Opinion ID: 2032140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Requirement of Causation.

Text: The parties do not dispute causation is an element of the tort theories alleged by the Gersts. See Hyler v. Garner, 548 N.W.2d 864, 873 (Iowa 1996) (including proximate cause as an element of fraudulent misrepresentation); Hagen, 526 N.W.2d at 537 (noting common-law strict liability theories require showing of proximate cause); Bickford v. American Interinsurance Exch., 224 N.W.2d 450, 455-56 (Iowa 1974) (negligence is actionable only if it is a proximate cause of injury). The parties disagree, however, on whether causation is an element of a citizen action under Iowa Code section 455B.111. Chapter 455B and the administrative rules implementing it regulate the handling of releases from USTs and the removal of USTs. See Iowa Code §§ 455B.471-.479 (1993); Iowa Admin.Code ch. 567-135 (1996). Section 455B.111 allows citizen actions to enforce chapter 455B and the governing regulations: 1. Except as provided in subsection 2, a person with standing as provided in subsection 3 may commence a civil action in district court on the person's own behalf against any of the following: a. A person, including the state of Iowa, for violating any provision of this chapter or a rule adopted pursuant to this chapter. Iowa Code § 455B.111(1) (1993) (emphasis added). A person has standing if the person is adversely affected by the alleged violation. Id. § 455B.111(3) (emphasis added). We conclude the standing requirement incorporates causation as an element of a section 455B.111 action. When we apply a statute, we give the words used by the legislature their plain and ordinary meaning unless the words are defined by the legislature or have a particular and definite meaning in law. State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 272 (Iowa 1996). Chapter 455B does not define the phrase adversely affected by, nor are we aware of any particular legal meaning given to this phrase. Consequently, we look to the dictionary definition of these words. See id.; State v. Romeo, 542 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1996). The dictionary defines adversely as in an adverse or hostile manner. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 31 (1993). The word adverse means in opposition to one's interests: detrimental, unfavorable. Id. Webster's defines affect as to act upon, to produce an effect ... upon, or to produce a material influence upon. Id. at 35. Finally, the preposition by means through the means or instrumentality of, through the work or operation of, or in consequence of; as a result of. Id. at 307. Based on the ordinary meaning of these words, we conclude a person adversely affected by the alleged violation is someone whose interests have been unfavorably affected as a result of or in consequence of the statutory violation. In other words, to have standing to bring a citizen action under section 455B.111, a plaintiff must be able to prove he has been damaged as a result of the defendant's conduct. We conclude the statutory language implicitly includes a causation requirement. Cf. Hagen, 526 N.W.2d at 537 (noting statutes imposing liability on animal owners for damages done by the animal implicitly require[ ] a causal connection between the animal's actions and the damages sought by the plaintiff). To avoid a causation requirement under section 455B.111, the Gersts rely on cases interpreting the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1995), as eliminating the need to establish a causal connection between the release of a defendant's hazardous substances and the plaintiff's cleanup costs. See, e.g., Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Morrison-Quirk Grain Corp., 987 F.2d 1335, 1339 (8th Cir.1993) (liability under CERCLA is not dependent on any showing of causation or fault); United States v. Alcan Aluminum Co., 964 F.2d 252, 265 (3rd Cir.1992) ([V]irtually every court that has considered this question has held that a CERCLA plaintiff need not establish a direct causal connection between the defendant's hazardous substances and the release or the plaintiff's incurrence of response costs.). The problem with this reasoning is the Gersts are not basing their claim on a federal statute; their claim is based on section 455B.111. CERCLA was drafted specifically to exclude the concept of causation as an element of recovery. United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 169-70 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156, 104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989). The language of section 455B.111 is significantly different. Compare Iowa Code § 455B.111 (1993) with 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1995). Therefore, the cases interpreting CERCLA are inapposite. The Gersts contend requiring causal connection confuses causation with standing. We have held, however, that a complaining party, to have standing, must have a specific, personal, and legal interest in the litigation, and be injuriously affected.  Hawkeye Bancorporation v. Iowa College Aid Comm'n, 360 N.W.2d 798, 801 (Iowa 1985) (emphasis added) (adopting two-prong test for standing). Thus, even traditional standing principles anticipate a causal relationship between a plaintiff's interests and the challenged conduct. Consequently, our interpretation of section 455B.111(3) is consistent with the legislature's use of the word standing rather than causation. In conclusion, to bring an action under section 455B.111, the Gersts must have standing. To show standing as defined in section 455B.111(3), they must establish the Marshalls' violation of chapter 455B.111 caused harm to the Gersts. Consequently, causation is an element of recovery in a citizen action brought pursuant to chapter 455B. We now consider whether a factual question was generated on the issue of causation.