Opinion ID: 415296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Taking of the Blood Samples Without a Prior Arrest

Text: 11 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), largely controls the resolution of this issue. In Schmerber, the Supreme Court held that a police officer who has validly arrested a suspect need not obtain a warrant in order to instruct medical personnel to draw a blood sample. The facts in Schmerber are similar to those in the cases before us: The defendant was involved in an automobile accident; the officer at the scene garnered indicia that the defendant was intoxicated; the officer proceeded to the hospital to take the defendant's blood sample; the officer requested the consent of the defendant to take the sample, which the defendant refused; and, the sample was taken over the defendant's objection. 1 384 U.S. at 758-759, 768-769, 86 S.Ct. at 1829-1830, 1834-1835, 16 L.Ed.2d at 912-913, 918-919. The key difference between our cases and Schmerber is that neither Harvey nor Chase were placed under formal arrest prior to extracting the blood. 12 The importance of the fact the defendant was placed under arrest in Schmerber is seen in the Court's rationalization of the seizure of the blood as a search incident to an arrest in which an emergency--the evanescent nature of blood alcohol levels--made it highly impracticable to first secure a warrant. 384 U.S. at 770-771, 86 S.Ct. at 1835-1836, 16 L.Ed. at 920. The importance of the arrest is also seen in the following language: 13 It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 14 384 U.S. at 772, 86 S.Ct. at 1836, 16 L.Ed. at 920. We feel constrained to follow the language of the opinion. To hold that a formal prior arrest is not necessary would be to extend Schmerber's applicability to different facts and conditions, a result the Court plainly did not intend. 15 Our constraint in requiring that a valid formal arrest is required prior to the taking of a blood sample is based on our recognition that the holding is somewhat formalistic. Professor LaFave makes a strong argument that the key element is probable cause to arrest, whether or not the intent to arrest is formally announced. 2 LaFave, Search and Seizure, Sec. 5.4(b) (1978). Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 93 S.Ct. 2000, 36 L.Ed.2d 900 (1973), also creates some uncertainty in our minds. In Murphy, the Supreme Court upheld the warrantless taking of fingernail scrapings from a suspect even though the suspect had not been placed under formal arrest. The Court noted first that the Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable seizures as well as arrests; it then focused on the existence of probable cause to seize and arrest Murphy. 412 U.S. at 294-295, 93 S.Ct. at 2003, 36 L.Ed.2d at 905. Seemingly equating Murphy's seizure with an arrest, the Court, as in Schmerber, rationalized the taking of fingernail scrapings as a limited and reasonable method to preserve evanescent evidence. 412 U.S. at 296, 93 S.Ct. at 2004, 36 L.Ed.2d at 906. Murphy was not arrested until a month later, a fact which convinced Justices Douglas and Brennan that the existence of probable cause to arrest the defendant was not so clear, making a remand appropriate. 412 U.S. at 301, 305, 93 S.Ct. at 2006, 2008, 36 L.Ed.2d at 909, 911. We do not, however, find Murphy controlling because it involved a much less intrusive search than the extraction of a blood sample. Also, we have found no cases which expand Murphy to the point of holding that a substantially contemporaneous formal arrest is not now required to support a search incident to arrest. Recently, the Supreme Court has cited Murphy in support of the following statement: Where the formal arrest followed quickly on the heels of the challenged search of petitioner's person, we do not believe it particularly important that the search preceded the arrest rather than vice versa. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 111, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 645-646 (1980). The law of this circuit goes no further. It upholds searches incident to an arrest prior to the actual arrest but requires that the arrest be substantially contemporaneous with the search. Cipres v. United States, 343 F.2d 95, 98 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 826, 87 S.Ct. 58, 17 L.Ed.2d 62 (1966); United States v. Chatman, 573 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir.1977). The arrests at issue here did not follow quickly on the heels of the search. The arrests, such as they were, did not occur until several months after the seizure of the blood and we are not yet persuaded to abandon the formal arrest requirement that is necessarily implied in Schmerber in favor of the probable cause to seize rule of Murphy. 16 Our decision is not without support. The one federal court that has addressed this issue has reached a similar conclusion. Holland v. Parker, 354 F.Supp. 196 (D.S.D.1973) (Three-judge court). Several state courts are in accord. See, e.g., People v. Superior Court of Kern County, 6 Cal.3d 757, 100 Cal.Rptr. 281, 493 P.2d 1145 (1972); State v. Richerson, 87 N.M. 437, 535 P.2d 644 (Ct.App.), cert. denied, 87 N.M. 450, 535 P.2d 657 (1975); Layland v. State, 535 P.2d 1043 (Alaska 1975) (See other cases cited at 1045). Some other states have held a prior arrest is not required. Devaney v. State, 259 Ind. 483, 288 N.E.2d 732 (1972); State v. McMaster, 118 N.J.Super. 476, 288 A.2d 583 (1972). 