Opinion ID: 2385358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Appellant's cause of action sounded in both contract and tort

Text: In granting Price's motion for summary judgment, Judge Doyle rejected the applicability of a negligence theory to this case. He stated: Damages sought by the Plaintiff for the alleged negligence are identical to his damages for his contract actions. If the Court were to accept this view, all contract actions would be transformed into negligence actions by simply changing the words of the complaint and thus allowing plaintiffs to avoid application of contract law and circumvent the rules that actions for defective work accrue when the work is performed, not discovered. We disagree with this determination and hold instead that appellant's complaint properly sounded in both contract and tort. With respect to appellant's action against Atherton, [13] the law is clear that an action in negligence under the rubric of architectural malpractice is in fact appropriate. In Noble v. Worthy, 378 A.2d 674 (D.C.1977), this court stated, [a]rchitects are held to a standard of performance which requires them to employ that degree of skill and care ordinarily used by their colleagues. Id. at 676 (footnote omitted) (citing Frank M. Dorsey & Sons v. Frishman, 291 F.Supp. 794, 796-97 (D.D.C. 1968)). Judge Doyle made no specific findings as to whether Atherton might also be liable under the contract, and accordingly, we leave this issue to be addressed on remand. It is equally clear that, with respect to Price, a cause of action sounding in both contract and tort is cognizable. According to Professor Prosser, American courts have extended the tort liability for misfeasance to virtually every type of contract where defective performance may injure the promisee. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 617 (4th ed. 1971). Research has not disclosed any case from the District of Columbia squarely setting forth the above proposition, but we find support for it by inference in several cases. For example, in Glekas v. Boss & Phelps, Inc., 437 A.2d 584, 588 (D.C.1981), we noted that it is frequently appropriate to assert both breach of contract and negligence claims in an agency case; and in Bay General Industries, Inc. v. Johnson, 418 A.2d 1050, 1055 (D.C.1980), we found that where appellants initially pursued relief under a theory of specific performance of a contract, they were not subsequently barred from proceeding under a theory alleging intentional tortious conduct. See also McCoy v. Coral Hills Associates, 264 A.2d 896, 899 (D.C.1970) (A duty, or obligation of due care in tort, may be created by means other than contract.); Wickersham v. DuBois, 34 App.D.C. 146, 149, 152 (1909) (duty of care may arise irrespective of the contract). But see Prouty v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 572 F.Supp. 200, 206 (D.D.C. 1983). Moreover, appellant has brought to our attention cases from other jurisdictions in which courts have recognized that the failure to perform work properly may at times give rise to claims both for breach of contract and for negligence. The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated: In construction contracts, there is an implied warranty that the work will be performed in a skillful, careful, diligent and workmanlike manner. Where negligence on the part of the contractor results in a breach of this warranty, a cause of action ex contractu and a tortious action premised on negligence, or both, are available to the contractee. Cline v. Sawyer, 600 P.2d 725, 732 (Wyo. 1979). Similarly, the California Supreme Court has stated: A tort may grow out of or be coincident with a contract, and the existence of a contractual relationship does not immunize a tortfeasor from tort liability for his wrongful acts in breach of the contract. Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal.2d 807, 249 P.2d 257, 260 (1952) (citation omitted); see, e.g., Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 421 F.Supp. 1367, 1370 (N.D. Fla.1976) (applying Florida law); Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 129 F.Supp. 335, 348-49 (N.D.Iowa 1955) (applying Iowa law); Stowe v. Smith, 184 Conn. 194, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (1981); Garden City Floral Co. v. Hunt, 126 Mont. 537, 255 P.2d 352, 356-57 (1953); W. PROSSER, supra § 92, at 616-18. The distinction between a claim based on breach of contract and one for negligence may of course have important consequences in a lawsuit, including different requirements of proof and assessment of damages, assignability of a claim or applicability of a different statute of limitations. See W. PROSSER, supra § 92, at 618-22. Because D.C.Code § 12-301 sets forth a three-year statute of limitations for both tort and contract claims, for our present purposes it is sufficient to determine that a tort action is cognizable against Price and Atherton. We leave to the trial court the development of the facts pertinent to these claims on remand. [14]