Opinion ID: 2103784
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Heading: Comparison of the Historical Background of the Law of the Land Clause and the Federal Due Process Clauses

Text: Nothing in the historical background of the Law of the Land Clause or of the federal due process clauses suggests that the Tennessee Constitution gives greater protection to liberty interests than does the federal Constitution. In fact, my research on this issue reveals that the history of each clause can be traced precisely to the same source: the per legem terrae, or Law of the Land, clause in Chapter 29 of Magna Carta, which states that [N]o free man shall be taken or imprisoned or dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed, nor will we go upon him, nor send upon him, except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. [5] Because each clause stems historically from the same original source, the majority cannot rely upon historical differences to conclude that the general protection of liberty in Tennessee is greater than that provided by the federal Constitution. The Law of the Land Clause enjoys a long history in the constitutional jurisprudence of this State, and because its proper interpretation is essential to the resolution of this case, it is important to carefully examine from where the clause was derived. In the years following American Independence, the lands that were later organized into the State of Tennessee were principally claimed by the State of North Carolina, and were governed by the Constitution and laws of that state. Apart from establishing a theory and form of government, the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 also contained a Declaration of Rights, which placed certain fundamental rights beyond the reach of any act of Assembly. See Marshall v. Lovelass, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 412 (1801) (Johnston, J.). Section 10 of the North Carolina Declaration of Rights of 1776 read: [N]o freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the law of the land. In June of 1784, North Carolina joined with other states in ceding its lands west of the Allegheny Mountains to the national government organized under the Articles of Confederation. Although North Carolina later repealed its cession law and reclaimed the ceded lands, East Tennessee took this opportunity to briefly organize itself into the State of Franklinnamed after Benjamin Franklinin anticipation of joining the federal union as a new state. In section 12 of the Declaration of Rights Made by the Representatives of the Freemen of the State of Franklina document taken substantially from the North Carolina Declaration of Rights, [6] the following clause appeared: That no freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned or desseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the laws of the land. This original Law of the Land Clause, along with the entire Declaration of Rights, was explicitly made a part of the Franklin Constitution by section 44 of that document. See Const. of the State of Franklin § 44 (That the Declaration of Rights is hereby declared to be part of the Constitution of this State, and ought never to be violated on any pretense whatsoever.). On December 22, 1789, North Carolina again ceded its western lands to the national government, see 1789 N.C. Pub. Acts 31, ch. 3, and by a provision of the act of separation, the laws of North Carolina became the laws of Tennessee, until repealed by the Legislative authority of the ceded territory. Congress accepted the cession on April 2, 1790, Act of April 2, 1790, ch. 6, 1 Stat. 106, and organized the territory into the Southwestern Territory, Act of May 20th, 1790, 1 Stat. 123. In this Act, Congress declared that the government of the said territory ... shall be similar to that which is now exercised in the territory north-west of the Ohio.... In the second article of the Ordinance of 1787 for the Government of the Northwest Territory, a clause similar to the earlier North Carolina and Franklin Law of the Land clauses again appeared, which stated that no man shall be deprived of his liberty or property but by the Judgment of his Peers, or the law of the land. 1 Stat. 51, note. This early history of Article I, section 8 is especially significant, because the respective provisions of state and federal law giving rise to the Law of the Land Clause in our 1796 Constitution were each directly descended from Chapter 29 of Magna Carta. For example, both the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of North Carolina have recognized that the respective federal and state Law of the Land clauses were derived from the nearly identical provision of Magna Carta. See Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276, 18 How. 272, 15 L.Ed. 372 (1855); State v. ___, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 28 (N.C.Sup.Ct.L. & Eq. 1794) (stating that if we attend to the [Law of the Land Clause of the North Carolina Declaration of Rights], we shall find it was copied almost verbatim from the 29th chap. of Magna Charta); see also Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 243, 4 L.Ed. 559 (1819) (stating that [t]he 21st article of the declaration of rights of the state of Marylandwhich is virtually identical to Article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitutionis in the words of Magna Charta). This ancestry has also been long recognized by the Tennessee Supreme Court, which has frequently stated that our own Law of the Land Clause of Article I, section 8 is a direct descendant of the per legem terrae clause of Magna Carta's twenty-ninth chapter. See, e.g., State ex rel. Anglin v. Mitchell, 596 S.W.2d 779, 786 (Tenn.1980) (stating that Article I, § 8 comes from Magna Carta); McGinnis v. State, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 43, 47 (1848) (comparing Article I, section 8 to the similar provision in Magna Carta). In a similar manner, the per legem terrae clause of Magna Carta is also the ancient ancestor of the modern Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. The first prominent use of the term due process of law was in a 1354 English statute, which provided that [n]o man of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to death, without being brought in answer by due process of the law, [7] and Sir Edward Coke confirmed that the use of the term due process in this 1354 statute was closely tied to the phrase Law of the Land in Magna Carta, see 2 Institutes 50 (5th ed.1797). Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly stated, and constitutional scholars have agreed, that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause is descended from the per legem terrae clause of Magna Carta. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992) (stating that the guaranties of due process [have] their roots in Magna Carta's `per legem terrae') (citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 532, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884)); O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 789 n. 2, 100 S.Ct. 2467, 65 L.Ed.2d 506 (1980) (Blackman, J., concurring in judgment) (It is well recognized that the Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution grew out of the `Law of the Land' provision of Magna Carta and its later manifestations in English statutory law.); see also, Frank R. Strong, Substantive Due Process of Law: A Dichotomy of Sense and Nonsense 3-25 (1986) (tracing the antecedents of substantive due process to Magna Carta). Given that Article I, section 8 and the federal due process clauses both owe their ancestry to Magna Carta's twenty-ninth chapter, the historical background of the clauses certainly provides no support for the proposition that the Law of the Land Clause is more broad than the corresponding federal due process protections. At most, any analysis of the historical background of the clauses shows that the protections intended by each clause are substantially identical, and that both of the protections are the same as those contemplated by the per legem terrae clause of Magna Carta. Accordingly, the majority must seek support from elsewhere for its conclusion that the state constitution provides greater sanctuary for the abortion rights than the federal Constitution.