Opinion ID: 3189206
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Different government claims

Text: Third, F.E.B. contends the statute of limitations has not run because, in opposing F.E.B.’s SLA claim to the island, the United States now asserts a “different claim” to the island than it asserted in 1951. But the interest in real property that the United States asserted in 1951 is the same interest that it asserts in this suit: ownership of Wisteria Island, going back through the entire chain of title to that island. F.E.B.’s predecessors had actual notice of that asserted interest in 1951. It is that interest—not “the subjective intent of the government to enforce [the interest] in the face of changed conditions”—that constitutes the government’s “claim” for purposes of the QTA’s statute of limitations. Vincent Murphy Chevrolet Co. v. United States, 766 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1985). Although the SLA created a new legal claim to the island for F.E.B.’s predecessors, it did not abolish their preexisting notice of the United States’ asserted interest. See id. at 251-52 (finding the QTA statute of limitations had run because, although the plaintiffs’ cause of action was newly available due to recently changed conditions, the plaintiffs had actual knowledge of the challenged government interest for many 18 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 19 of 25 years prior). F.E.B.’s predecessors remained on notice notwithstanding the fact that any government opposition to their newly minted SLA claim could implicate defensive legal arguments different from the affirmative claims raised in the government’s 1951 letter. See id. at 452 (“[F]or purposes of determining when ‘the claim’ accrues under § 2409a[(g)], all that is necessary is a reasonable awareness that the government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiffs.”) (internal alteration, quotation marks omitted); Knapp, 636 F.2d at 283 (“Knowledge of the claim’s full contours is not required.”).11 The QTA’s statute of limitations accrues upon notice of the United States’ claim—not upon the creation of an adverse claimant’s potential cause of action. The United States was not required to reassert its ownership interest after the SLA was enacted in order for the previously triggered limitations period to continue running. See Richmond, 945 F.2d at 770 (“To hold that the limitations period did not begin to run until conditions had changed and the government reasserted its claim would be in effect to extend the limitations period indefinitely, in contravention of Congress’s expressed intent.”). 11 See also Rio Grande, 599 F.3d at 1176 (“[T]he starting of the limitations clock is not dependent on the plaintiff knowing the precise nature of the property interest upon which the United States predicates its claim of title.”); Richmond, 945 F.2d at 770 (“Assuming . . . [the plaintiff] did not know the exact nature of the government’s claim in 1938, it still could not escape the limitations bar, for all that is necessary for accrual is a reasonable awareness that the Government claims some interest adverse to the plaintiff’s.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 Case: 15-11771 Date Filed: 03/28/2016 Page: 20 of 25