Opinion ID: 2630372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issue II Exclusion of expert testimony

Text: [¶ 16] On the final day of trial, the State objected to the proposed testimony of defense expert witness, Roger Willard, whom the defense intended to testify about the investigation conducted in the case, including the interviews and the crime scene evidence collection. [6] The prosecutor argued that Willard should not be permitted to testify about the collection of trace evidence from the crime scenes because Willard's curriculum vitae did not show that he had any specialized training or experience in evidence collection. The prosecutor also argued that any testimony concerning police interrogation practices was not relevant to establish or dispute the existence of any facts at issue in the case, noting that there had been no issue raised during trial that police did anything improper during the interviews, nor was there any universally accepted policy or law mandating that law enforcement officers conduct their interviews in any specific manner. [¶ 17] In response to the prosecutor's objection, the defense first argued that the prosecutor's objection was untimely and should have been raised earlier in the proceedings. The defense then briefly discussed Willard's background and his qualifications to testify generally about crime scene evidence collection and the protocols to be followed. In addition, after generally noting there were some discrepancies in Lieutenant Seeman's and Investigator Peyrot's recollection as to what Seiser had reported, the defense argued that Willard's proposed testimony was relevant, stating that the way law enforcement conducted the interviews and the investigation is always relevant in any case to talk about. The prosecutor then questioned whether Willard's proposed testimony would entail improper comments upon the credibility of the officers, and reiterated his earlier argument concerning the lack of relevance Willard's testimony had to any issue contested at trial. [¶ 18] Unable to determine whether the proposed testimony would be probative to any issue at trial or whether it was merely intended to impugn the credibility of the witnesses, the district court requested an offer of proof. During the offer of proof, defense counsel questioned Willard about his background, the materials he had reviewed, and about the substance of his proposed testimony. Willard testified that he had been in law enforcement since 1962 and was an expert in police policies and protocols. Although Willard believed that the officers conducting the interview had reconstructed their reports solely from their recollections, defense counsel was forced to correct Willard by pointing out that the officers actually had taken notes, which were then used to write their formal reports. Based on that information, Willard acknowledged that at least one of the primary protocols concerning police interviews was satisfied. However, Willard indicated that it was a trend in modern law enforcement to record interviews, especially those interviews conducted during the investigation of serious crimes, to ensure that the credibility of the investigation, the interviewing officer, and the person being interviewed is protected. Willard generally noted the differences in the statements of Martinez and Seiser and questioned whether there was an opportunity for those two witnesses to compare their statements and to conspire to ensure that certain statements that they made were consistent. [¶ 19] Willard also expressed some doubt as to the ability of the crime scene technicians to conduct a thorough investigation  specifically, the collection of evidence at the site where Forquer's body was found  at night via high-powered floodlights. [7] He testified that standard protocol would have been to secure the scene until the daylight hours when a more thorough examination could be performed. Finally, Willard testified that protocols were violated by the failure to conduct a forensic examination of the trailer home where the homicide occurred and the vehicle that was used to transfer Forquer's body. [8] [¶ 20] On cross-examination, Willard acknowledged that, in spite of his personal belief that there was a trend in modern law enforcement to record interviews, many law enforcement agencies, including those in Colorado with which Willard was most familiar, did not require the recording of interviews. Willard also acknowledged that the recording protocols he espoused were actually suggested practices, and that he knew of no legal requirement for the recording of interviews. In addition, Willard indicated that if personnel from the Wyoming State Crime Laboratory had in fact conducted trace evidence collection from the trailer where Forquer was murdered and the car in which his body was transported, as well as the site where his body was found, the protocols for crime scene investigations would have been satisfied. [¶ 21] Following Willard's testimony, defense counsel again generally argued that Willard's proposed expert testimony was relevant: [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I think I've explained my position on this already. I think that the relevance question concerning the investigation of this case, the interviews, the crime scene investigation, his testimony directly goes to the credibility of that investigation and allows, I think, the jury to consider that there are protocols that were not followed in this case that are generally accepted throughout the nation, and I