Opinion ID: 214784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tucker's Federal Criminal Trial

Text: Tucker did not testify at his federal criminal trial. However, the jury heard excerpts from a state court proceeding related to the incident in this case, in which Tucker did testify about his living arrangements and the events of September 7. During the state proceeding, Tucker testified that the shotgun was not found in his room, that he did not know the gun was in the large room, and that he lived in the small room and Alexander lived in the large room. He said that Alexander was mad at him because he didn't want to be with her, and that is when she called Officer Guiterrez. On cross-examination in the state proceeding, Tucker testified that the officers never asked him which room in the apartment was his. He and the prosecutor then had the following exchange: Q. Now, why did you have your own personal effects in the master bedroom? A. Well, those weren't my effects. She had a boyfriend. Q. A boyfriend with the same name as you? A. Same name as me? Q. Well, you heard the testimony A. I don't know what his name is. Tucker said that his prescription pills were in the master bedroom, where Alexander lived, and that she was a registered nurse. He said he did not have any clothes in the master bedroom, and had never been inside the master closet. He also said that he did not think he had any paperwork in that room, but that the movers could put anything anywhere. At Tucker's federal criminal trial, there was evidence presented that a forensic scientist was asked to examine the shotgun and the two shells found in the apartment for fingerprints. The scientist testified that he had not examined the shotgun because it had not been properly packaged, and therefore he would not be able to determine whether the gun had any fingerprints on it belonging to Tucker or anyone else. The scientist testified that he had examined the shells for fingerprints but did not recover any. The evidence related to fingerprints was referenced during counsels' opening and closing statements. During his opening statement, defense counsel said there are no fingerprints in [sic] that gun and the bottom line is that there's no prints in [sic] that firearmthat connect the firearm to Mr. Tucker or anybody else. During the government's closing statement, the prosecutor stated: [The defense said it] was going to show you that he did not possess the shotgun was that his fingerprints were not on the gun. Well, we now know that that was a misleading statement. We don't know if his fingerprints were ever on that gun. Unfortunately, this gun went through many hands. It was contaminated. And neither the detective or the forensic scientist who examined it felt that it was proper to examine an item of evidence for latent fingerprints when it's possibly been contaminated by other human hands. So we can't say one way or the other whether or not his fingerprints are on it. We don't know. That was a misleading statement from the defense. Tucker's counsel responded: What is it that we said that was misleading? His fingerprints, Mr. Tucker's fingerprints, were definitely not found on that gun. The gunthey didn't even do an analysis on the gun. . . . But I guess we're being misleading about saying that his prints are not on the firearm. If you think we wereI was, I apologize. . . . But I don't think so. I don't think I was. In addition, the prosecutor's closing argument contained comments about Dawn Alexander's new boyfriend or new man. The prosecutor stated: [W]hy is he denying that he lived in the master bedroom? Why is he claiming that Dawn Alexander had a new boyfriend that she had moved in there? Well, because he has to explain why there's male possessions in the master bedroom; right? He has to come up with some story because otherwise it's obvious the evidence points to the fact that he was residing in that bedroom. And why did he claim that he doesn't even know the new boyfriend's name? I mean, clearly this is not a true story. He doesn't even know the name of this alleged person who is living with him. The prosecutor made several more references to Dawn Alexander's new man or new boyfriend throughout her closing argument. [1] The prosecutor, in her closing argument, also commented on what the jury would have to find or believe, in order to convict Tucker. The prosecutor said she wanted to point out a couple of things that you as jurors are going to have to find to be true if you decide that the defendant is not guilty. Because for you to say that he's not guilty, these are the things that you have to believe. . . . The prosecutor went on to list various aspects of the defense theory of the case that the jury would have to believe, and stated [y]ou will have to believe that and that is not logical. It's not reasonable. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the standard of proof was being shifted to the defense. The district court overruled the objection, stating that the jury had already been correctly instructed on the burdens of proof. The prosecutor continued: To find the defendant not guilty, remember, you have to have some kind of reasonable doubt. And the key word there is reasonable. . . . If you are gonna find him not guilty, you also have to believe that [lists various points of the defense argument]. . . . You will have to believe that. Because if you do not, that means that that [sic] the personal property in that master bedroom was the defendant's. It means it was his bedroom. It means that it was his shotgun. It means that he is guilty. You would also have to believe that the defendant did not lie. And do you believe that?. . . . Again, if you're going to have a doubt it must be reasonable; it must be based on reason. Throughout her closing argument, the prosecutor reiterated that it was the government's burden to prove all elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. At several points during the trial, the district judge instructed the jury on reasonable doubt and burdens of proof. At the beginning of the trial, the district judge stated: The statements that the lawyers make now, as well as the arguments they present at the end of the trial, are not to be considered by you as evidence in this case or as a substitute for the instructions of law which will come only from me. Nevertheless, the statements and arguments of counsel are intended to help you understand the issues and the evidence as it comes in. In addition, at the close of all the evidence, the district judge reminded the jury that a defendant is presumed innocent, and that the government has the burden of proving a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The district judge also addressed the jury about the meaning of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. He instructed the jury that the verdict must be based on the evidence and the law, as articulated by the court, and reminded the jury that the arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. The district court also instructed the jury on possession of the firearm, stating: A person has possession of something if the person knows of its presence and has physical control of it, or knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it. More than one person can be in possession of something if each knows of its presence and has the power and intention to control it. Possession of a firearm can be actual or constructive. Actual possession means physical custody or actual physical dominion. Constructive possession exists when a person does not have actual possession but instead knowingly has the power and . . . intention at a given time to exercise dominion and control over an object, either directly or through another person or persons. To prove constructive possession, the government must