Opinion ID: 177197
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instruction for Defective Design

Text: Appellants first argue that the district court erred when it refused to instruct the jury on Colorado's consumer expectation test. We detect no error in the instruction given by the district court.
We review the district court's decision about whether to give a particular instruction for abuse of discretion. Martinez v. Caterpillar, Inc., 572 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir.2009). We review the trial court's conclusions on legal issues de novo, however, and need not defer to its decisions on questions of law. City of Wichita v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 72 F.3d 1491, 1495 (10th Cir.1996). In a diversity case like this one, the substance of jury instructions is a matter of state law. City of Wichita, 72 F.3d at 1494-95; see also Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-80, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). In such a case, our task is not to reach [our] own judgment regarding the substance of the common law, but simply to ascertain and apply the state law. Wankier v. Crown Equip. Corp., 353 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Huddleston v. Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232, 236, 64 S.Ct. 1015, 88 L.Ed. 1246 (1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted). To properly discern the content of state law, we must defer to the most recent decisions of the state's highest court. Id. Of course, by the principles of stare decisis, we also are bound by our own prior interpretations of state law. [W]hen a panel of this Court has rendered a decision interpreting state law, that interpretation is binding on district courts in this circuit, and on subsequent panels of this Court, unless an intervening decision of the state's highest court has resolved the issue. Id. (emphasis added).
Appellants argue that the district court misapplied Colorado law when it refused to instruct the jury on both the consumer expectation test and the risk-benefit test. To grapple with this contention, we must discern the import of Colorado law. The guiding case for us is Camacho v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 741 P.2d 1240 (Colo.1987). The plaintiff in Camacho crashed his motorcycle and injured his legs. He sued Honda, the manufacturer of the motorcycle, alleging that the vehicle was defectively designed because it lacked steel crash bars that would have protected his legs and lessened the severity of his injuries. Id. at 1242. The trial court granted Honda's motion for summary judgment, applying a form of the consumer expectation test and concluding that the risk of leg injury was obvious and foreseeable to any purchaser of a motorcycle. Id. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the consumer expectation test was inadequate under these circumstances. Total reliance upon the hypothetical ordinary consumer's contemplation of an obvious danger, the court reasoned, diverts the appropriate focus and may thereby result in a finding that a product is not defective even though the product may easily have been designed to be much safer at little added expense and no impairment of utility. Id. at 1246; see also id. at 1247 n. 8. In reaching this result, the court offered a standard for identifying those cases where the consumer expectation test would not be sufficient: [E]xclusive reliance upon consumer expectations is a particularly inappropriate means of determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous ... where both the unreasonableness of the danger in the design defect and the efficacy of alternative designs in achieving a reasonable degree of safety must be defined primarily by technical, scientific information. Id. at 1246-47 (citing Ortho Pharm. Corp., 722 P.2d at 414); see also Armentrout, 842 P.2d at 180-82 (discussing the Camacho standard); White v. Caterpillar, Inc., 867 P.2d 100, 104-06 (Colo.App.1993) (applying Camacho to conclude that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury concerning the risk-benefit test). Our court was called upon to apply Camacho in Montag v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 75 F.3d 1414 (10th Cir.1996). In that case, we rejected Appellants' claim that the district court had erred by not giving a combination of both instructions to the jury. The Colorado Supreme Court, we stated, has held that complex product liability claims involving primarily technical and scientific information require use of a risk-benefit test rather than a consumer expectations test. Id. at 1418-19 (emphasis added).
