Opinion ID: 2330330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Verdict Form and Instruction on Sources of Duty of Care

Text: [¶ 33] Section 1-1-123 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (a) Any person who takes part in any sport or recreational opportunity assumes the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity, whether those risks are known or unknown, and is legally responsible for any and all damage, injury or death to himself or other persons or property that results from the inherent risks in that sport or recreational opportunity. (b) A provider of any sport or recreational opportunity is not required to eliminate, alter or control the inherent risks within the particular sport or recreational opportunity. (c) Actions based upon negligence of the provider wherein the damage, injury or death is not the result of an inherent risk of the sport or recreational opportunity shall be preserved pursuant to W.S. 1-1-109. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-123 (LexisNexis 2009). [¶ 34] Inherent risk is defined as those dangers or conditions which are characteristic of, intrinsic to, or an integral part of any sport or recreational opportunity. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-1-122 (LexisNexis 2009). The parties agreed that horseback riding at the Gros Ventre River Ranch qualified as a sport or recreational activity falling with the scope of the Act. [¶ 35] This Court has previously held that the question of whether a particular risk is inherent in an activity covered by the Recreation Safety Act is generally one for the jury to decide. That decision can be made as matter of law on summary judgment only when the case involves undisputed facts and when reasonable persons could only conclude that an injury or death was caused by an inherent risk. Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort Corp. v. Rohrman, 2006 WY 156, ¶¶ 3, 15, 150 P.3d 167, 168, 172 (Wyo.2006); Muller v. Jackson Hole Mtn. Resort, 2006 WY 100, ¶ 14, 139 P.3d 1162, 1167 (Wyo.2006); Halpern v. Wheeldon, 890 P.2d 562, 566 (Wyo. 1995). [¶ 36] As already explained, the district court interpreted the Visitor's Acknowledgement of Risk to release liability only for risks which were inherent in a horseback ride at a dude ranch. That decision has not been challenged on appeal. Its ruling anticipated that the jury's decision as to whether Ms. Beckwith's injuries were caused by an inherent risk of trail riding would resolve all issues relating to the applicability of both the Recreation Safety Act and the Rider's Application and Liability Agreement. If they were not, the claim would be barred by neither, and the jury could award damages if it found negligence, causation, and proven damages. [¶ 37] Appellant disagrees with this approach. She argues that the language [a]lthough The Gros Ventre River Ranch has taken reasonable steps to provide you with appropriate equipment and skilled guides so you can enjoy an activity for which you may not be skilled created an obligation to provide skilled guides, which somehow removed the case from the scope of the Act. The proffered verdict form would have directed the juryupon finding that the guide involved in this case was not skilledto proceed immediately to questions of negligence and damages, skipping over the question of whether Appellant was injured by an inherent risk of the trail ride. The proffered instruction stating that contracts may be a source of a duty of care would in her view have tied the skilled guides language to the question on the verdict form. [¶ 38] Appellant points out that the United States District Court for the District of Wyoming dealt with a related issue in Carden v. Kelly, 175 F.Supp.2d 1318 (D.Wyo. 2001). That case also involved a fall from a horse, which occurred in the Bridger-Teton National Forest. The plaintiff argued that certain federal regulations preempted the Recreation Safety Act. An acknowledgement of risk was also involved, although its contents are not set out in the report of the case. The court in Carden held that the federal regulations did not preempt the Recreation Safety Act. Id. at 1326. It also observed that the defendants did not undertake or engage in a contractual duty which could potentially conflict with the Wyoming Recreation Safety Act. Id. [¶ 39] Building on this phrase in Carden, Appellant argues that the ranch agreed to do something (provide skilled guides) which would avoid limitations of the Recreation Safety Act, as well as the release language of the Rider's Application and Liability Agreement. She characterizes the Visitor's Acknowledgement of Risk as creating a duty of care rather than constituting a contractual guarantee of some kind. She contends that the district court should have adopted her verdict form, which would have taken the question of inherent risk from the jury if it believed the ranch had failed to provide the allegedly promised skilled guides. [¶ 40] There are a number of flaws in this argument. First of all, even if a duty of care could arise from the acknowledgment of risk form, the existence and scope of a duty are questions of law for the court, not for the jury, as the district court correctly ruled. Rice v. Collins Commc'n, Inc., 2010 WY 109, ¶ 10, 236 P.3d 1009, 1014 (Wyo.2010); Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 11, 49 P.3d 1011, 1014 (Wyo.2002). [¶ 41] Secondly, one of the settled rules of contract interpretation is that a court must begin with the language of the contract. Wyo. Bd. of Land Comm'rs v. Antelope Coal Co., 2008 WY 60, ¶ 8, 185 P.3d 666, 668 (Wyo.2008). The words used in a contract are afforded the plain meaning that a reasonable person would give to them. Doctors' Co. v. Ins. Corp. of America, 864 P.2d 1018, 1023 (Wyo.1993). When the provisions in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the four corners of the document in arriving at the intent of the parties. Hunter v. Reece, 2011 WY 97, ¶ 17, 253 P.3d 497, 502 (Wyo.2011) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee Partnership, 2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo.2000)). [¶ 42] The language Appellant relies upon simply does not say what she claims it means. It does not as a matter of law guarantee skilled guidesat most, it offers an assurance that the guest ranch used reasonable efforts to provide them. As the district court correctly held, neither the phrase in question nor the document as a whole can rationally be construed as a promise which somehow removed the case from the scope of the Recreation Safety Act. [¶ 43] Throughout the trial, Appellant sought to prove and forcefully argued that the guide in charge when she was injured was not properly trained or adequately experienced. This amounted to a contention that the ranch was negligent because it had failed to provide an adequately skilled guide. Under the district court's ruling, that argument went to an issue entrusted to the jury and was entirely proper. However, by her verdict form, she asked the district court to go farther and to treat the language she refers to as some sort of guarantee which would have waived the benefit of the Recreation Safety Act and the exculpatory language of the Rider's Application and Liability Agreement. [¶ 44] The district court correctly held that the gatekeeping question as to both the Act and the Visitor's Acknowledgement of Risk form was whether Ms. Beckwith's injuries were caused by an inherent risk of the activity. It did not abuse its discretion in refusing Appellant's proffered verdict form, which would have sidestepped a question properly entrusted to the jury. Rohrman, ¶¶ 13, 15, 150 P.3d at 172. It likewise did not err in declining to instruct the jury on potential sources of duties of care, as that was a question of law.