Opinion ID: 2507905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Misconduct Issues.

Text: Five months after the jury reached its penalty phase verdict, defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of jury misconduct. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his new trial motion because misconduct by two jurors violated his Sixth Amendment right to be tried by an impartial jury, as well as the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and under article 1, section 16 of the California Constitution. As will be shown below, these claims lack merit.
On August 17, 1992, Juror Robert R. signed a declaration prepared by defense counsel detailing three instances during voir dire where he failed to disclose information indicating a potential bias. Robert R. provided this information to defense counsel during an interview with him: (1) In June 1991, Robert R. had a criminal case pending for felony possession of 0.5 grams of methamphetamine. At the initial stages of the case, Robert R. had agreed to become an informant to work off the case but had later changed his mind; (2) five years prior to defendant's trial, he was prosecuted in Lodi, California, but the charges were dropped after police discovered that the person they were seeking had the same name; (3) when he was around 12 years old, he had been the victim of a crime in which he was attacked and repeatedly stabbed.
When misconduct involves the concealment of material information that may call into question the impartiality of the juror, we consider the actual bias test of People v. Jackson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 700, 705, 214 Cal.Rptr. 346, adopted by this court in People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146. Although intentional concealment of material information by a potential juror may constitute implied bias justifying his or her disqualification or removal [citations], mere inadvertent or unintentional failures to disclose are not accorded the same effect. `[T]he proper test to be applied to unintentional concealment is whether the juror is sufficiently biased to constitute good cause for the court to find under Penal Code sections 1089 and [former] 1123 that he is unable to perform his duty.' ( People v. Jackson, 168 Cal.App.3d at p. 706, 214 Cal.Rptr. 346.)[¶] Whether a failure to disclose is intentional or unintentional and whether a juror is biased in this regard are matters within the discretion of the trial court. Except where bias is clearly apparent from the record, the trial judge is in the best position to assess the state of mind of a juror or potential juror on voir dire examination. [Citations.] ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) Applying McPeters here, we determine whether any of Robert R.'s three failures to disclose are grounds for reversing the judgment.
Prior to voir dire, the jurors filled out a juror questionnaire. Question 15 asked whether the prospective juror had ever been involved in a criminal case as a victim, defendant, or a witness. Voir dire commenced on January 6, 1992. In testimony at the evidentiary hearing on the new trial motion, Robert R. stated that he did not reveal his June 1991 methamphetamine arrest because I thought there was no charge. I thought it was dropped. I didn't think there was nothing. He stated that he confirmed with the district attorney's office that no charges were pending against him several times. He added that he was not notified that charges were filed against him until after the jury had been dismissed. He further testified that he never thought about the incident at any time during the course of the trial. Robert R. also testified that 10 years earlier he had been arrested in Lodi and spent the night in jail before discovering that the police had confused him with another person with his name. He stated that he had to hire a private investigator to locate the real suspect before charges were finally dropped. Robert R. testified that he did not inform the court about this incident because the police made a mistake and that was it. In making its determination, the trial court acknowledged that it had not specifically asked Robert R. if he had previously been charged with an offense. The court accepted his testimony that he believed the methamphetamine case had gone away, given that six months had passed from the date of arrest to the date voir dire commenced. As to both incidents, the trial court concluded there was no misconduct because the failure to disclose was inadvertent or unintentional, and there was no resulting bias. We find no abuse of discretion in this conclusion. ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.)
