Opinion ID: 1381996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Railroad's Right of Way

Text: Defendants' final assignment of error involves an instruction relating to right of way. The pertinent portion of the instruction states: I next instruct you that if you find that the train had the initial right-of-way under the law just read you, but if you further find that the train crew thereafter failed to use ordinary and reasonable care under the circumstances or knew or should have known by the exercise of reasonable care the Plaintiff was unaware of the approaching train, then the right-of-way of the Defendant train would be forfeited in favor of the Plaintiff-motorist, and it would then be the duty of the train crew to yield the right-of-way to the Plaintiff subject to the Plaintiff's duty to thereafter use reasonable care. This again is a question of fact for your determination. Defendants contend that this instruction was erroneous insofar as it indicated that the train crew had a duty to yield the right of way to plaintiff. [6] In Koch v. Southern Pacific Co., 266 Or. 335, 513 P.2d 770 (1973), this court disapproved the practice of treating railroad crossing cases as a special breed, and held that [t]he duty of both railroad and motorist should be that of reasonable care under the attendant circumstances. 266 Or. at 355, 513 P.2d at 779. We believe the language in the instruction at issue here is inconsistent with both the letter and the spirit of Koch, and that the trial court erred in giving the instruction. The notion of a right of way, when used in connection with the responsibilities of persons on the highway, implies an absolute right, one to which other users of the highway must yield. The notion of such an absolute right, however, is necessarily inconsistent with the more flexible concept of reasonable care under the circumstances. As this court stated in Koch : It is not practical for the court to state, as a general rule, the particular acts required on the part of the railway to constitute ordinary care on the part of the latter for the proper safety of the traveler on the public highway crossing, or to state the particular acts required of the traveler for his own safety. The duties resting with each party depend on the conditions and circumstances relating to each case. 266 Or. at 354-55, 513 P.2d at 779, quoting Clements v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 124 Okl. 13, 253 P. 496, 498 (1927). If a motorist sees or hears an oncoming train, ordinary care would dictate that he stop and allow the train to pass. No right of way rule is necessary to support this notion. [7] However, as Justice Holman observed in Koch, People    usually    do not intentionally drive upon a railroad crossing immediately in front of a railroad train unless they are unaware that the train is there. 266 Or. at 349, 513 P.2d at 776. If this lack of awareness is a result of the negligence of the railroad, a motorist may fail to yield the right of way, yet nevertheless be exercising ordinary care. In such a case, instructions phrased in terms of a right of way only serve to create confusion. The inconsistency between the right of way concept and the reasonable care standard is further illustrated by the instructions the trial court gave in the case at bar. In instructing the jury that the railroad forfeited its right of way as soon as the crew realized plaintiff was unaware of the train, the trial court conveyed the impression that the crew had an absolute duty to stop the train at whatever point the crew recognized plaintiff's peril. Under Koch, however, the duty of the train crew was simply one of reasonable care under the circumstances, and a jury might find this duty to have been satisfied even though the crew did not discover plaintiff's peril until it was too late to yield the right of way. Consequently, the trial court should not have instructed the jury that the railroad's right of way was forfeited once the train crew realized plaintiff was unaware of the train. The court should have simply instructed the jury that both the plaintiff and the railroad had a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. While certain of the erroneous instructions were favorable to defendants, we agree that the instruction assigned as error could have been prejudicial, for the reasons stated above. It follows that the case must be reversed for a new trial. In summation, we hold: first, that the trial court correctly denied defendants' motion for a directed verdict; second, that the court erred in submitting to the jury plaintiffs' allegation that defendants negligently maintained their right of way; third, that the court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that as a matter of law plaintiff was at least partially negligent; and finally, that the court erred in instructing the jury that the railroad's right of way may have been forfeited. The case is reversed and remanded for a new trial in conformance with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.