Opinion ID: 2581604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Give Unanimity Instruction on Theory of Murder

Text: The court instructed the jury on the alternative first degree murder theories of willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder, as well as felony murder and second degree murder. It further instructed that if the jury agreed defendant was guilty of murder, they must unanimously agree whether the murder was first or second degree. Although requested by the defense to do so, the court did not instruct that the jury must unanimously agree which of the two theories of first degree murder supported the verdict. Defendant claims this omission violated his rights to proof beyond a reasonable doubt, to due process, and to a reliable determination of allegations that he committed a capital offense pursuant to the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution. In a criminal case, the jury must agree unanimously that defendant is guilty of a specific crime. ( People v. Russo (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132, 108 Cal. Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641 ( Russo ).) In order to `eliminate the danger that the defendant will be convicted even though there is no single offense which all the jurors agree the defendant committed,' when the evidence suggests more than one distinct crime either the prosecution must elect among the crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same criminal conduct. ( Ibid. ) In People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 476, footnote 23, 194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697, we said that in this state the two kinds of murder are not the `same' crimes and malice is not an element of felony murder. Premised on a mistaken interpretation of this language, defendant argues that felony murder and willful, premeditated, and deliberate murder are two separate and distinct crimes, requiring unanimous agreement as to each. He is incorrect. Felony murder and premeditated murder are not distinct crimes. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 514, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) As we have repeatedly explained, the statement referred to in Dillon means only that the two forms of murder have different elements even though there is but a single statutory offense of murder. ( Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1131, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 394-395, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) When, as here, the evidence shows only a single discrete crime but leaves room for disagreement as to exactly how that crime was committed, the jury need not unanimously agree on the theory under which the defendant is guilty. (See Russo, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 436, 25 P.3d 641.) This rule of state law passes federal constitutional muster. ( Schad v. Arizona (1991) 501 U.S. 624, 630-646, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555.) We decline defendant's invitation to reconsider these determinations.