Opinion ID: 2171880
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The New-Trial Motion.

Text: The plaintiff's new-trial motion was based on alleged misconduct of the defendant and her counsel. It also alleged surprise, newly discovered evidence, and mistake of fact by the court. The allegations of misconduct were based on the failure of the defendant to submit to further discovery following the order to compel and a claim that the defendant's attorney failed to cooperate in scheduling further depositions. These grounds are directly related to the issue under division I and, in effect, constitute a collateral attack on the court's refusal to grant the continuances. For the reasons discussed in the prior division, we believe the district court was within its discretion in refusing the continuance. Any misconduct by the defendant or her counsel in the discovery procedures should have been dealt with through discovery sanctions, not through a new-trial motion. We do not believe this is the type of misconduct envisioned by our new-trial rules. The second ground under this motion again raises the issue of the plaintiff's surprise by evidence of the sticky accelerator. Plaintiff claims that there was evidence available to rebut this testimony, but because of her inability to prepare for trial, it could not be presented. As already discussed, however, this matter could have been discovered by the plaintiff through the exercise of standard discovery techniques. In any event, this was not an [a]ccident or surprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against so as to entitle the plaintiff to a new trial under rule 244(c). The exercise of ordinary prudence, we believe, could have prevented this occurrence. Nor does it constitute material evidence, newly discovered, under rule 244(g), because that rule requires that the evidence be of the nature that it could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial. Next, the plaintiff complains that the court made mistakes of fact in its ruling. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 244(h). The plaintiff introduced evidence that the defendant actually intended to strike the defendant's ex-husband, who was standing near the plaintiff's car. The plaintiff complains that the court failed to recognize that the defendant's malicious and intentional actions toward this third party should be given the same consideration as if they had been directed against the plaintiff directly. This, she claims, was a mistake of fact. We do not agree. The court simply concluded that [t]he striking of plaintiff's vehicle by defendant in an intentional manner was not proved. In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently rejected the plaintiff's view of the evidence. This does not constitute a mistake of fact under rule 244(h). The court's finding in this regard has substantial support in the record. As the last ground for the new-trial motion, the plaintiff relies on rule 244(i), which provides for a new trial on any ground which would support a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict under rule 243(a). Such grounds exist here, she claims, because the defendant had failed to assert in her pleadings that there was an intervening or independent cause of the collision, i.e., the sticky accelerator. We find no merit in that argument. The defendant's state of mind was put in issue by the plaintiff's claim that the defendant intentionally struck her car. The defendant simply attempted to refute that allegation by testifying that it was caused by a sticky accelerator. Her response was within the scope of the pleadings; it was not necessary for her to allege an intervening or independent cause. We find no merit in any of the plaintiff's new-trial issues. We vacate the court of appeals decision and affirm the orders of the district court. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; ORDERS OF DISTRICT COURT AFFIRMED. All Justices concur except LAVORATO, J., who takes no part.