Opinion ID: 199008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hernandez and Gonzalez

Text: 33 Hernandez and Gonzalez argue that the district court erred in admitting the testimony of Puerto Rico Police Officer Gregorio Duran regarding investigations and surveillance at the Luis Pales Matos housing project. Duran testified that while investigating drug distribution at the housing project he observed Hernandez, Gonzalez, and Bonano acting as Pichi's bodyguards. Cross-examination, however, revealed that Duran was unsure precisely when he saw the co-defendants. Since some of Duran's observations were made before the charged conspiracy, he could not be certain that he had seen the defendants within the time frame of the conspiracy. Surveillance reports that could have been used to clarify when Duran saw the defendants, or to impeach his testimony if the defendants were not mentioned in them, could not be obtained because they were stored in a Puerto Rico facility that OSHA had declared highly contaminated. 34 In response, Hernandez and Gonzalez requested a mistrial. Although arguing that no mistrial was necessary, the government suggested to the district court that it might strike Agent Duran's testimony and issue a curative instruction. The trial court reasoned that there was no basis for a mistrial--or even for striking the testimony--because 1) the reports were unavailable to the government, 2) there had been no misconduct, and 3) the defendants have had the chance to cross-examine this witness and really attack his credibility on the grounds that he did not observe the matters within the time frame. Nonetheless, the court agreed to strike the testimony and issue the cautionary instruction because the Government wants to do that. On appeal, Gonzalez and Hernandez claim that Agent Duran's testimony impermissibly bolstered Masso's testimony. Given that Duran's testimony was struck, the only possible legal argument is that the remedy of striking the testimony and issuing a cautionary instruction was insufficient to cure the harms caused by the allegedly inadmissible testimony and that the mistrial the defendants sought should have been granted. 35 We find no error in the trial court's denial of a mistrial, much less the manifest abuse of discretion required for reversal. See United States v. Rullan-Rivera, 60 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 1995) (Mistrial is a last resort, to be employed only if the demonstrated harm can be cured by no less drastic means, such as a contemporaneous jury instruction.). Even assuming that Agent Duran's testimony was inadmissible(an assumption we make solely for the sake of argument), the district court's response--striking the testimony and issuing a curative instruction--was certainly adequate. The court told the jury: 36 Now, the testimony of Agent Gregorio Duran Malave concerning his observations that he saw the three defendants providing security service, body guarding 'Pichi', well I am ordering that testimony to be stricken from the record, and I am instructing you to erase it from your mind entirely, the way I told you, the way you swore to obey my instructions and follow the law. So again, I repeat, disregard that testimony , that portion of the testimony, that portion, entirely from your minds. 37 We presume that juries follow instructions. See United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 73 (1st Cir. 1998). While this presumption may be rebutted on a sufficient showing that the offending testimony reasonably could not have been ignored and that serious prejudice likely resulted, Rullan-Rivera, 60 F.3d at 18, no such showing has been made here. Indeed, Agent Duran's stricken testimony also implicated co-defendant Bonano as a bodyguard for Pichi. The jury, however, acquitted Bonano, indicating that they were not unduly influenced by the testimony.