Opinion ID: 2574897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Promise to help Sharp and her kids

Text: Sharp also argues that part of her coercion, by promise of benefit, was Wheeles' statement that he would help her and her kids find a place to live. After he advised that he and Sharp would leave the interview to bring her kids from Baker's campsite back to the station and then return for the reenactment scene, she asked if there was any way to go to a battered women's shelter or something? He replied, We'll work out some place for you to go, and [L]et me handle one thing at a time, but I promise we'll get that worked out. The earlier discussion regarding Wheeles' purported promises for Sharp's benefit applies here as well. After listening to defense counsel argue at the suppression hearing about this purported promise to find them living arrangements, the trial court nevertheless found that Sharp was not operating under any promises. That factual finding is supported by substantial competent evidence. Moreover, for this particular purported promise, substantial competent evidence exists to indicate there was no exchange of Sharp's statement for a place to stay. Instead, in this context considerable evidence indicates that rather than bargaining quid pro quo, Wheeles was merely trying to expeditiously rescue two small children who were left alone in a homeless camp with a registered sex offender, who reportedly had an outstanding arrest warrant for violating parole. See State v. Farmer, 285 Kan. 541, 554, 175 P.3d 221 (2008) ([T]he detectives made no promise of leniency for Farmer's honesty. Although Detective Richstatter's comments `be honest and help yourself' and `the truth will set you free' may imply a benefit, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, the comments do not indicate any promises in return for Farmer's confession. ); see also Swanigan, 279 Kan. at 40, 106 P.3d 39 (there must be a link between the coercive conduct of the State and the confession). Additionally, the purported promise about helping the children concerns a collateral benefit. Accordingly, a more stringent test is applied. State v. Kanive, 221 Kan. 34, 38, 558 P.2d 1075 (1976). As we stated in State v. Holloman, 240 Kan. 589, 597, 731 P.2d 294 (1987): A confession induced by a promise of a collateral benefit, with no assurance of benefit to accused with respect to the crime under inquiry, is generally considered voluntary and admissible in evidence, unless the circumstances surrounding the promise of the collateral benefit were such as to render the confession untrustworthy or the promise could reasonably be calculated to produce a confession irrespective of its truth or falsity. (Emphasis added.) (Quoting State v. Churchill, 231 Kan. 408, Syl. ¶ 1, 646 P.2d 1049 [1982]). The Holloman court held that appellant did not contend he was ever promised any personal benefit if he confessed. Nor was there any contention the circumstances surrounding the alleged collateral benefit  that brother L.C. would be released from jail if defendant confessed  were such as to render the confession untrustworthy. 240 Kan. at 597, 731 P.2d 294. Similarly, in State v. Pittman, 199 Kan. 591, 433 P.2d 550 (1967), there was evidence that the chief of police told the defendant during questioning that if he was holding back through fear of what would happen to his family, the chief would see that the proper authorities were contacted and the family would be cared for. This court held: This is not the sort of promise, either in phraseology or content, which would overcome a defendant's free and unfettered will. 199 Kan. at 596, 433 P.2d 550; see also Kanive, 221 Kan. 34, Syl. ¶ 4, 558 P.2d 1075 (promise by law enforcement was at most a promise of some collateral benefit, i.e., to discontinue further investigation of the rape of defendant's grandmother; it assured no benefit to defendant concerning the crime under inquiry, i.e., the murder).