Opinion ID: 1688330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of prior bad acts under A.R.E. 404(b)

Text: Ms. Diffee argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that she had attacked her former husband, Eddie Diffee, and that this testimony should have been ruled inadmissible under Arkansas Rules of Evidence 404, but before we examine the issue on its merits, we must first determine whether Ms. Diffee properly preserved this matter for appeal. Prior to trial, the State filed a formal motion seeking to admit the testimony of Eddie Diffee under A.R.E. 404, and for the admission of a statement allegedly made by Ms. Diffee to her ex-husband under A.R.E. 801, to which Ms. Diffee objected. (The A.R.E. 801 request is a non-issue, as the statement sought to be admitted under this rule was never presented at trial.) Although the State, in its brief, concedes that Ms. Diffee's A.R.E. 404(b) objection was preserved for appeal, the dissenting opinion in this case ignores the State's concession and declares to the contrary. The dissent points out that Ms. Diffee did not articulate her objection to Eddie Diffee's testimony under A.R.E. 404(b); rather, she questioned its sufficiency, and, as such, her objection was not specific enough to apprise the trial court of the specific error in question. Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993). The dissent is correct in part, as Ms. Diffee's objection was not specific. Yet, the dissent makes little of the fact that the trial court considered and admitted Mr. Diffee's testimony under this rule in direct response to the State's formal motion to admit his testimony. Granted, Ms. Diffee's concern at the pre-trial hearing went to the question of the sufficiency of Eddie Diffee's testimony; however, the fact still remains and the record reflects that the trial court was well-apprised of the issues of admissibility, as is noted in the court's response to Ms. Diffee's objection to the testimony that [w]er'e talking about whether or not it's admissible, not whether or not it's something you cannot or can attack at trial, you know. In short, the trial court considered Mr. Diffee's testimony pursuant to the State's request to admit it into evidence under A.R.E. 404(b), and wrongfully permitted it at trial. That rule provides in pertinent part as follows: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. The significant facts surrounding the evidence are these. Eddie Diffee testified that he and Ms. Diffee were married from 1967 until 1991, and that one evening in 1989, he was sleeping on his left shoulder in the front bedroom of their home with his right hand out from underneath the cover, when he swiped and hit something which fell out of Ms. Diffee's hand and to the floor. According to Mr. Diffee, the object cut three fingers on his hand and stuck him between his sideburn and eye. He further testified that Ms. Diffee screamed and ran through the foyer and living room to the kitchen, where she told him that a man had run through their house. Mr. Diffee then cleaned the blood off his fingers and face and went to work, as he was employed on the midnight shift at Jones Truck Line. The next morning, he came home from work to find Ms. Diffee asleep on the bed and an ice pick laying on the floor on the same side of the bed where he had knocked the object out of her hand the night before. Ms. Diffee characterizes the alleged attack of her former husband as an unrelated incident. In light of the facts before us, we must agree. Granted, evidence which shows a method of operation is independently admissible; however, the evidence in this case does not reach that level. There are two requirements for introducing evidence of an unrelated prior act to show a method of operation: (1) both acts must be committed with the same or strikingly similar methodology; and (2) the methodology must be so unique that both acts can be attributed to one individual. Frensley v. State, 291 Ark. 268, 274, 724 S.W.2d 165, 169 (1987) (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence, § 3.10 to 3.12 (1984)). This case fails both requirements. The first requirement is that there be a very high degree of similarity between the charged crime and the prior uncharged act. Professor Imwinkelried describes this first requirement as follows: The courts have repeatedly held that the degree of similarity required to establish identity based on modus operandi is greater than the degree required to negate innocent intent. The courts have contrasted the two theories by saying that the identity theory requires a high degree of similarity, a strict degree, a higher degree, a greater degree, or a much greater degree of similarity. The requirement for greater similarity is justified. When the prosecutor is offering the defendant's similar acts to disprove innocent intent, the doctrine of chances operates so long as the acts are of the same general category. However, when the prosecutor offers acts for the purpose of proving the defendant's identity, proof of acts of the same category or type is insufficient; in the words of Lord Widgerly, proof of acts in the same generic type is insufficient to support a permissive inference that the acts were performed by the same person. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Uncharged Misconduct Evidence § 3.11 at 23 (1984) (footnotes omitted). In this case the unrelated and uncharged prior act was that Eddie Diffee, who was Ms. Diffee's husband at the time, was asleep in their home and while moving his hand from underneath the cover, hit an ice pick and knocked it from her hand. He cut three fingers as he moved his hand from underneath the covers, and the ice pick stuck him between his sideburn and eye. In the charged act, the victim, Ms. Diffee's mother, was stabbed twenty-two times in the body and struck four times in the head. The weapon was most likely an ice pick. Her body was found on a couch in her residence, which was adjacent to the building in which Ms. Diffee lived. The two acts were similar because both acts involved an ice pick, both involved Ms. Diffee preparing to attack or attacking a member of her family, and both occurred in or near Ms. Diffee's residence. It is doubtful that there was a high degree of similarity, but even if there were, this case clearly fails the second requirement. The second requirement for admission as a method of operation is that the methodology be so unique that it independently identifies the accused as the perpetrator. Professor Imwinkelried describes this requirement as follows: Standing alone, proof of similarity of the two crimes is insufficient to justify admitting the uncharged misconduct