Opinion ID: 874379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Adverse and under a claim of right.

Text: The Backmans further argue that Powers’s use was adverse and under a claim of right because his testimony supports a finding that his use was without recognition of the right of Respondents. This Court has stated: A prescriptive right cannot be granted if the use of the servient tenement was by permission of its owner, because the use, by definition, was not adverse to the rights of the owner. Indeed, the rule is well established that no use can be considered adverse or ripen into a prescriptive right unless it constitutes an actual invasion of or infringement on the rights of the owner. Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006) (citations omitted). Thus, the nature of the use is adverse if “it runs contrary to the servient owner’s claims to the property.” Akers v. D.L. White Constr., Inc., 142 Idaho 293, 303, 127 P.3d 196, 206 (quoting Hodgins v. Sales, 139 Idaho 225, 231, 76 P.3d 969, 975 (2003)). The state of mind of the users of the alleged easement is not controlling; instead, the focus is on the nature of their use. Moreover, 9 “mere inaction and passive acquiescence is not a sufficient basis for proving that the use of the claimed right was with the permission of the owner of the servient tenement.” West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 511 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973). Finally, permissive use cannot ripen into a prescriptive easement. Wood v. Hoglund, 131 Idaho 700, 704, 963 P.2d 383, 387 (1998). If a use has commenced as permissive, a user must make some new and independent act that would put the owner of the servient property on notice that the use was no longer permissive. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326, 327, 563 P.2d 50, 51 (1977). The district court stated that “the threshold issue is whether there was a prescriptive right of access over Turtle Rock Road and its extensions when Powers purchased the one-hundred twenty (120) acres in 1994.” Without such a previously existing prescriptive right, the court determined that Powers “did not perform acts sufficient to convert that previous permissive use into a hostile and adverse use under a claim of right.” Prior to the Backmans’ purchase of the property, Section 8 was used solely for logging purposes and outdoor recreational activities. Defendants introduced evidence that, historically, logging operations obtained informal permission to cross properties. Counsel stated: The practice of the lumber company was to accommodate each other. When they logged they would seek permission from the neighboring logging companies and go across the property to log it, and that all evidence of any roads up until there was an actual development up here were all logging roads. And they were— people logged back and forth. After they logged they would wait 20 years before they logged again. Defense witness Richard Creed, a retired civil engineer with the United States Forest Service, also testified that timber companies would allow access to each other’s properties without recorded easements. Powers also testified that his approach was generally to try to get permission to cross properties when logging: Q: And that is what you do, isn’t it? You ask landowners for permission and try to develop what I think you said was a rapport with them to access their property? Powers: Yes. The district court determined that Powers’s use was not adverse under a claim of right because, outside of his assumption that there was an existing prescriptive use established by previous loggers, Powers did not testify to any specific act he engaged in to establish a hostile and adverse use. The court saw Powers’s actions as “nothing more than what logging companies had been doing for years, and was consistent with his assumption that a prescriptive easement 10 has been established by earlier logging operations.” The court found that, without evidence establishing the previous uses had been adverse and under a claim of right, the use by previous loggers is presumably permissive; therefore, the court determined the Backmans did not establish the use had been adverse and under a claim of right. d. With the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement. The Backmans also assert that the owners in Section 7 had actual and imputed knowledge that Powers claimed a right to use the roads. The Backmans contend that Powers’s use and maintenance of the roadways was sufficient to impute knowledge to the other owners. Generally, where a claimant establishes open, notorious, continuous and uninterrupted use under a claim of right for the statutory period, knowledge of the owner may be presumed. Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230. However, there are special considerations regarding notice to the owner when the claimant’s use of the subject property is shared with the general public: Where, as here, the same degree of use upon which the adverse claim is based has been exercised indiscriminately by the general public, individual acquisition of a prescriptive easement has generally been held impossible. In such a case, the claimant must perform some act whereby the adverse nature of the claim is clearly indicated to the owner of the servient estate. Id. (quoting Hall v. Strawn, 108 Idaho 111, 112-13, 697 P.2d 451, 452-53 (Ct. App. 1985)). When the claimant and members of the general public are both using the land, “it would simply be unfair to impute knowledge to the landowner that the claimant is making an adverse claim.” Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230. Powers told Respondent Lawrence he would be bringing in equipment and Powers unloaded all of the heavy equipment he used for the road work and logging on Lawrence’s property. Outside of that, there was little evidence presented showing that Powers’s use provided the owners of the servient properties with actual or imputed knowledge. The district court found that other than moving equipment over the Middle Road to extend the skid trail in 1997 or 1998, all other use by Powers after his logging ended in 1996 was no different from the general use by the public. His use of the property was primarily for recreational activities after 1996, such as “berry picking, hunting, firewood gathering, and other recreational activities,” and the district court found this was not enough to clearly indicate an adverse claim to Respondents. 11 e. For the statutory period of five years. The Backmans finally argue that Powers’s use satisfied the elements for a prescriptive easement for the statutory period. The statutory period required to claim a prescriptive easement is five years. I.C. § 5-203. The district court did not find that Powers’s use was open and notorious, continuous and uninterrupted, or adverse for a period of five years. The district court made factual findings with regard to each element of the claim for a prescriptive easement and we find the district court’s findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence based upon the testimony of the witnesses it heard. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Backmans’ claim for a prescriptive easement. 2. The district court did not misapply presumptions that were not relevant to the claim. The Backmans argue that the district court improperly applied presumptions of public use, use in common, and wild and unenclosed lands in its denial of their prescriptive easement claim. Instead, the Backmans assert the district court needed to simply focus on the five prescriptive easement elements. In Hughes, 142 Idaho at 481, 129 P.3d at 1230, this Court stated that courts should “streamline their analysis by focusing simply on whether the five prescriptive easement elements have been satisfied based on the facts before them” rather than applying presumptions. We reiterated that concept in Beckstead v. Price, 146 Idaho 57, __, 190 P.3d 876, 883 (2008). While the district court here did utilize the “use in common” presumption discussed in Beckstead, it is not error for the court to use such rules as “an approach to determining whether the claimant had met the elements for a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. at ___, 190 P.3d at 883. The district court here analyzed each of the five elements for a prescriptive easement claim, as this Court expressed a desire for in Hughes and Beckstead. As discussed supra, the court made factual findings with regard to each element and its findings were supported by substantial and competent evidence. Therefore, we affirm the district court’s denial of the Backmans’ prescriptive easement claim.