Opinion ID: 201339
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Additional Expert Witness

Text: 9 Appellant claims that the district court abused its discretion in denying her motion to allow late designation of an additional expert witness. Three months after the deadline for disclosure of new experts, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(C), 5 appellant had sought to add the testimony of Dr. Darrell Smith, an expert radiologist, to counter the testimony of the government's expert pathologist, Dr. James Connolly. The court, after conducting a hearing on appellant's motion, ruled that she had failed to meet her burden of showing substantial justification for her tardiness. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). The court, however, did allow appellant to supplement the testimony of her previously designated expert, Dr. Mary Jane Houlihan, to rebut Connolly's testimony. 10 Appellant complains that the court failed to consider all of the relevant factors in reaching its decision, including that the government would have suffered no prejudice from the late submission while the harm to her from exclusion was substantial. She further argues that the court's decision is due limited deference because excluding it was tantamount to dismissal of her case, and such a drastic sanction[ ] should be imposed only in limited circumstances, Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 352 (9th Cir.1995). 11 We decline to second-guess the district court in this instance. The adoption of Rule 37(c)(1) in 1993 gave teeth to a significantly broadened duty to comply with case management orders, Wilson v. Bradlees of New England, Inc., 250 F.3d 10, 19 (1st Cir.2001), and mandatory preclusion [is] `the required sanction in the ordinary case,' id. (quoting Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d 255, 269 (1st Cir.1998)). 6 Although preclusion of expert testimony is a grave step, not to be undertaken lightly, Thibeault v. Square D Co., 960 F.2d 239, 247 (1st Cir.1992), the court here acted with due deliberation. 12 The court noted that plaintiff had been granted multiple extensions to complete her discovery and expert designations. 7 Ultimately, the United States disclosed its expert reports on January 12, 2001, obliging appellant to respond by February 12. No response was forthcoming. The government filed a motion for summary judgment at the end of March. Although appellant sought and obtained extensions to respond to that motion, none of the requests stated a need to obtain additional expert testimony. 8 Not until she filed her opposition to the motion for summary judgment, on May 21, did she move to designate an additional expert witness. 13 The lack of urgency in the request was further reflected at the hearing on the motion to designate a new expert, where appellant's counsel told the court that appellant's previously named expert, Dr. Houlihan, was comfortable with rebutting Dr. Connolly herself. Counsel stated that strategically it would be better to have an extra person there and available, but also said that we have every reason to believe [Dr. Houlihan] can effectively professionally counter Dr. Connolly. In a related ruling, the court in fact assisted appellant in that effort. Describing as close the question whether to grant appellant's belated request to supplement Dr. Houlihan's testimony, the court allowed the submission so that appellant could more fully respond to the government's experts. 9 14 The court, moreover, considered, but was unimpressed with, appellant's explanations for her tardiness. Counsel attributes the delay to multiple factors: difficulties in securing an available expert; the unexpected weight given to Dr. Connolly's testimony in the government's motion for summary judgment; and the discovery after the deadlines of Dr. Smith's availability. 10 But in light of appellant's representation to the court that, in effect, Dr. Smith's testimony would be cumulative of Dr. Houlihan's, none of these bespeaks an abuse of discretion on the part of the district court. Difficulties in securing witnesses are presumably a standard problem; appellant may have been surprised by the government's use of Dr. Connolly's testimony, but it had been available to her; and late discovery of a new potential witness cannot on its own require the court to disregard its previously set timetable. Deadlines would have no meaning if such rationales were sufficient to support reversing a trial court's judgment as an abuse of discretion. 15 The district court also was concerned that the United States had prepared a summary judgment motion in reliance on appellant's earlier disclosure of her expert evidence. Whether or not appellant is correct that the case management rules and Rule 37(c)(1)'s sanctions were not aimed at this sort of pre-trial prejudice, we cannot fault the court for considering the time and expense involved in the government's having prepared a dispositive motion. To be sure, evidentiary changes on the eve of trial are much more problematic and disruptive of trial preparation. See, e.g., Laplace-Bayard v. Batlle, 295 F.3d 157, 162 (1st Cir.2002) (upholding exclusion where plaintiffs disclosed new expert witness barely a week before trial); Thibeault, 960 F.2d at 246-47 (Many courts — this court included — have recognized the introduction of new expert testimony on the eve of trial can be seriously prejudicial to the opposing party.). But contrary to appellant's contention, what occurred here was not simply a matter of inconvenience or timing; real resources were expended on legal work that was premised on the expert evidence submitted before the deadline. That work was relevant not only for the summary judgment motion, but for trial preparation as well. 16 Given these circumstances, and particularly counsel's verbal assurance that, in effect, appellant's case would not be significantly compromised by exclusion of the additional witness, we cannot view the court's decision as so wide of the mark as to constitute an abuse of discretion, Macaulay v. Anas, 321 F.3d 45, 51 (1st Cir.2003). That it acted within reasonable bounds is also reflected in the court's willingness to allow belated supplementation of Dr. Houlihan's testimony to meet appellant's need. We therefore affirm the court's decision to exclude Dr. Smith's testimony from the trial.