Opinion ID: 1967718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A. Dr. Fleury and Sibley

Text: In evaluating Dr. Fleury's and Sibley's motions for summary judgment, the trial court concluded that without expert testimony, Berkow would not be able to establish the requisite standard of care imputable to these defendants. See Allen v. Hill, 626 A.2d 875, 877 (D.C.1993). Berkow had failed to proffer qualified experts and their expected testimony in response to defense requests pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 26(b)(4), despite court-extended deadlines for doing so. The trial court accordingly granted judgment for Dr. Fleury and Sibley as a matter of law and denied Berkow's subsequent motions to vacate under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 59(e) and 60(b). Berkow argues that but for the misdiagnosis attributable to Dr. Fleury and Sibley, he would not have received ineffective, indeed damaging chemotherapy for over a year. Perhaps. But that allegation alone, even in a verified complaint, is insufficient to showor even to raise a genuine issue of material fact leaving room for a findingthat Dr. Fleury's diagnosis, while incorrect, amounted to a deviation from the applicable standard of care. See Meek v. Shepard, 484 A.2d 579, 581 (D.C.1984). Doctors may disagree from time to time on a diagnosis or course of treatment. Accordingly, in most cases alleging medical malpractice, testimony of a qualified expert will be required to establish the applicable standard of care. Dada v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., 715 A.2d 904, 908 (D.C.1998); Allen, 626 A.2d at 877. Only when a lay person, relying on common knowledge and experience, can find that the harm would not have occurred in the absence of negligence may the standard be established without the aid of an expert. Meek, 484 A.2d at 581 n. 4. That is not the case here. When the question is one of distinguishing the subtleties between lymphoma and sarcoma from a set of biopsy samples, common knowledge and experience will not equip one to discern whether a doctor failed to use the required care; the fact-finder must be informed by expert testimony. Despite extended deadlines, Berkow never filed a statement naming an expert or experts who satisfied the requirements of Rule 26(b)(4), and the trial court accordingly entered summary judgment for Dr. Fleury on August 29, 2001 (filed September 4, 2001). Earlier, on February 22, 2001, Berkow had submitted a statement under that rule naming four expert physicians, three of whom eventually turned him down. The other proffered expert, Dr. M. Hossein Tirgan, apparently was willing to testify, but Berkow never explained how Dr. Tirgan, as a physician board-certified in internal medicine and oncology, would have been qualified as an expert in Dr. Fleury's field of pathology. Berkow argues, nonetheless, that under Abbey v. Jackson, 483 A.2d 330 (D.C.1984), he was entitled to rely on cross-examination of Dr. Fleury and other defense witnesses to establish the standard of care, without proffering his own experts. He never notified the defendants that he intended to do so, however, and, in any event, there is no record basis (such as Dr. Fleury's deposition testimony or defense admissions) for believing that Berkow could have used defense witnesses to establish the standard of care and defendants' departure from it. Accordingly, after reviewing the trial court's ruling de novo, see Diamond v. Davis, 680 A.2d 364, 381 (D.C.1996) (opinion of Ruiz, J.), we agree with the trial court that Dr. Fleury and Sibley were entitled to summary judgment based on Berkow's failure, for lack of expert testimony, to establish a prima facie case. Later, in his motion of September 17, 2001 to vacate summary judgment for Dr. Fleury, Berkow noted that he had retained several other doctors, including a pathologist, Dr. John J. Shane, who would testify that Dr. Fleury's services fell below the applicable standard of care. But, because Berkow had never completed the proffer by moving to amend his Rule 26(b)(4) statement to include Dr. Shane (or anyone else) before summary judgment was entered, and because the trial court had bent over backwards to extend filing deadlines under that rule with which Berkow never fully complied, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Berkow's motions for reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60(b). See District No. 1 v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co., 782 A.2d 269, 278 (D.C.2001).