Opinion ID: 873684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jury Instruction on Materiality

Text: Because Ajoku did object to the instructions on materiality, we review de novo to determine whether the instructions omitted or misstated an element of the crime. See United States v. Knapp, 120 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir. 1997). Ajoku contends that the jury instructions were vague and overbroad because the district court failed to add the phrase “involving a health care benefit program” to the jury instruction on materiality. However, the same instruction told the jurors that they could not convict Ajoku unless they found that his statements were made in a matter “involving a health care benefit program.” Though the court did not use the “precise words” preferred by Ajoku, the instruction properly limited the jury to considering whether Ajoku’s statements were capable of influencing a decision or activity in a matter involving a health care benefit program. See United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 807 (9th Cir. 1999). 14 UNITED STATES V . AJOKU V. Admission of Evidence Regarding the Scope of the Fraud Non-constitutional evidentiary decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion and reversal is appropriate only if the error “more likely than not affected the verdict.” United States v. Decoud, 456 F.3d 996, 1010 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The probative value of the details of the Santos operation in determining whether Ajoku’s statements involved and were material to Medicare outweighed any prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 402. Ajoku suggests no evidence that the government could have presented to establish the elements absent the financial effect of the fraud. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 186 (1997). While Ajoku was personally unaware of the scope of the fraud, the details of the scheme were not so viscerally abhorrent to the jurors as to preclude them from viewing the rest of the case fairly. See United States v. Merino-Balderrama, 146 F.3d 758, 762–63 (9th Cir. 1998) (district court admission of child pornography with “graphic sexual conduct” was error because of unduly prejudicial effect of “inflammatory”evidence).