Opinion ID: 4114125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Principles of Statutory Interpretation

Text: Our interpretation comports with a holistic reading of the statutory exemption. See, e.g., Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 U.S. 280, 290 10 It is true, of course, that partsmen may spend some time on tasks unrelated to the servicing of an automobile: They may clean the stockroom, or they may sell parts to the public, for example. But that fact poses no interpretive problem because the exemption covers only those who “primarily” service cars. If an individual partsman spends little time servicing cars, the exemption does not apply. 18 NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS (2010) (“Courts have a duty to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Sturgeon v. Frost, 136 S. Ct. 1061, 1070 (2016) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context . . . “ (internal quotation marks omitted)). Read literally, the exemption encompasses six categories of employees: Salesman Partsman Mechanic primarily primarily primarily engaged in engaged in engaged in selling selling selling Salesman Partsman Mechanic primarily primarily primarily engaged in engaged in engaged in servicing servicing servicing Three of the literal categories describe common employees at a dealership: salesmen selling cars, partsmen servicing cars, and mechanics servicing cars. A “salesman . . . primarily engaged in selling . . . automobiles” neatly describes a car salesman.11 As noted above, many parts countermen likely qualify as “partsm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” And it is unassailable 11 “Automobile salesmen” were “important links between the makers and buyers of new cars, and between used car dealers and buyers.” OOH at 309. “The automobile salesman spends much of his time waiting on customers,” trying to make a sale. Id. at 310. NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS 19 that most (if not all) automobile mechanics service cars.12 The remaining three literal categories are: a “salesman . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles,” a “partsman . . . primarily engaged in selling . . . automobiles,” and a “mechanic primarily engaged in selling . . . automobiles.” Reading the exemption as a whole, we conclude that Congress did not intend to give meaning to those categories. A salesman is naturally understood to be someone primarily engaged in selling. After all, he is a salesman, defined at the relevant time as “a man who sells.” Random House at 1262 (emphasis added). It makes little sense, in ordinary speech, to describe a salesman who primarily engages in work activities other than selling. Moreover, we know that Congress did not intend for us to give effect to all six literal categories. Read literally, the statute exempts partsmen and mechanics primarily engaged in selling cars, but those categories do not exist in the real world. Neither partsmen nor mechanics occupy themselves regularly, let alone most of the time, with selling cars. By definition, they spend most of their time repairing cars, maintaining cars, repairing parts, determining interchangeability of parts, finding suitable replacement parts in the stockroom, and so on. Congress indisputably did not intend to connect “partsman” and “mechanic” with “selling” automobiles; Congress intended to connect “partsman” and “mechanic” only with “servicing” automobiles. 12 “Automobile mechanics keep the Nation’s rising number of automobiles . . . in good running order. They do preventative maintenance, diagnose breakdowns, and make repairs.” OOH at 477. 20 NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS Putting it all together, the most natural reading of the statute is that Congress intended the gerunds—selling and servicing—to be distributed to their appropriate subjects— salesman, partsman, and mechanic. A salesman sells; a partsman services; and a mechanic services. At first blush, it may seem odd for Congress to choose phrasing that, read literally, joins nouns with inapplicable verbs. But Congress sometimes makes that choice. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 742c(e) (referring to “the construction or repair of vessels lost, destroyed, or damaged” by an earthquake); see also Brief for Respondents in Encino Motorcars, 2016 WL 1298032, app. D (listing scores of statutory phrases using this distributive construction). Scholars and courts have recognized this method of distributive phrasing: “Where a sentence contains several antecedents and several consequents, courts read them distributively and apply the words to the subjects which, by context, they seem most properly to relate.” 2A Norman Singer et al., Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction § 47:26 (7th ed. Supp. Nov. 2016); see id. at n.1 (collecting cases); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 214 (2012) (“Distributive phrasing applies each expression to its appropriate referent.”); id. at 214–16 (describing cases that applied the principle). The most natural reading of these statutes is not that Congress wanted to give legal effect to each literal category. Rather, Congress merely used expedient wording to avoid tedious repetition of surrounding text, with the expectation that courts would read the statutes sensibly. This statute provides a good example. Congress could have separated out the treatment of salesmen from the treatment of partsmen and mechanics. But that would have required repeating the NAVARRO V. ENCINO MOTORCARS 21 “primarily engaged in” text, the list of vehicles— “automobiles, trailers, trucks, farm implements, or aircraft”— and the clause concerning employment at a dealership—“if employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such vehicles to ultimate purchasers.” 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(10) (1966). Instead, Congress trusted courts to recognize the obvious: Congress meant to exempt salesmen selling, not repairing, cars; and Congress meant to exempt partsmen and mechanics repairing, not selling, cars. Thus, the statute leaves only three categories of exempt employees:13 Salesman Partsman Mechanic primarily primarily primarily engaged in engaged in engaged in selling selling selling Salesman Partsman Mechanic primarily primarily primarily engaged in engaged in engaged in servicing servicing servicing