Opinion ID: 200511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: voir dire on officer credibility

Text: Defendant postulates the district court erred by not asking the venire this question: Police officers will be testifying as witnesses in this case. People who are not police officers will also be testifying in this case. Would you be more likely to believe the testimony of a police officer simply because he or she is a police officer? Defendant relies upon United States v. Victoria-Peguero, 920 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1990), to support his argument that the First Circuit, like others, holds it is error for the trial judge to refuse to question the venire about whether it would give extra credence to law enforcement witnesses. To make the determination of whether the failure to inquire is reversible error, Defendant adds that courts consider: (1) the importance of the law enforcement officer’s testimony to the case as a whole; (2) the extent to which a venire person’s attitude toward law enforcement is covered in other questions on voir dire and the general charge; (3) the extent to which the officer’s credibility is put to issue; and (4) the extent to which the officer is corroborated by other non-officer’s testimony. In support, he cites United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1988)(citing United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295, 1297-98 (9th Cir. 1979)). Defendant contends the testimony of the arresting officers was critical; indeed, he points out, the government argued to the jury it could convict on that testimony alone. Defendant asserts he -8- vigorously sought to impeach the officers. Specifically, he urges, he questioned Officer McCarthy’s ability to see an object in Defendant’s hands which he claimed ended up in Ms. Gillenwater’s clothing. Defendant further focused his credibility attack on the change in the address recorded from 111, where there was no street lamp, to 117 Zeigler Street, where there was a street light. Defendant exacuates the importance of Officer McCarthy’s testimony by reminding that jurors sent a note asking whether the couple was actually located under the lamppost. Hence, he argues, “the court did not specifically instruct the jury to treat the testimony of police officers in the same way they would treat the testimony of any other witness, nor did it caution them not to give extra credence to their testimony. Indeed, the court’s final instructions did not single out the testimony of the police officers for any special mention at all.” The government responds the district court determined whether any venire person had any connection with law enforcement. For those who did, the court examined them at side-bar about their potential for bias. The government argues at least five circuit courts have determined that this process sufficiently ferrets out pro-law enforcement bias. Moreover, this approach comports with this court’s holding that when law enforcement testimony is important to the government’s case, the district court “should ordinarily inquire into whether prospective jurors are more likely -9- to credit [police officers’] testimony.” United States v. Pappas, 639 F.2d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1980). The government adds whether the failure to ask specific questions is reversible error depends in part upon the extent to which the credibility of the government agent’s testimony is put into issue. Id. at 5. Here, the discrepancy between the officers’ testimony and the written report was irrelevant. It was unquestioned that the encounter took place at the intersections of Zeigler and Wheatly Way; but, more importantly, all agreed that the lights from the police vehicle were shining directly on Defendant and Ms. Gillenwater as the officers emerged. Thus, the attempted impeachment was based upon an insignificant discrepancy — whether the parties were under the street light did not affect whether the officers could observe Mr. Webb. Finally, we are reminded, in its general charge, the court instructed the jury to treat all witnesses alike. The government’s position is well taken. Once again, judging this issue under the abuse of discretion standard, we find no abuse. Although the officers’ testimony was important, it was corroborated by Ms. Gillenwater. Moreover, the attempt to impeach them fell short of a critical evidentiary issue. Judged in light of the entire record, the variance between the address stated in the testimony and that included in the written report did not suggest the officers were not credible. Finally, the jury was told in the -10- general charge that the testimony of one witness was not entitled to greater credibility than that of any other. The lack of abuse of discretion notwithstanding, we remain curious why the court did not eliminate the issue at the outset. The court’s method of probing the issue was certainly more complicated than simply asking the question proposed by the defense. True enough, the court was able to discover persons who might have harbored police bias. After that discovery, the court pursued questioning which probed the essence of disclosures Defendant sought. The court’s general charge was also sufficient to emphasize the jury could not give the officers more credibility than it gave to the remaining witnesses. But, any doubt and an appellate issue could have been eliminated by simply asking the question the defense solicited. A salutary result could also have been achieved. By asking the question, Defendant’s major concern could have been alleviated. He posits that a potential juror might have been reared to respect police authority. If so, that person might believe because of their position, officers are entitled to greater credibility than others. If the proposed question had been asked, Defendant maintains, such a person could have been alerted to explore his conscience for a previously unrecognized bias. Unfortunately, this sort of self-examination was not suggested by any of the questions posed by the court. -11- III. INSTRUCTION ON DEFENDANT’S RIGHT NOT TO TESTIFY Relying upon Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288 (1981), Defendant argues the district court erred by not instructing the jury it should draw “no adverse inferences” against him because he did not testify. He declares counsel “requested that the jury be charged regarding the defendant’s constitutional right not to testify.” Admitting counsel did not use the language “no adverse inference” in her request for the instruction, Defendant, nonetheless, insists he “adequately invoked his substantive right to jury guidance.” The government puts it another way: “Webb never requested the ‘adverse inference’ language at trial in any form.” Furthermore, even if the court’s failure to grant the instruction Defendant desired was error, “the error was not plain, as it is reflected in the fact that defense counsel was unable to articulate the problem with the instructions when the court had completed giving them.” In varying ways, the court instructed several times that Defendant had no duty to take the stand and did not have to testify. For example, part of the charge was: Mr. Webb started this case innocent . . . He has no obligation to explain anything or say anything or do anything. He doesn’t have to take the stand. He doesn’t have to testify. And you cannot hold against him anything that wasn’t done. That would turn the whole process on its head. The government -12- made this charge. The government’s got to prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.