Opinion ID: 412022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Daye's Presentation

Text: 25 In the present case, we conclude that Daye exhausted his state remedies under two of the criteria articulated above. First, his Appellate Division brief relied on two state cases in which New York's highest court had analyzed similar contentions in constitutional terms. Second, Daye's repeated challenge to the trial judge's alleged partiality or open display of partiality served to place his claim within the ambit of a long line of cases establishing a defendant's constitutional right to a trial before an unbiased judge. 26
27 The pertinent state cases relied on by Daye in his state appeal were People v. De Jesus, supra, 42 N.Y.2d 519, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752, and People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787 (1975). Daye cited De Jesus for the proposition that the Bench must be scrupulously free from and above even the appearance or the taint of partiality. (Daye's brief to Appellate Division at 8.) In De Jesus, the New York Court of Appeals described the issue before it--whether the excessive intervention of the trial judge deprived the defendant of a fair trial--in clearly constitutional terms, quoting and citing federal constitutional cases: 28 It is 'the law of the land' that no man's life, liberty or property be forfeited as a punishment until there has been a charge fairly made and fairly tried in a public tribunal (Matter of Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278 [68 S.Ct. 499, 510, 92 L.Ed. 682]. Such a right constitutes the most fundamental of all freedoms (Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 [85 S.Ct. 1628, 1631, 14 L.Ed.2d 543]. The underlying issue here is whether defendant ... was deprived of such a trial. 29 42 N.Y.2d at 520, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752. In concluding that the intervention of the trial judge had denied the defendant  'a fair and impartial trial before an unbiased court and an unprejudiced jury,'  id. at 523, 399 N.Y.S.2d 196, 369 N.E.2d 752 (quoting People v. McLaughlin, 150 N.Y. 365, 375, 44 N.E. 1017 (1896)), the court adverted not only to state cases but as well to Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 350-51, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1515-16, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966), and Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472, 85 S.Ct. 546, 549, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965), cases affirming the right, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution, to a fair trial. 30 Daye quoted People v. Crimmins for the proposition that his right to a fair trial was so fundamental that its denial precluded invocation of any sort of harmless error analysis. In Crimmins, the New York Court of Appeals introduced the portion of its harmless error discussion that was quoted by Daye with the following observation: 31 [O]ur discussion of the effect to be given constitutional error should not overlook a parallel, and in some instances an overlapping doctrine, also of constitutional proportion, namely, the right to a fair trial. 32 36 N.Y.2d at 237-38, 367 N.Y.S.2d 213, 326 N.E.2d 787. 33 The discussions in Crimmins and De Jesus, therefore, show that the New York courts view a defendant's right to a fair trial as one of constitutional dimension, and view a claim of excessive and biased judicial intervention in the trial as implicating that right to a fair trial. We conclude that Daye's citations of those two cases in the context of his factual assertions were sufficient to give the state courts notice that he asserted a constitutional claim. 34 We note in passing that Crimmins and De Jesus (as well as People v. Mees, 47 N.Y.2d 997, 420 N.Y.S.2d 214, 394 N.E.2d 283 (1979), which further confirms the constitutional thrust of Crimmins and De Jesus ) were decided after the defendants' state appeal in Johnson v. Metz. Obviously these New York cases were not cited in the Johnson state appeals. Further, although both Crimmins and De Jesus had been decided before Johnson was argued to our Court and Mees was decided several months before the Johnson decision was rendered, they apparently were not called to our attention. The Johnson panel stated 35 We have been cited to no case, nor have we found any, in which the intervention of a trial judge in the conduct of trial has been found so prejudicial as to amount to a violation of constitutional due process. 36 609 F.2d at 1056. 37
38 In addition, we conclude that Daye satisfied the exhaustion requirement because the contention that the trial judge's evident partiality and his assumption of a hostile and prosecutorial stance deprived Daye of a fair trial was sufficient to alert the state court that a federal due process claim was being asserted. Under the Due Process Clause there is a well developed right, established in a long line of cases, to a trial before an unbiased judge. The fundamental nature of this right is demonstrated by the fact that not even the appearance of bias is tolerated. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.... '[J]ustice must satisfy the appearance of justice.'  In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 75 S.Ct. 11, 13, 99 L.Ed. 11 (1954)). This principle is reflected in a long line of cases, involving a variety of circumstances bespeaking the real or apparent bias of the trial judge. E.g., Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 2704, 41 L.Ed.2d 897 (1974); Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60, 93 S.Ct. 80, 82-83, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 S.Ct. 499, 27 L.Ed.2d 532 (1971); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 278, 68 S.Ct. 499, 510, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 534, 47 S.Ct. 437, 441, 445, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). In Murchison and Oliver, the risk of bias inhered in the fact that the trial judge was the person who had brought the charges. In Taylor and Mayberry, the potential bias came from the fact that the judge presided over a trial adjudicating allegedly contemptuous behavior toward himself. And in Ward and Tumey, the appearance of potential bias was reflected in the fact that any fine or costs payable by the defendant upon conviction were to be paid to the judge. 39 We regard it as immaterial that none of these cases dealt with a bias manifested through allegedly excessive and one-sided intervention in the trial. The gravamen of a claim of denial of a fair trial due to judicial bias does not depend on the source of the bias or the manner of its manifestation. If judicial bias, or the appearance of it, existed, due process was denied. We do not believe it reasonable to assume that state judges presented with a claim of manifested judicial bias would fail to recognize the implication of due process rights simply because half a century of due process cases dealt with the mere risk of bias or with actual bias manifested in other ways. 40 Thus, to the extent that Johnson v. Metz actually construed Johnson's claim as one of bias (i.e., denial of an impartial trial, see 609 F.2d at 1054), rather than one simply complaining of the overall conduct of the trial judge, id., or simply complaining of intervention, id. at 1056, we disagree with its conclusion that the claim as one with constitutional thrust was novel, and with its decision to giv[e] the state court the first opportunity to pass on whether or not the novel constitutional point is 'within the mainstream of due process adjudication,'  id. n. 5. 41 In the present case there can be little doubt that Daye asserted his fair trial claim in terms of the alleged bias displayed by the trial judge. Having started from the basic doctrine that the judge must be scrupulously free from and above even the appearance or taint of partiality, (Daye's brief to Appellate Division at 8), Daye proceeded to assert, inter alia, that [t]hroughout the trial the Court set impartiality aside in favor of the prosecution, (id.); that the court assume[d] the role of prosecutor and thereby demonstrated to the jury that the Trial Judge believed the defendant to be guilty, (id. at 14); that the trial judge demonstrated an inability to remain 'impartial and dispassionate and not appear as an advocate,'  (id. at 20); and that the court blatantly and repeatedly indicated its disbelief in the defendant's testimony ... and assumed an obviously hostile and prosecutorial stance towards the defendant, (id. at 24). We conclude that the state courts were alerted to Daye's complaint that he had been deprived of a trial before an unbiased judge and unprejudiced jury, and we cannot assume that those courts did not recognize the constitutional implications of such a claim.