Opinion ID: 2262065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The SVP law grants DSHS authority to regulate pretrial evaluations.

Text: ¶ 16 At issue is whether RCW 71.09.040(4) authorizes one of the State's evaluators to use polygraph testing as part of the pretrial evaluation of an alleged SVP. RCW 71.09.040(1)-(3) provide for a hearing to establish that there is probable cause to believe that a person is an SVP. A positive finding sets off a process that culminates in a jury trial to determine whether the person is in fact an SVP. See RCW 71.09.050-.060. After a judge determines that there is probable cause, RCW 71.09.040(4) begins this process. It reads: If the probable cause determination is made, the judge shall direct that the person be transferred to an appropriate facility for an evaluation as to whether the person is a sexually violent predator. The evaluation shall be conducted by a person deemed to be professionally qualified to conduct such an examination pursuant to rules developed by the department of social and health services. In adopting such rules, the department of social and health services shall consult with the department of health and the department of corrections. In no event shall the person be released from confinement prior to trial. A witness called by either party shall be permitted to testify by telephone. RCW 71.09.040(4). ¶ 17 The key sentence for this case reads: The evaluation shall be conducted by a person deemed to be professionally qualified to conduct such an examination pursuant to rules developed by the department of social and health services. Id. The dispute is over whether the phrase pursuant to rules developed by the department of social and health services modifies conducted or whether it modifies deemed. The distinction is important because if the pursuant clause modifies conducted, then DSHS may prescribe rules for how the evaluations are to be conducted, perhaps including whether polygraph examinations may be employed. If the pursuant clause modifies deemed, however, then DSHS may only prescribe the qualifications for evaluators, not the means by which the evaluations are to be conducted. ¶ 18 RCW 71.09.040(4) is ambiguous because it is unclear at what point, if any, the verbal phrase beginning with deemed ends and the reader is supposed to revert to the main sentence describing how evaluations are conducted. To illustrate the point, compare the statutory sentence with this one: The evaluation shall be conducted by Dr. Freud pursuant to rules developed by the department of social and health services. In this sentence, by Dr. Freud is a prepositional phrase complete in itself and the pursuant clause modifies conducted; this is clear because it would be ungrammatical to have by Dr. Freud modified by the pursuant clause. But in RCW 71.09.040(4), the description of the examiner, by a person deemed to be professionally qualified to conduct such an examination, can be modified by the pursuant clause because one can deem someone qualified pursuant to certain rules. The result is that the reader cannot tell whether the pursuant clause is part of the description of the examiner, or whether the description of the examiner has concluded and the pursuant clause modifies conducted as it did in the Dr. Freud sentence. ¶ 19 When a statute is ambiguous, we construe it in a manner that fulfills the legislature's intent. City of Seattle v. St. John, 166 Wash.2d 941, 946, 215 P.3d 194 (2009). One means of doing so is to read the ambiguous portion in light of the rest of the provision and in the context of the statutory scheme. See State v. Engel, 166 Wash.2d 572, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). Doing so in this case, there are three reasons to conclude that the legislature intended to grant DSHS authority to prescribe rules for how an evaluation of an alleged SVP is to be conducted, not merely the qualifications an evaluator must possess. ¶ 20 First, the term evaluation is not defined in the SVP law. See RCW 71.09.020. Its ordinary meaning is a judgment, appraisal, rating, [or] interpretation. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 786 (2002). The evaluation as to whether the person is a sexually violent predator called for by RCW 71.09.040(4) therefore asks for the evaluator's judgment on the matter without indicating how the judgment is to be formed, although the evaluator must be deemed ... qualified. RCW 71.09.040(4). If, as the majority suggests, DSHS cannot prescribe rules for the evaluation, then it seems from the statute that a qualified evaluator has carte blanche to choose his or her method. Because it provides no information whatsoever about what the evaluation may entail, the statute does not bar any method of making the judgment, even flipping a coin. [1] It is absurd to think that the legislature intended to give individual evaluators such unfettered discretion. Instead, it makes sense to interpret the provision as granting DSHS the power to regulate how evaluations must be conducted. ¶ 21 Second, this interpretation explains why, when rulemaking, DSHS must consult with the department of health and the department of corrections. RCW 71.09.040(4). If DSHS were empowered to prescribe only the qualifications necessary for evaluators, it would make sense to require DSHS to consult with the Department of Health (which has experience with medical qualifications) but not with the Department of Corrections (DOC) (which does not). The fact that DSHS must consult with DOC indicates that DSHS is to know what is feasible for the evaluation and treatment of sex offenders, which is one of DOC's areas of expertise. This again is consistent with a grant of authority to DSHS