Opinion ID: 844220
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prospective Juror A.O.

Text: During the selection of alternates, the prosecutor used the second of her four peremptory challenges to remove Prospective Juror A.O., a Hispanic woman. Defense counsel renewed the Batson/Wheeler objection, saying: “Your Honor, again, we see a pattern of excusing female Hispanics from the jury panel, even as an alternate.” The following exchange occurred: The trial court: “Look at the questionnaire. [¶] She says, „I don‟t believe in the death penalty.‟ ” 43 Defense counsel: “Your Honor, we had a chance to clear that up in voir dire. Everybody that was up on the panel had a chance to explain their answers. She did and said she could and she would in the right case. [¶] It‟s submitted with the court. The court can make the call.” The trial court: “All right. [¶] But in view of the answer in the questionnaire, and changing of the position, I think counsel is justified; and I think based on that showing, I would have to find it‟s coincidental that she happens to be Hispanic in the case.” Because the trial court overruled the defense objection without asking the prosecutor to state her reasons for the peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror A.O., we construe the trial court‟s ruling as a finding that the defense failed to make a prima facie case. To establish a prima facie case, a defendant‟s “ „burden is simply to “produc[e] evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.” ‟ ” (People v. Hartsch (2010) 49 Cal.4th 472, 486, quoting Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. 162, 170.) As in other recent cases where we cannot be sure the trial court used the correct standard, “we review the record independently to resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror on the basis of race.” (People v. Hartsch, supra, at p. 487.) To determine here whether defendant has established a prima facie case, we may consider whether the record discloses neutral, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenges. (People v. Garcia (2011) 52 Cal.4th 706, 749; People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 346.) This approach seems particularly appropriate here because the prosecutor had previously indicated, when explaining her peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror P.J., that she intended to peremptorily challenge prospective jurors whose questionnaire responses indicated they were “weak on death.” As the trial court correctly observed, when asked for her “opinion 44 regarding the death penalty,” Prospective Juror A.O. had written on her questionnaire, “I don‟t believe in death penalty.” She wrote the same answer when asked why she “might or might not want to sit on this particular case.” On voir dire, she avoided a challenge for cause by stating that she could vote for the death penalty “depending on the situation, you know, depending on if it‟s a heinous crime or premeditated.” Nevertheless, her questionnaire answer put A.O. squarely in the category of being “weak on death” and provides a valid and persuasive explanation of the prosecutor‟s peremptory challenge. We therefore agree with the trial court that the defense failed to establish a prima facie case that discrimination had occurred. F. Alleged Bias of Trial Judge Defendant contends that the trial court‟s acts and omissions during the jury selection process exhibited racial bias requiring reversal of his conviction and death sentence. By failing to raise at trial a claim of judicial bias, defendant has forfeited it. (People v. Farley (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1110; People v. Samuels (2005) 36 Cal.4th 96, 114.) In any event, the claim lacks merit. The first incident of which defendant complains occurred during a discussion of the contents of the juror questionnaire. The defense had proposed a series of questions for the purpose of revealing racial prejudice. The court stated that was “a very difficult and sensitive issue” and that “both sides are entitled to inquire into and to try to probe for possible prejudices that people have . . . .” In the course of this discussion the court stated: “I just had occasion to see the Martin Luther King Museum in Memphis, Tennessee, a very moving and powerful experience; and I have very strong feelings about the progress of Afro-Americans in the country based on the exhibits there and what happened in the Deep South, contrasted, I think with California to a certain extent.” (Italics added.) Defendant 45 asserts that the italicized words are evidence that the “trial court apparently believed that racism is confined to the South and the 1950‟s.” We draw no such inference. Had the trial court held such a belief, it would have prohibited all questions regarding race and racial prejudice. Instead, it allowed the parties ample opportunity to question prospective jurors on that subject. The trial court‟s remark that the visit to the civil rights museum was a “very moving and powerful experience” suggests an absence of racial bias against African-Americans. During the same discussion, the trial court also stated: “I think that on this subject you just got too much in there that you are putting emphasis where it isn‟t really called for. Because it isn‟t as though this were some — if the theory of this case were some kind of hate crime that was racially motivated, or there were particular racial overtones that caused this crime to be committed that would not have been committed before, for racial aspects, then I think you would be entitled to probe into that in great detail.” We find nothing objectionable in this comment. Recognizing that this case involved an interracial killing — because