Opinion ID: 2585012
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to the Incidental Take Permit

Text: EPIC makes several challenges to the validity of the state 50-year Incidental Take Permit. Each of these will be considered in turn.
EPIC contends that the DFG violated CESA, the California Endangered Species Act (Fish & G. Code, ง 2050 et seq.), in agreeing to what are called no surprises clauses that would limit in advance the obligation of Pacific Lumber to mitigate various impacts on endangered and threatened species. An overview of CESA is useful for addressing these claims. The Legislature has declared that [I]t is the policy of the state to conserve, protect, restore, and enhance any endangered species or any threatened species and its habitat. (Fish & G. Code, ง 2052.) Under CESA, a native species of bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, reptile, or plant is considered `endangered' when it `is in serious danger of becoming extinct throughout all, or a significant portion, of its range' (Fish & G. Code, ง 2062), and `threatened' when it `is likely to become an endangered species in the foreseeable future in the absence of ... special protection and management efforts.' (Fish & G. Code, ง 2067.) ( Mountain Lion Foundation v. Fish & Game Com. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 105, 114 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 580, 939 P.2d 1280].) Central to CESA is its prohibition on the taking of an endangered or threatened species. (Fish & G. Code, ง 2080.) To take in this context means to catch, capture or kill. (Fish & G. Code, ง 86.) Nonetheless, CESA allows the DFG to authorize a take that is incidental to an otherwise lawful activity if certain conditions are met. (Fish & G. Code, ง 2081, subd. (b); see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, ง 783 et seq.) At the heart of CESA is the obligation to mitigate such takes. The impacts of the authorized take shall be minimized and fully mitigated. The measures required to meet this obligation shall be roughly proportional in extent to the impact of the authorized taking on the species. Where various measures are available to meet this obligation, the measures required shall maintain the applicant's objectives to the greatest extent possible. All required measures shall be capable of successful implementation. For purposes of this section only, impacts of taking include all impacts on the species that result from any act that would cause the proposed taking. (Fish & G. Code, ง 2081, subd. (b)(2); hereafter section 2081(b)(2).) In this case, a state Incidental Take Permit was issued to Pacific Lumber authorizing the incidental take of the marbled murrelet, an endangered bird, and the bank swallow, a threatened bird. The taking of two other fully protected species was not permitted under the permit. [18] EPIC contends that the state Incidental Take Permit was issued with unlawful no surprises clauses. As explained in the HCP, the no surprises provision consists of two major components. First, if there are changed circumstances that were anticipated in the HCP, and mitigation measures were prescribed to meet the adverse impacts of those changed circumstances, then if and when those circumstances occur, the landowner will be expected to implement those measures and no others. As the HCP's Implementation Agreement makes clear, this is the case even if additional conservation and mitigation measures are deemed necessary by [DFG] to respond to a Changed Circumstance. Second, in the case of unforeseen circumstances, the government will not require the commitment by the landowner of additional land, water, or financial compensation, or additional restrictions on the use of land, water or other natural resources unless the landowner consents. Unforeseen circumstances are defined as those changes in circumstances affecting a species or geographic area covered by an HCP, that could not reasonably be anticipated by a landowner and the wildlife agencies at the time of the HCP development and that result in a substantial and adverse change in the status of a species covered by the HCP. Particular types of changed circumstances and unforeseen circumstances are defined in the HCP. For example, fire changed circumstances are wildfires, including those originating from timber operations and prescribed burning that are 5,000 acres or less. Fire unforeseen circumstances is defined as all such wildfires that are over 5,000 total acres. Changed and unforeseen circumstances for wind, landslides, and flooding are similarly defined in terms of the magnitude of the events. EPIC argues that these kinds of advanced assurances that additional mitigation measures will not be required even when the measures are deemed necessary by DFG is contrary to that agency's statutory mandate. EPIC bases the argument on the language of section 2081(b)(2), as discussed above, that the impact of the authorized take must be fully mitigated. Pacific Lumber and DFG have several responses to this argument. First, they note, as the Court of Appeal did, that the no surprises rule is the established policy of federal wildlife agencies, as adopted by federal regulation (50 C.F.R. ง 17.22). They contend the authority to make regulatory assurances likewise resides in DFG. They also point to a provision of the Natural Community Conservation Planning Act (NCCPA; Fish & G. Code, ง 2800 et seq.), which allows for similar regulatory assurances in the context of the development of a Natural Community Conservation Plan. EPIC counters that the existence of a provision within the NCCPA authorizing a no surprises provisions undermines rather than supports Pacific Lumber's argument. It argues that this statute demonstrates that when the Legislature intends to authorize an agency to give a landowner regulatory assurances that no further mitigation measures will be required in the case of changed or unforeseen circumstances, it has done so explicitly, and that we should