Opinion ID: 2615040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: presumption of intent instruction

Text: Over the defendant's objection, the trial court gave the following presumption of intent instruction: Instruction No. 10 It is reasonable to presume that a person ordinarily intends the natural and probable consequences of his knowing acts. The jury may draw the inference that the defendant intended all of the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from such intentional act or conscious omission. Any such inference drawn must be considered along with the other evidence in the case in determining whether the State has met the burden to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant possessed the required criminal intent. This burden never shifts to the defendant. The trial court noted that Instruction No. 10 was one of the stock instructions, based upon PIK Crim.2d 54.01 (1992 Supp.). Instruction No. 10 was not based upon PIK Crim.2d 54.01 (1992 Supp.) and is wide of the mark. The defendant maintained the instruction would confuse the jury on the issue of intent. On appeal, Harkness argues Instruction No. 10 shifted the burden of proof to him because the instruction created a compulsory, rather than permissive, inference. He points out Instruction No. 10 did not follow the approved language of PIK Crim.2d 54.01 (1992 Supp.), which provided: Ordinarily a person intends all of the usual consequences of his voluntary acts. This inference may be considered by you along with all the other evidence in the case. You may accept or reject it in determining whether the State has met its burden to prove the required criminal intent of the defendant. This burden never shifts to the defendant. One significant difference, according to Harkness, is that Instruction No. 10 contained the language, Any such inference drawn must be considered. He maintains the use of the word must made the inference compulsory, not permissive. The defendant claims further proof is that Instruction No. 10 failed to include the following language, You may accept or reject the inference, found in the PIK instruction. He maintains that, because the instruction did not allow the jury to choose whether to accept or reject the inference, the inference became a mandatory rebuttable presumption. He claims this mandatory rebuttable presumption undermined his insanity defense because it juxtaposed the concept of voluntary intent with the concept of insanity without explaining that the two concepts are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In State v. DeVries, 13 Kan. App.2d 609, 613-14, 780 P.2d 1118 (1989), the Court of Appeals summarized the law in this area, stating: The State is required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every element necessary to constitute the crime with which an accused is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). Under this principle, evidentiary presumptions cannot be included in the jury instructions if they have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979). In order to decide whether such an instruction is unconstitutional, a court must decide whether the instruction creates a mandatory or rebuttable presumption or merely a permissive inference. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 313-14, 85 L.Ed.2d 344, 105 S.Ct. 1965 (1985). A presumption may be either mandatory or rebuttable. A mandatory presumption removes the presumed element from the case once the State has proven the predicate facts giving rise to the presumption. That is, once the State proves certain facts, a jury must infer intent from such facts and the accused cannot rebut the inferences. 471 U.S. at 314. A rebuttable presumption does not remove the presumed element from the case but nevertheless requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the accused persuades the jury otherwise. That is, once the State proves certain facts, the jury must infer intent from those facts, unless the accused proves otherwise. Both types of presumptions are unconstitutional if they relieve the State of its burden of persuasion on an element of an offense or if the suggested conclusion is not one that reason and common sense justify in light of the proven facts before the jury. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. at 517-18. By contrast, an instruction containing a permissive inference does not relieve the State of its burden because it still requires the State to convince the jury that an element, such as intent, should be inferred based on the facts proved. Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 314. The standard for reviewing an instruction such as the one in the instant case is whether a reasonable juror could have understood the instruction as a `presumption that shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion on the element of intent once the State had proved the predicate acts.' 471 U.S. at 316. If a reasonable juror could have understood the instruction in the present case as shifting the burden of proof on intent to the defendant once the State proved the defendant committed certain voluntary acts, the instruction is unconstitutional. 471 U.S. at 316. The allegedly unconstitutional instruction must be read and interpreted in light of all the instructions given, since other instructions might cure the defective language in the instruction. 471 U.S. at 315. General instructions on the presumption of the defendant's innocence or the State's burden of persuasion, however, do not remedy an erroneous instruction containing a conclusive or rebuttable presumption on an essential element. 471 U.S. at 319-20. See State v. Green, 245 Kan. 398, 410, 781 P.2d 678 (1989). The defendant has misinterpreted the instruction, which states, The jury may draw the inference, and if it does, such inference drawn must be considered along with the other evidence in the case. (Emphasis added.) Although the instruction could have been worded better, it did not create a mandatory or rebuttable presumption. Confusion, if any existed, was clarified by the final sentence of Instruction No. 10, which states: This burden never shifts to the defendant. This sentence was taken verbatim from PIK Crim.2d 54.01 (1992 Supp.). Furthermore, Instruction No. 8 informed the jury that the State has the burden of proof and that the defendant is not required to prove his innocence. Additionally, the jury was instructed to construe all instructions together and to apply them as a whole to the evidence. A reasonable juror would not have interpreted Instruction No. 10 as shifting the burden of proof on intent to Harkness once the State proved he committed certain voluntary actions. The instruction is not unconstitutional. Harkness also contends Instruction No. 10 permitted jurors to override the insanity defense because the instruction referred to standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge. He uses this language as proof the jury instructions, as a whole, emphasized physical actions over state of mind. The defendant claims that, as a result, the jury could convict him despite conclusive evidence that he was insane. As discussed in the previous issue, the evidence was not conclusive the defendant was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of committing the crimes. Additionally, the jury was instructed it  may draw the inference that the defendant intended all of the consequences which one standing in like circumstances and possessing like knowledge should reasonably have expected to result from such intentional act or conscious omission. (Emphasis added.) The jury was not required to make the inference. The defendant's arguments are not persuasive.