Opinion ID: 2994677
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Directing acceleration in the

Text: performance of the work. Paragraph G.21 gives the Postal Service rather extensive authority to alter the project by issuing a change order in a variety of circumstances. Given that the second factor only requires the retention of the right to supervise or control, we are of the opinion that factor number two weighs in favor of the United States being deemed in control of the site because [r]etention of this right [control] is . . . significant, even if it is not exercised. Savic, 918 F.2d at 701. The third factor, whether the United States constantly participated in the ongoing activities at the construction site, clearly, as the trial judge concluded, did not occur in this case because Tritt only visited the site twice a month and was the Postal Service’s representative for approximately 15-20 other projects in progress at the same time, and furthermore, Steiner only visited the job site on one occasion during the entire period of the contract. We hasten to point out that none of the parties dispute this finding. It is also clear that the fourth factor, whether the Postal Service had supervision and coordination of the subcontractors, weighs against finding that the Postal Service was in control of the worksite. Because no privity of contract existed between the government and the subcontractors which would allow the Postal Service to exert any authority over the subcontractors (none of the parties assert that the United States had any control over subcontractors), the judge correctly concluded that the fourth factor weighed against a finding that the government had control of the jobsite. According to the Illinois Supreme Court, the fifth factor to be considered is the responsibility for taking safety precautions at the jobsite. Like factor number two, the district court judge did not specifically conclude whether or not this factor weighed in favor or against finding that the government exercised control of the worksite. However, thecontract did specifically state that the contractor must comply with all OSHA, federal, state, and local safety regulations. Furthermore, we note that Paris was required to designate an employee (Syrigas) to be responsible for the safety concerns on the project. Although the Postal Service approved the contractor’s final safety plan as presented, Steiner testified that it was the contractor’s responsibility to ensure that the safety plan was followed. Additionally, as noted in Savic, 918 F.2d at 701, the fact the Postal Service was not involved in the day-to-day operations establishes that it was not responsible for safety precautions. Given the language of the contract, the understanding of the parties, and the fact that Tritt was at the project site only, on average, twice a month, and Steiner was there but once, we are of the opinion that factor number five (responsibility for safety precautions) weighs against finding that the government had control of the worksite. Factors six and seven, the authority to issue change orders and the right to stop work, when considered in isolation, weigh in favor of finding that the United States had control of the worksite because, as the interested parties agree, the Postal Service had the authority to do both. But, factor number eight, ownership of the equipment used on the project, weighs against finding the government had control because, as the trial judge determined, all of the equip ment used at the construction site, including the defective scaffold involved in Noble’s accident, were the property of and under the control of the contractor, Paris. The trial judge concluded that factor nine, the defendant’s familiarity with the construction, customs, and practice, when viewed in insularity, weighed in favor of a finding that the United States was in control of the jobsite because the government representatives were very familiar with the construction business in general and with government construction contracts in particular. According to Tritt’s testimony, he was the government’s representative for over 15 similar construction sites and had been involved in the construction industry for all of his adult life. Further, Steiner served as the government’s contracting officer for approximately 200 Postal Service contracts per year in Illinois, Indiana, and Michigan. Given these facts, we agree with the trial judge that the government’s representatives were familiar with the custom and practice of the construction business. Savic, 918 F.2d at 701. Finally, factor ten, whether the United States was in a position to assure worker safety or alleviate equipment deficiencies, or improper work habits, clearly weighs against finding that the Postal Service had control of the worksite. As the district court observed, Tritt was at the worksite only twice a month and Steiner visited the construction site only once during the duration of the contract. In Savic, 918 F.2d at 701, this court stated that: it is at best highly questionable and nigh unto impossible for the government to be in a position to assure worker safety or alleviate equipment deficiencies or improper work habits (the tenth element), given that the government inspectors visited the construction site only once or twice during an ordinary work day. If the government was not in a position to satisfy the tenth factor when it visited the construction site only once or twice a day as we observed in Savic, obviously factor ten weighs against finding the United States was in control of the worksite when Tritt, the Postal Service representative, only visited the site twice a month, and Steiner visited the site only on one occasion during the entire period of the contract. In Damnjanovic, 9 F.3d at 1276, this court cautioned against merely totaling up the ten factors and seeing which party had more factors in its favor. Rather, courts must engage in a totality of the circumstances approach in each case and, as we stated in Damnjanovic, whether a party has charge of the worksite depends upon the surrounding circumstances and the role the party assumed on the worksite. 