Opinion ID: 3010546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury instructions regarding the intent

Text: ELEMENT OF 18 U.S.C. § 242 Johnstone contends that the jury charge incorrectly defined the intent element of the crime for which the jury ultimately convicted him. In evaluating this contention, we must first set forth the appropriate legal standard. The statute reads, in relevant part, as follows: Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States . . . shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned, . . . or both . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 242. As is clear from the statute, the requisite the jury in the case at bar was properly instructed under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard, and whether a defendant violated state law is not relevant to that determination. Second, Johnstone argues that the district court constructively amended the indictment by charging the jury that the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness standard governed each count, when the indictment charged him with depriving his victims of their right to due process. He contends that he was denied his Fifth Amendment grand jury right because the district Court “broaden[ed] the possible bases for conviction from that which appeared in the indictment,” United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138 (1985), thus effectively trying him on charges for which he was not indicted. Again, we disagree. The indictment alleged as to each count that Johnstone deprived the victim of the “right secured and protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law, which includes the right to be secure in his person and free from the use of unreasonable force by one acting under color of law.” We find this language sufficient to charge a violation of the Fourth Amendment as made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, and therefore the notice and double jeopardy functions of the indictment were satisfied. An indictment is constructively amended only when the defendant is deprived of his “substantial right to be tried only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a grand jury.” Miller, 471 U.S. at 140 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 (1960)); see also United States v. Castro, 776 F.2d 1118, 112223 (3d Cir. 1985). That has not occurred here. See also United States v. Reese, 2 F.3d 870, 890-91 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that there was no constructive amendment of indictment in similar case). 14 intent required therein is willful[]. The statute, however, goes no further in explaining the meaning of that intent.
In the celebrated case of Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945), the Supreme Court had occasion to interpret the meaning of willful in the predecessor statute to § 242.7 It is not enough, the Court noted, for the defendant to exhibit a bad purpose or evil intent. Id. at 103; see also id. at 107.8 Instead, the Court declared that willfulness requires a specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law . . . . Id. at 103; see also id. at 104. Screws also requires the violation of a particular right. Clearly, the government has alleged such a violation in this case. As we discussed more fully supra, that right is the right to be free from the use of excessive force. 7 As quoted in Screws, the text of the predecessor statute reads in relevant part as follows: Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects, or causes to be subjected, any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . shall be fined . . . or imprisoned . . . or both. Screws, 325 U.S. at 93. Neither party suggests, nor do we believe, that the slight differences between the predecessor statute and that before us now warrant an interpretation of willfully different from that provided it by Screws. 8 The opinion in Screws could muster only a plurality. However, subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court have treated the reasoning with respect to the intent element of the statute as binding. See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 223 (1974); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1966); Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1951). Cases in this Circuit have treated Screws similarly. See United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 790 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Dise, 763 F.2d 586, 591-92 (3d Cir. 1985). 15 It is not necessary, however, for the government to prove that the defendant was thinking in constitutional terms [provided that the defendant's] aim was not to enforce local law but to deprive a citizen of a right and that right was protected by the Constitution. Id. at 106. The Court reconciles these facially inconsistent standards -- that an individual can intend to violate a right even if the individual is not thinking in terms of any right -- by recognizing that willfulness includes reckless disregard. See id. at 105 (When they act willfully in the sense in which we use the word, they act in open defiance or in reckless disregard of a constitutional requirement which has been made specific and definite.); see also United States v. Messerlian, 832 F.2d 778, 791 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Dise, 763 F.2d 586, 592 (3d Cir. 1985).9 Finally, Screws held that willfulness can be shown by circumstantial evidence. See Screws, 325 U.S. at 107; see also Dise, 763 F.2d at 592. 9 Although Johnstone does not raise this argument in terms, the tenor of his challenge suggests that he would claim that § 242 requires that Johnstone knowingly violate federal law. Screws clearly forecloses such an argument, however, when it states that a defendant need not be thinking in constitutional terms in order to be convicted of violating § 242. Screws, 325 U.S. at 106. Screws is therefore in line with the characterization of reckless disregard in other contexts in which reckless disregard is contrasted with and set apart from actual knowledge. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 125-130 (1985) (interpreting a provision in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and differentiating between knowledge and reckless disregard). Moreover, reckless disregard often entails some form of indifference. See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 1270 (6th ed. 1990) (For conduct to be 'reckless' it must be such as to evince disregard of, or indifference to, consequences . . . .). In common parlance, for an individual to be indifferent, he must not be concerned one way or the other about the consequences of his action. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1151 (1966). A requirement that an individual know the consequences of his action is not antithetical to this definition of indifference, but it would introduce an additional element beyond lack of concern. 16 As is evident from the text, and has oft been noted, Screws is not a model of clarity.10 Some of the sentences therein, examined in isolation, resist easy explanation and can be reconciled only by way of tortuous logic. Our task, however, is to read these sentences in light of the text of Screws in its entirety. The plurality in Screws believed its pronouncements to be consistent; we must do the same. In simpler terms, willful[] in § 242 means either particular purpose or reckless disregard. Therefore, it is enough to trigger § 242 liability if it can be proved -- by circumstantial evidence or otherwise -- that a defendant exhibited reckless disregard for a constitutional or federal right. Reckless disregard has different meanings in different contexts.11 In the context of § 242, we have only Screws to 10 For a more detailed discussion of Screws's somewhat opaque interpretation of willfulness, see Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 Tul. L. Rev. 2113, 2180-86 (1993). 11 In Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), the Supreme Court, in the course of defining deliberate indifference, discussed the different meanings of reckless disregard. The Court noted that in the civil context reckless disregard generally entails an objective analysis; an individual exhibits reckless disregard if he is indifferent to a risk that is either known or so obvious that it should be known. Id. at 1978. By contrast, in the criminal context, reckless disregard generally requires a subjective analysis; a criminal defendant exhibits reckless disregard if he is indifferent to a risk of which he is aware. Id. at 1978-79. Later in its discussion, the Court implied, at least in dicta, that reference to background criminal law is proper in understanding § 242. See id. at 1980 n.7 (Appropriate allusions to the criminal law would, of course, be proper during criminal prosecutions under, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 242, which sets criminal penalties for deprivations of rights under color of law.). Such a reference suggests that the reckless disregard standard of § 242 is subjective. In Dise, supra, we seemed to agree, stating that a defendant is potentially criminally liable under § 242 if he acted in reckless disregard of the law as he understood it. Dise, 763 F.2d at 592 17 guide us.12 In sum, as is evident from the passages quoted above, Screws is less than satisfying in its attempt to reconcile its internally inconsistent mandates. Unfortunately, any further attempt to explain the appropriate meaning of reckless disregard to a jury would probably either do violence to Screws or inject additional confusion into the standard that it announces; hence we eschew such explanation. Fortunately, such explanation is unnecessary for, given the Screws standard as it now stands, we easily conclude that the jury charge as to intent was permissible.
