Opinion ID: 1202216
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Errors Claimed to be Prejudicial

Text: Menzies' second argument, that many of the transcription errors are prejudicial, focuses on general errors that occurred in portions of the transcript relating to voir dire and the admission of the preliminary testimony of Walter Britton. In addition, Menzies cites specific errors relating to the transcription of numbers, the penalty phase, and the swearing in of witnesses. In a related claim, he argues that he is prejudiced because the transcription errors prevent an adequate review of the record for plain error. However, a review of the record reveals that none of the cited errors are prejudicial. The errors are obvious in nature and reconcilable when viewed in the context of the relevant passage or by referring to documentary evidence, and none have any bearing upon issues raised on appeal. Furthermore, it is possible to cure any conceivably prejudicial errors without retrying the case. This can be seen by addressing Menzies' claims separately.
Menzies advances several claims of error relating to the voir dire portion of the transcript. Specifically, Menzies asserts that (1) some of the prospective jurors' responses to questions are unintelligible and/or do not make sense, (2) the note reader made up admonitions, questions, and answers, and (3) questions and answers are omitted from the transcript. Because of these errors, Menzies argues that neither version of the transcript can be used to review appellate issues relating to voir dire. Voir dire in the instant case was extensive. It lasted approximately one week, and thirty-one jurors were dismissed for cause. There was a general voir dire, during which prospective jurors were questioned as a group, followed by individual voir dire. The individual voir dire was primarily concerned with capital punishment. Menzies' original docketing statement raised two claims relating to voir dire. He asserted that the court committed reversible error by refusing to excuse certain jurors who were challenged for cause and abused its discretion by rehabilitating prospective jurors. Objections made at trial preserved these issues. Before examining Menzies' specific claims, it is important to note that it is not necessary to examine the voir dire of every prospective juror. In order for mistakes in the transcript to prejudice Menzies' appeal, the error must occur in the voir dire of a juror who either sat on the case or was challenged for cause and not dismissed. The jurors who sat on the panel are easily identifiable from the jury list, the polling of the jury after the conviction, and a second voir dire that took place late in the trial after one of the jurors received prejudicial information from an anonymous phone call. Likewise, it is possible to determine which jurors were challenged for cause and not dismissed. At the end of voir dire, defense counsel, in order to preserve her objections for appeal, stated that eight jurors were challenged for cause and not dismissed. Review of the transcript confirms the fact that eight jurors were challenged for cause and not dismissed.
Several of Menzies' unintelligible or inappropriate answers cites involve voir dire of pertinent jurors. However, a review of the transcript reveals that the jurors' responses are readily reconcilable and/or nonprejudicial. It is true that some of the jurors' answers are inarticulate. [33] However, this may well be attributable to the jurors, not to the reporter. In any event, in each instance, one is able to ascertain that the juror is appropriately responding to the question posed. Difficulties with the answers can generally be reconciled by viewing the answer in the context of the question, and in each instance, it is possible to understand the juror's response. Furthermore, a vast majority of errors cited by Menzies relate to capital punishment. However, the jurors did not sit for the penalty phase of the proceedings. These questions are not highly relevant to an appeal of Menzies' conviction, and therefore, slight confusion surrounding these questions is not prejudicial. In addition, there are only one to four errors in a given juror's voir dire, and the voir dire questions are redundant. [34] The prejudicial effect of a transcription error in a voir dire question is diminished where the same basic information is sought in another question. [35] Given these facts, the instances of inarticulate answers are not prejudicial.
