Opinion ID: 2495239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Additional Claims Against the City

Text: Walker asserts three final claims against the City: malicious prosecution, the tort of outrage, and invasion of privacy, all based on the City's continued prosecution of Walker after she provided proof of her medical condition. All three claims alleging intentional torts are barred under § 11-47-190, which limits the liability of a municipality to injuries suffered through the neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness of some agent. In Neighbors v. City of Birmingham, 384 So.2d 113 (Ala.1980), this Court held that a city could not be held liable for malicious prosecution. The Court reasoned: Section 11-47-190 remains the pertinent legislative enactment. It limits the liability of municipalities to injuries suffered through `neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness.' To construe that language to include an action for malicious prosecution would be to expand the words beyond their normal meaning. This we decline to do. 384 So.2d at 114. This Court expressly affirmed that holding in Franklin v. City of Huntsville, 670 So.2d 848, 852 (Ala.1995) (This court therefore affirms the holding of Neighbors . . . that a municipality is immune from a malicious prosecution claim. . . .). Accordingly, under § 11-47-190, the City cannot be held liable on Walker's claim of malicious prosecution, and the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment for the City on that claim. Regarding the tort of outrage, this Court has stated: In order to recover, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct `(1) was intentional or reckless; (2) was extreme and outrageous; and (3) caused emotional distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.' Green Tree Acceptance, Inc. v. Standridge, 565 So.2d 38, 44 (Ala. 1990) Potts v. Hayes, 771 So.2d 462, 465 (Ala. 2000). The tort of outrage is, therefore, an intentional tort. Because the City, under § 11-47-190, may be liable only for acts of neglect, carelessness or unskillfulness, the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment for the City on Walker's tort-of-outrage claim. Finally, it is undisputed that Walker's claim of invasion of privacy is based on the City's allegedly putting her in a false light by proceeding with its prosecution of her. This Court has stated the following regarding a claim of invasion of privacy by putting one in a false light: ``One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if ``(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and ``(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed. ''  Butler v. Town of Argo, 871 So.2d 1, 12 (Ala.2003) (quoting Schifano v. Greene County Greyhound Park, Inc., 624 So.2d 178, 180 (Ala.1993), quoting in turn Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (1977)). S.B. v. Saint James School, 959 So.2d 72, 79 (Ala.2006) (emphasis added). Because this claim requires proof that the City's agent acted knowingly or recklessly, it also falls outside those acts of neglect, carelessness, or unskillfulness for which the City may be liable under § 11-47-190. Accordingly, the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment in the City's favor on this claim as well. Based on the foregoing, the City is not immune from liability on Walker's claim against it based on the alleged negligence of the jail nurse. However, Walker's remaining claims against the City, Chief Owens, and Officers Watkins and Rosser are barred under the doctrines of State-agent and municipal immunity, and the trial court correctly entered a summary judgment on those claims.