Opinion ID: 674271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: ineffective assistance of counsel--trial, appeal, and

Text: POST-CONVICTION 23 Harris also claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, on appeal and in post-conviction proceedings. However, Harris argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because the court-appointed attorney failed to submit critical facts of the case to the Arizona Supreme Court on appeal [and] trial and appeals lawyer are the same lawyer. Blue at 7. Thus, even liberally construing his pro se petition, he does not allege that his trial counsel was ineffective during his trial, only that the same lawyer was ineffective on appeal. 24 As Harris complains, appellate counsel inexplicably omitted many of Harris's claims from his petition to the Arizona Supreme court, thus producing many of the procedural bar problems Harris now faces. However, Harris has not shown that any of these omitted claims would have entitled him to relief, thus, he has not shown that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) Thus, Harris has not shown that appellate counsel's efforts were constitutionally ineffective for federal habeas purposes. 25 Finally, Harris's claim that post-conviction counsel was ineffective does not state any grounds for relief, as there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings and there can be no deprivation of effective assistance where there is no constitutional right to counsel. Coleman, 111 S.Ct. at 2566 (citing Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982)). 26