Opinion ID: 1774411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Construction of Title 13:1055 of the Baton Rouge Code of Ordinances

Text: It is necessary, however, before I proceed further, that I place a proper construction upon the ordinance. This threshold procedure is required because the core of the defendant's unconstitutionality claims, i.e. vagueness and overbreadth, is directed at the manner in which the City of Baton Rouge has articulated its definition of criminal activity in the ordinance. In addition, as the ensuing discussion will reveal, the nature of the offense with which Ross is charged also presents certain analytical difficulties which can be alleviated by a definitive construction of the ordinance. A. Criminal Solicitation and Free Speech and Assembly The ordinance under which Ross is charged is peculiar in that it does not directly punish drug trafficking, but rather penalizes the defendant who intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures another to engage in illegal drug activities. Thus, Ross is charged not with engaging personally in drug trafficking, but rather with soliciting others to do so. It is the nature of the offense with which Ross is charged, criminal solicitation, which makes an analysis of the ordinance in the free speech and assembly context difficult. Criminal solicitation falls within that family of common law offenses known as inchoate offenses, [7] those offenses such as attempt or conspiracy which are incipient to the completion of an actual offense. 3 Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England, P. 66 (1797); 2 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England, Pp. 221-240 (1883). See LSA-R.S. 14:26-28.1; Sidney M. Blitzer, Jr., Comments: Conspiracy, 28 La. L.Rev. 534, 543 (1968); Commonwealth v. Anderson, 538 Pa. 574, 650 A.2d 20, 23 (1994); People v. Guerra, 40 Cal.3d 377, 220 Cal.Rptr. 374, 377-78, 708 P.2d 1252, 1256 (1985); People v. Austin, 264 Ill.App.3d 976, 202 Ill.Dec. 46, 48, 637 N.E.2d 585, 587 (1994). In other words, an inchoate offense is committed when one has advanced a certain distance towards the commission of a separate proscribed offense, although the ultimate criminal purpose is not yet (and may never be) accomplished. 21 Am.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 162 (Solicitation is a substantive crime in itself, not an abortive effort to commit the crime solicited). See also Billy J. Tauzin, Impossible Attempts, 26 La. L.Rev. 426 (1966); State v. Richards, 426 So.2d 1314 (La.1982); State v. Harper, 205 La. 228, 17 So.2d 260 (1944). Inchoate crimes are designed to inhibit criminal conduct before it goes too far or to punish criminal conduct ... when ... it misfires. Alston v. State, 101 Md.App. 47, 643 A.2d 468, 475 (1993). See also State v. Pacheco, 125 Wash.2d 150, 882 P.2d 183, 186 (1994) ( En Banc ); State v. Clason, 3 Neb.App. 339, 526 N.W.2d 673, 681-82 (1994). Inchoate offenses therefore differ from other penal laws, which typically do not implicate free speech and assembly concerns unless they directly target expressive conduct, e.g. obscenity ordinances. Compare Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973). This is because inchoate offenses are by their nature incomplete and therefore lack a readily discernible corpus delicti; they consist solely of conduct or overt acts which on their face may appear innocent, [8] but which when combined with the requisite criminal intent constitute a prosecutable violation of the criminal law. See 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Pp. 78-79 (Bernard C. Gavit ed., 1941); State v. Richards, 426 So.2d 1314 (La.1982); Moffett v. State, 96 Nev. 822, 618 P.2d 1223 (1980); State v. Taft, 143 W.Va. 365, 102 S.E.2d 152 (1958); State v. Quick, 199 S.C. 256, 19 S.E.2d 101 (1942); State v. Rider, 90 Mo. 54, 1 S.W. 825 (1886). When, as in the instant case, the overt acts involved include constitutionally protected speech or conduct, this Court has a constitutional duty to ensure that those rights are not impermissibly infringed. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). In other words, the [ordinance] must be carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not be susceptible of application to protected expression. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 522, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1106, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972). The determination of whether an ordinance establishing an inchoate offense invades constitutionally protected interests must necessarily, as the trial court below realized, revolve around the element of criminal intent required by the statute. Only by requiring that the municipality prove that the overt acts of the defendant were performed for the purpose of a criminal or unlawful object does the ordinance clearly distinguish speech and conduct which may be properly proscribed from that which may not, i.e. distinguish criminal solicitation from peaceful expression. State v. Slutz, 106 La. 182, 30 So. 298, 299 (1901). An ordinance may not constitutionally prohibit Ross from hanging around on a street corner and conversing with acquaintances alone, but when such speech and conduct is linked to an intent to further a specific criminal purpose