Opinion ID: 6323841
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Prior Caselaw

Text: Construing § 1415 to preclude jurisdiction in this case would also call into question our holdings in P.N., 442 F.3d at 848 and D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2014). Instead, we take this opportunity to clarify implicit premises latent in our IDEA jurisprudence. While neither case 6 The dissent protests that Section 1415 only confers jurisdiction where an ALJ issues a “due-process-hearing decision.” Dissent at 4. Section 1415(i), however, does not refer to a “due-process-hearing decision,” but rather to the “findings and decision made under subsection(f),” which go beyond the due process hearing itself. 12 squarely addresses the jurisdictional question presented in this case, they jointly suggest that jurisdiction arises under § 1415 when an administrative order disposing of an IDEA claim is the subject of a complaint. In P.N., we considered whether prevailing party status could attach to plaintiffs whose administrative proceedings in an IDEA dispute were terminated by a settlement agreement embodied in a consent order. See 442 F.3d at 850-52. The parties in that case entered into two separate settlement agreements addressing plaintiffs’ complaint after P.N. was suspended from school following an outburst. See id. at 85051. Each agreement was reflected in a consent order, the second indicating that the order was a final decision of the ALJ. See id. at 851. Before the district court, plaintiffs sought attorney’s fees as a prevailing party pursuant to the IDEA. See id. The district court entered judgment in favor of the school district and denied attorney’s fees. See id. at 852. We concluded that an administrative consent order could satisfy the requirements imposed by Buckhannon Bd. and Home Care, Inc. v. West Va. Dept. of Health and Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001), for the recovery of attorney’s fees in a federally created action. See id. at 854-55.7 We reasoned that 7 A “stipulated settlement” confers prevailing party status when it “(1) contain[s] mandatory language, (2) [is] entitled ‘Order,’ (3) [bears] the signature of the District Court judge, not the parties’ counsel, and (4) provide[s] for judicial enforcement.” John T. ex rel. Paul T. v. Del. Cnty. Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 558 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002)). While administrative orders incorporating settlements do not bear a District Court judge’s signature, we explained in 13 “settlement of an administrative proceeding is the equivalent of an administrative decree on the merits where, as here, the parties’ obligation to comply with the terms of the settlement agreement has been made part of the order of dismissal.” Id. at 854. We recognized that the settlement agreement in that case was accordingly “judicially enforceable” because the “consent orders entered . . . were enforceable through an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . .” Id. Our statement that there was an avenue for judicial enforcement pursuant to § 1983 confirmed the district court’s conclusion in that case that the consent order was enforceable under § 1983, and comported with our then-existing caselaw. See W.B. v. Matula, 67 F.3d 484, 494 (3d Cir. 1995). Subsequently, in A.W. v. Jersey City Pub. Schs., 486 F.3d 791, 803 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc), we held that § 1983 was not an appropriate vehicle for vindicating rights guaranteed by the IDEA, partially abrogating W.B. Then, in D.E., we considered a federal court’s ability to hear an IDEA appeal from a party that received a favorable administrative determination ignored by the school district. 765 F.3d at 274. Plaintiffs in that case obtained an administrative order following a due process hearing directing the school district to remediate its failure to provide D.E. a FAPE. See id. at 266-67. No administrative appeal was taken and the district’s failure to comply with the ALJ’s final order was the basis for plaintiffs’ action for compensatory damages in the district court. See id. at 267. The district court dismissed P.N. that “administrative imprimatur” was sufficient to confer prevailing party status under Buckhannon. 442 F.3d at 854 (citing A.R. ex rel R.V. v. New York City Dept. of Educ., 407 F.3d 65, 76 (2d Cir. 2005)). 14 the IDEA claims on the grounds that, among other things, there was a failure of the parents to administratively exhaust those claims. See id. We held that parties in plaintiffs’ position “may properly pursue such claims in [federal] court.” Id. at 278. Our holding was premised on our determination that plaintiffs in that case, though victorious below, were “‘aggrieved by the findings and decision’ of the administrative proceedings,” and accordingly were entitled to “bring a civil action in state or federal court” to challenge the determination pursuant to § 1415(i)(2), because no other options for enforcement of the order were available to them. Id. at 276. D.E. acknowledges a right to enforce administrative orders in IDEA cases in a district court. P.N. acknowledges that an administrative consent order may satisfy the IDEA’s attorney fees’ shifting provision if it is judicially enforceable. While our holding in P.N. reflected that such orders were judicially enforceable pursuant to § 1983, our subsequent case law clarifies that the appropriate statute under which enforcement should be sought by a victorious party in an administrative proceeding is § 1415. See D.E., 765 F.3d at 278; A.W., 486 F.3d at 803. Unlike D.E., where the jurisdictional inquiry was complicated by whether a party was “aggrieved” within the meaning of § 1415(i)(2) when they, for lack of a better term, won below, the facts here present no such quandary. If a party that prevailed before an ALJ may enforce a settlement agreement embodied in an administrative consent order as an “aggrieved party” under § 1415(i)(2), then a party seeking to challenge such an order as improperly entered must likewise be able to bring their challenge in federal court. 15 To the extent that Appellants’ complaint challenges the basis for the ALJ’s final order, we hold that it is an appealable order from which jurisdiction is properly taken in the District Court pursuant to 20 U.S.C § 1415(i) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. To the extent that the remainder of Appellants’ claims address the validity of the settlement agreement on the basis of New Jersey contract law, we leave it to the District Court in the exercise of its discretion to consider in the first instance whether supplemental jurisdiction is appropriately taken to resolve that matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.