Opinion ID: 425935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the standard for judicial review of individual cia

Text: CENSORSHIP DECISIONS 56 The district court found that the CIA properly classified the [relevant] documents and [was] warranted in their censorship of portions of McGehee's article. 21 We agree, although we take this opportunity to clarify the standard of judicial review appropriate to a case such as this one. 57 This case arises in a posture significantly different from a request for release of CIA documents under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). In a FOIA case, an individual seeks to compel release of documents in the government's possession. Here, by contrast, McGehee wishes publicly to disclose information that he already possesses, and the government has ruled that his secrecy agreement forbids disclosure. 58 This difference between seeking to obtain information and seeking to disclose information already obtained raises McGehee's constitutional interests in this case above the constitutional interests held by a FOIA claimant. As a general rule, citizens have no first amendment right of access to traditionally nonpublic government information. See, e.g., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 8-9, 98 S.Ct. 2588, 2593, 57 L.Ed.2d 553 (1978) (plurality opinion); id. at 16, 98 S.Ct. at 2597 (Stewart, J., concurring); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 849, 94 S.Ct. 2811, 2814, 41 L.Ed.2d 514 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 831-32, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2808-09, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). A litigant seeking release of government information under FOIA, therefore, relies upon a statutory entitlement--as narrowed by statutory exceptions--and not upon his constitutional right to free expression. 59 In this case, however, McGehee wishes to publish information he possesses, and the CIA wishes to silence him. Although neither the CIA's administrative determination nor any court order in this case constitutes a prior restraint in the traditional sense upon McGehee or any other party, 22 the entire scheme of prepublication review is designed for the purpose of preventing publication of classified information. McGehee therefore has a strong first amendment interest in ensuring that CIA censorship of his article results from a proper classification of the censored portions. Cf. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362, 1367 (4th Cir.) (the deletion items should be suppressed only if they are found to be both classified and classifiable under the Executive Order), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1999, 44 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). 60 We must accordingly establish a standard for judicial review of the CIA classification decision that affords proper respect to the individual rights at stake while recognizing the CIA's technical expertise and practical familiarity with the ramifications of sensitive information. We conclude that reviewing courts should conduct a de novo review of the classification decision, while giving deference to reasoned and detailed CIA explanations of that classification decision. 61 We begin with an examination of the standard employed in the review of FOIA requests for classified information, because the scope of judicial review in this case should be at least that broad. The FOIA calls for de novo judicial review of an agency decision, and places the burden on the agency to justify its claim of exemption. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B). See, e.g., Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C.Cir.1982); Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C.Cir.1981). At the same time, courts are to accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record because the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified record. S.Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, U.S.Code & Admin.News 1974, p. 6267 (1974) (Conference Report on the FOIA Amendments). 62 This circuit has on many occasions reviewed whether the denial of a FOIA request properly fell within the FOIA exemption for classified documents. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(1). In these cases, we have established that CIA explanations for its classification decisions should be neither conclusory, merely reciting statutory standards, [nor] too vague [n]or sweeping. Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d 1381, 1387 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 937, 100 S.Ct. 2156, 64 L.Ed.2d 790 (1980). At the same time, [o]nce satisfied that the proper procedures have been followed and that the information logically falls into the exemption claimed, the courts 'need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith.'  Gardels v. Central Intelligence Agency, 689 F.2d 1100, 1104-05 (D.C.Cir.1982) (quoting Weissman v. Central Intelligence Agency, 565 F.2d 692, 697 (D.C.Cir.1977)); see also Halperin v. Central Intelligence Agency, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C.Cir.1980). Similarly, in Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, supra, the Fourth Circuit, after invoking the FOIA standard, announced a presumption of regularity for CIA classification decisions. 509 F.2d at 1368. 63 Because the present case implicates first amendment rights, however, we feel compelled to go beyond the FOIA standard of review for cases reviewing CIA censorship pursuant to secrecy agreements. While we believe courts in securing such determinations should defer to CIA judgment as to the harmful results of publication, they must nevertheless satisfy themselves from the record, in camera or otherwise, that the CIA in fact had good reason to classify, and therefore censor, the materials at issue. Accordingly, the courts should require that CIA explanations justify censorship with reasonable specificity, demonstrating a logical connection between the deleted information and the reasons for classification. These should not rely on a presumption of regularity if such rational explanations are missing. We anticipate that in camera review of affidavits, followed if necessary by further judicial inquiry, will be the norm. Cf. Hayden v. National Security Agency, 608 F.2d at 1387 (in camera review is neither necessary nor appropriate in FOIA cases once the agency demonstrates (1) that it followed proper classification procedures, and (2) that by its description the document logically falls within the claimed exemption). Moreover, unlike FOIA cases, 23 in cases such as this both parties know the nature of the information in question. Courts should therefore strive to benefit from criticism and illumination by [the] party with the actual interest in forcing disclosure. Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 825 (D.C.Cir.1973) (describing the defects in the FOIA procedures), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974). This was, in fact, the procedure employed by the district court here. 24 64 We are, of course, well aware that judicial review of CIA classification decisions, by reasonable necessity, cannot second-guess CIA judgments on matters in which the judiciary lacks the requisite expertise. Due to the mosaic-like nature of intelligence gathering, Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d at 971, for example, [w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed[ ] may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in context, United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 553, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972). But while the CIA's tasks include the protection of the national security and the maintenance of the secrecy of sensitive information, the judiciary's tasks include the protection of individual rights. Considering that speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government, 25 and that the line between information threatening to foreign policy and matters of legitimate public concern is often very fine, 26 see New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), courts must assure themselves that the reasons for classification are rational and plausible ones. 65