Opinion ID: 1250599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does smith's false imprisonment escape governmental immunity?

Text: We next deal with the issue raised in Smith as to whether an intentional tort, such as false imprisonment, [10] is an exception to governmental immunity either because it is not included within the meaning of the word tort in § 7 of the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401 et seq.; MSA 3.996(101) et seq., or because it is not an exercise of a governmental function under § 7 of that act. [11] Section 7 of the governmental immunity act provided: Except as in this act otherwise provided, all governmental agencies shall be immune from tort liability in all cases wherein the government agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Except as otherwise provided herein, this act shall not be construed as modifying or restricting the immunity of the state from tort liability as it existed heretofore, which immunity is affirmed. [MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107).][ [12] ] A plaintiff must plead facts in his complaint in avoidance of immunity, indicating that the alleged tort falls outside the protection afforded by sovereign or governmental immunity. See Ross v Consumers Power (On Rehearing), 420 Mich 567, 621, n 34; 363 NW2d 641 (1984); Galli v Kirkeby, 398 Mich 527, 532, 540-541; 248 NW2d 149 (1976); McCann v Michigan, 398 Mich 65, 77; 247 NW2d 521 (1976) (opinion of RYAN, J.). [13] This may be accomplished by stating a claim which fits within one of the statutory exceptions or pleading facts which demonstrate that the tort occurred during the exercise or discharge of a non-governmental or proprietary function. [ Ross, supra at 621, n 34.] Mr. Smith's claim of false imprisonment, however, does not fit within one of the statutory exceptions to the governmental immunity act. [14] Therefore, the facts of his complaint must demonstrate that the state defendants' actions in falsely imprisoning him did not involve the exercise or discharge of a governmental function unless, of course, there is a specific exemption for an intentional tort. The Court of Claims in granting summary judgment for defendant recognized no such exception for an intentional tort, finding that an act may be an exercise or discharge of a governmental function even though it amounts to an intentional tort. That court further held: [T]he Court is of the opinion the alleged confinement is protected by governmental immunity. The care, treatment, and custody of Plaintiff, whether as a ward of the state at a state orphanage or mental facility, were governmental functions. The MHTS transfer and confinement of Plaintiff in furtherance of his care and treatment were sufficiently related to the custodial function of the orphanage or mental facility to be in the exercise or discharge of these governmental functions.... There exists no allegation that Plaintiff's confinement resulted from a malicious or improper motive completely unrelated to the treatment and care of Plaintiff. See McCann, supra . Nor does the intentional tort alleged reach the assaultive level of obviously unlawful conduct found in Kriger [ v South Oakland Co Mutual Aid Pact, 399 Mich 835; 250 NW2d 67 (1977), rev'g 49 Mich App 7 (1973)] or Lockaby [ v Wayne Co, 406 Mich 65; 276 NW2d 1 (1979)]. The Court of Appeals, however, reversed, remanding the false imprisonment claim to the parties for reformulation of their pleadings consistent with its test that unjustified intentional acts did not constitute the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Thus, whenever a plaintiff in a complaint alleges an intentional tort, a defendant may answer arguing that the allegation should be dismissed due to governmental immunity because the action was justified under the particular facts of the case. If the plaintiff does not contest these facts, the allegation would subsequently be dismissed. However, if the plaintiff does contest the facts underlying the justification, the case would proceed to trial. [ Smith, supra at 346.] We agree with the reasoning of the Court of Claims; no intentional tort exception exists, and an act may be [the] exercise or discharge of a governmental function even though it results in an intentional tort. As will be seen, a majority of this Court has never expressly recognized an intentional tort exception to the governmental immunity act. [15] But, in several cases involving intentional torts, the Court has allowed suit to proceed against the state or local agency despite the presence of governmental immunity. In McCann v Michigan, supra , the plaintiff, a newspaper publisher, instituted suit against the State of Michigan, its Department of Mental Health, and the Traverse City State Hospital, alleging that hospital officials and employees wilfully and maliciously engaged in a campaign to destroy plaintiff's newspaper business. Plaintiff McCann filed suit for damages against the state in the Court of Claims, alleging various intentional torts, including interference with existing and future economic relations, libel, slander, and defamation. The Court of Claims, however, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of governmental immunity, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. This Court, though issuing four separate opinions, reversed and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals, unanimously agreeing that the activities involved did not constitute the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. However, not one member of the Court rested a decision on an explicit intentional tort exception to the governmental immunity act. Chief Justice KAVANAGH and Justice LEVIN concluded that the governmental immunity act did not apply because the day-to-day operation of a hospital did not constitute a governmental function.