infer from the lack of such explicit authorization in CESA that the Legislature did not intend such authorization. (See Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1395 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323] [when the Legislature intends to authorize an agency to award damages, it does so expressly, as evidenced by pertinent statutes].) In order to evaluate that argument, it is useful to understand the background and scope of the NCCPA. As originally enacted in 1991, the act provided that DFG may enter into agreements with any person for the purpose of preparing and implementing a natural community conservation plan to provide comprehensive management and conservation of multiple wildlife species (Fish & G. Code, former ง 2810), and that such planning may be undertaken by local, state and federal agencies independently or in cooperation with other persons. (Fish & G. Code, former ง 2820; Stats. 1991, ch. 765, ง 2, pp. 3424-3425.) The former statute further provided that the Fish and Game Commission, on recommendation from DFG, may authorize... the taking of any candidate species whose conservation, protection, restoration, and enhancement is provided for in a [DFG] approved natural community conservation plan that ensured compatibility with the federal Endangered Species Act. ( Id., former ง 2830; see also former ง 2825, subd. (a)(6).) (14) The NCCPA was amended in 2002 (Stats. 2002, ch. 4, ง 2) to define in much greater detail the kind of provisions that are to be included in a natural community conservation plan, including public participation in the development of the plan (Fish & G. Code, ง 2815), and an extensive set of findings required for plan approval ( id., ง 2820, subd. (a)). These findings are to include that [t]he plan integrates adaptive management strategies that are periodically evaluated and modified based on the information from the monitoring program ... ( id., subd. (a)(2)) and that [t]he plan provides for the protection of habitat, natural communities, and species diversity on a landscape or ecosystem level through the creation and long-term management of habitat reserves or other measures that provide equivalent conservation of covered species ( id., subd. (a)(3)). Section 2820 also includes detailed provisions for implementation agreements ( id., subd. (b)) and provisions for monitoring and enforcement ( id., subds. (b), (c)). Section 2820, subdivision (f)(2) provides: If there are unforeseen circumstances, additional land, water, or financial compensation or additional restrictions on the use of land, water, or other natural resources shall not be required without the consent of plan participants for a period of time specified in the implementation agreement, unless the department determines that the plan is not being implemented consistent with the substantive terms of the implementation agreement. (15) DFG argues that CESA and the NCCPA are distinct statutory schemes that never have been amended together, and that therefore the explicit provision for regulatory assurances in the latter statute does not imply a lack of authority to grant regulatory assurances under the former statute. We find DFG's argument unpersuasive. First, although CESA and the NCCPA are distinct statutes, they share a common objectiveโthey authorize the incidental taking of threatened and endangered species in a way that minimizes impacts on those species. The statutes take different routes to that objective, CESA through the imposition of roughly proportional mitigating measures on landowners, the NCCPA through a comprehensive agreement incorporating various mitigation measures, including the creation of habitat reserves. Although in practice these lines may be blurred, the Legislature clearly contemplated distinct statutory paths to the same objective. Moreover, CESA has been amended several times either contemporaneously with or subsequent to the 2002 amendment of the NCCPA. (See Stats. 2004, ch. 614, ง 1; Stats. 2003, ch. 62, ง 96; Stats. 2002, ch. 32, ง 2.) Where as here the Legislature has established alternative statutory schemes for authorizing and minimizing the taking of endangered species, but has provided a particular benefit to landownersโregulatory assurancesโin only one of those schemes, the natural inference is that it did not intend the same assurances to be provided in the other scheme. Nor does the language of CESA assist DFG's position. Pacific Lumber and DFG point out that although the act speaks of fully mitigat[ing] the impacts of the authorized take, it also has significant limiting language. The statute provides that the landowner's obligation only be roughly proportional in extent to the impact ... on the species. (ง 2081(b)(2).) As amici curiae California Building Industry Association et al. point out, the roughly proportional language mirrors the constitutional standard for what constitutes the taking of property set forth in Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 512 U.S. 374 [129 L.Ed.2d 304, 114 S.Ct. 2309]. In that case, the court held under Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments takings jurisprudence that when a government requires a dedication of land in exchange for a development permit, it must be guided by the principle of rough proportionality, i.e., it must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. (512 U.S. at p. 391.) As we stated in a case that applied Dolan 's rationale to development fees, Dolan was concerned with implementing one of the fundamental principles of modern takings jurisprudenceโ`to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.' ( Ehrlich v. City of Culver City (1996) 12 Cal.4th 854, 880 [50 Cal.Rptr.2d 242, 911 P.2d 429].) Thus, to require that mitigation measures be roughly proportional to a landowner's impact on a species means that the landowner is only required to mitigate its own impacts on the species. If the no surprises provisions applicable to Pacific Lumber did no more than guarantee