Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Shackling Orders (Oliver)

Text: Oliver maintains the trial court violated People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322 ( Duran ), when it ordered (1) a leg brace on April 20, 1992, several months before trial began, and (2) a leg-waist-and-wrist chain on February 2, 1993, the day after Oliver joined Lewis in attacking counsel in court. Oliver claims the decision to restrain him before trial, and to impose heavier restraints after the midtrial assault, violated his rights generally under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and under parallel provisions of the state Constitution. He asserts that the court's rulings had the additional legal consequence of violating his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Except for due process, the constitutional claims are forfeited. ( Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) No state law error occurred. Under Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, a criminal defendant may be subjected to physical restraints in the jury's presence upon a showing of a manifest need for such restraints. ( Id. at pp. 290-291, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; see People v. Mar (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1201, 1216-1217, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 161, 52 P.3d 95.) This requirement is satisfied by evidence that the defendant has threatened jail deputies, possessed weapons in custody, threatened or assaulted other inmates, and/or engaged in violent outbursts in court. ( People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th 821, 837-838, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007 [psychologist found defendant was a serious suicidal and homicidal risk and prosecutor stated he had possessed two shanks in jail and threatened jail deputies]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 730, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 [prosecutor stated defendant had a history of attempted and completed escapes and of violent conduct in the courtroom and in custody]; People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 943-944, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574 [defendant had a history of criminal violence and court security advised that he had been violent in jail]; People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95-97, 270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23 [court security advised that defendant had attempted to escape from a holding cell and engaged in violent conduct in the courtroom and in custody, and was planning to escape again and to shoot sheriff's deputies; defendant also threatened the trial judge and bailiffs].) The trial court's decision to physically restrain a defendant cannot be based on rumor or innuendo. ( People v. Combs, supra, 34 Cal.4th 821, 837, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) However, a formal evidentiary hearing is not required. ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 731, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) A shackling decision will be upheld absent a manifest abuse of discretion. ( Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 293, fn. 12, 127 Cal. Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322.) On appeal, as at trial, Oliver claims there was no manifest need under Duran and its progeny, for the restraints he endured. He faults the court for not holding a formal hearing in which witnesses were required to testify under oath as to whether he presented a credible threat of violence in the courtroom. Oliver also claims the court failed to consider less onerous restraints. However, contrary to what Oliver implies, the trial court invoked Duran at both shackling hearings. At the hearing on April 20, 1992, the court cited credible reports that Oliver had attacked another inmate with a typewriter and threatened to kill deputies. It added, I've seen his demeanor here in court. This is not a compliant person. The court followed the advice of the sheriff's department and ordered a leg brace, noting that it would be less visible and noisy than chains. The court also believed that a leg brace would allow fewer deputies to be present in court. Later, on February 2, 1993, when it ordered additional restraints, the court stressed that the leg brace had not prevented Oliver from attacking counsel. The court properly found, based on its own observations, that Oliver was dangerous in the courtroom. It did not need to summon outside witnesses to resolve the shackling question. No abuse of discretion occurred. [21]