Opinion ID: 1142688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Validity of Order on Rehearing.

Text: The Juvenile Court Law provides that many matters may be heard and decided in the first instance by referees rather than judges. (§§ 247-250.) [4] However, referees, sitting as such, are but subordinate judicial officers with limited powers. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 22; In re Edgar M. (1975) 14 Cal.3d 727, 732 [122 Cal. Rptr. 574, 537 P.2d 406].) All their findings and orders are subject to rehearing de novo by a juvenile court judge, either at the minor's request or on the judge's own motion. (§§ 248-254.) (2a) Nonetheless, Mark argues that the rehearing order in this case was beyond Judge Capaccioli's power. He contends, among other things, that the rehearing violated his right to disposition by the same judicial officer who took his negotiated plea. We agree and find the claim dispositive. (3) In People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 [150 Cal. Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220, 3 A.L.R. 4th 1171] this court held that whenever a judge accepts a plea bargain and retains sentencing discretion under the agreement, an implied term of the bargain is that sentence will be imposed by that judge. Because of the range of dispositions available to a sentencing judge, the propensity in sentencing demonstrated by a particular judge is an inherently significant factor in the defendant's decision to enter a guilty plea. [Citations.] Thus, the sentence imposed by a judge other than the one who took the plea cannot be allowed to stand. [Citations.] ... (Pp. 756-757.) Arbuckle has been extended to dispositions by judges in juvenile cases. ( In re Thomas S. (1981) 124 Cal. App.3d 934, 937 [177 Cal. Rptr. 742]; In re Ray O. (1979) 97 Cal. App.3d 136, 139-140 [158 Cal. Rptr. 550].) (2b) The only issue remaining is whether it applied to the bargained plea in this case, since the plea was entered before a juvenile court officer other than a regular judge. We emphasize that here, as in Arbuckle, the record indicates an actual assumption by the court and parties that the officer taking the plea would have final and exclusive dispositional authority. Browning made repeated references to the dispositions the Court could or might impose, though I'm not saying what the court is going to do. In context, Browning's interchangeable use of the personal pronoun with the phrase the Court implied that he and the Court were one and the same. (Compare Arbuckle, supra 22 Cal.3d at p. 756, fn. 4.) If any doubt on that score remained, Browning laid it to rest by announcing Mark's right to have the same judicial officer who took the plea handle the disposition. That was an obvious reference to Arbuckle, and the deputy district attorney did not object. Despite Browning's usual assignment elsewhere, considerable effort was expended to ensure that he, rather than some other judge or referee, would act at the dispositional phase. There seems ample basis to conclude that the plea bargain herein was entered in expectation of and reliance upon [disposition] being imposed by the same [judicial officer]. ( Id., at p. 756.) Yet any attempt by a referee, sitting as such, to make a final or binding disposition exempt from review by a juvenile judge would violate express statutory provisions (§§ 250-254); arguably it would contravene the subordinate judicial duties clause of the Constitution (art. VI, § 22, supra ) as well. (See, e.g., People v. Oaxaca (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 153, 158-159 [114 Cal. Rptr. 178].) The question arises whether those facts defeat the otherwise apparent Arbuckle bargain, either because such a bargain would be unenforceable, or because no reasonable expectation or reliance on Browning's final authority could have arisen. The Attorney General argues further that, even if the plea bargain did include an Arbuckle condition, Judge Capaccioli had the power to disregard it; the remedy for his breach of the bargain is simply to allow Mark to withdraw his plea. The answer to these concerns seems relatively simple. The parties may stipulate that a referee is presiding in their case as a temporary judge. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1316(b); see In re Perrone C. (1979) 26 Cal.3d 49, 57 [160 Cal. Rptr. 704, 603 P.2d 1300].) Both commissioners and referees may, if the parties properly stipulate, act as temporary judges. (§ 250; Code Civ.Proc., § 459.) A temporary judge has full judicial powers, and his orders are as final and nonreviewable as those of a permanent judge. (§ 250; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 244(a).) We conclude that the parties' conduct in this case constituted a sufficient stipulation that Browning was acting as a temporary judge. Respondent urges that a temporary judgeship cannot be conferred by mere participation in a proceeding. (4) However, several cases recognize that voluntary participation before a subordinate officer who lacks authority in that capacity may amount to an agreement that he acted as a temporary judge. In Estate of Soforenko (1968) 260 Cal. App.2d 765 [67 Cal. Rptr. 563]. an objector to a final accounting was represented by counsel who voiced no objection to hearing by an unauthorized commissioner, participated fully, cross-examined witnesses at length, and waived findings. The Court of Appeal construed this deportment on the part of appellant's attorney as tantamount to a stipulation that the commissioner was acting as a judge pro tempore. (Pp. 766-767.) (5) (See fn. 5.) Similar results were reached in People v. Oaxaca, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d 153, 161-166 (conviction and sentence on negotiated plea) and People v. Surety Ins. Co. (1971) 18 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, 3 [95 Cal. Rptr. 925] (forfeiture of bail). [5] Respondent points to People v. Tijerina (1969) 1 Cal.3d 41 [81 Cal. Rptr. 264, 459 P.2d 680], and Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351 [110 Cal. Rptr. 353, 515 P.2d 297], in which this court ruled that stipulations conferring necessary judicial authority were lacking. In both of those cases, however, the party asserting the absence of a stipulation had not initiated the disputed proceeding and had participated involuntarily. In Tijerina, a criminal defendant invoked the stipulation requirement against the order of a court commissioner revoking his probation. As Surety Insurance later explained (18 Cal. App.3d Supp. at p. 3), the defendant in Tijerina was not a willing participant in the revocation hearing, since he had requested a continuance to obtain counsel. Rooney, in turn, cited Surety Insurance, apparently approving the tantamount stipulation concept. However, that principle was deemed inapplicable under the facts of Rooney, a confession of judgment case, as defendants [there] were not notified of any date of hearing and were not present at the presentation to the commissioner of plaintiffs' application for entry of the judgment. (10 Cal.3d at p. 360.) (2c) The District Attorney of San Mateo County initiated this section 602 proceeding. Through his deputy, he willingly appeared before Browning, raising no objection when that officer announced he was proceeding under an Arbuckle condition and later entered a disposition on that basis. (6) (See fn. 6.) Such conduct, we think, was tantamount to a stipulation that Browning, by virtue of his status as a commissioner, was acting as a temporary judge rather than as a referee. [6] (2d) It follows that Browning's dispositional order had the same force as that of any other juvenile judge. It could not be reheard in the juvenile court, and Judge Capaccioli's subsequent order on rehearing is therefore void. In effect, Browning's order was never superseded; it stands as the juvenile court's last determination of Mark's status. [7] A word of caution is in order. We do not hold that every bargained plea entered before a juvenile referee is subject to Arbuckle. As we have seen, the rules may preclude the recognition of implied or tantamount stipulations conferring final dispositional authority on noncommissioner referees. ( Ante, fn. 5.) In any event, the referee may state on the record that his judicial status is subordinate and that he has no power to make a binding disposition. If he does so, no inference of temporary judgeship can arise, and no reasonable reliance on an Arbuckle condition can be found. Contrary circumstances exist in this case, however, and we have decided it accordingly. Our conclusion that an enforceable Arbuckle bargain arose makes it unnecessary to consider Mark's remaining contentions.