Opinion ID: 6729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII Claims: Laches

Text: Although Plaintiffs seem to concede in their original brief to this Court that the appropriate standard of review of the district court's determination with respect to laches was an abuse of discretion standard, they assert in their reply brief that de novo review is the applicable standard because CPS's laches motion was styled as a motion to dismiss. Because the district court was required to review the available evidence in order to determine whether to apply laches to the Title VII claim, this motion is more appropriately treated as one for summary judgment. This distinction does not affect Plaintiffs' argument, however, since the standard of review of a grant of summary judgment is also de novo. It is settled that a district court enjoys considerable discretion in deciding whether to apply the doctrine of laches to claims pending before it. Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, 954 F.2d 1116, 1121 (5th Cir. 1992). The issue before us is to 13 what extent that discretion is circumscribed or otherwise altered when the decision to apply laches is made within the context of a motion for summary judgment. Our review of the caselaw leads us to the following conclusion: to the extent that the facts relevant to laches are undisputed on summary judgment, the abuse of discretion standard applies. Put another way, as long as the district court applies the correct legal standard on summary judgment and does not resolve disputed issues of material fact against the nonmovant, its determination of whether the undisputed facts warrant an application of laches is reviewed for abuse of discretion. We begin our analysis with a case in which this Court determined that the district court had abused its discretion in applying the doctrine of laches. In Powell v. City of Key West, Florida, although [r]ecognizing full well that the defense of laches is one that is addressed largely to the discretion of the trial court, we nevertheless held that the granting of summary judgment on the basis of laches was improper because the defendants' motion for summary judgment was completely lacking . . . a factual basis for applying this defense. 434 F.2d 1075, 1080 (5th Cir. 1970). We found that laches was improperly applied because, based on an overly generous reading of the movants' affidavits,12 the district court had impermissibly resolved disputed issues of fact regarding prejudice, an essential element of laches, 12 We also noted that the district court's decision was founded on affidavits that did not meet the verification requirements of Rule 56(c). Powell, 434 F.2d at 1079-80. 14 in favor of the movants.13 Id. at 1079-80. We noted that [e]ven were the affidavits of the [movants] adequate to raise an issue of fact as to prejudice, this is all they would have done because there is clear proof on behalf of the plaintiff from which the trial court could have found a complete absence of prejudice by reason of the delay. Id. at 1080. Thus, although the district 13 For example, in Powell the affidavit of movant's counsel read: [T]he City of Key West, Florida, had insurance coverage at the time the accident, which is the subject matter of this litigation, occurred, but the insurance carrier has denied coverage to the city and is not now defending the city in this lawsuit on the grounds of late reporting of the accident. Powell, 434 F.2d at 1077. From this, the district court concluded that the defendants have lost insurance coverage that otherwise would have applied to the plaintiff's injury. Id. at 1079 (emphasis omitted). We found this extension of the affiant's statement impermissible in the context of summary judgment: It is impossible for the trial court to know from the document before it that the city had or had not lost insurance coverage, for, in fact, counsel did not even make such a statement of fact. He stated only that the insurance carrier had denied coverage and was not defending the suit. The trial court was not in a position to test the correctness of counsel's implied, although not expressed, conclusion that the city had lost coverage which it otherwise would have had. Moreover, there is no possible basis for the trial court to assume, since the city gave no notice to the insurance company until 1969, that, had it given notice within the four year statue of limitations, the insurance company would not, with equal justification, have declined to defend on the ground of a four year delay in giving notice under the policy. There is nothing in this record to indicate that, had the city given notice a few days short of the four year statutory period, the city would have had the coverage which the trial court now found it lost by reason of the delay in filing this complaint. Id. In addition, we noted that the district court erred in finding that another affidavit submitted by the movant showed that the movant had lost the opportunity to hold third parties liable for any damages assessed against it in the suit. Id. at 1080. 15 court had discretion to grant laches on motion for summary judgment, it did not have discretion to circumvent the requirements of Rule 56(c) by resolving genuinely disputed issues of fact material to laches.14 By contrast, when the district court has correctly applied the summary judgment standard, we have found no abuse of discretion in its determination as to laches. For example, in Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., we applied the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court's decision to bar plaintiff's claims on the basis of laches. 749 F.2d 223, 233 (5th Cir. 1984). Significantly, we noted that the material facts underlying defendant's summary judgment motion were undisputed. Id. Similarly, in Kennedy v. Electricians Pension Plan, 954 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1992), a declaratory judgment action tried to the court on a stipulation of facts and submission of the record, id. at 1118, we upheld the district court's decision not to apply laches under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 1121. We think this case falls squarely within the purview of the 14 To Powell, compare Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 596 F.2d 1276 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 671 (1980). In Fowler, we held that, despite the existence of undisputed facts regarding defendant's laches motion, the district court incorrectly found the doctrine applicable where the movant's summary judgment evidence as a matter of law did not satisfy the elements of laches. Id. at 1279-80. Specifically, we held that any time that elapsed during ongoing EEOC conciliation efforts could not be counted toward the calculation of the unreasonable delay element, id. at 1279, and that the defendant's assertion that key witnesses were no longer with the company, without an accompanying showing that they were currently unavailable to testify, was insufficient to show prejudice. Id. at 1279-80. More importantly for present purposes, however, we analyzed the case under the abuse of discretion standard. Id. at 1280. Fowler is therefore wholly consistent with our analysis here. 16 abuse of discretion standard. The material facts relevant to laches are not in genuine dispute. The length of the delay and the reasons for it are not controverted. The facts relevant to prejudice are likewise not contested. CPS does not dispute that it has records relevant to Plaintiffs' claims still on file; Plaintiffs' do not dispute that many of CPS's relevant witnesses are unavailable to testify. We now turn to the district court's determination that the material facts before it as to which there was no genuine dispute met the essential requirements of the laches defense. B. Application of Laches to Plaintiffs' Title VII Claims Laches is founded on the notion that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. NAACP v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., 753 F.2d 131, 137 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 3489 (1985). The defense consists of three elements: (1) a delay on the part of the plaintiff in instituting suit; (2) that is not excused; and (3) that results in undue prejudice to the defendant's ability to present an adequate defense. Geyen v. Marsh, 775 F.2d 1303, 1310 (5th Cir. 1985).
The district court in this case found that there had been a delay of nine years in bringing suit on the EEOC charges Plaintiffs filed in 1977. The district court correctly held that the period of time during which conciliation efforts were ongoing should not be counted against Plaintiffs in calculating the period of delay. See Fowler, 596 F.2d at 1279 ([A]lthough the doctrine of laches may be available in some cases to bar the EEOC from bringing suit, 17 this bar arises only if the EEOC has delayed unreasonably after it has completed conciliation.) (emphasis in original). Neither party disputes that conciliation efforts were terminated in 1980, nor that suit was not filed until late 1989.
The magistrate judge found, and the district court agreed, that Plaintiffs' delay in bringing suit was not excused. The magistrate judge based his determination as to inexcusability on the following undisputed facts: (1) Plaintiffs have been represented by counsel continuously since conciliation efforts were terminated in 1980; (2) the plaintiff union (and its predecessor), whose expertise in employment matters is presumed, was actively involved in the case from the time charges were filed with the EEOC in 1977; (3) Plaintiffs failed to take advantage of their right under the statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) to demand right to sue letters at any time after 180 days following filing of the EEOC charges; (4) Plaintiffs did not at any time from 1980 to 1989 make any inquiry with the Department of Justice or the EEOC as to the status of their claims; and (5) Plaintiffs' then attorney called a press conference in 1984, accusing the EEOC of failure to act and promising to file suit within six weeks, yet Plaintiffs did nothing at that time nor for five years thereafter to bring this suit. Plaintiffs attack the inexcusability determination, advancing two interrelated arguments. First, they argue that their delay in filing suit was not inexcusable because they were relying on the administrative process. Second, Plaintiffs contend, in effect, 18 that they should not be faulted for the laxity of their various attorneys in pursuing this suit. Neither of these contentions has merit. Plaintiffs contend that, as legally unsophisticated parties with few English skills, they cannot be assumed to be familiar with the administrative complexities of Title VII litigation.15 This argument fails to explain why Plaintiffs' counsel did not pursue this litigation, or why Plaintiffs should not be charged with their counsels' neglect. Under our system of representative litigation, each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 111 S.Ct. 453, 456 (1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That an attorney's conduct of the suit is inadequate may be grounds for a malpractice action against the attorney, but it is certainly no basis for requiring the defendant to pay the price of opposing counsel's dereliction. See Link v. Wabash Railroad, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390 n.10 (1962). Plaintiffs' assertion that one of their attorneys died and another was suspended from practice are wholly unavailing. As to the former, the record contains no indication of when the attorney died, but it does show that while he was representing Plaintiffs they were also represented by other counsel. As to the latter, the 15 We are puzzled by Plaintiffs' contention in their reply brief that they did not know that conciliation efforts had failed until 1989. Letters sent to Plaintiffs in 1980 from the EEOC clearly state that conciliation had failed and was terminated and that the matter was being referred to the Department of Justice. 19 record merely indicates that the attorney was eventually suspended from the practice of law (emphasis added); it does not indicate when the suspension occurred, and so far as the record shows the suspension could have come well after (or only shortly before) the time when other counsel had succeeded to the representation of Plaintiffs.16 Also significant in this respect is the ongoing and direct involvement of the union, which purports to represent Plaintiffs' interests in this suit. A labor union is assumed to have some degree of expertise in equal employment opportunity matters. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 1147, 1154 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 234 (1988). Plaintiffs have not argued that the union did not know of its right to request right to sue letters nor explained why the union failed to take any action to pursue the Title VII claims after conciliation failed.17 In sum, we are unable to fault the conclusion of the magistrate judge and the district court that under the undisputed facts of record the delay in this case was inexcusable.
To support a determination of laches, there must be more than 16 Nor is there any indication of the length of the suspension or any suggestion that the suspension was in any way related to counsel's representation in this matter. 17 Plaintiffs allege that growing tensions between the membership and management of AFSCME, NAGE's predecessor, led them to join NAGE in 1982. We are unpersuaded that this fact either relieved AFSCME of its duty to pursue these claims or excused NAGE from failing to pursue them after 1982. 20 simply an inexcusable delay; the party asserting laches must also establish that it has been prejudiced by the delay, that is, that the delay has cause[d] a disadvantage in asserting and establishing a claimed right or defense. Matter of Bohart, 743 F.2d 313, 327 (5th Cir. 1984). The requirement of demonstrating prejudice dovetails with the equitable nature of laches as a doctrine designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. Order of Railroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 64 S.Ct. 582, 586 (1944). The magistrate judge found that plaintiffs' inexcusable delay in filing this lawsuit has unduly prejudiced defendant and warrants the imposition of the laches defense. The magistrate judge's report further adequately warned of the necessity of timely filing properly specific objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation contained in the report and of the consequences of failing to do so. Plaintiffs' only objection to the prejudice part of the magistrate judge's report was the following: 5) Defendant only alleges and the Magistrate only found undue prejudice with regard to the allegations of discrimination during the period prior to November 29, 1989. Therefore as a matter of equity the Court should reject the recommendation to dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety and instead should allow Plaintiffs to proceed on the Title VII claims but deny any back pay for the period of undue prejudice prior to November 29, 1989. We agree with CPS that this does not constitute an objection to the determination of prejudice respecting alleged discrimination prior to November 29, 1989. As the district court adopted the 21 magistrate judge's report and its findings and conclusions, Plaintiffs are now barred from challenging the prejudice determination as to alleged discrimination prior to November 29, 1989, absent a showing of plain error or manifest injustice. See, e.g., Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 404, 410 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1982); Partfait v. Bowen, 803 F.2d 810, 811, 813, 814 (5th Cir. 1986); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-77 (5th Cir. 1988); Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247 (5th Cir. 1990); Edmond v. Collins, 8 F.3d 290, 293 n.7 (5th Cir. 1993). See also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Western District of Texas Local Rule 4(b). We find no plain error or manifest injustice. Indeed, we find no error. The magistrate judge described CPS's evidence of prejudice as unrefuted, substantial, and overwhelming, and we agree. Of the foremen and supervisors responsible for hiring and promotion during the period covered by the EEOC charges here at issue, nine had died, three were too ill to testify, and three had been terminated by CPS.18 In addition, CPS submitted thirty-six affidavits of other foremen and supervisors who prepared performance evaluations during the relevant period. Of those who could remember the employee at all (and there were many who could not), most remembered either only the name or only a general description of the person as either a good or poor employee. Few remembered specifically why they had rated a particular employee in 18 There is a presumption that employees whose employment was involuntarily terminated are hostile toward the employer. See EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 626 F.Supp. 90, 92 (M.D. Ga. 1985). 22 a particular way or the details of specific anecdotal events that Plaintiffs allege prove their discrimination claims. Plaintiffs counter that the loss of witness testimony is irrelevant because records that allegedly demonstrate the pattern and practice of discrimination at CPS are still available. These records, however, only help Plaintiffs in proving a prima facie case of discrimination; they do nothing to alleviate the prejudice to CPS in attempting to articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons to rebut any inference of discrimination these records might raise. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1094-95 (1981) (setting out the framework for shifting the burden of proof in Title VII disparate impact cases). In similar circumstances, other courts have found that the loss of witness testimony unduly prejudiced the defendant's ability to defend itself against employment discrimination charges. See, e.g., Cleveland Newspaper Guild, 839 F.2d at 1154; EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86, 88 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 626 F.Supp. 90, 93 (M.D. Ga. 1985). We think such is the case here and therefore find no error in the district court's determination of prejudice. C. Dismissal of Title VII Claims in Their Entirety Plaintiffs argue that, even if it was not error for the district court to apply the laches doctrine to their Title VII claims, the district court nevertheless abused its discretion by dismissing those claims in their entirety. They contend that the district court