Opinion ID: 1354261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Motion to Suppress Statements Post-Arrest

Text: Because the officers failed to provide Brobst with Miranda warnings while he was in custody at his residence, we must next determine whether the statements Brobst made at the police station, after receiving his Miranda warnings and signing the Miranda waiver, were admissible. See United States v. Orso, 234 F.3d 436, 440-41 (9th Cir.2000). An initial failure of law enforcement officers to administer Miranda warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, does not, without more, taint subsequent Mirandized statements. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285; see also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 169-70, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986) (holding that coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not `voluntary'). A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. Elstad. 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Here, Brobst's initial statements were not coerced. The officers' initial questionswhether the pornographic material was Brobst's, whether someone else lived in the residence, and whether the papers might belong to someone else though improper, were not deliberately coercive or improper tactics. See United States v. Toral, 536 F.2d 893, 896-97 (9th Cir.1976) (finding that because [a]ll of the questioning took place in the security of appellant's own home ... and the initial questioning, though improper, was in the form of preliminary questions that may have been asked of anyone in order to narrow the field of suspects[,] ... no coercive atmosphere ... was carried over after the Miranda warnings were given). Brobst was not subject to coercive or improper tactics, such as being confronted with the description of unpleasantness of prison for the obvious purpose of getting (appellant) to abandon (his) self-imposed silence ... in flagrant violation of ... Miranda. United States v. Olof, 527 F.2d 752, 753-54 (9th Cir.1975) (internal quotation marks omitted). Brobst stated no one else lived in the residence and that the house was his, so the materials must also be his. There is no evidence in the record that Brobst's in custody statements were the result of any coercion. Thus, we conclude the statements made after Brobst was advised of his rights under Miranda, which he voluntary waived, were appropriately admitted and the district court did not err.