Opinion ID: 741901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Apparatus Claim 17

Text: 13 OI argues that the district court erred in applying section 112, p 6, to the word passage. In particular, it asserts that the passage recited in paragraph (a) of claim 17 is not part of the means recited in the means-plus-function clause of that claim and therefore that it should not be interpreted under and limited by section 112, p 6. Tekmar responds that the passage recited in the claim is part of the recited means, as it is required for passing the analyte slug, that it is therefore part of a means-plus-function clause, and that the word passage as so construed does not include smooth-walled tubing. It refers to the written description, which discloses non-smooth tubing for swirling the analyte slug and which distinguishes over the prior art by stating that prior art tubing is generally smooth-walled. 14 Determining whether a patent claim has been infringed requires a two-step analysis: First, the claim must be properly construed to determine its scope and meaning. Second, the claim as properly construed must be compared to the accused device or process. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576, 27 USPQ2d 1836, 1839 (Fed.Cir.1993). Section 112, p 6, provides that: 15 An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof. 16 35 U.S.C. § 112, p 6 (1994) (emphasis added). 17 We conclude that the district court erred in applying section 112, p 6, to the word passage in apparatus claim 17, but that this error was harmless. There is no question that this section of the statute does apply to claim 17. It is an apparatus claim with means-plus-function clauses and no structure is recited in support of any means. The first and second means clauses of the claim recite means for passing an analyte slug through a passage without reciting definite structure in support of any means, and such clauses are therefore subject to the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112, p 6. See Cole v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 102 F.3d 524, 531, 41 USPQ2d 1001, 1006 (Fed.Cir.1996) (stating that to invoke section 112, p 6, a means-plus-function limitation must not recite definite structure for performing the described function); see also Greenberg v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 91 F.3d 1580, 1584, 39 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed.Cir.1996) (stating that use of the phrase means for generally invokes section 112, p 6). Literal infringement of a claim containing a means clause requires that the accused device perform the identical function as that identified in the means clause and do so with structure which is the same as or equivalent to that disclosed in the specification. Micro Chem., Inc. v. Great Plains Chem. Co., 103 F.3d 1538, 1547, 41 USPQ2d 1238, 1245-46 (Fed.Cir.1997). 18 However, the court erroneously concluded that the word passage recited in the claim is part of a means-plus-function clause and hence subject to the limitations of section 112, p 6. The recited function in claim 17 consists of passing the analyte slug through a passage, the analyte slug comprising a gas stream with contaminant and water vapor. Structure supporting the means for passing the analyte slug through the water management device containing the passage is not recited in the claim. Although the passage may act upon the slug by channeling it while it is being passed, it is not the means that causes the passing. Rather, it is the place where the function occurs, not the structure that accomplishes it. Thus, although claim 17 is a means-plus-function claim subject to section 112, p 6, it is not so in respect of the word passage. The specification also fails to indicate structure for accomplishing the passing which would support the means. It does, however, explain that the water management device is located between the sparge vessel and the trap for use in a backflush or, alternatively, a foreflush system, and the passing therefore apparently occurs by means known to those skilled in the art. Since we are not presented with the question whether the missing structure for carrying out the recited means limits the meaning of the claim, we will not dwell further on that question. We will consider only whether the court ultimately interpreted the meaning of the word passage correctly in light of our conclusion that it is not a part of the recited means ... for performing a specified function for purposes of section 112, p 6, and is therefore itself not subject to the construction called for by that statutory provision. 19 In construing a claim limitation, we look to the claim language, the written description, the prosecution history and, if necessary, extrinsic evidence. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582-83, 39 USPQ2d 1573, 1576-77 (Fed.Cir.1996). Here, the written description states that the structure for the passage includes non-smooth geometries and a conical shape: 20 Although a threaded configuration is shown for the second section, other non-smooth geometries may be used to remove water vapor and cause that water vapor to be trapped in the second section of the bore. For example, a series of ridges may be included in the interior surface of the second section. Alternatively, the second section of the bore may be conical in configuration. As with the threaded or ridged configuration, the conical shape causes a swirling effect on the water vapor to remove that vapor from the analyte slug. 21 '557 patent, col. 7, lines 13-22 (emphasis added). The written description also distinguishes over prior art geometries as follows: 22 A number of different geometries for the second section are contemplated, including those having an irregular shaped surface or noncylindrical shape. In contrast, the prior art has generally specified that the pneumatic tubing and passageways between the trap and GC are smooth-walled. 23 '557 patent, col. 7, lines 45-50 (emphasis added). 24 All of the passage structures contemplated by the written description are thus either non-smooth or conical. In addition, the description expressly distinguishes over prior art passages by stating that those passages are generally smooth-walled. OI has not identified anything in the prosecution history contrary to those statements. Therefore, we conclude that one skilled in the art reading the claims, description, and prosecution history would conclude that the term passage in claim 17 does not encompass a smooth-walled, completely cylindrical structure. Because the description adequately explains the meaning of passage as used in this patent, we need not consider extrinsic evidence. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582-83, 39 USPQ2d at 1577. It is undisputed that the accused device contains a smooth-walled, completely cylindrical passage. Thus, even though the district court erred in construing the claim term passage to be subject to the interpretation required by section 112, p 6, it did not err in concluding that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the accused device does not meet the terms of claim 17 of the '380 patent and that Tekmar is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law that it does not infringe that claim. The court's error thus was harmless. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 61. 25 OI argues nonetheless that construing the word passage to exclude smooth-walled geometries violates the doctrine of claim differentiation, noting that dependent claims further limit the meaning of the word passage to a structure that produces swirling or spiraling of the analyte slug. OI argues that the independent claim, being broader in scope than the claim that depends from it, should not be limited to structures that swirl the analyte slug. We do not agree. Although the doctrine of claim differentiation may at times be controlling, construction of claims is not based solely upon the language of other claims; the doctrine cannot alter a definition that is otherwise clear from the claim language, description, and prosecution history. See Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1567 n. 15, 15 USPQ2d 1039, 1047 n. 15 (Fed.Cir.1990) (stating that the doctrine of claim differentiation cannot overshadow the express and contrary intentions of the patent draftsman). We conclude that the description provides a clear meaning for the language of the claim in this case and that it trumps the doctrine of claim differentiation.