I have no trouble with concluding that the resulting combination is one which is traditionally and justifiably punishable under the criminal law. [9] See Medina v. California, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2577, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2322, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977) ([h]istorical practice is probative of the constitutionality of a penal law). B. Interpretation of the Ordinance 1. Basic Principles of Interpretation In an analysis of the ordinance, I am guided by basic precepts of statutory construction, which apply in a like manner to the construction of municipal ordinances. Landry v. Parish of East Baton Rouge, 352 So.2d 656, 661 (La.1977); Everhardt v. City of New Orleans, 217 So.2d 400, 401 (La.1968), appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 212, 89 S.Ct. 1775, 23 L.Ed.2d 214 (1969). The primary goal in construing a statute or ordinance is to effectuate the intent of the legislative body; in so doing, I proceed under the assumption that the ordinance is valid, and note that the burden of proving any constitutional defects is upon the party alleging the ordinance's unconstitutionality. Moore v. Roemer, 567 So.2d 75, 78 (La.1990); State v. Griffin, 495 So.2d 1306, 1308 (La.1986). In construing a penal ordinance, I apply (by analogy) the rules of interpretation provided by Louisiana's Criminal Code, namely that all of its provisions shall be given a genuine construction, according to the fair import of their words, taken in their usual sense, in connection with the context, and with reference to the purpose of the provision. LSA-R.S. 14:3; State v. All Pro Paint & Body Shop, Inc., No. 93-KA-1316, 639 So.2d 707, 712 (La.1994); State v. Azar, 539 So.2d 1222, 1224 (La.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823, 110 S.Ct. 82, 107 L.Ed.2d 48 (1989). I also note, however, that any doubt as to the ordinance's effective reach should be resolved in favor of the defendant. State v. Freeman, 411 So.2d 1068 (La.1982); State v. Brown, 378 So.2d 916 (La.1979). Furthermore, I observe that [w]henever it is possible, [Louisiana] courts have the duty to interpret statutes in a manner consistent with our state and federal constitutions. State v. Cinel, 94-KA-0942 (La.1994), 646 So.2d 309, 313 ( citations omitted ). Thus, a statute which is unconstitutional on its face may be preserved by a constitutional construction, provided that the saving construction of the statute is a plausible one. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990); City of Houston, Texas v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987). 2. The Penal Provision of the Ordinance I now turn these principles toward subsection (b) of the ordinance, the subsection which describes the proscribed activity. A person violates the ordinance if that person intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures another to engage in illegal drug activities. The City used the word intentional, thus specifically writing an intent element into the ordinance. To violate the ordinance, one must intend to solicit or procure another person to engage in drug trafficking activities. Given that the ultimate goal of the ordinance, as suggested by its language and expressed orally and in brief by the city prosecutor, is to target illegal drug activity at an early stage in the distribution process, I interpret the intent requirement to extend to the illegal drug activity resulting from the solicitation or procurement. In other words, a defendant charged under this ordinance must possess the requisite intent both to solicit another and, by means of the solicitation, to secure that other's participation in illegal drug activities. Accord, Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., Criminal Law, P. 418 (1972) (it is necessary that the solicitor intend to achieve [the proscribed] result through the participation of another). Finally, since solicitation by its very nature cannot occur in a vacuum, the speech and conduct utilized by a defendant to relay the criminal goal to the person being solicited are overt acts in furtherance of the criminal purpose; these overt acts, when combined with the requisite criminal intent, comprise the speech and conduct effectively criminalized by the ordinance. A question remains as to the exact level of criminal intent required by the ordinance. Louisiana criminal law recognizes two distinct levels of criminal intent: specific and general intent. LSA-R.S. 14:10. Specific criminal intent is that state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act. LSA-R.S. 14:10(1); State v. Daniels, 236 La. 998, 109 So.2d 896 (1959). Thus, if the ordinance requires a specific criminal intent, only if Ross actually intends for his conduct to result in another person becoming involved in drug trafficking is he in violation of the ordinance. In other words, Ross must possess a subjective or actual intent to bring about the prescribed criminal consequences, in this case the solicitation of another for criminal activity. General criminal intent is present whenever there is specific intent, and also when the circumstances indicate that the offender, in the ordinary course of human experience, must have adverted to the prescribed criminal consequences as reasonably certain to result from his act or failure to act. LSA-R.S. 14:10(2); State v. Chism, 436 So.2d 464 (La.1983). The objective nature of general criminal intent is what distinguishes it from specific criminal intent, since general intent exists when from the circumstances the prohibited result may reasonably be expected to flow from the offender's voluntary act, irrespective of any subjective desire on his part to have accomplished such result.  