contributorily negligent because she had a green light at the time of the collision. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-6,123(1)(a) (Reissue 1993) provides: Vehicular traffic facing a circular green indication may proceed straight through or turn right or left unless a sign at such place prohibits either such turn, but vehicular traffic, including vehicles turning right or left, shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and to pedestrians lawfully within the intersection or an adjacent crosswalk at the time such indication is exhibited. Pursuant to § 60-6,123, a driver approaching a green traffic light is in the privileged position. However, we have previously held that intersection right-of-way is a qualified, not absolute, right to proceed through an intersection, exercising due care, in a lawful manner in preference to another vehicle. Herman v. Lee, 210 Neb. 563, 316 N.W.2d 56 (1982); Reese v. Mayer, 198 Neb. 499, 253 N.W.2d 317 (1977). See, also, Floyd v. Worobec, 248 Neb. 605, 537 N.W.2d 512 (1995). We have also held that although one in a favored position may assume, until he has warning, notice, or knowledge to the contrary, that others will use a highway lawfully, he must nonetheless keep a proper lookout and watch where he is driving. Burrows v. Jacobsen, 209 Neb. 778, 780, 311 N.W.2d 880, 883 (1981). In fact, we recently held, with regard to a road protected by stop signs, that a driver approaching an intersection is not in a favored position and entitled to proceed merely because that driver has the right-of-way. Floyd v. Worobec, supra . We have also examined the question of whether a motorist was contributorily negligent in failing to recognize that another motorist would not stop. In Steinauer v. Sarpy County, 217 Neb. 830, 353 N.W.2d 715 (1984), a dumptruck failed to yield the right-of-way to another motorist. Although we stated that we are not prepared to say that the driver of a motor vehicle must slow down at every intersection in anticipation that the driver of the vehicle on the nonfavored street is about to commit a negligent act, we also recognized that even a driver on a favored highway must keep a proper lookout. Id. at 840, 353 N.W.2d at 722. Furthermore, in Sacco v. Gau, 188 Neb. 808, 199 N.W.2d 605 (1972), a car and a truck collided in an urban intersection controlled by a traffic signal; however, each party claimed to have a green light. Nevertheless, we found the evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that Gau had a green light, because two witnesses corroborated Gau's account that he had the green light. In discussing the issue of whether Gau was operating at a lawful speed, we noted that Gau had a right to assume, if he had the right-of-way, that other drivers would respect his right-of-way and not run a red light. Id. at 812, 199 N.W.2d at 608. Additionally, we noted, In view of the fact that Gau was entitled to assume that the Scapellato car would stop for the red light and could not reasonably have been expected to avoid the accident when it failed to do so, we cannot perceive wherein he was negligent. Id. at 813, 199 N.W.2d at 609. Under § 60-6,123, a driver with a green light must yield the right-of-way to other vehicles and pedestrians lawfully within the intersection. We recognize that we have previously said that the motorist's right-of-way is subject to the rights of those already in the intersection. See, Graves v. Bednar, 171 Neb. 499, 107 N.W.2d 12 (1960); Styskal v. Brickey, 158 Neb. 208, 62 N.W.2d 854 (1954); Laurinat v. Giery, 157 Neb. 681, 61 N.W.2d 251 (1953). However, in each of these cases, there was evidence that the vehicle already in the intersection entered the intersection lawfully. Therefore, our previous holdings do not contradict the statutorily imposed duty to yield to those lawfully within the intersection. However, Paltani did not enter the intersection lawfully. In light of the uncontroverted testimony that the light for Douglas Street was green, the trial court decided that Paltani ran the red light and was therefore negligent as a matter of law. Because she ran the red light, Paltani was not lawfully in the intersection. Again, it is undisputed that Dolberg had the green light. Paltani is asserting neither that she had the green light nor that she entered the intersection on a steady yellow, could not stop safely, and was thereby authorized to proceed cautiously. See § 60-6,123(2)(a). However, § 60-6,123 does not delineate the duty of a driver approaching a vehicle or pedestrian unlawfully in the intersection. Therefore, we must determine the duty of a driver with a green traffic light to keep a lookout for vehicles entering the intersection unlawfully from a cross street. We hold that absent exceptional circumstances, a motorist on a favored street with a green light does not have the duty to anticipate the negligence of a motorist on a cross street who runs a red light. By exceptional circumstances, we mean where the driver could have easily avoided the accident by exercising the slightest degree of care. As no such extreme circumstances were present in this case, there was not sufficient evidence to support the court's submission of the issue of contributory negligence to the jury. By submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury, the court committed prejudicial error.