Opinion ID: 1160402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Substituted Appointed Counsel

Text: The person accused of the commission of a crime has the constitutional right to be represented by an attorney of his own choice. Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954); Adger v. State, Wyo., 584 P.2d 1056. This is the construction given to the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, and the same construction must be given Art. 1, § 10 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. See Hoskins v. State, Wyo., 552 P.2d 342 (1976), reh. den., 553 P.2d 1390 (1976); Dryden v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 483 (1975). In those instances in which the person accused of crime is unable to employ his own counsel, and thus personally exercise his constitutional right, the choice of counsel is then made for him by the State through the district judge. United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Thompson, 56 F. Supp. 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). The accused has the absolute right to have counsel appointed if he is unable to employ his own attorney. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799, 93 A.L.R.2d 733 (1963); Hoskins v. State, supra; Dryden v. State, supra. The rule which appears to be universal, is that the constitutional right to have counsel appointed does not include a right to demand that a particular attorney be appointed by the Court. See cases cited in Annot., 66 A.L.R.3d 996 (1975). This rule also pertains in instances in which a defendant asks for the substitution of a particular attorney. E.g., United States v. Burkeen, 355 F.2d 241 (6th Cir.1966), cert. den., 384 U.S. 957, 86 S.Ct. 1582, 16 L.Ed.2d 553 (1966), reh. den., 385 U.S. 893, 87 S.Ct. 28, 17 L.Ed.2d 127 (1966); People v. Hughes, 57 Cal.2d 89, 17 Cal. Rptr. 617, 367 P.2d 33 (1961); State v. Reid, 146 Conn. 227, 149 A.2d 698 (1959); Douglas v. State, Fla.App., 212 So.2d 42 (1968); People v. Cox, 22 Ill.2d 534, 177 N.E.2d 211 (1961), cert. den., 374 U.S. 855, 83 S.Ct. 1925, 10 L.Ed.2d 1076 (1963); Schuble v. Youngblood, 225 Ind. 169, 73 N.E.2d 478 (1947); Rahhal v. State, 52 Wis.2d 144, 187 N.W.2d 800 (1971). Cf., Commonwealth v. Johnson, 428 Pa. 210, 236 A.2d 805 (1968); and Brewer v. State, 4 Tenn.Cr.App. 265, 470 S.W.2d 47 (1970). While a trial court has the power in its discretion to appoint substitute counsel, its refusal to do so is not error unless an abuse of discretion is shown. A factual showing of good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel is essential to the demonstration of an abuse of discretion, and good cause is to be found in incompetence, commitment to a position or an interest which would conflict with the furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or other good reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to furnish effective assistance. United States v. Burkeen, supra; Davis v. Stevens, 326 F. Supp. 1182 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Drumgo v. Superior Court of Maren County, 8 Cal.3d 930, 106 Cal. Rptr. 631, 506 P.2d 1007, 66 A.L.R.3d 984 (1973), cert. den., 414 U.S. 979, 94 S.Ct. 272, 38 L.Ed.2d 223 (1973); Martinez v. People, 173 Colo. 515, 480 P.2d 843 (1971); State v. Forsness, 159 Mont. 105, 495 P.2d 176 (1972). In this instance after remand upon reversal of the first conviction an order was entered in the district court on March 14, 1977, setting the case for trial on April 4, 1977. On March 23, 1977, the public defender filed a motion with a supporting affidavit requesting that the public defender's office be relieved of all obligations in defense of Irvin. The accompanying affidavit stated that prior to the verdict in the first trial Irvin requested the public defender and the assistant public defender to declare themselves incompetent. The affidavit went on to say: 6. We are unable to achieve the rapport, trust and confidence of said Irvin necessary to the vigorous defense to which he is constitutionally entitled. It is apparent that this motion was filed at Irvin's behest. The record shows no demand for a hearing of nor a formal denial of this motion by the trial court, but it is clear from the record that when the motion was filed the district court advised the public defender, who in turn advised Irvin, that the motion would not be granted. On the morning of trial Irvin presented a handwritten petition to proceed pro se and for a continuance which was supported by a purported affidavit. The pleading was not signed, and the affidavit was signed but not verified. The trial court, however, did treat these documents as presenting in part, at least, Irvin's position. Irvin stated in these documents: that the public defender told him he could not change attorneys because the court would not allow it; that he knew of the date of new trial fifteen days previously but that he did not see a lawyer for six days after that, and that then they only discussed pleading to a lesser charge; that he told the public defender he did not want him to represent him and the reason why; that the public defender told him he did not want to represent him, but the court would not take him off Irvin's case; that he and the public defender had had gulf differences for 26 months and that he dismissed the public defender in 1975; that the public defender did not handle this prior appeal; that he had the public defender as an attorney two years previously and tried to get him off his case; that