9 F. 3d at 1275 (citing Burger v. Prairie Dev., Ltd., 578 N.E.2d 1113, 1119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)). We are in agreement with the trial judge and conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances test, the government should not be considered in charge of the construction site in this case for the following reasons. Initially, while we do not just add up the factors to determine which parties have control of the worksite, we can certainly use the factors as part of our analysis, Savic, 918 F.2d at 704, and only four (factors two, six, seven, and nine) of the ten factors weigh in favor of the finding that the United States was in control of the worksite. Additionally, we have stated that of the ten factors particular emphasis is placed on those related to job safety, and all the factors even arguably related to job safety (factors three, five, eight, and ten) weigh against finding that the Postal Service was in control of the worksite. Also, both Steiner and Tritt testified that, while they had the authority to stop work at the construction site, the very limited purpose of that aspect of their authority and the contract was to ensure that the Postal Service got what it paid for within the time frame of the contractual document. With regard to the Postal Service, the procurement manual made clear that the objective of any purchase action is performance of the contract objectives, not control of the contractor’s businesses. According to the manual, Postal Service personnel were to devote their efforts only to quality assurance, cost monitoring, and other activities intended to ensure compliance with contract terms. (Emphasis added). Furthermore, the manual explicitly prohibited Postal Service personnel, except in cases where the contract specifically required it, from direct[ing] the contractor’s management activities or interven[ing] to supervise, train, or discipline contractor personnel. (Emphasis added). According to Steiner, it was not for the Postal Service to run the contractor’s business or tell it how to do its work. Rather, according to the procurement manual and Steiner’s testimony, the Postal Service allowed Paris to conduct business at the construction site as it saw fit so long as Paris performed the work in a timely manner and the government received the work it had contracted for. And, as this court and Illinois courts have said, the government should not be held liable for merely requiring compliance with the contract and insuring the quality of the work. Savic, 918 F.2d at 700 (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Gentile, 520 N.E.2d at 830. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the decision of the trial court that the United States was not in charge of the worksite./6 Consequently, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED. /1 According to Noble’s complaint and appellate brief, he fell 10-15 feet to the ground and sustained severe and permanent injuries, both internally and externally. The appellants’ counsel advised this court at oral argument that Noble is receiving Worker’s Compensation for his injuries. /2 Although the Structural Work Act, 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 150/1-150/9 (West 1992), was repealed by the Illinois legislature in 1995, it was in effect at the time of Noble’s accident, and we therefore apply it in this case. Atkins v. Deere & Co., 685 N.E.2d 342, 348 (Ill. 1997). /3 As the name implies, a correction letter is a letter issued by the Postal Service (through Steiner in this case) that informs the contractor of what corrections at the job site need to be made. According to Steiner’s testimony, he would typically issue correction letters if work was being performed in an unsafe manner. /4 It is important to note that the contractor supplied and maintained all of the equipment used at the site, including the unsafe scaffold in- volved in Noble’s accident. /5 It is important to note that, at oral argument, the appellants conceded that this case was moot if the clearly erroneous standard was applied. Despite the appellants’ concession, we believe that further discussion is warranted. /6 As we noted in Savic, the fact that the govern- ment is not in control of the construction site in this case is sufficient to affirm the trial judge’s decision. Savic, 918 F.3d at 704, 706 n.12. Given that the appellants conceded at oral argument that this case was moot if the clearly erroneous standard was to be applied, and our conclusion that the judge correctly determined that the United States was not in control of the worksite, we do not address the alternative findings of the district court that the Postal Service did not willfully violate the Illinois Structural Work Act and that the Postal Service did not proximately cause Noble’s injuries.