Opinion ID: 1477474
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allegedly Improper Comments

Text: During his opening statement, and again in his closing argument, the prosecutor referred to the murder of Michael Day in vivid terms. He noted that Mr. Day's young life was brought to an abrupt and violent halt and was snuffed out by a man with an axe to grind. He further commented that Mr. Day's life was draining, literally draining out of his body and characterized appellant as having a reckless disregard for human life. In one instance during his opening statement, the prosecutor expressed his personal opinion when he remarked that a particular witness' testimony would be honest. Appellant argues that these comments should have resulted in sanctions of varying degrees against the government. Although the comments at issue may perhaps have been more colorful than is customary, and although the characterization of the witness' testimony as honest should have been left unsaid, any prejudice suffered by appellant was minimal at best, given the strength of the government's case and the court's curative instructions. Our standard of review is well established. In reviewing appellant's contentions, this court must first consider whether the prosecutor's comments were improper. See Dancy v. United States, 745 A.2d 259, 270 (D.C.2000); Diaz v. United States, 716 A.2d 173, 179 (D.C. 1998); McGrier v. United States, 597 A.2d 36, 41 (D.C.1991). If we decide that they were, we will then evaluate the claim of error by viewing the [remarks] in context . . . consider[ing] the gravity of the [impropriety], its relationship to the issue of guilt, the effect of any corrective action by the trial judge, and the strength of the government's case. Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 75 (D.C.1989) (citation omitted). This court will reverse only if it can confidently say that the verdict was substantially swayed by the error. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946); see Hawkins v. United States, 606 A.2d 753, 756-757 (D.C.1992) (reversal is justified only where the challenged conduct bring[s] about substantial prejudice); McGrier, 597 A.2d at 41; Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 32 (D.C.1989). In this case, moreover, our review as to most of appellant's claims is only for plain error becausewith one exceptionnone of the prosecutor's comments at trial elicited any objection from defense counsel. See Chatmon v. United States, 801 A.2d 92, 99 (D.C.2002); McGrier, 597 A.2d at 41 (absent an objection, reversal is appropriate only in a `particularly egregious' case, when `a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result' (citation omitted)). Finally, although [appellant's] complaint is primarily with the prosecutor, it is our function to review the record for legal error or abuse of discretion by the trial judge, not by counsel. Irick, 565 A.2d at 33. The question we must decide, as we have said many times, is whether the trial judge erred by fail[ing] to intervene sua sponte when such intervention [was] called for . . . or to react with sufficient promptness and vigor to prosecutorial misdeeds . . . and our ultimate focus must therefore be on what the judge did or failed to do. Id. (citations omitted). As this court said in Dixon, [s]ome types of cases, particularly those involving tragic death or injury, have an inherent emotional impact. . . . The prosecutor . . . [is not] required to sanitize the government's evidence or make it appear less wrenching than it is. 565 A.2d at 76 (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Mills v. United States, 599 A.2d 775, 786 (D.C. 1991) (Many of the challenged comments appear to us to have been descriptions of the evidence in an especially horrifying and gory case, and to have fallen within the limits of permissible argument). The victim in this case was shot in the abdomen and, according to the medical examiner, bled to death as a result of his wounds. Under our case law, reference to the grim details of his death was well within the permissible bounds of comment. Moreover, the prosecutor was under no obligation to remove evidence from the jury's consideration or to lessen its impact merely because it was potentially dramatic. See Thacker, 599 A.2d at 60 (holding that prosecutor's references to a murder victim as having been carved up and butchered were not improper). Given the strong evidence of appellant's guilt, it is not likely that these brief comments substantially swayed the verdict. The prosecutor also offered his opinion about witness credibility during his opening statement when he said, A witness is going to be honest with you, just like Robin Holliday, that [she] just didn't want to get involved. We have repeatedly said that [i]t is improper for a lawyer to express a personal opinion about a witness' veracity during arguments to the jury. McGrier, 597 A.2d at 43 (citations omitted). We see no reason why the same principle should not apply to opening statements, and thus we conclude that the comment was improper. But defense counsel objected, and the objection was sustained. [21] The court then told the jurors to disregard any statements by counsel as to whether people can be believed or not. [22] Appellant insists that this curative instruction was not enough. Again, however, when the prosecutor's remark is weighed against the government's strong case, appellant's assertion that he suffered substantial prejudice strains logic, especially when the court told the jurors to ignore the comment seconds after it was made. See Hawkins, 606 A.2d at 756-757.