Opinion ID: 718778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines as Applied to Griffith

Text: 43 Griffith's final argument on appeal is that the Sentencing Commission's actions in promulgating the Sentencing Guidelines are invalid in various respects: that the Sentencing Commission's actions have, in practice, violated the separation of powers; that the Commission's failure to promulgate rules for its proceedings violates the due process clause; that the Guidelines violate the bicameral passage and presentment requirements; and that the Guidelines are inconsistent with the statutory mandates which dictate the powers of the Commission.
44 The Supreme Court upheld the Sentencing Guidelines and the Commission in the face of a separation of powers argument in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989). Griffith argues, however, that the functioning of the Commission since that decision mandates that the separation of powers question be reevaluated in two respects. First, he claims that, in practice, the functioning of the Sentencing Commission has undermined its characterization as a rulemaking body within the judiciary and revealed the Commission to be a Junior Varsity Congress. Second, he contends that the executive branch, through its prosecutors, exercises undue sway over the Sentencing Commission's activities. 45
46 Griffith's argument that the Commission is inappropriately engaged in the promulgation of legislation is not significantly different from the proposition advanced and rejected in Mistretta. While Griffith seeks to distinguish his argument on the grounds that it is addressed to the actual functioning of the Sentencing Commission rather than to its inherent structure, he does not succeed in showing that there is some aspect of the current situation that would render the reasoning of Mistretta no longer applicable. 47 Griffith repeats the argument that the Sentencing Commission exercises powers properly preserved to the legislature. He does not, however, demonstrate that its exercise of legislative power is more extensive than already acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Mistretta. The Court was well aware, when it decided Mistretta, that the promulgation of Sentencing Guidelines was not entirely analogous to the promulgation of rules of procedure and, further, that the Commission's work would be significantly political. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393, 109 S.Ct. at 666. However, the Court noted that [o]ur separation-of-powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an activity as 'substantive' as opposed to 'procedural', or 'political' as opposed to 'judicial.'  Id. 48 Instead, the Court based its ruling on its conclusion that locating the Commission within the Judicial Branch pose[s] no threat of undermining the integrity of the Judicial Branch or of expanding the powers of the Judiciary beyond constitutional bounds by uniting within the Branch the political or quasi-legislative power of the Commission with the judicial power of the courts. Id. This conclusion was based, in large degree, on the fact that the power to determine sentences had always resided in the judicial branch and on the extent of Congressional oversight of the Commission's activities. 49 Griffith's arguments do not call into question the Court's conclusion that the Commission would not tread on the toes of the Congress. Specifically, he argues that, because the Commission has been unresponsive to the concerns of the judiciary and because Sentencing Guidelines cases now compose a substantial fraction of the federal court docket, the expectations upon which the Mistretta decision rested are now exposed as unrealistic. We fail to see how either of these specific criticisms advances Griffith's argument. 50 Griffith's argument is that the Commission (which is part of the judicial branch) is exercising legislative authority properly reposed in Congress. 3 Any failure of the Commission to respond to judicial criticism of the Guidelines is not a separation-of-powers matter, however, since both the Commission and the Judiciary reside in the same branch. In any event, at least without further elaboration, the argument that the Commission does not respond to judicial concerns seems plainly untenable, given the fact that three of the Commission's seven members are federal judges. 51 The observation that federal judges now expend a substantial amount of effort interpreting the Sentencing Guidelines is true but immaterial. The thrust of this argument is apparently that the frequency with which the Guidelines are litigated reveals their importance. This is not a new insight. The sentencing decision has always been of great importance and has always been made by the judiciary. In the past, sentencing decisions were rarely litigated due to their highly discretionary nature. The frequent litigation of Sentencing Guidelines issues does not indicate that the judiciary has invaded a field formerly occupied by Congress or that Congress has improperly delegated its own legislative authority to the judiciary. Indeed, Congress now exercises more authority over sentencing decisions, through its ability to reject the Commission's proposals, than it did in the pre-Guidelines era. 52 In sum, Griffith has not succeeded in advancing any persuasive arguments for departing from the Supreme Court's prior analysis of the separation of powers issue as applied to the legislative power of the Commission. Id. at 380-97, 109 S.Ct. at 659-68.
