Opinion ID: 2735434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues with Grand Jury Procedures

Text: All prior counsel failed to properly raise the issues of challenges to the grand jury procedures. (Am. Pet. at 12, Civil Action No. 02~C-42.) Petitioner alleges that his indictment is void due to the prejudicial effect on the grand jury ofthe introduction of Zain~s test results through Officer Stiles. (ld.) Petitioner also alleges that Officer Stiles's testimony was 2 Petitioner's use ofthc phrase all prior counsel, all counsel subsequent to his trial counsel, and habeas counsel'l necessarily includes his first habeas counsel Higgins. Therefore, this Order addresses these claims even a though several regard Z in issues which have all been finally adjudicated on the merits. 9 ' intentionally fraudulent. (Jd. 12-13.) Petitioner further al~eges that no evidence was introduced to the grand jury supporting a charge of first degree sexual assault, i.e. that a weapon was used or that the victim was 11 years old or less. (ld. at 13.) To the extent that Petitioner alleges ineffective assistance of counsel based on the use of Zain's test results by the prosecutor or Officer Stiles, the Court denies the peti tion because all Zain issues were resolved in the Zain Habeas and further denied in the Court's Opinion Letter dated December 10, 2010 (which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia by Memorandum Decision; Nov. 20, 2012). Petitioner alleges that no evidence was introduced that a weapon was l.1Sed or that the victim was less than 11 years of age, therefore the evidence did not support the charge offirst degree sexual assault. First, the first degree sexual assault statute in 1988 also included as an ~~:' . •·.···100:...... element that the infliction of bodily injury upon anyone could raise the crime to that offirst C ... ~_ ' •• .<.; degree sex.ual assault. See W. Va. Code § 61-8B-3(a)(i) (1984) (current version at W. Va. Code § 61-8B-3 (2006)). Second, [g]enerally speak:ing~ the finding by the grand jury that the evidence is sufficient is not subject to judicial review. State v.Adams, 193 W. Va, 277,284, 456 S.E.2d 4, 11 (1995) (quoting I Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure Grand Jury and Indictments 1-651 (2d ed. 1993). [A] defendant may not challenge a facially valid indictment returned by a legally constituted grand jury on the basis that the evidence presented to the grand jury was legally insufficient. State v. Adams, 193 W. Va. at 284, 456 S.E.2d at 11. The 'Court finds that first habeas counsel Higgin.s was not ineffective under the iirst prong of Strickland and Miller because Higgins performance was not deficient under an objective standard of reasonableness. See jy'/iller, 194 W. Va. 3, 15,459 S.E.2d 114, 126 10
(1995). Counsel's performance cannot be considered deficient because the indictment was not reviewable in the first instance for sufficiency of the evidence in the grand jury proceeding. B. Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that habeas counsel Higgins was ineffective for not raising that trial counsel was not prepared to cross~ examine the St.ate's expert witnesses. Petitioner alleges that a[sJubsequcnt counsel in the Habeas and appeals failed to raise the issue that trial oounsel was not prepared to cross-examine the State's expert witnesses from the State Police Laboratory. Petitioner alleges that scientific evidence was avruluble to refute the reliability of hair comparison analysis. and trial counsel did not move for approval of expert consultation or expert testimony of his own in regard to the scienti.fic test results. (Am. Pet. at 13.) Petitioner has presented no evidence to substantiate his assertion that scientific ev~dence was available. One who charges on appeal that his triaJ counsel was ineffective and that such resulted in his conviction(] must prove the allegation by a preppnderance of the e·vidence. Syl. pt. 2, Carrico v. Griffith, 165 ·W. Va. 812,272 S.E.2d 235 (1980); syl. pt. 22, State v. Thomas, 157 W.Va. 64D. 203 S.E.2d 445 (1974). Because Petitioner has presented no evidence to this Court beyond a bald conclusion that there was scientific evidence available, he has failed to prove this allegation by a preponderance of the evjdence. C. Habeas counsel Higgins was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue that Petitioner Johnson was convicted of aiding and abetting criminal acts for which his brother, the principal, was later acquitted. . Petitioner Johnson alleges that all counsel subsequent to his trial counsel failed to . recognize and raise the issue that his convictions as aider and abettor to first degree sexual . assault were voided 'because ... the principal actorO was acquitted ofthe 0 charges of first degree sexual assault. (Am. Pet. at 13.) On January 7, 2013, the Petitioner also filed a pro se 11 tt Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure. The pro se Motion was filed within 120 days ofthe mandate of the \Vest Virginia Supreme Court affilming in part this Court's denial of habeas relief but remanding the case for findings of fact and conclusions of law on first habeas counsel Howard Higgins. Procedurally, a Rule 35(b) motion to reduce a sentence may only be used to reduce a sentence within 120 days after the sentence is imposed or probation invoked, or within 120 days ~fter the entry of a mandate by the supreme court of appeals upon affinnance of a judgment of a convktion or probation revocation or the entry of or an order by the supreme court of appeals dismissirig rejecting a petition for appeal of a judgment of a conviction or probation revocation. \V. Va. R. Crim; P. 35(b). This Court cannot consider a reduction of