Opinion ID: 772800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Sentencing Claims

Text: 32 The Appellants and the Government agree that the appropriate sentences for Velazquez and Regnier as principals and for Bergen as an accessory depend on identification of the underlying offense committed by Velazquez and Regnier. See U.S.S.G. § 2H1.1(a)(1). They also agree that Judge Mishler erred in identifying voluntary manslaughter as the appropriate underlying offense. Their shared opposition to his selection of voluntary manslaughter is based on their agreement that the evidence does not support a finding that the assailants acted in the heat of passion. However, the parties make entirely different arguments as to the consequences that would follow if we were to accept their view that the assailants did not act in the heat of passion. The Appellants contend that the appropriate underlying offense should have been involuntary manslaughter or minor assault, offenses carrying lower base offense levels. The Government contended in the District Court that the underlying offense should have been second degree murder, an offense carrying a higher base offense level. In this Court, the Government reiterates its view that the evidence supports a finding, as a matter of fact, see Brief for Appellee at 43, and perhaps of law, see id. at 44 n.10, that the assailants acted with malice, not negated by heat of passion, but then contents itself with urging only that the sentences based on voluntary manslaughter should be affirmed. See id. at 36. Resolving these competing claims usefully begins with careful consideration of Judge Mishler's explanation for selecting voluntary manslaughter. 33 Judge Mishler's first step was to define malice as the state of mind that would cause a person to act without regard for the life of another, Sentencing Memorandum at 5 (emphasis added). Next, Judge Mishler stated, I do not believe Defendants Velazquez and Regnier acted with such intent when they entered Pizzuto's cell on January 8. Id. (emphasis added). Immediately thereafter he concluded, The more appropriate classification for Defendants' actions is voluntary manslaughter, id. at 5-6, which he deemed appropriate because he found that Velazquez and Regnier acted in the heat of passion and that Pizzuto's conduct was sufficient to arouse the passion of a reasonable man. Id. at 6. This explanation raises three related questions: (1) Did Judge Mishler mean that Pizzuto's assailants lacked the mental state of malice, irrespective of whether they acted in the heat of passion, or that their mental state would have been malice had that mental state not been displaced by heat of passion? (2) Did Judge Mishler use the correct standard for determining the existence of heat of passion? (3) Did Judge Mishler use the correct standard for determining the existence of malice?
34 On the initial question of whether the no malice finding is independent of the heat of passion finding, the Judge's explanation is ambiguous. He might have meant that the assailants acted without malice, whether or not they acted in the heat of passion. On the other hand, he might have meant that the heat of passion displaced the state of mind that would otherwise have been malice. In view of his ultimate conclusion that the appropriate underlying offense was voluntary manslaughter, the latter interpretation of his explanation is arguably more likely, because [w]hile voluntary manslaughter requires a mental state that would be malice except for heat of passion or provocation, involuntary manslaughter requires only the lesser mental state of gross negligence. 2 Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions ¶ 41.02, at 41-52 (2000) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Sand]; see United States v. Roston, 986 F.2d 1287, 1291 (9th Cir. 1993) (heat of passion negate[s] the presence of malice); United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 552 (5th Cir. 1989) (same). However, we cannot be certain which of the two possible interpretations Judge Mishler intended. Moreover, because the Judge's findings with respect to both heat of passion and malice (whether made independently or in relation to each other) are vulnerable to serious legal challenge, this ambiguity needs to be resolved on remand, once the legal infirmities in the two findings have been considered and, if possible, remedied.
35 Judge Mishler's finding that the assailants acted in the heat of passion appears to be based on the fact that, as he noted, they acted in response to Pizzuto's refusal to obey their commands and the abusive epithets directed to them. These circumstances do not suffice to support a heat of passion finding. At common law, heat of passion could not be shown by words alone, no matter how provocative. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law § 7.10(b)(6), at 260 & 260 n.55 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter LaFave & Scott]. At least one circuit has followed this approach with federal offenses. See United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 705 (5th Cir. 1979). Although in some jurisdictions, insulting words have been deemed sufficient provocation to reduce murder to manslaughter, see People v. Morales, 684 N.Y.S.2d 853 (Sup. Ct. Kings Cty. 1999), the prevailing view has been that words can engender heat of passion only if the words impart information of a highly provocative nature. See LaFave & Scott, § 7.10(b)(6), at 260. The classic example is one spouse informing the other spouse of the former's infidelity, which provokes the recipient of the information to kill the adulterer. See id. Pizzuto's cursing at Velazquez imparted no information, and his isolated use of the same expletive Velazquez had directed at him will not suffice for a heat of passion finding. See State v. Hale, 453 N.W.2d 704, 707 (Minn. 1990) (victim's insults insufficient to provoke ordinary person to kill). 36 Nor, in the circumstances of this case, can Pizzuto's momentary refusal to obey Velazquez's command to reenter his cell constitute sufficient provocation for a heat of passion defense. Although appropriate force sometimes may have to be used to secure compliance with legitimate commands within a prison, Pizzuto was already in his cell when the fatal beating was administered. Force was not used to obtain compliance with a disregarded command; it was summary punishment for previous (and momentary) disobedience. 37 Furthermore, Judge Mishler's finding is vulnerable to the extent that it rested on his view that Pizzuto's conduct was sufficient to arouse the passion of a reasonable man. Just as law enforcement officers are entitled to have their conduct insulated from liability by assessing the circumstances confronting them through the eyes of a reasonable officer, see Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987), they must expect to have their actions assessed by the standards of a reasonable officer when liability is sought to be imposed. It is doubtful that Pizzuto's conduct sufficed to arouse the heat of passion of a reasonable corrections officer confronting a prison inmate. Cf. United States v. Cobb, 905 F.2d 784, 789 (4th Cir. 1990) ([M]ere words by a pretrial detainee [cannot] justify the use of physical force by a police officer.). 38 Finally, we note that the heat of passion defense is normally unavailable after some interval of time has elapsed between the provocation and the response. See LaFave & Scott, § 7.10(d), at 265. In the pending case, that interval included sufficient time for the assailants to inform their supervisor about Pizzuto's conduct and to don rubber gloves (as a precaution against HIV infection) before entering his cell to beat him. 39 Although one member of the panel believes that as a matter of law the evidence is insufficient for a heat of passion finding, we will leave the matter for further consideration on remand because the possibility exists, however remote, that more precise findings, possibly made on an amplified record, could support such a finding.
