Opinion ID: 2552553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Factor (k) Claim

Text: Defendant claims as an additional legal consequence that the rulings violated his right to present mitigating evidence. This right, however, does not trump or override the ordinary rules of evidence. (See People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th 518, 577, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137 [as a constitutional matter, trial courts retain authority to exclude evidence that has no bearing on a defendant's character or record or the circumstances of the offense].) As already explained, any error in sustaining the single question about Berta Siy's response to defendant's request to be adopted was harmless. 4. Prosecutorial Misconduct Defendant maintains that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct at the penalty phase. We disagree. In almost all instances, defendant did not object at trial to the misconduct he perceives on appeal. A defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely fashion, and on the same ground, the defendant objected to the action and also requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the perceived impropriety. ( People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 284, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) In this case, a timely objection and request for admonition would have cured any resulting harm. (See People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 167, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) Defendant's claims regarding the conduct he did not object to at trial are therefore forfeited on appeal. Exceptions will be noted below. We also see no misconduct. Most of defendant's contentions relate to closing argument. At that stage, prosecutors have wide latitude to discuss and draw inferences from the evidence presented at trial. `Whether the inferences the prosecutor draws are reasonable is for the jury to decide.' ( People v. Wilson (2005) 36 Cal.4th 309, 337, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 513, 114 P.3d 758.) The prosecutor stayed within proper bounds. Defendant also raises one complaint regarding the prosecutor's presentation of evidence. We turn to each contention. a. Remarks on Defendant's Learning and Emotional Difficulties Defendant complains that the prosecutor should have argued he was deserving of death despite his learning disabilities and emotional and psychological problems, rather than choosing to dispute the existence of these disabilities and relying on disinformation and ridicule to distract from the reality and allow the jury to get off the moral hook of voting to execute a troubled young man.... Defendant contends the prosecutor used questionable expert testimony and belittl[ed] the whole idea of learning disabilities. The claims are meritless. Defendant overlooks the prosecutor's role at the penalty phase, which includes inviting the jury to draw the inferences most favorable to his position within the limits set by the evidence. Prosecutors may attack the defense case and argument. Doing so is proper and is, indeed, the essence of advocacy. ( People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 635, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) As described, defendant presented evidence of his psychological impairments in mitigation. The prosecutor was within his rights to present evidence and argument that defendant's evidence did not accurately portray his condition. (See People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 420, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1 [jury is entitled to consider sympathy, but is not required to do so, and a prosecutor may argue that the facts do not warrant it]; People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 171, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988 [prosecutor has wide latitude to rebut and argue against the defense case].) Defendant characterizes the testimony of a prosecution expert, Linda Calvin, as questionable, pointing to the fee paid to her as evidence that the prosecution purchased her research results. As described, Calvin testified there was no conclusive evidence that defendant suffered from attention deficit disorder or ADHD, that if he had a learning disorder, it was mild to moderate, and that he possessed average intelligence. The prosecution was entitled to present Calvin's testimony to refute defendant's mitigating evidence of his cognitive and emotional impairments. In turn, of course, defendant was entitled to cross-examine Calvin and argue against her, attacking her credibility and the weight to be given her testimony. Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in suggesting that defendant was relying on an abuse excuse and in ridiculing the bureaucratic jargon of the educational establishment. The record shows that the prosecutor was scorning what he argued was school officials' predilection for euphemisms â obtuse phraseology masking their unwillingness to grapple with the reality of serious student misconduct. The prosecutor's remarks were well within the bounds of acceptable comment based upon the evidence, given that defendant was asking the jury to mitigate his penalty based on his personal history. `The prosecutor is permitted to urge, in colorful terms, that defense witnesses are not entitled to credence.'  ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 433, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; see also People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 420, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) b. Purported Sarcasm Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct by engaging in sarcasm and snide comments to belittle his case. He notes in particular the prosecution's disparaging characterization of section 190.3, factor (k), as a law that permits a criminal defendant to present any possible excuses for his conduct and the prosecutor's comments generally that the mitigation case was deficient and inconsistent with the tenets of a civilized society. These claims are unpersuasive. As noted, the prosecution is entitled to argue that the facts presented by a defendant at the penalty phase of a death penalty case do not warrant sympathy. As in People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 420, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1, the prosecutor did not tell the jury it could not consider sympathy for defendant â in fact he said it could â but instead urged, as he was entitled to do, that the defense evidence did not call for the extension of mercy to defendant as a result of that sympathy. c. Alleged Appeal to Political Prejudices Defendant draws our attention to two comments that he asserts were improper appeals to jurors'conservative political prejudices. An educational consultant, Carol Horwich Luber, testified that the school system failed to provide specialized services that would have made defendant a much more successful student in elementary, junior high and high school. Defendant contends that the prosecutor committed misconduct in describing Luber's testimony as unduly critical of the school system. The prosecutor argued that she was probably a professional complainer, a pain in the neck who would demand that the system follow her preferred course of action and might sue if it did not. Second, the prosecutor argued in effect that defendant was a layabout who had spurned work opportunities and instead had been receiving support from the state and a private charity before he committed the capital crime. As stated, `[t]he prosecutor is permitted to urge, in colorful terms, that defense witnesses are not entitled to credence.' ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th 381, 433, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) The comment relating to Luber was colorful but not improper. The prosecutor's argument that defendant had squandered opportunities in his short life before committing the capital crime also was not misconduct. He fairly pointed out that defendant's story was not limited to his childhood and adolescent difficulties; defendant had received help and opportunities from his family, counselors, and society in the form of employment, money, and food. d. Alleged Appeal To Regional Prejudices In closing argument, defendant told the jury that the two Hillside Strangler murderers had avoided the death penalty and urged that he was not as bad as they. He argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during rebuttal argument, when he argued that to the extent the jurors were unfamiliar with the evidence in that case, the comparison was inapposite, and further suggested that the county in which the Hillside Strangler murderers were tried might have had an effect on the determination of their sentence. There was no misconduct, but only fair argument in response to defendant's invocation of the Hillside Strangler case in support of a life sentence. ( People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 171, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) e. Adolescent Misconduct Defendant next contends the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by overemphasizing what defendant views as evidence of trivial and typical adolescent misbehavior. In particular, defendant refers to the prosecutor's focus on instances of his misconduct in high school in the prosecution's rebuttal case. As noted, defendant taunted one physically handicapped classmate and another student with a hygiene problem, and encouraged other students to do the same. Defendant first complains that the prosecutor should not have introduced the rebuttal evidence. With regard to the evidence of taunting the handicapped student, defendant raised objections at trial on unrelated evidentiary grounds, but not on the ground that the prosecutor was committing misconduct. With regard to the testimony regarding the student with the hygiene problem, defendant interposed no objection on any ground. He has not preserved his claims for review. ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765) Defendant next complains that the prosecutor should not have emphasized his adolescent misconduct at closing argument. In his view, the misconduct was so trivial that to bring it to bear on the question whether he should live or die was unseemly. Again, however, he failed to seek a remedy at trial, and has not preserved the claims for review. ( People v. Ayala, supra, 23 Cal.4th 225, 284, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3.) Defendant's contentions also fail on their merits. With regard to the presentation of evidence: defendant had presented a thorough case that he was, in effect, a victim of a substandard upbringing, neglect by school officials, and psychological difficulties â in sum, not fully in command of himself â and thus his behavior was not as blameworthy as it would have been in the case of someone who had not been similarly disadvantaged. He also presented evidence of his positive personal qualities, in the form of Berta Siy's statement that he had been and was still a nice person. In light of the defense presentation, the prosecutor was entitled to introduce evidence in rebuttal that defendant was cruel and callous toward others in varied situations, suggesting that intrinsic evil rather than external circumstances out of defendant's control predominated in governing his behavior or was the sole cause of it. (See In re Lucas (2004) 33 Cal.4th 682, 719, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 331, 94 P.3d 477 [suggesting that to rebut evidence of institutional failure and positive character traits, the prosecution could introduce evidence that from a very early age, petitioner demonstrated lack of conscience, a propensity for violence, and defiance of authority that did not respond to psychotherapy and that he committed criminal offenses as a juvenile, was subject to temper tantrums and uncontrollable rages as a child, was destructive, and sought only to please himsel[`].) With regard to argument, as noted, it is the prosecutor's role to question the soundness of a defense case, and he did not engage in misconduct by giving the jury a more nuanced view of what mitigating weight should be given to defendant's social history, learning disabilities, and emotional problems. (See People v. Smith, supra, 30 Cal.4th 