Opinion ID: 1270113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime

Text: In closing, we note that Rranci's case presents an issue of first impression for our Court. He and amici curiae raise the issue whether the Government's obligations under protocols of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 (the Convention), prohibit his removal. The Convention states: Each State Party shall take appropriate measures within its means to provide effective protection from potential retaliation or intimidation for witnesses in criminal proceedings who give testimony concerning offences covered by this Convention.... Id. at art. 24(1) (emphasis added). Annex III to the treaty, the Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea, and Air, is a supplement that is meant to be interpreted together with Annex I ( i.e., the main treaty). Id. at Annex III, art. 1(1). Offenses under Annex III are viewed as offenses under the Convention as whole, id. at Annex III, art. 1(3), and those offenses include the smuggling of migrants, id. at Annex III, art. 6(1)(a). Thus, it appears that the witness protections of Annex I would apply to witnesses such as Rranci who provided statements or testified to crimes defined under Annex III of the Convention, here Muho's smuggling crimes. We did not have the opportunity to address the Convention in Kamara, which (as noted above) was decided before the Convention took effect. [6] Amici argue that the state-created danger exception would be an appropriate vehicle to incorporate the Convention's provisions into United States law. We need not reach that issue of treaty interpretation here. But we note that the concept of protecting witnesses under the Convention is distinct from the state-created danger exception. The latter relates to constitutional due process of law, whereas protection under the Convention would come from the United States' treaty obligations. We are skeptical that the state-created danger exception, which extends well beyond the immigration context, can appropriately accommodate the specific obligations of the Convention. The Government argues that the Convention introduced no new protections for aliens. A Senate report and a letter from President Bush have stated that current United States law already complies with the Convention, obviating the need for any implementing legislation. Gov't's Br. at 15 (citing S. Exec. Doc. No. 109-4, §§ 1(c), 2(c), & 3(c), October 7, 2005; President of the United States, Letter of Transmittal, Treaty Doc. 108-16, February 23, 2004). Accepting that interpretation as accurate, the absence of implementing legislation does not imply that the BIA has no need to set out how existing law complies with the Convention. On the contrary, it may provide beneficial clarity to alien-informant cases for the BIA to explain its understanding of the United States' obligations toward aliens who provide information in criminal cases. The Government also argues that Rranci failed to exhaust administratively any claim he might have had under the Convention because he did not raise it in his motion to reopen before the IJ and the BIA. This argument misses the mark. On a motion to reopen, a petitioner claiming ineffective assistance of counsel need not argue the merits of his claimsthose will receive a hearing if the petitioner's motion to reopen is successful. Cf. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 163. It cannot be held against Rranci that he failed to raise the issue of a treaty before the IJ and the BIA in that particular procedural context, when the task at hand was to reopen his case. On remand, the BIA should determine how current U.S. law reflects compliance with the specific provisions of the Convention that are relevant to Rranci's claim. We leave interpretation of this issue to the BIA for consideration in the first instance. See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425, 119 S.Ct. 1439, 143 L.Ed.2d 590 (1999). But the Convention calls into question whether the Government may put Rranci into harm's way in Albania after using his cooperation to obtain a guilty plea from a significant criminal. The BIA's consideration of the Convention will factor into the degree to which Rranci may have been prejudiced by his prior counsel's decision to recommend forgoing a hearing and accepting voluntary departure.