Opinion ID: 2769429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing for Claims in Hutterville’s Name4

Text: We must first address the presence of Article III standing for the Waldners’ official capacity claims. See Brown v. Medtronic, Inc., 628 F.3d 451, 455 (8th Cir. 2010). To establish constitutional standing, the “person invoking the power of a federal court must” “prove that he has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct, and is likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. ___, ___, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). “[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Where, as here, the case has progressed only to “the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the defendant’s conduct may suffice, for on a motion to dismiss we ‘presum[e] that general allegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990)). The district court questioned whether Hutterville could show an injury-in-fact if the Waldners were not in control of the corporation. The district court explained that determining the existence of injury-in-fact “entails the fundamental question of 4 Because the Waldners’ official capacity claims effectively are claims by Hutterville itself, see Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991), we address them as such and refer to all claims in Hutterville’s name as the “official capacity claims.” -10- whether the [Waldners] can bring claims on behalf of [Hutterville], the corporate entity that holds the property of the colony.” The district court concluded the First Amendment would not permit the court to resolve this question. The attorneys similarly propose a First Amendment problem is inevitable because any injury to Hutterville “depends upon which faction has authority to speak and act for it” and “Johnny Wipf, the leader of the Wipf faction, has made clear that his faction has not authorized [this] litigation.” These are not questions of Article III standing. As the Waldners point out, the corporate control issue has “inextricably bound up” the jurisdictional question of injury with the merits of their claims, both of which are premised upon the attorneys acting in concert with Hutterville’s false agents to obtain Hutterville property. The Waldners are correct that for purposes of standing, we cannot question who controls Hutterville or acts as its authorized agents. Such questions attack the Waldners’ ability to prove their cause of action, yet “standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff’s contention that particular conduct is illegal.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). “It is crucial . . . not to conflate Article III’s requirement of injury in fact with a plaintiff’s potential causes of action, for the concepts are not coextensive.” Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 588 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2009). It remains to be seen whether the Waldners can prove Sveen, Wipf, and the rest acted unlawfully, and “[i]f [the Waldners’] allegations of misconduct on the part of [the attorneys] have merit, and that is the hypothesis upon which we must proceed at this stage of the case, [the Waldners] clearly ha[ve] standing in the constitutional sense.” Novartis Seeds, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 190 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); see also Vietnam Veterans of Am. v. Shinseki, 599 F.3d 654, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[T]he merits must be assumed when considering standing.”); Braden, 588 F.3d at 592 (“We must assume . . . [plaintiff’s] allegations are true.”). The complaint details numerous injuries to the corporation—including the conversion -11- of its property and livestock, redirection of payments owed to Hutterville, and the unapproved re-titling of Hutterville-owned vehicles—inflicted by the purported conspiracy in favor of the allegedly expelled Wipf faction members. In one such instance, the complaint alleges Sveen, as part of the conspiracy, instructed Wipf to record a warranty deed Wipf “had fraudulently executed as Hutterville’s ‘president,’” which “purported to convey from Hutterville to himself as trustee and for no consideration, all the real property described therein.” As alleged in the complaint, the injury is undoubtedly concrete and particularized; it is directly attributable to Sveen and Wipf’s participation in the alleged conspiracy; and redress is readily available in the form of damages or equitable relief. Assuming the merits, the three prongs of Article III standing have been pled. See Perry, 570 U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 2661; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61. While wrong to dress the issue as one of Article III standing, the district court correctly recognized a crucial defect in the Waldners’ claims.