Opinion ID: 1220392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Critique of the Majority Opinion

Text: The majority offers no explanation for its refusal to overrule Schiess, as requested by the Nebeker children, whose brief accurately asserts that the defendants have not shown that any other jurisdiction has cut off the right of a natural child to recover damages in an action for the wrongful death of a parent. The best argument that I have heard, and it is so pitiful that I am nigh brought to weeping, is that the legislature has overruled Schiess, for which reason this Court should not overly concern itself with letting this case stand, i.e., why overrule an outrageous judicial decision which other than for the Nebeker children will not visit misfortune on any future child plaintiffs? That philosophy undoubtedly stems from this passage where Bakes, J., is strangely not as precise as is ordinarily the case: Appellant contends that children, until Schiess, had always been considered proper parties plaintiff to an action for the wrongful death of one of their parents. In some cases prior to Schiess children, as plaintiffs, did recover damages under the wrongful death statute for the death of a parent. E.g. Hepp v. Ader, 64 Idaho 240, 130 P.2d 859 (1942); Lebak v. Nelson, 62 Idaho 96, 107 P.2d 1054 (1940); and Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 643, 86 P.2d 181 (1938). However, in none of those cases were children permitted to recover damages under our wrongful death statute when it was determined that they were not heirs under the intestate provision of the probate code at the time of the death of their parent. Not one single case since the adoption of our wrongful death statute has held that children who did not qualify as heirs under the intestate succession law were, nevertheless, considered to be heirs for purposes of the wrongful death statute. While not every wrongful death case has addressed the issue, every case that did has uniformly held that claimants, whether children, spouses, parents or other heirs, qualify or do not qualify as proper parties plaintiff solely on the strength of their qualifications as heirs under the intestate succession provisions in effect at the time of the wrongful death of the deceased. Majority Op., pp. 611-612, 747 P.2d pp. 20-21. The passage will immediately remind the reader of the current beer ad featuring Yogi Berra. Why?  because it does not say anything, but sounds as though it does. Justice Bakes' review of the case law is seriously flawed. He argues that Idaho courts have cultivated an ancient tradition in determining who are heirs for purposes of our wrongful death statute, I.C. § 5-311. He cites Whitley for the proposition that heirs are to be determined by reference to the statutes of descent and distribution in effect at the time of the decedent's death. He contends that this reference is accomplished by determining if a potential heir will take actual dollars  no dollars, no plaintiff's standing in a wrongful death action. This is an inaccurate, latter-day judicial gloss on the case law between Whitley (1913) and Hogan v. Hermann (1980). In Whitley, Justice Ailshie, at 23 Idaho 662, 132 P. at 127, says simply: Our statute defines who shall inherit the property of a deceased person. Those persons are his `heirs,' and our statute, sec. 4100 [now I.C. § 5-311], authorizes the `heirs' of a deceased person or his personal representative to maintain an action such as the one at bar. In our opinion, those heirs are statutory heirs rather than common-law `heirs.'  (Emphasis added.) The case does not say that if the intestacy statute is changed by future legislatures, then Idaho courts are bound to apply the new statutes in order to determine who may maintain a wrongful death action. The case does not say that one must refer to the statutes in effect at the time of decedent's death. This language is added by Justice Bakes. The judicial gloss underlined above was added in Hogan, 101 Idaho at 895, 623 P.2d at 902. However, even in that case, where the Court applied the former I.C. § 14-103, there was no determination made of the existence of separate property, if any, which is necessary if parents are to share in the estate. Surviving the deceased in Hogan were her parents and husband. The ancient tradition advanced by Justice Bakes really dates only from his own opinion in Everett v. Trunnell, 105 Idaho 787, 673 P.2d 387 (1983). There the Uniform Probate Code was used for the first time to close the courthouse door on parents who were plaintiffs in a wrongful death action. See, Everett, supra, 105 Idaho at 790, 673 P.2d at 390. The precise application of the Code advanced here surfaced only with the unfortunate decision of Schiess v. Bates, 107 Idaho 794, 693 P.2d 440 (1984). For the first time, the Court required plaintiffs to allege and prove an estate of separate property. None of the earlier cases made this requirement despite the fact that the former statute, I.C. § 14-103, required a separate estate in order for children to take. Powell v. Powell, 22 Idaho 531, 126 P. 1058 (1912). Schiess thus violates the spirit of Whitley and the intent of I.C. § 5-311. Justice Bakes' opinion is likewise deficient in its interpretation of the legislative intent which guided the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code in 1971. He states that the legislature intended that the wrongful death statute would be applied as it always had been, vis. `heirs' would be determined by reference to the intestate succession provision in effect at the time of death.  