Opinion ID: 2589845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definitions of Fault

Text: The majority next relies on three different dictionary definitions of fault, as well as those dictionaries' corresponding definitions of negligence, as support for the conclusion that the use of the term fault in the statute was intended to include intentional torts. I find the use of this authority unpersuasive on the question of whether the General Assembly intended to include intentional torts through the addition of the term fault in the statute. The majority's use of the dictionary definitions of fault and negligence does not support the proposition that the General Assembly intended to include intentional torts in the statute because these definitions serve only to illustrate that fault is a broader term than negligence. I do not dispute the majority's contention that fault is in fact a broader term than negligence, or their assertion that [t]hese definitions suggest that the General Assembly used the word `fault' purposefully in section 13-21-111.5(1). Maj. op. at 285. As discussed above, the term fault was added by the conference committee to ensure that this section would apply to actions based on gross negligence or products liability. Therefore, the term fault, as used in this section, does, in fact, contemplate more than mere negligence in that it extends the applicability of this statute to gross negligence and products liability actions; but its use does not support the majority's conclusion that it includes intentional torts. The majority next cites to our decision in Resolution Trust Corp. v. Heiserman, 898 P.2d 1049 (Colo.1995), for support. See maj. op. at 285. Because our holding in Heiserman only resolved the issue of the meaning of the language tortious act as used in subsection four of the statute, and did not require us to construe the language negligence or fault, I find the reference to this authority unpersuasive on the issue before us. As noted above, section 13-21-111.5(4) revives the common law rules of joint liability and right of contribution when two or more persons [] consciously conspire and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.  (Emphasis added.) This subsection was added to the statute one year after the original enactment of the pro rata liability scheme. See ch. 102, sec. 1, § 13-21-111.5, 1987 Colo. Sess. Laws 551, 551-552. As noted by the majority, Heiserman was a C.A.R. 21.1 proceeding where we agreed to answer two specific certified questions from the United States District Court. See Heiserman, 898 P.2d at 1052. Our resolution of the first certified question, [4] the relevant question for our purposes, only required us to determine whether the language tortious act, as used in subsection four, encompassed negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, breach of the fiduciary duty of due care, and breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. See id. We answered this question in the affirmative and concluded that  the term `tortious act' appearing in section 13-21-111.5(4) includes any conduct other than breach of contract that constitutes a civil wrong and causes injury or damages. Id. at 1055, 1056 (emphasis added). In our discussion of this question, we repeatedly noted that our holding was limited to the language used in subsection four. See id. at 1055-56 (Such conduct would constitute a `tortious act' for purposes of section 13-21-111.5(4). ), (We reject the argument that for purposes of section 13-21-111.5(4) a distinction should be made with respect to the degree of fault or the mens rea associated with particular conduct.), (There is no basis to assume that by using the term `tortious act' in section 13-21-111.5(4) the General Assembly for some reason intended to exclude one or more forms of wrongful conduct . . . .) (emphasis added). We ultimately concluded that both negligent and intentional acts are sufficient to give rise to joint liability for purposes of section 13-21-111.5(4).  Id. at 1056 (emphasis added). Our interpretation of the language tortious act in section 13-21-111.5(4) does not affect the resolution of the question before us today; therefore, I find the majority's reliance on Heiserman unpersuasive.