Opinion ID: 2537905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to instruct on voluntary manslaughter and attempted voluntary manslaughter

Text: (10) Manslaughter, an unlawful killing without malice, is a lesser included offense of murder. ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1086 [119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335]; see ง 192.) (11) Although section 192, subdivision (a), refers to `sudden quarrel or heat of passion,' the factor which distinguishes the `heat of passion' form of voluntary manslaughter from murder is provocation. ( People v. Lee (1999) 20 Cal.4th 47, 59 [82 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 971 P.2d 1001]; see People v. Rios (2000) 23 Cal.4th 450, 461 [97 Cal.Rptr.2d 512, 2 P.3d 1066] [certain mitigating circumstances will reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter `by negating the element of malice' (italics omitted)].) The provocation which incites the defendant to homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim [citation], or be conduct reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim. ( People v. Lee, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 59.) [T]he victim must taunt the defendant or otherwise initiate the provocation. ( People v. Carasi (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1263, 1306 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 265, 190 P.3d 616]; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 583-584 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 340, 123 P.3d 614] ( Manriquez ).) The `heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances ....' ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1252 [120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225] ( Steele ).) `[I]f sufficient time has elapsed for the passions of an ordinarily reasonable person to cool, the killing is murder, not manslaughter.' ( People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 868 [277 Cal.Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906].) Here, there is no substantial evidence of provocation. The record indicates that the victims and their friends, who were not armed, were socializing in a parking lot, and that two of the friends, Pereira and Casas, were talking with three young women, Quintana, Mesa, and Olsen. A dark-colored vehicle pulled into the parking lot. Defendant and one or two other men got out and walked toward the group of friends. The men told at least two of the women to get in the car. The women refused to leave, and defendant became irate. Padilla heard Pereira say Carmelos, which Padilla did not recognize, but assumed was a gang name. Defendant said Crown Town or Corona. Pereira and Montoya briefly argued with defendant, and someone from defendant's group suggested they go one-on-one. Montoya said defendant was free to take the women, and said [t]here's no big problem here. The confrontation appeared to dissipate, and Montoya and his friends started toward their vehicles. None of these events was sufficient to arouse feelings of homicidal rage or passion in an ordinarily reasonable person. ( People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 250 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Defendant asserts, however, that there was sufficient evidence of provocation to warrant instruction on voluntary manslaughter because Pereira was the first one to confront defendant, making the victims and their friends the initial aggressors. Contrary to defendant's assertion, Padilla did not so testify. Rather, Padilla testified that as defendant and one or two others started walking toward everyone in the group of friends, Pereira was the first one to confront them or talk to them. This is not evidence Pereira was initially aggressive. Defendant also relies on Padilla's testimony that Pereira yelled out Carmelos. Padilla had no idea what this term meant, but assumed it was a gang ... or something like that. Even assuming it was reference to a gang, and that a gang member might have perceived the statement as some sort of a challenge, the requisite provocation must be one that would provoke an ordinarily reasonable person. ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1252.) Reasonable people do not become homicidally enraged when hearing the term Carmelos, even if it is understood as a fleeting gang reference or challenge. Also contrary to defendant's assertion, there is no evidence that during this verbal confrontation, blows were exchanged. Defendant asserts that victim Montoya personally agreed to fight the Corona men. He relies on Casas's testimony that one person from defendant's group said they wanted to fight... one-on-one with one of us, ... which one of `em was man enough to fight him. Casas could not remember for sure, but thought perhaps Montoya had responded, [A]ll right, you know, if you want. Again, even assuming this response was made, it is scarcely a comment that would reasonably incite homicidal rage. Defendant also asserts that Olsen testified there was a fight which began that could have included a fist fight prior to the stabbing. Olsen was asked whether, while the conversation between the two groups occurred, anyone got into a fight where they were punching each other. She responded, [I]t could have been ... I can't actually say that I seen this person do anything, because I did not actually see anybody do anything. This is not evidence of physical contact. (12) In sum, there was no substantial evidence of provocation to support voluntary manslaughter or attempted voluntary manslaughter instructions, and defendant's request for such instructions was therefore properly denied. Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, was the jury forced into an all or nothing choice between murder and acquittal when the court refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter. (See Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382]; People v. Benavides (2005) 35 Cal.4th 69, 103 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 507, 105 P.3d 1099].) [N]o fundamental unfairness or loss of verdict reliability results from the lack of instructions on a lesser included offense that is unsupported by any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely. ( People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 141 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164].) Moreover, the jury was instructed on second degree murder, and accordingly had a choice in evaluating defendant's culpability. ( Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 646-648 [115 L.Ed.2d 555, 111 S.Ct. 2491] [second degree murder instruction sufficient to ensure verdict's reliability]; People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 103.)