Since, as explained above, this judicial gloss was added by the Hogan Court in 1980, Justice Bakes is improperly attributing clairvoyance to members of the 1971 legislature. With Hogan, Everett, and Schiess, our Court lost sight of the fact that all Justice Ailshie was doing in Whitley was gratuitously distinguishing statutory heirs from common law heirs. He was not decreeing, nor did he have any such authority to so decree, that future plaintiffs were bound by any legislative amendment of the intestacy statutes. At page 611, 747 P.2d at page 20, the majority opinion correctly states that the Nebeker children contend that until Schiess, children had always been considered proper parties plaintiff to an action for the wrongful death of one of their parents. That reads well enough. But then, get this next line, In some cases prior to Schiess, children, as plaintiffs did recover damages under the wrongful death statute for the death of a parent. And the good Justice cites three cases, Hepp v. Ader , Lebak v. Nelson , and Manion v. Waybright . The Justice then goes on to add this truly remarkable assessment of those cases which convinces him that ... in none of those cases were children permitted to recover damages under our wrongful death statute when it was determined that they were not `heirs' under the intestate provision of the probate code at the time of the death of their parent. Hepp v. Ader is no stranger to me or to Justice Bakes. The deceased parent there was a 56-year-old wife, who was a mother of two grown daughters, only one of whom joined her father in bringing suit. The plaintiff daughter was 33-years-old, married, and living with her own mother, and she did not testify. The Court, per Justices Ailshie, Morgan and Givens, set aside the daughter's judgment on a $1,500 verdict, based on grounds of lack of evidence supporting damages. What bearing that case has on the claim of the Nebeker children is beyond me. The case makes no mention of either grown daughter being not permitted to bring an action because they were not heirs, and clearly one daughter did do so. In the Lebak [8] case a widower father was killed, leaving minor children aged 10, 9 and 8. They brought suit against the defendants through a court-appointed guardian, and recovered a judgment. That case too, makes no mention of any other child being disenfranchised of a right of action on the basis of not being an heir. In fact, the Court's opinion did not even deem it necessary to mention that this was a wrongful death action, did not mention the statute itself, and did not mention that the three little children were intestate heirs of their deceased father. In Manion v. Waybright, 59 Idaho 643, 86 P.2d 181 (1938), the plaintiffs were the widow Eva Manion and the four minor children of the deceased William Manion. The Court again did not deem it necessary to spell out that this was a statutory wrongful death action, did not mention the statute, and did not mention that the five plaintiffs were under the Idaho intestate statutes of general succession of the heirs of the deceased husband and father. The action was simply mentioned as the damage action, which it was. Counsel involved in the case, three of whom were well known to me and to other practitioners in North Idaho, were Ezra Whitla and E.T. Knudson for the defendants, and N.D. Wernette and W.B. McFarland for the decedent's heirs. Mr. Wernette and Mr. Knudson would later both serve as Justices on this Court. In short, counsel were learned and able. If there were other children in that case who were not permitted, i.e. were dismissed on a determination that they were not heirs, such was never mentioned in the Court's opinion. Quite the contrary, counsel in that case were not pettifoggers, and all of them knew without looking at the statute that children, and especially minor children, had forever been prime plaintiffs in an action brought for negligence or willfulness in the killing of a parent. Most, if not all, of the Idaho cases reflect the simple indisputable fact that any person out of law school has known without resorting to the statutes, that children have been, at least up until the Schiess aberration, proper plaintiffs to bring suit for the death of a parent, and that minor children are the children who will be most likely to suffer a loss, to borrow again from the words from Bakes, J., in Everett v. Trunnell . In the paragraph above excerpted from the majority opinion, after misstating the content of Hepp v. Ader , and the content of Lebak v. Nelson , and also the content of Manion v. Waybright , he favors us with the statement that: Not one single case since the adoption of our wrongful death case has held that children who do not qualify as heirs under the intestate succession laws were, nevertheless, considered to be heirs for purpose of the wrongful death statute. Although, as I earlier intimated that this language smacks of a genuine Yogi Berraism, and not doubting that it is wholly inadvertently so, it can only be taken by the uninformed reader as a message from Bakes, J., that in his review of the cases there have been no cases where a child who did not qualify as an heir under the general intestate laws was permitted to be a plaintiff. Of course, the following are not uninformed readers: not counsel for the Nebeker children, not Justice Huntley, not this writer, and certainly not Justice Wernette