Opinion ID: 2587884
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statutory Authority to Obtain an Easement

Text: Winkel resurrects the curious argument from Winkel II that the applicable statute required KDOT to condemn a fee simple interest, rather than an easement. Given that the appraisers found that the entire value of the two tracts had been taken, the distinction is not compelling. Nevertheless, the Winkel II court held that the prior statute permitted, but did not require KDOT to condemn a fee simple interest. Slip op. at 8. The current statute, K.S.A. 68-413, did not change that law. The crux of Winkel's argument is that subsection (b)(4) is a limitation on the rights granted in subsection (a). In relevant part, K.S.A. 68-413 provides: (a) Subject to subsection (b), the secretary of transportation, in the name of the state, may acquire title or easement by purchase, dedication or by the exercise of the right of eminent domain: (1) To or upon any lands or interests or rights therein; (2) to water, gravel, stone, sand or other material; (3) to spoil banks or to borrow pits necessary for the construction, reconstruction, improvement, maintenance or drainage of the state highway system; or (4) to access ways to spoil banks or borrow pits or any bed, pit, quarry or other place where gravel, stone, water, or other material required in the construction, reconstruction, improvement, maintenance or drainage of the state highways may be located. The secretary of transportation, in the name of the state, may acquire, by purchase, title to an entire lot, block or tract of land for state highway purposes even though such entire lot, block or tract is not immediately needed for state highway purposes, if the secretary finds that by so doing the interests of the public will be best served, and without limiting the foregoing, the same may be done where uneconomic remnants of land would be left the original owner or where severance or consequential damage to a remainder make the acquisition of the entire lot, block or tract more economical to the state. (b)(1) Exercise of the right of eminent domain by the secretary shall be in accordance with and governed by article 5 of chapter 26 of the Kansas Statutes Annotated, and amendments thereto. (2) Every petition filed by the secretary to acquire lands or any interest in or title thereto by the exercise of the right of eminent domain shall set forth the extent, quantity and nature of the interest or title to be acquired. (3) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection (b), the secretary shall not acquire by eminent domain any right, title or interest in or to the oil and gas minerals under or in any lands, and the petition in any condemnation proceedings shall state that right, title or interest in or to such oil and gas minerals is not being condemned. (4) The secretary may acquire by eminent domain the fee simple title to lands when such lands are acquired for sites for the construction of buildings or improvements necessarily incident to the operation, maintenance and supervision of a state system of highways. Statutory interpretation is a function of law over which this court has unlimited review. Genesis Health Club, Inc. v. City of Wichita, 285 Kan. 1021, 1031, 181 P.3d 549 (2008). The first step is to ascertain legislative intent from the plain language employed in the statute. See Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska v. Kline, 283 Kan. 64, 77, 150 P.3d 892 (2007). Here, the legislature used the word may in subsection (b)(4), whereas in subsections (b)(1), (2), and (3) it used the word shall. The statute's plain language creates a presumption that the legislature intended to make the acquisition of a fee simple interest under subsection (b)(4) permissive, i.e., at KDOT's option. Winkel's answer to the plain language interpretation is to suggest that, because subsection (a) permits KDOT to acquire an easement, subsection (b)(4) would be superfluous if it likewise permitted the acquisition of an easement. A cursory reading of the statute reveals the fallacy of the argument. Subsection (a) addresses the property which may be acquired, while subsection (b) principally speaks to the extent, quantity, and nature of the interest or title that may be acquired in that property. Moreover, subsection (b)(3) specifically precludes the acquisition of any right, title or interest in or to the oil and gas minerals under or in any lands. K.S.A. 68-413. Obviously, if KDOT acquires land without the minerals interest, it has not acquired a fee simple interest. However, the minerals interest prohibition in subsection (b)(3) is prefaced by the statement, [e]xcept as otherwise provided in paragraph (4) of this subsection (b). K.S.A. 68-413. Thus, subsection (b)(4) serves the purpose of allowing KDOT to acquire a fee simple interest, i.e., including the minerals interests, in land that it will use for the purposes described in that subsection. Therefore, subsection (b)(4) is not superfluous, and we will apply it exactly as it is written. KDOT was not required to condemn a fee simple interest in Winkel's land.