Opinion ID: 629171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of the flsa to the indians

Text: 26 In Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116, 80 S.Ct. 543, 553, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a general statute in terms of applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests. Likewise, this court has stated [g]eneral statutes, ... whose concerns are widely inclusive and do not affect traditional Indian or Tribal rights, are typically applied to Indians. Smart, 868 F.2d at 932. A statute of general applicability does not apply to the Indians if: (1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservation.... Id. (quoting Coeur d'alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d at 1116) [hereinafter the Smart analysis]. 6 27 There is little doubt that the Fair Labor Standards Act is a statute of general applicability for the Act covers employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(a), as well as individuals employed by a public agency. Id. Sec. 203(e)(2). The Supreme Court has consistently construed the [FLSA] 'liberally, to apply to the furthest reaches consistent with Congressional direction,' recognizing that broad coverage is essential to accomplish its goals. Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 296, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 1959, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (quoting Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 211, 79 S.Ct. 260, 263, 3 L.Ed.2d 243 (1959)). Given Congress' plenary powers under the Commerce Clause and the judiciary's broad definition of commerce, without question the FLSA must be interpreted as a statute of general applicability. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727, 67 S.Ct. 1473, 1475, 91 L.Ed. 1772 (1947) (discussing the goal of the FLSA). 28 Before engaging in the Smart analysis, we must attempt to determine what, if any, treaty rights are at stake. At oral argument, counsel for the Commission was unable to answer and vacillated in an exercise of futility when asked to identify what specific right would be impaired by compliance with the subpoena or compliance with the requirements of the FLSA. Ultimately, he claimed that the FLSA would negatively impact the Indians' right to fish, hunt and gather (collectively usufructuary rights) on lands ceded to the States of Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin in a series of treaties dated 1836, 1837, 1842, and 1854. Just how the requirements of the FLSA would impair treaty rights he was unable to answer. Secondly, he claimed that having to comply with the FLSA rules would impose a financial burden that would inhibit the Commission's ability to manage and regulate the off-reservation usufructuary rights but gave no compelling examples of how this would inhibit regulation of treaty rights. 29 After reading the record and briefs as well as reviewing the oral argument tape, I remain unconvinced that applying the rules of the FLSA to the Commission would impact the Indians' usufructuary rights. Regarding the argument that the FLSA might affect the Commission's pay-scale or employment of conservation wardens, the majority stated, 30 one searches the treaties in vain for [a right to employ conservation wardens]. So far as pertains to this case the only rights granted are rights to hunt, fish, and gather. There is no mention of the system for enforcing these rights, let alone any reference to the terms of employment of those hired to enforce it. 31 At 493. The majority later adds that there is no treaty right to employ law enforcement officers on whatever terms the tribal organization sets and the officers are willing to accept.... At 494. Not only do the treaties fail to create a right to employ Indian conservation wardens as the majority concedes, there is also no indication in the treaties or in the deputization agreement between the State of Wisconsin and the Commission expressing an intent to provide for the alleged policemen that the majority has created. As I will explain, application of the FLSA to the Indian special conservation wardens will have only an indirect impact, if any, on the Commission. The Commission has failed to delineate any direct interference with treaty rights nor does the record before us identify that a direct interference with treaty rights will occur. 32 I am likewise unpersuaded by the Commission's argument that the FLSA would impose a financial burden on the Indians that will jeopardize treaty rights. This broad, ever-expanding, all-inclusive and speculative umbrella allegation that legislation will impact treaty rights must have some limits. The federal courts cannot continue to be held captive by allegations based on pure conjecture. I, for one, believe the trial court's refusal to enforce the subpoena is the straw that breaks the proverbial camel's back. Whether the FLSA would result in a significant financial burden to the Commission is a fact that is unknown and will remain unknown until such time as the government has had an opportunity to review and examine the Commission's payroll records to determine the number of wardens, their hours, as well as the compensatory time and payment policies of the Commission. Any argument to the contrary is nothing but pure speculation. Certainly, the Commission's creative allegation that the FLSA will have a negative financial impact is insufficient to refuse enforcement of the administrative subpoena because financial impact alone is not one of the factors that we must consider when determining whether a statute covers the Indians. See Smart, 868 F.2d at 932-33 (asking whether (1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservation ...). The concern of the Smart test is whether treaty rights are abrogated, not whether a statute will introduce a modest economic burden. The record before us and the oral argument are devoid of any evidence put forth by the Commission of a treaty right that would be abrogated by the FLSA. Nonetheless, because the Commission claims the FLSA would modify the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the treaties, it is incumbent upon me to refute this allegation with the required application of the Smart analysis. 