Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Allocution: Counsel's Assistance

Text: As an additional claim of IAC, Harris asserts that his counsel neither explained to him the allocution process nor assisted him in preparing a statement, and that his borderline IQ heightened the importance of receiving counsels' assistance. He contends that that deficiency constitutes ineffective assistance because prejudice, he says, surely befell him as a result. He now claims that even a simple statement of sorrow at the death of Ms. Huggins would have `substantially affected' the penalty jury's deliberations. The State's first response to this claim is that Harris has no remorse, and his behavior during trial evidenced his lack of compunction, something that our Court recognized during proportionality review. See Harris II, supra, 165 N.J. at 313, 757 A. 2d 221. Defendant went so far as to insult Huggins's family during his tirade. In any event, the State submits that Call did confer with Harris regarding allocution. Call stated on the record that he reviewed the judge's notice about allocution with defendant, and that they discussed the matter on prior occasions. Moreover, defendant was aware of his right: The trial court advised him and explained the scope of an allocution statement. The judge offered to read a draft of his statement and, when asked by the court if he had questions about allocution, defendant replied, no.
There is no question about the importance of an allocution. The right of allocution reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity to ask for mercy. State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 478, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994) ( DiFrisco II). In State v. Zola, the common law right of allocution was extended to capital defendants so they too could address their jury directly. 112 N.J. 384, 429-30, 548 A. 2d 1022 (1988). Exercising that right would allow the jury to hear from the defendant's voice that he is `an individual capable of feeling and expressing remorse and of demonstrating some measure of hope for the future.' Id. at 430, 548 A. 2d 1022 (quoting J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M.L.Rev. 41, 41 (1985)). The decision whether to make an allocution belongs to the defendant. Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 277, 736 A. 2d 469 (describing right to allocute as personal to defendant). However, as we specified in Bey: as with the right to testify, defense counsel should consult with their clients so the clients can make their own informed decisions. It follows that defense counsel should inform the defendant of the right of allocution or ensure that the trial court apprises the defendant of this right. Moreover, . . . counsel must advise the defendant on the issue whether to submit a statement of allocution to the jury and to explain the tactical advantages or disadvantages of doing so or not doing so. Counsel's responsibility includes advising a defendant of the benefits inherent in exercising that right and the consequences inherent in waiving it. . . . Indeed, counsel's failure to do so will give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. [ Id. at 278, 736 A. 2d 469 (quoting State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 630-31, 577 A. 2d 455 (1990)).] In this matter there appears to be no doubt that defendant was informed of his right to allocute, the only question is whether counsel left the ultimate determination to defendant. Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 277, 736 A. 2d 469 (Defense counsel should not make an independent strategic decision whether defendant should exercise that right.). Indeed, the trial court specifically addressed him about his right to allocute. On the second day of the penalty-phase hearings, the court stated: Before the Court adjourns for today, it should inform Mr. Harris of his right of allocution, that is, a right, in effect, to ask the jury to spare his life. The rules regarding allocution are set forth in a two-page document which the Court will provide to counsel and to Mr. Harris. In short, what Mr. Harris will be permitted to do, if he wishes to do so, is to ask the jury to spare his life. And he may explain, if it is true, his remorse, and he may express his hope for rehabilitating himself if his life is spared. He will be permitted to speak briefly, but he will not be given a prolonged period of time to speak.... Mr. Harris, if you wish to do so, you may write out in advance what it is you wish to say, and the Court will read it and tell you if it is approved. You are not required to do that. The choice is yours. But if you speak beyond the rules, the Court may interrupt and explain to the jury the rules, and the fact that you are speaking beyond the confines of what is permitted. The next day, the following colloquy took place: COURT: The Court has spoken with counsel for the defense. It has advised Mr. Harris yesterday that he has a right of allocution. It has handed to counsel for the defense a notice of right of allocution, setting forth, again, the very rules which the Court enunciated yesterday. Mr. Call, is Mr. Harris going to exercise his right of allocution? CALL: Your Honor, I've had an opportunity to review with Mr. Harris the notice of right of allocution which the Court provided. I've also had an occasion to discuss it with him on prior occasions. Mr. Harris just executed in open court the notice of right of allocution, and it would be Mr. Harris' decision at this point that he does not wish to exercise that right, fully understanding the nature and the limitations that would be placed upon him. COURT: Mr. Harris, do you have any questions about your right of allocution? You have to give me a verbal response for the record. DEFENDANT: No. Thus, separate and apart from defendant's discussions with counsel about allocution, the above exchange demonstrates that the trial court asked defendant whether he wished to allocute and whether he had any questions in respect of that right. Even if we assume that trial counsel did not leave to defendant the ultimate decision about allocution, defendant must show prejudice to succeed in his ineffective assistance claim. The mere denial of the right of allocution does not result in fundamental injustice. Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 276, 736 A. 2d 469. Both prongs of Strickland/Fritz must be satisfied. Despite defendant's assertions that he would have given an allocution that would have substantially affected jury deliberations, his actions and words at the time of trial betray his claims. See id. at 277, 736 A. 2d 469 ([W]e do not review the denial of the right of allocution in a vacuum[,]... [but] `in the context of the entire trial record and of the grave offenses of which defendant was convicted.') (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 252, 690 A. 2d 1 (1997)). As we noted in our review of defendant's capital conviction, we recall again the painful image of Harris mocking the pain endured by Huggins's father in open court. Call testified that when Mr. Huggins was testifying about the last time his daughter left home, he started to cry. In the jury's presence, Harris withdrew his handkerchief from his pocket, leaned forward and dabbed under both eyes. Call continued, [L]ooking over at the jurors at that time, I mean, Mr. Harris may very well have signed his own death warrant, and, the dabbing of the eyes was the most reprehensible thing I've ever seen a defendant do in a courtroom. When Harris did exercise his right to make a statement before being sentenced on the non-murder counts, he did not remotely express remorse. Harris exhibited a tirade that included arguments why he could not have been the one who committed those crimes, and why this crime paled in comparison to those committed by others, such as Jeffrey Dahmer. He continued with other remarks of a similar ilk: · I'm saying this to the Huggins family, that I did not kidnap your daughter, nor did I rape your daughter, nor did I shoot your daughter in the head. · I want the Huggins family to be man enough and woman enough to come up in my face and apologize to me. It will be proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Ambrose Harris did not rape or kidnap and kill that girl. · You ain't found shit because Ambrose Harris didn't kill that woman. I might take something from a woman. I might rape a mother-f____g woman, but I will be goddamned if I would kill a woman. Call stated that during discussions with defendant, Harris expressed delight in some of the great tragedies of mankind. The Oklahoma City bombing delighted him. The Holocaust, he thought that was a good thing. Harris's behavior and statements give credence to Call's belief that Harris was incapable of expressing either sincere or feigned remorse. Nor did PCR counsel try to rebut the character portrait of Harris painted during the PCR hearing. They did not ask to put defendant on the stand to testify about his remorse or the kind of remorse he would have conveyed during an allocution. The PCR record does reveal, however, that Harris's DOC records report an incident during which defendant became angered when a prison guard stepped on his shoe and he stated words to the effect that, you are the one with the family, not me, and when I get back to GP ... I'll kill you like that white bitch Kristin Huggins. Further, Call explained that he knew [Harris] was ... incapable of not using that opportunity to be at center stage in the courtroom to say something that would undo everything that we tried to do during the penalty phase. As evidenced by defendant's statement to the court prior to his non-capital sentencing, Call's concerns appear justified. Thus, there was a significant danger that Harris would have been reprimanded in front of the jury for going beyond the permissible scope of an allocution. See Bey, supra, 161 N.J. at 275-76, 736 A. 2d 469 (citing Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 430, 548 A. 2d 1022.) (A defendant, however, may not use allocation to rebut facts in evidence or to deny his guilt, and if he does, the court may strike the offending portions, allow the State to respond, or permit limited cross-examination of the defendant).
Given defendant's outbursts against the court and even towards the victim's family, it was not objectively unreasonable for counsel to conclude that defendant was incapable of exhibiting honest or feigned remorse. Furthermore, the trial court informed Harris of his right and asked him in open court if he had any questions. Harris affirmed that he did not and never asked to make an allocution. PCR counsel provided no evidence that defendant could have or would have expressed an allocution that would have substantially affected the jury's deliberations. Moreover, all evidence was to the contrary, supporting Call's opinion that defendant was incapable of expressing real or feigned remorse, particularly in respect of the crimes committed against Huggins. Assuming for purposes of defendant's argument that defendant did not make the ultimate decision about whether to make an allocution, we conclude that defendant has not satisfied Strickland's requirement that he demonstrate that he was prejudiced.