Opinion ID: 1277158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the bangert requirements for a plea colloquy

Text: ¶ 22 Given the frequency with which violations of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 [10] and Bangert are alleged, and in light of the inadequate plea colloquy in this case, we take this opportunity to reexamine the legal tenets fundamental to guilty pleas. ¶ 23 The duties established in Wis. Stat. § 971.08, [11] in Bangert, and in subsequent cases are designed to ensure that a defendant's plea is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. The faithful discharge of these duties is the best way we know for courts to demonstrate the critical importance of pleas in our system of justice and to avoid constitutional problems. [12] ¶ 24 The Bangert opinion is a timeless primer on the foundation principles of the plea colloquy. It answers the oft-expressed concern that pleas consume too much valuable court time. ¶ 25 The United States Constitution sets forth the standard that a guilty or no contest plea must be affirmatively shown to be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 260, 389 N.W.2d 12. If this showing does not appear in the transcript of the plea hearing, there is a high probability that it will have to be shown in a postconviction hearing. ¶ 26 Historical perspective on the required procedure is valuable. In Bangert this court confronted the implications of a decision it had made a year earlier. In State v. Cecchini, 124 Wis.2d 200, 368 N.W.2d 830 (1985), the court held unanimously that prior to accepting a plea, a trial court must ascertain that the defendant understands the nature of the charge, and that this must be done on the record at the plea hearing. Id. at 201, 368 N.W.2d 830 (emphasis added). The court added: Because the trial court failed to do so ... the plea was involuntary and unknowing and in violation of the defendant's right to due process. Id. In short, under Cecchini, a deficient plea colloquy was per se a violation of due process and required withdrawal of the defendant's plea. ¶ 27 Then Bangert came along. It involved a defendant who had murdered an Eau Claire police officer. Although the defendant had been involved in extensive proceedings and discussions before his plea, his plea colloquy was plainly insufficient to show that he understood the nature of the charge. If Cecchini were applied, Bangert could withdraw his plea as a matter of right. ¶ 28 The Bangert court reconsidered the Cecchini rule and withdrew language from that opinion, but it did not compromise or discard the mandatory requirement that trial judges undertake a personal colloquy with the defendant to ascertain his understanding of the nature of the charge[.] Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 260, 389 N.W.2d 12 (emphasis added). ¶ 29 The court held that a plea will not be voluntary unless the defendant has a full understanding of the charges against him. Id. at 257, 389 N.W.2d 12 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 n. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). In addition, for a plea to function as a valid waiver of constitutional rights, the plea must be an intentional relinquishment of known rights. Id. at 265, 389 N.W.2d 12 (citing McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)). Thus, a plea will not be voluntary unless the defendant understands the nature of the constitutional rights he is waiving. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 265, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 30 To ensure a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary plea, Bangert also required that a trial judge explore the defendant's capacity to make informed decisions. ¶ 31 In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Nathan Heffernan stated: Cecchini established that a complete record of a defendant's understanding of a plea be made at the plea hearing. This procedure discourages postconviction attacks. Id. at 298, 389 N.W.2d 12 (Heffernan, C.J., concurring). [A] postconviction cure procedure simply means there will be one or more evidentiary hearings on the plea withdrawal issue. Id. at 299, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 32 Smarting from this criticism, the majority condemned perfunctory colloquies, facially superficial colloquies, and ritualistic colloquies. This court cannot overemphasize the importance of the trial court's taking great care in ascertaining the defendant's understanding of the nature of the charges and the constitutional rights being waived. Id. at 266, 270, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 33 To head off postconviction hearings on plea withdrawals, the court said: We reiterate that the duty to comply with the plea hearing procedures falls squarely on the trial judge. We understand that most trial judges are under considerable calendar constraints, but it is of paramount importance that judges devote the time necessary to ensure that a plea meets the constitutional standard. The plea hearing colloquy must not be reduced to a perfunctory exchange. It demands the trial court's utmost solicitude. Id. at 278-79, 389 N.W.2d 12 (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)) (emphasis added). Such solicitude will serve to forestall postconviction motions, which have an even more detrimental effect on a trial court's time limitations than do properly conducted plea hearings. Id. at 279, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 34 To assist circuit courts, the Bangert decision outlined a judge's duties at a plea hearing, drawing on Wis. Stat. § 971.08, familiar case law, and Wis JICriminal SM-32 (1985), Part V, Waiver of Constitutional Rights. