Opinion ID: 78231
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alabama's death penalty statute and Ex parte Kyzer

Text: A review of Alabama's death penalty laws at the time of Magwood's offense and Ex parte Kyzer will be helpful in the analysis of Magwood's fair-warning claim.
Magwood committed the crime on March 1, 1979. At that time, Alabama's death penalty statute provided in Alabama Code § 13-11-2(a)(5) (1975): (a) If the jury finds the defendant guilty, it shall fix the punishment at death when the defendant is charged by indictment with any of the following offenses and with aggravation, which must also be averred in the indictment, and which offenses so charged with said aggravation shall not include any lesser offenses: (5) The murder of any police officer, sheriff, deputy, state trooper or peace officer of any kind, or prison or jail guard while such prison or jail guard is on duty or because of some official or job-related act or performance of such officer or guard. Alabama Code § 13-11-4 (1975), entitled Determination of sentence by court; court not bound by punishment fixed by jury provided: Notwithstanding the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, may refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury and sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without parole, which shall be served without parole; or the court, after weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and the fixing of the punishment at death by the jury, may accordingly sentence the defendant to death. If the court imposes a sentence of death, it shall set forth in writing as the basis for the sentence of death, findings of fact from the trial and the sentence hearing, which shall at least include the following: (1) One or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in section 13-11-6, which it finds exists in the case and which it finds sufficient to support the sentence of death . . . . Alabama Code § 13-11-6 (1975), did not have a corresponding aggravating circumstance to the crime for which Magwood was convicted, namely the murder of a law enforcement officer. Additionally, the resentencing court specifically found that Magwood's crime did not qualify him for any of the listed aggravating circumstances enumerated in Alabama Code § 13-11-6 (1975). Thus, although Magwood's conviction under Alabama Code § 13-11-2(a)(5) (1975), forced the jury to fix the punishment at death, the judge could nonetheless sentence Magwood to life imprisonment without parole. Magwood asserts that under Alabama Code § 13-11-4 (1975), he should have been sentenced to life imprisonment, as § 13-11-4 (1975) requires there be an aggravating circumstance listed in § 13-11-6 (1975). Magwood did not have an aggravating circumstance listed in § 13-11-6 (1975), to correspond with his crime.
In Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), the United States Supreme Court found fault with the Alabama death penalty scheme because it failed to allow a jury in a capital case to consider lesser included, noncapital offenses. On remand, the Alabama Supreme Court determined the preclusion clause could be removed from the statute, allowing the Alabama rule on lesser included offenses in noncapital cases to apply to capital cases. Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645, 658-59 (Ala.1980). The Alabama Supreme Court further decided the statute required jury participation in the sentencing process, and created the necessary procedures by adding an additional stage to the trial of a capital case. Id. at 659-62. [3]
Kyzer was tried and convicted under Alabama's 1975 death penalty statute, § 13-11-2(a)(10), for first degree murder wherein two or more human beings are intentionally killed by the defendant by one or a series of acts. Ex parte Kyzer, 399 So.2d 330, 332 (Ala.1981). The Alabama Supreme Court concluded there was an evidentiary basis for lesser included offense instructions in Kyzer's case, and thus reversed and remanded for a new trial to be conducted in conformance with Beck. Id. at 333. However, based on the facts of Kyzer's case, the Alabama Supreme Court went on to address the issue of whether the death penalty would be an available option to the State if Kyzer was retried. Kyzer, like Magwood, was convicted of an aggravated offense in § 13-11-2 (1975), for which the legislature failed to provide a corresponding aggravating circumstance in § 13-11-6 (1975). The Alabama Supreme Court stated: [t]his case presents in purest form an anomaly in Alabama's Death Penalty Statute. Id. at 334. The Alabama Supreme Court concluded [a] literal and technical reading of the statute would lead to the conclusion that if the trial judge cannot find the existence of an aggravating circumstance other than the one averred in the indictment, the trial judge must refuse to accept the death penalty as fixed by the jury. Id. at 337. The Alabama Supreme Court could think of no reason the Alabama legislature would have imposed such a result, however, and concluded the trial judge is authorized to find the same aggravation averred in the indictment and proven beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury. Id. at 337-38.