Opinion ID: 3062813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Reopen the Suppression Hearing

Text: McWhorter first argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to reopen the suppression hearing.2 The purpose for reopening the hearing, according to McWhorter, was to test Corporal Kestle’s credibility concerning his audiovisual equipment. McWhorter asserts that Corporal Kestle’s credibility was critical to the district court’s determination that McWhorter consented to the wingspan search. Additionally, McWhorter suggests it is possible Corporal Kestle destroyed or failed to preserve a recording, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194 (1963). We review a district court's denial of a motion to reopen or reconsider a suppression hearing for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2004). As noted, the district court denied the motion to reopen based on representations from counsel that McWhorter had no “new or 2 Within this argument section, McWhorter contends in a footnote that the magistrate judge erred in denying his motion to suppress based on the existence of probable cause to stop and search McWhorter’s vehicle. See Appellant’s Initial Brief at 10 n.1. McWhorter also appears to suggest that the magistrate judge erred in finding that McWhorter had consented to a wingspan search of his vehicle. See id. at 9-10. However, he concedes in his reply brief that he is not actually challenging the denial of the motion to suppress. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1. Accordingly, he has abandoned these issues. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003) (concluding that appellant abandoned his Rule 404(b) argument where he made only passing references to the issue under different topical headings). 7 additional evidence which would warrant the court granting said motion.” Doc. 79. This finding is supported by the record. McWhorter made the same arguments in his motion to reopen that he made in his motion to dismiss. Both motions contended that Corporal Kestle’s credibility had been compromised by evidence that his audiovisual equipment was functional on 2 May 2007. Additionally, both motions argued that Corporal Kestle may have committed a Brady violation. The evidence pertaining to these arguments was presented at the July 2008 hearing on the motion to dismiss. Corporal Kestle testified at this hearing and was subject to cross-examination. Thus, McWhorter already had the opportunity to present evidence related to Corporal Kestle’s audiovisual equipment, and the district court already had the opportunity to assess Corporal Kestle’s credibility on this issue and determine if a Brady violation had occurred. Furthermore, the motion to reopen did not identify any additional evidence which would have made another hearing necessary. For example, the motion to reopen cited video equipment guidelines of the Montgomery City Police Department, which stated, inter alia, that all traffic stops should be recorded. However, Corporal Kestle previously testified at the July 2008 hearing that it is standard procedure for an officer to turn on the audiovisual equipment when the officer gets into his vehicle, and he assumed his camera was working properly on 8 the day in question. The motion to reopen also contended that maintenance logs for Corporal Kestle’s patrol vehicle revealed “no records of an electrical system malfunction contemporaneous to the stop of May 2, 2007.” Doc. 66 at 4. Such evidence would have been duplicative of the repair technician’s testimony at the July 2008 hearing that Corporal Kestle’s vehicle had no visible problems with its electrical system. Finally, the motion to reopen referred to an August 2008 interoffice police department memorandum advising that no videotapes had been located for Corporal Kestle’s patrol vehicle during the time frame of the traffic stop on McWhorter’s car. Given that there was no videotape to introduce into evidence, this memorandum further supports the district court’s determination that there was no new or additional evidence which warranted reopening the suppression hearing. Contrary to McWhorter’s argument, Simms does not support a conclusion that McWhorter’s motion to reopen should have been granted. In Simms, the district court denied a motion to reopen a suppression hearing because it “found that the officers had not made any inconsistent statements at the suppression hearing.” 385 F.3d at 1356. A review of the suppression hearing transcript supported the district court’s finding that no inconsistent statements had been made. Id. We therefore concluded that the court had not abused its discretion in 9 denying the motion to reopen on this basis. Id. In contrast to Simms, the denial of the motion to reopen in McWhorter’s case hinged on the district court’s finding that no new or additional evidence was available which would warrant another hearing, not on the fact that no inconsistent statements had been made. As we have discussed, the district court’s stated basis for denying the motion to reopen is supported by the record. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in this matter.