Opinion ID: 2629250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: because all provisions of the right-to-work amendment remain valid, severability analysis is rendered unnecessary

Text: ¶ 7 As the court recognizes in its pronouncement and I discuss below, the judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma restricts the application of Oklahoma's right-to-work amendment without rendering any of its provisions void as unconstitutional. The district court determined (1) employees subject to regulation under the RLA, [15] the CSRA, [16] the PRA [17] and federal enclave jurisdiction are outside the scope of Oklahoma's right-to-work amendment, [18] (2) Article 23 § 1A subsection (B)(5), Okl. Const., exceeds the scope of authority granted the states by § 164(b) of the LMRA, [19] and (3) Article 23 § 1A subsection (C) is outside the scope of authority granted by § 164(b) of the LMRA. [20] After determining that limited aspects of the right-to-work amendment conflict with and are preempted by the LMRA, [21] the district court turned its attention to the severability issue, but did not declare any right-to-work provision void as unconstitutional. ¶ 8 The judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma pronounced that Article 23 § 1A subsections (B)(5) and (C) were preempted by federal law as being outside the grant of authority conferred by Section 164(b) of the LMRA. [22] It does not follow from this conclusion that the provisions are void based on the determination that statutory provisions are preempted for exceeding the scope of federally granted authority. [23] Rather, the district-court determination operates to condition or restrict the application of the provision instead of rendering it void. ¶ 9 The district court noted restrictions in the application of the right-to-work amendment that prevent the statute from conflicting with or exceeding the scope of authority granted by federal law. Applying the federal-law preemptions outlined by the district court, the right-to-work amendment is limited in its application by the following conditions (1) the amendment applies only to employees encompassed by the LMBR, (2) hiring halls that discriminate between members and non-members are prohibited, and (3) employee authorization is required before union dues may be deducted, the authorization to remain irrevocable for one year. ¶ 10 The district court's conclusion that Oklahoma's right-to-work amendment applies only to employment relationships falling within the scope of § 164(b) of the LMRA articulates the restricted scope of the amendment. As the district court states, application of the State of Oklahoma's prohibition against union security devices is necessarily limited to those employees falling under the purview of the LMRA. [24] The practical effect of the district court's declarations is to restrict the full range of right-to-work amendment provisions to those private labor-management relationships which do not substantially affect interstate commerce. ¶ 11 When addressing restrictions in subsections (B)(5) and (C) of the right-to-work amendment, the district court relied on federal law. [25] The drafters of the right-to-work amendment sought primarily to regulate (1) those labor-management relations that lie within the narrow window of state regulation authorized by § 164(b) of the LMRA, and (2) labor-management relations completely outside the scope of federal authority. Labor relationships falling within the limited scope of state regulation allowed by § 164(b) stand limited by applicable federal law. That law dictates that these labor relationships permit non-discriminatory union hiring halls [26] and an annual obligation once an employee authorizes a payroll deduction for union dues. [27] Labor relationships within the exclusive authority of state governance are utterly unaffected by federal regulations. This leaves Oklahoma's amendment fully applicable in those contexts. ¶ 12 Despite imposing federal-law restrictions on the right-to work-amendment, the district court refused to adopt a statutory construction that would defeat the constitutionality of Oklahoma's amendment. Specifically, the district court applied the rules of statutory construction supporting a construction of the state law which will uphold its validity as opposed to one which will render it void by reason of federal preemption. [28] In adopting rules of statutory construction that uphold the overall validity of the right-to-work amendment, the district court acknowledged (1) Oklahoma's prohibition against union security devices is necessarily limited to those employees who fall under the purview of the LMRA, [29] and (2) Oklahoma's right-to-work law does not include individuals governed by the RLA, the CSRA, the PRA and federal enclave jurisprudence. [30] Preemption (by invalidation) of the right-to-work amendment was avoided through a statutory construction which restricts application of the amendment to the private labor sector and the area encompassed exclusively by the states. ¶ 13 The drafters of Oklahoma's right-to-work amendment reasonably contemplated and expected the limiting effect of applicable federal law. This is evidenced by the absence of an express or implied intention to avoid conforming or tailoring the text to applicable federal law. Recognizing that federal law does not operate on the universe of labor-management relations, the drafters sought to regulate (1) the narrow area of labor relations governed exclusively by the states, and (2) the federally authorized window opened by LMRA § 164(b). Because federal labor law is neither stagnant nor mummified in its present form, the drafters understood the outer boundaries of right-to-work amendment must be flexible to remain in conformity with present as well as future