Opinion ID: 173641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Sixth Amendment right to a public trial

Text: We are informed on this issue by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Presley, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 721, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, as well as by our own circuit precedents, particularly Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48 (1st Cir.2007). Presley was not decided until after Appellants were convicted, but Owens dates back to the year before the present trial. We begin with the facts of Presley for reasons which will become obvious. At the commencement of Presley's case, and shortly before jury selection was about to start, the trial judge excluded Presley's uncle from the courtroom, who at the time was the only member of the public present for the proceedings. The judge told the uncle he was welcome to come back after jury selection was completed, but [could not] sit out in the audience with the jurors. Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 722. Presley's lawyer objected to the exclusion of the public from the courtroom, but the court explained, [t]here just isn't space for them to sit in the audience. Id. To counsel's insistence that some accommodation be reached, the court responded that the uncle can certainly come back in once the trial starts. There's no, really no real need for the uncle to be present during jury selection. . . . Id. The court went on to point out that the seats in the audience would be occupied by the jurors and [Presley's] uncle cannot sit and intermingle with members of the jury panel. Id. The court restated that the uncle would be allowed back once the trial started. Presley was convicted, and in post-trial motions he moved for a new trial based on the exclusion of the public during the voir dire. In the course of the hearing on the motion, Presley presented evidence to the effect that fourteen of the prospective jurors could have been seated in the jury box and the remaining twenty-eight could have fit entirely on one side of the courtroom, leaving adequate room for the public. Nevertheless, the court was not convinced, and the motion for new trial was denied, with the court commenting that it preferred to sit jurors throughout the entirety of the courtroom. Id. Georgia's appellate court found no abuse of discretion by the trial judge, and the state supreme court affirmed this conclusion, ruling that Presley was obliged to present the court with any alternatives that he wished the court to consider; in the absence of which there [was] no abuse of discretion in the court's failure to sua sponte advance its own alternatives. Presley v. State, 285 Ga. 270, 674 S.E.2d 909, 912 (2009). The United States Supreme Court reversed the Georgia courts. In so doing, the Court was pristinely clear that the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial extends to the jury voir dire process. Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 724. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that although the right to a public trial is not absolute, and may give way in certain cases to other rights or interests, such as the defendant's right to a fair trial or the government's interest in inhibiting disclosure of sensitive information, [s]uch circumstances will be rare . . . and the balance of interests must be struck with special care. Id. at 724 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 45, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984)). The Court, citing to the standards announced in Waller, then explained that before excluding the public from any stage of a criminal trial, id. (emphasis added): [1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceedings, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure. Id. (citing 467 U.S. at 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210). In Owens, we similarly stressed that closure may be justified only by `an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest,' and held that a court must consider (and reject) alternatives to closure before barring public access. 483 F.3d at 61-62 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted). Expounding further on this Sixth Amendment right, the Presley Court explained that `[t]he process of juror selection is itself a matter of importance, not simply to the adversaries but to the criminal justice system. The public has a right to be present whether or not any party has asserted the right.' Presley, 130 S.Ct. at 724-25 (quoting Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 505, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984)(holding that press has First Amendment right to free access to a public trial, including during voir dire)). The Presley court went on to describe the nature of the trial court's duty in this respect, in language particularly apropos to the concerns expressed by the district judge in the present case: Trial courts are obligated to take every reasonable measure to accommodate public attendance at criminal trials. . . . Without knowing the precise circumstances, some possibilities include reserving one or more rows for the public; dividing the jury venire panel to reduce courtroom congestion; or instructing prospective jurors not to engage or interact with audience members. . . . The generic risk of jurors over-hearing prejudicial remarks, unsubstantiated by any specific threat or incident, is inherent whenever members of the public are present during the selection of jurors. If broad concerns of this sort were sufficient to override a defendant's constitutional right to a public trial, a court could exclude the public from jury selection almost as a matter of course. Id. at 725.