Opinion ID: 3180293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory First-Party Bad Faith Claim

Text: Until 1982, the only recognized bad faith cause of action was the common law third-party bad faith action. See Laforet, 658 So. 2d at 58 (citing Auto Mut. Indem. Co. v. Shaw, 184 So. 852, 859 (Fla. 1938)). The third-party bad faith cause of action permits the insured or the injured third party to sue an insurer for failing to settle within the policy limits.2 See Macola v. Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co., 953 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 2006). In a third-party bad faith action, if the injured third party or the insured is successful in establishing that the insurer breached the duty of good faith in handling the claim, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full extent of the 2. The injured third party is the ultimate beneficiary of the third-party bad faith claim—the real party in interest, akin to a “judgment creditor.” See Thompson v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 259, 264 (Fla. 1971). The injured third party may bring a cause of action pursuant to an assignment from the insured or in his or her own right as a third-party beneficiary. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Cope, 462 So. 2d 459, 461 (Fla. 1985). If brought pursuant to an assignment, the injured third party stands in the shoes of the insured. See Roberts v. Carter, 350 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1977). - 11 - damages to which the insured was exposed, including an excess judgment. See, e.g., Berges v. Infinity Ins. Co., 896 So. 2d 665, 681-82 (Fla. 2004); Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 386 So. 2d 783, 784 (Fla. 1980). In 1982, the Florida Legislature created a statutory first-party bad faith cause of action through the enactment of section 624.155. See § 624.155(1)(b)1, Fla. Stat. This provision extended the duty of an insurer to act in good faith in handling claims brought by its own insured under a UM policy and exposed the insurer to the consequences of failing to do so. § 624.155, Fla. Stat. As a condition precedent to filing a civil action under section 624.155, “the [Florida Department of Financial Services] and the authorized insurer must have been given 60 days’ written notice of the violation.” § 624.155(3)(a), Fla. Stat. (2007); see also § 624.05(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). This notice is commonly referred to as the “civil remedy notice.” The statute further provides that “[n]o action shall lie if, within 60 days after filing notice, the damages are paid or the circumstances giving rise to the violation are corrected.” § 624.155(3)(d), Fla. Stat. (2007). This sixty-day window provides insurers with a final opportunity “to comply with their claim-handling obligations when a good-faith decision by the insurer would indicate that contractual benefits are owed.” See Talat Enters., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 753 So. 2d 1278, 1284 (Fla. 2000). However, if an insurer fails to respond to a civil remedy notice within the sixty-day window, there is “a - 12 - presumption of bad faith sufficient to shift the burden to the insurer to show why it did not respond.” Imhof, 643 So. 2d at 619. In 1990, the statute was amended to add subsection 624.155(7), specifying the damages recoverable under that statute as follows: “The damages recoverable pursuant to this section shall include those damages which are a reasonably foreseeable result of a specified violation of this section by the insurer and may include an award or judgment in an amount that exceeds the policy limits.” Ch. 90-119, § 30, Laws of Fla. (emphasis added). In McLeod v. Continental Insurance Co., 591 So. 2d 621, 626 (Fla. 1992), this Court considered the 1990 amendment as having clarified the legislative purpose with respect to damages. This Court concluded—in spite of the emphasized portion of the statute above—that an insured could not recover the amount of the excess judgment as an element of damages in a first-party bad faith claim, and instead could recover only those damages that were the “natural, proximate, probable, or direct consequence of the insurer’s bad faith actions.” Id. Just months after this Court issued its opinion in McLeod, the Legislature enacted section 627.727(10), Florida Statutes (1992), to provide: The damages recoverable from an uninsured motorist carrier in an action brought under s. 624.155 shall include the total amount of the claimant’s damages, including the amount in excess of the policy limits, any interest on unpaid benefits, reasonable attorney’s fees and costs, and any damages caused by a violation of a law of this state. - 13 - The total amount of the claimant’s damages is recoverable whether caused by an insurer or by a third-party tortfeasor. (Emphasis added.) The language of the amended section, which remains the same today, clearly and unambiguously reflects the legislative intent that the damages in section 624.155 bad faith actions shall include any amount in excess of the policy limits. See § 627.727(10), Fla. Stat. (2015). As this Court has recognized, “previous actions of this Court limiting the relief afforded under section 624.155 based upon distinctions between first- and third-party claims have been rebuked by the Legislature” by the 1992 enactment. Allstate Indem. Co. v. Ruiz, 899 So. 2d 1121, 