defendant is African-American and the armored car guard who was killed happened to be White — the trial court permitted extensive inquiry into the issue of racial prejudice. (See People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 539 [in a case involving an interracial killing, a trial court must grant a defense request to question prospective jurors about racial bias].) Indeed, defendant makes no claim that voir dire on this issue was inadequate. That the trial court would have permitted an even more extensive inquiry had there been an allegation that the killing was racially motivated is not evidence of judicial bias. Next, defendant complains about the trial court‟s remarks during a discussion about a defense challenge for cause to Prospective Juror T.K. The defense argued that T.K., who identified his race as White, was racially biased 46 because on the juror questionnaire he had answered “Yes” to this question: “Do you think Afro-Americans are more likely to commit crimes than other racial groups?” The trial court stated: “There have been statistical studies that would back that up. So let‟s leave the race part out of it, and let‟s just talk about how many people there are in a statistical group in the community, and what‟s the proportion of crime. And he can say that without being a racist at all.” We do not agree that the trial court‟s comment demonstrates racial bias. In stating that someone could believe, “without being a racist at all,” that “a statistical group in the community” committed a disproportionate number of crimes, the trial court‟s point, we infer, is that interpreting statistical data about race and crime is controversial and subject to debate. For example, one commentator, while stating that there are “some crimes that [B]lacks do commit disproportionately,” argues that “Blacks do not commit crimes because they are [B]lack.” Rather, “[t]heir overrepresentation among some classes of offenders is attributable to social and environmental conditions such as poverty, miserable schools, broken families, lack of access to health care, and even lead poisoning.” (Butler, One Hundred Years of Race and Crime (2010) 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1043, 1058-1059, fns. omitted; see also Peterson & Krivo, Race, Residence, and Violent Crime: A Structure of Inequality (2009) 57 U. Kan. L.Rev. 903.) Immediately after the trial court made that remark, defense counsel stated: “Your Honor, my client is a Black man. He‟s accused of killing a White man. We have no Black — we‟re going to lose one of the only two male Black jurors in the entire panel.” Defense counsel was referring to Prospective Juror R.M., an African-American man whom the prosecutor had successfully challenged for cause. The trial court responded with these statements: “[R.M.] has nothing to do with [T.K.]. . . . [¶] . . . If all of the other people in this whole panel were Black — 47 we‟re talking about [T.K.] now. And — so I can‟t be concerned with the racial make-up of this jury because you are losing a Black person for cause, therefore, I should lean over backwards and excuse White people just on that basis.” We do not agree with defendant that by this remark the trial court was “claiming a strange impotence to remedy the situation” or was improperly refusing to “take any responsibility for the likelihood that the venire was going to be completely lacking in African-American jurors.” What the remark showed, rather, was that the trial court was properly considering each challenge for cause separately, on its legal merits, without allowing its rulings to be improperly influenced by how they might affect the racial composition of the jury ultimately selected. Next, defendant cites remarks by the trial court when ruling on the defense Batson/Wheeler objection to the prosecution‟s peremptory challenge of Prospective Juror Mary G. (See, ante, at pp. 34-37.) In denying a defense request to require the prosecutor to explain the reasons for earlier peremptory challenges to Hispanic women, the court said: “Because I sounded a note of caution before and said that I had noticed a pattern, that there were systematic Hispanic names, although a couple of them I noticed appeared to be Hispanic by marriage rather than Hispanic because they were not Hispanic coloring. . . .” Defense counsel objected “to the court‟s classification of these women as being possibly Hispanic by marriage,” adding that “Hispanic names come in all colors just as any other names.” The court responded: “Well, all right. That was simply my observation. And I stand corrected on that because without going into what maiden names were, why, obviously that isn‟t a warranted conclusion.” Defendant complains that the quoted remarks show that the trial court “denied a pattern of removing five Hispanic people for the fatuous reason that they were „Hispanic by marriage‟ rather than „Hispanic coloring‟ — a justification that 48 has no basis in law or fact.” We disagree. Insofar as the trial court suggested it could identify a Hispanic person solely by appearance or “coloring,” the court immediately acknowledged its mistake. Insofar as the trial court remarked that a Hispanic surname did not prove Hispanic ancestry because many women assume their husband‟s surname at the time of marriage, the court‟s point was valid. Here, the most reliable guide was the prospective jurors‟ own descriptions of their race and ethnicity on the juror questionnaires. Examination of those questionnaires show examples of women with Hispanic surnames who identified themselves as “White” or “Caucasian” without indicating any Hispanic or Latino ancestry. Viewed in context, the court‟s remarks do not establish any disqualifying racial or ethnic bias.