Opinion ID: 2758259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Text and Facebook Messages

Text: Mr. Brinson argues that the district court erroneously admitted messages from an account on Facebook.com and text messages from Mr. Brinson’s cellphone. According to Mr. Brinson, these rulings violated the Federal Rules of Evidence and Mr. Brinson’s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We ordinarily review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Blechman, 657 F.3d 1052, 1063 (10th Cir. 2011). But we review the Sixth Amendment issue de novo. United States v. Mendez, 514 F.3d 1035, 1043 (10th Cir. 2008). 9 We hold that  introduction of the Facebook messages did not constitute hearsay and their introduction did not violate the Sixth Amendment, and  Mr. Brinson has waived his challenge to introduction of the “text messages” by failing to identify the disputed messages.
At trial, the prosecution offered Facebook messages written by “Twinchee Vanto.” The prosecution argued that “Twinchee Vanto” was a fake name used by Mr. Brinson. Mr. Brinson challenges this argument, insisting that he did not write the Facebook messages. 3 We reject this challenge and hold that the district court reasonably concluded that the prosecution had proven authorship by a preponderance of the evidence.
A statement is not considered “hearsay” if it is offered against a party and is the party’s own statement. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Proponents of the evidence need only show by a preponderance of the evidence that the opposing party had made the statement. See United 3 Mr. Brinson also asserts that the documents “do not meet the criteria for reliability and authentication.” See Mr. Brinson’s Opening Br. at 46. But, Mr. Brinson does not sufficiently develop this argument. Thus, we deem this argument waived. See United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) (stating that “arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived”) (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998)). 10 States v. Lang, 364 F.3d 1210, 1222 (10th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1108 (2005). To link Mr. Brinson to the messages, the government had to show by a preponderance of evidence that Mr. Brinson was “Twinchee Vanto.” The prosecution sufficiently established that link through five facts: 1. The “Twinchee Vanto” account was registered to an email address: “tarranb@yahoo.com.” 2. “Twinchee Vanto” identified himself in one message as “Tarran.” 3. A witness testified that “Twinchee Vanto” had identified himself as “Tarran.” 4. A phone number on the bill of sale for Mr. Brinson’s SUV matched the number that “Twinchee Vanto” had given as a contact number. 5. Two witnesses testified that “Twinchee Vanto” was Mr. Brinson’s “Facebook name” and that Mr. Brinson was known as “Twin.” V-VI Aplt. App. at 979, 1073, 1121-31. Mr. Brinson presented evidence that other individuals had access to the Facebook account and had posted messages. But the district court could reasonably find by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Brinson had authored the messages. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1987). Therefore, the district court properly admitted the Facebook messages as statements of a party opponent. 11
Because the messages did not constitute “hearsay,” their introduction did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 182.
Mr. Brinson also argues that the district court erroneously admitted text messages from Mr. Brinson’s cellphone. This argument has not been adequately developed. Mr. Brinson states in his headings and issue statements that the court “erred in admitting . . . text messages.” See Mr. Brinson’s Opening Br. at 2, 42. But Mr. Brinson has not identified the text messages erroneously admitted. Because Mr. Brinson has not adequately developed this argument, we deem it waived. See United States v. Cooper, 654 F.3d 1104, 1128 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding that “arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived”) (quoting Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998)).