Opinion ID: 337716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The abuse of process contention

Text: 53 Lupo and Szwandrak next contend that in the exercise of our supervisory power to prevent the misuse of subpoenas issued pursuant to Rule 17, we should prohibit the use of forthwith grand jury subpoenas as a means for facilitating investigatory interrogation outside the presumably protective presence of the grand jury. The record here amply supports the contention that the subpoenas were misused. We have in the past made clear that we do exercise supervisory power over the utilization of Rule 17 subpoenas. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85, 93 (3d Cir. 1973). Rule 17 does not, in our view, authorize the use of grand jury subpoenas as a ploy for the facilitation of office interrogation. Neither the FBI nor the Strike Force nor the United States Attorney has been granted subpoena power for office interrogation outside the presence of the grand jury. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 7602. 54 But it does not follow that we can enforce a suppression remedy for the abuse of Rule 17 process. Congress has decreed in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 that all voluntary confessions shall be admissible. In United States v. Crook,502 F.2d 1378, 1380-81 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1123, 95 S.Ct. 808, 42 L.Ed.2d 823 (1975), we held that once the issue of voluntariness was resolved in the government's favor, the court lacked any supervisory authority to suppress a statement. Thus disposition of the suppression motion properly turns not on whether the statements were obtained as a result of the improper use of Rule 17 subpoenas, but on their voluntariness.