Opinion ID: 1244769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: fulminante and its effects

Text: What the majority label an appropriate opportunity (maj. opn., ante, at p. 500) for their ill-conceived abandonment of the California rule of automatic reversal for the admission of a coerced confession  but what is perhaps in fact merely a convenient excuse  is the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. 279. The reasoning and result of that case demand our close examination. In Fulminante, the defendant was indicted in Arizona for the first degree murder of his 11-year-old stepdaughter. Prior to trial in the Arizona Superior Court, he moved to suppress a confession he had made on the ground that it was inadmissible because coerced in violation of his rights under the United States Constitution, effectively including the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He was unsuccessful. The confession was then admitted at trial. The defendant was subsequently convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to death. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court reversed. It held that the confession was in fact coerced contrary to federal constitutional law. It also held that under that same law its admission required automatic reversal. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed. Its discussion consists of four parts: (1) a description of the facts; (2) whether the confession was inadmissible under the United States Constitution because coerced; (3) whether the admission of a coerced confession remains automatically reversible under the federal charter or is to be subject to harmless-error analysis pursuant to Chapman; and (4) whether the admission of the confession there was prejudicial. The Fulminante court was widely fragmented and deeply divided. Justice White delivered an opinion, which was for the court as to: (1) the description of the facts, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy joined; (2) the conclusion that the confession was in fact inadmissible under the United States Constitution because coerced, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Scalia joined; and (3) the holding that the admission of the confession there was prejudicial, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and Kennedy joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered an opinion, which was for the court as to the conclusion that the admission of a coerced confession is no longer automatically reversible under the federal charter but is henceforth subject to harmless-error analysis, in which Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter joined. Justice White filed an opinion dissenting from the purported abrogation of the rule of automatic reversal, in which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion dissenting as to coercion, in which Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter joined. He also filed an opinion dissenting as to prejudice, in which Justices O'Connor and Scalia joined. Justice Kennedy filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, explaining why he joined which parts of the foregoing opinions, including his views to the effect that there was prejudice but no error. The first question that arises is whether Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion purportedly abrogating the federal constitutional rule of automatic reversal controls the issue before this court. The answer is negative. What we shall assume to be the authoritativeness of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion extends only to the United States Constitution. The determination here concerns California law. In this area, of course, we are the final arbiters. (Cf. Allen v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 520, 525 [134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 557 P.2d 65] [[O]ur Constitution is `a document of independent force' [citations], `whose construction is left to this court, informed but untrammeled by the United States Supreme Court's reading of parallel federal provisions. [Citations.]'].) We must shoulder the responsibility. (See Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress (1992) 59 U. Chi. L.Rev. 13, 16 fn. 9 [implying that state supreme courts may look to their state constitutions and statutory and decisional law to hold that `a coerced confession may so infect the trial process that its admission into evidence demands reversal' and that the admission of a coerced confession is not subject to harmless error analysis].) In passing, however, we may observe that, at first glance, the authoritativeness of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion appears minimal. The weight to be accorded to his views must be reduced  to borrow words he wrote in another case  by reason of the fact that they prevailed by the narrowest of margins, over [a] spirited dissent[] challenging the[ir] basic underpinnings. ... ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___, ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 737-739, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2611] (per Rehnquist, C.J.).) The weight of his views must be reduced still further because of the strong criticism they have justifiably provoked. (See, e.g., Ogletree, Arizona v. Fulminante: The Harm of Applying Harmless Error to Coerced Confessions (1991) 105 Harv. L.Rev. 152, 152-154, 161-175 [hereafter Ogletree].) When we look more closely, we come to realize that the authoritativeness of Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is actually nonexistent. The relevant discussion, which is manifestly unnecessary to the court's judgment, is dictum. The Chief Justice later expressly admitted as much, making a virtue of necessity. (Rehnquist, C.J., Review of Major Supreme Court Decisions  October, 1990 Term (June 28, 1991) Sixty-first Judicial Conference for United States Judges of the Fourth Circuit, vol. I, p. 19 [conceding that the discussion may be technically dicta [ sic ]].) The second question that arises is whether Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion is persuasive as to the issue before this court. Here too, the answer is negative. In purportedly abrogating the federal constitutional rule of automatic reversal, Chief Justice Rehnquist lays a foundation that assumes that the United States Constitution is concerned only with the reliability of the outcome of an individual criminal trial and not at all with the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself. (See Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 308 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 330-331, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1264] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) As a result, he builds on sand. Chief Justice Rehnquist then suggests that the federal constitutional rule of automatic reversal never existed, or at least has not existed since Chapman. (See Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 308 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 330-331, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1264] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) The implication is astonishing. Recall that Chapman expressly excepted from harmless-error analysis the admission of a coerced confession, citing to Payne. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 23 & fn. 8 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 710].) Chapman was followed impliedly by Lego v. Twomey, supra, 404 U.S. at page 483 [30 L.Ed.2d at pages 623-624], Mincey v. Arizona, supra, 437 U.S. at page 398 [57 L.Ed.2d at pages 303-304], and New Jersey v. Portash, supra, 440 U.S. at page 459 [59 L.Ed.2d at page 510]; it was followed expressly by United States v. Hasting, supra, 461 U.S. at page 508, footnote 6 [76 L.Ed.2d at pages 105-106]. Recall also that Chapman was adhered to in, and in fact reaffirmed by, Clark. ( Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 577-578 & fn. 6 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 470-471].) The Chief Justice sets out to show that Chapman is dictum and that Payne does not stand for the proposition cited. He runs squarely into the facts, which do not yield. (See Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 290 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 318-319, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1254] (dis. opn. of White, J.).) In addition, he ignores all the decisions that prove him wrong. The omission speaks for itself. Chief Justice Rehnquist proceeds to declare that the question whether a federal constitutional error is automatically reversible or, instead, is subject to harmless-error analysis under Chapman depends on the following crucial distinction. On one side, there is what he labels `trial error,' which occur[s] during the presentation of the case to the jury, and which may therefore be quantitatively assessed ... in order to determine whether [it] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 307-308 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 330-331, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1264] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) Here, assertedly, belongs the admission of a coerced confession, a classic `trial error[.]' ( Id. at p. 309 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 330-331, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1264] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) On the other, there are what he calls structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by `harmless-error' standards. ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at pp. 309-310 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 331-332, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1265] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) Here, assertedly, belong, inter alia, the total deprivation of the right to counsel at trial, the participation of a judge who was not impartial, the unlawful exclusion of members of the defendant's race from a grand jury, the denial of the right to self-representation at trial, and the deprivation of the right to public trial. ( Id. at p. 310 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 331-332, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1265] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) Each of these flaws affect[s] the entire conduct of the trial from beginning to end or the framework within which the trial proceeds. ( Id. at p. 310 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 331-332, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1265] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) `Without these basic protections, a criminal trial cannot reliably serve its function as a vehicle for determination of guilt or innocence, and no criminal punishment may be regarded as fundamentally fair.' ( Id. at p. 310 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 331-332, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1265] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.), quoting without internal citation Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 577-578 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 470-471.) Chief Justice Rehnquist's crucial distinction fails. ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 291 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 319-320, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1255] (dis. opn. of White, J.).) His dichotomy, it may be noted, has no support in precedent. (Ogletree, supra, 105 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 164.) And that is the least of its weaknesses. To begin with, the distinction simply does not work. The omission of an instruction on the prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is, in Chief Justice Rehnquist's words, a classic `trial error[.]' ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 309 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 330-331, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1264] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) Nevertheless, it requires automatic reversal. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 320, fn. 14 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 574, 99 S.Ct. 2781].) [9] By contrast, the denial of a criminal defendant's right to be personally present at his own trial is surely as much a structural defect as the denial of his right to represent himself. Indeed, it would strain[] credulity to assert otherwise. (Ogletree, supra, 105 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 164.) All the same, denial of the right of personal presence is deemed subject to harmless-error analysis. ( Rushen v. Spain (1983) 464 U.S. 114, 117-118 [78 L.Ed.2d 267, 272-273, 104 S.Ct. 453] ( per curiam ).) Perhaps more important, the distinction is meaningless. ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 290 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 318-319, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1254] (dis. opn. of White, J.).) Chief Justice Rehnquist never clearly articulates the structure that the structural errors undermine. (Ogletree, supra, 105 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 164.) In fact, he never articulates that structure at all. If we consider, as it were, the modern form of a criminal trial, we would conclude that the admission of a coerced confession is as great a structural defect as, say, the exclusion from a grand jury of persons of the same race as the defendant. The latter may have no effect whatsoever on any part or aspect of the trial. The former, however, distorts the trial process itself (Ogletree, supra, 105 Harv. L.Rev. at p. 166), seeing that it is substantially an extrajudicial plea of guilty. If we look more deeply to the traditional substance of a criminal trial, we would come to the same conclusion. The bar against the admission of a coerced confession (see Bram v. United States, supra, 168 U.S. at pp. 542-543 [42 L.Ed. at pp. 573-574]) and the prohibition of the exclusion of same-race persons from a grand jury (see Strauder v. West Virginia (1880) 100 U.S. (10 Otto 303) 303, 305-310 [25 L.Ed. 664, 664-666]) are coeval, each dating to the 19th century. Shorn of its analytical trappings, Chief Justice Rehnquist's discussion reduces itself to this: a confession looks like ordinary evidence; and the admission of a coerced confession looks like the kind of error that may appropriately be subject to harmless-error analysis. Appearance, however, is not reality. As stated, a confession is evidence sui generis, being substantially an extrajudicial plea of guilty. Further, as explained, harmless-error analysis is designed to assess threats to the reliability of the outcome of an individual criminal trial; it does not even take cognizance of the injury peculiar to the introduction of a coerced confession, which is the undermining of fairness in the contest between the government and the individual and, ultimately, the legitimacy of the criminal justice system itself. At bottom, it becomes manifest, Chief Justice Rehnquist holds a belief that there is [nothing] more `fundamental' about involuntary confessions than about other statements inadmissible under the United States Constitution, which are indeed subject to harmless-error analysis. ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 311 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 331-332, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1265] (opn. of Rehnquist, C.J.).) We need not engage in protracted argument on the point. Our constitutional history demonstrates that such a belief is unsound. The search for truth, as Justice White observes, is indeed central to our system of justice, but `certain constitutional rights are not, and should not be, subject to harmless-error analysis because those rights protect important values that are unrelated to the truth-seeking function of the trial.' [Citation.] The right of a defendant not to have his coerced confession used against him is among those rights, for using a coerced confession `abort[s] the basic trial process' and `render[s] a trial fundamentally unfair.' ( Arizona v. Fulminante, supra, 499 U.S. at p. 295 [113 L.Ed.2d at pp. 321-322, 111 S.Ct. at p. 1257] (dis. opn. of White, J.), quoting Rose v. Clark, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 587 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 476-477] (conc. opn. of Stevens, J.) and id. at pp. 577 & 578, fn. 6 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 470].) Having closely considered the question, we must arrive at this conclusion: Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion furnishes no principled basis on which to reconsider, less still abandon, our rule of automatic reversal in favor of harmless-error analysis.