Opinion ID: 2010928
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Speaking of the spirit and policy motivating enactment of chapter 25A we said in Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 860-861, 146 N.W.2d 626, 636-637:

Text: The general purpose of chapter 25A is to impose upon all the people of this state the burden, expense and costs which arise from tortious damage to property or injuries to persons by the officers, agents and employees of our state government. This is a valid means of promoting the general welfare of the state. This is a public purpose. [Citing authorities].    We can only conclude the General Assembly saw no ultimate advantage to the state by continuing to cast upon some unfortunate individuals the full burden of damage done by the tortious conduct of state officers, agents or employees. In fact we must assume the Sixty-first General Assembly recognized the problem here posed as one of general concern and elected to effect a solution. V. In state government sovereign immunity remains the rule rather than the exception. A large majority of the states, and most of their political subdivisions, still are immune to any tort liability. See Report of State Legislative Research Council, August 21, 1967, page 12, The Feasibility of Abolishing or Modifying the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity in South Dakota. On the basis of legislation drafted in other states modifying sovereign immunity five general approaches seem to have developed. Here we are concerned only with the statutory approach used by our legislature. See Van Alstyne, The Decline of Governmental Immunity, State Government, Winter, 1966, page 32. A few states have followed the federal example and have enacted legislation which expressly allows for tort actions to be brought against the state and its subdivisions. Several states have established legislative and administrative methods for settling tort claims. Some jurisdictions have also found tort liability where insurance has been authorized by statute and purchased by the governmental unit; in these situations there is usually a waiver of immunity to the amount of the insurance coverage. Comment, TortsGovernmental Immunity, 50 Iowa L.Rev. (Fall, 1964), 226, 228. Listed in footnotes to this comment as states that had then enacted legislation expressly allowing tort actions to be brought are Alaska Comp.Laws Annotated, sections 56-7-1 to -10 (Supp.1958); Hawaii Rev. Laws, sections 245A-1 to -17 (Supp.1960); New York Court Claims Act, sections 8, 8-a (1953); Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 12, section 5601 (Supp.1963); Washington Rev.Code, section 4.92.090 (1962). Effective July 1, 1966, the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, chapter 139, S.L.U. 1965, provides in section 63-30-10 subsection (4) as an exclusion an injury which arises out of a failure to make an inspection, or by reason of making an inadequate or negligent inspection of any property,    Alaska, Hawaii and Vermont, have Tort Claims Acts with exceptions similar to those found in the federal Tort Claims Act at section 2680(h). See Alaska statutes, Code of Civil Procedure, sections 09.50.250 (3) 1958; Hawaii Rev.Laws, section 245A-15(d) 1960; Vermont Statutes Annotated, Title 12, section 5602(6) 1963. However, we have not been cited any decisions of those jurisdictions interpreting the exclusionary clause nor has our independent research revealed any. We do not find that California, Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Washington or other states waiving a portion of their tort immunity have the exclusionary provision found at section 2680(h) of the federal Act or in the state statutes which model their acts after the federal Act. Nor do they afford any guideline to aid in interpreting section 25A.14(4) of the Iowa Act. Under these circumstances we have no occasion to apply the principle mentioned in the second paragraph of Division III, supra. So to determine the intent of our legislature in enacting section 25A.14(4), we must turn to the principle that where, as here, a state legislature adopts a federal statute which had been previously interpreted by federal courts it may be presumed it knew the legislative history of the law and the interpretation placed on the provision by such federal decisions, had the same objective in mind and employed the statutory terms in the same sense. See Lever Brothers Co. v. Erbe, supra, 249 Iowa at 462, 87 N.W.2d at 475; In re Estate of Tedford, supra, 258 Iowa at 895, 140 N.W.2d at 911, and citations in these opinions; 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 371; and 50 Am.Jur., Statutes, section 323. Hall and Neustadt, as previously noted, were decided and cited with approval by other federal jurisdictions before March 30, 1965. See Hungerford v. United States (9 Cir., 1962), 307 F.2d 99, 102; Steinmasel v. United States (D S.D. SD, 1962), 202 F.Supp. 335, 338; and Smith v. United States (D Wyo., 1963), 224 F.Supp. 402, 405. Both decisions have been cited frequently by federal jurisdictions since adoption of the Iowa Act. Jones v. United States (2 Cir., 1953), 207 F.2d 563, cert. denied 347 U.S. 921, 74 S.Ct. 518, 98 L.Ed. 1075, rehearing denied 347 U.S. 940, 74 S.Ct. 627, 98 L.Ed. 1089, another decision relied upon by the Court in United States v. Neustadt, supra, has been cited with approval several times before and since March 30, 1965. The Tort Claims Act was designed primarily to remove the sovereign immunity of the United States from suits in tort and, with certain specific exceptions, to render the Government liable in tort as a private individual would be under like circumstances (Emphasis supplied). Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6, 82 S.Ct. 585, 589, 7 L.Ed.2d 492. In Small v. United States (D Del., 1963), 219 F.Supp. 659, 661-663, the policy motivating enactment of the federal Act is expressed in consonance with that in Graham v. Worthington, supra, in this language: The purpose of the Federal Tort Claims Act was, at least, two-fold in character. It was, on the one hand, a recognition that a person injured in his property or person by the negligence or tort of an agent or employee of the Government was, under certain circumstances, entitled to legal examination of his claim and redress for his injuries, which prior to that time were denied to him because of the Government's immunity from suit. On the other hand, it was intended to provide a forum for the determination of claims against the Government which could theretofore be only considered by a private Act of Congress.    By looking at the exceptions enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 2680, we find, however, that the Government did not intend to waive immunity in all instances.          [T]he instances set out in Section 2680 are instances which Congress concluded should in no event be made applicable under the Federal Tort Claims Act. In seeking intent of our legislature here we have no guidepost except the assumption that it intended just what Congress intended by the same language as interpreted by the federal courts. We quote further from United States v. Neustadt, supra, 366 U.S. at 706-707, 81 S.Ct. at 1300-1301, 6 L.Ed.2d at 621: To say, as the Fourth Circuit did, that a claim arises out of `negligence,' rather than `misrepresentation,' when the loss suffered by the injured party is caused by the breach of a `specific duty' owed by the Government to him, i. e., the duty to use due care in obtaining and communicating information upon which that party may reasonably be expected to rely in the conduct of his economic affairs, is only to state the traditional and commonly understood legal definition of the tort of `negligent misrepresentation,' as is clearly, if not conclusively, shown by the authorities set forth in the margin, and which there is every reason to believe Congress had in mind when it placed the word `misrepresentation' before the word `deceit' in § 2680(h). As the Second Circuit observed in Jones v. United States, supra, `deceit' alone would have been sufficient had Congress intended only to except deliberately false representations. Certainly there is no warrant for assuming that Congress was unaware of established tort definitions when it enacted the Tort Claims Act in 1946, after spending `some twenty-eight years of congressional drafting and redrafting, amendment and counteramendment.' The authorities cited in the footnote are: The American Law Institute's Restatement of Torts (1938), c. 22, Deceit: Business Transactions, Topic 3, Negligent Misrepresentation, section 552; Prosser, Torts (1941 ed.), c. 16, Misrepresentation, section 87, Basis of Responsibility (Now Prosser, Torts, Third Ed., 1964, chapter 20, section 102); and Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence, or Warranty, 42 Harv.L.Rev. 733, 735-739 (1929); 23 Am.Jur., Fraud and Deceit, section 126, Negligent Representations (1939) (Now 37 Am.Jur.2d, Fraud and Deceit, sections 208 and 209). Under the Act, the State is liable as individual only in the manner and to the extent to which it has consented. Although the rule of liberality of construction, in favor of the exceptions, applies    [Citing cases] [t]he exceptions are not to be nullified through judicial interpretation, since Congress clearly delineated the areas in which it did not intend to forfeit its immunity from suit [Citing authorities]   . Builders Corporation of America v. United States (9 Cir., 1963), 320 F.2d 425, 426, certiorari denied 376 U.S. 906, 84 S.Ct. 660, 11 L.Ed.2d 606. The same restraint must govern us in interpreting section 25A.14(4). We do not believe anything in Hungerford v. United States, supra, 307 F.2d at 103 or Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. (2 Cir., 1967), 373 F.2d 227, 238-239, conflicts with the conclusion we reach. The legislature has not made actionable a claim against the State resulting from statements or representations which allegedly induce persons to act to their detriment. In support see Smith v. United States, supra, (D Wyo.1963), 224 F.Supp. at 405. Plaintiff's petition having failed to state a cause of action upon which recovery may be had, its dismissal by the trial court is Affirmed.