Opinion ID: 1195240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Administrative Practices and Policies.

Text: A basic rule of statutory construction is that the application of a statute is an aid to construction, especially where the public relies on that application over a long period of time. SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. (5th ed.1992). As Sutherland explains: Statutes are documents having practical effects. It is therefore improper to construe them in the abstract, without taking into consideration the historical framework in which they exist.... Correlatively, such information is also relevant when deciding what the statute means to others because it is important to know how people affected by an act understand it. SUTHERLAND, § 49.01 (footnotes omitted). [W]here contemporaneous and practical interpretation has stood unchallenged for a considerable length of time it will be regarded as very important in arriving at the proper construction of a statute. Id. § 49.07. In fact, [o]ne of the soundest reasons sustaining contemporaneous interpretations of long standing is the fact that the public has relied on the interpretation[]. Id. This Court has and continues to adhere to those tenets. In J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991), the Court established a four-part test for when agency construction of a statute should be accorded deference. This Court summarized this test as follows: This four prong test states that an agency's construction of a statute will be given great weight if: (1) the agency has been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue; (2) the agency's construction of the statute is reasonable; (3) the statutory language at issue does not expressly treat the precise question at issue; and (4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present. Garner v. Horkley Oil, 123 Idaho 831, 833, 853 P.2d 576, 578 (1993) (citing Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219). There is no question that IDWR is entrusted with the responsibility to administer water resources in the state. I.C. §§ 42-1701-1778; §§ 42-1801-1806. Moreover, the statutory language does not expressly treat the precise question at issue. As noted above, past cases from this Court indicate that partial forfeiture has been a recognized practice in Idaho. See Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461, 690 P.2d 916 (1984); Idaho Power Co. v. State, 104 Idaho 575, 661 P.2d 741 (1983); Olson v. Bedke, 97 Idaho 825, 555 P.2d 156 (1976); Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 552 P.2d 1220 (1976); Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Co., 40 Idaho 49, 231 P. 418 (1924). The case of Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 831 P.2d 527 (1992), establishes that the practice of partial forfeiture has also been followed by the IDWR. The Director's finding in that case was that the consumptive use appurtenant to the third field had been forfeited by nonuse.... Id. at 61, 831 P.2d at 529. Dovel indicates that the IDWR has made factual findings of partial forfeiture in the past. IDWR's practice of interpreting I.C. § 42-222(2) as allowing for a partial forfeiture is also apparent from its forms. The IDWR Application for Transfer of a Water Right asks applicants: 10. To your knowledge, has any portion of this water right undergone a period of five or more consecutive years of non-use? Moreover, the record shows that some of those now opposing partial forfeiture advocated its use in their objections to the Director's report in the SRBA proceedings. A Hagerman water right owner filed an objection to a water right on the basis that the water right had been partially forfeited, stating: The recommendation is for a greater quantity of water than has been beneficially used since at least before 1970. Thus, the right to anything more than 3.5 cfs does not exist. It has been forfeited or abandoned and/or the claimant is estopped from claiming the unused portion pursuant to agreement between the claimant and this objector. (Emphasis added). Case law and the record in this case show that the general public did indeed understand and depend upon the prior IDWR interpretation, policy and practice that partial forfeiture is a recognized concept in Idaho. That I.C. § 42-222(2) allows for partial forfeiture is a reasonable interpretation and otherwise meets the standards for according this interpretation deference. Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. The Court declines to unsettle[] the repose of all those who have detrimentally relied on ... agency interpretations, id. at 857, 820 P.2d at 1214, and will accord IDWR's interpretation deference in this case.