Opinion ID: 619293
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of Life Sentence

Text: Finally, challenging the constitutionality of the mandatory life sentence, defendant argues (1) that the enhancement of his sentence based upon his prior convictions violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment; and (2) that the mandatory life sentence is so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Constitutional challenges to a sentence present questions of law that are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Jones, 569 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir.2009). While the government argues that only the Eighth Amendment claim was raised in the district court, both claims fail even under a de novo review. The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and against multiple punishments for the same offense. United States v. Mack, 938 F.2d 678, 679 (6th Cir.1991). This court has squarely rejected defendant's contention that the enhancement of a sentence under § 841(b) on the basis of prior felony drug convictions violates double jeopardy. See Pruitt, 156 F.3d at 645-46; United States v. Flowal, 163 F.3d 956, 963 (6th Cir.1998); United States v. Gonzalez, 257 Fed.Appx. 932, 945-46 (6th Cir.2007). This court adheres to the narrow proportionality principle for evaluating Eighth Amendment claims articulated in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996-97, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). See United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir.2010), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2962, 180 L.Ed.2d 251 (2011); United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50-51 (6th Cir. 1994). A plurality in Harmelin rejected the claim that the Eighth Amendment required strict proportionality and concluded that it prohibited only extreme sentences that are `grossly disproportionate' to the crime. 501 U.S. at 1001, 111 S.Ct. 2680. Applying this principle, the plurality in Harmelin rejected the defendant's assertion that his sentence of life imprisonment without parole was grossly disproportionate to the crime since he was a first-time felony offender in possession of 650 grams of cocaine. Id. Likewise, this court has held that imposition of a life sentence without parole for a third felony drug conviction is not grossly disproportionate to the crime. See Hill, 30 F.3d at 50-51; see also Jones, 569 F.3d at 573-74; United States v. Wimbley, 553 F.3d 455, 463 (6th Cir.2009); Caver, 470 F.3d at 247. Defendant's assertion of this claim fairs no better. To the extent that defendant asserts a lack of proportionality between himself and others convicted of similar offenses, this court held that comparative proportionality is not mandated by the Constitution. See United States v. Layne, 324 F.3d 464, 474 (6th Cir.2003).