Opinion ID: 4188232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: [3] An evidentiary hearing on a motion for postconviction relief must be granted when the motion contains factual allegations which, if proved, constitute an infringement of the movant’s rights under the Nebraska or federal Constitution. However, if the motion alleges only conclusions of fact or law, or the records and files in the case affirmatively show 4 State v. Nolan, 292 Neb. 118, 870 N.W.2d 806 (2015); State v. Cook, 290 Neb. 381, 860 N.W.2d 408 (2015). 5 State v. Harris, 292 Neb. 186, 871 N.W.2d 762 (2015); State v. Thorpe, 290 Neb. 149, 858 N.W.2d 880 (2015). 6 State v. Molina, 279 Neb. 405, 778 N.W.2d 713 (2010). - 928 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. ROSS Cite as 296 Neb. 923 that the movant is entitled to no relief, no evidentiary hearing is required.7 Constitutional Challenges A re Procedurally Barred [4,5] In his first four assignments of error, Ross alleges the district court erred in failing to grant an evidentiary hearing on his allegations raising direct constitutional challenges to § 28-1212.04. We conclude the district court properly found these allegations were procedurally barred, because they could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal. Postconviction relief is a very narrow category of relief available only to remedy prejudicial constitutional violations.8 A motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to secure review of issues which were or could have been litigated on direct appeal.9 We therefore affirm the denial of postconviction relief as to the direct constitutional challenges. Counsel Was Not Ineffective [6] Although a motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to secure review of issues which were or could have been litigated on direct appeal, when a defendant was represented both at trial and on direct appeal by the same lawyer, the defendant’s first opportunity to assert ineffective assistance of counsel is in a motion for postconviction relief.10 Ross’ ineffective assistance of counsel claim is properly before us. [7,8] To establish a right to postconviction relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant has 7 State v. Ware, 292 Neb. 24, 870 N.W.2d 637 (2015); State v. Sellers, 290 Neb. 18, 858 N.W.2d 577 (2015). 8 State v. Hessler, 282 Neb. 935, 807 N.W.2d 504 (2011). 9 State v. Sellers, supra note 7; State v. Marshall, 269 Neb. 56, 690 N.W.2d 593 (2005). 10 State v. Armendariz, 289 Neb. 896, 857 N.W.2d 775 (2015); State v. Robinson, 285 Neb. 394, 827 N.W.2d 292 (2013). - 929 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. ROSS Cite as 296 Neb. 923 the burden, in accordance with Strickland v. Washington,11 to show that counsel’s performance was deficient; that is, counsel’s performance did not equal that of a lawyer with ordinary training and skill in criminal law.12 Next, the defendant must show that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense in his or her case.13 Under the Strickland v. Washington framework, a court may address the two elements, deficient performance and prejudice, in either order.14 Ross makes a novel argument in this regard based on Hall v. State.15 In Hall, the defendant, after being convicted of second degree murder, attempted to challenge the constitutionality of the Nebraska homicide statutes via declaratory judgment. We held the procedure was improper because declaratory judgment does not lie where another equally serviceable remedy is available. We stated: This [constitutional] issue could have been raised by conventional forms of remedy within the criminal prosecution. In a criminal prosecution, a defendant can bring a constitutional challenge to the facial validity of the statute under which he or she is charged by filing a motion to quash or a demurrer. . . . In the event the defendant’s counsel fails to make such a challenge, the defendant can allege ineffective assistance of counsel either on direct appeal or in an action for postconviction relief.16 Ross argues that this language from Hall established a rule that any time counsel fails to file a motion to quash challenging the constitutionality of a statute, a defendant has a valid 11 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). 12 State v. Armendariz, supra note 10. 13 Id. 14 State v. Torres, 295 Neb. 830, 894 N.W.2d 191 (2017). 15 Hall v. State, 264 Neb. 151, 646 N.W.2d 572 (2002). 16 Id. at 158, 646 N.W.2d at 578. - 930 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. ROSS Cite as 296 Neb. 923 ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a postconviction action. We disagree. Hall simply recognized the proper procedure for raising a constitutional claim within a criminal prosecution—it spoke to the procedure for alleging such claims. It did not, as Ross suggests, presume the validity of such claims. Whenever a claim of ineffective assistance is raised, a court must analyze whether the defendant has sufficiently alleged deficient performance resulting in prejudice.17 We focus here on whether Ross has sufficiently alleged that his trial and appellate counsel performed deficiently. Ross’ postconviction motion alleged his counsel was deficient for failing to raise a constitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04. [9] We addressed a nearly identical postconviction claim in State v. Sanders.18 There, we held that trial counsel did not perform in a deficient manner when he failed to raise a constitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04. We reasoned “counsel’s failure to raise novel legal theories or arguments or to make novel constitutional challenges in order to bring a change in existing law does not constitute deficient performance.”19 That same rationale applies to this case. Ross was tried in 2010, and his direct appeal was decided in 2012. At that time, no appellate court had been presented with a constitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04. We decided Sanders 2 years later. Given our holding in Sanders that counsel’s failure to raise a novel constitutional challenge to § 28-1212.04 did not constitute deficient performance, we fail to see how Ross’ trial counsel could be found deficient for not asserting such a challenge even earlier. [10] “‘The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent attorney. It does not [e]nsure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable 17 See Strickland v. Washington, supra note 11. 18 State v. Sanders, supra note 3. 19 Id. at 343, 855 N.W.2d at 357. - 931 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 296 Nebraska R eports STATE v. ROSS Cite as 296 Neb. 923 constitutional claim.’”20 Ross’ postconviction motion did not contain factual allegations which would constitute deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington. No evidentiary hearing was required.21