sentence after an unsuccessfi,U habeas corpus petition .. A petitioner is not entitled to application of Rule 35(b) base? upon an underlying unsuccessful attempt to obtain habeas corpus relief. Barritt v. Painter, 215 W. Va. 120, 123,595 S.E.2d 62,65 (2004) (per curiam) (finding that the 1996 modification of Rule 35(b) eliminated its use after a denial of habeas corpus relief). Although this Court fmds that Rule. 35(b) does not afford Petitioner relief in this situation, the Court considers the underlying assertions regarding Petitioner's convictions as . . aider and abettor because he has asserted that first habeas counsel Higgins was ineffective for failing to raise this ground. The C~urt co~cludes that thi~ particular legal issue has be~n fully adjudicated on the merits in a prior petition and therefore is barred by tes judicata as detailed in Lash v. lYfcKenzi! 166 W. Va. 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981). A judgment denying relief in post-conviction habeas corpus is res judicata on questiom of fact or law which have been fully and 11nally litigated and decided .... Syl. pt. 2, Losh v. lvJcKenzie, 166 W. Va 762, 277 S.E.2d 606 (1981). In Petitioner's first post-conviction habcz 12 ·' I I corpus proceeding, Civil Action No. 90~C-361, he questioned his conviction for aiding and . , u abetting kidnapping for which his brother, the principal, was subsequently acquitted. Judge Halbritter issued a written opinion detailing the legal reason why Petitioner's assertion fails as a matter of law. West Virginia Code §·61-2-14c provides that 'if any person in any way knowingly aid or abet any other person in the commission of any offense described ... § 61-2-14a ... of this article, either as accessory before or an accessory after the fact, such person so aiding ~d abetting sh~l1 be guilty as princip?i. i,n the commission of such offense ~d sb?ill be pup,ished in the same manner and to the same extent as i~ provided in said sections for the person who committed the olTense.' The statute does not reqUire that the principal be convicted before the aider and abettor can be convicted. . (Feb. 20, 1997 Opinion in Civil Action No. 90-C-361, at 22.) Although Judge Halbritter decided this particular legal issue as it regards to kidnapping, the same reasoning pertains to Pctitir;mer's present argument that he cannot be an aider and abettor to first degree sexual assault when. the principal is later acquitted. An aider and abettor is a principal in the second degree, see State v. H[[rper~ 179 W. Va. 24,29, 365 S.E.2d 69, 74 (1987), and as such is punishable as if he was a principal in the first degree. W. Va. Code § 61~11-6 (LexisNexis 2010). In order to sustain a conviction for aiding and abetting the p'rincipal offense, the prosecution must prove ;that there [was] a crime committed and a principal in the first degree, and it must be shown that the person for whom [the] accused was acting was connected with the offense. State v. Lola Mae C, 185 W. Va. 452,458,408 S.E.2d 31, 37 (1991). In Lola Mae c., the defendant was indicted~ tried. and convicted oftwo counts offust degree sexual assault. 185 \V. Va., at 455, 408 S.E.2d at 34. Important to the issue this Court must decide, the defendant in Lola Mae C. was indicted and tried separately from the principal., 185 W. Va. at 37, n.] 2, 408 ~.E.2d at 37,11.12. The defendant appealed her conviction on the 13 f,'1'ound that the state violated the purpose of having the father and stepmother separately indicted and tried by placing into evidence matters relating to the father's guilt, in particular 14 to 15 prior sexual assaults .... 185 W. Va. at 453,408 S.E.2d at 32. The Court held that as part of the state's case-in-chief, the state bore the obligation to prove that the defendanfs husband did inde~d commit the sexual assault on the victim on the occasion involving the defendant in ·order to prove that the defendant aided and abetted him. 185 W. Va. at 458, 408S.E.2d at 37. Thus the issue was whether evidence of such collateral acts by the father would have been admissible to prove his guilt on the occasion involving the defendant. Ie.!. The Court tinds Lola Mae C. instructive. The state, in order to secure a conviction for aiding and abetting> must prove that the principal did indeed commit the crime. However, as Lola .!vfae C. shows, the state inust do so at the trial of the principal in the second degree. · '. ..,'~.;, ..... ,. ObviouslY1 a principal in the first degree cannot be convicted in a trial in which he or she is not a defendant. The state carries the burden of proving at the aider and abettor's trial that the principal in the fIrst degree committed the act. The State carri.~d its burden in Petitioner's trial of provIng that his brother committed the crime of fITst degree sexual assault as a principal in the first deblTee. Any subsequent acquittal of the principal in the .fIrst degree in his own trial has no bearing on the aider and abettor's conviction. Petitioner. in his pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Civil Action No. 07-C­ 256, cites Shuttlesworth v. City ofBirmingham. 