17 In Harvey, the United States argues that, even if a prior arrest is required, there was probable cause to arrest and the defendant was under the functional equivalent of an arrest at the time the blood sample was taken. The district court agreed. We do not dispute that Harvey was temporarily seized at the time the blood was removed. Also, it is evident there was probable cause for such a seizure. We do not agree, however, that it was then ipso facto proper to order the removal of blood. While it is true that the fact of arrest does not depend solely on the mere recital of words by the police, United States v. See, 505 F.2d 845, 855 (9th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 992, 95 S.Ct. 1428, 43 L.Ed.2d 673 (1975), there is no question that neither Harvey nor Chase were under any restraint that can realistically be characterized as an arrest. See United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1289 (9th Cir.1982) (Even a complete restriction of liberty does not necessarily convert a stop into an arrest.) 18 Requiring an actual arrest prior to the removal of a blood sample will not place an undue burden on police. If placing a suspect under arrest is but a silly formality, as the United States argues in Harvey, there is no reason why the police cannot take the time to engage in this ritual prior to taking the sample. Placing the suspect under arrest will help ensure that the police do not arbitrarily violate an individual's privacy. Also, it will sharply delineate the moment at which the police officer determined he or she had probable cause to arrest. In this respect, it will help prevent an after-the-fact justification of the seizure of the suspect and the blood. See Layland v. State, supra, 535 P.2d at 1049. Furthermore, the formal announcement of arrest triggers certain responsibilities for the arresting officer and gives rise to certain rights for the accused; for example, those rights delineated in a proper Miranda warning. 19 Our conclusion that an arrest must precede (or at least be substantially contemporaneous with) the seizure of blood from a suspect requires us to reverse the judgment in Harvey. The facts and justification for the seizure in Chase are somewhat different, however, necessitating some additional analysis. 20 In Chase, the district court held that Montana's implied consent law, Mont.Code Ann. Sec. 61-8-402, controlled whether it was proper to admit the blood alcohol evidence. It based this holding on its belief the implied consent law did not infringe on the sovereignty of the tribes located on the Fort Peck Reservation. It also relied on 25 U.S.C. Sec. 311 which permits the Secretary of the Interior to grant the states right-of-ways through reservations in accordance with the laws of the state. Furthermore, the Montana Supreme Court has construed the Montana implied consent statute as not requiring the prior arrest of a person who is unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing consent. State v. Campbell, 615 P.2d 190 (Mont.1980). Concluding Chase was incapable of rendering a response to the request for the blood sample, the district court denied the suppression motion. The court also allowed the jury to consider Montana's presumption of intoxication for blood alcohol levels over .10%. 21 We do not agree that Montana laws pertaining to traffic safety apply to Indians within the Fort Peck Reservation. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 311 is not a general grant of jurisdiction to the states over the land constituting the right-of-way. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1151; Ortiz-Barraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1180 (9th Cir.1975). The laws of the United States govern Major Crimes Act prosecutions. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1153; see also 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3242. The Montana implied consent statute is not applicable to Indians on the reservation. We do not find, however, the district court to have committed reversible error. Although the district judge did not expressly reach the Fourth Amendment issue, we believe it sufficient that he found Chase so incapacitated that it was unnecessary for the patrolman to have effected an arrest prior to taking the blood sample. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957). That finding is sufficiently supported by the evidence. 2 Our conclusion that a prior formal arrest is necessary before taking a blood sample is not without exception. There is no compelling reason why a prior arrest is necessary when it is shown that the suspect could not appreciate the significance of such action. In this respect, the Montana rule comports with our interpretation of the Fourth Amendment. 3 22 We recognize that whether a suspect is at the level of incapacity which makes it unnecessary to effect a prior arrest may not always be readily determinable by the police. We would recommend, then, the following procedure to aid that determination. First, and in all cases, the investigating officer should request the suspect's consent to take the blood sample. If the suspect's consent is freely given, that ends the matter. If, however, the suspect refuses consent, he or she should be placed under arrest prior to taking the blood sample. The arrest, as well as the removal of the blood, must be supported by probable cause. If the officer does not receive a refusal to the request, and considering the physical and mental condition of the suspect, it may be assumed that the suspect is not lucid. In that case, a formal arrest is not required, but, again, the seizure of the person and the blood must be supported by probable cause.