Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Felony murder as a theory of Stopher's murder (count II)

Text: Defendant was charged with Stopher's murder in count II. The jury was instructed on three theories of first degree murder in connection with Stopher's murder: premeditated and deliberate murder, murder by lying in wait, and first degree felony murder, with the underlying felony being the burglary charged in count III. Count III charged defendant with the residential burglary of Rose V.'s house. Five target felonies were alleged in connection with the burglary charge: assault with a deadly weapon or firearm upon Rose V.; corporal injury to a spouse; false imprisonment by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit; kidnapping; and forcible rape. [7] Defendant contends that as a matter of law the felony-murder theory was inapplicable to the murder of Stopher, and that it was prejudicial error to instruct the jury on felony murder in connection with that crime. His argument is that his killing of Stopher was intentional, and hence the murder was not a negligent or accidental consequence of the predicate burglary, which as charged was directed at victim Rose V. In so arguing defendant misconstrues felony-murder law. `[A]ll murder ... which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate,' certain enumerated felonies, including [burglary], `is murder of the first degree. ...' (Pen.Code, § 189.) The mental state required is simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony; neither intent to kill, deliberation, premeditation, nor malice aforethought is needed. (See, e.g., People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868-869 [236 P.2d 570]; see, generally, 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law [ (2d ed. 1988) ] Crimes Against the Person, § 470, p. 528; see also People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 346 [253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289]....) There is no requirement of a strict `causal' (e.g., People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1016 [248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017]) or `temporal' (e.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348 [253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289]) relationship between the `felony' and the `murder.' All that is demanded is that the two `are parts of one continuous transaction.' (E.g., People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016 [248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017]; see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348 [253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289].) ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1085, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) The evidence reflects that defendant killed Stopher during the perpetration of the burglary of Rose V.'s residencethe burglary and murder were parts of one continuous transaction. ( People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016, 248 Cal.Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017.) Rose V. testified that when she answered the doorbell defendant and his son shoved open the door and pushed her to the floor. Joseph, wearing a Halloween mask, placed a handgun to Rose V.'s head; when she screamed to warn Stopher she was ordered to shut up. Joseph stayed in the living room guarding Rose V. with a handgun while defendant forced his way through the locked door of the master bathroom and fatally shot Stopher with the 12-gauge shotgun. There is no suggestion that any appreciable time elapsed between the time defendant and Joseph forced their entry into Rose V.'s home and subdued her and defendant's forcible entry into the master bathroom where he killed Stopher. Indeed, defendant observes in his opening brief that the killing of Stopher coincided with the burglary. Defendant's assertion that his intentional killing of Stopher was unrelated to the burglary perpetrated with reference to Rose V. is therefore meritless, and his lengthy discourse on why the felony-murder instructions should be found prejudicial is unavailing. He further urges that felony murder is inapplicable where the independent intent to kill exists prior to or coincides with the commission of the predicate felony, [because] the killing is not committed during commission of the felony. Putting aside the fact that defendant claimed at trial he did not harbor intent to kill Stopher when he first entered the residence, it is clear that concurrent intent to kill and to commit the target felony or felonies does not undermine the basis for a felony-murder conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 607-609, 268 Cal.Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127; People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 752, 175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446.) Felony murder was a viable theory of Stopher's murder and the jury was properly instructed as much.