Opinion ID: 1197692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: else's understanding of the nature of the charge

Text: Else contends that his guilty plea is invalid because he was not informed by the court or the prosecutor of an essential element of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon, specifically that his weapon must be loaded. In Hobbs v. State, 363 P.2d 357, 358 n. 3 (Alaska 1961), this court approved a jury instruction which stated that an unloaded pistol is not a dangerous weapon within the meaning of the assault with a dangerous weapon statute when there is no present ability to use it as a bludgeon. Thus, an assault with a dangerous weapon cannot be committed with an unloaded gun in Alaska unless the gun is used as a striking object. [4] Here there is no indication that Else did anything other than point a gun at the victim of the assault. If Else's gun was not loaded, as he contends, he could be guilty merely of the lesser included offense of simple assault. Else contends that he was denied due process of law, [5] since he did not receive adequate notice of the offense to which he pleaded guilty. He also charges that the trial court violated Criminal Rule 11(c), [6] by failing to assure that he understood the nature of the charge before accepting his plea, and Criminal Rule 11(f), [7] by failing to establish a reasonable basis for his plea before entering judgment. The following exchange shows the extent of Else's notice of the charge, the court's inquiry into Else's understanding of the charge, and the factual basis for the plea: THE COURT: But you understand the nature of the charge? MR. ELSE: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you understand the penalty? MR. ELSE: Yes.       THE COURT: All right. The indictment charges that on the 15th day of May, '74, at or near Anchorage you then being armed with a dangerous weapon, to wit, a rifle, did unlawfully and feloniously assault one Curtis Nerison, by pointing and threatening said Nerison. Well, this indictment charged that you were armed with a rifle and that you feloniously and unlawfully committed a crime by pointing a rifle at this Curtis and this is alleged to have occurred on the 15th day of May, 1974. Now, are you pleading guilty because those facts are in fact true, is that what happened? MR. ELSE: Yes, they are true. THE COURT: And you're pleading guilty for the only reason that they are true and for no other reason? MR. ELSE: True. A trial court should make a more exacting inquiry to assure a defendant's understanding of the charge when he seeks to enter a guilty plea pro se, than is required when he is represented by counsel. [8] Routine questions on the subject of understanding are insufficient, and a single response by a pro se defendant that he understands a charge is inadequate assurance or basis for believing that he does. [9] Based on the above-quoted exchange, and giving consideration to the fact that Else was not represented by counsel, we believe that the recent United States Supreme Court opinion in Henderson v. Morgan, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), requires withdrawal of Else's guilty plea on both federal and state due process grounds. In Henderson v. Morgan, supra , the defendant, Morgan, was indicted for first-degree murder. By agreement with the prosecution and on the advice of counsel, Morgan pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. Although the defendant stated to the court that he understood he was accused of killing his victim, there was no discussion of the elements of second-degree murder, no no indication that the nature of the offense had ever been discussed with the defendant, and no reference of any kind to the required element of intent to cause the death of his victim. Morgan made no factual statement or admission which would imply that he had the requisite intent. At the sentencing hearing his counsel stated that the defendant, who was substantially below average intelligence, meant no harm to the lady when he entered her room with a knife. Morgan testified at the subsequent plea withdrawal hearing that he would not have pled guilty had he known that intent to cause death was an element of second-degree murder. The Supreme Court stated: ... [C]learly the plea could not be voluntary in the sense that it constituted an intelligent admission that he committed the offense unless the defendant received `real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process'. Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 223 [sic], 61 S.Ct. 572, 85 L.Ed. 859. [10] The court held that Morgan's plea was involuntary since he did not receive adequate notice of the elements of the offense, and his judgment of conviction was therefore entered without due process of law. In Henderson v. Morgan, supra , the essential element of intent, which was not explained to Morgan, was contained in the New York statute defining second degree murder. [11] The requirement of an operable weapon  here, a gun which is loaded  is not contained in AS 11.15.220, the Alaska statute defining assault with a dangerous weapon. The requirement of a loaded weapon, however, has been added by judicial interpretation. The State argues that the essential element of AS 11.15.220 is a dangerous weapon, and that any requirement that the gun be loaded merely creates an evidentiary defense to the dangerousness of the weapon. [12] We agree with the case authority to the effect that the trial court is not normally required to inform a defendant of evidentiary defenses before accepting his guilty plea. [13] We cannot agree with the State's argument that the issue as to the loaded condition of the gun is merely a defense. As part of its prima facie case for assault with a dangerous weapon, the State must introduce evidence that the defendant's gun was either loaded or used as a bludgeon. A failure to introduce this evidence would mandate judgment of acquittal. Criminal Rule 29(a); Hobbs v. State, supra . Consequently, in fact situations where the weapon is a gun, we hold that its loaded condition or its use as a striking object are elements of the offense of assault with a dangerous weapon in Alaska. The trial court must inform a defendant of the essential elements of the offense with which he is charged before accepting a guilty plea. Henderson v. Morgan, supra . We hold that for the purpose of instructing a nonrepresented defendant, essential elements include those requirements not contained in the wording of the statute but created by judicial construction. Closely analogous situations were considered by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Smith v. United States, 309 F.2d 165 (1962), and Wilcox v. United States, 381 F.2d 450 (1967). The defendants were charged with assault with a dangerous weapon during a bank robbery and were erroneously advised by the prosecuting attorney on the record that it was immaterial that the gun used in the robbery was unloaded. The Ninth Circuit ordered relief because the prevailing construction of the statute at the time the defendants entered their guilty pleas was to the contrary. There is no reason to distinguish situations where erroneous advice is given on the record from situations like Else's where the defendant was not affirmatively misled on the record, but claims to have entered his plea under a similar mistaken understanding as to the applicable law. The State contends that Else was given notice of the requirement of a loaded gun by the term dangerous weapon used in the indictment, which the judge read to him in court. This position is supported by Edwards v. United States, 422 F.2d 788 (7th Cir.1970). We do not believe that a lay person appearing without counsel can be expected to interpret the term dangerous weapon as implying the requirement that a gun be loaded. A person untrained in law may well consider a gun, whether loaded or unloaded, a dangerous weapon because of its potential for causing injury or death. In the instant case, we hold that Else did not receive real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process. [14] We are not being asked to order Mr. Else's acquittal, but rather to afford him the opportunity of pleading again, with full knowledge of the elements of the offense with which he is charged. If with that knowledge, he elects to enter a plea of not guilty, he is entitled to a trial on the merits of the case. We consequently vacate Mr. Else's judgment of conviction and sentence, and remand to the trial court for new plea proceedings consistent with this opinion. [15] RABINOWITZ, J., concurs. BURKE, J., did not participate.