Opinion ID: 1405904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Voluntariness of Boyde's Statements.

Text: Boyde challenges the admission of his various statements to the police, claiming they were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt to have been voluntarily given. ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d 595.) Specifically, he argues that: (1) the January 22 statement in which he admitted knowledge of the 7-Eleven robbery-homicide was induced by an implied promise of leniency with regard to the charges arising out of the gas station robbery-kidnapping ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pp. 611-612); (2) he did not waive his rights with regard to the offense of murder (see U.S. v. McCrary (5th Cir.1981) 643 F.2d 323, 328); (3) the statement was given while he was in a state of extreme emotional upset and was not therefore the `product of a rational intellect and a free will' ( People v. MacPherson (1970) 2 Cal.3d 109, 113 [84 Cal. Rptr. 129, 465 P.2d 17]; In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal.2d 487, 498 [67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633]); (4) the January 23 statements in which he admitted involvement in the robbery-homicide were the fruits of the earlier, involuntary statement ( People v. Braeseke (1979) 25 Cal.3d 691, 703-704 [159 Cal. Rptr. 684, 602 P.2d 384]); and (5) the final statement on January 23, in which he confessed the 7-Eleven robbery was induced by police deception as to the legal consequences of his prior admission of some involvement (see People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101, 112, fn. 12 [127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272]). (6) It is axiomatic that the use in a criminal prosecution of an involuntary confession constitutes a denial of due process of law under both the federal and state Constitutions. [Citations.] In California, before a confession can be used against a defendant, the prosecution has the burden of proving that this was voluntary and was not the result of any form of compulsion or promise of reward. [Citations.] ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 602.) The prosecution bears the burden of proof, and the proof must establish voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id. at p. 608.) At the trial level, the determination is made by the trial court outside the presence of the jury. ( People v. Jimenez, supra, at p. 604.) The appellate court must examine the uncontradicted facts to determine independently whether the trial court's conclusion of voluntariness was properly found. With respect to conflicting testimony, the appellate court accepts that version of the facts most favorable to the finding below, to the extent it is supported by the record. ( Id. at p. 609.) Here the trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt all statements were voluntary.
(7) In general, a confession is considered voluntary if the accused's decision to speak is entirely `self-motivated' [citation], i.e., if he freely and voluntarily chooses to speak without `any form of compulsion or promise of reward....' [Citation.] ( People v. Thompson (1980) 27 Cal.3d 303, 327-328 [165 Cal. Rptr. 289, 611 P.2d 883].) However, where a person in authority makes an express or clearly implied promise of leniency or advantage for the accused which is a motivating cause of the decision to confess, the confession is involuntary and inadmissible as a matter of law. ( People v. Brommel (1961) 56 Cal.2d 629, 632 [15 Cal. Rptr. 909, 364 P.2d 845].) Mere advice or exhortation by the police that it would be better for the accused to tell the truth, when unaccompanied by either a threat or a promise, does not, however, make a subsequent confession involuntary. ( People v. Jimenez, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 611.) (8a) Boyde claims that his initial statement admitting knowledge of the Gibson robbery-homicide was induced by an implied promise that a statement would lead to more favorable disposition of the charges of robbery and kidnapping for robbery of Baker, for which he had been arrested. Because Detective Callow admitted that he considered appellant a potential suspect in the Gibson homicide at the time of the January 22 interview regarding the Baker robbery-kidnapping, Boyde asserts the officer was motivated by a desire to obtain an incriminatory statement. Further, although Callow repeatedly informed Boyde that the police could not promise leniency but could only pass any information along to the district attorney who had the authority to make such an offer, Boyde argues Callow made it crystal clear that he had no hope of anything other than incarceration unless he gave a statement on the homicide. (See In re Roger G. (1975) 53 Cal. App.3d 198 [125 Cal. Rptr. 625].) The argument is unpersuasive. The evidence shows that there was no promise of leniency, no attempt to induce a confession, and no confession. Appellant initiated discussion of the homicide because of his own hopes of obtaining leniency on the robbery-kidnapping charges. The statement he gave was neither a confession nor an admission, but an attempt to lay blame for the crime on Big Mike and Ellison. Detective Callow's role in eliciting the story was responsive rather than aggressive, and he repeatedly and clearly stated that he had no authority to make any promise of leniency regarding the pending robbery-kidnap charges, but could only pass information on to the district attorney. The cases upon which Boyde relies are inapposite. In In re Roger G., supra, 53 Cal. App.3d 198, for instance, officers engaged in a lengthy effort to induce a minor to abandon his claim of innocence of a shooting for which he had been arrested. They told him he might be incarcerated for `seven or eight or ten or life, you know ...' and said, `... it's gonna help you out for a chance of probation or getting parole if you are honest about the thing .... [but] if you go in there ... and... try to cover up, do you think we'd give you a chance at probation or parole? No way.' Although they subsequently stated they could not promise probation or parole, that it was only a possibility, the appellate court found the evidence established an implied, if not express threat of harsher punishment if Roger did not confess, and an implied, if not express, promise of the possibility of more lenient treatment if he did. ( Id. at pp. 200-202.) And although dictum in People v. Nelson (1964) 224 Cal. App.2d 238 [36 Cal. Rptr. 385] indicates that a confession to crimes for which defendant was arrested might be involuntary if induced by promises of lenient treatment on an unrelated pending charge, that is not the factual posture of appellant's case. At the time of his January 22 statement Boyde made a voluntary, if unwise, decision to offer false information in hope of obtaining favorable treatment. The trial court's determination that the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt is correct.
