Opinion ID: 2076498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: enhancement issues

Text: D.C.Code § 22-3202 (1989) provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Any person who commits a crime of violence in the District of Columbia when armed with or having readily available any pistol or other firearm (or imitation thereof) or other dangerous or deadly weapon (including a sawed-off shotgun, shotgun, machinegun, rifle, dirk, bowie knife, butcher knife, switchblade knife, razor, blackjack, billy, or metallic or other false knuckles): (1) May, if he is convicted for the first time of having so committed a crime of violence in the District of Columbia, be sentenced, in addition to the penalty provided for such crime, to a period of imprisonment which may be up to life imprisonment.... Edwards maintains that even if the incident occurred as the government claims it did, he nevertheless was not armed with a dangerous weapon as those terms are used in Section 22-3202. Resorting to the dictionary, he contends that a weapon is an instrument of offensive or defensive combat: something to fight with. M. WEBSTER, THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2589 (1971). He says that a stationary sink, commode or bathtub cannot be a weapon within that definition or within the statute. Although, as the trial judge recognized, the issue is not an easy one, we agree with Edwards. We are dealing here with the construction of a criminal statute imposing enhanced punishment up to and including imprisonment for life. This alone must give us pause before we give the word weapon an expansive interpretation. A defendant may not be subjected to a criminal penalty unless the words of the statute plainly impose it. United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 297, 92 S.Ct. 471, 474, 30 L.Ed.2d 457 (1971). Statutes creating crimes are to be strictly construed in favor of the accused; they may not be held to extend to cases not covered by the words used. United States v. Resnick, 299 U.S. 207, 209, 57 S.Ct. 126, 127, 81 L.Ed. 127 (1936) (citations omitted). As Chief Justice Fuller stated for a unanimous Supreme Court a century ago, [t]here can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the statute. United States v. Lacher, 134 U.S. 624, 628, 10 S.Ct. 625, 626, 33 L.Ed. 1080 (1890); accord, Resnick, supra, 299 U.S. at 210, 57 S.Ct. at 210; Zaimi v. United States, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 66, 79-80, 476 F.2d 511, 524-25 (1973). The question before us, therefore, is whether the bathroom fixtures were plainly and unmistakably dangerous weapons with which Edwards could be armed, or which he could have readily available, within the meaning of Section 22-3202. A word is known by the company it keeps. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 1582, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). The specific dangerous instrumentalities enumerated in Section 22-3202 are all items which an assailant carries and then uses to shoot, stab, or otherwise wound his adversary. They do not include stationary objects or anything resembling them. This may implicate the maxim known as ejusdem generis, which has been well articulated as follows: Where general words follow [3] specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words. 2A N. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17, at 166 (4th ed. 1984); see also United States v. Brown, 309 A.2d 256, 258 (D.C.1973). [4] This aid to construction is justified on the ground that if the legislature had intended the general words to be used in their unrestricted sense, it would not have included the particular words. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra, § 47.17, at 166; In re Bush Terminal Co., 93 F.2d 659, 660 (2d Cir.1938). It has been stated that this doctrine is especially applicable to penal statutes. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra, § 47.17, at 166, and authorities cited at 176 n. 10. Latin maxims will only take us so far, however; [t]he crux of the matter is that the rule of ejusdem generis is only a constructionary crutch and not a judicial ukase in the ascertainment of legislative intention. State v. Small, 99 N.H. 349, 351, 111 A.2d 201, 202 (1955); see also Standard Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U.S. 215, 220, 29 S.Ct. 252, 253, 53 L.Ed. 480 (1909). Another guide to the meaning of weapon in Section 22-3202 is its use in related legislation. D.C.Code § 22-3214(b) (1989) provides that [n]o person shall within the District of Columbia possess, with intent to use unlawfully against another, an imitation pistol, or a dagger, dirk, razor, stiletto, or knife with a blade longer than 3 inches, or other dangerous weapon.  (Emphasis added). There is a presumption that the same words used twice in the same legislation have the same meaning. 2A SUTHERLAND, supra, § 46.06, at 104; ICC Indus., Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 694, 700 (Fed.Cir.1987). When the meaning of a word in a statute is doubtful, it is appropriate to refer to related legislation to determine the sense in which the word was employed in the particular statute. Coldwell Banker-First Realty, Inc. v. Meide & Son, Inc., 422 N.W.2d 375, 380 (N.D.1988). It is difficult to conceive how an attached bathroom fixture could be possessed with the intent to use it as a weapon, and this would suggest that such a stationary object does not fall within the ambit of Section 22-3202. The presumption that identical words used in the same or related legislation were intended to have the same meaning is not a rigid one, however, see Atlantic Cleaners and Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433, 52 S.Ct. 607, 609, 76 L.Ed. 1204 (1932), and we cannot say that the notion that a weapon is something which the defendant must be able to possess is necessarily dispositive. Canons of construction provide some guidance, but cannot anticipate all of the variables which converge in a concrete case.
