Opinion ID: 2754507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Test for Retaliation

Text: “We review the district court’s summary judgment order de novo, and apply the same legal standards as [did] the district court.” Doe v. City of Albuquerque, 667 F.3d 1111, 1122 (10th Cir. 2012). The district court had to grant summary judgment if the Department of Interior showed the absence of a genuine dispute on any material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 4 To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact existed, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Ward. Doe, 667 F.3d at 1122. Mr. Ward can state a valid Title VII claim in one of two ways. He can present direct evidence, or he can rely on circumstantial evidence and utilize the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting test. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Because Mr. Ward’s evidence is circumstantial, he must rely on McDonnell Douglas. Under McDonnell Douglas, Mr. Ward bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence. Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 539 (10th Cir. 2014). In the prima facie case, Mr. Ward must show that (1) he engaged in protected opposition to discrimination, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1212 (10th Cir. 2003). The Department of Interior does not dispute the first two elements, so we consider only whether Mr. Ward established a causal connection between his protected activity (participation in the EEOC proceedings) and the adverse employment action (the refusal to give him his prior job responsibilities and the hiring of another applicant for the Provo position). 5 To establish a causal connection, Mr. Ward must present “evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive.” Williams v. W.D. Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1091 (10th Cir. 2007). If the protected conduct is closely followed by the adverse action, courts have often inferred a causal connection. Id. Because Mr. Ward’s participation in the EEOC proceedings took place years earlier, Mr. Ward must use “additional evidence . . . to establish causation.” See Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir. 1999) (stating that a threemonth period between the protected conduct and the adverse action was too long for a fact-finder to infer causation). To survive summary judgment, Mr. Ward had to present “additional evidence” tying the adverse employment actions to Mr. Ward’s participation in the EEOC proceedings. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981). The Supreme Court has likened this burden to a showing of “but-for causation.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013). The evidence of but-for causation “must be based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or surmise.” Bones v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 366 F.3d 869, 875 (10th Cir. 2004). Mr. Ward has not presented evidence connecting the adverse employment actions to his participation in the EEOC proceedings. Thus, he has not satisfied his burden to present a prima facie case. Without 6 presentation of a prima facie case, the district court properly awarded summary judgment to the Department of Interior. III. Retaliation Claim 1: The Refusal to Fire or Demote Mr. Durrant and Give Mr. Ward His Prior Supervisory Responsibilities The first retaliation theory is that the Department of Interior should have demoted or fired Mr. Durrant and given Mr. Ward his previous supervisory responsibilities. Mr. Ward points to four pieces of evidence to support his claim of retaliation: (1) Mr. Rhees told Mr. Ward that it would be “essentially impossible” to put Mr. Ward or Ms. Nelson in a supervisory position because of “things that had happened in the past.” (2) Mr. Ward, Ms. Nelson, and Ms. Postell were stripped of their supervisory responsibilities after participating in the EEOC process. (3) Mr. Ward’s performance evaluations as a supervisor did not refer to personality conflicts or communication problems. (4) Mr. Ward had the required classification for a supervisory position, but Mr. Durrant did not. Mr. Ward believes these pieces of evidence link his EEOC participation to the failure to give him his old supervisory responsibilities. But this link rests on surmise. Mr. Rhees’s statement is probative of retaliation only if we speculate on his meaning. Even Mr. Ward testified that he was not sure if Mr. Rhees was referring to the EEOC proceedings. Appellant’s App. at 58. We cannot speculate on Mr. Rhees’s meaning. Thus, this statement does not 7 provide the required link between Mr. Ward’s statements in the EEOC proceedings and the refusal to give him his old supervisory responsibilities. See Bones, 366 F.3d at 875. Mr. Ward likewise cannot prove causation by pointing to demotions for other individuals participating