Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Trial Court's Refusal to Charge Mitigating Factor c(5)(g)

Text: Defense counsel sought to introduce mitigating factor c(5)(g), namely, that defendant had rendered substantial assistance to the State in the prosecution of another person for the crime of murder. Defense counsel's theory was that at the meeting between defendant and Afdahl on the evening of their arrest defendant had induced Afdahl to confess, thereby aiding the State in its prosecution of Afdahl. The State opposed defendant's application, asserting that defendant had not rendered substantial assistance to the State. The trial court rejected defense counsel's request. It stated: Substantial assistance means considerable assistance, assistance which played a fairly large or important role in the arrest or prosecution of the other person [ Judge's Bench Manual For Capital Cases, Appendix J(1)-18]. And that has not happened here. Mr. Martini's short two to three minute discussion or statement to Therese Afdahl at approximately one a.m. on January 26, might have led Therese to then voluntarily give a statement as to her involvement in this, but certainly that in and of itself is not substantial assistance.... Defense may be able to utilize that testimony on the catch-all mitigating factor and argue that, but as a separate mitigating factor I'm going to sustain the objection of the prosecutor. However, if other evidence comes in that changes my mind on that, of course then we can always deal with that. [Emphasis added.] Although not precluded from offering any further evidence on the subject, defense counsel did not do so. Although in his penalty phase summation defense counsel did mention the extent of defendant's cooperation with law enforcement, he made no mention of Martini's assistance with respect to the prosecution of Afdahl. Defendant alleges that the trial court violated defendant's rights in not specifically instructing the jury on c(5)(g). The State argues that there was insufficient evidence to submit that factor to the jury, and even if it was error, it was harmless, because the jury could consider the evidence under catch-all mitigating factor c(5)(h). Significantly, this is not a case like Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed. 2d 1(1982), in which the trial court prevented the defense counsel from presenting evidence of a mitigating factor. Here, the trial court did not prevent defense counsel from submitting any evidence on factor c(5)(g). The trial court allowed, indeed invited, defendant to present additional evidence. Rather, the trial court refused to charge c(5)(g) specifically because it believed that there was insufficient evidence to submit that factor to the jury. We agree that there was insufficient reliable evidence of factor c(5)(g) to submit it to the jury; but even if there had been sufficient evidence, the failure to submit the factor was harmless error. Defendant contends that Martini's substantial assistance occurred at the meeting he and Afdahl had on the evening of his arrest. That meeting was the focus of defendant's argument that his confessions were inadmissible. See supra at 233-234, 619 A. 2d at 1234-1236. That when the trial court made its ruling and when the penalty-phase jury received the case the only evidence before the jury on this issue was Officer Trahey's testimony at the guilt phase of trial is undisputed: A At that time [Martini] indicated that he would be more than willing to cooperate and talk with us and lay out his entire involvement in the case, but that he first wanted an opportunity to speak to Therese Afdahl. It was agreed to afford him that opportunity, and he did speak with Therese. Q Before you gave him that opportunity, did he tell you what he wanted to say to Therese Afdahl? A Only that he was going to cooperate with us and that he was going to tell us what had happened and that he wanted her to be aware of that fact. Q Where was Therese Afdahl at this time? A Therese was in what was Captain Denning's office at that time, which was about ten feet down the hall. Q Did you give him that opportunity to speak to her? A Yes, I did. Q Was that done in your presence? A Yes, it was. Q About how long did that conversation last? A At best two to three minutes. Q And did it consist of what John Martini told you it would consist of? A Yes. At the pretrial hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his confessions, however, there was additional testimony concerning what had occurred at the January 26th meeting between defendant and Afdahl and at a subsequent meeting between them on January 30th. With respect to the January 26th meeting, the testimony was as follows. At various times throughout the pretrial hearing, Officer Trahey testified as below: A John Martini, actually we allowed John Martini to tell her that he was going to cooperate with us and that she  he wanted her to know that he was going to cooperate with us, and that's what he was allowed to tell her, that, Therese, I'm now going to cooperate with them and I'm going to tell them what happened. Q What did Therese say in response if anything? A I don't recall what she said. I don't know that she said anything because we told John that we weren't going to allow him to engage in conversation, that we would only allow him to tell her specifically that he was going to cooperate with us, and then we told him we were going to remove him from the room and go back to the conference room.         