Opinion ID: 786739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Partial Settlement

Text: 7 Castellano argues that the October 1998 letters constituted a binding settlement agreement that Wal-Mart fraudulently refused to honor because it knew that Castellano was in a dire financial situation. These financial woes led Castellano to enter into the March 1999 settlement agreement — a situation he says constitutes economic duress. Illinois law is clear that duress does not exist merely where consent to an agreement is secured because of hard bargaining positions or the pressure of financial circumstances. Cont'l Illinois Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Stanley, 606 F.Supp. 558, 562 (N.D.Ill.1985). Furthermore, it is clear that Castellano had options — accept the March 1999 settlement offer or compel Wal-Mart to honor the October 1998 agreement by legal action. Castellano chose the former and accepted the benefits of the March 1999 settlement agreement. This is not duress. Moreover, entering into an agreement and accepting the benefits of that agreement ends the inquiry as to the validity of the settlement agreement. Joyce v. Year Investments, Inc., 45 Ill.App.2d 310, 196 N.E.2d 24, 26-7 (1964). 8 Since the March 1999 settlement agreement was binding and enforceable, then by its own terms, the only issues left in the case deal with roof decking issues, roof repair issues, removal of carpeting from the tile floor, and rents due for the past and future, less any mitigation. This is true despite Plaintiffs' protestations to the contrary. 9 The Castellanos argue that the settlement letter's language stating, the only remaining damage issues in this case ... is ambiguous. It is not. The very same letter refers to the case by docket number. By referring to the case's docket number, the agreement unambiguously refers to the entire case.