Opinion ID: 2518547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proceedings, as it appears in Act 44, section 29, unambiguously refers to the initiation of a criminal prosecution against a defendant.

Text: The initiation of criminal proceedings-through a formal felony prosecution, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment  `is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice.' State v. Luton, 83 Hawai`i 443, 449-50, 927 P.2d 844, 850-51 (1996) (footnotes omitted) (quoting State v. Masaniai, 63 Haw. 354, 360, 628 P.2d 1018, 1023 (1981) (following Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972))). In Van den Berg, analyzing an identically worded savings clause, [10] this court construed the term proceedings to mean the initiation of prosecution through a charging instrument and concluded that the amendments in question were therefore not available to the defendants: In the present case, the record indicates that [the defendants'] respective proceedings were begun before [the effective date of the amendments]: (1) Van den Berg was indicted on October 25, 1991 . . .; and (2) Karagianes was charged on July 8, 1992. . . . Because the proceedings involving [the defendants] began prior to the effective date of Act 239, the 1993 Statute did not apply to [them]. 101 Hawai`i at 191, 65 P.3d at 138 (emphases in original). [11] Van den Berg raised the question whether the 1990 or 1993 version of HRS § 134-6(a), involving use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, applied to the defendants' cases. Id. at 190-91, 65 P.3d at 137-38 (majority opinion). In State v. Brantley, 99 Hawai`i 463, 469, 56 P.3d 1252, 1258 (2002), this court had concluded, based on a reading of the 1993 version of the statute and its legislative history, that the legislature intended to create a separate offense in HRS § 134-6(a) (Supp.1993) and, therefore, that second degree murder was not a lesser included offense, overruling State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i 1, 950 P.2d 1201 (1998), which was similarly based on an analysis of HRS § 134-6(a) (1993). Van den Berg, 101 Hawai`i at 191, 65 P.3d at 138. By contrast, in Van den Berg, this court concluded that the plain language of HRS § 134-6(a) ( Supp.1990 ) revealed no legislative intent to create a separate offense; accordingly, a defendant could not be convicted of both a violation of HRS § 134-6(a) (Supp.1990) and murder in the second degree. Id. at 192, 65 P.3d at 139. We then concluded that proceedings plainly meant the initiation of a criminal prosecution against both defendants, [12] and, noting that their proceedings had been initiated before the effective date of the 1993 amendments, held that the 1990 version of HRS § 134-6(a) applied to their cases and reversed their convictions of and sentences for the HRS § 134-6(a) offense. Id. at 191-92, 65 P.3d at 138-39. The dissent argues that this court's interpretation in Van den Berg of proceedings to clearly betoken the initiation of a criminal prosecution against the defendant is inapposite to the present case because an ameliorative sentencing statute was not at issue. Dissenting opinion at ___-___ & n. 24, 165 P.3d at 1008-10 & n. 24. The dissent contends that it is the ameliorative nature of an amendment that determines whether retroactive application is available to a defendant but fails to articulate how an unambiguous term can be rendered ambiguous merely because the statutory provision urged as applicable by the defendant is ameliorative. [13] See dissenting opinion at ___-___, ___- ___, 165 P.3d at 1008-10, 1014-16 (citing Koch, 107 Hawai`i at 221-22, 112 P.3d at 75-76; Avilla, 69 Haw. at 509, 750 P.2d at 78; State v. Von Geldern, 64 Haw. 210, 212-15, 638 P.2d 319, 321-24 (1981)). In short, nothing in the Van den Berg analysis conflicts with our conclusion in that case that proceedings unambiguously commence with the initiation of a unitary criminal prosecution and the various proceedings subsumed within it.
It is not the ameliorative nature of a statutory provision that has prompted us in the past to construe the term proceedings as meaning something other than the initiation of a criminal prosecution but, rather, the unique subject matter of the act in question. Avilla is illustrative. In Avilla, this court held that the ameliorative amendments to HRS § 804-4 (1985) provided for in Act 139 of 1987 [14]  allowing bail to convicted felons while on appeal  were available to a defendant who was indicted prior to June 5, 1987, the effective date of the amendments, but whose motion to continue bail pending appeal was heard and denied thereafter. 69 Haw. at 511, 513, 750 P.2d at 79, 81. We so held, not because the amendments were ameliorative, [15] but because the subject matter of Act 139  which pertained solely to bail, its availability, and related conditions  injected ambiguity into the term proceedings. Id. at 512-13, 750 P.2d at 80. We noted that, while proceedings normally would mean prosecutions, in the context of a statute concerned solely with bail, proceedings could also be interpreted as bail proceedings. [16] Id. at 512, 750 P.2d at 80. It was that ambiguity, and that ambiguity alone, that led us to the relevant committee reports in order to determine that the legislature's concerns in enacting the measure could be addressed by allowing Avilla to benefit from the amendments. Id. at 513, 750 P.2d at 80-81. In Avilla, this court presupposed that the term proceedings in the savings clause normally meant prosecutions. Id. at 512, 750 P.2d at 80. Insofar as Act 139 dealt exclusively with bail, the distinct nature of bail proceedings [17] was sufficient to inject ambiguity into the term, Avilla, 69 Haw. at 512, 750 P.2d at 80. Act 44, however, is comprehensive legislation enacted to address the epidemic of crystal methamphetamine use in the state, and includes sections increasing penalties for exposing children to the methamphetamine industry, inflicting injuries during its production, for sales of related drug paraphernalia, and for undertaking methamphetamine production near a park or a school. See 2004 Haw. Sess. L. Act 