Opinion ID: 890151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The State's Article VII, Section 8(1) Theory

Text: ¶ 73 First, the State contends that LR-119 does not impermissibly add to or change the Constitution, but instead implements the Constitution pursuant to Article VII, Section 8(1), which states: Supreme court justices and district court judges shall be elected by the qualified electors as provided by law. In the State's view, the as provided by law clause permits the statutory creation of electoral districts in which Supreme Court candidates must reside and from which the justices must be elected. ¶ 74 We disagree with the State's reading of this provision. For starters, Article VII, Section 8, which is titled Selection, does not purport to address the qualifications of Supreme Court justice. Those are covered exclusively in Article VII, Section 9, which is titled Qualifications. Significantly, there are a number of provisions in the Constitution explicitly granting the Legislature authority to set the qualifications for certain public offices. [11] Article VII, Section 8(1), however, is not one of them. Hence, this provision is not authority for LR-119's addition of qualifications (i.e., voter-registration and residency requirements) to the office of Supreme Court justice. ¶ 75 Nor is Article VII, Section 8(1) authority to convert the Supreme Court itself from a statewide elected body into a district-based representative body. As adopted in 1972, Article VII, Section 8 provided that: (1) vacancies on the Supreme Court or a district court shall be filled by nomination of the Governor or the Chief Justice, and the nomination shall be confirmed by the Senate, but if the nomination is made while the Senate is not in session, then the nomination shall be effective as an appointment until the end of the next session; (2) at the first election after Senate confirmation, and at the election before each succeeding term of office, the name of the incumbent justice or judge shall be placed on the ballot, either for a contested election if there is an opposing candidate, or for the voters to approve or reject the incumbent justice or judge if there is no election contest; and (3) if an incumbent does not run, then there shall be an election for the office. ¶ 76 In 1991, the 52nd Montana Legislature passed House Bill 353 (HB 353), which submitted to the electors various amendments to Article VII, Section 8. See Laws of Montana, 1991, ch. 475. Representative Bill Strizich introduced HB 353 in the Legislature, at the request of then-Secretary of State Mike Cooney, to close a perceived loophole in Article VII, Section 8. The issue was brought to the fore when Justice Gulbrandson retired from this Court on August 31, 1989. His seat (Seat 1) was set to expire on January 6, 1991. Governor Stephens nominated District Court Judge Diane Barz to fill the vacancy. The Governor also nominated Maurice Colberg Jr. to fill a similar vacancy on the Thirteenth Judicial District Court and Larry W. Moran to fill a similar vacancy on the Eighteenth Judicial District Court. Since the Senate was not in session at the time, it did not consider confirmation of these nominations. On March 14, 1990, Gene Huntley attempted to file for Seat 1 (then held by Justice Barz); however, the Secretary of State rejected Huntley's declaration based on a 1987 opinion of the Attorney General (42 Op. Atty. Gen. Mont. No. 31) which concluded that no election for a judicial position can occur until the Senate has confirmed a serving nominee. The case ultimately reached this Court, which agreed with the Attorney General and held that a nominee for Supreme Court justice or district court judge need not stand for election until the next election after the Senate's confirmation of the nominee. State ex rel. Racicot v. First Jud. Dist. Ct., 243 Mont. 379, 391, 794 P.2d 1180, 1187 (1990). Interpreting Article VII, Section 8, the Court concluded that the general constitutional rule is that appointees and nonappointees shall stand for contested and uncontested elections at the general elections prior to the expiration of each judicial term. The exception to that general rule provides that when the Senate has not had an opportunity to confirm a nominee, the nominee must stand for election for the first time at the next election following Senate confirmation. Racicot, 243 Mont. at 391, 794 P.2d at 1187. Hence, because the Senate had not yet considered the nominations of Justice Barz and Judges Colberg and Moran, the Secretary of State was not required to place their offices on the 1990 ballot. Presumably, Senate confirmation would occur when the Legislature next met in 1991, and the first elections for these positions would occur in 1992. This Court held that the resulting holdover situation (where a nominee could serve past the expiration of the predecessor's term) was mandated by the Constitution. Racicot, 243 Mont. at 385-86, 794 P.2d at 1183-84. Nevertheless, the Court suggested that it would be wise for the Legislature to consider amendment of the Constitution given the potential for unreasonable results and even abuses of the judicial selection system inherent in the scheme created by Article VII, Section 8. Racicot, 243 Mont. at 391, 794 P.2d at 1187. ¶ 77 That is the problem to which the Section 8 amendments were addressed. HB 353 added what is now Section 8(1) and amended other parts of Section 8 for the specific purpose of ensuring that appointees would face election in a timely manner and that no appointee could serve past the expiration of his or her predecessor's term without standing for election. Notably, Representative Strizich indicated at the February 1, 1991 hearing of the House Judiciary Committee that the intent of HB 353 was to protect the voter's right to vote for Supreme Court and District Court judges. Likewise, contrary to the State's and Legislators' arguments in the present case, Secretary of State Cooney noted at that same hearing and at the March 26, 1991 hearing of the Senate Judiciary Committee: In 1990, every voter in this state was denied the right to vote for their candidate of choice for a Supreme Court seat.... House Bill 353 will strengthen our Constitution and it will affirm the right of all Montanans to vote for those who govern our state. (Emphases added.) The purpose of the measure, Cooney explained, was to amend the constitution to mandate the election of judges and justices at the times prescribed by law. After voters approved the measure in November 1992 ( see Laws of Montana, 1993, Ballot Issues, Const. Amend. No. 22), the Legislature amended certain statutes specifically addressed to these issues ( see Laws of Montana, 1993, ch. 377 (amending §§ 3-1-1013 and -1014, MCA)). ¶ 78 Thus, HB 353 was a timing measure. Nothing in the plain language of Article VII, Section 8 (as amended) or in the history of HB 353 indicates that the 1992 amendments were intendedor even contemplatedto grant the Legislature power to convert the Supreme Court from an institution composed of members elected on a statewide basis into a representative body composed of members elected from separate districts. The State is mistaken in its claim that Section 8(1) grants such authority. If anything, the proponents' views indicate that HB 353 was intended to strengthen the right of all Montanans to vote for Supreme Court justices, not take that right away.