Opinion ID: 2401195
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the husband's contentions

Text: The evidence showed that Mr. Dews was in fact not the father of J., that Mrs. Dews had become pregnant with J. through an extramarital affair, that J. did not know that Mr. Dews was not his actual father, and that Mr. Dews had represented himself to J. (and all the world) as J.'s father. On these facts the trial court ruled that Mr. Dews was equitably estopped from denying [J.'s] legitimacy and that he was responsible for J.'s support. We agree with Mr. Dews that this ruling was error. Although a number of courts have addressed the applicability of equitable estoppel in the context of a child support proceeding... [i]n the majority of these cases, the courts have declined to apply the doctrine to estop the husband from denying paternity and an obligation to support the child. Knill v. Knill, 306 Md. 527, 547, 510 A.2d 546, 548 (1986) (citing cases). We recognize that [t]he presumption of the legitimacy of a child born in wedlock has always been considered one of the strongest known to the law. Peters v. District of Columbia, 84 A.2d 115, 118 (D.C.1951). Indeed, the District of Columbia has a statute declaring that if a child is born during the marriage of a woman and a man, the man is presumed to be the father of the child. D.C.Code § 16-909(a)(1) (1989). But that presumption is rebuttable, [9] and in this case it was rebutted. Although J. was born during the marriage, Mrs. Dews admitted that she engaged in sexual relations outside the marriage in order to conceive and that Mr. Dews was unable to father a child. See Beckwith v. Beckwith, 379 A.2d 955, 961 (D.C.1977) (mother's admission that son was fathered by another man, not her husband, is sufficient to support finding of adultery), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907, 98 S.Ct. 2239, 56 L.Ed.2d 405 (1978). Thus Mr. Dews, who under the circumstances is only a stepfather to J., has no duty, at least not one imposed by law, to support J. See Prager v. Smith, 195 A.2d 257, 259 (D.C.1963) (second husband has no duty to support wife's child from previous marriage). Many appellate courts, including this one, have considered whether the doctrine of equitable estoppel might be applied to prevent a supposed father from denying paternity, but none that we have found has affirmed a trial court decision to that effect. See, e.g., Fuller v. Fuller, 247 A.2d 767, 769 (D.C.1968) (declining to apply doctrine), petition for review denied, 135 U.S.App.D.C. 353, 418 F.2d 1189 (1969); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App.2d 658, 669, 11 Cal.Rptr. 707, 714 (1961) (finding elements of estoppel absent); Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117, 429 A.2d 833, 836 (1980) (facts not sufficient to establish estoppel); V.L.P. v. J.S.S., 407 A.2d 244, 249 (Del.Fam.Ct.1978) (same); Knill v. Knill, supra, 306 Md. at 550, 510 A.2d at 551 (declining to apply doctrine); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 166-70, 478 A.2d 351, 358-359 (1984) (reviewing trial court ruling and remanding for further findings); see also S.A. v. M.A., supra note 9, 531 A.2d at 1255 (despite the potential applicability of estoppel ... we do not rely on that doctrine). We see no reason in this case either to raise the bar of estoppel against Mr. Dews. The elements of equitable estoppel are set forth in Parker v. Sager, 85 U.S.App.D.C. 4, 8, 174 F.2d 657, 661 (1949): The essential elements of equitable estoppel as related to the party estopped are: (1) Conduct which amounts to a false representation or concealment of material facts, or, at least, which is calculated to convey the impression that the facts are otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those which the party subsequently attempts to assert; (2) intention, or at least expectation, that such conduct shall be acted upon by the other party; (3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts. As related to the party claiming the estoppel, they are: (1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party estopped; and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially. 19 AM.JUR. Estoppel, § 42. The propositions stated are so elementary that no further authority need be cited. The first case in the District of Columbia to discuss the application of equitable estoppel in a child support dispute was Fuller v. Fuller, supra . In that case the husband sought a divorce, and although the wife did not contest the divorce, she sought support for a child born during the marriage but conceived with another man prior to the marriage. This court held that [e]quitable estoppel to deny a duty to support can be invoked only upon a showing that there was an express or implied misrepresentation of fact inducing another to alter his position to his prejudice, and that the record failed to disclose such elements of equitable estoppel as would justify a reversal of the trial court. 247 A.2d at 769. We said that the husband's act of permitting the child to refer to him as Daddy would not suffice as an adequate misrepresentation and that there was no evidence demonstrating prejudice to the child. Id. We declared, further, that applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to require the husband to pay support could not alter the fact that the child was not his: In the absence of the marriage of [Mrs. Fuller] to the natural father and an acknowledgment of paternity by him, the child is now and always has been illegitimate, and the court is powerless to remedy that status by imposing upon [Mr. Fuller] the paternal duty of support. Id. We held that while the natural father had a continuing duty to support the child, the husband had no such duty. [10] Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra , a California case antedating Fuller by a few years, appears to have been the first to discuss the application of equitable estoppel against a husband who was attempting to assert the illegitimacy of a child born to his wife in order to avoid being obliged to provide support. The wife in Clevenger admitted that her husband was not the natural father and that she became pregnant while he was away in the Army. The court held that estoppel did not apply because, [a]lthough the findings of fact state that [the husband] accepted the child, publicly acknowledged and treated the child as his own, there was no evidence that the husband made any representation to the child, either directly or by implication, that he was the boy's father. 