Opinion ID: 158651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Undermining Jury's Responsibility in Selecting Punishment

Text: 97 The prosecutor stated in his second stage closing argument that when he files a bill of particulars and asks for the death penalty, it is a proper case for the death penalty. 12 Also, he informed the jury it is only one piece, one little cog in the community. Additionally, the prosecutor told the jury that 98 before any case can be presented to you for your consideration in terms of what sentence is appropriate in that sentence, a number of things have to happen. 99 The decision--the evidence has to be brought before you upon which you can base that decision. It would be improper for you to go in that jury room and bring back a decision without having the proper evidence before you, as Mr. Deason and I have done. 100 Prior to that time, decision has to be made as to what penalty will be sought in that case. That decision is then made. 101 Prior to that time, before that kind of decision can be made, an investigation has to be made by the police department-- 102 . . . 103 --in this case. And the evidence has to be brought forth. That evidence has to be gathered. It was done in this case. Before that. Before that evidence can be gathered, the one person who voluntarily enters into this whole scene is [petitioner] . . . . 104 Tr. vol. VII at 1626-27. Petitioner believes that these statements violated Caldwell and were designed to make the jury surrender its judgment to the judgment of the prosecution and law enforcement, rather than to make a decision based on the strength of the evidence. 105 On post-conviction review, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, apparently deciding petitioner's Caldwell argument, determined that these comments merely responded to petitioner's counsel's second stage closing argument. See Moore, 889 P.2d at 1255 n.4. The federal district court determined that defense counsel invited these comments by his own comments regarding petitioner's continuing threat to society, 13 petitioner's disease, 14 the social and personal consequences of the jury's decision, 15 and the types of cases appropriate for the death penalty. 16 Further, the district court determined the remarks did not place the ultimate sentencing decision on anyone other than the jury. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 328-29. The court believed that the comments merely underscored the jury's part in the system of justice. See Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1987). 106 The prosecutor's statements viewed in the context of the entire trial did not affirmatively mislead the jury regarding its responsibility for determining punishment, and thus did not violate Caldwell. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1994). Furthermore, the trial court's instructions informed the jury that it had the duty to determine the penalty to be imposed. We conclude the prosecutor's statements did not render the death penalty verdict unreliable.See Sellers, 135 F.3d at 1343 (prosecutor's suggestion that he personally approved of death penalty and statements that many hurdles had to be jumped before a capital murder trial could ever occur were insufficient to suggest that anyone other than jury had burden to make ultimate sentencing decision); see also Moore, 153 F.3d at 1113 (prosecutor's comments that jury was small part of machinery to put petitioner on death row and prosecutor made decision to seek death penalty, even if improper, were not significant enough to influence jury's sentencing decision); Parks v. Brown, 840 F.2d 1496, 1503-04 (10th Cir. 1987) (prosecutor's comments did not minimize importance of jury's role in fixing sentence), rev'd on other grounds by Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990). Petitioner has failed to show the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Caldwell. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).