Opinion ID: 204669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hernandez's Sentencing Enhancement

Text: Hernandez challenges the district court's application of a three-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) based on its conclusion that Hernandez played a supervisory or managerial role in the conspiracy. We review the district court's decision for clear error. United States v. Curb, 626 F.3d 921, 924 (7th Cir.2010). We reverse only if, after reviewing the entire evidence, [the court] is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Section 3B1.1(b) of the sentencing guidelines provides a three-level enhancement if the defendant was a manager or supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). The guidelines do not define the terms manager or supervisor. But the fourth application note to § 3B1.1(b) provides a list of factors that we consider when determining whether a defendant had a managing or supervisory role: Factors the court should consider include the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b), cmt. n.4; see United States v. Howell, 527 F.3d 646, 649 (7th Cir.2008) (We have noted that these factors are to be used to distinguish leadership from management, but have found that they are still relevant in ascertaining whether an individual had a supervisory role at all.). No one of these factors is considered a prerequisite to the enhancement, and, at the same time, the factors are not necessarily entitled to equal weight. United States v. Anderson, 580 F.3d 639, 649 (7th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). When examining these factors, we emphasize both relative responsibility and control over other participants. Howell, 527 F.3d at 649. [2] The district court discussed six of the seven factors listed in application note four and based its finding that Hernandez worked as a manager or supervisor on a variety of factual determinations relevant to those factors, which included, among other things, that Hernandez (1) exercised decision-making authority; (2) took part in planning and organizing the offense by working as Iniguez's right-hand man and taking directions from Iniguez that required. Hernandez to exercise managerial and supervisory responsibilities over Raymond Salinas and Phillip King; (3) acted as a sounding board for Iniguez by discussing the organization and planning of the drug conspiracy with Iniguez on a somewhat regular basis; (4) exercised control and authority over others when he supervised Salinas and King; and (5) was entrusted with substantial sums of money. The district court concluded that there was ample evidence from trial and the sentencing hearing that Hernandez had a managerial or supervisory role in the drug conspiracy. Hernandez claims that he played a passive role in the drug conspiracy, merely assisting Iniguez in carrying out the conspiracy without any authority or control over anyone involved. More specifically, he argues that he exercised no supervisory authority over Salinas or King and that the district court erred by concluding otherwise. He claims that it was Iniguez, not Hernandez, who attempted to supervise Salinas and King. We find no clear error in the district court's conclusion that Hernandez was a manager or supervisor of the drug conspiracy, or in the district court's factual conclusions listed above that supported its decision to apply the enhancement. With regard to Hernandez's control over Salinas and King, the record demonstrates that Iniguez sent Hernandez to Kentucky on two separate occasions to oversee the receipt and distribution of drugs in Kentucky, despite the fact that both Salinas and King were there. It also permits the conclusion that Hernandez had authority over Salinas when attempting to open hidden compartments in a car to retrieve drugs in Kentucky. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 584 F.3d 726, 729 (7th Cir.2009) (Villa admitted he was in Chicago to oversee drugs and drug proceeds for a Mexican cartel, which suggests he played a coordinating or organizing part in the criminal activity.). Hernandez claims that Iniguez exercised authority over Salinas and King, but this does not preclude the district court's finding that Hernandez also had such authority. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n.4 (There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy.); see also United States v. Sainz-Preciado, 566 F.3d 708, 715 (7th Cir.2009) ([A]ssuming that [the leader of the entire drug operation] did in fact tell Sainz-Preciado who to call to pick up the cocaine, Sainz-Preciado's resulting status as a mere middleman would not make him immune from application of § 3B1.1. It is Sainz-Preciado's relative responsibility and control over other participants that qualifies him as a manager. . . . (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Further, Hernandez does not point us to portions of the record that negate the other above-mentioned factual conclusions that the district court reached, and the portions of the record to which the government directs us supports the district court's findings. See United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956 (7th Cir.1991). Accordingly, we find no clear error in the district court's application of a three-level enhancement for Hernandez's role in the drug conspiracy pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).