Opinion ID: 874401
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nancys Partnership Claim

Text: Idaho has codified the Uniform Partnership Act at title 53, chapter 3. Idaho Code § 53-3-202(a) defines a partnership as the association of two (2) or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit... whether or not the persons intend to form a partnership. Idaho Code § 53-3-202(c) sets out the following rules for determining whether a partnership exists: (1) Joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entireties, joint property, common property, or part ownership does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the co-owners share profits made by the use of the property. (2) The sharing of gross returns does not by itself establish a partnership, even if the persons sharing them have a joint or common right or interest in property from which the returns are derived. (3) A person who receives a share of the profits of a business is presumed to be a partner in the business, unless the profits were received in payment: (i) Of a debt by installments or otherwise; (ii) For services as an independent contractor or of wages or other compensation to an employee; (iii) Of rent; (iv) Of an annuity or other retirement or health benefit to a beneficiary, representative, or designee of a deceased or retired partner; (v) Of interest or other charge on a loan, even if the amount of payment varies with the profits of the business, including a direct or indirect present or future ownership of the collateral, or rights to income, proceeds, or increase in value derived from the collateral; or (vi) For the sale of the goodwill of a business or other property by installments or otherwise. The official comment to this subsection states in part: Whether a relationship is more properly characterized as that of borrower and lender, employer and employee, or landlord and tenant is left to the trier of fact. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 202 cmt. (1994). The magistrate judge, after noting again that he was weighing the evidence, granted summary judgment declaring that no partnership existed. The magistrate judges weighing of the evidence was clearly error. There is no written partnership agreement in the record. However, Nancy presented the testimony of witnesses who claim that she and Jim were engaged in a partnership. Nancy also presented numerous documents showing that she was involved in operating the Alibi, including evidence that she contributed her own money towards the purchase of the liquor license. As it stands, there is evidence in the record tending to show the existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding the existence of a partnership. However, until such time as the trial court rules on the admissibility of this evidence, this Court is unable to determine whether summary judgment on the partnership issue was appropriate. Thus, we affirm the district court's decision vacating the grant of summary judgment on the partnership issue. On remand, the district court should instruct the trial court to rule on objections prior to determining whether summary judgment is appropriate as to Nancy's partnership claim. Because the question of how I.R.E. 601(b) should be applied will arise on remand, we deem it appropriate to briefly address this evidentiary issue. I.R.E. 601(b) is virtually identical to I.C. § 9-202(3), the so-called Deadman's Statute. [1] We have previously described the appropriate analysis to be applied: In Argyle v. Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 585 P.2d 954 (1978), we stated that the statute bars (1) certain persons from testifying (2) in specified actions (3) as to certain communications. All three portions of I.C. § 9-202(3) must be satisfied in order for the evidence to be barred. Id. at 547, 585 P.2d at 957. Matter of Estate of Keeven, 110 Idaho 452, 460, 716 P.2d 1224, 1232 (1986). Given the virtual identity of the rule and the statute, this analysis continues to be appropriate. We have not interpreted this provision so broadly as to bar testimony concerning a state of affairs or matters of fact occurring before a decedents death. Id. When testimony of an alleged oral agreement is presented alone, it is inadmissible; however, written evidence to substantiate the alleged agreement is admissible. Id.