Opinion ID: 1247774
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Boykin-Tahl Waiver.

Text: Following defendant's waiver of jury trial, counsel stipulated the court could read and consider the former testimony of 21 specified witnesses, with the understanding either side could if it wished call any of the witnesses for additional testimony. Defendant assented to the stipulation. The prior testimony dealt with the circumstances of the crimes and the background to defendant's statements to the police and was given at defendant's preliminary hearing, the special hearing on the admissibility of his confession, and his first trial. The parties called 3 of the 21 witnesses whose prior testimony was submitted, as well as 20 additional witnesses. (4a) Citing Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709], In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 and their progeny, defendant claims the court erred in failing to advise him and obtain on-the-record waivers of his constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confrontation and cross-examination and against compulsory self-incrimination. (5) Under the rule of Boykin v. Alabama, supra, 395 U.S. 238, and In re Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122, as extended in Bunnell v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 592 [119 Cal. Rptr. 302, 531 P.2d 1086] and other cases, when the defendant agrees to a submission procedure, such as a guilty plea or a submission on the preliminary hearing transcript, by virtue of which he surrenders one or more of the three specified rights [jury trial, confrontation and privilege against self-incrimination] ( People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 592), the record must reflect that he was advised of and personally waived the applicable right or rights. ( Bunnell, supra, at p. 605.) When the submission is a guilty plea or tantamount to a plea of guilty ( In re Mosley (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924 [83 Cal. Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473]) the Boykin-Tahl requirements are constitutionally compelled. ( Id. at p. 926, fn. 10; see People v. Levey (1973) 8 Cal.3d 648, 652 [105 Cal. Rptr. 516, 504 P.2d 452].) When, however, the submission is in fact not tantamount to a guilty plea  when it appears on the whole that the defendant advanced a substantial defense ( People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 497 [233 Cal. Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260])  the Boykin-Tahl advisements and waivers are not constitutionally compelled, but are required only as a matter of judicial policy. ( Ibid.; see People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 592; cf. People v. Gray (1982) 135 Cal. App.3d 859, 869 [185 Cal. Rptr. 772] [hybrid proceeding].) We have not previously had occasion to determine whether the Boykin-Tahl rule applies at the penalty phase of a capital case, nor has the United States Supreme Court addressed the application of Boykin to penalty trials. Assuming, without deciding, that the requirements of Boykin-Tahl would in some circumstances apply to a submission of the issue of penalty on the transcript of prior proceedings, this is not such a case. (6) A submission within the meaning of Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 and Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592 occurs when a defendant gives up his right to trial by jury and, unless otherwise specified, the right to present additional evidence in his own defense and agrees the court can decide his case on the basis of the transcript of prior proceedings. ( Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 604; see People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 593.) Although the parties may reserve the right to present additional evidence, the essential components of a submission are waiver of a jury trial and, with respect to the witnesses who testified in the prior proceedings, waiver of the right to confrontation in the present proceeding. (See People v. Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 496; People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 593, and cases cited; cf. People v. Phillips (1985) 172 Cal. App.3d 670 [218 Cal. Rptr. 524].) When the submission is a slow plea or tantamount to a plea of guilty, the defendant also gives up his privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Levey, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 652.) Thus, a submission is defined by the rights a defendant surrenders. (4b) Here, as indicated, defendant had no constitutional right at the penalty phase to a jury trial. His waiver of the statutory right, moreover, was not a consequence of his stipulation to admission of the witnesses' former testimony, but preceded it. (Cf. People v. Phillips, supra, 172 Cal. App.3d at p. 673.) Further, by agreeing to the stipulation defendant did not incriminate himself by an involuntary confession of guilt ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 495) or, in terms applicable to the penalty phase, an involuntary concession that death was the appropriate penalty; to the contrary, he offered a complete and skillful defense. Nor did defendant surrender the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him; rather, defendant expressly reserved the right to call the witnesses whose former testimony was admitted. As we recognized in People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pages 592-593, involving counsel's failure in a jury trial to present a defense, there is no surrender of any one or more of the three specified constitutional rights when the defendant undergoes  and thereby exercises his right to  a jury trial and has the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him and to refuse to incriminate himself. (Italics added.) We perceive no reason for a different conclusion when the defendant undergoes a court trial. Here defendant had the opportunity in the prior proceedings to confront and cross-examine the witnesses whose former testimony was admitted and he exercised that right. He preserved the opportunity  by reserving the right to call the witnesses  in the penalty trial. In these circumstances, counsel's choice ultimately to exercise defendant's right of confrontation in only a limited manner was not a submission, but rather, was no more than a tactical decision within counsel's discretion to make. (See People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 592-594; People v. Ratliff (1986) 41 Cal.3d 675, 697 [224 Cal. Rptr. 705, 715 P.2d 665]; People v. Williams (1970) 2 Cal.3d 894, 905 [88 Cal. Rptr. 208, 471 P.2d 1008]; People v. Hall (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 299, 314-316 [157 Cal. Rptr. 107]; see also People v. Chasco (1969) 276 Cal. App.2d 271, 274-276 [80 Cal. Rptr. 667] (opn. by Kaus, P.J.).) Once a defendant has elected to proceed with a contested trial, rather than plead guilty or accept sentencing based upon a preliminary examination transcript, the manner of presenting evidence ... becomes one of trial tactics properly vested in counsel, at least in the absence of a conflict between counsel and his client. ( People v. Ratliff, supra, p. 697, citing People v. Hill (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 306, 315-316 [96 Cal. Rptr. 813]; see also People v. Frierson (1985) 39 Cal.3d 803, 818, fn. 8 [218 Cal. Rptr. 73, 705 P.2d 396].) Although defendant would have us reach a contrary conclusion based on the sheer number of witnesses whose testimony was admitted, we perceive no meaningful basis for the distinction. (7) We recognize that trial counsel in the guise of a tactical choice cannot deprive a defendant of his basic constitutional rights ( People v. Frierson, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 812-817; Townsend v. Superior Court (1975) 15 Cal.3d 774, 781 [126 Cal. Rptr. 251, 543 P.2d 619]) and that the Boykin-Tahl rule applies to tactical decisions that implicate those rights (e.g., People v. Hall (1980) 28 Cal.3d 143, 157, fn. 9 [167 Cal. Rptr. 844, 616 P.2d 826]). In the instant case there was no deprivation. Rather, counsel reserved the right to call and cross-examine all the witnesses, but as a tactical matter determined it was to defendant's advantage not to have the witnesses testify in person. (4c) Even assuming, arguendo, that the stipulation in this case constituted a submission within the meaning of Tahl, supra, 1 Cal.3d 122 and Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d 592, clearly the submission was not tantamount to a concession that death was the appropriate penalty. In these circumstances the trial court was not constitutionally compelled to adhere to the requirements of Boykin-Tahl ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 495, 497); hence, the reasonable possibility standard of review applies. ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) Unless we indulge in mere speculation and conjecture, on this record we can come to no conclusion other than the following: Had defendant been advised of his right of confrontation and privilege against self-incrimination and then validly waived his rights, the submission procedure would have been the same with the same result. Had he instead chosen not to make the waivers, the result likewise would have been the same. The witnesses whose former testimony was admitted had been cross-examined at one of the prior proceedings and in some cases at more than one. Consequently, if defendant had chosen not to make a waiver, all or at least substantially all of the 18 witnesses whose prior testimony was admitted by stipulation and who did not testify would have given live testimony to the same or substantially the same effect. We thus conclude that the court's error, if any, in failing to give the required advisements and take defendant's waivers was nonprejudicial.