Opinion ID: 844274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Certification of Appellate Record

Text: Defendant raises two claims of error concerning the trial court's certification of the record on appeal. First, he claims the court erred in denying his request to settle the record with respect to a chalkboard diagram created by a blood spatter expert during her testimony. Second, he claims the court erred in including in the settled statement the trial court's own recollection of the circumstances surrounding the hardship excusal of 60 prospective jurors. Defendant argues these errors deprived him of a complete and accurate record on appeal. The record settling procedures were adequate and did not violate defendant's constitutional rights. (32) The record on appeal in a capital case `includes, but is not limited to, the following: [¶] (1) The normal and additional record prescribed in the rules adopted by the Judicial Council pertaining to an appeal taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction. [¶] (2) A copy of any other paper or record on file or lodged with the superior or municipal court and a transcript of any other oral proceeding reported in the superior or municipal court pertaining to the trial of the cause.' (Pen. Code, § 190.7, subd. (a)(1), (2).) `In any case in which a death sentence may be imposed, all proceedings conducted in the municipal and superior courts, including all conferences and proceedings, whether in open court, in conference in the courtroom, or in chambers, shall be conducted on the record with a court reporter present.' ( Id., § 190.9, subd. (a)(1).) ( Marks v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 176, 192 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 674, 38 P.3d 512].) When gaps occur in the record, rule 8.137 (former rule 7) of the California Rules of Court provides a mechanism for creating a settled statement. ( Marks, at p. 192; see also Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.346 [providing for the use of settled statement procedures in criminal appeals] & 8.619(d)(3) [providing for the use of settled statements in capital cases].)
On September 26, 2002, defendant's appellate counsel filed a request to augment, correct, and settle the record on appeal. Among several other items, defendant asked for a settlement of the chalkboard diagram created by Los Angeles Sheriff's Department Senior Criminalist Elizabeth Devine. During her direct examination, Devine was asked how a criminalist can determine from its appearance the direction a blood droplet has traveled. She requested and was provided with a chalkboard, which she used to illustrate her testimony about the effect of gravity on blood droplets. Because the diagram was drawn on a blackboard and was not admitted into evidence, it would have to be re-created by the witness for the record to be settled. The prosecutor recalled only that the diagram consisted of basic marks ... to indicate blood spatter in a directional way. He suggested that defendant's appellate counsel consult with Devine because the drawing might have been a standard demonstration that she does in these kinds of cases. Defendant's appellate counsel was not able to contact Devine. However, Devine's former supervisor expressed the belief that Devine would not have created her chalkboard diagram spontaneously in court, but would have based it on materials that were likely preserved in her case file. The Attorney General opposed appellate counsel's request to settle the record with a re-creation of Senior Criminalist Devine's chalkboard diagram. At a hearing on November 18, 2002, the trial court also expressed concern about allowing defendant's attorney to try to re-create the diagram from information in Devine's files because the files likely contained information not presented to the jury. Counsel was merely guessing that Devine had in fact re-created something in her file, and the court itself had no memory of the diagram. When counsel persisted in seeking a court order for access to Devine's files, the court refused, explaining the search would be futile: We are not talking about something that the jury was actually given in hand. It was something drawn, they saw whatever was drawn on the board. Accordingly, defendant's request to settle the record on this point was denied. The trial court did not err in refusing to authorize defendant's appellate counsel to search an expert's files in hopes of finding a document resembling a diagram the expert drew on a chalkboard to illustrate and explain her testimony. No attempt was made to preserve the chalk drawing, which was by its nature ephemeral. It was not marked, lodged, or admitted into evidence, nor was a photograph taken to preserve it. Neither the attorneys nor the trial court could recall exactly what the diagram looked like. Assuming record settlement procedures can be used for demonstrative evidence, the diagram was not a proper subject for settlement of the record. [14] (33) The rules authorizing settlement, augmentation, and correction of the record on appeal concern documents `file[d] or lodged' in the superior court and transcripts of `oral proceedings' that occurred therein. [Citations.] These provisionsmuch like the entire network of rules governing matter properly included in the appellate recordare intended to ensure that the record transmitted to the reviewing court preserves and conforms to the proceedings actually undertaken in the trial court. [Citations.] The settlement, augmentation, and correction process does not allow parties to create proceedings, make records, or litigate issues which they neglected to pursue earlier. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 585 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142].) Defendant's trial counsel took no steps to preserve the diagram Senior Criminalist Devine spontaneously drew during her testimony. The settlement process does not permit defendant to create anew something that he neglected to make part of the record in the first place. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying appellate counsel's request to search for a similar diagram in the expert's files.
