Opinion ID: 1615257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: procedure for proving the crime or fraud exception

Text: Having concluded that the attorney-client privilege is vitiated where the attorneyclient relationship is used to further an ongoing or a future crime or fraud, we must now reconsider the procedure for making that determination as detailed on the first rehearing. While it is true that the attorney-client privilege is not itself constitutionally guaranteed, nevertheless it is closely linked to the federal and state constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const. amend. VI; La. Const. art. 1, § 13. Because of the constitutional interest implicated in the attorney-client privilege, that privilege should not be easily derogated. For this reason, upon reconsideration, we conclude that the procedure set forth on the first rehearing does not afford adequate safeguards to the attorney-client privilege, and, in its stead, the following procedure should be utilized to evaluate whether the crime or fraud exception to the privilege is present. Generally, questions of admissibility, relevance, and weight of evidence are properly raised at trial on the merits, not by pretrial motions. State v. Tanner, 457 So.2d 1172 (La.1984). In the instant case, defendant challenges the admissibility of communications with his lawyer on the ground that those communications are privileged. However, because of the strong constitutional implications of the attorneyclient privilege, it would serve the orderly administration of justice and further insure the defendant a fair trial if the admissibility of the [attorney-client communications] could be determined in a pretrial proceeding. State v. Tanner, supra, at 1174. La. Code Crim. P. art. 703 provides that a defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence from use at trial on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained. There is no contention that the evidence of the communications between Fish and defendant in the present case was unconstitutionally obtained. Therefore, a literal reading of art. 703 would seem to exclude the use of a motion to suppress to test admissibility of allegedly privileged attorney-client communications. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth above, we believe that the importance of the attorney-client privilege justifies the use of the motion to suppress to test the admissibility of such communications prior to trial. Thus, pursuant to our authority under La. Code Crim. P. art. 3 [4] to establish procedural guidelines in the absence of specific legislative procedural rules, we hold that a motion to suppress is available to question the admissibility of allegedly privileged attorney-client communications. Once a defendant has made out a claim that certain communications are subject to the attorney-client privilege pursuant to La.R.S. 15:475, [5] the trial court shall hold an evidentiary hearing, see La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(E), in which the burden of proving the admissibility of those communications under an exception to the privilege is on the state as in the case of a confession or evidence seized without a warrant. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(D). The question of the standard of proof the state must meet in order to prove the crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is more problematic. In the instant case, where the controverted communications were allegedly in furtherance of a conspiracy to secrete material evidence, the state urges that it should be required to establish only a prima facie case of the underlying conspiracy in order to vitiate the attorney-client privilege, by analogy to La.R.S. 15:455, the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule. [6] Federal courts have similarly held that where the government makes a prima facie showing that the attorneyclient relationship was intended to further continuing or future criminal or fraudulent activity, the privilege does not exist. United States v. Dyer, 722 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir.1983), and cases cited therein. Nevertheless, we feel that the prima facie standard of proof does not afford adequate protection to the attorney-client privilege in criminal cases. Because of the importance of the privilege, therefore, we hold that the state must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the attorneyclient relationship was intended to further continuing or future criminal or fraudulent activity in order to vitiate the attorneyclient privilege. Our holding is supported by Comment (e) to Article 801 D(3)(b) of the Proposed Evidence Code, [7] which suggests that the appropriate standard of proof to invoke the co-conspirators exception to the rule against hearsay is a preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the criminal or fraudulent activity in question must be proved by substantial, independent evidence without considering the allegedly privileged communications. United States v. Shewfelt, 455 F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944, 92 S.Ct. 2042, 32 L.Ed.2d 331 (1972); cf. State v. Carter, 326 So.2d 848 (La.1975); also Comment (f) to Article 801 D(3)(b) of the Proposed Code of Evidence. At the hearing on the admissibility of the attorney-client communications, neither the defendant nor the attorney to whom the allegedly privileged communications were made may be compelled to testify. However, both the defendant and the attorney may testify in support of a motion to exclude privileged attorney-client communications without being subject to examination on other matters. See La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(E). If the defendant does so testify, his testimony cannot be used by the state except for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's testimony at the trial on the merits. Id. Similarly, if after the hearing the trial judge sustains defendant's claim of privilege, the attorney may not be called to the stand at trial, and his testimony at the hearing may not be used for any purpose. However, if the attorneyclient privilege is denied at the hearing, the state may call the attorney to the stand at trial, and his testimony at the hearing may be fully used. As previously stated, if the communications between Fish and defendant were made in pursuit of a criminal or fraudulent act yet to be performed (such as conspiracy to secrete relevant evidence), then those communications are not protected by the attorney-client privilege of La.R.S. 15:475. However, based on the record before us, we cannot make a determination as to the merits of the claim; therefore, we must remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with the views expressed herein.