as an attorney, or Justice Knudson as an attorney, nor any attorney. Yet Bakes, J., insists that there have been only some children, prior to Schiess who were allowed to be plaintiffs, and did recover damages. And apparently, two other members of the Court subscribe to such deceptive meanderings. Contrary to what Bakes, J., implies, the truth is that there is not a reported case where any child was ever dismissed as a party plaintiff in an action brought to recover for the wrongful death of a parent. It would be my pleasure to donate $500.00 to any charity of Bakes, J.'s choosing, in his name, if he can supply just one case, prior to Schiess, where a child was so deprived of his constitutional rights to pursue a right of action statutorily conferred upon him. In the majority opinion on page 612, 747 P.2d on page 21, literary license is taken to indulge again in the fancy that the Everett case was a probate proceeding, i.e. the parents would not inherit any portion of the intestate estate of their child... . This Court's concern in Everett did not involve the decedent's estate  nor do we know that there was any estate  nor did we know if it was separate property or the community property of the husband and wife before the husband's death. As to the community property, if any, such would be limited by the marriage contract, as per the language of the Whitley case, and is not within the purview of the general intestate laws  either prior to the adoption of the 1971 Uniform Probate Code, or afterward. Part (a) of § 15-2-102 is the 1971 version of the general intestate statutes. Under subparagraph (2) thereof, a surviving parent simply is not an heir where the decedent left issue surviving him. How much more simply can a statutory provision be stated? Moreover, prior to the adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, under the general intestate provisions of I.C. § 14-103(1) formerly and at the time of Whitley, Revised Code § 5702(1), any time there was even one child living, the parents did not qualify as heirs. Only under subparagraph (2) did the parents qualify  which was when the decedent left no issue, then the parents came in to share with the surviving spouse. Our opinion in Everett made that clear. Counsel for the plaintiff parents made no pretense that the parents qualified as heirs  but rather experimented on creating a new theory of recovery. The Court was not persuaded to that new theory, attorney fees were assessed against the Everetts, and no law was made. It should have been a short opinion, needing only to say, as it does, that Under this statutory scheme, where the decedent leaves both a surviving spouse and issue, parents of a decedent are not entitled to inherit any property, and Not being `heirs' they have no cause of action under I.C. § 5-311 for their son's wrongful death. Everett, 105 Idaho at 790, 673 P.2d at 390. But, before announcing that inescapable conclusion, and apparently still smarting from the four-member majority's rejection of his single action theory espoused in his dissenting opinion in Hogan, beginning at p. 789 of 101 Idaho, and at p. 389 of 673 P.2d, Bakes, J., brought to the fore that non-issue: The primary issue in this case is whether these particular plaintiffs can maintain this wrongful death action, particularly in light of the fact that these plaintiffs failed to join in the action brought by the decedent's spouse. (Emphasis added.) The underscored non-issue was not further again mentioned, and played no part in our judgment, which was unanimous other than the award of attorney fees for a frivolous appeal. It became necessary to point out in my separate concurring opinion, that Bakes, J.: [I]ncorrectly today refers to Whitley v. Spokane Ry. Co., 23 Idaho 642, 132 P. 121 (1913), aff'd 237 U.S. 487, 35 S.Ct. 655, 59 L.Ed. 1060 (1915), as standing for the proposition that the plaintiffs in this case cannot maintain this wrongful death action particularly in light of the fact that these plaintiffs failed to join in the action brought by decedent's spouse. Neither Whitley nor Hogan v. Hermann so held, and on the contrary, in both of those cases there were two suits. Bakes, J., with no one joining, espoused the single action theory and may be seen in his today's opinion as again espousing his own previous view. Moreover, in so doing, seemingly there is an abdication of his sometimes stance that the Court should not decide cases on issues which were not presented to the trial court. Defendants' motion was not predicated upon a single action theory, nor was that contention advanced in a supporting brief. The trial court, Judge Norris, did not rule against the appellants on that basis  nor should we  but on the grounds that they were not heirs as legislatively defined. 105 Idaho at 791, 673 P.2d at 391. What Justice Bakes wrote in Everett relative to his single action theory, while basically uncalled for and improper, did not in and of itself cause any difficulty in the ensuing Schiess case. It does, however, demonstrate his desires as to how long-existing case law may be distorted into conformance with his own views. To his credit, as mentioned above, he did then recognize that the legislature's objective in creating the cause of action for wrongful death was to allow suit by those persons most likely to be affected by the untimely death of a decedent, such as a surviving wife and child. 