Opinion ID: 729692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Severance of Count One

Text: 17 In its memorandum opinion, the district court stated that, without objection [it] bifurcated the trial such that count one, unlawful possession of a firearm by a Convicted Felon, would be tried alone, while the other four counts would be tried together at a later date. A.A. 28. Appellant argues that the district court erred in failing to sever the ex-felon element from the possession element [321 U.S.App.D.C. 355] for the trial on Count One. 9 The government disputes whether appellant properly raised this issue in the proceedings below. But even assuming, arguendo, that he did raise it, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by severing Count One from the other counts and trying Count One first, nor did it abuse its discretion by deciding not to bifurcate the ex-felon element and the other elements of Count One. 18 Appellant relies on United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50 (D.C.Cir.1992), in which this court held that it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to join an ex-felon firearms count with three drug counts in light of defense motions to sever, to introduce the defendant's prior conviction by stipulation or to try the count to the judge, as well as numerous references by the prosecution at trial to the defendant's prior conviction. Id. at 50. The Dockery court concluded that the trial court had not shown sufficient scrupulous regard for the defendant's rights when it refused to sever the ex-felon count from the separate drug distribution counts. Id. at 56 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Appellant argues that his situation is sufficiently like Dockery to make the trial court's decision an abuse of discretion. Although the trial court here did agree to sever the ex-felon count from the other counts for trial, appellant claims that the prejudicial spillover from the 'ex-felon' evidence was not cured because the jury was allowed to consider it with respect to the felon-in-possession charge itself. Brief of Appellant, at 21. 19 We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not severing the prior felony element from the other elements of the crime. This case is sharply distinguishable from Dockery, where the trial court refused to sever the ex-felon count from the other counts against the defendant. In this case, the trial court only refused to sever the ex-felon element from the element of appellant's possession of a gun that had traveled in interstate commerce; both were elements of the same count. This court's decisions in Dockery and United States v. Daniels guard against the joinder of a felon-in-possession count with other counts because of the high risk of undue prejudice insofar as such joinder allows evidence of a defendant's prior felony conviction to be introduced in a trial of charges with respect to which the evidence would otherwise be inadmissible. Daniels, 770 F.2d 1111, 1116 (D.C.Cir.1985). 10 When faced with the risk posed by joinder of separate charges, trial courts should consider other measures that assure a fair trial, such as holding a bench trial or a separate trial on the ex-felon count, or withholding evidence of a prior felony conviction until after the jury has reached a verdict with regard to the possession element. Dockery, 955 F.2d at 55 n. 4. Since the trial court here complied with this mandate by severing the ex-felon count from the other counts--which were later dismissed by the government anyway--appellant's claim is without merit. 11 [321 U.S.App.D.C. 356] C. Nondisclosure of Identity of Informant 20 Appellant claims that the district court erred by denying appellant's motion to compel disclosure of the confidential government informant's identity. Mangum argued that the informant was a relevant and necessary witness for the defense, that the informant might have been motivated by his desire to curry favor with the government, and that the informant might have had physical access to Mangum's knapsack, in which the gun was found. Tr. I, at 5-7, 9, 12, 14, 16-18. 12 At the hearing, Mangum argued that he needed to interview the informant in order to determine whether the informant might have planted the gun in the knapsack in order to help secure an arrest and curry favor with the government. Id. at 6-7, 53-54. 21 The district court rejected Mangum's motion. After explaining the relevant legal standards, the court found that the defendant was not entitled to know the informant's identity [b]ecause there is no evidence in the record supporting the Defendant's speculation that the informant actively participated in the offense. A.A. 25. Thus, the defendant had failed to meet his burden by showing that the informant's testimony is necessary to his defense so as to justify placing the informant's safety in jeopardy. Id. 22 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Mangum's motion to disclose the identity of the informant. In general, defendants seeking disclosure of an informant's identity bear a heavy burden in establishing that disclosure is warranted. United States v. Warren, 42 F.3d 647, 654 (D.C.Cir.1994) (quoting United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066, 1071 (D.C.Cir.1971)). This court has held that [m]ere speculation that the informer might possibly be of some assistance is not sufficient to meet this burden. United States v. Skeens, 449 F.2d 1066, 1070 (D.C.Cir.1971) (internal quotation marks omitted). In order to overcome the public interest in the protection of the informer, the defendant is obligated to show that the informer was an actual participant in or a witness to the offense charged, whose identity is necessary to [the] defense. Id. at 1070, 1071. 23 Appellant has failed to meet this burden here. The district court was correct in finding that appellant's assertion that the informant was a participant or witness whose testimony was necessary to the defense was purely speculative. Appellant offered no evidence in support of that assertion other than to point to the tip itself, which, in his view, suggested that the informant had access to the knapsack on the day of the offense. Yet, as the government convincingly argues, the substance of the informant's tip--that Mangum generally carried a gun in his knapsack as he went to and from work--did not indicate that the informant had any access to the knapsack. See Brief for Appellee, at 37-38. For example, the informant might have learned this information from something appellant said. Moreover, the tip was given to police approximately one week prior to appellant's arrest, and there appears to be no way that the informant would have known precisely when the police were going to stake out the barbershop and arrest the appellant. Id. at 38. 13 Finally, the government proffered [321 U.S.App.D.C. 357] that the informant was not a participant in or witness to the crime. A.A. 38-39. On these facts, the trial judge's factual finding that nothing in this record establishes that the informant was a participant, an eyewitness, or a person who was otherwise in a position to give direct testimony concerning the crime was not clearly erroneous. A.A. 23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's finding that appellant did not meet his burden of showing that the informant was an actual participant in or witness to the crime charged. D. Trial Judge's Questioning of Witness 24 Appellant argues that the trial court erred in asking two questions of Officer Johnson, a government witness, during Johnson's direct testimony at trial about the events that occurred on the date of appellant's arrest. The following interchange is at issue: 25 THE COURT: Had you observed this barbershop before the incident you're now describing? 26 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. 27