Opinion ID: 678821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Parnes

Text: 66 Based on the evidence adduced at trial, the jury could have drawn the following conclusions with respect to Parnes. Both Parnes and Brinkley-Obu performed the position of SQAM at different times. Parnes performed the job beginning in November 1989 at an OE level making $55,860. He was demoted to an E-5, but continued to receive at least two raises. While he was making $66,300 in a nonsupervisory, lead-person position, Brinkley-Obu took over his Software responsibilities. When she acquired the Software position, she was making only $49,836 at an OC level. When she finally brought suit, Brinkley-Obu was earning only $57,624 even though she was also performing the additional responsibilities of Hardware Quality Assurance and Quality Control. HTI tries to emphasize that Brinkley-Obu thought her responsibilities were greater and more difficult than Parnes' rather than substantially similar. Brinkley-Obu testified that she was responsible for additional duties when she was performing the software position that Parnes had performed. As noted in the EEOC interpretive regulations, additional duties performed by the lesser paid employee do not remove the claim from the ambit of the Equal Pay Act. At trial, witnesses from HTI testified to the similarity of the software positions.C. Monseur 67 Finally, with regard to Monseur, the jury could have drawn the following conclusions. Monseur held the position of Quality Control Manager at the OD level starting at $60,000. As a result of raises he was making $63,000 even after he was demoted to an E-5, nonsupervisory position. Brinkley-Obu performed the Quality Control function for a short time prior to her maternity leave in 1988. She also performs that position currently. She gained that responsibility in January 1992 at which time she was making $54,360. It was not until September 1992 that she received a raise to $57,624. At that time she was also performing Hardware and Software responsibilities. HTI has attempted to compare Brinkley-Obu's current job as a Manager with Monseur's current job as a lead person. Brinkley-Obu's comparison, however, is based on their performance of the same position--Quality Control Manager. 68 Several witnesses testified regarding the nature of the jobs held by Turner, Parnes and Monseur, including the skill, effort and responsibilities those jobs required. The jury had sufficient evidence on which to base a conclusion that Brinkley-Obu was performing substantially similar work with Parnes, Turner, and Monseur. Most importantly, after hearing all of the evidence and passing on the credibility of each witness before the court, the jury concluded that Brinkley-Obu was performing jobs substantially equal to those performed by three of the four male comparators she offered. The judge, in denying HTI's motion for judgment as a matter of law also concluded that sufficient evidence existed to warrant the jury's verdict. 69 D. HTI's Affirmative Defense to the Equal Pay Act Claims 70 It is understandable and quite legal for HTI to consider the experience and education of prospective employees in setting initial salaries. Brinkley-Obu contested her initial salary at the time she was hired, but she has not based her lawsuit on that premise. Rather, she contends that she has done equal work to the men employed on her level (or below her) in her department, often the same jobs, but has been paid substantially less for performing substantially similar work. The Equal Pay Act requires employers to pay employees of both sexes equally when they perform substantially equal work. The Equal Pay Act also allows employers to establish any of four affirmative defenses to Equal Pay claims showing that the disparities are the result of any other factor other than sex. The burden is on the employer to prove such other factors by a preponderance of the evidence. 71 HTI tried to show that experience and education considered in the initial hiring process explain and account for the disparities Brinkley-Obu experienced later in her career. 35 HTI has argued that [t]he jury could not reasonably have rejected HTI's evidence of a gender-neutral compensation system and [that] its Equal Pay Act verdict should be reversed. Considering the inconsistencies in HTI's treatment of its employees and the evidence adduced at trial showing that less experienced people (including men) are often paid more highly than more experienced people (including men) at HTI, it is not more likely than not that experience can account for the disparities Brinkley-Obu has demonstrated over the course of her law suit. The jury reasonably rejected HTI's affirmative defenses. Sufficiency of the Evidence--Title VII 72 Brinkley-Obu established her case under Title VII by meeting the standards for showing equal work as required by the Equal Pay Act, and by discrediting HTI's proffered explanation of the inequities she encountered with respect to Turner when the two worked under Smith. The same evidence regarding unequal wages for equal work that supports the Equal Pay Act claim against Turner also provides support for the jury's verdict that HTI discriminated against Brinkley-Obu in terms of compensation with respect to Turner under Title VII. As the discussion of the facts and the sufficiency of the evidence have shown, Brinkley-Obu did establish that she performed substantially similar work to the comparators. In addition, Brinkley-Obu presented evidence concerning her employment with HTI and her supervisor, Smith, unnecessary to prove her Equal Pay Act claim. That additional evidence supports an inference of intentional discrimination necessary to support a finding of liability under Title VII. 73 Brinkley-Obu may prove her Title VII case through direct evidence of discrimination or through the cumulative effect of indirect evidence of her employer's motivation. She presented testimony and evidence at trial establishing HTI's discriminatory motivation with regard to her compensation vis-a-vis Turner. 