Opinion ID: 2119729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the easement-granting power.

Text: The two tracts in question were once owned respectively by William Oney and his wife, Sarah Oney, and by Amanda J. Martin and her husband, F.F. Martin. By deeds dated April 6, 1903 from the Oneys and June 23, 1903 from the Martins, Consol's predecessor in interest, Northern Coal and Coke Company, acquired the mineral interests beneath both tracts. In addition to the mineral estate, these broad form deeds, commonly known as Northern form deeds, also conveyed: [T]he exclusive rights-of-way for any and all railroads, tram roads, haul roads and other ways, pipe lines, telephone and telegraph lines that may hereafter be located on said land by the parties of the first part, their heirs, representatives or assigns, or by the party of the second part, its successors or assigns, or by any person or corporation with or without the authority of either of said parties, their, or its, heirs, representatives, successors or assigns. . . . Citing Harry Caudill, Theirs Be the Power: The Moguls of Eastern Kentucky (U. of Ill. Press 1983) and Carolyn Clay Turner and Carolyn Hay Traum, John C.C. Mayo Cumberland Capitalist (Pikeville College Press 1983), Appellant asserts that Northern Coal and Coke Company used its Northern form of deed to acquire mineral interests in hundreds of thousands of acres of land in eastern Kentucky. On three occasions, our predecessor court was called upon to interpret the meaning of the so-called easement-granting clause quoted above. On each occasion, the clause was held to convey to the grantee of the mineral estate the easement-granting power with respect to the surface estate. In Cornett v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 298 Ky. 95, 182 S.W.2d 230 (1944), the owner of the surface estate sought to enjoin the grantee of a Northern form deed from granting an easement to a railroad company for the construction of a commercial railroad line across the surface of the property. The surface owner asserted that the easement-granting clause only pertained to easements appurtenant to the mineral estate, i.e., those easements necessary for the mining and removal of coal or other minerals from beneath the surface of the property. The Court held that the easement-granting clause contained no such restriction and that the owner of the mineral estate possessed the sole power to grant a railroad right-of-way easement across the surface estate. In Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Quillen, Ky., 242 S.W.2d 95 (1951), the railroad sought to condemn a right-of-way across property severed by a Northern form deed. The issue was whether the condemnation proceeds were payable to the surface owner or to the owner of the mineral estate. It was held that the owner of the mineral estate, as owner of the easement-granting power, was entitled to the proceeds. (During the pendency of the litigation, the railroad purchased the right-of-way from the holder of the mineral estate, so the upshot was that the railroad was entitled to repayment of the condemnation proceeds which it had previously paid into court.) In Elk Horn Coal Corp. v. Kentucky-West Virginia Gas Co., Ky., 317 S.W.2d 472 (1957), the issue was whether the owner of the mineral rights to forty-eight separate tracts of land could enjoin the construction of a pipeline across the surface of those tracts. The plaintiff had acquired its interest in some of the tracts by Northern form deeds and in others by deeds which did not contain an easement-granting clause. The plaintiff was held entitled to relief with respect to the tracts acquired by Northern form deeds, but not with respect to tracts acquired by other forms of deed. The opinion had this to say about the easement-granting clause in the Northern form deeds: The Cornett and Quillen cases clearly uphold the claim of the coal corporation here that the mineral deeds gave it complete control over rights of way, and negative the contention of the gas company that the mineral deeds conveyed only appurtenant easements. . . . . The simple answer to this argument is, that the deed did not purport to convey an easement, but rather ownership of the surface as concerned future grants of easements. The grantee did not receive a mere easement, but the easement-granting power. . . . . As hereinbefore indicated in this opinion, we think the coal corporation had complete ownership of the surface as concerns right of way uses, and was not limited to appurtenant easements. . . . Id. at 475, 476 (emphasis in original). (In Elk Horn Coal, there was no claim of a prescriptive easement because the action for injunctive relief was brought within the statutory period of limitations.)