Opinion ID: 2793140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Direct Appeal (Makiel I)

Text: Makiel appealed his conviction on three grounds: (1) the October 20, 1989 statement he made after his extradition hearing should have been suppressed, (2) the trial court erred in excluding Tim Anderson’s testimony, and (3) the prosecution made improper remarks during closing arguments. In a split decision, the state appellate court denied relief on Makiel’s claims regarding his pretrial statement and the prosecutor’s closing arguments, but it unanimously held that the trial court erred in barring Anderson from testifying. People v. Makiel, 635 N.E.2d 941 (Ill. App. 1994) (“Makiel I”). The court identified two errors with the trial court’s handling of Anderson’s testimony. First, in determining that the testimony was “not relevant,” the trial court improperly relied on the State’s impeachment evidence (the November 1990 written statement to police) and confused relevance with credibility: “The circuit court, by relying on the factors it cited, essentially determined that Anderson’s proffered testimony was not sufficiently credible.” Id. at 954. Since credibility determinations go to the weight of the testimony, not its admissibility, “the circuit court may have erred by keeping relevant evidence from the jury based on the court’s impression of its credibility.” Id. Second, although the trial court said that it did not determine competency, the appellate court noted that concerns about Anderson’s competency might have improperly influenced the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by not examining Anderson to see if he 16 Nos. 13-3076 & 13-3777 was in fact competent to testify. Id. Accordingly, the appellate court remanded the case to the trial court with the following instructions: We find that the circuit court here erred by failing to interview Anderson as a preliminary step to determine his competence and the relevance of his testimony. We therefore remand this case for such an in- quiry. If both his competency and the relevance of his testimony are established, the circuit court is to grant defendant’s motion for a new trial. If for some reason Anderson is unavailable, or unwilling, to participate in the inquiry, or if the circuit court finds him incompetent or his evidence irrelevant, we retain jurisdiction in this matter. Id. Justice McCormick concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 956–61. He agreed with the majority that the case had to be remanded to determine Anderson’s competency to testify, but he disagreed with the majority that the trial court needed to address the relevance of Anderson’s testimony on remand. Justice McCormick believed the majority had already decided that Anderson’s proffered testimony was relevant, so a remand on this issue was unnecessary. Id. at 958. He also disagreed with the majority’s treatment of Makiel’s other two claims and would have granted a new trial. Id. at 956, 961. Justice McCormick analyzed the evidence against Makiel in great detail, concluding that the evidence was “far from overwhelming” and that the State’s case “hinged largely on the credibility of Hlinko’s testimony at trial, which was inconsistent with all of his many pretrial Nos. 13-3076 & 13-3777 17 statements, some of which he made under oath.” Id. at 958. The dissent emphasized that Hlinko’s plea agreement “gave him a strong reason to lie,” that all of the physical evidence that allegedly corroborated Hlinko’s trial testimony was found before Hlinko accepted the plea deal, and that the allegedly corroborating testimony from Shane Miller and Allen Martin contradicted Hlinko’s testimony in several respects. Id. at 959–60. Justice McCormick concluded: “Hlinko’s testimony … is sufficient to support the conviction if the jury chose to believe it, but the evidence is closely balanced.” Id. at 961. The Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal in October 1994. E. Evidentiary Hearing and Appeal After Remand (Makiel II) The evidentiary hearing took place in December 1996 before a different trial judge. Tim Anderson and his mother testified. The parties also entered stipulations regarding the testimony of police officers who investigated Anderson’s statement at the time of his hospitalization in 1990. Anderson recanted his earlier story implicating “Jay” in the gas station murder. He testified that in October 1988, the month the crime occurred, he was nine years old and that at the time of the murder, he did not know Jay or the other boys mentioned in his story. He did not meet them until 1990—approximately two years after Hoch was murdered. He explained that he had fabricated the entire story to retaliate against the boys for bullying him. After the hearing, the trial court stated its findings about Anderson’s competency and the relevance of his testimony. On the issue of competency, the court found that Anderson was “intellectually challenged” at the time of Makiel’s trial, 18 Nos. 13-3076 & 13-3777 but that it did not have sufficient information to determine his competency to testify at the time of trial. It did find, however, that Anderson “was competent to testify at the December 30, 1996 hearing.” On the issue of relevance, the court found that Anderson first told the story about Jay and the gas station murder to a psychiatrist or counselor in October 1990 while he was a psychiatric patient at a hospital. The court also found that Anderson told the same story to police the following month and then again to Makiel’s attorney sometime before his trial in February 1991. The court found that Anderson recanted the story for the first time four years later, in February 1995. The trial court concluded: Further, based upon his not telling the story until two (2) years after the event, that his story is totally [uncorroborated], his propensity to lie at an early age, his motive to fabricate, the fact that no one ever believed his story and his subsequent recantation of his story of the October 19, 1988 events involving his friend, I find that his testimony would be remote and speculative and, therefore, would not be relevant. Supp. App. 26. Makiel appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by determining that Anderson’s testimony was irrelevant, and that in any event the principles of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), required its admission. The state appellate court affirmed. People v. Makiel, No. 1-97-2140, slip op. (Ill. App. June 8, 1998) (“Makiel II”). Apparently focusing on the relevance of Anderson’s hearing testimony rather than his profNos. 