Opinion ID: 1794679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mental Health as a Mitigating Circumstance

Text: Ferguson argues that the trial court erroneously required him to prove that he was legally insane rather than properly considering his mental health as both a statutory and a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance during his sentencing hearing. He alleges that the Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed as to this issue, in violation of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982), and Whisenhant v. State, 370 So.2d 1080, 1095-96 (Ala.Crim.App.1979). The trial court, in considering Ferguson's mental health as a statutory mitigating circumstance, wrote: 2. The Capital offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance [§ 13A-5-51(2), Ala.Code 1975]. DOES NOT EXIST. Although the clinical psychologist testified that the defendant had a low I.Q., may be mildly retarded, and may be handicapped mentally[,][h]e also testified [that] he did not suffer from any delusions or was psychotic. He knew right from wrong and was not insane. He had the ability to make choices, had a good job, was married, had advanced in his job, and had opportunities. There was no evidence that the defendant suffered from any extreme mental or emotional disturbances. C.R. at 137-38.
The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's findings concerning Ferguson's mental health as a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance on the basis that the trial court had properly considered the mitigating evidence, but placed little weight upon it in light of the other testimony and evidence produced at trial. We conclude that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly applied the settled law on this issue in finding that the trial court had in fact taken into account Ferguson's mental health as a possible nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Ex parte Hart, 612 So.2d 536, 542 (Ala.1992)( Lockett does not require that all evidence offered as mitigating evidence be found to be mitigating.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 953, 113 S.Ct. 2450, 124 L.Ed.2d 666 (1993); and Ex parte Slaton, 680 So.2d 909, 924 (Ala.1996) (`While Lockett and its progeny require consideration of all evidence submitted as mitigation, whether the evidence is actually found to be mitigating is in the discretion of the sentencing authority.')(quoting Bankhead v. State, 585 So.2d 97, 108 (Ala.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1079, 117 S.Ct. 742, 136 L.Ed.2d 680 (1997)).
Ferguson also argues that the trial court refused to find that statutory mitigating circumstances existed because, he says it improperly invoked the requirements for proving legal insanity, i.e., that Ferguson could not appreciate the difference between right and wrong or otherwise conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. The trial court, in addition to considering Ferguson's mental health as a statutory mitigating circumstance, specifically found that the following statutory mitigating circumstance did not exist: 6. The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired [§ 13A-5-51(6), Ala.Code 1975]. DOES NOT EXIST. The defendant's action[s] in or around the time of the killings indicate that he knew he was committing a criminal act, he tried to cover up his actions after the murders were committed.
These findings by the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals, do not conflict with the United States Supreme Court's holding in Eddings v. Oklahoma , as Ferguson argues. In Eddings, the Supreme Court applied the rule from Lockett v. Ohio, supra . It did not change the rule that a sentencer is to consider the characteristics of the person who committed the crime. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 112, 102 S.Ct. 869 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 197, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). This Court has also relied upon Eddings for this rule. See Ex parte Borden, 769 So.2d 950, 958 (Ala. 2000)(There is no requirement that a sentencing authority must find the evidence offered by the defendant as a mitigating factor; however, the sentencing authority may not be precluded from considering any mitigating factor. (Emphasis original.)); and Ex parte Cochran, 500 So.2d 1179, 1186 (Ala.1985)(The language in Lockett and Eddings indicates that so long as the sentencer is not precluded from considering any mitigating factor, the requirements of the Constitution have been satisfied.). We agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court did in fact consider Ferguson's offer of the mitigating evidence of his mental health, but gave that evidence little weight when compared against the other evidence that it had before it. These findings are also consistent with Whisenhant v. State, 370 So.2d 1080, 1095 (Ala.Crim.App.1979), because we agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding that the trial court did not incorrectly apply the standard for legal insanity when it considered Ferguson's mental health as a mitigating circumstance.