Opinion ID: 1201234
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gamble and Punitive Damages Review Under South Carolina Law

Text: Our own jurisprudence has largely tracked the Supreme Court's constitutional pronouncements, beginning with our Gamble opinion, which was written in response to Haslip. In Gamble, we identified eight considerations that trial courts should apply in conducting a post-judgment due process review of any punitive damages award. These considerations are: (1) the defendant's degree of culpability; (2) the duration of the conduct; (3) the defendant's awareness or concealment; (4) the existence of similar past conduct; (5) the likelihood the award will deter the defendant or others from like conduct; (6) whether the award is reasonably related to the harm likely to result from such conduct; (7) the defendant's ability to pay; and (8) any other factors deemed appropriate. Gamble, 305 S.C. at 111-12, 406 S.E.2d at 354. We have said in the past that trial courts must consider both the Gamble and the Gore factors. James v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 371 S.C. 187, 195, 638 S.E.2d 667, 671 (2006) (Although we find the punitive damages award was reasonable under the Gamble factors, we must also review the trial court's ruling on punitive damages under Gore ). However, considerations of judicial economy weigh in favor of a less burdensome and duplicative analysis. We now hold that Gamble remains relevant to the post-judgment due process analysis, but only insofar as it adds substance to the Gore guideposts. With these considerations in mind, we articulate the following test for our courts in conducting a post-judgment review of punitive damages awards.
First, any court reviewing a punitive damages award should consider the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct. Reprehensibility is perhaps the most important indicium of the reasonableness of a punitive damages award. Gore, 517 U.S. at 565, 116 S.Ct. 1589. This principle reflects the view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. Id. In considering reprehensibility, a court should consider whether: (i) the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; (ii) the tortious conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others; (iii) the target of the conduct had financial vulnerability; (iv) the conduct involved repeated actions or was an isolated incident; and (v) the harm was the result of intentional malice, trickery, or deceit, rather than mere accident. [7] Campbell, 538 U.S. at 419, 123 S.Ct. 1513.
Second, the court should consider the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the amount of the punitive damages award. The ratio of actual or potential harm to the punitive damages award is perhaps the most commonly cited indicium of an unreasonable or excessive punitive damages award. Gore, 517 U.S. at 580, 116 S.Ct. 1589. Although the Supreme Court has been reluctant to identify concrete constitutional limits on the ratio between harm, or potential harm, to the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and has consistently declined to adopt a bright line ratio or simple mathematical test, the Court has remarked that in practice, few awards exceeding a single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process. Campbell, 538 U.S. at 425, 123 S.Ct. 1513. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has made clear that there are no rigid benchmarks that a punitive damages award may not surpass, so long as the measurement of punishment is both reasonable and proportionate to the amount of harm to the plaintiff and the general damages recovered. Id. at 425-26, 123 S.Ct. 1513. With this instruction in mind, we note that a court, when determining the reasonableness of a particular ratio of actual or potential harm to a punitive damages award, may consider: the likelihood that the award will deter the defendant from like conduct; whether the award is reasonably related to the harm likely to result from such conduct; and the defendant's ability to pay. [8] Nevertheless, a court may not rely upon these considerations to justify an otherwise excessive punitive damages award.
Third, the court should consider the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. When identifying comparable cases a court may consider: the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff or plaintiffs; the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; the ratio of actual or potential harm to the punitive damages award; the size of the award; and any other factors the court may deem relevant.