Opinion ID: 2979430
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wilders’ Prior Theft Conviction

Text: Rodriguez challenges the district court’s refusal to allow admission of evidence on or cross examination of Detective Wilder regarding a 1992 misdemeanor theft conviction: theft of two horses valued at less than $500. Rodriguez contends that the district court erred in denying him the opportunity to impeach Wilder’s credibility under Fed. R. Evid. 609 and pursuant to his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Rodriguez’s claims are without merit. Because Wilder’s theft conviction was a misdemeanor, Rule 609(a)(2) applies to its admission, as does the staleness provision of Rule 609(b). A district court’s evidentiary rulings are ordinarily reviewed by this Court for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 320, 332 (6th Cir. 2009). This standard applies to a district court’s Rule 609(b) decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Franco, 484 F.3d 347, 353 (6th Cir. 2007). Fed. R. Evid. 609(b) limits, for the purpose of impeachment, the admissibility of prior conviction evidence “more than 10 years old.” Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). That is, “Rule 609(b) creates, in effect, a rebuttable presumption that convictions over ten years old are more prejudicial than helpful and should be excluded.” United States v. Sims, 588 F.2d 1145, 1150 (6th Cir. 1978). Particularly, after reviewing the legislative history of Rule 609(b), this Court has held that “evidence of convictions more than ten years old should be admitted very rarely and only in exceptional and circumstances.” United States v. Sloman, 909 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotations omitted). -5- United States v. Rodriguez No. 086136 In this case, the district court found that Wilder’s 14-year-old conviction was inadmissible for staleness under Rule 609(b). Thus, even if we assume that the theft evidence was admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) as a crime involving an element of dishonesty or false statement,2 the district court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the conviction under Rule 609(b). Rodriguez also challenges the exclusion of Wilder’s theft conviction as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accusers. However, Rodriguez did not make a Confrontation Clause objection to the district court’s evidentiary rulings at the trial level, and thus we review his argument now for plain error. See United States v. Deitz, 577 F.3d 672, 683 (6th Cir. 2009). “[T]he Confrontation Clause affords the right to impeach a witness with his criminal record, subject to the trial court’s discretion to impose reasonable limitations to prevent harassment and annoyance of the witness.” Vasquez v. Jones, 486 F.3d 135, 143 (6th Cir. 2007) (discussing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986) and Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)). On review, “[t]he key issue is whether the jury had enough information to assess the defense’s theory of the case despite the limits placed on cross-examination.” United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 704 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Boggs v. Collins, 26 F.3d 728, 739 (6th Cir. 2000)). 2 Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) determinations as to whether a specific conviction constitutes a crime of dishonesty or false statement are reviewed de novo because Rule 609(a)(2) removes from the district court any discretion in admitting evidence of a prior conviction with an element of dishonesty or false statement. See United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 228 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc)). Instead, under the rule, evidence that a witness has been convicted of a crime with an element of dishonesty or false statement “shall be admitted” without any balancing of prejudice or other factors. Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 1992); United States v. Peatross, 377 F. App’x 477, 489 (6th Cir. 2010). It is unnecessary to address this issue because the evidence was properly excluded under Rule 609(b). -6- United States v. Rodriguez No. 086136 We must be mindful to view this standard through the lens of plain error. In particular, in order to show plain error, the district court’s error must have, inter alia, “affected the appellant’s substantial rights, i.e., affected the outcome of the district court’s proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 192 S. Ct. 1423, 1425 (2009) (internal citations omitted). Given the strength of the prosecution’s evidence with regard to the Russell’s Market robbery, in particular Rodriguez’s confession and Mr. Reed’s positive identification of Rodriguez as the assailant, it is difficult to imagine how Rodriguez’s ability to cross-examine Wilder on a 14-year-old misdemeanor theft conviction would have changed the outcome of the trial. Thus, we find no violation of Rodriguez’s Confrontation Clause right that rises to a level of plain error. For these reasons, we find no error in the district court’s exclusion of Wilder’s conviction evidence for impeachment purposes.