Opinion ID: 4529387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unlawful-Objective Exception

Text: CSMN asks us to adopt an unlawful-objective exception to Appellees’ “entitle[ment] to Petition Clause immunity.” Opening Br. 21 (title case removed). Under its proposed exception, Petition Clause immunity would not apply to 22 petitioning seeking an unlawful objective. To support this exception, CSMN relies on a Bill Johnson’s footnote and two circuit court cases.15 We decline to extend this test outside the labor-relations context. As discussed earlier, in Bill Johnson’s, the Court considered whether the NLRB could enjoin “an [ongoing] employer’s lawsuit that the federal law would not bar except for its allegedly retaliatory motivation.” 461 U.S. at 737 n.5. The Court concluded that it could not. Id. at 743 (“The filing and prosecution of a well-founded lawsuit may not be enjoined . . . even if it would not have been commenced but for the plaintiff’s desire to retaliate against the defendant for exercising rights protected by the [NLRA].”). The Court contrasted that situation with another, noting that the NLRB could enjoin a suit seeking “an objective that is illegal under federal law.” Id. at 737 n.5 Recasting these two situations, we see the following: (1) an employer lawsuit with an improper motive (one that would be legal but for its improper motive), and (2) a lawsuit seeking an illegal objective. Under Bill Johnson’s, the NLRB could enjoin the second suit but not the first if that suit was objectively reasonable. The 15 One of the cases CSMN cites, Premier Electrical Construction Co. v. National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc., 814 F.2d 358 (7th Cir. 1987), does not apply here. It involved antitrust claims arising from conduct that sought “to use the courts to carry out private cartel agreements.” Id. at 374. So unlike Appellees here, who merely sought “a favorable rule of law,” the petitioners in Premier Electrical sought more, because “[t]here is no such thing as the lawful enforcement of a private cartel.” Id. at 376. Moreover, if Premier Electrical were decided today, Professional Real Estate would apply to its antitrust claims, with the same result, because a party cannot realistically expect success when asking a court to enforce a private cartel. 23 first situation mirrors Professional Real Estate’s sham-petitioning test, while the second situation applies that test to the labor-relations context, announcing a per se rule that petitioning is objectively and subjectively unreasonable if seeking an illegal objective.16 So in resolving a labor dispute, Bill Johnson’s used the method that Professional Real Estate would adopt ten years later. In fact, Professional Real Estate recognized Bill Johnson’s when it fashioned its two-step sham-petitioning rule.17 Given these considerations, we limit the application of this per se unlawfulobjective rule to the Bill Johnson’s context, meaning it speaks only to what the NLRB must show to enjoin an ongoing lawsuit. Further, good reasons counsel against extending this per se rule beyond the labor-relations context. For starters, the rule assumes that a suit seeking an illegal objective is brought with improper motive. This would bypass a review of the 16 In International Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union v. NLRB, 884 F.2d 1407, 1414 & n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1989), the D.C. Circuit recognized that its conclusion that a union had sought an illegal objective with its petitioning meant that the union’s petitioning “necessarily had an improper motive” and “necessarily lacked a reasonable basis.” So even several years before Professional Real Estate was decided, courts were recognizing that the unlawful-objective exception contained both an objective and subjective prong. 17 In Professional Real Estate, the Supreme Court partly relied on Bill Johnson’s in concluding that “[o]ur decisions . . . establish that the legality of objectively reasonable petitioning ‘directed toward obtaining governmental action’ is ‘not at all affected by any anticompetitive purpose [the actor] may have had.’” Prof’l Real Estate, 508 U.S. at 59 (omission and second alteration in original) (quoting Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140). To reach this conclusion, the Court noticed that Bill Johnson’s had used an “analogy to Noerr’s sham exception . . . [to hold] that even an ‘improperly motivated’ lawsuit may not be enjoined under the [NLRA] as an unfair labor practice unless such litigation is ‘baseless.’” Id. (quoting Bill Johnson’s, 461 U.S. at 743–44). 24 plaintiffs’ subjective motivation, substituting a per se rule that lawsuits seeking an illegal objective are brought with improper intent. But in practice, not all litigation seeking an illegal objective does so.18 By adopting an unlawful-objective exception to Petition Clause immunity, we would eliminate immunity even in cases in which the party petitioning for redress does so for benign reasons. We reject that result. Petition Clause immunity exists to promote access to the courts, allowing people to air their grievances to a neutral tribunal. In fact, “the ability to lawfully prosecute even unsuccessful suits adds legitimacy to the court system as a designated alternative to force” and ensures that litigants can argue for “evolution of the law.” BE & K, 536 U.S. at 532. For instance, litigants might advocate in good faith for changes to laws, outside what is presently allowed. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1967) (seeking to validate a marriage that petitioners recognized was then illegal under settled Virginia law). Applying an unlawful-objective exception in these circumstances could expose those parties to liability. Such a rule could stifle litigation and slow the law’s development. We should promote development of the law, even when the result may be unpopular. “It is important to emphasize that a person’s speech or petitioning activity is not removed from the ambit of First Amendment protection simply because it advocates an unlawful act.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1227 (9th Cir. 2000). 18 We question whether a per se unlawful-objective exception survives BE & K even under the NLRA. There, the Court stressed the importance of looking at both objective reasonableness and subjective intent. BE & K, 536 U.S. at 526, 528. 25 With the two-step sham test from Professional Real Estate, we strike the appropriate balance between protecting individuals’ First Amendment petitioning rights and preventing lawsuits that are used to harass or discriminate against others. Both the subjective and objective components are necessary to protect important First Amendment rights. Adopting a categorical, unlawful-objective exception to the First Amendment’s right to petition the government for a redress of grievances would run the risk of imposing liability on individuals who seek to undermine what they consider unjust laws. So for these reasons, we reject adopting a broad unlawfulobjective exception to Petition Clause immunity.