Opinion ID: 2388781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Attorney's Alleged Prejudicial Comment

Text: The defendant did not testify. At the close of the District Attorney's rebuttal argument, the defendant's counsel, in the absence of the jury, made a motion for mistrial based on the District Attorney's supposed remark to the jury, which he said was made twice, in manner as follows: Did defense give an innocent interpretation? The District Attorney, in response to the Court's inquiry, stated: Your Honor, I can honestly say I don't recall the exact words I used. I do recall in rebuttal, I was responding to [defendant's attorney's] argument on innocent interpretation of certain facts. And I was simply responding to show that they should not confuse an innocent interpretation with an interpretation of guilt. But, this was just in direct response to [defendant's attorney's] argument. The Court: You don't recall how you said it? Do you deny that you said it in the manner that [defendant's attorney] has said? [District Attorney]: I cannot in good conscience deny it or admit it, Your Honor. The Court: Well [District Attorney]: But, I can certainly say I at no time comment either directly or indirectly on the defendant's failure to take the stand, because I know that's improper, and I try ethically to stay away from that. The Court: I'm going to take it under advisement and let it go to the Jury, and see what happens. A motion for a new trial raising the identical point was later denied by the presiding Justice. In State v. Tibbetts, Me., 299 A.2d 883 (1973), we said that it becomes the affirmative duty of a prosecutor to refrain from the use of equivocal or ambiguous language in argument, respecting the rights of the accused, and the duty of the jury to disregard his election, not to be a witness, not to mention any direct, unambiguous and specific statement thereon. In Tibbetts, we cited with approval the rule enunciated in Fontaine v. California, 390 U.S. 593, 88 S.Ct. 1229, 20 L.Ed.2d 154 (1968): [W]hen a state jury is asked to convict a defendant on circumstantial evidence, and a constitutionally impermissible comment is made in argument, such comment cannot be considered harmless unless it is shown beyond a reasonable doubt that it did not contribute to the resultant conviction. In Tibbetts, we formulated the rule in relation to equivocal or ambiguous prosecutorial comment on the failure of a criminal defendant to become a witness, that the State must then demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt, for classifying the comment as harmless, that the record contains no evidence, either direct or circumstantial, which would rationally support acquittal. In Tibbetts, the objectionable comment was reproduced in full in the context in which it was used. In the instant case, the objectionable statement appears out of any context in which it was made, so that any reference of the claimed impermissible comment to the defendant's failure to take the stand is wholly conjectural. Absent the Justice's charge to the jury, the defendant-appellant has deprived this Court from consideration of the probability that the Justice's instructions may have dissipated any possible link in the minds of the jury between the objectionable statement and the failure of the defendant to testify. We note that Gagnon personally requested a specific instruction on his right not to be a witness and on the jury's duty to disregard his election to remain silent at his trial. The defendant must be assumed to have been satisfied with the Justice's instructions in relation to this very problem as no objections were thereafter articulated. Considering that the objectionable statement, in the absence of the context in which it was made, does not per se, directly or indirectly, refer to the defendant's election not to testify in his behalf, we cannot say that there was impermissible comment as claimed by the defendant. Furthermore, assuming the statement to be an equivocal or ambiguous comment by the prosecutor on the failure of the defendant to become a witness, we are satisfied from our analysis of this record that the evidence, albeit circumstantial, demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that such comment did not contribute to the resultant conviction as no rational basis for a verdict of acquittal existed. State v. Tibbetts, supra.