Opinion ID: 2589958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: salt lake's title to water intercepted in the kentucky-utah mine

Text: ¶ 21 SFPC argues that Salt Lake failed to prove, by way of decreed right, certificate of appropriation, or diligence or use claim, its alleged right to divert water at the mine. SFPC concedes the Morse Decree provided Salt Lake title to use of water flowing in the creek near the mouth of the canyon. However, according to SFPC, because the Morse Decree issued in 1914, and percolating water was not subject to appropriation in Utah prior to 1935, the Morse Decree could not provide Salt Lake with rights to the underground source waters of the creek. Accordingly, Salt Lake's water rights are limited to specific points of diversion at the mouth of the canyon, as set forth in the Morse Decree. SFPC further argues that Salt Lake's failure to file a change application with the state engineer seeking permission to change its point of diversion from the mouth of the canyon to the portal of the mine precludes Salt Lake from relying on the Decree to claim title to water intercepted in the mine. Salt Lake counters that the Morse Decree grants it title to water intercepted in the mine, because this water is naturally tributary to the creek. In addition, even prior to 1935, Utah law allowed owners of surface water rights to enforce their rights against anyone who interfered with the source of those waters, including percolating water. [5] ¶ 22 Salt Lake correctly asserts that a right to water includes an interest in the source(s) of those waters. [6] See Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 249-50, 258 P.2d 440, 443 (1953). Thus, Salt Lake possesses an interest in the source waters to Big Cottonwood Creek. The question is whether the mine waters are, in fact, a source of the creek.
¶ 23 To be considered source waters, the percolating waters in question must be naturally tributary to the creek above Salt Lake's historic point of diversion. See, e.g., Mountain Lake Mining Co. v. Midway Irr. Co., 47 Utah 346, 149 P. 929 (1915). [7] ¶ 24 In the instant case, the district court found that water intercepted in the mine, ultimately, in the absence of the Kentucky-Utah Mine Tunnel would have contributed to Big Cottonwood Creek above the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon, before, during, and after the 1914 Morse Decree. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. Salt Lake presented testimony of four experts who testified that water intercepted in the mine would ordinarily and naturally flow into the creek absent interception at the mine. [8] These experts based this conclusion on geological characteristics of the canyon generally, and on the area surrounding the mine specifically; on chemical testing of water intercepted in the mine compared with water drawn from other areas in the canyon, including the creek; and on tests that determined the age of water flowing above and below ground throughout the canyon, particularly water intercepted in the mine and flowing in the creek. In light of all the credible evidence, the trial court did not err in finding that the mine water is tributary to Big Cottonwood Creek.
¶ 25 Quieting title to source waters requires not only a finding that these waters are naturally tributary to an appropriated creek, but also that interception of these waters substantially interferes with the quantity or quality of water that would otherwise reach the appropriator of the creek. [9] See Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Sandy City, 123 Utah 242, 250, 258 P.2d 440, 444 (1953); Wrathall v. Johnson, 86 Utah 50, 74, 40 P.2d 755, 766 (1935). ¶ 26 The district court found that interception of nearly .5 c.f.s. of water from the mine impacts and interferes with the water rights of Salt Lake City at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon, and that such interference is substantial. This finding is supported by substantial evidence. The trial court noted that .5 c.f.s. of water continuously flowing from the mine would yield approximately 362 acre-feet of water each year, enough to support 362 families of four for an entire year. Assuming that virtually all water intercepted in the mine would naturally flow into the creek but for the presence of the mine, the court determined that interception of these waters created a substantial interference with Salt Lake's right to flow of water in the creek. We agree that diminution of the creek by nearly .5 c.f.s. is substantial. ¶ 27 SFPC argues that the district court erred in finding substantial interference without requiring Salt Lake to proffer actual measurements of water flowing in the creek at the mouth of the canyon, illustrating that diversion of water at the mine significantly diminished the flow in the creek. We disagree that a court must premise its finding of substantial interference on actual measurements reporting flow before and after interception of the water at its source. Measurements of water flow are often not available to prove interference, and when they are, their value is limited to the extent that other environmental factors dictate flow, such as season and amount of precipitation. It is especially difficult to demonstrate by empirical evidence the extent to which interception of percolating water interferes with a surface body of water to which it is tributary. Hydrogeological characteristics in a particular area may extend to decades the time it takes for underground water to percolate through the soil before reaching the surface, only then making the effect of interception evident based on diminished water levels. ¶ 28 Given the difficulty in obtaining reliable measurements of water flow that accurately reflect the effects of interception of underground source waters, we cannot agree that a finding of interference must be premised on this type of evidence. If nearly .5 c.f.s. of water intercepted in the mine would naturally flow into the creek but for the existence of the mine, it is reasonable to infer that Salt Lake has suffered, or will eventually suffer, a diminution in its water right of approximately 362 acre-feet of water each year. This evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's finding of substantial interference. [10]
