Opinion ID: 613517
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Jury Instruction at Webb's Trial

Text: The starting point for all statutory interpretation is the language of the statute itself.... Med. Transp. Mgmt. Corp. v. Comm'r, 506 F.3d 1364, 1367 (11th Cir.2007) (quotation marks omitted); Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 972 (11th Cir.2000) (en banc) ([C]ourts should always begin the process of legislative interpretation... with the words of the statutory provision.). [O]ur task is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the dispute in the case. Our inquiry must cease if the statutory language is unambiguous and the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent. Med. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 506 F.3d at 1368 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, § 841(b)(1)(C) imposes an enhanced penalty whenever death or serious bodily injury results from the use of the controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). We agree with our sister circuits that the plain and unambiguous language of § 841(b)(1)(C) contains no foreseeability or proximate cause requirement. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d at 138; Houston, 406 F.3d at 1122; McIntosh, 236 F.3d at 972; Robinson, 167 F.3d at 826; Patterson, 38 F.3d at 145. The government is not required to prove a defendant's conduct proximately caused the victim's death or that the death was reasonably foreseeable to the defendant. Rather, under § 841(b)(1)(C), the government must prove only that the death results from the victim's use of a controlled substance charged in the indictment. We apply the language of the statute as written. The statute requires a cause-in-fact connection between the victim's ingestion of the drugs and death. It does not require that the defendant's conduct proximately cause the death. Accordingly, in Webb's case, we find no error in the district court's jury instruction regarding § 841(b)(1)(C), nor any error in the district court's refusal of Webb's requested instruction. The district court properly instructed that the § 841(b)(1)(C) standard was satisfied upon a finding that, but for the victims' ingesting the controlled substances charged in the indictment, the victims would not have died. This but for charge told the jury it had to find but for (had it not been for) the victim's ingestion, no death would have occurred. The statutory term results from is a cause-in-fact requirement that was met by the but for charge. Thus, as to § 841(b)(1)(C), the district court's jury instructions were correct, and Webb's requested instructions were not.