Opinion ID: 2999168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diminishment of FMLA Rights

Text: Mr. Harrell next contends that, even if the postal return-towork regulations are part of a valid collective bargaining agreement, the Postal Service was not allowed to impose any condition on his return that is more stringent than what is specifically allowed by the FMLA, and, by doing so, the Postal Service violated rights protected by the FMLA. The Postal Service takes the opposite view. It maintains that the FMLA allows for a more stringent return-to-work certification if required by state law or if set forth in a CBA. Thus we arrive at the pivotal issue in this case: Whether the Postal Service can rely upon return-to-work regulations incorporated into a valid collective bargaining agreement to impose requirements on employees that are more burdensome than what is set forth in the statute. To resolve this issue, we begin with the language of the statute, specifically 29 U.S.C. §§ 2614(a)(4) and 2652. If the intent of Congress, as expressed in the language of the statute, is clear with respect to this issue, then “that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984). However, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court must defer to the agency’s answer if it “is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. Generally speaking, an agency’s interpretation of a statute that it administers is “permissible” if it is “reasonable.” Id. at 845. Section 2614(a)(4) permits employers to impose, as a condition of returning to work, a uniformly applied practice or policy that requires each employee to receive certification from the health care provider of the employee that the employee is able to 20 No. 03-4204 resume work, except that nothing in this paragraph shall supersede a valid State or local law or a collec- tive bargaining agreement that governs the return to work of such employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(4). The legislative history for this section notes that the last phrase “clarifies that [§ 2614(a)(4)] was not meant to supersede other valid State or local laws or collective bargaining agreement that, for reasons such as public health, might affect the medical certification required for the return to work of an employee who had been on medical leave.” S. Rep. 103-3 at 32. Section 2652, in turn, reads:
Nothing in this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall be construed to diminish the obligation of an employer to comply with any collective bargaining agreement or any employment benefit program or plan that provides greater family or medical leave rights to employees than the rights established under this Act or any amendment made by this Act.
The rights established for employees under this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall not be diminished by any collective bargaining agreement or any employment benefit program or plan. 29 U.S.C. § 2652. The legislative history to this section adds that “[subsection (a)] specifies that employees must continue to comply with collective bargaining agreements or employment benefit plans providing greater benefits than the act. Conversely, [subsection (b)] makes clear that rights under the act cannot be taken away to collective bargaining or employer plans.” S. Rep. 103-3 at 38; see also id. at 47 (exNo. 03-4204 21 plaining that under § 2652 nothing in the FMLA “shall diminish an employer’s obligation under a collective bargaining agreement or employment benefit plan to provide greater leave rights nor may the rights provided under this title be diminished by such agreement or plan”). As noted above, Mr. Harrell believes that the Postal Service’s insistence on a detailed return-to-work statement violated the FMLA. He asserts that, although the Postal Service was allowed to have a uniform fitness certification policy under 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(4), this provision is limited by the language of 29 U.S.C. § 2652(b) which provides that “[t]he rights established for employees under this Act or any amendment made by this Act shall not be diminished by any collective bargaining agreement or any employment benefit program or plan.” Therefore, as these provisions apply to his case, Mr. Harrell submits that, because Dr. Smith cleared him for work without restrictions, the Postal Service was not authorized to impose a more stringent certification requirement, even if such a requirement was part of the governing collective bargaining agreement. The Postal Service and the Department of Labor urge a different interpretation of these provisions. They maintain that § 2614(a)(4), with its deference to “a valid State or local law or a collective bargaining agreement,” defines the “right” to return to work as guaranteed by the FMLA. The Postal Service goes on to explain that, [b]ecause an employee has no right under the Act to circumvent a collective bargaining provision governing his return to work, applying section 2614 to require additional certification measures does not “diminish” any “right established for employees under th[e] Act,” and therefore does not contravene section 2652. 22 No. 03-4204 Rehearing Pet. at 11. Both parties urge that we need not look beyond the statutory language to resolve the question at hand— whether a CBA can impose a more stringent return-to-work requirement than a simple certification by the employee’s own physician. We do not believe this to be the case. Here, § 2614 provides that an employer may have a certification requirement, but further provides that “nothing in this paragraph shall supersede a valid State or local law or a collective bargaining agreement that governs the return to work of such employees”; § 2652 states that nothing in the Act “shall be construed to diminish the obligation of an employer to comply with any collective bargaining agreement . . . that provides greater family or medical leave rights to employees than the rights established under this Act” and further states that rights provided by the FMLA “shall not be diminished by any collective bargaining agreement or any employment benefit program or plan.” There are two possible ways to reconcile these provisions. The first is the interpretation urged by Mr. Harrell—that a CBA can provide greater, but not fewer, rights to employees. This interpretation, however, renders the last clause of § 2614(a)(4) superfluous, a result that we usually try to avoid. