Opinion ID: 1275413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cases Interpreting Federal Statutory Counterparts

Text: The Janken court relied in part on decisions interpreting similar language in federal statutes. Because the antidiscrimination objectives and relevant wording of title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) [(42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.)], the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) [(29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.)] and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) [(42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq.)] are similar to those of the FEHA, California courts often look to federal decisions interpreting these statutes for assistance in interpreting the FEHA. (See, e.g., Los Angeles County Dept. of Parks & Recreation v. Civil Service Com. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 273, 280, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 150; Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 590, 606;,262 Cal. Rptr. 842 8 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (9th ed. 1988) Constitutional Law, § 759, pp. 255-259.) Title VII defines employer as `a person... who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such a person.' [(42 U.S-C. § 2000e(b).)] The ADEA defines employer as `a person ... who has twenty or more employees' including `any agent of such a person.' [(29 U.S.C. § 630(b).)] The ADA defines employer as `a person ... who has 15 or more employees ... and any agent of such person.' [(42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A).)] These three federal statutes thus contain definitions of employer identical in all relevant respects to the definition of employer contained in the FEHA: specifically, all the definitions of employer in these statutes are worded to cover the `agent' of the employer. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 66, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741, fns. omitted.) The court cited the clear and growing consensus ( Stephens v. Kay Management Co., Inc. (E.D.Va.1995) 907 F.Supp. 169, 173) of courts interpreting the federal statutes that supervisors cannot be held personally liable for employment discrimination. It noted that, since 1993, eight federal circuits have either (1) held that the agent language does not create individual liability for discrimination, or (2) found that, although individuals can be sued in their official or representative capacity, they may not be sued in their individual capacity and have no personal liability, or (3) interpreted similar language in a state statute as not creating individual liability. ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal. App.4th at p. 67, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 741.) The court discussed these circuit decisions individually.  Tomka v. Seiler Corp. (2d Cir.1995) 66 F.3d 1295, 1313-1314 was a Title VII case. In Tomka, the Second Circuit rejected `a narrow, literal reading of the agent clause' which implied `that an employer's agent is a statutory employer for purposes of liability.' Instead, on `a broader consideration' of the purposes of Title VII, Tomka found that the `agent' language was intended as a simple expression of respondeat superior liability. (66 F.3d 1295, 1314.)  Birkbeck v. Marvel Lighting Corp. [(4th Cir.1994)] 30 F.3d 507 was an ADEA case. In Birkbeck, the Fourth Circuit noted that `[t]he few courts that have found individual liability under the ADEA tend to seize on the use of the word agent `in the definition of employer. Birkbeck found that rationale `unpersuasive,' finding instead that the `agent' reference was `an unremarkable expression of respondeat superiorthat discriminatory personnel actions taken by an employer's agent may create liability for the employer.' (30 F.3d 507, 510.)  Grant v. Lone Star Co. (5th Cir.1994) 21 F.3d 649, 651-653 was a Title VII case. In Grant, the Fifth Circuit stated that neither public nor private sector employees are subject to individual liability on the basis of the `agent' language, instead agreeing that the purpose of the `agent' provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into Title VII. (See also Harvey v. Blake (5th Cir.1990) 913 F.2d 226, 227-228 [public officials may be liable in their official capacities, but not in their individual capacities].)  U.S. E.E.O.C. v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd. (7th Cir.1995) 55 F.3d 1276 was an ADA case. In U.S. E.E.O.C, the Seventh Circuit joined `analogous decisions of our sister Circuits in holding that individuals who do not independently meet the ADA's definition of employer cannot be held liable under the ADA.' (55 F.3d 1276, 1279.) The Seventh Circuit stated that the EEOC was `fighting against the weight of authority' in urging individual liability on the basis of the `agent' wording in the employer definition. While finding the EEOC's ` plain language `argument to have `surface appeal,' the Seventh Circuit found `upon closer examination that appeal is really an illusion.' (55 F.3d 1276, 1281.) The court ruled that the reason for the inclusion of the `agent' language in the definition of employer `was to ensure that the courts would impose respondeat superior liability upon employers for the acts of their agents. [Citations.]' ( [Ibid.], original italics.)  Miller v. Maxwell's Intern. Inc. (9th Cir. 1993) 991 F.2d 583 was a Title VII and ADEA case. In Miller, the Ninth Circuit rioted that, because of the use of the word `agent' in the definition of employer, `some courts have reasoned that supervisory personnel... are themselves employers for purposes of liability.' ( Miller, supra, 991 F.2d 583, 587.) Although the Ninth Circuit found that this statutory construction argument was `not without merit,' the court found the `better rule' to be that the purpose of the agent provision was to incorporate respondeat superior liability into the statute. ( [Ibid.]. ) [To the same effect, see also Green-law v. Garrett (9th Cir.1995) 59 F.3d 994, 1001.]  Sauers v. Salt Lake County (10th Cir. 1993) 1 F.3d 1122 was a Title VII case. In Sauers the Tenth Circuit found that a supervisor with significant control over hiring, firing or conditions of employment acts as an `agent' of the employer, and that the employer is therefore liable for a hostile work environment created by the supervisor whether or not the employer knew of the supervisor's conduct. (1 F.3d 1122, 1125.) The supervisor himself, however, was not the employer and could be sued only in his official, and not in his individual, capacity. The `agent' language in the definition of employer did not render the individual liable. (But see Brownlee v. Lear Siegler Management Services Corp. (10th Cir.1994) 15 F.3d 976, 978 [suggesting individual liability under Title VII in dictum].) The Eleventh Circuit has ruled that individual supervisory employees cannot be held personally liable under either Title VII or the ADEA, because they are not employers. Instead, the individual nonemployers may be sued in their official or agency capacity only. ( Cross v. State of Ala. (11th Cir. 1995) 49 F.3d 1490, 1504 [individuals may be sued under Title VII in their official capacities only]; Smith v. Lomax (11th Cir.1995) 45 F.3d 402, 403, fn. 4 [under Title VII and the ADEA, individual supervisors are not employers and cannot be held personally liable]; Busby v. City of Orlando (11th Cir. 1991) 931 F.2d 764, 772 [supervisory employees may be named in their agency capacity, but are not personally liable].) ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 67-69, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 741, fn. omitted.) The last federal case the Janken court surveyed was Lenhardt v. Basic Institute of Technology, Inc. (8th Cir.1995) 55 F.3d 377, in which the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals construed similar language in a Missouri statute as not imposing individual liability on supervisors. Reviewing federal law, the Eighth Circuit found a `clear consensus' that supervisors cannot be held liable in their individual capacity, and that instead supervisors could be named only in their `official' capacities, finding that `[e]very circuit that has considered the issue ultimately has concluded that an employee, even one possessing supervisory authority, is not an employer upon whom liability can be imposed under Title VII.' (55 F.3d 377, 381.) ( Janken, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at pp. 69-70, 53 Cal. Rptr.2d 741, fn. omitted.)