Opinion ID: 2585508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the special errand exception

Text: ¶ 16 We address the application of the special errand exception and the employer-provided transportation exception not because we adopt them in negligence cases, but to show that the Ahlstroms, having proffered these possible exceptions, would nevertheless be unable to meet them even were we to approve their use in such cases. A special errand occurs when the employee engages in a special activity which is within the course of his employment, and which is reasonably undertaken at the request or invitation of the employer. Drake v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 939 P.2d 177, 183 (Utah 1997) (quoting Dimmig v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 6 Cal.3d 860, 101 Cal.Rptr. 105, 495 P.2d 433, 439 (1972)). In Drake, we noted that one important factor in determining whether an employee was on a special errand was the `relative regularity or unusualness of the particular journey.' Id. (quoting 1 Arthur Larson, Larson's Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.11, at 4-204 (1996)). The proof advanced by the Ahlstroms is insufficient to meet this exception. On the day of the accident giving rise to this suit, Ross was attending a regularly scheduled meeting. The facts before the trial court indicate that although it was outside the normal duties of an officer, for a Field Training Officer such as Ross the meeting was part of her regular duties, and her commute to and from the meeting that day was not unlike her commute on any other duty day. Accordingly, the special errand exception would not be met under these facts, even assuming its application in negligence cases.