federal re-definitions. The restrictions imposed by the district court's pronouncement clearly articulate specific limitations on Oklahoma's right-to-work amendment while allowing the entire text of the amendment to stand available for application in conformity with extant federal law. ¶ 14 The district court's judgment that federal law preempts the text of Article 23 § 1A subsections (B)(5) and (C) does not create a lacuna in the amendment. A facial four-corners' examination of the amendment discloses complete survival of the legislation despite federal-law-imposed conditions being placed on the application of the right-to-work amendment. The impact of preemption on the amendment does not leave any unfilled territory that lies within the coverage of the statute, which if present, would call for severability analysis. As no provisions of the right-to-work amendment are constitutionally invalidated by the district court's declaratory judgment, the statutorily defined prerequisite for an employment of severability analysis (that a provision be declared void as unconstitutional) has not been met. The use of that analysis is hence inappropriate. SUMMERS, J., concurring in result and joined by LAVENDER, J. and BOUDREAU, J. ¶ 1 The federal courts in this case have determined that the Oklahoma Right to Work amendment, Okla. Court Art. 23 § 1A, has no application to certain employees, [1] and further was preempted in part by certain federal legislation. [2] The Federal District Court held that even with the invalid and preempted portions out, the Right to Work amendment's core provisions would have still been enacted, and thus withstood judicial severability analysis. ¶ 2 Preemption questions are those of federal law [3] and are not before us today. But severability of a partially invalid set of laws is a state question. [4] I must initially point out that the Court's opinion distinguishing preempted state law from unconstitutionality is incorrect. A state law is unconstitutional when it is preempted by federal legislation. Because the Court's opinion turns on this point, I must point out that the U.S. Supreme Court does not share our Court's view. For example: Because the state Act's provisions conflict with Congress's specific delegation to the President of flexible discretion, with limitation of sanctions to a limited scope of actions and actors, and with direction to develop a comprehensive, multilateral strategy under the federal Act, it is preempted, and its application is unconstitutional, under the Supremacy Clause. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 388, 120 S.Ct. 2288, 147 L.Ed.2d 352 (2000), (emphasis added). One hornbook explains: The supremacy clause mandates that federal law overrides, i.e., preempts, any state regulation where there is an actual conflict between the two sets of legislation. J. Nowak & R. Rotunda, Constitutional Law, 319 (5th Ed.1995). Preempted state law is struck down as unconstitutional  it violates the supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution. [5] In Crosby, the application was unconstitutional, as in the present case before us. It is the partial application of state law that is preempted and thus unconstitutional. [6] ¶ 3 On appeal the Tenth Circuit Court has certified to us the following questions: 1. Is severability analysis required in light of the preemption of [Okla. Const.] article XXIII, § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) as to workers covered by the NLRA, as opposed to the invalidation of those provisions? 2. If severability analysis is appropriate, are § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), § 1A(C), and § 1A(E) (insofar as it enforces § 1A(B)(1), § 1A(B)(5), and § 1A(C)) severable from the non-preempted portions of § 1A? ¶ 4 The first question: Is a severability analysis required? I would answer in the affirmative. However, the Court states that it takes the reasoning applicable to those workers covered by the Railway Labor Act, Civil Service Reform Act, and Postal Reorganization Act, and applies it to workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. Opin. at ¶ 13. I do not agree with this analysis in part, because: (1) The federal court stated that Art. 23 § 1A was not applicable in its entirety to workers covered by Railway Labor Act, Civil Service Reform Act, and Postal Reorganization Act, and that only portions of Art. 23 § 1A were invalid as to workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act; and (2) The point of the certified questions is whether valid portions (i.e., non-preempted portions) of Art. 23 § 1A may nevertheless apply to workers covered by the National Labor Relations Act and the Labor Management Relations Act. [7] ¶ 5 The Court concludes that the valid portions of Art. 23 § 1A apply to all workers to whatever extent they are not preempted. I agree in that result here, but only because of a severability analysis showing that the remaining portions of Art. 23 § 1A are capable of being enforced absent the preempted language. The severability analysis is what shows this capability. ¶ 6 Although the Court's opinion states that a severability analysis is not necessary, I must note that some of the language used by the Court herein is part of a severability analysis used by most courts. For example, the Court's opinion states that a severability analysis is not needed because Art. 23 § 1A was not intended to apply to certain groups of people, i.e., those covered by the Railway Labor Act, Civil Service Reform Act, Postal Reorganization Act. As I explain below, this type of reasoning, non-application of a state law to a particular class, or here, easily identifiable groups of people, is part of a severability analysis. ¶ 7 Cases involving a preemption of state law by federal law frequently