Opinion ID: 1982561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the receipt in evidence at the trial on the merits of allgood's grand jury testimony

Text: Prior to the trial on the merits the State announced that it proposed to offer Allgood's testimony before the Grand Jury in its case in chief. Defense counsel objected. He claimed that the Grand Jury testimony is not admissible in any event. When the State proffered the transcript of the Grand Jury testimony at trial, the court admitted it over the objection of defense counsel. The Court of Special Appeals, in its unreported opinion, held that the trial court did not err when it admitted the Grand Jury testimony into evidence at the trial on the merits. It relied on Ball v. State, 57 Md. App. 338, 365-366, 470 A.2d 361 (1984). It said: We hold, as we did in Ball, that the statements made by appellant in connection with the plea agreement were admissible against him at trial after the agreement had been terminated because of his breach. His testimony before the grand jury was voluntary and admissible. He had been warned, prior to testifying before the grand jury, that he was not required to incriminate himself and that his testimony could be used against him if he subsequently went to trial on the pending charges. The case reported as Ball v. State actually involved two defendants in addition to Sheldon Savior Ball  Joseph Melvin Wright and Kenneth D. Coley. Each of them sought a writ of certiorari. We denied Ball's petition. 300 Md. 88, 475 A.2d 1200 (1984). We granted Coley's petition, id., and Wright's petition, id. at 90, 475 A.2d 1202, and decided their cases in one opinion, reported as Wright v. State, 307 Md. 552, 515 A.2d 1157 (1986). We reversed as to Wright, and affirmed as to Coley. We look to that part of our decision with respect to Coley, for it concerned the admissibility in evidence of a plea agreement entered between the State's Attorney and ... Coley, and Coley's confession pursuant to that agreement. Id. at 555, 515 A.2d 1157. The gist of the agreement was that Coley promised to give a full statement and testify before the grand jury and at trial in return for the State's promise to accept a plea of guilty to second degree murder. The plea agreement stated that if Coley broke his promise, the State could use any of his statements against him.... Coley testified before a grand jury. Later Coley reneged on his part of the plea agreement, elected to stand trial on a not guilty plea, and moved to suppress all of his statements on grounds of involuntariness. Id. at 579, 515 A.2d 1157. Coley conceded that the police had complied with the dictates of Miranda, but claimed that the State had induced him to confess by agreeing to drop the first degree murder charge and accept a plea to second degree murder. The trial court denied Coley's motion, and, at trial admitted Coley's plea agreement, confession, and grand jury testimony despite repeated objections from Coley. Coley relied on the Maryland inducement rule set forth in Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 406 A.2d 415 (1979), and other cases. Id. We reviewed our cases which developed and applied the inducement rule. We found that it excluded from evidence a confession or statement by a defendant which was obtained by enforcement authorities through an improper inducement. Id. 307 Md. at 585, 515 A.2d 1157. Eldridge, J., for the Court, pointed out: It would be anomalous, however, to hold that the State's actions were improper when they are expressly authorized by law (i.e. Rule 4-243) and when the State neither rescinds nor breaches the plea bargain agreement. Id. In addition, Judge Eldridge observed, Rule 4-243(d), on its face, does not contemplate that defendant's promises can be deemed per se involuntary on the ground that they were induced by the State's promises. Id. The circumstances as to Coley were that the inducement took the form of promises under a negotiated plea bargain agreement, made in exchange for Coley's promises under that agreement. The agreement was sanctioned and regulated by Rule 4-243. The mutual promises were specifically authorized by the Rule. The State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement. Finally, the agreement specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could be used against him at trial. Id. at 583-585, 515 A.2d 1157. In those circumstances, we did not believe that it would foster the policy favoring plea bargain agreements to hold Coley's statements inadmissible. On the contrary, it would likely have the opposite result, encouraging defendants to rescind consummated plea bargain agreements without justification. Id. at 587, 515 A.2d 1157. We rejected Coley's urging that on policy grounds the inducement rule of Hillard should be extended to situations like those of Coley in order to encourage plea bargaining. Wright at 585-587, 515 A.2d 1157. In considering this notion, we examined numerous cases in other jurisdictions relied on by Coley. Some were to the effect that offers and statements made in plea bargain negotiations should not be admitted at trial. Id. at 586 n. 9, 515 A.2d 1157. Some held that defendants' statements made pursuant to plea agreements rescinded or breached by the State should not be admitted. Id. n. 10. There were some which concluded that inculpatory statements should not be admitted when there was no showing that the defendant rescinded or breached the plea agreement. Id. n. 11. Some decided that statements made in connection with withdrawn guilty pleas should not be admitted. Id. n. 12. We further noticed Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. We believed, however, that the cases relied on by Coley were entirely distinguishable from the circumstances in his case. Id. at 586, 515 A.2d 1157. We ascertained, on the other hand, that in situations analogous to those of Coley, courts have held that defendants' inculpatory statements are admissible. Id. at 587 n. 13, 515 A.2d 1157. The decisive difference between Coley's situation and that of Allgood is that the defendant reneged on the agreement in the former but the State terminated the agreement in the latter. In Coley's case, the State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement. Id. at 586, 515 A.2d 1157. In Allgood's case the State flatly rescinded the agreement in a letter to defense counsel, and thereafter refused to submit it to the court. It proceeded to try Allgood on the murder and robbery charges despite his desire to plead pursuant to the agreement. Furthermore, the Coley agreement specified that if Coley reneged, his inculpatory statements could be used against him at trial. Id. at 585, 515 A.2d 1157. The agreement with Allgood contained no such provision. Allgood answered Yes when he appeared before the Grand Jury to the question if he understood that anything you say here can be used against you in a court of law. But this is far from an agreement that his statements could be used against him at trial. In fact, the accuracy of the question so broadly phrased is at least questionable. In our rejection of Coley's importuning that we extend the inducement rule to include promises under plea agreements, we noted our accord with those cases relied on by Coley that held in effect that defendants' statements made pursuant to plea agreements rescinded or breached by the State should not be admitted.... Id. at 586, 515 A.2d 1157. We said: We ... agree that defendants would be reluctant to enter plea bargaining agreements if the State court thereafter rescind or breach the agreements, and then use at trial the defendant's inculpatory statement made as part of the agreement or pursuant thereto. Id. However, we carefully pointed out and stressed that in Coley's situation [t]he State neither rescinded nor breached the agreement. Wright, 307 Md. at 585, 515 A.2d 1157. We iterated that fact shortly thereafter, id., and reiterated it, id. at 586, 515 A.2d 1157. We emphasized that aspect in discussing the terms of the Coley agreement. In declaring that the State's actions could not be said to be improper when they are expressly authorized by Rule 4-243, we added and when the State neither rescinds nor breaches the plea bargain agreement. Id. at 585, 515 A.2d 1157 (emphasis supplied).