Opinion ID: 2453269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the plain language of the ombudsman act allows the ombudsman's office to arbitrate property ownership as it applies to takings and eminent domain disputes

Text: ¶ 17 The arbitration provision of the Ombudsman Act does not support the court of appeals' conclusion that the issue of property ownership lies beyond the statutory authority of the Ombudsman's Office. Rather, the plain language of the Ombudsman Act indicates that the Ombudsman's Office has authority to arbitrate the issue of property ownership as it applies to takings and eminent domain disputes. ¶ 18 When interpreting statutes, our `primary objective . . . is to give effect to the legislature's intent.' [9] To discern legislative intent, `we look first to the statute's plain language.' [10] In doing so, [w]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. [11] Additionally, `[w]e read the plain language of the statute as a whole [] and interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter.' [12] When the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no other interpretive tools are needed. [13] ¶ 19 We hold in Part I.A. that the Ombudsman's Office has authority to determine the issue of property ownership as it relates to takings and eminent domain issues. We conclude that the plain language of the Ombudsman Act grants the Ombudsman's Office authority to arbitrate disputes involving takings and eminent domain issues and that the issue of ownership is a necessary element to all takings and eminent domain claims. In Part I.B., we hold that the Selmans qualify as property owners for purposes of invoking the Ombudsman Act because the mere allegation of property ownership is sufficient to invoke the authority of the Ombudsman's Office.