Opinion ID: 2809285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The “Cat’s Paw” Doctrine

Text: Before evaluating the evidence, we review the “cat’s paw” doctrine because Godwin must prove that Brown’s age-based animus was the but-for cause of, or the determinative influence on, Trupiano’s termination decision. See Sims, 704 23 Case: 14-11637 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 24 of 30 F.3d at 1335–36 (describing the but-for cause as the determinative cause or determinative influence). Under certain circumstances, a plaintiff can establish but-for causation even where the person who ultimately decided to take the adverse employment action was neutral and unbiased. See Stimpson v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing Llampallas v. Mini-Circuits, Lab, Inc., 163 F.3d 1236, 1249 (11th Cir. 1998)). Under the cat’s paw doctrine, a plaintiff may establish but-for causation if she shows that the unbiased decision-maker (here Trupiano) followed a “biased recommendation without independently investigating the complaint against the employee.” Id. “In such a case, the recommender is using the decisionmaker as a mere conduit, or cat’s paw[,] to give effect to the recommender’s discriminatory animus.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In the past, this Court has analyzed whether the ultimate decision was merely a “rubber stamp” of the recommendation when considering whether the decision-maker acted as a “cat’s paw.” See id. More recently, the Supreme Court addressed the cat’s paw doctrine in a case brought under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (“USERRA”), 38 U.S.C. § 4311. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 131 S. Ct. 1186 (2011). USERRA provides that members of uniformed services “shall not be denied initial employment . . . or any benefit of employment by an 24 Case: 14-11637 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 25 of 30 employer on the basis of” their membership in a uniformed service. 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). However, USERRA further provides that an employer acts unlawfully under § 4311(a) when a person’s membership in a uniformed service “is a motivating factor in the employer’s action.” Id. § 4311(c)(1) (emphasis added). 13 In Staub, the Supreme Court held that, “if a supervisor performs an act motivated by [prohibited] animus that is intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable under USERRA.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 1194 (footnote omitted). C. Applying the Cat’s Paw Doctrine in post-Staub ADEA Cases This Court has already reviewed Staub and held that its “motivating factor” standard does not apply to cat’s paw cases involving age discrimination. Sims, 704 F.3d at 1336. In Sims, this Court noted that “the text of the USERRA and the ADEA differ in important respects.” Id. at 1335. Specifically, this Court noted that “the ADEA states that it is unlawful if an employee suffers adverse employment action ‘because of such individual’s age,’” id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 13 USERRA covers any “person who is a member of, applies to be a member of, performs, has performed, applies to perform, or has an obligation to perform service in a uniformed service.” See 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a). As in Sims, we need not decide and do not decide here whether Staub changes in any way our prior cat’s paw ADEA cases with respect to agency principles as they relate to scienter. See Sims, 704 F.3d at 1336. 25 Case: 14-11637 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 26 of 30 623(a)(1)), whereas USERRA’s causation standard requires only that the unlawful animus was a “motivating factor,” id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c)). 14 Accordingly, the Sims Court stated, a plaintiff alleging violations of the ADEA “must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision,” which “requires that the proscribed animus have a determinative influence on the employer’s adverse decision.” Id. at 1335–36 (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). 15 In addition, this Court has interpreted the ADEA’s causation standard as requiring more than a mere causal link between an action motivated by unlawful animus and the adverse employment action. Thus, in order to succeed under a cat’s paw theory of liability, an ADEA plaintiff must show more than that her adverse employment action would not have occurred in the absence of the action taken by the individual (Brown) with the alleged unlawful animus. Rather, the plaintiff must show that the biased individual’s action had a “determinative influence” on the ultimate decision, see Sims, 704 F.3d at 1335–36, or was a “determinative cause,” see Simmons, 647 14 In Sims, this Court pointed out that the Tenth Circuit in Simmons v. Sykes Enterprises, Inc., 647 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2011), held that Staub’s causation analysis did not govern claims brought under the ADEA. See Sims, 704 F.3d at 1336 (citing Simmons, 647 F.3d at 949–50). The Tenth Circuit stated that, “even after Staub, an ADEA plaintiff seeking to hold an employer liable through the discriminatory conduct of its subordinate must show the subordinate’s animus was a ‘but-for’ cause of the adverse employment action, i.e. it was the factor that made a difference.” Simmons, 647 F.3d at 949–50. 15 As in Sims, we need not decide anything more about Staub’s potential effect, if any, on other issues in ADEA cases. See Sims, 704 F.3d at 1336. 