Opinion ID: 418037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Reciprocal Duty Instruction.

Text: 24 The Water Works challenges as error the trial court's instruction 41 relating to negligence and contributory negligence. The plaintiff requested an instruction dealing with the rights and duties of each party regarding the Water Works' alleged contributory negligence. 4 The Water Works contends that the trial court erred when it reworked the proposed instruction to make the instruction reciprocal as to both negligence and contributory negligence. The court's instruction stated: 25 Each defendant contends plaintiff was contributorily negligent and that such contributory negligence bars the plaintiff from recovery. Plaintiff contends each defendant was negligent. 26 A party cannot be found negligent because it failed to anticipate the negligent acts of another party. 27 In determining whether a party was negligent, you must first consider what duty that party had a right to expect of each other party. One to whom a duty of care is owed has the right to assume that it will be performed unless the circumstances should warn him to the contrary. 28 Instruction 41. 29 We agree with the Water Works that the trial court erred when it submitted instruction 41 to the jury. In the second paragraph of the instruction, we find the trial court misstated the law regarding the reciprocal duty of each party to anticipate the negligence of another party. The trial court compounded that error when it attempted to equate the duties regarding negligence with those regarding contributory negligence. 5 30 The contributory negligence of a plaintiff is determined by the same tests and rules as the negligence of a defendant, i.e., both concepts involve standards of conduct defined in terms of the reasonable person of ordinary prudence in like circumstances. But the respective duties underlying the two concepts are not the same. Negligence relates to conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Contributory negligence involves conduct which creates an unreasonable risk of harm to one's self or one's own interests. 2 F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts Sec. 22.10, at 1227 (1956); W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts Sec. 65, at 418 (4th ed. 1971). Therefore, the application of the reasonable person test yields differing results depending on the party and the corresponding duty involved. 31 The trial court erred when it instructed the jury as a matter of law that [a] party cannot be found negligent because it failed to anticipate the negligent acts of another party. Even in a general sense, this is not a correct statement of law. Whether a person is negligent for failing to anticipate the negligence of others is to be determined by the application of the reasonable person test, i.e., whether a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in like circumstances would have taken precautions against the negligence of another. As Dean Prosser observed: 32 [T]he hypothetical reasonable man ... is required to realize that there will be a certain amount of negligence in the world. In general, where the risk is relatively slight, he is free to proceed upon the assumption that other people will exercise proper care.... But when the risk becomes a serious one, either because the threatened harm is great, or because there is an especial likelihood that it will occur, reasonable care may demand precautions against that occasional negligence which is one of the ordinary incidents of human life and therefore to be anticipated. W. Prosser, supra, Sec. 33 at 170-71. 6 33 See also Restatement (Second) of Torts Secs. 302(b), 302A & comment c (1965). Therefore, a person has a right to expect that others will exercise due care, but he may so expect only as long as it is reasonable to do so. It is incorrect to state as a matter of law that a person is not negligent for failing to anticipate the negligence of another. 34 The error becomes prejudicial to the Water Works when considered along with the error committed in the third paragraph of instruction 41. The court told the jury that it was to consider what duty a party had a right to expect of another party, and then instructed the jury that [o]ne to whom a duty of care is owed has the right to assume that it will be performed unless the circumstances should warn him to the contrary. But nowhere in the instructions did the court inform the jury that, although the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty to avoid creating an unreasonable risk of harm to the plaintiff, the plaintiff did not owe the same duty of care to the defendants. The plaintiff only had an obligation to use due care to protect itself and its interests from an unreasonable risk of harm. 7 When the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to the nature of the Water Works' obligations, and then instructed the jury regarding [o]ne to whom a duty of care is owed without defining the party or parties to whom the duty of care was owed, the court left the jury to speculate as to whether the Water Works owed a duty of care to the defendants, and as to what the Water Works was required to do to satisfy that duty. The Water Works owed no duty of care to the defendants; it only had an obligation to protect itself. 8 On the other hand, a plaintiff to whom a duty of care is owed generally has the right to assume that a defendant who owes him the duty of care will not be negligent, unless circumstances should warn the plaintiff to the contrary. 