Opinion ID: 2615027
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reasonable cause for discharge

Text: In deciding this case, we find a framework to guide our analysis in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494, (1985). We must first determine whether appellant had a property right in continued employment. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. at 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d at 501. If a reasonable expectation of continued employment cannot be shown, then there is no property interest under state law or otherwise. Leonard v. Converse County Sch. Dist. No. 2, 788 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Wyo.1990) (quoting Roberts v. Lincoln County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 676 P.2d 577, 579 (Wyo.1984)). If a property right is found to exist, appellant may not be deprived of that right without due process of law. [1] Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. at 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d at 501; Town of Upton v. Whisler, 824 P.2d 545, 549 (Wyo.1992). As instructed by Loudermill, we look not to the Constitution to define the existence of a property right, but to existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law to determine its creation and dimensions. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538, 105 S.Ct. at 1491, 84 L.Ed.2d at 501 (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d 548, 561 (1972)). With this guideline in mind, we examine the rules before us to determine whether appellant was conferred such a right. We begin by noting rules that have been interpreted as providing a property right. An Indiana state statute that did not permit a commission to change a probationary firefighter's status unless his `conduct or capacity' was found `not to be satisfactory' was held to impose a substantive standard and confer upon the probationer a reasonable expectation that his status would not be altered. Marvin v. King, 734 F.Supp. 346, 354 (S.D.Ind.1990). That court stated: In order to give rise to a constitutionally-protected property interest, a statute or ordinance must go beyond mere procedural guarantees to provide some substantive criteria limiting the state's discretionas can be found, for example, in a requirement that employees be fired only for cause. Marvin, 734 F.Supp. at 350 (quoting Cain v. Larson, 879 F.2d 1424, 1426 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992, 110 S.Ct. 540, 107 L.Ed.2d 537). In Lewis v. Hayes, 152 Ill.App.3d 1020, 505 N.E.2d 408, 106 Ill.Dec. 102, (1987), the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against the Village of Bradley for the failure to hire plaintiff, a probationary police officer, as a full-fledged police officer once he qualified for the eligibility hiring list. Under rules enacted by the Village, a probationary employee could be terminated if he is found incompetent or disqualified for the performance of his duties, following the submission of written reasons for the termination by the police chief. The court viewed these provisions as a for cause requirement that once established must be followed. Lewis, 106 Ill.Dec. at 105, 505 N.E.2d at 411. In essence, the Village, by enacting these rules, had created a protectable property interest in employment as a probationary police officer. Lewis, 106 Ill.Dec. at 105, 505 N.E.2d at 411. Our considerations in the instant case affect the interpretation of the state personnel policies and are facilitated by our discussion in Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo.1985). In Mobil Coal, we considered whether an employee handbook outlining infractions which would subject the employee to discipline as well as a procedure for progressive discipline could alter an at-will employment arrangement. In our review, we stated, Not only does the tenor of the foregoing reflect the necessity for the existence of cause for discharge, but it specifically requires such. Mobil Coal, 704 P.2d at 706. We found that the handbook's provisions change the appellant's unfettered right to discharge appellee at any time and without cause. Mobil Coal, 704 P.2d at 707. In another case involving interpretation of an employee handbook, we stated: The mere existence of a handbook or employer's manual will not make employment other than at will in all instances. Each case must be considered on its own merits. Some handbooks or manuals may not contain provisions which negate the employment at will. Some handbooks or manuals may be ambiguous or may not have apparent meaning, making the determination of their effect on at will employment a question of fact. Normally, the construction and interpretation of a contract is for the court as a matter of law. Leithead v. Am. Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059, 1063 (Wyo.1986) (quoting Mobil Coal, 704 P.2d at 707). In that case, we found that a handbook listing such misconduct as absenteeism and lateness in arriving for work to contain terms that were clear and unambiguous and that [b]y listing misconduct that could result in discharge, the handbooks imply that cause is required. Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1063. [B]oth the specific terms and the general tenor of the handbooks gave appellant an enforceable right to be discharged only for cause. Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1063. In the instant case, a specific limitation on the state's discretion to dismiss probationary employees is contained in the state's personnel rules: (ii) Dismissal of Probationary and Other Non-Permanent Employees. An agency head may dismiss an employee having other than permanent status, without right of appeal, for reasonable cause upon providing written notification to the employee specifying: (A) The reason(s) for the dismissal; and (B) The effective date of the dismissal. State of Wyoming Personnel Rules, Ch. XI, Section 3(c)(ii) (emphasis added). We hold this to be precisely the type of limit on discretion that provides the basis for a property interest. [2] Marvin, 734 F.Supp. at 354. We consider the State of Wyoming Personnel Rules to be the equivalent of an employee handbook or manual. As in Leithead, we now ask whether the terms concerning discharge of a probationary employee are clear and unambiguous. We find that the state has specifically declared in Ch. XI, Section 3(c)(ii) that a probationary employee may be discharged only for reasonable cause. The rules further list types of misconduct that constitute for cause reasons. That section states: (a) An agency head may discipline an employee for cause including, but not limited to, the following reasons: (i) Absenteeism; (ii) Incapacity to perform assigned duties; (iii) Assault; (iv) Carelessness; (v) Damaging State property; (vi) Dishonesty; (vii) Insubordination; (viii) Misconduct; (ix) Refusal to work; (x) Sexual harassment; (xi) Theft; (xii) Unsatisfactory work performance; (xiii) Violation of agency rules or policy; and (xiv) Violation of the State Personnel Rules. Ch. XI, Section 1(a). We find the terms given in Sections 1(a) and 3(c)(ii) of Chapter XI to be clear and unambiguous and, as in Leithead, gave appellant an enforceable right to be discharged only for cause. Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1063. We now ask, as in Mobil Coal, whether the state complied with the provisions of its personnel rules. Mobil Coal, 704 P.2d at 707. Dewey stated that Abell's work was good and that [t]here's never been any question about her ability or the quality of her work. Dewey made clear the reason he terminated Abell when he stated: Linda wasn't terminated because of her performance. Linda was terminated because she is a convicted felon. We note that a felony conviction is not among the list of non-exclusive reasons for discipline given in the state personnel rules. We conclude that it remains a question for the jury, under the facts of this case, recognizing both the quality of appellant's work and that she was continued in employment after the conviction was made known, whether appellant's prior conviction is reasonable cause for termination.