Opinion ID: 4557831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Party‘s Deposition Testimony Is

Text: Not a Judicial Admission ¶36 We agree with the commentators that the first approach is ―preferable in policy and most in accord with the tradition of [a] jury trial.‖ MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 258; see also Keller v. United States, 58 F.3d 1194, 1198 n.8 (7th Cir. 1995) (―When a party testifying at trial or during a deposition admits a fact which is adverse to his 10 Cite as: 2020 UT 63 Opinion of the Court claim or defense, it is generally preferable to treat that testimony as solely an evidentiary admission.‖). ¶37 Commentators also note that a general rule of conclusiveness necessitates an elaboration of qualifications and exceptions, which represents an unfortunate transfer to the appellate court of some of the traditional control of the jury by the trial judge, or in a nonjury case of the judge‘s factfinding function. Also, the moral emphasis is wrong. In the early cases where the rule of conclusiveness first appeared, judges were outraged by apparent attempts by parties to play fast and loose with the court. However, this is far from being the typical situation of the party testifying to disserving facts. Instead of the unscrupulous party, it is either the one who can be pushed into an admission by the ingenuity or persistence of adverse counsel or the unusually candid or conscientious party willing to speak the truth regardless of its consequences who is penalized by the rule of conclusiveness. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 258 (footnotes omitted). ¶38 We agree. There is benefit in eschewing a rule that would bar a party from introducing credible contradictory evidence. And we prefer permitting the finder of fact to assess the credibility of such evidence. See id.; see also Guenther v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 406 F.2d 1315, 1317 (3d Cir. 1969) (―In other words, the law recognizes the fact that parties, as well as other witnesses, may honestly mistake the truth, and requires juries to find the facts by weighing all the testimony, whatever may be its source.‖ (citation omitted)); id. (―[I]n other words, a party is regarded as not bound by his own testimony where there is contradictory evidence or circumstances which the trier of facts might fairly believe.‖ (quoting Jerominski v. Fowler, Dick & Walker, 93 A.2d 433, 435 (Pa. 1953)). And in the case of a motion for summary judgment, the court should be allowed to assess the evidence before it, including anything contradicting a party‘s testimony, to see if there is a genuine issue of a material fact. ¶39 In other words, we believe that a party‘s deposition testimony is best categorized as an ordinary evidentiary admission that can be contradicted with other appropriate evidence. ¶40 We can understand why the court of appeals credited the policies favoring treating unequivocal testimony as a judicial 11 LUNA v. LUNA Opinion of the Court admission. The court of appeals noted that judicial resources are finite and that permitting ―cases to proceed to trial when the two parties do not disagree about the matter to be tried is a poor use of our limited judicial resources.‖ Luna v. Luna, 2019 UT App 57, ¶ 17, 442 P.3d 1155. ¶41 We part ways with the court of appeals in a couple of respects. First, it is not correct to say that the rule we adopt would permit cases to go to trial where the ―parties do not disagree about the matter.‖ See id. When a party seeks to contradict her deposition testimony with other credible evidence, she does not agree about the matter. We are, in essence, allowing a party to say, ―I know what I said, but I understand that there is other evidence which shows that my recollection was incorrect.‖ That party then disagrees about the matter, and if the additional evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact, the question should go the trier of fact. ¶42 Although we agree with the court of appeals‘ second concern—that judicial resources should be preserved—we are not convinced that the rule it announced will prove superior at conserving them. To the contrary, we predict that the rule the court of appeals adopted would lead to increased litigation over whether the deposition statement actually qualifies as a judicial admission.5 It does not take much imagination to anticipate the motion practice over whether ―the statement is clear and unequivocal‖ and whether ―giving binding effect to the statement would be consonant with the policies underlying the ‗judicial admission‘ rule.‖ Id. ¶¶ 23–28.6 _____________________________________________________________ 5 The dissent disagrees and claims our rule will lead to more litigation and increased costs or will just ―kick the can down the road.‖ Infra ¶ 72. Admittedly, both we and the dissent are attempting to predict litigation behavior with little besides our practical litigation experience to guide us. For the reasons expressed, we believe that the rule we adopt will lead to less ancillary motion practice and be a more fair and efficient use of resources. But we take comfort in the fact that if further experience reveals that we have misaligned the incentives, we can adjust them by amending our rules. 