to prove the defendant's identity. Even if the crimes are identical, it just may happen that every safe robber or counterfeiter is familiar with that technique. Before admitting the evidence to prove the defendant's identity, the judge must conclude that the crimes were committed by one and the same person. The courts and commentators have used various expressions to describe the requirement that the methodology be attributable to only one criminal: The methodology must be bizarre, highly characteristic, distinguishing, distinctive, dramatic(ally) similar, an earmark, exceptional, a fingerprint, a handiwork, identifying, idiosyncratic, novel, parallel, peculiar, remarkably similar, set apart, signature quality, singular, strikingly similar, a veritable trademark, uncommon, unique, or unusual. Imwinkelried, supra § 3.12 (1984) at 26 (footnotes omitted). In this case, Mr. Swope, the crime scene specialist, testified that he had seen several homicides that had involved the use of ice picks. The uncharged act did not involve a stabbing, so there is nothing unique about the locations of the stab wounds or the manner of stabbing. In short, the methodology did not set apart the perpetrator. To be admissible, the method of operation must so set apart the perpetrator that it independently discloses the criminal's identity. Professor Imwinkelreid states: There are numerous, excellent hypothetical and actual examples of unique methodology. The hypothetical examples are more colorful. Professor Alan Polasky of the University of Michigan hypothesized the bandit with the silver crossbow. The British examples are just as histrionic; criminals who repeat a particular humorous limerick or who wear the ceremonial headdress of an Indian chief. More recently, Professors Broun and Meisenholder have given us the example of the robber wearing the medieval knight's helmet. The point of each hypothetical is to illustrate the required standard of uniqueness. There are several illustrations drawn from actual cases that are equally good examples of the standard. The courts have admitted evidence of other crimes to establish a one-of-a-kind modus operandi in the following cases: The burglar always left a bathroom scale on the front door of the burgled residence; the drug trafficker sold a type of white heroin rare in the San Antonio area; the killer always shot the victim in the back near the fourth cervical vertebra; the thief used a rare automobile to make his getaway; the forged money orders were identical in amount, payee, and payer and sequential in number; the burglaries were committed after the burglar bypassed the alarm system in a sophisticated, distinctive manner; the bank robber wore rose-tinted wire-framed glasses and a certain color shirt and wig; the caller making the phone threat always mentioned a Mary D during the call; and the smugglers used the same ingenious stratagem even though on one occasion the smuggled contraband was drugs but on the other occasion the contraband was a handgun. In these cases, although the crimes may not have been identical in every detail, the crimes were sufficiently similar and the modus sufficiently unique to justify admitting the uncharged misconduct evidence to show identity. Imwinkelreid, supra § 3.13 at 31 (footnotes admitted). Frensley is a good example of the proper admission of prior unrelated acts to show the accused's method of operation. There we held that the prior acts were admissible because: [T]he methodology uniquely sets apart and identifies appellant as the robber. The similarities include the robbery of Long John Silver's restaurants, the time of entry, the place of seating, the long stay in the restroom, the knowledge of the layout of the restaurants, the use of a dark colored revolver, the use of tape, the wearing of long jersey work gloves, and the physical appearance of the robber. Both actions were committed in the same unique fashion. Further, the two acts were so unique and uncommon that they became distinctive and identifying. The two acts establish a method of operation. The inference is clear, there were not two different robbers. The evidence was properly admitted. Frensley, 291 Ark. at 274, 724 S.W.2d at 169. In sum, to be admissible, the two unrelated acts must be so distinctive, so unique, and so uncommon that they become identifying, and they must be independently relevant to show a method of operation. The unrelated acts in this case do not reach such a level. Another theory advanced by the State is that Mr. Diffee's testimony was properly admitted to show Ms. Diffee's intent, plan, and identity in light of our decision in Brenk v. State, 311 Ark. 579, 847 S.W.2d 1 (1993). The appellant in Brenk was charged with capital murder in the connection with the death of his wife, Lou Alice Brenk, whose torso was found in a cooler floating in Lake Norfork. The cooler contained cement as well as her torso, which had been severed at the upper thighs and back. At trial, Jackie Brenk, the appellant's former wife, was permitted to testify that he had threatened her when they were married, had tried to kill her, and had told her he would kill her, cut her body to pieces, and scatter the pieces from Mammoth Springs, Arkansas, to Louisiana so that no one would ever find her. In short, Jackie Brenk's testimony was that Brenk had told her that he would cut her body to pieces and scatter those pieces, and the body of Lou Alice Brenk was so found. Under these circumstances, we held that [g]iven the similarity of the circumstances of Lou Alice Brenk's death and the specific threats made by appellant to Jackie Brenk, although several years earlier, these threats were admissible to show appellant's `intent, plan, and identity.' Conversely, little similarity of circumstances exists in this case. While Eddie Diffee testified that some several years previous, he was cut on three fingers of his hand and stuck between his sideburn and eye when he knocked an ice pick from Ms. Diffee's hand, there was no proof that Ms. Diffee made any specific threats towards her former husband. In fact, she denied being involved in his injury, claiming that it was the result of an attack by a third party. Although it is apparent that Ms. Diffee may have used an ice pick in an assault on her ex-husband and in stabbing Ms. Durham some twenty-two times in various parts of her body, such use of an ice pick to assault her ex-husband, absent specific threats to him or other evidence of an intent or plan to inflict harm or take his life, simply does not pass muster as permitted evidence under A.R.E. 404(b). The admission of this testimony was prejudicial error for which we must reverse and remand for a new trial.