Opinion ID: 2754130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Daubing or marking Bingo cards. These

Text: electronic devices fail to satisfy the daubing requirement enumerated in Cornerstone. The ball draw is rapid and there is no ability for the individual player to daub between the ball draws. Further, the machines allow only collective daubing of identified winning patterns not individual daubing of a single matching number. Indeed daubing is not required until the game is concluded and a winning pattern is identified by the machine. HEDA argues that the trial court erred in focusing on the fact that there is no ability for the individual player to daub between the ball draws. HEDA contends that nothing in Cornerstone required daubing between ball draws. HEDA's brief, at 47. We disagree. As already noted, the second element requires that the alphanumeric or similar designations being used be randomly drawn and announced one by one. 42 21 1130388 So. 3d at 86. Moreover, the third element, as noted, requires that players must pay attention to the values announced. 42 So. 3d at 86. It clearly contemplates that, following each announcement of a value that matches a value on the player's card, the player must physically act by marking his or her card. 42 So. 3d at 86. Obviously, if a player is to physically act by marking his or her playing card, he or she must have time to do so. As to the fourth element, the trial court found: D. Requirement to pay attention and mark properly. In a traditional bingo game, the player is required to pay attention to the ball drawn by the caller and daubs, paints, or marks matching numbers on his cardboard card as they occur in anticipation of achieving a winning card. In this case the electronic machines or player stations at Center Stage are controlled by the computer chips and the electronic animations which are displayed by the computer and the computer predetermines the game-winning pattern. The player does not physically paint or write a matching number. In fact, the players interface with the computer does not require the players to display any particular attention or skill. This factor of Cornerstone is not satisfied by the electronic machines. As to this element, HEDA takes issue with the trial court's finding that the player does not physically paint or write a matching number (emphasis in HEDA's brief), noting 22 1130388 no such requirement in the fourth element. Clearly, however, as stated previously in the same paragraph of its findings, the trial court applied a standard by which a player was required to daub[], paint[], or mark[] matching numbers. The essence of the trial court's finding as to this element was that there was no individual, one-by-one, physical marking of numbers by the player as the game progressed, and we find no error as to this issue. HEDA insists, however, that the games meet the requirement of the fourth element that a player must pay attention and properly mark his card or run the risk of miss[ing] an opportunity to be declared a winner. 42 So. 3d at 86. HEDA argues that this requirement is met by the fact that, at the conclusion of each game, a player is given 30 seconds to physically press a numeric pattern that has been electronically selected, recorded, and displayed to him or her in the span of several seconds. This, however, is not what was intended by the fourth element, particularly when that element is read in pari materia with the other elements. The fourth element contemplates that, as alphanumeric or other designations are announced one by one, the player must 23 1130388 physically mark his or her card accordingly and can fail to pay proper attention or to properly mark his or her card, 42 So. 3d at 86, in response to an announced value at the time it is announced. The games at issue in the present case do not contemplate one-by-one physical marking of the values announced, but, instead, provide by computer a preselected winning pattern, and give the player the winning pattern in its entirety, and then give the player 30 seconds in which to press that pattern. As the State notes: [P]layers did not have to pay attention to the numbers drawn and could only mark winning patterns after the computer highlighted them for the players.10 As the trial court found, players had no control over the recognition of matching numbers or winning patterns. The computer identified matching numbers and winning patterns; the player was merely required to touch the winning numbers after the computer had identified them for the player. The trial court concluded that a game of this nature did not qualify as the game of bingo that has been described by this Court in Cornerstone and subsequent cases. We agree. 10 Further, the machines made it physically impossible to mark numbers on the grid unless the computer had identified those numbers as part of a winning pattern. 24 1130388 As to the fifth element announced in Cornerstone, the trial court found as follows: E. Recognizing a winning card and announcing before another player. While playing the machines in question the Player was not required to verbally announce to the other group of players that they had a winning pattern. In all of the games in question the individual player pushes a button to claim a prize. The evidence is clear that on these electronic devices the individual player and his play [are] controlled by computer software generated patterns which dictate the game. Each individual player is not required to identify any pattern of play to win. The player is not in control of the recognition factor. Hence there is no basis under the dictated play to verbally announce. The operation of the machines does not change the Cornerstone requirement that 'a player must recognize that his or her card has a Bingo.' HEDA argues that the trial court incorrectly injected the requirement of a verbal announcement into this element. We disagree. This, in fact, is exactly what was intended by the fifth element in Cornerstone, particularly when all six elements are read in pari materia and in the context of the fundamental principle that the game at issue is, in fact, that game commonly or traditionally known as bingo. 