Opinion ID: 870427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Rousing Overmastering Hostility

Text: Here, the evidence of the conduct in Hawai`i, as the majority concedes, proved the same overall conduct of sexual relations with complainant. Majority opinion at ___ - ___, 237 P.3d at 1173-74. This abrogated the need for such evidence. However, assuming arguendo such need, the evidence of prior bad acts was highly prejudicial and likely to rouse the jury to overmastering hostility. Pinero, 70 Haw. at 518, 778 P.2d at 711. Such evidence would interfere with the jury's ability to determine guilt solely on the basis of the acts that occurred in Hawai'i and not those occurring in other states. As the majority states, The primary difference between the sexual conduct in Hawai'i and that in South Dakota was that the South Dakota conduct occurred while [complainant] was several years younger, and, according to [complainant], occurred more frequently than in Hawai`i.  Majority opinion at ___, 237 P.3d at 1174 (emphases added). Evidence of sexual intercourse with an eleven-year-old minor would appear more disturbing and inflammatory than evidence of sexual relations with an older person. Nevertheless, the majority attempts to minimize the inflammatory nature of such evidence by arguing that [Respondent] did not argue in closing that [complainant's] age at the time of the South Dakota contacts made [Petitioner's] conduct more culpable or reprehensible[.] Id. The majority cites to nothing supportive of its view that the prejudicial effect of admitting such evidence was contingent on Respondent using it in closing argument. As previously explained, a large portion of complainant's and sister's testimony detailed acts of sexual abuse beginning when complainant was eleven years old. The prejudice occurred over the course of the testimony submitted at trial, and it is unreasonable to expect its impact to be limited to what was said in closing argument. Nor can it be reasonably maintained that the effect upon the jury of the difference in complainant's age from when the acts began and the acts occurred in Hawai'i is negligible. `[E]vidence of other sexual behavior is, by its very nature, uniquely apt to arouse the jury's hostility.' State v. Haslam, 663 A.2d 902, 912 (R.I.1995) (quoting State v. Jalette, 119 R.I. 614, 382 A.2d 526, 533 (1978)). Undoubtably, such evidence substantially increased the jury's hostility towards Petitioner and was likely to rouse the jury to overmastering hostility[.] Pinero, 70 Haw. at 518, 778 P.2d at 711. Furthermore, the allegations that Petitioner engaged in sexual relations with complainant more frequently on the mainland were exceedingly prejudicial. Both the age of complainant and the frequency of the sexual assaults pertaining to the out-of-state acts would have `an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis[,]' HRE Rule 403 cmt. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. Rule 403 advisory committee's note), inasmuch as such evidence suggests that Petitioner's prior sexual abuse of complainant was much more frequent when complainant was much younger. Unlike the prior act evidence, the Hawai'i evidence avoided the risk that the jury would decide Petitioner's guilt on an improper basis, i.e., its visceral reaction to Petitioner's prior uncharged sexual acts with an eleven-year-old girl. Such evidence went only to prove Petitioner's character by showing that his actions in Hawai'i were in conformity with his acts in South Dakota and Washington, thereby violating the HRE prohibition against such evidence. In light of the minimal probative value of prior bad acts, and the substantial likelihood that Petitioner was unfairly prejudiced by evidence of the uncharged prior bad acts, the court abused its discretion in admitting that evidence.
HRE Rule 403 provides in part that relevant[] evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of ... confusion of the issues[.] During its deliberations, the jury submitted jury question 1, which asked, To what purpose do we put the evidence and testimony from S. Dakota[?] The court responded simply by referring the jury back to the instruction limiting the consideration of prior bad acts. The jury was given no further explanation with regard to that question. Transcripts of the proceedings do not indicate that the court gave the jury a cautionary instruction with regard to the purposes for which complainant's testimony of prior bad acts could be considered at the time she testified. The jury's confusion as to the introduction of prior bad acts is apparent from the jury's question even after it had been instructed on the use of such evidence. Nevertheless, the majority maintains that Petitioner's intensified efforts to maintain his relationship of trust and control with [complainant] after they returned from Hawai`i... would be likely to confuse rather than enlighten the jury absent the context provided by the prior conduct in South Dakota. Majority opinion at ___, 237 P.3d at 1173. To the contrary, the jury's question to the judge indicates that the prior act evidence was the cause of confusion. Details regarding the uncharged conduct were not relevant to the charged offenses and obviously only served to distract the jury from the principle issue of Petitioner's guilt for the offenses that were charged. Rather than confusing the jury as declared by the majority, Petitioner's intensified efforts to assert control over complainant established how Petitioner was able to assert himself as the central authority figure amidst complainant's dysfunctional family relationships. Petitioner's behavior, as testified to by complainant and sister, explained the matters that the majority maintains were inexplicable absent the evidence of prior bad acts. Given the minimal benefit derived from the evidence of prior bad acts and the disproportionate confusion it generated, as demonstrated by the jury's question to the court, the cost-benefit analysis plainly weighed in favor of excluding the evidence. Evidentiary decisions based on HRE Rule 403, which require a `judgment call' on the part of the trial court, are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Walsh v. Chan, 80 Hawai`i 212, 215, 908 P.2d 1198, 1201 (1995) (citing Sato v. Tawata, 79 Hawai`i 14, 19, 897 P.2d 941, 946 (1995)). Hence, the court abused its discretion in admitting such evidence.
In addition to being highly prejudicial, evidence of prior bad acts was manifestly cumulative. Under HRE Rule 403, evidence that is needlessly cumulative of other evidence is excluded. In order for evidence to be considered `cumulative' for HRE [Rule] 403 purposes, it must be substantially the same as other evidence that has already been received. State v. Pulse, 83 Hawai`i 229, 247, 925 P.2d 797, 815 (1996) (citing Aga v. Hundahl, 78 Hawai`i 230, 241, 891 P.2d 1022, 1032 (1995)). The majority's own discussion of the acts alleged makes it obvious that the prior bad acts and the charged offenses were substantially the same[.] Id. According to the majority, [t]he conduct in South Dakota was of the same general type and involved the same complaining witness [,] majority opinion at ___, 237 P.3d at 1173 (emphasis added), and [t]he similarities between the crimes were strong, since the conduct in South Dakota was in substance the same as that in Hawai`i, i.e., alleged sexual contact between [complainant] and [Petitioner,]  id. at ___, 237 P.3d at 1172 (emphasis added). As noted supra, the evidence of uncharged prior bad acts and charged offenses both involved references to sexual relations between Petitioner and complainant in close proximity to a family member. Moreover, both the evidence of the uncharged prior bad acts and the charged offenses describe a situation in which Petitioner was the dominant figure exerting control in the lives of both complainant and sister. Inasmuch as evidence of acts in and out of state were substantially the same[,] Pulse, 83 Hawai`i at 247, 925 P.2d at 815 (citation omitted), presenting identical bases for explaining complainant's behavior was needlessly cumulative, and the court's failure to exclude the prior acts was an abuse of discretion.