Opinion ID: 3010227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: young's challenge to his past conviction

Text: To find that the district court had jurisdiction over Young's petition un Maleng is not also to say that Young may challenge his expired 1989 conviction in a attack on his current sentence. That is a question expressly left unanswered in Ma 490 U.S. at 494. The Commonwealth contends that in Custis v. United States, 114 S. 1732 (1994), the Supreme Court answered this question in the negative, holding that contention that a petitioner may not seek to amend his petition after the Report an Recommendation has been filed. Since the district court must review a Report and Recommendation de novo if the petitioner files objections to it, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) is immaterial whether the magistrate judge was in a position to construe the petiti attacking the 1984 conviction. Besides, as noted above, the magistrate judge effec addressed the argument Young raised in his objections to the Report and Recommendat albeit hypothetically, finding that even if the sentence Young was serving had been enhanced as a result of the 1989 conviction, he was not in custody under that convi 8 prisoner may not attack a prior expired conviction used to enhance his current sent unless he claims that he was denied his right to counsel under Gideon v. Wainwright U.S. 335 (1963), in the proceedings resulting in that expired conviction. According Commonwealth, Custis bars Young from challenging his 1989 conviction because he mer alleges ineffective assistance of counsel rather than denial of his right to counse Gideon. See Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738. Therefore, under the Commonwealth's argum not only did the district court not err in failing to construe Young's petition as attacking his current sentence, it should have dismissed the petition even if it ha jurisdiction. If the Commonwealth is correct, Custis effectively overrules Clark v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 892 F.2d 1142 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied sub nom. C v. Clark, 496 U.S. 942 (1990), a case curiously cited by neither party but in which answered the question left open in Maleng. We held there that, although the distri court lacked jurisdiction over Clark's petitions attacking two convictions whose se had expired, we could review those sentences because of their collateral enhancemen the sentence that Clark was still serving. Id. at 1143 n.2 & 1145.0 In support of their interpretation of Custis, the Commonwealth cites Part Hopkins, 30 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1135 (1995), the court stated that in Custis the Supreme Court held that there is no federal constitutional right to collaterally attack a prior conviction used to enhance a se on any constitutional ground other than failure to appoint counsel for an indigent 0 Clark was convicted of two sexual assault charges in 1974; he completed t sentences for both crimes in 1978. In 1979, he was found guilty of rape and other offenses. In imposing the new sentence, the judge took into consideration the two convictions. Clark filed three separate petitions seeking federal habeas corpus re from all three state convictions. The district court reviewed all of his petitions found that they lacked merit; Clark filed a notice of appeal. In the meantime, the Court decided Maleng, following which Clark conceded that the district court did no jurisdiction to consider the merits of the 1974 convictions. 9 defendant. Partee applied this principle to a habeas corpus petitioner seeking to a state sentence that had been enhanced by two prior state convictions. We are not persuaded by either Partee (whose entire discussion of the poi contained in two sentences) or the Commonwealth's characterization of Custis. In C 114 S. Ct. at 1734, the Supreme Court addressed only the narrow question whether a defendant may collaterally attack prior state convictions used to enhance his sente under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), during sentencing proceedings under the Act. The Court held that Congress, in enacting the ACCA, did intend to permit collateral attacks on prior convictions during sentencing proceedi under the Act. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1735-37. The Court also rejected the defendan argument that the Constitution required such collateral attacks. Id. at 1737-39. Constitution, the Court said, requires only that collateral attacks based on a fail appoint counsel in violation of Gideon be heard at sentencing. Id. Thus, § 924(e) not permit Custis to use the federal sentencing forum to gain review of his state convictions. Id. at 1739. Importantly, however, the Court's conclusions regarding the ACCA and the Constitution did not preclude Custis from challenging his prior convictions through habeas petition. The Court noted that Custis, who was still `in custody' for purp his state convictions at the time of his federal sentencing under § 924(e), may att state sentences in Maryland or through federal habeas review. Id. at 1739 (emphas added). If he is successful, the Court explained, he may then challenge his enhance federal sentences. Id. Indeed, as noted in Brock, 31 F.3d at 890, [t]he Court's constitutional holding was, as its citation to Maleng evidences, clearly premised o fact that collateral attacks based on other defects may be heard on habeas review. Even more importantly, the Court said nothing about whether a prisoner ma federal habeas petition to attack an expired state conviction in the context of challenging his current state sentence that was enhanced or otherwise affected by t 10 expired conviction. Custis, in other words, did