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarenga-Silva, 324 F.3d 884, 887 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Courts should avoid statutory constructions that render another part of the same provision superfluous.”). The second possible interpretation—the one urged by the Postal Service—is to read § 2614(a)(4) as an exception to the general rule set forth in § 2652. Such a reading is consonant with general canons of statutory interpretation, see United States v. Salerno, 108 F.3d 730, 737 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing the “cannon [sic] of statutory interpretation that a more specific statutory provision takes precedence over No. 03-4204 23 a more general provision”); however, Congress’ intent to limit the operation of § 2652 with respect to return-towork provisions could have been made clearer through the use of a cross-reference to § 2614(a)(4). Given the shortcomings with each interpretation, we are not able to conclude that Congress clearly addressed the question at issue through the statutory language. We therefore may turn to the interpretive regulations to resolve the issue. Chevron instructs that we must defer to the reasonable interpretation of an agency tasked with administering the statute. Whether an interpretation is reasonable involves a two-step inquiry. The first step requires that the court identify the agency’s position on the specific issue. The second step requires a determination of whether the agency’s position is a principled one. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844. Here, Mr. Harrell maintains that the interpretation of § 2614(a)(4) set forth in the Department of Labor’s regulation is no more than a restatement of the language of the statute and, therefore, is not worthy of deference. Although such an argument does find support in recent Supreme Court case law,3 we find it unpersuasive with respect to the regulation at issue. It is true that part of the implementing regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.310,4 follows closely the language of the statute; however, the regulation goes beyond the mere recitation of the statutory language and speaks to the issue 3 See Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 904, 915 (2006) (rejecting the Government’s argument that an interpretive rule was worthy of deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997), in part because “the underlying regulation does little more than restate the terms of the statute itself”). 4 The relevant sections of 29 C.F.R. § 825.310 are set forth supra at 13. 24 No. 03-4204 presented in this case. First, the title of the regulation sets forth the question that the regulation purports to answer: “Under what circumstances may an employer require that an employee submit a medical certification that the employee is able (or unable) to return to work (i.e., a ‘fitness-for-duty’ report)?” 29 C.F.R. § 825.310. Subsection (a) then states the general proposition that, as a condition of restoring an employee to his or her position after FMLA leave, “an employer may have a uniformly-applied policy or practice that requires all similarly-situated employees . . . who take leave for such conditions to obtain and present certification from the employee’s health care provider that the employee is able to resume work.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(a). Subsection (b) speaks more directly to the situation presented here; it states: (b) If State or local law or the terms of a collective bargaining agreement govern an employee’s return to work, those provisions shall be applied. Similarly, requirements under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) that any return-to-work physical be job-related and consistent with business necessity apply. For example, an attorney could not be required to submit to a medical examination or inquiry just because her leg had been amputated. The essential functions of an attorney’s job do not require use of both legs; therefore such an inquiry would not be job related. An employer may require a ware- house laborer, whose back impairment affects the ability to lift, to be examined by an orthopedist, but may not require this employee to submit to an HIV test where the test is not related to either the essential functions of his/her job or to his/her impairment. 29 C.F.R. § 825.310(b) (emphasis added). Not only does subsection (b) clearly state that a CBA takes precedence over No. 03-4204 25 the statutory requirements, the examples that follow illustrate that the Department of Labor does not believe that return-to-work requirements found in a CBA only can provide employees with greater protections than the statutory language. The last example discussing the warehouse laborer is particularly telling: A CBA that provided only greater rights to employees could not require a warehouse laborer, as a condition of returning to work, to be examined by an orthopedist; if the employee had obtained a return-towork release from his general practitioner, that release, without more, would suffice under the statutory provisions of the FMLA. Thus subsection (b) not only provides for compliance with a CBA, it also indicates that the CBA may impose more stringent return-to-work requirements on the employee than those set forth in the statute.5 Having identified the agency’s answer to the question,6 the 5 Subsection (c) then goes on to describe the statutory protections set forth in the act for returning to work—those protections that are applied in the event subsection (b) is inapplicable. See 29