Opinion ID: 2802634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 404(b) Evidence: Swartz’s 2002 Kidnapping

Text: For his fourth point on appeal, Conte asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing evidence regarding his kidnapping of Swartz. The State responds that Conte failed to preserve this issue for review and it is also without merit. Prior to trial, Conte filed a motion for production of Ark. R. Evid. 404(b) evidence. The State responded that it might seek to introduce evidence that Conte had kidnapped Swartz. Conte made no written or oral motion in limine concerning this evidence before trial. During opening statements, both the State and Conte mentioned the kidnapping. 28 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 However, when the State began to question Swartz about the kidnapping during her direct examination, Conte objected, asserting that “I just wanted to lodge an overall objection to - -.” The circuit court then ruled that the State was not allowed to go through the incident step-by-step but was only allowed to ask general questions: [W]e’re not trying him on kidnapping. Let’s don’t go through that blow-by-blow, step-by-step. If you want to ask her some - - couple of general questions about what happened, what the result was, that’s - - . .... Let’s move through it really quickly. I don’t want to go into, you know, every detail. .... Let’s - let’s get in and move on. The record demonstrates that Conte made no further objection or argument regarding this issue. In addition to Swartz, five witnesses, Ashley, Trey, Clark, Gathright, and Brown all testified in detail regarding the kidnapping. Yet, Conte made only a general objection and did not apprise the circuit court of the precise issue he raises on appeal, which is that evidence of Swartz’s kidnapping was more prejudicial than probative and that it should not have been admitted under Ark. R. Evid. 404(b). A defendant must object at the first opportunity, and he must then renew his objection each time the issue is raised; otherwise, he has waived his argument regarding that issue on appeal. Vaughn v. State, 338 Ark. 220, 992 S.W.2d 785 (1999). To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant must object at the first opportunity. Holt v. State, 2011 Ark. 391, 384 S.W.3d 498. A party who does not object to the introduction of evidence at the first opportunity waives such argument on appeal. Id. Consequently, Conte did not make a 29 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 timely objection to the testimony regarding Swartz’s kidnapping and he is now precluded from raising the issue on appeal. Furthermore, evidence that is merely cumulative or repetitious of other evidence admitted without objection cannot be claimed to be prejudicial. Gonzalez v. State, 306 Ark. 1, 811 S.W.2d 760 (1991); Dumond v. State, 290 Ark. 595, 721 S.W.2d 663 (1986)). V. The Circuit Court Erred When It Overruled Numerous Relevancy Objections For his fifth and final point on appeal, Conte asserts that the circuit court erred in its ruling on five evidentiary issues regarding relevancy. Rule 403 provides that “[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Ark. R. Evid. 403 (2013); Laswell v. State, 2012 Ark. 201, 404 S.W.3d 818. “The balancing mandated by Rule 403 is also a matter left to a circuit court’s sound discretion, and an appellate court will not reverse the circuit court’s ruling absent a showing of manifest abuse. Croy v. State, 2011 Ark. 284, 383 S.W.3d 367. The evidence should not be excluded under Rule 403 unless the defendant can show that the evidence lacks probative value in view of the risk of unfair prejudice. Id. The test of admissibility of evidence over an objection to relevancy is whether the fact offered into proof affords a basis for rational inference of the fact to be proved. Grigsby v. State, 260 Ark. 499, 507, 542 S.W.2d 275, 280 (1976). “Evidence may be independently relevant if it shows motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. 30 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. 75, 364 S.W.3d 443. Additionally, any evidence that is relevant to explain the act, show a motive, or illustrate the accused’s state of mind, may be independently relevant and admissible. Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313, 245 S.W.3d 132 (2006); Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000).” Lard v. State, 2014 Ark. 1, 9, 431 S.W.3d 249, 258. It is sufficient if the fact may become relevant in connection with other facts, or if it forms a link in the chain of evidence necessary to support a party’s contention. See Grigsby, supra. Finally, relevant evidence is any evidence which aids in establishing the guilt or innocence of the accused, even though only a slight inference can be drawn from the evidence. A. Conte’s Statements That He Was a “Mercenary” and Traveled Abroad to Kill Foreign Officials Conte asserts that the circuit court erred in allowing Swartz’s testimony regarding statements Conte had made regarding being a contract killer, testimony regarding Conte’s statements that he went by the alias “Paladine,” testimony that Conte claimed to have been on special missions to Cambodia, and the introduction of Conte’s dog tags. The State responds that, although Conte admitted to Barrett that his stories were “fantasy,” the testimony and evidence was more probative than prejudicial because the evidence allowed the jury to understand Conte’s motive and plan to control Swartz. Here, the evidence was relevant to Conte’s plan and mental state. Based on our standard of review, we cannot say the circuit court erred. 