Opinion ID: 2446257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The private right of action argument.

Text: The District's principal argument is that AU cannot obtain review of the Commission's licensing decisions because the Diploma Mill Act does not create a private right of action to enforce D.C.Code § 29-618. This argument fails for two reasons. As a threshold matter, the District's private right of action argument is squarely foreclosed by our holding nearly fifteen years ago that [j]udicial reviewability of agency action does not depend on the creation of a private right of action in the statute sought to be enforced. District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 359 (D.C.1996) (citing Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230-31 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986)). As then-Judge Breyer explained in a case involving the federal Administrative Procedures Act, it is difficult to understand why a court would ever hold that Congress, in enacting a statute that creates federal obligations, has implicitly created a private right of action against the federal government, for there is hardly ever any need for Congress to do so. That is because federal action is nearly always reviewable for conformity with statutory obligations without any such `private right of action.' NAACP v. Secretary of Hous. & Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 152 (1st Cir.1987) (quoted in Sierra Club, 670 A.2d at 359). What is true of suits against federal agencies for alleged violations of federal duties is true of suits against District agencies for alleged violations of duties imposed by District law. Thus, in Sierra Club, we held that Sierra Club, an environmental organization, had a right to judicial review of its allegation that the District suspended its recycling program in violation of District law; following NAACP (and other cases), we emphatically rejected the District's contention that a private right of action analysis had any bearing on the question whether the District's actions were reviewable by a private party that was aggrieved by those actions. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d at 356, 357-61. Similarly in this case, AU's complaint involves a routine challenge to agency action. Thus, AU's ability to obtain review of the Commission's actions does not depend on the existence of a private right of action. The District's claim that § 29-618the Diploma Mill Act provision that bars educational institutions from using the word American in their titlesdoes not create privately enforceable rights also overlooks the fact that AU is not suing anybody for violating § 29-618. Rather, AU is suing the Commission for violating the ELC Act by granting a license to AUD and to Goldstein. True, AU's theory for why the Commission abused its discretion under the ELC Act is that the Commission could not issue a license to AUD so long as the latter was in violation of § 29-618. But AU does not allege (how could it?) that the Commission itself violated § 29-618. Therefore, the District is battling a strawman when it claims that § 29-618 does not create a private right of action. In its reply brief, the District makes an argument different from its private right of action claim; it relies on the principle that agency decisions not to prosecute or not to enforce are presumptively unreviewable. E.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985); Tucci v. District of Columbia, 956 A.2d 684, 690 (D.C.2008); J.C. & Assocs. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Appeals & Review, 778 A.2d 296, 309 (D.C.2001); Sierra Club, 670 A.2d at 360. We have no quarrel with this proposition as a general matter. Indeed, we have held that `the determination whether and when to institute enforcement proceedings against a specific individual is a core executive responsibility which may reasonably be viewed as having been committed to agency discretion so as to preclude substantive judicial review.' Tucci, 956 A.2d at 690 (quoting Sierra Club, 670 A.2d at 360) (brackets omitted). Tucci concerned two District residentsthe Tucciswho were frustrated by, among other things, their neighbors' alleged failure properly to dispose of garbage. Id. at 687-88. In response to this grievance, the Tuccis sued the District seeking a court order requiring more robust enforcement of the Litter Control Administration Act against their neighbors. Id. at 690. We affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District on this claim, holding that the enforcement action that the Tuccis sought was a core executive function committed to the discretion of the District, which in turn meant that judicial review of the Tuccis' suit was precluded. Id. The presumption that enforcement decisions are not reviewable is inapplicable in this case for the simple reason that, unlike the plaintiffs in Tucci, AU is challenging actions that the Commission has takento wit, the Commission's grants of licenses to AUD and Goldstein. See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831, 105 S.Ct. 1649; J.C. & Assocs., 778 A.2d at 308 (if the Mayor does choose to take action, his decision may be contested one way or another). The unreviewability presumption of course may resurface later in the struggle between AU and the Commission. For instance, if after our decision in this case the Commission revokes AUD's license but fails to seek other enforcement against AUD, the Commission likely will rely on the presumption in order to resist AU's attempt to force its hand further. (And because a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another, Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146, 35 L.Ed.2d 536 (1973), AU also will not be able to force the U.S. Attorney's Office to prosecute AUD.) At this juncture, however, the presumption of unreviewability does not bar review of the Commission's actions. In the end, as far as reviewability is concerned, this case is no different from the host of challenges to District agency actions that we hear each year. Consider, for example, challenges to decisions by District regulators to permit new construction, sign off on zoning variances, or the like. See, e.g., Cathedral Park Condo. Comm. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 743 A.2d 1231 (D.C.2000); Downtown Cluster of Congregations v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 675 A.2d 484 (D.C.1996); Dupont Circle Citizens Ass'n v. Barry, 455 A.2d 417, 419, 422-23 (D.C.1983); see also Brentwood, 661 A.2d 652, 653 (D.C.1995) (holding that holders of liquor licenses in the same neighborhood as a license recipient had standing to assert the violation of a regulation prohibiting the issuance of a liquor license to an establishment located within 400 feet of another licensee). We have never suggested in such cases that an aggrieved party's right to judicial review of the agency's decision is conditioned on the existence of a private right of action in the statutes that the agencies are alleged to have violated. In short, although our review of agency action often is deferential, the notion that no review at all can be had in this case cannot be reconciled with the applicable precedents or with the sound reasons of policy that underlie them. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d at 357.