Opinion ID: 1751995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Arising from the First Trial

Text: The jury found that Hanson and Oldcastle were not liable to any of the individual plaintiffs except the members of the Parker family and the Schwieker family, comprising 5 individuals. The remaining 13 individual plaintiffs argue that these findings were inconsistent and contrary to the great weight of the evidence. This Court will not disturb a jury's verdict unless the evidence against the verdict is so much more credible and convincing to the mind than the evidence supporting the verdict that it clearly indicates that the jury's verdict was wrong and unjust. Campbell v. Burns, 512 So.2d 1341, 1343 (Ala.1987). Moreover, `denial of a motion for a new trial strengthens the presumption of correctness afforded to a jury verdict.' Keibler-Thompson Corp. v. Steading, 907 So.2d 435, 440 (Ala.2005)(quoting Bowers, 827 So.2d at 73). The plaintiffs have failed to show that the jury's verdict as to these remaining 13 plaintiffs should be set aside. A reasonable jury could have concluded from the evidence that the Parkers and the Schwiekers were damaged by Hanson and Oldcastle's actions, but that the other 13 individual plaintiffs were not. [3] The verdict as to these remaining 13 plaintiffs was not plainly wrong or unjust, and it must stand.
With respect to the City and the Utilities Board, the jury found Hanson and Oldcastle liable for negligence but awarded no damages. The City and the Utilities Board argue that this verdict is inconsistent and requires a new trial. We agree. Damages are an essential element of the tort of negligence. `[P]roof of damage [is] an essential part of the plaintiff's case.' Ex parte Stonebrook Dev., L.L.C., 854 So.2d 584, 589 (Ala.2003)(quoting Matthews Bros. Constr. Co. v. Stonebrook Dev., L.L.C., 854 So.2d 573, 578 (Ala. Civ.App.2001), quoting in turn William C. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30 (4th ed.1971)). As a result, a finding that a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for negligence is inconsistent with an award of no damages. The jury's finding for each of the Plaintiffs, which is clear and unequivocal, necessarily embraced all of the elements of the tort claim, including the element of injury and resultant damages. To so find, and then award no damages, is inconsistent on its face as a matter of law. . . . . [This] compels a decision that the trial court should have afforded Appellants a new trial on the basis of the inadequacy of the award, or, as we see it, the inconsistency of the award of no damages, when such award is juxtaposed with the jury's finding of Defendants' liability. Stinson v. Acme Propane Gas Co., 391 So.2d 659, 661 (Ala.1980); accord Thompson v. Cooper, 551 So.2d 1030, 1030 (Ala. 1989); Moore v. Clark, 548 So.2d 1352 (Ala.1989); and Clements v. Lanley Heat Processing Equip., 548 So.2d 1345 (Ala. 1989). Hanson and Oldcastle do not concede that the verdict for the City and the Utilities Board was inconsistent. However, they fail to present any substantial argument that this Court should not apply the Alabama rule on inconsistent verdicts in this case. Instead, in their argument they assume an inconsistent verdict but maintain that the inconsistency does not require reversal. The focus of Hanson and Oldcastle's argument that the verdict does not require a reversal is that the City and the Utilities Board either 1) invited the error of an inconsistent verdict, 2) consented to the inconsistent verdict, or 3) waived their right to challenge the verdict. Immediately following the verdict, the trial court noted the possibility that the verdict was inconsistent. The parties and the court then discussed how the verdict could be corrected. This began with the following exchange: Trial court: On the two verdict forms to the City of Opelika and the Utilit[ies] Board where they found in favor of the Plaintiff and awarded zero [damages], I would consider that an award of nominal damages. Do you want any clarification form the jury on that point? Mr. Vercelli [counsel for the City and the Utilities Board]: I think it's inconsistent to award nothing and find them liable. I think nominal damages should have been awarded. So, yes.  (Emphasis added.) At this point, it is clear that counsel for the City and the Utilities Board wanted clarification from the jury on the inconsistent verdict. The colloquy continues: Trial court: Well, what I am asking is: Do y'all agreethatthat's what I would think. I canI can come back and recharge them on the nominal damage[s] charge that was presented by Hanson andand just see what they come up with, or I can just plain ask them if that was your intent in front of everyone. Or y'all can just accept it as an award of nominal damages andjust let them go. Mr. Byram [defense counsel]: We are satisfied. Mr. Adams [defense counsel]: Satisfied. Mr. Denson [defense counsel]: Satisfied. Mr. Vercelli: Which means what? Trial court: That they are agreeing that it's an award for nominal damages. I mean, essentially it would be the same thing as saying they awarded one dollar. Mr. Vercelli: Is that what the defendants are saying? That they agree it would be the same as awarding a dollar? Mr. Adams: Well, what is thewhat is the Plaintiffs' response, Your Honor, to the verdict? I don't know that there is a procedure by which the Defendant gets to be asked questions by Plaintiffs' counsel. Trial court: Well, there isthere is Mr. Adams: We are saying that we are satisfied with the verdict andas recorded and as explained by the Court. Trial court: All right. Mr. Vercelli: It appears to me to be an inconsistent verdict. I don't see how they can award zero and find them at fault and then award nothing.  (Emphasis added.) It is clear that to this point, the City and the Utilities Board have not invited the court to do anything, consented to the verdict, or waived any objection to the verdict. The colloquy then turned to whether the jury's verdict was based on a finding of nuisance or of negligence. Defense counsel stated that the jury had found that the quarry created a nuisance. In fact, the jury had indicated by special interrogatory that its verdict was based on negligence. Mr. Byram: It's a claim for public nuisance. Trial court: Well, that would be my interpretation, that they found that the burden of proof was met; they just didn't award any damages. . . . Mr. Vercelli: So that is a finding of public nuisance; we would be satisfied with nominal damages. Trial court: Okay. If y'all are satisfied, I will bring [the jury] back in and let them go. Here, the City and the Utilities Board agreed that the verdict could be interpreted as one awarding nominal damages, and therefore valid, but only if it was based on a theory of nuisance. Hanson and Oldcastle argue that the City and the Utilities Board then chose to accept the verdict and prompted the court to accept the verdicts and discharge the jury. The record, however, does not support this conclusion. The conference continues: Mr. Vercelli: Smith and Schwieker appear inconsistent.[ [4] ] I guess negligence is what it is. Trial court: Hum? Mr. Adams: That's a verdict on negligence. Mr. Vercelli: We will talk about it post-trial. Trial court: Yes, I mean Mr. Adams: That's a verdict on the negligence Mr. Byram: Yes, I would. I may have misspoke, too. It's the negligence one that's checked here. Mr. Adams:theory, Your Honor. Trial court: Correct. Mr. Adams: That's right. Trial court: Okay. Bring [the jury] in. At that point, the trial court discharged the jury. Contrary to Hanson and Oldcastle's assertion, the City and the Utilities Board did not express satisfaction with an inconsistent verdict on their negligence claim. Nor did they prompt the trial court to discharge the jury. The record indicates that counsel for the City and the Utilities Board, defense counsel, and the trial court all understood that if the verdict was based on negligence (as opposed to nuisance), it was inconsistent, and some corrective action was necessary. The trial court suggested three ways to resolve the inconsistency: 1) recharge the jury, 2) poll the jury in open court, or 3) have the parties agree to treat the verdict as one for nominal damages. The trial court was trying to fix the problem created by the inconsistent verdict, and counsel for the City and the Utilities Board insisted that there was a problem. In the ensuing confusion, for which the City and the Utilities Board cannot be held responsible, the jury was discharged without any of the court's proposed solutions having been put in place. The only statement that even comes close to an agreement by the City and the Utilities Board to discharge the jury is Mr. Vercelli's statement that [w]e will talk about it post-trial. This statement, however, cannot be characterized as a waiver of the right to challenge an inconsistent verdict. Instead, the statement declared that the City and the Utilities Board were not abandoning the issue but would raise it in a later motion. We conclude that the City and the Utilities Board did not consent to an inconsistent verdict or invite the court to commit error and that their motion for a new trial was sufficient to preserve the inconsistent-verdict issue for review. [5] The trial court erred in denying that motion, and the City and the Utilities Board are entitled to a new trial on their negligence claim.
