Opinion ID: 183879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Right to a Fair Trial

Text: We review the district court's denial of habeas corpus relief de novo. Clements, 592 F.3d at 51. We may affirm . . . on any basis apparent in the record. Chiang v. Verizon New England, Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 34 (1st Cir.2010). The parties dispute the applicability of two sections of AEDPA to Kirwan's prosecutorial misconduct claim. The government contends that this court should treat as presumptively correct, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1), the SJC's conclusion that the inference that Kirwan said he was going home to get a shank was supported by the record. Kirwan, on the other hand, argues that the presumption of correctness under section 2254(e)(1) does not apply to that conclusion. We determine below that the SJC correctly concluded that the evidence at trial permitted the inference that Kirwan said he returned home to get a shank. Thus, we need not decide whether that conclusion is entitled to the presumption of correctness under section 2254(e)(1). See Forsyth v. Spencer, 595 F.3d 81, 84 n. 3 (1st Cir.2010) (declining to determine whether section 2254(e)(1) presumption of correctness applies where petitioner could not prevail even under a standard arguably more favorable to him). In addition, the parties dispute whether the SJC's determination that there was no prosecutorial misconduct is entitled to deference under section 2254(d)(1), and whether any related factual determinations are entitled to deference under section 2254(d)(2), assuming they are not entitled to deference under section 2254(e)(1). Section 2254(d) applies to claims that have been adjudicated on the merits in [s]tate court. 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). Deference to the state court's determination is warranted . . . if the court either expressly resolved the federal claim on its merits or adjudicated it under a state law standard that `is at least as protective of the defendant's rights as its federal counterpart.' Young v. Murphy, 615 F.3d 59, 64-65 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Foxworth v. St. Amand, 570 F.3d 414, 426 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1710, 176 L.Ed.2d 197 (2010)). The government argues that the SJC applied a state standard that is the functional equivalent of the federal standard when it relied on Commonwealth v. Duguay, 430 Mass. 397, 720 N.E.2d 458 (1999), in resolving the prosecutorial misconduct issue. Thus, the government claims, the SJC's decision is entitled to deferential review under section 2254(d)(1), and any factual determinations that are not entitled to the presumption of correctness under section 2254(e)(1) are entitled to deferential review under section 2254(d)(2). Kirwan contends that the standard set out in Duguay is not as protective of his rights as the standard in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 180, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986), and Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974), and therefore he is entitled to de novo review. Because Kirwan cannot prevail even under the de novo standard, we assume without deciding that section 2254(d) is inapplicable here. See Obershaw v. Lanman, 453 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir.2006) (declining to decide whether deferential AEDPA standard of review applies because petitioner would lose even under de novo standard).
We first address Kirwan's contention that the prosecutor's argument that Kirwan said he was going home to get a shank and then went home to retrieve the shank was improper because it was not supported by the evidence. The relevant question is whether the [prosecutor's] comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868). We conclude that both the inference that Kirwan returned home to retrieve a knife and the inference that he stated his intention to Perry were grounded in the evidence, and thus that the comments urging the jury to accept these inferences did not so infect[] the trial with unfairness, Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, as to constitute a due process violation. Kirwan correctly points out that at one point, when the prosecutor asked Perry if Kirwan had [s]aid he was going to get a shank, Kirwan replied, He just said something about a shank. This testimony, in isolation, might suggest that Kirwan did not tell Perry that he was going home to get a shank and did not, in fact, retrieve a shank at home. Viewed, however, in light of the surrounding testimony, this statement does not negate the inference that Kirwan went home to get a shank. Prior to this statement, Perry testified as follows in response to a question from the prosecutor: Q. Before [the defendant] left, Mr. Perry, did he make a statement to you about getting some type of weapon? A. He really didn't say it was a weapon. He said something about a shank. In his initial answer, Perry did not deny that Kirwan said he was going home to get something; he simply clarified that Perry did not refer to a weapon, but rather used the word shank. The direct examination continued as follows: Q. Tell us exactly what he said, would you? A. I couldn't exactly tell you what he said. He just said something about a shank. He was worried about the two guys [sitting with his former girlfriend] on the other side, and he was worried about wanting