Opinion ID: 1728915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred by granting instructions which incorrectly defined malice aforethought thereby negating the manslaughter defense.

Text: ¶ 6. The trial court granted two of the State's instructions regarding malice aforethought and manslaughter and refused Russell's instruction defining malice aforethought. Russell contends that the court's actions resulted in confusing and misleading instructions and, in effect, denied him the defense of manslaughter. Specifically, he contends that the jury could not have understood that one could have an intent to kill and nonetheless be guilty of no more than manslaughter. ¶ 7. State's instruction S-5A, which was granted, states as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that malice aforethought is required by Mississippi law to make a homicide a murder. Malice aforethought means intent to kill, without authority of law and not being under circumstances that would reduce the act to a lesser crime. ¶ 8. State's instruction S-7 was also granted and states as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that the term heat of passion is defined as a state of violent, uncontrollable rage engendered by certain provocation given, and will reduce a homicide from the grade of Murder to that of Manslaughter. Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. [sic] The term includes an emotional state of mind characterized by anger, rage, hatred, furious resentment or terror. ¶ 9. Russell argues that his instruction D 7 (Alt.1), which was refused, would have helped explain the difference between murder and manslaughter and that both contain the element of intent. That instruction states as follows: The court instructs the jury that malice aforethought, as defined, indicates a full awareness of what one is doing, and generally implies careful and unhurried consideration of the consequences; to calculate, plan, contemplate. ¶ 10. Russell's instruction D-4 (Alt.1) was granted. This instruction first lists the material elements required for a finding of guilt of murder and then details the elements of manslaughter. The portion of the instruction pertaining to manslaughter states as follows: However, if the State has failed to prove any one or more of these elements of the charge of murder beyond a reasonable doubt, you will proceed with your deliberation to decide whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt the crime of Manslaughter. The court instructs the jury that Manslaughter is the killing of a human being, without malice aforethought, and in the heat of passion by the use of a deadly weapon, without authority of law. Thus, if you find from the evidence, that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt all of the following material elements that: 1. On September 17, 1992, in the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, 2. The Defendant, ALVIN JUDE RUSSELL, did wilfully, feloniously and without authority of law and without malice aforethought, in the heat of passion, with the use of a deadly weapon, did shoot and kill Rebecca June Russell, a living person, and further, 3. That the Defendant had the mental capacity to realize and appreciate the nature and quality of his acts and to distinguish between right and wrong at the time he committed these acts then you shall find the Defendant, ALVIN JUDE RUSSELL, Guilty of Manslaughter. If after considering all of the evidence in this case you find the State has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was sane at the time of the commission of either Murder or Manslaughter, then your verdict must be Not Guilty by reason of insanity. ¶ 11. Russell cites Williams v. State, 729 So.2d 1181 (Miss.1998), in support of his proposition that it was error to exclude his definition of malice aforethought. This Court stated the following in Williams: What is under consideration in this case is whether, in a prosecution for deliberate design murder, where a manslaughter instruction is warranted and granted, the jury should be instructed as to how to determine the aforethought portion of malice aforethought or the deliberation portion of deliberate design. We hold that such an instruction is proper in such a case as this, and error in this case to refuse a proper instruction (D-10) thereon. Id. at 1184. ¶ 12. We find that the jury in the present case was not properly instructed regarding malice aforethought. The language of instruction S-5A is unclear and does not sufficiently define the term, and no other granted instructions provide an adequate definition. We have held numerous times that [t]his Court will not reverse for denial of an individual instruction when the jury has been instructed properly and fully by the granting of all the instructions. Id. (quoting Collins v. State, 594 So.2d 29, 35 (Miss.1992)). A holistic reading of the instructions in this case does not correct the error. The definition of malice aforethought is simply absent. Therefore, Russell's instruction D-7 (Alt.1) should have been granted. The judge committed reversible error by failing to grant the instruction.