Opinion ID: 1310456
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Change of venire.

Text: Coppola filed a motion for a change of venue, which he supported by copies of news articles and transcripts of radio and television broadcasts to show that because of prejudicial media coverage he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Newport News. The motion was modified to a motion for a change of venire, and, as modified, was denied. Coppola renewed the motion and alleged, in addition to the grounds previously asserted, that the extensive publicity given to the Miltier trial, in which Coppola's wife, Karen, had testified as a witness for the Commonwealth, made it impossible for Coppola to obtain a fair trial by a Newport News jury. A motion for a change of venire or venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his action in overruling such a motion will not be reversed unless the record affirmatively shows that there has been an abuse of that discretion. Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 461-62, 248 S.E.2d 135, 140 (1978), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 99 S.Ct. 2419, 60 .Ed.2d 1074 (1979); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 716, 204 S.E.2d 414, 419 (1974); Foster v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 297, 302-03, 163 S.E.2d 565, 569 (1968); Pannill v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 244, 252, 38 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1946); Webb v. Commonwealth, 154 Va. 866, 871-72, 152 S.E. 366, 367-68 (1930). The law presumes that a defendant can receive a fair trial from the citizens of the county or city in which the offense was committed and to overcome this presumption the defendant must clearly show that there is such a widespread feeling of prejudice on the part of the citizenry as will be reasonably certain to prevent a fair and impartial trial. Farrow v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 353, 355, 89 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1955). A court may refuse to summon a jury from another county until an ineffectual effort has been made to obtain an impartial jury from the county in which the trial is to take place. Pannill v. Commonwealth, supra, 185 Va. at 252, 38 S.E.2d at 461; Puryear v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 51, 53, 1 S.E. 512, 514 (1887). The mere existence of a preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality, if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based upon the evidence. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Prospective jurors in the Coppola trial were examined on voir dire collectively by the court and individually by counsel. Only three veniremen reported that they had been influenced or prejudiced by the media coverage and they were struck for cause. All twelve of the jurors who served had been exposed to some pretrial publicity, but five stated that they were only casually or vaguely aware of any details of the crimes. Each juror stated that he or she had formed no opinion as to Coppola's guilt and could distinguish media reports from the evidence in the case. Hence, there is no evidence in the record of the voir dire examination of any widespread prejudice against Coppola which would prevent his receiving a fair and impartial trial, see Commonwealth v. Pass, 468 Pa. 36, 360 A.2d 167 (1976), and we hold that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying his motion.