Opinion ID: 2310847
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disciplinary Sanction As Punishment

Text: Addressing first the punishment issue, I start with the proposition that a disciplinary proceeding against a member of the bar, although intended to protect the public and to preserve the integrity of the legal profession, nevertheless has the additional effect of punishing the sanctioned attorney. In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550, 88 S.Ct. 1222, 1225-1226, 20 L.Ed.2d 117 (1968). Thus the Supreme Court has held that disciplinary matters are adversary proceedings of a quasi-criminal nature. Id. at 551, 88 S.Ct. at 1226 (citation omitted). Indeed, the Court in Ex parte Garland declared that exclusion from any of the professions or any of the ordinary avocations of life for past conduct can be regarded in no other light than as punishment for such conduct. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 377. Of course, this court on many occasions has emphasized that the purpose of bar discipline is to serve the public and professional interests ... rather than to visit punishment upon an attorney. In re Reback, 513 A.2d 226, 231 (D.C.1986) (en banc) (citations omitted); see also In re Williams, 513 A.2d 793, 796 (D.C.1986). Nevertheless, we have acknowledged that an unintended, yet inevitable, result of imposing a sanction on an attorney is that the attorney is penalized to some degree. See, e.g., In re Wild, 361 A.2d 182, 184 (D.C.1976). Accordingly, because of the harsh consequences that often result from disciplinary proceedings, we have held that attorneys are entitled to due process safeguards. In re Thorup, 432 A.2d 1221, 1225 (D.C.1981); In re Wild, supra, 361 A.2d at 184; cf. In re Williams, supra, 513 A.2d at 797 (delay coupled with actual prejudice could result in a due process violation). Given these authorities, I am convinced that the sanction imposed by the majority in this caseindeed, any sanction at allwill necessarily have a punitive impact on Mr. Abrams. The Supreme Court's expansive reading of the Pardon Clause compels this conclusion. See, e.g., Knote v. United States, supra note 7, 95 U.S. at 153 (A pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offence); United States v. Klein, supra note 7, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 147 (a pardon blots out the offence pardoned and removes all its penal consequences). Indeed, when faced with an analogous set of facts in Ex parte Garland, the Court expressly held that a full presidential pardon nullified an attorney's exclusion from the practice of law and restored him to the identical position he occupied before committing the offense: [W]hen the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted . . . after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man. . . . 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 380-381. Likewise, Ex parte Grossman teaches that a full presidential pardon shields its recipient even from sanctions which are left to the sole discretion of the judiciary to impose. Grossman, supra, 267 U.S. at 119-120, 45 S.Ct. at 336-337. Reading Garland and Grossman together, I conclude that this court cannot impose any punitive sanction on Mr. Abrams based on the conduct which was the subject of his presidential pardon.