Opinion ID: 204125
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Intent to Traffic in This Case

Text: We consider the district court's application of this guideline to the facts of this case to be a mixed question of law and fact, which we review using a sliding standard of review. We review predominantly legal questions de novo, while we defer to fact-driven determinations and review them for clear error. See United States v. Sicher, 576 F.3d 64, 70-71 & n.6 (1st Cir. 2009). The district court's application of § 2G2.4(c)(2) in this case was heavily fact-dependent, and we find that it did not err in -23- concluding that Dyer's online conduct showed an intent to traffic under § 2G2.4(c)(2). We would reach this conclusion even if we were to review the district court's application of § 2G2.4(c)(2) de novo. The Internet, and its capacity to facilitate online bartering of computer files between collectors and purveyors of child pornography, readily links a single computer user to a possible network of others. See United States v. Lewis, 554 F.3d 208, 210 (1st Cir. 2009). It is clear that for there to be any meaningful distinction between the crimes of possession and the enhancement for intent to traffic, more than mere receipt of child pornography on a computer must be shown for § 2G2.4(c)(2) to apply. Sromalski, 318 F.3d at 751-52. Other circuits have held that this cross-reference applies to defendants who arranged to exchange images of child pornography with others over e-mail or by posting these images in an online chatroom. See, e.g., United States v. Bender, 290 F.3d 1279, 1285 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying crossreference to defendant who traded child pornography over email); United States v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 83, 98 (2d Cir. 2000), cert denied, 533 U.S. 953 (2001) (applying 2G2.4(c)(2) to defendant who conceded that he sen[t] and received images of child pornography on his computer). We do not decide whether the use of file-sharing software such as LimeWire per se would have qualified as trafficking under -24- § 2G2.4(c)(2). Our holding centers on the facts of this case. As the sentencing judge emphasized, Dyer chose to download and frequently use LimeWire, a type of peer-to-peer software that creates a shared system of users, and he did so to acquire images of child pornography for his personal collection.9 He downloaded these files into a shared folder that he knew would be made available to others. He did so for two years and gave no indication to Agents Lechner and Pritchard that he would have stopped had he not been arrested. He knew how to turn off the sharing feature of LimeWire and prevent other users from accessing these features, but he did not, at any point, make an effort to do so. By his actions, Dyer took deliberate steps to become part of a virtual community of consumers of child pornography who shared images to enlarge their own collections. Our holding that these acts showed an intent to traffic likewise comports with the holdings of other circuits on similar fact patterns. See United States v. Groenendal, 557 F.3d 419, 423-24 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant engaged in trafficking 9 We have previously discussed LimeWire's functions at length. LimeWire is a peer-to-peer file sharing application that connects users who wish to share data files with one another. Lewis, 554 F.3d at 211. When a user downloads LimeWire, the program creates a new folder on his computer where any files downloaded from LimeWire will be saved. LimeWire designates this as a shared folder, meaning that its contents will automatically be available to other users. Users can locate and download these files free of charge by entering search terms describing the desired content. When a user downloads a copy of the file, LimeWire saves it in the user's shared folder. Id. at 211. -25- under § 2G2.4(c)(2) when he posted images online to child pornography-trading group); Todd, 100 F. App'x at 250 (finding that [b]y downloading the images and making them accessible to others, defendant became eligible for sentencing pursuant to § 2G2.4(c)(2)).10 To be clear, we do not today reach the abstract issue of whether any LimeWire user who downloaded child pornography could have been sentenced under § 2G2.4(c)(2) because of LimeWire's inherent file-sharing features and purposes. Dyer, by his own admission, was differently situated from an unwitting LimeWire user who failed to realize that by downloading files, he was also saving them to a shared, universally accessible folder on his own computer. On the facts of this case, the district court was correct to conclude that Dyer's conduct warranted the application of § 2G2.4(c)(2).