Opinion ID: 501750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rockwood

Text: 37 Rockwood appeals an order of the district court denying its request for reimbursement from the State for the construction of ten additional classrooms. 38 Rockwood made its first request under section X.B.3. in 1984. Judge Hungate approved that request. Rockwood made the present request on April 1, 1986. The district court denied the request because the plain meaning of one-time extraordinary costs is that a county school district can seek state funding of desegregation-related capital expenditures only once. 39 The question of Rockwood's request hinges on the meaning of one-time in the phrase one-time extraordinary costs: does it define the kind of costs (i.e., recurring versus non-recurring) which are reimbursable or does it define the number of times reimbursement can be sought? In our view, the district court erred in deciding that it limited the number of times reimbursement may be sought. 40 We start by observing that the district court essentially interprets the phrase to read that a district may seek reimbursement only one-time for extraordinary costs. Such an interpretation, however, is not compelled by the language. To the contrary, a more reasonable interpretation is that one-time costs are those that do not recur on a regular basis, or put another way, costs for particular items whose useful life is, in theory, unlimited. See, e.g., United States v. Board of Educ., 621 F.Supp. 1296, 1350 (D.C.Ill.1985) (where the court notes in discussing a budget matter that certain of the items funded in school year 1983-84 are one-time costs and will not recur in subsequent years), vacated on other grounds, 799 F.2d 281 (7th Cir.1986). Such costs would be distinguishable from operational costs (such as salaries, supplies, and building maintenance) which recur on a regular basis. 41 In this case, the cost for the classrooms for which Rockwood sought reimbursement in 1984 are one-time costs in that those particular classrooms will not have to be replaced in the short-term. If Rockwood has to build more classrooms, the cost of those classrooms would be one-time in that the additional classrooms would also not have to be replaced in the short-term. In this way, both Rockwood's 1984 request and its present request would be for one-time costs. 42 The State contends that to read the phrase in such a fashion would render the term extraordinary superfluous. We disagree. First, we think that standing on its own, the term extraordinary as interpreted by the district court is unclear. The State argues that extraordinary costs refer to capital costs. This Court has examined a number of cases in which the term extraordinary costs is used, and in none of them is extraordinary synonomous with capital. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of California v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 1387, 1391 n. 6 (9th Cir.1985) (plaintiffs seeking extraordinary costs associated with housekeeping and plant engineering); Nevada Power Co. v. Watt, 711 F.2d 913, 921 (10th Cir.1983) (federal environmental statute listing extraordinary costs as those of special studies; environmental impact statements; monitoring construction, operation, maintenance, and termination of any authorized facility; or other special activities); Geneva Towers Tenants Org. v. Federal Mortgage Investors, 504 F.2d 483, 497 n. 6 (9th Cir.1974) (using extraordinary costs in terms of unanticipated costs in a case involving federal housing legislation). While these cases by no means resolve the meaning of extraordinary costs, they certainly cast doubt on the State's interpretation. 43 We believe a more reasonable interpretation would be this: extraordinary means those costs which are due, not to ordinary operation of a school district for its resident students, but are due to the presence of transfer students from outside the school district. Thus, the full phrase one-time extraordinary costs would mean those non-recurring costs incurred as a result of the presence of the transfer students. 44 In addition, this interpretation of the language of X.B.3. is more fiscally prudent than the interpretation offered by the State. Under the State's interpretation, Rockwood should have made a complete budget request in 1984 which would have anticipated all the future capital needs necessitated by the transfer students. Such a request, however, would have to have been based on projections of the growth of the resident population and the number of transfer students who might choose to come to the district. It could have turned out to be grossly inflated, and the State would have had to reimburse the district for expenditures not required by the settlement plan. 45 In most instances it would be far more prudent to expand incrementally to avoid wasting money on classroom space that might not be needed for transfer students. This is precisely what Rockwood did. Such an approach is consistent with both the letter and spirit of the settlement plan. We therefore hold that that the district court erred in refusing to consider Rockwood's second budget request under section X.B.3.