Opinion ID: 2140428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: correct labor market

Text: [3, 4] Tyrrell contends that the review panel erred in affirming the trial judge's finding that Money was an odd-lot worker in both the Lincoln and the Table Rock labor markets. It argues that Money failed to prove loss of earning power, also referred to as earning capacity, [4] because she failed to present any evidence of her ability to procure employment in the Lincoln labor market. What a court may consider in assessing disability involves statutory construction and thus is a question of law. [5] [5-7] A trial judge should base the compensation an employer pays on the worker's loss of earning power. [6] One of the factors used to assess earning power is the worker's general ability to procure employment. [7] In our recent decision in Giboo v. Certified Transmission Rebuilders, [8] we stated that this factor depends partly upon the number and type of jobs available in a given market. So the factor could change if the worker moves from a metropolitan labor market to a rural community with fewer available jobs. [9] Also, we concluded that a labor market encompasses employment opportunities within a reasonable geographic radius around a hub community. Thus, in Giboo, we concluded that the first step in identifying the relevant labor market for assessing a worker's loss of earning power is to determine whether the hub is where the injury occurred, or where the claimant resided when the injury occurred, or where the claimant resided at the time of the hearing. [10] Like Tyrrell, the employer in Giboo argued that the labor market must include both the community where the injury occurred and the community to which the claimant moved. It argued that unless the labor market includes both communities, claimants could manipulate their earning power loss by moving to an area with fewer available jobs. We rejected that argument. We reasoned that requiring claimants to show that they had moved for legitimate reasons would screen out such claimants. [8] We also recognized in Giboo that some courts additionally require claimants to show that they relocated because of economic necessity. But we declined to impose this burden. We believed it could potentially force claimants to choose between their statutory right to receive compensation and a legitimate desire to move for reasons that were not strictly economic. Thus, we held: If a claimant relocates to a new community in good faith, the new community will serve as the hub community from which to assess the claimant's loss of earning power. [11] Our holding in Giboo conflicts with the review panel's determination that a court must assess loss of earning power based on both labor markets. We conclude that Money did not have to show her loss of earning power in both the Lincoln and the Table Rock communities. Tyrrell, however, contends that when the review panel issued its decision in Money's first appeal, neither this court nor the Court of Appeals, in a relocation case, had addressed the appropriate labor market. Because Money did not appeal that decision, Tyrrell argues the review panel's first decisionthat a trial judge must consider both labor marketsbecame the law of the case. It further argues that in the subsequent proceedings, neither the trial judge nor the review panel correctly assessed Money's loss of earning power based on both labor markets. We do not reach that issue because we conclude that the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply in this circumstance.