Opinion ID: 2369367
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to initially swear in grand jurors

Text: The trial court did not swear in the grand jury until midway through its proceedings, and defendant contends this omission constituted a fundamental jurisdictional error that compels reversal. [4] These are the relevant facts: Defendant's case was initiated by way of an indictment rather than a complaint. (See § 682.) On February 28, 1996, the trial court selected the jurors for a criminal grand jury, including a foreperson, from a pool of potential petit jurors. The person selected as the grand jury foreperson admonished the rest of the potential grand jurors to step down if they could not act impartially. The prosecutor made his opening statement. Sanfilippo then testified and played a portion of the audiotape recording of defendant's confession. At this point, the trial court realized that the assembled jurors had not been sworn in, so it administered the oath for grand jurors. [5] The grand jury then finished listening to the audiotape. Sanfilippo continued to testify. Sanfilippo's partner also testified; during his testimony several photographs were introduced into evidence. The prosecutor then made his closing argument and instructed the grand jury. The grand jury returned the indictment at issue. On April 26, 1996, defendant moved pursuant to section 995 to set aside the indictment on the ground, among others, that some evidence was presented to the grand jury before it was sworn in. [6] Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant filed a petition for writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, which denied it without comment. ( Booker v. Superior Court (Sept. 10, 1996, E018917) [nonpub. order].) The Attorney General concedes the trial court administered the oath to the grand jurors after they had heard some testimony, but contends defendant suffered no prejudice from this belated swearing-in of the grand jurors and thus is not entitled to relief. (1) The Attorney General is correct. Under federal and state law, irregularities in grand jury proceedings generally are reviewed for prejudice. (See, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 250, 254-257 [101 L.Ed.2d 228, 108 S.Ct. 2369] [citing Fed. Rules Crim.Proc., rule 52(a), 18 U.S.C.]; People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 800 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938] [citing Bank of Nova Scotia ] ( Jablonski ).) Isolated exceptions to this general rule, not applicable to defendant's case, have included cases involving discrimination in the composition of the grand jury based on the grand jurors' race ( Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254 [88 L.Ed.2d 598, 106 S.Ct. 617]) or gender (see Ballard v. United States (1946) 329 U.S. 187 [91 L.Ed. 181, 67 S.Ct. 261]). Citing People v. Pompa-Ortiz (1980) 27 Cal.3d 519 [165 Cal.Rptr. 851, 612 P.2d 941] ( Pompa-Ortiz ), defendant contends the challenge to the indictment that he filed prior to the start of his trial now relieves him of the burden of demonstrating on appeal the prejudice he suffered. Not so. In Pompa-Ortiz, we affirmed the defendant's conviction despite irregularities in his preliminary examination and ruled that, as to pretrial challenges to irregularities during the preliminary examination, a defendant need not demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief, but does as to posttrial challenges. ( Id. at p. 529.) We have since extended the rule articulated in Pompa-Ortiz to include irregularities during grand jury proceedings. (See, e.g., Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 800-801.) Defendant is correct that Pompa-Ortiz did not require a showing of prejudice during a pretrial challenge to irregularities in the preliminary examination, but nothing in Pompa-Ortiz suggests that standard of review applies to a posttrial challenge if the defendant asserted the challenge pretrial. In Jablonski, notwithstanding the defendant's having challenged alleged irregularities during the grand jury proceedings in a section 995 motion, we rejected the claim as presented on appeal because he failed to demonstrate prejudice. ( Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 800-801.) As Pompa-Ortiz and Jablonski demonstrate, the need for a showing of prejudice depends on the stage of the proceedings at which a defendant raises the claim in a reviewing court, and not simply on whether he or she had raised the claim prior to trial. That defendant here, unlike the defendant in Jablonski, filed a pretrial writ petition does not alter the analysis as to why no showing of prejudice is required for pretrial challenges to grand jury proceedings but is required for posttrial challenges. Defendant also cites Serna v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 239 [219 Cal.Rptr. 420, 707 P.2d 793] in support of the contention that pretrial exhaustion obviates the need for a posttrial showing of prejudice. In Serna, we granted a pretrial petition for writ of mandate directing the superior court to dismiss a case on speedy trial grounds. We did so without requiring a showing of prejudice. In the course of our analysis, we observed, it is not unreasonable to require a felony defendant who does not seek or obtain pretrial relief to demonstrate actual prejudice when reversal of a judgment is sought on this ground on appeal. ( Id. at p. 263, italics added; see also People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 461 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] ( Stewart ) [But when such claims are presented for the first time on appeal ... (italics added)].) [7] Seizing on the italicized language, defendant emphasizes that he did in fact seek relief prior to this appeal, and contends he ought therefore to be excused from the requirement to demonstrate prejudice. We are not persuaded. Serna and Stewart are consistent with Pompa-Ortiz 's rule that whether a showing of prejudice is required depends on the stage of the proceedings at which the claim is raised in the reviewing court. To the extent defendant reads Serna or Stewart as implying there exists a different required showing of prejudice for posttrial challenges based on whether there was also a pretrial challenge, he is mistaken. Thus, because this is a posttrial challenge to the grand jury proceedings, any irregularity in the proceedings requires reversal only if defendant has been prejudiced. Assuming for the sake of argument that the irregularity violated the federal Constitution, defendant is entitled to relief unless the prosecution can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the irregularity did not affect the outcome of trial. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824] ( Chapman ).) Under state law, defendant bears the burden of demonstrating any error deprived him of a fair trial. (See Jablonski, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 800.) Here, defendant is not entitled to relief under either standard. As the trial court noted, the evidence presented to the grand jury after the trial court administered the oath was sufficient to support an indictment against defendant. The belated swearing-in of the grand jurors did not have a structural impact on those proceedings, as the grand jury, once properly sworn, received sufficient evidence to support the indictment. [8] Contrary to defendant's assertion, the error is susceptible to review for actual prejudice because we can reviewand, indeed, have reviewedthe evidence that was presented to the grand jury after it was sworn. Unlike Vasquez v. Hillery, supra, 474 U.S. 254, where racial animus of the grand jurors may have affected their decision of whether and how to charge the defendant, our review of these grand jury proceedings does not require us to speculate as to the jurors' motives. Consequently, we reject his claim that it is impossible to determine whether there was sufficient evidence to support his indictment, and we need not consider his claim that the indictment was based at least partly on evidence received prior to jury being sworn.