Opinion ID: 165743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Particularity: The Subsequent Search of the Computer Files

Text: 35 The district court held that the warrant to seize and examine Mr. Riccardi's computer failed to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement, but that the law enforcement officers acted in good faith in executing the warrant. Mr. Riccardi agrees that the warrant failed the particularity requirement, but he challenges the district court's application of the good faith exception. We agree with the district court. 36 The Fourth Amendment mandates that no Warrants shall issue... without particularly describing the place to be searched. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The manifest purpose of this particularity requirement was to prevent general searches. By limiting the authorization to search the specific areas ..., the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987); see also Voss v. Bergsgaard, 774 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir.1985); United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir.2000). 37 In United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592 (10th Cir.1988), we set out the general standard for evaluating when the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirement has been met. There we explained: 38 A description is sufficiently particular when it enables the searcher to reasonably ascertain and identify the things authorized to be seized. Even a warrant that describes the items to be seized in broad or generic terms may be valid when the description is as specific as the circumstances and the nature of the activity under investigation permit. However, the fourth amendment requires that the government describe the items to be seized with as much specificity as the government's knowledge and circumstances allow, and warrants are conclusively invalidated by their substantial failure to specify as nearly as possible the distinguishing characteristics of the goods to be seized. 39 Id. at 600 (internal quotations and citations omitted). In United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.1999), this Court applied the particularity requirement to the search of computer files. As summarized in a subsequent decision: 40 The underlying premise in Carey is that officers conducting searches (and the magistrates issuing warrants for those searches) cannot simply conduct a sweeping, comprehensive search of a computer's hard drive. Because computers can hold so much information touching on many different areas of a person's life, there is a greater potential for the intermingling of documents and a consequent invasion of privacy when police execute a search for evidence on a computer.... Thus, when officers come across computer files intermingled with irrelevant computer files, they may seal or hold the computer pending approval by a magistrate of the conditions and limitations on a further search of the computer.... Officers must be clear as to what it is they are seeking on the computer and conduct the search in a way that avoids searching files of types not identified in the warrant. 41 United States v. Walser, 275 F.3d 981, 986 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Our case law therefore suggests that warrants for computer searches must affirmatively limit the search to evidence of specific federal crimes or specific types of material. See id.; Campos, 221 F.3d at 1147. 42 The warrant in this case was not limited to any particular files, or to any particular federal crime. The warrant authorized the seizure of Mr. Riccardi's computer 43 and all electronic and magnetic media stored therein, together with all storage devises [sic], internal or external to the computer or computer system, including but not limited to floppy disks, diskettes, hard disks, magnetic tapes, removable media drives, optical media such as CD-ROM, printers, modems, and any other electronic or magnetic devises used as a peripheral to the computer or computer system, and all electronic media stored within such devises. 44 Motion to Suppress Physical Evidence, R. Vol. I Doc. 25, Attachment D, at 1. It concluded with a command to execute this warrant by searching the ... thing or means of conveyance hereinbefore specified for such items, and to seize and hold such items to be dealt with according to law and make due return of this warrant whether executed or not. Id. at 2. By its terms, the warrant thus permitted the officers to search for anything — from child pornography to tax returns to private correspondence. It seemed to authorize precisely the kind of wide-ranging exploratory search[ ] that the Framers intended to prohibit. Garrison, 480 U.S. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013. 45 In this connection, we note that the first warrant — for a search of Mr. Riccardi's home — was limited to records of telephone calls with juveniles, [p]rint outs of directory listings or telephone search results, pictures, videos or other depictions of juveniles, and [n]otes, journals, or logs of calls or contact with juveniles. The second warrant could have been similarly limited. The second warrant, unlike the first, did not describe the objects of the search with as much specificity as the government's knowledge and circumstances allow, as our precedents demand. Leary, 846 F.2d at 600. We therefore agree with the district court that the warrant lacked the specificity required by Carey and its progeny. 1 46