Opinion ID: 4170872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prohibited Practices: It shall be an unfair or

Text: discriminatory practice for any: 1. Person to refuse to hire, accept, register, classify, or refer for employment, to discharge any employee, or to otherwise discriminate in employment against any applicant for employment or any employee because of the race, creed, color, sex, age, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity of such applicant or employee, unless based upon the nature of the occupation. Dubuque, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 8-3-3(A)(1) (2016); see also Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a). Both the ICRA and the Dubuque ordinance include this small-employer exemption: 2. This section shall not apply to: a. Any employer who regularly employs less than four (4) individuals. For purposes of this subsection, the owners, owners’ spouses, and children shall not be counted as employees. Id. § 8–3–3(B)(2)(a) (emphasis added); see also Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(a) (same). “Local civil rights ordinances must be consistent with the civil rights statute.” Consol. Freightways, Inc. v. Cedar Rapids Civil Rights Comm’n, 366 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Iowa 1985). “It follows that when ordinances contain provisions identical to those in the statute the provisions have the same meaning.” Id. Section 216.19 of the ICRA permits local ordinances to prohibit “broader or different categories of unfair or discriminatory practices,” but it does not authorize ordinances to expand coverage to employers not otherwise included. Baker v. City of Iowa City, 750 N.W.2d 93, 100–01 (Iowa 2008) (emphasis added) (quoting Iowa Code § 216.19). The phrase “regularly employs” under Dubuque’s 14 ordinance therefore must have the same meaning under the ICRA’s exemption in section 216.6(6)(a). 1. Is the numerosity requirement jurisdictional? Simon Seeding argues the numerosity requirement is a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. The DHRC disagrees. We reiterate “the importance of resolving jurisdictional issues first, especially those involving subject matter jurisdiction.” State v. Lasley, 705 N.W.2d 481, 485 (Iowa 2005). “[Lack] of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time.” State v. Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993). “Subject matter jurisdiction refers to ‘the authority of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not merely the particular case then occupying the court’s attention.’ ” Alliant Energy-Interstate Power & Light Co. v. Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 869, 874–75 (Iowa 2007) (quoting Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 448 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 1989)). “If a court enters a judgment without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the judgment is void and subject to collateral attack.” Klinge v. Bentien, 725 N.W.2d 13, 16 (Iowa 2006). In Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., the United States Supreme Court held Title VII’s fifteen-employee numerosity requirement is not jurisdictional, but rather is a merits-based substantive proof requirement. 546 U.S. 500, 515, 126 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 (2006). First, the Court emphasized subject-matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived,” and it had the obligation to raise the inquiry on its own motion. Id. at 501, 126 S. Ct. at 1237 (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S. Ct. 1781, 1785 (2002)). But “[n]othing in the text of Title VII indicate[d] that Congress intended courts, on their own motion, to assure that the employee-numerosity requirement is met.” Id. at 514, 126 S. Ct. at 1244. Second, when subject-matter jurisdiction “turns on contested 15 facts,” the judge may resolve the dispute. Id. However, the “jury [was] the proper trier” of the numerosity requirement, which involved an “essential element of a claim for relief.” Id. Finally, the Court noted the unfairness and “waste of judicial resources” that would entail if the numerosity requirement were jurisdictional because a party could raise the issue after trial and vacate the judgment. Id. at 515, 126 S. Ct. at 1245. The Court concluded, “[W]hen Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as nonjurisdictional in character.” Id. at 516, 126 S. Ct. at 1245. We find the Arbaugh analysis persuasive and hold the numerosity requirement in the ICRA and Dubuque ordinance is not jurisdictional. Simon Seeding argues Arbaugh is inapposite because the ICRA is structured differently than the Federal Act. Title VII includes the fifteenemployee threshold in the statutory definition for the word “employer.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, § 701(b), 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2012)). 