Opinion ID: 2708545
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ban on Any Alcohol & Mood Altering Substances

Text: Baker first points out that the oral pronouncement of special condition 1 did not include the phrase “or mood al12 No. 13-1641 tering substance.” The government admits in its response that “mood altering substance” seemingly refers to something that is not “alcohol” or a “controlled substance,” which were the only provisions of condition 1 discussed at the sentencing hearing. This would also include various innocuous foods, vitamins, and beverages, all of which may be “mood altering.” Accordingly, the phrase is inconsistent with the terms of the condition that the judge orally pronounced at the sentencing, and in such a situation, the sentence pronounced from the bench controls. See United States v. Alburay, 415 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2005) (“The rule in such situations is clear: ‘If an inconsistency exists between an oral and the later written sentence, the sentence pronounced from the bench controls.’” (quoting United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1998)). The extraneous language in the written order (i.e., “or mood altering substance”) must be removed from special condition 1. The crux of Baker’s argument regarding special condition 1, however, is the ban on any alcohol. Indeed, Baker acknowledges that a ban on excessive use of alcohol would be appropriate. He simply does not believe that the record supports a conclusion that he is addicted to alcohol or completely dependent upon its use, such that an absolute prohibition is appropriate. See United States v. Simons, 614 F.3d 475, 480– 81 (8th Cir. 2010) (explaining that the court has vacated a special condition involving a complete ban on alcohol “where the defendant’s history or crime of conviction did not support [it]”). The government agrees with that assessment, conceding that Baker has abused alcohol in the past but that there is no evidence that Baker’s alcohol use has contributed to his repeated criminal conduct or that Baker is dependent on alcohol. In light of that concession, we need No. 13-1641 13 not provide a full analysis explaining why a complete ban is inappropriate here. Cf. United States v. Schave, 186 F.3d 839, 842–43 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a special condition that banned all alcohol use). We do note though that some limitation on Baker’s use of alcohol is proper because Baker has been cited for illegal transportation of alcohol on two occasions, Baker told the presentence investigator that he consumed a six-pack of beer or more twice per week, and Baker’s breath tested positive for alcohol on two days in August 2011 while he was participating in a substance-abuse treatment program while on pre-trial release. These instances demonstrate that Baker has abused alcohol in the past, so a condition barring him from consuming “certain” amounts of alcohol in the future involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary. The question remains as to what amount of alcohol Baker should abstain from consuming. Both parties previously agreed that a condition simply prohibiting “excessive” use of alcohol, rather than “any” use, would be sufficient. That was before we decided United States v. Siegel, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 2210762 (7th Cir. May 29, 2014). In Siegel, we vacated conditions of supervised release requiring the defendant to refrain from “excessive use of alcohol” and from purchasing any “mood altering substance (excluding coffee, tea, and soda)” because they were unduly vague. Id. at . Our conclusion requiring “mood altering substance” to be deleted from condition 1 removes the question of the phrase’s legitimacy from our consideration here. But as to the issue of whether the prohibition of “excessive” use of alcohol, without more, is appropriate, we do not believe so—even if the parties agreed to it. As we noted in Siegel, there are different 14 No. 13-1641 definitions of what constitutes excessive use of alcohol. See id. at 10. Whether excessive constitutes the violation of any local, state, or federal law as a result of alcohol use; encompasses any use that “adversely affects” one’s employment, relationships, or ability to comply with the conditions of supervision; or involves something specific to a particular individual in a given day (e.g., a male defendant consuming more than four drinks in a sitting), that is not for us to decide at this point. Nevertheless, a condition prohibiting a defendant from “excessive” use of alcohol, without any further guidance or direction, will not pass muster. On remand, the judge should specify what constitutes excessive use of alco- hol as to Baker. Finally, although not addressed by either party, we highlight the fact that condition 1 requires Baker to undergo “not more than six tests per month to determine whether [he has] used controlled substances and/or alcohol.” As was the case with defendant Norfleet in Siegel, Baker is allowed to consume alcohol. So, the exact purpose of these tests, at least as to Baker’s use of alcohol, is unknown. See id. at  (“Presumably the purpose of the tests is to see how much [the defendant has] consumed, but the statement of conditions of supervised release doesn’t say that.”). Whatever the answer is, we believe this involves questions best left to the sentencing judge and the Probation Office—e.g., whether a test for alcohol is necessary to determine whether Baker has consumed a prohibited amount of alcohol, regardless of how the amount is defined; or how frequently any such test should occur. We vacate condition 1 and remand for further consideration of the issues discussed, noting that a restriction on No. 13-1641 15 Baker’s use of alcohol is proper if reasonably tailored and defined.