Opinion ID: 1194929
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Which entities are person[s] (and hence potentially liable) under section 1983

Text: (2) Neither states nor state officials acting in their official capacities are person[s] within the meaning of section 1983 when sued for damages. ( Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police (1989) 491 U.S. 58, 71, fn. 10 [109 S.Ct. 2304, 2312, 105 L.Ed.2d 45]; Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 365 [110 S.Ct. at p. 2437] [[T]he State and arms of the State ... are not subject to suit under § 1983 in either federal court or state court.].) Hence, neither can be sued for damages under section 1983, even in state court. (See Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, supra, 491 U.S. at pp. 63-64, 71, fn. 10 [109 S.Ct. at pp. 2308-2309, 2312].) In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. 658, the high court overruled that portion of Monroe which held that local governments were not person[s] within the meaning of section 1983, and hence were wholly immune from suit. ( Id. at pp. 663, 690 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2022, 2035-2036].) (3) Under Monell, local governments can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover, ... local governments ... may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pursuant to governmental `custom' even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels. ( Id. at pp. 690-691 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2035-2036].) Local government includes counties as well as cities. ( McMillian v. Monroe County (1997) 520 U.S. 781, ___-___ [117 S.Ct. 1734, 1735-1736, 138 L.Ed.2d 1] [if sheriff's actions constitute county as opposed to state policy, then county is liable under section 1983]; Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 690, fn. 54 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2036] [Section 1983 applies to local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes.].) However, a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor  or, in other words, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. ( Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, supra, 436 U.S. at p. 691 [98 S.Ct. at p. 2036], original italics.) Thus, a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under § 1983. (436 U.S. at p. 694 [98 S.Ct. at pp. 2037-2038]; see Pembaur v. Cincinnati (1986) 475 U.S. 469, 481 [106 S.Ct. 1292, 1299, 89 L.Ed.2d 452] (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.) [Municipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. [Fn. omitted.]].) (4) Moreover, it is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff merely to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the `moving force' behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights. ( Bd. of County Com'rs of Bryan County, Okl. v. Brown (1997) 520 U.S. 397, ___ [117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 137 L.Ed.2d 626], original italics.) [P]roof that a municipality's legislative body or authorized decisionmaker has intentionally deprived a plaintiff of a federally protected right necessarily establishes that the municipality acted culpably. Similarly, the conclusion that the action taken or directed by the municipality or its authorized decisionmaker itself violates federal law will also determine that the municipal action was the moving force behind the injury of which the plaintiff complains. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1389].)