105 Idaho 790, 673 P.2d at 390. That same opinion correctly noted that such a suit had indeed been pursued by Kenneth Everett's surviving spouse and child, and that the case was settled without going to trial. 105 Idaho 789, 673 P.2d at 389. That the child was a minor, and that defense counsel, Daniel T. Eismann of Homedale, and William J. Brauner of Caldwell did not plead any defense such as that the child was not a proper plaintiff because he did not actually inherit any property from his deceased father are matters of public judicial record of which this Court can judicially take notice. Equally so, we can judicially notice that Kenneth Everett died possessed of no separate estate whatever, and that the total value of the community estate of Kenneth and his wife was $11,000. As mentioned earlier in this opinion, there has never been a case prior to Schiess where the parties or the courts have confused a probate proceeding (actually inheriting) with a wrongful death action (by an heir entitled to inherit). Justice Huntley in his dissenting opinion has thoroughly explained how the Court went wrong in the Schiess case. Simply stated, it allowed itself to be persuaded that a person, be he a minor or a parent, is not an heir unless he actually comes into some property from, as there, a deceased father, and as in this case, a deceased mother. As stated that has never been the law, and the Schiess case should not be allowed to stand in the way of the Nebeker children. Assuming that the two justices who join Justice Bakes in standing on the Schiess case do so only because it is of such recent origin, and to overrule it would be tantamount to having been not too careful in joining in the Schiess opinion, so be it, stare decisis should govern. But, are reasons why that case is not entitled to any benefit of that doctrine. The Schiess opinion never became final, a fact which was not known to me [9] until inadvertently discovered on pulling volume 108 of the Idaho Reports to review Miller v. Farmers Insurance Co. of Idaho, at page 896 [702 P.2d 1356]. On that same page there is this order in the Schiess case, which speaks for itself: No. 15239. Supreme Court of Idaho. July 23, 1985 ORDER Prior report: 107 Idaho 794, 693 P.2d 440. The Court having entered an Order on June 18, 1985, 108 Idaho 715, 701 P.2d 663, recalling the REMITTITUR previously issued by this Court on January 2, 1985, and granting Appellants' PETITION FOR REHEARING and counsel for the parties having filed a STIPULATION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL on July 1, 1985; and the Court being fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that counsel's STIPULATION for dismissal of PETITION FOR REHEARING be, and hereby is, APPROVED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellants' PETITION FOR REHEARING filed June 18, 1985, be, and hereby is, WITHDRAWN and the REMITTITUR shall reissue as of the date of this Order. My curiosity whetted, it was in order to turn to page 715 of 108 Idaho [701 P.2d 663], where this order is found: No. 15239. Supreme Court of Idaho. June 18, 1985 Prior report: 107 Idaho 794, 693 P.2d 440. The Appellant having lodged a PETITION FOR REHEARING on April 5, 1985, and supporting BRIEF having been lodged April 10, 1985, of the Court's Opinion filed December 20, 1984; and a REMITTITUR having been issued by this Court on January 2, 1985, and the Court being fully advised; therefore, good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the REMITTITUR issued by this Court on January 2, 1985, be, and hereby is, RECALLED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the PETITION FOR REHEARING and BRIEF which were previously lodged with this Court shall be filed as of the date of this Order. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Appellant's PETITION FOR REHEARING be, and hereby is, GRANTED and Respondents shall file a Brief in response to Appellant's BRIEF filed in support of PETITION FOR REHEARING within twenty-eight (28) days from the date of this Order. Any Reply Brief by Appellant shall be filed within fourteen (14) days from the date of filing of Respondents' Brief. What these two orders tell me is that the Remittitur was recalled, this Court resumed jurisdiction, a petition for rehearing was GRANTED, a briefing schedule for respondent was set, and that for some reason the rehearing was no longer required. To satisfy an innate curiosity the original file in the clerk's office was examined, and the stipulation referred to was found to contain this language,  the matter having been compromised and settled ... after the rehearing had been granted. The stipulation was submitted by Merrill and Merrill, Chartered, attorneys for defendants and by Isaac MacDougall for the plaintiffs. With it was submitted a proposed order, as follows: ORDER UPON THE FOREGOING STIPULATION and good cause appearing therefor: IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled matter be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice to bringing of another action and with each party to bear their own costs. DATED this ____ day of June, 1985. Why the action was not dismissed as the parties intended, there is no way of knowing. Not having sat in that case, I was not privy to what was taking place. With the matter having been compromised and settled, after a petition for rehearing had been granted, it is my understanding, based on experience on this Court, that the issued opinion would have no precedential value, and should not have been published. A like circumstance was the case of Lystrop, Hatch, Packer, and