Opinion ID: 1034991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of the In Limine Order

Text: On appeal, Warger argues the district court should have declared a mistrial because the second violation of the in limine order was prejudicial. This Court will not disturb a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Pullman v. Land O' Lakes, Inc., 262 F.3d 759, 762 (8th Cir. 2001). A violation of an order granting a motion in limine may only serve as a basis for a new trial when the order is specific in its prohibition and the violation is clear. Black v. Shultz, 530 F.3d 702, 706 (8th Cir. 2008). Such violation must constitute prejudicial error or result in an unfair trial. Id. Prejudicial error is error which in all -3- probability produced some effect on the jury's verdict and is harmful to the substantial rights of the party assigning it. Id. (quoting Pullman, 262 F.3d at 762). It is undisputed the district court's in limine order was specific in its prohibition and the violation was clear. The issue raised on appeal is whether the violation was prejudicial. We agree with the district court, it was not. The court gave a curative instruction after the recess and, during final jury instructions, reminded the jury that if an objection is sustained they must ignore the question and must not try to guess what the answer might have been. Appellant's App. 79. We have previously upheld district courts' refusals to grant mistrials for violations of in limine orders when, inter alia, the court gives a prompt and clear curative instruction. Russell v. Whirlpool Corp., 702 F.3d 450, 460 (8th Cir. 2012). Warger argues the curative instruction was insufficient because it was not given until the jury had returned from the recess. Although it is true the instruction was not given until after the recess, Warger provides no persuasive explanation as to how Shauers's question affected the jury's verdict. He claims the question was prejudicial because it was an attempt to introduce inadmissible evidence which was key to Shauers's defense. However, the jury heard no inadmissible testimony because the district court sustained the objection and Shauers's counsel did not ask any similar questions during the remainder of the trial. Accordingly, we cannot say the district court abused its discretion in denying a new trial.