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 261-62, 270-71, 389 N.W.2d 12. We take this opportunity to restate and supplement the Bangert outline. ¶ 35 During the course of a plea hearing, the court must address the defendant personally and: (1) Determine the extent of the defendant's education and general comprehension so as to assess the defendant's capacity to understand the issues at the hearing; [13] (2) Ascertain whether any promises, agreements, or threats were made in connection with the defendant's anticipated plea, his appearance at the hearing, or any decision to forgo an attorney; [14] (3) Alert the defendant to the possibility that an attorney may discover defenses or mitigating circumstances that would not be apparent to a layman such as the defendant; [15] (4) Ensure the defendant understands that if he is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, an attorney will be provided at no expense to him; [16] (5) Establish the defendant's understanding of the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the range of punishments to which he is subjecting himself by entering a plea; [17] (6) Ascertain personally whether a factual basis exists to support the plea; [18] (7) Inform the defendant of the constitutional rights he waives by entering a plea and verify that the defendant understands he is giving up these rights; [19] (8) Establish personally that the defendant understands that the court is not bound by the terms of any plea agreement, including recommendations from the district attorney, in every case where there has been a plea agreement; [20] (9) Notify the defendant of the direct consequences of his plea; [21] and (10) Advise the defendant that If you are not a citizen of the United States of America, you are advised that a plea of guilty or no contest for the offense [or offenses] with which you are charged may result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country or the denial of naturalization, under federal law, as provided in Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(c). [22] ¶ 36 A circuit court's failure to fulfill a duty at the plea hearing will necessitate an evidentiary hearing if a defendant's postconviction motion alleges he did not understand an aspect of the plea because of the omission. As Bangert put it: Whenever the sec. 971.08 procedure is not undertaken or whenever the court-mandated duties are not fulfilled at the plea hearing, the defendant may move to withdraw his plea. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 274, 389 N.W.2d 12. Assuming the defendant's postconviction motion is adequate to require a hearing, he may withdraw his plea after sentencing as a matter of right unless the state can show the plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, despite the deficiencies in the plea hearing. Trochinski, 253 Wis.2d 38, ¶ 17, 644 N.W.2d 891; Van Camp, 213 Wis.2d at 139, 569 N.W.2d 577. ¶ 37 If a defendant does not understand the nature of the charge and the implications of the plea, he should not be entering the plea, and the court should not be accepting the plea. On the other hand, if a defendant does understand the charge and the effects of his plea, he should not be permitted to game the system by taking advantage of judicial mistakes. ¶ 38 Under our rules, a defendant can wait until he knows his sentence before he moves to withdraw his plea, and he may not be disadvantaged by this delay as long as he is able to point to a deficiency in the plea colloquy. Thus, only the court, with the assistance of the district attorney, can prevent potential sandbagging by a defendant by engaging the defendant at the plea colloquy and making a complete record. See Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 275, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 39 After sentencing, in cases that involve an alleged deficiency in the plea colloquy, an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea proceeds as follows. The defendant must file a postconviction motion under Wis. Stat. § 809.30 or other appropriate statute. The motion must (1) make a prima facie showing of a violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1) or other court-mandated duties by pointing to passages or gaps in the plea hearing transcript; and (2) allege that the defendant did not know or understand the information that should have been provided at the plea hearing. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 274, 389 N.W.2d 12. ¶ 40 When a Bangert motion is filed, it is reviewed by the court. If the motion establishes a prima facie violation of Wis. Stat. § 971.08 or other court-mandated duties and makes the requisite allegations, the court must hold a postconviction evidentiary hearing at which the state is given an opportunity to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary despite the identified inadequacy of the plea colloquy. [23] Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 274, 389 N.W.2d 12. When the defendant has met his two burdens, the burden of producing persuasive evidence at the evidentiary hearing shifts to the state. [24] Id. at 275, 389 N.W.2d 12. In meeting its burden, the state may rely on the totality of the evidence, much of which will be found outside the plea hearing record. Hampton, 274 Wis.2d 379, ¶ 47, 683 N.W.2d 14. For example, the state may present the testimony of the defendant and defense counsel to establish the defendant's understanding. Bangert, 131 Wis.2d at 275, 389 N.W.2d 12. The state may also utilize the plea questionnaire and waiver of rights form, documentary evidence, recorded statements, and transcripts of prior hearings to satisfy its burden. ¶ 41 If the state is able to meet its burden, the hearing should be over. In a theoretical sense, the burden will have shifted back to the defendant, but there is nothing for the defendant to prove because the defendant is not entitled to turn a Bangert hearing into a fishing expedition on other issues that were not pleaded in the defendant's original motion. ¶ 42 When the defendant files a dual purpose motionthat is, a Bangert motion combined with a motion that alleges ineffective assistance of counsel or some other problem affecting the plea that is extrinsic to the plea hearing recordthe court should make an initial ruling on whether an evidentiary hearing is required and, if it is, what the hearing will address. It must be remembered that when the defendant makes the type of motion discussed in Bentley, which requires testimony or the examination of evidence outside the existing record, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if his postconviction motion alleges facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. Id. at 310, 548 N.W.2d 50. To ask the court to examine facts outside the record in an evidentiary hearing requires a particularized motion with sufficient supporting facts to warrant the undertaking. Hampton, 274 Wis.2d 379, ¶ 61, 683 N.W.2d 14. In addition, the defendant maintains the burden of proof in a Bentley -type hearing and the facts adduced must show manifest injustice by clear and convincing evidence before the defendant may withdraw his plea. Bentley, 201 Wis.2d at 311, 548 N.W.2d 50.