Opinion ID: 2509517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Dr. Hatcher's Testimony

Text: Section 190.3, factor (a) permits both the prosecution and the defense to introduce evidence of [t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. In People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436, this court adopted an expansive reading of this language. Edwards explained: The word `circumstances' as used in factor (a) of section 190.3 does not mean merely the immediate temporal and spatial circumstances of the crime. Rather it extends to `[t]hat which surrounds materially, morally, or logically,' the crime. ( Id. at p. 833, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) We therefore held that factor (a) authorized evidence of the specific harm caused by the defendant, including the impact on the family of the victim. ( Id. at p. 835, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) We also held that evidence of the massive five-day air and ground search for the defendant after the crime was discovered was admissible under factor (a). ( Id. at pp. 831-832, 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436.) In other cases we have held that characteristics of the crime fall within the scope of section 190.3, factor (a). People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 714-715, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248, held a photograph of the victim when alive was admissible because it portrayed the victim as seen by the defendant before the murder. People v. Coddington, supra, 23 Cal.4th 529, 640, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081, said that factor (a) included the method of killing or evidence of extensive planning. People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 581, 286 Cal.Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893, held evidence of the defendant's hatred of his wife's religion was admissible as bearing upon the defendant's motive for the crime. (See also People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 708, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640 [motive as part of circumstances of crime].) In light of these precedents, we conclude here that Dr. Hatcher's testimony was admissible under section 190.3, factor (a). It explained the motivation for the crime, and the history and mental condition that produced such motivation. It explained the significance of the methods used to commit the crime  the handcuffs and duct tape, the act of sodomy, the post mortem burning of the body. It also explained how evidence found in defendant's home and car showed that he premeditated the crime, and related to the manner in which it was committed. In short, Dr. Hatcher's testimony was evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime.
Defendant insists, however, that Dr. Hatcher's testimony falls under factors (d) and (k) of section 190.3, and that such evidence can only be mitigating. Factor (d) authorizes the penalty jury to consider evidence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. We have held in previous cases that such evidence can only be mitigating. (E.g., People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 944, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d 620, 654, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 776, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) In People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330, we said that no reasonable juror could believe that extreme mental or emotional disturbance ... were circumstances in aggravation, and hence a jury instruction to that effect was unnecessary. ( Id. at p. 802, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330; see People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 675, 280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Factor (k) of section 190.3 authorizes consideration of [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime. Under factor (k), the jury must consider any `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878-879, fn. 10, 196 Cal.Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813, quoting Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973.) Consequently, even though factor (d) refers to extreme emotional or mental disturbance, evidence of mental disorder of less extreme character is admissible under factor (k). (See, e.g., People v. Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 655, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849.) Evidence admitted under factor (k), like that admitted under factor (d), is mitigating. (See People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 672, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 944, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) The Attorney General argues that Dr. Hatcher's testimony does not implicate the principle that evidence of mental illness is mitigating because Dr. Hatcher testified only that a murder such as the one here is usually committed by a sadistic pedophile, not that defendant himself was a sadistic pedophile. The inference, however, is unmistakable: if the nature of the crime shows it was probably committed by a sadistic pedophile, and defendant admits committing the crime, then defendant is probably a sadistic pedophile. [6] Dr. Hatcher's testimony, moreover, acquires relevance only to the extent that it does describe defendant. As the trial judge observed: [I]t's irrelevant unless you want to argue to somebody that he is a sexual sadist. Otherwise it's meaningless.
