Opinion ID: 867340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The transcript of David Doogan's testimony

Text: ¶ 20 Armstrong next argues that the admission of a transcript of David Doogan's guilt phase testimony was error because parts of it were irrelevant and prejudicial. He also argues that the transcript violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. State v. Tucker, 215 Ariz. 298, 314 ¶ 58, 160 P.3d 177, 193 (2007). Evidentiary rulings based on constitutional law or statutory construction, however, are reviewed de novo. See id. at 315 ¶ 61, 160 P.3d at 194. Because Armstrong objected below, we will review any error under the harmless error standard. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 18, 115 P.3d at 607. Harmless error review places the burden on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to or affect the ... sentence. Id. ¶ 21 David Doogan testified extensively at Armstrong's guilt phase trial. The State planned to call Doogan as a witness during the resentencing trial, but he refused to testify. Armstrong moved to preclude the State from offering the transcript of Doogan's prior testimony, arguing that its admission would violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause and the rules of evidence. ¶ 22 The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that A.R.S. § 13-703 (Supp.2006) allowed the resentencing jury to hear anything the first jury heard, the transcript was relevant, and there was no confrontation problem because Armstrong had an opportunity to cross-examine Doogan at the first trial. During the aggravation phase, the State read to the jury Doogan's direct examination.
¶ 23 The trial court based its decision to allow Doogan's testimony at least partially on a faulty interpretation of A.R.S. § 13-703 (Supp.2007) and A.R.S. § 13-703.01 (Supp. 2007). The judge thought that the statutes stated that the new jury is entitled to consider anything or any evidence ... that was adduced at the guilt phase of the trial. ¶ 24 This is an incorrect interpretation of our statutes. As we have stated before, evidence admitted at the guilt proceeding is deemed admitted at a sentencing proceeding only if the trier of fact is the same in both proceedings. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 136 ¶ 80, 140 P.3d 899, 919 (2006); see also A.R.S. § 13-703(D) (Evidence that is admitted at the trial and that relates to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances shall be deemed admitted as evidence at a sentencing proceeding if the trier of fact considering that evidence is the same trier of fact that determined the defendant's guilt.). Indeed, A.R.S. § 13-703(B) commands that [a]t the aggravation phase ... the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating circumstances ... shall be governed by the rules of evidence. Thus, it would have been error to allow Doogan's transcript solely because the guilt phase jury had heard the testimony. ¶ 25 The trial court, however, did not admit Doogan's testimony for this reason alone; it also determined that the evidence was relevant. Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of some fact of consequence more or less probable. Ariz. R. Evid. 401. Rule 403 gives the judge discretion to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, among other considerations. Ariz. R. Evid. 403. ¶ 26 Armstrong advances two theories to support his argument that the Doogan transcript was irrelevant or too prejudicial. First, Armstrong argues that substantial portions of Doogan's testimony were irrelevant to the (F)(5) pecuniary gain aggravator or the (F)(8) multiple murders aggravator. Specifically, Armstrong suggests that Doogan's testimony on the following topics was irrelevant: planning the murders; digging the grave and burying the bodies; removing the furniture and cleaning the trailer; and Armstrong's fleeing from Arizona. ¶ 27 The details of the crime, including the planning and execution of the murders, were relevant to both the (F)(5) and (F)(8) aggravators. In addition, evidence regarding the blood-stained furniture corroborated testimony regarding the location of the murder, a fact relevant to the (F)(8) aggravator. The details of Armstrong's flight were relevant to the (F)(5) pecuniary gain aggravator because the evidence included the theft of items from Williams and Farrah's apartment that Armstrong later pawned. To the extent some of the information was minimally relevant, it was not overly prejudicial. Indeed, Armstrong admits that the most inflammatory details from Doogan's testimony  where and how the violence occurred  were relevant to the (F)(8) multiple murders aggravator. The judge's determination that Doogan's testimony was relevant was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 28 Second, Armstrong argues that Doogan's transcript was overly prejudicial because he was willing to concede the existence of the (F)(8) multiple murders aggravator. Armstrong sought to prevent the State from proving (F)(8) because this Court had conclude[d] that no reasonable jury could have found other than that the two murders... were temporally, spatially, and motivationally related. Armstrong II, 208 Ariz. at 365 ¶ 19, 93 P.3d at 1081. The trial court allowed the State to prove (F)(8), reasoning that the State was obligated to secure a jury finding, notwithstanding this Court's holding that the previous judicial determination that (F)(8) existed was harmless error. ¶ 29 In effect, Armstrong asked the judge to repeat the same harmless error that occurred at the first trial. We rejected a similar argument in State v. Pandeli ( Pandeli IV ), 215 Ariz. 514, 522 ¶ 15, 161 P.3d 557, 565 (2007). There, we held that even if a judge's finding of an aggravating circumstance was harmless error, when a death sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing, the State was obligated to re-prove the ... aggravating circumstance on resentencing. Id. Moreover, A.R.S. § 13-703.01(P) requires the jury to make all factual determinations required by this section or the Constitution of the United States or this state to impose a death sentence. ¶ 30 Armstrong's original sentence was vacated and remanded for resentencing; therefore, the State was obligated to prove any aggravating circumstance to the jury. Armstrong II, 208 Ariz. at 366 ¶ 24, 93 P.3d at 1082. There was no abuse of discretion.
¶ 31 Armstrong also contends that the admission of the transcript of Doogan's testimony violated his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right because he did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine Doogan. At trial, he also argued that admitting the transcript violated Rule 19.3(c) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that former testimony is admissible if [t]he party against whom the former testimony is offered ... had the right and opportunity to cross-examine the declarant with an interest and motive similar to that which the party now has. ¶ 32 The Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial hearsay unless (1) the declarant is unavailable and (2) the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); see also State v. McGill, 213 Ariz. 147, 159 ¶ 51, 140 P.3d 930, 942 (2006) (noting that the Confrontation Clause applies to testimonial hearsay used to establish an aggravating circumstance). ¶ 33 We need not decide whether the admission of the transcript in the aggravation phase caused error because any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Violations of the Confrontation Clause do not result in automatic reversal. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). Because the jury found the State did not prove the (F)(5) aggravator and because the Confrontation Clause and Rule 19.3(c) would not have prohibited the admission of the transcript as mitigation rebuttal during the penalty phase, the only way Doogan's transcript could have impermissibly affected the verdict is with respect to the finding of the (F)(8) multiple murders aggravator. See McGill, 213 Ariz. at 159 ¶ 52, 140 P.3d at 942 (holding that the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit the admission of testimonial hearsay to rebut defendant's mitigation). ¶ 34 Apart from Doogan's prior testimony, the State presented other evidence sufficient to establish the (F)(8) aggravating circumstance. Specifically, Medina testified that she heard four shots and saw Armstrong and Doogan dragging the bodies from the trailer to the pre-dug grave. Medina also testified that Armstrong told her how the murders occurred, including that he shot Williams and Farrah in the living room and that he shot them each in the chest and the head. Finally, she testified that Armstrong told her he planned to kill the victims because Farrah intended to turn him over to Oklahoma authorities. It is clear that any error did not contribute to or affect the ... sentence. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 18, 115 P.3d at 607.