Opinion ID: 1151125
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guidelines in Thornburg v. Gingles

Text: The leading United States Supreme Court decision construing section 2 is Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) 478 U.S. 30 [92 L.Ed.2d 25, 106 S.Ct. 2752] ( Thornburg ), where the court upheld an African-American voter challenge to five multimember districts, from each of which the voters were to elect three to eight members of the North Carolina Legislature. The court pointed out that the 1982 amendment to section 2, newly prohibiting any voting procedure that results in abridgement of voting rights, was largely a response to this court's plurality opinion in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), which had declared that, in order to establish a violation either of § 2 or of the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments, minority voters must prove that a contested mechanism was intentionally adopted or maintained by state officials for a discriminatory purpose (478 U.S. at p. 35 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 37], italics added). Referring to section 2(b)'s requirement that proof of a violation be based on the totality of circumstances, the court quoted, from a Senate Judiciary Committee Report approving the amendment, a list of typical factors that might be probative. [8a] These factors were derived principally from two cases arising in Texas and Louisiana respectively ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 37, fn. 4 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 38]) and pertain largely to historical aspects of discrimination and racial polarization. The Report stresses, says the court, that this list of typical factors is neither comprehensive nor exclusive, and that `the question whether the political processes are equally open depends upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality' [citation] and on a `functional' view of the political process. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 45 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 43].) The court then turned to the African-American plaintiffs' claim that the use of multimember, rather than single-member, districts in the contested jurisdictions diluted their votes by submerging them in a white majority, thus impairing their ability to elect representatives of their choice. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 46 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 44], fns. omitted.) The court listed three necessary preconditions to the sustaining of such a claim: First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46], italics added.) Second, the minority group must be able to show that it is politically cohesive.  ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 51 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 47], italics added.) Third, the minority must be able to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 51 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 47].) Despite the court's formal reservation of the question whether these prerequisites are fully pertinent to a claim of vote dilution caused by the splitting of a large and geographically cohesive minority between two or more multimember or single-member districts ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 46-47, fn. 12 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 44]; cf. id. at p. 50, fn. 16 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46]), lower courts have assumed their applicability to claims of vote dilution by single-member districts (see Jeffers v. Clinton (E.D.Ark. 1989) 730 F. Supp. 196, 205; Neal v. Coleburn (E.D.Va. 1988) 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1435), and we likewise assume their applicability to the single-member districts that we propose. We can avoid section 2 challenges to our new districts by eliminating the possibility of a minority group's proving any one of the three Thornburg prerequisites. The information from which our districts are drawn is furnished by the 1990 federal census, which tells us, as to each census tract, the total number of persons together with the numbers in particular categories of age, race, and Latino origin. [9] From that data, we can judge whether minority groups are sufficiently large and geographically compact to satisfy the first Thornburg prerequisite. The second and third prerequisites, however, depend on what analyses of election results would show about a minority's political cohesiveness and about White majority bloc voting. In this area, the federal census is of little help. We have therefore drawn district lines so as to avoid either (1) unnecessary fragmentation of any sufficiently large, geographically compact protected minority group [10] into two or more districts, or (2) overconcentration of such a group in a single district. By thus preventing the dilution of the votes of any minority group that could qualify under the first Thornburg prerequisite, we can eliminate the possibility of section 2 challenges regardless of whether a group could fulfill the second or third prerequisite. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of the first prerequisite.