show a sufficient connection between the defendant and the firearm to support an inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the item. (emphasis added). The court declined to give Tucker's proposed jury instruction on possession, which generally tracked the given instruction but omitted the line about it being possible for more than one person to be in possession of something and added the following language at the end: It is not the same as merely knowing the weapon is nearby. Therefore, mere proximity to the firearm, mere presence, or mere association with the person who does control the firearm is insufficient to support a finding of possession. A person's brief touching or handling of a firearm, without other steps to give him physical custody of or dominion and control over the firearm, is not sufficient to constitute actual or constructive possession. Tucker was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the district judge considered, among other factors, Tucker's prior guilty plea for Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect in 2005. The copy of the Guilty Plea Agreement and the Judgment of Conviction before the district court did not set forth the facts to which Tucker pleaded guilty, but stated only that Tucker pleaded guilty to ATTEMPT CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (Category B FelonyNRS 193.330, 200.508), as more fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit `1.' The copy of the Guilty Plea Agreement provided to the court did not have an attachment labeled Exhibit 1 but was accompanied by a charging document, the Information, which stated in pertinent part: LORENZO DARNELL TUCKER, III, the Defendant above named having committed the crime of ATTEMPT CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (Felony NRS 193.330, 200.508), on or about the 30th day of January, 2005, within the County of Clark, State of Nevada, contrary to the form, force and effect of statutes in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Nevada, did wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly attempt to neglect, cause, or permit a child under the age of 18 years, to-wit: [Child] [2] , being approximately 6 years old, to suffer unjustifiable physical pain, or mental suffering, or by permitting the said [Child] to be placed in a situation where he might have suffered unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, by repeatedly attempting to strike the said [Child] about the body with a belt. The district court also considered the contents of the Presentence Report (PSR) that was prepared by the government. The PSR recommended a sentence of 96 months' imprisonment, followed by three years' supervised release. The PSR reflected that Tucker committed the felon in possession offense after sustaining two felony convictions for crimes of violence one for battery with substantial bodily harm, [3] and one for Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect. The PSR included the following comment on the 2005 conviction for Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect: According to the Nevada Parole and Probation presentence report on January 30, 2005, [Woman] [4] left her children with Lorenzo Tucker, father of one of the children and who was the victim. When [Woman] arrived to pick up the children, she noticed a red mark on her son's face and asked him about it. The child advised that Lorenzo had told him to work on a Hooked on Phonics program on the computer, but that when he wasn't doing it exactly the way Lorenzo had told him to, he got a belt and beat him with it. Photos of the child showed bruises and belt marks to his face, throat, shoulders, arms, back, abdomen, groin, and buttocks. When [Woman] asked Lorenzo about the marks, he advised her that the child got a beat down because the child wasn't doing what he wanted him to do. . . . This is a crime of violence as defined in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2. (emphasis in original). The PSR also reflected several other criminal convictions and arrests for Tucker, including some for battery, destruction of property, and weapons possession, whose underlying incidents took place from 1992 to 1999. In Tucker's sentencing memorandum, he objected to the PSR's determination that his prior conviction for Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect was a crime of violence, and argued that the PSR's recommended 96-month sentence was unreasonable. The district court determined that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range was 77 to 96 months, based on a base offense level of 24, seven criminal history points, and a criminal history category of IV. The court determined that Tucker's base offense was 24 because he had committed the felon in possession offense after receiving two felony convictions of a crime of violence, including the Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect conviction. The court determined that although Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect was not categorically a crime of violence under Nevada law, Tucker's conviction constituted a crime of violence under the modified categorical approach. In response to the defense objections, the court noted that even though much of the Information was boiler-plate, its specific languageby repeatedly attempting to strike the said [Child] about the body with a beltnegated any inference that the act was a matter of negligence or was committed by someone else. Later in the sentencing proceeding, the district court reiterated that the evidence showed that Tucker actually did beat the boy with a belt, and noted that the reports indicate that this child washad red marks on his head, his neck, his body from the belt. Defense counsel objected to the reference to the PSR, stating that if it played any factor into the Court's mind what's stated in the PSR about the red marks about the neck and face because it's inappropriate under Ninth Circuit case law to consider what's in the PSR. The district judge appears to have agreed that he had to go strictly on the Information, but indicated he could make an adjustment when considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a). Defense counsel also noted that the Guilty Plea Agreement stated that Tucker was pleading guilty to Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect as more fully alleged in the charging document attached hereto as Exhibit 1  (emphasis added), and argued that it was the prosecutor's burden to come forward with appropriate documentation of the conviction. The district court, nonetheless, took notice of the Information, commenting that it was a copy of a certified copy which bears no indication of forgery or fabrication, mentioned Tucker by name, and listed the same charge to which Tucker had pleaded guilty (that is, Attempt Child Abuse and Neglect). The district court also noted that defense counsel did not suggest that the charging document was fabricated or amended, or that some other charging document applied. Accordingly, the district court determined the Information was reliable as the applicable charging document, and that it accurately described the offense to which Tucker had pled guilty. The district court recognized that in calculating the sentencing guidelines, it was limited to admissible information including the plea agreement and the Information. However, it noted that at the end of the day, as you are well aware, the Court can take into consideration other matters, including whether the defendant's criminal history is underrepresented and I can take into consideration all of the defendant's history, not just his conviction history. The district court reviewed Tucker's criminal history, as reflected in the PSR, and stated that a 96 months' sentence met the purposes of sentencing.