Opinion ID: 362454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the seizure in foreign waters

Text: 15 The Fourth Amendment not only protects all within our bounds; it also shelters our citizens wherever they may be in the world from unreasonable searches by our own government. Reid v. Covert, 1957, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6, 77 S.Ct. 1222, 1225, 1 L.Ed.2d 1148, 1157. See Note, The Applicability of the Exclusionary Rule in Federal Court to Evidence Seized and Confessions Obtained in Foreign Countries, 16 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 495 (1977). The mere consent of foreign authorities to a seizure that would be unconstitutional in the United States does not dissipate its illegality even though the search would be valid under local law. 9 Indeed the United States does not here contend that those aboard the NAHOA were beyond the shield of the Fourth Amendment. The issue is whether the search was invalid because it was made without a warrant and by a federal agency, the Coast Guard, that lacked express statutory authority to conduct it.
16 In United States v. Warren, 5 Cir. en banc 1978, 578 F.2d 1058, we held that the Coast Guard has authority under 14 U.S.C. § 89(a) 10 to board American vessels on the high seas beyond the twelve-mile limit not only to inspect for safety and documentation but also to look for obvious customs and narcotics violations. 578 F.2d at 1065. In United States v. Cadena, 5 Cir. 1978, 585 F.2d 1252, we gave the same statutory provision, Section 89(a), a reading broad enough to cover the stop on the high seas of foreign vessels subject to extra-territorial application of domestic law. That statute in terms, however, would not reach the territorial waters of another nation for it relates only to the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. 11 17 Conceding that the statute per se would not authorize the Haitian search, the government urges that the phrase, upon the high seas and waters over which the United States has jurisdiction, was not intended to be restrictive, and that the Coast Guard has implicit power to search an American vessel in foreign waters even in the absence of express statutory authority. We agree. 18 The legislative history of the present form of the statute leads to the conclusion that the high-seas phrase was not intended to be restrictive. Before it was amended to incorporate that phrase, the statutory authority of the Coast Guard was examined in Maul v. United States, 1927, 274 U.S. 501, 47 S.Ct. 735, 71 L.Ed. 1171. The majority opinion searched specific statutes to find express statutory authorization for the Coast Guard to seize domestic vessels on the high seas in enforcing the revenue laws. Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom Mr. Justice Holmes joined, concurring, would not have rested on an interpretation of specific statutory authority because of his apprehension that the construction adopted by the court may have in other cases far-reaching and regrettable results. 274 U.S. as 512, 47 S.Ct. at 739, 71 L.Ed. at 1176. He added that, notwithstanding what he perceived as lack of express statutory language, authority (to seize American vessels beyond the territorial waters) exists because it is to be implied as an incident of the police duties of ocean patrol which Congress has imposed upon the Coast Guard. Id. 19 Thereafter, Congress amended Section 89(a) to incorporate the high-seas phrase in the hope of avoiding the problem foreseen by Mr. Justice Brandeis. The act was designed to overturn the Maul majority's strict interpretation of the laws governing the conduct of the Coast Guard, and the House Committee report quoted Mr. Justice Brandeis at length. H.R. Rep. No. 2452, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1936). It cited with approval his view that the Coast Guard is authorized to arrest American vessels subject to forfeiture under our law, no matter what the place of seizure and no matter what the law violated. Id. at 3. In supporting the new legislation governing the Coast Guard, the Committee observed, In the future it is possible that, based upon some expressions in the majority opinion (in Maul ), the contention will be made that express authority of law is necessary to secure enforcement by the Coast Guard of some laws and also to give jurisdiction to enforce those laws beyond the 12-mile limit. Id. at 2-3. The proposed legislation was intended to prevent those possible 'far-reaching and regrettable results.'  Id. at 3. 20 The language adopted by Congress in enacting what is now Section 89(a) was adequate to deal with the precise situation presented in Maul, a search of an American vessel on the high seas. However, while affirmatively empowering the Coast Guard to engage in law enforcement activities on the high seas and in American territorial waters, the resultant statute was silent as to the role of the Coast Guard elsewhere. The reason for the omission is apparent: the authority of the Coast Guard to proceed in foreign territorial waters simply was not a matter entertained by Congress while deliberating upon the statute. 21 Here, once again, as Chief Judge Brown has observed, we are asked to determine what Congress would have thought about a subject about which it never thought . . . and one about which we have never thought nor any other Court has thought. Wirth Ltd. v. S/S Acadia Forest, 5 Cir. 1976, 537 F.2d 1272, 1276. Congress's silence on a subject about which no one had suggested a need to speak should not be interpreted as reflecting an intent either to grant or to deprive the Coast Guard of authority to proceed in foreign territorial waters to enforce American law. 22 Because neither mandate nor prohibition of search can be divined from Section 89(a), the Coast Guard's authority, if it exists, must be, as Mr. Justice Brandeis said, an incident of its other powers. The powers that Congress gives agencies in the executive branch are better when as is usually the case they are explicit. The statute that is express and unequivocal is least likely to be misunderstood or violated either by neglect or zealous overuse. Yet authority may be granted by inference as well; in its relationship with the executive branch, Congress is not bound by the strictures that apply to the criminal law, and require such statutes to be explicit. 12 The pattern of legislation from 1790 to 1927 traced by Mr. Justice Brandeis and the subsequent congressional action we have here discussed, make it clear that, in the absence of objection by the sovereign power involved, Congress intended the Coast Guard to have authority to stop and search American vessels on foreign waters as well as on the high seas and in territorial waters even though it never said so with unequivocal didacticism.
