Opinion ID: 2519206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: count 1 first degree murder

Text: 1. On or about July 2, 2004, 2. in Fremont County, Wyoming, ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR JR. (D.O.B. 09/05/1974), 3. while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate the abuse of Marcella Hope Yellowbear, D.O.B. 08/15/2002, a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, 4. killed Marcella Hope Yellowbear, a human being. . . . . COUNT 2  ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT TO FIRST DEGREE MURDER 1. On or between May 15, 2004 and July 2, 2004, 2. in Fremont County, Wyoming, 3. ANDREW JOHN YELLOWBEAR JR., (D.O.B. 09/05/1974), 4. knowingly aided or abetted another person, Macalia Marcine Blackburn, in the commission of a felony, specifically the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate the abuse of Marcella Hope Yellowbear, D.O.B. 08/15/2002, a child under the age of sixteen (16) years and said abuse resulted in the death of Marcella Hope Yellowbear, a human being. such facts constituting a violation of W.S. § 6-1-201, (1977) as amended[.] [¶ 41] Almost immediately, the appellant filed a motion to strike the amended information, alleging: (1) the State did not have leave of court to file the amended information; (2) the appellant had not consented to the amendment; (3) the appellant's rights were prejudiced by the amendment; (4) the first count in the new information alleged new elements; and (5) the second count alleged a new charge for which there had been no preliminary hearing. At the arraignment held soon thereafter, the district court noted these difficulties with the amended information and chose to arraign the appellant on the single original charge. The State responded by filing a motion to strike its own amended information. In what can only be described as a strange turn of events, the appellant then contested the State's motion to strike, arguing that, by its statements during the arraignment, the district court had, in effect, remanded the entire matter to the circuit court for another preliminary hearing. The court granted the State's motion and the case continued under the original single-count information. [¶ 42] On May 20, 2005, the appellant filed another motion to dismiss the information. The contentions of that motion may be summarized as follows: (1) the information is not explicit as to the manner in which the appellant is alleged to have violated the child abuse statute, which statute is complex and can be violated in a number of ways; and (2) Blackburn and the appellant are charged in the conjunctive, with no indication of what acts either allegedly committed. Fundamentally, the appellant alleges that the information is so inadequate as to violate his constitutional due process right to notice of the charges being made against him. On the same date, the appellant filed a motion for bill of particulars stating essentially the same grievances. [¶ 43] The motion for bill of particulars was heard on June 16, 2005. The appellant set forth in detail the arguments contained in his motions, and the State responded with the contention that the appellant, rather than seeking clarification of the charge, was seeking evidence, facts, theories, and strategies. The district court resolved the dispute by ordering the State to provide a bill of particulars specifying which subsection of the child abuse statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-503 (LexisNexis 2007), was the basis for the underlying felony. [¶ 44] The State complied with the district court's order by filing a one-sentence bill of particulars declaring that the State asserts the Defendant, in the alternative, violated W.S. § 6-2-503(a) or W.S. § 6-2-503(b). [3] Concurrently, the State filed a response to the appellant's earlier motion to dismiss the information, which motion had not been heard at the time the motion for bill of particulars was heard. The appellant replied almost immediately with another motion to dismiss the information. In addition to the contentions raised in his earlier motion, the appellant added the following: 3. It is improper for child abuse to serve as the predicate for felony murder. This underlying charge could not have involved conduct with a felonious purpose other than that the alleged conduct purportedly killed the victim. 4. To permit such a felony-murder charge of this nature would eliminate the need for the State to prove an intentional or knowing killing in most murder cases. 