Opinion ID: 2972375
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony Regarding Uncharged Acts

Text: We review a district court’s evidentiary determinations for abuse of discretion. United States v. Price, 329 F.3d 903, 905 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 920 (2003); United States v. Copeland, 321 F.3d 582, 595 (6th Cir. 2003). Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . . This court has specified four necessary steps before 404(b) evidence can be properly considered by a jury. See United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1996). First, upon objection, the proponent of the evidence must identify the specific purpose or purposes for which the proponent offers the evidence. Id. at 1077. Next, the district court must determine whether the identified purpose is material or in issue in the case. Id. If it is, then the court must weigh the evidence’s probative value against its prejudicial value pursuant to Rule 403. Id. Finally, after receiving the evidence, the district court must instruct the jury as to what limited purpose they may consider the evidence. Id. Krushinski contends that the testimony regarding the uncharged acts of vandalism falls under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b), and that none of the four steps above were satisfied. If the testimony was offered as 404(b) evidence, we would agree that neither the prosecutor nor the district court complied with the steps outlined above. The prosecutor did not indicate a No. 03-6586 8 specific purpose for the evidence, rather he stated that the evidence was intended to show the situation at the post office at the time Krushinski allegedly committed the offenses charged in the indictment. Moreover, the district court did not decide whether this background information was relevant to the case, or whether it was outweighed by its prejudicial value. Finally, the district court failed to give a limiting instruction concerning the uncharged acts of vandalism. The government disputes that the testimony is 404(b) evidence because it is inextricably intertwined with the charged crimes, and therefore argues that the fact that the court did not satisfy the four steps above is irrelevant.1 Whether or not the testimony is 404(b) evidence, it should not have been admitted. At trial, the government did not attempt 1 In Price, 329 F.3d at 904-05, the defendant was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. At trial, the defendant stipulated to being a felon but disputed ownership of the firearms and ammunition. He argued that they belonged to his wife and that he stayed at her home only on weekends. Officers found evidence in the bedroom that tended to show the defendant lived there. One piece of that evidence that the government sought to introduce was a certificate of completion of a handgun safety course issued to the defendant. The defendant objected, arguing that the certificate was evidence of another crime, because the certificate specified that he possessed and used a firearm as part of the course, and because he was a felon at the time he took the course, the certificate was evidence that he committed another count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. This court rejected the defendant’s argument, holding: “Rule 404(b), however, does not apply to evidence that itself is probative of the crime charged, without regard to whether any ‘other act’ occurred. . . . Here, as the district court found, the certificate itself is circumstantial evidence that Price possessed the firearms and ammunition found on May 5, 2001 [the date agents searched the home], regardless of whether Price possessed a Glock firearm on April 17, 2001 [the date the certificate was issued].” Id. at 906. Similarly, in United States v. DeClue, 899 F.2d 1465, 1472 (6th Cir. 1990), we held that evidence of a defendant’s evasion of corporate taxes was not 404(b) evidence because it directly implicated whether he properly reported income for the tax years at issue in the indictment. We stated that “[e]vidence which is probative of the crime charged and does not solely concern uncharged crimes is not ‘other crimes’ evidence.” Id. The government now argues that Krushinski was circumstantially linked to the uncharged acts of vandalism, and that those acts were inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offenses and therefore not 404(b) evidence. We disagree. There was absolutely no evidence linking Krushinski to the uncharged acts of vandalism. Furthermore, unlike Price and DeClue, the uncharged acts were not evidence directly relating to whether Krushinski was guilty of the crimes charged. No. 03-6586 9 to link the other acts of vandalism to Krushinski, nor to any of the crimes for which he was charged. It was simply irrelevant. Although we find the admission of this evidence to be error, we also conclude the error was harmless. “An error is harmless unless one can say, with fair assurance that the error materially affected the defendant’s substantial rights—that the judgment was substantially swayed by the error.” United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 555 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). An evidentiary error is harmless “unless it is more probable than not that the error materially affected the verdict.” United States v. Fountain, 2 F.3d 656, 668 (6th Cir. 1993). Therefore, we examine whether “it [was] more probable than not that the jury would have reached the same verdict based on the evidence properly admitted at trial, without regard to [the improperly admitted] testimony.” Id. “In determining whether an error is harmless, the reviewing court must take account of what the error meant to the jury, not singled out and standing alone, but in relation to all else that happened.” United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 751 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks, brackets, and citation omitted) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946)). The error here was harmless because the jury acquitted Krushinski of the crimes most closely related to the uncharged acts, the egging of the post office and the bombing of Vance’s truck just months after the uncharged acts, and because there was other strong evidence linking Krushinski to the crimes of which he was convicted. He admitted to writing the threatening letter to the postmaster. His trucking company’s dispatch record revealed that he was dispatched to the locations from where the harassing calls originated. Finally, the No. 03-6586 10 charges relating to the unexploded pipe bomb were supported by evidence that Krushinski’s tools made the bomb.