Opinion ID: 42363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spence’s PROTECT Act Challenges

Text: Spence also argues that his sentence upon revocation of his supervised 5 Rather, without pointing to any corroborating evidence, Spence claims that he left in order to avoid being subject to medical procedures to which he did not consent. Spence does not dispute the fact that he was found and arrested in Camden County, Georgia, which is outside the jurisdiction. The district court judge found Spence’s account of why he left the nursing home not to be credible. Revocation Hearing at 97. 7 release did not comply with the requirements of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act, (the “PROTECT Act”) Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Sta. 650 (2003). Specifically, Spence maintains that the district court erred by (1) imposing a sentence above the sentencing range set forth in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, which Spence argues was made mandatory by the PROTECT Act, and (2) failing to include a written explanation for its decision to impose the sentence. Spence preserved his challenge to the sentence outside of the sentencing range described in U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, but did not object to the district court’s failure to provide a written statement of its reasons for doing so. Therefore, we review this issue for plain error. See United States v. Aguillard, 217 F.3d 1319, 1320 (11th Cir. 2000).6 We have “held that where neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever resolved an issue, and other circuits are split on it [or have unanimously held against the appellant], there can be no plain error in regard to that issue.” Aguillard, 217 F.3d at 1321, citing United States v. Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585, 588 (11th Cir. 1999). 6 To establish plain error, Spence must persuade us that (1) there was an error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected his substantial rights, and (4) that, if left uncorrected, would seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of a judicial proceeding. See, e.g. United States v. Humphrey, 164 F.3d 585, 588 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999). 8 Spence’s argument that the sentencing range described in the U.S.S.G. §7B1.4 policy statement is now mandatory is based upon the following provisions of the statute. Section 3553(b)(1) of Title 18 provides in relevant part: The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. §3553(b)(1). The referenced subsection (a)(4) includes the following provision regarding parole revocations: The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider – ... (B) In the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. §3553(a)(4). In addition, Spence relies upon 18 U.S.C. §3742(e), which requires that an appellate court review departures from the Guideline range de novo. Finally, Spence relies upon 18 U.S.C. §3742(f)(2) which provides that an appellate court should set aside and remand a sentence if it is outside the “applicable guideline range and the district court failed to provide the required statement of reasons in the order of judgment and commitment.” The “required statement of reasons in the order of judgment and commitment” refers to 18 9 U.S.C. §3553(c)(2) which provides in relevant part as follows: Statement of Reasons for Imposing a Sentence – The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the sentence – ... (2) is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in subsection (a)(4), the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment ... 18 U.S.C. §3553(c)(2). As is readily apparent from a close review of the foregoing statutory provisions, the crucial provision upon which Spence relies to support his argument that the policy ranges are mandatory is §3553(b)(1). In other words, only in §3553(b)(1) is there any indication at all of a mandatory obligation. For two reasons, we readily conclude that there is no merit in Spence’s argument that the sentencing ranges recommended in the Chapter 7 policy statements are mandatory. First, the crucial language of §3553(b)(1) was not changed by the PROTECT Act, and our pre-PROTECT Act case law was well established that such policy ranges were merely advisory. In United States v. Hofierka, 83 F.3d 357 (11th Cir. 1996), we rejected an argument that the then applicable §3553(b) imposed a mandatory obligation upon the sentencing judge to impose a sentence within the range specified in Chapter 7 for a violation of 10 probation or supervised release. The Hofierka opinion included a quotation of the then applicable §3553(a)(4) and of the then applicable §3553(b). So far as is relevant to the question of whether or not there is a mandatory obligation upon a sentencing judge to impose a sentence within the ranges specified in Chapter 7 for violation of probation or supervised release, there is absolutely no difference in the language of the statute applied in Hofierka as compared to the currently applicable provisions of the statute. Thus, Spence’s argument is wholly without merit. A second reason for rejecting Spence’s argument that the sentencing ranges recommended in the Chapter 7 policy statements are mandatory is based upon United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 756-57 (2005). In that case, the Court “severed and excised” §3553(b)(1), thus eliminating the statutory language upon which Spence relies to support his argument. Pursuant to Booker, even the Guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission are merely advisory, and, of course, the sentencing ranges recommended in the Chapter 7 policy statements remain merely advisory as well. Having disposed of Spence’s argument that the sentencing ranges 11 recommended by the Chapter 7 policy statements are mandatory7, we turn next to his argument that the sentencing judge failed to state with specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment the reasons for departing from the recommended sentencing range. In this regard, Spence relies upon §3553(b)(1) and §3553(c)(2). As noted, the former section has now been “severed and excised,” and therefore cannot support Spence’s argument. However, §3553(c)(2) remains, and we must address Spence’s argument. As noted above, Spence did not object in the district court to the failure to provide such a written statement, and therefore we review only for plain error. We readily conclude that Spence cannot satisfy the plain error standard. In analyzing the currently applicable statutory language, the Eighth Circuit has squarely held that the Chapter 7 sentencing ranges for violation of supervised release remain merely advisory, that a sentence above that advisory range is not an upward departure contemplated by the statutory language, and that the requirement of specific findings justifying departures does not apply to a sentence above such an advisory range. United States v. White Face, 383 F.3d 7 Spence’s other arguments challenging the sentence are rejected without need for discussion. For example, his double counting argument is rejected because we conclude there was no double counting. His argument for de novo review is based upon § 3742(e), which was also “severed and excised” by Booker; his challenge to the sentence is due to be affirmed under any conceivable standard. 12 733, 737-39 (8th Cir. 2004); United States v. Martin, 371 F.3d 446, 449 (8th Cir. 2004). Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has squarely addressed the issue, although we note that the rationale of our Hofierka decision would point toward a ruling similar to that of the Eighth Circuit. However, we need not resolve the issue in this case because Spence cannot establish plain error. Even if there were error, which we doubt, it is not plain or obvious. We also readily conclude that Spence could not satisfy either the third or fourth prongs of the plain error analysis.8