Opinion ID: 203979
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identicality and Plaintiffs' Supervisory Liability Claims

Text: We first consider whether plaintiffs' extrajudicial claim letter is sufficiently identical to their subsequent complaint. As to the first identicality requirement, namely whether the same relief was sought, there is little question and, in fact, defendants concede, [4] that plaintiffs sought the same form of relief  money damages  both in the letter and in the subsequent complaint. That the letter requested a different amount in damages ($1,500,000) than the complaint (over $4,000,000) is not a problem here because the letter put Toledo on notice of a potential lawsuit for damages. See id. (Although the amount of damages differs in the two complaints, the allegation of damages in her state complaint gave the defendants the requisite `fair notice that [they] might be called upon to defend a damages suit ....') (quoting Hernández del Valle v. Santa Aponte, 575 F.2d 321, 324 (1st Cir.1978) (alteration in original)). Plaintiffs, however, do not fare as well with respect to the second identicality requirement, namely whether the causes of action in the extrajudicial claim and subsequent complaint are based on the same substantive claims. As we have previously stated, Puerto Rico law requires sufficient detail to put defendant on notice of the general nature of their claims. Id. at 100. Here, we conclude that the extrajudicial letter did not assert a claim of supervisory liability in sufficient detail to meet the second prong of the identicality requirement. We explain. Plaintiffs' complaint asserted that the subordinate officers had a propensity of violence, that their supervisors knew of this propensity, and they did not act to correct it through retraining, psychological evaluation, or remedial action. As part of the allegation of the subordinate officers' propensity for violence, the complaint referred to incidents of unwarranted physical violence against citizens. [5] Although the extrajudicial letter was addressed to Superintendent Toledo and mentioned § 1983 in its penultimate sentence [6]  the letter failed to assert, even remotely, the factual allegations supporting supervisory liability that ultimately were raised in the complaint. Instead, the letter recounted plaintiffs' version of the events of June 8 and 9, alleging that the actions and/or omissions of the officers who perpetrated the violence against him caused damages and losses. Further, plaintiffs claimed that the arrest and filing of charges against Santana tarnished his reputation and violated his dignity because they were published in the newspapers and broadcast on the radio. Even if we took a liberal approach in assessing this second prong, analyzing the letter in its totality, we cannot conclude that Toledo, or any of the other defendant supervisors, would have been on sufficient notice to defend a supervisory liability claim. Thus, we conclude that because plaintiffs' extrajudicial letter fails to satisfy the second identicality requirement, the supervisory liability claim as to all defendant supervisors is time-barred. [7]