Opinion ID: 2333284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the district court commit plain error by admitting hearsay testimony by one of the state's witnesses?

Text: [¶ 9] The appellant argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of hearsay testimony at his trial. Because no objection was made to the testimony at trial, we will review for plain error. Schreibvogel v. State, 2010 WY 45, ¶ 26, 228 P.3d 874, 884 (Wyo. 2010). To establish plain error the appellant must prove the following three requirements: (1) that the record clearly reflects the alleged error, (2) that a clear and unequivocal rule of law was violated, and (3) that the violation adversely affected a substantial right of [the appellant]'s to his material prejudice. Foster v. State, 2010 WY 8, ¶ 15, 224 P.3d 1, 7 (Wyo.2010). [¶ 10] The prosecution's examination of witness Vitale elicited information regarding the conversation he had with MY when he drove her home from TY's house: [S]he told me that she was pretty sure that she was raped that night because she told me that sheshe thought it was a dream at first and then she woke up and Miachel was on top of her and she felt something inside of her. But she wasn't sure for a while and took her thinking about it [sic] til we got home that she was suresure that it had even happened because she could feel it and remember it. The record is clear as to the alleged error, meeting the first prong of plain error review. [¶ 11] The appellant suggests that this statement amounts to hearsay and thus violates a clear and unequivocal rule of law. Cook v. State, 7 P.3d 53, 56 (Wyo.2000). `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. W.R.E. 801(c). Generally, such a statement is inadmissible, unless some exception applies. W.R.E. 802. One such exception applies to prior statements by witnesses when [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). Four requirements must be satisfied before a prior consistent statement will be properly admissible: (1) The declarant testifies at trial; (2) the declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the prior statement; (3) the prior statement is consistent with the declarant's trial testimony; and (4) the prior statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. Martin v. State, 2007 WY 76, ¶ 26, 157 P.3d 923, 929 (Wyo.2007) (citing Lancaster v. State, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d 80, 88 (Wyo.2002)). In the instant case, the declarant, MY, testified at trial and was subject to cross-examination, meeting the first two requirements. [¶ 12] As to the third requirement that the prior statements be consistent with the declarant's testimony, we have stated that it is the consistency, rather than the substance of the consistent statement, which takes such a statement out of the realm of objectionable hearsay and tends to prove the value of the original statement. Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 17, 43 P.3d at 88-89 (quoting Curl v. State, 898 P.2d 369, 374 (Wyo.1995)). Vitale's testimony, that MY told him she was raped, was consistent with MY's trial testimony. She testified that the defendant inserted his finger into her vagina and attempted to insert his penis into her vagina, both without her permission. Although these statements are not identical, the underlying assertions are consistent. Consistency does not require virtual identity, provided no material difference exists between the two accounts. Curl, 898 P.2d at 374, 375. Both statements consistently assert that the appellant touched MY against her will. [¶ 13] Finally, to fit within the W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) exception, there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper motive. The charge of fabrication or improper motive need not come only as a specific allegation during cross-examination; rather, it may be made by implication or innuendo, and it may be found in the `thrust' of the defenses and testimony presented. Lancaster, 2002 WY 45, ¶ 18, 43 P.3d at 89. The thrust of an argument will not amount to an implication of recent fabrication or improper motive where the argument is merely an attack on the witness's credibility. Marquess v. State, 2011 WY 95, ¶ 15, 256 P.3d 506, 511 (Wyo. 2011). Likewise, [i]t has generally been held in state prosecutions that mere contradiction of a witness through the testimony of other witnesses or through attacks on the witness' reputation for truth or veracity are insufficient grounds for the admissibility of the witness' prior consistent statement. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The thrust of a defense strategy, if merely directed at questioning the witness' credibility, cannot overcome the explicit requirement that the statement is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). [W]e have never held that an 801(d)(1)(B) prior consistent statement is admissible where no charge of recent fabrication, improper motive or influence is made at all. Any suggestion in Lancaster to the contrary is dicta and inconsistent with the plain language of the rule and our precedent. Marquess, 2011 WY 95, ¶ 16 n. 5, 256 P.3d at 512 n. 5. [¶ 14] At trial, the thrust of the appellant's argument in his opening statement was that the appellant reasonably believed that MY had consented to sexual activity. The appellant also argued that MY told conflicting accounts of whether the appellant was on top of her when she woke up. On cross-examination of MY, the appellant questioned MY's honesty regarding the amount of alcohol she drank on the night in question and again suggested she changed her story with regard to whether she woke up with the appellant on top of her or next to her. The appellant also questioned whether MY told the interviewing officer the accurate time she left the Legal Tender. None of this amounts to a charge of recent fabrication or improper motive. The appellant is merely questioning MY's honesty and has not suggested any intervening event that would cause MY to change her story. See Large v. State, 2008 WY 22, ¶ 39, 177 P.3d 807, 819 (Wyo.2008) (Testimony was nonhearsay under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) where there were accusations that the children's testimony was influenced and fabricated as the result of interviews with teachers and counselors.); Proffit v. State, 2008 WY 103, ¶ 29, 191 P.3d 974, 982 (Wyo.2008) (Nonhearsay under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) where witness was accused of lying to gain leniency for himself); Alicea v. State, 13 P.3d 693, 699 (Wyo.2000) (Accusations of improper motive existed where the children testifying were accused of fabricating their testimony to get back at the appellant who banned them from his church youth group.). [¶ 15] Not only must there be an accusation of recent fabrication or improper motive or influence due to some intervening event, the purpose of introducing the prior statement must be to rebut such an accusation. It seems evident that the fabrication of which the declarant is accused must relate to the prior consistent statement in that both statements support the same contention. Otherwise, the prior statement necessarily cannot serve to rebut such an accusation. Here, the appellant challenged the veracity of MY's testimony regarding what time she left the Legal Tender and whether the appellant was on top of her or next to her at the time of the attack. To qualify as 801(d)(1)(B) nonhearsay, MY's prior statement to Vitale that she told me ... she was raped would have had to rebut an accusation that MY lied about what time she left the bar or where the appellant was positioned when he touched her. The prior statement was not offered to rebut an express or implied charge against MY of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive, however, and therefore the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. [¶ 16] Although Vitale's testimony included inadmissible hearsay, the appellant was not denied a substantial right, and therefore was not materially prejudiced. The elements of the crime of sexual assault were submitted to the jury as follows: 1. On or about the 9th day of January, 2010 2. In Uinta County, Wyoming 3. The Defendant, Michael [sic] Maier 4. Inflicted sexual intrusion on [MY] by putting his finger into her vagina[ [1] ] 5. When [MY] was physically helpless, and 6. Defendant knew or reasonably should have known that [MY], the victim, was physically helpless and had not consented. Neither the date, nor the location of the incident, nor the identity of the appellant were contested. In his testimony, the appellant acknowledged that he put his finger into MY's vagina and that he touched her vagina with his penis in an attempt to have sex with MY. [¶ 17] Physically helpless is defined as unconscious, asleep or otherwise physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-301(a)(iii) (LexisNexis 2011). The emphasis is on the victim's inability to communicate, rather than any size or power differentials between the victim and the aggressor. Haynes v. State, 2008 WY 75, ¶ 21, 186 P.3d 1204, 1209 (Wyo.2008). The appellant testified that MY was intoxicated at the bar and that he offered MY a ride to TY's apartment because he was concerned that she was too drunk to drive and that MY continued to drink once they arrived at the apartment. He further stated that MY soon ended up on the floor of the bathroom, hugging the toilet, and needed to be physically removed so that other people could use the restroom. MY returned to the bathroom, again preventing others from using the facilities. Despite the fact that MY had visited TY's apartment a number of times and was certainly well aware that the apartment contained only one bathroom, in her diminished capacity she told the other guests to use the second restroom. The appellant described MY's condition while in the bathroom: She was kind of just laying there [in the bathroom] on the pile of clothes that we had in there, kind of hugging them. She wasI couldn't tell if she was really passed out or somewhat coherent. She was moving a little bit, but that's all I could tell. I couldn't tell if she was really passed out or not. The appellant observed MY crawling and stumbling toward the bedroom. The appellant also testified that MY was having a hard time speaking: Q: From the time she wasyou were helping her out of the bathroom to the time you guys were getting in the bed was there any conversation going on? A: She was trying to say something to me, but I couldn't understand her. Q: Okay. Did you say anything to her? A: I just kept saying, All right. Let's go, you drunk. After the appellant helped MY into the bed, he got into bed behind her and adjusted her underwear to ease his access to her vagina. [¶ 18] In CSC v. State, the appellant appealed his conviction of aiding and abetting in the commission of first-degree sexual assault. 2005 WY 106, ¶ 12, 118 P.3d 970, 974 (Wyo.2005). As in the instant case, conviction required that the appellant knew or reasonably should have known that [the victim] was physically helpless. Id. CSC observed the victim participate in a chugging contest, and saw her stumble as her assailant helped her to the bedroom. Id. at ¶ 15, 118 P.3d at 974. He also witnessed the assailant remove the victim's clothes and knew that he intended to have sexual intercourse with the victim. Id. at ¶ 14, 118 P.3d at 974. This Court ruled that the foregoing was a sufficient factual basis to support a guilty plea. Id. at ¶ 15, 118 P.3d at 974. Likewise, here, the appellant testified that he observed MY drinking to the point of intoxication, that she passed out on the bathroom floor, that she was unable to walk, and that he could not understand her when she tried to speak. Although the appellant disputes that he pulled down her pants, he testified that he adjusted her underwear so he could touch her vagina. It is irrelevant that the appellant thought MY was enjoying this or that she may have been flirtatious earlier. The appellant reasonably should have known that she was incapable of conveying a lack of consent and was therefore physically helpless. The appellant admitted to all of the elements of the crime other than MY's physical helplessness, and on that point he provided the jury with sufficient testimony to convict. The appellant was not denied a substantial right as a result of the admission of hearsay and therefore was not prejudiced.