Opinion ID: 1714125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying horne's motion to transfer from circuit court to youth court.

Text: ¶ 10. Because one of the crimes of which Horne was accused, i.e., capital murder, was punishable by death or life imprisonment, the circuit court had original jurisdiction over this matter despite the fact that Horne was 14 years old at the time of the crime. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-21-151(1)(a) (2000). The circuit court could, however, transfer the case to the youth court if it found that it was in the best interest of the minor and in the interest of justice. Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-159(4) (2000). The power to transfer the case is clearly permissive, not mandatory. ¶ 11. The standard of review for a denial of a motion to transfer to youth court is abuse of discretion. State v. U.G., 726 So.2d 151, 154 (Miss.1998). ¶ 12. Horne makes much of the decision of State v. U.G ., where we made it mandatory for a circuit court to consider two factors when ruling on a motion to transfer to youth court: whether the transfer would be in the (1) best interest of the minor; and (2) interest of justice. Id. at 155. The record shows that, in denying the motion to transfer, the circuit court did not make any findings as to these two factors. ¶ 13. Even though the trial court heard argument of counsel on Horne's motion to transfer, the record is devoid of any evidence which would support a finding that a transfer would be in Horne's best interest or in the interest of justice. The only facts in support of the motion presented by Horne were his age (14), his educational background (9th grade) at the time of the crime, and the fact that he had no prior criminal record with the youth court. ¶ 14. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice to prosecute such a heinous crime in circuit court, where an appropriate punishment could be meted out. It was not necessary to murder Myong Cheon Son. He had no opportunity to present a defense to the two intruders; indeed, they were in the store only 15 secondsnot enough time for anyone to react. The acts of the perpetrators demonstrate a clear lack of conscience. The perpetrators needed to be dealt with harshly, no matter their ages. ¶ 15. We find that, even though the circuit court erred by not considering the two factors under State v. U.G ., this error was harmless.