Opinion ID: 1440383
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Malice Reasonable Doubt

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court failed to instruct the jury that the inference of malice, by way of finding the use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the body, must be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, Appellant has arguably pleaded the Pierce prongs properly by claiming that there is arguable merit to the underlying claim, that there was no tactical basis for remaining silent because absence of malice was essential to his defense on the homicide charge, and that he was prejudiced by the prosecution's diminished burden of proof. See Pierce, supra . Nonetheless, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. This Court has previously considered the language utilized by the trial court, which mirrored the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions, and found that it properly informed the jury that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving every element of each crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Holloway, 739 A.2d at 1047-48. [12] In turn, the court instructed the jury that malice was an element of murder. We discern no reason why the jury would believe the Commonwealth could prove malice by another, lower standard. Thus, there was no reason for counsel to object to the malice instruction. See Marinelli, supra ; ( Darrick) Hall, supra . Appellant adds, This error is compounded by that detailed in [Part I.D.2] regarding jury instructions. The jury was never told what constituted `elements' of murder, and thus never knew which points of proof had to satisfy the reasonable doubt standard. Amended PCRA Petition at 36. However, Appellant provides no support for his assertion that a court must specifically label each element as an element, and this Court's holding in Holloway contradicts his claim. See Holloway, supra . Accordingly, counsel cannot be faulted for failing to object to this instruction. See Marinelli, supra ; ( Darrick) Hall, supra .