Opinion ID: 2449377
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sean's Other Arguments Lack Merit.

Text: Sean argues that AS 47.10.019 applies to his case. This statute provides: Notwithstanding other provisions of this chapter, the court may not find a minor to be a child in need of aid under this chapter solely on the basis that the child's family is poor, lacks adequate housing, or exhibits a lifestyle that is different from the generally accepted lifestyle standard of the community where the family lives. However, this section may not be construed to prevent a court from finding that a child is in need of aid if the child has been subjected to conduct or conditions described in AS 47.10.011-47.10.015. Sean asserts that he was not steadily employed and had indigent status. He suggests that he was faced with a dilemma: He was criticized if he did not have work and blamed when his work schedule interfered with attending meetings. The record and factual findings do not support this argument. Sean could have communicated his work schedule more clearly. Instead the record suggests that Sean relied on others to keep track of meetings concerning Josh. The superior court found that Sean expected others would exert all the efforts and give him his child, rather than taking the initiative necessary to reunite with Josh. In light of these facts, AS 47.10.019 does not preclude the superior court's conclusions that Josh was a child in need of aid and that termination of Sean's parental rights was proper.
Sean also draws our attention to AS 47.10.080( o ). This provision authorizes termination of parental rights where the parent is incarcerated. Sean suggests that this standard should have been applied in his case because he spent three weeks in county jail while Josh was in OCS custody. In Rick P. v. State, Office of Children's Services, [32] we explained: [Alaska Statute 47.10.080( o )] is merely an additional, independent authority OCS may rely on to terminate rights in cases where the parent's incarceration itself is likely to injure the child in the future; it does not supplant AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(A) and 47.10.011[] as grounds for terminating the rights of a parent who [meets the requirements under those statutes].[ [33] ] The superior court was not required to apply AS 47.10.080( o ) because AS 47.10.088(a)(1)(A) provides sufficient authority for terminating parental rights in this case.
Sean also argues that the trial court improperly found that placement with him was denied as result of his non-cooperation with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children home study. However, the superior court did not make this specific finding. At most, the court considered evidence to that effect. While this does not appear to be error, [34] even if error it was harmless because there was sufficient other evidence in the record to support the superior court's conclusion that termination was justified under AS 47.10.088.