Opinion ID: 706991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City Officials As Final Policymakers

Text: 13 In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, the Supreme Court held that the search of a doctor's office without a warrant gave rise to municipal liability because the County Prosecutor was acting as a final decisionmaker when he ordered the illegal search. 475 U.S. 469, 484-85, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1301, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Justice Brennan explained that if an official, who possesses final policymaking authority in a certain area, makes a decision--even if it is specific to a particular situation--that decision constitutes municipal policy for Sec. 1983 purposes. Id. at 481, 106 S.Ct. at 1299. Hence, such an act can be understood as an act of the municipality which the municipality officially sanctioned or ordered. Id. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1298. 14 However, Pembaur left open the question of how to determine who is a final policymaker. That question was later addressed in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). 9 First, Praprotnik explained that final policymaking authority is a legal issue to be determined by the court based on state and local law. Id. at 124, 108 S.Ct. at 924. Praprotnik then reasoned that, since the St. Louis Civil Service Commission possessed final authority on personnel decisions, id. at 129-30, 108 S.Ct. at 927-28, the discretionary hiring and firing decisions by subordinate employees did not constitute final policymaking by the municipality. This reasoning relied on the four touchstones of municipal liability outlined in Pembaur. Id. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924. First, a municipality can only be held liable for acts which the municipality itself is responsible--that is, those it has officially sanctioned or ordered. Second, only those officials with final policymaking authority can subject a municipality to liability. Third, the question of whether an official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law. Fourth, the challenged conduct must have been taken pursuant to a policy adopted by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area. Id. 15 Praprotnik also set out the basic conundrum and line drawing exercise that lower courts face in ascertaining the existence of a municipal policy: 16 If the mere exercise of discretion by an employee could give rise to a constitutional violation, the result would be indistinguishable from respondeat superior liability. If, however, a city's lawful policymakers could insulate the government from liability simply by delegating their policymaking authority to others, Sec. 1983 could not serve its intended purpose. 17 Id. at 126-27, 108 S.Ct. at 926. In outlining the elegant line drawing exercise of assigning municipal liability, Justice O'Connor highlighted two guiding inquiries: (1) whether a subordinate's discretionary decisions are constrained by general policies enacted by others; and (2) whether the subordinate's specific decisions are reviewable by others. Id. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926. This guidance largely flowed from an example offered in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Justice Brennan explained that in the case where the Board of County Commissioners established county employment policy and delegated to the County Sheriff alone the discretion to hire and fire employees pursuant to that policy, the county itself would not be liable if the Sheriff unconstitutionally exercised this authority because the decision to act unlawfully would not be a decision of the Board. Id. at 483 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 n. 12. However, if the sheriff had been delegated final responsibility for establishing employment policy--i.e., if the sheriff was not subject to any meaningful review or constraints--then the county could be held liable for his actions within the grant of his official authority. Id. Justice Brennan defined a policy as a course of action [consciously chosen] from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question. Id. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1300. However, he underscored that while the quintessential policy is a governmental entity's establish[ed] fixed plans of action to be followed under similar circumstances consistently and over time, id. at 480-81, 106 S.Ct. at 1299, policy can also be established pursuant to a specific and one-time decision made by a final policymaker, id. at 481, 106 S.Ct. at 1299. 18 Guided by the general principles outlined above, we can identify three elements that help determine whether an individual is a final policymaker: (1) whether the official is meaningfully constrained by policies not of that official's own making; (2) whether the official's decision are final--i.e., are they subject to any meaningful review; and (3) whether the policy decision purportedly made by the official is within the realm of the official's grant of authority. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926; Ware v. Unified School Dist., 902 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir.1990) (Delegation does not occur when a subordinate's decisions are constrained by policies not of his making or when those decisions are subject to review by the authorized policymaker.). 