Opinion ID: 1374657
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Virginia Standing

Text: Citing Stanley v. City of Norfolk, 218 Va. 504, 237 S.E.2d 799 (1977), Jaynes argues there is an established First Amendment overbreadth standing requirement and relies on the following statement we made in Stanley: [I]t appears that, for purposes of standing to make facial attacks, the Supreme Court makes a distinction between two separate concepts of overbreadth, viz., (a) due process overbreadth, resulting from statutory language so vague that it could be selectively construed and enforced by police, prosecutors, and triers-of-fact to penalize persons pot before the court, for conduct not before the court, without fair warning of the criminality of their conduct, and (b) First Amendment overbreadth resulting either from statutory language so vague it could chill the exercise of constitutionally protected speech or conduct, or from precise statutory language which expressly seeks to regulate protected speech, Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-22, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972), or to regulate the time, place, and manner of communicative conduct, see e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115-21, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972), or to require prior approval of communicative conduct by officials vested with standardless discretionary power, see e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); or from statutory language which might be so applied as to burden innocent associations, see e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675, 17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967). It seems clear that, when overbreadth impinges upon First Amendment guarantees, a person accused under the statute has standing to make a facial attack, even though his own speech or conduct was not constitutionally protected; when overbreadth has only due process implications, he has no standing to make a facial attack but only standing to challenge the statute as applied to his own conduct. 218 Va. at 508, 237 S.E.2d at 801-02. However, Stanley and other cases Jaynes cites as making similar pronouncements do not have the precedential status he envisions, particularly as they relate to otherwise unprotected commercial speech. [9] A review of case law on First Amendment standing before and after Stanley is particularly instructive. We begin with our decision in Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 191, 191 S.E.2d 173 (1972), in which the defendant, Bigelow, was convicted of encouraging . . . the procuring of abortion by publication when advertisements for abortion services ran in the weekly newspaper he managed. 213 Va., at 191-92, 191 S.E.2d at 174. On appeal, we determined Bigelow had no standing to assert a First Amendment overbreadth challenge to the operation of the statute at issue because his activity was of a purely commercial nature. Id. at 198, 191 S.E.2d at 177. We distinguished our opinion in Owens because that case involved unlawful assembly and breach of the peace, not a commercial activity. Id. Upon appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the case was remanded for further consideration in light of Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 93 S.Ct. 739, 35 L.Ed.2d 201 (1973). Bigelow v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 909, 93 S.Ct. 3057, 37 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1973). Upon remand, we again affirmed Bigelow's conviction. Bigelow v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 341, 342, 200 S.E.2d 680 (1973). The United States Supreme Court, on the second appeal, reversed our judgment. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975). The Supreme Court opined that this Court erred in denying Bigelow standing to make this claim without any consideration of whether the alleged overbreadth was or was not substantial, id. at 817, 95 S.Ct. 2222, but decline[d] to rest [the] decision on overbreadth and pass[ed] on to the further inquiry . . . whether the statute as applied . . . infringed constitutionally protected speech. Id. at 818, 95 S.Ct. 2222. Ultimately, the Supreme Court held the statute as applied to Bigelow violated his First Amendment rights. Id. at 829, 95 S.Ct. 2222. During the pendency of the second Bigelow appeal in the United States Supreme Court, we decided the case of Wayside Restaurant, Inc. v. City of Virginia Beach, 215 Va. 231, 208 S.E.2d 51 (1974). In Wayside Restaurant, operators of topless bars challenged an ordinance of the City of Virginia Beach in a declaratory judgment action. 215 Va. at 232, 208 S.E.2d at 52-53. The ordinance, inter alia, had been interpreted by the police to prohibit `topless' female dancers as entertainment at the operators' bars. Id. at 232-33, 208 S.E.2d at 53. In the declaratory judgment action, the operators claimed the ordinance is overbroad and violates the First Amendment guarantees of free speech and assembly. Id. at 233, 208 S.E.2d at 53. The circuit court rejected that claim. On appeal, this Court noted the crucial fact that the appellants are admittedly engaged in . . . a commercial enterprise and then rejected the operators' First Amendment overbreadth claim for lack of standing. Id. at 234-35, 208 S.E.2d at 54. The appellants advance a number of arguments that the ordinance is overbroad, i.e., that it would proscribe the wearing of many types of socially acceptable wearing apparel and beach wear, and that dancing, as a form of expression, is speech protected by the First Amendment. The rule is that where, as here, a line can be clearly drawn between commercial and noncommercial conduct and it clearly appears that the prohibited activity is in the commercial area, the actor does not have standing to rely upon the hypothetical rights of those in the non-commercial zone in mounting an attack upon the constitutionality of a legislative enactment. [T]he appellants have no standing to assert the rights of those engaged in noncommercial activity. . . . Id. (citation omitted). Although later decisions cited by Jaynes  Stanley, Esper Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 595, 283 S.E.2d 185 (1981), and Gray v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 675, 537 S.E.2d 862 (2000)  all accorded standing to a defendant to make a facial challenge invoking the First Amendment rights of third parties, Esper Bonding Co., 222, Va. at 597, 283 S.E.2d at 186, all of those cases involve noncommercial conduct by the defendants. Stanley concerned a charge of disorderly conduct during an assault and raised a due process overbreadth challenge and not a First Amendment claim. 218 Va. at 505-06, 237 S.E.2d at 800. Esper Bonding Co. involved the Commonwealth's attempt to assert third party rights regarding the forfeiture of a bail bond, which we denied. 