Opinion ID: 1248471
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on Count One

Text: We turn now to the more difficult question of whether the government offered evidence sufficient to prove the charges alleged in Count One.
As we stated above, evidence that wire transmissions occur in the usual course of business will not show sufficiently that a particular wire transmission occurred when the evidence suggests a deviation from usual practice. See, e.g., Swinson, 993 F.2d at 1300-02. Just such a deviation occurred on July 16, 2002, when, at CHHS's request for quick payment, the VA transferred funds to Ratliff-White's account using a poorly understood off line process. Since the VA deviated from its standard practice in order to expedite payment to CHHS, the prosecution could not rely on Merculief's testimony regarding the standard payment procedure to prove that payment instructions were transmitted from Hyattsville, Maryland to Dallas, Texas on July 16, 2002, as alleged in Count One. Ratliff-White contends that this flaw is fatal to the government's case on Count One, and compels the automatic reversal of the guilty verdict on that count. We do not agree. The defendant's position ignores the foundational question of prejudice. The defendant does not deny that there was a fraud. She admits that wire transmissions  transmissions that furthered the scheme  occurred on the dates charged, stating [t]here is no dispute that payments were wired from the Federal Reserve Bank in Dallas, Texas to the defendants' bank account. But, for whatever reason, that is not the interstate wire transmission with which Ms. Ratliff-White was charged. Defendant's Reply Br. at 13. And, she unquestionably foresaw (i.e., caused) those wire transmissions, because she, Norwood, and Norwood's daughter established a bank account where they wanted the VA to deposit CHHS's payments. The proof at trial established a glaring violation of the federal wire fraud statute. Instead of disclaiming participation in a wire fraud, then, the defendant resorts to arguing that the government failed to prove the precise step in the July payment process alleged in Count One. Specifically, we understand the defendant to be contending that she was prejudiced by either a constructive amendment to the indictment or a variance between the indictment and proof at trial. Constructive amendments and variances can imperil a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her and her Sixth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury. [4] See Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 215-16, 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960); United States v. Pigee, 197 F.3d 879, 886 (7th Cir.1999); United States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 817 (7th Cir.1985). A variance between indictment and proof exists when the terms of the indictment are unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir.1984) (citation omitted); see United States v. Willoughby, 27 F.3d 263, 265 (7th Cir.1994); Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 598-99 (10th Cir. 1990). [A] variance is fatal only when the defendant is prejudiced in his defense because he cannot anticipate from the indictment what evidence will be presented against him or is exposed to the risk of double jeopardy. Hunter, 916 F.2d at 599; United States v. Kuna, 760 F.2d 813, 819 (7th Cir.1985). A constructive amendment to an indictment: is found where a complex set of facts is presented to the jury during the trial which is distinctly different from the set of facts set forth in the charging instrument. Alternatively, to find a constructive amendment the crime charged in the indictment must be materially different or substantially altered at trial, [so that] it is impossible to know whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved. Kuna, 760 F.2d at 818 (citations omitted); Pigee, 197 F.3d at 886. The line distinguishing variances from constructive amendments essentially is between the situation in which different evidence supports the charged crime [as with a variance] and that in which the evidence supports a crime other than that charged [as with an amendment]. United States v. Pisello, 877 F.2d 762, 765 (9th Cir.1989); see United States v. Patterson, 348 F.3d 218, 227 (7th Cir.2003); Willoughby, 27 F.3d at 265-66. While there exists only a `rather shadowy distinction' between amendments and variances, a finding of one rather than the other achieves a crystal clear difference in result: `amendments have been held to be prejudicial per se, while variances may be subject to the harmless error rule.' Kuna, 760 F.2d at 817 (citations omitted); Pisello, 877 F.2d at 765 (Although . . . an amendment[ ] requires reversal, . . . a variance[ ] does not warrant reversal unless it affects the substantial rights of the defendant.). We turn now to that distinction for guidance, looking first at case law on constructive amendments and then at the law of variances. In Stirone v. United States , the Supreme Court found a constructive amendment where the indictment charged the defendant only with interfering with the importation of sand, yet the trial evidence also went to prove a qualitatively different violation of the Hobbs Act  the interference with the possible exportation of steel. 361 U.S. at 217, 80 S.Ct. 270. Noting that after an indictment has been returned its charges may not be broadened through amendment except by the grand jury itself, id. at 215-16, 80 S.Ct. 270, and that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment against him, id. at 217, 80 S.Ct. 270, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction, id. 219, 80 S.Ct. 270. There was simply no way of knowing whether a grand jury satisfied to charge that Stirone's conduct interfered with interstate importation of sand, would have been willing to charge that Stirone's conduct would interfere with interstate exportation of steel from a mill later to be built. . . . Id. at 217, 80 S.Ct. 270. By contrast, when confronted with a case resembling this one, the Second Circuit in United States v. Dupre, 462 F.3d 131 (2d Cir.2006), found a variance, not a constructive amendment of the indictment, and affirmed the defendants' convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Id. at 140-41. There, the defendants engaged in an advance fee fraud, whereby they told investors that they were working to release frozen funds owed to the family of former Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos. Id. at 135. Investors were promised that in exchange for their $1,000 contributions to the effort to release the funds, they would ultimately receive $500,000. Id. Although the indictment charged that the defendants caused an investor to wire approximately $2,000 via Western Union from Liberty Township, Ohio to New York, New York, and that fact was not proved at trial, the court nonetheless affirmed the defendants' convictions based on proof unequivocally establishing that other interstate transmissions occurred in furtherance of the scheme. Id. at 140 n. 10 (emphasis omitted). The court reasoned that: the prosecution did not constructively amend Count Two because the evidence at trial concerned the same elaborate scheme to defraud investors as was described in the indictment. The starting and ending dates of the conspiracy noted in the indictment correspond to the conspiracy proven at trial, and the evidence at trial demonstrated that defendants misled investors into believing that defendants would eventually be able to obtain the frozen funds purportedly belonging to the family of former Filipino president Ferdinand Marcos described in the indictment. There was, however, clearly a variance because the particular wire transfer identified in the indictment was not proven at trial. Id. at 140-41; see also United States v. Momeni, 991 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir.1993); Pisello, 877 F.2d at 765; United States v. Von Stoll, 726 F.2d 584, 586 (9th Cir.1984). So too here. In this case, the superseding indictment charged that Ratliff-White knowingly devised, intended to devise, and participated in a scheme to defraud and obtain money from the United States of America, through the Department of Veterans Affairs, by means of materially false and fraudulent pretenses. . . . In particular, the indictment alleged that from in or about July 2002 to August 2002, defendant RATLIFF-WHITE and defendant NORWOOD caused the VA to deposit approximately $32,100 in funds representing payment for services purportedly performed by Compassionate Home Health Services into the account that they jointly owned at TCF National Bank, well knowing that Compassionate Home Health Services was a fictitious company and had not provided any such services. The proof at trial established exactly that. Therefore, we conclude, just as the Second Circuit did in Dupre, that the prosecution did not constructively amend [the indictment] because the evidence at trial concerned the same elaborate scheme to defraud [the United States] as was described in the indictment. Dupre, 462 F.3d at 140-41. Further, the starting and ending dates of the scheme noted in the indictment and proved at trial are identical. See id. And the evidence adduced at trial showed that, as described in the indictment, the defendant caused the VA to deposit approximately $32,100 in funds representing payment for services purportedly performed by Compassionate Home Health Services into the account . . . at TCF National Bank, well knowing that Compassionate Home Health Services . . . had not provided any such services. See id. Moreover, this case presents facts even more compelling than those of Dupre. In Dupre, the court recognized that the wire transmission actually proved at trial was not mentioned in the indictment at all. Dupre, 462 F.3d at 142. But here, the indictment expressly references the wire transmissions proved at trial  deposits totaling $32,100 into the account Ratliff-White shared with Norwood and her daughter. We need not wonder whether the grand jury would have indicted for the crime actually proved, Kuna, 760 F.2d at 818, because it did. And importantly, unlike Dupre, this case concerns only one true transfer that involved a particular payer (the VA) and payee (CHHS). Although the indictment anticipated that the transfer would require multiple steps and highlighted one of those steps, the overarching transfer discussed in the indictment was proved at trial. In Dupre, however, the transfer charged in the indictment and that proved at trial were completely different as they involved entirely different payers. Finding no constructive amendment of the indictment, we consider whether the facts suggest a fatal variance. These facts evince a variance between Count One, which pinpointed a particular step in the payment process, and the proof at trial, which established another. But, every instance in which we find a variance between indictment and proof does not require reversal. Indeed, [a] variance between allegation and proof is not fatal unless the defendant has been thereby deprived of an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense or has been exposed to a risk of being prosecuted twice for the same offense. Kuna, 760 F.2d at 819 (citations omitted). In Dupre, the Second Circuit considered that question and found that the proof of a wire transmission different from that alleged in the indictment was not prejudicial. Count Two of the indictment in that case charged that the defendants caused an investor to wire approximately $2,000 via Western Union from Liberty Township, Ohio to New York, New York. 462 F.3d at 140 n. 10 (emphasis omitted). Instead of proving the transfer of $2,000 from Liberty Township, Ohio to New York, New York, however, the Second Circuit found that the evidence at trial established several other wire transfers to the Southern District of New York in furtherance of the fraud, including a $2,000 transfer from Irving, Texas to New York, New York during the period alleged in the indictment. Id. at 141. The court concluded that the defendants were not prejudiced by this variance. First, the court found that the defendants had notice sufficient to defend themselves: The description of the scheme in the indictment put defendants on notice that the prosecution aimed to prove that defendants conspired in the Southern District of New York to fraudulently induce investors to transfer money by wire to defendants between October 2002 and February 2004. Id. at 141. Further, the court reasoned, the defendants could not have been surprised by the evidence used to prove the transfer from Irving, Texas to New York City because, among other things, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 requires the disclosure of exhibits and witnesses prior to trial. Id. The defense also knew that a particular individual would be testifying, and that she possessed certain