he felt that the public defender did not want to help him in any way; that he had asked the public defender several times to go to court and see about a bond hearing; that he also asked about law books and all the public defender told him or talked about was pleading guilty to a lesser charge; that the public defender wanted to do things his own way for his own personal gain, and not in Irvin's interest. The transcript of the dialogue among the trial judge, counsel and Irvin prior to the trial demonstrates that Irvin agreed that this same case involving the same factual situation had been tried in the court two years previously. The judge stated that the public defender previously had researched the case on the first trial, and that he assumed that the public defender was prepared to go again on the trial set for April 4, 1977. The public defender responded that he was prepared to proceed to trial. In discussing the motion to withdraw made by the public defender the judge pointed out that the motion had been discussed orally and that he had advised the public defender that he could see no reason for relieving him, and that there had been no effort to pursue the motion by asking that it be set for hearing prior to trial. The judge pointed out that appointed counsel was the public defender, and the district judge stated his opinion that he was adequate and competent counsel, which he had demonstrated over a period of two or three years while serving in the capacity of public defender. The judge also stated that the fact that Irvin did not like the public defender did not make him incompetent counsel. The district judge refused to appoint substitute counsel in lieu of the public defender. Our examination of the record does not disclose any facts which would demonstrate an abuse of the trial court's discretion in so ruling. There is nothing to show incompetence of counsel nor any conflicting interest. Irvin's assertions and allegations in that regard do not serve as evidence of the facts as he claims them to be. In re Brown, 9 Cal.3d 679, 108 Cal. Rptr. 801, 511 P.2d 1153 (1973). At most the record demonstrates that after his first trial, for reasons that do not appear, Irvin asked his trial counsel to declare themselves incompetent. Obviously there would have been an advantage to him on appeal if they had agreed to do that. Having taken that stance Irvin has maintained a consistent position, but we are satisfied that his claims and contentions, absent some evidence of incompetence or a conflict of interest, are insufficient to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court here. The cases cited by Irvin are not persuasive to the contrary. McKinnon v. State, Alaska, 526 P.2d 18 (1974) and Smith v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 68 Cal.2d 547, 68 Cal. Rptr. 1, 440 P.2d 65 (1968), both involved situations in which the court appointed substitute counsel for appointed counsel whom the respective defendants wanted to represent them. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166 (9th Cir.1970), is not the inverse of Irvin's case, but it is distinguishable by the fact that the dispute between the defendant and counsel there arose almost immediately, and it was called to the court's attention promptly. Here any breach occurred only after the trial of the case the first time, and it was premised only upon Irvin's request that counsel then declare themselves incompetent. Further, in Brown v. Craven, supra, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court denied Brown's motions summarily and made no adequate inquiry into the cause of Brown's dissatisfaction. Upon the refusal of the district judge to appoint substitute counsel Irvin pursued his petition to proceed pro se and for a continuance. The district judge permitted Irvin to act as his own counsel but required the public defender to remain present and be available to consult with Irvin during the course of the trial. Prior to doing so, the district judge cautioned Irvin that this was a serious matter, and asked him whether he had given adequate thought to this tactic and whether he was sure he wanted to proceed in his own behalf. The court asked him about his education, which Irvin stated was up to the ninth grade. The judge then asked Irvin if he had any background or training in this area, and Irvin said that he had been studying law on his own for two years. The district judge asked him if he had any idea about the method of making objections, cross-examining and examining witnesses, and making proper motions, at the same time pointing out that these procedural steps might require more background and training than Irvin had at that point, and that he might possibly miss some of the things that he should do or do things that he should not do if he had proper legal counsel. Irvin responded that he was aware of these risks and persisted in his desire to proceed as his own attorney. An accused has the right to represent himself which must be regarded if he is competent to make that decision. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1972). This right has been recognized by this Court in Miller v. State, Wyo., 560 P.2d 739 (1977) and Ash v. State, Wyo., 555 P.2d 221 (1976). The record adequately shows a knowing and intelligent waiver of the assistance of counsel by Irvin and his awareness of the pitfalls and disadvantages of representing himself and the possible consequences. See State v. DeLuna, 110 Ariz. 497, 520 P.2d 1121 (1974).