Opinion ID: 2972049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guidelines interpretation

Text: Although Booker excised that part of the Guidelines which made them mandatory, sentencing courts must continue to take into consideration the recommended Guidelines sentence. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 764. Consequently, this Court will continue to provide guidance as to the proper interpretation of any Guidelines provision whose application is challenged on appeal. See United States v. McDaniel, 398 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2005). We therefore turn to Susewitt’s claim, separate and apart from his Booker argument, that the district court erred in determining the date of offense commencement for purposes of calculating Susewitt’s criminal history score under § 4A1.2(e)(2) of the Guidelines. Section 4A1.2(e)(2) of the Guidelines, which was cited by the district court at Susewitt’s sentencing hearing, instructs that in calculating a defendant’s criminal history score, “any other1 1 The preceding sub-section, § 4A1.2(e)(1), which is not relevant here, provides for the counting of any prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of the commencement of the instant offense. 5 No. 03-6572 prior sentence that was imposed within ten years of the defendant’s commencement of the instant offense is counted.” U.S. S.G. § 4A1.2(e)(2). Application Note Eight to this section then explains that “[a]s used in § 4A1.2(d)(2) and (e), the term ‘commencement of the instant offense’ includes any relevant conduct. See § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).” U.S. S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 8. Ignoring § 1B1.3 and its definition of relevant conduct, Susewitt argues that in order to show that the offense commenced when Susewitt sawed off the weapon in 1993, the government was required to establish that Susewitt continuously possessed the weapon from that time until the weapon was found in his residence in November 2002. Susewitt contends that this is so because “the offense of felon in possession of a firearm is a continuing offense.”2 (Def. Brief at 15). In support of this assertion, Susewitt cites only one case, United States v. Barnes, 910 F.2d 1342, 1344 (6th Cir. 1990), in which this Court considered whether police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant, who was suspected of being a felon in possession of a firearm. After discussing cases authorizing stops where the police had reasonable suspicion that a suspect was about to commit a crime or had been involved in a completed crime, this Court explained “[i]n our case, we have both a completed and an ongoing crime involved, since the offense of felon in possession is complete once the felon actually obtains possession of a firearm, but continues as long as it remains in his possession.” Id. Susewitt fails to offer any reasoning to connect those principles, articulated in an entirely different context from the circumstances of this case, to his contention that the government was 2 Of course, Susewitt was not convicted of being a felon in possession, but of possession of a sawed-off shotgun. 6 No. 03-6572 required to prove continuous possession of the weapon. That failure is inevitable, as there is simply nothing in the Guidelines or in the case law that imposes such a requirement. Indeed, such a requirement would render wholly ineffective Application Note Eight to § 4A1.2(e), which, as explained above, instructs the sentencing judge to determine the date of commencement of the instant offense by reference to any “relevant conduct,” as defined in § 1B1.3. U.S. S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n. 8. The Fourth Circuit has explained that Application Note Eight “reflects the fundamental principle of the Sentencing Guidelines that relevant conduct should be treated as an integral part of the offense of conviction.” United States v. Dixon, 318 F.3d 585, 590 (4th Cir. 2003). Susewitt’s argument would have us ignore the Guidelines’ instruction to refer to relevant conduct in determining the date of the commencement of the offense, and is therefore untenable. We turn, then, to what the Guidelines actually say about relevant conduct. Section 1B1.3(a)(1), in relevant part, defines “relevant conduct” as “all acts and omissions committed . . . by defendant . . . that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.” U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1). The district court’s determination that sawing off the shotgun was relevant conduct to the offense of possession of a sawed off shotgun is thus supported not only by common sense but also by the language of § 1B1.3 that relevant conduct includes acts committed by the defendant “in preparation for” the offense of conviction.