Opinion ID: 2516066
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Presence at Critical Stage of the Proceedings

Text: [¶ 19] Next, Mr. Skinner argues he was deprived of his right to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings by not being allowed to attend the trial court's hearing concerning the juror misconduct described above. As previously explained, a juror was questioned as to his communications with the defense counsel after the verdict in the initial proceeding was announced but prior to the habitual criminal proceeding. Only the trial judge, the defense counsel, the prosecutor, and the juror were present for the hearing, and the defense counsel lodged no objection to the defendant's absence. The question of whether a defendant had the right to be present at a specific phase of his trial is an issue of law and, as such, is subject to de novo review. Seeley v. State, 959 P.2d 170, 175 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 20] The Sixth Amendment and the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee an accused the right to be present during every stage of the criminal proceeding that is critical to its outcome if his presence would contribute to the fairness of the procedure. 959 P.2d at 177. Article 1, Section 10 of the Wyoming Constitution is even more explicit in its guarantee to an accused of the right of presence at trial. Maupin v. State, 694 P.2d 720, 722 (Wyo.1985) (In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to defend in person). [¶ 21] The right to be present at trial stems in part from the fact that by his physical presence the defendant can hear and see the proceedings, can be seen by the jury, and can participate in the presentation of his rights. Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 274 (9th Cir.1972); see also Maupin, 694 P.2d at 723. These constitutional guarantees are incorporated into Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-11-202 (LexisNexis 2001) and W.R.Cr.P. 43(a), which provide that a defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial. Seeley, 959 P.2d at 177. However, the due process right to be present is not unequivocal. The defendant's presence is not required when it `would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow.' Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106-07, 54 S.Ct. 330, 78 L.Ed. 674 (1934)). [¶ 22] We have previously stated that constitutional error is not established when a defendant is absent during bench conferences on legal questions. Sandy v. State, 870 P.2d 352, 359 (Wyo.1994); W.R.Cr.P. 43(c)(3). However, even the state concedes in this case the issues addressed at the hearing were more than purely questions of law they were fact-finding inquiries into what communications occurred between the juror and the defense counsel. We cannot conclude the hearing was a minor occurrence which did not necessitate Mr. Skinner's presence. See United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 527, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (the United States Supreme Court held the absence of defendants during an inquiry into a juror's concern about one of the defendant's sketching jurors was a minor occurrence which did not violate the Fifth Amendment). The hearing discussed facts in controversy and law that was applicable to the initial phase of the case, and the failure to allow Mr. Skinner to be present was error. [¶ 23] As we stated in Seeley, the absence of a defendant during a conference with the court, even though of constitutional proportion, is subject to a harmless error analysis. 959 P.2d at 178. Before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare its belief that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In determining whether reversible error occurred, we ask if the defendant's absence created any reasonable possibility of prejudice. The State must show that an error can pass muster under this standard. Id. (citations omitted). In light of the entire record, we are convinced Mr. Skinner's absence from the hearing was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as his absence from the hearing did not create any reasonable possibility of prejudice. [¶ 24] Although he is not obligated to establish prejudice, Mr. Skinner insists prejudice resulted because he was not able to advise his counsel whether to ask questions of the juror, he could have asked his counsel to explain the proceedings and their significance, and he could have conferred with his counsel regarding what course of action should have been suggested to the court. Given the fact that this juror's questions indicated he was sympathetic to Mr. Skinner in that he did not believe the victim should have been forced to testify, it is unlikely Mr. Skinner's presence would have resulted in the defense counsel taking any different action than he did. Perhaps more importantly, the hearing at issue was conducted after the guilt phase of the trial and before the habitual criminal proceeding. Therefore, Mr. Skinner's absence did not create any reasonable possibility of prejudice. The narrow inquiry addressing the juror's confusion over an issue during the previous proceeding could not affect the juror's consideration of whether Mr. Skinner had been previously convicted of additional felonies the matter at issue in the final phase of the proceedings. We conclude the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.