Opinion ID: 2264738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim Under the Human Rights Act

Text: In setting aside the verdict for Strass, the trial court concluded that the evidence was insufficient to allow a reasonable juror to conclude that Kaiser unlawfully terminated Strass in violation of the Human Rights Act. Specifically, the trial court determined that no reasonable juror could conclude on the evidence presented that Strass was a handicapped person within the meaning of the Act because she had failed to establish that a reasonable accommodation could be made for her claimed disability. Strass argues that the trial court erred in vacating the jury's finding that Kaiser failed to accommodate her physical handicap in violation of the Human Rights Act. The Human Rights Act prohibits an employer from discharging an employee based wholly or partially upon discriminatory reasons, including physical handicap. D.C.Code § 1-2512(a)(1) [4] ; American Univ. v. Commission on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 421 (D.C.1991) (citing D.C.Code § 1-2512(a)(1) (1987)). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination based upon handicap, a claimant is required to prove that (a) except for his [or her] physical handicap, he [or she] is qualified to fill the position; (b) he [or she] has a handicap that prevents him from meeting the physical criteria for employment; and (c) the challenged physical standards have a disproportionate impact on persons having the same handicap from which he [or she] suffers. To sustain this prima facie case, there should also be a facial showing or at least plausible reasons to believe that the handicap can be accommodated or that the physical criteria are not `job related.' American Univ., 598 A.2d at 422 (quoting Prewitt v. United States Postal Serv., 662 F.2d 292, 309-10 (5th Cir.1981)). Special interrogatories were submitted to the jury in this case covering each of the foregoing elements. [5] The jury found for Strass on each of these issues. In addition, the jury found specifically that Strass had proved that Kaiser intentionally discriminated against her, in whole or in part, on the basis of her physical handicap. At the time relevant to this case, the Act defined a physical handicap as a bodily or mental disablement which may be the result of injury, illness or congenital condition for which reasonable accommodation can be made. [6] D.C.Code § 1-2502(23). Thus, under this statutory definition, Strass had to prove that her claimed disability, hypertension, was a condition for which reasonable accommodation could be made. Id.; American Univ., supra, 598 A.2d at 422. The trial court's decision setting aside the jury's verdict on the claim under the Human Rights Act rested upon its conclusion that Strass had failed to prove there was any reasonable accommodation which Kaiser could have provided that would have enabled Strass to perform the essential functions of her job. While recognizing that usually, the question of reasonableness of accommodation is a question of fact for the jury, the trial court determined that the undisputed facts showed that the accommodations requested were unreasonable as a matter of law. Since this argument forms the basis of the trial court's ruling, we address it first. Strass proposed two ways for Kaiser to accommodate her condition: (1) restore staff in her department to a full complement of four full-time public affairs representatives; or (2) transfer her to a newly created position of Director of Community Affairs. She contends that the first requested accommodation would have restored the staffing in her department to the level which existed when she handled the position without experiencing hypertension. She contends that the alternative request, a transfer, would have placed her in a position of performing some of the duties required in her public affairs position, but with fewer demands. Thus, Strass argues that the trial court erred in concluding that reasonable accommodation could not be made because it failed to view the facts and reasonable inferences in her favor and accepted Kaiser's evidentiary assessment that Strass' recommended accommodations were merely speculative. Assuming first, for the sake of argument, that the accommodations requested would have controlled or eliminated her hypertension, Strass had to show that the accommodations were reasonable. Kaiser argues that Strass' proposed accommodations were not required by law, and the trial court agreed. Specifically, Kaiser contends that an employer is not required to accommodate a handicapped employee by reassigning her to a different position. In support of this argument, Kaiser relies upon the decisions in Guillot v. Garrett, 970 F.2d 1320 (4th Cir.1992), Chiari v. City of League City, 920 F.2d 311 (5th Cir.1991), and Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465 (4th Cir.1987). Neither Chiari or Carter support Kaiser's position. In Chiari, at issue was whether reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), required an employee to create a new job for the handicapped individual. [7] In Carter, the employee sought as an accommodation a light duty assignment. 822 F.2d at 467. In that case, the court concluded that an alternative assignment was not required unless the employer normally provides such alternative employment under its existing policies. Id. Here, Strass did not request the company to create a new position, but only that it assign her to a job reasonably available. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 n. 19, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987). Although dicta, the Supreme Court stated the rule on this issue in Arline as follows: Employers have an affirmative obligation to make a reasonable accommodation for a handicapped employee. Although they are not required to find another job for an employee who is not qualified for the job he or she was doing, they cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policies. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.12). This passage tends to support Strass' claim that she should have been considered for another position available in the organization. In Guillot, the third case relied upon by Kaiser, the 4th Circuit declined to read the passage from Arline as imposing upon the employer an obligation to assign to another position, an employee who was no longer qualified to hold his current position, with or without accommodation. Guillot, supra, 970 F.2d at 1326-27. The employee in Guillot had lost a top security clearance after it was learned that he failed to disclose his drug and alcohol dependency. Therefore, the employee was no longer eligible for the position he had held. The court held in Guillot that reasonable accommodation does not require an employer to transfer or reassign an employee who is not otherwise qualified for the position he then holds. Id. at 1327. The court did observe, however, that neither under the Rehabilitation or Civil Rights Acts, may a government agency or department deny the handicapped employeebecause of his handicapopportunities that are available under existing statutes or regulations. Id. The primary purpose of the District's Human Rights Act is to eliminate all employment discrimination. See Daka, Inc. v. Breiner, 711 A.2d 86, 94 (D.C.1998) (citing Estate of Underwood v. National Credit Union Admin., 665 A.2d 621, 637 (D.C.1995)) (referencing the legislative history of the Human Rights Act). It would further that objective to interpret reasonable accommodation to include, as the Supreme Court articulated in Arline, supra, that the employer cannot deny an employee alternative employment opportunities reasonably available under the employer's existing policies. 480 U.S. at 289 n. 19, 107 S.Ct. 1123. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (1995), the definition of reasonable accommodation includes job restructuring and reassignment to a vacant position. Beck v. University of Wisconsin Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1135 (7th Cir.1996) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)); see also Johnston v. Morrison, Inc., 849 F.Supp. 777, 779 (N.D.Ala.1994). Kaiser points out correctly that this law did not become effective until July 26, 1992, after Strass' discharge. See Morrison v. Carleton Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 443 (1st Cir.1997). The ADA is not retroactive. Id. Kaiser contends, therefore, that this court cannot look to the terms of the ADA or cases decided under it for guidance, unless consistent with prior Rehabilitation Act law. To address this issue, we need not resolve whether this court can look to subsequent enactments and cases based thereon as guidance for the meanings of words in our own preexisting statute. For, not only is there nothing in the Human Rights Act which would preclude an interpretation of reasonable accommodation in our statute to include the requirement that the employer not deny reasonable alternative and available employment for which the employee is qualified, but that meaning may be inferred within the context of the Act, particularly given its broad purposes. See Arline, supra, 480 U.S. at 289 n. 19, 107 S.Ct. 1123. Clearly, the employer could not deny her the employment because of her handicap without violating the Human Rights Act. Id. We are persuaded that, in determining whether the employer failed to make reasonable accommodation for Strass' condition, the jury could consider properly evidence that there was a vacant position available which Strass was qualified to fill. The position, according to Strass' evidence, was less demanding. Instead, the company hired for the position someone who, according to the evidence, had difficulties in two other management positions with the company. Considered with the other evidence of how Strass' termination came about, the jury could have concluded that the employer could have, but declined to, accommodate her condition. Kaiser argues that it sought to accommodate Strass in other ways, but that she insisted on only two accommodations. Considering all the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom, the jury was at liberty to reject Kaiser's version of the events. Strass also requested as an accommodation that Kaiser restore the staff removed from her department. Kaiser argues that employers are not required to assign employees or hire new employees to perform an employee's duties in order to accommodate that individual's condition. While job restructuring, under certain circumstances, may be a reasonable accommodation, an employer is not required to reallocate essential functions of a particular position. Johnston, supra, 849 F.Supp. at 779. [8] The employer is not required to hire staff to perform the essential functions of the job which the employee cannot perform. Id. at 779-80; accord, Reigel v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 859 F.Supp. 963, 973 (E.D.N.C.1994). An employer is not required to make fundamental or substantial modifications in its operations to assure every disabled individual the benefit of employment. Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, an employer is not required to place a stress-sensitive employee in a virtually stress-free environment. Pesterfield v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 941 F.2d 437, 442 (6th Cir.1991). However, this case is different than Johnston, Reigel, and Pesterfield. Here, there was evidence that Strass could perform her functions before her staff was removed. She did not request additional staff to perform her job; she requested to return to the status quo before she experienced the conditions which brought on the hypertension. The vacancies needed to be filled in order that she could perform her job, and the new staff, presumably, could perform the jobs previously performed by former staff. There was evidence that the company deferred filling the vacancies until after Strass' termination. As Strass summarizes her argument, the jury could have determined from the evidence that the company learned of her disability, attempted to force her to quit by failing to fill the positions on her staff essential to the performance of the job, denied her alternative employment for which she was qualified, and then filled the staff positions for her replacement shortly after she left Kaiser. While an employer is not required to hire employees to perform the functions of the job that a handicapped individual cannot perform, the employer cannot deliberately create conditions which render it impossible for a handicapped person to discharge the responsibilities of the position for the purpose of forcing the handicapped person to quit. That is essentially Strass' claim in this case. [9] Although Kaiser offered evidence to counter Strass' evidence as outlined, the jury could have rejected it in favor of Strass' version of the facts. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Strass, it cannot be said that no reasonable juror could find in her favor on the Human Rights Act claim. Kaiser makes two additional arguments which require only brief discussion. Kaiser argues that no reasonable juror could find that Strass had a physical handicap within the meaning of the Human Rights Act. It contends first that Strass did not prove that she had a perceived or actual disablement and that her condition did not meet the definition of a handicapped person under federal law in that it did not substantially limit one of her major life's functions. [10] Our dissenting colleague also takes this position. Instead of applying the definition of handicap which was in effect at the time Strass' claim arose, D.C. Human Rights Act, D.C.Code § 1-2502(23) [11] and regulations then in effect, 4 DCMR § 599.1 (1995), [12] they rely principally on the more restrictive requirements of the subsequently amended local statute which redefined the protected class using the term disability, instead of handicapped. [13] Although the term disability in the amended version of the Human Rights Act is defined in language identical to the federal definition appearing in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and federal regulations, the new law and the federal case law interpreting this language, cited in the dissenting opinion, are not controlling in resolving this case which arose under prior law. Moreover, this issue is not properly before this court. Kaiser did not proceed to trial on the theory that the definition of disability under the subsequent enactment controlled. [14] It did not raise this issue in its motion for judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court did not consider it. [15] Rather, in its motion, Kaiser relied specifically upon the definition prior to the amendment of the Human Rights Act, i.e., D.C.Code § 1-2502(23). [16] Then, it argued only that Strass did not meet the definitional requirements of § 1-2502(23) factually because: (1) her condition was controlled by medication and her pressure was low at one point; and (2) there was no showing that reasonable accommodation could be made for her condition. [I]t is not appropriate at this juncture to inject a different defense theory which was not presented at trial. Vector Realty Group v. 711 14th St., 659 A.2d 230, 233 (D.C.1994) (citing Easter Seal Soc'y for Disabled Children v. Berry, 627 A.2d 482, 488-89 (D.C.1993)). There are some differences between federal law and the Human Rights Act and the regulations governing it which define more broadly those covered under the Act. [17] Under the provisions of the Human Rights Act in effect at the time her claim arose, it is sufficient that Strass showed that she had a physical disability and that Kaiser discriminated against her in her employment, in whole or in part, because of it. Although Kaiser points to other evidence from which the jury could have found that it had non-discriminatory reasons for discharging Strass, there was evidence from which the jury could have determined that the reasons either did not exist or were pretextual. The jury apparently did that, and there is no basis for disturbing its findings. [18]