Opinion ID: 321744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The warning contentions

Text: 5 Plaintiffs predicated recovery upon two separate theories-- strict liability for a defective product and ordinary negligence. 2 Strict liability was rested wholly upon Brunswick's alleged failure to give adequate warning of the inherent dangers in the refinishing lacquer; this same failure was also charged as one of several acts of negligence. 3 The trial court refused plaintiffs' instructions concerning warning; the result was to eliminate from the jury's consideration the strict liability theory and that asserted act of negligence. We are clear these rulings were correct. 6 As indicated, plaintiffs did not contend that the lacquer was defective per se; rather they urged that it was made defective because not accompanied with an adequate warning to make it reasonably safe for the intended use. The Supreme Court of Washington has adopted the rule of 402A of the Restatement of Torts, Second, which makes liable in damages 'one who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user . . .' for the injuries caused by such product. Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75 Wash.2d 522, 452 P.2d 729 (1969). Although that Court has not had occasion to decide whether the rule includes properly manufactured products that are unaccompanied by an adequate warning, the developing national trend appears to favor this broad application, 4 and we will assume that Washington is in accord. 5 However, the defect which makes the product 'unreasonably dangerous' and allows the imposition of liability without proof of fault must itself be the actual cause of injury. 6 Cf. Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories,399 F.2d 121, 131 and 131 n. 20 (9th Cir. 1968). See Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability 11.04(3), at 219. Thus, if despite a deficient warning the user is fully aware of the danger of which a reasonable warning should apprise him, then the deficiency is not a cause of the ensuing accident. 7 The record in this case establishes as a matter of law that Brunswick's failure to warn was not the actual cause of the explosion. 7 On cross-examination Nelson testified at length regarding his awareness of the danger and its magnitude; he frankly admitted knowledge that the fumes given off by the drying lacquer were highly explosive and that they were readily susceptible of detonation by a spark or a lighted match. His testimony makes manifest the conclusion that he knew all that an adequate warning would tell him and that a cause of the explosion was not his lack of appreciation of the danger. 8