Opinion ID: 2207921
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence on Christianson's undue influence.

Text: Roger Christianson likewise urges error in the trial court's failure to sustain his motion for a directed verdict on the issue of his undue influence. Like the trial court, however, we are convinced from a review of the record that substantial evidence was produced on each of the elements essential to plaintiff's proof, i.e., susceptibility, opportunity, disposition, and result. See In re Estate of Davenport, 346 N.W.2d at 532. As previously noted, the question of Patricia's susceptibility to influence cannot be seriously contested. Not only did plaintiff offer expert opinion on this matter, five other witnesses described her as easily influenced. Included in this number was Orville Witte, the only man with whom Patricia enjoyed a serious relationship. He testified that she could be influenced by anyone showing her attention. As for opportunity to exercise influence, Roger Christianson's role as conservator gave him first hand knowledge of Patricia's financial affairs, placing him in regular contact with her, and reposing her confidence and trust in him. After conferring with Patricia concerning the contents of her last will, he personally secured the scrivener (an attorney previously unknown to Patricia) and delivered to him an outline of the proposed instrument, expecting the will to be drawn from those notes. The evidence reveals that when the attorney insisted on a personal interview with Patricia at the nursing home, Christianson arranged to be present and left Patricia's side only at counsel's request. He personally picked up the original and one copy of the will at the attorney's office that same day. On the question of Christianson's disposition to unduly influence Patricia for the purpose of procuring an improper benefit for himself, plaintiff offered three pieces of significant circumstantial evidence. First, Christianson was knowledgeable in the behavior of the mentally ill, having been educated as a recreational therapist for the mentally handicapped prior to assuming his role as officer in his family's bank corporation. Second, Christianson served simultaneously as conservator for both Patricia and her father, Frank. Records reveal that after the 1980 will was executed, Christianson authorized the payment of virtually all of Patricia's living expenses out of Frank's conservatorship assets, thereby preserving Patricia's estate and Christianson's expected inheritance. Third, Christianson told no one, not even Floyd Ensign, that a new will had been executed. After Patricia's death, he feigned surprise upon learning that he was her primary beneficiary, notwithstanding his full knowledge of the contents of her will. We think it reasonable for a fact finder to infer from such lack of candor an improper motive. See Frazier v. State Central Savs. Bank, 217 N.W.2d 238, 245 (Iowa 1974). Finally, the substantial bequest to Christianson is at best surprising and, at worst, suspicious. Christianson was not a family member. He was no more than a casual acquaintance and local banker when he became Patricia's fiduciary and soon found himself the proposed inheritor of over $300,000. Even if we assume, as Christianson contends, that entirely legitimate inferences can be drawn from the facts we have recited, as long as the inferences ... are in equipoise, the question of undue influence is for the jury. In re Estate of Ankeny, 238 Iowa 754, 761, 28 N.W.2d 414, 418 (1947). The district court was correct in so ruling.