Opinion ID: 1442039
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Request for Additional Voir Dire of Jury

Text: Defendant moved to impanel a new jury for the penalty phase on the ground that the jury, having heard no defense offered at the guilt phase, would question defense counsel's credibility when evidence of defendant's mental condition was presented at the penalty phase. The trial court denied the motion, noting that section 190.4, subdivision (c) mandates the same jury in both phases of the trial unless good cause is shown. Defense counsel then requested to voir dire the jury to determine the openness of their minds. The court denied the request, finding nothing in section 1089 or case law that suggested additional voir dire into potential challenges for cause should be permitted after the jury was sworn. The court indicated, however, that it would permit comment during defense counsel's opening statement. Section 190.4, subdivision (c) states in relevant part: If the trier of fact which convicted the defendant of a crime for which he may be subject to the death penalty was a jury, the same jury shall consider ... the penalty to be applied, unless for good cause shown the court discharges that jury in which case a new jury shall be drawn. (6) The policy favoring a single jury to determine both guilt and penalty is well established. (See, e.g., People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1028-1029 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017]; People v. Fields (1983) 35 Cal.3d 329, 351-352 [197 Cal. Rptr. 803, 673 P.2d 680].) We have rejected arguments for re-voir dire of the jury before the penalty phase in a number of cases. ( People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 27-28 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249]; People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1028-1029; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 748-750 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1198-1199 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) (7) Although none of these cases involved the precise argument now presented, the present argument shares the same flaw as those previously advanced  namely, lack of anything more than speculation supporting the assertion of need for the re-voir dire. For example, counsel in Ainsworth could point to no facts furnishing good cause [for re-voir dire], other than speculation that the sitting jury, having found defendant guilty of the charges against him, could no longer be impartial. ( People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1029.) Likewise, in Malone, defendant's assertions of possible juror bias ..., based on the inflammatory nature of the guilt phase evidence and the promptness of the verdict, were insufficient to impose any duty of inquiry on the court. ( People v. Malone, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 28.) Despite defendant's assertions to the contrary, the situation here is not significantly different from those at issue in the prior cases, particularly Malone. For the reasons given in the prior cases, the trial court did not err in denying defendant's request to re-voir dire the jury. If defendant's argument were accepted, the trial court would be required to permit re-voir dire of the jury in every case in which there was any deviation between the defense strategy at the guilt phase and that contemplated at the penalty phase. This clearly is not the intent of section 190.4, subdivision (c).