Opinion ID: 1993228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reprosecution Upon State's Successful Appeal

Text: We have concluded that the State has a statutory right to appeal the decision by the Justice of the Peace Court to terminate the prosecution against Pusey because that decision, not based upon the sufficiency of the State's evidence, was a dismissal rather than an acquittal. The remaining question to be decided is whether Pusey can be retried if the State's appeal is successful. The United States Supreme Court has held that, if a defendant voluntarily terminates the trial without any determination of factual guilt or innocence, a retrial following a successful appeal by the government does not violate the defendant's rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause of the federal constitution. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 101, 98 S.Ct. at 2199. [2] This Court has previously noted that § 9902 is not broad enough to permit any appeal by the State that does not violate the principles of Double Jeopardy. State v. Bailey, 523 A.2d at 537 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the Delaware General Assembly has enacted a statutory double jeopardy scheme that addresses the preclusive effect of former prosecutions on subsequent prosecutions. However, this case does not require us to determine whether the Delaware statutory double jeopardy scheme provides greater protection than the Double Jeopardy provision in the federal constitution. 11 Del.C. § 207. The State's ability to retry Pusey is the same under the Delaware double jeopardy statute as it is pursuant to the United States Constitution. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. at 101, 98 S.Ct. at 2199. The Delaware double jeopardy statute provides in pertinent part, as follows: When a prosecution is for a violation of the same statutory provisions and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is barred by the former prosecution under the following circumstances: (4) The former prosecution was improperly terminated. Except as provided in this subdivision there is an improper termination of a prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and it takes place after the first witness is sworn but before verdict. Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper: a. The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by motion to dismiss or otherwise, his right to object to the termination. b. The trial court declares a mistrial in accordance with law. 11 Del.C. § 207(4). In this case, the record reflects that Pusey's trial was terminated, after the first witness was sworn and jeopardy had attached, for reasons that did not constitute an acquittal. The record also reflects that the termination of the prosecution was not improper because it was made pursuant to Pusey's motion to dismiss. Consequently, if the State's appeal is successful, the Delaware double jeopardy statute does not bar Pusey's reprosecution for the same offenses. 11 Del.C. § 207.