Opinion ID: 1959151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Existence of More Appropriate Alternative Sanctions

Text: Beyond these grounds for dissent, there is a more basic and, I think, more compelling ground upon which to dissent. The wrong people are being punished for the officer's alleged contempt/non-compliance. I do not find the officer to have been in error in this case. I find that he had every legal right to resist the improper disclosure order; and, perhaps even a moral duty to resist. Nonetheless, assuming, arguendo, that he was wrong, even obstinately and contemptuously wrong, I cannot agree that the charges against Redmond should therefore be dismissed. Rather, the burden of any sanctions for the alleged contempt/non-compliance should fall upon the officer, individually, rather than upon the Commonwealth and the interests of justice. The majority blames the Commonwealth for the officer's alleged contempt. The theory upon which this constructive contempt finding is based, is that even though the prosecutor did not know the identity of the informant, the prosecutor had control of the information. (Majority Opinion, supra, at 299). How so? Could the prosecutor have exercised power over the officer which the trial court could not? Certainly not. The court had authority to compel the disclosure on pain of contempt. The prosecutor, on the other hand, could do no more than ask for compliance, which is, of course, an insufficient ground upon which to rest the prosecution's presumed control over the information sought. The contempt, if any existed, was the officer's alone, and not the Commonwealth's. In Commonwealth v. Carson, 510 Pa. 568, 510 A.2d 1233 (1986), our Supreme Court explained: While a trial court must have authority to regulate attendance upon its schedule and concomitant authority to sanction a breach, the sanction must be visited upon the offender and not upon the interests of public justice. The failure of a party to observe the orders of a court may result in a loss to a party in a civil action, because there the loss falls upon private interests and those who invoke the power of a court must be obedient to its orders or lose its powers to serve their purposes. Criminal cases involve issues of public justice; issues that transcend the immediate parties. In criminal cases, sanctions may be imposed upon individuals, including counsel for either side; sanctions that vindicate the authority of the court to maintain its schedule and enforce its orders. 510 A.2d at 1234. (Emphasis added). The reasoning in Carson requires that any sanction, if appropriate for the failure to comply with the disclosure order, be imposed upon the recalcitrant officer, and not upon the Commonwealth and the interests of public justice. Cf. Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 381 Pa.Super. 23, 51-02, 552 A.2d 1075, 1089-90 (1988) (identical reasoning with regard to sanctions imposed on Commonwealth for a Commonwealth witness' failure to appear at a sentencing hearing). There is no reason why the police officer's alleged contempt, if any, should be made to inure to the benefit of the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Carson, supra, 510 A.2d at 1235 (Papadakos, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Ferguson, supra, 552 A.2d at 1090. As this Court explained in Ferguson: No Commonwealth employee is cloaked with an agency which would authorize wilful misconduct such as contempt of court; consequently, we see no reason why the sanction for contempt by a Commonwealth employee should be imposed upon the Commonwealth, rather than directly upon the employee. Cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8542(a)(2), 8550 (a local agency may not be held liable for the wilful misconduct of its employee, and an employee of a local agency enjoys no official immunity from liability for injuries arising from wilful misconduct). 552 A.2d 1090. [2] Here, the trial court readily could have imposed contempt sanctions (fine or imprisonment) to compel compliance with the disclosure order. Instead, the trial court imposed a discovery sanction prohibiting any and all evidence from the recalcitrant officer, entirely regardless of whether the evidence was related to the informant or the informant's tip. This was far too high a price to exact for no real benefit  Redmond's alleged recent confession was suppressed along with other evidence properly obtained, and the prosecution's case substantially impaired, but the officer was not made to pay any personal price for the alleged non-compliance/contempt. [3] The majority suggests that Carson may be distinguished in that no prejudice to the defendant was shown in Carson. The language of Carson suggests no such distinction. Moreover, as noted above, I find no semblance of prejudice here. Still further, I find no reason why simply holding the officer in contempt to force the disclosure would not have vindicated fully the court's authority, and prevented whatever prejudice was anticipated from non-disclosure, without the serious deleterious effects which the court's sanction order necessarily imposes upon the interests of public justice.