Opinion ID: 4503119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: mdlea subject-matter jurisdiction

Text: Guagua-Alarcon and Palacios-Solis contend that, even if the MDLEA is constitutional, the district court erred in concluding that its statutory requirements for subject-matter jurisdiction were met.13 The government bears the burden of establishing that the statutory requirements of MDLEA subject-matter jurisdiction are met. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1114. procedure “merely provide[d] a method by which the Executive Branch [could] evidence that it ha[d] obtained a foreign nation’s consent to jurisdiction,” and that nothing in the procedure “deprive[d] the court of its ability and obligation to determine whether the requirements of the MDLEA ha[d] been met.” Id. at 1214-15 (explaining that the MDLEA left courts “free to determine, and [t]o decide, whether a proffered certificate [was] sufficient evidence of jurisdiction”). While we have not directly addressed in a published case whether the revised MDLEA statute’s certification procedure implicates separation of powers, we have stated that “courts must still determine whether the MDLEA’s jurisdictional requirements have been met,” regardless of the MDLEA assigning conclusive proof to a certification provided by the Secretary of State or designee. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d at 1186-88; accord United States v. Mejia, 734 F. App’x 731, 734-35 (11th Cir.) (unpublished), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 593 (2018) (rejecting, in dicta, the defendant’s separation of powers challenge under Rojas and Wilchcombe and concluding that “nothing in [§ 70502(d)(2)] deprives the district court of its power to determine whether the MDLEA’s jurisdictional requirements have been met”). Ultimately, because the district court did not rely on a Secretary of State certification in finding that the defendants’ vessel was subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, we need not rule on Guagua-Alarcon’s separation of powers claim. 12 In a letter notice of supplemental authority, Palacios-Solis argues that the MDLEA is void for vagueness. Because Palacios-Solis failed to raise this issue at all in his brief, he has abandoned it. See United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003). 13 We review de novo a district court’s interpretation and application of statutory provisions regarding whether the district court has subject-matter jurisdiction. Tinoco, 304 F.3d at 1114. However, we review for clear error the district court’s factual findings with respect to jurisdiction. Id. 28 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 29 of 97 As noted above, a vessel is covered by the MDLEA if it is “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” 46 U.S.C. § 70503(e)(1). Here, the government asserted subject-matter jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. § 70502(c)(1)(A): that the vessel was “subject to the jurisdiction of the United States” because it was “a vessel without nationality.” In § 70502(d)(1), the MDLEA defines “a vessel without nationality” as including each of the following three statutory options: (A) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry that is denied by the nation whose registry is claimed; (B) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge fails, on request of an officer of the United States authorized to enforce applicable provisions of United States law, to make a claim of nationality or registry for that vessel; and (C) a vessel aboard which the master or individual in charge makes a claim of registry and for which the claimed nation of registry does not affirmatively and unequivocally assert that the vessel is of its nationality. Id. § 70502(d)(1)(A)-(C). From the outset, the government invoked jurisdiction over the defendants’ vessel under § 70502(d)(1)(B), based on the defendants’ failure to make a claim of nationality for the vessel. Based on the record evidence, we conclude that the government established that the defendants’ vessel was a “vessel without nationality” under the § 70502(d)(1)(B) definition and was thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States under § 70502(c)(1)(A). At trial, the Coast Guard boarding team members 29 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 30 of 97 testified that they asked the defendants to identify the master of the vessel and in response the defendants pointed at each other but no one identified himself as the master. The LRI boarding team then also asked the defendants individually if anyone wished to make a claim of nationality for the vessel, but no one responded.14 Despite being given two opportunities, the defendants did not produce any nationality documents, did not fly any nation’s flags, and did not make any verbal claim of nationality or registry. Id. § 70502(e)(1)-(3). We recognize that, on appeal, Guagua-Alarcon alleges that the defendants verbally claimed Ecuadorian nationality for the vessel, that the Ecuadorian government was unable to confirm the claim, and that, without a Secretary of State certification, the Coast Guard improperly assumed that the vessel was stateless, seized the defendants, and destroyed the vessel. The record evidence, however, does not show that any defendant claimed a nationality in response to the LRI boarding team’s questions. Rather, the record shows that the LRI boarding team asked the defendants individually if anyone wished to make a claim of nationality for the vessel and the defendants did not respond. Because the defendants made no 14 We recognize that the LRI boarding team did not also ask who was “the individual in charge,” but the team’s questions were nevertheless sufficient because they did ask all defendants if anyone wished to make a claim of nationality for the vessel. As such, any individual who possessed the authority to make a claim of registry or nationality for the vessel was given the opportunity to do so at the request of a duly authorized officer. See 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1)(B). 30 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 31 of 97 claim of nationality, the statelessness of their vessel is clear under subsection (d)(1)(B), and a Secretary of State certification was unnecessary. Id. § 70502(d)(1)(B), (d)(2).15 We do acknowledge that the Coast Guard learned that the vessel’s last port of call was Ecuador, found the vessel’s Ecuadorian maker’s mark, and took an additional step beyond its statutory obligation when it contacted Ecuador to receive its statement of no objection. This courtesy call, however, did not create a nationality claim on behalf of the defendants and their vessel where no master presented himself or actively made a claim of nationality. See United States v. Obando, 891 F.3d 929, 933, 938 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that, because no crew member made a claim of nationality for their vessel, their vessel was “without nationality” under § 70502(d)(1)(B) even though the Coast Guard “out of an abundance of caution” did more than what was required by the MDLEA by contacting the Ecuadorian government when the vessel’s master indicated that a painted flag on the vessel’s hull was Ecuadorian); United States v. Hernandez, 864 F.3d 1292, 1304 (11th Cir. 2017) (recognizing that, once “the statutory requirements for MDLEA prosecution in U.S. courts have been met . . . any further 15 Even so, the defendants’ claim that the government must produce a certification when subject-matter jurisdiction is based on subsections (d)(1)(A) or (C) is unsupported by the language of subsection (d)(2). While a certification provides conclusive proof of the foreign nation’s response, the subsection does not state that the response cannot be proven by other means. See 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(2). 31 Case: 17-14294 Date Filed: 01/30/2020 Page: 32 of 97 jurisdictional complaint over that U.S. prosecution is to be handled by the executive branch, nation-to-nation, in the international arena”). Rather, the vessel remained stateless under § 70502(d)(1)(B). It also is of no matter that the Coast Guard takes the last port of call as the nationality of the vessel and contacts that corresponding government when no claim is made. Whatever the foreign government’s response (or non-response), the Coast Guard’s taking of that additional step does not void a statelessness finding under §§ 70502(c)(1)(A) and 70502(d)(1)(B). Consequently, the defendants’ vessel was a “vessel without nationality,” 46 U.S.C. § 70502(d)(1), and thus a “vessel subject to the jurisdiction of the United States,” id. § 70502(c)(1)(A), and therefore a “covered vessel,” id. § 70503(e)(1), to which the MDLEA’s criminal prohibition against possessing a controlled substance with distributary intent extends, id. § 70503(a)(1). The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over the defendants and their offenses under the MDLEA.