Opinion ID: 2633459
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts I through IV

Text: HRS § 702-205 (1993) defines the elements of an offense as: such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct, as: (a) Are specified by the definition of the offense, and (b) Negative a defense (other than a defense based on the statute of limitations, lack of venue, or lack of jurisdiction). (Emphases added.) Further, HRS § 701-114 (1993) provides that no person may be convicted of an offense without proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the offense. As discussed below, the lack of legal consent was an element of each of the offenses in Counts I, II, III, and IV. Because compulsion is an element of each of the crimes charged in Counts I, II, and IV, the prosecution had the burden of proving that Defendant committed the culpable acts by compulsion. HRS §§ 707-731(1)(a) and 707-733(1)(a). [8] The definition of compulsion includes the absence of consent. HRS § 707-700 (1993). [9] Thus, with respect to Counts I, II, and IV, the absence of consent is an element of the offense specified by the definition of the offense, HRS § 702-205(a), and was required to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the prosecution. With respect to Count III, the prosecution must prove that Defendant knowingly expose[d][his] genitals to [Complainant] under circumstances in which [his] conduct [was] likely to alarm the [Complainant] or put the [Complainant] in fear of bodily injury [.] HRS § 707-733(b) (emphasis added). HRS § 702-233 (1993) provides that: In any prosecution, the [victim's] consent to the conduct alleged, or to the result thereof, is a defense if the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. (Emphasis added.) Clearly, consent negatives the element that Defendant's conduct [was] likely to alarm [Complainant] or put [her] in fear of bodily injury. Id. Consent, therefore, is a defense to Count III, and, pursuant to HRS § 702-205(b), the prosecution had the burden of negating the defense of consent. In the context of this case, there were two possible ways for the prosecution to meet its burden of negating the defense of consent. The first waythe prosecution's primary theorywas to prove that Complainant did not consent at all, i.e., the absence of consent. The second way was to prove that, even if Complainant consented, such consent was ineffective. HRS § 702-235 (1993) provides that consent is not a defense if: (1) It is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize the conduct alleged [Ground 1]; or (2) It is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease, disorder, or defect, or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the defendant to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct alleged [Ground 2]; or (3) It is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense [Ground 3]; or (4) It is induced by force, duress or deception [Ground 4]. The commentary to HRS § 702-235 provides that [t]his section deprives the defendant of a defense based on consent in those situations where the [victim's] apparent consent is actually meaningless. Commentary to HRS § 702-235 (emphasis added). Further, [f]acts which deprive consent of its effectiveness negative a defense, thereby making them elements of the offense. Id. Moreover, Hawaii's case law recognizes that ineffective consent, if proven, also renders consent meaningless where the absence of consent is an element of the crime specified in the definition of the offense. See State v. Oshiro, 5 Haw.App. 404, 408, 696 P.2d 846, 850 (1985) ([I]f consent as a defense is subject to the ten qualifications of HRS § 702-235, then [lack of] consent as an element is similarly restricted.). Thus, with respect to each of Counts I, II, III, and IV, the attendant circumstance of lack of legal consent was an element of the charged offense, see HRS § 702-205, and the prosecution could prove that element by establishing (1) that Complainant did not consent (absence of consent) or (2) that any apparent consent was ineffective pursuant to HRS § 702-235 (ineffective consent). As discussed in section III.B., infra, we must determine whether the jury was required to reach a unanimous verdict as to the particular mode of proving the element of lack of legal consent.
With respect to jury instructions, [i]t is a grave error to submit a [criminal] case to a jury without accurately defining the offense charged and its elements. Accordingly, the jury may not be instructed in a manner that would relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving every element of the offense charged. State v. Jenkins, 93 Hawai`i 87, 108, 997 P.2d 13, 34 (2000) (citations and footnote omitted). Further, where . . . the jury has been given instructions on a defense other than an affirmative defense, [10] but has not been instructed that the prosecution bears the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to negativing that defense, substantial rights of the defendant may be affected and plain error may be noticed. Raines v. State 79 Hawai`i 219, 225, 900 P.2d 1286, 1292 (1995); see also HRS § 701-115 (1993). In its application, the prosecution seems to argue that Defendant was not entitled to an instruction on the defense of consent. However, [o]ur cases have firmly established that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on every defense or theory of defense having any support in the evidence, provided such evidence would support the consideration of that issue by the jury, no matter how weak, inconclusive, or unsatisfactory the evidence may be. State v. Sawyer, 88 Hawai`i 325, 333, 966 P.2d 637, 645 (1998) (quoting State v. Kaiama, 81 Hawai`i 15, 24, 911 P.2d 735, 744 (1996)[).] State v. Cabrera, 90 Hawai`i 359, 370, 978 P.2d 797, 808 (1999) (some citations and internal quotation marks omitted). It was Defendant's theory of the case that Complainant had consented to his sexual acts based on evidence that she voluntarily accompanied him all day to the beach and his hotel room, even after an alleged assault, and that she did not complain to any of the other children who were present. Although this evidence is inconclusive as to the ultimate question whether Complainant consented to the conduct alleged, under Cabrera, the evidence was relevant to Defendant's theory that Complainant consented. Therefore, as to Counts I, II, III, and IV, the attendant circumstance of lack of legal consent was an element of the crime charged, and thus, the trial court was required to instruct the jury as to the defense of consent with respect to each of those counts. Accordingly, we reject the prosecution's argument that Defendant was not entitled to an instruction regarding the defense of consent.