Opinion ID: 2581377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Jenkins argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his convictions of involuntary manslaughter. This court in State v. Jamison, 269 Kan. 564, 571, 7 P.3d 1204 (2000), explained the standard of review for sufficiency of evidence: When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation omitted.] The jury convicted Jenkins of the version of involuntary manslaughter requiring proof of the unintentional killing of a human being committed recklessly. See K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-3404(a). The trial court instructed the jury on the following definition of recklessness: Reckless conduct means conduct done under circumstances that show a realization of the imminence of danger to the person of another and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that danger. The terms `gross negligence,' `culpable negligence,wanton negligence' and `wantonness' are included within `reckless.' The above definition is substantially similar to the definition of reckless conduct found at K.S.A. 21-3201(c). Based on the State's theory, the issue is whether a rational factfinder could have found that Jenkins demonstrated a realization of the imminence of danger and a conscious and unjustifiable disregard of that danger when he decided to drive his car prior to the fatal collision. Jenkins argues that his history of accidents caused by seizures was not sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. Jenkins relies on State v. Huser, 265 Kan. 228, 959 P.2d 908 (1998). This court in Huser reviewed the State's appeal from the trial court's dismissal of two counts of reckless aggravated battery. The Huser court affirmed the district court, holding that evidence of driving under the influence does not, standing alone, amount to reckless behavior. 265 Kan. at 234. The Huser court relied on and quoted extensively from State v. Mourning, 233 Kan. 678, 664 P.2d 857 (1983). The Mourning court considered whether reckless driving and driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs were the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. The Mourning court concluded that the two crimes required different evidence. 233 Kan. at 681. In its analysis, the Mourning court addressed the State's argument that any time a person under the influence of alcohol or drugs operates a vehicle he does so in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of others. 233 Kan. at 682. The Mourning court rejected this argument by pointing out that driving under the influence only requires driving when impaired, not swerving or driving recklessly. 233 Kan. at 682. Jenkins would have this court interpret Huser as standing for the proposition that there can be no criminal liability for reckless behavior anytime a person drives knowing he or she suffers from any condition that might preclude his or her ability to safely operate a vehicle. Such cannot be the law. The better interpretation of Huser is simply that the mere proof of driving under the influence is insufficient to prove recklessness. The State has presented sufficient evidence of recklessness. The State's evidence showed that Jenkins' history of past accidents was caused by his susceptibility to seizures. The State provided evidence of seven such accidents. This case is different from Huser. In Huser, there was no evidence that the defendant had a conscious disregard for a known danger. The Huser court also pointed out that [o]ne's behavior is only reckless if he or she realizes that his or her conduct creates imminent danger to another person but consciously and unjustifiably disregards the danger. [See K.S.A. 21-3201(c).] 265 Kan. at 234. Jenkins' seven prior collisions provided sufficient evidence to show that Jenkins knew of the imminent danger he created for other motorists. Based on Huser, Jenkins is correct to note that driving in an impaired condition is alone insufficient evidence of recklessness. Had the seizure been Jenkins' first, he would not have had any criminal liability because he would not have had any reason to believe he was putting other motorists in danger by driving. Here, the jury understandably found that Jenkins knew of the imminent danger before driving and consciously disregarded it. The seizure was not a surprise to Jenkins.