Opinion ID: 1450094
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction on murder charges

Text: On appeal, Grissom renews his claim that the District Court of Johnson County, Kansas, lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him on the three murder charges because no evidence was presented at trial concerning the location of the alleged killings and because the three women were last seen alive in Missouri. At the conclusion of the State's case, Grissom moved for a judgment of acquittal on the murder charges, which the trial court denied. Based upon the same grounds, Grissom subsequently filed a motion to arrest judgment, which also was denied. Grissom acknowledges the testimony of FBI Agent Napier and the Leawood detective who interviewed him after his arrest in Texas. Napier testified that Grissom said everything happened in Kansas and nothing would be found in Missouri. According to the Leawood detective, Grissom specified that the women would be found in Johnson County and that everything happened in Johnson County. No evidence was introduced at trial to dispute Napier's and the detective's testimony. Based upon Napier's and the detective's testimony, the State argues that Grissom conceded jurisdiction. Grissom, on the other hand, contends his uncorroborated extrajudicial statement cannot be relied upon to establish jurisdiction. In support of his contention, Grissom cites Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 90, 99 L.Ed. 101, 75 S.Ct. 158 (1954) (We think that an accused's admissions of essential facts or elements of the crime, subsequent to the crime, are of the same character as confessions and that corroboration should be required.), and State v. Tillery, 227 Kan. 342, 346, 606 P.2d 1031 (1980) (An uncorroborated extrajudicial confession is insufficient to sustain a conviction.). Neither Opper nor Tillery involved jurisdictional issues. Our territorial jurisdiction statute provides, in pertinent part: (1) A person is subject to prosecution and punishment under the law of this state if: (a) He commits a crime wholly or partly within this state; or (b) Being outside the state, he counsels, aids, abets, or conspires with another to commit a crime within this state; or (c) Being outside the state, he commits an act which constitutes an attempt to commit a crime within this state. (2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either an act which is a constituent and material element of the offense, or the proximate result of such act, occurs within the state. If the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death is presumed to have occurred within the state. K.S.A. 21-3104. Grissom frames his argument as follows: [D]oes Kansas have jurisdiction over alleged homicides apparently committed in Missouri where the state's theory of the case is that the victims were abducted by the defendant in Kansas? Grissom maintains the murders occurred in Missouri because the women were last seen alive in Missouri; Rusch, when she was photographed making an ATM withdrawal in Belton, Missouri, on the evening of June 26, 1989; Brown, at the Mini Warehouse in Raytown, Missouri, on the morning of June 26, 1989; and Butler, when she left her friend's apartment in Kansas City, Missouri, in the early morning hours of June 18, 1989. Although no one actually saw Butler at her Overland Park, Kansas, apartment after leaving her friend's place, Grissom wants us to ignore the fact that the clothes Butler had on when she left her friend's place were found in her apartment bedroom. The State contends the emphasis should be on where the chain of events originated. The State claims the chain of events began with the victims' abductions in Kansas: The State maintains that Butler did make it back to her Overland Park apartment because the clothes she had been wearing when she left Missouri were found in her bedroom. Brown was last seen by her boyfriend at his Johnson County residence. Plus, the T-shirts Brown was wearing when she left her boyfriend's place were found on the bedroom floor of her apartment. Rusch was last seen before her disappearance at an Overland Park nightclub. According to the State, the evidence suggests Rusch was at least held at the storage locker in southern Johnson County. For further support, the State points out the fact that the other crimes in this case took place in Kansas: the aggravated kidnapping of and robberies involving Rusch, the aggravated burglaries of Butler's apartment and Rusch and Brown's apartment, and the misdemeanor theft. In support of its contention, the State cites cases from several states. In State v. Kills On Top, 241 Mont. 378, 787 P.2d 336 (1990), the victim was kidnapped in Montana and murdered in Wyoming. The Supreme Court of Montana rejected the defendant's jurisdiction argument, stating: The evidence in this case clearly establishes the commission of aggravated kidnapping in Montana, the death in Wyoming, and a causal connection between the aggravated kidnapping and death. 241 Mont. at 388. Montana and Kansas have similar jurisdiction statutes. In State v. Lane, 112 Wash.2d 464, 771 P.2d 1150 (1989), the victim was kidnapped in Washington, but murdered in an area in which the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the defendant's jurisdiction argument, stating that Washington had jurisdiction over crimes if an essential element of the crime occurred in Washington. The court determined that premeditation was an essential element of first-degree murder and that the State had proved premeditation occurred in Washington. Washington and Kansas have similar jurisdiction statutes. The purpose of [the Washington statute] is to eliminate twilight zones affording safe haven to persons who commit offenses partly within this state and partly without it. State v. Swanson, 16 Wash. App. 179, 189, 554 P.2d 364 (1976), cert. denied 434 U.S. 967 (1977). In Smith v. State, 101 Nev. 167, 697 P.2d 113 (1985), the defendant kidnapped the victim in Nevada and then transported her to California where he sexually assaulted and attempted to murder her. In rejecting the defendant's jurisdiction argument, the Nevada Supreme Court stated that the defendant's actions in Nevada were themselves criminal in nature and were a necessary and integral part of a larger crime plan to assault and murder the victim. 101 Nev. at 169. In other words, if a defendant commits criminal acts in Nevada which are a substantial and integral part of an overall continuing crime plan, and which are clearly in `partial execution' of the plan, then Nevada has jurisdiction. 101 Nev. at 169. In People v. Cullen, 695 P.2d 750 (Colo. App. 1984), the victims were kidnapped in Colorado and killed in New Mexico. The appellate court upheld the defendant's murder convictions, reasoning that deliberation, an essential element of the crime of first degree murder, occurred within Colorado. 695 P.2d at 751-52. In Conrad v. State, 262 Ind. 446, 317 N.E.2d 789 (1974), the victim was assaulted and kidnapped in Indiana, but the blows from which he died were delivered in Ohio at a place on State Line Road. The Supreme Court of Indiana rejected the defendant's jurisdiction argument, reasoning: There was substantial evidence presented from which the jury could find that the assault and abduction of the victim were integrally related to the victim's murder. Thus viewed, the assault and abduction provide an adequate jurisdictional base for [the defendant's] conviction of murder in ... Indiana. 262 Ind. at 451. The line of cases cited by the State is persuasive and consistent with our broad interpretation of the territorial jurisdiction statute. See State v. Henwood, 243 Kan. 326, 330, 756 P.2d 1087 (1988) (K.S.A. 21-3104[1] requires that a defendant have some connection with the State of Kansas in order to permit a prosecution of that person for violations of the Kansas Criminal Code.). Additionally, the Judicial Council's comment to K.S.A. 21-3104 states: Subsection (1)(a) applies where all or part of a crime is committed in the state. Where the entire crime is committed in Kansas, there is no problem of jurisdiction. However, this subsection, as amplified by subsection (2) makes it clear that the state has jurisdiction where any element or the result of the crime occurs in Kansas. Under (1)(a) two states may have concurrent jurisdiction over the same crime. A broad interpretation of the territorial jurisdiction statute is consistent with our venue statutes. Although jurisdiction and venue are different, an analogy can be made to the venue statutes. For example, if a crime is committed in two counties, either county has venue. K.S.A. 22-2603. If a crime is committed on or so near the boundary of two counties that it cannot be determined in which county the crime occurred, either county has venue. K.S.A. 22-2604. If the cause of death is inflicted in one county and the victim dies in another county, either county has venue. K.S.A. 22-2611. In discussing venue, this court has said, A murderer should not escape punishment because the exact place of his crime is concealed. State v. Zimmer, 198 Kan. 479, 499, 426 P.2d 267, cert. denied 389 U.S. 933 (1967). The same rationale applies here. There is evidence from which a jury could find that Grissom committed criminal acts in Kansas which were a substantial and integral part of an overall continuing crime plan and which were in partial execution of the plan. For example, a jury could find that the abduction of the women occurred in Kansas and that the abductions were related integrally to the murders. Grissom's jurisdiction argument fails.