Opinion ID: 2493500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony of dr. shukan and dr. hayne.

Text: ¶ 19. The standard of review for the admission or exclusion of expert testimony is abuse of discretion. Utz v. Running & Rolling Trucking, Inc., 32 So.3d 450, 457 (Miss.2010) (citations omitted). This Court should find error in the trial court's decision to exclude expert testimony only if the decision was arbitrary or clearly erroneous. Franklin Corp. v. Tedford, 18 So.3d 215, 237 (Miss.2009) (citing Troupe v. McAuley, 955 So.2d 848, 856 (Miss.2007)).
¶ 20. In addressing Daubert issues, our analysis must be guided by Rule 702, which addresses the admissibility of expert testimony: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. Miss. R. Evid. 702. ¶ 21. In Daubert, the United States Supreme Court held that experts should be given wide latitude when offering opinions within their expertise. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The Daubert Court rejected the Frye [9] standard, which required general acceptance of the theories offered by experts, and held that expert testimony must be relevant and reliable. Id. at 589, 113 S.Ct. 2786. Daubert enumerated several factors which the trial courts may consider when determining if expert testimony is reliable: (1) whether the expert's theory can be or has been tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) the known or potential rate of error of a technique or theory when applied; and (4) the general acceptance that the theory has garnered in the relevant expert community. Id. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786. These factors are nonexclusive, and their application depends on the nature of the issue, the expert's expertise, and the subject of the testimony offered by the expert. Miss. Transp. Comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So.2d 31, 37 (Miss.2003). ¶ 22. When determining whether expert testimony is admissible, our trial judges should act as gatekeepers and must determine whether the proposed testimony meets the requirements of Rule 702 and Daubert 's relevance and reliability prongs. Evidence is relevant if it will assist the trier of fact. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591, 113 S.Ct. 2786. The offered testimony in today's case is clearly relevant, and the defendants do not dispute its relevance. Because the offered testimony is relevant, our inquiry in today's case will focus on whether the testimony was reliable.
¶ 23. In his order excluding the expert testimony, the trial judge focused on the lack of consensus among a wide range of authorities on the half-life of Demerol in a newborn. He also, however, pointed out that Dr. Hayne and Dr. Shukan had failed to provide an authority that supports the half-lives used in their calculations. Patterson now argues that lack of consensus among authorities is not a valid reason for excluding expert testimony under Daubert. ¶ 24. In support of her argument, Patterson cites Tedford, 18 So.3d at 238, where this Court upheld the trial court's admission of four expert witnesses in a workers' compensation case. The plaintiffs in Tedford were exposed to a neurotoxin while at work, and the expert witnesses testified to the effect the toxin had on the plaintiffs. Id. at 234-36. On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court had erred in allowing the expert testimony because none knew of the [neurotoxin] exposure level at which injury occurs in humans, and none knew of the exposure experienced by the . . . plaintiffs. Id. at 237. This Court noted that the impact of the toxin on humans is a new field of study and that ethical constraints have limited scientists' studies in this field. Id. Ultimately, this Court found that the absence of data on the exact exposure level at which humans suffer neurologic injury ought not preclude the Plaintiffs' experts from testifying. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 25. We find Tedford to be distinguishable from today's case. In Tedford, there was an absence of data relating to the subject of the experts' opinions. Id. In today's case there is not an absence of data on the half-life of Demerol in newborns; rather, the defendants presented published data on the subject which contradicts the plaintiff's experts. The shortage of data in this case is an absence of data supporting the half-lives used by the plaintiff's experts. ¶ 26. In Watts v. Radiator Specialty Company, 990 So.2d 143, 150 (Miss.2008), this Court held that expert testimony may be excluded as scientifically unreliable when there is a lack of scientific data supporting the expert's opinion. In Watts, the subject of the expert testimony was the focus of several different studies on which the expert had relied in forming his opinion. Id. at 147. However, none of the studies provide[d] a basis for the conclusion that the expert had made. Id. The dissenting opinion in Watts argued that expert opinions need not be supported unequivocally by published studies. Id. at 154. The majority responded by stating that: While certainly there is no requirement that an expert's opinion be `generally accepted in the scientific community' as under the Frye standard, it is a factor for trial courts to consider. This factor was properly considered by the trial court. When this Court adopted the Daubert standard, it did not `lower the bar' for admittance of expert testimony. We simply recognized that our learned trial judges are in the best position to make the determination. We made them the gatekeepers of expert testimony, not the doormen. Id. at 150 (emphasis added). ¶ 27. In Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 724 (Miss.2005), this Court also held that consensus among peer-reviewed materials is not a requirement of admissibility. Citing Daubert, this Court in Poole stated that [r]equiring that the subject of expert testimony be known to a certainty is not necessary either, however, because, as the Daubert Court pointed out, `there are no certainties in science.' Id. at 723-24 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786). ¶ 28. To counter Patterson's argument that the trial court erred in excluding the expert testimony, the defendants cite this Court's recent holding in Hill v. Mills, 26 So.3d 322, 331 (Miss.2010), that when an expert . . . renders an opinion that is attacked as not accepted within the scientific community, the party offering that expert's opinion must, at a minimum, present the trial judge with some evidence indicating that the offered opinion has some degree of acceptance and support within the scientific community. ¶ 29. This Court in Hill distinguished Poole, stating that: We do not today retreat in any respect from our holding in Poole. We find it completely distinguishable. Unlike the present case, the challenged opinion at issue in Poole had not been the subject of peer-reviewed articles. Consequently, the defendant in Poole did not challenge the expert's opinions by producing peer-reviewed