Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comments Relating to the Victim

Text: (38a) Defendant claims that through certain comments bearing on Marcie D.'s personal characteristics and the emotional impact of the crime on her family and others, the prosecutor committed misconduct under both California law and the United States Constitution  specifically, section 190.3 and the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. We reject the point on procedural grounds insofar as it is based on section 190.3. The rule of timely and specific assignment of misconduct and request for admonition was not satisfied. Defense counsel did indeed make an unsuccessful assignment and request on the ground that the prosecutor incorrectly presented the sentiments and [o]utrage of the Sacramento community as a circumstance in aggravation. But he did not make an assignment and request on the ground that underlies his point here. [19] Moreover, the exception to the rule is inapplicable. We cannot conclude that any harm threatened by the comments here was incurable. Indeed, the remarks focused on the nature and circumstances of the crime and the effect on the victim  topics that were altogether proper ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 797). We reject the point on the merits insofar as it is based on the cruel and unusual punishments clause of the Eighth Amendment. In Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496, 502-509 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 448-453, 107 S.Ct. 2529], the United States Supreme Court concluded that the introduction of evidence concerning such matters as the victim's personal characteristics, the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family, and the opinions of family members about the crime and the criminal  except to the extent it related directly to the circumstances of the crime  was violative of a criminal defendant's rights under the cruel and unusual punishments clause, and that accordingly such evidence was inadmissible per se. In South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805, 810-812 [104 L.Ed.2d 876, 882-884, 109 S.Ct. 2207], the court followed Booth and concluded that the presentation of argument relating to such matters was violative of those same rights and as such was improper per se. But recently, in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S.  [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597], the court overruled Booth and Gathers to the extent that they held that evidence or argument relating to the victim's personal characteristics or the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's family was inadmissible or improper per se. ( Id. at p.  [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 730, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2611].) (39) Of course, a new [federal constitutional] rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception for cases in which the new rule constitutes a `clear break' with the past. ( Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328 [95 L.Ed.2d 649, 661, 107 S.Ct. 708].) (40)(See fn. 20.), (38b) Payne is such a rule and this is such a case. [20]