5. It would be improper to find anyone similarly charged to be a first degree murderer when the predicate felony was inherent in the killing and when the State fails or cannot prove another form of first degree murder to the jury. [¶ 45] The appellant fleshed out these arguments in a memorandum of law outlining the perceived difficulty that results from basing a first-degree murder charge upon an underlying assaultive-type crime: the distinctions among homicides would be rendered meaningless because all second-degree murders and manslaughters would become first-degree felony murders. The State countered these arguments by repeating its earlier response to the motion for a bill of particularsthat the notice provided by the information was sufficientby pointing out that the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-101(a) clearly includes child abuse as a predicate felony for felony murder, and by citing Johnson v. State, 2003 WY 9, ¶ 34, 61 P.3d 1234, 1248 (Wyo.2003), for the proposition that the statute gives fair notice that if a child dies as the result of child abuse, then the potential penalties include execution or life in prison. [¶ 46] The appellant's first motion to dismiss the information was heard on August 12, 2005. Primarily, the appellant argued that he was unable to prepare a defense to the crime as charged, even as clarified by the bill of particulars, because the child abuse statute can be violated in so many separate ways. The State argued that the information was sufficient because it alleged all the necessary elements of the crime of felony murder, and that the bill of particulars was sufficient because it apprised the appellant of the fact that the State intended to allege in the alternative in regard to the child abuse statute. [4] The district court took the issue under advisement for issuance of a written decision. [¶ 47] All that we have written so far on this issue has been prologue to what happened next. On August 25, 2005, the district court authored a decision letter siding largely with the appellant. Although the court denied the motion to dismiss, it did agree with the appellant that the existing felony information was insufficient to provide notice to him as to what crime was charged, and that it would create a  Tanner problem when it came time to instruct the jury. [5] To remedy the situation, the district court ordered as follows: The Motion to Dismiss is denied; however, the State is to file an Amended Information specifying in detail the exact nature of the charges against the Defendant. The Amended Information must include the specific portions of the child abuse statute upon which the State relies. Nothing in this letter precludes the State from pleading in the alternative; however, if the State is choosing to do so, it must set out the alternative theories in the Information. Furthermore, the State must draft a proposed verdict form and proper elements instruction(s). The proposed verdict form and elements instruction(s) are to be consistent with the Amended Information and should be drafted under the guidance provided in the Tanner line of cases. . . . [¶ 48] Even before the order implementing the decision letter was filed, the State had filed a single document entitled Amended Felony Information, Proposed Verdict Form and Proposed Jury Instructions. It is this instrument that changed the course of these proceedings and resulted in the issue that we now address. Instead of charging a single count of felony murder under alternative theories, it charged four separate crimes: one count of felony murder based upon intentional physical injury child abuse, one count of felony murder based upon reckless physical injury child abuse, one count of accessory before the fact to felony murder based upon aiding and abetting Blackburn in intentional physical injury child abuse, and one count of accessory before the fact to felony murder based upon aiding and abetting Blackburn in reckless physical injury child abuse. [¶ 49] Perhaps not surprisingly, the appellant filed yet another motion to dismiss. In addition to all of his earlier arguments, the appellant now averred that the amended information alleged new and different crimes. The State's response disavowed any intent to charge new crimes and declared that the purpose of the amended information, filed at the court's direction, was to separate out what the appellant had always known: that the State would allege, alternatively, that the appellant had recklessly or intentionally abused his daughter and killed her, or that Blackburn had done so, with the appellant aiding and abetting her in such a fashion that he associated himself with her in commission of the crime. In particular, the State noted that Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201(b)(i) (LexisNexis 2007) allows an accessory before the fact to be informed against as if he were the principal. [6] [¶ 50] We will not detail the appellant's reply to the State's response to its motion to dismiss, except to note that the appellant asserted his right to a preliminary hearing on the amended information. He did so again when the motion to dismiss was heard on October 10, 2005. The motion to dismiss was denied on the ground that the amended information did not add new crimes or materially change the allegations of the original felony information. The district court's conclusion that new crimes had not been added likely explains why the district court did not remand the case for a preliminary hearing, or arraign the appellant on the four charges of the amended information, or require the appellant to enter a plea to each charge. [7] The logical inference that must be drawn from all of this, despite the verdict form which we will discuss more in detail later, is that the appellant actually was only convicted of one crimefelony murderwhich crime the jury found he committed in more than one of the alternative methods alleged by the State. See infra at ¶ 58. [¶ 51] It is this conclusion that brings us full circle because it brings us to the point where we must ask whether the contested instruction