Opinion ID: 666579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Elements Test

Text: 11 The statutory elements test is the proper method for determining when a federal criminal defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction. United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1331, 127 L.Ed.2d 378 (1994). See also United States v. Browner, 937 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir.1991) (Browner II ) (concluding that the Supreme Court in Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 109 S.Ct 1443, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989), adopted the statutory elements test). Pursuant to the statutory elements test an offense is not lesser included unless each statutory element of the lesser offense is also present in the greater offense. Browner II, 937 F.2d at 168. In contrast to the indictment test, under the statutory elements test the mere fact that the particular indictment in charging the greater offense includes allegations embracing all statutory elements of the putative lesser offense does not suffice to render the latter an included offense, for the statutory elements test looks only to the statutory elements of both offenses. Id. 4 Thus, the district court should have given a lesser included offense instruction only if all of the elements of simple possession pursuant to section 844 were also elements of possession with intent to distribute pursuant to section 841(a)(1).
Section 844(a) provides in part: 12  It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance unless such substance was obtained directly, or pursuant to a valid prescription or order.... Any person who violates this subsection may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not more than 1 year ... except that if he commits such offense after a prior conviction ... for any drug or narcotic offense ... he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 15 days but not more than 2 years ... except, further, that if he commits such offense after two or more prior convictions ... for any drug or narcotic offense ... he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than 90 days but not more than 3 years.... Notwithstanding the preceding sentence, a person convicted under this subsection for the possession of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base shall be imprisoned not less than 5 years and not more than 20 years, and fined a minimum of $1,000, if the conviction is a first conviction under this subsection and the amount of the mixture or substance exceeds 5 grams, if the conviction is after a prior conviction for the possession of such a mixture or substance under this subsection becomes final and the amount of the mixture or substance exceeds 3 grams, or if the conviction is after 2 or more prior convictions for the possession of such a mixture or substance under this subsection becomes final and the amount of the mixture or substance exceeds 1 gram. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 844(a) (West Supp.1993) (bracketed numbering added). 13 Pursuant to the first and second sentences of section 844(a), a person can be convicted and sentenced for simple possession of any quantity of a controlled substance; the maximum confinement varies from one to three years depending on whether the offense was committed after one or two prior drug convictions. 5 In accordance with the third sentence of section 844(a), a person can be convicted of simple possession of a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base if the amount thereof so possessed exceeds the statutory defined quantity; 6 the sentencing range in each instance is the same, namely, not less than five nor more than twenty years' imprisonment. 14 Deisch's five year sentence was necessarily under the third sentence of section 844(a), as she had no prior conviction. The question thus arises whether the identity of the knowingly possessed substance as being a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base is, on the one hand, an element of the section 844(a) offense, or, on the other hand, a mere sentencing factor. We conclude that it is an element of the offense. 15 In United States v. Michael, 10 F.3d 838, 839 (D.C.Cir.1993), the D.C.Circuit concluded that the third sentence of Sec. 844(a) ... creates an independent crime of possession of cocaine base. The Michael court further clearly, albeit inferentially, held that the identity of the substance possessed as being cocaine base was an element of this independent crime. 7 The opinion relies in part on the structure of section 844(a), noting that its third sentence is buried in one great paragraph, in contrast to the penalty section of Sec. 841, which is clearly set off in subsection '(b)' and labeled 'Penalties.'  Id. at 840. It also relies on the third sentence's person convicted ... for the possession of ... cocaine base language, which it characterizes as suggesting that the conviction itself must encompass cocaine base. Id. Michael also attaches significance to the fact that the third sentence was a completely new provision added in 1988, and that the remainder of section 844(a) did not, and does not, mention cocaine base. Id. 8 We are generally in agreement with the reasoning of Michael in these respects. 