Opinion ID: 203825
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Text and Structure of Statute

Text: In addition to its plain language argument, the government asserts that Mrs. Taing should not be considered an immediate relative under § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) because she was not married to Mr. Taing for at least two years at the time of his death. It cites the second sentence of the statute for this two-year requirement and argues that this requirement extends to spouses described in the first sentence. The government insists that the inclusion of the phrase for purposes of this subsection in the second sentence supports its interpretation. The government's argument is undermined by the text and structure of the statute as well as related provisions concerning the right of a surviving spouse to adjust her status. [L]ooking to the `specific context in which [the] language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole,' Pérez-Olivo, 394 F.3d at 49 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997)), it is clear to us that the first two sentences in § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) should be read as creating separate and independent pathways. The second sentence does not modify or limit the meaning of the term spouse in the first sentence. See Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1039. The only term in the first sentence which contains a limitation is parents and the statute restricts the status of immediate relative to parents whose citizen children are at least twenty-one years of age. Id. There is no comparable qualifier to be a `spouse'  that is, a requirement that the marriage must have existed for at least two years. Id. The second sentence, rather than modifying the first as the government contends, creates a separate and independent right for certain alien spouses to self-petition for immediate relative status. [7] See 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i); see also Freeman, 444 F.3d at 1041-42. This sentence addresses the situation of an alien spouse whose husband or wife died before filing an I-130 petition. It limits the surviving alien spouse's right to self-petition by requiring that spouses be married for two years prior to the citizen spouse's death. The two-year duration requirement places a limitation on the alien spouse's ability to obtain a new right. There is nothing in the language of the second sentence to imply that it was intended to strip away spouse status from a surviving spouse whose deceased spouse had already filed an I-130 petition. From the text and structure of these statutes, it is evident that Congress put in place two separate processes for petitioning for adjustment of status  the first sentence contemplates a situation like Mrs. Taing's where the citizen spouse has already filed a petition. In these situations, the duration of the marriage is of no importance. However, the second sentence deals with the situation where the citizen spouse has died before filing an I-130 petition on his or her spouse's behalf. Congress's decision to set up dual processes is reaffirmed by reading § 1151(a)(1)(A)(ii) in conjunction with related statutory provisions. For example, § 1154 states that [a]n alien spouse described in the second sentence of section 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) of this title also may file a petition with the Attorney General under this subparagraph for classification of the alien (and the alien's children) under such section. 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). We agree with the Freeman court that [t]he inclusion of the word `also' in this subsection, as compared to the right given to living citizen spouses in § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (i.e., to file a petition on behalf of their alien spouse), further establishes that the right of self-petition is given to a select group of alien widows as an alternative to their citizen spouse's I-130 filing. 444 F.3d at 1042 n. 17. Moreover, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a states that an alien spouse who receives permanent resident status as an immediate relative before the second anniversary of her qualifying marriage does so on a conditional basis. That status can be terminated if the qualifying marriage is found to be improper. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (b)(1). Notably, § 1186a(b)(1) provides that this finding can be made if it is determine[d], before the second anniversary of the alien's obtaining the status of lawful admission for permanent residence, that  the qualifying marriage ... has been judicially annulled or terminated, other than through the death of a spouse. Id. (emphasis added). As the Freeman court noted, this language, by excepting a spouse's death, presents compelling evidence that Congress did not intend its provision for a widow's self-petition for adjustment of status to have the implicit collateral consequence of terminating a citizen spouse's already pending petition-particularly when the effect would be to foreclose a grieving widow from any adjustment at all `through the death of [her] spouse.' 444 F.3d at 1042; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii). Thus, § 1186a also lends support to our conclusion that § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) provides surviving spouses with two distinct processes to petition for adjustment of status. We are mindful of the cardinal rule that courts must strive to harmonize all the provisions of a statute to give them all force and effect. United States v. Roberson, 459 F.3d 39, 55 (1st Cir.2006). Applying this tool of statutory construction, and viewing § 1151 in the context of the entire statutory scheme concerning a surviving spouse's right to adjust her status, we are convinced that Congress plainly and unambiguously intended that surviving spouses like Mrs. Taing, who is the beneficiary of an I-130 petition filed prior to her spouse's death, remain eligible for immediate relative status.