Opinion ID: 6335862
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RCr5 6.18 and 8.31.

Text: Kesseh argues that the three charges (rape, burglary, and robbery) related to T.D. were too dissimilar from the other counts that the denial of his motion to sever amounted to reversible error. Kesseh further requests severing the charges into a number of cases, arguing that he is entitled to eight separate trials. In order to succeed on these challenges Kesseh must prove that combining these charges into one case severely prejudiced him and resulted in a fundamentally unfair sentence. RCr 6.18 allows more than one offense to be charged together so long as the offenses are “of the same or similar character or are based on the same acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.” In turn, RCr 8.31 establishes boundaries, requiring that “[i]f it appears that a defendant or the Commonwealth is or will be prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment, information, complaint or uniform citation or by joinder for trial, the court shall order separate trials of counts, grant separate trials of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.” Since trial courts are in the best position to strike the proper balance between RCr 6.18 and RCr 8.31, they are afforded “great discretion” 5 Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure. 7 when determining whether to “join or sever offenses.” Davidson v. Commonwealth, 548 S.W.3d 255, 258 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted); Smith v. Commonwealth, 520 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Ky. 2017). Consequently, we do not disturb their judgment on these issues “absent a showing of clear abuse and actual prejudice.” Davidson, 548 S.W.3d at 258; see also Peacher v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 821, 838 (Ky. 2013) (“we have many times noted that an erroneous severance ruling does not justify appellate relief unless it resulted in actual prejudice to the party opposing the ruling[]”). While it may often be required for the Commonwealth to establish that the crimes of which a defendant is charged were part of a “common scheme or plan” by presenting the jury evidence regarding time and proximity, those elements are not enough, on their own, to satisfy RCr 6.18. Hammond v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.3d 425, 428-29 (Ky. 2012). Likewise, RCr 6.18 is not satisfied because a defendant is charged with multiple counts of the same crime. Id. at 429. Instead, as this Court has stated, the better approach is to determine “[i]f evidence from one of the offenses joined in the indictment would be admissible in a separate trial of the other offenses[.]” Cohron v. Commonwealth, 306 S.W.3d 489, 493 (Ky. 2010). In Furnish v. Commonwealth, we applied this rule and affirmed the trial court’s consolidation of a burglary and murder involving the same victim at the same home where both crimes were perpetrated. 95 S.W.3d 34 (Ky. 2002). In Furnish, the defendant, while working as a carpet cleaner, entered the victim’s home and stole jewelry. Id. at 40. A month later, the defendant broke into that 8 same home and murdered the homeowner. Id. The trial court denied Furnish’s motion to have the charges severed. Id. at 52-53. Affirming the denial, this Court stated that Furnish’s prior visit to the victim’s home was probative because it showed that he was aware of the house and its contents. Such evidence tended to establish “identity, motive, and part of a plan for criminal action.” Id. at 52. This Court concluded its reasoning by noting that joining charges will almost always result in prejudice but may nonetheless be probative and relevant and well within the bounds of RCr 6.18. Id. at 53. Conversely, in Rearick v. Commonwealth, we reversed a trial court’s consolidation in a case involving three indictments of sexual abuse committed against three different juvenile victims. 858 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1993). Despite all being minors, the victims shared no other characteristics, nor were the specific incidents reflective of a theme or common plan. Since no evidence of the other incidents could be introduced at a trial of the other two, had they not been consolidated, joinder was improper. Id. at 187. Unlike in Rearick, the charges in this case share a multitude of relevant similarities and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the indictments. We address each of Kesseh’s factual assertions in turn. 1. The charges related to T.D.: We note from the outset that the incident with T.D. followed the exact same factual pattern as the other reported burglaries and robberies. Kesseh entered the apartment in the early morning hours and began rummaging through the common areas, looking for valuables. When Kesseh was 9 confronted by T.D. he acted exactly as he did with Wells and Meehan, he brandished the toy gun. The only difference between