Opinion ID: 1379871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Denial of defendant's request for a half-day continuance.

Text: Lord first contends that the district court abused its discretion in denying the defense request for a half-day continuance to permit six out-of-state witnesses from Maryland to testify the next morning. We agree. On August 23, 1989, the Wednesday before Lord's trial, the court conducted its calendar call for this case. The trial was to start on the following Monday. Defense counsel informed the court that he had five or six out-of-state witnesses arriving on Thursday night of trial week who would be ready to testify in the penalty hearing on Friday morning. The judge suggested that defense counsel try to have the witnesses ready to testify by Thursday, because the guilt phase would probably be finished by Wednesday. Later in the calendar call, however, the district court recalled Lord's case. At that time, the court stated that it understood the hazards of transportation and that it would be flexible on scheduling the penalty phase. Indeed, the district judge suggested that he might continue the penalty phase until the week after the guilt phase. The next discussion of scheduling the defense penalty witnesses came on Tuesday, August 29, 1989, the second day of trial. At this time, the court made it clear that it would require all the defense witnesses for the penalty hearing to be ready to testify on Thursday. Lord was found guilty on Wednesday evening, and the penalty hearing began at 11:30 a.m. on Thursday, August 31, 1989. Explaining that he had been unable to move up the witnesses' travel arrangements, defense counsel requested the court to allow him to present the out-of-state witnesses the next morning. The court denied this request without inquiring as to whether there was good cause for the delay. As a consequence of this denial, the jury heard only one out of seven of Mr. Lord's planned witnesses. The six out-of-state witnesses, including Lord's father, were unable to testify on Lord's behalf. Even without the out-of-state defense witnesses, the testimony at the penalty hearing concluded Thursday afternoon and the case was submitted to the jury at five o'clock that evening. The jury adjourned to go home at 6:30 p.m. The next day, at 9:45 a.m., the jury returned a verdict of death before another district judge, whom the presiding district judge had requested to take the verdict. Defense counsel later filed a motion for new trial based in part on the denial of the continuance. Attached to the motion was an affidavit of Joan Coe of the public defender's office. Coe attested that, during the week of trial, she had attempted to move up the arrivals of the witnesses, but was unsuccessful. She further stated that the witnesses she was able to reach told her that their schedules would not permit change, or gave other reasons why they could not change their travel plans. Also attached to the motion for new trial were affidavits from the witnesses themselves confirming that they had arrived on Thursday evening and were available to testify on Friday morning. The parties agree that the granting or denial of a motion for a continuance is in the sound discretion of the district court. See, e.g., Zessman v. State, 94 Nev. 28, 573 P.2d 1174 (1978); see also NRS 174.515. In the present case, the district judge abused this discretion by refusing to grant this reasonable request for a modest continuance. First, the prejudice to the court and the administration of justice due to what amounts to, at most, a half-day continuance appears minimal. If the six other witnesses had been present on Thursday, the proceedings would have lasted until Friday anyway, unless the district judge conducted court into Thursday evening. It is unclear why the district judge would not be in session the next morning. Second, the prejudice to the defendant was readily apparent. The court had been informed that fully five or six out of the seven defense witnesses were involved. Third, the record does not show any lack of diligence on the part of defense counsel sufficient to justify the denial. The discussion during calendar call on the previous Wednesday had left the scheduling unresolved or at least flexible. Based on that discussion, it was not unreasonable for Mr. Lieberman to believe that the court would be willing to reschedule the penalty phase for the next week if necessary. The district judge's remarks suggested that if Lord's trial could be concluded in three days, he might be able to try another criminal case on Thursday and Friday, deferring Lord's penalty phase until the next week. Alternatively, if Lord's trial went longer than expected, then Lord's witnesses might not be required until Friday anyway. From the facts contained in the record, defense counsel did not realize that the judge would require the witnesses' presence until after the discussion on Tuesday, the second day of trial. Thus, the defense had, at most, two days to rearrange the flight plans of their witnesses from Maryland. Additionally, these were out-of-state witnesses not subject to subpoena. Finally, the judge had earlier stated that he understood the problems of transportation. Yet later, although it was shortly before the busy Labor Day weekend, the judge did not even inquire into whether, for example, the witnesses had been unable to obtain seats on earlier flights. This court has held denials of motions for reasonable continuances to be an abuse of discretion where the purpose of the motion is to procure important witnesses and the delay is not the particular fault of counsel or the parties. See, e.g., Colgain v. State, 102 Nev. 220, 719 P.2d 1263 (1986); Banks v. State, 101 Nev. 771, 710 P.2d 723 (1985). The same considerations of fairness and substantial justice must apply with even greater force in the penalty phase of a capital case, even at the expense of some inconvenience to the calendar of the district court and, indeed, even if the delay, in some small degree, is the fault of counsel.