(i) Admonitions. The court reporter did not record some of the judge's admonitions. Instead, she often used asterisks to represent admonitions throughout the transcript. However, Menzies, in his original docketing statement, did not raise the claim that the jurors were subject to improper influences or acted in an improper manner. Many of the judge's admonitions were properly recorded. Furthermore, near the end of the trial, after one juror was exposed to prejudicial information, the trial judge conducted a second individual interrogation of each juror, inquiring whether any of them had been subjected to any outside influence. The record, therefore, is adequate to review any claim relating to admonitions and jury misconduct. (ii) Questions. There is an indication that either the note reader or Lee failed to record each question as it was asked and simply repeated the question asked of previous jurors. This is apparent because an error in a question concerning capital punishment was repeated throughout the transcript. [36] Beginning with the third prospective juror, each juror was asked, DO YOU BELIEVE THAT A LIFE SENTENCE COULD ACCOMPLISH THE SAME GOAL OF REPEATED CRIMINAL ACTIVITY IN THE SAME WAY AS THE DEATH PENALTY? The first and second jurors were asked if life imprisonment could accomplish the goal of preventing repeated criminal activity. However, no juror appears to have been confused by the question. When a juror's answer involved more than yes or no, it was clear that the juror understood the question. Neither the defense nor the prosecution challenged the propriety or the content of the question. Furthermore, the prospective jurors were given a list of the questions and could read along as the judge asked them. Given these facts, it is likely that the jurors were asked the correct question. Even assuming that this mistake cannot be reconciled, it is not prejudicial. The question is one directed toward capital punishment and is therefore not directly at issue in the case. This is particularly true in this instance, where confusion occurs only if jurors' answers are limited to yes or no. In addition, there are other appropriate questions which cover the same basic issue. [37] This error, therefore, does not prejudice Menzies' appeal. (iii) Answers. Close examination of the pertinent prospective juror responses does not reveal any instances where the note reader made up actual juror answers. There are a few discrepancies between the original transcript and the court reporter's notes. However, these discrepancies are minor in nature and do not bear upon the substance of the prospective juror's response, [38] and again, a vast majority of these discrepancies occur in questions concerning capital punishment. Given these facts, the discrepancies are not prejudicial.
Menzies asserts that the transcript lacks voir dire questions and answers. In support of this contention, he cites to portions of the transcript which deal with individual voir dire. By reason of the fact that the same questions were asked of each juror, it is possible to reconstruct the list of individual voir dire questions and compare the list with the testimony of the pertinent prospective jurors. [39] Such an approach reveals that in voir dire of two pertinent jurors, the transcript does not contain a question asked of all other pertinent jurors. [40] The individual voir dire questions were read from a prepared list; therefore, it is likely that these questions were asked but not recorded. In arguing that these omissions require a new trial, Menzies relies on State v. Taylor. [41] As discussed above, in Taylor we ordered a new trial because omissions in the voir dire portion of the transcript rendered the record inadequate for appeal. [42] In reaching this conclusion, we noted that the omissions were extensive, the answers in the record indicated that jurors harbored prejudice, and the omissions occurred in portions of the transcript that directly related to issues on appeal. [43] In the instant case, only one question asked of two jurors was omitted, other questions cover the same basic information, [44] and the question concerns capital punishment and is therefore not directly at issue in the case. Given these circumstances, these omissions are not prejudicial, and the instant case is clearly distinguishable from Taylor. Although not cited by Menzies, the following omission in the general voir dire is also worth notice: THE COURT: HAVE YOU OR MEMBERS OF YOUR FAMILY OR CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS EVER BEEN A VICTIM OF A CRIME OF A SIMILAR NATURE AS THOSE WHICH ARE INVOLVED IN THIS CASE? ... . . . . THE COURT: DON JACKSON. WOULD THE FACT THAT YOUR NEXT-DOOR NEIGHBOR OR THAT POLICE OFFICER WAS KILLED PREVENT YOU FROM SITTING IN ON THIS CASE AND TRYING THIS CASE ON ITS MERITS? A JUROR: LAST WEEK I WAS ROBBED IN MY BUSINESS. THE COURT: DO YOU FEEL YOU CAN LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE AND THE EVIDENCE ALONE TO REACH A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL VERDICT? A JUROR: PROBABLY. THE COURT: OKAY. ANYONE ELSE? It is clear from this colloquy that there is a gap in the transcript. Don Jackson was dismissed for cause due to poor hearing. Therefore, the fact that portions of his responses are missing is of no concern. Rather, the difficulty is that it is not possible to tell from this portion of the transcript whether the gap incorporates testimony of other jurors. Nonetheless, this gap is not prejudicial. As noted above, it is possible to identify jurors who were challenged for cause and not dismissed. [45] In the arguments concerning whether these jurors should have been dismissed for cause, there was no mention of any concerns stemming from their prior experience with violent crime. It is clear, therefore, that Menzies did not object to any juror on any basis related to the missing testimony. In addition, when problems arose in the general voir dire, the jurors were questioned further on the subject in individual voir dire. None of the pertinent jurors were questioned concerning prior experience with violent crime. Thus, the record indicates that the pertinent jurors' testimony did not raise questions concerning their experience with violent crime. Furthermore, although there were no other questions dealing directly with past experience with violent crime, several other questions dealt with the presumption of innocence and prospective jurors' prejudice against criminal defendants. [46] Given these facts, this omission is distinguishable from the omissions in Taylor and does not prejudice Menzies' case on appeal. [47] The record is adequate to provide Menzies with a full and fair review of any claim relating to jury selection.
