Opinion ID: 1464517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prejudicial Error Requires Reversal

Text: Having determined that the trial judge's rulings were in error, we must now determine if this error was harmless. The Supreme Court in Chapman, supra, rejected the argument that all federal constitutional errors, regardless of their nature or the circumstances of the case, require reversal of a judgment of conviction. The Court reasoned that in the context of a particular case, certain constitutional errors may have been harmless in terms of their effect on the fact-finding process at trial. Since Chapman, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Arsdall, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 1436. See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983); Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 98 S.Ct. 458, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). The constitutional complications manifest in the trial court's error here were not sufficiently mitigated by its order to redact any mention of appellant's name from those portions of the former testimony read to the jury. Under the Sixth Amendment, evidence offered against appellant must be reliable, and the trial court could not cure problems related to reliability by editing the content or altering the form of this testimony, which can only be described as hearsay that does not fall within any established exception. The hearsay evidence must be weighed against all other evidence on review, however, in order to determine its effect on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Arsdall, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 1436. The fact that the government relied heavily on Farley's earlier testimony to establish the underlying felony in this case is not in dispute. In her closing argument, the prosecutor explained to the jury the crucial importance of Farley's prior testimony: How would you know whether there was an armed robbery in the alley when the only people in the alley were the four original defendants, Farley, Myrick, Hawthorne and Mr. Thomas? And so you heard from Mr. Farley, who basically told you he didn't remember anything and so you heard portions of his testimony from the last trial.... The purpose was for you to see from that testimony what happened to [ William Reed ] in the alley .... How would you know that if you didn't hear from someone in the alley? I submit to you, ladies and gentlemen, now you know, from whatever the source, exactly what happened to Big Mike in that alley ... that he was robbed at gunpoint, that there was an armed robbery, and he was murdered in the course of that robbery. (Emphasis added.) The only other evidence presented by the government was testimony from two witnesses, Edward Judge and Katherine Pounds, who were in the area at the time of the shooting. Although they heard gunfire, they were not eyewitnesses to the crime. They testified that they saw appellant flee from the scene at the time of the shooting, that William Reed had drugs and money on his person prior to his murder, and that Thomas, Myrick and Farley all had engaged in drug dealing in the same vicinity as Reed. Pounds also testified that William Reed had drugs and money on his person apparently some fifteen or more minutes prior to his murder. They also gave testimony that the primary motive for the shooting may have been a price war among competing sellers of preludin in the 11th and O Streets area. The government's argument that the portions of Farley's testimony admitted into evidence in no way connected appellant with the crime is totally without merit. Appellee's quote Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827, stating that there is `no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.' This is obviously not a valid assessment of the evidence as presented to the jury in this case. Given that appellant was acquitted of first degree murder, the existence of the robbery, if established by Farley's testimony, was crucial. According to the prosecutor at the trial, Farley's former testimony is the only eyewitness account of the events in the alley, and the only direct evidence offered against appellant which establishes the underlying felony of the felony murder charge. The government is scarcely in a position to deny the accuracy of the prosecutor's statement to the jury. The mere absence of any direct reference to appellant's name or presence, had this been the actual case, would not in and of itself neutralize the negative inferences to be drawn from the government's persistent questioning of Farley on the stand during appellant's trial despite his reluctance to answer coherently, and the read-back to the jury of his graphic, descriptive and detailed account of the bloody events in the alley over persistent objections by defense counsel. The truth of the matter is that two portions of prior testimony on cross-examination read to the jury did refer to appellant by name. The first was as follows: Q. So anyone who testified that Melvin [Thomas] walked with Big Mike into the alley of 10th Street wouldn't be right, is that what you are telling us? A. Yeah. The second reference was substantially the same as the first, as both questions asked for essentially the same information: Q. If I told you that another eyewitness stated that Melvin led Big Mike into the alley over here, would that witness have been mistaken? A. Yes. Q. Or lying? A. Mistaken. Q. Mistaken? A. Yes. In addition, both defense counsel and government's counsel referred to those portions of Farley's prior testimony not read to the jury in their closing arguments: (Counsel for defense): And one thing the government says, that they have put [Farley] in and his testimony into evidence to establish the robbery occurred. Where is that testimony, that prior testimony, is there anything that implicates Mr. Thomas in the participation of that event? Did you hear anything? And then during the government's closing: (Prosecutor): Oh, [defense counsel] says to you, Mr. Farley doesn't implicate my client. He does not say in his testimony about the robbery and the murder that my client was in the alley. When we started reading Mr. Farley's testimony you learned that we read, and you saw us, portions (Defense Counsel): Objection. (Prosecutor):of Mr. Farley's testimony (Defense Counsel): Objection  (The Court): Excuse me. Step forward. A bench conference ensued where the court admonished the prosecutor and cautioned her not to refer again to those portions of the testimony not read to the jury. The court did not instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statements, however. The negative inference to be drawn by the jury from Farley's prior testimony is clear. The armed robbery occurred and Farley said that he saw it happen. It resulted in the death of the victim. Farley said that he watched as the assailants killed him. Appellant's friends and drug-business associates were convicted of the crime based on this testimony. Judge and Pounds saw appellant enter the alley, and then they saw him run from it after shots were fired. Pounds knew the victim was carrying cash and drugs at some uncertain time before he entered the alley, and the police found none on the body after the shooting. Excise Farley's prior testimony and not very much remains. Yet, appellant had no opportunity to challenge Farley's statements, nor to question him regarding what he knew or saw of appellant's own role, if any, in the events of the crime as they developed the day of the shooting, nor for that matter, what role Farley himself played in that event. [9] While the government contends that in this case, the testimony of the two other witnessesJudge and Poundsprovided ample evidence upon which reasonable persons could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, this is not a relevant test here. The denial of appellant's right to confrontation constituted prejudicial error because in light of all the evidence presented to the jury, we are unable to conclude that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, supra . Ordinarily, we would reverse and remand for a new trial. Thomas also contends, however, that because the remaining evidence, excluding the improperly admitted prior testimony of Farley, is insufficient to sustain his convictions, we should reverse with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978); Graves v. United States, 515 A.2d 1136, 1146 (D.C.1986); In re M.L.H., 399 A.2d 556, 558-59 (D.C.1979). Where the government has presented insufficient evidence to convict, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. Burks, supra . In this case, excluding Farley's inadmissible prior recorded testimony, the government clearly presented insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction. We reverse with instructions to enter a judgment of acquittal. [10] Graves v. United States, supra, 515 A.2d at 1146; In re M.L.H., supra, 399 A.2d at 558-59. So ordered. Before: Pryor, Chief Judge; Mack, Newman, Ferren, Belson, [] Terry, Rogers, and Steadman, Associate Judges.