581, 635, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) f. Alleged Logical Fallacies and Illogical Argument Defendant identifies specific portions of the prosecutor's closing argument as constituting misconduct because they contained logical fallacies, such as nonsequiturs, or made no logical sense. He argues that these lapses were deliberate and calculated. Specifically, defendant complains that (1) because evidence about his difficult birth and his mother's prenatal drug use related to whether he was mentally impaired, the prosecutor argued improperly when he contended that what happened before defendant was born did not weigh on his blameworthiness for his crimes; (2) because evidence was presented that babies who fail to thrive early in life may have long-term learning and behavior problems, the prosecutor improperly argued that defendant's failure to thrive during the first six months was insignificant as defendant could have no memory of it; (3) because evidence was presented that defendant was a disfavored stepchild and suffered learning disabilities, the prosecutor improperly argued that the defense's failure to present evidence that defendant's half-sister, Chantal, suffered similar difficulties undercut the defense's theory that defendant was merely a product of his environment; (4) because the prosecutor did not address the broader question whether defendant's home life could have led him to any form of violence, he improperly argued that defendant's home life did not make him a murderer; and (5) because the prosecutor's reasoning relied on a false assumption that the skills required for academic and mechanical tasks are the same, and that those with learning disabilities cannot do mechanical tasks, the prosecutor argued improperly in contending that defendant's ability to take apart a carburetor and put it back together showed his brain worked well and refuted evidence of learning disabilities in an academic environment. Again, defendant's complaints are meritless. The prosecutor was arguing, as he was entitled to do, that the penalty phase evidence did not warrant sympathy. (See People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th 342, 420, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) g. References to Juvenile Offense as a Felony Defendant argues that defendant's juvenile car burglary, evidence of which was introduced at the guilt phase, should not have been referred to as a felony by the prosecutor in closing argument. Defendant cites two separate instances of alleged misconduct. The prosecutor reminded the jury not to consider his juvenile burglary as aggravating evidence under section 190.3, factor (c). Later, the prosecutor, over defendant's objection, argued that defendant committed burglaries and called one of them a felony, even as he reminded the jury that because of defendant's age the jurors could not consider that burglary in aggravation. Defendant's claims regarding the first instance are forfeited. The second set of claims are preserved for review. Both, however, fail on the merits. We have already explained there was nothing improper in reminding the jury not to consider in aggravation conduct that it was not entitled to consider. As for the second comment, it was not misconduct for the prosecutor to point out that the statutory factors of defendant's age and his lack of felony convictions should not be given much weight in mitigation, since he had squandered opportunities for positive change after being put on probation for the felony juvenile matter. h. Invoking Defendant's Statement Evincing Indifference Defendant contends the prosecution committed misconduct in invoking his extrajudicial statement that I don't care about her, meaning his murder victim, Kellie O'Sullivan, in an effort to persuade the jury to see defendant as indifferent to O'Sullivan's death and as having no remorse for murdering her. The prosecutor could urge that remorse was unavailable as a factor in mitigation. `[P]ostcrime evidence of remorselessness does not fit within any statutory sentencing factor, and thus should not be urged as aggravating.' [Citation.] When evidence of postcrime remorselessness has been presented, however, the prosecutor may `stress that remorse is not available as a mitigating factor.' ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1184-1185, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353, italics deleted.) The prosecutor did no more than he was entitled to do. Thus, defendant's claims are without merit. i. Allegedly Hinting at Defendant's Failure to Testify at the Penalty Phase Defendant contends that the prosecution improperly made veiled references to him not taking the stand at the penalty phase. Specifically, defendant complains about the prosecutor's comments that a defendant seeking mercy should at least present evidence that he or she is sincerely and genuinely remorseful and that defendant did not show that within a short amount of time he was sincerely and genuinely remorseful about what he did. Defendant objected to the first remark as being improper argument and was overruled, but did not object to the second. Respondent maintains that any claim regarding the second remark is forfeited for purposes of appeal. (See People v. Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 167, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) We disagree. Any objection to the prosecutor's second remark would have been futile. Both prosecutorial remarks touched on defendant's lack of sincere and genuine remorse, and the second followed immediately after the trial court overruled defendant's objection to the first. Defendant has preserved his claims for review with regard to both prosecutorial remarks. There was, however, no misconduct. The prosecutor's remarks constituted fair argument regarding the lack of evidence of remorse. As noted, such argument is proper to show the absence of remorse as a mitigating factor. ( People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1184-1185, 13 Cal. Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353.) The prosecutor was arguing that defendant had shown no remorse, not commenting on defendant's failure to testify.