Opinion ID: 1143526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Property or Liberty Interest.

Text: The protections of due process attach only to deprivations of property or liberty interests. Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir.1976). The NCAA argues that Tarkanian did not possess a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest. We disagree. In Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 557, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972), the Supreme Court stated that property interests are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law  rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that support claims of entitlement to those benefits. A contract for employment can be the basis of a property right. Stewart v. Bailey, 556 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir.1977). In our view, Tarkanian's contractual relationship with UNLV establishes a property interest in continued employment. Since July, 1973, Tarkanian had been employed under a series of one-year contracts running from July through June. His 1977-1978 contract was entitled Tenured Professional Employment Document. This contract, which was dated June 20, 1977 and was for a term running from July 1, 1977 through June of 1978, was a continuation of an established practice between the parties. The contract granted Tarkanian tenure, thus confirming his testimony that upon arrival at UNLV he was promised tenure would be given at some time in the future. This contract was in force when UNLV suspended Tarkanian in September, 1977. The NCAA argues that Tarkanian was not deprived of a property interest because the suspension affected only his duties as head coach. According to his 1977-1978 contract, Tarkanian held the positions of both head basketball coach and professor of physical education. Case law supports that employees do not have a property interest in a particular position. See e.g., Childers v. Independent School Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir.1982); Sullivan v. Brown, 544 F.2d 279, 282 (6th Cir.1976). Given the facts of this case, this argument is not persuasive. Tarkanian had been a head basketball coach for twenty-eight years, four at UNLV. Continued employment only as a professor of physical education would be a drastic change from his previous assignment. We also believe that Tarkanian possessed a liberty interest protected by the due process clause. The Supreme Court defined the parameters of the due process liberty interest in Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 985, 96 S.Ct. 2194, 48 L.Ed.2d 811 (1976). In Davis, the Court held that in order to invoke the protections of the due process liberty interest, a plaintiff must show that a right or status previously recognized by state law was distinctly altered or extinguished and that his reputation was injured as a result. Id. at 711, 96 S.Ct. at 1165. This test has become known as the stigma-plus test, the stigma being an injury to reputation, the plus being a change in a previously recognized status. The NCAA is unpersuasive in contending that Tarkanian fails both prongs of the test. The stigma which satisfies the stigma-plus test in the employment context must be such that it forecloses plaintiff's opportunity to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Altman v. Hurst, 734 F.2d 1240, 1243 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982, 105 S.Ct. 385, 83 L.Ed.2d 320 (1984); Bollow v. Federal Reserve Bank, 650 F.2d 1093, 1101 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 948, 102 S.Ct. 1449, 71 L.Ed.2d 662 (1982). Dismissal from employment on grounds involving immorality or dishonesty satisfies the stigma prong of the stigma-plus test. Lawson v. Sheriff, 725 F.2d 1136, 1139 (7th Cir.1984). The grounds for suspending Tarkanian satisfy this standard. [2] The NCAA also contends that Tarkanian has not suffered a sufficient change of status. As already noted, however, even though Tarkanian would have retained employment as a professor, the NCAA's disciplinary action would have drastically altered his position. Cf. Hardiman v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 709 F.2d 635 (11th Cir.1983) (one week suspension without pay insufficient to invoke due process protections); Mosrie v. Barry, 718 F.2d 1151, (D.C. Cir.1983) (lateral transfer to less desirable district insufficient to invoke due process protections). Absent judicial intervention, Tarkanian's suspension might well have ended his college coaching career.