Opinion ID: 1461691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defense of Property Issue

Text: After the government completed its case-in-chief, counsel for Dr. Anigbo raised the defense of property defense, as the trial court was considering the defense motion for judgment of acquittal. Her attorney referenced CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, no. 5.20 (4th ed.2002), and specifically mentioned Mr. Owen, the police and Ms. Ferrechio. The trial court expressed uncertainty about the defense. [16] At the next day of the trial, before the defendants presented their cases, the trial court rejected the defense of property defense. As to the assault count involving Ms. Ferrechio, the trial court reasoned that each of those assaults sweep within them allegations of conduct in the main office, that viewed in the light most favorable to the Government was not aimed at [ejecting] a trespasser but in getting a notebook at a minimum. With regard to the assault of Mr. Owen, the court stated: I just think that on these facts this doctrine cannot common-sensically have any application. The trial judge added: The long and short of it is that it just cannot be that one can resort to force in a matter of moments while the police are standing there. Moreover, it [was not] clear [to the trial judge that Mr. Owen was asked to leave before physical steps were taken. And, concerning the assaults charged with respect to Officers Best and Poe, the trial judge said: [I]t goes without saying it seems to me that you can't use [this do ctrine of self help with regard to trespassers on your property] as to the police, that you can't, certainly not on the facts such as these, where the police have been present on your property for a matter of time less than five minutes, use physical force to eject them in the course of a criminal investigation from the property. In reaching its conclusions, the trial judge referenced the [LAFAVE] Treatise on criminal law. After the presentation of the case for the defendants and the closing arguments, the trial court rendered its verdict as to all of the counts in the indictment. When Ms. Holt reminded the court that it did not make findings regarding the claims of trespass with regard to both [Ms.] Ferrechio and , the trial judge interrupted her and said: I'm happy to talk about that for a moment. You're right, I didn't actually. I thought that I'd explained my view of that but I should probably do so with  in a minute with more clarity. [D]uring trial I cited to you some treatise[] discussions of the defense of property and the ability of people to use force [in defense of] property in ejecting trespassers, and we talked about the LAFAVE treatise. I think those, and there are more treatises that discuss it, I think that they require that a person be told to leave and that the use of force be necessary to expel a person not entitled to be there, and that the amount of force, be reasonable, and on all of the evidence at this trial, for reasons that I think we've discussed before, which you're quite right I didn't mention in this final ruling, with regard to any complainant that it would apply to, I am not persuaded that your theory applies on these facts. Your position is, I think, carefully set forth . . . in the record. The trial court also denied appellants' motion for a new trial. As the trial judge summarized, their argument is that the [c]ourt failed to apply to defendants an applicable defense  the right to use force in defense of one's property  and refused to make findings in that regard. In response to this argument, the trial court asserted in full: The short answer to defendants' contentions is that the [c]ourt considered their proffered defense and found, for reasons discussed at several points during the trial, that the evidence did not support application of the defense to any defendant for any crime charged. One such discussion took place at counsel's request at the time the [c]ourt rendered its ruling on August 8, 1997. The [c]ourt does not have a transcript of the trial proceedings, but remembers a further explicit discussion with counsel regarding the reasons for the inapplicability of the particular proffered defense at [the] time motions for judgment of acquittal were made, discussed, and ultimately denied. In this [c]ourt's view, the evidence adduced at trial offers no support for the defense theory that defendants' conduct was justified by legal doctrines giving citizens a right to use force to defend their property from trespass. Id. In essence, Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Smith contend on appeal that the trial court abused its discretion in denying their motion for a new trial because the court did not properly consider their defense of property defense. They maintain that complainants Ferrechio, Owen, Poe and Best consistently testified that they refused to leave the [Garvey Charter School] when instructed. And, they assert that: If this had been a jury trial and the [c]ourt had refused to instruct a jury on an affirmative defense raised by the evidence, the error would certainly be deemed harmful and reversible. The government primarily argues that the trial court considered and properly rejected the defense of property defense and did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' motion for a new trial. `Absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, decisions of the trial court regarding the denial of a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal.' Graham v. United States, 703 A.2d 825, 830 (D.C.1997) (quoting Smith v. United States, 466 A.2d 429, 432 (D.C.1983) (citations omitted)). However, [a] motion for a new trial requires `consideration of all the evidence, both favorable and unfavorable.' Railan v. Katyal, 766 A.2d 998, 1013 (D.C.2001) (quoting Lyons v. Barrazotto, 667 A.2d 314, 324 (D.C.1995)) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Since 1971, the court has addressed the application of the defense of property defense only once and rejected it in a case where the defendant was vindicating a principle rather than defending