2 The ICRA, however, defines “employer” to include “the state of Iowa . . . and every other person employing employees within the state.” Iowa Code § 216.2(7). The numerosity requirement is placed in the substantive portion of the Act. See id. § 216.6 (entitled “Unfair employment practices”). That placement reinforces our conclusion it is a meritsbased element of proof required for liability, rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite. Whether an employer “regularly employs” four or more employees, as this case shows, is a fact-intensive inquiry best determined by the trier of fact. 2The1964 Act required twenty-five employees for twenty weeks in any current or preceding calendar year. A 1972 amendment changed the requirement to fifteen employees. 1972 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 92–261, § 2(2), 86 Stat. 103, 103 (1972). 16 Our analytical approach to subject-matter jurisdiction mirrors the Arbaugh analysis: [J]urisdiction of the subject matter is conferred by operation of law, and not by act of the parties or by procedure of the court. It cannot be ousted by act of the parties, if it exists, nor conferred by such acts, if it does not exist. Its existence antedates the particular litigation, and is not conferred by the litigation or by its procedure. Pottawattamie Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. v. Landau, 210 N.W.2d 837, 843 (Iowa 1973) (alteration in original) (quoting Appeal of McLain, 189 Iowa 264, 269, 176 N.W. 817, 819 (1920)). The ICRA “provides a cause of action for discriminatory practices” and “gives the district court subject matter jurisdiction of such actions.” Christie, 448 N.W.2d at 450. Subject-matter jurisdiction “cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel.” Duckett, 732 N.W.2d 874 (quoting Keokuk County v. H.B., 593 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1999)). If numerosity were jurisdictional, a party could raise it after trial to vacate a judgment, resulting in a waste of resources. See In re Estate of Falck, 672 N.W.2d 785, 789 (Iowa 2003) (noting lack of subject-matter jurisdiction makes the judgment void). The better interpretation is that the numerosity requirement of section 216.6(6)(a) is part of the plaintiff’s substantive burden of proof. If the defendant does not contest numerosity, “the judgment becomes final and is not subject to collateral attack.” Id. at 790. 2. Did the agency correctly interpret the term “regularly employs”? Simon Seeding urges us to follow Cochran v. Seniors Only Financial, Inc., which interpreted the ICRA’s numerosity requirement. 209 F. Supp. 2d 963, 967 (S.D. Iowa 2002). Janet Cochran alleged a hostile work environment and sex discrimination in violation of the ICRA. Id. at 964. The defendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the ground it employed less than four individuals. Id. The Cochran court 17 noted, “Iowa Code section 216.6(6)(a) has not been heavily inspected by the courts.” Id. at 967. The court observed that although federal law “is not controlling of ICRA claims,” it can provide “the analytical framework.” Id. at 966 (quoting Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872, 873 (Iowa 1999)). Title VII’s numerosity requirement defines the term “employer” to include only those having “fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The Cochran court concluded it was appropriate to rely on federal authorities for guidance to interpret section 216.6(6): In Vivian, the Iowa Supreme Court found some stark differences in the language the Iowa legislators [chose] to use, and found that federal law was not persuasive and a supervisor could be held personally liable under the ICRA. In this case, the Court does not find these same differences in the relevant statutory language when comparing the ICRA to Title VII. While the ICRA states that for an employee to count he or she must be “regularly” employed, Title VII goes a step farther and says that an employee must be employed “for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year” in order for the employee to count towards the numerosity requirement. The Court finds that Title VII does provide appropriate guidance for determining whether an employee is “regularly” employed under the ICRA and adopts this definition. 