Opinion ID: 2545099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: New Obligation, Duty or Disability

Text: Young's argument encompasses the second disjunctive option, that section 115.350 imposes a new obligation, duty or disability solely because he has a prior felony conviction. Young claims this Court's analysis in F.R. is dispositive because his 1995 conviction predates the enactment of section 115.350, thereby imposing a new obligation, duty or disability on him. Specifically, Young contends the statute imposes upon him an affirmative obligation to refrain from running for elective office and, by extension, from holding office. In F.R., this Court held two statutes were unconstitutional as applied to F.R. and Raynor when they imposed new obligations and duties on them solely as a result of their prior sex offense convictions, and their failure to perform these new duties and obligations carried criminal penalties. F.R., 301 S.W.3d at 66. The first statute imposed upon F.R. a duty to determine whether the residence to which he wished to move was within 1,000 feet of a school or day care facility. Id. at 63. This obligation was imposed on F.R. years after his conviction and required his performance under threat of criminal penalty. Id. The second statute imposed four obligations or duties upon Raynor to be carried out on Halloween, which included: (1) avoiding contact with children; (2) remaining inside his residence; (3) posting a sign on his door; and (4) leaving his light off. Id. Like F.R., these obligations were imposed years after Raynor's conviction and required him to perform or be subjected to criminal penalties. Id. The Court found the challenged statutes simply impose new obligations or duties on F.R. and Raynor, giving new legal effect to their prior convictions and accordingly, were retrospective when applied to them. Id. This Court was mindful of the difficulties in distinguishing the retroactive effect of this law from the ordinary regulatory actions that may take into account past conduct or past conditions in providing current or prospective regulation. Id. Further, this Court recognized a slippery slope wherein it could be well claimed that no statute could be enacted imposing new duties upon or giving new privileges or rights to a person already born ... [or] to a corporation already created. Id. at 64 (quoting Squaw Creek Drainage Dist. v. Turney, 235 Mo. 80, 138 S.W. 12, 16 (1911)). Young's argument attempts to go down this slippery slope. Section 115.350 does not impose any new obligation or duty on Young because he has no affirmative obligation to take any action whatsoever to comply with section 115.350. Cf. F.R.,; Doe v. Phillips, 194 S.W.3d at 852 (statute that imposed a new obligation and duty on sex offenders to register, maintain, and update registration based solely on their offenses prior to the statute's enactment was retrospective in operation). Moreover, [a] statute is not retrospective or retroactive because it relates to prior facts or transactions but does not change their legal effect, or because some of the requisites for its action are drawn from a time antecedent to its passage, or because it fixes the status of an entity for purpose of its operation. Jackson v. Members of Missouri Bd. of Probation & Parole, 301 S.W.3d 71, 71-72 (Mo. banc 2010) (quoting Jerry-Russell Bliss v. Hazardous Waste, 702 S.W.2d 77, 81 (Mo. banc 1985)). While section 115.350 relates to Young's 1995 conviction and forecloses his ability to qualify to run for office, its operation does not change the legal effect of his conviction. Young also attempts to draw a parallel between his claim and those of F.R. and Raynor by arguing he will be subjected to criminal penalties under the election statutes based solely upon his 1995 conviction. In F.R., this Court stated both men would be subject to criminal penalties if they failed to comply with the laws as applied to them and that an essential element to be proven if felony charges were brought was that they both were convicted sex offenders. Id. at 63. Likewise, Young argues his 1995 conviction would be an essential element of any felony charge brought pursuant to section 115.631 concerning the averments contained in his declaration of candidacy form. Section 115.349.1 provides that every candidate must file a written declaration of candidacy prior to having his or her name placed on the ballot. Section 115.349.3 requires the written declaration contain a statement that if nominated and elected he or she will qualify. This declaration must be subscribed and sworn under oath. Id. Section 115.631 sets forth felony election offenses connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage. This section includes falsely making any statement on the declaration of candidacy form. The declaration of candidacy requirements apply to all candidates, not only those who have a felony conviction. Young's obligation to prepare the declaration only arises because of his desire to run for office, not his 1995 conviction. Young filed his written declaration of candidacy and averred he was qualified to be elected as presiding commissioner. In contrast to the sex offenders in F.R., any possible criminal consequences Young may suffer pursuant to section 115.631 would not arise solely because of his 1995 conviction, but rather, would arise because the averment he included in his declaration of candidacy that if nominated and elected he ... will qualify was false. Any persons, previously convicted or otherwise, would be subject to criminal liability under section 115.631 if they included false assertions in the declaration of candidacy form, unlike the sex offenders in F.R., who were subject to liability solely due to their status as sex offenders. Section 115.350, as applied to Young, does not operate retrospectively in violation of the constitution. Young's first point is denied.