involve a severability analysis, and the question of whether the remaining portions of non-preempted state law may remain valid presents a question for a state court to decide. For example in one opinion the High Court explained that a state's law was, as in the case before us today, preempted by federal law, in part, [8] and the Court concluded that the proper state court should decide whether the remaining valid provisions of state law were severable. State legislation is invalid to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law, Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Energy Resources Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 204, 103 S.Ct. 1713, 1722, 75 L.Ed.2d 752 (1983), and such a conflict has been demonstrated in this case. We leave to the New Jersey Supreme Court the state-law question whether, or to what extent, the nonpreempted provisions of the statute are severable from the pre-empted provisions. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 376, 106 S.Ct. 1103, 89 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986). This Court has used a severability analysis and concluded that invalid language invalidated the entire provision in which the invalid language appeared. [9] We have also used a severability analysis for severing the invalid portion and upholding the valid portion as legally effective. [10] ¶ 8 The severability analysis includes both a facial challenge to the language used in a statute or constitutional provision as well its applications. One author explained the authority on this issue as follows: ... the Supreme Court, the state courts, and secondary authorities all appear to agree that the invalidity of part of a law or of some of its applications will not affect the remainder (1) if the valid provisions or applications are capable of being given legal effect standing alone, and (2) if the legislature would have intended them to stand with the invalid provisions stricken out. Stern, Separability and Separability Clauses in the Supreme Court, 51 Harv. L.Rev. 76 (1937), emphasis added. That author further explained that courts use a severability analysis for problems of language as well as application Questions of separability fall into two general classes. One relates to situations in which some applications of the same language in a statute are valid and other applications invalid; the other to statutes containing particular language  whether words, phrases, sentences or sections  which is invalid, and other language entirely constitutional.... The first will be described as the problem of separable applications; the second as the problem of separable language. Id. 51 Harv. L.Rev. 78-79 (1937), emphasis in original and material omitted. This view is consistent with our statute on severability. See, for example, Ethics Commission v. Cullison, 1993 OK 37, 850 P.2d 1069, 1078, where we said that: Section 11a of Title 75 also requires examining whether an act may be severable in application. ¶ 9 The method a court uses in making its conclusion is based upon the court's assessment that the valid portion is capable of being enforced absent the invalid part, and that the legislative body intended such. For example, one author explained that a separability analysis involving different applications of a statute requires a court to determine legislative intent  specifically whether it is evident, from a contemplation of the statute and of the purpose to be accomplished by it, that it would not have been passed at all, except as an entirety, and that the general purpose of the legislature will be defeated if it shall be held valid as some cases and void as to others. 1 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 367 (8th ed.1927). The invalid parts of a legislative act, whether invalid by language or application, must be separable from the valid parts so that the valid may be enforced, otherwise the whole act is invalid: In general where the different portions of the statute form `inseparable parts of the same system,' the whole is invalidated by the unconstitutionality of a part. T. Sedgwick, The Interpretation and Construction of Statutory and Constitutional Law, 414 (2d ed. 1874). In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court and authors such as Stern, Cooley, and Sedgwick, agree that a severability analysis is used to determine whether a law, invalid in part, may nevertheless have its valid parts enforced. Thus, I decline to join the Court's opinion rejecting the application of such analysis to the present controversy. ¶ 10 What did the People intend when Art. 23 § 1A became law? A severability analysis attempts to determine such intent. The challenge to Art. 23 § 1A based upon application to workers covered by the Railway Labor Act, Civil Service Reform Act, Postal Reorganization Act, and the National Labor Relations Act is based solely upon the general and broad nature of the language in Article 23. [11] No language in Art. 23 § 1A specifically targets such employees or makes reference to federal law. ¶ 11 In 1996 this Court stated that: Four years ago, this Court held that the people's legislative power as defined in article 5, section 1, of the Oklahoma Constitution does not include the power to use the initiative process to attempt to change federal constitutional law. In re Initiative Petition No. 364, 1996 OK 129, 930 P.2d 186, 195, citing, In re Petition No. 349, State Question No. 642, 1992 OK 122, 838 P.2d 1. No language in Article 23 § 1A may be reasonably construed as an attempt to overturn federal law. These two opinions stating the People's inability to amend federal law via a State Question predate the passage of Art. 23 § 1, and this Court may presume that the People, acting as a legislative body, were aware of such