Opinion ID: 696276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contract for Sale of Goods for $500 or More

Text: 26 Fieldcrest also argued in its motion for summary judgment that the oral agreement alleged by Floors is unenforceable under Section 2.201(a) of the Texas Business and Commerce Code, which provides that a contract for the sale of goods at a price at or over $500 is not enforceable unless it is in writing. 34 The district court did not address this argument, instead basing its summary judgment dismissal of Floors' claims on Section 26.01(b)(6) of the Texas statute of frauds. 27 As we find that Section 26.01(b)(6) does not apply to the parties' oral agreement, we turn to Fieldcrest's alternative argument for summary judgment dismissal grounded in Section 2.201(a) of the Texas statute of frauds. The parties have failed to cite any relevant Texas cases expressly addressing the issue whether Section 2.201(a) is applicable to dealership or dealership contracts, and we have been unable to locate any such cases independently. Given the apparent absence of Texas law on the subject, we decline the invitation to address the issue whether a dealership agreement such as the one in the instant case falls within the statute of frauds provision regarding contracts for the sale of goods priced at $500 or more. It would not be prudent for us to render decision on such an uncertain issue when the district court has not yet addressed it. 35 28 Although we do not express any opinion on the applicability of Section 2.201(a) to the agreement in this case, we note that if the district court on remand decides that a dealership agreement such as the one between Floors and Fieldcrest is subject to Section 2.201(a) of the Texas statute of frauds, it must then reexamine the issue whether, separately or in combination, Fieldcrest's letters to Floors constitute a writing sufficient to meet the requirements of the statute of frauds. The Uniform Commercial Code Comment accompanying Section 2.201 states that the phraseology of this section is intended to make clear that ... [t]he required writing need not contain all the material terms of the contract and such material terms as are stated need not be precisely stated. 36 The comment also provides that [a]ll that is required is that the writing afford a basis for believing that the offered oral evidence rests on a real transaction. 37 In light of this commentary interpreting the statutory language at issue, the district court on remand should closely examine Fieldcrest's various letters to Floors to determine whether, under Texas law, the correspondence meets the writing requirement of Section 2.201 of the Texas statute of frauds.