Opinion ID: 2363018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expanded In Camera Review and Attorney-Client Privilege[12]

Text: Maryland Rule 2-402(a) states in relevant part: A party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged. . . . (Emphasis added). The type of privilege that is relevant in this portion of our discussion is that which exists between an attorney and his or her client. [13] Practically speaking, [o]nce the attorney-client privilege is invoked, the trial court decides as a matter of law whether the requisite privilege relationship exists, and if it does, `whether or not any such communication is privileged.' E.I. du Pont, 351 Md. at 415, 718 A.2d at 1138 (quoting Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122, 136, 345 A.2d 830, 838 (1975)). If that two-part test is met, then any communications which are subject to the privilege are not discoverable. In the unusual circumstances of the present case, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, in its May 24, 2006, order, acting pursuant to the Court of Special Appeals's April 10, 2006, order, effectively directed that certain documents which the Governor claimed were subject to attorney-client privilege be made available to Grove's counsel through expanded in camera review. After the Governor filed a motion for clarification or reconsideration, asserting the attorney-client privilege specifically to certain documents, and Grove filed a response, the Circuit Court, based on Grove's waiver of his request, found that four documents relating to Grove's litigation were privileged and denied the remainder of the Governor's motion. The consequence of which was to make some of the documents the Governor was claiming were privileged available to Grove's counsel for expanded in camera review. The Governor argues that documents which are protected by the attorney-client privilege should not be subjected to expanded in camera review. He is correct. If they are protected by the privilege they are not subject to such expanded review. Grove counters by arguing that the Governor should not be allowed to assert the attorney-client privilege because, according to Grove, the Governor had never before asserted the attorney-client privilege with respect to the documents which are the subject of this appeal. Grove also argues that the Governor is asserting the privilege too broadly and that he has waived it by producing similar documents. [14] On or about April 5, 2004, in the Governor's amended response to Grove's request for documents, the Governor clearly made a blanket statement protecting documents subject to the attorney-client privilege. It is only natural, as the discovery process unfolds, that the scope of the Governor's blanket statements covering privileged material narrowed from many documents to fewer documents. Although it is preferred that responses to document requests be as accurate as possible and are complied with as soon as possible in the discovery process, it is unrealistic to require an entity as large as the Executive Branch to know and to name precisely what documents are protected by attorney-client privilege when they are collecting and sorting tens of thousands of documents in the early stages of a litigation with such broad discovery requests of this nature. The discovery process is designed, in part, to narrow the scope of information necessary to conduct a trial. In the early stages of that process lawyers may make blanket assertions to protect their clients and preserve the protection until the discovery process narrows the scope of inquiry to relevant documents. Once that point is reached, the protection is tailored to specific communications. The initial action of the Governor in broadly asserting the attorney client privilege was no different than the initial over-broad reach of Grove's discovery requests. It is unclear from the court's June 23, 2006, order whether the Circuit Court actually determined that the documents were not subject to attorney-client privilege or whether, irrespective of the applicability of the privilege, the Circuit Court felt bound to subject them to expanded in camera review as a result of the Court of Special Appeals's April 10, 2006, order. In either eventuality, documents which are subject to the attorney-client privilege, generally, are not to be subjected to expanded in camera review because of the havoc such a practice would play with one of the cornerstones of our judicial system-the protected communication between an attorney and his or her client. Simply because the Governor is a government official does not make the protection of his communications with his attorney any less important or less viable. We conclude that the trial court acted improperly if it ordered that documents subject to attorney-client privilege be made available for expanded in camera review. [15] If it did so, it abused its discretion. Therefore, on remand any document determined by the trial court to fall within the coverage of attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine shall not be made available to Grove or his attorney in any manner, including through expanded in camera review.