authority. [12] Further, It is nothing unique to the jurisprudence of this State that federal law may be used to carve out an exception to applying an Oklahoma legislative act to certain groups of people. See, e.g., Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450, 458-459, 115 S.Ct. 2214, 132 L.Ed.2d 400 (1995), (Court noted its holdings where it has held unenforceable a number of state taxes whose legal incidence rested on a tribe or on tribal members inside Indian country). ¶ 12 This Court has construed, when possible, statutes and constitutional provisions so as to give effect to valid parts thereof. [13] We have said that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, a reasonable and rational statutory construction that upholds the validity of a legislative act will be used by courts. TXO Production Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Commission, 1992 OK 39, 829 P.2d 964, 968-969. [14] The People's intent to have a partial application of law combined with an absence of any showing of an intent to subvert federal law supports a conclusion of an intent that the valid portions of Article 23 § 1 should be applied as severed. ¶ 13 On this issue the parties discuss the lack of a severability clause, and the application of 75 O.S. § 11a. [15] Section 11a is a statutorily required presumption of severability. Facially, this section applies to statutes. Whether § 11a applies does not matter in this constitution-based controversy. [16] This is because the absence of a severability clause in Art. 23 § 1A, is not determinative. ¶ 14 When construing a federal statute the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that while the presence of a severability clause shows Congress' intent for severance, the absence of the clause does not carry with it a showing of an opposite intent. The inquiry is eased when Congress has explicitly provided for severance by including a severability clause in the statute. This Court has held that the inclusion of such a clause creates a presumption that Congress did not intend the validity of the statute in question to depend on the validity of the constitutionally offensive provision. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 932, 103 S.Ct. at 2774; Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n of Oklahoma, 286 U.S. at 235, 52 S.Ct. at 565. In such a case, unless there is strong evidence that Congress intended otherwise, the objectionable provision can be excised from the remainder of the statute. In the absence of a severability clause, however, Congress' silence is just that  silence  and does not raise a presumption against severability. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 686, 107 S.Ct. 1476, 94 L.Ed.2d 661 (1987). Mere legislative silence on the issue of severability may not control the presumption that legislative acts will be enforced to the extent that they are valid. ¶ 15 Part of examining legislative intent is whether the statute, or in this case a constitutional provision, is capable of being enforced without the offending applications. May the valid language be applied to workers not subject to the invalid portions? In our case today, after the invalid portions are removed as to certain workers, Art 23 § 1A states, in part, that: No person shall be required, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to: Become or remain a member of a labor organization; Pay any dues, fees, assessments, or other charges of any kind or amount to a labor organization; Pay to any charity or other third party, in lieu of such payments, any amount equivalent to or pro rata portion of dues, fees, assessments, or other charges regularly required of members of a labor organization; Further, that any person who directly or indirectly violates these provisions shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. These provisions are capable of being enforced, as a matter of state law, apart from the preempted language. ¶ 16 In Potter v. State, 1973 OK CR 228, 509 P.2d 933, our Court of Criminal Appeals discussed a criminal obscenity statute that created an exemption for certain conduct, specifically, motion pictures produced or manufactured as commercial motion pictures which (1) have the seal under the Production Code of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., and certain foreign films. Id. 509 P.2d at 934. The court determined that the exemption was both invalid and severable from the remainder of the statute. Id. 509 P.2d at 935-936. [17] Similarly, we have discussed whether invalid and valid provisions are so interwoven as to be incapable of distinct separation. Parwal Inv. Co. v. State, 1918 OK 498, 175 P. 514, 515. ¶ 17 In our case today, Article 23 § 1A defines certain conduct as constituting a misdemeanor. Similar to Potter, the conduct which is preempted does not interfere with enforcing the remainder of the non-preempted portion of Art. 23 § 1A that defines certain other conduct. The provisions listing types of conduct are not so interwoven as to be incapable of distinct separation. Parwal Inv. Co. v. State, supra . ¶ 18 This Court has indicated that the intent of a legislative body is for its enactments to be enforced in part, unless either a contrary intent is apparent, or the provisions are not capable of separate enforcement. No party has shown an intent of the People that Art. 23 § 1A should not be enforced, at least in part. The non-preempted language of Art. 23 § 1A is capable of being enforced apart from the preempted language. ¶ 19 I would thus answer the two questions in the affirmative. Yes, a severability analysis is required. Yes, the preempted portions are severable from the non-preempted portions. I concur in the Court's result. The non-preempted parts of the Right To Work Amendment are the law of Oklahoma.