Opinion ID: 4582841
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Diaz’s Post-Arrest Statements

Text: Acosta contends that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the district court when it admitted three statements made by Diaz following his arrest. “Alleged violations of the 13 Confrontation Clause are reviewed de novo, subject to harmless error analysis.” United States v. Vitale, 459 F.3d 190, 195 (2d Cir. 2006). The Confrontation Clause bars “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). A statement is testimonial if it “was given with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. 237, 250–51 (2015) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011)). Acosta’s challenges under the Confrontation Clause fail because none of the three post-arrest statements by Diaz fall into this ambit of testimonial statements. The first statement occurred at the FBI offices, when Acosta and Diaz passed each other in the hallway, and Diaz asked the agent, “Who is that guy?” App’x at 1415. Later that day, while in the waiting room at the Pretrial Services Office in the courthouse, an agent overheard Diaz spontaneously say to himself, “I know who that guy is,” referring to Acosta. App’x at 1416. Given that neither of these statements were made in response to any questioning by the police, it is clear that such statements were not made as a substitute for trial testimony. The third statement at issue occurred when, while Diaz was speaking to his ex-wife over the telephone, he was heard saying, “I think I’m going to cooperate. I am thinking about cooperating.” App’x at 1417–18. Such a statement, also not in response to any questioning by the police, is non-testimonial. See Clark, 576 U.S. at 249 (“Statements made to someone who is not principally charged with uncovering and prosecuting criminal behavior are significantly less likely to be testimonial than statements given to law enforcement officers.”). In any event, given the fact that none of these statements by Diaz directly implicated Acosta in any crime, any Confrontation Clause error was harmless because it is clear, based upon the trial record, “beyond a reasonable doubt that the error 14 complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” United States v. Becker, 502 F.3d 122, 130 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted).