Opinion ID: 1813096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying investigator joe smith's testimony.

Text: ¶ 15. The standard of review for the admission or exclusion of evidence is abuse of discretion. Brown v. State, 969 So.2d 855, 860 (Miss.2007) (citing Poole v. Avara, 908 So.2d 716, 721 (Miss.2005)). The relevancy and admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial court and reversal may be had only where that discretion has been abused. Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.1990) (citing Hentz v. State, 542 So.2d 914, 917 (Miss.1989); Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592, 599 (Miss.1988)). ¶ 16. Croft contends the trial court erred by not allowing the testimony of Investigator Joe Smith, a narcotics investigator with the Bolivar County Sheriff's Department, who did not participate in the robbery investigation conducted by the Bolivar County police. Croft proffered Smith's testimony for the court's determination as to what parts would be admissible for his defense. Croft maintains that Smith would have testified that Mac's Place was being investigated for both drug and gambling activity, and that McKnight had served time in federal prison for a drug crime. Croft asserts this testimony would have supported his defense theory, which was as follows: McKnight was running a crooked game of dice the night of September 15, and because Croft had threatened to inform the police about illegal gaming at Mac's Place if McKnight did not return Croft's money, McKnight was biased and had an interest in testifying against Croft. ¶ 17. On proffer, Smith testified that Croft approached him shortly after Croft's arrest for the armed robbery with information regarding drug activity at Mac's Place. Smith first put Croft in contact with an agent for the Drug Enforcement Agency, but nothing transpired from that meeting. Smith thereafter initiated his own drug investigation into Mac's Place. At the time of Croft's trial, Smith indicated he was still gathering intelligence and information about drug activity at the establishment. Smith stated he had no knowledge concerning illegal gambling activity at the establishment. Finally, when asked whether he knew if McKnight had served time in federal prison for drugs, Smith said he thought he heard that McKnight had, but was not sure. ¶ 18. The trial court ruled Smith's testimony inadmissible under Mississippi Rules of Evidence 608 and 609. [1] The trial court determined that Smith had insufficient knowledge pertaining either to McKnight's prior federal conviction or to illegal gambling activity at the establishment. The trial court also ruled that Smith's ongoing drug investigation was irrelevant. The trial court ruled, however, that because gambling may have been involved on the night of the robbery, Croft would be permitted to probe the issue further during his cross-examination of the State's witnesses. Croft also would be permitted to test the veracity of their testimony through inquiry with regard to any arrests made for illegal gambling, if such arrests were contemporaneous with the robbery matter at hand. But Croft would not be permitted to introduce Smith's testimony as extrinsic evidence for the purpose of impeaching the State's witnesses. ¶ 19. Croft argues the trial court failed to consider Mississippi Rule of Evidence 616, which provides for the admission of evidence for the purpose of showing the bias, prejudice, or interest of a witness. See Miss. R. Evid. 616. For support, Croft relies on McLemore v. State , wherein this Court reversed an armed-robbery conviction, inter alia, on the ground that the defendant was not permitted to testify on direct examination to the bias and prejudice of his arresting officers. See McLemore v. State, 669 So.2d 19, 25 (Miss.1996) (five-four decision) (Smith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [2] We are not persuaded. ¶ 20. In McLemore, following McLemore's arrest for the robbery at issue in that case, his arresting officers also questioned him about a murder that had taken place near the location where McLemore was alleged to have committed the robbery. Id. at 23-24. It was later determined, however, that the murder had been committed while McLemore was in custody. Id. The majority found this information relevant and material to the central issue in the case. Id. at 25. The majority reasoned that because the officers had wrongly suspected McLemore's involvement in an unrelated murder while still investigating him for the robbery matter, their suspicion could have had an adverse impact on their on going robbery investigation. [3] Id. Therefore, the majority held that McLemore should have been allowed to testify about the alleged possible bias or prejudice on the part of the investigating officers. Id. at 27. ¶ 21. McLemore, however, provides no solace for Croft's argument. Unlike McLemore, there is no doubt here that Smith's proffered testimony revealed nothing other than a collateral matter. As this Court has long held, a matter is collateral if it is not one embodying a fact substantive in its nature and relevant to the issue made in the case. Lee v. State, 944 So.2d 35, 43 (Miss.2006) (quoting Williams v. State, 73 Miss. 820, 824, 19 So. 826, 827 (1896)). And it is error to allow a witness to be contradicted on an immaterial (or collateral) matter. Johnson v. State, 655 So.2d 37, 41 (Miss.1995) (quoting Price v. Simpson, 205 So.2d 642, 643 (Miss.1968) (footnote omitted)). ¶ 22. The trial court essentially found Smith's ongoing drug investigation to be a matter wholly unrelated and immaterial to any of the issues likely to be addressed in the State's case against Croft. The record supports this finding. Not only did the drug investigation begin after the alleged armed robbery, but there was no showing whatsoever that McKnight knew anything about it. The fact that Smith was conducting a drug investigation simply had no substantive bearing on the relevant attendant circumstances ( res gestae ) surrounding the night Croft was alleged to have committed the armed robbery. Injecting it into the case would have served no purpose other than to unfairly prejudice the State's case by confusing the jury with inconclusive information that one of the State's witnesses was being investigated for drug activity. Our trial courts have the responsibility, within judicial discretion, to confine testimony to the issues before them. Hannah v. State, 336 So.2d 1317, 1321 (Miss.1976). ¶ 23. Further, Smith's testimony also revealed that he had no knowledge concerning gambling activity at the establishment; nor did he know for sure whether McKnight had served time in federal prison. [4] His testimony therefore offered no impeachment value, and established no substantive evidence regarding bias, prejudice, or motive on the part of McKnight. The trial court correctly excluded it. Croft's argument is without merit.