Opinion ID: 222485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether any adverse action by Defendants was motivated at least in part by Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected activity

Text: Alternatively, even if Plaintiffs could satisfy the second element of a First Amendment retaliation claim, we conclude that Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead the third element, namely that any adverse action by Defendants was motivated at least in part by Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected activity. Plaintiffs present nothing more than unadorned allegations concerning Defendants' intent and motivation. ( See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 40 (Defendants seek to officially censor, correct, and/or condemn certain political views and ideas and thereby prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, and other matters of opinion); id. ¶ 41 (The RWE Policy is designed to deter, prevent, and preempt activities that government officials deem to be in opposition to. . . the current administration); id. (Defendants seek to influence domestic public opinion in support of . . . the current administration); id. ¶ 42 (tool of intimidation to stifle political opinion and opposition); id. ¶ 44 (deter `rightwing extremist' speech activities); id. ¶¶ 51-52 (in order to deter); id. ¶ 105 (silence political opposition marginalize political opponents; deter and diminish political opponents); id. ¶ 107 (designed to marginalize them and their opposition to the policies and practices of the federal government).) These vague and conclusory allegations of nefarious intent and motivation by officials at the highest levels of the federal government are not well-pleaded, and are therefore insufficient to plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir.2009) (The bald allegation of impermissible motive . . ., standing alone, is conclusory and is therefore not entitled to an assumption of truth.). In Iqbal, the plaintiff alleged that high ranking federal officials had adopted a policy of unconstitutional detention based on race, religion and/or national origin. In declining to credit as true the plaintiff's allegations of intent, the Supreme Court held that conclusory allegations of intent without reference to [] factual context are deficient. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1954. In this case, similar to Iqbal, nothing in the Amended Complaint states a plausible claim that Defendants personally, or through their respective departments, took any actions on account of Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected activities, or that any policy was adopted or enforced on an improper basis. Nothing in the alleged conduct of relevant federal law enforcement officers plausibly suggests that they were motivated by anything other than a proper law enforcement motive. Indeed, the Amended Complaint makes no plausible allegation that the relevant actions of law enforcement were not supported by probable cause, or otherwise taken pursuant to a valid law enforcement purpose. See Gordon, 706 F.2d at 781 n. 3 (Courts have recognized that [government activity] in connection with a good faith law enforcement investigation does not violate First Amendment rights, even though it may be directed at communicative or associative activities.); see also Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 355 (6th Cir.2007) (Probable cause is clearly relevant to [] First Amendment retaliation claims.). Cf. Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc., 477 F.3d at 822-24 (holding that a three-hour detention without probable cause would suggest improper motive where, during the detention, the officers knew of and discussed the political activity of plaintiffs). The Ninth Circuit confronted a similar claim in Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, where protestors who were removed by the U.S. Secret Service claimed that the agency had a policy of removing protestors who were critical of President George W. Bush in violation of the First Amendment. 572 F.3d at 962. The Ninth Circuit rejected the claim on a motion to dismiss, reasoning: The allegation of systematic viewpoint discrimination at the highest levels of the Secret Service, without any factual content to bolster it, is just the sort of conclusory allegation that the Iqbal Court deemed inadequate, and thus does nothing to enhance the plausibility of Plaintiffs' viewpoint discrimination claim against the Agents. Id. at 970. Likewise in this case, and for the reasons discussed herein, the Amended Complaint fails to adequately plead that any adverse actions by Defendants were motivated by a desire to discriminate or retaliate against Plaintiffs on account of their constitutionally protected expressive activities. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950-51 (stating that the plaintiff has not nudged his claims of invidious discrimination across the line from conceivable to plausible) (internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have failed to adequately plead that any adverse action by Defendants was motivated at least in part by Plaintiffs' constitutionally protected activity.