in EEOC proceedings. Mr. Ward’s first claim does not involve a demotion; the claim involves the decision not to give him his old job responsibilities years after they had been taken away. He also relies on his performance evaluations, stating that they do not refer to any personality conflicts or communication problems. This reliance is misguided because the performance evaluations are not in the record, 1 and Mr. Ward’s description would not support an inference of causation. Mr. Ward admitted “there [had been] interaction issues” with Ms. Postell and Ms. Nelson. Appellant’s App. at 59. We cannot infer that just because Mr. Ward had positive evaluations, he would have been reinstated to a position already being occupied if he had not participated in the EEOC proceedings. We also cannot infer causation based on Mr. Durrant’s classification. According to Mr. Ward, Mr. Durrant did not have the required classification for a supervisory position. But reclassification would have been easy, involving only a ministerial adjustment. Appellant’s App. at 1 See Oral Arg. 12:03-12:10. 8 114. As a result, we cannot infer that the Department of Interior acted in retaliation by refusing to oust Mr. Durrant in favor of Mr. Ward. On the first claim, Mr. Ward fails to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. A reasonable fact-finder could not infer retaliation from the decision to keep another employee in his job rather than replace him with someone who had admittedly experienced “interaction issues” with other employees. Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Department of Interior on the claim involving a refusal to give Mr. Ward his prior supervisory responsibilities. IV. Retaliation Claim 2: The Decision Not to Promote Mr. Ward to the Position as Provo Area Manager The second retaliation claim involves Regional Director Larry Walkoviak’s decision not to hire Mr. Ward as the Provo Manager. On this claim, the element of causation is again lacking. Three facts are undisputed: (1) Five qualified candidates were interviewed by a panel that included Mr. Rhees and Ms. Ann Gold. The panel recommended two candidates to Mr. Walkoviak, who would make the final selection. Mr. Ward was not among the panel’s two recommendations. But, Mr. Walkoviak interviewed all five of the candidates. After these interviews, he selected someone other than Mr. Ward. (2) During a prior EEOC claim, Mr. Ward had alleged retaliation by Ann Gold’s husband. At the time of the panel interview, Mr. Ward also had a pending claim alleging discrimination by Mr. Rhees. 9 (3) In 2010, Mr. Ward completed additional work at the department’s Mid-Pacific Region. For this work, the MidPacific Region recommended a $4,500 award for Mr. Ward. Mr. Rhees was required to approve the award, but he reduced the amount to $2,000. These facts do not support causation because Mr. Ward does not claim retaliation by Mr. Walkoviak. In the absence of retaliation by Mr. Walkoviak, Mr. Ward could create a fact issue only through a theory of “Cat’s Paw” liability. Under this theory, the biased motive of a subordinate can be imputed to the final decision-maker. EEOC v. BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of L.A., 450 F.3d 476, 487-88 (10th Cir. 2006). But the theory does not apply when decision-makers conduct their own investigations without relying on biased subordinates. Lobato v. N.M. Env’t Dep’t, 733 F.3d 1283, 1295 (10th Cir. 2013). To survive summary judgment on a “Cat’s Paw” theory, Mr. Ward must establish ● bias by the subordinates, Mr. Rhees and Mrs. Gold, ● their influence in the decision-making process, and ● Mr. Walkoviak’s adoption of Mr. Rhees and Ms. Gold’s biased recommendation without an independent investigation. English v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1011 (10th Cir. 2001); BCI Coca-Cola, 450 F.3d at 487-88. Mr. Walkoviak did not accept the panel’s recommendation, but he interviewed all of the candidates (including Mr. Ward). Mr. Walkoviak 10 then selected another applicant who had served as the Deputy Area Manager in Provo for three years and had experience with landmanagement issues, recreational issues, dam safety, planning activities, and interaction with stakeholders in the Provo area. The panel ultimately had little input into the hiring decision. That decision was made by Mr. Walkoviak. Accordingly, liability cannot be based on a “Cat’s Paw” theory. See Simmons v. Sykes Enters., Inc., 647 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir 2011) (holding that the “Cat’s Paw” theory did not apply when the decision-makers conducted their own investigation and personally interviewed the employee before firing her). Without the “Cat’s Paw” theory, Mr. Ward lacks any evidence of retaliation by Mr. Walkoviak. Thus, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Department of Interior on the second claim.