Opinion ID: 147081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of For-Cause Challenge to Prospective Juror

Text: We review Allen's claim that the district court erroneously denied his for-cause challenge for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 624-25 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 201 (2d Cir.2002). In reviewing denials of challenges for cause, we accord great deference to the judgment of the experienced trial judge based on his unique opportunity to assess the credibility of the jurors during voir dire examination, as well as their demeanor throughout the course of the trial. United States v. Nururdin, 8 F.3d 1187, 1190 (7th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Barnes, 909 F.2d 1059, 1070-71 (7th Cir.1990)); accord Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995) (according special deference); Nelson, 277 F.3d at 201-02 (There are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of discretion, absent clear abuse, than in ruling on challenges for cause in the empaneling of a jury.) (quoting United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 n. 4 (2d Cir.1972)). The Constitution guarantees criminal defendants due process of law and the right to an impartial jury. U.S. Const. amends V, VI. These mandates are satisfied, when seating a prospective juror despite a party's for-cause challenge, if the prospective juror has given final, unequivocal assurances, deemed credible by the judge, that for purposes of deciding the case, she can set aside any opinion [she] might hold, Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984), relinquish her prior beliefs, Thompson, 248 F.3d at 626, or lay aside her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences, United States v. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d 1109, 1114 (9th Cir.2000). See Thompson, 248 F.3d at 626 (collecting cases). The district court was within its discretion to find that the prospective juror gave final, unequivocal, and credible assurances that she could set aside any bias she might have stemming from the kidnapping attempt on her daughter and decide the case on the evidence, for three reasons. First, the unrelatedness of Allen's case and of the kidnapping attempt suggest that any bias was minimal compared with other cases in which the trial judge determined the juror's ability to overcome bias. In Thompson, where the ultimate issue was the spuriousness of the employee's claim, the prospective juror manifested a belief, based on his experience as an employer, that some claims against employers are spurious. Thompson, 248 F.3d at 626. The relationship between the case's ultimate issue and juror's prior experience was precise coincidence, thus forming a strong bias or predisposition to find against a certain party. See also Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1112 (finding implied bias where the juror had some personal experience that is similar or identical to the fact pattern at issue). But here the prospective juror's prior experience was wholly unrelated to whether Allen committed the crimes for which he was indicted, much less any specific evidentiary issues such as Allen's state of mind or the identity of kidbot. The prospective juror's predisposition in this casehaving personally experienced the attempted molestation of her daughter and the effect it must have had on her daughter, herself, and her entire familywas to find those who commit crimes against children particularly heinous. This belief has nothing to do with whether any particular defendant is guilty of committing crimes against children. Moreover, the crime here involved child pornography, not kidnapping. As the prospective juror acknowledged, this crime has nothing to do with that crime. App. A-3 at 140. Neither at voir dire nor on appeal has Allen's counsel been able to explain how the prospective juror's experience related directly to the issues in this trial in such a way that the district court was beyond the bounds of its discretion to find the prospective juror able to weigh the evidence impartially. For this reason, we give particular deference to the district court's finding that the prospective juror would give due weight to the evidence. Thompson, 248 F.3d at 626. Second, the prospective juror stated finally that she would suspend judgment until she ha[s] heard all the evidence, id., when she informed the court in her last statement during voir dire that she would give him the benefit of the doubt until everything is presented. She told the judge what she would do, not that she would merely try, Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1111, and we do not find this statement equivocal simply because the question to which it responded was preceded by the judge saying that [t]here is not anything wrong with [the kidnapping attempt] having an impact. Any impact of the kidnapping attempt, as we have said, went to the prospective juror's predisposition to find certain criminals heinous, not to find certain people criminals, and in any event was related only tangentially to Allen's crimes. Nor, on this cold record, will we overturn the determination, by the sole judge who was present, that the prospective juror's final, unequivocal assurance was credible. Prior equivocating or wavering is hardly dispositive in assessing credibility, as [j]urors ... cannot be expected invariably to express themselves... consistently. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 2885. Indeed, other factors may indicate which of a prospective juror's two opposed sets of statements is more credible, such as which was least influenced by leading. Id. Here the judge found that any statements indicating bias were a result of Allen's counsel pushing her. You pushed her in another direction. App. A-3 at 143. Furthermore, the paper record does not reveal the relative pushiness of the prospective juror's questioners. Nor does it reveal on which of her opposing sets of statements the prospective juror varied her emphasis, in terms of volume, inflection, or demeanor. A district court's findings concerning actual bias are based upon determinations of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Because appellate judges are absent from voir dire, when a prospective juror fails to express herself carefully or even consistently ... it is [the trial] judge who is best situated to determine competency to serve impartially. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1039, 104 S.Ct. 2885. Finally, the trial judge was in the best position to gauge the prospective juror's ability to follow[ ][his] instructions. Thompson, 248 F.3d at 626. Both times the judge instructed the prospective juror on the burden of proof, he elicited a response indicating that she would presume Allen innocent. Moreover, the paper record does not reveal the relative confidence or tentativeness of these responses, which only the trial judge was able to examine. We do not doubt that the trial judge's questioning of the prospective juror could have been more explicit in determining whether she would be able to set aside any opinion [she] might hold, Patton, 467 U.S. at 1036, 104 S.Ct. 2885, relinquish her prior beliefs, Thompson, 248 F.3d at 626, or lay aside her biases or her prejudicial personal experiences. Gonzalez, 214 F.3d at 1114. Neverthelessgiven the relatively minimal bias the prospective juror must have had toward finding this particular defendant guilty, her final and unequivocal statement that she would give Allen the benefit of the doubt until the close of trial, and her demonstrated ability to follow the judge's instructionswe hold that the district court was within its discretion to find that the prospective juror's prior experience would not impede her ability to decide the case fairly. So we find no violation of Allen's rights to due process and to an impartial jury.