Opinion ID: 162912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Make Express Findings on Disputed Sentencing Issues

Text: 35 Mr. Brown also argues that the district court erred by failing to make particularized findings in response to his objections to the PSR and by failing to reduce those findings to writing. Mr. Brown asserts that the district court was required to do so by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D). 1 Aplt. Br. at 44. The requirements imposed by Rule 32(c)(1) are best understood in their proper context. 36 Rule 32(b)(6)(B) requires a defendant, within 14 days after receiving the PSR, to communicate in writing to the probation officer ... any objections to any material information ... contained in the PSR. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(6)(B). Thereafter, the probation officer may meet with the defendant to discuss the objections to try to resolve any differences. Id. At a time not less than seven days prior to the sentencing hearing, the probation officer must submit the PSR to the court, together with an addendum setting forth any unresolved objections, the grounds for those objections, and the probation officer's comments on the objections. Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b)(6)(C). Except for any unresolved objection under subdivision (b)(6)(B), the court may, at the hearing, accept the [PSR] as its findings of fact. Fed. R.Crim.P. 32(b)(6)(D). At the sentencing hearing, the district court may, in its discretion and [f]or good cause shown, allow a new objection to be raised at any time before imposing sentence. Id. 37 Rule 32(c)(1) then governs the district court's obligations at the sentencing hearing with regard to the defendant's objections: 38 At the sentencing hearing, the court must ... rule on any unresolved objections to the presentence report.... For each matter controverted, the court must make either a finding on the allegation or a determination that no finding is necessary because the controverted matter will not be taken into account in, or will not affect, sentencing. A written record of these findings and determinations must be appended to any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau of Prisons. 39 Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(1). 40 In construing Rule 32(c)(1) and its predecessor, Rule 32(c)(3)(D), we have held that the district court does not meet its burden by simply adopting the PSR as its finding. United States v. Henning, 77 F.3d 346, 349 (10th Cir.1996). However, unless unresolved objections remain and those objections involve non-perfunctory specific allegations of factual inaccuracy, no controverted matter exists, and the district court's fact-finding obligation under Rule 32(c)(1) is not implicated. United States v. Pedraza, 27 F.3d 1515, 1530 (10th Cir.1994); United States v. LeRoy, 944 F.2d 787, 790 (10th Cir.1991); United States v. Hart, 922 F.2d 613, 615-16 (10th Cir.1990) overruled on other grounds as stated in United States v. Warner, 23 F.3d 287, 290 n. 3 (10th Cir.1994). Arguments that merely challenge the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts and not the facts themselves do not trigger any obligation on the part of the district court to make specific findings. United States v. Windle, 74 F.3d 997, 1002 (10th Cir.1996). 41 In his objections to the PSR and again at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Brown levied general allegations of inaccuracies against the information in the PSR. I R. Doc. 55 at 1 (The Offense Conduct... contains many inaccuracies, unsupported assumptions and conclusions based upon unreliable sources.); VII R. at 3 (referring generally to information in the PSR as a whole bunch of fluff that is just not true). It is clear that such generalized, perfunctory objections are not specific allegations of factual inaccuracy and are insufficient to controvert a matter such that the district court's fact-finding obligation under Rule 32(c)(1) is invoked. See, e.g., Hart, 922 F.2d at 615 (vague and cryptic objections are not sufficient to invoke Rule 32). 42 Additionally, at the sentencing hearing, Mr. Brown himself claimed, among other things, that he did not run from the police, that he did not possess a gun and that he was not in Ms. King's apartment. VII R. at 7-11. After repeated questioning in an attempt to clarify the nature of the objections, the district court opted not to allow the objections at all and thus did not rule upon them, noting instead that [t]he jury found you guilty, you are guilty[,] and I'm not trying the case again[,] [y]ou're here to be sentenced. Id. at 11. None of the objections raised by Mr. Brown were among the objections to the PSR filed November 9, 2001. I R. Doc. 55. Because these factual objections were an unbelievable story contradicting both the entire body of evidence before the court, VII R. at 10, and the verdict rendered by the jury, were raised for the first time at the sentencing hearing, and since Mr. Brown showed no good cause for why they should be allowed, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow them. 43 In his objections to the PSR, Mr. Brown next alleged that the basis cited in the PSR in support of the reckless endangerment enhancement was inaccurate and misleading for characterizing his conduct as throwing the handgun on the ground. I R. Doc. 55 at 1-2. He asserted that his actual conduct was merely [d]ropping the gun into a water turnoff hole, a characterization he believes to be far different than throwing it on the ground. Id. at 2. Mr. Brown also claimed that the water turnoff hole had a metal cover on it. Id. These two points appear to us to be Mr. Brown's only objections of factual inaccuracy relating to the reckless endangerment enhancement; his other objections on this issue relate only to application of the guidelines to the facts. 44 We conclude that neither of these objections is sufficient to invoke the fact-finding requirement of Rule 32(c)(1). At the sentencing hearing, counsel for Mr. Brown withdrew the contention relating to whether the hole had a metal cover, VII R. at 11-12, so this particular matter was no longer controverted. Furthermore, we deem immaterial the point relating to whether the gun was thrown or dropped, for such objection relates only to semantics. See id. at 4 (where Mr. Brown's counsel states that Mr. Brown threw or placed the gun in the hole) (emphasis added). The material fact here was whether Mr. Brown did in fact leave a gun behind in the presence of children as he ran from the police. No objection was levied against this fact, thus no specific allegation of factual inaccuracy exists to make this matter controverted. Essentially, Mr. Brown advanced an argument relating to how the court should interpret the facts when applying the guidelines, and this simply does not implicate Rule 32(c)(1). 45 Finally, Mr. Brown objected to various portions of the criminal history section of the PSR. I R. Doc. 55 at 8-9. One such objection, that Mr. Brown was never arrested on February 28, 1988, was resolved and was no longer controverted at sentencing given the production of documentation supporting the PSR. See II R. Add. at 5. In several of Mr. Brown's objections, he takes no issue with the veracity of the facts included in the PSR, but only notes additional alleged facts that might otherwise have been included. I R. Doc 55 at 8-9 (including objections to page 6, ¶ 24 relating to both arrests in Sept. 1988, the objection to page 9, ¶ 29, the objection to page 10, ¶ 36, and the objection to page 11, ¶ 37). None of these objections rose to the level of specific allegations of factual inaccuracy and thus none of these matters were controverted, especially in light of the fact that the district court more than once explained that it would allow additions to the PSR if Mr. Brown provided some evidence to support them. See VII R. at 15, 18-20. The objection to page 9, ¶ 30 was also clarified as one not directed to the veracity of the facts, but to the prejudicial nature of those facts. VII R. at 18. Again, such an objection leaves the matter uncontroverted for the purposes of Rule 32(c)(1). 46 We are left with two allegations of factual inaccuracy to portions of the criminal history section of the PSR that give us pause. The first is an objection to page 6, ¶ 24 involving a hearsay statement in an arrest report that Mr. Brown was heavily involved in drug trafficking. I R. Doc. 55 at 8. Mr. Brown denied that the statement was true and reiterated this point at the sentencing hearing. Id.; VII R. at 15. He did not deny that the report relied on by the probation officer contained the statement. VII R. at 15. The district court stated that [i]f it's not in the report, if it's not a true statement of the report I'll hear you on it, but we're not going to go in and try to invalidate the report. Id. at 16. The second is an objection to page 8, ¶ 27 involving whether Mr. Brown possessed rock cocaine during an arrest. I R. Doc. 55 at 9. Mr. Brown denied possessing rock cocaine, though at the sentencing hearing, the focus was on the fact that he was not charged with such possession. VII R. at 16-17. The PSR accurately reflected that Mr. Brown was not charged. II R. at 8. 47 Our review of these objections leads us to conclude that they were specific allegations of factual inaccuracy sufficient to implicate Rule 32(c)(1). Although these two disputed facts were obviously not relied upon by the district court in arriving at its sentence, 2 [i]f the disputed facts are not important to the sentencing determination and will not be relied upon in sentencing, the district court should say so. United States v. Rutter, 897 F.2d 1558, 1565 (10th Cir.1990). Doing so serves as a safeguard against the manifest unfairness to a defendant if false or unreliable information is relied upon by the Bureau of Prisons or the Parole Commission in their custody and parole determinations. United States v. Wach, 907 F.2d 1038, 1041 (10th Cir.1990). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the district court did not make an explicit determination that no finding was necessary as required by Rule 32(c)(1). Accordingly, we remand to the district court for the ministerial task of entering a determination that it did not take the controverted matters into account in sentencing Mr. Brown. United States v. Easterling, 921 F.2d 1073, 1081 (10th Cir.1990).