Opinion ID: 4526485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The error affected Rosa’s substantial rights.

Text: Third, we conclude that the error affected Rosa’s substantial rights. In so doing, we reject the Government’s argument that the district court’s issuance of the SOR precludes a finding of plain error. This Court has previously declined to find plain error where a district court failed to provide an in-court explanation but then adopted in writing a PSR containing “factual findings . . . adequate to support the sentence.” 25 Where a district court adequately explains its sentence through subsequent written adoption of a PSR, “the error”—that is, failure to provide an 25United States v. Espinoza, 514 F.3d 209, 212 (2d Cir. 2008); see Molina, 356 F.3d at 277 (no plain error where “there were no specific factual findings and no explicit adoption by the district court of appellant’s PSR in open court” but “[t]he adequate findings of defendant’s PSR were adopted in the written judgment” (citation omitted)). 17 adequate in-court explanation—“d[oes] not affect a substantial right of the defendant.” 26 Here, however, the SOR was unusually disconnected from the orally imposed sentence and contained too many errors to reflect clear adoption of the PSR and to serve as an adequate explanation for the sentence imposed. Although the SOR purported to adopt the PSR without change, in fact the district court had explained in open court that it was deviating significantly from the PSR’s Guidelines calculation. Moreover, the SOR identified a different total offense level and a different Guidelines range than those used at sentencing. 27 And finally, the SOR identified a completely different restitution amount than the amount imposed at sentencing. The SOR provided only confusion, not an explanation. 26 Molina, 356 F.3d at 278. 27The SOR also stated that the sentence imposed fell within the Guidelines range even though this sentence actually fell beneath the Guidelines range calculated in the PSR (94 to 111 months). It appears to be mere coincidence that the actual sentence imposed fell not only within the range used at sentencing but also within the erroneous range in the SOR. 18 Given the number of inaccuracies in the SOR, we conclude that the error here affected Rosa’s substantial rights. D. The error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings Fourth and finally, we conclude that the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. As the Supreme Court explained in Rita v. United States, § 3553(c)’s requirement protects public trust in the judiciary: The statute does call for the judge to “state” his “reasons.” And that requirement reflects sound judicial practice. Judicial decisions are reasoned decisions. Confidence in a judge’s use of reason underlies the public’s trust in the judicial institution. A public statement of those reasons helps provide the public with the assurance that creates that trust. 28 Here, no explanation of the sentence is evident from the record, whether from the transcript of the sentencing hearing or other materials, and the reasons underlying Rosa’s sentence are therefore not available either to this 28 Rita, 551 U.S. at 356. 19 Court or the public. Accordingly, all four prongs of the plain error test are satisfied in this case. We therefore remand with instructions that the district court conduct a resentencing, during which the court will have an opportunity to clearly set forth the reasons for its sentence. 29 In so doing, we stress that nothing in this opinion should be read as intimating a view that this Court harbors concerns regarding the substantive reasonableness of Rosa’s sentence. We 29As to the appropriate remedy, depending on the circumstances of a district court’s failure to comply with § 3553(c), our Court has taken either of two approaches. In United States v. Lewis, we remanded with instructions that the district court vacate the sentence and conduct a full resentencing. 424 F.3d at 249. By contrast, in United States v. Zackson, we “affirm[ed] the judgment of conviction and sentence” but remanded for an adequate statement of reasons. 6 F.3d at 914. We also stated that the same panel would “retain jurisdiction in the event of a subsequent appeal.” Id. at 924. (We commonly use the term “Jacobson remand” to refer to the approach in which we “remand partial jurisdiction to the district court to supplement the record on a discrete factual or legal issue while retaining jurisdiction over the original appeal.” Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 115 (2d Cir. 2016) (Winter, J., concurring). The name derives from United States v. Jacobson, in which this Court recognized the authority of federal appellate courts to seek “supplementation of a record without a formal remand or the need for a new notice of appeal before the appellate panel acts on the supplemental record.” 15 F.3d 19, 22 (2d Cir. 1994).) This Court has discretion to follow either path. We conclude that the Lewis course is more appropriate here, given the confusion caused by the conflicting restitution amounts. By directing the district court to vacate the sentence and to conduct a fresh sentencing, the court will have authority to enter a correct restitution order free from any jurisdictional doubt. 20 limit ourselves to the single question of whether the record satisfies § 3553(c).