had any improper effect upon the verdict. The contested instruction began as the State's proposed Instruction No. 30, entitled Aiding and Abetting by Violating Duty to Protect Child. As proposed, it read as follows: When considering whether defendant aided or abetted Macalia Blackburn in the crime of felony child abuse murder, you may consider whether defendant knew of a serious and immediate threat to the welfare of Marcel[l]a Yellowbear and failed to act to protect Marcel[l]a Yellowbear from that harm. That is, whether there is evidence from which it can be inferred that the defendant knew that Marcel[l]a Yellowbear was sustaining injury and, based on the severity of the injuries being sustained, knew that there was a substantial risk that death or great bodily injury would result if the defendant did not act to protect Marcel[l]a Yellowbear. Parents are required to intercede on their child's behalf and, if they fail to act, they risk being held responsible for the other person's criminal conduct. By failing to act, the parent may be deemed to have implicitly sanctioned the criminal behavior and, therefore, may be held accountable for the abusive conduct. Even in situations where the parent is not present at the time when the abuse resulting in death takes place, the parent may be held accountable for the criminal conduct resulting in death, if it is proved that the parent knew that the child had been abused by the principal in the past and, because of the nature of previous injuries sustained by the child, also knew there was a substantial risk of serious harm, yet took no action to protect the child from future injury by the abuser. [¶ 52] As authority for the proposed instruction, the State cited People v. Pollock, 202 Ill.2d 189, 215-16, 269 Ill.Dec. 197, 780 N.E.2d 669, 684 (2002). The State also filed a lengthy memorandum of law in support of the instruction, in which it cited Wyoming statutes and cases, and cases from numerous other jurisdictions, that establish a parent's duty to protect his or her child. The appellant objected to the proposed instruction by filing his own memorandum of law, with its principal argument being that a parent's duty to protect his or her child is not an element of the underlying felony of child abuse or of the accessory before the fact statute. In other words, in the view of the appellant, the State's proposed instruction would add a crime of omission to the crimes of commission defined by the statutes. During the instruction conference held at the end of the guilt phase of the trial, the appellant refined this argument by noting that the giving of a parental duty instruction would, in effect, replace the underlying crime of child abuse with the crime of child endangerment, with which he had not been charged. [8] [¶ 53] After much debate, and over the appellant's objection, the district court decided to instruct the jury as to parental duty. Before we quote the two instructions that he gave in lieu of the State's proposed instruction, we will first set forth Wyoming's pattern jury instructions that normally would be given in a case alleging that the defendant aided and abetted in the commission of a crime: W.P.J.I.C. 7.01A ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT  RESPONSIBILITY It is not necessary that the defendant personally did every act necessary to constitute the crime of ________. It is enough if [he knowingly aided and abetted someone else to commit the crime of ________] [he counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured some other person to commit the crime of ________, and the crime was attempted or committed. W.P.J.I.C. 7.01B ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT  ELEMENTS The elements of being an Accessory Before the Fact to the Crime of ________ are: 1. On or about the ___ day of ________, 200__ 2. In ________ County, Wyoming 3. The Defendant, ________ 4. Knowingly [aided or abetted another person in the {commission of} {attempt to commit} the crime of _________] [counseled, encouraged, hired, commanded or procured the crime of ________ to be committed by another person], and 5. That other person [committed] [attempted to commit] the crime of ________. . . . . W.P.J.I.C. 7.01C ACCESSORY BEFORE THE FACT  MERE PRESENCE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME INSUFFICIENT TO CONVICT Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct for the jury to find that the defendant was an accessory before the fact to that crime. The State must prove that the defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime in some way as a participant  someone who wanted the crime to be committed  and not as a mere spectator. [¶ 54] We have identified the basic elements of the crime of accessory before the fact as being (1) someone committed the underlying felony; and (2) the defendant participated in that crime. Hawkes v. State, 626 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Wyo.1981); see also Goldsmith v. Cheney, 447 F.2d 624, 627-28 (10th Cir.1971) (To prove aiding and abetting, the State must prove that the crime was committed by someone and that the person charged as an aider and abettor associated himself and participated in the accomplishment and success of the criminal venture). In the instant case, the district court did not give these pattern