Opinion ID: 3011668
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The facts underlying the instant dispute have not been developed in detail, given the early stage at which the matter was resolved in the District Court. Bur gh's complaint is the only pleading in the recor d and no discovery has been taken. According to the complaint, in April 1993, Bur gh applied for a position as a part-time police officer with the Borough's police department. He updated this job application sometime before June 1994. In April 1994, Burgh accepted a position as a part-time police officer in the Clifford Township (Pennsylvania) Police Department. Clifford Township is located appr oximately 25 miles from Burgh's home in South Montrose. In June 1994, the Montrose Police Department hired a white male, allegedly with no prior on-the-job police experience, as a part-time police officer,filling the position that Burgh had sought. The Montrose Police Department 2 did not interview Burgh for this, or any other , position. Burgh alleges that he was more qualified than the person hired and that the department failed to hir e him because of his race. On December 8, 1994, Burgh filed a char ge of racial discrimination against the Borough with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (PHRC) under the PHRA, 43 Pa. C.S. S 955(a).1 The PHRA claim was filed within 180 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice, the Borough's failure to hire Bur gh because of his race. The state administrative complaint was therefor e timely. See 43 Pa. C.S. S 959(h). Burgh requested that his complaint be r eferred to the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) for dual filing as a Title VII char ge. The federal claim was accepted and docketed by the EEOC on Mar ch 20, 1995. This claim was filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory employment practice and it too was timely. See 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(e)(1). On May 20, 1995, the EEOC sent Burgh a letter advising him of thefiling of his Title VII claim. The letter stated that the EEOC would investigate and resolve the charge and that the Commission must issue a Notice of Right Sue before Bur gh could file a court action under Title VII. On March 18, 1996, the PHRC sent Burgh a letter advising him that it had been one year since hefiled his complaint with the PHRC and notifying him that he now had the right to bring a private civil action under the PHRA in the Court of Common Pleas. The letter stated that Burgh was not required to file such a private action and that the Commission was continuing to process his case and would make every effort to resolve it as soon as possible. If, however, Burgh did wish to file in state court, the Commission would dismiss the administrative complaint and would not decide the case. The letter further advised Burgh to ensure that any complaint was pr operly filed, particularly that it was timely filed, and to consult an _________________________________________________________________ 1. The administrative complaint was not time-stamped and docketed with the PHRC until December 24, 1994. However , the parties have stipulated to the December 8 filing date. 3 attorney about representing him in court. There is no dispute that Burgh received this letter . Burgh never filed an action in the Court of Common Pleas. The PHRC appar ently took no further action on the administrative char ge. Sometime prior to October 1998, Burgh r etained counsel. On October 19, 1998, Burgh's attorney sent a letter to the EEOC, requesting that the agency issue a right-to-sue letter in light of the Pennsylvania Commission's extended delay in resolving this matter. The EEOC on December 1, 1998, sent a letter to Burgh's attorney, advising Burgh of his right to institute a civil action under Title VII within 90 days of receipt of that letter. Burghfiled his lawsuit, alleging violations of Title VII and the PHRA, in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His suit was filed on February 26, 1999, 87 days after the right-to-sue letter was issued. On May 28, 1999, Burgh moved for default judgment; this motion was withdrawn by stipulation, dated June 21, 1999. On June 28, 1999, the Borough filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), contending that, because Bur gh had brought suit beyond the applicable statutes of limitations, his discrimination claims were untimely. The District Court notified both parties during a case management conference that the motion would be treated as one for summary judgment; both parties agr eed to rest on their memoranda and neither requested the opportunity to file additional evidence. On November 16, 1999, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The District Court held first that Burgh could not rely on the fact that he had not received a right-to-sue letter from the EEOC prior to December 1998 as reason for the delay in filing his action because to accept Plaintiff's argument we would have to decide we could wait forever to file suit even when the commission takes no action and fails to notify the Plaintiff. This flies in the face of the basic reason for a statute of limitations. The court then determined that the issuance of a right-to-sue letter was not a necessary prerequisite to the commencement of a civil action. In 4 reaching this conclusion, the court relied on case law holding that the PHRC's failure to issue a notice of right to sue after one year does not bar a civil action under the state statute. See Rogers v. Mount Union Bor ough by Zook, 816 F. Supp. 308, 316 (M.D. Pa. 1993) (citing Snyder v. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Sch. Retirees, 566 A.2d 1235 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989)). The court concluded that each agency should have responded to Burgh's administrative complaints within one year of filing with that agency--the PHRC by December 8, 1995; the EEOC by March 20, 1996. The court reasoned that after the passage of one year, Burgh could have brought a private civil action on the federal and state claims. As a result, the statute of limitations for each claim began to run on the one year anniversary of its filing with the agency. The District Court went on to determine the period after the one-year anniversary within which a complainant could bring suit. Because the court found no specific limitations period in Title VII, it decided to borr ow a state statute of limitations governing an analogous cause of action. The court held that Pennsylvania's two-year limitations period for personal injury actions, which has been applied to federal civil rights actions brought under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, should govern Title VII. The court found a rationale for this conclusion in the fact that both statutes pr ovide redress for employment discrimination. Working fr om March 20, 1996, the one-year anniversary of the referral of the complaint to the EEOC, the court held that Burgh had until March 20, 1998, to file suit.2 Because he did not file until February _________________________________________________________________ 2. It is worth noting that, even assuming ar guendo that the District Court's approach to the limitations issue was correct as a matter of law, its application of the limitations period to this case was incorrect. Under federal law, the EEOC has 180 days to process a claim and notify the complainant of the result; the complainant may request a right-to-sue letter after that 180 days. 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 C.F.R. S 1601.28(a). There is no provision in the statute that supports the application of a one-year period from the filing of the EEOC charge as a limit for the filing of a court action. Ther efore, even if a two-year limitations period were to be grafted onto T itle VII, the two-year period should have begun to run on September 16, 1995, 180 days from the March 20 EEOC filing. It would then have lapsed on September 16, 1997, even earlier than the District Court deter mined. 5 1999, his suit was 11 months late and therefor e timebarred. The District Court did note that the inaction of the PHRC and EEOC was partially to blame for the delays. However, the court held that the filing of the action almost five years after the filing of the first administrative complaint was clearly unreasonable and therefor e untimely. This timely appeal followed.