Opinion ID: 4539450
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The juvenile is 14 years of age.

Text: B. The likelihood of his adoption is high. Despite some testimony about some challenging behavior, he is smart, very mature for his age, adaptable and pleasant. He presents today as stable and mature about why he is here and how he got to this point. C. Termination will aid in the adoption of the juvenile, which is the most permanent plan. D. The juvenile is very bonded with his mother. It is obvious to the Court that the mother loves the juvenile. There have been no authorized visits, even though there were a number of unauthorized visits. The juvenile seldom mentions his father, although he expresses his desire to go home and live with his mother. E. The juvenile has been living at his current group home since late October of 2018. He has had approximately 13 placements since he came into DHHS custody. Although he has not had time to create a bond in his current home, he has bonded with foster parents in previous placements, and he has easily adjusted to different settings. First, in regards to Andy’s age, respondents acknowledge that the trial court correctly found that Andy was fourteen years old at the time of the hearing. Yet, citing to Mintz v. Mintz, 64 N.C. App. 338, 341, 307 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1983)—which is not binding on this Court—respondent-mother argues that due to Andy’s age, the trial court should consider his “obvious” preference to live with her. In Mintz, the Court of Appeals stated that as a child approaches the age of fourteen, their custodial preference on visitation may be considered by the trial court, but that “his choice is -9- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court not absolute or controlling.” Id. at 340–41, 307 S.E.2d at 393. Mintz, however, is readily distinguishable from the case before us. In Mintz, the Court of Appeals addressed parental visitation rights in the context of a divorce action, not an assessment by the trial court of a child’s best interest in a termination of parental rights proceeding. Id. at 338, 307 S.E.2d at 392. Moreover, the Court of Appeals affirmed that it remained the duty of the trial judge to determine “the weight to be accorded the child’s preference, to find and conclude what is in the best interest of the child, and to decide what promotes the welfare of the child.” Id. at 341, 307 S.E.2d at 394. Respondent-mother further contends that “Andy’s age and maturity level, and his obvious awareness of his and his family’s circumstances, weigh against the termination decision.” Here, the trial court made a dispositional finding that “[Andy] is smart, very mature for his age, adaptable and pleasant. He presents today as stable and mature about why he is here and how he got to this point.” We have noted that an important aspect of the trial court’s role as finder of fact is assessing the demeanor and credibility of witnesses, often in light of inconsistencies or contradictory evidence. It is in part because the trial court is uniquely situated to make this credibility determination that appellate courts may not reweigh the underlying evidence presented at trial. In re J.A.M., 372 N.C. 1, 11, 822 S.E.2d 693, 700 (2019). Thus, any reasonable inferences the trial court drew based on Andy’s age, demeanor, or attitude—and any -10- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court determinations it made as to the weight of those inferences—were solely for the trial court to make. See In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. 432, 437, 831 S.E.2d 62, 66 (2019). Respondent-father argues that Andy’s age weighs against the trial court’s determination that termination of his parental rights was in his best interest because a child over the age of twelve is required to consent to his adoption. See N.C.G.S. § 48-3-601 (2019). He asserts that, “Andy will have the right to object to the adoption, compounding the difficulty in procuring permanency for him.” However, the court may waive the consent requirement “upon a finding that it is not in the best interest of the minor to require the consent.” Id. § 48-3-603(b)(2). Thus, even assuming arguendo that Andy fails to consent at the time of an adoption, his lack of consent would not preclude him from being adopted. Second, respondents challenge the trial court’s finding that the likelihood of Andy’s adoption is high. While recognizing that the trial court appears to have based its finding on a report filed by the guardian ad litem (GAL) and the GAL’s testimony at the termination hearing, they assert the report and testimony is “undercut” and “directly contradicted” by Andy’s history while in DHHS custody. Respondent-mother contends that the trial court’s finding is not based on convincing evidence and respondent-father argues that the trial court’s finding is not based on competent evidence, given Andy’s behavioral and psychiatric issues and multiple placements while in foster care for nearly four years. -11- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court The GAL’s 29 January 2019 report, which was admitted into evidence, specifically stated that the “likelihood of adoption for [Andy] is high.” The report further stated that, “[Andy] is a smart, charming young man who easily engages in conversation. Although [Andy] has often struggled to find stability since entering DHHS custody, this GAL fully believes that when the right family is found for [Andy], he will find permanence.” In addition, at the termination hearing, the GAL testified that adoption was “likely, if he finds the right family . . . [b]ecause he is a very smart, charming young man who engages easily with adults, and I think that once he finds the right family, he would be able to find permanence.” The court’s finding of fact that Andy had a high likelihood of adoption is supported by record evidence and is thus binding on appeal. See In re A.U.D., 373 N.C. 3, 12, 832 S.E.2d 698, 704 (2019) (“To be sure, evidence existed that would have supported a contrary decision. But this Court lacks the authority to reweigh the evidence that was before the trial court.”). Third, with respect to the trial court’s finding that termination will aid in Andy’s adoption, respondent-mother appears to suggest that this finding amounts to a mere conclusory recitation of “magic words.” She cites to In re B.C.T., 828 S.E.2d 50 (N.C. Ct. App. 2019), to support her contention. The Court of Appeals’ decision in In re B.C.T. is not binding on this Court, and respondent-mother’s reliance on it is otherwise misplaced because it is distinguishable. In In re B.C.T., the trial court adjudicated that the respondent-mother’s child was neglected and concluded “[t]hat it is in the best interests of the Juvenile for [Ms. Mitchell, a family friend,] to be -12- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court granted the care, custody, and control of the Juvenile.” Id. at 58. The Court of Appeals held that because there was almost no evidence regarding Ms. Mitchell, her home, or care of the child, a conclusory recitation of the best interest standard was insufficient to support the trial court’s conclusion. Id. In the instant case, we are not convinced that the trial court was making a conclusory recitation. The permanent plan was adoption, and termination of parental rights is undoubtedly a prerequisite to accomplishing that plan. Fourth, while respondents do not challenge the trial court’s finding that Andy “is very bonded” with respondent-mother and “seldom mentions” respondent-father, they contend that this factor does not support the trial court’s conclusion that it is in Andy’s best interest to terminate their parental rights. It is clear from the trial court’s findings, however, that it considered several factors in making the best interests determination. “[T]he bond between parent and child is just one of the factors to be considered under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a), and the trial court is permitted to give greater weight to other factors.” In re Z.L.W., 372 N.C. at 437, 831 S.E.2d at 66. Finally, respondents challenge the trial court’s finding regarding Andy’s relationship with “the proposed adoptive parent, guardian, custodian, or other permanent placement.