instructions and it did not define the crime of being an accessory before the fact as we did in Hawkes. Instead, the district court instructed the jury as follows: INSTRUCTION NO. 30 To convict a person of aiding or abetting (accessory before the fact), it must be proved that the crime was committed by someone and that the aider or abettor associated himself with and participated in the accomplishment and success of the criminal venture. Merely being present at the scene of a crime or merely knowing that a crime is being committed or is about to be committed is not sufficient conduct for the jury to find that the Defendant was an accessory before the fact to the crime unless the Defendant had a duty to prevent the crime and a reasonable opportunity to do so, and the jury finds that the Defendant's failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the crime constituted knowingly aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime or counseling, encouraging or commanding someone to commit the crime. The State must prove either: 1. That the Defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime in some way as a participant  someone who wanted the crime to be committed  and not as a mere spectator; or 2. That the Defendant knew that the child had been abused in the past, and because of the nature of the previous injuries, knew there was an imminent danger to the physical health or welfare of the child, and took no action to protect the child from the abuser; and that the Defendant's failure to act constituted knowingly aiding or abetting in the commission of the crime or counseling, encouraging or commanding someone to commit the crime. (Emphasis added.) INSTRUCTION NO. 31 It is the duty of a parent to protect their children and to do whatever may be reasonably necessary for their care and their safety. [¶ 55] Before deciding to give these instructions, the district court heard at length from both counsel, described its own research into the matter, and literally agonized on the record as to whether the instructions should be given. Its final decision was based upon the following rationale: THE COURT: This  as I indicated, this is a very difficult problem. And quite frankly, as I've gone through it from the moment I first got the State's memorandum to the defendant's memorandum, I have gone back and forth. My first reaction was not to instruct on a duty. And I did some substantial research. Obviously, there is no  nothing in Wyoming that directs us to do this or directs us not to do it; but certainly there is no authority for giving this instruction. Maybe the initial question is does Wyoming  does the common law of Wyoming provide that the parents have a duty to protect and care for their children. It seems to me that they do. Now, the statutes are all civil statutes, but there are adoption statutes; for example, In re, Adoption TLC, which is at 46 Pacific 3d, they talk about the customary parental duties of a parent who is not incarcerated. And a termination case, MBB versus ERW, the State talks about its duty to supervise the welfare of the children and promote their best interest when the State takes over custody. Now, it seems to me if the State has that duty, the parent has at least as great a duty. The Dellapenta case talks about the duty to buckle in, which implies there is some duty to provide the safety of the children. One of the statutes, 14-2-403, talks about parental rights or duties. So I  I think in Wyoming, by implication, at least, there is a parental duty to protect and care for their children. Then the question is, Should the jury be instructed on them? In other words, would the Supreme Court, if it were to address this, say, Is there an exception to the general rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime does not make a person an accomplice; or would they say that there is an exception that where there's an affirmative common-law duty, they may be guilty of criminal conduct by failure to act, or what I think the State referred to as an act of omission? (Emphasis added.) [¶ 56] The district court's instincts were correct; these instructions should not have been given. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-102(a) (LexisNexis 2007) provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Common-law crimes are abolished. No conduct constitutes a crime unless it is described as a crime in this act or in another statute of this state. . . . (Emphasis added.) We have recognized this principle many times. See Mares v. State, 939 P.2d 724, 727 (Wyo.1997); Bush v. State, 908 P.2d 963, 965-66 (Wyo.1995); and Keser v. State, 706 P.2d 263, 269 (Wyo.1985). Consequently, the important question is not what may have constituted a common-law crime, but what the crime is under the language of the statute alleged in the charging document. Keats v. State, 2003 WY 19, ¶ 25, 64 P.3d 104, 112 (Wyo.2003). The words of the statute emphasized aboveas a crimemake it clear that conduct may not be charged as a crime unless it is made a crime by statute. Furthermore, [I]t is well settled that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed, which means that they are not to be enlarged by implication or extended by inference or construction   . This rule, said to be based upon a conception of manifest justice and