33 Application of the Smart doctrine to the facts in the case before us is lacking in the majority opinion. Rather than employing the test adopted by this court to determine whether a federal statute of general applicability covers the Indians, i.e. Smart, the majority has opted to defer to a concern for comity. The majority states [t]he idea of comity--of treating sovereigns, including such quasi-sovereigns as states and Indian tribes, with greater respect than other litigants--counsels us to exercise forbearance in construing legislation to intrude upon the central regulatory functions of a sovereign entity. At 495. I do not dispute, and in fact, agree with the theory that comity is a proper consideration in statutory interpretation, id., but I object to invoking the theory as a substitute for the very analysis we have adopted for determining when and if comity is appropriate. The very fact that we have a test (Smart ) to determine when a statute of general applicability applies to the Indian population assumes that some federal regulatory statutes cover Indians unless there is an express exemption. Smart, 868 F.2d at 932 ([g]eneral statutes ... whose concerns are widely inclusive and do not affect traditional Indian or Tribal rights, are typically applied to Indians); see, e.g., Lumber Industry Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Products Industries, 939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.1991) (applying ERISA to an Indian enterprise); United States Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n (OSHRC), 935 F.2d 182, 186-187 (9th Cir.1991) (applying OSHA to Indian businesses); Smart, 868 F.2d at 932-36 (applying ERISA); Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d at 1115 (applying OSHA to tribal business). Although Smart acknowledges that the United States has given specified but limited rights to the Indians through treaties, neither Smart, nor any other case, has held that treaty rights prevail over subsequent legislative enactments of the United States Congress. 7 In fact, Smart held that [f]ederalism uniquely concerns States; there simply is no Tribe counterpart. Smart, 868 F.2d at 936 (emphasis added). The implication of this language is obvious, comity has never been applied in prior case law as a principle that should dictate outcomes in conflicts between federal legislation and Indian Treaty rights. For this reason, Smart, which we are bound to follow, set forth three inquiries to determine whether a statute of general applicability governs the Indians. The majority's unique approach of invoking the general principle of comity is unsupported in judicial precedent and must not replace the step-by-step application of Smart to the facts before us. A. Tribal Self-governance 34 As explained above, a statute of general applicability excludes the Indians if: (1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters; (2) application of the law would abrogate treaty rights; or (3) the legislative history reveals a clear congressional intent not to cover the Indians. Smart, 868 F.2d at 932-33. The district court, applying a very watered down test, found that FLSA coverage of the Commission would impinge upon one of the tribes' most essential aspects of self-governance: their ability to manage and regulate their exercise of their treaty rights. Martin v. Great Lakes Indian Fish and Wildlife Comm'n, No. 92-C-409-C, 1992 WL 300841 at  9, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15883, at  24 (W.D.Wis. Oct. 7, 1992). The district court was mistaken on two counts. Even if there was a treaty right to regulate usufructuary rights (which there is not), the Commission's right to enforce and manage those usufructuary rights is neither exclusive nor purely intramural, as required under Smart. 1. Lack of Exclusivity 35 The absence of exclusivity regarding tribal self-governance is evident from the fact that tribal enforcement and regulation of off-reservation usufructuary rights is shared with the states. State regulation of Indian usufructuary rights falls under the state's police power to protect its natural resources and its citizens; Lac Courte Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 668 F.Supp. 1233, 1237 (W.D.Wis.1987) (LCO IV), hence, tribal usufructuary rights are subject to state regulation in the interests of conservation and public health and safety. Lac Courte Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir.1985) (LCO II); LCO IV, 668 F.Supp. at 1235-39. As the case law above makes clear, the tribes' right to regulate off-reservation activities is by no means exclusive but must be shared with the states. LCO IV, 