this kind of proportionality, then they would be unquestionably within DFG's purview. But these provisions go further. For example, included in the changed and unforeseen circumstances pertaining to fire are fires originating from timber operations. Furthermore, in defining landslide or flood, changed and unforeseen circumstances are cast solely in terms of magnitude, and do not differentiate between those events partially caused or exacerbated by timber harvesting and those that are not. Nor do the regulatory assurances permit DFG to require additional mitigation measures when changed and unforeseen circumstances have rendered previously prescribed mitigation measures insufficient. Inasmuch as the language categorically exempts Pacific Lumber from mitigating impacts of its own activities on listed species and their habitat, it goes further than the language section 2081(b)(2) contemplates. In other words, reading the roughly proportional language together with the fully mitigate language leads to the conclusion the Legislature intended that a landowner bear no moreโbut also no lessโthan the costs incurred from the impact of its activity on listed species. To the extent that the changed and unforeseen circumstances provisions of the Incidental Take Permit exempt landowners from this obligation, they exceed DFG's statutory authority under CESA. The language in the last sentence of section 2081(b)(2) stating that impacts of taking include all impacts on the species that result from any act that would cause the proposed taking (ง 2081(b)(2)) further supports our construction of the statute. [19] (16) Pacific Lumber and DFG in support of their argument also point to the language providing that [w]here various measures are available to meet this obligation [to fully mitigate], the measures required shall maintain the applicant's objectives to the greatest extent possible. (ง 2081(b)(2).) This language does not diminish the extent of a landowner's obligation under CESA, however, but merely provides that when that obligation can be met in several ways, the way most consistent with a landowner's objectives should be chosen. It does not relieve the landowner of the obligation to fully mitigate its own impacts. With respect to the changed circumstances portion of the no surprises provisions, Pacific Lumber and DFG endorse the Court of Appeal's conclusion: The required responses to changed circumstances are designed to mitigate the impact of physical processes (such as fire, flood, earthquake) that can be anticipated in the course of the underlying activities. Insofar as [EPIC contends] that the responses will not in fact fully mitigate the adverse impacts, their contention is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the Department's finding on full mitigation, and that challenge is foreclosed. But as noted, the Implementation Agreement to the HCP provides that even [i]f additional conservation and mitigation measures are deemed necessary by [ DFG ] to respond to a Changed Circumstance and such measures were not provided for pursuant to the HCP, [DFG] will not require any new, additional or different conservation and/or mitigation measures from [Pacific Lumber] in addition to those provided for pursuant to the HCP without the consent of [Pacific Lumber]. Thus, we do not understand EPIC to be mounting a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the mitigation measures proposed in the HCP in response to certain anticipated changed circumstances, but rather to be challenging a provision stating that even when DFG itself concludes the prescribed mitigation measures are not adequate in light of changed circumstances, it will not impose new measures without Pacific Lumber's consent. As discussed, this provision cannot be reconciled with Pacific Lumber's duty to fully mitigate the impacts of its take. Nor do we agree with the Court of Appeal's approach in addressing the unforeseen circumstances issue. As the court stated: With respect to unforeseen circumstances, the full mitigation requirement does not apply. The focus of the full mitigation requirement is on adverse impacts that result from an `act'โi.e., a purposeful activity. (Fish & G. Code, ง 2081, subd. (b); see Department of Fish & Game v. Anderson-Cottonwood Irrigation Dist. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1554, 1561 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 222].) Adverse impacts that result from unforeseen circumstances are impacts that cannot reasonably be anticipated, not impacts from purposeful activities. We agree that the focus of the full mitigation requirement is on adverse impacts that result from purposeful activity. But as discussed above, unforeseen circumstances, as defined in the HCP, includes impacts resulting from purposeful activity. A catastrophic event such as a fire or flood is classified as unforeseen when it reaches a certain magnitude, whether or not Pacific Lumber's timber operations contributed to that event. Moreover, when natural disasters change baseline conditions, then logging activities that previously would not have had a significant impact on endangered species may now have such an impact, and therefore fall within the scope of the CESA obligation to fully mitigate impacts. To be sure, there is no obligation for a permit holder to mitigate the impacts of the natural disasters themselves when it did not contribute to them. But when these impacts are exacerbated by the permit holder's own subsequent purposeful activities, then section 2081(b)(2) mandates the full mitigation of the impacts of a take, guided by the principle of rough proportionality. Particularly in light of the 50-year duration of the permit, provisions that freeze Pacific Lumber's obligations to mitigate in the face of changing circumstances, even when these circumstances are labeled unforeseen, cannot comply with the statutory mandate. [20] Moreover, the term unforeseen circumstance is a misnomer. Obviously, events identified in the