Opinion ID: 2812008
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instruction D-14 and D-19

Text: ¶83. Cox argues that the trial court erred in instructing the jury to impose a sentence of death if the mitigating circumstances did not outweigh the aggravating circumstances. Cox argues the jury should have been instructed that a death sentence may be imposed only if the aggravation outweighs the mitigation. Carrothers addressed the same issue. Carrothers, 148 So. 3d at 319. Carrothers held that there is “no error in a jury instruction stating that death could be imposed if mitigation did not outweigh aggravation.” Id. (citations omitted). The trial court did not err in refusing the instructions. Cox concedes that this Court has rejected 35 Cox’s argument previously. No further analysis is required, and we find this issue to be without merit. VI. THE VERDICT ¶84. Cox’s sixth issue claims that the jury’s verdict was insufficient under Sections 99-19101 and 99-19-103 of the Mississippi Code. Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101(3) instructs: (3) For the jury to impose a sentence of death, it must unanimously find in writing the following: (a) That sufficient factors exist as enumerated in subsection (7) of this section: (b) That sufficient aggravating circumstances exist as enumerated in subsection (5) of this section; and (c) That there are insufficient mitigating circumstances, as enumerated in subsection (6), to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. In each case in which the jury imposes the death sentence, the determination of the jury shall be supported by specific written findings of fact based upon the circumstances in subsections (5) and (6) of this section and upon the records of the trial and the sentencing proceedings. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(3) (Rev. 2007). Section 99-19-103 reads in pertinent part that “. . . [t]he jury, if its verdict be a unanimous recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the foreman of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-103 (Rev. 2007). 36 ¶85. Cox argues these statutes should be interpreted to mean that the jury must make “explicit written and unanimous findings beyond a reasonable doubt.” Cox argues that the jury’s written findings in this case were insufficient to impose a sentence of death. The jury specifically listed the facts it found beyond reasonable doubt to have existed at the time of the commission of the capital murder. For mitigating circumstances, the jury wrote “number 1-7 of Sec. B were unanimously agreed to exist beyond a reasonable doubt.” Items 1-7 of Sec. B were typed on the previous page of the instruction. ¶86. Cox failed to object to the jury’s findings. See Jordan v. State, 786 So. 2d 987, 1003 (Miss. 2001) (Issues concerning the form of the verdict are procedurally barred if no objection was made when the verdict was returned.). Procedural bar aside, Jordan presents an analogous case in which the jury found the elements of an aggravator beyond a reasonable doubt. However, the jury did not specifically “say that it had found beyond a reasonable doubt that the State had proved the theory contained in the instruction. . . .” Id. This Court held that, even though the jury’s verdict was not ideal, as it did not reword the aggravator into a “responsive and affirmative statement,” the entire verdict as a whole clearly supported the jury’s verdict. Id. “A fair reading of the verdict convinces us that the jury’s decision is unambiguous and Jordan’s claim is without merit.” Id. In today’s case, a fair reading of the record before us and the announced verdict of the jury “convinces us that the jury’s decision is unambiguous and [Cox’s] claim is without merit.” Id. ¶87. The jury was presented evidence on all seven aggravating factors: (1) whether the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons; (2-4) whether the captial 37 offense was committed while Cox was in the act of kidnapping Kim, L.K., and D.C.; (5) whether the murder was committed while Cox was in the commission of a burglary; (6) whether the murder was committed during the commission of sexual battery against L.K.; and (7) whether the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. In Cox’s guilty plea, he admitted facts satisfying each. The State presented evidence of each through the evidence presented to the jury. Cox does not argue that the jury lacked evidence to support each and every aggravator. ¶88. The facts of this crime spree amply support the determination of the jury, which after weighing the aggravators and mitigators, decided that the penalty of death is not too great. See Nixon v. State, 533 So. 2d 1078, 1102 (Miss. 1987), overruled on other grounds by Wharton v. State, 734 So. 2d 985 (Miss. 1998). There exists no doubt that the jury’s verdict was sufficient to impose the death penalty. This issue is without merit. V. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DEATH PENALTY ¶89. Cox begins his argument under this issue as follows, “[a]lthough Cox respectfully acknowledges that neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court have, heretofore, adopted the positions he takes here, these positions are legally meritorious and warrant a revisiting and abandoning of any precedent inconsistent with them.” We decline to revisit or abandon the established law. ¶90. Cox submits that his sentence was unconstitutional because two of the seven aggravators on which the jury was instructed were not included in the indictment, i.e., that the defendant created a great risk of death to many persons pursuant to Mississippi Code 38 Section 99-19-101(5)(c), and that the murder was especially atrocious, heinous, or cruel pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101(5)(h). Miss. Code Ann. §§ 99-19-101(5)(c), 99-19-101(5)(h) (Rev. 2007). Cox relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2355, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002). Cox also argues that Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006), renders both Apprendi and Ring applicable. However, this Court, in Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 871 (¶ 175) (Miss. 2013), recently held otherwise. In Berry, we determined that Apprendi and Ring do not invalidate Mississippi’s capital-murder sentencing scheme. Berry v. State, 882 So. 2d 157, 172 (Miss. 2004). Apprendi’s statement that any fact that increases the maximum penalty must be charged in an indictment relates to the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, not to requirements for an indictment. Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 801 (Miss. 2006). Neither Apprendi nor Ring addressed state indictments. See Berry v. State, 882 So. 2d at 170. We have held that “these cases . . . address issues wholly distinct from our law, and do not address indictments at all.” Brown v. State, 890 So. 2d 901, 918 (Miss. 2004) (citing Stevens v. State, 867 So. 2d 219 (Miss. 2003)). Batiste argues that Apprendi and Ring should apply to Mississippi’s capital-sentencing scheme after Kansas v. Marsh, 548 U.S. 163, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 165 L. Ed. 2d 429 (2006). Because Kansas did not address the requirements for indictments, it does not alter our analysis of this issue. Accordingly, this issue is without merit. Batiste, 121 So. 3d at 871 (¶ 175). See also Goff v. State, 14 So. 3d 625, 665 (Miss. 2009); Brawner v. State, 947 So. 2d 254, 265 (Miss. 2006); Havard v. State, 928 So. 2d 771, 801 (Miss. 2006); Brown v. State, 890 So. 2d 901, 918 (Miss. 2004); Berry v. State, 882 So. 2d 157, 172 (Miss. 2004). In accordance with this Court’s precedent, Cox’s issue is without merit. 39 ¶91. Next, Cox argues that the statute under which Cox was sentenced is unconstitutional pursuant to Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S. Ct. 1676, 95 L. Ed. 2d 127 (1987), requiring that, “to be sentenced to death, a person convicted of capital murder actually must have killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill, or intended that lethal force be used in a felony.” Batiste, 121 So. 3d at 871-72. Cox again concedes that this Court has declined to accept this argument. See Batiste, 121 So. 3d at 871-72; Carrothers, 148 So. 3d 278; Knox v. State, 901 So. 2d 1257, 1268 (Miss. 2005); Stevens v. State, 867 So. 2d 219, 223 (Miss. 2003). This issue is without merit. ¶92. As identically raised in Batiste, Cox argues that Mississippi Code Section 99-19105(3)(c) is unconstitutional on its face because it fails to provide for adequate or meaningful appellate review in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and corresponding sections of the Mississippi Constitution. See Batiste, 121 So. 3d at 872. Further, Cox argues, as in Batiste, that “the statute allows the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty because it does not provide for consideration of cases where the death penalty was not imposed.” Id. ¶93. Batiste stated: This argument was considered and rejected in Lester v. State, 692 So. 2d 755, 802-03 (Miss. 1997) (overruled on other grounds by Weatherspoon v. State, 732 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 1999)). Like Batiste, Lester argued that all cases where the death penalty was not imposed should be considered. Id. We found that “the current guidelines are sufficiently specific, and we find no reason to undertake the overwhelming task of considering all death-eligible cases in our review.” Id. We adhere to our decision in Lester and find this issue entitles Batiste to no relief. 