Menzies claims that he is prejudiced by the numerous transcript errors in portions of the record relating to the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony of Walter Britton. Britton was imprisoned in the Salt Lake County jail at the same time as Menzies. At Menzies' preliminary hearing, Britton testified that Menzies had confessed to the murder. However, Britton refused to testify at trial on the ground that he feared reprisals from other inmates. The trial court ruled that Britton was unavailable under Utah Rule of Evidence 804, and his preliminary hearing testimony was read to the jury. In his docketing statement, Menzies asserts that he was denied his right of confrontation due to the fact that he was not able to cross-examine Britton on information learned subsequent to the preliminary hearing and the fact that a subpoena served on the State's counsel was quashed. Menzies also claims that the trial court erred in ruling that Britton was unavailable. The factual basis for these claims is provided through the testimony of Mr. Savage, Britton's attorney. Savage testified at a pretrial hearing and during trial. His testimony concerned Britton's competence and a rule 35 hearing in federal court. In the rule 35 hearing, it was argued that because Britton cooperated in the State's case against Menzies, his federal sentence should be reviewed. One of the prosecuting attorneys testified briefly in this hearing. During the trial, Menzies subpoenaed the prosecutor to testify regarding his participation in the federal hearing. The only other relevant testimony is the reading of the preliminary hearing transcript and Britton's pretrial hearing testimony concerning why he would not testify at trial. Menzies cites more than sixty errors relating to this portion of the transcript. Virtually all of them relate to insignificant grammatical or spelling problems or to mistranscriptions where the actual sense of the testimony is obvious. None of the cited errors prejudice Menzies' ability to pursue his claims on appeal. Nor is there any error significant enough to interfere with an independent review of the trial court's decision.
In the relevant testimony, there are instances of discrepancies between the court reporter's notes and the original transcript [48] and instances of inarticulate statements. [49] However, these errors are reconcilable when read in context and/or have no relevance to appellate issues. Nevertheless, Menzies points to this portion of the transcript to illustrate his claim that the transcript prejudices his ability to appeal. Specifically, he claims that confusion in the transcript concerning whether Savage first discussed a rule 35 hearing with prosecutors before or after Menzies' preliminary hearing prejudices his ability to raise issues regarding Britton's motive for testifying in the preliminary hearing. [50] It is true that conflicting dates are given concerning this conversation. In a proffer of proof made to the court, a prosecutor claimed that if Savage testified, he would state that the first time he had contact with the prosecuting attorneys was on May 26, after the preliminary hearing. Savage, in fact, testified that he first had contact with the prosecutors on May 2, prior to the preliminary hearing. Read in context, this conflict is clearly not the result of a transcription error but rather the result of the attorney's confusion as to what evidence Savage would provide. Indeed, confusion as to whether the first discussion occurred before or after the preliminary hearing was one of the reasons the trial judge allowed Savage to testify at the hearing. Therefore, it is clear not only that there is no prejudicial error in the transcript, but also that the transcript supports Menzies' claim that Britton had a motive to testify falsely.