74 When Brinkley-Obu asked why she was being requested to offer Turner, a subordinate, a higher salary than she was making, her supervisor responded, We got you cheap. When Brinkley-Obu left on maternity leave, the same supervisor stripped her of her responsibilities and transferred them to Turner, the new hire. At that time, he created the managerial position and promoted Turner to that position giving him an $18,000 raise to do essentially the same job plaintiff had been performing prior to the time she took leave. The promotion took place only one or two weeks before Brinkley-Obu returned to work. When she returned to work as Turner's subordinate, her infant experienced several illnesses. Taking authorized leave to attend to her family responsibilities she was told to choose between having a career and being a mama. Although Turner was ultimately fired, and plaintiff ultimately began performing all of his responsibilities in addition to several others, she is still being paid less than Turner was in April of 1990 when he left HTI. 75 Although these incidents occurred prior to the limitations period, the evidence of a pattern or practice that pre-dated the relevant charge period is relevant for the limited purpose of inferring from it the continuation of the practice into the limitations period. Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 568 n. 12 (4th Cir.1985) (noted in the context of employer's practice of failing to hire black women). HTI started out paying Brinkley-Obu less than she deserved to be paid even according to HTI's own payment schedule. HTI paid her less than Turner despite the fact that he was hired as her subordinate because he had superior experience coming in to HTI. However, HTI inexplicably gave him an $18,000 raise to perform the same responsibilities plaintiff had performed prior to her maternity leave. HTI's supervisor, Smith, exhibited sexist attitudes and conduct in his treatment of plaintiff until he left HTI. The company, though made aware of Smith's activities, never reprimanded Smith nor did it correct plaintiff's situation with respect to Turner. HTI still has not raised plaintiff's salary to that earned by Turner when he left the job in April 1990 despite the fact that she has taken over his responsibilities completely. Sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's Title VII verdict. 76 Compensatory Damages and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 77 The district court rejected HTI's argument that the jury's Title VII damages award included $10,000 in compensatory damages based on conduct that occurred prior to November 21, 1991. The district court held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was not to be applied retroactively and instructed the jury accordingly. Although the jury received permission to consider acts occurring before December 1991 in determining whether or not there was a Title VII violation (i.e., liability), the court instructed the jury that it was not to use that information for the purposes of damages. Because jurors are presumed to follow the law and the instructions given by the court, absent evidence to the contrary, the court felt it could be presumed that the jury followed the instructions in computing the damages. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 211, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1709, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (noting pragmatic rule that juries are presumed to follow their instructions). In essence, then, the district court was of the opinion that the compensatory damages award by the jury did not include what HTI has referred to as retroactive damages. 78 HTI has argued that the district court erred by failing to set aside the compensatory damages award under Title VII. Compensatory damages in Title VII actions were not authorized until the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 on November 21, 1991. In Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1508, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994), the Supreme Court held that the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 creating the right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain Title VII violations do not apply retroactively. 79 In the instant case, the court instructed the jury that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was not to be applied retroactively and that the jury could not consider any acts or conduct by HTI which occurred prior to December 25, 1991 for purposes of damages. 