Opinion ID: 2351127
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Third Exception.

Text: This exception, like the others, alleges more than one erroneous ruling, challenging not only those which refused to permit the appellants (1) to cross-examine a witness they had called to the stand, on the ground that she was hostile and adverse, and was giving testimony which was a surprise to them, (2) to prove that she had declared the factual recitals carried in a statement prepared by their counsel and signed by her, identified as Exhibit 2, were true, and (3) to introduce that Exhibit in evidence, but additional rulings so interrelated with those three that they require no separate consideration. The witness was Mrs. Evelyn Paradis, the wife of the contingent beneficiary. She had testified in opposition to the allowance of the will in the Probate Court, had signed Exhibit 2 when it was presented to her for that purpose by appellants' counsel, and has asserted to them, in the presence of other witnesses, that the factual recitals carried in it were true, after the opening of the case in the Supreme Court of Probate. She had indicated at that time, however, that she did not wish to testify again, and had stated that she would be out of town when the case was heard, if she knew when it was to be. There can be no doubt the appellants and their counsel knew that her attitude was both hostile and adverse when they called her to the stand, as was made entirely clear by counsel's statement to the court: Sometimes you have to call hostile witnesses, Your Honor. The law recognizes the fact the purpose of a law suit is to get out the truth. If this woman can contribute to the truth and the facts in this case she ought to be permitted to testify. They won't put her on, we know, and the only alternative is for us to put her on although we know she is hostile. Recitals in the Bill of Exceptions disclose that the procedure appellants sought to follow was to compel this witness, through a cross-examination conducted by reference to Exhibit 2, to affirm the truth of its factual declarations, or impeach her, if she did not make the affirmations, by the testimony of witnesses asserting that they had heard her declare them to be true. It ought not to require the citation of any authority to demonstrate that such a plan of procedure has no support in legal precedent. All the evidence presented in litigated cases must be sworn testimony, and must be so presented as to give the parties to whom it is adverse the opportunity for cross-examination. Facts cannot be proved in court by having a witness, or a multiplicity of witnesses, make oath that some named person said at some time or times that the recitals of a written document were true. Parties may be permitted, it is true, under appropriate circumstances, to cross-examine witnesses they have placed on the stand, State v. Benner, 64 Me. 267; State v. Crooker, 123 Me. 310, 122 A. 865, 33 A.L. R. 821, but it has always been recognized in this court that the granting of such a permissive right was vested in the discretion of the Justice presiding, and that the exercise of his discretion was not subject to exception. It is so declared in the cited criminal cases, and has been recognized in the field of civil litigation in other jurisdictions. Devine v. Johnson & Jennings Co., 189 Ill.App. 556; Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Hurt, 101 Ala. 34, 13 So. 130; Maloney v. Martin, 81 App.Div. 432, 80 N.Y.S. 763; Bank of the Northern Liberties v. Davis, 6 Watts & S., Pa., 285. All of these cases are cited in appellants' brief. This exception, so far as it challenges the ruling denying the appellants the right to cross-examine Mrs. Evelyn Paradis, might be dismissed on the ground that it was made in the exercise of a discretion that is not subject to exceptions, but reference to the record discloses that counsel was permitted to examine the witness exhaustively in connection with the factual recitals carried in Exhibit 2, and that she answered questions dealing directly with substantially every such recital. On many occasions, it is true, she gave answers which minimized the force of statements carried in absolute terms therein, as where she said, when asked if the testator once declared, in referring to his trip to the office of the scrivener to make the will, no matter if I say no I'll have to go, that he had a smile on his face when he said it. The additional rulings challenged by this exception were made in strict accordance with established precedents in this jurisdiction and in others. The law does not look with favor on permitting a party to call a witness and proceed to demonstrate his lack of credibility when his evidence is disappointing. It was declared in the first volume of the published reports of this court that: the party calling a witness shall not be permitted to attack his character by general evidence, although it was recognized, even then, that he might disprove facts to which such a witness had testified. Morrell v. Kimball, 1 Me. 322. There has been no departure from this general principle in subsequent years, although exceptions to it have become well established when a party is required to call a witness who has subscribed to a document which must be proved, Dennett v. Dow, 17 Me. 19, or is surprised by unfavorable testimony given unexpectedly by one he has called to the stand, Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Stevens, 123 Me. 368, 123 A. 38. See also Gooch v. Bryant, 13 Me. 386; Brown v. Osgood, 25 Me. 505; Chamberlain v. Sands, 27 Me. 458; Shorey v. Hussey, 32 Me. 579; State v. Knight, 43 Me. 11; Harmon v. Perry, 133 Me. 186, 175 A. 310. In Dennett v. Dow, supra, the establishment of the exception applicable to subscribing witnesses was protested in a dissent on the ground that it was unwise as having: a tendency to unsettle the law of evidence by preferring the particular benefit to the general good. The rule applicable to surprise is well stated in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Stevens, supra, but a limitation on it is expressed very forcibly in Bank of the Northern Liberties v. Davis, supra. Therein the court, recognizing that the authority was discretionary and that a party had the right to protect himself from the treachery of a particular witness by proving his case through others, negatived the appellants' claim completely by saying that: In such cases, and others of similar kind, the court before whom the cause is tried, has always, in the exercise of a sound discretion, allowed the party calling him (a treacherous witness) to prove that at different times and in the presence of other persons, he has held different language. This, however, is not substantive evidence of itself, but is permitted to neutralize the evidence given by the witness. To the same effect see Akins v. State, Okl.Cr.App., 215 P.2d 569, State v. Lane, 69 Ariz. 236, 211 P.2d 821, and the cases cited in the Note in Ann.Cas. 1914B, 1121, at page 1134, under the caption Effect of Impeachment. The rulings which denied the appellants the right to introduce Exhibit 2 in evidence to prove the truth of the factual recitals carried in it, or to permit other witnesses to testify that Mrs. Paradis had asserted such recitals to be true, at some time or times, were proper. If the appellants had produced any evidence, through other witnesses, competent to prove any of those facts, or tending to do so, and her testimony had been of opposite effect, the evidence they sought to offer would have been proper to minimize the force of her statements, but such is not the situation presented in the record before us. In the partial record accompanying the Bill of Exceptions, including those parts of the testimony quoted in it, there is no evidence whatsoever having any tendency to prove any part of those factual recitals. A careful reading of the testimony given by Mrs. Paradis, and of Exhibit 2, furnishes ample proof that she is not the type of witness whose evidence would carry convincing weight. Such a reading makes it apparent that her own wishes, for a cause we cannot know, induced her to desire that the will be disallowed when the case was heard in the Probate Court, and to favor its allowance at the time of the hearing in the Supreme Court of Probate. No witness whose evidence is colored by personal feelings can furnish credible testimony to support the cause she favors. The will in question was excuted in accordance with the requirements of our statute of wills, by a person of sound mind within the purview thereof, as the appellants admit by their statement that the evidence heard in the Supreme Court of Probate would justify a factual finding to that effect. Their claims that the testator was influenced, in the making of it, by fraud, coercion or undue influence are not supported by any evidence in the partial record accompanying, or forming a part of, their Bill of Exceptions. They could not have been supported effectively by the evidence excluded under the rulings challenged by the second and third exceptions. Exceptions overruled.