Opinion ID: 2634854
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Prevailing Social and Cultural Standards of the Relevant Indian Community Have Only Limited Application in Determining Whether Good Cause Exists To Depart from ICWA's Adoptive Preferences.

Text: Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act out of concern over the unwarranted break-up of Indian families caused by removal of children by state authorities and the placement of an alarmingly high percentage of such children with non-Indian foster and adoptive placements. [11] In an effort to reverse this trend, ICWA specifies preferred adoptive placements for Indian children. [12] Thus, 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides: In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with (1) a member of the child's extended family; (2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or (3) other Indian families. Furthermore, Congress intended in enacting ICWA that white, middle-class standards not be used in determining whether preferred placements are suitable. [13] Instead, § 1915(d) provides: The standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this section shall be the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community in which the parent or extended family resides or with which the parent or extended family members maintain social and cultural ties. The three preferred placements listed in § 1915(a) comprehensively rank the different possible family and Indian placements. Only for good cause may a state deviate from the three preferred placements, i.e., approve a placement with someone who is neither extended family nor Indian. [14] The prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community described in § 1915(d) unquestionably apply to disputes about the suitability of the preferred placements listed in § 1915(a). We will sometimes refer to these as community, prevailing, or social and cultural standards. But these standards do not override or change the preference requirements of § 1915. Under § 1915(d) the prevailing standards are to be used in meeting the preference requirements, not to override them. This means that within a preference tier the prevailing standards are to be used in selecting a placement. But as the statute is structured, it appears that social and cultural standards taken alone cannot provide for a different order of preference. In other words, community standards notwithstanding, an extended family member entitled to first-tier preference under § 1915(a) will occupy a higher tier of preference than a non-extended family member of the child's tribe entitled to a second-tier of preference under the same subsection. Of course community standards may be reflected in a tribal resolution setting a different order of preference under § 1915(d) and if this is done the new order of preference is legally established. Furthermore, the standards are to be used in determining the suitability or unsuitability of a prospective placement. They may, for example, support a conclusion that a higher-tier potential custodian is unsuitable, thus clearing the way for a lower-tier custodian. The tribe's main contention on appeal is that these standards also apply to any dispute under § 1915(a) about whether good cause exists to deviate from those placement preferences. The tribe argues that the superior court erred by failing to consider the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Village of Kasigluk when it decided whether there was good cause to grant Matilda's petitions for adoption. In considering whether these standards apply to the good cause determination, we look to the statutory language, legislative history, [15] the interpretation given the statute by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), and relevant case law. [16] Because we read most of these sources, particularly the text of the statute and the BIA's interpretation, to indicate that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community are not generally applicable to the good cause determination, we ultimately disagree with the tribe. Nonetheless, because ICWA's purpose and the BIA's interpretation make the prevailing social and cultural standards relevant to the good cause determination insofar as this determination may implicate the suitability of a statutorily preferred placement candidate, many of the tribe's concerns are minimized. Furthermore, the superior court may refer to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community in determining whether a child's special needs or other circumstances are sufficient to establish good cause to deviate from § 1915(a)'s placement preferences. The plain language of § 1915 suggests that the prevailing social and cultural standards do not apply to the good cause determination. Subsection 1915(d) dictates that the prevailing Indian standards are to be applied in meeting the preference requirements of this section. [17] Subsection 1915(a) mandates that these preferences be applied in the absence of good cause to the contrary. [18] The tribe, in arguing that ICWA's plain language requires application of the standards to the good cause determination, contends that [t]he `preference requirements' of § 1915 of the ICWA can be `met' either by giving an adoptive preference to a priority placement, or by showing that there is `good cause to the contrary.' (Emphasis in original.) The tribe argues that the phrase meeting the preference requirements plainly includes the good cause inquiry and that we should not create an exemption from the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community for the good cause determination. But we cannot agree with the tribe and the concurring opinion that the phrase meeting the preference requirements in § 1915(d) plainly includes § 1915(a)'s good cause inquiry. [19] In our view, a court applies the preference requirements by determining the suitability of potential preferred placements using the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. Although they are part of a common statutory scheme, inquiries