Opinion ID: 2334177
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Mandatory Retirement Provision of Section 16(b) to Appointed Members of the Pennsylvania Judiciary

Text: Madame Justice Stout first asks us to determine whether there are any limits to the mandatory language of Section 16(b) requiring retirement upon the attaining of age seventy by members of the judiciary. In support of finding such a limitation, Madame Justice Stout notes that she is an appointed justice, appointed to the Court pursuant to Article V, Section 13(b) of the Constitution to fill the vacancy created on the Court when Mr. Justice William D. Hutchinson resigned his commission. Although Article V, Section 13(b) requires that the person so appointed shall serve for a term ending on the first Monday of January following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs . . . (which in this case would have been January 1, 1990), the Governor appointed Madame Justice Stout to a term ending on the first Monday of January following a general election (January, 1989) and the Senate confirmed same. We corrected this misconception in Sprague v. Casey, supra , where we held that the election scheduled for 1988 was not in a municipal election year and that an election for the Supreme Court vacancy could not be held until 1989. Pursuant to our decision in Sprague, we ordered that the term of the office to which Madame Justice Stout had been appointed be extended to the first Monday in January of 1990 to comply with the provisions of Article V, Section 13(b) of the constitution which sets the end of the term as the first Monday of January following the next municipal election more than ten months after the vacancy occurs. In compliance therewith, a second commission was issued to Madame Justice Stout by the Governor reflecting the correct termination date of the term. Madame Justice Stout argues that because the termination date listed in her commission exceeds her seventieth birthdate, that an inconsistency exists. Must she retire on her seventieth birthday pursuant to Section 16(b) or may she complete the term as set forth in the commission as provided in Section 13(b)? In support of the claim that the provisions of Section 13(b) should take precedence over the mandatory retirement provisions of Section 16(b), Madame Justice Stout advances several arguments. It is argued that since the constitutional language of Section 13(b) specifically defines the length of the term of office without regard to the mandatory retirement provision, this lack of reference to the mandatory retirement section should prevail over the provisions of Section 16(b). Were this but true, then a jurist who was elected at age 69 could serve a full ten years to age 79 since Article 5, Section 15(a) provides: The regular term of office of justices and judges shall be ten years . . . . without regard to the mandatory retirement provision, and this lack of reference to the mandatory retirement section should prevail over the provisions of Section 16(b). We have laid this argument to rest in our recent decision in Gondelman v. Pennsylvania, 520 Pa. 451, 554 A.2d 896 (1989), wherein we emphatically held constitutional the mandatory retirement provision at age seventy and held that jurists after attaining said age could serve only in a senior judge capacity. Furthermore, the issue was met head on in Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 353 A.2d 833 (1976), wherein we held that a district justice must retire upon attainment of age seventy, and that his term of office ended at such age so that he was not entitled to salary for the balance of the unexpired term. Firing was retained as a district justice, with his retention term beginning in January 1970. He reached the mandatory retirement age on September 29, 1973, and while he voluntarily retired, he maintained that he was entitled to his compensation as a district justice for the balance of the six year term for which he had been retained. In support of his claim, he argued that his salary could not be diminished during the term of office pursuant to Article V, Section 16(a) of the Constitution which provides: Justices, judges and justices of the peace shall be compensated by the Commonwealth as provided by law. Their compensation shall not be diminished during their terms of office, unless by law applying generally to all salaried officers of the Commonwealth. District Justice Firing argued that his term would not expire until the date on his commission (at the end of a six year term of office) and that under Section 16(a) he was entitled to his full salary for this length of time, notwithstanding his retirement mandated by Section 16(b). We rejected this construction noting that in interpreting constitutional provisions, we do so in their popular sense as understood by the people who adopted them and that we try to interpret them insofar as possible in terms of their spirit and intention. See also, Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976); Commonwealth ex rel. Attorney General v. Beamish, 309 Pa. 510, 164 A. 615 (1932). Reading the related provisions in connection with one another we concluded their proper meaning was that a member of the Pennsylvania judiciary reaches his or her seventieth year, according to the rule of the common law, that is on the day before his or her birthday, (see Gerson v. Daly, 337 Pa. 346, 11 A.2d 148 (1940)), and that when a jurist reaches the age of seventy years his or her term expires. We also noted that retirement, involuntary removal and demise all cause a vacancy to occur and cause a term of office to expire. Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. at 566, 353 A.2d at 837 (1976). In discussing the application of Section 16(b) to the retention term of a district justice, we noted that the Constitution was not specific in setting forth that such retained district justices are required to retire upon attaining the age of seventy years, as the Constitution is with regard to the mandatory retirement of retained justices and judges. Section 15(b) of Article V, of the Constitution specifically provides that: At the expiration of each term a justice or judge shall be eligible for retention as provided herein, subject only to the retirement provisions of this article. In concluding that this section, which omitted any reference to the mandatory retirement of district justices, nevertheless did not affect the mandatory applicability of Section 16(b) to district justices, we said: It is true that this retention provision does not apply to justices of the peace, but we do not think that the framers could have intended the absurd result that all justices, judges, and justices of the peace would be subject to the retirement provision of Section 16(b), but that only justices and judges retained under Section 15(b) would have less than a regular term if mandatorily retired. Rather, Section 15(b) provides a clear guide to the meaning and application of Section 16(b). Firing v. Kephart, 466 Pa. 560, 568, 353 A.2d 833, 837 (1976). Thus, Madame Justice Stout's claim that her term of office is governed by the provisions of Section 13(b), which omits reference to mandatory retirement, must fail. As we held in Firing, Section 16(b) is applicable to all justices, judges and justices of the peace. Its terms are mandatory and they express in the simplest language possible the absolute will of the sovereign people of the Commonwealth that jurists must retire upon reaching their seventieth birth-date. Section 13(b), like Section 15(b), is not read as a specific provision which takes precedence over Section 16(b), rather both serve as guides in applying the mandatory retirement provisions of Section 16(b). Madame Justice Stout also argues that public policy reasons mitigate in favor of reading Section 15(b) in such a way that a full complement is maintained on the Court at all times during an appointive term, such as hers. It is true that the framers of the Judiciary Article recognized that in order to ensure an efficient court system, a vacancy which results when an elected incumbent dies, resigns, retires or is removed should not remain unfilled until a new judiciary officer can be elected. Berardocco, 469 Pa. at 457, 366 A.2d at 567. We recognize that the framer's desire to see to it that the judiciary is not handicapped in such situations compelled them to draft Section 15 and that appointive members to the judiciary serve as respected and valued members on our courts. This is not to say, however, that such appointees are favored with greater rights than other members of the judiciary. Appointees must comply with all the requirements of our Constitution including mandatory retirement. In fact, in the past we have seen no reason to distinguish between mandatory retirement, voluntary retirement, involuntary removal or demise. All these circumstances are held to operate as an expiration of a term and create a vacancy. Berardocco; Firing; Barbieri v. Shapp, 476 Pa. 513, 383 A.2d 218 (1978); Creamer v. Twelve Common Pleas Judges, 443 Pa. 484, 281 A.2d 57 (1971) (Opinion of Mr. Chief Justice Bell, joined by Mr. Justice O'Brien and Mr. Justice Roberts). We do not find that Madame Justice Stout's arguments can overcome the mandatory effect of Section 16(b). As a matter of our own constitutional law, this section applies to all jurists upon their attaining the age of seventy and it must be applied here as it was applied in our recent case of Gondelman, supra. Any other reading of this section would put us in the precarious position of extending a constitutionally fixed term of judicial office, which we cannot do. However appealing the power to do so might appear under even extenuating circumstances, we are bound to give effect to the clear language of the Constitution. In the alternative, Madame Justice Stout maintains that if we apply the mandatory retirement section to her we will be violating federal constitutional and statutory law. These considerations will be discussed below.