Opinion ID: 2507697
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Self-Defense Jury Instructions

Text: Finding the trial judge properly submitted self-defense to the jury, I now assess the sufficiency of the judge's jury instructions.
In challenging the judge's instructions, Dickey argues the Court of Appeals erred in finding the instruction on the right to act on appearances was adequate where the instruction did not explain the proper test, which is especially critical where Dickey could see Boot reaching under his shirt. Additionally, Dickey asserts the Court of Appeals failed to recognize that the right to act on appearances is a separate issue from the second and third elements of self-defense regarding actual danger and reasonable belief of danger. As an initial matter, I believe Dickey is barred from raising certain arguments to this Court as they were not presented to the trial judge or the Court of Appeals. See State v. Haselden, 353 S.C. 190, 196, 577 S.E.2d 445, 448 (2003) (holding a defendant may not argue one ground at trial and another on appeal). At trial, Dickey's counsel submitted two requests to charge on the right to act on appearances. Although the trial judge instructed the jury on the right to act on appearances, he did not use the specific language requested by Dickey. [8] On appeal, Dickey generally argued that the trial judge erred by refusing to adequately charge on appearances. Accordingly, I confine my review of this issue solely to a determination of whether the trial judge's instruction on the right to act on appearances adequately covered Dickey's requests to charge. To warrant reversal, a trial judge's refusal to give a requested jury charge must be both erroneous and prejudicial to the defendant. Burkhart, 350 S.C. at 263, 565 S.E.2d at 304. Failure to give requested jury instructions is not prejudicial error where the instructions given afford the proper test for determining the issues. Id. An appellate court will not reverse the trial judge's decision regarding a jury charge absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Pittman, 373 S.C. 527, 570, 647 S.E.2d 144, 166 (2007). Turning to the facts of the instant case, I agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals that the trial judge sufficiently instructed the jury on the right to act on appearances as the instruction essentially tracked the language of this Court's opinion in State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 278, 87 S.E.2d 681, 684 (1955). [9] Notably, Dickey cited Jackson in support of his two requests. Given the judge's instruction covered the substance of Dickey's requests, the judge's failure to charge the requests did not constitute reversible error.
Dickey asserts the Court of Appeals erred in finding the trial judge correctly refused to instruct the jury on curtilage. In support of this assertion, Dickey claims the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the duty to retreat was adequately charged based solely on its conclusion that the public sidewalk was not curtilage. At trial, Dickey's counsel requested the following instruction on curtilage: The absence of a duty to retreat extends to the curtilage of the dwelling or place of business. The curtilage is the area of land adjoining a dwelling or business, which includes porches, outbuildings, yards, gardens and parking lots. Although the trial judge declined this instruction, he charged the jury on the duty to retreat: I would charge you that if a defendant is on his own premises or if a defendant is on his own place of business that the defendant had no duty to retreat before acting in self-defense. As previously discussed, I agree with the Court of Appeals' ruling that Dickey was not within the curtilage of the apartment building as he was on a public sidewalk at the time of the shooting. Even if curtilage should have been charged, I find Dickey's request to charge was an incorrect statement of law. The charge expanded this state's definition of curtilage by adding the phrase the area of land adjoining a dwelling or business. See Wiggins, 330 S.C. at 548 n. 15, 500 S.E.2d at 494 n. 15 (defining curtilage to include outbuildings, the yard around a dwelling, a garden of the dwelling, or the parking lot of a business); cf. State v. Brooks, 79 S.C. 144, 149, 60 S.E. 518, 520 (1908) (stating that one on his land, adjoining a public road, if assaulted by another who is on such road, is bound to retreat before taking the life of his adversary if there is probability of his being able to escape without losing his life or suffering grievous bodily harm given he would not have had the right to eject his adversary from the place where he had a right to be). Accordingly, I believe the Court of Appeals correctly found that self-defense was properly submitted to the jury and the trial judge sufficiently charged the requisite elements.