Opinion ID: 2982559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cat’s Paw Liability and But-For Causation

Text: Plaintiff does not argue that Alutto was personally motivated by retaliatory animus when he rejected Plaintiff’s application for tenure. Rather, Plaintiff asserts that Alutto was the unwitting tool of those who did harbor retaliatory animus—in other words, Plaintiff advances a cat’s paw theory. The Supreme Court has recently defined this so-called “cat’s paw liability” as follows: “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by [discriminatory] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable.” 3 Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 5. Ct. 1186, 1194 (2011) (footnote omitted). The statute at issue in Staub required that the discriminatory action be a “motivating factor” in the resulting adverse employment action. See id. at 1190—91. We have thus directly applied Staub in Title VII discrimination actions, which are governed by a similar causation standard. See Chattman v. Toho Tenax Am., Inc., 686 F.3d 339, 351 (6th Cir. 2012). But during the pendency of this appeal, the Supreme Court established that Title VII retaliation claims require but-for causation; that is, “proof that the unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in 3 S ince we hold that Plaintiff cannot establish cat’s paw liability, we need not consider whether and to what extent cat’s paw liability fits into the framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Diaz v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 643 F.3d 1149, 1151 (8th Cir. 2011) (discussing, but not resolving, the “uneasy marriage” between Staub and McDonnell Douglas). -16- No. 13-3029 the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). The heightened standard of causation in Title VII retaliation claims forces us to tailor the Staub rule to fit in this context, but the required alteration is straight-forward. If the retaliatory actions of nondecisionmakers 4 were nothing more than a motivating factor of Alutto’s decision, then retaliation could not have been a but-for cause of the ultimate employment action. Therefore, we hold that cat’s paw liability will lie in this case if: (1) nondecisionmakers took actions intended to deny Plaintiff tenure in retaliation for his protected conduct, and (2) those retaliatory actions were a but-for cause of Alutto’ s decision to deny tenure. 5 This is the same standard courts have announced when applying Staub to claims for age discrimination—claims that require the plaintiff to establish but-for causation. See Sims v. MVM’ Inc., 704 F.3d 1327, 1336 (11th Cir. 2013); Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 949—50 (10th Cir. 2011). The but-for standard has an important impact in “overdetermined” cases—cases where “two forces create an injury each alone would be sufficient to cause.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). If a plaintiff is not required to establish but-for causation, she may still be able to recover from a tortfeasor whose conduct was sufficient, but not necessary, to 4 S taub did not resolve whether cat’s paw liability can be predicated on actions taken by co-workers, rather than supervisors. See Staub, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 n.4; Shazor v. Prof’l Transit Mgmt., 744 F.3d 948, 956 (6th Cir. 2014). In the context of tenure decisions, “the line between coworker and supervisor is significantly blurred,” Seoane II, 2012 WL 6138661, at , and even a few colleagues can wield dispositive influence over a plaintiff’s academic future. See Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1327 (6th Cir. 1988). We assume in this opinion that cat’s paw liability can spring from the actions of Plaintiffs colleagues in the COP. Plaintiffs claim still fails. 5 P laintiff points to our nonprecedential decision in Bishop v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections, 529 F. App’x 685 (6th Cir. 2013), and asserts that the proximate cause standard applies to his cat’s paw theory. Bishop was decided less than three weeks after Nassar, and as a result, the panel did not have the opportunity to fully consider the interplay between Nassar and Staub. -17- No. 13-3029 cause her injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 432(2). Not so where the standard is butfor causation. Following Nassar, “a Title VII plaintiff alleging retaliation cannot establish liability if her firing was prompted by both legitimate and illegitimate factors.” Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Plaintiff’s claim will therefore fail if Alutto decided to deny tenure based on factors untainted by retaliatory animus, even if Alutto’s decision was also based on factors that were tainted by retaliation. So long as the untainted factors were sufficient to justify Alutto’s ultimate decision, the University will be entitled to summary judgment.