Opinion ID: 2244953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel/Right to Remain Silent

Text: Taylor next argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment because his attorney failed to object to the admission of statements gathered during the interrogation. Taylor contends that after his expression of indecision described in Part I, he also made the statements described below which he contends asserted his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, and that the police therefore had a duty under Miranda to stop questioning him. Because there was no objection to the statements on this ground, Taylor asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must first show that trial counsel's performance was deficient under prevailing professional norms. He also must show that the deficient performance was so prejudicial to his case that he was denied a fair trial. Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 321 (Ind.1993). There is a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance was not deficient, and the defendant must overcome that presumption with strong and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Yerden v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1283, 1286 (Ind.1997). Where a claim of ineffective assistance is based on a failure to object at trial, the defendant must show that a proper objection, if made, would have been sustained. Jackson v. State, 683 N.E.2d 560, 563 (Ind.1997). Taylor has not met the burden of overcoming the presumption that his trial attorney's performance was effective. He claims to have asserted his right to remain silent during the following exchange with Detective Stacey: Stacey: If you wanna tell us your version, that's why we're here. We're taking the time to talk to you. Taylor: I would, but I don't wanna say anything to ... I don't know. I wouldn't word it right. I know I wouldn't and I don't wanna get myself into trouble that I didn't do or that I did do or whatever and I just, you know. Since I've never done it, I'm nervous. I don't know what to say. I know you guys want to hear my story. Stacey: Absolutely. Taylor: And I would love to tell you my story, but I don't wanna tell you the story because I don't wanna like slip up and say the wrong thing that'll get me into trouble. After this exchange, Taylor continued to talk with Detective Stacey without indicating that he wanted to stop. This Court in Haviland v. State, 677 N.E.2d 509 (Ind.1997) recently described the analysis of a purported assertion of the right to remain silent as intensely fact-sensitive. Id. at 514. In that case, the suspect, after validly waiving his right to remain silent, said I'm through with this several times during a custodial interrogation. In affirming the trial court, we reasoned that the suspect answered questions without pausing or indicating in any manner that he would no longer respond. Id. Although there are no particular words of legal magic to cut off questioning, id., a suspect must do more than express reluctance to talk in order to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Taylor expressed a concern that he would use the wrong words while talking and would not adequately convey his story. Critically, however, as in Haviland, Taylor never indicated that he would not talk at all. Because Taylor's comments did not constitute an assertion of the right to remain silent, failure to object based on that theory to the admission of subsequent statements cannot constitute ineffective assistance.