¶ 29 SFPC next argues that it is irrelevant whether underground water intercepted in the mine is naturally tributary to Big Cottonwood Creek, because, in 1914, when rights to the creek were adjudicated in the Morse Decree, underground water in Utah was not public and could not be appropriated. The Morse Decree could not, therefore, provide any rights to percolating waters intercepted in the mine. In support of its argument, SFPC relies on textual changes to Utah's Water Code in 1935. In 1914, Utah Code Ann. § 100-1-1 read: The water of all streams and other sources in this state, whether flowing above or under the ground, in known or defined channels, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof. Comp. Laws of Utah § 40-3-1288x18 (1907) (emphasis added). The Legislature amended this provision in 1935 to read as follows: All waters in this state, whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof. 1935 Utah Laws ch. 105, § 100-1-1 (presently codified at Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-1). According to SFPC, the 1935 omission of the phrase in known or defined channels indicates that percolating water, which by definition does not flow in a known or defined channel, was not public property in 1914 and, therefore, not subject to appropriation. ¶ 30 SFPC also relies on Provo River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 932-33 (Utah 1993), to support its argument that percolating waters were not subject to appropriation prior to 1935. In Provo River, this Court interpreted the scope of the Weber River Decree, a general adjudication lasting between 1921 and 1937, to ascertain whether the decree was intended to adjudicate all waters, including percolating waters, in the Weber River drainage area. This would have foreclosed subsequent appropriation of any water with a hydrological connection to the river. We concluded the Weber River Decree adjudicated only water rights to the Weber River and its surface tributaries, rather than rights to all isolated springs and percolating water. See id. at 932. We based our determination in part on the fact that during the first fourteen years of the Weber River proceedings, from 1921 through 1935, Utah law did not require users of percolating waters to assert their rights in a general adjudication. However, we did not hold that any adjudication of water rights commencing prior to 1935 could not, as a matter of law, resolve rights to percolating waters. ¶ 31 As part of our Provo River analysis, we provided an historical overview of this Court's early treatment of percolating waters. [11] Although we initially treated percolating waters as subject to the absolute control of the property owner, our view changed in conjunction with a greater understanding of the way underground water systems work in this mountainous and arid state. As we have since indicated, the public has always owned percolating waters in spite of statements to the contrary in earlier cases. In Provo River, we rejected the characterization of percolating water as privately owned. See id. at 933 n. 8. We acknowledged that some pre-1935 decisions characterized diffused groundwater and isolated springs and seeps as subject to private ownership, id. However, we expressly agreed with the statement by Chief Justice Wolfe, made in 1952, that public ownership of all water in the state, even that which percolates underground,  must have always been so. . . . But the fact that the State progressively applied regulation to the acquisition of use rights in water does not disturb the fundamental principle that all water . . . at least from the time it reaches land within the confines of this state belongs to the publicthe people of this state. Id. (quoting McNaughton v. Eaton, 121 Utah 394, 405, 242 P.2d 570, 575 (1952) (Wolfe, C.J., concurring)). [12] ¶ 32 SFPC's reliance on the 1935 textual changes to the Water Code is likewise misplaced. For even prior to 1935, percolating water was subject to appropriation by private individuals who diverted and beneficially used such water. See Dalton v. Wadley, 11 Utah 2d 84, 355 P.2d 69 (1960); Fairfield Irr. Co. v. Carson, 122 Utah 225, 247 P.2d 1004 (1952); Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949). The 1935 Utah law simply subjected appropriators of underground waters to the statutory application process of our Water Code. [13] See Riordan, 115 Utah at 224-25, 203 P.2d at 927. ¶ 33 SFPC's argument that the Morse Decree could not grant Salt Lake title to percolating water intercepted in the mine because this water was not public property until 1935 mischaracterizes early Utah law and ignores this Court's clear statements that percolating waters have always been public property subject to appropriation. [14] Therefore, Progress could, and in this case did, provide Salt Lake with title to water intercepted in the Kentucky-Utah Mine. When Salt Lake and its predecessors appropriated use of waters in the creek, they also appropriated percolating source waters of the creek. [15]
