Opinion ID: 2762940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Local-Law Claims

Text: After dismissing Brown’s federal claim, the district court exercised its discretion to retain and decide Brown’s pendent local-law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (giving district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within” district court’s “original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”); see also Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (“[W]hen a court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a federal claim, the court generally retains discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 5 As Johnson indicates, Brown should be allowed on remand to add a citation to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to her complaint. 12 U.S.C. § 1367, over pendent state-law claims.”); Saksenasingh v. Sec’y of Educ., 126 F.3d 347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). Our review of the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s local-law claims follows.
The DCHRA proscribes discriminatory actions taken by employers based on, inter alia, race and sex. D.C. CODE § 2– 1402.11(a). We use the “burden-shifting framework established for Title VII cases in McDonnell Douglas” to evaluate claims under the DCHRA. McFadden v. Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP, 611 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2010). This is the same framework we used to evaluate Brown’s section 1981 claim. See supra Part II.A.; see also McFadden, 611 F.3d at 3 (McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is used to evaluate both DCHRA and section 1981 claims). We, unsurprisingly, reach the same conclusion here and reverse the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s DCHRA claim.
Brown’s breach of contract claim is premised on her belief that the Board—not Sessoms or Baxter—was, under the Merger Agreement, the final entity to review her tenure application. “To prevail on a claim of breach of contract, a party must establish (1) a valid contract between the parties; (2) an obligation or duty arising out of the contract; (3) a breach of that duty; and (4) damages caused by breach.” Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009). Assuming arguendo that the Faculty Handbook and the Merger Agreement constitute valid contracts, Brown’s contractual claim fails because she has not alleged any facts showing that the UDC defendants breached a contractual obligation. 13 The Merger Agreement outlines the process for reviewing DCSL tenure applications: The Faculty Evaluation and Retention Committee shall evaluate faculty candidates for award of tenure and make recommendations to the Dean. Based on the recommendation of the Faculty Evaluation and Retention Committee, the Dean will recommend faculty candidates for promotion and tenure to the Provost, who shall forward those recommendations to the President with his or her own recommendations. The provisions of Chapter 14 of the DCSL Rules shall be amended to provide for the Dean to forward recommendations for promotion and tenure to the President of the University, through the Provost, for final approval. Joint Appendix 93. This language makes clear that the Board is not required to review Brown’s tenure application. The Committee is to forward its recommendation to the Provost, who then forwards the Committee’s recommendation, as well as her own, to the President. Brown correctly notes that the Merger Agreement provides that D.C. municipal regulations must be amended to provide final approval authority to the President. Appellant Br. 18. She also notes that no such amendment occurred and, without it, Brown alleges that Sessoms was contractually obligated by the Merger Agreement to forward her tenure application to the Board for final approval. We disagree. The Board is bound “by the terms of the Merger Agreement.” D.C. CODE § 38– 1202.11(c). The Agreement’s call to conform municipal 14 regulations does not affect the President’s authority vis-à-vis tenure applications. It provides that the President has final approval over tenure applications, adding only that local regulations should conform. We therefore affirm the dismissal of Brown’s breach of contract claim.
All contracts in the District of Columbia “contain an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, which means that neither party shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the contract.” Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 310 (D.C. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). A party breaches this covenant if it “evades the spirit of the contract, willfully renders imperfect performance, or interferes with performance by the other party” to the contract. Id. A party does not breach “its duty of fair dealing when reasonable persons in the parties’ shoes would have expected the contract to be performed as it was.” Adler v. Abramson, 728 A.2d 86, 90–91 (D.C. 1999). We believe Paul v. Howard University, supra, controls our resolution of this issue. In Paul, the plaintiff sued Howard University when her tenure application was rejected. Paul, 754 A.2d at 301. She alleged breach of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing but both claims were rejected. Id. at 310–11. The court was unpersuaded by the plaintiff’s good faith and fair dealing claim principally because she “had no contractual right to receive tenure automatically” and because the defendants “acted within the standards set forth in the handbooks when considering her tenure applications.” Id. 15 Like the plaintiff in Paul, Brown had no contractual right to receive tenure. Additionally, Sessoms was not obligated under the Merger Agreement to forward her tenure application to the Board. See supra Part II.B.2. Accordingly, the UDC defendants did not breach the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to do something they had no obligation to do. Because “reasonable persons in the parties’ shoes would have expected the contract to be performed as it was,” Adler, 728 A.2d at 90–91, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Brown’s good faith and fair dealing claim.
An employer engages in negligent supervision under D.C. law if it “knew or should have known its employee behaved in a dangerous or otherwise incompetent manner, and that the employer, armed with that actual or constructive knowledge, failed to adequately supervise the employee.” Godfrey v. Iverson, 559 F.3d 569, 571 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Brown’s complaint contains no facts from which it can be inferred that the Board “knew or should have known” that Sessoms or Baxter would not follow protocol, assuming arguendo either (or both) did so. In short, Brown does not “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the dismissal of Brown’s DCHRA and section 1981 claims and remand those claims for further proceedings consistent with this opinion (including an opportunity for Brown to amend her complaint in accordance with Johnson). We affirm the dismissal of Brown’s remaining claims for the reasons stated herein. So ordered.