Opinion ID: 4537850
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: timeframe of the ex parte order

Text: ¶33 Because we have determined that the protective order was not served in accordance with the Act, subsection 107(1)(d) applies. It states that “[i]f at [the] hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed.” UTAH CODE § 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017) (emphasis added). Based on this provision, the magistrate concluded that the ex parte order was still in effect. This was correct. 14 ¶34 Bridgewaters does not dispute that the ex parte order was properly served on him. However, he argues that another __________________________________________________________ 13 We flag another issue highlighted by these circumstances. The Act specifies that a protective order is to be served by the sheriff (or another law enforcement agency if it has contact with the respondent and the agency determines it is in the best interests of the petitioner to do so). See UTAH CODE § 78B-7-106(8) (2017). Bridgewaters has not argued that the service here was improper because it was completed by counsel rather than the sheriff. However, it is arguable that the Cohabitant Abuse Act requires not only rule 4 service, but rule 4 service by the entities it specifies—the sheriff or another law enforcement agency. See id. § 78B-7-106(12) (2017) (“Insofar as the provisions of this chapter are more specific than the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding protective orders, the provisions of this chapter govern.”). As Bridgewaters has not made this argument, we do not resolve it. However, we note the issue in the event that the legislature wishes to provide clarification. 14 The State argues that because the magistrate based its bindover decision on subsection 107(1)(d), we should not reach the issue of whether the protective order was properly served, as we have done. See supra ¶¶ 20–32. But under the Cohabitant Abuse Act, the ex parte order remains in effect only if “service of process of the protective order” has not been “completed.” So it is necessary to first determine whether the protective order has been served in a particular case to ascertain whether subsection 107(1)(d) is applicable. 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 32 Opinion of the Court provision of the Act limits the life of an ex parte order to 180 days, so it had expired by the time of the alleged violations. See id. § 78B-7-107(1)(c) (2017). ¶35 If a court issues an ex parte protective order, the Act requires the court to hold a hearing on the petition within twenty days. Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(a) (2017). “If at that hearing the court does not issue a protective order, the ex parte protective order shall expire, unless it is otherwise extended by the court.” Id. § 78B-7- 107(1)(b) (2017) (emphasis added). The Act then specifies that a court may not extend an ex parte order beyond the twenty-day period unless: (i) the petitioner is unable to be present at the hearing; (ii) the respondent has not been served; (iii) the respondent has had the opportunity to present a defense at the hearing; (iv) the respondent requests that the ex parte order be extended; or (v) exigent circumstances exist. Id. The next subsection states, “Under no circumstances may an ex parte order be extended beyond 180 days from the date of initial issuance.” Id. § 78B-7-107(1)(c) (2017). ¶36 This is followed by subsection 107(1)(d), which states, “If at that hearing the court issues a protective order, the ex parte protective order remains in effect until service of process of the protective order is completed.” ¶37 Bridgewaters argues that the language in subsection 107(1)(c) limits subsection 107(1)(d) and “shows a legislative intent for all ex parte protective orders issued pursuant to the Act to have a maximum effective life of 180 days.” Because the alleged violations occurred more than 180 days after the ex parte order was issued, Bridgewaters contends the ex parte order cannot form the basis of the criminal charge against him. But this interpretation of the statute is incorrect. ¶38 We agree with the district court that the 180-day limit on extensions of an ex parte order in subsection 107(1)(c) modifies the circumstances listed in subsection 107(1)(b) under which a court may extend the ex parte order beyond twenty days. Both subsections 107(1)(b) and 107(1)(c) use iterations of the word “extend” (i.e., “extended” and “[e]xtensions”). Id. § 78B-7- 13 STATE v. BRIDGEWATERS Opinion of the Court 107(1)(b)–(c) (2017). This suggests that the two subsections should be read in conjunction with one another. Further, each of these subsections uses language suggestive of court action (i.e., “extended by the court” and “be extended”), id., but subsection 107(1)(d) uses the more passive language of “remains in effect,” id. § 78B-7-107(1)(d) (2017). Based on the language of these subsections, it is apparent that subsection 107(1)(c) works with subsection 107(1)(b) to prohibit a court from extending an ex parte order beyond 180 days. ¶39 But while the 180-day limit applies to a court’s decision to extend an ex parte order before the court has held a hearing or before the court has issued a protective order, subsection 107(1)(d) applies when a court has held a hearing and has decided to issue a protective order. See id. (“If at that hearing the court issues a protective order . . . .”). In this circumstance, the Act permits the ex parte order to remain in effect until “service of process of the protective order is completed.” Id. The 180-day time limit no longer applies. ¶40 Here, in the underlying civil protective order proceeding, the court issued an immediate ex parte order. Bridgewaters was personally served with the ex parte order, which notified him of the date of the hearing on the petition. 15 The court held the hearing and determined that a protective order was warranted. However, the protective order issued by the court was not served in accordance with the Act. Under these circumstances, the magistrate correctly concluded that the ex parte order __________________________________________________________ 15 We note that the ex parte order form contains potentially confusing language. It states, “This order lasts until the above hearing date; or later, if the court extends time for service.” Although we flag this language to acknowledge its potential for confusion, we also note the immediately preceding sentences: “Go to the court hearing on the date listed below. If you do not go to the hearing, the judge can make orders without hearing your side.” The order lists a hearing date and time, along with the commissioner’s name and the address and specific location of the hearing. While these sentences alleviate potential confusion, we flag this language for possible refinement in light of this opinion. We also note that Bridgewaters has not raised any legal challenge in relation to this language. 14 Cite as: 2020 UT 32 Opinion of the Court remained in effect at the time of the alleged violations. However, we clarify that the charges against Bridgewaters may be based only on a violation of the ex parte order, not the protective order.16