Opinion ID: 770166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application of Section 212(c) to Plea Bargains

Text: 13 Because [e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly, there is a presumption against retroactive application of new laws absent a clear congressional intent that the law should be applied to past conduct. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265; see also LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041; Reyes-Hernandez, 89 F.3d at 492. A statute has a retroactive effect where it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. To determine whether a statute should be applied retroactively, we look first to the statute's language and context to determine whether Congress has prescribed the statute's temporal scope. Where Congress has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits, we will not ordinarily disturb the conclusion it has reached. Id. at 272-73; see Deck v. Peter Romein's Sons, Inc., 109 F.3d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that even where Congress has clearly expressed its intent that a statute apply retroactively, the statute must still satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause). However, when congressional intent is unclear, we consider whether the statute attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 269-70. If we determine that the statute prescribes new consequences, we will not apply the statute retroactively. See id. Mere procedural changes that effect only secondary rather than primary conduct are generally considered not to have retroactive effect. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275; Reyes-Hernandez, 89 F.3d at 492. However, when a procedural change does disturb reasonable expectations, the presumption against retroactive application of the new procedures applies. See LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041; see also Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 559-60 (1884) (declining to give retroactive effect to a new immigration procedure requiring certification before a Chinese alien who had left the country could return where the petitioner had left the country before the passage of the act). 14 Since AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996, there has been considerable debate concerning the retroactive application of its provisions. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997); LaGuerre, 164 F.3d 1035; Henderson v. INS, 157 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1998); Scheidemann v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517 (3d Cir. 1996); Campos v. INS, 16 F.3d 118 (6th Cir. 1994). Some sections of AEDPA contain explicit statements that they are to apply either prospectively, see, e.g., sec.sec. 421(b), 435(b), 440(f), or retroactively, see sec.sec. 401(f), 413(g). However, sec. 440(d) contains no such explicit language. In LaGuerre, we concluded that Congress's intent with regard to the retroactive application of this section is ambiguous. 164 F.3d at 1040-41; see also Turkhan, 188 F.3d at 825-26. As a result, we have found that AEDPA sec. 440(d) could operate in either fashion depending on the particular circumstances of the case. Turkhan, 188 F.3d at 826. Therefore, we examine the specific circumstances in which the section is being applied to determine whether, in that instance, the section attaches new legal consequences to past conduct. 15 In Reyes-Hernandez, we concluded that sec. 440(d) would have a retroactive effect if it were used to bar eligibility for discretionary relief to aliens who had a colorable defense to deportation but who conceded deportability in reliance on the possibility of receiving sec. 212(c) discretionary relief. 89 F.3d at 492-93. Absent express language calling for retroactive application, we declined to ascribe the ignoble intention to Congress of mousetrapping aliens into conceding deportability in reliance on being eligible for a discretionary waiver and then removing this type of relief after the concession had been made. Id. Thus, we held that sec. 440(d) did not apply retroactively in this situation. Id. We reached a similar conclusion in Burris v. Parke, where we held that application of AEDPA's rule precluding successive habeas petitions did not apply retroactively because it would attach new legal consequences to the filing of two separate petitions, thereby mousetrapping a defendant who had relied on the less stringent abuse of the writ standard when making his deliberate strategic decision to file two habeas petitions rather than one. 95 F.3d 465, 468-69 (7th Cir. 1996). However, in LaGuerre, we concluded that sec. 440(d) does apply retroactively to aliens convicted of crimes that were committed before AEDPA's date of enactment. 164 F.3d at 1041. We based this conclusion on the rationale that [i]t would border on the absurd to argue that these aliens might have decided not to commit drug crimes had they known they would become ineligible to receive discretionary relief from deportation. Id. Therefore, we determined that removing eligibility for discretionary relief in this circumstance would not attach a new legal consequence to the decision to engage in past conduct. 