Opinion ID: 2655544
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The second delay

Text: ¶43 The second period of delay stretched from June 7, 2011, to the date of the filing of the omnibus order on August 30, 2011, and totaled 84 days.1 The District Court attributed this period of delay to the State for “lack of diligence,” which it found to occupy the middle ground on the culpability scale, weighing more lightly against the State than a deliberate attempt to hamper the defense. ¶44 We have explained that, in analyzing delays under Factor Two, a court does not consider actions or events which did not result in a delay of the trial. Couture, ¶ 82 n. 6, (citing Ariegwe, ¶ 63). However, where a trial date has not yet been set—as was the situation during the second period of delay identified by the District Court in the present case—and a continuance or some other event delays the setting of the trial date, then that delay must be attributed to the proper party. Couture, ¶¶ 80-82. Here, it appears that the filing of the omnibus order was required before the District Court set the first trial date. The District Court ordered Redlich to sign and return the omnibus order within two 1 The District Court and the parties on appeal misstate Redlich’s arraignment date and miscalculate the duration of the second period of delay as 77 days. These errors do not affect the District Court’s order in any way, or the total number of days of delay. 17 weeks after the State had completed its portion of the order. Additionally, the State was ordered to request a status hearing if Redlich did not meet this two-week deadline. Because Redlich failed to return the order within the deadline, the prosecutor argued that the 84-day delay associated with filing the omnibus order should be attributed to Redlich. The District Court determined, however, that the State bore responsibility for this delay because the prosecution had failed to request a status hearing. The District Court found that the State lacked diligence in failing to request a status hearing and that this delay occupied “the middle ground” on the culpability scale. The State does not contest this determination on appeal.