Opinion ID: 1454560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Amnesia

Text: Owens and the State both moved for a determination of his competency to stand trial. The trial court ordered that Owens be examined by the Wyandot Mental Health Center (Health Center). The Health Center filed its report with the trial court. The report included the following:  Clinical Interview In reference to the date and time of the alleged act, [Owens] reported he had consumed a substance (`PCP'), assumedly Phencyclidine. He stated that due to the intoxicating effect of the substance that he had no recollection of that particular evening. . . .  Competency to Stand Trial Examination The client was oriented to time, place, person and situation. He stated he had an attorney but saw little sense in working with him so as to provide the best possible defense, because he feels he will be found guilty regardless of defense counsel's efforts. His comprehension and knowledge of courtroom procedures and terminology was basic, yet sufficient. He has the ability, if he so desires, to work with his attorney to provide the best possible defense. He is cognizant of the charges against him and to the gravity of the situation. He comprehends right from wrong action and understands the concepts of guilt and innocence.  Mental Status Examination . . . Remote and recent memory functions were intact except for his report of memory loss at the time of the alleged crime. (Emphasis added.) The report concluded:  Summary A twenty year old Caucasian male was evaluated to assess his competency to stand trial. The Clinical Interview found him to be negative, focused and direct. The Competency to Stand Trial Examination proved him to be fully oriented, able to work with his attorney to provide the best possible defense and aware of courtroom procedures and terminology. The Mental Status Examination reveals an individual with memory functions intact, not depressed and not psychotic. In consideration of the results of this evaluation, Archie E. Owens, Jr. is found competent to stand trial. (Emphasis added.) Owens moved for a further determination of competency and for funds for psychiatric services. In this motion, Owens stated that he was suffering from amnesia, either hysterical, drug induced, or feigned and that he could not remember the events at the time of the crime. During the hearing on the motion, Owens' counsel stated that a psychiatrist, Dr. Claude Werth, and a sociologist had examined Owens. Owens requested funds for additional tests, stating that Dr. Werth advised taking the additional tests. It was claimed that these tests could possibly retrieve Owens' memory or eliminate the possibility of feigned amnesia. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the Health Center had found Owens competent. The Health Center report was the only evidence before the trial court. In response to Owens' motion, the trial court appointed two psychiatrists as a commission to evaluate Owens' competency and to report to the court. The doctors took an oath to examine Owens and determine whether he is, at this time, able to comprehend his position and make his defense to the charges. Both doctors found Owens competent to stand trial. Following this second determination of competency, Owens filed a motion for a jury of six persons to assist in the determination and for psychiatric treatment to restore his memory. Owens presented an affidavit from Dr. Werth which stated that Owens claimed to be under the influence of marijuana and PCP the morning of the crime. Owens claimed to have a memory gap between the time of the sexual encounter with Bierman and his waking up the next morning. Dr. Werth concluded the memory gap made it virtually impossible for Owens to aid in his defense, consequently, making him incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Werth recommended that Owens be admitted to Larned State Hospital where a number of diagnostic methods can be employed which may aid in the retrieval of suppressed or repressed memory processes. (Emphasis added.) After taking note of the court-appointed psychiatrists' reports, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court found Owens competent to stand trial. The first day of trial, Owens filed and argued a motion to dismiss. In the written motion Owens stated: Defendant further contends that he is and has been competent to stand trial, and that the failure to be brought to trial, and the delay in doing so, is not the result or fault of the Defendant. (Emphasis added.) The trial court denied the motion. Owens filed a motion for a new trial, again raising the issue of Owens' competency. The trial court overruled the motion. Owens argues that his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were violated because his amnesia rendered him incompetent to stand trial. Owens claims that because the trial court (1) failed to make a finding whether Owens had amnesia and (2) used an incorrect standard to determine competency, the case should be remanded for further findings or the conviction should be reversed because Owens was incompetent to stand trial. Owens relies on Wilson v. United States, 391 F.2d 460 (D.C.Cir.1968), and State v. Blake, 209 Kan. 196, 495 P.2d 905 (1972). A significant factual distinction exists between Wilson and the instant case. In Wilson, the State conceded that Wilson suffered permanent retrograde amnesia resulting from a head injury. Here the State claims Owens' alleged amnesia is a sham. Because Wilson had a rational understanding of the charges against him and suffered no mental disorder aside from the amnesia, the trial court found him competent to stand trial. On appeal, Judge Skelly Wright, speaking for a divided court, rejected the view that amnesia renders a defendant incompetent per se to stand trial. Judge Wright adopted a case-by-case approach, stating: [T]he question must come down to whether, `in light of the personal intellectual or emotional deficiencies of the accused [defendant] can perform the functions essential to the fairness and accuracy of the particular proceedings in which he is presently involved.' 