In an addendum to his original request to settle the record, defendant's appellate counsel also asked the court to clarify whether the discussion of jurors' hardship requests was reported or whether the record needed to be settled regarding the excusals. In his first proposed settlement of the record, defendant noted that after prospective jurors completed hardship questionnaires, the trial court read the names of jurors whose hardship requests had been granted and those of jurors from whom more information was sought. Except for jurors who were questioned about their requests, the record included no discussion about 61 jurors who were excused for hardship based on their questionnaires alone, and the prosecutor did not recall how the court handled these hardship excusals. In order to settle the record, defendant's appellate counsel requested the trial court's assistance in detailing the procedures employed and the reasons for excusing the prospective jurors at issue. At the November 18, 2002 hearing, defendant's appellate counsel asked for the court's input regarding the hardship excusal of 61 jurors. Trial counsel had told him he believed a hearing had been conducted on the record before these jurors were excused. The trial court stated, I do have a recollection; and as far as the original hardships were concerned, both counsel stipulated that certain jurors could be excused; and it was done on the basis of their paid jury leave. Although the court was reluctant to attempt to recreate a record when neither side had objected to excusing the jurors, it agreed with appellate counsel's proposal to have both trial counsel review the 61 hardship questionnaires and try to recollect the reasons for their release. In his second revised proposed settled statement, appellate counsel reported that, although the prosecutor did not recall any details about the hardship excusals, defendant's trial counsel recalled that the Court was `pretty liberal' in ruling on the hardship requests and the Court's primary concerns were whether (1) the prospective juror would be compensated adequately for jury service, (2) whether anyone was ill in the juror's family, or (3) whether the juror was a primary caretaker for another person. Defendant's trial counsel also believed a hearing had been held with a court reporter on the hardship requests. At the next court hearing, the trial court added its recollection that each counsel did, indeed, see the questionnaires and ... stipulated or agreed that these jurors would be excused ... because they couldn't be away from work that long. The court recalled that the financial hardship of serving on a long jury trial was the only aspect of hardship discussed with the 60 prospective jurors who were excused at the outset of jury selection. The court agreed to settle the record on this point as set forth in defendant's proposed statement. Defendant's appellate counsel reminded the court of his request for the court reporter to review her notes to look for any reported proceedings concerning the excused jurors. The court responded that the matter had been reviewed and the court reporter had reported everything that was done before her. (34) Defendant now objects that the court exceeded its authority in settling the record when it reported that both counsel had stipulated to the hardship excusals. Defendant complains the court usurped the role of the parties in stating its own recollection about the procedure. We disagree. Although the trial court's duty is `to settle a proposed statement, not to make one' ( Marks v. Superior Court, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 195, quoting Stevens v. Superior Court (1958) 160 Cal.App.2d 264, 269 [325 P.2d 204]), we have observed that record settlement is to be based on `all available aids, including the judge's own memory ...' ( Marks, at p. 196, quoting People v. Gzikowski (1982) 32 Cal.3d 580, 585, fn. 2 [186 Cal.Rptr. 339, 651 P.2d 1145], italics added). In this case, neither trial attorney could remember specific reasons why the 60 prospective jurors were excused for hardship, and defendant's appellate counsel specifically asked the trial court to explain what had happened. Defendant's first proposed settled statement expressly sought the Court's assistance in detailing the procedures employed and the reasons for excusing the prospective jurors at issue. At the November 18, 2002 hearing, defendant's appellate counsel asked again for the court's recollection about the hardship dismissals, and the court responded that both counsel had stipulated to them. The court did not exceed its authority by describing its memory of the proceedings, at the specific request of counsel, to aid counsel in preparing a settled statement. (See Marks, at p. 196.) To the extent there was any error, it was invited by defendant's repeated requests for the court's input. ( People v. Williams (2008) 43 Cal.4th 584, 629 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 691, 181 P.3d 1035].) Furthermore, because defendant has presented nothing to suggest the court's recollection is untrue, any error was harmless. (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1170 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487] [defendant's burden to demonstrate prejudice].) Defendant also challenges the court's representation that all reported proceedings regarding hardship excusals had been transcribed. Defendant asked the court to contact the court reporter about a possible missing transcript on December 12, 2002, and the court stated at the December 16, 2002 hearing that the reporter had been contacted and had verified her transcriptions were complete. Because only three days had elapsed between his request and the court's representation at the hearing, defendant speculates that the court had not, in fact, contacted the reporter, but was instead basing its representation on a discussion with the court's capital appeals coordinator. Defendant did not make this serious accusation below, and thus the trial court had no opportunity to respond to it. We will not conclude the trial court was disingenuous based on sheer surmise and at this late date, when defendant's appellate counsel could have established the source of the court's information by asking a simple question at the December 16 hearing. Defendant's trial counsel believed a hearing had been conducted, with a reporter, for hardship requests, but this memory could have applied to the second round of hardship dismissals, during which jurors who were not excused in the initial cut were questioned in greater detail about their reasons for seeking to be released from service. These proceedings were transcribed and are included in the record on appeal.