Opinion ID: 1696947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: claim of excessive leniency

Text: Alternatively, the State argues that even if a sentence of probation could lawfully be imposed for a Class II felony, its imposition on the facts of this case resulted in an excessively lenient sentence. Pursuant to § 29-2320, the State may appeal a sentence imposed following a finding or plea of guilty if such [county] attorney reasonably believes, based on all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case, that the sentence is excessively lenient. Whether the sentence imposed is probation or incarceration is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. State v. Spurgin, 261 Neb. 427, 623 N.W.2d 644 (2001). Whether an appellate court is reviewing a sentence for its leniency or its excessiveness, a sentence imposed by a district court that is within the statutorily prescribed limits will not be disturbed on appeal unless there appears to be an abuse of the trial court's discretion. State v. Harrison, 255 Neb. 990, 588 N.W.2d 556 (1999). A judicial abuse of discretion exists only when the reasons or rulings of a trial judge are clearly untenable, unfairly depriving a litigant of a substantial right and denying a just result in matters submitted for disposition. State v. Decker, 261 Neb. 382, 622 N.W.2d 903 (2001); State v. Harrison, supra . Having concluded that probation was a legally permissible sentence in this case, we turn to the question of whether the sentence was excessively lenient under the facts reflected in the record. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2322 (Reissue 1995) provides that where the State challenges a sentence as excessively lenient, the appellate court should consider: (1) The nature and circumstances of the offense; (2) The history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) The need for the sentence imposed: (a) To afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (b) To protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; (c) To reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; and (d) To provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; and (4) Any other matters appearing in the record which the appellate court deems pertinent. In State v. Harrison, supra , we recognized that where the sentence alleged to be excessively lenient is one of probation, it is also necessary for the trial court and the reviewing appellate court to consider the provisions of § 29-2260, which states in relevant part: [T]he court may withhold sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the offender, the court finds that imprisonment of the offender is necessary for protection of the public because: (a) The risk is substantial that during the period of probation the offender will engage in additional criminal conduct; (b) The offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by commitment to a correctional facility; or (c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the offender's crime or promote disrespect for law. (3) The following grounds, while not controlling the discretion of the court, shall be accorded weight in favor of withholding sentence of imprisonment: (a) The crime neither caused nor threatened serious harm; (b) The offender did not contemplate that his or her crime would cause or threaten serious harm; (c) The offender acted under strong provocation; (d) Substantial grounds were present tending to excuse or justify the crime, though failing to establish a defense; (e) The victim of the crime induced or facilitated commission of the crime; (f) The offender has compensated or will compensate the victim of his or her crime for the damage or injury the victim sustained; (g) The offender has no history of prior delinquency or criminal activity and has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period of time before the commission of the crime; (h) The crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; (i) The character and attitudes of the offender indicate that he or she is unlikely to commit another crime; (j) The offender is likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment; and (k) Imprisonment of the offender would entail excessive hardship to his or her dependents. In State v. Harrison, 255 Neb. 990, 588 N.W.2d 556 (1999), a case concerning the prosecution for motor vehicle homicide involving a driver impaired by alcohol, we determined that there was competent evidence received at the sentencing hearing which supported the sentence of probation. This evidence included a statement by the defendant expressing deep remorse for her conduct and a promise to maintain sobriety in the future; letters from members of the community attesting to the defendant's sincere attempts to rehabilitate herself; and, of particular importance to the sentencing judge, a letter from relatives of the two victims expressing their opinion that the defendant's remorse and efforts at rehabilitation were genuine. We noted that this evidence established that the defendant was unlikely to commit another crime, that she was likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment, and that imprisonment would entail excessive hardship to her children. In this case, the district court reasoned that consecutive sentences of 20 months' to 5 years' imprisonment on the Class IV felony and 5 years' probation on the Class II felony would result in Hamik's being subject to the State's supervision for a longer period than under the concurrent sentences of incarceration proposed by the State, thus providing Hamik with a better opportunity to alter his attitude and behaviors. While this rationale seems reasonable on its face, it does not square with the record. Hamik did not offer evidence or personally address the court at the sentencing hearing. Unlike the defendant in Harrison, he did not acknowledge his criminal conduct or express any remorse. Indeed, during the sentencing hearing, the district court specifically noted that it could not discern in Hamik's attitude any appreciation of a need to make changes in his life. Although the court characterized Hamik as a predator who prey[s] upon the trust of young girls, it concluded that absent the opportunity, the likelihood of your reoffending is not great. This conclusion is not supported by the presentence investigation report (PSI) which describes several instances of aggressive and violent conduct on the part of Hamik. For example, the PSI indicates that in October 1999, Hamik instituted an altercation with another individual while both were in a post office, and then said to the individual, You better watch your kids, I'm going to get them, they're mine. In reviewing the record, we find none of the grounds favoring probation which are enumerated in § 29-2260(3). Regarding § 29-2260(3)(a) and (b), the crime clearly caused serious psychological harm to the victim. The victim's counselor diagnosed her as suffering from significant trauma from the abuse and stated that she would be at high risk for needing additional psychological services periodically throughout her lifetime. There is no claim or evidence to suggest that Hamik did not contemplate that his conduct would cause such harm. With respect to § 29-2260(c) through (f), there is no evidence that Hamik acted under strong provocation or under circumstances tending to excuse or justify his conduct; or that the victim, who because of her age was incapable of consent, induced or facilitated commission of the crime. With respect to § 29-2260(f), the PSI reflects that the victim's parents incurred unreimbursed expenses for her counseling and medical services. The PSI reflects that Hamik was convicted of third degree assault in 1986, as well as the conviction on one count of first degree sexual assault on a child for which he was sentenced contemporaneously with the sentence here under review. As noted above, the record does not support a conclusion that the crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur; that Hamik's character and attitudes make him unlikely to reoffend; or that he is likely to respond affirmatively to probationary treatment. See § 29-2260(h), (i), and (j). Finally, the record does not support a finding that imprisonment would constitute excessive hardship to Hamik's dependents within the meaning of § 29-2260(k). As we stated in State v. Harrison, 255 Neb. 990, 588 N.W.2d 556 (1999), the sentencing court is not limited in its discretion to any mathematically applied set of factors. The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge's observation of the defendant's demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant's life. Id.; State v. Riley, 242 Neb. 887, 497 N.W.2d 23 (1993). However, there must be some reasonable factual basis for imposing a particular sentence. Here, while we believe that the trial court was attempting in good faith to fashion a sentence which would both punish Hamik and afford him an opportunity to rehabilitate himself, the record simply does not reflect statutory or other grounds for the imposition of probation. Accordingly, we determine that the sentence constituted an abuse of discretion.