Opinion ID: 433635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sentence Imposed for Commission of the Same Crime in Other Jurisdictions

Text: 53 Finally, we compare the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. A brief look at the law in the southern states of Georgia, Mississippi, Florida, and Tennessee is appropriate. 54 Georgia law provides, in pertinent part, as follows: A person convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than 5 nor more than 20 years. Ga.Code Ann. Sec. 16-8-41 (1982). 26 Georgia has no habitual offenders statute. 55 Similarly, Mississippi has no habitual offender statute. Robbery in Mississippi, however, can be punished by any sentence from three years to death. Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 97-3 (1972). Thus, it is clear that in the states of Georgia and Mississippi (which do not have habitual offender statutes), Seritt could have received the penultimate sentence of life imprisonment for his armed robbery conviction. 56 Florida law provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 57 If in the course of committing the robbery the offender carried a firearm or other deadly weapon, then the robbery is a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life imprisonment or as provided in section 775.082, section 775.083, or section 775.084. 58 Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 812.13 (West 1976). Hence, in Florida, Georgia, and Mississippi, Seritt could have received a sentence of life imprisonment for his conviction of armed robbery. 59 Florida, however, unlike Georgia and Mississippi, has a habitual felony offenders statute. Section 775.084, Florida Statutes (West 1976) authorizes the imposition of an extended term of imprisonment on a habitual felony offender if the offender has one prior felony conviction plus two convictions for misdemeanors in the first degree or similar offenses in other states or federal courts. The Florida statute also provides that the date of the present felony must not have occurred more than five years after the date of the conviction of the last prior felony, misdemeanor, or other qualified offense of which the defendant was convicted, or it must have occurred within five years of the defendant's release, on parole or otherwise, from a prison sentence or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later. 60 The record reveals that the armed robbery in this case occurred on May 6, 1980, and Seritt's latest prior felony conviction was on March 5, 1975. We, therefore, conclude that Seritt's earlier convictions were more than five years prior to his most recent conviction. 61 A Florida court's inquiry under the Habitual Felony Offenders Act would not stop here. Under Florida law, if the felony for which Seritt is to be sentenced were committed within five years of Seritt's release from a prison sentence, parole, or other commitment imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, the sentencing court would be authorized to impose an extended term of imprisonment. 62 The record, however, is barren with regard to Seritt's prior imprisonment, release, parole, or other commitment imposed as a result of Seritt's previous felony convictions. Thus, it is not clear whether Seritt would have received a less severe penalty for his conviction of armed robbery on a fifth felony offense in Florida. 63 In Tennessee, for robbery with a deadly weapon, the defendant may receive ten or more years in prison, life imprisonment, or the death penalty. 27 Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 39-2-501 (1982). Tennessee, however, has a habitual felony offenders' law. Tenn.Code Ann. Sec. 39-1-801 (1982). Under the Tennessee statute, like the Florida statute, we are not convinced that Seritt would not have received an enhanced sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 64 The Tennessee law requires that at least two of the three prior felonies committed by the defendant be specific types of crimes. The list includes the sale of a schedule I controlled substance, mayhem, assault with intent to murder, malicious shooting or stabbing, abducting a female from her parents, and capital offenses. The record shows that Seritt has been convicted of four felonies; each felony conviction involved the sale of controlled substances in violation of the Uniform Alabama Controlled Substance Act. 65 The record, however, does not reveal the type of controlled substance Seritt sold. Thus, we are unable to determine whether the type of controlled substance Seritt sold was a schedule I controlled substance within the meaning of the Tennessee Habitual Offenders Law. 66 Notwithstanding this impediment, we are convinced that Seritt would have received an equally severe penalty for his felony conviction of armed robbery as a fifth felony offense under the Tennessee Habitual Offenders Law. In sum, Seritt has not proved, and we, therefore, are not convinced, that he was treated more severely in Alabama than he would have been in any other state. 67 The constitution requires that we examine Seritt's sentence to determine if it is proportionate to his crime. After applying objective criteria, we find that Seritt, a habitual felony offender, has received a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for serious life-threatening criminal conduct. Seritt has not been treated more harshly than other defendants in Alabama who have committed equally serious or more serious crimes. It is not clear that Seritt has been treated more harshly than he would have been in any other jurisdiction. Thus, we are not left with a firm conviction that Seritt's sentence is disproportionate to his crime. 68 Accordingly, we conclude that the Alabama Habitual Felony Offenders Act meets the objective criteria articulated, as a guide, by the Court in Solem v. Helm. We hold that Seritt's sentence is proportionate to his crime and is, therefore, not prohibited by the eighth amendment.