Opinion ID: 1397013
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of polygraph evidence

Text: On August 13, 1981, the Brigham City police asked the defendant to submit to a polygraph examination. Before being examined, the defendant signed a written stipulation stating that he was aware that he was a suspect in the murder of Mike Johnston and that the results of the examination might be received into evidence for either the prosecution or the defendant. The stipulation was also signed by the defendant's counsel and the Box Elder County attorney. The results of the examination were unfavorable to the defendant. The defendant answered no to the questions: Did you stab Mike? Did you cut Mike with a knife? The examiner concluded that the defendant was lying when he answered these questions. At trial, defendant objected to the admission of the polygraph evidence, and the trial court overruled the objection. State v. Abel, Utah, 600 P.2d 994, 998 (1979) left open the question of whether polygraph test results may be admitted in the absence of a stipulation. However, Utah law allows polygraph evidence to be admitted when there is a valid stipulation binding both parties. State v. Abel, supra; State v. Collins, Utah, 612 P.2d 775 (1980); State v. Jenkins, Utah, 523 P.2d 1232 (1974); State v. Rowley, 15 Utah 2d 4, 386 P.2d 126 (1963). See generally Annot., Admissibility of Lie Detector Test Taken upon Stipulation That the Result Will Be Admissible into Evidence, 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 (1973). The defendant characterizes these cases as perpetuating a Dinosaur Rule that we should now overrule. He cites several decisions from other jurisdictions which make polygraph test results per se inadmissible, regardless of the parties' stipulation. E.g., People v. Monigan, 72 Ill. App.3d 87, 28 Ill.Dec. 395, 390 N.E.2d 562 (1979); Akonom v. State, 40 Md. App. 676, 394 A.2d 1213 (1978). See also cases discussed in Annot., supra, 53 A.L.R.3d 1005 § 3 (1973). The Utah rule is neither fossilized nor is it approaching extinction. The above-cited annotation shows that more courts admit stipulated polygraph results than exclude them. However, certain conditions must be met before stipulated polygraph results may be admitted. The defendant's participation in the examination must be free and voluntary, and the trial court must have the discretion to exclude the evidence if it finds that the examiner was not qualified or that the conditions under which the test was given were unfair. The defendant must be allowed to cross-examine the examiner as to his expertise, the reliability of polygraph exams, the accuracy of the apparatus used, and all other points that bear on the accuracy of the polygraph in the particular case and in general. In addition, the jury should be instructed that the examiner's testimony as to the results of the test is not conclusive, but is to be taken only as expert opinion. E.g., State v. Thompson, 37 N.C. App. 651, 247 S.E.2d 235 (1978); State v. Ross, 7 Wash. App. 62, 497 P.2d 1343 (1972); State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 P.2d 894 (1962). See generally Annot., 53 A.L.R. 1005 (1973). Defendant does not contend that any of these conditions were violated. The defendant also argues that polygraph results should be inadmissible because they have not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and accurate means of ascertaining truth or deception and no stipulation can cure that defect. However, polygraph tests properly administered do have a degree of reliability. [2] Defendant is, of course, correct in pointing out that a stipulation lends no greater degree of accuracy to the test. We noted that point in State v. Abel, supra, at 997: [I]t is, of course, clear that a stipulation does not in any way establish the reliability or accuracy of polygraph test results. However, it does embody an important notion of fairness for those parties who consider the polygraph reliable and are willing to rely on it. A stipulation forecloses one party from preventing admission of an adverse test after he and the opposing party have agreed it would be admissible, simply because he does not like the results. On appeal, the defendant does not attack the fairness of the polygraph test in this case. He does not contend that the stipulation was not properly signed; that his consent to the test was not voluntary; that the polygraph examiner was not qualified; that the test was improperly interpreted; or that the test was otherwise unfair or inaccurate. The trial court did not err in admitting the polygraph evidence. Affirmed. HALL, C.J., and OAKS, HOWE and DURHAM, JJ., concur.