Opinion ID: 3053932
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Where Congress has intended to criminalize the

Text: making of material false statements, it has expressly done so. [6] Congress has expressly used the word “material” in other provisions that criminalize the making of false statements, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).7 Congress’s omission of “material” from § 1015(a), combined with its inclusion of “material” in a similar statutory provision (§ 1001(a)), is evidence of Congress’s expressed intent not to impose a materiality requirement in § 1015(a). See Russello v. United States, 7 Section § 1001(a) states in pertinent part: [W]hoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, knowingly and willfully— (1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme or device a material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry; shall be fined under this title [or imprisoned, or both]. (emphasis added). 15166 UNITED STATES v. YOUSSEF 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”). Although § 1015(a) and § 1001(a) were not enacted as part of the “same Act” within the meaning of Russello, they are both located within Chapter 47 of Title 18 of the United States Code, which deals with “Fraud and False Statements.” Section 1001(a) explicitly requires a false statement to be material. Congress could have written a materiality requirement into § 1015(a) as it did in § 1001(a), but chose not to do so. [7] Under the Russello rationale, § 1015(a) should be interpreted as Congress enacted it, without a materiality requirement. Therefore, we do not interpret § 1015 to include a materiality requirement.