Opinion ID: 2101543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Breaking and Entering

Text: As the majority points out, a person is not guilty of the misdemeanor offense of breaking and entering if he acted on the reasonable belief that he was authorized to break and enter. That belief must be 1) objectively reasonable and 2) actually held. This exposition of the law will come as no surprise to the attorneys who tried this case. Warfield's attorney argued to the jury that under the circumstances it was perfectly reasonable for Warfield to have gone into the garage in order to open the garage doors and thus facilitate the shoveling of snow. She told the jury that authority to enter the garage was implied in doing the job. She said: [O]ur contention is that  that a person shoveling snow in the  around the garage had implied consent to go into the garage. Certainly, he was never told not to go into the garage, and it's perfectly reasonable to think that a person who's shoveling snow might very well go into the garage, and Larry Warfield [1] testified he did when he shoveled. The prosecutor countered: Ms. Campbell asked you to believe that it was reasonable for the Defendant to go into the garage to shovel the snow. The defense witnesses, particularly Larry Warfield, would have you believe that it's reasonable for him to go into the garage when he shoveled snow. Mrs. Weller was adamant that there was no need to go into that. Of course, Mrs. Weller said she never had Larry Warfield shovel snow for her. The implication in the defense testimony is that, well, it's reasonable, other folks have done it, going into the garage; therefore, he had a right to go in there. No need to go into the garage, he could shovel from the outside, down the sidewalk, up to the garage doors on this apron to the garage door  doors themselves, no need to go in there to open those doors. The defendant, as was his absolute right, did not testify. Why he went into the garage, and whether he held the honest belief that he was authorized to enter the garage through a closed door, had to be gleaned from the surrounding circumstances and from the three reasons he had given earlier for his entry. When the complainant saw the defendant exiting the garage, she immediately confronted him, demanding to know why he had entered. He said he had to open the garage doors to shovel the snow. As the following testimony of the complainant discloses, she pointed out to Warfield why that explanation would not hold water, and he changed his story: And he said we'd have to get the garage doors open to shovel the snow. There's a  well, a little ramp between the street and the garage. He said he had to get the garage  have the garage doors open to shovel that snow and that wasn't so at all because the snow's out here and the doors are here. So, I told him that, I said, you didn't need to go in the garage for that at all. He said, well, I got tired. I went in to rest. A third explanation for the defendant's entry was given to the police officer who arrested him on the following day. On that occasion, the defendant said he went into the garage to clean his boots. Cross-examination of the complainant only served to reinforce her testimony that there was absolutely no need to enter the garage in order to shovel the snow. Defense Attorney: So the person who was to shovel your snow needed to go in the garage to open up the door to be ... Complainant: You didn't have to have the door opened. Defense Attorney: Are you saying that neither the  Kevin Warfield, or anyone else who shoveled for you before this episode, opened the garage door? Complainant: They've never even been in the garage. There was no need to. Defense Attorney: How do you know that? Complainant: When your garage doors come down straight and the snow is here, you don't have to have those doors open to shovel the snow out here. Heavens. I cannot square this testimony with the majority's conclusion that, as a matter of law, Warfield harbored a reasonable belief that it was necessary in the performance of his duties that he open the garage door and enter the garage to get at the snow piled against the door. Majority opinion at [501]. Moreover, because the jurors could readily have found that Warfield lied about why he went into the garage, they were at liberty to infer a consciousness of guilt on his part. [2] [C]hanges in defendant's explanation or conflicting admissions may support a finding of scienter, since while either of defendant's stories may be true, both cannot be and the changes indicate an attempt to hide the guilty knowledge. Carter v. State, 10 Md. App. 50, 55, 267 A.2d 743 (1970). The evidence was sufficient to support the conviction of unlawful breaking and entering.