Opinion ID: 2585299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Separation Decree's Status as an Interim Order

Text: Danny disputes the superior court's conclusion that the Glasens' 1991 separation agreement was not a final property division. We agree with the superior court that the legal separation decree was an interim order that was provisional and conditional, affording an opportunity for reconciliation. [7] First, Danny's testimony from 1991 indicates that he did not intend the separation to be final. He and Gail specifically chose to separate rather than divorce because they believed they might still reconcile. [8] Danny testified that we don't want to totally, even though we can't get along, we're incompatible right now, we don't want to totally close the door on it for the future if something does happen we can get together. Thus, Danny himself believed that he and Gail might reconcile, indicating that the separation was not a permanent arrangement. Moreover, the test of a final judgment is essentially a practical one. [9] We have stated: The basic thrust of the finality requirement is that the judgment must be one which disposes of the entire case, ... one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Further, the reviewing court should look to the substance and effect, rather than form, of the rendering court's judgment, and focus primarily on the operational or decretal language therein. [10] The Glasens' decree of legal separation fails this test of finality, for it provides that the child custody and property settlement agreement shall be incorporated in any final judgment issued in this action or in any decree of divorce where ever issued.... This clearly implies that the separation decree itself is not the final judgment issued in this action. Further, the decree demonstrates that it is only a stepping stone on the path to divorce as it provides that at any time hereafter either party may ... calendar an uncontested divorce hearing for the purpose of terminating the parties' marriage. Thus, the separation decree was an interim rather than a final order. Finally, a contract that purports to embody a final property distribution, but which does not list or describe all of the spouses' property or assets, is invalid as a final property division. [11] The Glasens' separation agreement did not fully list or describe all of the marital property that existed in 1991. Indeed, the Glasens may have continued to acquire marital property or debt from 1991, when the separation decree was entered, to 1997, when Danny filed for divorce. Because the Glasens continued their marital relationship for approximately six years after the initial settlement agreement, that agreement could not have embodied a final property division. We conclude that the Glasens' decree of legal separation could not be a final judgment. Thus, even assuming that Alaska law authorizes entry of a separation decree, the Glasens' separation decree was valid only insofar as it settled certain support and property issues between the spouses while they were separated.