Opinion ID: 884925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 27 Did the District Court err when it found Dr. Van Orden unqualified to provide expert testimony regarding the standard of care? ¶ 28 Another witness in Seal's expert witness list was Dr. Van Orden, a psychiatrist and expert on addiction medicine. Dr. Van Orden's resume also indicates that he has substantial experience in pharmacology. However, he is not an anesthesiologist. ¶ 29 Dr. D.G.H. contends that in order for Dr. Van Orden to give expert testimony, he must have similar qualifications as Dr. D.G.H. and be qualified to testify as to the standard of care of a board-certified anesthesiologist. In his deposition, however, Dr. Van Orden admitted that he could not testify as to this standard of care. ¶ 30 Seal, on the other hand, argues that it is not necessary for Dr. Van Orden to be board-certified in the same area of medicine as Dr. D.G.H., especially since Dr. D.G.H. was holding himself out to be in the practice of pain management, not anesthesiology. It is Seal's position that Dr. Van Orden can testify that the prescription drugs prescribed by Dr. D.G.H. were excessive given the addictive propensity of the drugs and that evidence shows LaRell was susceptible to addictions. Seal provides a written report in which Dr. Van Orden wrote that Dr. D.G.H. prescribed a huge increase in narcotics and engaged in reckless and redundant prescribing of controlled substances! Furthermore, Seal contends that the credibility of Dr. Van Orden's testimony can be buttressed by the testimony of another proposed expert witness, Dr. O'Brien, a toxicologist and pharmacologist. ¶ 31 Nonetheless, the District Court concluded that Dr. Van Orden did not demonstrate the necessary qualifications to testify as an expert witness. Citing Glover v. Ballhagen (1988), 232 Mont. 427, 756 P.2d 1166, the District Court made a conclusive determination that Dr. Van Orden could not testify as to the standard of care of a board-certified anesthesiologist. In Glover, 232 Mont. at 430, 756 P.2d at 1168, we held that pursuant to Rule 702, M.R.Evid., an expert witness must be qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education to testify as to the appropriate standard of care. ¶ 32 The District Court also determined that Dr. Van Orden was not prepared to testify in the area of pain management. Dr. Van Orden's deposition statements were limited to an assessment that Dr. D.G.H.'s planning and record keeping were poor and were indicative of Dr. D.G.H.'s poor medical skills. While Dr. Van Orden opined that Dr. D.G.H. should have done a better job of learning LaRell Seal's addictive past and should have planned and monitored LaRell accordingly, he admitted that he could not testify as to whether the drugs Dr. D.G.H. prescribed to LaRell were excessive given LaRell's condition. Thus, the District Court did not allow Dr. Van Orden to testify. ¶ 33 The determination of the qualification of a skilled or expert witness is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial judge in the absence of a showing of abuse. See O'Leyar v. Callender (1992), 255 Mont. 277, 281, 843 P.2d 304, 306. Since we discern no such abuse here, we do not disturb the court's discretion. ¶ 34 Seal next contends that even in the absence of Dr. Van Orden's testimony, the District Court should not have granted summary judgment. On appeal of a summary judgment, we review Seal's contention de novo. See, e.g., Stutzman v. Safeco Ins. Co. (1997), 284 Mont. 372, 376, 945 P.2d 32, 34 (citing Treichel v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (1997), 280 Mont. 443, 446, 930 P.2d 661, 663). ¶ 35 Seal attempts to distinguish the cases cited by the District Court in support of its summary judgment, Estate of Nielsen v. Pardis (1994), 265 Mont. 470, 878 P.2d 234, Hunter v. Missoula Community Hosp. (1988), 230 Mont. 300, 750 P.2d 106, and Montana Deaconess Hosp. v. Gratton (1976), 169 Mont. 185, 545 P.2d 670, on the basis that the type of expert testimony sought in these cases was not like the type of expert testimony at issue here. However, all these cases stand for the general proposition that when there is no genuine issue of material fact because plaintiff has failed to produce a medical expert competent to establish the applicable standard of care and a departure from that standard, summary judgment is appropriate. ¶ 36 Seal asserts that a medical expert is not necessary to establish the applicable standard of care because other evidence is available to establish Dr. D.G.H.'s negligence. In addition, he argues that it is not necessary to establish a standard of care to prove negligence because this is not a medical malpractice case. He claims that negligence can be established by Dr. D.G.H.'s failure to produce any records of blood tests or physical examinations to show he monitored the level of and efficacy of the drugs he prescribed to LaRell. Seal also contends that a note Dr. D.G.H. wrote stating that LaRell reports he is working a lot, continuing not to lift, and that he is not quite as bright and energetic as has been in the recent past, indicates that the medication Dr. D.G.H. prescribed to LaRell was having an adverse effect on him. Finally, Seal believes that the instrumentality that caused LaRell's death, the massive doses of narcotics, were exclusively in the control of Dr. D.G.H. ¶ 37 Because we are not persuaded that the evidence Seal provides can prove Dr. D.G.H.'s negligence in the absence of establishing a standard of care, we conclude that the District Court did not err when it granted Dr. D.G.H. summary judgment.