Opinion ID: 2067279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Testimony, Emphasized in Closing Argument

Text: Defendant next asserts that testimony by State Trooper Ron Towery that defendant didn't want to talk after being informed of his Miranda rights, and the prosecutor's closing argument which emphasized that testimony, violated defendant's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination and right to due process of law, in addition to his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const., amends. V, VI. Defendant notes that during cross-examination by defense counsel, Towery was asked how much time he had spent in defendant's presence on the night of the incident: Q. [Defense counsel]: And how much time did you spend in his presence at that point? A. [Trooper Towery]: After he was placed in the room, I went in the room and asked if he had been given his rights under the miranda [ sic ] which he had and been told that he didn't want to talk. Defendant also points out that during closing argument, the prosecutor then argued that defendant was not intoxicated because he was able to answer questions from police after his arrest. Defendant cites the following portion of the prosecutor's argument: The officer, Steven Huggins, testified later that same evening that he got what is known as a personal history from the defendant in which he asked him certain questions about his life, his family, occupation, age, and in his opinion, the defendant was not intoxicated. Trooper Towery testified that he obtained clothing from the defendant and he had no difficulty whatsoever removing that clothing from himself. Now if you've ever been really intoxicated, one of the toughest things in the world you've got to do is get your clothes off especially. He had no difficulty in understanding any of the questions propounded by Officers Huggins and Towery. (Emphasis added by defendant.) Defendant contends that this argument reminded the jury that defendant didn't want to talk after the Miranda warnings. Further, defendant asserts that the unsolicited testimony of Towery that defendant did not want to talk improperly suggested that defendant was concealing his guilt rather than suffering from an alcoholic blackout. Defendant relies on Wainwright v. Greenfield (1986), 474 U.S. 284, 106 S.Ct. 634, 88 L.Ed.2d 623, to support his assertion that defendant's silence was ambiguous and was improperly used to rebut his intoxication defense, and breached the due process guarantee that silence following Miranda warnings cannot be used against a defendant. Defendant asserts that although defense counsel did not move to strike the unresponsive testimony or object to the closing argument at trial, nevertheless, the due process violation constituted plain error reviewable by this court. ( People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 68 Ill.Dec. 935, 447 N.E.2d 193.) Defendant also contends generally, without explication, that defense counsel's omissions regarding the damaging testimony and argument was ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of defendant's sixth amendment right ( Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91; People v. Rothe (1934), 358 Ill. 52, 192 N.E. 777). We review defendant's due process claim under the plain error doctrine (134 Ill.2d R. 615(a)), first determining if error occurred, and if so, whether the error amount to plain error ( People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill.2d 195, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1). The State asserts that the prosecutor cannot be held accountable for Towery's unresponsive answer, citing People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill.2d 376, 256 N.E.2d 321, overruled on other grounds, Wilson v. Clark (1981), 84 Ill.2d 186, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322. The State asserts that the prosecutor did not attempt to make use of the defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment rights to obtain his conviction, and the prosecutor's argument was within the proper bounds set forth in Greenfield, 474 U.S. at 292, 106 S.Ct. at 639, 88 L.Ed.2d at 630-31. The State asserts that the comments referred merely to defendant's answers given to routine booking questions asked by the police, which questions fall outside the protection of Miranda. Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990), 496 U.S. 582, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528. Further, the State asserts that although curative instructions to the jury would be deemed to have eliminated any prejudice ( Greer v. Miller (1987), 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 3109 n. 8, 97 L.Ed.2d 618, 630 n. 8), nevertheless, there is no sixth amendment violation under Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, because defense counsel could reasonably have decided that an objection would only have served to call attention to an otherwise relatively innocuous remark. We believe that Towery's response did exceed the bounds of a proper response to the State's question and should have been stricken. (See People v. Burris (1971), 49 Ill.2d 98, 273 N.E.2d 605; People v. Phillips (1989), 186 Ill.App.3d 668, 681, 134 Ill.Dec. 468, 542 N.E.2d 814.) However, we do not believe that Towery's statement alone, taken in the context of the full trial, in view of all of the evidence against defendant, amounted to harmful error. Further, we do not find that the prosecutor's closing argument placed undue emphasis on Towery's improper remark. We agree with the State that the statements in closing argument appeared to be directed toward defendant's responses to routine booking questions following his arrest, rather than an improper comment on defendant's exercise of his fifth amendment right. We find no reversible error. Moreover, we agree with the State that there was no sixth amendment violation. The United States Supreme Court in Strickland provided that ineffective assistance of counsel is shown where: (1) counsel made errors so serious and his performance was so deficient that defendant was denied reasonably effective assistance; and (2) the deficiencies so prejudiced defendant as to deprive him of a fair trial which reaches a reliable result. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693; see also People v. Johnson (1989), 128 Ill.2d 253, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118. Here, we find that neither prong of Strickland is met. First, counsel's action was not so deficient that defendant was denied effective assistance, because counsel reasonably could have decided not to object to the remark and argue its impropriety in order not to call further attention to the remark. ( Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066-67, 80 L.Ed.2d at 696.) Further, we find that admission of the testimony and the statement in closing argument, in view of all of the evidence, did not result in substantial prejudice to defendant as to deny him a fair trial. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693.