Opinion ID: 171070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The handcuffs and excessive force

Text: The district court was correct in denying qualified immunity to McCants and Krause on Vondrak's claim for excessive force. [T]he right to make an arrest or investigatory stop necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it, and [d]etermining whether the force used to effect a particular seizure is `reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (citations and some internal quotation marks omitted). Each case requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances. . ., including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Id. Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We have consistently rejected a bright-line rule requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate physical injury when bringing excessive force claims. See Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir.2001) (explaining that [p]hysical injury may be the most obvious injury that flows from the use of excessive force, but declin[ing] to adopt a `bright-line' standard dictating that force cannot be `excessive' unless it leaves visible cuts, bruises, abrasions or scars). Nevertheless, when an excessive force claim relies upon unduly tight handcuffing, we have held that the plaintiff must show some actual injury: In some circumstances, unduly tight handcuffing can constitute excessive force where a plaintiff alleges some actual injury from the handcuffing and alleges that an officer ignored a plaintiff's timely complaints (or was otherwise made aware) that the handcuffs were too tight. . . . We believe that a claim of excessive force requires some actual injury that is not de minimis, be it physical or emotional. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129. The district court correctly concluded that McCants and Krause were not entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak's excessive force claim for unduly tight handcuffing. Although the officers claim to have been unaware that Vondrak's handcuffs were tight, Vondrak has presented evidence that the officers ignored [his] timely complaints (or [were] otherwise made aware) that the handcuffs were too tight. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129. For instance, Vondrak asserts that he told the officers [a] half dozen times that the handcuffs were too tight, and that his wrists were hurting and going numb. Vondrak Dep., Pl. ROA, at 57. He also claims that he told McCants that [his] wrists hurt immediately when she put [the handcuffs] on . . ., when she clamped down hard on both of them. Id. at 57-59. He claims that he told McCants on the way to the police station that the handcuffs were too tight, and that they . . . felt like . . . they were bleeding, that they were too tight, cutting into my wrists. Id. at 58. Finally, Vondrak asserts that he made several requests at the police station for someone to loosen his handcuffs because his wrists were hurting, but the officers ignored him. Vondrak has also presented evidence that he suffered a permanent, actual injury as a result of the handcuffing. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129. Vondrak has stated that the pain in his wrists has not subsided since the arrest. His neurologist, Dr. Jain, has diagnosed him with permanent nerve injury in his wrists, and has concluded that the handcuffing was the competent producing cause of his right radial and bilateral median nerve injuries. Jain Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at 146-47. Likewise, Vondrak's orthopedist, Dr. Lindsey, has concluded that Vondrak now suffers from [s]uperficial radial nerve palsy in his right wrist, and [b]ilateral mild carpal tunnel syndrome. Lindsey Diagnosis, Def. ROA, at 160. According to Dr. Lindsey, these injuries are permanent, and they are the direct result of constriction of the superficial radial nerve and median nerve of the wrists secondary to prolonged constriction by handcuffs placed during [the arrest]. Id. Further, at the time of Vondrak's arrest, the right to be free from unduly tight handcuffing was clearly establishedas were the contours of the right. See Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1129 (citing cases and implying that this framework was clearly established for claims in which plaintiffs allege that unduly tight handcuffing. . . constitute[s] excessive force); see also Lyons v. City of Xenia, 417 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir.2005); Crumley v. City of St. Paul, 324 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir. 2003); Herzog v. Village of Winnetka, 309 F.3d 1041, 1043-44 (7th Cir.2002); Bastien v. Goddard, 279 F.3d 10, 14 (1st Cir.2002); Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1993); cf. Hannula v. City of Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 132 (10th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the excessive force claim under the due process clause and concluding that [t]he cases do not `clearly establish' that handcuffing a detainee too tightly constitutes excessive force, at least in the absence of apparent physical damage to the plaintiff's wrists), abrogated in part by Graham, 490 U.S. at 394-95, 109 S.Ct. 1865. [6] Lastly, given Krause's close proximity to the initial handcuffing, and his presence immediately thereafter, the district court was correct in denying qualified immunity to Krause on the excessive force claim. It is clearly established that all law enforcement officials have an affirmative duty to intervene to protect the constitutional rights of citizens from infringement by other law enforcement officers in their presence. An officer who fails to intercede is liable for the preventable harm caused by the actions of the other officers where that officer observes or has reason to know: (1) that excessive force is being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official. In order for liability to attach, there must have been a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. Whether an officer had sufficient time to intercede or was capable of preventing the harm being caused by another officer is an issue of fact for the jury unless, considering all the evidence, a reasonable jury could not possibly conclude otherwise. Anderson v. Branen, 17 F.3d 552, 557 (2d Cir.1994) (citations omitted); see also Mick v. Brewer, 76 F.3d 1127, 1136 (10th Cir.1996). Neither McCants nor Krause was entitled to qualified immunity on Vondrak's excessive force claim.