Opinion ID: 437695
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admissibility of items seized from bauman.

Text: 15 Before trial, Hans objected to the introduction into evidence against him of the items seized from Bauman. Introduced against Hans were the police scanner, the $4,000 in $100 denominations, and Bauman's notebook. Hans contended that these items were both irrelevant to the question of his guilt and highly prejudicial. The trial judge overruled all the objections except the ones directed against the introduction of a gun and several bullet-proof vests. The judge ruled the gun inadmissible because it was not clearly of the type carried by the robbers, and he ruled the vests inadmissible because there was no evidence that the robbers had worn vests. 16 Among the items the judge ruled admissible were the five windbreakers seized from Bauman's apartment. These were identified but never actually offered or admitted into evidence. During its deliberations, the jury asked to inspect the windbreakers. Hans objected to this, arguing that the trial was over and the prosecution had long rested its case. The judge overruled the objection and allowed the jurors to inspect the jackets. 17
18 Hans argues that everything seized from Bauman was irrelevant to the question of whether Hans participated in the robbery. He concedes that these items had some relevance to the degree that they corroborated Grzybowski's testimony, but he contends that this minimal relevance is far outweighed by the prejudicial effect on the jury. Hans argues that the trial judge misapplied Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence by ruling admissible items seized from Bauman. 19 The law in this circuit is clear: a trial judge has broad discretion to evaluate whether the probative value of relevant evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. Fed.R.Evid. 403; see United States v. Clifford, 704 F.2d 86, 89 (3d Cir.1983). Absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, appellate courts will not disturb a trial judge's ruling under Rule 403. United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 762 (3d Cir.1983). 20 The district judge clearly did not abuse his discretion in allowing most of the evidence seized from Bauman to be introduced into evidence against Hans. Because these items tended to corroborate Grzybowski's testimony, they were relevant. The Federal Rules define relevant evidence as evidence with any tendency to make the existence of any [material] fact .... more or less probable. Fed.R.Evid. 401 (emphasis added). Under this standard, everything seized from Bauman was relevant. 21 Moreover, it is clear from the record that the district judge evaluated all the proposed evidence to see whether it presented a danger of unfair prejudice to Hans. The judge ultimately excluded some evidence, such as the handgun and the bullet-proof vests, because of the danger of prejudice to Hans. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting these other items into evidence. 22
23 At a pre-trial hearing, the district judge ruled that the windbreakers were admissible. Grzybowski testified at that hearing that, although they were similar to the ones the robbers wore, the windbreakers were in fact not the ones used in the robbery. During the trial itself, the windbreakers were marked for identification, but for some reason they were never actually introduced into evidence. Because they were not admitted into evidence, Hans' lawyer had no need to elicit testimony from Grzybowski that these windbreakers were different from the ones the robbers wore. Soon after the jury began deliberations, it sent a note asking to inspect the windbreakers. Over Hans' strenuous objections, the trial judge granted the request. 24 A jury is bound to decide a case purely on the law and the evidence, it is therefore error for a jury to rely on items not admitted into evidence to reach its verdict. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Joseph, 685 F.2d 857, 863-64 (3d Cir.1982). To be reversible, however, the error must be objected to in a timely fashion, and substantial rights must be affected. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a); United States v. Ong, 541 F.2d 331 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1075, 97 S.Ct. 814, 50 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977). 25 In Joseph, the unadmitted evidence was given to the jury inadvertently, without an objection by defendant's lawyer. The court therefore had to apply a plain error standard in holding that the jury's use of the evidence had prejudiced Joseph's right to a fair trial. Because Hans' attorney made a timely objection to allowing the jury to inspect the windbreakers, we need not resort to a plain error analysis in this case. 26 In urging us to uphold the trial judge's ruling on this point, the government first argues that the judge committed no error. The government cites a number of cases, including Joseph, to support its contention that a trial judge commits error only if he allows the jury to examine unadmitted evidence which he previously had ruled inadmissible or on whose admissibility he has not ruled. This argument overlooks the clear language of Joseph: the jury room must be kept free of evidence not received in the trial, and that its presence, if prejudicial, will vitiate the verdict. 685 F.2d at 863, quoting Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 553 (D.C.Cir.1969). The error comes not from the inadmissibility of the evidence, but from the jury's reliance on evidence which had not properly been admitted. 27 The government also argues that the trial judge did not err because, in effect, he was permitting the government to reopen its case and move the windbreakers into evidence. To support this position, the government relies primarily on Gormley v. United States, 167 F.2d 454 (4th Cir.1948). In Gormley, the district judge allowed the jury to inspect a sample bolt of cloth, even though it had not been introduced into evidence. The government had offered to move the introduction of a number of bolts of cloths, but the trial judge had declined the offer because of the great bulk of the cloth. Instead, the parties stipulated that the bolt was part of the cloth involved in the transaction and that it was present in the courthouse. Id. at 458. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that the sample cloth, though representative of some of the cloth involved in the transaction in question, was not representative of the entire quantity. 28 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the stipulation was for all practical purposes, equivalent to the formal introduction of the cloth into evidence. Id. Considering the bulkiness of the cloth, and that the judge had given the jury a cautionary instruction, the Fourth Circuit found no error. This recitation of the facts of Gormley makes clear the significant differences between it and the case now before this court. The windbreakers were not cumbersome, in fact they were in the courtroom during the entire trial; the parties never stipulated that these were indeed the windbreakers the robbers had worn; and the trial judge never gave a cautionary instruction. The trial judge should have dealt with the request by allowing the government to reopen its case and move the introduction of the windbreakers. This would have given Hans the opportunity to recall Grzybowski so she could testify that the windbreakers were not those worn by the robbers. 29 The judge therefore clearly erred in allowing the jurors to inspect the windbreakers. The government argues that, even if the judge erred, the error was harmless because [t]he jackets did not in any way directly implicate the appellant in the robbery. Appellee's brief at 27. This argument verges on the disingenuous. First of all, the only possible reason that the jury could have had to inspect the windbreakers would have been to compare them to those in the bank photographs of the robbers. 30 During the trial, the government had constantly stressed the windbreakers, both during the testimony of the F.B.I. agents and of the bank's employees. Additionally, although the prosecutor conceded in his opening remarks that there was no evidence that the windbreakers had been used in the robbery, he continued by noting that, if the jurors would look at the robbers and the pictures I have for you, ... you'll find they're wearing windbreakers similar to the type we recovered. The clear implication of this statement, and of the government's use of the windbreakers at trial, was that these were indeed the robbers' windbreakers, even though the government introduced no evidence to support that conclusion. 31 Under these circumstances, we cannot declare that the error did not affect substantial rights. The jury's interest in these items of at best marginal relevance indicates that the jurors considered the windbreakers to be important evidence linking Hans to the robbery. The trial judge should at least have afforded the defense the opportunity of informing the jury of Grzybowski's opinion that these were not the windbreakers the robbers had worn. 1 32