Opinion ID: 1276339
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Heading: Should Iowa Code Section 622.10 Bar Disclosure?

Text: Plaintiff first argues that Iowa Code section 622.10 constitutes a statutory bar to disclosure of privileged communications contained within the records identified in the subpoena duces tecum. Section 622.10 provides, in relevant part: A practicing attorney, counselor, physician, surgeon, physician's assistant, mental health professional, or the stenographer or confidential clerk of any such person, who obtains information by reason of the person's employment, ... shall not be allowed, in giving testimony, to disclose any confidential communication properly entrusted to the person in the person's professional capacity, and necessary and proper to enable the person to discharge the functions of the person's office according to the usual course of practice or discipline. The trial court found that this section did not apply in this case because plaintiff could comply with the subpoena without giving testimony, the only activity explicitly protected by the statute's wording. Plaintiff contends that such a literal interpretation of the statute should be rejected because it ignores and essentially undermines the purpose for the privilegecreation of an atmosphere of trust between the medical professional and the patient. She argues that mental and emotional problems can be treated effectively only if the privilege attaches at the commencement of the psychotherapist-patient relationship and thereafter totally insulates the relationship from public scrutiny. See Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa 836, 843, 89 N.W.2d 349, 354-55 (1958) (The policy of the statute is to provide for great freedom of disclosure by a patient to his physician, for the patient is often in no position to know what disclosures may or may not be necessary for his proper treatment.). She points out also that we have previously interpreted the words giving testimony in the statute quite expansively, holding that the phrase includes written documents as well as oral testimony. See Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa at 844, 89 N.W.2d at 355. Although we are inclined to interpret section 622.10 liberally to foster its worthwhile goals, we are not free to rewrite the section under the guise of liberal construction. State v. Bedel, 193 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Iowa 1971). We have frequently noted that the privilege in section 622.10 is limited. [Section 622.10] has a unique and limited purpose. Because it is in derogation of every person's duty to give evidence, it is subject to special restrictions. See generally Lamberto v. Bown, 326 N.W.2d 305, 306-07 (Iowa 1982). Head v. Colloton, 331 N.W.2d 870, 875 (Iowa 1983); see State v. Munro, 295 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Iowa 1980) (section 622.10 applies only to testimonial use of privileged information and not to use for determining the most effective way to interrogate a person in police custody); Noble v. United Benefit Co., 230 Iowa 471, 475, 297 N.W. 881, 884 (1941) (dictum) (Predecessor to § 622.10 does not prohibit a physician from disclosing any confidential communications. It prohibits him from giving testimony.). The trial court properly held that section 622.10 did not provide plaintiff with a legal defense in the contempt proceeding, because the order directing plaintiff to produce the subpoenaed records did not require that she disclose privileged communications by the giving of testimony. Plaintiff protests that this interpretation would require her to reveal indirectly what she is protected from revealing directly, a practice we disallowed in Newman v. Blom, 249 Iowa at 843, 89 N.W.2d at 354. Plaintiff reads too much into that decision. In Newman, we held that medical records that contained information gathered from a patient were to be considered confidential communications under section 622.10 because the records contained information which would be inadmissible at trial as oral testimony from the physician. Newman did not discuss the disclosure of confidences in a non-testimonial setting and therefore is inapposite. The subpoena duces tecum in this case does not force the petitioner to testify indirectly. A subpoena duces tecum issued under rule 5(6) is part of a county attorney's general investigatory power for use in lieu of a grand jury proceeding. State v. Kelley, 353 N.W.2d 845, 848 (Iowa 1984); Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510, 511 (Iowa 1983). Information obtained under this rule may not be used to perpetuate testimony for trial. State v. Hamilton, 309 N.W.2d 471, 478 (Iowa 1981). Moreover, documents produced in response to a county attorney's subpoena remain confidential unless and until a criminal charge is filed, and the court may thereafter order such documents to remain confidential. Iowa R.Crim.P. 5(6). Because we have found the statutory physician-patient privilege did not excuse plaintiff from complying with the subpoena issued pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(6), we need not address the State's contention that the appointment books and ledgers contained no confidential communications within the meaning of section 622.10.