Opinion ID: 2331594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Prosecutor's Remarks Amounted To Plain Error: They Affected Substantial Rights And Were Obviously Prejudicial.

Text: Review of a criminal defendant's claim of error not raised at trial is governed by Alaska Criminal Rule 47(b), which provides: Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. Our cases applying Criminal Rule 47(b), however, are in conflict with recent decisions of the court of appeals. We take this opportunity to clarify the standard for plain error review under Criminal Rule 47(b). As an initial matter, our cases have consistently held that plain error does not exist where the right at issue was intelligently waived or the defendant's decision not to object to the error was strategic or tactical. [56] Moreover, beginning in the mid-1970s, our cases began to consistently define plain error as error that affects substantial rights and is obviously prejudicial. [57] We have generally interpreted affects substantial rights to mean that the alleged error must raise[ ] a substantial and important question [58] such that a failure to address it could undermine the fundamental fairness of the trial and contribute to a miscarriage of justice. [59] The phrase obviously prejudicial has come to encompass two requirementsthat the error be both obvious and prejudicial. [60] A review of our case law shows that in order for a court to find plain error, the error must not be the result of an intelligent waiver or a strategic decision not to object; the error must affect substantial rights; the error must be obvious; and the error must be prejudicial. Confusion has persisted, however, over how to apply this standard when the alleged error is a constitutional violation. In our earliest case to directly address this subject, Burford v. State , we held that [d]enial of a constitutional right, in the normal case, would affect substantial rights and give rise to plain error unless the State proves that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [61] If the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the rights of the accused are not prejudiced and the requirements of plain error have not been met. [62] In contrast, in cases where the alleged error was not a constitutional violation, we applied our traditional harmless error standard of whether the defendant has shown that the error appreciably affected the jury's verdict. [63] In other words, Burford identified two differences in applying the plain error doctrine to constitutional violations: First, constitutional violations always affect substantial rights, while others may not; and, second, constitutional violations are always prejudicial unless the State proves they are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, while other errors are only prejudicial if the defendant proves that the error appreciably affected the outcome. But constitutional errors must still be obvious in order to constitute plain error, [64] and they must not have been the result of intelligent waiver or a strategic decision. [65] We reaffirmed the approach outlined in Burford in 1974 in Martin v. State, [66] in 1979 in Brown v. State, [67] and in 1981 in Dorman v. State . [68] But in 1983 the court of appeals held in Van Hatten v. State that the standard of prejudice for all plain error cases, including those involving constitutional error, was whether it can be fairly said that the alleged error did not appreciably affect the jury's verdict. [69] To support its holding the court of appeals quoted language from our decision in Gilbert v. State : [N]ot all constitutional claims require extensive review under the plain error rule. To say that asserted errors of constitutional dimension must all be examined in depth under the plain error rule would circumvent the strong basic policy which requires that, in order to preserve an error for appeal, an objection must have been made in the trial court. [70] The State, pointing to Van Hatten, now suggests that our plain error rulings are inconsistent [71] and urges us to resolve this perceived inconsistency by adopting the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal analogue to Alaska Criminal Rule 47(b). [72] We decline to do so for two reasons. First, the language in Gilbert cited by the court of appeals in Van Hatten does not pertain to the prejudice standard for constitutional errors. When read in context, it is apparent that in Gilbert we were discussing the requirement that plain error be obvious. [73] Immediately prior to the language quoted in Van Hatten, we wrote: Where the error is not obvious or immediately apparent we should abstain from a full-scale examination of it. [74] One of the underlying principles of the plain error doctrine is that the error must have been so obvious that the trial court should have noticed it despite the absence of an objection. Gilbert simply explained that this principle applies even when the appellant alleges a constitutional violation. [75] Second, although we did not expressly refer to Van Hatten, our recent decision in Raphael v. State reaffirmed our pre- Van Hatten case law. Quoting Burford, we held in Raphael that denial of a defendant's constitutional rights, `in the normal case, would . . . give rise to plain error' [76] unless the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [77] Our decisions, starting with Burford and on through Raphael, are consistent on this point. The plain error standard announced in Van Hatten is not controlling. Establishing plain error under Criminal Rule 47(b) requires the following: (1) there must be error, and the error must not have been the result of an intelligent waiver or a tactical decision not to object; (2) the error must be obvious, meaning that it should have been apparent to any competent judge or lawyer; (3) the error must affect substantial rights, meaning that it must pertain to the fundamental fairness of the proceeding; and (4) the error must be prejudicial. A constitutional violation will always affect substantial rights and will be prejudicial unless the State proves that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. An error that is not constitutional in nature will be prejudicial if the defendant proves that there is a reasonable probability that it affected the outcome of the proceeding.