Robert R., who was 34 years old at the time of the new trial hearing on August 27, 1992, admitted that 22 years beforewhen he was 12 or 13 years olda group of five Latino youths had stabbed him about 15 times in the side, the head, and under the chin. He suffered broken ribs, and still has scars on his forehead and buttocks. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred: The Court: Have you ever been the victim of a crime? Robert R.: No, not thatnot that I can remember. The Court: How about an assault on your person, any kind of assault, battery on your person? Robert R.: No. The Court: As a youth or as an adult? Robert R.: No. The Court: You have never personally been the victim or the subject of any violence of any kind, is that correct? Robert R.: That's right. At the evidentiary hearing, Robert R. stated that he did not disclose this information to the court because I ... just never thought about it, to be honest with you. He added that It just never came to me or else I would have put it down. I mean I had no reason ... not to put it down. He left question 19 of the juror questionnaire blank, where he was asked if he had ever been a crime victim. When asked why the answer was left blank, Robert R. stated, Like I said, I, my mind just wentI never thought about it. Defense counsel then asked whether the incident had come back to him when he heard the victims in this case had been stabbed. He replied, No, I never thought about it, to be honest with you. My focus was to be [unbiased]. I thought like, like we was supposed to be. He also stated: [W]hen I was chosen as a juror, I mean [its] like anything else I do, I try to do to the best of my ability, and I think I, my main thing was trying to listen ... to the testimony, and listen to the Court's instructions and to everybody in general here, not nothing to do with nothing outside. Robert R. told defense counsel that the only reason he told him of these incidents after the trial is because the juror thought there was nothing, there would never be nothing else said about it. The trial court reviewed several juror declarations, and at an evidentiary hearing questioned Robert R. and submitted him to cross-examination by defense counsel. The court concluded that Robert R. did not intentionally fail to disclose the 20-year-old stabbing incident. First, the court found that Robert R. was credible: [Robert R.] appeared to be frank with the Court and counsel. [He] [d]idn't seem to have anything to hide. [He] [d]idn't even seem to be too uncomfortable at being here. [He] didn't hesitate in his responses. [He] [d]idn't seem to contradict himself.... [¶] [I]t appears to me that [Robert R.] has been forthright with the Court, did not exhibit the often-seen symptoms of a person caught up in something, making desperate attempts to extricate themselves, and otherwise giving the symptoms of discomfort that often accompany a person who is not or may not be telling the truth. The court ultimately was persuaded as to Robert R.'s inadvertence because Why would he mention it to [defense counsel] two months later? If you are going to hide this from the Court and counsel in January, why not do so in June? Why unload it on a one-to-one, six months later? The court concluded that Robert R. was a fair and impartial juror in this case. Notwithstanding this determination, juror misconduct may still be found where bias is clearly apparent from the record. ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) To the degree that the trial judge concludes that juror concealment, even when not intentional, reflects a state of mind that would prevent a person from acting impartially, then consistent with the standard in Jackson and McPeters a new trial must be granted. ( People v. Jackson, supra, 168 Cal.App.3d 700, 214 Cal.Rptr. 346; cf. People v. Diaz (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 934-936, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77 ( Diaz ).) We defer to the trial court's judgment on Robert R.'s credibility. The court noted that Robert R. cooperated fully with defense investigators, and ultimately concluded that Robert R. was a credible witness at the evidentiary hearing and a fair and impartial juror in this case. On this basis we conclude that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to determine that no such bias was apparent and no misconduct occurred. (See People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) In so concluding, we distinguish two cases with a factual background similar to this one. In Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d 926, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77, a case involving a defendant charged with assault with a deadly weapon (knife), a juror concealed during voir dire that she had been assaulted at knifepoint during an attempted rape 13 years before, notwithstanding having been specifically asked. ( Id. at p. 931, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) During the last day of the four-day trial, and after the prosecution had rested its case, the juror revealed to court personnel her prior knife attack. She stated initially that she did not remember being specifically asked whether she had been a victim of any similar type of incident involving a knife, but later stated that it never occurred to her the assault on her was an assault with a deadly weapon. ( Ibid. ) Both the bailiff and clerk testified that the juror seemed to be prejudiced as to violent crimes. ( Ibid. ) As the trial had not yet ended and no alternate jurors had been selected, the trial court asked defense counsel whether he was willing to proceed with 11 jurors. Defense counsel refused to stipulate, and the trial court denied the motion to dismiss the juror. The defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon. ( Id. at p. 930, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in refusing to discharge the juror pursuant to former section 1123, now Code of Civil Procedure section 233. ( Diaz, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d at