Opinion ID: 1937140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: nlra

Text: The plaintiff also contends that the provisions of RSA 415:18-a (Supp. 1977) conflict with the policies of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 29 U.S.C. § 141 et seq. (1947), and therefore must be preempted by the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the State's law interferes with free collective bargaining process because the statute mandates mental health benefits at levels the parties never agreed to provide in the terms of their collective bargaining agreement. Here, as was the case with Erisa, [t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone. Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). We cannot declare pre-empted all local regulation that touches or concerns in any way the complex interrelationships between employees, employers, and unions; obviously, much of this is left to the States. Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 289 (1971). The preemption doctrine in labor law is premised on the principle that the NLRB has preemptive authority to determine whether conduct is either protected under section 7 of NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947), proscribed as an unfair labor practice under section 8 of the act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1947), or whether it falls between these sections. Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469, 472 (1972). Preemption will not occur where state action involves matters of peripheral concern to federal law. See San Diego Union v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1355 (1972). [8] Medical insurance benefits are subject to mandatory collective bargaining. However, Congress in Erisa intended to preserve the States' authority to regulate insurance laws, including mandated prescribed mental health benefits. Moreover, the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides expressly that no federal law shall supersede state insurance laws unless it is specifically related to the business of insurance. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1970). NLRA does not expressly supersede insurance laws such as RSA 415:18-a (Supp. 1977) and we rule that such a law is peripheral to it. Wadsworth v. Whaland, 562 F.2d 70, 79 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 980 (1978).