The district court considered extensive arguments on whether to instruct the jury in accordance with the consumer expectation test, the risk-benefit test, or both. Appellants argued that both instructions should be given. On the other hand, Teleflex urged the district court to instruct the jury only under the risk-benefit test. Acknowledging that it was a difficult call, the court agreed with Teleflex and decided to give only the risk-benefit instruction. In explaining its decision the court stated: I am going to go on the basis of the risk harm instruction only to avoid jury confusion in a case that seems here to be premised on an unusual set of circumstances of an alleged design defect allowing a break to occur in circumstances where the alternative suggested is much beyond the knowledge of the ordinary consumer and it is based upon distinctions primarily technical and scientific, namely whether there is an alternative design of stainless steel to carbon. Aplt.App. at 815. Later, the district court explained further that its conclusion was based upon what seems to be the mandate that the risk benefit formulation be used where you are dealing with technical or scientific information beyond the normalwhat would be expected of the normal consumer. Id. at 866 (emphasis added). It seems to us that the best interpretation of the statements above is that the district court held that (1) this case involved primarily technical and scientific evidence, and (2) it thus was required to give only the risk-benefit instruction. The district court accordingly rejected Appellants' request to instruct the jury on both tests and instead gave the following instruction: A product is unreasonably dangerous because of a defect in its design if it creates a risk of harm to persons or property that is not outweighed by the benefits to be achieved from such design. Id. at 966.
On appeal, Appellants seem to contend that two errors underlie the district court's failure to give the consumer expectation instruction. First, Appellants argue that the district court erred because it excluded the `consumer expectation' test as a possible basis for liability under Colorado law, Aplt. Opening Br. at 25, instead instructing the jury on the risk-benefit test and effectively treating the two tests as mutually exclusive. Second, Appellants contend that the court erred in concluding that this case involved primarily technical and scientific information: An ordinary person can understand, without the benefit of scientific or technical information, that it is unreasonable to use a material that will rust and corrode in a marine steering cable.... In short, rust is not rocket science. Id. at 22.
We first address Appellants' argument that the district court erred by concluding that, once it found that this case involved primarily technical and scientific information, it was required to give only the risk-benefit instruction. In support of their allegation of legal error, Appellants hold up Biosera, Inc. v. Forma Scientific, Inc., 941 P.2d 284 (Colo.App.1996), for the proposition that the `consumer expectation' and `risk/benefit' tests are not mutually exclusive; both tests can be applied in the appropriate circumstances. Aplt. Opening Br. at 21. In Biosera, the Colorado Court of Appeals did appear to conclude that the two tests were not mutually exclusive. The BioSera court stated that we do not read Camacho as precluding application of the consumer expectation test in an appropriate case. 941 P.2d at 287. Rather, a court should review each [test] to determine if it is an appropriate standard for judging the dangerous nature of the product at issue. Id. The Biosera court concluded that the trial court did not err in instructing the jury on both tests. Id. The court reached this result because the issue before itwhether a health care company's freezer that stored blood products was defective because it could be turned off inadvertently by the slightest pressure on its power switchdid not involve the sort of technical, scientific information that would render use of the `consumer expectation' test inappropriate. Id. In light of Montag, however, we interpret Colorado law on this question as follows: where a case is defined primarily by technical and scientific information, the court must use only the risk-benefit test; it may not use the consumer expectation test, and it may not use both tests together. See Montag, 75 F.3d at 1419. Appellants seem to acknowledge that we closed the door to their argument in Montag when we held that claims involving primarily technical and scientific information require use of a risk-benefit test rather than a consumer expectations test. Id. (emphasis added). But Appellants would distinguish or ignore this precedent, arguing that the suggestion that Montag somehow ties this Court's hands and prevents it from considering the analysis in Biosera ... is flawed. Aplt. Reply Br. at 6 n.2. To the contrary, it is Appellants' argument that is flawed; Montag is controlling law. Appellants are correct to note, see id., that [t]he decision of an intermediate appellate state court is a datum for ascertaining state law which is not to be disregarded by a federal court unless it is convinced by other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide otherwise. Stickley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 1070, 1077 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But, as we stated above, when a panel of this Court has rendered a decision interpreting state law, that interpretation is binding on district courts in this circuit, and on subsequent panels of this Court, unless an intervening decision of the state's highest court has resolved the issue. Wankier, 353 F.3d at 866 (emphasis added). Biosera came after Montag; however, the Colorado Court of Appeals decided Biosera, so it is not an intervening decision of the state's highest court.  