articles or authorities which contradicted the opinions. Thus, Poole stands for the proposition that there exists no per se requirement that an expert's opinion be supported by peer-reviewed articles. In contrast to Poole, the subject matter of the expert opinion in the case before us today has been extensively explored and documented, and one hundred percent of the documentation presented to the trial judge contradicts Dr. Fuselier's opinion. Thus, we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion in finding that, under Rule 702, Dr. Fuselier's opinions regarding available interventions to prolong Hill's pregnancy were unreliable and inadmissible. We restate for emphasis that, when the reliability of an expert's opinion is attacked with credible evidence that the opinion is not accepted within the scientific community, the proponent of the opinion under attack should provide at least a minimal defense supporting the reliability of the opinion. The proponent of the expert cannot sit on the side lines and assume the trial court will ignore the unrebutted evidence and find the expert's opinion reliable. Were we automatically to allow introduction of expert opinions which are based upon nothing more than personal experience in cases where those opinions are contradicted in the scientific literature, we would effectively render Rule 702 and Daubert a nullity. Id. at 332-33 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 30. We find that today's case is analogous to Hill. The defendants presented peer-reviewed articles contradicting the expert opinions offered by Patterson, and she failed to provide evidence that the offered opinions have some degree of scientific acceptance and support. The defendants presented one peer-reviewed article stating that the half-life of Demerol in neonates is approximately 10.7 hours, another article stating that the half-life varies from 6.5 to 39 hours in newborns, and another stating that the average half-life is 13.24 hours. Patterson did not present scientific literature in support of Dr. Shukan's and Dr. Hayne's opinions. While Dr. Shukan did state that he referred to medical texts and websites in forming his overall opinion, he did not provide a source for the half-life he used in his calculation. Dr. Hayne testified that he obtained the half-life used in his calculation  four and one half to five hours  from Mississippi Crime Laboratory personnel. ¶ 31. Patterson is correct in her assertion that lack of consensus among sources does not automatically render an expert opinion inadmissible. An offered opinion that has been contradicted by published and peer-reviewed data, however, must be supported by some evidence of support and acceptance in the scientific community. Patterson has failed to meet this standard. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert witnesses' testimony on the predeath levels of Demerol in Atravius's system.
¶ 32. In the alternative, Patterson argues that today's issue is one of credibility, which is proper for the trier of fact to determine and not the trial court. Treasure Bay Corp. v. Ricard, 967 So.2d 1235, 1239 (Miss.2007). As part of its gatekeeping role under Rule 702, the trial court is to determine whether expert testimony is reliable. Id. at 1241 (citing Miss. R. Evid. 702 cmt.). Neither the rule nor its comment mentions any requirement that statements relied upon by an expert using proper, reliable, methodology also be found credible. Id. ¶ 33. In Treasure Bay, the expert witness relied on a statement made by a drunk driver in forming his opinion that the driver was visibly intoxicated when served intoxicating beverages by a casino. Id. at 1237-38. When arguing that summary judgment was improper, the defendants claimed that the trial court should not have relied on the expert's opinion because it was partially based upon a statement by [the drunk driver], which, according to the defendants, lacks credibility. Id. at 1240. Specifically, the defendants argued that the driver's statement was untruthful. Id. In response, this Court held that: Indeed, experts in many fields, including medicine, accident reconstruction and forensic pathology, frequently rely on histories provided by patients and witnesses. Thus, it would be unsettling for this Court abruptly to reject all expert opinion which relies on a historical account of the facts. Of course, whether or not the facts relied upon are credible is a matter for cross-examination and collateral attack at trial. Id. ¶ 34. Patterson argues that, even if the trial court found the half-lives used by Dr. Shukan and Dr. Hayne to be incorrect, according to this Court's reasoning in Treasure Bay, it was error to exclude the testimony. Patterson supports this argument by claiming that the half-life used in a back-extrapolation calculation is an issue of credibility, which may be attacked through cross-examination or contradicting experts. ¶ 35. This Court, however, has held that the sufficiency of foundational facts or evidence on which to base an opinion is a question of law.  Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. v. Bailey, 878 So.2d 31, 60 (Miss.2004) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). As part of the trial court's gatekeeping role, it must examine the reliability of the expert's opinion and must determine whether the facts afford a `reasonably accurate basis' for the expert's conclusion. Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 36. We find that the question of whether Dr. Hayne and Dr. Shukan used the correct half-life in their calculations is an issue of reliability, not credibility. The Court in Treasure Bay referred to a historical account of . . . facts when finding that statements relied upon by experts need not be judged on their credibility by the trial court in determining whether to accept an expert's opinion. Treasure Bay, 967 So.2d at 1240. The experts in today's case, however, do not rely on a factual statement made by another doctor or a patient. The experts must rely on scientific data to form their opinions. Under Rule 702, these opinions must be based on sufficient facts or data. Using a correct half-life is essential to performing a correct back-extrapolation calculation. Without the correct data, the experts' calculations will not be based on sufficient data. This is an issue of law which the trial court must determine, not the trier of fact. See Janssen, 878 So.2d at 60; Int'l Paper Co. v. Townsend, 961 So.2d 741, 758 (Miss.Ct. App.2007) (citations omitted) (The sufficiency of foundational facts or evidence on which an expert bases his opinion is a question of law which must be determined by the trial judge.). ¶ 37. In sum, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of Dr. Shukan and Dr. Hayne. Patterson failed to present evidence supporting her experts' testimony when the defendants challenged the reliability of the plaintiff's experts with published data. This lack of support is an issue of reliability, not credibility.