Opinion ID: 794277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dr. Lum

Text: 43 Reasonover argues Dr. Lum was a state actor and therefore liable under section 1983. The district court found Dr. Lum was not a state actor and therefore granted Dr. Lum summary judgment. We agree with the district court. 44 A private party may be deemed a state actor for purposes of section 1983 liability when he acts under cover of state law and performs a function traditionally exclusively reserved to the state. Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352, 95 S.Ct. 449, 42 L.Ed.2d 477 (1974). Reasonover points to Dr. Lum's 200 hypnosis sessions for the police over his seventeen years in private practice as evidence of state action, but cites no case law explaining why Dr. Lum should be considered a state actor, nor any case law asserting hypnosis is a traditional state function. We do not consider a psychiatrist in private practice who occasionally (on average about once a month) performs hypnosis sessions at the request of law enforcement, not under contract and sometimes without compensation, to be a state actor for purposes of liability under section 1983. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Dr. Lum on Reasonover's section 1983 claim. J. Familial Association Claim 45 Reasonover argues the defendants violated her right to familial association as a result of her incarceration, relying on the recognition of that general right in City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24, 109 S.Ct. 1591, 104 L.Ed.2d 18 (1989). Addressing first whether there was a violation of a constitutional right, see Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, we conclude there is insufficient evidence to show defendants violated Reasonover's alleged right to familial association. A defendant can be held liable for violating a right of intimate association only if the plaintiff shows an intent to interfere with the relationship. Singleton v. Cecil, 133 F.3d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting Morfin v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch., 906 F.2d 1434, 1440 (10th Cir.1990)), cited with approval in Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 423 (8th Cir.1999) (en banc). Reasonover presents no evidence the defendants had an intent to interfere with the relationship between Ellen Reasonover and her daughter. Even if Reasonover did present such evidence, we agree with the district court's finding that any right to familial association was not sufficiently clear such that the defendants reasonably could have understood they were violating it. Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has clearly held wrongful prosecution and incarceration of a family member violates a right to familial association. K. State Law Claims 1. Prosecutor Goldman 46 Under Missouri law, prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from tort claims. State ex rel. Griffin v. Smith, 363 Mo. 1235, 258 S.W.2d 590, 593 (1953) (en banc), overruled on other grounds, State v. Honeycutt, 96 S.W.3d 85 (Mo.2003) (en banc). As discussed above, Goldman's acts challenged by Reasonover were all performed as a function of his prosecuting Reasonover. Goldman is therefore entitled to absolute immunity against Reasonover's state law claims. 47 2. Detective Eichelberger, Detective Tillman, Officer Banaszek, Officer Welling, and Officer Needham 48 a. Negligence 49 Under Missouri law, the official immunity doctrine protects public officials from liability for injuries arising out of their discretionary acts or omissions, but not from liability in claims arising from their performance of ministerial acts. Bryan v. Mo. State Highway Patrol, 963 S.W.2d 403, 406 (Mo.Ct.App. 1998). However, official immunity is a qualified immunity and does not apply to those discretionary acts done in bad faith or with malice. Davis v. Bd. of Educ. of St. Louis, 963 S.W.2d 679, 688 (Mo.Ct.App.1998). The investigation of a crime is a discretionary act, not a ministerial one. Cf. Beaver v. Gosney, 825 S.W.2d 870, 874 (Mo.Ct.App. 1992). Putting aside her numerous unsupported contentions, we conclude Reasonover presents no specific evidence of bad faith on the part of any of the officers. We therefore affirm the district court's conclusions that Detective Eichelberger, Detective Tillman, Officer Banaszek, Officer Welling, and Officer Needham are entitled to official immunity and therefore summary judgment on Reasonover's negligence claim. 50 b. False Arrest 51 Notwithstanding the applicable statute of limitations, see Mo.Rev.Stat. § 516.130 (establishing three-year limitations period for actions against public officers), Reasonover's state law claim for false arrest fails for the same reason her section 1983 claim fails. The allegations upon which her false arrest claim rest (the officers suppressed evidence, fed Jolliff information, and created a false report) are unsupported in the record. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Detective Eichelberger, Detective Tillman, Officer Banaszek, Officer Welling, and Officer Needham on Reasonover's state law false arrest claim. 52 c. Malicious Prosecution 53 To establish malicious prosecution, Reasonover must show, inter alia, the absence of probable cause for her prosecution. See Sanders v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 807 (Mo.1984) (en banc). Reasonover's claim again depends on her allegations officers suppressed evidence, planted evidence, and filed a false report. As demonstrated above, these allegations lack support in the record. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Detective Eichelberger, Detective Tillman, Officer Banaszek, Officer Welling, and Officer Needham on Reasonover's state law malicious prosecution claim. 54 d. Abuse of Process 55 To establish her abuse of process claim, Reasonover must present evidence demonstrating, inter alia, the officers had an improper purpose in exercising illegal, improper, or perverted use of process. See Duvall v. Lawrence, 86 S.W.3d 74, 84-85 (Mo.Ct.App.2002). Here, there is no evidence the officers had any motive in investigating Reasonover other than prosecuting her for Buckley's murder. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Detective Eichelberger, Detective Tillman, Officer Banaszek, Officer Welling, and Officer Needham on Reasonover's state law abuse of process claim. 56 3. St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, St. Louis County, and the City of Jennings 57 Reasonover seeks to hold the governmental entities vicariously liable for the wrongful acts of their respective employees. Under Missouri law, with certain exceptions not applicable here, sovereign immunity shields governmental entities from liability in tort. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.600. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the St. Louis Board of Police Commissioners, St. Louis County, and the City of Jennings on Reasonover's state law claims. 4. Dr. Lum 58 a. Collateral Estoppel and Negligence Claim 59 Reasonover claims Dr. Lum was negligent in hypnotizing Main, because Dr. Lum knew or should have known that hypnotically induced identifications lack reliability. Reasonover argues the district court erred in concluding she is collaterally estopped from relitigating this issue, because it was decided by the Missouri Court of Appeals on Reasonover's direct appeal of her conviction. See Reasonover, 714 S.W.2d at 721. Reasonover also argues collateral estoppel does not apply to her co-plaintiff and daughter Bufford, because Bufford was not a party to the direct appeal. We need not determine the collateral estoppel effect of that previous decision because we hold there is no genuine issue of material fact whether Dr. Lum was negligent in conducting his hypnosis of Main. 60 Reasonover's evidence that Dr. Lum was negligent consists of the following: (1) after the hypnosis session, Main was more confident of his identification of White; (2) Officer Pruett and Dr. Lum deny having a conversation about the details of the case before the hypnosis session, but Officer Pruett admits brief[ing] Dr. Lum of the circumstances surrounding the incident; and (3) the transcript of the hypnosis session suggests Dr. Lum knew details about the case and Dr. Lum intentionally cemented Main's tentative identification of White. The transcript includes the following passages: Dr. Lum brought up the initial photographic lineup without it being mentioned by Main; after Main stated he glanced up at White's face, Dr. Lum asked You had a pretty good look at the face didn't you?; Dr. Lum closed the hypnosis session by admonishing Main to let the Detectives know ... if you can help identify any ... guys, and again asked Main [w]hy aren't you positive? 61 Reasonover argues this evidence presents a genuine issue of material fact whether Dr. Lum negligently and in a conspiracy with Officer Pruett and other officials suggested Main identify White as the person he saw at the Vickers station, suggesting Dr. Lum helped manufacture evidence used wrongly to convict Reasonover. We do not agree. The parties do not provide, and we do not find, any Missouri case law enunciating the standard of care a psychiatrist practicing hypnosis must follow to avoid being liable for negligence, beyond the general standard for physicians in the context of a malpractice claim: [A] physician is required to use and exercise that degree of care and skill used and exercised by the ordinarily skillful, careful and prudent physician acting under the same or similar circumstances. Williams v. Chamberlain, 316 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo.1958). Given this dearth of state law, we must turn to Missouri law on admissibility of post-hypnotic testimony. Under Missouri law, at the time of Reasonover's trial, post-hypnotic testimony was admissible, absent a showing of impermissible suggestiveness. State v. Greer, 609 S.W.2d 423, 435-36 (Mo.Ct.App.1980), vacated on other grounds, Missouri v. Brown, 450 U.S. 1027, 101 S.Ct. 1735, 68 L.Ed.2d 222 (1981). 5 This admissibility rule suggests a hypnotist's duty is to refrain from impermissibly suggesting responses to a hypnotized witness. 62 The evidence in the record does not present a triable issue whether Dr. Lum was impermissibly suggestive. The fact Officer Pruett and Dr. Lum discussed the case before the hypnosis, during which Officer Pruett apparently told Dr. Lum about Main's previous identification, does not raise a genuine issue of any illicit agreement between Dr. Lum and the police. It merely demonstrates Dr. Lum's preparations for the hypnosis session. More importantly, Dr. Lum states he was not told the identities of Reasonover or White, and Reasonover provides no evidence to the contrary. Finally, contrary to Reasonover's claims, the transcript of the session does not show Dr. Lum suggested who Main should identify. Dr. Lum did not know White's identity; thus, he could not steer Main toward identifying White. The questions Dr. Lum asks that might be construed as leading Main to identify White often prompt responses different than those suggested. For example, at one point Dr. Lum asks whether the person Main saw had a [s]hort neck, or thick neck, to which Main responds, It was a slender neck ... kind of long. Dr. Lum's questioning whether Main had a pretty good look at the face and why Main wasn't positive about the identification does not show any suggestion, let alone impermissible suggestion. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Dr. Lum on Reasonover's state law negligence claim. 63 b. Remaining State Law Claims 64 Reasonover also claims Dr. Lum's actions instigated Reasonover's false arrest, Dr. Lum helped cause Reasonover to be prosecuted without probable cause, and Dr. Lum had an improper purpose leading to an improper use of process against Reasonover. There is no evidence Dr. Lum encouraged Reasonover's arrest aside from his non-negligent participation in hypnotizing one witness, Dr. Lum encouraged the prosecutor to initiate prosecution against Reasonover, or Dr. Lum had an improper purpose in hypnotizing Main. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Dr. Lum on Reasonover's state law false arrest, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process claims.