A John had had the opportunity to tell Therese that he was going to cooperate with us and at that point we sat down and we started to get into the questioning of, you, about himself and what had happened. Officer Petersen also testified about the meeting between defendant and Afdahl: A. Well, he had told us at one point in time that he'd be willing to cooperate and tell us exactly what had happened in this matter. He said but, first, he would like to consult with Therese Afdahl because he wanted to alert her to tell the whole truth as well and, basically, that's what he had provided to us. Q. So did you discuss  you or Investigator Trahey in your presence discuss with Mr. Martini what he was going to say to Ms. Afdahl when they met? A. Well, basically he told us what he wanted to tell her, is that he wanted to tell her to just tell the truth of exactly what had happened and he would be doing the same to us.         A.    What Mr. Martini said to us basically was that, you know, he wanted to talk to Ms. Afdahl to tell her to  you know, to tell the truth as to what had happened. However, Officer Petersen was not present during the conversation between Martini and Afdahl. Officer Carlino, the policeman involved in questioning Afdahl and not Martini, testified that Afdahl had signed the consents to search the apartment and the rooms at Days Inn prior to speaking to Martini, that she had requested to speak to Martini, and that he brought her to the January 26th meeting but was not present during the meeting. In his report, he stated that when Afdahl returned from her meeting with Martini, [w]e then asked Ms. Afdahl if she was willing to cooperate with us at this time and tell us the truthful facts concerning her and Martini's participation in Irving Flax's murder. At this time, Ms. Afdahl was crying and said that she was willing to cooperate with us and she said that she could now tell us the truth regarding Mr. Flax's murder, because Martini had told her to cooperate with the police. With respect to the January 30th meeting, there was pretrial testimony by FBI Officer Hoyt Peavy and Officer Carlino, and the State submitted a report by Officer Trahey. They all testified that at the later meeting defendant had urged Afdahl to tell the police that she, rather than defendant, had shot Flax. Agent Peavy testified as follows: Q. Was there a meeting where  do you recall Mr. Martini indicating to you that he had been lying about when said that he had shot Flax and that it was really Ms. Afdahl that had done it? A. Yes. Q. And when was that that he told you that? A. I don't recall which day that was. It was late in the week though, I believe. Officer Carlino also testified about such a meeting at the pretrial hearing: A She said that she had shot and killed Irving Flax. Q And what was your response? A Our response was I didn't feel as though she was being truthful. Q What did she do at that point? A She ultimately began crying again, and I asked her if she could truthfully tell me that she shot Irving Flax, and she said no. Q And did she further tell you that Martini told her to say that she killed Irving Flax? A Yes, she did. Q Did she further tell you that John Martini told her that if she said that she shot Irving Flax, that the two of them could go off together in some sort of federal program and live together in a little cottage? A That's correct. Q So is it fair to say that as a result of what John Martini told her, Ms. Afdahl confessed to a shooting that she actually did not commit?         Q Did she also tell you Martini promised her, We'll get married while we're in prison and remain together throughout our sentence? A Yes, she did. Q And that Martini said, We'll live in a little cottage which will be furnished by the Witness Protection Program? MS. ZDOBINSKI: Objection, your Honor. It's been asked and answered. We've been over this. THE COURT: I'll allow it in the context. A That's correct. Q Did she also tell you that this could only happen according to Martini if she told the police that he did not kill Irving Flax? A Yes. Details of the January 30th meeting also were contained in a report prepared by Officer Trahey: John Martini, Sr. requested that we give him an opportunity to speak to Therese Afdahl so that he could convince her to tell the truth about the shooting of Irving Flax. I went to the room where Therese Afdahl was being interviewed by Sr. Inv. Michael Carlino and asked her if she would be willing to speak to John Martini, Sr. She agreed to speak to him, at which time I escorted her to conference room two, where Martini was being questioned. In my presence Martini told Therese Afdahl that he still loved her and that they could still get married