Opinion ID: 2010460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense counsel's decision to pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill violated Cooke's constitutional rights.

Text: When a defendant is represented by counsel, the authority to manage the day-to-day conduct of the defense rests with the attorney. [31] Specifically, the defense attorney has the immediate and ultimate responsibility of deciding if and when to object, which witnesses, if any, to call, and what defenses to develop. [32] In addition to shouldering these tactical decisions, representation of a criminal defendant entails certain basic duties. Counsel's function is to assist the defendant, and hence counsel owes the client a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest. From counsel's function as assistant to the defendant derive the overarching duty to advocate the defendant's cause and more particular duties to consult with the defendant on important decisions and to keep the defendant informed of important developments in the course of the prosecution. Counsel also has a duty to bring to bear such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process. [33] The defense attorney's duty to consult with the defendant regarding important decisions does not require counsel to obtain the defendant's consent to every tactical decision. [34] However, certain decisions regarding the exercise or waiver of basic trial and appellate rights are so personal to the defendant that they cannot be made for the defendant by a surrogate. [35] In Jones v. Barnes, [36] the United States Supreme Court recognized that a criminal defendant has ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding the case, as to whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify in his or her own behalf, or take an appeal. Such choices implicate inherently personal rights which would call into question the fundamental fairness of the trial if made by anyone other than the defendant. [37] Therefore, as to these decisions on the objectives of the representation, a lawyer must both consult with the defendant and obtain consent to the recommended course of action. [38] These rights cannot be waived by counsel without the defendant's fully-informed and publicly-acknowledged consent. [39] Accordingly, the defendant has autonomy to make the most basic decisions affecting his case, including whether to plead not guilty and have a trial by jury where he has an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and whether to testify. [40] Although these fundamental decisions are indeed strategic choices that counsel might be better able to make, because the consequences of them are the defendant's alone, they are too important to be made by anyone else. [41] Moreover, counsel cannot undermine the defendant's right to make these personal and fundamental decisions by ignoring the defendant's choice and arguing affirmatively against the defendant's chosen objective. [42] Here, defense counsel pursued a guilty but mentally ill verdict over Cooke's vociferous and repeated protestations that he was completely innocent and not mentally ill. This strategy deprived Cooke of his constitutional right to make the fundamental decisions regarding his case.
One of the fundamental decisions reserved for the defendant alone to make is the plea decision. [43] In Delaware, [a] defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, nolo contendere, or guilty but mentally ill. [44] A defendant may also raise the defense of guilty but mentally ill at trial. [45] In this case, Cooke was competent to stand trial and chose the alternative of a plea of not guilty over a plea of guilty but mentally ill. [46] Nevertheless, Cooke's attorneys decided to override Cooke's choice and advised the trial judge that they would ask the jury, over Cooke's objection, to find Cooke guilty but mentally ill. In a pretrial conference, the defense attorneys told the trial judge that the conflict between their objective and Cooke's objective might result in disastrous consequences before the jury. The judge was concerned about the propriety of the defense attorneys pursuing an objective that was inconsistent with Cooke's objective. The trial judge stated: I don't know how you can argue something that has the word `guilty' in it when the defendant doesn't want you to, because it's guilty as charged, not guilty of the lesser-included offense. Yet, the record reflects that defense counsel did so without the trial judge ever attempting to address the rift counsel described as an impending disaster. In their opening statement, Cooke's defense attorneys gave no support for Cooke's desire to plead not guilty. Instead, they told the jury they would introduce evidence that Cooke was guilty but mentally ill. Later, in presenting that mental illness evidence during trial, Cooke's defense attorneys introduced a confession which he disputed. Then, in their closing argument to the jury, Cooke's defense attorneys asked the jury to reject Cooke's plea of not guilty because he committed the crimes with which he was charged. They did not ask the jury to consider Cooke's objective of being found