Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: undue burden standard of review

Text: Even assuming for sake of argument that the right of privacy guaranteed under the state constitution is more broad than the corresponding federal right, it is still not reasonable to subject abortion regulations to strict scrutiny analysis. The very problem with the right of privacy is that the right enjoys no textual support in our Constitution, and the right may be stretched to encompass virtually any perceived injustice. To conclude that all rights falling within the rubric of privacy are subject to the same level of constitutional scrutiny ignores the fact that every privacy right that we discover may not be entitled to such practical immunity from reasonable regulation. Although the majority portrays itself as lawfully bound to apply strict scrutiny analysis because the right to obtain an abortion is a fundamental right under the Tennessee Constitution, no case or rule of law compels this result. While the majority relies heavily upon Davis to provide the constitutional basis for its decision today, Davis simply cannot be read to mean that the state right of privacy is so broad as to require strict scrutiny in all cases involving infringement of that right, particularly when the federal Constitution does not so require. I can find no language in that opinion which actually declares that the right of privacy is fundamental under the state constitution, as one would certainly expect, and according to my reading of Davis, if the right of privacy is fundamental at all, it is because federal courts have so held under the federal Constitution. It is worth remembering, though, that the United States Supreme Court also views the right to obtain an abortion as a fundamental right, yet that Court has stopped reviewing abortion regulations under the strict scrutiny standard of Roe . The Supreme Court has reached this conclusion while simultaneously acknowledging in other cases that other privacy rights are usually protected by strict scrutiny analysis. Reading footnote seven of the majority opinion in this case, one would think that this Court is of the same opinion today, as the majority remarks that [d]ifferent tests may be warranted in different contexts. (emphasis added). This important principle having been admitted, it is of some wonder, then, why the majority goes to great pains to overrule scores of cases and centuries of constitutional interpretation to arrive at a decision that is not even compelled by our great charter of government.
The majority's primary criticism of the undue burden standard is that it provides no standard at all by which to review abortion regulations. Without a doubt, reasonable minds will sometimes disagree as to whether a particular regulation constitutes an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. Indeed, reasonable disagreement as to the meaning of rules and standards is commonplace in many parts of our law and is a direct consequence of the common law system of adjudication inherited from England. Despite its shortcomings, though, the flexibility of the undue burden standard is its very strength, and this more flexible standard allows courts to accommodate various interests and to fashion appropriate relief under the circumstances of an individual case. By way of contrast, the application of strict scrutiny is not flexible at all, and I can find no case in this state where application of this standard has resulted in upholding the challenged law. With the adoption of strict scrutiny, this Court has forced the State of Tennessee into an all-or-nothing scenario, where only the most impeccably drafted legislation withstands the slightest possibility of darkening the constitutional doorway. I simply cannot fathom that the people of Tennessee, who outlawed the practice of abortion until Roe v. Wade , intended to remove all power from themselves to enact reasonable regulations on abortion. Nevertheless, this is the very conclusion reached by the majority today. Even despite the majority's admittedly legitimate concerns, the undue burden standard is practically no more flexible than any other standard of review. After all, even strict scrutiny analysis begs the question of how a right achieves fundamental status, [17] or even how a state interest becomes compelling, rather than merely important or legitimate. [18] Other objective constitutional standards, such as the reasonableness of a search, or the fairness of a trial, are just as capable of lawless decision making by judges who refuse to follow precedent or who wish to place their own imprimatur upon the law. The undue burden standard, though, is not subjective or without definition as the majority asserts. As Casey defined the standard, the phrase undue burden is shorthand for those regulations which have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (emphasis added). Surely the majority does not shy away from the undue burden standard because it requires an examination of the purpose of a statute, as this task is performed daily within the halls of this hallowed institution. Moreover, an examination of the effects of a regulation requires only that the parties fully develop and document the appellate record and that the reviewing court diligently consider the relevant parts of that record. Contrary to the majority's assertions, therefore, a court that is faithful to its duty to declare what the law is does have an objective benchmark by which to measure whether a regulation places an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. Without any citation to legal authority or analysis whatsoever, the majority boldly declares that it would find that all of the challenged regulations also place an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. The majority then uses my disagreement with this statement to illustrate the subjective nature of the undue burden standard. The majority is certainly correct that application of the undue burden standard can result in subjective analysis, but only when that analysis consists of bald declarations of unconstitutionality. The reasoned judgment of the Courtnot the adoption of strict scrutinyis the check in our system against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power. So long as the judgment of the court can be supported by experience, logic, and precedent, then I cannot conceive that any standard, including the undue burden standard, offers no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry that governmental regulation of abortion will be objective, evenhanded, or well-reasoned. [19] It is true that by using the undue burden standard, we are forced to put our trust and faith in judges of good character who are dedicated to sound and reasoned interpretations of law, and I agree that we would be in trouble if the judges took it upon themselves to make law rather than interpret it. So long as the Court is able to make a reasoned decision, the majority's fears concerning the undue burden standard should be minimized. It is my hope and expectation, perhaps navely so, that reason and sound judgment would prevail at the end of the day. The flexibility of the undue burden standard is simply not a legitimate reason to adopt the wrought-iron hammer of strict scrutiny.
