Opinion ID: 1111382
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Voice Lineup

Text: Mr. Nicholson argues that the voice lineup conducted at the police station on September 5 was permeated with taint and held in absence of his legal counsel. The procedure involved seven black men standing in an adjoining room with the door closed and speaking the same line through the door louvers. Mr. Nicholson was speaker # 4, who Ms. McKinion immediately identified as that of her assailant. The test was conducted a second time and immediately she identified his voice. She never saw Mr. Nicholson. The initial question is whether such a voice lineup is equivalent to a corporeal lineup, which requires the protection of the right to counsel if that right has attached, where the witness sees the persons in the lineup and perhaps hears them speak. In U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a corporeal pre-trial lineup not capable of reconstruction at trial is a critical stage of criminal proceedings requiring aid of counsel for the defendant in order to avert prejudice and assure meaningful confrontation at trial. Wade at 236, 87 S.Ct. at 1937. Wade specifically spoke to postindictment lineups where it was clear that criminal proceedings against a defendant had begun. We hold today that when the right to counsel has attached, this kind of voice lineup closely resembles the trial-like confrontation of a corporeal lineup amounting to a critical stage for which counsel should be present under Wade and its progeny and under York. Under the rationale of Wade, counsel's absence from a voice lineup forestalls effective cross-examination on this point to bring out any suggestive or prejudicial circumstances surrounding the voice lineup. Therefore, we analyze the voice lineup like a corporeal lineup. The next question, then, is whether Nicholson's right to counsel had attached. Unlike the lineup in Wade, this voice lineup occurred before indictment, arraignment or preliminary hearing. It may have occurred before Nicholson was arrested. Unfortunately, the record is not clear on this point. In Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the right to counsel does not attach until such time as adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against him. Kirby at 688, 92 S.Ct. at 1881. Kirby indicates that the starting point of the whole system of adversary criminal justice is that point at which [g]overnment has committed itself to prosecute... . Kirby at 689, 92 S.Ct. at 1882. This point may be at formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment, according to Kirby, implying that the states must determine, within the context of their criminal justice systems, how early that point will be. Taking the earliest possible point in Mississippi as being arrest pursuant to warrant, if the voice lineup was conducted before Nicholson was arrested pursuant to warrant, his right to counsel claim is without merit. If, however, he was arrested pursuant to warrant at the time of the voice lineup, his right to counsel had attached. If the voice lineup was conducted in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, testimony about the voice lineup identification would be inadmissible. Under Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), the prosecution cannot buttress its case-in-chief by introducing evidence of a pretrial identification made in violation of the accused's Sixth Amendment rights, even if it can prove that the pre-trial identification had a different source. Moore at 231, 98 S.Ct. at 466, citing Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 273, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 1957, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1966). Therefore, it would have been error for the trial court to allow the testimony into evidence. Under Moore and Gilbert this Court would next have to determine if beyond a reasonable doubt the admission of the testimony in this case would have constituted harmless constitutional error under Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828) Moore, 434 U.S. at 232, 98 S.Ct. at 466, Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 274, 87 S.Ct. at 1957. See also Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713 at 724 (Miss. 1984). The record in this case is unclear as to whether or not Nicholson was even under arrest at the time of the voice lineup. However, even if the voice lineup was conducted in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, use of the voice lineup identification testimony at trial was harmless constitutional error. In so holding, we note that the voice lineup was not the first confrontation of the victim and defendant. Ms. McKinion had previously identified Nicholson as her assailant in a photo identification and an inadvertent voice showup, both of which she was able to make because of the substantial amount of time she spent in intimate contact with her assailant. Had this voice lineup been the first confrontation, and in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, under the rationale of Moore and Gilbert, testimony of any subsequent pretrial identifications would also have been inadmissible because of the possibility of exploitation of the initial illegality. See Moore, 434 U.S. at 231, 98 S.Ct. at 466, Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273, 87 S.Ct. at 1957. In a related matter, we note that even if the voice lineup had been conducted in violation of Nicholson's right to counsel, the in-court identification would still be permitted upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifications are based on observations of the suspect other than a lineup identification. York at 1383, citing U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). We hold that there was clear and convincing evidence that Ms. McKinion made her in-court identification of Nicholson based on her intimate observations of him for some three hours on the night of the crime, observations which she accurately gave to Officer Allen when he first spoke with her. As to Nicholson's claim that the voice lineup was permeated with taint, there is no evidence on the record that Nicholson's voice was in any way singled out, pointed out, or suggested to Ms. McKinion. Nicholson's contention is without merit. In summary, under our scope of review, we hold that there is substantial evidence to support the trial judge's suppression hearing findings that, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification testimony was not impermissibly tainted.