Opinion ID: 775822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Accomplices' Plea Agreements

Text: 62 Petitioner argues that Barrett's and Eckstrom's plea agreements rendered his conviction unconstitutional. According to Petitioner, the agreements required Barrett and Eckstrom to give specific testimony implicating Petitioner, regardless of the truth or falsity of that testimony. 63 Barrett signed a plea agreement in January 1986. That agreement originally contained eight conditions: (1) that Barrett's representation that she did not personally injure Van Zandt was true; (2) that Barrett would be released on her own recognizance; (3) that Barrett would agree to waive time for the commencement of the . . . action pending against her in county court; (4) that Barrett would make herself available to receive subpoenas and to take a polygraph examination; (5) that Barrett would testif[y] completely and truthfully at all proceedings including preliminary examination and trial concerning all the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and death of Rick[e]y Van Zandt; (6) that Barrett would not exercise her right to remain silent during the proceedings; (7) that Barrett would take and pass a lie detector test; and (8) that Barrett would remain in California and inform the district attorney of her address. The agreement provided that if condition No. 1 were not met, or if Barrett violated any condition of the agreement, the agreement would be void. If Barrett complied with the terms of the agreement, the district attorney agreed that, after Petitioner's trial, all charges against Barrett would be dropped, with the exception of a single count of felony vehicle theft to which Barrett would plead guilty. 64 Eckstrom's plea agreement was similar but not identical. She received transactional immunity in exchange for her testimony. The other major difference between her agreement and Barrett's was that Eckstrom's agreement did not require her to take a polygraph test. 65 Before Barrett testified, the state amended her agreement to remove the condition that she not have personally inflicted any injuries on Van Zandt. That condition remained in Eckstrom's agreement. 66 After the prosecution and the defense both mentioned the agreements during opening argument, Petitioner sought to have the agreements admitted into evidence. The trial court admitted Eckstrom's agreement and read to the jury Barrett's agreement, which had been modified by the deletion of condition No. 1 (the requirement that Barrett not have injured Van Zandt) and condition No. 7 (the polygraph requirement). 2 At trial, defense counsel cross-examined Barrett and Eckstrom about the agreements and discussed the agreements in jury arguments during both the guilt and penalty phases. 67 Petitioner argued on direct appeal that the agreements were coercive and rendered Barrett's and Eckstrom's testimony unreliable and inadmissible. The California Supreme Court rejected that argument. Morris, 807 P.2d at 970. As to Barrett, the court concluded that the agreement did not taint her testimony because the no-injury condition had been removed from the agreement before trial. The only remaining condition that bore on her testimony was the condition that she testify completely and truthfully, which condition, the court concluded, was neither coercive nor improper. Id. 68 As to Eckstrom, the court declined to reach the question whether the no-injury provision in her agreement rendered the agreement impermissibly coercive. Instead, the court concluded that, even if her testimony was improperly admitted, Petitioner was not prejudiced by the error. In that regard, the court noted that Eckstrom's testimony was not central to the state's case against Petitioner. Instead, the court concluded: [Petitioner's] several detailed pretrial admissions of guilt were the cornerstone of the case against him. Id. The court reasoned: 69 Even if the accomplice testimony is set aside, it remains that [Petitioner] voluntarily and unequivocally confessed his guilt three times: once to a hitchhiker he picked up in Nebraska, once in a detailed statement to Nebraska law enforcement officers, and once in a letter to Avette Barrett. The remaining evidence corroborates the confessions . . . . [T]he evidence of [Petitioner's] guilt was overwhelming and any error in admitting the accomplice testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 70 Id. at 971 n.5. 71 Petitioner argued in his federal habeas petition that the plea agreements induced Barrett and Eckstrom to give false testimony. The magistrate judge rejected that argument, concluding (1) that the deletion of the no-injury clause from Barrett's agreement before trial removed any potentially coercive element from the agreement; and (2) that, although Eckstrom's plea agreement contained the no-injury clause and therefore violate[d] due process in the abstract,  the error in admitting her testimony was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of Petitioner's guilt. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and rejected Petitioner's claim. 72 On appeal, Petitioner again asserts that the prosecutor bargained for specific testimony about the crime, rather than for the truth. He also argues that the removal of the no-injury condition from Barrett's agreement renders the agreement illusory, because Barrett received all the benefits but none of the burdens of the plea contract. 73 The general rule is that an accomplice who has pled guilty may testify against non-pleading defendants without raising due process concerns. United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1537 (9th Cir. 1988). Generally, such testimony will be admitted if the jury is informed of the exact nature of the agreement, defense counsel is permitted to cross-examine the accomplice about the agreement, and the jury is instructed to weigh the accomplice's testimony with care. Id. Those conditions were satisfied here. In addition, a plea agreement may require an accomplice to testify fully and truthfully without violating the Due Process Clause. Gallego v. McDaniel, 124 F.3d 1065, 1078 (9th Cir. 1997). 74 Here, both plea agreements required the accomplices to testify truthfully. But, even assuming that it was error to admit their testimony, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner asserts that his trial boiled down to a swearing contest, with Barrett and Eckstrom blaming Petitioner for the murder, and Petitioner blaming Barrett and Eckstrom. That view of the trial ignores the most damning evidence of Petitioner's guilt: his own admissions. For example, Petitioner told hitchhiker Logan that he had killed Van Zandt in order to steal his van and that he had really rocked and rolled him. Next, Petitioner confessed to police officers that he had hit Van Zandt on the head between 12 and 14 times with a rock that was the size of a softball, might have talked beforehand about killing him so as to steal the van, and had told Barrett and Eckstrom to leave while he finished killing Van Zandt with a stick. Not long after that, Petitioner wrote a letter to Barrett, which proclaimed: I've killed once for you, and if I have to I'll do it again!!! And you know that I can, and I don't need a rock to do it either. Then Petitioner told two fellow inmates that he had hit a man's skull with a rock 13 times. 75 Even if Barrett and Eckstrom had never testified, the jury would have been left to consider those admissions -and the corroborating physical evidence, such as Petitioner's bloodspattered clothing -in the light of Petitioner's proffered explanation that he had lied about committing the crime to protect Barrett. That explanation is particularly specious when applied to the statements that Petitioner made to Barrett herself. As the California Supreme Court majority noted, Petitioner's own admissions were the cornerstone  of the state's case and constitute unusually strong evidence of guilt. Morris, 807 P.2d at 970. 76 In sum, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on this claim. Any error was harmless.