Opinion ID: 613588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the Appellate Division's Ruling An Exorbitant Application of New York Law?

Text: I acknowledge that [o]ur task is not to determine whether ... [the Appellate Division's] ruling was correct, but to determine its adequacy to preclude federal habeas review. Cotto, 331 F.3d at 247. On habeas review, we do not reach questions of federal law when the state court's decision rests upon a state-law ground that `is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.' Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1780, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). In general, a state ground for a decision is adequate where it is based on a state rule that is firmly established and regularly followed. Walker v. Martin, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In exceptional cases, however, the exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question. Lee, 534 U.S. at 376, 122 S.Ct. 877. I agree that, in general, New York's contemporaneous objection rule is firmly established and regularly followed. See Whitley v. Ercole, 642 F.3d 278, 286-87 (2d Cir.2011); Richardson v. Greene, 497 F.3d 212, 219 (2d Cir.2007). Hence, the question is whether this application of a generally sound rule was exorbitant. I believe it was. The determination of adequacy rests upon the statute and caselaw. Cotto, 331 F.3d at 243. Accordingly, I consider first the plain language of New York's contemporaneous objection rule and second the caselaw applying it.