31 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 B. The Cleanliness of Conte’s Residence in Carson City, Nevada and Cabin in Duck Creek, Utah Next, Conte asserts that the circuit court erred by allowing testimony regarding the lack of cleanliness at his homes. Conte claims that the evidence was not probative and was offered only to prejudice Conte. A review of the record demonstrates that the testimony at issue occurred during Swartz’s description of Conte’s homes in connection with questions regarding the deterioration of their relationship. Thus, the evidence was relevant to Conte’s mental state, plan and motive. Based on our standard of review, we do not find error. C. A Phone Call to Swartz from Conte Where He Represented That He Was in a Firefight in Afghanistan Conte asserts that Swartz’s testimony, over his objection, regarding a phone call Conte made where she could hear gunfire in the background and Conte told her he was in Afghanistan and pinned under an SUV and was calling to tell her he loved her for possibly the last time, was erroneously admitted. The State responds that the ruling was not erroneous because the testimony was relevant to Conte’s mission to regain Swartz, and “win her back,” and was connected to the murders because it was all part of his plan to regain Swartz. Further, the State responds that the same testimony was admitted during Clark’s testimony, without objection. Evidence that is merely cumulative or repetitious of other evidence admitted without objection cannot be prejudicial. Wedgeworth v. State, 2012 Ark. 63, at 5 (citing Eliott v. State, 342 Ark. 237, 242, 27 S.W.3d 432, 436 (2000)). This court will not reverse an evidentiary decision by the trial court in the absence of prejudice. Marks v. State, 375 Ark. 265, 269, 289 S.W.3d 923, 926 (2008). Here, the evidence was relevant to 32 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 demonstrate Conte’s state of mind, plan, and motive. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony under Rule 403. D. Emails Alleged to Have Been Authored by Conte From Swartz’s Email Account Conte next asserts that the circuit court erred by allowing evidence that Conte sent emails to friends, family members, and co-workers that Swartz had slept with a man, then murdered him and fled to Mexico. The State responds that the emails showed Conte’s state of mind and were relevant. The State further responds that any error was harmless because the same testimony came in through two other witnesses, Ashley and Gathright, without objection. We agree that the evidence was relevant to prove Conte’s plan, motive and state of mind. Evidence that is merely cumulative or repetitious of other evidence admitted without objection cannot be prejudicial. Wedgeworth, supra. This court will not reverse an evidentiary decision by the trial court in the absence of prejudice. Marks, supra. We hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. E. Introduction of Numerous Firearms, Magazines, Ammunition and a Book Called “The History of Torture and Executions” Conte also asserts that the circuit court erred when, over his objection, it admitted evidence of a book titled “The History of Torture and Executions” that was seized from his home in 2002. Conte contends that there was no relevancy to offering the book and it was introduced to inflame the jury and prejudice Conte. The State responds that the testimony at trial demonstrated that the victims had been executed and this evidence was thus, relevant. During trial, the State contended that “these items collectively show that [Conte] possessed the tools, ability and knowledge” to commit the murders. The record demonstrates that 33 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 Erickson testified that there was an “element of these two individuals being in—under the control of another individual . . . at the time of their death.” This court rejects the admission of inflammatory evidence where claims of relevance are tenuous and prejudice is great, and expects the trial court to carefully weigh the probative value of photographs against their prejudicial nature. See Camargo v. State, 327 Ark. 631, 637–38, 940 S.W.2d 464, 467 (1997) (holding that we require the trial court to first consider whether such evidence, although relevant, creates a danger of unfair prejudice, and then to determine whether the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value); see also Beed v. State, 271 Ark. 526, 609 S.W.2d 898 (1980). Relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Ark. R. Evid. 403. Evidence is admissible if it tends to shed light on any issue, to corroborate testimony, or if it is essential in proving a necessary element of a case, is useful to enable a witness to testify more effectively, or enable the jury to better understand testimony. Weger v. State, 315 Ark. 555, 869 S.W.2d 688 (1994). Here, an essential element of the offenses charged was intent; to secure a conviction for capital murder, the State had to prove that appellant caused the victims’ deaths with a premeditated and deliberated purpose. The State offered two books, “Quiet Killers, Silenced Weapons in War and Espionage” and “The History of Torture and Executions,” to show Conte’s knowledge and ability to commit the crimes. Moreover, the record reveals that the titles of the books were introduced but no portions of the books were read to the jury and no witness testified as to the content of the books. Because the books were relevant to prove an element of the 34 Cite as 2015 Ark. 220 State’s case, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence and affirm the circuit court on this point. This case involves a sentence of life imprisonment without parole; therefore, it is subject to review under Arkansas Supreme Court Rule 4-3(i). As required under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-3(i), the record has been examined for all objections, motions, and requests made by either party that were decided adversely to Conte, and no prejudicial error has been found. Affirmed. Special Justice ALVIS NOYL HOUSTON joins in this opinion. HART, J., concurs. WOOD, J., not participating.