Opinion ID: 6109859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process Grounds for Appointment of Counsel

Text: As noted, because the court of appeals granted mandamus relief on statutory grounds, it did not address the constitutional due process arguments Brown asserted in support of his right to counsel. The State argues that by reurging these unaddressed arguments here, Brown effectively asks this Court to exercise mandamus jurisdiction in the first instance without stating a compelling reason for doing so. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e) (requiring a petition for writ of mandamus to be presented first to the court of appeals unless there is a compelling reason not to do so). We disagree. Brown presented his mandamus petition, which included his due process arguments, to the court of appeals. He presents these same arguments here as an alternative ground to deny the State's petition. That the court of appeals chose to grant Brown's petition for different reasons does not preclude us from addressing the arguments he raised. On the merits, Brown argues that due process entitled him to counsel in defending the State's motion to modify, the purpose of which was to remove him from an outpatient treatment program and place him in a program that includes the possibility of inpatient treatment. Brown argues that he should be afforded the full panoply of due process rights when the State seeks to impose a much more restrictive curtailment of his liberties. In analyzing Brown's due process argument, we find guidance in the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Vitek v. Jones , 445 U.S. 480 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 , 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980), and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Meza v. Livingston , 607 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2010). In Vitek , the issue was the adequacy of the statutory procedures by which an inmate could be involuntarily  transferred to and treated at a mental hospital. 445 U.S. at 484 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 . Noting that the loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of freedom from confinement, the Court held that an inmate subject to such commitment was entitled to due process protections notwithstanding a valid criminal conviction. Id. at 492-93 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 . The Court further held that the inmate was entitled to notice, a hearing, and an independent decisionmaker. Id. at 496 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 . And the Court concluded that, in light of the mental-health concerns at issue, the inmate was entitled to qualified and independent assistance, but the Court stopped short of requiring that such assistance include representation by a licensed attorney. Id. at 497 , 100 S.Ct. 1254 (Powell, J., concurring). 9 In Meza , the Fifth Circuit reviewed the adequacy of the State's procedures for placing sex offender restrictions on a parolee who had never been convicted of a sex offense. 607 F.3d at 395 . The court found that the parolee, Meza, had a liberty interest in being free from being required to register as a sex offender and participate in sex offender therapy. Id. at 401 . In considering whether the provided process was adequate, the court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which requires consideration of three factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 402 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge , 424 U.S. 319 , 335, 96 S.Ct. 893 , 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ). Noting the serious deprivation of liberty and stigmatizing consequences associated with sex offender registration and treatment, the court concluded the private interest affected was significant. Id. The court also found a high risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest because the procedures in place did not give the parolee or any attorney he retained the opportunity to inspect the information provided to the parole board or to correct or explain that information. Id. at 402-03 . Finally, the court recognized the State's significant interest in rehabilitating and monitoring sex offenders and the significant additional costs the State would incur in providing extra procedural protections. Id. at 403 . Considering these factors, the court held that the minimum process owed the parolee included written notice; disclosure of evidence against him; an opportunity to be heard, present evidence, and confront adverse witnesses; an impartial decisionmaker; and a written statement explaining the decision. Id. at 409-10 . However, the court concluded that the State was not required to provide counsel to Meza in light of the substantial cost to the State and the absence of the concerns at issue in Vitek , where the inmate allegedly suffered from a mental illness that potentially rendered him unable to understand or exercise his rights. Id. at 411 . While neither Vitek nor Meza is factually directly on point, the results of those cases are instructive and advise against requiring appointed counsel in this  case. Certainly, Brown has a liberty interest in being free from inpatient treatment. See In re Commitment of Fisher , 164 S.W.3d at 653 (comparing the pre-2015 Act with the analogous Kansas statute upheld by the United States Supreme Court and noting that the intrusion on the liberty of Texas SVPs committed to outpatient treatment is far less restrictive than if he were confined in a secure facility in Kansas). However, as we recognized in Fisher , commitment under the pre-2015 Act already involved intensive treatment and supervision. Id. at 642. To that end, Brown's commitment in 2010 resulted in a significant loss of liberty, as Brown was required to, among other things, reside in supervised housing at a Texas residential facility under contract with the Council on Sex Offender Treatment ... or at another location or facility approved by the Council. Such supervised housing can include substantial restrictions. See, e.g. , In re Commitment of Dodson , 434 S.W.3d 742 , 745 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) (noting that after being committed to outpatient treatment, Dodson was required to wear a leg monitor and to live at a camera-monitored transitional facility, enclosed by a fence topped with barbed wire). Importantly, Brown was afforded the full panoply of due process protections, including representation by counsel, when he was originally determined to be an SVP and subjected to these types of restrictions on his liberty. These are the same protections afforded to persons who are civilly committed under the amended Act. See In re Terry , 2016 WL 4698648 , at  (holding that an SVP who had appointed counsel in his initial civil commitment proceeding in 2014 did not show that due process required the court to appoint counsel to represent him in a hearing on the State's motion to modify his commitment order pursuant to the 2015 amendments). Further, neither the State's motion nor the trial court's order granting it placed Brown in inpatient treatment. The sole purpose of the motion was to modify the terms of Brown's civil commitment order that conflicted with the Act's 2015 amendments. See Act of May 21, 2015, 84th Leg., R.S., ch. 845, § 40, 2015 Tex. Gen. Laws 2701 , 2712 (directing the trial court to, after notice and a hearing, modify a civil commitment requirement that differs from those in section 841.082 of the amended Act to conform to that section); see also Richards , 2015 WL 5310853 , at  (noting that the 2015 amendments bring[ ] Texas's SVP scheme in line with similar programs that the Supreme Court has upheld as constitutional). And it is undisputed that Brown received the required notice and hearing on the State's motion. In light of the motion's limited scope and the process already afforded Brown under state law, the risk of erroneous deprivation was significantly less severe than in Meza . Finally, we must consider the State's interests. As recognized in Meza , the State has a significant interest in ensuring SVPs (and other sex offenders) are properly treated and monitored. 607 F.3d at 403 . Moreover, we cannot ignore the significant cost associated with providing counsel for SVPs committed under the pre-2015 Act, whose commitment orders all conflict with the amendments. In sum, taking all these factors into account-the liberty interest at stake, the risk of erroneous deprivation, and the State's interest-we hold that the minimum process to which Brown is entitled in connection with the State's motion to amend his commitment order to conform to the Act's 2015 amendments does not include appointed counsel. See Morrissey v. Brewer , 408 U.S. 471 , 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593 , 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972) ([D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.). State law afforded Brown notice  and a hearing, which was sufficient process under the circumstances. That said, we must emphasize the narrow scope of our holding. As noted, unlike the pre-2015 Act, the tiered treatment program provides for an additional level of confinement in the form of inpatient treatment at the more restrictive tiers. And the Act enumerates procedures for the movement of SVPs between treatment tiers. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 841.0834 (allowing the Office to transfer a committed person to less restrictive or more restrictive housing and supervision under certain circumstances, and providing procedures for the person to request transfer to less restrictive supervision and to challenge a return to more restrictive supervision). Further, as amended, the Act continues to require a biennial review of the status of the committed person, for which appointed counsel is required. Id. §§ 841.005, .102. 10 We express no opinion on whether these procedures are constitutionally adequate, and we express no opinion on any other constitutional challenges to the amended Act that may be brought. 11 We hold only that Brown was not entitled to appointed counsel on the State's motion to amend his civil commitment order to conform to the amended Act.