Opinion ID: 2570367
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Vehicular Homicide Prior Convictions

Text: As stated above, for aggravated sentencing purposes, the Supreme Court has excepted the finding of prior conviction facts from the Sixth Amendment jury requirement. Prior conviction facts are Blakely -exempt in large part because these facts have been determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant in a knowing and voluntary plea agreement. Thus, as long as the prior proceedings were not constitutionally flawed, the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights were adequately protected in the prior conviction proceeding. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999)(a prior conviction must itself have been established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial guarantees). Whether prior convictions are extraordinary aggravating circumstances is a determination made by the judge alone. See Blakely, 124 S.Ct. at 2538 n. 8 (the sentencing judge's legal determinations must be based on properly received facts); see also, Watkins, 684 P.2d at 238 (abuse of discretion standard applied to sentencing determinations by sentencing judges). The critical point is that the underlying fact in a prior conviction analysisthat the defendant was previously convicted of certain crimesis one that has passed through the safeguards of the jury right or plea proceedings, and sentencing judges may consider these facts without further jury involvement. In this case, the trial court could permissibly aggravate Lopez's possession sentence based on his convictions in the vehicular homicide case. After lengthy discussion of Lopez's conduct during his deferral period, the court stated that he was aggravating the possession sentence for Lopez's driving with the excessive amount of alcohol, [and] killing another person in a vehicular homicide incident. Lopez was convicted by a jury of both of these acts. The unique facts of this case present some question as to whether the vehicular homicide convictions are prior convictions with regard to the possession sentencing. The vehicular homicide itself occurred after the possession offense. However, the convictions for the homicide were entered before the possession sentencing. We determine that, under the circumstances of this case, the vehicular homicide convictions are proper Blakely -exempt aggravating factors for the possession sentence because the facts are reflected in a jury's verdict that was entered before the possession sentence was imposed. The trial court determined the prior convictions to be extraordinary circumstances that supported an aggravated sentence for the possession conviction. Under the Apprendi-Blakely rule, this determination could properly rest on the prior conviction facts. The legal judgment that these facts are extraordinary aggravating circumstances to the possession offense is within the trial judge's discretion. Leske, 957 P.2d at 1044-45; Watkins, 684 P.2d at 238. In imposing sentence, the trial court must consider the nature and elements of the offense, the character and record of the offender, and all aggravating or mitigating circumstances, which include: unusual aspects of the defendant's character, past conduct, habits, health, age, the events surrounding the crime, pattern of conduct which indicates whether [the defendant] is a serious danger to society, past convictions, and possibility of rehabilitation. Leske, 957 P.2d at 1043 (internal citations omitted; alteration in original); § 18-1.3-401(1)(b)(I), C.R.S. (2004). The fact that Lopez drank to excess and drove recklessly, killing Mrs. Tinoco, is clearly relevant to unusual aspects of his character, his habits, and the danger he poses to society. See Leske, 957 P.2d at 1043. The fact that this conduct occurred during the supervised deferral is relevant to his susceptibility to rehabilitation. See Allen I, 973 P.2d at 623-24 (sentence aggravated on basis of conduct during probation). We therefore determine that the aggravated sentence in this case was imposed constitutionally where the trial court deemed Blakely -exempt prior conviction facts to be extraordinary aggravating circumstances in this case. See Watkins, 684 P.2d at 238 (abuse of discretion standard applied to trial court sentencing determinations).