Opinion ID: 1998547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: validity of slaton's consent

Text: We are left then with the only issue properly presented by this appeal, i.e. whether Slaton's consent to the inspections of his prescription files was valid. The majority posits two reasons for concluding that Slaton's consent was invalid. First, the majority finds that the narcotics officers failed to state their purpose as required by 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(2). The majority construes the statement of the purpose to require disclosure of the fact that Slaton had become the focus of the officers' suspicions by the time of the challenged inspections. Second, the majority finds that in accordance with Commonwealth v. Poteete, supra , the officers' deception in that respect rendered Slaton's consent invalid. I cannot agree.
Pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(2), the narcotics officers were required to state their purpose, identify themselves and present evidence of their authority to inspect before conducting their administrative inspections. Slaton contends, and the majority agree, that the officers failed to properly state their purpose when they failed to inform him that he had become the focus of their investigation. I would find, however, that the mandate of the statute was completely fulfilled by the officers' statements that they wanted to inspect Slaton's prescription file for fraudulent prescriptions. The purposes for which administrative inspections may be conducted are set forth in 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(1) as follows: For the purpose of inspecting, copying, and verifying the correctness of records, reports, or other documents required to be kept or made under this act and otherwise facilitating the carrying out of his functions of this act, the secretary is authorized, in accordance with this section, to enter controlled premises and to conduct administrative inspections thereof, and of the things specified in this section, relevant to those functions. (Emphasis added). Pursuant to 35 P.S. § 780-124(b)(2), officers authorized by the secretary are required to identify themselves, state their purpose, and provide written notice of inspection upon seeking to conduct an administrative inspection. Read together with § 780-124(b)(1), it is apparent that the requirement in § 780-124(b)(2), that the purpose of the inspection be stated, related to the type of inspection to be conducted and not the motivation or grounds for suspicion which gave rise to the decision to inspect. State and federal authorities are authorized to conduct administrative inspections which range in scope and duration from a simple inspection of the pharmacy's prescription file to a prolonged audit and review of every facet of the pharmacy's operation. In order to inform the pharmacist of the type and scope of the administrative inspection to be conducted, both state and federal law uniformly require the officers conducting the inspection to state their purpose ( i.e. the type of inspection to be conducted) before commencing the inspection. The reason for this requirement has been cogently explained as follows: 2. Entry: Statement of purpose, presentation of credentials and Notice of Inspection. Federal regulations require that upon seeking to gain entrance into a place which manufactures, holds or distributes controlled substances, a DEA investigator must state the purpose of his visit, must present his/her credentials, and must provide the operator of the establishment with a Notice of Inspection. The statement of purpose is an important piece of information to obtain. If the DEA investigators announce that the purpose of the visit is a general inspection, the operator of the establishment to be inspected can plan on the investigators being at the establishment for a period of 3-6 weeks. If, on the other hand the DEA investigators announce that their visit is for the simple purpose of checking the firm's biennial inventory report, the establishment operator can calculate that the investigators will probably be at the plant for a short period of time. This statement of purpose will enable the operator to plan his personnel's time accordingly. Davids, DEA Administrative Inspections, 31 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 229, 234 (1981). I find that Slaton was properly apprised of the purpose of the inspection as required by statute, when the officers informed him that they wanted to inspect his prescription file to determine if forged or otherwise fraudulent prescriptions had been presented. Thus, while Slaton was not informed of the officer's underlying motivations, he was fully informed of the type and limited scope of the administrative inspection intended and was thereby prepared for the inconvenience which such an inspection might entail. I do not construe the statute to require any further statement of the motivation or grounds for the decision to inspect. Hence, I dissent from the majority's conclusion that the officers failed to comply with the statute.
The majority contends that the inspection cannot be deemed consensual under 35 P.S. § 780-124(c)(1) because the officers permitted Slaton to remain under the misapprehension that the officers were still looking for evidence against Merriweather and his associates, when the focus of the investigation had shifted by then to Slaton. The majority find that the officers' deception in this respect vitiated any consent obtained from Slaton. I cannot agree.
