Opinion ID: 1639440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: ¶ 2. In June 2000, Guy Philp Ruff, Jr., (hereinafter Ruff) executed two promissory notes in exchange for a loan of approximately $281,000 from his parents, Guy P. Ruff, Sr., and Puddie E. Ruff. The purpose of this loan was to enable Ruff to complete the development of his 298-acre cattle farm and bring all of his debts current. Ruff developed the farm for the benefit of Big Oaks Farm, LLC, in which he owned Class A and Class B shares. As consideration for his efforts, Ruff received development fees as well as distributions on his B shares. ¶ 3. Ruff failed to make any payments on the promissory notes. As a result, on May 22, 2002, Ruff's father filed a complaint against him in the Chancery Court of Benton County. On March 28, 2003, a default judgment was entered against Ruff for his failure to cooperate in discovery. Ruff's father obtained an equitable lien against the farm, compensatory damages in the amount of $357,678, and attorney fees and expenses in the amount of $4,600. ¶ 4. On February 4, 2004, one day before the scheduled foreclosure on the farm, Ruff filed for bankruptcy. Ruff's father filed a motion for relief from the automatic stay. On August 26, 2004, the bankruptcy court entered a consent order settling the motion for relief from the automatic stay (hereinafter the Bankruptcy Consent Order). Under this order, Ruff granted his father a third deed of trust on the farm property and a security interest in the cattle. He further agreed to pay $16,500 per quarter to satisfy the remaining balance on his father's prior judgment. At the same time, Ruff assigned to his father the cash proceeds from his B shares. He also executed an assignment of all his financial interests in Big Oaks. This assignment was to be held in escrow by attorney Stephan L. McDavid, who served as counsel for Ruff's father, and would not become effective unless Ruff defaulted on his quarterly payments and failed to cure. So long as Ruff fulfilled his obligation to pay, he retained his right to collect distributions on his A shares, as well as any development fees owed to him from Big Oaks. ¶ 5. Following the Bankruptcy Consent Order, Big Oaks terminated Ruff's services on its behalf. Consequently, Ruff no longer received development fees or distributions on his B shares. ¶ 6. Ruff eventually defaulted on the quarterly payments and was sent a notice of default on March 21, 2005. On June 22, 2005, after more than sixty days had passed without cure, McDavid sent Ruff a notice of intent to release the assignment of all funds, disbursements, or income from Big Oaks. On July 19, 2005, the Estate of Guy P. Ruff, Sr., [1] presented the assignment to Big Oaks with instructions that all previously withheld and future disbursements due Ruff be directed to the Estate (hereinafter the 2005 Assignment). [2] ¶ 7. As the Estate once again began execution on the farm, Ruff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction. [3] On February 8, 2006, the chancery court entered a Consent Order of Dismissal with Prejudice Based on Settlement of All Claims (hereinafter the Chancery Consent Order). Under the terms of this order, Ruff agreed to pay $2,000 each month. Ruff also executed a quitclaim deed in lieu of foreclosure to the Estate, to be held in escrow by McDavid. If payment was not received by the fifth day of the month, McDavid was entitled to file the quitclaim deed on the sixth day. The order also stated that [e]xcept as specifically stated herein, the Note and Deed of Trust, and all obligations under the same and the [Bankruptcy Consent Order] remain in full force and effect. Nothing in this Order shall be deemed to otherwise modify any other obligations of the parties. ¶ 8. Ruff made timely payments from February 2006 through November 2006, but failed to do so in December 2006. Around December 2006, the Estate received notice that the Bank of Holly Springs, which held a second deed of trust on the farm, was about to foreclose. [4] Based on Ruff's failure to make the December payment and the potential foreclosure, McDavid sent notices of default to Ruff on December 28 and 29, 2006, informing him that the quitclaim deed had been filed and that all personal property, including the cattle, would be sold. Ruff was prohibited thereafter from using or accessing the farm property. To protect its interest in the farm, the Estate paid the Bank of Holly Springs note current. ¶ 9. On January 19, 2007, Ruff filed a Motion for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction, Temporary Restraining Order and for Permanent and Mandatory Injunction. Ruff asserted that he had not made the December 2006 payment because he reasonably believed that the November 2006 disbursement on his A shares had been applied toward his debt to the Estate pursuant to the 2005 Assignment. Ruff argued that he stood to suffer immediate and irreparable injury because the Estate had interfered with his ability to care for the cattle, and because the Bank of Holly Springs' note contained an acceleration clause effective upon any transfer of interest. ¶ 10. Following a hearing, the chancellor denied Ruff's motion on June 27, 2007, in a written order, without making findings of fact. Ruff now appeals to this Court.