222 Va. at 597-98, 283 S.E.2d at 186. Gray involved a challenge on vagueness grounds to a statute prohibiting possession of an unregistered silenced firearm. 260 Va. at 680-81, 537 S.E.2d at 865. The distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech set forth in Wayside Restaurant was never at issue. More importantly, Wayside Restaurant has never been overruled. Even if the dicta in the Supreme Court's second Bigelow decision on First Amendment overbreadth standing was deemed to contradict the conclusion in Wayside Restaurant, that dicta has no force after the clear pronouncement in Hicks. The authority of the several states to make their own standing rules regarding an overbreadth challenge is unmistakable under Hicks: our standing rules limit only the federal courts' jurisdiction. . . . Whether Virginia's courts . . . entertain [an] overbreadth challenge is entirely a matter of state law. Hicks, 539 U.S. at 120, 123 S.Ct. 2191 (citation omitted). Thus, the force, if any, of the earlier Supreme Court decision in Bigelow on the issue of Virginia standing is clearly and unequivocally negated by Hicks. As noted earlier, neither Stanley nor the other First Amendment standing cases cited by Jaynes addressed the standing distinction set forth in Wayside Restaurant. [10] Thus, it would appear that Virginia does not accord standing to a person, such as Jaynes, whose actions involve only otherwise unprotected commercial speech, to assert the First Amendment rights of those who engage in noncommercial speech. However, to resolve the case at bar, it is unnecessary to resolve the extent of any precedential value of Wayside Restaurant. In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976), the United States Supreme Court recognized that certain commercial speech, even that which does no more than propose a commercial transaction, can be entitled First Amendment protection. 425 U.S. at 776, 96 S.Ct. 1817 (Stewart, J., concurring). In later cases, the Supreme Court recognized the commonsense distinction between speech proposing a commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation,' Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980) (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U.S. 447, 455-56, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978)). The Constitution therefore accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 562-63, 100 S.Ct. 2343. In commercial speech cases, then, a four-part analysis has developed. At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Id. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343. In Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 3028, 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989), the Supreme Court re-emphasized the holding in Central Hudson that the initial portal through which one claiming First Amendment protection for commercial speech must pass is that such speech not be misleading. 492 U.S. at 475, 109 S.Ct. 3028 (quoting Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. 2343). Commercial speech which fails this initial test does not receive First Amendment protection. Id As the Court further noted in Fox, this result is, in part, due to the realization that overbreadth analysis does not normally apply to commercial speech, [and] a statute whose overbreadth consists of unlawful restriction of commercial speech will not be facially invalidated on that ground  our reasoning being that commercial speech is more hardy, less likely to be `chilled,' and not in need of surrogate litigators. Id. at 481, 109 S.Ct. 3028. While Central Hudson Gas and Fox did address First Amendment claims on the merits, the condition precedent recognized in each case as to whether a person's commercial speech can be accorded First Amendment protection, that the commercial speech not be misleading, seems equally applicable in an analysis of standing. There is no question in this case that Jaynes' e-mails propose a commercial transaction, Id. at 482, 109 S.Ct. 3028, and are thus some form of commercial speech. As noted earlier, Jaynes makes no claim that his' commercial speech, on its `own merits, is entitled to any First Amendment protection. Just as clearly, it is self-evident that Jaynes' e-mails are misleading because each contained intentionally false and inaccurate routing and header information intended to shield Jaynes from accountability for his sales schemes. Jaynes does not contest the e-mail routing and header information was false. Thus, Jaynes' commercial speech would fail the initial requirement for First Amendment review under Central Hudson Gas and Fox because it is misleading on its face. In that circumstance, it is reasonable not to accord the speaker of such misleading commercial speech, admittedly unprotected in its own right, standing to vicariously raise the First Amendment claims of others. We therefore hold that Jaynes has no standing to raise a First Amendment objection to Code § 18.2-152.3:1. No Virginia standing should be accorded a person to assert an overbreadth challenge when that person's conduct consists of misleading commercial speech that is entitled to no First Amendment protection on its own merits. [11] If we were to rule otherwise, a criminal defendant whose misleading commercial activities are clearly a crime and otherwise unprotected by the First Amendment gets an unrestricted invitation to apply for a Get Out of Jail Free card by merely pleading a hypothetical First Amendment infringement upon a hypothetical person not charged with a crime. This fails the test of common sense, but also seems unlikely to be a practical bulwark of defending First Amendment rights as decisions like Central Hudson Gas and Fox recognize. [12] Jaynes thus has no standing to challenge the statute in question unless he could show there is no set of circumstances in which Code § 18.2-152.3:1 can be constitutionally applied. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095; see Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974) (This Court has, however, repeatedly expressed its reluctance to strike down a statute on its face where there were a substantial number of situations to which it might be validly applied. Thus, even if there are marginal applications in which a statute would infringe on First Amendment values, facial invalidation is inappropriate if the `remainder of the statute . . . covers a whole range of easily identifiable and constitutionally proscribable . . . conduct') (citations omitted); see also Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n, 551 U.S. ___, ___ n. 5, 127 S.Ct. 2372, 2382 n. 5, 168 L.Ed.2d 71 (2007). As noted earlier, Jaynes does not make a pure facial challenge to the statute, and we therefore do not consider an argument on that basis. Rule 5:17; Rule 5:25. Moreover, it is self evident Jaynes could not establish that there is no set of circumstances which exist under which the statute would be valid; it is obviously applicable to him. Jaynes therefore lacks standing to raise the First Amendment claim.