Opinion ID: 1154038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: point i decided

Text: We will hold in deciding the second issue, that the payments ordered by the trial court were a part of the property-settlement provisions of the decree following the entry of which the court loses jurisdiction, Paul v. Paul, Wyo., 631 P.2d 1060, 1064 (1981); but we would not have found an abuse of the trial court's discretion even if the payments were considered to be alimony. We have held on countless occasions that the district court's decision regarding the modification of alimony and support-payment provisions contained in divorce decrees will not be disturbed unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Heyl v. Heyl, Wyo., 518 P.2d 28 (1974); Tanner v. Tanner, Wyo., 482 P.2d 443 (1971); Salmeri v. Salmeri, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1244 (1976); Rubeling v. Rubeling, Wyo., 406 P.2d 283 (1965); Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, 46 Wyo. 23, 22 P.2d 199 (1933). In resolving the question which asks whether the trial court has abused its discretion, we seek to discover whether the trial court could reasonably have come to the conclusion it did. Martinez v. State, Wyo., 611 P.2d 831 (1980). In the case at bar, we have no trouble whatever in concluding that any change of financial circumstance suffered by appellant has not rendered him incapable of paying the sum of money to the appellee which was decreed by the court. The ultimate question is whether the appellant possesses the ability to pay. Lonabaugh v. Lonabaugh, supra. It was for the trial court to decide whether the appellant treated the corporation as though it were one and the same entity as Tom McMillan, and the record supports the trial judge's decision that they have been treated for business as well as personal purposes as one and the same. This being so and it having been established that the company was financially sound, it appears to this court, as it did to the trial court, that Mr. McMillan's circumstances have not changed so dramatically as to preclude his complying with the payments to the appellee that were mandated by the divorce decree.