Opinion ID: 1451210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The KRS 342.125(3) Statute of Limitation

Text: In two unpublished opinions, Cook v. Unicorn Min., No.2003-SC-0616-WC, 2004 WL 1908114, (August 26, 2004) and Cruse v. Aristech Chemical Co., No.2004-SC-0291-WC, 2005 WL 119771, (January 20, 2005), [5] this Court rendered opinions supporting the opinions of the Workers' Compensation Board and Court of Appeals on facts similar to the facts at hand. We did not, however, closely scrutinize the distinction between the words original award or order granting or denying benefits.  See KRS 347.125(3). In Cook, we overlooked the statutory language award or order referred to in KRS 342.125(8), noting only that the claimant's 1998 order denying benefits, following his 1995 award, was not the award or settlement referred to in the statute. Cook, No.2003-SC-0616-WC, 2004 WL 1908114, at  (emphasis added). Plainly, the pertinent statutory language refers to an order or award rather than a settlement. [6] In Cruse, we recognized the correct statutory language of KRS 342.125(3), i.e., original award or order granting or denying benefits, but still held that an order reducing the claimant's award on the employer's later motion to reopen was not the original award or order granting or denying benefits. Cruse, No.2004-SC-0291-WC, 2005 WL 119771, at  2. As was often the practice concerning unpublished opinions, we did not elaborate on our reasons for giving control of the subject phrase to the word original. Johnson v. Gans Furniture Industries, Inc., 114 S.W.3d 850, 858 (Ky.2003), the facts of which again, did not involve a subsequent order granting or denying benefits as did Cruse and Cook, made the same mistake in its' dicta, relying only on the statutory language original award, while overlooking the full statutory language original award or order granting or denying benefits. KRS 342.125(3). Wray v. Allied Systems, No.2004-SC-002122-WC, 2005 WL 1058862, (Ky.App. 2005), followed with the same result as Cruse. Here again, a subsequent order reducing the Appellant's award on the employer's motion to reopen was not recognized as an order granting or denying benefits. And here, in this case, the Court of Appeals relied on Kendrick, 145 S.W.3d at 425. Kendrick , however, dealt only with the question of whether the voluntary payment of post-award TTD benefits by the employer without a motion and order granting such benefits, extended the four year statute of limitations under KRS 342.125(3). The Court, holding the filing of the motion to reopen untimely, held the [v]oluntary payment of TTD benefits post-award is not an exception contained within the statute. Id. A point with which we do not disagree, since there was no order requiring payment of income benefits. It is now apparent that these previous interpretations of KRS 342.125(3), by the Court of Appeals and this Court, have put claimants such as Hall in the untenable position of attempting to avoid their holdings by (1) filing premature motions to reopen, even though the claimant has not reached MMI and thus cannot realistically determine and apprise the tribunal of the required degree of change, [7] or (2) being forced to forego promised benefits by allowing the statute of limitation to expire while actively receiving medical treatment designed to achieve the MMI necessary for such a motion, where MMI (and thus the existence of objective medical, disability and occupational evidence) occurs post-limitation period. Surely workers' compensation cases for injured claimants should be decided on their merits rather than on the basis of gamesmanship. Kroger Co. v. Jones, 125 S.W.3d 241, 246 (Ky.2004). Thus, we are compelled by the patent absurdity of this result to question our earlier analysis of the legislature's intent regarding the statutory language at issue. The seminal duty of a court in construing a statute is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Commonwealth v. Plowman, 86 S.W.3d 47, 49 (Ky.2002) ( citing Commonwealth v. Harrelson, 14 S.W.3d 541 (Ky.2000)). A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir.2005) ( citing Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311, 314, 62 L.Ed.2d 199 (1979)).Thus, we are to ascertain the intention of the legislature from words used in enacting statutes rather than surmising what may have been intended but was not expressed. Stopher v. Conliffe, 170 S.W.3d 307, 309 (Ky.2005), overruled on other grounds by Hodge v. Coleman, 244 S.W.3d 102 (Ky.2008). Thus, if a statute is clear and unambiguous and expresses the legislature's intent, the statute must be applied as written. Griffin v. City of Bowling Green, 458 S.W.2d 456, 457 (Ky.1970). And absent an ambiguity, there is no need to resort to the rules of statutory construction in interpreting it. Stewart v. Estate of Cooper, 102 S.W.3d 913, 915 (Ky.2003). However, where an ambiguity does exist, an absurdity which may follow one construction or another may properly be considered. Fayette County v. Hill, 304 Ky. 621, 625, 201 S.W.2d 886, 889 (1947). Statutes, of course, must be read as a whole and in context with other parts of the law. Lewis v. Jackson Energy Co-Op Corp., 189 S.W.3d 87, 92 (Ky.2005). It is a basic principle of statutory construction that terms joined by the disjunctive or must have different meanings because otherwise the statute or provision would be redundant. United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1482, 1483 (6th Cir.1996); see also Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 73, 105 S.Ct. 479, 481, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) (Canons of construction indicate that terms connected in the disjunctive in this manner be given separate meanings.). Although one could argue the words or and and can be easily interchanged, we point out that to make such interchange it must be obvious that the intent of the legislature would be thwarted if the change were not made. Boron Oil Co. v. Cathedral Foundation, Inc., 434 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Ky.1968) ( citing Duncan v. Wiseman Baking Co., 357 S.W.2d 694 (Ky.1962)). Here, if the limitation was intended to mean four years from the original decision, it is fair to assume the legislature would not have added the additional language, or order granting or denying benefits. KRS 342.125(3). One surely would not contend that an order denying benefits is the same as an original award. That the reference to the original award or order granting or denying benefits was intended to encompass orders granting benefits other than the original award, is established by several additional uses in the same statute. For example, KRS 342.125(1) allows an ALJ to reopen and review any award or order  on stated grounds. (emphasis added). It is uncontestable that the reference to order in KRS 342.125(1) encompasses an order different than the original award, otherwise there could be no reopenings of awards changed subsequent to the original award, increasing or decreasing benefits, as all must concede is the practice. For example, KRS 342.125( l )(d) specifically allows a reopening and review upon a [c]hange of disability as shown by objective medical evidence of worsening or improvement of impairment due to a condition caused by the injury since the date of the award or order.  (emphasis added). If the word order was interpreted to refer only to the original award, a review and reopening of a subsequently increased or decreased award or order could simply not occur. And, KRS 342.125(4) acknowledges that the [r]eopening shall not affect the previous order or award as to any sums already paid thereunder. (emphasis added). Meaning simply that the new award or order will operate prospective only for the remaining term of the award. Given our further analysis, the conclusion that an order granting or denying benefits was tended to encompass an order granting benefits different than an original award or settlement is compelling. Thus, the reference in KRS 342.125(3) to the the original award or order granting or denying benefits, must necessarily refer not only to the original award, but to any subsequent order granting or denying benefits. Any contrary interpretation leads to absurd results, as well as a violation of the clear spirit of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act. Plummer v. Sharondale Coal Corp., 834 S.W.2d 708, 711 (Ky.App.1992) (We refuse to afford an interpretation to the statute that would create irrational distinctions yielding absurd results that would serve to undermine the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act.). We have often said that statutes will not be given [such a] reading where to do so would lead to an absurd or unreasonable conclusion. Wesley v. Board of Ed. of Nicholas County, 403 S.W.2d 28, 30 (Ky.1966); see also Commonwealth of Ky., Dept. of Highways v. Wilkins, 320 S.W.2d 125, 126 (Ky.1959). The Appellant's motion, therefore, was clearly filed within the four year period of the statute of limitations contained in KRS 342.125(3), as the motion to reopen filed on November 7, 2003, was within four years from the February 14, 2001, order granting benefits. [8] An order denying a motion to reopen under the prima facie principles of Hodges and Stambaugh , on the other hand, would not constitute an order granting or denying benefits, as a denial of a motion to reopen for failure to make a prima facie showing does not deal with benefits, but rather whether or not there are grounds to reopen and take proof akin to a motion to re-docket. Cf., Hodges, 182 S.W.3d at 500; see also Stambaugh, 488 S.W.2d at 681. In contrast, it has been suggested that if KRS 342.125(3) is interpreted to mean that a subsequent order granting or denying TTD benefits would renew the four year period allowed for reopening, then the four year period would effectually be nullified by the filing of successive frivolous motions ad infinitum. We do not succumb to this argument. Nor do we agree that a medical fee dispute encompasses benefits, as benefits relate only to income benefits. Cf., KRS 342.730. In the case of motions to reopen to increase or decrease monetary benefits filed within the limitation period set out in KRS 342.125(3), it is unrealistic to even suggest that one could file motions to reopen every four years for the purpose of preventing the four year period of limitation from ever ending, as the motion to reopen must make a prima facie showing of sufficient grounds for an award under the standard of Hodges and Stambaugh . A second obvious obstacle is obtaining legal counsel to file, or assist, in such a motion as there are no incentives for claimant's attorneys to file frivolous motions to reopen. A meritorious motion to reopen is challenging enough, and pursuant to KRS 342.320, no fee can be charged unless an attorney wins additional benefits, which fee is limited to the formula set out therein, and must be approved by an ALJ. [9] Payments from clients are simply unacceptable under the Kentucky's Workers' Compensation Act. Nor can we conceive that compensation carriers would be so wasteful of their funds. Thus, such an argument is simply not supportable. Aside from CR 11, KRS 342.310 is an additional deterrent to the filing of such frivolous motions. It allows substantial sanctions against a party who files such motions. KRS 342.310(1) provides that if an ALJ, the Board, or any court before whom such proceedings are brought under the Workers' Compensation Act, determines that such proceedings have been brought, prosecuted or defended without reasonable grounds, they may assess the whole cost of the proceedings, including court costs, travel expenses, deposition costs, physician expenses, attendance fees at depositions, attorney fees, and all other out-of-pocket expenses, against the party who so brought, prosecuted, or defended them. This Court addressed such an infraction in the case of Pikeville Coal Co./Chisholm Coal Co. v. Sullivan, 895 S.W.2d 574 (Ky. 1995), wherein a claimant filed three successive claims for retraining incentive benefits within two years against the same employer. In Pikeville Coal Co ., the employer asserted its concern to the Court regarding employers being subjected to economic blackmail because of the threat of successive claims for retraining incentive benefits which could cost more to defend than to settle. This court responded as follows: We would point out ... that there are ramifications for filing frivolous claims, and costs may and should be assessed against the offending party. KRS 342.310. Certainly, merely filing the same claim over and over again, after a decision has been reached on the merit s, and without different circumstances to warrant reopening, KRS 342.125, or a new claim, justify all penalties and sanctions permitted by law. Id. at 575. With regard to motions for TTD benefits, this could not be the case, as KRS 342.125(3) refers to a motion seeking TTD benefits during the period of the award, which for anything less than a total disability award, cannot exceed 425 weeks (8.17 years) or 520 weeks (10 years), depending on the disability rating for which the award was made. KRS 342.730(1)(d). Thus, our analysis today convinces us that our holdings in Cruse and Cook, as well as the Court of Appeals' decision in Wray, were incorrect as to the timing of the four year statute of limitation under KRS 342.125(3), and thus, Cruse, Cook and Wray are overruled to the extent they are inconsistent herewith. We do not, however, depart from the holding in Kendrick , as KRS 342.125(3) plainly requires an order granting or denying benefits.