Opinion ID: 53880
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ADA's Standard of Causation

Text: The causation question under the ADA is really a question of whether the ADA's use of the causal language `because of,'[ [24] ] `by reason of,'[ [25] ] and `because'[ [26] ] means that discriminatory and retaliatory conduct is proscribed only if it was solely because of, solely by reason of, or solely because an employee was disabled or requested an accommodation. Head v. Glacier Nw., Inc . [27] The answer to this question is unsettled in the Fifth Circuit. Some circuit decisions in the 1990s endorsed, without explaining the reasons, the sole causation standard. [28] Other circuit decisions have approved the motivating factor causation test for ADA claims. [29] Seven of our sister circuits have held that the ADA causation standard does not require a showing of sole cause. [30] The Ninth Circuit in Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc . and the Eleventh Circuit in McNely v. Ocala Star-Banner Corp ., thoroughly analyzed this question. The McNely court concluded after analyzing the statutory language, the legislative history, and the Supreme Court precedent interpreting because of in Title VII cases, that the sole cause standard was misplaced in ADA cases. [31] The court thought it inappropriate to import the solely restriction from § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, when a plain reading of the because of causation language in the ADA conveys the idea of a factor that made a difference in the outcome, not one that was necessarily the sole cause of the outcome. [32] Under a plain reading of the statute, and in accord with the position of other circuits, we conclude that the sole causation standard is not the appropriate standard for ADA claims. We hold that under a straightforward reading of the statute, the motivating factor test should be applied to ADA claims. This is consistent with the law of most other circuits, [33] and it is in line with the causation standard we have applied to similar anti-discrimination statutes. The because of, by reason of, and because language in the ADA statute means that Congress intended the ADA to cover situations in which discrimination on the basis of disability is one factor, but not the only factor, motivating an adverse employment action. [34] Similar language is used under Title VII, which prohibits employers from discriminating because of any protected characteristic, including race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. [35] The Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified Title VII by imposing liability on employers where discrimination was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. [36] The Second Circuit reasoned persuasively in Parker that although the 1991 Civil Rights Act does not, by its own terms, apply to violations of the ADA, nothing in either the language or purpose of either statute suggests that Congress intended different causation standards to apply to the different forms of discrimination. [37] In fact, use of the nearly identical causal language in Title VII and the ADA indicates that the expansion of Title VII to cover mixed-motive cases should apply to the ADA as well. [38] Significantly, we have held that the identical because of causal language in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) mandates application of the mixed-motive analysis to ADEA cases. Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc. [39] In line with these cases, we hold that to establish liability in an employment discrimination action under the ADA, the plaintiff must show that disability played a motivating role in the adverse employment action. Because the ADA standard applies in § 501 cases, the motivating factor test is applicable here. It was not used in the jury charge below, therefore we must reverse.