Opinion ID: 1926022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Victims' Families' Opposition to Death Sentence

Text: Appellant proffered evidence that some of the victims' family members did not wish to see a death sentence imposed because of the anxiety and uncertainty that would result from the possibility of a future successful attack upon the sentence. The trial court ruled that the evidence was not relevant and hence inadmissible. We agree. Appellant argues that the evidence was admissible for two purposes. First, he argues that it was admissible as a potential mitigating circumstance under § 413(g)(8), the catch-all provision, and may not be restricted under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Second, he argues that it was admissible to respond to the victim impact evidence introduced by the State. His theory is that victim impact evidence may establish that a family member is plagued by grief, fear, and anxiety. Evidence that a family member opposes a death sentence is directly responsive because of its tendency to show that at least some of these emotions may be reduced in intensity or severity by a sentence of life without parole. In Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held that a jury should not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. A plurality of the Court also noted that [n]othing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. Id. at 605 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954. Victim impact evidence is admissible during capital sentencing. The United States Supreme Court held in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), that admission of victim impact evidence during capital sentencing does not violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court held that [v]ictim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a type long considered by sentencing authorities. 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597. The sentencing authority, however, may not consider statements of the victim's family that amount to an opinion regarding the appropriate sentence to be imposed upon the defendant. See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), overruled in part on other grounds, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. at 830 & n. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597. In overruling Booth, the Supreme Court in Payne did not disturb the Eighth Amendment proscription against the introduction of victim statements that the death penalty should be imposed. [10] See Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217 (10th Cir.1991); State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 851 P.2d 934, 941 (1993); State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A.2d 164, 172 (1996); State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 904 P.2d 245, 269 (1995). In Robison v. Maynard , the United States Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit held that the opinion of a relative of a victim is irrelevant to the jury's determination of whether the death penalty should be imposed. 943 F.2d at 1217. The court concluded that such testimony is calculated to incite arbitrary response from the jury. Id. Interpreting Payne, the 10th Circuit stated: Payne merely put aside the bar to the introduction of and comment upon victim impact evidence which had been created in Booth [v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) ] and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989). The Court did not expand the universe of admissible relevant mitigating evidence established by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982).... We cannot agree that Payne portends admissibility of any evidence other than that related to the victim and the impact of the victim's death on the members of the victim's family. Nothing said by the Court suggests the Court intended to broaden the scope of relevant mitigating evidence to include the opinion of a victim's family member that the death penalty should not be invoked. Id. The Maryland General Assembly has exercised its prerogative to permit victim impact evidence by requiring the Department of Parole and Probation to prepare a pre-sentence investigation report for consideration by the judge or jury at sentencing. See Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl. Vol., 1999 Supp.) Art. 41, § 4-609(d). By statute, a victim impact statement must be included in this report. See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1999 Supp.) Art. 27, § 781; Evans v. State, 333 Md. 660, 685, 637 A.2d 117, 130 (1994). Section 413(g) addresses mitigating factors. The statute enumerates seven statutory mitigators, and an eighth catch-all provision, providing as follows: If the court or jury finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of these aggravating circumstances exist, it shall then consider whether, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, any of the following mitigating circumstances exist: (1) The defendant has not previously (i) been found guilty of a crime of violence; (ii) entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or (iii) had a judgment of probation on stay of entry of judgment entered on a charge of a crime of violence. As used in this paragraph, crime of violence means abduction, arson in the first degree, escape in the first degree, kidnapping, manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter, mayhem, murder, robbery, carjacking or armed carjacking, or rape or sexual offense in the first or second degree, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, or the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or another crime of violence. (2) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act which caused the victim's death. (3) The defendant acted under substantial duress, domination or provocation of another person, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution. (4) The murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental incapacity, mental disorder or emotional disturbance. (5) The youthful age of the defendant at the time of the crime. (6) The act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's death. (7) It is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would constitute a continuing threat to society. (8) Any other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case. Section 413(g). Appellant relies on the Section 413(g)(8) mitigator, the so-called catch-all mitigator. A Section 413(g)(8) mitigator is anything relating to the defendant or to the crime which causes [the jury or any of its individual members] to believe that death may not be appropriate. Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 253, 539 A.2d 637, 651 (1988) (quoting Mills v. State, 310 Md. 33, 51, 527 A.2d 3, 11 (1987), judgment vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 367, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 100 L.Ed.2d 384 (1988)). In addition, the judge or jury, as the sentencing authority, is free to include as mitigating circumstances [a]ny other facts which the jury or the court specifically sets forth in writing that it finds as mitigating circumstances in the case. Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 734, 415 A.2d 830, 850 (1980). We reiterated this holding in Calhoun, pointing out that, under the Maryland statute, the sentencing authority may articulate any factor it finds in mitigation. 297 Md. 563, 637, 468 A.2d 45, 81 (1983). In addition to a victim impact statement included in the pre-sentence report, a victim's family member may testify orally at sentencing. See § 780(a). [11] The permissible scope of victim impact testimony ... lies within the sound discretion of the presiding judge, as limited by Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.), Art. 27, § 413(c)(1)(v). Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 197, 699 A.2d 1170, 1189-90 (1997). Admissible evidence is any evidence that the court deems of probative value and relevant to sentence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any statements. [12] § 413(c)(1)(v). The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in excluding the testimony that the victim's family did not wish a death sentence imposed. Opinions that Appellant should not receive a sentence of death have no bearing as to defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of the offense. They do not qualify as victim impact evidence or rebuttal thereto. Such evidence has no bearing on the actual harm caused by the particular crime. The testimony does not constitute mitigating evidence under the Maryland statute. Because the proffered evidence concerned the appropriate sentence to be imposed on Appellant, it was excluded properly by the trial court. We hold that the trial court did not err by excluding evidence of the victims' families opinion on the death penalty because it was not relevant, even under a loose evidentiary requirement of relevance. The trial court did not exclude evidence of a mitigating circumstance in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Other jurisdictions that have considered the admissibility of such evidence have reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., Robison v. Maynard, 943 F.2d 1216, 1217-18 (10th Cir.1991) (upholding exclusion of victim's sister's testimony that she opposed death penalty as not relevant to mitigation), superseded by statute, OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 984 (evidence admissible by statute); Barbour v. State, 673 So.2d 461, 468-69 (Ala.Ct.Crim.App.1994) (holding that a letter from the victim's brother requesting that defendant receive life without parole was properly excluded since, under Eddings, this evidence was not relevant to any mitigating circumstance because it did not pertain to defendant's character, record, or the circumstances of the offense); Floyd v. State, 569 So.2d 1225, 1230 (Fla.1990) (finding no abuse of discretion in excluding victim's daughter's testimony that defendant should not be executed); State v. Clark, 128 N.M. 119, 990 P.2d 793, 805-06 (1999) (upholding exclusion of clergymen's testimony regarding religious doctrine and opinions about the death penalty); State v. Bowman, 349 N.C. 459, 509 S.E.2d 428, 440 (1998) (upholding exclusion of victim's mother's testimony expressing ambivalence about imposition of the death penalty because not evidence of mitigating circumstance since it had nothing to do with defendant's character, record, or circumstances of offense and did not reduce moral culpability of the killing); State v. Wright, 323 Or. 8, 913 P.2d 321, 324-27 (1996) (upholding exclusion of opinions as to whether defendant should receive death sentence because not relevant to any mitigating circumstance); State v. Pirtle, 127 Wash.2d 628, 904 P.2d 245, 268-69 (1995) (upholding exclusion of victim's essay stating general opposition to death penalty because essay not mitigating evidence and not pertinent to an extenuating circumstance or to defendant's moral culpability).