Opinion ID: 2060561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Cross-examination at preliminary.

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court's restriction of his cross-examination of the victim's wife at the preliminary examination was erroneous and violated his right to confrontation. At the preliminary, Mrs. Kennedy identified Wilson as the man who shot her husband. On cross-examination, she was asked whether she described the man who shot her husband to the police. After having answered in the affirmative, she was asked by defense counsel whether she recalled how she described the person she believed shot her husband. The district attorney objected on the ground that this amounted to discovery. The objection was sustained, the court stating that counsel could go into the issue of veracity at the time of trial. The court also sustained objections to questions involving a lineup identification. The state contends that under State v. Knudson [39] questions propounded by defense counsel amounted to discovery and thus were properly excluded. In Knudson, at the preliminary examination, the victim of the crime identified the defendant and described the incident. After the state rested, the defense called the victim, presumably adversely. The defense then attempted to call the victim's mother and the chief of police, `... to delve further into exactly what ... [the victim] understood about the incident and as to statements she made at that time as to what [the defendant] said....' [40] Defense counsel was trying to get contradictory evidence from both the victim's mother and the police chief. On objection by the state, the magistrate refused to allow the defense to call these two witnesses. On appeal, this court upheld the ruling of the magistrate on the ground that there was no unrestricted right to call witnesses and the defense was improperly using the preliminary for discovery, citing State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim [41] (which involved a challenge to the sufficiency of a complaint) for the proposition that the: `... [I]ssue as to credence or credibility is for the trial. The hearing as to probable cause before the magistrate is not a preliminary trial. It is not the proper forum to debate and determine issues as to credibility and weight of evidence once essential facts as to probability have been established.' [42] In Knudson the court noted that the defense was attempting to expose inconsistencies in the accounts given by the victim to various people, thereby affecting the victim's credibility. Since the defense was able to do this on its adverse examination of the victim, the court found the defendant not to be prejudiced by being prevented from calling additional witnesses who would possibly shake the victim's credibility. Knudson stands for the proposition that there is no unrestricted right to call other witnesses for the purpose of destroying the credibility of the state's witnesses and fishing for elements of the state's case. In the later case of State ex rel. Hanna v. Blessinger [43] the issue before the court was whether there was sufficient credible evidence to bind the defendant over for trial. Only one witness (the victim of the battery) testified. His testimony was to the effect that Hanna had struck him, although the witness had not seen him deliver the actual blow as he (the victim) was facing the other direction. Hanna claimed this testimony was conclusory in nature and not credible. Citing State ex rel. Tessler v. Kubiak, [44] this court stated that the examining magistrate has the duty of determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. [45] The Tessler case involved conflicting testimony by police officers and by the appellant. The examining magistrate chose to believe the police officers. Upholding this decision, the court stated: ... The examining magistrate had the duty of determining the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the testimony. He elected to believe the police officers and we cannot disturb his finding. [46] Earlier in Stathopoulos v. Hanley, [47] the court held that it was within the province of the examining magistrate to consider the credibility, weight, and effect of the testimony of the state's witness to be such as to render the charge against the petitioner within reasonable probabilities. Hanna, Tessler and Stathopoulos indicate that the magistrate must determine credibility of witnesses if he is to determine that there is credible evidence to support a finding of probable cause. But the determination is merely one of plausibility of the story and not general trustworthiness of the witness. The central approach to the role of the magistrate in determining credibility of witnesses is one of degree. In Knudson, the defendant was able to attack the credibility of the state's witness through what amounted to a cross-examination of her, but was not allowed to call in other witnesses to show variances in her story. There is a point where attacks on credibility become discovery. That point is crossed when one delves into general trustworthiness of the witness, as opposed to plausibility of the story. Because all that need be established for a bindover is probable cause, all that is needed is a believable account of the defendant's commission of a felony. Applying this standard to the cause now before this court, defense counsel should have been allowed to crossexamine the state's witness on her prior description of the man who shot her husband. This is because the question propounded did not merely go to the witness' general trustworthiness, but also to the plausibility of her description of the defendant, upon which the finding of probable cause rested. In the instant case, however, the error was harmless, since defense counsel at trial took the strategy of, in effect, admitting that the defendant committed the crime, but arguing that it was third- and not first-degree murder.