Opinion ID: 1279175
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Defense Attorneys' Offer of Proof

Text: At the trial, the attorneys for Richard Jahnke offered the testimony of Dr. McDonald, a forensic psychiatrist, for the purpose of providing a backdrop for the jury's decision as to the reasonableness [13] of Richard Jahnke's behavior on the night of November 16, when he shot his father. In making his offer of proof to explain that to which Dr. McDonald would testify, the defense attorney represented to the court that the testimony was being offered to prove or disprove    the reasonableness of the apprehension of Richard Jahnke on the night in question. (Emphasis added.) The issue of reasonableness, argued the defense counsel,    would go to the fact that    Richard Jahnke was brutalized by his father in May of 1982, that he was brutalized by his father on November 16th of 1982, that he had been brutalized by his father for many years in the past. At another point in the offer, defendant's attorney submitted that the doctor would testify that it was his opinion    that Richie Jahnke is emotionally impaired, that he believes that Richie Jahnke is a battered child. The defendant's attorney explained that the doctor should be allowed to testify concerning what Richard Jahnke told him during the course of the doctor's examination for the reason that Richard's statements would go to    the reasonableness of Richard Jahnke's apprehension of harm on that evening   . This offer says to me that the doctor's testimony would have supplied such underlying psychiatric information as would have permitted the jury to resolve the issue of reasonableness in an intelligent and informed manner. Even if the offer is read to say that the testimony would have touched on the ultimate issue of the reasonableness of the defendant's behavior at the time and place in question, this is no longer prohibited  at least within the context of the law of this case. See The Ultimate Issue  Invading the Province of the Jury, infra this opinion, and particularly Rule 704, W.R.E., infra. In Ibn-Tamas v. United States, D.C.App., 407 A.2d 626, 628 (1979), a battered-person self-defense case, the court said:    As to the first  the `ultimate facts' or `ultimate issue' rule  Dr. Walker was not going to express an opinion on the ultimate question whether Mrs. Ibn-Tamas actually and reasonably believed she was in danger when she shot her husband. Rather, this expert would have merely supplied background data to help the jury make that crucial determination. See United States v. Hearst, 412 F. Supp. 889 (N.D.Cal. 1976) ( Hearst I ). In any event, the ultimate issue rule has, over time, been reduced to a prohibition only against questions to an expert `which, in effect, submit the whole case to an expert witness for decision.'[ [14] ] Id. There is no such risk here.