Opinion ID: 2275645
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ultra-hazardous Crossing Exception

Text: The second exception to the minimal duty rule concerns private crossings that are found to be ultra-hazardous. Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Quisenberry, 338 S.W.2d 409 (Ky.1960). There we explained that: There is a well recognized exception to the general rule [at private crossings] where there exist peculiar or extraordinary circumstances surrounding a crossing and the facts are known to trainmen. In such cases reasonable care may require that an alarm or signal be given by the approaching train and the question of whether circumstances are such that require a signal is for the jury to determine. Id. at 411 (emphasis added). The question is whether the crossing: was a highly dangerous crossing and was so constructed that neither the engineer nor the [traveler] had enough time to do anything to prevent the accident after they came within view of each other... [thus] the engineer should have warned of the train's approach to this crossing by proper signals. Id. at 410-411. Therefore, when a private crossing is ultra-hazardous, the railroad has a duty to warn those using the crossing. Quisenberry involved a fatal accident where a train struck the traveler's car at a private crossing. Id. at 410. The Court described the track as having a sharp curve about 300 feet north of the crossing, and a bluff that obscures the vision of an operator proceeding south. Id. Furthermore, testimony established that a person approaching within 34 feet of the crossing would be able to see the track for about 500 feet north of the crossing, but when getting closer, he could see only 300 feet in that direction. Id. The trial court then submitted the case to the jury on theory that if they found the crossing, due to its location and surroundings, to be unusually dangerous ... [they] might reasonably find that the railroad company was negligent in not sounding a horn or whistle when approaching this crossing. Id. We held that the case was properly submitted. Id. at 411. In the present case, the Court of Appeals concluded that the obstructive vegetation on the west side of the tracks (the BCS side) could qualify as ultra-hazardous. However, the Court of Appeals utilized a slightly different ultra-hazardous standard set forth in Hare's Adm'x, which required the crossing to be so exceptionally dangerous that one exercising ordinary care... can not see an oncoming train. Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry. Co. v. Hare's Adm'x, 297 Ky. 5, 178 S.W.2d 835, 837 (1944). [17] After reviewing the evidence, the Court of Appeals placed dispositive weight on portions of Mary Calhoun's deposition along with two photos depicting the BCS crossing taken by CSX's agent. The court quoted Mary Calhoun's admission that it was possible to pull her car past the tree line and obtain an unobstructed view of the tracks. Furthermore, the court found that Appellants' forensic mapping expert's opinions (that twenty-two feet from the crossing the sight distance is 263 feet) were blatantly contradicted by the record, namely, the two CSX photographs. Consequently, the Court of Appeals refused to adopt Appellants' expert's opinions for the purposes of summary judgment, and found that was it was obvious that a vehicle could safely pull past the vegetation and see to the horizon. Therefore, the Court of Appeals found the ultra-hazardous exception inapplicable to the BCS crossing as a matter of law. We agree with the Appellants' contentions that the trial court, as well as the Court of Appeals, made factual findings based on two of CSX's photographs, ignored the factual parallels to Quisenberry, ignored other explanatory parts of Mary Calhoun's deposition, [18] and erred by failing to allow a jury to decide whether the ultra-hazardous exception applies. Even though a trial court may believe the party opposing the motion may not succeed at trial, it should not render a summary judgment if there is any issue of material fact. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 480. In this Commonwealth, it is axiomatic that appellate courts are not fact-finders; and neither are trial courts when ruling on motions for summary judgment. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Deloney, 20 S.W.3d 471, 473-474 (Ky.2000). And here, the Court of Appeals exceeded its scope of review when it made factual findings regarding the validity of some of Appellants' evidence. The purview of an appellate court reviewing a summary judgment order is to determine whether there was some affirmative evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482. Based on a review of the record, we hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial as to whether the BCS crossing was ultra-hazardous due to the vegetation and the relevant positioning of the crossing. [19] Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at 482. As stated above, in Quisenberry, we approved the trial court's submission to the jury of the issue of whether, inter alia, 300 feet of sight line at a private crossing fell within the ultra-hazardous exception. Here, Appellants introduced expert testimony that twenty-two feet from the crossing the sight distance is 263 feet. Whether this crossing was as unusually dangerous as the one described in Quisenberry under the facts of this caseis for a jury, not a trial or appellate court, to decide. Furthermore, we are not persuaded that CSX's two photographs blatantly contradicted Appellants' forensic mapping expert's opinions. A photograph's perspective is easily manipulated by the photographer. In cases such as the present one, photos taken of an accident scene are likely used for litigious purposes. Thus, courts must be cognizant that photographs taken by a litigant's agent are a form of advocacy. Based on the circumstances surrounding these two photographs, we believe the Court of Appeals erred when it assigned them dispositive weight over Appellants' forensic mapping expert's opinions. Rather, the conflict between the expert's opinions and the photographs created a material issue of fact for a jury to resolve. Therefore, we reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the crossing was ultra-hazardous due to the vegetation. As stated above, if the crossing is ultra-hazardous, our common law imposes a duty on the railroad to warn of its approach. [20]