Opinion ID: 407565
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Basis of the FLRA's Revocation Power

Text: 137 Of course, the starting point for the interpretation of any statute is the language Congress employed to express its meaning. E.g., Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 1382, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976); Department of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140, 1151 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1443, 71 L.Ed.2d 658 (1982). Section 7120(f) states: 138 In the case of any labor organization which by omission or commission has willfully and intentionally, with regard to any strike, work stoppage, or slowdown, violated section 7116(b)(7) of this title, the Authority shall, upon an appropriate finding by the Authority of such violation- 139 (1) revoke the exclusive recognition status of the labor organization, which shall then immediately cease to be legally entitled and obligated to represent employees in the unit; or 140 (2) take any other appropriate disciplinary action. 141 5 U.S.C. § 7120(f) (Supp. IV 1980). The language of this section clearly requires the FLRA to take some disciplinary action when it finds that a union has violated section 7116(b)(7). Section 7120(f)(2) just as clearly announces that the FLRA has some discretion to revoke or not to revoke the exclusive recognition status of a union that, like PATCO, is found to have committed an unfair labor practice by calling, participating in or condoning a strike against the federal government. 142 The inference that the FLRA has some degree of discretion in the enforcement of section 7120(f) is supported by another section of the Act that generally deals with remedies for unfair labor practices, of which union strikes are only a single example. This provision, found in section 7118(a)(7), grants the FLRA the power to issue an order requiring a party found to be guilty of an unfair labor practice (1) to cease and desist from the practice, (2) to renegotiate a collective bargaining agreement, (3) to reinstate an employee with backpay, or (4) to take such other action as will carry out the purpose of this chapter. 5 U.S.C. § 7118(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1980). 70 143 At the same time, yet another provision in the same Act, found in section 7103(a)(4), suggests that the FLRA is without discretion in its choice of remedy once it finds that a union has violated the Act's no-strike provisions. In defining labor organization under the Act, section 7103(a)(4) states that: 144 (4) labor organization means an organization composed in whole or in part of employees, in which employees participate and pay dues, and which has as a purpose the dealing with an agency concerning grievances and conditions of employment, but does not include- 145 .... 146 (D) an organization which participates in the conduct of a strike against the Government or any agency thereof or imposes a duty or obligation to conduct, assist, or participate in such a strike .... 147 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(D) (Supp. IV 1980). 71 Broadly construed, this definitional section at least implies that a labor organization found to have violated the Act's no-strike proscriptions may no longer be treated as a labor organization under the Act, and hence may not be accorded exclusive recognition status. 148 We hesitate to read so much into a definitional section of a statute, particularly where, as here, that broad reading would contradict a separate section of the same statute that describes the power given to an agency to determine the substantive rights of parties before it. 72 Nevertheless, section 7103(a)(4)(D) arguably clouds the interpretation of section 7120(f). Moreover, even without reference to the statutory definition of a labor organization, section 7120(f) does not plainly declare the extent of the Authority's discretion to revoke a union's exclusive recognition status. Therefore, because the plain words of the statute cannot resolve our inquiry, we must turn to the statute's legislative history for further guidance as to Congress' meaning. 149