Opinion ID: 2293414
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearing Committee Report and Recommendations

Text: An evidentiary hearing was held before Hearing Committee Number One of the Board on Professional Responsibility (Hearing Committee) in May 2007, and a report was issued the following August. The two-person [11] Hearing Committee observed that Bar Counsel and respondent fundamentally differ[ed] as to what the Stipulation[ ] mean[t], with [r]espondent perceiving only technical violations in areas where Bar Counsel allege[d] serious, substantive, and deliberate ethical breaches. This fundamental difference required the Hearing Committee to consider additional evidence of respondent's conduct beyond the conduct referenced in the Stipulation to reach its conclusions. Ultimately, the Hearing Committee found that the following six Rule violations, [12] to which respondent stipulated, were supported by clear and convincing evidence: 1) issuing witness vouchers worth more than $42,000 to friends and relatives of government witnesses, not to serve as witnesses but to help the witnesses maintain their resolve to testify for the government in the Card/Moore and Newton Street Crew cases (in violation of Rules 3.3(a), 3.4(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); [13] 2) miscaptioning witness vouchers by issuing federal court vouchers ( Newton Street Crew case) to witnesses in connection with a Superior Court case ( Card/Moore case), consequently impeding discovery in the Card/Moore case by frustrating opposing counsel's efforts to subpoena information concerning payments to government witnesses and continuing an intentional effort to conceal both the miscaptioning and respondent's misuse (in violation of Rules 3.3(a), 3.4(c), 3.8(e), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); 3) using witness vouchers to compensate two retired police detectives for their work in assisting respondent as case agents in the Card/Moore and Newton Street Crew cases, for periods from 68 to 167 days, though they testified only for one to three days (in violation of Rules 3.3(a), 3.4(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); 4) using witness vouchers to make unlawful and excessive payments to incarcerated witnesses, prohibited both by their plea agreements and under 28 U.S.C. § 1821(f), in the Card/Moore and Newton Street Crew cases since there was no federal money, and because he wanted to ensure that the incarcerated witnesses wouldn't revert . . . [and] wouldn't get killed . . . . (in violation of Rules 3.3(a), 3.4(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); 5) using witness vouchers to make other unlawful and improper payments in the Jones case (issuing vouchers under the Newton Street Crew case caption to members of the Jones family even after respondent left the USAO) and in the Card/ Moore case (to a Philadelphia police detective who only testified one day, but received 3 days worth of federal vouchers) (in violation of Rules 3.3(a), 3.4(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(b), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d)); and 6) failing to disclose the improper vouchers as potentially exculpatory evidence to criminal defendants in the Card/ Moore and Newton Street Crew cases, where the prosecution's case depended largely on the highly contested credibility of cooperating incarcerated coconspirators, where defendants made requests regarding witness voucher recipients and where respondent repeatedly assured defendants and the court that all exculpatory evidence had been disclosed (in violation of Rule 3.8(e)). In addition to the six aforementioned charges, to which respondent stipulated, the Hearing Committee also found that a Rule 8.4(b) violation was supported by clear and convincing evidence in each of the three groups of cases: [There was] clear and convincing evidence that [r]espondent's conduct constituted false statements and certifications in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001 and 1018criminal acts that reflect adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness or fitnesswhen he 1) signed vouchers for incarcerated witnesses even though he knew that those witnesses were not entitled to receive vouchers; 2) used vouchers to compensate retired police detectives. . . for their work as `case agents'; 3) used witness vouchers to compensate two Jones children who were not fact witnesses; and, 4) used vouchers to compensate the Jones family for dates of supposed meetings with [r]espondent after he left the USAO. Overall, the Hearing Committee found that respondent committed twenty ethical violations (seventeen stipulated and three non-stipulated) of seven ethical rules in three separate groups of cases from 1993 to 1995. [14] Despite agreement about the factual findings and legal conclusions underlying respondent's misconduct, the Hearing Committee was divided as to the appropriate sanction. The Hearing Committee Report noted that [b]roadly speaking, the record reflects two core types of misconduct[:] misapplication of public funds and failure to disclose information required to be provided to criminal defendants[,] concluding that the seriousness of the misconduct overwhelms any mitigating factors, including the delay in this case which has been substantial. [15] One member recommended a two-year suspension with a fitness requirement based on Bar Counsel's recommendation, but noted that he would have recommended disbarment but for Bar Counsel's recommendation. [16] The member deferred to the Board and our court as to whether respondent's case warranted such a departure from the recommended sanction. However, the other member recommended disbarment because the gravity of the misconduct support[ed]. . . an upward departure [17] from Bar Counsel's recommended sanction, stating: [T]he misconduct in this record appears capable of supporting disbarment either on the basis of [r]espondent's defalcations from public funds entrusted to his control or on the basis of his prosecutorial misconduct relating to Brady and Giglio violations. Taken together, and particularly in consideration of the extensive dishonesty involved, the Committee believes that the record in this matter amply supports the sanction of disbarment. (Emphasis added.) Respondent filed his exceptions to the Hearing Committee Report on August 31, 2009, and the parties filed their briefs with the Board thereafter.