Opinion ID: 199098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets

Text: 30 The jury found Martin guilty of count 13, which charged him with conspiracy to steal trade secrets in violation of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, specifically 18 U.S.C. §a1832(a)(5). 6 In order to find a defendant guilty of conspiracy, the prosecution must prove (1) that an agreement existed, (2) that it had an unlawful purpose, and (3) that the defendant was a voluntary participant. See United States v. Echeverri, 982 F.2d 677, 679 (1st Cir. 1993). The government must prove that the defendant possessed both the intent to agree and [the] intent to commit the substantive offense. United States v. Andujar, 49 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Garca, 983 F.2d 1160, 1165 (1st Cir. 1993)). In addition, the government must prove that at least one conspirator committed an overt act, that is, took an affirmative step toward achieving the conspiracy's purpose. See 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(5); United States v. Cassiere, 4aF.3d 1006, 1014 (1st Cir. 1993). 31 The agreement need not be express, however, as long as its existence may be inferred from the defendants' words and actions and the interdependence of activities and persons involved. Cassiere, 4 F.3d at 1015 (quoting United States v.Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1990)). A so-called tacit agreement will suffice. See United States v. Woodward, 149 F.3d 46, 67 (1st Cir. 1998). Moreover, the conspirators need not succeed in completing the underlying act, see United States v.Giry, 818 F.2d 120, 126 (1st Cir. 1987), nor need that underlying act even be factually possible. See id. 32 As of yet, only the Third Circuit has had the opportunity to address § 1832(a), which specifically covers private corporate espionage. See United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998). The statute criminalizes the knowing theft of trade secrets, as well as attempts or conspiracies to steal trade secrets. The Act defines a trade secret broadly, to include both tangible property and intangible information, as long as the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep such information secret and the information derives independent economic value . . . from not being generally known to . . . the public. Id. at 196; 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). 7 This definition of trade secret protects a wider variety of information than most civil laws; however, it is clear that Congress did not intend . . . to prohibit lawful competition such as the use of general skills or parallel development of a similar product, Hsu, 155 F.3d at 196-97, although it did mean to punish the disgruntled former employee who walks out of his former company with a computer diskette full of engineering schematics,id. at 201 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 104-788, at 7). In other words, § 1832(a) was not designed to punish competition, even when such competition relies on the know-how of former employees of a direct competitor. It was, however, designed to prevent those employees (and their future employers) from taking advantage of confidential information gained, discovered, copied, or taken while employed elsewhere. 33 Martin contends that the evidence is factually insufficient to establish a meeting of the minds or agreement to violate § 1832(a), because (1) insufficient evidence exists to establish an agreement between Martin and Camp; (2) insufficient evidence exists to prove that Martin had the necessary intent to commit an act prohibited by § 1832(a), i.e., injure the owner of the trade secret (IDEXX); and (3) the information provided by Camp to Martin did not meet the statutory definition of a trade secret under § 1839(3). As we explain below, none of these arguments are persuasive. 34 First, the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that Martin and Camp formed an agreement regarding the theft of trade secrets. Martin's argument against the existence of an agreement relies on the facts that (a) his early e-mails specifically requested that Camp not send him confidential information, and (b) Camp did not seem to know the distinction between confidential information, proprietary information, and office gossip. However, while Martin's disclaimer and Camp's confusion indicate the lack of an explicit agreement at that time, they do not necessarily negate the existence of an agreement. See Woodward, 149 F.3d at 67 (including tacit agreements within conspiracy requirements). A rational jury could have plausibly concluded on the basis of the evidence presented at trial that an agreement existed. By July 21, Martin had received extensive correspondence from Camp that she had either marked confidential or proprietary, or had expressed some hesitation in forwarding. 8 Despite his previous protestations that he wanted nothing to do with IDEXX or its confidential information, Martin asked Camp on July 21 to absorb as much information, physically and intellectually, as you can, and included a set of questions to direct Camp's research. Throughout June and July, Martin referred to Camp as Agent Ace, or as his spy. Given the type of information that Martin had already received, a reasonable jury could have concluded that, whatever Martin's original intentions, as of July 21, Camp and Martin had reached a tacit agreement by which she would send him items and information that potentially fell under the trade secret definition of 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3). In other words, sufficient evidence exists to show an agreement between Camp and Martin to violate § 1832(a). 35 Second, the evidence is sufficient to show that Martin intended to injure IDEXX by obtaining IDEXX trade secrets and competing against IDEXX. Although Martin consistently claimed that he had no interest in developing products that competed with IDEXX, and hence had no intention of injuring IDEXX economically, his correspondence with Camp detailed a plan of competition. Martin had, among other things, considered the possibility of starting a competing veterinary lab, 9 and had asked Camp to think, in particular, about ways to compete with tests that IDEXX manufactured. A reasonable jury could have found that Martin intended to use the information gained from Camp, particularly information on IDEXX's costs and customer dissatisfaction with IDEXX, to create a more successful competitor with greater capability to injure IDEXX. 36 Third, Martin's final argument - that he actually received no trade secrets - even if true, is irrelevant. Martin has only been found guilty of a conspiracy to steal trade secrets, rather than the underlying offense. 10 See Giry, 818 F.2d at 126. The relevant question to determine whether a conspiracy existed was whether Martin intended to violate the statute. See id; see alsoHsu, 155 F.3d at 198 ([T]he crimes charged - attempt and conspiracy - do not require proof of the existence of an actual trade secret, but, rather, proof only of one's attempt or conspiracy with intent to steal a trade secret.). The key question is whether Martin intended to steal trade secrets. A rational jury, considering the information Camp had already sent Martin, could have concluded that his further queries indicated such an intention. 37 A reasonable jury could therefore have concluded that Martin and Camp formed an agreement by which Camp conveyed information and property to Martin that potentially fell under the definition of a trade secret in 18 U.S.C. § 1839. As a result, sufficient evidence existed to convict Martin of conspiracy to steal trade secrets. 38