Opinion ID: 2372009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment

Text: ¶ 9 A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to be present at all critical stages of a trial. Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 117, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983). Although the right to be present is rooted to a large extent in the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, [4] the United States Supreme Court has recognized that this right is also protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him. United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985). In that vein, the Court has said that a defendant has a right to be present at a proceeding whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds sub nom. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964). The Court went on to indicate, however, that because the relationship between the defendant's presence and his opportunity to defend must be reasonably substantial, a defendant does not have a right to be present when his or her presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow. Id. at 106-07, 54 S.Ct. 330. Thus, it is fair to say that the due process right to be present is not absolute; rather the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence. Id. at 107-08, 54 S.Ct. 330. ¶ 10 The State asserts here that the e-mail exchange between the [trial] court and counsel [for the State and Irby] regarding excusing potential jurors was not a critical stage[ ] of the trial because it was not substantially related to Irby's opportunity to defend against the charge. Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 1, 7, 14. In prior cases, this court has discussed the right of a defendant to be present at various stages of a trial. For instance, in Rice, we held that [u]nder the Snyder standard, a defendant has a due process right to be present at the return of his verdict. Rice, 110 Wash.2d at 617, 757 P.2d 889. In another case, Lord, our court determined that a defendant did not have a right to be present at in-chambers or bench conferences between the court and counsel on legal matters. Lord, 123 Wash.2d at 306, 868 P.2d 835; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Pirtle, 136 Wash.2d 467, 484, 965 P.2d 593 (1998) (no right to be present at in-chambers conferences between court and counsel involving legal matters, such as the wording of jury instructions, or ministerial matters, such as jury sequestration). Similarly, in Benn, we held that a defendant did not have a right to be present at a hearing on a motion for a continuance. Benn, 134 Wash.2d at 920, 952 P.2d 116. ¶ 11 The State likens the e-mail exchange between the trial judge and counsel for the parties to a sidebar or chambers conference, proceedings that our court and other courts have said that a defendant has no due process right to attend. We disagree with the State's analogy to those sorts of proceedings. In our judgment, the e-mail exchange was a portion of the jury selection process. We say that because this novel proceeding did not simply address the general qualifications of 10 potential jurors, but instead tested their fitness to serve as jurors in this particular case. ¶ 12 The fact that jurors were being evaluated individually and dismissed for cause distinguishes this proceeding from other, ostensibly similar proceedings that courts have held a defendant does not have the right to attend. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 688 So.2d 298, 300 (Fla.1996) (distinguishing general qualification of the jury from the qualification of a jury to try a specific case and holding that general qualification process is not a critical stage of the proceedings requiring the defendant's presence); Commonwealth v. Barnoski, 418 Mass. 523, 530, 531, 638 N.E.2d 9 (1994) (distinguishing preliminary hardship colloqu[y] from individual, substantive voir dire). Indeed, the questionnaire that was given to the jurors after the juror's oath was administered indicated that filling out the questionnaire was part of the jury selection process, and designed to elicit information with respect to your qualifications to sit as a juror in this case.  CP at 1234 (emphasis added). The subsequent exchange of e-mails resulted in decisions being made, at least in part, on the basis of the questionnaire about the ability of particular jurors to try this specific case. This decision making was clearly a part of the jury selection process, a part that Irby did not agree to miss. ¶ 13 The State points out that the courtroom was empty at the time and that there were no proceedings on the record. Suppl. Br. of Pet. at 12, 10. What was not happening in the courtroom is beside the point: What ought to have happened there was instead happening in cyberspace. Contrary to the State's claim that no court proceedings took place at the time, the e-mails in question substituted for jury selection. See id. at 6, 10, 14-15. ¶ 14 The question, then, becomes: did Irby have a right to be present at this portion of the jury selection process? The Court of Appeals recognized in Wilson that the due process right to be present extends to jury voir dire. Wilson, 141 Wash.App. at 604, 171 P.3d 501. We are in full accord with that principle. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court said in Snyder that a defendant's presence at jury selection bears, or may fairly be assumed to bear, a relation, reasonably substantial, to his opportunity to defend because it will be in his power, if present, to give advice or suggestion or even to supersede his lawyers altogether. Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106, 54 S.Ct. 330 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892)). The United States Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia Circuit came to the same conclusion in United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119 (1987), where the defendant, at his attorney's request, was absent from the whole of voir dire and never told of his right to attend. The District of Columbia Circuit said, That Gordon's presence at voir dire was substantially related to his defense is indicated by the fact that he had no opportunity `to give advise [sic] or suggestion[s] ... to ... his lawyers.' Id. at 124 (most alterations in original) (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 106, 54 S.Ct. 330); see also Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595, 602, 609 N.E.2d 1208 (1993) (defendant has a right to be present when jurors are being examined in order to aid his counsel in the selection of jurors and in the exercise of his peremptory challenges (citing Lewis, 146 U.S. at 373, 13 S.Ct. 136)). ¶ 15 In Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 873, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989), the United States Supreme Court affirmed that jury selection is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding, during which the defendant has a constitutional right to be present. The court pointed out that it is the primary means by which a court may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from ethnic, racial, or political prejudice, or predisposition about the defendant's culpability. Id. (citations omitted). This right attaches `at least from the time when the work of empanelling the jury begins.' Id. at 873, 109 S.Ct. 2237 (quoting Lewis, 146 U.S. at 374, 13 S.Ct. 136 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 578, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884))). ¶ 16 In Irby's case, the work of empaneling the jury began on January 2, when jurors were sworn and completed their questionnaires. The work was ongoing when the trial judge e-mailed Irby's attorneys and the prosecutor about potentially dismissing 10 jurors, not only for hardship, but because 4 jurors had parents who had been murdered. As noted above, Irby was not present during this discussion because he was in his jail cell. Furthermore, because the trial judge sent his initial e-mail at 1:02 p.m., and Irby's attorneys replied at 1:53 p.m., it is unlikely that the attorneys spoke to Irby about the e-mail in the interim. Even if [d]efense counsel had time to ... consult him regarding excusing some of the jurors if they chose to do so, as the State suggests, Suppl. Br. of Pet'r at 16, where ... personal presence is necessary in point of law, the record must show the fact. Lewis, 146 U.S. at 372, 13 S.Ct. 136. Significantly, the record here does not evidence the fact that defense counsel spoke to Irby before responding to the trial judge's e-mail. In sum, conducting jury selection in Irby's absence was a violation of his right under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution to be present at this critical stage of trial.