Opinion ID: 1880592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gang graffiti photographs and Sgt. Jackson's explanation of the graffiti.

Text: Ferguson contends that photographs of a dresser covered with gang graffiti and Sgt. Jackson's explanation of that graffiti were improperly admitted into evidence because it was extrinsic evidence of a collateral matter, improper character evidence, and overly prejudicial. Ferguson's first contention is that the state admitted this evidence for impeachment purposes, and he correctly points out that extrinsic evidence of collateral matters cannot be used to impeach a witness. Admittedly, when the state first proposed introducing this evidence, it did so under the guise of impeaching Ferguson's and his mother's testimony that Ferguson was not a gang member. If this evidence were offered only for impeachment purposes, its admissibility depends on whether the evidence relates to a collateral matter. Under Minn. R. Evid. 608(b), specific instances of conduct to attack a witness's credibility cannot be proved by extrinsic evidence. The rule of law is well established that an examining attorney who inquires into collateral matters on cross-examination, including those matters relating to the witness' credibility, is bound by the answers he receives. The cross-examiner is not permitted [to introduce] collateral matters to prove facts contradicting the answers, even if they are false. State v. Sharich, 297 Minn.19, 24, 209 N.W.2d 907, 911 (1973). Therefore, if the gang graffiti is only a collateral issue, the extrinsic evidence of the photographs and the police testimony about the graffiti should not have been admitted for impeachment purposes. Thus, we must address whether evidence of Ferguson's gang affiliation is only a collateral issue. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is inadmissible to prove that the perpetrator of these other acts acted in conformity with an alleged character trait. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b). Such evidence, however, is admissible for other purposes, such as evidence of motive. Id. After the gang graffiti evidence was admitted, the defense moved for a mistrial. At that point, the state replied that the evidence was admissible because it tended to prove Ferguson's motive. The state's theory of the case was that the murder was gang-related, and that Ferguson and Allen Jr. belonged to rival gangs. As such, Ferguson's gang affiliation was essential to the state's proof of motive. The admission of the graffiti evidence did not violate rule 608 because gang affiliation was not a collateral issue. Nor did its admission violate rule 404(b) because the evidence tended to prove motive. Ferguson's final argument regarding the gang graffiti is that its admission violated Minn. R. Evid. 403 because the possibility of its prejudice outweighed its probative value. His argument focuses especially on Sgt. Jackson's testimony about the meaning of the graffiti, which he characterizes as highly inflammatory. Under Minn. R. Evid. 403, evidence should be excluded if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. This court has explained that in Rule 403, `prejudice' does not mean the damage to the opponent's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to the unfair advantage that results from the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means. State v. Cermak, 365 N.W.2d 243, 247 n.2 (Minn.1985) (quoting 22 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure-Evidence § 5215 (1978)). Evidence does not violate rule 403 merely because it is highly damaging to the other side's case. To the contrary, such evidence is admissible when it is highly probative. See, e.g., Cermak, 365 N.W.2d at 246-47 (affirming the admission of photographs of the sexual abuse of children when the pictures strengthened the state's case against the defendant). For instance, in State v. Naylor, the state alleged that the murder was related to the defendant's involvement in witchcraft. 474 N.W.2d 314, 317 (Minn.1991). The district court admitted testimony about the defendant's involvement with witchcraft, photographs of books on witchcraft in the co-defendant's house, and the actual books on witchcraft to which the defendant had access. Id. This court affirmed the admission of almost all of these evidentiary items, concluding that any unfair prejudice was substantially outweighed by the evidence's probative value because it tended to prove his research into and planning of the murder. Id. at 318-19. [1] Ferguson's case is similar to Naylor. While the photographs of the gang graffiti and the testimony explaining the graffiti may have been highly prejudicial, the evidence was also highly probative of Ferguson's alleged motive to kill Allen Jr. Further, the district court explicitly instructed the jury that Ferguson was not on trial for being or not being a member of a gang or for associating or not associating with persons who may be gang members. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the gang graffiti evidence.