these three incidents is that Wells recognized the weapon as a toy and did not capitulate, whereas T.D. and Meehan both believed their lives to be in danger and complied. Furthermore, the fact that Kesseh took T.D. into her bedroom was not an outlier. Testimony at trial showed that Kesseh had several times before entered a female victim’s bedroom. In fact, that same morning, after the initial encounter with Wells, Kesseh found an apartment shared by four women and entered two of their bedrooms. With regards to Eden’s, her testimony stated that he simply peered into her room before leaving. However, Meehan’s testimony stated that he climbed into bed with her, consistent with the Commonwealth’s theory of escalating behavior. Consequently, given these similarities, any argument by Kesseh that his incident with T.D. differed in character from the other charges is belied by the record. Finally, we note that simply because rape required an intent not present in the remaining charges is not enough to require severance. When weighed against the remaining charges, the trial court correctly found the single incident of rape and assault insufficient to require severance under RCr 8.31. 2. The gun charges: On appeal, Kesseh argues simultaneously that the four charges involving the toy gun must be severed from the remainder of the charges, while also asserting that charges 17 and 18 (those involving Wells) and charges 19 and 20 (those involving Meehan) must be severed from one another. Although Kesseh 10 relies solely on the presence of the toy guns to support his position of severing charges 17-20 from the remainder of the counts, the discordance between the encounters stems from the location inside the apartments where he encountered the victims. Kesseh encountered Wells in the kitchen, brandished the toy gun defensively and demanded Wells’s possessions. When Wells recognized the orange tip on the weapon and refused to comply Kesseh left the apartment without further incident. By contrast, Meehan was confronted in her bedroom, requiring Kesseh to leave the familiar confines of common spaces in his previous burglaries. To quote Kesseh’s brief, the Wells robbery “indicat[ed] an intent to avoid others but to use force if encountered,” while robbing Meehan “indicat[ed] that he no longer avoided others.” Kesseh’s position is unpersuasive. At trial, and on appeal, the Commonwealth asserts that Kesseh’s behavior indicated a common scheme, burgling student apartments, while also showing that he was becoming bolder and escalating his behavior. The robberies involving Kesseh’s toy gun are probative for that reason. The trial court did not err in consolidating these charges. We are compelled to note the irony in Kesseh’s argument that severance is required because each incident is clearly unique, while in the same breath declaring that Kesseh’s behavior escalated until he no longer sought to avoid his victims. The Commonwealth relied on the same theory in support of joinder. 11 3. The remaining charges: In addition to requesting severance for the charges involving sexual assault and the toy gun, Kesseh asserts that we should sever the remaining charges against him. Specifically, Kesseh seeks to sever the charges in jury instructions 4 from charges in instructions 5 and 66 and all three charges from those in jury instructions 7-9.7 In addition, Kesseh seeks further delineation by severing the charge in jury instruction 38 and those charges laid out in jury instructions 12-169 from the remainder of the charges. Finally, Kesseh seeks to sever the burglary of the ESPN radio office in Louisville from all of the other charges. Kesseh’s position is unavailing because he relies on the quality of evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial, which is a task for the jury to weigh. See Ross v. Commonwealth, 531 S.W.3d 471, 477 (Ky. 2017) (“Assessing the credibility of a witness and the weight given to her testimony rests within the unique province of the jury [or finder-of-fact][]”) (internal quotations and citation omitted). As Kesseh’s brief concedes, the charges in 6Jury instruction 4: Burglary in the Second Degree at 1830 S. Third St. Apt. 1343; Jury instruction 5: Burglary in the Second Degree at 325 W. Cardinal Blvd Apt. 1107; Jury instruction 6: Theft by Unlawful Taking over $500. 7 Jury instruction 7: Burglary in the Second Degree at 325 W. Cardinal Blvd. Apt. 1466; Jury instruction 8: Theft by Unlawful Taking over $500; Jury instruction 9: Fraudulent use of Credit Card under $500. 8 Jury instruction 3: Theft by Unlawful Taking under $500. 9 Jury instruction 12: Burglary in Second Degree at 2108 Unity Place Apt. 112A; Jury instruction 13: Theft by Unlawful Taking over $500; Jury instruction 14: Theft by Unlawful Taking under $500; Jury instruction 15: Fraudulent use of a credit card under $500; Jury instruction 16: Fraudulent use of a credit card under $500. 