189 Cal.App.2d at 670, 11 Cal.Rptr. at 714. The court went on to say: If the facts should show, however, that the husband represented to the boy that he was his father, that the husband intended that his representation be accepted and acted upon by the child, that the child relied upon that representation and treated the husband as his father and gave his love and affection to him, that the child was ignorant of the true facts, we would have the foundation of the elements of estoppel. Id. The court then embarked on an extended discussion of the facts of the case and the elements of estoppel, ruling ultimately in the husband's favor. In S.A. v. M.A., supra note 9, a somewhat analogous case in this jurisdiction, the issue was whether the husband who sought to deny paternity (and the resulting obligation to pay support) could obtain an order requiring the child to submit to a blood test. This court held that more than a mere suspicion of non-paternity must be shown before a child born in wedlock would be required to submit to such a test. 531 A.2d at 1254. In holding that the husband had offered insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of legitimacy, we highlighted the following facts: [T]hroughout N.'s [the child's] first six years, appellant [the husband] consistently affirmed his parentage of N. and treated N. as his child: when N. was born, appellant added N. as a dependent covered by his health benefits; with appellant's knowledge and consent, appellant was named as N.'s father on N.'s birth certificate; ... in his dealings with N., appellant always referred to himself as Daddy, and N. knew appellant, and appellant only, as Daddy.... Thus, for over six years, and on numerous occasions in which appellant could presumably be prosecuted for fraud for providing false information, appellant represented his parentage of N. Id. (citation omitted). In addition, the S.A. court said in dictum that the doctrine of equitable estoppel had potential applicability... to the facts of this case, but expressly refused to rely on that doctrine to support its ruling. Id. at 1255. While in S.A. we said only that estoppel had the potential to apply, we are asked in this case to rule on the correctness of its actual application by the trial court. Considering the elements of equitable estoppel set forth in Parker v. Sager, supra , we conclude that application of the doctrine in the case at bar is particularly inappropriate, if for no other reason than the factfound by the trial courtthat Mr. Dews was deceived as to Mrs. Dews' method of conception. Because Mr. Dews was without knowledge, actual or constructive, of the real facts, Parker, supra, 85 U.S.App.D.C. at 8, 174 F.2d at 661, [11] we hold that it would be plainly inequitable to apply the doctrine against him. See Nolan v. Nolan, 568 A.2d 479, 484 (D.C. 1990). Mr. Dews' ignorance of the true state of affairs, namely, that Mrs. Dews was not artificially inseminated but instead conceived through an adulterous affair, is determinative and requires us to reverse the child support order. See Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra, 189 Cal.App.2d at 673, 11 Cal.Rptr. at 716 (when putative father was deceived into believing that the child was his, he was not estopped later from disclaiming fatherhood when the truth became known). The manner of conception is significant for estoppel purposes. To clarify the paternity of the child conceived through artificial insemination, thirty states have adopted laws, many based on the Uniform Parentage Act, which provide that the artificial insemination offspring is the legal child of both the sperm recipient and her consenting husband. Even in states without such statutes, courts have held that the consenting husband is the child's legal father. 2 CHILD CUSTODY & VISITATION LAW & PRACTICE § 11A.02[1] (McCahey ed. 1991). Thus, assuming that his consent is valid i.e., given with full knowledge of all the relevant factsa husband even belatedly consenting to artificial insemination may well consider himself, and be considered by the courts, to have a duty to support that child. At the very least, he would most likely be estopped in many cases to deny that duty. But in the case of a child conceived in an extramarital relationship, which we have here, the natural father remains fully liable to support the child. Fuller v. Fuller, supra, 247 A.2d at 769. There is nothing in the record before us to suggest that such support is not available in this case. See D.C.Code § 16-916(c) (1989) (authorizing court to order a father or mother to support a minor child). [12] There may well be circumstances in which it is appropriate to impose on a stepparent the obligation to support a stepchild by invoking the doctrine of equitable estoppel. There should, however, be no doubt about when that doctrine will be applied, for any uncertainty will ultimately discourage the voluntary support that is so often provided by stepparents. See Miller v. Miller, supra, 97 N.J. at 166, 478 A.2d at 358. In this case the facts compel us to refrain from imposing on Mr. Dews any duty of fatherhood by estoppel.