668 F.Supp. at 1241 ( 'ordinarily the state and the tribe possess concurrent power to regulate ...' ) (quoting United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676, 686 n. 4 (9th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086, 96 S.Ct. 877, 47 L.Ed.2d 97 (1976)). For instance, Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (DNR) conservation wardens are authorized to issue citations to tribal members for violating tribal fishing regulations, Lac Courte Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 707 F.Supp. 1034, 1038 (W.D.Wis.1989) (LCO VI). DNR wardens may likewise observe and monitor any walleye or muskellunge harvesting plaintiffs undertake by spearing or netting. Id. at 1060. Concurrent State enforcement of off-reservation usufructuary rights also applies to hunting fur bearing animals and small game, Lac Courte Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 740 F.Supp. 1400, 1402, 1413 (W.D.Wis.1990) (LCO VII), gathering miscellaneous forest products, Lac Courte Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 758 F.Supp. 1262, 1275-76 (W.D.Wis.1991) (LCO IX), and enforcing state boating laws. Lac Courte Oreilles v. Wisconsin, 775 F.Supp. 321, 325 (W.D.Wis.1991) (LCO X). The preceding authorities make it quite obvious that the Commission never possessed the exclusive right to regulate off-reservation usufructuary rights and thus does not qualify for exemption from FLSA on the grounds that the FLSA would impinge upon rights of self-governance. 8 2. Not Purely Intramural Matter 36 Secondly, as is likewise evident from the above-cited authorities, the Commission special conservation wardens' activities are not purely intramural as the off-reservation usufructuary rights necessarily involve both Indians and non-Indians. (When engaging in off-reservation fishing, hunting and gathering, the individual Indians exercising these rights commonly come in contact with non-Indians). The Supreme Court and this court have determined that purely intramural matters include things like determining tribal membership, domestic relations, and rules of inheritance. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563-65, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 1257-58, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981); Smart, 868 F.2d at 932; Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d at 1116. In United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978), the Court stated that Indian tribes had lost many attributes of sovereignty including those areas involving the relations between an Indian tribe and non-members of the tribe.... Id. at 326, 98 S.Ct. at 1087. It is rather obvious that off-reservation fishing, hunting and gathering involve relations between Indians and non-Indians and thus by definition are not purely intramural. See id. Furthermore, exercise of these usufructuary rights is quite distinct from determining tribal membership, domestic relations and rules of inheritance (functions the courts have deemed purely intramural). 37 The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the principle of limited tribal sovereignty in South Dakota v. Bourland, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2309, 2319, 124 L.Ed.2d 606 (1993), stating the 'exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes, and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation.'  (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564, 101 S.Ct. at 1258). The Commission should not be able to wave an unbridled umbrella of treaty rights and avoid application of federal legislation that has as its purpose the elimination of labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency and general well-being of workers.... 29 U.S.C. Sec. 202. Without explanation, the district court has stretched the principle of tribal self-government in holding that [t]o the extent that [the Commission] is required to take into account the Fair Labor Standards Act in deciding how to deploy its wardens, its ability to exercise its treaty rights is affected directly and critically. Martin, 1992 WL 300841 at  8, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15883 at  22. The district court's emphatic language fails to disguise its lack of reasoning. There simply is no evidence in the record that rights of self-governance are in jeopardy. Because the Commission's regulation of off-reservation usufructuary rights is neither exclusive nor intramural, the district court improperly held that the FLSA impinged upon tribal self-governance. Indeed, the impact of the FLSA on off-reservation treaty rights will likely be much less significant than that of the above-cited State conservation and safety laws. B. Abrogation of Treaty Rights 38 When considering whether federal legislation abrogates treaty rights this court stated in Smart that [s]imply because a treaty exists does not by necessity compel a conclusion that a federal statute of general applicability is not binding on an Indiana tribe.... The critical issue is whether application of the statute would jeopardize a right that is secured by the treaty. Smart, 868 F.2d at 934-35 (emphasis added). The language in Smart is plainly at odds with the district court's application of Smart to the facts before us. If any modification of a treaty right barred application of a federal statute with general applicability (like the FLSA), then the principle from Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. at 