We examine first the requirement that the minority be geographically compact ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 50 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46]). There is little case law interpreting this phrase. We believe that the key to its meaning lies in the view, expressed in Thornburg, that Congress intended the determination of a section 2 violation to `depend[] upon a searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality... and on a functional view of the political process (478 U.S. at p. 45 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 43], quoting from the Senate report). The court in Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ. (M.D.Ala. 1988) 686 F. Supp. 1459, seized upon this passage from Thornburg in holding that the prerequisite of geographical compactness was met by a minority group who lived within an irregular strip of land, just inland from Mobile Bay, which appears to be approximately 20 miles long and, at some points, less than a mile wide. As the Dillard court explained, [t]he degree of geographical symmetry or attractiveness is ... a desirable consideration for districting, but only to the extent it aids or facilitates the political process.... [¶] ... For example, a district would not be sufficiently compact if it was so spread out that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representatives could not effectively and efficiently stay in touch with each other; or if it was so convoluted that there was no sense of community, that is, if its members and its representative could not easily tell who actually lived in the district.... [B]ecause compactness is a functional concept, the number and kinds of factors a court should consider may vary with each case, depending on the local geographical, political, and socioeconomic characteristics of the jurisdiction being sued. ( Id. at p. 1466.) We fully agree with this functional view of geographical compactness. Accordingly, in the context of statewide redistricting in California, particularly in rural areas where considerations of communication and access are of considerable importance, section 2 need not control formulation of plans where minority voters are not, functionally, geographically compact.
Under Thornburg 's first prerequisite, the minority group complaining of vote dilution must be not only geographically compact but also sufficiently large ... to constitute a majority in a single-member district ( Thornburg, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 50 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 46]). The majority referred to has been widely interpreted to mean a majority of persons of voting age, rather than a majority of the entire population. ( Dickinson v. Indiana State Elections Bd. (7th Cir.1991) 933 F.2d 497, 503 ( Dickinson ); Romero v. City of Pomona, supra, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425; Solomon v. Liberty County, Florida (11th Cir.1990) 899 F.2d 1012, 1018 [rehg. en banc] ( Solomon ); McDaniels v. Mehfoud (E.D.Va. 1988) 702 F. Supp. 588, 592 ( McDaniels ).) That interpretation is consistent with Thornburg 's repeated references to minority voters (e.g., 478 U.S. at p. 50, fn. 17 [92 L.Ed.2d at pp. 46-47]) and appears correct. A majority of registered voters, on the other hand, is not a prerequisite to a section 2 claim. ( Dickinson, supra, 933 F.2d at p. 503; Solomon, supra, 899 F.2d 1012; McDaniels, supra, 702 F. Supp. at p. 592.) As pointed out at an earlier stage of the Solomon case: Minority voter registration figures are inherently unreliable measures in vote dilution cases because the very lack of minority political power responsible for the bringing of the section 2 action also may act to depress voter registration. ( Solomon v. Liberty County, Fla. (11th Cir.1988) 865 F.2d 1566, 1574 [vacated on grant of rehg. en banc].) But though not part of any threshold requirement, voter registration or turnout may be considered in fashioning a remedy that will enhance the minority group's opportunity to elect the candidate of its choice. ( Dickinson, supra, 933 F.2d at p. 503.) However, we would note that there are difficulties in developing reliable minority registration data. [11] At least one court has considered not only age but citizenship in determining whether the minority group would constitute a majority of eligible voters within a district. (See Romero v. City of Pomona, supra, 883 F.2d 1418, 1425.) For several reasons we have assumed that citizenship would not be a factor in determining fulfillment of Thornburg 's first prerequisite. Since an application for naturalization resembles voter registration in that both require individual initiative, lack of citizenship is arguably more akin to nonregistration than to underage as a measure of ineligibility to vote. Moreover, rejection of the dubious citizenship test theoretically results in conferring Thornburg standing on more minority groups than if the test were accepted. Thus, district lines based on such rejection will more effectively preclude possibilities of section 2 claims. Though we have not relied on voter registration or citizenship statistics in determining what groups are entitled to voter protection under Thornburg, we have occasionally considered such data in determining how best to divide up a minority group which cannot be accommodated in a single district in a way that will maximize the group's voting potential.
