Opinion ID: 2021311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discovery and the Preliminary Examination

Text: ś 26 We begin with discovery because of the character of the information the defendant seeks. Schaefer's Subpoena and Certificate of Appearance uses Form 126. His document adds the words Duces Tecum under the form's heading. The subpoena is issued to Chief of Brookfield Police Department or Designee. (Emphasis added.) It demands that the witness bring [a] complete copy of all reports, memorandums, witness interviews and any records related to the investigation and arrest of Ronald Schaefer on suspected criminal offenses or relating to his alleged sexual assault of Kerry M. DOB 4/6/76 in 1990. ś 27 The expansive swath of Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum and the subpoena's indifference regarding which person should appear with the requested information immediately raise questions about the subpoena's purpose. Because Schaefer makes no showing of a particularized need of information for the preliminary examination, his demand to inspect law enforcement files amounts to generalized, unrestricted discovery. This court decided in Lynch that giving defendants the right to compulsory inspection of the state's files before the preliminary examination will impede the orderly process of discovery prescribed by statute, unjustifiably delay the administration of justice, and needlessly complicate the relatively informal procedures of the preliminary examination. Lynch, 82 Wis.2d at 466, 262 N.W.2d 773. [6] ś 28 The Wisconsin Statutes do not define the term discovery. [7] As a result, we must refer to other authority. ś 29 Black's Law Dictionary defines discovery as [t]he act or process of finding or learning something that was previously unknown and  [c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party's request, of information that relates to the litigation. Black's Law Dictionary 478 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added). The first definition is general; the second relates specifically to legal proceedings. The California Supreme Court commented on the difference in Arnett v. Dal Cielo, 14 Cal.4th 4, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 706, 923 P.2d 1, 10-11 (1996), in a discussion of civil discovery: [The word discover can be used] in its general sense of finding something out by search or observation. . . . [D]iscovery also has a specific legal meaning, to wit, the formal exchange of evidentiary information and materials between parties to a pending action. The two meanings of the word are well recognized in the dictionaries. Thus a leading legal dictionary first defines discovery to mean,  In a general sense, the ascertainment of that which was previously unknown; the disclosure or coming to light of what was previously hidden. . . . (Black's Law Dict. (6th ed. 1990) p. 466). But the same work also defines the word [discovery] in its specifically legal sense, as [t]he pretrial devices that can be used by one party to obtain facts and information about the case from the other party in order to assist the party's preparation for trial, . . . Even nonlegal dictionaries draw this distinction . . . 3. Law. Data or documents that a party to a legal action is compelled to disclose to another party either prior to or during a proceeding. (Am. Heritage Dict. (2d college ed. 1985) p. 403). ś 30 Discovery, in the legal sense, is distinguishable from less formal information-gathering techniques. Discovery is grounded in statute or court rule, is designed to avoid unfairness and surprise in litigation, and may be enforced by judicial orders and sanctions. As a result, discovery, in the legal sense, is subject to reasonable terms and limitations as to timing, convenience, cost, methodology, privilege, and purpose. This is especially true of discovery in criminal cases, for criminal discovery operates on different principles from civil discovery. In criminal discovery, the stakes are different, the purposes are different, the procedures are different, and the disclosure of information is understandably not reciprocal. ś 31 The essence of discovery for purposes of analysis here is [c]ompulsory disclosure, at a party's request, of information that relates to the litigation. Black's Law Dictionary 478 (7th ed. 1999). Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum seeks to compel a law enforcement agency to produce information and material relate[d] to the litigation before the preliminary examination. Id. Hence, Schaefer is using the subpoena duces tecum as a discovery tool. ś 32 We turn now to the preliminary examination. There is no constitutional right to a preliminary examination. State v. Williams, 198 Wis.2d 516, 525, 544 N.W.2d 406 (1996). The right to such an examination stems purely from statute. State ex rel. Klinkiewicz v. Duffy, 35 Wis.2d 369, 373, 151 N.W.2d 63 (1967). As noted above, Wis. Stat. § 970.03 provides a preliminary examination for the specific purpose of determining whether there is probable cause to believe a felony has been committed by the defendant. Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1). ś 33 The independent screening function of the preliminary examination serves as a check on the prosecutorial power of the executive branch. An accused has the option to assure that the hearing is scheduled expeditiously so that he may be discharged quickly if the government cannot justify its right to go forward. Klinkiewicz, 35 Wis.2d at 373, 151 N.W.2d 63. ś 34 We examined the scope of the preliminary examination in State v. Dunn, 121 Wis.2d 389, 359 N.W.2d 151 (1984). We emphasized that a preliminary hearing as to probable cause is not a preliminary trial or a full evidentiary trial on the issue of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 396, 359 N.W.2d 151 (citing State v. Hooper, 101 Wis.2d 517, 544, 305 N.W.2d 110 (1981)). Rather, the preliminary examination is intended to be a summary proceeding to determine essential or basic facts as to probability. Dunn, 121 Wis.2d at 396-97, 359 N.W.2d 151. [A] preliminary hearing is not a proper forum to choose between conflicting facts or inferences, or to weigh the state's evidence against evidence favorable to the defendant. Id. at 398, 359 N.W.2d 151. The preliminary examination is not a mini-trial on the facts; its purpose is merely to determine whether there is sufficient evidence that charges against a defendant should go forward. See id. ś 35 Significantly, a defendant may present evidence at a preliminary examination. Wis. Stat. § 970.03(5). [8] He may call witnesses to rebut the plausibility of a witness's story and probability that a felony was committed. See Dunn, 121 Wis.2d at 396-98, 359 N.W.2d 151. In this regard, the defendant must have compulsory process to assure the appearance of his witnesses and their relevant evidence. ś 36 However, a defendant's right to present evidence at a preliminary examination is not boundless. In State v. Knudson, 51 Wis.2d 270, 187 N.W.2d 321 (1971), we held that Knudson's attempt to call two witnesses â the victim's mother and the chief of police â was an effort to expose inconsistencies in the accounts given by the victim to various people and impermissible at the preliminary examination. Id. at 280-81, 187 N.W.2d 321. After the victim testified to the factual basis for the charge of child enticement, Knudson sought to impugn the victim's credibility and, in the process, gain some valuable information for his defense by presenting contradictory testimony. Id. at 281, 187 N.W.2d 321. The court described this as pretrial discovery beyond the role of the preliminary examination. Id. See also State ex rel. Funmaker v. Klamm, 106 Wis.2d 624, 630, 317 N.W.2d 458 (1982) (observing that possible weaknesses in [the witness's] identification are matters affecting . . . weight and credibility and not subjects for the preliminary examination). ś 37 Because the statutory purpose of the preliminary examination is narrowly focused upon a determination of probable cause, Wis. Stat. § 970.03(1), a defendant's right to present evidence at the hearing is limited to essential facts as to probability that the alleged offense occurred. Knudson, 51 Wis.2d at 280, 187 N.W.2d 321 (citing State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 Wis.2d 223, 228, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968)). This means that although a defendant may subpoena witnesses and evidence for the preliminary examination, see Wis. Stat. §§ 973.03(5), 972.11(1), and 885.01, his subpoena may be quashed, a witness may not be allowed to testify, or evidence may be excluded if the defendant is unable to show the relevance of the testimony or evidence to the rebut probable cause. ś 38 When a defendant's subpoena duces tecum seeks all investigatory material in the possession of the police, and the subpoena is returnable before the preliminary examination, the subpoena is fishing for elements of the state's case, see Knudson, 51 Wis.2d at 280, 187 N.W.2d 321, and is not proper. ś 39 We do not see how Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum aimed at securing [a] complete copy of all reports, memorandums, witness interviews and any records related to the investigation and arrest of Ronald Schaefer can be viewed as a narrow attempt to secure essential information to rebut the State's showing of probable cause. (Emphasis added.) It is plainly an attempt to effect discovery. ś 40 To summarize, we conclude that the purpose of a preliminary examination is limited to an expeditious determination of whether probable cause exists for the state to proceed with felony charges against a defendant. The limited purpose of the preliminary examination does not permit a criminal defendant to compel discovery in anticipation of the hearing. Schaefer's subpoena duces tecum in the instant case is an effort to effect discovery.