Opinion ID: 581293
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 6 Following the conversion of Defendant's Chapter 11 petition to a Chapter 7 proceeding, Plaintiff filed a complaint objecting to discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4), and (a)(6). Defendant moved to strike the complaint because it was directed jointly at Defendant and his wife, who was pursuing her own separate bankruptcy proceeding. After Plaintiff remedied the defect by amendment, Defendant moved for dismissal on the grounds that the Amended Complaint was filed beyond the time allowed by Bankr.R. 4007(c) and any relation-back rule could not cure the problem because the original complaint had never been served within the period prescribed by Bankr.R. 7004(j). When Plaintiff failed to respond as required by D.Kan.Rule 206(b), the bankruptcy court entered an order, submitted ex parte by Defendant, which deemed the motion confessed pursuant to D.Kan.Rule 206(g). Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, but after an adversary hearing, the bankruptcy court concluded that Plaintiff's conduct throughout the proceedings warranted the severe sanction effected by its initial ruling. The bankruptcy court's decision was affirmed on appeal to the district court, and Plaintiff's present appeal followed. The district court, however, refused to grant Defendant's request for appellate sanctions against Plaintiff pursuant to Fed.R.App.P. 38, prompting Defendant's cross appeal. 7 Plaintiff raises several issues concerning the procedures followed and determinations made by the bankruptcy court in arriving at its decision to dismiss the Amended Complaint. Our review of the bankruptcy court's orders is constrained by the same standards--de novo for legal conclusions and clear error for factual findings--that generally govern appellate scrutiny of bench rulings. Davidovich v. Welton (In re Davidovich), 901 F.2d 1533, 1536 (10th Cir.1990). Of course, we review the bankruptcy court's ultimate decision to impose the sanction of dismissal under an abuse of discretion standard. See, e.g., Miller v. Department of Treasury, 934 F.2d 1161, 1162 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1215 (1992); Toma v. City of Weatherford, 846 F.2d 58, 60 (10th Cir.1988). For the reasons set forth below, we reject most of Plaintiff's objections, but remand for (1) a more particularized specification of the prior procedural abuses that, in conjunction with the D.Kan.Rule 206 problem, led the bankruptcy court to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, and (2) an express determination regarding the relative culpability of Plaintiff and Plaintiff's counsel with respect to these incidents. As for Defendant's cross appeal, we likewise review the district court's denial of the requested appellate sanctions for an abuse of discretion, Sherk v. Texas Bankers Life & Loan Ins. Co. (In re Sherk), 918 F.2d 1170, 1178 (5th Cir.1990); see also Lawrence Nat'l Bank v. Edmonds (In re Edmonds), 924 F.2d 176, 181 (10th Cir.1991) (sanction imposed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (Bankr.R. 9011)), and affirm that decision, as well as the district court's rejection of Defendant's oversized brief, for substantially the reasons expressed by the district court in its order.