Opinion ID: 1377787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lay-opinion Testimony

Text: (12) (See fn. 9.) Defendant also urges error in the admission, over his objection that the witnesses had not been qualified as experts, of testimony by Ron Hauser, a detective, who returned defendant to Merced from Arizona in 1978, and Charles Visher, a correctional officer, who was then the manager of the Merced County jail, that in their opinion defendant was not strung out when they observed him. [9] Although lay opinion with regard to alcohol-induced intoxication and sobriety has been held to be admissible if [r]ationally based on the perception of the witness (Evid. Code, § 800, subd. (a); People v. Garcia (1972) 27 Cal. App.3d 639, 643 [104 Cal. Rptr. 69]; In re Joseph G. (1970) 7 Cal. App.3d 695, 703 [87 Cal. Rptr. 25]), the admissibility of opinion as to drug-induced intoxication appears never to have been considered by this court. Defendant offers no basis upon which to distinguish evidence of drug-induced intoxication, however, and the Court of Appeal has held that if sufficient foundation is laid, lay opinion testimony that a person is under the influence of narcotics is admissible. ( People v. Moore (1945) 70 Cal. App.2d 158, 165 [160 P.2d 857]; see also People v. Newberry (1962) 204 Cal. App.2d 4, 9 [22 Cal. Rptr. 23] [point waived by failure to object, but [i]t is doubtful whether testimony that a person is under the influence of a narcotic requires expert qualifications on the part of the witness].) People v. Nunn (1956) 46 Cal.2d 460, 466-467 [296 P.2d 813], on which defendant relies is not contrary. In that case we held that the court properly admitted opinion testimony of a police officer experienced in interviewing addicts on whether more addiction resulted from use of pain medication or from criminal association. We noted that the officer had qualified as an expert since he had knowledge of the causes of addiction not possessed by the average man. No issue was before the court with respect to lay opinion regarding drug intoxication or withdrawal, subjects with which the average man has some knowledge particularly as to the outward manifestations of these conditions. People v. Cruz (1968) 260 Cal. App.2d 55, 59 [66 Cal. Rptr. 772], on which defendant also relies, involved identification of narcotic substances, a very different subject. Lay opinion testimony is admissible where no particular scientific knowledge is required, or as a matter of practical necessity when the matters ... observed are too complex or too subtle to enable [the witness] accurately to convey them to court or jury in any other manner. ( Manney v. Housing Authority (1947) 79 Cal. App.2d 453, 459 [180 P.2d 69]; see also People v. Ravey (1954) 122 Cal. App.2d 699, 703 [265 P.2d 154]; Eger v. May Department Stores (1953) 120 Cal. App.2d 554, 558 [261 P.2d 281].) The manifestation of drug intoxication and withdrawal are no less subtle than those of alcohol intoxication, and, unfortunately may be sufficiently common today that lay persons are capable of recognizing them. The courts of several states have so concluded. (See collected cases in Annot. (1983) 21 A.L.R.4th 905.) Reasoning that a layman who had himself ingested LSD in the company of defendant and had observed its effects had special knowledge, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that he could offer his opinion that tablets consumed by defendant were LSD. The witness's lack of scientific training went only to the weight of the evidence, not admissibility. ( State v. Johnson (1972) 54 Wis.2d 561 [196 N.W.2d 717].) Relying on Johnson, the Appellate Court of Illinois, in People v. Davis (1972) 6 Ill. App.3d 622 [286 N.E.2d 8], held that with proper foundation the opinion testimony of a lay witness that defendant was under the influence of drugs would be admissible. (13) Here, however, no opinion was offered by the witnesses. The objection was to Detective Hauser's lack of qualification as an expert and to the imprecision of the term strung out. This objection was made after a foundation had been laid by ascertaining that in his work he had encountered persons who were strung out. Although the court overruled the objection and the court acknowledged that, I don't know if we know what anybody knows by the term, the subsequent questions were directed to, and the testimony was about Detective Hauser's specific observations. He testified that he did not see defendant sick, nauseated, shaking or trembling or sweating excessively, and that defendant did not complain of pain or discomfort. Charles Visher, the jail manager, testified that he, too, was familiar with the condition of inmates who were strung out, and that he had not noticed anything that indicated to him that defendant was strung out. In response to defendant's objection and motion to strike on grounds of lack of qualification and foundation the court ruled that the witness should define the term as he understood it. Visher explained that the reference was to an inmate who reflected lack of sleep, nervousness, generally not in control of himself which he attributed to drug usage. This witness also testified that defendant had not complained to him of nausea, vomiting, pain or discomfort, and did not appear to be perspiring or sweating excessively. Defendant acknowledges that these witnesses testified regarding their observations, but argues that admitting the testimony allowed the prosecutor to give his own definition to the term strung out using symptomatology of heroin withdrawal that lacked validity. Any misconception in this regard could and should have been brought out on cross-examination. It must be recalled, also, that the evidence of drug usage offered by defendant was not limited to heroin, but included a wide spectrum of drugs, many of which are considered addictive. [10] Defendant's own medical expert had testified about an interview with defendant in which, after defendant described the drugs he had been using, defendant implied that at the time the offenses were committed he was strung out on drugs. Inasmuch as this witness used that term twice during his testimony, and the rebuttal testimony to which defendant objected was by the next two witnesses, any issue with regard to the imprecision of the term, or prejudice from lack of definition appears to have been waived.