40 Id. Likewise, Cox has failed to present this Court with any basis–legal, factual, or otherwise–to warrant a decision in conflict with this Court’s precedent. Thus, this argument fails. ¶94. Last, Cox challenges the method by which he is sentenced to be executed, lethal injection, under the Eighth Amendment, alleging cruel and unusual punishment, citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 170 L. Ed. 2d 420 (2008). ¶95. This Court has rejected Cox’s argument in, 121 So. 3d at 872; Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 256-57 (Miss. 2010); Carrothers, 148 So. 3d at 320-21; Goff, 14 So. 3d at 665; Chamberlin v. State, 55 So. 3d 1046, 1056 (Miss. 2010); Bennett v. State, 990 So. 2d 155, 161 (Miss. 2008); and Jordan v. State, 918 So. 2d 636, 661 (Miss. 2005). ¶96. In Bennett v. State, we stated: If differences exist between Mississippi’s execution protocols and those used in Kentucky, then, the inquiry is whether Mississippi’s lethal-injection protocol meets Constitutional muster in light of this recent Supreme Court decision. The Fifth Circuit, when considering inmate Dale Leo Bishop’s Eighth-Amendment challenge to Mississippi’s lethal-injection procedures, recently announced that “Mississippi’s lethal injection protocol appears to be substantially similar to Kentucky’s protocol that was examined in Baze.” We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s analysis, and hold that Bennett’s Eighth Amendment challenge to the lethal injection protocol in Mississippi is without merit. Batiste, 121 So. 3d at 872 (quoting Bennett v. State, 990 So. 2d 155, 161 (Miss. 2008)) (citations omitted). Therefore, this issue is without merit. VI. DISPROPORTIONATE SENTENCE 41 ¶97. Cox concedes that he does not meet the M’Naghten standard to render him legally insane pursuant to Nolan v. State, 61 So. 3d 887, 895 (Miss. 2011).12 Cox’s expert and a mitigation witness, psychiatrist Dr. Mark Webb, testified that he first deemed Cox incompetent to stand trial in July 2010, only a few months after the crime. However, in September 2011, Webb testified to improvements in Cox’s behavior and opined Cox was competent to stand trial. Cox stipulated to his competency in December 12, 2011. ¶98. Cox concedes that “this Court must conclude ‘after a review of the cases coming before this Court, and comparing them to the present case, [that] the punishment of death is not too great when the aggravating and mitigating circumstances are weighed against each other,’” citing Nixon, 533 So. 2d at 1102. Cox argues his death sentence was constitutionally disproportionate because his witnesses opined that he suffered from mental illness and “organic brain damage”13 from extended years of drug use and that it should be set aside under his Eighth Amendment protections addressed in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002) (holding that mentally retarded defendants shall not be sentenced to the death penalty), and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005) (holding that juveniles who are under the age of eighteen at the time 12 “Under the M’Naghten test or rule, an accused is not criminally responsible if, at the time of committing the act, he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.” M’Naghten’s Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 13 Cox’s brief refers to the condition as “organic brain damage,” however, the record reveals extensive expert testimony regarding “organic brain syndrome.” From Cox’s brief and the record before us, it appears that Cox is referring to organic brain syndrome (“OBS”). 42 of the crime shall not be sentenced to the death penalty). Cox argues that the holdings of Atkins and Roper should be extended to the case sub judice. ¶99. The State, however, points out a key distinctive factor– juvenile and mentally retarded defendants are classified based on factors that are out of the individual’s control, i.e., the defendant’s age or intellectual disability. ¶100. In today’s case, conflicting testimony was presented to the jury: (1) whether Cox suffered from a mental illness, (2) whether his condition resulted from nearly twenty-five years of admitted drug use, including crystal methamphetamine (“crystal meth”), inter alia, (3) whether Cox was on crystal meth at the time of the crime, and (4) whether he suffers from a mental illness or is a malingerer, feigning mental illness. ¶101. Cox presented expert witnesses opining on his mental condition at the time of the crime and the consequences of prolonged drug abuse. Cox offered testimony from John Owen, a drug and alcohol counselor, who was tendered as an expert in alcohol, drug, and chemical dependency. Owen testified that, when he met with Cox, Cox told him that he had huffed gasoline fumes from the age of fifteen to twenty-five, had abused pain killers for at least five years, and had been using crystal meth for ten years. Owens testified that Cox could have suffered diminished brain development from huffing gasoline fumes. Owen opined that, based on meeting with Cox and hearing the in-court testimony of Cox’s sister-in-law and brother regarding Cox’s erratic behavior, Cox was under the influence of crystal meth at the time of the crime, which could have resulted in Cox experiencing a “black out” during the commission of the crime. Owen was questioned on direct examination extensively 43 concerning OBS and its symptoms, including cognitive difficulties, difficulty reasoning, speech impairment, and memory loss. Owen compared OBS to chronic alcoholism. However, Owen admitted that Cox did not suffer any difficulties such as memory loss or speech difficulties, except for Cox telling him that he did not remember committing the crime. Owen opined that Cox was a drug addict who suffered regressed reasoning from prolonged drug abuse or OBS. ¶102. Cox also presented Dr. Mark Webb, who was tendered as an expert in psychiatry. Webb testified that he met Cox