Opinion ID: 492488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Restrictions on Enrichment of Foreign Uranium

Text: 41 Count one of plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the DOE violated 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(v) (1982) when it refused to restrict enrichment of foreign uranium despite a determination that the domestic uranium industry was not viable. The DOE argues that restrictions are only required if they would make the domestic uranium industry viable and that restrictions at this time would not result in a viable industry. The district court interpreted section 2201(v) to require the DOE to restrict enrichment of foreign uranium whenever the domestic industry is not viable--whether or not such restriction would result in successful resuscitation of the uranium industry. The DOE appealed and moved to stay enforcement of the district court order until the appeal was finally decided. We granted the motion to stay and expedited the appeal. 42 This case is one of statutory interpretation. The parties agree that the domestic uranium industry is not viable and agree that the DOE's actions are controlled by section 2201(v). However, they disagree on the meaning of that statute. Even under current law, which requires great deference to agency interpretation of statutes, the Supreme Court has recognized that 43 [t]he judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent. If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect. 44 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2781 n. 9, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (citations omitted). Under this authority, the district court decided that, unless the DOE determines that something other than restrictions will assure the viability of the domestic uranium industry, section 2201(v) requires restrictions on enrichment of foreign uranium whenever the domestic industry is not viable. Since this is a statutory interpretation question, we review that decision de novo. See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986); City of Edmonds v. United States Dep't of Labor, 749 F.2d 1419, 1421 n. 2 (9th Cir.1984). 45 The courts have long recognized that the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980); see also Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 429, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633 (1981). When we find the terms of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except 'in rare and exceptional circumstances. '  Id. at 430, 101 S.Ct. at 701 (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187 n. 33, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2298 n. 33, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U.S. 55, 60, 51 S.Ct. 49, 50, 75 L.Ed. 156 (1930)). Even when an agency interpretation is normally entitled to deference, [i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. Chevron U.S.A., 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. at 2781. Thus, we look first to the language of the statute, and if it is unambiguous, we look to the legislative history only to determine if exceptional circumstances dictate an interpretation contrary to the language of the statute. 46 As noted, the relevant portion of the statute provides that to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry, [the DOE] shall not offer  enrichment services for foreign-source uranium designated for use in the United States. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2201(v) (emphasis added). The DOE relies on Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, 476 U.S. 974, 106 S.Ct. 2360, 90 L.Ed.2d 959 (1986), in arguing that the phrase to the extent necessary gives it discretion to determine whether to restrict enrichment of foreign uranium. The Supreme Court in Young was interpreting 21 U.S.C. Sec. 346 (1982), which states: 47 Any poisonous or deleterious substance added to any food, except where such substance is required in the production thereof or cannot be avoided by good manufacturing practice shall be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2)(A) of section 342(a) of this title; but when such substance is so required or cannot be avoided, the Secretary shall promulgate regulations limiting the quantity therein or thereon to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health, and any quantity exceeding the limits so fixed shall also be deemed to be unsafe for purposes of the application of clause (2)(A) of section 342(a) of this title. 48 (Emphasis added.) The FDA's longstanding interpretation was that the phrase to such extent as he finds necessary for the protection of public health modified the word shall. Thus, the FDA was of the opinion that it was to determine when regulation was necessary to protect public health. Having determined that regulating aflatoxin (a poisonous substance present in some foods) was not necessary to protect the public health, the FDA did not promulgate regulations. The Supreme Court decided that it was unclear whether the critical phrase modified shall or the quantity therein or thereon. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded that the courts should adopt the agency interpretation of the statute as a reasonable one. The critical point in the analysis was that the FDA [had] advanced an interpretation of an ambiguous statutory provision. Young, 106 S.Ct. 2365. Once that point was reached, the Court was required to defer to the reasonable interpretation of the agency. 49 The case before us presents a different situation. Congress, in enacting section 2201(v), used unambiguous language. It stated the [DOE] ... shall not offer the enrichment of foreign uranium. The use of shall is usually mandatory language and will require action unless a convincing argument to the contrary can be made. See City of Edmonds, 749 F.2d at 1421; American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Federal Labor Relations Auth., 739 F.2d 87, 89 (2d Cir.1984); Manatee County v. Train, 583 F.2d 179, 182 (5th Cir.1978); Association of Am. R.R. v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C.Cir.1977). Thus, section 2201(v) requires that the DOE not offer enrichment of foreign uranium. 