Opinion ID: 153863
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Grant of Summary Judgment to IBEW

Text: - 12 - York brought two claims against IBEW, alleging that the union (1) discriminatorily breached its duty of fair representation under Title VII when it refused to pursue her grievances and (2) acquiesced in AT&T’s disparate treatment of women and its maintenance of a two-year experience requirement which had a disparate impact on women. IBEW moved for summary judgment on both of these claims. On the first claim, the district court denied the motion for summary judgment as it related to the trainee position and granted the motion with respect to the Operating Engineer position. On the second claim, the court granted IBEW’s motion for summary judgment. York now appeals the grant of summary judgment on these claims. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard employed by the district court. Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995). Under this standard, mere assertions and conjecture are not enough to survive summary judgment. Branson v. Price River Coal Co., 853 F.2d 768, 77172 (10th Cir. 1988). We turn first to the breach of fair representation claim. To establishing a prima facie Title VII claim against a union for a breach of its duty of fair representation, a plaintiff must show that (1) the employer violated the collective bargaining agreement with respect to the plaintiff, (2) the union permitted the violation to go unrepaired, thereby breaching the union’s duty of fair - 13 - representation, and (3) there was some indication that the union’s actions were motivated by discriminatory animus. Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co. & Retail Meatcutters Union, Local 320, 773 F.2d 857, 868 (7th Cir. 1985). The district court found that York failed to establish the third element--that IBEW was motivated by discriminatory animus in declining to pursue her grievance--in that she failed to submit any evidence demonstrating such motivation on the part of the union or any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find such motivation. York contends that the fact that no other member of the union stood to benefit from IBEW’s support of AT&T’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement necessarily dictates an inference that discriminatory animus must have motivated the union’s refusal to contest AT&T’s interpretation. This contention is flawed. The collective bargaining agreement entitles IBEW to pursue grievances on any matter “arising with respect to the interpretation and application of this agreement or other terms and conditions of employment.” However, IBEW is not compelled, either under this agreement or under Title VII, to pursue an individual member’s grievance if the union reasonably disagrees with the basis for that grievance. A union’s statutory duty of fair representation does not oblige it to take action on every grievance brought by every member. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-92 (1967). Indeed, if a union could be compelled to - 14 - take official action on every grievance, irrespective of merit, the union would quickly deplete its resources and credibility; and the arbitration machinery would eventually become overburdened. See id. at 191-92. For more than twenty years, IBEW had consistently adhered to the understanding of the collective bargaining agreement shared by AT&T--that Operating Engineer applicants must possess practical experience. IBEW argues that it supported the experience requirement because of the significant risks and responsibility for others’ safety involved in powerhouse operation. IBEW also notes that the classroom vocational training that York received did not include instruction in the repair of powerhouse equipment. IBEW has maintained this position with respect to both male and female applicants. The mere fact that no other union members possessed interests that were directly adverse to York’s grievance does not constitute an indication of discriminatory animus on IBEW’s part where a reasonable basis exists for the union’s belief that a viable grievance did not exist. The experience requirement is a legitimate, non-discriminatory qualification for the job, and York failed to present evidence showing that the requirement was merely a pretext for discrimination. York also contends that the conversation she had with Srejma, a conversation of which IBEW was aware, compels the conclusion that IBEW acted with discriminatory animus. This contention is incorrect, because obtaining a - 15 - Class I license entailed acquiring practical experience when the conversation occurred. Thus, Srejma’s answer implicitly conveyed the experience requirement to York. Moreover, he indicated in subsequent testimony that he did not intend his statement to be taken as a complete list of qualifications for the job. The fact that IBEW did not share York’s strained conclusion that Srejma’s statement of qualifications was evidence of sexual discrimination by AT&T does not amount to an indication of discriminatory animus on the part of IBEW. In addition, York claims that the union acquiesced in AT&T’s allegedly discriminatory treatment of York and its maintenance of a two-year experience requirement that had a disparate impact on women. Under Title VII, a union may not refuse to file a valid discrimination claim against an employer on behalf of one of its members simply because that member belongs to a particular minority group. Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 666-69 (1987). We have held that “[a] union cannot acquiesce in a company’s prohibited employment discrimination and expect to evade Title VII liability for such discrimination.” Romero v. Union Pac. R.R., 615 F.2d 1303, 1311 (10th Cir. 1980). However, mere inaction does not constitute acquiescence. Acquiescence requires (1) knowledge that prohibited discrimination may have occurred and (2) a decision not to assert the discrimination claim. See Goodman, 482 U.S. at 669. In this case, the plaintiff failed to present evidence from which a reasonable jury could - 16 - conclude that IBEW possessed the requisite knowledge. York offered no evidence establishing either that IBEW knew of intentional discrimination against women by AT&T management regarding the Operating Engineer position or that IBEW was aware of any disparate impact effected by the practical experience requirement. York argues that the fact that plant management had never employed a woman in the Operating Engineer position suffices to establish that IBEW knew that AT&T was intentionally discriminating against female candidates for this position. Drawing such a conclusion from the mere fact that no women had worked in the Operating Engineer position requires too many assumptions and logical leaps. The district court was therefore correct when it concluded that York had presented no evidence showing that IBEW knew of sex discrimination by AT&T regarding the position of Operating Engineer. York also argues that the absence of women in the position suffices to establish IBEW’s knowledge of the disparate impact of the experience requirement. This argument also must be rejected. The mere absence of women is insufficient to show that the experience requirement was the cause of any disparity in the number of men and women in the position, let alone that IBEW knew of and acquiesced in any such causality. On this issue as well, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to defendant IBEW. - 17 -