Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Where Should the Cuyler Line Be Drawn?

Text: 246 I recognize that not every conflict of interest pitting a lawyer's self-interest against his client's interests should trigger the analysis outlined in Cuyler. As one commentator notes, [i]n a sense, every representation begins with a lawyer-client conflict. If the representation is for a fee, the lawyer's economic interest will be to maximize the amount of the fee and the client's will be to minimize it. Wolfram, supra, Sec. 7.1.1, at 313. Conversely, if the representation is for a flat fee, the attorney's interest will be to minimize the amount of time spent on the case, and the client's interest will be to maximize it. Similar conflicts inure in any contract for the sale of goods or services; the seller's interest is to maximize the amount the buyer spends and minimize his own costs, and the buyer's interest is to minimize the amount that he spends and maximize the quality of the goods or services. 247 Thus, the Cuyler exception would swallow the Strickland rule if it were applied to every case in which a criminal defendant complains that his lawyer failed to investigate a witness or a defense, neglected to perform an experiment, did not hire a witness, or otherwise failed to take action because the attorney decided that it was not worth the time or the expense. We have recognized that Cuyler is not meant to cover these types of cases. Strickland appropriately governs claims for failure to investigate 16 and the like, and courts have had little difficulty in treating such claims under Strickland's ineffectiveness rubric. See, e.g., Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir.1995) (refusing to apply Cuyler when a defendant alleged that the fact that payment for any investigation or psychiatric services could have come from counsel's pocket forced counsel to choose between [the defendant's] interests and his own); United States v. Zackson, 6 F.3d 911, 921 (2d Cir.1993) (finding that Strickland, not Cuyler, was applicable to a claim that defense counsel was plagued by a conflict of interest, namely that he was under enormous time constraints in regard to prior trial commitments (internal quotations omitted)); Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222, 227 (5th Cir.1993) (finding that a failure to hire an expert was not a conflict in the Cuyler sense and applying Strickland to the alleged conflict). 17 248 In addition to conflicts that are more properly treated under Strickland as claims about competence and diligence, there are other attorney-client conflicts frequently or normally encountered in the practice of law that will be better handled under Strickland. For example, the conflict claimed to exist in United States v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 64-65 (D.C.Cir.1992), involving a lawyer who allegedly failed to request a continuance because he was afraid the judge would take action against him and his law firm if he made such a request, would arise with some frequency, as would the conflict claimed to exist in Zamora v. Dugger, 834 F.2d 956, 960 (11th Cir.1987), that the lawyer was more concerned with publicity than with his client's fate. Both these charges can be made, with some credibility, in a good number of cases, and where they form the basis for a claim for post-conviction relief, they should be evaluated under Strickland. 249 While the great majority of alleged attorney-client conflicts arising in post-conviction proceedings--those frequently or normally encountered in the practice--will be better handled under Strickland, there are exceptional conflicts between an attorney's self-interest and his client's interest, stemming from highly particularized and powerfully focused sources, of the sort not normally encountered in law practice, that demand the application of Cuyler. A media rights contract is such a source, 18 as are the kind of contingent fee arrangement at issue in Winkler and an attorney's involvement in the allegedly criminal conduct of his client. These circumstances present situations so fraught with the temptation for the lawyer to sacrifice his client's best interest for his own benefit that they constitute particularly serious threats to the duty of loyalty. Not coincidentally, the Supreme Court and lower courts have applied the Cuyler presumption to these very types of cases. 19 250 The majority posits that in these cases, unlike in the multiple representation context, the risk of prejudice is not plain, and that [w]hen the duty of loyalty is challenged by an attorney's self-interest, the range of possible breaches ... is virtually limitless. Beets, 65 F.3d at 1271. I disagree. The risk is all too plain. Further, Cuyler has been the law for fifteen years, and it cites precedents at the circuit level (including this circuit's decision in Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.1975)), that are even older. The inescapable fact is that the courts have not had difficulty with the boundary problems described by the majority, as courts have been able to separate ordinary ineffective assistance claims (even those dressed in conflict language) from the exceptional cases that warrant the Cuyler standard. But even if we do encounter problems with cases at the boundaries, that is no reason to change the rule in a case that lies at the heart of the principles animating Cuyler. 251 In short, there is no authority whatsoever for limiting Cuyler to the multiple representation situation, and, as many courts have recognized, it makes no sense to do so in those exceptional cases where an attorney's self-interest poses a serious threat to the duty of loyalty.