Opinion ID: 627196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the prosecution's closing argument was improper?

Text: Vasquez next argues that he was deprived of his right to a fair trial by prosecutorial statements that, he asserts, were improper. Vasquez's fairness argument implicates due process. For a denial of constitutional due process, the prosecution's [improper statements] must so infect the trial as to substantially affect the fairness of the proceeding. Vargas, 580 F.3d at 277-78. To establish reversible error, Vasquez must show that (1) the prosecutor made an improper remark; and (2) the defendant was prejudiced. Stephens, 571 F.3d at 408 (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a prosecutor's comment was improper, it is necessary to look at the comment in context. United States v. Insaulgarat, 378 F.3d 456, 461 (5th Cir.2004). To show prejudice, Vasquez must demonstrate that the remarks affected the outcome of his trial. See United States v. McCann, 613 F.3d 486, 496 (5th Cir.2010). This inquiry requires us to assess (1) the magnitude of the statement's prejudice, (2) the effect of any cautionary instructions given, and (3) the strength of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 415 (5th Cir.1998). Moreover, our review here is only for plain error because Vasquez did not object at trial. Vasquez argues that two distinct comments during the prosecution's closing argument were improper. First, Vasquez argues that the prosecution improperly argued that Vasquez did not make any statements of consequence to law enforcement on the day of his arrest when, in fact, Vasquez had repeatedly protested his innocence. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: [T]he investigation did not stop there. Did the agents talk to him? Yes. Though one may infer that much didn't come out of it. You heard his behavior. His actions. His inconsistencies. (emphasis added). According to Vasquez, this statement wrongly suggested to the jury that he never offered an innocent explanation of his conduct to law enforcement and invited the jury to infer guilt from the absence of such an explanation. However, read in context, the statement can just as easily be understood as a reference to his evasive answers about his ownership of the Suburban. We have previously held that where a prosecutor's statement is susceptible to at least two possible readings, the remarks do not rise to the level of obvious error, as is necessary to satisfy the second prong of the plain error test. Vargas, 580 F.3d at 279. There was no plain error in this prosecutorial remark. Second, Vasquez argues that the prosecution improperly argued outside the record when it made the following comments during closing argument: The government, we brought all these people here. . . . We tried to leave no stone unturned. Some people didn't even want to be here. You heard one witness that was excited about getting out of here. That's reasonable. It's not fun being up there in that stand. But yet we did our investigation, and we tried to turn every stone that was there. And the complete picture from my investigation and the evidence is that that defendant, Pedro Vasquez, brought those drugs in his truck, and he did so knowingly. (Emphasis added). It is well-settled that a prosecutor may not refer or even allude to evidence not adduced at trial. United States v. Murrah, 888 F.2d 24, 26 (5th Cir.1989). Read in isolation, the prosecutor's reference to my investigation is concerning. At the very least, it reflects poor word choice and should have been avoided. Nevertheless, Vasquez has not shown that the prosecutor's remark was plain error. In context, my investigation can also be understood as referring to the testimony of the agents who discovered the cocaine and conducted the subsequent investigation. [5]