Opinion ID: 2121062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appropriateness of Sentences

Text: Appellant's final claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in imposing enhanced sentences on his four convictions and in ordering three of the four to be served consecutively. Because we have found that appellant's convictions and sentences on Counts II and III, theft and criminal confinement, must be reversed, the remaining sentences to be reviewed are the sentences for robbery, a Class B felony, and intimidation, a Class C felony. Class B felonies carry a presumptive sentence of ten years, which may be enhanced by up to ten years for aggravating circumstances. I.C. XX-XX-X-X. Class C felonies carry a five-year presumptive sentence, which may be enhanced by up to three years for aggravating circumstances. I.C. XX-XX-X-X. The trial court found aggravating circumstances to exist in this case, enhanced both sentences to the maximum allowed by law, and ordered that they be served consecutively. The trial court found in aggravation that appellant knowingly and recklessly endangered the lives of the victims and, in substantiation of this finding, set out those details concerning the commission of the crimes which indicated to the court that [appellant] is possessed of a calloused disregard for the potential consequences of his actions. Appellant argues that this finding was improper because it is not an aggravating circumstance enumerated in I.C. XX-XX-X-X(b) of the felony sentencing statute and because the gravamen of the aggravator constituted the elements of the offenses and had already been taken into account by the State in charging him with B and C felonies. This argument is without merit. I.C. XX-XX-X-X(d) expressly states that the aggravators listed in subsection (b) of that statute do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the sentence, and this Court has repeatedly held that sentencing courts are free to consider other relevant factors relating to the specific facts of the crime and the defendant's character. See, e.g., Ballard v. State (1988), Ind., 531 N.E.2d 196; Miles v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1040. Further, a court may find that the factual details of the manner in which the crimes were committed constitute an aggravating circumstance as long as its finding is a particularized account of the aspects of the crime which illustrated to the court the defendant's deservedness of an enhanced sentence rather than a bare recitation of the elements of the charges. Bustamante v. State (1990), Ind., 557 N.E.2d 1313. The trial court also cited the following valid factors in support of its decision to impose an enhanced sentence: appellant's criminal history and his need of correctional or rehabilitative treatment, its belief that imposition of a reduced sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime, and the fact that the evidence showed that the crime was carefully planned. See McCawley v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 137, 409 N.E.2d 594; I.C. XX-XX-X-X(b)(2) and (3). When a sentencing court exercises its discretion to enhance a presumptive sentence, order that sentences be served consecutively, or both, the record must identify the relevant factors which underlie this decision. Shippen v. State (1985), Ind., 477 N.E.2d 903. Appellant correctly points out that the trial court failed to make a specific statement of the aggravating circumstances supporting its order that the sentences be served consecutively. However, the same aggravators may be used by a sentencing court to justify both the increase of the presumptive sentences and an order that they be served consecutively. Smith v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 71, and the sentencing order in this case shows that the factors cited by the court in support of the enhancement of appellant's sentences could properly have been considered as aggravating circumstances justifying the imposition of consecutive sentences as well. In a case presenting similar circumstances, this Court stated: Based upon this record, a remand to the trial court would accomplish no purpose other than to have the judge state that the aggravating circumstances supporting consecutive sentences also support the enhanced sentences. Thus, we find no error; however, we stress that the better and preferable practice is for the trial court to state unequivocally that the aggravating circumstances justify both the enhanced sentences and consecutive sentences. Forrester v. State (1982), Ind., 440 N.E.2d 475, 488-89. Likewise, here, the trial court should have made discrete statements identifying the reasons underlying both the decision to enhance the sentences and to order their consecutive service. However, we will not remand for a correction of the sentencing order because the record amply demonstrates its appropriateness. The convictions and sentences on Counts I and IV, robbery and intimidation, are affirmed. The convictions and sentences on Counts II and III, theft and criminal confinement, are reversed, and we therefore remand to the trial court with instructions to vacate them. SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, J., concur. GIVAN, J., concurs in result and dissents with separate opinion, in which PIVARNIK, J., concurs. PIVARNIK, J., dissents with separate opinion, in which GIVAN, J., concurs.