Opinion ID: 2998614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Implausible Testimony

Text: Shtaro first contends generally that the IJ erred in finding her testimony implausible because his skepticism has no basis in the record. We agree. An IJ may not base an adverse credibility determination on conjecture or speculation, see Hor v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 497, 500 (7th Cir. 2005); Chen, 420 F.3d at 710; Uwase, 349 F.3d at 1042; or on “ ‘personal beliefs or some perceived common knowledge,’ ” 6 No. 04-4201 Dong, 421 F.3d at 577 (quoting Huang v. Gonzales, 403 F.3d 945, 949 (7th Cir. 2005)). The IJ gave four different reasons for rejecting Shtaro’s testimony. He “[did] not believe” (1) that she would be targeted for a bribe before her official appointment to the election commission; (2) that her position as election commissioner (or party secretary) was important enough for her to be “singled out” for persecution; (3) that the Socialists would be interested in persecuting her in any case since her refusal to cooperate did not cause them to lose the election; and (4) that they would bear a grudge for five months after the elections. But the IJ points to no evidence to support these assumptions about the motivations of Shtaro’s alleged persecutors, and her story is not so inherently improbable that we can uphold the IJ’s decision without such evidence. Cf. Bace v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1133, 1138-39 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that there was “ample evidence” that Albanian Democrat was persecuted on account of political opinion after he refused to certify fraudulent election returns in 1998). See also Hor, 421 F.3d at 499-500 (remanding case involving adverse credibility determination, in part because IJ relied on unsubstantiated assumption that petitioner’s alleged persecutors would have attacked him, if at all, “ ‘long before five months [had] passed’ ”).