Opinion ID: 2394702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the standard of review and analysis of the claims of error

Text: This Court reviews a trial court's grant of a summary judgment de novo to determine whether, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the moving party has demonstrated that there are no material issues of fact in dispute. [7] We review the application of discovery rules, including the rules governing requests for admissions for an abuse of discretion. [8] The May 1 Paper Filing, Followed by The May 2 E-Filing, Was Sufficient To Toll The Statute Of Limitations. Bryant first claims that his filing of hard copies of the complaint and praecipe on May 1, followed by his e-Filing of those same documents the next day, were legally sufficient to commence the action on May 1. Whether a paper filing of a complaint and praecipe is sufficient to toll the statute of limitations, despite being (i) non-conforming as to the mode of filing (in this specific case, by not being e-Filed) and (ii) rejected by the Prothonotary on that basis, appears to be an issue of first impression in Delaware. As to the form of the filing, nothing in the text of Superior Court Rule 3(a) mandated that the complaint or the praecipe must be e-Filed. Indeed, Rule 3(a) requires the filing of sufficient copies of the complaint . . . so that one copy can be served on each defendant. That requirement can only be satisfied by filing paper copies. The source of the e-Filing requirement was not Rule 3(a) but, rather, an Administrative Directive of the President Judge of the Superior Court that became effective in October 2003, [9] but was not explicitly made a part of Rule 3(a). [10] The Superior Court concluded (preliminarily) that the rejection of the hard copy paper filing by the Prothonotary was irrelevant for limitations purposes, and that Bryant's action was commenced on May 1, the date of the paper filing. That conclusion, we hold, was correct. The issue is whether the initial filing of paper copies of the pleadings, where e-Filing was required, precludes the tolling of the statute of limitations. We conclude that the failure to e-File was not legally significant for tolling purposes. Administrative Directive No. 2003-8, Procedure No. 10, which bears on that issue, provides that [i]f the electronic filing is not filed with the Prothonotary or served because of . . . rejection by the Prothonotary . . . the Court may upon satisfactory proof enter an order permitting the document to be filed or served nunc pro tunc to the date it was first attempted to be sent electronically. [11] Citing that provision, the Superior Court found that, although Bryant's counsel had made no request for a nunc pro tunc order, and even though the quoted provision was clearly intended only to apply to electronic filing errors, [its] language [was] instructive. [12] We agree, because the rationale authorizing a nunc pro tunc order to remedy a rejection by the Prothonotary of e-Filings is equally applicable to rejected paper filings. Thus, Administrative Directive No. 2003-8 inferentially contemplates the result reached here. Our determination that the action was validly commenced on May 1 is also consistent with the counterpart Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP). [13] Neither party has cited to us any Delaware case that addresses the consequences, for limitations purposes, of the adoption of e-Filing requirements by Delaware's trial courts. The Federal Rules do address this issue: Federal Rule 5(e) establishes that paper filing and e-Filing are equivalent, and directs that [t]he clerk should not refuse to accept for filing any paper presented for that purpose solely because it is not presented in proper form as required by [the Federal Rules] or any local rules or practices. [14] Applying that rule, the Third Circuit has held that it was improper for a clerk to refuse to docket the complaint because of  technical deficiencies in the format of the pleading. [15] Explaining that the purpose of Rule 5(e) is to protect litigants whose claims might be time-barred if their non-conforming pleadings were rejected by court clerks, the Court noted that this was not an appropriate role for the clerk's office. [16] We find the treatment of the issue under the counterpart Federal Rules to be highly persuasive. The Prothonotary's rejection of the paper filing should also not be given legal effect for tolling purposes, because that rejection was neither legally mandated or necessary. The Prothonotary had two options: reject the paper filing or hold the filed documents (without rejecting them) pending the receipt of a corrected filing. The Prothonotary chose to reject the paper-filed documents. That action by court-related personnel prevented Bryant from exercising his legal remedy ( i.e., pursuing his malpractice claim). [17] Our case law permits retroactive tolling of the statute of limitations in cases where a party is prevented from exercising a legal remedy by an action of the court itself, if the party acted with due diligence. [18] Despite his numerous procedural missteps, Bryant's counsel did act with due diligence. He put the judicial machinery in motion [19] by filing the complaint and the praecipe with