The vast majority of the errors which Menzies cites do not deal with testimony but rather with arguments held outside the presence of the jury. In fact, of the sixty cited errors, more than fifty deal with argument. It appears that the reporter had more difficulty transcribing argument, where the discussions were more heated. [51] Errors in transcribing arguments made outside the presence of the jury are of less significance than errors in other portions of the transcript. This is because these arguments are relevant to appeals only in reviewing trial court rulings, reviewing proffers of evidence, and determining what issues were raised in the trial court. In the instant case, Menzies does not cite any errors in the trial court's rulings, and there is no indication that the court's rulings were incorrectly transcribed. Likewise, there are no references to the record or other indications, other than the one instance discussed above, that an error occurred in the transcription of a proffer of evidence. All of the cited errors relate only to whether a particular argument concerning the admission of testimony was not raised at trial and therefore should be reviewed under a plain error standard. [52] The errors that occurred in the arguments are similar to the errors that occurred throughout the transcript. There are discrepancies between the original transcript and the court reporter's notes, [53] instances where the attorney's arguments are inarticulate, [54] and instances where there is confusion concerning who is speaking. [55] However, because it is only necessary to determine what issues were being raised, problems with one or two words or statements are more readily reconcilable than errors occurring in other portions of the transcript. This is particularly true in the instant case, where there were three separate arguments concerning the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony. In each hearing, many of the same issues were raised. Given the rather extensive argument, there is no difficulty in determining what issues were presented to the trial court. Menzies, however, points to a specific error in this portion of the transcript as illustrative of how the transcript prejudices his case on appeal. In a hearing held before trial, there was some confusion concerning what rule of evidence the attorneys were arguing. It appears from the context of the hearing that the attorneys were discussing rule 804(a). However, regardless of what rule was being argued, Menzies is not prejudiced by this confusion. The purpose of the hearing was to establish if Britton must be brought into court to determine if he would not testify. The court ruled in favor of Menzies. Therefore, any error in the transcription of this hearing does not impact Menzies' appeal. None of the errors relating to the admission of Britton's preliminary hearing testimony are prejudicial.
A section of Menzies' brief is devoted to establishing that specific transcription errors prejudice his ability to raise particular claims on appeal. Specific errors which deal with voir dire or the admission of Britton's preliminary hearing testimony have been addressed above. The remaining errors deal with the transcription of numbers, the penalty phase, and the swearing in of witnesses. However, when these errors are viewed in the context of the testimony and in the context of the specific appellate issue, it is clear that they are not prejudicial. Indeed, this section is particularly illustrative of how minor transcription errors and discrepancies will generally have very little impact on appeal.
Throughout the transcript, it appears that the court reporter had particular difficulty in transcribing numbers. Therefore, there is often confusion concerning addresses, distances, and dates. Menzies claims that these errors prejudice his ability to raise claims concerning the admission of identification cards belonging to the victim, the identification of Menzies as a man seen near the location where the victim's body was found, sufficiency of the evidence to convict Menzies of robbery and kidnaping, and an unspecified claim regarding statements Menzies made to police officers. Each claim will be addressed separately. (i) Admission of identification cards. During the trial, the victim's social security card, found among Menzies' possessions, and three other identification cards belonging to the victim, found at the Salt Lake County jail, were admitted into evidence. Menzies objected at trial to the admission of all the cards. However, in his docketing statement he claims only that the court erred in the admission of the social security card on the ground that it contained inadmissible hearsay. In this appeal, he claims that discrepancies concerning dates and a stipulation prejudice his ability to pursue claims concerning the admission of these cards. At the time of the murder and prior to his arrest, Menzies was living with Nicole Arnold. After Menzies' arrest but before trial, Arnold met and married Rodney Duffy. When Duffy was moving Arnold's possessions into his house, he found the victim's social security card. He took the card to Arnold's mother, Janet Franks, who phoned the police. The police arrived and took possession of the card. This all occurred on the same day the card was found. At trial, the State called the victim's husband, who identified the social security card, Duffy, Franks, and the police officer who took possession of the card. In