Opinion ID: 1806535
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to allow recall of prosecution witness.

Text: During the trial the prosecution called Officer Hundt, the cousin and an uncle of Cassel. After the prosecution rested and after the defense had called a few preliminary witnesses, Cassel's counsel attempted to recall Officer Hundt for further examination. The state objected and the court refused to allow further cross-examination on the ground that Richards v. State (1892), 82 Wis. 172, 51 N. W. 652, prohibited such procedure and that Cassel's attorney had stated at the conclusion of his cross-examination of Hundt that he had no further questions to ask of the witness. The Richards Case is not in point; this is conceded by both sides. All Richards held was that one cannot impeach his own witness. However, after an attorney has stated to the court he has no further questions of an adverse witness, he may nevertheless have a limited right to recall such witness if he has good reason to do so. The exercise of such right, however, is subject to the discretion of the trial court. 3 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), pp. 720, 721, sec. 1036; 3 Wharton's, Anderson, Criminal Evidence (12th ed.), p. 341, sec. 917. Here, defense counsel stated as such a reason that he would be pursuing him to determine whether or not his veracity as a witness truly reflects itself; and if it does not, I think it should be brought to the attention of the jurors. In his brief, Cassel's counsel states the reason for the recall was to lay a foundation for impeachment, but we do not find this is clear in the record as that reason is generally understood. After an attorney has excused an adverse witness from cross-examination, he has no right to recall such witness to continue general cross-examination and that is all this record shows Cassel's counsel proposed to do. The record indicates counsel intended to engage in a fishing expedition to find some evidence for impeachment, not to lay a specific ground for the use of impeachment evidence. If counsel had disclosed the fact, if it were a fact, that he had evidence which he would lose because he had inadvertently omitted to cross-examine the witness to lay a foundation for its use, the trial court would be obliged to allow the recall of the witness for such purpose. In Perkins v. State (1891), 78 Wis. 551, 47 N. W. 827, we held it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court not to allow further examination when the party requesting the recall had attempted to impeach the witness during his original cross-examination but failed to prove the precise out-of-court statement which would have laid the foundation for impeachment. And more recently in Sipero v. State (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 390, 164 N. W. 2d 230, we extended this rationale and held it an abuse of discretion not to allow the defense to recall a prosecution witness which it sought to impeach even though counsel had neglected to lay a proper foundation to impeach the witness during the initial cross-examination. While other areas of impeachment were explored, the defendant did not lay a proper foundation for the impeaching evidence he offered to prove and he would lose the use of evidence having some value to him if he could not recall the witness. That is not the case here and without some indication of the foundation for impeachment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing the recall of the witness for further cross-examination.