Opinion ID: 774546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Conduct

Text: 20 We review the district court's handling of claims of juror misconduct for abuse of discretion. United States v. Caldwell, 83 F.3d 954, 955 (8th Cir. 1996). 21 Rankin contends that the district court erred by not questioning jurors individually as to whether, as they left the courtroom for lunch, they may have seen a plain-clothed federal marshal conferring with one of Rankin's defense witnesses in the hallway outside of the courtroom. The district court held a hearing on the matter and concluded that the jurors pass down the jury room down the hall in the other direction so that it was unlikely that they had seen the conversation taking place. The court also noted that the marshal was in plain clothes similar to that of the defense's investigator, spoke quietly, and did not enter the courtroom, and that the witness subsequently voluntarily accompanied the marshal. We agree with the government that Rankin's argument on this point is based entirely on speculation. Even if it was certain that jury members had seen the conversation, we do not believe that such an interaction must necessarily be viewed as prejudicial to Rankin. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the incident did not require further action. Cf. United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1988) (We give substantial weight to the trial court's appraisal of the prejudicial effects of extraneous information on the jury.). 22 Rankin also argues that the court should have granted a mistrial because, immediately before Rankin testified, one juror, apparently frustrated with the numerous conferences held outside the presence of the jury, stated that it was discourteous to the jury members to have so many delays during trial. There is no evidence to suggest, however, that the juror was offended particularly by either the government or the defense, rather than by the delays in general; Rankin presents nothing more than conclusory allegations of prejudice. To prevail on his claims of juror misconduct, Rankin must present evidence of juror misconduct that is not barred by the rule of juror incompetency and is sufficient to establish grounds recognized as adequate to overturn the verdict. We conclude that he has not done so. See Caldwell, 83 F.3d at 956 (juror comments that I've heard all of this I need to hear and this is just a bunch of crap insufficient to impeach jury's verdict). The district court did not abuse its broad discretion in refusing to conduct further inquiry and grant a mistrial. See id. 23 The judgment is affirmed.