Opinion ID: 520594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of Secret Grand Jury Information

Text: 68 Hill and Rose each allege that during the course of the grand jury proceedings, Smyth and Goodman regularly reported what transpired in the grand jury to Defendants Asher and Bartle, contrary to state law regarding the confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. See Rose Amended Complaint p 41(b); Hill Amended Complaint p 40(b). 10 The district court held that the defendants were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity with respect to this alleged activity because the leak occurred within the context of a judicial proceeding and was for the purpose of relaying information that was actually presented to the state grand jury. See, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 692 F.Supp. at 527. 69 The court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that this court's decision in Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d at 564 (per curiam), mandated a contrary holding. Helstoski involved an action against a number of defendants including a United States Attorney for, inter alia, allegedly abusing the grand jury process and allegedly deliberately leaking false information to the press, in violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The Helstoski court held that absolute prosecutorial immunity was inapplicable, reasoning: 70 Even if absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to the administrative and investigative functions of a United States Attorney, it is our opinion that certain paragraphs of Mr. Helstoski's complaint aver conduct which goes beyond the proper performance of these aspects of a prosecutor's job. We note, in particular, the several allegations of deliberate leaks by the prosecutor of false information concerning Mr. Helstoski in order to damage his political prospects. It would appear that such activity, if it occurred would lie outside of the rationale for absolute immunity set forth in Imbler. At most, it would be subject to a qualified good-faith immunity. 71 Id. at 566. 72 The district court distinguished Helstoski on two grounds. It stated that in Helstoski, the leaks necessarily occurred outside of any judicial proceeding, whereas here, the leaks occurred within the context of a judicial proceeding and thus fell within the Imbler standard. The district court further indicated that Helstoski was not controlling because in Helstoski the leaked information was allegedly false, whereas here, the plaintiffs merely alleged that defendants leaked accurate information. See, e.g., Rose v. Bartle, 692 F.Supp. at 527. On appeal, the essential dispute between the parties involves whether or not Helstoski mandates reversal of the district court's holding on this issue. 73 To the extent that the district court's grant of immunity was premised upon the bare fact that the leaks involved here occurred during the course of a grand jury proceeding, its analysis is erroneous. For instance, in Powers v. Coe, 728 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir.1984), the court held that a prosecutor was not absolutely immune for leaking secret information from the grand jury investigation to the media, reasoning that [t]o the degree that a prosecutor is called upon as part of his official duties to deal with the press, it would appear beyond cavil that such a duty would be administrative rather than 'quasi judicial,' and hence not deserving of the cloak of absolute immunity. Moreover, we agree with the plaintiffs that the court erred in reasoning that because the leaked information in this case was accurate, the defendants were entitled to immunity. The accuracy of the information disclosed is irrelevant in an inquiry as to whether the defendants' alleged activities were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process under Imbler. 74 Smyth correctly recognizes that a court must employ a functional analysis test in determining whether immunity is available, see Mancini, 630 F.2d at 992; that the critical issue for immunity purposes is whether a prosecutor is acting within his quasi-judicial role or his administrative/investigative role. However, neither Smyth, the other parties, nor the district court seem to have actually applied such a functional analysis in considering this issue. The relevant inquiry here is whether Smyth and Goodman, when they allegedly reported what was happening in the grand jury proceedings to Asher, the Chairman of the Montgomery County Republican Party, and Bartle, the Chairman of the County Commission, were acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, an administrative/investigative capacity, or totally outside any prosecutorial authority. Viewing the issue in this light, Helstoski is not particularly helpful; there, the prosecutor disseminated information to the press, whereas here, the information was disseminated to various co-defendants. 75 Based upon the pleadings as they stand, we believe that the district court erred in holding that prosecutorial immunity was available as a matter of law; there simply is not enough information in the pleadings to have enabled it--or to enable us--to determine what role the defendants were acting in when they relayed the relevant information to Bartle and Asher. There is no indication, for instance, that the information was relayed in the course of routine meetings dedicated to the preparation and prosecution of the case, Weg v. Macchiarola, 654 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (immunity available for allegation that prosecutor discussed criminal case against plaintiffs with co-defendants who were not prosecutor's fellow employees, because discussions took place during case preparation meetings). In fact, it is possible that the leaking of information to Bartle and Asher was totally unrelated to Smyth and Goodmans' prosecutorial roles and exceeded the scope of their prosecutorial authority. 11 76 Smyth maintains, however, that even if absolute immunity is unavailable for the alleged disclosures, such conduct is insufficient to state a claim under section 1983, and that therefore, this claim against both prosecutors must be dismissed. We agree. 77 As noted earlier, Hill and Rose allege in their respective complaints that the disclosures were violative of state law. It is axiomatic that violations of state law alone are insufficient to state a claim for section 1983 relief. Powers, 728 F.2d at 105 (citing Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980)). In their briefs, the plaintiffs do not argue that these disclosures also are independently actionable under section 1983, and at oral argument, counsel for Rose who argued, in effect, for all of the plaintiffs, stated that whether the disclosures constituted a civil rights violation was not relevant to our claim. Hill did not disassociate himself from this statement. Instead, the plaintiffs assert that the disclosures establish a link in the conspiracy among the defendants to violate the plaintiffs' civil rights; in essence, that the disclosures, although they themselves are not claimed to have impinged any constitutional right, can be used as a bootstrap to render these defendants liable for conspiracy to maliciously prosecute. 78 We disagree. Smyth and Goodman are absolutely immune from liability for the damages resulting from the malicious prosecution. See Imbler. Engaging in an illegal conspiracy does not affect this immunity. The plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the illegal conspiracy, independent of the malicious prosecution, deprived them of any rights or resulted in any damage. The injury claimed by the plaintiffs resulted from the malicious prosecution, for which the prosecutors are absolutely immune. The plaintiffs have failed to claim a redressable injury. 79 We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of all the plaintiffs' claims against Smyth and Goodman. 12