Opinion ID: 2616816
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of the Recordings Made on September 18 and 19

Text: (4a) Defendant's next assignment of claimed prejudicial error concerns the trial court's admission of the hearsay recordings made on September 18 and 19, almost three and one-half weeks after the murder. He contends that the recordings did not fall within the ambit of the coconspirators exception to the hearsay rule since they neither were made during nor in furtherance of the conspiracy. We agree. The statements contained in the recordings were clearly made not only after Catherine Murphy had been killed but also after payment had been made to defendant and Jerry Carnes. It does not appear that the statements were otherwise made during any activity in pursuance of any significant objective of the conspiracy. That the statements in the recordings concerned the method by which detection and punishment were to be avoided is of no moment. In Krulewitch v. United States, supra, 336 U.S. 440, the Supreme Court rejected, as a further breach of the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence, the government's argument that even after the central criminal objectives of a conspiracy have succeeded or failed, an implicit subsidiary phase of the conspiracy always survives, the phase which has concealment as its sole objective. ( Id. at p. 443 [93 L.Ed. at p. 794].) Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in the judgment, explained the illogic of the government's position: I suppose no person planning a crime would accept as a collaborator one on whom he thought he could not rely for help if he were caught, but I doubt that this fact warrants an inference of conspiracy for that purpose.... [¶] It is difficult to see any logical limit to the `implied conspiracy,' either as to duration or means, nor does it appear that one could overcome the implication by express and credible evidence that no such understanding existed, nor any way in which an accused against whom the presumption is once raised can terminate the imputed agency of his associates to incriminate him. Conspirators, long after the contemplated offense is complete, after perhaps they have fallen out and become enemies, may still incriminate each other by deliberately harmful, but unsworn declarations, or unintentionally by casual conversations out of court. ( Id. at pp. 455-456 [93 L.Ed. at p. 800] (Jackson, J. concurring); see also Goldstein, The Krulewitch Warning: Guilt by Association (1965) 54 Geo. L.J. 133.) [9] The People make an alternative argument  one with which the trial court agreed  that the recorded conversations were admissible as being made during a conspiracy to collect the proceeds of the insurance policies on the life of Catherine Murphy. The People contend that since such a conspiracy did not end until the insurance proceeds were paid, the statements made by a coconspirator prior to that time were admissible. (5) Before evidence of the acts and declarations of an alleged coconspirator is admissible against the other conspirators prima facie evidence of the conspiracy must be proved. (Evid. Code, § 403; People v. Steccone (1950) 36 Cal.2d 234, 238 [223 P.2d 17].) (4b) We have carefully examined the lengthy record and are compelled to the conclusion that there was no evidence, other than the recordings themselves, to constitute a prima facie showing of the existence of the claimed insurance conspiracy. The only admissible evidence adduced at trial concerning insurance was that (1) there were life insurance policies insuring Catherine Murphy in the total amount of $25,665; (2) the Murphys had an automobile insurance policy containing an uninsured motorist provision which allowed either insured to recover $15,000 if injured or killed as the result of being struck by a hit-and-run driver; and (3) Murphy apparently had forged his wife's signature on an application for one of the insurance policies and the authorization card for that policy. Aside from the recordings, the receipt of which is sought to be justified on the independent showing of an insurance conspiracy, there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant or the Carnes brothers were involved in a conspiracy to collect the proceeds of the insurance policies, nor is there any evidence from which we may infer the existence of such a conspiracy. [10] (6) Holding that the hearsay recordings were erroneously admitted as not falling within any exception to the hearsay rule does not necessarily warrant reversal. It must also be evident that `after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,' ... it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243].) As stated above, we have read the entire record, including the transcripts of the recordings. Although the competent evidence of defendant's guilt is substantial, it is not compelling. Jerry Carnes testified that defendant conspired to rough up a victim who might have been Catherine Murphy. Defendant was seen in the general vicinity of the crime with Jurgenson who later stated that he and defendant had killed the victim in a manner consistent with the physical evidence of her death. Defendant was also connected with the killing by evidence that placed his automobile at the scene of the crime; that Murphy transferred money to him; and that he attempted to arrange for an alibi at the time of the killing. The recordings, on the other hand, are extremely damaging to defendant. They compel the inference, particularly when considered with the competent evidence, that Murphy initiated a conspiracy involving Robert Pokey Jurgenson, Jerry Carnes and defendant (the latter two being paid for their participation) to murder Murphy's wife and that she was killed as a result of that conspiracy. The recorded discussions generally relate to the progress the investigating officers were making and the manner in which Murphy and the Carnes brothers should conduct themselves in order to frustrate the investigation. Great concern is expressed that defendant and Jurgenson might sing and what strategy Murphy and the Carnes brothers should adopt in such event. Comment is made that defendant had agreed to take the rap without involving anybody else in the event anything went wrong and that defendant was pretty scared. Again great concern is expressed when it appeared that defendant had returned from some undesignated place and might still have in his possession the knife and the victim's credit cards. Murphy indicates that defendant had everything in his pocket.... [and Murphy had not] laid eyes on the guy since that night. Murphy also states, inconsistently with his statements to the investigating officers, that I laid her down there  [she was] unconscious at this stage but the blood was still coming from the jugular vein  it looked like you just turned on a faucet in a house. When Jerry Carnes indicates that he would have been nauseated, Murphy mentions that it was for such reason that defendant did not want Jerry to be present. At other points in the conversations the possibility of defendant signing a confession, particularly if he was high when picked up, is considered, and it is speculated that, if they are not careful, all of them will end up in the chair ... [a]s a matter of fact, they would probably put three more chairs up there. The foregoing and other incriminating remarks were related under circumstances which would necessarily persuade a trier of fact of their truth. In addition, the recordings contained other remarks of an inflammatory nature from which it could be concluded that defendant was a dope addict and under the influence of heroin at the time of the killing and that he had on some earlier occasion driven his vehicle over the body of a police officer. It appears, then, that the effect of receiving the transcripts of the recordings and thus allowing the trier of fact to consider them together with the competent evidence of defendant's guilt adduced at trial destroyed the force of defendant's testimony that he was innocent and compelled the conclusion of guilt. [11] We conclude that on our examination of the whole cause it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached in the absence of the error of receiving the recordings. The judgment is reversed.