Opinion ID: 1945963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence Seized from Defendant's Bedroom

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence seized by investigators from his bedroom shortly after the homicides. As noted, that evidence included the five strips of paper, gun magazines, a price list for crime-related items, and violent writings that appeared to be song lyrics. We will summarize the arguments of the parties in respect of each piece of evidence, starting with the paper strips. At trial, defendant objected to the admissibility of the strips of paper found over the coat hooks, arguing that they were irrelevant and that the handwriting had not been properly authenticated. According to defendant, he placed the signs over the coat hooks so that his friends would know where to hang their coats. He asserts that the handwritten language derived from a scene in the movie Stripes, in which one character jokingly threatens to kill anyone who touches his belongings. The trial court admitted the paper strips. The police officer who seized the strips testified that he believed them to be relevant because they contained the word kill. The court noted, we're dealing in this case with a young man who is alleged to have rather, for no real purpose, except possibly establishing himself by reputation as a criminal, if that can be considered a purpose, who for no good purpose supposedly shot and killed some people. And I guess this is trying to show some type of background that he had the mentation to kill people. It's open to a lot of argument both ways, but it seems to me appropriately probative. The State can try to show this as [an] indication of a mindset. Outside the presence of the jury, the State moved to offer into evidence the gun magazines seized from defendant's bedroom to corroborate testimony about defendant's familiarity with guns and to refute the notion that the gun he ultimately used might have been fired accidentally. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the magazines, which contained such titles as Combat Handguns, Handgunning, and Guns and Weapons, were highly prejudicial. Counsel also argued to the trial court that the fact that [defendant] looks at guns, enjoys guns really is not an aspect in this case. The court agreed with the State, admitting the magazines. The court found that defendant's interest in guns could be part of showing a familiarity with the weapons and ability to use them. Subsequent to its initial ruling, the court agreed to limit the admission to photocopies of the magazines' covers. The State also offered into evidence a piece of lined notebook paper that listed prices for a number of crime-related items, including fake identification materials and literature promoting credit card fraud. The State contended that such evidence was probative of a mindset of someone embarking on a life of crime. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that the price list would be used solely to show that defendant was a bad person who thought about illegal things. The trial court admitted the evidence, essentially accepting the State's basis for admission. The trial court also admitted the song lyrics into evidence. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the lyrics had no probative value. In agreeing with the State, the trial court admitted the evidence because it bespeak[s] a concern that, an involvement, sort of obsession with killing people, and we are dealing with a man who's alleged to have killed other people. In reviewing the admissibility of each of the disputed items, we must determine whether such evidence was relevant to any fact attempted to be proved or disproved by the State. All relevant evidence is admissible at trial unless prohibited by a specific rule. State v. Wilson, 135 N.J. 4, 13, 637 A. 2d 1237 (1994). N.J.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action. To be relevant, evidence must have probative value, which is the tendency of the evidence to establish the proposition that it is offered to prove. Wilson, supra, 135 N.J. at 13, 637 A. 2d 1237. In determining whether evidence satisfies that standard, courts focus on the logical connection between the proffered evidence and a fact in issue[.] State v. Hutchins, 241 N.J.Super. 353, 358, 575 A. 2d 35 (App.Div.1990). If the evidence offered makes the inference to be drawn more logical, then the evidence should be admitted [.] State v. Covell, 157 N.J. 554, 565, 725 A. 2d 675 (1999). Applying those tenets, we are satisfied that the admitted evidence was relevant and, therefore, admissible. Each of the disputed items was offered to help prove that defendant killed the victims knowingly or purposefully, and to prove the motive of defendant advanced by the State, specifically, that defendant killed the victims to experience the thrill of killing or to establish his reputation as a criminal. The trial court properly admitted the paper strips and song lyrics because they were sufficiently probative of defendant's motive, in that they revealed defendant's obsession with, or at least interest in, killing. As the trial court stated, the paper strips could be interpreted in various ways. Additionally, a defense witness testified about the innocent nature of the strips. In a case like this, however, in which the State's basic theory is that defendant murdered his victims to experience the thrill of killing, the paper strips and song lyrics, which referred to weapons and a willingness and desire to kill, are probative of defendant's motive. Likewise, the gun magazines were relevant because they helped to establish that defendant intentionally and purposefully murdered the victims and understood that by shooting them, death would result. This Court has never held that gun paraphernalia is per se irrelevant. State v. Loftin, 146 N.J. 295, 383, 680 A. 2d 677 (1996). In Loftin, the defendant objected to the admission into evidence of certain gun paraphernalia, including bullets, ammunition, and ammunition-making equipment. Ibid. We explained that testimony about that type of evidence supported an inference of the knowledge, competency, and experience of defendant in handling firearms. Such evidence is significant to show that defendant intended to kill [the victim] when he shot him in the head, and that the shot was not the result of an accidental discharge caused by