Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lead Counsel's Failure to Appear in Court Due to Illness

Text: Defendant was represented at trial by lead counsel David Huffman. Pursuant to section 987, subdivision (d), the trial court also appointed cocounsel Donnalee Huffman, lead counsel's wife, to represent defendant. Both attorneys vigorously participated in the guilt phase of the trial. Defendant contends he was denied his constitutional right to counsel when he was forced to proceed in the sanity phase represented by Mrs. Huffman as his sole counsel. As explained below, we find he waived any objection at trial.
On January 15, 1985, the second day of the sanity phase, Mr. Huffman was absent due to illness. Defendant agreed to proceed with cocounsel, Mrs. Huffman. Mr. Huffman appeared the next day, but was absent again on Thursday, January 17, 1985. The following discussion took place: THE COURT: . . . I understand that defense wishes to proceed and defendant will agree to proceed at this time, since the witnesses are here, with Mrs. Huffman representing Mr. Weaver. Is that correct? MRS. HUFFMAN: That's correct, your Honor. THE COURT: And you have discussed that with Mr. Weaver? MRS. HUFFMAN: Yes. That's all right with Mr. Weaver, [¶] Is that all right with you, Mr. Weaver? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. The next court session was on Tuesday, January 22, 1985. Mr. Huffman was again absent. The trial court stated: The record should show that yesterday I had a conference with Mrs. Huffman, during which I called [the prosecutor] by telephone, and the status of the case is now that Mr. Huffman is hospitalized . . . in Los Angeles, and will be for several days, and after discussing the pros and cons with counsel, we arrived at the determination that we should defer resuming the case until Monday[,] February the 4th, at which time I realize, at least the way things look now, Mr. Huffman will have been out of the hospital for a few days and will be in a position to be back, conducting or assisting the defense in the case. [¶] Is that correct, Mrs. Huffman? Mrs. Huffman responded: Yes, that's correct, your Honor. He is getting better, and when we get back, we are not sure exactly whether he will be taking over the case completely or whether he will be assisting me as he did before. . . . Defendant agreed to the two-week continuance. When the parties returned to court on Friday, February 1, 1985, it became clear that Mr. Huffman's absence would be more extended than was first thought. When the court asked whether lead counsel would be present the following Monday as anticipated, the following discussion, critical to defendant's present claim, took place: MRS. HUFFMAN: The likelihood of him being present is almost nil, your Honor. I talked to Mr. Weaver about this. I am not sure whether he [Mr. Huffman] will be here or he will not, but Mr. Weaver told me that he was ready to proceed even if he is not here. THE COURT: Mr. Weaver, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: You thoroughly have discussed that with Mrs. Huffman? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Let me tell you what the options at this point are. If Mr. Huffman is unable to take part in the trial meaningfully, I would consider delaying the trial for a length of time to appoint counsel to assist Mrs. Huffman, that is, for that counsel to become thoroughly familiar with the case, read the transcripts that we already have prepared of the testimony to date and discuss the case with her, or I would allow the case to proceed Monday, and I understand the witnesses have been subpoenaed and so forth. Are you aware of those options? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: With that in mind, do you wish to go ahead . . . at this time? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. The prosecutor then asked defendant some questions: MR. SHUMAKER: Mr. Weaver, do you feel that you have had an adequate time to discuss this with Mrs. Huffman? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. SHUMAKER: And to make a decision about what you want to do? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. SHUMAKER: Do you feel it would be beneficial if you were able to talk to another attorney about whether you should proceed on the basis that's being suggested or have someone else come into the case? THE DEFENDANT: I didn't understand that. MR. SHUMAKER: The Court, if you requested, the Court could possibly appoint another attorney to discuss the matter with you or give you additional time. THE DEFENDANT: I don't want no other attorney. MR. SHUMAKER: You do feel you have had an adequate opportunity to discuss this in the last couple of days then with Mrs. Huffman? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Mr. Huffman appeared at the sanity phase for the week of February 4-8, 1985, and then did not appear again until he argued a motion for a new trial on April 4, 1985. For the balance of the sanity phase and for the complete penalty phase, defendant was represented solely by Mrs. Huffman.
