Opinion ID: 1136544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: cross-examination of plaintiff's medical experts.

Text: We agree with the defendant's contention that in the cross-examination of an expert witness there is no requirement that hypothetical questions be based upon facts already in evidence. While the authorities are divided on this issue, we think that in cross-examining an expert witness a question aimed at demonstrating an alternative theory or contesting a substantive element of the case may be based on (1) those facts already in evidence, (2) those facts which are the proper subject of judicial notice, and (3) those facts which the cross-examiner in good faith anticipates he will establish later in the trial. If the cross-examiner fails to prove the facts assumed in his hypothetical question, then a motion to strike by opposing counsel is appropriate to cure the defect. Peterson v. Schlottman, 237 Or. 484, 392 P.2d 262 (1964); see also H.R.C.P. Rule 7(b) (1) and Trask v. Kam, 44 Haw. 10, 18, 352 P.2d 320, 325, 88 A.L.R. 2d 1 (1959). While it has never been questioned in Hawaii, the use of the hypothetical question has been critically regarded by many authorities as a necessary evil. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 686 (3d ed. 1940); McCormick, Evidence § 16 (1954); McCoid, Opinion Evidence and Expert Witnesses, 2 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 356, 364-66 (1955). Judge Learned Hand referred to it as the most horrific and grotesque wen upon the fair face of justice. [2] The Uniform Rules of Evidence, the Model Code of Evidence, the proposed Federal Rules of Evidence and various state rules provide that a question calling for the opinion of an expert witness shall be permitted although not hypothetical in form unless the trial judge, in his discretion, requires it to be in such form. [3] The major criticism of the use of the hypothetical question is that the expert's mouth is often clamped by the examiner's selection of the assumptions used in his question, strategically omitting those assumptions which could harm his case. The jury is consequently confused and misled as to what the expert's opinion really is. 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 686 at 812 (3d ed. 1940). These problems can be partially remedied by an unrestricted and intensive cross-examination of the expert. On cross-examination the purpose of the hypothetical question determines what facts can be assumed in it. Cross-examination has been allowed to test the skill and accuracy of the expert by assuming facts which need never be proved. Such questioning is simply to determine the credibility of the expert. Stafford v. Lyon, 413 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Mo. 1967); 2 Wigmore § 684 (3d ed. 1940). But, where facts not yet proved are used in the form of a hypothetical question to demonstrate alternative theories or contest a substantive element as in the present case, the examiner must in good faith assure the court and opposing counsel that these facts will be developed later in the record. To require the cross-examiner to stick to the facts which the plaintiff has adduced would often deprive the cross-examiner of the benefits of cross-examination and compound the defects of the hypothetical question. The rule has been aptly stated by the Washington Supreme Court in Levine v. Barry, 114 Wash. 623, 628, 195 P. 1003, 1005 (1921): It is our view that the cross-examiner may rightfully propound hypthetical questions based entirely on conjectural facts for the purpose of testing the skill and knowledge of the witness, and, where he has not had an opportunity to present his proof as to the facts, his hypothetical question may be based on his contention of what the facts will be as they may be developed later by his testimony, for the purpose of throwing light on the facts as they may ultimately be submitted to the jury. The present case demonstrates the need for this type of questioning. The trial took place on Kauai, an island approximately 100 miles by airplane from the medical experts' offices in Honolulu. The doctors were not easily available for recall by the defendant. The orderly progress of the trial and the search for a just resolution of the issues required the defendant's questions to be put to Marlene's experts at the time of cross-examination. The plaintiffs contend that the defendant failed to prove that Marlene was actually pregnant before marriage and knew of her condition. Since the objection to the defendant's questions asked of Marlene's experts on cross-examination was sustained, there was no need subsequently to prove the pregnancy and knowledge thereof. Nevertheless, we are satisfied that enough circumstantial evidence was introduced by the defendant to show that Marlene knew she was pregnant before marriage. Combined with the proof is the common notoriety of the fact that most pregnancies are of approximately 280 days duration. See 9 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 2571, 2583 (3d ed. 1940). From the fact of a normal pregnancy it can reasonably be inferred that Marlene knew of her condition. Although the evidence demonstrates that a bufo test was negative, Marlene knew she missed her menses in January and February of 1966, at least two months prior to her marriage in April, and had an enlarged uterus diagnosed in February. If she wasn't positive that she was pregnant, the record indicates that she was at least concerned about the possibility. The plaintiffs cite Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd., 49 Haw. 77, 106, 412 P.2d 669, 687 (1966) as controlling this situation. That case held that on direct examination a non-treating medical expert cannot base his opinion on a plaintiff's out-of-court statements as to the plaintiff's condition, not shown to be the same as indicated by the evidence in the record. In the present case, since the defendant's cross-examination of a plaintiff's expert witness was involved, there was no opportunity for the defendant to have introduced his evidence into the record prior to the time when the question was asked. The necessary evidence could have been introduced into the record by the defendant at a later time when he was presenting his case. If such evidence were admitted at that later time, then the policy behind the rule in Cozine would be satisfied. Otherwise a motion to strike the portion of the witness' testimony which was violative of Cozine would be justified.