Opinion ID: 156166
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Threat of Use” of a Firearm

Text: The Three Strikes statute also does not define “threat of use” for purposes of determining whether an offense involved the “threat of use” of a firearm under § 3559(c)(3)(A)(i). Furthermore, no court has expressly defined “threat of use” in this context. Gottlieb argues the word “threat” generally, and especially in criminal statutes, “means a communicated intent to engage in a harmful act against someone or something.” Gottlieb argues that under this definition of “threat,” the 1987 offense did not involve the “threat of use” of a firearm, particularly in light accompany the coconspirators to the robbery site. See id. -17- of the absence of evidence that the intended victims even knew of the existence of the scheme. Gottlieb’s proposed definition of “threat” is consistent with the one federal court case discussing the term in the context of the Three Strikes statute. In United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 335 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 134 (1997), the defendant, who was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Three Strikes statute, argued on appeal that his three bank robbery convictions constituted “nonqualifying felonies” under § 3559(c)(3)(A). See id. at 337. In each of the bank robberies, the defendant utilized a written note which stated, among other things, “‘I have a gun.’” Id. The court summarily concluded that “[s]uch a statement implies a ‘threat of use of a firearm’ and prevents [the defendant] from satisfying subsection (i) [of § 3559(c)(3)(A)].” Id. Although the Washington court did not expressly define “threat of use,” its holding indicates the term includes a communicated expression to a victim that the defendant would use a firearm. Relying on Washington, the government asserts Gottlieb’s actions in this case constituted a “threat of use” of a firearm. 9 Unlike the defendant in 9 The government asserts that Gottlieb’s request of the firearm and his reaching for the firearm “is the functional equivalent of [the Washington] defendant’s three notes to bank tellers stating, ‘I have a gun.’” The government, however, fails to develop this mere assertion by explaining precisely how Gottlieb’s actions are the “functional equivalent” of communicating a threat to a -18- Washington, however, Gottlieb did not communicate to any intended victim a threat to use a firearm. The presence of undercover agents assured there was not even a reasonable possibility that Gottlieb would come into contact with his intended victims. The holding of Washington is therefore inapposite; its focus on a “threat” as a communication, however, is instructive. Gottlieb’s argument that “threat of use” of a firearm means a communicated intent to use a firearm is also consistent with the plain meaning of the word “threat.” See Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2382 (1993) (defining “threat” as an “expression of an intention to inflict loss or harm on another by illegal means and esp[ecially] by means involving coercion or duress of the person threatened”); Black’s Law Dictionary 1480 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “threat” as “[a] communicated intent to inflict physical or other harm,” “[a] declaration of an intention to injure,” “[a] declaration of intention or determination to inflict punishment, loss, or pain,” and “an avowed present determination or intent to injure”). Interpreted broadly, however, the word “threat” can also mean a “risk” that something will occur. See Webster’s, supra, at 2382 (defining “threat” as “an indication of something impending and usu[ally] undesirable or unpleasant,” as in “the air held a [threat] of rain”). victim. -19- The government apparently advocates this broader definition of “threat.” Specifically, the government argues that “Gottlieb’s actions of requesting a firearm . . ., dressing prepared to use a firearm (‘wearing a bulletproof vest . . .’), and . . . reaching for the firearm prevent Gottlieb from meeting the no-threat requirement.” 10 Gottlieb recognizes that “threat of use” may be interpreted to mean “risk of use” but argues that if this broad definition were adopted, “virtually every robbery would be a qualifying felony because every robbery can be said to involve some inherent risk of use of a firearm.” There is a difference, however, between a general risk inherent in all violent crimes that a firearm may be used and a demonstrated risk that a firearm will be used in a particular offense. Therefore, if “threat of use” were interpreted broadly to include “risk of use,” the “nonqualifying felonies” exception would still have meaning. Cf. Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 506 (noting that in determining meaning of statutory language, court should act “with the assumption that Congress intended each of [the statutory] terms to have meaning”). This court need not decide, however, whether “threat of use” of a firearm as used in § 3559(c)(3)(A)(i) means a communicated intent to use a firearm, 10 The government makes no attempt to expressly define “threat of use.” Rather, the government summarily asserts that Gottlieb’s actions constituted such a threat. -20- whether it means a risk that a firearm would be used in the offense, or whether it incorporates both meanings. Under any of these formulations, Gottlieb’s actions did not constitute a “threat.” It is undisputed that Gottlieb was arrested before he even touched the firearm and before he ever came into contact with his intended victims. Gottlieb therefore never had the opportunity to threaten anyone with the firearm. Further, as Gottlieb notes, the firearm was at all times under the sole control of the federal agents and at a place distant from the site of the intended substantive crime. Thus, there was never any actual risk that the firearm would be used in the offense. Under the discrete facts of this case, therefore, the defendant has met his burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that no “threat of use” of a firearm was involved in the 1987 offense.