Opinion ID: 2763094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FOIA Fees

Text: We review a district court’s determination of attorneys fees “for abuse of discretion, assessing fact findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” 18 FOIA authorizes the district court to “assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case . . . in which the complainant has substantially prevailed.” 19 To prevail substantially, the complainant in a FOIA action must obtain relief either by (1) “judicial order, or an enforceable written agreement or consent decree” or (2) “a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the agency, if the complainant’s claim is not insubstantial.” 20 This second theory of causation requires the plaintiff to show that “prosecution of the action could reasonably be regarded as necessary to obtain the information and that the action had a substantive causative effect on the delivery of the information.” 21 When deciding whether to award attorneys fees under FOIA, the district court must conduct a two-step inquiry, asking first “whether a plaintiff has substantially prevailed” according to the statutory definition of the term (“eligibility”). 22 If the plaintiff has thus prevailed, the court then “determine[s] whether the plaintiff should receive fees” (“entitlement”). 23 18 Batton v. I.R.S., 718 F.3d 522, 525 (5th Cir. 2013). 19 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E)(i) (2013). 20 Id. § 552(a)(4)(E)(ii). 21 Batton, 718 F.3d at 525 (quoting Lovell v. Alderete, 630 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir. 1980)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 22 Id. (quoting Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 23 Id. (quoting Brayton, 641 F.3d at 524) (internal quotation mark omitted). These factors are “(1) the benefit to the public deriving from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the complainant; (3) the nature of the complainant’s interest in the records sought; and (4) whether the government’s withholding of the records had a reasonable basis in law.” Id. at 527 (quoting Texas v. I.C.C, 935 F.2d 728, 730 (5th Cir. 1991)). 8 Case: 14-30296 Document: 00512876525 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/19/2014 No. 14-30296 If the district court concludes that a fee award is appropriate, it must then determine the amount of that award, again by a two-step process: First the court calculates the “lodestar” which is equal to the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the prevailing hourly rate in the community for similar work. The court should exclude all time that is excessive, duplicative, or inadequately documented. Once the lodestar amount is calculated, the court can adjust it based on the twelve factors set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc. 24 The circumstances of the case and the Johnson factors allow either upward or downward adjustments of the lodestar. 25 This fact-intensive process is committed to the discretion of the district court, 26 which must “provide ‘a reasonably specific explanation for all aspects of a fee determination.’” 27
In two comprehensive opinions, the district court ruled that DaSilva was eligible for and entitled to fees under FOIA, but it questioned the amount requested and awarded only $4,170, less than ten percent of the initial application for $45,282.50. DaSilva makes numerous objections, which we consolidate into four groups: (1) The district court erred in awarding fees only 24 Jimenez v. Wood Cnty., Tex., 621 F.3d 372, 379–80 (5th Cir. 2010), on reh’g en banc, 660 F.3d 841 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The twelve Johnson factors are (1) the time and labor required for the litigation; (2) the novelty and complication of the issues; (3) the skill required to properly litigate the issues; (4) whether the attorney had to refuse other work to litigate the case; (5) the attorney's customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) whether the client or case circumstances imposed any time constraints; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) whether the case was “undesirable;” (11) the type of attorney-client relationship and whether that relationship was long-standing; and (12) awards made in similar cases. Johnson v. Ga. Highway Exp., Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717–19 (5th Cir. 1974), abrogated on other grounds by Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87 (1989). 25 Rutherford v. Harris Cnty., Tex., 197 F.3d 173, 192 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 552 (2010) (“[A]lthough we have never sustained an enhancement of a lodestar amount for performance, we have repeatedly said that enhancements may be awarded in ‘rare’ and ‘exceptional’ circumstances.” (citation committed)). 26 Watkins v. Fordice, 7 F.3d 453, 457 (5th Cir. 1993). 27 Jimenez, 621 F.3d at 380 (quoting Perdue, 559 U.S. at 558). 