The question before us, therefore, is whether on the facts of this case the prosecution could present evidence in its penalty case-in-chief from which the jury could infer that defendant is a sadistic pedophile and argue that inference as an aggravating consideration. Defendant contends that under People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782, evidence of mental illness cannot be presented as aggravating evidence. Defendant's assertion misstates the import of Boyd, which does not bar the admission of evidence of defendant's mental condition as aggravating evidence if it is relevant to the circumstances of the crime. Boyd held that the 1978 law prevents the prosecution from introducing, in its case-in-chief, aggravating evidence not contained in the various factors listed in section 190.3. ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 774, 215 Cal.Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782; see People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 56, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 554; People v. Guzman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 915, 963, 248 Cal.Rptr. 467, 755 P.2d 917.) As we have noted, some of those listed factors, including factor (d) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and factor k (any aspect of defendant's character offered as a basis for a sentence less than death) can only be mitigating. Because evidence of mental illness under factors (d) and (k) of section 190.3 cannot be considered aggravating, such evidence cannot be introduced by the prosecution as part of its case in chief at the penalty phase. ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1135, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 438-439, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000; People v. Coleman (1989) 48 Cal.3d 112, 149, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32.) But in this case the evidence of defendant's mental illness is pertinent not only to factors (d) and (k), but also to another listed factor  factor (a), the circumstances of the crime. Evidence of the circumstances of the crime is admissible as aggravating evidence in the prosecution's case-in-chief, even though that evidence would have been inadmissible as prosecution evidence if offered only under factors (d) or (k). This conclusion is supported by two decisions of this court that discuss the scope of prosecutorial argument. In People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, the prosecutor argued that factor (j) of section 190.3  whether the defendant was an accomplice  was aggravating because the defendant acted alone. We observed that even if factor (j) could only be mitigating, the jury could certainly consider that defendant acted alone as a circumstance of the crime. It mattered little whether the jury considered it in relation to factor (j) or factor (a). ( People v. Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 414-415, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) In People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1185, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353, the prosecutor argued that the defendant's lack of remorse as he fled the scene of the crime was an aggravating factor. Our prior decisions had stated that the presence of remorse is mitigating, but its absence is generally not aggravating. (See People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 992, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) Pollock, however, drew a distinction: Absence of remorse at the crime scene or when the defendant is fleeing the scene is admissible as aggravating evidence because it relates to the circumstances of the crime. ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1185, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) Although both Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th 312, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, and Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353, involved prosecutorial argument, it is reasonable to infer that if the prosecutor is permitted to argue that evidence is aggravating, that evidence can be introduced as part of the prosecutor's case-in-chief. People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th 394, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000, also supports this conclusion. There the defendant protested that prosecution evidence of defendant's previous violent crimes, offered under section 190.3, factor (b), should have been excluded because the prosecution cannot introduce evidence of defendant's bad character (factor (k) evidence) in its case in chief. We replied: The fact that evidence of defendant's previous violent crimes was also indicative of his character or mental condition does not render the evidence inadmissible. ( People v. Avena, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 439, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) We distinguish two decisions in which prosecution evidence of mental illness or bad character was held inadmissible in the prosecution penalty case in chief. In People v. Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d 112, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32, a prosecution psychologist testified that the defendant had a passive-aggressive, antisocial personality and was criminally oriented, immature, and defensive. The psychologist did not relate his observations to the crime, but instead used them as a basis to recommend that defendant was dangerous and should not be released. We said that this expert evidence was inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief because it was not relevant to any of the statutory aggravating or mitigating factors other than section 190.3, factor (k). ( People v. Coleman, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 149, 255 Cal.Rptr. 813, 768 P.2d 32.) We continue to hold that general evidence regarding a defendant's mental state is not admissible in aggravation at the penalty phase. Here, by contrast, Dr. Hatcher's testimony, when considered with the evidence regarding defendant's bizarre behavior while committing the crime, provided evidence from which the jury could infer defendant acted with sexual sadism. This specific evidence of the motivation behind the killing was relevant as a circumstance of the crime. In People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1, we said the prosecution acted improperly in arguing that evidence of the defendant's background and history  evidence that did not relate to the circumstances of the crime  showed `that he's had all the breaks' ( id. at p. 1033, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1) so the crime could not be blamed on childhood deprivation or hardship. Character evidence relevant only to factor (k), we said, cannot be used affirmatively as a circumstance in aggravation. ( People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1033, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1.) These cases show that evidence of mental illness or bad character is admissible in the prosecution's case in chief only if, as here, it relates to an aggravating factor listed in section 190.3. But if the evidence does relate to an aggravating factor, it is admissible as part of the prosecution's penalty case-in-chief, even if it also bears upon a mitigating factor listed in that section.
Defendant asserts that admitting evidence of his mental illness as an aggravating consideration violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Defendant, however, did not raise these contentions in the trial court. Seeking to avoid the conclusion that his constitutional claims have been forfeited (see People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 250, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 940 P.2d 710), defendant cites People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th 93, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166, which said: [N]o useful purpose is served by declining to consider on appeal a claim that merely restates, under alternative legal principles, a claim otherwise identical to one that was properly preserved.... ( Id. at p. 117, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) But here defendant's constitutional claim is not identical to his properly preserved claim based on California decisions and statutes. His state law claim is based on decisions interpreting section 190.3 and asserting that factors (d) and (k) can only be mitigating. There are, however, no federal decisions preventing the jury from treating factor (d) or factor (k) evidence as aggravating. (See Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 976-979, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.)