Opinion ID: 1296935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: West Virginia's Statutory Guidance

Text: In attempting to reconcile the competing interests involved in the case sub judice, we are assisted, to some extent, by the substance of West Virginia Code § 49-6-4(a) (1984) (Repl.Vol.2001), West Virginia Code § 57-2-3 (1965) (Repl.Vol.1997), and West Virginia Code § 49-7-1 (2000) (Repl.Vol. 2001). While the Appellant acknowledges the existence of certain protections contained in these statutes, he contends that such protections are inadequate to permit the full exercise of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and the vigorous defense of his parental rights. West Virginia Code § 49-6-4(a) addresses medical and mental examinations in the child abuse and neglect proceeding and provides as follows: (a) At any time during proceedings under this article the court may, upon its own motion or upon motion of the child or other parties, order the child or other parties to be examined by a physician, psychologist or psychiatrist, and may require testimony from such expert, subject to cross-examination and the rules of evidence: Provided, That the court shall not terminate parental or custodial rights of a party solely because the party refuses to submit to the examination, nor shall the court hold such party in contempt for refusing to submit to an examination. The physician, psychologist or psychiatrist shall be allowed to testify as to the conclusions reached from hospital, medical, psychological or laboratory records provided the same are produced at the hearing. The court by order shall provide for the payment of all such expert witnesses. If the child, parent or custodian is indigent, such witnesses shall be compensated out of the treasury of the State, upon certificate of the court wherein the case is pending. No evidence acquired as a result of any such examination of the parent or any other person having custody of the child may be used against such person in any subsequent criminal proceedings against such person. W.Va.Code § 49-6-4(a) (emphasis supplied). West Virginia Code § 57-2-3 provides additional protection, as follows: In a criminal prosecution other than for perjury or false swearing, evidence shall not be given against the accused of any statement made by him as a witness upon a legal examination. Finally, West Virginia Code § 49-7-1 provides generally for confidentiality of records concerning a child which may be accumulated by DHHR. [9]
This Court addressed the statutory protections in West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources ex rel. Wright v. Doris S., 197 W.Va. 489, 475 S.E.2d 865 (1996), as they affect the issue of utilization of evidence in the civil and criminal contexts against the interests of a parent also accused of a crime related to the alleged abuse and neglect of children. This Court explained: Such a parent or guardian may be invoking his/her right to remain silent pursuant to the Fifth Amendment because that individual also may be facing criminal charges arising out of the abuse and neglect of the child. The rights of the criminally accused are sufficiently protected, however, by the following statutory provisions: 1) West Virginia Code § 49-6-4(a) (1995) which allows medical and mental examinations of the child or other parties involved in an abuse and neglect proceeding provides that [n]o evidence acquired as a result of any such examination of the parent or any other person having custody of the child may be used against such person in any subsequent criminal proceedings against such person; 2) West Virginia Code § 49-7-1 (1995) provides that [a]ll records of the state department, the court and its officials, law-enforcement agencies and other agencies or facilities concerning a child as defined in this chapter shall be kept confidential and shall not be released...[;] and 3) West Virginia Code § 57-2-3 (1966) provides that [i]n a criminal prosecution other than for perjury or false swearing, evidence shall not be given against the accused of any statement made by him as a witness upon a legal examination. Id. at 497-98, n. 22, 475 S.E.2d at 873-74, n. 22. In Wright, a case involving the death of child, this Court reviewed the authorities supporting the prevailing rule that the Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them. Id. at 498, 475 S.E.2d at 874, quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318, 96 S.Ct. 1551, 47 L.Ed.2d 810 (1976). [10] In light of that review of authorities, this Court held as follows in syllabus point two of Wright: Because the purpose of an abuse and neglect proceeding is remedial, where the parent or guardian fails to respond to probative evidence offered against him/her during the course of an abuse and neglect proceeding, a lower court may properly consider that individual's silence as affirmative evidence of that individual's culpability. Id. at 492, 475 S.E.2d at 868.
