Opinion ID: 797389
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Would the Facts Alleged Establish a Violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights?

Text: 36 We conclude that Humphrey has indeed alleged that the officers violated his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. As a threshold matter, a search and seizure without a warrant by police officers is presumptively unreasonable, although several exceptions apply. An officer may permissibly conduct an investigatory stop when he or she can point to a particularized and objective basis that leads . . . reasonably to [the conclusion] in light of [the officer's] experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom [the officer] is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Houston v. Clark County Sheriff Deputy John Does 1-5, 174 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir.1999). Reasonable suspicion for an investigative stop must be considered under the totality of the circumstances, considering all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time. Feathers, 319 F.3d at 849. 37 Whether excessive force was used in conducting an investigative stop is also subject to a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). This inquiry requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865 (internal quotation marks omitted). Reasonableness must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. ; Pray v. City of Sandusky, 49 F.3d 1154, 1158 n. 3 (6th Cir.1995). Even if a stop at gunpoint is reasonable, the use of force to effect a seizure after officers knew or should have known that they had the wrong person is inherently unreasonable. Pray, 49 F.3d at 1161. 38 We agree with our dissenting colleague that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Humphrey, he has alleged a constitutional violation; that is, considering all of the information available to law enforcement officials at the time, Feathers, 319 F.3d at 849, a reasonable jury could conclude that the Columbus police violated Humphrey's Fourth Amendment rights when they misidentified his car, stopped him at gunpoint, forcibly seized him and restrained him, albeit briefly. Accordingly, we move to the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. 39