Opinion ID: 585811
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Other Damages Claims

Text: 45 There is another, perhaps even stronger reason for dismissing this appeal. Inasmuch as the immunity resulting from substitution under the Reform Act does not apply to actions for violations of the United States Constitution or federal statutes under which such action against an individual is otherwise authorized, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(b)(2), the immunity resulting from substitution under the Reform Act could apply only to Schrob's common law tort claims. Even if the district court had granted the motion to substitute and then dismissed these claims (or, alternatively, even if we asserted jurisdiction over this appeal and mandated the same result), the appellants still must go to trial on the Bivens claims, unless the district court dismisses these claims on grounds of absolute or qualified immunity or unless the appellants are entitled to a pretrial disposition on some other basis. In Prisco v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 851 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1089, 109 S.Ct. 2428, 104 L.Ed.2d 985 (1989), we held that a district court's denial of a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity is not immediately appealable where claims for prospective injunctive relief (which are not subject to immunity) remained pending. In language directly applicable here we held: 46 It is clear, therefore, that a suit seeking both prospective relief and money damages will not end for a party successfully asserting a defense of either absolute or qualified immunity. That being the case, it is necessary to consider the rationale for the Mitchell v. Forsyth- Harlow v. Fitzgerald exception to the final judgment rule. That rationale is that the collateral interest being protected is the freedom from having to defend a lawsuit; this interest, like a claim of double jeopardy, is lost beyond recall even if the defendant prevails at trial.... That rationale has only the slightest application to a case involving claims for both prospective relief and money damages. The part of the case that will determine the liability must go forward in any event. The marginal benefit to a governmental official from an interlocutory review of a ruling that proof of damages should not be heard is so slight that it cannot outweigh the systemic harms from permitting piecemeal interlocutory review of discrete issues in a case which, even against that official, will be ongoing. We hold, therefore, that in an action in which claims for prospective relief remain pending, a party against whom they remain pending may not appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment on immunity grounds. 47 Id. at 96 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 48 This case presents an even stronger justification for the result in Prisco than in Prisco itself, as Schrob in all his pending claims seeks to hold the defendants personally liable for damages. Moreover, all of the claims asserted by Schrob arise from the same core set of facts, so discovery is not likely to be any less burdensome if some of the claims are dismissed. Arguably, therefore, Prisco cannot fairly be distinguished and directly controls our result. 49 We recognize that we may now be alone in holding that orders denying qualified immunity in cases seeking both damages and equitable relief are not immediately appealable. 16 While in Mitchell, the Court expressly left open the question of whether such an order could be immediately appealed, 472 U.S. at 519 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. at 2812 n. 5, virtually every other court of appeals that has addressed the issue has held contrary to Prisco. See, e.g. DiMartini v. Ferrin, 889 F.2d 922, 924-25 (9th Cir.1989), amended on other grounds, 906 F.2d 465 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2796, 115 L.Ed.2d 970 (1991); Marx v. Gumbinner, 855 F.2d 783, 787-88 (11th Cir.1988); Giacalone v. Abrams, 850 F.2d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir.1988); Young v. Lynch, 846 F.2d 960, 961-62 (4th Cir.1988); DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 717-18 (10th Cir.1988); Scott v. Lacy, 811 F.2d 1153 (7th Cir.1987); Kennedy v. Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 305-06 (6th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103, 107 S.Ct. 1334 (1987); De Abadia v. Izquierdo Mora, 792 F.2d 1187, 1190 (1st Cir.1986); Tubbesing v. Arnold, 742 F.2d 401, 403-04 (8th Cir.1984). 50 These courts have criticized Prisco for qualitatively equating the burdens associated with defending against a suit for money damages with the burdens associated with defending a suit for injunctive relief. A defendant in a suit for money damages is liable in an individual personal capacity. By contrast, a defendant who has lost a claim for injunctive relief will simply be ordered to take or refrain from action in an official capacity with any expenses charged to the public. Marx, 855 F.2d at 787-88. 17 Additionally, these courts fear that plaintiffs can easily circumvent a defendant's right to immediate appeal simply by adding a claim for equitable relief. See Scott, 811 F.2d at 1154. But notwithstanding these strong arguments, Prisco is binding on this panel. 