Opinion ID: 1688092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Circuit Court of Hancock County, Mississippi erred in granting summary judgment to SCI, Inc., the Plaintiff-Appellee.

Text: ¶ 13. The Commission believes that the circuit court's grant of summary judgment on damages to SCI caused a grave miscarriage of justice and frustrated the well-established legal principles of additurs and remittiturs of this State. It is well-settled that a motion for summary judgment challenges the legal sufficiency of all or part of an opponent's case. The motion lies only where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. A fact is material if it tends to resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties. This Court conducts a de novo review of the record on appeal from a grant of a motion of summary judgment. When reviewing an award of summary judgment, this Court views all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, including admissions in pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc. and will presume that all evidence in the non-movant's favor is true. If any triable issues of fact exist, the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment will be reversed. Otherwise, this Court affirms the decision. Diogenes Editions, Inc. v. State ex rel. Bd. of Trustees of Institutions of Higher Learning, 700 So.2d 316, 319 (Miss.1997) (citations omitted). ¶ 14. Initially, the Commission argues that the circuit court below was without authority to enter summary judgment after refusal of an additur and election of a new trial on damages. However, SCI argues that the trial court is entitled to grant summary judgment, if appropriate, in cases that have been remanded for a trial on damages only, relying on United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 86, 71 S.Ct. 160, 95 L.Ed. 89 (1950). The procedural history in United States Gypsum was somewhat different from the instant case, since there was no additur or remittitur involved. Rather, after reversing an order of dismissal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings. Id. at 81, 71 S.Ct. 160. At that point, one party moved for summary judgment on the grounds that there was no genuine issue of material fact. Id. Recognizing the trial court's ability to grant summary judgment on remand, the Court noted that the trial court, in determining whether genuine issues of fact remained, could rely on the findings of the Court in previous procedural appeals. Id. at 86, 71 S.Ct. 160. Then the Court went on to evaluate the proof regarding summary judgment. Id. at 87, 71 S.Ct. 160. ¶ 15. While the Commission argues that the additur/remittitur statute does not allow a trial court to enter summary judgment, it offers no precedent to support its position. The situation faced by the circuit court here is analogous to United States Gypsum. The circuit court below had already received damages evidence in the trial of the matter. Upon the summary judgment motion, SCI offered proof based on the jury's determinations and the circuit court's amended order. To the itemization of facts presented by SCI in support of its summary judgment motion, the Commission responded with its own brief and admissions/denials of SCI's itemized facts. At that point, the circuit court issued an order that read in part: Came on for hearing the Motion of SCI, INC., For Summary Judgment, and the Court, having considered and read the Motion and Briefs in support and opposition thereto, as well as all of the evidence submitted at the first trial that began October 2, 1995, and MDOT's Supplemental Responses to SCI's First Set of Interrogatories, and having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, finds and concludes that Plaintiff's Motion is well taken and should be granted. ¶ 16. A party seeking to recover upon a claim may, at any time after the expiration of thirty days from the commencement of an action, move for a summary judgment in his favor. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(a). See also Soley v. Star & Herald Co., 390 F.2d 364, 367 (5th Cir.1968) (recognizing the general rule which permits judicial notice of a court's prior cases to support a motion for summary judgment, but reversing because in his order, the trial judge made no specific reference to the basis for his grant of summary judgment). [1] Accordingly, we hold that it was proper for SCI to move for summary judgment, and we also hold that the circuit court was within its power to grant summary judgment in the trial on damages, if such judgment was proper. ¶ 17. The question becomes, then, whether summary judgment for SCI was actually appropriate in this case. Clearly, the Commission had the alternative to elect a new trial on damages only, after refusing the additur. Odom v. Roberts, 606 So.2d 114, 121 (Miss.1992). There was, on remand, no question that the Commission breached the contract with SCI. Pursuant to United States Gypsum, it was proper for the circuit court to rely on its determination that SCI's proof at trial was inherently probable, reasonable, credible, and trustworthy. However, since the circuit court determined that the original jury award of $2,370,888.65 was influenced by bias, passion, and prejudice, that award should have been treated as a nullity instead of a floor for awarding damages. As a result, the additur ordered by the circuit court was, at best, a suggestion offered to the Commission, which was rejected in lieu of a new trial on damages. ¶ 18. The Commission argues that numerous issues of material fact remain as to the extent of damages due SCI and, accordingly, that summary judgment was inappropriate. Further, the Commission argues, evidence showed that SCI could do productive work even with utilities present on the project site, that there was a difference in the damages actually incurred by SCI, and that SCI was not entitled to recover for extra work because it was not required to perform such work. The Commission also disputed the method by which SCI calculated its damages. ¶ 19. To determine the propriety of summary judgment, this Court must conduct a de novo review of the evidence regarding damages that was relied on by the circuit court below. Specifically, the Commission cites testimony suggesting that SCI failed to mitigate its damages. The Commission argues that evidence would show that SCI could have used more efficient equipment and could not have performed certain activities that are reflected in SCI's calculation of damages. Testimony at trial indicated that SCI was aware of work that it could have performed even with utilities on the project site, including new lane construction, dirt and grading work, repaving and widening of the shoulders, and wetlands mitigation planting. ¶ 20. SCI's summary judgment motion was simply that its damages, as determined by the Court previously, were still undisputed. It did not establish conclusively that mitigation did not exist. Nothing in the facts supporting summary judgment attempt to conclusively establish that mitigation of damages was not a defense. ¶ 21. SCI admitted in the hearing on the motion for summary judgment that there was proof as to SCI's failure to mitigate damages. However, SCI tried to dismiss this proof as useless because there was no quantum associated with it. Though the circuit court asserted that MDOT presented no evidence of the value of SCI's alleged failure to mitigate, did not promise any such evidence, and therefore MDOT did not demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists, this assertion is contradicted by what the Commission provided in responses to interrogatories, which constitute valid summary judgment evidence. ¶ 22. Jack McSwain, Rick Turner, David Foster, and Sam Peterson were all expected to offer evidence relating to work that SCI could have performed on the Highway 603 project that could have possibly mitigated damages that would be owed by the Commission. Similar testimony was presented by these individuals at trial. Foster and Peterson testified that SCI was able to do productive work on the Highway 603 Project. Turner testified that SCI could have done new lane construction and grading work despite the utility conflicts. The jury was even instructed regarding mitigation of damages. Although the jury verdict does not indicate explicitly that mitigation was a factor in its decision, if such mitigation evidence was sufficient to warrant an instruction to the jury, a factual question had to be present for resolution by the finder of fact. Moreover, the circuit court's determination that the jury verdict was improper reinforces the concept that mitigation might have been a factor that was improperly ignored by the jury. The circuit court recognized that money damages was challenged heavily by the Commission at trial. Given the circuit court's reliance on the facts revealed at trial, that court could not have concluded that SCI's damages were clear and undisputed. ¶ 23. We now emphasize that although the circuit court is empowered to grant summary judgment in a trial on damages only, it may only do so if there are no genuine issues of material fact as to damages. Here, there was a conflict as to the amount of damages. In light of its finding that the jury came back with an improper verdict, the circuit court should not have relied solely on that verdict to conclude that SCI was automatically entitled to damages. Genuine issues of fact as to the amount of damages recoverable by SCI existed in this case. Accordingly, we find that the circuit court below erred in assessing damages through summary judgment.