while they were in jail. He told Afdahl that it was important that she now tell the police the truth that she was the one who actually shot Irving Flax. He suggested that if she did confess they would be able to get married in jail and do their prison time together under the witness protection program. Afdahl told Martini that if it meant they could be together in prison, she knew what she had to do. At this point I told Martini that I would not allow him to try and influence Therese Afdahl by making promises to her, which were never discussed at any time by our office. I then escorted Therese Afdahl back to the room she was being interviewed in, along with Sr. Inv. Michael Carlino. Officer Trahey's report was not entered into evidence either at the pretrial hearings or during the trial. Defendant requested the court's ruling on the c(5)(g) instruction at the beginning of the penalty phase. The court should have withheld its ruling until the end of the penalty phase when all the evidence was before the jury and just prior to the time when the court actually charged the jury with respect to the mitigating factors. In this case, however, the failure to have done so made little difference. Defendant was given the unlimited right to introduce evidence on factor c(5)(g). The trial court specifically stated that if other evidence comes in that changes my mind, on that, of course, then we can always deal with that. The trial court also suggested to defense counsel that evidence of that mitigating factor could be used in the catch-all factor. Defendant, however, chose neither course. Indeed, he presented no other evidence before the jury. At the end of the penalty phase, the jury still had before it as evidence of Martini's substantial assistance to the State only Officer Trahey's testimony that defendant had told Afdahl [o]nly that he was going to cooperate with us and that he was going to tell us what happened and that he wanted her to be aware of that fact. A defendant has the burden to produce evidence of the existence of any mitigating factor. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(a). Although the statute does not specify the quantum of evidence needed to justify jury consideration of a mitigating factor, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(2)(b) provides that defendant may offer evidence relevant to any of the mitigating factors. Defendant is entitled to the use of all reliable, helpful information. State v. Davis, 96 N.J. 611, 619-20, 477 A. 2d 308 (1984). In Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 47, 594 A. 2d 172, we concluded that a factor could be established by some reliable evidence. Some of the pretrial testimony was such reliable evidence. However, defendant chose not to produce that evidence at trial. In view of Trahey's report and the testimony of Agent Peavy and Officer Carlino about the January 30th meeting, defense counsel's failure to do so is understandable. That meeting discloses that instead of substantially assisting the State, defendant was actively attempting to obscure the facts and to frustrate the State's case. Disclosure of the pretrial testimony of the January 26th meeting or comment on it in the penalty phase would have allowed the State to offer in rebuttal the testimony of Agent Peavy and Officer Carlino, and Officer Trahey's report. More damaging testimony to defendant's character than his attempt to have Afdahl confess to the murder is hard to imagine. We reject the dissent's contention that the trial court's clear invitation to defendant to present additional evidence to the jury supporting factor c(5)(g) was in effect an exclusionary ruling. Post at 342, 619 A. 2d at 1295. The following facts remain undisputed: (1) the only evidence before the jury of defendant's alleged substantial assistance to law enforcement was Officer Trahey's testimony that defendant had told Afdahl that he was going to cooperate with the police; (2) the trial court informed defense counsel that he could submit any other evidence on factor c(5)(g) and that the court on the basis of such testimony would be willing to reconsider its denial of defendant's requested c(5)(g) instruction; (3) the trial court told defendant that he could use the evidence in support of c(5)(h), the catch-all mitigating factor; and (4) most significantly, defense counsel did not introduce any other c(5)(g) evidence before the jury. These are the facts and no tortured analysis of the record by the dissent can change them. There is simply no support for the dissent's allegation that defense counsel did not introduce the evidence because the court had already decided such evidence to be insufficient and inadmissible. Post at 349, 619 A. 2d at 1298. Such a conclusion is unfounded. Defense counsel had every right to produce all of the pretrial evidence before the jury. Such evidence could clearly have been used by counsel not only to request the trial court to reconsider its ruling but equally importantly to influence the jury in its consideration of the catch-all factor, c(5)(h). However, defense counsel did not present the jury with