51 We also point out that the reasons given by the other courts for rejecting Prisco are not applicable here. Since constitutional claims would survive the proposed substitution, the first criticism of the Prisco approach, namely that there is a qualitative difference between damages and injunction claims, is not relevant here. Additionally, fear that a plaintiff may add an equitable claim to a damage claim to preclude an immediate appeal when qualified immunity is denied is of no concern in this case. We also point out that there is nothing in the record to suggest that Schrob has acted in bad faith in asserting damage claims not subject to substitution, for we cannot say that the Bivens claims are insubstantial in this case. Thus, even if we were not bound by Prisco, this case would surely not be an appropriate vehicle to reexamine that precedent. 52 Cases from the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit help us focus on the multiple damage claims problem. Initially that court in Schopler v. Bliss, 903 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir.1990), stated: If we find that appellants must stand trial for at least some of their alleged misdeeds under at least one cause of action for damages, then the reasons for allowing an immediate appeal disappear, and we must dismiss the appeal of the order rejecting claims of immunity for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Id. at 1378. Recently, however, the court en banc, squarely held that government officials continue to be entitled to interlocutory appeal when a civil rights plaintiff attaches other counts to which the official is not immune, or when the same official acknowledges that at least some of the plaintiff's allegations do make out violations of clearly established law. Green v. Brantley, 941 F.2d 1146, 1152 (11th Cir.1991) (en banc). 53 The court in Green reasoned that, even where certain claims remain, the defendant's litigation burdens are lessened when some of them are dismissed. Id. at 1149. If the defendant is successful on appeal in dismissing some of the claims, moreover, the plaintiffs may voluntarily withdraw or settle the remaining claims. Id. If there is a trial, the duration will likely be shortened, the issues simplified, and the focus narrowed, thus resulting in reduced attorney's fees. Id. at 1149-50. Additionally, the court noted the possibility that the remaining claims may be for substantially less damages, or may be covered by insurance. Id. at 1150. Further, the stigma of facing suit for negligence (for example) probably is, and ought to be, less than that associated with having allegedly violated someone's civil rights. ... Moreover, the plaintiff's constitutional claim may be the only federal claim in the lawsuit. If the federal claim is dismissed because of qualified immunity, the state-law claims may have no place in federal court. Id. Additionally, the court determined that, while these considerations implicate whether the entitlement to qualified immunity is effectively lost if the defendant must go to trial, the other two Cohen factors were satisfied--that the order conclusively determines the disputed question, and is separable from the merits. Id. at 1151-52. See also Musso v. Hourigan, 836 F.2d 736, 742 n. 1 (2d Cir.1988) (permitting interlocutory appeal of one claim even though plaintiff may have to go to trial on another). 54 The dissent in Green argued that the majority gave short shrift to the importance of the final judgment rule, and stressed the narrowness of the collateral order doctrine. 941 F.2d at 1154-56 (Johnson, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent persuasively argued that the majority greatly overestimated the benefits of permitting an immediate appeal, since the same evidence needed to prove the claim from which the defendant may be immune is also needed to prove the claims that must go forward in any event: 55 Consequently, even if a panel of this Court reverses the district court's denial of qualified immunity as to the property interest claim, that reversal would have practically no effect on the course of the subsequent litigation. If the 'burdens of litigation' were lessened for the defendants, it would be only imperceptibly so. It is difficult to imagine that discovery would be any more limited, that the duration of trial would be any shorter, that attorneys' fees would be reduced, that the embarrassment of the legal process would be decreased, or that the distraction from official duties would be any less intense. More importantly, the defendants would remain potentially liable in money damages. The many benefits of a successful assertion of qualified immunity simply would not inure to the defendants in this case. 56 Id. at 1153-54 (footnote omitted). 57 This reasoning is particularly applicable here. 18 Schrob's complaint alleges numerous theories of recovery, but all stem from the same common nucleus of fact. Moreover, it appears that the Bivens claims in this case are, as Schrob alleges, the primary thrust of his complaint. Consequently, while the reasoning of Prisco may be debatable, little would be gained by permitting immediate appeal of the denial of immunity of some claims where other claims for money damages remain. In these circumstances, the justifications for permitting immediate appeals of denials of immunity are simply not compelling, and the benefits discussed by the majority in Green would be illusory. We simply cannot fit this case within the narrow range of appeals permitted under the collateral order doctrine. Furthermore, while there are valid reasons for permitting early appeals of immunity questions, this case clearly demonstrates that there is a price to be paid in allowing such appeals, for here Schrob filed his suit well over two years ago but has not had his trial. Thus, there is a basis for Schrob's statement in his brief that the appellants have done everything possible to avoid open discovery and to delay the normal progress of his matter before the district court ... and have achieved some measure of success to date.