Opinion ID: 1457749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Amendment Cause of Action: Retaliation

Text: We recognize that the district court did not have the opportunity to consider Hartman and, given the way it conducted the Smiddy I analysis, did not directly address the retaliation question. Although it will often be the better approach to remand in such cases for the district court to apply the appropriate standards, see In re Exxon Valdez, 270 F.3d 1215, 1241 (9th Cir.2001), [t]he matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). We are comfortable resolving the Hartman retaliation issue on the facts of this case, where the new legal standard arose during the briefing of this appeal, the standard was brought to our attention by one of the parties, and, critically, the retaliation issue was extensively litigated in the district court, albeit under a somewhat different legal framework. See also Kimes v. Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir.1996) (courts may take up an issue for the first time on appeal when a change in law raises a new issue while an appeal is pending) (quotation in original omitted); Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir.1994) (Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below, as where the proper resolution is beyond any doubt.) (quoting Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868). The reason the retaliation issue was litigated in the district court, including on the defendants' Smiddy I -based motion for summary judgment, is this: Under Smiddy I, proof that officials have deliberately or recklessly misled a prosecutor is sufficient to show that the prosecutor has not exercised independent judgment. See Galen v. County of Los Angeles, 477 F.3d 652, 663-64 (9th Cir.2007). As part of Beck's theory of deliberate falsehood, he argued that the officers were motivated by retaliatory animus to create a false case against him. The parties therefore litigated that question, which had first been raised in Beck's complaint. [15] Because the retaliation issue has therefore been present in the case from the start, all parties have had ample opportunity to investigate it and to bring forward evidence and legal arguments regarding it. Nor does the applicability of Hartman come as a surprise. Although Hartman was published after Beck's opening brief was due, it issued before the officers filed their answering brief. So, in addition to having addressed the retaliation issue throughout the litigation, the officers had a chance to address the Hartman frameworkas Beck did in his reply brief although they failed to do so. Further, because we are reviewing a summary judgment record, we resolve factual disputes in favor of the non-moving party and decide legal issues de novo. It therefore does not matter whether the officers might have paid more attention to rebutting retaliation had they addressed Hartman. We would still view the facts in the light most favorable to Beck. [16] In sum, the officers suffer no prejudice, see Kimes, 84 F.3d at 1126, if we consider here the same retaliation issue which the parties have already litigated in the context of the Smiddy I framework. For these reasons, and because it has already been four years since Beck's arrest and three years since this case was filed, considerations of judicial efficiency lead us to resolve the matter today. Justice would not be served by subjecting the parties to further pre-trial disputes over immunity when the matter can be clearly settled on the present summary judgment record.
Beck alleges that his arrest was retaliatory in two regards: First, he maintains that the officers arrested him in retaliation for his brusque comments to Chief Thouvenell at the bank opening party. Second, he contends that the officers's actions were the culmination of the extended dispute between Beck and Upland that began with his protests against the rubble removal contract and were in retaliation for that protest. On the summary judgment record, a rational jury could find for Beck on either theory, see Blankenhorn, 485 F.3d at 470, satisfying Hartman. As to the first theory: Beck presented evidence showing that he had a heated confrontation with Chief Thouvenell and Sergeant Mendenhall at the bank opening party. He could show that, in the heat of the moment, Thouvenell had told him that we should have taken care of you a long time ago. He also presented evidence from the Chamber of Commerce meeting, indicating that Thouvenell, Mendenhall, and Milhiser had been agitated over Beck's comments and that Thouvenell, in particular, had threatened that he would take legal action against Chamber members who interfered with [missing text]. Beck also could show that the police, the alleged victims of his crime, did not investigate the matter beyond making a few phone calls before going to the District Attorney to file charges and secure an arrest warrant. Further, the police report left out Thouvenell's hostile comment to Beck and reported the crime as a potential felony, rather than as a misdemeanor, suggesting that it was written to cast Beck in the worst possible light. As viewed most favorably to Beck, the facts in this regard resemble those in Duran, in which a police officer stopped and arrested a man who first exchanged a few heated words with him and who then made obscene gestures at him just before the arrest. 904 F.2d at 1374-75. In that case, we first held that probable cause for the stop was absent and then warned that it appeared that the officer stopped the plaintiff at least partly in retaliation for the insult he received from him. Id. at 1377-78. Beck's showing of a heated personal confrontation followed by a hasty arrest likewise could rationally support a finding of retaliatory animus. Even if it did not adopt the above theory based on personal retaliatory animus, a rational jury could find that the arrest was the culmination of Beck's long-running dispute with Upland over his efforts to block the rubble removal contract. Beck presented a substantial case that his protests created the tensions that led to his arrest. First, Beck could show that Chief Thouvenell himself had advised him to work out a deal with his competitor to share the contract. Second, he could demonstrate that his competitor had suggested investigating him for zoning violations after threatening that every agency in Upland would be down on top of [Beck]. Beck could present evidence that such investigations of existing nonconforming businesses were against city policy, and that, at the time of the relevant zoning changes, Upland's senior planner was not aware of one single enforcement action against an existing nonconforming use in Upland's history. Further, he could demonstrate that Chief Thouvenell and Sergeant Mendenhall were involved in the code enforcement action, and that Beck and Mendenhall had had a dispute when Mendenhall arrived to discuss the zoning problems with him. In addition to these showings, he could add the incidents we have already described, including, in particular, Chief Thouvenell's statements at the Chamber of Commerce meeting. In short, even if the jury did not believe that the police would retaliate against Beck solely because of the confrontation at the bank opening party, Beck could make out a case that the confrontation was the culmination of a longer conflict rooted in his First-Amendment-protected contract protest, and that the arrest was in retaliation for Beck's overall role in that conflict. Viewed in that light, the facts in this case closely parallel those in Hartman. The plaintiff in Hartman, Moore, made equipment used by the postal service and successfully lobbied against a policy that would have favored his competitors. Hartman, 547 U.S. at 252-54, 126 S.Ct. 1695. After he succeeded, Postal Service inspectors began to investigate him for various crimes; he was prosecuted but was cleared of all charges. Id. at 254, 126 S.Ct. 1695. Record evidence showed that the inspectors had pressured the U.S. Attorney to prosecute, had thin evidence to support their criminal allegations, and had been angered by Moore's activities. See Moore v. Hartman, 388 F.3d 871, 882-85 (D.C.Cir.2004). [17] Similarly, Beck lobbied against government action that would have favored his competitors and found himself under investigation. While Beck might or might not ultimately succeed in convincing a jury that his advocacy efforts prompted the zoning investigation that escalated into the arrest, a rational jury looking at the present record in the light most favorable to Beck could so infer. Thus, under either view of retaliatory animus, Beck has met the retaliation prong of Hartman. As we have discussed, he has also shown that probable cause was absent. He has therefore completed the Hartman showing, and his First Amendment cause of action survives.