Opinion ID: 997646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dobkin v. Johns Hopkins University

Text: (Appeal No. 96-1715) Dobkin contends the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the JHU defendants, specifically JHU, Dr. German, and Ms. _________________________________________________________________ 4 In his letter to Mr. Perot, Dobkin stated: My NIH grant was administered fraudulently by Johns Hopkins, my records were slandered, the NIH now threatens suit against me and refuses to investigate any written allegation of corruption and lies in correspondences and actions by John Hopkins with NIH officials to ruin me. (J.A. at 159-60). 5 In their letter to Hillary Clinton, Mr. and Mrs. Dobkin stated: [o]ur son, a Yale alumnus (M.P.H. 86), has been academically and apparently irremediably destroyed as a reward for his hard work, dedication, integrity and scholarship -- the recipient of pre-meditated misconduct, cover-up and fraudulent grant administration at the highest bureaucratic levels of Johns Hopkins University and involving the National Institutes of Health. (J.A. at 142-49). 6 In their letter to Vice President Gore, Mr. and Mrs. Dobkin stated: Last November (with no response to date), we wrote to Hillary Clinton requesting any possible assistance in a matter concerning waste and misuse of government funding (the National Institutes of Health) and the premeditated academic assassination of our son, Robert Dobkin, and subsequent cover up at the Johns Hopkins University School of Hygiene and Public Health . . . . (J.A. at 150-53). 7 Although there was nothing alleged to be defamatory in the letter to Senator Dole, Mr. and Mrs. Dobkin attached copies of the letters to Hillary Clinton and Vice President Gore. See Letter to Senator Dole. (J.A. at 136). 6 Fishbein. He contends (1) that he established genuine issues of fact that Dr. German and Ms. Fishbein (and thus JHU) defamed him by stating that he exposed himself; committed sexual harassment; was not truthful about the state of his health; was psychologically unstable; and posed a danger to the lives and safety of JHU personnel; (2) that he stated an actionable false light claim; and (3) that he stated an actionable breach of contract claim. Summary judgment is appropriately granted when a party having the burden of proof on a particular claim is unable either to produce admissible evidence or point in the record to admissible evidence which would be sufficient to support a jury verdict on each element of that claim. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986). In considering the motion, the district court must consider the evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597-88 (1986). Our review of the district court's finding is de novo. Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1313 (4th Cir. 1993). To establish defamation in Maryland, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person; that the statement was false; that the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement; and that the plaintiff thereby suffered harm. Rosenberg v. Helinski, 616 A.2d 866, 871 (Md. 1992), cert. denied, 509 U.S. 924 (1993).8 A defamatory statement is one which tends to expose a person to public scorn, hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby discouraging others in the community from having a good opinion of, or associating with, that person. Id. (citations omitted). A communication may be conditionally privileged `when the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty to publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct.' Henthorn v. Western Md. Ry. Co., 174 A.2d 175, 179 (Md. 1961) (citations omitted). However, a conditional privilege can be overcome by a showing of actual mal_________________________________________________________________ 8 In a diversity action, the law of the forum state applies. Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941); Fortress Re, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 766 F.2d 163, 165 (4th Cir. 1985). 7 ice. Marchesi v. Franchino, 387 A.2d 1129, 1133 (Md. 1978). The standard by which malice is to be measured is `knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth.' Id. (citation omitted). The district judge found that Dobkin did not contest that Dr. German's alleged statement about Dobkin's genitals becoming exposed was conditionally privileged. However, Dobkin contended that the conditional privilege was defeated because Dr. German uttered the statement, knowing it was false or with a reckless disregard for the truth. Dobkin, however, neither presented nor pointed to evidence that Dr. German had described the incident as sexual harassment or had acted recklessly in describing the incident. The district court properly granted summary judgment since there was insufficient evidence of actual malice to create a jury question. The second statement Mr. Dobkin contends was defamatory was one made by Dr. German to Robin Fox, the Assistant to the Dean of the School of Hygiene