Opinion ID: 757051
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Diane Schwartz George

Text: 114 Hall claims that Diane Schwartz George should have been struck for cause because (1) she stated in her juror questionnaire that she supported the death penalty because she believed it saved taxpayer money and that, as a taxpayer, she did not appreciate paying the[ ] 'bills'  of certain criminals; (2) during voir dire, she stated that the fact that a defendant had an abusive childhood was not something that would have much bearing on her sentencing recommendation; and (3) when asked whether she could impose a life sentence if the government proved all of the aggravating factors as to which it gave Hall notice and the defendant established no mitigating factors, she responded that, [w]ithout thinking about that more, I think I would have to say no, thereby saddling Hall with the burden of proving through mitigating factors that a sentence of death was inappropriate. We disagree. 115 First, while George indicated that, as a general matter, she favored the existence of the death penalty in part because of financial considerations, she also expressly stated that she would be able to base her decision on whether or not to impose the death penalty in this case solely upon the evidence presented during the trial. The district court could thus properly conclude that George was capable of set[ting] aside [her] own predilections in deference to the rule of law. Flores, 63 F.3d at 1356. 116 Second, George indicated that she could consider evidence of an abusive childhood as a mitigating factor but that such evidence might not weigh strongly in her determination of whether the death penalty constituted an appropriate penalty in a particular case. Further, she indicated that the degree of mitigation that such evidence would warrant depends upon the strength of the evidence of abuse. The Constitution does not require that a juror be willing to give a mitigating factor any particular amount of weight; it only requires that the juror manifest an ability to consider such factors in determining whether death is an appropriate punishment. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114-15, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982) (The sentencer ... may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But [it] may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from [its] consideration.); Cordova v. Collins, 953 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir.1992) (holding that the defendant could not make an arguable constitutional claim based upon the trial court's failure to strike for cause a venireperson who stated in voir dire that he would consider evidence of intoxication as a mitigating circumstance, but did not believe that that factor was entitled to receive much weight). 117 Third, George's statement that, without thinking about it more, she believed that, in the absence of mitigating factors, she could not consider life imprisonment as an option if the government proved an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt might, considered in a vacuum, indicate bias. However, George previously stated in response to a question by the government that, even in the absence of mitigating factors, she could consider the possibility of life imprisonment. Additionally, she expressly stated that she could follow the district court's instructions. Moreover, the answer was given in response to a rather complex question by defense counsel. Having heard and viewed the entire voir dire firsthand, the district court concluded, based on the whole record, that [George] will consider all of the things she's supposed to consider, including if there's only aggravating factors presented, whether those aggravating factors should be enough for a vote for death or whether they are insufficient for death. On the basis of a cold appellate record, we cannot say that this determination constituted an abuse of discretion. 118