We are satisfied that this rule allowing a trial court to consider one's silence as affirmative evidence of culpability, as set forth in Wright, is soundly supported by the authorities and is consistent with the policy of this State which encourages prompt hearing of abuse and neglect cases and a paramount concern for the best interests of the children involved in such proceedings. We are also satisfied that the rule does not offend the protections against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and Article III, Section 5 of our State Constitution. As applied to the issue of culpability, the rule simply confronts the accused parent with a choice: Assert the privilege against self-incrimination with the risk that silence will be considered in the civil proceeding as evidence of culpability, or waive the privilege and offer such evidence as the accused may alone possess to refute the charge of abuse and neglect. The Appellant argues, however, that this Court was in error when it concluded in Wright that the statutory protections cited in Wright are sufficient to permit Appellant's full and proper exercise of the right against self incrimination guaranteed to him by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and by Article III, Section 5 of our State Constitution. The Appellant contends that the statutes relied upon in Wright do not protect him in all of the circumstances which might arise if he undertook a vigorous effort to maintain his parental rights and prevent their termination in the abuse and neglect proceedings. The Appellant maintains that participation in interviews with DHHR workers, participation in multi-disciplinary team meetings and submission to treatment, as contrasted with mere diagnostic examinations, by medical or other professional personnel are not within the scope of the protections afforded by the statutes relied upon in Wright. The Appellant further argues that none of the statutes protects him against the use of evidence gathered in the abuse and neglect proceedings to impeach any testimony offered against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding involving his alleged abuse and neglect of the children. To address the Appellant's claims, we will discuss each relevant statute. West Virginia Code § 49-7-1, as quoted in pertinent part above, is a statute providing generally for the confidentiality of records of the Department of Health and Human Resources accumulated in abuse and neglect cases. The statute is replete with exceptions, including exceptions directing release of the information to law-enforcement agencies and prosecuting attorneys, ... [a] grand jury, circuit court or family law master.... We find that West Virginia Code § 49-7-1 provides no meaningful protection of confidentiality or privilege for statements made by an accused in an abuse and neglect proceeding and is, in fact, designed to facilitate the dissemination of information to those charged with the public duty of prosecuting those who may be or are accused of criminal conduct. The remaining statutes at issue appear to provide some substantive protection to those involved in abuse and neglect cases who may also be charged with crime related to the alleged abuse and neglect. The Appellee argues that these protective statutes provide adequate opportunity for a parent accused of abuse and neglect and also accused of a crime arising from any such alleged abuse and neglect to exercise rights against self-incrimination in the criminal proceeding. The Appellee further argues that the protections adequately balance the paramount interest of the State in the protection of children with the right of the Appellant against self-incrimination. The Appellee contends that those protective statutes therefore do not unconstitutionally deprive the Appellant of those rights. Finally, the Appellee argues that if the lower court is reversed [t]he entire system for resolving abuse cases would be destroyed. We do not shrink from a close examination of the Appellant's claims because of this warning of dire results. We share the view of the lower court that the issues raised by the Appellant present a very difficult situation. The trial court addressed the complexity of this issue on at least three separate occasions, as evidenced by the record of the proceedings below. During the February 23, 2000, adjudicatory hearing, the lower court astutely observed as follows: I think wein cases of this nature and specifically in this case, we put the father between the proverbial rock and a hard place in the sense that we tell him to go for clinical diagnosis, but he knows going in that anything he says which may incriminate him may be used against him at a later time. And so if he doesfaces the prospect of criminal charges, if he does exercise his right not to make a statement, which which is a constitutional right, then that can be used against him to say, Well, no improvement period. We're going to terminate your custodial rights. I think in this case inasmuch as the child has never been removed from her mother and is being placed with her mother and will remain there. That there'sthere's no harm to be done by granting the father an improvement period just for the simpleI don't think this Court or any Court has any way of getting him out of the situation he's in now, and that is choosing between losing his child or making admissions which my subject him to criminal penalties.... I'm hesitant about totally terminating his parental rights because counsel properly advised him that if thethese matters could be used against him, and he exercised his Fifth Amendment Rights. During a May 31, 2000, hearing at the termination of one of the improvement periods, this issue was again raised, and the lower court stated: I think he's in that place that we refer to between a rock and a hard place, and that is if hethe only way he can see the children is to admit itadmit the sexual abuse. And if he admits the sexual abuse, he's looking at criminal chargesan admission in criminal charges. During the November 28, 2000, dispositional hearing, the lower court explained: The Court isagain recognizes the situation the father's in. He's not been tried yet and obviously would not be to his best interest in the criminal proceeding toto admit the acting in this proceeding. If the protective statutes are narrowly read and applied, it appears to this Court that they do, in fact, provide little comfort to an accused abuser who desires (1) not to waive his right against self-incrimination, and (2) make a bona fide effort to fully participate in the process established for resolving abuse and neglect cases, including remedial examination and treatment. While the Appellee asserts in its brief that it can be argued that the protections of West Virginia Code § 57-2-3 could apply to Multi-Disciplinary Team proceedings, the Appellee did not so concede, and the Appellant, at the lower court level, had every reason to fear that the Appellee would not so concede in his upcoming criminal prosecution. [11] We recognize that if the statutes are construed to provide protections only for statements made in diagnostic examinations by a physician, psychiatrist or psychologist and to legal examinations had under oath, then the protections they offer may be seen as illusory. We likewise recognize that those statutes cannot, under any circumstances, operate to protect a criminal defendant's statements in an abuse and neglect proceeding from subsequent use in a criminal proceeding in any and all circumstances. Nevertheless, the statutes appear to provide substantial protections in this regard if carefully observed and liberally construed to achieve the remedial purposes for which it appears they were enacted.
