Opinion ID: 900762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: [¶ 13.] Did the court abuse its discretion in failing to find Macmuller's doctor qualified as an expert witness? [¶ 14.] `[T]he trial court has broad discretion in determining the qualifications of expert witnesses and in admitting expert testimony.' State v. Edelman, 1999 SD 52, ¶ 38, 593 N.W.2d 419, 425 (quoting State v. Dirk, 364 N.W.2d 117, 120 (S.D.1985)). It's rulings in this regard are reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. See id. [¶ 15.] The magistrate court refused to find Machmuller's doctor was qualified as an expert because he had not spent enough time in his career studying the effects of alcohol on a person's blood alcohol level and because his testimony would be based almost exclusively on the South Dakota Driver's License Manual. Machmuller argues this ruling was an abuse of discretion. We agree. [¶ 16.] South Dakota has adopted the test set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993) for the admission of expert scientific testimony in a criminal trial. Edelman, 1999 SD 52 at ¶ 13, 593 N.W.2d at 422. Under this test, the trial judge... has the `task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.' State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482, 484 (S.D.1994)(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2799, 125 L.Ed.2d at 485). [¶ 17.] Here the State conceded important factors relevant to the reliability prong of the Daubert inquiry in a stipulation at trial. During the course of the Daubert hearing, the following exchange took place between the trial court, the prosecutor and defense counsel: THE COURT: Now Mr. Chavis [the prosecutor], I don't think you would dispute the fact that chemistry and science is well establishedand I'm trying to save us some timethey've well established certain average man theories regarding the consumption of alcohol. Would you stipulate to that and how it affects the blood alcohol? MR. CHAVIS: If I didn't know the doctor I wouldn't, but since I know him, yes, I know the doctor, I stipulate. THE COURT: Then the question is, during this brief hearing I'll take the foundational testimony to determine whether or not he's qualified to give that testimony unless you want to save us some time and stipulate to it. MR. CHAVIS: I think, Judge, I don't know what he's going to testify to. If he's going to testify that a person with a certain body weight and a certain height and had so many drinks and so much time, absorb in, absorb out, process in, process out, you know, that's one thing. But if he's going to say, you know, based upon this little handy, dandy book put out by the state, you know, it looks to me like he's only had three drinks, he should be in good shape, I don't think we can allow that. I don't think the book can come in. I'd kind of renew my objection and ask for a standing objection so we don't disrupt the jury. THE COURT: You'll be granted that standing objection. MR. CHAVIS: As to him testifying about a charge which doesn't exist. THE COURT: That's understood.    THE COURT: He's stipulated so far, if I understand it right, that the methodologies concerning the chemistry, the amount of alcohol and how that alcohol consumed affects blood alcohol levels, is a scientifically reliable theory. It's been published. It's even published in our book here. It's been published widely around the country and has been widely testified to by experts in the field. You agree to that? MR. CHAVIS: I do. I assume, and we can ask him, and I assume that Dr. Smith has had the education, experience and training to so testify. (emphasis added). [¶ 18.] Following this exchange, the court went on to take testimony from Machmuller's doctor concerning his education and background and his considerable training, experience and expertise in chemistry, pharmacology [3] and medicine. The doctor also testified that, over the years, he had been called upon by a number of major drug firms to sit on advisory boards and teach other physicians in the area of pharmacology. In addition, the doctor testified that he had been the chairman of a multi-organizational body advising on OSHA regulations for psychotropic drugs in nursing homes and that, more recently, he had been a member of a group dealing with pharmacologic issues in nursing homes for Medicare. The doctor further testified concerning his ability to calculate bloodalcohol levels based upon weight, alcohol consumed and extrapolation charts and indicated he could demonstrate his calculations to the jury and explain them. [¶ 19.] Notwithstanding the above testimony and the stipulation by the state's attorney, the court found Machmuller's doctor was not qualified to testify as an expert in this case. This was error. Considering the State's stipulation to the doctor's qualifications and the doctor's own testimony concerning his extensive medical and pharmacological background, we conclude that the court's determination was an abuse of discretion. Clearly, the stipulation and the doctor's testimony were more than adequate to establish his credentials as an expert and that his analysis would rest on a reliable foundation supported by scientifically valid principles. Daubert requires nothing more. See Hofer, supra . [¶ 20.] Reversed and remanded. [¶ 21.] AMUNDSON, KONENKAMP and GILBERTSON, Justices, concur. [¶ 22.] SABERS, Justice, concurs in result.