Opinion ID: 2807875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: title vii and the bona fide occupational

Text: QUALIFICATION Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment practices that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Nevertheless, a facially discriminatory employment practice, such as the sex-based hiring practice we have here, may pass 14 TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. legal muster if sex is a bona fide occupational qualification or BFOQ. That narrow exception—found in § 2000e-2(e)(1)— provides: [I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of . . . sex . . . where . . . sex . . . is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “[t]he BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly.” UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). The BFOQ defense applies to “special situations” where employment discrimination is based upon “objective, verifiable requirements” that “concern job-related skills and aptitudes.” Id. An “occupational qualification” means a “qualification[] that affect[s] an employee’s ability to do the job.” Id. Under our precedent, the BFOQ defense “may be invoked only when the essence of the business operation would be undermined by hiring individuals of both sexes.” Breiner v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 610 F.3d 1202, 1210 (9th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To justify discrimination under the BFOQ exception, an employer must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) the “job qualification justifying the discrimination is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business”; and (2) that “sex is a legitimate proxy for determining” whether a correctional officer has the necessary job qualifications. Ambat v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 15 757 F.3d 1017, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1210). In light of these demanding legal standards, BFOQs are few and far between. In many industries, it is difficult to imagine any jobs that would qualify as BFOQs. However, the “unique context of prison employment,” id. at 1028, is one area where courts have found sex-based classifications justified. The Supreme Court directly addressed the prison environment in just one case, Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). The Court held that, in the context of a maximum-security facility “where violence is the order of the day” and sex offenders were interspersed with other prisoners, a female guard’s sex may “undermine her capacity to provide the security that is the essence of a correctional counselor’s responsibility.” Id. at 335–36. Referencing Dothard, the Court in Johnson Controls explained that “[s]ex discrimination was tolerated because sex was related to the guard’s ability to do the job—maintaining prison security.” 499 U.S. at 202. When justified under the circumstances, we and other circuits similarly have upheld sex-based correctional officer assignments in women’s prisons. See Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (BFOQ designation of six correctional officer positions at Hawaii women’s prison); Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 749–50 (6th Cir. 2004) (BFOQ designation of 250 correctional officer positions at Michigan women’s prisons); Tharp v. Iowa Dep’t of Corr., 68 F.3d 223, 224 (8th Cir. 1995) (BFOQ designation of all correctional officer positions in women’s residential unit within a mixed-gender minimum security prison); cf. Torres v. Wisc. Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1532 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (noting 16 TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. that prison officials are not required to provide “objective evidence, either from empirical studies or otherwise,” and remanding the denial of a BFOQ designation for evaluation “on the basis of the totality of the circumstances contained in the entire record.”). Although limited gender discrimination may be permissible in the prison employment context, prison administrators do not get a free pass. The Department must have an objective “basis in fact” for “its belief that gender discrimination is ‘reasonably necessary’—not merely reasonable or convenient—to the normal operation of its business.” Everson, 391 F.3d at 748 (citing W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 414 (1985)). This means prison administrators “seeking to justify a BFOQ must show a high correlation between sex and ability to perform job functions.” Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1213 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Speculation about gender roles is insufficient—the evidence must demonstrate that prison administrators had a “concrete, logical basis for concluding that gender restrictions are reasonably necessary” and that alternatives to sex discrimination have been “reasonably considered and refuted.” Ambat, 757 F.3d at 1028 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An additional significant factor is at play: deference to prison officials. “Judgments by prison administrators that are the product of a reasoned decision-making process, based on available information and expertise, are entitled to some deference.” Breiner, 610 F.3d at 1212 n.6 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Robino, 145 F.3d at 1110 (holding that, where Hawaii prison administrators appointed a task force to review prison policies, their “professional judgment is entitled to deference”). TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. 17 Although we have not offered up a cookbook for a “reasoned decision-making process,” cases that have invoked the deference principle point to undertakings that address systemic issues, consider outside views and data, and weigh reasonable alternatives. See Robino, 145 F.3d at 1111 (deferring to Hawaii prison administrators who directed a “specially appointed task force” to study prison problems); Everson, 391 F.3d at 741–45 (deferring to Michigan prison administrators where they conducted three studies, one pursuant to a settlement with the Department of Justice). To be sure, although studies and empirical data are indicia of a deliberative approach, we have emphasized that “the decision-making process supporting a discriminatory policy” need not “take any particular form.” Ambat, 757 F.3d at 1026. Deference is a threshold legal determination. The Department’s exhaustive process fits well within the rubric of “reasoned decision making” and is entitled to deference. After the Jane Doe prisoner class action was filed in 2007, the Department did not rush headlong into sex-based staffing. Instead, it hired experts, consulted with other states, reviewed relevant caselaw, documented scores of sexual misconduct allegations and investigated many more, and sought advice from the Human Rights Commission. Drawing on its decades of experience, the state did not view sex-based staffing as a panacea, instead proposing a package of reforms that included measures such as applicant psychological testing, sex-awareness training, and security cameras. Teamsters argues that the Department implemented sexbased staffing “during a time of Departmental crisis” and in a “panic” that was little more than a “desperate attempt” to settle the state court class action. The Union’s characterization begs the question: If sordid details of sexual 18 TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 117 V. WASH. DEP’T OF CORR. abuse and constitutional violations do not inspire a “crisis” and feelings of “panic,” then what does? The state shouldn’t be demonized for kicking into gear to find a remedy for its long-running challenges. In any event, our inquiry does not turn on the subjective state of mind of the Department’s leadership. The Department undertook a rigorous review of its staffing policies to address the issues raised in the report and the class action. The Department’s thorough, thoughtful approach stands in stark contrast to the sheriff in Ambat, who rejected out of hand alternatives to discrimination—such as pre-hiring screening, surveillance cameras, and training—and declined to order an internal investigation or hire outside consultants. See 757 F.3d at 1022, 1026. The sheriff did not consult deputies directly responsible for prisoner supervision or other jurisdictions with similar policies, and no internal review documented the extent of misconduct. Id. Ambat instructs that “[d]etermining whether a corrections official is entitled to deference is a fact-intensive and case-specific inquiry” that is “generally within the discretion of the district court.” Id. at 1026. The district court found that the Department’s process merited deference, and we see no reason to conclude otherwise. Accordingly, we give “some deference,” Robino, 145 F.3d at 1110, to Washington’s prison administrators, although we remain mindful of the antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII.