Opinion ID: 2584803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Superior Court Erred in Part in Its Dismissal of Lorenz's Counterclaims.

Text: After Lorenz filed an amended statement of her counterclaims, Maddox moved to strike all of Lorenz's counterclaims. In response, the superior court issued a notice of intent to dismiss counterclaims in which the court suggested that Lorenz failed to state any claim on which relief may be granted and provided Lorenz twenty days to amend her counterclaims. After Lorenz filed an amended pleading, Maddox again moved for dismissal on Civil Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. Lorenz did not file an opposition to this motion. The superior court granted Maddox's motion to dismiss all of Lorenz's counterclaims without further explanation. Lorenz makes two challenges. First, she argues that the superior court erred by not treating her pro se pleadings charitably and by not providing her sufficient information so that she could properly amend her counterclaims. Second, she argues that the superior court erred in its denial of her counterclaims because each counterclaim sufficiently stated a claim for relief. Because we independently review and charitably construe Lorenz's counterclaims, we do not address Lorenz's first argument. We treat Lorenz's final pro se pleading of counterclaims as an opposition to Maddox's Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Accordingly we reject Maddox's argument that Lorenz defaulted by failing to respond to his final Rule 12(b)(6) motion. [35] We review the superior court's dismissal of Lorenz's counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted de novo, presum[ing] all factual allegations of the complaint to be true and [making] all reasonable inferences . . . in favor of the nonmoving party. [36]
Lorenz's first and second counterclaims were for defamation. Lorenz alleged that Maddox made false statements to the government, the press, and local citizens about issues related to the lawsuit and her cleanup efforts. She alleged that Maddox's words placed an unfortunate shadow on her vocation as an interior designer and her role as one of Seward's Historical Preservation Commissioners. In his motion for dismissal, Maddox argued that Lorenz's pleadings did not set forth the allegedly false statements and that Lorenz failed to properly allege damages. On appeal Lorenz argues that a complete reading of her complaint provided sufficient information about Maddox's statements. She also argues that she adequately alleged damages by claiming harm to her standing in the community. In response, Maddox contends that Lorenz never set forth the allegedly defamatory statements, made no claim that the statements were false, and inadequately pled damages. The elements of defamation are: (1) a false and defamatory statement; (2) an unprivileged publication to a third party; (3) fault amounting at least to negligence on the part of the publisher; and (4) the existence of either `per se' actionability or special harm. [37] A charitable reading of Lorenz's pro se counterclaim leads us to conclude that Lorenz included sufficient allegations of the statements that Maddox made. Lorenz alleged that Maddox wrote disparaging letters to the editor in the Seward Phoenix Log, that Maddox sought news coverage of the effects of the burn, that Maddox contacted state and federal agencies alleging illegal activities in connection with Lorenz's fire, and that Maddox distributed flyers disparaging Lorenz's cleanup activities. While these allegations did little to suggest the substance of Maddox's statements, they generally put Maddox on notice of Lorenz's claims. Lorenz's complaint sufficiently alleged that the statements Maddox made were false by making the general assertion that Maddox made wholly and in-part false statements. While the lack of specific statements in her pleadings makes this falsity allegation broad, this assertion was sufficient to put Maddox on notice of Lorenz's position. Lorenz's complaint insufficiently alleged damages for some of her potential defamation claims. Lorenz's complaint could be read to state causes of action in libel and slander per se. These claims do not require an allegation of special damages. [38] However, to the extent that Lorenz attempted to recover for slander requiring proof of special damages (slander per quod), she failed to plead damages with any specificity. [39] But this failure might be attributable to insufficient guidance from the trial court. On remand, Lorenz should replead all of her defamation claims. The trial court can then consider a renewed Rule 12(b)(6) motion or a motion for a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). Maddox can also utilize discovery to distill Lorenz's claim and may choose to file a motion for summary judgment. We note that some of Maddox's statements may be privileged. For example, Maddox's communications with state and federal officials alleging illegal activities likely warranted a qualified privilege and, if so, the only question would be whether the privilege was abused. [40] We further note that the jury's special verdict in favor of Maddox might provide him with a defense of truth as to most of Lorenz's defamation claims. But we take no conclusive position on the validity of Lorenz's claims as they relate to Maddox's ability to assert privileges or other defenses.
Lorenz's third, fourth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims for relief involved the intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Maddox argued that Lorenz failed to allege extreme or outrageous conduct and that she made insufficient and improper allegations of damages. On appeal, Lorenz groups her claims together into a more general argument of IIED. Lorenz's pleadings can be read to state a cause of action for IIED. An action for IIED lies where: (1) the conduct is extreme and outrageous, (2) the conduct is intentional or reckless, (3) the conduct causes emotional distress, and (4) the distress is severe. [41] Lorenz claimed at least one instance of arguably outrageous conduct: Maddox allegedly stated that the next time he caught [Lorenz] alone he would shoot her. However, some of Lorenz's other allegations do not appear to amount to outrageous conduct for the purposes of IIED. For example, she alleged that Maddox verbally harassed and taunted her and her daughter. [42] Lorenz sufficiently alleged that Maddox's conduct was intentional and that it caused her emotional distress. Lorenz's allegations suggested that the distress was severe, resulting in anxiety, depression, and migraine headaches. On remand, Lorenz should replead all of her IIED claims. [43] Maddox will have the same options as outlined above concerning Lorenz's defamation claims. We make no comment on collateral estoppel or mootness that might result from our decision in this appeal.
Lorenz's fifth claim for relief was for battery. Maddox, basing his response on Lorenz's three-paragraph claim for relief, moved for dismissal because the paragraphs did not state a cause of action. On appeal, Lorenz argues that an earlier paragraph in her answer alleged that Maddox threw a five-gallon bucket of dirty water on her. Battery occurs when an actor intends to cause harmful or offensive contact with another and an offensive contact results. [44] Lorenz's allegation that Maddox threw a bucket of water on her would constitute an intentional, offensive touching. Accordingly the superior court erred in dismissing this counterclaim.
Lorenz's ninth and tenth counterclaims alleged that Maddox operated a dog boarding business and a drug business from his property and that both of these activities constituted a nuisance. A nuisance is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use or enjoyment of real property. [45] Lorenz correctly argues that Maddox's briefing never suggests why her nuisance claims should fail on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds. A kennel of barking dogs can constitute a nuisance. [46] Maddox's alleged marijuana business might constitute a private nuisance. [47] Maddox argued in his motion to dismiss that the counterclaims were not part of the same transaction or occurrence as his claims. But Maddox based his entire motion on Rule 12(b)(6). As is the case with Lorenz's other permissive counterclaims, the superior court erred when it failed to accept Lorenz's permissive nuisance counterclaim in accordance with Civil Rule 13(b).