Opinion ID: 1353832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the district court improperly assumed subject matter jurisdiction over the case in violation of the ripeness requirements of Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank.

Text: As an initial matter, New Haven argues that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the case because Flying J is really asserting a takings claim cloaked as an equal protection claim, and that because Flying J has not exhausted its zoning application or its state remedies the case is not ripe. The Supreme Court's decision in Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank holds that in land use cases a claim that the application of government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue. 473 U.S. 172, 186, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985). Even in cases where a developer's proposed use is clearly at odds with local zoning ordinances, the developer must first seek a variance in the local zoning laws and then pursue whatever state court remedies are available before filing a takings claim in federal court. Id. at 193-94, 105 S.Ct. 3108. The rationale for this rule is that [t]he Fifth Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes the taking of property without just compensation. Id. at 194, 105 S.Ct. 3108. If a state has a procedure in place to compensate landowners for takings, regulatory and otherwise, then the property owner's Fifth Amendment rights have not been violated until the state process is completed and the owner has still been denied just compensation. Id. at 195, 105 S.Ct. 3108. This circuit has read Williamson County broadly, rejecting attempts to label `takings' claims as `equal protection' claims and thus requiring `ripeness.' Forseth v. Vill. of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir.2000). This circuit also applies the ripeness requirements to most claims labeled as substantive due process or procedural due process claims. Id. However, courts in this circuit have recognized an exception for  bona fide equal protection claims, and held that, in some circumstances, land use cases raising equal protection issues are not subject to Williamson County 's ripeness requirements. Id. at 370. Litigants making these claims, however, must place them into one of two categories, pleading either: (1) the malicious conduct of a government agent, in other words, conduct that evidences a spiteful effort to `get' him for reasons unrelated to any legitimate state objective; or (2) circumstances, such as prayer for equitable relief and a claim that would evaporate if the government body treated everyone equally that sufficiently suggest that the plaintiff has not raised just a single takings claim with different disguises. Id. at 371 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). New Haven raises this issue in their reply brief, after raising it in their motion to dismiss to the district court. The city argues that because Flying J has not applied for a variance or gone through the state procedures for seeking compensation for the taking, the issue is not ripe for review and accordingly this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Flying J responds that the district court determined that the ripeness requirements of Williamson County did not apply and that because New Haven did not cross-appeal the issue they are precluded from bringing it up here. This last assertion is incorrect, however, because ripeness when it implicates the possibility of this Court issuing an advisory opinion, is a question of subject matter jurisdiction under the case-or-controversy requirement. Wisconsin Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir.2008). The point of Williamson County is that there is no case or controversy within the meaning of Article III until the plaintiff has pursued all available remedies in state court, since zoning boards are capable of granting variances from the challenged zoning ordinance, and local authorities are capable of granting compensation. See Sprint Spectrum v. City of Carmel, Ind., 361 F.3d 998, 1004 (7th Cir.2004). New Haven's argument thus concerns this court's subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. We are obliged to consider that at any point in the litigation. Wisconsin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 512 F.3d 921, 935 (7th Cir.2008). Accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, however, it appears that Flying J has presented a bona fide equal protection claim. Flying J alleges that New Haven has engaged in costly and protracted litigation in an effort to draw out the application process for Flying J, covertly passed an amended zoning ordinance that invalidated the results of the litigation after the city lost, and that it wrote the ordinance in such a way that it would only affect Flying J and no other service station owners in the area. Flying J has also presented additional allegations to the appellate court, arguing that various members of the Common Council and the Plan Commission have conflicts of interest because they own parcels of land around the proposed development. Without passing judgment on the ultimate viability of these allegations, they are sufficient to allege that the ordinance was passed because of ill-will or malice toward Flying J, and thus fit within the first of the two categories of bona fide equal protection violations. New Haven claims that recent decisions from this circuit, most notably Patel v. City of Chicago, 383 F.3d 569 (7th Cir. 2004), have further narrowed the window of equal protection claims. Patel recognized the validity of bona fide equal protection claims, however. Id. at 573. The opinion did hold that if a plaintiff only alleges an equal protection violation based on depressed property values, and the parties file suit primarily for relief from the operation of eminent domain powers, then their claim is properly labeled a takings claim rather than an equal protection claim. Id. However, while the plaintiffs in Patel alleged that the city ordinance singled out their parcels for acquisition through eminent domain, this court was uncertain about the precise sort of equal protection claim that the plaintiffs in that case were raising. Id. at 572 ([T]hey appear to be claiming that the ordinance is a law that rests on wholly irrational distinctions, presumably between their properties and all others in the city. Or they may in part be asserting the type of equal protection claim that arises when a party is subject to `a spiteful effort to get him for reasons wholly unrelated to any government objective.') (internal citations omitted). We concluded, based on the asserted injury and the requested relief, that the plaintiffs were essentially asserting a takings claim recast as an equal protection claim. Id. at 573-74. The complaint in this case, however, more definitely alleges the sort of conduct that evidences a spiteful effort to `get' him that serves as an exception to the ripeness requirements of Williamson County. Specifically, Flying J alleges that the city has improperly denied its development plan and covertly drafted, noticed and passed an ordinance that denies the company the right to develop its property in order to void the result of earlier Indiana court case. The complaint thus alleges the sort of ill-will and spiteful conduct that brings this case within the ambit of Forseth 's exception to the requirements of Williamson County. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's determination that the ripeness requirements of Williamson County do not apply to the present case.