Opinion ID: 150472
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Principals of Contractors

Text: If an artificial entity, rather than an individual, is awarded (or seeks) a state contract, the CFRA bans contributions made by any principal of that entity. [10] See id. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B). A principal is defined to include, among other things, (1) any member of the entity's board of directors, [11] (2) any individual who has an ownership interest of five per cent or more in the entity, (3) the president, treasurer or executive vice president of the entity, [12] and (4) any officer or employee of either a business entity or a nonprofit organization who has managerial or discretionary responsibilities with respect to a state contract. [13] The definition of principal sweeps broadly and prevents a wide range of individuals from contributing to campaigns for state office. We have some doubts, therefore, as to whether the provision is indeed closely drawn to achieve the state's anticorruption interest. Nonetheless, we are mindful of the teachings of the Supreme Court that we, as judges, cannot consider each possible permutation of a law limiting contributions, and thus we cannot determine with any degree of exactitude the precise restriction necessary to carry out the statute's legitimate objectives. Randall, 548 U.S. at 248, 126 S.Ct. 2479. Moreover, in light of the troubling episodes involving state contractors in Connecticut's recent history, we are reluctant to second-guess the judgment of the General Assembly when it defines which individuals associated with an artificial entity are likely to attempt to exert improper influence over a state official. We will, therefore, follow the ordinar[y] approach in evaluating the ban on principal contributions and defer[ ] to the legislature's determination of such matters. Id. The ban on principals' contributions strikes us as bordering on overboard, but the record shows that the dangers of corruption associated with contractor contributions are so significant in Connecticut that the General Assembly should be afforded leeway in its efforts to curb contractors' influence on state lawmakers. We thus conclude that, insofar as it applies to campaign contributions made by principals of state contractors or prospective state contractors, see Conn. Gen. Stat. § 9-612(g)(1)(F), (2)(A)-(B), the CFRA is closely drawn and withstands First Amendment scrutiny.