Opinion ID: 2200470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plain Error and Invited Error.

Text: The District, however, never objected to this instruction, nor did it express any dissatisfaction with it, either directly or indirectly. On the contrary, at the conclusion of the judge's charge, the Assistant Corporation Counsel reiterated her dissatisfaction with the judge's instruction that the jury could find gross negligence on the basis of a violation of the MPD's general order, see pp. 975-976, supra, but she did not say a word about the negligent supervision claim. Moreover, the District effectively invited the judge to treat negligent supervision as requiring ordinary negligence rather than gross negligence. Prior to the judge's charge, the Assistant Corporation Counsel tendered to the court Defendant's Proposed Verdict Form, which would have inquired of the jury in relation to Count I if the District was grossly negligent in pursuing the fleeing felon, but would have asked as to Count II if the District was negligent in the supervision of its police officers. (Emphasis added). [5] Rule 51 of the Superior Court's Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part that [n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless that party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly [6] the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. The language of the Rule recognizes no explicit exception to its proscription. We may reverse a judgment on the basis of an incorrect instruction, notwithstanding the lack of a sufficient objection, only where it is apparent from the face of the record that a miscarriage of justice has occurred. Weisman v. Middleton, 390 A.2d 996, 1000 (D.C.1978) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). This is essentially the language of plain error. See District of Columbia v. Wical Ltd. Partnership, 630 A.2d 174, 182-83 (D.C.1993). Moreover, courts are especially reluctant to reverse for plain error when it is invited, Wical, supra, 630 A.2d at 183 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), and there is more than a hint in this record that the District invited the error of which it now complains. We find no plain error or miscarriage of justice in this record. The action by the trial court which the District invited or encouraged below, but which it now assails on appeal, is essentially an incorrect statement of the degree of negligence required to establish negligent supervision. Such an error is unfortunate, but it does not rise to the level of a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, in Joyner v. District of Columbia, 109 Daily Wash. L.Rptr. 357 (D.C.Super.Ct.1981), the court held, on facts quite similar to those here, [7] that an impartial jury might reasonably find that the District was grossly negligent as a result of the manner in which a pursuing officer conducted a comparable high-speed chase. The District insists that Joyner was wrongly decided, and reasonable people might differ on that score. [8] Given the similarity of the two cases, however, a judgment in Banks' favor is not the stuff of which a finding of miscarriage of justice is made. Moreover, for the reasons stated in Judge FARRELL'S concurring opinion, we agree that the error was not plain (in the sense of clear or obvious). See United States v. Olano, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). To reverse this judgment on the basis of an instructional error to which the District did not object would prejudice important principles of judicial management. As we observed in Hunter v. United States, 606 A.2d 139, 144 (D.C.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 509, 121 L.Ed.2d 444 (1992). [l]itigants should not be permitted to keep some of their objections in their hip pockets and to disclose them only to the appellate tribunal; [o]ne cannot take his chance on a favorable verdict, reserving a right to impeach it if it happens to go the other way. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Patouillet, 42 A.2d 273, 274 (D.C.1945); see also Hopkins v. United States, 595 A.2d 995, 996 n. 3 (D.C.1991) (quoting Patouillet ). The District suggested at oral argument that these considerations and others like them apply with less force to government attorneys than to private counsel, but we firmly rejected such a contention in Wical, 630 A.2d at 183-84, and do so again here. [9] Accordingly, we conclude that the instructional error in question did not constitute plain error, nor did it result in a miscarriage of justice.