Opinion ID: 2625117
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Magnitude of the risk; nature and likelihood of foreseeable harm

Text: Jeffries argues that his actual driving was not particularly egregious and did not create a very high risk of death. He minimizes the riskiness of his behavior by characterizing it as a poorly executed left turn. We are unpersuaded by this characterization. Jeffries's conduct was much more risky than the conduct in a typical drunk-driving accident for two reasons. First, the evidence suggests that Jeffries's error in judgment was severe. Jeffries was attempting to make a left-hand turn across DeBarr Road, a five-lane street with a speed limit of forty-five miles per hour, against oncoming traffic. Jeffries was traveling as slowly as ten miles per hour when he pulled directly in front of Bergeron's oncoming car. Bergeron's headlights were on, and although it was dark, streetlights lit the street well. Bergeron was traveling at or below the posted speed limit, probably at about thirty-five miles per hour. The street was icy and slippery. Bergeron had about enough warning to take [his] foot off the gas before the collision, but not enough time to stop or swerve to avoid the accident. Bergeron's car hit Jeffries's passenger door  almost the center of the car. The point of impact demonstrates that Jeffries either badly misjudged the speed of the oncoming car or altogether failed to see it. His speed of ten miles per hour was too slow to permit him to cross safely in front of Bergeron's oncoming car and left Jeffries's passenger gravely and predictably vulnerable to a side impact. Second, Jeffries was highly intoxicated on the night of the accident. Jeffries's apartment maintenance supervisor testified that Jeffries smelled of beer during an encounter with Jeffries between 10:30 A.M. and noon on the day of the crash. In response to the supervisor's concerned inquiry about Jeffries's ability to drive, Dean commented that he's been worse than this. At roughly 3:30 P.M. Jeffries and Dean arrived at the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) club in MountainView. The bartender testified that Jeffries drank only six beers there and left with Dean at 8:00 P.M. After the crash, an empty beer can was found on the passenger floorboard of the car. Police investigating the crash testified that Jeffries smelled strongly of alcohol and failed a field sobriety test. A blood test performed at 9:25 P.M., an hour and ten minutes after the accident, measured Jeffries's blood alcohol content at 0.27 percent. The state's expert testified that had Jeffries begun drinking at noon, he would have had to consume 23.6 drinks to reach a blood alcohol content of 0.27 percent by 9:25 P.M. The evidence established that Jeffries's blood alcohol content made it highly dangerous for him to drive. An expert witness for the state testified about a study that demonstrated that the probability of causing an accident increases exponentially as blood alcohol content increases. While a driver with a .08 percent blood alcohol content is three times more likely to cause an accident than a sober driver, [50] a driver with a 0.15 percent blood alcohol content is twelve times more likely to cause an accident than a sober person. Jeffries's blood alcohol content was nearly twice the highest level discussed by the expert. Thus, there was evidence that the probability Jeffries would cause an accident was at least twelve  and probably many more  times that for a sober driver. The fact that the roads were icy and slick on the night of the accident probably increased the risk even more because the condition of the road made it more difficult for oncoming drivers to altogether avoid a collision by stopping or swerving or to minimize the consequences by slowing down. At least one court, the Kentucky Supreme Court, has upheld murder convictions of intoxicated drivers based primarily on their extreme intoxication at the time of the accident. [51] Although we do not decide here whether a murder conviction might be warranted on the basis of extreme intoxication alone, we do conclude that Jeffries's intoxication, at over two-and-a-half times the legal limit, [52] was extreme. The jury could properly find the objective risk posed by a driver with Jeffries's level of intoxication to be significantly higher than that of a typical drunk driver. Likewise, the nature of the harm  the risk of death or serious bodily injury  inherent in abruptly turning and driving slowly across the path of oncoming traffic on slippery streets is both great and readily foreseeable. And it is very likely, and foreseeable, under such circumstances that the conduct will cause that harm.