Opinion ID: 1752743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Withdrawal as a defense.

Text: Defendant argues that trial court erred in failing to find that defendant had withdrawn from the drag race prior to the collision between the Sulgrove and Ellis vehicles. The legal underpinning for his asserted withdrawal defense was State v. Fair, 209 S.C. 439, 40 S.E.2d 634 (1946). In that case, it was recognized that one drag racer could be held responsible for a death resulting from a collision between his competitor and a third party, under the vicarious liability theory of joint criminal enterprise; however, the defendant's conviction was reversed because of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the effect of withdrawal. Id. at 443-45, 40 S.E.2d at 636-37. The withdrawal defense is usually associated with the theory of joint criminal enterprise, as it was in Fair. As noted earlier, however, that theory of liability is not sufficient in this case to justify defendant's conviction for the death of Sulgrove; thus, the theory we have been examining is based on the idea that defendant's own reckless commission of a public offense cause[d] the Sulgrove and Ellis deaths within the meaning of section 707.5(1). Under this this theory, the notion of withdrawal is pertinent only insofar as it relates to the element of proximate cause. For example, if one drag racer were to abandon the race by slowing down to normal speeds or stopping, and his competitor became aware of the defendant's withdrawal but still chose to continue driving fast and recklessly, that fact might have a bearing on whether the defendant's drag racing was a proximate cause of a subsequent collision between his competitor and a third party; it might also bear on whether the competitor's decision to continue his reckless driving was an intervening, superseding cause. See Saisa v. Lilja, 76 F.2d 380, 381 (1st Cir. 1935); Jones v. Northwestern Auto Supply, 93 Mont. 224, 229-31, 18 P.2d 305, 306-07 (1932); Boykin v. Bennett, 253 N.C. 725, 732, 118 S.E.2d 12, 17 (1961); Lemons v. Kelly, 239 Or. 354, 356-60, 397 P.2d 784, 785-87 (1964). Thus, the point we wish to make here is that under the theory of direct liability we are considering, a defendant's asserted withdrawal should not be viewed as an absolute defense, but only as a factor affecting the determination of proximate cause. We will so consider it in the following division when we review the sufficiency of the evidence of proximate causation.