think that's the impetus of his testimony and should be allowed. The prosecutor countered: [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, if that is the direction that the defense would intend this testimony to take, I believe that Mr. Willard's testimony would have to beat [sic] the Daubert test and there would have to be testimony by him that this is a generally accepted principle by everybody in the country, that it's set down nationwide protocol that all of the experts in the field agree that the recording has to be done. The best that he can do is tell you that it's a suggestion by nationwide police agencies. And more importantly, his testimony is that there's a trend across the country that there be recordings. There's no requirement legally by his testimony. There's no requirement constitutionally in Wyoming. And as a result of that, Your Honor, that testimony with respect to recording, is a lay witness' opinion that in his opinion this should have been recorded. When you take it a step further and you consider his testimony, I can't remember how many times he said words like credibility and reliability and truthfulness, and clearly, that testimony is completely inappropriate for any witness to utter. He is defining for the jury how to evaluate each witness that has testified, and that's their job. With respect to evidence collection, Your Honor, I don't think that's an issue anymore. The testimony before this Court from Agent Hamilton was that the crime lab processed all three scenes. He specifically testified he watched them take trace evidence, so it's not even relevant with respect to that area. [¶ 22] After considering the offer of proof and counsel's arguments, the district court sustained the State's objection to Willard's testimony: THE COURT: All right, And there are several things about this testimony that troubles me. First, it appears that the witness did not have an understanding that notes were taken and then destroyed. It appears that his analysis initially of the statements was that the  essentially, law enforcement was reconstructing a report purely on memory. That's not the testimony. Further, then we turn to the crime scene. His understanding was there was no trace evidence taken. That's not the evidence before the Court. The Court remembers specifically hearing from the crime lab, hearing about putting on special suits for transporting the vehicle, other matters. As a consequence, it appears that that information was not supplied to this witness. Turning then to the test of whether or not this witness' testimony would be, in fact, directly probative and helpful to the jury or whether it would merely confuse the issue, the Court finds that it has a greater capability of confusing the issue. Finally, I don't  I'm not exactly sure whether this is a Daubert test or not. [9] It might be, and if it is, the Daubert standard has not been met. For that reason, the Court will sustain the State's objection. [¶ 23] Proffit contends the district court erred in refusing to allow Willard to testify about what he perceived to be deficiencies in the investigation of Forquer's murder. Proffit claims the district court's erroneous ruling deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense and his right to compulsory process. [10] In his argument, Proffit alludes to matters that were not presented to the district court. Our review on this issue, however, is limited to whether the district court's decision, given the evidence and arguments at the time, was reasonable. [¶ 24] There is no question that a criminal defendant has the right to present evidence in his own defense. That right, however, is not unlimited. Dysthe v. State, 2003 WY 20, ¶ 5, 63 P.3d 875, 879 (Wyo.2003). For evidence to be admissible, it must be relevant. W.R.E. 402. Evidence is relevant if it has a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. W.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded, however, if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. W.R.E. 403. [¶ 25] After a careful review of the record in this case, we agree with the district court that Willard's testimony was not relevant. The crux of Proffit's trial defense was that he was not involved in Forquer's murder and that the primary witnesses against him  Martinez and Seiser  were simply liars with ulterior motives. Although defense counsel did at times ask witnesses whether interviews were taped or crimes scenes were processed in a certain manner, the defense did not question the manner in which trace evidence was collected or processed, nor did the defense allege any improprieties in the interviews of Martinez and Seiser or question whether the recording of their statements would have made a difference in the stories they told. Willard's testimony therefore would not have proved or disproved any fact of consequence to the determination of the case. Furthermore, it is clear Willard's opinions that certain investigative protocols were not followed in this case, specifically the investigating officers' alleged failure to make notes of the interviews with Martinez and Seiser and the alleged failure to process the trailer and Hicks' car, had little to no basis in fact. As the district court determined, the admission of Willard's testimony in this regard in light of the other trial evidence would have only served to confuse the jury. Considering the extent of the trial evidence and defense counsel's offer of proof, we hold that the district court's exclusion of Willard's proposed testimony was reasonable.