Opinion ID: 1181006
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: kinter's disability

Text: We must first determine the meaning of the word permanent as that term is used in AS 23.30.180. This is a legal question for which we use the substitution of judgment standard of review. See Peck v. Alaska Aeronautical, 756 P.2d 282, 284, 285, (Alaska, 1988); State v. Dupere, 709 P.2d 493, 495 (Alaska 1985). Then, we must determine whether there is substantial evidence [3] to support the Board's factual determination that Kinter's disability is permanent. See Whaley v. Alaska Workers' Compensation Board, 648 P.2d 955, 959 (Alaska 1982); Burgess Construction v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312, 317 (Alaska 1981). The first question concerns the interpretation of the word permanent as used in the workers' compensation statutes. [4] Generally, [u]nless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common usage. Division of Elections v. Johnstone, 669 P.2d 537, 539 (Alaska 1983) (quoting State v. Debenham Electric Supply, 612 P.2d 1001, 1002 (Alaska 1980)), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1092, 104 S.Ct. 1580, 80 L.Ed.2d 114 (1984). See also AS 01.10.040 (words used in statutes are to be construed according to their common and approved usage). The meaning of permanent has been neither statutorily nor judicially defined in Alaska. [5] As Professor Larson wrote, [o]ccasionally, the term `permanent' has to be construed, although usually permanence is fairly obvious, as in the case of loss of limbs, or other incurable conditions. Permanent means lasting the rest of claimant's life. 2 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 57.13, at 10-42 (1986). In addition, [a] condition that, according to available medical opinion, will not improve during the claimant's lifetime is deemed a permanent one. If its duration is merely uncertain, it cannot be found to be permanent. Id. at 10-42 to 10-43. We believe that this definition is logical and comports with common usage, and, thus, we adopt it here. The second question presented in this case is whether there was substantial evidence for the Board's finding that Kinter's total disability is indeed permanent. Alaska International argues that, since the Board found that [a]fter the passage of an uncertain period of time, ... it is hoped by the medical witnesses that Mr. Kinter will be able to return to some sort of limited work, his condition must be temporary. That is, the medical experts agreed that Kinter might someday be able to do some work, and according to Alaska International, this precludes a finding that he is permanently disabled. We are not persuaded by Alaska International's argument; we believe that there was substantial evidence to support the Board's finding of permanence. The medical experts agreed that Kinter's condition is going to be of a permanent nature. Dr. Voke said that he will never be a welder again, and that he would obviously lead a sedentary life. These statements provide substantial support for a finding that Kinter's condition is incurable and will last[] the rest of [Kinter's] life. 2 A. Larson, supra, at 10-42. The fact that the medical experts offered some cautious comments that Kinter might someday be able to work in a non-demanding job does not preclude the Board's finding. [6] In order for a claimant to be permanently totally disabled, he need not establish that there is no chance of him ever doing anything again. In fact, we upheld a finding of permanent total disability for a carpenter with a physical impairment of 40 to 45% in similar circumstances in J.B. Warrack Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986 (Alaska 1966). [7] Following his injury, the worker in Roan was not qualified by education or experience to do other than odd jobs provided they are not physically taxing. Id. at 988. We found that the claimant's ability to do odd jobs did not preclude a finding of permanent total disability. In Hewing v. Peter Kiewit & Sons, 586 P.2d 182, 187 (Alaska 1978), we again discussed the odd lot doctrine, stating that if the worker's subsequent employment was in the odd lot category, it would not preclude a finding of permanent total disability. Id. Likewise, Kinter's possible future sedentary work does not preclude permanent total disability classification. [8] The Board found that Kinter was in this category of workers who could only perform odd lot labor, and that his condition was permanent. Thus, it concluded that he was permanently totally disabled. We hold that there was substantial evidence that Kinter's condition would last[] the rest of [Kinter's] life, 2 A. Larson, supra p. 5, at 10-42, and that he would never be able to do anything but odd lot labor. Accordingly, we affirm the determination that he is permanently totally disabled.