Opinion ID: 2015721
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Review of the Sentence

Text: The second issue presented is whether the sentence imposed was manifestly unjust. We will not revise a sentence authorized by statute unless the sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Ind. Appellate Rule 17(B)(1). A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable if a reasonable person could find the sentence appropriate to the particular offense and offender. App.R. 17(B)(2). Concurrent sentences are within the trial court's discretion so long as it is clear what factors the court considered in arriving at the length of the sentence. Marshall v. State, 621 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Ind.1993). Fisher again asks us to reweigh factors not within our province to consider on appeal. Fisher's objection to the 173-year sentence focuses on his pre-trial psychiatric evaluation, which recommended Fisher not receive consecutive sentences. The trial court acknowledged the evaluation, but accorded its conclusions little weight. This the trial court was entitled to do. In light of Fisher's lengthy criminal record, increasingly violent behavior, lack of mitigating circumstancesall of which the trial court documented during the sentencing hearingas well as the nature of the murders Fisher committed in this case, we cannot say the sentence imposed was manifestly unreasonable. Fisher's argument that concurrent sentences are warranted because these crimes all purportedly arose out of one act flies in the face of applicable law: murder of one person is a separate offense. IND.CODE § 35-42-1-1 (Supp.1992). Hence, the merger doctrine does not apply here. Most of the decisions Fisher cites to support his argument involved improper application of the habitual offender statute, and therefore are inapposite.