HCP, such as fires over 5,000 acres and 100-year floods, are not unforeseen. They may be rare events, but if Pacific Lumber's timber operations contribute to cause such events to occur more frequently, or if the events themselves change conditions in such a way as to necessitate additional mitigation measures, there is no reason under section 2081(b)(2) that additional measures cannot be required. Pacific Lumber further argues that Assembly Bill 1986, the legislation that authorized the Headwaters Agreement, implicitly approved the no surprises clause. The statute made compliance with the Implementation Agreement [for the HCP] a condition of the SYP and other permits. Section 3 of that act states: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, funds appropriated by this act shall only be encumbered by the board if the final habitat conservation plan (hereafter `final HCP'), implementing agreement, and permits to allow the incidental take of threatened and endangered species, ... incorporate, at minimum, the following additional conditions and the final HCP is no less protective of aquatic or avian species than the draft HCP, as amended by those conditions.... (Stats. 1998, ch. 615, ง 3.) The Act then goes on to prescribe certain specific conditions and restrictions on Pacific Lumber's timber harvesting. ( Ibid. ) (17) This argument is not persuasive. Assembly Bill 1986's reference to the draft HCP established the minimum protective measures to be included in the final HCPโit was to serve as a floor, not a ceiling. The citation to a draft HCP that was then undergoing public review and possible revision obviously did not signify legislative approval of the contents of that draft beyond its use as a baseline. Moreover, an implied amendment of a statute is generally disfavored. ( Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531, 540-541 [277 Cal.Rptr. 1, 802 P.2d 317].) Here, the general reference to complying with the conditions imposed by the draft HCP does not evince any legislative intent to alter the scope of DFG's statutory authority to issue incidental take permits under Fish and Game Code section 2081(b)(2), nor indicate any consideration of the use of regulatory assurances. There is no evident legislative intent to grant an exception to section 2081(b)(2)'s full mitigation and rough proportionality requirements. Pacific Lumber and DFG, as well as several amici curiae, also emphasize the important policy promoted by such regulatory assurances, endorsing the Court of Appeal's statement that the `no surprises' rule is ... intended to encourage landowners to factor into their day-to-day activities measures to protect endangered species. By bringing in an element of certainty, the no-surprise rule removes a disincentive a landowner might have to obtaining an incidental take permit and submitting to the mitigation measures. As discussed above, however, the Legislature has already provided a means for DFG to validly provide the types of regulatory assurances at issue here to landowners pursuant to the NCCPA. The expansion of the circumstances under which such assurances can and should be given is a matter best addressed by the Legislature. [21]
EPIC contends that the Incidental Take Permit constituted abandonment of the DFG's public trust obligation to protect the natural resources of this state by virtue of the no surprises clauses, discussed above, and because of improper delegation to Pacific Lumber to determine which northern spotted owl sites will receive protection and which will be eliminated. (18) As the Court of Appeal recognized, there are two distinct public trust doctrines invoked by EPIC. First is the common law doctrine, which involves the government's affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of water resources.... ( National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (1983) 33 Cal.3d 419, 446 [189 Cal.Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709].) The second is a public trust duty derived from statute, specifically Fish and Game Code section 711.7, pertaining to fish and wildlife: The fish and wildlife resources are held in trust for the people of the state by and through the department. ( Id., subd. (a).) There is doubtless an overlap between the two public trust doctrinesโthe protection of water resources is intertwined with the protection of wildlife. (See National Audubon Society, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 447.) Nonetheless the duty of government agencies to protect wildlife is primarily statutory. Fish and Game Code section 1801, which declares that it is the policy of the state to encourage the preservation, conservation, and maintenance of wildlife resources under the jurisdiction and influence of the state, also declares in subdivision (h) that [i]t is not intended that this policy shall provide any power to regulate natural resources or commercial or other activities connected therewith, except as specifically provided by the Legislature. Generally speaking, therefore, we will look to the statutes protecting wildlife to determine if DFG or another government agency has breached its duties in this regard. In the previous part of this opinion we concluded that DFG breached its duty to require full mitigation of the impacts of an authorized take of a listed species under section 2081(b)(2) by the no surprises provisions in the HCP and Implementation Agreement. Its violation, therefore, is not of some general public trust duty, but of a specific statutory obligation. Moreover, we find no support in the record for EPIC's second claim, that in the Incidental Take Permit DFG improperly delegated to Pacific Lumber which northern spotted owl sites should be preserved. Rather, the relevant documents reveal that DFG has maintained its authority to review Pacific Lumber's site-specific decisions regarding preservation of northern spotted owl habitat. We therefore conclude the Incidental Take Permit did not violate a common law public trust duty.
EPIC contends that there were inadequate CESA findings to support the Incidental Take Permit. Although the findings leave something to be desired, we disagree there is prejudicial error. Administrative agency decisions in which discretion is exercised may generally be challenged by a writ of administrative mandamus pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. In Topanga Assn. for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles (1974) 11 Cal.3d 506, 515 [113 Cal.Rptr. 836, 522 P.2d 12] ( Topanga ), we considered the meaning of subdivision (b) of that statute, defining `abuse of discretion' to include instances in which the administrative order or decision `is not supported by the findings, or the findings are not supported by the evidence' and subdivision (c), wherein `abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.' We concluded that implicit in section 1094.5 is a requirement that the agency which renders the challenged decision must set forth findings to bridge the analytic gap between the raw evidence and ultimate decision or order.... By focusing ... upon the relationships between evidence and findings and between findings and ultimate action, the Legislature sought to direct the reviewing court's attention to the analytic route the administrative agency traveled from evidence to action. In so doing, we believe that the Legislature must have contemplated that the agency would reveal this route. Reference, in section 1094.5, to the reviewing court's duty to compare the evidence and ultimate decision to ` the findings' ... we believe leaves no room for the conclusion that the Legislature would have been content to have a reviewing court speculate as to the administrative agency's basis for decision. ( Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 515.) The findings do not need to be extensive or detailed. `[W]here reference to the administrative record informs the parties and reviewing courts of the theory upon which an agency has arrived at its ultimate finding and decision it has long been recognized that the decision should be upheld if the agency in truth found those facts which as a matter of law are essential to sustain its ... [decision].' ( Sierra Club v. California Coastal Commission, supra, 19 Cal.App.4th at p. 556.) On the other hand, mere conclusory findings without reference to the record are inadequate. (See Village of Laguna Beach, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 1022, 1035 [185 Cal.Rptr. 41].) EPIC contends that the CESA findings are inadequate. Under DFG regulations promulgated pursuant to CESA, the director of DFG must make findings that the take authorized by the Incidental Take Permit is consistent with the statutory requirements in Fish and Game Code section 2081, subdivision (b). (FP Rules, ง 783.4, subd. (a).) EPIC claims that DFG's CESA findings merely recited statutory criteria without any supporting rationale linking the evidence to the ultimate conclusion. The record discloses that the March 1, 1999 document containing the CESA findings recites the language of Fish and Game Code section 2081, subdivision (b) and affirms compliance with its provisions, referring to specific documents in the record: for example, that the Take of Covered Species as defined in the ITP [Incidental Take Permit] will be incidental to the otherwise lawful activities covered under the ITP, that the impacts will be minimized and fully mitigated through the HCP's Operating Conservation Program and [Implementation Agreement] and that the conservation and mitigation measures required pursuant to the HCP's Operating Conservation Program are roughly proportional in extent to the impact of Pacific Lumber's take. Thus, the findings refer to a specific documentโthe HCP's operating conservation program. This portion of the HCP describes conservation plans for each of the critical species expected to be impacted by Pacific Lumber's activities, setting forth for each species specific management objectives, conservation measures, and a monitoring program. The findings also refer to the Implementation Agreement, where Pacific Lumber's obligations are further delineated. The CESA findings were made in conjunction with findings for the final EIS/EIR. In the final EIS/EIR, the HCP's conservation programs were analyzed, and it was concluded that these programs would mitigate the adverse effects of incidental take on various species. Although the better practice would have been for the CESA findings to have referred more specifically to those portions of the final EIS/EIR that support the conclusion that the impacts of the take will be minimized and fully mitigated, we have no trouble under the circumstances discerning the analytic route the administrative agency traveled from evidence to action. ( Topanga, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 515; see No Slo Transit, Inc. v. City of Long Beach (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d 241, 260 [242 Cal.Rptr. 760].) We find no prejudicial error.