Opinion ID: 2377101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Judge Anderson Subpoena Duces Tecum

Text: As outlined above, Judge Anderson's subpoena duces tecum called for his testimony as well as the production of several items that came into his possession or were created by him because of the Inquisition: (1) the reports submitted by CHPP to KDHE and produced by the agency during the Inquisition; (2) the CHPP patient records produced by the clinic during the Inquisition; (3) Judge Anderson's Memorandum Decision dated April 18, 2007; and (4) one of Judge Anderson's July 13, 2007, letters, presumably the one addressed to Kline and Morrison about CHPP. The State's Notice of Interlocutory Appeal was timely and specific enough to create appellate jurisdiction over the subpoena to Judge Anderson. The record before us demonstrates that Kline intended to use Judge Anderson to accomplish at least three purposes. First, he wanted Judge Anderson to give traditional document custodian's testimony to authenticate or prove a link in the chain of custody for the KDHE reports and the patient records produced in the Inquisition. Second, he wanted Judge Anderson to be a fact witness, one who would testify to the circumstances surrounding the opening and continuation of the Inquisition, and, specifically, the manner in which the submitted KDHE reports were produced by the agency and the copies by defendant. Finally, Kline repeatedly made it obvious that he hoped Judge Anderson also could function as a legal expert, repeating his earlier gratuitous opinions on the quality of the State's proof, which Judge Anderson had expressed at various times and in various settings throughout this and related cases. Two initial points must precede our discussion of the document production and testimonial components of Judge Anderson's subpoena duces tecum. First, Judge Tatum relied entirely on our April 4, 2008, protective order entered in Morrison v. Anderson to quash the subpoena duces tecum directed to Judge Anderson. The State's argumentthat our protective order, because it was entered in an original action rather than in an appeal, carried no more weight than an order of another district court, which Judge Tatum could therefore feel free to ignoreis unsupported by pertinent authority. Failure to support a point by pertinent authority or to show why it is sound despite a lack of supporting authority is akin to failing to brief an issue. See State v. Conley, 287 Kan. 696, 703, 197 P.3d 837 (2008); McCain Foods USA, Inc. v. Central Processors, Inc., 275 Kan. 1, 15, 61 P.3d 68 (2002). That being said, we acknowledge that the April 4, 2008, protective order gave Judge Anderson and Six more relief than they sought when Judge Anderson filed his Notice of Collateral Proceedings and Six filed his emergency motion for protective order in Morrison v. Anderson. The initial scope of the order was nevertheless necessary to ensure the protection of patient privacy at the heart of this series of cases, given imperfect information from both sides of the dispute and the temporal exigency of a preliminary hearing we believed to be set for the next business day. We further acknowledge that the eventual dismissal order in Morrison v. Anderson was silent on the continuing force of the unamended portion of the protective order, which covered Judge Anderson's participation in this criminal prosecution. The discussion and holdings below constitute the further order of this court necessary under the protective order, correcting any initial overbreadth and otherwise refining its design in accord with the governing law and the now-apparent subject matter. We note that Kline earlier attempted to obtain a modification of our April 4, 2008, protective order by moving to intervene in Morrison v. Anderson. This was the correct initial procedural avenue to obtain relief, but he nevertheless failed to demonstrate the appropriateness of intervention on the merits. His principal arguments appeared to focus on his desire to have Judge Anderson testify about his previously expressed opinions on the quality of the State's evidence against CHPP. As discussed below, a judge who presides over an inquisition should not later serve as an expert witness on the culpability of a criminal defendant prosecuted as a result of evidence gathered in the Inquisition. In addition, Kline's motion to intervene had structural and substantive flaws pointed out in Six' Response opposing it. The modification of the April 4, 2008, protective order effected by this opinion necessitates modification in Judge Tatum's ruling based upon it, and it is affirmed in part and reversed in part as to Judge Anderson's subpoena duces tecum.
We first address the document production aspect of the subpoena duces tecum directed to Judge Anderson. Judge Anderson cannot be subpoenaed to produce the first category of documents, i.e., the reports produced by the KDHE during the Inquisition for the 23 patients whose abortions are the subjects of the felony counts in the complaint. Again, the District Attorney cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he cannot do directly under the plain and unambiguous language of K.S.A. 65-445. For this and all of the reasons discussed above with regard to the Crawford and KDHE records custodian, Judge Anderson cannot be ordered to produce for the District Attorney the reports that came from KDHE in the Attorney General's Inquisition. These reports are other protected matter under K.S.A. 60-245(c)(3)(A)(iii), and the subpoena duces tecum is quashed as to them. The fact that Judge Anderson apparently brought the KDHE reports to court when he testified at Judge Tatum's January 16, 2008, hearing on Kline's motion to disqualify defense counsel does not affect our holding on this issue. The record before us reveals no general objection to Judge Anderson's appearance as a witness or his production of the reports at that time, whether by Judge Anderson himself, KDHE, or CHPP; thus the potential prohibitive effect of K.S.A. 65-445 was not before Judge Tatum. We also note Judge Tatum did not admit the KDHE reports or any other document brought by Judge Anderson into evidence at that hearing, and none became a part of the public file. Counsel for CHPP did raise the issue of confidentiality when admission into evidence was sought for the KDHE reports and the CHPP patient records. Judge Anderson may be ordered to produce for the district attorney the CHPP patient records produced by the defendant clinic in the Inquisition. Although these records clearly are confidential and constitutionally protected and statutorily privileged in their original pristine statefor all of the reasons already discussed by this court in our Alpha decision, see 280 Kan. at 919-25, 128 P.3d 364the set the District Attorney seeks here was redacted for patient-identifying information by CHPP before they ever reached Judge Anderson's possession during the Inquisition. There has been testimony that a patient and her family may still be able to tell from the records if her abortion is the one documented. Judge Tatum should conduct an in camera review of the records and order any further redaction necessary to protect patient privacy and ensure compliance with this court's decision in Alpha. In addition, we are confident that Judge Tatum and the parties can design any further safeguards necessary at this stage. As we already noted, the Inquisition was unusual in that it led to an evidence custodian role for the supervising district judge. Now, as that custodian, Judge Anderson can be ordered to bring the CHPP patient records to court to facilitate this criminal prosecution. Judge Anderson also may be ordered to produce for the Johnson County District Attorney Judge Anderson's April 18, 2007, Memorandum Decision and his July 13, 2007, letter to Kline and Morrison. (Judge Anderson's other July 13, 2007, letter regarding WHCS records is plainly immaterial to this criminal prosecution.) As with other documents that have previously been under seal in the Inquisition, Judge Tatum may need to make special arrangements for the transmission and storage of these documents. We have not been asked to determine at this time whether these documents constitute relevant and admissible evidence for trial. We leave those questions to Judge Tatum in the first instance, guided by the discussion of Judge Anderson's testimony below.
