Opinion ID: 765760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Exhaust State Court Remedies

Text: 14 The exhaustion provision of 28 U.S.C. 2254 reflects a policy of federal-state comity, and requires a federal habeas petitioner to fairly present to the state courts the substance of his federal habeas claim prior to seeking such relief. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971); see Anderson v. Harless, 459 U.S. 4, 6 (1982). The exhaustion doctrine is principally designed to protect the state courts' role in the enforcement of federal law and prevent disruption of state judicial proceedings. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982). Only if the state courts have had the first opportunity to hear the claim sought to be vindicated in a federal habeas proceeding does it make sense to speak of the exhaustion of state remedies. Accordingly, we have requireda state prisoner to present the state courts with the same claim he urges upon the federal courts. Picard, 404 U.S. at 276. A rigorously enforced total exhaustion rule will encourage state prisoners to seek full relief first from the state courts, thus giving those courts the first opportunity to review all claims of constitutional error. Rose, 455 U.S. at 518-19. The exhaustion requirement serves to minimize friction between our federal and state systems of justice by allowing the State an initial opportunity to pass upon and correct alleged violations of prisoners' federal rights. Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 3 (1981) (per curiam). 15 In Kilby v. Jones, 809 F.2d 324, 325 (6th Cir. 1987), this Court found that a petitioner had failed to exhaust his state court remedies when he argued in state court that his court-appointed trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective legal assistance because he 'delegated' to counsel for a codefendant the 'factual investigation prior to trial,' but argued in federal court that his counsel was ineffective in conducting the trial itself as well as in handling his motion to suppress. This Court held that because the basis for the petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim as argued in the federal courts was not the same basis as argued in the state courts, the petitioner had not exhausted his state court remedies. Id. 16 Similarly, in the instant case, although Petitioner raised the evidentiary claim to the state appellate courts, he argued it on the basis that he was denied his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative, not because the evidence violated the presumption of innocence as he argues to the federal courts 3 . As such, the Michigan state appellate courts were denied a fair opportunity to consider and pass on the error that Petitioner claims in federal court -- that the use of evidence that assumes guilt violates the presumption of innocence 4 . Picard,404 U.S. at 276; Kilby, 809 F.2d at 325; see Pillette v. Foltz, 824 F.2d 494, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding that the doctrine of exhaustion requires that the same claim under the same theory be presented to state courts before raising it in a habeas petition, and that the petitioner had not exhausted his state remedies because he based his claim of ineffective of assistance of counsel in the state courts on different grounds than he asserted in the federal courts). 17 Normally, Petitioner's failure to exhaust his state court remedies on the evidentiary claim would require dismissal of his entire petition. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 522 (holding that a federal district court must dismiss a state habeas petitioner's writ containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims). However, in Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129, 131-32 (1987), the Supreme Court held that although there is a strong presumption in favor of requiring a petitioner to exhaust his available state court remedies, the failure to do so is not an absolute bar to appellate consideration of his petition -- i.e., the doctrine of exhaustion is discretionary, not jurisdictional. For example, as in this case, where the state fails to raise the defense, the appellate court should determine whether the interest of comity and federalism will be better served by addressing the merits forthwith or by requiring a series of additional state and district court proceedings before reviewing the merits of the petitioner's claim. Id. at 134. Furthermore, it has been found that where the federal constitutional claim was plainly meritless and it would be a waste of time and judicial resources to require exhaustion, nonexhaustion and procedural default should be excused 5 . Cain v. Redman, 947 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987)). 18 In Cain v. Redman, this Court held that it was in the interest of judicial economy for the Court to hear the case before it in spite of the unresolved issues of exhaustion and procedural default [because,] [a]lthough petitioner's federal constitutional claim [was] not plainly meritless, . . . it [could] not withstand the hurdle of the rule of Teague v. Lane, which forbids retroactive application of new rules of law. 947 F.2d at 820. The Court reasoned that a remand to the district court for a hearing on exhaustion and procedural default would be a waste of time because even if these issues were decided in the petitioner'sfavor, this Court would still be barred from hearing the merits of the petitioner's constitutional claim inasmuch as the petitioner relied upon a new rule of law that could not be applied retroactively on federal habeas review 6 . Id. Likewise, because Petitioner in this case seeks retroactive application of a new rule of law, in the interest of judicial economy, Petitioner's lack of exhaustion and apparent procedural default shall be excused where a hearing on cause and prejudice would be futile.
