Opinion ID: 1172852
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Excluding Certain Property from the Property Settlement?

Text: Ronald acquired three items of property between the parties' April 1983 separation and November 1983 divorce. [4] The trial court declined to divide this property, thus leaving it with Ronald. The appropriate property division is within the broad discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless it is clearly unjust. Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1222 (Alaska 1981); Merrill v. Merrill, 368 P.2d 546, 547 (Alaska 1962). The legislature empowered courts to divide property of the parties acquired during coverture. AS 25.24.160(6). Susan argues that coverture ends with the final decree of divorce and all property acquired by either party before that time is subject to division. Ronald argues that the trial court has discretion to exclude property acquired after separation. Ronald in essence urges this court to apply the equitable divorce doctrine, whereby the cutoff date for determining what is marital property subject to division is the point at which the marriage is no longer viable. See Bussell v. Bussell, 623 P.2d 1221, 1223 (Alaska 1981). [5] Property acquired after the permanent separation but prior to final divorce should be included in the property settlement if it was acquired with property which would otherwise have been subject to division. If the later-acquired property was purchased with property which would not have been divided, then the new property should remain with the purchasing spouse. See Bussell, 623 P.2d at 1223 n. 3. The trial court found that Ronald had no equity in the 107 Seventh Avenue fourplex. This finding is not supported by the evidence. Ronald testified that the fourplex was appraised at $300,000 and the mortgage principal was $262,850. Therefore the total equity is $37,150; Ronald's 50% share is $18,575. However, the down payment on the fourplex came from loans from Data Management to Ronald, after the parties separated. Since Susan is not liable on these notes, it was proper for the trial court to refuse to divide the fourplex, because Ronald is paying for it with property which would not be the subject of property division. The next property at issue is personalty located in Ronald's residence. The trial court apparently found this property had no value. Ronald contends that even if the property does have value, it is not marital property subject to division. The evidence indicated that the personalty in Ronald's home has a value of $7,383.00. Therefore, the trial court's finding that this property has no value is not supported by the evidence. The record does not disclose whether Ronald bought this property with money which would have been subject to division had it not been used to furnish his apartment; absent any evidence that Ronald invaded property which should have been divided, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's omission of this property. Finally, the trial court used the date of separation in valuing Ronald's retirement benefits at $17,275. The retirement plan contributions totaled $25,236 on December 31, 1983 and only $17,275 in April 1983. We find no abuse of discretion in the use of the April cutoff date.