16 There is, however, an additional consideration that is particularly influential in our conclusion that the identity of the substance knowingly possessed as being cocaine base is an element of the offense denounced by the third sentence of section 844(a) instead of being merely a sentencing factor for a violation of the first sentence of section 844(a). 9 This consideration arises from the indictment clause of the Fifth Amendment, 10 which requires a grand jury indictment for any federal offense that is a felony or is punishable by confinement in a penitentiary or at hard labor. 11 It has become clear that any federal offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year is an offense for which the Fifth Amendment requires a grand jury indictment. 12 17 For anyone, such as Deisch, not previously convicted, exposure to more than one year's confinement for a violation of section 844(a) would be possible if the substance possessed was a mixture or substance which contains cocaine base, but not otherwise. If the nature of the substance as cocaine base is an element of the offense, then Deisch will be afforded the protection of the indictment clause in this respect because the indictment must allege every element of the offense. United States v. Carll, 105 U.S. [15 Otto] 611, 26 L.Ed. 1135 (1882); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 764-65, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 1047 (1962); Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798, 803-04 (1965). As the above authorities reflect, it is not enough that the grand jury concludes that the defendant should be prosecuted for violating a particular statute; rather, the indictment must also allege every element of the offense. 13 Only in this way is any assurance furnished that the grand jury found probable cause to believe that the defendant in fact committed acts constituting the offense in question. This clearly appears from the reason so often given for the rules that the failure of the indictment to allege all elements of the offense may not be cured by evidence or instructions at trial, 14 nor by a bill of particulars, 15 and that the indictment may not be actually or constructively amended by adding material allegations as to the offense charged or of another offense, 16 namely, that absent such rules there is lacking the necessary assurance the grand jury found probable cause to believe the defendant committed acts constituting all elements of the offense of conviction as proved at trial. 18 On the other hand, an indictment need not allege mere sentencing facts. United States v. Vasquez-Olvera, 999 F.2d 943, 944-45 (5th Cir.1993); United States v. Pico, 2 F.3d 472, 474-5 (2nd Cir.1993) (indictment charging conspiracy to import cocaine need not allege quantity, even though mandatory minimum sentence is based on quantity, because quantity is relevant only to the sentence and is not an element of the offense). See also United States v. Affleck, 861 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir.1988) (Traditional sentencing factors need not be pleaded....); Buckley v. Butler, 825 F.2d 895, 903 (... there is no Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment on the sentencing facts....). Accordingly, if the third sentence of section 844(a) does not create a separate offense and the only offense established by section 844(a) is the knowing possession of any controlled substance as denounced in the first sentence thereof, so that the identity of the substance possessed as cocaine base is not an element of any section 844(a) offense but is only a sentencing factor, then, even if an indictment were required, 17 nevertheless it would not have to allege that the controlled substance possessed was cocaine base. However, were that the rule, then any defendant without a prior conviction, such as Deisch, would be exposed to an infamous punishment without a grand jury ever having considered whether there was probable cause to believe that the defendant did that which the law requires she have done before she can be exposed to any infamous punishment. Such a rule--which is the necessary consequence of holding that under section 844(a) the identity of the substance as cocaine base is merely a sentencing factor--would emasculate the protection intended by the Fifth Amendment's indictment clause. If no indictment were required, then obviously such a section 844(a) defendant could be exposed to infamous punishment without the protection of a grand jury. But if an indictment is required because the punishment may be infamous if (and only if) cocaine base is what is possessed, then it is wholly illogical to authorize a punishment of that character even though the indictment does not allege cocaine base. That which requires the grand jury must likewise require allegation in the indictment, else the presence of the grand jury does nothing to subserve the purpose of requiring it. 19 Surely the indictment clause must be understood to mean that the defendant may not be exposed to an infamous punishment unless the grand jury finds probable cause to believe that he did that which the law requires him to have done before any character of infamous punishment whatever may be imposed on him. 18 20 Our conclusion in this regard is supported by several decisions holding that where an offense that is otherwise a misdemeanor becomes a felony if committed in a certain way or with certain consequences, the particular attribute that makes it a felony is an element of the offense, which must be alleged in the indictment and proved at trial. We have applied this rule