Opinion ID: 2756011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Firearm Tattoo Testimony

Text: As discussed above, Boswell chose to waive his Fifth Amendment right and testify in his own defense. On direct examination, Boswell was asked, “Have you possessed any firearms since you obtained your first felony conviction?” To which he responded, “No, sir. I don’t mess with weapons.” Boswell further stated on direct, “I’m a fighter. I don’t use weapons.” On cross-examination, the government sought to elicit testimony from Boswell regarding a tattoo of a revolver that he had inked to his neck. In a bench conference, the following exchange took place: Government: I’ll ask this. I believe the defendant indicated on his direct testimony that he doesn’t like guns, that ever since his grandfather committed suicide he doesn’t like them. I’m going to inquire as to his tattoo. … I think that goes to his credibility, which he’s made an issue by taking the stand. Defense Counsel: It’s too much of a stretch between a picture of a gun and a gun. … [j]ust because he owns a picture of a gun and it happens to be on his No. 13-3641 9 skin I don't think is enough of a connection to impeach it as that. The Court: I don’t think it’s otherwise objectionable. I think it’s fair game. On appeal, Boswell insists that the district court committed reversible error in permitting the government’s proposed line of inquiry regarding his firearm tattoo. According to Boswell, the firearm tattoo testimony should have been excluded as irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. In the alternative, he claims that even if relevant, the firearm tattoo testimony should have been excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the risk of unfair prejudice it engendered significantly outweighed its probative value. We first address the issue of relevancy.
We agree with Boswell that defense counsel’s objection that any questions regarding Boswell’s firearm tattoo were “too much of a stretch” or lacked “enough of a connection to impeach” squarely challenged the relevancy of the evidence. Because a timely objection was made on the basis of relevance, we review the district court’s corresponding evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. We “will not substitute our opinion for that of the trial judge merely because we may be inclined to rule differently on the question of relevancy.” United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012). Rather, a district court’s evidentiary ruling “will be reversed ‘only where no reasonable person could take the view adopted by the trial court.’” United States v. Reese, 666 F.3d 1007, 1015 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Vargas, 552 F.3d 550, 554 (7th Cir. 2008)). Given 10 No. 13-3641 the “low threshold” that Rule 401 comprehends for establishing that evidence is relevant, Boswell faces a significant obstacle in contending that the firearm tattoo testimony should have been barred as irrelevant. See Boros, 668 F.3d at 907; see also United States v. McKibbins, 656 F.3d 707, 711 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[A]ll relevant evidence is admissible and the Rules define relevance broadly.”); Int’l Merger Acquisition Consultants, Inc. v. Armac Enters., Inc., 531 F.2d 821, 823 (7th Cir. 1976) (relevancy standard is liberal). The government maintains, as it did before the district court, that the firearm tattoo inquiry was relevant to impeach Boswell’s credibility, which he put in issue when he elected to testify. The district court accepted the government’s position. Because relevant evidence is admissible provided it is not otherwise proscribed by law or rule, see Fed. R. Evid. 402, the district court need only identify a legitimate basis for its ruling. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 56 (1984) (“[T]here is no rule of evidence which provides that testimony admissible for one purpose and inadmissible for another purpose is thereby rendered inadmissible; quite the contrary is the case.”). Accordingly, we begin—and end—our analysis with the district court’s adopted justification. The rule is well established that when a criminal defendant elects to testify in his own defense, he puts his credibility in issue and exposes himself to cross-examination, including the possibility that his testimony will be impeached. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 365 U.S. 148, 154–55 (1958); United States v. Tolliver, 454 F.3d 660, 667 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Chevalier, 1 F.3d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Amaechi, 991 F.2d 374, 379 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. No. 13-3641 11 Studley, 892 F.3d 518, 529 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Covelli, 738 F.2d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 1984). Boswell chose to testify and, by doing so, he thrust his credibility in issue. The government, in turn, was entitled to impeach Boswell’s testimony, i.e., cast doubt upon his credibility as a witness. See Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009) (defining “impeachment evidence” as “evidence used to undermine a witness’s credibility”). Impeachment can be effected in a number of ways, including contradiction, which involves presenting evidence that the substance of a witness’s testimony is not to be believed. See, e.g., United States v. Douglas, 408 F.3d 922, 928 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Poole, 207 F.3d 893, 898–99 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1243 (7th Cir. 1996); United States v. Kozinski, 16 F.3d 795, 805 (7th Cir. 1994). Therefore, the question for us to resolve is whether the government’s firearm tattoo-related inquiry had any tendency to impeach, or cast doubt upon, the truthfulness of Boswell’s trial testimony. See Fed. R. Evid. 401. As we view the matter, it did. Boswell, in defending himself on direct examination, sought to cast himself as someone who steers clear of guns, asserting “I don’t mess with” and “I don’t use” weapons—guns, in this case. Such a strategy was not without risk, however. By portraying himself as someone who generally does not associate with guns, Boswell “opened the door” for the government to cross-examine and impeach him on that testimony. See Douglas, 408 F.3d at 928; Poole, 207 F.3d at 898–99; Taylor v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 920 F.2d 1372, 1375 n.3 (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Gaertner, 705 F.2d 210, 216 (7th Cir. 1983). And, that’s what the government did on cross-examination. After Boswell affirmed the government’s 12 No. 13-3641 characterization of his direct testimony as stating he did not “like guns,” the government asked him about his firearm tattoo. Although it may well be impossible to ascertain an individual’s subjective motive or reasons for getting any particular image memorialized on his or her skin, this does not render the firearm tattoo testimony without impeachment value, as Boswell seems to claim. Rather, a jury may draw a number of reasonable inferences from the tattoo evidence. Prominent among such inferences is that Boswell maintained some degree of association with, or affinity for, guns—an inference which casts doubt upon his testimony that he does not “mess with” or “like” guns. Given the “low threshold” that Rule 401 comprehends, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed the government to ask Boswell about his firearm tattoo.
