Opinion ID: 1622307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for McBride.

Text: ¶ 6. This Court conducts a de novo review of a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment. Smith v. Gilmore Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 952 So.2d 177, 180 (Miss.2007) (quoting Brown v. J.J. Ferguson Sand & Gravel Co., 858 So.2d 129, 130 (Miss.2003)). The moving party is granted judgment `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Smith, 952 So.2d at 180 (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). Although summary judgment, in whole or in part, must be granted with great caution, it is mandated where the respondent has failed `to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.' Smith, 952 So.2d at 180 (quoting Brown, 444 So.2d at 363; Wilbourn v. Stennett, Wilkinson & Ward, 687 So.2d 1205, 1214 (Miss.1996)). ¶ 7. In granting summary judgment for McBride, the trial court found that Julie had essentially talked herself right out of court. Prior to Mabus I, the trial court had denied McBride's motion for summary judgment on the fraudulent-concealment claim. At that time, Julie had asserted in an affidavit that had she known she was being taped, she would have responded differently or refused to participate in the conversation. But on remand from Mabus I, Julie gave a deposition and submitted an affidavit in which she stated that she suspected Ray was taping her. [2] Significantly, Julie confirmed that her suspicions arose shortly into the meeting. The trial court found that these concessions showed that Julie was not prevented from discovering the tape recording; and therefore, she could not establish one of the necessary elements for a cause of action based on fraudulent concealment. ¶ 8. Julie claims that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for McBride, and that it applied an incorrect legal test to reach its conclusion. She submits that the trial court failed to apply the proper elements of fraudulent concealment as set forth in Mabus I. ¶ 9. In Mabus I, this Court explained fraudulent concealment as follows: ... [T]he plaintiff must prove (1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth, (5) his intent that it should be acted on by the hearer and in the manner reasonably contemplated, (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity, (7) his reliance on its truth, (8) his right to rely thereon, and (9) his consequent and proximate injury. Furthermore, under Mississippi law, these elements must be shown by clear and convincing evidence.... [I]n order for there to be liability for nondisclosure, silence must relate to a material fact or matter known to the party and as to which it is his legal duty to communicate to the other contracting party. An affirmative act of concealment is necessary. Mabus I, 884 So.2d at 762 (citations omitted). The trial court, however, relied on Phillips v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co., 36 F.Supp.2d 345, 348 (S.D.Miss.1998) (quoting Davidson v. Rogers, 431 So.2d 483, 485 (Miss.1983)) which states three requirements for fraudulent concealmentthe plaintiff must show that the defendant (1) took some action, affirmative in nature; (2) that was designed or intended to prevent; and (3) which did prevent the plaintiff's discovery of the facts giving rise to a claim of fraud. Phillips, 36 F.Supp.2d at 348 (quoting Davidson, 431 So.2d at 485). ¶ 10. Although Mabus I further expounds on the elements of fraudulent concealment, there is nothing inherently wrong or inconsistent with the test used by the trial court. Mabus I incorporates the three elements stated in Phillips and Davidson. Therefore, we find that the standard employed by trial court was not improper per se. [3] ¶ 11. Turning to the basis of the trial court's decision, we disagree with its finding that no genuine issue of material fact exists regarding Julie's knowledge of the recording. It is true that Julie stated in her deposition that she suspected or figured that the conversation was being recorded. But in her affidavit, she explained further that she quickly dismissed these thoughts because she did not believe that McBride would participate in or condone such actions. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Julie, it is plausible that she merely suspected, but did not seriously believe or know, that the conversation was being taped. ¶ 12. Despite our disagreement with the trial court's rationale, we find summary judgment proper for a more fundamental reasonJulie is unable to establish that McBride had a legal duty to disclose any knowledge he had of the recording. In order to be liable for nondisclosure, a party must have had a legal duty to communicate a known material fact. Mabus I, 884 So.2d at 762 (citing Guastella v. Wardell, 198 So.2d 227, 230 (Miss. 1967)). Thus, nondisclosure in itself, even if fraudulent, does not give rise to a legal claim. The party must have concealed something that he or she was legally required to disclose. This Court previously found that no fiduciary relationship existed between Julie and McBride. Mabus I, 884 So.2d at 761. A fiduciary relationship requires that both parties understood that a special trust and confidence was being reposed. Id. at 758 citing Lowery v. Guar. Bank & Trust Co., 592 So.2d 79, 84 (Miss. 1991). It is clear, however, that Julie was not dependent upon McBride, nor did she repose any trust or confidence in him. Mabus I, 884 So.2d at 759. Nothing resembling a marital counseling session ever occurred. Id. at 761. In the absence of a fiduciary relationship, and with no other legal duty apparent from the record, we find that Julie's claim of fraudulent concealment against McBride must fail. [4] ¶ 13. For the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment for McBride on the fraudulent-concealment claim.