Opinion ID: 1723445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Empire Iron Mining v. Asmund

Text: In Asmund, I agree that there is no good-faith requirement in § 29(8). The analysis of the lead opinion, by examining the rationale underlying the [Michigan Employment Security Act], and by considering the history and circumstances surrounding § 29(8)(b), Op. p. 847, suggests that the statute's language is ambiguous. Although the opinion claims that it is only engaging in judicial construction in footnote 12 on page 850 to demonstrate that the plain meaning of the statute will not produce an absurd result, the rest of the opinion's analysis suggests otherwise. I believe that the statute unambiguously fails to include a good-faith requirement. Hence, I do not think there is any reason to engage in judicial construction. See Tryc, supra at 135, 545 N.W.2d 642. I also agree with the lead opinion that an examination of the legislative history of the statute reveals that the Legislature did not intend to create a good-faith requirement, but instead only established objective criteria. See Op. p. 849. This judicial construction is only necessary, in my opinion, for demonstrating that the statute's plain meaning does not create an absurd result. In examining the language of § 29(8), I would hold that the statute requires an employee to prove three points before terminating the labor dispute disqualification: he must prove that (1) he has worked for two consecutive weeks, (2) with the same employer, and (3) has earned a wage equal to or greater than the actual or potential benefit rate from his previous employer. For these thirteen employees in Asmund, each employee satisfied the objective criteria of § 29(8) by working for a single employer for two consecutive weeks and, during that period, was paid a greater wage than he was paid by his previous employer. I concur with the lead opinion to reverse the Court of Appeals decision.