Opinion ID: 1213697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: public funding of appeals in other civil cases

Text: The final question before us is whether a civil litigant who has an alleged property interest which is threatened by a private party has a right to appeal at public expense solely because he or she is indigent. The party seeking review in the third of these consolidated cases is a worker who claims that exposure to industrial chemicals resulted in an occupation-related illness. Pursuant to RCW 51.52 of the workers' compensation statute, the case was appealed first to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals, which found in favor of the worker, and then to the superior court where a jury rendered a verdict in favor of the employer. The worker, who is now indigent, has appealed the verdict to the Court of Appeals and asks that this appeal be funded by the public. [10] If the worker seeking review in the present case had a statutory or a constitutional right to an attorney, he would be entitled to appeal at public expense, under our construction of RCW 10.101. However, the workers' compensation statute contains no provision for appointment of counsel for indigent claimants. [10] He thus has no statutory right to counsel on appeal. He also has no constitutional right to counsel on appeal. [11] In civil cases, [11] the constitutional right to legal representation is presumed to be limited to those cases in which the litigant's physical liberty is threatened, Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25, 68 L.Ed.2d 640, 101 S.Ct. 2153 (1981); Tetro v. Tetro, 86 Wn.2d 252, 544 P.2d 17 (1975), or where a fundamental liberty interest, similar to the parent-child relationship, is at risk. In re Luscier, 84 Wn.2d 135, 524 P.2d 906 (1974) (the right to one's children is a liberty interest protected by the due process clauses of the federal and state constitutions); In re Myricks, 85 Wn.2d 252, 533 P.2d 841 (1975). [12, 13] Where, as here, the interest at stake is only a financial one, the right which is threatened is not considered fundamental in a constitutional sense. United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 445, 34 L.Ed.2d 626, 93 S.Ct. 631 (1973); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 659, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 93 S.Ct. 1172 (1973); Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d 732, 739, 557 P.2d 321 (1976). There is thus no constitutional right to counsel afforded indigents involved in worker compensation appeals. There are three remaining legal bases under which such a litigant may move for public funding of an appeal. First is RAP 15.2, which requires indigent persons moving for expenditure of public funds to prove the review is sought in good faith, the issues have probable merit, and the party seeking review is entitled under the state or federal constitution to review partially or wholly at public expense. RAP 15.2(c). Second are statutes which require that, in a civil case in which the Legislature has not provided for a right to counsel, an indigent litigant must either prove a constitutional right to obtain review (RCW 4.88.330) or a constitutional right to a transcript of the trial court proceedings (RCW 2.32.240). Third, where no constitutional right exists, the litigant may attempt to convince this court to use its inherent power to waive fees and costs. The litigant here is unable to meet the burden of proof required under any of these theories. Under either the rule or the statutes discussed above, a party seeking review must prove a federal or state constitutional right to appeal at public expense. [14] The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that there is no federal constitutional due process right to appeal, even in a criminal case. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 606, 41 L.Ed.2d 341, 94 S.Ct. 2437 (1974) (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 38 L.Ed. 867, 14 S.Ct. 913 (1894)); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 660, 35 L.Ed.2d 572, 93 S.Ct. 1172 (1973) (even in criminal cases, due process does not require a state to provide an appellate system); see generally Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-11, at 1461 (2d ed. 1988). [15] In the state of Washington, Const. art. I, § 22 (amend. X) expressly grants a right of appeal in criminal cases. Housing Auth. v. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d 732, 740, 557 P.2d 321 (1976); Speer v. Roney, 52 Wn. App. 120, 122, 758 P.2d 10, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1025 (1988). However, there is no comparable right in civil cases, and none can be inferred. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d at 740-41. [16] In civil cases, if the right to appeal exists, it is a right which is granted by the Legislature or at the discretion of the court. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d at 741. In the present case a right of appeal from the final superior court judgment is authorized by statute, RCW 51.52.140, but is not constitutionally mandated. [17] The fact that the opportunity to appeal has been made available by statute prevents the State from arbitrarily depriving a litigant of access to the appellate system. See Ford Motor Co. v. Barrett, 115 Wn.2d 556, 569, 800 P.2d 367 (1990). The State could not limit the resolution of disputes involving fundamental rights to specific judicial avenues and then, by imposing filing fees and other costs, foreclose an indigent person's access to those avenues. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 28 L.Ed.2d 113, 91 S.Ct. 780 (1971). This does not mean, however, that a state acts unfairly because it does not provide counsel and public funding at every stage of every lawsuit. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. at 611. [18] We have held that the rights guaranteed by the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and this state's privileges and immunities clause, Const. art. I, § 12, are substantially identical. [12] Saylors, 87 Wn.2d at 739; In re Runyan, 121 Wn.2d 432, 448 n. 14, 853 P.2d 424 (1993). This court in Saylors followed the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the equal protection clause when it held, If the litigation is in the field of economics and social welfare, and there is no suspect classification, the applicable standard for determining the propriety of imposing fees is rational justification. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d at 739 (citing Ortwein v. Schwab, supra ). In Ortwein, an action brought by welfare recipients whose welfare grants had been reduced by the State of Oregon, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of an Oregon statute requiring all civil appellants, including those who were indigent, to pay a $25 filing fee before an appeal would be accepted. [19] The Ortwein Court held the purpose of the fee, which was to assist in operating costs of the court system, was not disproportionate and met the requirement of rationality. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 660. The Supreme Court further held that the Oregon courts did not create a capricious or arbitrary classification by waiving the $25 filing fee for indigent litigants involved in criminal cases, and in civil cases that result in loss of liberty or in termination of parental rights. Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 661. Thus, under Ortwein, the constitutional rights of the appealing welfare recipients were not violated and the appellants were not entitled to public funding of their appeals. Ortwein is indistinguishable from the present case. The expenses related to the appellate process here, like those considered in Ortwein, help produce the revenues used to operate the judicial system. RCW 2.32; RCW 36.18. The imposition of fees and costs therefore is rationally justified by the State. [20, 21] We hold there is no constitutional right to appeal at public expense in civil cases in which only property or financial interests are threatened. Where there is no constitutional or statutory right to counsel at public expense and where there is no constitutional or statutory right to a waiver of fees and payment of costs, there is no right, simply because of the fact of indigency, to appointment of counsel on appeal or to waiver of fees and payment of costs. This court is sympathetic to the economic difficulties facing those who use our appellate system. As we recognized in Saylors, the appellate process is expensive: We can safely surmise that many litigants who are not to be classified as indigent are still not affluent enough to afford the luxury of an appeal. Whether the public interest requires that the appellate process be more extensively utilized, and whether the public is willing to finance a greater utilization of it, is a question to be resolved by the legislature. It is certain that this court cannot provide for the financing of appeals in every case of probable merit where the appellant is not able to afford the expense of further litigation, absent a legislative appropriation. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d at 741. [22, 23] This court has the inherent power to waive the fees and costs of litigation in civil cases in those rare cases where justice demands it. Saylors, 87 Wn.2d at 742; O'Connor v. Matzdorff, 76 Wn.2d 589, 458 P.2d 154 (1969). We have held that in such cases, a litigant must prove indigency, good faith in bringing the appeal, probable merit of the issues raised and, further, that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. In re Lewis, 88 Wn.2d 556, 559, 564 P.2d 328 (1977); Saylors, 87 Wn.2d at 743; Bowman v. Waldt, 9 Wn. App. 562, 571, 513 P.2d 559 (1973). Additionally, the court, in determining whether to exercise its inherent power, may properly consider not only the interests of the indigent litigant, but the interest of the general public and other affected individuals as well. Bowman, 9 Wn. App. at 571. In the case before us, no miscarriage of justice is alleged which would justify a waiver of fees or expenditure of public funds for this appeal. To summarize, we hold that where a civil litigant has a statutory right to counsel at all stages of the court proceeding, that right includes a right to counsel on appeal and for the purpose of filing a motion for discretionary review of an interlocutory trial court order. This right to counsel further contemplates a right to public funding of the expenses necessarily incident to effective appellate review. To the extent RAP 15.2 requires proof beyond that required under this analysis, it is inapplicable. Where a civil litigant is not granted a statutory or constitutional right to counsel at all stages of the proceeding, and where only a financial or property interest is at stake, there is no right to appeal at public expense solely because the litigant is indigent. The motions for expenditure of public funds filed in In re Grove and in In re Peterson are granted. The motion filed in Smith v. National Semiconductor Corp. is denied. SMITH and JOHNSON, JJ., and ANDERSEN, BRACHTENBACH, and UTTER, JJ. Pro Tem., concur. MADSEN, J. (dissenting) I dissent as to Mr. Grove's case (appeal from the dependency disposition) and Mr. Peterson's case (discretionary review of the interlocutory trial court order) because I do not agree that the Legislature has provided a statutory right to review at public expense in these cases. The majority's resolution of these two cases is founded on an assumption which does not withstand scrutiny, that is, if a statute provides counsel at all stages of a court proceeding, then there is a right both to appointed counsel on appeal or interlocutory discretionary review, and a right to review at public expense. Without this assumption, the entire majority analysis in these two cases unravels. The majority places heavy reliance on the policy set forth in RCW 10.101.005, which, according to the majority, justifies the conclusion that if there is a statutory right to counsel `at all stages' of a particular court proceeding, that right should include representation through an appeal as of right. Majority, at 233. RCW 10.101.005 was never cited by any of the parties. It establishes no substantive rights. It does not provide that the language at all stages of a proceeding includes the appellate stage; nor does anything else in RCW 10.101. RCW 10.101.005 is a statute which says that if there is a right to counsel, that right is a right to effective counsel. That is all the statute says. The majority fails to adequately consider the impact of RCW 4.88.330 and RCW 2.32.240, statutes which are cited by the parties and which are relevant to these cases. The majority's conclusion that Mr. Peterson has a statutory right to appointed counsel and review at public expense is strange for another reason: Mr. Peterson never argues at all that he has a statutory right to appointed counsel to represent him in seeking discretionary review of the trial court's interlocutory order. The ramifications of the majority's opinion extend far beyond the facts of these cases. Under the majority opinion, indigents' motions for discretionary review must be funded at public expense whenever a statute provides for appointment of counsel at all stages of the proceeding. This means, for example, that all motions for discretionary review of dependency orders not appealable as of right will be publicly funded regardless of their merits, at the expense of the Indigent Defense Fund. I believe that examination of the relevant statutes leads to the conclusion that neither Mr. Grove nor Mr. Peterson has a statutory right to review at public expense or to appointed counsel for appellate review. Accordingly, I believe this court should address the significant constitutional issues raised in these two cases.