9 Case: 14-30296 Document: 00512876525 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/19/2014 No. 14-30296 for work related to the second set of documents, but not the first set; (2) the court abused its discretion in setting Counsel’s hourly rate at $200; (3) the court inappropriately made percentage-based reductions to the total hours; and (4) the court should have granted fees for specific activities ancillary to the FOIA litigation, such as litigating the fee dispute and reviewing the produced documents. We consider each group of objections in turn. First, DaSilva makes much of the district court’s analytical approach, contending that the court was wrong to divide his FOIA cause of action into two parts and withhold fees as to the “judicially created first part.” He fails to recognize, however, that FOIA’s fee-shifting provision does not guarantee him the entirety of his fee request. Under FOIA, the district court determines if the plaintiff is eligible for and entitled to any fee award. The district court then determines the amount of the award in accordance with our general precedents on attorneys fees. As such, DaSilva’s objection is more properly understood as a challenge to the amount of the award. 28 Thus viewed, we find no error in the district court’s rulings, as fees may be awarded only for hours reasonably expended. 29 We agree with the district court that USCIS’s processing of the first set of documents did not reflect “the sort of dilatory litigation tactics that [the attorneys fees] provision was aimed to prevent.” 30 We further agree that DaSilva’s FOIA strategy—submitting his request on December 3, 2012, and waiting precisely the statutory minimum of twenty business days before filing his complaint on January 4, 2013— 28 We also note that the district court divided its resolution of the FOIA fee application entirely because of severe errors in Counsel’s initial timesheet, which prevented the court from making a fee award in FOIA Order I. This initial timesheet contained entries entirely unrelated to DaSilva’s FOIA claim, such as hours associated with the PRC litigation. 29 See Jimenez, 621 F.3d at 379–80; see also Sojourner T v. Edwards, 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that we may “affirm on any grounds supported by the record”). 30 Mobley v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F. Supp. 2d 42, 48 (D.D.C. 2012). 10 Case: 14-30296 Document: 00512876525 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/19/2014 No. 14-30296 demonstrates a “resort to the ‘squeaky wheel’ technique of prematurely filing suit in an effort to secure preferential treatment” that the FOIA fee-shifting scheme “was not meant to reward.” 31 DaSilva offers no evidence that his lawsuit “could reasonably be regarded as necessary” or that it “had a substantive causative effect on the delivery” of the first set of documents. 32 Without any persuasive demonstration of causality, hours expended in relation to the first set of documents are excessive. 33 The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding them from the fee award. Second, DaSilva claims that $200 per hour is not an appropriate “prevailing rate” for attorneys with Counsel’s level of experience. The district court’s “determination of a ‘reasonable hourly rate’ is a finding of fact . . . reviewable under the clearly-erroneous rubric.” 34 The rate must be “in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation.” 35 Here, the district court based its determination on a review of case law from the Eastern District of Louisiana and cited, as one example, a case in which an attorney with seven years of experience—the same as Counsel—was awarded $185 per hour. DaSilva urges us to rely on a single recent FOIA case in which an attorney with eight years of experience was awarded a rate of $300 per hour. 36 But even 31 Arevalo-Franco v. I.N.S., 772 F. Supp. 959, 961 (W.D. Tex. 1991) (quoting Fund for Constitutional Gov’t v. Nat’l Archives, 656 F.2d 856, 871 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 32 The record indicates that the government initiated a search for DaSilva’s A-File before the lawsuit was filed on January 3, 2013. Although the requested material was not released until February 12, FOIA disclosures must be reviewed for exemptions, a process which can take some time. There is nothing to suggest that DaSilva’s lawsuit had any impact on the timing of this initial disclosure. 33 Alternatively, they could have been excluded under the Johnson factor that adjusts the lodestar according to “results obtained.” 34 Islamic Ctr. of Miss. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 876 F.2d 465, 468 (5th Cir. 1989). 35 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 896 (1984). 36 See Hernandez v. U.S. Customs & Border Prot. Agency, No. 10-4602, 2012 WL 398328, at  (E.D. La. Feb. 7, 2012). 11 Case: 14-30296 Document: 00512876525 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/19/2014 No. 14-30296 in that case, $300 per hour appeared to be atypically high. 37 Although it was within that court’s discretion to award a high hourly rate, the district court in this case did not clearly err in staying within the middle of the range. Third, DaSilva challenges as insufficiently detailed the district court’s use of percentage-based reductions. The district court was forced to fall back on these reductions, however, because Counsel’s revised timesheet still failed to differentiate between FOIA claims and non-FOIA claims, and between hours expended in relation to the first versus the second set of documents. 38 The district court’s calculations result from Counsel’s own failure to document adequately or justify his time entries, despite the court’s very clear instruction to do so. Moreover, in light of the serious concerns that the district court repeatedly expressed about Counsel’s timesheets, an additional fifteen percent reduction for lack of billing judgment was not an abuse of discretion. 