1128 n.2 (Fla. 2005). Indeed, section 624.155 itself does not distinguish between first- and third-party bad faith actions and contains the same language that has been used in the third-party bad faith context. See id. at 1126. Consequently, first-party bad faith claims under section 624.155 should be treated in the same manner as third-party bad faith claims.3 Importantly, in both first- and third-party bad faith actions, an element of 3. Indeed, the Note for use on the current standard jury instruction reflects the same. The pertinent instruction and Note read as follows, in relevant part: 404.4 INSURER’S BAD FAITH (FAILURE TO SETTLE) Bad faith on the part of an insurance company is failing to settle a claim when, under all the circumstances, it could and should have done so, had it acted fairly and honestly toward [its policyholder] [its - 14 - damages includes any amount in excess of the policy limits. See § 627.727(10), Fla. Stat. II. Intertwined Nature of UM Verdict & First-Party Bad Faith Action A. Entitlement to a Determination of Liability & Full Extent of Damages The Fifth District and Safeco both recognize that an element of damages within the first-party bad faith case would be any damages in excess of the policy limits for the injuries arising from the automobile accident. However, the Fifth District decided, and Safeco argues, that the determination of the full extent of damages can and should be adjudicated in the subsequent bad faith case—rather than in the UM action—because Safeco’s decision to tender the policy limits rendered the underlying UM action moot. While the Fifth District held that Fridman did not need to obtain a jury verdict in excess of the UM policy limits in the UM case in order to subsequently file a first-party bad faith action, the pertinent question is whether the insured is entitled to that determination. Four insured] [an excess carrier] and with due regard for [his] [her] [its] [their] interests. Notes on Use for 404.4 1. Instruction 404.4 does not distinguish statutory claims from common law claims or first party claims from third party claims. See State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. LaForet, 658 So. 2d 55 (Fla. 1995). Fla. Std. Jury. Instr. (Civ.) 404.4. - 15 - cases from this Court—including the three cases with which the Fifth District’s decision conflicts—make clear that the answer is that the insured is entitled to a jury determination of the amount of damages in the UM action. In the first case, Blanchard, 575 So. 2d at 1290-91, this Court addressed a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals regarding whether the statutory claim for bad faith under section 624.155 had to be asserted in the original action against the insurer for UM benefits. This Court answered the certified question in the negative, reasoning that if an uninsured motorist is not liable for damages, then the insurer has not acted in bad faith in refusing to settle the claim; therefore, the insured’s underlying action for insurance benefits against the insurer must be first resolved in favor of the insured before the cause of action for bad faith can accrue. Id. at 1291. As this Court made clear in Blanchard, “[a]bsent a determination of the existence of liability on the part of the uninsured tortfeasor and the extent of the plaintiff’s damages, a cause of action cannot exist for a bad faith failure to settle.” Id. (emphasis added). Blanchard thus clearly supports the conclusion that the determination of liability and full extent of the insured’s damages must be determined before litigating the bad faith action. In the second case, Imhof, 643 So. 2d at 617, this Court addressed the issue of whether an action for bad faith damages pursuant to section 624.155(1)(b)1 is barred by Blanchard, where the complaint in the bad faith action fails to allege that - 16 - there has been a determination of the extent of the plaintiff’s damages as a result of the uninsured tortfeasor’s negligence. This Court clarified that while bad faith is presumed when the insurer fails to respond within the sixty-day window after the civil remedy notice is filed, Blanchard requires a determination of damages in order to state a bad faith claim. Imhof, 643 So. 2d at 619. This Court held that a bad faith complaint that fails to allege that there has been a determination of the full extent of the insured’s damages as a result of the uninsured tortfeasor’s negligence should be dismissed. Id. Imhof further supports our conclusion that the insured is entitled to a determination of liability and the full extent of his or her damages before litigating the first-party bad faith claim. Indeed, without a determination of damages, Imhof requires the bad faith complaint to be dismissed. This Court echoed this point again in the third case—Vest, 753 So. 2d at 1275. During that bad faith litigation, the insurer approved a settlement between the insured, Vest, and the tortfeasor, and the insurer paid Vest the UM policy limits, after which the trial court entered summary judgment on the bad faith claim in favor of the insurer. Id. at 1272. The First District affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary final judgment in favor of the insurer. Vest v. Travelers Ins. Co., 710 So. 2d 982, 984 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), quashed, 753 So. 2d 1270 (Fla. 2000). - 17 - When the case reached this Court, we quashed the First District’s