Opinion ID: 1318727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: basis in the complaint to apply res ipsa loquitur

Text: We shall first consider whether the plaintiff's complaint permitted an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine is nothing but a Latin phrase that recognizes a possible effect of circumstantial evidence. It is a rule of evidence. Watzig v. Tobin, 292 Or. 645, 648, 642 P.2d 651 (1982). A rule of evidence should not be pleaded in a claim for relief. A pleading which asserts a claim for relief    shall contain: A. A plain and concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting a claim for relief without unnecessary repetition. ORCP 18 A. It would not be proper to label the claim as being dependent on application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. A plaintiff need only plead ultimate facts that, if true, show that an injury occurred in circumstances that more probably than not would not have occurred in the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant. The defendant's argument, however, is that the plaintiff pleaded only specific allegations of negligence and that the defendant did not receive notice that the plaintiff intended to rely on res ipsa loquitur. A second argument by the defendant is that because the complaint contained only specific charges of negligence, the court could instruct on res ipsa loquitur only as it applied to those specifics, but the court here did not limit application of the doctrine to the specific charges of negligence. The general rule of pleading to invoke the doctrine is set forth in Short v. D.R.B. Logging Co., 192 Or. 383, 393, 232 P.2d 70, 235 P.2d 340 (1951): The rule in Oregon is that, where a plaintiff makes specific allegations of negligence in his complaint, he may invoke res ipsa loquitur, if applicable, as to such specific acts.    [citations omitted.] Lest we be misunderstood, we hasten to add that, of course, he may if he wishes, allege negligence both generally and specifically, and invoke res ipsa, if applicable, as to either or both. [3] In this case the plaintiff argues that it pleaded negligence both generally and specifically. It points to its allegation quoted above that the defendant in a reckless, careless and negligent manner caused the gasoline being delivered to ignite, spread and damage the plaintiff's property. Taken alone this might be considered a general allegation of negligence, but at the end of the paragraph in which those words appear the plaintiff has added as will be more fully described hereafter. It might be considered that these last words apply only to the claims of injury, but it is just as logical to infer that they apply both to the allegation of negligence and the claims of injury. We shall, arguendo, resolve that issue against the plaintiff and therefore hold that the plaintiff relies on specific charges of negligence. [4] We conclude that a fair reading of the instructions reveals that the trial court limited the jury's consideration of the rule of res ipsa loquitur to the four specific allegations of negligence submitted to the jury and forbade consideration of any general charge of negligence.