The second Thornburg prerequisite to a section 2 claim is that the minority group seeking protection show that it is politically cohesive. ( Thornburg, supra, 478 U.S. at p. 51 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 47].) In an abundance of caution we are assuming, as already explained, the political cohesiveness of any single minority group that meets the first prerequisite, i.e., that it is sufficiently large and geographically compact. The question of cohesiveness also arises, however, where two or three minority groups claim that together they could constitute the geographically compact majority of a district even though none is large enough to qualify separately. If the groups are politically cohesive, i.e., if they vote the same way, they are likely to be treated as a combined single group so long as the combined group fulfills the other Thornburg prerequisites. ( Campos v. City of Baytown, Tex. (5th Cir.1988) 840 F.2d 1240, 1244 [African-Americans and Hispanics treated as one minority group if cohesive as a whole]; see Romero v. City of Pomona, supra, 883 F.2d 1418, 1426-1427 [African-Americans and Latinos not combined because found not to be politically cohesive].) Accordingly, in areas containing substantial numbers of more than one of the state's principal minority groups (African-American, Asian, and Latino) of which two or three combined, but no one group alone, would be large and compact enough to qualify under Thornburg, we have assumed political cohesiveness and endeavored to protect the combined group's voting potential in accordance with section 2.
A footnote in Thornburg warned that the court there had no occasion to consider whether § 2 permits, and if it does, what standards should pertain to, a claim brought by a minority group that is not sufficiently large and compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district, alleging that the use of a multimember district impairs its ability to influence elections. (478 U.S. at pp. 46-47, fn. 12 [92 L.Ed.2d at p. 44], italics in original.) Disregarding this suggestion that section 2 might require less than intradistrict majority status for protection of a minority voter group, some courts have insisted on the majority requirement of the first Thornburg prerequisite as a brightline test that should be adhered to in the interests of clarity and uniformity. ( McNeil v. Springfield Park Dist. (7th Cir.1988) 851 F.2d 937, 944; accord, Brewer v. Ham (5th Cir.1989) 876 F.2d 448, 455-456; Skorepa v. City of Chula Vista (S.D.Cal. 1989) 723 F. Supp. 1384, 1391; see Garza v. County of Los Angeles, supra, 918 F.2d 763, 770, fn. 2; Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the Voting Rights Act (1991) 77 Va.L.Rev. 1, 31-32.) The high court's recent decision in Chisom v. Roemer (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 348, 111 S.Ct. 2354], however, contains a stronger recognition of the possibility of an influence vote-dilution claim by a minority voter group too small to constitute an intradistrict majority. In Chisom, the court sustained the right to challenge elections of state judges under section 2. The majority opinion, joined in by six justices, reasoned that the right to an equal opportunity `to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice' (§ 2(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b)) is a unitary right, and that judges are representatives within the meaning of section 2(b). (501 U.S. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 364, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2365], italics added by the court.) The Chisom dissent argues that judges are not representatives and that section 2(b) confers two separate rights. Otherwise, says the dissent, minorities who form such a small part of the electorate in a particular jurisdiction that they could on no conceivable basis `elect representatives of their choice' would be entirely without section 2 protection. ( Chisom v. Roemer, supra, 501 U.S. at p. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 372, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2371] (dis. opn. of Scalia, J.).) The majority replies in a footnote: The dissent argues that our literal reading of the word `and' [in section 2(b)] leads to the conclusion that a small minority has no protection against infringements of its right `to participate in the political process' because it will always lack the numbers necessary `to elect its candidate,' post, at [page] ___ [115 L.Ed.2d at page 372, 111 S.Ct. at page 2371]. This argument, however rests on the erroneous assumption that a small group of voters can never influence the outcome of an election. ( Id. at p. ___, fn. 24 [115 L.Ed.2d at p. 364, 111 S.Ct. at p. 2365.) In Armour v. State of Ohio (N.D.Ohio 1991) 775 F. Supp. 1044, the majority of a three-judge district court (28 U.S.C. § 2284), over a vigorous dissent, sustained a section 2 claim that the boundary between two single-member districts for election to the lower house of the Ohio Legislature diluted the vote of the plaintiff minority group regardless of whether the group would be large enough to form a majority in either district. In reaching this result, the majority relied on the foregoing footnotes in Thornburg and Chisom. Without undertaking a definitive resolution of the validity of section 2 influence claims, we recognize that their legal grounding is sufficiently strong to call for our using every reasonable effort to avoid their being asserted against our redistricting proposals. Accordingly, we have aimed to maximize the voting potential of a geographically compact minority group of any appreciable size even where it would not constitute a majority in the particular district.