Opinion ID: 806090
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Director Caruso

Text: Caruso was the Director of the Michigan Department of Corrections in 2004 when Parsons was transferred to Standish. Parsons’s argument with regard to Caruso is difficult to understand. He seems to contend that Caruso should be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for two reasons: (1) because she implemented or was responsible for policies and procedures that were deliberately indifferent, or resulted in officials acting with deliberate indifference, to Parsons’s serious medical - 20 - No. 10-1584 and 11-1992 Parsons v. Caruso needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and (2) because she failed to supervise subordinates who violated Parsons’s constitutional rights. To be sure, Parsons has presented evidence of numerous possible systematic failures during Parsons’s short stay at Standish that may have contributed to his death, including: the delay in conducting Parsons’s medical intake; the failure of Pausits to immediately secure Dilantin for Parsons; Heebsh’s ordering of the medication from PharmaCorr or, if she was unaware that Parsons lacked his medication, the breakdown in communication between the nurses and Heebsh; the possible failure to administer Dilantin to Parsons once it arrived at Standish; and the possible administering of Wellbutrin, a drug contraindicated for seizure disorder patients like Parsons. However, this argument fails for at least two reasons. First, Parsons has not explained how the policy or procedure claim can be brought against Caruso. Under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978), “[l]ocal governing bodies . . . can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where . . . the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy, statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” Parsons has not cited any case where this sort of unconstitutional policy claim has proceeded against state officials like Caruso rather than against municipalities. Second, even if this policy claim was allowed to proceed against Caruso, Parsons has not presented sufficient facts to demonstrate that Caruso implemented any medical policies or procedures at issue in this case. As Caruso points out in her brief, she is not a medical professional and had virtually no involvement in medical-related policies. - 21 - No. 10-1584 and 11-1992 Parsons v. Caruso Parsons also fails to present evidence that Caruso had any direct involvement in Parsons’s medical care or treatment at Standish, or any direct involvement in the supervision of officials such as Pausits, Alexander, or Heebsh. In a supervisory liability claim, “the liability of supervisors [cannot] be based solely on the right to control employees.” McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Schools, 433 F.3d 460, 470 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, although prison officials arguably engaged in unconstitutional conduct, as required for supervisory liability, Parsons cannot show that Caruso “either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Parsons has not produced any evidence that Caruso was involved in the direct supervision of the other defendants in this action and because the policy claim cannot be brought against Caruso, Caruso did not act with deliberate indifference and is entitled to summary judgment.