Opinion ID: 2612481
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sentencing with prosecutorial involvement

Text: There is a distinguished line of prosecutorial veto cases which address the sentencing feature implicit in the Wyoming Modified Juvenile Sentencing Act of 1909. The principles first enunciated in California case law which addressed sentencing and separation of powers have taken hold in other jurisdictions whose courts addressed issues similar to the issue here. The conflict first arose in Tenorio, 473 P.2d 993 where, in sentencing, the court could dismiss a charged prior offense without approval of the prosecutor. That court indicated: Thus, even if the Legislature could constitutionally remove the power to strike priors from the courts, it has not done so, but rather has proposed to vest in the prosecutor the power to foreclose the exercise of an admittedly judicial power by an appropriate judicial officer. It is no answer to suggest that this is but a lesser included portion of the prosecutor's discretion to forego prosecution, as the decision to forego prosecution does not itself deprive persons of liberty. When the decision to prosecute has been made, the process which leads to acquittal or to sentencing is fundamentally judicial in nature. Just as the fact of prosecutorial discretion prior to charging a criminal offense does not imply prosecutorial discretion to convict without a judicial determination of guilt, discretion to forego prosecution does not imply discretion to sentence without a judicial determination of those factors which the Legislature has never denied are within the judicial power to determine and which relate to punishment. The judicial power is compromised when a judge, who believes that a charge should be dismissed in the interests of justice, wishes to exercise the power to dismiss but finds that before he may do so he must bargain with the prosecutor. The judicial power must be independent, and a judge should never be required to pay for its exercise. Id. at 996. The court held that the tested statute was violative of the California constitutional separation of powers, as that concept demands that the branches of government be coequal and that a prosecutor not be vested with power to foreclose the exercise of a judicial power recognized in [statute]. Id. at 997. Tenorio was followed by Esteybar v. Municipal Court for Long Beach Judicial Dist. of Los Angeles County, 5 Cal.3d 119, 95 Cal. Rptr. 524, 485 P.2d 1140 (1971) where the prosecutorial veto in determining that a charged defendant may not be tried as a misdemeanor was rejected as a violation of separate judicial responsibility and separation of powers. People v. Navarro, 7 Cal.3d 248, 102 Cal. Rptr. 137, 497 P.2d 481 (1972) held that the legislature can control eligibility for probation, parole and term of imprisonment but cannot infringe upon a core judicial function by subjecting a judge to the control of the prosecuting attorney. The imposition of sentence and the exercise of sentencing discretion are fundamentally and inherently judicial functions. Id. 102 Cal. Rptr. at 143, 497 P.2d at 487 (quoting People v. Burke, 47 Cal.2d 45, 52, 301 P.2d 241 (1956)). When an individual judge exercises sentencing discretion he exercises a judical power which must be based upon an examination of the circumstances of the particular case before him, and which is subject to review for abuse. ( People v. Tenorio, supra, 3 Cal.3d 89, 95, 89 Cal. Rptr. 249, 473 P.2d 993.) Here, as in Tenorio and Esteybar the Legislature sought to vest the district attorney with unreviewable powers.    We reiterate the statement made by Justice Schuaer in his dissent in People v. Sidener (1962) 58 Cal.2d 645, 654, 25 Cal. Rptr. 697, 702, 375 P.2d 641, 646, in his analysis of the separation of powers doctrine, that It bears reiteration that the Legislature, of course, by general laws can control eligibility for probation, parole and the term of imprisonment, but it cannot abort the judicial process by subjecting a judge to the control of the district attorney.[ [18] ] Navarro, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 144, 497 P.2d at 488 (emphasis in original). The California principles of excluding the prosecutor from control over sentencing was accepted in Arizona under State v. Jones, 142 Ariz. 302, 304, 689 P.2d 561, 563 (1984) (citations omitted): The concept of separation of powers is fundamental to constitutional government as we know it.    It is essential that sharp separation of powers be carefully preserved by courts so that one branch of government not be permitted unconstitutionally to encroach upon the functions properly belonging to another.    The legislature may not enact a statute which is in conflict with a provision of the state Constitution. In State v. Prentiss, 163 Ariz. 81, 786 P.2d 932 (1989), that principle was reaffirmed when the court considered whether the prosecutor could control sentencing discretion by his charging decision. The court found that the statute violated constitutional concepts of separation of powers, equal protection, and/or substantive due process. [O]nce the legislature provides the court with the power to use sentencing discretion, the legislature cannot then limit the court's exercise of discretion by empowering the executive branch to review that discretion. Id. 163 Ariz. at 85, 786 P.2d at 936. The Arizona court severed the prosecutorial control feature in a fashion comparable to action taken by the Minnesota courts. Id. 163 Ariz. at 87, 786 P.2d at 938, appendix. [19] In Illinois, courts have identified the difference between a sentence and the alternative treatment diversion: The Act provides an alternative to the usual criminal justice procedures; it allows a criminal defendant with a drug abuse problem to avoid the criminal justice machinery   . The treatment under the Act, unlike a sentence, is not a consequence of defendant's guilt. It is instead an alternative to a criminal conviction and the regular sentencing alternatives available under [Illinois law]. People v. Teschner, 81 Ill.2d 187, 40 Ill. Dec. 818, 407 N.E.2d 49, 52 (1980) (emphasis in original and quoting People v. Phillips, 66 Ill.2d 412, 416, 6 Ill.Dec. 215, 217, 362 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (1977)). The difference was also recognized between disposition and imposition of a criminal sanction. Accord People v. Caldwell, 118 Ill. App.3d 1027, 74 Ill.Dec. 464, 455 N.E.2d 893 (1983). [20] In State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn. 1982), the Supreme Court of Minnesota considered a statute which conditioned the power of a court to sentence without regard to the mandatory minimum provisions upon the discretion of a prosecutor. The Minnesota court observed that the prosecutor is not only a member of the executive branch, but an advocate as well. His or her attention throughout the criminal trial is focused on achieving conviction, and appropriately so. But we expect too much when we look to the prosecutor alone for an evenhanded assessment of whether mitigating factors may exist in cases that have been successfully prosecuted. The present appeals amply illustrate the inadequacy of such a limited mechanism; it is neither constitutional, nor practical in our adversary system of criminal justice.          If the legislature gives such power to the prosecutors, it must also give it to the courts. It cannot constitutionally do otherwise. Id. at 19. In summary, not only does a rigorous analysis of the diversion cases cited in the majority opinion fail to authenticate the prosecutorial participation in judicial function, but the appropriately related authority uniformly denies that executive branch preclusion in essentially a sentencing decision which is not justified in Wyoming.