Opinion ID: 1853364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Refusal to Reinstate.

Text: Rule 215.1 is written with both mandatory and discretionary grounds for reinstatement. See 2 A. Vestal and P. Willson, Iowa Practice § 44:04, at 374 (1984 rev.). The object and purpose of the rule is to discourage dilatory tactics and require `reasonable diligence' to see that court actions are brought to trial promptly.... Baty v. City of West Des Moines, 259 Iowa 1017, 1022-23, 147 N.W.2d 204, 208 (1966); see Glenn v. Farmland Foods, Inc., 344 N.W.2d 240, 244 (Iowa 1984). A. Plaintiff contends the trial court's refusal to reinstate this action infringed her right to reinstatement under the rule's mandatory language: The trial court ... shall upon a showing that such dismissal was the result of oversight, mistake or other reasonable cause, reinstate the action or actions so dismissed. To support reinstatement under this portion of the rule, plaintiff relies heavily on Rath v. Sholty, 199 N.W.2d 333 (Iowa 1972), where we found the circumstances mandated reinstatement. We first pointed out that the trial court's factual findings are binding on us if supported by substantial evidence in the record, although the ultimate determination whether the factual situation constitutes oversight, mistake or other reasonable cause presents a question of law. Id. at 336. We explained that oversight is similar to excusable neglect but is not gross neglect or willful procrastination. Id. We held in Rath, on essentially undisputed facts, that the plaintiff was entitled to reinstatement because his lawyer was diligently seeking a trial assignment of this cause, not a continuance, and the judge indicated he was retaining the burden of letting counsel know about the assignment. Id. at 337. The plaintiff in Rath thereby established that the dismissal resulted from an oversight and that he had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to bring the case to trial. The circumstances in Rath were unlike the facts in this case. In Rath, the plaintiff was seeking assignment of the case for trial. Here the plaintiff had not undertaken to obtain a trial date and was not ready for trial even though the case had been dismissed and reinstated many months earlier. The trial court accurately concluded that there had been a lack of any meaningful activity and a complete lack of effort on plaintiff's counsel to actively seek a trial date. Much of the activity plaintiff referred to in her second application for reinstatement was not adequately documented. Much of the activity consisted of actions undertaken by defendants' counsel. Plaintiff's brief candidly discloses that as late as December of 1985, when defendant's counsel thought another dismissal was imminent, plaintiff was seeking not to try the case but merely to obtain a further continuance past January. The district court did not overlook the plaintiff's allegation of oversight but wisely looked beyond that factor and based its ruling on the extent to which the plaintiff had undertaken sufficient meaningful activity to comply with the spirit and purpose of rule 215.1. The oversight claimed by plaintiff did not cause dismissal, it merely caused plaintiff's counsel to delay by five months her filing of one more request for continuance. The first paragraph of rule 215.1 mandates that litigants exercise reasonable diligence in prosecuting civil actions. A person seeking a continuance to avoid a rule 215.1 dismissal must either prove one of the six exceptional circumstances separately listed in the rule (none of which here applies) or must prove that the case has not been processed to final disposition notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence. A person, like plaintiff here, who has failed to seek a continuance and attempts to reinstate a dismissed case must certainly prove no less. See Glenn, 344 N.W.2d at 244; Baty, 259 Iowa at 1022-23, 147 N.W.2d at 208. To establish the right to reinstatement she requested under the mandatory portion of rule 215.1, the plaintiff was required to demonstrate both oversight, mistake or other reasonable cause and the exercise of reasonable diligence. Rule 215.1, after all, was designed not to produce a stream of continuances or requests for reinstatement but to produce activity that fairly and promptly moves cases to trial or other final disposition. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that she was entitled to a reinstatement of her action under the mandatory portion of rule 215.1. B. We turn to the plaintiff's contention that the district court should have granted the discretionary reinstatement she requested in the alternative. The district court does have the authority to reinstate a dismissed case even if dismissal was not a result of oversight, mistake or other reasonable cause, but as with the mandatory portion of the rule a prerequisite to reinstatement is the plaintiff's showing of reasonable diligence. The district court has a duty to exercise discretion in considering any application to reinstate. Johnson, 184 N.W.2d at 683. The district court should measure any discretionary reinstatement by the policies described in Glenn, 344 N.W.2d at 244: We must balance the tension between the goal of protecting each plaintiff's day in court, and the useful purpose of rule 215.1 in preventing unnecessary delays and compelling expeditious determinations of the issues.... The plaintiff has pointed to no special circumstances, however, that suggest the trial court abused its discretion in denying reinstatement. Plaintiff essentially makes the same arguments for discretionary reinstatement that she has presented in her unsuccessful bid for a mandatory reinstatement. We find the district court exercised sound discretion in denying the plaintiff's second motion for reinstatement. AFFIRMED.