Opinion ID: 553829
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: IRS Sting Operation.

Text: 41 The district court expressed some concern about government misconduct in the IRS sting and left the question open by dismissing the motion without prejudice before trial. See Mem. Op. at 5-6. Nicely contends that Agent Wallace's conduct in first dangling out enormous sums of money to a poor businessman, and then later making veiled threats of physical harm when the transfer was delayed, was so outrageous that due process requires that he not be subject to prosecution. Even if we give appellant the benefit of all doubt, the cases line up squarely against him. 42 Both of this court's recent decisions on outrageous government conduct grew out of Abscam, and both rejected similar due process challenges. See United States v. Jenrette, 744 F.2d 817 (D.C.Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1099, 105 S.Ct. 2321, 85 L.Ed.2d 840 (1985); United States v. Kelly, 707 F.2d 1460 (D.C.Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 264, 78 L.Ed.2d 247 (1983). The court observed in Kelly that only a rare instance of police overinvolvement (physical or psychological coercion that 'shocks the conscience' ) would violate due process. See 707 F.2d at 1476 & n. 13 (citation omitted). This simply is not one of those rare instances. Cf. Jenrette, 744 F.2d at 823-24 (rejecting due process claims that defendant was targeted without reasonable suspicion, that the government repeatedly attempted to induce criminal behavior, and that a $100,000 bribe constituted compelling inducement). 43 Nicely tries to distinguish the Abscam decisions as involving corrupt public officials and not unreasonably large monetary inducements, erroneously quoting from sections of a concurring opinion that was not part of the per curiam court's opinion in Kelly. Even if a 5% fee on a $100,000 transaction would double Nicely's existing annual income (not to mention the substantial future amounts he could expect), that enticement alone would not necessarily qualify as coercive and outrageous conduct. Cf. United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir.1987) (offer of $200,000 finder's fee was not intended as bait for college students, but as a method to smoke out a supplier capable of selling large quantities of cocaine). Nor do the agent's ambiguous threats seem to qualify as outrageous conduct. First, they hardly amount to duress, appearing instead to be perfectly consistent with what one would expect when large sums of money are not accounted for as promised in a murky transaction involving shady characters seeking to launder large sums of money. See id. (because threats are ordinary bargaining tactics in drug deals, government agents may need to engage in such unsavory conduct to maintain their cover); United States v. Nixon, 777 F.2d 958, 963-64 (5th Cir.1985). Secondly, because the threats did not arise until after most of the overt acts involving the currency reporting conspiracy were completed, they would provide no basis for overturning his conviction. 44