Opinion ID: 2782886
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Meaning of “Interrogation” under Miranda

Text: In Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S. Ct. 1682, the Supreme Court defined the meaning of “interrogation” under Miranda. In that case, police officers advised the defendant of his Miranda rights upon arresting him on the street in connection with a robbery and murder committed with a sawed-off shotgun, and the defendant stated that he wanted to speak with a lawyer. Innis, 446 U.S. at 294, 100 S. Ct. at 1686. Immediately thereafter, while transporting the defendant to the police station, three officers had a conversation among themselves concerning the possible danger posed to “handicapped” children playing in the area by the missing murder weapon. Id. at 294-95, 100 S. Ct. at 1686-87. Overhearing this, the defendant interrupted the conversation and instructed the officers to return to the scene of his arrest, where he directed them to the location of the murder weapon out of concern for “the kids in the area.” Id. at 295, 100 S. Ct. at 1687 (quotation omitted). On certiorari review, the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant had not been “interrogated” within the meaning of Miranda. Id. at 302-03, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91. The Supreme Court held that “the term ‘interrogation’ under Miranda 59 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 60 of 87 refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Id. at 301, 100 S. Ct. at 1689-90 (emphasis added) (alteration in original) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612).14 In defining “interrogation” in Innis, the Supreme Court noted that the concern of the Miranda Court “was that the ‘interrogation environment’ created by the interplay of interrogation and custody would ‘subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner’ and thereby undermine the privilege against compulsory selfincrimination.” Id. at 299, 100 S. Ct. at 1688. The police “techniques of persuasion” that caused this concern extended beyond “express questioning” and included the use of “coached witnesses,” as follows: For example, one of the practices discussed in Miranda was the use of line-ups in which a coached witness would pick the defendant as the perpetrator. This was designed to establish that the defendant was in fact guilty as a predicate for further interrogation. A variation on this theme discussed in Miranda was the so-called “reverse line-up” in which a defendant would be identified by coached witnesses as the 14 In Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990), the Supreme Court recognized a “routine booking exception” to Miranda’s coverage for questions to secure the defendant’s “biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services,” such as questions regarding name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age. Muniz, 496 U.S. at 600-02, 110 S. Ct. at 2649-50 (quotation omitted). The Supreme Court reasoned that, where such questions are “requested for record-keeping purposes only” and therefore “appear reasonably related to the police’s administrative concerns,” the questions “fall outside the protections of Miranda and the answers thereto need not be suppressed.” Id. at 60102, 110 S. Ct. at 2638. 60 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 61 of 87 perpetrator of a fictitious crime, with the object of inducing him to confess to the actual crime of which he was suspected in order to escape the false prosecution. The Court in Miranda also included in its survey of interrogation practices the use of psychological ploys, such as to “posi[t]” “the guilt of the subject,” to “minimize the moral seriousness of the offense,” and “to cast blame on the victim or on society.” It is clear that these techniques of persuasion, no less than express questioning, were thought, in a custodial setting, to amount to interrogation. Id. at 299, 100 S. Ct. at 1688-89 (emphasis added). Thus, in Innis the Supreme Court held, “Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent.” Id. at 300-01, 100 S. Ct. at 1689. In concluding that the officers’ comments were not the functional equivalent of interrogation, the Supreme Court observed that nothing in the record suggested that the officers should have known that their conversation was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant. Id. at 302-03, 100 S. Ct. at 1690-91. In addition to these cases discussing what constitutes “interrogation,” we must also review the scope of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against selfincrimination. 3. Scope of the Fifth Amendment Privilege against Self-Incrimination The privilege against self-incrimination protects a person only against being incriminated by his own compelled “testimonial” communications. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 207, 108 S. Ct. 2341, 2345 (1988) (quotation omitted and 61 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 62 of 87 emphasis added) (holding that the court-ordered signing of consent forms by the target of a grand jury investigation to authorize foreign banks to disclose records of his accounts was not testimonial). “[I]n order to be testimonial, an accused’s communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself.” Id. at 210, 108 S. Ct. at 2347 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has held that certain compelled acts, though incriminating, are not within the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment because they are not testimonial or of a communicative nature, including providing a handwriting exemplar, Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266-67, 87 S. Ct. 1951 (1967); furnishing a blood sample, Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 760-65, 86 S. Ct. at 1830-33;15 providing a voice exemplar, United States v. 15 Schmerber also raised a Fourth Amendment claim. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766, 86 S. Ct. at 1833. The Supreme Court held that the police officer did not violate Schmerber’s Fourth Amendment rights by taking a blood sample without a warrant because, inter alia, the diminishing alcohol in Schmerber’s blood presented an emergency and the threatened destruction of evidence. Id. at 770-71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36. In Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013), the majority held that the natural metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream does not present a per se exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunk-driving cases. Id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1556. Instead, the McNeely majority held, exigency in this context must be determined case by case based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. A number of state courts had interpreted Schmerber as a per se rule under the Fourth Amendment, see id. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 n.2, but the McNeely majority went to great lengths to interpret Schmerber as also using a “totality of the circumstances” approach. One state court has held that McNeely announced a new rule of law for purposes of state habeas petitions because it “broke new ground,” Siers v. Weber, 2014 S.D. 51, ¶ 17 (S.D. 2014), and for this reason Westlaw has Schmerber flagged as abrogated by McNeely as recognized in Siers. 62 Case: 14-11857 Date Filed: 02/27/2015 Page: 63 of 87 Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 7, 93 S. Ct. 764, 768 (1973); standing in a lineup, United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222-23, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 1930 (1967); or wearing particular clothing, Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 252-53, 31 S. Ct. 2, 6 (1910). Similarly, “the ‘right’ to counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination is not absolute.” Roberson, 486 U.S. at 686 n.6, 108 S. Ct. at 2100 n.6. If police decide not to “provide counsel during a reasonable period of time in which investigation in the field is carried out, they may refrain from doing so without violating the person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S. Ct. at 1628.