Opinion ID: 2075877
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Capital Punishment in Kent County

Text: Dawson's counsel also contends that the motion for a change in venue should have been granted by the Superior Court because, he was able to show, by a statistical analysis, that it is far more likely that any defendant found guilty of murder in the first degree will receive the death sentence in Kent County than in New Castle County or Sussex County. Dawson's counsel argues that his statistical evidence demonstrates an element of arbitrariness in the penalty determination process in Delaware, which is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The statistical evidence upon which Dawson relies is that: since May 14, 1977, the effective date of [Delaware's] death penalty statute, and until 1986, there had been a total of one hundred eight (108) First Degree Murder indictments in New Castle County, forty (40) in Kent County, and forty (40) in Sussex County. Of the seven defendants currently under a sentence of death, six have been sentenced by Kent County juries. Kent County, with only twenty-one percent of the murder indictments for the State, is thus responsible for eighty-three percent of the death sentences. Dawson argues that the foregoing statistics demonstrate that Kent County juries appear uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 521, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The State submits that the statistical evidence upon which Dawson bases his claim is inadequate. The State argues that Dawson's analysis fails to address several important variables, inter alia: the number of cases in which the death penalty was sought in each county; the number of cases in which a penalty hearing was actually conducted in each county; variations in the nature and circumstances of the various cases in which a penalty hearing was held in each county; and variables in the character and propensities of defendants in each case in which a penalty hearing was held in each county. Additionally, the State points out that, apart from his own case and one other, [13] Dawson does not contend that any of the death sentences imposed in Kent County were unwarranted. In ruling upon this aspect of Dawson's motion for a change of venue, the Superior Court stated: [The] defendant has failed to carry his ultimate burden of persuasion on this issue. His statistical method has not accounted for all the neutral variables unrelated to venue in each of the capital crimes which could have produced the same result. Nor has his method accounted for all of the neutral variables unrelated to venue in the character and propensities of each capital defendant which could have produced the same result. In addition, the Superior Court stated: Moreover, [the] defendant's argument that Kent County juries are uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die fails even using his deficient statistical method. Of the last three Kent County first-degree murder cases involving a capital penalty phase, each has resulted in a life sentence. See State v. Shipley, State v. Graham, and State v. Thompson. Dawson's statistical argument must be viewed in the context in which it is raised. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1769, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). Dawson challenges decisions at the heart of the criminal justice system. Id. [O]ne of society's most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through criminal laws against murder. Id. (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 226, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2949, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) WHITE, J., concurring). The implementation of these laws, by necessity, requires discretionary judgments. Id. The unique nature of the decisions at issue in the criminal laws against murder require caution before an inference is adopted based upon a statistical study. Id. Because discretion is essential to the criminal justice process, this Court, like the United States Supreme Court, demands exceptionally clear statistical proof before we would infer that the discretion accorded to juries in capital cases has been abused. Id. See DeShields v. State, Del.Supr., 534 A.2d 630, 646 (1987). We hold that Dawson's study is clearly insufficient to support an inference that an element of arbitrariness was introduced into his case by having his penalty hearing before a Kent County jury. Id. The Superior Court's decision denying Dawson's motion for a change of venue, on the basis of the deficiencies in his statistical presentation, is affirmed. Id.