into suitable preferred placements are separate from inquiries into good cause. It is not plain from the language of the statute that standards applicable to the issue of the suitability of preferred placements must necessarily also apply to the issue of good cause. Rather, accepted principles of statutory interpretation suggest that the opposite is true. Congress specified in § 1915(d) that the prevailing social and cultural standards are the standards to be applied in meeting the preference requirements, but did not specify that these standards be applied to the good cause inquiry. Its failure to do so suggests that it did not intend the standards to apply to the good cause inquiry. Had Congress intended the states to apply the prevailing Indian standards when determining whether there is good cause to deviate from the preferences, we think it would have expressed itself more clearly. [20] For example, § 1915(d) could have stated generally that the prevailing Indian standards apply to disputes under § 1915(a). Or it could have specified that they apply in determining whether there is good cause. Instead, by dealing with non-Native placements in the good cause clause, Congress appears to have intended that questions of the need for non-Native placements be conceptually separate from disputes about whether a preferred placement is suitable. [21] The tribe also argues that in interpreting statutes that protect the rights of Native Americans, this court must resolve any ambiguity in favor of Native Americans. [22] According to the BIA, Congress left the primary responsibility for interpreting ICWA to the courts deciding Indian child custody cases. [23] We have recognized that other authorities interpreting the same provisions may also be useful. [24] In dealing with statutes protecting the rights of Native Americans, the standard principles of statutory construction do not have their usual force. [25] But this principle is not a license to disregard the clearly expressed intent of Congress, nor does it permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist. [26] United States Supreme Court opinions interpreting statutes protecting the rights of Native Americans have not completely disregarded traditional precepts of statutory interpretation. [27] A fair appraisal of §§ 1915(a) and (d) demonstrates a congressional intent to apply the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community to determinations of suitability of potential preferred placements, but not to determinations of good cause to deviate from the preferences. ICWA's context points to the same conclusion. The context of ICWA's enactment suggests that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community do not apply to the good cause determination. The House Report's analysis of section 5, later codified as § 1915(d), stated that [a]ll too often, State public and private agencies, in determining whether or not an Indian family is fit for foster care or adoptive placement of an Indian child, apply a white, middle-class standard which, in many cases, forecloses placement with the Indian family. [28] The House Report also stated that [d]iscriminatory standards have made it virtually impossible for most Indian couples to qualify as foster or adoptive parents, since they are based on middle-class values. [29] Congress was clearly worried about the application of white, middle-class values to suitability determinations. Because the good cause inquiry is distinct from the suitability inquiry for preferred placement candidates, it falls outside the purview of Congress's intent for the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. The tribe argues that the same context supports its proposed interpretation. Congress found that in placing Indian children, state courts and agencies have failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of Indian people and the social and cultural standards prevailing in Indian communities and families. [30] Congress enacted ICWA in large measure to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for . . . placement . . . which will reflect the unique values of Indian culture. [31] The use of the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community to determine the suitability of preferred placements furthers this end and addresses the specific concern voiced by Congress. We are not persuaded that applying the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community to the good cause determination is necessary to advance ICWA's purposes. Subsection 1915(a) establish[es] a Federal policy that, where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community, but is not to be read as precluding the placement of an Indian child with a non-Indian family. [32] But in cases contested by Indian communities, this could be precisely the effect of applying the communities' prevailing social and cultural standards to the good cause determination. [33] There was evidence here that Yup'ik standards dictate that Yup'ik children should invariably be raised by Yup'ik people. Applying the prevailing social and cultural standards to the good cause determination would effectively nullify the good cause exception in any case in which a tribe intervened under Alaska Adoption Rule 12(a) and offered equivalent evidence. [34] Such a result would be contrary to accepted precepts of statutory interpretation. The tribe notes that almost every ICWA case involves a determination of good cause. This suggests to the tribe that applying non-Native standards to the good cause determination would create a loophole, eviscerating the protections of ICWA. The tribe's fear is misplaced. First, as outlined below, in determining whether good cause exists, white, middle-class standards may not be applied to reassess the suitability of a preferred placement. Second, under Alaska law the burden of showing good cause is on the party proposing placement outside the statutory preferences. [35] The BIA Guidelines for State Courts note that this allocation of the burden of proof is necessary [s]ince Congress has established a