Opinion ID: 684069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The BRB Exceeded the Scope of Its Review

Text: 36 The BRB's review of Judge Lesser's rulings went well beyond determining whether his findings and conclusions were supported by substantial evidence. Because Judge Lesser's award of benefits was in fact so supported, the BRB was statutorily required to affirm it, and we need not reach the question whether the BRB erred in reviewing Judge Neusner's ruling. 37
38 Dr. Schwartz's testimony formed the basis of Judge Lesser's original order awarding benefits to Burns. The ALJ explained that he was persuaded by Dr. Schwartz's theory that Claimant's inhalation of propane gas in combination with the [blockage] in his carotid artery caused a temporary hypoxia (low oxygen content) in the blood going to the Claimant's brain which caused his stroke. ALJ I, at 9-10. On review, the Board--seizing on Schwartz's additional observation that propane can have an anesthetic effect on humans--held that Judge Lesser had erred when he did not consider [Jurinski's] ... testimony regarding the percentage of propane necessary in the atmosphere before the gas will have an anesthetic effect. BRB I, at 5. 39 On remand, Judge Lesser explained that Jurinski's testimony was immaterial and irrelevant because [t]here was no suggestion made by ... any of the [ ] witnesses that Burns had been anesthetized. ALJ II, at 3. Judge Lesser repeated that on his understanding of Schwartz's testimony, Burns's stroke had resulted when his inhalation of propane had reduced the amount of available oxygen in the limited supply of blood that his substantially blocked carotid artery provided to his brain. Id. 40 The second BRB opinion flatly rejected Judge Lesser's interpretation of Schwartz's testimony. It maintained that the underlying basis for Dr. Schwartz's testimony was that the propane had an anesthetic effect on [Burns]. BRB II, at 4. The Board therefore repeated that the administrative law judge's failure to consider Dr. Jurinski's opinion as to the percentage of propane necessary to have an anesthetic effect was an abuse of discretion. Id. 41 The BRB's dialogue with Judge Lesser on this point bears little relation to the Board's statutory duty to ensure that the ALJ's findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence. Once Judge Lesser found that Burns's blood-oxygen level had been lowered by breathing propane, the BRB could not insist, based on its own review of Schwartz's testimony, that the ALJ had to find that Burns had either been anesthetized or left unaffected by the propane. Here, as in Crum v. General Adjustment Bureau, 738 F.2d 474, 480 (D.C.Cir.1984): 42 the Board failed to give [the ALJ's] determination its statutorily required conclusiveness, and instead redetermined the facts ... by focusing on [selected portions of the record]. But the BRB was not entitled to review this matter de novo; rather the Board was bound by the ALJ's determination if supported by substantial evidence. 43 Accord Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Loxley, 934 F.2d 511, 514 (4th Cir.1991) (overruling the BRB's reversal of the ALJ on the ground that the Board's independent analysis of evidence presented at the hearing erroneously expanded its scope of review). In Burns's case, our independent review of the record, Licor, 879 F.2d at 903, indicates that Judge Lesser's analysis of Schwartz's testimony was supported by substantial evidence. 11 44 The Board's impermissible re-characterization of Schwartz's testimony fatally infected its review of Judge Lesser's rulings. The Board's belief that Lesser was obliged to make a specific finding regarding whether the air within the enclosure Burns entered was 89% propane--the quantity of propane that Jurinski testified would be necessary to produce an anesthetic effect--stemmed from its improper re-characterization of Schwartz's testimony. We cannot permit the Board thus to usurp the fact-finding responsibility of the ALJ through its limited power of review. Mijangos, 948 F.2d at 944. 45 2. Judge Lesser's Award of Benefits Was Supported by Substantial Evidence 46 If the Board had accepted--as it was required to do--Judge Lesser's reasonable interpretation of Schwartz's testimony, the question before it would have been an altogether different one. Rather than asking that Judge Lesser make a finding regarding the 89% propane Jurinski thought necessary to anesthetize Burns, the Board should have considered whether Judge Lesser's conclusion that Burns's stroke resulted from hypoxia was supported by substantial evidence. We now address that question, and conclude that Judge Lesser's finding was so supported. 47 The record is clear that Burns suffered a stroke. Both medical experts testified that an insufficient supply of oxygen to the brain will result in an area of brain damage--a stroke. The experts also agreed that Burns's left carotid artery was 90% blocked; the ALJ's finding that Burns was peculiarly vulnerable to a reduced blood-oxygen level thus cannot be questioned. Finally, there is ample evidence in the record from which Judge Lesser could conclude that inhaling propane displaces oxygen from the blood stream; Schwartz, whose testimony Judge Lesser credited, so testified, and even Keshishian acknowledged that an individual who breathed enough propane would be starved for oxygen. 48 The only legitimate issue in this case is therefore whether the ALJ's determination that Burns encountered a quantity of propane sufficient, in combination with his stenosis, to reduce the available oxygen in his blood to the point where he suffered an hypoxia, was supported by substantial evidence. Assuredly, there is no way to determine with absolute certainty whether Burns's stroke was precipitated by a temporary lack of oxygen. It would be impossible to ascertain precisely how much oxygen would have to have been displaced to affect Burns, in his uniquely sensitive condition; there is, moreover, no way to determine whether the amount of propane necessary to displace that unknown quantity of oxygen was present in the air at the point Burns entered the enclosure. The level of propane in the enclosure simply was not measured at the time of Burns's stroke. 12 49 The ALJ was not, however, required to make a certain determination of causation, but only one supported by substantial evidence. As is frequently the case under the substantial evidence standard, the evidence given before the ALJ would have permitted a finding in favor of either party. 13 Judge Lesser could have found that there was not enough propane in the enclosure to affect Burns, as Judge Neusner later did; record evidence indicating that the area was at least minimally ventilated, and Keshishian's opinion that it would take a large amount of propane in the air to have a deleterious effect on a human being, would have supported his decision. Instead, however, Judge Lesser found that there was a heavy concentration of propane, enough to precipitate Burns's stroke. For this finding, Judge Lesser relied on Burns's credited report of having been hit by a wave of propane gas, and the accounts of disinterested observers that the odor of propane was particularly strong that day in the area Burns entered. Either way, given the structure of the LHWCA, the BRB was required to uphold the finding of the ALJ. See Mijangos, 948 F.2d at 944 (The facts of this case could support a finding in favor of either party. The choice between reasonable inferences is left to the ALJ and may not be disturbed if it is supported by [substantial] evidence.).