Opinion ID: 1674452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The relevant portions of defendant's January 20 motion to dismiss are set out in record in the following language:

Text: 1. That this Defendant was arrested on or about the 17th day of August, 1970. 2. That this Defendant received the benefit of Court-appointed counsel on or about the 12th day of October, 1970, and further that the court-appointed counsel was permitted to withdraw from said case on or about the 10th day of November, 1970. 3. That this Defendant has been incarcerated since the 1st day of September, 1970, and has been without the effective benefit of legal Counsel since the 10th day of November, 1970, and has remained without counsel until January 13, 1971. 4. That the Defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial as afforded under the laws of the State of Iowa and the United States Constitution, and the Constitution of the State of Iowa. WHEREFORE, the Defendant respectfully requests that the charge now pending against the Defendant be dismissed. The trial court's ruling on the foregoing motion is neither set out in the record nor in the clerk's transcript before us. The only reference in the record to the court's ruling is this statement: On the 26th day of January, 1971, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was overruled. However, this court has been furnished a certified copy of a ruling isued in criminal cause 35312. The motion to dismiss in that cause was based on the grounds defendant had been denied a speedy trial as guaranteed under the state and federal constitutions. It is obvious the motions made in 35312 and 35313 were identical. The record shows that in proceedings had November 10, 1970, when both criminal cause 35312 and 35313 were being considered, the court announced that the same calendar entry will be made in this case [35313] as was made in 35312. It is a fair inference to be drawn from the practice indicated in the November 10 hearings that defendant's motion to dismiss in 35313 was denied by an order similar to that made in 35312 on January 25. Defendant insists he is relying on section 795.2, The Code, in urging that the trial court erred in this ruling. This statute provides: Delay in trial. If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial within sixty days after the indictment is found, the court must order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. An accused not admitted to bail and unrepresented by legal counsel, shall not be deemed to have waived his privilege of dismissal or be held to make demand or request to enforce a guarantee of speedy trial, and the court on its own motion shall carry out the provisions of this section as to dismissal. Defendant argues he is entitled to a dismissal of the charge under the terms and provisions of the second sentence of the quoted statute since he was not effectively represented by counsel from November 10, 1970 until January 14 and was not admitted to bail. The record is not entirely clear as to whether defendant had been incarcerated since September 1, 1970, as he alleged in the motion to dismiss previously set out. The clerk's transcript discloses that an order was made August 17, 1970 releasing defendant from custody on his own recognizance without bond on that date. It does not show whether he had been returned to custody on this charge or was being confined on one of the several other charges pending against him. In this connection see State v. Mason, 203 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1972). However, the court's judgment sentencing defendant to the state penitentiary in criminal cause 35313 provided: Defendant shall receive credit for time already spent in custody on this charge. The copy of the mittimus included in the transcript has this clerk's note: Defendant also to be given credit for time already spent in custody on this charge. Credit 210 days (9/1/70 to 4/7/71). Conceding that the foregoing record supports defendant's assertion he had been incarcerated before trial since September 1, the second sentence of section 795.2 relied on by defendant at this point in his argument requires he also be unrepresented by legal counsel. State v. Johnson, 167 N.W. 2d 696, 700 (Iowa 1969); Parrott v. Haugh, 158 N.W.2d 766, 769 (Iowa 1968). In this connection defendant argues he was without counsel from November 10, 1970, until January 14, 1971, a period of 65 days. Shockey insists he could not have been deemed to have waived his rights to a speedy trial by failure to make demand under the foregoing circumstances. Assuming arguendo that defendant's contention he was without counsel from November 10 until January 14 the following year is tenable the question thus presented for determination is whether a defendant can waive his right to a speedy trial by means other than his failure to make demand when he is both incarcerated and unrepresented by legal counsel. The State does not contend defendant waived his right to a speedy trial by failure to make a demand but maintains that where delay in bringing a criminal case to trial is brought about by a defendant he waives his right to a speedy trial. This could be a persuasive argument in light of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, where the supreme Court in dealing with the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by amendment 6 of the federal constitution set out the criteria by which the speedy trial right is to be judged. In rejecting both of the inflexible approachesthe fixed time period because it goes further than the Constitution requires; the demand-waiver rule because it