Opinion ID: 867120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prior instances of sexual abuse

Text: Prior to trial, the government, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), filed a motion seeking the court’s permission to introduce testimony from EV’s sisters, CC and SH, that they too had been sexually abused by Roux. Rule 404 prohibits proof of a defendant’s uncharged wrongful acts for the purpose of establishing his propensity to commit the charged offense, but allows the court to admit such evidence for another purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. The government offered the evidence of the abuse suffered by EV’s sisters principally to establish Roux’s motive to commit the charged offense and his identity as the perpetrator. R. 76 at 15-16. Roux opposed the government’s motion. The court conducted a hearing on the motion, at the conclusion of which it found that the proffered evidence of sexual abuse met three of the four criteria we have identified for the admission of other acts evidence. See, e.g., United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 2012) (per curiam), cert. denied, 2013 WL 754692 (U.S. Apr. 1, 2013). Specifically, the court determined that the government was offering the testimony of EV’s sisters for a purpose other than to establish his criminal propensity; that the proffered testimony was sufficient to establish that Roux had engaged in uncharged acts of sexual abuse; and that although the proffered evidence was “very prejudicial,” the danger of undue prejudice did not substantially outweigh the probative value No. 10-2192 7 of this evidence. R. 76 at 28. The court reserved ruling as to the fourth factor: whether the sexual abuse of EV’s sisters was sufficiently similar to the charged offense of using a minor to create sexually explicit photographs, given that EV’s sisters were not photographed. R. 76 at 28. The court subsequently issued a brief order finding that the proffered testimony met the similarity test and was therefore admissible, relying on this court’s ruling in United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir. 2006). EV’s sisters joined the roster of witnesses against Roux. CC, the eldest of Roberta’s daughters and roughly four years older than EV, testified that several months after Roux moved in with her mother in 2002, Roux began to touch her inappropriately, grabbing her breasts and fondling her buttocks. The following year, Roux came into her bedroom while she was sleeping, woke her up, exposed his penis to her, and invited her to compare its size to that of her mother’s ex-boyfriend. Roux left the room when she screamed at him to get out. When CC reported Roux’s misconduct to a school counselor, DCFS conducted an investigation. DCFS concluded that the allegation of abuse was “unfounded.” CC was later placed in foster care after she assaulted Roux, and, as we noted previously, never returned to live with her mother and Roux. CC acknowledged on cross-examination that she had also been sexually abused by both EV’s father, when he lived with Roberta, and by a male babysitter. The parties stipulated that both of those men pleaded guilty to criminal charges after CC reported the abuse. 8 No. 10-2192 SH was two years younger than EV. She testified that in late 2006, Roux came into her bedroom one night and, over her protests, touched her underneath her clothing in her “lower area” or “crotch,” moving his hands in a circle and pushing down while he did so. R. 80 at 66-68, Tr. 164-66. She also said that Roux had placed his fingers inside of her. SH indicated that similar incidents occurred both before and after this occasion. On cross-examination, SH agreed that Roberta, CC, and EV did not like Roux and wanted him out of the house. Roux contends that the admission of this testimony deprived him of a fair trial. “Child sexual abuse has a ‘unique stigma’ in society,” he reasons, “and the introduction of such inflammatory evidence has a correspondingly unique prejudicial effect on juries.” Roux Br. 6. He believes that because the acts described by CC and SH did not involve the creation of photographic images, their testimony had limited probative value with respect to the child pornography offense with which he was charged, and was likely to have misled the jury into thinking that the trial was about whether Roux had sexually assaulted EV and/or her sisters. At the same time, their testimony was so inherently prejudicial as to make it probable that the jury was likely to convict him on the basis of his prior bad acts, regardless of whether it was convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed the pornography offense. Finally, Roux argues that CC’s testimony was insufficient to support a finding that Roux in fact committed the acts she described, given that DCFS in- vestigated her allegations in 2003 and yet labeled them No. 10-2192 9 “unfounded.” In any case, because the acts CC described took place some four years before the charged pornography offense, Roux contends they were too remote to qualify for admission under Rule 404(b). We review the district court’s decision to admit the testimony for abuse of discretion. E.g., White, 698 F.3d at 1018. The first point bearing mention is that Roux’s de- fense—that he did not take the sexually explicit photographs of EV and had never engaged with her in the sexual conduct depicted in some of those photo- graphs, and was instead being framed by Roberta and her daughters—necessarily implicated his motive to commit the charged offense. Motive is typically not an element of the offense, but it is a factor that often points to who may have committed the crime. “[U]nlike issues of knowledge and intent, the defendant’s motive—an explanation of why the defendant would engage in the charged conduct—becomes highly relevant when the defendant argues that he did not commit the