Opinion ID: 795169
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Heading: Substantive Due Process: Sanford's State-Created Danger Claim Against Stiles

Text: 19 Sanford alleges that Stiles is liable under a state-created danger theory because her actions increased the risk that Michael would commit suicide. (Appellant's Br. at 14.) Generally, the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty upon the state to protect citizens from the acts of private individuals. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). However, we have explicitly recognized two exceptions to this general rule. First, the state has a duty to protect or care for individuals when a special relationship exists. 4 Second, the state has a duty when a state-created danger is involved. See Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir.1997). Sanford's federal claims are based on this second exception. 20 In Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1201 (3d Cir.1996), we first adopted the state-created danger theory as a mechanism by which plaintiffs may establish constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We confirmed that liability may attach where the state acts to create or enhance a danger that deprives the plaintiff of his or her Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. Id. at 1205; see also Brown v. Pa. Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473, 478 (3d Cir.2003). The state-created danger theory is now widely recognized. Although the Supreme Court has not yet explicitly adopted it, a majority of our sister circuits have implemented some variation of the theory. 5 21 To prevail on a state-created danger claim in the Third Circuit, a plaintiff must prove the following four elements: 22 (1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and fairly direct; 23 (2) a state actor acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience; 24 (3) a relationship between the state and the plaintiff existed such that the plaintiff was a foreseeable victim of the defendant's acts, or a member of a discrete class of persons subjected to the potential harm brought about by the state's actions, as opposed to a member of the public in general; and (4) a state actor affirmatively used his or her authority in a way that created a danger to the citizen or that rendered the citizen more vulnerable to danger than had the state not acted at all. 25 Bright v. Westmoreland County, 443 F.3d 276, 281 (3d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and footnotes omitted); see also Smith II, 430 F.3d at 153 (quoting an earlier version of the test). 26 Sanford maintains that Stiles created the risk of Michael's death by, for example, holding herself out as a source of aid to Michael, cutting off other possible avenues of help, undertaking an assessment of Michael without proper training, improperly evaluating his risk, and deciding not to contact the school psychologist or a parent. Sanford's claim against Stiles fails because she is unable to show at least two of the four required elements of a state-created danger claim. Specifically, no reasonable jury could find (1) that Stiles acted with the requisite degree of culpability, or (2) that she create[d] an opportunity that otherwise would not have existed for [harm] to occur. Smith II, 430 F.3d at 153. Therefore, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. We examine the two elements in question, prongs two and four, in turn. 6
27 Because the culpability requirement is often the most difficult element for a plaintiff to prove, the outcome of a state-created danger case will often turn on this prong. See id. The Supreme Court has not fully explicated the standard of culpability in substantive due process cases generally, and our own jurisprudence is difficult to discern. See County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998) (noting that a complete analysis of the fault requirement in substantive due process cases is a matter for closer calls). We now attempt to clarify this difficult area of the law. 28
29 In assessing the standard of fault in state-created danger cases, we have inquired in the past whether the state actor acted in willful disregard for the safety of the plaintiff. See, e.g., Morse, 132 F.3d at 908 (quoting Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208). More recently, largely in consideration of the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis, 523 U.S. at 847-49, 118 S.Ct. 1708, we have acknowledged that the fault inquiry requires asking whether the state official acted with a degree of culpability that shocks the conscience. See, e.g., Bright, 443 F.3d at 281. 30 The Supreme Court decided Lewis nearly two years after we issued our opinion adopting the state-created danger theory in Kneipp. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the circuits as to the standard of culpability for due process violations in the context of a police chase. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 839, 118 S.Ct. 1708. The Court held that generally, in a due process challenge to executive action, the threshold question is whether the government officer's actions shock the contemporary conscience. Id. at 847 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708. The Court determined that in the specific context of a high-speed police pursuit, only an intent to harm the plaintiff could shock the conscience. Id. at 854, 118 S.Ct. 1708. However, the Court stated that whether behavior rises to the level of conscience-shocking will depend upon the facts of each individual case. Id. at 850, 118 S.Ct. 1708 (Rules of due process are not ... subject to mechanical application in unfamiliar territory.). 