Id. (emphasis added). And Colorado's highest court, the Colorado Supreme Court, has not offered any intervening guidancethrough interpretation of Camacho or otherwiseindicating that a trial court is authorized to instruct the jury in products liability cases that are defined primarily by technical and scientific information regarding the consumer expectation test, in addition to the risk-benefit test. Thus, we appropriately apply Montag here. Consequently, we conclude that the district court committed no legal error when it held that it was required to instruct the jury on only the risk-benefit test. [2]
Appellants also contend that the district court erred in instructing the jury concerning the risk-benefit test in any event because the case does not involve primarily technical and scientific information. In that regard, Appellants assert: Although the case does involve some technical and scientific information, an ordinary person can form reasonable expectations regarding the dangerous risks posed by the cable and the efficacy of alternative designs. Aplt. Reply Br. at 11 (emphasis added); see also id. at 7 (Plaintiffs have never argued that this case does not involve some technical and scientific information. (emphasis added)). We discern no error. To assess this argument we must look to Colorado cases to see which products they have deemed to involve primarily technical and scientific information. We have already reviewed Camacho, in which the Colorado Supreme Court found that the feasibility of installing leg guards on a motorcycle was defined primarily by technical and scientific information because manufacturers of such complex products as motor vehicles invariably have greater access than do ordinary consumers to the information necessary to reach informed decisions concerning the efficacy of potential safety measures. 741 P.2d at 1247. In Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., the direct predecessor to Camacho, the Colorado Supreme Court found that the dangerousness of an oral contraceptive was defined primarily by technical and scientific information. 722 P.2d at 414. The court determined that the plaintiff's claim that her estrogen dose was too high could not be resolved without balancing the risks and benefits of the chemical composition of the drug. Id. As three Justices later described it, the Ortho court reasoned that [a] consumer of drugs cannot realistically be expected to foresee dangers in prescribed drugs which even scientists find to be complex and unpredictable. Camacho, 741 P.2d at 1251 (Vollack, J., dissenting). In Armentrout, a crane oiler sued the crane manufacturer to recover for injuries that he suffered when he was trapped in a pinch point between moving parts of the crane. See 842 P.2d at 178. In discussing the legal principles governing design-defect claims in Colorado, the court noted that [t]he instruction given by the trial court incorporate[d] the rule that whether a product is `unreasonably dangerous' is to be determined under a risk-benefit analysis. Id. at 182. See also White, 867 P.2d at 105-06 (holding that the trial court erred by instructing the jury under the consumer expectation test, rather than under the risk-benefit test, where a truck driver alleged that his gasoline-delivery truck exploded due to a defectively designed engine). In light of these cases, we conclude that this case primarily involved technical and scientific information. In particular, there was testimony of this sort about the steering cable, its manufacture and design, the measures taken to keep water from entering its inner core, the possible avenues of entry for water into the core, and the chemical and physical properties of two different kinds of steel. Even if this information was not as technical and scientific as the level of estrogen found in the oral contraceptive at issue in Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., it seems that the design of the steering cable was at least as technical and scientificif not more sothan the design of a motorcycle without leg guards in Camacho or the design of a crane with a dangerous pinch point in Armentrout. Although common knowledge of rust may have aided the jury's understanding of the issues, both parties proffered technical and scientific evidence from various expert witnesses. Indeed, Appellants themselves called as witnesses two boat mechanics, see Aplt.App. at 159-60, 316-17, a mechanical engineer, see id. at 219-20, and a forensic engineer and a metallurgist, see id. at 268-69. Appellants' arguments appear to tacitly acknowledge that the issue for the jury's consideration was one of a technical and scientific nature. See Aplt. Opening Br. at 7 (Plaintiffs' experts testified that it would be foreseeable to any engineer that water would likely enter the carbon steel core in a marine environment and cause corrosion. (emphasis added)). Thus, we hold that the district court did not commit error in determining that, if it concluded that the case involved primarily technical and scientific information, then it was required to instruct the jury only in accordance with the risk-benefit test. Nor do we believe that the district court erred in concluding that this case involved primarily technical and scientific information.