Opinion ID: 849201
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Versus Indirect Evidence of Discrimination

Text: Plaintiff claims that defendants discriminated against her on the basis of race in violation of M.C.L. § 37.2202(1)(a), which provides, in relevant part: (1) An employer shall not do any of the following: (a) Fail or refuse to hire or recruit, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against an individual with respect to employment, compensation, or a term, condition, or privilege of employment, because of religion, race, color, national origin, age, sex, height, weight, or marital status. In some discrimination cases, the plaintiff is able to produce direct evidence of racial bias. In such cases, the plaintiff can go forward and prove unlawful discrimination in the same manner as a plaintiff would prove any other civil case. DeBrow v. Century 21 Great Lakes, Inc. (After Remand), 463 Mich. 534, 537-539, 620 N.W.2d 836 (2001); Matras v. Amoco Oil Co., 424 Mich. 675, 683-684, 385 N.W.2d 586 (1986). For purposes of the analogous federal Civil Rights Act, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has defined direct evidence as evidence which, if believed, requires the conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the employer's actions. Jacklyn v. Schering-Plough Healthcare Products Sales Corp., 176 F.3d 921, 926 (C.A.6, 1999); see also Harrison v. Olde Financial Corp., 225 Mich.App. 601, 610, 572 N.W.2d 679 (1997). In many cases, however, no direct evidence of impermissible bias can be located. In order to avoid summary disposition, the plaintiff must then proceed through the familiar steps set forth in McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802-803, 93 S.Ct. 1817. The McDonnell Douglas approach allows a plaintiff to present a rebuttable prima facie case on the basis of proofs from which a factfinder could infer that the plaintiff was the victim of unlawful discrimination. DeBrow, supra at 537-538, 620 N.W.2d 836. Although originally created for use in race discrimination cases, we have adopted the McDonnell Douglas approach for use in age and gender discrimination cases brought under the Michigan Civil Rights Act as well. See Lytle v. Malady (On Rehearing), 458 Mich. 153, 172-178, 579 N.W.2d 906 (1998). Because plaintiff here has offered no direct evidence of race discrimination, she is constrained to rely on the McDonnell Douglas framework. Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first offer a prima facie case of discrimination. Here, plaintiff was required to present evidence that (1) she belongs to a protected class, (2) she suffered an adverse employment action, (3) she was qualified for the position, and (4) the job was given to another person under circumstances giving rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. Lytle, supra at 172-173, 579 N.W.2d 906; see also Texas Dep't. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, n. 6, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. [6] When the plaintiff has sufficiently established a prima facie case, a presumption of discrimination arises. Lytle, supra at 173, 579 N.W.2d 906. In Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978), the Court explained that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case raises an inference of discrimination because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. However, the fact that a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas does not necessarily preclude summary disposition in the defendant's favor. As the Supreme Court explained in Burdine, supra at 254, n. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089: The phrase prima facie case not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Title VII context we use prima facie case in the former sense. [Citation omitted.] In other words, the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case does not describe the plaintiff's burden of production, but merely establishes a rebuttable presumption. Thus, once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant has the opportunity to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision in an effort to rebut the presumption created by the plaintiff's prima facie case. Lytle, supra at 173, 579 N.W.2d 906; McDonnell Douglas, supra at 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817. [7] The articulation requirement means that the defendant has the burden of producing evidence that its employment actions were taken for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. [8] Thus, the defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel. Burdine, supra at 256, n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1089; see also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-507, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). If the employer makes such an articulation, the presumption created by the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case drops away. [9] At that point, in order to survive a motion for summary disposition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the evidence in the case, when construed in the plaintiff's favor, is sufficient to permit a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that discrimination was a motivating factor for the adverse action taken by the employer toward the plaintiff. Lytle, supra at 176, 579 N.W.2d 906. [10] As we first held in Town v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., 455 Mich. 688, 698, 568 N.W.2d 64 (1997), and then reaffirmed in Lytle, supra at 175-176, 579 N.W.2d 906, a plaintiff must not merely raise a triable issue that the employer's proffered reason was pretextual, but that it was a pretext for [unlawful] discrimination. The inquiry at this final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework is exactly the same as the ultimate factual inquiry made by the jury: whether consideration of a protected characteristic was a motivating factor, namely, whether it made a difference in the contested employment decision. See SJI2d 105.02. [11] The only difference is that, for purposes of a motion for summary disposition or directed verdict, a plaintiff need only create a question of material fact upon which reasonable minds could differ regarding whether discrimination was a motivating factor in the employer's decision. As the Supreme Court explained in Burdine, supra at 256, n. 8, 101 S.Ct. 1089, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is merely intended to progressively sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination. It is important to keep in mind, therefore, that for purposes of claims brought under the Michigan Civil Rights Act, the McDonnell Douglas approach merely provides a mechanism for assessing motions for summary disposition and directed verdict in cases involving circumstantial evidence of discrimination. [12] It is useful only for purposes of assisting trial courts in determining whether there is a jury-submissible issue on the ultimate fact question of unlawful discrimination. The McDonnell Douglas model is not relevant to a jury's evaluation of evidence at trial. Accordingly, a jury should not be instructed on its application. See Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (C.A.7, 1995) (explaining that, in federal discrimination cases, [o]nce the judge finds that the plaintiff has made the minimum necessary demonstration [the `prima facie case'] and that the defendant has produced an age-neutral explanation, the burden-shifting apparatus has served its purpose, and the only remaining question-the only question the jury need answeris whether the plaintiff is a victim of intentional discrimination).