State v. Elzie, 343 So.2d 712, 714 (La.1977) ( emphasis added ); LSA-R.S. 14:10(2). See also Ronald N. Boyce & Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law and Procedure, P. 497 (7th ed. 1989), citing 1 Austin, Jurisprudence, P. 424 (5th ed. 1888) (a result is intended if it is contemplated as a probable consequence, whether it is desired or not). Specific criminal intent, therefore, addresses itself to the actual thoughts of the defendant, while general criminal intent focuses upon the objective activity of the defendant and its probable consequences. [10] Andre' Douget, Comment, The Louisiana Criminal Code and Criminal Intent: Distinguishing Between Specific and General Intent, 46 La.L.Rev. 1061 (1986). Thus, if the ordinance requires only a general criminal intent, Ross may be convicted if, although subjectively he had no desire to solicit another for drug purposes, nonetheless the trial court decides that a reasonable person observing the defendant's objective speech and conduct would conclude that illegal drug activity would result therefrom. [11] In this case the trial court found that LSA-R.S. 14:11, see Note 6, supra, mandated that the ordinance be construed to require only a general criminal intent, and found that such an intent requirement was insufficient to protect the defendant's constitutional rights. In reviewing this decision, it first be determined which level of criminal intent the City-Parish expected to apply; if it was a specific criminal intent, the construction of the ordinance is at an end. If it was general criminal intent, however, it will be necessary to inquire further to determine if that level of intent satisfies the demands of the free speech and assembly provisions of Louisiana and federal constitutions. 3. Construction of the Intent Requirement Criminal solicitation, such as that punished by the ordinance, was an offense known to the ancient common law. State v. Slutz, 106 La. 182, 30 So. 298, 299 (La.1901). See Rex v. Higgins, 102 Eng.Rep. 269, 276 (1801) (A solicitation or inciting of another, by whatever means it is attempted, is an act done; and that such an act done with a criminal intent is punishable by indictment has been clearly established). At the common law, criminal solicitation, like the other inchoate offenses, required a specific intent. [12] See State v. Reagan, 111 Ill.App.3d 945, 67 Ill.Dec. 506, 509, 444 N.E.2d 742, 745 (1982), aff'd, 99 Ill.2d 238, 75 Ill.Dec. 701, 457 N.E.2d 1260 (1983) ([t]he intent requirement necessary to commit a completed offense differs from the specific intent necessary to commit [an] inchoate offense). Accord, State v. Ray, 267 Mont. 128, 882 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1994); State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189, 516 A.2d 1047, 1054 (1986); Commonwealth v. Shea, 398 Mass. 264, 496 N.E.2d 631, 636 (1986); People v. Johnson, 30 Cal.3d 444, 179 Cal.Rptr. 209, 637 P.2d 676, 679 (1981); Gallegos v. People, 159 Colo. 379, 411 P.2d 956, 959 (1966) ( En Banc ). In the early jurisprudence of this state, when a common law designation of a crime was used in a penal statute, the applicable rule of interpretation was that the common-law elements of the crime must be used. State v. Bellard, 23 So. 504, 506 (La.1898). Accord, State v. Berger, 156 La. 737, 101 So. 124, 125 (La.1924); Kraemer, supra, 22 So. at 255-256. See also Robert H. Marr, The Criminal Jurisprudence of Louisiana, P. 22-26 (1906) (discussing the Crimes Act of 1805 and its effect upon Louisiana criminal jurisprudence). However, even prior to the comprehensive codification of Louisiana's criminal statutes in 1942, if a statute defining a common law crime altered the common law definition of that crime, a reviewing court was bound by the parameters of the crime as expressed in the statute. State v. Cooley, 176 La. 448, 146 So. 19, 20 (1933) (arson); State v. Snowden, 174 La. 156, 140 So. 9, 9-11 (1932) (burglary); State v. Ward, 147 La. 1083, 86 So. 552, 553 (1920) (burglary). In 1942, Louisiana's Criminal Code was substantially codified and placed into the form in which it is known today. See, generally, La.Acts.1942, No. 43, § 1; Dale E. Bennett, The Louisiana Criminal Code: A Comparison With Prior Louisiana Criminal Law, 5 La.L.Rev. 6 (1942). This Court has previously found that in the course of this codification the legislature, by means of the statutory language employed, transformed a number of crimes which were specific intent crimes at the common law into general intent crimes. See Chism, supra, 436 So.2d at 468 (The Louisiana offense of accessory after the fact deviates somewhat from the original common law offense in that it does not require that the defendant actually know that a completed felony has occurred ... rather, it incorporates an objective standard); State