Opinion ID: 1223772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: R.C.P. 36(b) (emphasis added).

Text: Whether to permit withdrawal or amendment of an admission is a matter committed to the discretion of the court. I.R.C.P. 36(b). This is the rule in the federal system with respect to F.R.C.P. 36(b) where the trial court's decision to permit the withdrawal or amendment of an admission is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 999 v. C.I.T. Corp., 776 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir.1985); American Auto. Ass'n v. AAA Legal Clinic, 930 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir.1991). The conclusiveness of matters admitted pursuant to F.R.C.P. 36(b) applies equally to admissions made affirmatively and those made by default. American Auto., 930 F.2d at 1120. An admission that is not withdrawn or amended cannot be rebutted by contrary testimony or ignored by the district court simply because it finds the evidence presented by the party against whom the admission operates more credible. Id. The reasoning of these cases is persuasive and consistent with this Court's view of I.R.C.P. 36(b). The trial court allowed Lynn to contradict the admissions rather than treating the matters admitted as being conclusively established as provided for in I.R.C.P. 36(b). It is necessary to determine if this was a proper exercise of discretion. Two requirements must be met before an admission may be amended or withdrawn pursuant to Rule 36(b): (1) presentation of the merits must be promoted, and (2) the party who obtained the admission must not be prejudiced by the withdrawal. I.R.C.P. 36(b). Neither the magistrate nor the district court made a finding or ruled that the merits of this case would be promoted by withdrawing or amending the admissions. The Ninth Circuit has said that the first half of the Rule 36(b) test is satisfied when upholding the admissions would practically eliminate any presentation of the merits of the case. Hadley v. United States, 45 F.3d 1345, 1348 (1995). Issues in this case turn upon whether Lynn wrongfully, thorough the use of threat, obtained Ron's assent to the Agreement and quitclaim deed. Consequently, presentation of the merits was promoted by admitting testimony to contradict the untimely denied Requests for Admission. Prejudice as contemplated in F.R.C.P. 36(b) is `not simply that the party who obtained the admission will now have to convince the factfinder of its truth. Rather, it relates to the difficulty a party may face in proving its case, e.g., caused by the unavailability of key witnesses, because of the sudden need to obtain evidence' with respect to the questions previously deemed admitted. Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Brook Village N. Assoc. v. General Elec. Co., 686 F.2d 66, 70 (1st Cir.1982)). The party who obtained the admission has the burden of proving that withdrawal of the admission would prejudice the party's case. Id. Again, these federal decisions are persuasive and consistent with I.R.C.P. 36(b). The Court determined that no prejudice had occurred in Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 111 Idaho 536, 726 P.2d 648 (1985), where, [j]ust prior to trial, the plaintiffs made a motion to have the requests for admissions `discarded.' Id. at 544, 726 P.2d at 656. In that case, statements in depositions and interrogatories set out plaintiffs' position which adequately denied the substance of the requests for admissions submitted by the association. Id. Similarly, in the Ninth Circuit, [c]ases finding prejudice to support a denial generally show a ... [high] level of reliance on the admissions. Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1349. Where the motion for withdrawal is not made until the middle of the trial, prejudice has been found. Id. See 999, 776 F.2d at 869. On the first day of trial Ron's attorney requested that the statements made in the Requests for Admissions be admitted. Lynn's counsel responded: All I can suggest, Judge, is that I have filed a response. I don't see that the defense in this case is any way prejudiced by the response that I filed. I have admitted to the facts of almost all of the request for the admissions filed. I think in response there were, I think, two denials, with an explanation of what the denial was based upon. Ron's attorney responded: As I said, Judge, my request for admission went out February 1st. I did not receive a response until February 28th. And I prepared my case based on an untimely response of the defendant. So I'm here prepared under those circumstances. . . . I did not get a response [until] ... three days before trial. So I'm here, as I say, prepared to proceed under those assumptions as I stated in my memorandum. I don't care what his response is on the 28th, Judge. These statements by Ron's attorney do not show the requisite level of prejudice contemplated by I.R.C.P. 36(b). Ron has failed to carry his burden of showing that he would be faced with difficulty in proving his case due to unavailability of key witnesses or any other commensurate burden. Hadley, 45 F.3d at 1348. Ron was able to put on evidence that Lynn had threatened him. In fact the magistrate found that [t]he Defendant informed the Plaintiff that if he signed the deed that she would not call the police and that the Plaintiff would not lose his job. Ron was not prejudiced by the decision to allow contrary testimony.