44, §§ 3, 4, and 8 at 206-10, 212. It amends penalties for promoting the drug. Id. §§ 5-7 at 210-11. It adopts a more treatment-oriented approach with respect to first-time offenders. Id. §§ 9-12 at 212-15. It addresses tort liability for drug dealers, insurance coverage for substance abuse, and civil commitment and treatment centers for substance abusers. Id. §§ 13, 15-22 at 216-19, 221-24. It supports citizen empowerment in combating the drug. Id. §§ 24-26 at 225. In contrast to Act 139 of the 1987 legislature at issue in Avilla, which dealt solely with bail, see 1987 Haw. Sess. L. Act 139, passim at 312-16, no ambiguity is introduced by Act 44's subject matter that would lead us to question, as we did in Avilla, the standard interpretation of proceedings as the initiation of a criminal prosecution. [18] Cf. 69 Haw. at 512, 750 P.2d at 80. Avilla, therefore, does not stand, as Reis contends, for the proposition that this court construes the language of the standard savings clause in a manner that best effectuates the underlying legislative intent and purpose of that particular statute. We resort to legislative history only when there is an ambiguity in the plain language of the statute. Valdivia, 95 Hawai`i at 472, 24 P.3d at 668. Rather, Avilla stands for the unremarkable proposition that, if a statutory amendment on a single subject addresses proceedings other than criminal prosecutions  and the numerous hearings subsumed within criminal prosecutions, including hearings on evidentiary matters, motions for reconsideration, and sentencingso as to give rise to an ambiguity, the defendant may benefit from the amendment if doing so would comport with the intent of the legislature as reflected in the amendment's underlying legislative history. b. The inclusion of a specific savings clause within the body of the amending statute demonstrates a clear legislative intent that the contents of the act do not apply retroactively. It is important to note that in both Koch and Von Geldern, upon which the dissent relies, see dissenting opinion at ____-____, 165 P.3d at 1014-16, neither of the statutes at issue contained specific savings clauses, a crucial fact that informed the discussion of the underlying legislative history and the ultimate conclusion in both cases that the ameliorative amendments could apply to the defendants. [19] See Koch, 107 Hawai`i at 221-22, 112 P.3d at 75-76, (citing 2002 Haw. Sess. L. Act 161 at 568-75); Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 215, 638 P.2d at 323 (citing 1980 Haw. Sess. L. Act 284 at 544-46). In both cases, only the general savings clause, codified at HRS § 1-3 (1993), [20] presented an obstacle to retroactive application of the ameliorative amendments, and this court concluded that HRS § 1-3 `is only a rule of statutory construction and where legislative intent may be ascertained, it is no longer determinative.' Koch, 107 Hawai`i at 222, 112 P.3d at 76 (quoting Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 213, 638 P.2d at 322). The foreign case law upon which the dissent relies for the purpose of bolstering its argument that ameliorative amendments must be applied retroactively, regardless of savings clauses, dissenting opinion at ___-___, 165 P.3d at 1021-23 (citing People v. Schultz, 435 Mich. 517, 460 N.W.2d 505 (1990); State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D.1986); People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d 152, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d 197 (1956)), merely comports with our conclusion, appearing in Von Geldern and Koch, that the existence of a general savings clause does not prevent ameliorative amendments from being applied retroactively if such application would conform to specific legislative intent divined from the statute itself or from legislative history surrounding the specific statute in question. [21] See Koch, 107 Hawai`i at 222, 112 P.3d at 76; Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 213-14, 638 P.2d at 322; Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 511-12; Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 472 (concluding that, unless otherwise indicated by the Legislature, an ameliorating amendment to a criminal statute is reflective of the Legislature's determination that the lesser punishment is the appropriate penalty for the offense) (emphasis added); Oliver, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d at 201-02. None of the cases that the dissent cites implicate a specific savings clause enacted as part of the ameliorative amendments, as is found in Act 44, section 29, see supra note 1. Indeed, Schultz, Cummings, and Oliver all relied upon legislative silence regarding solely prospective application within the four corners of the legislation at issue in order to conclude retroactive application was implicitly endorsed by the ameliorative nature of the amendments. See Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 509; Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 470 (observing that the legislature did not expressly state whether the new law or the old law would apply to offenses committed before the amendments); Oliver, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d at 201-02. [22] By contrast, a specific savings clause, expressly contained within the body of the amending legislation, is clear evidence of legislative intent that the act not affect rights and duties that matured, penalties that were incurred, and proceedings that were begun, before its effective date, i.e., that it not apply retroactively, eliminating any justification for further analysis. The dissent attempts to avoid the distinction when it asserts that, in the instant case, [a]s was the case in Von Geldern, Avilla, and Koch, here there is simply no express indication that the legislature desired to prohibit retrospective effect to the remedial provisions, dissenting opinion at ___, 165 P.3d at 1017 (emphasis omitted), but, in doing so, ignores the very real and clear legislative intent represented by the inclusion of a specific savings clause barring retroactive application within the very body of Act 44.