6 Moreover, there exists a natural disincentive to try cases where the evidence that contradicts a party‘s own deposition testimony is weak. Placing that party on the stand will expose them to the type of (continued . . .) 12 Cite as: 2020 UT 63 Opinion of the Court ¶43 The court of appeals also was concerned ―there is something unjust about allowing a litigant to convene a trial so that a jury can determine if the facts are other than what the litigant swears they are.‖ Id. ¶ 19. We think the larger injustice would be to deny a party the opportunity to use credible evidence to let the trier of fact determine what actually occurred. ¶44 ―[T]he processes of law have only one legitimate objective, to seek out the truth and to do justice.‖ State v. Kent, 432 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1967). The court ―is a place to determine the truth—the facts of a particular case, to review the law and act accordingly, all that justice may prevail.‖ Id.; see also Conagra, Inc. v. Nierenberg, 7 P.3d 369, 379 (Mont. 2000) (―The truth of the case depends on a comparison of what all the witnesses say and all the circumstances indicate. A rule which binds a party to a particular statement uttered on the stand becomes an artificial rule. It is out of place in dealing with testimony.‖ (citation omitted)). ¶45 To repeat the hypothetical we discussed in our introduction, we see no compelling policy reason to prevent someone who genuinely believes that the light was green, and testifies honestly about his belief, from introducing traffic camera footage and the testimony of twenty-seven nuns returning from Mass that demonstrate the light was red. Under the court of appeals‘ approach, we would be saying that, as a judicial system, we should pretend that the traffic camera video does not exist.7 Although justice is oft cross-examination that most of us dreamed of conducting but rarely did. 7 The rule we adopt also acknowledges the reality that human memory is very slippery. By way of example, there are hundreds of people who believe that sometime in the 1990s, they watched a movie called ―Shazaam‖ that starred the comedian Sinbad. See Amelia Tait, The Movie that doesn’t exist and the Redditors who think it does, NEWSTATESMAN (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www. newstatesman.com/science-tech/internet/2016/12/ movie-doesn-t- exist-and-redditors-who-think-it-does. In this movie, Sinbad played a genie. Id. If placed under oath, these people would testify that they have a clear recollection of watching Sinbad in Shazaam. The problem with that is that Sinbad never made a movie called Shazaam and never starred in a movie in which he played a genie. See Dan Evon, Did Sinbad Play a Genie in the 1990s Movie ‘Shazaam’?, (continued . . .) 13 LUNA v. LUNA Opinion of the Court represented as blind, we see no reason why justice would require us to not see what we know to exist in this circumstance. ¶46 Finally, the court of appeals expressed concern that a party may be tempted to commit perjury. Luna, 2019 UT App 57, ¶ 19. The court of appeals‘ reasoning is not immediately apparent. It would seem that the incentive to commit perjury is stronger where a party cannot, under any circumstances, relieve themselves from the consequence of honest but case-damaging testimony. If a party is concerned about how her testimony may be used to prevent the introduction of other evidence, she may be inclined to testify in a less than truthful manner. A better rule is one that incentivizes a party to testify to the facts as she remembers and any discrepancies or issues as to a material fact can be sorted by the factfinder. This better comports with our desire of ―ascertaining the truth and securing a just determination‖ in every proceeding. UTAH R. EVID. 102.8 ¶47 The dissent adds another reason to prefer the court of appeals‘ approach. It finds ―no meaningful distinction between an unequivocal admission in a deposition and an unequivocal admission in a pleading or response to a request for admission.‖ Infra ¶ 61; see also infra ¶ 62 n.17. We disagree. SNOPES (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.snopes.com/factcheck/sinbad-movie-shazaam/. That does not prevent these people from having very specific memories about the movie and its plot. To some of them, their memories of the non-existent movie are so vivid that they can only be explained by a theory that those who remember the movie travelled from a parallel dimension where Sinbad actually starred in Shazaam. See Vikram Murthi, Sinbad’s ‘Shazaam’: Inside the Internet’s Conspiracy Theory About a Non-Existent Movie, INDIEWIRE (Dec. 23, 2016), https://www.indiewire.com /2016/12/sinbad-shazaam-internet-conspiracy-theory-film-redditmandela-effect-1201762425/. 8 Maria argues that a party‘s disserving testimony can qualify as a judicial admission when it is a deliberate, clear, unequivocal statement about a concrete fact within the party‘s knowledge. Maria briefly cites to other jurisdictions that have adopted such a rule. See, e.g., Caponi v. Larry’s 66, 601 N.E.2d 1347 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). But Maria does not appear to argue any policy reasons different from those the court of appeals articulated for why we should adopt a similar rule. 14 Cite as: 2020 UT 63 Opinion of the Court ¶48 Our Rules of Civil Procedure provide parties with a number of discovery tools that serve different purposes and trigger different consequences. Requests for admission are specifically designed to narrow the issues for trial. We provide parties with twenty-eight days to respond, at times with the benefit of counsel‘s input. UTAH R. CIV. P. 36.