Opinion ID: 325263
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Paul L. Wayman

Text: 32 Wayman requested that the judge charge the jury on the duties of an escrow holder as follows: 33 An escrow holder is neither concerned with nor responsible for defects in validity of instruments delivered, nor does he become guarantor or insurer of the truthfulness of representations in the instruments, other than his own special covenants and promises therein contained, or as contained in the escrow agreement by which he is directed to act. Neither is the escrow holder responsible for private understandings which are neither included in the written terms of the escrow as signed by the parties utilizing an escrow, nor in some other way communicated to him as conditions of the escrow either at or prior to the time the escrow is opened. 34 The judge refused to give the requested charge. A review of the evidence and of the conspiratorial scheme itself convinces us that the district court did not commit reversible error in refusing to give the requested charge. 35 The briefs do not say, and we fail to find, that Wayman noted an exception to the court's refusal to give the requested charge. But assuming an exception was duly noted, the refusal was not error. The charge as requested may be applicable in civil cases where the legitimacy of the escrow is not in question and there are no charges of fraud and collusion against the escrow holder. The law as stated in the requested charge assumes full honesty and good faith on the part of the escrow holder. That assumption embraces one of the very questions at issue in this criminal trial. The government's theory was that the escrow holder was at the very heart of the conspiracy, knowing all the while that through his cooperation the victims were to be defrauded out of the escrow funds. The requested charge represents only the narrowest view of the functions of an escrow holder and assumes his honesty without even so requiring. We agree with the government's position that the giving of such charge in this case would be akin to charging that the driver of a getaway car in a bank robbery would be acting legally if he simply obeyed all traffic laws.VII. REMARKS BY PROSECUTOR IN CLOSING ARGUMENT 36 The appellants argue that a remark made by the Assistant U.S. Attorney in closing argument warrants a reversal. 7 Although a prosecutor should not express his personal opinion as to the guilt of a defendant, based upon facts not in evidence, this court has not found it to be reversible error for a prosecutor to express his opinion when it is based solely upon evidence adduced at trial. Thompson v. United States, 272 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1959); see also Schmitt v. United States, 413 F.2d 219 (5th Cir. 1969). Careful analysis of the remark made discloses that government counsel was not even expressing any personal belief in the guilt of the defendants but was simply arguing the weight of the evidence-- 'the evidence has shown the guilt of these defendants is overwhelming.' The argument objected to was, in effect, the same as a previous argument which was not objected to, viz., 'We come in and we have put on a case that we think has proved our case beyond a reasonable doubt.' The time has not yet come when a prosecuting attorney cannot argue the strength of his case--the weight and sufficiency of the evidence--and ask the jury for a conviction.