Opinion ID: 1375322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lack of Probable Cause to Support Issuance of Warrant

Text: The appellants launch a two-pronged attack on the probable cause finding in this case. First, they argue the magistrate could not have made an informed decision because the allegations in the affidavit concerning the informant's veracity were bare bones and conclusory[.] Second, at oral argument, the appellants contended the affiant officer provided the magistrate with no independent information or proof that there was any independent corroboration of the highly unilluminating statements of the informant. Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant exists if the facts and circumstances provided to a magistrate in a written affidavit are sufficient to warrant the belief of a prudent person of reasonable caution that a crime has been committed and that the specific fruits, instrumentalities, or contraband from that crime presently may be found at a specific location. [10] It is not enough that a magistrate believes a crime has been committed. The magistrate also must have a reasonable belief that the place or person to be searched will yield certain specific classes of items. There must be a nexus between the criminal activity and the place or person searched and thing seized. 1 Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure I-358 (1994). The probable cause determination does not depend solely upon individual facts; rather, it depends on the cumulative effect of the facts in the totality of circumstances. Here, the issue of probable cause is impacted by the use of a confidential informant. A key issue in determining whether information provided by an informant is sufficient to establish probable cause is whether the information is reliable. An informant may establish the reliability of his information by establishing a track record of providing accurate information. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 545 (1983). However, where a previously unknown informant provides information, the informant's lack of a track record requires some independent verification to establish the reliability of the information. See State v. Hlavacek, 185 W.Va. 371, 407 S.E.2d 375 (1991); State v. Adkins, 176 W.Va. 613, 346 S.E.2d 762 (1986); State v. Schofield, 175 W.Va. 99, 331 S.E.2d 829 (1985). Independent verification occurs when the information (or aspects of it) is corroborated by independent observations of the police officers. Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-45, 103 S.Ct. at 2333-36, 76 L.Ed.2d at 550-53; Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 333, 3 L.Ed.2d 327, 332 (1959). Thus, we must decide whether the informant had a sufficient track record of providing accurate information and, if not, whether any aspect of the informant's information was corroborated. We begin by observing that Corporal Livingston's affidavit did not disclose why the informant could be considered reliable. It failed to disclose whether any information previously provided by the informant related to an investigation of his own narcotic or drug-related activities or similar activities by other persons; whether his information was important or incidental in other criminal investigations; or whether the information of the informant ever resulted in any search warrants, arrest warrants, or convictions. Here, there is not even an averment that the informant provided reliable information in the pastwhich obviously is preferable to the mere statement in the affidavit that the person supplying the information is reliable. The malady of this general averment is that it still leaves the nature of that [past] performance undisclosed, so that the judicial officer making the probable cause determination has no basis for judging whether the [affiant's] characterization of [the informant as reliable] is justifiedthe magistrate remains relegated, albeit in a more attenuated sense, to relying on an affiant's reliability judgment. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3(b) at 636 (2nd ed. 1987). Therefore, the allegation of reliability in Corporal Livingston's affidavit should have been entitled to only slight weight. United States v. Miller, 753 F.2d 1475, 1480 (9th Cir.1985). Discounting the affidavit's allegation of the informant's reliability, however, does not end our inquiry. [E]ven if we entertain some doubt as to the informant's motives, [an informant's] explicit and detailed description of alleged wrongdoing, along with a statement that the event was observed firsthand, entitles his tip to greater weight than might otherwise be the case. Gates, 462 U.S. at 234, 103 S.Ct. at 2330, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545. Furthermore, under the totality of the circumstances announced in Gates, veracity and basis of knowledge are no longer viewed as independent prerequisites to a finding of probable cause: [A] deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of reliability such as corroborating evidence gathered by law enforcement. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329, 76 L.Ed.2d at 545. [11] In the instant case, the affidavit states the informant had seen the plants within the last 5 days and accused told informant that the plants were marijuana. Considering the discretionary nature of the magistrate's determination, we find the informant's statement, although general and generally vague, was based on firsthand observations and demonstrated an adequate basis in knowledge. [12] As a result, the central question becomes whether there was sufficient corroboration of the informant's veracity to support an overall finding of probable cause. See Thompson, 178 W.Va. at 257, 358 S.E .2d at 818 (even under Gates, information establishing probable cause must attest[] to the `veracity' and basis of knowledge of the person supplying the information). See also State v. Hlavacek, 185 W.Va. 371, 378, 407 S.E.2d 375, 382 (1991) (when information received from a confidential informant is relied upon in an affidavit for a search warrant, the affidavit must contain information which establishes the informant's basis of knowledge and lends credibility to the informant's statements). The appellants' second argument goes precisely to this issue of corroboration. Their argument is both appealing and persuasive. There are several different ways for the police to corroborate an informant's veracity. One way is to independently confirm what the informant said is true. [13] Another way is to create circumstances under which the informant is unlikely to lie. Here, the magistrate was not provided with any information as to why and how the informant made his observations. For example, such information may include whether the informant made his observations in the context of a controlled surveillance operation and reported intermittently to a supervising police officer who was able to corroborate the informant's access to the appellants. [14] Relevant information also may include whether a questionably reliable report given by an informant consists of facts readily verifiable so, if the warrant is issued, lies likely would be discovered quickly and favors falsely curried would dissipate rapidly. Accord 1 LaFave, supra, § 3.3(f) at 686-87. Finally, the corroboration requirement could be met by information contained in police files about the appellants. See United States v. Scalia, 993 F.2d 984, 988 (1st Cir.1993) (corroboration may derive from second-hand information in the police intelligence files). Even considering the discretionary nature of a magistrate's determination and our limited task on appeal only to ensure that there is a substantial basis for the conclusion, under the totality of circumstances presented before the magistrate in this case, we are compelled to say the finding of probable cause was without such a substantial basis. Indeed, no aspects of the informant's prediction were corroborated by independent observations of the police. Thus, the value of the information was diminished because of the complete lack of corroboration. As we stated in Adkins, [t]here are no facts in the affidavit indicating that police investigation had tended to corroborate the informant's tip such as existed in the Gates' affidavit. State v. Adkins, 176 W.Va. 613, 624, 346 S.E .2d 762, 774 (1986). Moreover, the reliability of the information was not enhanced by the fact that the informant was able to describe some factual details that were not easily discovered. [15] See Gates, 462 U.S. at 245, 103 S.Ct. at 2335, 76 L.Ed.2d at 552-53. To the contrary, the information in the affidavit was bare bones at best and standing alone hardly could support a finding of probable cause under either Gates or Adkins. Accordingly, we hold that the issuance of the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and, therefore, violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 6 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution. [16]