Opinion ID: 3177083
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sanders’ Conduct

Text: Sanders maintains that his difference in opinion about the “Charlie” designation of a condition report was an objection to a specific practice, policy, or occurrence that he reasonably believed was a nuclear safety issue, similar to the employees’ complaints in Bechtel and Stone & Webster. Sanders’ conduct, however, is distinguishable. Unlike the carpenter and the ironworker employees who raised first-hand safety concerns with their supervisors, Sanders had no independent 10 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST knowledge of possible safety violations prior to the creation of the internal condition reports at issue. Sanders did not generate these condition reports. His employer, Energy Northwest, was already aware of the potential safety violations, and its internal process for remediation was underway. The essence of Sanders’ complaint concerned which department - maintenance or security - would take responsibility for the internal condition reports about access badges, and at what level of inquiry - “Bravo” or “Charlie.” Sanders was given the responsibility for a “Bravo” condition report involving access badges for several maintenance contractors. Two weeks later, Pease was given responsibility for a “Charlie” condition report that involved the access badge of one terminated employee. Sanders objected to this “Charlie” designation, but ultimately “let it go as a Charlie.” There is no suggestion in the record that because these condition reports were labeled a “Bravo” or a “Charlie,” they would not be remedied in due course. Nor is there any suggestion of any safety concern that was overlooked, neglected, or concealed by management. The designation process for condition reports involved the managers’ collaborative opinions as to the assigned severity level. The record indicates that if two managers disagreed, they were asked to resolve their different opinions, and if they couldn’t agree, other managers would assign the severity designation. Here, Sanders expressed a different opinion from a co-manager, then “let it go.” Under these facts, Sanders’ single expression of a difference of opinion about the “Charlie” designation of one existing internal condition report lacks a sufficient nexus to a concrete, ongoing safety concern. See Am. Nuclear Res. Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t. of Labor, SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST 11 134 F.3d 1292, 1296 (6th Cir. 1998) (employee never alleged that employer was ignoring safety procedures; employee complained about an isolated incident, not a concrete and continuing safety concern). Because Sanders’ conduct falls outside the scope of the Act’s protection, the district court properly granted summary judgment. Sanders moved to amend his complaint to include statelaw disability and retaliation claims. This motion was made less than three weeks before the close of discovery and a year after filing the complaint. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion. See Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Sw. Marine, 194 F.3d 1009, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Late amendments to assert new theories are not reviewed favorably when the facts and the theory have been known to the party seeking amendment since the inception of the cause of action.” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)). Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Energy Northwest, we need not decide whether Sanders waived the jury trial issue by failing to include the correct order in his notice of appeal. AFFIRMED. 12 SANDERS V. ENERGY NORTHWEST