Opinion ID: 1362904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admission of statement of ambulance attendant

Text: Defendant contends that reversible error occurred during the trial through admission into evidence of the following testimony by the ambulance attendant concerning a statement made to him by the wife of the defendant while enroute from the scene of the accident to the hospital: Q. And what did she tell you? A. Well, she said there was [sic] two motorcycles riding abreast, and they went to go in between them, and they bumped. Q. Did she tell you anything else? A. I asked her how fast they were going, and she said about 90.    We need not address the substance of defendant's contention inasmuch as the admission of such testimony was not prejudicial even if improperly admitted. The questioned testimony had to do with the fact that defendant tried to go between two other motorcycles and that he was traveling in excess of the speed limit. The foregoing summaries of portions of the testimony of Patrolman Coleman, Apodaca, and Ventling are to the same effect. The physical evidence and defendant's statement to the highway patrolman and to Apodaca were to the effect that defendant was attempting to drive between the other two motorcycles. Apodaca testified that defendant told him he was traveling at a speed of 80 miles per hour. Apodaca estimated that speed at 80 miles per hour and Ventling estimated it at 75 to 80 miles per hour. The testimony of the ambulance attendant was repetitive and cumulative to this other testimony. The speed limit was 55 miles per hour. In addition to the foregoing summary of the evidence and the testimony of the ambulance attendant, the only other evidence was testimony by prosecution witnesses Vaughn and Klahs, and by defense witnesses Susan Harvey (defendant's wife) and DeWitt. Vaughn did not testify concerning the accident itself, but only as to the damage to the motorcycles. Klahs testified that he was a friend of the defendant and that defendant told him, during a conversation three or four weeks after the accident, that he was traveling 60 miles per hour and had just looked at his speedometer before the accident. Klahs testified that he saw the accident from the rear at a distance and that defendant's motorcycle was on the right of Vaughn's motorcycle at the time of the accident, with Vaughn's vehicle swerving about a foot just before impact. He did not testify as to his opinion of the speed of defendant's motorcycle. Susan Harvey testified that her head was behind the defendant's back, and she did not testify as to speed or position of the motorcycles. She said that the information given by her to the ambulance attendant was information previously told to her by Apodaca and was not that of her own knowledge. Thus, not only the evidence favorable to the prosecution (which was sufficient to sustain the verdict), but the evidence taken as a whole, is substantial and convincing of guilt. Without the testimony of the ambulance attendant, a different verdict would not have resulted. In other words, the prosecution's case would not have been significantly less persuasive had the ambulance attendant's testimony been excluded. There was substantial and convincing evidence of guilt, and the error, if one, was not likely to have changed the verdict. Under such circumstances, the error, if one, is not prejudicial. Reeder v. State, Wyo., 515 P.2d 969 (1973); Pack v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 241 (1977); Hampton v. State, Wyo., 558 P.2d 504 (1977); Madrid v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 709 (1979); State v. Campbell, 42 Wyo. 252, 293 P. 365 (1930); Hollywood v. State, 19 Wyo. 493, 120 P. 471 (1912), reh. den. 19 Wyo. 493, 122 P. 588; Espy v. State, 54 Wyo. 291, 92 P.2d 549 (1939); Jenkins v. State, 22 Wyo. 34, 134 P. 260 (1913), reh. den. 22 Wyo. 34, 135 P. 749; Murdock v. State, Wyo., 351 P.2d 674 (1960); Eagan v. State, 58 Wyo. 167, 128 P.2d 215 (1942). Affirmed.