116, 80 S.Ct. at 553, that general statutes apply to Indians would be cast aside and eviscerated. That a statute must do more than modify a treaty right for the Indians to be exempted is evident from the fact that on several occasions courts have applied general federal statutes to the Indians. See Lumber Industry Pension Fund v. Warm Springs Forest Products Industries, 939 F.2d 683 (9th Cir.1991) (applying ERISA to an Indian enterprise); United States Dep't of Labor v. Occupational Safety & Health Rev. Comm'n (OSHRC), 935 F.2d 182, 186-187 (9th Cir.1991) (applying OSHA to Indian businesses); Smart, 868 F.2d at 932-36 (applying ERISA); Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d at 1115 (applying OSHA to tribal business); Confederated Tribes of Warm Springs Reservation v. Kurtz, 691 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.1982) (holding that tribes and their members are subject to federal excise taxes unless express exemption appears), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1040, 103 S.Ct. 1433, 75 L.Ed.2d 792 (1983); Fry v. United States, 557 F.2d 646 (9th Cir.1977) (applying federal tax laws to Indian businesses), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1011, 98 S.Ct. 722, 54 L.Ed.2d 754 (1978); United States v. Burns, 529 F.2d 114 (9th Cir.1975) (holding that federal gun control law applies to Indians). In OSHRC, the Indians maintained that their treaty right to exclude non-Indians from the reservation barred applicability of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 651-678 (1988), to an on-reservation sawmill. The Ninth Circuit held that the conflict between a statute (OSHA) and a treaty right must be direct rather than attenuated to prevent the application of a general federal statute to the Indians. OSHRC, 935 F.2d at 186. The requirement for a direct conflict between a treaty and statute is reflected in U.S. Supreme Court decisions asking whether the statute abrogates treaty rights. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738-40, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 2219-20, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (holding that the Eagle Protection Act abrogates treaty right to hunt eagles); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690, 99 S.Ct. 3055, 3076, 61 L.Ed.2d 823 (holding that international fishing treaty does not abrogate Indian fishing rights), modified, 444 U.S. 816, 100 S.Ct. 34, 62 L.Ed.2d 24 (1979); Coeur d'Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d at 1116 (requiring that the federal statute abrogate treaty rights rather than just modify them). 39 Application of the FLSA to the Commission conservation wardens will have no greater effect on Indian treaty rights than application of other federal regulatory statutes like ERISA and OSHA which the courts have already upheld. It is evident that the Department of Labor is merely trying to prevent the Indian employees of the Commission from being treated as second-class citizens by assuring that they receive the same protection as all other employees covered under the Act. Certainly the mere fact that Department of Labor inspectors merely request through the power of subpoena the right to examine payroll records cannot of itself constitute abrogation of treaty rights. Thus I am in agreement with the Department of Labor's contention at oral argument that enforcement of the administrative subpoena and application of the FLSA to the Commission would have no direct impact on the Indians' rights to hunt, fish and gather. 40 In the case before us, the Commission has failed to set forth much less document any logical reason or evidence of how submitting to an administrative subpoena or to the Fair Labor Standards Act will have any direct impact on a treaty right. Just because the Commission has invoked the ever-expanding umbrella of impact on treaty rights to challenge application of the FLSA does not mean that we should abandon sound jurisprudence in addressing the conflict. The courts must not cave in to the ever-growing, all-expansive claim that treaty rights are affected unless the claimants initially identify what specific treaty right is at stake and how it is affected. When a federal statute allegedly comes in conflict with Indian treaty rights, the case law mandates that we apply a legal standard to ascertain if the alleged treaty right exists and whether it is in fact abrogated. The mere possibility that application of the FLSA to Commission conservation wardens may require the Commission to alter employment practices or pay additional wages certainly falls far short of jeopardizing usufructuary rights guaranteed by treaties much less abrogating them. Without further development of the record we will never know if applying the FLSA to the Commission will abrogate treaty rights; however, it is certain, based on the evidence presented, that the Commission has failed to delineate any treaty rights that would be abrogated by the FLSA. 41 Finally, as the majority acknowledges, nothing in the legislative history evinces a congressional intent to exempt the Indians from the FLSA; at 493. As the foregoing discussion makes clear, the Commission has failed to establish any one of the three grounds in Smart for exempting Indians from the FLSA. Accordingly, I am of the opinion that it was premature for the district court to rule as a matter of law that the Commission is not subject to the FLSA.