Opinion ID: 1106169
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: the lower court's excessive involvement in the case for the prosecution constituted reversible error.

Text: Ladner complains of five instances where the judge wrongfully assisted the prosecution during the trial. They follow: (1) The prosecutor was questioning Anthony Schwankhart about the night that the police came to search his house for Ladner's gun and the prosecutor was unable to find the Consent to Search document. In an effort to speed the trial up, the trial judge instructed him to go ahead and ask Schwankhart about the document and introduce it later. The prosecutor found the document and had it marked State's Exhibit 4 for identification. (2) The prosecutor attempted to introduce into evidence a picture of Barnes' mother, the victim. Defense counsel objected to its introduction and the trial judge sustained the objection, explaining his reasoning for doing so. The defense objected to the explanation. (3) During the testimony of Delbert Seay, the prosecutor was attempting to introduce a sketch of the rooms in the victim's mobile home prepared by Jim Odom. Chief Investigator Delbert Seay had helped Odom in taking the proper measurements, but he did not draw the sketch himself. Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the sketch and requested an opportunity to voir dire the witness. At the conclusion, the lower court asked the question, Does it fairly and accurately depict the scene and condition as it existed on the date and time in question? The witness answered that it did. Counsel for the defense objected to the question by the court. (4) Investigator Seay was testifying about the night he went to Schwankhart's home to search for Ladner's gun. The trial judge sustained defense counsel's objection to leading, but in an attempt to speed up the trial, he asked Seay the question: What, if anything, did you do once you reached the door? Counsel for Ladner objected that the court was telling the prosecutor how to ask questions without leading. (5) During the testimony of Investigator Delbert Seay, Ladner's counsel moved for a mistrial after the judge called a bench conference and instructed counsel for the State to, in essence, be careful of where he was going because he was about to open up something that might be dangerous to him. The judge instructed the prosecutor to approach the witness and tell the witness not to say a certain thing that might prejudice the jury; and in full view of the jury, the prosecutor approached the witness at the witness chair and whispered in his ear in the presence of the jury and then stepped back and asked him the question. Ladner relies on West v. State, 519 So.2d 418 (Miss. 1988). The case is distinguishable from the case at bar. In West, this Court found thirty (30) instances where the trial judge improperly, or unnecessarily, interjected himself into the proceedings. Id. at 421. The instances included coaching the district attorney, questioning a witness when the district attorney's questions were ineffective, and commenting on the evidence. Id. We recognize that a trial judge must be careful not to influence the jury and have said so on numerous occasions: It is a matter of common knowledge that jurors . .. are very susceptible to the influence of the judge.... [J]urors watch closely his conduct, and give attention to his language, that they may, if possible, ascertain his leaning to one side or the other, which, if known, often largely influences their verdict. He cannot be too careful and guarded in language and conduct in the presence of the jury, to avoid prejudice to either party. Green v. State, 97 Miss. 834, 838, 53 So. 415, 416 (1910). See also West at 422-23; Thompson v. State, 468 So.2d 852, 854 (Miss. 1985). We have carefully read the record with reference to the complaints here made by Ladner as to the trial judge's conduct of those matters. We are of the opinion that neither singly nor collectively do they constitute reversible error. The most egregious incident occurred when the trial judge instructed the prosecutor to whisper in the witness' ear not to mention a certain item in the presence of the jury. It is apparent, however, that he foresaw the possibility that the witness might blurt out a prejudicial statement and he was attempting to insure the defendant a fair trial by not permitting the witness to insert prejudicial matters into the record. The better procedure would have been to excuse the jury, hear the questions and answers in the jury's absence, ascertain whether or not the defense had objection, and then rule upon the objection. We emphasize that trial judges must not leave any impression with the jury that they are partisan to either side of a case. The appearance of fairness and non-partiality must surround every situation in a trial, even though they may result in delay of the trial. The issue is resolved against the appellant.