Opinion ID: 2586281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Motion to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing or Exclude Statements of Jailhouse Informants

Text: Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to hold an evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of the jailhouse informants' statements, or to exclude them. He asserts the error denied him due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [12] As discussed below, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying the motion.
Defendant contends that Evidence Code section 402 and the federal due process clause required the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the admissibility of Jimenez's testimony. Evidence Code section 400 et seq., sets forth the rules for determining the existence or nonexistence of a preliminary fact when the parties dispute its existence. A `preliminary fact' means a fact based upon the existence or nonexistence of which depends the admissibility or inadmissibility of evidence. (Evid.Code, ง 400.) Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b), provides in relevant part: [I]n a criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the question of the admissibility of a confession or admission of the defendant out of the presence and hearing of the jury, if any party so requests. (Italics added.) But subdivision (b) of Evidence Code section 402 does not mandate, as defendant appears to contend, that a court must hold an evidentiary hearing on request. Subdivision (b) states only that if a court holds an evidentiary hearing concerning the admissibility of a confession or admission, then it must do so outside the presence of the jury, if any party so requests. The pretrial defense motions asserted that jailhouse informants were inherently unreliable, but raised no preliminary fact concerning the admissibility of Jimenez's testimony beyond the undisputed fact that he was a jailhouse informant. Defendant's challenges to the reliability of the jailhouse informants therefore went to the weight of their testimony rather than its admissibility (Evid.Code, ง 351), which the trial court correctly concluded in denying the motion by stating: Jailhouse informants may not be the most trustworthy and perhaps believable individuals, but if there is competency to testify, they may testify. Therefore, at the time the trial court ruled on the defense's in limine motions, the defense had raised no admissibility issues concerning Jimenez that warranted an evidentiary hearing. [13] Nor was the trial court required to hold an evidentiary hearing on federal due process grounds. Defendant correctly notes that under Evidence Code sections 402 and 405, the voluntariness of a confession is a preliminary fact that a trial judge must determine before the confession may be submitted to the jury. ( People v. Rowe (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 1023, 1029, 99 Cal.Rptr. 816.) In addition, under the federal due process clause, a defendant has a right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of his confession's voluntariness. ( Jackson v. Denno (1964) 378 U.S. 368, 376-377, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908; People v. Bennett (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 230, 236, 129 Cal.Rptr. 679.) Although the Jimenez statements reported Alvarado's admissions, defense counsel never raised the issue of the voluntariness of Alvarado's admissions to Jimenez. Rather, defense counsel claimed Jimenez's statements were inherently unreliable because Jimenez was a jailhouse informant. Therefore, the due process cases defendant cites are inapplicable.
Defendant next contends the court should have excluded Jimenez's statements under Evidence Code section 352, and as a matter of federal due process. [14] Defendant asserts that jailhouse informant testimony is inherently unreliable, so that any probative value is outweighed by the testimony's prejudicial impact. Referring to the observations of state and federal courts ( People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603, 617-618, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 701, 12 P.3d 1110; In re Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 945, 957, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 269, 838 P.2d 1222; Commonwealth of Northern Mariana Islands v. Bowie (9th Cir.2001) 243 F.3d 1109, 1114-1116), defendant seeks to document the unreliability inherent in jailhouse informant statements, and relies on many items outside the record on appeal. Defendant has cited authorities indicating that courts are aware of reliability issues concerning jailhouse informants. But we have consistently rejected claims that the testimony of jailhouse informants is inherently unreliable. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1165, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Nothing defendant presents here causes us to reconsider this conclusion. The abuse of discretion standard of review applies to any trial court ruling on the admissibility of evidence. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113, 40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321 ( Guerra ).) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate due process in denying defendant's motion to exclude the jailhouse informants' testimony.