not address the question left unan in Maleng and therefore does not affect our decision in Clark. Consequently, we de to follow Partee's interpretation of Custis, which appears to be shared by no other of appeals, and reject the Commonwealth's argument that Custis bars Young from atta his 1989 conviction. If a general principle is to be derived from Custis, it is th narrower one that federal sentencing hearings are not the proper forum for address validity of prior convictions. United States v. Billops, 43 F.3d 281, 288 (7th Ci 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1389 (1995) (emphasis added); see also United State Morning, 64 F.3d 531, 536 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1030 (1996). B. (Non)Application of Custis; Application of Clark Together with Maleng, Clark controls the outcome of the present appeal. explained above, Maleng requires the district court to construe Young's petition as attacking the sentence he is presently serving, thereby granting it jurisdiction ov Young's petition. Under Clark, a federal habeas petitioner in custody under a sent enhanced by a prior conviction may attack that prior conviction, even if he is no l in custody for it. However, he may do so only in the context of a challenge to the enhanced sentence for which he is in custody. In other words, a prisoner may attac current sentence by a habeas challenge to the constitutionality of an expired convi if that conviction was used to enhance his current sentence. In all important respects Young's petition falls under Clark: he seeks b habeas to attack a conviction whose sentence has expired but which caused the sente is presently serving. Thus, he may attack the expired conviction in the context of challenge to his current sentence. As noted above, it is true that the relationshi between Young's convictions and sentences is unusual. Instead of enhancing a subse sentence (as in Maleng, Clark, and most of the other cases cited in this opinion), expired 1989 conviction constituted a parole violation in his 1984 conviction, ther 11 serving as a predicate for his present prison sentence. However, this difference o makes Young's case stronger: but for his 1989 conviction, he would not be in priso otherwise in custody at all. Young's confinement is thus even more closely relat his 1989 conviction than if it were merely the result of a sentence enhanced by tha conviction. As the court noted in Brock: With an enhanced sentence the prior conviction only lengthens the period confinement; here, the prior conviction is a necessary predicate to the confinement. If anything, it is even more appropriate for a court to exam expired conviction in the present circumstances than for it to do so in t context of an enhanced sentence.0 31 F.3d at 890. To allow Young to attack his expired conviction in this manner is not unu Every court of appeals to confront the question allows a habeas petitioner to chall conviction whose sentence has expired if he is currently incarcerated as a result o conviction, or if it was used to enhance a sentence presently being served. Most s our approach in Clark, interpreting Maleng as requiring the petitioner to do so by attacking his current sentence. See, e.g., Tredway v. Farley, 35 F.3d 288 (7th Cir 1994); Crank v. Duckworth, 905 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 10 (1991); Taylor v. Armontrout, 877 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Weston, 31 F.3 (9th Cir. 1994); Feldman v. Perrill, 902 F.2d 1445 (9th Cir. 1990); Collins v. Hess F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1992); Gamble v. Parsons, 898 F.2d 117 (10th Cir.), cert. denie U.S. 879 (1990).0 With the possible exception of the Eighth Circuit's decision in 0 In Brock, the petitioner pleaded guilty in 1974 to second degree assault; sentence expired in 1984. In 1991, the State of Washington filed a petition for commitment alleging that Brock was a sexually violent predator within the meaning Washington Sexually Violent Predators Act. The state court ordered Brock's indefin confinement. His 1974 conviction was allegedly a predicate of that petition for commitment. Id. at 888-89. The district court dismissed Brock's petition for lack jurisdiction. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, instructing the district that if it reached the merits, it should determine whether the expired conviction s as a predicate for Brock's current commitment. Id. at 891. In the present case, t no dispute that Young's 1989 conviction was the predicate for his current incarcera 0 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit takes a somewhat different app in order to challenge a conviction with an expired sentence, it is sufficient for t petitioner to allege a positive and demonstrative nexus between the expired sente 12 we are aware of no case holding that a prisoner in custody under a sentence resulti (or enhanced by) a conviction whose sentence has expired may not attack the prior conviction at all. The only disagreement concerns how he may attack that conviction. The Co Appeals for the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits apparently allow the expired conviction attacked directly, in contrast to most courts of appeals, which require an attack u sentence currently being served. In practice, however, it makes little difference petitioner states his claim because, with one exception, the courts of appeals that our approach in Clark follow Maleng, as we have done here, and construe habeas peti that appear to attack only the expired sentence as attacking the current sentence instead.0 The expired conviction may then be attacked as having improperly enhanced resulted in the present sentence. See, e.g., Gamble, 898 F.2d at 117; Brock, 31 F. 887.0