Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Artificial Inflation of Aggravating Circumstances.

Text: Among other factors, the jury was instructed to consider (a) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true.... [¶] (b) The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. [¶] (c) The presence or absence of any prior felony conviction. Relying on People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36 [201 Cal. Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433] (plur. opn.), defendant contends this language improperly required the jury to translate single aggravating acts of defendant into multiple aggravating factors, thus artificially inflating the case for death.
(26) The jury found true two felony-murder special circumstances: robbery-murder and kidnapping-for-purposes-of-robbery murder. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i) and (ii).) Defendant argues the two felonies necessarily overlap because they describe an indivisible course of conduct having one principal criminal purpose: the robbery of Benham. Consequently, he contends that under People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, it was error to instruct the jury to consider each as a distinct aggravating factor under subdivision (a). In Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, a plurality of this court held that in cases where there have been alleged and found true multiple felony-murder special circumstances based on an indivisible course of conduct having one principal criminal purpose, the jury should be instructed that for purposes of determining penalty the multiple special circumstances should be considered as one. ( Id. at p. 66.) The Harris court reached this conclusion in the belief that to permit the jury to take into account all of such multiple felony-murder special circumstances would artificially inflate the defendant's conduct and undercut the constitutionally mandated objective of focusing on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. ( Id. at p. 62.) The plurality further suggested that separate consideration of such overlapping special circumstances at the penalty phase would violate [t]he principles underlying California's prohibition of double punishment. ( Id. at p. 64; see § 654.) In People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713 we reconsidered Harris. We determined there was no constitutional impediment to permitting the jury to consider multiple felonies leading to the capital murder ( id. at p. 767), so long as the various felonies are not weighed in the penalty determination  more than once for exactly the same purpose ( id. at p. 768, italics in original). [19] As we there observed, it is constitutionally legitimate for the state to determine that a death-eligible murderer is more culpable, and thus more deserving of death, if he not only robbed the victim but committed an additional and separate felonious act, burglary [or, as here, kidnapping], in order to facilitate the robbery and murder. ( Id. at p. 767; accord, People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 954-955 [760 P.2d 996].) Each of the crimes underlying the felony murder special circumstances invades a distinct interest that society seeks to protect. ( Bean, supra ; accord, People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 340.) In the instant case the jury was properly permitted to consider both the robbery special circumstance and the kidnapping-for-robbery special circumstance as aggravating factors under section 190.3 factor (a).
Defendant argues the instructions permitted the jury to consider the robbery and kidnapping of Benham as aggravating circumstances under both factors (a) and (b). It is settled that factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3 pertain only to criminal activity other than the crimes for which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106.) Although in Miranda, supra, we expressed doubt that a jury would believe factors (b) and (c) embrace the guilt phase offenses, in order to avoid any possible confusion, we directed trial courts in the future to expressly instruct that factors (b) and (c) refer to crimes other than those underlying the guilt determination. (44 Cal.3d at p. 106, fn. 28.) In the case at bench, there could have been no confusion concerning consideration of the guilt phase robbery and kidnapping crimes as section 190.3 factor (b) criminal activity. The trial court specifically instructed the jury as to which of defendant's alleged criminal acts could constitute criminal activity and prior felony convictions ( ante, fn. 13, p. 37); the guilt phase crimes were not among them.
(27) The jury was required to consider the murder of White  the murder underlying the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance  under section 190.3 factor (a). In addition, the court in its list of possible other criminal activity and prior felony convictions permitted the jury to consider the murder twice more  once as The murder of Minnie Ola White, and once as Defendant's prior conviction of First Degree Murder. (See ante, fn. 13, p. 37.) Asserting that each of the factors is intended to be exclusive, defendant argues the court erred in permitting a triple counting of the White murder. We have previously rejected the claim that the statutory factors are necessarily exclusive. Although factors (b) and (c) pertain only to criminal activity other than the crimes for which the defendant is convicted in the present proceeding ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 105-106), a prior felony conviction that involves a crime of violence can be considered under both factors (b) and (c) ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 764-765). The only limitation is that an individual criminal act cannot be counted twice in aggravation for the same purpose.  ( Id. at p. 765, italics in original.) The purpose of the prior-murder-conviction special circumstance is to circumscribe, as the Eighth Amendment requires [citation], the classes of persons who may properly be subject to the death penalty.... Unlike recidivism statutes, ... section 190.2(a)(2) is directed neither to deterring misconduct nor to fostering rehabilitation. ( People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d 584, 595.) The purpose of section 190.3 factor (b), by contrast, is to show defendant's propensity for violence. And the purpose of factor (c) is to show the capital offense was the culmination of the defendant's habitual criminality  that it was undeterred by the community's previous criminal sanctions. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764, quoting People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 202.) Given these distinct purposes, there is no constitutional impediment to consideration of a defendant's prior-murder conviction under factors (a), (b) and (c). In the instant case, because the murder of White involved force and violence, it could properly be considered under factor (b). ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764.) Had the conviction occurred before the instant offense, it could also be considered under factor (c). But because the conviction occurred after commission of the instant offense, the court erred in permitting the jury to consider it as a prior felony conviction under factor (c). ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 203; see Melton, supra . ) The error, however, clearly was nonprejudicial. Nothing in the argument of either party underscored multiple consideration of the prior conviction. The prosecutor never enumerated the statutory factors as such; he merely discussed defendant's prior criminal activity and convictions in general, without reference to their relevance to a particular factor or factors. Neither did he indicate to the jury that it was to count aggravating factors. Rather, both he and defense counsel spoke of the jury's responsibility to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. The jury was fully aware of defendant's first degree murder conviction for the killing of White, as well as the circumstances surrounding the killing. Nothing in the trial, the instructions or the argument was calculated to lead the jury to believe the White murder was more heinous because it came within three, rather than two, factors. We thus conclude the error in instructing the jury concerning application of section 190.3 factor (c) to the special circumstance murder could have had no bearing on its penalty verdict.