Applying these standards to the present case, we conclude that there was plain error. First, there is no evidence that Adams's failure to object was strategic. In Dorman v. State , we explained that where a defendant neither injected the issue of his silence into the case nor obtained a benefit from the prosecutor's inculpatory comment, there is no basis for inferring that the failure to object was tactical unless it is implied that defense counsel invited error for the purpose of obtaining a reversal on appeal. [78] Such a conclusion, we cautioned, is not one which should be lightly inferred in any case, for it would preclude review of the most fundamental defects under the plain error doctrine. [79] We have already determined that Adams did not inject the issue of his silence into the case, [80] and Adams did not obtain any discernible benefit from the prosecutor's comments. This case turned chiefly on credibility, and the prosecutor argued that Adams was a less credible witness because he did not talk to the police. The State argues that Adams cannot . . . show that defense counsel did not make a tactical decision to refrain from objecting to the prosecutor's references to Adams'[s] silence because [d]efense counsel was well aware that Adams'[s] silence could not be used against Adams . . . during the first part of the state's case-in-chief. But the prosecutor's remarks during cross-examination occurred four days after the sidebar discussion about Adams's silence during the State's case-in-chief, and his remarks during closing argument occurred a full month later. Defense counsel's awareness of Adams's rights during the State's case-in-chief is not enough to show that his failure to object later in the trial was tactical. [81] Second, the error in this case was obvious. The major cases establishing that Alaska law protects a defendant's pre- and post-arrest silence were all decided in the 1980s; [82] Adams was tried in late 2005. Thus, the law protecting Adams's right to silence was well established at the time of his trial and the prosecutor committed an obvious violation of that right by expressly arguing that Adams's silence diminished his credibility. [83] Third, the prosecutor's comments affected Adams's substantial rights. As explained above, any comment on Adams's post-arrest silence would affect substantial rights because it would violate article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. But those comments that were limited to Adams's pre-arrest silence also affected his substantial rights. As the court of appeals explained in Silvernail v. State , whether grounded in the Alaska constitution or the rules of evidence, the prohibition on using evidence of a defendant's silence is motivated by the same concern: The underlying rationale of the constitutional bar against admitting evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is the concern that such evidence is only minimally probative, while possessing a high potential for prejudice to the defendant's case. This is the same basic concern expressed in Alaska Rule of Evidence 403. [84] To put it another way, the introduction of evidence of a defendant's silence, whether pre- or post-arrest, affects substantial rights in precisely the same wayby admitting evidence that has an inherently low probative value but a high potential for unfair prejudice. Admission of such evidence threatens the fairness of the proceeding and therefore affects substantial rights. Finally, the prosecutor's comments were prejudicial. We conclude that the State has not shown that the prosecutor's improper questions and comment about post-arrest silence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And even if our analysis is limited to the non-constitutional claim that the prosecutor commented on Adams's pre-arrest silence, we conclude that Adams has shown that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case. Our decisions in Dorman and Gunnerud and the court of appeals' decisions in Van Hatten and Silvernail identify several factors that should be considered when determining whether a prosecutor's comments on a defendant's silence were harmless error. First, of course, is the strength of the State's other evidence. Gunnerud and Silvernail instruct that comment on a defendant's silence is more likely to be prejudicial if the conviction depended primarily on conflicting witness testimony. [85] This case hinged primarily on the conflicting testimony of Adams and K.S. The elements of the crime at issue were whether K.S. was unaware of the sexual act and whether Adams knew that she was unaware. Adams testified that K.S. was aware and consented to the sexual act. K.S. testified that after going to see Emma Hawley, the next thing she remembered was waking up with Adams on top of her engaged in intercourse, and that she did not consent. The State's other chief witness was Mae Adams. Some parts of Mae Adams's testimony did contradict Adams's testimonyfor instance, Mae testified that K.S. was just lying on the bed with her eyes open, while Adams testified that K.S. was actively participating. But other aspects of Mae's story corroborated Adams's testimony, and Adams attempted to impeach Mae's credibility based on the fact that she accepted a plea bargain on the eve of trial that allowed her to serve minimal jail time and avoid sex offender registration in exchange for her testimony. Second, in Dorman we observed that comments on a defendant's silence are more likely to be prejudicial if they occur, as they did here, during closing argument. [86] In Dorman, we noted that plain error review of such comments was appropriate in part because of our doubts concerning the effectiveness of an objection made during final argument. [87] We explained: A timely objection could have prevented the evidence from ever reaching the jury. However, an objection during final argument is not so effective. The prejudicial comment is before the jury before the objection can be made, and the curative effect of an admonition of the court to disregard the comment is of debatable value.[ [88] ] The court of appeals in Van Hatten also recognized that comments on a defendant's silence are more likely to be prejudicial if the comment was express rather than a brief and passing reference and if the evidence was directly elicited by the prosecutor's questioning. [89] All of these circumstances are present here; the prosecutor first directly elicited evidence of Adams's silence on cross-examination, and then he expressly commented on that silence during his closing argument. We conclude that Adams has shown that there is a reasonable probability that the prosecutor's comments on pre-arrest silence affected the jury's verdict and that the State has not shown that the comments on post-arrest silence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus there was plain error as to the comments on both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence.