Opinion ID: 1403238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Section 1385 Dismissal.

Text: Although the trial court had the power to dismiss for insufficient evidence as a matter of law after submission to the jury, we will not construe its dismissal as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes absent clear evidence the court intended to exercise this power. Because the record here does not clearly indicate such an intent, no double jeopardy bar to retrial exists. The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that no person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.... This clause applies to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ( Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707), and protects defendants from multiple trials. ( United States v. Wilson (1975) 420 U.S. 332, 342, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 ( Wilson ).) Article I, section 15, of the California Constitution offers similar protection: Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense.... Because the California Constitution is a document of independent force and effect that may be interpreted in a manner more protective of defendants' rights than that extended by the federal Constitution, we are guided by those decisions interpreting the double jeopardy clauses of both the United States and California Constitutions. ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 298, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832.) Over 20 years ago, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment precludes retrial if a court determines the evidence at trial was insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of law. ( Burks v. United States (1978) 437 U.S. 1, 18, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1.) Thus, an appellate ruling of legal insufficiency is functionally equivalent to an acquittal and precludes a retrial. (See id. at pp. 16-17, 98 S.Ct. 2141.) An analogous trial court finding is also an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. ( Hudson, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 42, 101 S.Ct. 970; Martin Linen Co., supra, 430 U.S. at p. 575, 97 S.Ct. 1349.) Where a court merely disagrees with a jury's resolution of conflicting evidence and concludes that a guilty verdict is against the weight of the evidence, however, a reversal or dismissal on that ground does not bar retrial. ( Tibbs v. Florida (1982) 457 U.S. 31, 42, 45-46 fn. 22, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652, ( Tibbs ).) We have interpreted the double jeopardy clause of the California Constitution in a similar manner. Because the standard for determining the legal sufficiency of evidence is the same under both federal and California law, the rule of Burks applies to trials conducted in our courts. ( People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 210, 155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91 ( Pierce ).) We have also held that the reversal of a conviction based on a reweighing of evidence does not bar retrial under the California Constitution. (See People v. Serrato (1973) 9 Cal.3d 753, 761, 109 Cal.Rptr. 65, 512 P.2d 289, overruled on other grounds in People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 583, fn. 1, 189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144; see also Veitch v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 722, 730-731, 152 Cal.Rptr. 822 [granting a new trial based on a reweighing of the evidence does not bar retrial], cert. den. (1979) 444 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 293, 62 L.Ed.2d 306.) In applying these principles, we have not distinguished between trial and appellate court determinations of legal insufficiency because both courts must apply the substantial evidence standard when making this determination. (See Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 698-699, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719 [barring retrial because the trial court correctly found the evidence insufficient as a matter of law despite a guilty verdict]; Pierce, supra, 24 Cal.3d at p. 210, 155 Cal.Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91 [an appellate determination that evidence is insufficient as a matter of law precludes retrial].) Specifically, both trial and appellate courts must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment and decide whether it discloses substantial evidence ... such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Under this standard, the court does not `ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] Instead, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.) Although a trial court may apply the substantial evidence standard when dismissing pursuant to section 1385, it usually does not. Indeed, the standard for dismissal under section 1385 is quite broad and permits dismissal under a variety of circumstances. For example, a court may dismiss under section 1385 if it believes the only purpose to be served by a trial or a retrial is harassment of the defendant ... notwithstanding the fact that there is sufficient evidence of guilt, however weak, to sustain a conviction on appeal. ( Howard, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 504, 72 Cal.Rptr. 330, 446 P.2d 138.) Thus, a section 1385 dismissal may not even involve a consideration of the merits of the cause. ( Agresti, supra, 5 Cal. App.4th at p. 604, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 353.) Because section 1385 dismissals often are not based on the insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law, we believe these dismissals should not be construed as an acquittal for legal insufficiency unless the record clearly indicates the trial court applied the substantial evidence standard. [7] Specifically, the record must show that the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and concluded that no reasonable trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Lagunas, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1038, fn. 6, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 67, 884 P.2d 1015 [declining to construe the trial court's grant of a new trial as an acquittal for legal insufficiency because the record indicates the court did not use the `substantial evidence' standard].) Absent such a showing, we will assume the court did not intend to dismiss for legal insufficiency and foreclose reprosecution. In doing so, we do not intend to impose rigid limitations on the language trial courts may use to dismiss for legal insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to section 1385. Certainly, courts need not restate the substantial evidence standard or use certain magic words whenever they determine that the evidence is insufficient as a matter of law. We merely ask trial courts to make their rulings clear enough for reviewing courts to confidently conclude they viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and found that no reasonable trier of fact could convict. This simple request properly balances the competing interests embodied in the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. Although repeated prosecutions unfairly burden a defendant and increase the risk of conviction through sheer perseverance, a defendant's valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal must in some instances be subordinated to the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments. ( Wade v. Hunter (1949) 336 U.S. 684, 689, 69 S.Ct. 834, 93 L.Ed. 974; see also Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 522, 183 Cal.Rptr. 647, 646 P.2d 809 [recognizing the important public interest in finally determining whether [a defendant] committed an offense].) For example, this right does not have the same force when there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction. ( Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211.) In that case, retrial simply affords the defendant a second opportunity to seek a favorable judgment and does not violate the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy. ( Id. at p. 43, 102 S.Ct. 2211, fn. omitted.) By barring retrial only when a trial court clearly makes a finding of legal insufficiency, we remain faithful to these governing principles. (See Richardson v. United States (1984) 468 U.S. 317, 325, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 [the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause by its terms applies only if there has been some event, such as an acquittal, which terminates the original jeopardy].) Our decision also reduces the likelihood of future confusion over the effect of a section 1385 dismissal by creating an incentive for parties to seek clarification at the time of dismissal. Applying this rule to these facts, we conclude retrial is permitted because the record does not clearly show an intent by the trial court to dismiss for legal insufficiency of the evidence. Our analysis begins with the trial court's minute order which merely states that no reasonable jury would convict ... based on the evidence presented in court. (See § 1385 [The reasons for the dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes].) This order does not indicate that the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Moreover, the use of the word would rather than could suggests a reweighing of evidence rather than an application of the substantial evidence standard. (See Schlup v. Delo (1995) 513 U.S. 298, 330, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 [the use of the word `could' focuses the inquiry on the power of the trier of fact to reach its conclusion; the use of the word `would' focuses the inquiry on the likely behavior of the trier of fact].) Taken together, these ambiguities make it impossible for us to conclude that the court intended to dismiss for lack of sufficient evidence as a matter of law. The reporter's transcript bolsters our conclusion. [8] (See People v. Smith, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 599, 189 Cal.Rptr. 862, 659 P.2d 1152 [conflicts in the clerk's and reporter's transcripts regarding the meaning of a § 1385 dismissal should be resolved on a case-by-case basis].) Like the minute order, nothing in the reporter's transcript indicates the trial court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Rather, the court's inquiries about additional evidence and its remarks on the quality of the trial presentations and the apparent pro-prosecution bent of the jury suggest an assessment of the strength of the evidence. The court's comments on the improbability of an unanimous verdict of guilt do not suggest otherwise. Indeed, the mere likelihood of disagreement among rational men is not in itself equivalent to a failure of proof by the State.... ( Johnson v. Louisiana (1972) 406 U.S. 356, 362, 92 S.Ct. 1620, 32 L.Ed.2d 152; see also Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42, fn. 