Opinion ID: 167775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: M arch 31, 2003.

Text: The district court found that Thornton was responsible for 7.1 grams of crack he obtained from his co-defendant Kenneth Charles (“K.C.”) Brown on M arch 31, 2003. At trial, the Government played a recording of two telephone 11 “The Guidelines require a sentencing court to consider ‘relevant conduct’ at sentencing, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, including uncharged drug quantities if they are part of the same conduct for which the defendant was convicted.” United States v. Hauk, 412 F.3d 1179, 1195 (10th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted). Thornton did not challenge at sentencing, and does not challenge now on appeal, that these seven transactions are part of the relevant conduct on which his sentence should be based. In calculating the relevant drug quantity under the guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 provides that where there is “an agreement to sell a controlled substance,” the district court can use the amount agreed upon unless “the defendant establishes that he or she did not intend to provide, or was not reasonably capable of providing, the agreed-upon quantity of the controlled substance.” Id., application note 12. - 10 - calls 12 made that night between Thornton’s girlfriend, Elizabeth Lyons, and Brown, an admitted drug dealer. 13 During the first call, Thornton can be heard in the background directing Lyons to ask questions and relay information to Brown. During that call, Lyons tells Brown they need “one of them.” Brown testified that what Lyons meant by “one of them” w as one-quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams, of crack. During the second call, Lyons told Brown that Thornton had asked her to call and see if they could get it now. Brown testified that after that second call, Thornton came over to Brown’s home that same evening and bought a quarter ounce of crack. Police officers followed Thornton and were able to verify that he did briefly go to Brown’s home that night. The jury found that Thornton had used the telephone on this date to facilitate a drug transaction, but acquitted him of possessing crack with the intent to distribute. It may be that jurors acquitted Thornton of possessing the crack because they did not find Brow n’s testimony credible. 14 It was only Brow n’s 12 Neither party has provided this court with the tapes of the telephone calls at issue in this case. W e, therefore, rely on the trial testimony describing the contents of these calls. 13 In this same prosecution, Brown had previously pled guilty to being one of two leaders of a drug trafficking conspiracy involving cocaine, crack, and marijuana. 14 Alternatively, jurors may have found that Thornton possessed this amount of crack, but did not intend to distribute it. There was conflicting evidence presented at trial on the question of whether Thornton could have been purchasing this amount of crack for personal use instead of intending to resell it. It was (continued...) - 11 - testimony that would have supported the jury finding that Thornton actually obtained any crack that night. Likewise, it was only Brown’s testimony that would have supported a finding that Thornton’s wanting “one of them” meant that he was specifically seeking to buy a quarter ounce, or 7.1 grams, of crack. If, as may be the case, the jury did not find Brown’s testimony credible as to the fact 14 (...continued) unclear from the evidence whether Thornton even used crack, and if so, how much he used and with what frequency. The evidence did establish that Thornton’s girlfriend, Lyons, was a crack addict, but there was again no evidence as to the frequency and amounts she used. During at least one of the taped telephone calls, Lyons commented to Brown about how good the stuff was that Thornton had just obtained from Brown, suggesting that Lyons had used at least some of the crack Thornton had bought from Brown. Brown testified that a person could individually use the amount of crack Thornton purchased from him, although Brown believed Thornton was instead reselling it to his own customers. On the other hand, several Government witnesses testified that, in their experience with crack addicts, one-quarter ounce of crack was too large a quantity for personal use and so Thornton must have been purchasing this amount of crack for resale. Further, there are several references during the taped telephone calls indicating that Thornton had customers to whom he was going to sell the crack he obtained from Brown. The Government, however, was unable to produce any evidence tending to prove that Thornton actually did resell any of the crack. The evidence, then, was disputed as to whether or not Thornton could have himself used all the crack he purportedly purchased from Brown, or instead whether he resold most of that crack to his own customers. So it may be that the jury acquitted Thornton of possessing the crack on M arch 31 because the Government did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Thornton actually possessed the crack. On the other hand, the jury may have acquitted Thornton of possessing the crack with the intent to distribute because the Government failed to prove that Thornton intended to distribute the crack instead of use it personally. In light of that ambiguity, the Government cannot meet its burden on appeal of establishing that a jury, had it been asked, would have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Thornton obtained 7.1 grams of crack on M arch 31, 2003. - 12 - that Thornton actually bought crack from Brown that night, then there is no reason to think that the jury would, nevertheless, have found Brown’s testimony credible as to the amount of crack that was being discussed over the telephone. At a minimum, then, the evidence is sufficiently equivocal that the Government cannot establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, had it been asked, would have found Thornton responsible for a transaction involving 7.1 grams of crack on this date.