Opinion ID: 1599368
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Heading: Nature of a Presumption.

Text: A presumption is a fact inferred from another proved or established fact or facts. State v. Kipf, supra . [A] presumption as employed in criminal matters corresponds to an inference in civil matters. Clarity would be fostered by reference to criminal instructed inferences rather than criminal presumptions. M. Graham, Handbook of Federal Evidence § 303.4 at 129 (3d ed. 1991). While the words inference and presumption are sometimes used interchangeably, they by no means are synonymous. An inference is a conclusion as to the existence of a particular fact reached by considering other facts in the usual course of human reasoning.... An inference is thus a deduction the factfinder may in its discretion draw, but is not required to draw as a matter of law. Under certain circumstances an inference may be so strong that no other conclusion may be reasonably reached. However, this is because of the compelling nature of the particular factual circumstances rather than that, as is the case with a presumption, a rule of law requires the conclusion to be drawn. M. Graham, supra, § 301.7 at 103-04. Constitutional Considerations in Jury Instructions on Presumptions. As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979): The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the presumption it describes.... That determination requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury ... for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction. Accord Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). The presumption of innocence, although unarticulated in the U.S. and Nebraska Constitutions, is a basic component of a defendant's fair trial and, therefore, an aspect of due process in the criminal justice system. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976); State v. Harney, 237 Neb. 512, 466 N.W.2d 540 (1991). Due process in a criminal case requires that the prosecution prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every factual element necessary to constitute the crime charged against a defendant. State v. Harney, supra at 514, 466 N.W.2d at 543 (1991). See, also, In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). As a result of the constitutional guarantee of due process, including the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a verdict cannot be directed against the defendant in a criminal case. State v. Harney, supra 237 Neb. at 516, 466 N.W.2d at 544. See, also, Sandstrom v. Montana, supra . Regarding the presumption of innocence, W. LaFave & A. Scott, Criminal Law § 1.8 at 58 (2d ed. 1986), observed: The so-called presumption of innocence is actually not a presumption at all in the legal sense ... that, once an underlying fact has been proved, another (ultimate) fact may (or must) be taken as proved.... It is more properly said that the innocence of the defendant is assumed, which is generally taken to mean no more than that the prosecution has the two burdens of proof ... the burden of producing evidence of guilt in order to avoid a directed verdict; and of persuading the fact-finder of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure a conviction. However, the customary statement to the jury when the trial court gives instructions is that the defendant is presumed innocent, that the mere fact of accusation is no evidence of his guilt, and that the prosecution must prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v. Kipf, 234 Neb. 227, 450 N.W.2d 397 (1990), this court examined a jury instruction concerning proof for the crime of intimidation by telephone call, specifically Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-1310(2) (Reissue 1989), which provides: The use of indecent, lewd, or obscene language or the making of a threat or lewd suggestion shall be prima facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate, threaten, harass, annoy, or offend. The Kipf instruction in question was a verbatim expression of the language in § 28-1310(2). In Kipf, we determined that prima facie evidence, used in § 28-1310(2), actually resulted in a mandatory and conclusive presumption of criminal intent, that is, factual establishment of the telephone call with its statutorily prohibited conduct necessarily (`shall') results in the conclusively established criminal intent of the caller. State v. Kipf, supra at 245, 450 N.W.2d at 410. In Kipf, after reviewing various U.S. Supreme Court decisions regarding presumptions in criminal cases, decisions such as Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979), Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), and Francis v. Franklin, supra , we noted that the Supreme Court, concerning presumptions, whether mandatory, conclusive, or rebuttable, concluded that the due process requirement of the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal cases prohibits the State from using evidentiary presumptions in a jury charge that have the effect of relieving the State of its burden of persuasion beyond a reasonable doubt of every essential element of a crime. [Quoting from Francis v. Franklin, supra at] 471 U.S. at 313 [105 S.Ct. at 1970]. State v. Kipf, supra 234 Neb. at 250, 450 N.W.2d at 413. In view of U.S. Supreme Court decisions, we stated in Kipf: If we were to approve an instruction framed in the literal language of § 28-1310(2), which informs a jury about the function of prima facie evidence or proof of intent, such an instruction, in the absence of a defendant's presentation of evidence negativing intent established by the prima facie evidence, would have the legal effect of a directed verdict on the issue of criminal intent as an element of the offense prohibited by § 28-1310: [V]erdicts may not be directed against defendants in criminal cases.... Sandstrom v. Montana, supra 442 U.S. at 516 n. 5 [99 S.Ct. at 2455 n. 5]. In accordance with Sandstrom, we conclude that a jury instruction founded on the presumption created by § 28-1310(2) is constitutionally impermissible because such an instruction deprives a defendant of the due process right that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime charged, and shifts the burden to the defendant to disprove the element of intent in the offense charged. Since the jury instruction given in this case informed the jury that based on § 28-1310(2), Kipf's criminal intent had been established, the instruction is erroneous and prejudicial because it deprived Kipf of his substantial right to a trial by jury on the issue of criminal intent necessary for the crime charged under § 28-1310. Such prejudicial error requires reversal of Kipf's conviction. State v. Kipf, supra 234 Neb. at 251, 450 N.W.2d at 413.