Opinion ID: 1202533
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: stipulation to victims' identities

Text: The twelfth point in defendant's brief is that the trial court erred by failing to order the State to stipulate to the identities of the victims. Before the State called its first witness, defendant made a motion to preclude the State from introducing certain identification evidence including photographs of the victims, the victims' clothing, and testimony from the victims' parents and guardians. This motion was based upon defendant's affidavit in which he admitted killing the five victims, briefly indicated the manner in which the victims were killed, and described how he disposed of the victims' bodies. Defendant's theory was that the effect of the affidavit was to render the issue of identity uncontested, thereby making the State's identification evidence irrelevant. Defense counsel told the court, [T]his does not go to a stipulation. We are not saying that we stipulate. We are saying we admit. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, defense counsel objected to some of the State's physical and testimonial evidence (that defendant had sought to preclude by his motion) on the ground that he either had admitted or would stipulate to the fact sought to be proved or established. These objections were overruled. Defendant contends that the trial court erred by admitting the State's identification evidence. He argues that the prosecution could have achieved the full probative value of the admitted testimony and exhibits without unfairly prejudicing defendant simply by stipulating to the identities of the victims. As a general rule, a party may not preclude his adversary's offer of proof by admission or stipulation. [139] The rationale for this rule was well stated in United States v. Grassi: [140] A piece of evidence can have probative value even in the event of an offer to stipulate to the issue on which the evidence is offered. A cold stipulation can deprive a party of the legitimate moral force of his evidence, and can never fully substitute for tangible, physical evidence or the testimony of witnesses. In most cases, a party has the right to present to the jury a picture of the events relied upon. [141] Notwithstanding this general rule, evidence is subject to rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That rule provides for exclusion of relevant evidence on the ground of unfair prejudice. [142] Thus, the State is bound to stipulate to facts, to use an alternative mode of proof, or to forego introduction of the material if the evidence it offers cannot satisfy rule 403, i.e., if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [143] In this regard, the Advisory Committee Note to rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence suggests, In reaching a decision whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice ... [t]he availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor. Thus, an important consideration when examining probativeness is the prosecutorial need for the proffered evidence. [144] It follows that although trial courts should seriously consider offers to stipulate in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence pursuant to rule 403, [145] such an offer is only one factor that plays into the rule 403 balancing process. [146] After carefully reviewing the record in this case, it is clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not requiring the State to stipulate to defendant's admissions in his affidavit. However, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in failing to exclude three of the State's exhibits. At trial, there was significant ambiguity concerning what defense counsel was trying to accomplish. His statement that he was making an admission as opposed to a stipulation seemed to contradict later statements that the defense was willing to stipulate to certain facts. Although such a distinction may seem at first glance to be an exercise in semantics, such is not the case; defendant was not willing to stipulate to the State's evidence at issue here. Instead, he was in effect trying to substitute his affidavit for the State's proof. Of concern is the fact that some of the disputed testimony and exhibits were relevant for purposes other than identification, and indeed the evidence in several respects went beyond what was admitted in defendant's affidavit or what he was willing to stipulate to. For example, testimony of the parents and guardians helped to establish the crime of aggravated kidnapping; they testified that defendant did not have permission to take the victims. Furthermore, the victims' identities were an essential element of the State's case. Defendant relies on United States v. Spletzer [147] and United States v. Cook [148] in support of his contention. In both Spletzer and Cook, the defendants' convictions were reversed because the trial judge admitted evidence of prior convictions despite one defendant's willingness to concede and the other's ability to stipulate to the existence of the same. One important consideration to both courts was the fact that the nature of the felonies was not essential to establish the convictions. [149] Contrastingly, in this case the victims' identities, as well as other facts established by the disputed evidence, were essential to the State's case. Defendant's reliance upon Cook and Spletzer is unpersuasive since those cases involved evidence concerning collateral matters. Given the facts of this case, it is clear that the prosecutorial need for most of the disputed evidence was significant since it established essential elements of the crimes with which defendant was charged. Defendant was not willing to stipulate to the State's proof, and submission of his affidavit did not have this effect. The probative value of this evidence simply was not outweighed by unfair prejudice. However, three of the State's exhibits (photographs) that defendant challenges are inadmissible under our prior cases. All three of those photographs show Graeme Cunningham's head wounds. The first was taken from the top of the head, looking down toward the nose. It shows two open wounds: one gash on the top of the head and another gash running between the top of the head and the eye. The picture also shows wet hair surrounding the gashes and discoloration across the face. The second photograph shows a gash surrounded by wet, matted hair. The wound is on the back of the head near a discolored ear. The third picture shows a hole in the skull and a pair of tongs pulling skin away from the opening to reveal the brain cavity. The wet hair surrounding the wound appears to be matted with blood. The three photographs of Graeme's head were improperly admitted under rule 403 and under our decisions in Cloud and Garcia. This evidence had minimal probative value, being essentially cumulative of unchallenged expert and lay testimony identifying the remains and the causes of death. In fact, two of the three photographs apparently had no probative value. The medical examiner testified on direct examination that all of the wounds shown, except the hole in the skull, could have occurred in the stream after the boy's body was left there. On the other hand, having seen the photographs, it is evident to us why the prosecution resisted their exclusion. Cumulatively and individually, the photographs had great potential for unfairly prejudicing defendant. The State either should have proceeded without the evidence or should have been compelled to stipulate to the facts shown. For these reasons, we hold that the trial court erred in admitting the photographs described above. Although we have either assumed (part XA) or concluded (part XB) that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the described photographs, we find the error harmless. In State v. Banner, [150] we applied rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to nonconstitutional evidentiary error. [151] That rule directs in part, Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded. To the same effect is rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. The Court in State v. Knight [152] unanimously held that whether reversible error occurs under rule 30 is determined by applying the test found in State v. Fontana. [153] In Fontana, we held that affect the substantial rights of a party means that an error warrants reversal only if a review of the record persuades the [C]ourt that without the error there was `a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the defendant.' [154] In Knight, the Court adopted an erosion-of-confidence criterion to give substance to our reasonable likelihood standard. [155] We stated that for an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine our confidence in the verdict. [156] Application of the standard to the case at hand invariably leads to the conclusion that the error was harmless. The photographs were inflammatory and had significant power to prejudice the jury unfairly. However, in light of defendant's gruesome confession, detailing how he brutally murdered the victims, we are convinced that the jury would have returned the verdicts of guilt and the death sentences had the photographs been excluded.