Opinion ID: 726137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 13 Carpenter failed to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of all of the evidence. It makes little difference whether we review his claim of insufficiency of the evidence for plain error, Oliver, 60 F.3d at 551, or under the usual standard for properly preserved issues, Segura-Gallegos, 41 F.3d at 1268. Carpenter's attack fails under either standard. 14 Of course, a conviction for conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to accomplish an illegal objective coupled with one or more overt acts in furtherance of the illegal purpose and the requisite intent necessary to commit the underlying substantive offense. See United States v. Nelson, 66 F.3d 1036, 1044 (9th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Pinkney, 15 F.3d 825, 827 (9th Cir.1994). A conviction for mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 requires proof that the accused (1) participated in a scheme or artifice to defraud, and (2) caused a use of the mails, (3) for the purpose of executing the scheme. United States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1411 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 2610, 132 L.Ed.2d 854 (1995); see also United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1207 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 925, 106 S.Ct. 259, 88 L.Ed.2d 266 (1985); United States v. Bohonus, 628 F.2d 1167, 1172 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 3026, 65 L.Ed.2d 1122 (1980). Mail fraud also requires the intent to defraud someone of money or property. See United States v. Thomas, 32 F.3d 418, 419 (9th Cir.1994); see also McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 2879-80, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987); United States v. Lewis, 67 F.3d 225, 233 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Bruchhausen, 977 F.2d 464, 467-68, 469 (9th Cir.1992). Finally, a conviction for money laundering requires proof that a defendant (1) conducted a financial transaction which involved the proceeds of unlawful activity, (2) knew that the property involved was the proceeds of some form of specified unlawful activity, and (3) either (a) intend[ed] to promote the carrying on of specified illegal activity, or (b) knew that a transaction he engaged in was for the purpose of concealing or disguising ownership or control of ill-gotten proceeds. United States v. Montoya, 945 F.2d 1068, 1076 (9th Cir.1991) (internal quotation omitted). 15 We have reviewed the evidence in this case, and it is pellucid that a rational juror could find Carpenter guilty of all of the crimes charged. In brief, he did engage in a conspiracy to defraud political contributors of their funds by helping to divert those funds from proper purposes to the personal uses of Robbins. Carpenter got a fee for his trouble. He also helped to hide those activities by filing false reports with the California Secretary of State. Had Carpenter filed truthful reports, the scheme would have been easily uncovered. Of course, we do not mention all of the evidence here; nor need we do so. We have already set forth much of the salient information, and some additional detail appears in United States v. Jackson, 72 F.3d 1370 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1546, 134 L.Ed.2d 649 (1996). 16