Opinion ID: 214784
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Statements Regarding the Burden of Proof

Text: Tucker argues that the prosecutor intentionally shifted the burden of proof by listing various facts that the jury would have to find if it were to determine that Tucker was not guilty. Tucker contends that the district court made matters worse by commenting, I have instructed the jury on the burdens of proof already. However, this is argument. And I believe that it is within bounds. So you may proceed. The record shows that the prosecutor's comments about what the jury must find were made in the context of explaining why the jury should reject Tucker's version of events, and only after the prosecutor already had said that the government was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Tucker was guilty of possession of a firearm. In addition, the prosecutor reiterated on several occasions that the government had the burden of proof. We further agree with the district court that the prosecutor's comments were only argument, and note that the district court correctly instructed the jury on the proper standard. While the prosecutor's phrasing was inartful, his meaning is evident from context: to believe the defendant's account, the jury would have to believe implausible aspects of his testimony. This sort of argumentation is permissible. See Vaandering, 50 F.3d at 701-02. Accordingly, the prosecutor's comments did not constitute misconduct, and the district court did not err by allowing them. Furthermore, even if the comments were improper, the court's statements and instructions to the jury neutralized any potential prejudice. See Tam, 240 F.3d at 802 (holding that even if the prosecutor's burden-shifting statements during closing argument were improper, they were rendered harmless as a result of the district court's comments and instructions to the jury).