Opinion ID: 864531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: the claim relating to the proportionality of

Text: WALKER'S SENTENCE IS BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA. ¶86. Walker claims once again that his sentence is disproportionate to that received by his co-defendant and thereby violates the Eighth Amendment. First, in deciding the direct appeal in this case, this Court conducted the proportionality review required by Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(c).See Walker, 671 So.2d at 630-31. Thus, the merits of this claim have been decided against Walker. They cannot be relitigated on post-conviction review. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1200; Foster, 687 So.2d at 1129,1138,1140; Wiley, 517 So.2d at 1377. ¶87. Without waiving the bar in any manner, the federal constitutional portion of the claim Walker makes is specious because there is no Eighth Amendment right to have a state court conduct any proportionality review at all. In Pulley v. Harris, the United States Supreme Court held: There is thus no basis in our cases for holding that comparative proportionality review by an appellate court is required in every case in which the death penalty is imposed and the defendant requests it. Indeed, to so hold would effectively overrule Jurek and would substantially depart from the sense of Gregg and Proffitt. We are not persuaded that the Eighth Amendment requires us to take that course. 465 U.S. at 50-51. ¶88. Later in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), the Supreme Court held: In light of our precedents under the Eighth Amendment, McCleskey cannot argue successfully that his sentence is disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense. See Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37,43,104 S.Ct. 871, 876, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984). He does not deny that he committed a murder in the course of a planned robbery, a crime for which this Court has determined that the death penalty constitutionally may be imposed. Gregg 39 v. Georgia, 428 U.S., at 187,96 S.Ct, at 2931. His disproportionality claim is of a different sort. Pulley v. Harris, supra, 465 U.S., at 43, 104~S.Ct, at 876. McCleskey argues that the sentence in his case is disproportionate to the sentences in other murder cases. On the one hand, he cannot base a constitutional claim on an argument that his case differs from other cases in which defendants did receive the death penalty. On automatic appeal. The Georgia Supreme Court found that McCleskey's death sentence was not disproportionate to other death sentences imposed in the State. McCleskey v. State, 245 Ga. 108,263 S.E.2d 146 (1980). The court supported this conclusion with an appendix containing citations to 13 cases involving generally similar murders. See Ga. Code Ann. § 17-10-35(e) (1982). Moreover, where the statutory procedures adequately channel the sentencer's discretion, such proportionality review is not constitutionally required. Harris, supra, 465 U.S., at 50-51, 104 S.Ct. at 879. On the other hand, absent a showing that the Georgia capital punishment system operates in an arbitrary and capricious manner, McCleskey cannot prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty. In Gregg, the Court confronted the argument that the opportunities for discretionary action that are inherent in the processing of any murder case under Georgia law, 428 U.S., at 199, 96 S.Ct, at 2937, specifically the opportunities for discretionary leniency, rendered the capital sentences imposed arbitrary and capricious. We rejected this contention. The existence of these discretionary stages is not determinative of the issues before us. At each of these stages an actor in the criminal justice system makes a decision which may remove a defendant from consideration as a candidate for the death penalty. Furman, in contrast, dealt with the decision to impose the death sentence on a specific individual who had been convicted of a capital offense. Nothing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. Ibid. Because McCleskey's sentence was imposed under Georgia sentencing procedures that focus discretion on the particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant,” Id. at 206, 96 S.Ct., at 2940, we lawfully may presume that McCleskey's death sentence was not “wantonly and freakishly” imposed, Id. at 207,96 S.Ct.. at 2941, and thus that the sentence is not disproportionate within any recognized meaning under the Eighth Amendment. 40 481 U.S. at 306-07 (footnote omitted). See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 655-56, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3058, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 2770, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989). Since there is no federal constitutional requirement for this Court to compare Walker's sentence with Riser's or any other, there can be no Eighth Amendment violation. ¶89. This Court decided that Walker's sentence is not disproportionate considering the crime and his individual character. This claim is now res judicata under § 99-39-21(3) and cannot be relitigated on postconviction review. See Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1200;Foster, 687 So.2d at 1129, 1138, 1140; Wiley, 517 So.2d at 1377. Walker is not entitled to seek relief on this claim.