Opinion ID: 2967695
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial-of-Training Claim

Text: We address first Thompson’s contention that the district court should not have granted PEPCO summary judgment on his denial-of training claim. Because Thompson presented no direct evidence of discriminatory denial of training based on race, he was obliged to proceed under the McDonnell Douglas proof scheme, under which he carried the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Evans v. Technologies Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 959 (4th Cir. 1996).1 To establish a prima facie case of discriminatory denial of training, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; (2) the defendant provided training to its employees; (3) the plaintiff was eligible for the training; and (4) the plaintiff was not provided training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Pafford v. Herman, 148 F.3d 658, 667 (7th Cir. 1998). When we view the evidence in light of this standard, it is immediately obvious that Thompson has presented no evidence of a denial of training giving rise to an inference that he has suffered discrimination. As the district court noted, Thompson received extensive training during his career at PEPCO, including the period at issue during which he attended some thirty-two courses. We also agree that the temporary upgrades to SPPO were not undertaken as training exercises, but were primarily to provide coverage for absent Control Room operators. Even if we were to treat the temporary upgrades to SPPO as de facto training exercises, Thompson was not denied training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination, because there is no evidence that similarly situated employees were selected for upgrades on the basis of race. See Pafford, 148 F.3d at 667. 1 As an initial matter, we note that the elements required to establish a prima facie case are the same under Title VII and Section 1981; therefore, the district court properly considered these claims together. See Gairola v. Virginia Dep’t of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985). THOMPSON v. POTOMAC ELECTRIC POWER CO. 7 Thompson contends that the upgrade opportunities afforded to Norris, who was two years his junior in service, and Combs, a B Operator, demonstrate that PEPCO did not upgrade him because of his race. However, as the district court properly observed, two other white A Operators, Pilkerton and Morris, both senior to Thompson, were denied the opportunity to upgrade altogether. Thompson’s argument that Pilkerton and Morris should not be considered because they did not seek temporary upgrades is unavailing because there is no evidence Thompson himself sought upgrades during the relevant period either. The record also indicates that PEPCO did upgrade other similarly situated African-American employees. In particular, after PEPCO reorganized in 1998, two other African-American Power Plant Technicians, Shade and Joseph, were temporarily upgraded to the Control Room Supervisor (formerly the SPPO) position. Shade and Joseph were both junior to Thompson. Because the practice of temporary upgrades remained in effect before and after the reorganization and reclassification of positions, Thompson’s argument that only the upgrades afforded to operators prior to the 1998 reorganization should be considered is unavailing. Consequently, Thompson has failed to demonstrate that PEPCO did not provide him with training under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment with respect to Thompson’s denial-oftraining claim.