Early cases involving consent to search contained language which suggested that consent must be knowing and intelligent, i.e. made with full and express knowledge of the right to refuse consent. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). However, in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), our Supreme Court held that valid consent is established by demonstrating that it was given voluntarily, i.e. without coercion express or implied. Subsequent decisions have reinforced the ruling in Schneckloth that the prosecution need not establish that the party giving consent knew that consent could be refused. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Early cases were also construed to provide that consent obtained by stealth, deceit, or misrepresentation was invalid. See Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709 (1963), citing Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654 (1921), Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 41 S.Ct. 261, 65 L.Ed. 647 (1921), [3] and Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). The Wright dictum was followed by this Court in the more recent cases of Commonwealth v. Poteete, 274 Pa.Super. 490, 418 A.2d 513 (1980) and Commonwealth v. Morgan, 353 Pa.Super. 463, 510 A.2d 754 (1986) (citing Poteete ). The majority herein would also rely on the Wright dictum as stated in Poteete. Their reliance is misplaced. Subsequent to Amos, Gould, and Weeks, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld consensual searches as valid despite deception as to the identity and/or the purpose of the person conducting the search. See United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 99 S.Ct. 1465, 59 L.Ed.2d 733 (1979); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 91 S.Ct. 1122, 28 L.Ed.2d 453 (1971) (plurality); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 87 S.Ct. 429, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312 (1966); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 83 S.Ct. 1381, 10 L.Ed.2d 462 (1963); Rathburn v. United States, 355 U.S. 107, 78 S.Ct. 161, 2 L.Ed.2d 134 (1957); On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 72 S.Ct. 967, 96 L.Ed. 1270 (1952). Thus, the United States Supreme Court has expressly recognized that deception does not invariably vitiate consent. Likewise, more recent cases of our Supreme Court demonstrate that the broad Wright dictum (that consent acquired by deception is invalid) does not accurately state the law of consent as it is currently understood in Pennsylvania. In Commonwealth v. Morgan, 517 Pa. 93, 534 A.2d 1054 (1987), our Supreme Court reversed the decision of a divided panel of this Court which had held that a suspect's consent for a police officer to enter (by stating come on in) was rendered invalid by the officer's deception as to his identity (by answering Joe to the suspect's question who's there). In Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 510 Pa. 603, 511 A.2d 764 (1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 951, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987), our Supreme Court held that a suspect's consent to search the trunk of his car was valid despite the fact that the uniformed officers did not inform the suspect that they knew from prior lawful observations that incriminating evidence was located in the trunk. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Brown, 437 Pa. 1, 261 A.2d 879 (1970), our Supreme Court held that a uniformed police officer's deception as to the reason for wanting the suspect's gun did not render the suspect's consensual relinquishment of the gun invalid. In Brown, after citing Wright and acknowledging subsequent federal Supreme Court cases eroding the basis for the broad dictum set forth in Wright, our Supreme Court concluded: It is not necessary for this Court to determine what deceptive devices are improper in light of Lewis, Hoffa and Lopez although that is a very difficult question as the United States Supreme Court seems to have granted broad powers to the police. The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 Harv.L.Rev. 112, 191-4 (1967). It is enough to state that in light of those three United States Supreme Court decisions, the police officer's (Petrovich) tactics were constitutional, and the court below properly refused to suppress evidence of the gun, holster and bullets. 261 A.2d at 883. [4] Thus, our Supreme Court has expressly recognized that deception does not invariably vitiate consent. This Court, too, has retreated from the broad proscription in Wright, and has recognized that consent may be valid despite deception as to an officer's identity and/or motivation in obtaining a suspect's consensual relinquishment of privacy with respect to statements, contraband or other inculpatory facts or evidence. Subsequent to our Supreme Court's decision in Brown, this Court stated in Commonwealth v. Weimer, 262 Pa.Super. 69, 396 A.2d 649 (1978), that, stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police officer. We found in Weimer that consent to enter a private hunting club was not invalid despite the officers' deception as to their identities and their reasons for seeking entry. In Commonwealth v. Poteete, supra , this Court, citing Wright but not Brown, held that consent to enter the suspect's home was invalid when the officer deceived the suspect by letting the suspect think that the officer was there to follow-up on the suspect's stolen car report, when the officer was actually there to confirm his suspicion that property lawfully observed on a prior visit was in fact recently stolen property. However, two months later in Commonwealth v. Morrison, 275 Pa.Super. 454, 418 A.2d 1378 (1980), cert. denied sub nom. Morrison v. Pennsylvania, 449 U.S. 1080, 101 S.Ct. 863, 66 L.Ed.2d 804 (1981), an en banc panel of this Court held that a landowner's consent to enter a barn in which large quantities of marijuana were suspected to have been stored was not rendered invalid by the officer's deception as to both his identity and his reason for wanting to see the barn. The en banc panel, without citing Brown or Poteete, expressly distinguished Wright as having been decided on the basis of federal precedent which had subsequently been substantially modified. 