Opinion ID: 2518471
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Plain Error or Prejudicial Error

Text: [¶ 9] Mr. Landsiedel claims the district court erred in failing to fully and accurately instruct the jury when it refused to give the following instruction: The owner of a business has a duty to visitors to use reasonable care to prevent or correct dangerous conditions on the premises. This duty includes the duty to inspect the premises to discover possible dangerous conditions, of which the owner does not know, and to take reasonable precautions to protect users of the premises from dangers which are foreseeable from the condition or use of the property. Mr. Landsiedel also claims the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury by not giving the following instruction: You may consider building codes, including the Uniform Building Code and industry standards, such as the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) on the question of negligence. Conformity to these codes is not an absolute defense to a claim based on ordinary negligence. These codes establish minimum standards of care. [¶ 10] Buffalo Properties responds that Mr. Landsiedel failed to object to the district court's ruling on these proposed instructions as required by W.R.C.P. 51(b). Therefore, Buffalo Properties asserts, his claim concerning the instructions is reviewed for plain error. [¶ 11] The record reflects the following events concerning the proposed instructions. Counsel for Mr. Landsiedel offered the instructions at the final instruction conference by reading them aloud to the district court and opposing counsel. He made no argument in support of the instructions. The district court asked Buffalo Properties whether it had any objection to the proposed duty of care instruction. Buffalo Properties responded that it did object on the basis that Wyoming has not imposed an affirmative duty to inspect on the premises owner. The district court stated: ... The Court is going to refuse Plaintiff's proposed instruction. It believes that Instruction Number 13 already approved by the parties will allow the Plaintiff to argue that the owner of this business premises must have acted as a reasonable person in maintaining its property. Counsel for Mr. Landsiedel did not object or attempt to show the court why the proposed instruction was necessary to fully inform the jury concerning the applicable law. [¶ 12] The district court then asked counsel for Buffalo Properties whether it objected to Mr. Landsiedel's instruction concerning building codes and industry standards. Counsel again objected, arguing that Wyoming has not recognized violation of building codes as evidence of negligence. The district court responded: ... This Court is not going to give this proposed jury instruction. It is not satisfied that Wyoming law has stated the proposition that these codes establish minimum standards of care. However, both of you will undoubtedlyand I think appropriatelybe able to refer to the compliance or noncompliance of the standards that each of you presented to the jury in your closing remarks. As with the duty to inspect instruction, counsel for Mr. Landsiedel made no objection to the ruling nor did he attempt to argue why the instruction should be given. [¶ 13] Considering claimed error in instructing the jury, we have said: Over the years, this court has been consistent in its interpretation of Rule 51, W.R.C.P. We consider only those claims of error relating to jury instructions in those cases where proper objections were raised. Unless the circumstances justify a finding of plain error, we do not consider claims of error in jury instructions to which no objections were made. The spirit and purpose of the rule is designed to appraise and inform the trial court of the purpose of the instruction in order that the judge may make such corrections as he deems necessary before submitting the instructions to the jury. Triton Coal Co., Inc. v. Mobil Coal Producing, Inc., 800 P.2d 505, 510 (Wyo.1990) (citations omitted). [¶ 14] Mr. Landsiedel argues that the spirit of the rule was satisfied here because he fully informed the district court of the legal issues implicated in the instructions through pretrial submissions, briefing and argument on pretrial motions and a lengthy discussion during the instruction conference. He points specifically to his pretrial memorandum filed five weeks before trial in which he advised the court he anticipated two contested issues of law, the first concerning the applicability of the UBC and ANSI standards and the second concerning whether Buffalo Properties had an affirmative duty to inspect its premises. He also points to his response to Buffalo Properties' motion to exclude his glass expert's opinion testimony, filed about the same time as his pretrial memorandum, in which he argued Buffalo Properties had a duty to inspect and codes and industry standards are evidence of minimum standards of care. On that basis, he asserts, there could scarcely have been a doubt in the trial court's mind as to [his] position on these two instructions. [¶ 15] Mr. Landsiedel's contention is strikingly similar to Triton Coal's claim that it constructively objected to the instruction in its pretrial memorandum and in statements made by counsel during the unrecorded instruction conference and that these previous written and unrecorded objections satisfied the letter and purpose of Rule 51. Triton Coal, 800 P.2d at 510. In response to this argument, we said: The function of Rule 51, W.R.C.P., is well established in our law, and we will not expand it by adding a constructive objection based on off-the-record statements by counsel or relation back to arguments made in earlier court proceedings not directly tied to the jury instruction preparation. Triton had the opportunity and the obligation to make its objections to undesirable or unfavorable or improper jury instructions, on the record, during the formal jury instruction conference prior to submission of the instructions to the jury. It did not do so. The burden for that failure is properly placed upon the party at trial. Id. at 510. [¶ 16] As in Triton Coal, we will not expand the meaning of Rule 51 by allowing Mr. Landsiedel to rely on his pretrial submissions, responses to pretrial motions or an unreported jury instruction conference to show that he objected to the court's ruling on the instructions. Mr. Landsiedel, like Triton Coal, had the opportunity and the obligation to make his objections to the instructions, on the record, during the formal jury instruction conference prior to submission of the instructions to the jury. Despite having the opportunity to do so, he failed not only to state any objection to the court's ruling; he likewise failed to offer reasons why the instructions were necessary. Therefore, we review his claim for plain error. [¶ 17] Under the plain error rule, Mr. Landsiedel is required to show: (1) the record reflects clear and unequivocally the fact complained of; (2) the facts prove a transgression of a clear rule of law; (3) the error affects a substantial right of [Mr. Landsiedel]; and (4) [Mr. Landsiedel] has been materially prejudiced by that violation. Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282, 1291 (Wyo.1985) (citation omitted). We begin with consideration of the district court's refusal to give Mr. Landsiedel's duty to inspect instruction.