Opinion ID: 26042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duenas’s Rehabilitation Act Claim

Text: Duenas must timely exhaust his administrative remedies before he can file suit against the USPS in district court. See Fitzgerald v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 121 F.3d 203, 206 (5th Cir. 1997). As part of the administrative process, EEOC regulations require an aggrieved person to file an EEO complaint within forty-five days of the allegedly discriminatory personnel action. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1).8 To mitigate the effect of this short time limit, EEOC regulations provide for mandatory equitable tolling of the forty-five-day time limit in certain circumstances: The agency or the Commission shall extend the 45-day time limit . . . when the individual shows that he or she was not notified of the time limits and was not otherwise aware of them, that he or she did not know and reasonably should not have been (sic) known that the discriminatory matter or personnel action occurred, that despite due diligence he or she was prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control from contacting the counselor within the time limits, or for 8 See supra note 1 for the full text of 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(1). 8 other reasons considered sufficient by the agency or the Commission. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a)(2) (1999). The burden is on Duenas to show that circumstances warrant equitable tolling. In this case, both parties agree that Duenas’s EEO complaint was filed well after the forty-five-day time limit. The Postmaster General argues that this fact makes Duenas’s EEO complaint untimely. Duenas counters that because he was not notified of the time limit and was not otherwise aware of it, the regulations mandate equitable tolling. Accordingly, the issue presented in this case is whether Duenas established a genuine issue of material fact with respect to his lack of knowledge of the forty-five-day time limit. To defeat the Postmaster General’s motion for summary judgment, Duenas must support his assertion of lack of knowledge with “specific, non-conclusory affidavits or other competent summary judgment evidence.” Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1991). “[U]nsupported assertions are insufficient” to ward off summary judgment when the defendant produces proper summary judgment evidence. Lewisville Properties, Inc. v. Cauble, 849 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1988). In this case, the Postmaster General supports its motion for summary judgment with comprehensive evidence showing that Duenas filed his EEO complaint outside of the forty-five-day time limit. In his response to the Postmaster General’s motion, Duenas merely 9 asserts a lack of knowledge of the time limit; he fails to present any evidence to support his claim for equitable tolling. Because he failed to come forward with specific facts indicating a genuine issue for trial, Duenas cannot avoid summary judgment in favor of the Postmaster General. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.