¶ 34 SFPC further attacks Salt Lake's title to use of water intercepted in the mine by claiming SFPC appropriated the water before Salt Lake did. Utah is a prior appropriation state, where the appropriator first in time is first in right. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989). A senior appropriator is guaranteed the full measure of his or her appropriation before any claim by a junior appropriator may be satisfied. See id. ; see also Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d 255 (1949). Therefore, even if Salt Lake is otherwise entitled to source water intercepted in the mine, if SFPC or its predecessors in interest lawfully appropriated water from the mine before Salt Lake or its predecessors did, Salt Lake cannot prohibit SFPC's use of the water. ¶ 35 However, we find that SFPC has no valid claim to waters intercepted in the mine predating 1894, the date by which Salt Lake and its predecessors in interest appropriated use of almost all the water flowing in the creek near the mouth of the canyon. First, even if Salt Lake and its predecessors did not fully appropriate the water in the creek until 1914, the year the Morse Decree issued, SFPC would have no interest that predates Salt Lake's. Excavation of the mine did not commence until 1915, the earliest time from which predecessors of SFPC could have beneficially used the .5 c.f.s. of water intercepted in the mine. In fact, evidence indicates that the mine did not produce a significant amount of water until after 1930. Second, as discussed more fully below regarding SFPC's diligence claim, even if we assume that it was possible to obtain rights to the .5 c.f.s. of water intercepted at the mine before the mine was built, SFPC has failed to establish that it has a legitimate claim to that water. For one, SFPC failed to establish a chain of title between itself and early Silver Fork residents. See infra, ¶¶ 42-45. Furthermore, SFPC failed to demonstrate that early Silver Fork residents beneficially used (i.e., appropriated) .5 c.f.s. of water flowing in the area. See infra, note 19. Therefore, SFPC has no interest in the mine waters senior to Salt Lake's title. [16]
¶ 36 SFPC notes that although Salt Lake sold water intercepted in the mine to SFPC or its predecessor from 1945 until the present, Salt Lake did not file an application with the state engineer seeking approval for change in its point of diversion, from the mouth of the canyon to the mine, until December 10, 1991. SFPC argues that because Salt Lake failed to obtain permission to divert water at the mine until 1991, it had no right to these waters, and by selling this water Salt Lake has illegally enlarged its rights in the creek. On this point, the trial court held that [a]ny failure of Salt Lake City to obtain an approved change application is irrelevant to the instant action and any such failure did not result in a forfeiture of any of Salt Lake City's water rights. We agree. ¶ 37 Salt Lake's failure to file a change application does not affect its title to use water intercepted in the mine, in spite of the Water Code's prohibition against changing a point of diversion without an approved application to do so. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3 allows parties to change the place of diversion, but requires that such changes be made in the manner provided in this section. Id. § 73-3-3(2) & (3). The statute expressly prohibits a change in point of diversion before a change application is approved by the state engineer. See id. § 73-3-3(4). Although, as we stated in Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104 Utah 216, 217, 140 P.2d 638, 639 (1943), section 73-3-3 provides its own enforcement clause and nowhere in the statutes does it appear that . . . a change in the place of the diversion . . . shall constitute a forfeiture of the water to which a party is otherwise entitled. The enforcement provision of section 73-3-3 reads: (9) Any person who changes or who attempts to change a point of diversion, place, or purpose of use, either permanently or temporarily, without first applying to the state engineer in the manner provided in this section: (a) obtains no right; and (b) is guilty of a misdemeanor, each day of the unlawful change constituting a separate offense, separately punishable. Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-3(9) (1989). Salt Lake's failure to file a change application could not alone deprive it of its rights to waters intercepted in the mine. ¶ 38 Aside from Utah's Water Code, nothing precludes Salt Lake from changing its point of diversion except the general rule that it may not do so to the injury of any downstream appropriator who is a party to the dispute. See, e.g., East Bench Irr. Co. v. Deseret Irr. Co., 2 Utah 2d 170, 177, 271 P.2d 449, 454 (1954). As discussed more fully below, SFPC, the only other party in this dispute, owns no interest in the waters intercepted in the mine apart from its purchase agreement with Salt Lake. Therefore, no party to this dispute can claim injury as a result of Salt Lake's diversion of water at the mine. Salt Lake's failure to file a change application with the state engineer has no bearing on its claim to the water intercepted in the mine.