Opinion ID: 203566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of Evidence as to the Travelers Settlement

Text: Doe contends that the district court erroneously admitted evidence. The evidentiary rulings of a trial court will not be upset unless they involve an abuse of discretion. McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 242 n. 1 (1st Cir.1985). In Tiller v. Baghdady, 244 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.2001), we defined abuse of discretion as follows: A judge abuses this discretion when a relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not considered. United States v. Hastings, 847 F.2d 920, 924 (1st Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Kramer, 827 F.2d 1174, 1179 (8th Cir.1987)). We acknowledge that, [t]here is no neat, standardized test for judging abuse of discretion; each case must be judged on its own facts and circumstances. Loinaz [ v. EG & G, Inc. ], 910 F.2d[ 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1990)]; see also Espeaignnette v. Gene Tierney Co., 43 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir.1994). We note that [o]nly rarelyand in extraordinarily compelling circumstances will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir.2005) (alteration in original, quotation marks omitted). At trial, National Union sought to introduce evidence of the amount of the settlement between Doe and Travelers, which had provided an umbrella liability insurance policy to the insureds. Doe objected to the introduction of testimony as to the amount of the settlement, arguing that the introduction of evidence of the result of her settlement negotiations with Travelers was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence and contrary to Rule 408, which bars the introduction of an offer or agreement to compromise a disputed claim, or the content of settlement negotiations, to prove liability for, invalidity of, or [the] amount of the disputed claim. Fed.R.Evid. 408(a). The district court, in admitting the evidence, reasoned that the amount of the settlement was relevant not to establish liability but to enable the computation of punitive damages for Doe's Chapter 93A claim, see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 9(3), and was not unduly prejudicial. The district court reasoned that if the jury determined to award punitive damages by multiplying actual damages, it would need to know the amount of the settlement to deduct[] the settlement amount from the amount of Doe's ultimate judgment against Hovestadt, i.e., the jury needed the amount to calculate the actual damages and thus punitive damages. J.A. at 2603. Doe argued that no deduction for the settlement was appropriate, and alternatively, that any calculation of the damages amount could be made by the court without revealing the amount of the settlement to the jury. Doe points out that indeed the verdict form ultimately adopted made it unnecessary for the jury to make this computation. We need not decide whether the settlement amount was correctly admitted for computational purposes, however, since we may affirm on an alternative ground. See United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110, 1127 (1st Cir.1989) (declining to reverse improper admission of hearsay evidence as business records, based on a conclusion that the same records could properly be admitted under the residual hearsay exception); see also Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262 (4th Cir. 1999) ([W]e can affirm the evidentiary ruling of the district court on a ground different from that employed below. ...). National Union points out that Doe opened the door to the introduction of the Travelers settlement by asking about the Travelers settlement in the context of a dispute as to whether National Union had acted to delay Doe's Massachusetts litigation in bad faith, as Doe alleged, or in good faith to facilitate a settlement with Travelers, as National Union alleged. At trial, Doe questioned witnesses as to whether National Union, for purposes of delay and in bad faith, had sought United States Supreme Court review of an order of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court requiring Senechal to participate in a paternity test. So too, Doe's counsel asked Woodbury whether she had delayed mediation proceedings between the various parties involved in this case (including Travelers) in bad faith because you wanted one last shot to see maybe she's done it, maybe she's dead, maybe she's in an institution, and we can save money. J.A. at 2312. [11] National Union sought to rebut this allegation of bad faith by showing that it had delayed the Massachusetts litigation and had engaged in mediation in good faith to facilitate a settlement payment from Travelers. On behalf of National Union, in answer to a question regarding what she did in that time after the petition for certiorari [as to the paternity test] was filed, Woodbury testified that she tried to get ... other insurance carriers involved to come to the table with some money ... [t]o try to get the case settled. J.A. at 2483. After Woodbury's testimony, counsel for Doe asked the next witness, Martin Foster (an attorney retained by the insureds), about settlement negotiations between National Union, Travelers, the insureds, and Doe at a mediated settlement conference. Doe's counsel suggested that the negotiations were unproductive, thus casting doubt upon whether the delay was really designed to produce a settlement beneficial to Doe. It was in this context, upon cross examination by National Union, and over Doe's objection, that Foster was allowed to testify that Doe ultimately reached a settlement with Travelers whereby Travelers paid Doe $980,000. [12] Having introduced evidence regarding the settlement negotiations between National Union and Travelers, and having suggested that those negotiations were fruitless, Doe opened the door to introduction of evidence regarding her ultimate settlement with Travelers. See Willco Kuwait (Trading) S.A.K. v. deSavary, 843 F.2d 618, 625 (1st Cir.1988). The district court did not err in admitting evidence of the settlement amount.