clear preference for placements within the tribal culture. [36] (The BIA issued the Guidelines to provide nonbinding guidance to state courts interpreting ICWA. [37] ) We are satisfied that these protections, together with the sound judgment of Alaska's trial courts, are sufficient to preserve ICWA's protections for Indian children and communities. The tribe suggests that our cases are not inconsistent with applying the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community to the good cause determination, but only reflect the lack of evidence of those standards. Thus, it contends that applying these standards is required in this case where, for the first time, the tribal-standards mandate of § 1915(d) [is] directly at issue. The tribe's approach is problematic in several respects. First, the tribe offers no criterion by which to measure whether sufficient evidence of the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community has been presented to determine good cause based on those standards. Second, it would create unnecessary uncertainty in litigation, as the state and potential non-Native placements could not be certain of the standard by which they had to prove good cause until the trial was well underway. This would prolong litigation in cases which require expeditious resolution. [38] The tribe also argues that cases from other jurisdictions support its contention that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community apply to the good cause determination. In Matter of Baby Boy Doe, [39] the Idaho Supreme Court addressed this question. After quoting the BIA Guidelines regarding the good cause inquiry, the court stated that [i]n determining whether good cause existed, the trial court rejected the arguments by the adoptive parents' counsel that the child is old enough to request a preference; the child has extraordinary physical needs mitigating against the preferences; and that the proposed Indian placement (with the maternal aunt and uncle) is unsuitable. The trial court demonstrated knowledge of applicable legal standards in rejecting the adoptive parents' argument that negative social and economic conditions on the reservation constitute good cause. The trial court correctly held that ICWA requires the court to apply the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. [ [40] ] In Baby Boy Doe, the non-Native adoptive parents mistakenly argued that negative social and economic conditions on the reservation constituted good cause for departing from the preferences. [41] But these conditions would be relevant, if at all, to the suitability of potential Native relative placements, and as such had to be viewed in light of the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. The court's language does not suggest that the child's ability to request a preference or the existence of extraordinary physical needs is governed by the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. [42] The Baby Boy Doe court suggested that whether the psychological need for permanence could be satisfied by a relative placement should be analyzed in light of an Indian standard. [43] But the court ultimately affirmed the finding of good cause based on the biological mother's preference, the certainty of emotional trauma if the child was removed from the adoptive parents, and the likelihood of emotional trauma if the child encountered the father while living on the reservation. [44] In concluding that these considerations together constituted good cause under the applicable legal standards, it did not discuss them with reference to the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. [45] The court instead approved of applying the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community primarily to the determination of suitability. [46] Similarly, In re Jullian B. reversed a finding of good cause because the trial court failed to consider several factors in light of the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. [47] The social worker in that case was concerned about the potential placement's age, his inability to suggest a person who could care for the minor if he became incapacitated, his prior conviction for vehicular manslaughter of a child when he was driving under the influence, his failure to rehabilitate for many years . . . [and] his health and his lack of support system. . . . [48] None of these concerns implicated special needs of the child. Instead, each of these factors was relevant to the suitability of the potential Native relative placement, and thus had to be considered in light of the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. [49] The court ultimately reversed on other grounds, [50] but never suggested that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community apply to anything determining the suitability of preferred placements. These cases recognize that the prevailing social and cultural standards apply to determinations of the suitability of preferred placements even if the suitability determinations arise in the context of the good cause inquiry. We do not read these cases as requiring that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community apply to all aspects of the good cause inquiry. Our conclusion that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community do not generally apply to the good cause determination is supported by the BIA Guidelines, which suggest three factors to consider in determining good cause: (i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the child is of sufficient age. (ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness. (iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the preference criteria.