Boswell next argues that the government’s inquiry regarding his firearm tattoo should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 403 permits the district court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice … .” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Since “‘most relevant evidence is, by its very nature, prejudicial,’ we have emphasized that evidence must be unfairly prejudicial to require exclusion.” United States v. Hanna, 630 F.3d 505, 511 (7th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2003)). “Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it will induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis rather than on the evidence presented.” United States v. Klebig, 600 F.3d 700, 713 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Rodgers, 587 F.3d 816, 822 (7th No. 13-3641 13 Cir. 2009). The amount of prejudice that is acceptable varies according to the amount of probative value the evidence possesses. Vargas, 552 F.3d at 557. Because Boswell’s trial counsel did not lodge a specific objection or make any reference to prejudice during the bench conference, we review for plain error. See United States v. Christian, 673 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2012). On review for plain error, Boswell must show (1) that the complained of error occurred, (2) that the error “was so obvious and so prejudicial that a district judge should have intervened without being prompted by an objection from defense counsel,” and (3) that the error affected his “substantial rights—meaning that [he] likely would have been acquitted” absent the error. United States v. Haldar, 751 F.3d 450, 456 (7th Cir. 2014). “‘Once these three conditions have been met, we may exercise our discretion to correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. LeShore, 543 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. James, 464 F.3d 699, 709 (7th Cir. 2006)). The plain error standard sets a tremendously high bar, indeed one far too high for Boswell's arguments to reach. As indicated, the government’s firearm tattoo-related inquiry bore on Boswell’s credibility. After Cunningham, the only other defense witness, admitted that she was not paying attention to White and Boswell when the firearms transaction occurred, Boswell’s testimony stood as the only evidence refuting the government's case. In other words, Boswell’s credibility was not just in issue, but it was a major issue for the jury to consider. Through his testimony, Boswell sought his acquittal by placing before the jury the notion that he is 14 No. 13-3641 someone who deliberately steers clear of guns. Although the firearm tattoo evidence did not unequivocally fly in the face of his testimonial statements regarding his relationship with guns, it certainly cast doubt upon the truthfulness of those statements and his credibility as a witness. At the same time, however, the government’s inquiry regarding Boswell’s firearm tattoo did contain a significant prejudicial element. See United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 631–33 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding the district court violated Rule 403 in permitting government to introduce a picture of defendant’s gun tattoo on its case in chief, where defendant was charged with being a felon in possession and the court could not “see how the … photo of the tattoo was admitted for any purpose other than to establish [the defendant’s] propensity to possess guns”). This, of course, is the crux of Boswell's “unfair prejudice” argument. We afford the district court great deference when it comes to the admissibility of evidence for good reason. Unlike the district court, we are not in a position to observe the trial proceedings first-hand and gauge the impact of the evidence in the context of the proceedings as a whole. United States v. Boone, 628 F.3d 927, 932 (7th Cir. 2010). Instead, we must rely on the record on appeal. Neither of the parties’ briefs nor the record indicate where on Boswell's neck the tattoo was located, how big it was, how identifiable it was, where the jury sits in the particular Indiana district court relative to the witness stand or the defense table, etc. At oral argument, the government did indicate that Boswell was wearing an open-collar shirt at trial, but counsel could not say with any certainty whether some or all of the jurors could identify the firearm tattoo from the jury box. At any rate, the admissibility of the No. 13-3641 15 fact that the tattoo existed under the circumstances of this case was not error, clear or otherwise. Furthermore, at trial, the government presented a collection of recorded conversations made incident to the January 26, 2011, sting operation. Government witnesses White, O'Boyle, and Murphy each identified Boswell’s voice as that of the “male seller” in the recorded conversations. The only evidence that called these voice identifications into question was the testimony of Boswell himself, who, unsurprisingly, denied that it was his voice on the recordings. Most significantly, however, the audio recordings were played in open court. Accordingly, the jury, who heard Boswell testify, was able to make its own determination as to whether it was Boswell’s voice on the recordings. Plainly stated, this determination was all but outcome determinative in this case. Indeed, defense counsel acknowledged this much in closing argument, telling the jury, “If you think that you can … say that beyond a reasonable doubt that the person you heard testify this morning (referring to Boswell) is the person that’s on those recordings, then your verdict will be guilty.” By finding Boswell guilty, we think the jury made their view clear. Because the audio recordings made incident to the sting operation comprise overwhelming, untainted evidence of Boswell’s guilt, his challenge to his conviction must fail.