Opinion ID: 22771
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Foreseeability of Loss from the Khayambashi Checks

Text: 28 The district court found that the amount of the loss attributable to Dadi was $807,100. Had the Khayambashi checks been excluded, the total loss attributable to Dadi would have been $95,728. Thus, without the Khayambashi checks, Dadi's base offense level would have been increased---at most---by only one level (instead of four) under the relevant Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. §§ 2S1.2(b)(2); 2S1.1(b)(2)(B). 7 29 The losses to be considered were attributed to the $53,000 Yazdanpanah check, the $95,728 Southern Polymer check (deposited into Stella Reyes' account) and the forged Gillman checks for $130,000, $77,650, $125,000, $75,750, and $249,972. All these checks were deposited into one of Khayambashi's accounts (Southwest Oil, N&M Petrochemical or his personal account at the Wallis State Bank). Dadi argues that, even if the evidence was sufficient to convict him, the trial court erred in attributing to him the six checks deposited into Khayambashi's accounts. 30 In order to find a defendant accountable for a co-conspirator's acts, the trial court must expressly find that the acts were reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. See United States v. Evbuomwan, 992 F.2d 70, 74 (5th Cir. 1993) (to hold a defendant accountable for losses arising from a check fraud scheme, the scheme must be within the scope of the conspiracy and the losses must be foreseeable); United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 574 (2d Cir. 1995) (for a defendant to be sentenced based on the acts of a co-conspirator, a district court must make a particularized finding as to whether the activity was foreseeable to the defendant.). 31 Dadi contends that only the $95,728 check should be attributed to him because the other checks were presented for deposit into Khayambashi's accounts----something not reasonably foreseeable to Dadi. Dadi's contention is based on the thesis that there was no connection between him and Khayambashi aside from the fact that Dadi allegedly referred Khayambashi to the Wallis State Bank. The government did not establish, Dadi argues, that there was an agreement between Dadi and Khayambashi, that---even if there were such an agreement--the Khayambashi checks were within the scope of that agreement, or that the checks were reasonably foreseeable to him. But see United States v. Sneed, 63 F.3d 381, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1995)(sufficient evidence of money laundering where the scheme was defendant's idea and defendant profited). 32 The government argues that the record supports the foreseeability of these losses, citing the facts that (1) Patricia Mackvandian (Mackvandian's wife) issued a $30,000 check payable to Dadi from an account into which Mackvandian deposited a Khayambashi check; (2) the handwriting on a Gillman Properties counterfeit check---deposited into Khayambashi's Wallis State Bank account---resembled that on other checks prepared by Dadi; and (3) the other checks involved Mike Maharaj, the mysterious man with whom Dadi dealt in counterfeit checks, according to Mackvandian's testimony. The government notes that a common denominator in the transactions involving these checks was Mike Maharaj. Also, the government argues that the trial testimony traces the proceeds of all these checks back to Dadi. 33 Dadi argues that, because the amount of the loss was not reasonably foreseeable to him, the trial court erred in attributing that amount to him. See United States v. Scurlock, 52 F.3d 531, 539 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting that defendants are only responsible for the amount of loss reasonably foreseeable to them). But there was sufficient evidence that the losses from the Khayambashi checks were foreseeable to Dadi; he received the profits from them and was heavily involved in the entire scheme. We may reverse the factual findings of a trial court only if there is clear error. There is no clear error if a finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole; and, if a monetary loss is involved, the trial court need not determine the amount of the loss with precision. See United States v. Humphrey, 104 F.3d 65, 71 (5th Cir. 1997). We therefore do not see any clear error in the trial court's findings. 34