Opinion ID: 2805323
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title VII Disparate Treatment Claim

Text: Title VII provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual’s . . . sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). In evaluating disparate treatment claims supported by circumstantial evidence, we use the framework of 8 Case: 14-14480 Date Filed: 06/02/2015 Page: 9 of 21 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079, 1087 (11th Cir. 2004). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case, which generally requires showing: (1) the plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) she was qualified to do the job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) she was treated less favorably than similarly situated individuals outside her protected class. Holland v. Gee, 677 F.3d 1047, 1055 (11th Cir. 2012). To prove an adverse employment action, the plaintiff must show “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. Moreover, the employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis in original). If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the employer then has the burden of production to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. If the employer satisfies its burden, the presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the plaintiff must then offer evidence that the employer’s reason is a pretext for illegal discrimination. Id. The district court granted summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s disparate treatment claim, finding that Plaintiff’s employment termination was the 9 Case: 14-14480 Date Filed: 06/02/2015 Page: 10 of 21 only adverse action it could consider, and that even if any of Defendant’s pretermination decisions were adverse for Title VII purposes, Plaintiff presented no comparator evidence necessary to establish a prima facie case. Regarding Plaintiff’s termination, the district court found that Defendant met its burden of articulating a non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff’s employment, which Plaintiff failed to show was pretextual. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s refusal to transfer her away from the supervision of Denis Arauz was an adverse employment action. We disagree. We have held that transferring an employee to a different position can be adverse if it involves a reduction in pay, prestige, or responsibility. Doe v. DeKalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441, 1448–49 (11th Cir. 1998); Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 2000). But, “it is important not to make a federal case out of a transfer that is de minimis, causing no objective harm and reflecting a mere chip-on-the-shoulder complaint.” Doe, 245 F.3d at 1453 & n.21. Here, not even a de minimis transfer is at issue because Plaintiff alleges that it was Defendant’s failure to transfer her that was the adverse action. Yet, she obviously suffered no reduction in pay, prestige, or responsibility by remaining in the same position for which she had been hired: the position of a Financial Analyst. Nor 10 Case: 14-14480 Date Filed: 06/02/2015 Page: 11 of 21 has she alleged that she would have gained additional pay, prestige, or responsibility in one of the two positions on which she bid. See Davis, 245 F.3d at 1239 (a plaintiff must show “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”); Hinson, 231 F.3d at 829 (“transfer to a different position can be ‘adverse’ if it involves a reduction in pay, prestige or responsibility”). Importantly, Plaintiff does not claim that Defendant failed to promote her. She alleges only that Defendant denied her request to be transferred into a different position. The district court stated that “the failure to allow such a transfer does not constitute a serious and material change because there is no change.” The district court was correct. We do note, however that requiring an employee to remain in her present position could constitute an adverse action in Title VII failure to promote claims. See Carter v. Three Springs Residential Treatment, 132 F.3d 635, 642 (11th Cir. 1998) (stating prima facie elements for a Title VII failure to promote claim, including that a plaintiff must show she was “qualified for and applied for the promotion” and was rejected) (emphasis added). But there is no failure to promote claim at issue here, and Defendant’s failure to grant Plaintiff’s request for a transfer is not adverse for Title VII purposes. 11 Case: 14-14480 Date Filed: 06/02/2015 Page: 12 of 21
Plaintiff also contends that she was fired because of her gender. Regarding this claim, the district court assumed that Plaintiff had established a prima facie case. Defendant’s articulated reason for terminating Plaintiff—her ongoing performance issues culminating in the poorly-performed task she submitted while on probation—was a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Wilson, 376 F.3d at 1087. There was ample evidence in the record to support the legitimacy of this reason. Both Arauz and Plaintiff’s coworker, Tiara Love, attested that Plaintiff struggled with the requirement that she accurately, efficiently, and timely complete her job assignments. Further, after Plaintiff submitted her final assignment, Arauz reviewed it and determined that it contained several errors of the same type she had been committing throughout her employment. To confirm Arauz’s assessment, another analyst reviewed Plaintiff’s assignment and agreed that Plaintiff’s report was inaccurate, internally inconsistent, and appeared to be prepared by someone who lacked the necessary analytical skills to do the work. Moreover, the fact that Arauz hired Plaintiff only a year before her discharge undermines the notion that any of his actions toward her were gender-motivated. See Williams v. Vitro Servs. Corp., 144 F.3d 1438, 1443 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that where same person who hires plaintiff, with knowledge of her protected status, then takes adverse action 12 Case: 14-14480 Date Filed: 06/02/2015 Page: 13 of 21 against her shortly thereafter, an inference may be drawn that the action was not motivated by discriminatory animus). Plaintiff failed to present evidence that Defendant’s stated reason was a pretext for illegal gender discrimination. To show pretext, the plaintiff must cast sufficient doubt on the defendant’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons to allow a reasonable factfinder to determine that the proffered “legitimate reasons were not what actually motivated its conduct.” Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). This requires the plaintiff to demonstrate “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Combs v. Plantation Patterns, 106 F.3d 1519, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation omitted). Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary judgment. Evidence relating to discriminatory comments, though it can contribute to a circumstantial case for pretext, must be read in conjunction with the entire record and considered with the other evidence in the case. See Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339, 1342–43 (11th Cir. 2002). The only facts she cites to show pretext are: (1) on five to six occasions, Plaintiff heard Arauz refer to two female coworkers as “bitches” and once he called Plaintiff a “bitch” behind her 13 Case: 14-14480 Date Filed: 06/02/2015 Page: 14 of 21 back, and (2) Arauz once told Plaintiff she had “mommy brain.” Though the district court did not address these comments, the evidence suggests that these were merely isolated comments unrelated to Plaintiff’s termination, particularly when considered together with the evidence of Plaintiff’s poor performance. See id. at 1343 (“Because [the employer’s] alleged comment was . . . an isolated comment, unrelated to the decision to fire [the plaintiff], it, alone, is insufficient to establish a material fact on pretext.”). While the evidence to which Plaintiff points includes inappropriate and offensive gender-based remarks that we do not condone, under the totality of the circumstances, it alone is not enough to raise a material issue of fact as to pretext. In order to show that Defendant’s proffered reasons for taking adverse employment action were pretextual, Plaintiff must address the employer’s proffered legitimate reason “head on and rebut it.” Chapman v. Al Trans., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). In order to do so, Plaintiff “must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” McCann v. Tillman, 526 F.3d 1370, 1375 (11th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff made no such showing. Instead, the evidence amply supports the district court’s findings that Defendant’s concerns about Plaintiff’s job performance were legitimate. For 14 Case: 14-14480 Date Filed: 06/02/2015 Page: 15 of 21 example, Arauz was not the only employee at BBVA who recognized Plaintiff’s inability to perform her employment tasks. Tiera Love stated that Plaintiff approached her “for guidance and instruction on how to perform her job” on a daily basis and that Plaintiff’s “questions related to basic financial analysis concepts and procedures that an individual with her professed level of education and experience already should have possessed.” Love further stated that Plaintiff’s inability to work independently “began to negatively impact [Love’s] ability to perform [her] own job, as [she] was undertaking the tasks of both [] jobs just to ensure they were completed in a timely and satisfactory manner.” In sum, Plaintiff presented no evidence that Defendant’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment was a mere pretext for gender discrimination. To the contrary, the record shows that Plaintiff consistently was unable to perform her job-related duties.