Opinion ID: 2612839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Respond to Request for Admissions

Text: We must separately consider the trial court's order of summary judgment in favor of Bobich on the Hughes' claim for overtime wages. The order was entered as a result of the Hughes' failure to answer Bobich's August 6, 1991 request for admission. Under Civil Rule 36(a), the subject matter of a request for admission is automatically deemed admitted when the party to whom the request is addressed fails to file a timely response or objection. [6] See 4A Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 36.05[4], at 36-58 n. 6. The potential harshness of this automatic provision is mitigated by Rule 36(b), which provides that the trial court may permit withdrawal or amendment [of the admission] when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in maintaining the action or defense on the merits. [7] See United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 n. 6 (7th Cir.1987). The trial court's decision to allow or disallow the withdrawal of an admission is subject to reversal for abuse of discretion. City of Kenai v. Ferguson, 732 P.2d 184, 190 (Alaska 1987). We will find an abuse of discretion if our review of the record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that the judge made a mistake[.] Id. (citing Channel Flying, Inc. v. Bernhardt, 451 P.2d 570, 572 (Alaska 1969)).
In the present case, Bobich requested the Hughes to [a]dmit that on or about the time you quit employment with Publix Storage you were paid for all past due overtime compensation. Almost immediately after the request for admission was filed, the parties agreed to refrain from formal discovery pending settlement discussions. The Hughes promptly furnished Bobich detailed information pertaining to their claim for overtime wages. Settlement discussions eventually broke down and formal discovery resumed. The Hughes did not formally respond to Bobich's earlier request for admission, evidently believing that the information they had informally supplied amounted to a sufficient answer to Bobich's request for admission. This belief was not patently unreasonable, since the information the Hughes had already disclosed unquestionably answered Bobich's request for admission in substance, if not inform. Notably, although the trial court ultimately concluded that the Hughes' informal response did not technically satisfy the requirements Civil Rule 36(a), the court did not find that the Hughes had acted willfully or in bad faith. Moreover, the information that the Hughes had informally disclosed unquestionably placed Bobich on notice that the issue of overtime wages was actually disputed and had not been admitted. In moving for summary judgment based on the Hughes' failure to deny his request for admission, Bobich candidly acknowledged that he had suffered no actual prejudice. Civil Rule 36(b) expressly authorizes withdrawal of an admission when the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and when no prejudice will result therefrom. City of Kenai, 732 P.2d at 190. This court has held that [a] party can demonstrate that withdrawal of admissions subserves the merit by showing that the admission concerns a key factual issue. Id. Here, the disputed admission plainly concerned a key factual issue. [8] Furthermore, as we have already observed, withdrawal of the admission would have resulted in no actual prejudice to Bobich. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Bobich's motion for summary judgment without first allowing the Hughes the opportunity to withdraw the admission that resulted from their failure to formally respond to Bobich's earlier request. [9]