Opinion ID: 1898007
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In course of jury argument plaintiffs' attorney also made some reference, as previously disclosed, to relative financial resources of plaintiffs and defendant commission.

Text: That was unquestionably improper and statements of like nature have been repeatedly condemned by this court. Hackaday v. Brackelsburg, 248 Iowa 1346, 1352-1353, 85 N.W.2d 514; Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 124-126, 21 N.W.2d 311; cf. Perry v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 180 N.W.2d 417, 422-423 (Iowa); Welton v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 211 Iowa 625, 635-636, 233 N.W. 876. See also 5A C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1713; 53 Am.Jur., Trial, § 499; Annot. 32 A.L.R.2d 9, 35. Appropriate at this point, however, is the statement in Connelly v. Nolte, supra, at 237 Iowa 125, 21 N.W.2d at 317, quoting Withey v. Fowler Co., 164 Iowa 377, 391, 145 N.W. 923: `Jurors must be given the credit of ordinary common sense and honest purpose to dispose of questions submitted to them upon the evidence under the instructions given by the court,   .' Accord, Baysinger v. Haney, supra, at 261 Iowa 582, 155 N.W.2d 496. Instantly the record reveals trial court, by instructions 5 and 24, cautioned the jury it was to decide the case as though both parties were individuals, indulging no inferences or presumptions against defendant commission. See Iowa Uniform Jury Instructions 14.2. Again, it is assumed the jury at all times heeded and complied with the instructions so given. IX. Ordinarily conduct on the part of plaintiffs' attorney, such as above set forth, would constitute reversible error. In other words, when error appears prejudice will be presumed unless the contrary is affirmatively disclosed. Bailey v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co., 179 N.W.2d 560, 567 (Iowa); Bellew v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 171 N.W.2d 284, 291 (Iowa); Rutten v. Investors Life Ins. Co. of Iowa, 258 Iowa 749, 758, 140 N.W.2d 101; see State v. Levy, 160 N.W. 2d 460, 467-468 (Iowa). X. Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure, 344(f) (3), states: In ruling upon motions for new trial the trial court has a broad but not unlimited discretion in determining whether the verdict effectuates substantial justice between the parties. This rule was considered in Vojak v. Jensen, 161 N.W.2d 100 (Iowa), and we there said at 105-106: The granting of a new trial is largely discretionary, and an order either granting or refusing one will be set aside only upon a clear showing of abuse of such discretion. 39 Am.Jur., New Trial, section 141, page 148; Rule 344(f), (3), and (4), Rules of Civil Procedure; Grant v. Thomas, 254 Iowa 581, 584, 118 N.W.2d 545, 547, 548; Coleman v. Brower Construction Company, 254 Iowa 724, 731, 119 N.W.2d 256, 260; Smith v. Ullerich, supra, 259 Iowa 797 at page 807, 145 N.W.2d 1 at page 6; 35 A.L.R. 2d, Annotations, 311. We are more reluctant to interfere with the granting of a new trial than with its refusal. Rule 344(f), (4), R.C.P.; Schneider v. Keokuk Gas Service Company, 250 Iowa 37, 42, 92 N.W.2d 439, 442; Hahn v. Graham, 256 Iowa 713, 722, 128 N.W.2d 886, 891. So the ultimate question posed is whether trial court abused its discretion in ordering a conditional new trial under existing circumstances. XI. In that regard, unless it appears probable a different result would have been reached but for claimed misconduct of counsel for the prevailing party, a court is not warranted in interfering with the verdict. See Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391, 402 (Iowa); Sandman v. Hagan, 261 Iowa 560, 572, 154 N.W.2d 113; Connelly v. Nolte, 237 Iowa 114, 130, 21 N.W.2d 311. As already pointed out, (1) the initial taking, from which this case stems, occurred in 1963; (2) the first trial resulted in an award of $68,750 to plaintiffs; (3) on second trial, from which appeal is now taken, a $77,500 verdict was returned. That means the present eight year old case has been twice tried to different juries with approximately the same result. Moreover the award in the instant case was within the range of trial testimony. It cannot therefore be characterized as excessive. See Townsend v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 168 N.W.2d 30, 33-34 (Iowa). And this is a factor to be considered in determining whether prejudice resulted from the unprofessional conduct of plaintiffs' attorney. As we said in Baysinger v. Haney, supra, at 261 Iowa 577, 583, 155 N.W.2d 496, Where each of two trials has resulted in a verdict for the same party, the error which will justify reversal and a third trial must be such as to demonstrate a failure of justice will occur if we do not again interfere. McKlveen v. Townley, 233 Iowa 328, 331, 7 N.W.2d 186, 187 and citations. See also Newland v. Linn County Board of Supervisors, 256 Iowa 424, 429-430, 127 N.W.2d 625; Crist v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 255 Iowa 615, 631-632, 123 N.W.2d 424; Stoner v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 227 Iowa 115, 120-122, 287 N.W. 269. Instantly there is no plausible basis upon which to assume a materially different result would be forthcoming upon a third trial of this case. XII. For all the reasons set forth above, we conclude and now hold the grant of a new trial upon defendant's application was improper. By the same token it was error to order remittitur. Other elements involved in the trial of this case, heretofore set forth, though disapproved, have been duly considered but found to be relatively innocuous and not of such nature as to alter the foregoing result.