Opinion ID: 2013901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shiffra

Text: ¶ 21. To determine whether Green met his burden, we first examine Shiffra, the case in which the court of appeals established that a defendant may obtain an in camera review of such privileged records upon a showing of materiality. [4] ¶ 22. Shiffra was charged with second-degree sexual assault, and one day before trial, he received evidence from the state showing that the victim had a history of psychiatric problems. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 603. He therefore moved for an adjournment arguing that he had recently received information from the state `which indicate[d] that ... the complaining witness has a history of psychiatric problems which may affect her ability to perceive and relate truthful information.' Id. The court granted the adjournment, and subsequently, Shiffra moved for an order requiring the state and the victim to provide him with the victim's psychiatric records and medical records. Id. At the hearing on the motion to compel, Shiffra argued that his theory of defense was that the sexual contact was consensual and that he sought review of the records only to obtain evidence concerning whether the complainant may have suffered from `some type of psychiatric disorder which causes her an inability to truthfully relate facts as she perceives them' or from `some disorder which causes her to have flashbacks to previous instances in her life and then they become sexual assaults of her because of her disorders.' Id. The circuit court found an adequate showing and ordered an in camera review of the complainant's records. Id. at 604. The state appealed. ¶ 23. On review, the court of appeals affirmed. In its analysis, the court began by noting the competing rights and interests involved when a defendant seeks an in camera review of privileged records. On the one hand, a criminal defendant's right to due process, in particular the right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, is implicated. Id. at 605 and n.1. On the other hand, the state has an interest in protecting a patients' privileged records, Wis. Stat. § 905.04(2), [5] from being disclosed. In balancing these interests, the Shiffra court concluded that an in camera review was appropriate. Id. A defendant, however, is not automatically entitled to such an in camera review upon request. Instead, [t]o be entitled to an in camera inspection, the defendant must make a preliminary showing that the sought-after evidence is material to his or her defense. Id. (citing State v. S.H., 159 Wis. 2d 730, 738, 465 N.W.2d 238 (Ct. App. 1990)). ¶ 24. In establishing the burden for this preliminary showing, the Shiffra court analogized to cases where a defendant seeks disclosure of a government informant's identity, which is also protected by privilege pursuant to statute. [6] The court noted that, as in cases involving privileged psychiatric records, similar competing rights and interests are implicated in government informant cases. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 609. In government informant cases, a defendant may obtain an in camera review if he or she provides sufficient evidence to show that an informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a criminal case .... Id. at 609 n.3. This burden is reflected in Wis. Stat. § 905.10(3)(b). [7] ¶ 25. The court adopted a similar standard for defendants seeking to compel an in camera review of a victim's privileged psychiatric records. The Shiffra opinion, however, contained some internal inconsistencies in setting forth the specific test. At one point in the opinion, the Shiffra court concluded that the defendant's burden should be to make a preliminary showing that the sought-after evidence is relevant and may be helpful to the defense or is necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 608 (emphasis added). However, in a later part of the opinion the court enumerated the test as may be necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 610 (emphasis added). The Munoz court noted this inconsistency, but embraced the may be necessary language as the appropriate test, stating: The broad language of Shiffra that the sought-after evidence is relevant and may be helpful to the defense,certainly would seem to suggest a very low threshold for a defendant to establish the basis for an in camera inspection. A closer reading of Shiffra, however, reveals that a defendant must establish more than the mere possibility that psychiatric records may be helpful in order to justify disclosure for an in camera inspection. [A]lthough Shiffra's reference to information that is relevant and may be helpful to the defense could cover almost anything the defense sought to discover, Shiffra did not repeat the may be helpful language elsewhere in the opinion but, instead, reiterated the standard: may be necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence. Munoz, 200 Wis. 2d at 397-98 (citations omitted). [8] In cases subsequent to Munoz, the court of appeals has followed the Munoz court's interpretation of Shiffra and applied the may be necessary to a fair determination of guilt or innocence standard. See State v. Navarro, 2001 WI App 225, ¶ 11, 248 Wis. 2d 396, 636 N.W.2d 481; State v. Walther, 2001 WI App 23, ¶ 10, 240 Wis. 2d 619, 623 N.W.2d 205 (Ct. App. 2000). ¶ 26. In the end, the Shiffra court concluded that Shiffra had met his burden in making a preliminary showing of materiality. The court noted that Shiffra had presented ample evidence during the hearing on his discovery motion that [the victim's] psychiatric difficulties might affect both her ability to accurately perceive events and her ability to relate the truth. Shiffra, 175 Wis. 2d at 612. These difficulties, the court reasoned, were relevant because they affected the complainant's credibility and bore directly on Shiffra's defense of consensual sex. Id. ¶ 27. Before concluding, the Shiffra court considered the state's argument that the victim's psychiatric records may contain information that was merely cumulative to information that was already available to him. Id. at 610. The state described the significant amount of information that Shiffra had available to him on the victim's mental health history that was contained outside the records. Id. at 610-11. This evidence showed the extensive history of the victim's mental health problems and strongly suggested that Shiffra's specific concerns about the victim experiencing flashbacks and about her ability to relay truthful information were valid. The court recognized that some of the information contained in the records may be cumulative, but it nevertheless allowed for an in camera review, stating: We disagree with the state. It may well be that the evidence contained in the psychiatric records will yield no information different from that available elsewhere. However, the probability is equally as great that the records contain independently probative information. It is also quite probable that the quality and the probative value of the information in the reports may be better than anything that can be gleaned from other sources. Finally, the information might well serve as a confirmation of Pamela's [the victim's] problems in sexual matters. It is the duty of the trial court to determine whether the records have any independent probative value after an in camera inspection of the records. Id. at 611. See also Navarro, 2001 WI App 225, ¶ 18 (concluding that an in camera review of confidential prison records was still warranted despite concerns that the information may be cumulative).