With specific reference to West Virginia Code § 49-6-4(a), that statute provides that no evidence acquired as a result a parent or other person having custody of a child being examined by a physician, psychologist or psychiatrist under court order may be used against such person in any subsequent criminal proceedings against such person and that the court shall not terminate parental or custodial rights of a party solely because the party refuses to submit to the examination. That statute is supplemented by West Virginia Code § 57-2-3, preventing the use of evidence acquired upon a legal examination, in subsequent court proceedings other than a prosecution for perjury or false swearing. In the case sub judice, in a slight variation on this proposition, the lower court took evidence from a psychologist to the effect that there was no hope of correcting the conditions of abuse because the Appellant, in the exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination, failed to admit the abuse during a psychological examination and argued that the statutes did not adequately protect him. We believe that the Appellant's argument has merit if the statutes are narrowly construed, but that the remedial purposes of the statutes require a broader construction. Our abuse and neglect statutes contemplate reasonable and timely efforts being made during the course of the abuse and neglect proceedings to achieve a correction of the conditions creating the abuse or neglect. Moreover, there is little doubt that the Appellant's silence regarding the conditions of abusein essence, his failure to take part in the examination ordered by the lower court at least to the extent of discussing those conditions with the examining psychologist contributed materially to the trial court's decision here to terminate parental rights. As we contrast the design of our abuse and neglect statutes to provide reasonable and timely efforts to correct conditions creating abuse and neglect with the dilemma created by the Appellant's silence, we are guided by the holding of this Court in syllabus point one of State v. White, 188 W.Va. 534, 425 S.E.2d 210 (1992): `A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith. Syllabus Point 5, State v. Snyder, 64 W.Va. 659, 63 S.E. 385 (1908).' Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, [172] W.Va. [312], 305 S.E.2d 268 (1983). Syl. Pt. 3, Shell v. Bechtold, 175 W.Va. 792, 338 S.E.2d 393 (1985). In syllabus point two of White, this Court continued: `In ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part of the statute and to the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the legislation.' Syl. Pt. 2, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975). Syl. Pt. 3, State ex rel. Fetters v. Hott, 173 W.Va. 502, 318 S.E.2d 446 (1984). In discussing the protections afforded to the accused individual in State v. James R., II, 188 W.Va. 44, 422 S.E.2d 521 (1992), this Court referenced West Virginia Code § 49-6-4 and explained as follows in syllabus point three: No evidence that is acquired from a parent or any other person having custody of a child, as a result of medical or mental examinations performed in the course of civil abuse and neglect proceedings, may be used in any subsequent criminal proceedings against such person. W.Va.Code § 49-6-4(a) (1992). Our review of the statutes, corresponding case law of this state, and authority from other jurisdictions compels our conclusion that West Virginia Code § 49-6-4 was intended to constitute a full and comprehensive prohibition against criminal utilization of information obtained through court-ordered psychological or psychiatric examination, whether for diagnosis, therapy, or other treatment of any nature ordered in conjunction with abuse and neglect proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that West Virginia Code § 49-6-4 applies to disclosures in any court-ordered examination of an accused who is a respondent in an abuse and neglect proceeding, whether such disclosures occur in the course of diagnosis or treatment. [12] If a trial court, in the course of an abuse and neglect proceeding, requires by its order that an accused submit to an examination by a person proposed by any party as an expert who is neither a physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist, such an examination is conducted under warrant of law [13] and is, accordingly, subject to the prohibitions of West Virginia Code § 57-2-3. [14] We further hold that, in an abuse and neglect proceeding, an accused required by court order to undergo an examination by an expert who is neither a physician, psychologist, or psychiatrist is entitled to have the trial court's determinations regarding the protections afforded by West Virginia Code § 57-2-3 set forth in a protective order for future reference. We are mindful of this Court's holding in State ex rel. Wright v. Stucky, 205 W.Va. 171, 517 S.E.2d 36 (1999), that neither West Virginia Code § 57-2-3 nor a protective order under Rule 26(c) of the West Virginia rules of Civil Procedure provide use immunity to require a person to answer questions in civil discovery over a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination, remarking in the body of the opinion that the subject statute protects only statements made in court. To the extent that Stucky conflicts with our holding here regarding the protections afforded by West Virginia Code § 57-2-3, Stucky is hereby modified to exclude from its holding court-ordered examinations in abuse and neglect proceedings. [15] The remedial interpretations adopted by this Court serve a twofold purpose: first, they provide significant protection of the Fifth Amendment rights of the accused; and second, they advance the significant goal of ascertaining truth and appropriate protection of children's rights in abuse and neglect proceedings by removing a potential stumbling block to full and complete disclosure, investigation, and treatment of perpetrators. As this Court has consistently recognized, the primary goal in all abuse and neglect cases must be the health and welfare of the children. In re Katie S., 198 W.Va. 79, 479 S.E.2d 589 (1996). Any operation of the statute which provides less than such constructive, comprehensive protection would be incongruous with the underlying intent of both the statute itself and the goal of abuse and neglect proceedings. We emphasize here that these protective statutes apply only to court-ordered examinations. Obviously, there is no basis to extend those protections to investigations prior to the filing of an abuse and neglect proceeding, other contacts with DHHR personnel, or statements made in MDT meetings where numerous persons may be present. In those situations, a parent is left to his or her own judgment whether to speak or remain silent on all or any issue that may arise.