the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested primarily in the Legislature, requires a sufficient degree of certainty in a criminal statute, that will place it outside the necessity of judicial determination, through mere implication or construction, of who or what acts are punishable under it. . . . State v. Stern, 526 P.2d 344, 350 (Wyo.1974), quoting State v. A.H. Read Co., 33 Wyo. 387, 240 P. 208, 212-13 (1925). [¶ 57] It was error for the district court to instruct the jury as it did about parental duty because neither the crime of child abuse, nor the crime of accessory before the fact contains that duty as an element, or makes criminal a violation of such duty. Therefore, we must evaluate, in the context of the charging-document complexities described above, whether the error prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial. Mainville v. State, 607 P.2d 339, 343 (Wyo.1980); W.R.A.P. 9.04. [¶ 58] Succinctly stated, the four theories of guilt to be separately considered by the jury were: (1) the appellant killed Marcella by intentionally physically abusing her; (2) the appellant killed Marcella by recklessly physically abusing her; (3) the appellant aided and abetted Blackburn, who killed Marcella by intentionally physically abusing her; and (4) the appellant aided and abetted Blackburn, who killed Marcella by recklessly physically abusing her. The verdict form clearly delineated these theories and required the jury to decide each of them separately. The jury found the appellant guilty under all four theories. Without more, we would have to conclude that the appellant was prejudiced as to both accessory theories, due to inclusion of the parental-duty instructions. However, the verdict form in this case was very thorough and complete, and as to each accessory count, the jury was required to answer the following special interrogatory: Do you find that the Defendant knowingly associated himself with the crime in some way as a participantsomeone who wanted the crime to be committedand not as a mere spectator? By twice answering this question in the affirmative, the jury effectively negated any harm that may have occurred as a result of inclusion of the parental-duty concept. That is, the jury found that the appellant's crimes were crimes of commission, and not crimes of omission or lapse in duty, and therefore satisfied the dictates of the statute and Hawkes. See supra at ¶¶ 49, 54. [¶ 59] We will summarize our conclusions in this section of the opinion as follows: 1. While the statute allows a person charged with aiding and abetting to be informed against and convicted as if he were a principal, that is not what the State did in this case. Rather, the State charged the appellant with four theories of liability under one count: two as a principal and two as an accessory. The verdict form and judgment and sentence make it appear as though the appellant were charged with, and convicted of, four separate crimes. 2. The appellant was afforded a preliminary hearing on only one crime, was arraigned on only one crime, and entered a plea to only one crime, leading to the inexorable conclusion that he could be convicted of only one crime. 3. The jury separately considered and determined each theory of guilt. Our review of the record indicates that there was sufficient evidence to support each of those findings of guilt. 4. Inclusion of the parental-duty instruction was erroneous, but such error was harmless, given the circumstances set forth above. [¶ 60] Finally, we will note that the language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-1-201(b)(i) that allows an accessory before the fact to be indicted, informed against, tried and convicted as if he were a principal, is fraught with danger, given the need for notice, specificity, and due process in criminal proceedings. This case should be adequate evidence of that fact. We have previously stated that the rationale behind this language, which abrogated the common-law distinctions between principal, aider and abettor, and accessory before the fact, was to allow all to be treated as a principal for purposes of punishment. Jahnke v. State, 692 P.2d 911, 920-21 (Wyo.1984), overruled on other grounds by Vaughn v. State, 962 P.2d 149 (Wyo.1998). It might have been better simply to say the latter. At the very least, prosecutors must be aware that they cannot charge both that a defendant acted as a principal and that he acted as an accessory before the fact, as two separate crimes, in one count. Did the prosecutor commit misconduct during rebuttal closing argument by inserting his own credibility and beliefs, by arguing facts not in evidence, and by presenting an argument that was not properly a rebuttal argument? [¶ 61] The district judge met with counsel in chambers after the trial phase verdict was received, at which time the following colloquy occurred: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Although we did not do so at the time the rebuttal closing was made, we would object to the improper form and nature of the rebuttal closing. I believe that it constituted prosecutorial misconduct, and we would move the Court for a mistrial based on that at this time. THE COURT: All right. The Court agrees that it was not appropriate rebuttal. It was not rebuttal in the sense that it did not address