Opinion ID: 574278
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Civil Rights Claims

Text: 35 Appellant alleges that appellees have discriminated against him on racial grounds by subjecting him to the monitoring and supervision agreement and by refusing to act on his application for reappointment to the Medical Staff. We find that these claims are also ripe for adjudication and, on remand, should be considered on the merits. 36 If, as alleged, appellees have discriminated against appellant on the basis of race in their imposition of the monitoring and supervision agreement, this action would arguably give rise to private causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and/or 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1985, as well as the relevant provisions of the District of Columbia Code. 11 The district court held, however, that the terms of the agreement could not be a source of injury to appellant because he entered into it voluntarily. Mem. op. at 9. We think the district court erred in making that finding on voluntariness. The question of whether under all the attendant circumstances appellant voluntarily entered into the monitoring and supervision agreement is clearly a matter of dispute between the parties, and thus determinable only after an adversary hearing. 37 Although appellant actually signed the monitoring agreement, the language of the accompanying letter from the Hospital clearly shows that he signed it to avoid termination of his hospital privileges. The letter states: 38 [p]ursuant to the recommendation of the Executive Committee at the meeting with you on August 21, 1989, the summary suspension of your privileges will be rescinded. The rescission becomes effective when you return the signed [monitoring agreement]. 39 Letter from Medical Staff President to Appellant (Aug. 23, 1989) (emphasis supplied). Had appellant not signed the letter, the rescission would not have become effective and his hospital privileges would have been terminated immediately. Certainly if appellant is able to prove that the original termination was illegally motivated, it could not be said that he voluntarily entered into an agreement designed to rescind that unlawful termination. 12 The voluntariness issue was clearly in dispute and should not have been resolved on a motion to dismiss. 40 Appellant also alleges civil rights violations and injury in the failure of the Hospital to act on his application for reappointment to the Medical Staff. If racial animus animated that refusal, he has arguably suffered an additional injury cognizable under the civil rights laws. 13 In sum, then, appellant's allegations of civil rights violations appear to present no threshold jurisdictional obstacles to adjudication. 41 Appellees, however, again raise prudential objections to their consideration. And, at least insofar as the monitoring and supervision agreement is concerned, the district court agreed, finding that even if it did in fact injure appellant, his claim was not ripe because the agreement was not a permanent or final action since the Hospital might rescind it upon completion of the termination process. Mem. op. at 9. The district court assumed, in effect, an exhaustion requirement whereby a party suffering allegedly discriminatory treatment must await the outcome of an internal institutional appeal before pursuing a civil rights claim in federal court. 42 This premise is not in accord with relevant precedents. A private party alleging federal civil rights violations need not pursue internal administrative remedies before pressing a claim in federal court. See Doe on Behalf of Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 425 (7th Cir.1986); Donaldson v. Taylor Products Div. of Tecumseh Products Co., 620 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir.1980) (there is no exhaustion requirement under either of the civil rights acts); Smallwood v. National Can Co., 583 F.2d 419, 421 (9th Cir.1978) ([t]here is no duty to exhaust union remedies as a precondition to suit under Title VII); Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 57 (5th Cir.1972) (aggrieved employees may seek relief under Title VII without first invoking or exhausting available alternative legal or contractual remedies). In Doe on Behalf of Doe v. St. Joseph's Hospital, supra, a woman doctor of Korean descent sued a hospital alleging, inter alia, that the hospital suspended her medical staff privileges on account of racial and gender animus in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Before filing her federal suit, however, she had not appealed the Executive Committee's affirmance of her suspension in accordance with hospital bylaws. The hospital argued therefore that the district court properly dismissed her civil rights claims because she had failed to exhaust her internal administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit expressly rejected this argument, holding that exhaustion of remedies does not apply to claims under § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or, for that matter, any of the federal civil rights laws. See Doe, 788 F.2d at 425-26. 43 Appellant has alleged violations of the federal civil rights laws and resulting injuries stemming from the terms of the monitoring agreement and the Hospital's refusal to promptly reappoint him to the Medical Staff. His claims appear to be ripe for adjudication and the district court should consider them on the merits. 44