Opinion ID: 834956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Resubmission Under ORS 132.430(2)

Text: We begin with defendant's argument that, under ORS 132.430(2), the trial court erred in allowing the state to resubmit the 1996 charges to a second grand jury in 2004. That statute provides: When an indictment indorsed `not a true bill' has been filed with the clerk of the court, the effect thereof is to dismiss the charge; and the same cannot be again submitted to or inquired of by the grand jury unless the court so orders. ORS 132.430(2). Citing State v. Turner, 104 Or. 334, 207 P. 602 (1922), defendant urges that a circuit court may authorize resubmission of charges to a grand jury only when it is in the interest of justice to do so. See id. at 339-40, 207 P. 602 (describing the evident design of the statute). Here, defendant contends that resubmission was not in the interest of justice, because the state sought resubmission eight years after the case was closed, and was motivated to do so because defendant had been released unexpectedly from California. Defendant asserts that the state was merely reassessing the cost-benefit analysis of whether to pursue the prosecution, which is not an adequate basis for resubmission. The state counters that the resubmission of the charges in this case was based on the existence of evidence that was not available at the time of the original grand jury proceeding i.e., the complaints of additional victimsand that the trial court's order authorizing resubmission was proper under the statute. To determine the legislative intent behind ORS 132.430(2) and, in particular, whether resubmission under these circumstances comported with the statute, we begin with text and context. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 171, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009) (text and context are considered at first level of statutory analysis). The text of ORS 132.430(2) is straightforward. It requires dismissal of charges after a not true bill and bars resubmission of dismissed charges unless the court so orders. The statute does not, however, identify what the trial court is to consider in issuing or declining to issue such an order. Given that silence, the statute's text, in and of itself, is of little help in resolving the particular issue before us. More helpful in that regard is the context of the statute, which includes `the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the law was enacted.' Ram Technical Services, Inc. v. Koresko, 346 Or. 215, 232, 208 P.3d 950 (2009) (quoting Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or. 392, 401, 84 P.3d 140 (2004)). The context also includes case law interpreting the statute. See State v. Sullens, 314 Or. 436, 443, 839 P.2d 708 (1992). The statute in its current form dates to 1864. See General Laws of Oregon, Crim. Code, ch. VII, § 65 (Deady 1845-1864). [6] It replaced the contrary common-law rule that allowed a prosecutor to resubmit charges without limit or oversight. See Wayne R. LaFave et al., 4 Criminal Procedure § 15.2(h), at 485-86 (3d ed. 2007) (describing common-law rule). [7] At the least, the decision to adopt a rule differing from the common law implies a general intention to place some limitation on a prosecutor's ability to resubmit charges to subsequent grand juries. The question remains: what limitation? Although the statute has been in place since statehood, only one case has come to this court requiring us to interpret it. That case, Turner, 104 Or. 334, 207 P. 602, was decided in 1922. In Turner, a grand jury had, without a court order, investigated and indicted the defendant on a charge on which a different grand jury had earlier returned a not true bill. Id. at 335, 207 P. 602. The issue was whether the statute requires a court order when charges are reconsidered or resubmitted to any grand jury or, instead, whether the statute applies only when charges are reconsidered by the same grand jury that initially returned the not true bill. Id. at 335-36, 207 P. 602. To resolve that issue, the court compared the statute to similar statutes from other states as well as to the contrary common-law rule, which either imposed no restriction on resubmission of dismissed charges, or restricted only the ability of the prosecutor to resubmit charges to the same grand jury that returned a not true bill; the authority of the grand jury itself was not impaired. Id. at 336-39, 207 P. 602. The court observed that the text of Oregon's statute (now codified as ORS 132.430(2)) was broader and divested the grand jury itself of authority to reconsider previously dismissed charges unless the grand jury did so by leave of the court. Id. at 339, 207 P. 602. The statute did not, however, specify whether it applied only to the same grand jury that had returned the not true bill, or to subsequent grand juries as well. The court commented that the evident design and purpose of the statute was to prevent the resubmission of charges unless authorized by an order of the court made upon a showing that adequate reason exists, requiring that the charge be reconsidered in the interest of justice. Id. at 339-40, 207 P. 602. Guided by that understanding of the overall purpose of the statute, the court in Turner held that a court order is required when a later grand jury undertakes to reconsider charges dismissed by an earlier one, because an opposite conclusion would not accomplish the statute's purpose. Id. at 340, 207 P. 602. As that description of Turner reveals, the issue before the court in Turner did not involve the propriety of a trial court order authorizing resubmission of charges to a grand jury. Turner held only that the statute places [a charge's] revival or subsequent investigation in the exclusive control of the court, and the consent of the court is a condition precedent