Opinion ID: 2834586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Can a Court Divide Disability Pay Before Disability Occurs?

Text: Federal law prohibits division of VA disability pay upon divorce. [12] But because we construed the Berry decree to apply to VA disability pay and that decree was not appealed, we held the decree could not be collaterally attacked as it was voidable rather than void. [13] It is generally true that a divorce decree cannot be collaterally attacked on the ground that it improperly divided community property. [14] But any decree can be collaterally attacked if the court issuing it had no jurisdiction. [15] The decree in Berry falls under both rules. Many cases discuss whether a judgment is void or voidable , but in fact a judgment can be both. If a plaintiff with no standing obtains a judgment for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the decree is both voidable (negligent infliction is not a valid claim) and void (standing is jurisdictional). If a defendant fails to appeal a default judgment by a court with neither personal jurisdiction nor proper venue, the judgment is again both void and voidable . If an appellate court issues an advisory opinion that misinterprets the law, its judgment is both void and voidable . In all these cases, the judgment can be collaterally attacked because it is void, even if the ground that renders it voidable cannot be reached. I agree the Berry decree was voidable because it divided VA disability pay in violation of federal law. But it was also void because it divided VA disability pay before any disability existed, or anyone knew whether one ever would. Res judicata applies to issues that “were raised or could have been raised in the first action.” [16] When a veteran’s disability arises 27 years after divorce (as was the case here), it could not possibly have been raised in the divorce because no one knew then if any disability would ever occur, much less when it would begin or how extensive it would be. Courts cannot decide hypothetical claims. [17] Doing so violates the constitutional provisions for separation of powers and open courts. [18] A judgment dividing VA disability pay when no disability has yet occurred is void under the rules of both ripeness and standing. [19] Ripeness prohibits suits involving “uncertain or contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” [20] Standing prohibits suits by those who are not personally aggrieved, [21] as would be true when a person’s ex-spouse suffers a disability after divorce. [22] Both ripeness and standing are components of subject-matter jurisdiction, [23] and thus can be raised in a collateral attack. [24] Of course, divorce decrees often divide future retirement benefits if, as, and when received, including military retirement pay. [25] But pensions are a form of deferred compensation earned during marriage, and at the time of divorce constitute a contingent interest in property. [26] By contrast, post-divorce VA disability payments are not “earned” during marriage and “are not property.” [27] “ Neither this Court, nor the trial court, has the power to counsel a legal conclusion on a hypothetical or contingent set of facts.” [28] At the time of the divorce here and in Berry , the prerequisite for VA disability pay — a disability — was hypothetical. Other branches of government may decree that disability pay arising after divorce should be shared with a former spouse, but the courts cannot. [29] Accordingly, Berry incorrectly held that such a decree was voidable rather than void.