Opinion ID: 1688665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred by denying watts' motion in limine to exclude testimony about watts' purchase of crack cocaine.

Text: ¶ 20. Before trial, Watts filed with the trial court a Motion in Limine requesting the trial court to order the district attorney to refrain from mentioning the purchase of and use of crack cocaine after the homicide. Although the trial court did not enter an order denying Watt's Motion in Limine, the trial court effectively denied the motion when it granted the defense a continuing objection to the introduction of evidence of the purchase of and use of crack cocaine after the homicide. Watts asserts that the trial court erred by denying his Motion in Limine requesting that the State be precluded from introducing evidence at trial regarding Watts' purchase of and use of crack cocaine. Watts contends that the fact of his use of crack cocaine at a point remote in time from the acts charged in the indictment should not have been allowed to be presented to the jury where it was unnecessary to the disposition of the case and highly prejudicial to Watts in the minds of the jury. ¶ 21. This Court has held that it was error for the trial court to allow evidence regarding the purchase of cocaine with proceeds from the robbery of the murder victim and that when considered together with an accumulation of other errors compelled reversal. Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452, 455 (Miss. 1997). The Snelson Court specifically held that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 401 of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence by stating that the introduction of the evidence which showed that Snelson bought and used cocaine after he had sold the stolen guns did not have the tendency to make any fact that was of consequence to the determination of whether Snelson killed Stephen Goode more probable or less probable than it would without the introduction of such evidence.... It is certainly separable from the main offense and cannot be made a part of whatever is referred to as the res gestae of the entire transaction. The evidence was clearly inflammatory and offered for the sole purpose of improperly influencing the jury. Snelson, 704 So.2d at 455. The Snelson Court also found that the trial court committed error by failing to declare a mistrial after the prosecution introduced evidence of other murders that were previously committed even though the trial court instructed the jury to disregard such evidence. Id. at 457-58. The Court additionally found that there had been numerous discovery violations by the prosecution in Snelson and that all the errors weighed together compelled reversal. Id. at 458-59. Thus, in Snelson the Court was concerned with three substantial accumulated errors which mandated reversal. ¶ 22. Although the Snelson Court found that evidence which occurred after the robbery and murder that the defendant purchased crack cocaine with the proceeds of the robbery and smoked the cocaine was irrelevant to prove any of the elements of the crimes charged, this Court has held that under certain circumstances that such evidence is relevant and admissible as a Rule 404(b) exception to prove motive. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1313 (Miss.1994). In Mack, the State presented evidence that Mack had been smoking crack cocaine before the robbery and murder and that he ran out of funds to satisfy his desire to purchase more crack cocaine. Mack, 650 So.2d at 1313. The State presented further testimony that before committing the robbery and murder Mack did not have enough money to purchase more cocaine, that Mack stated he would be back, that Mack then committed the robbery and murder, and that Mack returned with money to purchase more cocaine. Id. at 1312. In concluding that admission of the evidence that Mack purchased cocaine with the money from the robbery was harmless error, if any, the Court recognized the effect of Rule 404 is that evidence of other crimes is not admissible to show that a defendant committed crimes other than the one for which he is on trial. Id. at 1311. However, the Court stated: There are certain recognized exceptions to the rule. Proof of another crime is admissible where the offense charged and that offered to be proved are so connected as to constitute one transaction, where it is necessary to identify the defendant, where it is material to prove motive and there is an apparent relation or connection between the act proposed to be proved and that charged, where the accusation involves a series of criminal acts which must be proved to make out the offense, or where it is necessary to prove scienter or guilty knowledge. Id. (quoting West v. State, 463 So.2d 1048, 1051 (Miss.1985)). The Mack Court further recognized that [i]f evidence that a defendant has committed a crime or other bad acts falls within a 404(b) exception, before admitting evidence of the crime or act, the trial judge must weigh the probativeness of the evidence against the prejudicial effect under Rule 403. Id. Thus, by recognizing that, under a set of facts where all acts encompass a single transaction, evidence of other crimes or bad acts can be admissible to show motive or one of the other possible exceptions set forth in Rule 404(b), the Court stated: This is an area fraught with danger, and prosecutors and trial courts alike should approach with caution any evidence of other crimes offered for the purpose of proving motive for a robbery. Robbery has its own motivethe attainment of something of value.... Here, because of the close connection of a specific monetary objective and because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude that the error in admitting this evidence, if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1313. ¶ 23. In the case sub judice, there was no evidence of a close connection of a specific monetary objective to rob and murder Shivers in order for Watts to obtain money to purchase crack cocaine. In addition, Watts filed a Motion in Limine to exclude any evidence about Watts' purchase of crack cocaine. Although the trial court never entered an order denying the motion, the trial court apparently denied the motion by granting the defense a continuing objection to the introduction of the evidence prior to trial. Furthermore, the trial court failed to conduct a Rule 403 analysis of weighing the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect of the evidence to the defendant as required by Mack and Ford. See Mack, 650 So.2d at 1311; Ford v. State, 555 So.2d at 691, 693 (Miss.1989). Thus, we find that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence that Watts used the money taken from Shivers to purchase crack cocaine after the robbery and murder. ¶ 24. However, although it was error to allow introduction of the evidence under these facts, we hold that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because of the overwhelming weight of the evidence against Watts. See Mack, 650 So.2d at 1313. In this case, Watts voluntarily turned himself in and gave a statement concerning the shooting and robbing of Shivers but claimed that it was all an accident. Watts' theory of an accidental shooting was overwhelmingly disproved by the compelling testimony of Dr. Ward that Shivers had been shot ten times with the bullets being fired from distances of three feet to less than two inches from Shivers' body. Dr. Ward testified that one of the entrance wounds entered through Shivers' back and created a one-inch circle of stippling abrasions, caused by unburned gunpowder, around the bullet wound. With regard to the distance of the barrel from Shivers' back when this bullet entered, Dr. Ward testified as follows: Q. Okay. And the one-inch circle of that entrance wound in the backthat's the one we're talking about? A. Yes, sir. Q. indicates to you that the barrel of that weapon was how far away? A. It's my opinion that the end of the barrel was about an inch away from the skin when the trigger was pulled to create that wound. Dr. Ward also testified that there was an entrance wound on the left side of the front of the stomach just abovea little bit above the belly button. And around this wound there are not stippling abrasions like we talked about here, but there are a few particles of gun powder laying on the skin around it. Dr. Ward testified that this wound would fall into the definition of a close-range wound which would indicate that the gun was less than three feet away from him when that wound was created. Dr. Ward testified that these two wounds were the only ones in which stippling abrasions were discovered around the bullet's entrance. As to the distance of the other wounds, Dr. Ward testified: Q. Okay. You didn't find the stippling on any of the other entrance wounds that you've described? A. No, sir, we didn't. Q. Would they, then, be at a distance greater than three feet? A. Again, thatthat's a conservative estimate, but, yes, sir, somewhere between 18 inches and three feet away. Furthermore, Dr. Ward testified about the relationship of the position of the entrance wounds as follows: Q. Okay. Did you make any determination as to the angle of theof any of the wounds? A. Yes, sir, I did. Most of the wounds went basically straight through his body. The wound on the left side of his chest below the collarbone is traveling at an angle, going from left to right, because of the little scrape in the skin around the wound. The wounds through the arms are basically going straight through. The wound on the left side of his chin is going a little bit at a downward angle, because itit ends up damaging the neck organs, the windpipe and the blood vessels that are in his neck. Q. So is itit's your testimony that some of the wounds that he would have been facing histhe person firing the shots and others he might have been turned to the side, or do youor else the the shooter was moving around? A. Yes, sir, that wouldthat would be correct. Q. And we know that some of the shots were fired into the back? A. Yes, sir, that's correct. Q. So some shots were fired straight in, some were from an angle to thefrom his left and some were straight in from the back? A. That's correct. Thus, Dr. Ward's testimony indicates that Shivers was shot ten different times from the front, the side, and the back, and the fact that some of the wounds were created when the barrel was at distances of as far away as three feet and as close as one inch to the body overwhelmingly discredits Watts' claim that the shooting was an accident. ¶ 25. Watts' theory of an accidental shooting was also substantially discredited by his own subsequent actions of cutting the phone lines, taking Shivers' wallet and truck keys, and leaving in Shivers' truck. Watts discarded the wallet after removing Shivers' money at a location a few miles from Shivers' trailer. He disposed of the gun at a different location a few miles north of Yazoo City. Thus, all of these actions following the shooting are not consistent with Watts' claim of an accidental shooting. Therefore, we hold that as a result of Watts' voluntary statement, overwhelming physical evidence and expert testimony that the shooting was not an accident, as well as Watts' inconsistent actions with the shooting being an accident, the error by the trial court of allowing evidence that Watts used the money from the robbery to purchase crack cocaine when he got to Yazoo City was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. This assignment of error is without merit.