Opinion ID: 604217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clark's ADEA Claim

Text: 40 Clark contends that he was forced to accept early retirement in violation of ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). In an unlawful discharge case the plaintiff must ultimately prove by the preponderance of the evidence that age was a determining factor in the employer's decision to fire him. Carter, 870 F.2d at 581. Initially, however, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing a prima facie case. This may be accomplished by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent; by satisfying the McDonnell Douglas scheme; or by statistical proof. Id.; see also Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081. Clark asserts that he has presented both direct proof of discrimination and satisfied the McDonnell Douglas scheme.
41 Clark has not introduced direct evidence that he was forced to retire because of his age. As in the ERISA context, evidence of age discrimination is direct when, if believed, it establishes discriminatory intent without inference or presumption. Earley, 907 F.2d at 1081. Only the most blatant remarks whose intent could only be to discriminate on the basis of age constitute direct evidence. Id. Even accepting Clark's version of his final day, there is no evidence of this type. According to Clark, Bradner told Clark that he had to retire but did not say why he had to retire. If Clark's version is accepted there is direct evidence that he was involuntarily retired, but the discriminatory intent motivating that decision must be inferred. See Young v. General Foods Corp., 840 F.2d 825, 831 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 782, 102 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989).
42 To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas scheme this court requires a plaintiff to show that he: 43 (1) was a member of the protected group of persons between the ages of 40 and 70, (2) was subject to adverse employment action, (3) was replaced with a person outside the protected group, and (4) was qualified to do the job. 44 Mitchell v. Worldwide Underwriters Ins. Co., 967 F.2d 565, 566 (11th Cir.1992); see also Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1469-70 (11th Cir.1991); Earley, 907 F.2d at 1082. These requirements are not, however, interpreted strictly if the plaintiff can otherwise provide a basis for the inference that age was a factor in the employment decision. 2 See, Mitchell, 967 F.2d at 567 (citing Pace v. Southern Ry. System, 701 F.2d 1383, 1386-87 (11th Cir.), cert. denied 464 U.S. 1018, 104 S.Ct. 549, 78 L.Ed.2d 724 (1983)). 45 We hold that Clark presented sufficient evidence of each element of the McDonnell Douglas scheme to establish a prima facie case. First, at the time Clark left Coats & Clark's employment he was 58 years old and therefore protected by ADEA. Second, Clark stated at his deposition that he was involuntarily retired because he refused to accept early retirement. Coats & Clark contends that Clark voluntarily accepted early retirement but concedes that Clark's statements create a factual issue precluding summary judgment on the issue whether Clark was subjected to an adverse employment decision. It therefore assumes, for purposes of summary judgment only, that Clark's statement that he was forced to retire is correct. 46 Third, Clark established that he was replaced by someone outside the protected age group. Although Coats & Clark attempts to cast Clark's termination as a part of a reduction in force, this characterization is contradicted by the record. As discussed above, the number of employees at the plant was increasing at the time Clark stopped working. More important, Bradner stated that Jim Cauthen, aged 27 at the time, took over Clark's position as department manager of preparation and spinning, Bradner Dep., at 83, and further stated that Cauthen actually had fewer responsibilities than Clark. See id. at 86. This evidence was sufficient to establish that Clark was replaced rather than reduced and that his replacement was outside the protected age group. 47 Fourth, Clark presented evidence sufficient to establish that he was qualified for the position of department manager of preparation and spinning. In Title VII and ADEA cases we have focused on plaintiffs' skills and background to determine if they were qualified for a particular position. See Smith v. Farah Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 64, 68-69 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981) (ADEA); see also Woody v. St. Clair Cty. Comm'n, 885 F.2d 1557, 1561-63 (11th Cir.1989) (Title VII); Wu v. Thomas, 847 F.2d 1480, 1484 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006, 109 S.Ct. 1641, 104 L.Ed.2d 156 (1989); Panlilio v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 643 F.2d 315, 318 (5th Cir. Unit A Apr. 1981) (Title VII). Clark's 25 years of service in supervisory positions and the fact that Coats & Clark transferred him into the position of department manager of preparation and spinning from assistant plant manager--a job with even greater responsibility--both show that he possessed the skills and background necessary to be a department manager. 48 Coats & Clark introduced several reprimands issued to Clark regarding his handling of specific incidents. These reprimands may indicate that Coats & Clark was concerned about Clark's performance, but they do not establish that Clark was unqualified. In any event, concerns about Clark's performance are more appropriately raised as part of the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas scheme. See Young, 840 F.2d at 829 n. 3; Rosenfield, 827 F.2d at 1495 n. 2; see also Siegel v. Alpha Wire Corp., 894 F.2d 50, 54 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906, 110 S.Ct. 2588, 110 L.Ed.2d 269 (1990); Bienkowski v. American Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1505-06 (5th Cir.1988). 3 49 Because Clark has established a prima facie case Coats & Clark must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for his involuntary retirement. Coats & Clark asserts that, if it did force Clark to retire, it did so because his performance was unsatisfactory. An employer's good faith belief that an employee's performance is unsatisfactory constitutes a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination. See Young, 840 F.2d at 830. Coats & Clark thus has met its burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory reason for Clark's involuntary retirement, so to avoid summary judgment Clark must introduce significantly probative evidence showing that the asserted reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. The burden of proving pretext merges with the plaintiff's ultimate burden of proving that age was a determining factor in his discharge, and it can be met by showing that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated the employer's decision, or by discrediting the employer's proffered explanation. See Elrod, 939 F.2d at 1470. 50 The evidence introduced by Clark could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that age more likely than not motivated the decision to force Clark to retire. According to Clark, he rejected the offer of early retirement but was forced to retire anyway. Although Coats & Clark contends that Clark voluntarily retired it admits that it offered Clark early retirement and further admits that its decision to offer Clark early retirement was based on age as well as performance. See Bradner Dep., at 83, 85. Moreover, when asked what impact Clark's performance had on the decision to offer early retirement, Bradner responded: 51 Well it played a part in it. As to how much I couldn't very well tell you that. But, it was part of the decision making process, along with the fact that he was eligible for early retirement. 52 Bradner Dep., at 87. Based on this response and Clark's statement that he was forced to retire, a rational juror could infer that age was a determinative factor in the decision to force Clark into retirement. See Young, 840 F.2d at 831 (noting that termination following offer of retirement may, in some cases, support inference of age discrimination). Furthermore, assuming that Clark's statement that he was forced to retire is true, Bradner's statement that Clark voluntarily retired is a serious misrepresentation. This misrepresentation, combined with the admission that Clark's age was a factor in the decision to offer early retirement, provides further support for the inference that age discrimination motivated Coats & Clark's decision to force Clark into retirement. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir.1990). 53 The evidence concerning Clark's performance does not compel the conclusion that he was forced to retire based on performance. Coats & Clark contends that Clark was involuntarily retired after 25 years at the supervisory level because his autocratic management style could no longer be tolerated. In support of this contention, Coats & Clark introduced evidence that could lead a reasonable juror to conclude that Coats & Clark was concerned about Clark's managerial style. 4 But this evidence does not establish that Coats & Clark was so dissatisfied with Clark's performance that a reasonable juror would be precluded from finding that age was a determinative factor in the decision to involuntarily retire Clark. In short, whether Clark was discriminated against because of his age is a question that must be decided by a jury. Accordingly, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to Coats & Clark on Clark's ADEA claim. 54