Opinion ID: 1947466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: the solution

Text: The Court notes: [W]e do not write rules by opinion. We must decide what Texas law requires for finality, given the present rules. 39 S.W.3d at 205. Yet, the Mafrige finality rule this Court created represented such a major departure from prior Texas law. In fact, but for the judicially-created Mafrige rule, no one would dispute that what Texas law requires for finality of summary judgments is an order actually disposing of all parties and issues. Rather than simply amend the Mafrige finality rule and perpetuate the problems the unworkable system Mafrige and its progeny created, the Court should focus on shaping a real solutionone providing the desired certainty and protecting parties' right to appellate review. This requires wiping the slate clean. Mafrige created enough problems with its fictional finality and its holding that trial courts can use magic language to create final summary judgments by granting relief not requested. 866 S.W.2d at 591-92. In Inglish we compounded the problem by confirming that Mafrige applies even when the parties continue litigating rather than appealing a partial summary judgment made final under Mafrige. 945 S.W.2d at 811. We completed the trilogy in Bandera, holding that when a party appeals a summary judgment granting more relief than requested, the court of appeals should address the merits of the appeal, remanding only the part of the judgment that exceeds the relief requested in the summary judgment motion. 946 S.W.2d at 337. Undeniably, these rules were designed to simplify summary judgment finality. But, in application, these cases only demonstrate that we should have adhered to our own admonishments that this Court simply should not make rules by opinion. E.g., Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex.1992) (explaining that we should not revise rules by opinion); see also Verburgt v. Dorner, 959 S.W.2d 615, 619 (Tex.1997) (Baker, J., dissenting) (noting that this Court's jurisprudence forbids rule amendments by judicial fiat). Thus, we should overrule Mafrige, Inglish, and Bandera to the extent they created new rules by judicial fiatand instead tackle the problems of summary judgment finality through our rulemaking process. Accordingly, we should return to our prior position that a Mother Hubbard clause (or other magic language) has no place in any summary judgment order final or partialand that a trial court may not sua sponte grant more relief than the parties request simply by adding conclusory finality language to a summary judgment order. Further, a summary judgment should be entitled to no presumption at all about whether it is final. Returning to the law as it was pre- Mafrige requires determining the state of the law before Mafrige. Mafrige actually held two things: (1) that `Mother Hubbard' language or its equivalent in an order granting summary judgment makes an otherwise partial summary judgment final for appeal purposes; and (2) that if a summary judgment grants more relief than requested, it should be reversed and remanded, but not dismissed. 866 S.W.2d at 590, 592. Before Mafrige, this first holding was not the law. In Teer v. Duddlesten we held that: There is no presumption in partial summary judgments that the judgment was intended to make an adjudication about all parties and issues. The Mother Hubbard clause that all relief not expressly granted is denied has no place in a partial summary judgment hearing. The concepts of a partial summary judgment on the one hand, and a judgment that is presumed to determine all issues and facts on the other, are inconsistent. 664 S.W.2d at 704. In Mafrige we recognized this earlier statement in Teer, but rejected it and held that finality language could render a partial summary judgment final for purposes of appeal. 290 S.W.2d at 592. Mafrige's second holdingthat a summary judgment granting more relief than requested should be reversed and remanded, but not dismisseddoes not appear to be an entirely new rule. In both Teer and Chessher, another pre- Mafrige case, we reversed and remanded (rather than dismissed) summary judgment orders after determining that they were interlocutory because they granted more relief than requested. See Teer, 664 S.W.2d at 705; Chessher v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.1983). But see Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992) (opining that these cases are in direct contravention of Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(c) and discussing disagreement in the courts over whether summary judgment orders granting more relief than requested were interlocutory or appealable, but erroneous, judgments), rev'd sub. nom. Mafrige, 866 S.W.2d at 590. Thus, while the courts were not entirely in agreement, it appears we had already established the rule that a summary judgment order granting more relief than requested is not interlocutoryit is simply erroneous. For this reason, I agree with the Court that if an order actually does dispose of each claim and every party, it is an appealable judgment, even if it grants more relief than requested. This is consistent with the long-standing rule that if an order actually disposes of all parties and issues, it is final for appeal purposes. E.g., Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. First Court of Appeals, 722 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.1986). However, consistent with my view that we should overrule Mafrige and its progeny and recognize no presumption for or against finality, I do not believe any type of conclusory finality language can ever be read to grant more relief than requested by the parties. [6] We should determine summary judgment finality by comparing the live pleadings and the summary judgment order. A summary judgment order should only be final if it matches the contents of the pleadings. And, as was the law before Bandera, a court of appeals should summarily reverse any summary judgment granting more relief than requested, without any sua sponte severance of some issues while others are remanded. Wiping the slate clean by overruling the rules created in Mafrige, Inglish, and Bandera while we study the best method of tackling summary judgment finality through our formal rule-promulgation process is the better solution for several reasons. First, this approach strikes a more reasonable balance between the competing policies of promoting certainty and preserving parties' rights to appellate review. And, under this approach, the trial court and the parties drafting summary judgment orders would have the burden, and the incentive, to ensure that the pleadings, summary judgment motions, and the summary judgment orders match. If a premature appeal is taken, the court of appeals need only compare the pleadings, motions, and order. If the order does not dispose of parties or issues raised in the pleadings, then it is interlocutory and the court must dismiss the appeal. [7] If the order explicitly disposes of issues and parties not raised in the motion, it is erroneous and the court must reverse the entire order. Most importantly, this approach alters the consequences of poorly-drafted orders. Specifically, the consequence flowing from a poorly drafted order becomes the risk of a premature appeal rather than an untimely one. This eliminates the greatest risk Mafrige createdthat an interlocutory order, contrary to the trial court's and (at least one party's) intent, will be fictitiously made final, starting the appellate and plenary power timetables even while the litigation continues. No one would argue that conducting a trial after the trial court's plenary power has expired is not a waste of judicial resources. Moreover, because overruling Bandera eliminates the benefits of a premature appeal, taking such an appeal would not be a cost-efficient mistake for litigants to make, increasing the incentive to ensure orders are more clearly drafted. If a premature appeal is nonetheless taken, it would not create an onerous burden for the appellate court. The opposing party need only file a brief pointing out that the pleadings, motion, and order do not match, leading to automatic remand or dismissal. No one disputes that rules governing summary judgment finality could be helpful to the bench and bar and facilitate judicial efficiency. But history, as well as our own precedent, has shown that judicial opinions are not the place to achieve this. Any attempt to adhere to the Mafrige principle or retain parts of it while rejecting others can only lead to more problems. Instead, this Court should overrule Mafrige and its progeny and start anew. As the Court even notes, our rules advisory committee is currently studying summary judgment finality. 39 S.W.3d at 216. Retaining parts of Mafrige, Inglish, Bandera as modified by the Court's less-than-clear opinion todayonly to follow with promulgation of a concurrent finality rulewill only lead to more confusion. I agree that the cases here should be reversed. But, because the Court refuses to fix the problems its judicial rulemaking in Mafrige caused and allow our rulemaking process to work, I cannot join the Court's opinion.