Opinion ID: 2815884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reckless Indifference to Human Life

Text: Consideration of Matthews‘s mens rea also leads us to conclude he is legally ineligible for a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. Reckless indifference to human life ―requires the defendant be ‗subjectively aware that his or her participation in the felony involved a grave risk of death.‘ ‖ (People v. Mil, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 417, quoting People v. Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at 20 p. 577.) There was evidence from which the jury could infer Matthews knew he was participating in an armed robbery. But nothing at trial supported the conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt that Matthews knew his own actions would involve a grave risk of death. There was no evidence Matthews intended to kill or, unlike the Tisons, knowingly conspired with accomplices known to have killed before. Instead, as in Enmund, Banks‘s killing of Gonzalez was apparently a spontaneous response to armed resistance from the victim. The Court of Appeal, in a line of reasoning endorsed by the People, concluded that ―[w]ith advance knowledge of the planned robbery and burglary, Matthews had to be aware of the risk of resistance and the extreme likelihood that death could result.‖7 According to the appellate court, Matthews‘s confederates surely ―anticipated as much because they were armed,‖ and although Matthews was not armed, the jury could readily infer Matthews knew his confederates were. The problem with the sufficiency of such evidence to prove reckless indifference to human life is that Enmund and Tison deem identical evidence inadequate. In Enmund, the Supreme Court rejected exactly this argument, that the risk of death inherent in an armed robbery justifies the death penalty simply for knowingly participating in such a crime. ―It would be very different if the likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony. But competent observers have concluded that there is no basis in experience for the notion that death so frequently occurs in the course of a felony for which killing is not an essential ingredient that the death penalty should be considered as 7 The prosecutor‘s closing argument rested on the same theory: Matthews knowingly participated in a robbery, and the fact armed robberies carry with them ―a possibility someone may get killed‖ is common knowledge. 21 a justifiable deterrent to the felony itself.‖ (Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 799.) In Tison as well, the Arizona Supreme Court had employed the same logic as the Court of Appeal here, reasoning that the constitutional culpability requirement was satisfied by the fact a participant in an armed robbery could anticipate lethal force might be used. The United States Supreme Court was unpersuaded, observing Earl Enmund himself might well have anticipated the use of lethal force as a possibility, for ―the possibility of bloodshed is inherent in the commission of any violent felony and this possibility is generally foreseeable and foreseen; it is one principal reason that felons arm themselves.‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 151.) This understanding of the requisite culpability ―amounts to little more than a restatement of the felony-murder rule itself‖ (ibid.), rendering death eligible every felony-murder accomplice and running afoul of the Enmund court‘s holding that death is a disproportionate penalty for participation in ―felony murder simpliciter.‖ (Tison, at p. 148; id. at pp. 146–149.) Awareness of no more than the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any armed crime is insufficient; only knowingly creating a ―grave risk of death‖ satisfies the constitutional minimum. (Id. at p. 157.) The People attempt to distinguish Tison‘s discussion of the issue by noting it arose as part of the high court‘s rejection of the Arizona Supreme Court‘s equating knowledge of the foreseeability of possible death with the intent to kill called for by Enmund. However true, this point does not sap the discussion of its force. While Tison slightly revised the mental culpability necessary for death eligibility, from intent to kill to reckless indifference toward human life, it simultaneously concluded knowledge of the possible risk of death inherent in certain felonies (like armed robbery) would not satisfy this lesser standard either. The Tison court distinguished the defendants before it from ―the category of 22 felony murderers for whom Enmund explicitly held the death penalty disproportional,‖ because for the Tisons, unlike for Earl Enmund and his ilk, ―the record would support a finding of the culpable mental state of reckless indifference to human life.‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 151.) The Supreme Court thus made clear felony murderers like Enmund, who simply had awareness their confederates were armed and armed robberies carried a risk of death, lack the requisite reckless indifference to human life. The Court of Appeal‘s equating Matthews‘s similar awareness with reckless indifference to human life cannot be squared with Enmund and Tison.8 Alternatively, the People highlight the United States Supreme Court‘s recognition that ―there are some felonies as to which one could properly conclude that any major participant necessarily exhibits reckless indifference to the value of 8 In People v. Lopez (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1106, the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole after she lured a man into an alley under the pretext of engaging in prostitution, whereupon he was robbed and murdered by her accomplice. The Court of Appeal opined that evidence the defendant knew her accomplice ―had a gun shows that she acted with reckless indifference to the life of the man she lured into the alley.‖ (Id. at p. 1116.) That the defendant may have acted with the requisite reckless indifference was supported by other evidence as well, and we need not resolve whether Lopez was correctly decided based on that other evidence. However, we disapprove People v. Lopez, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th 1106 to the extent it holds the knowledge one‘s accomplice is armed can, by itself, establish reckless indifference to human life under section 190.2(d). In People v. Hodgson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 566, the Court of Appeal upheld a robbery-murder special circumstance, reasoning in part that the defendant ―had to be aware use of a gun to effect the robbery presented a grave risk of death.‖ (Id. at p. 580.) As with Lopez, there was other evidence to support the special circumstance, but we disapprove People v. Hodgson, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th 566 to the extent it may be read to hold awareness a robbery accomplice is armed, without more, establishes the necessary subjective awareness of a grave risk of death. 23 human life.‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12.) They argue each crime listed in section 189 qualifies and thus Matthews, because he participated in two such crimes, robbery and burglary, has automatically exhibited reckless indifference to human life. Section 189 codifies the first degree felony-murder rule (People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1294); participation in the crimes it lists subjects one to liability for first degree murder. To make participation in such crimes also sufficient, without more, to establish categorically reckless indifference to human life would collapse the Tison inquiry into the felony-murder inquiry and treat all felony murderers as equally culpable and eligible for death. But the central holding of Enmund, and Tison after it, was that for purposes of the death penalty, not all felony murderers are equally culpable and eligible for death. The People‘s position embraces the very punishment—death eligibility for participation in felony murder simpliciter—the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional. (See Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at pp. 147–150; Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 797.) That one may infer the felonies listed in section 189 are those the Legislature views as ―inherently dangerous‖ (People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 197) does not change the analysis. Whether a category of crimes is sufficiently dangerous to warrant felony-murder treatment, and whether an individual participant has acted with reckless indifference to human life, are different inquiries. Section 189 cannot be read as attempting to conflate them, and in any event under Enmund and Tison it would be impermissible for a state legislature to declare all participation in broad classes of felony murders, such as burglaries or robberies, punishable by death without further inquiry into each 24 individual defendant‘s mental state. (See Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 149; Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 798.)9 Finally, the People note two case-specific features of the armed robbery here that they suggest demonstrate reckless indifference to human life. First, Matthews, Daniels, and Gardiner—but not Banks—were members of the same gang. An expert testified their gang included 750 members, divided into cliques. In a single line of testimony, the expert identified the primary activities of the entire gang as ―narcotics sales, burglaries, robberies, shootings, attempted murders, murders, gun—carrying guns.‖ No evidence indicated Matthews or his two confederates had ever participated in shootings, murder, or attempted murder, or even that any member of their clique had.10 This evidence does not materially distinguish this case from Enmund or bring it any closer to Tison. The evidence connecting Daniels and Gardiner personally to past acts of violence was so attenuated as to be essentially nonexistent; as to Banks, the actual shooter, it was entirely nonexistent. The contrast with Tison, where the Tison brothers freed and armed Gary Tison, who had killed before in the course of a previous prison escape, is stark. 9 Tison does not specify those few felonies for which any major participation would ―necessarily exhibit[] reckless indifference to the value of human life.‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 158, fn. 12.) One could surmise a partial list of crimes the United States Supreme Court might agree on—say, the manufacture and planting of a live bomb. But we need not speculate. Even the Tisons‘ prison break of two convicted murderers was remanded, rather than treated as per se demonstrating the requisite reckless indifference. Plainly, armed robbery does not qualify. (See id. at pp. 147–150.) 10 The only specific gang crimes the expert testified to were two firearm possession convictions committed by other members uninvolved in the instant robbery. (See § 186.22, subd. (e)(31) & (32).) 25 Second, the dispensary had a sally port, security cameras, and a guard. To get through the sally port, the robbers had a medical marijuana authorization; to deal with the guard and others, they brought zip ties to subdue employees. Gonzalez‘s coworkers testified they believed he was an unarmed guard, and there was no evidence Matthews believed otherwise, or even that he knew a guard would be present. Because nothing in the record reflects that Matthews knew there would be a likelihood of resistance and the need to meet that resistance with lethal force, the evidence failed to show Matthews ―knowingly engag[ed] in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death.‖ (Tison v. Arizona, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 157.) The insufficiency of these details to distinguish Enmund aside, a larger consideration is at issue here. The actions of Earl Enmund, the Tison brothers, and countless other nonkiller felony murderers fall on a continuum, a spectrum of culpability. To ask whether there is any variation at all between Matthews‘s conduct and Enmund‘s is certainly relevant, but in doing so we do not simply assume Enmund‘s conduct represents a constitutional maximum, i.e., the most culpable one can be and yet still be constitutionally ineligible for death, such that any variation would move one into the death-eligible zone. Nationally, thousands of armed robberies occur each year; per Enmund, only roughly 1 in 200 results in death. (Enmund v. Florida, supra, 458 U.S. at p. 800, fn. 24.) If Enmund‘s actions represented the outer limit of conduct immune from death eligibility, Tison would have been an easy case. It was not. We do not view Enmund as defining a maximum for ineligibility for the death penalty, any more than we view the egregious actions of the Tison brothers as a constitutional minimum level of culpability for death eligibility. 26 Because on the evidence in the record no rational trier of fact could have found Matthews‘ conduct supported a felony-murder special circumstance, the jury‘s special-circumstance true finding cannot stand. 27 DISPOSITION We reverse the Court of Appeal‘s judgment as to defendant Lovie Troy Matthews and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. WERDEGAR, J. WE CONCUR: CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J. CHIN, J. CORRIGAN, J. LIU, J. CUÉLLAR, J. KRUGER, J. 28 See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court. Name of Opinion People v. Banks __________________________________________________________________________________ Unpublished Opinion NP opn. filed 8/29/13 – 2d Dist., Div. 2 Original Appeal Original Proceeding Review Granted Rehearing Granted __________________________________________________________________________________ Opinion No. S213819 Date Filed: July 9, 2015 __________________________________________________________________________________ Court: Superior County: Los Angeles Judge: Gail Ruderman Feuer __________________________________________________________________________________ Counsel: Sharon M. Jones, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Leon Banks Danalynn Pritz, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant Lovie Troy Matthews. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Marc A. Kohm, Peggy Z. Huang, Keith H. Borjon and Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 1 Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion): Danalynn Pritz 3625 East Thousand Oaks Boulevard, Suite 182 Westlake Village, CA 91362 (844) 805-3262 Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. Deputy Attorney General 300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702 Los Angeles, CA 90013 (213) 897-2396 2