Opinion ID: 2570544
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Allegedly Improper Instruction on Torture

Text: Defendant was charged with a torture-murder special circumstance, that is, that [t]he murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).) Although the jury sustained this allegation, defendant contends we must vacate this finding because a small discrepancy between the written instructions provided the jury and the instructions read orally to it may have led the jury to sustain the allegation without finding he intended personally to inflict torture. The jury was provided a written version of CALJIC No. 8.81.18, which provided: To find that the special circumstance, referred to in these instructions as murder involving infliction of torture, is true, each of the following facts must be proved: [¶] 1. The murder was intentional; and [¶] 2. [The] [ A ] defendant intended to inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering upon a living human being for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion or for any sadistic purpose[.] [; and [¶] 3. The defendant did in fact inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering upon a living human being no matter how long its duration.] [10] [¶] Awareness of pain by the deceased is not a necessary element of torture. (Italics added.) On this written form, the word The in part 2 is crossed out. When the trial court instructed the jury orally, however, it told the jury that to sustain the special circumstance allegation, it must find [ t ] he defendant intended to inflict extreme cruel physical pain and suffering . . . . (Italics added.) Defendant thus observes the jury was presented with slightly discordant versions of the instruction: The written instruction required it to find a defendant intended to torture, whereas the oral instruction required it to find  the defendant did so. This small discrepancy is critical, he claims, because he and codefendant Phillips were tried together and also because the jury heard that Charone Parker, Norman Culpepper and Michael Woods were active participants in the events that culminated in Uwe Durbin's death. Without a specific finding that he personally intended to torture the victim, defendant claims, the jury may have believed that although he may have participated in the acts of torture, only Phillips, Parker, Culpepper or Woods (or some combination of those four) actually harbored the requisite intent to torture the victim. (See People v. Petznick (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 663, 686 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 726] [held the phrase a defendant could have referred to any one of the four participants in the crime (italics omitted)].) We of course presume that jurors understand and follow the court's instructions. ( People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 231.) This presumption includes the written instructions. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 542 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].) To the extent a discrepancy exists between the written and oral versions of jury instructions, the written instructions provided to the jury will control. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 717 [55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 138 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) When an appellate court addresses a claim of jury misinstruction, it must assess the instructions as a whole, viewing the challenged instruction in context with other instructions, in order to determine if there was a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the challenged instruction in an impermissible manner. ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 831 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938]; People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1216 [120 Cal.Rptr. 2d 477, 7 P.3d 262].) (12) We agree the written (but not the oral) instruction defining torture in this case was technically erroneous, for the torture-murder special circumstance requires proof that the defendant himself intended to torture the victim. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) We explained in Davenport that although the express words of the special circumstance set forth in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(18) do not require either the intent to kill or to torture, we interpret the statutory language to require such dual intent, both because such meaning is most consistent with the electorate's probable intent in enacting the provision and to ensure the constitutionality of the law. ( Davenport, at pp. 260-271; People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 839.) Thus, to sustain a special circumstance that a killing was committed with torture, it must be proved that the defendant intended to . . . torture the victim . . . . ( Davenport, at p. 271, italics added.) The written instructions did not require the jury to make such a finding. (13) Although the written instructions contained a technical error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824].) First, the court orally instructed the jury with the correct instruction. Although this court gives priority to the written version of an instruction when a conflict exists between the written and oral versions, the jury is not informed of this rule. It is thus possible the jury followed the oral instruction. Second, there is no indication the jury was aware of the slight difference between the written and oral versions of the instructions, as it asked no questions about this point. Third, the evidence was overwhelming that defendant beat, tortured and killed Uwe Durbin. Two eyewitnesses (Michael Durbin and L.R.), who knew both defendant and the victim, identified defendant and testified, describing his activities the night of the crimes. Their accounts of how defendant beat the victim with the batteries inside the gardener's glove were largely consistent with the injuries the victim sustained. The jury betrayed no confusion, convicting defendant of all charges. [T]he trier of fact may find intent to torture based on all the circumstances surrounding the charged crime . . . . ( People v. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 841.) Finally, considering the other elements of the torture instruction, which the jury necessarily found true that the murder was intentional and defendant did in fact inflict cruel physical pain and sufferingit would have been impossible on these facts for the jury to have found defendant did not intend to torture the victim. Considering all these factors, we conclude the instructional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Petznick, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th 663, cited by defendant in support, is inapposite. Petznick, as here, involved a murder in which several defendants were alleged to have participated. As here, the trial court incorrectly used the indefinite article ( a defendant rather than the defendant) in instructing the jury on the torture-murder special circumstance. The similarity between the two cases, however, ends there. Unlike in this case, the court in Petznick did not correctly instruct the jury orally from the bench. Nor, unlike in this case, was there strong evidence in Petznick showing the defendant in that case personally intended to torture his victim. The Petznick court noted these factors in concluding the error could not be found harmless. (E.g., id. at p. 686 [evidence the defendant intended torture not so overwhelming as to convince us the error was harmless].) Petznick thus does not support a finding the error here was prejudicial. Although defendant contends the instructional error violated both state law [11] and his constitutional rights to due process and a jury trial under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, we find the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 8-12, 15-16 [144 L.Ed.2d 35, 119 S.Ct. 1827]; Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24) and, a fortiori, the state law error was harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].