cross-examination of Franks, Menzies emphasized that Franks was confused as to the year she received the social security card. The discrepancy which Menzies claims prejudices his appeal occurred during this questioning. Menzies' counsel asked, WAS THE CARD GIVEN TO YOU SOMETIME IN 1986 [court reporter's notes read 1987], BEING SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, OR WAS IT GIVEN TO YOU IN 1987 [court reporter's notes read 1986], UP TO A YEAR AND SOME MONTHS AGO? This line of questioning continued until Franks stated that she had no idea what year she received the social security card. This discrepancy is not prejudicial. The context of the sentence itself establishes the correct dates. The transcript clearly contains the information the question was designed to elicit  that the witness did not remember what year she received the social security card. The police officer who took custody of the card testified that he received the card in 1986. Furthermore, the error does not relate to Menzies' claim that the card contains inadmissible hearsay. The discrepancy relating to the admission of the other identification cards is similarly insignificant. During Menzies' booking process, he suddenly broke away from the jailers and ran into a dressing room. He was alone in the dressing room for several seconds. Later that day, a jail employee, Jay Smith, found three identification cards belonging to the victim in a hamper in the dressing room. Not realizing the significance of the cards, Smith placed them in a drawer in the room. A few days later, a jailer, Officer Valdez, recovered the cards. At trial, the State called the jailers who booked Menzies into jail, Smith, and Valdez. Menzies' attorney asked Valdez how he was sure he found the cards after February 24, the date Menzies was booked into jail. Valdez testified that he could refer to his work schedule, particularly the type of duties which he performed, to help him remember the approximate date on which he recovered the cards. The discrepancy which Menzies claims prejudices his appeal occurred in the follow-up questions: Q. DID YOU WORK ON THE 26TH [court reporter's notes read 22nd] OF FEBRUARY? A. NO, MA'AM. Menzies claims that this discrepancy makes it impossible to determine if Valdez discovered the cards before or after Menzies was booked. However, given Valdez's testimony that he remembered the approximate date on which he found the cards by recalling the type of duties he performed that day, the exact dates on which Valdez did not work are not highly relevant. The transcript clearly establishes that Valdez testified that he found the card after the 24th. Smith testified that he found the card on the 24th. Furthermore, Menzies did not ask the trial judge not to admit the cards because Valdez found them before Menzies was booked. Nor was any such argument made to the jury. Finally, even assuming that a transcription error prejudices Menzies' ability to raise claims concerning the admission of the cards found at the jail, this should not result in a new trial. Given the strong evidence of guilt and the admission of the victim's other identification cards, any error in the admission of these cards would be harmless. Menzies' claims that a discrepancy in a stipulation as to how long the booking process lasted is prejudicial. He contends that a shorter booking process would establish that he did not have time to hide the cards in the hamper. However, no such argument was ever raised at trial. The testimony of several jailers established that Menzies was alone in the dressing room for a few seconds. The length of the booking process does not impact on the length of time Menzies was alone in the dressing room. In any event, it is clear from the transcript that the stipulation in question does not purport to establish what time the booking process was completed. (ii) Identification of Menzies. Tim Larabee was at Storm Mountain, where the victim's body was found, during the time the victim was missing and before her body was discovered. He testified that he twice saw a man and a woman walking together, heard a scream, and then saw the man leave alone. At trial, Larabee identified the man as Menzies. In the transcript, there is a discrepancy concerning whether Larabee first saw the man and the woman from a distance of twenty or fifty yards. However, this discrepancy is easily reconcilable. When asked the same question on cross-examination, Larabee stated that the distance was fifty yards. In any event, the distance from which Larabee first viewed the man is not particularly relevant. Larabee did not see the man's face until he saw the man for the third time. There is also a discrepancy concerning the date on which a composite drawing was prepared from Larabee's description. This discrepancy, however, is resolved by comparing the testimony of Larabee and the police officer who prepared the drawing. No motion was ever made to suppress the identification, and no claim concerning the identification was presented in Menzies' docketing statement. (iii) Insufficient evidence of kidnaping and robbery. At trial and in his docketing statement, Menzies maintains that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of kidnaping and robbery, the convictions used to elevate the homicide to first degree murder. Menzies claims that a discrepancy concerning the amount of money taken from the gas station prejudices this claim. However, the discrepancy did