26 Case: 14-11637 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 27 of 30 F.3d at 950. And the but-for cause that a biased individual recommended that the plaintiff’s employment be terminated does not constitute a “determinative cause” where “undisputed evidence in the record supports the employer’s assertion that it fired the employee for its own unbiased reasons that were sufficient in themselves to justify termination.” See id. at 950. V. GODWIN’S AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM UNDER THE ADEA In this case, the record creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether WellStar discriminated against Godwin, in violation of the ADEA, under the cat’s paw doctrine. If a jury believes plaintiff Godwin’s evidence, a reasonable jury could find that Trupiano did not conduct an independent investigation and that Brown’s recommendation was the “but-for” cause of, or the determinative influence on, Trupiano’s decision. The record contains ample evidence to create genuine issues of material fact as to whether Brown recommended termination of Godwin because of discriminatory age-based animus. Brown admits that she asked Godwin her age. And Godwin alleges that Brown made several ageist comments, including (1) asking Godwin why, at her age, was she still working; (2) stating that, at Godwin’s age, she should be home with her husband; (3) saying that Godwin should have planned for certain expenses when she was young; (4) stating that Godwin was not “capable of mentally understanding” her job; (5) saying that Godwin should 27 Case: 14-11637 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 28 of 30 probably be home with her husband because he was ill; and (6) stating that Brown was “going to put [Godwin] out to pasture.” Furthermore, Tifft’s testimony indicates that Brown admitted that she said Godwin should have made provisions for being out of work when she was young, and that Brown knew she “messed up” by making that comment. And although Brown claims to have been trying to give Godwin “options” by asking why Godwin was working “past retirement age” and stating that, in light of Godwin’s age, she thought Godwin would want to be home taking care of her husband, Tifft agreed that a reasonable interpretation of Brown’s comments is that she was trying to suggest “retirement options.” Godwin also presented evidence that at least one other employee— Carpenter, who was interviewed as part of the investigation into Godwin’s complaint to human resources—thought that Brown was “trying to get rid of her because of her age.” And a separate employee allegedly said that Brown was trying to sabotage Godwin. Based on this record evidence, there are at least genuine issues of material fact as to whether Brown was motivated by age and as to whether she intended the precise adverse employment action taken here—namely, termination. Similarly, the record contains sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Brown’s recommendation had the determinative 28 Case: 14-11637 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 29 of 30 influence on Trupiano’s recommendation. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Godwin, a jury could conclude that Trupiano would not have fired Godwin but for Brown’s recommendation. When asked whether he would have terminated Godwin’s employment in the absence of Brown’s recommendation, Trupiano testified, “Would I have terminated her on my own? She was not a direct report, and I would not have.” This testimony, viewed in the light most favorable to Godwin, taken with the other extensive evidence in this case, establishes a causal link between Brown’s recommendation and Trupiano’s ultimate decision. In addition, there is sufficient evidence to create an issue of material fact as to whether Brown’s recommendation so permeated Trupiano’s review of Godwin that Trupiano failed to conduct a truly independent investigation. Although Trupiano reviewed a number of Godwin’s purchase orders before making the decision to fire her, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Godwin, suggests that Brown herself chose from Godwin’s file the purchase orders that Trupiano reviewed. Trupiano testified that he did not conduct an independent investigation to verify the completeness or accuracy of the information that Brown gave him. As a result, Trupiano did not know the percentage or ratio of Godwin’s purchase orders that had errors. Furthermore, Trupiano did not review purchase orders by other buyers in the purchasing department. Trupiano admitted that he had “no direct knowledge” of the quantity of mistakes made by other purchasing 29 Case: 14-11637 Date Filed: 06/17/2015 Page: 30 of 30 department buyers. And he did not know how Godwin’s error rate compared to the error rates of other buyers. 16 In addition, Bryant, Godwin’s co-worker, reviewed purchase orders by Godwin and four other buyers, and she concluded that all five had similar error rates. Although Godwin was fired, three of the other four remained as employees at WellStar through August 22, 2013, and the fourth worked at WellStar until June 2013. Put simply, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Godwin and drawing all reasonable inferences in Godwin’s favor, the record evidence creates genuine issues of material fact as to whether Brown’s recommendation was the result of age-based animus and whether that recommendation had the determinative influence on Trupiano’s ultimate decision to fire Godwin.