Opinion ID: 709238
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impact of Farrar v. Hobby

Text: 92 Relying on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992), the defendants contend that, even if the action was the catalyst for the relief provided, the plaintiffs are not entitled to any fees. We reject the defendants' contention that Farrar provides a basis for upholding the denial of fees in this case. 93 Farrar does not alter the test for determining when a litigant qualifies as a prevailing party. The Court explicitly affirmed its prior holding that the degree of success does not affect the prevailing party inquiry. Id. at 112-14, 113 S.Ct. at 574. 10 Farrar does, however, change the standard for determining when a prevailing party is entitled to recover fees. Farrar holds that a prevailing party may be denied fees where he obtains only a narrow, technical victory such as nominal damages. Id. at 114-16, 113 S.Ct. at 575. In such cases, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all. Id.; see also Romberg v. Nichols, 48 F.3d 453, 455 (9th Cir.1995) (district court did not err in denying fees to prevailing party who originally sought $2 million in damages but obtained only $1). 94 Farrar's holding is limited to cases in which the plaintiff seeks substantial monetary damages but obtains only a nominal award. This case is clearly not among those to which the Farrar rule applies. As the defendants point out, the plaintiffs did not obtain all the injunctive relief originally sought. The special board did not grant Chamar a license. Nor, of course, did it grant Ernsberger and Stivers licenses as corporate officers or qualifying agents of Chamar. It did, however, grant Stivers individual licenses, permitting him to work as a private patrolman, process server, and investigator. The settlement obtained was more than a de minimis victory. While the plaintiffs did not obtain all the relief sought, they did obtain tangible results, Wilcox v. City of Reno, 42 F.3d 550, 555 (9th Cir.1994), and are therefore entitled to fees. 11 We remand for the district court to determine the appropriate amount of fees. 12