Opinion ID: 203886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence as to Defendant Santiago

Text: We review evidentiary sufficiency claims de novo. United States v. Ofray-Campos, 534 F.3d 1, 31 (1st Cir.2008). A district court's denial of a motion for acquittal must be affirmed `unless the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, could not have persuaded any trier of fact of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' Id. (quoting United States v. Paradis, 802 F.2d 553, 559 (1st Cir.1986)). We do not weigh evidence or make credibility judgments, id., and `must uphold any verdict that is supported by a plausible rendition of the record,' id. at 32 (quoting United States v. Hernández, 218 F.3d 58, 64 (1st Cir.2000)).
Here, Santiago was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a) (Count One); aiding and abetting in an attempt to possess with intent to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Nine); and aiding and abetting in carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Ten). Santiago challenges the evidence on all counts. With respect to Count One, [t]o prove conspiracy, the government must show `the existence of a conspiracy, the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy, and the defendant's voluntary participation in the conspiracy.' Hernández, 218 F.3d at 64-65 (quoting United States v. Gómez-Pabón, 911 F.2d 847, 852 (1st Cir.1990)). To establish that the defendants belonged to and participated in the drug conspiracy, the government must show two kinds of intent: `intent to agree and intent to commit the substantive offense.' Id. at 65 (quoting Gómez-Pabón, 911 F.2d at 853). With respect to Count Nine, Santiago was convicted of aiding and abetting an attempt to possess with intent to distribute narcotics. Aiding and abetting requires the government to show that a defendant `participated in the venture and sought by [his] actions to make it succeed.' Id. (quoting United States v. Guerrero, 114 F.3d 332, 341 (1st Cir.1997)). The government can satisfy this burden by showing `that the defendant consciously shared the principal's knowledge of the underlying criminal act, and intended to help the principal.' Id. (quoting United States v. Spinney, 65 F.3d 231, 235 (1st Cir.1995)). We note that [k]nowledge of the particular controlled substance being imported or distributed is not necessary, and intent to distribute can be inferred from the quantity of drugs involved. Id. (citations omitted). To prove attempt, the government must show that a defendant intended to commit the substantive offense and that he took a substantial step toward its commission. United States v. Gobbi, 471 F.3d 302, 309 (1st Cir.2006). Where, as here, the substantive offense is possession of drugs with intent to distribute possession may be either actual or constructive. Id. Actual possession is `the state of immediate, hands-on physical possession.' Id. (quoting United States v. Zavala Maldonado, 23 F.3d 4, 6 (1st Cir.1994)). On the other hand, [c]onstructive possession occurs when `a person knowingly has the power and intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through others.' Id. (quoting United States v. Ocampo-Guarin, 968 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (1st Cir. 1992)). Constructive possession of drugs may be inferred `from a defendant's dominion and control over an area where narcotics are found.' Id. (quoting United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 675, 678 (1st Cir.1993)). Lastly, with respect to the weapons charge in Count Ten, to find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the government must show that the defendant knew `to a practical certainty' that some participant in the drug-trafficking crime would be using, carrying, or possessing a firearm in furtherance thereof. [2] United States v. Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d 33, 37-38 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 50 (1st Cir.1998)). For the purposes of this count, Santiago can be found guilty even though the gun [Santiago] possessed was an inherent part of his employment as a police officer. United States v. Vázquez Guadalupe, 407 F.3d 492, 500 n. 4 (1st Cir.2005).
Santiago maintains that no rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that he must be acquitted on grounds of insufficient evidence. He argues that from the evidence presented at trial a jury could not make out a reasonable inference that he had the requisite knowledge and intent to participate in the conspiracy charged in the indictment. Specifically, Santiago points to Canino's March 31, 2005 meeting with Bristol where Canino inquired about using another police officer in order to escort a cocaine shipment. Santiago argues that at no point in this meeting is his name suggested or even mentioned. Furthermore, Santiago argues that the jury could not draw a rational inference of his guilt from the events of April 6, 2005, when Canino met with Bristol and Santiago at the parking lot of the Wyndham Hotel. Santiago states that he was not formally introduced as the alleged corrupt cop and that he was not particularized in any way. He notes that he only said what's up? and that at no point was he paying attention to the conversation between Bristol and Canino. Santiago maintains that Canino was only instructing Bristol as to how the drugs were to be transported. Santiago further asserts that there is no evidence that he was paid $4,000 for his part in the conspiracy. Finally, with respect to the weapons charge in Count Ten, Santiago maintains that since the government did not meet its burden in showing Santiago had the requisite intent for the conspiracy and aiding and abetting charges in Counts One and Nine, respectively, the government likewise did not meet its burden on the firearms count. Santiago relies on the fact that he was merely present at the scene and that he carried a gun as a police officer. The record does not support Santiago's version of events and instead shows that the government met its burden at trial. Even if we were to disregard the March 31, 2005 planning meeting between Canino and Bristol, the events of April 6, 2005 provide sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer Santiago's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, at trial Canino testified that he gave Santiago and Bristol keys to a vehicle to use for the drug operation, instructed them on what to do, and told them that they were going to receive $4,000 each when they completed the trip. Canino also testified that Bristol and Santiago drove in a separate car to pick up the drugs from Canino's associate; that they drove to meet another one of Canino's associates and dropped off the drugs in that associate's vehicle; and finally, that Canino paid Bristol and Santiago $4,000 each and proceeded to discuss participating in a larger transaction. Canino further testified that Santiago was present during all conversations, during the loading and unloading of drugs, and during the discussion of the 300 kilogram transaction. Although Santiago maintains that he was merely present at the scene, a reasonable jury could credit Canino's testimony, as well as Jamill's corroborating testimony, which showed that Santiago was actively involved in the joint action. On appeal, we do not engage in credibility determinations. See Hernández, 218 F.3d at 66 n. 5 (It is not our role to assess the credibility of trial witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence, instead we must resolve all such issues in favor of the verdict.). As detailed above, Canino's testimony implicates Santiago as an active participant in the drug operation who was rewarded for his involvement. This testimony, if believed, is sufficient to satisfy the elements of Counts One and Nine. With respect to the weapons charge in Count Ten, Santiago cannot escape conviction on this count simply because he was otherwise obligated to carry a gun as part of his job as a police officer. A jury could rationally infer that Santiago also possessed the gun to further the drug crime. For example, a jury could infer that one of the objectives of enlisting Santiago's participation in the activity ... was to prevent, by [his] presence, other drug dealers or other legitimately motivated police officers from interfering in and disrupting the transport of the drugs. United States v. Villafañe-Jiménez, 410 F.3d 74, 83 (1st Cir.2005). Furthermore, a jury could infer that the presence of the gun[ ], displayed in the open, by the Defendant[ ] as [an] active participant[ ] in the illegal activity, would have a tendency to discourage interruption of the transport by other persons. [3] Id. Thus, because a jury could infer that Santiago used his status as a police officer, which includes the fact that he carries a gun, in order to protect the drug transaction in which he engaged, Vázquez Guadalupe, 407 F.3d at 500 n. 4, we conclude that there existed an adequate nexus between [Santiago's] possession of the gun and the drug trafficking crime sufficient to support the charge. [4] Id.