Opinion ID: 578719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Morgan's Claim Against the City

Text: 15 Morgan also argues that the district court erred in not granting him a new trial against the City. Morgan claims that the City is liable because the actions of Jetton were the result of an official policy or custom of the City. More specifically, Morgan states that the City--a municipality with only two police officers--had delegated its authority to Jetton to establish customs and policies for the City as to police procedures, including the use of deadly force, and that Jetton customarily used his police vehicle to intentionally collide with fleeing motorcyclists, thus making the City liable ... as a matter of law. Brief for Morgan at 8. 16 The decision whether to grant a new trial because the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence is in the sound discretion of the trial court; and, as we have stated before, this is a decision we will reverse only upon a clear showing of abuse of discretion by the district court. See, e.g., Green v. American Airlines, 804 F.2d 453, 454-55 (8th Cir.1986). After reviewing the record, it is clear to us that Morgan has not demonstrated an abuse of discretion. In fact, Morgan has not pointed to any evidence in the record that even raises an inference that Jetton's actions were the result of a policy or custom. 17 Morgan's argument is essentially as follows. Jetton must have been delegated the power to make policy for the City because (1) the City did not have a written or official policy on how to set up roadblocks or how to use deadly force (other than, as the City officials testified, Jetton was expected to follow the law) and (2) the City officials could not explain the correct procedure for setting up a roadblock or using deadly force. This argument is simply without merit. The City's lack of an official or written policy and the inability of the City officials to articulate the law does not establish that the City delegated its policy-making power to Jetton. 18 Furthermore, Morgan argues that Jetton must have had a custom of intentionally colliding with motorcycles because the incident with King and the incident in Caraway both involved motorcycles. As we explained above, however, the district court's exclusion of the evidence relating to the King incident was not an abuse of discretion; and, as we explain below, the evidence of the Caraway incident was inadmissible. Neither incident, moreover, has been shown to have involved excessive force insofar as stopping a motorcycle is concerned. Thus, the present case is the only instance in which Jetton allegedly used excessive force to stop a motorcyclist. One alleged incident, especially if it involved only actors below the policy-making level, generally will not suffice to raise an inference of the existence of a custom or policy. Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1045 (2nd Cir.1989). Thus, we affirm the district court's judgment with respect to the City.