Opinion ID: 1736768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: E.B. challenge

Text: Viewed in a vacuum the state's use of eight of eight peremptory challenges to exclude female prospective jurors could be viewed as giving rise to a pattern of gender discrimination sufficient to establish defendant's prima facie burden; however, the record supports the trial court's contrary conclusion. First, and foremost, defendant's claim that a pattern of gender discrimination was established is undercut by the final composition of the juryfive females and seven males. This case falls short of the pattern of wholesale exclusions demonstrated by the selection process in Myers, supra, and Givens, supra, discussed above, in which we found a prima facie case established and remanded for additional consideration of the Batson challenge. Second, defendant does not cite, nor do we discern, from the prosecutor's statements, questions, or comments during the lengthy voir dire in this case any inference of gender-based exercise of peremptory challenges. Third, given this case includes a charge of rape, the normal scenario would be for the prosecutor to attempt to use his peremptory challenges to strike male jurors. See Givens, supra . That defendant alleges the prosecutor is discriminating by using his challenges to strike female jurors is inconsistent with that normal stereotypical conduct J.E.B. is aimed at preventing. This would appear to dictate that defendant offer some additional support for this claim, yet, as noted, he failed to offer anything other than bare statistics. Given the trial court's discretion in making this determination, the number of female jurors ultimately seated on the jury, and defendant's failure to make any argument other than citing bare statistics, we conclude that the trial court's decision that defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination was not an abuse of discretion.