Opinion ID: 1861054
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Alleged Error under Anderson v. State, 574 So.2d 87 (Fla.1991)

Text: Evans also claims that reversal is required because the State's case at the time of the indictment, as set out in the Complaint Affidavit, and the State's case at trial were materially different from each other, relying upon this Court's decision in Anderson v. State, 574 So.2d 87 (Fla.1991). In response, the State maintains that although Evans requested the grand jury testimony, Evans did not raise the alleged variances between the complaint and the trial testimony at trial, and, therefore, this claim is unpreserved. Furthermore, the State contends that even if the Court decides to reach the merits of this claim, Evans has failed to show that the grand jury testimony was either perjured or material. We agree with the State that the matter is unpreserved. Moreover, we do not find that Evans' allegation amounts to error, let alone fundamental error. In Anderson, the defendant claimed that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictment when a witness admitted that her grand jury testimony differed from her trial testimony. 574 So.2d at 90. The defendant contended that because the State knew prior to trial that the witness's grand jury testimony was perjured and did nothing to correct the testimony, the trial court should have dismissed the indictment. See id. This Court held that due process is violated if a prosecutor permits a defendant to be tried upon an indictment which he or she knows is based on perjured, material testimony without informing the court, opposing counsel, and the grand jury. Id. at 91 (emphasis supplied). However, the Court found that although the testimony was false in part, it was not false in any material respect that would have affected the indictment. Id. at 92. Moreover, the Court explained that this was not a case where it was faced with deliberate subornation, because the State did not knowingly present false testimony to the grand jury. See id. In this case, Evans does not maintain that the State deliberately presented false testimony to the grand jury, and there is no indication that the State did present false testimony to the grand jury. Rather, Evans contends that variances between the complaint and the trial testimony necessitate a reversal. In Brookings v. State, 495 So.2d 135, 137 (Fla.1986), a case similar to this case, the defendant claimed that he was entitled to an inspection of the grand jury testimony due to certain inaccuracies and conflicts between two witnesses' depositions and the original criminal affidavit. This Court rejected the defendant's claim, explaining there is no pretrial right to inspect grand jury testimony. Id. Although the defendant enumerated several instances of alleged inconsistencies between the grand jury testimony and the witnesses' depositions, this Court found that appellant's counsel, through cross-examination at trial of both [witnesses], was able to direct the jury's attention to any purported inconsistencies between the witnesses' trial testimony and their prior depositions, thus obviating any need for resort to the grand jury testimony. Id. at 138. Therefore, based on this Court's decision in Brookings, we reject Evans' claim that reversal is justified based on alleged inconsistencies between the complaint and the trial testimony.