Opinion ID: 4544408
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Trial and Verdict

Text: Following deliberations, the jury found that only Lt. Treubig used excessive force in violation of Jones’s constitutional rights. 5 It found that Officers Vaccaro, Muniz, and UC #349 did not use excessive force against Jones. The jury did not award compensatory damages, and initially awarded Jones solely punitive damages against Lt. Treubig in the amount of $30,000. After the district court instructed the jury to reconsider the award of nominal damages, the jury awarded Jones twenty-five cents. At the close of evidence, Lt. Treubig had requested that the district court dismiss the excessive force claim on qualified immunity grounds, and he renewed that motion after the jury returned its verdict. Over Jones’s objection, the district court asked the following questions to the jury in a special verdict form to assist the district court in resolving the qualified immunity issue, and the jury provided the following answers: 1. Did Lieutenant Treubig say he would use the taser before he used it? 5On appeal, Lt. Treubig does not contest the jury’s finding that he used excessive force. 9 A: Yes. 2. Was a second taser cycle needed to gain control of the plaintiff’s arms? A: No. 3. Did Lieutenant Treubig believe that a second taser cycle was needed to gain control of the plaintiff’s arms? A: Yes. 4. Was the plaintiff resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the first time? A: Yes. 5. Did Lieutenant Treubig believe that the plaintiff was resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the first time? A: Yes. 6. Was the plaintiff resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the second time? A: No. 7. Did Lieutenant Treubig believe that the plaintiff was resisting arrest when Lieutenant Treubig used the taser the second time? A: Yes. J. App’x at 137-38, 185-88. In short, the jury found that Jones was resisting arrest at the time that Lt. Treubig first used the taser. The jury also found that Jones was not resisting when Lt. Treubig used the taser the second time and that the second taser cycle was not needed to gain control of Jones’s arms for handcuffing, but that Lt. Treubig believed the opposite to be true as to both facts. As to his renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, Lt. Treubig argued that the jury’s answers demonstrated that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Given his belief that Jones was resisting arrest throughout the entire 10 incident, Lt. Treubig asserted that the district court should find that his mistaken belief was reasonable under the circumstances even as it related to the second use of the taser. In response, Jones argued, in part, that subjective beliefs were not relevant to qualified immunity; rather, the reasonableness of any perceived facts related to whether Lt. Treubig used excessive force in the first place—a question already answered against Lt. Treubig by the jury. Moreover, even though the jury found that Jones was resisting before the first taser cycle, Jones asserted that it was not clear from the verdict form whether “resisting arrest” meant passive resistance, in line with Jones’s theory, or active resistance, in line with defendants’ theory. In particular, Jones highlighted a portion of Lt. Treubig’s testimony when he was asked for details of Jones’s “active” resistance, to which Lt. Treubig responded that Jones had refused to “comply with the officers’ orders” and “to place his hands behind his back and he was refusing those orders.” J. App’x at 82. Such passive resistance, according to Jones, did not justify the use of force applied. Jones further contended that, even if qualified immunity applied to the first use of the taser, it did not apply to the re-cycling of the taser when Jones (as the jury found in the special interrogatory) was no longer resisting.