Opinion ID: 3014613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The two dictionary definitions

Text: The Supreme Court has stated that “when a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946). Here, the jury asked the Court for a dictionary. The District Court was disinclined to provide the jurors with a dictionary, stating to counsel in chambers: “As we all know, we don’t permit jurors to embark upon their own research, their own quest for information.” To prevent any dictionary misuse, the District Court asked the jury to specify the words for which it needed definitions: “The Court and the parties have received your request for a dictionary. In the space provided below, please list the word or words or term or terms you wish to define. It is not necessary to provide an explanation of why you wish to define those words or terms.” The jury submitted its request for definitions for the words “forthright” and “motivating.” With the input of counsel, the District Court decided to provide photocopied definitions for 7. Gibson’s counsel makes the further argument that he had objected to the authenticity of the tapes in chambers but that he was forced to withdraw his objection because he did not want to cause further prejudice to his client by having the jury see him question the authenticity of the tapes. However, there is nothing in the record of this conversation in chambers that suggests that he was “forced” to withdraw his objection, nor that authentication could not have taken place without the jury present. 22 the two words out of the abridged version of Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary.8 Gibson argues that he was unduly prejudiced by the jury’s receipt of a dictionary definition of the word “forthright,” because the meaning of the word forthright was a key issue at trial. Part of Gibson’s argument at trial was that a reasonable person would have no understanding, and therefore no notice, as to the meaning of the word “forthright.” Gibson further argues in the appellate brief that the very fact that the jury asked for a definition of the word demonstrates that the word was confusing and ambiguous enough to prevent average people from understanding it. This contention has no merit. During the course of the police investigation and of the trial, Gibson himself demonstrated a perfectly good understanding of the word “forthright.” In response to a question during the police investigation, Gibson used the word “forthright” in contradistinction to the word “truthful” without being prompted to do so: Police Investigator: . . . are you being totally truthful when you were talking to the Data Center? Gibson: I’m being ah I’m being ah truthful probably but not forthright. On cross-examination at the trial, Gibson was asked to what he meant by the word forthright, as he had used it in his answer to the police investigator. Counsel: What do you mean by the word forthright? Gibson: What do I mean? 8. The relevant definitions read as follows: 1. forthright adv. 1 a: directly forth or ahead b: without hesitation: frankly 2 archaic: at once. 2. forthright adj. 1 archaic: proceeding straight on 2: free from ambiguity or evasiveness: going straight to the point. motivate vt -vated; -vating (1885): to provide with a motive: IMPEL. Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 486, 774 (1986). 23 Counsel: Yes. Gibson: Sir, you’re asking me for my definition? Counsel: I am. Gibson: To be. . . . (Pause). I don’t know. To be candid, frank. Gibson’s subsequent contention that he did not know what forthright meant and that providing the jury with a definition would prejudice the deliberations against him is simply belied by the record. In our view, the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it provided the jury with the definitions of the words “motivating” and “forthright” at the jury’s request.9 In fact, it declined to send in a dictionary and inquired further as to the jury’s exact need so that it could specifically tailor the supplemental instructions. Such judicial tailoring of supplemental instructions was deemed the preferred procedure in United States v. Birges, 723 F.2d 666, (1984): Questions or disputes as to the meaning of terms which arise during jury deliberations should be settled by the court after consultation with counsel, in supplemental instructions. Such guidance will avoid the danger that jurors will use the dictionary to construct their own definitions of legal terms which do not accurately or fairly reflect applicable law. 9. With respect to providing the jury with a dictionary definition of “motivating,” Gibson does not even allude to any prejudice arising from the provision of this word, as his entire argument focuses on the prejudice that allegedly accrued from providing a definition of the word “forthright.” In all likelihood, the jury asked for a definition of the word “motivating” to help it understand the meaning of a “substantial and motivating factor,” one of the elements in the free speech retaliation charge. Providing a plain English language definition of a legal term is not problematic if the supplemental definition does not alter the essential meaning of the word. See United States v. He, 245 F.3d 954 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, there is no contention that the supplemental definition altered the meaning of the word “motivating,” and the District Court clearly did not abuse its discretion in providing a dictionary definition for the word. 24 Id. at 670-71. Here, the District Court took seriously its responsibility to be as precise as possible and provided the jury with exactly what was needed, no more and no less. The Court did not abuse its discretion in providing the two requested dictionary definitions.