Opinion ID: 2630295
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: apprendi violation

Text: Next, Tyler argues that when the district court made factual findings supporting its decision to authorize adult prosecution, it increased his potential punishment in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). This raises a question of law, and our standard of review is unlimited. See State v. Jones, 273 Kan. 756, 770, 47 P.3d 783, cert. denied 537 U.S. 980, 123 S.Ct. 444, 154 L.Ed.2d 341 (2002). Tyler points out that, if he had been adjudicated for the murder as a juvenile offender, his punishment could not have extended beyond his 23rd birthday, when the jurisdiction of the juvenile court terminates. See K.S.A. 38-1604(c)(2). In contrast, by prosecuting him as an adult, the State subjected him to the possibility of a hard 50 life sentence. See K.S.A. 21-4706(c). Therefore, the argument continues, the factual findings necessary to certify an adult prosecution violate the mandate that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Accordingly, Tyler asks for a reversal and a remand to submit his adult certification hearing to a jury. Tyler acknowledges that Jones rejected this argument, but he urges us to reconsider that ruling, which has been affirmed in subsequent decisions. See, e.g., State v. Mays, 277 Kan. 359, 367-68, 85 P.3d 1208 (2004); State v. Kunellis, 276 Kan. 461, 465, 78 P.3d 776 (2003). Tyler's argument for reconsideration focuses on his assertion that the reasoning in Jones was largely based on policy reasons as to why it is undesirable to allow a jury to make the certification ruling. However, Jones also cited to the Court of Appeals decision in State v. Hartpence, 30 Kan.App.2d 486, 496, 42 P.3d 1197 (2002), which opined that the adult certification process is a jurisdictional determination, rather than a sentencing question. Apprendi dealt with the imposition of a sentence beyond the statutory maximum permitted by the facts necessary to the jury's finding of guilt. That constraint would still apply after the certification procedure sends the juvenile to adult court. A State is not constitutionally required to provide preferential treatment to juveniles, and Apprendi was not intended to place constraints on the determination of which court will prosecute a juvenile offender. The holding in Jones remains valid.