decision and clarified that Blanchard means that the “ ‘determination of the existence of liability on the part of the uninsured tortfeasor and the extent of the [insured’s] damages’ are elements of a cause of action for bad faith.” Vest, 753 So. 2d at 1275 (quoting Blanchard, 575 So. 2d at 1291). Once those elements exist, there is no impediment as a matter of law to the recovery of damages for bad faith starting from the time of a proven violation. Id. Vest thus further supports our conclusion that the insured is entitled to a determination of liability and the full extent of damages before litigating the bad faith cause of action. In the fourth case, this Court in Laforet, 658 So. 2d 55, considered the amount of damages to which an insurer would be exposed in a bad faith action, in addressing whether section 627.727(10) was retroactive. This Court held that the statute could not be applied retroactively because the Legislature “has now determined that damages in first-party bad faith actions are to include the total amount of a claimant’s damages, including any amount in excess of the claimant’s policy limits without regard to whether the damages were caused by the insurance company”—damages that are, in substance, a penalty. Id. at 60. This Court noted that if section 627.727(10) had been applicable in that case, “under the retroactive application of the new statute, [the insurer] was liable for the entire excess judgment awarded to the Laforets in their original [UM] case.” Id. at 57. Thus, - 18 - Laforet recognizes that the determination of the full extent of damages is properly made in the UM case and not litigated in the bad faith action. Nothing in our precedent suggests that the eventual tendering of the policy limits renders the UM case moot. We have already addressed this same scenario in the common law third-party bad faith context, holding that “the tender of the policy limits to the insured when the underlying tort action is still pending does not eliminate the underlying tort action or the insured’s exposure to an excess verdict.” Macola, 953 So. 2d at 458; see also Whritenour v. Thompson, 145 So. 3d 870, 873-74 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“A plaintiff must be allowed to proceed to trial and liquidate her damages before bad faith becomes an issue. If a plaintiff chooses to pursue a trial, the trial court cannot compel her to accept the defendant’s policy limits.”) (citation omitted). Analogously, in the statutory first-party bad faith context, the tender of the policy limits to the insured does not eliminate the UM action or the insurer’s exposure to an excess verdict. Additionally, the UM trial involves more than just a determination of whether the insurer owes the insured the UM policy limits. Rather, the UM trial also includes a determination of whether the uninsured or underinsured driver is liable and the full extent of the insured’s damages. As Judge Sawaya cogently explained: The purpose of UM litigation is to determine the damages caused by a negligent tortfeasor. It is, in essence, a personal injury - 19 - action filed against the insured’s insurer, who steps into the shoes of the tortfeasor, and the litigation proceeds as if the suit was filed against the tortfeasor. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Boynton, 486 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1986). The relevant evidence relates to how the accident happened, who was at fault, how the injuries occurred, the extent of those injuries, how those injuries were treated and are to be treated in the future, the cost of the treatment, lost wages, and all of the other damage issues generally present in personal injury litigation. Thus, absent coverage issues, causation and damages to the injured insured are the primary focus of the UM litigation. Fridman, 117 So. 3d at 27 (Sawaya, J., dissenting). Judge Sawaya further aptly described why the UM action is not moot merely because the insurer has tendered the policy limits: “An issue is moot when the controversy has been so fully resolved that a judicial determination can have no actual effect. A case is ‘moot’ when it presents no actual controversy or when the issues have ceased to exist.” Godwin v. State, 593 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 1992) (citations omitted). The damage issue is not moot because a verdict in excess of the policy limits is evidence and a recoverable measure of damages in the subsequent bad faith action, and Fridman had the right to seek such a verdict in the UM case. Moreover, an exception to the mootness doctrine provides that “an otherwise moot case will not be dismissed if collateral legal consequences that affect the rights of a party flow from the issue to be determined.” Id. As previously indicated, the courts have repeatedly held that a determination of the extent of the damages is a prerequisite to the bad faith action. See Vest[, 753 So. 2d at 1276]; Blanchard[, 575 So. 2d at 1291]; [Progressive Select Ins. Co. v.] Shockley[, 951 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)]. A collateral legal consequence of the UM proceedings is that the confessed judgment in the amount of the policy limits, which has been foisted upon Fridman against his will by Safeco in an attempt to deprive Fridman of his right to a jury trial, is not a determination of the extent of the insured’s damages. Id. at 28-29. - 20 - We agree with Judge Sawaya’s reasoning