Opinion ID: 791265
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Simasko's Decision to Remain Neutral in the Campaign

Text: 13 The defendants' constructive discharge of Simasko based on his decision to remain neutral in Kelly's campaign for judge, however misguided and vindictive that action may have been, did not violate the Constitution. While the First Amendment prohibits the politically-motivated dismissal of many governmental employees, the Supreme Court recognized in Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367-68, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (1976) (plurality opinion), and in Branti, 445 U.S. at 517-18, 100 S.Ct. 1287 (1980), that public employees in policymaking or confidential positions may be terminated for politically-motivated reasons without violating the First Amendment. The Elrod/Branti exception applies not only to discharges based on political affiliation, but also to terminations based on actual speech. See Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 921 (6th Cir.2002). Furthermore, the Elrod/Branti exception has been interpreted to permit a hiring authority to terminate a policymaking or confidential employee based on political differences of any kind. Williams v. City of River Rouge, 909 F.2d 151, 153 n. 4 (6th Cir. 1990). 14 In this case, Simasko was employed in a policymaking or confidential position. In Branti, the Court elaborated on the policymaking or confidential requirement, stating that the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label `policymaker' or `confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. In Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 426 (6th Cir.1991), we held that an assistant county prosecutor is properly considered a policymaking or confidential employee under Michigan law and that political affiliation is an appropriate consideration in the discharge of such an employee. 15 Simasko argues that his termination does not fall within the Elrod/Branti exception because he did not actively oppose his supervisor in her race for a district court judgeship, but instead only remained neutral in the election. This argument lacks merit. The government has an important interest in securing employees who will loyally implement the policies of its democratically elected officials. The Supreme Court has found force in the argument that politically loyal employees are necessary to the end that representative government not be undercut by tactics obstructing the implementation, of policies of the . . . administration, policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (plurality opinion). Our court, moreover, has indicated that the government's interest in appointing politically loyal employees to certain positions converges with its interest in operating an efficient workplace when dealing with policymaking employees because loyalty by those employees is an essential requirement for the efficient functioning of the workplace. Rose, 291 F.3d at 923. In this case, George supported Kelly, Simasko's supervisor, in her campaign for a district court judgeship. Simasko's decision not to support George's choice for the district court judgeship election was sufficient to implicate loyalty concerns that could have caused George to lose confidence in Simasko. As we recognized in Latham v. Office of Att'y Gen. of State of Ohio, 395 F.3d 261, 266-67 (6th Cir.2005), the mere fact that an employee is affiliated with an opposing political party, however quietly, can cause the employer not to trust the employee to implement fully the employer's practices. Accordingly, because Simasko was a policymaking or confidential employee, the defendants' constructive discharge of Simasko based on his failure to support Kelly's campaign did not violate the Constitution. 16 This conclusion is supported by the Seventh Circuit's holding in Dimmig v. Wahl, 983 F.2d 86 (7th Cir.1993). In that case, a probationary deputy sheriff was fired after he refused to comply with a policy requiring all probationary employees to participate in the sheriff's campaign for re-election. Id. at 86. The deputy sheriff filed suit alleging that the termination, and the policy itself, violated his First Amendment rights. Id. Although the court had previously held that a deputy sheriff was properly labeled a policymaking or confidential employee, the deputy argued that political neutrality was not a proper basis for his termination because it did not affect his loyalty or ability to enforce the law . . . as his employer saw fit. Id. at 87. The court rejected the deputy's argument, however, and held that, because the sheriff used political considerations in deciding that [the deputy's] refusal to campaign on his behalf could hinder the effective performance of the department, the termination did not violate the Constitution. Id. See also Mitchell v. Thompson, 18 F.3d 425, 426-27 (7th Cir.1994) (holding that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity for demoting deputy sheriff based on his decision to remain neutral during the sheriff's re-election campaign). 17 While this court has recognized that terminating employees based solely on their political beliefs may seem draconian at first glance, such a result is less troubling when one recalls that, pursuant to the Elrod/Branti exception, a policymaking employee can be fired simply for supporting a political party different from that of his employer, even if that employee never evidences any policy disagreement with his employer. Latham, 395 F.3d at 266-67; see also Williams, 909 F.2d at 153 n. 4 (stating that the reasoning for the Elrod/Branti exception has been understood to apply to political differences of any kind). The defendants' actions leading to the termination of Simasko based on his decision to remain neutral in Kelly's campaign for judge did not violate the First Amendment, and the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. 18