Opinion ID: 180848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Reasonableness of Larkin's Sentence

Text: Larkin's final argument is that the imposed sentence of thirty years imprisonment is unreasonable. In determining the reasonableness of a sentence, we give great deference to [t]he sentencing judge [who] is in a superior position to find facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual case. The judge sees and hears the evidence, makes credibility determinations, has full knowledge of the facts and gains insights not conveyed by the record. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir.2006) (we give deference to the District Court because it is in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case. (internal quotations and citations omitted)). The reasonableness of the District Court's sentence is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 243 (3d Cir.2008). Consistent with our post- Booker [19] precedent, District Courts engage in a three step process when imposing a sentence. United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir.2006); United States v. King, 454 F.3d 187 (3d Cir.2006). First, as was done in the pre- Booker era, the defendant's guideline range is calculated. See id. Second, the sentencing court must issue formal rulings on any departure motions on the record and, to the extent it grants a motion, it must then articulate how that departure affects the Guidelines calculations. King, 454 F.3d at 196. Third, the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) are considered in setting the sentence they impose regardless whether it varies from the sentence calculated under the Guidelines. Gunter, 462 F.3d at 247 (footnote omitted). The § 3553(a) factors are: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need for the sentence imposed (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; (3) the kinds of sentences available; (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines ... (5) any pertinent policy statement ... (6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and (7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. Although Larkin complains about the overall reasonableness of the sentence, her chief allegation is that the District Court failed to sufficiently account for the similarity in the sentence between herself and her co-defendant, Richard King. Both Larkin and King received the same sentence despite the fact that Larkin provided substantial assistance to the government, as set forth in the government's § 5K1.1 motion for downward departure. [20] Thus, Larkin's complaint implicates both procedural and substantive error. [W]here a district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable sentencing court would have imposed that same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court provided. United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir.2009). In deference to this principle, we will first address the procedural argument. Procedural errors include failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence-including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Based on our review of the record, we find no procedural error. At the sentencing hearing, the District Court expressly considered the similarity of Larkin's sentence to King's sentence as required by § 3553(a)(6). Finally, I want to address the sixth factor under section 3553(a), which is the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities for defendants with similar records and in particular, Mr. King, the co-defendant in this case. As we know, he pled guilty to interstate travel with a minor under 12. And that's an offense with which you were also charged. Mr. King's relevant conduct included physical contact with your daughter, prior abuse of his own daughter, distribution of child pornography and obstructing the investigation. But you solicited the sexual contact that Mr. King had with your daughter. You were present for and a participant in nearly all of the abuse that Mr. King perpetrated on your daughter. And you abused the second victim; just like Mr. King also, your own child. And you distributed pornography. And you obstructed justice by asking others to commit perjury. And you directed others to destroy or conceal evidence of your offense. Your first words to the investigating agent in this case, and I'm paraphrasing, were how do I get myself out of this. Well, you didn't and you can't. You engaged in substantially similar conduct to Mr. King. And I might agree with the contention that your conduct was worse. I don't know how you could be subject to less severe punishment under the circumstances, and you won't be. App. Vol. II at 221-22. In addition, even though the sentence imposed was outside the applicable guideline range, it was procedurally sound and not unreasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586 ([I]f the sentence is outside the Guidelines range, the court may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness. It may consider the extent of the deviation, but must give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.). Here, the District Court's analysis of factor (a)(6) consists of more than mere boiler-plate language and demonstrates both thoughtful and meaningful consideration. The touchstone of `reasonableness' is whether the record as a whole reflects rational and meaningful consideration of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 571 (3d Cir.2007) (en banc). We have long required that sentencing courts give meaningful consideration to all of the § 3553(a) factors. Meaningful consideration requires more than mere recitation that the factors have been considered. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329 (3d Cir.2006). A review of the entire record demonstrates that the District Court gave thoughtful and meaningful consideration of all of the circumstances that impacted Larkin's sentence, including subsection (a)(6) of § 3553. Id. (noting that a sentencing court need not discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing.) We conclude that the District Court laid the proper foundation and appropriately applied the § 3553(a) factors in formulating Larkin's sentence. I have considered all of the 3553(a) factors carefully, dispassionately, although this is a case that triggers passion. I have given great consideration to all of the circumstances that I have before me in the voluminous submissions by counsel. I will note that had I not departed upward under 5K2.1, as I did in my prior order, I would vary up to a sentence at the same level that I'm about to give you. I take no joy in this. This is the worst case. This is the ugliest, most difficult case I have ever seen in my seven years on the bench. And in fact, other than homicides, wanton killings, this is the worst case that I have seen not only in the seven years on the bench but in 22 years of lawyering before that. App. Vol. II at 222. The District Court's sentence was procedurally sound and therefore entitled to a presumption of reasonableness. The District Court was free to, and did, exercise its discretion in imposing sentence. Whether, as argued, there was room here for a lower sentence, we have considered that argument and conclude that the sentence imposed was not unreasonable. Our decision today is reinforced by Gall, which reminds us that [t]he fact that the appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Therefore, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District Court.