Opinion ID: 754226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: What Relief Plaintiffs Had Sought

Text: 74 The most important factor in determining a reasonable fee for a prevailing plaintiff is the degree of success obtained. Pino v. Locascio, 101 F.3d at 237; see, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. at 114, 113 S.Ct. at 574-75; Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941; Carroll v. Blinken, 105 F.3d at 81. In the present case, the district judge ruled that no fee was reasonable because plaintiffs attained a most limited degree of success as compared to what the[y] had sought. Fee Decision at 10. Even assuming, however, that the phrase degree of success as used in the above cases refers merely to a comparison of the relief granted against the relief requested, but see Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. at 433-37, 103 S.Ct. at 1939-41, and Part II.C.4. below, we have several difficulties with the district court's conclusions here, for the court not only, as discussed in Parts II.C.1. and 2. above, failed to recognize what was achieved and plaintiffs' key role in its achievement, but it also clearly erred in stating what relief plaintiffs had sought. 75 For example, in emphasizing plaintiffs' request for relief in the form of dissolution of the Village, the district judge erroneously stated that prior to this Court's decision in LeBlanc-Sternberg I, plaintiffs had made no request for other equitable relief. See Fee Decision at 7 ([t]he only injunctive relief [plaintiffs] sought (prior to the Court of Appeals decision which focused on the Zoning Code) was the abolishment of the Village of Airmont and/or the return of Orthodox Jewish residential areas to the Town (footnote omitted)). While dissolution was surely plaintiffs' most spectacular request, their substantive objection plainly was not to the existence of the Village per se, but rather to the Village's imminent discriminatory exercise of zoning power. Thus, their pleading, in a section entitled Nature of the Action, charged that the Village had been incorporated with the express purpose of excluding or limiting the Orthodox Jewish population within the village by, among other things, imposing burdensome zoning and other restrictions upon Orthodox Jewish places of worship. (Second Amended Complaint p 1 (emphasis added).) And from the outset plaintiffs sought, as an alternative to dissolution, a permanent injunction restraining Defendants and all others acting in concert with them from continuing their unlawful acts and conspiracy, including, without limitation, pursuing any further proceedings with respect to the ... zoning of the Village. (Id. at 32, p 1.b. (emphasis added).) Thus, the district judge's statement that the only injunctive relief plaintiffs had sought was dissolution of the Village is squarely contradicted by the record. 76 The record also belies the district judge's view that plaintiffs sought primarily monetary damages of $1,000,000, plus punitive damages. Fee Decision at 7. As to compensatory damages, the Second Amended Complaint did not mention $1,000,000 or any dollar figure; rather, it requested only damages in an amount to be determined at trial (Second Amended Complaint at 32, p 1.c.). And although plaintiffs apparently placed a $1 million value on their claims in response to a pretrial interrogatory, the Village has not cited us to any part of the trial record indicating that plaintiffs asked the jury for any given sum of money. Indeed, the record indicates the contrary. While plaintiffs contended before the jury that they had suffered compensable injury (hardly surprising, since the jury was to decide only claims for damages), plaintiffs' counsel began the trial by stating that this case is about prayer. It's about people['s] desire to exercise what is the most basic form of religious freedom, the right to pray (Trial Transcript at 16), and he asked the jury to award damages in the amount you, the jury, feel[ ] appropriate for the amount of suffering and what [plaintiffs] had to endure in the deprivation of these rights (id. at 41-42). Plaintiffs ended their trial presentation in the same vein, with their counsel stating that this case [i]s about prayer (id. at 5639) and disavowing extravagant monetary claims: 77 You haven't heard the plaintiffs come in this courtroom and ask for stated sums of money. 78 You didn't hear any of the plaintiffs tell you that they had filed this lawsuit because they wanted a million dollars, as you heard testimony about some other lawsuits. 79 You didn't hear them come in here and ask for money in terms of stated amounts. That has been--in fact, if anything, has been played down to the point that one witness testified, Yes, if I get anything at all, I will donate it to the synagogue. They are not looking to profit, ladies and gentlemen, from this case. 80 (Id. at 5636-37). As the Village itself notes on this appeal, the critical issue ... in litigation was prayer services. (Village brief on appeal at 23.) 81 As to punitive damages, it is clear that the district judge erred in characterizing this as one of plaintiffs' primar[ ]y goals against the Village, Fee Decision at 7, for insofar as their claims against the Village were concerned, it was expressly not a goal at all. Plaintiffs' pleading requested an award[ of] punitive damages against [certain] Defendants, other than the Village. (Second Amended Complaint at 32, p 1.e. (emphasis added).) 82 In sum, in exercising its discretion to deny plaintiffs' fee motion on the basis that their success against the Village was limited, the district court erred in concluding, inter alia, that plaintiffs had not prevailed on any issue critical or essential to their claims; that plaintiffs had not materially changed the legal relationship between themselves and the Village; that the injunctive relief granted was insignificant; that plaintiffs' success before the jury in establishing the Village's liability was of little consequence in the obtaining of any relief, either in this action or in the government action; that plaintiffs had asked for no injunctive relief other than dissolution of the Village; and that plaintiffs' primary goal, other than dissolution of the Village, was compensatory and punitive damages. We conclude that the denial of plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees was an abuse of discretion. 83