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a)(5). Specifically, respondent-mother contends that DHHS failed to identify any permanent placement for Andy, “so Andy has no relationship with any proposed caretaker.” We note that the absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar -13- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court to terminating parental rights. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. 190, 200, 835 S.E.2d 417, 424 (2019) (affirming the district court in terminating parental rights even though “[the child] was not currently in a pre-adoptive placement”); See also In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. 217, 223, 753 S.E.2d 732, 736 (2014) (“[T]he absence of an adoptive placement for a juvenile at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights.”). Thus, her argument is unavailing. Respondent-mother additionally argues that the portion of the trial court’s finding that provides Andy “easily adjusted to different settings” is not supported by the record. This portion of the trial court’s finding, however, is supported by record evidence and the GAL’s testimony. In the 31 March 2016 permanency planning order, the trial court found that Andy had been placed in a therapeutic foster home and “adjusted well,” developing a close bond with the foster parents. In the 31 October 2017 permanency planning order, the trial court found that while in a group home, Andy had “shown great improvement with his mood, his anger, his academic program[m]ing, his respect towards adults, and his manipulation.” In the 23 April 2018 permanency planning order, the trial court found that the foster home in which he was placed in November 2017 appeared to be a “good fit” for him. He formed a “strong bond with the foster parents, especially the foster mother” and seemed “very comfortable” in the home. It was the “happiest the Social Worker has seen him since the start of this case.” In a 29 January 2019 GAL report, the GAL stated that she had “observed [Andy] bond with previous caregivers.” The GAL had also observed Andy -14- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court bond with his foster parents in his most recent foster home. He “frequently teased and joked with his foster mother, demonstrating a level of comfort in the home and trust with her.” When asked at the termination hearing as to how Andy was currently adjusting in a group home, the GAL testified that “[h]e’s doing okay. . . . [O]nce he got into this home and kind of adjusted, his grades greatly improved and some behavioral issues improved.” Based on the foregoing evidence, the trial court made the reasonable inference that Andy had the ability to easily adjust to different settings. Respondent-father, on the other hand, argues that the portion of the trial court’s finding stating that Andy had been in thirteen different placements since entering DHHS custody undermines the trial court’s conclusion that termination was in Andy’s best interests and “only emphasizes the point that there is no proposed adoptive parent, and underscores that no permanent proposed placement was in existence at the time of the hearing.” He asserts that this case is similar to the circumstances found in In re J.A.O, 166 N.C. App. 222, 601 S.E.2d 226 (2004). We disagree. As previously stated, the lack of a proposed adoptive placement for Andy at the time of the termination hearing is not a bar to terminating parental rights. See In re A.R.A., 373 N.C. at 200, 835 S.E.2d at 424; In re D.H., 232 N.C. App. at 223, 753 S.E.2d at 736. Furthermore, In re J.A.O. is not binding on this Court, and we find the circumstances here to be readily distinguishable. In In re J.A.O., the juvenile was -15- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court fourteen years old at the time of the termination hearing. He had been in foster care since he was eighteen months old and had been placed in nineteen treatment centers. In re J.A.O., 166 N.C. App. at 227, 601 S.E.2d at 230. The juvenile’s GAL opined that it was in the juvenile’s best interests not to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. Id. at 225, 601 S.E.2d at 229. The GAL testified that it was “highly unlikely that a child of [the juvenile’s] age and physical and mental condition would be a candidate for adoption, much less selected by an adopted family.” Id. at 228, 601 S.E.2d at 230. The Court of Appeals stated that although there was a small possibility that the juvenile would be adopted, the “remote chance of adoption in this case” did not “justif[y] the momentous step of terminating respondent’s parental rights.” Id. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that it was in the juvenile’s best interests to terminate the respondent’s parental rights. Id. Here, the GAL distinctly testified that it was likely Andy would be adopted and included in her report that the likelihood of Andy’s adoption was high. Notably, the GAL recommended termination of respondents’ parental rights. Moreover, while the mother in J.A.O. had made reasonable progress towards correcting the conditions that led to the removal of her son from her care, respondents here failed to make such progress. The remainder of respondents’ arguments concern whether the statutory criteria of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110 as a whole weigh against terminating their parental rights. The trial court’s dispositional findings demonstrate it considered the relevant -16- IN RE A.J.T. Opinion of the Court statutory criteria of N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110(a). The trial court gave due consideration to Andy’s age, the likelihood of his adoption, whether termination would facilitate in the achievement of the permanent plan, Andy’s bond with respondents, and the quality of the relationship between Andy and his current placement. Respondents essentially ask this Court to do something it lacks the authority to do—to reweigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion than the trial court. We are satisfied that the trial court’s conclusion that termination of respondents’ parental rights was in Andy’s best interests was neither arbitrary nor manifestly unsupported by reason. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the 22 February 2019 order of the trial court terminating respondents’ parental rights. AFFIRMED. -17-