Opinion ID: 2801691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Design Patents

Text: The design patents on appeal claim certain design elements embodied in the iPhone. The D’677 patent focuses on design elements on the front face of the iPhone: The D’087 patent claims another set of design features that extend to the bezel of the iPhone: The D’305 patent claims “the ornamental design for a graphical user interface for a display screen or portion thereof” as shown in the following drawing: APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 19 Samsung contends that it should not have been found liable for infringement of the asserted design patents because any similarity was limited to the basic or functional elements in the design patents. Moreover, according to Samsung, there was no evidence of actual deception of consumers and that the differences between the accused smartphones and the asserted design patents should have been clear if prior art designs were properly considered. Samsung raises these three issues— functionality, actual deception, and comparison to prior art—in the context of the jury instructions and the sufficiency of evidence to support the infringement verdict. Finally, Samsung argues that the district court legally erred in allowing the jury to award as damages Sam- sung’s entire profits on its infringing smartphones. We do not find any of these challenges persuasive as discussed below.

a. Functional Aspects in the Asserted Design Patents “Where a design contains both functional and non- functional elements, the scope of the claim must be con20 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. strued in order to identify the non-functional aspects of the design as shown in the patent.” OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Just Toys, Inc., 122 F.3d 1396, 1405 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Samsung contends that the district court erred in failing to exclude the functional aspects of the design patents either in the claim construction or elsewhere in the infringement jury instructions. Specifically, Samsung contends that the district court should have excluded elements that are “‘dictated by their functional purpose,’ or cover the ‘structural . . . aspects of the article.’” Appellants’ Br. 23 (quoting Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 597 F.3d 1288, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Lee v. DaytonHudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1188 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Such elements, according to Samsung, should be “ignored” in their entirety from the design patent claim scope. Id. at 29. For example, Samsung contends that rectangular form and rounded corners are among such elements that should be ignored in the infringement analysis. See, e.g., id. Our case law does not support Samsung’s position. In Richardson, the design patent at issue depicted a multifunction tool with numerous components that were “dictated by their functional purpose.” 597 F.3d at 1294. But the claim construction in Richardson did not exclude those components in their entirety. Rather, the claim construction included the ornamental aspects of those components: “the standard shape of the hammer-head, the diamond-shaped flare of the crow-bar and the top of the jaw, the rounded neck, the orientation of the crow-bar relative to the head of the tool, and the plain, undecorated handle.” Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1050 (D. Ariz. 2009). That construction was affirmed on appeal. Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1294. As such, the language “dictated by their functional purpose” in Richardson was only a description of the facts there; it did not establish a rule to eliminate entire elements from the claim scope as Samsung argues. APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 21 Our case law likewise does not support Samsung’s proposed rule of eliminating any “structural” aspect from the claim scope. Samsung arrives at its proposed rule by selecting a few words from the following statement in Lee: “[d]esign patents do not and cannot include claims to the structural or functional aspects of the article . . . .” 838 F.2d at 1188. But that statement addressed design patent validity. See id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 1.153(a) on a design patent application requirement). It did not specify a rule, as Samsung represents, to eliminate elements from the claim scope of a valid patent in analyzing infringement. More directly applicable to the claim scope issue at hand, Lee stated elsewhere that “it is the non-functional, design aspects that are pertinent to determinations of infringement.” Id. (footnote omitted). That principle was properly reflected in this case in the district court’s construction of the design patents as claiming only “the ornamental design” as shown in the patent figures. J.A. 01390-91. Samsung has not persuasively shown how the district court’s claim constructions were legally erroneous under Lee or Richardson. See Richardson, 597 F.3d at 1295 (noting that “discounting of functional elements must not convert the overall infringement test to an element-by-element comparison”). Samsung asserted alternatively during oral argument that the jury should have been instructed to compare the accused Samsung smartphones to the “overall ornamental appearance” of a patented design, instead of simply “the overall appearance” as the district court provided. Oral Arg. 4:06–4:25, 5:54–6:10. According to Samsung, “crucially, what’s missing there is the word ‘ornamental.’” Id. at 4:25–4:28. But jury instructions are reviewed “as a whole” to determine whether “the substance of the applicable law was [not] fairly and correctly covered” such that the alleged error was prejudicial. See Gantt, 717 F.3d at 706 (quoting Swinton, 270 F.3d at 802) (alteration in 22 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. original). The jury instructions, as a whole, already limited the scope of the asserted design patents to the “ornamental” elements through the claim constructions as discussed earlier: the design patents were each construed as claiming “the ornamental design” as shown in the patent figures. J.A. 01390-91. As such, Samsung has failed to show prejudicial error in the jury instructions as a whole that would warrant a new trial. b. Actual Deception and Role of Prior Art Samsung further contends that the infringement instruction was erroneous for stating that actual deception was not required, and for providing guidelines in considering prior art. A design patent is infringed if an ordinary observer would have been deceived: “if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is infringed by the other.” Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1872). Moreover, an infringement analysis must include a comparison of the asserted design against the prior art: “[i]f the accused design has copied a particular feature of the claimed design that departs conspicuously from the prior art, the accused design is naturally more likely to be regarded as deceptively similar to the claimed design, and thus infringing.” Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 678 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc). These holdings from Gorham and Egyptian Goddess were reflected in the infringement instruction here, and Samsung does not contend otherwise. Samsung argues instead that the portions in the infringement instruction highlighted below made the jury consider a lack of actual deception irrelevant and led the jury to disregard the prior art: APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 23 Two designs are substantially the same if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a purchaser usually gives, the resemblance be- tween the two designs is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to purchase one suppos- ing it to be the other. You do not need, however, to find that any purchasers actually were deceived or confused by the appearance of the accused Sam- sung products. . . . This determination of whether two designs are substantially the same will benefit from compar- ing the two designs with prior art. You must fa- miliarize yourself with the prior art admitted at trial in making your determination of whether there has been direct infringement. You may find the following guidelines helpful to your analysis . . . . J.A. 1394 (emphases added). We conclude instead that the jury instruction simply clarified that actual deception was not required, which is an accurate reflection of the analysis in Gorham. See 81 U.S. at 530 (crediting expert opinions “that ordinary purchasers would be likely to mistake the [accused] designs for the [patented design]”). We also conclude that the jury instruction expressly required that each juror “must” consider the prior art admitted at trial. J.A. 1394 (“You must familiarize yourself with the prior art admitted at trial in making your determination of whether there has been direct infringement.”). The jury instruction’s guidelines did not reduce the entire prior art analysis to a mere option as Samsung contends. Samsung again has failed to show that “when, looking to the instructions as a whole, the substance of the applicable law was [not] fairly and correctly covered.” See 24 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. Gantt, 717 F.3d at 706 (quoting Swinton, 270 F.3d at 802) (alteration in original).
Samsung contends that the infringement verdict was not supported by substantial evidence. Samsung’s contentions, however, are premised on the same issues— functionality, actual deception, and comparison to prior art—it raises in the context of the jury instructions. See, e.g., Appellants’ Br. 27 (“The uncontroverted evidence at trial showed the claimed features in Apple’s design patents to be overwhelmingly not ornamental, but structural or functional.”). Having rejected the jury instruction challenges, we likewise find Samsung’s parallel substantial evidence complaints unpersuasive. Apple’s witnesses provided sufficient testimonies to allow the jury to account for any functional aspects in the asserted design patents. Additionally, the witnesses testified on the similar overall visual impressions of the accused products to the asserted design patents such that an ordinary observer would likely be deceived. Apple’s experts also testified about the differences between the asserted patents and both the prior art and other competing designs. The jury could have reasonably relied on the evidence in the record to reach its infringement verdict.
Samsung also appeals the district court’s preclusion of testimony on Samsung’s independent development of its F700 phone that pre-dated the iPhone to rebut an allegation of copying. The evidence on the F700 was previously excluded as a prior art reference under a Rule 37 sanction due to Samsung’s failure to timely disclose the evidence during discovery, which Samsung does not challenge. The district court found that Samsung’s witness did not design any of the accused devices and was unaware APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 25 that any of the accused devices was based on the F700. The district court thus determined that the proffered testimony of Samsung’s witness would have limited probative value on the question of whether Samsung copied any of Apple’s design patents because she lacked first-hand knowledge relevant to the underlying issue. As a result, the district court concluded that the limited probative value of the testimony was outweighed by the likelihood that it would be considered by the jury for the prohibited purpose under the earlier Rule 37 sanction. We find that the district court acted within its discretion in precluding Samsung’s proffered testimony to rebut an allegation of copying. We conclude that there was no prejudicial legal error in the infringement jury instructions on the three issues that Samsung raises: functionality, actual deception, and comparison to prior art. We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Samsung’s evidence of independent development and that there was substantial evidence to support the jury’s infringement findings. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Samsung’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on design patent infringement and Samsung’s alternative motion for a new trial.