209 F. Supp. 2d at 967 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). The court concluded each employee “must have been employed for twenty weeks in order to have been ‘regularly’ employed’ ” under the ICRA. Id. Under that definition, the employer “regularly employed only two employees during the relevant time frame.” Id. Therefore, the court granted summary judgment for the employer. Id. Simon Seeding argues we should follow Cochran to count only individuals it had employed for at least twenty weeks. The Cochran court, however, used a twenty-week requirement nowhere codified in the 18 ICRA. Moreover, Cochran is contrary to the great weight of federal authority as well as state court numerosity decisions. We decline to follow it. 3 The DHRC relies on Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., a United States Supreme Court case clarifying how to count employees under Title VII. 519 U.S. 202, 207, 117 S. Ct. 660, 664 (1997). Darlene Walters filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), “claiming that Metropolitan had discriminated against her on account of her sex in failing to promote her.” Id. at 204, 117 S. Ct. at 662. Metropolitan filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that it “did not pass the 15-employee threshold for coverage under Title VII.” Id. The district court granted the motion, reasoning that employees only counted toward the fifteen-person requirement on days “which they actually performed work or were being compensated.” Id. at 205, 117 S. Ct. at 663. The court of appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to explain how and when persons are counted as employees. Id. The Walters Court stated that “an employer ‘has’ an employee if he maintains an employment relationship with that individual.” Id. at 207, 117 S. Ct. at 664. To determine whether an employment relationship 3Nofederal appellate court has adopted the Cochran approach urged by Simon Seeding—that an employee must work for twenty weeks before counting toward the threshold employee requirement. See Cochran, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 967. A federal district court, interpreting a similar numerosity requirement under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, observed, All that the statute requires is that the employer have 20 or more employees for each day of 20 or more calendar weeks. It does not require that a particular individual be employed for 20 weeks prior to being counted as an employee. Rogers v. Sugar Tree Prods., Inc., 824 F. Supp. 755, 761 (N.D. Ill. 1992), aff’d 7 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 1993). 19 exists, courts should look “first and primarily to whether the individual in question appears on the employer’s payroll.” Id. at 211, 117 S. Ct. at 666. [A]ll one needs to know about a given employee for a given year is whether the employee started or ended employment during that year and, if so, when. He is counted as an employee for each working day after arrival and before departure. Id. at 211, 117 S. Ct. at 665–66. “Metropolitan had between 15 and 17 employees on its payroll” for thirty-eight weeks out of the year. Id. at 205, 212, 117 S. Ct. at 663, 666. Therefore, Metropolitan met the fifteen-employee threshold and was subject to the provisions of Title VII. Id. at 212, 117 S. Ct. at 666. Walters resolved a circuit split among federal circuits over how to count employees to meet Title VII’s numerosity requirement. 519 U.S. at 205–07, 117 S. Ct. at 662–64. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Eighth Circuits had counted employees for a particular working day only when the employer was “actually compensating the individual on that day.” Id. at 206, 117 S. Ct. at 663; see also E.E.O.C. v. Garden & Assocs., Ltd., 956 F.2d 842, 843 (8th Cir. 1992), abrogated by Walters, 519 U.S. at 206, 212, 117 S. Ct. at 663, 666; Zimmerman v. N. Am. Signal Co., 704 F.2d 347, 354 (7th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Walters, 519 U.S. at 206, 212, 117 S. Ct. at 663, 666. This interpretation excluded many part-time workers who did not work each day and thus were not considered “employees” for that week, and excluded employees who left or began work mid-week. Garden & Assocs., 956 F.2d at 843 (part-time employees); E.E.O.C. v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225, 1228 (7th Cir. 1995) (counting employees who exit or enter mid20 week is a “highly unlikely reading of the statute”), rev’d sub nom. Walters, 519 U.S. at 212, 117 S. Ct. at 666. On the other side of the circuit split, in Thurber v. Jack Reilly’s, Inc., the First Circuit adopted a broader payroll approach based on Title VII’s legislative history. 717 F.2d 633, 634 (1st Cir. 1983). “Congressional debate on enactment of Title VII revealed concern for the over-regulation of small family or neighborhood businesses.” Id. “The number 15 was a compromise figure,” but there was “nothing in the record to indicate a Congressional intent to require that employees report to work on each day that they are included.” Id. at 635. The court recognized that Title VII was a “remedial statute, and the prevailing majority in Congress intended to give it broad effect.” Id. The court stated, It is true that the interpretation given to the statute by the district court might sweep into the ambit of the statute a few truly “Mom and Pop” stores, which employ a large number of part-time employees in order to keep open long hours. The burden on such businesses, however, is the relatively modest one of forbearance from discrimination in employment. In our opinion, the inclusion of such stores offends less against the policy of the statute than does the exclusion of businesses such as the appellant. Id. “ ‘[T]he term “employer” [was] intended to have its common dictionary meaning,’ and that employers with part-time or seasonal staffs were intended to be covered by the act ‘when the number of employees exceeds the minimum figure.’ ” Pedreyra v. Cornell Prescription Pharmacies, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 936, 941 (D. Colo. 1979) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7216–7217 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 1964)); see also David A. Forkner & Kent M. Kostka, Unanimously Weaving a Tangled Web: Walters, Robinson, Title VII, and the Need for Holistic Statutory Interpretation, 36 Harv. J. on Legis. 161, 170 (1999) (detailing comments of Senator 21 Dirksen, the author of the amendment that coined the “employer” definition, stating purpose of twenty-week requirement was to reach seasonal workers). The Cochran approach we reject would allow savvy employers to structure their workforce to avoid compliance obligations. An employer could “keep[] its staffing levels above the threshold on most working days, and allow[] it to fall under the level on just one work day.” Wright v. Kosciusko Med. Clinic, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1327, 1332 (N.D. Ind. 1992). The Thurber approach counted an employee toward the threshold on each day an employment relationship existed, as evidenced by payroll records, regardless of whether the employee reported to work. 717 F.2d at 634. The Walters Court found this more expansive payroll method persuasive and adopted it as the federal standard. 519 U.S. at 210–11, 117 S. Ct. at 665–66. We agree with the DHRC that the Walters payroll approach should be used to count employees for the ICRA and Dubuque small-employer exemption, without regard to the number of weeks individual employees worked. In the absence of a legislative definition, we strive to give words their ordinary meaning. City of Riverdale v. Diercks, 806 N.W.2d 643, 655–56 (Iowa 2011). “The primary purpose of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent,” gleaned from the words used by the legislature. State v. McCoy, 618 N.W.2d 324, 325 (Iowa 2000). “[W]e read statutes as a whole rather than looking at words and phrases in isolation”; context is important. Iowa Ins. Inst. v. Core Grp. of Iowa Ass’n for Justice, 867 N.W.2d 58, 72 (Iowa 2015). “We ‘look to the object to be accomplished and the evils and mischiefs sought to be remedied in reaching a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose rather than one which will defeat it.’ ” Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 15 22 (quoting Sommers v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 337 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 1983)). In Baker, we discussed the purpose of the small-employer exemption. 750 N.W.2d at 101. John Baker owned a home in Iowa City and employed a resident manager to run the property while he lived out of state. Id. at 95. Baker allegedly discriminated against a female applicant for the position. Id. An Iowa City civil rights ordinance applied by its terms to employers with “one or more” employees. Id. at 100 (quoting Iowa City, Iowa, City Code § 2–3–1 (2003)). We held the city ordinance could not expand the coverage of the Iowa Civil Rights Act and thereby nullify the ICRA’s small-business exemption. Id. at 101–02. We recognized that the small-employer exemption was enacted as a result of “changes advocated in a 1964 law review article” by Professor Arthur Bonfield. Id. at 101. Bonfield “urged enactment of an employment discrimination statute that included a small-employer exemption.” Id. (citing Arthur E. Bonfield, State Civil Rights Statutes: Some Proposals, 49 Iowa L. Rev. 1067, 1108 (1964) [hereinafter State Civil Rights Statutes]). Almost all fair employment practices acts exempt small employers, which are defined as employers with less than a specified number of employees. The general consensus seems to be that notions of freedom of association should preponderate over concepts of equal opportunity in these situations because the smallness of the employer’s staff is usually likely to mean for him a rather close, intimate, personal, and constant association with his employees. Id. (quoting State Civil Rights Statutes, 49 Iowa L. Rev. at 1109)). Accordingly, in Baker we interpreted the ICRA to “protect small employers’ associational interests.” Id. We concluded “the legislature made the policy decision that ‘freedom of association should preponderate over concepts of equal opportunity’ in situations involving 23 small employers.” Id. (quoting State Civil Rights Statutes, 49 Iowa L. Rev. at 1109). We also apply the legislative directive to “construe[ the ICRA] broadly to effectuate its purposes.” Iowa Code § 216.18(1); accord Dubuque, Iowa, Code of Ordinances § 8-4-10 (codifying same rule of construction). The ICRA was enacted “to eliminate unfair and discriminatory practices in . . . employment” and “correct a broad pattern of behavior rather than merely affording a procedure to settle a specific dispute.” Renda, 784 N.W.2d at 19 (alteration in original) (first quoting 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 121 (title of act), then quoting Estabrook v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm’n, 283 N.W.2d 306, 308 (Iowa 1979)). We strive to effectuate these purposes as we define the phrase “regularly employs less than four individuals.” The dictionary defines “regularly” as “in a regular, orderly, lawful or methodical way.” Regularly, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (unabr. ed. 2002). “Regular,” is defined as “returning, recurring, or received at stated, fixed, or uniform intervals.” Regular, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. We construed “employ” in the Iowa wage payment collection law to mean, To engage in one’s service; to hire, to use as an agent or substitute in transacting business; to commission and intrust with the performance of certain acts or functions or with the management of one’s affairs; . . . the term is equivalent to hiring, which implies a request and a contract for compensation. To make use of, to keep at work, to entrust with some duty. Runyon v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 653 N.W.2d 582, 585 (Iowa 2002) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Employ, Black’s Law Dictionary (abr. 6th ed. 1991)); see also Employ, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (defining “employ” as “to provide with a job that 24 pays wages or a salary or with a means of earning a living”). Thus, the word “employ” focuses on the existence of a contract for services, and the word “regular” focuses on recurring acts. We must interpret words in context. The phrase “regularly employs” modifies “employer,” not employee. Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(a) (“Any employer who regularly employs” (emphasis added)). The exemption could have been drafted to say, “Any employee who is regularly employed.” For example, Connecticut’s workers’ compensation statute defines an employee as excluding a person engaged in service in a private dwelling “provided he is not regularly employed by the owner or occupier over twenty-six hours per week.” Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 31275(9)(A)(vi) (West, Westlaw current through General Statutes of Conn., Revision of 1958, Revised to Jan. 1, 2017). This was interpreted to mean the “person must work more than twenty-six hours per week during the majority of the fifty-two weeks preceding the date of his or her injury.” Smith v. Yurkovsky, 830 A.2d 743, 746 (Conn. 2003); see also La. Stat. Ann. § 47:111(A)(3)(a) (Westlaw current through 2017 1st Extraordinary Sess.) (defining “regularly employed” as a person who performs services over a set period of twenty-four days per calendar quarter). Simon Seeding’s interpretation would make more sense under those statutes. By contrast, the Iowa legislature chose to define the smallemployer exemption by focusing on the actions of the employer rather than the individual employee. We are bound by the language our legislature selected. Iowa Code section 216.6(6)(a) exempts employers who regularly employ less than four individuals. Our interpretation is supported by the numerosity decisions of other state appellate courts construing equivalent small-employer exemptions. For example, the California Fair Employment and Housing 25 Act defines an “employer” as “any person regularly employing five or more persons.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12926(d) (West, Westlaw current through ch. 8 of 2017 Reg. Sess.). In Robinson v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, the California Supreme Court interpreted the term “regularly employing” under the Act. 825 P.2d 767, 768 (Cal. 1992). The Robinson court gave those words their ordinary meaning, stating, The California act states that an employer falls within its provisions only when he is regularly employing five or more persons. This does not mean that the accused employer must have five or more employees every day throughout the year or that he must have five or more employees at the time of the discriminatory act. It does mean that he must have an “average” or “normal” complement of five or more persons in his employ on a “regular” basis. Id. at 773 (quoting Michael C. Tobriner, California FEPC, 16 Hastings L.J. 333, 343 (1965) [hereinafter Tobriner]). The court determined the purpose of the Act was to reliev[e] the administrative body of the burden of enforcement [of the Act] where few job opportunities are available, and [to] keep[] the agency out of situations in which discrimination is too subtle or too personal to make effective solutions possible. Id. at 774. As