an inexperienced marksman. Id. at 384, 680 A. 2d 677. Similarly, in the present case, the State offered the gun magazines not only to show that defendant was interested in guns, but also to demonstrate defendant's experience and proficiency with weapons, which helped prove that the shooting of Giordano and Gallara was purposeful and knowing. Finally, the trial court properly admitted the price list for the crime-related items. The list was relevant to show defendant's familiarity with certain crimes and to demonstrate his overall criminal motive and intent. In this appeal, defendant argues for the first time that the objects seized from his bedroom were impermissibly admitted into evidence in violation of N.J.R.E. 404(b). N.J.R.E. 404(b) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the disposition of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. Such evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. Specifically, defendant contends that the seized items represented other-conduct evidence (evidence of conduct that is not overtly criminal in nature but nonetheless wrong or improper), which was impermissibly used to show his propensity to commit a crime. In response, the State claims that N.J.R.E. 404(b) is not implicated by the items seized from defendant's bedroom, and that, regardless, any error regarding the admissibility of that evidence was harmless because of the other strong evidence produced at trial. The State makes a legitimate argument that the items at issue do not represent other wrongs as contemplated by N.J.R.E. 404(b), and thus no analysis is required under that rule. Nonetheless, given that there is at least some basis to consider the implication of N.J.R.E. 404(b), we will address defendant's claims. Evidence of a defendant's other crimes, wrongs, or acts may not be admitted into evidence to prove a defendant's criminal disposition as a basis for proving guilt of the crimes charged. State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 563, 725 A. 2d 675; see also State v. Nance, 148 N.J. 376, 386, 689 A. 2d 1351 (1997) (observing that courts should exclude evidence of other crimes, civil wrongs, or acts enumerated in the ... rule when such evidence is offered solely to establish the forbidden inference of propensity or predisposition). Importantly, Rule 404(b) does allow such evidence to be admitted to prove other factual issues, like a defendant's motive, intent, or plan. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 563, 725 A. 2d 675. Although not overtly criminal in nature, the disputed evidence in the present case was admitted to show both defendant's intent and his motive for the killings. In State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338, 605 A. 2d 230 (1992), this Court established a four-pronged test to determine when other-crime evidence is admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). The same four-part test is used to determine whether other-conduct evidence should be admitted. Nance, supra, 148 N.J. at 387, 689 A. 2d 1351. The test is as follows: 1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice. [ Cofield, supra, 127 N.J. at 338, 605 A. 2d 230 (citation omitted).] Under the first prong of Cofield, the evidence of a defendant's prior bad conduct must be relevant to a material fact in dispute. (Because of the similarity of issues, the analysis under this first prong of the Cofield test resembles our previous discussion in respect of whether the items were relevant under N.J.R.E. 401.) At criminal trials, courts generally admit a wider range of evidence when the motive or intent of the accused is material. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 565, 725 A. 2d 675. See also State v. Rogers, 19 N.J. 218, 228, 116 A. 2d 37 (1955) (All evidentiary circumstances which are relevant to or tend to shed light on the motive or intent of the defendant or which tend fairly to explain his actions are admissible in evidence against him although they may have occurred previous to the commission of the offense.). Courts have frequently admitted other-crime and other-conduct evidence as probative of intent and motive. For example, in State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 558, 725 A. 2d 675, the defendant was convicted of child luring in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:13-6. The Court reasoned that the defendant's statement that he was sexually attracted to young girls was properly admitted at trial and satisfied the first prong of the Cofield test because the defendant's purpose in luring [the victim] is an essential element to convict defendant[.] Id. at 567, 725 A. 2d 675. Specifically, the defendant's statement made it more likely that defendant's purpose in beckoning to [the victim] was to commit a sexual crime with or against her. Id. at 566-67, 725 A. 2d 675. In State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 117, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991), the defendant was convicted of capital murder. On the evening of the charged murder, the defendant made certain statements about a prior murder he had committed and for which he had been convicted. The defendant challenged the admission of those statements, as well as the admission of the records of that prior conviction. Id. at 130, 594 A. 2d 232. The Court found that the [d]efendant's statements evidence his state of mind at the time he killed [the victim].... They were relevant to whether defendant had killed [the victim] purposely or knowingly[.] Thus, defendant's statements related to the crucial issue of his mental state. The records of defendant's convictions ... were necessary to prove the State's theory of defendant's motive. [ Id. at 131, 594 A. 2d 232.] In State v. Crumb, 307 N.J.Super. 