Opinion ID: 2216890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the equity case.

Text: This is an appeal by Cumberland under G.L.c. 40A, § 21, from a decision of the board holding that the issuance to Cumberland of building permit No. 224, without prior approval of the board, was a violation of the zoning by-law. Permit No. 224 was for an extension to a barn which was not in existence until some time after November, 1964. Cumberland contends that the making and filing of the board's decision more than ninety days after the filing of the appeal in violation of G.L.c. 40A, § 18, vitiates the decision. [6] The appeal from the issuance of building permit No. 224 was filed on September 1, 1965. On November 15, 1965, a public hearing was held on this appeal at which time the board requested from the parties an extension of the ninety day period set forth in G.L.c. 40A, § 18. The appealing party agreed to an extension of one week but Cumberland neither agreed nor disagreed. The decision, which was filed on December 7, 1965, ninety-five days from the date of the filing of the appeal, was five days late. The judge ruled that the decision was not invalid. There was no error. As was said in Cheney v. Coughlin, 201 Mass. 204, 211: As to a statute imperative in phrase, it has often been held that where it relates only to the time of performance of a duty by a public officer and does not go to the essence of the thing to be done, it is only a regulation for the orderly and convenient conduct of public business and not a condition precedent to the validity of the act done. The ninety day requirement in § 18 did not go to the essence of the thing to be done; it was directory and not mandatory. See Kerr v. Palmieri, 325 Mass. 554, 558, and Monico's Case, 350 Mass. 183. The issuance of permit No. 224 without board approval violated the express provisions of § VI of the by-law. Cumberland contends, however, that the by-law exceeds the authority of the enabling act and that it should yield to the inconsistent provisions of G.L.c. 40A, § 5. The trial judge ruled as matter of law that ... [c. 40A, § 5] did not apply to the construction... the Board of ... Appeals ... having found it to be new construction. Cumberland urges that this ruling was unsupported by the findings of either the master or the board. More, specifically, it assigns as error the fact that the judge relied on the findings of the board. It is true that in an appeal under G.L.c. 40A, § 21, the case is heard de novo and the decision of the board cannot be the basis of the court's decision. Devine v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Lynn, 332 Mass. 319. On the basis of the auditor's report we are of opinion, however, that the judge's decision was correct, although he may have assigned the wrong reason. See Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118, 125. The auditor found that permit No. 224 was for an extension to a barn which was constructed some time after November, 1964. The extension, together with the portions constructed under other permits, forms one barn which is a new barn for purposes of the by-law because it was not in existence when the by-law went into effect. Accordingly G.L.c. 40A, § 5, which deals with nonconforming buildings and uses, has no application to permit No. 224. Chilson v. Zoning Bd. of Appeal of Attleboro, 344 Mass. 406, 411. Nor, as stated above, does the proviso in § 5, added by the 1962 amendment, apply to new buildings. The final decree sustaining the decision of the board was right, and the entry must be Decree affirmed.