Opinion ID: 2519946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Count III: Physical and/or Mental Illnesses to Justify Withdrawal

Text: RPC 1.15 details withdrawal requirements for lawyers in Washington State. It contains two sections. RPC 1.15(a)(1)-(3) identifies circumstances that require a lawyer to withdraw from representation of a client, and RPC 1.15(b)(1)-(6) identifies circumstances when a lawyer is permitted to withdraw from representation of a client so long as withdrawal does not cause material adverse effect on the interests of the client. RPC 1.15(b). The provision at issue in this matter, RPC 1.15(a)(2), states: (a) Except as stated in section (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where representation has commenced, shall, notwithstanding RCW 2.44.040, withdraw from representation of a client if: . . . . (2) The lawyer's physical or mental condition materially impairs his ability to represent the client;.... Thus, if a lawyer suffers from a physical or mental condition that affects his representation of a client, RPC 1.15(a)(2) requires the lawyer to withdraw. Cohen argues that RPC 1.15(a)(2) required his withdrawal. He claims that during his representation of Erickson he suffered from weight gain, depression, toothaches, backaches, prostate problems, and nausea. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 282. Further, he asserts that his sister-in-law's death exacerbated his physical and mental problems to the point of impairing his ability to represent Erickson. Cohen's Br. at 17. Other than his own testimony, the only evidence that Cohen presented to support his claim that his physical and mental conditions required his withdrawal was a letter from his physician. The letter stated: I am the primary care physician and an internist caring for Mr. Cohen over the last 10 to 15 years. He has recently been found to have hyperlipidemia and elevated blood pressure. It is my opinion that Mr. Cohen's health requires him to decrease his workload dramatically. I have recommended and continue to recommend a number of modalities including a significantly reduced work schedule for the next three months. He is receiving appropriate treatment for his current illness. On a different level, he is also undergoing a significant time of personal stress, and other significant issues, exacerbated by a recent death in the family. Ex. 41. The hearing officer concluded that this letter lacks sufficient specificity to be accorded weight, particularly absent any opportunity to be subject to cross-examination. Record at 11, Findings of Fact (FOF) 55. The Board affirmed the hearing officer's conclusion. DP at 1. We generally require expert testimony in disciplinary proceedings to establish medical facts that cannot be discerned by a layperson. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Petersen, 120 Wash.2d 833, 869, 846 P.2d 1330 (1993). For example, in Petersen, the attorney claimed depression as a mitigating circumstance. We held that expert testimony was required because [a]lthough some symptoms may be observable by lay witnesses, the entire diagnostic process involves medical matters which cannot be evaluated by the observation of lay witnesses. Id. at 871, 846 P.2d 1330. Additionally, we have required that attorneys claiming depression as a mitigating factor demonstrate that they sought professional help and are pursuing a recommended treatment plan. In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against McGough, 115 Wash.2d 1, 17, 793 P.2d 430 (1990). Here, Cohen did not produce any expert testimony to establish the medical facts of his alleged physical and mental conditions. See Petersen, 120 Wash.2d at 871, 846 P.2d 1330. Moreover, we agree with the hearing officer that the letter from Cohen's physician carries little weight given its lack of specificity about his conditions. The physician's letter fails to mention many of the health problems claimed by Cohen during his own testimony at the disciplinary proceeding. In regards to the two conditions it does mention, hyperlipidemia and high blood pressure, it fails to discuss how long Cohen suffered from the conditions and what type, if any, of the treatment he pursued. Because Cohen fails to provide any expert testimony or specific details about his conditions and treatments, he cannot argue that RPC 1.15(a) mandated his withdrawal. Since Cohen cannot convincingly claim that RPC 1.15(a)(2) or any other events under RPC 1.15(a) mandated his withdrawal, the permissive withdrawal provisions in RPC 1.15(b) govern. RPC 1.15(b) states that a lawyer may withdraw if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of the client. Here, the WSBA established that Cohen withdrew less than a month before trial and that Erickson could not find another attorney to take his case. Erickson also suffered financial consequences since he paid Cohen for at least some of his legal fees. Thus, Cohen's last-minute withdrawal clearly had a material adverse financial effect on Erickson, and effectively denied him his day in court. Therefore, we hold that the hearing officer correctly concluded that Cohen violated RPC 1.15(b), 1.3, and 1.4 when he withdrew from Erickson's case one month before the scheduled trial. [4]