204, 231, 704 A. 2d 952 (App.Div.1997), certif. denied, 153 N.J. 215, 708 A. 2d 66 (1998), evidence of the defendant's racist writings were admitted into evidence to help prove the defendant's motive. The Appellate Division reasoned that [a]lthough defendant's writings are constitutionally protected free expressions of his racial beliefs and are not themselves unlawful, they nonetheless may be interpreted by a jury to constitute other wrongs or acts. Ibid. In this case, the State's theory was that defendant purposefully or intentionally murdered Giordano and that his motive for doing so was to experience the thrill of killing. In that regard, we are satisfied that the evidence taken from defendant's bedroom was relevant to demonstrate defendant's intent. We note that the evidence was not admitted to prove that defendant was a bad person. Rather, the fact that defendant had a long-standing interest in firearms and violence indicates that he fired his weapon intentionally, not accidentally. Moreover, defendant's familiarity with firearms tends to prove that he understood that when he fired his weapon at the victims, death would result. The references to killing and death on the paper strips and in the song lyrics helped to reveal defendant's motive and helped the jury to understand, to some degree, defendant's state of mind. Lastly, the evidence admitted in this case was somewhat analogous and similar in nature to the evidence admitted in State v. Covell , State v. Erazo , and State v. Crumb . The first prong of the Cofield test has been satisfied. The second prong of the Cofield test requires that the other-conduct evidence be similar to, and reasonably close in time to, the offense charged. State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 567, 725 A. 2d 675. We conclude that the disputed evidentiary items, all of which relate to guns, violence, killings, or other forms of criminal conduct, were sufficiently similar in nature to the crimes for which defendant was charged. Although the violent writings and the other items do not compare perfectly to an actual killing or robbery, we find that there is a logical connection between that evidence and the crimes charged sufficient to satisfy Cofield's second prong. Moreover, the temporal requirement under the second prong is satisfied because the items were recovered from defendant's bedroom shortly after the killings and thus were reasonably close in time to the offenses charged. The third prong of the Cofield test requires some showing that the person against whom the evidence is being used actually committed the other crime or wrong. State v. G.V., 162 N.J. 252, 275, 744 A. 2d 137 (2000) (Coleman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That prong is satisfied here because there is no serious dispute that the items recovered from defendant's bedroom belonged to defendant. Moreover, the jury could have reasonably interpreted items like the language found on the paper strips or the violent song lyrics to be an expression of defendant's intent to kill. See State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 568, 725 A. 2d 675 (Although being sexually attracted to young girls in and of itself is not a crime, a jury may interpret defendant's expression of those feelings to be a wrong or bad act in relation to his intent.... We find that the statement satisfies part three of the Cofield test.). The fourth prong of the Cofield test requires application of the balancing test contained in N.J.R.E. 403. That test requires the trial court to exclude evidence if `its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of ... undue prejudice.' State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 568, 725 A. 2d 675 (citation omitted). Evidence claimed to be unduly prejudicial is excluded only when its probative value is so significantly outweighed by [its] inherently inflammatory potential as to have a probable capacity to divert the minds of the jurors from a reasonable and fair evaluation of the issues in the case. State v. Thompson, 59 N.J. 396, 421, 283 A. 2d 513 (1971). Moreover, [t]he mere possibility that evidence could be prejudicial does not justify its exclusion. State v. Morton, 155 N.J. 383, 453-54, 715 A. 2d 228 (1998), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 1380, 149 L.Ed. 2d 306 (2001). Additionally, certain types of evidence, including evidence of motive or intent, require a very strong showing of prejudice to justify exclusion. State v. Covell, supra, 157 N.J. at 570, 725 A. 2d 675. Two prior cases are instructive. In State v. Loftin, supra, 146 N.J. at 383-86, 680 A. 2d 677, this Court considered whether ammunition and bullet-making equipment should have been admitted into evidence at the defendant's trial. Acknowledging that the evidence may have prejudiced the defendant, the Court permitted it nonetheless. `[T]hat evidence is shrouded with unsavory implications is no reason for exclusion when it is a significant part of the proof.' Id. at 385, 680 A. 2d 677 (quoting State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 308, 558 A. 2d 833 (1989)). Likewise, in State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 645 A. 2d 734 (1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1129, 116 S.Ct. 949, 133 L.Ed. 2d 873 (1996), the Court considered the admission of certain testimony in the defendant's penalty phase trial. The Court noted that, [c]onsidering that defendant confessed to the execution-style killing of [the victim], the fact that he stole a car, committed a few traffic violations, and yelled at his mother had very little tendency to divert the jurors' attention from their duties. Id. at 497, 645 A. 2d 734. Similarly, defendant in the present case has not made the strong showing of prejudice required to justify exclusion of the disputed evidence. The evidence seized from defendant's bedroom was important to the State's theory of the case because it helped to explain defendant's motive for the killings. It was not so inflammatory as to distract the jurors from performing their jobs fairly and in a deliberate fashion. Thus, the fourth prong of the Cofield test has been satisfied. In sum, we conclude that the trial court properly admitted the disputed evidentiary items. The evidence was relevant to establishing defendant's motive and intent. That the jury was diverted from its duties because of that evidence is highly unlikely. The magazines, song lyrics, paper strips, and crime-related price list were not so inflammatory that they caused the jurors to render a verdict that they would not have otherwise rendered. Admission of the items, therefore, satisfied all prongs of the Cofield test. Even if we assume some slight error on the part of the trial court in admitting the disputed items, it was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result because, absent those items, there remained strong and overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 496-97, 691 A. 2d 293 (1997).