Opinion ID: 1593307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Failure to Present Jury and Trial Court with Available Mitigation and Trial Court's Failure to Consider Mitigation Contained in the Record

Text: In his next issue on appeal, Eaglin contends that the outcome of his penalty phase is unreliable because available mitigating evidence was not presented to the jury or the trial court. Further, Eaglin argues that the trial court failed to adequately consider all available mitigation that was present in the record. As to the claim that all available mitigation was not presented, the record affirmatively establishes that Eaglin instructed his counsel to forego the presentation of evidence regarding his childhood. As to mental mitigation, defense counsel indicated to the court that he felt that the evidence should not be presented to the jury. Although counsel did not specifically state his reasons for his decision to forego mental mitigation, the record demonstrates that Eaglin agreed with his counsel's decision. Eaglin now asserts that the jurors were unable to fulfill their duty to determine the validity and weight of the aggravating and mitigating evidence because they were not made aware of all available mitigating evidence. Although Eaglin frames his claim as one of an unreliable penalty phase and does not directly allege that his counsel erred in his decision not to present mental health and background mitigation, in effect this claim is actually one of ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not cognizable on direct appeal. Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 (Fla.2001). However, such a claim may be raised on direct appeal when the ineffectiveness is apparent on the face of the record. Id. at 63 n. 14. In this case, any alleged ineffectiveness is not apparent from the face of the record. In fact, the record demonstrates that the waiver of mitigation concerning his childhood was prompted by Eaglin himself because he did not want his family to be involved. It also appears from the record that counsel discussed the reasons for not presenting mental mitigation to the jury with Eaglin before a decision was made. Moreover, both Eaglin and the State point out in their briefs that counsel had been working on mental mitigation continuously and [had] been since day one and had been all over the country developing social information for purposes of phase II. Thus, because a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel does not appear from the face of the record, we do not decide this claim at this stage of the proceedings. See Gore v. State, 784 So.2d 418, 438 (Fla.2001) (concluding that ineffectiveness was not apparent on the face of the record where the record demonstrated that counsel was reasonable in evaluating potential mitigating evidence and made strategic decisions in declining to call witnesses). In addition to his claim that the jury was unaware of critical mitigating evidence, Eaglin also asserts that the trial court failed to consider all available mitigation in the record. [5] Specifically, he asserts that in the sentencing order, the court did not address the information regarding Eaglin's substance abuse in his teenage years or the mental disorder that plagued him. We reject this claim. First, in this case, Eaglin did not waive all mitigation. We have explained the distinction between the waiver of the right to present mitigation and the decision to limit mitigation. See Boyd v. State, 910 So.2d 167, 189 (Fla.2005). Importantly, we have extended the duty of the trial court to consider all mitigating evidence contained in the record to the extent it is believable and uncontroverted, Muhammad v. State, 782 So.2d 343, 363 (Fla.2001), only to cases in which there is a complete waiver of all mitigation. Second, despite the fact that Eaglin did not want to present evidence of his childhood, the trial court did in fact accord some weight to the mitigating factor that Eaglin suffered from a severely abusive childhood with a severely dysfunctional family. The additional mitigation Eaglin asserts should have been considered by the trial court consisted of information in the PSI report ordered by the court that Eaglin had abused alcohol and cocaine in his younger years along with the prescription drug Prozac. Because Eaglin was unwilling to cooperate in the presentence investigation, [6] this information was taken from a Florida Department of Corrections (DOC) report relating to the prior murder committed by Eaglin. Eaglin also alleges that the trial court failed to mention in its sentencing order a letter contained in the record from Dr. Harry Krop, a psychologist, in which Eaglin was diagnosed with a serious psychiatric disorder. The letter was attached to Eaglin's Notice of Mental Mitigation filed before counsel made the decision not to offer mental health mitigation. The trial court did not err in failing to accord weight to mitigation that was neither presented to the trial court nor argued as mitigation. As to the information regarding Eaglin's substance abuse, this asserted mitigation consists of double hearsay, as it appears in the PSI report based on a DOC report. Further, considering the nature of the crime for which Eaglin was charged and the fact that he was imprisoned for a prior murder, any alleged alcohol or substance abuse would constitute minimal mitigation under the circumstances. As to the failure to consider the letter from Dr. Krop regarding Eaglin's mental state, counsel decided to forego the presentation of mental mitigation because counsel felt it would be on the dangerous side as far as the jury [was] concerned. In light of this affirmative decision not to present any alleged mental mitigation, the trial court did not err in failing to consider Dr. Krop's letter in its sentencing order. Accordingly, based on the above, we reject all aspects of this claim of error.