42 So. 3d at 86. Listening for values that are announced one by one, physically acting to mark one's card where appropriate 25 1130388 in response to each such announcement, and, upon discerning a winning pattern of markings, announc[ing] to the other players and the announcer that this is the case before any other player does so, 42 So. 3d at 86, are all part of that traditional game. Moreover, as discussed below, the sixth element expressly provides that the game is, by definition, a group activity. In reference to the sixth element, the trial court found as follows: F. The group play and player competition. Cornerstone requires a group competition where a number of players are competing against each other in order to be first to mark their card and 'Bingo.' The traditional game of bingo is a group experience and it is easy to determine through visual observation that the group is playing one against another. There is no testimony or evidence in this case that proves this type of activity. Indeed, it is clear that a single player can win the game without other competitors being physically present. While these machines are networked through a common computer interface there is no demonstrative evidence that players are competing one against another. Indeed it may be a software configuration in these machines would prevent anything other than solitary play. The designer of the computer software in question was the person who identified how these games were to be played. But, there is no evidence that the group experience was contemplated in its operation. 26 1130388 HEDA takes issue with the reference by the trial court to a player's ability to determine through visual observation that the group is playing one against another. Considering this language in context, we are clear to the conclusion that the trial court meant nothing more than what this Court itself intended when it stated in the sixth element identified in Cornerstone that [t]he game of bingo contemplates a group activity in which multiple players compete against each other to be the first to properly mark a card with the predetermined winning pattern and announce that fact. 42 So. 3d at 86. Indeed, the full text of the sentence in which appears the allegedly offending language of the trial court is as follows: [T]he traditional game of bingo is a group experience and it is easy to determine through visual observation that the group is playing one against the other. As the State argues, in the games at issue players race only 'against the computer clock,' not against other players. Merely linking various terminals through a central server is not sufficiently like the traditional game of bingo to satisfy the sixth [element]. We agree and find nothing in the trial court's conclusions as to the sixth element warranting reversal. 27 1130388 In addition to the foregoing, HEDA argues that the State, in order to satisfy its burden of proof in this action, was required to offer expert testimony concerning the operation of the electronic-gaming devices. We disagree. The State offered ample, and mostly undisputed, evidence demonstrating the actual game play on the electronic devices at issue. That testimony included direct testimony from agents who had played the electronic devices and who had personal knowledge concerning how the games played as well as video footage of the games being played.11 No expert technical testimony as to the specific operation of the circuitry or software was necessary to support the trial court's conclusions that the devices in question did not play the game commonly or traditionally known as bingo. The trial court concluded its order as follows: 11 HEDA also argues that there was no evidence indicating that the computer servers seized by the State constituted illegal gambling devices. The record, however, supports the trial court's conclusion that the computer servers seized in this case were related to the operation of the gaming machines. HEDA's own expert testified that servers were an integral part of the networked gaming systems. The testimony indicated that, as the servers at Center Stage were unplugged, the terminal screens in the gaming area began powering down or displayed a message that they were searching for the server. Furthermore, the servers bore labels such as Bingo I. 28 1130388 It is clear that in this case the test factors identified in the Cornerstone case have not been fulfilled. ... Clearly the games that the players play at the machines at issue are not the same as the traditional game known as Bingo. Not only did they not qualify with the Cornerstone test, they place the computer-generated game into an area where the inception and termination of the game is not shown to the player. Each of the individual players has no knowledge of their competitors and no ability to identify any other player that might be competing against them. There is no way of verifying another players' bingo victory and essentially all human skill has been eliminated from this animated version of the game. The devices before this Court are not the ... traditional game known as 'Bingo' as defined by the Supreme Court. [T]he Constitution is not to have a narrow or technical construction, but must be understood and enforced according to the plain, common-sense meaning of its terms. Hagan v. Commissioner's Court of Limestone Cnty., 160 Ala. 544, 554, 49 So. 417, 420 (1909). As has been noted, '[o]ur peculiar security is in the possession of a written Constitution. Let us not make it a blank paper by construction.' Cole v. Riley, 989 So. 2d 1001, 1017 (Ala. 2007) (Bolin, J., dissenting and quoting Thomas Jefferson's letter to Wilson C. Nicholas, September 7, 1803, 10 