Opinion ID: 196070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prosecutor's Rebuttal.

Text: 48 Next, appellant assails the prosecutor's rebuttal, which, he says, contained a minimum of three peccadilloes, namely, (1) an implication that appellant had alerted the four people who mugged Lynch and stole his booty, (2) a suggestion that Lynch should be believed because he suffered from sickle-cell anemia and had tested positive for HIV, and (3) an intimation that Clavin, during her testimony, lowered her voice out of fear. 49 These accusations do not withstand scrutiny. The prosecutor made the first of the cited comments without objection and in direct response to defense counsel's argument that Lynch had turned against Taylor because the latter did not come to his aid during the mugging. We have previously expressed our reluctance to find plain error when a prosecutor's remarks are made to rebut specific statements by defense counsel, and are proportionate to that end. See Whiting, 28 F.3d at 1302; Mejia-Lozano, 829 F.2d at 274. Here, our reluctance ripens into outright unwillingness. Similarly, the prosecutor's remarks about Lynch's health drew no contemporaneous objection. Those remarks were obviously designed to rebut the defense argument that Lynch was hoping to earn a reduced sentence by testifying against Taylor. The statement recounted facts in evidence, and did not constitute either vouching or an improper appeal to the jury's sympathies. Finally, the remark about Clavin's demeanor was not out of line. The jury saw and heard her testimony, and could determine for itself her state of mind. 10 See, e.g., United States v. Mount, 896 F.2d 612, 625 (1st Cir.1990) (Although it is the jury's job to draw inferences, there is nothing improper in the Government's suggesting which inferences should be drawn.). 50