Opinion ID: 222559
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application of SORNA to Pre-Enactment Sex Offenders

Text: On July 27, 2006, in an effort to bring a measure of cohesiveness to the existing patchwork of state and federal sex-offender registration systems, Congress enacted the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA or the Act), codified at 42 U.S.C. § 16901 et seq., as Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, Pub.L. 109-248, Tit. I, 120 Stat. 590. Title 42 U.S.C. § 16913 creates the sex offender registration requirements, and 18 U.S.C. § 2250 imposes criminal penalties for failing to register under the Act. The registration requirements and criminal penalties imposed for failing to register under the Act are just one aspect of the comprehensive effort embodied in the Act to create, over time, a set of national minimum standards for the registration of sex offenders in all jurisdictions. Section 16913 sets forth the registry requirements for sex offenders: (a) In general A sex offender shall register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the offender resides, where the offender is an employee, and where the offender is a student. For initial registration purposes only, a sex offender shall also register in the jurisdiction in which convicted if such jurisdiction is different from the jurisdiction of residence. (b) Initial registration The sex offender shall initially register  (1) before completing a sentence of imprisonment with respect to the offense giving rise to the registration requirement; or (2) not later than 3 business days after being sentenced for that offense, if the sex offender is not sentenced to a term of imprisonment. (c) Keeping the registration current A sex offender shall, not later than 3 business days after each change of name, residence, employment, or student status, appear in person in at least 1 jurisdiction involved pursuant to subsection (a) of this section and inform that jurisdiction of all changes in the information required for that offender in the sex offender registry. That jurisdiction shall immediately provide that information to all other jurisdictions in which the offender is required to register. (d) Initial registration of sex offenders unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before the enactment of this chapter or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction, and to prescribe rules for the registration of any such sex offenders and for other categories of sex offenders who are unable to comply with subsection (b) of this section. (e) State penalty for failure to comply Each jurisdiction, other than a Federally recognized Indian tribe, shall provide a criminal penalty that includes a maximum term of imprisonment that is greater than 1 year for the failure of a sex offender to comply with the requirements of this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 16913. Title 18 U.S.C. § 2250 criminalizes the failure to register or update registration for any person who (1) is required to register under [SORNA], (2) travels in interstate or foreign commerce, and (3) knowingly fails to register or update a registration as required by [SORNA]. 18 U.S.C. § 2250. The Supreme Court recently held that these three elements are to be satisfied sequentially: It is far more sensible to conclude that Congress meant the first precondition to § 2250 liability to be the one it listed first: a `require[ment] to register under [SORNA].' Carr v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2229, 2235-36, 176 L.Ed.2d 1152 (2010). Concluding that interstate travel that occurred prior to enactment of SORNA on July 27, 2006, cannot form the basis for liability under the Act, the Court explained: Once a person becomes subject to SORNA's registration requirements, which can occur only after the statute's effective date, that person can be convicted under § 2250 if he thereafter travels and then fails to register. Id. at 2236. The issue presented in this case is whether SORNA applied to Trent on the date of his indicted failure to register such that he was required to register under SORNA, the first element which must be established for imposition of criminal liability under the Act. Trent argues that he was not required to register under SORNA because at the time of his indicted failure to register, Ohio had not yet implemented SORNA and the Attorney General had not yet ruled on the retroactive application of SORNA to sex offenders who failed to register in a jurisdiction that had not yet implemented SORNA. The District Court held that the Attorney General's February 28, 2007, interim rule, which specified that SORNA applied to all sex offenders, including those like Trent who were convicted in jurisdictions that had not fully implemented SORNA, was applicable to Trent on the date of his indicted failure to register in November, 2007. Since the District Court issued its opinion in this case, much has transpired on the SORNA legal landscape and resolution of the issue presented in this case is now dictated by this Court's post-2008 decisions in Cain and Utesch, supra . In Cain, this Court held that SORNA did not apply retroactively of its own force and that SORNA unambiguously delegated to the Attorney General the sole authority to determine the retroactive application of the statute to pre-enactment sex offenders, i.e., sex offenders convicted before enactment of SORNA on July 27, 2006. 583 F.3d at 420. This Court relied on the plain language of § 16913(d) which provides in pertinent part: The Attorney General shall have the authority to specify the applicability of the requirements of this subchapter to sex offenders convicted before July 27, 2006 or its implementation in a particular jurisdiction.... 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d). The Court then concluded that the Attorney General had not validly, in conformance with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), established such regulations on the date of Cain's alleged failure to register between October 16, 2006 and March 28, 2007. 583 F.3d at 419-20. This Court reasoned that the Attorney General failed to provide a good cause justification for dispensing with notice and comment and directing immediate effectiveness of a February 28, 2007, Interim Rule specifying application of the Act to pre-enactment sex offenders. Id. at 423. This Court further ruled that the Interim Rule could take effect, if at all, no sooner than thirty days after its publication on February 28, 2007, which preceded the date of Cain's indicted failure to register during a period ending on March 28, 2007. Id. at 423. This Court concluded that [b]ecause the Attorney General did not issue [a regulation specifying application of SORNA to a sex offender convicted before its enactment] in compliance with the notice and comment and publication requirements of the APA within the time period charged in Cain's indictment, the indictment must be dismissed. Id. at 424. In Utesch, this Court had occasion once again to address the retroactive application of SORNA to a pre-enactment sex offender. This Court first recognized that the government's argument that SORNA applied of its own force to pre-enactment sex offenders was rejected and foreclosed by the holding in Cain, supra , that SORNA vested the retroactivity decision with the Attorney General. 596 F.3d at 308. Turning to the issue presented by Utesch's alleged failure to register as sex offender from September 1, 2006, to November 12, 2007, this Court concluded that the Attorney General's regulations applying SORNA to defendants who were convicted before SORNA was enacted on July 27, 2006, were not effective until the Attorney General issued final guidelines in full compliance with the APA rule making procedures on August 1, 2008. 596 F.3d at 311. As this Court explained in Utesch, there were three possible candidates for validly promulgated regulations: (1) the February 28, 2007, immediately effective Interim Rule issued by the Attorney General, 72 Fed.Reg. 8894 (the Interim Rule); (2) the May 30, 2007, SMART Guidelines (an acronym derived from the Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, Registering and Tracking, which was created by SORNA and authorized to administer the standards for sex offender registration and notification that are set forth in SORNA and interpreted and implemented in the SMART Guidelines), 72 Fed.Reg. 30,210 (the Preliminary SMART Guidelines); and (3) the July 2, 2008, Final SMART guidelines, which became effective on August 1, 2008, after notice and comment, 73 Fed.Reg. 38,030 (the Final SMART Guidelines). [3] 596 F.3d at 308. In settling on the August 1, 2008, effective date, this Court in Utesch rejected arguments for the adoption of two earlier possible dates based upon the Interim Rule or the Preliminary SMART Guidelines. This Court found that the Attorney General failed to provide good cause to justify dispensing with notice and comment on the February 27, 2008, Interim Rule which therefore was never finalized pursuant to APA procedures and further concluded that the May 30, 2007 Preliminary SMART Guidelines were just that  proposed and preliminary  and did not carry the force of law. 596 F.3d at 310-11. Because only the July 2, 2008, Final SMART Guidelines, published for notice and comment and effective thirty days later on August 1, 2008, fully complied with the APA, this Court concluded unequivocally that: SORNA became effective against offenders convicted before its enactment thirty days after the final SMART guidelines were published: that is, on August 1, 2008. Id. at 311. [4]