Opinion ID: 1227477
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Substantive issues in sentencing

Text: We now turn to the three substantive issues raised by Vasquez with respect to his sentencing. He argues that the district court erred in (1) determining that his offenses involved seven kilograms of cocaine, (2) increasing his offense level for his leadership role, and (3) increasing his offense level for obstruction of justice. In the following sections, we will address each of these issues in turn.
We will not set aside a district court's determination of drug quantity attributable to the defendant for sentencing purposes unless the determination was clearly erroneous. United States v. Swanberg, 370 F.3d 622, 624-25 (6th Cir.2004). In this case, the determination of the quantity of drugs attributable to Vasquez turns upon the proper application of Sentencing Guidelines § 2D 1.1 Application Note 12. Note 12 states in relevant part: If the offense involved both a substantive drug offense and an attempt or conspiracy, ... the total quantity involved shall be aggregated to determine the scale of the offense. In an offense involving an agreement to sell a controlled substance, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance shall be used to determine the offense level unless the sale is completed and the amount delivered more accurately reflects the scale of the offense.... If, however, the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase, or was not reasonably capable of providing or purchasing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance, the court shall exclude from the offense level determination the amount of controlled substance that the defendant establishes that the defendant did not intend to provide or purchase or was not reasonably capable of providing or purchasing. U.S.S.G. § 2D 1.1, cmt. n. 12 (2001). We have previously held that [t]he government must prove the amount to be attributed to a defendant by a preponderance of the evidence. Swanberg, 370 F.3d at 625. Once the government has established the negotiated amount of cocaine to be transferred, the defendant[] ha[s] the burden of proving that [he was] not capable of producing that amount. United States v. Vasquez, 352 F.3d 1067, 1071 (6th Cir.2003) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A district court's finding is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Id. at 1070. Based solely on the fact of conviction for the distribution of cocaine, Vasquez was exposed to a maximum sentence of 20 years in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). By finding Vasquez responsible for more than 500 grams but less than 5 kilograms of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine (Count 1), the jury's verdict exposed him to an enhanced statutory maximum of 40 years of imprisonment. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)(II). But the fact that the jury found the quantity to be less than five kilograms is not dispositive for sentencing purposes because the district court retains an independent obligation to find sentencing facts by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Flores, 477 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir.2007). Vasquez does not dispute that the agreed-upon amount for the December 2001 transaction was seven kilograms of cocaine. He instead contends that he was not reasonably capable of providing that quantity. Vasquez points to the fact that Montes required a down payment of only $2,000 for a transaction that would have involved upwards of $140,000 to suggest that his actual intent and ability was to provide no more than the one kilogram of cocaine actually delivered. He also argues that although there was a lot of big talk and that the final quantity of the cocaine negotiated by Detective Winters was seven kilograms, the quantity discussed by Montes, Vasquez, and Winters was all over the map. The district court, however, disagreed with Vasquez's contention that the actual amount of cocaine at issue was only the one kilogram, and found instead that [t]he only impediment that the evidence supported for the delivery of the seven kilograms was the fact of coordinating product, money and transportation. We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Vasquez's offense involved seven kilograms of cocaine. Neither Montes nor Vasquez ever suggested during the negotiations that they would be unable to provide Mason and Winters with that amount. During the discussions between Montes, Vasquez, and Winters, both Montes and Vasquez participated in the offer to sell seven kilograms for $13,000 per kilogram if Mason and Winters traveled to Texas for a personal pick-up, but that the price would be $23,500 per kilogram if Montes and Vasquez had to take the time and risk of driving the cocaine to Detroit. Montes told Winters that he and Vasquez could not get the full amount of the cocaine until they paid off an outstanding balance to their supplier in Texas, and Montes asked Winters to front the money for the exchange so that he and Vasquez could obtain the cocaine. Finally, Mason testified that he had witnessed a friend purchase two kilograms from Montes, Vasquez, and Juan on an earlier occasion, and that he had observed that they had a total of ten kilograms to sell during the transaction. All of this evidence establishes that Vasquez was reasonably capable of providing seven kilograms of cocaine to Winters.
