Opinion ID: 1419027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Violation of Petitioner's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Text: Petitioner contends that at the State Bar proceedings his privilege against self-incrimination was violated. (U.S. Const., Amends. 5 & 14; Cal. Const., art. I, § 13.) At the local committee hearing the State Bar called him as a witness. Immediately after he was sworn the committee chairman told him ... if you have any reason to raise any constitutional or other objections about testifying ... we would entertain that, otherwise we would be happy to have your testimony. Petitioner replied, I have nothing to hide, and his attorney stated No objections. Petitioner then proceeded to testify to his version of the facts. Later during the hearing the State Bar indicated it wanted to recall him as a witness. Petitioner objected on the ground that the State Bar has not rested [its] case and that the State Bar's seesawing back and forth between one of [its] witnesses and the opposition was denying him a fair trial. The objection was overruled, and he was told he would be called to the stand unless he wishe[d] to invoke some type of privilege. He thereupon proceeded to testify and did not object to any question on the ground his answer would tend to incriminate him. At the proceeding before the board after the local committee made its findings, which were unfavorable to him, he argued, as he does now, that there was a violation of his privilege against self-incrimination. It is petitioner's position that the State Bar's calling him as a witness violated his privilege against self-incrimination and that he had a right to receive an admonition that he did not have to be sworn [or] testify and that ... his refusal to be sworn or ... testify could not be used against him.... The State Bar's position is that petitioner had no privilege to refuse to be sworn; that, although he could have declined to answer questions on the ground his answers would tend to incriminate him, he did not do so; and that [i]n answering questions ... [he] purposely waived any claim of privilege in order to ... mitigate ... the evidence against him. The Fifth Amendment of the federal Constitution provides: No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, ... (Italics added.) This provision is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct. 1489].) Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution contains a substantially identical provision. The availability of the privilege, of course, does not turn upon the type proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure it invites. ( In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 49 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 558, 87 S.Ct. 1428]; in accord, Ex parte Clarke, 103 Cal. 352, 354 [37 P. 230].) `The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory ... it protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used in a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used.' [Fn. omitted.] (Emphasis added.) ( In re Gault, supra, at pp. 47-48 [18 L.Ed.2d at pp. 557-558], quoting from conc. opn. by Justice White in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n., 378 U.S. 52, 94 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 704, 84 S.Ct. 1594].) (3) The privilege protects an accused in a criminal case from being called to the stand as a witness and testifying ( United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 897; United States v. Housing Foundation of America, 176 F.2d 665, 666; People v. Whelchel, 255 Cal. App.2d 455, 460 [63 Cal. Rptr. 258]; Killpatrick v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App.2d 146, 149-150 [314 P.2d 164]; see Evid. Code, § 930), and any person from being required to give answers that will subject him to criminal prosecution ( Malloy v. Hogan, supra, 378 U.S. 1, 11-14 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 661-663]; Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 [35 L.Ed. 1110, 1113-1114, 12 S.Ct. 195]; Ex parte Clarke, supra, 103 Cal. 352, 354; see Evid. Code, § 940; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (2d ed. 1966) p. 828). [11] With respect to our state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, it has been held that an attorney against whom a disciplinary proceeding is brought does not have the complete immunity from testifying of the defendant in a criminal case; he may be compelled to testify but may refuse to answer questions on the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him. ( Fish v. The State Bar, 214 Cal. 215, 222-223 [4 P.2d 937]; McIntosh v. The State Bar, 211 Cal. 261, 262-263 [294 P. 1067]; In re Vaughan, 189 Cal. 491, 496-497 [209 P. 353, 24 A.L.R. 858]; see Witkin, Cal. Evidence, supra, p. 836.) By the quoted phrase the court evidently meant tend to establish criminal liability. In Johnson v. State Bar, 4 Cal.2d 744, 752 [52 P.2d 928] this court stated, It has frequently been held that a member of the profession may be called upon to testify, even though such testimony may establish his violation of his oath of office and his duty as an attorney at law. (See also McCormick on Evidence (1954) p. 268, fn. 4; 8 Wigmore on Evidence (1961) § 2257.) In re Vaughan, supra, 189 Cal. 491, 496, reasoned, Although it has been held that an accusation is in the nature of a criminal charge [citation], and that a proceeding on such a charge is a quasi -criminal action [citation], `this court has uniformly treated disbarment proceedings as peculiar to themselves, and governed exclusively by the code sections specifically covering them.' [Citation.] The purpose of such a proceeding is to determine the fitness of an officer of the court to continue in that capacity, and it has been said the disbarment of attorneys is not intended for the punishment of the individual but for the protection of the courts and the legal profession. The above cited cases involving our state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination preceded Malloy v. Hogan, supra, 378 U.S. 1, and the question is presented whether with respect to the federal privilege against self-incrimination a different rule prevails than that under our state Constitution. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 [17 L.Ed.2d 574, 87 S.Ct. 625], an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding refused to honor a subpoena duces tecum by refusing to produce the demanded financial records and by refusing to testify at the judicial inquiry. His defense was that the production of the records and his testimony would tend to incriminate him. The state court ordered him disbarred for his refusal, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that an attorney may not be disbarred for claiming his privilege against self-incrimination. Spevack overruled Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117 [6 L.Ed.2d 156, 81 S.Ct. 954], wherein an attorney, relying on his privilege against self-incrimination, refused to testify and was disbarred for his refusal, and it was held that the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment was inapplicable to the states. Although Spevack suggests to at least one commentator that the United States Supreme Court would now regard a disciplinary proceeding as criminal for purposes of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination (see 53 A.B.A.J. 631), courts and other commentators have expressly or impliedly rejected that view ( State Bar of Michigan v. Block, 383 Mich. 384 [175 N.W.2d 769, 771 et seq.]; In re Klebanoff, 21 N.Y.2d 920 [289 N.Y.S.2d 755, 237 N.E.2d 75] [cert. den. 393 U.S. 840 (21 L.Ed.2d 110, 89 S.Ct. 118)]; Zuckerman v. Greason, 20 N.Y.2d 430 [285 N.Y.S.2d 1, 231 N.E.2d 718, 721] [cert. den. 390 U.S. 925 (19 L.Ed.2d 985, 88 S.Ct. 856); rehg. den. 390 U.S. 975 (19 L.Ed.2d 1196, 88 S.Ct. 1031)]; see In re Selig, 32 App.Div.2d 213 [302 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95-96]; The Myth of Spevack v. Klein by Michael Franck, 54 A.B.A.J. 970, 971-972; Spevack v. Klein: Milestone or Millstone in Bar Discipline? by Russell Niles and Judith Kaye, 53 A.B.A.J. 1121, 1124.) Zuckerman, for example, held that the sustaining of misconduct charges against two attorneys on the basis of testimony given by them allegedly under the compulsion of Cohen v. Hurley, supra, 366 U.S. 117, was not unconstitutional. Zuckerman stated that a disbarment proceeding is not a criminal case and that The evidence which [the attorneys] produced ... cannot be used against them in any criminal proceeding. They had no privilege against making disclosure usable only in a disciplinary proceeding. (P. 721.) Neither In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550-551 [20 L.Ed.2d 117, 121-123, 88 S.Ct. 1222], nor In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. 1, requires our holding that a disciplinary proceeding against an attorney is criminal for purposes of the federal constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Ruffalo, in concluding that an attorney in a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to fair notice of the charge, states that such proceedings are of a quasi-criminal nature. Cf. In re Gault, [ supra ] 387 U.S. 1, 33 and that disbarment designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on the lawyer. ( Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 380; Spevack v. Klein, [ supra ] 385 U.S. 511, 515.) However, Ruffalo hardly stands for an equation of criminal and disciplinary proceedings, a most unlikely view. ( Kelly v. Greason, 23 N.Y.2d 368 [296 N.Y.S.2d 937, 244 N.E.2d 456, 466].) In re Gault, supra, 387 U.S. 1, 49, declared that juvenile proceedings to determine `delinquency,' which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be regarded as `criminal' for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination. To hold otherwise would be to disregard substance because of the feeble enticement of the `civil' label of convenience which has been attached to juvenile court proceedings. Disciplinary proceedings, however, unlike juvenile court proceedings, cannot result in incarceration, and, although they may result in disbarment, suspension, or censure, such a penalty is designed to protect the court and public from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice. (See In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347, 349; Zitny v. State Bar, 64 Cal.2d 787, 790-791, fn. 1 [51 Cal. Rptr. 825, 415 P.2d 521]; In re Vaughan, supra, 189 Cal. 491, 496-497.) (4) We conclude that an attorney against whom a disciplinary proceeding is brought does not have the complete immunity from testifying of a defendant in a criminal case; [12] he may be called upon to testify but may decline to answer questions on the ground that his testimony would tend to incriminate him. (5) Here, by testifying fully without objecting to any question on the ground of the privilege against self-incrimination, petitioner waived it. ( United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 10 [25 L.Ed.2d 1, 9, 90 S.Ct. 763]; Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370-371 [95 L.Ed. 344, 347-348, 71 S.Ct. 438, 19 A.L.R.2d 378]; Vajtauer v. Comm'r of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 113 [71 L.Ed. 560, 566, 47 S.Ct. 302]; Steinmetz v. Cal. State Board of Education, 44 Cal.2d 816, 824 [285 P.2d 617] [cert. den. 351 U.S. 915 (100 L.Ed. 1448, 76 S.Ct. 708)]; see also The Florida Bar v. Curry (Fla.) 211 So.2d 169, 172 [cert. den. 393 U.S. 981 (21 L.Ed.2d 442, 89 S.Ct. 451)].) (6) Petitioner has cited no authority, and we have found none, requiring that in a disciplinary proceeding the State Bar give admonitions regarding the privilege against self-incrimination to an attorney represented by counsel. Under some circumstances admonitions must be given regarding the privilege against self-incrimination (e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-469 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 719-721, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 10 A.L.R. 3d 974] [to a defendant before custodial interrogation]; In re Tahl, 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449] [cert. den. 398 U.S. 911 (26 L.Ed.2d 72, 90 S.Ct. 1708)] [to a defendant who is pleading guilty]; Killpatrick v. Superior Court, supra, 153 Cal. App.2d 146, 149 [to unrepresented defendant in a criminal case]). However, the circumstances here differ substantially from those in the cited cases.