Opinion ID: 1135325
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inability to Conduct Effective Cross-Examination of Susan Y.

Text: If a child testifies and is subject to cross-examination, the State may introduce the child's hearsay statements pursuant to NRS 51.385, without violating the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. However, in this case, the State continued to introduce statements recounting Susan's accusatory hearsay statements after Susan had been excused as a witness. These statements were presented through the testimony of Susan's mother and psychologist Payne, and by Susan in her videotaped preliminary hearing testimony. The videotape of Susan's preliminary hearing testimony contained her allegation that Ontiveros stuck a knitting needle up her crotch, which may have supported the one count involving Susan for which Ontiveros was convicted. The defense was unable to cross-examine Susan on several statements that others claimed she had made. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), requires that cross-examination be full and effective. Id. at 158, 90 S.Ct. at 1935. As a practical matter, if a child is excused before her hearsay statements are proffered, the defense has no opportunity to cross-examine the child on those statements. On remand in Green, the California Supreme Court held that admission of an unsworn hearsay statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause because the declarant was recalled to the stand after the police officer recounted the declarant's prior statement. People v. Green, 3 Cal.3d 981, 92 Cal.Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998 (1971) (en banc). This procedure gave the defense an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about the hearsay statement. The same opportunity should have been afforded the defense in this case. We adopted a similar procedure in Jacobs v. State, 101 Nev. 356, 705 P.2d 130 (1985), for allowing the admission of prior consistent statements to rebut claims of undue influence of a witness pursuant to NRS 51.035(2)(b). In Jacobs, the defendant was charged with murdering his ex-wife. His five-year-old son testified against him and left for Arkansas before the trial was over. Defendant's counsel then attempted to impeach the boy's testimony by suggesting that his grandmother improperly influenced him. With the boy out of the jurisdiction, the trial court admitted prior consistent statements the boy had made to police. We decided that admitting this evidence was reversible error because the boy could not be cross-examined on these statements. Id. at 358, 705 P.2d at 131-32. Admittedly, NRS 51.035(2)(b) specifically requires that the defendant have the right to cross-examine the declarant and NRS 51.385 does not. However, the requirement that a defendant be permitted to examine the declarant about an earlier hearsay statement received into evidence after declarant's trial testimony is desirable and would protect the integrity of the court's truth-finding mission. Arguably, the defense could have recalled Susan and other children for cross-examination. However, we conclude that placing that burden on the defense is unfair. In Long v. State, 742 S.W.2d 302, 319 (Tex.Ct.App.1987), the court considered a statute which admitted child testimony, so long as the child was available to testify. The court held that requiring the defense to call a child to the stand for cross-examination regarding the videotape would violate due process. Long notes that such a requirement would put the defense in a Catch-22 position. If the State does not call the child to testify, the defense must either forego the right of cross-examination or call the child to the stand with the very real risk of incurring the wrath of the jury, which would blame the defense for forcing the child to testify. Id. at 320. The Catch-22 posed to the defense in this case was as serious as that in Long. In this case, the defense had to either forego its right to cross-examination, or prejudice itself by calling children like Susan to the stand to be examined a second time. Our conclusion is supported by other authorities. Sosebee v. State, 257 Ga. 298, 357 S.E.2d 562 (1987) (interpreting a statute similar to NRS 51.385, court concluded that prosecution or court must make declarant available to defense for further cross-examination if hearsay statements of declarant alleging additional crimes are received into evidence after declarant testified); see also Michael H. Graham, The Confrontation Clause, the Hearsay Rule, and Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: The State of the Relationship, 72 Minn. L.Rev. 523, 580-86 (1988) (supporting this view, and stating other reasons why the burden to call the child rests with the proponent of the hearsay statements). Some courts have suggested that requiring defense counsel to recall a witness whose hearsay statements have been introduced subsequent to his or her testimony in CSA cases is not unconstitutional. One court even placed this burden on the defense when the child's hearsay statement was admitted under an exception which is not firmly rooted, the residual reliability exception. U.S. v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.1985). We find this view unsound because it leaves the defense in the Catch-22 heretofore described. See Long, 742 S.W.2d at 320. In order to avoid placing the defense in such an unfair dilemma, the Sosebee court concluded that Georgia's child hearsay statute (a statute quite similar to NRS 51.385) requires that at the close of the State's case-in-chief, either the defense or the State may request that a child witness or hearsay declarant be called or recalled for cross-examination regarding hearsay statements already admitted. Sosebee, 357 S.E.2d at 563. The court also must inform the jury that the court, not the State or defense, is calling the witness. In order to avoid interfering with the defense's opportunity to cross-examine effectively, we construe NRS 51.385 to require that either the State or the court recall a child witness upon the request of the defense, if hearsay statements not firmly rooted in a hearsay exception are introduced subsequent to the child's testimony, and the child-victim did not cover the statements in his or her testimony.