Opinion ID: 1783903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Was the chancery court's judgment of September 5, 1990, approving the Sheriff's report and confirming the Sheriff's Sale, without allowing Martin's attorney to object and without holding a hearing, erroneous and a violation of Martin's right to due process of law?

Text: Martin contends that his attorney was not allowed to object at the September 5, 1990, hearing which approved and confirmed the sheriff's report. He also argues that the chancellor refused to hear any testimony, evidence, argument, or even any statement by his attorney or him. Pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 11-5-103 (1972), which states that the Court shall proceed to make a decree confirming the sale, unless good reason be shown to the contrary, Martin claims that a party has a right to object and be heard. In addition, he argues that the chancellor failed to make any findings of fact according to Miss.R.Civ.P. 52(a) which provides that [i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury the court may, and shall upon the request of any party to the suit or when required by these rules, find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and judgment shall be entered accordingly. To the contrary, Martin offered no testimony, evidence, argument or statement, and, in fact, when asked if there was any testimony or evidence to be presented, he responded with a negative reply. Martin did have a right to file an objection to the confirmation proceeding had he so desired. However, there was no objection filed with the court. Neither party asked that the chancellor make its findings of fact and conclusions of law separately, and, accordingly, Martin should not now be heard to complain of their absence. The only authority Martin presents is Tricon Metals & Services, Inc. v. Topp, 516 So.2d 236 (Miss. 1987), wherein we remanded a case to the chancery court to make findings of fact separately from its conclusions of law. However, this case is misplaced as authority for Martin because we said: [I]n cases of any complexity, tried upon the facts without a jury, the Court generally should find the facts specially and state its conclusions of law thereon. As in other areas, we will not interfere with a trial court's exercise of its discretion unless that discretion be abused. Where, however, a case is hotly contested and the facts greatly in dispute and where there is any complexity involved therein, failure to make findings of ultimate fact and conclusions of law will generally be regarded as an abuse of discretion. Tricon Metals & Services, Inc., 516 So.2d at 239. The contempt case pending before the lower court was simple, and there was no need for special findings of facts and conclusions of law in the absence of request by either party. Since there was no such request made, there is no error. Martin also claims that the alleged refusal by the chancellor to let him object to the sale, testify and offer evidence violated due process of law. He relies on Weeks v. Weeks, 556 So.2d 348 (Miss. 1990), wherein we held that a party was denied due process of law when the chancellor refused to let him present witnesses' testimony in a motion for a new trial hearing. Weeks, 556 So.2d at 349. In Weeks, the ex-husband attempted to show, through his testimony and others, that he had paid his ex-wife the money she alleged he owed her. Id. The chancellor refused the ex-husband's proof stating he was satisfied that he was in contempt. Id. We reversed and remanded that case because the record discloses that there were important, material, and pertinent facts and available witnesses which should have been heard. Id. Every defendant has a right to introduce evidence at a hearing. Edwards v. James, 453 So.2d 684, 686 (Miss. 1984). See Fortenberry v. Fortenberry, 338 So.2d 806, 807 (Miss. 1976). However, in the instant case, Martin had no witnesses standing ready to testify, no evidence, and no new or pertinent facts to place before the court. Had he objected to the confirmation of the Sheriff's sale and offered proof of evidence that was to be presented, a different outcome might result, but there is no error to complain of in the chancellor's confirmation.