Opinion ID: 541961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contingency Enhancement of Fee

Text: 33 After the trial, Kelly petitioned the district court under the provisions of the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(b) (1982), for an award of reasonable attorney's fees. She requested a lodestar figure based on the 248.15 hours at a rate of $200 per hour, and an enhancement of double that figure based on the contingent nature of the litigation. 34 To support her request for an enhancement, Kelly filed eight affidavits from local attorneys, some of which stated that their firms no longer took employment discrimination cases for economic reasons. Other affiants stated that their firms would only take contingency fee cases when the fee was high enough or when a good probability of success existed. 35 The district court found that the lodestar figure, the hours expended multiplied by the rate per hour, was reasonable; it did not reduce this figure to take into account the unsuccessful claim, finding that the claims were interrelated. It refused, however, to enhance the lodestar amount to reflect the contingent nature of the plaintiff's success, concluding that enhancement was not necessary to attract competent counsel in the relevant community. Kelly cross-appeals from the district court's denial of her motion for a multiplier. 36 Kelly argues that the affidavits clearly establish that it will be necessary to compensate attorneys at twice the normal hourly rate in order to attract competent counsel because some contingency fee cases will result in no fees. Our scope of review of this issue is narrow. [T]his court may alter the award only if the district court abused its discretion. Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp. (Blum I), 829 F.2d 367, 378 (3d Cir.1987). 37 We recently faced the elusive task of deciding when to augment a lodestar with a multiplier in Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp. (Blum II), 888 F.2d 975 (3d Cir.1989). Plaintiffs in Blum filed eight affidavits in support of their request for a fee enhancement. On appeal, we reversed the allowance of a 50% multiplier by the district court. We noted that several factors must be met before a court could award a multiplier:  'compensation for contingency must be based on the difference in market treatment of contingent fee cases as a class, rather than on an assessment of the riskiness of any particular case,'  888 F.2d at 981, the risk enhancement must be necessary to attract competent counsel, id.,  'the fee applicant bears the burden of proving the degree to which the relevant market compensates for contingency,'  id., and the determination is controlling for future cases involving the same market, id. (citations omitted) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 731, 733, 107 S.Ct. 3078, 3089, 3090, 97 L.Ed.2d 585 (1987)). 38 The district court in this case determined that the affidavits and evidence presented did not prove that an enhancement was necessary to attract competent counsel. In order to qualify for an enhancement, a plaintiff must establish that without adjustment, it  'would have faced substantial difficulties in finding counsel in the ... relevant market,'  Blum I, 829 F.2d at 379 (quoting Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. at 733, 107 S.Ct. at 3090 (O'Connor, J., concurring)), which includes all contingency cases in a given geographic market, Blum I, 829 F.2d at 381. After studying the affidavits, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to enhance the lodestar amount. Although the plaintiff initially had difficulty in finding counsel to represent her, this fact, coupled with the affidavits, does not satisfy the need to show the significant burden that could justify a contingency multiplier, Blum II, 888 F.2d at 981, which we have stated is a mandatory prerequisite to an enhancement.