418 A.2d at 1381. In Commonwealth v. Schalszberger, 285 Pa.Super. 586, 428 A.2d 200 (1981), consent to enter was deemed valid despite the fact that it was obtained by deception as to the officers' identity and reason for seeking entry, i.e. in order to facilitate the safe and effective execution of a lawful search warrant. In Commonwealth v. Ginter, 289 Pa.Super. 9, 432 A.2d 1024 (1981), consent to enter was deemed valid despite the officers' deception as to their identities and their reason for seeking entry, i.e. to confirm suspicions of liquor law violations. In Commonwealth v. Markman, 320 Pa.Super. 304, 467 A.2d 336 (1983), a panel of this Court stated unequivocally, [c]onsent may be deemed voluntary even when procured by a police officer who misrepresents both his identity and purpose for making the search. As noted previously, this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Morgan, which ignored Morrison, Schalszberger, and Ginter and instead relied on Poteete, was reversed by our Supreme Court. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Carelli, 377 Pa.Super. 117, 546 A.2d 1185 (1988), following a review of a majority of the foregoing cases, this Court held that neither Wright nor Poteete correctly stated the law regarding the effect of deception on consent as it is currently understood in Pennsylvania. I remain of that opinion. In resurrecting Poteete, the majority herein offer three distinct justifications. I find each fatally flawed. First, the majority attempts to distinguish Carelli based upon the presence in this case of a statutory duty on the part of the officers to state the purpose of their inspections. As explained above, I find that the statute requires no more than a statement of the type of authorized administrative inspection the officer intends or requests consent to conduct. Because the officer is not required by statute to disclose the reasons for seeking the inspection, this case is not distinguishable in that respect. Second, the majority attempts to distinguish this case based upon their conclusion that the cases cited in Carelli, were primarily cases involving undercover agents in fact situations uniquely suited to such police tactics; e.g. illegal narcotics dealings and illegal gambling operations. Majority Opinion, supra, 382 Pa.Superior Ct. at 311 n. 6, 556 A.2d at 1347 n. 6. While Morgan, Ginter, Schalszberger, Morrison, and Weimer arguably fit the restriction on the permissible use of deception which the majority suggests; Albrecht, Brown, and Carelli do not. Albrecht involved uniformed officers investigating an arson case. Brown involved a uniformed officer investigating a murder case. Carelli involved a uniformed officer investigating a stolen truck case. Significantly, our Supreme Court explained in Brown: The problem for this Court is to determine the permissible extent of police power in light of these United States Supreme Court decisions. Lewis (involving sales of marijuana to a federal narcotics agent), Hoffa (involving the planting of a government informer in defendant's hotel room to overhear conversations), and Lopez (involving an attempted bribe of an Internal Revenue agent) clearly do not require the police to be completely open and truthful as to their identity and purpose when dealing with suspects. They recognize that undercover work is an essential weapon in the police arsenal. In this case the `undercover' work was not as to Petrovich's identity as a policeman but rather as to his motives in offering to sell the gun. It appears to us that there is no real difference between this deception and those found permissible in Lewis, Hoffa and Lopez. 261 A.2d at 881-82. (Emphasis added). Thus, this case is not distinguishable from Albrecht, Brown or Carelli based upon the fact that the officers involved here were not working undercover, nor is this case distinguishable based upon the type of crime under investigation. Third and finally, the majority suggests that because Wright has never been expressly overruled, Poteete and not Carelli correctly states the law with respect to the effect of deception upon consent in Pennsylvania. As explained in Carelli, however, Wright was decided by our Supreme Court based solely on federal law which was subsequently substantially modified. Moreover, subsequent decisions of our Supreme Court, while not overruling Wright expressly, have nonetheless expressly recognized this change in the law. See Commonwealth v. Morgan, supra ; Commonwealth v. Albrecht, supra ; Commonwealth v. Brown, supra . Thus, I remain of the opinion that Wright and Poteete no longer correctly state the controlling law, and that they were properly distinguished in Morrison and Carelli. Of course, consent remains invalid if it is given in response to a false or invalid claim of authority. See LoJi Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 99 S.Ct. 2319, 60 L.Ed.2d 920 (1979); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 51 S.Ct. 153, 75 L.Ed. 374 (1931). [5] Likewise, consent is exceeded when the scope of the search actually conducted is broader than that to which the individual has consented. See Gouled v. United States, supra ; Commonwealth v. Shaw, 476 Pa. 543, 383 A.2d 496 (1978); see generally III LaFave, Search and Seizure § 8.1(c), at 160-174 & nn. 48-108. Whether other types of deception vitiate consent must depend upon a case by case determination of the voluntariness of the consent in light of the totality of the circumstances, including the challenged deception. See Commonwealth v. Brown, supra, 261 A.2d at 882; Commonwealth v. Morrison, supra, 418 A.2d at 1380-81. The voluntariness of consent need only be established by a preponderance of the evidence. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 176, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2779, 97 L.Ed.2d 144, 153 (1987); United States v. Matlock, supra . With the foregoing in mind, I turn to the facts of this case.