31 The Court suggested that in some instances, conduct involving more than negligence but less than intentional conduct could be shocking in the constitutional sense. Therefore, deliberate indifference, or perhaps gross negligence or recklessness, could be sufficient. Id. at 849-50, 118 S.Ct. 1708. In discussing the importance of context, the Court compared a high-speed chase or a prison riot on one hand with decisions regarding the medical needs of custodial prisoners on the other. Id. at 849-52, 118 S.Ct. 1708. In the latter custodial situation, deliberate indifference to the medical needs of prisoners would likely be sufficient because the state actor could engage in actual deliberation and unhurried judgments. Id. at 851, 853, 118 S.Ct. 1708. In the former situation, where deliberation is impossible, the higher standard of intent to harm would be required. Id. at 854, 118 S.Ct. 1708. Of course, we note that Lewis was not a state-created danger case but rather dealt with substantive due process generally. 32 Following Lewis, we have stated that in substantive due process cases, [t]he exact degree of wrongfulness necessary to reach the conscience-shocking level depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. Miller v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir.1999). And we have had occasion to reflect on the appropriate standard of fault in a number of different settings. Sometimes, an intent to cause harm has been required; other times, deliberate indifference has been sufficient. In Miller, 174 F.3d at 375-76, we first utilized a standard part way between intent to harm and deliberate indifference. In that case, a Department of Human Services social worker believed that two children were victims of domestic abuse, based on reports by daycare personnel, videotape footage of the children's injuries, and statements made by the children themselves. Id. at 371. The children were removed almost immediately from their mother's custody after an order was issued by an on-call emergency judge. Id. After custody was restored, the children's mother filed a substantive due process suit against the social worker, alleging that he had pursued his investigation without probable cause, misrepresented facts to an assistant city solicitor, and induced a children's hospital doctor to perjure himself. Id. 33 We stated that the social worker's actions, leading to the emergency order to separate parent and child, involved less urgency than a high-speed chase but more urgency than a decision involving the medical care of a prisoner. Id. at 375-76. Therefore, we applied a standard of fault between deliberate indifference and purpose to cause harm. Id. at 375. We defined this new standard as gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed `shocks the conscience.' Id. at 375-76. This standard was created to apply to cases in which no immediate or split-second decision was required, but where officials nonetheless did not have the luxury of true deliberation. As a result, we had articulated three possible standards to determine whether behavior rose to the level of conscience-shocking: 1) deliberate indifference; 2) gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed `shocks the conscience; and 3) intent to cause harm. We concluded that the middle standard had not been met, relying in part on the fact that there was substantial evidence ... that the children were in danger of abuse. Id. at 377. Like Lewis, Miller was not a state-created danger case, and is therefore distinguishable on that basis. However, given the subsequent incorporation of Miller into our state-created danger case law, we find it highly instructive. 34 In Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 800-01 (3d Cir.2000) (en banc), we reviewed a substantive due process claim brought by a minor against a New Jersey Department of Human Services caseworker who placed him in the equivalent of a foster home. Nicini was clearly very troubled and had apparently made two suicide attempts in the past. Id. at 801. After Nicini was sexually abused by one of the parents in his new foster home placement, he filed suit against the caseworker. He alleged that the caseworker failed to properly investigate the background of the foster parent, and that the caseworker knew or should have known that the placement was inappropriate. 7 Id. at 804. We assessed the caseworker's actions under the deliberate indifference standard, declining to impose the heightened standards utilized in Lewis and Miller. Id. at 811. We explicitly distinguished Miller because the caseworker in Nicini, unlike the social worker in Miller, had time `to make unhurried judgments' in investigating whether to permit the child to remain in the foster care in which he was placed. Id. (quoting Lewis, 523 U.S. at 853, 118 S.Ct. 1708). 35 Roughly two years later, in Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 58-59 (3d Cir.2002), a plaintiff brought a substantive due process claim against two paramedics, asserting that their careless actions in lifting him from a fall rendered him a quadriplegic. Rather than immobilizing the plaintiff's cervical spine before they moved him from the ground, the paramedics quickly lifted him and allegedly caused his injuries. Id. at 60. 36 We noted that Miller was binding and that the standard of culpability discussed there — a standard more rigorous than deliberate indifference — should apply. Id. at 65. However, we determined that the language in Miller — gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed `shocks the conscience' — was not intended as a precise articulation. Id. at 65. Specifically, we noted that arbitrariness is a general requirement for substantive due process violations and that gross negligence encompasses a lower level of intent than deliberate indifference. Id. at 66 n. 6. 