Opinion ID: 1850321
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Violation of the Sequestered Jury Requires a New Trial.

Text: ¶ 72. Our rules of court dictate that [i]n any case where the state seeks to impose the death penalty, the jury shall be sequestered during the entire trial. Miss. U.R.C.C.C. Rule 10.02. The violation of a sequestration order in a capital case requires automatic reversal. Wilson v. State, 248 So.2d 802 (Miss.1971) (violation of the sequestration rule in capital cases affects a fundamental right and requires automatic reversal). Compare King v. State, 580 So.2d 1182, 1187 (Miss.1991) (distinguishing sequestration violations in non-capital cases). For [t]he separation of even one juror in such cases is an irregularity which will vitiate the verdict. Wilson, 248 So.2d at 804 (internal citations omitted). This was the common law rule long before we adopted Rules of Court. See Boles v. State, 21 Miss. 398, 402, 13 S. & M. 398 (1850) (where the jurors depart from the bar, a bailiff must be sworn to keep them together, and not suffer any one to speak with them . . . Any departure from it is a violation, and leads to confusion and difficulty in which there is no rule of law to guide us). ¶ 73. There are only two exceptions to this bright-line rule in non-capital cases: (1) where it was highly improbable that the juror saw anyone while separated; and (2) where the juror was necessarily separated because of illness and saw no one but a doctor. Clark v. State, 209 Miss. 586, 48 So.2d 127 (Miss.1950) (citing Cunningham v. State, 94 Miss. 228, 48 So. 297 (Miss. 1909); Haley v. State, 123 Miss. 87, 85 So. 129 (Miss.1920)). Obviously, neither exception applies in the present case. [8] ¶ 74. The case at hand was riddled with violations of the sequestered jury. The events encircle one juror, Latoya Batteast. There is ample evidence that Batteast spoke with her boyfriend nightly and that they discussed the outcome of the trial. Indeed, the evidence of misconduct by Batteast was so strong that the trial court ordered that she be furnished with an attorney, and testimony was heard regarding her misconduct. ¶ 75. The court reporter brought to the trial judge's attention that a man had been heard talking to one of the jurors on a cell phone. The trial court held a hearing in chambers. A member of the maintenance staff, Laverne Askew, testified to the court that Batteast had nightly telephone contact with her boyfriend, Malcolm Morris, throughout the trial. Morris allegedly bragged about having knowledge about the deliberations of the jury. Specifically, Askew testified that she overheard Morris say, I been talking to my wife on the phone. She's on the jury. And it ain't going to be long . . . it ain't going to be long and we'll be out of here. [9] Another witness, Shirley Roberts, testified that Batteast had talked to Morris: Roberts: Well, he was talking about the jury, what was going on. He said that his wife had been calling him every night. She had a cell phone in there. Court: Did he say that? Roberts: Yes. He said that there was two people in the jury, which was his wife and another guy-from my understanding I think he meant the white guy that was on the jury-that voted against-they didn't agree with the verdict. They disagreed with it, and they were the only two that disagreed with the jury before the verdict came out. Court: And did he say anything else? Roberts: No. Just he was saying that she just didn't believeyou know, the evidence that they were giving to them, that it didn't sound  . . . . Defense: Ms. Roberts, how long a time did you talk with him? How long did you talk with him? Roberts: I stay in the hall outside from the10 or 15 minutes. He had a phone call. His cell phone was ringing. Had that funny sound like some type of music. He had a conversation on the phone. They must of asked him where he was. He said he was still at the courthouse. He got off the phone he wassaying that it was messed up, the verdict was messed up, and that it was not going toas she did  he also said that he know for a fact that they not going to do the legal objection [sic]you know, the verdict. [10] Reporter: I'm sorry? Roberts: He said that he knows for a fact that they are not  they said they are not going to vote on behalf of a conviction. Court: Did he say how he knew that? Roberts: He said he talk to his wife every night. ¶ 76. Batteast and Morris admitted they had contact with each other, but both denied that she owned a cell phone. [11] Their testimony conflicted; Batteast denied ever having telephone contact with Morris, but did admit that she saw him when he came to give her clothing. In contrast, Morris testified that Batteast telephoned him, and not her mother, to acquire clothing. As the majority acknowledges, Morris provided the trial court with a ridiculously weak explanation for the telephonic contact he had with the juror: Judge, we had a conversation yesterday [about a movie]. Anybody rent it. It's at Blockbuster. Jury Duty is the name of the movie. It's a man on jury duty, his wife is up for murder, and he's got a cell phone contacting, he's hanging the jury up on purpose. He's contacting everybody. Go rent it. It's on sale right now. He's contacting everybody getting  calling out whose in the jury, and they killing them one by one. That's all the conversation we had about a phone being brought up yesterday. ¶ 77. Morris also repeatedly contradicted his own testimony and admitted he lied to the trial court. When asked how he knew to come to the court, he first said, the newspaper said it plain as day Friday, court should be gettinggetting the case today, and that he was Batteast's only ride. However, when asked, is that why you're here today, Morris answered, [t]hat's why I'm here today. And to be honest  to be honest with that, no, that's not really why I'm here today, because really the reason I'm here because someone contacted me and told me that I supposed to been said something about my wife had a phone. Morris testified that one of the maintenance staff telephoned him and told him he was in trouble. However, he later waffled and said that she [the maintenance staff] didn't call me or nothing, but rather had spoken to him in person. This pattern of constant duplicity was characteristic of Morris. ¶ 78. Batteast was also forewarned that she would be brought before the trial court to explain her alleged misconduct. After hearing testimony from the maintenance staff, the trial judge called in an attorney to represent Batteast for possible contempt of court charges. The judge told the attorney, I wanted you to have an opportunity to speak with her before I take steps to have her things searched, because I do believe that the Court has probable cause to do that. The judge then released the other jurors but ordered that Batteast remain. ¶ 79. Indeed, Batteast's service to the jury started bizarrely and had already warranted concern by the trial court. After she was selected for jury duty, Batteast began crying and told the bailiff she did not want to serve. The trial judge noted this was an unusual reaction and called Batteast in for questioning, at which time the juror voiced concerns about finding childcare for her three children. A few days later, the juror's mother came to the court. The trial judge stated that her mother came back with four children with her and was furious and demanded to speak to me. I did not know what was going on. And said, `See, these children are her children, and I don't know what's going to happen to them because I have to work'. . . . Blah, blah, blah. And the juror sat on the steps outside and went out and started crying again. [12] ¶ 80. There was clear evidence of repeated misconduct in this case that this Court cannot overlook. The majority's attempt to distinguish the present case from Wilson is in direct contradiction to this Court's own words in that case. Wilson, 248 So.2d at 804. It makes no difference whether one juror or all twelve have improper contact outside the venire. Id. (internal citations omitted). By holding otherwise, the majority overrules a century and a half of Mississippi law. Boles, 21 Miss. 398; Organ v. State, 26 Miss. 78, 1 Morr. St. Cas. 684 (1853); Clark, 209 Miss. 586, 48 So.2d 127; Wilson, 248 So.2d 802.