The relevant language of the charge follows: The fourth element which the United States must prove (emphasis added). Screws gives no indication as to which definition, objective or subjective, is correct. We do not reach the question here because it is obvious that Johnstone, a trained police officer, was aware that federal and state law (recall that Johnstone was employed by a municipal police department that operated under state law) set boundaries within which the use of force is permissible and was surely aware that any use of force presented some risk of falling outside those boundaries. 12 Courts have looked to three Supreme Court cases decided subsequent to Screws for assistance in defining the intent requirement of § 242. None, however, are very helpful in furthering our present undertaking. In Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951), for example, the Court assumed -- with little discussion -- that police who beat a confession out of a suspect acted willfully and purposely; their aim was precisely to deny the protection that the Constitution affords. See id. at 102. In United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) and Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974), the underlying offense was a conspiracy, prohibited under § 241. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 746-47; Anderson, 417 U.S. at 213. The gravamen of any conspiracy charge -- including a charge under § 241 -- was stated to be the specific intent to achieve an illegal objective. See Guest, 383 U.S. at 753-54; Anderson at 223; id. at 234 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Neither Guest nor Anderson provide guidance with respect to the definition of reckless disregard. 18 beyond a reasonable doubt is that as to the count under consideration the defendant acted willfully. I instruct you that an act is done willfully if it is done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a specific intent to do something the law forbids, that is, as relevant here, with an intent to violate a protected right. Knowledge and intent exist in the mind. Since it is not possible to look into a person's mind to see what went on, you must take into consideration all the facts and circumstances shown by the evidence and determine from all such facts and circumstances whether the requisite knowledge and intent were present at the time in question. Knowledge and intent may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances. You may infer, for example, that a person ordinarily intends all the natural and probable consequences of an act knowingly done. In other words, you may infer that a defendant intended all the consequences that a person standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should have expected to result from his acts knowingly done. You are not, of course, required to so infer. It is not necessary for you to find that a defendant was thinking in constitutional terms at the time of the conduct in question. You may find that a defendant acted with the required specific intent even if you find that he had no real familiarity with the Constitution or with the particular constitutional right involved, here the right to be free from the use of unreasonable or excessive force, provided that you find that the defendant intended to accomplish that which the constitution forbids. Nor does it matter that a defendant may have also been motivated by hatred, anger or revenge, or some other emotion, provided that the specific intent which I have described to you is present. We find nothing in the language of the charge that is contrary to the appropriate legal standard of § 242 as interpreted by Screws. Though the charge may not be crystal clear, any confusion is a result of Screws itself and not of the charge. The district court explained the appropriate legal standard, such as it is, as well as that standard could be explained. Johnstone, however, submits that the district court was 19 required to charge the jury that it could find him guilty only if it found that he knowingly violated state law prohibitions against excessive force. We disagree. As we have explained, the underlying right Johnstone was alleged to have violated was a Fourth Amendment right. Therefore, it is the Constitution itself that defines the standard for excessive force. See supra note 6. State law is simply of no consequence. Neither is Dise nor Messerlian on point in this regard, notwithstanding the pronouncement in Dise that a knowing violation of state law demonstrates reckless disregard for constitutional rights, see Dise, 763 F.2d at 592, and the fact that Messerlian approved jury instructions requiring that the defendant knowingly violate state law, see Messerlian, 832 F.2d at 789, 791. Even assuming that state law were relevant, nothing in Dise nor Messerlian requires a knowing violation of state law; they merely hold that when a person acting under color of state law invades the personal liberty of another, knowing that such invasion is in violation of state law, he has demonstrated bad faith and reckless disregard for constitutional rights. Dise, 763 F.2d at 592. That holding in no way forecloses the possibility that a defendant has acted in reckless disregard for constitutional rights without knowingly violating state law.
In sum, to convict a defendant under § 242, the government must show that the defendant had the particular purpose of violating a protected right made definite by rule of law or recklessly disregarded the risk that he would violate such 20 a right. The government does not need to show that the defendant knowingly violated any right. We conclude that, in this case, the district court properly explained this standard to the jury.