Opinion ID: 1308987
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the superior court err in denying local 959's motion for a new trial or remittitur?

Text: Local 959 argues that the superior court erred in denying its motion for a new trial or remittitur. The Local based its motion on the lack of evidence that Wells was physically injured and the scant evidence of his emotional distress. [21] Our study of the record persuades us that there was substantial evidence presented at trial that Wells feared for his life. His affidavit and testimony both disclose that fear. Wells testified he was frightened, his wife testified he sounded shook up, and his affidavit stated: The only reason I'm here in Seattle, is because I am in fear of my life based on my prior experiences with the teamsters and the violent acts that have occurred during the Odom strike. [22] The jury could have found that an implied threat on Wells' life was sufficiently severe to result in emotional damage. We conclude that there is a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury's award of $12,500 for emotional distress. This award cannot be said to be either unreasonable or the result of undue passion or prejudice. The focus of Local 959's challenge to the superior court's decision to deny it a new trial or remittitur is that the jury was swayed by prejudice and passion in reaching its special verdicts. The Local complains of Wells' counsel's remarks to the jury, and of the superior court's failure to give a cautionary instruction. [23] It also complains of the punitive damages instructions. It argues that the jury's prejudice is reflected in the jury's note to the judge, seeking to punish the union for all its deeds rather than for merely the actions against Wells. [24] At the outset it should be noted that the Local did not object to the court's instruction on punitive damages, and therefore cannot raise this issue on appeal unless there is plain error. The same can be said of the alleged failure of the trial court to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding counsel's allegedly improper argument. Local 959's argument with regard to the trial court's jury instruction on punitive damages parallels its argument concerning the court's instructions on the elements of the emotional distress claim. Local 959 claims that the trial court erred in not explicitly instructing the jurors that they must find outrageous conduct or reckless indifference before assessing any punitive damages. For the same reasons that we concluded that the superior court's instruction pertaining to Wells' claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress did not constitute error, we conclude that its instruction regarding punitive damages also did not constitute plain error. [25] Local 959 points to the jury's award of past earnings to Wells as indicative of the jury's prejudice. The jury awarded Wells $32,500 for past lost earnings and nothing for future lost earnings. The Local points to testimony which it claims indicates that Wells' past lost earnings were based on his employer's decision to require its drivers to be independent truck drivers, rather than because of his withdrawal from the union. If, however, Wells had remained a union driver, he would not have been required to acquiesce to the employer's demand that he become an independent truck driver, and therefore he could have continued to receive hourly union wages, even if he had to work for another employer. Moreover, there was testimony that because of his termination from the union, Wells lost some $130,000 in earnings. Although he had been working during the period in question, he had essentially no reported income because of expenses. Therefore we conclude that it was not unreasonable for the jury which balanced this testimony with that of the union's expert (who testified that Wells had no lost past earnings), to award him $32,500. Moreover, the jury awarded Wells no damages for future lost earnings; Wells' expert testified that his future lost earnings would be $236,000 and the union's expert testified this figure should be zero. In our view, the jury's separate treatment of past and future lost earnings does not reveal passion or prejudice. [26] Even Wells' counsel's inflammatory remarks, while improper, cannot be said to have resulted in an overall award that was the product of passion or prejudice. The superior court ordered the jury to disregard counsel's remark. While the jury's note asked the superior court whether the punitive damages assessed had to be awarded to Wells, the trial court indicated to the jury that Wells would be the recipient of any punitive damages awarded. The superior court asked counsel if there would be any objections to its statement to the jury to that effect. Local 959's counsel did not object to the manner of the superior court's response. [27] Thus, the jury was required to focus its punitive damages award considerations as initially instructed, on the union's behavior towards Wells. The only potentially serious argument raised by the union's remittitur/new trial specification of error is whether the superior court was remiss in not considering the wealth of the union. The union itself did not raise the issue in its motion. It argues that Wells should have presented evidence of the union's wealth. It further argues that because of judgment in this suit the union had to file a petition in bankruptcy. Our problem with this argument is that by not raising the issue in the superior court, the Local gave the court no opportunity to consider the issue. In such circumstances we hold that the superior court cannot be said to have abused its discretion in denying the motion for remittitur or new trial. [28] The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED. [29]