Opinion ID: 2032518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Certiorari the Appropriate Remedy?

Text: Under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 306, certiorari may furnish a remedy when an inferior tribunal exercising judicial functions exceeds its proper jurisdiction or otherwise acts illegally. State v. Gaffney, 237 Iowa 1399, 1403-04, 25 N.W.2d 352, 354 (1946). Here, the city's challenge is based on the premise that the district court illegally denied its requested entry of default judgment. Because the city has characterized that act as compulsory, the court asserts that the action sought is purely ministerial, not judicial, and therefore not subject to review by way of certiorari. We cannot agree. Assuming arguendo that the defendants were all in default, [1] the next procedural step upon which the city relies provides that, upon motion of the prevailing party, the court shall order the judgment to which he is entitled. See Iowa R.Civ. P. 232(b) (emphasis added). Significantly, the rule does not provide for automatic entry of the judgment that plaintiff has claimed. In other words, an element of discretion is clearly implicated in those cases in which the claim is not for a sum certain, determinable by the clerk. Compare Iowa R.Civ.P. 232(a) with id. 232(b) ([t]he court may ... either hear any evidence or accounting required to warrant the judgment or refer it to a master; or submit it to a jury...) Thus, the question is whether, in the case before us, the court abused that discretion and acted illegally by arbitrarily denying the default judgments. So framed, certiorari is the proper vehicle for challenging the court's decision. Next, we turn to the court's defense of untimeliness. Under the court's view of the facts, either the city is premature for having petitioned this court before a final ruling had been entered, or the city is tardy for not having commenced the action within thirty days from the first time a proposed default decree was tendered in each case. We addressed a similar contention in State v. Gaffney, 237 Iowa at 1405-07, 25 N.W.2d at 354-56. There we held that the illegal act chargedthe court's refusal to set a criminal case for trialwas of a continuing nature, entitling the State to relief irrespective of the fact that the right could have been asserted sooner. Id. As in Gaffney, the continuing nature of the district court's inaction here, if illegal at all, will not support a defense that the city has not pursued its remedy within the statutory time limits. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 319 (petition must be filed within thirty days from time tribunal acts illegally). We therefore proceed to a consideration of the merits of the city's petition.