12 jury instructions 4-9 occurred on the same night and at the same locations he had previously burgled. That footage would be relevant in either case as establishing his presence at the location on the night of the burglaries. The same may be said of the security footage showing his use of the stolen bank cards. That information was relevant to show that the man on the security footage at the apartment complex was Kesseh, because he was observed using the stolen bank cards to make purchases. While Kesseh correctly notes some differences in clothing and accessories between the different clips, that argument was properly made to the jury because it refers to the strength of the evidence. Finally, while the burglary at the ESPN radio building did differ in character from Kesseh’s previous burglaries, any error by the court to join the charge was not material. The radio building was adjacent to Cardinal Towne Apartments, the burglary occurred the day following the attempted robbery of Wells and the assault on T.D. and was accompanied by overwhelming evidence tying Kesseh to the charge. Consequently, Kesseh fails to show actual and undue prejudice resulted from joining that burglary with the remaining charges. Reversal is unwarranted in this case. II. The disc presented to the jury during deliberation. Having determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the charges, we turn to Kesseh’s next allegation of error: that the digital copies of surveillance videos prepared for the jury by the Commonwealth at the trial court’s request resulted in undue prejudice and constituted reversible error. Following the close of proof, the Commonwealth prepared a 13 copy of all the surveillance videos shown at trial for the jury to take into the deliberation room. Kesseh asserts that the organization of the video clips and the titles used by the Commonwealth created an impermissible flowchart. As an initial matter, concerning preservation, we note RCr 9.22 requires parties to make[] known to the court the action which that party desires the court to take or any objection to the action of the court, and on request of the court, the grounds therefor; and, if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order at the time it is made, the absence of an objection does not thereafter prejudice that party. In this case, Kesseh’s counsel failed to object to the file names when they were introduced at trial by the Commonwealth’s witnesses and did not object to the file names on the disc which was presented to the jury.10 Consequently we review the matter only for palpable error pursuant to RCr 10.26. Under RCr 10.26, an unpreserved error may generally be noticed on appeal if the error is palpable and if it affects the substantial rights of a party. Even then, relief is appropriate only upon a determination that manifest injustice resulted from the error. For an error to rise to the level of palpable, it must be easily perceptible, plain, obvious and readily noticeable. Martin v. Commonwealth, 409 S.W.3d 340, 344 (Ky. 2013) (internal quotations omitted). Manifest injustice is present when a “defect in the proceeding [exists that is] shocking or jurisprudentially intolerable.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 10 The record is silent as to whether Kesseh ever reviewed the disc, however, both parties agree that the creation of the disc was discussed at length in a private conference with the judge, and that Kesseh was aware the disc would be presented to the jury well before the conclusion of proof. His assertion that he would have objected to the titles during trial is unsupported by the record and does not satisfy the requirements of RCr 9.22. 14 207 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ky. 2006). Consequently, we will find palpable error when the defendant suffers a “manifest injustice, either through the probability of a different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant’s entitlement to due process of law.” Jones v. Commonwealth, 331 S.W.3d 249, 256 (Ky. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). RCr 9.72 allows jurors to “take all papers and other things received as evidence in the case.” Given the extensive nature of the charges against Kesseh, the trial court directed the Commonwealth to prepare a digital copy of all the surveillance footage presented at trial. The result was a disc containing ten folders which corresponded to twenty-three charges. Inside of each folder was a series of files containing the video clips presented during trial. Kesseh’s first allegation of error relates to the organization of those discs and the titles given the video clips, such as “cT1108 C 1st floor Hallway to 1108” and “CT 1108 E Suspect Walking towards East Exit 1st Floor.” Kesseh claims that the organization of the folders and the titles given to several of the video clips amounted to a flow-chart and impermissibly lowered the Commonwealth’s burden of proof. In support of his position, Kesseh