crime.” United States v. Siddiqui, 699 F.3d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original), pet’n for cert. filed (U.S. Apr. 4, 2013) (No. 12-9651); see generally 22A C. Wright & K. Graham, FEDERAL P RACTICE & P ROCEDURE: F EDERAL R ULES OF E VIDENCE § 5240, at 306 (2012) (“Evidence of motive may be offered to prove that the act was com- mitted, to prove the identity of the actor, or to prove the requisite mental state.”); see also, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez-Berrios, 573 F.3d 55, 65 (1st Cir. 2009) (other acts evidence relevant to show defendant’s motive, given his claim of innocence). This is why the government sought to establish Roux’s motive to take sexually 10 No. 10-2192 explicit photographs of his girlfriend’s daughter—to meet his defense of false accusation and to show that he in fact was the person who took the photos. And although both the government and the district court spoke of the evidence being relevant to both motive and identity, what they really meant was that proof of motive would serve to establish the identity of the perpetrator—the ultimate issue in the case. See Wright & Graham § 5246, at 337.1 The district court properly determined that the acts of abuse described by CC and SH were probative of Roux’s motive to commit the charged child pornography offense. As Judge Mihm recognized, this court’s deci- sion in Sebolt held that “[p]rior instances of sexual mis- 1 Proof of identity, as a distinct Rule 404(b) factor, would normally entail proof that a defendant’s prior acts share distinctive characteristics in common with the charged crime. See Wright & Graham § 5246, at 340-41; see also, e.g., United States v. Simpson, 479 F.3d 492, 497-98 (7th Cir. 2007), abrogated in part on other grounds by United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927, 933 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Connelly, 874 F.2d 412, 416-17 (7th Cir. 1989). Although the abuse described by CC and SH certainly share some characteristics in common with the abuse of EV, the briefs have not discussed in any real detail whether the common features are distinctive and meaningful enough to render the prior acts of abuse independently probative and admissible to show the identity of the perpetrator. Given our conclusion that the testimony of CC and SH was admissible as proof of Roux’s motive, we need not explore this subject further. No. 10-2192 11 conduct with a child victim may establish a defendant’s sexual interest in children and thereby serve as evidence of the defendant’s motive to commit a charged offense involving the sexual exploitation of children,” including child pornography offenses, and “it also may serve to identify the defendant to the crime.” 460 F.3d at 917. Apropos of Roux’s observation that child sexual abuse and the production of child pornography are different offenses, such that the commission of the former does not establish a motive to commit the latter would serve only to misdirect and ignite a jury’s passions, is the following passage from Sebolt: The motive to molest children does not completely overlap with the propensity to possess, transport, or advertise child pornography. See [United States v.] Cunningham, 103 F.3d [553,] at 556-57 [(7th Cir. 1996)]. If it did, then there would a greater chance that evidence of molestations introduced in this case was used to prove propensity. (Indeed the motive to molest children would completely overlap only with the propensity to molest children.) And the conceptual gap between molestation and child pornography is not so wide as to “induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis . . . rather than on the evidence presented.” United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2003) (quotations and citations omitted). In other words, the molestations and the evidence supporting the statutory criminal elements were similar in character, i.e., establishing Sebolt’s sexually deviant mental state, so there is no reason to suspect the jury was inflamed by the admission 12 No. 10-2192 of the molestations. The prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh the probative value, and the molestations were appropriately admitted. 460 F.3d at 917. See also United States v. Russell, 662 F.3d 831, 847-48 (7th Cir. 2011) (prior instances of inappropriate touching, by establishing defendant’s sexual interest in his minor daughter, were probative of his motive to induce his daughter to create sexually explicit photographs in violation of section 2251(a)); United States v. Courtright, 632 F.3d 363, 369-70 (7th Cir. 2011) (prior instances of sexual misconduct with minor female tends to establish motive to commit charged crime of production, possession, and receipt of child pornography in violation of section 2251(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)). Undoubtedly, as Roux argues, testimony that the defendant has sexually abused children is highly prejudicial; but we are not persuaded that the district court wrongfully concluded that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial to Roux. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. Our cases addressing the admission of molestation evidence have recognized the substantial prejudice that it necessarily poses to any defendant; yet, we have regularly sustained the admission of such evidence when probative of a defendant’s motive, intent, or other pertinent (and admissible) factor. See, e.g., United States v. Chambers, 642 F.3d 588, 595-96 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Zahursky, 580 F.3d 515, 525 (7th Cir. 2009); Sebolt, 460 F.3d at 917. We have also emphasized that we owe deference to a district judge’s balancing of probative value versus risk of undue prejudice under Rule 403, given that the No. 10-2192 13 judge presiding over the trial has a superior familiarity with and appreciation for the context and ramifications of the proffered evidence. See, e.g., White, 698 F.3d at 1018; United States v. Hosseini, 679 F.3d 544, 556 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 623, 774 (2012). The record in this case reveals that the district judge carefully weighed the relevance of CC’s and SH’s testimony along with the prejudice that it posed to Roux’s defense. The judge also gave the jury the standard instruction limiting its consideration of the other acts evidence, and notwithstanding the prejudicial nature of the evidence in this case, we presume that the jury followed that instruction. E.g., Chambers, 642 F.3d at 595-96.2 And, for what it is worth, we note that Roux does not contend, and the trial record does not indicate, that the government in any way overstepped its bounds with respect to this evidence. See Sebolt, 460 F.3d at 917. Having reviewed the record, we are not convinced that this is a case in which we should disturb the district court’s judgment as to the relative probative value and prejudicial effect of the other acts evidence. 2 The court gave the instruction both just prior to SH’s testimony and in the final set of instructions to the jury. Roux has pointed out that the court did not give the instruction prior to CC’s testimony. That is true, but somewhat misleading. Because CC testified immediately after SH, when the court gave the instruction in advance of SH’s testimony, it explained that its testimony was applicable to “the next two witnesses.” R. 80 at 54, Tr. 152. Roux did not ask the court to repeat the instruction when CC took the stand. 14 No. 10-2192 Having said this, we agree with Roux that given the inherently prejudicial effect of Rule 404(b) evidence involving other uncharged acts of sexual abuse, particularly the abuse of minors, courts must take particular care in admitting such evidence and in instructing the jury as to its appropriate use. Courts have a variety of tools at their disposal to address the prejudicial effects of this evidence, including: reserving ruling on the admission of the evidence until trial, when the relevance and ramifications of the evidence may be more con- cretely assessed, see, e.g., Russell, 662 F.3d at 838-39 (court admitted evidence only after defendant testified in such a manner as to place in issue his purpose and intent in taking charged photographs); placing limits on the extent and detail of the evidence, see id. at 839 (court allowed government to establish that inappropriate touching had occurred, but not to develop the details); and giving stronger and more focused limiting instructions that confine the jury’s consideration of the evidence for the specific purposes identified by the government and approved by the court, rather than the entire range of possible purposes identified in Rule 404, see United States v. Miller, 673 F.3d 688, 701-02 & n.1 (7th Cir. 2012); Seventh Cir. Pattern Crim. Jury Instr. 3.11 & Committee Comment. Roux’s counsel has suggested that the court in this case should have expressly limited the jury’s consideration of the Rule 404(b) evidence to motive and identity; yet, he also concedes that a more focused instruction was never proposed to the court and makes no case for plain error in the court’s omission to give such an instruction on its own initiative. See, e.g., No. 10-2192 15 United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2012). As we have said, the record indicates that the district judge approached the Rule 404(b) evidence in this case with an appropriate degree of caution. Roux’s remaining points require only brief discussion. First, in addition to suggesting that the abuse that CC and SH described was not relevant because it did not involve the creation of sexually explicit photographs—a contention with which Sebolt dispenses—Roux has also emphasized that, in contrast to EV, they did not describe forced sexual acts. This point may reflect an unduly narrow view of force. In any case, force is not an element of the offense charged here. More to the point, as Sebolt makes clear, the prior acts were relevant to establish Roux’s sexual interest in underaged girls, and thus his motive to cause EV to participate in the creation of sexually explicit photographs; any distinctions between the abuse that CC and SH suffered and the abuse inflicted on EV are immaterial in that regard. Second, Roux renews his contention that because DCFS found CC’s allegations of abuse unfounded, her testimony was insufficient to establish that Roux, in fact, abused her. However, the authorities’ decision not to pursue charges does not render CC’s testimony incredible. See Cookson v. Schwartz, 556 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2009) (“a conclusion by DCFS that an allegation is ‘unfounded’ does not establish that it is false”) (citing People v. Mason, 578 N.E.2d 1351, 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (DCFS decision not to pursue charges is neither a judicial decision nor a final determination that the victim’s allegations were false)). Whether to credit her 16 No. 10-2192 testimony was thus the jury’s prerogative. Finally, the fact that the abuse CC described took place four years before the charged photographs of EV were created does not render the prior acts too remote in time to be relevant. The prior acts were offered to establish Roux’s sexual interest in minors, a proclivity that, as we pointed out in Russell, is unlikely to vanish with the passage of time. 662 F.3d at 848. More to the point, one can infer from the testimony that when Roux began to abuse CC in 2002, he commenced a long-term course of abuse that eventually included two of her sisters and continued largely unabated through the creation of the charged photographs of EV four years later. In the circumstances, the acts involving CC were not too remote in time to be admissible under Rule 404(b).