Opinion ID: 2569354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 46

Heading: Whether the trial court's definition of intentional at the sentencing hearing was error.

Text: The trial court's definition of intentional is taken almost verbatim from section 18-1-501(5), 6 C.R.S. (1999). Sentencing Phase Instruction No. 9 provided that for the purpose of [the instruction listing statutory aggravating factors], that: A person acts `intentionally' or with `intent' when his conscious objective is to cause the specific result proscribed by the statute defining the offense. It is immaterial whether or not the result actually occurred. (Emphasis added.) Harlan has two objections. First, the definition of intentionally in the sentencing instructions referred to statutory aggravating factors, not offenses. Given the context of the definition and its specific reference to the aggravators, however, we conclude that there was no likelihood that the jury was misled or confused. See Davis, 794 P.2d at 192-93. Second, Harlan asserts it was error to instruct the jury that whether the result occurs is irrelevant to whether intent exists. Harlan argues that this definition of intent directed the jurors to ignore relevant evidence in the sentencing phase of his trial. We disagree. Whether or not the result Harlan intended actually occurred was addressed by the other elements of the instructions defining the statutory aggravators.