Opinion ID: 2812253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Doctrine

Text: The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment ordinarily bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). Statements made in response to the questioning of a law enforcement officer are testimonial if the circumstances establish that “the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154 (2011). Not surprisingly, the state has not disputed that Lena’s and Leif Jr.’s contested statements were testimonial. Without a doubt they were. Officer Ward questioned Lena and Leif Jr. several hours after Leif Jr. was hit. Carlson had already been taken into custody and secured in the back of Ward’s vehicle. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. Ward’s questions reflected a concern for what had “happened” rather than what was “happening.” Id. at 830 (internal quotation marks omitted). So, unless the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applies, admission of those statements against Carlson was prohibited by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53–54, 68–69. The forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine is an exception to the Confrontation Clause’s protections. That doctrine permits the introduction of a testimonial statement by an unavailable witness if the preponderance of the evidence shows that the “witness is absent by [the defendant’s] own wrongful procurement.” Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 14 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. (1878); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.3d 815, 822–23 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that forfeiture by wrongdoing must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence). The leading post-Crawford case on forfeiture by wrongdoing, Giles, explains that the rationale behind the rule is avoidance of “an intolerable incentive for defendants to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses against them.” 554 U.S. at 365. Relying on that rationale, Giles rejected a theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing that would have permitted unconfronted testimonial statements to be admitted against a defendant any time the defendant had by his own culpable acts rendered the witness unavailable. Id. at 364–65, 368. Explaining that the “bad acts” theory could not be reconciled with “the common law’s uniform exclusion of unconfronted inculpatory testimony by murder victims,” id. at 368, Giles held that forfeiture by wrongdoing applies only where the defendant engaged in “conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying,” id. at 365. As the parties here agree,4 Giles established the mens rea aspect of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception: The defendant must intend that a witness be made unavailable to testify. Neither party’s briefing, however, articulates a standard for the kind of action a defendant must take to effectuate that intent. 4 Carlson’s argument that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applies only to statements made by the defendant’s “victims” has no merit. Supreme Court authority does not so limit the forfeiture exception, and the rule’s incentive-avoidance rationale applies as fully to non-victim witnesses as to victims. See Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (explaining that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applies “when defendants seek to undermine the judicial process by procuring or coercing silence from witnesses and victims” (emphasis added)). CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. 15 Despite the parties’ reticence, Supreme Court authority is as clear on the overt act point as on the mens rea question. The standard was articulated in the Court’s first opinion applying the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception, Reynolds, 98 U.S. 145, and cited approvingly in Giles. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 366; see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds). Reynolds explained that, “as long ago as the year 1666,” in Lord Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769, 771 (H.L.1666), adjudicators had admitted statements of an absent witness who “was detained by the means or procurement of the [defendant],” and that “now, in the leading text-books, it is laid down that if a witness is kept away by the adverse party, his testimony . . . may be given in evidence.” Id. at 158–59 (emphasis added) (citing evidence textbooks). Reynolds concluded that, in that case, the state had proven enough to shift the burden to the defendant to show that he was not “instrumental in concealing or keeping the witness away.”5 Id. at 160. Well over a century later, Davis and Giles reaffirmed that the Confrontation Clause does not protect statements by a witness kept from testifying “by the means or procurement of the [defendant].” Giles, 554 U.S. at 359 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 833 (describing 5 An 1866 edition of the Dictionary of the English Language defines “instrumental” as “(1) Conducive as means to some end; . . . (2) Acting to some end; contributing to some purpose; helpful.” 1 Robert Gordon Latham, A Dictionary of the English Language 1273 (1866) (emphasis added). See also 1 B. Abbott, Dictionary of Terms and Phrases Used in American or English Jurisprudence 630 (1878) (defining “instrument” as “a means of accomplishing something; a thing useful in the execution of a purpose”). 16 CARLSON V. ATT’Y GEN. OF CAL. a defendant who “procur[es] or coerc[es] silence from witnesses . . . who obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing”). In examining what “means or procurement” signifies, Giles cited dictionaries defining “to procure” as, inter alia, “to contrive and effect”; “to get . . . as by request, loan, effort, labor or purchase”; “to contrive or devise with care . . . ; to endeavour to cause or bring about.” Giles, 554 U.S. at 360 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). The pertinent Supreme Court authority, then, clearly establishes that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine applies where there has been affirmative action on the part of the defendant that produces the desired result, non-appearance by a prospective witness against him in a criminal case. Simple tolerance of, or failure to foil, a third party’s previously expressed decision either to skip town himself rather than testifying or to prevent another witness from appearing does not “cause” or “effect” or “bring about” or “procure” a witness’s absence. Such passive behavior is therefore not a sufficient reason to foreclose a defendant’s Sixth Amendment confrontation rights at trial.