Opinion ID: 1113494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Developments under the 1974 Constitution

Text: Although the 1974 Constitution retained the 1921 Constitution's language prohibiting the abolition of forced heirship (abolition or prohibiting clause), the new constitution contained an additional clause declaring that the determination of forced heirs shall be decided by the legislature (empowering clause). This change was viewed by some delegates to the constitutional convention as merely making explicit what had been implicit under the 1921 Constitution, particularly in light of Earhart; [36] that is, that the legislature had broad powers to vary the laws regarding forced heirship provided they did not abolish that institution. [37] This is especially so where the legislature does not have to rely on the definition of abolish in order to find room to exercise its power but is instead able to find its authority to act in a specific grant under the same constitutional provision. At this point, I note my disagreement with the majority's conclusion that Article XII, Sect. 5 is clear and unambiguous, and, therefore, resort to the Constitutional Convention Transcripts is not appropriate. The majority makes three errors regarding the transcripts by finding: (1) that resort to transcripts is only proper when a provision is unclear; (2) that Article XII, Sect. 5 is clear; (3) that transcripts have little value; and (4) that the transcripts herein bear out the majority's interpretation. First, this court has previously held that even in the face of clear and unambiguous constitutional provisions, the transcripts are valuable aids which should be given some weight in determining the purpose, intent, and consequent meaning of provisions for those who find them doubtful. New Orleans, Etc. v. Civ. Service, Etc., 422 So.2d 402, 407 (La.1982). Secondly, even assuming the transcripts are to be used as an interpretive source only when the provisions are unclear, I believe the section in question herein is definitely ambiguous and not at all clear. Although each sentence, when read separately, is clear, when the two sentences of this constitutional provision are read together, as they must be, the inherent tension between the two becomes apparent. If the words of a constitution are indeed ambiguous, a court may resort to the transcripts of the constitutional convention proceedings as an aid to find the purpose, intent, and meaning of those words. Cajun Elec. Power v. Public Serv. Com'n, 544 So.2d 362 (La.1989). To arrive at the conclusion that Article XII, Sect. 5 is clear, the majority finds that because the prohibiting clause of the 1974 Constitution is virtually the same as that of Article IV, Sect 16 of the 1921 Constitution, the former should be interpreted to mean the same as the latter. Only then does the majority seek to give meaning to the second sentence of the 1974 provision, the empowering clause. In spending so much time discussing the meaning of the prohibiting clause of the 1921 Constitution, the majority fails to give adequate consideration to the significant addition of the empowering clause in the 1974 Constitution. Indeed, the majority uses a rule of interpretation which states when a constitutional provision is identical or very similar to that of a former constitution, it is presumed that the same interpretation will be given to it as was attributed to the former provision. I agree with this principle of constitutional interpretation; however, the inclusion of the empowerment clause in the 1974 Constitution rendered the instant provision so dissimilar from the 1921 provision that application of this rule seems erroneous in this case. Thirdly, the majority additionally states that even where resort to the transcripts is proper, they furnish an uncertain and unreliable guide in the interpretation of constitutions and laws and may be of little value as expressions of the convention as a whole. I note, however, that this court has not had a problem in relying on transcripts before, as they have been a pivotal determinant in other cases by this court wherein we were called upon to interpret various provisions of the constitution. See, e.g., Polk, et al. v. Edwards, et al., 1993 WL 364714 (La.1993); State v. Peart, 621 So.2d 780 (La.1993); Cajun Elec. Power v. Public Serv. Com'n, 544 So.2d 362 (La.1989); Bd. of Directors of La. Recovery Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners, and Citizens of State of La., 529 So.2d 384 (La.1988); Bd. of Com'n of Orleans Levee Dist. v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 496 So.2d 281 (La.1986); Sibley v. Bd. of Sup'rs of La. State University, 477 So.2d 1094 (La.1985); Francis v. Morial, 455 So.2d 1168 (La.1984); State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140 (La.1983); Loyacano v. Loyacano, 358 So.2d 304 (La.1978); and State v. Roach, 338 So.2d 621 (La.1976). Accordingly, the transcripts are a relevant source of guidance in this case and can be used for determination of the intent behind the inclusion of the second sentence. Finally, the majority opines that no delegate even suggested the legislature would be able to make less than all children forced heirs. A fair reading of the transcripts reveals the inaccuracy of the majority's statement as seen in the following excerpts from those transcripts: Mr. Fontenot: Mr. Stinson, I see there's no reference to the provisions which [sic] had in the old constitution which had to do with adopted children having the same rights as legitimate children. Why did you all leave that provision out of there? Mr. Stinson: Because it doesn't say even children it says forced heirs and the legislature will say who forced heirs are. In this section we don't even refer to children. It just says forced heirs as shall be determined by the legislature. Mr. Fontenot: But, in the old constitution adopted children, regardless of what the legislature says, have the same rights as legitimate children, yet, we're not saying that in this new constitution, the way I read it. Mr. Stinson: The committee felt that it shouldn't be in the constitution. Neither do they say that children will be forced heirs of fathers and mothers and their ascending line. It will be left up to the legislature. [38] See also the following discussion concerning the legislature's power under the empowering clause. Mr. Avant: Mr. Dennery, this is just one of those questions for the record. If your amendment is adopted, then, under the section as amended, the legislature would have the right by statute to change the classification of persons who are forced heirs, change the amount of the forced portion, or do virtually anything that, in their wisdom, they thought was correct with the system insofar as correcting what they may feel to be inequities but they could not abolish the system. There would be a system of forced heirship, but what it consisted of, and all the refinements thereof, would be up to the legislature? Dr. Dennery: Yes, sir. That's the whole purpose of this section, and I believe, Mr. Avant, that that's basically the law as it presently stands. [39] Furthermore, although the majority correctly notes that an amendment to omit the prohibiting clause from the constitution was rejected, the Framers nevertheless did vote to give the legislature the power to determine forced heirs, thereby indicating that while the Framers did not want to completely abandon the concept of forced heirship, they did want to allow the legislature flexibility to vary its nature.