Opinion ID: 2336124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the blood serum.

Text: Before the Louisville police obtained the search warrant to procure the blood and urine samples, the hospital drew blood from Appellant pursuant to hospital procedures. This occurred at 4:25 a.m. An employee then centrifuged the sample precipitating the solid portion of the blood from the liquid portion (the serum). A lab technician then tested the blood serum for the presence of alcohol or drugs. The results, recorded at 5:40 a.m., revealed a BAC of 0.24%. Appellant raises four claims of error concerning the testing of his blood serum.
Appellant alleges error because the Commonwealth failed to prove a complete chain of custody with respect to the centrifuge process. At trial, the phlebotomist who drew the blood and the lab technician who performed the actual testing testified as to the chain of custody. The only absent member of the chain of custody was the technician who centrifuged the sample. However, the technician who performed the testing further testified that in the centrifuge process the tube containing the sample is placed unopened in the centrifuge and spun down. Once complete, the tube is given to the testing technician, who is the first to open the sealed sample. In Rabovsky v. Commonwealth, Ky., 973 S.W.2d 6 (1998), we thoroughly analyzed chain of custody law in Kentucky. As to blood, the chain of custody ensures that the sample tested was the same sample drawn from the individual. R. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 11.00, p. 592 (3rd ed. Michie 1993). However, [e]ven with respect to substances which are not clearly identifiable or distinguishable [like blood], it is unnecessary to establish a perfect chain of custody or to eliminate all possibility of tampering or misidentification, so long as there is persuasive evidence that `the reasonable probability is that the evidence has not been altered in any material aspect.' Rabovsky, supra, at 8 (quoting United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909, 109 S.Ct. 3197, 105 L.Ed.2d 705 (1989)). Important to the present matter, Rabovsky also held that [g]aps in the chain normally go to the weight of the evidence rather than its admissibility. Id. at 8; see also United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244, 250 (7th Cir.1988). Under these standards, the trial judge properly admitted the blood serum test results. The record contains persuasive evidence that Appellant's sample was tamper free, as the testimony of the lab technician who performed the test proved that the sample remained sealed during the centrifuge process. It was for the jury to decide the weight to be given to the blood serum evidence.
Blood serum occurs when the solid cellular material in whole blood is precipitated out, leaving only the liquid portion called serum. When this serum is tested for alcohol a higher BAC often results as more alcohol is concentrated in the liquid serum. Thus, Appellant argues that the hospital's test of his blood serum should have been excluded as it did not accurately depict Appellant's level of intoxication at the time of either the testing or the accident. Additionally, Appellant notes that the definition of alcohol concentration in KRS 189A.005(1) does not include blood serum, and that a Daubert hearing was not held to determine the scientific validity of blood serum. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). A trial judge's decision with respect to relevancy of evidence under KRE 401 and 403 is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v. English, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (1999); Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 979 S.W.2d 98 (1998). There was no abuse of discretion in admitting evidence that made a determination of Appellant's intoxication more probable than not. KRE 401. Appellant's concerns go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Both sides presented expert testimony as to BAC amplification in blood serumanywhere from 10 to 35 percent. From this evidence, the jury could evaluate the results and determine what weight to give to the serum. [1] Nor is it dispositive that KRS 189A.005(1) does not mention blood serum in the definition of alcohol concentration. Like the urine sample discussed supra, the failure of the statute to mention blood serum does not render the evidence inadmissible. Nor do we need to determine whether a jury could find a defendant guilty under KRS 189A.010(1)(a) based solely on the BAC of his blood serum. It was permissible for the jury to consider this evidence when attempting to decide whether Appellant was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcohol under KRS 189A.010(1)(b). Appellant's argument that the trial court was required to conduct a Daubert hearing with respect to the blood serum evidence was not preserved for appellate review. At trial, Appellant's objection to the evidence was premised upon relevancy, KRE 401, not scientific reliability, KRE 702. He did not assert that blood serum tests rest upon an unreliable foundation, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2799, but that blood serum test results do not accurately reflect the BAC necessary to convict under KRS 189A.010(1)(a) as evinced by the contradictory expert testimony on the subject. In fact, the word  Daubert  was never uttered during either the suppression hearing or the trial. At trial, Appellant offered his own expert witness on the subject of blood serum, and even he did not testify that blood serum testing was scientifically unreliable, but only that the test results would produce a higher BAC level than test results on whole blood. Additionally, numerous other jurisdictions allow the admission of blood serum evidence, without requiring a Daubert hearing, so long as the jury is provided appropriate whole blood conversion information. See Domino's Pizza v. Gibson, 668 So.2d 593 (Fla.1996); People v. Green, 294 Ill.App.3d 139, 228 Ill.Dec. 513, 689 N.E.2d 385 (1997); Commonwealth v. Michuck, supra, note 1; Reidweg v. Texas, 981 S.W.2d 399 (Tex.Crim.App.1998).
Appellant complains that the requirements of 500 KAR 8:030(2) were not complied with when the hospital drew blood from Appellant in accordance with its own procedures at 4:25 a.m. KRS 189A.103(1) and (3) provide that if a person is arrested for an offense arising out of a violation of KRS 189A.010(1) or KRS 189.520(1), a breath, blood or urine test may be administered at the direction of a peace officer and in accordance with administrative regulations. Appellant was not under arrest when the hospital drew his blood, and his blood was not drawn at the request or under the direction of a peace officer. Thus, the procedures required by 500 KAR 8:030(2) were not applicable. Love argues that he was in police custody, and cites to Cook v. Commonwealth, Ky., 826 S.W.2d 329 (1992) for the proposition that this is sufficient to trigger the requirements of KRS 189A.103 and 500 KAR 8:030(2). However, in Cook , hospital personnel admittedly drew the defendant's blood sample at the direction of a police officer. The issue in that case was whether the defendant had consented to the search. Appellant's argument that he was in police custody is based solely on the testimony of Officer Raymond Sutherland. After the accident, Officer Sam Cromity was dispatched to the hospital to learn the identity of the driver of the Thunderbird. Cromity asked Appellant if he had been the driver of the vehicle and Appellant answered affirmatively. Cromity then read Appellant his Miranda rights, which Appellant immediately invoked. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Cromity then ceased questioning Appellant and proceeded to obtain a search warrant. Officer Sutherland remained in the room while Cromity obtained the warrant. At trial, Sutherland opined that Appellant was not in his custody, but was in police custody. If this were a Fifth Amendment issue, that statement might have some import. Under Miranda, a person is in custody when deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way by a law enforcement officer. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. However, the Fifth Amendment is not implicated by the taking of a blood sample. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). It is purely a Fourth Amendment inquiry. The Fourth Amendment protect[s] personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the state. 384 U.S. at 767, 86 S.Ct. at 1834. Here, it was the hospital that conducted the search, not the state.
Along the same lines, Appellant argues that the hospital blood test is inadmissible because it is interwoven with state action, i.e., Appellant was in police custody when the sample was drawn and tested. We reiterate that absent any evidence that the blood was drawn at the request or direction of the police, there was no state action.