This court has employed a functional rather than a maxim-shackled analysis in determining whether a particular object is a dangerous weapon. In holding that a Cadillac automobile, which bears little or no resemblance to the enumerated instrumentalities, may nevertheless be encompassed by the enhancement provisions of Section 22-3202, this court stated that an instrument capable of producing death or serious bodily injury by its manner of use qualifies as a dangerous weapon whether it is used to effect an attack or is handled with reckless disregard for the safety of others. Powell v. United States, 485 A.2d 596, 601 (D.C.1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 981, 106 S.Ct. 420, 88 L.Ed.2d 339 (1985). Similarly, in United States v. Gualdado, 794 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1101, 107 S.Ct. 1327, 94 L.Ed.2d 178 (1987), the court upheld appellants' conviction of assault with a dangerous weapon where they had rammed customs officials with their boat. Quoting United States v. Barber, 297 F.Supp. 917 (D.Del.1969), the court explained that [a]lmost any object which as used or attempted to be used may endanger life or inflict great bodily harm, or which is likely to produce death or great bodily injury, can in some circumstances be a dangerous weapon. Id. The best evidence of [a weapon's] dangerous character, and of what it was capable of doing, was the injury actually inflicted by it. Hopkins v. United States, 4 App.D.C. 430, 442 (1894); [5] see also Freeman v. United States, 391 A.2d 239, 242 (D.C.1978). Accordingly, a dangerous weapon need not be a hand-held item, like a pistol, dagger or hatchet, which could readily be used in combat. Tatum v. United States, 71 App.D.C. 393, 393-94, 110 F.2d 555, 555-56 (1940) (lye); Logan v. United States, 460 A.2d 34, 36 (D.C.1983) (fire). The parties have cited no District of Columbia authority, and we have found none, addressing the precise question whether a stationary fixture may be a dangerous weapon. The government relies primarily on Logan, supra, while Edwards invites our attention to Curtis v. United States, 568 A.2d 1074 (D.C.1990). Neither decision is controlling. In Logan, the defendant first tried to push the complainant's face into a gas burner on a kitchen stove. He then set some telephone books on fire in the living room and tried to thrust the complainant into the resulting conflagration. Sustaining Logan's ADW conviction in connection with the burning telephone books, this court stated that [a]ppellant attempted to shove Osborne into these flames. A jury could reasonably find that appellant, through conduct separate and distinct from his actions in the kitchen, intended in the living room to harm Osborne with a dangerous weaponnamely, fire. 460 A.2d at 36. Logan differs from the present case, however, in that there the appellant lit the fire for the purpose of using it as a weapon and propelled his victim into it. The telephone books which Logan ignited were movable items which he possessed for use against another. In the present case, the bathroom fixtures were but a pre-existing part of the surroundings in which Edwards found himself while perpetrating the assault. They were not something which Edwards could possess or with which he could arm himself as he went looking for his victim. In Curtis, this court considered the question whether convictions of malicious disfigurement while armed and assault with a dangerous weapon merged with one another. 568 A.2d at 1076. In analyzing the elements of the two offenses, we observed that [e]ven an armed man could inflict disfigurement without the use of any weapon, e.g., by breaking the victim's nose with a punch or kick, pushing his face against barbed wire or a hot stove. Id. The court's focus in this discussion was on the weapon with which the hypothetical defendant was armed, and the lack of any connection between that weapon and the victim's injury. The court was not asked to, and did not, decide whether a stationary object can be a dangerous weapon when used by an otherwise unarmed defendant in order to inflict injury. Although the court's use of the word any suggests that a defendant who injures a person by pushing him into barbed wire or a hot stove has not used any weapon, the court was not confronted with the question here presented and did not address our opinion in Logan. [6]
Several decisions in other jurisdictions cast some light on the question before us. In State v. Johnson, 770 S.W.2d 263 (Mo. App.1989), the defendant inflicted injuries on his inamorata when he grabbed her by the hair and beat her head against a door casing and later against some plumbing fixtures. Id. at 269. He also kicked and bit her. Id. Johnson was convicted of first degree assault, (an offense of which the infliction of serious injuries is an element). He was eventually sentenced to life imprisonment as a recidivist. He appealed, in part, on the ground that the trial court committed plain error in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of second degree assault with a dangerous instrument. The court summarily rejected his contention, stating that [i]t was, under the facts here, untenable to suggest that the dangerous instrument or deadly weapon components of the statute were implicated. Id. [7] There was no additional analysis. In State v. Legendre, 362 So.2d 570 (La. 1978), the defendant was charged with aggravated battery with a dangerous weapon. Responding to a motion for a bill of particulars, the prosecutor identified the weapon as Concrete on Parking Lot. The somewhat unusually phrased Louisiana statute under which Legendre was prosecuted defined dangerous weapon as including any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily harm. [8] Id. at 571 (citing La.Rev.Stat. § 14:2(3)). The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that Legendre could not be prosecuted for aggravated battery because [a] dangerous weapon is not by that definition or any other an expanse of concrete forming a parking lot; just as it is not a graveled area or the turf in a meadow. We realize that the accused could use the concrete of the parking lot by striking the victim a blow which would cause him to fall upon the concrete and sustain injuries. [9] But this is not `use' of a `weapon.' No other `use' of the concrete parking lot has been suggested which would produce death or great bodily harm. Obviously by relying upon a concrete parking lot as a dangerous weapon, the State is seeking to convert this offense into aggravated battery. Without a dangerous weapon involved the offense would necessarily be one of a lesser grade. In doing so the State is attempting to extend the article of the Code so as to create a crime not provided for therein, contrary to the spirit and letter of the law. This is not genuine construction of the term dangerous weapon as contemplated by the statute defining aggravated battery. According to the fair import of the words in their usual sense dangerous weapon does not mean a concrete parking lot. La.Rev.Stat. 14:3. Consequently, the State has not charged a crime in the manner required by law.