Opinion ID: 2142998
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Felony-Murder Instruction

Text: Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that it could convict him of murder based on aggravated battery. He maintains that the first degree murder counts were predicated on the same acts as alleged in the aggravated battery countdefendants beat the victim with their fists, feet and a board. Defendant insists that under the authority of People v. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d 404, 447, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813 (2001), and People v. Pelt, 207 Ill.2d 434, 442, 279 Ill.Dec. 610, 800 N.E.2d 1193 (2003), an aggravated battery count cannot serve as a basis for felony murder when the predicate felony is inherent in the murder itself. In response, the State contends that the appellate court correctly concluded that any error was harmless under the one-good-count presumption. We agree with the State that any error with the felony-murder instruction was harmless. Defendant was charged with three different theories of first degree murder intentional, knowing and felony murder for the single killing. Our first degree murder statute describes three mental states or conduct that can accompany the acts that cause the murder. A defendant can (1) intend to kill or do great bodily harm to the victim (intentional murder), (2) know that his acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the victim (knowing murder, also known as strong probability murder), or (3) attempt or commit a forcible felony other than second degree murder (felony murder). See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a) (West 2004). Here, a general verdict form was submitted to the jury and it returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder. Defendant did not object to the general verdict form. It is well settled that when an indictment alleges three forms for a single murderintentional, knowing and felony murderand a general verdict is returned, the net effect is that the defendant is guilty as charged in each count and there is a presumption that the jury found that the defendant committed the most serious of the crimes alleged, which is intentional murder. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 448, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813; People v. Cardona, 158 Ill.2d 403, 411, 199 Ill.Dec. 667, 634 N.E.2d 720 (1994); People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d 401, 455, 117 Ill. Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988). In Morgan, the defendant was indicted on eight counts for killing his grandparents. The defendant obtained a gun to shoot himself, but instead fired off a shot in his grandparents' bathroom at a bottle. The defendant claimed that he feared for his life when he saw how angry his grandfather became over the incident, so the defendant shot the grandfather. He then shot the grandmother in the back as she attempted to flee the house. Regarding each victim, the defendant was charged with three separate theories of murder, including first degree murder predicated on aggravated battery. Defendant was found guilty of the first degree murder of the grandmother and the second degree murder of the grandfather. This court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on felony murder where the predicate felony arose from and was inherent in the murder. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 447-48, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. In so holding, this court distinguished People v. Viser, 62 Ill.2d 568, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975), on the basis that there the charges of felony murder arose from the cause and effect relationship between the crime committedaggravated battery and the resulting murder. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 446-47, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. In Viser, the victim died of abdominal injuries two weeks after he was beaten by a group of men. Morgan found that the cause and effect relationship between the crime committed and the resulting murder [was] not so clear in the case before it. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 447, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. Morgan noted that it was arguable that it was not the predicate felonies which resulted in and caused the murders of [the grandparents], but rather it was the murders    which gave rise to the predicate felonies. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 447, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. This court agreed with the appellate court that every shooting necessarily encompasses conduct constituting aggravated battery and that potentially all fatal shootings could be charged as felony murder predicated on aggravated battery, effectively eliminating the second degree murder statute and the need to prove an intentional and knowing murder in most cases. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 447, 259 Ill. Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. This court also agreed with the appellate court's holding that the predicate felony underlying [the] charge of felony murder must have an independent felonious purpose. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 458, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. Even though this court found error, however, it did not end its analysis there. Morgan next found that the error was not a reversible one because the jury returned a general verdict of guilty of first degree murder. Morgan noted that it is well settled that `where an indictment contains several counts arising out of a single transaction, and a general verdict is returned[,] the effect is that the defendant is guilty as charged in each count.' Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 448, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813, quoting People v. Thompkins, 121 Ill.2d 401, 455, 117 Ill.Dec. 927, 521 N.E.2d 38 (1988), quoting People v. Lymore, 25 Ill.2d 305, 308, 185 N.E.2d 158 (1962). A general verdict charging three theories of murder raises the presumption that the defendant committed the most serious crime alleged: intentional murder. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 448, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. Thus, this court in Morgan presumed that the jury found defendant guilty of the most serious crime alleged, the intentional murder of the grandmother. Morgan, 197 Ill.2d at 448, 259 Ill.Dec. 405, 758 N.E.2d 813. Defendant argues that the one-good-count presumption as set forth in Morgan should not apply in this case because here defendant was charged with and convicted of aggravated battery, whereas the defendant in Morgan was not. He further complains that the prosecutor emphasized at closing argument that if defendant was guilty of aggravated battery he had to be guilty of felony murder. Defendant also attempts to distinguish Morgan on the basis that felony murder predicated on accountability was not an instruction given in Morgan. According to defendant, an accountability instruction directs the jury's attention away from other counts of murder by telling it that none of the participants had to intend to kill the victim, but only had to commit aggravated battery. We do not find defendant's arguments persuasive. In Cardona, the defendant was also charged with and convicted of the underlying felony that formed the basis of the felony-murder conviction and the jury was given an accountability instruction, yet this court still applied the presumption that defendant was guilty of intentional murder when the jury returned a general verdict. Cardona, 158 Ill.2d at 411-13, 199 Ill.Dec. 667, 634 N.E.2d 720. Cardona found that it was enough that there was sufficient evidence presented from which it could be concluded that the defendant was guilty, under a theory of accountability, of the offense of murder committed with the intent to kill or do great bodily harm. Cardona, 158 Ill.2d at 412-13, 199 Ill.Dec. 667, 634 N.E.2d 720. Similarly, as we will explain more fully below, the evidence here was sufficient to show that defendant committed intentional or knowing murder under a theory of accountability. Defendant additionally points to two juror affidavits that he attached to his posttrial motion to show that the jury relied upon the felony-murder count to reach a guilty verdict of first degree murder. Defendant's reliance on the affidavits, however, is not proper. It is well settled that evidence which relates to the motive, method, or process of deliberations is inadmissible to impeach a verdict. People v. Nitz, 219 Ill.2d 400, 426, 302 Ill.Dec. 418, 848 N.E.2d 982 (2006). Finally, defendant relies upon the principle that when one of the theories that the trial court submits to the jury is unconstitutional, the error is not cured by a general verdict. See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535-36, 75 L.Ed. 1117, 1122-23 (1931) (conviction based on a general verdict could not stand where one of the three possibilities rested on a provision that was unconstitutional under the first amendment); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 292, 63 S.Ct. 207, 210, 87 L.Ed. 279, 282 (1942); Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 526, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2460, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 52 (1979); but cf. Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 312, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1073, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356, 1371 (1957) (court extended, in sub silentio fashion, the holding of Stromberg to include nonconstitutional errors). In Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991), the Supreme Court appeared to limit Stromberg and its progeny, upon which defendant relies. Griffin observed that Stromberg do[es] not necessarily stand for anything more than the principle that, where a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict that may have rested on that ground. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 53, 112 S.Ct. at 471, 116 L.Ed.2d at 379. Griffin noted that Stromberg was based on the fact that the statute in question criminalized conduct that was protected by the first amendment. On the other hand, Griffin noted that there was a long historical practice of validating general verdicts returned on multicount indictments where one or more of the counts were legally defective, so long as the general verdict was legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds, even though there was no assurance that the valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actually the basis of the jury's action. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 49-51, 112 S.Ct. at 469-70, 116 L.Ed.2d at 376-77. Thus, Griffin saw a difference between counts that were invalid because they violated a provision of the constitution as opposed to counts that were merely invalid because they were legally defective. In the present case, the felony-murder count would, at most, be legally invalid, not constitutionally invalid. Griffin also discussed at length the Court's decision in Yates, which extended the holding in Stromberg. Yates involved a federal prosecution where one of the counts included in the general verdict was barred by the statute of limitations and thus was simply legally defective, not constitutionally defective. Yet, Yates refused to apply the one-good-count presumption. Griffin criticized Yates, noting that it was an unexplained extension of Stromberg, and that it did not even invoke the unlikely basis of the due process clause. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 55-56, 112 S.Ct. at 472, 116 L.Ed.2d at 380. In the end, however, the Griffin Court noted that its continued adherence to the holding of Yates is not at issue in this case. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56, 112 S.Ct. at 472, 116 L.Ed.2d at 380. This was because the petitioner in Griffin was seeking to set aside the general verdict merely because it was unsupported by sufficient evidence, not because it was unconstitutional as in Stromberg or even illegal as in Yates. Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56, 112 S.Ct. at 472, 116 L.Ed.2d at 380. Defendant argues that applying the presumption in this case would violate due process, claiming the challenged instruction allowed a conviction on a nonexistent offensenamely, felony murder predicated on aggravated batteryand this was akin to permitting the jury to convict without finding every element of a valid theory of an offense. Defendant initially cites Johnson v. United States, 805 F.2d 1284, 1288 (7th Cir.1986), Adams v. Murphy, 653 F.2d 224, 225 (5th Cir.1981), and Evanchyk v. Stewart, 340 F.3d 933, 941 (9th Cir. 2003), for this proposition. We note, however, that these cases address due process in the context of convictions and punishment for nonexistent crimes. See Johnson, 805 F.2d at 1288; Adams, 653 F.2d at 224-25; Evanchyk, 340 F.3d at 941; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 122-25, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 1703-05, 109 L.Ed.2d 98, 117-19 (1990). In contrast, felony murder predicated on aggravated battery is a legally existent crime in Illinois. The Code of Criminal Procedure of 1961 expressly defines felony murder predicated on aggravated battery as a crime. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(3) (West 2006); 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2006). Moreover, this court in People v. Viser, 62 Ill.2d 568, 580, 343 N.E.2d 903 (1975), held that felony murder predicated on aggravated battery is a valid and existing crime under nearly identical circumstances to the present case. Viser has never been overruled by this court, and was essentially reaffirmed by our most recent decision in this area in People v. Davis, 213 Ill.2d 459, 475, 290 Ill.Dec. 580, 821 N.E.2d 1154 (2004). Thus, defendant's argument that there was a due process violation in this case is not supportable based on Johnson, Adams and Evanchyk. While the instant case was on remand to the trial court for a new Batson hearing, the United States Supreme Court decided Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388 (2008) ( per curiam ). We allowed defendant leave to cite this case as additional authority to support his argument that the one-good-count presumption should not be applied to this case. In Pulido, the defendant was convicted by a California state court jury of felony murder. On direct appeal, the defendant sought to vacate his conviction on the basis that jury instructions erroneously permitted him to be convicted of felony murder if he formed the intent to aid and abet the underlying felony only after the murder. The California Supreme Court held that this theory was invalid under California law, but upheld the conviction on the ground that the defendant was not prejudiced by this error. Defendant obtained habeas relief in federal district court, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. See Pulido v. Chrones, 487 F.3d 669 (9th Cir.2007) ( per curiam ). The court of appeals held that the jury instruction error was a `structural error,' which required that the conviction be set aside without regard to whether the flaw in the instructions prejudiced the defendant. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 530, 172 L.Ed.2d at 390. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the cause to determine if the defendant was prejudiced by the error. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 533, 172 L.Ed.2d at 392. The Supreme Court noted that the court of appeals had based its structural error analysis upon Stromberg, which addressed the validity of a general verdict that rested on an instruction that indicated that the defendant could be found guilty of constitutionally protected conduct. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 531, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391. Pulido then observed that Yates extended the reasoning of Stromberg to a conviction resting on multiple theories of guilt when one of those theories is not unconstitutional, but is otherwise legally flawed. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 531-32, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391. The Supreme Court in Pulido did not discuss Griffin and its criticism of Yates. Moreover, the issue before the Supreme Court in Pulido did not involve the full scope of the Stromberg rule or the continued viability of the one-good-count presumption. Instead, the limited issue was whether a Stromberg/Yates type error is a structural error that requires automatic reversal or whether such an error is instead subject to a harmless-error analysis. Relying upon analogous cases, the Supreme Court in Pulido easily concluded that in cases where a jury is instructed on multiple theories of guilt, one of which is improper, a harmless-error analysis is applicable. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 532, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391 (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10-11, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 1834-35, 144 L.Ed.2d 35, 47-48 (1999) (omission of material element from jury instructions was harmless), California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 117 S.Ct. 337, 136 L.Ed.2d 266 (1996) (erroneous aider and abettor instruction), Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 107 S.Ct. 1918, 95 L.Ed.2d 439 (1987) (misstatement of an element of an offense), and Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (erroneous burden-shifting as to an element of an offense)); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (constitutional errors can be harmless). The Court continued its analysis by stating as follows: [W]e emphasized in Rose that `while there are some errors to which [harmless-error analysis] does not apply, they are the exception and not the rule.' [Citation.] And Neder makes clear that harmless-error analysis applies to instructional errors so long as the error at issue does not categorically `vitiat[e] all the jury's findings.' [Citation.] An instructional error arising in the context of multiple theories of guilt no more vitiates all the jury's findings than does omission or misstatement of an element of the offense when only one theory is submitted. In fact, drawing a distinction between alternative-theory error and the instructional errors in Neder, Roy, Pope, and Rose would be `patently illogical,' given that such a distinction `reduces to the strange claim that, because the jury ... received both a `good' charge and a `bad' charge on the issue, the error was somehow more pernicious than ... where the only charge on the critical issue was a mistaken one.' [Citations.] (Emphases in original.) Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 532, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391-92. In so finding, the Pulido Court emphasized that both Stromberg and Yates were decided before Chapman concluded that constitutional errors can be harmless. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 532, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391. Accordingly, neither Stromberg nor Yates had any reason to address whether the errors they identified could be reviewed for harmlessness, or instead required automatic reversal. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 532, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391. We note that defendant after remand has cited our recent decision in People v. Smith, 233 Ill.2d 1, 329 Ill.Dec. 331, 906 N.E.2d 529 (2009), to support his argument that the one-good-count rule should not apply to insulate from review any error with respect to the felony-murder instruction. He also claims that Smith supports his contention that any such alternate-theory instructional error should not be subject to a harmless-error analysis. We find Smith inapplicable to the present case. Smith involved a defendant who was charged with three theories for a single murder (intentional, knowing and felony murder), plus the underlying felony of attempted armed robbery. He specifically requested a special verdict form, but that request was denied by the trial court. A general verdict form was then used, and the jury returned a general verdict of guilty of murder. At sentencing, the trial court found that the defendant clearly committed intentional murder. The court imposed a 60-year sentence for murder and a consecutive 8-year sentence for attempted armed robbery. The appellate court observed that had the jury found defendant guilty of felony murder premised on attempted armed robbery and not guilty of both intentional and knowing murder, defendant would not have been eligible to be sentenced to a consecutive sentence on the attempted armed robbery conviction. People v. Smith, 372 Ill. App.3d 762, 771, 310 Ill.Dec. 590, 866 N.E.2d 1192 (2007). The appellate court found it was error to refuse the defendant's request for a special verdict form in such a case, but nevertheless affirmed the murder conviction and modified the eight-year sentence to run concurrently. Smith, 372 Ill.App.3d at 771-72, 310 Ill.Dec. 590, 866 N.E.2d 1192. This court in Smith affirmed the murder conviction, but vacated the conviction and sentence for attempted armed robbery. In so doing, this court's holding was narrow: where, as here, specific