Opinion ID: 1138043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: alleged statutory conflict

Text: The Alabama Table Wine Act, now codified at Code 1975, § 28-7-1, et seq., became effective on September 30, 1980. Section 2 of the Act sets out the legislative intent: The public interest lying in the promotion of temperance by and through the proper regulation of alcoholic beverages, through the instrumentality of the Alabama alcoholic beverage control board and otherwise, it is the intent of the legislature and declared to be the purpose and intent of this Act to promote temperance and to further regulate the sale of alcoholic beverages in the state by distinguishing between fortified wine or vinous liquor having more than fourteen percent (14%) alcohol by volume and table wine having not more than fourteen percent (14%) alcohol by volume, which is hereby declared to be non-liquor and not vinous liquor, and specifically to authorize and regulate the sale and handling of table wine in Alabama by wine manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers licensed by the board. The Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code, also with an effective date of September 30, 1980, is found at Code 1975, § 28-3A-1, et seq. Section 13(a) [1] of the Table Wine Act provides that statewide table wine license fees shall be $150 for a wine retailer's license, $550 for a wine wholesaler's license, $500 for a wine importer's license, and $500 for a wine manufacturer's license. That section goes on to provide, however, that said county or municipality shall levy no license or privilege tax, or other charge for the privilege of doing business as a wine wholesaler, importer or retailer, which shall exceed one-half the amount of the state license fee levied under the provisions of this Section for like privilege. Section 16(d) of the Table Wine Act requires that [t]he tax herein levied is exclusive and shall be in lieu of all other and additional taxes and licenses of the state, county or municipality, imposed on or measured by the sale or volume of sale of table wine; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed to exempt the retail sale of table wine from the levy of tax on general retail sales.... The local ordinances of the named and class Defendants either levied license fees exceeding one-half of the state license fee in violation of Section 13(a), or imposed taxes based upon percentage of sales or purchases of table wine in violation of Section 16(d), or both. We agree with Cities' argument that the passage of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code demonstrates a clear intention on the part of the legislature to revise the law as to the licensing and regulation of all alcoholic beverages. Indeed, such was the precise conclusion reached in Merrell v. City of Huntsville, 460 So.2d 1248 (Ala.1984): The Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code is an extensive and comprehensive revision of the law regarding the licensing of alcoholic beverages in Alabama.... [W]e conclude that the legislature intended Act 80-529, the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code, to provide a uniform and comprehensive body of liquor licensing law. Merrell, at 460 So.2d 1248. The Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code, however, while specifically repealing particular sections of the then-existing alcoholic beverage statutes (see Section 27 of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code), does not specifically repeal any provision of the Table Wine Act. Indeed, the exclusive tax on, or measured by the sale of, table wine levied by Section 16 of the Table Wine Act is in no way addressed or dealt with in the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code. Further, the general repealing clause found at Section 27 of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code cannot operate to repeal the Table Wine Act except to repeal by implication any conflicting portions of the Table Wine Act; and it has been consistently held in this State that repeal by implication is never favored by the courts. Sand Mountain Bank v. Albertville Bank, 442 So.2d 13 (Ala.1983); Ex parte Jones, 212 Ala. 259, 102 So. 234 (1924). The degree of conflict required between two statutes in order to declare that one impliedly repeals the other is that of irreconcilability. `We are not unmindful of the fact that repeal by implication is not favored in the law. It is only when two laws are so repugnant to or in conflict with each other that it must be presumed that the Legislature intended that the latter should repeal the former. If there is a reasonable field of operation, by a just construction, for both, they will both be given effect. This is said to be preferable to repeal by implication.' [Citations omitted.] `We are also not unmindful of the fact that bills pending at the same time, and enacted into laws at the same session of the Legislature, are to be construed in pari materia. They are presumed not to conflict, and a field of operation will be given each, if consistent with clear intent.' [Citations omitted.] Reid v. City of Birmingham, 274 Ala. 629, 635-36, 150 So.2d 735, 741 (1963), quoting Davis v. Browder, 231 Ala. 332, 335, 165 So. 89, 91 (1935). `The rule announced in Hand v. Stapleton, 135 Ala. 156, 33 So. 689, that when sections of a statute are in conflict the last in order of arrangement will control, is subject to the dominant rule that the statute should be construed as a whole to find the legislative intent. Indeed, separate acts relating to the same subject, pending for consideration at the same time, will be construed in pari materia, without undue regard to the dates of actual passage. Conflicting intentions in one and the same act are not to be supposed, and never so regarded, unless forced upon the courts by unambiguous language. The rule of construction is to harmonize seeming conflicts. To do so, the less certain must yield to its more certain terms. For this reason a description giving not only the course or direction of a line, but also giving its terminal point, must dominate over one giving course or direction only, unless other terms of the statute, in connection with the subject matter, makes clear a different intent.' Reid v. City of Birmingham, supra , quoting Marengo County v. Wilcox County, 215 Ala. 640, 642, 112 So. 243, 245 (1927). Further, where, as here, a special subject has been specially provided for by law, it will not be considered as repealed by a subsequent law which deals with a general subject in a general way, though the specific subject of a special provision may be included in the general subject and the general provision. City of Mobile v. Mobile Electric Company, 203 Ala. 574, 578, 84 So. 816, 819 (1920). We hold, then, that the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code is a comprehensive statute which deals with the licensing of those engaged in transactions involving alcoholic beverages; and, while it is comprehensive, it is, by the very nature of its own broad scope, a general statute. The Table Wine Act, however, is a statute enacted to further a specific legislative intent and deals exclusively with transactions involving table wine; thus, it is a specific statute. Because the conflict between these two statutes does not rise to the degree of irreconcilability, we find that each statute may be given a reasonable field of operation, which will, when they are construed together, give effect to the legislative intent and purpose of both enactments. Although, in this case, the specific will control the general, we do not find that the overall purpose of the general statute will be thwarted by giving effect to the specific statute. We find additional support for our decision in the legislature's further amending Section 16 of the Table Wine Act during its 1983 regular session (see Act No. 83-594, approved July 25, 1983). Accordingly, we hold that the Table Wine Act, as amended, is neither repealed nor modified, either expressly or impliedly, by the provisions of the Alcoholic Beverage Licensing Code. The statutes should be construed in pari materia, and where there exists a conflict between the two, the more specific provisions of the Table Wine Act will control.