As Attorney General Six observed in opposing Kline's motion to intervene in Morrison v. Anderson, asking a district judge to testify is a serious matter. United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1989); see also United States v. Frankenthal, 582 F.2d 1102, 1108 (7th Cir. 1978) (compulsion of judge's testimony create[s] sensitive problems requiring delicate attention); In re Whetstone, 354 S.C. 213, 580 S.E.2d 447, 448 (2003) (collecting cases). Generally, [a]bsent a showing of extraordinary need, a judge may not be compelled to testify about matters observed as the consequence of the performance of his [or her] official duties. Hensley v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 197 F.Supp.2d 548, 550 (S.D.W.Va. 2002). This rule allows judges to perform as arbiters of the law without fear of having to provide later explanatory testimony, and it prevents juries from being unduly influenced by judges' robes. Hensley, 197 F.Supp.2d at 550; see Inscoe v. Inscoe, 121 Ohio App.3d 396, 418, 700 N.E.2d 70 (1997). A judge should only be required to testify if he or she possesses factual knowledge; the knowledge is highly pertinent to the jury's task; and the judge is the only possible source of testimony on the relevant factual information. See United States v. Roth, 332 F.Supp.2d 565, 568 (S.D.N.Y.2004). This common law is reflected in part by K.S.A. 60-442, which gives a party in a trial veto power over testimony of the presiding judge. We do not routinely permit judges who handle preliminary hearings, for example, to testify at trial about their reasons for concluding there was probable cause to bind the defendant over for that trial. The role of such judges, like Judge Anderson's role here, should be and remain that of a neutral and detached magistrate, not a member of the prosecution or defense team. It also is consistent with our unwillingness to recall jurors to examine their thought processes in arriving at a verdict. See K.S.A. 60-441; see also Roth, 332 F.Supp.2d at 567 (judge's testimony limited to factual knowledge; testimony as to mental processes impermissible); see also Brinkerhoff v. Bank, 109 Kan. 700, 709, 205 P. 779 (1921) (citing Packet Co. v. Sickles, 72 U.S. 580, 5 Wall. 580, 18 L.Ed. 550 [1866] [judge's reasons for decision not admissible any more than those of jury]). Given our rulings above on the reports produced by the KDHE during the Inquisition, it follows that Judge Anderson may not testify about the contents of any of the particular KDHE reports the subpoena duces tecum purports to order him to produce. This prohibition includes testimony from memory about those contents, as well as any comparison between those contents and the contents of any other sets of documents. Again, the Johnson County District Attorney cannot be permitted to do indirectly what he is forbidden to do directly under K.S.A. 65-445. Judge Anderson may, however, testify as a fact witness about any relevant events of the Inquisition that led to and followed KDHE's production of reports to Kline when he was Attorney General. In this extraordinary case, Judge Anderson also may give traditional document custodian testimony, insofar as it is relevant, about the redacted CHPP patient records, i.e., authenticate them as the documents that came into his possession during the Inquisition. He also may testify as a fact witness on how the Inquisition began and was conducted, how the dispute leading to Alpha arose and was resolved, how he set up a procedure to comply with Alpha 's directives, and how that process was pursued. In particular, he may testify to the limits of his personal factual knowledge about CHPP giving the redacted patient records to him and/or Cavanaugh and events that followed. Regarding the content of his April 18, 2007, Memorandum Decision and his July 13, 2007, letter to Kline and Morrison, it appears from the record before us and the earlier statements of Kline in his time as Johnson County District Attorney that the State intended to use Judge Anderson and the opinions he expressed in these documents as substantive evidence of CHPP's culpability. We have previously described as most troubling the State's invocation of a judge's prior determination of probable cause before a jury. In re Care & Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845, 858, 127 P.3d 277 (2006). The use to which Kline repeatedly indicated he wanted to put Judge Anderson's testimony on the judge's evaluation of the evidence against CHPP in this criminal prosecution is similar in kind and in potential unduly prejudicial effect. It is not fact witness testimony; and Judge Anderson was not, by virtue of his participation in the Inquisition, automatically transformed into an expert witness who may give opinion testimony on the issue of CHPP's criminal culpability. But we do not know whether Kline's intention persists in Howe, Kline's successor in the Johnson County District Attorney chair. Howe's representative at oral argument before this court appeared unsure on this point. We therefore leave to Judge Tatum on remand the question of what use, if any, under the strict standards set forth above, Judge Anderson's testimony based on these two documents may be put by any party.