Opinion ID: 617722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Ballard’s Claims Regarding the OPPB3

Text: 2 We also note that in Apodaca v. Ferguson, No. 96-8118, 1997 WL 618712 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 1997) (unpublished), we recognized that the order in which an inmate is serving consecutive sentences is a state law issue that does not give rise to federal habeas review. Id. at  (“At most, petitioner is complaining about the order in which he is serving his sentences. Such sentencing matters are state law concerns that do not raise federal issues cognizable on federal habeas review.”). 3 In his brief, Mr. Ballard raises only a claim challenging the sequence of his sentences. But in his motion to proceed in forma pauperis, he claims that, in addition to Continued . . . -5- In his § 2241 petition, Mr. Ballard requested the district court to order the OPPB to rehear, reconsider, and review its decision to deny Mr. Ballard parole on his robbery conviction. He also claimed that he was denied due process when the OPPB refused to hold a hearing on his request for rehearing, reconsideration, and review. Finally, he claimed that the OPPB’s lack of an administrative grievance procedure for review of denials of parole renders the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision denying a petition for writ of habeas corpus a violation of state and federal law. Based on established precedent, we agree with the district court and magistrate judge that Mr. Ballard has no liberty interest in parole under the Oklahoma parole statutes. See, e.g., Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir. 1979); Shabazz v. Keating, 977 P.2d 1089, 1093 (Okla. 1999) (“[T]here is no protectable liberty interest in an Oklahoma parole.”); see also Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”); Fristoe v. Thompson, 144 F.3d 627, 630 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The Constitution does not itself afford appellant a liberty interest in a reduced sentence.”). It follows that Mr. Ballard has no claim for violation of procedural or substantive due process. See Fristoe, 144 F.3d at 630 the sequence of his sentence, he is challenging “all the reasons and grounds raised in” the district court’s order denying his petition for habeas corpus. Motion for Leave to Proceed on Appeal without Prepayment of Costs or Fees, at 2. He makes a similar claim in his notice of appeal and application for a COA. Because we construe pro se filings liberally, see Sigala v. Bravo, 656 F.3d 1125, 1126 (10th Cir. 2011), we also consider his claims regarding the OPPB’s parole decision and procedures. -6- (“To make out a due process claim, appellant must assert the infringement of a protected liberty interest.”); Wildermuth v. Furlong, 147 F.3d 1234, 1239 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a claim for a violation of substantive due process because the inmate had no liberty interest in parole). Finally, we agree with the district court and magistrate judge that Mr. Ballard did not allege or show that he was denied parole for an arbitrary or unconstitutional reason.