Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Overlapping Special Circumstances

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that in determining penalty, they should consider, inter alia, The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant has been convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. The ultimate source of the foregoing language is, of course, section 190.3. As also noted, the jury found all three special circumstance allegations  which arose out defendant's single attack on Marcie D.  to be true: felony-murder-rape, felony-murder-sodomy, and felony-murder-lewd conduct. (44) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that they should not take into account the felony-murder-lewd conduct special circumstance. We disagree. The legal premise of defendant's argument fails. Contrary to his assertion, neither California law nor the United States Constitution bars the consideration of special circumstances that overlap, i.e., that arise out of a single course of conduct. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 765-768.) The factual premise of defendant's argument fails as well. Again contrary to his assertion, the felony-murder-lewd conduct special circumstance here is not necessarily reducible to either or both of the other special circumstances, viz., felony-murder-rape and felony-murder-sodomy. At the guilt phase, the People introduced evidence that defendant may have committed forcible oral copulation on Marcie by inserting his penis into her mouth. We recognize that the evidence  the presence of a single sperm cell in her mouth  was not overwhelming. But it was sufficient. Indeed, defendant testified that although he did not think that he had done the act, it may have been a possibility.... (45) Next, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that they should not consider the acts comprising rape, sodomy, and lewd conduct under both [t]he circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. The trial court's instructional omission in this case was not error. [W]hen ... the instruction under challenge is adequate, the court is under no obligation to amplify or explain in the absence of a request. ( People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 700.) The instruction here was such. Of course, as defendant argues, the same conduct may not be counted under both [t]he circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true without offense to section 190.3. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 768.) Strictly speaking, it is under the heading of [t]he circumstances of the crime that section 190.3 covers the conduct underlying a special circumstance; under the heading of the existence of any special circumstances found to be true, it reaches merely the presence of any such special circumstances. We believe that as a general matter at least, a hypothetical reasonable juror would understand an instruction like the present to allow only single counting. We further believe that such a juror would have so understood the instruction here. The language directs attention to [t]he circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true  but not to the circumstances of the special circumstances. (Italics added.) All the same, an instruction such as that given by the trial court in this case might conceivably be taken by a jury to permit double-count[ing] ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 768) if its language were construed loosely to refer to the circumstances of the special circumstances as well as the circumstances of the crime. (Italics added.) In view of such an eventuality, we have stated that On defendant's request, the trial court should admonish the jury not to [double-count]. ( Ibid. ) Here, defendant made no such request.