(a). Parties are alerted that ―[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established.‖ See UTAH R. CIV. P. 36(c).9 The rules governing depositions do not contain a similar warning. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 30. ¶49 We agree with the California Court of Appeals that [t]here is a vast difference between written discovery admissions, which are a studied response, made under sanctions against easy denials, that occur under the direction and supervision of counsel, who has full professional realization of their significance. . . and glib, easily misunderstood answers given by a lay opponent in a deposition. Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc., 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 826, 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that the plaintiff‘s deposition testimony was not the equivalent of a judicial admission). ¶50 Moreover, the distinction the dissent wants to draw may depend on the way the request for admission is phrased. To return to our now-favorite hypothetical, if the plaintiff in that case received a request for admission asking her to admit that the light was green, she may honestly deny the request and support that denial with the traffic camera video and the nuns‘ testimonies. And that denial results in no conclusively established fact. _____________________________________________________________ 9 We draw a similar line with respect to responses in pleadings; that is, they are ―normally conclusive‖ on the party making them. See Baldwin v. Vantage Corp., 676 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1984). Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 8(d) advises parties that statements ―in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required, other than statements of the amount of damage, are admitted if not denied in the responsive pleading.‖ It stands to reason that the consequences of an admission in a written pleading would differ from those made in a deposition. Litigants have weeks to prepare their written responses, free from the pressures a deposition imposes on a witness, and often with counsel drafting them. 15 LUNA v. LUNA Opinion of the Court ¶51 If, however, the plaintiff is requested to admit that she perceived the light to be green, the honest answer would require an admission. But the conclusively established fact would be that she perceived the light to be green, not that the light was, in fact, green. This might prevent her from changing her testimony to say that she perceived the light was red, but it would not preclude her from introducing the other evidence about the light‘s color in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. ¶52 The dissent says that the answer to this problem is to permit the deponent to change her deposition testimony to say that she is aware of other evidence of the light‘s color. That remedy elevates form over substance. The facts of this case demonstrate how. Counsel asked Luis, ―Did you see the color of the light as you were entering the intersection?‖ Luis responded, ―Yes. It was green.‖ The dissent would instruct Luis to, within the twenty-eight days that rule 30(e) permits, amend his answer to, ―Yes, but Antonio says it was red. So I guess it might have been red.‖10 And the dissent would allow Luis to use that amended deposition testimony in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. But the dissent would not permit Luis to attempt to defeat summary judgment by advancing Antonio‘s testimony directly. There is no practical reason to draw that distinction. ¶53 A better rule is one that recognizes the realities of litigation practice. In the words of the Southern District of New York, ―[a]s a practical matter, a party-deponent cannot reasonably be held to the same precision of expression, breadth of knowledge, or legal expertise as a party responding through counsel to a written interrogatory.‖ Guadagno v. Wallack Ader Levithan Assocs., 950 F. Supp. 1258, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Depositions can become emotionally charged and high-pressure affairs. Deponents are often asked, under intense and adversarial questioning, to recall the smallest details from events that occurred years before. As commentators have recognized, the parties most likely to bear the brunt of a rule of conclusiveness are not those that are trying to play games with the system, but those ―who can be pushed into an admission by the ingenuity or persistence of adverse counsel‖ and _____________________________________________________________ 10This assumes, of course, that Luis learns of Antonio‘s testimony before the twenty-eight days to amend his deposition responses expire. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 30(e). 16 Cite as: 2020 UT 63 Opinion of the Court ―the unusually candid or conscientious party willing to speak the truth regardless of its consequences.‖ MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 258 (footnotes omitted).11 We understand those realities and prefer to treat deposition testimony as giving rise to an evidentiary, rather than a judicial, admission.