Opinion ID: 3173486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Reconsider or Reopen

Text: When the Board denied Gomez-Gutierrez relief on September 22, 2014, he filed a motion to reconsider or reopen his case. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6), (7); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1), (c)(1). “‘A motion to reconsider contests the correctness of the original decision based upon the previous factual record.’” Mshihiri v. Holder, 753 F.3d 785, 789 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 56, 57 (BIA -8- 2006)). “A motion to reconsider must identify ‘errors of fact or law in the prior Board decision and shall be supported by pertinent authority.’” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1)). The motion “must give the [Board] ‘a reason for changing its mind, something the tribunal has no reason to do if the motion merely republishes the reasons that had failed to convince the tribunal in the first place.’” Sukhov v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 568, 570 (8th Cir. 2005) (quoting Strato v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 651, 655 (8th Cir. 2004)). “[A] motion to reopen ‘seeks a new hearing based on new or previously unavailable evidence.’” Mshihiri, 753 F.3d at 789 (quoting In re O-S-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 57-58). Such motions “are disfavored because they undermine the government’s legitimate interest in finality.” Guled v. Mukasey, 515 F.3d 872, 882 (8th Cir. 2008). The Board may deny a motion to reopen if the movant fails to present new, previously unavailable evidence; if the movant does not establish a prima facie case of eligibility for the desired relief; or if the [Board] determines “that even if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief sought.” Xiu Ling Chen v. Holder, 751 F.3d 876, 878 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Habchy v. Gonzales, 471 F.3d 858, 867 (8th Cir. 2006)). Unsatisfied with the depth of the Board’s realistic-probability analysis, GomezGutierrez complained in his motion that “[t]he Board failed to consider” Burkland and Kelly, which Gomez-Gutierrez maintained “demonstrate[d] a realistic probability that Minnesota prosecutes solicitation for non-morally turpitudenous [sic] conduct.” Gomez-Gutierrez—attaching news articles dated between 1991 and 2011—proposed “additional cases confirm[ed] the categorical overbreadth” of Minnesota’s solicitation statute. Based on three of those articles, Gomez-Gutierrez argued for the first time that Minnesota’s past “prosecution of adult and juvenile sex trafficking victims -9- demonstrate[d] a realistic probability of non-categorical moral turpitude.” Asserting Minnesota’s “2013 Safe Harbor Act [for sex-trafficking victims] did not go into effect until August 1, 2014,”4 Gomez-Gutierrez also claimed “new evidence” that Minnesota only then softened its stance toward sex-trafficking victims warranted reopening his case. The Board denied Gomez-Gutierrez’s motion, concluding Gomez-Gutierrez “largely raise[d] the same or similar arguments in the motion to reconsider as were raised in his prior appeal brief” and any “new arguments related to his solicitation conviction” were “not properly raised.” In the end, the Board was “not persuaded that [Gomez-Gutierrez’s] supplemental arguments affect[ed] the ultimate determination that his conviction categorically constitute[d] a crime involving moral turpitude.” We review the Board’s “decision denying a motion to reopen and reconsider for an abuse of discretion.” Guled, 515 F.3d at 882. The Board “abuses its discretion where it gives no rational explanation for its decision, departs from its established policies without explanation, relies on impermissible factors or legal error, or ignores or distorts the record evidence.” Id. Gomez-Gutierrez asserts the Board abused its discretion by (1) failing to consider his “new evidence of a new law evincing categorical overbreadth which requires reopening”; (2) “conflating this new evidence as both ‘new argument’ and ‘supplemental legal argument’”; and (3) “vaguely den[ying] the motion to reconsider” without specifying which arguments it rejected and why. According to GomezGutierrez, the Board owed him more specific findings regarding realistic probability 4 In other places in his motion, Gomez-Gutierrez dated the “paradigm shift in law enforcement approaches toward victims of sexual exploitation” to the mid-2000s and the changes caused by the safe-harbor law to 2011. -10- and a more explicit analysis of his examples. Gomez-Gutierrez’s arguments are unpersuasive. The Board “‘must consider the issues raised and announce its decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely reacted.’” Omondi v. Holder, 674 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting Averianova v. Holder, 592 F.3d 931, 936 (8th Cir. 2010)). The Board need not “‘list every possible positive and negative factor in its decision’ or . . . ‘write an exegesis on every contention.’” Id. We will uphold the Board’s decision as long as it has given “‘reasons that are “specific” enough’” to enable us to “‘perform the requisite judicial review’” and “‘appreciate the reasoning behind the decision.’” Id. at 800-01 (quoting Singh v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 553, 557 (8th Cir. 2007)). In denying Gomez-Gutierrez’s motion, the Board thoughtfully considered Gomez-Gutierrez’s arguments and evidence, gave a rational explanation for its denial, and provided sufficient analysis to allow meaningful review. The Board undoubtedly could have said more to address Gomez-Gutierrez’s specific claims, but “the Board is entitled to a presumption of regularity” and does not have “to mention every piece of evidence that it considered.” Doe v. Holder, 651 F.3d 824, 831 (8th Cir. 2011). The Board did not abuse its discretion in concluding Gomez-Gutierrez’s arguments did not warrant further review or a fuller explanation.