The trial plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by excluding four pieces of evidence: This evidence included (1) testimony, with supporting documentation by the Lee County Engineer, Neal Hall, that the County was required to spend a quarter of a million dollars to repair less than 1,000' of one road that was damaged by the quarry, (2) testimony from Mr. Hall that the bridge over the Little Uchee Creek, which was within a few hundred feet of multiple large sinkhole collapses in the Little Uchee and on or near the Spring Villa Road right-of-way, could fail if a sinkhole developed on one of its supports, (3) testimony from a qualified civil engineer, Derek Barrentine, that if a sinkhole formed under the Dixie LP Gas Pipeline, then due to the weight of the earth above and the pipeline itself, the pipeline sag and crack [sic], causing an explosion, and (4) testimony and supporting documentary evidence (in the form of a certified ADEM [Alabama Department of Environmental Management] record) that the quarry intended to increase pumping from 4.5 mgd to 10 mgd. (Brief of Appellants at pp. 62-63.) The objections to the exclusion of items (2), (3), and (4) have not been properly preserved for review. The record shows that the trial plaintiffs failed to present the substance of item (2) to the trial court. [6] As to item (3), Derek Barrentine, a civil engineer, was to testify about what might have happened if a sinkhole appeared near the liquified-petroleum gas pipeline. The trial court stated that it would allow this testimony as far as the injunctive relief portion of the case. The trial plaintiffs' counsel responded: And that's all we havethat's the only reason we are offering it. Because the question of injunctive relief was to be decided (if necessary) by the court, not the jury, this statement by plaintiffs' counsel waived any objection to the trial court's decision to keep that evidence from the jury. Finally, the trial plaintiffs have failed to identify the testimony or documents constituting item (4). As a result, our analysis is limited to whether the trial court exceeded its discretion by excluding the testimony of Neal Hall, the county engineer for Lee County, about the road-repair expenses Lee County would incur as a result of the quarry's operation. According to the trial plaintiffs' brief, the trial court kept Hall's testimony from the jury because 1) Lee County was not a party to the litigation, and 2) evidence of a non-party's expenditures might confuse the jury on the issue of damages. A trial court has discretion to exclude otherwise admissible evidence in order to avoid misleading the jury. Rule 403, Ala. R. Evid. The trial plaintiffs' conclusory responsethat such problems were either nominal or could have been resolved by an appropriate instruction rather than not admitting the evidence is insufficient to show that the trial court exceeded that discretion. The trial plaintiffs' arguments regarding the exclusion of evidence do not require a new trial.
Finallyand despite the jury's verdict that the quarry was not a nuisancethe trial plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred by failing to enjoin the quarry's continued operation. They cite City of Birmingham v. City of Fairfield, 375 So.2d 438 (Ala.1979), and McClung v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 255 Ala. 302, 51 So.2d 371 (1951), as examples of cases in which this Court has previously held that a finding of negligence can support injunctive relief. Both City of Birmingham and McClung support the proposition that a nuisance may result from acts or omissions that constitute negligence. City of Birmingham, 375 So.2d at 441. Neither case, however, stands for the proposition that a trial court may enjoin conduct that does not constitute a nuisance. In this case, the factual issue whether the quarry was a nuisance was inextricably linked with the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief. See Wootten v. Ivey, 877 So.2d 585, 589 (Ala.2003). Because the jury found no nuisance, the trial court properly refused to consider whether the trial plaintiffs were entitled to an injunction.