Opinion ID: 2320689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of New-Trial Motion

Text: In denying the motion for a new trial, the trial justice's review of the evidence was less than exhaustive. He focused primarily on defendant's tape-recorded admission to killing the victim, which occurred in a telephone call between defendant and his girlfriend, Joyce Simpson. As the trial justice noted: He admitted on that [tape recording] that he killed her and he gave her a reason why. Based on that evidence, the trial justice concluded, and [on that evidence] alone, the jury could find that this defendant did, in fact, commit the murder. Thus, despite the lack of physical evidence linking defendant to the crime scene and the other reservations the trial justice entertained about the quality of the prosecution's case, the court believed that defendant's uncoerced admission of guilt  captured during a secretly tape-recorded telephone call with his girlfriend  was enough to convict him of the crime. We cannot evaluate this conclusion, however, without noting all the other circumstantial evidence pointing to defendant's guilt (including his presence at or near the scene of the crime when it was committed, his false alibis, his hiding in the closet when the police first called on his girlfriend, and his motive to commit the crimes of larceny and murder to support his drug habit). Having heard thisevidence and having evaluated the witnesses' credibility, the court denied the motion because, as the trial justice put it, I cannot say that reasonable people could not have found this defendant guilty. The defendant suggests on appeal, as did his trial attorney in his closing argument, that he had confessed in that taped telephone call merely to protect his girlfriend so she would not have to go through this anymore. But this argument drew scant sustenance from the evidence that was presented to the jury. Indeed, even as a mere possibility, the suggestion was a highly incredible one and, at the very least, was inconsistent with the rest of defendant's behavior during the investigation and its aftermath, as it was presented to the jury. For example, if defendant truly had sought to protect his girlfriend from suspicion for the murder, why would he admit his guilt to her but deny it to the police? Consequently, defendant's argument on this score not only failed to impress either the jury or the trial justice, but it also leaves us similarly unpersuaded. We have repeatedly held that in deciding a motion for a new trial, the trial justice must determine whether the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient for the jury to conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Scurry, 636 A.2d 719, 725 (R.I.1994). In making this decision, the trial justice acts as a thirteenth juror and exercises independent judgment on the credibility of witnesses and on the weight of the evidence. State v. Banach, 648 A.2d 1363, 1367 (R.I.1994). If the trial justice has articulated an adequate rationale for denying a motion, State v. Bleau, 668 A.2d 642, 646 (R.I.1995), his or her ruling on a new trial motion will be accorded great weight on appeal. State v. Dame, 560 A.2d 330, 332 (R.I.1989). Nevertheless, we shall overturn a ruling on a motion for a new trial, if the justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence or was otherwise clearly wrong. State v. Rieger, 763 A.2d 997, 1002 (R.I.2001); Scurry, 636 A.2d at 725. Given the importance that the trial justice and, quite evidently, the jury placed on the defendant's uncoerced, but apparently candid admission of guilt in his telephone call to Simpson, we cannot say that the justice overlooked material evidence by failing to mention the testimony of any defense witness when he denied the defendant's motion for a new trial. Even if the trial justice had believed the defense's witnesses, their aggregate testimony did not overcome, negate, or diminish the damning effect of the defendant's recorded admission to having committed the murder after Mrs. Picard had surprised him while he was pilfering her apartment for drug money. Consequently, we cannot say that the trial justice overlooked material evidence or otherwise reached an erroneous conclusion when he denied the motion for a new trial.