over how evaluations are conducted. ¶ 22 Third, DSHS is afforded similar regulatory power elsewhere in the SVP law. RCW 71.09.800 grants the DSHS secretary broad authority to make rules to carry out the SVP law's operation. Specifically, DSHS is empowered to make rules for the evaluation and treatment of SVPs who are conditionally released to a less restrictive alternative to the Special Commitment Center (SCC). RCW 71.09.350(1). What's more, DSHS is responsible for the costs of evaluation and treatment for all committed individuals, regardless of their placement in the SCC or a less restrictive alternative, and is required to adopt rules to contain these costs. See RCW 71.09.110. It would be nonsensical to require DSHS to pay for evaluations for all SVPs and to adopt rules designed to lower the associated costs without giving DSHS the authority to adopt rules for how the evaluations may proceed, which principally affects their cost. ¶ 23 Thus, the appropriate interpretation of RCW 71.09.040(4) is one that grants DSHS the authority to prescribe rules governing evaluations of alleged SVPs, just as DSHS prescribes rules for the evaluation and treatment of SVPs confined in the SCC and those released to less restrictive alternatives. The question becomes one concerning the scope of this authority. ¶ 24 Reading RCW 71.09.040(4), there is nothing that purports to limit DSHS's authority to prescribe what tools or methods are appropriate during an evaluation. As noted above, evaluation is not defined. No methods are mentioned other than the calling of witnesses. A strict construction of RCW 71.09.040(4), as argued for by the majority, would limit evaluation solely to this method. But no one seriously believes that the legislature intended to exclude all other evaluative techniques: even Hawkins admits that a medical examination also fits within the provision. At best, we are left with an undefined test and the idea that DSHS may prescribe rules governing it, on the condition that any witnesses called should be allowed to testify by telephone. ¶ 25 At this point, the majority steps in with a new canon of construction tailored solely to the polygraph. If the legislature does not specifically enumerate the polygraph as a permissible testing tool, the majority concludes, polygraph examinations are not permitted. This canon is based on the invasiveness and unreliability of polygraph testing, recognized elsewhere in the law. As evidence that the legislature considered the polygraph but chose to omit it from RCW 71.09.040(4), the majority points to RCW 71.09.096(4), which enumerates a polygraph examination as one possible condition that can be imposed when an SVP is released to a less restrictive alternative: Prior to authorizing any release to a less restrictive alternative, ... [t]he court shall order the department of corrections to investigate the less restrictive alternative and recommend any additional conditions to the court. These conditions shall include, but are not limited to the following: Specification of residence, prohibition of contact with potential or past victims, prohibition of alcohol and other drug use, participation in a specific course of inpatient or outpatient treatment that may include monitoring by the use of polygraph and plethysmograph, monitoring through the use of global positioning satellite technology, supervision by a department of corrections community corrections officer, a requirement that the person remain within the state unless the person receives prior authorization by the court, and any other conditions that the court determines are in the best interest of the person or others. RCW 71.09.096(4). The presence of the polygraph in the later provision, the argument goes, means that the polygraph is impermissible under the earlier provision in which it is not referenced. ¶ 26 This argument is misguided. For one thing, RCW 71.09.096(4) enumerates several types of conditions. The majority's reasoning suggests that anything enumerated in this provision (and perhaps anything similar that is implicitly included in its nonexclusive list) should be impermissible under RCW 71.09.040(4), in which it is not enumerated. The majority circumvents this consequence of its argument by insisting that the polygraph is disfavored, and that a different rule of statutory interpretation applies to it than to all other methods of evaluation. This approach ceases to search for legislative intent and instead applies a general dislike of polygraphs as the rule of decision. ¶ 27 The majority's reasoning sidesteps the statutory scheme. RCW 71.09.096(4) discusses conditions for which DSHS retains the authority to impose once an SVP is released to a less restrictive alternative. DSHS may prescribe rules for the evaluation and treatment of these conditionally released SVPs under RCW 71.09.350(1). If DSHS may permit polygraphs when prescribing rules for evaluating SVPs released to a less restrictive alternative, it would seem at a minimum that DSHS has equal authority to permit polygraphs in the evaluations of SVPs in the SCC. And, despite the majority's intuitive distinction between those who have been adjudicated SVPs after trial and those who await trial after the probable cause hearing, RCW 71.09.040(4) makes no such distinction. [2] It authorizes only an undefined evaluation and leaves it to DSHS to determine what the evaluation entails. ¶ 28 Reading the SVP law as a whole, it is clear that the legislature wished to delegate the definition of evaluation and the permissible evaluative techniques to DSHS. Although we must strictly construe the SVP statute, it makes no sense to interpret the undefined term evaluation in RCW 71.09.040(4) differently. [3]