Opinion ID: 2977851
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Michigan Antitrust Claims

Text: Although plaintiff has argued its antitrust claims together, the district court recognized that the complaint asserted separate claims under the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act (MARA), MCLA §§ 445.772 and 445.773, which are modeled after § 1 (restraint of trade) and § 2 (monopoly) provisions of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2, respectively. As the district court concluded, plaintiff’s MARA “restraint of trade” claims under § 445.772 fail for the same reasons that the “restraint of trade” claims fail under § 1 of the Sherman Act. See MCLA § 445.784(2) (“courts shall give due deference to interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable antitrust statutes, including, without limitation, the doctrine of per se violations and the rule of reason”). Section 445.773 makes unlawful “[t]he establishment, maintenance, or use of a monopoly, or any attempt to establish a monopoly, of trade or commerce in a relevant market by any person, for the purpose of excluding or limiting competition or controlling, fixing, or No. 08-1590 13 maintaining prices.” Monopolization has two elements: the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market, and the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). For a claim of attempted monopolization, which plaintiff seems to be asserting here, plaintiff must prove (1) specific intent to monopolize, (2) anticompetitive conduct, and (3) a dangerous probability of success in achieving monopoly power. Tarrant Serv. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 12 F.3d 609, 615 (6th Cir. 1993). Market strength that approaches monopoly power (the ability to control prices and exclude competition) is a necessary element for showing a dangerous probability of achieving monopoly power. Id. The district court found that this claim failed as a matter of law because there was no evidence of intent, no evidence of anticompetitive conduct, and no showing that defendant had a dangerous probability of monopolization.3 On appeal, plaintiff argues that ExxonMobil monopolized the relevant market, the “stretch of Fenkell Road served by plaintiff’s franchise,” through the agreements that required plaintiff to buy a minimum quantity of branded gasoline from a single distributor. Relevant markets are generally not limited to a single manufacturer’s products, but are composed of products that have reasonable interchangeability—i.e., gasoline rather than ExxonMobil-branded gasoline. See Brighton Optical, Inc. v. Vision Serv. Plan, 422 F. Supp. 2d 792, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2006). If this were not the case, virtually every exclusive distributor relationship would be illegal. See Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 3 Bazzy testified that he did not know defendants’ intent behind the rebranding, except that it was done as a favor to Michigan Fuels, which, in turn, wanted to get back at plaintiff for selecting McPherson Oil as its distributor. No. 08-1590 14 430 (3d Cir. 1997). Further, plaintiff offered no evidence that ExxonMobil had the power to exclude competition from the market for gasoline. We affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants on this claim.