to pick up a shank or something like that. Here, Perry's answer again suggests that Kirwan was going someplace to pick up a shank. Furthermore, the evidence at trial showed that (1) after making these statements, Kirwan went home; (2) Kirwan later returned to the bar; (3) during his fight with Meagher, he had a shiny metallic object in his hand; (4) Meagher died of blood loss from a knife wound; and (5) a knife with blood matching the DNA of Meagher's blood was found at the scene. Given all of this evidence, it was proper for the prosecutor to argue in closing that Kirwan told Perry he was going home to retrieve a shank and then did so. Therefore, this argument did not violate Kirwan's constitutional rights. We next address Kirwan's contention that the prosecutor violated his constitutional rights when he argued that Kirwan twice told Perry I'm going to go get my shank. Perry never testified that Kirwan said I'm going to go get my shank. Assuming that the prosecutor's statement was improper, the statement still did not result in a constitutional violation. Where, as here, the allegedly objectionable statements do not implicate a specific right in the Bill of Rights, [t]he relevant question is whether the [prosecutor's] comments `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Darden, 477 U.S. at 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464 (quoting Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868). There is no precise federal standard governing due process claims based on a prosecutor's remarks. Dagley v. Russo, 540 F.3d 8, 15 n. 3 (1st Cir.2008). Darden and Donnelly, however, provide the relevant Supreme Court law. In Darden, one prosecutor stated in summation, among other things, that the defendant should only be let out of his prison cell with a leash on, that he wished the victim had blown the defendant's face off, and that he wished the defendant had used his final bullet on himself. 477 U.S. at 181 n. 12, 106 S.Ct. 2464. In considering whether the closing argument violated the petitioner's right to due process, the Court noted that (1) the summation did not manipulate or misstate the evidence, (2) the judge instructed the jurors several times that their decision was to be made on the basis of the evidence alone, and that the arguments of counsel were not evidence, and (3) [t]he weight of the evidence against petitioner was heavy. Id. at 182, 106 S.Ct. 2464. The Court reasoned that this last factor was important because the `overwhelming eyewitness and circumstantial evidence to support a finding of guilt on all charges' reduced the likelihood that the jury's decision was influenced by argument. Id. (quoting Darden v. State, 329 So.2d 287, 291 (Fla.1976)). In Donnelly, the prosecutor commented that although the defendant and his counsel asked the jury to find the defendant not guilty, I quite frankly think that they hope that you find him guilty of something a little less than first-degree murder. 416 U.S. at 640, 94 S.Ct. 1868 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court concluded that this comment did not deprive Donnelly of the right to a fair trial because (1) it was unclear that the jury would have concluded, as the Court of Appeals supposed it would, that Donnelly must have wanted to plead guilty to a lesser offense but had been unable to do so, and (2) the judge instructed the jury generally that closing arguments were not evidence and specifically told them that the prosecutor's remark was not supported by evidence and thus should be disregarded. Id. at 644, 94 S.Ct. 1868. Kirwan's strongest argument is that the prosecutor manipulate[d] or misstate[d] the evidence, Darden, 477 U.S. at 182, 106 S.Ct. 2464, when he stated that the most critical piece of evidence at trial was Kirwan's statement to Brian Perry, `I'm going to go get my shank.' According to Kirwan, had the prosecutor not misquoted Perry, the issue of whether Kirwan's acts were premeditated would have been a much closer call for the jury. We conclude, however, that this comment was so minor a misstatement that it could not have so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process, Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, especially given the context of the entire trial. First, as in Darden, there was ample evidence to support a conviction for first-degree murder, so it is very unlikely that the comment influenced the jury's verdict. Perry's testimony that Kirwan said something about a shank before leaving the bar, and that Kirwan was worried about wanting to pick up a shank or something like that, combined with the evidence that Kirwan, when he attacked Meagher after returning to the bar, had a shiny metallic object in his hand, and that Meagher died of blood loss from a knife wound, could easily convince the jury that Kirwan returned home to get the murder weapon. Second, although the trial judge did not specifically address the comments, he did instruct the jury that (1) they should decide what the facts are solely from the evidence admitted, (2) closing arguments were not a substitute for the evidence, and (3) they should follow [their] own recollection of the evidence. Given how minor the misstatement was, that the evidence was overwhelmingly against Kirwan, and that the judge did instruct the jury that their recollection of the evidence was controlling, we conclude that the prosecutor's comments did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial.