Opinion ID: 2569893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Third Breit Prong: Did the Official Intend to Provoke a Mistrial or Act in Willful Disregard of the Resulting Mistrial, Retrial, or Reversal?

Text: {58} To determine whether the prosecutor's conduct amounts to willful disregard of a resulting mistrial, retrial, or reversal, the appellate court will carefully examine the prosecutor's conduct in light of the totality of the circumstances of the trial. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 40, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792; accord State v. Pacheco, 1998-NMCA-164, ¶ 14, 126 N.M. 278, 968 P.2d 789. In Breit, we defined willful disregard as connoting a conscious and purposeful decision by the prosecutor to dismiss any concern that his or her conduct may lead to a mistrial or reversal, while emphasizing that the prosecutor is actually aware, or is presumed to be aware, of the potential consequences of his or her actions. Breit, 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 34, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. The presumption that the prosecutor is aware of such consequences is established by the prosecutor's egregious conduct, not necessarily from an inference of a conscious and purposeful decision to bring about a mistrial. We have always intended the threshold of willful disregard to be high, stating that [t]he idea that the misconduct must be so prejudicial as to cause a mistrial or new trial suggests that double jeopardy will rarely bar reprosecution if the misconduct is an isolated instance during the course of an otherwise fair trial. Id. ¶ 33 (emphasis added). Additionally, the test was intended to be a narrow expansion of the more restrictive federal standard established in Kennedy, and [r]aising the bar of double jeopardy should be an exceedingly uncommon remedy. Id. ¶ 35. {59} The reprosecution bar in Breit was based on the trial court's (1) findings that showed the pervasive, incessant, and outrageous nature of the prosecutor's misconduct during [the defendant's] first trial, and (2) conclusion that the trial was out of control. Id. ¶¶ 37, 41. (internal quotation marks omitted). We concluded that to avoid an acquittal at any cost, it appears that among the costs the prosecution was willing to incur were a mistrial, a new trial, or a reversal on appeal. Id. ¶ 48. {60} Here, we have a single incident of misconduct at trial: Montoya's introduction of nonexistent evidence at worst, or at best, inadmissible hearsay through his cross-examination questions. Defendant claims that Montoya's willful disregard is clear because the misconduct occurred shortly before the end of trial, when the weakness of the State's case was apparent. The State reiterates that we should give deference to the trial court's factual findings that led to its conclusion that Montoya did not act in willful disregard. {61} At the reopened hearing on the motion to bar prosecution, Montoya directly denied that he was inserting hearsay during his cross-examination of Defendant even after we had published our analysis clearly explaining the material was hearsay. On direct examination, Montoya testified he had relied, inter alia, on statements he obtained when he conducted an interview with Goen. He named two attorneys who were present at that interview, yet when the attorneys were called to testify, neither attorney confirmed that the interview had taken place. Moreover, the State failed to call Goen and Tucker to testify, the two witnesses who could have conclusively established that they indeed made statements that were consistent with Montoya's cross-examination of Defendant. Even assuming such statements exist, that the State elicited testimony and submitted exhibits establishing that the material Montoya used during his cross-examination of Defendant was hearsay and then argued that the hearsay established a good faith basis for the cross-examination questions, troubles us. Again, as we discussed previously, there is no good faith basis exception for the admission of hearsay. The rules of evidence are clear and our analysis on this specific instance of the use of hearsay at Defendant's trial had been published prior to Montoya's testimony: The statements that were used by the State did not serve only to impeach; they offered an admission by Defendant on an issue that was highly disputed at trial. Pursuant to Rule 11-801(D)(2), the exclusion of hearsay statements does not apply to admissions made by party-opponents. An opposing party may introduce out-of-court statements made by its opponent under the theory that the declarant party is in court and has the opportunity to deny or explain such statements, 5 Weinstein & Berger, supra, § 801.30[1][a], at 801-44, but the admission must be the party's own out-of-court statement, not statements made by a third party. See Rule 11-801(D)(2)(a) (excluding admissions by a party-opponent from the hearsay rule). In this case the statements offered by the State are not Defendant's own statements. McClaugherty I, 2003-NMSC-006, ¶ 27, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486. At the reopened hearing, the State further argued that it was a shame that the Supreme Court had to step in and overrule the jury on this matter... because they did not hear the testimony. This also troubles us. We rely on the transcript of proceedings to review the testimony at trial and our published opinions represent the sum of that work. The State did not file a motion for rehearing enumerating its concerns that we did not correctly apprehend the proceedings of the trial. See Rule 12-404(A) NMRA (a motion for rehearing shall state briefly and with particularity, but without argument, the points of law or fact which in the opinion of the movant the court has overlooked or misapprehended.). {62} Judge Kennedy's dissent in McClaugherty II noted that many courts have discussed the impropriety of injecting improper content into evidence through cross-examination questions. 2007-NMCA-041, ¶ 85, 141 N.M. 468, 157 P.3d 33. It is improper under the guise of artful cross-examination to tell the jury the substance of inadmissible evidence. United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1222 (9th Cir.1999) (quoted authority omitted). Over twenty-five years ago the Court of Appeals announced that [t]he attempt to communicate impressions by innuendo through questions which are answered in the negative ... when the question has no evidence to support the innuendo, is an improper tactic which has often been condemned by the courts. Bartlett, 96 N.M. at 418, 631 P.2d at 324 (quoted authority omitted). Our rules clearly state, [a] lawyer shall not ... in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence. Rule 16-304(E) NMRA. {63} In McClaugherty I, we reviewed Montoya's conduct through the lens of the hearsay rule because [t]he purpose of the [hearsay] rule is to protect against the danger that a statement of a declarant is unreliable because it is not given under oath by a witness who is present at trial and subject to cross-examination. 2003-NMSC-006, ¶ 17, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486. We concluded that Montoya's use of this highly prejudicial practice merited reversal of Defendant's convictions holding that [t]he statements made to the police were not used simply to challenge the credibility of a witness's testimony, but to prove that Defendant actually admitted to shooting a gun on that night. Id. ¶ 25. {64} In State v. Flanagan, 111 N.M. 93, 97, 801 P.2d 675, 679 (Ct.App.1990), the Court of Appeals imposed a strict prohibition against asking the defendant if another witness is mistaken or lying and established as standard that such behavior is categorically improper. We agreed with that analysis in State v. Duran, 2006-NMSC-035, ¶¶ 18-21, 140 N.M. 94, 140 P.3d 515, because it is irrelevant at trial what one witness thinks of another witness' testimony. It is an enumerated duty of a juror to determine the weight to give to each witness' testimony. See UJI 14-5020 NMRA (Credibility of Witnesses). Even though Montoya stated he was neither familiar with nor believed in the existence of such a rule, he should have been able to deduce that cross-examining a witness by introducing statements that he did not intend to admit into evidence at trial and asking the witness on the stand to comment on the veracity of those statements was improper since the only evidence of the statements was his own questioning. {65} In Huff, the Court of Appeals found that the prosecutor acted in willful disregard of a resulting mistrial, but concluded that double jeopardy did not bar retrial because the first two prongs of the Breit test were not met. 1998-NMCA-075, ¶¶ 22-25, 125 N.M. 254, 960 P.2d 342. The conduct at issue in Huff was the continued questioning of a doctor in a criminal sexual contact case about the doctor's diagnosis of the victim. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. The district court repeatedly sustained defense objections, held bench conferences, and warned the prosecutor to limit her questions. Id. Because the prosecutor nevertheless persisted with the questioning, even though she modified it based on the court's concerns, the Huff Court presumed that the prosecutor was aware of the potential for a mistrial from her conduct. Id. ¶ 24. The Huff Court held that Breit's knowledge test was satisfied by presuming knowledge on the part of a prosecutor who introduced irrelevant, misleading, and prejudicial testimony.... Id. ¶ 21. That Court continued, stating that prohibitions against proffering evidence without an adequate legal and factual foundation was not a subtle point of law, and one we can presume any prosecuting attorney to know, and that [a] prosecutor should know the rules of evidence. At the very least, a prosecutor should know a fundamental rule of evidence.... Id. ¶¶ 18, 21. {66} These requirements lead us to conclude that Huff is similar to the case at bar. Montoya testified that he was the lead prosecutor in Defendant's trial, that he had extensive murder trial experience, and in his words, I think I did more murder trials [in one year] than everybody else put together in the state. From that we conclude that Montoya is an experienced attorney who can be reasonably presumed to know the rule of evidence regarding the admission of hearsay. Holding a piece of paper purporting to contain a witness's statement and then failing to call its declarant as a witness has been called reprehensible. United States v. Steele, 91 F.3d 1046, 1051 (7th Cir.1996) (brandishing an unidentified piece of paper during cross-examination to insinuate he had a document other than the one in his hand when he knew his insinuation was untrue was a reprehensible tactic although harmless when there was a plethora of evidence against defendant); see also United States v. Beeks, 224 F.3d 741, 747 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that where the government's case was not strong, the gravity of the single instance of the prosecutor using an act of inappropriate inquiry was not harmless and was proper basis for a new trial). {67} The ABA standards for prosecution also condemn the practice of attempting to expose factfinders to inadmissible material through cross-examination. A prosecutor should not knowingly and for the purpose of bringing inadmissible matter to the attention of the judge or jury offer inadmissible evidence, ask legally objectionable questions, or make other impermissible comments or arguments in the presence of the judge or jury. American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function § 3-5.6(b) (3d ed.1993). This is because [t]he mere offer of known inadmissible evidence or asking a known improper question may be sufficient to communicate to the trier of fact the very material the rules of evidence are designed to keep from the fact finder. Id. § 3-5.6, cmt. [The] prosecutor may not use impeachment as a guise for submitting to the jury substantive evidence that is otherwise unavailable. Silverstein, 737 F.2d at 868. [A] prosecutor who asks the accused a question that implies the existence of a prejudicial fact must be prepared to prove that fact. Id. {68} Considering the totality of circumstances, we agree with the initial conclusion of the district court and the Court of Appeals' dissent that Montoya's misconduct was willful. In sum, the State requested that the hearing on the motion to bar further prosecution be reopened to articulate the bases for Montoya's trial conduct. Instead of calling witnesses who could have not only confirmed that the alleged statements existed, but also assisted the district court to understand how Montoya intended to properly gain the admission of the hearsay, at the reopened hearing the State continued to advance its untenable theory that a good faith exception existed for the admission of the hearsay. As we did in McClaugherty I, we again reject the State's request to find that this hearsay was admissible through Montoya. 2003-NMSC-006, ¶ 35, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486. Montoya's misconduct meets the third prong of a Breit analysis. {69} When conducting the Breit analysis and evaluating a prosecutor's conduct by looking at the totality of the circumstances, we must be careful that the citizens of New Mexico are not, without exceptionally good reason, deprive[d] ... of their case against a defendant, particularly when the prejudice to the defendant can be rectified by a new trial that will be free from the prejudice. State v. Day, 94 N.M. 753, 757, 617 P.2d 142, 146 (1980). Equally compelling, of course, is a defendant's constitutional right not to be subjected to double jeopardy. Moreover, unlike the State's interest in a lawful conviction, which could be vindicated upon appeal after a second trial, if the accused is acquitted at a second trial, or, if convicted, has his conviction ultimately reversed on double jeopardy grounds, he has still been forced to endure a trial that the Double Jeopardy Clause was designed to prohibit. In Day we concluded that double jeopardy barred retrial when the prosecutor engaged in any misconduct for the purpose of precipitating a motion for a mistrial, gaining a better chance for conviction upon retrial, or subjecting the defendant to the harassment and inconvenience of successive trials. 94 N.M. at 757, 617 P.2d at 146. In barring a retrial in Breit we relied on Justice Douglas's explanation of the purpose of the double jeopardy clause, and recall his eloquence now: I read the Double Jeopardy Clause as applying a strict standard. The prohibition is not against being twice punished, but against being twice put in jeopardy. [The double-jeopardy clause] is designed to help equalize the position of government and the individual, to discourage abusive use of the awesome power of society. Once a trial starts jeopardy attaches. The prosecution must stand or fall on its performance at the trial. I do not see how a mistrial directed because the prosecutor has no witnesses is different from a mistrial directed because the prosecutor abuses his office and is guilty of misconduct. In neither is there a breakdown in judicial machinery such as happens when the judge is stricken, or a juror has been discovered to be disqualified to sit, or when it is impossible or impractical to hold a trial at the time and place set.... The policy of the Bill of Rights is to make rare indeed the occasions when the citizen can for the same offense be required to run the gauntlet [sic] twice. The risk of judicial arbitrariness rests where, in my view, the Constitution puts it-on the Government. Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 372-73, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 6 L.Ed.2d 901 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoted authority omitted). Our holding in Breit reflected this view. We announced that, to evoke a bar to retrial under our double jeopardy clause, the State's misconduct must manifest a willful disregard of the defendant's right to a fair trial. 1996-NMSC-067, ¶ 40, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792. {70} In ordering a new trial in McClaugherty I, we found that the timing of the cross-examination and the paucity of properly admitted evidence led us to the conclusion that [u]nder the facts of the present case, we cannot conclude that the reference to Defendant's alleged admission was harmless. 2003-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 32-33, 133 N.M. 459, 64 P.3d 486. If Montoya's testimony at the reopened hearing on the motion to bar reprosecution is taken as true, it establishes that he (1) interviewed a crucial witness without her lawyer of record present; (2) did not inform the defense that he had conducted an interview with this witness; (3) never intended to call this witness at trial; and (4) introduced the content of this interview through his cross-examination questions to Defendant. We decline to adopt the State's position that we should defer to the trial court's findings that Montoya's testimony to his additional improprieties formed a good faith basis for his questions. We conclude that Montoya's acts at the trial were executed with willful disregard of the potential for a mistrial, retrial or reversal and that the third Breit prong was met.
{71} Section 39-1-1 time limits are not triggered by filing of a motion after a notice of appeal has been filed because the notice places jurisdiction over the matter in the appellate court. {72} We clarify the holding in Breit that the standard by which courts should evaluate a prosecutor's conduct to determine whether the conduct is willful is an objective one in light of the totality of the circumstances of the trial. The prosecutorial misconduct in this case can be described as a single event in front of the jury that, alone and isolated, completely denied this Defendant the due process of law to which he is afforded through our state and federal constitutions. In addition to being prejudicial, our objective review of the evidence reveals that the prosecutor executed these acts with full knowledge of their impropriety and acted with willful disregard of the resulting mistrial, retrial or reversal on appeal. On double-jeopardy grounds we reverse Defendant's convictions, retrial is barred, and we discharge Defendant from any further prosecution in this matter. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. {73} IT IS SO ORDERED. WE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice, and PATRICIO M. SERNA, RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justices, and RICHARD E. RANSOM, J. Pro Tem.