Opinion ID: 2225661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dismissal, For Cause, Of Prospective Juror and Trial Court's Conduct of Voir Dire

Text: Castor urges that a prospective juror was improperly dismissed in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968), 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, because a prospective juror must make it unmistakably clear that such juror would automatically vote against the death penalty, regardless of the facts, in order to justify a challenge for cause. The State correctly points out that the standard which we must use in reviewing the trial court's granting of a challenge for cause of a prospective juror is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the juror's performance of duty in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. Wainwright v. Witt (1985), 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; Underwood v. State (1989), Ind., 535 N.E.2d 507, cert. denied (1989) 493 U.S. 900, 110 S.Ct. 257, 107 L.Ed.2d 206. Here, the prospective juror stated that he did not feel that he could judge guilt or innocence irrespective of penalty, and that he might raise the State's burden of proof so high as to not be able to give the State a fair trial. Further, he stated that he could not take an oath to render a verdict based on the law and the evidence, and could not accept the law's definition of reasonable doubt and apply it to the evidence. We agree with the State that these answers justified a finding that the prospective juror's views substantially impaired his ability to perform the duties of a juror in accordance with the court's instructions and his oath. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excusing this juror for cause. Castor also argues that the trial court erred in discharging prospective jurors from sitting on the jury when such jurors made it unmistakably clear that they would either automatically vote against the death penalty in spite of the evidence or that they could not impartially render a judgment at the guilt-innocence phase. He contends that he timely objected to the excusal of these jurors for cause based upon the assertion that the systematic exclusion of such jurors who oppose the death penalty death qualifies a jury so that it would be prone to convict and to render a death sentence recommendation. Our review of the transcript convinces us that the trial court properly excused these jurors who stated that they could not follow the law or could not render an impartial verdict in the case. The goal of the jury selection process is to grant to both sides a procedure to obtain an impartial jury that can render a verdict based on the law and the evidence. Here, the trial court's proper exercise of discretion achieved that goal. We see no error.