and Public Health at JHU, about the state of Dobkin's health. Later, the statement was put in Dobkin's file. The alleged statement appears in a memo written by Robin Fox and reads as follows: While at Hopkins, Mr. Dobkin disclosed to a number of people that he had been earlier diagnosed with cancer of the urinary bladder. In the statement of objective section of his application, he states that he was diagnosed with cancer (type not mentioned) in 1983 and was treated at Sloan Kettering. According to Dr. German, Dr. Dan Ford examined Mr. Dobkin at our Student Health Center and mentioned to Dr. German that he (Dr. Ford) thought it unlikely that Mr. Dobkin had ever had bladder cancer because he still had his bladder. Some time later, Dr. German wrote in the margin of the memo that Dr. Ford informed her that it was not clear what type of cancer Mr. Dobkin had since he still had his bladder. The district judge found that the statement was conditionally privileged because Ms. Fox was conducting an investigation of Mr. Dobkin and Dr. German made the statement in response to questioning from Ms. Fox. The district judge also found that Dobkin failed to set forth specific facts indicating Dr. German acted with actual malice. Therefore, the district judge granted 8 summary judgment for Dr. German on Dobkin's claim for defamation. We agree that Dobkin failed to provide or point to evidence sufficient to create a factual issue regarding either conditional privilege or actual malice and, therefore, we find summary judgment on that claim to have been appropriate. Next, Dobkin contends that Ms. Fishbein's statements to David Frulla, former counsel for Dobkin, that he and his firm had a legal duty to warn any person, including Dr. German and myself, if any contact with your client leads to a reasonable belief that he is inclined to commit a violent act against that person was defamatory. Dobkin further claims that Ms. Fishbein's statement to her son, Rand Fishbein, expressly or impliedly stated that Dobkin was dangerous. She allegedly misinformed her son that Dobkin had attended two of the universities where the Unabomber struck. The district court held that the letter to Dobkin's attorney contained the subjective impressions of Ms. Fishbein and her clients. Generally, to be actionable a statement must contain or imply a statement of provable false fact. See e.g., Chapin v. Knight-Ridder, Inc., 993 F.2d 1087, 1093 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that [t]hough opinion per se is not immune from a suit for libel, a statement is not actionable unless it asserts a provably false fact or factual connotation). The district judge found the letter could not reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about Dobkin. As for the statement to her son, the district judge found that the statement about Dobkin attending two of the universities where the Unabomber struck was substantially accurate, therefore, no legal harm was done. See AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1004 (4th Cir. 1990) (noting that[i]f the gist or `sting' of a statement is substantially true,`minor inaccuracies will not give rise to a defamation claim'). Again, we agree with the analysis of the district court. Dobkin next argues that he did state an actionable false light invasion of privacy claim. To state an actionable false light claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) publicity in a false light which a reasonable person would find highly offensive and (2) that the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter placing plaintiff in a false light. See, Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E; Bagwell v. Peninsula Reg'l Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297 (Md. App. 1995), cert. denied, 669 A.2d 1360 (Md. 1996). As with a defa- 9 mation claim, qualified privileges preclude a false light claim absent a showing of actual malice. See Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 286 A.2d 146 (Md. 1972); Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 652G, comment (a). The district court held that, for the same reasons that Dobkin's defamation claims failed, Dobkin's false light claims failed. See AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs., 903 F.2d at 1004 n.1 (citing Phillips v. Washington Magazine, Inc., 58 Md. App. 30, 36 n.1, 472 A.2d 98, 101, cert. denied, 300 Md. 89, 475 A.2d 1201 (1984) and stating that the same considerations and legal standards apply to defamation actions and invasions of privacy actions). Additionally, the district court held that Dobkin failed to proffer any evidence demonstrating widespread dissemination as required to state a false light invasion of privacy claim. As to the contract claim, the district court found that Dobkin did not put forth any evidence raising a genuine issue of fact concerning an express or implied contract with JHU to award Dobkin a M.P.H. degree. We agree with the district court's reasoning on the false light claim and its finding on the contract claim.