Opinion ID: 3005401
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a. The action of making something publicly

Text: known; public notification or announcement; an instance of this. 1.b. Law. Notification or communication to a third party or to a limited number of people regarded as representative of the public; an instance of this. … 3. The action or fact of making a thing public or common property. OED Online (Oxford University Press, June 2015). All of those definitions share a commonality: they describe the release of information by the party holding it. This comports with a common-sense understanding, and the common usage, of the term publication. After all, it derives from the word “public,” or “exposed to general view.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1836 (1993). In this case, none of the information obtained by Defender was communicated to any individual or entity. While it was captured by the recording device, that device was wholly maintained by Defender. And, as we described above, Defender offered no information to suggest that any individual ever accessed the recordings. Yet, Defender argues that the transmission of the information to the recorder constitutes publication, despite the fact that the information was never accessed or shared. SupNo. 14-1805 7 pose, hypothetically, that Defender had a different policy regarding its incoming customer calls. Imagine that, instead of recording the calls, a Defender sales associate would speak to the customer and take copious notes. He would then place those notes in a paper file, in a filing cabinet. Would that constitute publication? In both cases, the information has been received by Defender; it has been transmitted to a storage medium; and it has been stored in a manner that enables future access. We see no meaningful distinction between the hypothetical paper notes and the actual audio recording. (The only obvious distinction is that the recording is stored in an oral form, whereas the notes would be stored in written form.) If under Defender’s definition, the recording constitutes publication, so must the notes. In our view, this hypothetical illustrates that Defender’s suggested definition of publication would encompass a wide variety of acts that would strain (at best) any common understanding or usage of the term publication. And Indiana courts have, in the defamation context, applied the common usage definition of “publication”. In Bals v. Verduzco, the Indiana Supreme Court stated that “[i]n an action for defamation, the plaintiff must show that the defamatory matter was ‘published,’ that is, communicated to a third person or persons.” 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1354 (Ind. 1992). So, under Indiana defamation law, “publication” requires communication to a third party. First Mercury relies heavily on Doe v. Methodist Hospital as establishing that, as a matter of law, publication must consist of communication to a third party. 690 N.E.2d 681 (Ind. 8 No. 14-1805 1997). We do not agree with First Mercury’s reading of Methodist. In that case, the Indiana Supreme Court considered whether Indiana law recognized a cause of action for the “privacy tort” of public disclosure of private facts. Among the elements of that tort, according to the Second Restatement, is the requirement that a person must give “publicity” to the private fact at issue. Id. at 692. Following is the relevant passage from the court’s analysis: A key issue contested in the briefs is whether “publicity” requires disclosure to the general public or whether more isolated disclosures are also actionable. According to the Second Restatement, “publicity” in disclosure law is not the same as “publication” in defamation law. “Publication” can consist of communication to just one individual. In contrast, “publicity” requires communication of the information “to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded as sub- stantially certain to become one of public knowledge.” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652(D) cmt. a). So the question facing the Methodist court was whether “publicity,” as an element of the tort, required the broad dissemination of information. Or, alternatively, could disclosure to just one individual suffice? The court looked to a related term, “publication,” in the context of defamation law as a guide: and in that context, Indiana law established that publication could be achieved by disclosure to just one person. No. 14-1805 9 That was the extent of the court’s foray into “publication.” So Methodist does not render this an open-and-shut case. But, as we concluded above, Defender’s suggested definition of the term is expansive, and it draws in many activities that cannot be commonly understood as publication. And in the defamation context, Indiana law requires that the defamatory material be communicated to a third party to be actionable. As such, we cannot draw the conclusion that publication includes the mere recording and storage of information when that information is not also communicated to another party or entity. Defender argues in the alternative that, even if publication does not include transmission to a recording device, the term “publication” is ambiguous. Therefore, “it is to be construed strictly against the insurer and in favor of its insured,” triggering First Mercury’s duty to defend. Under Indiana law, a “failure to define terms in an insurance policy does not necessarily make it ambiguous.” Am. Family Life Assurance Co. v. Russell, 700 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (citation omitted). And “[a]n ambiguity does not exist simply because a controversy exists between the parties, each favoring an interpretation contrary to the other.” Newnam Mfg., Inc. v. Transcon. Ins. Co., 871 N.E.2d 396, 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citations omitted). Rather, “an ambiguity exists where the provision is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.” Russell, 700 N.E.2d at 1177. Where there is ambiguity, “insurance policies are to be construed strictly against the insurer.” Newnam, 871 N.E.2d at 401 (citation omitted). 10 No. 14-1805 Here, the parties each favor a specific interpretation of the term “publication.” Defender argues that the term publication is susceptible to its definition, and it points to a decision of the United States District Court of the Southern District of Ohio as supporting its view. In that case, under similar facts, the district court concluded that publication occurred at the moment that the conversation was disseminated to the recording device. See Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc. v. Ace Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., No. 1:12-cv-297, 2013 WL 3354571, at  (S.D. Oh. Jul. 3, 2013), vacated on May 19, 2014. But, as noted, Encore was vacated while on appeal. Id. Defender cites to no other cases that establish its view of publication. For the reasons we described above, including Indiana’s definition of publication in the defamation context, we conclude that the term publication was not susceptible to Defender’s interpretation. It was not ambiguous as used in the Policy.