Opinion ID: 202936
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Leasing Act Claim

Text: The prudential standing concern at issue here is whether Plaintiffs' Leasing Act claim fall[s] within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked. [13] Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315. The `zone of interest' test is a guide for deciding whether, in view of Congress' evident intent to make agency action presumptively reviewable, a particular plaintiff should be heard to complain of a particular agency decision. Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 399, 107 S.Ct. 750, 93 L.Ed.2d 757 (1987). We disagree with the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs do not fall within the zone of interests protected by the Leasing Act. It is true, as the district court emphasized, that the Leasing Act requires federal approval when `restricted Indian lands, whether tribally or individually owned, [are] leased by the Indian owners. ' Nulankeyutmonen Nkihtaqmikon, 462 F.Supp.2d at 110 (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 415(a)). The district court also agreed that Plaintiffs are almost certainly correct that the Leasing Act was intended to protect `Indian tribes and their members. ' Id. (quoting San Xavier Dev. Auth. v. Charles, 237 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2001)). But we do not read the former passage referring to Indian owners to suggest that the duty owed by the BIA under the Leasing Act is limited to the land owners regulated by the Act. But see Bullcreek v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 426 F.Supp.2d 1221, 1230 (D.Utah 2006) (denying standing to tribal members with no property interest in the leased land because the act refers to Indian Landowners). Rather, it clearly appears to us to be a limitation on the leases subject to the Leasing Act. The federal government's duty under the Leasing Act, through the BIA, is to ensure that the parties to a lease of Indian land have given adequate consideration to the impacts of the lease on, inter alia, neighboring lands and the environment. 25 U.S.C. § 415(a). The land owners presumably have a vested interest in a lease's approval, so it stands to reason that they would rarely challenge the BIA's failure to comply with federal law in approving the lease. Congress surely intended, therefore, for other tribal members whose interests would be adversely affected by the lease's impacts to complain of the agency's action. See Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399, 107 S.Ct. 750. This conclusion is bolstered by the BIA's own regulations, which allow any person whose interests could be adversely affected by a decision in an appeal to request review of an agency action. 25 C.F.R. § 2.2; see also id. § 162.113 (allowing appeal of BIA lease approvals pursuant to 25 C.F.R. pt. 2). Furthermore, [t]he ['zone of interests'] test is not meant to be especially demanding. Clarke, 479 U.S. at 399-400, 107 S.Ct. 750 ([I]n particular, there need be no indication of congressional purpose to benefit the would-be plaintiff.); see also Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 461, 111 S.Ct. 865, 112 L.Ed.2d 969 (1991) (The plaintiff need only demonstrate a plausible relationship between his interest and the policies to be advanced by the relevant provision. (internal quotation marks omitted)). When a plaintiff is not the subject of the regulatory action, as here, prudential standing requirements may be satisfied so long as the plaintiff's interests are [not] so marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit. Id. Here, Plaintiffs have demonstrated, as discussed above, their concrete and particularized interest in the lands and environment surrounding Split Rock. [14] These interests are explicitly addressed in the Leasing Act as ones that the BIA must consider before granting approval of the lease. They are therefore not peripheral interests. Plaintiffs' interests are also consistent with the statute, which was intended to protect . . . Native American interests, Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. McDivitt, 286 F.3d 1031, 1036-37 (8th Cir.2002) (referring to 25 U.S.C. § 416, an analog to § 415), and to ensure that the parties to the lease have adequately considered its impacts. Thus, we find that Plaintiffs meet the prudential standing requirement that their interests arguably fall within the zone of interests protected by the Leasing Act. [15] See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153, 90 S.Ct. 827, 25 L.Ed.2d 184 (1970) (The question of standing . . . concerns, apart from the `case' or `controversy' test, the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.).