Opinion ID: 177263
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title of Act and Section 5 are Unrelated to Section 1

Text: Sherman attempts to equate the historical context in this case with Wallace by pointing to the change in the title of the Act in 2002 from the Silent Reflection Act to the Silent Reflection and Student Prayer Act. She argues that the insertion of the word prayer in the name of the Act confirms that the Illinois legislature sought to promote religion. This argument completely ignores the fact that the title of the Act was changed in 2002 when the Illinois legislature passed an entirely separate lawSection 5which addressed students' right to pray and be free from state-sponsored prayer in schools. Thus, the addition of and Student Prayer Act to the title merely updates the Act's title based on the addition of a new section to the law. Sherman and the ACLU also argue that the addition of Section 5 itself is evidence of the Illinois legislature's desire to promote religion. They further assert that there was no need for Illinois to pass a law allowing school prayer because nothing prohibited the students from praying. There are several flaws in this argument. First and foremost, Sherman did not challenge the constitutionality of Section 5. And even if she had, we see nothing improper with the government attempting to summarize constitutional protections in a statute. The timing of Section 5 indicates that this is exactly what the Illinois legislature had in mind as Section 5 was adopted shortly after the Supreme Court issued its decision in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 120 S.Ct. 2266, 147 L.Ed.2d 295 (2000). In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that studentled, student-initiated prayer before a football game violated the Establishment Clause, but the Court also stressed that nothing in the Constitution as interpreted by this Court prohibits any public school student from voluntarily praying at any time before, during, or after the schoolday. Id. at 313, 120 S.Ct. 2266. Second, while Sherman and the ACLU portray Section 5 as promoting religion, it does no such thing. Rather, Section 5 sets forth in a balanced way the rights of students to both pray and to be free from government-mandated prayer. Specifically, Section 5 addresses students' rights under both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause and their rights to free exercise of religion and freedom to not be subject to pressure from the State either to engage in or to refrain from religious observation on public school grounds.... 105 ILCS 20/5. Third, Section 5 in no way addresses or relates to the period of silence governed by Section 1. Section 1 established a period of silence and addressed the prohibition on the use of the period of silence as a religious exercise, as well as the students' right to pray during the period of silence, if they chose. In Section 5, the Illinois legislature was addressing an entirely separate issuethe students' right to pray at other times during the school day, as well as their right not to be subject to state-imposed prayer. There is nothing in the text or legislative history of Section 5 which indicates that the Illinois legislature intended to amend or otherwise affect the period of silence when it passed Section 5. In fact, Section 5 was added by the legislature in 2002 three decades after the original passage of Section 1and during the legislative debate of Section 5, there was no mention of the period of silence law established by Section 1. In short, Section 5 is unrelated and separate from the question of the constitutionality of Section 1.