Opinion ID: 2534147
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence as to aiding or abetting

Text: Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the felony-murder special-circumstance findings. Defendant does not contend the evidence was insufficient to prove he planned and participated in the burglaries and robberies; he concedes it was sufficient. Rather, defendant contends the prosecution was required to prove, not only that he aided or abetted the burglaries and robberies, but also that he assisted in the killings themselves. Defendant relies upon the language we italicize in section 190.2, former subdivision (b). Every person whether or not the actual killer found guilty of intentionally aiding, abetting ... or assisting any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall suffer death or confinement in state prison for a term of life without the possibility of parole, in any case in which one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in [specified paragraphs covering, among others, the crimes of burglary and robbery] of subdivision (a) of this section has been charged and specially found under Section 190.4 to be true. (§ 190.2, former subd. (b), added by initiative measure Prop. 7, § 6, approved by the electorate Nov. 7, 1978; see now § 190.2, subd. (c).) Section 190.2, former subdivision (b) is not helpful to defendant because, under the felony-murder doctrine, he was found guilty of aiding or abetting first degree murders. All persons aiding or abetting the commission of burglary or robbery are guilty of first degree murder when one of them kills while acting in furtherance of the common design. (§ 189; People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 716, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d 1235; People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 782, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130.) Defendant also relies on People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306 ( Anderson ), to support his argument that the actus reus of a special circumstance requires that a defendant aid or abet the actual killing, not just the underlying felony. In particular, defendant relies upon the following statement in Anderson: [G]iven a realistic reading the statutory requirement that the aider and abetter intentionally aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist any acts in the commission of first degree murdereven when applied to felony murderis not ambiguous: the aider and abetter must intentionally aid in a killing.  ( Anderson, at p. 1145, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Defendant's reliance on Anderson is unfounded. It is axiomatic a decision does not stand for a proposition not considered by the court. ( People v. Barker (2004) 34 Cal.4th 345, 354, 18 Cal.Rptr.3d 260, 96 P.3d 507; People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1071, 255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619 ( Harris ).) The proposition advanced by defendantfor a felony murder special circumstance, the aiding or abetting has to relate to the act of killing itself, rather than just the underlying felony was not considered by the court in Anderson. The question we considered in Anderson reconsidered, actuallywas whether and under what circumstances intent to kill is an element of the felony murder special circumstance. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1141, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Anderson overruled Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862 ( Carlos ). In Carlos ..., we held that intent to kill was an element of the felony-murder special circumstance whether or not the defendant was the actual killer. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1139, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) In Anderson, we concluded the broad holding of Carlos that intent to kill is an element of the felony-murder special circumstance cannot stand, and that the following narrow holding must be put in its place: intent to kill is not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance; but when the defendant is an aider and abetter rather than the actual killer, intent must be proved before the trier of fact can find the special circumstance to be true. ( Id. at pp. 1138-1139, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) The premise of the decision in Carlos, the Anderson court explained, was our determination that section 190.2[, subdivision] (a)(17) is ambiguous. As shown above, on further reflection we now believe that premise was mistaken: given a fair reading, section 190.2[, subdivision] (a)(17) provides that intent is not an element of the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1143, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) According to Anderson, Carlos's mistaken premise rested on two bases. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1143-1145, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) The statement relied upon by defendant appears in the context of Anderson's reexamination of the second of the two bases. The second basis of our analysis in Carlos was our belief that unless section 190.2(a)(17) were read to require intent to kill, the meaning and function of section 190.2(b) would be hard to determine: `In the first place, paragraph 17, alone of the listed paragraphs, already contains language equating the liability of principal and accomplice. In addition, the requirement that the accomplice intentionally aid in the commission of a murder is inherently ambiguous when applied to a felony murder, for it could mean either that the accomplice must intentionally aid in a killing, or that he need only intentionally aid the commission of the underlying felony.' ([ Carlos, supra, ] 35 Cal.3d at p. 142 [197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862].) On reexamination we now find this basis, too, to be lacking. First, section 190.2(a)(17) does not treat the liability of the murderer and his aider and abetter, but rather the liability of the perpetrator of the underlying felony and his aider and abetter. Thus, the statutory provision does nothing more than declare that both the perpetrator of the underlying felony and his aider and abetter are felony murderers. Section 190.2(b) then declares that the felony-murder aider and abetter is eligible for the death penalty if intent to kill is proved. Second, given a realistic reading the statutory requirement that the aider and abetter intentionally aid, abet, counsel, command, induce, solicit, request, or assist any acts in the commission of first degree murder even when applied to felony murder is not ambiguous: the aider and abetter must intentionally aid in a killing.  ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1144-1145, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) In the paragraph immediately following the statement upon which defendant relies we reiterated the issue we were actually resolving in Anderson. Thus, in Carlos we mistook the first and crucial step in our analysis by determining that section 190.2(a)(17) is ambiguous: given a fair reading in conjunction with section 190.2(b), the provision can realistically be read only to require intent to kill for the aider and abetter but not for the actual killer. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1145, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) [7] Finally, defendant recasts this argument as an instructional claim. He contends the trial court prejudicially erred by failing to instruct the jury he had to have aided or abetted the actual killings, not just the underlying felonies. For the reasons stated, this contention lacks merit.