Opinion ID: 2514211
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ER 608(b) impeachment

Text: Clark contends the trial court erred in denying him the opportunity to impeach Hillius under ER 608(b) with specific instances of conduct underlying his 1993 convictions for theft and forgery. Clark argued those instances of conduct were probative of Hillius' truthfulness and would have assisted the jury in assessing his credibility. Such evidence is admissible as follows: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or (2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another witness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified. ER 608(b). Thus allowing such testimony is within the discretion of the court and will be reviewed only for an abuse of discretion. Failing to allow cross-examination of a state's witness under ER 608(b) is an abuse of discretion if the witness is crucial and the alleged misconduct constitutes the only available impeachment. State v. York, 28 Wash. App. 33, 621 P.2d 784 (1980). The need for cross-examination on misconduct diminishes with the significance of the witness in the state's case. State v. Robinson, 44 Wash. App. 611, 622, 722 P.2d 1379 (1986). Once impeached, there is less need for further impeachment on cross. State v. Martinez, 38 Wash.App. 421, 424, 685 P.2d 650 (1984). The state argues Hillius was not a crucial witness because the statements from Clark to which he testified were susceptible to innocent explanation. The state further argues that it impeached Hillius on cross with 36 instances of prior convictions, including the ones Clark has put at issue. As Hillius was not a crucial witness, and was effectively impeached on cross, the state concludes that it was within the trial court's discretion to deny cross-examination by Clark on the misconduct underlying certain of those convictions. Here, the rule concerning use of prior convictions for witness impeachment is also relevant to the analysis. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness in a criminal or civil case, evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the witness or established by public record during examination of the witness.... ER 609(a). Under this rule, cross-examination regarding prior convictions is limited to the fact of the conviction, the type of crime, and the punishment. State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 284, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996). Further, under ER 609, [t]he details of the acts leading to the prior convictions are not admissible. State v. Coles, 28 Wash.App. 563, 573, 625 P.2d 713 (1981). However these holdings are limited to an ER 609 analysis. Judge Thorpe could have let prior misconduct in under ER 608(b) but chose not to. Given the fact that Hillius was impeached under ER 609 on direct examination by an enumeration of each of his 36 prior convictions, Judge Thorpe concluded further examination on the misconduct underlying some of those convictions would not be any more probative. That was not an abuse of discretion.