Opinion ID: 609824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Juror challenges for cause

Text: 198 Chandler contends that the district court erred in refusing to strike four jurors for cause. We review for an abuse of discretion, mindful that there are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of discretion. United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 509 (11th Cir.1983). 199 A party challenging a juror for cause must demonstrate that the juror in question exhibited actual bias by showing either an express admission of bias or facts demonstrating such a close connection to the present case that bias must be presumed. United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 955, modified, 910 F.2d 713 (11th Cir.1990). A juror who would automatically vote for the death penalty in every case must be removed for cause because that juror will fail to consider the aggravating and mitigating evidence as the instruction require her to do. Morgan v. Illinois, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2229, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992). 200 Chandler argues that four jurors should have been removed for cause.a. Jurors Frye and Landers 201 Chandler argues that jurors Frye and Landers should have been excused because both indicated that they would impose the death penalty if Chandler was found guilty. Reading the entirety of their responses at voir dire, it does not appear that the district court abused its discretion by not striking these jurors for cause. The answers make it clear that while Frye and Landers were proponents of the death penalty, they would not automatically vote for the death penalty if they found Chandler guilty of murder. 202 Chandler also argues that Landers should have been removed for cause because he was overheard telling other jurors that [t]he way to get off this case is to say the defendant looks guilty. RIV-312. Although informed of Landers's remark by the district court, defense counsel did not explore the statement during voir dire questioning of Landers. The district court held that this incident did not make it totally improper for Landers to serve on the jury and rejected Chandler's motion to strike Landers for cause. 203 Most jurors are aware that they can avoid jury duty by claiming a lack of impartiality. The statement does not demonstrate that Landers was biased against Chandler. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to remove Landers for cause. 204 b. Juror Tuggle 205 Chandler argues that juror Tuggle should have been excused because he was biased against drug activity. During voir dire, Tuggle stated that he had a son-in-law who was in jail because marijuana and possibly some other articles were found in his son-in-law's car. The juror's response to the district court's questions do not demonstrate that the Tuggle would be biased against a defendant prosecuted for marijuana distribution. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to remove Tuggle for cause. 206 c. Juror Grimes 207 Chandler argues that juror Grimes should have been excused because she would not consider some of the statutory mitigating factors in reaching her conclusion on the appropriateness of sentencing Chandler to death. During voir dire, Grimes stated that she did not have strong feelings towards the death penalty one way or the other. However, she also stated that she did not believe that the defendant's age and past criminal history would affect her recommendation for or against a death sentence. Both of these factors are mitigating factors as defined in Section 848(m). 208 In Morgan, the Supreme Court asserted that: 209 [a]ny juror to whom mitigating factors are likewise irrelevant should be disqualified for cause, for that juror has formed an opinion concerning the merits of the case without basis in the evidence developed at trial. 210 --- U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2235. Grimes's answers do not raise the primary concern of Morgan; that is, a juror who would automatically recommend a penalty of death regardless of any mitigating evidence. The statement that she would not consider two of the statutory mitigating factors was made in response to defense counsel's questions and in ignorance of the mandates of Section 848. Jurors are not expected to know the law prior to being properly instructed. More important, Grimes stated that she would follow the district court's instructions in arriving at her decision. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in finding that Grimes would be able to follow the court's instructions. 211 In conclusion, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse for cause these four jurors.