Opinion ID: 1040176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mandatory Restitution Under Section 2259

Text: Originally enacted as part of the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, tit. IV, 108 Stat. 1902, 18 U.S.C. § 2259 requires courts to order restitution for any offense under this chapter, including the crimes of receiving and possessing child pornography. 18 U.S.C. § 2259(a), (b)(4); see also id. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), (a)(5)(B). The offender must make restitution for the full amount of the victim's losses. Id. § 2259(b)(1). As used in the statute, victim means the individual harmed as a result of a commission of a crime under this chapter. Id. § 2259(c). In Aumais, we held that the children depicted in child pornography generally -- and Amy specifically -- are victims within the meaning of this section. Aumais, 656 F.3d at 152.8 8 We reject Lundquist's argument that Amy was not his victim because he did not know that the child in the image was Amy. Although the term 'knowingly' . . . applies to every element of Lundquist's crimes, United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008), the identity of the child is not an element of those crimes, see 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A), (a)(5)(B). Lundquist needed to know only that the image was child pornography, id., defined as sexually explicit visual portrayals that feature children, Williams, 553 U.S. at 288. By pleading guilty, Lundquist admitted he had such knowledge and therefore knew that each child in those images was a victim of his offense. See Aumais, 656 F.3d at 152. - 15 - The full amount of the victim's losses is defined as: any costs incurred by the victim for -- (A) medical services relating to physical, psychiatric, or psychological care; (B) physical and occupational therapy or rehabilitation; (C) necessary transportation, temporary housing, and child care expenses; (D) lost income; (E) attorneys' fees, as well as other costs incurred; and (F) any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense. Id. § 2259(b)(3). We have held that the victim's losses must be proximately caused by the defendant's offense even if they fall within one of the enumerated categories in subparagraphs (A) through (E) because proximate cause is a deeply rooted principle in both tort and criminal law that Congress did not abrogate when it drafted § 2259. Aumais, 656 F.3d at 153 (citing United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).9 For this standard to be met, there 9 We note that as of the date of this opinion, every circuit except the Fifth Circuit has concluded, based on either the text or background common law principles, - 16 - must be 'some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.' Id. (quoting Hemi Grp., LLC v. City of New York, 559 U.S. 1, 9 (2010)). To the extent there is [a]ny dispute as to the proper amount or type of restitution[,] [it] shall be resolved by the court by the preponderance of the evidence, with the government bearing the burden of proof. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e); see id. § 2259(b)(2) (An order of restitution under this section shall be issued and enforced in accordance with section 3664 in the same manner as an order under section 3663A.). The district court need not hold a full-blown evidentiary hearing on these issues, but it must offer each defendant an adequate opportunity to present his position. United States v. Sabhnani, 599 F.3d 215, 258 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Maurer, that section 2259 contains a proximate cause requirement. See United States v. Benoit, 713 F.3d 1, 20 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Fast, 709 F.3d 712, 721-22 (8th Cir. 2013); United States v. Gamble, 709 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Laraneta, 700 F.3d 983, 990 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 459 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Kearney, 672 F.3d 81, 95-96 (1st Cir. 2012); United States v. Kennedy, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011); United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 2011); United States v. McDaniel, 631 F.3d 1204, 1208-09 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 125 (3d Cir. 1999). But see In re Amy Unknown, 701 F.3d 749, 774 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (holding that there is no proximate cause requirement for the five enumerated categories of compensable losses). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split. See Paroline v. United States, No. 12-8561, 2013 WL 497856 (U.S. June 27, 2013) (mem.). - 17 - 226 F.3d 150, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). Even if the district court holds an evidentiary hearing, however, [n]o victim shall be required to participate in any phase of a restitution order. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(g)(1). In setting the amount of restitution, the court need only make a reasonable estimate of the victim's loss. See Pearson, 570 F.3d at 486-87. 'We will uphold an award of restitution under Section 2259 if the district court is able to estimate, based upon facts in the record, the amount of [a] victim's loss with some reasonable certainty.' Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 488 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 460 (4th Cir. 2012) ([T]he district court is not required to justify any award with absolute precision . . . .); Monzel, 641 F.3d at 540 (noting that, under section 2259, some degree of approximation is acceptable and mathematical precision is not required (quotation omitted)). Section 3664(h) also authorizes the district court to impose joint and several liability in certain circumstances: If the court finds more than 1 defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim, the court may make each defendant liable for payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level - 18 - of contribution to the victim's loss and economic circumstances of each defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h). In Aumais, it was unnecessary for the Court to address the issue of joint and several liability because there was no evidence that the defendant in that case had proximately caused any of Amy's losses. See Aumais, 656 F.3d at 155. Nevertheless, the Court suggested that holding a criminal defendant jointly and severally liabile with others who were not before the sentencing court would be problematic and inconsistent with the text of section 3664(h), which implies that joint and several liability may be imposed only when a single district judge is dealing with multiple defendants in a single case (or indictment). Id. at 15556.