Opinion ID: 518397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence on the Substantive Counts

Text: 34 We turn next to appellant's convictions on the charges of 1) the importation of a controlled substance, or aiding and abetting therein, and 2) possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute, or aiding and abetting therein. 35
36 Apropos of the substantive counts, the government argues that the appellant, by entering into and affirmatively associating himself with a conspiracy to import drugs, was criminally liable on the substantive charges regardless of which member of the conspiracy had possession of the drugs. 37 While it is true that a member of [a] conspiracy ... [can be convicted] of [a] substantive offense ... committed by his co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy, United States v. Pugliese, 712 F.2d 1574, 1583 (2d Cir.1983); see Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 1184, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946); United States v. Cambindo Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 639 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940, 100 S.Ct. 2163, 64 L.Ed.2d 795 (1980); United States v. Stassi, 544 F.2d 579, 584 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 907, 97 S.Ct. 1176, 51 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977), here, there was insufficient evidence to implicate Nusraty in the charged conspiracy, cf. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 645, 66 S.Ct. at 1183, and further, Detrich, his alleged co-conspirator, was acquitted of conspiracy at his trial, so this basis of liability on the substantive counts must fail. 38
39 In assessing whether Nusraty could have been liable for the possession, or the importation, of the drugs, we must note that there is no record evidence, direct or circumstantial, to show that Nusraty ever had dominion or control over the drugs. 40 By the terms of the statute, a conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute requires that the defendant have had possession--either actual or constructive--of the controlled substance. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson, 700 F.2d 944, 952 (5th Cir.1983); see also Tussa, 816 F.2d at 63. Here, there was no evidence that Nusraty ever had actual possession of heroin. Nor can the government point to any evidence other than Nusraty's involvement in the alleged conspiracy to show that Nusraty exercised constructive possession--i.e.,  'knowingly ha[d] the power and the intention ... to exercise dominion and control' --over the heroin. See United States v. Aiello, 864 F.2d 257, 263 (2d Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Tribunella, 749 F.2d 104, 111-12 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Craven, 478 F.2d 1329, 1333 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 54, 38 L.Ed.2d 85 (1973)). 41 To convict a defendant of importing a controlled substance, the government must show, inter alia, that the defendant either imported the substance or caused it to be imported. See United States v. Samad, 754 F.2d 1091, 1096 (4th Cir.1984); United States v. Koua Thao, 712 F.2d 369, 371 (8th Cir.1983). There was no evidence here that the appellant himself imported the drugs. Nor was there evidence that the appellant caused the drugs to be imported; to prove this count, it was critical for the government to show a nexus between Nusraty and the charged scheme to import the heroin, and as has been discussed, there was insufficient evidence to prove that Nusraty joined such a scheme.
42 Finally, we must examine whether there was sufficient evidence that Nusraty aided and abetted a principal in the possession of the heroin with intent to distribute or in the importation of the heroin. The jury was adequately instructed as to the charge of aiding and abetting with respect to Counts Two and Three, and so, drawing all inferences in favor of the government, we must examine whether the convictions can be sustained on these grounds. 43 As this court recently observed, to convict a defendant under a theory of aiding and abetting a crime the government must show, inter alia,  'that the person charged joined the venture, shared in it, and that his efforts contributed towards its success.'  Aiello, at 263 (quoting United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 154 (2d Cir.1988); United States v. Zambrano, 776 F.2d 1091, 1097 (2d Cir.1985)). Like conspiracy, the offense of aiding and abetting requires that the defendant have knowingly involved himself in a criminal act. Though the offense of conspiracy requires that the defendant have agreed to a criminal act, and the crime of aiding and abetting the commission of a substantive offense requires that the defendant have furthered the criminal act, see Tyler, 758 F.2d at 70-71, a conviction for either of these crimes requires that the defendant have known a crime was to be committed, United States v. Gallishaw, 428 F.2d 760, 763 (2d Cir.1970). 44 As we have discussed above in relation to the appellant's conviction for conspiracy, the evidence here was insufficient to establish that Nusraty knew of the scheme to import the heroin. Similarly, the evidence could not support a conviction for aiding and abetting since there was not a sufficient showing that Nusraty knew of the commission of a substantive offense. As we noted in United States v. Mariani, 539 F.2d 915 (2d Cir.1976): 45 It is a basic principle of criminal law that to be convicted of aiding and abetting, more than mere presence at the scene is required. Rather, the defendant must be shown to have knowingly associated with and participated in the criminal venture in a manner designed to accomplish its goal. 46 Id. at 919; see United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir.1938) (L. Hand, C.J.) (to be convicted of aiding and abetting, defendant must have had a purposive attitude towards the criminal venture). 47 The government's proof need not, of course, have been so strong as to exclude all possible inferences but those of guilt. United States v. Lubrano, 529 F.2d 633, 636 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 818, 97 S.Ct. 61, 50 L.Ed.2d 78 (1976). Nevertheless, for the reasons stated above, the key evidence against the appellant--that he was at the airport when Dr. Detrich arrived and joined him, and that he subsequently gave a false statement about his reasons for being there--does not warrant an inference that Nusraty knew he was involved in the commission of a crime to possess or to import drugs. See Wiley, 846 F.2d at 154 ( '[A] general suspicion or knowledge [of illegality is] ... not enough.'  (quoting Zambrano, 776 F.2d at 1097)).