Opinion ID: 363087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the mason hearsay testimony

Text: 146 I am in complete accord with the court's application of Judge MacKinnon's perceptive opinion in Brown 34 to the bulk of the statements made by Williams to Mason. 35 I cannot, however, reconcile Brown with admission of (a) the slip bearing appellees' names and a telephone number, (b) testimony by Mason that when Williams turned the slip over he made a statement or (c) evidence that Mason called the police after the shooting and gave them the information on the slip when it is combined with the first two. 36 147 To begin with, if testimony averring the mere delivery of the slip is as neutral as the court labels it, 37 then by the same token it is also quite irrelevant. And if the writing on the slip does not assert anything except that Beanny and/or Eric might have a particular telephone number and is not being offered as proof that Beanny and/or Eric had that telephone number, 38 what possible justification is there for allowing its admission? If as the court holds, 39 Mason cannot reveal to the jury the content of Williams' statement accompanying the delivery, what is accomplished by showing simply that a statement was made? And if Mason's post-homicide call to the police conveyed nothing but valueless data on the slip, what importance would it have to the issues? Regardless of hearsay analysis, here, as with the proffered but so far rejected testimony that Williams said his leg was hurting, the evidence is admissible only if it is relevant and fairly probative on a material issue in the case. 40 148 The court suggests that this evidence tends to show a current Association between Williams and individuals named 'Beanny' and 'Eric'. 41 This theory was never mentioned by the Government in any of its lengthy pretrial filings, probably because it has a long line of witnesses, including Mason himself, who could testify Directly to the undisputed fact that Williams knew Day and Sheffey and had been in contact with them shortly before the murder. The simple fact is that in actuality, the Government seeks to have something more inferred 42 : that Williams feared Day and Sheffey. 149 Thus, I cannot subscribe to my colleagues' theory that these items of evidence are innocuous. On the contrary, I have no difficulty in recognizing the implications they are apt to have for lay jurors. The only consequence thus far emerging 43 toward which these evidentiary items could contribute is that the jury will infer that Williams told Mason something about Day and Sheffey that would indicate that they were the parties who shot Williams an hour later. Thus, not from the Content of Williams' statement to Mason but simply from its Making, and from the turnover of a slip of paper naming both Day and Sheffey coupled with transmittal of that information to the police, (t)he jury is being asked to infer . . . that Day, and Sheffey as well, bore ill will toward Williams and had reason to cause him harm. 44 150 That the inference arising from Williams' delivery of the note is somewhat less obvious than that which would spring from the excluded content of his concomitant statement his instruction to Mason to communicate with the police if he had not returned to his home by the following afternoon does not mean that it is appreciably less potent. The urgent and threatening circumstances surrounding the episode are enough to demonstrate that Williams intended the utterance of the statement, as well as its content, as an assertion that he feared Day and Sheffey, 45 and thus it can be no more reliable than the words themselves. Consequently, even assuming that Mason's description of the physical events would not be hearsay when viewed completely in isolation, it does not follow that the inferences the jury may well draw, 46 and that the Government patently wants drawn, 47 from Williams' behavior are unburdened by the dangers of hearsay. 48 151 I submit that, in the milieu in which it was made, the fact of Williams' statement does not qualify under the hearsay-rule exception for nonassertive nonverbal conduct. I say, too, that the text of Williams' note plainly intended as a message from Williams to the police, through the medium of transmittal by Mason deserves the usual fate of unmitigated hearsay. I think, in sum, that each of the evidentiary items under discussion is inadmissible even if accompanied by a limiting instruction. 49 Since Williams cannot be confronted nor his perception, memory, narrative-accuracy and sincerity tested, 50 I would exclude not only the statement but also all its behavioral trappings. Because the court refuses to uphold the District Judge on this score and on his rejection of the other-crimes evidence implicating Day, I must respectfully dissent.