Opinion ID: 2064615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Family Membership

Text: Herman argues that Terrance's and Eric's maintenance of separate residences does not foreclose application of the doctrine. Terrance cites Bryan v. Schatz, 77 N.D. 9, 39 N.W.2d 435 (1949), and various dictionary definitions of the terms family and household in support of his argument that because Terrance and Eric did not reside under the same roof, Eric was not a member of Terrance's family and therefore the doctrine is inapplicable. We agree that Eric is not a member of Terrance's family for purposes of the family car doctrine. Contrary to Terrance's suggestion, however, we do not premise our holding on their maintenance of separate physical abodes. Bryan v. Schatz, supra , presented this court with the same issue that it faces herein, that is, whether a son whose negligent operation of a motor vehicle that resulted in injuries to plaintiff was a member of his father's family for purposes of the family car doctrine. In Bryan, the court delineated in general terms the factors relevant to a resolution of this issue: When the head of a family provides an automobile for the use and pleasure of the members of the family and permits them to use it [at] will, they become the agents of the head of the family for the purposes of such use which includes their own personal pleasure, and when they are so using the automobile the head of the family is liable to respond in damages for injuries resulting from their negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior. The membership of the family is not determined by blood or marital relationship to the owner. The existence or non-existence of such a relationship is not determinative of the owner's liability. Neither is minority the test. These matters are circumstances to be considered along with other facts. 77 N.D. at 12, 39 N.W.2d at 437. Applying this standard, the court focused on the relationship between the son and the members of the father's family. Because the son had severed his relationship with members of the household [of the father] some three years prior to the accident, had maintained his own home and was no longer a member of the family group, the court declined to hold the father liable for the son's negligent operation of the vehicle. 77 N.D. at 13-14, 39 N.W.2d at 437-438. The Bryan application of the family car doctrine reveals that Terrance's argument is too narrow. Consistent with the agency basis of the doctrine, the totality of circumstances surrounding the relationship between Eric and members of the Terrance's family determines whether or not Eric was a member of the family for purposes of the doctrine. While the maintenance of a single physical abode is important, it is but one indicium of family membership. Other courts, when faced with this problem, have adopted an analytic approach akin to that used by this court in Bryan, supra . See, e. g., Platt v. Gould, 26 Ariz. App. 315, 548 P.2d 28 (1976)doctrine inapplicable because the daughter had reached her majority, had moved from the family home in New Mexico to her own home in Arizona, and was generally self-sufficient; Alexander v. Kendrick, 134 Ga.App. 249, 213 S.E.2d 911 (1975)despite divorce between the father and the mother, with custody of their daughter awarded to the mother, and their maintenance of separate physical abodes with their daughter residing with the mother, doctrine applicable to hold father liable because he admitted that he was the head of household; White v. Vananda, 13 N.C.App. 19, 185 S.E.2d 247 (1971)doctrine applicable even though son was in the military and resided away from home; Calhoun v. Eaves, supra doctrine inapplicable for various reasons, one of which was the son's residence away from home at the time of accident; Dunn v. Caylor, 218 Ga. 256, 127 S.E.2d 367 (1962) doctrine applicable even though the son was in military; McGinn v. Kimmel, 36 Wash.2d 786, 221 P.2d 467 (1950)doctrine inapplicable because the son had left the family circle and established a home of his own. Although not reaching identical results, the courts in these cases looked beyond the important but not dispositive factor of maintenance of separate physical abodes and delved into the relationship between the operator of the vehicle and members of the family of the alleged head of the household. The determinative factor implicit in these cases was whether or not the operator of the vehicle had severed his or her relationship with the family of the head of the household so as to terminate the fictitious agency relationship upon which the family car doctrine is premised. We use this test to decide the issue of family membership in the case at bar. The facts relevant to this issue are not in dispute. Eric was employed by Terrance's company. He lived in a trailer home owned by Terrance. He frequently visited and dined at Terrance's home. He often turned to Terrance for advice on personal matters. Yet the interaction between Eric and Terrance during working hours may be characterized as nothing more than that normally present in any employer-employee relationship. While Terrance owned the trailer home in which Eric lived, Eric and his two roommates, one of whom was not related to Terrance and Eric and clearly was not a member of Terrance's family, paid the trailer lot rent and utility expenses that they incurred. Nothing in the material submitted to the district court in regard to the motion for summary judgment establishes that Eric and his roommates rented the trailer home at a rental rate substantially below the reasonable rental value of the property. Finally, Eric's presence at Terrance's home and reliance on his counsel demonstrates only that Eric and Terrance maintained a normal father-son relationship. In view of these undisputed facts, the only possible inference is that, for purposes of the family car doctrine, Eric was not a member of Terrance's family, and there was no genuine issue as to a material fact. Although we believe a genuine issue of fact might exist as to the furnishing element of the family car doctrine, there is no such issue or inference as to the family membership element. Because both elements are necessary for application of the family car doctrine, summary judgment was proper. We recognize that Herman wields a significant weaponthe sword of public policy represented by the family car doctrine. With this sword in hand, we might be inclined to whittle away at the facts of this case in an effort to make the doctrine applicable. Yet, when confronted with an equally important concernencouragement and strengthening of normal familial bonds we find that this sword is blunted. We decline to extend the family car doctrine in a manner that would discourage normal, desirable interaction between family members who have severed, for purposes of the doctrine, the fictitious agency relationship that formerly existed between them. The judgment of the trial court in favor of Terrance is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PEDERSON, PAULSON and SAND, JJ., concur.