Opinion ID: 2598683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: schelin's constructive possession of a firearm is insufficient as a matter of law to prove he was armed

Text: Investigating an anonymous tip, an officer with the Spokane Police Department approached Schelin's children playing outside his home and requested their father to come outside. When Schelin came out, unarmed, the officer engaged him in a conversation, which led the officer to suspect Schelin might be engaged in criminal, drug-related activities. The officer later applied for and was issued a search warrant, which was executed a few days later by the Spokane Police Department's Special Investigative Unit. Entering Schelin's home, police first encountered his live-in girl friend at the front door. They then progressed further into the house, at which point they found Schelin standing, still unarmed, at the foot of the stairs to the basement. An officer ordered Schelin upstairs. Still unarmed, he complied. Schelin was then arrested and handcuffed. Only subsequent to Schelin's arrest did police search his home, including the basement area. The basement was made up of a laundry room and two bedrooms, one room to the north, and another to the southeast. The search revealed rooted and starter marijuana plants, dried marijuana leaves, scales, militia materials, money, and a weapons collection. In the southeast bedroom, separate from the marijuana grow operation, police also found two firearms hanging from the door, one of which was loaded. The record is unclear on the precise distance between Schelin, where he was standing at the bottom of the stairs, and the loaded gun, but the distance seems to have been at least 10 to 15 feet. At trial Schelin testified the gun was intended to defend his family from his girl friend's ex-husband. Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Apr. 7 & 8, 1998) at 393, 403-05. The State presented no evidence to the contrary. There was no evidence Schelin ever used the gun, let alone used it to defend or promote his marijuana grow operation. The jury found Schelin guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture and possession with intent to deliver. Notwithstanding the complete lack of evidence Schelin ever used the gun in furtherance of a crime, the jury also returned a special verdict finding Schelin was armed contrary to former RCW 9.94A.125. Schelin now challenges the weapon enhancement verdict for want of substantial evidence. The statutory issue is whether Schelin was armed with a deadly weapon pursuant to the deadly weapon enhancement statute, former RCW 9.94A.125, when he committed his ongoing crime of possession of a controlled substance. To properly resolve this issue we must construe this statute on its face and in light of the constitutional right to keep and bear arms (article I, section 24 of our state constitution) so as to critically evaluate whether the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt Schelin was in fact armed while he committed the crimes for which he was charged. The deadly weapon enhancement statute provides in part: [T]he court shall make a finding of fact of whether or not the accused or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, or if a jury trial is had, the jury shall, if it find[s] the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether or not the defendant or an accomplice was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime. Former RCW 9.94A.125 (1983). This statute is part of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA), although it was not added to the SRA until 1983. See Laws of 1983, ch. 163, § 3. As originally enacted, the deadly weapon statute subjected only a limited number of felonies to a sentence enhancement, none of which were possessory crimes. [1] However, the statute was radically revised in 1995 when voters approved Initiative 159 (I-159). This initiative made the deadly weapon enhancement applicable to nearly every felony defined by Washington law, and also lengthened the mandatory sentence enhancements. Laws of 1995, ch. 129. The leading Supreme Court authority on what it means to be armed under the deadly weapon enhancement statute is State v. Valdobinos, 122 Wash.2d 270, 858 P.2d 199 (1993). There, as the majority concedes, we held mere constructive possession of a firearm is insufficient to establish a defendant was armed for purposes of former RCW 9.94A.125. Id. at 282, 858 P.2d 199; majority at 635. [2] Until today this holding has been good law and the fundamental underpinning of a proper application of former RCW 9.94A.125. We further elaborated our holding in Valdobinos by explaining a person is armed so as to justify applying the deadly weapon enhancement only if the State has shown a weapon [was] easily accessible and readily available for use, either for offensive or defensive purposes. Valdobinos, 122 Wash.2d at 282, 858 P.2d 199. The State must make this showing beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain a deadly weapon enhancement. State