37 In attempting to elucidate and apply the level of culpability required in Miller, we noted that the case appear[ed] to have demanded proof of something less than knowledge that the harm was practically certain but more than knowledge that there was a substantial risk that the harm would occur. Id. at 66. We formulated the following standard for circumstances where no instantaneous decision is necessary, but where the state actor also does not have the luxury of proceeding in a deliberate fashion: A plaintiff must show that the defendant[] consciously disregarded, not just a substantial risk, but a great risk that serious harm would result. Id. (emphasis added). 8 38 We next decided Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d at 506, or Smith I, in which the plaintiffs explicitly brought a state-created danger claim. As in Ziccardi and Miller, we believed that the situation in Smith I demanded a standard for conscience-shocking behavior that was between deliberate indifference and intent to cause harm. Specifically, we examined the appropriateness of state police officers' decision, inter alia, to activate a Special Emergency Response Team. Id. at 508-09. We determined that the relevant decisions were not made in a hyperpressurized environment. Id. at 508. 39 Not acknowledging Ziccardi, we utilized the articulation earlier formulated in Miller. We reiterated that in situations falling in the grey area between requiring true split-second decisions and allowing relaxed deliberation, liability may be found if an official's conduct exhibits a level of gross negligence or arbitrariness that shocks the conscience. 9 Id. at 509. 40 It was not until we decided Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir.2004), that we first explicitly acknowledged the heightened standard in Ziccardi in a state-created danger case. 10 There, we considered a family's claim that two emergency medical technicians exposed a seizure victim to danger by calling the police and reporting that the victim attacked them, but failing to warn the officers that the victim had suffered a seizure. Id. at 185-88. Upon arrival, the police restrained the man, allegedly causing his death. Id. at 200. We echoed the Ziccardi reiteration of Miller, stating at one point that a reasonable jury could conclude that the technicians consciously disregarded a great risk of serious harm to [the victim]. 11 Id. at 196. 41 Finally, in Smith II, 430 F.3d at 153-56, we again considered the elusive fault requirement, though in the context of qualified immunity. We first noted the inherent difficulty in determining whether conduct shocks the conscience. Id. at 153 (quoting Smith I, 318 F.3d at 509; Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 428, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the usefulness of `conscience shocking' as a legal test)). We also stated that [o]ur ... decisions have not clarified this [second] element of the test to any great extent. Id. at 153. For example, we recognized that the definition applied in Smith I was somewhat circular. Id. 42 In addressing the claim before us, we noted and seemed to apply our decision in Ziccardi, and stated in a footnote that the standard articulated there was useful. Id. at 154 n. 10. However, we also stated that the Ziccardi opinion did not deal with the question whether the standard formulated applied to state-created danger claims. Id. at 154. 43
44 From the cases discussed above, we gather the following. The level of culpability required to shock the conscience increases as the time state actors have to deliberate decreases. In a hyperpressurized environment, an intent to cause harm is usually required. On the other hand, in cases where deliberation is possible and officials have the time to make unhurried judgments, deliberate indifference is sufficient. 12 Though we need not decide the issue here, we note the possibility that deliberate indifference might exist without actual knowledge of a risk of harm when the risk is so obvious that it should be known. 13 We also recognize that there are circumstances involving something less urgent than a split-second decision but more urgent than an unhurried judgment. Generally, this category will include situations in which the state actor is required to act in a matter of hours or minutes. See Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 65. In other words, these are situations in which there is some urgency and only hurried deliberation is practical. For these circumstances, we utilize the standard set forth in Miller and reiterated in the explicit context of state-created danger in Smith I. However, we believe that gross negligence or arbitrariness that indeed `shocks the conscience' is a standard that provides little guidance. Therefore, we will incorporate the Ziccardi test, which is an interpretation of Miller, insofar as it requires that the defendants disregard a great risk of serious harm rather than a substantial risk. 14 45 In conclusion, we hold that in a state-created danger case, when a state actor is not confronted with a hyperpressurized environment but nonetheless does not have the luxury of proceeding in a deliberate fashion, the relevant question is whether the officer consciously disregarded a great risk of harm. Again, it is possible that actual knowledge of the risk may not be necessary where the risk is obvious. 15 46
