Opinion ID: 1147963
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Effect of Relation Between the Religious and Their Church.

Text: It is argued by the plaintiffs that members of the Religious are bound by their oaths of obedience to obey their superiors in the church. They quote from Codex Juris Canonici, the official body of laws and regulations governing the Roman Catholic Church, as follows: Canon 499. All members of Religious Orders are subject to the Roman Pontiff as their supreme Superior, to whom they owe obedience, also by virtue of their vow of obedience. Canon 501. Superiors and Chapters, according to their constitutions and common law, have right of dominion over their subjects. Canon 592. All religious are subject to the general obligations of the clerics in Canons 124 to 142 unless otherwise expressly stated. Canon 127. All clerics specially priests with special obligation must render obedience and reverence to the diocesan authority. Canon 128. As many times as the Church needs it, according to the Bishop's judgment, and unless a legitimate impediment prevents it, they must faithfully fulfill any obligation imposed on them by the Bishop. A number of the Religious testified they were bound to obey their superiors, the priest or the archbishop, in matters of religion, and that teaching of religion before or after classes was within the jurisdiction of their superiors. By virtue of Sec. 9 of Art. 12 of our Constitution, supra, no religious tests can be prescribed for any teacher, or a member of any faith denied the right to teach because of his or her religious beliefs. But do the vow of obedience and the historic position of the Roman Catholic Church as to public schools and their own schools, the fact that all money received for teaching by members of the Religious is turned over to their Orders (which it is claimed is state aid to religion), and the wearing of religious garb disqualify them from teaching in the public schools? For the position or policy of the Roman Catholic Church as to schools, we have no better information than that given by Mr. Justice Jackson of the United States Supreme Court in his dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 514, 91 L.Ed. 711, 168 A.L.R. 1392, as follows: The function of the Church school is a subject on which this record is meager. It shows only that the schools are under superintendence of a priest and that `religion is taught as part of the curriculum.' But we know that such schools are parochial only in name  they, in fact, represent a world-wide and age-old policy of the Roman Catholic Church. Under the rubric `Catholic Schools,' the Canon Law of the Church, by which all Catholics are bound, provides: `1215. Catholic children are to be educated in schools where not only nothing contrary to Catholic faith and morals is taught, but rather in schools where religious and moral training occupy the first place    (Canon 1372.)' `1216. In every elementary school the children must, according to their age, be instructed in Christian doctrine. `The young people who attend the higher schools are to receive a deeper religious knowledge, and the bishops shall appoint priests qualified for such work by their learning and piety. (Canon 1373.)' `1217. Catholic children shall not attend non-Catholic, indifferent, schools that are mixed, that is to say, schools open to Catholic and non-Catholics alike. The bishop of the diocese only has the right, in harmony with the instructions of the Holy See, to decide under what circumstances, and with what safeguards to prevent loss of faith, it may be tolerated that Catholic children go to such schools. (Canon 1374.)' `1224. The religious teaching of youth in any schools is subject to the authority and inspection of the Church. `The local Ordinaries have the right and duty to watch that nothing is taught contrary to faith or good morals, in any of the schools of their territory. `They, moreover, have the right to approve the books of Christian doctrine and the teachers of religion, and to demand, for the sake of safeguarding religion and morals, the removal of teachers and books. (Canon 1381.)' (Woywod, Rev. Stanislaus, The New Canon Law, under imprimatur of Most Rev. Francis J. Spellman, Archbishop of New York and others, 1940.) These being fundamental laws of the Church, the Religious having dedicated their services to the Church and the teaching of the youth, and our school authorities having condoned or even encouraged the Religious in the teaching of religion in the public schools, it is small wonder we find the Religious overstepping constitutional bounds. They were doing what they believed to be commanded by the Church and, of course, to be right in the eyes of their Lord. The question is are they so bound in their consciences and by the laws of their Church that they cannot serve as teachers in the public schools and perform their duties in accordance with the federal and our state Constitutions, as announced in People of State of Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 649, 2 A.L.R.2d 1338, and the Everson case, supra. The Religious have taken vows of poverty and all their earnings go to their respective Orders, the Religious in return receiving care, housing, clothing and maintenance. In all probability, the money received by the Orders exceeds such cost. However they receive only the same salary as other teachers and we do not feel this is the aid to religion or the church denounced by the federal and our state Constitutions. O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184 N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612, 7 L.R.A.,N.S., 402, 6 Ann.Cas. 432. The Supreme Court of Missouri in the case of Harfst v. Hoegen, 349 Mo. 808, 163, S.W.2d 609, 613, 141 A.L.R. 1136, did bar the Religious from teaching in the public schools under constitutional provisions substantially like ours and on quite similar facts. In the course of the opinion it is stated: There is another constitutional inhibition which respondents do not observe. It forbids a school district to make payments from any public fund to sustain any private or public school controlled by any sectarian denomination. Respondents might argue that the St. Cecelia school is controlled by the school board and not by the church, but we find from the record that the nominal supervision by the school board is but an indirect means of accomplishing that which the Constitution forbids. The statement of the county superintendent of schools that `We put the St. Cecelia parochial school into the public school system' is fully borne out by the facts in evidence. It was not only put there but it was maintained there with public funds. The Sister Superior of the Order to which the Religious there belonged (Sisters of the Most Precious Blood) testified that members of her Order had dedicated their lives to teaching and to the Catholic faith, that she had given religious instruction in all her teaching experience and, finally, that she could not teach any differently. In the course of the opinion, the court stated: From her testimony (Sister Superior) we must conclude that the members of her religious order, their lives dedicated to the training of children both in religion and education, come within this constitutional interdiction as teachers of religion, and payment to them from public school funds is forbidden. While the compulsory school attendance laws, public funds and public buildings may not be used for the teaching of sectarian religion, and, as stated in the Everson case, supra, and affirmed in the McCollum case, supra, there must be a wall of separation between church and state; still we are unwilling to follow the Missouri court on this point and bar the Religious as teachers in our public schools by virtue of their membership in a religious order.