Opinion ID: 1738301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: whether the chancellor committed manifest error in failing to grant downward modification of hubert magee's child support obligation.

Text: ¶ 9. Hubert Magee seeks downward modification of his $1,000 a month child support obligation because he is allegedly unable to meet his living expenses under such a heavy burden. In seeking a modification of decree to reduce child support payments, Hubert must prove a material change in circumstances since the entry of the decree, that such change was unforeseeable at the time of the decree and that the change was not caused by willful or bad faith actions on Hubert's part. Varner v. Varner, 666 So.2d 493, 497 (Miss.1995). ¶ 10. While expenses incurred as a means to meet child support obligations may be a consideration, generally, accumulation of personal expense is not used as a factor to modify child support. Varner, 666 So.2d at 495-98. Indeed, debt owed in an attempt to meet ... support payments... in and of itself does not warrant a reduction in child support. Lack v. Nash, 751 So.2d 1078, 1081 (Miss.Ct.App. 1999). ¶ 11. Hubert primarily accumulated debt attributable to buying a new house and a new car and taking out loans on his land. While he alleges that the loans were required to meet his living expenses and meet his child support obligations, there is evidence to suggest that a significant amount of the loan for $40,000 was spent on gambling. Hubert admitted that he had a gambling problem during late 1996 and early 1997, the loan being made on December 5, 1996. Although he denied any loss due to large gambling debts, Hubert failed to explain adequately where the money from the loans had been spent. A general accounting will not suffice; earnings and expenses must be proved with particularity. Poole v. Poole, 701 So.2d 813, 818 (Miss.1997); Mullen v. Mullen, 246 So.2d 923, 924 (Miss.1971). ¶ 12. Such ambiguity does not help Hubert in his cause. Furthermore, testimony from Hubert himself concerning his 1996 tax return suggests that he actually had no living expenses in late 1996 and early 1997 as he was being provided for by his boss/girlfriend with whom he was living. ¶ 13. Regarding the loan of $25,000 made on the land in late January 1998, there are more questions as to where the money went. Hubert filed for modification on January 27, 1998, and in May 1998 Hubert wrote Lynette a note claiming he could not make the full payment for that month because he was short on money. Again, there is testimony that Hubert frequented a casino in May of 1998. If it is not conclusive that Hubert wasted his money on gambling, the lack of specificity in his accounting for the money is at least evidence of bad financial planning above and beyond his poor business decisions and mishaps. Such decisions were not only foreseeable but made of his own free will. ¶ 14. It must not be forgotten that Hubert readily agreed to the divorce decree. He assured the chancellor that he could afford $1,000 per month in child support. It must be assumed that Hubert understood and approved of the agreement. Morris v. Morris, 541 So.2d 1040, 1043 (Miss.1989). Now, approximately one year and a five months after the divorce, Hubert seeks modification. The short lapse of time between the divorce and the petition for modification is itself a weighty consideration which does not bode well for Hubert. Morris, 541 So.2d at 1043. Such a short passing should be critically scrutinized by the Court. ¶ 15. Hubert claims that the imposition of the current child support amount violates 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) which states that: The maximum part of the aggregate disposable earnings of an individual for any work week which is subject to garnishment to enforce any order for the support of any person shall not exceed: (A) Where such individual is supporting his spouse or dependent child (other than a spouse or child with respect to whose support such order is used), 50 per centum of such individual's disposable earnings for that week; Hubert claims in his brief that, after taxes and mandatory deductions, his disposable income per pay period is $884.48 from which $463.85 is withheld for child support, in excess of the 50% allowed by 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2)(A). The limit, however, is extended to 55% where such garnishment is employed to enforce an order issued three months prior to the first work-week in which wages are garnished. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2)(B). The amount withheld is less than 55% of Hubert's disposable income, requiring no decrease. ¶ 16. Even if the amount were to violate the statutory maximum this would not require a reduction in the child-support obligation. Rather, the amount garnished would be reduced to comply with the statutory maximum. Hubert would still be obligated for $1,000 per month in child support. ¶ 17. The evidence reveals that Hubert's current income is almost identical to his income at the time he agreed to the divorce decree. In a very short period of time, Hubert has accumulated considerable personal debt through his willful acts. Such acts are foreseeable. Hubert has explained his earnings and expenses in only general terms, failing to make a detailed accounting. Hubert voluntarily agreed to the amount of child support and within a short time sought modification. Given this Court's limited standard of review, prior case law and the fact that Hubert utterly failed to prove a material change in his circumstance, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying a downward modification of Hubert's child-support obligation.