Opinion ID: 2784363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court’s denial of one of hartfield’s

Text: P E R E M PT O R Y CH A L L EN G E S W A S N O T C L E A R L Y ERRONEOUS. ¶18. Hartfield challenges the trial court’s denial, under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), of his peremptory challenge to venire person number sixteen. During jury selection, Hartfield exercised seven successive peremptory challenges on white venire members. The State made a “reverse-Batson” challenge. Batson forbids the prosecution from racially discriminating through the use of peremptory challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S. Ct. 1712. This Court has held that neither the defense nor the prosecution is permitted to use peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory 2 Because we find that the statements were not against Graham’s penal interest and were properly excluded, we do not reach the issue of whether they were trustworthy. Although we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the statements, we note that the trial court erroneously relied upon evidence adduced at Graham’s separate trial in its finding that the statements were not trustworthy. The trial court should have limited its inquiry to the record in Hartfield’s trial. 15 manner. Hardison v. State, 94 So. 3d 1092, 1097 (Miss. 2012). When the State challenges the defense’s use of a peremptory challenges as racially discriminatory, this Court refers to it as a “reverse-Batson” challenge. Id. When a Batson challenge is made, the trial court employs a three-step process for determining whether a Batson violation has occurred. First, the party objecting to the peremptory strike of a potential juror must make a prima facie showing that race was the criterion for the strike. Second, upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for excluding that particular juror. Finally, after a race-neutral explanation has been offered by the prosecution, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory strike, i.e., that the reason given was a pretext for discrimination. Pitchford v. State, 45 So. 3d 216, 224 (Miss. 2010) (citing Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 917 (Miss. 2007)). Further, five indicia of pretext should be considered when analyzing a proffered race-neutral reason for a peremptory strike: (1) disparate treatment, that is, the presence of unchallenged jurors of the opposite race who share the characteristic given as the basis for the challenge; (2) the failure to voir dire as to the challenged characteristic cited; (3) the characteristic cited is unrelated to the facts of the case; (4) lack of record support for the stated reason; and (5) group-based traits. Pruitt v. State, 986 So. 2d 940, 944 (Miss. 2008). “[T]he rule in Batson provides an opportunity to the [proponent of the strike] to give the reason for striking the juror, and it requires the judge to assess the plausibility of that reason in light of all evidence with a bearing on it.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 251-52, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2331, 162 L. Ed. 2d 196 (2005). ¶19. The State argued that a prima facie case of racial discrimination was made when Hartfield used his first seven peremptory strikes on white jurors, while accepting all African- 16 American jurors tendered. The trial judge found that this pattern constituted a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and Hartfield provided a race-neutral reason for each strike. Hartfield’s counsel stated that he struck venire person number sixteen because he was asleep during defense counsel’s voir dire. The judge stated that number sixteen had not been asleep. Defense counsel responded that “I watched him. He kept yawning and I would look and he wasn’t firmly asleep, but the reason was when Mr. Whitacre was asking questions he would nod back and shut his eyes. And that was the reason.” The prosecutors stated that they had not noticed number sixteen sleeping and that number sixteen had been responsive to questions, and argued that Hartfield’s reason was pretextual. The trial court found that Hartfield’s peremptory challenge to number sixteen was discriminatory but allowed his other six peremptory challenges. When defense counsel objected, the trial court noted that number sixteen had yawned a couple times and “did close his eyes, but he never was asleep.” ¶20. This Court will overturn a trial court’s Batson ruling only if it was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Batiste v. State, 121 So. 3d 808, 848 (Miss. 2013). Because a Batson ruling is largely based on credibility, we give great deference to the trial court’s decision. Id. Hartfield argues that a juror’s appearing sleepy is a race-neutral reason for a strike. He argues that the trial court’s finding of pretext was clearly erroneous because the trial court observed that number sixteen had yawned and closed his eyes; therefore, the trial court should have found the strike was not pretextual. ¶21. Critically, Hartfield’s race-neutral reason for the strike was not that number sixteen had been sleepy, but that number sixteen had been asleep. The trial judge observed that number sixteen had never been asleep, but that he had yawned a couple of times and closed 17 his eyes. Apparently, the judge found from his observation that number sixteen’s demeanor did not justify the strike for the proffered race-neutral reason, and that the profferred raceneutral reason was a pretext for discrimination. The United States Supreme Court has stated Step three of the Batson inquiry involves an evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility, and “the best evidence [of discriminatory intent] often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge.” In addition, race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges often invoke a juror’s demeanor (e.g., nervousness, inattention), making the trial court’s firsthand observations of even greater importance. In this situation, the trial court must evaluate not only whether the prosecutor’s demeanor belies a discriminatory intent, but also whether the juror’s demeanor can credibly be said to have exhibited the basis for the strike attributed to the juror by the prosecutor. We have recognized that these determinations of credibility and demeanor lie “‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province,’” and we have stated that “in the absence of exceptional circumstances, we would defer to [the trial court].” Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2008) (citations omitted). Here, the trial court evaluated the proffered race-neutral reason, that number sixteen had been asleep during voir dire, in light of the trial court’s own observation, that number sixteen had not been sleeping, but had yawned and closed his eyes, and found that the race-neutral reason was pretextual. This determination rested entirely upon the trial court’s firsthand observation of both defense counsel and number sixteen, and the trial court’s conclusion that number sixteen’s demeanor did not support the proffered race-neutral reason. Given that evaluations of credibility and demeanor are “peculiarly within a trial judge’s province,” we find that the trial court’s finding of pretext was not clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.3 3