Opinion ID: 1090165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in granting the Motions to Transfer Venue?

Text: ¶ 16. Adams asserts that while DeSoto County may also be a proper venue for this action, the action was properly brought in Tunica County and should not be transferred. The medical defendants and Goldstrike counter that the only permissible venue for all defendants is DeSoto County, pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3). The pertinent portions of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3 state: (1) (a)(i) Civil actions of which the circuit court has original jurisdiction shall be commenced in the county where the defendant resides, or, if a corporation, in the county of its principal place of business, or in the county where a substantial alleged act or omission occurred or where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. . . . (3) Notwithstanding subsection (1) of this section, any action against a licensed physician, osteopath, dentist, nurse, nurse-practitioner, physician assistant, psychologist, pharmacist, podiatrist, optometrist, chiropractor, institution for the aged or infirm, hospital or licensed pharmacy, including any legal entity which may be liable for their acts or omissions, for malpractice, negligence, error, omission, mistake, breach of standard of care or the unauthorized rendering of professional services shall be brought only in the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred. . . . ¶ 17. The medical defendants suggest that the meaning of the word notwithstanding is clear and therefore, subsection (3) is to control regardless of the language of subsection (1). The medical defendants further argue that since Adams concedes the alleged acts of medical negligence took place wholly in DeSoto County, utilizing a straightforward application of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3), the only appropriate venue for claims against the medical defendants is DeSoto County. ¶ 18. Initially, Adams argued venue was proper in Tunica County pursuant to M.R.C.P. 82(c) and Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(1)(a)(i), as an action shall be commenced where a substantial event that caused the injury occurred. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-11-3(1)(a)(I) (Rev.2004)(emphasis added). Adams asserts the injury would not have occurred and necessitated medical care but for the fall at the casino in Tunica County. ¶ 19. Adams and the medical defendants argue there is a conflict between Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(1)(a)(i) and 11-11-3(3). However, the Legislature has furnished guidance through its notwithstanding language contained in Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3). ¶ 20. Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3) states,  Notwithstanding subsection (1), and this notwithstanding language is quite telling in determining venue for medical providers. Notwithstanding is defined by Webster's Dictionary as (1) In spite of; (2) Nevertheless; (3) In spite of the fact that. See Webster's II New College Dictionary 749 (3d 2001). ¶ 21. When construing the meaning of a statute, we must look at the words of the statute. Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 309 (Miss.1985). Further, [o]ur duty is to carefully review statutory language and apply its most reasonable interpretation and meaning to the facts of a particular case. Pope v. Brock, 912 So.2d 935, 937 (Miss.2005). ¶ 22. The notwithstanding language is clear. Regardless of Goldstrike's joinder as a defendant, the only proper venue for a suit against medical providers is the county in which the alleged act or omission occurred. This Court addressed the issue of when medical providers are not found in the same county in its recent decision in Rose v. Bologna, 942 So.2d 1287 (Miss. 2006). ¶ 23. The dissent incorrectly concludes that this Court, by following the mandate of Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3, is creating a special class of medical defendants. The contentions advanced by the dissent reveal an aversion to the legislative act and are better suited for debate before the Legislature. ¶ 24. Enacting venue statutes referencing only certain groups of defendants is not novel to this State. We have noted: The first statute dealing with venue was contained in the 1807 Statutes of the Mississippi Territory. This statute provided that all civil cases shall be commenced in the circuit court of the county in which the defendant may be found or if a real action, action of ejectment, or trespass quare clausum fregit, then in the county where the cause of action arose. In addition, no free-holder of the territory could be sued out of the county of his permanent residence unless it be one of the actions for which the statute made an exception. The venue statute found in Hutchinson's Code of 1848, one of the first codes following statehood, contains almost the identical language as that of the 1807 statute. Clark v. Luvel Dairy Prods., Inc., 731 So.2d 1098, 1105 (Miss.1998) (emphasis added). Venue regarding specific classes of defendants was long recognized by our previous venue statutes. Separate venue statutes were enacted for railroad, express, steamboat, power, superpower, telephone and insurance companies, executors, nonresident motorists and state boards. See Hemingway's 1917, § 487 (1930); Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-11-5, -7, -13 (repealed 2002); see also Miss.Code Ann. §§ 11-11-9, -15 (Rev.2004). ¶ 25. The dissenting opinion is structured loosely around a perceived constitutional violation which has no application to the case sub judice and was not raised by either party. [3] This Court `may not act upon or consider matters which do not appear in the record and must confine itself to what actually does appear in the record.' Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss.1973). ¶ 26. Contrary to the language of the dissent, this Court firmly recognizes and accepts the responsibility of ensuring the preservation of every citizen's constitutional rights. The author of the dissent has a penchant for the repetitious citation of the same provisions of the Constitution, as evidenced by recent dissents in civil matters, wherein Miss. Const. Art. 3, Sections 24 and 25 have been cited. [4] The dissent fails to demonstrate injury to the plaintiff's case, as it is still pending in a court of competent jurisdiction. The plaintiff still has a remedy by due course of the law and has not been debarred from prosecuting any civil cause for him[self]. . . . See Miss. Const. art. 3, § 24; see also Miss. Const. art. 3, § 25. ¶ 27. Adams additionally argues there is a conflict between Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3(3) and Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 82(c), which states in pertinent part, Where several claims or parties have been properly joined, the suit may be brought in any county in which any one of the claims could properly have been brought. . . . M.R.C.P. 82(c). ¶ 28. However, before applying M.R.C.P. 82(c), one must examine M.R.C.P. 82(b), which states, Except as provided by this rule, venue of all actions shall be as provided by statute. Therefore, a determination as to where the action could properly have been brought circuitously leads us to the venue statute, Miss.Code Ann. Sect. 11-11-3 (Rev.2004). The presence of medical providers in this action renders subsection (1) inapplicable, as the notwithstanding language of subsection (3) negates the language of subsection (1). Therefore, as subsection (3) is applicable, the only proper venue for this action is DeSoto County. Adams's claim that M.R.C.P. 82(c) is in conflict with the venue statute is unfounded.