Dance, individually and on behalf of all architecture students as a class v. The Idaho State Board of Education, S.Ct. No. 12012. This Court's 4-1 opinion issued March 4, 1977, reversing the Hon. Arthur P. Oliver, District Judge of the District Court, Sixth Judicial District State of Idaho, Bannock County, whose ruling was in favor of the students. The plaintiffs petitioned for a rehearing, which was granted. Prior to the rehearing, the parties compromised their differences, and the Court was so advised. The opinions in that case were not published in view of the controversy being settled without any reconsideration by the Court. The teaching of that experience is that a settlement by the parties after this Court has granted a rehearing operates to destroy the precedential value of the Court's judgment and opinion, and the opinion will remain unpublished. If our system is to operate fairly and evenly, there cannot be one rule for Lystrop, and another rule for Schiess. Of course, without my bringing up the Lystrop circumstance, Bakes, J., along with Shepard, J., and Donaldson, J., were part of the majority of four in Lystrop, and conveniently forgetting it, prefer to believe themselves bound by Schiess, putting Lystrop out of sight, out of mind. Better I say that Schiess be laid to rest. On top of everything else that can be said is wrong with Schiess, as pointed out in the defendant-appellant's brief, at the time the case was moved out of district court by the appeal to this Court, although there had been filed a motion to dismiss all of the individual Schiess children as being improper party plaintiffs, not being `heirs' under I.C. § 5-311... . This motion has not yet been ruled on by the district court. Defendant Bates' brief, pp. 2-3. The conclusion of that brief requested that this Court should direct the district court to dismiss the surviving children of Mr. Schiess as parties plaintiff... . Blue brief, p. 26. Worse yet, this unresolved question was not included in the Notice of Appeal, which stated only: 1. The above named appellant, Peter Bates, appeals against the above named respondents to the Idaho Supreme Court from that final order and judgment denying appellant's motion for leave to file a third party complaint against the Estate of Laddie Ervin Schiess, Sr., entered in the above entitled action on the 3rd day of May, and reconfirmed pursuant to motion for reconsideration on the 10th day of August, 1983, the Honorable William H. Woodland, presiding. The brief filed on behalf of the Schiess children clearly pointed to the Everrett v. Trunnell circumstance that the surviving spouse and child had indeed sued, and the action was settled without going to trial. The brief was only remiss in not emphasizing that it is the entitlement to inherit which qualifies an heir as a wrongful death plaintiff, and actually inheriting had never been judicially said to be a requirement. The brief relied more on the wife's renunciation. The brief was remiss in failing to remind the Court of its often stated rule that it does not pass upon questions or issues which have not previously been submitted to the trial court. When the rule is broken, and the issue is not ripe for appellate determination, a quality opinion would most likely be the exception, not the rule. On most of our appeals it is to be hoped that we first closely examine the views of the trial court. It is the trial judge, second in line only to the involved attorneys, who best knows what the controversy involves. Here, for whatever reason, this Court ignored that the appeal was from one specific trial court order, and obliged the defendant by passing on an issue not yet ruled on at trial, and did so without the benefit of adequate briefing, and obviously without any critical research on the issue involved. For certain, it was not simply a replay of Everett. In sum, the only difference between the views entertained by Justice Bakes and myself are that he espouses the notion that for all wrongful deaths occurring after 1911, for a child to be an heir the decedent must have died possessed of some separate estate in order for the child to qualify under the Whitley case. I say that there is no case law to that effect, that Bakes, J., can point to none, and that Bakes, J., merely writes to make the reader think that there are some cases and he has found them. When one considers the case of minor children, and further considers that the parents of minor children will be comparatively younger couples, it is a matter of general knowledge that 90 percent of those couples will have acquired no property which is not community property, and likely not much of that. It is such minor heirs whose case is before us today and the law established in Whitley sensibly observed that heirs are those persons who are entitled to inherit, not that there must be a probate proceeding where they do in fact inherit some separate estate from a deceased parent. The view espoused by Justice Bakes has never been the law and, if it is to be the law for just this particular case, it disenfranchises minor children of their right of action notwithstanding that the admitted objective of the wrongful death statute was to allow suit by those persons most likely to be affected by the untimely death of a decedent, such as a surviving wife and [minor] child. Everett, supra, 105 Idaho at 790, 673 P.2d at 390 (Bakes, J.). The indifference of those who join the opinion of Justice Bakes is both disheartening and frightening.