Opinion ID: 1115370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lifetime Ban or Limit on Consecutive Terms

Text: (3a) As a preliminary matter, we must address the interpretive question whether Proposition 140 imposes a lifetime ban on officers who have served the specified number of terms, or merely limits the number of consecutive terms they may serve. With respect to state legislators, petitioners and intervener assume that once a legislator has served the prescribed maximum number of terms, the measure would forever bar him or her from running for a seat in the legislative house previously served. Respondent Secretary of State, contends, however, that the term limitation is directed only at the incumbent office holder. (Italics in original.) In her view, the measure simply limits the number of consecutive terms served, and she suggests that a former legislator might run for a new term of office if he or she is not currently holding that office. We focus first on the language of the new measure. The introduction to Proposition 140 refers to curtailing [t]he ability of legislators to serve unlimited ... terms, by limiting the number of terms which may be served. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5.) Thus, the limitation on the term of state Senators adds the language, No Senator may serve more than 2 terms, to the existing language of the Constitution that The Senate has a membership of 40 Senators elected for 4-year terms, 20 to begin every 2 years. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 2, subd. (a).) The limitation on Assembly members is similarly phrased, stating that No member of the Assembly may serve more than 3 terms. ( Ibid. ) As petitioners observe, the foregoing provisions do not expressly refer to the number of consecutive terms served. Moreover, the measure repeatedly announces its intent to eliminate career politicians (see Cal. Const., art. IV, §§ 1.5, 4.5), language which would support the view that a lifetime ban was intended. Respondent Secretary of State points out, however, that these limitations are directed to a Senator or member of the Assembly, rather than a person, and she argues that a literal interpretation of the measure thus discloses an intent to limit the right of an incumbent legislator to continue unabated terms in office. In respondent Eu's view, once the incumbent legislator has left office, he or she can no longer be described as a Senator or member of the Assembly to which the term limitation provision would apply. Petitioners argue that even a purely literal reading of Proposition 140 would support their interpretation: A person who, having already served two prior terms as Senator, surrenders his or her seat for one term and thereafter enters on a third Senate term, could be accurately described as a Senator who is serv[ing] more than 2 terms contrary to the language of Proposition 140. Intervener suggests that respondent Eu's interpretation, with its emphasis on limiting only incumbents, could lead to absurd results, permitting a legislator to avoid the term limitations by resigning shortly before his or her final term had expired, and thereupon announcing an intent to run for reelection unencumbered by any term limitations applicable to incumbents. Nonetheless, we agree with respondent Eu that the language of Proposition 140 is ambiguous as to its intent to impose a lifetime ban. (4) As we have previously recognized, to help resolve such ambiguities it is appropriate to consider indicia of the voters' intent other than the language of the provision itself. [Citation.] ( Kennedy Wholesale, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1991) 53 Cal.3d 245, 250 [279 Cal. Rptr. 325, 806 P.2d 1360].) Such indicia include the analysis and arguments contained in the official ballot pamphlet. (See ibid.; Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 245-246 [149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281] [hereafter Amador ].) (3b) These materials strongly support the position of petitioners and intervener that a lifetime ban from office was contemplated by the framers of, and voters for, Proposition 140. First, the analysis by the Legislative Analyst described the term limitations as limiting the number of terms that an elected state official can serve in the same office. ... (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Stats. and Amends. to Cal. Const. with argument to voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 6, 1990) p. 69, italics in original [hereafter Ballot Pamphlet].) No suggestion is made that only a consecutive term limitation was contemplated. Second, and more significantly, the opponents' ballot arguments against Proposition 140 forcefully and repeatedly stressed the measure's lifetime ban, and criticized the proponents' failure to disclose that particular aspect of the measure in their arguments to the voters. Indeed, the primary thrust of the opponents' ballot arguments was directed to this aspect of the measure. (See Ballot Pamp., supra, at pp. 70-71.) The argument against Proposition 140 used the phrases lifetime ban, banned for life, or similar terminology 11 times. ( Ibid. ) We are mindful of the fact that ballot measure opponents frequently overstate the adverse effects of the challenged measure, and that their fears and doubts are not highly authoritative in construing the measure. ( DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Trades Council (1988) 485 U.S. 568, 585 [99 L.Ed.2d 645, 661, 108 S.Ct. 1392].) Nonetheless, we find it significant that the proponents failed to contradict the opponents' lifetime ban argument. (See D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1970) 6 Cal. App.3d 716, 725 [86 Cal. Rptr. 245].) Moreover, the proponents stressed that Proposition 140 was directed at eliminating career politicians or career legislators, and suggested that good legislators will always have the opportunity to move up the ladder. (Italics added.) These arguments seem to reinforce the idea that a lifetime ban was intended. We think it likely the average voter, reading the proposed constitutional language as supplemented by the foregoing analysis and arguments, would conclude the measure contemplated a lifetime ban against candidacy for the office once the prescribed maximum number of terms had been served. (5) As we stated in In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744], In construing constitutional and statutory provisions, whether enacted by the Legislature or by initiative, the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration.  (Italics added.) Respondent Eu suggests that the applicable principle of interpretation requires us to avoid any constitutional doubts or difficulties by adopting a construction which will render the measure constitutional. (E.g., Kortum v. Alkire (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 325, 333-334 [138 Cal. Rptr. 26].) We find no cases suggesting, however, that this interpretive principle precludes resort to extrinsic evidence to resolve possible ambiguities in a measure. Moreover, as we explain in this opinion, the measure's lifetime ban is constitutional in all respects. (3c) We conclude that Proposition 140's term limitations extend over the lifetime of each affected officeholder.