Opinion ID: 1215871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant contends that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a finding that the film is obscene and that the evidence fails to prove he had any control over the showing of the film or knowledge of its content. Appellant argues that this film is not merely a stag film, but is a full length film with a continuous story line, an attempt at innovative lighting, and that a moral can be gleaned from viewing it. Therefore, appellant asserts, the film is not utterly without redeeming social value, one of the tests still required in Georgia to find obscenity. Appellant argues that the film has at least a modicum of social value since it goes beyond a mere pretense, and appellant relies on United Artists v. Gladwell, 373 FSupp. 247 (S. D. Ohio, 1974), and United States v. Language of Love, 432 F2d 705 (2d Cir. 1970), to conclude that under the evidence in this case, including the testimony of the clinical psychologist, this film is not obscene. We are not bound to approve the jury's finding that this film is obscene, since it is clear the United States Supreme Court has determined that an independent appellate review must be made of the material to decide the constitutional fact of obscenity. Jenkins v. Georgia, 94 S. C. 2750 (41 LE2d 642) (June 24, 1974). See, also, United States v. Groner, 479 F2d 577 (5th Cir. 1973); and, Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U. S. 184 (84 SC 1676, 12 LE2d 793) (1964). We have discharged this constitutional duty by an en banc review of this film, Devil in Miss Jones. Each member of this court concludes from viewing the film that it is rank, hard core pornography. The conduct of the film actors includes individual and group sexual acts of intercourse, fellatio, and cunnilingus. The film is primarily devoted to scenes depicting bizarre acts of both natural and aberrational sexual conduct that are not necessary to describe in further detail here. During these scenes, the camera focuses primarily upon the actors' genitals which are displayed in a lewd manner. The majority of the scenes depict sexual activity and they appear to exist solely for their own lewd and lascivious purpose and add no other discernible meaning to the film. The so-called plot which appellant urges is accomplished by the placing of a brief backdrop in the initial scene of the film which shows a woman committing suicide for which she is to be sent to hell. However, she is permitted to return to earth to lead a life consumed with lust while awaiting the devil's call to go to hell. This woman, who is Miss Jones, then indulges in every conceivable sexual perversion which she can devise until her time on earth is ended. The rather brief opening scene is followed by the major portion of the film which is devoted to a variety of sexual experiences. In the final scene, Miss Jones is summoned by the devil and doomed to spend infinity with a deranged male completely uninterested in her voracious sexual appetite. It is our view that an otherwise obscene film cannot be constitutionally salvaged by adding to it a vague moral which is superimposed on the predominant theme of the film which is an appeal to a prurient interest in sex. This film, in the opinion of the court, is utterly without redeeming social value. It is barren of any effort to express an idea or serve even a questionable social purpose. We find, upon application of the standards set forth in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, supra, that the film, Devil in Miss Jones, is obscene as a matter of constitutional law and fact. Appellant further argues the evidence is legally insufficient to sustain his conviction for exhibition of this film because it failed to show he had control over the showing of the film or knowledge of its content. The evidence shows that the film was advertised on the marquee of the theatre managed by appellant and that the theatre was an adult theatre. Appellant was shown to be on the premises when the film was exhibited on the two separate dates charged in the accusation and, on the second occasion, appellant sold tickets for admission to see it. This was sufficient to authorize the jury to conclude that on each occasion appellant at least aided and abetted in the exhibition of the film. See Code Ann. § 26-801. Appellant's reliance upon Sokolic v. State, 228 Ga. 788 (187 SE2d 822) (1972) is misplaced. The evidence there showed only that the defendant had made an application for a business license to operate a bookstore almost two years prior to the date of the alleged crime and failed to show that defendant had any connection with the store at the time he was charged with selling obscene material through the store. We must also reject appellant's contention that the evidence failed to prove scienter or guilty knowledge by him of the nature of the film itself. Under Code Ann. § 26-2101, the applicable test for knowingly exhibiting obscene material is whether the defendant has knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable and prudent man on notice as to the suspect nature of the material. The evidence need not show appellant actually knew the film was legally obscene. See, Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29 (16 SC 434, 40 LE 606) (1896); United States v. Thevis, 484 F2d 1149 (3) (5th Cir. 1973); and Hamling v. United States, 94 S. C. 2887, supra. We believe the evidence presented by the state in this case was sufficient to authorize the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was guilty of both counts of this accusation. Appellant further urges that his constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated when the state was permitted to introduce into evidence appellant's statement that he was the manager of the theatre. Appellant's argument is that this statement was elicited by the state investigator without first giving the warning required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (86 SC 1602, 16 LE2d 694, 10 ALR3d 174) (1966). We find no merit in this argument since, at the time of this question, appellant was not in custody and the criminal investigation had not focused upon him as an individual. Miranda was written to protect the rights against self-incrimination of citizens taken into custody or otherwise restrained who are suspected or accused of crime. Carnes v. State, 115 Ga. App. 387, 391 (154 SE2d 781) (1969). Miranda simply does not apply to the inquiry made of appellant under the facts of this case. Therefore, appellant's statement was properly admitted into evidence by the trial court and could be used by the jury in reaching its verdict.