Opinion ID: 889482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: After a previously-entered injunction was dissolved, did the District Court err by failing to compel Deschamps to pay the amount of back monthly payments the Estate claimed it was due?

Text: ¶ 41 As indicated above, the Estate initiated a non-judicial foreclosure against Deschamps in 2007. A non-judicial foreclosure may occur when a trust deed or mortgage deed provides that the beneficiaryin this case the Estatemay sell the property in the event the grantorDeschampsdefaults on the deed. As its name implies, a non-judicial foreclosure can be completed outside the court system and is generally less expensive and time-consuming than a judicial foreclosure. Conversely, a judicial foreclosure requires that the beneficiary undertake a legal proceeding in the event the grantor defaults. ¶ 42 In this case, the Trust Indenture under which Deschamps secured financing allowed the Estate to issue a Notice of Trustee Sale if Deschamps defaulted. After the Estate recorded the Notice of Trustee Sale, foreclosure proceedings were stayed by the issuance of an injunction. See Opinion, ¶ 12. When the injunction was ultimately lifted following trial, the Estate moved the court to use its equitable and contempt powers to compel Deschamps to pay the amount necessary to bring the unpaid monthly installments current, or go to jail if he refused to do so. The court declined, explaining that the Estate was entitled to the amount provided as security at the time the injunction was issued ($67,000) and that the Estate could resume its non-judicial foreclosure proceedings, or initiate judicial foreclosure proceedings, for further remedy. By this ruling, the court explained, it returned both parties to the positions they held at the time the injunction was issued rather than putting the Estate in a better position. The Estate appeals the District Court's ruling. ¶ 43 We review a district court's equitable rulings under § 3-2-204(5), MCA, which provides, In equity . . . matters . . . the supreme court shall review all questions of fact arising upon the evidence presented in the record . . . as well as questions of law . . . Among other rulings, this statute has been employed to review a district court's equitable decision to award attorney fees ( Zier v. Lewis, 2009 MT 266, ¶ 14, 352 Mont. 76, 218 P.3d 465); refusal to apply the doctrine of laches ( Edwards v. Cascade County, 2009 MT 229, ¶ 32, 351 Mont. 360, 212 P.3d 289); and division of property upon an unmarried couple's dissolution ( LeFeber v. Johnson, 2009 MT 188, ¶ 18, 351 Mont. 75, 209 P.3d 254). We concluded in these cases that our duty was to determine whether the facts upon which the district court relied were clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law were correct. ¶ 44 Although neither party cites this statute, the provisions of § 71-1-232, MCA, are arguably germane to this issue. The Estate asked the District Court to invoke its equitable powers to award it all past due payments, while also intending to foreclose upon the property. The court concluded that the parties should be returned to the positions they occupied at the time the injunction was issued, which was at the point of the Trustee Sale. Here, because the Estate as the Seller financed the sale of the property to Deschamps, it was acting in the capacity of a purchase money mortgagee. As such, it would not be entitled under the law to a deficiency judgment upon the foreclosure of the property. Section 71-1-232, MCA. See also Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Hill, 266 Mont. 258, 267, 879 P.2d 1158, 1163 (1993). This being the case, we cannot conclude that the District Court erred in releasing the bond and returning the parties to the Trustee Sale position, but refusing to grant to the Estate what would in essence have constituted a deficiency recovery over and above the possession of the property. ¶ 45 While in the exercise of its equitable power to make a party whole, the District Court may have reached another conclusionone that may have been more beneficial to the Estatethis does not mean that the court's refusal to invoke its equitable powers in such fashion was erroneous or reversible. It is well established that we consider whether the evidence presented supports a district court's findings, not whether it supports different findings. LeFeber, ¶ 19. We conclude that the record and the law support the court's ruling. Therefore, we decline the Estate's insistence that we must fashion a remedy to suit its needs.