Opinion ID: 530889
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: willful obstruction of the administration of

Text: 7 JUSTICE--SECTION 3C1.1 OF U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 8 Avery does not challenge the District Court's determination that, under Sec. 2K2.1, the possession of firearms by a prohibited person carries with it a base offense level of 9. Avery also agrees to a one level increase based on the fact that one gun was stolen and another gun had an obliterated serial number. Sec. 2K2.1(b)(1). Avery, therefore, contends that the highest base offense level should have been 10, producing a guideline range of between 21-27 months (as opposed to the 30-37 month range corresponding to a base offense level of 13). See Sentencing Guidelines, Chapter 5. 9 The District Court, however, increased the base offense level by another two levels pursuant to Sec. 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. This section provides: 10 If the defendant willfully impeded or obstructed, or attempted to impede or obstruct the administration of justice during the investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, increase the offense level from Chapter Two by 2 levels. 11 The Commentary to Sec. 3C1.1 states that this section is meant to increase the sentence of a defendant who engages in conduct calculated to mislead or deceive authorities or those involved in a judicial proceeding. Application Note 1(c) to Sec. 3C1.1 specifically provides that testifying untruthfully as to a material fact during a trial may be a basis for applying this two level adjustment. Suspect testimony, however, should be construed in favor of the defendant. Section 3C1.1, Application Note 2. Interpreting Application Note 2, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Franco-Torres, 869 F.2d 797, 801 (5th Cir.1989), stated that it: 12 [did] not believe that this note requires the sentencing judge to believe the defendant whenever he denies that he hid evidence, or shot at witnesses. To construe the note in that way would effectively enable every defendant to nullify its application by self-serving testimony. Instead, we believe the note simply instructs the sentencing judge to resolve in favor of the defendant those conflicts about which the judge, after weighing the evidence, has no firm conviction. 13 The trial judge saw and heard all the evidence and observed the demeanor of the witnesses on direct and cross-examination. In addition, despite testimony by Avery and Richardson that Avery did not live at 4002 Trumbull where the four firearms were found, the jury found Avery guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the jury must have concluded that Avery and Richardson's testimony was false. These factors clearly support a finding that the judge had a firm conviction that Avery had testified falsely concerning his residence at 4002 Trumbull. 2 14 This Court's review of the District Court's findings of fact and application of Sec. 3C1.1 is governed by the clearly erroneous standard. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e); United States v. Perez, 871 F.2d 45, 47 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 3227 (1989). A succinct definition of the clearly erroneous standard was enunciated in Archer v. Macomb County Bank, 853 F.2d 497, 499 (6th Cir.1988) (citations omitted), in which the court stated that [a] finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In light of this standard, as well as the jury verdict finding Avery guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the District Court's determination that Avery lied on the stand in violation of Sec. 3C1.1 was not clearly erroneous. 15