Opinion ID: 880447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Modification of Court Decree

Text: Rick Robertson contends that the payments to Patti Robertson constitute maintenance and not a property settlement, and that, therefore, the court should modify the agreement because it was unconscionable. The statute governing this premise is § 40-4-208, MCA (1987). Modification and termination of provisions for maintenance, support, and property disposition. (1) Except as otherwise provided in 40-4-201(6), a decree may be modified by a court as to installments accruing subsequent to actual notice to the parties of the motion for modification. (2) ... (b) Whenever the decree proposed for modification contains provisions relating to maintenance or support, modification under subsection (1) may only be made: (i) upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unconscionable; However, § 40-4-201(6), MCA (1987), as referred to in the above statute directs us that Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation of children, the decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of terms set forth in the decree if the separation agreement so provides. (Emphasis added.) Under the statutes, the District Court does have the power to reopen a prior decree on the grounds of unconscionability if the support at issue is child support, custody, or maintenance that is not integrated with a property settlement. ..... The property disposition provisions of a dissolution decree may only be modified where the parties give their written consent or where the agreement is subject to rescission or modification under the general law governing all contracts. In re Marriage of Richardson (1985), 214 Mont. 353, 693 P.2d 524. Patti Robertson entered into a property settlement and gave up the right to any future support beyond four years of college and the six months thereafter. She relinquished claims against Rick Robertson's retirement, savings and profit sharing accounts acquired during the marriage. These accounts were subject to discovery at the time of the dissolution and Patti Robertson had the right to implement full discovery procedures. On December 31, 1986, those accounts showed the following balances: Employee Stock Ownership Plan $20,106.00 and Carpenter's Retirement $1,716.00. Patti gave up that right her claim to those funds as consideration for the exchange promise from Rick Robertson that he would pay her tuition of $2,000.00 per year ($167.00 paid monthly) and payments of $250.00 per month in lieu of that property. The couple had agreed that Rick would sell the family home in which they were living and from the proceeds of that sale he would repay Patti Robertson's attorney fees of $870.00. They were to have split the remainder of any proceeds after all expenses were paid. After the dissolution was final, Rick moved out of the home which they purchased for $54,000.00. Patti had moved out before the dissolution. In its vacant state it sold for $47,000.00. Rick did not divide the proceeds with Patti quite as he agreed. He himself received $3,000.00 or so from the sale, paid the $870.00 attorney fees and gave Patti $1,000.00. It is clear to this Court that the wife's monthly payments were an inseverable part of a property settlement arrangement. The obligation was undertaken by the husband in exchange for the wife's forbearance in regard to the property of the marital estate. This Court in Washington v. Washington (1973), 162 Mont. 349, 356, 512 P.2d 1300, adopted the rule that ... if support provisions have been made an inseverable part of the agreement between husband and wife to divide their property, and the court in the divorce action approves the agreement, the provisions of such agreement cannot thereafter be modified without the consent of both of the contracting parties. It is obvious here as it was in Washington, 162 Mont. at 354, 512 P.2d at 1303, that one cannot sever the maintenance provision from the property settlement agreement between the parties without destroying the contract. We hold that the contractual property agreement was not subject to modification and the District Court erred in so modifying.