Opinion ID: 606297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The May 31, 1990 Sentencing Order

Text: 5 The appellant advances two arguments in support of his contention that the district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order was illegal. 6 First, he argues that the imposition of probation on Count 2 was impermissible because he had already served his time on Count 2. According to the appellant, his sentence on Count 2 was inextricably linked to his sentence on Count 1 because the district court declared these sentences to be concurrent in its initial sentencing order of June 26, 1989. Consequently, when his sentence on Count 1 was reduced to time served, appellant argues that his sentence on Count 2 was similarly reduced to time served thereby leaving no prison time for the district court to reduce to probation. 6 The appellant's argument misconceives the concept of concurrent sentences. When two or more sentences are designated as concurrent, this designation means only that the sentences are to be served simultaneously. See Black's Law Dictionary 264 (5th ed. 1979). It does not mean that these sentences have been inextricably merged into a single sentence. Rather, concurrent sentences remain at all times distinct and independent sentences. Thus, an order reducing or reversing one sentence does not automatically affect a corresponding reversal or reduction of any other concurrent sentences. United States v. Montoya, 676 F.2d 428, 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856 (1982); see United States v. Bush, 659 F.2d 163, 167-68 (D.C.Cir.1981), United States v. Cardona, 650 F.2d 54, 57-58 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Durant, 648 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C.Cir.1981). 7 Accordingly, we reject the appellant's contention that the district court improperly imposed probation on Count 2 because his sentence on this count had expired. Notwithstanding the district court's reduction of his sentence on Count 1 to time served, the appellant's sentence on Count 2 remained 10-years imprisonment until the district court independently reduced this sentence to 5-years probation. 8 The appellant next argues that the district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order was illegal because the reduction of his sentence on Count 2 to 5-years probation violated the split sentencing limitations of 18 U.S.C. § 3651. We agree. 9 The district court reduced the appellant's sentence on Count 2 pursuant to Rule 35(b). 7 However, the court's authority to reduce the appellant's sentence under this provision was circumscribed by the dictates of 18 U.S.C. § 3651. 8 This provision prohibits a court from sentencing a defendant to a term of probation coupled with more than six months total imprisonment for a single offense. United States v. Shulman, 940 F.2d 91, 94 (4th Cir.1991); United States v. Martin, 938 F.2d 883, 884-85 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Clayton, 588 F.2d 1288, 1292 (9th Cir.1979); Sibo v. United States, 332 F.2d 176, 176 (2d Cir.1964). And what a court may not initially impose as a split sentence under § 3651 it may not subsequently craft under the authority of Rule 35(b). United States v. Carter, 704 F.2d 1063, 1064 (9th Cir.1983) ([S]ection 3651 is a limitation upon the Rule 35(b) power of the district court.); Advisory Committee Note, Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(b) (Should the reduction to a sentence of probation occur after the defendant has been incarcerated more than six months, this would put into issue the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 3651.); see United States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423, 423-24 (3rd Cir.1987) (reduced sentence imposed by district court under Rule 35(b) violated § 3651's split sentencing limitation). 10 In the instant case, the district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order violated the split sentencing limitations of § 3651. At the time the district court reduced the appellant's sentence on Count 2 to 5-years probation, the appellant had already served 3 years, 5 months, and 2 days in jail on this count. Consequently, the net effect of the district court's sentencing order was to convert the appellant's sentence on Count 2 to a combined sentence of probation and prison. Since the appellant's prison sentence had already exceeded six months, however, § 3651 prevented the district court from sentencing the appellant to any term of probation. See Martin, 938 F.2d at 884 (split sentence of 8 months imprisonment and 12 months probation imposed after revocation of probation was illegal where defendant had already served 4 months in prison); United States v. Principato, 717 F.2d 1313, 1314 (9th Cir.1983) (split sentence of 6 months imprisonment and 3 and 1/2 years probation was illegal where defendant had already served 6 months in prison), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1984). Accordingly, we conclude that the district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order was illegal. 11 Having concluded that the appellant was illegally sentenced to 5-years probation on Count 2, we must nevertheless determine whether this illegality was cured by any of the district court's subsequent actions. Under Rule 35(a), the district court had the authority to correct its May 31, 1990 sentencing order at any time. Martin, 938 F.2d at 885. 12 The district court purported to exercise its authority to corect an illegal sentence under Rule 35(a) in its September 16, 1992 order denying the appellant's Rule 35(a) motion. In this order, the court stated that it was conditionally altering its May 31, 1990 sentencing order nunc pro tunc, should it be found defective, to read that the execution rather than the imposition of the appellant's remaining prison term on count 2 was being suspended. While this conditional alteration may have resolved one defect, 9 it did not alter the fact that the district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order imposed on the appellant a split sentence combining probation with a prison term in excess of six months. Accordingly, the district court's conditional alteration of its prior sentencing order did not prevent this order from violating § 3651. 13 On the same day that the district court conditionally altered its May 31, 1990 sentencing order, the court, in a separate order, also resentenced the appellant to 10-years imprisonment. This sentencing order could be construed as a corrective order pursuant to Rule 35(a). See Martin, 938 F.2d at 884-85 (construing district court's resentencing of defendant upon revocation of probation as correction of illegal split sentence under Rule 35(a)); Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 427 (construing district court's subsequent alteration of illegal split sentence under Rule 36 as a corrective order pursuant to Rule 35(a)). Under the facts of this case, however, we believe that such an interpretation of the district court's action would be a fiction. The court did not realize it was correcting an illegal sentence at the time it resentenced the appellant to 10-years imprisonment; rather, it thought that it was resentencing the appellant for a violation of his probation. While 18 U.S.C. § 3653 permits a court to reimpose a lesser sentence than that originally imposed when revoking probation, 10 a court may often feel compelled to reimpose its initial sentence in such a situation. Such a compulsion is less likely to exist, however, when a court is resentencing a defendant anew. Consequently, we do not believe it can be said that the district court would necessarily have imposed the same sentence on the defendant had it known it was resentencing the defendant pursuant to Rule 35(a). We therefore refuse to construe the district court's resentencing order as a corrective order under this rule. 14 Given our conclusion that neither of the district court's September 16, 1992 orders adequately remedied the court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order, we hold that this order must be vacated with respect to Count 2 and remand the case to the court for resentencing on this count. We reject the appellant's claim that, in lieu of remanding, we should simply strike that portion of the district court's May 31, 1990 sentencing order which placed the appellant on probation. A prisoner is not entitled to escape punishment for a valid conviction merely because the court committed an error in passing sentence. Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160, 166 (1947). The Constitution does not require that sentencing should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge means immunity for the prisoner. Id. at 166-67. Thus, a court may always correct an illegal sentence by imposing all or part of the sentence that might originally have been imposed. Principato, 717 F.2d at 1314. 11 In the instant case, therefore, the district court may impose any sentence that it was authorized to impose in its original sentencing order of June 26, 1989, so long as this sentence does not contain a term of probation. 12 The defendant will of course be entitled to credit the time he has already been incarcerated against whatever sentence he receives. Martin, 938 F.2d at 885; Principato, 717 F.2d at 1314.