Opinion ID: 2282838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: intent instructions

Text: The defendant, relying on Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S. Ct. 2450, 61 L. Ed.2d 39 (1979), claims that the trial court's instructions to the jury on the element of intent, which included the statement that every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his act, violated his constitutional rights. On a number of recent occasions this court has considered jury instructions alleged to violate the rule of Sandstrom. State v. Stankowski, 184 Conn. 121, 149-50, 439 A.2d 918, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1052, 102 S. Ct. 596, 70 L. Ed.2d 588 (1981); State v. Brokaw, 183 Conn. 29, 33-34, 438 A.2d 815 (1981); State v. Truppi, 182 Conn. 449, 452-65, 438 A.2d 713 (1980), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 941, 101 S. Ct. 2024, 68 L. Ed. 2d 329 (1981); State v. Nemeth, 182 Conn. 403, 411, 438 A.2d 120 (1980); State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 375-80, 438 A.2d 432 (1980); State v. Vasquez, 182 Conn. 242, 245-53, 438 A.2d 424 (1980); State v. Maselli, 182 Conn. 66, 75-78, 437 A.2d 836 (1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1083, 101 S. Ct. 868, 66 L. Ed. 2d 807 (1981); State v. Perez, 181 Conn. 299, 311-15, 435 A.2d 334 1980); State v. Ruth, 181 Conn. 187, 200-201, 435 A.2d 3 (1980); State v. Arroyo, 180 Conn. 171, 173-82, 429 A.2d 457 (1980); State v. Harrison, 178 Conn. 689, 693-99, 425 A.2d 111 (1979). This case, however, involves jury instruction language not previously considered by this court. In the ordinary case we would refuse to review error claimed in jury instructions which, as here, was not brought to the attention of the trial court. Practice Book §§ 315, 3063. We have, however, previously held that because the type of error claimed falls within the exceptional circumstances rule of State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 69-70, 327 A.2d 576 (1973), we will review it despite the lack of objection and exception below. State v. Vasquez, supra, 245-46; State v. Maselli, supra, 75; State v. Perez, supra, 311; State v. Arroyo, supra, 173-74. In Sandstrom v. Montana, supra, the United States Supreme Court held that a jury instruction that [t]he law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts violated the defendant's due process rights because a reasonable jury could have interpreted the instruction as a burden-shifting presumption like that invalidated in Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S. Ct. 1881, 44 L. Ed.2d 508 (1975), or as a conclusive presumption like those invalidated in United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed.2d 854 (1978), and Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S. Ct. 240, 96 L. Ed. 288 (1952). Sandstrom, supra, 517-24. The rule of Sandstrom, however, must not be oversimplified. State v. Arroyo, supra, 175. Sandstrom does not invalidate, for example, the use of an entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allowsbut does not requirethe trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and that places no burden of any kind on the defendant. Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 60 L. Ed.2d 777 (1979); State v. Arroyo, supra. The use of the word presume by itself does not render an instruction invalid under Sandstrom. State v. Arroyo, supra. Rather, it is the lack of qualifying instructions as to the legal effect of the presumption, making it possible for a reasonable jury to interpret the presumption as conclusive or burden-shifting, which renders the instruction unconstitutional. Sandstrom, supra, 517. In a number of cases this court has found no error in instructions containing language similar to that invalidated in Sandstrom because the challenged instructions contained other language not present in the Sandstrom instructions which was sufficiently precise or elaborate so that the jury would not have applied the instructions in an unconstitutional manner. State v. Stankowski, supra, 151; State v. Truppi, supra, 461-63; State v. Nemeth, supra, 411; State v. Vasquez, supra, 249-53; State v. Maselli, supra, 75-78; State v. Perez, supra, 315; State v. Arroyo, supra, 179-80. In examining a jury instruction to determine how a reasonable jury could have interpreted it; Sandstrom, supra, 514; we look at the charge as a whole, and will not sever one portion and analyze it in isolation from the rest. State v. Truppi, supra, 458; State v. Vasquez, supra, 246; State v. Harrison, supra, 693. Although general instructions on the state's burden of proof and the defendant's presumed innocence do not by themselves cure an otherwise invalid instruction; Sandstrom, supra, 518-19 n.7; State v. Harrison, supra, 697; general instructions may be considered together with other instructions in determining whether the jury could have interpreted the charge in an impermissible manner. State v. Vasquez, supra, 251. In evaluating a jury charge to determine whether a Sandstrom error has been corrected, the proper consideration is whether the charge, taken as a whole, clearly delineates the state's burden of proof on every element, including intent so that the potential for confusing the jury is sufficiently reduced. State v. Harrison, supra, 697. Prior to instructing the jury regarding the elements of the four crimes with which the defendant was charged and the specific criminal intent required for attempted murder, kidnapping in the second degree, and robbery in the first degree, the trial court provided the jury with a number of general instructions, including a general instruction on intent. It described these instructions as general comments and principles which form a necessary part of every charge. The jury were told that it was the trial court's duty to state the rules of law applicable to the case and that such statements of law were binding on them. They were also instructed that it was the jury's duty to find the facts and that they were the sole judges of what the facts are. The jury were instructed on the defendant's presumed innocence, the state's obligation to prove every element of the crimes charged and the state's burden of proving those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. The general instructions contained an explanation of circumstantial evidence and how the jury could draw reasonable and fair conclusions or inferences from such evidence. Previously the jury had been told that the evidence that they were to consider included not only the testimony heard and exhibits offered but any reasonable inferences which you may draw therefrom. You may draw reasonable inferences from the established facts in the case. The inference which you draw, however, must not be from a guess upon the evidence or a surmise upon the evidence, but it must be