is insensitive to a right which is deemed fundamentalthe Court adopted the approach of a balancing test in which the conduct of both the prosecution and defendant is weighed. The Court identified length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and prejudice to the defendant as some of the factors which courts could assess in determining whether a particular defendant had been deprived of his right. The question is whether the language in Barker v. Wingo, supra, in dealing with the constitutional provision may be relied on in resolving the question presented here in view of the second sentence of section 795.2, The Code, which goes further than the provisions of the state and federal constitutions require. The State, of course, is free to prescribe conditions which are not inconsistent with constitutional standards. We conclude the language of Barker is relevant in determining whether a delay attributable to defendant may be considered as a factor in deciding whether defendant has waived his privilege of a speedy trial even though he be incarcerated and unrepresented by counsel. This interpretation embodies fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice both from the defendant's standpoint and society's interest in bringing swift prosecutions. Any other interpretation of this statutory provision would, in effect, declare that a defendant in such circumstances could not waive his right to a speedy trial by any means. We are not convinced the legislature so intended by the 1963 amendment adopted by the Regular Session, Sixtieth General Assembly, chapter 332, section 2, which added the second sentence to section 795.2. It is our view the legislature solely intended by this amendment to eliminate the necessity of a demand or request by a defendant neither at liberty on bail nor represented by an attorney to protect his right to a speedy trial. With this interpretation in mind we turn to the record in our pursuit to find whether the delay in trial here was attributable to defendant. We recognize at the outset a defendant has no duty to bring himself to trial; the State has that duty as well as the duty of insuring that the trial is consistent with due process. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. at 427, 92 S.Ct. at 2190, 33 L. Ed.2d at 115; State v. Gorham, 206 N.W. 2d 908, 911 (Iowa 1973), both cited by the State and prosecution. As pointed out, the case was originally set for trial October 5, 1970, after defendant had appeared with retained counsel to enter his plea. October 12 defendant, represented by his first court-appointed counsel, sought and obtained the first of three continuances when commencement of his trial was continued to November 23. December 30 the case was reset for trial commencing January 18, 1971. Defendant, with the aid of his newly court-appointed counsel who had replaced his former court-appointed attorney, obtained the third continuance January 14 when at his request trial was set commencing January 25. Defendant filed his motion to dismiss January 20. It was not ruled on until January 26. The case was again reset and the jury selected February 16. Examination of the record of the November 10, 1970, hearing discloses the diligent effort the trial court made in securing defendant's right to a speedy trial. As stated, defendant's failure to apprise the court on November 17 of the name of the attorney he had selected to represent him at county expense was never explained. This delay is directly attributable to defendant as are the other delays detailed earlier. When these delays are considered as a factor along with the length of delay shown here, the reasons therefor and lack of prejudice to the defendant as well as other circumstances shown by the record in assessing whether Shockey has been deprived of his right we conclude defendant was not denied a speedy trial in violation of section 795.2, The Code, as urged. See Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L.Ed.2d 183. It is obvious, of course, defendant was not denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial under either the state or federal constitutions. Barker v. Wingo and State v. Gorham, both supra. Defendant tells us his position is two-fold. If the court determines he waived his right to a speedy trial he then relies on State v. Gorham. Gorham determined that this court's demand-waiver rule as applied to section 795.2 was constitutionally defective in view of Barker v. Wingo. Gorham did not reach the problem presented here. Defendant's reliance is misplaced. The assignment is without merit. II. Defendant's remaining assignment challenges the court's failure to give his requested instruction relating to a derringer pistol found on defendant's person. The court did instruct on possession of burglar tools and implements as an element of the offense charged but not in the language of defendant's request. Defendant made no objection to the instruction given either at the time the proposed instructions were furnished counsel as required by rule 196, Rules of Civil Procedure, or in motion for new trial. He did not except to the court's failure to give his requested instruction before the instructions were read to the jury and in motion for new trial his only complaint is stated in this language: That the court improperly refused to instruct the jury as requested by the defendant. Under this record defendant's assignment presents nothing for review. State v. Brown, 172 N.W.2d 152, 156-160 (Iowa 1969); State v. Gilmore, 181 N.W.2d 145, 146-147 (Iowa 1970); State v. Youngbear, 203 N.W.2d 274, 277-278 (Iowa 1972). The case is therefore Affirmed.