Opinion ID: 166912
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kansas’ Relevant Statutes of Limitations

Text: As Mr. Cosgrove correctly argues, state law determines the applicable statute of limitations and accompanying tolling provisions for § 1983 actions. Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675. Generally, “the appropriate statute of limitations for § 1983 actions arising in Kansas is two years, under Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60513(a)(4).” Johnson v. Johnson County Comm’n Bd., 925 F.2d 1299, 1300-01 (10th Cir. 1991). However, section 60-515(a), which was amended in 1992 to include the italicized language below, provides in relevant part: Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-523, if any person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real property or a penalty or a forfeiture, at the time the cause of action accrued or at any time during the period the statute of limitations is running, is less than 18 years of age, an incapacitated person or imprisoned for a term less than such person’s natural life, such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one year after the person’s disability is removed, except that no such action shall be commenced by or on behalf of any person under the disability more than eight years after the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-515(a). The Kansas Supreme Court has determined that “the 8-year statute of repose under 60-515(a) applies to all tortious acts committed -5- while the plaintiff is a minor, regardless of how old the plaintiff is (a minor or an adult) when the action actually accrues.” Ripley v. Tolbert, 921 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Kan. 1996). Since Mr. Cosgrove was a minor when the alleged abuse occurred, the eight-year statute of repose applies to his claims unless another statute takes his action out of § 60-515. 1 In his complaint, Mr. Cosgrove alleges that the abuse continued from early 1984 to “on or about October 16, 1992.” Assuming § 60-515 applies, “[t]he 8- year statute of repose under 60-515(a) would have begun to run on the date of this last act,” Ripley, 921 P.2d at 1215, and therefore would have expired on October 16, 2000. 2 Mr. Cosgrove, however, did not file his § 1983 claim against 1 Section 60-513(a)(4)’s two-year statute of limitations may also be tolled for inmates “imprisoned for a term less than [their] natural life” if they do not have “access to the court for purposes of bringing an action.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-515(a). In such cases, but only in such cases, inmates may file an action “within one year after” their release from prison. Id. Mr. Cosgrove is currently serving a criminal sentence in a federal facility in Greenville, Illinois and claims that he has only strictly limited access to the courts by virtue of his federal incarceration outside the state of Kansas, where he has no access to Kansas state statutes with which to prepare, file, and proceed on a civil rights action. While we recognize and appreciate the severe obstacles a pro se prisoner must overcome in bringing even the most basic legal action, our remand of this case on other grounds makes it unnecessary for us to determine the applicability of this provision in this case. 2 Under § 60-515(a), Mr. Cosgrove had one-year from reaching the age of majority to file his claim if the injury was reasonably ascertainable and accrued when he was still a minor. Alternatively, under § 60-513(a)(4), Mr. Cosgrove had two-years from the date his injury became reasonably ascertainable to file his claim if the injury was not reasonably ascertainable and did not accrue until he (continued...) -6- Defendants until November 1, 2004, more than four years after the eight-year statute of repose expired. In 1992, however, Kansas enacted § 60-523(a), which provides that: No action for recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual abuse shall be commenced more than three years after the date the person attains 18 years of age or more than three years from the date the person discovers or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse, whichever occurs later. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-523(a). By its plain terms then, § 60-523 does not have a statute of repose. And, with the amendment to § 60-515(a) in 1992, that section by its plain language no longer applies to childhood sexual abuse claims governed by § 60-523. 3 See Kan. Ann. Stat. § 60-515(a) (“Except as provided in K.S.A. 60-523 . . . no . . . action [governed by this section] shall be commenced . . . more 2 (...continued) was an adult. See Ripley, 921 P.2d at 1215. “[F]ederal law governs the accrual time for § 1983 claims.” Smith v. Gonzales, 222 F.3d 1220, 1222 (10th Cir. 2000). “A civil rights action accrues when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action.” Smith v. City of Enid ex rel. Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotations omitted). And because “the injury in a § 1983 case is the violation of a constitutional right,” determining when a § 1983 cause of action accrues requires the court “to identify the constitutional violation and locate it in time.” Id. (quotations, citations omitted). But we need not do so in this case because, “[u]nder either accrual date, . . . the action was barred by the 8-year statute of repose under [§] 60-515(a)” in 2000. See Ripley, 921 P.2d at 1215. 3 Furthermore, neither § 60-523 nor § 60-513 indicates that 60-513’s tenyear statute of repose should apply to childhood sexual abuse claims, and no Kansas court has ever done so. -7- than eight years after the time of the act giving rise to the cause of action.”). Thus, if the “childhood sexual abuse” statute of limitations applies, a plaintiff’s complaint is not time barred by any statute of repose. In enacting § 60-523, the legislature specifically expressed its intent that the section apply to “[a]ny action commenced on or after July 1, 1992.” Id. 60523(d)(1). Mr. Cosgrove’s commenced his action in 2004. Thus, if the childhood sexual abuse statute of limitations applies, his § 1983 claim would only be time barred if he filed his complaint “more than three years from the date [he] discover[ed] or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or illness was caused by childhood sexual abuse, whichever occurs later.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 523(a). B. Statute of Limitations Applicable to Mr. Cosgrove’s § 1983 Claim It is unclear from the face of Mr. Cosgrove’s complaint whether section 60515(a)’s or 60-523(a)’s statute of limitations period should apply. Mr. Cosgrove alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by placing him in an abusive foster home, where he suffered daily physical and mental abuse as a result of various Kansas officials’ conduct. The district court concluded that § 60523(a) did not apply because Mr. Cosgrove alleged “only physical abuse” and “[h]is attempt to broadly expand the scope of . . . [§] 60-523 to include ‘a pattern of physical abuse’ as ‘consequently’ including childhood sexual abuse as defined -8- by . . . [§] 60-523 . . . is unfounded.” 4 But the district court erred in doing so because, liberally construing a pro se complaint, we could imagine cases where an adequately developed factual backdrop to a claim of physical abuse includes the types of sexual abuse that invoke § 60-523(a)’s extended statute of limitations. 5 Thus, while it is certainly possible that § 60-515(a)’s two-year statute of limitations and eight-year statute of repose should apply, this fact is not patently clear from the face of the complaint nor rooted in adequately developed facts. 4 Section 60-523(b)(2) states: (2) “Childhood sexual abuse” includes any act committed against the person which act occurred when the person was under the age of 18 years and which act would have been a violation of any of the following: (A) Indecent liberties with a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3503 and amendments thereto; (B) aggravated indecent liberties with a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3504 and amendments thereto; (C) aggravated criminal sodomy as defined in K.S.A. 21-3506 and amendments thereto; (D) enticement of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3509 and amendments thereto; (E) indecent solicitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3510 and amendments thereto; (F) aggravated indecent solicitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3511 and amendments thereto; (G) sexual exploitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3516 and amendments thereto; or (H) aggravated incest as defined in K.S.A. 21-3603 and amendments thereto; or any prior laws of this state of similar effect at the time the act was committed. 5 In fact, Mr. Cosgrove submitted, in his objections to the district court’s dismissal on statute of limitations grounds, that “the central allegation of the complaint is the violation of plaintiff’s civil rights based upon the pattern of physical abuse, which consequently includes ‘childhood sexual abuse’ as defined in K.S.A. 60-523.” -9- Furthermore, if § 60-523’s statute of limitations applies, it is not patently clear when Mr. Cosgrove discovered or reasonably should have discovered that his injuries were caused by childhood sexual abuse. A court, therefore, cannot determine when the three-year statute of limitations began to run without making certain factual determinations. Section 1915, however, “cannot serve as a factfinding process.” See Fratus, 49 F.3d at 675 (prohibiting factfinding in a § 1915(d) dismissal, which is the precursor to § 1915(e)) (quotations omitted).