Opinion ID: 1472872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Power to subpoena person from outside Baltimore City

Text: The appellants contend that since the landlord is not a Medicaid provider and is located outside Baltimore City, the Grand Jury of Baltimore City does not have the power to pursue the investigation of a county land holding company that is not a Medicaid provider. A skillful argument has been woven to the effect that what is being done here amounts to a special grand jury, with the contention made that proposals for such grand juries have been rejected in the past. In Circuit Administrative Judges of Maryland, A Handbook for Grand Jurors in Maryland § 11 (1976), it is stated in pertinent part: As a part of your duties as an accusatory body, acting upon evidence presented, you have general inquisitorial powers to inquire into abuses and evils which may exist generally within your jurisdictions. You are entitled to take notice of any matter of public danger or abuse, to inquire into it, and to make public your findings with regard to it. For this purpose you have the right to call before you any public official or private citizen in furtherance of your inquiry. Id. at 11. This advice for prospective grand jurors is in line with the charge to grand juries given by many judges over the years to the effect that their power of inquiry ordinarily gives them the right to summon before them any person in the State. Appellants' arguments on the power to subpoena witnesses from counties beyond that in which the grand jury is sitting confuse the power to subpoena a witness with the legality of a subsequent indictment. The authority to return an indictment rests with the grand jury of the county in which the offense occurred, absent contrary statutory authorization. 1 J. Bishop, New Criminal Procedure § 859, 495-96 (1895). Maryland follows this principle. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 85 Md. 231, 233, 36 A. 823 (1897), and Parrish v. State, 14 Md. 238 (1859). See also McBurney v. State, 280 Md. 21, 371 A.2d 129 (1977), and Urciolo v. State, 272 Md. 607, 325 A.2d 878 (1974), discussing venue of circuit courts to try criminal cases. The discussion of venue in these two cases logically parallels the question of grand jury authority to indict. In McBurney Judge Orth said for the Court: There are two facets to the jurisdiction of a court  jurisdiction over the subject matter and venue. With respect to the subject matter, within its county, a circuit court of this State has full common law jurisdiction in all criminal cases committed in Maryland except where limited by law. Maryland Code (1974) Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article § 1-501. Venue, however, is the place of trial, or where a criminal trial may properly occur. Jurisdiction in this sense relates only to the place where either party may require the case to be tried and unless `venue' is given jurisdictional effect by being a localized action, the question of jurisdiction of subject matter is not presented. The case here may be resolved on the issue of whether the venue was properly laid. Jurisdiction of the subject matter is not involved. `At common law criminal offenses were tried by a jury of the county where the offense was committed.' Kisner v. State, 209 Md. 524, 529, 122 A.2d 102 (1956), citing 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries . See 1 Wharton's Criminal Procedure (12th ed. 1974) § 36 (hereinafter cited as Wharton); L. Hochheimer, Law of Crimes and Criminal Procedure (1st ed. 1897) § 75.... In Kisner we gave a comprehensive history of the venue of the circuit courts of this State in criminal cases. 209 Md. at 529-536. We found the common law rule, that the proper venue of a crime is the county of commission, to be the general rule in Maryland. It is widely recognized, however, that in the absence of any limitation by constitutional provision, the power of the legislature to fix the venue of criminal prosecution in a county other than that in which the crime was committed is unrestricted. 1 Wharton § 36. Kisner pointed to a number of statutes in which the General Assembly of Maryland had prescribed the place of trial, and noted cases in which the Court of Appeals had construed statutes as authorizing trial in a county other than the one in which the crime was committed.... Kisner concluded that the common law necessity for trial in the county of the commission of the crime is not a fundamental right or requirement. Id., at 531. 