Opinion ID: 1962344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the plaintiffs' better plan

Text: The plaintiffs' most serious contention is that their plan CT 151, which uses the same number of house districts as the adopted plan and has a lower maximum population deviation, [17] demonstrates the invalidity of the adopted plan because CT 151 cuts fewer towns. As previoulsy noted, the adopted plan cuts fifty-four towns resulting in ninety-three segments in the formation of 151 districts. The plaintiffs' CT 151, in contrast, cuts only forty towns resulting in sixty-four segments overall. The adopted plan segments nineteen towns smaller than the ideal population for a district, while CT 151 cuts only three such towns. [18] It cannot be disputed that the plaintiffs' CT 151 is better than the adopted plan, at least from the perspective of the town integrity principle, because it cuts fewer towns. The question, therefore, is whether the showing of the hypothetical existence of such a plan, by itself, demonstrates that the adopted plan violates the town integrity principle. In Miller v. Schaffer, supra, we held (p. 24) that [i]nsofar as the cutting of town lines and the segmenting of towns is concerned the number of cuts or segments resulting is not per se an indication of invalidity under Connecticut constitutional provisions. This conclusion arises because, as previously established, it is impossible to meet fully the federal equal population requirements without cutting town lines. Ibid. The dispositive questions in Miller v. Schaffer, supra, 25, therefore, were whether the 1971 plan segmented towns in order to meet the federal equal population requirement and whether the reapportionment authority [19] exercised its best judgment to harmonize the town integrity principle of the Connecticut constitution with the federal constitutional standards.... Because of the procedural posture in this case, these questions become: whether the mere existence of a better plan demonstrates that the adopted plan segmented towns for reasons other than compliance with the federal requirement and whether the existence of that plan demonstrates that the General Assembly failed to exercise its best judgment in harmonizing the town integrity principle with the federal requirement. The problem with the plaintiffs' reliance on the existence of a better plan to demonstrate the invalidity of the adopted plan is that the purported demonstration depends upon the assumption that a plan is unconstitutional if there is a better plan. [20] This assumption is incorrect. In Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S. Ct. 232, 37 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1973), the United States Supreme Court considered such an argument with respect to alternative reapportionment plans and their different maximum population deviations. The court noted that the plaintiffs in that case had submitted alternate plans with lower deviations than the adopted plan. The district court, however, did not accept these plans and appointed a master to develop another plan. In disapproving of this approach, the court asked: Was the Master compelled, as a federal constitutional matter, to come up with a plan with smaller variations than were contained in [the plaintiffs'] plans? And what is to happen to the Master's plan if a resourceful mind hits upon a plan better than the Master's by a fraction of a percentage point? Id., 750. The court answered its own question by concluding: Involvements like this must end at some point, but that point constantly recedes if those who litigate need only produce a plan that is marginally `better' .... The point is that such involvements should never begin. Id., 750-51. The plaintiffs' case, which depends upon demonstrating the unconstitutionality of the adopted plan by the mere existence of their better plan, suffers the same infirmity. Although CT 151 is better than the adopted plan in that it cuts fewer towns, it is not perfect. It creates sixty-four segments, only thirty-one of which the plaintiffs claim are inevitable. Thus, CT 151 itself creates thirty-three segments which are avoidable. [21] Does this mean that it, too, if it were a completed plan, is unconstitutional so long as another even better plan can be drawn? We think not. This process of comparing one plan to another, by itself, does not and cannot demonstrate a plan to be unconstitutional. The question that needs to be asked is not whether there is a plan better than the challenged plan, but whether the challenged plan is itself constitutional. The existence of a plan which cuts fewer towns is evidence only that fewer towns could have been cut. It is not, by itself, evidence that towns were cut in the adopted plan for reasons other than to meet the federal equal population requirement or that the challenged plan was not the legislature's best judgment in harmonizing the conflicting constitutional requirements. In order to present a prima facie case, the plaintiffs would have had to present such evidence. This the plaintiffs did not do. The plaintiffs have suggested that if we were to reach the decision we have, we would deprive the town integrity principle of legal meaning. We disagree. All we have decided today is that the plaintiffs in this case failed to make out a prima facie case supporting their allegation of a violation of the town integrity principle. We do not even decide, because we are not called upon to do so, whether the adopted plan actually violates the town integrity principle. What we have decided today, however, is that anyone challenging a reapportionment plan must show more than that a better plan could be drafted. We emphasize that this decision in no way alters the fact that the town integrity principle is an operative part of our constitution and is a significant constraint on the General Assembly's reapportionment authority. There is no error.