Opinion ID: 2382156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of partial summary judgment

Text: The Newells contend that the trial court committed reversible error when it denied [their] pre-trial motion for partial summary judgment. They assert that the doctrines of res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bar relitigation of the fact, cause and nature of Mrs. Newell's injury, all of which were decided in her workers' compensation proceeding. The District asserts that res judicata or claim preclusion is inapplicable and that with respect to the Newell's reliance on offensive collateral estoppel, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying preclusive effect to the DOES decision. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion or res judicata, when a valid final judgment has been entered on the merits, the parties or those in privity with them are barred, in a subsequent proceeding, from relitigating the same claim or any claim that might have been raised in the first proceeding. Washington Med. Ctr. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1280-81 (D.C. 1990) (citing Smith v. Jenkins, 562 A.2d 610, 613 (D.C.1989) (other citation omitted)). Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion, renders conclusive in the same or a subsequent action determination of an issue of fact or law when (1) the issue is actually litigated and (2) determined by a valid, final judgment on the merits; (3) after a full and fair opportunity for litigation by the parties or their privies; (4) under circumstances where the determination was essential to the judgment, and not merely dictum. Davis v. Davis, 663 A.2d 499, 501 (D.C. 1995) (quoting Holle, supra, 573 A.2d at 1283) (other citations omitted). Offensive use of collateral estoppel arises when a plaintiff seeks to estop a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and lost against another plaintiff. Ali Baba Co. v. WILCO, Inc., 482 A.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C.1984) (citing Parklan[e] Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329, 99 S.Ct. 645, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979)). We agree with the District that res judicata or claim preclusion is inapplicable to this matter because the Newells do not argue that any particular claim should have been precluded.... (Emphasis supplied). We also agree with the District that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to apply the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel to give preclusive effect to DOES's findings in Mrs. Newell's disability claim. Under offensive collateral estoppel, [t]he issue to be concluded must be the same as that involved in the prior action, and must have been raised and litigated, and actually adjudged. Ali Baba Co., supra, 482 A.2d at 421 n. 6 (quoting 1B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.443[1] (2d ed.1982)). In addition, [t]he issue must have been material and relevant to the disposition of the prior action, and [t]he determination made of the issue.... must have been necessary and essential to the resulting judgment. Id. We apply the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel with some caution, however, because it presents issues relating to the potential unfairness to a defendant. Ali Baba Co., supra, 482 A.2d at 422. Consequently, `the preferable approach for dealing with these problems in federal courts [and in our court] is not to preclude the use of offensive collateral estoppel, but to grant trial courts broad discretion to determine when it should be applied.' Id. (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 331, 99 S.Ct. 645 (other citation omitted)). The focus at Mrs. Newell's workers' compensation proceeding, which was defended by the D.C. Public Schools and their General Counsel, was on whether [she] sustained any disability as a result of [her] injury at work. DOES determined that [Mrs. Newell] was disabled from February 14, 1989 through June 15, 1989, as a result of her fall at work. She is, therefore, entitled to disability benefits and payment of all medical bills related to that fall. DOES concluded, aided by the presumption of compensability which governs workers' compensation actions, see D.C.Code § 36-321(1) (1997), that Mrs. Newell was entitled to disability benefits because her injury arose out of and in the course of her employment  that is, her injury occurred in the performance of her duties and thus was related to the fall at work. We need not decide whether the issue raised at the workers' compensation proceeding was the same as the proximate cause issue presented in the Newells' tort action. Potential unfairness to the District may have resulted from an application of the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel in favor of the Newells not only because Mrs. Newell's three-month disability claim was not defended by the District's office of the chief legal counsel, the Corporation Counsel, but also because the interests in defending against a three-month disability claim are not the same as those in this tort action where the demand for damages ranged from $500,000 to $872,000. Indeed, during the proceedings on Mrs. Newell's disability claim, the D.C. Public Schools, unlike the District in the tort case before us, presented no expert testimony on the issue of proximate cause. Thus, the District may not have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the proximate cause issue during the disability proceeding. On the record before us, then, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to give preclusive effect to the DOES decision, or that the trial court erred by denying the Newells' partial summary judgment motion. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. [6] So ordered.