Opinion ID: 1812472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Johnson's consent

Text: ¶ 59 Whether an individual has given consent to search is, in the first instance, a question of fact. Garcia, 195 Wis.2d at 75, 535 N.W.2d 124. In the first step of this analysis, we determine what the defendant said or did. Id. The validity of the consent given is not affected by whether an officer informs the person that he or she has the right to withhold consent. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996); Vorburger, 255 Wis.2d 537, ¶ 100, 648 N.W.2d 829; Phillips, 218 Wis.2d at 203, 577 N.W.2d 794. Consent may be given verbally or it may be given in a non-verbal form, by gestures or actions. State v. Tomlinson, 2002 WI 91, ¶ 37, 254 Wis.2d 502, 648 N.W.2d 367. If consent-in-fact is found, the second step is to determine whether the consent was constitutionally sufficient. Phillips, 218 Wis.2d at 190-94, 577 N.W.2d 794. ¶ 60 Only voluntarily given consent will pass constitutional muster. [2] Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Phillips, 218 Wis.2d at 194-95, 577 N.W.2d 794. Consent that is the product of duress, coercion or misrepresentation by law enforcement is not voluntarily given consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); State v. Giebel, 2006 WI App 239, ¶ 19, ___ Wis.2d ___, 724 N.W.2d 402. There is no single fact, the absence or presence of which, determines whether consent was voluntarily given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041. The problem of reconciling the recognized legitimacy of consent searches with the requirement that they be free from any aspect of official coercion cannot be resolved by any infallible touchstone. Id. at 229, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Rather, in order to determine whether consent was voluntarily given, the totality of the circumstances of each individual case must be examined. Id. at 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041. In examining the totality of the circumstances, we consider both the circumstances surrounding the consent and the characteristics of the defendant. Phillips, 218 Wis.2d at 198, 577 N.W.2d 794 (additional citations omitted). The State has the burden of proving that the consent was freely and voluntarily given. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 222, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (further citations omitted). ¶ 61 In addressing the issue of consent, the majority conflates consent-in-fact with the voluntariness of the consent. Majority op., ¶¶ 16-19. When a verbal response is given, as occurred here, consent to search and the voluntariness of the consent are two separate issues, with different tests and different standards of review. Phillips, 218 Wis.2d at 196-97, 577 N.W.2d 794. ¶ 62 Because the circuit court found that Johnson consented to the search of his vehicle, I begin with a review of the circuit court record to determine whether a finding that Johnson's consent-in-fact is clearly erroneous. State v. Kieffer, 217 Wis.2d 531, 541, 577 N.W.2d 352 (1998). The transcript of the hearing of Johnson's motion to suppress shows that Officer Dummer, one of the arresting officers, testified that Johnson's response to Officer Stillman's statement that he was going to search Johnson's vehicle was, I don't have a problem with that. There is nothing equivocal about Johnson's statement. Johnson was present and represented by counsel at the suppression hearing. He heard Dummer's testimony. However, Johnson did not testify that Dummer's statement was incorrect. [3] He also has not argued that the officer reported his statement incorrectly. ¶ 63 The testimony of Dummer is sufficient to support the finding that Johnson consented, and even if more than one inference could have been drawn from the testimony at the suppression hearing, it is for the circuit court to decide which inference to choose. State v. Friday, 147 Wis.2d 359, 370-71, 434 N.W.2d 85 (1989). [T]he inferential finding of the suppression judge[] was not a legal determination to be addressed de novo by the court of appeals. . . . Id. at 371, 434 N.W.2d 85. There is nothing in the record that would show that the circuit court's finding of historic consent-in-fact was clearly erroneous. ¶ 64 However, instead of analyzing whether the circuit court's finding of historic fact, i.e., what did Johnson say, was clearly erroneous, the majority opinion focuses on the officer's statement that he would have searched the vehicle even if Johnson had said that he could not. Majority op., ¶ 18. However, the officer did not tell Johnson that he was going to search his vehicle even if Johnson said he could not. Furthermore, it has long been the law in Wisconsin, as we have recently explained, that we are unwilling to entertain Fourth Amendment challenges based on the actual motivations of individual officers. State v. Sykes, 2005 WI 48, ¶ 29, 279 Wis.2d 742, 695 N.W.2d 277 quoting Accord Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 771, 121 S.Ct. 1876, 149 L.Ed.2d 994 (2001) (further citations omitted). The officers' subjective beliefs are not dispositive of any aspect of the Fourth Amendment questions presented here. Accordingly, because the circuit court's finding of historic fact was not clearly erroneous, I move to the second step of the consent analysis, whether Johnson's verbal response was consent voluntarily given. ¶ 65 The totality of the circumstances surrounding the consent show there was no coercion, duress or misrepresentation by law enforcement. When Johnson fell to the ground a second time as the officer attempted to pat-down the pocket in the left leg of his pants, the officers permitted him to sit on the curb. In so doing, they were solicitous of Johnson's claimed leg injury. They did not threaten him or misrepresent any fact to him. Johnson appeared to understand what the officers were saying, as he sat on the curb and waited while the officer searched his vehicle. His statement, I don't have a problem with that was a direct response to the officer's statement. Furthermore, Johnson has not claimed he was coerced, or that he was under duress when he responded or that law enforcement misrepresented to him. Accordingly, I conclude that Johnson's consent to search his vehicle passes constitutional muster, as the totality of the circumstances show it was voluntarily given. ¶ 66 The majority opinion concludes that because the officer advised Johnson that he was going to search the vehicle, Johnson's response, I don't have a problem with that is insufficient to show consent and shows only