his property. Doby v. United States, 550 A.2d 919, 920 (D.C.1988). Earlier, in Shehyn v. United States, 256 A.2d 404, 406 (D.C. 1969), the court articulated the basic principle governing the defense of property defense: It is well settled that a person may use as much force as is reasonably necessary to eject a trespasser from his property, and that if he uses more force than is necessary, he is guilty of assault. Furthermore, the District's criminal jury instruction no. 5.20 provides, in part: A person is justified in using reasonable force to protect his/her property from trespass or theft when s/he reasonably believes that his/her property is in immediate danger of an unlawful trespass or taking and that the use of such force is necessary to avoid the danger. . . . The defendant is not required to prove that s/he acted in defense of his/her property. If evidence of defense of property is present, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of his/her property. If you find that the government has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of property, you must find the defendant not guilty. This instruction comports with similar instructions codified in most states. See LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 10.6, vol. 2 (2003) (One is justified in using reasonable force to protect his [or her] property from trespass or theft, when he [or she] reasonably believes that his [or her] property is in immediate danger of such an unlawful interference and that the use of such force is necessary to avoid that danger.). We turn now to an application of the defense of property defense to the charged assaults of Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Smith against Officers Best and Poe inside the main office or its doorway, during the second entry into the Garvey Charter School on December 3, 1996. The trial court's rejection of the defense where police officers are conducting a criminal investigation is consistent with a trend on the part of some jurisdictions. As LAFAVE reports in his treatise: [S]ome courts, by analogy to the modern rule disallowing force to resist an unlawful arrest, have held force is inappropriate against a police officer's seizure of property. Id. § 10.06(a). In deviating from the common law rule allowing a person to resist an unlawful arrest forcibly, one court determined that this rule is no longer consistent with the needs of modern society and should be abrogated. Commonwealth v. Moreira, 388 Mass. 596, 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (1983). [17] The court conclude[d] that in the absence of excessive or unnecessary force by an arresting officer, a person may not use force to resist an arrest by one he knows or has good reason to believe is an authorized police officer, engaged in the performance of his duties, regardless of whether the arrest was unlawful in the circumstances. Id. at 1227 (citation omitted). In New Hampshire, a state which codified the common law rule allowing the reasonable use of force to defend one's property, the Supreme Court declared that there are limits to the common law rule: To say that a statute designed to permit and condone self-help as a way of protecting oneself from the actions of tortfeasors, wrongdoers, and run-of-the-mill miscreants authorizes the use of force against a police officer discharging his duties in the removal of an automobile from disputed turf is to stretch the statute past the breaking point. State v. Haas, 134 N.H. 480, 596 A.2d 127(1991). Similarly, in the case before us, application of the common law defense of property defense to preclude proper police investigation of criminal allegations within the common, public areas of a school building is inconsistent with society's larger interest in the fair and timely administration of its criminal laws. Consequently, we hold that where, as here, the police have entered the common, public areas of a school building without excessive force to investigate a criminal complaint, school personnel who have been charged with assault of one of those police officers within the school, are not entitled to the defense of property defense. We also hold that a school employee, such as Ms. Gatlin, who has been charged with assault of a newspaper photographer within the school may not rely on the defense of property defense where the employee is able to seek the assistance of police officers who are on the scene to protect the integrity of the school building. Consequently, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion of appellants relating to the charged assaults of Officers Best and Poe, and photographer Owen. We turn now to the assault charged against Ms. Gatlin and Dr. Anigbo with respect to Ms. Ferrechio's first entrance into the Garvey Charter School on December 3, 1996. Criminal jury instruction no. 5.20 specifies in pertinent part that: The defendant is not required to prove that [he] acted in defense of [his] property. Rather, [i]f evidence of defense of property is present, the [burden is on the] government [to] prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in defense of [his] property. The record does not show that the trial court made comprehensive factual findings and credibility determinations, relevant to the defense of property defense and Ms. Ferrechio's first entry into the Garvey Charter School, at the end of the presentation of all evidence, although it made some findings at the close of the government's case-in-chief. Nevertheless, based upon our review of the record and transcripts before us, we are satisfied that even if the defense of property defense arguably was available to Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Gatlin when Ms. Ferrechio first entered the school and encountered Dr. Anigbo, their use of force was unreasonable. Even assuming, without deciding, that upon seeing Ms. Ferrechio, Dr. Anigbo said: [W]hat are you doing here? I have no appointment with you. Why are you interviewing my students? Get out, I want you out, she almost immediately demanded the notebook in Ms. Ferrechio's hands. By her own testimony, Dr. Anigbo