Opinion ID: 166940
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Consent

Text: Briseno and Rodriguez assert that the consent for Jones to search the Suburban was not voluntarily given. “A traffic stop may become a consensual encounter if the officer returns the license and registration and asks questions without further constraining the driver by an overbearing show of authority.” United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1996). A court must consider the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officer’s conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was free to terminate the encounter of his own volition. United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1997). “In determining whether a consent to search was free from coercion, a court should consider, inter alia, physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, threats of violence, promises or inducements, deception or trickery, and the physical and mental condition and capacity of the defendant.” United States v. Pena, 143 F.3d 1363, 1367 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). Finally, it must be noted that “[b]ecause voluntariness is a question of fact, [this] court must accept the district court’s finding unless it is clearly erroneous.” United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1177 (10th Cir. 2000). In asserting that their consent to Jones’ search of the Suburban was not voluntary, Briseno and Rodriguez argue as follows: (1) Jones testified at the suppression hearing that he would have continued to detain them even had they -15- not consented to the search because he believed he had reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing; (2) they were separated from their traveling companion during the interaction with Jones; (3) the presence of a number of officers on the scene was coercive; (4) Jones leaned into the Suburban when he asked Briseno for consent to search; and (5) Briseno’s grasp of English is too limited to have given valid consent. For those reasons set out below, this court finds these arguments unconvincing. In contrast to the defendant’s assertions on appeal, Jones’ unexpressed subjective views about whether he had a sufficient legal basis to hold them if they refused to consent to a search of the Suburban are irrelevant to the question whether the consent was free of coercion. This is especially true in light of the district court’s finding that there was nothing coercive or forceful in the manner in which Jones interacted with Briseno and Rodriguez. For instance, the district court specifically found that Jones leaned into the Suburban simply to facilitate conversation with Briseno, who was seated in the back seat of the Suburban. Because Jones did not express, either through word or deed, that he intended to continue detaining the defendants had they declined consent to search the Suburban, Jones’ subjective intent is irrelevant to the question whether Briseno’s consent was voluntary. -16- The remainder of Briseno’s and Rodriguez’s contentions are equally unavailing. The separation of Briseno from his traveling companion was of a limited duration, lasting no more than twenty minutes. In addition, the district court rejected the assertion that Briseno could not understand English, finding that “[t]here is no evidence to support a finding that the Defendants did not understand what Trooper Jones was asking them.” D. Ct. Order at 7. Finally, we agree with the district court that the presence of other officers on the scene did not create a coercive environment. The district court specifically found that although three other troopers eventually joined Jones at the scene, only one of those officers came near Briseno prior to the search. None of the troopers unholstered his firearm or displayed any show of force. In sum, the defendants have not identified anything in the record demonstrating that the district court’s conclusion that Briseno voluntarily consented to the search of the Suburban is clearly erroneous. -17-