The right to obtain an abortion is the single most complex right falling under the privacy umbrella, and these procreational rights involve a myriad of interests other than that of the mother, including those legitimate interests of the fetus, the father, [20] and certainly of the state. As the Supreme Court of Mississippi held when faced with this same question: While we have previously analyzed cases involving the state constitutional right to privacy under a strict scrutiny standard requiring the State to prove a compelling interest, we are not bound to apply that standard in all privacy cases. The abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights. We are placed in the precarious position of both protecting a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability and protecting unborn life. In an attempt to create a workable framework out of these diametrically opposed positions, we adopt the well reasoned decision in Casey , applying the undue burden standard to analyze laws restricting abortion. We do not limit any future application of the strict scrutiny standard for evaluating infringement on a person's right to privacy in other areas. Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 655 (Miss.1998). Because strict scrutiny is usually strict in theory, and fatal in fact, I question the Court's decision only to permit the General Assembly to enact regulations when those regulations are the least restrictive means to achieve the precise interest at stake. More specifically, I question whether abortion regulations can ever be crafted to serve a single interest, and any effort to balance and accommodate several competing interests may result in the regulation failing strict scrutiny with respect to any single interest. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has conceded, the state's important and legitimate interest in potential life ... has been given too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases [using the strict scrutiny standard of Roe ]. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 112 S.Ct. 2791; see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist `throughout pregnancy.'), overruled by, Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Because the majority opinion refuses to recognize that many interests may be furthered by a single regulation, it weighs the value of a regulation against a single interest in order to strike down the regulation. For example, in its discussion of the mandatory waiting period, the majority concludes that the regulation cannot survive strict scrutiny simply because it does not further the State's interest in maternal health. When considering the possible purposes of the regulation, however, I recognize that the state also has an interest in fetal life, and that this interest combined with the state's interest in ensuring informed and deliberate decision making, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 885, 112 S.Ct. 2791, could work to uphold the regulation. Although the undue burden standard does not fully work to accommodate all the various interests involved, the standard certainly recognizes that the legislature may work to advance several interests with a single regulation. Nevertheless, with its adoption of strict scrutiny today, this Court is set to spiral down the same road which has already been traveled and abandoned by the United States Supreme Court. We do so while recognizing that this path is a rough one and not wide enough to safely accommodate all of its travelers. Although I understand the apparent motives of the majority, the judiciary of this state is simply not legitimately empowered to make our Constitution say today what it did not say yesterday. After all, if I were vested with law-making authority and remain[ed] opposed to any assertion that previous decisions should control the outcome of this case, it could be that I would also require a different constitutional standard when reviewing abortion regulationsI would probably only require the challenged regulation to be rationally related to the state's legitimate interests in ensuring maternal health and fetal life. Nevertheless, I recognize that the history, language, and structure of our Constitution provide protection that is co-extensive with federal due process. Accordingly, for the reasons given above, I would hold that the undue burden standard developed by the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey , should apply to review abortion regulations under the Tennessee Law of the Land Clause. This standard is proper because our historical interpretation of the Law of the Land Clause is substantially identical to that of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and because the undue burden standard better works to accommodate the myriad of interests arising in this increasingly complex issue of public policy.