Opinion ID: 699208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Corrective Testimony

Text: 74 A district court has broad discretion to make a determination that the probative value of evidence outweighs the risk that its admission will result in unfair prejudice. See United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1233 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 971, 104 S.Ct. 2344, 80 L.Ed.2d 818 (1984). Evidentiary rulings are not grounds for reversal except where they are made arbitrarily or irrationally. See United States v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 781 (2d Cir.1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1019, 109 S.Ct. 1139, 103 L.Ed.2d 200 (1989). Otherwise inadmissible testimony may be received on re-direct in order to rebut a false impression created by an opposing party during cross-examination. See United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 335 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Wiley, 846 F.2d 150, 156 (2d Cir.1988). Defense counsel's cross-examination here was deliberately designed to foster a false impression in the jury's mind that for years the government had been unsuccessfully and abusively investigating Gambino. It was this misimpression that the prosecutor was allowed to correct on re-direct by asking the agent about the legality and success of the former surveillance operations. 75 Appellant contends this corrective attempt may have persuaded the jury that he was one of the unnamed persons convicted as a result of the earlier investigations. In allowing the jury to form such a belief, he insists, the court improperly infringed his due process right to be tried solely on the basis of evidence presented to the jury. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1048, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). We recognize that evidence of a defendant's prior conviction is inadmissible unless it relates to a disputed issue and unless, further, its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. Fed.R.Evid. 403, 404(b); United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 939 (2d Cir.1980). 76 We reject the notion that admitting this corrective testimony was an abuse of discretion. Under the circumstances, the trial court might well have been justified in allowing the introduction of evidence pertaining to Gambino's earlier guilty plea. But it did not. Rather, the scope of the government's questioning was carefully circumscribed, and the jury was promptly given a limiting instruction, approved by Gambino's counsel, as to what inferences could be drawn from those facts. Moreover, even if it were error to admit this proof, such error would have been harmless in light of the overwhelming record evidence of Gambino's guilt. See United States v. DeVillio, 983 F.2d 1185, 1195 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Lasanta, 978 F.2d 1300, 1306 (2d Cir.1992).