Opinion ID: 1770265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Extent of Discipline

Text: The Hearing Committee's recommendation of a three-year suspension was prompted by the Committee's finding of aggravating factors in that respondent acted dishonestly by attempting to defraud his wife and engaged in deceptive practices by lying to the sentencing judge. See Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.22(b) and (f). Respondent admitted that the transfer of the stock to his father was a ploy brought on by marital discord. While the desperate tactic, even when viewed in the disastrous economic conditions of the combined depression and inflation existing at the time, cannot be condoned, it is much more likely that respondent intended a temporary deprivation of his wife's control while he attempted to salvage their real estate enterprise than it is that respondent intended to deprive his wife and children of the stock permanently. The wife could have attacked the questionable sale if she had not died, and upon her death the stock became an asset inherited by their children whom respondent was raising. Most significantly, the January transfer, whether or not motivated by dishonesty, was entirely immaterial to respondent's dishonesty in omitting the asset from the October return. The omission is the crime upon which this disciplinary proceeding is based and is the only misconduct with which respondent is charged herein. The only party possibly defrauded by the crime (as opposed to the stock transfer) was the government. We therefore decline to consider, as an aggravating factor of dishonest motive under Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.22(b) (1986), any dishonesty in respondent's transferring the stock to his father. [7] Respondent's replies to the trial judge's questioning at his plea, taken in context, cannot reasonably be construed as lying to the judge for the purpose of obtaining a favorable sentence. In reply to the judge's request for an admission that what he sought to do was to defraud his wife, respondent stated that that was essentially correct, but that he did not intend to deprive her children who were also his children. Consistent with that answer, respondent could have explained further (as he did in the disciplinary proceeding) that he simply intended to place the corporate stock and voting power temporarily beyond the control of his allegedly alcoholic wife in order to salvage his real estate holdings for the ultimate benefit of himself, as well as his wife and his children. He apparently chose not to go into a lengthy explanation in the setting of a sentencing hearing, but rather to simply concede the judge's point. There was nothing irreconcilable between respondent's disciplinary hearing statement that he transferred the stock as part of an attempt to salvage his real estate holdings for everyone's benefit and his equivocal answer to the judge at the sentencing hearing. There are many other things in this record which the Hearing Committee could have used to discredit respondent's candor before the Committee, rather than seizing upon the lying to the judge as a basis for rejecting respondent's candor to the tribunal. We therefore decline to consider, as an aggravating factor of a deceptive practice during the disciplinary proceeding under Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.22(f) (1986), respondent's telling inconsistent stories to the judge and to the Hearing Committee. We now proceed to determine the appropriate discipline without reference to the aggravating factors of dishonest conduct by attempting to defraud the wife or deceptive practice in the disciplinary proceeding by telling inconsistent stories to the sentencing judge and to the Hearing Committee. As stated earlier, the conviction itself established that respondent intentionally omitted an asset from his wife's estate tax return. This is a serious crime which reflects on his fitness to practice law, although the seriousness in the context of a disciplinary proceeding is somewhat lessened by the fact that the omission did not involve his practice of law and did not breach any duty or cause any damage to a client. The baseline discipline for this dishonesty constituting the first professional misconduct of an attorney over a lengthy period of practice would be at least a suspension in the range of two to three years. Louisiana State Bar Association v. O'Halloran, 412 So.2d 523 (La.1982); Louisiana State Bar Association v. Schoemann, 444 So.2d 608 (La.1984). There are several aggravating factors. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.22 (1986). The principal one is dishonest or selfish motive, since respondent apparently sought financial gain for himself and his children by avoiding payment of the taxes on the items intentionally omitted. Respondent also had substantial experience in the practice of law, although this aggravating circumstance is counterbalanced by the fact that he had no disciplinary violations or criminal charges against him during his extensive period of practice. On the other hand, there are very substantial mitigating factors. Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions § 9.32 (1986). Respondent's lack of a prior disciplinary or criminal record has already been noted. Moreover, the crime of which respondent was convicted is only a misdemeanor in Louisiana. See La.Rev.Stat. 47:1642. There is also character evidence that respondent led an exemplary business and personal life prior to and after this incident. Another mitigating circumstance conceded by the disciplinary counsel is the fact that respondent has already been punished extensively as a result of his misconduct, serving thirteen months imprisonment and suffering the related loss of his personal fortune in bankruptcy court. Respondent was also beset at the time by the personal and emotional problems associated with raising four young children and by the decline of his previously successful business. A very significant mitigating factor is the time delay in this case. Respondent obviously was unable to practice law during his confinement. Upon his release the former disciplinary agency filed for an interim suspension, which was denied in June, 1989. The disciplinary proceeding was not immediately forthcoming because of the change in the procedure, and a formal disciplinary proceeding was not instituted until September, 1990, almost three years after the conviction and eighteen months after respondent was released from confinement. While we do not suggest the disciplinary counsel was at fault for the delay, the fact of the matter is that a delay did occur and that respondent's practice of law has been virtually non-existent since his plea in 1987. The Disciplinary Board approved the Hearing Committee's recommendation of a three-year suspension, but allowed a credit for the thirteen months served in prison. This credit implicitly recognized the delay in the proceeding which consequently delayed the beginning of the suspension and the eventual opportunity to return to the practice of law. While we deem it inappropriate to give credit for time served in a disciplinary proceeding, we believe that the mitigating factor of the delay in the proceeding should bear on the length of the suspension. Viewed in that light, the Disciplinary Board's recommendation was effectively for less than two years. Further considering the very substantial mitigating factors in this case, we conclude that a suspension of one year and one day, beginning upon the finality of this judgment, is appropriate under the circumstances of this case.