Opinion ID: 181107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: categorical crime of violence

Text: We review de novo whether a prior conviction constitutes a 'crime of violence' under U.S.S.G. y 2L1.2. United States v. Medina-Villa, 567 F.3d 507, 511 (9th Cir. 2009). To determine whether Martinez-Vazquezùs prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence, we apply the approach set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990). We first consider whether the prior offense 'is categorically a crime of violence by assessing whether the full range of conduct covered by the statute falls within the meaning of that term.' United States v. Grajeda, 581 F.3d 1186, 1189 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations, alteration, and citation omitted). If the statute of conviction punishes some conduct that would qualify as a crime of violence and some conduct that would not, it does not categorically constitute a crime of violence. See id. In that case, we then employ the 'modified categorical approach,' which 'permits a court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial record--including charging documents, plea agreements, transcripts of plea colloquies, findings of fact and 2 conclusions of law from a bench trial, and jury instructions and verdict forms.' Johnson v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 1265, 1273 (2010). We previously held that the North Carolina General Statute y 14-202.1 does not fit the generic definition of abuse of a minor because the least egregious end of conduct covered by the statute does not necessarily result in psychological or physical harm to a child and therefore is not necessarily abusive. United States v. Baza-Martinez, 464 F.3d 1010, 1015-17 (9th Cir. 2006). Thus, Martinez-Vazquezùs conviction can qualify as a crime of violence only under the modified categorical approach.