Opinion ID: 1870908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the court err in admitting the results of blood alcohol tests performed on Lonnie Edwards?

Text: This assignment of error is made in two distinct parts which must be considered separately. The first question is whether the admitted evidence resulted from tests performed pursuant to § 63-11-7 Miss. Code Ann. (1972). The alternative question is whether the test results were admitted in violation of Edwards's medical privilege, which is alleged to have not been waived. Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-7 (1972) states: If any person be unconscious or dead as a result of an accident, or unconscious at the time of arrest or apprehension or when the test is to be administered, or is otherwise in a condition rendering him incapable of refusal, such person shall be subjected to a blood test for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood ... if the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe the person to have been driving ... while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The results of such tests or test however, shall not be used in evidence against such person in any court or before any regulatory body without the consent of the person so tested.... [B]lood samples taken under this section shall be used exclusively for statistical evaluation of accident causes with safeguards established to protect the identity of such victims and to extend the rights of privileged communications to those engaged in taking, handling and evaluating such statistical evidence. (emphasis added). As a result of the collision which is the basis of this suit, Lonnie Edwards was rendered unconscious. Although he apparently had a few conscious moments shortly after the accident, he remained essentially unconscious until the end of July. It is Edwards's contention on appeal that the admitted results were from tests presumably made at the request of the Highway Patrol and therefore were inadmissible under § 63-11-7. The record clearly shows that two distinct blood alcohol tests were administered to Lonnie Edwards after the accident. The first was performed pursuant to § 63-11-7; its results indicated a .24% alcohol content in Lonnie Edwards's blood. The results of that blood test were properly ruled to be inadmissible. Stong v. Freeman Truck Line, 456 So.2d 698, 712-713 (Miss. 1984). The results which were admitted were those of later tests administered in Memphis, Tennessee, as part of Edwards's medical treatment. In Cutchens v. State, 310 So.2d 273 (Miss. 1975); cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1061, 96 S.Ct. 799, 46 L.Ed.2d 652 (1976) this Court held that the result of a hospital blood test, administered under circumstances substantially analogous to those in the instant case, was competent evidence bearing upon the question of a criminal defendant's state of intoxication. If such results were admissible against a criminal defendant, to whom the law affords greater protection, they would certainly be admissible against a civil litigant. This is especially true where, as in the present case, additional competent evidence was available which indicated the defendant's state of intoxication. Here, both Edwards and his wife testified that he had been drinking gin shortly before the accident. Ellis testified that while pulling Edwards from the wrecked pickup truck, he could smell liquor on Edwards. Edwards had a bottle of gin in his back pocket at the time of the accident. The test result from the Memphis hospital, taken as part of Edwards's diagnosis and treatment, was separate and distinct from the blood test administered pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 63-11-7 (1972), and, therefore, was as competent and admissible as was other evidence of Edwards's intoxication. The second part of Edwards's first assignment of error centers about his medical privilege. Anticipating that the result of the second blood test would not be held inadmissible under § 63-11-7, Edwards contends that it was nonetheless inadmissible as a privileged communication between patient and physician: All communications made to a physician, ... hospital, [or] nurse ... by a patient under his charge ... are hereby declared to be privileged, and such party shall not be required to disclose the same in any legal proceeding except at the instance of the patient... . Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-21 (Supp. 1984). In refutation of Edwards's assertion of privilege, Ellis produced a medical authorization form, signed by Edwards and witnessed by his wife, which stated, in part, that it constitutes [Edwards's] waiver of the physician/patient privilege and authorizes [attorneys for Ellis] to receive medical information about [Edwards's] injuries and treatment as a result of [the June 14, 1980] collision. The question presented is whether this waiver is contractual (and, therefore, irrevocable) or gratuitous. As we find the waiver to have been contractual, we are not called upon to determine whether a gratuitous waiver of such a privilege is subject to revocation. As Judge Grant has correctly noted in his Summary of Mississippi Law, § 766: There is a sufficient consideration for a promise if there is any benefit to the promisor or any loss, detriment, or inconvenience to the promisee. The consideration, to be sufficient in law, need not be adequate. The consideration is sufficient if the person to whom the promise is made refrains from doing anything which he has a right to do, whether there is any actual loss to him or actual benefit to the party making the promise or not. Any benefit resulting to the party promising, by the act of the promisee, is a sufficient consideration. It is not essential that there should be any adequacy in point of actual value, but a slight benefit, in the absence of fraud, deceit, or the like, will be sufficient. Sadler v. Lee (1957) 232 Miss. 349, 98 So.2d 863. Also see American Olean Tile Co. v. Morton (1963) 247 Miss. 886, 157 So.2d 788. In this case, Edwards did receive benefits as a result of his promise to waive the physician/patient privilege. By waiving the privilege Edwards was able to enjoy continued negotiation of his claim against Ellis. He received Ellis's cooperation during the settlement negotiations; ultimately, he received $20,000 in settlement of his claim. Appellee William Ellis, on the other hand, relinquished rights at least in partial reliance on Edwards's promised waiver. Obviously, by settling Edwards's claim, Ellis gave up the right to take the case to trial and defend. He gave up the right to confront and cross-examine any witnesses whom Edwards might have called. He also gave up $20,000. It would be impossible to dissect all the transactions which take place during settlement negotiation, subject them to comprehensive analysis, and determine each precise quid and its corresponding quo in the quid pro quo. It would also be unnecessary. In the give and take of such negotiations, any concession by one party is legally sufficient as consideration for all concessions made by the other party. The respective values of those concessions are immaterial. It is fundamental law that, no matter how meager the actual value of the consideration, it may nonetheless be legally sufficient. See American Olean Tile Co. v. Morton, 247 Miss. 886, 157 So.2d 788 (1963); Meder v. Superior Oil Co., 151 Miss. 814, 119 So. 318 (1928); see also York v. Georgia-Pacific, 585 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Miss. 1984). A contract found to be merely improvident will supply no basis for relief. It is therefore apparent that Lonnie Edwards contractually relinquished his physician/patient privilege by a signed and witnessed waiver. Any information which William Ellis came to possess through reliance on that waiver, including evidence of Edwards's blood alcohol level, was properly admitted at trial.