Opinion ID: 510047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Refusal To Instruct.

Text: 30 Mollier argues that the district court committed reversible error by refusing his instruction on the definition of the word knowingly. The court did charge the jury with the following instruction: 31 The word knowingly as that term is used in these instructions means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally and not because of mistake or accident. 32 To this instruction, Mollier's attorney proposed the following addition: 33 [and f]urther with awareness on the part of the Defendant that those with whom he dealt were engaged in illegal activity and the Defendant would necessarily have to be aware ... that the items he sold were to be used for an illegal purpose by the recipients. 34 The issue we must decide is whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing Mollier's proposed jury instruction in this case. See Duvall, 846 F.2d at 971; United States v. Rubio, 834 F.2d 442, 450 (5th Cir.1987). In reviewing the district court's decision, we afford the trial judge  'substantial latitude in tailoring his instructions as long as they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented by the case.'  United States v. Kimmel, 777 F.2d 290, 293 (5th Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547, 558 (5th Cir. Unit B Nov. 1981)). Accordingly, we have adopted the following rule: 35 A trial judge's refusal to deliver a requested instruction constitutes reversible error if, but only if, the instruction (1) is substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually delivered to the jury; and (3) concerns an important point in the trial so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to effectively present a given defense. 36 United States v. Grissom, 645 F.2d 461, 464 (5th Cir. Unit A May 1981). See Rubio, 834 F.2d at 447; U.S. v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1097 (5th Cir.1986). In short, we may not overturn Mollier's conviction on the ground that the district court omitted his instruction from its jury charge unless that instruction is legally correct, represents a theory of defense with basis in the record which would lead to acquittal, and ... that theory is not effectively presented elsewhere in the charge. Rubio, 834 F.2d at 447. 37 Mindful of these principles, we conclude that Mollier's proffered instruction was properly refused. First, it is not a definition of knowingly at all, but rather is a statement of the Mollier's theory of what the government was required to show in order to prove a conspiracy. Second, it is a flatly incorrect statement of the law of conspiracy, and in fact is much more favorable to the government than the conspiracy instruction that was actually given. 38 That instruction properly stated that A conspiracy is a combination or agreement of two or more persons to join together in an attempt to accomplish some unlawful purpose, and correctly emphasized that conspiracy could be found only if two or more persons in some way or manner, positively or tacitly, came to a mutual understanding to try to accomplish a common and unlawful plan. (Emphasis added.) Mollier's proffered instruction lacks any requirement of mutual agreement; it would allow conviction based upon a determination that he had knowledge of the drug conspiracy and knowledge that the items he supplied would be used illegally, even though he did not intend to join the conspiracy. 39