to 18 U.S.C. Secs. 659 (theft of shipments in commerce) and 641 (theft of property of the United States) in each of which the offense is a misdemeanor if the value of what is taken does not exceed $100, and is otherwise a felony, holding that a value of $100 or more is an element of the felony that must be alleged and proved, Packnett v. United States, 503 F.2d 949, 950 (5th Cir.1974) (section 659); Theriault v. United States, 434 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.1970) (section 641), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869, 92 S.Ct. 124, 30 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Cartwright v. United States, 146 F.2d 133, 135 (5th Cir.1944) (former section 82, predecessor to section 641). Other courts have reached similar results. See United States v. Scanzello, 832 F.2d 18, 23 (3d Cir.1987) (sections 649 and 641); United States v. Alberico, 604 F.2d 1315, 1321 (10th Cir.) (section 641), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 992, 100 S.Ct. 524, 62 L.Ed.2d 422 (1979). 21 For purposes of deciding if a particular factor is merely a sentencing consideration or is an offense element under section 844(a), two other circuits have also given significance to whether the presence or absence of the factor determines whether the defendant is guilty of a misdemeanor only or of a felony. In United States v. Puryear, 940 F.2d 602, 603-4 (10th Cir.1991), the Tenth Circuit, relying in part on Theriault, Alberico, and Scanzello, held that the amount of cocaine base possessed by a defendant was an essential element of simple possession under section 844(a) and that [a]bsent a jury finding as to the amount of cocaine, the trial court may not decide of its own accord to enter a felony conviction and sentence, instead of a misdemeanor conviction and sentence, by resolving the crucial element of the amount of cocaine against the defendant. Similarly, in United States v. Sharp, 12 F.3d 605 (6th Cir.1993), the Sixth Circuit held that for section 844(a) possession of cocaine base to be sentenced as a felony, the trial jury must have found the requisite quantity because the quantity does not merely affect the length of the defendant's sentence but determines whether he is guilty of a felony or a misdemeanor, and that for a sentencing judge to make factual findings that convert what would otherwise be a misdemeanor into a felony seems to us an impermissible usurpation of the historic rule of the jury. Id. at 608. Sharp distinguished cases holding that under section 841 quantity was merely a sentencing factor and not an element of the offense, because in those cases the offense would have been a felony regardless of the quantity and the felony/misdemeanor dichotomy was not implicated. Id. at 608 & n. 1. 22 Accordingly, we hold, consistent with Michael, that the third sentence of section 844(a) creates a separate offense, an element of which is that the substance possessed contains cocaine base. 19 23
24 Section 841(a)(1) makes it unlawful to knowingly or intentionally manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance. 20 The term controlled substance is defined in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 802(6) as a drug or other substance, or immediate precursor, included in schedule I, II, III, IV, or V of part B of this subchapter. The referenced schedules are set forth in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 812(c). Provision for amendments to the schedules by the Attorney General is made in 21 U.S.C. Sec. 811. See also section 812(a) & (b). The current schedules are set forth in 21 C.F.R. Secs. 1308.11-1308.15. 25 The schedules list a vast number of controlled substances, among the more commonly known of which are heroin, Lysergic acid diethylamide, marihuana, opium, and several others. 26 Cocaine is, and has been ever since well prior to the offense in question, included in schedule II as set forth in section 812(c) in the following language: 27 Schedule II 28 (a) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in another schedule, any of the following substances whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis: 29 . . . . . 30 (4) Coca leaves except coca leaves and extracts of coca leaves from which cocaine, ecgonine, and derivatives of ecgonine or their salts have been removed; cocaine, its salts, optical and geometric isomers, and salts of isomers, ecgonine, its derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers; or any compound, mixture, or preparation which contains any quantity of any of the substances referred to in this paragraph. (Emphasis added). 21 31 Section 841(b) sets out a series of penalties, introduced by the language any person who violates subsection (a) of this section shall be sentenced as follows. Various different penalties are set out in the subsequent paragraphs of section 841(b), generally depending on which particular controlled substance is involved in the offense, the quantity thereof, and whether the defendant committed the offense after a prior drug offense conviction. For any violation of section 841(a) involving cocaine or any other of the controlled substances listed in any of schedules I, II, III or IV, the authorized sentence always includes confinement in excess of one year, and the offense is hence always a felony regardless of the drug quantity or of which particular one of the various controlled substances listed in the schedules is involved (and regardless also of the presence or absence of prior convictions or other factors). 