Opinion ID: 1935332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The second issue relates to preindictment delay, which defendants says was unreasonable and prejudicial. He claims this requires a dismissal of the case.

Text: The statute of limitations on this charge is three years. (§ 752.3.) The indictment was returned well within that period. However, the statute of limitations is not the only standard to be applied in determining whether defendant has been denied due process because of delay in prosecution. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 97 S.Ct. 2044, 52 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) and United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Both these cases hold the length of, and reason for, such delay should be balanced against any resulting prejudice to see if a defendant has been inhibited in his defense. We have considered this same matter in a number of recent cases. See State v. Schlick, 257 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1977); State v. Newman, 257 N.W.2d 29 (Iowa 1977); State v. York, 256 N.W.2d 922 (Iowa 1977); State v. Burrell, 255 N.W.2d 119 (Iowa 1977). This is not a claim of denial of speedy indictment under § 795.1 or speedy trial under § 795.2, The Code. It is a due process claim under the 5th amendment to the federal constitution based on alleged unreasonable delay between the time the offense was committed and the time defendant was arrested and charged with the offense. The cited cases fix certain guidelines for deciding the question we face here. They hold a defendant must establish two conditions before he can claim right to relief for preaccusatory delay. It must appear, first, that the delay is unreasonable and without justification and, second, the delay must have resulted in actual prejudice to his defense. In Burrell we said: Defendant must show he was actually prejudiced in defending himself by the delay in order to invoke the protection afforded by the due process clause. 255 N.W.2d at 121. Mere general claims of prejudice are insufficient. Actual prejudice must be both alleged and proved. The fact that the defendant is unable to reconstruct events charged or that his memory has dimmed is insufficient. State v. Schlick, 257 N.W.2d at 61; State v. York, 256 N.W.2d at 926; State v. Burrell, 255 N.W.2d at 122. Defendant relies on Ross v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 233, 238, 349 F.2d 210, 215 (1965); People v. Hernandez, 15 Mich.App. 141, 170 N.W.2d 851 (1968); and People v. Lawson, 38 Ill.App.3d 239, 347 N.E.2d 430 (1976). These cases do no more than approve the same rules our own decisions have adopted. Each holds defendant must show actual prejudice before delay denies due process. Each is decided, as every case must be, on its own special facts and circumstances. We point out the Lawson case was reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court after defendant's brief was filed. See People v. Lawson, 67 Ill.2d 449, 10 Ill.Dec. 478, 367 N.E.2d 1244 (1977). In considering defendant's claim, we keep in mind the peculiar nature of investigations and prosecutions for narcotics violations. These matters usually involve undercover work over a prolonged period. Ordinarily a number of persons are under surveillance. Good police work is concerned more with stopping the flow of narcotics than with the arrest of any one person. The moment one suspect is arrested, the value of the undercover agent in further investigation is destroyed. We repeat what we said in Schlick, 257 N.W.2d at 61: There may be many sound reasons for investigative delay, particularly in drug cases which frequently involve related activities by a number of suspects. Sometimes a quick arrest of one would prevent apprehension of the others. Both Marion and Lovasco recognize that prosecutors must be allowed wide discretion in deciding when the time is ripe for bringing charges. This must be decided on a case-by-case basis. Lovasco specifically refused to lay down any guidelines by which to decide such matters except to say the State should not be allowed to use the delay merely to obtain a tactical advantage over defendant. We start with the premise any prosecution within the statute of limitations is timely, unless the two factors referred to above have been shown. Here the delay was certainly of long durationtwo-and-a-half years. The trial court found it was not unreasonable under the circumstances and found, too, that defendant had failed to show prejudice. Defendant asserts he was unable to remember the events because of the delay, but the record does not bear this out. An examination of the evidence at defendant's original trial shows he admitted delivery of the cocaine. The real question was whether he did so for profit. He testified unequivocally and in some detail that he did not. Defendant has failed to show the delay in any way hampered his defense. He also claims two witnesses who might have helped him were unavailable because of the delay. However, one of these testified. The record before us does not show the other was actually unavailable nor any effort by defendant to locate him. Neither is there any plausible reason to believe his testimony would have helped defendant. We hold trial court was right in overruling defendant's motion for dismissal on this ground.