Opinion ID: 1711814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: recent trends

Text: Although the majority of states in this country initially adopted the parental immunity doctrine in varying degrees, [5] many have now either abrogated the doctrine completely [6] or have established significant exceptions to its application. [7] Those courts have reexamined and, in many instances, rejected outright the public policy rationales originally asserted in support of the doctrine. For example, in Guess v. Gulf Ins. Co., 96 N.M. 27, 627 P.2d 869, 871 (1981), the New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that family relationships are affected to a far greater extent by the misconduct of the party against whom the suit is filed than by the legal action based on that misconduct. And, in Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal.3d 914, 92 Cal.Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d 648 (1971), the California Supreme Court held that the policy reasons originally cited in support of the doctrine had been demonstrated to be insufficient to sustain a continued total bar to parent-child suits based upon wrongful conduct: We think that the reasoning of those decisions [abrogating the doctrine] has totally destroyed two of the three grounds traditionally advanced in support of parental immunity: (1) disruption of family harmony and (2) fraud or collusion between family adversaries. The third ground, the threat to parental authority and discipline, although of legitimate concern, cannot sustain a total bar to parent-child negligence suits. Id., 92 Cal.Rptr. 288, 479 P.2d at 651; see also Shearer v. Shearer, 18 Ohio St.3d 94, 480 N.E.2d 388, 391 (1985) (stating that [i]f the elimination of parental immunity were a bad legal position, one would reasonably expect to find that those states [that have now rejected the doctrine after initially adopting it] were experiencing problems with the abrogation ... [and] there is no evidence or persuasive material that any of these states [that never adopted the doctrine] ever suffered adverse consequences for the lack of such a rule). Other courts have partially retreated from use of the doctrine and have held it should not apply in circumstances which include negligence claims involving accidents covered by liability insurance, [8] or some intentional tort claims. [9] Abrogation of the parental immunity doctrine in accident cases has been largely based on the prevalence of liability insurance. Importantly, the courts have emphasized that the domestic harmony policy concern is diminished under these circumstances because the injured child's dispute is actually with the financially responsible insurance carrier rather than with the parents. See Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 471 P.2d 282, 284 (1970) (Where such insurance exists, the domestic tranquility argument is hollow, for in reality the sought after litigation is not between child and parent but between child and parent's insurance carrier.), overruled on other grounds by Broadbent v. Broadbent, 184 Ariz. 74, 907 P.2d 43 (1995). The courts have also noted that allowing recovery against an insurance fund would not impact family assets. See Sorensen v. Sorensen, 369 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907, 914 (1975) (stating that when insurance is involved,... both parties seek recovery from the insurance carrier to create a fund for the child's medical care and support without depleting the family's other assets). [10] Similarly, claims that fraud would increase in such cases have been rejected either outright as no greater than concerns about fraud in any litigation, or as insufficiently demonstrated. See, e.g., Glaskox v. Glaskox, 614 So.2d 906, 912 (Miss.1992); Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St.3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275, 278 (1984).