Opinion ID: 2811817
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Public Disclosure of Private Facts

Text: The Restatement articulates this form of the tort, on the basis of case decisions, as follows: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977), Publicity Given to Private Life. Comment a. — publicity — articulates a distinction between publication of a private matter and giving publicity to a person’s private life. Publication “includes any communication by the defendant [about a private fact] to a third person.” Id. 7 at cmt. a. Publicity means that the defendant has communicated the matter in such a manner that it is “substantially likely to become one of public knowledge.” Id. Comment h — private facts — states in pertinent part: [A] line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern. Comment c — highly offensive publicity — states in pertinent part: The rule stated in this Section gives protection only against unreasonable publicity, of a kind highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable man. The protection afforded to the plaintiff’s interest in his privacy must be relative to the customs of the time and place, to the occupation of the plaintiff and to the habits of his neighbors and fellow citizens. This court has similarly defined this form of the tort as requiring “(1) publicity, (2) absent any waiver or privilege, (3) given to private facts, (4) in which the public has no legitimate concern, (5) and which would be highly offensive to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.” Wolf, 553 A.2d at 1220. 8 In this instance, appellant has pleaded that appellee Ren, having received a copy of the video from appellant, made it available to appellee law firm. Appellee Bernabei, a lawyer in the firm, conducted an interview on a website about the incident using appellant’s name. It is also pleaded that the law firm posted the video on YouTube. Appellant pleaded as well that she was randomly contacted by friends and third persons about the matter. As to the pleading requirement of publicity given to private life, we conclude that appellant has set forth sufficient facts to establish those elements of the tort. However, more is required. Appellant must also plead factual allegations that the publicity concerning the private life of appellant “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person and . . . not of legitimate concern to the public.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D. The Comments to these elements indicate that by design, the latter requirements are to be viewed objectively rather than subjectively. Throughout this litigation — in the trial court and on appeal — appellant has espoused the view that the publicity by the appellees of the incident alleged is subjectively offensive to her and is of no legitimate concern to the public. Given the circumstances of this case, including the limited nature of what is actually shown in the video and the disclosure of the matter to some members of the public, we conclude that appellant has not set forth sufficient facts to establish that publicizing this matter 9 would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and of no legitimate concern to the public, and thus entitle her to relief under this cause of action.