Opinion ID: 169924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Scope of the Anti-Injunction Act's Relitigation Exception

Text: The Anti-Injunction Act provides that a federal court may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except in three circumstances: as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 28 U.S.C. § 2283. This case concerns the scope of the third circumstance, commonly known as the relitigation exception. Specifically, the question presented is whether the relitigation exception permits a federal court to protect and effectuate the full res judicata effect of its judgments that is, to bar state litigation of both claims actually raised in a prior federal action and those that could have been raised [3] or whether it covers only issues that the federal court actually decided.
For enlightenment on this question, we turn to the Supreme Court's opinion in Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 108 S.Ct. 1684, 100 L.Ed.2d 127 (1988). The case began when Leong Chong, a Singapore resident, was accidentally killed in that country while repairing a ship owned by Exxon. Chick Kam Choo, Chong's widow, sued Exxon in federal district court, asserting claims under the Jones Act, the Death on the High Seas Act, general federal maritime law, and the Texas wrongful death statute. Id. at 142, 108 S.Ct. 1684. The district court granted summary judgment in Exxon's favor on the federal statutory claims, finding them inapplicable to Mr. Chong. Id. at 143, 108 S.Ct. 1684. The court further concluded that, under federal choice-of-law principles, Singapore law must control the lawsuit. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment on the general maritime law claim and dismissed the remainder of the case on forum non conveniens grounds. Id. But instead of refiling the unadjudicated claims in Singapore, Ms. Choo filed suit in Texas state court, alleging the state law claim and a claim under Singapore law. Id. In response, Exxon brought a new action in federal court, wherein it procured an injunction barring Ms. Choo from commencing any . . . claims against [defendant] in the courts of . . . any. . state . . . arising out of or related to the alleged wrongful death of her husband. Id. at 144, 108 S.Ct. 1684. Ms. Choo appealed, contending that the injunction ran afoul of the Anti-Injunction Act. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court first explained the purpose of the AIA. The law is a necessary concomitant of the Framers' decision to authorize, and Congress' decision to implement, a dual system of federal and state courts. Id. at 146, 108 S.Ct. 1684. By prohibiting frequent federal court intervention in state court proceedings, the AIA forestalls . . . `friction between the state and federal courts.' Id. (quoting Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630-31, 97 S.Ct. 2881, 53 L.Ed.2d 1009 (1977)). But given the ultimate need to ensure the effectiveness and supremacy of federal law within this dual system, the AIA contains the above-noted exceptions. Id. Specifically, [t]he relitigation exception was designed to permit a federal court to prevent state litigation of an issue that previously was presented to and decided by the federal court. It is founded in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. at 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684. The Court turned to its prior decision in Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 90 S.Ct. 1739, 26 L.Ed.2d 234 (1970), as the best illustrat[ion] of the relitigation exception's proper scope. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684. In that case a railroad sought a federal injunction to prevent union picket activities. Id. The federal court refused, holding that the unions were `free to engage in self-help.' Id. (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 289, 90 S.Ct. 1739). The railroad then turned to state court, where it procured the desired injunction. Two years later, in an unrelated case, the Supreme Court held that federal statutory law prohibited state court injunctions of the type issued in favor of Atlantic Coast Lines. Accordingly, the union returned to federal district court and procured an injunction against enforcement of the original state court injunction. The federal district court read its earlier order as concluding that federal law preempted state interference with union self-help. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the district court had no authority to issue the injunction. Id. It rejected the district court's reading of the earlier order, finding that the `point [was] never argued to the court, [and] there [was] no language in the order that necessarily implies any decision on that question.' Id. at 148, 108 S.Ct. 1684 (quoting Atlantic Coast Line, 398 U.S. at 290, 90 S.Ct. 1739). In light of this holding, the Chick Kam Choo Court concluded: an essential prerequisite for applying the relitigation exception is that the claims or issues which the federal injunction insulates from litigation in state proceedings actually have been decided by the federal court. Moreover, Atlantic Coast Line illustrates this prerequisite is strict and narrow. The Court assessed the precise state of the record and what the earlier federal order actually said; it did not permit the District Court to render a post hoc judgment as to what the order was intended to say. Id. (first emphasis added). Applying this rule to Ms. Choo's case, the Court concluded that because Texas and federal forum non conveniens law differ, the issue of whether the Texas state courts are an appropriate forum for petitioner's Singapore law claims ha[d] not yet been litigated, and an injunction to foreclose consideration of that issue [was] not within the relitigation exception. Id. at 149, 108 S.Ct. 1684. In contrast, because the district court concluded that Singapore law must apply to the casea decision that necessarily preclude[d] the application of Texas lawthe validity of this claim was adjudicated in the original federal action. Id. at 150, 108 S.Ct. 1684. Accordingly, the relitigation exception permitted a federal injunction on that issue. Id. at 150-51, 108 S.Ct. 1684.
