Opinion ID: 2622768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Propriety of Partial Mill Levies

Text: [ถ 25] BP contends that the SBOE, the DOR, and Sweetwater County all lack statutory authority to make use of partial mill levies in the collection of ad valorem taxes on increased mineral values for production years 1980-1986. [ถ 26] We embark on this discussion by making reference to our own description of the DOR's and the SBOE's role in the taxation process: A comparison of the roles of the Department and the Commission as established by the legislature demonstrates that the Department, acting through the Board, is vested with pervasive and sole authority over all aspects of the taxation of Wyoming citizens and business entities, including the construction of any statute affecting the assessment, levying, and collection of taxes. The Commission is empowered to adopt rules and regulations and act administratively to prevent waste and encourage the conservation of Wyoming's oil and gas resources. The Commission must make its decisions and promulgate its orders by its discerning conclusions as to what will either prevent or remediate waste. Kerr-McGee v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 903 P.2d 537, 544 (Wyo.1995). [ถ 27] Our response to this argument need only be brief. Partial mill levies were not used. BP had paid only a part of the mill levy on production in Sweetwater County. BP was required to make up the difference. The mineral values were not increased, they simply were allocated to the proper production location (i.e., county). BP is not aggrieved in any way by the accommodations that needed to be made in order to work out the knotty problem created by its improper acts, and we are not persuaded that those accommodations were in any way in violation of the standards set out in Wyo. Stat. Ann. ง 16-3-114(c) (LexisNexis 2005). [ถ 28] Moreover, we have long held that administrative agencies have certain implied powers necessary to fulfillment of their statutory purposes. Of course, those implied powers are only those derived by necessary implication from express statutory authority granted to the agency. See Billings v. Wyoming Board of Outfitters and Guides, 2001 WY 81, ถ 24, 30 P.3d 557, 569 (Wyo.2001); and Cody Gas Company v. Public Service Commission, 748 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Wyo. 1988). A more comprehensive statement of the concept of implied powers in this setting is this: Generally, administrative agencies have the implied or incidental powers that are reasonably necessary in order to carry out the powers expressly granted. The reason for implied powers is that, as a practical matter, the legislature cannot foresee all the problems incidental to carrying out the duties and responsibilities of the agency. However, the inherent or implied power of an administrative agency is not boundless. Courts disagree as to how much latitude administrative agencies have with respect to implied powers. Some courts say wide latitude must be given to administrative agencies in fulfilling their duties. Some of these courts even say that the authority does not have to be necessary to effectuate the expressly delegated authority, but only appropriate. Other courts say that powers should not be extended by implication beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. Still other courts state that implied powers are necessarily implied, and that necessary implication is an implication which yields so strong a probability of intent to allow these powers that any intention to the contrary cannot be supposed. 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law ง 57 at 80-81 (2004). [ถ 29] We conclude that the DOR, the county assessor, and the county treasurer possessed the authority to effectuate the remedy that the DOR structured for this matter.