Opinion ID: 107969
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: subject matter jurisdiction.

Text: As we pointed out in Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 198 (1962), there is a significant difference between determining whether a federal court has jurisdiction of the subject matter and determining whether a cause over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction is justiciable. The District Court determined that to decide this case on the merits . . . would constitute a clear violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and then dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction of the subject matter. Powell v. McCormack, 266 F. Supp. 354, 359, 360 (D. C. D. C. 1967). However, as the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, the doctrine of separation of powers is more properly considered in determining whether the case is justiciable. We agree with the unanimous conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the District Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. [33] However, for reasons set forth in Part VI, infra, we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that this case is not justiciable. In Baker v. Carr, supra , we noted that a federal district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter (1) if the cause does not arise under the Federal Constitution, laws, or treaties (or fall within one of the other enumerated categories of Art. III); or (2) if it is not a case or controversy within the meaning of that phrase in Art. III; or (3) if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute. And, as in Baker v. Carr, supra , our determination (see Part VI, B (1) infra ) that this cause presents no nonjusticiable political question disposes of respondents' contentions [34] that this cause is not a case or controversy. [35] Respondents first contend that this is not a case arising under the Constitution within the meaning of Art. III. They emphasize that Art. I,  5, assigns to each House of Congress the power to judge the elections and qualifications of its own members and to punish its members for disorderly behavior. Respondents also note that under Art. I,  3, the Senate has the sole power to try all impeachments. Respondents argue that these delegations (to judge, to punish, and to try) to the Legislative Branch are explicit grants of judicial power to the Congress and constitute specific exceptions to the general mandate of Art. III that the judicial power shall be vested in the federal courts. Thus, respondents maintain, the power conferred on the courts by article III does not authorize this Court to do anything more than declare its lack of jurisdiction to proceed. [36] We reject this contention. Article III,  1, provides that the judicial Power . . . shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may . . . establish. Further,  2 mandates that the judicial Power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Constitution. . . . It has long been held that a suit arises under the Constitution if a petitioner's claim will be sustained if the Constitution . . . [is] given one construction and will be defeated if [it is] given another. [37] Bell v. Hood, 327 U. S. 678, 685 (1946). See King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, 263 U. S. 361, 363-364 (1923). Cf. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9 Wheat. 738 (1824). See generally C. Wright, Federal Courts 48-52 (1963). Thus, this case clearly is one arising under the Constitution as the Court has interpreted that phrase. Any bar to federal courts reviewing the judgments made by the House or Senate in excluding a member arises from the allocation of powers between the two branches of the Federal Government (a question of justiciability), and not from the petitioners' failure to state a claim based on federal law. Respondents next contend that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioners' suit is authorized by a jurisdictional statute, i. e., 28 U. S. C.  1331 (a). Section 1331 (a) provides that district courts shall have jurisdiction in all civil actions wherein the matter in controversy . . . arises under the Constitution . . . . Respondents urge that even though a case may arise under the Constitution for purposes of Art. III, it does not necessarily arise under the Constitution for purposes of  1331 (a). Although they recognize there is little legislative history concerning the enactment of  1331 (a), respondents argue that the history of the period when the section was first enacted indicates that the drafters did not intend to include suits questioning the exclusion of Congressmen in this grant of federal question jurisdiction. Respondents claim that the passage of the Force Act [38] in 1870 lends support to their interpretation of the intended scope of  1331. The Force Act gives the district courts jurisdiction over any civil action to recover possession of any office . . . wherein it appears that the sole question . . . arises out of denial of the right to vote . . . on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude. However, the Act specifically excludes suits concerning the office of Congressman. Respondents maintain that this exclusion demonstrates Congress' intention to prohibit federal courts from entertaining suits regarding the seating of Congressmen. We have noted that the grant of jurisdiction in  1331 (a), while made in the language used in Art. III, is not in all respects co-extensive with the potential for federal jurisdiction found in Art. III. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 246, n. 8 (1967). Nevertheless, it has generally been recognized that the intent of the drafters was to provide a broad jurisdictional grant to the federal courts. See, e. g., Mishkin, The Federal Question in the District Courts, 53 Col. L. Rev. 157, 160 (1953); Chadbourn & Levin, Original Jurisdiction of Federal Questions, 90 U. Pa. L. Rev. 639, 644-645 (1942). And, as noted above, the resolution of this case depends directly on construction of the Constitution. The Court has consistently held such suits are authorized by the statute. Bell v. Hood, supra ; King County v. Seattle School District No. 1, supra . See, e. g., Gully v. First Nat. Bank in Meridian, 299 U. S. 109, 112 (1936); The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U. S. 22, 25 (1913). As respondents recognize, there is nothing in the wording or legislative history of  1331 or in the decisions of this Court which would indicate that there is any basis for the interpretation they would give that section. Nor do we think the passage of the Force Act indicates that  1331 does not confer jurisdiction in this case. The Force Act is limited to election challenges where a denial of the right to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment is alleged. See 28 U. S. C.  1344. Further, the Act was passed five years before the original version of  1331 was enacted. While it might be inferred that Congress intended to give each House the exclusive power to decide congressional election challenges, [39] there is absolutely no indication that the passage of this Act evidences an intention to impose other restrictions on the broad grant of jurisdiction in  1331.