we did in Baker, the California Supreme Court noted the legislature’s policy choice to favor the associational rights of small employers: A sense of justice and propriety led the framers to believe that individuals should be allowed to retain some small measure of the so-called freedom to discriminate; besides, they feared the political repercussions of eliminating totally an area of free choice whose infringement had been so bitterly opposed. In the second place, the framers believed that discrimination on a small scale would prove exceedingly difficult to detect and police. Third, it was believed that an employment situation in which there were less than five employees might involve a close personal relationship between employer and employees and that fair employment laws should not apply where such a relationship existed. 26 Finally, the framers were interested primarily in attacking protracted, large-scale discrimination by important employers and strong unions. Their aim was not so much to redress each discrete instance of individual discrimination as to eliminate the egregious and continued discriminatory practices of economically powerful organizations. Thus they could afford to exempt the small employer. Id. at 775 (quoting Tobriner, 16 Hastings L.J. at 342). The Robinson court concluded the word “regularly” suggested an understanding of “occurring at fixed intervals.” Id. Thus, “the number of employees who work regularly as opposed to intermittently, or who are carried on the payroll at the time of the discriminatory act, would be dispositive.” Id. Similarly, North Carolina’s Equal Employment Practices Act applies to employers that “regularly employ 15 or more employees.” See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 143-422.2 (West, Westlaw effective through S.L. 2017-9, 2017 Reg. Sess.). Interpreting this phrase, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found the federal “payroll method” persuasive: “The ultimate purpose of . . . [N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 143– 422.2, and Title VII . . . is the same; that is, the elimination of discriminatory practices in employment.” Accordingly, we find the language of Title VII, and the principles of law applied to claims arising under Title VII, to be instructive here. We conclude that an employer regularly employs 15 or more employees, and is thus governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143–422.2, when 15 or more employees appear on the employer’s payroll each working day during each of 20 or more calendar work weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. Walker v. Town of Stoneville, 712 S.E.2d 239, 248 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting N.C. Dep’t of Corr. v. Gibson, 301 S.E.2d 78, 85 (N.C. 1983)). Under Simon Seeding’s interpretation, an employer could employ 100 individuals for nineteen weeks, terminate their employment, then hire 100 different individuals for the next nineteen weeks, and so on. The employer would thereby escape the purview of the Act because at no 27 point would he have employed the same four or more individuals for twenty consecutive weeks. Given that section 216.6(6)(a) was intended to exempt only small employers, we refuse to open that loophole in the ICRA. We instead adopt the Walters approach to hold that an employee is counted for purposes of the small-business exemption if that employee has an employment relationship with the employer—that is, if he or she is on the payroll. We decline to import a twenty-week requirement into the ICRA. Title VII expressly codifies a twenty-week requirement. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (defining “employer” as “a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each working day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year”). Title VII was enacted with the twenty-calendar week requirement in 1964. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–190, § 701, 78 Stat. 241, 253. The Iowa legislature declined to include a twenty-week term when it enacted the ICRA a year later. See 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 121, § 7. We will not add a requirement to a statute that the legislature chose to omit. See Hawkeye Land Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 847 N.W.2d 199, 210 (Iowa 2014) (“[L]egislative intent is expressed by what the legislature has said, not what it could or might have said. . . . Intent may be expressed by the omission, as well as the inclusion, of statutory terms.” (quoting State v. Beach, 630 N.W.2d 598, 600 (Iowa 2001)). The ICRA’s requirement that an employer “regularly employ” four or more employees does not include a requirement the employer must do so for twenty weeks. Nonetheless, we must give effect to the word “regularly” as used in the small-business exemption. Our statute is unlike Ohio’s in which the numerosity requirement merely states “any person employing four or 28 more persons within the state.” Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4112.01 (West, Westlaw current through 2017 File 4). Such a statute would not require a minimum period during which the requisite number must be employed and could be interpreted to apply if the employer merely had four employees at the time of the discrimination. See Cisneros v. Birck, No. 94APE08–1255, 1995 WL 222156, at  (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 11, 1995) (“The statute does not say that an employer is any person who employed four people during any period of time whatsoever. . . . [I]t is apparent that the legislature meant that the employer must have at least four employees at the time the discrimination occurred.”). But “we must ‘give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.’ ” TLC Home Health Care, L.L.C. v. Iowa Dep’t of Human Servs., 638 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 2002) (quoting United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538–39, 75 S. Ct. 513, 520 (1955)). At the time of ICRA’s enactment, the workers’ compensation laws in many states applied to employers who “regularly employed” the requisite number of individuals. In Mobile Liners, Inc. v. McConnell, the Alabama Supreme Court adjudicated whether a steamboat company “regularly employ[ed]” less than sixteen employees under that state’s act. 126 So. 626, 627 (Ala. 1930). The employer continuously employed nine people to do office work, but employed many more as checkers when steamboats came into port. Id. at 628. “These checkers were not employed every day, but were employed for each vessel when it was in port,” and the arrival of the vessels occurred at regular intervals. Id. The court determined the employer “regularly” employed more than sixteen individuals, despite the intermittent nature of the work. Id. at 631. The McConnell court stated, 29 The word “regularly” is not synonymous with “constancy.” There are businesses of importance which employ numbers of men regularly, who employ none of them continuously. And a number of businesses, as this, will require a large number of employees, nearly all or a large number of whom are employed only periodically, for the reason that the needs of the business require their services only at intervals or periods, whenever the business is in active operation. We may illustrate by amusement parks, theaters, places of entertainment, building or construction contractors who have or may have many men working for them, and yet fall within the class of those who cannot foretell the number of workmen they will have or need on the first of the next month or a given, designated date. Id. at 629. The proper focus was on the employer and “whether the occurrence is or is not an established mode or plan in the operation of the business.” Id. at 630. In other words, if the employer’s typical method of transacting business involved the work of the requisite number of employees, then the employer was covered by the Act. See id. Many other courts had taken the same approach at the time the ICRA was enacted. 4 4The Arizona Supreme Court observed, “[W]here in the ordinary conduct of an employer’s business he customarily or regularly employs the number required to make the act applicable to him . . . he is within the provisions of the [Workers’ Compensation] Act.” Marshall v. Indus. Comm’n, 156 P.2d 729, 732 (Ariz. 1945) (collecting cases); see also Grant v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 11 Alaska 355, 361 (D. Ct. 1947) (“[W]hen the statutory number of persons is employed most of the time so that it can be said to be the rule rather than the exception; or where . . . the event or condition requiring their employment is a regularly recurring one in the ordinary course of the business, the employer is within the Act.” (Citation omitted.)); Wallace v. Wells, 255 S.W.2d 970, 973 (Ark. 1953) (noting employer “had five men regularly employed, although some of them worked only two days a week”); France v. Munson, 3 A.2d 78, 81 (Conn. 1938) (“The word ‘regularly’ implies a practice [of employment] . . . .”); Mathers v. Sellers, 113 So. 2d 443, 444 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (“It is also the general rule that coverage is imposed where there is uniformity of practice in the particular business of the employer and the requisite number of employees are employed . . . .”); McDonald v. Seay, 8 S.E.2d 796, 797 (Ga. 1940) (concluding employer within purview of Act when “employer . . . testified that it was his custom or plan of operation to work as many as twelve men thirty per cent. [sic] of the time”); Fowler v. Baalmann, Inc., 234 S.W.2d 11, 14 (Mo. 1950) (en banc) (“And ‘regularly’ as used in the statute ‘refers to the question whether the occurrence is or is not in an established mode or plan in the operation of the business, and has no reference to the constancy of the occurrence.’ ” (quoting McDonald, 8 S.E.2d