22 More particularly, any violation of section 841(a) where the controlled substance is cocaine is always a felony, regardless of whether or not the cocaine is cocaine base and regardless of the quantity involved or the presence or absence of prior convictions. 32 Neither cocaine base nor crack cocaine nor any equivalent term is mentioned in section 841(a) or in any of the controlled substance schedules; nor is there anything in any of the controlled substance schedules which can be said to describe cocaine base (or crack cocaine) but not cocaine, or to describe cocaine base (or crack cocaine) as a discrete variety or type of cocaine. Until 1986, all this was also true of section 841(b). However, in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-570, October 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207, Congress amended section 841(b)(1)(A) and (B) so as, inter alia, to insert the special sentencing provisions for cocaine base which now appear at section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii). Id. 100 Stat. 3207-2, 3207-3. These amendments in effect provided for the same sentence range for a given amount of cocaine base as for an amount of cocaine 100 times as large. 23 It will be observed that the descriptions of the covered substances given in section 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii) (see note 23 supra ) are essentially in the very same wording as that used in paragraph (4) of section (a) of schedule II appearing in section 812(c), hereinabove quoted, which schedules cocaine. The inference from this is that cocaine base, as something distinct from cocaine or as some discrete variety or type of cocaine, is not listed or described in the controlled substance schedules. Apart from the noted provisions of section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii), neither cocaine base nor crack cocaine is mentioned in section 841(b). Further, when Congress in 1986 added the references to cocaine base by enacting section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii) as above described, no change was made in section 841(a)(1) or in the wording by which cocaine was listed in schedule II. 33 There is no statutory definition of cocaine base. While there may be some relatively minor differences in judicial definitions, all concur that cocaine base is a form of cocaine. See United States v. Metcalf, 898 F.2d 43, 46 (5th Cir.1990) ( 'Cocaine base or crack is any form of cocaine with [a] hydroxyl radical' in the chemical compound, (quoting United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 976 n. 1 (8th Cir.1990)); United States v. Brown, 859 F.2d 974, 975-6 (D.C.Cir.1988) ( 'Cocaine base' ... is any form of cocaine with the hydroxyl radical; 'cocaine base' excludes, for example, salt forms of cocaine). 24 34 We have generally held that the quantity listings in section 841(b)(1) are merely sentencing factors, not elements of the section 841(a) offense. See United States v. Valencia, 957 F.2d 1189, 1197 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 254, 121 L.Ed.2d 185 (1992) (no need to charge jury on quantity of heroin as [q]uantity is not an element of the crimes proscribed by 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) ...). Most other circuits are in accord. See United States v. Campuzano, 905 F.2d 677, 678 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 363, 112 L.Ed.2d 326 (1990) (cocaine; citing cases). Contra: United States v. Alvarez, 735 F.2d 461, 467-68 (11th Cir.1984). 35 Just as section 841(a)(1) does not speak to quantity, so also it says nothing about the identity of the substance involved other than that it must be a controlled substance. Arguably, therefore, the identity of the particular controlled substance involved is not an element of the section 841(a)(1) offense, the only requirement being that the substance involved is a controlled substance. Cf. United States v. Cartwright, 6 F.3d 294, 303 (5th Cir.1993) (not necessary in section 841(a)(1) prosecution to show that the defendant knew the substance was cocaine, only that the defendant knew that the substance was a controlled substance); United States v. Collado-Gomez, 834 F.2d 280 (2nd Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 969, 108 S.Ct. 1244, 99 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) (the government does not have to prove that the defendant knew the specific nature and amount of the controlled substance ...). On the other hand, it is also arguable that unless the jury, petit or grand, knows what the controlled substance is it cannot know that it is a controlled substance. No such concern, however, is implicated respecting cocaine base, for all cocaine base is cocaine, the controlled substance schedules do not mention cocaine base or describe some discrete substance which is cocaine base as distinguished and different from cocaine, and cocaine base is a controlled substance only because it is or contains cocaine. This is likewise clear from the fact that cocaine base, as a form of cocaine, was a controlled substance before the term cocaine base was ever introduced into Title 21, from the fact that section 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) and (B)(ii) (see note 23, supra) in substance replicate the listing for cocaine in schedule II, and from the fact that when section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) and (B)(iii) respecting cocaine base were added in 1986 there was no corresponding change in the schedule II listing embracing cocaine. 