Opinion ID: 3064476
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 4(d)(ii) (rev. June 15, 2004).

Text: 2634 MARMOLEJO-CAMPOS v. HOLDER oughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” 323 U.S. at 140. Recognizing that the BIA’s interpretations of the INA are entitled to at least this much respect, we have applied Skidmore when reviewing its unpublished orders. See, e.g., Ortiz-Magana v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 1042, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008); Estrada-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 517, 520 (9th Cir. 2007); OrtegaCervantes v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 2007); Garcia-Quintero, 455 F.3d at 1014. 3 In light of these principles, we consider the extent to which the BIA’s interpretations of the term “moral turpitude” are entitled to our deference. a The meaning of the term falls well short of clarity. Indeed, as has been noted before, “moral turpitude” is perhaps the quintessential example of an ambiguous phrase. See Galeana Mendoza v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 1054, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006).10 In a series of published decisions, the BIA has set forth its general understanding that a “crime involving moral turpitude” involves “conduct that shocks the public conscience as being inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the rules 10 Some have suggested that the imprecision of the term “moral turpitude” demonstrates Congress’s intent that its meaning be developed over time through judicial and administrative construction. Others have construed matters less charitably. As Justice Jackson once wrote, “Congress knowingly conceived [the term] in confusion,” deliberately ignoring a warning raised by a member of the House that “ ‘[n]o one can really say what is meant by . . . a crime involving moral turpitude.’ ” Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (quoting House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization Hearings on H.R. Rep. No. 10384, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916)). MARMOLEJO-CAMPOS v. HOLDER 2635 of morality and the duties owed between man and man, either one’s fellow man or society in general.” In re PerezContreras, 20 I. & N. Dec. 615, 618 (B.I.A. 1992); see also In re Danesh, 19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 670 (B.I.A. 1988) (same). In a welcome effort to “establish a uniform framework” for the determination of crimes involving moral turpitude, the Attorney General has recently decreed that “[a] finding of moral turpitude . . . requires that a perpetrator have committed [a] reprehensible act with some form of scienter.” In re SilvaTrevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688, 706 (A.G. 2008). [6] Despite the principles set forth above, we have been hesitant to defer to such general statements by the Board, and we are not alone in this view. As the Seventh Circuit has explained, the Board’s general understanding of the term “moral turpitude” is not the result of “any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigration cases,” Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004), but simply a recitation of the definition found in the criminal law, see, e.g., Benitez v. Dunevant, 7 P.3d 99, 104 (Ariz. 2000); In re Craig, 82 P.2d 442, 444 (Cal. 1938); In re Farina, 972 P.2d 531, 541 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). Thus, as we have stated before, because the Board’s general definition of “moral turpitude” fails to “particularize” the term in any meaningful way, “ ‘giving Chevron deference . . . has no practical significance.’ ” Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1058 n.9 (quoting Mei, 393 F.3d at 739). Consequently, without more specific guidance from the Board, we have relied on our own generalized definition of “moral turpitude,” see Carty v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1081, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that we have traditionally divided crimes involving moral turpitude into two basic types: “those involving fraud and those involving grave acts of baseness or depravity.”); see also Navarro-Lopez v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 1063, 1074 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Reinhardt, J., concurring for the majority) (same), although we have noted that our 2636 MARMOLEJO-CAMPOS v. HOLDER understanding does not differ materially from the Board’s, Galeana-Mendoza, 465 F.3d at 1058 n.9. b [7] Orders issued by the BIA contain more than an abstract definition of moral turpitude, however. When the Board adjudicates a case, it must determine whether a petitioner’s offense, once established, meets the definition of such term. In so doing, it assesses the character, gravity, and moral significance of the conduct, drawing upon its expertise as the single body charged with adjudicating all federal immigration cases. This is precisely the type of agency action the Supreme Court instructs is entitled to Chevron deference. See AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. at 425. Indeed, we accord Chevron deference to the BIA’s construction of other ambiguous terms in the INA promulgated through its precedential decisions. See, e.g., Miguel-Miguel v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 941, 947-48 (9th Cir. 2007) (“particularly serious crime”); Murillo-Espinoza v. INS, 261 F.3d 771, 774 (9th Cir. 2001) (“conviction”); Fisher v. INS, 79 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (“persecution”). Similarly, we accord Skidmore deference to the Board’s nonprecedential decisions interpreting its governing statute. See supra at 2633-35 (collecting cases). We see no reason to exempt the Board’s treatment of “moral turpitude” from these rules.