Opinion ID: 1631088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Discovery Violation.

Text: I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the pretrial discovery agreement only required Gray to share the results of scientific tests under RCr 7.24(3)(A)(i). Because the majority takes this narrow view of the parties' pretrial discovery agreement, the majority undertakes an extensive analysis of RCr 7.24. Such detailed scrutiny is unnecessary. I believe the pretrial discovery agreement was broad in scope, as evidenced by the fact that it states that the Defendant [Gray] agrees to provide reciprocal discovery[.] So, unlike the majority, I believe that the trial court correctly found that Gray breached the agreement when he failed to share the taped statements with the Commonwealth. And I believe that the trial court had broad authority to fashion the appropriate remedy for this breach, regardless of whether the taped statements fit nicely into any specific subsection of our criminal rules. Under RCr 7.24(9), a trial court has the inherent discretion to fashion a remedy when a discovery rule has been violated. Under our settled jurisprudence, we may only disturb a trial court's remedy if that remedy represents an abuse of discretion. [1] Under the circumstances of this case, I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion. The parties clearly envisioned reciprocal discovery. And there is no indication that the Commonwealth failed to abide by that agreement. Additionally, the trial court, which was surely in the best position to judge the parties' intent, also must have believed that the parties intended to provide broad reciprocal discovery because the trial court did not engage in the RCr 7.24 analysis undertaken by the majority. I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting Gray from introducing evidence that he had not disclosed to the Commonwealth. The trial court's ruling merely held Gray to the terms of his voluntary agreement. [2] I also respectfully suggest that the majority's discussion of harmless error and invited error is unnecessary. When the trial court ruled that Gray could not impeach Crutcher or Eggerson with a specific inquiry into their prior statements, it concurrently allowed Gray to ask Crutcher or Eggerson whether they recalled making those statements. But Gray's counsel did not accept the trial court's invitation to ask either Crutcher or Eggerson whether they recalled making the statements at issue. So the propriety of the exclusion of those statements is not preserved for our review. [3]