that the amount of damages in the UM case does not become moot by virtue of an insurer’s “confession of judgment” and tendering of the policy limits. Such a position as that taken by the Fifth District majority would “countenance the actions of an insurer that confesses judgment at the last hour in an effort to avoid a trial that would reveal, through the jury’s verdict, the true extent of the insured’s injuries and provide a basis to award damages in the inevitable bad faith action the insurer foresaw on the horizon.” Id. at 29. Certainly, the insured is not obligated to obtain the determination of liability and the full extent of his or her damages through a trial and may utilize other means of doing so, such as an agreed settlement, arbitration, or stipulation before initiating a bad faith cause of action. See, e.g., Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945 So. 2d 1216, 1234-35 (Fla. 2006). But the availability of other alternatives does not change the insured’s entitlement to a determination of liability and the full extent of damages in the first instance. Therefore, for all these reasons, we conclude that an insured is entitled to a determination of liability and the full extent of his or her damages in the UM case prior to filing a first-party bad faith action. - 21 - B. Binding Effect of UM Verdict in First-Party Bad Faith Trial Having reached this conclusion, an interrelated question is whether the determination of damages that is reflected in the UM verdict is binding, as an element of damages, in the subsequent bad faith action. The key to answering this question is whether the insurer has a right to appellate review of properly preserved claims of error in the determination of damages obtained in the UM action. First, it is obvious that the UM verdict to which the insured is entitled must be binding in the bad faith action. Because a determination of the full extent of the insured’s damages is one of the prerequisites to a bad faith cause of action, to preclude a UM verdict in excess of the policy limits from being used in the bad faith case would force the parties to relitigate the issue of damages a second time prior to the bad faith trial. This would be an obvious waste of judicial and litigant resources. It would also result in serious, unintended consequences, such as “running the almost-certain risk of inconsistent verdicts; potentially raising comity issues between state and federal courts; creating a discrepancy . . . between firstand third-party bad faith claims; placing an inexplicable burden on plaintiffs to prove their cases twice; and causing a great deal of judicial inefficiency.” Batchelor v. Geico Cas. Co., No. 6:11–cv–1071–Orl–37GJK, 2014 WL 3906312, at  (M.D. Fla. June 9, 2014). - 22 - If the amount of the UM verdict is not binding as an element of damages in the bad faith litigation, it would allow the insurer—or the insured, if the verdict were less than anticipated—a second bite at the proverbial apple. As the Fourth District Court of Appeal stated in GEICO General Insurance Co. v. Paton, it would be “such bad policy” that there is not “even a hint of its existence in any case the Supreme Court has decided in this area.” 150 So. 3d 804, 807 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014). Where the insurer “participated fully in the first trial with an opportunity to challenge the plaintiff’s evidence and a powerful motive to suppress the amount of damages,” Florida’s “policy is not to give multiple bites at the same apple absent some legal infirmity in the first trial.” Id. In GEICO Casualty Co. v. Barber, Judge Sawaya explained that utilizing the UM and bad faith statutes “as a charade whereby insurers are allowed, through the expedient of a fictional confession of judgment made years into the litigation, to push and pull their insureds from one lawsuit to another only to require the insureds to try the same damage issues all over again” would “def[y] all logic and common sense, contravene[] the fundamental principles underlying the UM and bad faith statutes, and improperly ignore[] the last chance provisions of section 624.155(3)(a), thus rendering that statute virtually meaningless.” 147 So. 3d 109, 117-18 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (Sawaya, J., dissenting). Accordingly, the Fifth District’s decision here—which authorizes this exact type of conduct—incentivizes - 23 - insurers to undergo tactics that are adverse to the legislative intent behind section 627.727(10). Because we have concluded that the insured is entitled to a determination of the full extent of damages in the UM action, it follows that such a determination is binding in the subsequent bad faith action against the same insurer. The same is true when the insured attempts to relitigate the issue of damages in the bad faith case, as a federal court recently properly found. See Wiggins v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 13-23354-CIV, 2015 WL 1396583, at  (S.D. Fla. Mar. 6, 2015), adopted by No. 13-CV-23354, 2015 WL 1402970 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 18, 2015). In that case, it was actually the insurer that contended that “recent Court rulings make clear that in Florida, a verdict in an underlying UM action, determines the damages available to a claimant in a subsequent bad faith action against the insurer.” Id. at . Truly, this is an appropriate example of the classic adage “what