Opinion ID: 2982813
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Keller’s Opportunity for Profit or Loss

Text: The next factor to consider is whether Keller had an opportunity for greater profits based on his management and technical skills. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1119. The district court made four observations relevant to determine the degree of control Keller had over his profitability: (1) Keller determined the geographical region where he worked; (2) he had control over how many jobs he took each day; (3) he could have hired other technicians to work for him; and (4) he earned some money from Dish Network television for selling routers. The district court concluded that this factor supports a finding that Keller was an independent contractor. We 7 We recognize that some circuit and district courts have found that investments in vans and hand tools favored independent-contractor status. See, e.g., Freund v. Hi-Tech Satellite, Inc., 185 F. App’x 782, 783–84 (11th Cir. 2006) (upholding a district court finding that a cable installer invested in the equipment necessary to perform installations because “[h]e drove his own vehicle and provided his own tools and supplies for each installation.”); Keeton, 2011 WL 2618926, at  (“Because the evidence . . . does not demonstrate that Time Warner made a significant capital investment into tools required to execute the [cable] installation process, a reasonable fact-finder would have to conclude that this factor does not support a finding that Plaintiffs were Time Warner employees.”); Scruggs v. Skylink, Ltd., No. 3:10–0789, 2011 WL 6026152, at  (S.D. W.Va. Dec. 2, 2011) (“This factor weighs in favor of finding independent contractor status as it is undisputed that Plaintiffs[, satellite-dish technicians,] were responsible for providing their own work equipment and vehicles.”). These divergent views support, rather than detract from, our conclusion that this factor weighs against granting Miri’s motion for summary judgment. That reasonable judges throughout the country disagree on this point strongly suggests that there is a genuine dispute of material fact about whether technicians’ use of personal cars, computers, and hand tools is evidence of economic independence. No. 14-1430 Keller v. Miri Microsystems Page 13 disagree because a reasonable jury could also find that this factor weighs in favor of employee status. Although Keller controlled the size of his territory and the number of jobs he accepted each day, we cannot conclude that Keller could have earned greater profits had he expanded his territory or chosen to work elsewhere. Keller’s territory was quite large; it covered most of the “thumb” of Michigan and parts of a few surrounding counties. If Miri scheduled Keller at opposite ends of the territory, then Keller could spend most of his day driving. Moreover, if Keller chose to turn down a work assignment because it was too far away, there was no guarantee that there would be another installation to take its place. We recognize that Keller could have become a subcontractor, like ABC Dishman, and hired assistants.8 By hiring assistants, Keller arguably could have accepted more jobs every day, and he could have accepted installation jobs in a broader territory. In fact, Keller admitted that he invited a helper, Kyle, and Keller’s wife to accompany him sometimes. Kyle and Mrs. Keller primarily provided companionship, but Kyle occasionally helped with the installations, and Mrs. Keller talked with customers and helped with paperwork. Keller finished his assigned jobs slightly faster than usual when he had company, but Kyle and Mrs. Keller did not net Keller more money. We note, however, that hiring employees carries additional costs that would have affected Keller’s ability to earn a greater profit. Wages, vehicles, gas, tools, and computers—these are just a few of the additional expenses Keller would have accrued had he hired assistants to increase the number of installations he could perform every day. Keller paid Kyle ten dollars for every installation and five dollars for every repair. In addition, Miri did not pay technicians an increased fee if the technicians employed assistants. Moreover, although satellite-dish technicians could hire helpers to increase efficiency, that hiring authority may be “illusory” if the defendant-company maintains control over the technicians’ hiring ability. See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1317. Here, although Miri did not require that installation helpers contract with Miri directly, Miri exercised some control by adhering to HughesNet’s certification requirement. 8 We express no opinion as to whether subcontractors, like ABC Dishman, are also employers within the meaning of the FLSA, and therefore jointly liable for overtime wages. See Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126, 1131 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 209(d)). The parties have not raised or briefed the issue. No. 14-1430 Keller v. Miri Microsystems Page 14 Finally, nothing in the record compels the conclusion that Keller could improve his efficiency such that he could complete more than four installations each day. The two to three hours required for installation, travel time, and time spent preparing and submitting paperwork for each job amount to eight hours total at the very least. Accordingly, it is unlikely that Keller could have earned more if he had just become a bit more efficient. See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1317; Schultz v. Capital Int’l Sec., Inc., 466 F.3d 298, 308 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the evidence did not support a finding that managerial skill and business acumen could affect the plaintiffs’ profits when the employer dictated the rate of pay and schedule, and it was not possible to finish a job more efficiently in order to perform another job). Still, Keller profited from other ventures to some minor extent. Keller admitted that he earned money from Dish Network on two sales during his tenure at Miri. Two of Keller’s friends asked how to obtain satellite television; Keller connected those two friends with Dish Network and received commissions. Keller also helped a few customers configure routers for which he collected a $25–35 fee directly from the customer, which he did not turn over to Miri. And there were a few occasions when Keller sold customers routers that he had bought at WalMart, but he said that it was a “nightmare” to do, so he stopped. Keller’s profits also varied if the installation was more complex, but that was not something within his control. Ordinarily, technicians mount the satellite dish onto the customer’s roof; however, if a roof mount was not feasible or the customer requested a pole mount, then the technician would have to dig a hole, install a pipe, and put the satellite dish on top of the pipe for which he collected an additional $12. But whether a customer requested a pole mount was not within Keller’s control—that depended on Miri’s scheduling and on customer demand. In light of this record, we conclude that there is a material dispute as to whether Keller could have increased his profitability had he improved his efficiency or requested more assignments, and therefore a jury should consider this evidence.9 9 We recognize that some other circuit courts have considered the employment status of cable and satellitedish technicians and concluded that technicians control their profitability. See, e.g., Freund, 185 F. App’x at 783; Chao v. Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., Inc., 16 F. App’x 104, 106–07 (4th Cir. 2001) (“An Installer’s net profit or loss depends on his skill in meeting technical specifications, thereby avoiding backcharges; on the business acumen with No. 14-1430 Keller v. Miri Microsystems Page 15 5. Miri’s Right to Control the Manner Keller Performed His Work The fifth factor is whether Miri exercised control over Keller’s work. The district court evaluated the following four considerations when analyzing the control Miri exercised: (1) Keller could refuse work assignments, (2) Miri never supervised or monitored how Keller performed the work, (3) Miri’s ability to control Keller’s day-to-day work, and (4) Keller could do work for other companies. Keller had some control over his schedule, but Miri also exercised control. In the event that Keller could not make a scheduled appointment, he could call the customer and reschedule the installation at a mutually agreeable time. Keller usually just followed the schedule he received from Miri, but he was free to reject an assignment or take vacation days. Miri scheduled the installations in blocks, and the technicians were expected to arrive at the customer’s house and finish their work within the scheduled time. But a worker’s ability to set his own hours and vacation schedule “is not sufficient to negate control.” Lilley, 958 F.2d at 750. It is also relevant to consider whether “the hours [the worker] [is] required to work on a project . . . , coupled with driving time between home and often remote work sites each day, make it practically impossible for them to offer services to other employers.” Baker, 137 F.3d at 1441. Therefore, a reasonable jury could find that the way that Miri scheduled Keller’s installation appointments made it impossible for Keller to provide installation services for other companies. Miri did not exercise traditional control over how Keller performed his job. Miri never accompanied Keller during his installation appointments, except when he was in training. Although Miri does not give technicians step-by-step guides about how to perform their jobs, Miri insists that all technicians perform their jobs in accordance with HughesNet’s specifications. Miri and HughesNet require that all technicians obtain a HughesNet certification to perform the repair and installation services. And Miri teaches the certification course. In addition, Miri supplies technicians with HughesNet’s and RS&I’s instructions about how to which the Installer makes his required capital investments in tools, equipment, and a truck; and on the Installer’s decision whether to hire his own employees or to work alone.”). None of these out-of-circuit opinions bind us. United States v. Simmons, 587 F.3d 348, 383 (6th Cir. 2009). We note that the analysis of this factor in the other circuits’ opinions is cursory, and therefore less persuasive. See Freund, 185 F. App’x at 783; Mid-Atl. Installation Servs., 16 F. App’x at 106–07. More to the point, reasonable minds could reach different conclusions about whether the record supports a finding that Keller was, in fact, economically dependent upon Miri. No. 14-1430 Keller v. Miri Microsystems Page 16 install the dishes. A jury could therefore find that Miri controlled Keller’s job performance through its initial training and hiring practices. Moreover, Miri monitors the quality of installations remotely. HughesNet and RS&I require Miri to submit reports, documenting when technicians start and finish the installation or repair work. In turn, Miri mandates that technicians must submit those hours through WARP. Miri also requires that technicians take photographs of the installation and send those photos to HughesNet and RS&I along with the other post-installation paperwork. Keller stated that he felt pressure to submit paperwork to Miri as soon as possible. In addition, Miri guarantees the quality of technicians’ performance. HughesNet and Miri warrant that the