in July 2010 and again in September 2011. He diagnosed Cox as a manic depressive with bipolar disorder. Dr. Webb opined that he saw improvements in Cox. By September 2011, he concluded that Cox was competent to stand trial. Dr. Webb stated that he made his diagnosis based on reviewing Cox’s records, meeting with Cox, and Cox telling him that he had not taken drugs for one year prior to the crime.14 Dr. Webb opined that Cox’s behavior was consistent with either his diagnosis or crystal meth abuse, as persons with disorders and crystal meth users exhibit similar traits. Dr. Webb stated that he regarded as true Cox’s statement that he had not taken drugs for a year prior to the crime. Thus, he maintained his diagnosis that Cox suffered from manic depression and bipolar disorder. Dr. Webb disagreed with an OBS diagnosis and testified that OBS had been removed from the diagnostic manual for being “too imprecise.” ¶103. In rebuttal, the State called Dr. Reb McMichael. He was tendered as an expert in forensic psychiatry. Dr. McMichael was employed at Mississippi’s state hospital at 14 This statement is totally inconsistent with Owen’s testimony. (See Supra ¶ 101). 44 Whitfield. Dr. McMichael testified that Cox was admitted for inpatient observation, per court order, for two weeks. Dr. McMichael testified “Mr. Cox was, in my opinion, malingering, which is faking or exaggerating real symptoms that he may have had; and because of that, we decided to admit him for a period of inpatient observation.” Dr. McMichael stated that, after observation, he reached the conclusion that Cox was malingering. Cox refused multiple malingering tests, however, he agreed to take one test, receiving a score of twelve. Dr. McMichael explained that the cutoff to indicate that malingering existed was a score of six. Cox’s score was double the score necessary to indicate malingering. Dr. McMichael stated that, after he and the hospital staff observed Cox, he and the staff concluded that Cox was faking memory loss and using “baby talk.” Both Owens and Dr. Webb testified that Cox never spoke in “baby talk.” ¶104. The staff at Whitfield observed that Cox’s behavior was normal when he was unaware that he was under observation, but that his behavior would change once he was aware that he was being observed, for example, he would begin to “rock back and forth.” Dr. McMichael further testified that the medications Cox told the hospital he was taking while in jail were not consistent with objective blood tests. Although Cox claimed that he did not know key facts such as the season of the year or his birthday, when he was told he would undergo a CT scan he questioned “was that going to be NPO?” His testimony established that “NPO” is the Latin phrase used in medicine for “nothing by mouth.” Dr. McMichael also testified that Cox reported to him that he could not read. Contrastingly, Cox’s family revealed that he could read and that he wrote letters to his family while incarcerated. 45 ¶105. Lastly, Dr. McMichael testified that Cox showed no symptoms or signs consistent with someone who was hallucinating, although Cox claimed that he was being taunted by demons. Dr. McMichael testified that Cox’s CT scans were normal, countering the testimony that Cox could have been suffering from brain damage. Dr. McMichael stated that Cox was released from Whitfield because the staff “did not see any objective evidence that Mr. Cox was mentally ill.” ¶106. It was for a jury to sort out the contested facts and conflicting evidence. Experts disputed that Cox admitted to taking crystal meth regularly for years prior to this crime. Neither Atkins nor Roper is applicable to today’s unprecedented arguments and they provide no basis for relief. Atkins, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242; Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183. ¶107. Last, Cox argues that Mississippi Code Section 99-19-101 (6)(f), permitting the jury to consider mental illness and diminished capacity as a mitigating factor, is insufficient for capital sentencing. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (6)(f) (Rev. 2007) (the jury may consider as a mitigating factor, “[t]he capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.” Cox’s argument is without merit, as Cox presented mitigation testimony regarding mental illness and diminished capacity, and it is obvious that the jury was not “buying in,” perhaps due to the conflicting testimony of his own experts and his family disputing his ability to read and write. This issue is without merit. VII. CUMULATIVE ERROR 46 ¶108. Cox argues that the cumulative errors “incorporated into this assignment of error by reference” require reversal, citing Walker v. State, 913 So. 2d 198, 216 (Miss. 2005); Jenkins v. State, 607 So. 2d 1171, 1183 (Miss. 1992); Griffin v. State, 557 So. 2d 542, 553 (Miss. 1990). The State submits that “[w]here there is no reversible error in any part, . . . there is no reversible error to the whole.” Doss v. State, 709 So. 2d 369, 401 (Miss. 1996) (quoting McFee v. State, 511 So. 2d 130, 136 (Miss. 1987)). Because we find no merit in the errors presented, this issue is likewise without merit.