Opinion ID: 2160058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: impeachment by prior inconsistent statement

Text: Next is the question concerning admissibility of Black's prior inconsistent statement made to Arndt regarding Watkins' involvement in the burglary. In its distilled substance, the prosecutor's question to Black was: Did you tell Arndt that your relative informed (told) you that Watkins had committed the burglary? In the setting of Watkins' appeal, we are not confronted by a party's questionable conduct in calling a witness to impeach that witness and thereby present otherwise inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay, to the jury, which might miss the subtle distinction between impeachment and substantive evidence. See State v. Marco, 220 Neb. 96, 368 N.W.2d 470 (1985). As expressed in State v. Jackson, 217 Neb. 363, 367, 348 N.W.2d 876, 878 (1984): [T]he State may not use a prior inconsistent statement of a witness under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible. See, also, State v. Brehmer, 211 Neb. 29, 317 N.W.2d 885 (1982). In this appeal, we find attempted impeachment through use of a prior inconsistent statement made by a witness called by the adverse party. The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him. Neb.Evid.R. 607 (Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-607 (Reissue 1985)). Regarding a witness' prior inconsistent statement, Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. Neb.Evid.R. 613(2) (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-613(2) (Reissue 1985)). The State contends that Black's statement to Arndt was admissible as a prior inconsistent statement because Black denied making the statement in question. However, Neb.Evid.R. 607, which authorizes impeachment, and Neb.Evid.R. 613, which permits extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement to impeach a witness, are not absolute rules for testimonial impeachment of a witness. Permissibility of testimonial impeachment by use of a witness' prior inconsistent statement is determined by collaterality of the prior statement, or, as this court expressed in O'Connor v. State, 123 Neb. 471, 475, 243 N.W. 650, 652 (1932): The principle is stated in Attorney General v. Hitchcock, 1 Wels.H. & G.Exch. (Eng.) 91: The test, whether the matter is collateral or not, is this: If the answer of a witness is a matter which you would be allowed on your part to prove in evidenceif it have such connection with the issue that you would be allowed to give it in evidencethen it is a matter on which you may contradict him. Referring to the test found in The Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 154 Eng.Rep. 38 (Exch.1847), Wigmore states: The simple test is ... whether [the contradictory statement] concerns `a matter which you would be allowed on your part to prove in evidence' independently of the self-contradiction,i.e., if the witness had said nothing on the subject. 3A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 1020 at 1011 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1970). The prohibition against impeachment concerning a collateral fact or matter was reaffirmed in State v. Tainter, 218 Neb. 855, 857-59, 359 N.W.2d 795, 797-98 (1984): The applicable rules were stated in State v. Zobel, 192 Neb. 480, 484, 222 N.W.2d 570, 572-73 (1974): ... If a witness is cross-examined on a matter collateral to the issues, his answer cannot be subsequently contradicted by the party conducting the examination. [Citation omitted.] ... In State v. Claire, 193 Neb. 341, 344, 227 N.W.2d 15, 18 (1975), we said: ... `Evidence which does not tend to impeach any witness on a material point and which is not substantive proof of any fact relative to the issue is properly excluded.' The rule was stated in Jones v. Tranisi, 212 Neb. 843, 846, 326 N.W.2d 190, 192 (1982), as follows: `[A] witness may not be impeached by producing extrinsic evidence of collateral facts to contradict the first witness's assertions about those facts.' McCormick on Evidence § 47 at 98 (2d ed. 1972). McCormick further says at 98: `What is to be regarded here as within this protean word of art, collateral? The inquiry is best answered by determining what facts are not within the term, and thus finding the escapes from the prohibition against contradicting upon collateral facts. The classical approach is that facts which would have been independently provable regardless of the contradiction are not collateral.' The above is the rule in Nebraska. ` It is only as to matters relevant to some issue involved in a case that a witness can be contradicted for the purpose of impeachment. Carpenter v. Lingenfelter, 42 Neb. 728, 60 N.W. 1022, 32 L.R.A. 422. .... `The general rule is that a witness cannot be impeached as to collateral or immaterial matter brought out on cross-examination;   .' Ambrozi v. Fry, 158 Neb. 18, 26, 62 N.W.2d 259, 265 (1954). Some believe that the test for admitting or excluding a prior contradictory statement to impeach a witness should be controlled by Neb.Evid.R. 401 (relevant evidence; defined) (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1985)), Neb.Evid.R. 402 (admissibility of relevant evidence) (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 1985)), and the factors prescribed in Neb.Evid.R. 403 (Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1985)): Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Applying Rule 403 to impeachment by contradiction would require courts to exclude the proffered impeachment evidence if its probative value was substantially outweighed by these factors. This approach of leaving contradiction testimony to the discretion of the trial judge has been approved by Wigmore and McCormick.... 