not guilty, but instead asked the jury to agree with their objective by finding Cooke guilty but mentally ill. The defense attorneys told the trial judge that they saw no problem with Cooke entering a not guilty plea and asserting his innocence while they argued to the jury that he was guilty but mentally ill. We find two problems with that course of conduct. First, Cooke did not have the assistance of counsel in pursuing his chosen objective for the trialobtaining a not guilty verdict. [47] Second, Cooke was denied the benefit of the reasonable doubt standard and meaningful adversarial testing of the prosecution's case. [48] Consequently, Cooke's fundamental right to enter a plea of not guilty was effectively negated by the conflicting objective of his defense attorneys to have the jury find him guilty but mentally ill. [49]
A second fundamental decision reserved for the defendant alone to make is the decision to testify. [50] Cooke wanted to exercise his right to testify in his own defense, but his attorneys refused to call him as a witness because they believed that he would assert his innocence, contradicting counsel's position that Cooke was guilty of the crimes charged. They explained that Cooke's assertion of factual innocence would not be perjury because Cooke believed he was innocent. [51] The defense attorneys then told the trial judge, who would make the final decision on whether to sentence Cooke to life or death, that they believed Cooke had committed the crimes and was guilty but mentally ill. Ultimately, the trial judge called Cooke to testify because his defense attorneys refused to do so. Cooke testified that he did not agree with his attorneys' guilty but mentally ill strategy and that he was on his own for representation. Cooke denied committing the crimes in an effort to realize his trial objective of being found not guilty. In an effort to realize their independent trial objective of having the jury return a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, Cooke's defense attorneys completely negated Cooke's objective of having the jury find him not guilty by introducing into evidencewithout seeking Cooke's waiver of the psychotherapist-patient privilege [52] a confession which Cooke denied making. Cooke's attorneys also attempted to ask Cooke's pastor, on direct examination, whether Cooke had confessed, but Cooke refused to waive his right to protect the privileged communication. [53] That exchange on the record illustrates the magnitude of the conflict between Cooke and his attorneys. The prosecution recognized that the question of Cooke's innocence was no longer an issue after the defense attorneys introduced Cooke's disputed statements to Dr. Turner. The prosecutor said: I would ask your Honor to consider the shifting landscape as of today; to wit, Cooke's confession is now in evidence. In response to an argument about prejudice from the introduction of other crimes, the prosecutor said: That issue is dead and gone now because Cooke has admitted at least that crime, that Bonistall burglary, rape and homicide. What's at issue in this case now, and really it's been an issue in the case first and foremost since [defense counsel's] wonderful opening statement, is Cooke's mental state. Consequently, Cooke's fundamental right to testify in his own defense was effectively negated by the objective of his defense attorneys to have the jury find him guilty but mentally ill. [54]
A third fundamental decision reserved for the defendant alone to make is the decision to have a jury trial. [55] Cooke's defense attorneys compromised the impartiality of his jury, starting with their opening statement, in which they told the juryagainst Cooke's wishesthat Cooke was guilty but mentally ill. The record reflects frequent exchanges between the trial judge, the defense attorneys, and the State about the fear that Cooke would react adversely in front of the jury about the conflict between him and his attorneys over the objective of Cooke's trial. Although the trial judge met with Cooke and all of the attorneys in a separate courtroom after the opening statements, the trial proceeded without the conflict in objectives being either addressed or resolved. This resulted in the frequent outbursts in front of the jury that defense counsel had predicted. Not only did Cooke testify about his dispute with his defense attorneys about the guilty but mentally ill objective, but on two separate occasions his outbursts on the subject resulted in his attorneys moving for a mistrial, because Cooke's assertion that he was not guilty was highly prejudicial to the defense that we're putting on. The record reflects that Cooke's right to a jury trial was also compromised by his exclusion from the courtroom at the request of his counsel. [56] Although Cooke was removed from the courtroom for outbursts about the conduct of his defense attorneys generally and specifically on occasions when evidence to support the guilty but mentally ill objective was presented, at other times, Cooke's defense attorneys told the judge it would be better for Cooke not to be in the courtroom when they presented the mental illness evidence to the jury