Opinion ID: 2632135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: or correctional officer

Text: It is a defense to a charge of (fill in crime) that the force [used] [attempted] [offered to be used] was lawful as defined in this instruction. A person may [use] [attempt to use] [offer to use] force [to resist] [to aid another in resisting] an arrest by someone known by the person to be a [police] [correctional] officer, only if the person being arrested is in actual danger of serious injury. The person [using] [or] [offering to use] the force may employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances. 11 WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 17.02.01, at 199 (2d ed.1994) (emphasis added). Notwithstanding the WPIC caption, because the instruction refers only to arrests, the trial court changed the language without objection from Bradley or the State to reflect the circumstances involving correctional officers: It is a defense to a charge of Custodial Assault that the force used was lawful as defined in this instruction. The use of force upon or toward the person of a known correctional officer is lawful only when the person using the force is in actual danger of serious injury as a result of the use of unlawful force by the officer. The person using the force may employ such force and means as a reasonably prudent person would use under the same or similar circumstances as they appeared to the person, taking into consideration all of the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time of the incident. The state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the force used by the defendant was not lawful. Clerk's Papers at 36 (emphasis added). Bradley's trial counsel specifically said in open court he had no objection to the actual danger language. On appeal, however, Bradley now asserts that language misstates the law. He claims RCW 9A.16.020(3) controls, notwithstanding our case law, because the Legislature made no exception in that statute for custodial assault cases. This argument fails in light of Holeman and Valentine, cases articulating the actual danger standard in interpreting the statute. Bradley also urges us not to adopt the Holeman rule because the policy reasons behind Holeman prevention of the escalation of violencedo not apply to correctional officers in jails. Bradley contends that in jail, where such officers do not carry firearms, the danger of deadly violence is much less than on the streets. The possibility that a conflict will escalate to a loss of life is remote. Supplemental Br. of Pet'r at 14-15. In other words, Bradley advances a more permissive standard for using physical force against correctional officers than the standard we have adopted for using physical force against arresting officers. Bradley bolsters his argument by citing two cases. First, he cites State v. Miller, 89 Wash.App. 364, 949 P.2d 821 (1997), where the Court of Appeals considered a claim of self-defense by a detainee in the Asotin County jail who was tried for third-degree assault against a jailer. In a brief opinion, the Court of Appeals overturned the conviction because the trial court did not instruct the jury the State had the burden of proving the absence of lawful force beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 365, 949 P.2d 821. But Miller had nothing to do with the issue in the present casewhether force in self-defense was justified by a person facing actual or only apparent, imminent harm. The only issue Miller considered was whether the instruction on the burden of proof was proper. The Miller court quoted at length from State v. Walden, 131 Wash.2d 469, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997), to establish the State bears the burden of disproving self-defense. Miller, 89 Wash.App. at 368, 949 P.2d 821. The parties and the Court of Appeals in Miller did not address the issue we now face; there was no issue before the Miller court as to whether there was actual danger or only apparent danger of imminent harm to Miller when he struck the jailer. Bradley also points to State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wash.2d 863, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998), for support. [5] Hutchinson killed two Island County police officers who had taken him into custody. He claimed self-defense. Although this case might have been good precedent for the issue in the case at bar, the Hutchinson trial court did not employ the same jury instruction the trial court here used. Rather, the Hutchinson trial court instructed the jury on the more lenient standard, WPIC 16.02: Homicide is justifiable when committed in the lawful defense of the slayer when the slayer reasonably believes that the person slain intends to inflict death or great personal injury and there is imminent danger of such harm being accomplished. Hutchinson, 135 Wash.2d at 884, 959 P.2d 1061. The State did not argue on appeal this instruction should have used the words actual intention to inflict death. Thus, we had no occasion in Hutchinson to decide whether actual or apparent was the correct standard to employ as justification for self-defense. While Bradley argued from Hutchinson in his brief to the Court of Appeals, he has not cited to Hutchinson in his supplemental brief here, and has apparently abandoned the case as support for his position. Finally, with respect to the question of whether escalation of violence is more or less likely in jails than on the streets, Bradley's assertion that jails are inherently less volatile than the circumstances of a street arrest simply defies common knowledge and common sense. As is apparent from the facts in Hutchinson, weapons may be available in custodial situations. See In re Personal Restraint of Anderson, 112 Wash.2d 546, 772 P.2d 510 (1989) (discussing problem of weapons found on prison detainees). Security problems, some occasioned by the fact correctional officers are usually outnumbered by detainees, are serious in correctional facilities. [A] detention facility is a unique place fraught with serious security dangers. State v. Baker, 28 Wash.App. 423, 425, 623 P.2d 1172 (1981). As we have noted, [a] prison is `a tightly controlled environment populated by persons who have chosen to violate the criminal law, many of whom have employed violence to achieve their ends.' In re Personal Restraint of Reismiller, 101 Wash.2d 291, 294, 678 P.2d 323 (1984) (quoting Dawson v. Hearing Committee, 92 Wash.2d 391, 396, 597 P.2d 1353 (1979)). The United States Supreme Court has noted in a much-cited passage: Prisons, by definition, are places of involuntary confinement of persons who have a demonstrated proclivity for antisocial criminal, and often violent, conduct. Inmates have necessarily shown a lapse in ability to control and conform their behavior to the legitimate standards of society by the normal impulses of self-restraint; they have shown an inability to regulate their conduct in a way that reflects either a respect for law or an appreciation of the rights of others. Even a partial survey of the statistics on violent crime in our Nation's prisons illustrates the magnitude of the problem. During 1981 and the first half of 1982, there were over 120 prisoners murdered by fellow inmates in state and federal prisons. A number of prison personnel were murdered by prisoners during this period. Over 29 riots or similar disturbances were reported in these facilities for the same time frame. And there were over 125 suicides in these institutions. See Prison Violence, 7 Corrections Compendium (Mar.1983). Additionally, informal statistics from the United States Bureau of Prisons show that in the federal system during 1983, there were 11 inmate homicides, 359 inmate assaults on other inmates, 227 inmate assaults on prison staff, and 10 suicides. There were in the same system in 1981 and 1982 over 750 inmate assaults on other inmates and over 570 inmate assaults on prison personnel. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). In this case, Sergeant Snodgrass testified detainees at the King County jail are out of their cells during the late evening shift change and not yet asleep: And if we have a disruption and everybody has toif you are an officer, you have to freeze your wing and try to make everybody go back to their cells. 2 Report of Proceedings at 131. It is possible to conclude that a situation in which detainees become upset at what they might consider brutal treatment of one detainee may lead to a general affray, in which many might be injured. We conclude the use of force against correctional officers should have the same status as the use of force against arresting officers, and should generally be discouraged as a matter of public policy. There seems to be little reason to differentiate between law enforcement officers making an arrest and correctional officers maintaining order in jails or other correctional facilities. We adhere to our preference expressed in Mierz, Valentine, and other cases for persons to resort to the processes of law rather than the self-help violence of the street.