Opinion ID: 2982147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “Exhaust” Means “Obtain a Final Decision”

Text: Section 402 establishes two ways that a member can exhaust his internal union remedies and thus begin the one-month limitations period. He can “exhaust[] the remedies available under the constitution and bylaws of” his union, § 402(a)(1), or “invoke[] such available remedies without obtaining a final decision within three calendar months after their invocation,” § 402(a)(2). 29 U.S.C. § 482(a). Murray’s administrative complaint was untimely under § 402(a)(2) regardless of whether the dateof-mailing or date-of-receipt rule applies. But a member’s administrative complaint satisfies § 402(a) if it is timely under either § 402(a)(1) or (a)(2). See Martin, 946 F.2d at 462. The question, then, is when Murray “exhausted” his internal union remedies under § 402(a)(1). The LMRDA does not explicitly define “exhausted” and dictionary definitions simply confirm that a member exhausts his remedies when he reaches the end of the union’s procedures. See Black’s Law Dictionary 654–55 (9th ed. 2009); Oxford English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989), available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/66155?; Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 796 (1993). These broad definitions do not illuminate the narrow question before us. However, our plain meaning analysis does not end there. We discover a statute’s plain meaning “by looking at the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Metro. Hosp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 712 F.3d 248, 259 (6th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted). Thus, we read § 402(a)(1) and (a)(2) together. When a member begins the exhaustion process, the timeliness of any future administrative complaint is governed by § 402(a)(2) alone. But section 402(a)(2) No. 12-4390 Perez v. Postal Police Officers Ass’n Page 7 becomes irrelevant if the member “obtain[s] a final decision” within three months. 29 U.S.C. § 482(a)(2). If that happens, the timeliness of the member’s administrative complaint is controlled by § 402(a)(1). In other words, § 402(a)(1) does not apply—and therefore the member has not “exhausted” the union’s procedures—until he has “obtain[ed] a final decision.” Interpretive sources beyond the bare text confirm this interpretation. The Department of Labor’s interpretive rule construing § 401(a)(1) reads sections (a)(1) and (a)(2) together, so that “[i]f the member obtains an unfavorable final decision within three calendar months after invoking his available remedies, he must file his complaint within one calendar month after obtaining the decision.” 29 C.F.R. § 452.135(b) (emphases added). The Department issued this rule in 1973 based on its experience litigating LMRDA election actions. See 38 Fed. Reg. 18,324, 18,324, 18,338 (July 9, 1973). We find the Secretary’s interpretation, long held and strongly grounded in the statute’s text, persuasive. See United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 219–20 (2001). Therefore, Murray’s one-calendar-month limitations period began to run when he “obtain[ed] a final decision” from Defendant. B. Members “Obtain a Final Decision” When They Receive That