Opinion ID: 1463326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R.R.'s Attorney's Fees Post-Settlement Offer

Text: The first question is whether the district court abused its discretion [9] in awarding attorney's fees to R.R. for work performed after EPISD's written settlement offerformalizing the offer made at the resolution meetingwhich was made the day of the resolution meeting and more than ten days before the administrative proceeding. That question is answered by several provisions of the IDEA. The IDEA envisions that the parties to a dispute should resolve their differences cooperatively. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 53, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005) (The core of the [IDEA] is the cooperative process that it establishes between parents and schools.). To effectuate this goal, the statute requires that [p]rior to the opportunity for an impartial due process hearing . . . the local education agency shall convene a meeting with the parents and the relevant. . . members of the [educational program t]eam . . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(i). The statute further contemplates resolution without resort to litigation by endorsing settlement agreements: In the case that a resolution is reached to resolve the complaint at [the resolution] meeting described in [20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)](i), the parties shall execute a legally binding agreement that is . . . enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States. Id. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii)(II). Early resolution through settlement is favored under the IDEA. The statute bars an award of attorney's fees for work performed subsequent to a written settlement offer that does not achieve anything more than that which was offered. See supra Section II(A) (discussing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(D)(i)). Notwithstanding that bar, a court may award attorney's fees to a parent who is the prevailing party and who was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(E).
Because it is undisputed that R.R. did not achieve any educational benefits beyond what EPISD offered, the question is whether R.R. was substantially justified in rejecting EPISD's settlement offer. The district court held that EPISD's settlement offer would not have been enforceable if it had been reduced to an agreement. Specifically, the district court determined that a private settlement would have lacked the judicial imprimatur required to be enforceable in federal court. Further, the district court determined that Texas had not waived its immunity from suit in state court for the type of settlement offered by EPISD, and accordingly, EPISD's settlement offer would not have been enforceable in state court. The district court, after determining that R.R. would not have been able to enforce the settlement in either federal or state court, concluded that R.R. had an interest in continuing litigation to obtain an enforceable order of relief, and declined to reduce R.R.'s attorney's fee award. With respect, we disagree. The IDEA states that district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under this section [20 U.S.C. § 1415] without regard to the amount in controversy. Id. § 1415(i)(3)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.516(d). The statute further contemplates that, if the parties are able to resolve their dispute at the resolution meeting, they should execute a legally binding agreement that is . . . enforceable in any State court of competent jurisdiction or in a district court of the United States. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1)(B)(iii)(II); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.510(d). Pretermitting any discussion of whether R.R. could have enforced a settlement agreement against EPISD in state court, we determine that a settlement agreement reached at the resolution meeting would have been enforceable in federal court. Courts have recognized that federal courts can enforce IDEA settlement agreements reached at a resolution meeting. In H.C. ex rel. L.C. v. Colton-Pierrepont Central School District, the Second Circuit considered whether an agreement between the parties reached outside a resolution meeting or mediation was enforceable in federal court. No. 08-4221-CV, 2009 WL 2144016, at  (2d Cir. July 20, 2009) (summary order). There, H.C. filed a due process complaint seeking greater educational services in November 2005. H.C. ex rel. L.C. v. Colton-Pierrepont Cent. Sch. Dist., 567 F.Supp.2d 340, 342 (N.D.N.Y.2008). The parties then met at the required resolution meeting later that November, but they were unable to reach an agreement. Id. However, in May 2006, before any administrative hearing had occurred, the parties entered into a written settlement agreement that resolved their dispute. Id. In June 2006, the school district created a new educational plan for H.C. that reduced the level of services provided to H.C., and, in response, H.C. again made a due process request, seeking more services and enforcement of the May 16 settlement agreement. Id. At the due process hearing, the hearing officer, despite considering the substance of H.C.'s educational claims, declined to exercise jurisdiction over the May 2006 settlement agreement, and the state review officer concurred on appeal. Id. As a party aggrieved by the decisions of the hearing officer and the state review officer, H.C. filed suit in federal district court. The district court concluded, among other things, that the hearing officer erred in determining that he had no authority to enforce the settlement agreement, and the court accordingly remanded to the hearing officer for a new hearing. Id. at 344. The school district then appealed the district court's order to the Second Circuit. On appeal, the Second Circuit vacated the district court's remand order. H.C., 2009 WL 2144016, at . In its opinion, the Second Circuit considered [w]hether the district court had federal question jurisdiction to enforce the [May 2006] settlement agreement. Id. at . The court stated that [while c]ontract enforcement is generally a question of state law[,] . . . Congress has expressly provided for enforcement of IDEA settlement agreements in federal district courts when the agreement at issue was entered into . . . at a `resolution session' required by § 1415(f)(1)(B).  Id. (emphasis added). However, because the May 2006 settlement agreement was not entered into either at the resolution meeting or through mediation, the Second Circuit remanded the case to the district court to determine whether there [wa]s a jurisdictional basis for considering plaintiff's contract claim. Id. District courts across the country have also recognized that IDEA settlement agreements reached at a resolution meeting are enforceable in federal court. See, e.g., J.M.C. v. La. Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 584 F.Supp.2d 894, 898 (M.D.La.2008) (stating that an agreement reached at a resolution meeting would have been enforceable in federal court); L.K. ex rel. L.K. v. Burlingame Sch. Dist., No. C 08-02743, 2008 WL 2563155, at  n. 8 (N.D.Cal. June 23, 2008) (The Court also notes that . . . the [IDEA] permits settlement agreements reached . . . through a resolution session under 1415(f) to be enforceable in federal courts . . . .); Traverse Bay Area Intermediate Sch. Dist. v. Mich. Dep't of Educ., No. 5:06-CV-139, 2007 WL 2219352, at  (W.D.Mich. July 27, 2007) ([W]ritten settlement agreements reached during the mediation process or in a resolution session which comply with the [IDEA] requirements are now enforceable in state and federal courts.); Bowman v. District of Columbia, No. 05-01933, 2006 WL 2221703, at  (D.D.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (recognizing that a district court has jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement reached either at the resolution meeting or during mediation). [10] Here, EPISD offered R.R. all of his requested educational relief at the resolution meeting. We conclude that if R.R. had accepted EPISD's offer, he could have enforced the resulting settlement agreement in federal court. [11] As such, there was no need for R.R. to reject EPISD's settlement offer and continue litigation solely to obtain an enforceable order of relief.
Given that R.R. did not need to continue litigation to obtain an enforceable agreement covering all requested relief, we conclude that R.R. was not substantially justified in rejecting EPISD's settlement offer. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(E). Further, R.R.'s own filings indicate that he recognized that a settlement agreement made at the resolution meeting was enforceable. [12] Because R.R. was not substantially justified in rejecting EPISD's settlement offer, Id. § 1415(i)(3)(D) applies and prohibits an attorney's fee award for work performed subsequent to the time of EPISD's written settlement offer. See Shelly C. ex rel. Shelbie C. v. Venus Indep. Sch. Dist., 878 F.2d 862, 864 (5th Cir.1989) (recognizing that the IDEA bars an award of attorney's fees for work performed subsequent to a settlement offer of all requested relief); Duane M., 861 F.2d at 119 (same). Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion by awarding attorney's fees to R.R. for work performed subsequent to EPISD's written settlement offer.