Opinion ID: 662535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Defense Arguments

Text: 19 Huebner's contention that he was tried and convicted on theories not alleged in the indictment is largely directed at the counts charging aiding and abetting attempted evasion. To that extent, the contention is moot. In any event, we are satisfied that the government's theory at trial was consistent with the charges set out in Count One, the conspiracy count, of the indictment.
20 Huebner argues that because of the alleged change in the government's theory the jury's findings based on evasion of income taxes were the product of confusion, caused by the government. This argument is also moot.
21 Huebner, Williams and five taxpayers were originally brought to trial. Each taxpayer was charged with conspiracy in Count One and with several counts of attempted tax evasion. Much of the evidence relevant to each taxpayer was not relevant to the other four unless and until a single conspiracy involving all was established. During the trial, the court granted severance to the five taxpayers. The situation was somewhat different as to Huebner and Williams because of their continuing involvement with Freeman and the taxpayers. 22 Huebner now argues that the court erred in denying him a mistrial after severance of the others. 23 The court instructed the jury that evidence admitted solely as to one of the severed defendants should not be considered against Huebner or Williams unless there was a later, different instruction. Much of the evidence was, in fact, relevant to the charges against Huebner, and he has not demonstrated which evidence was prejudicial to him. The denial of mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.
24 Judge Pro permitted the jurors to pass up notes requesting evidence on particular points. He would inform counsel of the request. Huebner argues that this practice prejudiced him because it allowed the prosecutor to become a friend of the jurors, and ... it allowed the jury to participate in the production of evidence (acting like attorneys). Huebner Brief at 17. 25 The procedure was entirely neutral, and Huebner does not point out prejudice resulting from any of the few questions asked. There was no error or abuse of discretion. See United States v. Gonzales, 424 F.2d 1055, 1056 (9th Cir.1970); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826, 100 S.Ct. 49, 62 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979).
26 Both defendants argue that it was error not to submit a special verdict which would show whether the jury found a conspiracy to evade income taxes or a conspiracy to defraud the United States. We find no abuse of discretion. 27 Generally, when a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive ... the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 420, 90 S.Ct. 642, 654, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970); United States v. Outpost Dev. Co., 552 F.2d 868, 869 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 965, 98 S.Ct. 503, 54 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977); Griffin v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 466, 469, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (general jury verdict valid so long as legally supportable on one of the submitted grounds--even though no assurance that a valid ground, rather than an invalid one, was actual basis for a jury's action). 28
29 After the commencement of trial, Huebner's counsel filed a motion entitled Motion for Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence (Rule 16). It stated that it was filed under the authority of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and contained 35 numbered requests, some with subdivisions. The second of 19 subdivisions of paragraph 20 requested All Documents maintained in the system of records known as Individual Master File (IMF) Treasury/IRS 24.030, which pertain to the Defendant. 30 The district court denied his motion without prejudice. The IMF was written in code, with numbers standing for events and procedures. Huebner contends that the district court's denial prevented him from effectively cross-examining a prosecution witness as to the accuracy of the IMF and its contents. He states that his counsel was unable to translate the document and was unaware of its evidentiary significance until trial, and that counsel could not possibly have known that the prosecution would make use of it. Huebner also contends that the court's ruling deprived him of his right to exculpatory evidence under Brady. 31 In response, the government states that, prior to trial, defense counsel had access to documents which translated the IMF into a readable form, as well as access to Certificates of Assessments and Payments, which had been prepared from the IMF and contained translations of its relevant information. Counsel's brief, although asserting generally that he had found inconsistencies in the IMF so great that the IMF document is literally fraudulent, and a fraud, a shame, a red herring, contains no description of any prejudicial use of the IMF at trial, and no demonstration of unfair prejudice nor that any information would have been exculpatory, so as to invoke Brady. 32 We find no error.
33 Examination of the record has satisfied us that there was ample evidence to support a jury verdict that both defendants were guilty of conspiracy to defraud the government. The evidence of repeated activity of each in carrying out what we have referred to as the Freeman pattern readily supports the inference that they agreed to participate with knowledge of the purpose. Setting out the detail of each piece of evidence would be an unnecessary exercise. Several overt acts were proved. 34 The conviction of defendant Huebner on the aiding and abetting counts is REVERSED, along with the special assessment for those counts. His conviction on Count One (conspiracy) is AFFIRMED. His sentence is VACATED, and the cause REVERSED for resentencing on Count One. 35 The conviction and sentence of defendant Williams are AFFIRMED. 36