Opinion ID: 2974873
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Penix–Davis Dichotomy

Text: On remand from the Ohio Supreme Court for resentencing, the petitioner also moved to withdraw his jury waiver on the ground that it was not knowing and intelligent because he did not anticipate the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Penix, which was decided while Davis’s case was still on direct appeal. The court held in Penix that a capital defendant who is sentenced by a jury in the first instance 7becomes ineligible for the death penalty following reversal of that sentence. See 513 N.E.2d at 748. Davis now argues in effect that he should have been allowed to withdraw his jury waiver prior to resentencing because reimposition of the death sentence by the three-judge panel was a violation of his right to equal protection of the laws, given that a defendant originally sentenced to death by a jury would not have been eligible for imposition of the same sentence on remand. In Davis IV, 584 N.E.2d at 1196, the Ohio Supreme Court addressed this claim as follows: In his fifth proposition of law, appellant challenges the constitutionality of our holding in Davis [II], supra, which permitted the three-judge panel to consider reimposing the death penalty on remand. Appellant argues that our holding in Davis [II] is unconstitutional since a defendant whose death sentence is vacated following a jury trial would not similarly be subject to the death penalty upon sentencing remand. See State v. Penix, . . . 513 N.E.2d 744 [(1987)]. In effect, appellant requests that we reconsider our holding in Davis [II] in which we distinguished Penix. However, we decline appellant’s invitation, at this time, to revisit our basic holding in Davis [II]. As an initial matter, we note that this ruling is not a decision on the merits and, therefore, that the AEDPA standard of review set out in § 2254 does not apply to this claim. See Newton v. Million, 349 F.3d 873, 878 (6th Cir. 2003). When the state courts do not assess the merits of a petitioner’s claims, the federal habeas court need not extend the deference otherwise due under AEDPA. See id. Instead, the habeas court reviews de novo questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact. See id. When a law seeks to regulate an individual’s fundamental rights or distinguishes between individuals on the basis of certain suspect characteristics, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause. See Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976). Davis clearly does not belong to a “suspect class” for equal protection purposes, however. Federal courts have consistently held that prisoners do not constitute such a class, see Hadix v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000), nor do capital defendants. See Tigner v. Cockrell, 264 F.3d 521, 526 (5th Cir. 2001); Pitsonbarger v. Bramley, 141 F.3d. 728, 739 (7th Cir. 1998). Nor has Davis’s fundamental right to have his punishment determined by a jury yet been implicated in this matter. In the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002), the Court did recognize that Sixth Amendment jurisprudence now requires that a jury find, beyond a reasonable doubt, any fact necessary to increase a defendant’s authorized punishment.8 Ring, however, post-dates not only the petitioner’s sentencing and resentencing, but 7 The Ohio legislature subsequently amended Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.06 to provide for reimposition of the death penalty in cases tried to a jury after the effective date of the amendment. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.06(B). 8 Obviously, Ring’s mandates would apply only in situations in which the criminal defendant did not exercise the prerogative to waive the constitutional right to a jury trial. See, e.g., United States v. Ashe, 47 F.3d 770, 775-76 (6th Cir. 1995) (“Any right, even a constitutional right, may be surrendered . . . if that waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily.”). No. 02-3227 Davis v. Coyle Page 16 also the denial of habeas relief by the district court. Consequently, the state courts cannot be faulted for failing to analyze Davis’s motion to withdraw his jury waiver under a fundamental-rightsanalysis when the right in question had yet to be recognized by the Supreme Court in the context raised by the petitioner. Furthermore, the decisions of the Ohio state courts in refusing to grant the petitioner’s withdrawal motion cannot be successfully attacked as violating the rational basis prong of an equal protection analysis. In order to succeed in such a challenge, Davis must demonstrate that there is no conceivable basis sufficient to sustain the statute, “even if there is no indication that the suggested rationale actually motivated the legislature in enacting it.” Innes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702, 708 (6th Cir. 1996). In denying Davis the habeas corpus relief he sought, the district judge noted that a sound, rational basis did indeed exist in this case for the different treatment of defendants resentenced after jury trials and those resentenced after trials before three-judge panels. According to the district court, “[t]here are obvious difficulties presented in trying to reassemble the original trial jury to participate in a resentencing hearing.” By contrast, “the three judges who comprised the original panel in the petitioner’s case were still available to resentence the petitioner.” Because such a distinction is arguably rational, we must conclude that Davis’s equal protection challenge to the original denial of his motion to withdraw his jury waiver is without merit.