Opinion ID: 724016
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Individual Appellants

Text: 34 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act imposes liability on [a]ny person who, on or in connection with any goods or services ... uses in commerce any ... name ... which ... is likely to cause confusion. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). The district court found after trial that Yost, Hoffman and Johns knowingly, intentionally and deliberately adopted and used [appellee's] name ... in order to cause confusion, obstruct [appellee's] pursuit of its environmental agenda, and thereby to obtain an advantage in the snail de-listing litigation by preventing [appellee's] intervention therein. 881 F.Supp. at 1468. The acts that the individual appellants performed included the formation of the appellant corporation under the name Committee for Idaho's High Desert, Inc., id. at 1464, 1466, and Hoffman's testimony--under the title of president of CIHD, with the intent to add to his credibility as an environmentalist--at a U.S. Air Force hearing in favor of an air force training range in southern Idaho, id. at 1467. Sufficient evidence of these acts was available at the summary judgment stage to create genuine issues of fact, and these acts would be sufficient to render the individual appellants liable under § 43(a) for using in commerce, in connection with services, a name which is likely to confuse. 35 Moreover, [a] corporate officer or director is, in general, personally liable for all torts which he authorizes or directs or in which he participates, notwithstanding that he acted as an agent of the corporation and not on his own behalf. Transgo, Inc., 768 F.2d at 1021 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). While the particular act of unfair competition involved in that stage of Transgo was a conspiracy to pass off goods, the Fourth Circuit has recognized the applicability of the principle to trademark infringement generally. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145, 149 (4th Cir.1987) (A corporate official may be held personally liable for tortious conduct committed by him, though committed primarily for the benefit of the corporation. This is true in trademark infringement and unfair trade practices cases.) (citing Transgo ). See also Donsco, Inc. v. Casper Corp., 587 F.2d 602, 606 (3d Cir.1978) (corporate president who authorized and approved corporation's act of unfair competition liable under § 43(a); a corporate officer who knowingly and substantially participates in corporation's act of infringement is personally liable); Electronic Laboratory Supply Co. v. Cullen, 977 F.2d 798, 807-808 (3d Cir.1992). 36 The district court was correct that an injunction against appellant corporation would, under Rule 65, bind the individual appellants as corporate officers. It nonetheless erred in dismissing the individual appellants even though it correctly dismissed CIHD's damages claims. If the individual appellants were to be found liable for their acts under § 43(a), CIHD would be entitled, under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the action, and, in exceptional cases ... reasonable attorney fees. Even though CIHD failed to create a genuine issue of material fact as to the individual appellant's profits or CIHD's actual damages, the individuals could still be liable for the costs of the action and any attorney's fees that might be awarded. Therefore, the district court should not have dismissed CIHD's claims against the individual appellants. 37