from a fact which the evidence has established. Inferences that you may draw from these established facts must be logical and reasonable and well-founded upon facts which have been proven in the trial of this case. In its general instructions, the trial court described intent as [o]ne of the elements common to each of the four charges in the information and promised to discuss this in more detail as I explain the elements of each offense to you. It went on to state: The question of intent should cause you no great concern because intent is a question of fact that is solely within your province as jurors. However, you should be aware of a rule of law that will be helpful to you and that is that a person's intention may be inferred from his conduct and every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his act. (Emphasis added.) The initial question for this court is whether the general instructions, taken as a whole, were erroneous under Sandstrom. If the challenged instructions violate the rule of Sandstrom, they must do so solely because of the occurrence of the word conclusively. Had these instructions been cast in terms of a mere presumption rather than a conclusive presumption, the apparent Sandstrom violation would have been cured by the remainder of the general instructions. Those other instructions precisely and elaborately delineated the nature of the inferences the jury could draw and the state's burden on each element. They, therefore, would have prevented the jury from interpreting the presumption in an unconstitutional manner. State v. Stankowski, supra, 151; State v. Truppi, supra, 461-63; State v. Nemeth, supra, 411; State v. Vasquez, supra, 249-53; State v. Maselli, supra, 75-78; State v. Perez, supra, 315; State v. Arroyo, supra, 179-80. The challenged instruction was cast expressly as a conclusive presumption. While the use of the word presume by itself is ambiguous as to whether the presumption is permissive, mandatory, burden-shifting, or conclusive, there can be no serious question as to how the challenged instruction could have been interpreted. Thus, even though the trial court's general instructions, taken as a whole, were precise, elaborate and cast in highly permissive language, it cannot be said those instructions were sufficient to prevent the jury from interpreting the presumption in the way it was expressed to them. The general instructions, therefore, were invalid under Sandstrom because they contained an express conclusive presumption. The unconstitutional effect of such a presumption, unless elsewhere cured, would be to deny the defendant a fair trial by requiring or directing the jury to find against the defendant on the element of intent, thus invading the fact-finding function of the jury. Sandstrom, supra, 521-23; United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435, 446, 98 S. Ct. 2864, 57 L. Ed.2d 854 (1978). The conclusion that the trial court's general instructions were erroneous under the rule of Sandstrom does not, however, dispose of the defendant's claim of error because it is still necessary to consider the impact of the erroneous general instructions on the specific instructions given on each count. Although the general instructions would normally be incorporated, where applicable, in the court's specific instructions, the actual instructions on each count must be examined to determine whether the Sandstrom error in the general instructions was repeated, incorporated, or possibly cured by the specific language used. State v. Truppi, supra.
In its specific instruction on the crime of attempted murder, the trial court properly told the jury that one of the elements of the crime that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt was that the defendant had the specific intent to commit murder. The jury was told that in considering the question of the defendant's intent no one can look into a man's mind and see what his intention is. The only way to decide that question is to infer from the accused's conduct in the light of the surrounding circumstances. At this point, the trial court repeated its erroneous instruction as previously stated, that every person is conclusively presumed to intend the natural and necessary consequences of his act. (Emphasis added.) While the trial court later somewhat undercut its conclusive language by telling the jury [i]f you believe [the victim's] version as to the defendant's conduct at the bridge, you may presume he intended what would be the natural and necessary consequences of his actions, this language cannot overcome the express conclusive presumption repeated in the instructions on this count. (Emphasis added.) Because the instructions on the first count contained the express language previously found offensive under Sandstrom, the defendant's conviction on this count must be reversed.
In its specific instruction on the crime of kidnapping in the second degree, the trial court properly explained the element of intent applicable to that crime and told the jury that a person acts intentionally with respect to a result or to conduct described by a statute defining an offense when his conscious objective is to cause such result or to engage in such conduct. At this point the trial court stated that I have already instructed you that what a man's intention has been is necessarily very largely a matter of inference. Again, no witness can be expected to come here and testify that he looked into another man's mind and saw therein a certain intention. The only way in which you can determine in a case such as this what a man's intention was at any given time is by determining what his conduct was and what the circumstances were surrounding that conduct and from those infer what his intention was. As stated before, to draw such an inference is not only the privilege but also the duty of a juror provided, of course, the inference to draw is a reasonable inference. (Emphasis added.) The trial court's instruction on the second count neither used the offending language of the general instruction nor expressly incorporated it. In fact, these specific instructions were cast solely in properly permissive language. In the absence of the phrase conclusively presumed, the highly permissive language of this instruction, expressed in terms of inference rather than presumption, had a significant curative effect. State v. Vasquez, supra, 249; State v. Arroyo, supra, 178-80. The Sandstrom error of the court's general instruction was cured by the specific instruction given by the court. In considering the defendant's guilt on the second count the jury would have applied the permissive inferences described to them in the specific instructions on that count rather than the improper presumption described in general terms earlier. Therefore, there was no error in the trial court's instructions on this count.