36 The jury awarded the plaintiff compensatory damages based upon its finding of a Title VII violation with respect to Turner. HTI has argued that because Turner's employment at HTI was terminated in April 1990, the jury improperly applied the Civil Rights Act of 1991 retroactively. As the foregoing analyses of the statute of limitations and the sufficiency of the evidence have shown, however, the jury apparently awarded compensatory damages based on HTI's continuing violations, i.e., acts which occurred after December 25, 1991, as instructed by the district court. HTI continued to violate the Act because HTI continued to pay Brinkley-Obu less throughout the relevant time period. Under this analysis, retroactivity is not an issue because the jury's damage award was based on the injury the plaintiff continued to suffer with the issuance of each paycheck after the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Admissibility of Evidence 80 This court reviews the district court's decision to admit exhibits into evidence for an abuse of discretion. Persinger v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 920 F.2d 1185, 1187 (4th Cir.1990). 81 HTI objected at trial to the admission of two exhibits numbered 5D and 35 which depicted the salaries of managers and which allegedly demonstrated the under-utilization of women in HTI's hiring and promotion practices. Exhibit 5D consisted of two pages of graphs based on information derived from HTI's Affirmative Action Plan. The graphs purported to show a statistical under-utilization of female supervisors in HTI's Herndon facility as evidence of discrimination in Brinkley-Obu's compensation. Exhibit 35 provided a list of all of the salaries and the gender of all HTI managers at the OD level from 1988 to 1991. 82 In Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 337-38 (4th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 539 (1984), we noted that evidence of discriminatory intent in one employment context, e.g., hiring, may be probative of discriminatory intent in a different employment context, e.g., promotion, but only where it has been demonstrated that the same managerial personnel were involved as decisionmakers in both settings. HTI has asserted that, because plaintiff did not establish that the managerial personnel who were responsible for the discrimination against her were also responsible for the alleged evidence of discrimination provided by the charts, the charts should not have been admitted. 83 Brinkley-Obu argues that the black letter law in this circuit, i.e., Lilly, did allow the admission of the exhibits as corroborative evidence of salary discrimination against women in supervisory positions. It is unnecessary to resolve the Lilly dispute in light of the harmless error analysis. 84 HTI has argued that the admission of these exhibits necessarily tainted the jury's verdict and mandates a new trial pursuant to FRCP 61. [T]he decision to grant a new trial ' is a matter resting in the sound discretion of the trial judge, and ... his action thereon is not reviewable on appeal, save in the most exceptional circumstances. '  Persinger v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 920 F.2d 1185, 1189 (4th Cir.1990). We may affirm the district court's denial of HTI's motion for a new trial for either of two reasons: 1) the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion; or 2) the admission of the exhibits constituted harmless error. Under a harmless error analysis, Brinkley-Obu, as a beneficiary of the district court's error, would have the burden of showing that the error almost surely did not affect the outcome of the case. Id. If Brinkley-Obu has satisfied this burden, the error would be considered harmless. 85 Considering the record as a whole, there is overwhelming evidence that HTI discriminated against Brinkley-Obu by paying her less than men who held comparable jobs. That evidence would have been sufficient without the graphs and charts submitted in Exhibits 5D and 35. The two exhibits in dispute almost surely did not affect the outcome of the case. Id. If the district court's admission of the exhibits constituted error under Lilly, that error was harmless. Brinkley-Obu's Cross Appeal Issues 86 On cross-appeal, Brinkley-Obu raised two issues: 1) whether the court erred in denying her future salary relief calculated on the same basis that the jury had used in awarding her backpay; and 2) whether she was entitled to liquidated damages. Future Salary Relief 87 As part of its equitable powers under Title VII, a district court has broad equitable discretion to fashion remedies to make the plaintiff whole for injuries resulting from a violation of the statute. Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763-64, 96 S.Ct. 1251, 1264, 47 L.Ed.2d 444 (1976). Section 706(g) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(g), vests broad equitable discretion in the federal courts to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate to remedy a violation including back pay and such other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate. Id. at 763, 96 S.Ct. at 1263-64. We review a district court's decision to deny requested prospective equitable relief for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Home Ins. Co., 777 F.2d 849, 860 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142, 106 S.Ct. 2249, 90 L.Ed.2d 695 (1986). 