Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Compton murder.

Text: As aggravating evidence, at the penalty phase, of other violent criminal activity by the defendant (§ 190.3, factor (b)), the prosecution introduced evidence that 75-year-old Houston Compton was brutally stabbed to death in Fullerton on the evening of August 22, 1980. Compton's body, which had sustained numerous knife wounds, was found on the Fullerton College campus. His abandoned vehicle, containing substantial blood residue, was later located in Santa Monica. To demonstrate that defendant was Compton's killer, the prosecution presented testimony of William Harbitz that on an August evening in 1980, he saw defendant wearing a bloody T-shirt; defendant, who had been drinking, said he had been in a knife fight. The prosecution also presented the testimony of Linda Weissinger, who, then 16 years old, had worked in August 1980 at a McDonald's restaurant on Leffingwell Road in Whittier. Weissinger indicated that, in a photo lineup conducted in May 1983, she positively identified defendant as the man wearing a bloodstained T-shirt who came to the drive-through window of the Whittier McDonald's around 10:15 p.m. on August 22, 1980, driving an old white car, and bought two hamburgers. The prosecution showed that a receipt recovered from Compton's abandoned vehicle (a white Ford Fairlane from the early 1960's) was for two hamburgers purchased at the same Whittier McDonald's at 10:12 p.m. on August 22, 1980. Defendant makes several related contentions concerning the admissibility, and sufficiency, of the Compton murder evidence. We find no basis to disturb the penalty judgment. Defendant first urges at considerable length that the trial court wrongly denied him a so-called Phillips hearing (see People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 222 Cal.Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423 ( Phillips )), with presentation of live testimony by the parties, to determine, in advance of the penalty trial, whether evidence he committed the Compton murder was legally sufficient to present to the penalty jury. [48] In particular, defendant asserts, the court should have determined whether, because of improper pretrial lineup procedures, his due process rights would be violated by admission of Weissinger's crucial eyewitness identification. Defendant further contends that Weissinger's testimony was constitutionally tainted by the pretrial lineup procedures, and should have been excluded from evidence. Moreover, he insists that, with or without her identification, the evidence he murdered Compton was legally insufficient. Once before the beginning of jury selection, and again prior to the penalty phase, the trial court entertained in limine defense motions to withhold all evidence of the Compton murder from the penalty jury. Each time, the defense sought an evidentiary hearing as to whether Weissinger's anticipated identification testimony was tainted by improper pretrial lineup procedures, and whether the prosecution's proof that defendant committed this crime was sufficient to go to the jury. [49] On both occasions, the court received the prosecution's offers of proof and heard extensive argument. Without taking live evidence, it then ruled that the Compton murder evidence, including the testimony of Weissinger, could be admitted. [50] As noted, defendant insists these procedures were inadequate to resolve his objections to the Compton murder evidence. However, we need not determine whether the trial court should have given greater attention, in limine, to the issues raised by defendant, [51] including whether Weissinger's identification was tainted by improper pretrial lineup procedures (see, e.g., People v. Citrino (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 778, 783, 90 Cal.Rptr. 80 [where defendant objects to in-court identification, court must determine, as preliminary fact, whether prosecution has carried burden of showing pretrial identification procedures were not unduly suggestive]). That is because we independently conclude in any event that (1) Weissinger's identification testimony at trial was not excludable as the tainted product of flawed lineups, and (2) the evidence that defendant murdered Compton was legally sufficient for consideration by the penalty jury. We address those issues in turn.
Given the August 22, 1980, receipt linking Compton's murderer to the McDonald's restaurant on Leffingwell Road in Whittier, there is little doubt that Weissinger, who was working at the McDonald's that night, observed the killer. The only issues concern Weissinger's identification of defendant as the man she saw. As recounted above, Weissinger picked other men from live lineups, conducted in November 1980 and July 1981, [52] before she picked defendant from a photo lineup in May 1983. Subsequently, in October 1983, Weissinger tentatively identified defendant in a live lineup. The parties agree that the October 1983 lineup was conducted in the unwaived absence of defendant's counsel, and the penalty jury heard no reference to it. On two later occasions, in 1985 and 1991, Weissinger was shown the same photo array from which she had identified defendant in May 1983. At trial, Weissinger testified that, although she took her time to decide, she ultimately was certain, when she picked a photo from the May 1983 array, that the picture she selected showed the man she saw at the McDonald's restaurant on the night of August 22, 1980. Weissinger confirmed that she so advised Detective Lewis, who was supervising the May 1983 photo lineup. The defense stipulated that the photo in question was defendant's. Neither the prosecutor nor defense counsel inquired specifically about any identification Weissinger made after May 1983. Neither counsel sought to confirm whether, at the time of the 1992 trial, Weissinger was still sure she had picked the right man in May 1983. Moreover, Weissinger was not asked to identify defendant in person as he sat before her in the courtroom, and she did not do so. [53] Defendant urges that Weissinger's courtroom identification testimony was tainted by flaws in the lineup procedures. These defects, defendant insists, include the illegal live lineup of October 1983, from which defendant's counsel was absent (see United States v. Wade (1967) 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 ( Wade )), and the unnecessary, unduly suggestive reshowing of the May 1983 photo array on two later occasions, in 1985 and 1991 (see Manson v. Brathwaite (1977) 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140; Neil v. Biggers (1972) 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1242, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251). Defendant argues that due process thus required exclusion of Weissinger's testimony because, under the multipronged totality of circumstances test established by the United States Supreme Court, the testimony did not possess sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the corrupting effect of the improper lineups. ( Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, at pp. 110-114, 97 S.Ct. 2243; Neil v. Biggers, supra, at pp. 