Opinion ID: 1229535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliance on an Unsubstantiated Fact

Text: If, as Juwa argues, the district court sentenced him in reliance on the assumption that Juwa had sexually abused a minor on more than one occasion, this reliance was improper on the record before us. Because Juwa agreed to admit only to a single incident charged in the Rockland County indictment, and because the district court had ruled out reliance on the oral and written testimony of Juwa's nephew and the nephew's mother, the district court, as far as we can tell, was not presented with reliable substantiation for the remaining charges in the state indictment. Under such circumstances, a sentence enhancement based solely on unproven charges in an indictment would be improper. A sentencing court is not limited to considering only evidence of the convicted offense; it may take into account other relevant conduct, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. (Conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline sentencing range.), and even acquitted conduct, see United States v. Vaughn, 430 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir.2005); see also Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 563, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 82 L.Ed.2d 424 (1984) (describing sentencing court's discretion to consider any and all information that reasonably might bear on the proper sentence for the particular defendant). Nevertheless, there are distinct limits to this discretion, and they include a defendant's due process right to be sentenced based on accurate information. See United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447, 92 S.Ct. 589, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972); see also Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 740-41, 68 S.Ct. 1252, 92 L.Ed. 1690 (1948) (noting that whether caused by carelessness or design, [it] is inconsistent with due process of law for a defendant to be sentenced based on assumptions concerning his criminal record that were materially untrue, when the defendant's sentence had been influenced by other criminal charges to which he had not pled guilty). As the Third Circuit stated in United States v. Matthews, [f]actual matters considered as a basis for sentence must have `some minimal indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.' 773 F.2d 48, 51 (3d Cir.1985) (quoting United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030, 1040 (3d Cir.1982)). We have held that facts relevant to sentencing must be found by a preponderance of the evidence. Vaughn, 430 F.3d at 525; United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 388 (2d Cir.1992). Here, the district judge applied the upward departure provision of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 Application Note 6 in imposing a guidelines sentence of 90 months. In the alternative, he imposed a nonguidelines sentence of 90 months based, at least in part, on the Rockland county conduct. If he imposed this sentence based on a finding that Juwa had sexually abused a minor on multiple occasions, that finding would have to have been substantiated by a preponderance of the evidence. There was, however, no evidence of which we are aware to support that finding apart from the charges contained in the state indictment, and a bare-bones indictment, without more, is insufficient to support a factual underpinning for sentencing purposes. It is axiomatic that in a criminal trial an indictment is not evidence of guilt, nor may it alter the presumption of innocence with which every defendant is cloaked; it is only a finding of probable cause that a crime has been committed. United States v. Romano, 706 F.2d 370, 374 (2d Cir.1983) (emphasis added). While the evidentiary standard at sentencing is more relaxed than at trial, and the burden of proof on the government is a preponderance of the evidence and not beyond a reasonable doubt, probable cause is a lower standard than preponderance of the evidence; it requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity. United States v. Bakhtiari, 913 F.2d 1053, 1062 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n. 13, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Moreover, an indictment is not meant to serve an evidentiary function. Its primary purpose is to acquaint the defendant with the specific crime with which he is charged, United States v. Berlin, 472 F.2d 1002, 1007 (2d Cir.1973) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), allow him to prepare his defense, and protect him from double jeopardy, United States v. Doe, 297 F.3d 76, 87 (2d Cir.2002); see also United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 667 (2d Cir.2001) (describing notice function); United States v. D'Anna, 450 F.2d 1201, 1204 (2d Cir. 1971) (notice and protection from double jeopardy). We therefore adhere to the prescription that at sentencing, an indictment or a charge within an indictment, standing alone and without independent substantiation, cannot be the basis upon which a criminal punishment is imposed. Some additional information, whether testimonial or documentary, is needed to provide evidentiary support for the charges and their underlying facts. Given that Juwa intended to plead guilty, and ultimately did plead guilty in state court, to only one instance of sexual abuse, and given the lack of reliable independent information to support the other charges in the state indictment, it was impermissible for the district court to simply assume the multiple charges to be true and to enhance Juwa's sentence accordingly. As we have discussed, however, it is unclear from the record whether the district court did rely on the assumption that Juwa had engaged in sexual misconduct on more than one occasion. Therefore, we remand the case to the district court with instructions to resentence the defendant consistent with this opinion and to make clear the basis upon which the sentence rests.