Opinion ID: 884315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did Granby waive his claim of insufficiency of the evidence as to both offenses by failing to raise the issue in the District Court?

Text: The State argues that Granby has waived the claim of sufficiency of the evidence as to the disorderly conduct and violation of privacy in communications offenses because he never presented these arguments to the District Court. The State claims that if Granby believed that the evidence was insufficient to meet the State's burden of proof, he could have filed a motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence under § 46-16-403, MCA, or made an oral motion to dismiss, either at the close of the prosecutor's case or at the close of all the evidence. The State cites § 46-20-104(2), MCA, and State v. Walsh (1997), ___ Mont. ___, ___, 931 P.2d 42, 45, 54 St.Rep. 64, 65, as support for its contention that because Granby failed to raise insufficiency of the evidence at the District Court level, it is waived for purposes of appeal. [1] Section 46-20-104(2), MCA, provides: Upon appeal from a judgment, the court may review the verdict or decision and any alleged error objected to which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment. Failure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection except as provided in XX-XX-XXX(2). Granby argues that the plain language of § 46-20-104(2), MCA, provides this Court with ample authority to review Granby's convictions. He argues that the statute distinctly separates review of a verdict or decision from alleged error committed during the district court proceedings, and requires a defendant to object to error, but does not require a defendant to object to the verdict or decision itself, in order to preserve the case for appeal. Granby further argues that the decision in Walsh was based on in appropriate authority and that the decision is contrary to the legislature's intent in its adoption of § 46-20-104, MCA. We agree. In Walsh, this Court declined to consider Walsh 's challenge to charges of accountability because Walsh failed to argue at any time prior to filing his brief on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict on the accountability charges.... See State v. Johnson (1993), 257 Mont. 157, 162, 848 P.2d 496, 499. Walsh, ___ Mont. at ___, 931 P.2d at 45. Granby argues that the Walsh Court's reliance on Johnson was misplaced. In Johnson the defendant claimed on appeal that the testimony of an accomplice was insufficiently corroborated. Johnson, 848 P.2d at 498. The Court in Johnson declined to address the issue because nothing in the record disclosed a challenge to the sufficiency of the corroborative evidence, or the evidence as a whole, by way of either a motion for an acquittal or a motion for a directed verdict. Johnson, 848 P.2d at 498. The Court did not hold that a general claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict was barred on appeal for the failure to either move for a judgment of acquittal or a dismissal at the end of trial. The Court simply declined to address an allegation of specific trial error on appeal on the basis of the defendant's failure to object to the trial error in the district court. It is clear that the Court in Johnson was concerned with error committed during the course of the trial, and not with review of the defendant's verdict or final judgment. Therefore, we agree with Granby that Walsh 's reliance on Johnson was misplaced. Additionally, Granby argues that the result in Walsh is contrary to the intent of the Code Commission when it recommended adoption of § 46-20-104, MCA, by the legislature. The Commission Comments provide: [Subsection (2) ] also broadens the scope of appeal in one respect. Under the present code it is necessary to make a motion for a new trial and then appeal from an adverse ruling if the grounds of appeal are also the grounds for a motion for a new trial. No such requirement is intended to be imposed by this code. All questions here to fore raised on such an appeal may be raised on appeal from the judgment regardless of whether a motion for a new trial has been made in the trial court.... It is the purpose of Subsection [ (2) ] to provide one complete, full and adequate review by enlarging the power of the reviewing court. This is accomplished by allowing the court to decide all questions raised by the entire proceeding, below, including an appeal from a motion for a new trial. Although the Comments discuss a motion for new trial rather than a motion for a judgment of acquittal or directed verdict, we believe the reasoning is equally applicable. It is clear that the legislature intended that a reviewing court have the power to provide a comprehensive review of the district court proceedings for sufficiency of the evidence without the necessity of a motion challenging the sufficiency of the evidence in the district court. Furthermore, allowing a comprehensive review of a verdict or decision without a motion for acquittal does not deny a district court the opportunity to rule on the issue of sufficiency of the evidence. Under § 46-16-403, MCA, a district court may, on its own motion ... dismiss the action ... when the evidence is insufficient to support a finding or verdict of guilty. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Walsh's holding that an appellant waives the right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict on appeal by failing to raise the issue in the district court was decided on the basis of inappropriate authority and is contrary to the intent of the legislature. Therefore, we overrule Walsh insofar as it bars a claim of insufficiency of the evidence to support a verdict on appeal for failure to raise the issue in the district court. Furthermore, we agree with Granby that a plain reading of § 46-20-104, MCA, indicates that an appellant need not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at the district court level in order for this Court to review a verdict or decision on the basis of sufficiency of the evidence. The second sentence in § 46-20-104, MCAFailure to make a timely objection during trial constitutes a waiver of the objection ...addresses an appeal based on any alleged error objected to which involves the merits or necessarily affects the judgment, and does not prohibit this Court from reviewing a verdict or decision as a whole. For the foregoing reasons we hold that Granby did not waive his claims of insufficiency of the evidence as to either offense.