comments made by the defense during its closing and not reasonably anticipated; however, I don't have any reason to believe and the defense has not stated anything that indicates that it is prejudicial. I treat it almost like a plain-error analysis, and I will deny that motion. [¶ 62] After the penalty phase of the trial, but prior to sentencing, the appellant filed a motion for new trial, based upon the same grounds, but with more detail as to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct: 3. During the state's rebuttal closing, the prosecution did not respond to the defense closing argument. Instead, the prosecution made improper comments, such as calling Mr. Yellowbear the father from hell and injecting his personal opinions about Mr. Yellowbear's guilt by stating that he had spoken to his mother about the case who stated something to the effect of sometimes the weak and the defenseless children only find refuge in the grave. Such statements also constituted arguing facts not in evidence before the jury. Thus, the rebuttal closing was improper, inflammatory and prejudicial to Mr. Yellowbear. [¶ 63] The motion was heard on May 9, 2006. After brief argument from counsel, the district court ruled as follows: I agree with [the prosecutor] that this has to receive a plain-error analysis since there was no contemporaneous objection to [the prosecutor's] remarks. The record does reflect that the incident alleged occurred. The movant in this case, Mr. Yellowbear, through counsel, must demonstrate violation of a clear and unequivocal rule of law. That's a little more close, but I also think that counsel has met that obstacle. [The prosecutor] did say, Her first line was, There is no credible evidence that my client wished harm on Marcella in any way. That, perhaps, is proper rebuttal. The balance of the argument I don't believe is appropriate rebuttal. It does not address factual issues raised by [defense counsel] in her closing argument. It basically is a conclusion that should have been given at the Stateat the close of the State's primary argument, at least in large part. Having said that I don't think it's proper rebuttal and I'm convinced that it is not proper rebuttal, Yellowbear has to show  Mr. Yellowbear has to show that his substantial rights have been abridged. And I don't think this is the case in this situation for a number of reasons. First, the remarks were relatively succinct. [The prosecutor] didn't drag it out. While he wasn't making rebuttal, he just made a brief repetition of the closing or the conclusion of the primary argument. He did not call into question his [ sic ] credibility of the witnesses to any extent. He didn't insert his own personal belief. And given the evidence that was presented, I don't believe that even if [defense counsel] had objected that this would have affected the outcome of the trial. Frankly, if [defense counsel] had objected, I probably would have stopped [the prosecutor]. I'm not being critical of counsel and I don't think it's ineffective counsel not to object. I recognize that there is a substantial school of law that  or school of thought that in legal arguments, counsel should be given sufficient and substantial latitude, and I think that's what [defense counsel] was doing. And having ruled that I don't think this is significant, I think her failure to object is fairly inconsequential. So I'm going to deny the motion for a new trial. [¶ 64] It is customary for us, before discussing an issue, to set forth the standard of review that will be applied. That is harder to do in this case than it usually is. The appellant presents the issue as if it were simply one of prosecutorial misconduct to which there was no objection, meaning our review would be for plain error. See Adams v. State, 2005 WY 94, ¶ 18, 117 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Wyo.2005). The State, perhaps understandably, agrees that plain error review is appropriate, citing Seymore v. State, 2007 WY 32, ¶ 17, 152 P.3d 401, 407 (Wyo.2007) for the proposition that a contemporaneous objection is required to avoid plain error analysis. The purpose of the plain error rule, however, is to allow us to review errors that were not brought to the attention of the trial court. W.R.A.P. 9.05. It seems to go without saying that, where the issue was raised and decided below, the first two elements of the plain error test are inapplicable. [9] [¶ 65] The problem with plain error review in this case is that the district court considered and decided the question of prosecutorial misconduct in the rebuttal closing, not once, but twice. In denying the appellant's oral motion for a mistrial, the district court found that the rebuttal closing was not proper rebuttal, but that it was not prejudicial. Similarly, in denying the appellant's subsequent written motion for a new trial, the district court concluded that the appellant's substantial rights had not been abridged by the rebuttal closing, even if it were improper. Consequently, what we are really doing here is reviewing the denial of the motion for mistrial and the denial of the motion for a new trial. [¶ 66] We review the denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of discretion. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 2, ¶ 11, 149 P.3d 707, 710 (Wyo.2007). The same standard applies to review of the denial of a motion for a new trial. Barker v. State, 2006 WY 104, ¶ 12, 141 P.3d 106, 112 (Wyo.2006). In either case, an abuse of discretion occurs where the district court could not have reasonably concluded as it did. Thomas v. State, 2006 WY 34, ¶ 10, 131 P.3d 348, 352 (Wyo.2006); Gunnett v. State, 2005 WY 8, ¶ 15, 104 P.3d 775, 779 (Wyo.2005). [¶ 67] It is important to remember that there is a distinction between the role of this Court and the role of the district court in regard to both of these motions. The district court is not applying a standard of review when it determines the motion. Rather, in the case of a motion for mistrial, the district court is governed by the following principles: Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial. (Emphasis added.) Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo.1995); see also Martin, 2007 WY 2, ¶¶ 18-19, 149 P.3d at 712. This is similar to the district court's role in determining a motion for a new trial, where W.R.Cr.P. 33(a) dictates that the court may grant such a motion if required in the interest of justice. In discussing this rule, we have repeatedly stated that it is the appellant's burden to show how he was prejudiced by the denial. See, e.g., Doherty v. State, 2006 WY 39, ¶ 27, 131 P.3d 963, 972 (Wyo. 2006); Gunnett, 2005 WY 8, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d at 780; Black v. State, 869 P.2d 1137, 1141 (Wyo.1994); Calene v. State, 846 P.2d 679, 684 (Wyo.1993); Garcia v. State, 777 P.2d 603, 609 (Wyo.1989); Gist v. State, 737 P.2d 336, 343 (Wyo.1987). [¶ 68] Boiled down to its essence, the process is this: (1) when a motion for mistrial or new trial is presented, the district court considers the motion and grants it if justice so requires; (2) justice requires that the motion be granted only if the appellant has been prejudiced because his or her substantial rights were abridged; (3) if the motion is denied, and that denial is appealed, we review that denial for an abuse of discretion; (4) abuse of discretion has occurred where the district court could not have reasonably concluded as it did. With specific regard to claims of prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument, we consider the alleged misconduct in the context of the entire argument, and the entire record, with the determinative factor being whether, in the absence of the error, the verdict might have been more favorable to the accused. Phillips v. State, 2007 WY 25, ¶ 8, 151 P.3d 1131, 1133-34 (Wyo.2007); see also Talley v. State, 2007 WY 37, ¶ 9, 153 P.3d 256, 260 (Wyo.2007); Butcher v. State, 2005 WY 146, ¶ 39, 123 P.3d 543, 554 (Wyo.2005); Burton v. State, 2002 WY 71, ¶¶ 11-12, 46 P.3d 309, 313 (Wyo.2002). Although the district court in the instant case stated that it was applying plain error analysis to its determination of both motions, the record reveals that what it actually did was to consider the alleged prosecutorial misconduct under the above standard and to find that the appellant was not prejudiced, which process was appropriate. [¶ 69] Because the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument was brief, and because the allegations of misconduct must be viewed in context, we will set forth the entire rebuttal closing: [PROSECUTOR:] Thank you, Judge. Ladies and gentlemen, you have heard much evidence and testimony over the last few days. I won't repeat it to you. What counsel has said is not evidence, and there's a reason for that. Her first line was, There is no credible evidence that my client wished harm on Marcella in any way. Look at those pictures. That man is the father from hell. The defendant did to Marcella what he wanted. She took it for as long as she could, and she died. She died because of him. And now is the time to hold him responsible. Only you can do that. I ask you, on behalf of the people of the state of Wyoming, to go into that jury room, to deliberate, to think about this case thoroughly, to consider each and every piece of evidence, including that murder weapon right there, and to mark guilty as to each of those four counts on that verdict form, and to answer yes as to each of those three questions that follow the verdicts on Counts 3 and 4. An old Greek philosopher said, The strong do as they will; the weak endure what they must. This case is over. This case is over for Marcella, but it is not over until justice is done. My mom said  when I talked to her about this case, she said, Some of these kids have no refuge but the grave. And Marcella is crying out to you from the grave today. Now is the time to hold Mr. Yellowbear  to hold Mr. Yellowbear responsible for his conduct; not to shift the blame to someone who isn't present in this courtroom, but to hold him responsible for what he did and what he didn't do. He is guilty. The evidence shows you he is guilty of each of these four counts. And when you're back there deliberating, I hope you'll do one thing for me. Pick out State's Exhibit 72. Pick it out and set it someplace where you all can see it. And you'll know, when you look at that exhibit, what must be done in this case.