Opinion ID: 2624953
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: cross-examination of appellant regarding prior convictions

Text: [¶ 73] Appellant argues that the district court erred in not granting his motion for a mistrial after the State asked appellant on cross-examination if he had been convicted of felonies twice in the past. Appellant's argument emphasizes the district court's failure, once it decided to strike the question, to instruct the jury as to the implications of what striking a question had to do with their deliberations. Regarding the mistrial motion, appellant argues that the jury was able to follow the line of questioning which led to a deliberate question regarding inadmissible testimony which had dire implications for Appellant. Based on this alone, the district court should have granted the mistrial. Appellant does not argue that the State's question violated a pretrial order. [¶ 74] The question at issue occurred in the following context: Q. You also made a statement to the paramedic that you don't use illegal drugs? A. That's correct. Q. Even though we found all thiswe found this marijuana in your system? A. That'syeahthat is claimed, yes. But I do notif you'd like me to clarify, I can on that. Q. Well, do you use illegal drugs? A. No, I do not. Q. Did you state that to the paramedic? A. Yes, I did. Q. But, in fact, sir, you have been convicted of felonies twice in the past, have you not? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, may we approach? The district court held a hearing outside the jury's presence on the admissibility of the convictions pursuant to W.R.E. 609 [14] (appellant's counsel having entered a timely objection). The parties disputed whether the convictions were more than ten years old and whether the State had provided adequate notice of its intent to use the convictions as impeachment evidence. After researching the issue, the district court ultimately decided to exclude the evidence (it was a tough matter, a close call in some ways) and proceed as best I can to simply rule on the pending objection and strike the question from consideration by the jury. The district court also denied appellant's mistrial motion, and then stated in the jury's presence: THE COURT: When we broke, we had an objection pending, and I'm going to sustain the objection and strike the last question that was pending at the time we broke for lunch. You may proceed. [¶ 75] The decision to grant a mistrial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Absent a clear abuse of discretion that prejudices the defendant, a decision not to grant a mistrial will not be reversed. DeLeon v. State, 894 P.2d 608, 612 (Wyo.1995). Granting a mistrial is an extreme and drastic remedy that should be resorted to only in the face of an error so prejudicial that justice could not be served by proceeding with trial. Warner v. State, 897 P.2d 472, 474 (Wyo. 1995). The trial court is in the best position to assess the prejudicial impact of such error. Id. [¶ 76] The district court did act to cure any prejudice that resulted from the State's question. After hearing both parties' arguments on the merits of admitting such evidence (a close call in some ways), the district court sustained appellant's objection and struck the question. While it may have been advisable to give a more thorough curative instruction, and recognizing that the district court is in the best position to assess prejudicial impact, the jury was instructed at the trial's outset that if any evidence is admitted and afterwards is ordered by me to be stricken out, you must disregard entirely the matter thus stricken. And if any counsel intimates by any of his questions that certain hinted facts are or are not true, you must disregard any such intimation and must not draw any inference from it. We presume that the jury followed its instructions. Ramirez v. State, 739 P.2d 1214, 1220 (Wyo.1987). Under these circumstances, the district court did not clearly abuse its discretion in denying appellant's mistrial motion. [¶ 77] Affirmed.