Opinion ID: 839438
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of sington standard

Text: The WCAC's determination that claimant proved a work-related injury is conclusive because there is no evidence of fraud. Mudel, supra at 701, 614 N.W.2d 607. At issue is only whether claimant sustained his burden of proving that his work-related injury effected a reduction of his maximum wage-earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications and training. Because this is a question of law, we review this issue de novo. DiBenedetto, supra at 401, 605 N.W.2d 300. We hold that claimant did not satisfy his burden of establishing a disability. Claimant's demonstration that he could no longer perform his job because of a work-related injury was simply insufficient to establish a disability under MCL 418.301(4). In holding to the contrary, we believe that the Court of Appeals and the WCAC short-circuited the requirements of Sington and effected a reversion to Haske. Under Sington, claimant was required to demonstrate that the injury to his cervical spine limited his maximum wage-earning capacity in work suitable to his qualifications and training. Claimant merely testified regarding his employment and educational background. Claimant presented no evidence that he had even considered the possibility that he was capable of performing any job other than driving a forklift. Likewise, the lower court, the magistrate, and the tribunal seemingly assumed that because claimant had driven a forklift for so many years, that was all he was able to do and that he had acquired no additional skills throughout his life that might translate to other positions of employment. At a minimum, claimant was required by the WDCA to show that he had considered other types of employment within his qualifications and training that paid his maximum wages and that he was physically unable to perform any of those jobs or unable to obtain those jobs. There is no evidence in this case that claimant sought any post-injury employment or would have been willing to accept such employment within the limits of his qualifications, training, and restrictions. The Court of Appeals opinion effectively relieved claimant of this burden of proof by concluding: [T]o the extent the WCAC addressed the issue from the standpoint of the production of evidence, and held that as a practical matter, an employee's proofs will generally consist of the equivalent of the employee's resume  i.e., a listing and description of the jobs the employee held up until the time of the injury, the pay for those jobs, and a description of the employee's training and education  and testimony that the employee cannot perform any of the jobs within his qualifications and training paying the maximum wage, the WCAC did not err. By producing such evidence, in addition to evidence of a work-related injury causing the disability, an employee makes a prima facie case of disability  a limitation in the employee's maximum wage-earning capacity in all jobs suitable to the employee's qualifications and training. The WCAC did not err in concluding that such a showing is adequate to establish disability in the absence of evidence showing that there is in fact real work within the employee's training and experience, paying the maximum wage, that the employee is able to perform upon hiring. [ Stokes, supra at 589, 727 N.W.2d 637.] By finding that claimant had met his burden of proof under Sington, in the absence of evidence concerning other jobs for which he might have been qualified, the Court of Appeals suggested strongly that the burden of showing the existence of such jobs is on defendant. It is not. In this case, claimant did not meet his burden of proving a disability under the WDCA because he only presented evidence of an inability to perform his prior job. However, even if claimant met his burden, the employer was effectively denied the opportunity to rebut claimant's proofs. The employer's pre-trial request to have claimant interviewed by the employer's vocational expert was denied. The employer renewed this request at the remand hearing, but this request was also denied. Because claimant refused to meet with the employer's vocational expert, and the magistrate was unwilling to compel an interview, the employer's vocational expert could only provide speculative testimony regarding the effect of claimant's injury on his wage-earning capacity. The employer's expert testified that, after interviewing claimant, he would have completed a transferable-skills analysis based on claimant's profile and work restrictions. Next, the employer's expert would have contacted potential employers to determine job availability and wages for any jobs falling within claimant's qualifications, training, and restrictions. The employer requested an adjournment or continuance to allow its expert to perform this analysis, but that request was also denied. The employer was essentially denied the opportunity to ascertain claimant's ability to perform other jobs. Not only did the magistrate's ruling deprive the employer of the ability to present evidence of actual jobs in the marketplace that claimant could have obtained, but the employer was deprived of the ability to assess whether there were any jobs available within its own company that claimant could perform. While the employer was in the best position to know which openings were available within its company, it was not in a position to know all the skills and training claimant had acquired throughout his life that might be compatible with one of the jobs available. The employer was entitled to discovery before the hearing to enable it to meet its burden of coming forward with evidence to rebut claimant's claim of disability. [4]