Opinion ID: 2174133
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Heading: The Property Owners' Appeal.

Text: We first consider the property owners' appeal. The McFaddens urge that the district court erred in ruling that a statute exempting a century farm from inclusion in a designated economic development area was unconstitutional. At issue is Iowa Code section 403.17(20) (Supp.1989). This statute reads as follows: Economic development area means an area of a municipality designated by the local governing body as appropriate for commercial and industrial enterprises where housing and residential development for low and moderate income families, including single or multifamily housing. Such designated area shall not include land which is part of a century farm. Iowa Code § 403.17(20) (Supp.1989) (emphasis added). The final sentence of this statute was added by a 1989 amendment. 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 299, § 4. Sometime in 1989, the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship issued a certificate designating a sixty-two-acre agricultural tract owned and operated by the McFaddens as a century farm. Under criteria established by that agency, a century farm designation is a recognition that at least forty acres of a particular farm has remained in the same family for 100 or more years. On December 17, 1990, the City, by resolution, approved inclusion of the McFaddens' property in a designated economic development area. The McFaddens then brought the present action, alleging that as a result of the property's century farm status its inclusion in the economic development area was illegal. The City filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that the 1989 amendment exempting century farms from economic development areas was invalid on several constitutional grounds. These constitutional challenges, all posited on the Iowa Constitution, were: (1) that the statute violates Article I, Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution; (2) that this was improper class legislation in violation of Article I, Section 6 of the Iowa Constitution; (3) that the statute is void for vagueness; and (4) that the legislation improperly delegates legislative power. The district court found the 1989 amendment to section 403.17(20) was invalid for each and every one of the grounds asserted by the City. Consequently, the court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the McFaddens' action. Although the McFaddens strenuously urge on this appeal that the City lacks standing to raise all or some of the constitutional challenges lodged against the century farm legislation, we prefer to review the district court's ruling on the merits. [1] A. The effect of Article I, Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. The first constitutional issue that we consider is the district court's conclusion that the exemption of century farms from inclusion in a designated economic development area violates Article I, Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. That provision reads as follows: All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inalienable rights among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness. The district court cited the case of Pierson v. Lane, 60 Iowa 60, 14 N.W. 90 (1882), which, in limiting the scope of the common-law estate of fee tail, concluded that the constitutional provision last cited did not protect hereditary rights to property. From this negative conclusion concerning a claimed constitutional protection, the district court implied a constitutional prohibition against legislative protection of hereditary rights to property. Appellants urge that this implication is not warranted. We agree. The fact that Article I, Section 1 does not guarantee the protection of hereditary rights to property does not, we believe, imply a constitutional prohibition against an act of the legislature granting certain protection to hereditary property rights. The challenged statute is not a contravention of Article I, Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution. B. Alleged violation of Article I, Section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. In considering the district court's conclusion that the exemption of century farms from economic development areas was class legislation invalid under Article I, Section 6 of the Iowa Constitution, we are mindful of the following admonition: One who challenges a statute on this constitutional ground must negate every conceivable basis which may support the classification, and the classification must be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. John R. Grubb, Inc. v. Iowa Hous. Fin. Auth., 255 N.W.2d 89, 95 (Iowa 1977). In considering the interpretation of the challenged statute, later in this opinion we conclude that the term century farm refers to a well-known program of the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship for the designation of multigenerational family farms that meet certain criteria established by that agency. That interpretation suggests that the legislative purpose for the challenged legislation is the protection of the cultural achievement that is represented by a multigenerational family farm. Governmental action protecting cultural interests has in other contexts been recognized as promoting a legitimate governmental interest. Goodman Group, Inc. v. Dishroom, 679 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir.1982); Colorado River Indian Tribes v. Marsh, 605 F.Supp. 1425, 1430 (C.D.Cal. 1985). For these reasons, we reject the district court's conclusion that the challenged legislation violates Article I, Section 6 of the Iowa Constitution. C. The void for vagueness challenge. In finding the challenged statute void for vagueness, the district court emphasized that the term century farm is nowhere defined in the legislation. The court acknowledged that a statute has the requisite specificity if its meaning may be gleaned by reference to similar statutes, prior judicial interpretations, the dictionary, or a common and generally accepted meaning for the statutory language. See Pottawattamie County v. Iowa Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 272 N.W.2d 448, 452 (Iowa 1978). It concluded, however, that such extraneous sources do not provide a sufficiently definite meaning in the present case. Appellants urge that the Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship had established a sufficiently well-known definition of century farm in connection with a program that it had been administering during the twelve-year period preceding the enactment of the challenged statute. As a result of that activity, appellants contend that the meaning of the term century farm was well known and generally accepted throughout the state at the time the challenged legislation was enacted. We agree with this conclusion. Intrinsic aids to statutory interpretation arise from composition in structure of the act, while extrinsic aids pertain to matters outside the act. Willis v. City of Des Moines, 357 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Iowa 1984). Matters outside of the act that may be used as an aid to interpretation include contemporary circumstances. State v. Bessenecker, 404 N.W.2d 134, 136-37 (Iowa 1987); Smith v. Thompson, 219 Iowa 888, 896, 258 N.W. 190, 194-95 (1935). See also Model Stat. Constr. Act § 2, 14 U.L.A. 391 (1990). We believe that, as a result of the century farm program of the Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, the concept of a century farm did have an established meaning and that this was the meaning that the legislature intended in the enactment of the statute. D. Whether the statute presents an improper delegation of legislative power. The final constitutional question that we consider is the district court's conclusion that the challenged legislation involves an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Again, we disagree. In interpreting the statute, we conclude that the legislature intended to incorporate the definition of century farm employed by the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship at the time the challenged legislation was adopted in 1989. Consequently, the meaning of the phrase century farm has been fixed by direct legislative enactment. Although, as the district court suggests, the agency is free to alter its definition, this presents no constitutional issue in the present case. These appellants do not contend that the term century farm, as used in the statute, has a meaning other than that which was being utilized in the agency's century farm program at the time the legislation was enacted. We hold that the challenged statute, as applied to the McFaddens, did not improperly delegate legislative authority. Based upon the conclusions we have reached concerning the constitutional challenges lodged to the 1989 amendment to Iowa Code section 403.17(20), the district court erred in granting the City's motion for summary judgment. The McFaddens' action must be remanded to the district court for a decision on their entitlement to an exemption under that statute.