Opinion ID: 791101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Misconduct and Biased Juror

Text: 37 For his third point on appeal, Michael argues that the district court failed to adequately investigate potential juror misconduct. We review the district court's handling of allegations of juror misconduct for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d 954, 955 (8th Cir.1996). The alleged incident of juror misconduct in this case involves an intrajury statement overheard by a nonjuror during the government's presentation of the evidence. Detective Brian Green reported that he observed one juror, Skjoldal, silently mouth to another juror, McGregor, he's guilty. 38 In order to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial as well as his or her due process right to place the burden on the government to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury must refrain from premature deliberations in a criminal case. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). At a trial's beginning, judges typically admonish juries not to discuss the case among themselves or with anyone else prior to its conclusion. If a jury contravenes that instruction, it is not a light matter. A legitimate concern that a juror's impartiality is suspect cannot be ignored. Matters which come to the attention of the trial judge after trial has commenced which may affect impartiality on the part of a juror or jurors command careful consideration. United States v. Rowell, 512 F.2d 766, 768 (8th Cir.1975). 39 Jurors should clearly abstain from communicating to one another about a case before instructed to begin deliberations by the trial court. However, when there are premature deliberations among jurors with no allegations of external influence on the jury, the proper process for jury decision making has been violated, but there is no reason to doubt that the jury based its ultimate decision only on evidence formally presented at trial. See United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (8th Cir.2001); Caldwell, 83 F.3d at 956 (citing United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684, 690 (3d Cir.1993)). The appellant must show prejudice. 40 Michael contends that the district court erred by not determining whether he had been prejudiced by the alleged premature deliberations between Skjoldal and McGregor. When the court was put on notice of the potential misconduct, it summoned the parties. The district court assessed the nature and extent of the jurors' premature discussions. The court noted that this was not a matter of great significance and that it would inform the jury that engaging with other jurors in a discussion of the case ... would be inappropriate. The court admonished the jury: 41 Don't talk about the case or anyone connected with it until I finally chase you off to the jury room to decide the matter. And if, based on the testimony you've heard so far, any one of you has reached a conclusion as to guilt or innocence and decided that there's no way that can be shaken, if that's happened, don't share it with anybody, unless and until you finally get into the jury room to decide the case .... 5 42 Michael did not object to the court's admonition nor did he move for a mistrial. Because no objection was made, we review for plain error. 43 The trial judge is in a better position than our court to observe the impact of premature jury discussions of guilt, and to make a considered judgment as to the effectiveness of a cautionary instruction. Resko, 3 F.3d at 690. The court also acted consistent with the request of the defendant to instruct the jury not to prematurely deliberate and to report anyone among them who did. Given these facts, we hold that the district court did not commit plain error in choosing not to inquire further into the alleged juror misconduct or to order a mistrial sua sponte. The district court acted within its broad discretion in finding that the juror's alleged misconduct was insufficient to merit further investigation. See United States v. Williams, 77 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir.1996). 44 In addition, Michael argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to remove juror Skjoldal, the juror suspected of mouthing to another juror that Michael was guilty. Rule 24(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that alternate jurors shall replace jurors who become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties. The decision to excuse a juror for cause and substitute an alternate is vested in the district court's discretion, and will be upheld if the record shows a legitimate basis for the court's decision. United States v. Campbell, 845 F.2d 782, 785 (8th Cir.1988). 45 The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury. We presume impartiality so long as the jurors can conscientiously and properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts of the particular case. United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 1069, 1078 (8th Cir.2001) (quoting Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986)). [I]n federal criminal cases, we will not overturn the district court's finding that a prospective juror can put aside any pretrial opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence at trial `unless the error is manifest.' United States v. Blom, 242 F.3d 799, 805-806 (8th Cir.2001). 46 After the close of the evidence, and based upon the same incident recounted previously, Michael moved that juror Skjoldal be removed and replaced with an alternate juror due to bias, or, in the alternative, a mistrial. The court responded stating, It's— I'm not sure that's what happened. It's what the detective indicated he believed he thought he saw. The court denied both motions without conducting voir dire of juror Skjoldal. The government argues that the fact that the jury deliberated for a full two days and eventually returned a split verdict is a strong indication that the jury deliberated based upon the evidence provided rather than upon preconceptions. Michael argues that the record is void of any legitimate basis for the court's decision to allow Skjoldal to deliberate. 47 The court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to replace juror Skjodal. Even if it was certain that juror Skjoldal mouthed, he's guilty, this communication was not necessarily prejudicial to Michael. See Caldwell, 83 F.3d at 956 (juror comments that I've heard all of this I need to hear and this is just a bunch of crap insufficient to impeach jury's verdict). Here, Michael produced no evidence of juror Skjoldal holding any prior bias against him. Nor is there any evidence that juror Skjoldal acquired any extrinsic information. Juror Skjoldal made this alleged statement on the fourth day of trial. We have held that there is nothing wrong with a juror being influenced by prior testimony. Evans, 272 F.3d at 1079-80. The concern with bias is that a juror will decide a case on the basis of a pretrial predisposition against the interest of a party rather than on the basis of the evidence presented during the trial. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the incident did not require further action. 6