Opinion ID: 1171519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Risberg Matter

Text: In July 1987, Martha and Kenneth Risberg retained the respondent to represent them in obtaining visitation rights with their grandchild. They paid the respondent $300. Their son, Wayne Risberg, was the child's father. Wayne Risberg and his former wife, Denise Martinez, were then involved in a dispute over visitation and support of the child arising from the dissolution of their marriage. Martinez had filed a motion to take the child out of Colorado and to restrict Wayne Risberg's visitation rights. The respondent filed a motion to intervene in the dissolution proceeding on behalf of the Risbergs on September 9, 1987. On that date, the applicable statute concerning grandparent visitation rights was section 19-1-116, 8B C.R.S. (1986), which provided in part: 19-1-116. Visitation rights of grandparents. (1) Any grandparent of a child may, in the manner set forth in this section, seek a court order granting him reasonable grandchild visitation rights when there is or has been a child custody case.... .... (2) A party seeking a grandchild visitation order shall submit, together with his motion for visitation, to the district court for the district in which the child resides an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the requested order and shall give notice, together with a copy of his affidavit, to the party who has legal custody of the child. The party with legal custody may file opposing affidavits.... A hearing shall be held if either party so requests or if it appears to the court that it is in the best interests of the child that a hearing be held. At the hearing, parties submitting affidavits shall be allowed an opportunity to be heard. If, at the conclusion of the hearing, the court finds it is in the best interests of the child to grant grandchild visitation rights to the petitioning grandparent, the court shall enter an order granting such rights. § 19-1-116, 8B C.R.S. (1986). A hearing on Martinez's motion to take the child out of state was scheduled for September 9, 1987, the same day that the respondent filed the motion to intervene. The respondent arrived late at that hearing, however, because of a scheduling conflict. The hearing board found that the respondent had failed to make adequate arrangements for another attorney to cover the hearing. The hearing was not held because the respondent was late and was rescheduled for October 28, 1987. The court advised the respondent that the grandparent visitation statute required the filing of an affidavit and that he must file one to proceed. The respondent did not argue that no affidavit was required or that the verified motion constituted an affidavit under the statute. In 1987 the general assembly repealed the Children's Code and reenacted the Code with amendments. Former section 19-1-116 was recodified at section 19-1-117, 8B C.R.S. (1990 Supp.). Ch. 138, sec. 1, § 19-1-117, 1987 Colo.Sess.Laws 709-10. The effective date of section 19-1-117 was October 1, 1987. Ch. 138, sec. 48, 1987 Colo. Sess.Laws 823. The pertinent provisions of section 19-1-117(2) are, however, identical to those of former section 19-1-116(2). On October 28, 1987, the respondent had not filed the affidavit. At the hearing, the court took no action on the motion to intervene, but an order was entered allowing Martinez to remove the child from the state based on Wayne Risberg's consent. The respondent was again instructed to file the affidavit as soon as possible, and the respondent told the court, I'll file the affidavit this afternoon. A further hearing on the issue of grandparent visitation was held on December 1, 1987, but because the respondent had still not filed the affidavit, the motion to intervene was denied. The court also assessed the respondent $375 in attorney's fees to be paid to counsel for Martinez because the respondent required that attorney to appear at two hearings without substantial justification. The respondent maintained for the first time before the hearing board that his motion to intervene was sufficient under C.R.C.P. 24 and that since Rule 24 does not explicitly require an affidavit, none was necessary. The respondent's contention is doubly wrong. First, the respondent's motion to intervene was defective even under C.R.C.P. 24. Rule 24 requires that [a] person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motion shall state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.  C.R.C.P. 24(c) (emphasis added). As we said in Capitol Industrial Bank v. Strain, 166 Colo. 55, 58, 442 P.2d 187, 188 (1968): A motion is not a pleading. This is so although the two have similar formal parts and even though certain defenses may be raised by motion. The filing of a motion to intervene, alone, is not sufficient. The positive requirement of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure is that a pleading must also be filed. Parties litigant have a right to rely upon the rules as written. It is the duty of trial courts, as well as our duty, to enforce them when timely objection is made by a party to litigation. Second, a grandparent's right of visitation is statutorily derived. In re Marriage of Aragon, 764 P.2d 419, 421 (Colo.App.1988). Section 19-1-117, 8B C.R.S. (1991 Supp.), requires that an application for grandparent visitation comply with the criteria contained in subsection (2) whether the grandparents seek to institute a new proceeding or to intervene in a pending proceeding. The respondent's application therefore had to include an affidavit in conformity with the statute. The respondent also asserted for the first time before the board that the affidavit requirement was satisfied because the motion to intervene was verified. An affidavit is a signed, written statement, made under oath before an authorized officer, in which the affiant vouches that what is said is true. Otani v. District Court, 662 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Colo.1983). A verified pleading or other verified legal document may under some circumstances be held to be an affidavit if the document otherwise meets the legal requirements of an affidavit. See 2A C.J.S. Affidavits § 5 (1972). The chief test of the sufficiency of an affidavit required by law is whether it is so clear and certain that an indictment for perjury may be sustained on it if false. Jotter v. Marvin, 67 Colo. 548, 551, 189 P. 19, 21 (1920). The trial court could properly conclude, however, that the conclusory statements contained in the respondent's motion to intervene did not meet the legal requirements of an affidavit setting forth facts supporting the requested order. § 19-1-117(2). The point to be made is that the district court ruled that an affidavit was required under the grandparent visitation statute and implicitly found that the verified motion to intervene was insufficient. The respondent never contested that ruling in the district court and did not seek direct review of the ruling. He cannot now collaterally attack that ruling in this disciplinary proceeding. The respondent's derelictions denied the Risbergs any meaningful opportunity to obtain visitation rights to their grandchild in Colorado. We conclude, as did the hearing board, that the respondent's conduct violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice), DR 6-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to the lawyer), DR 7-101(A)(1) (a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful objectives of the lawyer's client through reasonably available means), DR 7-101(A)(2) (a lawyer shall not intentionally fail to carry out a contract of employment entered into with a client), and DR 7-101(A)(3) (a lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage the lawyer's client during the course of the professional relationship).