36 Accordingly, we conclude that the identity of the involved controlled substance as being cocaine base rather than simply cocaine is not an element of any section 841(a)(1) offense. For a section 841(a)(1) offense involving cocaine base the indictment need only allege, and the jury need only find, that the substance was cocaine, and whether or not it was the cocaine base form of cocaine is purely a sentencing factor. 25 We are aware of no court which has held otherwise, and implicit in numerous decisions is the conclusion that for purposes of section 841(a)(1), whether or not the cocaine involved is cocaine base is merely a sentencing factor. That, of course, is the implicit holding of Michael. 37 In United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545 (1st Cir.1989), in affirming a section 841(a)(1) conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, and a sentence therefore under section 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) because the substance was cocaine base, the First Circuit observed: 38 It is important to note that the court, not the jury, determines the quantity and type of controlled substance appropriate under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b).... Section 841(b) describes the penalty provisions for violations of section 841(a), in this case possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. Therefore, as a penalty provision, the district court judge determines the facts at the sentencing.... 39 . . . . . 40 ... questions as to whether the mixture found was cocaine base and its specific weight were factual findings for the judge at sentencing. The jury need only have found that the three chunks seized contained some mixture of cocaine as defined in schedule II. See 21 U.S.C. Sec. 812. Id. at 551 n. 6. 26 41 See also United States v. Easter, 981 F.2d 1549, 1557 (10th Cir.1992) (with respect to cocaine base, [s]ection 841(b)(1) is merely a penalty provision and as such does not change the elements of cocaine trafficking offenses, rather it lengthens the penalties that Congress has already imposed for those offenses); United States v. Lopez-Gil, 965 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir.1992) (conviction following jury trial for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and importation of cocaine affirmed, but sentence remanded to trial court for it to determine whether the cocaine was cocaine base); United States v. Pinto, 905 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir.1990) (as to alleged vagueness of cocaine base, section 841(b) is a sentencing provision. As such, the notice required to satisfy due process is less rigorous than that applied to substantive provisions); United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1033, 1034 (6th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1091, 111 S.Ct. 974, 112 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1991); 27 Collado-Gomez (The 1986 amendments [adding Sec. 841(b)(1)(A)(iii) & (B)(iii) concerning cocaine base] did not alter the elements of the substantive offense, which require the government to prove that a defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed a controlled substance). 42
43 All cocaine base is cocaine, and all is a controlled substance; all cocaine is a controlled substance; but not all cocaine is cocaine base. That the controlled substance possessed is cocaine base is an element of the offense denounced by the third sentence of section 844(a), but is not an element of any offense denounced by section 841(a)(1). Therefore, under the statutory elements test a violation of the third sentence of section 844(a) can not be a lesser included offense under an indictment charging possession with intent to distribute in violation of section 841(a)(1), even if, as here, the indictment alleges that the controlled substance is cocaine base. See Browner II at 168. However, the offense denounced by the first sentence of section 844(a) is knowing or intentional possession of simply a controlled substance, the very same words as are used in section 841(a)(1). Just as the identity of the controlled substance as cocaine base is not an element of the section 841(a)(1) offense, so also it is not an element of the offense denounced by the first sentence of section 844(a). Therefore, simple possession of cocaine, contrary to the first sentence of section 844(a), may be a lesser included offense under a charge of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it contrary to section 841(a)(1). Michael at 842; United States v. Chase, 838 F.2d 743, 747 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1035, 108 S.Ct. 2022, 100 L.Ed.2d 609 (1988). 44 Accordingly, Deisch's sentence under the third sentence of section 844(a) may not stand. This, however, does not require that we set aside the jury's verdict which necessarily found her guilty of a violation of the first sentence of section 844(a), and assuming no other bar to sustaining her conviction for violating the first sentence of section 844(a), she will only be entitled to a remand for resentencing on that basis. Michael at 842. See also Theriault at 215; Sharp at 609; Puryear at 604; Scanzello at 23. 45 We now turn to the remaining issues presented by Deisch's appeal. 46