88 Brinkley-Obu submits that the judge instructed the jury to calculate her back pay award measured by the difference between her salary and the average salary of the men in her department who were found to have performed equal work at higher pay (Parnes and Monseur). In the district court's initial prospective relief order, it ruled that her future salary should be adjusted by using the average male salary at her level (OD). Because the plaintiff is now the only OD level employee in her department (Parnes and Monseur have been demoted) and because the necessary evidence regarding other OD level employees at HTI was not in evidence, she requested the judge to reconsider his ruling in a post-verdict motion. She suggested that her future salary should be set as the average of Parnes and Monseur, the two men the jury found had been paid more for doing substantially equal work who were still employed at HTI. On reconsideration, the judge denied prospective relief altogether due to the lack of evidence in the record on which to calculate the requested relief. 89 Brinkley-Obu has argued that, based on the principles of issue preclusion and the Seventh Amendment, the judge was not at liberty to depart from the formula the jury used in computing back pay in order to determine her future relief. In her discussion of issue preclusion, plaintiff relied primarily on E.E.O.C. v. Liggett & Myers Inc., 690 F.2d 1072, 1077 (4th Cir.1982), but Liggett & Myers deals only with the calculation of a back pay award. It has nothing to do with the equitable award of future relief. Liggett & Myers did hold that the proper male comparators in that calculation were those who, during the damage period, were proven to have performed equal work for higher pay. Plaintiff does not cite a case, however, for the proposition that the judge is bound by the back pay formula in his determination of additional equitable relief in the form of future salary adjustments. As HTI has noted in its brief, [i]ssue preclusion has absolutely nothing to do with the ability of the District Court to award prospective relief in this case. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying prospective relief based on its conclusion that the relevant evidence was lacking in the record. 90 A lack of prospective relief, however, will leave the plaintiff with a series of new Equal Pay Act claims, accruing with each new paycheck subsequent to the date of this action, if Brinkley-Obu continues to be paid less than comparable male employees such as Monseur and Parnes. Our acceptance of the continuing violation theory indicates that HTI will continue to violate the Equal Pay Act until it begins to pay the plaintiff a higher salary in line with those of men who have performed the jobs she is now performing or comparable jobs. Liquidated Damages 91 Under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 260, an employer in violation of the Equal Pay Act will be liable for liquidated damages, equal to and in addition to compensatory damages, unless the employer demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the act or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was not violative of the Act. Under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 260, the district court has the discretion to decline to award liquidated damages when good faith is established. This determination is subject to review for abuse of discretion. Fowler v. Land Management Groupe, Inc., 978 F.2d 158, 163 (4th Cir.1992). 92 The language of the statute is mandatory. Although the judge has the discretion not to award damages, the statute puts upon the 'delinquent employer [who would] ... escape the payment of liquidated damages [a] ... plain and substantial burden of persuading the court by proof that his failure to obey the statute was both in good faith and predicated upon such reasonable grounds that it would be unfair to impose upon him more than a compensatory verdict. '  Richard v. Marriott Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1977). 93 Brinkley-Obu presented evidence at trial that clearly established the discriminatory behavior of Smith, her first supervisor. She also introduced evidence, however, that subsequent supervisors, despite their failure to remedy her situation by paying her comparable wages, reacted to her complaints and made some effort to address her questions regarding her compensation. Brinkley-Obu sought and obtained salary reviews which occasionally resulted in increased wages. Her supervisors did studies, albeit inadequate, to support their actions with respect to the plaintiff. In addition, the record showed that Brinkley-Obu received occasional merit raises and some promotions. 37 None of this evidence negates the fact that HTI did not pay Brinkley-Obu wages comparable to those paid to her male co-workers or the fact that HTI did not promote her to the job grade she had earned, but it was evidence on which the district judge could base a finding of good faith. 94 In addition, the jury found that HTI's Equal Pay Act violation was not willful. In Fowler, we noted that a judge's findings on good faith do not have to be consistent with a jury's findings of willfulness, but a jury's finding of non-willful behavior can provide an objective basis on which a judge could premise a finding of good faith. The district court's order denying Brinkley-Obu liquidated damages did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Brinkley-Obu's appeal of that Order is, therefore, denied.