280 Md. at 31-32. The power to compel attendance of witnesses is broader in scope than the issue of place of trial. The grand jury in Maryland, having plenary inquisitorial power, cannot be limited to witnesses located solely in the particular county where the offense occurred. Because the grand jury must use the power of the court to issue and enforce subpoenas, a study of the supervising court's power is appropriate. There is no Maryland prohibition against commanding the attendance of witnesses at a trial where the witnesses reside outside the county of trial. Code (1974) § 1-501, Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides: The circuit courts are the highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction within the State. Each has full common-law and equity powers and jurisdiction in all civil and criminal cases within its county, and all the additional powers and jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and by law, except where by law jurisdiction has been limited or conferred exclusively upon another tribunal. The criminal jurisdiction of the grand jury regarding offenses committed in its county parallels this section. Section 6-102(a) provides:  Basis of personal jurisdiction.  A court may exercise personal jurisdiction as to any cause of action over a person domiciled in, served with process in, organized under the laws of, or who maintains his principal place of business in the State. Section 9-202 provides for compensation of witnesses at specified rates. Subsection (c) (2) relative to Baltimore City specifically states, A witness who resides outside the city limits is allowed itinerant charges. Moreover, § 9-202 (a) allows itinerant charges to witnesses from other principal county subdivisions. These statutory provisions leave no doubt as to the propriety of securing witnesses from other counties. The grand jury possesses powers and duties coextensive with the jurisdiction of the court of which it is an integral part. S. Thompson & E. Merriam, A Treatise On the Organization, Custody and Conduct of Juries, § 604 (1882). These authors go on to discuss general inquisitorial powers in § 615, stating that in England the grand jury was `returned to inquire of all offences in general in the county, determinable by the court into which they are returned,' referring to Serjeant Hawkins' definition of an indictment. (Emphasis theirs.) Inter-county jurisdiction in compelling witnesses to attend grand jury hearings was not unknown to our English ancestral grand juries. See 1 J. Chitty, A Practical Treatise On the Criminal Law -21 (1819), and The King Against G. Ring, 8 T.R. (Durnford & East) 585 (1800). A situation somewhat analogous to the case at bar was before the court in Samish v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. App.2d 685, 83 P.2d 305 (1938). In that case a grand jury was investigating charges against state legislators pertaining to lobbying, bribery, and conspiracy. A writ of prohibition was sought to restrain the grand jury and the prosecuting officers of Sacramento County from obtaining possession by subpoena or otherwise of copies of petitioner's income tax returns for certain years and from compelling a disclosure of the contents thereof. The court there said: It is not necessary that formal charges of specific offenses shall first be made against particular named individuals to authorize a grand jury to institute an investigation thereof. One of the chief purposes of a grand jury is to investigate and ascertain whether crimes have been committed within the borders of its county and to institute criminal prosecutions thereof. A grand jury is not deprived of jurisdiction to investigate asserted public offenses merely because its members are uncertain as to whether a crime was actually committed, whether it was really committed within the borders of the county, or because of a lack of identity of the particular individual who perpetrated the crime. If it should develop after a thorough investigation by a grand jury that the alleged crime was really committed in another county that does not render the proceedings invalid or void, but merely precludes the presenting of an indictment therefor in that county. 28 Cal. App. at 688. It must not be forgotten that, as Justice Stewart pointed out for the Court in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 15-16, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973), a sufficient basis for an indictment may only emerge at the end of the investigation when all the evidence has been received. He went on to quote for the Court in that case from Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 26 S.Ct. 370, 50 L.Ed. 652 (1906): It is impossible to conceive that ... the examination of witnesses must be stopped until a basis is laid by an indictment formally preferred, when the very object of the examination is to ascertain who shall be indicted. 201 U.S. at 65. The Court ended its opinion in Dionisio by stating: Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws. Cf. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532-533; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363-364; Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327-328. The grand jury may not always serve its historic role as a protective bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor, but if it is even to approach the proper performance of its constitutional mission, it must be free to pursue its investigations unhindered by external influence or supervision so long as it does not trench upon the legitimate rights of any witness called before it. 410 U.S. at 17-18 (footnote omitted).