over Cooke's objection. Accordingly, despite Cooke's request for a jury trial, the objective of his defense attorneys led to their asking for his exclusion from the courtroom while they presented either evidence or argument that Cooke opposed. The denial of Cooke's right to a fair trial by an impartial jury on the issue of his guilt is apparent from his defense attorneys' closing argument, during which they told the jury that Cooke's testimony about his innocence was not credible and should not be believed because it was a manifestation of his mental illness. They also told the jury that Cooke committed the crimes with which he was charged. The defense attorneys then asked the jury to find Cooke guilty but mentally ill. Moreover, by pursuing the objective of obtaining a guilty but mentally ill verdict during the guilt phase, the defense also compromised the impartiality of Cooke's jury during its penalty phase consideration of the statutory aggravating factors that would make Cooke death eligible. Defense counsel hoped that a guilty but mentally ill verdict would give Cooke the advantage of a mental illness mitigating factor as a matter of law during the penalty phase. However, by asking the jury to find Cooke guilty but mentally ill, as charged, defense counsel also asked the jury to find Cooke guilty of all the felonies that established statutory aggravating circumstances as a matter of law. [57] Cooke's assertion of factual innocence disputed not only his guilt, but also his eligibility for the death penalty. His own attorneys affirmatively opposed his assertion of innocence by contending he committed the crimes charged and that his testimony asserting innocence demonstrated mental illness. As result, Cooke's fundamental right to have an impartial jury during both the guilt and the penalty phases was effectively negated by the objective of his defense attorneys to have the jury find him guilty but mentally ill. [58]
In Florida v. Nixon , [59] the United States Supreme Court explained that, although defense counsel is obligated to discuss potential strategies with the defendant, when counsel informs the defendant of the strategy counsel believes to be in the defendant's best interest and the defendant is unresponsive, counsel's strategic choice is not impeded by any blanket rule demanding the defendant's explicit consent. In that case, defense counsel decided that the best strategy was to concede that the defendant had committed murder in the guilt phase of the capital trial, and to concentrate on attempting to spare the defendant's life in the penalty phase. Counsel consulted with and informed the defendant that the strategy was the best way to attempt to avoid a death sentence. The defendant did not respond affirmatively or negatively, and so counsel proceeded with that strategy without the defendant's express consent. [60] The United States Supreme Court explained that, when a defendant fails to give express consent to pursue a tenable strategy [that] counsel has adequately disclosed to and discussed with the defendant, prejudice is not presumed. [61] Instead, [t]he reasonableness of counsel's performance, after consultation with the defendant yields no response, must be judged in accord with the inquiry generally applicable to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, that is, whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. [62] The court explained that a presumption of prejudice is not in order based solely on a defendant's failure to provide express consent to a tenable strategy counsel has adequately disclosed to and discussed with the defendant. [63] This case is not like Nixon, where the defendant did not respond to counsel's proposed strategy, and neither consented nor objected when his counsel pursued that strategy at trial. In stark contrast to the defendant's silence in that case, Cooke repeatedly objected to his counsel's objective of obtaining a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and asserted his factual innocence consistent with his plea of not guilty. [64] The Court's holding in Nixon that counsel was not required to acquire the defendant's affirmative, explicit acceptance to a tactical decision to concede guilt, was expressly qualified as applying only to the factual scenario in which the defendant is unresponsive to counsel's proposed strategy. [65] However, where, as here, the defendant adamantly objects to counsel's proposed objective to concede guilt and pursue a verdict of guilty but mentally ill, and counsel proceeds with that objective anyway, the defendant is effectively deprived of his constitutional right to decide personally whether to plead guilty to the prosecution's case, to testify in his own defense, and to have a trial by an impartial jury. [66] The right to make these decisions is nullified if counsel can override them against the defendant's wishes. In this case, the trial court's failure to address the breakdown in the attorney-client relationship allowed defense counsel to proceed with a trial objective that Cooke expressly opposed. This deprived Cooke of his Sixth Amendment right to make fundamental decisions concerning his case. [67]