Opinion ID: 3008138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Smith contends that there was insufficient evidence to prove (1) that he knowingly violated the mandatory EPA work practice standards that govern asbestos removal, (2) that he engaged in a conspiracy with Cole, or (3) that he was an “owner or operator” of the worksite. Because Smith did not move for a judgment of acquittal based on the sufficiency of the evidence in the District Court, we review for plain error. United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 (3d Cir. 2002). As such, we may overturn the verdict only if it amounts to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Id. (quoting United States v. Thayer, 201 F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir.1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted). That high threshold is not crossed here. 2 First, there was extensive evidence from which a reasonable juror could have concluded that Smith knew the property contained asbestos and knew and approved of Cole’s illegal abatement work. That evidence included testimony by a contractor 2 On this record, we would find no error even under the less stringent standard of review applicable if Smith had moved in the District Court for acquittal based on sufficiency of the evidence. That is because, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we sustain the verdict where, as here, any “rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” See United States v. Mercado, 610 F.3d 841, 845 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). 5 indicating that Smith knew about the asbestos before allowing Cole to hire workers and to oversee the illegal removal himself, and testimony from other witnesses that Smith was on the worksite at various points over the course of the renovation project, including for the purposes of paying the workers for their efforts. While Smith disputes this evidence, his disagreement with testimony proffered at trial is not a basis for overturning his conviction, as it is not our role to reweigh the evidence in the jury’s stead. United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998). Second, the ample evidence of Smith’s informal agreement with Cole to remove the contaminated materials after they were both made aware of the asbestos from the contractor’s quote is sufficient to support the conspiracy conviction. To prove conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371, the Government must show: “(1) the existence of an agreement to achieve an unlawful objective; (2) the defendant’s knowing and voluntary participation in the conspiracy; and (3) the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 206 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Testimony regarding Smith’s choice to disregard the abatement contract proposal submitted by the qualified contractor, his agreement with Cole, and his periodic presence at the worksite was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find the elements of conspiracy satisfied. Third, in stipulating to the fact that Smith was the owner of the property at issue, the Government and Smith provided sufficient evidence at trial from which a reasonable juror could conclude that Smith was the “owner or operator of a demolition or renovation 6 activity” within the meaning of the CAA. 40 C.F.R. § 61.145. Smith nonetheless contends the evidence showed that he was merely a “passive owner” who did not exercise “substantial control” over the worksite. Appellant’s Br. 16-17. That, however, would not render the evidence of Smith’s ownership insufficient. While it is true that we have held that a non-owner’s “significant or substantial or real control and supervision of a project” may tip the scales in favor of finding criminal liability under the CAA, United States v. Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Anthony Dell’Aquilla, Enters. & Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 333 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), Smith can point to no authority that requires such a control element for an actual owner. Rather, an “owner or operator” is defined in the pertinent regulations as “any person who owns, leases, operates, controls, or supervises the facility being demolished or renovated or . . . the demolition or renovation operation, or both,” 40 C.F.R. § 61.141, and it is undisputed that Smith owned the property being renovated in this case. Even if the Government had been required to prove “substantial control,” Smith can hardly be said to have been a “passive owner” given that he knew about the asbestos problem, declined to hire a qualified removal expert, made the decision to leave removal to Cole, provided money for Cole’s workers, and, despite repeated warnings from city officials, refused to ameliorate the situation. Thus, there was more than enough evidence to deem Smith the “owner or operator” of the warehouse within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. § 61.145. 7 In sum, on this record, there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could convict Smith on all charges, and it cannot be said that the conviction amounts to a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Gordon, 290 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).