is good for the goose is good for the gander.” Nevertheless, Safeco argues that the determination of damages reflected in the UM verdict cannot fix the amount of damages in the subsequent bad faith cause of action because this determination of damages in excess of the policy limits is not and cannot be subject to appellate review of trial court errors. This inability to review the UM verdict for trial court error, Safeco argues, creates a procedural due process issue. But Safeco’s position is somewhat inconsistent with its own actions - 24 - in this case because Safeco did, in fact, appeal the UM verdict for trial error to the Fifth District. Of course, if the parties were actually unable to appeal the UM verdict that fixed damages in the bad faith case, a due process concern—or at least a question of basic fairness—could arise. However, in this case, the Fifth District nowhere indicated that it was without authority to review the jury verdict for trial errors and Safeco had not made that argument below as a reason to vacate the jury verdict. Instead, Safeco appealed the denial of its motion for mistrial and post-trial motions. And in another UM case, the Fifth District reviewed a substantial UM jury verdict for error. See Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Darragh, 95 So. 3d 897, 898-99 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) (reviewing a $3.99 million verdict in an appeal brought by Nationwide for errors in the damage award, where the UM policy limit was $200,000; reversing the portion of the verdict related to future economic damages; and remanding for a new trial to determine future economic damages). We agree with Safeco that there must be an opportunity for both parties to obtain appellate review of any timely raised claims of error in the determination of damages obtained in the UM trial, for the very reason that it becomes binding as an element of damages in the subsequent bad faith case. However, we do not agree— nor does Fridman suggest—that the appellate court is without jurisdiction to review the UM verdict. - 25 - District courts of appeal have appellate jurisdiction under article V, section 4(b)(1), of the Florida Constitution. While district courts do not have jurisdiction over all non-final orders, in this case, the final judgment including the determination of the full extent of damages was properly within the jurisdiction of the Fifth District. Further, once the trial court denied Safeco’s motion for a new trial, rejecting a claim of an excessive verdict, that order also became subject to appellate review—as Safeco evidently understood when it filed its appeal in this case. We therefore respectfully disagree with the view that a district court lacks jurisdiction to review an excess verdict, if the amount of damages was not included within the final judgment. See Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Bottini, 93 So. 3d 476, 478 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (Altenbernd, J. concurring). Just as Judge Gross has expressed, writing for the Fourth District in Paton, we also do not “discern the constitutional conundrum” under these circumstances. 150 So. 3d at 808. Specifically, [b]ecause the damages in the first trial fixed the amount of bad faith damages and an order denying a motion for new trial could have addressed damages in excess of $100,000, an appeal after the final judgment in the first trial directed at the total amount of damages thus would have fallen within the constitutional parameters of the jurisdiction of this Court as an appeal from a “final judgment[ ] or order[ ]” of the trial court. Art. V, § 4(b)(1), Fla. Const. - 26 - Id. Further, as Judge Gross recognized, “[t]his approach conserves judicial resources and best serves the procedure contemplated by Blanchard.” Id.4 As Federal District Court Judge Dalton explained in Batchelor v. Geico Casualty Co., Florida’s district courts have powers of plenary review that allow review of a UM verdict for potential errors: [O]rders granting remittiturs are reviewed for abuse of discretion; on review, the appellate courts must look at whether the verdict was so high as to be against the manifest weight of the evidence. See, e.g., Normius v. Eckerd Corp., 813 So. 2d 985, 988 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). Similarly, orders granting judgment notwithstanding the verdict are reviewed de novo; there, appellate courts must look to whether any reasonable jury could have rendered the verdict. See, e.g., Duclos v. Richardson, 113 So. 3d 1001, 1003-04 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). In both of these instances, even though there is a judgment that is different than the verdict, the appellate courts can and must review the verdict and the evidence supporting the verdict to determine whether the judgment was appropriate. 2014 WL 3906312, at  (footnote omitted).5 4. The insurer sought review of Paton in this Court. Because Paton also involved the issue of whether the parties may rely on the determination of damages made in the UM case in the subsequent first-party bad faith action between the same insurer and insured, we stayed review of Paton pending disposition of this case. Geico Gen. Ins. Co. v. Paton, No. SC15-63 (Fla. Sup. Ct. order filed Apr. 9, 2015). 