Opinion ID: 766961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Decision to Depart Downward

Text: 19 In a thoughtful published opinion, the district court set out its reasons for departing downward. At the outset, the district court stated that the heartland of the offense[of possessing child pornography] and the offenders who commit it has not been well defined. United States v. Stevens , 29 F. Supp. 2d 592, 599 (D. Alaska 1998). The court reasoned that this was so because possession of child pornography is not a frequently prosecuted offense and there is no opportunity to rely on social science literature to characterize the heartland of offenders. Id. at 601. The district court decided, therefore, to approach the issue indirectly for purposes of distinguishing between heartland, or typical offenders, on the one hand, and worst or least offenders on the other, id., by looking to Supreme Court cases interpreting Congress' intent behind the enactment of laws prohibiting the possession of child pornography, see id. at 602. The district court concluded that Congress prohibitedthe possession of child pornography for three reasons: (1) the receipt and possession of child pornography encourage its production; (2) pedophiles can use child pornography to seduce their victims; and (3) pornographic materials are a permanent record of a child's abuse, which can haunt the child for years to come. See id. at 603. 20 The district court ruled that an offender whose relevant conduct constituted a greater offense or whose conduct substantially contributed to the harms identified by Congress in enacting the statutes in question, would be a worst offender who is eligible for an upward departure. Id. The district court concluded that Defendant was not a worst offender, because he was not clearly guilty of a more serious offense, did not use his collection of child pornography to seduce children, and did not directly encourage anyone to produce child pornography. Id. at 603-04. 21 Additionally, the district court concluded that Defendant's contribution to the harms that Congress sought to prevent was de minimis, because [n]o victim past, present or future is likely to be harmed solely or even significantly because of anything [Defendant] did or failed to do. Id. at 605. In so concluding, the district court identified two ways in which offenders like Defendant collectively contribute to the harms that Congress sought to prevent: (1) encouraging, by their consumption, continued production of child pornography, and (2) encouraging, by their consumption, further distribution of the pornographic images once they are produced. Id. 22 With respect to the first point, the district court reasoned that Defendant's encouragement of the production and distribution of child pornography was passive. He did not pay for the images either in cash or in kind, carry on correspondences with producers and purveyors of the pornography, take an active part in the management of the chat rooms, or share his collection with others, or even disclose to others . . . that he had the collection. Id. 23 Next, the district court reasoned that Defendant's conduct did not significantly harm the victims of child pornography or significantly contribute to creating a permanent record of past abuse. Because the images that Defendant possessed were mass-produced and mass-mailed, [t]he incremental harm [Defendant] has caused any specific person is de minimis. Even if [Defendant] had destroyed his collection, the same images would be continuously available. Id. at 606. The court also opined that, because [i]t appears likely that most of the pictures in [Defendant's] possession are more than twenty years old[, i]t is unlikely that any persons pictured in those images would fear that they could be recognized from them today. Id. Further, the court found it significant that Defendant did not know any of the people portrayed in his pornographic pictures. See id. 24 After concluding that Defendant was not a worst offender, the district court defined the heartland of those convicted of possessing child pornography: 25 If the purpose of the legislation is the protection of present children and the specific children to be pro tected are the children pictured in the images, and by reasonable extension those who will be harmed by anyone influenced by the willingness of the posses sor to possess, then at the heartland of the Sentenc ing Guideline are those offenders who exploit victims who are currently children by in effect encouraging child pornography's production so that they can receive and possess it. 26 Id. (citation omitted). 27 Finally, the district court concluded that Defendant was not within the heartland of those convicted of possessing child pornography. The court focused on two justifications: (1) of those convicted of possessing child pornography, virtually all have made greater efforts [than Defendant ] to involve themselves with producers and distributorsof child pornography, id. at 607-08, and (2) because most of the images that Defendant possessed were probably more than 20 years old, Defendant's conduct did not harm those whom Congress sought to protect by prohibiting the possession of child pornography, see id. at 606-07. 28