39 Fourth, DaSilva contends that the district court erred in excluding some hours spent by Counsel on ancillary matters; in particular on litigating the fee dispute and reviewing documents produced pursuant to FOIA. As to the issue of “fees on fees,” the district court found that this additional fee litigation was the result of Counsel’s initial failure to keep an accurate timesheet. 40 It is within the district court’s wide discretion to award or deny fees on fees, based 37 See id. (listing nine cases, in which hourly rates for attorneys with seven or eight years of experience ranged from $180 to $240 per hour). 38 See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434–36 (1983) (discussing the possibility of a fee reduction if the prevailing party only succeeded on some of his claims). 39 See Saizan v. Delta Concrete Prods. Co., 448 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 2006) (“[T]he District Court faulted Plaintiffs for vagueness, duplicative work, and not indicating time written off as excessive or unproductive. Plaintiffs unconvincingly argue that the lodestar amount should not be reduced for neglecting to list unbilled time.”); cf. Hernandez, 2012 WL 398328, at  (“Additionally, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s counsel have exercised reasonable billing judgment by excluding hours spent by legal assistants, and by voluntarily reducing their total request by 10%.”). 40 Counsel had a duty to file a reasonable initial fee motion. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434 (“Counsel for the prevailing party should make a good faith effort to exclude from a fee request hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary . . . .”). 12 Case: 14-30296 Document: 00512876525 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/19/2014 No. 14-30296 on its evaluation of the merits of the underlying fee request. 41 On the issue of fees for reviewing FOIA productions, there is no precedent in this court. In light of this, and considering our deferential standard of review, the district court’s decision to deny fees is not an abuse of discretion.
We review a district court’s grant or denial of a motion for extension of time for abuse of discretion. 42 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) allows the district court to grant a party’s motion to file an untimely pleading on a showing of good cause and “if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.” 43 We have said that “‘excusable neglect’ under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat ‘elastic concept’ and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of the movant.” 44 In evaluating a party’s claim of excusable neglect, the district court may consider the danger of prejudice to the opposing party, the length and impact of the delay, the reason for the delay, and the moving party’s good faith. 45 The district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing USCIS to file an untimely opposition to DaSilva’s revised motion for attorneys fees. The government mistakenly and in good faith believed that DaSilva’s second motion for FOIA fees was merely supplemental to the first and could not be opposed. When alerted to its misunderstanding, the government immediately 41 Cf. La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 336 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that refusing to award fees for costs litigation when the prevailing party “recovered only part of the costs and fees it requested . . . fell well within the district court’s proper exercise of its discretion”). 42 See Geiserman v. MacDonald, 893 F.2d 787, 793 (5th Cir. 1990); see also McCarty v. Thaler, 376 F. App’x 442, 443 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“The permissive language of Rule 6(b) shows that any grant of an extension of time for when an act must be done falls to the district court’s discretion.”). 43 FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b)(1)(B). 44 Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993). 45 See Adams v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn., 465 F.3d 156, 168 (5th Cir. 2006). 13 Case: 14-30296 Document: 00512876525 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/19/2014 No. 14-30296 requested a brief extension of time and filed its memorandum in opposition within three days. This untimely filing resulted in a delay of only six business days to the consideration of DaSilva’s motion. Moreover, DaSilva was not prejudiced by the government’s untimely opposition. Considering that the district court had sua sponte questioned several of Counsel’s original timesheet entries, the court’s close scrutiny of the revised timesheet would have occurred even without the government’s untimely opposition. DaSilva’s entire claim of prejudice rests on the alleged ex parte communication between counsel for USCIS and the district court’s law clerk. This contact was purely administrative, however, and does not qualify as a proscribed ex parte communication. 46 Given the government’s good faith misunderstanding, the minimal delay, and the lack of prejudice to DaSilva, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the government’s motion.