Opinion ID: 717496
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sanchez's claim

Text: 68 Related in part to Dumlao's claim of entrapment, Sanchez contends that the district court erred in ruling that she could not present a defense of public authority, sometimes called entrapment by estoppel. In general terms this defense permits an acquittal when the defendant was reasonably mistaken in believing her criminal activity was authorized by the government. Sanchez claims that since this was a theory of her defense, the district court's refusal to give the instruction effectively deprived her of a fair trial in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 69 Defendants are entitled to a theory of defense instruction if: (1) they propose a correct statement of the law; (2) their theory is supported by the evidence; (3) their theory is not part of the charge; and (4) the failure to include an instruction on the defendant's theory of defense would deny him or her a fair trial. United States v. Howell, 37 F.3d 1197, 1203 (7th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1810, 131 L.Ed.2d 735 (1995); United States v. Elder, 16 F.3d 733, 738 (7th Cir.1994). In reviewing these matters, [w]e defer to the substantial discretion of the district court for the specific wording of the instructions and for the decision to reject a proposed instruction, as long as the essential points are covered by the instructions given. Howell, 37 F.3d at 1203-04; United States v. Scott, 19 F.3d 1238, 1245 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 163, 130 L.Ed.2d 101 (1994). 70 The defense of entrapment by estoppel is rarely available. Howell, 37 F.3d at 1204. In essence, it applies when, acting with actual or apparent authority, a government official affirmatively assures the defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant reasonably believes that official. Id. To employ this defense, we have required that the government official actively mislead the defendant; and that the defendant's reliance be actual and reasonable in light of the identity of the agent, the point of law represented, and the substance of the misrepresentation. Id. (footnote with extensive case citations omitted). 71 The district court found that the evidence was insufficient to support this defense--Sanchez had received no authorization from the government to commit the crimes of which she was convicted, and she could not have reasonably believed that she was acting pursuant to official authorization during the conspiracy. The district court did, however, allow Sanchez to put on evidence of the extent of her cooperation with law enforcement officers; she called seven federal law enforcement agents to testify concerning their relationship with her. Sanchez's counsel also reminded the jury in his closing argument of this theory, concluding his presentation by asking, If you're going to play Frankenstein, do you take responsibility for the monster? 72 The district judge was correct in concluding that any monster here was of Sanchez's own making. The only authorization Sanchez mentions in her brief is the claim that DEA agent Paul Galvin directed Sanchez to produce prosecution witnesses in the following conversation: 73 Galvin: You know what would really help them? If, if, instead of waiting for us to come out and see them, if they really wanted to show that they wanted to cooperate. 74 Sanchez: I can get Carol [Turner] and them to come down. 75 Galvin: You should get, yes, get Carol and them to come down. You know where our office is. If they come down on their own free will and tell us the truth, it'll, it'll really help them out. 76 We fail to see how this constitutes an authorization to produce witnesses, especially since they must come of their own free will, let alone how it constitutes an authorization to commit the many other crimes involved here. We also fail to see anywhere in the record any active misrepresentation which authorized Sanchez to obtain, deal, and profit from Dilaudid to the tune of hundreds of thousands of dollars. Her actions within the Dilaudid conspiracy make her claim of public authority palpably incredible; the relevant evidence of her minimal and opportunistic interaction with the DEA has been recounted above. Even if Sanchez somehow truly believed that she was indeed a government agent, this is unavailing, for reasonableness in this context is objective. United States v. Barker, 546 F.2d 940, 947-48 (D.C.Cir.1976). And since the district court allowed the relevant aspects of her theory to be introduced through the evidence and closing arguments, Sanchez was not denied a fair trial. None of the requirements necessary to warrant the instruction were met here, and it was proper to exclude it.