40 If, on remand, Judge Mishler clarifies that he would have found malice had that state of mind not been displaced by heat of passion, and if a valid finding of heat of passion is not made, the question will then arise as to the proper standard for determining malice for purposes of distinguishing second-degree murder from involuntary manslaughter. Judge Mishler correctly ruled that the assailants could not be punished for second-degree murder unless the evidence established that they acted with malice aforethought. 18 U.S.C. § 1111(a). Without proof of malice, their underlying offense would be, at most, manslaughter (either voluntary or involuntary). See id. § 1112(a). However, in defining malice as the state of mind that would cause a person to act without regard for the life of another, Judge Mishler may have used an incomplete standard. 41 Two aspects of his formulation are of concern. First, the standard is usually expressed in terms that convey some heightened degree of disregard for human life. For example, the Tenth Circuit has stated, Second-degree murder involves reckless and wanton disregard for human life that is extreme in nature, while involuntary manslaughter involves reckless and wanton disregard that is not extreme in nature. United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000). Judge Sand's model instruction recommends informing a jury that to establish the malice required for second-degree murder, the Government needs to prove reckless and wanton conduct on the part of a defendant which grossly deviated from a reasonable standard of care such that he was aware of the serious risk of death. 2 Sand, ¶ 41.01, at 41-13. Profs. LaFave and Scott state, Extremely negligent conduct, which creates what a reasonable man would realize to be not only an unjustifiable but also a very high degree of risk of death or serious bodily injury to another or to others--though unaccompanied by any intent to kill or do serious bodily injury--and which actually causes the death of another, may constitute murder. LaFave & Scott, § 7.4, at 200. 2 The Model Penal Code suggests that a reckless killing is murder only if done under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 42 Second, in the context of second-degree murder in federal law, the requisite malice can in some circumstances be found when the assailant acts with awareness of 'a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm.' United States v. Milton, 27 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 (8th Cir. 1978)); see United States v. Wood, 207 F.3d 1222, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000) ('[S]econd degree murder's malice aforethought element is satisfied by:... (2) intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury....') (quoting United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 486 (10th Cir. 1998)); United States v. Fleming, 739 F.2d 945, 948 (4th Cir. 1984) (without regard for the life and safety of others) (emphasis added). 3 An intent to cause a serious risk of a serious injury will frequently suffice to demonstrate a heightened disregard for human life, although a fact-finder might in some circumstances conclude that such intent does not indicate the malice required for second-degree murder. 43 In particular, an inference of malice might not be appropriate where the victim is assaulted and dies substantially as a result of his unusual and unforeseeable fragility, such as a thin skull or hemophilia. For example, in United States v. Livoti, 22 F. Supp. 2d 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), the victim's asthma condition made him especially vulnerable to injury (and resulting death) from a police officer's use of a choke hold to subdue the victim. The officer's offense was classified as involuntary manslaughter. Id. at 245-46. See also LaFave & Scott, § 7.13(d), at 296 ([I]t is almost universally held... that one is guilty of involuntary manslaughter who intentionally inflicts bodily harm upon another person, as by a moderate blow with his fist, thereby causing an unintended and unforeseeable death to the victim (who, unknown to his attacker, may have a weak heart or a thin skull or a blood deficiency).). Of course, a beating that causes the death of an especially vulnerable victim might well permit a finding of malice if the evidence shows that the extent of the beating would have posed such a serious risk of serious injury to an average person as would demonstrate the assailant's heightened disregard for human life. 44 In the pending case, if, on remand, voluntary manslaughter is rejected because heat of passion cannot be validly found under the applicable standard, the choice between second-degree murder and involuntary manslaughter will turn on how great a risk of serious bodily injury Pizzuto's assailants could reasonably apprehend would result from their assaultive conduct and what that risk reveals about the degree of their indifference to Pizzuto's life. On this issue, if it arises, further findings will be needed. In particular, it will be necessary to determine whether there was a substantial risk that the repeated punching and kicking administered by Velazquez and Regnier would inflict serious bodily injury on an average adult, sufficient to infer an extreme indifference to human life, or whether the resulting laceration of Pizzuto's spleen occurred primarily because it was enlarged five or six times normal weight, a circumstance that was not reasonably foreseeable.