391 F.2d at 463. The test of competency must be whether the defendant has sufficient `present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' 391 F.2d at 463 (quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 [1960]). Wilson lists six factors to aid the trial court in making findings concerning the effect of amnesia on the trial fairness issue. These factors are: (1) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to consult with and assist his lawyer. (2) The extent to which the amnesia affected the defendant's ability to testify in his own behalf. (3) The extent to which the evidence in suit could be extrinsically reconstructed in view of the defendant's amnesia. Such evidence would include evidence relating to the crime itself as well as any reasonably possible alibi. (4) The extent to which the Government assisted the defendant and his counsel in that reconstruction. (5) The strength of the prosecution's case. Most important here will be whether the Government's case is such as to negate all reasonable hypotheses of innocence. If there is any substantial possibility that the accused could, but for his amnesia, establish an alibi or other defense, it should be presumed that he would have been able to do so. (6) Any other facts and circumstances which would indicate whether or not the defendant had a fair trial. 391 F.2d at 463-64. Wilson's case was remanded for the trial court to make these findings. Owens contends that we adopted in Blake, 209 Kan. 196, 495 P.2d 905, the Wilson approach requiring post-trial findings and consideration of the six factors. Owens' contention is not correct. Again we note a factual distinction between Blake and Owens' case. In Blake the State made no contention that Blake's amnesia was a sham. The evidence was unrefuted that Blake suffered from hysterical amnesia resulting in his inability to remember any of the critical events at the time of the murder of his small daughter. 209 Kan. at 198, 495 P.2d 905. In Blake, the court stated: We are persuaded that a case by case evaluation of the fair-trial effect of amnesia, adopted explicitly by the majority in Wilson and implicity by this court in [ State v. ] Severns [184 Kan. 213, 336 P.2d 447 (1959)], is the sounder rule; we again reject the per se approach. 209 Kan. at 200, 495 P.2d 905. Although we reversed Blake on other grounds, we found that, under the circumstances of the case, Blake's amnesia did not prevent him from making a rational defense. We did not remand for findings nor did we discuss the six Wilson factors. In Blake, we adopted the fair-trial effect of amnesia case-by-case approach rather than the per se approach. Blake does not mandate, for every alleged amnesia case, the post-trial findings discussed in Wilson. In Blake, we held that the trial court's implied finding that Blake was competent to stand trial was supported by the evidence. 209 Kan. at 201, 495 P.2d 905. Amnesia alone should not supply the basis for declaring a defendant incompetent to stand trial. Amnesia is a factor to be considered in determining whether the defendant is able to meet the test of competency to stand trial and to obtain a fair trial. State v. Gilder, 223 Kan. 220, Syl. ¶ 3, 574 P.2d 196 (1977). See Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 544. The danger of false claims is great. Fajeriak v. State, 520 P.2d 795, 802 (Alaska 1974). Amnesia can easily be feigned. State v. McClendon, 103 Ariz. 105, 108, 437 P.2d 421 (1968). The State argues that Owens' amnesia is a sham. The State contends that the trial court properly found Owens competent based on the report from the Health Center and the report of the two psychiatrists appointed as a commission to determine competency. The State relies on the statement Owens made to the Health Center doctors: [Owens] stated he had an attorney but saw little sense in working with him so as to provide the best possible defense, because he feels he will be found guilty regardless of defense counsel's efforts. The State also relies on the presentence investigation report. Portions of the report were referred to by Owens' counsel as well as the State during argument on post-trial motions. Owens told the court services officer his version of the events on the night of the crime. There was no mention of amnesia. He stated that Hernandez and Bierman dropped him off at the Woodlands Race Track while they went elsewhere to engage in sexual relations. They returned later with the stolen property. Owens explained that he did not testify at trial because he decided it would be difficult to get a jury to believe his story. K.S.A. 22-3301(1) states the standard for determining competency to stand trial: [A] person is `incompetent to stand trial' when he is charged with a crime and, because of mental illness or defect is unable: (a) To understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; or (b) to make or assist in making his defense. K.S.A. 22-3302 provides the procedure the trial court should follow in determining competency. The determination of competency is made by the trial court after conducting a hearing. K.S.A. 22-3302(1), (3). The statute does not require an adversarial hearing at which the accused may cross-examine the court-appointed physicians. State v. Costa, 228 Kan. 308, 317, 613 P.2d 1359 (1980). Absent an abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination of competency will not be reversed on appeal. 228 Kan. at 317, 613 P.2d 1359. In the case at bar, the trial court ordered Owens examined by the Health Center at the request of both Owens and the State. The report submitted to the court found Owens to be aware of the charges against him and of the gravity of the situation. His comprehension and knowledge of courtroom procedures was sufficient. The report specifically stated that he had the ability, if he desired, to work with his attorney to provide the best possible defense. The report noted Owens' claim of amnesia but found his memory functions intact. In response to Owens' request for an additional determination of competency, the trial court ordered a second competency evaluation. The two appointed psychiatrists found Owens competent to stand trial. Owens has shown no abuse of discretion. The record indicates that Owens' memory was intact at the time of his evaluation by the Health Center and after trial during the presentence investigation. In his motion to dismiss filed on the first day of trial, Owens stated that he was and had been competent to stand trial. Several witnesses testified that Owens did not consume drugs or alcohol in their presence and that he did not appear to be under the influence of drugs before or after the crimes. The State's case against Owens was overwhelming. The other two participants testified against him and detailed his involvement. Tambi Lewis, with whom he lived, testified that Owens told her about his involvement. The prosecutor had an open file policy. The evidence, which was made available to Owens prior to trial, sufficiently reconstructed the events during the period of the alleged amnesia. Under the facts of this case, Owens' alleged amnesia did not prevent him from receiving a fair trial.