that pretrial testimony and did not even comment in his closing statement on defendant's alleged assistance in securing Afdahl's cooperation. Defense counsel was faced with a realistic and practical problem. Although he was given the unlimited right to introduce before the jury all of the pretrial evidence, he wisely realized that to do so would allow the State to introduce in rebuttal the extraordinarily damaging evidence of FBI Agent Hoyt Peavy, Officer Carline and Officer Trahey that Martini on January 30th had urged Afdahl to tell the State that she, and not he, had killed Flax. This evidence is virtually ignored by the dissent. Post at 349, 619 A. 2d at 1298. Thus, a realistic reading of the record discloses that defense counsel did not introduce to the jury any other evidence, including the evidence produced at the pretrial proceedings, because of the serious damage such testimony could have on the defendant's chance to escape the death penalty and not because he was prohibited by the court from doing so. In any event, the only evidence before the court of Martini's substantial assistance to the State with respect to Afdahl was Officer Trahey's statement. We do not think that that satisfies the threshold requirement. We find unpersuasive the dissent's analysis of three contract-murder cases to support its conclusion that a c(5)(g) instruction should have been given. Two of these cases, State v. Miguel Melendez and State v. Michael Rose, A-4874-84TA (Feb. 16, 1989), are unreported and were chosen by the dissent from the Baldus Report's Detailed Narrative Summaries of Death Eligible Cases. An examination of these cases reveals that the evidence of cooperation of the respective defendants in each of the three contract-murder cases is substantially greater than the evidence of Martini's cooperation. In State v. Melendez, the assistance rendered was greater than that alleged by the dissent. Although the dissent asserts in its Appendix, post at 371, 619 A. 2d at 1310 that the only assistance Melendez rendered was to break down under questioning, the trial transcript states that Melendez made a statement to law-enforcement officers that led to the arrest and indictment of a co-defendant, and he took the police to the co-defendant's home. State v. Melendez, transcripts micro-formed at State Law Library, Box 5150, Reel 7335. As a result of that assistance, the co-defendant pleaded guilty to a criminal offense. Ibid. Clearly, the degree of assistance afforded to the State by Melendez greatly exceeds the assistance to the State derived from Martini's brief conversation with Afdahl. Likewise, the defendant in State v. Michael Rose, who identified for police the person who had hired him to kill and testified about that person at trial rendered substantially greater cooperation to the State than did Martini. Moreover, even from the narrative summary set forth in the Baldus Report, it is evident that defendant Rose was a far different person than defendant Martini: There was substantial testimony from friends and family that D was helpful, quiet, easy-going, always there for me. He had been a church goer and in the Choir. It appears that he went downhill after meeting Zoran Cveticanin. Tests done after his arrest indicate that D has an I.Q. of 68 and is mildly retarded although defense witnesses testified that it was not apparent to them. D had no prior record. [Baldus Report, Detailed Narrative Summaries of Death Eligible Cases § B, at 268 (1991).] In State v. DiFrisco, 118 N.J. 253, 571 A. 2d 914 (1990), without defendant's identifying Franciotti as the person who had hired him to kill, the police would have had absolutely no clue to Franciotti's identity. Moreover, as found by the trial court, DiFrisco gave substantial assistance to the police: On the day of his arrest, Anthony DiFrisco, the defendant, informed both New York Detective Kukk and Detective Sergeant Saunders of Maplewood in detail concerning his role and that of Franciotti in the death of Potcher. He described Franciotti. He provided his address. He related when and where he had been paid as well as how Franciotti had transported him to and from the scene of the crime. And the State does have in its possession at least circumstantial evidence to corroborate that Franciotti and the defendant were well known to each other. Apparently, upon the retention of and prior to speaking to private counsel the defendant, upon the advice of his father, ceased his cooperation until such time, he stated, as he should have had an opportunity to speak to counsel or to the counsel that his father had retained to represent him. Since that time the State had not requested nor has the defendant further offered any further cooperation. The State's witnesses, Detective Kukk and Detective Saunders and Investigator Kennedy all offered the opinion that the defendant's confession was a truthful one. It is noteworthy that until the defendant voluntarily related his participation and that of Mr. Franciotti in the crime, that no one had the slightest idea or even a scintilla of evidence of any culpability on their part.