50 This requirement is, of course, subject to the modifying phrase to the extent necessary to assure the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry. That phrase, however, is also unambiguous. It informs the DOE of the amount of restriction required; it does not provide a scenario in which the DOE is excused from restricting foreign enrichment notwithstanding a nonviable domestic industry. It instructs that when domestic nonviability is determined, restrictions on enrichment of foreign-source uranium must be imposed and must become increasingly aggressive, to the point of 100% restriction, until the domestic industry is rejuvenated and becomes viable. If a less-than-100% restriction can assure viability, only that lesser level of restriction is required. The statute does not provide that increasingly stiffer restrictions are required only to the point that DOE determines that such restrictions will not resuscitate the industry. Under its interpretation of the statute, the DOE has no discretion until that time, but once such a determination is made, it may lift all restrictions--at the precise point in time when the domestic industry is at its lowest ebb. 51 Furthermore, the nature of the modifying phrase here differs from Young. In Young, the FDA specifically argued that regulations were not required to protect the public health; rather, tolerance levels established by the FDA accomplished that goal. The FDA credibly argued that it could serve the statutory purpose--the protection of the public health--without publishing regulations for aflatoxin. In this case, the DOE cannot accomplish its statutory purpose--the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium industry--without imposing restrictions on enrichment of foreign uranium. Rather, the DOE proposes to abandon the statutory goal. The DOE does not argue that the domestic industry is viable without restrictions; it claims that it has discretion to determine whether to implement restrictions when restrictions will not assure the viability of the domestic industry. The DOE's interpretation strains the plain meaning of section 2201(v). The unambiguous language of the statute requires the DOE to refuse enrichment of foreign uranium to the extent necessary to assure a viable domestic industry. The DOE may determine how much restriction is required to assure viability, but it cannot decide not to impose restrictions when the industry is not viable. It must continue to increase restrictions until the domestic industry becomes viable. The DOE's argument that this policy is not wise in the present uranium market should be made to Congress and not to the courts. We can only apply the statute as Congress passed it. 52 Finally, this is not a rare and exceptional case in which the language of the statute must give way to clear congressional intent. In hearings prior to the enactment of section 2201(v), consistent concern was expressed over the effects of imports on the domestic uranium industry. See, e.g., Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 114-15 (1963) (Statement of Richard D. Bokum II, President, United Nuclear Corp.); id. at 145 (statement of Andrew J. Biemiller, Director, Department of Legislation, AFL-CIO); Private Ownership of Special Nuclear Materials, 1964: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1964) (statement of Dean A. McGee, President, Kerr-McGee Oil Industries). In its report to Congress, the Joint Committee first recognized the importance of a viable domestic uranium industry: 53 The maintenance of a viable domestic uranium mining and milling industry is an essential part of a sound nuclear industry and is also vital to the long-range defense and security interests of the United States. The bill accompanying this report, by providing for uranium enrichment services, is a desirable step in this direction. 54 S.Rep. No. 1325, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin.News 3105, 3115. The committee then explained the basis for requiring restrictions. 55 [I]mportation could have a serious impact on the uranium mining and milling industry, particularly during a period of limited demand for its product. Accordingly, the flexible restrictions contained in the committee bill will allow the [DOE] to review periodically the condition of the domestic and world uranium markets and to offer enrichment services on a basis which will assure, in its opinion, the maintenance of a viable domestic uranium mining and milling industry. 56 .... 57 ... [T]he committee ... has concluded that it would be reasonable to place restrictions upon the performance of services by the [DOE] where the enrichment of foreign material would have an adverse effect on the domestic uranium industry. It is the committee's view that the measures taken in this bill to assure the viability of the domestic uranium industry are in the national interest since this industry is closely related to our vital defense and security interests. 58 Id., reprinted in, 1964 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 3120-21. At no point in the legislative history is there any indication that Congress would permit the DOE to abandon attempts to maintain a healthy domestic industry. On the contrary, Congress considered a viable domestic industry to be vitally important to United States defense and security interests and did not want the United States to become dependent on foreign sources of uranium. We conclude that the legislative history supports our determination that if the domestic uranium industry is not viable, the DOE must restrict enrichment of foreign uranium. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision granting plaintiffs' summary judgment motion on count one.