[ [51] ] As the Guidelines observe, the legislative history indicates that the term `good cause' was designed to provide state courts with flexibility in determining the disposition of a placement proceeding involving an Indian child. [52] This flexibility is not a license to impose non-Native standards when courts consider the suitability of statutorily preferred placement candidates. Rather, it is an authorization to take the child's special needs into account when determining whether good cause exists to place the child outside the statutory preferences despite the existence of an otherwise suitable home within the preferences. Applying white, middle-class standards to the suitability inquiry as an aspect of the good cause determination could effectively read the preference requirements and the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community out of the statute. This would occur if courts, while determining whether there is good cause for deviating from the statutorily preferred placements, could apply white, middle-class standards to examine or reexamine the suitability of a Native or relative placement deemed suitable under prevailing Indian social and cultural standards. This is the very problem ICWA was enacted to eliminate. Our holding today respects the purposes of ICWA by preventing non-Native standards from being used to decide that a preferred placement is not suitable. The qualifications required of expert witnesses in our ICWA cases reinforce this conclusion. In some parental rights termination cases, experts with specialized knowledge of the Native culture are needed because social workers without expertise are unable to distinguish between the prevailing standards of the Indian community and actual abuse and neglect. [53] But so long as issues of cultural bias are not implicated, experts need not have training in the cultural standards of the Indian community. [54] These rules reflect an implied judgment that while the suitability of a Native household must be viewed in light of the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community, courts are not compelled to analyze a child's special needs according to those standards. Such needs would demonstrate good cause if, as the superior court found here, adequate facilities to address them were not available to the preferred placement but were available to the non-preferred placement. [55] In determining whether a child's special needs rise to the level that constitute good cause to deviate from the preferences, the superior court may consider the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. Courts should be sensitive to any differences in the circumstances that allow children to flourish in Native and non-Native communities. But courts need not ultimately apply the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community in determining whether the resources available to an otherwise-suitable preferred placement are adequate to address the child's special needs. The concurring opinion contends that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community directly apply to the good cause determination. This contention is grounded on a perception of the role of the placement preferences and the good cause determination fundamentally different from our own. The concurring opinion suggests that the good cause determination is a device for choosing between non-preferred placements and suitable preferred placements. [56] If this were indeed the role of the good cause inquiry, we would agree that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community must govern. But although it is correct that the word preference generally connotes a choice between two options, [57] we read ICWA's structure and purpose to preclude choosing between preferred and non-preferred placements if the preferred placement is suitable, as measured by the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community. The existence of a suitable preferred placement precludes any consideration of a non-preferred placement unless good cause exists, for example, because another preference has been expressed by the child or the child's biological parents, or because the child has special needs that cannot be met by an otherwise-suitable preferred placement. The concurrence also contends that the court's interpretation of § 1915 creates an unrealistic dichotomy between placement decisions and good cause determinations. [58] It characterizes the suitability determination required for a preferred placement and the special needs assessment necessary for a good cause determination as flip sides of the same coin. [59] But that is not how the words of the statute treat them. The statute expressly envisions good cause as an exception to the general rule of preferred placements. As noted above, the proponent of placing a child in a non-preferred placement bears the burden of demonstrating that the child's special needs require that placement. The concurrence is doubtless correct in saying that any placement decision involves examining more than a potential placement's abstract ability to care for a hypothetical child. [60] But a good cause determination is nonetheless legally and analytically distinct from a placement decision. It requires extenuating circumstances beyond the typical considerations at issue in a placement decision. In holding that the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community apply to the good cause determination only when it implicates a preferred placement's suitability, we recognize our disagreement with a decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court. In Matter of Custody of S.E.G., that court rejected a trial court's finding that the need for permanence was an extraordinary emotional need and that adoption was the only way to meet that need. [61] On appeal, the court held that evidence of a special need for permanence must be presented by qualified experts with knowledge of the Indian community, suggesting that permanency is defined differently in Native American cultures. [62] The court thus seemingly integrated the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian community of § 1915(d) into the § 1915(a) good cause analysis while leaving open the possibility that the location of necessary treatment services would not fall under § 1915(d)'s purview. [63] Nevertheless, we believe that the words of the statute, the context of the legislation, and the BIA Guidelines support our holding.