19 If it were not for the application of Teague to this case, in the interest of comity Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus would be dismissed. As noted, the exhaustion requirement is grounded in principles of comity, such that the states should have the first opportunity to adjudicate and possibly correct an alleged violation of a state prisoner's federal constitutional right. See Rose, 455 U.S. at 515; Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 323 (6th Cir. 1998) (noting that a federal court may issue a writ of habeas corpus to correct a constitutionally infirm state court conviction [u]pon [the] petitioner's exhaustion of available state remedies . . . .). The Supreme Court explained the exhaustion doctrine, and the role comity plays in its enforcement, as follows: 20 Because it would be unseemly in our dual system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction without an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation, federal courts apply the doctrine of comity, which teaches that one court should defer action on causes properly within its jurisdiction until the courts of another sovereignty with concurrent powers, and already cognizant of the litigation, have had an opportunity to pass upon the matter. 21 Rose, 455 U.S. at 518 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see Blacks Law Dictionary 267 (6th ed. 1990) (defining comity as that where courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and mutual respect). In Prather v. Rees, 822 F.2d 1418, 1422 (6th Cir. 1987), we stated that all other considerations aside, such as judicial efficiency, if we thought that our disposition [of a petition] would negatively impact federal-state comity, we would dismiss for lack of exhaustion. In this case, the state has continually argued that the evidentiary claim raised by Petitioner is solely a matter of state law. 22 It is true that where a full trial has been held in the district court and it is evident that a miscarriage of justice has occurred, nonexhaustion should be excused. See Granberry, 481 U.S. at 135. However, in this case, although the district court granted Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus, the court also refused to release Petitioner from jail pending appeal of the district court's decision due to the severity of the offense and the strong likelihood of another conviction. Thus, Petitioner's rights would not be offended by failing to excuse his nonexhaustion. See, e.g., O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 442 (noting that under habeas review, we are dealing . . . with an error of constitutional dimension -- the sort that risks an unreliable trial outcome and the consequent conviction of an innocent person). 23 In Prather, this Court excused the petitioner's failure to exhaust and addressed the merits of his constitutional claims for the following reasons: 24 Because [the petitioner's] petition is so plainly meritless, addressing the merits of his claim will be efficient and will not offend federal-state comity. Efficiency includes bringing criminal litigation to a final conclusion. To return this case to the district court for a hearing on exhaustion, possible state post-conviction remedies, and perhaps still another habeas corpus proceeding, would greatly and wastefully expend judicial resources. Even so, if we thought our disposition would negatively impact federal-state comity, we would dismiss for lack of exhaustion. But where, as here, the petition is meritless, the state's attorney concedes the issue of exhaustion, and our disposition will not affect the state court's decision, comity and efficiency are served, not offended. 25 822 F.2d at 1422. Here, however, any decision to excuse Petitioner's failure to exhaust is inapposite to Prather in that it supports an inverse proposition. That is to say, a decision to excuse Petitioner's failure to exhaust and apparent procedural default to find Petitioner's evidentiary claim meritorious thereby would affect the state court's decision, and comity and efficiency would be offended, not served. See O'Guinn v. Dutton, 88 F.3d 1409, 1411-13 (6th Cir. 1996) (per curiam en banc). 26 Furthermore, it appears that a hearing to determine cause for and prejudice due to the apparent procedural default would be futile despite the application of Teague. See supra note 5. To satisfy the cause requirement, a habeas petitioner must make a showing of some external impediment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the claim. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492. [T]he mere fact that counsel failed to recognize the factual or legal basis for a claim, or failed to raise the claim despite recognizing it, does not constitute cause for a procedural default. Id.; see Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). Here, Petitioner raised a challenge to the evidence in question in the state appellate courts; however, he failed to base his challenge on the grounds upon which he rests on appeal. His failure to recognize these alternative grounds or failure to raise them despite recognizing them below, cannot constitute cause. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 492. Prejudice may be shown if the constitutional error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the jury's verdict. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). Petitioner did not suffer prejudice from the admittance of this evidence. Likewise, the facts of this case do not present the extraordinary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, thereby allowing us to excuse the lack of cause and prejudice. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 496. 27 Accordingly, it appears that Petitioner's evidentiary claim would be barred from our review even without the application of Teague v. Lane. 28