Opinion ID: 2332091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alibi Instructions

Text: Appellant alleges that in reinstructing the jury on the defense of alibi the trial court improperly shifted the burden to appellant to establish his innocence. During deliberations the jury requested further instructions with respect to the alibi defense. [8] After considerable discussion with counsel, the judge, over the objection of defense counsel, gave the following instruction to the jury: The Government has offered evidence in the hopes of persuading you that they have carried their burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was present at the time and place alleged in the indictment. The defendant, however, contends that the Government has not carried its burden of proof because the defendant contends that he was somewhere other than the place and time alleged in the indictment. . . . . . If this evidence of the defendant, considered in its entirety, is sufficient to cause you to have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was present at the time and place alleged, you must find the defendant not guilty. If, on the other hand, the evidence of alibi, considered in its entirety, does not cause you to have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was present at the time and place alleged in the indictment, then you may find the defendant guilty, assuming, of course, that you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government has proved all the other essential elements of the offense. I hope I have answered your question. If I have not, I will entertain another question. You want to go back to the jury room and see if this does the job? This instruction does not shift the burden to the defendant to prove his alibi. [9] The judge stated that the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was present at the time and place alleged in the indictment and if the alibi evidence was sufficient to cause the jury to have a reasonable doubt as to the first fact it must find the defendant not guilty. The two cases which appellant relies upon are distinguishable. In United States v. Scott, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 96, 529 F.2d 338 (1975), the Court of Appeals reversed a conviction because the trial court gave the following instruction: Intoxication is not an excuse for the commission of a crime. Voluntary drunkenness is no defense to a criminal act unless specific intent or knowledge is an element of the offense; then drunkenness may be shown to prove mental incapability to form the specific intent. [ Id. at 98, 529 F.2d at 340 (emphasis in original).] The trial court had rejected a commonly accepted instruction and instead gave that questionable one, to which objection was made by defense counsel. The court concluded that the instruction given could well have been understood by the jury to place the burden on the defendant to establish lack of specific intent. In United States v. Alston, 179 U.S.App. D.C. 129, 551 F.2d 315 (1976), credibility was crucial in the case and appellant relied upon an alibi. Viewing the instructions in their entirety, the court concluded they did not adequately inform the jury that the defense alibi evidence need only raise a reasonable doubt in their minds that the defendant was present at the crime scene; that they must consider the evidence in its totality, including the alibi evidence, in deciding the defendant's guilt; and that the burden of proof never shifts. Id. at 133, 551 F.2d at 319 (footnotes omitted). Taken as a whole, the instructions here do not have those deficiencies. As a matter of fact, the questioned reinstruction on alibi, which had been requested by the jury, specified that before finding the defendant guilty the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Government has proved all the other essential elements of the offense. We consider that the instructions in this case were not prejudicial to appellant.