A criminal defendant, of course, enjoys the right to counsel under both the state and federal Constitutions. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15; Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799; People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 876, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 219, 905 P.2d 1305.) Waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing and voluntary. ( People v. Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 987, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) The right to appointment of a second attorney in a capital case is not a constitutional right ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 424, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489, 640 P.2d 108), but is permitted by statute in the discretion of the trial court (§ 987, subd. (d)). Although defendant frames his argument in terms of his failure to waive the assistance of counsel, that characterization is inaccurate. There is no question defendant was represented by counsel, as Mrs. Huffman represented defendant at all times. Accordingly, the authorities defendant cites addressing the outright denial of counsel, the voluntariness of a waiver of counsel, or the denial of counsel of choice are inapt. Indeed, it is unclear whether a capital defendant has any right at all to expect that one of two appointed counsel will take the reins of a capital trial at any particular time. (See People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 632-634, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683 [no error in cocounsel splitting representation duties with one handling the guilt phase and one the penalty phase].) In any event, we find defendant adequately waived the presence of Mr. Huffman for the duration of his illness. As the discussion on February 1, 1985, demonstrated, it was not clear at that time when Mr. Huffman would recover from his illness, and defendant was faced with the choice of proceeding with Mrs. Huffman alone, or accepting a long continuance to permit an additional attorney to be located, appointed, and educated about the case. Defendant was expressly given this choice on the record and explicitly affirmed he had conferred with Mrs. Huffman about his rights. When questioned by the prosecutor, defendant was informed of his right to consult an independent attorney and declined the invitation. On this record, we conclude defendant adequately waived the presence of lead counsel until Mr. Huffman was well enough to return to court. Defendant contends his waiver was not a knowing one because he was not told expressly that his waiver was for the remainder of the trial. Read in context, however, the record makes clear that no one knew how long Mr. Huffman would be gone, and that defendant was agreeing to representation by Mrs. Huffman alone until Mr. Huffman could return. Although defendant argues waivers should have been taken before every day's court session in which Mr. Huffman did not appear, this is belied by the trial court's suggestion on February 1, 1985, that one option was to appoint wholly new counsel to replace Mr. Huffman and to work with Mrs. Huffman. Such an option would not have been considered unless the trial court and the parties believed Mr. Huffman might be absent for an extended period. It was thus clearly implied that defendant's waiver of Mr. Huffman's presence was to cover an extended and indefinite period of time. We are not persuaded a different result should obtain merely because lead counsel, arguing for a continuance on January 2, 1985, stated that I have worked over a year-and-a-half on the psychiatric aspect of this case and I can't expect . . . [Mrs. Huffman] to come in next Monday and take over this entire psychiatric defense. Although the sanity phase was indeed complex, with allegations of PTSD, as a result of defendant's service in the Vietnam War, schizophrenia, and substance abuse, and defendant's claim of being a victim of child abuse, Mrs. Huffman had two weeks from that point to prepare and she never sought a continuance to allow further preparation although the trial court seemed amenable to granting one. Moreover, as noted above, Mr. Huffman did appear at the sanity phase for a week before suffering a relapse. We similarly reject the further claim that, in light of defendant's apparent mental deficiencies, the trial court was required to undertake a searching and detailed inquiry into whether Mrs. Huffman was able to shoulder the load of representing defendant alone. Mrs. Huffman had actively participated in the trial to that point, and there was no suggestion she was unable to proceed. Indeed, on January 22, 1985, Mrs. Huffman stated she was not sure whether, should Mr. Huffman return, he will be taking over the case or whether he will be assisting me as he did before. (Italics added.) To reiterate, she did not seek a continuance to permit greater preparation, and the trial court was entitled to assume she was prepared to proceed. We also agree with respondent that People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 186 Cal.Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145, cited by defendant in support, is inapposite. In that case, the defendant was represented by an inexperienced attorney who associated an experienced attorney as cocounsel to assist her at trial. Shortly before trial, experienced cocounsel withdrew. Lead counsel sought a continuance to procure new cocounsel, but the trial court denied the motion. We found the trial court's denial of a continuance resulted in the defendant's being denied his counsel of choice. By contrast, in this case defendant unequivocally stated he was willing to proceed with Mrs. Huffman alone and did not want a continuance to allow the procurement of a replacement cocounsel. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests Mrs. Huffman was an inexperienced attorney or was otherwise unable to assume lead counsel status. Gzikowski is thus distinguishable. Finally, although it is unclear whether defendant is raising the same claim with regard to Mr. Huffman's absence from the penalty phase, which occupied just a few days, we reach the same conclusion for the same reasons. In sum, we find no constitutional violation flowing from defendant's decision to proceed with the sanity and penalty phases of the trial represented by Mrs. Huffman only.