Opinion ID: 22923
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court properly confirmed

Text: THE ARBITRATOR’S AWARD Devine raises two arguments3 regarding whether the arbitration award should be vacated. First, Devine contends that 3 Devine also asserts that the parties did not actually reach a settlement because there was no meeting of the minds. We do not consider this issue because Devine did not raise this objection below, and no plain error exists. See Forbush v. J.C. Penney Co., 98 F.3d 817, 822 (5th Cir. 1996) (“This Court will not address an argument raised by a party for the first time on appeal . . . unless it meets the plain error standard.”); see also Ferguson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 164 F.3d 894, 897 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 61 (1999). We note, however, that during the first arbitration, the arbitrator asked both parties if they wished him to read and comment, as a neutral party, upon the settlement agreement. Both parties declined. The arbitrator also asked whether the document was in fact their settlement agreement. Both parties answered affirmatively. We take this as sufficient to establish a meeting of the minds between the parties. 4 the arbitrator failed to comply with the district court’s June 9 Order by simply incorporating the entire settlement agreement into the modified arbitration award. He asserts that the district court ordered a “rehearing” of the issues, and therefore, the district court erred in confirming the modified award when the arbitrator did not conduct further arbitration. We find no merit in Devine’s argument because the district court’s June 9 Order was a clear order to the arbitrator to clarify his findings, not an order to rehear the dispute. The district court was concerned with the award because the arbitrator appeared both to incorporate by reference the parties’ settlement agreement and, at the same time, to use “standard language” that appeared to expressly exclude the agreement. Not wishing to “second-guess” the arbitrator, the district court ordered that the issues be resubmitted so that the arbitrator could “reissue his award setting forth precisely the terms resulting from the arbitration.” The parties resubmitted the issues, and the arbitrator reissued the award, expressly incorporating the entire agreement. In its February 4, 2000 order, the district court found that the arbitrator complied with its June 9 Order and had clearly “resolved the uncertainty about the status of the settlement agreement.”4 Under the deference we accord to the arbitration 4 Devine asserts that he raised the issue of breach of the settlement agreement upon resubmission to the arbitrator and that 5 process, we agree with the district court that the arbitrator complied with its June 9 Order. In his second argument, Devine asserts that the arbitrator refused to hear material evidence in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) (1999). Under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3), an arbitration award may be vacated if “the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct . . . in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy.” 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3). Devine presented no evidence to the district court or to this court that demonstrates that the arbitrator refused to hear evidence. In fact, the case was in arbitration for approximately three days the arbitrator did not consider evidence regarding this claim. The district court found that after the arbitrator received the resubmission of the issues and the accompanying arguments, he incorporated the entire settlement agreement into the modified award. Because of this action by the arbitrator, the court concluded that the arbitrator “implicitly dismissed” the issue. Devine argues that the district court erred in finding that the arbitrator “implicitly dismissed any argument by Devine that the settlement agreement was not binding on the parties” when he incorporated the entire agreement into the modified award. We find no fault with the district court’s decision for the simple reason that an arbitrator need not list the reasons for his or her award. See Antwine v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 899 F.2d 410, 412 (5th Cir. 1990). The policy behind this rule is that “[i]f arbitrators were required to issue an opinion or otherwise detail the reasons underlying an arbitration award, the very purpose of arbitration—the provision of a relatively quick, efficient and informal means of private dispute settlement—would be markedly undermined.” Id. After a review of the record, we note that this policy has already been frustrated in this action. We agree with the district court “that both parties have accomplished little more than an increase in their clients’ fees since the removal of this suit on August 13, 1996.” Accordingly, we find that the district court did not err by finding an implicit dismissal of this issue. 6 before the settlement agreement was reached. In addition, during resubmission of the issues, both parties submitted documents to the arbitrator to support their positions. Hence, the district court did not err in finding that this argument provided “no reason” to vacate the award.5