Opinion ID: 2514209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count 2: Kidnapping

Text: To convict Valdivia of the offense of kidnapping, pursuant to HRS § 707-720(1)(d), see supra note 1, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Valdivia intentionally or knowingly restrained Officer Heatherly with the intent to inflict bodily injury upon him. See HRS §§ 701-114 (1993) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of an offense and the state of mind requisite to each element) and 702-205 (1993) (providing, inter alia, that the elements of an offense are the conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct specified by the definition of the offense). Valdivia argues that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to justify a reasonable person in the conclusions (1) that he intentionally or knowingly restrained Officer Heatherly and (2) that he did so intending to inflict bodily injury upon Officer Heatherly.
With respect to Valdivia's first claim, we note that the prosecution, at a minimum, was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Valdivia was aware that his conduct  to wit, pinning Officer Heatherly's left arm to the steering wheel of Valdivia's vehicle  was of such a nature as forcibly to restrict the officer's movement in such a manner as to interfere with his liberty. See HRS §§ 702-206(2)(a) (1993) (defining knowing state of mind with regard to conduct) and 707-700 (defining restraint) supra note 1. Because of the difficulty of proving the requisite state of mind by direct evidence in criminal cases, this court has consistently held that . . . proof by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising from circumstances surrounding the [defendant's conduct] is sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in drawing a conclusion regarding a defendant's state of mind. Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i at 106, 997 P.2d at 32 (brackets in original) (citations and internal quotation signals omitted). Accordingly, the mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts, conduct[,] and inferences fairly drawn from all the circumstances. Id. (citations omitted). Officer Heatherly testified that Valdivia had pinned the officer's left arm against the steering wheel of his car when Valdivia engaged the car and dragged the officer down the street for approximately thirty yards. Officer Heatherly further testified that he was unable to free his arm from being pinned, despite his concerted efforts to do so. Although other witnesses could not confirm whether Valdivia was or was not holding or pinning the officer's arm while driving down the street, the fact remains that no evidence was adduced contradicting Officer Heatherly's testimony on this point. Officer Heatherly's testimony, if found credible by the jury, was sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in drawing the conclusion that Valdivia, at the very least, was aware that he had Officer Heatherly's arm pinned and, thereby, was forcibly restricting the officer's movement (that is, preventing him from freeing his arm) such that it interfered with the officer's liberty. Accordingly, the prosecution adduced substantial evidence regarding Valdivia's state of mind with regard to his conduct.
Turning to Valdivia's claim that the prosecution adduced insufficient evidence regarding his intent to inflict bodily injury to Officer Heatherly, we note that the prosecution was required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that, at the time he intentionally or knowingly restrained Officer Heatherly, Valdivia's conscious object for doing so was to inflict bodily injury upon the officer, either by the means employed to restrain the officer or by some other conduct. See HRS §§ 707-720(1)(d), supra note 1, 701-114, 702-205, and 702-206(1)(c) (1993) (defining intentional state of mind with regard to a result of defendant's conduct). The testimony recapitulated supra in section III.A.1.a, if found credible by the jury, was sufficient to justify a person of reasonable caution in drawing the inference and concluding that Valdivia's conscious object, at the time he restrained and dragged Officer Heatherly  who was hanging out of the vehicle  for thirty yards down Kalakaua Avenue, was to inflict bodily injury  i.e., physical pain or an impairment of physical condition, see HRS § 707-700 supra note 1  upon the officer. That Valdivia may also have intended, as defense counsel argued, to flee from the threat posed by Officer Heatherly's drawn firearm does not render the inference that he intended to inflict bodily injury upon the officer unreasonable. Accordingly, we hold that the prosecution adduced sufficient evidence to justify the jury's verdict in this regard as well.