5. This issue of the binding effect of the underlying verdict for damages in excess of the policy limits and the ability to appeal the verdict for errors appears to have created concerns for Federal District Court judges in Florida. At least four Federal District Court judges—Judges Kovachevich, Presnell, and Williams, in addition to Judge Dalton in Batchelor—have concluded that the jury determination of the full extent of the damages in the UM action becomes a binding element of the damages recoverable in the subsequent first-party bad faith claim, with the - 27 - Alternatively, other trial courts have entered a partial final judgment for the amount of damages, recognizing the right to appellate review of a partial final judgment. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Ill. v. Rader, 132 So. 3d 941, 948 (Fla. 1st issue of the right to appeal the underlying verdict becoming central. See Wiggins, 2015 WL 1396583, at  (finding that the initial action between the insurer and the insured fixes the amount of damages in the first-party bad faith action and rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that there was no right to appeal from the underlying UM judgment); Cadle v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 6:13-cv-1591-Orl-31GJK, 2014 WL 4983791, at  (M.D. Fla. Oct. 6, 2014) (expressing some concern about the scope of review in considering alleged errors in the UM verdict that exceeds the policy limits but stating that “the current state of law in Florida does not support [the insurer]’s position” that the UM jury verdict is not binding as a measure of damages in the bad faith action); Bottini v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 8:13–CV– 365–T–17AEP, 2014 WL 4749054, at  (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2014) (concluding that the amount of damages is necessarily determined in the underlying UM action, and that there was no failure of due process because the insurer had the opportunity to and did raise the issue of excessive damages by post-trial motions and on appeal). Accord Thorne v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 8:14–CV–827–T– 17AEP, 2015 WL 809530, at  (M.D. Fla. Feb. 25, 2015); Lawton-Davis v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 6:14–cv–1157–Orl–37GJK, 2014 WL 6674458, at  (M.D. Fla. Nov. 24, 2014). On the other hand, in King v. Government Employees Insurance Co., No. 8:10-cv-977-T-30AEP, 2012 WL 4052271 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 2012), aff’d by 579 Fed. Appx. 796, 802-803 (11th Cir. 2014), Judge Moody determined that the underlying verdict in excess of the policy limits was not binding because it had not been reviewed on appeal. And in Harris v. Geico General Insurance Co., 961 F.Supp. 2d 1223 (S.D. Fla. 2013), aff’d by 619 Fed. Appx. 896 (11th Cir. 2015), Judge Ryskamp concluded that the jury verdict in the underlying UM case was not the proper measure of damages in the first-party bad faith action. In both cases, on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals declined to address the issue of whether the excess verdict in the underlying UM action was binding as to damages in the subsequent first-party bad faith action because it affirmed the decision that the insurer was found by the jury not to have acted in bad faith. King, 579 Fed. Appx. 796 at 802-803; Harris, 619 Fed. Appx. at 898. - 28 - DCA 2014). As set forth in Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.110(k), partial final judgments are reviewable either on appeal from the partial final judgment or on appeal from the final judgment in the entire case. Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(k). A partial final judgment, other than one that disposes of an entire case as to any party, is one that disposes of a separate and distinct cause of action that is “not interdependent with other pleaded claims.” Jay A. Yagoda, Early Appellate Remedies: Partial Final Judgments, 87 Fla. B.J. 30 (2013). Any of these views reflect that the parties can and should be afforded appellate review of the UM verdict for properly preserved trial court error. We also disagree with the view taken by the Second District Court of Appeal in Bottini, in which it held that “even if Geico were correct that errors may have affected the jury’s computation of damages,” any errors in the jury’s computation of damages were “harmless” in the “context of [the] case and the amount of the judgment.” 93 So. 3d at 477. We reject the suggestion that errors in the computation of the UM verdict are necessarily harmless where the damages reflected in the UM verdict are significant relative to the UM policy limits because the damages will eventually become part of the subsequent bad faith case. In fact, that is precisely what occurred in the bad faith litigation following Bottini. When the Bottini litigants proceeded with the bad faith case, Judge Kovachevich came to the conclusion that the amount of damages is necessarily determined in the - 29 - underlying UM action and also determined that the insurer failed to pursue further relief to review the Second District’s decision. See Bottini v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., No. 8:13–CV–365–T–17AEP, 2014 WL 4749054, at  (M.D. Fla. Sept. 23, 2014). For all these reasons, we conclude that the determination of damages obtained in the UM action becomes a binding element of damages in the subsequent bad faith litigation against the same insurer and that the parties have the opportunity to appeal timely-raised errors in the UM verdict. We now turn to this case.