Opinion ID: 2615551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: plaintiff's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress

Text: ¶ 7 This case presents the question of whether a plaintiff can allege a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based on her witnessing an injury to a third person. Here the plaintiff operated the instrumentality that caused injury to the third person but was not personally threatened with physical injury. Straub argues Fisher and Paykel negligently failed to include a pressure release valve in the plastic chamber of its humidifier, which would allow patients to exhale even if the Y attachment were not connected to the delivery tube. She contends this was a design defect that proximately caused the emotional distress she suffered from watching Mrs. Boney suffocate and die. Fisher and Paykel argues that Straub cannot prevail on this claim because she was never in danger of physical injury. ¶ 8 This Court first recognized a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress in Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 785 (Utah 1988). In Johnson, a father and son were waiting at an intersection when a drunk driver negligently jumped the curb, killing the son and injuring the father. The Court allowed the father to maintain a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. In so doing, it adopted the zone of danger test from section 313 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965). The Restatement provides that when an actor unintentionally causes emotional distress to another, the actor is subject to liability when the actor should have realized that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing the distress, and that the distress might result in illness or bodily harm. Id. § 313(1). Section 313(2) provides, however, that there shall be no recovery where emotional distress arises solely from harm or peril to a third person, unless the negligence of the actor has otherwise created an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to the other. In other words, unless the plaintiff herself has been placed in actual physical peril, she may not recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress suffered while witnessing injury to a third party. ¶ 9 In Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 830 P.2d 236 (Utah 1992), we framed the zone of danger analysis as a distinction between direct victims, those who are in actual physical peril, and bystanders, those who may witness or be affected by the actions, but who themselves suffer no actual physical peril. In Hansen, we refused to extend recovery for emotional distress outside the zone of danger created by a defendant's negligence, even though the plaintiff reasonably believed she was in danger of injury. While on a boating outing, the plaintiff in Hansen witnessed several people near the boat receive electrical shock, including her son. See id. at 238. Although the plaintiff was never actually in danger of harm, she experienced a general `global' kind of fear for her own safety. Id. We held that a plaintiff who reasonably believes that she is threatened with bodily harm cannot bring a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress if the threat of bodily harm is not real in fact. See id. at 243. ¶ 10 Even if Straub could show that Fisher and Paykel's negligence caused Mrs. Boney's death, Straub's claim fails as a matter of law because she was never personally at risk of physical injury when she witnessed the death of her patient. Straub argues that she should nonetheless recover for her emotional distress on the basis that she was not a mere bystander but a direct victim of Fisher and Paykel's negligence. She claims that because she operated the allegedly defective humidifier that caused Mrs. Boney's death, it was reasonably foreseeable that she would suffer emotional distress when the humidifier caused injury to someone under her care. Straub relies on the following cases from other jurisdictions to support her view that a user or operator of a defective product causing injury to another has a negligence claim for emotional distress suffered after witnessing the injury: Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d 912 (1968); Shepard v. Superior Court, 76 Cal.App.3d 16, 142 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1977); Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561 (Iowa 1982); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal.3d 916, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813 (1980); Kately v. Wilkinson, 148 Cal.App.3d 576, 195 Cal.Rptr. 902 (1983). ¶ 11 These cases are unpersuasive. Dillon expanded the zone of danger analysis to allow a bystander who witnesses injury negligently caused to another to recover for emotional distress if three conditions are present: (1) the plaintiff is located near the scene of the accident; (2) the emotional shock results from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident; and (3) the plaintiff and victim are closely related. See Dillon, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 441 P.2d at 920-21. Shepard and Walker apply the Dillon rule. See Shepard, 142 Cal.Rptr. at 614; Walker, 320 N.W.2d at 562-63. This Court, however, specifically rejected Dillon as having an artificial and unworkable analytical framework based on the fortuitous circumstances of the incident and a breach of duty to someone other than the plaintiff. Hansen, 830 P.2d at 242. We concluded that vicarious recovery by a Dillon bystander is too attenuated from the principle of duty to allow for reasonable limitations on recovery. Id. Hansen precludes Straub from relying on Dillon and its progeny to support her argument that she is entitled to recover for her emotional distress even though Fisher and Paykel's negligence did not place her at risk of injury. ¶ 12 Straub relies on Molien and Kately to argue that she is not a mere bystander to whom Restatement section 313(2) should apply. Straub argues instead that, in having operated the allegedly defective instrumentality that caused Mrs. Boney's suffering and death, she was a direct victim to whom Fisher and Paykel is liable. A brief description of the facts in Molien and Kately is helpful to understand Straub's theory. In Molien, the California Supreme Court recognized the negligence claim of a plaintiff who suffered emotional distress upon learning that doctors diagnosed his wife with syphilis. See Molien, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d at 816-17. The court first suggested that application of Dillon would preclude recovery because the plaintiff was not present when the doctors announced the diagnosis which later proved erroneous; however, the court concluded that Molien was a case factually dissimilar to the bystander scenario. Id. The court distinguished between a bystander, who suffers emotional trauma as a mere witness to injury of a third person, and a direct victim of a negligent act, who a defendant should reasonably foresee will suffer emotional distress as a result of the defendant's negligent conduct. See id. at 816, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831. The court concluded the plaintiff was a direct victim because the defendant doctors should have foreseen that negligent diagnosis of a sexually transmitted disease would cause severe emotional distress to the patient's spouse. The doctors' tortious conduct was therefore directed towards the plaintiff as well as his wife. See id. at 817, 167 Cal.Rptr. 831. ¶ 13 In Kately, the California Court of Appeals relied on Molien to hold that a plaintiff stated a cause of action against a boat manufacturer for the emotional distress she suffered when the boat she operated malfunctioned, causing the injury and death of a friend waterskiing behind the boat. See Kately, 195 Cal.Rptr. at 909. Application of Dillon would have precluded recovery because the plaintiff was not closely related to the water skier. See id. at 907. However, even though the plaintiff suffered emotional distress by witnessing an injury of another, the court concluded that the plaintiff was a direct victim to whom the defendant might be liable because the defendant should have foreseen that operators of its defective boats would feel responsible for injuries to skiers they towed and that this sense of guilt would cause severe emotional distress. See id. at 909. ¶ 14 These cases, however, are not compatible with our decisions in Johnson and Hansen. Under this Court's zone of danger analysis it makes no difference that Straub suffered emotional distress either as the operator of the allegedly defective equipment causing the death of Mrs. Boney, or as an uninvolved observer of Mrs. Boney's death. A plaintiff cannot recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress unless the plaintiff is a direct victim of the defendant's negligence. This rule applies regardless of whether the plaintiff's emotional distress resulted from fear for her own safety or from witnessing harm to another. That is, Fisher and Paykel's negligence must have placed Straub in actual physical peril for her to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress. ¶ 15 In a case such as this, a manufacturer of medical devices may be able to foresee harm to patients and medical personnel who are placed at risk of harm or peril by devices negligently manufactured. However, the manufacturer cannot reasonably foresee the extent to which persons who operate or administer these devices will suffer emotional distress upon witnessing injury to patients when they are not themselves placed at risk of injury. The manufacturer's potential liability for emotional distress extends only to direct victims, not bystanders. Finally, the rule ensures that a plaintiff sues only in his own right for a wrong personal to him, and not as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to another. Id. at 241 (internal quotes omitted). In sum, we decline to extend recovery to Straub, who was outside the zone of danger, and refuse to require Fisher and Paykel to compensate Straub for emotional distress arising from a situation in which Fisher and Paykel did not breach a duty of care owed to Straub. See id. at 241.