Opinion ID: 2811504
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Final Termination

Text: Valderaz next argues that UMC advised him to transfer as a ploy to ultimately terminate his employment. The parties do not dispute that Valderaz’s loss of employment is an adverse employment action, as this Court has always held that it is. See DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 214 F. App’x 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). C. Whether There Was a Causal Link Valderaz must next show that his termination on June 24, 2011 had a causal nexus to the report he made about his female coworkers on March 2, 2011. We have often looked to three factors when considering the causal link prong: “(1) the employee’s past disciplinary record, (2) whether the employer followed its typical policy and procedures in terminating the employee, and (3) the temporal proximity between the employee’s conduct and termination.” Id. at 442-43 (citation omitted). The record here supports only the third prong, which Valderaz employs. While suspicious timing alone is rarely sufficient to establish the requisite causal connection, see id., this Court allows for a prima facie case to be made on temporal proximity alone if it is “very close,” Washburn v. Harvey, 504 F.3d 505, 511 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). For example, a time lapse of up to four months has been found to be sufficient. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir. 2001)); Hypolite v. City of Houst., Tex., 493 F. App’x 597, 606 (5th Cir. 2012). But see Flanner v. Chase Inv. Servs. Corp., 600 F. App’x 914, 921-22 (5th Cir. 2015) (noting that a four-month gap, or even a two-month gap, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation, and that Evans actually held that the fiveday gap in time was sufficient in that case.) 519, 523 (5th Cir. 2007); Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 354 (5th Cir. 2001); Wojciechowski v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, L.P., 763 F. Supp. 2d 832, 856 (S.D. Tex. 2011). 10 Case: 14-10761 Document: 00513091787 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/24/2015 No. 14-10761 Here, fewer than four months elapsed between the time that Valderaz reported sex harassment to his supervisor and his termination. Therefore, Valderaz has established his prima facie case for retaliation. II. Legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for termination The burden now shifts to UMC to articulate its legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse action. See Aldrup, 274 F.3d at 286. UMC proffers two legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for Valderaz’s termination: that his final termination was due to his lack of diligence in seeking available transfer positions and that he lacked the requisite number of on-call shifts to remain on the payroll. This is sufficient to satisfy its burden of production.