Opinion ID: 4098814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absence of Error

Text: As a threshold matter, we hold that the district court committed no error when it accepted Comrie’s plea and sentenced him without identifying, sua sponte, and expressly considering possible RFRA arguments. “Congress enacted RFRA in order to provide greater protection for religious exercise than is available under the First Amendment.” Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 859–60 (2015). “A person whose religious practices are burdened in violation of RFRA ‘may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.’” Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 424 (2006) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–1(c)). 4 Case: 15-31072 Document: 00513762282 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 No. 15-31072 Notably, the statutory framework depends upon litigants to affirmatively invoke RFRA defenses. See Muhammad, 165 F.3d at 336–37 (applying plain error standard of review where appellant only raised a RFRA argument “for the first time on appeal”); see also Hankins v. Lyght, 441 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A party may certainly waive or forfeit a RFRA defense by failing to argue that a law or action substantially burdens the party’s religion.”). To claim RFRA’s protections, a person “must show that (1) the relevant religious exercise is ‘grounded in a sincerely held religious belief’ and (2) the government’s action or policy ‘substantially burdens that exercise by, for example, forcing the plaintiff to engage in conduct that seriously violates his or her religious beliefs.’” Ali v. Stephens, 822 F.3d 776, 782–783 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 862) (brackets and internal quotations omitted).4 Only “if the [religious person] carries this burden” does the government “bear[] the burden of proof to show that its action or policy (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.” Id. at 783. In this case, even assuming for the sake of argument that Comrie’s statements recorded in the presentence report and his wife’s statements at the sentencing hearing would satisfy Comrie’s initial RFRA burdens, Comrie never “assert[ed]” a RFRA violation “as a claim or defense” below. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c); see also Appellant’s Br. at 7 (conceding that “Comrie did not raise this defense below . . . .”). Instead, Comrie entered a guilty plea. We conclude that the district court committed no error, and certainly no reversible “plain error,” when it accepted Comrie’s plea and sentenced him 4 Ali construed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, not RFRA. The precedent provides guidance in RFRA cases, however, since the RLUIPA “mirrors RFRA” and allows persons “to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.” See Holt, 135 S. Ct. at 860 (quoting O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. at 436). 5 Case: 15-31072 Document: 00513762282 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/16/2016 No. 15-31072 without reference to an unraised RFRA defense. Cf. Musacchio v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 709, 718 (2016) (“We conclude . . . that a district court’s failure to enforce an unraised limitations defense under [18 U.S.C.] § 3282(a) cannot be a plain error.”). Comrie’s appeal, therefore, fails to satisfy the first prong of our plain error review.