[ [10] ] Now is the time to hold the defendant responsible, to make him accountable for what he did, for the choices he made, for everything that he permitted to happen, that he chose not to stop. And there's a laundry list nine days long. Nine days long, the evidence showing that that defendant is responsible for the murder of his daughter, who was not even two years old, a baby. And that man is responsible for her murder. And he wants to walk out of here a free man? I don't think so. Thank you very much. [¶ 70] The appellant challenges this rebuttal argument on several grounds: (1) that it was not proper rebuttal in that it did not respond to comments or arguments raised in the appellant's closing argument; (2) that it argued facts not in evidence; (3) that the prosecutor inserted his own beliefs and credibility; (4) that it appealed to the jury's passions; and (5) that it told the jury it had a duty to convict the appellant. When the district court orally denied the motion for new trial, it first agreed with defense counsel that the prosecutor wasn't making rebuttal, and that his statements were, to that extent, improper. The district court concluded, however, that the appellant was not prejudiced because the rebuttal closing was brief, that the prosecutor did not call into question the credibility of any witnesses, and that he did not insert his own personal beliefs into the argument. Further, the district court opined that, even had an objection to the rebuttal closing been made and sustained, it would not have affected the outcome of the trial, given the evidence that was presented. Instead, the district court characterized the matter as not being significant and as being fairly inconsequential. [¶ 71] We cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in reaching these conclusions. This was a nine-day jury trial with dozens of witnesses and dozens of exhibits. The incriminating evidence was powerful and overwhelming. The State's closing argument consumes twenty-eight transcript pages. The defense closing is thirty-five pages in length. It is not reasonably likely or probable that the prosecutor's few words in rebuttal had any prejudicial effect upon the outcome of the trial. [¶ 72] While the prosecutor's description of the appellant as the father from hell and the reference to the conversation the prosecutor had with his mother were not well-advised, they are comparable to comments that we previously have found not to constitute reversible error. See James v. State, 888 P.2d 200, 207 (Wyo.1994) (prosecutor calls defendant a leech and a predator); Tennant v. State, 786 P.2d 339, 346 (Wyo.1990) (prosecutor calls defendant a leech, a bloodsucker, and a predator). In the context of the entire record of the present case, we reach the same conclusion here: this brief rebuttal closing was not reversible error. Furthermore, while the characterization of the appellant was extreme, it was made in response to defense counsel's argument that there is no credible evidence that my client wished harm on Marcella in any way, and the prosecutor followed the characterization with a direction to the jury to [l]ook at the pictures. Though perhaps inartful and extreme, this was an attempt to connect the characterization to the evidence. [¶ 73] We have often stated that the purpose of closing argument is to allow counsel to suggest ways for the jury to view the evidence, and that prosecutors, like defense counsel, have the right to review the evidence and to explore the logical inferences that arise therefrom. See, e.g., Moe v. State, 2005 WY 58, ¶ 20, 110 P.3d 1206, 1214 (Wyo. 2005); Leiker v. State, 994 P.2d 917, 919 (Wyo.1999). In Trujillo v. State, 2002 WY 51, ¶ 5, 44 P.3d 22, 24-25 (Wyo.2002), we adopted the following ABA standards as guidelines for prosecutorial argument: (a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw. (b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant. (c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury. (d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict. (e) It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury is kept within proper, accepted bounds. This last guideline is consistent with our previous observation that the scope of permissible argument is best determined by the trial judge because he or she is in the best position to assess the appropriateness of the argument and any prejudice that may result. See Harper v. State, 970 P.2d 400, 403 (Wyo. 1998); Mintun v. State, 966 P.2d 954, 959-60 (Wyo.1998); Dennis v. State, 963 P.2d 972, 976 (Wyo.1998). [¶ 74] Our assessment of the State's closing argument in the instant case is that it violated neither the spirit nor the letter of the above guidelines, even though it may have approached the line in places. The father from hell and no refuge but the grave comments were better left unsaid, but we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding that they were not prejudicial under these circumstances. Similarly, asking the jury to hold the appellant responsible for the crime because the evidence shows you he is guilty, is not the same as telling the jury that it has a duty to convict the defendant. And despite the guidelines set forth above, it is too much to expect that a certain amount of hyperbole does not find itself into a prosecutor's closing argument in a death penalty case. So long as that hyperbole is fairly grounded in the evidence and does not violate one of the specific rules set forth above, it does not constitute reversible error.