Opinion ID: 183690
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonableness of West's Sentence

Text: West argues that the district court's sentence is unreasonable in light of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), specifically, that the sentence was greater than necessary: (A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner. The reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Bunchan, 626 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007)). Our review of the district court's sentence for reasonableness is a two-step process. We first review the sentence for procedural errors, then `turn to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence actually imposed and review the sentence for abuse of discretion.' United States v. Rivera-Gonzalez, 626 F.3d 639, 646 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting United States v. Politano, 522 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir.2008)). Turning to the former, the court considers whether the district judge made any procedural errors: such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentenceincluding an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. United States v. Gentles, 619 F.3d 75, 88 (1st Cir.2010) (quoting Politano, 522 F.3d at 72). West's procedural challenge is based on the district judge's reliance upon facts allegedly unsupported by the record: first, that West ran a club that was rife with prostitution; and second, that West ran after hours parties with drugs and that the parties were a veritable beehive of criminal activity. After careful review, we conclude that the district judge's characterization of the parties, while descriptive, was firmly based upon record evidence. The record reflects that the parties involved the unlicensed sale of liquor and presence of prostitutes. West's own procurement of party favors to be used at the club confirms a general lawlessness surrounding the gatherings. Moreover, West's indifferent reaction to the request for party favors suggests that such lawlessness was commonplace and unremarkable. We are wary of second-guessing the first-hand impressions of the trial judge, who had the benefit of directly observing the witnesses and evidence at trial. The district judge's assessment of these facts, including his description of the parties, was appropriate. Turning to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, we note that district courts are afforded wide discretion in reaching a sentencing decision. Rivera-Gonzalez, 626 F.3d at 647. [T]he linchpin of a reasonable sentence is a plausible sentencing rationale and a defensible result. Id. (quoting United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir.2008)). Where the district court has substantially complied with this protocol and has offered a plausible explication of its ultimate sentencing decision, we are quite respectful of that decision. Gentles, 619 F.3d at 89 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 194, 204 (1st Cir.2006)). Having found no procedural error, we review the substantive reasonableness of West's sentence for abuse of discretion in light of all circumstances. United States v. Rosa-Carino, 615 F.3d 75, 82 (1st Cir.2010). West argues that his sentencing guideline classification as a career offender is overstated given the small quantities of cocaine, his status as a small-time hoodlum whose primary business was not drug sales, and the thirteen-year gap between his Virginia drug conviction and the instant offense. The district court was correct in taking into account West's two prior convictions. See United States v. Brown, 621 F.3d 48, 54 n. 5 (1st Cir.2010) (Prior convictions may be treated as sentencing factors even when they `trigger[ ] an increase in the maximum permissive sentence' to which the defendant is exposed. (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 244, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998))). Here, the district judge did precisely what West contends he should have done: he took into account the guideline range, the nature of the crime, and West's criminal history, and he imposed a markedly reduced sentence. Rather than applying the guideline range mechanically, the judge duly considered both West's relatively low-level criminal status and the comparatively small drug quantities for which West was convicted, and he handed down a more lenient sentence than suggested by the guidelines. To the extent the district judge concluded that West's criminal history generated a guideline range too harsh for West in light of the § 3553(a)(2) factors, the judge reduced his sentence from a guideline minimum of 262 months to 180 months. In short, we find that the imposed sentence was reasonable.