Opinion ID: 1478239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: USAA's Policies.

Text: At the time of the collision, Major McCarden was insured by USAA under four policies. These policies provided liability coverage to McCarden with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. [2] The USAA policies, by their explicit terms, require the insurer to pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for which any covered person becomes legally responsible. Covered person is defined in pertinent part as 1. You or any family member for the ownership, maintenance or use of any auto or trailer. 2. Any person using your covered auto. Subparagraph 1 does not apply to the collision which precipitated this case. It does not reach Major McCarden because he did not own the rented vehicle, nor does Northbrook allege that he was maintaining or using it. [3] Neither Adjusters nor Mlle. Claudel was a family member, as required by subparagraph 1. Subparagraph 2 is likewise inapplicable because the rental car did not fall within the definition of your covered auto. The definition of that phrase includes [4] [a]ny vehicle shown in the Declarations, and [a]ny auto or trailer you do not own while used as a temporary substitute for any other vehicle described in this definition which is out of normal use because of its: a. breakdown; b. repair; c. servicing; d. loss; or e. destruction. (Emphasis added). The car which Mlle. Claudel was driving was not shown in the Declarations, nor was it a temporary substitute for any other vehicle which had become unavailable as a result of breakdown, repair, servicing, loss, or destruction. In fact, Major McCarden testified, and Northbrook does not deny, that he rented the car because all of his vehicles were in locations other than Washington, and because he needed one to drive during his visit here. Moreover, it is commonly understood in the car insurance business that a substitute automobile is one actually but only temporarily used in place of [a] specified automobile for the same use the insured automobile would have been used except for its withdrawal from all normal use and while such withdrawal is because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. 6B JOHN A. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 4293.5, at 209 n. 38.30 (1979) (emphasis added) (citing Fulton v. Woodford, 17 Ariz.App. 490, 498 P.2d 564, 569 (1972)). The USAA policies were phrased in the very terms used in APPLEMAN, and were inapplicable to the scenario in the present case, which was a conventional short-term rental by someone who had no vehicle of his own in the Washington, D.C. area. [5]