53 Griffith also argues that the executive branch, through its prosecutors, holds inappropriate sway over the Sentencing Commission, and, hence, over the judicial branch. Griffith did not raise this argument in the district court and the government argues that it is forfeited on appeal. A successful allegation of prosecutorial intrusion into the sentencing process might survive plain error review, however. In any event, though he raises an interesting and important issue, which has been the subject of much scholarly comment, Griffith's particular arguments in this regard cannot prevail. 54 Griffith first complains that the Guidelines have, on the whole, increased the severity of criminal sentences and alleges that the Commission has come to be widely perceived as closely identified with the Department of Justice, and as little more than an arm of that department. Def. Br. at 41. While it may be the case that prosecutors on the whole favor increased sentences, Griffith presents us with no rationale nor anything beyond a supposed public perception that links the higher sentences resulting from the Guidelines to that prosecutorial preference. 55 Next, Griffith points to USSG § 5K1.1, which requires a motion from the government before a downward departure for substantial assistance to authorities may be granted. He argues that the result of this guidelines provision is that [w]ithout the 'permission' of the U.S. Attorney, the courts are required to apply the rigid criteria set out in the guideline manual and impose the often draconian sentences provided therein. Def. Br. at 42. However, the departure for substantial assistance is only one of a number of provisions which allow judges to depart from the rigid application of the guidelines and it is the only type of departure which the government must approve. We might agree that the Guidelines, taken as a whole, constrain the discretion to depart in an undesirable manner. However, the decision to condition a departure for substantial assistance to the government on a prosecutorial motion does not necessarily indicate undue prosecutorial influence on the framing of the Sentencing Guidelines. How else would a court determine whether a defendant had substantially assisted the government if not to ask the government's representative? Thus, the existence of this departure provision does not support Griffith's argument that the Sentencing Commission is dominated by the executive branch.
56 Griffith next argues that the failure of the Commission to adopt written rules and regulations governing its procedures violates due process. This argument was not specifically raised below, Griffith having raised merely a broad due process challenge and the government argues that the argument has been forfeited. In any event, the argument fails on the merits. 57 Griffith contends that the failure of the Commission to enact rules or regulations has allowed it to be arbitrary and capricious in fashioning the Guidelines and that he, in particular, has suffered from the Commission's failure to follow the statutory directive to insure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a sentence other than imprisonment in cases in which the defendant is a first offender who has not been convicted of a crime of violence or an otherwise serious offense.... 28 U.S.C. § 994(j). 58 Griffith's contention that the Sentencing Reform Act requires the Commission to promulgate rules and regulations governing its procedure is simply unsupported. He refers, in this regard, to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o). Nowhere does that subsection mandate the adoption of procedural rules by the Commission. As the government points out, the Commission is authorized to adopt such rules, 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(1), if necessary. The Commission has apparently not found it necessary to do so. The Congressional approval requirement closely cabins the discretion of the Commission in designing the Guidelines. Thus, the Commission need not promulgate rules for its proceedings in order to provide due process. 59 In any event, while the Sentencing Reform Act directs that sentences other than imprisonment are appropriate for first offenders who have committed relatively minor crimes, Congress' rejection of the money laundering guideline amendment demonstrates that it apparently does not view money laundering as one of these minor crimes. Act of October 30, 1995, P.L. 104-38 (1995). 60
61 The argument that the Sentencing Guidelines violate the Presentment Clause has been previously rejected by this court as inconsistent with Mistretta. United States v. Macias, 930 F.2d 567 (7th Cir.1991). In light of this prior precedent, Griffith's argument on this point is patently meritless.
62 Lastly, Griffith argues that the Guidelines violate various statutory mandates intended to limit the Commission's discretion. These include: the requirement that the Guidelines be formulated to minimize the likelihood that prison capacity will be exceeded, 28 U.S.C. § 994(g); the requirement that first offenders who have committed relatively minor offenses receive non-prison sentences, 28 U.S.C. § 994(j); the requirement that sentences be no greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of punishment, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); the requirement that no limitation be placed on the information about an offender which may be considered by a court in imposing sentence, 18 U.S.C. § 3661. 63 As the government points out, Griffith fails to explain how he has been specifically injured by any of these alleged failings of the Commission and thus lacks standing to pursue them. The suggestion that the money laundering guideline violates 28 U.S.C. § 994(j) by not prescribing a sentence other than a term of imprisonment for cases such as his is, as already noted, contradicted by Congress' rejection of the Commission's attempts to provide lower sentences for that offense.