Opinion ID: 2365094
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Asserted Instruction Errors

Text: Defendant's final contentions concern the denial of his request for a charge on self-defense, defense of others, and the lesser-included offense of passion/provocation manslaughter. The trial court declined to give those charges because they were unsupported in the record.
The use of force against another in self-defense is justified when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4a. Self-defense requires an actual, honest, and reasonable belief by the defendant of the necessity of using force. State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 198-99, 478 A. 2d 364 (1984). The reasonableness of the defendant's belief is determined by the jury, using an objective standard of what a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have done at the time the force was used. Id. at 199-200, 478 A. 2d 364. The jury is not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's belief was honest and reasonable. Id. at 200, 478 A. 2d 364. Rather, if any evidence raising the issue of self-defense is adduced, either in the State's or the defendant's case, then the jury must be instructed that the State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the self-defense claim does not accord with the facts. Ibid. For a defense of others charge, it must be shown that the use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifiable to protect a third person when ... [t]he actor would be justified under section 2C:3-4 in using such force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person whom he seeks to protect. N.J.S.A. 2C:3-5a(1). The defense is applicable if the defendant reasonably believed that the person he sought to aid was unlawfully attacked and that the force used was necessary to protect the person from the attack. State v. Bryant, 288 N.J.Super. 27, 35, 671 A. 2d 1058 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 144 N.J. 589, 677 A. 2d 761 (1996). Similar to the self-defense doctrine, the trial court is required to instruct on defense of another if there is a rational basis in the record to support it. State v. Doss, 310 N.J.Super. 450, 458-60, 708 A. 2d 1219 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 155 N.J. 589, 715 A. 2d 992 (1998). To support his claim to the charges, defendant cites to several parts of the record: Emil's testimony that tensions had been mounting in the apartment; the testimony of Fonceta Young and Joyce Poole, the two neighbors who heard thumping noises and who thought that some guys in the apartment were wrestling, playing around, or fighting before the shootings occurred; and the fact that McLean had been beaten with a steam iron before he was shot as indicating that McLean either threatened or attacked defendant causing defendant to pick up the iron and use it in self-defense. Defendant's recitation of the evidence would require a jury to make several inferences: that the sounds heard by the neighbors were fights, that one of the victims was the aggressor, that defendant was provoked into attacking the victim, and finally that deadly force was necessary to protect defendant or another person. Defendant failed to point to any facts that provide a rational basis from which a jury could reasonably infer that he acted in self-defense or in defense of another. The trial court did not err by declining those charges.
Defendant's contention concerning the trial court's denial of a passion/provocation manslaughter charge suffers from similar infirmities. Murder is reduced to manslaughter if the murder is committed in the heat of passion in response to a reasonable provocation. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4b(2). Passion/provocation manslaughter has four elements: (1) reasonable and adequate provocation; (2) no cooling-off time in the period between the provocation and the slaying; (3) a defendant who actually was impassioned by the provocation; and (4) a defendant who did not cool off before the slaying. State v. Mauricio, 117 N.J. 402, 411, 568 A. 2d 879 (1990). The first two elements of the offense are objective; thus, if they are supported by the evidence, the trial court should instruct the jury on passion/provocation manslaughter, leaving the determination of the remaining elements to the jury. State v. Robinson, 136 N.J. 476, 491, 643 A. 2d 591 (1994). In support of the passion/provocation manslaughter claim, defendant theorizes that based on the neighbors' testimony of possible wrestling or fighting before the shootings, a fight broke out between defendant and Junior and the victims after Junior attempted to shoot Emil. Under that version of events, defendant claims he had little time to cool off as a result of the provocation. Further, defendant submits that Emil, McLean, or Mitchell may have threatened defendant with a weapon, which also would have added to the adequacy of the provocation. Although mutual combat may constitute adequate provocation, State v. Crisantos, 102 N.J. 265, 274, 508 A. 2d 167 (1986), defendant's suggestions of mutual combat are nothing more than rank speculation and are unsupported by the record. We find no basis on which to overturn the trial court's refusal to give a passion/provocation manslaughter charge that lacked a rational basis in the record.