technician would return to the customer’s home to fix any problems within thirty days of the installation. If a customer complains within the warranty time period, then the technician must return and fix the satellite dish without any additional compensation. Moreover, Miri controlled the amount customers paid Keller—and ultimately Miri—for installations or repairs. Miri told Keller when to collect additional fees from customers and how much to charge. Regardless of these mechanisms of control, Keller made some decisions free from Miri’s control. Miri did not object if Keller or any other technician rearranged their schedules to create the most convenient driving route. Miri stated, however, that had Keller missed appointments or arrived late routinely, then Miri would have severed ties with him. Miri did not require that Keller wear a uniform with Miri’s or HughesNet’s logo. When it came to how to complete every installation job, Keller was free to assess the customers’ needs and respond accordingly without checking with Miri so long as the installation met HughesNet’s specifications. Finally, Keller independently decided to bring Kyle and Mrs. Keller on some installation jobs to keep him company and improve his efficiency. There are genuine facts in dispute about whether and how Miri could discipline Keller. Miri asserted that the company has never disciplined a technician. Customers who were unhappy with an installation or repair would submit feedback to HughesNet, HughesNet would contact Miri, and then Miri would relay the complaints to the technicians. In these No. 14-1430 Keller v. Miri Microsystems Page 17 conversations, Miri “would discuss . . . the issue and try to find and determine . . . if there was a particular problem on one job or . . . a particular habit that[] [was] being formed” in order to “correct that situation.” R. 24-2 at 19 (A. Miri Dep. at 64–65) (Page ID #342). Keller believed that Miri could or would fire him. The record offers reasons to believe this fear was not unfounded: when Keller told Miri that he wanted to “blow off” a customer’s complaint, Miri responded with a threatening email. See R. 21-8 at 2 (Email Nov. 7, 2012) (Page ID #108). Given the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could determine that Miri could, in fact, terminate Keller. We believe that reasonable minds can differ about whether these forms of remote control support a finding that Miri had the power to discipline and control technicians. Unlike in Brandel, the record may lead reasonable minds to different conclusions as to whether Miri “retain[ed] the right to dictate the manner in which the details of” how Keller installed satellite dishes. 736 F.2d at 1119. Rather, we believe that there is a genuine dispute as to whether Keller’s “whims or choices” affected his profitability, or whether “the demands of the business controlled” his ability to install more satellite dishes every day. Snell, 875 F.2d at 806. 6. Keller’s Role in Miri’s Business The final inquiry is whether Keller rendered services that are “an integral part” of Miri’s business. Brandel, 736 F.2d at 1119–20. The more integral the worker’s services are to the business, then the more likely it is that the parties have an employer-employee relationship. Keeton, 2011 WL 2618926, at . Miri is a satellite-dish installation provider for HughesNet and iDirect. The only services Miri provides are satellite-dish installation and repair. Accordingly, a reasonable jury would conclude that satellite-dish technicians are integral to Miri’s business—a factor that weighs in favor of finding that Keller was a Miri employee. 7. Other Factors The economic-reality test is not an exclusive list of factors. We may and should look to other evidence in the record to determine whether the totality of the circumstances establishes that Miri employed Keller. See Superior Care, 840 F.2d at 1059. No. 14-1430 Keller v. Miri Microsystems Page 18 A reasonable jury could find that one factor that supports a finding that Keller was an employee is that he held himself out to customers as a representative of HughesNet and not as an independent contractor, as evidenced by the way Keller interacted with customers. Keller never registered for a Federal Employer Identification number. He did not carry business cards or use signs to identify himself as a Miri employee or as an independent contractor. Keller put a HughesNet sticker on his van and wore a hat that read “Do more with Gen4”—HughesNet’s advertising campaign slogan. Id. at 24 (Keller Dep. at 87–88) (Page ID #380). And Miri offered these shirts, hats, and bumper stickers to technicians for purchase. A uniform can often be a sign of control, but the uniforms were not required, nor did they connect Keller to Miri. We are mindful that Miri never required that Keller do any of this, but we believe these considerations suggest that a jury could reasonably find that Keller was Miri’s employee. 8. Conclusion Regarding Employee Status We conclude that there are many genuine disputes of fact and reasonable inferences from which a jury could find that Keller was an employee. Summary judgment for the defendant is not appropriate when a factfinder could reasonably find that a FLSA plaintiff was an employee. See Scantland, 721 F.3d at 1319 (“Because there are genuine issues of material fact, and because plaintiffs were ‘employees’ if . . . reasonable factual inferences are found in plaintiff’s favor, the district court erred in granting summary judgment . . . .”); Imars, 1998 WL 598778, at  (“The appropriate weight of the factors can be more properly assessed after a trial.”). We therefore hold that a jury could reasonably find that Keller was a Miri employee, and Miri is not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.