acquiescence. Majority op., ¶ 19. The majority then goes on to conclude that because there was acquiescence, as the majority uses that term, the circuit court's finding that Johnson consented is clearly erroneous. Id. ¶ 67 However, the concept of acquiescence, when there is a verbal response to law enforcement in regard to a proposed search, is related to voluntariness, a question of constitutional fact. State v. Wilson, 229 Wis.2d 256, 269, 600 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App.1999). Acquiescence is a term that has been used in a number of opinions. But contrary to the majority opinion's assertion, it is not the silver bullet to set aside voluntarily given consent. ¶ 68 For example, in Schneckloth, while relating the reasoning underlying Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 90 L.Ed. 1453 (1946), the Supreme Court explained that even though there was an initial refusal, that [] initial refusal to turn the coupons over was soon followed by acquiescence in the demandthese circumstances all support the conclusion of the District Court [that petitioner consented to the search]. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Therefore, in Schneckloth, the Supreme Court's own use of the term, acquiescence, shows it is not fatal to a constitutionally sufficient consent. ¶ 69 However, acquiescence causes Fourth Amendment problems when the acquiescence is made to claimed lawful authority to search, when no such lawful authority exists. Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788. For example in Bumper, law enforcement personnel obtained permission of the homeowner to search by asserting that they had a warrant to search. Id. However, they had no warrant. Id. As the supreme court explained, the consent obtained subsequent to this misrepresentation was not a voluntary consent: When a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. Id. at 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788. ¶ 70 The court of appeals applied a similar analysis in Giebel, where law enforcement showed Giebel part of a subpoena, implying it was for his computer. Giebel said that when the officer showed him part of the subpoena, he believed he had no choice to refuse to give consent. Giebel, ___ Wis.2d ___, 724 N.W.2d 402, 2006 WI App 239, ¶ 7. The court of appeals considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding Giebel's consent and concluded that his consent was not voluntary. As the court explained, we will not presume acquiescence in the loss of a fundamental right. Id., ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 402 citing Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Util.'s Com'n of Ohio, 301 U.S. 292, 307, 57 S.Ct. 724, 81 L.Ed. 1093 (1937). ¶ 71 The majority opinion uses acquiescence incorrectly because it does not acknowledge that when a person gives a verbal, but positive, response to a request to search or a statement that a search will be conducted, he is always acquiescing to law enforcement. [4] However, such acquiescence is not the equivalent of an involuntary consent, and only that acquiescence that evidences involuntary consent violates constitutional guarantees. See State v. Williamson, 58 Wis.2d 514, 521, 206 N.W.2d 613 (1973) (concluding that Williamson's response of I don't care to an officer's request to search his car did not even raise the issue of voluntariness of the consent to search). ¶ 72 Only verbal acquiescence that is evidence of a consent that is involuntarily given runs afoul of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. See State v. Bermudez, 221 Wis.2d 338, 585 N.W.2d 628 (Ct.App.1998) (explaining that when the totality of the circumstances shows that consent was obtained due to duress, coercion or misrepresentation by law enforcement, it is constitutionally insufficient because it was obtained by acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of authority). Id. at 348, 585 N.W.2d 628 (citing Bumper, 391 U.S. at 548-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788). ¶ 73 The majority opinion also quotes a statement from Wilson that Acquiescence to an unlawful assertion of police authority is not equivalent to consent, but its analysis slides over the requirement that the assertion of authority must be unlawful. Majority op., ¶ 16. In Wilson, the court of appeals opinion relies on the unlawfulness of police action and the duress applied to Wilson to obtain consent to search. Wilson, 229 Wis.2d at 269, 600 N.W.2d 14. Wilson relies on Bumper where law enforcement obtained consent by misrepresenting that they had a warrant to search. In Wilson, law enforcement unlawfully penetrated the curtilage of Wilson's home and applied duress by refusing to permit Wilson to use the bathroom until he was searched, such that the totality of the circumstances showed that the search was unlawful. Id. ¶ 74 However, there is nothing unlawful about an officer saying, I am going to search the car, any more than there would have been in a question, Can I search the car? As Bermudez, and the cases on which it relies, explain, an unlawful assertion of authority arises when law enforcement is coercive, applies duress or misrepresents to the person whose property law enforcement seeks to search. Bermudez, 221 Wis.2d at 348, 585 N.W.2d 628. There was nothing unlawful about the officer's statement to Johnson. ¶ 75 The record created in the circuit court shows that the State's concession that Johnson did not consent to the search of his vehicle should have been rejected by the majority of this court. As Professor Blinka relates, A consent search is constitutionally reasonable to the extent that the search remains within the bounds of the actual consent given to the officers. 9 Christine M. Wiseman, Nicholas L. Chiarkas & Daniel D. Blinka, Wis. Prac., Criminal Practice & Procedure § 19.82 (2006) (citing State v. Douglas, 123 Wis.2d 13, 22, 365 N.W.2d 580 (1985)). Here, there can be no question that Johnson's consent to search his vehicle was not exceeded. Marijuana was found under the front seat of Johnson's vehicle and Johnson consented to the scope of that search. ¶ 76 Johnson was arrested for possession of marijuana (tetrahydrocannabinols also referred to as THC), contrary to Wis. Stat. § 961.41(3g)(e); therefore, the subsequent search of his person, where the 11 rocks of crack cocaine were found, was incident to a lawful arrest. There is no basis for suppressing the discovery of crack cocaine on Johnson's person, nor is there any basis to suppress his statement that he had just begun selling crack cocaine. The majority opinion errs in doing so.