Since Chick Kam Choo, this Court has dealt with the AIA's relitigation exception three times, [4] but we have never squarely addressed its scope. [5] We do so now and, like the vast majority of circuits that have explicitly [6] or implicitly [7] considered this issue, conclude that Chick Kam Choo leaves little room for doubt: the AIA's third exception does not authorize a federal court to protect the full res judicata effect of its decisions. Instead, it authorizes injunctions against state adjudication of issues that actually have been decided by the federal court. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148, 108 S.Ct. 1684. The Ninth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that has rejected the majority reading of Chick Kam Choo and continues to apply the broader conception of the relitigation exception. See W. Sys., Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 868-71 (9th Cir.1992). Some commentators have also taken issue with the majority view. See, e.g., 17A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Edward H. Cooper & Vikram David Amar, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4226, at 120 n. 22 (3d ed. 2007) (The Chick Kam Choo opinion is ambiguous and does not show that a distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion was really considered or intended.); George A. Martinez, The Anti-Injunction Act: Fending Off the New Attack on the Relitigation Exception, 72 Neb. L.Rev. 643 (1993) (criticizing the majority view of Chick Kam Choo and suggesting an alternative reading of the case and the AIA). Admittedly, the Chick Kam Choo opinion contains language pointing both ways. The Court broadly stated that the relitigation exception is rooted in the well-recognized concepts of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 486 U.S. at 147, 108 S.Ct. 1684. Given that res judicata extends beyond claims actually decided and includes those that could have been raised, MACTEC, 427 F.3d at 831, this statement might be seen to conflict with the opinion's later statement that the exception applies only to claims or issues . . . actually . . . decided by the federal court. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 148, 108 S.Ct. 1684. As the Ninth Circuit explained: To read Choo as the other Circuits have . . . would in essence be to read res judicata entirely out of section 2283. Any issue which was actually litigated by the parties in a prior proceeding will be barred by collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), without any need to rely on res judicata (claim preclusion). Ulloa, 958 F.2d at 870. Be that as it may, we think Chick Kam Choo 's specific explication of the scope of the relitigation exception, along with the case's actual outcome (and that of Atlantic Coast Line ), leads to the conclusion that the relitigation exception does not encompass all aspects of claim preclusion. Whether or not this is the best interpretation of the statute, and whether or not this limitation undermines the rights that are supposed to attach to a federal judgment, see Martinez, supra, at 662-79, Chick Kam Choo says what it says, and we must follow it. In any event, we believe this interpretation is consistent with the dual purposes of the AIA: to respect comity while also ensur[ing] the effectiveness and supremacy of federal law. Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 146, 108 S.Ct. 1684. When a federal court affirmatively decides an issue, that decision is entitled to respect and finality. But when a federal court has not passed on a specific claim, the main concern raised by subsequent state litigation is harassment of the opposing party. That concern is not to be taken lightly, but it is the province of res judicata, a defense that a party is free to raise in the subsequent state-court suit, see Staffer, 878 F.2d at 643 (Here, the proper forum for a complete investigation of the res judicata effects of the district court's judgment is the state court. . . . )and that the state courts are presumed competent to resolve, Chick Kam Choo, 486 U.S. at 150, 108 S.Ct. 1684.