Opinion ID: 529953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Development of This Litigation

Text: 23 On August 26, 1988, a federal grand jury for the Middle District of Pennsylvania returned a twenty-eight count indictment against Furst including allegations of bank fraud, theft from pension funds, making false statements in bank records, misapplication of bank funds, and making false statements in reports required by ERISA. 24 A jury trial commenced on January 9, 1989. At the close of the government's case the district court dismissed counts XII through XVII and XX on Furst's motion for acquittal but otherwise denied that motion. Furst unsuccessfully renewed his motion for acquittal on the remaining counts at the end of the presentation of all the evidence. On January 27, 1989, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on counts III and IV, which had charged embezzlement from pension funds, counts V through VII, which had charged making false statements in bank records, and counts IX through XI, which had charged making false statements in ERISA documents. The jury reached no verdict on the remaining counts. 25 On March 20, 1989, notice of sentencing was mailed to Furst and on April 3, 1989, Furst filed a motion to disqualify 8 Judge Kosik, who had presided over Furst's trial, from participating in his sentencing. See brief for appellant at 19. This motion was based exclusively on 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. This motion and the accompanying affidavit of Robert L. Potter, Furst's attorney, asserted that the district judge had engaged in ex parte communications during the course of the trial and that during these discussions, the judge had attempted to encourage a plea bargain and had made comments regarding the likelihood of enhanced sentences should the case be tried and result in a guilty verdict. See brief for appellant at 19. The motion concluded with the statement that Furst has reasonable ground to question whether Judge Kosik would be willing to follow the law and act in an unbiased and impartial manner at sentencing. Appellant's app. at 793. 26 On April 6, 1989, the district court filed a memorandum opinion denying the motion without hearing, primarily on the ground that it was untimely. See appellant's app. at 819. The following day, Furst was sentenced to five year concurrent terms of imprisonment on each count and was required to make restitution of $358,757.50. Immediately following the imposition of sentence, the government filed a motion pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 48(a) to dismiss without prejudice the counts of the indictment not previously dismissed and on which no verdict was returned and the court granted the government's motion. On April 7, 1989, Furst filed his timely notice of appeal and moved for release pending appeal. The district court denied the motion but on April 21, 1989, we granted Furst's motion. 27 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291. The district court had subject matter jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3231 inasmuch as each of the counts of the indictment charged Furst with violation of federal criminal laws.