Opinion ID: 2622812
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Williams Is Entitled to an Implied Easement To Use the Disputed Road Across Fagnani's Property.

Text: Williams advances various theories to support his claim that he is entitled to an easement across Fagnani's land. He argues, among other things, that because the disputed road provided the only access to his property when Harrison sold the parcel to the Blisses in 1964, he is entitled to an implied easement. Fagnani seems to argue in response that the easement was never reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of Williams's property. Fagnani also argues that the easement ceased to exist when other means of accessing the property arose, and cites Methonen v. Stone as support for this proposition. [4] This case is resolved by our analysis of Williams's claim of implied easement. An implied easement arises when there is (1) a quasi-easement at the time of contract of sale or conveyance, (2) which is apparent, (3) reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the land retained or the land conveyed, and (4) continuous in nature. [5] Addressing the first and third elements, Fagnani asserts that there was no quasi-easement at the time of the sale to Bliss, and that even if there was an easement at one time, it was extinguished by the time Williams purchased the land because it was no longer `reasonably necessary.' Fagnani does not dispute the existence of the second and fourth elements of an implied easement, so we will address only the first and third elements. As to the first element, a quasi-easement arises if a person make[s] use of one part of his land for the benefit of another part. [6] Williams argues that Harrison created a quasi-easement because Harrison could only access the land that later became the Williams parcel by using the disputed road. Williams also argues that a quasi-easement arose because Elkins used the road to clear what is now the Williams parcel for Harrison to qualify for his homestead. Fagnani responds that no quasi-easement existed when Harrison sold the parcel to the Blisses. To support that assertion, Fagnani argues that Patrick Bliss asked one of Harrison's successors in interest in parcel C8 for permission to use the disputed road. The superior court resolved the quasi-easement dispute by concluding that [t]here was no evidence presented of any . . . quasi-easement granted by Harrison to Bliss. We disagree with that legal conclusion. We do so based on our review of the superior court's factual findings. The superior court made two critical findings: that when it was built, the disputed road was the only practical way to access the homesteads, and that the Blisses used the disputed road as their route of travel to the road and highway system. The court made no finding that, as of 1964, there was any other practical means of accessing the parcel (C3) that was sold to the Blisses in that year. The court's only other potentially relevant findings regarding access do not imply that between 1960, when the disputed road was built, and 1964, when the parcel was sold to Williams's predecessor, there was any additional way to gain practical access to the homesteads. [7] Based on the superior court's factual findings, we conclude that a quasi-easement existed as a matter of law when Harrison sold the parcel to the Blisses in 1964 at a time when the disputed road provided the only practical access to the Blisses' parcel. This case is controlled by Freightways Terminal Co. v. Industrial & Commercial Construction, Inc., in which we held that the landowner, by building a road over one part of his land so that another part of his land was connected to the road system, had created a quasi-easement. [8] That Bliss may have sought permission to use the disputed road, as Fagnani contends, is irrelevant. Assuming that Bliss did ask for permission to use the disputed road and assuming that doing so reflected his subjective belief he had no right of passage, that subjective belief would not defeat his legal right to an implied easement. As to the third element of the implied easement test, the easement must be reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the land . . . conveyed. [9] Williams argues that the easement was reasonably necessary when Harrison sold the land to the Blisses because the disputed road provided the only route of travel to what became the Williams parcel. Fagnani responds that, according to our holding in Methonen, an implied easement only continues as long as it is reasonably necessary. [10] In his reply brief, Williams argues that Norken Corp. v. McGahan should control. [11] In Norken, we held that [h]aving once arisen, the implied easement is not extinguished merely because the reasonable necessity ceases to exist. [12] We agree with Williams that Norken controls here. Although Methonen is more recent than Norken, it is not on point. It addressed an easement for access to a well, not an easement needed for access to a landlocked parcel. [13] Norken concerned a road that provided access to a parcel that might have been landlocked when the parcel was originally sold. [14] In Norken, a landowner named McGahan had used the disputed road to access working gravel pits on his homestead. [15] Based on the record in Norken, we concluded that the parcel McGahan retained might have been landlocked when he sold the rest of his land. [16] Because the superior court, reasoning that the property was not landlocked at the time of trial, had denied McGahan an implied easement, we remanded so the superior court could determine whether the parcel had been landlocked at the time of severance. [17] We held: [T]he existence of reasonable necessity is determined as of the time of severance, because it is at that time that the implied easement either does or does not arise. Having once arisen, the implied easement is not extinguished merely because the reasonable necessity ceases to exist. [18] Here, the superior court found that the disputed road was the practical means of access to the homesteads, including what became parcel C3, in 1960 and did not find any change in access as of 1964, at the time of severance. [19] We therefore conclude that the easement was reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the land. Because the first and third elements have been established, and the second and fourth elements are not contested, we hold that it was error to conclude that Williams did not have an implied easement permitting him to use the portion of the disputed road on Fagnani's property. Having held that Williams is entitled to an implied easement based on undisputed facts, we need not consider whether he would be entitled to an easement under any of the other legal theories he advances. Although the issue was not briefed, Williams's attorney conceded at oral argument on appeal that the easement was limited to thirty feet. Williams's attorney also stated at argument: He's not entitled to a bigger easement. He's not entitled to an easement that allows him more intensive use than he now has. Having concluded that Williams was not entitled to an easement, the superior court did not consider what scope any easement should have. We will therefore not address the scope of the implied easement here. [20]