Opinion ID: 2535924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The March 6, 2009, Order Regarding the Settlement Agreement

Text: In appeal no. 1080662, the chapter raises several arguments relative to the trial court's interpretation of the settlement agreement and its March 6, 2009, order requiring the chapter to comply with that interpretation. We have already determined that the March 6, 2009, order was injunctive in nature. [A] permanent injunction is reviewed de novo.  TFT, Inc. v. Warning Sys., Inc., 751 So.2d 1238, 1241-42 (Ala.1999), overruled on other grounds by Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So.3d 1173, 1176 (Ala.2008). Nevertheless, this Court has noted that a trial court's consideration of ore tenus testimony has a bearing upon the standard of review we apply to the entry of a permanent injunction. Classroomdirect.com, LLC v. Draphix, LLC, 992 So.2d 692, 701 (Ala.2008). `Where evidence is presented to the trial court ore tenus, a presumption of correctness exists as to the court's conclusions on issues of fact; its determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. However, when the trial court improperly applies the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's judgment.'  American Petroleum Equip. & Constr., Inc. v. Fancher, 708 So.2d 129, 132 (Ala. 1997) (citations omitted). Collins v. Rodgers, 938 So.2d 379, 384 (Ala. 2006). The trial court based its decision regarding the settlement agreement on the representations of counsel regarding the agreement at the November 20, 2008, hearing. `[A]ttorneys are officers of the court and `when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.'' Molton v. State, 651 So.2d 663, 670 n. 6 (Ala.Crim.App.1994) (quoting Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 486, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978)); see also Ex parte Owen, 860 So.2d 877, 880 (Ala.2003) (citing Molton ). Accordingly, we will review with a presumption of correctness those portions of the trial court's decision based on the representations of counsel made at the November 20, 2008, hearing. The gravamen of the chapter's arguments is that the settlement agreement encompassed all claims against the chapter and that a claim against any of the individuals as agents of the chapter is, in essence, a claim against the chapter, thus defeating the purpose of the settlement agreement. Price-Williams argues that the chapter is fully protected by Price-Williams's release of all claims against it based on theories of vicarious liability and, thus, that the settlement agreement is satisfied. Price-Williams also argues that he expressly reserved his rights against the individual defendants in their capacities as individuals and as agents of the chapter. The transcript of the November 20, 2008, hearing is limited at best. It is apparent that Price-Williams and the chapter agreed to settle the claims between them. Price-Williams's counsel stated that the individual defendants were still hanging out there and that the amount of the remaining liability after the settlement would be determined by the trial court. However, neither Price-Williams nor the chapter stated that the settlement would include Price-Williams's claims against any of the individual defendants as agents of the chapter. Moreover, during the colloquy, counsel for the chapter expressed his interest in including in the release the national fraternity, which had already prevailed on summary judgment, and in obtaining finality for his clients. Counsel for Price-Williams immediately responded, That's right. Fraternities. That's right. Counsel for the chapter made no subsequent statement to contradict or expand the scope of the contemplated release as including only the national fraternity and the chapter. At its hearing on the parties' motions to enforce the settlement agreement held on February 6, 2009, the trial court correctly noted that counsel for the chapter did not represent the individual defendants and that counsel therefore had no basis on which to argue on behalf of the individual defendants. The trial court also correctly concluded that a release by Price-Williams of all claims against the chapter, including all claims based on theories of vicarious liability, would fully protect the chapter from liability-even liability arising from actions of the individual defendants to the extent they are agents of the chapter. In light of the colloquy that took place on November 20, 2008, we conclude that the trial court's interpretation of the settlement agreement was not clearly erroneous, without supporting evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the evidence. [4]