23 Our statutory interpretation of Coast Guard authority, premised on the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Maul, is implicitly supported by principles of international law that justify law enforcement activities by the Coast Guard in foreign waters. International law is part of our domestic law. The Paquete Habana, 1900, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 20 S.Ct. 290, 299, 44 L.Ed. 320, 328. The possible application of the law of nations to supplement the statute is consistent with the statement in the House of Representatives report, The powers conferred by this act are not to be construed to affect any other powers conferred by existing law. H.R.Rep. No. 2452, at 4. 24 The law of nations classifies Coast Guard vessels as warships. Such vessels belong to the State, are under the direction of a military commander and manned by a military crew, and legally bear the ensign of the national navy. See II C. Hyde, International Law 395 (1922): Convention on the High Seas, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, art. 8. 25 Early interpretations of the law of nations denied the right of innocent passage to warships; it was thought that armed vessels did not enjoy an absolute legal right to pass through a state's territorial waters any more than an army may cross the land territory, P. Jessup, The Law of Territorial Waters and Maritime Jurisdiction 120 (1927), and prior permission had to be obtained. Until 1959, a regulation issued by the United States Office of the Chief of Naval Operations provided, Naval vessels should not be navigated in or near such claimed territorial waters without having obtained prior authorization from higher authority. 4 Whiteman, Digest of International Law 417 (1965). 13 26 The United-Nations-sponsored Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone entered into force in 1964; the United States Senate had previously ratified the Convention in 1960, and the President had signed it in 1961. 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639 (1958). Haiti is also a party to the Convention. Thus the Convention represents existing U. S. policy, at least with respect to other party nations. 27 After much debate, the draftsmen of the multilateral treaty rejected any requirement of previous authorization by a coastal state for the entry of a foreign warship into its territorial waters. See 4 Whiteman, Supra, at 415-16. Article 14(1) of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone states simply, Subject to the provisions of these articles, ships of all States, whether coastal or not, shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial sea. 15 U.S.T. at 1610. Article 16(1) provides that the coastal state may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage which is not innocent. No distinction is made between warships and other vessels. 28 At least between parties to the Convention, such as the United States and Haiti, a warship of one nation may enter the territorial waters of the other without first giving notification and receiving authorization. 14 Ratification of the convention by the United States manifests implicit authorization for its warships to do what the warships of other nations might do. The DAUNTLESS was not, of course, on a hostile mission. Indeed, it bears emphasis again that, despite the fact that presumably no consent by Haitian authority was required under the terms of the treaty, permission was in fact obtained. Therefore, in the ensuing search, there was a conjunction of implicit recognition by the United States Government of the power of its warship to make the search, and explicit approval of the search by the Haitian government. 29 Even had we been provided no guidance by the implicit authorization granted warships under the treaty, we would still be compelled to conclude that the defendants can not assail the legality of the seizure of their vessel in Haitian waters. Since 1815 it has been established that redress for improper seizure in foreign waters is not due to the owner or crew of the vessel involved, but to the foreign government whose territoriality has been infringed by the action. In The Richmond, 1815, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 102, 3 L.Ed. 670, the Court rejected a challenge similar to the one we face here to the seizure of an American registered vessel in the territorial waters of Spain. Chief Justice Marshall explained, The seizure of an American vessel, within the territorial jurisdiction of a foreign power, is certainly an offense against that power, which must be adjusted between the two governments. This court can take no cognisance of it. 13 U.S. at 103, 3 L.Ed. at 671. Here, where not even the foreign government complains of the American assertion of sovereignty over its own vessel, defendants have no basis for complaint unless the seizure was improper on some other grounds.
30 We have dealt with other issues before reaching the constitutional question. Having concluded that the search was not invalidated by lack of authority to make it, we must consider whether the Coast Guard was required by the Fourth Amendment to obtain a warrant before proceeding. It is almost too obvious to require reiteration that the mere existence of statutory authority to make a search does not obviate the need for Fourth Amendment compliance. 15 This constitutional issue was involved both in Warren, supra, and in Cadena, supra. In each of these cases there was a warrantless search by the Coast Guard. The Warren majority, whom we have already quoted, recognized in Section 89(a) a grant of plenary authority to stop and board United States vessels on the high seas for either a safety-and-document inspection or to check for obvious customs and narcotics violations. Once aboard, if probable cause arises to suspect the presence of narcotics, a search can then be made of the vessel. Judge Fay dissented from the suggestion he found in the opinion that the statute gives plenary authority to search; nevertheless he began: 31 No one can question that the Coast Guard may stop and search an American vessel on the high seas when it has probable cause to believe a crime has been or is being committed. (578 F.2d at 1079.) 32 Neither opinion speaks directly to the question whether probable cause alone justifies the warrantless search of an entire vessel as compared to boarding for purposes of a safety-and-document inspection and a check for obvious customs and narcotics violations. 33 In Cadena a foreign vessel was intercepted on the high seas pursuant to Section 89(a) authority. The vessel's subsequent flight created probable cause to search without regard to any prior knowledge of the Coast Guard of the vessel's activities. 34 We find Cadena persuasive precedent. Here, as in Warren and Cadena, the Coast Guard had plenary authority to stop and board the ship. The DAUNTLESS was indeed lying in wait for the NAHOA. There was previously existing probable cause to believe the vessel was engaged in smuggling; we may assume, arguendo, that a warrant would have been necessary had the NAHOA docilely continued on its course, approached the DAUNTLESS and, upon being hailed, submitted to a search. 16 However, the NAHOA's flight of itself created exigent circumstances that, coupled with the antecedent probable cause, justified the subsequent warrantless search of the vessel. 17