(9) Boyde argues that the failure to inform him he was a suspect in the robbery-murder rendered his January 22 statement involuntary because his decision to waive his rights to remain silent and to consult counsel was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. He acknowledges that no California decision had held that Miranda warnings ( Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. 436) must specify the actual charge pending against the person being interrogated and that the Court of Appeal rejected such an argument in People v. Neely (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 1011, 1017 [157 Cal. Rptr. 531]. He also acknowledges that the Court of Appeal has held that new Miranda warnings are not necessarily required whenever an interrogation about one crime leads to discussion of another. ( People v. Schenk (1972) 24 Cal. App.3d 233, 236 [101 Cal. Rptr. 75].) He urges that the position taken by a minority of courts which require such information to implement Miranda is the better approach. Boyde relies upon United States v. McCrary, supra, 643 F.2d 323, Schenk v. Ellsworth (D.Mont. 1968) 293 F. Supp. 26, and Commonwealth v. Dixon (1977) 475 Pa. 17 [379 A.2d 553]. The argument does not fit the facts of this case. On January 22 Boyde volunteered information about these crimes, and as noted above, admitted no complicity but claimed to know that others had committed the offenses. This statement was damaging because it led directly to the later statements in which Boyde admitted his guilt, but was incriminating only by comparison to those later statements.
(10) Boyde asserts that his January 22 statement was taken within minutes after he was removed from the holding cell because he was completely unnerved by an apparent attack of claustrophobia, and in terror of being incarcerated in the Riverside County Jail. He cites Detective Callow's description of his very hyper, very nervous condition to show that his decision to give a statement was not `the product of a rational intellect and a free will.' ( People v. MacPherson, supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 113; In re Cameron, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 498.) The evidence does not indicate Boyde was so distraught that his will to resist confession was overborne. Detective Callow testified that Boyde seemed to calm down after being removed to an interview room and being given coffee and a cigarette. Boyde presented no contradictory evidence. There was no indication of intoxication or mental illness.
(8b) This argument falls with the conclusion that the January 22 statement was voluntarily given.
When Detectives Lund and Ropac approached Boyde on January 23 they first told him they thought the story he told Callow was not truthful. They asked if he was willing to talk with them again about the robbery-homicide and when he indicated he would, took a full Miranda waiver. Boyde then told his second story. He admitted he had been with Ellison and Big Mike at the 7-Eleven, that Big Mike had pulled the robbery and that he (Boyde) had driven the car from the store to the orange grove. But he claimed he did so under protest, denied assisting in the killing and denied any advance knowledge of Big Mike's intent to rob or kill. (11) Boyde claims that at the conclusion of this statement Lund told him it amounted to a full confession, that he believed Boyde had in fact been more deeply involved than he had admitted, and that any further statement could not result in any greater liability than he had already incurred. After this confrontation Boyde told his final version, which implicated him at least as an accomplice in the robbery and felony murder. Boyde contends this incriminating statement was induced by Lund's misrepresentation as to the legal effect of the prior statement, and that this deception amounts to psychological coercion which rendered the statement involuntary. (See People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 840-841 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93].) Boyde's description of the encounter is factually inaccurate. The transcript of the interview shows that at the conclusion of the I was just along for the ride story, Lund stated: I'll tell you the problems I'm having, and, and I'm no lawyer, but I would think ... what bothers me is you, you got such great detail, you sure you weren't in the store? You sure you didn't walk in? Boyde repeated he had not gone in. Lund continued questioning whether Boyde might have been in the doorway of the store and whether he could have seen the money go into the bag or heard Big Mike saying it was a robbery without having been in the store. Finally, Lund stated: It doesn't make no difference whether you were sitting in the car the whole time or whether you were right in Big Mike's back pocket, you're, you're involved in this the same, if everything else is the truth.... While Lund made it clear he believed appellant was more deeply involved in the crimes than he was admitting, he did not tell Boyde that his prior statement amounted to a confession or that any further statement could not result in any greater liability. Lund's statements amounted to harsh questioning, but did not rise to the level of psychological coercion or misrepresentation of the legal consequences of appellant's prior statement.