Opinion ID: 1159308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues on liability

Text: The second jury trial was held approximately five months after the first. According to defendant, the testimony at the two trials was substantially identical. The neurologist did not testify in the second trial, but an additional police officer, an additional accident reconstruction expert, and an eyewitness were added. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, awarding special medical expenses of $986.63, lost wages of $43, and general damages of $150,000, for a total of $151,029.63. Defendant moved for a new trial on various grounds, and the court denied that motion. However, on the ground that plaintiff's attorney had engaged in misconduct at trial, the court conditioned its denial on plaintiff's remitting $15,000 of the damages, which he did. This appeal and cross-appeal followed. Defendant challenges the admission of certain testimony given by a police officer at the second trial. After reciting his observations and inquiries upon arriving at the scene of the collision, the officer gave this description of the accident: [Defendant's vehicle] was westbound on Riverdale Road attempting to make a left turn into Freeway Mazda. [Plaintiff's vehicle] was eastbound on Riverdale Road in the outside lane. [Defendant's vehicle] turned in front of [plaintiff's vehicle] and failed to yield the right of way in turning. [Emphasis added.] Thereafter, the officer was allowed, over defendant's objection, to give his opinion as to which vehicle was the cause of the accident. My opinion was that Mr. Trujillo's vehicle failed to yield the right of way in turning. (Emphasis added.) After briefly cross-examining the witness, defendant moved for a mistrial based upon the testimony of his opinion. The motion was denied. Defendant now argues that the officer's statement was objectionable as a legal conclusion, since it characterized defendant as having failed in a legal duty. Opinion testimony on questions of law (other than foreign law) is inadmissible. McCormick on Evidence 28 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972); 7 Wigmore on Evidence § 1952 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978); 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 69 (1967). This rule has been applied to hold inadmissible the testimony of a police officer as to right-of-way. Akin v. Randolph Motors, Inc., 95 Ga. App. 841, 99 S.E.2d 358, 363 (1957). On the other hand, an investigating officer's opinion testimony on right-of-way might be admissible as bearing on an ultimate issue of fact under Uniform Rules of Evidence 56(4). Edwards v. Didericksen, Utah, 597 P.2d 1328 (1979). We elect not to decide that issue on the record in this case. Even assuming arguendo that it was error to allow the officer to give his opinion on the question of right-of-way, we think the error was not prejudicial. The officer's statement that defendant's vehicle failed to yield the right of way in turning, had already been received without objection. More importantly, the trial court's instructions to the jury on the subject of right-of-way adequately treated the subject and thus neutralized whatever error may have occurred at trial by giving the jury a framework within which to weigh the testimony of the officer. [1] Defendant's other challenges to the officer's testimony were not submitted to the trial court and therefore are not properly before this Court.