10 19 In order to determine whether an individual holds final policymaking authority, we begin by examining the legal chain of authority. See Jantz v. Muci, 976 F.2d 623, 631 (10th Cir.1992) (school board not liable for school principal's actions because the school board had ultimate legal authority to review decisions involving the hiring and firing of employees); Ware, 902 F.2d at 819 (municipality not liable because the principal, who fired the plaintiff, was not the final policymaker on personnel matters as he was not vested with such authority and any decisions he made were reviewable by the school board); Wulf v. City of Wichita, 883 F.2d 842, 868-69 (10th Cir.1989) (municipality not liable because the police chief who fired plaintiff was not the final policymaker of the city's personnel policy nor was the police chief's decision and the basis for it ratified by the city manager who had the legal authority to hire and fire employees). Nevertheless, our decisions also underscore that any review procedure or constraints must be meaningful--as opposed to merely hypothetical--in order to strip an official of final policymaking authority. See Melton, 879 F.2d at 724 n. 24 (although not explicitly addressing its significance, charter provision that all personnel decisions were to be made solely based upon merit and fitness did not immunize City from liability based upon City Manager's personnel decision); Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1569 (10th Cir.1989) ([F]or all intents and purposes the Chief's discipline decisions are final, and any meaningful administrative review [by the City Council or City Manager] is illusory.); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 818-19 (10th Cir.1989) (Wadley had final authority to set employment policy as to the hiring and firing of his staff because City did not offer any meaningful avenues of review). 20 Applying the proper legal standard for determining whether an official is a final policymaker to the circumstances of the instant case, we conclude that the record before us contains disputes of material fact which preclude a grant of summary judgment for the City. Thus, we remand this case for further proceedings. 21 Randle contends that summary judgment was improper because there was significant evidence suggesting that the City officials were final policymakers. Specifically, Randle points to Charter provisions that (1) grant the City Manager full authority over personnel policies (albeit subject to any personnel regulations that may be adopted by the City Council); and (2) prevent the City Council from any involvement in employment decisions. The City Charter provides that 22 The city manager shall be responsible to the council for the proper administration of all affairs of the city placed in his charge, and to that end he shall have the power and duty to: 23 . . . . . 24 (b) Appoint, suspend, transfer and removal of all employees of the city, except as otherwise provided herein, subject to the personnel regulations of the city adopted by the council. 25 Charter of City of Aurora Sec. 7-4 (Nov. 3, 1987) [hereinafter City Charter]. The City of Aurora Personnel Policy and Procedures Manual (June, 1989) [hereinafter Manual] also provides that: 26 The City Manager is responsible for the employment of personnel other than appointees of the City Council, for proposing and administering these Policies and Procedures, for keeping the City Council advised of personnel matters and for the overall effectiveness of the personnel management program. 27 Manual at 3. The Manual also sets forth the authority of the department directors (such as Gross and Carney) as follows: Department Directors are responsible for appointment, promotion, transfer, or separation of employees and for managing employees in accordance with these Policies and Procedures. Manual at 4. 28 By contrast, the City relies on the following provision of the City Charter to support its position: 29 The council shall provide for a comprehensive public employment system for all full time regular employees of the city except the heads of departments. The system shall provide for a classification of all employments in the public service, as specified herein; open and competitive examinations and/or interviews to determine qualifications for employment; employment and promotions based upon merit, experience and record of service; establishment of pay scales; and such other matters as the council may deem proper. 30 City Charter Sec. 3-13. However, even though the City Charter mandates that the Council pass such regulations, the absence of any mention of such regulations in the City's brief or evidence of them in the record prevents us from considering whether the Council has, in fact, enacted such regulations or whether they provide a meaningful constraint on the City Officials' employment decisions as to Randle. Moreover, there is nothing in this record to suggest that the City Council in fact involved itself in the terms and conditions of Randle's employment or the hiring and promotion decisions which affected her. 11 The Manual also states that: 31 The City Council shall be the ultimate policy making authority for the City of Aurora in matters pertaining to personnel administration. No changes in the compensation plan, fringe benefits, or Personnel Policies shall be effective unless submitted to and approved formally by the City Council. 32 Manual at 3. 33 Perhaps most significantly, the City Charter precludes the City Council from reviewing the City Manager's (or any other city official's) personnel decisions regarding employees, such as Randle, who not are Council appointees: 34 Neither the council nor any of its committees or members shall direct or request the appointment of any person to, or his removal from, employment by city manager, or in any manner take part in the appointment or removal of employees in the administrative service of the city, except as otherwise provided in this Charter. The council and its members shall deal with that portion of the administrative service for which the city manager is responsible solely through the manager, and neither the council nor any member thereof shall give orders to any employee of the city either publicly or privately. 35 City Charter Sec. 3-10 (Powers Withheld From Council). 12 36 Based on the record before us, we conclude that a genuine dispute remains as to whether the City officials exercise final policymaking authority in the area of personnel matters. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of the City's motion for summary judgment and remand the issue of whether the City officials are final policymakers on personnel matters for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.