not occur in the testimony but rather in the State's closing argument. The prosecutor stated, THAT FINAL AUDIT DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS SOMEWHERE BETWEEN $115 [court reporter's notes read $114] AND $116 MISSING.... AND IT WAS CERTAINLY A FIGURE REMARKABLY CLOSE TO THE $115 WHICH MR. DENTER TESTIFIED TO WHEN HE SAID HE REMOVED THAT AMOUNT CONCEALED IN AN UMBRELLA AT THE DEFENDANT'S RESIDENCE. Because this discrepancy does not concern evidence but rather the prosecutor's closing argument and because there was confusion in the evidence concerning the exact amount of money at issue, this discrepancy is not prejudicial. (iv) Menzies' statement to the police. The State called Officer Thompson, who testified about an interview he had with Menzies concerning Menzies' whereabouts the night the victim disappeared. Thompson testified that Menzies told him that on the night in question, he picked up a woman who was hitchhiking. Menzies and the hitchhiker drove around for a while and talked, and then he took the hitchhiker to his house. At approximately 2:30 a.m., Arnold, Menzies' girlfriend, phoned from a trailer park and asked Menzies to take her home. Menzies and the hitchhiker picked up Arnold and returned to Menzies' house, where Arnold and the hitchhiker had a fight. Menzies and the hitchhiker left the house, drove around, and got stuck in the mud. The hitchhiker left Menzies at this point, and Menzies returned home to Arnold. Menzies claims that he is prejudiced by discrepancies in the date on which the interview took place, the location where he picked up the hitchhiker, and the location where the car got stuck in the mud. However, he does not identify what claim these discrepancies prejudice. Menzies did not object to the admission of this evidence. [56] In fact, during cross-examination, Menzies' counsel attempted to bolster Menzies' story. Given the fact that this evidence supported Menzies' case, an erroneous ruling admitting this evidence cannot be prejudicial. Furthermore, this evidence conflicts with other evidence which supports the jury's verdict. Therefore, an appellate court would not consider this evidence in ruling on an insufficient evidence claim. [57] Thus, no transcription error in this portion of the transcript could possibly prejudice Menzies' appeal. In any event, the relevant content of this testimony is preserved in the transcript. The exact date on which the interview took place is insignificant, and from the context of the testimony, it is clear that the interview took place between February 23 and February 29. On cross-examination, it was established that Menzies picked up the hitchhiker at a location near Mark's Lounge, a club where the victim had a membership. The location in which Menzies claims to have been stuck in the mud is of no consequence. The relevant information  that Menzies has an explanation for the mud found on and in the car  is in the transcript.
Menzies asserts that transcription errors in the penalty phase prejudice his ability to claim that the death penalty was improperly imposed, a claim that Menzies raises in his docketing statement. However, the errors Menzies cites are either reconcilable or inconsequential. The transcript is thus sufficient for this court to review the penalty phase and determine if the `sentence resulted from prejudice or arbitrary action or was disproportionate.' [58] A discrepancy occurred in transcribing the testimony concerning the qualifications of a defense expert witness. There is confusion as to whether the witness based a pilot study on one or one hundred patients. It would seem clear that a pilot study would be based on more than one patient. However, even assuming the error cannot be reconciled, it is insignificant. The discrepancy involves only one question, and the questioning concerning the witness's qualification was extensive, covering over nine transcript pages. The record clearly establishes that the witness was qualified to testify as an expert. There are also discrepancies in the testimony concerning Menzies' I.Q. percentile. However, other portions of the record indicate that Menzies was functioning in the average range of intellectual functioning. Testimony concerning a diagnosis contained in a psychological evaluation Menzies underwent as a juvenile is unintelligible. However, the transcript can be reconciled by referring to the evaluation, which was entered into evidence. In any event, the important information  that Menzies' expert witness's opinion differs from the opinion expressed in the evaluation  is present in the record. While there are other errors in the penalty phase, the basic information Menzies offered at trial is present in the record and adequate to review his claims.
Menzies claims that because the court reporter used asterisks to represent the swearing in of witnesses, it is impossible to tell if the witnesses were sworn. [59] However, the use of symbols to represent redundant occurrences such as the swearing in of a witness is simply a method of shorthand. Although Menzies cites to the transcript to support his claim, both the transcript and the court record indicate that the witnesses were properly sworn. Furthermore, there was no claim at trial or in the docketing statement relating to the swearing of witnesses. It is evident from the record that none of the errors cited by Menzies as prejudicial substantially affect his ability to appeal his conviction or sentence.
