Opinion ID: 1811477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: reversion clause

Text: Griggs argues that the trial court improperly failed to give effect to the reversion clause contained in the deed from the McPhauls to the State. She argues that the State failed to comply with the requirement in the deed that the state to use the property for the purpose of a state park or state parkway, and that this failure caused a reversion of title, in favor of her, as the ultimate successor in interest to Amos Garrett, to whom the McPhauls had assigned this reversionary right. She argues that the trial court's failure to give effect to the reversionary clause is clearly erroneous and against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. Griggs admits that there is an overlap of 30 feet between the parcel described in the State's deed and that parcel described in Driftwood's deed. However, she argues that the State did not use the land as a state park or state parkway. In support of this argument, Griggs relies on evidence that the plats in the office of the Baldwin County tax assessor reveal that, at all times between 1946 and 1983, the owners of the lots within the Garrett subdivision had paid taxes on the full 100-foot width of those lots, rather than on the lesser width that they should have been paying taxes on if the State had title to the disputed 30-foot strip. However, this evidence provides no support for her arguments. Neither Griggs nor others owning the lots could claim title to the 30-foot strip because of their payment of taxes. State ex rel. Attorney General v. Tarleton, 279 Ala. 555, 188 So.2d 516 (1966). Griggs also refers to evidence that while the Griggses and Neil Lauder, a previous owner, owned the lots, they used the 30-foot strip and that the State did not use it. She argues that their acts of possession demonstrate that the State has not used the land as a state park or state parkway, within the meaning of the reversion clause. [2] Griggs relies on this Court's holding in Trustees of Howard College v. McNabb, 288 Ala. 564, 573, 263 So.2d 664 (1972), for the proposition that a parkway must be used `for the benefit of the public' at large, and [must be] open for the use and enjoyment of everyone, rather than for the use of those few individuals who own adjoining property. Griggs argues that the disputed strip in this case was used only for the benefit of the abutting landowners and not for the benefit of the public at large. In McNabb, a similar condition was inserted in a deed to Jefferson County, Alabama; the property conveyed contained a lake, and the deed required that the said property be used as a parkway only. Id. 288 Ala. at 568, 263 So.2d at 667. Jefferson County agreed to beautify and use the property hereby conveyed as such a parkway. Later, the lake was drained and Jefferson County conveyed the land to the Trustees of Howard College (now Samford University), who, the original grantors argued, did not maintain it as a parkway. Construing the term parkway, this Court relied on a prior decision dealing with the meaning of the word parkway and defining the term as follows: It is entirely within the functions of the city to provide sidewalks for pedestrians and a separate zone for vehicles, outlined by curbs, and to establish a zone or parkway between the two for ornamentation with grass or flower pots, trees and shrubs, a city beautiful feature, for the benefit of the public and abutting owners....  McCraney v. City of Leeds, 239 Ala. 143, 145, 194 So. 151, 152 (1940) (Emphasis added.) Applying the definition used in McNabb, this Court held that where no public dedication of the lake had been made and where abutting landowners had been allowed to use the lake for their benefit and enjoyment, but where no private easement or reservation in the lake was created, the trustees of Howard College had not complied with the requirement. McNabb, 288 Ala. at 574, 263 So.2d at 673. Accordingly, this Court gave effect to a reversion clause, which caused title to revert to the original grantor. Id. This Court has also held that the State is not required to construct facilities or park-like features on property to meet a deed requirement that the State use the land for state park purposes. Taylor v. Martin, 585 So.2d 849, 850 (Ala.1991). Where the State preserved the property in its natural state to provide the public with an aesthetic view, this was sufficient to meet the requirement in the deed and thus prevent the operation of the condition subsequent. Furthermore, this Court has adhered to the general rule of law that disfavors conditions subsequent in conveyances of real property because they tend to the destruction of estates. Taylor v. Martin, 585 So.2d 849, 852 (Ala.1991); Stewart v. Weaver, 264 Ala. 286, 87 So.2d 548 (1956). See also Burnham v. City of Jackson, 379 So.2d 931, 933 (Miss.1980). Accordingly, this Court strictly construes such conditions against the grantor. Taylor, 585 So.2d at 852; Henry v. Etowah County, 77 Ala. 538 (1884) (conditions subsequent are generally to be construed strictissimi juris, against the grantor in the deed creating them). We find evidence to support the trial court's finding that the State's use of the land substantially complied with the condition. See 4 G. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Real Property § 1890 (1979) (substantial compliance). There was evidence that the State used the disputed strip in its construction of State Highway 161 in 1945, as a buffer between the pedestrian and residential zones and the vehicular zone along Highway 161, and as property reserved for possible future expansion of that road. Indeed, evidence indicated that the State has expanded Highway 161 by approximately six to eight feet and that it has added a bicycle lane alongside the highway, and that these additions expanded onto 30-foot strip in dispute here. Furthermore, Griggs acknowledges that Highway 161 runs north and south alongside the disputed strip of land, directly to the west of that strip, and that Gulf State Park is located directly to the west of Highway 161. It is also undisputed that the construction of Highway 161 was for the benefit of the public. The trial court's holding also complies with the law regarding reversionary clauses. Using the definition of parkway recommended by Griggs, and upon which this Court relied in McNabb, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to permit the trial court to infer that the State had used the disputed strip in substantial compliance with the deed requirement. The State's use of the property, therefore, does not invoke the condition subsequent. Accordingly, the trial court's holding was not clearly erroneous or against the great weight of the evidence.