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 607[05] at 607-79 (1987). As observed in McCormick: The application of the standard theory of collateral contradiction ... has been criticized for use under the Federal Rules of Evidence on the ground that the result is a mechanically applied doctrine without consideration of properly pertinent matters.... Basically, Federal Rules of Evidence 401-403, which do govern impeachment by contradiction, are entirely consistent with the collateral doctrine... except that Rule 403 is explicit in the discretion granted the trial judge to admit or exclude contradictions found relevant under Rule 401. McCormick on Evidence § 47 at 112-13 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984). We note that Rules 401 to 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence are substantially identical to Neb.Evid.R. 401 to 403. Nevertheless, we find Nebraska's current test concerning impeachment, that is, impermissible impeachment on a fact or matter which is collateral, is satisfactory for disposition of Watkins' contention that Black's prior contradictory statement was inadmissible. Did Black's prior statement involve a matter which the State could show, independent of Black's self-contradiction? Bearing in mind the crime charged against Watkins was burglary, we must answer the immediately preceding question No. First, the fact that Black discussed the burglary with his brother-in-law is irrelevant evidence that Watkins burglarized or broke and entered the Arndt house. Second, the content of Black's conversation with his brother-in-law is clearly hearsay, that is, [A] statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Neb.Evid.R. 801(3) (Neb.Rev. Stat. § 27-801(3) (Reissue 1985)). Consequently, Black's prior inconsistent statement related to a matter which the State could not prove independent of the self-contradiction and was, therefore, a collateral matter on which impeachment is not permitted under present Nebraska law. For that reason, the trial court committed error by allowing admission of Black's prior inconsistent statement. Our next consideration in Watkins' appeal is whether the trial court's erroneously admitting Black's statement into evidence is reversible error. See Neb.Evid.R. 103(1) (Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-103(1) (Reissue 1985)): Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected. See, also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2308 (Reissue 1985): No judgment shall be set aside ... in any criminal case, on the grounds of ... improper admission or rejection of evidence ... if the Supreme Court, after an examination of the entire cause, shall consider that no substantial miscarriage of justice has actually occurred. Harmless error exists in a jury trial of a criminal case when there is some incorrect conduct by the trial court which, on review of the entire record, did not materially influence the jury in a verdict adverse to a substantial right of the defendant. See United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868 (8th Cir.1985). Recognizing the distinction between an error of constitutional dimensions and a procedural error which does not reach constitutional proportions, we held in State v. Lenz, 227 Neb. 692, 699, 419 N.W. 2d 670, 674 (1988): [E]rror in admitting or excluding evidence in a criminal trial, whether of constitutional magnitude or otherwise, is prejudicial unless it can be said that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In view of all the evidence before the jury in the Watkins case, we conclude that the error in admitting Black's prior inconsistent statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Our conclusion is supported by the substantial, even overwhelming, evidence in addition to Black's inadmissible prior statement. See, State v. Daniels, 222 Neb. 850, 388 N.W.2d 446 (1986) (in addition to erroneously admitted evidence, other competent evidence supported a conviction); State v. Price, 202 Neb. 308, 275 N.W.2d 82 (1979) (other admissible evidence was substantial; error in admitting evidence was inconsequential); State v. Franklin, 194 Neb. 630, 234 N.W. 2d 610 (1975) (admissible evidence was very strong and practically conclusive). On arrival at the Arndt house, the officers saw Watkins near the open window, which had been shut by the Arndts. The officers found Watkins with Arndt's stereo in his hands. The officers' observations of Watkins are devastating evidence against Watkins. On discovery, Watkins' mercurial departure from Dodge was an inculpatory expression which undoubtedly influenced the jury far more than any prior statement by Black. Again, without reiteration of all salient facts, we are convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court's admitting Black's statement into evidence had no material effect upon the jury in arriving at its verdict, namely, Watkins' guilt of the burglary charged. There is no reversible error in the trial which resulted in Watkins' conviction of burglary. The judgment of the district court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.