Opinion ID: 2083040
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearing requirements imposed by federal and state constitutions.

Text: The railroad also argues the form and method of notice in this case violated a constitutional principle: [W]hen a hearing is afforded [by constitution or statute] due process demands contestants be given notice thereof sufficient to permit a reasonable opportunity to appear and assert their rights. Smith v. Iowa Employment Security Commission, 212 N.W.2d 471, 473 (Iowa 1973); see Schroeder v. New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211, 83 S.Ct. 279, 281, 9 L.Ed.2d 255, 258 (1962); see generally Auxier v. Woodward State Hospital School, 266 N.W.2d 139, 142 (Iowa) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 319, 58 L.Ed.2d 324 (1978); 16A Am.Jur.2d Constitutional Law § 829, at 1018-20 (1979); 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 619, at 804, 808-809, 810 (1956). The question in this case is whether the notice given by the city falls within that standard of reasonableness. Roznos v. Town of Slater, 254 Iowa 77, 116 N.W.2d 471 (1962) indicates that it was. In Roznos the defendant municipality proposed to construct a new sewer system. A statute provided that in such circumstances it was required to cause notice of the time when [a] resolution will be considered by it for passage by publication. See Iowa Code § 391.24 (1958). Pursuant to this statute a notice was issued that advised those owners whose property was subject to assessment of the nature of the improvement and prescribed the time and place for hearing objections thereto. The notice also incorporated a copy of the proposed resolution. When the owners' objections were overruled at the hearing they instituted an action to enjoin construction, alleging the notice violated due process because the attached resolution was either incomplete or erroneous in describing the streets involved, the specific location of the sewer line, and the materials and method of construction. The district court granted a motion to dismiss and this court affirmed, stating: [C]ertainly a notice which does not in some way direct the attention of property owners interested to the fact that their property is or may be within the taxing or assessment limit of the proposed improvement would be too obscure to be a notice at all. In the absence of a specific requirement in the statute (section 391.24) to set out in the notice all the requirements as to the resolution of necessity (section 381.18), we see no injustice or hardship in holding that, when one is notified that an attached resolution is pending before the council proposing a street improvement for which he can see his designated property will be assessed, and that opportunity is being offered for all who may think themselves aggrieved by such project to appear and make known their objections to it, one cannot ignore such notice or object to it alone on the plea that it is not as specific as he thinks it should be, and base his objection on the ground that he has not been given an opportunity to show cause why such improvement should not be made. To hold otherwise would seem to serve the purpose of unjust and unreasonable delay in this case. Both the resolution and the plans and specifications were on file in the clerk's office and were public records open to inspection. Upon reading the notice actually received, each plaintiff must have known that his property was exposed to liability of assessment .    [T]heir first impulse as men of even a low degree of caution would have been to apply at the office of the town clerk and satisfy their minds concerning it. If the terms set out in the resolution had left them in doubt, they could have and as reasonable men should have resolved that doubt by further inquiry. Their property was listed in the notice as adjacent and abutting property to be assessed for the sewer improvement. This is not the case where there is lack of notice, which of course would be a jurisdictional defect. The notice was given and received. It did not require the plaintiffs to guess whether or not their property was involved .... We are satisfied it also complies with the constitutional requirements of due process, for it advises those whose property is subject to assessment as to the nature of the improvement and affords an opportunity for them to be heard. 254 Iowa at 84, 85, 86, 116 N.W.2d at 475, 476 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Applying the reasoning in Roznos to the facts of this case, the city's notice to the railroad was reasonable. It advised the railroad that it had enacted a new ordinance and specifically referred to section 327G.32 for authority, and the enclosed copy of the ordinance revealed that the railroad's property would be affected accordingly. The notice was mailed to the office of the railroad's trainmaster in the area, return receipt requested. Under such circumstances, form and method of notice was thus reasonably calculated to accomplish its purpose. Smith, 212 N.W.2d at 473.