Opinion ID: 183984
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: A.3. Delay in Obtaining the State Search Warrant

Text: Stabile also argues that the Government unreasonably delayed by waiting almost three months [9] before obtaining the state search warrant and searching the seized hard drives. This argument raises some difficult issues. Initially, we note that Stabile's reliance on United States v. Mitchell, 565 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir.2009), and United States v. Dass, 849 F.2d 414 (9th Cir.1988), is misplaced. Mitchell and Dass held, respectively, that a 21-day delay and a 7- to 23-day delay between seizure and search were unreasonable when the warrantless seizures were based on probable cause, not consent. Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1349-51; Dass, 849 F.2d at 414-15. This distinction matters. The Mitchell court carefully policed the temporal delay in obtaining a search warrant because each passing day infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on `unreasonable searches.' Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1350 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984)). But where a person consents to search and seizure, no possessory interest has been infringed because valid consent, by definition, requires voluntary tender of property. [10] Of course, a seizure lawful at its inception can nevertheless violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes possessory interests protected by the Fourth Amendment's prohibition on `unreasonable seizures.' Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 125, 104 S.Ct. 1652. To determine whether the seizure became unreasonable, this Court must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983); see United States v. Martin, 157 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir.1998) (even a seizure based on probable cause is unconstitutional if police act with unreasonable delay in securing a warrant). Here, we balance the interests at stake to determine whether the three month delay was reasonable. Stabile relies on Mitchell 's focus on the property interest at stake in one's computer: Computers are relied upon heavily for personal and business use. Individuals may store personal letters, e-mails, financial information, passwords, family photos, and countless other items of a personal nature in electronic form on their computer hard drives. . . . If anything, this consideration applies with even greater force to the hard drive of a computer, which is the digital equivalent of its owner's home, capable of holding a universe of private information. Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1351-52. Stabile also argues that his job required him to have constant access to a computer. Appx. at A-202; Appellant's Br. 23. Stabile's actions undermine his argument. First, it is undisputed that Stabile did not ask for the return of his hard drives until February 15, 2008 eighteen months after the initial seizure of the hard drives. [11] See United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 487, 105 S.Ct. 881, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985) (defendants who never sought return of the property cannot argue that delay adversely affected Fourth Amendment rights). And when asked why he never requested the return of the hard drives, Stabile testified, I just assumed that perhaps that they didn't find anything and it was going to go away. Appx. at A-780. Second, although Stabile claims he needed a computer for work, Deetz brought a replacement computer to the house one day after Stabile's computers had been seized. Appx. at A-473-75. We also consider the Government's rationale for the delay. Agent Albanese testified that the three-month delay in securing a state search warrant was due to his assignment to a Secret Service Detail protecting the President and other high officials. Moreover, because Albanese was the lead case agent, he was responsible for seeking the state search warrant. Stabile notes that the Eleventh Circuit in Mitchell rejected the argument that a 21-day delay was not unreasonable because the officer was attending a training seminar. Mitchell, 565 F.3d at 1352. However, the Mitchell court explicitly stated that we emphasize that we are applying a rule of reasonableness that is dependent on all of the circumstances. Id. Moreover, the Mitchell court stated that it would be sympathetic if some overriding circumstances arose, necessitating the diversion of law enforcement personnel to another case. Id. at 1353. Here, such overriding circumstances were present because Agent Albanese was assigned to what was obviously important security work. Agent Albanese was also the lead investigator on a multiple-county investigation requiring coordination. Considering this explanation along with the other factors, we believe the Government's three-month delay in obtaining a state search warrant was reasonable under the circumstances. Nevertheless, the delay was not unavoidable, and we are troubled by it. In the absence of the same circumstances present here, we might very well reach a different result.