Opinion ID: 368265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: banishment

Text: 22 The defendant contends that his sentence was an unconstitutional attempt to banish or exile him. He relies on Dear Wing Jung v. United States,312 F.2d 73 (9th Cir. 1962). We found an unconstitutional banishment when the trial court suspended imprisonment on the condition that the defendant leave the country. This case is distinguishable. 23 Here, the court did not require the defendant to leave the country as part of his sentence. It stayed execution of the sentence until After the pending deportation hearing, at which time it would Consider modification if the defendant had been deported. No subsequent comments by the court reflect that this order was changed. 24 The defendant alleges the court indicated an intent to banish him when it stated: I was right when I said that the worst possible sentence that I could give Mr. Kouwenhoven was banishment from the United States. . . . The trial transcript, however, establishes that the court believed it was worse punishment for the defendant to be exiled By the INS than to serve his two-year prison sentence. Believing that deportation was inevitable in light of the conspiracy conviction, the court imposed a relatively light prison sentence. 25 The defendant asserts that the court's language indicating it would be satisfied if he left the country voluntarily altered the original sentence to banishment because it forced him to choose whether to go to jail or leave the country. We disagree. That language meant only that, after entry of a deportation order, an alien may possibly be granted voluntary departure at his own expense, instead of being deported at government expense. 2 26 Although during the October 17 hearing the court gave the defendant's passport to the Dutch Consulate and expressed the desire that the defendant leave the country immediately at the least possible expense to the government, it did so with the understanding the deportation hearing would conclude that day and issue a deportation order against the defendant. It was the court's hope that he would be granted voluntary departure and leave immediately. It did not sanction his departure before conclusion of the deportation hearing, nor did it change the original sentence by giving him the choice of serving his prison term or leaving the country. 27 At the December 5th modification hearing, the judge did nothing to disturb the original sentence. Because the defendant had not been deported or granted voluntary departure and did not surrender to the United States Marshal by December 5th to begin serving his prison term, he had not begun to serve his sentence. See Scott v. United States, 434 F.2d 11, 23 (5th Cir. 1970); Bandy v. Willingham, 398 F.2d 333 (10th Cir.), Cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1006, 89 S.Ct. 497, 21 L.Ed.2d 470 (1968); 18 U.S.C. § 3568. The court may legitimately treat him as a fugitive and require him to appear before it to determine how much time he must serve in prison should he ever reenter the country.II. DOUBLE JEOPARDY 28 The defendant also urges that he began to serve his sentence of exile or banishment on October 20, when he left the country, and that the December 5 order to appear for resentencing upon re-entry violates double jeopardy and due process because it increased his punishment after he had begun serving his sentence. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 307-309, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931). 29 In view of our conclusion that the initial sentence imposing a two-year prison term had never been altered, and that defendant had not begun to serve it when he left the country, defendant's contention is meritless. Denial of his motion for a sentence reduction did not increase the sentence. As a result, there was neither a double jeopardy nor a due process violation.