Opinion ID: 2192834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Foreseeability of Crime

Text: The summary judgment evidence shows that, from January 1, 1990, through the date of the incident, 190 violent crimes, including murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults, were reported within a quarter-mile radius of Mellon's garage. This amounted to one reported violent crime every five days, and was enough to support a High Crime designation for the area in 1991 and an Above Average designation in 1992. John Hilliard, a Mellon employee, testified by deposition that his Jeep was stolen out of the garage in October 1992. Hilliard sent a memo to the garage manager, Curtis Oblinger, among others, expressing his concern about a drastic increase in crime in the surrounding area in the previous six months. Hilliard had heard rumors of increased criminal activity from other Mellon employees, including reports of violent crime in the surrounding area. Hilliard proposed a plan for increased garage security, but Oblinger never responded to his memo. Cathleen Hackward, another Mellon employee, sent an e-mail to Oblinger and others to lodge a formal complaint about the virtually non-existent security for our parking garage. She wrote that people are free to roam through there, obviously committing crimes, and stated that she was concerned for her personal safety. Hackward testified by deposition that she had Mellon's security guard escort her to her car when she worked late because she did not consider it safe to go to the garage alone. According to Hilliard, it was obvious that people were sleeping in the garage. There were blankets and newspapers rolled up like someone was sleeping in the stairwell. Oblinger knew that vagrants were going into the garage, and that they were drinking beer there. He did nothing, however, to prevent their entry. Reviewing this evidence, Justice Baker concludes that the risk that someone would be sexually assaulted in Mellon's garage was not foreseeable to Mellon as a matter of law. Such a conclusion drawn from this summary judgment record, in my opinion, blinks reality and strains the Timberwalk factors beyond their logical or intended reach. Justice Baker draws a bright line between property crimes occurring inside Mellon's garage and personal crimes occurring outside. He thus discounts the employee memos identifying property crime within the garage, and dismisses their reference to violent crime in the vicinity as rumors. It is clear, however, that the employees' memos were written out of concern for their own personal safety, not just the security of their cars. The Hackward memo explicitly states, not only am I worried about my car, but I fear for my personal safety as well. And Hilliard testified in his deposition that the drastic increase in crime in the surrounding area to which his memo referred included reports of violent crimes, including an armed robbery. Hilliard's memo to Oblinger suggested that the garage should be patrolled to prohibit automobile theft and potential danger to employees. In Timberwalk we held that, for a risk to be foreseeable, evidence of criminal activity either on the landowner's property or closely nearby may be considered. See Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 757. Considering the crime that had occurred in the garage and the abundance of violent crime in the immediate area, it was entirely foreseeable that a sexual assault might occur in Mellon's open and abandoned garage. Justice Baker also discounts Holder's evidence of prior violent crimes because there is no evidence that any of the four reported sexual assaults in the area surrounding the garage occurred in either a public or private parking garage or were otherwise similar to Holder's. It is true that neither party presented evidence detailing the circumstances of the sexual assaults or other 190 violent crimes committed in the vicinity. But Timberwalk does not require such a heightened degree of similarity for purposes of determining foreseeability. See Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 758. As we recognized in Timberwalk, it is difficult to compartmentalize criminal activity, and [p]roperty crimes may expose a dangerous condition that could facilitate personal crimes. Id. at 758. See also Galloway v. Bankers Trust Co., 420 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 1988) (stating [w]e do not believe, however, that crimes initially directed toward property are without any probative value on the question of foreseeability of injury.); Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Mo. 1988) (stating [i]t is not necessary to allege that past crimes involving entry into unauthorized places are of the same general nature as the one which gave rise to the claim.... If a burglar may enter, so may a rapist.). To the extent Justice Baker bases his similarity distinction upon the manner in which Holder was assaulted, i.e., that she was lured into the garage from another location, it is immaterial, for we have long recognized that what must be foreseeable is not the exact sequence of events that produces the criminal conduct, but only the general danger. See Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d 375, 377 (Tex.1996); Lofton v. Texas Brine Corp., 777 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex.1989). And to the extent his distinction is based upon the differing nature of other crimes in the area, I fail to see it. In the year Holder was assaulted, four sexual assaults, fifty-seven robberies, and twenty-seven aggravated assaults occurred in close proximity to the garage. Any distinction that might be drawn between Holder's assault and these prior violent crimes is inconsequential at best. Moreover, we stated in Timberwalk that the frequency of previous crimes necessary to show foreseeability lessens as the similarity of the previous crimes to the incident at issue increases. See Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 759. Conversely, the similarity of previous crimes necessary to show foreseeability should lessen, to a certain extent, as the frequency of the previous crimes increases. See Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 525 (Del.1987) (stating the repetition of criminal activity, regardless of its mix, may be sufficient to place the property owners on notice of the likelihood that personal injury, not merely property loss, will result.). Here, any distinction that might be drawn between Holder's assault and the other violent crimes diminishes in light of their sheer number. Holder presented additional foreseeability evidence that accounts for the nature and character of the premises in issue, a parking garage, which Justice Baker's opinion altogether disregards. While it is true that our decision in Timberwalk articulated similarity, proximity, recency, frequency, and publicity of previous criminal conduct as factors relevant to determine foreseeability, there is nothing to suggest that these factors are meant to be exclusive. [2] Oblinger admitted in his deposition that he knew parking garages in downtown Houston are inherently susceptible to criminal activity. And the report of Holder's security expert, Horace Loomis, refers to the inherently dangerous nature of unattended and unprotected parking garages. Justice Baker's opinion gives no consideration to the fact that the particular premises at issue may, under certain circumstances, pose a peculiar attraction for criminal misconduct. See Gomez v. Ticor, 145 Cal.App.3d 622, 628, 193 Cal.Rptr. 600 (1983) (stating that the deserted ... nature of these structures, especially at night, makes them likely places for robbers and rapists to lie in wait). I agree with my fellow justices that it was not unforeseeable as a matter of law that a rape might occur in the parking garage, and therefore cannot join Justice Baker's opinion. And I agree with Justice Enoch that the plurality's analysis comes dangerously close to imposing upon landowners a general common law duty not to be negligent. Like Justice Enoch, I believe that the traditional premises liability distinctions govern our analysis. The inquiry should be whether Mellon established as a matter of law that it acted within the scope of any duty that it owed to Holder. The nature of that duty depends upon the status of the person entering the property. III