The standard that governs the review of a sentencing enhancement for a leadership role under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is not altogether clear. A district court's legal conclusions are generally reviewed de novo, and its factual findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Moncivais, 492 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir.2007). In Buford v. United States, 532 U.S. 59, 121 S.Ct. 1276, 149 L.Ed.2d 197 (2001), however, the Supreme Court held that a district court's application of the Guidelines should be reviewed deferentially rather than de novo in light of the fact-bound nature of the legal decision. Id. at 66, 121 S.Ct. 1276. We need not resolve this uncertainty in the present case because we conclude that the leadership adjustment was appropriate under either standard of review. A district court may increase a defendant's offense level by two levels if the defendant was an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in any criminal activity of one or more participants. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c), cmt. n. 2. More than one person involved in an offense may be a leader or organizer. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, cmt. n. 4. A defendant qualifies for a leadership enhancement if the district court concludes that he has exercised decisionmaking authority, recruited accomplices, received a larger share of the profits, was instrumental in the planning phase of the criminal venture, or exercised control or authority over at least one accomplice. United States v. Lalonde, 509 F.3d 750, 765-66 (6th Cir.2007). Vasquez argues that Montes was the sole leader involved in the offense. At trial, however, Detective Winters testified that he had negotiated the price of the cocaine with Vasquez, that Vasquez had informed Winters that the cocaine would be of higher than average quality, and that Vasquez had offered to have his brother Juan transport the cocaine to Michigan for Winters. Mason added that he viewed Montes and Vasquez as equals. Juan Trujillo, another witness for the government, testified that he had bought cocaine from someone nicknamed Junior, that Junior obtained the cocaine from Vasquez, and that Junior paid Vasquez for the cocaine. Based on Vasquez's representations to Winters and Mason, his knowledge and involvement in the details of the transaction, his position as a supplier to others, and his authority over his brother Juan, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Vasquez was a leader in this offense.
In reviewing a district court's application of obstruction of justice enhancements under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 3C1.1 (1998), we employ a three-step process of review. United States v. Roberts, 243 F.3d 235, 237 (6th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). These steps are as follows: First, this Court applies a clearly erroneous standard to the district court's findings of fact with respect to the enhancement. Second, a district court's determination of whether facts constitute obstruction of justice is a mixed question of law and fact that requires de novo review. Third, once there has been a finding that the defendant obstructed justice, application of the enhancement is mandatory, so review of the enhancement at that point is de novo. Id. (citations omitted). In light of Buford, 532 U.S. at 66, 121 S.Ct. 1276, we will also give due deference to the district court's application of the guideline to the facts. See United States v. Cline, 362 F.3d 343, 350 (6th Cir.2004). A two-level enhancement for obstruction of justice is appropriate where the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction..... U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Application Note 4 of § 3C1.1 contains a non-exhaustive list of examples of the types of conduct to which the obstruction-of-justice enhancement applies, and instructs that the enhancement is appropriate where the defendant has engaged in escaping or attempting to escape from custody before trial or sentencing.... U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. n. 4(e). This section of the Guidelines also provides examples of conduct ordinarily not covered, which includes avoiding or fleeing from arrest. The district court found that a two-level enhancement was appropriate. In this case, Vasquez absconded before he was indicted but after he agreed to cooperate in order to obtain his release. Vasquez argues on appeal that his conduct was more akin to avoiding or fleeing from arrest rather than escaping or attempting to escape from custody. He particularly points out that his flight did not involve any deception, false names, use of an alias, or any other fraudulent misrepresentation to avoid arresthere he simply absented himself from the jurisdiction to avoid arrest. We are not persuaded. In a case virtually identical to the instant case, this court concluded that a defendant obstructed justice where he delayed his prosecution by agreeing to cooperate in order to obtain his release and then fleeing the jurisdiction upon his release. United States v. Lopez, 102 Fed.Appx. 985, 989 (6th Cir.2004). Exactly as in Lopez, Vasquez obtained his release after his initial arrest by agreeing to cooperate with the government. He then fled the jurisdiction. Vasquez never disputed that he fled in order to evade prosecution for a federal offense; nor did he proffer any other reason for his flight. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in increasing Vasquez's offense level for obstruction of justice.