the Prothonotary within the period of limitations, as Rule 3(a) required. Although apparently unaware that e-Filing was required, Bryant's counsel, once apprised of that fact, corrected the error the next day. Thereafter, he filed a separate paper copy of the praecipe, which was needed for service of process. [20] Bayhealth was served on July 5, 2006, less than 120 days from the filing of the complaint, in accordance with the Superior Court Rules. [21] In short, the Superior Court correctly ruled that the paper-filing of the complaint and the praecipe, despite being non-conforming in the sense that the documents were not e-Filed, and despite being rejected by the Prothonotary, was sufficient to commence the action on May 1, 2006. Where the Superior Court erred was in holding that Bryant's judicial admission by default had the effect of undoing its ruling that May 1 was the legally valid commencement date. The June 21 Filing of Another Paper Praecipe Did Not Undo The Superior Court's Ruling That The Action Was Commenced On May 1. The sole basis for the Superior Court's dismissal of this action was the (by default) judicially admitted fact that the praecipe filed on June 21 was the first legally cognizable praecipe filed with the Superior Court. Bryant claims that dismissal was too extreme a remedy, because his failure to timely respond to the Request for Admissions was an oversight, not the product of a willful or conscious disregard of discovery obligations. Bayhealth responds that Bryant may not seek relief from his judicial admission for the first time in this Court, because he never sought that relief in the Superior Court. On that narrow point, Bayhealth is correct. Supreme Court Rule 8 requires that an argument must be fairly presented to the trial court in order to be preserved on appeal. Matters that are deemed admitted under Superior Court Rule 36 are conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. [22] Bryant's counsel never sought relief from the Superior Court from his admission by default. Instead, counsel filed a substantive response to the Request for Admissions long after the prescribed 30 day window from the time the Request was served had closed. Having failed to request the Superior Court to grant relief from his judicial admission by default, [23] Bryant cannot now be heard to argue for the first time on appeal that he should be relieved from his admission. This conclusion, however, does not end the analysis. Even though Bryant is bound by his judicial admission, we must still decide: what was the effect of that admission in these circumstances? The trial court held that the effect of the admission was to establish that the filing of a legally cognizable praecipe did not occur until June 21. Consequently (the Court ruled), Bryant's action was time-barred, despite the Court's determination that the May 1 filing was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. That holding was erroneous for two separate reasons. First, it was wrong factually, because the trial court found that the June 21 praecipe was a new praecipe, [24] rather than a service copy of the same praecipe that had been originally filed on May 1 and 2. Second, the ruling was erroneous legally, because the admission by default, resulting solely from Bryant's untimely response to the Request for Admissions, was an improper vehicle to resolve the legal issue of when the action was commenced. The Superior Court's ruling that the June 21 praecipe was a new praecipe is factually wrong. The docket sheetan easily accessible and more convenient [25] source for determining when the first legally cognizable praecipe was filedclearly indicated that a praecipe had been e-Filed on May 2. That praecipe was identical to the one that had been paper-filed on May 1. [26] A comparison of the May 2 and the June 21 praecipes would have revealed that identity. [27] Instead, the Superior Court ruledsolely on the basis of the default judicial admission and contrary to verifiable undisputed factthat the June 21 praecipe was a new praecipe. [28] It was not. The Superior Court also erred legally by giving effect to the judicial admission resulting from Bryant's counsel's untimely response to the Request for Admissions. In this specific case, a request for admissions was not the proper vehicle to resolve a legal dispute over when this action was effectively commenced. [29] The purpose of a request for admissions is not to deprive a party of a decision on the merits. [30] Rather, it is to simplify trials by eliminating facts about which there is no real controversy, but which are often difficult and expensive to prove. [31] Requests for admissions should not be used to establish the ultimate facts in issue [32] or to demand that the other party admit the truth of a legal conclusion. [33] Here, Bayhealth's Request for Admission that the June 21 praecipe was the first legally cognizable document requesting service upon Bayhealth was, by its own terms, a request to admit a conclusion of law and an ultimate fact going to the merits of the case. By permitting a Rule 36 admission to be deployed in this manner, which resulted in undoing the court's predicate holding and in the dismissal of the action as time-barred, the trial court erred.