Opinion ID: 885241
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indendi v. Workman

Text: ถ 80 In our 1995 decision, Indendi v. Workman , the injured driver, Indendi, brought a negligence claim against the owners of a horse with which she had collided. It was undisputed that the highway in question was part of the federal-aid primary system, and therefore subject to ง 60-7-201, MCA, as well as our decision in Ambrogini. ถ 81 The district court had determined that the owners of the horse, the Workmans, fell under the statutory exclusion, ง 60-7-202(2), MCA, which provides that the general proscription of permitting livestock to occupy such highways does not apply to the parts of fenced highways adjacent to open range where a highway device has not been installed to exclude range livestock. The court concluded that although the Workmans' horse had been confined within a fenced pasture, their ranch nevertheless was open range, and therefore they owed no duty to prevent the horse from occupying the highway. See Indendi, 272 Mont. at 67, 899 P.2d at 1087. ถ 82 We concluded that the factual statements in the court's memorandum and order were not substantiated by the record. See Indendi, 272 Mont. at 69, 899 P.2d at 1088. We concluded that the directed verdict entered in favor of the Workmans was therefore inappropriate because pursuant to the exception under subsection (2) of ง 60-7-202, MCA, there was no evidence that the highway in question was fenced, and that the area adjacent to the highway was, as a matter of law, open range. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 69-70, 899 P.2d at 1088-89. ถ 83 After properly reaching this conclusion, and requiring a remand, we then moved into a negligence per se analysis based on Indendi's contention that the Workmans had not constructed a legal fence around their property in accordance with ง 81-4-101, MCA. As explained by the Court, one of the key criteria for establishing a negligence per se claim based on the violation of a statute is that the statute was enacted to protect a specific class of persons, and the plaintiff is a member of that class. See Indendi, 272 Mont. at 72, 899 P.2d at 1090 (quoting negligence per se test from VanLuchene v. State (1990), 244 Mont. 397, 401, 797 P.2d 932, 935). We stated: It is apparent that the whole purpose for the legislature's requiring fences to be constructed in a certain manner is to insure, to the extent possible, that livestock not on open range are adequately confined and are not free to roam and to cause harm to persons and property or to breed with the livestock of others. There could be no other purpose for that sort of legislation. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 72, 899 P.2d at 1090 (emphasis added). Based on this assumption, we then stated that it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature ... recognizes the reality that one of the purposes of a legal fence is to keep livestock off the roadways of this state. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 72, 899 P.2d at 1090 (addressing ง 81-4-102, MCA, a 1933 amendment, which allows a cattle guard exemption to the legal fence requirement of ง 81-4-101, MCA). But see Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 118, 642 P.2d at 1017 (stating that ง 81-4-102, MCA, merely provides that an auto pass will not make an otherwise legal fence illegal). We reasoned that because  ง 81-4-101, MCA, was enacted to require the containment of livestock by means of a `legal fence' and, thereby, to prevent, among other harm, livestock/vehicle accidents, Indendi presented evidence that the Workmans violated the statute by failing to construct a legal fence. Indendi, 272 Mont. at 73, 899 P.2d at 1090. ถ 84 As addressed above, the purpose of the legal fence statutes, as indicated by ง 81-4-215, MCA, was to exclude not confine livestock, and applies strictly to the legal relationship between livestock owners and landowners who wish to establish the condition precedent necessary to sustain a trespass action. Based on a clearly erroneous premise, we again substituted our judgment for that of the Legislature by inserting a statutory duty that simply did not exist, and by further establishing that the legal fence statutes established motorists as a class of person that the statutes supposedly were enacted to protect. ถ 85 Thus, we conclude that ง 81-4-101, MCA, which defines a legal fence, and งง 81-4-103 and 104, MCA, which establish liability for defective fences, do not mandate any statutory duty on the part of livestock owners in this state to fence-in their animals or otherwise maintain fences, and thus overrule Indendi v. Workman to the extent it holds that a violation of ง 81-4-101, MCA, may serve as a basis for a finding of negligence per se with regard to an injury to a motorist or passenger traveling on a highway. Thus, Larson-Murphy's argument to the District Court and here that Zancanella's fence, which the Steiners were obligated to maintain, was legally defective due to the fact it violated the legal fence statute is without merit.