Opinion ID: 6500406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Decision On Motions

Text: In a written decision following oral argument, the superior court first addressed Hoffman’s motion to dismiss. After “assum[ing] for purposes of a motion to dismiss[] that Hoffman falsely stated that he had decided to remain married on Notti’s terms,” the court found that Notti’s claim was “not actionable.” The court’s decision hinged on the distinction between “fraud in fact” and “fraud in the inducement.” The court first concluded that fraud in fact — such as impersonating another in order to have -4- 7603 sex1 — would be actionable because it involves “outright lies” that go “to the very definition and nature of the act for which one gives consent.” In contrast, fraud in the inducement is not actionable because it could cover “a vast array of assertions made by a person who is exploring the possibility of sexual activity with another.” The court remarked that such communications “are almost by definition efforts to induce.” The court determined that it was not necessary to “craft a definitive boundary” between the two types because “Hoffman’s assertion that he wanted to remain in the marriage . . . is far from an imposter’s deception about basic identity” and thus Notti’s claim was “not actionable.” The superior court then turned to Hoffman’s motion for summary judgment. The court explained that it would first determine the date on which the agreement took effect because that would determine whether and how it was intended to apply to the March 2016 conduct. If the agreement took effect when the parties signed it in December 2015, the court would have to decide whether the release applied to subsequent misconduct. And if the agreement took effect when the divorce decree was entered in May 2016, the court would have to determine if the release applied to conduct that happened after it was signed but before the court entered the divorce decree. The court concluded that the settlement agreement took effect in May 2016 when it was accepted and made part of the divorce decree with the finding that “the parties’ settlement agreement . . . is a fair and equitable way to divide the marital estate.” The court based its conclusion on its statutory power to effectuate divorce and its “affirmative obligation to ‘fairly allocate the economic effect of divorce.’ ”2 It reasoned that this obligation requires a superior court to “evaluate and approve a proposed 1 See, e.g., State v. Kelso-Christy, 911 N.W.2d 663, 664-65 (Iowa 2018). 2 AS 25.24.160(a)(4). -5- 7603 property settlement.” The December 2015 agreement therefore did not become enforceable until the superior court approved it after hearing from the parties. The superior court also found that Notti and Hoffman knew the settlement agreement was not final when they signed it in December 2015 because each of them agreed to revisions between December and the May hearing. The court found that the time between their “tentative agreement and the trial court’s approval of it . . . converted the conduct of March 2016 from a future (and obviously unknown) event (from the perspective of December 2015) to a past (and known) event (from the perspective of May 2016).” The court noted that Notti and Hoffman could have clarified that the release’s “trigger date” was the date of the tentative agreement but chose not to. Because they had not done so, the court found that “the release became effective no sooner than the May 2016 hearing.” The superior court proceeded to interpret the release, citing Philbin v. Matanuska-Susitna Borough for our instruction that “the focus is on what a reasonable person would have understood the release language to have meant.”3 The court found that the “operative portion could not be broader,” because it released “all claims and demands of every kind, nature[,] and description, whether sounding in tort, contract, or equity, whether past, present, or future.” The court concluded that “[t]here is no question that a reasonable person would understand that the language of the release would apply to the . . . March 2016 conduct whether the release took effect in December 2015 or May 2016 . . . [as t]he release applied to both future and past torts.” It also noted that from the perspective of May 2016, a reasonable person would have understood that the release of past torts encompassed the March 2016 conduct. The court rejected Notti’s “self-serving” claim that she intended the release 3 991 P.2d 1263, 1266-67 (Alaska 1999). -6- 7603 to apply only to behavior that predated the agreement, noting that her argument did not “square with the language of the release.” The court cited earlier cases that “caution[] trial courts not to give significant weight to a litigant’s assertion of subjective understanding about the meaning of contract language that is in stark contrast to the objective meaning of language.”4 The court explained that “[t]hese self-serving assertions do not create issues of fact in the face of very clear contract language.” Notti appeals the court’s order granting the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment.