Opinion ID: 198065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Qualified Immunity Diaz-Pagan.

Text: Diaz-Pagan trumpets that Diaz-Martinez was not under his direct command, and that, in all events, he was on vacation when Diaz-Martinez allegedly assaulted Camilo-Robles. Based largely on these undisputed facts, Diaz-Pagan maintains that he deserves qualified immunity because there is no causal link between his conduct and the assault on Camilo-Robles. This argument speaks less to qualified immunity and more to the merits and a denial of summary judgment on the merits, even in a section 1983 case, is not immediately appealable. SeeDomegan, 859 F.2d at 1061. Still, a plausible causal chain is relevant to the objective legal reasonableness of a state actor's conduct and, viewed in that light, Diaz-Pagan's contentions are not entirely off base. At any rate, on the assumed set of facts the court supportably could have concluded that Diaz-Martinez presented a serious risk of harm and that Diaz-Pagan knew as much; put another way, Diaz-Pagan was put on notice of behavior which was likely to result in the violation of the constitutional rights of citizens. Febus-Rodriguez, 14 F.3d at 93. The court likewise could have concluded that Diaz-Pagan had the authority to prevent recurrences of Diaz-Martinez's erratic behavior, but nevertheless failed to take obvious steps within his power to reduce or eliminate that risk. Similarly, the court could have found the requisite causal connection. Finally, the court could have concluded that Diaz-Pagan's omission was outside the range of mistaken judgments that the qualified immunity doctrine protects.Seen in that light, Diaz-Pagan's conduct was not objectively reasonable and, thus, qualified immunity does not attach. F. Qualified Immunity Santiago-Gonzalez. Santiago-Gonzalez similarly claims qualified immunity on the ground that the causal connection between his functions and Diaz-Martinez's transgressions is too attenuated to justify the imposition of section 1983 liability. As above, we examine causation insofar as it bears on qualified immunity (i.e., as an element of objective legal reasonableness). On the facts proffered by Santiago-Gonzalez and amplified elsewhere in the record, it is plain that Santiago-Gonzalez knew that Diaz-Martinez was a ticking time bomb and also knew (or should have known) that Diaz-Martinez, if restored to active duty, was likely to commit acts that would violate the constitutional rights of others. As was true of Diaz-Pagan, Santiago-Gonzalez had both the authority and the opportunity to prevent Diaz-Martinez from interacting with the public, yet failed to intervene. Accordingly, his indifference and the assault on Camilo-Robles were causally linked. In a nutshell, on the assumed set of facts revealed by the summary judgment record the district court supportably could conclude that Santiago-Gonzalez acted in an objectively unreasonable fashion, thus exempting his conduct from the prophylaxis of qualified immunity. G. Qualified Immunity Toledo-Davila. At the end of the day, Toledo-Davila maintains that he and the officers under his command followed proper police procedures when rearming Diaz-Martinez. He adds that in all events he acted in good faith and qualified immunity protects officers who make good-faith mistakes. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641.Although we find no evidence to suggest that Toledo-Davila (or the other appellants, for that matter) acted in bad faith, we nonetheless conclude that Toledo-Davila cannot wrap himself in the mantle of qualified immunity. The extant record eloquently refutes Toledo-Davila's assertion that his conduct was, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable. Toledo-Davila knew of Diaz-Martinez's vicious propensities and the peril presented; he had the sole de jure responsibility to authorize rearming; and yet he treated DiazMartinez not as a dangerous sociopath, but as any other officer.To cinch matters, a causal relationship existed between ToledoDavila's conduct and the incident at the Bayamon Judicial Center.We think that the police superintendent's latitudinarian approach in the face of Diaz-Martinez's patent instability was so far outside the realm of reasonableness that it rendered him ineligible for protection under the qualified immunity doctrine.