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 419). 'Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding, and should, therefore, be 29 1130388 construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which may make anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure.' Id. (quoting Jefferson's letter to Judge William Johnson, June 12, 1823, 15 The Writings of Thomas Jefferson 449-50). Further, as observed in Fraternal Order of Eagles Sheridan Aerie No. 186, Inc. v. State, 126 P.3d 847, 859 (Wyo. 2006): 'When we ascend to the bench we do not discard the ordinary common sense observations, experiences and intelligence of common men.' (Quoting 37 Gambling Devices v. State, 694 P.2d 711, 717-18 (Wyo. 1985).) In accordance with the foregoing, we reiterate today that the game traditionally known as bingo is not one played by or within an electronic or computerized machine, terminal, or server, but is one played outside of machines and electronic circuitry. It is a group activity, and one that requires a meaningful measure of human interaction and skill. This includes attentiveness and discernment and physical, visual, auditory, and verbal interaction by and between those persons who are playing and between the players and a person commonly known as the announcer or caller, who is responsible for 30 1130388 calling out the randomly drawn designations and allowing time between each call for the players to check their cards and to physically mark them accordingly. In accordance with the previously stated list of characteristics, each player purchases and plays the game on one or more cards that, in a county such as Houston County (in which the amendment does not expressly permit electronic marking machines), are not electronic devices or electronic depictions of playing surfaces but are actual physical cards made of cardboard, paper, or some functionally similar material that is flat and is preprinted with the grid and the designations referenced above. Roubingo Tables We turn now to the trial court's ruling that Roubingo did not constitute the traditional game known as bingo. The trial court held: In addition to the electronic machines found at the Center Stage facility there were also other gambling devices utilized at the facility. One of these devices was a game identified as 'Roubingo.' These games were constructed in the form of a table configured in a similar fashion as the game of roulette; however, in this case the player purchased chips from a 'table boss' and waged a bet by placing the chips on a designated portion of the table. When all bets are made the dealer draws two balls 31 1130388 from a container blower located on the table. Only these two balls are drawn and that determines the winner. The determination of the prize is designated by the call and numeric value of the number where the player has deposited his chips, that is whether the number of the B ball and the last number of the O ball correspond with the wager made by the player. Roubingo cannot be construed as the traditional Bingo game. Bingo contemplates drawing of a number of balls to determine a winning pattern. Playing this game is limited to a selection of two numbers. There is no physical marking or daubing in this specific game. Any identification or marking occurs when the chips are actually placed on the table in the respective number designation. None of the elements of Cornerstone are complied with by this device. It is illegal gambling cloaked in a 'Bingo' costume. This game is not Bingo as the Supreme Court has defined that game. HEDA argues on appeal that the Roubingo tables seized by the State in fact played the traditional game of bingo as defined by this Court in Cornerstone and that the trial court's decision is contrary to the great weight of the evidence presented at trial. We disagree. Based on our thorough review of the evidence and the testimony presented at trial, the trial court correctly ruled that the gaming devices at issue in this case did not play the game commonly or traditionally known as bingo.12 42 So. 3d at 86. 12 We do not mean to be understood as directly adopting the analysis of the trial court's order as to this issue. 32 1130388 B. Whether HEDA's property was exempt from forfeiture. Next, we turn to HEDA's argument that its property was exempt from the seizure and forfeiture provisions of Alabama's generally applicable antigambling laws, § 13A-12-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Amendment No. 569 provides that the Houston County Commission may promulgate rules and regulations for issuing permits or licenses and for operating bingo games within the county jurisdiction. On February 8, 2010, the Houston County Commission promulgated a resolution regulating the operation of bingo in Houston County. That resolution defined lawful Bingo Equipment and Supplies to include equipment used for playing electronic bingo: 'Bingo Equipment and Supplies' shall mean any electronic or mechanical equipment, machine or device, or computer or other technologic hardware or device, (i) which is installed, or is to be installed, at a bingo facility and (ii) which is used, or can be used to play Bingo as herein defined. Bingo Equipment and Supplies includes any machine, device or hardware that assists a player in the playing of Bingo Games, broadens the participation levels in a common game and includes all of the ancillary Bingo supplies. Examples of Bingo Equipment and Supplies include, but are not limited to, dispensers, readers, electronic player stations, player terminals, central computer servers containing random number generators and other processing capabilities for remote player terminals, electronic consoles capable of providing game results in different display modes, telephones and 33 1130388 telephone circuits, televisions, cables and other telecommunication circuits, and satellites and related transmitting and receiving equipment. Bingo Equipment