Opinion ID: 1792208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue: Whether the Evidence Is Legally Sufficient to Support Hattie's Conviction of Conspiracy?

Text: As noted in Section I of this opinion, the jury found Hattie guilty of conspiracy only. Hattie now contends that the evidence does not support the verdict. The State concedes: Undeniably, the evidence against Hattie King is close. The State nonetheless concludes that the evidence does support the verdict. This issue will be treated as an appeal of the judge's denial of Hattie's j.n.o.v. motion. In circumstantial-evidence cases such as this: the test to be applied on motion for judgment of acquittal and on review of denial of such motion is not simply whether in the opinion of the trial judge or the appellate court the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis, but that of guilt, but rather whether the jury might reasonably so conclude. McDonald, 454 So.2d at 493 (quoting Harper v. United States, 405 F.2d 185 (5th Cir.1969) (quoting Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228 (5th Cir.1954)). Considering as true all the evidence most favorable to the State, together with reasonable inferences, this Court is unpersuaded that the jury could have excluded  every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793, 796 (Miss. 1985) (Robertson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). The only evidence which the State presented to prove that Hattie was a member of the conspiracy was the testimony of William Taylor. Taylor testified that, late one night, James drove to his house: Q. Did he [James] have anybody with him? Taylor: His wife. Q. Hattie Ray? Taylor: Yes, sir. Q. What happened when he came ... by there? Taylor: He come ... by and asked me about the [jury] list [which he had given me during a previous meeting] and where it was and I told him it was in the house. He told me to go in there and get it. Q. What did you do? Taylor: Went back in there and got it and gave it to him. Q. What did he say to you? Taylor: He said  said the law might come around to talk to [me], and I said, About what, I ain't did nothing, and he said, Well, I don't know, but I believe they're going to come around and talk with you. Q. What did he say for you to do? Taylor: He told me to keep his name out of it. Q. What did Hattie Ray say? Taylor: I don't think she said anything. Q. You don't remember her saying anything? Taylor: No, sir. Q. Was she there with him while the conversation was going on? Taylor: Yes, sir. Vol. VII, at 568-69 (This meeting between James and Taylor transpired after Taylor had attempted influence jurors, Truly and Harris). Thus, the only evidence discoverable in the record, which suggests that Hattie was a member of the conspiracy, was her presence in the vehicle when James drove to Taylor's house one night to pick up the jury list and warn Taylor to keep quiet if investigators pay him a visit. Mere presence at the scene of the crime, even when coupled with knowledge that a crime is being committed, is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy. Moreover, mere association with conspirators is similarly insufficient. Davis v. State, 485 So.2d 1055, 1058 (Miss. 1986) (citing authoritative support); see McDonald v. State, 454 So.2d 488 (Miss. 1984) (It is elementary that neither association with conspirators nor knowledge of illegal activity constitutes proof of participation in a conspiracy.); see also United States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503, 507 (2d Cir.1944) (It is true that at times courts have spoken as though if A. makes a criminal agreement with B., he becomes a party to any conspiracy into which B. may enter, or may have entered, with third persons. That is of course an error: the scope of the agreement actually made always measures the conspiracy, and the fact that B. engages in a conspiracy with others is as irrelevant as that he engages in any other crime... . [In order for B. to considered a member of the conspiracy, B.] must be aware of th[e] purposes [of the conspiracy], must accept them and their implications. ...) (emphasis in original). For further analysis of the law of conspiracy, see Davis, 485 So.2d at 1057-59, and McDonald, 454 So.2d at 488. Admittedly, Hattie probably heard all that was said during James and Taylor's conversation. However, hypothetically, the phraseology being used was so general or generic that a disinterested or unknowledgeable bystander would not have understood what James and Taylor were specifically talking about. An individual may not be deemed a co-conspirator absent proof that the individual recognized her entrance into or participation in some kind of common plan and knowingly intended to further its common purpose. McDonald, 454 So.2d at 495; see also Davis, 485 So.2d at 1058 (There must exist some evidence that a defendant has associated himself with the venture in some fashion, participated in it as something that he wished to bring about, or sought by his action to make it succeed.) (citing cases). Clearly, the record is devoid of evidence reflecting beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite mens rea of knowledge. The very best the State can claim with respect to Hattie is guilt by association, which is clearly insufficient to sustain a conviction of conspiracy. Finally, the facts of this case are analogous to those of McDonald, 454 So.2d at 488. In McDonald, this Court reversed and rendered after concluding that the State's case against one of the alleged conspirators, Miss Bookout, did not support the jury verdict: Crediting all the evidence and all reasonable inferences most favorable to the government, we are unpersuaded that the jury could reasonably exclude the hypothesis that Miss Bookout did not enter into the conspiracy to utter the counterfeit currency. Miss Bookout did nothing and said nothing from which the jury could reasonably infer that she entered the conspiratorial agreement prior to the attempt by Miller to pass the bill in the Broward Drug Store. Certainly, no event occurred in the Capatorto home supportive of such an inference. At most, the evidence reveals that Bookout first gained knowledge of the plan when she entered the Miller bedroom to comb her hair. She did not indicate at the time that she gave any attention to the transaction and conversation underway at the bed, but the government is entitled to the inference that she overheard plans being discussed as to methods of using the money. ... . In sum, we are left with an abiding conviction that the jury's verdict of guilty as to Bookout is based upon suspicion and surmise only. She associated with the wrong people and was convicted because of guilt by association only. Her conviction for conspiracy may not be permitted to stand since we conclude that the inference of her guilt was not a reasonable one for the jury to entertain. Id. at 493-94 (emphasis in original). In sum, the case against Hattie is simply too weak to support the verdict. This Court is left with little choice but to reverse and render the case against Hattie.