to the authority of the same or a subsequent grand jury to inquire of the charge. Id. Turner thus provides, at best, limited guidance on the question before us in this case. Still, Turner 's observation of the overall purpose of the statute is consistent with other contextual sources that we may consider. Oregon originally adopted the statute as part of a criminal code that was based largely on New York law. See Frederic E. Brown, The Sources of the Alaska and Oregon Codes, 2 UCLA-Alaska L. Rev. 15, 31-33 (1972) (discussing in detail the sources of the criminal procedure provisions in the 1864 Oregon criminal code). [8] The commentary to the 1850 New York Codethe predecessor of the Oregon statuteexplained that the statute was designed to provide a convenient check upon the practice which now prevails, of repeated applications to the grand jury for an indictment, where it has been already dismissed. N.Y.Code of Crim. Proc., title V, ch. I, § 286, commentary (1850). The commentary further noted that, under the common-law rule, the mere perseverance of the prosecutor sometimes led to an indictment after frequent dismissals and that the statute was intended to prevent, on the one hand, the abuse referred to, and to guard the interests of the public, on the other. Id. Based on that commentary, we conclude that Turner 's in the interest of justice standard is apt, as long as it is understood to embrace the kinds of factors that are relevant to the decision to be made (resubmission of a charge to the grand jury), such as the public's interest in avoiding prosecutorial abuse and having persons who commit crimes brought to justice. We review that type of decision under the statute for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247, 257-58, 839 P.2d 692 (1992) (review of trial court's denial of defendant's motion to substitute appointed counsel, based on factual findings and conclusion that defendant's complaint was not legitimate, is for abuse of discretion); State v. Little, 249 Or. 297, 311-12, 431 P.2d 810 (1967) (review of trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a change of venue, based on whether defendant could receive a fair and impartial trial, is for abuse of discretion). Here, in support of the motion seeking an order allowing resubmission of the charges, the prosecutor provided an affidavit stating the basis for the motion. The affidavit explained that, after the first grand jury returned the not true bill, two additional victims came forward with complaints of sexual assault by defendant. The affidavit further explained the substance of the new complaints, which were both by two adult males who were acquainted with defendant before he turned aggressive and sexually threatening. Those two complaints described physical actions and emotional manipulations by defendant that were similar to the ones involved in the previously submitted charges. [9] The additional victims were not known to the prosecution when the first grand jury deliberated. Given those representations, the trial court in this case permissibly viewed those complaints as additional or new evidence for the grand jury's consideration. [10] The averments in the prosecutor's affidavit thus provided an adequate basis to support the trial court's conclusion that resubmission of the previously considered charges to a subsequent grand jury was in the interest of justice. [11] Defendant nevertheless argues that resubmission was unjust under the particular facts of this case, principally because, in his view, the real reason the state sought resubmission was a change in circumstances leading to a modified cost-benefit analysis. Defendant emphasizes the fact that prosecutors were aware of the additional victims within two months after the first grand jury returned the not true bill, but did not seek resubmission of the charges until eight years had passed and defendant was unexpectedly released from California custody. At that point, the state decided that defendant's risk to public safety was worth the cost of prosecution. Defendant contends that the prosecutor's assessment of the benefit of pursuing the charges, and not the presence of new evidence, prompted the motion seeking a court order authorizing resubmission. In defendant's view, a modified cost-benefit analysis is never an adequate reason for resubmission. Defendant's framing of the issue confuses the basis for seeking resubmission (new evidence) with why the prosecutor subjectively thought, given that new evidence, that it was worthwhile to pursue the prosecution. Our inquiry is whether the trial court decision to order resubmission was a permissible choice based on the information before it. See, e.g., State v. Barone, 329 Or. 210, 219, 986 P.2d 5 (1999) (reviewing trial court's denial of defendant's motion for change of venue, considering only the evidence that was before the trial court at the time of the motion). The statute contemplates an ex parte application to the trial court, and permits the court to make a decision based on the averred facts before it and, presumably, other facts of which the court might be aware or might choose to inquire. The prosecutor's subjective cost-benefit assessment of whether a prosecution would be worthwhile to pursue may have motivated the prosecutor to seek an order permitting resubmission to the grand jury, but that assessment was not the ground on which the prosecutor relied in seeking the new order. The ground for the prosecutor's motion was new evidence. [12] Here, the new evidence on which the prosecutor relied in seeking resubmission permitted the trial court to determine that resubmission was in the interest of justice. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, and thus that the trial court did not err in ordering resubmission of the two previously dismissed charges to the grand jury.