Opinion ID: 686771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Entrapment by Estoppel

Text: 32 It was undisputed that Ralph and Simon had worked for years up to April 1990 as confidential informants engaging in illegal narcotics transactions under authorization of the DEA. As summarized above, what happened thereafter is disputed. Simon denied he was ever told he was terminated. Although Ralph acknowledged he was told of a termination, he testified to the effect that he was promptly reactivated, and was instructed to keep the agents informed, which he did so on a regular basis. He testified Agent Colavito told him he was still working for [the DEA]. Even the testimony of the government agents showed an unclear and confusing message communicated by the agents to the Abcasises. If the jury accepted the defendants' version that they kept the agents fully informed about their participation in the drug deal, the agents' acknowledged request for continuing delivery of information could easily have been understood as authorization. 33 There was surely good reason for the court to doubt the good faith of the defendants' contention. Nonetheless, the evidence submitted by the defendants provided a sufficient basis, if believed by the jury, to establish that the government's agents misled the defendants into a reasonable belief that they were authorized to engage in the narcotics transaction as cooperating confidential informants, as they had done many times previously. Once they presented a prima facie defense, the defendants were not required to pass a credibility test to have their defense presented to the jury. See United States v. Johnson, 994 F.2d 980, 988 (2d Cir.) (defendant entitled to jury charge on defense for which there is a foundation in the evidence), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 418, 126 L.Ed.2d 364 (1993). 34 The facts in the instant case distinguish it from prior Second Circuit cases in which we have held that an entrapment by estoppel defense was not warranted. In United States v. Corso, 20 F.3d 521, 528 (2d Cir.1994), the defendant was convicted of illegal firearms manufacturing. Defendant argued that two machine gun receivers he purchased should not be considered in assessing a sentencing enhancement because he relied on a statement by an ATF official and on representations by a firearms company. We rejected this contention because (1) there was no showing of any communication by a government official, (2) defendant had not shown that he saw the letter on which he claims to have relied, and (3) the advertisement issued by the firearms company contained a warning that revealed that the defendant could not lawfully purchase its receiver kit. Id. 35 We similarly refused to apply the defense in United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir.1984). There, the defendants were convicted of illegally transporting explosives and firearms. The defendants asserted that they were reasonably relying on the apparent authority of a person who claimed to be a CIA agent when they engaged in the criminal acts, but the district court refused to provide the requested defense instruction to the jury. On appeal, we affirmed the district court decision. There was no evidence that the person allegedly relied on was in fact a CIA agent. Furthermore, the defendants had no personal knowledge of his claimed status and sought no independent verification that he was a CIA agent. Id. at 84. Under these circumstances, any claimed reliance on representations by the purported CIA agent was unreasonable as a matter of law. 36 In this case, it was undisputed that the defendants had numerous communications with the very DEA agents who had previously authorized the defendants to engage in narcotics transactions as informants. If the defendants' testimony as to the number and contents of these communications is accepted, then a jury might conclude that the agents in fact communicated encouragement or assurance to the defendants and the defendants reasonably relied on that encouragement or assurance in believing they were once again authorized to participate in a narcotics transaction as informants. The defendants were entitled to an instruction putting their contention to the jury. 37 We recognize that great caution should be exercised when it comes to the application of [this] defense. Corso, 20 F.3d at 528. Our conclusion that the Abcasises were entitled to present this defense to the jury should not be construed as an abandonment of caution or restraint in applying the defense or as a departure from this court's precedent. Nor should it be viewed as an endorsement of the Abcasises' claim that they reasonably believed they were authorized to engage in illegal conduct. On retrial, the defendants will have the burden of convincing the jury that a government agent in fact made statements or committed acts that produced in the defendants a reasonable belief that they were authorized to engage in the illegal conduct as an aid to law enforcement. We believe, however, that the Abcasises produced enough evidence to justify submitting their defense to the jury. 38 Under the circumstances of this case, the district court's failure to instruct the jury on entrapment by estoppel deprived the Abcasises of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (internal quotation omitted). 39 Because the case will probably be retried, we note for guidance on retrial that we found no merit to the other contentions put forth by the defendants.