cites Mills v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W.3d 366 (Ky. 2001), in which the jury heard recorded witness interviews which were not played at trial. Id. at 371. The defense objected on the grounds that the statements were inadmissible prior consistent statements. Id. The trial court overruled the objection and the tapes were made available to the jury. Id. This Court reversed the conviction, citing the testimonial nature of 15 the recordings and the fact that they were not properly admitted at trial. Id. at 372. Unlike in Mills, however, the Commonwealth here took sufficient care to introduce the video clips at trial. Witnesses identified the hallways outside of their apartments as well as the stolen property being carried off by the individual in the surveillance footage. Heather Hadden, the assistant manager of the two apartment buildings,11 testified with regards to how the video clips were gathered and labeled. Finally, Detective Brown testified that the titles of the clips he used during his investigation were provided by the managers of the apartment complex and businesses. While titles could become testimonial in nature, the inclusion of the word “suspect” in a label or identifying a hallway location does not meet that threshold. Given that the video clips were admitted at trial and subject to cross-examination by the defense, their inclusion in the jury deliberation room meets the requirements of RCr 9.72. No error occurred. III. Video clips admitted into evidence without a time stamp. Kesseh’s allges that, because several video clips were not accompanied by an “on screen” time stamp, those videos are inadmissible because they fail to show that he was present at the time of the burglaries. These deficiencies, according to Kesseh, render the offending video clips inadmissible under KRE12 901’s requirements for authentication and identification. We review the trial court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of discretion. Anderson v. University Pointe and Cardinal Towne Apartments are owned by the same 11 company, of which Ms. Hadden was the assistant manager. 12 Kentucky Rules of Evidence. 16 Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007). Consequently, we do not disturb the trial court’s ruling unless the decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Id. (citation omitted). In order to admit evidence under KRE 901(a), the party attempting to introduce the evidence must provide “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” KRE 901(b) provides several, non-limiting, examples which demonstrate how evidence may be properly authenticated; such as: KRE 901(b)(1) “[t]estimony of a witness with knowledge[;]” KRE 901(b)(4) “[d]istinctive characteristics and the like[;]” and KRE 901(b)(9) “[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result[.]” KRE 901(a) treats questions of identification and authentication as matters of conditional relevancy. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 566 (Ky. 2004). This initial burden on the proponent is “slight” and “requires only a prima facie showing of authenticity[.]” Id. (citation omitted). In this case, the Commonwealth presented the jury with Hadden’s testimony. Hadden, the assistant manager of the two apartment complexes involved, testified that Detective Brown approached the organization and requested surveillance footage from the relevant dates. Hadden testified that she and another (unidentified) employee compiled the video clips for Detective Brown. Hadden testified that although not all clips contained a time-stamp, the server containing the surveillance footage was searchable by time and date which could then generate the relevant footage. Hadden testified that this process was followed and that no alterations to the video clips were made. 17 Detective Brown testified that the parameters he provided to the managing company for surveillance footage were based on victim statements and the Computer-Aided Dispatch Report. When Detective Brown identified a time frame from these reports, he requested footage for one-half hour before and one-half hour after the crime was reported to have occurred. Thereafter, Detective Brown testified that he reviewed the footage with the company prior to their creating the disc containing the relevant footage. Finally, Detective Brown testified that he also requested that each clip be identified by date and time. Unfortunately, not all files were labeled in this manner. Nonetheless, at trial the witnesses reviewed the footage, identifying the location in the films, along with stolen items, such as the hats and stereo equipment. Although no direct eyewitnesses authenticated the scenes depicted in the video clips, the Commonwealth presented sufficient testimony to properly contextualize and identify the surveillance footage in accordance with KRE 901. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the footage into evidence.