Opinion ID: 2631807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Severance or Separate Jury

Text: Defendant contends the court erred in failing to hold separate penalty trials, or convene separate juries, to decide the appropriate penalty for him and codefendant DeWitt. Defendant suggests that he was necessarily disadvantaged by the jury's probable comparison of the two codefendants. Defendant notes that he is a bi-racial Caucasian and African-American male from the Bronx, and DeWitt is entirely Caucasian from Southern California, where trial was held. According to defendant, his prior criminal record was more significant, and his mitigating evidence less impressive, than DeWitt's. Indeed, the jury rendered a verdict of life imprisonment without parole for DeWitt, while selecting death for defendant. Defendant relies on cases strongly suggesting the need for individualized sentencing in capital cases. (See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 811, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310.) He observes that we have upheld the use of separate juries for jointly tried defendants, as an alternative to outright severance. ( People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1287, 18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1; see § 190.4, subd. (c) [for good cause court may discharge penalty jury and convene new jury].) Cummings explained, however, that the decision to use dual juries is largely a discretionary one, and that [w]hen the trial court's denial of severance and impanelment of dual juries is urged as error on appeal ... the error is not a basis for reversal of the judgment in the absence of identifiable prejudice or `gross unfairness ... such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law.' [Citations.] ( People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1287, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1; see also Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 180, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 [upholding use of single jury to try both guilt and penalty phases of single defendant's trial]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 753,114 Cal.Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267 [same]; People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1241, 255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047 [no good cause shown for separate penalty juries at joint trial].) We recently considered the very issue defendant raises regarding the need for severance or separate juries for multiple defendants. In People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 69, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506, we observed, We have held that, in light of the statutory preference for joint trials (see § 1098), severance remains largely within the trial court's discretion. [Citations.] Nonetheless, we have also stated that a reviewing court may reverse a conviction when, because of consolidation, 'gross unfairness` has deprived the defendant of a fair trial. [Citation.] The record in the present case, however, fails to show that the jurors in this joint trial were unable or unwilling to assess independently the respective culpability of each codefendant or were confused by the limiting instructions. In Ervin, we rejected the defendant's claim that the court should have ordered separate guilt and penalty trials for each defendant. ( Ibid. [guilt phase]; id. at pp. 95-96, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506 [penalty phase].) In the present case, we find nothing in the record indicating defendant's jurors failed to assess independently the appropriateness of the death penalty for defendant or DeWitt, or engaged in improper comparative evaluations of these men. The penalty phase jury was instructed to consider the evidence separately as to each defendant, and not consider as evidence against one defendant any evidence admitted only against another. Moreover, the jury was told to decide separately the question of the penalty as to each of the defendants, the same instruction given in the Ervin case. ( People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 95, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) These instructions were adequate to ensure individual consideration of penalty as to each defendant. In the absence of a showing that the jurors in this joint trial were unable or unwilling to assess independently the respective culpability of each codefendant, we can find no abuse of discretion in failing to sever the trial or order separate penalty phase juries.