instead should have merely denied the award of back pay for the period before November 29, 1989, the day suit was 23 filed, because they have alleged that discrimination at CPS is ongoing and submitted statistical proof to support their allegations. We are unpersuaded. As Plaintiffs acknowledge elsewhere in their brief, Title VII requires that parties exhaust administrative remedies before instituting suit in federal court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The EEOC charges on which Plaintiffs' Title VII claims are based relate to events that happened in 1976 and 1977. Since then, as the magistrate judge found, the undisputed evidence shows significant changes in CPS's workforce and employment practices. In 1981, an affirmative action plan was adopted. In 1983, the CPS employment policy was revised to eliminate formal educational requirements for promotion to foreman or supervisor. CPS has thereafter used seniority in determining advancement. In 1986, CPS began posting job vacancies.19 The percentage of Hispanics in supervisory positions at CPS has increased considerably faster than the percentage of Hispanics in CPS's entire workforce.20 It is well-settled that courts have no jurisdiction to consider Title VII claims as to which the aggrieved party has not 19 The 1977 EEOC charge complained, among other things, of failure to post vacancies and non-job-related educational requirements such as the requirement of a high school degree for promotion to the better paying positions of equipment operators or other better jobs. 20 From 1975 to 1991, the percentage of Hispanics in the entire CPS workforce increased from 36% to 53%. During the same period, the percentage of Hispanic supervisors and foremen increased from 5% to 26%. There was undisputed evidence that the increase would have been faster but for the fact that CPS had a very stable workforce with very low turnover in these positions. 24 exhausted administrative remedies. Tolbert v. United States, 916 F.2d 245, 247-48 (5th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). We have held that a judicial complaint filed pursuant to Title VII 'may encompass any kind of discrimination like or related to allegations contained in the charge and growing out of such allegation during the pendency of the case before the Commission.' Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970) (emphasis added; citation omitted). This is because the civil action is much more intimately related to the EEOC investigation than to the words of the charge which originally triggered the investigation. Id. Other courts have expressed the same thought. [The EEOC] charge, enlarged only by such EEOC investigation as reasonably proceeds therefrom, fixed the scope of the charging party's subsequent right to institute a civil suit. The suit filed may encompass only 'the discrimination stated in the charge itself or developed in the course of a reasonable [EEOC] investigation of that charge. King v. Seaboard Coastline R. Co., 538 F.2d 581, 583 (4th Cir. 1976) (footnote and citation omitted). See also Johnson v. General Electric, 840 F.2d 132, 139 (1st Cir. 1988); Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1973) (suit may include reasonably related noncharged new acts occurring during the pendency of the charge before the EEOC) (emphasis added); Moore v. Sunbeam Corporation, 459 F.2d 811, 826 & n.38, 828 (7th Cir. 1972); Smith v. Joseph Horne Co., Inc., 438 F.Supp. 1207, 1213 (W.D. Pa. 1977); Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 436 F.Supp. 1184, 1190-91, 1193-94 (D.C. Md. 1977); 2 Larson, Employment Discrimination § 49.11(c)(1) at 9B-16 (if an [EEOC] investigation 25 has actually been conducted, most courts hold that the scope of the complaint is limited to the actual scope of the investigation). Here, the charges were filed in February 1977, the EEOC undertook an investigation which was completed and resulted in an October 31, 1979, determination letter. Conciliation was attempted, but all such efforts were terminated by June 1980. Over ten years after the investigation was completed, and after substantial changes in CPS's employment practices and profile, this suit was filed. As we have held, this delay was substantial, inexcusable, and prejudicial, so as to bar by laches Plaintiffs' Title VII claims. In these circumstances, to allow the 1977 charges to be the basis of claims of current discrimination, without new EEOC charges, would be to effectively read out of Title VII the requirement of administrative exhaustion. This we decline to do.21 21 See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld the dismissal on the basis of laches of a suit brought by the EEOC itself. The Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that the dismissal should not have extended to the request for injunctive relief against discrimination allegedly continuing when the suit was brought: The EEOC also seeks injunctive relief against an alleged pattern and practice of discrimination that continued up to the time the action was brought in 1976. Prejudice from unreasonable delay may also hamper the defense of a claim alleging a pattern and practice of discrimination and may justify dismissal of an entire action. . . . Such prejudice is particularly evident in this case. The district court found that the employment practices of Alioto and the local restaurant industry had significantly changed since the time of . . . [the] original charge. The defense to the claim of a pattern and practice of discrimination would require much of 26