Opinion ID: 2362143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bell County Coal Made a Timely Appeal to the Court of Appeals.

Text: Cumberland Valley and Del Rio contend that Bell County Coal did not file their appeal to the Court of Appeals in a timely manner; and, therefore, the appeal should have been dismissed. They insist that the trial court's judgment should be fully reinstated. The trial court entered its judgment following the jury verdict on February 24, 1998, stating [t]his is a final and appealable judgment, and there is no just reason for delay. On March 5, 1998, Bell County Coal and Huff timely filed a Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment. After hearing oral argument, the trial court entered an Amended Judgment on April 13, 1998, which denied the CR 59.05 motion and also stated, [t]he original Judgment is adopted but made interlocutory in all respects except as herein amended. On April 21, 1998, Bell County Coal and Huff filed a CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate the amended judgment of April 13, 1998, stating that the amended judgment failed to adjudicate a sum certain in damages for each of the plaintiffs and failed to adjudicate Bell County Coal's counterclaim against Del Rio, as well as arguing the appropriate amount of the supersedeas bond. On June 18, 1998, the trial court entered an order ruling on all pending motions, which overruled all [m]otions. On June 22, 1998, Bell County Coal and Huff filed their notice of appeal. Cumberland Valley and Del Rio filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, which the Court of Appeals denied in its modified opinion of September 22, 2000. Cumberland Valley and Del Rio now argue that the trial court's initial judgment, rendered February 24, 1998, recited that it was a final judgment and that there was no just cause for delay. They argue that Bell County Coal's failure to file a notice of appeal within thirty (30) days of that final judgment barred their appeal under CR 73.02(1). We disagree because the trial court expressly revoked the finality of the February 24 judgment when it entered its amended judgment of April 13, 1998, following Bell County Coal's filing of a CR 59.05 motion to alter, amend, or vacate. In Kentucky, a court speaks through the language of its orders and judgments. [4] Furthermore, as our predecessor-court stated, we know of no rule of law that denies to a court the right to revoke an order and substitute in lieu thereof a new and different one, provided that court has not lost jurisdiction over the case involved. [5] Since Bell County Coal's initial motion to alter, amend, or vacate was filed within ten days of judgment, it was timely filed under CR 59.05. So the trial court retained its jurisdiction and, therefore, was free to revoke its original order, including its statement of finality. Bell County Coal's separate CR 59 motion to alter, amend, or vacate the amended judgment, entered April 13, 1998, was not an impermissible successive CR 59 motion. While Kentucky law does not recognize an appeal from an order refusing to reconsider an order denying a new trial[,] [6] the trial court's order of April 13 did not deny the CR 59 motion entirely but amended the substance of its earlier judgment by resolving issues concerning punitive damages, the claim against Huber, the counterclaim against Del Rio, and explicitly revoked the finality of the initial judgment. As stated by the federal courts, when a trial court makes substantive changes  as opposed to merely correcting clerical errors  in entering an amended judgment, the time for filing an appeal starts from the entering of the amended judgment rather than the original judgment. [7] Since the trial court changed the substance of its judgment by entering the Amended Judgment on April 13, Bell County Coal's timely CR 59 motion regarding the amended judgment was, thus, a CR 59 motion regarding a new judgment, not an impermissible successive CR 59 motion regarding the same judgment challenged by the first CR 59 motion. So the running of the time for appeal stopped until the second CR 59 motion was resolved by the trial court's order of June 18. Bell County Coal's appeal, filed on June 22, 1998, was timely as the Court of Appeals correctly determined.