Opinion ID: 8414555
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Principles Governing the Application of Miranda

Text: Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona, the prosecution is prohibited from using at trial a defendant’s statements made during a “custodial interrogation” unless “it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.” 23 There is no dispute that Agent Mancene did not advise Schaf-fer of his Miranda rights until after Schaf-fer had made his incriminating statements. Accordingly, the only relevant issue on appeal is whether Schaffer was in “custody” for purposes of Miranda when he spoke with law enforcement agents. As we have had occasion to observe, “ i[c]ustody’ for Miranda purposes is not coterminous with ... the colloquial understanding of custody.” 24 Instead, an individual is in “custody” only if two conditions are met: (1) “a reasonable person would have thought he was [not] free to leave the police encounter at issue” and (2) “a reasonable- person would have understood his freedom of action to have been curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest.” 25 While the first condition — a seizure — is necessary for concluding that a suspect was in custody, “not every seizure constitutes custody for purposes of Mir anda..” 26 Thus, the “ultimate inquiry” is whether a reasonable person would have understood the law enforcement agents’ restraint on his freedom to equal “the degree associated with a formal arrest.” 27 To determine whether a suspect’s freedom of movement was “curtailed to a degree associated with formal arrest,” courts are required to conduct an objective examination of “all the surrounding circumstances.” 28 Because our case law requires an objective inquiry, “[a]n individual’s subjective belief about his or her status generally does not bear on the custody analysis.” 29 Rather, a court should consider a variety of factors including: (1) the interrogation’s duration; (2) its location (e.g., at the suspect’s home, in public, in a police station, or at the border); (3) whether the suspect volunteered for the interview; (4) whether the officers used restraints; (5) whether weapons were present and especially whether they were drawn; and (6) whether officers told the suspect he was free to leave or under suspicion. 30 Ultimately, if a court determines that it was reasonable for the individual being interrogated to conclude that his detention was “not likely to be temporary and brief’ and to feel that he was “completely at the mercy of [the] police,” then the individual was in “custody” and Miranda’s protections apply. 31