Opinion ID: 855433
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: at the time of disclosure or use, knew or

Text: had reason to know that his knowledge of the trade secret was: (A) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it; (B) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or (C) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use. . . . Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2) (LexisNexis 2012). The March 4th email reflects PMAA’s knowledge that ASUS obtained or developed a copy of Dr. Adams’s Detector from IBM and provided it to Winbond. See March 4th email at J.A.3174 (alleging Winbond had a “copy of Dr. Adams’[s] Detector” and that it had obtained such detector from ASUS, “who developed the test utility from an IBM supplied design.”). This is adequate to show constructive knowledge of misappropriation pursuant to the Trade Secrets Act. That is, if IBM was authorized to have the detector, ASUS’s disclosure to Winbond would constitute “disclosure” of a trade secret that was “derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use.” Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2)(b)(ii)(C) (LexisNexis 2012). If, on the other hand, IBM was not authorized to have the programs, ASUS’s acquisition was prohibited misappropriation, and its disclosure to Winbond was “derived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to 18 ADAMS & ASSOC v. DELL COMPUTER acquire it.” Id. § 13-24-2(2)(a),(b)(ii)(A) (LexisNexis 2012). PMAA’s contention that it did not know whether ASUS “used” the misappropriated detector program is thus inapposite, because the March 4th email reflects sufficient knowledge to meet the elements of misappropriation in a variety of ways. Additionally, PMAA’s argument that it had no information of ASUS’s state of mind does not defeat PMAA’s constructive knowledge of facts sufficient to make up its trade secrets claim. The statutory discovery rule “does not allow plaintiffs to delay filing suit until they have ascertained every last detail of their claims.” McCollin v. Synthes Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 1119, 1124 (D. Utah 1999); see also id. (quoting United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993)) (“‘All that is required [to trigger the statute of limitations] is . . . sufficient information to apprise [the plaintiff of the underlying cause of action] so as to put them on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions’ about the defendant’s actions.”) (alterations in McCollin). 13 Additionally, the fact that ASUS did not admit it had stolen PMAA’s trade secrets when questioned, PMAA’s Opening Br. at 69, does not defeat PMAA’s “constructive knowledge” of facts sufficient to make up its trade secrets claim. Statutes of limitations would be rendered meaningless if claims did not accrue until the potential defendant admitted wrongdoing. In sum, there is no genuine issue of material fact that PMAA had constructive knowledge of its trade secrets 13 With respect to state of mind, the Utah Su- preme Court has held that constructive notice of a fraud claim was shown as a matter of law by a letter in which plaintiffs accused defendant of the underlying fraudulent conduct, even though the letter did not make allegations regarding defendant’s state of mind. Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred, 182 P.3d 337, 345 (Utah 2008). ADAMS & ASSOC v. DELL COMPUTER 19 claim by March 4, 2004, more than three years before it brought its claim against ASUS on May 3, 2007. The district court’s grant of summary judgment is thus affirmed. 2. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING ATTORNEY FEES The district court found that ASUS’s litigation misconduct relating to its spoliation of the IFDC.exe source code made the case “exceptional” under 35 U.S.C. § 285. Attorney Fees Op. at 5. However, the court declined to grant attorney fees to penalize such spoliation, having already imposed an adverse inference sanction for the same conduct. Id. On appeal, PMAA argues this denial of attorney fees was an abuse of discretion. “A district court abuses its discretion when ‘its decision is based on clearly erroneous findings of fact, is based on erroneous interpretations of the law, or is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary or fanciful.’” Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 339 F.3d 1324, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., 138 F.3d 1338, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). None of these situations is present here. To the contrary, it was reasonable for the district court to decide against imposing two different penalties for the same conduct. Furthermore, this court’s determination with respect to ASUS’s motion for JMOL of noninfringement means that PMAA is no longer a “prevailing party” in the case, making attorney fees under § 285 inappropriate. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.”) (emphasis added).