Opinion ID: 1218709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.

Text: At first blush, Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), seems to require the conclusion that the four-year statute of repose in § 2-725 governs this case. That case held that § 2-725 applies to indemnity actions which grow out of an underlying U.C.C. contract or warranty action. Perry is, however, distinguishable. In Perry, the manufacturer sold defective doors to Pioneer, a wholesale supply company, who in turn sold them to Perry, a subcontractor. Perry installed the doors as part of its subcontract on a building project. The general contractor rejected the doors and covered by purchasing replacement doors. The general contractor then sued Perry, and Perry filed a third-party complaint against the wholesaler and the manufacturer for breach of warranty. The general contractor's action against Perry was based on delivery of nonconforming goods and sought only a contract measure of damages based on the delivery of defective doors. This Court held that § 2-725 governed Perry's third-party complaint and that Perry had four years from the tender of delivery of defective goods to bring its action against the wholesaler and the manufacturer for breach of warranty. [3] Perry, 681 P.2d at 217. The Court stated that the limitation period specified in the Uniform Commercial Code conflicts with the general limitations rule for indemnity actions... . By its terms, this provision [§ 2-725] appears to override the general rule regarding indemnity actions. Perry, 681 P.2d at 218. In the present case, the trial court applied Perry and held that Davidson's indemnity claims were barred by § 2-725. The trial court then held that provision unconstitutional as applied. Davidson's action against Bonneville and Sproul grew out of a prior lawsuit in which Thrifty Corporation sued Davidson. Thrifty, however, was not the purchaser of the beam; rather, it was the lessee of the premises where the beam was installed. Thrifty sued for the damages that the collapse of the beam caused to its personal property and its business. Thus, the damages it sought were not for breach of contract or breach of a U.C.C. warranty, but for the commission of a tort. The issue in this case is whether § 2-725 applies only to actions for economic or breach of contract damages or whether it also applies to tort actions.