17, 102 S.Ct. 2211 [holding that disagreements among jurors or judges do not themselves create a reasonable doubt of guilt].) Accordingly, we decline to construe the section 1385 dismissal in this case as an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. Our decision in Trevino does not compel a different result. In Trevino, the trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial under section 1181 after previously denying his motions for a judgment of acquittal under section 1118.1. (See Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 695-696, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719.) Although the standard for granting a new trial is different from the standard for entering a judgment of acquittal, the court expressly granted a new trial under the substantial evidence standard. [9] (See id. at p. 694, 217 Cal.Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719.) In light of the court's irreconcilable rulings on the sections 1118.1 and 1181 motions, we independently reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence and concluded that the court should have entered a judgment of acquittal barring retrial. (See Trevino, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 696-698, 217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719.) Unlike Trevino, the trial court in this case did not make irreconcilable rulings. Thus, we do not have to review the evidence at trial to determine the true nature of the court's ruling and need only review the record to determine whether the court, in fact, dismissed for legal insufficiency of the evidence. In any event, an independent review of the record establishes there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. Indeed, Hatch does not even argue the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law. Hudson is also distinguishable. In Hudson, the United States Supreme Court barred retrial because the trial judge granted a new trial motion based on the legal insufficiency of the evidence at trial. ( Hudson, supra, 450 U.S. at pp. 44-45, 101 S.Ct. 970.) The court relied on the judge's comments on the dearth of evidence and his amazement over the guilty verdict as well as the Louisiana Supreme Court's own characterization of the judge's actions. (See id. at pp. 43-44, 101 S.Ct. 970.) [10] Unlike Hudson, the record in this case is ambiguous and suggests that the trial court dismissed the case based on a reweighing of the evidence. As such, the Fifth Amendment does not bar retrial. (See Tibbs, supra, 457 U.S. at p. 42 & fn. 17,102 S.Ct. 2211.) Finally, Mannes, even if controlling, is inapplicable. In Mannes, the trial court dismissed murder charges pursuant to section 1385 after a mistrial. In dismissing these charges, the court stated there was insufficient evidence to establish certain elements of the crime and no likelihood that a retrial on these charges will result in a unanimous verdict of guilty of murder. ( Mannes, supra, 967 F.2d at p. 1314.) Concluding that the phrase insufficient evidence is a term of art and absent a contrary indicationmeans the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction as a matter of law, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the dismissal was equivalent to an acquittal and barred retrial under the Fifth Amendment. ( Id. at pp. 1315-1316.) In contrast, the trial court in this case never used the term insufficient evidence. Accordingly, we hold that retrial is not barred and the People may proceed with the prosecution of Hatch on the refiled charges. (See People v. Williams (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 927, 933-934, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 329 [holding that the prosecution may add additional charges after a mistrial absent a finding of legal insufficiency of the evidence].) In doing so, we do not reach the remaining issue: whether a section 1385 dismissal for legal insufficiency is appealable. Of course, our conclusion that such a dismissal is equivalent to an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes does not automatically bar appellate review. (See United States v. DiFrancesco (1980) 449 U.S. 117, 132, 101 S.Ct. 426, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 [T]he prohibition against multiple trials is the `controlling constitutional principle' ( United States v. Wilson, [supra,] 420 U.S. at [p.] 346 [95 S.Ct. 1013, 43 L.Ed.2d 232]) and [t]he double jeopardy focus ... is not on the appeal but on the relief that is requested.].) Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the double jeopardy clause only prohibits multiple trials and does not preclude appeals from postconviction rulings made by a trial court. (See Martin Linen Co., supra, 430 U.S. at pp. 569-570, 97 S.Ct. 1349 [where a government appeal presents no threat of successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended]; Wilson, supra, 420 U.S. at p. 344, 95 S.Ct. 1013 [where there is no threat of ... successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended]; see also United States v. Sharif (9th Cir.1987) 817 F.2d 1375, 1376 [prosecution may appeal a postconviction dismissal for legal insufficiency despite the double jeopardy bar]; see also Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 716-717, 87 Cal.Rptr. 361, 470 P.2d 345 [the California Constitution only protects defendants from multiple prosecutions or trials].) We therefore leave the resolution of this issue for another day.