Opinion ID: 485697
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the amish exemption

Text: 54 Plaintiffs' final constitutional challenge involves the state's denial of plaintiff parents' request to be exempted from the above requirements through the Amish exemption, Iowa Code Sec. 299.24. 7 As the district court noted, this exemption has been granted only to parents of children attending Amish schools and one conservative Mennonite school, all of which are located in distinct geographical areas of the state and which follow the style of life and religious tenets described by the Supreme Court in Yoder. See 620 F.Supp. at 319; Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 209-12, 216-18, 92 S.Ct. at 1530-32, 1533-35. In Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, the Iowa Supreme Court specifically ruled that plaintiff parents 8 were not entitled to the exemption because they failed to prove that their church professes principles or tenets that differ substantially from the 'objectives, goals, and philosophy of education' embodied in the areas of study listed in subsections (3) and (4) of section 257.25, which must be taught in grades one through eight. 368 N.W.2d at 83. 9 The Court found that no tenet of plaintiffs' church was in conflict with teaching subjects such as English-language arts, social studies, mathematics and science; plaintiffs sought only to teach those subjects in their own way, and nothing in section 257.25 prevented plaintiffs from doing so. Holding that plaintiffs had not established any substantial dissimilarity between their educational goals and those embodied in section 257.25, certainly none which sets them apart from all the many other parochial schools in the state, the Charles City Court approved the administrative denial of plaintiffs' request for an exemption. Id. 55 Plaintiffs argue before this Court, as they did before the district court and before the Iowa Supreme Court, that this denial violates the equal protection clause. They further contend that granting the exemption to the Amish but not to them violates the establishment clause because the effect is to advance the Amish religion and to inhibit the plaintiffs'. 56 Because religion is a fundamental right, any classification of religious groups is subject to strict scrutiny. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 1169 n. 14, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974); 2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law Sec. 1840 at 696-97 (1986). That is, the state must show the classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216-27, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394-2400, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982). Of course, this standard is substantially equivalent to the free exercise standards we have already applied to Iowa's reporting and teacher certification requirements. See Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 2317, 2322 n. 4, 90 L.Ed.2d 899 (1986); 2 Treatise on Constitutional Law, supra, Sec. 1840 at 697. 57 The equal protection clause directs that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Plyler v. Doe, supra, 457 U.S. at 216, 102 S.Ct. at 2394 (citation omitted). But so too, '[t]he Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.'  Id. In creating an exemption to its compulsory school laws based upon religious beliefs, Iowa treads the fine line between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause noted by the Supreme Court in Yoder: 58 The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception.... 59 406 U.S. at 220-21, 92 S.Ct. at 1535-36. The Court found an exception for the Amish warranted based upon what can only be described as their very unique circumstances and their centuries-old insulated, isolated lifestyle. As the Court itself noted, the Amish had made a convincing showing, one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make, concerning the nature of their religious beliefs, the severe burden placed upon those beliefs by the state's requirements and the adequacy of the continuing informal vocational education which they preferred to serve the state's interest in the education of their children. Id. at 235-36, 92 S.Ct. at 1543-44. 60 Both the district court and the Iowa Supreme Court recognized that resolving plaintiffs' equal protection challenge required the court to determine whether plaintiffs and the Amish were so similarly situated that the denial of the exemption to the plaintiffs violated the constitution. Both courts analyzed the factors upon which the Supreme Court relied in Yoder to create an exemption to Wisconsin's compulsory attendance laws for the Amish who opposed sending their children to high school, and compared plaintiffs' position to that of the Amish. Both courts concluded that plaintiffs were properly denied the exemption. The Iowa Supreme Court stated: 61 When the same factors [applied by the Supreme Court in Yoder ] are placed in balance on this record the opposite conclusion asserts itself. Sincerity of belief is the only factor wholly common to both the Amish and these plaintiffs. The beliefs of the plaintiffs are greatly less interwoven with their daily mode of life. The Amish culture is greatly more isolated from mainstream American life. Plaintiffs' children, for all the distinctive religious convictions they will be given, will live, compete for jobs, work, and move about in a diverse and complex society. Their educational needs are plainly not as circumscribed as those of Amish children. Neither does exposure to the more general American culture pose such an immediate threat to plaintiffs' mode of living as is the case with the Amish. 62 Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, supra, 368 N.W.2d at 84. 63 After adopting the state court's reasoning and holding, the district court added the following observations: 64 The Court is also conscious of the impact that granting these plaintiffs an exception to the compulsory education requirements could have on public education and the courts. Under Yoder and Johnson a clear line of demarcation is established that offers guidance to parents, school officials and the courts. A blurring of that line by granting an exception here would create an impossible burden upon all persons and agencies involved to decide whether minor variations of fact one way or the other entitled each individual church school to an exception. The Court is convinced that the Supreme Court intended the exception to be a narrow one. 65 620 F.Supp. at 319. We agree with these observations. The Supreme Court has recently recognized the validity of a clear line where religious practices are concerned. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 1314, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986) (upholding military regulation which draws a line between visible and nonvisible religious apparel, allowing only the latter to be worn by service personnel); id. 106 S.Ct. at 1315-16 (Stevens, J., concurring). 66 We have previously addressed the factual dissimilarities between the plaintiffs and the Amish, and they will not be repeated here. The record in this case contains additional specific evidence of the beliefs and lifestyles of those who have been granted the exemption in Iowa, and we find more dissimilarities than similarities between these individuals and the plaintiffs. Accordingly, we agree with the district court that the denial of the section 299.24 exemption to the plaintiffs does not violate their right to equal protection of the laws. 67 We also find no establishment clause violation on the facts of this case. As the Yoder Court stated, narrow exemptions such as Iowa has adopted successfully traverse the tight rope created by the tension between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause. Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 221, 92 S.Ct. at 1536. This narrowly drawn accommodation to one religious view does not require the state, under the establishment clause, to accommodate all others. See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1057, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 451-52, 91 S.Ct. 828, 837-38, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971). The Yoder Court cited the need for preserving doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses, Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at 221, 92 S.Ct. at 1536, and we believe that such an approach in this case supports to the conclusion that the Amish exemption as interpreted by the Iowa Supreme Court is constitutional.