Opinion ID: 579987
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delay before being charged: February 2-19

Text: 18 The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment requires a prompt judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to an extended pretrial detention following a warrantless arrest. 8 Last year the Court held that a 48-hour detention before an appearance before a judicial officer will generally comply with the Fourth Amendment's requirement of promptness. 9 After 48 hours, however, that general rule changes: 19 Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, the calculus changes. In such a case, the arrested individual does not bear the burden of proving an unreasonable delay. Rather, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance. 10 20 We read the Court's opinion in County of Riverside to state that an unexplained detention of 17 days before being charged with the crime for which the detainee is held is presumptively unconstitutional. 21 This Court has already held that an 18-day detention without an appearance before a judge or magistrate is a deprivation of liberty without due process of law. 11 Sivard was held by Pulaski County for 17 days before being charged before a judicial officer. The district court found that Sivard may have been deprived of his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures. The court nevertheless found that Sivard's amended complaint did not make out a claim under § 1983 for that violation. We disagree. 22 Although mindful that we should avoid scour[ing] the record to make the case of a party who does nothing, 12 we are obligated to protect a viable cause of action that Sivard has indeed raised. We respect the district court's frustration with Sivard's inelegant pleading and his failure to respond to the defendants' motion for summary judgment, and we acknowledge the Supreme Court's emphasis on the non-moving party's burden at summary judgment. 13 But we cannot ignore--nor deprive Sivard of any advantage from--facts that are well established in the record, facts that are admitted even by the defendants. The defendants' own motion for summary judgment admits the facts of Sivard's detention in terms sufficient to justify denying the motion. Sivard may indeed have been unaware of the value of his Fourth Amendment claim until the district court acknowledged it in its order granting summary judgment against him. Sivard originally sought recovery on state tort grounds. When he lost that basis for his suit he amended his complaint to allow for recovery under § 1983. Because Sivard did not respond to the defendants' motion for summary judgment we cannot look beyond his complaint to sustain his lawsuit. Given the facts admitted by the defendants, we find that Sivard's second amended complaint stated a Fourth Amendment claim in terms sufficient to preclude summary judgment against him. 23 The pertinent paragraphs of Sivard's second amended complaint are: 24 9. The Plaintiff, Harold E. Sivard, was wrongfully detained by the Pulaski County authorities between the dates of February 2, 1987 and March 26, 1987. That no charges were filed against the Plaintiff by the Defendants until February 19, 1987. 25 .... 26 11. That Plaintiff was wrongfully detained pursuant to the policy and custom of the defendants. 27 .... 28 14. That Defendant Charlotte Ward knew that the Plaintiff was held without charge from February 2, 1987 to February 19, 1987 and that she continued to detain Plaintiff without charge despite her knowledge. 29 .... 30 20. That despite Plaintiff's injury Plaintiff was wrongfully detained without medical treatment and without arraignment until March 26, 1987 by the Defendants, Pulaski County, Pulaski County Sheriff's Department, and Charlotte Ward. 31 .... 32 22. That Plaintiff's injury and wrongful detention were a direct result of the Defendant Pulaski County, Pulaski County Sheriff's Department and Charlotte Ward's actions, custom and policy. 33 .... 34 24. That contrary to the provisions of 42 U.S.C.A. Sec. 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution defendants, under color of law, denied Harold E. Sivard rights and privileges due him under the United States Constitution and Indiana State Law. 35 This Court demands that plaintiffs suing a municipal body under § 1983 plead with greater specificity than might ordinarily be required. 14 We read Sivard's amended complaint to have satisfied that demand. 15 36 The district court held, first, that Sivard's complaint did not mention the time at which he was taken before a judicial officer. Sivard's complaint, as quoted above, states clearly that no charges were filed against him until February 19, 1987, and that he was held without charge from February 2, 1987 to February 19, 1987. These two statements can only mean that Sivard was not charged, by a judicial officer, with the commission of a crime until he had been held for 17 days. It is not necessary even to say that we presume that held without charge includes held without being brought before a judicial officer. It is the failure of the county to charge a detainee held subject to a warrantless arrest with the commission of any crime that violates the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, the defendants' own motion for summary judgment adds to Sivard's allegation an admission that he was not brought before a judicial officer on the charge for which he was arrested until February 19, 1987. 16 The hearing that the defendants admit did not take place until February 19 is the hearing owed to a detainee within 48 hours. A party opposing summary judgment generally bears an evidentiary burden at the summary judgment stage, but he satisfies that burden when his factual allegations are uncontested by the moving party. In this case, the legal burden has remained on Pulaski County to explain a 17-day detention before Sivard was charged. 17 It has not done so. 18 37 The district court also held that even if Sivard was not taken promptly before a judicial officer, he did not show that any of the defendants were personally involved in the constitutional deprivation or that the deprivation resulted from a municipal policy or custom; both are necessary requisites for establishing liability in a defendant's individual or official capacity. 19 38 Sivard's amended complaint is not specific in its allegations of Sheriff Ward-Tillett's personal involvement or of municipal custom behind his detention; but neither is it so vague as to deserve dismissal. As to Sheriff Ward-Tillett, it states that she knew of his wrongful detention and continued to detain him in spite of that knowledge. We hold that such an allegation is sufficient to state a cause of action under § 1983 for a public official's personal involvement in an unconstitutional deprivation of due process. We also hold that the defendants' admission that Sivard was held in prison without charge for 17 days establishes the sheriff's potential liability in either her personal or official capacity, and also satisfies Sivard's burden at summary judgment. More proof--much more--will be necessary for him to prevail at trial, but at this stage he should not be denied that trial. The sheriff's mere denial of such knowledge is not enough; the material fact of that knowledge remains to be decided. 39 As for municipal liability, we find that Sivard's amended complaint also makes a showing of policy or custom that should survive a motion for summary judgment. The complaint mentions policy and custom twice. It states that Sivard was wrongfully detained pursuant to the policy and custom of the defendants. It also states that his injury and wrongful detention were a direct result of the Defendant Pulaski County, Pulaski County Sheriff's Department, and Charlotte Ward's actions, custom, and policy. These statements approach the level of boilerplate vagueness that this Court has ruled should not survive summary judgment. Without uncontroverted evidence of the length of his detention, and without the remaining question of when, and how, Pulaski County officials inquired into and learned of the Massachusetts indictment of Sivard (and, later, the warrant for his arrest), we might affirm the district court's summary dismissal of Sivard's contention that his detention was the product of some policy or custom. But we are not without such evidence and such remaining questions; we find that the inexplicable nature of Sivard's detention makes it seem within the realm of probability that some official policy was responsible for his excessively long detention. 40 In conclusion we note that summary judgment is a carrot to encourage the prompt resolution of meritless cases, not a stick to punish a plaintiff for not conducting discovery when the factual basis for his cause of action is admitted by the defendants. Mr. Sivard must develop more facts to prevail, but he should be allowed to proceed. 41