Opinion ID: 1354851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Five Successive Calendar Years or Five Successive Irrigation Seasons?

Text: Next we are requested to determine if the term five successive years in ORS 540.610(1) means five successive calendar years or five successive irrigation seasons. If the findings of the Director of Water Resources are correct, they support the conclusion that Rencken did not use the water from the East Branch of Mud Creek to irrigate the subject 10 acres during five successive irrigation seasons but did use it during five successive calendar years. The undisputed use of the water in November 1983 was not within the irrigation season, but was within the calendar year. Rencken contends that ORS 540.610(1) refers to calendar years. Therefore, even if the Director found that Rencken did not use the water during the fifth irrigation season which ended on October 31, 1983, his undisputed use of the water in November 1983 was within the fifth calendar year and the terms of the statute. Under Rencken's position, this proceeding should be dismissed. Even if we should decide that ORS 540.610(1) refers to calendar years and not irrigation seasons, it does not help Rencken. His water right from the East Branch of Mud Creek was limited for irrigation to a season from March to October. Rencken's use of the water in November was not the water appropriated under the circuit court decree and referred to in ORS 540.610(1). If he had a right to use the water from the East Branch of Mud Creek in November to irrigate the 10 acres, it would have to come from some other legal source. If the description of the water right in the decree as Irrigation & domestic Stock Mar to Oct. and the certificate of water rights as Irrigation season: from March to October of each year stood alone, it might be argued that the descriptions referred only to the average or normal season and were not definitive. However, the decree of November 18, 1910 strictly limits the irrigation season with the following language:    with the season during which such water is used for irrigation and to which such use is now limited.    (Emphasis added.) The decree of the circuit court in confirming the water right controls the certificate of water right issued at a subsequent date by an administrative agency. [8] All water within the State of Oregon from all sources of water supply belongs to the public. ORS 537.110. When Rencken's predecessor appropriated the water in question under the Water Appropriation Act of 1909, he obtained a vested property right which was appurtenant to the subject 10 acres. Skinner v. Jordan Val. Irr. Dist., 137 Or. 480, 491, 300 P. 499, 3 P.2d 534 (1931). However, it was a usufructuary estate subject to being divested by forfeiture. 2 Kinney on Irrigation and Water Rights 1326, 2020 (2d ed. 1912). [9] Caselaw in Oregon gives courts the authority to limit the irrigation seasons in a decree. An appropriation of water is limited in every case, in quantity as well as for the period of time for which the appropriation is made. Davis v. Chamberlain, 51 Or. 304, 314, 98 P. 154 (1908) (citations omitted). It is also a well-authenticated principle that appropriations may be measured by the period or time of use, as well as by the quantity employed. McPhee v. Kelsey, 44 Or. 193, 201, 74 P. 401, 75 P. 713 (1903). One of the reasons for the rule set out in the Davis and McPhee cases is demonstrated by Oliver v. Skinner and Lodge, 190 Or. 423, 442, 226 P.2d 507 (1951): A prior appropriation of a definite amount of water may be made, limited to use during a definite period of time, and a subsequent appropriator may appropriate a like quantity of water from the same source, for use during another period. [10] We hold that Rencken's use of the water from the East Branch of Mud Creek during November 1983 was not appropriated water within the limits of his adjudicated right. We are dealing with a decree that specifically limits the use of the water for irrigation from March to October of each year  other decrees may contain different provisions. We express no opinion as to Rencken's claimed use of the water in October 1983  that is a disputed question of fact to be determined by the Director of Water Resources.