Opinion ID: 2207277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal of Amendment Claiming Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.

Text: Prior to trial, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their petition to assert a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The trial court refused to allow the amendment. It did not indicate in this ruling that the proffered amendment was untimely but, rather, found that the factual allegations did not give rise to such a claim. No specific offer of proof was made at the time of this ruling. Considering the totality of the evidence adduced at trial, however, we find no basis for having included such a claim in the issues submitted to the jury. We need not base this determination on whether the degree of emotional distress, if any, which plaintiffs were shown to have suffered was sufficient to sustain an intentional infliction claim. The court must first determine whether the relevant conduct of the defendant was sufficiently outrageous to permit such a claim. See Roalson v. Chaney, 334 N.W.2d 754, 756 (Iowa 1983). In making that determination, we have followed the requirement set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 46 comment d. For conduct to be sufficiently outrageous to permit an intentional infliction claim, it must go beyond all possible bounds of decency and be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Harsha v. State Sav. Bank, 346 N.W.2d 791, 801 (Iowa 1984). Indeed, we have recognized that it is not even sufficient that the conduct in question would have entitled the plaintiff to punitive damages. Vinson v. Linn-Mar Community School Dist., 360 N.W.2d 108, 118 (Iowa 1984). Judged by these standards, defendant's conduct, as shown by the evidence, fell far below that which is required in order to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.