Opinion ID: 77916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Regulation to Scheerer

Text: Scheerer next argues that due process required the BIA to consider his motion to reopen under the law as it existed at the time of our remand, rather than under the amended regulation. Relying on cases in which courts have declined to apply new rules of law to prior conduct, Scheerer contends that the BIA's decisions involve an improper retroactive application of the amended regulation to his case. Relatedly, Scheerer and the amicus also contend that the BIA's application of the amended regulation violates our Scheerer I remand instructions. We review the BIA's denial of a motion to reopen and its denial of a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion. Abdi v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 430 F.3d 1148, 1149 (11th Cir.2005) (per curiam); Assa'ad v. United States Att'y Gen., 332 F.3d 1321, 1341 (11th Cir.2003). To the extent that the BIA's decisions were based on a legal determination, our review is de novo. Li v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 488 F.3d 1371, 1374 (11th Cir.2007) (per curiam). However, we defer to the BIA's interpretation of the regulations governing it if the interpretation . . . is reasonable and does not contradict the clear intent of Congress. Silva v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 448 F.3d 1229, 1243 (11th Cir.2006). Scheerer's due process argument fails for two reasons. First, the amended 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1) does not have retroactive effect. A statute or administrative regulation does not operate retroactively merely because it applies to prior conduct; rather a statute or regulation has retroactive effect if `would impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase [his] liability for past conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed.' Ga. Power Co. v. Teleport Commc'ns Atlanta, Inc., 346 F.3d 1033, 1043 (11th Cir.2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1505, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)). Jurisdictional statutes and regulations speak to the power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the parties, Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 (internal quotation marks omitted), and therefore are generally not considered impermissibly retroactive. See Labojewski Gonzales, 407 F.3d 814, 819 (7th Cir.2005); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer; 520 U.S. 939, 951, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 1878, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997) (Statutes merely addressing which court shall have jurisdiction to entertain a particular cause of action can fairly be said merely to regulate the secondary conduct of litigation and not the underlying primary conduct of the parties.). As discussed above, the amended 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(a)(1) merely defines the jurisdiction of the immigration courts in relation to that of USCIS. Therefore, applying this regulation to Scheerer's motion takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case. Landgraf 511 U.S. at 274, 114 S.Ct. at 1502 (internal quotation marks omitted). While such application may upset[] expectations based in prior law, id. at 269, 114 S.Ct. at 1499 (alteration and emphasis added), it does not impair any of Scheerer's rights or otherwise operate retroactively. [9] Second, Scheerer cannot prevail on his due process claim because he has no constitutionally protected interest in purely discretionary forms of relief. To establish due process violations in removal proceedings, aliens must show that they were deprived of liberty without duo process of law, and that the asserted errors caused them substantial prejudice. Lonyem v. United States Att'y Gen., 352 F.3d 1338, 1341-42 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam). The decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider is within the discretion of the BIA, 8 C.F.R. § 10T;.2(a), and we have recognized that this discretion is very broad. Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir.1999) (per curiam). Adjustment of an alien's status likewise is a discretionary form of relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). We have held that the failure to receive relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation of a liberty interest. Garcia v. Att'y Gen., 329 F.3d 1217, 1224 (11th Cir.2003) (per curiam), Because Scheerer has no constitutionally protected interest either in the granting of his motions or in adjustment of status, he cannot establish a due process violation based on the BIA's decisions. We likewise reject the argument that the BIA's application of the amended regulation to this case violates our remand instructions in Scheerer I. In those instructions, we did not order the BIA to reopen proceedings or to remand Scheerer's case to an IJ for adjudication of his adjustment application. We merely directed the BIA to conduct further proceedings consistent with [our] opinion. Scheerer I, 445 F.3d at 1322. The BIA complied with this requirement, as neither of its orders relied on the invalidated 8 C.F.R. § 1245.2(c)(8) or otherwise conflicted with our decision. Scheerer I in no way precluded the BIA from relying on the amended regulation, which, as noted, was expressly made applicable to all cases pending administrative or judicial review on or after May 12, 2006. While our opinion established that Scheerer could not be declared ineligible for adjustment of status based on the mere fact of removal proceedings, id., it did not create any requirement that his adjustment application be adjudicated by an immigration court.