findings by the jury with regard to the offenses charged could result in different sentencing consequences, favorable to the defendant, specific verdict forms must be provided upon request and the failure to provide them is an abuse of discretion. (Emphasis added.) Smith, 233 Ill.2d at 23, 329 Ill.Dec. 331, 906 N.E.2d 529. This court was also careful to note that the defendant was not arguing that his convictions for murder should be set aside and was not repudiating the one good count rule. Smith, 233 Ill.2d at 22-23, 329 Ill. Dec. 331, 906 N.E.2d 529. This court concluded by finding that the error of refusing the defendant's request where it could ultimately be key to his receiving more severe sentencing was not subject to a harmless-error analysis. Smith, 233 Ill.2d at 23, 25, 329 Ill.Dec. 331, 906 N.E.2d 529. The present case is a world away from Smith. Here, defendant did not object to the general verdict form and did not request a special verdict form. Again, the holding of Smith was conditioned on the trial court's refusal to grant such a request and did not establish a rule that the court must act sua sponte to give a specific verdict form. Additionally, defendant is challenging the validity of the one-good-count rule, something which was expressly not done in Smith. Finally, we note that Stromberg -like errors, such as the one here, have now been specifically held by the United States Supreme Court to be subject to a harmless-error analysis and are not structural defects that require automatic reversal. Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 532, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391. Turning to the case before us, we note that even if we were to find that a constitutional due process error occurred in instructing the jury on felony murder or that the one-good-count presumption is questionable, it would still not require automatic reversal of defendant's murder conviction. See Pulido, 555 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 530, 172 L.Ed.2d 388; Chapman, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. The Supreme Court has applied a harmless-error analysis to a wide variety of errors and has recognized that most constitutional errors are subject to a harmless-error analysis. See, e.g., Pulido, 555 U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 532-33, 172 L.Ed.2d at 391; Neder, 527 U.S. at 10-11, 119 S.Ct. at 1834-35, 144 L.Ed.2d at 47-48 (omission of material element from jury instructions was harmless). Accordingly, we hold that the instant felony-murder instruction, even if erroneous, was a typical trial error that did not amount to a structural defect that required automatic reversal. It would be analogous to the Apprendi cases that we have decided such as People v. Nitz, 219 Ill.2d 400, 302 Ill.Dec. 418, 848 N.E.2d 982 (2006), and People v. Thurow, 203 Ill.2d 352, 272 Ill.Dec. 185, 786 N.E.2d 1019 (2003), where we found that the error of not submitting every essential element of an offense to the jury for consideration was subject to either a harmless-error analysis if defendant made a trial objection or a plain-error analysis if defendant did not object. Under plain-error review, which is applicable to this case due to defendant's lack of an objection at trial, [3] the defendant has the burden to persuade the court that the error was prejudicial, that is, defendant must show that the evidence was so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against him. Nitz, 219 Ill.2d at 410, 414, 302 Ill.Dec. 418, 848 N.E.2d 982. Again, we note that in the case before us, defendant did not object to the general verdict form, nor did he object to the felony-murder instruction on the basis that it was improperly predicated on aggravated battery. Thus, a plain-error analysis is appropriate, assuming arguendo that defendant is correct in his contention that a straightforward application of the one-good-count presumption would be faulty. It is axiomatic that a defendant is legally accountable for the crimes of his codefendants where defendant aids and abets the commission of those crimes during their actual commission. Here, defendant was legally accountable for the actions and mental states of his codefendants. The two good countsthe intentional and strong probability murder countsonly required the State to prove that defendant, or one for whom he was legally accountable, either intended to do great bodily harm to the victim or knew that his acts that caused the death created a strong probability of great bodily harm. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2004). Here, the record shows that defendant and his co-assailants repeatedly beat the victim until he reached a state of unconsciousness. After defendant saw the victim lapse into unconsciousness, defendant picked him up and threw him into a dumpster. Defendant acknowledged, and it was undisputed, that he acted as a lookout to facilitate the beating, during which Edward Durant (Pee Wee) intentionally struck the victim several times with a piece of lumber. The brain injuries suffered by the victim were so serious that he never came out of his coma before dying. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the evidence of intentional and strong probability murder based on accountability was not closely balanced, and therefore any error in instructing the jury on felony murder was harmless.