Opinion ID: 2307522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Continuing Jurisdiction to Enforce a Child Support Order

Text: The comment to Section 205 of UIFSA (1992) indicates that under that Act when all the parties and all the children leave the issuing state, the issuing tribunal loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its existing order, but does not lose jurisdiction to enforce the order. The comment states: [t]his section is perhaps the most crucial provision in UIFSA. It establishes the principle that the issuing tribunal retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the support order except in very narrowly defined circumstances. If all parties and the child reside elsewhere, the issuing state loses its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction  which in practical terms means the issuing tribunal loses its authority to modify its order. The issuing state no longer has a nexus with the parties or child and, furthermore, the issuing tribunal has no current information about the circumstances of anyone involved. Note, however, that the one-order of the issuing tribunal remains valid and enforceable. That order is in effect not only in the issuing state and those states in which the order has been registered, but also may be enforced in additional states in which the one-order is registered for enforcement after the issuing state loses its power to modify the original order, see Sections 601-604... The one-order remains in effect until it is properly modified in accordance with the narrow terms of the Act, see Sections 609-612. [34] This comment to Section 206 of UIFSA (1992) reinforces the premise that for the issuing state to retain the power to modify its order, the child or at least one party must continue to reside in the issuing state. [35] It states [s]ubsection (b) confirms the power to modify a child support order of the issuing state, provided it retains a sufficient nexus with its order [;] UIFSA defines that nexus as any situation in which the child or at least one of the parties continues to reside in the issuing state. [36] The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (1992) was amended in 1996. Although these amendments have no bearing on this action, they are supportive of our interpretation. [37] The 1996 revised comment to Section 611 of UIFSA (1996) states: [u]nder UIFSA, registration is subdivided into distinct categories; registration for enforcement, or modification, or both. UIFSA is based on recognizing the truism that when a foreign support order is registered for enforcement, the rights of the parties affected have been previously litigated. Because the obligor already has had a day before an appropriate tribunal, an enforcement remedy may be summarily invoked. On the other hand, modification of an existing order presupposes a change in the rights of the parties. In fact, even under RURESA more elaborate procedures were required by most states prior to the issuance of a modified order. The requirements for modification of a child support order are much more explicit and restrictive under UIFSA. ... UIFSA establishes a set of bright line rules which must be met before a tribunal may modify an existing child support order. The intent is to eliminate multiple support orders to the maximum extent possible consistent with the principle of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction that pervades the Act. . . . . The procedure put in place by UIFSA is in marked contrast to the actual system under RURESA. The multiple-order system provided virtually no incentive for an obligor to seek to reduce an unfair or unduly burdensome child support order. Rather, the obligor typically waited for an enforcement proceeding to be filed in his state of residence and then sought modification in a forum which presented him with the hometown advantage. Two major arguments sustain the choice of venue made by the Act. First, jurisdiction by ambush will be avoided. That is, personal service on either the custodial or non-custodial party found within the state borders will not yield jurisdiction to modify. Thus, parents seeking to exercise rights of visitation, delivering or picking-up the child for such visitation, or engaging in unrelated business activity in the state, will not be involuntarily subjected to protracted litigation in an inconvenient forum. The chilling effect on the exercise of parental contact with the child that the possibility of such litigation might have is avoided. Second, disputes about whether the tribunal has jurisdiction will be eliminated; submission by the petitioner to the state of residence of the respondent alleviates this issue completely. [38] As will be discussed, it is unnecessary for us to determine if Minnesota had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify its original 1983 Support Order in 1995 because we find that the 1995 Minnesota Arrearages Order was an enforcement action authorized under UIFSA (1992) and not a modification of the original order. Amicus asserts, in the alternative, that even if an issuing tribunal loses continuing, exclusive jurisdiction when all the parties and child(ren) leave its jurisdiction, the issuing state still has continuing jurisdiction to enforce accrued amounts and non-modifiable assets of its order as compared to continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify. UIFSA (1992) provides that the issuing state does not lose its power to enforce the existing order until another state properly exercises its jurisdiction and modifies the issuing state's order. [39] Section 207 states: [i]f only one tribunal has issued a child support order, the order of that tribunal must be recognized. [40] Although not dispositive, the revised comment to Section 207 UIFSA (1996) confirms this interpretation: [s]ubsection (a) declares that if only one child support order exists, it is to be denominated the controlling order, irrespective of when and where it was issued and whether any of the individual parties or the child continue to reside in the issuing state. [41] We agree with the Amicus that, if sections 205 and 207 are read together, they provide that when only one order has been issued that order controls, and the issuing tribunal is authorized to enforce its order if no other state has assumed continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.