Opinion ID: 2995134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Severity of the Distress

Text: The third element of the tort focuses on the severity of the emotional distress; it was regarding this element that the district court specifically found that Mr. Honaker had not put forward sufficient facts to sustain his claim. Illinois courts have explained that: The emotional distress must be severe. Although fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, worry, etc. may fall within the ambit of the term emotional distress, these mental conditions alone are not actionable. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Welsh v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 713 N.E.2d 679, 684 (Ill. App. Ct.) (emphasis in original) (quoting Public Fin. Corp., 360 N.E.2d at 768), appeal denied, 720 N.E.2d 1107 (Ill. 1999). Indeed, over time, Illinois courts have delineated with some precision the type of emotional distress that is sufficiently severe to meet the law’s requirements. More specifically, when plaintiffs have complained that a defendant’s actions caused them simply to become annoyed, frustrated, stressful, distressed, embarrassed, humiliated or nervous, those plaintiffs have been found not to have stated a claim under Illinois law./18 In contrast, when the distress has manifested itself either through physical symptoms or has necessitated medical treatment, Illinois courts have been more inclined to characterize the emotional distress as severe./19 Yet neither physical injury nor the need for medical treatment is a necessary prerequisite to establishing severe emotional distress. See Bristow v. Drake St. Inc., 41 F.3d 345, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1995); Corgan, 574 N.E.2d at 609; Clark v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, Inc., 697 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). In some instances, when no physical manifestation of the emotional distress existed and where no medical treatment was sought, Illinois courts have still found that a plaintiff could establish severe emotional distress. See, e.g., Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (plaintiff satisfactorily alleged that minister’s actions caused him distress, when minister abused counseling relationship with plaintiff’s wife by engaging in affair with her, causing depression, despair, insomnia, anxiety, nervousness and emotional trauma in plaintiff); Vance, 597 N.E.2d at 237 (plaintiff could survive motion to dismiss when her estranged husband allegedly conspired to have her murdered, which caused her to become extremely fearful for her life, safety, health and welfare and to suffer great emotional distress). Additionally, some Illinois cases have noted the principle, stated in the Second Restatement of Torts, that [s]evere distress must be proved; but in many cases the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant’s conduct is in itself important evidence that the distress has existed. Wall, 561 N.E.2d at 1088; see also Kolegas, 607 N.E.2d at 213. These cases have acknowledged that, even when significant evidence was not presented as to the severity of distress, the very nature of the conduct involved may be evidence of its impact on the victim. See Kolegas, 607 N.E.2d at 213 (when radio station knew plaintiffs had neurofibromatosis and nevertheless made false and highly offensive comments regarding the effects of the disease upon their personal appearance, severe distress presumed); Wall, 561 N.E.2d at 1088 (when plaintiff alleged that physician harassed her to have surgery removing part of her head’s internal structures and tissues and to abort her fetus, all to cover up previous medical malpractice on his part, severe distress presumed). In Bristow v. Drake Street Inc., 41 F.3d 345 (7th Cir. 1994), we extensively discussed when emotional distress is sufficiently severe under Illinois law. In the course of that discussion, we also took note that Illinois courts, following the Restatement, have tend[ed] to merge the issue of the outrageousness of the defendant’s conduct with the issue of the severity of the plaintiff’s emotional distress, in effect requiring more evidence of outrageousness the weaker the evidence of distress. Id. (internal citation omitted). In this case, Mr. Honaker testified that when he saw his house burning on the morning of the fire, he was upset and got mad and started yelling at everybody. R.70 at 96. Additionally, he points to the testimony of two witnesses to confirm the severity of the emotional distress he suffered. His ex-wife, Virginia Honaker, explained that on the day of the fire, Mr. Honaker was pissed and that he was cussing, raising all kinds of cain, hollering at the neighbors, everybody else, screaming to the top of his lungs because his house was burned. Id. at 380. However, she also qualified some of her answers regarding the seriousness of Mr. Honaker’s mental state. For example, Virginia Honaker explained that at one point, Mr. Honaker was bawling, though when asked if that was unusual for him, she replied Depends. Id. When asked if it took Mr. Honaker a while to get over his house being burned down, she answered [a]ccording to him, yes. Id. at 381. Additionally, James Webb, a neighbor of Mr. Honaker’s, testified that on the day of the fire, Mr. Honaker was visibly upset and very distraught, nervous. Id. at 308. Webb also observed that he had only seen Mr. Honaker in that emotional state once before, upon his divorce from Virginia Honaker. Aside from the testimony of these two witnesses, Mr. Honaker points to no other evidence to establish severe emotional distress. The district court took the view that the evidence was, as a matter of law, insufficient to permit a jury to determine that the emotional distress was sufficiently severe to be actionable. In reaching this determination, the court placed great, and perhaps controlling, weight on the fact that this testimony focused on the manifestations of Mr. Honaker’s distress on the day of the fire. Although duration is certainly a factor to be weighed in determining the severity of the plaintiff’s distress, see Welsh, 713 N.E.2d at 684, it is not the only factor that ought to be considered. Here, the district court apparently gave no consideration as to whether the severity of the alleged conduct--being told by the mayor to get out of town or be burned out followed by the burning of the house--permitted the reasonable inference that Mr. Honaker’s distress was not only severe but of significant duration. We believe that the magnitude of that conduct, in conjunction with the evidence of emotional distress that Mr. Honaker did put forward, could allow a jury to find that he suffered severe emotional distress in this case. Accordingly, although we express no view on the ultimate outcome of the case, we cannot sustain the dismissal of this count alleging a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress under the law of Illinois.