p. 932, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) The court found that when a juror has been victimized by the same type of crime, the probability of bias is substantial and often unconscious and thus unlikely to be admitted during an evidentiary hearing. ( Id. at p. 939, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) When this occurs, the court reasoned that bias should be implied as a matter of law ( ibid. ), rebuttable `by an affirmative evidentiary showing that prejudice does not exist or by a reviewing court's examination of the entire record to determine whether there is a reasonable probability of actual harm to the complaining party resulting from the misconduct.' ( Id. at p. 934, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) The Court concluded that the prosecutor failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 936-937, 200 Cal.Rptr. 77.) Assuming Diaz is correct that a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises when jurors fail to disclose their material prior history as crime victims, we conclude that the presumption was rebutted in the present case. In contrast to the juror in Diaz, Robert R. was consistent in his explanation that he never thought about the stabbing during voir dire or trial. The trial court found him credible based on its specific observations of his demeanor and on the fact that it made no sense for him to disclose this information voluntarily to defense counsel six months after the verdict if he intentionally failed to disclose it. Nor was there in the present case any evidence affirmatively indicating juror bias, as there was in Diaz. Thus, unlike in Diaz, any presumption of prejudice was surmounted by substantial evidence that Robert R. was in fact an unbiased juror. In Dyer v. Calderon (9th Cir.1998) 151 F.3d 970, 973-983, the Ninth Circuit found that a juror's misconduct on voir direthe concealment of the fact that her brother had been murderedrequired application of the doctrine of implied bias and reversed a murder judgment without resort to a harmless error analysis. The Ninth Circuit held that the trial court erred in accepting, without further inquiry, the juror's explanation that the shooting was an accident, given that the court file, which was in the court's possession at the time it made its ruling, indicated that the victim was pistol whipped four times and then shot in the back of the head. Unlike the cursory examination performed by the trial court in Dyer, the trial court before us conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing, considering juror declarations, additional evidence, and live testimony from jurors. We are satisfied on this well-developed evidentiary record the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Robert R.'s failure to disclose the stabbing incident was not deliberate and that he was not biased. (Cf. Dyer v. Calderon, supra, 151 F.3d at pp. 976-978.)
As to Juror Renee P., defendant alleges two theories of misconduct: (1) that Renee P., a registered nurse, improperly asserted her expertise during deliberations, and (2) that she improperly consulted outside sources. Defendant requested that the court conduct an evidentiary hearing, and in support of the motion, he submitted statements from four jurors: Juror Robert R. declared that a major point of dispute during deliberations was whether April James was dead at the time of the rape. Renee P. disclosed to the jury that she was a nurse, and she explained a number of the medical issues relating to blood pressure and circulation. She also explained shunting, and the manner in which the body would have directed the blood after the stab wounds were inflicted. Her explanations were helpful in determining whether the child was dead before she was sexually assaulted. Juror Randall G. similarly declared that whether April James was dead at the time of the sexual assault was a major issue during the deliberations, that Renee P. was an emergency room nurse familiar with stab wounds, that she explained blood pressure, blood circulation in the pelvic area, and shunting, and provided clarification of [the pathologist's] testimony. Juror Cecile Q. told defense investigator Jerry Kubena that Renee P. had gone home and read a lot of books and brought the facts back to the jury. While Cecile Q. initially wavered on whether April James was alive when she was raped, she changed her mind after further explanation from Renee P. on how long death would come after the stab wounds, and how much blood would flow as a result of the wounds. Juror Pam V. told Kubena that Renee P. had been a great help during deliberations by explaining medical terms and definitions. Renee P. explained to the jury the pumping of the heart, the circulatory system, and some of the medical evidence given during trial. A court may hold an evidentiary hearing when jury misconduct is alleged in a new trial motion, but the court may also, in its discretion, conclude that a hearing is not necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact. ( People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 415, 272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260.) Based on the proffered juror statements, the trial court denied defendant's motion to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Renee P. improperly asserted her expertise during deliberations. However, it did conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether Renee P. had consulted and introduced outside sources during deliberations, and took testimony from Juror Cecil Q. on this issue. It was stipulated that Renee P. would categorically deny consulting outside medical sources and bringing such information back to the jury. After considering the evidence adduced at the hearing, the trial court ruled that Renee P. had not consulted nor introduced outside sources and denied defendant's motion for a new trial. We will consider in turn defendant's claims that Renee P. rendered an improper opinion during deliberations and that she improperly introduced outside sources.
