Opinion ID: 688699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Allocation of the Costs of the Monitors

Text: 70 The State next avers that the district court improperly taxed the State for ninety percent of the costs of the monitors. We also reject this contention. 71 The guidelines for compensation of special masters (or referees, auditors, examiners, and assessors) is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(a). This Rule provides, in part, that, [t]he compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the parties ... as the court may direct.... Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(a). 72 The State first contends that it cannot be assessed any of the monitors' costs as costs of court because [the] Monitors w[ere] appointed solely to deal with issues arising from the suit between the County and the Plaintiffs.... This position is insupportable. Perceiving the effect of the State's actions on the jails as early as December of 1987, the district court altered the charge of the monitors. At that time, the court issued an order stating that in view of the sudden and sharp increase in the population of the Harris County Jail due in part to the imposition of population quotas by the [TDC], the Monitors shall review the cause(s) of the overcrowding and assess its impact [on the jails]. Thus, by the end of 1987, the monitors were evaluating the impact of the State's actions on the county jails. See Alberti I, 937 F.2d at 987. 73 Although the monitors were specifically instructed to determine the effect of State action as early as December of 1987, the court did not charge the State for any of the monitors' expenses incurred before the State became a party to the lawsuit. The State was joined as a party to the lawsuit in January of 1989, see id., and the district court's final order taxed the State for ninety percent of the monitors' fees incurred from February 1, 1989. 74 The State asserts that because it is asked to reimburse the County for fees that the County has already paid to the monitors, the State is actually being required to pay damages to the County in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. This is simply a misstatement of the law. We have held that: 75 an assessment of costs against the state is not prohibited by the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. Moneys paid for a special master are included in the recoverable costs under Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; a district court does not abuse its discretion by taxing the losing party with the full share of the Special Master's fee. 76 Gary W. v. Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir.1979). 77 The district court determined that the actions of the State were the primary cause of the overcrowding plaguing the county's jails. It is this overcrowding that in large part necessitated the monitors' presence. We find no authority, and the State cites none, for the proposition that the district court abused its discretion by holding the State responsible for ninety percent of the costs of the monitors for the time period after the State entered the litigation. 13 78