shall not be deemed to be for any purpose a 'gambling device' or 'slot machine' within the meaning of the Code of Alabama 1975, Sections 13A- 12-20(5) and (10) or any other provision of law, whether now in effect or hereafter enacted. Resolution 10-10 (2010). The resolution further required that each electronic-gaming-device terminal operated under the resolution must bear an annually renewable machine-bingo stamp. HEDA notes that each of the electronic-gaming devices at issue in this case bore a machine-bingo stamp paid for by HEDA and issued by Houston County. HEDA calls our attention to the following portion of the implementing legislation enacted by the legislature: Any other law providing a penalty or disability on a person who conducts or participates in bingo games, who possesses equipment used in conducting bingo, who permits bingo to be conducted on his or her premises, or who does other acts in connection with bingo, shall not apply to the conduct when done pursuant to this act or rules promulgated under this act. § 45-35-150.15, Ala. Code 1975. HEDA contends that, because the electronic devices seized by the State were equipment used in conducting bingo ... pursuant to ... rules promulgated under this act, the equipment was not subject to forfeiture 34 1130388 under § 13A-12-30. Accordingly, HEDA argues, the State's forfeiture action under § 13A-12-30 failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and should have been dismissed. We disagree. Section 45-35-150.15 exempts persons from penalties associated with the operation or participation in bingo games as authorized by Amendment No. 569. In determining what constitutes a lawful bingo game under Amendment No. 569, this Court applies the analysis originally articulated in Cornerstone and summarized in Part III.A above. Notwithstanding a resolution to the contrary, to the extent that a gaming device does not meet the definition of bingo as authorized by Amendment No. 569, it remains a lottery prohibited under § 65 of the Constitution and, consequently, punishable under Alabama's generally applicable antigambling laws. In this case we affirm the trial court's holding that the gaming devices seized from Center Stage do not play the game of bingo as permitted by Amendment No. 569. Accordingly, the property in question was subject to forfeiture under § 13A-12-30. C. Whether the use of electronic-gaming devices in Houston County has been judicially validated. 35 1130388 Next, HEDA argues that the use of electronic devices for playing bingo in Houston County has been judicially validated. HEDA's brief, at 29. Specifically, HEDA refers to a bond-validation proceeding related to the issuance of revenue bonds for the purpose of raising money to fund the multi-use entertainment complex known as the Country Crossing Project in Houston County, which would eventually include Center Stage. In 2008, the Houston County Commission established a public corporation known as the Cooperative District of Houston County for the purposes of issuing revenue bonds to develop the Country Crossing Project. A key component of the planned Country Crossing Project was an electronic-gaming center, and the revenue bonds were to be repaid, in part, by a special fee on each charity bingo machine operated within the project.13 The Cooperative District filed a bond-validation petition in the Houston Circuit Court pursuant to § 11-81-221, Ala. Code 1975. That statute allows a public corporation to 13 The bond-validation order provided that the bonds would be payable, in part, from the Entertainment Fees to be imposed by the Cooperative District on each and every charity bingo machine operated within the Cooperative District at a rate of $1,312 per machine per year. 36 1130388 determine its authority to issue ... obligations and the legality of all proceedings had or taken in connection therewith, and the validity of the tax or other revenues or means provided for the payment thereof. In October 2009, the Houston Circuit Court entered a final judgment confirming the validity and enforceability of the bonds issued for the Country Crossing Project. Upon the entry of a judgment validating the issuance of obligations issued under § 11-81220 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, Alabama law provides: [T]he judgment of the circuit court validating and confirming the issuance of the obligations shall be forever conclusive as to the validity of such obligations against the unit issuing them and against all taxpayers and citizens of each organizing subdivision, and the validity of such obligations or of the tax, revenues or other means provided for their payment and of any pledge, covenant or provision for the benefit of said obligations, to the extent that the validity of any such pledge, covenant or provision shall have been presented to the court and validated by its judgment, shall never be called in question in any court in this state. § 11-81-224, Ala. Code 1975. Center Stage was constructed as part of the Country Crossing Project. HEDA therefore contends that the Houston Circuit Court's order validating the bonds used to finance the Country Crossing Project and approving the repayment of the 37 1130388 bonds from fees imposed on each and every charity bingo machine served as a forever conclusive judicial validation of HEDA's electronic-gaming operation. We disagree. The final judgment in the bond-validation proceeding did not in any way decide the central legal issue before the trial court in this case -– the legality of the specific gaming devices operated by HEDA and seized by the State. The purpose of the bond-validation proceeding was to put to rest any question affecting the validity of the bonds. The legality of certain gaming machines or devices was plainly not a subject of those proceedings. Accordingly, we reject HEDA's contention that the judgment in the bond-validation proceeding is in any way dispositive of any issue in this case.14