Opinion ID: 1723465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: custodial liability

Text: Wilson v. Department of Public Safety & Corrections, 576 So.2d 490 (La.1991) allowed this court the first opportunity to set forth the test which should be applied when the victim of a crime committed by an escapee sues prison authorities for damages inflicted by the escaped prisoner. Wilson states that custodians of prisoners have a duty to manage the activities of their respective prisons in a manner such that the public is not exposed to an unreasonable risk of harm. The state is not the insurer of the safety of its citizens, therefore, this duty does not encompass all harm inflicted by an escapee. However, the operative intent of this duty is to protect the public from being harmed by escaping prisoners while in the process of their escape. In order to recover for injuries caused by an escaped prisoner, an injured plaintiff must prove the following: (1) negligence on the part of the custodian in managing the facility; (2) that this negligence facilitated the escape; (3) that the escapee's actions caused the harm complained of; and, (4) that the risk of harm encountered by the plaintiff falls within the scope of duty owed by the custodian. Id. at 493. In Wilson, Robert Downs was serving an eighteen-year sentence for armed robbery, when he along with two other inmates escaped from the Angola State Penitentiary on August 23, 1986. The escape was made possible by removing a cinder block located in one of the walls at the prison, and cutting through a fence located directly beneath an unmanned watch tower. Their escape was discovered within one hour and the authorities began a search which included parts of the state of Mississippi. Nearly two weeks after the escape, plaintiffs Alvin Wilson and Ed Hilliard were confronted by Downs on September 5, 1986 while returning home. Plaintiffs were held at gunpoint and Wilson was ordered to relinquish the keys to his truck. They were then brought inside of their trailer and tied up with hangers while Downs took money, food and the vehicle. Plaintiffs filed their action against the state contending that because of its negligence, they suffered personal injuries. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and awarded both plaintiffs damages because Downs' criminal acts were perpetrated during the course of an ongoing escape and were carried out to obtain money and transportation to complete the escape. Finding that plaintiffs' injuries, having occurred some thirteen days after the escape were too remote to fall within the scope of the duty owed to the public by prison custodians, the appellate court reversed the trial court's judgment. Upon writ of review, we found that the state was negligent in allowing the escape and reinstated the trial court's judgment. The facts of this case leave no doubt that the lower courts were correct to conclude that the negligent supervision provided by the Town of Iota facilitated Gibbs' escape. Immediately prior to his escape, he was being supervised by a non-commissioned officer which was contrary to the requirements set forth by the sheriff's department. Cart's many acts of negligence, including his admission that he purposely left the keys in the ignition of the vehicle used in the escape, lead this court to find that the first two steps of the test enunciated in Wilson have been fulfilled. Additionally, we find that the third tier of the test has been met, because had Gibbs not escaped, plaintiff would not have suffered injury. To determine the scope of duty owed by the custodians, the question which must be answered is whether the offense occurred during or as an integral part of the escape. Id. at 493. [4] Although the theft of Alvin Wilson's truck occurred some thirteen days after the inmates had escaped, it was a necessary and integral component of the escape process. The vehicle provided the instrument used by the inmates to elude authorities as they continued their escape. Likewise, the Town of Iota's vehicle used by Gibbs in his escape proved to be a necessary component and facilitated his flight from the authorities. Because Keith Marceaux's damages resulted from Gibbs' escape, we affirmatively answer the question of whether the risk of plaintiff's injuries was within the scope of duty Gibbs' custodians owed to the general public. Therefore, under our query of whether a custodian has a duty to protect the public from acts of ordinary negligence committed by an escapee, we find that custodians do have such a duty when all of the Wilson factors are present.