Opinion ID: 1103334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: introduction of romines' statements made at the hospital

Text: A trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Alston v. State, 723 So.2d 148, 156 (Fla. 1998); see also Kearse v. State, 662 So.2d 677, 684 (Fla.1995); Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520, 523 (Fla.1984). In the instant case, the trial court ruled that Romines' statements made on the side of the road to the individuals who came to her aid were admissible as excited utterances, and Romines' statements made at the hospital were admissible for impeachment purposes. Fitzpatrick asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing into evidence Romines' hearsay statements made at the hospital. The initial question is whether the proposed testimony constitutes hearsay at all. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. § 90.801(1)(c), Fla. Stat. (2001). Romines' statements made at the hospital are not hearsay because the statements were offered in evidence not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but merely for impeachment purposes to demonstrate inconsistency with Romines' statements made at the crime scene. See Ellis v. State, 622 So.2d 991, 996 n. 3 (Fla.1993) (Impeachment's object is to attack the credibility of the witness.... [T]the evidence so introduced is not being admitted `to prove the truth of the matter asserted' but rather to show why the witness is not trustworthy.). Therefore, the hearsay rule does not preclude admission of the statements under review. Further, the trial court properly admitted the statements for impeachment purposes pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), which provides: When a hearsay statement has been admitted in evidence, credibility of the declarant may be attacked and, if attacked, may be supported by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. Evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. (Emphasis added.) In this action, the trial court admitted into evidence Romines' hearsay statements made when she was found on the side of the road, that Steve was her assailant, as excited utterances. Romines' statements made at the hospital, nodding that Steve was not her assailant, was evidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant ... inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement, which pursuant to section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2001), is admissible, regardless of whether or not the declarant has been afforded an opportunity to deny or explain it. Therefore, it is irrelevant that Romines, the declarant, who was dead at the time of trial, was not afforded the opportunity to deny or explain the inconsistency. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony with regard to Romines' statements made to the police at the hospital for the limited purpose of impeachment. [7]