Opinion ID: 3133690
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The End of the Cross-Jurisdictional Tolling

Text: Period The next question we confront is, when did the crossjurisdictional tolling of our state statute of limitations end? We are cognizant of the authority marshalled by the Defendants that a majority of the federal courts hold that “the tolling rule announced in [American Pipe] extends only through the denial of class status in the first instance by the district court.” Giovanniello, 726 F.3d at 107-08; see also Arivella, 623 F.Supp.2d at 174-75 (“Most courts . . . also agree that [class action] tolling ceases upon entry of an order denying class certification in the trial court.” Citing this authority, the Defendants argue that any tolling ended upon the Texas district court’s July 11, 1995 order dismissing the Carcamo/Delgado case for f.n.c. and all other pending motions as moot. Therefore, argue the Defendants, Plaintiffs’ October 3, 1997 Complaint was untimely, having been filed beyond the twoyear statute of limitations in HRS § 657-7. 29  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Plaintiffs, on the other hand, focus on the language of the July 11, 1995 order. They argue that the order’s paragraph denying all other pending motions as moot was a “generic housekeeping order,” that “did not even refer to a class certification motion,” and “did not contain any discussion of the requirements of class certification under federal Rule 23.” The Plaintiffs also argue that any tolling ended at the earliest on October 10, 19958, 90 days after the entry of the July 11, 1995 order, because the order did not take effect immediately; instead, the order stated, “[N]o case will be dismissed until 90 days have elapsed after the entry of this Memorandum and Order.” 890 F.Supp. at 1367. Therefore, argue the Plaintiffs, their October 3, 1995 Complaint was timely, having been filed days before the two year statute of limitations in HRS § 657-7 ended. They urge this court to “clarify the law to require that the termination of class action tolling must be sufficiently clear and unambiguous to put putative members of the class on notice that limitations has begun to run against their claims and they have an obligation to act.” The Plaintiffs’ arguments are persuasive. While it is not true that the July 11, 1995 order “did not even refer to a class 8 The Plaintiffs calculate the 90th day to be October 11, 1995, but it appears that the 90th day was October 10, 1995. 30  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  certification motion,”9 it is true that it “did not contain any discussion of the requirements of class certification under federal Rule 23.” The denial of class certification in the July 11, 1995 order was, as Plaintiffs argue, not express. Therefore, we agree with the Plaintiffs that the July 11, 1995 order did not terminate class action tolling in a “sufficiently clear and unambiguous” way in order to “put putative members of the class on notice that” the Hawaii state statute of limitations had begun to run against them. Moreover, it would appear from the plain language of the order that July 11, 1995 was not the date that the order itself would take effect in any event. In the order, the Texas district court stated that its dismissal of the cases would not take effect for another 90 days: The court concludes that the overwhelming majority of the relevant sources of proof are more readily available to the parties in the home countries of the plaintiffs and that this factor weighs heavily in favor of dismissal. Nevertheless, because foreign fora might not afford plaintiffs as many opportunities for discovery as they desire, to ensure that plaintiffs have access to evidence located in the United States no case will be dismissed until 90 days have elapsed after the entry of this Memorandum and Order. During that time plaintiffs may pursue expedited discovery against defendants under the supervision of this court. 890 F.Supp. at 1367 (emphasis added). Further, the district court’s affirmative statement that “no case will be dismissed 9 The record reflects that there was a pending class certification motion in Carcamo, and the Texas district court was aware of it when it stated in the July 11, 1995 order, “Defendants respond that while plaintiffs have sought class certification in several of the pending actions, no classes have been certified.” Delgado, 890 F.Supp. at 1368. 31  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  until 90 days have elapsed after the entry of this Memorandum and Order” is in tension with the more tentative “may be dismissed” language of the provision dismissing all pending motions as moot: Other motions In addition to defendant’s motion to dismiss for f.n.c., a number of other motions are pending. Because Delgado, Jorge Carcamo, Valdez, and Isae Carcamo may be dismissed in 90 days, all pending motions in those cases not otherwise expressly addressed in this Memorandum and Order are DENIED as MOOT. 890 F.Supp. at 1375. (capitalization in original; emphasis added). It would appear from the plain language of the July 11, 1995 order that, as of that date, there still remained a possibility that the Carcamo/Delgado litigation might not be dismissed; therefore, a related motion for class certification might not become moot. Thus, as Plaintiffs argue, the July 11, 1995 order did not unambiguously signal to putative class members of the need to act to protect their interests. It was not until October 27, 1995 that the Texas district court filed its judgment dismissing the Carcamo/Delgado cases that it could be said with certainty that class certification was denied. In order to prevent such confusion from arising in the future, we hold that the pendency of a class action in another jurisdiction operates to toll our state’s applicable statute(s) of limitations until the court in our sister jurisdiction issues an order expressly denying a motion for class certification (or 32  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  expressly denying the last such motion, if there is more than one motion). The July 11, 1995 order in this case was not an express denial of class certification; therefore, July 11, 1995 is not the date our state statute of limitations began to run again. Barring such an express order in this case, we hold that the Texas district court’s October 27, 1995 final judgment dismissing Carcamo/Delgado for f.n.c. clearly denied class certification and triggered the resumption of our state statute of limitations. The Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which was filed on October 3, 1997, was therefore timely. Finally, although the parties no longer pursue the issue of whether the Abarca filing constituted an “opt-out” of the Carcamo/Delgado class action, we note that cross-jurisdictional tolling would also end upon a class member’s decision to opt-out of a class action suit. In the present case, however, the Abarca filing was not an opt-out of the Carcamo/Delgado class action under the Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure (“HRCP”) or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”). Under both HRCP Rule 23(c)(2) (2011) and FRCP Rule 23(c)(2) (2009), once a court determines that a class action can be maintained under subsection (b)(3), then the court notifies class members that they can opt out of the class by sending a request to the court. See HRCP Rule 23(c)(2) (“In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the 33  FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAII REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  class the best notice practicable under the circumstances . . . advis[ing] each member that . . . the court will exclude the member from the class if the member so requests by a specified date. . . .”); FRCP Rule 23(c)(2) (“For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances . . . clearly and concisely stat[ing] in plain, easily understood language . . . that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion. . . .”) In this case, the Texas district court had not certified the Carcamo/Delgado class action; therefore, the opt-out provisions of HRCP Rule 23(c)(2) and FRCP Rule 23(c)(2) were not triggered. The Abarca filing was not an opt-out as envisioned under those rules.