Opinion ID: 541116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trunk Search

Text: 26 Defendant Williams argues that his fourth amendment rights were violated when his luggage, which contained cocaine, was seized from the trunk of a car belonging to Clara Davis. The seizure was made on March 25, 1987, the day Williams flew from Los Angeles to St. Louis with a shipment of cocaine to be delivered to Davis. He arrived around 5:30 a.m., but the airline lost his luggage. Williams filled out the standard claim forms, registered himself at the Northwest Inn in St. Louis, made arrangements for hotel personnel to pick up his luggage when it arrived in St. Louis, and then took a taxi to Davis' residence. When the Northwest Inn later notified Williams that it had received his luggage, Williams and Davis drove Davis' Mercedes-Benz to the Northwest Inn to collect the cocaine, and to transact a sale with Michael Batchman. After Williams sold two kilograms to Batchman from room 353 at around 2:30 p.m., they took the elevator to the hotel lobby, and proceeded to the parking lot. Batchman was arrested as he was driving away from the hotel. Williams put the luggage in the trunk of the Mercedes-Benz, and then proceeded back into the hotel. There, he and Davis were arrested near the elevator, in an enclosed area off the hotel lobby. 27 The alleged fourth amendment violation stems from the events surrounding the arrest of Williams and the seizure of the Mercedes-Benz. Williams points to evidence in the record which indicates that the trunk of the car was opened at the hotel parking lot, before a warrant was obtained for its search. Davis testified on cross-examination that when she got off the elevator, where she was arrested, she heard the burglar alarm on her car sounding, indicating to her that the trunk had been opened without the key. Trial Transcript, vol. 8, at 54. F.B.I. Agent Long, who was at the hotel when Davis and Williams were arrested, testified that the trunk of the car had been opened, but was closed within a short time after the alarm sounded. Id. vol. 11, at 91. Because a group of twenty or twenty-five officers surrounded the car at the time the alarm sounded, Agent Long could not say who opened the trunk, or how it was opened. The car was impounded, however, and taken to F.B.I. headquarters in St. Louis. A magistrate issued a search warrant at 5:40 p.m., and the luggage belonging to Williams was then taken out of the trunk and searched, yielding eight kilograms of cocaine. 28 Williams attacks the search in broad terms. He is not specific whether he challenges a warrantless search of the trunk, or of his luggage. 6 Williams filed a motion to suppress the cocaine found in his luggage, as well as a motion to compel the testimony of Davis at a suppression hearing on his motion, set for September 10, 1987. In preparation for the suppression hearing, Williams had Davis served with a subpoena on November 6, 1987, which the government moved to quash on November 23, 1987. On January 4, 1988, the magistrate recommended that the subpoena be quashed. Clara Davis did not testify before trial. 7 29 Williams appeals both the district court's grant of the government's motion to quash, and its denial of his motion to suppress. Concerning the motion to quash, Williams argues that his sixth amendment right to compulsory process was violated when Davis was not compelled to testify prior to trial. In granting the motion to quash, the district court found that Williams had not shown that the testimony of Davis would be both material and favorable to his motion. We agree with the district court that Williams has no absolute right to production of a witness, and that his sixth amendment right to compulsory process is denied only upon a showing that the testimony of the witness sought would be both material and favorable. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). See also United States v. Capozzi, 883 F.2d 608, 614-15 (8th Cir.1989); Perry v. Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1386-87 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 378, 107 L.Ed.2d 363 (1989); Wright v. Lockhart, 854 F.2d 309, 312 (8th Cir.1988); United States v. Rubin, 836 F.2d 1096, 1101 (8th Cir.1988). Williams produced no more than an assertion by counsel that the testimony of Davis would be favorable to his motion, 8 and thus failed to meet his burden. Indeed, Davis' testimony at trial did not support Williams' claim that his luggage was searched at the hotel. Beyond indicating that she heard the car alarm sounding when she was arrested, Davis could say nothing about what the agents did. In fact, Davis testified that from where she was arrested, she could not even see the car. Trial Transcript, vol. 8, at 55. Thus, we find no abuse of discretion in granting the government's motion to quash. See United States v. Bass, 472 F.2d 207, 211 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 928, 93 S.Ct. 2751, 37 L.Ed.2d 155 (1973). 30 Williams is left arguing that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 9 We note initially that while Williams may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his luggage, 10 he has no such legitimate expectation of privacy in the trunk of the Mercedes-Benz, which belonged to Davis. 31 Williams bears the burden of proving a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-05, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561-62, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424 n. 1, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). See also United States v. Fahnbulleh, 748 F.2d 473, 477 (8th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1139, 105 S.Ct. 2685, 86 L.Ed.2d 702 (1985). With regard to the Mercedes-Benz, Williams has simply not met this burden. In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that because fourth amendment rights are personal and cannot be vicariously asserted, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34, 99 S.Ct. at 425-26, a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in an automobile belonging to another. Like the trunk of an automobile, these are areas in which a passenger qua passenger simply would not normally have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. at 148-49, 99 S.Ct. at 433. Thus, in Fahnbulleh, we held that where defendants had no possessory interest in the vehicle searched, they had no legitimate expectation of privacy therein. Fahnbulleh, 748 F.2d at 477. Furthermore, we have held that to have a legitimate expectation of privacy by way of a possessory interest, defendant must have possession of the vehicle and the keys. United States v. Rose, 731 F.2d 1337, 1343 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 931, 105 S.Ct. 326, 83 L.Ed.2d 263 (1984); United States v. Williams, 714 F.2d 777, 779 n. 1 (8th Cir.1983). 32 Williams was presented with numerous opportunities to establish that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Mercedes-Benz. He has failed to do so. Whether Williams had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the trunk was first raised by the government at a hearing on its motion to quash the subpoena obtained by Williams for Davis. The government noted that since Williams did not own the Mercedes-Benz from which his luggage had been seized, and did not claim ownership, he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in it. Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Quash, December 4, 1987, at 6. Williams responded merely that his expectation of privacy was based on his luggage being in the trunk. Id. at 10. 11 Given a clear lack of evidence that Williams had any interest in the Mercedes-Benz, his fourth amendment argument based on any warrantless opening of the trunk must fail. 33 As to the search of his own luggage, 12 Williams presented almost no evidence to the district court in support of his assertion that the luggage was opened prior to a warrant being obtained on March 25, 1987. The record does not indicate that he presented evidence at the suppression hearing, nor did Williams testify at trial. The only evidence offered by Williams to support the merits of his fourth amendment challenge came during trial, when counsel presented the district court, out of the presence of the jury, with an offer of proof on the motion to suppress. Counsel offered a handwritten affidavit, signed by Williams, that when he was arrested at the Northwest Inn, Williams saw the trunk of the Mercedes-Benz open, and that he saw the suitcase in an opened condition. Affidavit of September 26, 1988. Counsel stated: [T]hat completes by way of offer of proof the testimony that we would have in support of the motion to suppress. Trial Transcript, vol. 12, at 101. Given the absence of any other proof by Williams in support of his motion to suppress, we find that the district court's factual determination was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Munoz, 894 F.2d 292, 296 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 1990 WL 44095, --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1990); Laing v. United States, 891 F.2d 683, 685 (8th Cir.1989).