Opinion ID: 1612479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Insufficient Funds Checks.

Text: We next consider the claim involving the two checks Herrera wrote which were returned for insufficient funds. At the outset, we find the charge was adequately pled in the complaint. Although the Board primarily alleged the conduct violated DR 9-102(B)(4) for failing to pay funds requested by a client, the complaint also alleged the conduct was dishonest in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4). Moreover, the prehearing brief filed by the Board unequivocally asserted that Herrera's conduct in issuing the checks to his client without sufficient funds in the accounts from which the checks were drawn was dishonest, prejudicial to the administration of justice, and adversely reflected on his fitness to practice law, contrary to DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6). We conclude Herrera had sufficient notice of the specific complaint. The issuance of an insufficient funds check by a lawyer can constitute a violation of our rules of professional responsibility. See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Walters, 603 N.W.2d 772, 776-77 (Iowa 1999). If the conduct is more than a mistake or mere negligence, it violates DR 1-102(A)(4) (dishonest conduct). See Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Bitter, 279 N.W.2d 521, 526 (Iowa 1979) (DR 1-102 does not apply to conduct involving negligence); see also In re Pokorny, 453 N.W.2d 345, 347 (Minn.1990) (issuance of insufficient funds check followed by failure to issue a substitute check); Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Taylor, 187 W.Va. 39, 415 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1992) (attorney must either know check was worthless when written or fail to make check good after knowledge of insufficient funds). Additionally, an insufficient funds check issued in connection with the practice of law can amount to conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and can adversely reflect on an attorney's fitness to practice law in violation of DR 1-102(A)(5) and (6). See Walters, 603 N.W.2d at 777; Taylor, 415 S.E.2d at 283. Although Herrera may not have been obligated to return the fee as requested by his client, the evidence is clear that Herrera agreed to do so, or at least made the decision to return a large portion of the fee the client had paid by issuing a check on his office account to the client. In issuing the check, Herrera was bound by DR 1-102(A) to do so in an honest manner, as well as in a manner that would not be prejudicial to the administration of justice or reflect adversely on his fitness to practice law. The circumstances of this case clearly reveal Herrera's conduct was dishonest. The bank account from which the first check was drawn was perpetually overdrawn and never contained close to enough funds for the bank to pay the check during the time it was issued. Furthermore, Herrera did not maintain a register or balance for either account, and was hoping to receive a fee from another client to cover the second check. While the issuance of the first insufficient funds check could conceivably be excused as inadvertence or neglect, the failure to make the check good and the subsequent issuance of a second insufficient funds check from a separate account supports a finding that Herrera's conduct was dishonest. Furthermore, the matter relates directly to the practice of law and the operation of his law office. Consequently, Herrera's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice and reflected adversely on his fitness to practice law. We conclude Herrera violated DR 1-102(A)(4), (5), and (6). The public perception of the legal profession and lawyers is damaged when lawyers knowingly issue insufficient funds checks. Taylor, 415 S.E.2d at 283. 3. Communication with Another Lawyer's Client. Generally, a lawyer representing a client is barred from any representational contact with a party known to be represented by another lawyer. [1] See Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 11.6.2, at 611 (1986) [hereinafter Wolfram]. This rule is followed in nearly every jurisdiction in the nation. See In re News America Publ'g, Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 100 n. 3 (Tex.App.1998);Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Communication with Party Represented by Counsel as Ground for Disciplining Attorney, 26 A.L.R.4th 102, 108-12 (1983 & Supp.1999). The specific Iowa rule is found in DR 7-104(A)(1), and provides as follows: (A) During the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not: (1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the representation with a party known to be represented by a lawyer in that matter except with the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other party or as authorized by law. The rule exists to protect the represented person from the supposed imbalance of legal skill and acumen between the lawyer and the party litigant. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 211, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 1205, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, 253 (1964) (White, J., dissenting); see State v. Miller, 600 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Minn.1999). It promotes the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and serves to prevent a variety of overreaching. See Miller, 600 N.W.2d at 463; see also Leubsdorf, at 686-88 (listing various rationales for the rule). The threshold requirement of the rule limits the prohibition to communications during the course of representing a client. DR 7-104(A)(1). Additionally, the rule applies only to communications on the subject of the representation with a party known to be represented by a lawyer in that matter. Id. On the other hand, the rule does not exist to prohibit a lawyer from consulting with a prospective client concurrently represented by another lawyer to discuss complaints or concerns. Wolfram § 11.6.2, at 612; see News America Publ'g, Inc., 974 S.W.2d at 102. The status of a person as a client does not place that person into bondage. Wolfram § 11.6.2, at 612. Instead, the language of the rule reveals that the prohibition is limited to efforts by lawyers in their representation of their clients to drive a wedge between other lawyers and their clients. Id. Herrera asserts the rule cannot apply to him because he did not actually represent either defendant, and was not representing Lopez at the time he met with Santos. Instead, he claims he met with the two defendants only because they were dissatisfied with their lawyers and wanted him to represent them. We have not previously considered the phrase [d]uring the course of representing a client under DR 7-104(A). Nevertheless, we recognize that [c]ommunications in the course of preliminary discussion[s] with a view to employing [a] lawyer are privileged [even] though the employment is ... not [ultimately] accepted. Edward W. Cleary et al., McCormick on Evidence § 88, at 179 (2d ed.1972); see Wolfram § 6.3, at 251. Moreover, the rationale for the no-contact rule would apply equally to a lawyer in an existing attorney-client relationship as it would to a lawyer in a pending attorney-client relationship. Our system of justice would suffer immeasurably if a lawyer could meet with multiple parties to a case before selecting a party to represent. Thus, we believe a lawyer can be in the course of representing a client under DR 7-104(A) prior to the time in which the terms of the representation are finalized. Applying this principle to this case, we conclude Herrera was in the course of representing Lopez under DR 7-104(A)(1) at the time he met with Santos. Notwithstanding, the rule only prohibits communications on the subject of the representation. DR 7-104(A)(1). In this case, the communications between Herrera and Santos did not extend to the subject of the representation between Santos and his existing lawyer, but to the subject of new representation. The discussion between Herrera and Santos was confined to inquiries to determine if Herrera would represent the defendants in the criminal case and the fee which would be necessary to secure the representation. For sure, this type of contact between a lawyer and a represented party presents a very delicate issue, and the line between communications pertaining to representing another in a criminal case and the criminal case itself is extremely fine. The safe course of conduct for a lawyer would be to abstain from any communications under these circumstances. Nevertheless, the evidence at the hearing failed to show the communications between Herrera and Santos extended to any matters covered within the subject of the representation between Santos and his existing counsel. Therefore, even though Herrera was in the course of representing Lopez for the purpose of DR 7-104(A)(1) at the time he met with Santos, the Board failed to prove the communications between Herrera and Santos fell within the scope of the rule.