Opinion ID: 186703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disqualification of the Special Master

Text: 14 We explained In re Brooks that [i]f ... Balaran should have been recused from the contempt proceedings, then any work produced pursuant to the [contempt] referrals must also be `recused' — that is, suppressed. Id. Similarly, in this case to determine whether we should suppress the reports at issue, we must address the merits of Interior's petition to disqualify Balaran. Although a writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 289, 108 S.Ct. 1133, 99 L.Ed.2d 296 (1988), we will issue the writ compelling recusal of a judicial officer where the party seeking the writ demonstrates a clear and indisputable right to relief. In re Brooks, 383 F.3d at 1041. 15 Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) a justice, judge or magistrate judge must recuse himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned ... by one fully apprised of the surrounding circumstances. Cobell, 334 F.3d at 1143 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under § 455(b)(1) he must recuse himself if he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. We have held that a special master is subject to the same ethical restrictions as a judge when the special master serves as the functional equivalent of a judge even though the special master is under a judge's control. Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 630-32 (D.C.Cir.1988). 16 The plaintiffs contend § 455 is simply inapplicable here, [f]irst and foremost because Balaran's assignment was solely investigatory (rather than `adjudicative'). On the contrary, the district court charged the Special Master with finding the facts in the first instance and making a report and recommendation detailing his findings and conclusions. As we held In re Brooks, Balaran's role in assessing allegations of misconduct plainly demonstrates the adjudicative nature of [the] position, 383 F.3d at 1045; he was functionally indistinguishable from ... a trial judge. Jenkins, 849 F.2d at 631. The disqualification provisions of § 455 therefore applied fully to Balaran in his conduct of that investigation. 17 Interior contends Balaran's conduct warranted his disqualification under both §§ 455(a) and (b)(1). NAID charged the Department had committed a fraud on the court by omitting from its Eighth Quarterly Report material information on the progress of the TAAMS project and, as explained below, after unsuccessfully attempting to intervene in the class action, NAID brought administrative proceedings against the Department in connection with those allegations. The Department also points to the plaintiffs' statement in their brief that Balaran hired Smith specifically to identify and produce many of the [exhibits] used to prepare the Interim Report filed on April 21, 2003. Invoking § 455(a), the Department contends that [a] judicial officer who collaborates with an accusing party to determine the accuracy of the party's accusations cannot under any objective standard be thought to be impartial. Alternatively, Interior argues Balaran exhibited actual bias, in violation of § 455(b): [t]he retention of Mr. Smith revealed Mr. Balaran's bias, it did not create it. 18 With respect to § 455(a), the plaintiffs respond that an objective observer would not question Balaran's impartiality because his interim report includes only findings firmly rooted in evidence; indeed, we are told, [e]very fact is supported by one of the 73 exhibits [Balaran] attached to his report — exhibits containing the very record Interior was ordered to turn over ... but did not. Furthermore, Balaran's site visit reports were made pursuant to the district court's authorization and direction to investigate the retention and protection from destruction of IIM Records through ... on-site visits to any location where IIM Records are maintained. Because Balaran had broad authority to investigate and to interview any relevant persons in connection with NAID's allegations, the plaintiffs reason that Interior has not produced any evidence Balaran either was or appeared to be biased. 19 We agree with the Department that Balaran should have recused himself pursuant to § 455(a). His impartiality was placed in question when he hired Smith because NAID, of which Smith was until then a senior executive, stood to gain financially from a finding of misconduct. As recounted above, NAID had sought to intervene in the class action against Interior and had been remitted by the district court to an administrative action against the Department for relief under the Contract Dispute Act of 1978. A finding by Balaran that Interior covered up deficiencies in the TAAMS over NAID's protests would tend to support NAID's claim that the Department terminated its contract because of the company's unfavorable assessment of the TAAMS project. In fact, Smith — who returned to NAID after working for Balaran — because of his direct involvement in the TAAMS project, will likely be a witness in NAID's case against the Department. As a sister circuit has made plain, conflicted advisors who participate or influence a judge require[] the judge's disqualification under § 455(a), as distinct from an expert or other assistant to the judge who is disinterested and non-conflicted. In re Kensington Int'l Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 311 (3d Cir.2004). 20 What is more, Balaran's employment of Smith raises the specter of selection bias which, as we held In re Brooks, necessitates his disqualification under § 455. See 383 F.3d at 1046. An impartial observer apprised of the facts would reasonably believe Balaran's reliance upon Smith for documents and other sources of information likely color[ed] the way in which he approach[ed] his task, and ultimately his reports and recommendations to the district court. Id. Indeed, a reasonable observer would be hard-pressed to conclude otherwise for, as the plaintiffs concede, Balaran hired Smith to help in obtaining documents and information upon which Balaran could assess NAID's allegations of misconduct against the Department. 21 Nor would a reasonable observer see any justification for Balaran's conduct. If Balaran needed Smith's help in identifying and analyzing documents, then at the very least Balaran immediately should have disclosed the arrangement to the Department. Interior's counsel had invited Smith to assist in Balaran's initial inspection because his knowledge of the administrative record would be helpful to the Department in meeting its obligation to produce the relevant documents; for Balaran then to hire and pay Smith retroactive to the date of that inspection therefore seems particularly suspect. Worse still, after Balaran's initial inspection, Interior's counsel was not present to dispute anything Smith was telling Balaran. It is difficult to imagine a more biased way of conducting and reporting upon an investigation, save perhaps by permitting Smith actually to write the report. In fact, having selected the exhibits upon which the report was based, Smith might as well have written it.  22