Opinion ID: 200797
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statute of Repose

Text: 11 Although the district court's decision did not address the applicability of the statute of repose, Toll Bros. raised the issue both in its motion to dismiss and here on appeal. Toll Bros. argues for affirmance pursuant to the six-year statute of repose for claims involving construction and improvement to real property. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, § 2B; see also Nett v. Bellucci, 269 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2001) (federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply Massachusetts statute of repose, which is deemed substantive rather than procedural). We agree that § 2B applies to the Kozikowskis' two deceit claims and hence affirm their dismissal on that basis. § 2B provides in pertinent part: 12 Actions of tort for damages arising out of any deficiency or neglect in the design, planning, construction or general administration of an improvement to real property ... in no event shall ... be commenced more than six years after the earlier of the dates of: (1) the opening of the improvement to use; or (2) substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner. 13 Mass. Gen. L. ch. 260, § 2B. The six-year deadline set forth in § 2B operates without regard to when a plaintiff discovers any injury allegedly caused by tortious activity by the architect or contractor at issue. See Klein v. Catalano, 386 Mass. 701, 702, 437 N.E.2d 514 (1982). It serves the well recognized public purpose of protecting those engaged in the construction industry from defending claims brought against them long after evidence has dissipated and strikes a reasonable balance between the public's right to a remedy and the need to place an outer limit on the tort liability of those involved in construction. Id. at 709-10, 437 N.E.2d 514. 14 The Kozikowskis' common law and statutory deceit claims sound in tort and arise out of the design and construction of the home. In both claims, the Kozikowskis allege that Toll Bros. misrepresented that their home was constructed in compliance with state and municipal building codes and was safe and fit for occupancy. The 93A deceit claim specifically alleges that Toll Bros. knowingly concealed and failed to inform the Kozikowskis of the building code defects. 15 The Kozikowskis argue that their deceit claim under ch. 93A is not barred by the statute of repose, because, as in Sullivan v. Iantosca, 409 Mass. 796, 800, 569 N.E.2d 822 (1991), the alleged violation occurred in the sale of the house. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Sullivan reasoned that § 2B grants protection to designers, planners, builders, and the like ... [but not to] people who sell real estate. Id. at 799, 569 N.E.2d 822. The Kozikowskis allege that Toll Bros. acted as both builder and seller of the property, and claim that, as the seller of the property, Toll Bros. violated ch. 93A by concealing known defects in the home. Accordingly, the Kozikowskis contend, their chapter 93A deceit claim should not be barred by the statute of repose. 16 In this transaction, Toll Bros. was the builder of the home. Franklin Chase is denoted as the Seller in the sale agreement, the December 19, 1989 release, and the resulting deed of the property. Toll Bros. itself is nowhere mentioned in any of these crucial instruments. It is, however, specifically listed as the applicant in the building permit and certificate of occupancy as one would expect. Importantly, the Kozikowskis made no effort below to pierce the corporate veil between Franklin Chase and Toll Bros., or otherwise prove that Toll Bros. was the seller of the home. 17 Accordingly, we assess whether the statute of repose began to run for the deceit claims against Toll Bros. solely in its capacity as the builder of the house and not as seller. Toll Bros. argues that the opening of the improvement to use took place on December 14, 1989, when the Town issued the Certificate of Occupancy after inspecting the home. Five days later, substantial completion of the improvement and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner occurred at the sale closing and title transfer, immediately after which the Kozikowkis moved into the home. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has ruled that the statute of repose begins to run when a Certificate of Occupancy is issued and the owners move into the home. See Aldrich v. ADD, Inc., 437 Mass. 213, 221-22, 770 N.E.2d 447 (2002). 18 We agree. According to § 2B, Toll Bros. was therefore subject to tort liability in connection with its construction of the home only until, at the latest, December 19, 1995. The deceit claims, filed in November 2001, since they arise solely out of Toll Bros.'s actions as builder, and not seller, are hence time-barred by the statute of repose.