Opinion ID: 2831320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Unlawful Acts Doctrine

Text: More than 120 years ago, this Court recognized the common law unlawful acts doctrine as barring a plaintiff from recovering damages if it could be shown that, at the time of injury, the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal act that contributed to the injury.4 See Johnson, 9 S.W. at 603. The doctrine originated with the principle of in pari delicto or “unclean hands” in the contract context, but was extended to tort causes of action. See Rico v. Flores, 405 F. Supp. 2d 746, 759–61 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing the use of the unlawful acts and in pari delicto doctrines in Texas jurisprudence), rev’d on other grounds, 481 F.3d 234 (5th Cir. 2007). The doctrine is based on the public policy that wrongdoers should not be compensated for their immoral acts. See, e.g., Ward v. 4 The unlawful acts doctrine is also referred to as the “outlaw doctrine,” the “ex turpi rule,” the “wrongfulconduct rule,” and the “serious misconduct doctrine.” See Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort Law, 43 W M . & M ARY L. R EV . 1011, 1019 & n.35 (2002). 5 Emmett, 37 S.W.3d 500, 502 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, no pet.); Saks v. Sawtelle, Goode, Davidson & Troilo, 880 S.W.2d 466, 470–71 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994, writ denied). As early as 1888, we recognized that “no action will lie to recover a claim for damages, if to establish it the plaintiff requires aid from an illegal transaction, or is under the necessity of showing or in any manner depending upon an illegal act to which he is a party.” Johnson, 9 S.W. at 603 (holding that the unlawful acts doctrine did not apply because there was no allegation or proof showing that, at the time of the injury, the plaintiff did any illegal act contributing to his injury). Since then, “[c]ourts throughout Texas . . . have used this rule, along with public policy principles, to prevent a plaintiff from recovering damages that arose out of his or her own illegal conduct.” Ward, 37 S.W.3d at 502 (internal citations omitted). Courts applying the unlawful acts doctrine have required that the plaintiff’s illegal act be “inextricably intertwined” with the claim for the illegal act to bar recovery. See, e.g., id. at 503. An illegal act is “inextricably intertwined with the claim” if a plaintiff cannot prove a claim without having to prove his or her own illegal act. See, e.g., Norman v. B.V. Christie & Co., 363 S.W.2d 175, 177–78 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (quoting Stone v. Robinson, 234 S.W. 1094, 1095 (Tex. 1921)). In Texas tort cases, the doctrine has most recently arisen in medical and legal malpractice cases. See, e.g., Ward, 37 S.W.3d at 501; Saks, 880 S.W.2d at 470. Recently, scholars and courts have disagreed over the viability of the unlawful acts doctrine in modern jurisprudence. The Restatement (Second) of Torts and respected legal scholars reject the principle that tortious or criminal conduct can completely bar recovery. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF TORTS § 889 (1979); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 232 6 (5th ed. 1984); see generally Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort Law, 43 WM . & MARY L. REV . 1011 (2002) (suggesting that the unlawful acts doctrine, or “serious misconduct bar,” should be abandoned by American courts). Several courts and legislatures, on the other hand, have approved of the unlawful acts doctrine in statutes and case law. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT . § 09.65.210 (2012) (setting out a detailed statutory affirmative defense based on the unlawful acts doctrine); Barker v. Kallash, 468 N.E.2d 39, 43–44 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that a teenager who was injured while constructing a “pipe bomb” could not recover from the young boy who supplied the gun powder); see also Vincent R. Johnson, The Unlawful Conduct Defense in Legal Malpractice, 77 UMKC L. REV . 43, 45 (2008) (“Today, in an important range of cases, statutes and court decisions, in many states, now provide that injuries arising from the plaintiff’s serious unlawful conduct are not compensable under tort law.”). Since Texas’s shift to the proportionate responsibility scheme, discussed below, most Texas courts have used a plaintiff’s unlawful act to measure proportionate responsibility and reduce recovery, rather than completely bar the plaintiff from recovering damages. See, e.g., Fifth Club, Inc. v. Ramirez, 196 S.W.3d 788, 790, 797–98 (Tex. 2006) (allowing a publicly intoxicated plaintiff to recover for injures sustained by a security guard); Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 445–46 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (permitting a decedent’s wife to recover despite the decedent’s failure to wear a seatbelt). We turn next to Chapter 33’s proportionate responsibility scheme and consider whether the Legislature intended it to abrogate the common law unlawful acts doctrine as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s recovery. 7