Opinion ID: 1059828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: defendant's motions to suppress

Text: Swisher filed a motion to suppress a confession that he made to the deputies after he had been given his Miranda warnings, and the trial court denied the motion. On appeal, Swisher contends that his confessions were made at a time when he had not been advised of his rights to remain silent and his right to counsel and were not made within the guidelines of the standards set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We disagree with Swisher. In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that an individual must be warned before questioning by police of his right to remain silent and his right to an attorney only when that individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning.... Id. at 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The Supreme Court subsequently explained in Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977), that Miranda warnings are implicated only during a custodial interrogation: Any interview of one suspected of a crime by a police officer will have coercive aspects to it, simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. But police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question. Nor is the requirement of warnings to be imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody.' It was that sort of coercive environment to which Miranda by its terms was made applicable, and to which it is limited. We have also observed that Miranda warnings are not required in every instance when a suspect is interrogated at a police office. Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 47, 307 S.E.2d 864, 872 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109, 104 S.Ct. 1617, 80 L.Ed.2d 145 (1984). We have stated that [i]t is the custodial nature rather than the location of the interrogation that triggers the necessity for giving Miranda warnings. Id. at 47, 307 S.E.2d at 872; accord Burket v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 596, 605, 450 S.E.2d 124, 129 (1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1053, 115 S.Ct. 1433, 131 L.Ed.2d 314 (1995); see Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 346, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). Applying these principles, we hold that the deputies did not violate Swisher's Miranda rights. Initially, we note that Swisher did not make any incriminating statements between the time he left his uncles' house and the time he was placed under arrest at 12:05 a.m. on February 24. Before Swisher was arrested, the deputies informed him that he was free to leave the Sheriff's Office. After Swisher was arrested, he was informed of his Miranda rights twice. The record reveals that his confession was made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. 1602, and that his confession was the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); accord Roach v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 324, 340-41, 468 S.E.2d 98, 108, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 951, 117 S.Ct. 365, 136 L.Ed.2d 256 (1996).
Swisher filed a motion to suppress all evidence, oral and physical, including any statements made by [him], whether prior to or subsequent to his arrest, and any property seized as a result of the arrest, detention or interrogation of [him] and any property seized by a warrantless search of the premises occupied by [him], and any property or goods seized by virtue of the search warrant for [his] body, which warrant was issued ... on [February 25, 1997]. Swisher contends that: his arrest was illegal; the deputies unlawfully searched and seized certain items from the house where he lived and; the deputies unlawfully searched his person by obtaining pubic hair, head hair, and blood. When the deputies went to Swisher's uncles' house, they knocked on the door, and one of Swisher's uncles permitted the deputies to enter. As we have already stated, the deputies asked Swisher to accompany them to the Sheriff's Office, and he voluntarily agreed to do so. As Swisher was about to leave the house, one of the deputies asked Swisher if he would like to take a jacket with him because it was cold outside. A deputy helped Swisher put the jacket on. At the Sheriff's Office, Sergeant A.C. Powers noticed a few dark spots on Swisher's jacket, and he asked Swisher for permission to test the jacket to determine whether the spots were blood. Swisher replied, [t]hat's all right with me, because I don't know nothing about what you're talking about. When the test showed that blood was present on the jacket, Sergeant Lemerise asked Swisher for permission to send the jacket to a forensic laboratory for further testing and Swisher agreed. While Swisher was still at the Sheriff's Office, some of the deputies asked one of Swisher's uncles for permission to search two large burn barrels which were on the uncles' property. The uncle gave the deputies permission to search, and they recovered several items from the barrels, including burned sneakers and a green shirt. On February 24, 1997, some deputies returned to Swisher's uncles' house and asked William Swisher for permission to search the premises. The deputies gave William Swisher a consent form and told him that he did not have to consent to a search. William Swisher gave the deputies permission to search, and he signed the consent form. We hold that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to suppress the evidence because the defendant's uncles gave the deputies consent to search the house and the burn barrels. We also note that none of the items taken from the consensual search of the burn barrels was admitted in evidence at Swisher's trial. Additionally, the trial court did not err in refusing the defendant's motion to suppress the jacket. Swisher gave the deputies consent to test his jacket. The evidence of record supports the trial court's finding that in each instance, Swisher's consent was voluntary. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 327, 356 S.E.2d 157, 164, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). We do not consider Swisher's conclusional statement that his arrest was illegal and, therefore, his pubic hairs, head hairs, and blood were illegally seized. Swisher does not assign as error that he was subject to an illegal arrest. Thus, this argument is beyond the scope of any assignment of error, and it is procedurally defaulted. Rule 5:17(c); Burket, 248 Va. at 613, 450 S.E.2d at 133.