Opinion ID: 2745630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kellum v. Johnson

Text: ¶18. One case details the relationship between the 1908 Act and Sections 3143 and 3144 – Kellum v. Johnson. The Court addressed Section 3144’s silence regarding when to file 8 a primary election contest for an office covering multiple counties. The Court considered the historical background, purpose and objectives of the relevant statutes. ¶19. In Kellum, the losing candidate for the office of District Attorney of the Seventeenth Circuit Court District challenged the election results in the Democratic primary. Kellum, 115 So. 2d at 148. The election took place on August 4, 1959, and Kellum filed his complaint on September 8, 1959 – thirty-five days after the election. Id. The Democratic Executive Committee decided to take no action on the complaint. Id. Thereafter, Kellum sought judicial review. Id. Johnson, the declared winner, moved to dismiss Kellum’s petition as untimely because it was not filed within twenty days of the primary election. Id. The trial court agreed, dismissing the petition. Id. Kellum appealed to this Court. ¶20. The Court considered the history of the State’s primary election contest-laws, starting with the 1908 Act. Id. at 149. The Court stated that the 1908 Act, “with slight and unimportant amendments, now appears as Sections 3143-45, Code of 1942 . . . .” Id. Because Sections 3143 and 3144 were parts of the same Act and regarded the same subject matter, the Court determined that the Sections must be considered as a whole: An intent to discriminate unjustly between different cases of the same kind is not to be ascribed to the Legislature. Statutes should, if possible, be given a construction which will produce reasonable results, and not uncertainty and confusion. ... The different parts of a statute reflect light upon each other, and statutory provisions are regarded as in pari materia where they are parts of the same act. Hence, a statute should be construed in its entirety, and as a whole. The general intention is the key to the whole act, and the intention of the whole controls the interpretation of its parts. The fact that a statute is subdivided into Sections or other parts should not obstruct or obscure the interpretation of the 9 law as a whole. All parts of the act should be considered, compared, and construed together. It is not permissible to rest the construction upon any one part alone, or upon isolated words, phrases, clauses, or sentences, or to give undue effect thereto. Id. at 149-50. ¶21. The Court noted that Section 3144 did not mention when the complaint should be filed. The Court recognized, however, that a primary election contest “must be conducted speedily” in light of the looming general election. Id. at 150. Using canons of statutory construction, the Court considered the statutes as a whole and determined that the twenty-day deadline to file a contest for a single county office (Section 3143) also applied to an office covering multiple counties (Section 3144). The Court also considered a statute pertaining to a general or special election contest which required that a complaint be filed within twenty days and found it to be persuasive authority. Miss. Code § 3287 (1942). ¶22. The Court reasoned that: It is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to limit the time in which contests could be filed where, a county or beat office was involved, and yet fix no time limit whatever for that purpose in regard to all other offices. So to hold would convict the Legislature of unaccountable capriciousness and result in endless uncertainty and confusion. The two Sections are in pari materia, and all contests therefore must be begun within twenty days after the primary. To hold otherwise would be senseless. Id. Finding that the twenty-day deadline was “a condition precedent to the right to file a contest” under Section 3144, the Court found that Kellum had failed to meet the deadline and, in a unanimous opinion, dismissed the case. Id. at 151. ¶23. McDaniel states that, since Kellum, the Legislature repealed Sections 3143 and 3144 and made material changes to the statutes. Thus, McDaniel argues that Kellum no longer has 10 precedential value. McDaniel also notes that the Legislature added or modified time requirements in forty-seven sections of the election code. According to McDaniel, the Legislature had the opportunity, if it desired, to add a time requirement to Section 23-15-923 to contest a primary election; it did not. Cochran counters that the substance of Sections 3143 and 3144 was carried forward in current election law and, thus, Kellum applies. ¶24. “Congress is presumed to be aware of an administrative or judicial interpretation of a statute and to adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change.” Caves v. Yarbrough, 991 So. 2d 142, 153 (Miss. 2008) (quoting Lorillard, Div. of Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 580-81, 98 S. Ct. 866, 55 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1978)). The Legislature reenacted Section 3144 in Section 23-15-923 without material change. Review a side-by-side comparison of the former and current statute: 11 § 3144 Chairman of state executive § 23-15-923. Nominations with respect to committee to issue his fiat to county State, congressional, and judicial chairman reciting charges. districts, etc., investigation findings, and declaration of nominee. In state, congressional and judicial districts, upon complaint filed with the chairman of Except as otherwise provided in Section the state executive committee, by petition, 23-15-961, a person desiring to contest the reciting the allegations of fraud, and with election of another returned as the