Opinion ID: 2500575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attorney depositions

Text: Nevada's discovery rules grant broad powers to litigants promoting and expediting the trial of civil matters by allowing those litigants an adequate means of discovery during the period of trial preparation. Maheu v. District Court, 88 Nev. 26, 42, 493 P.2d 709, 719 (1972). NRCP 26(a) permits discovery of information in a variety of methods including depositions upon oral examination. Such depositions are governed by NRCP 30, which allows a party to depose any person by oral examination. NRCP 30(a)(1). Thus, the rule does not prohibit the taking of opposing counsel's deposition. Nevertheless, the district court may, based on good cause shown, bar or limit discovery to prevent, among other things, an undue burden. NRCP 26(c). With the foregoing principles of depositional discovery in mind, we examine the policies behind limiting the practice of taking the deposition of an opposing party's attorney and whether these depositions create an undue burden. Forcing an opposing party's trial counsel to personally participate in trial as a witness has long been discouraged and recognized as disrupting the adversarial nature of our judicial system. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327 (citation omitted). In particular, requiring attorneys to participate in such a manner may increase the time and costs of litigation, create delays to resolve work-product and attorney-client objections, distract the attorney from representation of the client, and prevent clients from openly communicating with their attorneys. Id. Permitting the unbridled deposition of a party's attorney could further command delays to resolve collateral issues raised by the attorney's testimony. See Wardleigh, 111 Nev. at 359, 891 P.2d at 1189 (courts must protect an attorney's work product as mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, and legal theories of counsel concerning . . . litigation are not discoverable under any circumstances). Additionally, such depositions could provide a back-door method for attorneys to glean privileged information about an opponent's litigation strategy from the opposing attorney's awareness of various documents. In re Subpoena Issued to Dennis Friedman, 350 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir.2003); see also McMurry v. Eckert, 833 S.W.2d 828, 830-31 (Ky.1992) (explaining that the potential for harm created by attorney depositions is too great to permit them to be routinely performed); Kerr v. Able Sanitary, 295 N.J.Super. 147, 684 A.2d 961, 967 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1996) (concluding that the request to depose a party's attorney creates a rebuttable presumption of good cause for issuing a protective order); but see Munn v. Bristol Bay Housing Authority, 777 P.2d 188, 196 (Alaska 1989) (asserting that an attorney is no more entitled to withhold information than any other potential witness, and may be required to testify at a deposition or trial as to material, non-privileged matters). Based on the aforesaid apprehensions of placing counsel under the microscope of interrogation, courts across this country have disfavored the practice of taking the deposition of a party's attorney. Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 185 F.3d 477, 491 (5th Cir.1999); see, e.g., Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 278 F.3d 621, 628 (6th Cir.2002); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 830-31 (10th Cir.1995). While we have not encountered rampant attorney depositions in Nevada, we are wholeheartedly concerned with this vehicle of discovery and its imaginable ability to create an undue burden. However, opposing counsel should not be absolutely immune from being deposed. Therefore, we conclude that such depositions should only be permitted under exceptionally limited circumstances. To address the difficulties presented by attorney depositions, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has developed a stringent three-factor test under which the party seeking to take the deposition of an opposing party's counsel has the burden of proving that (1) no other means exist to obtain the information than to depose opposing counsel; (2) the information sought is relevant and nonprivileged; and (3) the information is crucial to the preparation of the case. Shelton, 805 F.2d at 1327 (citations omitted). We agree with the Shelton court that, in the absence of these conditions, a party should not be permitted to depose an opposing party's attorney, and thus, we adopt this three-factor test. [7] In evaluating these three factors, the district court should consider whether the attorney is a percipient witness [8] to the facts giving rise to the complaint. See Kerr, 684 A.2d at 967 (including, among factors to be considered in determining whether to permit an attorney deposition, the relative quality of the information purportedly in the attorney's knowledge). By establishing this heightened standard when a party is attempting to depose opposing counsel, we advise litigants to resort to alternative discovery methods and discourage endeavors to seek confidential and privileged information. When the facts and circumstances are so remarkable as to allow a party to depose the opposing party's counsel, the district court should provide specific limiting instructions to ensure that the parties avoid improper disclosure of protected information. In the instant case, the discovery master mentioned the Shelton factors but did not analyze their application to this situation. Further, the district court adopted the master's recommendations without any discussion of whether the Shelton factors were satisfied. Accordingly, as the district court did not consider pertinent factors for resolving the motion for a protective order, we grant the writ in part and direct the district court to reconsider the motion in light of the Shelton factors and this opinion. In doing so, the district court should consider whether Morrill has any relevant, discoverable information and the impact of Club Vista's definitive assertion at oral argument that Morrill has been withdrawn as a potential witness for trial. [9] To the extent that the instant petition seeks an order compelling the district court to issue a protective order preventing the proposed deposition, we deny it. Instead, we take no position on the proper resolution of the motion for a protective order, as it is for the district to evaluate the motion under the proper standard, as discussed in this opinion.