2 F. Harper & F. James, supra, Sec. 22.10 at 1229-30. See also Schuller v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 328 N.W.2d at 332; Jorgensen v. Horton, 206 N.W.2d 100, 105 (Iowa 1973); Conrad v. Board of Supervisors of Lee County, 199 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Iowa 1972); Christianson v. Kramer, 255 Iowa 239, 248, 122 N.W.2d 283, 288-89 (1963); Jones v. O'Bryon, 254 Iowa 31, 37, 116 N.W.2d 461, 464-65 (1962); Tucker v. Tolerton & Warfield Co., 249 Iowa 405, 410, 86 N.W.2d 822, 826 (1957); Flattery v. Goode, 240 Iowa 973, 977-78, 38 N.W.2d 668, 670-71 (1949); Stafford v. Gowing, 236 Iowa 171, 178, 18 N.W.2d 156, 159 (1945); Webber v. E.K. Larimer Hardware Co., 234 Iowa 1381, 1384-85, 15 N.W.2d 286, 288 (1944); Coonley v. Lowden, 234 Iowa 731, 737, 12 N.W.2d 870, 875 (1944); LaSell v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 233 Iowa 929, 956-58, 11 N.W.2d 36, 49-50 (1943). 35 The trial court instructed the jury that ABH, the engineer, was bound to furnish design and specifications prepared with a reasonable degree of technical skill, and such as would produce, if followed and adhered to, a facility of the kind called for, without marked defects in character. (Instruction 36). Similarly, the court instructed the jury that Dorr-Oliver, the manufacturer, had a duty to design, manufacture and assemble a product which is reasonably suitable and adequate for the purpose for which it is intended. (Id.) The Water Works argues that it fulfilled its obligation to use due care to protect itself and its interests when it engaged the services of a trusted engineering firm that had performed satisfactorily for the Water Works in the past. 9 We agree. But the error here was that the jury was allowed to speculate to the contrary; when the trial court instructed the jury that [o]ne to whom a duty of care is owed has the right to assume that it will be performed unless the circumstances should warn him to the contrary, the court failed to instruct the jury as to which party owed a duty of due care, to whom the duty was owed, and the nature of the duty. The context of the entire instruction strongly implied that the court was discussing generally the duties of the plaintiff toward the defendants as well as the duties of the latter toward the Water Works. 36 The trial court reasoned that its other instructions clarified which party was owed a legal duty. We must respectfully disagree. As previously indicated, the trial court erred when it attempted to make the duties regarding contributory negligence reciprocal with the duties regarding negligence. The prejudice to the plaintiff flowing from instruction 41 was magnified when the trial court told the jury in instruction 42: 37 The defendants assert the plaintiff was negligent in the following particulars: 38 a) In failing to take field tests of the chemical and settling characteristics of the plaintiff's lime sludge prior to the design and construction of the lime sludge concentrator. 39 b) In failing to notify the defendants that the concentrator system had to produce a fifteen percent concentration in order to satisfy the plaintiff. 40 c) In failing to include a process guarantee in the plans and specifications for the project if plaintiff wished to have a process guaranteed. 41 d) In purportedly abdicating to Dorr-Oliver its responsibility as to the design of the lime sludge concentrator. 42 e) In failing to avail itself of information, knowledge and expertise of its trustees, employees and agents in the design, purchase and construction of the concentrator system and its component parts. 43 f) In failing to read and fully understand the plans and specifications prepared for the project. 44 g) In failing to operate the water treatment facility according to design. 45 h) In failing to exercise due care in the circumstances. 46 In the context of this case, assertions (a) through (f) set forth duties to the defendants which the Water Works did not owe. The Water Works argues as much on appeal. However, for reasons we do not know, it failed to challenge this instruction at the trial. We need not decide whether instruction 42 constitutes plain error, since we have found that instruction 41, creating reciprocal duties, was erroneous and resulted in prejudice to the Water Works. Nevertheless, we emphasize that instruction 42 improperly magnified the prejudice that flowed from the reciprocal instruction. The jury could have concluded that the plaintiff's duties instructed upon in instruction 41 included the allegations set forth in instruction 42. However, assertions (a) through (f) did not constitute contributory negligence, even if proven. Once the plaintiff contracted with the defendants to design and construct the concentrator system, it should be obvious the duties outlined in these assertions did not rest on the Water Works. 47 Thus, we conclude that the trial court erred in instructing the jury as a matter of law that a party is not negligent for failing to anticipate the negligence of another and that the duties owed by the parties were reciprocal, thereby implying that the plaintiff owed the defendants affirmative duties in fact not owed by the plaintiff. 48 Conclusion. 49 We affirm the judgment on the verdict finding Dorr-Oliver was not liable for breach of warranty. However, because the trial court erred in instructing the jury on contributory negligence, the trial court's judgment on the negligence count is vacated and the case is remanded for a new trial against both defendants. 50