Opinion ID: 1780949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prematurity of Brown's Cross-claim

Text: The trial court dismissed Brown's cross-claim as premature. This rationale is sound, if the pleading is viewed as a claim for damages. Brown argues that its cross-claim should not be dismissed, pointing to the similarities between its spoliation-of-evidence claim and the claim asserted in Smith v. Atkinson, 98 F.Supp.2d 1334 (M.D.Ala.2000) (Smith I). In Smith I, the United States district court denied a motion to dismiss a spoliation-of-evidence claim based on our response to a certified question in Smith v. Atkinson, 771 So.2d 429 (Ala.2000)( Smith II). In Smith II, we noted that this Court had never recognized spoliation of evidence as a cause of action separate and independent of negligence, and we declined to do so in that case. Smith II, 771 So.2d at 432. We then held that general principles of Alabama tort law provided a remedy for an injured party whose recovery is defeated because a third party lost or destroyed material evidence. In Smith II we established a test to determine when a party could be liable for negligent spoliation of evidence. 771 So.2d at 432. We analyzed concepts of duty, breach, and proximate cause. With respect to proximate cause, we held: Therefore, we conclude that, in order for a plaintiff to show proximate cause, the trier of fact must determine that the lost or destroyed evidence was so important to the plaintiff's claim in the underlying action that without that evidence the claim did not survive or would not have survived a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P. 771 So.2d at 434 (emphasis added). Applying this standard to an alleged tortfeasor defendant asserting a claim for damages against a spoliator of evidence other than the plaintiff, the Smith standard must be reformulated. In order for a defendant to show proximate cause, the trier of fact must determine that the lost or destroyed evidence was so important to the defense in the underlying action that without that evidence the defendant had no defense to liability. The alternative available to a plaintiff is a way to avoid futile litigation by showing that without the spoliated evidence a summary judgment would have been entered against him had the plaintiff filed an underlying action. Id. Where, as here, the plaintiff's claim remains pending against the defendant, that alternative has no field of operation. No showing can be made in this action at this stage of the proceedings that the lost or destroyed evidence was so important to Brown's defense in the underlying action that without that evidence Brown had no defense to liability. Until Brown suffers a judgment at the hands of Ward and it can be established that without the lost evidence Brown had no defense to liability, a spoliation claim against a third party is premature. Cincinnati and Thompson point to Missouri law as support for their contention that a spoliation cross-claim is premature when the underlying tort claim remains pending. In Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863 S.W.2d 905 (Mo.Ct.App.1993), the Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed one defendant's negligent-spoliation cross-claim against another defendant because [r]esolution of the underlying claim would be necessary to demonstrate actual harm and prevent speculative recovery. Baugher, 863 S.W.2d at 914. Our application of Smith II to a cross-claim by a tortfeasor, so as to require proof that the lost or destroyed evidence was so important to the defense in the underlying action that without that evidence the defendant had no defense to liability is analogous to the Missouri court's rationale in rejecting the cross-claim between codefendants for spoliation on the ground that it was premature. Brown relies upon Yoder v. Kuvin, 785 So.2d 679 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2001), for the proposition that spoliation claims should be brought simultaneously with the underlying tort action. In Yoder, the plaintiffs brought a products-liability claim against the manufacturer of a ladder. The plaintiffs placed the ladder in the possession of a third-party bailee, who subsequently lost the ladder. The plaintiffs sought to consolidate a spoliation claim and a breach-of-bailment claim against the third-party bailee in the underlying products-liability action. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' spoliation claim because it held that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 680. The Florida District Court of Appeals held that the statute of limitations had not run because the injury would not occur until the underlying action had been decided. The court then quoted Miller v. Allstate Insurance Co., 650 So.2d 671, 673-74 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995), stating that `where a viable means exists to pursue the underlying products liability claim, that cause of action must be pursued prior to, or together with, the spoliation of evidence claim.' Yoder, 785 So.2d at 681. The Florida court also pointed to judicial economy as a reason for allowing the plaintiffs' claims to be brought simultaneously with the underlying tort claim. Id. The ladder manufacturer in Yoder filed a cross-claim against the alleged spoliator. The Yoder opinion does not address the viability of the cross-claim, does not state whether the cross-claim sounded in indemnity or damages, and does not address the consolidation of that claim with the plaintiffs' claims. Even if we found Florida law persuasive, the holdings in Yoder as to limitations periods and the propriety under Florida law of consolidating a plaintiff's underlying products-liability claim with a damages claim for negligent spoliation do not support Brown's contention that it has stated a viable cross-claim.