Opinion ID: 2631088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Field Sobriety Tests Must Be Suppressed as Evidence Obtained from an Unconstitutional Detention

Text: ¶ 41 Having concluded that the field sobriety tests were conducted after an unconstitutionally expansive investigatory detention of Worwood, we next consider whether the tests are subject to suppression. Because we find that the field sobriety tests were obtained as a result of Worwood's illegal detention, we reverse the court of appeals' affirmation of the district court's denial of Worwood's suppression motion. ¶ 42 When applicable, the exclusionary rule keeps out of trial evidence primarily or derivatively obtained through a violation of an individual's constitutional rights (the fruit of unconstitutional police conduct). [55] It was first adopted to deter unlawful police conduct by preventing police from benefiting from activities violative of the Fourth Amendment. [56] Because of the high social cost attendant with suppressing evidence, [57] however, the rule is not operable when the evidence in question has been cleansed of the taint of illegality, a circumstance that can occur in a number of different ways. [58] ¶ 43 Evidence will not be excluded as fruit of an illegal search or seizure if the illegality is not the but for cause of the evidence's discovery. [59] The causal chain between the illegality and the discovered evidence can be broken if the evidence was also discovered through independent and lawful activityin other words, through an independent source. [60] The independent source doctrine has a forward-looking corollary in the inevitable discovery doctrine. While the independent source doctrine looks at what was actually discovered, the inevitable discovery doctrine considers what hypothetically would have been discovered. [61] For courts to apply the inevitable discovery doctrine, there must be persuasive evidence of events or circumstances apart from those resulting in illegal police activity that would have inevitably led to discovery. [62] In sum, the independent source and inevitable discovery doctrines are two ways that the causal link between the initial illegality and the evidence can be broken. ¶ 44 Even if the illegality is the but for reason for the evidence's discovery, it should still be admitted if it is sufficiently attenuated to dissipate the taint of the illegality. [63] The court asks whether the challenged evidence was obtained `by exploitation of [the initial] illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' [64] Attenuation can occur if the connection between the illegality and the evidence is too remote. [65] It can also occur if the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained. [66] As a final policy consideration, the exclusionary rule is applicable only where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs. [67] ¶ 45 The State argues that the challenged field sobriety test results were conducted on the basis of pre-detention reasonable suspicion. The State argues that because there was a constitutional basis for the field sobriety tests without the illegal detention, the evidence was not obtained by exploiting the initial illegality. In short, the State argues that there was no causal chain linking the Fourth Amendment violation to the field sobriety tests. ¶ 46 In support of this argument, the State cites cases in which the causal links between the illegality and the evidence were never established. For instance, in United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, officers found evidence of a crime after conducting a legal stop but an illegal arrest. [68] Because the probable cause that led to the discovery of the challenged evidence was the fruit of the legal stop rather than the illegal arrest, there was no causal connection between the illegal arrest and the discovered evidence. [69] And in Hudson v. Michigan , police had enough evidence to establish probable cause and obtain a warrant, but violated the knock-and-announce rule. [70] The Court stated that the constitutional violation of an illegal manner of entry was not a but-for cause of obtaining the evidence. Whether that preliminary misstep had occurred or not, the police would have executed the warrant they had obtained, and would have discovered the gun and drugs inside the house. [71] ¶ 47 The circumstances of both cases differ from those present here. Unlike Ibarra-Sanchez and Hudson, Worwood's illegal detention was the but-for cause of Officer Kevin Wright's administration of the field sobriety tests at Wright's home. There was no intervening event to break the causal chain. The fact that before the illegality reasonable suspicion would have justified further investigation does not break the actual linkages between the illegal detention and the field sobriety tests. Investigations under reasonable suspicion do not have a shelf life, unlike a transportable warrant. An officer must either confirm the suspicion by establishing probable cause for arrest or dispel the suspicion and release the suspect. Wright took neither constitutional path. Instead, he not only exploited the illegality in order to obtain the evidence needed for probable cause, he arguably created the illegality in order to obtain the evidence without conducting the arrest himself. The field sobriety tests would not have been obtained absent the illegality or different choices by Wright. ¶ 48 Under our decision in State v. Topanotes, [72] we cannot assume that Wright would have conducted a field sobriety test at the scene of the initial encounter if he had not chosen to illegally transport Worwood. In Topanotes, officers retained the defendant's identification during a consensual stop, elevating the stop to one requiring reasonable suspicion. [73] A subsequent warrants check revealed two outstanding arrest warrants. [74] In the search incident to arrest, officers found heroin on the defendant. [75] Relying on the defendant's cooperative nature throughout the stop, the State argued that the heroin would have been inevitably discovered had the defendant not been unlawfully detained. [76] We rejected this argument, reasoning that just because the defendant was cooperative while her identification was seized, that did not mean that she would have been cooperative if she had been truly free to leave. [77] ¶ 49 We reaffirm our conclusion in Topanotes that [c]ases that rely upon individual behavior as a crucial link in the inevitable discovery chain, particularly when that behavior is heavily influenced by the illegality that did occur, rarely sustain an inevitable discovery theory. [78] Absent the illegality, Wright may have conducted the field sobriety tests on the roadside, but he may have just as likely released Worwood to avoid the trouble of making an off-duty arrest. ¶ 50 Finally, we find that the deterrent benefits of suppression in this case clearly outweigh its social costs. Allowing an officer to capriciously move a defendant without fear that subsequently obtained evidence would be suppressed creates an incentive for police misconduct. Denying the defendant's suppression motion encourages an if we hadn't done it wrong, we would have done it right defense, insulating officers from any repercussions from unconstitutionally extending investigative detentions. [79]