nominee the advice of four members of said in state, congressional and judicial districts, committee, the chairman shall issue his fiat and in legislative districts composed of to the chairman of the county executive more than one (1) county or parts of more committee, where fraud is alleged to have than one (1) county, upon complaint filed been committed, and in like manner as in with the Chairman of the State Executive county office, the county committee shall Committee, by petition, reciting the grounds investigate the complaint and return their upon which the election is contested. If findings to the chairman of the state necessary and with the advice of four (4) committee, which shall declare the members of said committee, the chairman candidate nominated, whom the corrected shall issue his fiat to the chairman of the returns show is entitled to the same. And the appropriate county executive committee, same procedure shall apply to senatorial and and in like manner as in the county office, flotorial contests in and by their respective the county committee shall investigate the executive committees. complaint and return their findings to the chairman of the state committee. The State Executive Committee by majority vote of members present shall declare the true results of such primary. ¶25. One material change exists. The Legislature expanded the grounds to contest a primary election. Under Section 3144, a person could challenge an election only for fraud. Now, Section 23-15-923 does not limit the grounds for a challenge. No other changes were made to the substance of the law. For instance, Section 23-15-923 clarifies who can file an election contest. It eliminates antiquated language such as “senatorial and flotorial contests” and clarifies that election challenges shall be filed with the State Executive Committee. The changes are not material. Thus, Kellum still has precedential value. ¶26. The Court previously has found that a judicial interpretation of a statute was adopted 12 when the Legislature reenacted the statute without change. Take, for example, McDaniel v. Beane, 515 So. 2d 949 (Miss. 1987). J.C. McDaniel, not to be confused with the Appellant, failed to have his petition for judicial review signed by two, disinterested lawyers pursuant to Section 23-15-927. Id. at 950-952. On appeal, he argued that the statute did not require that the petition be signed by disinterested lawyers. The Court, however, found that the “disinterested” language was contained in another statute and, by previous caselaw, was judicially interpreted into Section 23-15-927. Id. at 951-952; see Pittman v. Forbes, 186 Miss. 783, 191 So. 490 (1939); Pearson v. Jordan, 186 Miss. 789, 192 So. 39 (1939). Because the statutes were re-enacted into current law without substantial change, the Court found that the prior judicial interpretation was engrafted into the statute. Id. ¶27. Viewed side-by-side, former Section 3144 and current Section 23-15-923 are not materially different. Thus, it cannot be said that the Legislature intended to repeal the statute and thereby lessen Kellum’s precedential value. The Legislature is assumed to be aware of judicial interpretations of its statutes, and the Legislature has failed to amend Section 23-15923 to reflect a decision contrary to Kellum. “[W]e must conclude that the legislative silence amounts to acquiescence.” Caves, 991 So. 2d at 154. The Court’s interpretation of the statutes in Kellum was approved by the Legislature, and, absent legislative action, has become a part of the statute. See Crosby v. Alton Oschner Med. Found., 276 So. 2d 661, 670 (Miss 1973). ¶28. Even if we disagreed with Kellum’s holding, the principle of stare decisis is strong. “[A] former decision of this court should not be departed from, unless the rule therein announced is not only manifestly wrong, but mischievous.” Caves, 991 So. 2d at 151. Of 13 course, McDaniel alleges that Kellum is mischievous, as its application would result in an illogical outcome – the challenger would be required to file the contest before the examination of election records is complete. But, as Cochran points out, it is possible for a challenger to file an election contest, which covers multiple counties, within twenty days. See, e.g. Pyron v. Joiner, 381 So. 2d 627 (Miss. 1980) (within twenty days of primary, candidate filed complaint to contest election for office that covered thirty counties). Also, the initial complaint, like any other complaint, must specify only a claim under the statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-923 (Rev. 2007) (stating that the complaint must “recit[e] the grounds upon which the election is contested”). The challenger may amend his or her petition to include additional evidence. See, e.g., Noxubee County v. Russell, 443 So. 2d 1191 (Miss. 1983). In fact, McDaniel amended his complaint twice after filing with the SREC. We are not persuaded by his argument. ¶29. Briefly, we address the argument presented by amicus curiae, Conservative Action Fund. Conservative Action Fund contends that the Court should afford strict deference to the plain language of Section 23-15-923. It states that anything more would violate the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution, which grants the Legislature exclusive authority to regulate federal elections. See U.S. Const. art. I, §4, cl. 1. The Court’s decision in no way violates the Elections Clause. It is our job to resolve ambiguities in the law. This is fundamental. We are not creating a deadline. As determined by Kellum’s sound interpretation of our election contest laws, the deadline already exists; it was put in place by the Legislature in 1908, and it was carried forward into the present statute.