Opinion ID: 2584004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Causal Connection between Use and Injury

Text: If the use is foreseeably identifiable with the inherent purpose of a motor vehicle, the next prong of the inquiry is whether the use is causally related to the claimant's injury. Beginning with our decision in Mason, we have consistently interpreted the phrase arising out of the use of a motor vehicle as requiring some causal connection between the use of the motor vehicle and the injury complained of. Mason, 161 Colo. at 443-44, 423 P.2d at 24-25. While occasionally referred to as a but for causal test, we have always required a claimant to show something more than a mere but for relation between the use of the vehicle and the injury. We have also required something less than proximate cause in the tort sense. In Kohl, we stated that [t]o establish the requisite causal relationship, the claimant must establish that the accident would not have occurred but for the vehicle's use. Kohl, 731 P.2d at 135 (emphasis added). In that same opinion, however, we also reaffirmed our previous decision in Titan Construction Co. and emphasized that the `but for' doctrine should not apply when there is a lack of relationship between the [vehicle] and the accident. Id. at 136 (citing to Titan Constr. Co., 183 Colo. at 195, 515 P.2d at 1126). Titan Construction Co. explained that courts will not assess the causal relationship according to the realm of torts, but rather according to contract causation analysis. Titan Constr. Co., 183 Colo. at 194, 515 P.2d at 1126. Several later cases restated the tight but for test first enunciated in Titan Construction Co. but also obscured it slightly by including language that first appeared in Azar v. Employers Cas. Co., 178 Colo. 58, 495 P.2d 554 (Colo.1972). In Azar, we interpreted arising out of the use of a vehicle only to require that the injury originate from, grow out of, or flow from the use of the vehicle. Azar, 178 Colo. at 61, 495 P.2d at 555 (internal quotations omitted). We also held in Azar that there must be a causal relation or connection between the injury and the use of a vehicle in order for the injury to come within the meaning of the phrase `arising out of the use' of a vehicle. Id. Titan Construction Co., decided one year after Azar, and interpreting a liability policy nearly identical to the one in Azar, made no mention of the test formulated in that case. Nevertheless, we have cited the language of both decisions in PIP, liability and even UM cases, often simultaneously. [4] See, e.g., Hall, 690 P.2d at 231. In Cung La, we stated that recovery depended not only upon the nexus between the motor vehicle and the injuries complained of, but also upon whether the injury would not have occurred but for the use of the vehicle and whether the injury flowed from or arose out of the use of the vehicle. Cung La, 830 P.2d at 1012. Finally, our most recent case to interpret the phrase arising out of the use of a motor vehicle was McMichael. In McMichael, we described the causal analysis as requiring a claimant to show that the accident would not have occurred but for the vehicle's use. McMichael, 906 P.2d at 103. There, we equated this phrase with a showing that the injury originated in, grew out of, or flowed from a use of a vehicle. Id. We also held that the claimant must show that the vehicle's use was integrally related to the claimant's activities and the injury at the time of the accident. Id. (emphasis added). McMichael was also careful to point out that the nexus guarantees that the accident is within the kind of risks that the automobile insurance contract was meant to cover. Id. We interpret this series of cases as requiring not only a but for connection between the use of the vehicle and the claimant's injury, but also an unbroken causal chain between that use and the injury. Under this framework, the claimant must first show that except for the use of the vehicle, the accident or incident in question would never have taken place. Since Titan Construction Co., this requirement has been explicit and continually treated on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Cung La, 830 P.2d at 1012 (noting that to survive a summary judgment motion, the claimant must only show a material question of fact exists as to the initial but for determination). In addition, to complete and satisfy the causal analysis, the claimant must show that the use of the vehicle and the injury are directly related or inextricably linked so that no independent significant act or non-use of the vehicle interrupted the but for causal chain between the covered use of the vehicle and the injury. Where the injury in question suffered by the insured is actually the result of an intentional act of another, this showing can be particularly difficult to make. However, our cases, as well as cases in a significant number of other states, illustrate that the intentional, even criminal act of another will not automatically preclude recovery. See Cung La, 830 P.2d at 1011-12; see also McMillan, 925 P.2d at 794 (holding that the intentional nature of a drive-by shooting did not preclude a finding that injuries were caused by an accident for purposes of UM coverage; [T]he intentional conduct of the uninsured tortfeasor [in Nissen ] did not preclude our holding that uninsured motorist coverage existed for the insured.). Instead, these cases demonstrate that the claimant may recover provided that the injury flows directly from the use of the vehicle, without interruption, so that the use of the vehicle and the resulting injury constitute one ongoing assault. We have previously observed that using a car merely to help carry out a criminal act is not the kind of risk that the automobile insurance contract was meant to cover, McMichael, 906 P.2d at 103. Instead, where the act causing the injury is intentional, the use of the vehicle must bear a direct relation to the assault. For example, in Cung La, the insured was driving his own insured vehicle down the highway at the time his assailants shot him. Cung La, 830 P.2d at 1008. The assailants, too, were driving down the highway and used their uninsured vehicles to position themselves in order to shoot the insured. Id. We assumed that the assailants and the insured were using their cars as contemplated by the insured's policy since the cars were moving at the time of the shooting. The issue, therefore, in Cung La was whether a jury could find, based on the evidence, that the shooting injuries arose out of this use. Id. at 1011-12. In response to that issue, we determined as an initial matter that the shooting would not have occurred but for the victim's use of the car (he was identified by his assailants only by the car he was driving and thus would not have been shot except for the fact that he was using his car as transportation). Id. at 1012. Because the covered use of the cars served as an active accessory to the shooting, and because there was no interruption or other independent significant act between this use and the shooting, a jury could have found that the injuries were sufficiently causally related. The act of driving and the act of shooting were inextricably linked with no intervening act. See Cont'l W. Ins. Co. v. Klug, 415 N.W.2d 876, 878 (Minn.1987)(holding there was no act of independent significance to break the causal link between the uninsured's shooting the insured while both were driving on a road). The result reached in Cung La is in line with the reasoning in cases from other jurisdictions with practically identical facts. See, e.g., Wausau Underwriter's Ins. Co. v. Howser, 309 S.C. 269, 422 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1992) (per curiam); see also AIG Hawaii Ins. Co., Inc. v. Caraang, 74 Haw. 620, 851 P.2d 321, 330-31 (1993). In Nissen, we permitted recovery where the uninsured hit the claimant with her own car, throwing her onto the hood and pinning her between two cars after driving into traffic. Nissen, 851 P.2d at 166. Because the uninsured was driving the car when he hit the claimant, we did not question whether the car was being used at the time of the assault. Additionally, because the car physically contacted the claimant, we did not question the causal relationship between the use and the injury in that case. Instead, resolution of Nissen turned on the interpretation of two conflicting terms in the insured's policy. Id.