told Ms. Ferrechio, you're not going out of here with my note pad, give me back my note pad, and then reached for the note pad and snatched it out of [Ms. Ferrechio's] hand. This action, as the trial court concluded, was not directed at removing a trespasser but at retrieving a notebook, and Dr. Anigbo had no right to use any force to obtain possession of the notebook since the trial court found that it did not belong to her. [18] Indeed, Dr. Anigbo did not claim that the notebook was hers when Officer Taylor remarked: Well, ma`am, regardless of what someone had written in their (sic) notebook, you had no right to take that from anybody. Dr. Anigbo replied that Ms. Ferrechio had no right to that information, but did not assert that the note pad was hers. And, in responding to questions posed by Captain Smith, Dr. Anigbo referred to the note pad as the reporter's notebook. On this record, then, Dr. Anigbo could not have had a reasonable belief that the note pad belonged to her. Even assuming that Dr. Anigbo reasonably believed that the note pad was hers, and that the school personnel were entitled to eject Ms. Ferrechio from the school, the record shows that the amount of force used to accomplish that goal was not reasonable, even taking into account the trial court's statement that Ms. Ferrechio may have exaggerated the size and veracity (sic) of the attack upon her. As we declared in Shehyn, supra, 256 A.2d at 406: It is well settled that a person may use as much force as is reasonably necessary to eject a trespasser from his [or her] property, and that if he [or she] uses more force than is necessary, he [or she] is guilty of assault. In summary, even if the defense of property defense arguably was available to Dr. Anigbo, and recognizing that in that case, the burden of proof shifted to the government to disprove the defense, we are satisfied that the trial judge could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Gatlin were guilty of the assault on Ms. Ferrechio. We address the remaining arguments of the appellants summarily. We affirm the convictions of Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Gatlin on count two of the indictment, taking property (Ms. Ferrechio's notepad) without right. Based upon testimony by Officer Taylor, Captain Smith, the portion of Ms. Ferrechio's testimony that the trial court credited, and Dr. Anigbo's own testimony, we are satisfied that the trial court properly found beyond a reasonable doubt that the notepad belonged to Ms. Ferrechio, that Dr. Anigbo was guilty of taking Ms. Ferrechio's notebook without right, and that Ms. Gatlin was an intentional, active participant in the offense of taking property without right. We also affirm the conviction of Ms. Gatlin on count three of the indictment, assaulting Mr. Owen. Mr. Owen testified that Ms. Gatlin reached over the police officers and punched [him] in the shoulder area with her fist, and the trial court determined that his account [was not] meaningfully impeached in any way. . . . . Hence, contrary to Ms. Gatlin's contention, there was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict her of the assault on Mr. Owen. Finally, we consider the remaining challenges of Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Smith to their convictions on counts five and six of the indictment, the assaults on Officers Best and Poe. They assert that [t]here is no such chargeable offense in the District of Columbia as misdemeanor assault on a police officer. They argue that they were entitled to a jury trial because, in reality, they were charged with a jury demandable felony offense, [a]ssault on a[p]olice [o]fficer (APO) § 22-505 governing encounters between police officers and citizens, rather than the nonjury demandable offense, [s]imple [a]ssault, § 22-504 governing encounters between police officers and citizens. We previously rejected this argument: Simple assault is a lesser-included offense of assault on a police officer. McDonald v. United States, 496 A.2d 274, 276 (D.C. 1985); see also Speed v. United States, 562 A.2d 124, 127 (D.C.1989). In addition, we said in Evans v. United States, 779 A.2d 891, 895 (D.C.2001): `If the facts show a violation of two or more statutes, an election may be made to prosecute under either.' Id. at 895 (quoting United States v. Young, 376 A.2d 809, 812 (D.C.1977)). The government made its election, and since they were charged with the non-jury demandable simple assault offense, Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Smith were not entitled to a jury trial. Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Smith also argue that the trial court's factual findings regarding their alleged assault against Officers Best and Poe were clearly erroneous, and that Ms. Ferrechio's testimony was inherently incredible. They base their argument in large measure on photographs introduced into evidence. In adjudging Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Smith guilty of assaulting the police officers, the trial court determined that the government proved the assaults that took place in the [main] office or in its doorway. Given the testimony of Officers Best and Poe, which the trial court credited in material part, and our review of the record, there was sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to convict Dr. Anigbo and Ms. Smith of assaulting these officers. Moreover, the trial court identified the portions of Ms. Ferrechio's testimony that it deemed troubling and those which it credited. Hence, we see no basis for rejecting her entire testimony as inherently incredible. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions of Ms. Gatlin on counts one, two and three of the indictment (assault on Ms. Ferrechio, taking property without right and assaulting Mr. Owen). We also affirm the convictions of Dr. Anigbo on counts one, two, five and six of the indictment (assault of Ms. Ferrechio, taking property without right, and assaulting Officers Best and Poe). And, we affirm the convictions of Ms. Smith on counts five and six of the indictment (the assaults on Officers Best and Poe). So ordered.