`It is not improper for a juror, regardless of his or her educational or employment background, to express an opinion on a technical subject, so long as the opinion is based on the evidence at trial. Jurors' views of the evidence, moreover, are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including their education and professional work. A juror, however, should not discuss an opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside sources. Such injection of external information in the form of a juror's own claim to expertise or specialized knowledge of an issue is misconduct.' ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1265, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225 ( Steele ), quoting In re Malone (1996) 12 Cal.4th 935, 963, 50 Cal.Rptr.2d 281, 911 P.2d 468.) In Steele, the defendant introduced extensive evidence regarding his military training and Vietnam experience and its effect, if any, on a brain electrical activity mapping (BEAM) test. He alleged that four jurors, two with military and Vietnam experience, and two with medical experience, committed misconduct by offering their expertise to other jurors. It was alleged that two jurors `with medical experience ... told the [other jurors] that the criteria that the Doctor's [ sic ] used to establish the validity of the B.E.A.M. Test' was `inadequate' based on `what they have learned in their own experience in the medical field.' ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1260, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Another juror stated that this input `helped me because I have no experience when it comes to that type of thing.' ( Ibid. ) The trial court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and denied defendant's motion for a new trial. We agreed and first noted: To the extent the declarations stated what effect these jurors had on the deliberations, the statements are inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1150, subdivision (a), which prohibits evidence showing the effect that statements or conduct [have] `upon a juror either in influencing him to assent or to dissent from the verdict.' ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1265, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) We continued: A juror may not express opinions based on asserted personal expertise that is different from or contrary to the law as the trial court stated it or to the evidence, but if we allow jurors with specialized knowledge to sit on a jury, and we do, we must allow those jurors to use their experience in evaluating and interpreting that evidence. Moreover, during the give and take of deliberations, it is virtually impossible to divorce completely one's background from one's analysis of the evidence. We cannot demand that jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in the subtle distinctions that attorneys draw, never refer to their background during deliberations.... [¶] ... In this case, the declarations do not so clearly show that the jurors crossed the line into misconduct as to have required the court to conduct an evidentiary hearing. ( Id. at p. 1266, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) Similarly, in the present case, the evidence presented in support of defendant's motion for a new trial does not show that Renee P. offered the jurors any basis for deciding the case other than the evidence and testimony presented at trial. No declaration suggests that she made any assertion inconsistent with the properly admitted evidence and testimony. Indeed, the remarks attributed to her in her declaration are consistent with the trial testimony of the pathologist, who expounded at length on the concept of blood flow, circulation, and the meaning of shunting. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Renee P.'s explanation of blood evidence was not misconduct.
It is improper for a juror to receive information outside of court about the pending case, and to discuss the case with nonjurors. ( In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 647, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) When such misconduct is determined to be prejudicial, reversal is required. ( Id. at pp. 650-651, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Cecile Q., the sole juror called to testify at the hearing, was ambiguous as to whether Juror Renee P. had consulted outside sources. She first stated that Renee P. had done research on the point of whether April had been alive at the time of the rape. She explained what ... research she had done, and we listened.... Then we discussed it. But she conceded that she could not recall when Renee P. had made this statement or when she had done the research. She also hedged her statement: Maybe I just, we just assumed that it was a research thing. In other words, she had, she had access to the books, or ... the medical library. Maybe. I don't know. The defense attorney also questioned Cecile Q., ultimately receiving responses that indicated there was no consultation of outside materials. She stated, I don't remember anybody saying exactly if they were going to a library or if it was mentioned and if they really did. She also equivocated, I'm not really sure, a hundred percent sure. I know that the subject was brought up, but whether they really did it, I don't know. The defense attorney again asked who brought up the subject of consulting other books, to which she stated that Renee P. did discuss it, but did not mention that she had consulted books at home or at a library. Further, she stated that at no point did jurors return from a recess with additional information they had not had previously. The trial court ruled that the defense had not established that outside sources were brought into the room. It therefore reaffirmed its earlier ruling that no misconduct occurred. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1175, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.)