13-3076 & 13-3777 19 fered testimony at Makiel’s trial, the appellate court held that Anderson’s “testimony” would have been irrelevant because it had been fabricated and therefore was not “material to establishing [Makiel’s] guilt.” Supp. App. 29. The court then addressed the Chambers argument, referring to the excluded evidence as Anderson’s “prior statements.” The court held that these “prior statements” constituted “inadmissible hearsay” and could be excluded under Chambers because they lacked insufficient indicia of reliability. Supp. App. 30–31. Citing Chambers, the court explained that “[w]hen judging the admissibility of [Anderson’s] declaration, it must be determined whether the declaration was made under circumstances that provide ‘considerable assurance’ of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness.” Id. at 31. It then concluded that Anderson’s “prior statements” did not satisfy these criteria. Id. The Supreme Court of Illinois again denied leave to appeal in October 1998. F. State Post-Conviction Proceedings (Makiel III) While still awaiting the evidentiary hearing on Tim Anderson’s excluded testimony, Makiel filed a motion for postconviction relief in June 1995 under 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/122-1 et seq. Makiel argued that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective because she did not argue in his direct appeal that the trial court erred by excluding (1) Allen Martin’s pending forgery charge and (2) Brian Spodach’s testimony about the reputations of Martin and Shane Miller. Makiel’s petition was initially stayed pending completion of his direct appeal and eventually denied without an evidentiary hearing. 20 Nos. 13-3076 & 13-3777 The state appellate court unanimously reversed, holding that Makiel had made a substantial showing of a deprivation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. People v. Makiel, 830 N.E.2d 731 (Ill. App. 2005) (“Makiel III”). On both of Makiel’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the court ordered an evidentiary hearing because his petition raised “unanswered questions of fact as to the strategy which motivated appellate counsel” not to challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. Id. at 745, 748. The court noted, however, that it was not taking a position on whether Makiel could ultimately prove his claims. Id. at 749. G. Evidentiary Hearing and Appeal After Remand (Makiel IV) The evidentiary hearing was held on March 14 and April 4, 2008. Makiel presented the testimony of the assistant public defender who represented him in his original appeal. She testified that she could not explain why she did not challenge either of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings. She also testified that she did not remember “specifically considering and rejecting” the two issues. The lawyer explained, however, that she reviewed the trial record and Makiel’s post-trial motion, consulted with her supervisor about which issues to raise, and discussed her strategy with Makiel during the appeal. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Makiel’s petition. Makiel appealed again, and this time the state appellate court affirmed. People v. Makiel, No. 1-08-0921, 2011 WL 9548460, at  (Ill. App. Sept. 28, 2011) (“Makiel IV”). The appellate court held that the trial court had erred when it barred evidence of Martin’s pending forgery charge, but that Nos. 13-3076 & 13-3777 21 appellate counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to raise the issue because she “reasonably could have determined” that such a challenge “would not have been a meritorious issue on appeal.” Id. at . The court also held that Makiel had not established prejudice from appellate counsel’s failure to raise the issue. Id. On Makiel’s claim for failure to appeal the exclusion of Spodach’s testimony about reputation, the state appellate court relied on a purported state-law rule that Makiel failed to satisfy the burden of proof applicable to third-stage postconviction proceedings because he relied exclusively on his initial proffer and failed to present additional evidence to support his claim. Id. (As explained below, the State concedes on appeal that state law imposed no such requirement on Makiel.) The court also concluded that Makiel had failed to establish prejudice from appellate counsel’s failure to raise this issue. Id. at . Once more, the Supreme Court of Illinois denied leave to appeal in January 2012. H. Federal Habeas Petition In December 2012, Makiel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court raising claims about the prosecutor’s remarks during closing arguments, the trial court’s exclusion of Tim Anderson’s testimony, and appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the trial court’s evidentiary rulings on Martin’s pending forgery charge and Spodach’s reputation testimony. The district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing and granted a certificate of appealability limited to the claim about the prosecutor’s remarks. United States ex rel. Makiel v. Atchison, No. 12 CV 9644, 2013 WL 4538583, at  (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2013). We granted Makiel’s motion to expand the certificate of appealability to 22 Nos. 13-3076 & 13-3777 include his other claims. On appeal, Makiel has abandoned the claim about closing arguments and raises only the claims about appellate counsel’s failure to challenge the evidentiary rulings and the trial court’s exclusion of Anderson’s testimony.