Opinion ID: 1706781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying plaintiff's motion to name u.s.f. & g. as a party.

Text: ¶ 23. The appellant argues that the trial court erred in not allowing U.S.F. & G. to be named as a party. The appellant claims that, because the trial court had determined that Jefferson Davis County could not be liable, due to sovereign immunity, U.S.F. & G. was the only party that had an interest in the outcome, and therefore, should be named as a party. At the time of the trial judge's ruling, our precedent clearly prohibited direct actions against insurance companies by third parties. Westmoreland v. Raper, 511 So.2d 884, 885 (Miss.1987); Smith v. City of West Point, 475 So.2d 816, 819 (Miss.1985). In State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Eakins, No. 96-CT-00034-SCT, 1998 WL 852920,  (Miss. Dec.10, 1998), superseded on rehearing, 1999 WL 798573 (Miss. Oct. 7, 1999), we overruled the line of cases, including Westmoreland, which prohibited direct actions against insurance companies. In their place, we held that under Rule 57 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, an insurance company may be named as a party to an action for the purpose of seeking declaratory judgment on the question of coverage. Id. In the current case, the trial court allowed U.S.F. & G. to be named as a party ... to assert a Declaratory Judgment action against that insurance company as an additional Defendant, but denied the plaintiff's motion to name U.S.F. & G. as a real party in interest under Rule 17. The trial court did not have the benefit of the Eakins decision before it. Nonetheless, the trial court satisfied the Eakins theory of declaratory judgment in this case. ¶ 24. Further, then existent Miss. Code Ann. § 19-7-8 directed that no attempt shall be made at the trial of this case to suggest the existence of any insurance which would cover in whole or in part any judgment awarded the plaintiff. Obviously, naming U.S.F. & G. as the real party in interest would conflict with that statutory directive. Thus, this assignment of error is without merit. B. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO THE DEFENSE COUNSEL COMMENTING IN HIS CLOSING ARGUMENT THAT JEFFERSON DAVIS COUNTY WOULD HAVE TO PAY THE VERDICT. ¶ 25. The appellant's next assignment of error is that in his closing argument, Easterling, the defense counsel, improperly implied that Jefferson Davis County was not insured and would have to pay the verdict. The appellant maintains that the trial court erred in failing to overrule his objection to this statement. The comment the appellant refers to was Easterling's statement, But we're talking about Jefferson Davis County being required to pay money. And that is not proper. The appellant objected at this point, and the trial judge responded to this objection stating, What's the objection? It's obviously going to be a verdict in favor of the appellant against Jefferson Davis County, so the objection is overruled ... ¶ 26. It is well established in this state that evidence of insurance or lack thereof may not be presented at a trial to show who would have to pay the judgment. Morris v. Huff, 238 Miss. 111, 118-19, 117 So.2d 800, 802-03 (1960); Snowden v. Webb, 217 Miss. 664, 675-76, 64 So.2d 745, 750 (1953). This Court has stated, ... it may not be conveyed to the jury that the defendant in the case has no protection by insurance, and if the verdict is against him, he, not the insurance company, must pay it.... It would be manifestly unfair to permit a defendant in a damage suit to show that he carried no insurance and whatever verdict rendered would be enforced upon him personally. Snowden, 217 Miss. at 675-76, 64 So.2d at 750 ( quoting Avent v. Tucker, 188 Miss. 207, 225, 194 So. 596, 602 (1940)). In Snowden, we held that it was improper and prejudicial for the defense counsel to tell the jury that any verdict rendered for the plaintiff would have to be paid out of the defendant's wages. As previously noted, then existent Miss.Code Ann. § 19-7-8 directed that no attempt shall be made at the trial of this case to suggest the existence of any insurance which would cover in whole or in part any judgment awarded the plaintiff. ¶ 27. Similarly, we will not allow the defense attorney in the present case to imply that Jefferson Davis County would have to pay the damages if any damages were assessed. To do so would be asking the jury, who are taxpayers, to hold against themselves. Further, our notions of fairness in this case compel this conclusion since we prohibit the naming of the insurance company as the real party in interest. We find both the defense counsel's statement during his closing argument and the trial judge's response to the plaintiff's objection improper and prejudicial. Therefore, we hold that these statements constitute reversible error.