Opinion ID: 1655389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the youth court act is unconstitutional pursuant to the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution and corresponding sections of the mississippi constitution.

Text: ¶ 18. The argument section of the parent's brief under this issue is extremely difficult to follow as it is largely incoherent. As best as can be determined, the parents allege that the procedure used by the trial court is unconstitutional according to both the Mississippi and United States Constitutions, calling it arbitrary, capricious, and based upon a preponderance of the evidence. It seems the parents are arguing that a clear and convincing evidence standard should be applied rather than a preponderance of the evidence standard. ¶ 19. As support for their argument, the parents refer this Court to Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), where the parents appealed from a judgment of a family court which adjudged their children to be neglected. The Supreme Court held that before a state may sever completely and irrevocably the rights of parents in their natural child, due process requires that the state support its allegations by at least clear and convincing evidence, and therefore the fair preponderance of the evidence standard prescribed by the New York Family Court Act for the termination of parental rights denied the parents due process. ¶ 20. The parents believe that because Judge Ward adjudicated the children abused and neglected, he effectively terminated their parental rights through that proceeding. This is, of course, an incorrect reading of the law. The proceeding below was not a parental rights termination case, but rather a disposition hearing to determine whether or not the children were abused and neglected. Neither this finding nor the later finding of the trial court that aggravating circumstances existed served as a termination of parental rights. It was simply a decision that allowed the Department of Human Services to avoid working with the parents through counseling and other channels toward reunification with the children. This is consistent with the statutory scheme outlined in the Youth Court Act. Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-603 & -613 (2000). ¶ 21. The parents failed to raise the constitutionality of the statute at trial. This Court has held that although an issue is constitutional in nature, it is not absolved from the general rule that objections must be raised at the trial level. In re V.R., 725 So.2d 241, 245 (Miss.1998). See also Smith v. Fluor Corp., 514 So.2d 1227, 1232 (Miss.1987) (holding that the constitutionality of a statute will not be considered unless the point is specifically pleaded); Colburn v. State, 431 So.2d 1111, 1114 (Miss.1983) (determining that failure of defendant to raise a constitutionality question about an aggravated assault statute in a proper motion before the trial court is a constitutional waiver of any error and precluded defendant from seeking reversal on this ground on appeal). The parents had ample opportunity to argue this issue during any one of their numerous hearings, but failed to do so, barring the issue on appeal. ¶ 22. Serving as a second procedural bar, the parents failed to send notice of their challenge to the Attorney General, violating Rule 24(d) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure which requires that proper notice be given to the Attorney General when the constitutionality of a statute is challenged to afford him an opportunity to intervene and argue the question of constitutionality. Pickens v. Donaldson, 748 So.2d 684, 691 (Miss.1999) (citing Miss. R. Civ. P. 24(d)). Rule 44(a) of the Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure similarly requires service of any appellate brief challenging the validity of a statute on the Attorney General, the city attorney, or other chief legal officer of the governmental body involved. Pickens, 748 So.2d at 691 (citing M.R.A.P. 44(a)). Except by special order of the court to which the case is assigned, in the absence of such notice neither the Supreme Court nor the Court of Appeals will decide the question until the notice and right to respond contemplated by this rule has been given to the appropriate governmental body. Id. at 691. The parents' failure to raise the issue of the constitutionality of a statute at trial or to notify the Attorney General's Office of their challenge of the statute results in the procedural bar on this issue. Id. at 691. ¶ 23. Procedural bars notwithstanding, the merits of the claim are as follows. This Court, in In re T.L.C., 566 So.2d 691 (Miss.1990), discussed the standard of review employed when considering the constitutionality of a statute: Without doubt, our constitutional scheme contemplates the power of judicial review of legislative enactments; however, that power may be exercised affirmatively only where the legislation under review be found in the palpable conflict with some plain provision of the... Constitution. Statutes such as the Youth Court Act come before us clothed with a heavy presumption of constitutional validity. The party challenging the constitutionality of a statute is burdened with carrying his case beyond all reasonable doubt before this Court has authority to hold the statute, in whole or in part, of no force or effect. When a party invokes our power of judicial review, it behooves us to recall that the challenged act has been passed by legislators and approved by a governor sworn the uphold the selfsame constitution as are we. Id. at 696 (citations omitted). The parents have failed to make any showing that any of their fundamental constitutional rights have been violated, much less proving their allegation beyond all reasonable doubt. They simply complain that their rights were denied in an argument consuming less than three paragraphs on a single page in their brief. Therefore, this issue is both procedurally barred and meritless.