Opinion ID: 2262565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Stalking by Harassment

Text: ¶ 60 Stalking by harassment requires that the defendant repeatedly harasses another person without lawful authority, among other factors. RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a). As explained above, repeatedly means on two or more separate occasions. 9A.46.110(6)(e). Harasses means unlawful harassment, pursuant to RCW 10.14.020. See RCW 9A.46.110(6)(c). Unlawful harassment is a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such person, and which serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. RCW 10.14.020(1). Course of conduct means a pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. RCW 10.14.020(2). ¶ 61 To be found guilty of stalking under the harassment prong, then, the course of conduct (i.e., the pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts ) must occur repeatedly (i.e., happen more than once). Said another way: The defendant must commit a series of acts more than once to stalk a victim by harassment. In both the Westfall and Gudaz incidents, Kintz engaged in only one course of conduct. By definition his actions comprised a single pattern or single series of acts. ¶ 62 But the majority today rewrites the stalking statute to effectively delete the repeatedly requirement in RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a), allowing the State to prosecute for stalking when it is not warranted. The majority achieves this end by artificially deconstructing the events in this single pattern to create multiple patterns. It cleaves a single course of conduct into multiple courses of conduct to satisfy the repeatedly element of RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a). This sleight of hand impermissibly toys with the stalking statute's plain language. It manipulates facts to force them into the stalking statute when, in reality, they do not fit. ¶ 63 The majority cites a Court of Appeals case, State v. Haines, 151 Wash.App. 428, 213 P.3d 602 (2009), review denied, 167 Wash.2d 1022, 225 P.3d 1011 (2010), for the proposition that harassment requires two separate acts to qualify as stalking. Majority at 478-79. Its reliance on this case is perplexing. Haines unequivocally supports the notion that any single incident of harassment must comprise a harassing `course of conduct' as defined by RCW 10.14.020(2)i.e., a `series of acts over a period of time, however short.' Haines, 151 Wash.App. at 435, 213 P.3d 602 (quoting RCW 10.14.020(2)). [B]oth the plain text and structure of the statutory sections at issue indicate that what must be `repeated' is a `course of conduct'.... Id. The plain meaning of the words at issue is, again, that it is the series of acts that, when combined, serve to sufficiently alarm, annoy, or cause detriment such that the definition of `harassment' is met. Id. at 436, 213 P.3d 602. ¶ 64 As Haines points out, a series of acts creates a single act of harassmentnot a single act of stalking. The Haines court affirmed Haines's conviction because his harassing conduct ( e.g., a series of acts including threats to rape and kill a female store clerk) occurred on clearly separate occasions. Id. at 437, 213 P.3d 602. The first occasion included a single course of conduct (or a series of acts) when Haines repeatedly told the clerk he intended to (1) rape her, (2) Haines left the shop, (3) the clerk followed him outside to ensure he didn't hurt other customers, and finally (4) Haines threatened to rape and kill her again. Id. at 430-31, 213 P.3d 602. This was the first case of unlawful harassment. The second (or repeated) incident of harassment occurred more than a month later, when Haines again performed a series of harassing acts. Id. at 431-32, 213 P.3d 602. [8] This repeated harassment (or repeated course of conduct) rightfully constituted stalking. ¶ 65 The majority today would transform both Haines's first and second acts into stalking, when in reality each is unlawful harassment. Haines was guilty of stalking because he harassed his victim initially, then a second time more than a month later. Unlike Haines, Kintz's case involves only a single series of acts (i.e., only one course of conduct) with each individual. Kintz cannot be guilty of stalking by harassment because he did not harass either Westfall or Gudaz repeatedly. ¶ 66 The majority today impermissibly expands stalking incidents by criminalizing commonplace interactions. I read the majority opinion to criminalize, like Kintz, (1) a driver asking a stranger for directions, then (2) turning around (beyond eyeshot) and driving slowly past that same stranger. Majority at 479-80. It categorizes these two events as separate courses of conduct, each worthy of unlawful harassment. Any two interactions separated by breaks in contact between [the] episodes could qualify as stalking. Id. at 480. If this is right, many Washingtonians would be guilty of stalking in their everyday lives. A person who enters into a heated verbal exchange with a customer at a coffee shop, breaks off the exchange, but then restarts the debate minutes later on the sidewalk could be guilty of stalking. Similarly, a man who uses an ill-considered pickup line, is rebuffed, but again attempts to woo the object of his affection later, could be convicted of stalking. [9] This cannot be right. ¶ 67 Based on the facts of this case, no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of stalking by harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. Insufficient evidence exists to uphold Kintz's conviction. Because the jury did not indicate the alternative means by which it found Kintz guilty, and because the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction for stalking by harassment, Kintz's conviction cannot be sustained. See Ortega-Martinez, 124 Wash.2d at 708, 881 P.2d 231. I would reverse and dismiss the charges.