Opinion ID: 390883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of Identity of Informant

Text: 26 Appellant next argues that the district court erred in restricting cross-examination at the suppression hearing about the identity and reliability of the informant. Appellant argues that disclosure of the identity of the informant, the informant's past criminal record, if any, and possible incentive for supplying allegedly distorted information to the police was necessary because the circumstances under which the informant gathered his information cast doubt upon the informant's reliability. 27 We disagree. As discussed above, the affidavit adequately established the reliability of the informant by referring to the informant's history of investigative cooperation which led to the arrests of several narcotics offenders. 28 Contrary to appellant's argument, this is not a Franks v. Delaware case. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978); United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1172-73 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939, 100 S.Ct. 2161, 64 L.Ed.2d 793 (1980). The reliability of the informant is essential to a finding of probable cause in the present case; however, (t) he deliberate falsity or reckless disregard whose impeachment is permitted (under Franks) is only that of the affiant, not of any nongovernmental informant. Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684. Appellant does not argue in the present case that the affiant did not believe the information provided by the informant or accept it as true. Appellant cannot use Franks to impeach the informant. United States v. Luschen, supra, 614 F.2d at 1172. 29 Nor do we think that disclosure of the identity of the informant as a material defense witness was necessary under Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627-28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). The informant in the present case was a mere tipster. The informant simply provided the police with information and did not witness or participate in any drug transaction. See United States v. House, supra, 604 F.2d at 1140. In cases involving the 'tipster' type of informant, who merely conveys information to the government but neither witnesses nor participates in the offense, courts generally hold that disclosure is not material and therefore not required. United States v. Barnes, 486 F.2d 776, 778 n.3 (8th Cir. 1973) (citations omitted).