Opinion ID: 187085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Crack Evidence

Text: Lloyd also challenges the sufficiency of the trial evidence to establish that the substance in the seized ziplocks was crack cocaine, that is, smokable or vaporizable cocaine base. Following our recent decision in United States v. Powell, 503 F.3d 147 (D.C.Cir.2007), we reject this argument as well. In Powell, a DEA forensic chemist testified that the substance in the ziplock bags seized from the defendant was 83% pure cocaine base and his written report to this effect was admitted into evidence. In addition, the two arresting officers testified they had seen crack many times and the substance seized was crack cocaine. Finally, Sergeant Brennan, qualified as an expert in that case as well, testified from a photograph that the substance was crack. The court concluded that the evidence, [w]hile not exactly overwhelming, . . . was enough to enable a rational trier of fact to determine that [the substance] was crack cocaine. 503 F.3d at 149. The court explained: The arresting officers had ample experience with crack cocaine. Their identification of Powell's material as crack cocaine was not contradicted. Nor was Sergeant Brennan's expert testimony on the subject. Id. In this case, the evidence is likewise adequate. The chemist's report, entered into evidence, identified the substance seized from the console as 52% pure [c]ocaine base, App. 15, and Lloyd stipulated the report was true and accurate, Trial Tr. 162. In addition, Brennan, again without contradiction, positively identified the white substance in the ziplocks as crack cocaine based on his experience and expertise. Trial Tr. 194; see also id. 197 (Exhibit Number 1 is 28.5 grams. It's 11 Ziplock bags, and it contains cocaine base, crack cocaine.). Id. 197. Examining a photograph of the drugs, Brennan testified that their rock-like form looked like crack. Id. 195. Detective Martin, who recovered the substance, also identified it as white and rock-like. Id. 151. Brennan further testified that, given the customary practices of packaging crack cocaine for sale in the District of Columbia, the crack cocaine was basically packaged for the wholesale street distribution, Id. 197. Finally, he explained that the knife found in the console could be used for protection in the drug trade or could be used to break up the cocaine base, break up the rocks and that [t]he scale is used to measure the amounts in packaging crack cocaine for wholesale distribution. Id. at 198. Lloyd asserts that. Brennan's testimony demonstrated a lack of precision regarding the critical distinction recognized in [ United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d 910 (D.C.Cir.2004) ] between cocaine base generally and the particular form of cocaine base known as crack because Brennan testified that crack is a `street name' for the same drug that chemists identify as `cocaine base' and did not testify that the particular substance seized in this case was smokable. Appellant's Br. 35 (citing Trial Tr. 195-96). Nonetheless, Brennan was correct in identifying crack as the street name for the form of cocaine base commonly distributed in Washington, DC since the 1980s. See United States v. Brisbane, 367 F.3d at 911-12 (D.C.Cir. 2004). Moreover, while one of the distinctive characteristics of crack is that it can be vaporized and therefore smoked without losing its narcotic effect, [6] the absence of expert testimony on vaporizability d[oes] not undermine the force of the other evidence that the seized substance is crack cocaine. Powell, 503 F.3d at 149. As in Powell, we cannot say that no rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt  based on the DEA analysis and Brennan's testimony  that [Lloyd] possessed crack cocaine. Id. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment convicting Lloyd of Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 of the superseding indictment. So ordered.