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375.) However, no taint arising from improper lineups appears in Weissinger's carefully circumscribed testimony, which was confined to her May 1983 photo identification. Defendant does not suggest that, prior to May 1983, any efforts by the police to obtain an identification from Weissinger were unduly suggestive in a way that might cause her to misidentify defendant as the McDonald's customer she saw. Indeed, so far as appears, neither defendant's photo, nor his person, played any part in those efforts. Defendant criticizes the May 1983 photo lineup on grounds that Weissinger was shown pictures in a group, rather than sequentially. However, he cites no case authority for the proposition that a group photo array is, per se, unduly suggestive. Defendant focuses on events that occurred after the May 1983 photo identification. He insists that the improper October 1983 live lineup conducted in counsel's unwaived absence, and the subsequent reshowing of the May 1983 photo array to Weissinger in 1985 and 1991, may have locked her into her May 1983 identification, and may actually have created false memories, hardening her sincere but mistaken belief in the accuracy of the identification she made at the earlier time. As noted, however, Weissinger did not testify to anything that could have been affected by these subsequent events. She vouched only for the certainty of her May 1983 identification at the time it was made. This was an issue upon which both she and Detective Lewis could be effectively examined. Moreover, the jury could fully assess whether Weissinger's testimony, so limited and scrutinized, constituted persuasive evidence that defendant was the man she observed at McDonald's on August 22, 1980. Under these circumstances, there was no need for an independent assessment whether Weissinger's testimony should be excluded as unreliable. It was properly admitted. [54]
Defendant claims that the evidence he murdered Compton was legally insufficient. The prosecution's failure to sustain its burden of proof, defendant insists, violated his due process and reliability interests under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.) On appeal, the test of legal sufficiency is whether there is substantial evidence, i.e., evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1114, 1156, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 117 P.3d 476; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 413-414, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576, 162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Evidence meeting this standard satisfies constitutional due process and reliability concerns. ( Carter, supra at p. 1156, 117 P.3d 476; People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 690, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) While the appellate court must determine that the supporting evidence is reasonable, inherently credible, and of solid value, the court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, and must presume every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. ( People v. Carter, supra, 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1257-1258, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544; People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496, 117 Cal. Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754 ( Hillhouse) ; People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618.) Issues of witness credibility are for the jury. (E.g., Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 414, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314, 270 Cal.Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643.) Identification of the defendant by a single eyewitness may be sufficient to prove the defendant's identity as the perpetrator of a crime. (See People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 570-575, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347 ( Anderson ).) Moreover, a testifying witness's out-of-court identification is probative for that purpose and can, by itself, be sufficient evidence of the defendant's guilt even if the witness does not confirm it in court. ( People v. Cuevas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 252, 263-275, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290 ( Cuevas ), overruling People v. Gould (1960) 54 Cal.2d 621, 631, 7 Cal.Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865; see Evid.Code, § 1238.) Indeed, an out-of-court identification generally has greater probative value than an in-court identification, even when the identifying witness does not confirm the out-of-court identification: `[T]he [out-of-court] identification has greater probative value than an identification made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied recognition in the witness' mind. [Citations.] . . .' [Citations]. ( Cuevas, supra, at p. 265, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290.) Here, though based primarily on Weissinger's out-of-court identification, the evidence that defendant murdered Compton was sufficient. Weissinger readily testified that, after careful consideration, she made a positive identification of defendant from a photo array as the McDonald's customer she saw on the night of the Compton murder. While Weissinger did not independently identify defendant in the courtroom, or confirm that she remained certain of her photo identification, she did not disavow it (see Cuevas, supra, 12 Cal.4th 252, 267-268, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 135, 906 P.2d 1290), and she explained at length why she felt sure of her choice at the time she made it. There was nothing inherently improbable about the evidence she offered. (See, e.g., People v. Lang (1974) 11 Cal.3d 134, 139, 113 Cal.Rptr. 9, 520 P.2d 393.) Defendant's counsel had a full opportunity to cross-examine Weissinger, not only about the actual degree of certainty of her photo selection, but about all aspects of the identification process, including the conditions under which she had observed the McDonald's customer, and the occasions on which, as Weissinger candidly admitted, she had identified other men. Defendant also presented expert testimony on factors affecting the accuracy of eyewitness identifications. Under these circumstances, the jury was able to evaluate the credibility of Weissinger's identification, and the weight her testimony deserved was for the jury to resolve. Moreover, William Harbitz provided some independent evidence of defendant's identity as Compton's killer by describing the incident, on an August 1980 evening, when defendant, wearing a bloodstained T-shirt, approached Harbitz and said he had been in a knife fight. In sum, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant was Compton's murderer. Accordingly, the jury was properly allowed to consider, in aggravation of penalty, whether defendant committed this crime.