16 In this case, there is evidence that Jideonwo reached a plea agreement with the government at least in part relying on the availability of relief from deportation under sec. 212(c). The length of Jideonwo's sentence--four years and eleven months--is virtually the longest sentence he could have received while retaining his eligibility for a discretionary waiver. In addition, this sentence is a considerable downward departure from the typical sentencing range for the crime to which Jideonwo pled guilty. Furthermore, there were lengthy negotiations between Jideonwo and the government and the IJ found that the whole point of the plea negotiations in [Jideonwo's] criminal case [was] that he got less than five years to avoid what would have been a statutory bar on 212(c) relief. See Admin. Rec. (Matter of Jideonwo No. Ahv-wkx-cxx) at 61. Jideonwo argues that since he relied on the availability of sec. 212(c) relief in making his decision to plead guilty, AEDPA's sec. 440(d) should not be applied retroactively to him because it would alter the legal consequences of his plea. Three of our sister circuits agree with this position, see Mattis v. Reno, 212 F.3d 31, 38-40 (1st Cir. 2000); Tasios v. Reno, 204 F.3d 544, 549 (4th Cir. 2000); Magana-Pizano v. INS, 200 F.3d 603, 613 (9th Cir. 1999), 6 and we now consider its merits. 17 A guilty plea involves the waiver of several substantial constitutional rights. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (noting that when a defendant pleads guilty he waives rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); United States v. Fernandez, 205 F.3d 1020, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). As a result, courts must use the utmost solicitude to ensure that the accused has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44. A statute enacted after a plea bargain has been reached that changes the consequences of that bargain may have an impermissible retroactive effect if it attaches new legal consequences to the accused's decision to plead guilty. Cf. Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 440 (1997) (In both the civil and criminal context, the Constitution places limits on the sovereign's ability to use its lawmaking power to modify bargains it has made with its subjects.). 18 The decision to plead guilty may involve considerations other than the accused's consciousness of guilt for the crime charged. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33 (1970) (holding that a guilty plea is not inconsistent with a claim of innocence because reasons other than the fact that he is guilty may induce a defendant to so plead) (quotation and citations omitted); see also Politte v. United States, 852 F.2d 924, 930-31 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that a calculated plea bargain that includes a benefit for a third party is voluntary and constitutional). While we have previously stated that a person's decision to commit a crime is unlikely to be influenced by the consequences of his criminal act on the availability of a discretionary waiver of deportation, see LaGuerre, 164 F.3d at 1041, decisions made during the plea bargaining process may be affected by the immigration consequences of the plea, see Magana-Pizano, 200 F.3d at 612 (That an alien charged with a crime involving controlled substances would factor the immigration consequences of conviction in deciding whether to plead or proceed to trial is well-documented.). In recognition of this fact, many states have found that it is a breach of professional responsibility for a defense attorney to fail to discuss the immigration consequences of a plea agreement with a criminal defendant. See, e.g., Williams v. Indiana, 641 N.E.2d 44, 48-49 (Ind.App. 1994); People v. Mehmedoski, 565 N.E.2d 735, 738 (Ill. App. 1990); see also Wis. Stat. 971.08(1)(c) (requiring that state trial courts inform criminal defendants of the federal immigration consequences of a guilty plea). Furthermore, while sec. 212(c) relief is discretionary, waivers of deportation are granted with sufficient frequency that it would not border on the absurd for an alien accused of a crime that carries a lengthy sentence to enter into a plea agreement that would preserve his eligibility for this form of relief. See Tasios, 204 F.3d at 551 (noting that in the years preceding the enactment of AEDPA, immigration judges and the BIA granted over half of the sec. 212(c) applications they considered); Reyes- Hernandez, 89 F.3d at 492 (noting that this Court has on a nontrivial number of occasions vacated the Board's denial of section 212(c) relief and remanded for further proceedings). Thus, the mousetrapping concerns we expressed in Reyes- Hernandez are also present in a situation where a defendant pleads guilty in reliance on retaining sec. 212(c) eligibility. As in that case, we will not ascribe to Congress the ignoble intention of changing the immigration consequences of a plea bargain after an agreement has been reached absent evidence that Congress intended that its statute be applied retroactively. 7 We, therefore, conclude that where specific facts demonstrate that an alien pled guilty to an aggravated felony before the enactment of AEDPA and relied, at least in part, on the availability of sec. 212(c) relief in making his decision to so plead, AEDPA's sec. 440(d) cannot be applied retroactively to bar that alien from receiving a discretionary waiver under INA sec. 212(c). 8 19 In this case, there is significant evidence that the availability of a sec. 212(c) waiver influenced Jideonwo's decision to plead guilty and provide a substantial amount of assistance to the government in order to receive a sentence that would preserve his eligibility for that relief. We conclude that the BIA and the IJ erred in finding that Jideonwo was ineligible to receive a sec. 212(c) waiver and remand this case to the IJ to determine in the first instance whether such a wavier should be granted.