Opinion ID: 1900990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the Verdict

Text: In affirming the trial court's finding of reasonableness, the district court of appeal stated that the verdict was admittedly at the maximum of any reasonable range, but found that [f]orty years' imprisonment within a helpless body racked with pain and requiring nearly $200,000 worth of medical care each year can hardly be equalled by all the tortures of the damned. 436 So.2d at 1024. The Fund and the hospital contend that the award to Von Stetina of $4.1 million for pain and suffering is unsupported by this record because Von Stetina, whose brain is dead and who hangs on to life at a level less than fully human, is unaware of the extent of her bank account. They further assert that Von Stetina is currently receiving complete and ideal care and that $188,000 per year in maintenance costs is more than adequate to provide for all her needs. They allege that our decision in Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So.2d 185 (Fla. 1953), stands for the proposition that when a pain and suffering award will yield a return which exceeds the plaintiff's annual earnings prior to his injury, the amount of the award is excessive and requires reversal. They also argue that we should apply Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 2679, 81 L.Ed.2d 874 (1984), in which the federal court held that a $1.3 million award for loss of enjoyment of life to a comatose patient cannot be justified as compensatory damages as a matter of law, because the patient is not aware of his or her status of life. I would expressly reject the Flannery rule. In Florida, jury is instructed that it may award damages for bodily injury, pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, mental anguish, and the loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life to be experienced in the future. Fla.Std.Jury Instr. (Civ.) 6.2(a). I am unable to accept the proposition that a comatose patient may not, as a matter of law, recover compensatory damages for the loss of capacity for the enjoyment of life. Under such a rule of law, damages awarded to the most grievously injured individuals would be reduced solely because of the nature and seriousness of the victims' injuries. One authority has stated: A plaintiff who sustained a serious enough impact to cause loss of consciousness will almost surely manifest some other sign or effect of injury to which a claim for pain and suffering could properly be appended. Should the injured person have been rendered permanently comatose, the pain and suffering issue would pale next to the claims arising from the permanent injury and total destruction of the victim's capacity to ever again engage in activities of life. M. Minzer, Damages in Tort Actions § 4.21[3][a](1984) (emphasis added). Further, under the particular facts of this case, I do not believe that the Flannery holding is applicable. There is no question that Von Stetina has been deprived of life in all but the most basic sense of that word. Yet, competent evidence adduced at trial established that she responds to external stimuli  she reacts to people, music, and pain  making her plight all the more tragic. I would also find that the application of the Loftin holding does not compel the conclusion that the damage award was unreasonable. Although the plaintiff's annual earnings should be considered in determining whether a verdict for pain and suffering and lack of ability to lead a normal life is excessive, I disagree with appellants' assertion that it is the single controlling factor. I recognize that a $4.1 million verdict for future pain and suffering and loss of ability to lead a normal life is initially difficult to comprehend. However, if Von Stetina had been paralyzed for only one year, and the jury had rendered a verdict of $288,000  $188,000 of which was for medical expenses and the remainder for pain and suffering and the lack of ability to lead a normal life for one year  that perception would change. Few, if any, courts would find that verdict unreasonable. The size of the verdict in this case is principally attributable to the fact that Von Stetina will suffer this brain-damaged condition throughout her forty-year life expectancy. I conclude, as did the district court, that the damage award does not exceed the range for which the jury could properly render a verdict under the tragic facts of this case.