Opinion ID: 151419
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ward Has Alleged Facts Which, If Proved, Would Entitle Him to Relief

Text: Ward alleges that he instructed Opgenorth to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, but that Opgenorth disregarded these instructions. If it is true that Opgenorth refused to file a motion to withdraw Ward's plea despite a direct instruction that he do so, his performance was constitutionally ineffective under Strickland. Such conduct would fall below Strickland's objective standard of reasonableness, and it prejudiced Ward because there was at least a reasonable probability that such a motion would have succeeded.
As the state conceded at oral argument, if Opgenorth did indeed refuse to heed a direct request, this conduct was deficient. The decision whether or not to plead guilty is a major one that rests ultimately with the client, and a lawyer who disregards specific instructions as to such a decision acts unreasonably. See Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 187, 125 S.Ct. 551, 160 L.Ed.2d 565 (2004) (defendant has ultimate authority over decisions involving fundamental trial decisions including whether to plead guilty (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983))); Wallace v. Davis, 362 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 2004) ([m]any decisions during trial fall to counsel by default or by virtue of superior knowledge, but the major ones ... may be exercised personally, if the accused wants to make rather than delegate these vital choices); cf. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029 (lawyer who disregards specific instructions to file a notice of appeal acts unreasonably). If, on the other hand, it turns out that Opgenorth strongly advised Ward not to withdraw the plea as a strategic matter, but did not disregard any direct, unequivocal instructions, his conduct may well have been reasonable, particularly in light of Strickland's strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Brown v. Finnan, 598 F.3d 416, 423 (7th Cir.2010). The circumstances of what exactly transpired between Ward and Opgenorth will be a determination for the district court to make with the benefit of an evidentiary hearing at which credibility determinations can be made. See Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 477, 120 S.Ct. 1029; Matheney, 253 F.3d at 1040.
Assuming that Ward's allegations are true and that Opgenorth's performance was objectively unreasonable, Ward must also demonstrate that the refusal to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea prejudiced him. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To demonstrate prejudice, Ward would have to show that (1) there was reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and (2) there was a reasonable probability that the court would have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366; Moore, 348 F.3d at 241. We find that Ward has satisfied these requirements. As to Hill's first requirement, Ward contends that he would have gone to trial but for Opgenorth's actions because he had a viable defense against the charges he faced. Ward claims that although he may have taken customer money without performing any services in return, he never intended to keep the money and always meant to eventually complete the work. He argues that the government therefore could not have proven intent, a necessary element for a violation of the theft by contractor law. Wis. Stat. § 943.20(1)(b). We need not assess the likely success of such a defense; Ward's claim that he would have insisted on going to trial to pursue it is enough at this juncture to satisfy the first prong of the prejudice analysis. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366; see also Holtan v. Parratt, 683 F.2d 1163, 1170 (8th Cir.1982) (prejudice where attorney failed to act on defendant's request to withdraw a nolo contendre plea); cf. Castellanos v. United States, 26 F.3d 717 (7th Cir.1994) (prejudice where lawyer failed to carry out client's instruction to file an appeal regardless of chances of success). The district court concluded that Ward did not demonstrate prejudice because he never actually alleged that he would have gone to trial but for Opgenorth's alleged errors. We disagree with this interpretation. While it is true that Ward's § 2254 petition does not explicitly state that he would have insisted on going to trial, that to us is the clear import of his claim that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. The natural result of a plea withdrawal would have been to face trial on the charges instead (and with the benefit of counsel on appeal, Ward makes the point explicitly). This interpretation is particularly appropriate in light of our obligation to liberally construe pro se submissions like Ward's. See, e.g., McGee v. Bartow, 593 F.3d 556, 566-67 (7th Cir.2010). [2] Hill's second requirement is a reasonable probability that the state court would have granted a motion to withdraw his guilty plea had one been filed. 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. In Wisconsin, a defendant will be permitted to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing if there is a fair and just reason for doing so, and the prosecution will not be greatly prejudiced by the withdrawal. State v. Barney, 213 Wis.2d 344, 570 N.W.2d 731, 735 (Wis.Ct.App. 1997). The state conceded at oral argument that it would not have been prejudiced by a withdrawal of Ward's guilty plea, so our inquiry turns solely on whether a fair and just reason exists for withdrawal under Wisconsin law. Wisconsin courts have consistently articulated a liberal rule in determining what constitutes a fair and just reason to withdraw a plea. State v. Jenkins, 303 Wis.2d 157, 736 N.W.2d 24, 33-35 (2007); see also State v. Garcia, 192 Wis.2d 845, 532 N.W.2d 111, 117 (1995) (confusion is a fair and just reason for withdrawal); State v. Manke, 230 Wis.2d 421, 602 N.W.2d 139, 144 (Wis. Ct.App.1999) (granting plea withdrawal where defendant misunderstood his plea and received misleading advice from his attorneys). Ward asserts that his confusion during his plea hearing constitutes a fair and just reason to withdraw the plea. A review of the plea hearing transcript does create the impression that Ward may have been confused about the plea he entered. Even after the judge explained the difference between a no contest and guilty plea to Ward, he continued to express confusion. Ward further contends that Klopp did not resolve his confusion during the recess that followed, but instead pressured him to enter the guilty plea. That said, Ward did eventually indicate to the court that he understood the difference between a guilty and no contest plea, and that he wished to plead guilty. We need not decide whether Ward's assertions definitively constitute a fair and just basis for withdrawal of his plea; we need only determine whether there was a reasonable probability that a Wisconsin court would so conclude. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366; see also Julian v. Bartley, 495 F.3d 487, 498 (7th Cir.2007) ([t]he chances of prejudice need only be better than negligible.). Given the broad discretion Wisconsin courts have in this area, we find that there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have found that there was fair and just reason to permit Ward to withdraw his plea. See Jenkins, 736 N.W.2d at 33; see also Garcia, 532 N.W.2d at 117 (confusion is a fair and just reason for withdrawal).