Opinion ID: 172401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BLM feedgrounds

Text: In 1981, BLM and Wyoming entered into an MOU. The MOU stated its purpose was to recognize and coordinate management of those winter elk feeding programs which impact Federal surface and/or mineral estates in Sublette County, Wyoming. The agreement set forth the objectives and operating procedures of both agencies. BLM agreed to [a]uthorize, through legal authority and this Memorandum, the continued use of existing facilities falling on public lands [by Wyoming]. It also agreed to [a]llow [Wyoming] to maintain, reconstruct, or construct access roads, trails, facilities, etc., as mutually deemed necessary by [BLM] and [Wyoming]. An environmental analysis of the feedgrounds was prepared in connection with the MOU. GYC claims NEPA demands an environmental analysis of disease threats related to the four BLM elk feedgrounds. GYC argues BLM's failure to issue permits for the use of the affected federal lands in contravention of 43 C.F.R. § 2920.1-1 constitutes major federal action triggering NEPA requirements pursuant to the failure to act language of 40 C.F.R. § 1508.18. Respondents contend the district court correctly determined the MOU was rightfully undertaken in lieu of the permitting procedures required by 43 C.F.R. § 2920.1-1, and thus the failure to issue permits is not a major federal action requiring an environmental analysis. Resolution of the issue depends primarily on the relationship between a provision of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA), 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b), and BLM's permitting regulations for non-federal uses of the public lands at 43 C.F.R. §§ 2920.1-1, 1-2. 43 U.S.C. § 1737 provides in relevant part: (b) Contracts and cooperative agreements Subject to the provisions of applicable law, the Secretary may enter into contracts and cooperative agreements involving the management, protection, development, and sale of public lands. 43 C.F.R. §§ 2920.1-1, 1-2 provide in relevant part: § 2920.1-1 Authorized Use Any use not specifically authorized under other laws or regulations and not specifically forbidden by law may be authorized under this Part. Uses which may be authorized include residential, agricultural, industrial, and commercial, and uses that cannot be authorized under title V of [FLPMA] ... Land use authorizations shall be granted under the following categories: .... (b) Permits shall be used to authorize uses of public lands for not to exceed 3 years that involve either little or no land improvement, construction, or investment.... § 2920.1-2 Unauthorized Use (a) Any use, occupancy, or development of the public lands, other than casual use as defined in § 2920.0-5(k) of this title, without authorization under the procedures in § 2920.1-1 of this title, shall be considered a trespass. According to GYC, because agreements authorized under 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) are Subject to the provisions of applicable law, they remain subject to the requirements of 43 C.F.R. §§ 2920.1-1, 1-2. Thus, GYC argues that in authorizing ongoing feedground operations, BLM was required to issue permits of no more than three years' duration informed by the appropriate NEPA analysis. The permitting regulations cited by GYC, 43 C.F.R. §§ 2920.1-1, 1-2, were expressly promulgated pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 1732 with no reference to 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b). Leases, Permits, and Easements; Land Use Authorizations Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 46 Fed.Reg. 5772, 5777 (Jan. 19, 1981) (Under the authority of [43 U.S.C. § 1732], ... the Code of Federal Regulations [is] amended as set forth below.); Leases, Permits, and Easements; Effective Dates of Permit Decisions; Appeal Procedure, 61 Fed.Reg. 32351 (June 24, 1986) (The existing regulations in 43 CFR part 2920 contain procedures for many types of land users to obtain authorizations in the form of permits, leases, and easements to use, occupy, and develop public lands and their resources. BLM's statutory authority to allow these uses is found in... 43 U.S.C. § 1732.). The first clause of 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) is considerably broader than 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b). Specifically, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) directs BLM to regulate the use, occupancy, and development of the public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). In contrast, 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) permits BLM to enter into contracts and cooperative agreements involving the management, protection, development, and sale of public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b). Thus, the first clause of 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) refers to all land uses and development, while 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) governs a subset of activities carried out under contracts or cooperative agreements. If 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) did not exist, the activities covered by that statute would still be covered by 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b), and such uses would be subject to the regulations at 43 C.F.R. § § 2920.1-1, 1-2. 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) does exist, however, and its interplay with 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) is addressed, in part, in the latter provision: In managing the public lands, [BLM] shall, subject to this Act and other applicable law and under such terms and conditions as are consistent with such law, regulate, through easements, permits, leases, licenses, published rules, or other instruments as [BLM] deems appropriate, the use, occupancy, and development of the public lands ... Provided, That unless otherwise provided for by law, [BLM] may permit ... where the proposed use and development are similar or closely related to the programs of [BLM] for the public lands involved, cooperative agreements under section 1737(b) of this title. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). The language following the word Provided suggests that Congress intended 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) cooperative agreements to be approved by BLM outside of the process required for all other uses under 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b). Moreover, an alternative reading would render 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) superfluous. If the management and stewardship activities described in 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) required approval under the same permitting procedure used for all other activities, there would be no reason for BLM to enter into 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) cooperative agreements because it would still have to issue permits under 43 C.F.R. §§ 2920.1-1, 1-2. [A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant. Corley v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1566, 173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (quotations omitted). In light of the statute's structure, the most likely purpose of the phrase Subject to the provisions of applicable law at the beginning of 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b) is not to require BLM to go through the permitting process at 43 C.F.R. § § 2920.1-1, 1-2 for uses allowed under cooperative agreements, but is instead to ensure the uses approved through cooperative agreements are in compliance with other statutes imposing limitations on the uses of federal land and the activities of federal agencies such as NEPA, the Endangered Species Act, and FLPMA's multiple use and sustained yield mandate. GYC's argument is also undercut by the language of 43 C.F.R. § 2920.1-1, which states, [a]ny use not specifically authorized under other laws or regulations and not specifically forbidden by law may be authorized under this Part. Because the agreement here was authorized under other law, namely 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b), 43 C.F.R. § 2920.1-1 is not applicable. See also Peter v. Smilde, 144 I.B.L.A. 31, 34 n. 3 (1998) (The department has traditionally regarded the issuance of special use permits as appropriate only if the proposed use could not be authorized under other law.). Even assuming the phrase Subject to the provisions of applicable law creates ambiguity as to whether the permitting regulations must be followed when cooperative agreements are used, the statute's legislative history further supports Respondents' position. United States v. Manning, 526 F.3d 611, 614 (10th Cir. 2008) (If the statute's plain language is ambiguous as to Congressional intent, we look to the legislative history and the underlying public policy of the statute.) (quotation omitted). Respondents point to the House Report for 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b), which provides: The Committee expects the Secretary of the Interior to use this authority whenever contracting or cooperative agreements would be the more feasible or economical way to accomplish the purposes of this bill. These advantages would be particularly true where States and local government entities have competent organizations in being which could effectively carry out the Secretary's programs. Examples of the types of activities which might be handled in this manner include, among others, fire prevention and suppression, law and regulation enforcement, supervision of the range especially in intermingled land areas, and construction of facilities. H. Rep. No. 94-1163, at 16 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6175, 6190. The House Report would not have called cooperative agreements  more feasible or economical except in comparison to the procedure for allowing all other uses on public lands, i.e., 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) and its permitting regulations. Cooperative agreements would surely not be more feasible or economical if the permitting procedure had to be followed each time BLM entered into such an agreement. The House Report also indicates the construction of feedgrounds pursuant to an agreement between BLM and the State of Wyoming is the type of agreement envisioned by the House Report as a more feasible or economical way to accomplish the purposes of this bill. The district court appropriately opined that [t]he inclusion of construction of facilities in the above House Report undermines GYC's argument that [43 U.S.C. § 1737(b)] does not provide a parallel track for land use authorizations that would allow the BLM to bypass permitting requirements under 43 C.F.R. § 2920.1-1. (Quotations omitted). GYC asserts the MOU's authorization of feedgrounds through legal authority and this Memorandum, means the MOU is not self-executing, but instead acknowledges the need for additional legal authority, i.e., a § 2920.1-1 permit. It is more likely, however, that the term legal authority refers to 43 U.S.C. § 1737(b), which, as discussed above, provides for the type of agreement entered into here. Finally, GYC argues that even assuming the MOU properly authorized the feedgrounds, this is an ongoing major federal action requiring a supplemental analysis under NEPA due to changed circumstances. The federal action is ongoing, GYC contends, because the MOU provides BLM will review the MOU for operating efficiency annually and BLM may renegotiate the MOU based on the outcome of that review. As with the Forest Service permits discussed above, the major federal action here occurred when BLM entered into the MOU. That BLM reviews the MOU yearly and has the discretion to renegotiate does not by itself establish a continuing federal action. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 73, 124 S.Ct. 2373; Cold Mountain, 375 F.3d at 894. Thus, we conclude BLM's actions with regard to the four Wyoming feedgrounds in question were not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law and affirm the district court's denial of GYC's request to compel BLM to undertake environmental analyses of these feedgrounds.