Finally, with regard to the design patents, Samsung argues that the district court legally erred in allowing the jury to award Samsung’s entire profits on its infringing smartphones as damages. The damages, according to Samsung, should have been limited to the profit attributable to the infringement because of “basic causation principles . . . .” Appellants’ Br. 36-37. Samsung contends that “Apple failed to establish that infringement of its limited design patents . . . caused any Samsung sales or profits.” Id. at 40. Samsung further contends that 26 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. consumers chose Samsung based on a host of other factors. Id. These “causation” arguments, however, advocate the same “apportionment” requirement that Congress rejected. See Nike, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 138 F.3d 1437, 1441 (Fed. Cir. 1998). “Apportionment . . . required [the patentee] to show what portion of the infringer’s profit, or of his own lost profit, was due to the design and what portion was due to the article itself. . . . The Act of 1887, specific to design patents, removed the apportionment requirement . . . .” Id. The provisions in the Act of 1887 on design patent infringement damages were subsequently codified in Section 289 of Title 35. Id. at 1440-43 (containing a detailed and thorough discussion of the legislative history that need not be repeated here). Section 289 now provides: Whoever during the term of a patent for a design, without license of the owner, (1) applies the pa- tented design, or any colorable imitation thereof, to any article of manufacture for the purpose of sale, or (2) sells or exposes for sale any article of manufacture to which such design or colorable im- itation has been applied shall be liable to the owner to the extent of his total profit, but not less than $250, recoverable in any United States district court having jurisdiction of the parties. Nothing in this section shall prevent, lessen, or impeach any other remedy which an owner of an infringed patent has under the provisions of this title, but he shall not twice recover the profit made from the infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 289 (emphasis added). In reciting that an infringer “shall be liable to the owner to the extent of [the infringer’s] total profit,” Section 289 explicitly authorizes the award of total profit from the article of manufacture APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. 27 bearing the patented design. 1 Several other courts also concluded that Section 289 authorizes such award of total profit. See Schnadig Corp. v. Gaines Mfg. Co., 620 F.2d 1166, 1171 (6th Cir. 1980); Henry Hanger & Display Fixture Corp. of Am. v. Sel-O-Rak Corp., 270 F.2d 635, 643-44 (5th Cir. 1959); Bergstrom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 496 F. Supp. 476, 495 (D. Minn. 1980). The clear statutory language prevents us from adopting a “causation” rule as Samsung urges. Samsung continues its quest for apportionment by arguing, alternatively, that the profits awarded should have been limited to the infringing “article of manufacture,” not the entire infringing product. Samsung argues for limiting the profits awarded to “the portion of the product as sold that incorporates or embodies the subject matter of the patent.” Appellants’ Br. 38. Samsung contends that the Second Circuit had “allowed an award of infringer’s profits from the patented design of a piano case but not from the sale of the entire piano . . . .” Id. These Second Circuit opinions, however, addressed a factual situation where “[a] purchaser desiring a piano of a particular manufacturer may have the piano placed in any one of several cases dealt in by the maker.” Bush & Lane Piano Co. v. Becker Bros., 222 F. 902, 903 (2d Cir. 1915). That factual situation occurred in the context of the commercial practice in 1915 in which ordinary purchasers regarded a piano and a piano case as distinct articles of manufacture. The facts at hand are different. The innards of Samsung’s smartphones were not sold separately 1 Amici 27 Law Professors argues that an award of a defendant’s entire profits for design patent infringement makes no sense in the modern world. Those are policy arguments that should be directed to Congress. We are bound by what the statute says, irrespective of policy arguments that may be made against it. 28 APPLE INC. v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS CO., LTD. from their shells as distinct articles of manufacture to ordinary purchasers. We thus do not agree with Samsung that these Second Circuit cases required the district court to limit the damages for design patent infringement in this case. We agree with the district court that there was no legal error in the jury instruction on the design patent damages. Samsung does not argue a lack of substantial evidence to support the damages awards under the district court’s jury instruction. We therefore affirm the damages awarded for design patent infringements.