Opinion ID: 2081068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Totality of Circumstances.

Text: The question remains whether, under all of the circumstances shown, the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was valid. Iowa Code section 232.45(9) provides in part that when a court is construing a voluntariness issue in connection with the juvenile statement, it may consider any factors it finds relevant and shall consider the following factors: a. Opportunity for the child to consult with a parent, guardian, custodian, lawyer or other adult. b. The age of the child. c. The child's level of education. d. The child's level of intelligence. e. Whether the child was advised of his or her constitutional rights. f. Length of time the child was held in shelter care or detention before making the statement in question. g. The nature of the questioning which elicited the statement. h. Whether physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep was used upon the child during the shelter care, detention, or questioning. We note that the first criterion has been met here; although there was evidence the defendant's mother left the interrogation room for brief intervals, such as to get coffee, the defendant had full opportunity to consult with her. In respect to the remaining criteria, we note that the defendant was seventeen at the time and had had at least seven years of formal education. (He testified he had left school in the seventh or eighth grade.) His level of intelligence is not evident in the record but there is no claim made that he lacks sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of his rights or the effect of his waiver of them. The record establishes that he was advised of his constitutional rights, that he was held only briefly in connection with the questioning, and that neither the nature of the questioning itself nor the circumstances surrounding it show any duress, punishment, or deprivation of the defendant's essential needs. In summary, we conclude that application of the criteria of section 232.45(9) does not bear out a claim of involuntariness. Evidence supporting the defendant's claim of involuntariness, based upon his assumption he would be treated as a juvenile, includes the failure of the officers to specifically inform him of his possible transfer to adult court; the fact that the waiver form, a copy of which is appended, is entitled  Juvenile Miranda Rights (emphasis added); that it provides for the signature of the child; and that in his five prior brushes with the law he had always been processed as a juvenile. On the other hand, the State points out that the waiver form advised the reader that any statement can and will be used against you in a Court of Law; that the defendant was capable of reading and writing; and that he was street wise through earlier dealings with the law. Moreover, he was accompanied by his mother at all material times and she consented to his waiver; the warnings given orally advised of his rights in addition to the written form used. When the totality of the circumstances is considered we agree with the district court and the Court of Appeals that the defendant's rights were knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived. AFFIRMED.