Menzies also claims that he is prejudiced because the transcription errors prevent appellate counsel or the supreme court from adequately reviewing the record for plain error. Implicit in this argument is the assertion that because it is so difficult to determine how transcription errors affect a review for plain error, Menzies should not be required to establish which transcription error prejudices such a review. This assertion is without merit. The only added difficulty in determining whether a mistake in the transcript prejudices a claim of plain error, as opposed to an error that has been properly preserved, is determining what appellate issue the transcription error impacts. However, unless the transcript is so inarticulate that it is impossible to tell what evidence is being offered or what issue is being argued, it is always possible to determine what appellate claims a transcription error impacts by viewing the error in the context of the relevant passage. This is particularly true in case of plain error, where the error must be both harmful and obvious. [60] It is true that a record could be so severely affected by transcription errors that it would be impossible to ascertain what arguments are being made or what evidence is being offered. However, a review of the entire record reveals no instance where it is impossible to determine what conceivable appellate issues are impacted by specific errors. Since transcription errors of such a magnitude that might render significant portions of the record inarticulate would be obvious in nature, it is clear that the condition of the record does not prevent review for plain error. Indeed, there is only one instance where due to a transcription error, plain error might have occurred. During the testimony of the medical examiner, a juror fainted. The transcript reads as follows: DR. SWEENEY, DID YOU FIND ANYTHING ELSE DURING YOUR INTERNAL EXAMINATION? THE COURT: LETS CALL A RECESS HERE. JUST A MOMENT. HAVE THEM TAKE THE JUROR OUT. ONE JUROR FAINTED. (TAKING THE JUROR OUT.) MR. JONES: JUDGE WITH REFERENCE TO WHICH EXHIBIT IS IT? IT'S THE IDENTIFICATION OF MAUREEN HUNSAKER. THE DEFENSE APPARENTLY OBJECTED ON THE GROUNDS THEY FELT THERE WAS MORE FOUNDATION REQUIRED.... MS. WELLS: EXCUSE ME, JUST A MINUTE, I DIDN'T MEAN TO INTERRUPT, BUT THE DEFENDANT IS NOT HERE.... HE NEEDS TO BE PRESENT YOUR HONOR.... MR. JONES: WE CAN MAKE THE ARGUMENT, AGAIN.... I JUST THOUGHT MAYBE WE CAN RESOLVE THIS, SOME OF THIS STUFF. THE COURT: WHAT PARTICULARLY HAPPENED DURING THE JURORS  DURING THE COURSE OF THE TRIAL. RICK WOULD BE A LITTLE MORE SUBTLE OR SOPHISTICATED. WE WILL RECESS UNTIL 2:00 P.M. (RECESS UNTIL 2:00 P.M.) After the recess, the juror who fainted was brought into court and explained that she fainted due to the nature of the testimony and the fact that she had not eaten. She also stated that she had eaten lunch, remembered the medical examiner's testimony, and was able to continue. It is clear that an omission occurred in this portion of the transcript. It is also clear that some discussion was held at this point. Nonetheless, any prejudice Menzies suffers because of this error can be cured. All of the medical examiner's testimony is present in the record. Also, the court's discussion with the juror who fainted is properly recorded. [61] Therefore, the error only impacts a discussion held outside the presence of the jury. Although the court's statement is unintelligible, the statements of the prosecutor indicate that no ruling was made and the issues discussed were reargued later in the proceedings. Therefore, it would appear that Menzies suffered no prejudice from this omission. Indeed, there is no contention that anything of significance occurred at this point in the proceedings. In any event, it is possible to cure the fact that some of the arguments are missing without ordering a new trial. All that is necessary to insure that Menzies in not prejudiced by this omission is to review any claim that could have conceivably been raised at this point as though it had been properly preserved. [62] Given the fact that no prejudicial transcription error has been identified, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the transcript was adequate for an appeal. The record is sufficient to proceed with an appeal on the merits. If, in the context of discussing specific appellate issues, Menzies can demonstrate that a transcription error prejudices his case, it would be proper to grant him a new trial at that time. However, absent an indication that errors prejudice his ability to raise or identify appellate issues, the existence of transcription errors alone does not justify a new trial.