Opinion ID: 522904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Private Suits for Whistle-Blowers?

Text: 52 Price's remaining theory for recovery asserts that he has a private right of action, under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997d, for having blown the whistle to outside authorities regarding drug-pushing and maltreatment of patients at the facility. Section 1997d is part of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, and provides: No person reporting conditions which may constitute a violation under the [Act] shall be subjected to retaliation in any manner for so reporting. Price contends that this statute creates an implied private right of action for employees, as well as inmates and patients, who report violations of civil rights and wrongdoing in institutions to outside authorities. 53 The district court pretermitted the question of whether an implied right of action exists under this statute on the ground that even if such an action did exist, Price had adduced no evidence of retaliation. 17 We find no fault with the district court's conclusion concerning the weight of the evidence against Price's claim. However, because we consider the issue of whether a private right of action exists at all under section 1997d to be at the threshold here, we address that issue and conclude that no private right of action exists. 54 In determining whether courts should infer a private right of action from federal law, we must examine legislative intent. See Deubert v. Gulf Fed. Sav. Bank, 820 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir.1987) (citing Universities Research Ass'n, Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770, 101 S.Ct. 1451, 1461, 67 L.Ed.2d 662 (1981)). In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78, 95 S.Ct. 2080, 2087-88, 45 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975), the Supreme Court provided analytical guidance for courts attempting to determine whether a private right of action can be inferred from legislative history. The first inquiry is whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted. 18 55 It is upon this first inquiry that Price founders. Price was an employee of the facility and not an institutionalized person. We discern from the legislative history no intent to expand private rights of action beyond the benefited class of inmates/patients. Both the Senate Report 19 and House Conference Report 20 contain abbreviated, general expressions of intent with respect to the whistle-blower provision. The Conference Report, for example, states only that [i]t is the intent of Congress that those who have knowledge of systematic abuse of Constitutional rights in institutions and who report such abuse to the Attorney General or other appropriate officials or interested parties shall be protected. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 897, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 839. 56 Price's strongest argument is that this statement, taken together with the language of section 1997d (No person reporting conditions ...) and the Act's broad definition of person 21 creates a reasonable inference that Congress intended that the whistle-blower provision would also encompass employees. However, although these premises and the inference they support are taken from language that is most general, that language is bereft of any indication that a private remedy was contemplated for all who might be covered. In such circumstances, the Court has warned against engraving private rights of action upon statutory schemes: 57 The Court consistently has found that Congress intended to create a cause of action 'where the language of the statute explicitly confer[s] a right directly on a class of persons that include[s] the plaintiff in the case.' Conversely, it has noted that there 'would be far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons' where Congress, rather than drafting legislation 'with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class,' instead has framed the statute simply as a general prohibition. 58 Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-72, 101 S.Ct. at 1461-62 (citations omitted). 59 Here, there was a specific class of persons to be benefited: those committed to mental health institutions. But as to whether Congress directed its focus beyond that class in enacting the whistleblower provisions, the legislative history suggests only one extension--to parents and other relatives. The Senate Report states: 60 [A] less obvious, but not less powerful force [than lack of funds] tending to inhibit institutionalized persons from asserting their legal rights is their fear of retaliation. Completely dependent on their institutional environments, residents are particularly susceptible to intimidation and frequently afraid to voice their grievances. Parents and caring relatives of institutionalized individuals may be equally inhibited. 61 S.Rep. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 20 (emphasis added). 62 Employees are nowhere mentioned; nor are they subject to the same forms of intimidation or susceptible in the same degree as the patients and their families. 22 Thus, as we stated in Deubert, 820 F.2d at 759, when neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history affirmatively indicates that Congress contemplated private enforcement by persons in the plaintiff's circumstances, the Cort analysis need not continue. See also Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 579-80, 99 S.Ct. 2479, 2490-91, 61 L.Ed.2d 82 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring). 63 Moreover, inferring such a cause of action would contravene the jurisprudence now governing an employee's reporting to outside authorities. As we explain in Part II, supra, the Supreme Court and this circuit have attempted to strike a careful balance between the employee's interest in expressing criticisms and the government employer's need to maintain order and control. 23 We have emphasized that it is especially important to weigh in the employee's favor the extent to which his speech activities relate to matters of public concern. At the same time, the competing concerns of the employer must be given significant weight; an employer may legitimately require of his employees that, where practical, they report problems to administrators first. See, e.g., Deubert, 820 F.2d at 759; George v. Aztec Rental Center, Inc., 763 F.2d 184 (5th Cir.1985). There is no indication that Congress intended to allow reports or threats of reports to outside authorities, to be a complete shield against an employer's authority to discipline its employees. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. at 1690. 64 Yet, implying a private right of action for employees under section 1997d would provide just such a shield. The statute has no provision for giving due consideration to the employer's need to create an efficacious process for correcting problems at the institution. Thus, an employee who immediately reports any transgression to outside authorities would be cloaked with immunity, even though, for example, the employer might have ample means to fix the problem and might have already begun efforts toward correction. With regard to institutions such as the Felicia Forensic Facility, the sudden involvement of some outside authority might be duplicative, complicating, or generate unnecessary publicity and could charge the atmosphere among the patients and create tension between staff and inmates. Such an effect would run counter to the interests of the institutionalized persons whom Congress sought to protect in the first place. Hence, we conclude that Price has no cause of action under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1997d. 65 AFFIRMED.