Opinion ID: 159006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 15 Mrs. Guidry next complains the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. This argument presents a high hurdle, and one Mrs. Guidry fails to surmount. 16 [I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, this court must review the record de novo and ask only whether, taking the evidence both direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 17 United States v. Beers, 189 F.3d 1297, 1301(10th Cir. 1999) (quoting United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 889 (1996)). We will not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations or conclusions concerning the weight of the evidence presented. Id. 18 Mrs. Guidry contends the only evidence supporting willfulness consists of her background and experience in accounting, the testimony to the effect Internal Revenue Service documents listed embezzled income as taxable income, and Agent McCormick's testimony he observed some Internal Revenue Service tax booklets in Mrs. Guidry's files at her home. Seeing a lack of evidence, Mrs. Guidry then goes on to cite our decision in McCarty v. United States, 409 F.2d 793 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969), for the proposition that willfulness cannot be inferred from a mere understatement of income. Id. at 795 (citing Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492 (1943)). This analysis suffers from two fatal flaws: it fails to view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government, and it provides an incomplete view of the Supreme Court's guidance in Spies. 19 While it is well established willfulness cannot be inferred solely from an understatement of income, willfulness can be inferred from 20 making false entries of alterations, or false invoices or documents, destruction of books or records, concealment of assets or covering up sources of income, handling of one's affairs to avoid making the records usual in transactions of the kind, and any conduct, the likely effect of which would be to mislead or to conceal. 21 Spies, 317 U.S. at 499; see also United States v. Samara, 643 F.2d 701, 704 (10th Cir. 1981). This conduct can be used to prove willfulness even though the conduct may also serve other purposes such as concealment of other crime. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499. The jury heard sufficient evidence to support its finding of willfulness in this case. 22 First, the jury heard evidence of Mrs. Guidry's expertise in accounting via her degree in business and her work experience as the controller of a company. The evidence showed Mrs. Guidry prepared the family taxes, and did so elaborately according to her husband. An investigator observed tax booklets from unknown years in Mrs. Guidry's files, and the jury learned the tax booklets specific to the years in question in this case either stated embezzled income should be reported, or referenced a second Internal Revenue Service document where taxpayers might receive that information. The evidence also showed: an ever-burgeoning disparity between the Guidrys' reported income and their actual income as complemented by the embezzlement scheme; the embezzled cash was used to purchase goods, making the money more difficult to detect; the Guidrys took significant charitable deductions on their taxes while not reporting the embezzled income; and the money was embezzled in increments of $9,000 or $10,000. Mrs. Guidry argues the jury should not have been allowed to take evidence of the embezzlement scheme itself into account, but such an argument defies logic. 23 Concealment of income can have more than one purpose. Such activity can show a desire to conceal the theft from the employer, and it can tend to show a purposeful attempt to conceal such income from the Internal Revenue Service. In addition, an inference of willfulness can be supported by a consistent pattern of underreporting large amounts of income. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139 (1954); see also United States v. Frank, 437 F.2d 452 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 974 (1971). Criminal willfulness can be inferred when a defendant does not supply her tax preparer with evidence of substantial items of income. United States v. Stokes, 998 F.2d 279, 281 (5th Cir. 1993). In Stokes, the Ninth Circuit upheld a conviction under 7206(1) when the defendant did not disclose illegal income to her tax preparer. It makes little sense to apply one standard to a person who withholds information from a tax preparer, and another standard to a self-preparer who withholds similar information from the Internal Revenue Service directly. The jury was free to conclude Mrs. Guidry had accounting expertise, that information stating embezzled income was to be reported as income on the tax return was available to her, and that she would have availed herself of the information. The jury was also free to examine the way the embezzlement scheme was designed to conceal assets, and infer Mrs. Guidry's intent was to avoid paying a known tax liability. As in Spies, Mrs. Guidry claims other motives animated [her] in these matters. We intimate no opinion. Such inferences are for the jury. Spies, 317 U.S. at 500. Our holding is limited to the unique facts of this case. Given the combination of Mrs. Guidry's background and training, the details of her embezzlement scheme and attempts to conceal her income, and the testimony concerning the presence and contents of federal tax booklets, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict in this case.