Opinion ID: 844137
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: response to the deliberative process

Text: Contrary to Justice MARKMAN'S assertion, my dissent does not reveal a single predecisional deliberation regarding an adjudicated case. My dissent does, however, outline important facts regarding the disposition of a now-closed administrative file of this Court, ADM 2003-26. This Court has both adjudicative responsibilities and administrative responsibilities. No Michigan case establishes a judicial deliberative privilege, nor does any Michigan statute or court rule. Justice MARKMAN has not identified any law that requires a justice to be forever silent regarding the handling of administrative matters. In fact, quite the contrary is true. Canon 3(B) of the Code of Judicial Conduct addresses a judge's performance of his or her administrative responsibilities. Canon 3(B)(1) provides: A judge should diligently discharge administrative responsibilities, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials. To facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilities of other judges and court officials, it may at times be necessary for a justice to inform the public of the Court's mishandling of its administrative responsibilities. This is such a time. Nor is there any law requiring permanent silence regarding the Court's deliberations on cases. A judicial deliberative privilege, as it exists in Michigan, is articulated within the canons of the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. It is this judicial privilege that I have understood for my entire 32-year judicial career, and by which I strive to abide. Regarding public comment on adjudicative responsibilities, Canon 3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides: A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any court, and should require a similar abstention on the part of court personnel subject to the judge's direction and control. This subsection does not prohibit a judge from making public statements in the course of official duties or from explaining for public information the procedures of the court or the judge's holdings or actions. [Emphasis added.] Canon 3(A)(6) thus recommends against a judge speaking with regard to a case that is pending or impending in any court; however, Canon 3(A)(6) does not absolutely prohibit comment on such cases. [29] Beyond the longstanding restriction imposed by Canon 3(A)(6) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on November 13, 2006 during an unscheduled executive session from which Court staff were excluded, the majority of four adopted an Internal Operating Procedure (IOP)___a secret gag rule___ attempting to forever forbid a justice from publicly revealing memoranda and conference discussions regarding cases or controversies on the CR and opinion agendas. . . . [30] Moreover, at the close of the November 29, 2006, conference, it was moved, seconded, and tabled that a slightly edited version of the new secret gag rule be adopted as an emergency court rule having immediate effect, without notice or public comment before its adoption. I am guided by the fact that, as a justice, I am accountable first and foremost to the public. The public expects to be informed by a justice if something is seriously wrong within the operations of the Court. How else would the public know and be able to correct the problem through the democratic and constitutional processes? The public rightly expects the justices of this Court to act with courtesy, dignity, and professionalism toward one another. In matters of principle and legitimate public concern, however, the public does not expect a justice to go along to get along. The public trusts, or should be able to trust, that the justices of this Court will not transform the Court into a secret society by making rules to protect themselves from public scrutiny and accountability. Yet the public does not expect, and likely would not tolerate, being informed every time a justice changes positions on a matter before the Court, or every time a justice loses his or her temper with a colleague. The public expects justices to debate frankly, to be willing to change positions when persuaded by better argument, and to be willing to admit that they have changed their position. Moreover, momentary, human imperfections do not affect the work of the Court. The public would lose patience with and not support a justice who recklessly and needlessly divulged such information for intemperate or political reasons. The public expects that justices will exercise wise and temperate discretion when disclosing information regarding the operations of the Court and the justices' performance of their duties. It is an elected or appointed justice's compact with the people that, whenever possible, he or she will make all reasonable efforts to correct problems in the Court from within. But the public does need to know, and expects to be informed by a justice, when repeated abuses of power and/or repeated unprofessional conduct influence the decisions and affect the work of their Supreme Court. I believe it is my duty and right to inform the public of such repeated abuses and/or misconduct if and when they occur. I recognize that there is a federal judicial deliberative privilege of uncertain scope in federal common law, but that is not Michigan law and is not binding on this Court. Moreover, the deliberative privilege articulated in federal law does not prevent a justice from speaking out regarding matters of legitimate public concern. Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). The federal deliberative privilege is narrowly construed and qualified. The privilege is not intended to protect justices, but rather operates to protect the public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary. For such public confidence to be warranted, this Court must be orderly and fair and must act with integrity, professionalism, and respect. By contrast, the majority's new secret gag rule is specifically designed to prevent public access to information that would allow the public to hold each justice accountable for the performance of his or her duties. In a pertinent federal case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed whether a judge could be reprimanded for publicly commenting on the administration of justice as it related to a case in his court. Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201 (C.A.5, 1990). The court cited Pickering, supra, in recognition that the deliberative privilege could not prevent the judge from truthfully speaking out regarding matters of legitimate public concern where the judge's First Amendment rights outweighed the government's interest in promoting the efficient performance of its function. In light of Pickering, supra, the Scott court concluded: Neither in its brief nor at oral argument was the Commission able to explain precisely how Scott's public criticisms would impede the goals of promoting an efficient and impartial judiciary, and we are unpersuaded that they would have such a detrimental effect. Instead, we believe that those interests are ill served by casting a cloak of secrecy around the operations of the courts, and that by bringing to light an alleged unfairness in the judicial system, Scott in fact furthered the very goals that the Commission wishes to promote. [ Id. at 213.] The Scott court thus held that the judge could not constitutionally be reprimanded for making public statements critical of the court. The federal deliberative privilege as defined in the federal common law does not extend to every utterance and action within the Court's conferences and communications. It does not protect actions taken on nonadjudicative matters involving administrative responsibilities. It also does not extend to actions or decisions of the Court, because the actions and decisions of the Court are not deliberations, they are facts that occur at the end of a deliberative period. Further, any judicial privilege does not extend to repeated resort to personal slurs, name calling, and abuses of power, such as threats to exclude a justice from conference discussions, to ban a justice from the Hall of Justice, or to hold a dissenting justice in contempt. Nor should it extend to conduct such as refusing to meet with justices on the work of the Court as the majority of four have now twice done on November 13 and November 29, 2006. The privilege certainly does not extend to illegal, unethical, and improper conduct. Abuses of power and grossly unprofessional conduct are entirely unrelated to the substantive, frank, and vigorous debate and discussion of pending or impending adjudicated cases that a properly exercised judicial privilege should foster. Like all privileges, a judicial privilege can be waived. An absolute judicial privilege (ancient or newly created) that members of this Court allege exists is not written in Michigan law. Perhaps, further attempts to define the scope of the judicial privilege in Michigan may or may not be warranted. However, the privilege cannot effectively be expanded beyond that expressed within the Code of Judicial Conduct through the recent adoption of the IOP/secret gag rule. Nor should the new IOP/secret gag rule be adopted as an emergency court rule. If the Court embarks on an attempt to further define the judicial deliberative privilege, it should do so by opening an administrative file on the issue and by inviting public comment before making any such decision. After all, any judicial deliberative privilege must serve the public's interest in maintaining an efficient and impartial judiciary, not the justices' personal interests in concealing conduct that negatively and seriously affects the integrity and operations of the Court. The public must, therefore, have a voice in defining the boundaries of any expanded deliberative privilege. Moreover, any judicial privilege defined in any rule must not infringe on a justice's constitutional duties and rights. Const. 1963, art. 6, § 6 requires: When a judge dissents in whole or in part he shall give in writing the reasons for his dissent. Any new court rule on deliberations that would force a dissenter to not include in his or her dissent any or all of his or her reasons would interfere with the dissenter's duty under art. 6, § 6. In effect, such a rule would allow the majority to write the dissent and would be unconstitutional. In my opinion, the majority of four mishandled the justice disqualification file. For over nine (9) months, dating back to March 1, 2006, Chief Justice TAYLOR and Justices CORRIGAN, YOUNG, and MARKMAN have delayed action on, and thus publication of, the Court's minutes, and the dissents to the substance of those minutes, for critical administrative conferences involving the justice disqualification file, ADM 2003-26. Specifically, they have failed to act on the proposed March 1, 2006, minutes and to publish the minutes approved on September 7, 2006, because I have dissented to the substance of the minutes proposed for March 1, 2006, to the minutes for several of the dates approved on September 7, 2006, and to the September 7, 2006, action in closing the file on justice disqualification, ADM 2003-26. [31] Moreover, they have abruptly closed the file despite the overwhelming evidence of the need for reform. Because there is a relationship between the majority of four's handling of the justice disqualification file and the disposition of this case, the fair administration of justice by this Court is at stake. The mishandling of the disqualification file has, coincidently or not, occurred during the period that this case, which involves several motions to disqualify members of the majority of four, was pending before this Court My silence on these matters would be more damaging to this institution than my speaking out, because I believe it is my duty and right to do so. Finally, Justice MARKMAN engages unjustifiable speculation by suggesting that I make notes during conference discussions for the purpose of publicly disclosing discussion or debate among the justices. I do keep notes during this Court's conferences. My note-taking permits me to better respond to and track the myriad issues that arise on cases and administrative matters that this Court addresses.