Opinion ID: 854034
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jury Instruction on Absence of Motive

Text: Kriner next contends that the trial court erred when it refused to give the following tendered jury instruction: Absence of motive for committing the crime charged is in the nature of an exculpatory circumstance which a defendant on trial is entitled to establish and which may be considered by the jury as a circumstance favorable to the accused. The State responds that the standard instruction on motive that was givendirecting that [t]he State is not required to prove a motive for the commission of the crime chargedadequately covered the issue. The State is not correct; there is no link between the elements of the crime and whether a particular fact (lack of motive) may be relevant or how it may be weighed. It does not follow, however, that Kriner has carried the day. A number of our decisions, of both recent and older vintage, have upheld the refusal to give similar instructions dealing with the weight to be accorded absence of motive. For the reasons explained below, today's case is another in that line. Modern Indiana authority on this subject emanates principally from Robinson v. State, 262 Ind. 463, 317 N.E.2d 850 (1974). In that case, the following instruction was at issue: If upon careful examination of all the evidence, the State has failed to show any motive on the part of the accused to commit the crime charged against her, then this is a circumstance which you the jury should consider in favor of the accused in making up your verdict. Id. at 467, 317 N.E.2d at 853 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In affirming the trial court's refusal to give this instruction, Robinson emphasized the well established principle that jury instructions should not single out specific evidence or particular witnesses and comment upon the weight or consideration to be given such matters. Id. We held a few years later that an instruction stating that absence of proof of motive is a powerful circumstance in favor of the accused was properly refused because it amounted to an unfair judicial comment upon the weight of evidence. Reburn v. State, 421 N.E.2d 604, 607 (Ind.1981) (not citing or discussing Robinson). Other post- Robinson decisions involving similar instructions are in accord. See also Legue v. State, 688 N.E.2d 408, 411 (Ind.1997) (failure to instruct jury that absence of motive is a powerful circumstance intending to exculpate a defendant when the State's proof is entirely by circumstantial evidence was not error); Currin v. State, 497 N.E.2d 1045, 1048 (Ind.1986) (following Robinson and declining invitation to overrule it); Wilson v. State, 268 Ind. 112, 119-20, 374 N.E.2d 45, 49 (1978) (citing Robinson in affirming refusal to instruct jury that failure to show motive should be considered by the jury as a circumstance in favor of [the defendant's] innocence). [4] These cases were driven by the concern that instructions speaking to the effect of absence of motive interfere with the jury's role as trier of fact. The jury is vested with a unique function in our constitutional scheme in this respect. IND. CONST. art. I, § 19 (In all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts.). As a general proposition, jury instructions in a criminal case should lay out the legal principles and rules that are relevant to adjudicating the matter at hand, including elements of the crime, burdens of production and persuasion, and any defenses. They are not designed to suggest, even remotely, what the facts may be. Kriner's tendered instruction advised jurors that they may weigh lack of motive in a particular fashion as opposed to instructing that they should or must do so. Nonetheless, it singled out one circumstance and identified it as exculpatory. As such it suffered from the same infirmity identified in Robinson. Defense counsel was free to argue, as he did without interference, in his opening and closing statements, that Kriner had no motive for the killing. Kriner did not object to the State's instruction and does not contend that he was barred from offering relevant evidence showing an absence of motive or that the jury was prohibited from considering any such evidence in his favor. Thus, if the jury was so inclined, the trial framework provided ample opportunity for jurors to draw the conclusions Kriner preferredthat he lacked a motive for the killing and that this decreased the likelihood that he was the assailant. In sum, although there may be circumstances when a defense instruction on absence of motive is appropriate, in this case the trial court's rejection of the tendered instruction presents no reversible error.