Opinion ID: 844288
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective assistance of counselfailure to impeach Penilton

Text: In a contention closely related to the immediately preceding due process claim, defendant asserts he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel due to trial counsel's failure to impeach Vera Penilton with Sonya Williams's statement to police. [22] Defendant notes that counsel unquestionably had access to the proof of [Penilton's] prior admission to Sonya Williams that she had just had a baby by Proby, because it was contained in a court exhibit, memorialized in both a videotape and a written transcript, other portions of which came before the jury. Yet ... trial counsel unaccountably failed to impeach Penilton with her prior statement to Williams. (24) The law governing defendant's claim is settled. `A criminal defendant is guaranteed the right to the assistance of counsel by both the state and federal Constitutions. [Citations.] Construed in light of its purpose, the right entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance.' ( People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 575 [280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290], quoting People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839], italics in original.) It is defendant's burden to demonstrate the inadequacy of trial counsel. [Citation.] We have summarized defendant's burden as follows: `In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must first show counsel's performance was `deficient' because his `representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms.' [Citations.] Second, he must also show prejudice flowing from counsel's performance or lack thereof. [Citation.] Prejudice is shown when there is a `reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'' [Citation.] [¶] (25) Reviewing courts defer to counsel's reasonable tactical decisions in examining a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel [citation], and there is a `strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.' [Citation.] Defendant's burden is difficult to carry on direct appeal, as we have observed: `Reviewing courts will reverse convictions [on direct appeal] on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for [his or her] act or omission.' [Citation.] ( People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 436-437 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373].) If the record on appeal `sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] ... unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected,' and the claim of ineffective assistance in such a case is more appropriately decided in a habeas corpus proceeding. ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267 [62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134].) As noted above, on this record, we cannot determine whether Penilton was lying when she made her statement to Williams, or when she testified at defendant's trial, or if it was Williams's statement that was false. Nor does the record reveal why counsel failed to introduce Williams's statement to police to impeach Penilton. To conclude definitively that counsel was remiss in failing to impeach Penilton would, on this record, be difficult. But even assuming for the sake of argument that trial counsel rendered deficient performance, defendant's claim would still fail for lack of prejudice. As defendant acknowledges, although trial counsel did not impeach Penilton with Sonya Williams's statement to police, he undermined Penilton's credibility by relying on evidence of her convictions of six petty thefts. But perhaps more importantly in light of defendant's present complaint, trial counsel elicited from Penilton that she and Proby were boyfriend and girlfriend, that they were pretty close, that she and Proby shared a bedroom in her house where Proby kept some of his clothes, and that they slept together every night. In other words, counsel probed her possible motivations for protecting Proby. Given that the jury heard of Penilton's convictions and the extent of her intimate relationship with Proby, and that the evidence of defendant's guilt was strong, we see no reasonable probability that, had trial counsel impeached Penilton on an additional collateral matter, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 104 S.Ct. 2052].)