47 The District Court concluded that the deliberate indifference standard applied, but like many other courts to examine this difficult area of the law, it incorrectly differentiated between a shocks the conscience standard on the one hand and a deliberate indifference standard on the other. For example, the Court suggested that the Lewis standard does not apply in non-urgent situations. We again clarify that in any state-created danger case, the state actor's behavior must always shock the conscience. But what is required to meet the conscience-shocking level will depend upon the circumstances of each case, particularly the extent to which deliberation is possible. In some circumstances, deliberate indifference will be sufficient. In others, it will not. 48 In finding that the deliberate indifference standard applied, the District Court noted that Stiles had an entire week — and another visit from Michael Sanford — to reconsider her [initial] evaluation. We agree that at least some forethought about Michael's condition was possible. Certainly, the intent to harm requirement utilized in Lewis does not apply. We also find this case distinguishable from Miller to the extent that there was probably no need for [Stiles] to act in a matter of hours or minutes. Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 65. But regardless of whether deliberate indifference, or something more, is required to show that Stiles' conduct shocked the conscience, Sanford is unable to meet her burden. Mere negligence is not enough to shock the conscience. See Schieber, 320 F.3d at 419. Thus, the relevant question is not whether Stiles should have contacted the school psychologist or Michael's parent. Instead, the question is whether, under the circumstances, Stiles' decisions shock the conscience. We hold that, applying either the deliberate indifference standard or the heightened standard we articulated above, they do not. 49 First, we examine the apparent gravity of the risk. As the District Court noted, no one, including Michael's mother, Karen, or Michael's uncle, believed that Michael was at risk of harm. Karen indicated several times that she did not believe that Michael would actually commit suicide. For example, she stated: I was shocked by the fact that he said he wanted to go kill himself. But, of course, I didn't think by the context of it that he was serious. (App. 410.) Karen had never heard Michael talk about hurting himself before and she concluded that he was not being serious since it just seem[ed] like one of those things that you would say and because Michael joked in the note. (App.410, 460-61.) 50 We also do not believe that the language in the note itself was a clear cry for help. Karen testified that the expression I want[ ] to kill myself was used all the time by her friends. (App. 461.) Karen was also told by Valladares that the guidance office get[s] notes like this all the time. (App.424.) Significantly, the note also referred to any suicidal thoughts as occurring in the past. 51 Second, Stiles cannot be said to have disregarded any risk that Michael presented. She did not simply ignore the note. To the contrary, she promptly spoke with Michael, at which point she made a conscious judgment that he indicated no suicidal signs. ( See, e.g., App. 421.) This judgment was influenced by the fact that Michael assured Stiles that he was no longer upset about the issue with Karen and that he had future plans. (App.256, 280.) For these reasons, we cannot conclude that Stiles' conduct shocked the conscience. The evidence adduced by Sanford, even when all inferences are drawn in her favor, falls short of both the standard we have borrowed from Ziccardi and the deliberate indifference standard. 52
53 Given that Sanford has failed to show that Stiles demonstrated the requisite level of fault, her claim can go no further. However, we note that Sanford has also failed to create a question of fact as to the fourth prong of the state-created danger test. Given our opinion in Bright, we ask if Stiles used her authority in a way that created a danger to Michael or that rendered [him] more vulnerable to danger than had [she] not acted at all. Bright, 443 F.3d at 281. 54 Sanford alleges eleven specific affirmative acts on the part of Stiles. (Appellant's Br. at 25-26.) For example, she alleges that Stiles (1) Interject[ed] herself into Michael's mental status, (2) Cut[] Michael off from other sources of aid, (3) Question[ed] Michael in a manner that pushed him toward suicide, (4) Misdiagnos[ed] Michael's psychological condition, (4) Intentionally decid[ed] not to refer Michael to the school psychologist, (5) Intentionally decid[ed] not to contact Michael's parent, and (6) Refus[ed] Michael's request to reveal the identify of the person who had turned in the note. ( Id. ) We agree with the District Court that [i]n this case, the link between the Defendants' conduct and Michael Sanford's untimely death is far too attenuated to justify imposition of liability. We reach this decision based on several considerations. First, as the District Court noted, Michael visited Stiles on only two occasions — once when she initially called him into her office and again when Michael asked her who she had received the note from. There is no evidence that Michael was agitated by these meetings, or that they contributed in any way to his suicidal feelings. 55 Second, contrary to Sanford's contentions, there is nothing in the record to suggest that Michael relied on Stiles for support or guidance. The primary encounter between Stiles and Michael was initiated by Stiles, and Michael repeatedly indicated that nothing was troubling him. Finally, Stiles did not in any way interfere with Sanford's parental relationship with her son. She did not, for example, suggest that Michael not speak with his mother. Sanford's choice not to intervene, for example, once she had seen Michael's instant messages referring to suicide, was not influenced by Stiles. 56 As the District Court noted, Sanford has attempted to recharacterize Stiles' failures as affirmative actions. We believe that this case is more about Stiles' failure to prevent Sanford's death. As we have stated many times, mere failure to protect an individual ... does not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 284 (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197, 109 S.Ct. 998) (internal quotation marks omitted).