v. Tongate, 93 Wash.2d 751, 754, 613 P.2d 121 (1980). Our decision in Valdobinos was heavily influenced by the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Sabala, 44 Wash.App. 444, 723 P.2d 5 (1986). In Sabala the defendant was stopped in his car after having made a controlled buy from the Yakima police department. Id. at 445, 723 P.2d 5. A consent search of his car revealed a handgun under the driver's seat. Id. There was no dispute the gun belonged to the defendant, and that it was within easy and actual reach when he sat in the driver's seat. See id. at 448, 723 P.2d 5. The defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, and his sentence was enhanced based on his possession of the firearm. Id. at 446-47, 723 P.2d 5. Sabala challenged his conviction arguing he was merely in constructive possession of the gun, which was insufficient to prove he was armed with it. Id. at 447, 723 P.2d 5. The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence, concluding the presence of the gun under the driver's seat constituted sufficient evidence the gun was easily accessible and readily available for use by the defendant for either offensive or defensive purposes. Id. at 448, 723 P.2d 5. The same could be said of the armed robber. Although we accepted the Sabala court's reasoning in Valdobinos, we concluded the evidence presented in Valdobinos was insufficient to support a finding the defendants were armed pursuant to former RCW 9.94A.125. Valdobinos, 122 Wash.2d at 282, 858 P.2d 199. In Valdobinos, law enforcement officers executing a search warrant of defendants' home discovered a .22 rifle under a bed. Id. at 273-74, 282, 858 P.2d 199. We affirmed defendants' convictions for the underlying drug-related crimes, but struck the firearm enhancement portions of their sentences, stating: On this record, evidence that an unloaded rifle was found under the bed in the bedroom, without more, is insufficient to qualify Valdobinos as armed in the sense of having a weapon accessible and readily available for offensive or defensive purposes. The trial court therefore erred in relying on the provision of RCW 9.94A.125 permitting a sentence to be enhanced if a defendant is armed with a deadly weapon. Id. at 282, 858 P.2d 199 (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals further addressed when a person is armed in State v. Call, 75 Wash.App. 866, 880 P.2d 571 (1994). There the court held the State must show more than potential to use a firearm to justify a deadly weapon sentence enhancement. Id. at 868-69, 880 P.2d 571. In Call Spokane police officers went to the defendant's home to arrest him on outstanding warrants. Id. at 867, 880 P.2d 571. Before the defendant left with the officers, he went to his bedroom to pick up some identification. Id. Although the defendant kept three handguns in his bedroom, which the defendant had every potential to use at the officers' peril, he returned from the bedroom unarmed. Id. When the officers returned to the defendant's home at later point in time to execute a search warrant they found cocaine, LSD, marijuana, and a marijuana grow operation. Id. at 868, 880 P.2d 571. [3] They also discovered the three handguns, one of which was loaded, in the defendant's bedroom. Id. The defendant was convicted of three counts of possession of a controlled substance, and the trial court enhanced his sentence 12 months pursuant to former RCW 9.94A.125 based on its finding the defendant `was in constructive possession of the three (3) handguns.' Id. at 867-68, 880 P.2d 571. The defendant appealed this sentence enhancement, arguing his constructive possession of the guns was insufficient basis to find he was armed. Id. at 868, 880 P.2d 571. The Court of Appeals agreed, applying the Valdobinos standard: Here, the trial court's findings relating to the guns in Mr. Call's bedroom establish constructive possession of the weapons, but fail to address the essential question, namely whether any of the weapons was easily accessible and readily available. The findings are insufficient to support imposition of an enhanced sentence under RCW 9.94A.310(3)(c), and the sentence must be stricken. The only evidence relating to availability of the guns was the police officer's testimony he found two in a dresser drawer within the bedroom against the south wall of the bedroom, and one in a tool box at the footfoot of the bed .... Mr. Call had gone to the bedroom and returned unarmed. This is not sufficient evidence to support a finding the guns were easily accessible and readily available. Call, 75 Wash.App. at 869, 880 P.2d 571. The rejection of constructive possession as sufficient basis for a deadly weapons enhancement took one further step in State v. Mills, 80 Wash.App. 231, 907 P.2d 316 (1995). There, the court held a defendant was not armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime pursuant to former RCW 9.94A.125 even when in contemporaneous constructive possession of both a weapon and illegal drugs. In Mills a sheriff deputy discovered methamphetamine in Mills's car, arrested Mills, and placed him in custody in the back of the patrol car. Mills, 80 Wash.App. at 233, 907 P.2d 316. After the defendant began moving furtively in the back seat of the patrol car, the deputy removed defendant and searched between the seat cushions. Id. The search revealed a motel key, based on which the deputy obtained a search warrant for the motel room. Id. Upon executing the warrant, the deputy discovered a gun pouch beside a large quantity of methamphetamine. Id. The defendant was convicted for possession of a controlled substance and received a 12-month sentence enhancement based on his constructive possession of the firearm. Id. at 232, 907 P.2d 316. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction for possession, but reversed the sentence enhancement. Id. at 232, 907 P.2d 316. The court rejected the State's argument the defendant was armed based on exclusive possession and control over the contents of the motel room, which included the gun. Id. at 234-35, 907 P.2d 316. The court also rejected the trial court's approach, which looked only for a connection between the underlying crime, possession of methamphetamine, and the gun. Id. at 236, 907 P.2d 316. According to Mills, the potential to use the gun to protect drugs is insufficient. Id. Instead the court held the State was required to show a nexus between the defendant and the weapon. Id. Mills's nexus approach was further developed in State v. Johnson , in which the court explained a person is not armed simply because a weapon is present during the commission of a crime. 94 Wash.App. 882, 892, 974 P.2d 855 (1999). The court reasoned: Simply constructively possessing a weapon on the premises sometime during the entire period of illegal activity is not enough to establish a nexus between the crime and the weapon. Without that nexus, we run the risk of convicting a defendant under the deadly weapon enhancement for having a weapon unrelated to the crime. The theory behind the deadly weapon enhancement is that a crime is potentially more dangerous to the victim, bystanders or the police if the defendant is armed while he is committing the crime because someone may be killed or injured. Thus, the crime is more serious than it would have been without the weapon. Where no officers, victims or bystanders are present, the potential danger is also absent, and the rationale for greater punishment based on greater danger to others does not apply. The underlying rationale can apply only where there is a possibility the defendant would use the weapon. Id. at 895-96, 974 P.2d 855 (footnotes omitted). I agree an essential element of proof must demonstrate a nexus between the defendant, the crime, and the weapon. So says our majority as well. Majority at 639. In sum, this line of precedent establishes the following: First, constructive possession of a firearm is insufficient to support a deadly weapons sentence enhancement. Valdobinos, 122 Wash.2d at 282, 858 P.2d 199. Second, a defendant's potential to use a firearm in connection with a criminal enterprise is also not enough to apply former RCW 9.94A.125. Call, 75 Wash.App. at 868-69, 880 P.2d 571. Cf. State v. Williams, 85 Wash. App. 508, 514, 933 P.2d 1072 (1997) (holding proof that defendant actually handled loaded gun during drug transaction established accessibility of the gun under Valdobinos ), rev'd on other grounds, 135 Wash.2d 365, 957 P.2d 216 (1998). Third, merely establishing a firearm was present on premises where an ongoing crime was committed is insufficient as a matter of law to justify enhancing a sentence for the substantive crime. Johnson, 94 Wash.App. at 892, 974 P.2d 855. And finally, the State must affirmatively prove beyond a reasonable doubt a nexus between the defendant, the crime, and the weapon. See Mills, 80 Wash.App. at 236, 907 P.2d 316. Although the majority purports to rely on Valdobinos and its progeny, the evidence presented at Schelin's trial shows, at most: (1) Schelin was in constructive possession of the gun hanging on the wall in his bedroom; (2) Schelin had the potential to use the gun at the officers' peril during their execution of the search warrant by closing the gap of 15 or so feet from the bottom of the stairs to where the gun was hanging in the bedroom; and (3) the firearm in question was discovered on the same premises on which Schelin's criminal enterprise took place. However, under the principles discussed above, this is insufficient as a matter of law to support Schelin's deadly weapon enhancement because no nexus was proved. The majority's decision to nevertheless uphold Schelin's sentence constitutes a radical departure from the Valdobinos line of cases, while at the same time giving them lip service. Moreover, if former RCW 9.94A.125 means what the majority claims it does, this statute violates the right to bear arms guaranteed by article I, section 24, of the Washington Constitution. It is our duty to avoid such a statutory construction if at all possible. Anderson v. Morris, 87 Wash.2d 706, 716, 558 P.2d 155 (1976).