Despite the officers' clear and uncontradicted testimony that Slaton was not the focus of the investigation when the challenged inspections were conducted on December 6, 1983 and December 7, 1983, the suppression court found that Slaton was in fact the focus of the investigation by December 6, 1983. The suppression court made its finding based upon the fact that numerous prescriptions seized in a prior, concededly lawful, consensual inspection of Slaton's prescription file had been confirmed as being fraudulent. The trial court rejected as not credible the officer's explanation that, though the forgeries and defects in the prescriptions were apparent to him as an experienced narcotics agent assigned to investigate such cases, the potential culpability of Slaton for knowingly filling fraudulent prescriptions did not receive the officers' focused attention until after numerous additional prescriptions were seized during the challenged inspections, and statements implicating Slaton were made by some of the suspects who pled guilty to having passed the fraudulent prescriptions. Even then, the officers did not process charges against Slaton until they received expert opinions from doctors and pharmacists that the defects in the seized prescriptions were such that they should have been questioned by Slaton. [6] Nonetheless, the burden of proof was on the Commonwealth and it was within the province of the trial court to access the officer's credibility. Consequently, I reluctantly accept the trial court's finding that Slaton had become the focus of the investigation by December 6, 1983, despite grave reservations in this regard. See Commonwealth v. Carelli, supra, 377 Pa.Superior Ct. at 129 n. 1, 546 A.2d at 1191 n. 1. The deception which the majority concludes is so implicitly coercive as to vitiate Slaton's consent is the deception implied from the fact that prior to the first lawful, consensual inspection of Slaton's prescription file the officers had indicated that they were investigating the possibility that a man named Merriweather and his accomplices had been passing fraudulent prescriptions, but that prior to the subsequent challenged inspections, the officers failed to inform Slaton that he had become the focus of their investigation. I find this deception to be inconsequential. Slaton knew that the officers had seized numerous prescriptions as being potentially fraudulent during the previous lawful consensual inspection. He received a receipt for each of the prescriptions seized. As a licensed pharmacist he must be presumed to be aware of the fact that it would be a crime for him to knowingly fill fraudulent prescriptions. Consequently, when the officers returned and indicated that they wanted to conduct further inspections of his prescription file, is it not just as likely that Slaton was aware of his own potential liability without being informed of it by the officers, as it was for the officers to have focused their investigation on Slaton's potential culpability at that juncture? I think so. Moreover, had Slaton been informed that he had become the focus of the investigation, is there any reasonable likelihood that he would then have withheld consent? I think not. An overwhelming percentage of state administrative inspections of pharmacies are consensual. See Simonmeier, Governmental Inspections of Pharmacies, in Strauss, The Pharmacist and the Law, at 14 (1980). Likewise, federal administrative inspections of pharmacies and drug manufacturing facilities are also overwhelmingly consensual. See O'Reilly, Bad Actors Make Worse Law, 37 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 368, 371 (1982) (an estimated 99.5% of FDA inspections are consensual); Levitt, FDA Inspections and Criminal Responsibility, 36 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal 469, 473 n. 2 (1981) (though the FDA conducted approximately 33,000 inspections in 1978 and 1979, only about 25 inspection warrants were sought per year). There are simple yet very good reasons why pharmacists almost invariably consent to administrative inspections. First and foremost, the vast majority of pharmacists are conscientious professionals who have nothing to hide, and who are as interested as law enforcement officers in preventing criminals from obtaining drugs illegally by passing fraudulent prescriptions in their pharmacies. [7] Second, refusal to grant consent may fuel nascent suspicions, while consent and cooperation, on the other hand, may be argued later in support of a defense that any irregularities discovered were innocent and inadvertent. See O'Reilly, supra, 37 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal at 370-71; Levitt, supra, 36 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal at 474-75; Davids, supra, 31 Food Drug Cosmetic Law Journal at 237; cf. Commonwealth v. Carelli, supra, 546 A.2d at 1197. Finally, an administrative warrant, if it is even needed (Parts III & IV, supra ), may be easily obtained by the officers. Thus, resistance to inspection would often be a futile and potentially harmful gesture. Assuming, arguendo, that knowledge of the officers' suspicions would have outweighed the first possible motivation to consent, the second and third motivations would nonetheless apply. Based upon the fact that prescriptions lawfully seized previously had been confirmed as being fraudulent, there can be no doubt that an administrative warrant would have been issued authorizing further inspections of Slaton's prescription file had Slaton refused consent. What possible effect then could refusal have had but to fan suspicions and forfeit potentially favorable exculpatory evidence, i.e. that Slaton consented and cooperated freely because he at least believed he had nothing to hide? For this reason, I find the challenged deception inconsequential, and Slaton's consent fully voluntary.