incriminating documents. Id. For those reasons, the court found the defense had every reason to, and did, vigorously cross-examine the witness. Id. at 141-42. And, [n]othing in the record suggest[ed] that the defense would have prepared any differently had the indictment specified a transfer via Western Union of $2,000 from Irving, Texas, instead of a transfer via Western Union of $2,000 from Liberty Township, Ohio. Id. at 142. Finally, the Second Circuit acknowledged that since the only wire transmission alleged in the indictment was not proved at trial and [b]ecause neither the prosecution's summation nor the District Court's charge to the jury mentioned what specific transfer was relied upon, [that] neither [the court] nor the defendants [could] know what single act substituted for that enumerated in the indictment. Id. at 142. Nonetheless, the court found no prejudice because the district court properly instructed the jury that it could find defendants guilty of Count Two only if it found them responsible for a fraudulent interstate wire transfer. Id. at 142-43; see United States v. Davis, 471 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir.2006) (All that remains is the defendant's argument that the indictment, coupled with inadequate jury instructions, allowed him to be convicted by less than a unanimous jury. . . . Taken in context, the jury was adequately informed of the need for unanimity and that all elements  and at least one scheme  be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury instructions and the inclusion of multiple schemes in a single count did not deprive the defendant of a unanimous jury.); see also Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (When a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, . . . the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged.) (quoting Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970)); United States v. Jones, 418 F.3d 726, 729-30 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Bond, 231 F.3d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.2000); United States v. Durman, 30 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir.1994). Here, as in Dupre, we find that the variance between the indictment and proof at trial was harmless, because the defendant was not deprived of an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense or exposed to a risk of being prosecuted twice for the same offense. The defendant had notice  the language of the indictment made clear that the prosecution sought to prove that from July 2002 to August 2002, defendant RATLIFF-WHITE . . . caused the VA to deposit approximately $32,100 in funds representing payment for services purportedly performed by Compassionate Home Health Services into the account . . . at TCF National Bank, well knowing that Compassionate Home Health Services . . . had not provided any such services. See Dupre, 462 F.3d at 141. Additionally, the defendant could not have been surprised by the evidence showing the electronic transfer of funds to her bank account on July 16, 2002. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 and Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 16.1, the prosecution disclosed exhibits to the defendant before trial. Id. So, the defense was advised that the prosecution would be proffering documents to prove the interstate wire transmission of funds into Ratliff-White's shared account. And, perhaps most importantly, Ratliff-White's counsel cannot show that she would have conducted the defense case any differently had the indictment been drafted more artfully to charge only the deposit of $22,470 on July 16, 2002, rather than the transmission of payment instructions between Hyattsville and Dallas. Given that the defendant concedes that payments were wired from the Federal Reserve Bank in Dallas, Texas to the defendants' bank account, what defense she might have offered is wholly unclear. Id. at 142 (Nothing in the record suggest[ed] that the defense would have prepared any differently had the indictment specified a transfer via Western Union of $2,000 from Irving, Texas, instead of a transfer via Western Union of $2,000 from Liberty Township, Ohio.). Further, the jury instructions alleviate concern that the jury convicted on less than a unanimous verdict. Specifically, the jury was properly instructed that to convict it had to reach a unanimous verdict and find each element of wire fraud, including the existence of a charged wire transfer, beyond a reasonable doubt. Dupre, 462 F.3d at 142-43 (The district court instructed the jury it could find defendants guilty of Count Two only if it found them responsible for a fraudulent interstate wire transfer.); see Davis, 471 F.3d at 790-91. Finally, affirming Ratliff-White's conviction on Count One does not give rise to a possible double jeopardy claim. The indictment alleged a specific fraud  one that: (1) occurred during a finite interval, from in or about July 2002 to August 2002; (2) involved a particular perpetrator and victim, Ratliff-White and the VA, respectively; and (3) alleged specific misconduct by the perpetrator, caus[ing] the VA to deposit approximately $32,100 in funds representing payment for services purportedly performed by Compassionate Home Health Services into the account . . . at TCF National Bank, well knowing that Compassionate Home Health Services was a fictitious company and had not provided any such services. The indictment also specified the particular wire transmissions at issue  the deposit of a total of $32,100 into Ratliff-White's account, and the transmission of payment instructions from Hyattsville, Maryland to Dallas, Texas on July 16, 2002 and August 15, 2002. We perceive no difficulty in judging the scope of the conviction for double jeopardy purposes. See Dupre, 462 F.3d at 143 n. 12. For all the above reasons, we find that any variance between the language of Count One and the proof at trial was harmless. [5]
Having concluded that there was sufficient evidence to show that a wire transmission charged in Count One in fact occurred, the final question is whether Ratliff-White foresaw any wire transmission associated with the fraud alleged in Count One. For the same reasons we found that the government satisfied its burden of proving that Ratliff-White foresaw the use of the wires in furtherance of the wire fraud alleged in Count Two, we find that she foresaw a wire transmission in connection with the charges in Count One.