The Appellant chose to remain silent in the abuse and neglect proceeding based upon what this Court considers a legitimate concern regarding the clarity and scope of the protective statutes. Based upon the Appellant's decision to remain silent, he was unable to utilize his improvement periods for their intended benefit, as an opportunity to remedy the existing problems. West Virginia Dept. of Human Serv. v. Peggy F., 184 W.Va. 60, 64, 399 S.E.2d 460, 464 (1990). As this Court explained in syllabus point six of In re Carlita B., 185 W.Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991), At the conclusion of the improvement period, the court shall review the performance of the parents in attempting to attain the goals of the improvement period and shall, in the court's discretion, determine whether the conditions of the improvement period have been satisfied and whether sufficient improvement has been made in the context of all the circumstances of the case to justify the return of the child. When the Appellant did not attempt to utilize his improvement period for its intended benefit, the lower court concluded that the Appellant had not demonstrated improvement and found that termination was justified. We conclude that the Appellant did not utilize his improvement periods and chose to remain silent based upon legitimate legal questions of constitutional dimension. These questions addressed the perceived illusory effect of the statutes discussed herein, questions this Court has now answered for the first time. As we have noted, the trial court shared the Appellant's concerns, but until this Court addressed those concerns the Appellant had no remedy, and the trial court was understandably equally constrained. Our discussion herein should permit the Appellant to pursue his case more aggressively on remand and permit him to seek full evaluation and treatment, if he desires to prevent termination of his parental rights. On remand, the Appellant should be provided with one additional improvement period. If the Appellant chooses to remain silent, whether based upon the Fifth Amendment or otherwise, then the termination order should stand, based upon the reasoning of the lower court. By this opinion, we have clarified the breadth of the legislative provision and have emphasized that a limiting order could be crafted to identify protected conversations, admissions, evaluations, and treatment to protect the Appellant from the fear that anything expressed in conjunction with the abuse and neglect proceeding will be utilized in the criminal proceeding. [16] Our conclusions herein shall have only prospective application in other cases wherein an order of termination has not been entered. On remand, the lower court should assess the Appellant's progress at the cessation of this additional improvement period and proceed accordingly, within the discretion of the lower court. The lower court correctly determined that the abuse and neglect could not be remedied without the cooperation and treatment of the Appellant. However, our review of the record compels our conclusion that the Appellant withheld such cooperation and submission to treatment based upon a legitimate concern. That concern having been resolved herein, to the extent possible, the Appellant should be entitled to demonstrate whether he possesses the desire and ability to fully cooperate in a meaningful improvement period. In so ruling, this Court does not wish to express any preference or opinion regarding the ultimate determination of the lower court on the issue of termination of the Appellant's parental rights or the degree to which the Appellant may be permitted supervised visitation or post-termination visitation. We are also cognizant of the need for final resolution in the lives of these young children. Were these children being placed for adoption or lingering in foster care, we would be less disposed toward extending the additional improvement period to the Appellant. Where the children are securely with their mother, however, we see no impediment to permitting the Appellant the opportunity to participate in a meaningful improvement period, if he so chooses. If termination is the ultimate result, the possibility of post-termination visitation must also be addressed by the lower court. We directed as follows in syllabus point five of In re Christina L., 194 W.Va. 446, 460 S.E.2d 692 (1995): When parental rights are terminated due to neglect or abuse, the circuit court may nevertheless in appropriate cases consider whether continued visitation or other contact with the abusing parent is in the best interest of the child. Among other things, the circuit court should consider whether a close emotional bond has been established between parent and child and the child's wishes, if he or she is of appropriate maturity to make such request. The evidence must indicate that such visitation or continued contact would not be detrimental to the child's well being and would be in the child's best interest. Reversed and Remanded with Directions.