v. Raymo, 419 So.2d 858, 860 (La.1982) (Louisiana ... has deviated from the early common law rule that forgery required an intent to defraud a particular person). However, this Court has also recognized that in the 1942 codification the legislature retained a number of crimes as defined at the common law. State v. Gyles, 313 So.2d 799, 800 (La.1975). Accordingly, when dealing with such offenses [t]he historical basis of Louisiana's criminal law in the common law makes appropriate resort to common law principles for aid in interpreting legislative intent. State v. Taylor, 463 So.2d 1274, 1276 (La.1985) ( citation omitted ). Accord, Gyles, supra (murder); State v. Langford, 483 So.2d 979, 985 n11 (La.1986) (theft); State v. Fulghum, 242 La. 767, 138 So.2d 569, 585 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 5, 83 S.Ct. 82, 9 L.Ed.2d 50 (1962) (murder). LSA-R.S. 14:11, see Note 6, supra, mandates that in the absence of qualifying provisions the word intentional, which the ordinance I consider employs, connotes a general criminal intent. However, this Court has in the past read the phrase qualifying provisions broadly, to include the context and purpose of the legislative enactment and, as the preceding paragraph reveals, whether the prescribed offense traces a direct and unvarying line to common law origins. See State v. Fuller, 414 So.2d 306 (La.1982); State v. Dyer, 388 So.2d 374 (La.1980); State v. Fluker, 311 So.2d 863 (La.1975). Thus, I examine the ordinance to discern whether the ultimate purpose of the ordinance requires a specific intent element, or whether the City of Baton Rouge intended to incorporate the common law definition of criminal solicitation, including its specific intent element, into the ordinance. The ordinance is designed to deter and strike at criminal solicitation in public places, and therefore is focused upon an objective manifestation of criminal activity. The ordinance serves a dual purpose in that it seeks not only to obviate future criminal activity, but also is clearly aimed at sweeping the streets clean so that security and aesthetic concerns of the general public will be assuaged. As such, it is plain that a general criminal intent requirement, i.e. an objective standard, would more completely facilitate the achievement of the ordinance's objective. Furthermore, I note that this ordinance does not on its face or accompanying legislative commentary express any intention to incorporate elements of the common law crime of criminal solicitation. By coincidence or design, the ordinance's language substantially deviates from LSA-R.S. 14:28, the State criminal solicitation offense, which the official comments reveal is similar to the common law crime of solicitation. LSA-R.S. 14:28, Reporter's Comment. See also Henry Morrow, The Louisiana Criminal Code of 1942Opportunities Lost and Challenges Yet Unanswered, 17 Tul.L.Rev. 1, 9 (1942). In sum, there is simply no evidence that the City of Baton Rouge intended that common law principles assist the construction of the ordinance. As a matter of simple statutory construction, I am not free, in the absence of qualifying provisions, to stray from the dictate of LSA-R.S. 14:11. In this case the express language and purpose of the ordinance do not compel a conclusion that anything other than general criminal intent is required to establish a violation of the ordinance. A showing of constitutional necessity is required before departing from what I consider to be a fairly simple and straightforward reading of the City-Parish Council's design in implementing the ordinance. In other words, the real question is whether anything in the state or federal constitutions requires me to read a specific intent requirement into this ordinance. 4. Constitutional Analysis of the Intent Requirement Article I, §§ 7 and 9 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 [13] read as follows: § 7. Freedom of Expression Section 7. No law shall curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments on any subject, but is responsible for abuse of that freedom. § 9. Right of Assembly and Petition Section 9. No law shall impair the right of any person to assemble peaceably or to petition government for a redress of grievances. In interpreting Louisiana's constitutional provisions, it is the understanding that can reasonably be ascribed to the electorate that controls. Radiofone, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 93-WA-0962, 630 So.2d 694, 698 (La.1994) ( citations omitted ). Thus, [w]hen a constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences, it must be applied as written without further interpretation in search of its intent. Succession of Lauga, 624 So.2d 1156, 1165 (La.1993) ( citations omitted ). In addition, [e]very provision must be interpreted in light of the purpose of the provision and the interests it furthers and resolves. Id. The text and avowed purposes of Article I, §§ 7 and 9 of Louisiana's constitution shed no light on this issue. § 7 speaks in terms of a freedom of speech and an individual's responsibility for abuse of that freedom. § 9 addresses the right of a person to assemble peaceably. The ordinance in this particular case is, as this Court has noted, aimed at activity which is traditionally criminal in nature; Louisiana's constitutional provisions, on the other hand, speak of expansive rights which are limited by a hazy notion of individual responsibility and civility. When considering the particular questions raised herein, therefore, the express terms of Louisiana's 1974 Constitution give no guidance on where the line between the freedom of expression and the government's authority to proscribe criminal conduct should be drawn, and in this Court's jurisprudence the issue is res nova. Therefore, as this Court has at other times in the much-litigated First Amendment context, I look to federal constitutional jurisprudence to guide my consideration of corollary state constitutional provisions. See Note 13, supra. The application of first amendment principles to criminal defendants who incite or solicit others, or agree among themselves to commit specific, serious crimes in a non-political context has not been much explored by the United States Supreme Court. Edward L. Barrett, Jr., William Cohen, & Jonathan D. Varat, Constitutional Law, P. 1241 (8th ed. 1989). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has established relevant principles of constitutional law in three distinct areas of First Amendment jurisprudence, namely those cases dealing with obscenity, political agitation, and political association and assembly. I now turn to these three discrete lines of Supreme Court jurisprudence to assist in interpreting the scope of Louisiana's state constitutional provisions. In the area of obscenity, the Supreme Court has utilized the term scienter to describe the requirement for knowledge of particular facts, e.g. that a certain container being shipped across state lines contains pornography, which is necessary to preserve a statute which implicates protected expression. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 464, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994); Osborne v. Ohio, supra, at 115, 110 S.Ct. at 1699; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). The Court has consistently utilized a background presumption of evil intent to find that statutes aimed at regulating obscenity must require an actual knowledge of the gravamen of the offense to impose criminal culpability; an intention to engage in a (perhaps superficially innocent) course of conduct which is likely to lead to a particular societal harm, e.g. the propagation of child pornography, is simply insufficient in light of the applicable First Amendment interests. X-Citement, supra, at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 468, citing Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 105 S.Ct. 2084, 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985); United States v. United States Gypsum Company, 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978); Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952). The Court has expressly noted that the presumption in favor of a scienter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements which criminalize otherwise innocent conduct. X-Citement, supra, at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 468. See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 80 S.Ct. 215, 4 L.Ed.2d 205 (1959), reh'g denied, 361 U.S. 950, 80 S.Ct. 399, 4 L.Ed.2d 383 (1960). Although this line of jurisprudence expressly addresses itself only to obscenity, it directly speaks to what sort of intent requirement will save a statute which, while legitimately proscribing certain unprotected speech or conduct, impacts significantly upon protected speech or conduct. These cases stand for the simple proposition that some element of subjective knowledge, i.e. scienter, limits an obscenity statute's reach to specific unprotected speech or conduct. The Supreme Court has also addressed itself to the criminalization of political speech advocating unlawful conduct, a manner of speech which, when deprived of its political character, is indistinguishable from criminal solicitation. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 89 S.Ct. 1827, 1830, 23 L.Ed.2d 430 (1969) ( per curiam ) ( footnote omitted ), the Court declared that such speech could not be proscribed except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. The Brandenburg standard only permits prohibition of such speech when the speaker's exhortations are intended to produce and likely to produce imminent disorder. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 109, 94 S.Ct. 326, 329, 38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973). This formulation thus contains an element of the familiar specific intent, [14] namely that the speech criminalized be spoken with a specific intent to bring about immediate illegal results. Socialist Workers' Party v. Hardy, 480 F.Supp. 941, 946 (E.D.La.1977), aff'd 607 F.2d 704 (5th Cir.1979). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982), re'hg denied, 459 U.S. 898, 103 S.Ct. 199, 74 L.Ed.2d 160 (1982); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4, 69 S.Ct. 894, 895, 93 L.Ed. 1131 (1949). Admittedly, this approach considers the reasonable probable effect of the speech sought to be regulated, but even if the speech leads to unlawful conduct it cannot be criminalized unless the defendant had the specific intent to [incite such conduct] in his mind. Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 216, 39 S.Ct. 252, 254, 63 L.Ed. 566 (1919). Compare State v. Douglas, 278 So.2d 485, 487 (La.1973) (the proscribed speech must result from a willful, intentional `endeavor' to gain as an immediate result, and specifically from that speech, the lawless conduct). Thus, like the requirement of scienter in the obscenity context, when dealing with inflammatory political speech the Supreme Court has found that an actual subjective intent to produce future criminal consequences is required to transform protected into unprotected and legitimately proscribable speech. The third line of jurisprudence relevant to this inquiry deals with freedom of association, particularly political association. The United States Supreme Court has noted on a multitude of occasions that the First Amendment `restricts the ability of the State to impose [culpability] on an individual solely because of his association with another' when the individual lacks the specific intent to further any illegal aims that may be promoted by other members of a group. Lyng v. International Union, 485 U.S. 360, 366 n5, 108 S.Ct. 1184, 1190 n5, 99 L.Ed.2d 380 (1988), quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., supra at 925-926, 102 S.Ct. at 3432. Accord, United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 103 S.Ct. 1702, 75 L.Ed.2d 736 (1983); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 262, 88 S.Ct. 419, 422, 19 L.Ed.2d 508 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15, 86 S.Ct. 1238, 1240, 16 L.Ed.2d 321 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 511, 84 S.Ct. 1659, 1666, 12 L.Ed.2d 992 (1964); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 136, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 1342, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943). In these cases it has been established that `guilt by association alone, without (establishing) that an individual's association poses the threat feared by the Government,' is an impermissible basis upon which to deny First Amendment rights. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 2348, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972), quoting Robel, supra, at 265, 88 S.Ct. at 424. Thus, the Supreme Court has consistently required showings of scienter or specific intent, i.e. subjective or actual criminal intent, of legislation which significantly impacts upon protected expression and peaceable assembly. In addition, I note the plethora of state jurisdictions which have concluded that criminal solicitation statutes or ordinances must contain a specific intent requirement to survive First Amendment scrutiny. [15] See Wyche v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 236 (Fla.1993); City of Akron v. Rowland, 67 Ohio St.3d 374, 378-380, 618 N.E.2d 138, 143-144 (1993); Seattle v. Slack, 113 Wash.2d 850, 784 P.2d 494, 497 (1989) ( En Banc ); People v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.3d 381, 250 Cal.Rptr. 515, 519, 758 P.2d 1046, 1050 (1988) ( In Bank ); People v. Bright, 71 N.Y.2d 376, 526 N.Y.S.2d 66, 71, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1359 (1988); State v. Cook, 139 Ariz. 406, 678 P.2d 987, 989 (1984); Milwaukee v. Wilson, 96 Wis.2d 11, 291 N.W.2d 452, 458 (1980); State v. Bloss, 62 Haw. 147, 613 P.2d 354, 357-358 (1980); Williams v. Osmundson, 281 N.W.2d 622, 626 (Iowa 1979); Lambert v. City of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 645, 250 S.E.2d 456, 458 (1978); State v. Armstrong, 282 Minn. 39, 162 N.W.2d 357, 361 (1968); Coleman v. City of Richmond, 5 Va.App. 459, 364 S.E.2d 239, 243 (1988), reh'g denied, 6 Va.App. 296, 368 S.E.2d 298 (1988); State v. Evans, 73 N.C.App. 214, 326 S.E.2d 303, 307 (1985); South Bend v. Bowman, 434 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind.App.1982); Short v. City of Birmingham, 393 So.2d 518, 522 (Ala.Cr.App.1981); In re D., 27 Or.App. 861, 557 P.2d 687, 690 (1976), review denied, 278 Or. 1 (1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 914, 98 S.Ct. 385, 54 L.Ed.2d 271 (1977). These intent requirements serve to differentiate protected from unprotected speech, i.e. to distinguish between conduct calculated to cause harm and conduct that is essentially innocent. Bright, supra, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 71, 520 N.E.2d at 1359. I take this jurisprudence to suggest, at a minimum, that a criminal solicitation ordinance which imperils constitutionally protected speech and assembly must contain a requirement of subjective criminal intent to survive constitutional scrutiny. Compare Ex Parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108, 45 S.Ct. 332, 333, 69 L.Ed. 527 (1925) ([t]he language of the Constitution cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law). Therefore, I conclude, as a matter of Louisiana constitutional law, that the considerations broached above force me to construe the ordinance as requiring a specific criminal intent, as defined by Louisiana law, to solicit or procure others for illegal drug activities. I also conclude that the trial court erred in failing to give the ordinance a saving construction where such was possible. Now, armed with this construction, I proceed to a determination of the ordinance's constitutionality.