Opinion ID: 1998968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Railways' Motion for a New Trial

Text: In evaluating the merit of this motion which is based solely on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, we must review and consider the entire record: Ason v. Leonhart, 402 Pa. 312, 165 A. 2d 625 (1960). The determination of whether a verdict is against the weight of the evidence, so that a new trial should be granted, rests primarily with the trial judge and his action will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is a palpable abuse of that discretion: Ason v. Leonhart, supra; Eisert v. Jones, 408 Pa. 73, 182 A. 2d 717 (1962). By the same token, where a verdict is capricious, or against the weight of the evidence, or results in a miscarriage of justice, it should not be allowed to stand, no matter how many new trials are necessary in the interests of justice: Bohner v. Eastern Express, Inc., 405 Pa. 463, 175 A. 2d 864 (1961). In the instant case, it is admitted that if the bus started in motion when the plaintiff was standing directly in its path, as related in his testimony, that this in itself is sufficient to sustain a finding of negligence on the part of the defendant, Railways. However, the bus driver and two other passengers testified in defense, that the bus did not move during the period of time involved, namely, after the plaintiff alighted and before he was hit by the Gibbs' automobile. Further it is pointed out that while the accident occurred on February 28, 1957, and suit was instituted against Gibbs on June 14, 1957, the action against Railways was not started until February 26, 1959. It is also urged that in explaining the reason for the delay in suing Railways, plaintiff's testimony was evasive and inconsistent. In view of all these factors, it is argued that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and justice requires the grant of a new trial. We do not agree. A reading of the record in its entirety clearly manifests that the question of Railways' negligence was peculiarly for the jury's determination. The plaintiff's credibility was for that body alone to resolve. A reading of his testimony, a man of sixty-four years of age, who had only completed fifth grade in school, is not persuasive of Railways' contention that he discredited himself or that his testimony is of such a quality that it should be stamped as unworthy of belief. His testimony as to how the accident occurred was clear and unshaken. The fact that it was contradicted in material part by the testimony of witnesses called by the defense does not in itself require the grant of a new trial: Stewart v. Ray, 366 Pa. 134, 76 A. 2d 628 (1950), and Joseph v. Rochester Motor Coach Co., 380 Pa. 189, 110 A. 2d 214 (1955). We find no palpable abuse of discretion in the action of the court below in refusing Railways a new trial. Judgment against Railways is affirmed. Judgment against Gibbs is reversed and here entered for the defendant.