373 U.S. 262 (1963),Jor the proposition that [iJt is generally recognized that there can be no conviction for'aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act. (Nov. 5,2007 Pet. in Civil Action No. 07-C-2S6, at 20.) Petitioner also cites United States v. Prince 430 F.2d 1254 (4 th Cir. 1970), f~r the proposition that where the 14 ,i r' . '• •• 00 acquittal of the principle established the act constituting the offense was not committed, then the conviction of the aider and abettor to that crime must be set aside. (Nov. 5, 2007 Pet. at 20.) A close reading of Shuttlesworth shows it does not afford Petitioner relief. The convictions as aiders and abettors were overturned because the underlying acts were not in themselves criminal acts. The Court stated: Petitioners were convicted for inciting. aiding, and abetting a violation of the city trespass ordinance. The trespass 'violation' was that committed by the petitioners in Gober v. City o/Birmingham, 373 U.S. 374 .... Since the convictions in Gober have been set aside, it follows that the present petitioners did not incite or aid and abet any crime, and that therefore their oyvn convictions must be set aside. It is generally recognized that there can be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act. Shuttienvorth, 373 U.S. 262, 265 (footnote omitted). In Gobe~, the Court issued a very short written opinion: The judgmen~ are reversed. Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 83 S.Ct. 1119. In Peterson v. City ofGreenville, the Court found that a city ordinance. requiring the . segr~gation of African-Americans and Caucasians at lunch counters and which was enforceable through. the state's criminal processes was a deprivation of the equal protection ofthe law as required by the Fourteenth Amendment to theDnited States Constitution. Peterson, 373 U.S~· 244,248 (1963). There was no violation .of the city ordinance beca1.!se the city ordinance was unconstitutional. . The Court finds that this is materially distinguishable from Peti-qoner's case. Petitioner was convicted as an aider and abettor of a violation of a state law prohibiting a person from employing a deadly weapon in the c0:rru:x?-ission of sexual assault. It is quintessential criminal conduct. A conviction for aiding and ab~tting that criminal conduct does not violate either the State Constitution or the Federal Constitution. TIle jury fOWld at Petitioner'S trial that the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime was committed, Elwood Johnson committed it as 15 l . .. the. principal, and William Mark Johnson aided and abetted that crime. Shuttlenvorth is not on point. Petitioner also cites United Slates v. Prince, 430 F.2d 1324 (4th Cir. 1970) (per curi~), for the proposition that an acquittal of the principal requires the conviction of an aider and abettor to be set aside. (Nov. 5,2007 Pet. at 20.) In Prince, the Fourth Circuit vacated a conviction for aiding and abetting the takjng of a rail bird from a boat while a motor was running in violation of federal law. Prince, 430 F.2d at 1325. While rus appeal was pending, his companion, the alleged principal, was fOllild not guilty. Id. The Fourth Circuit concluded that because there were only two people in the boat, the appellant could not have aided and abetted any other person, therefore no crnne 'vvas committed. ld. This Court finds Prince unpersuasive. First, Prince has been cited as a minority position and has never been cited by any court in the Fourth Circuit in a published opinion. The holding in Prince was criticized in a well-reasoned opinion from the Third Circuit, which represents the majority position and is in accord with the West Virginia Supreme Court's reasoning in Lola . Alae C. In United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076 (3 rd Crr. 1979), the 'Th.ifd Circuit, sitting en bane. stated that although [t]he superficial attractiveness of [the Prince] approach is readily apparent ... we [do not] believe that this rype of conundrum would be ?ll that unusual in cases where aiders and abettors are tried separately from the principals that committed the crime. It will surely come as no surprise that in many cases the proof available to the goyernrnent may vary depending on who is being .. prosecuted and when the prosecution .is brought. Evidence inadmissible against one defendant may often be used against another. For example, differing defense strategies may result in different rulings on admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence or ... different witnesses and different emphasis in testimony. Similarly, one defendant may lack standing to challenge the admissibility of evidence unconstitutionally obtained from a co-defendant, and therefore inadmissible against the co-defendant but admissible against him. And if there is a substantial time difference between the trials of the defendants, a key witness at the first trial may die or be missing at the time of the second trial) or 16 I' considerably shorter [sentence] creating an inequity of sentences between codefendants. (Am. Pet. at 13~14, Civil Action No. 02-C-42.) The Court finds that this is not an actual issue and therefore first habeas counsel Higgins was not ineffective for noi addressjng it. The statute prescribing the punishment of principals in the second degree at the time Petitioner was sentenced stated [i]n the case of every felony, every principal in the second degree ... shall be punishable as ifhe were the principal in the fIrst degree[.] \V. Va. Code § 61-11-6 ( 1923) (current version at w,. Va. Code § 61-11-6 (2009)). The punishment for sexual . .' . : assault in the :first degree at the time Petitioner was convicted of aiding and abetting first degree sexual assault was imprisonment in the penitentiary not less than .fifteen nor more than twenty­ five years, or fined not more than ten thousand dollars and imprisoned in the penitentiary not less than fifteen nor more than twenty-five years. W. Va. Code § 61-8B-3 (1984) (current verSlon at \V. Va. Code § 61-8B-3 (2006)). First habeas counsel Higgins was not ineffective for not raising this because there is no merit to Petitioner's assertion that he has received an inequitable sentence. The law in place at the time of Petitioner's convictions clearly allowed for his punishment by consecutive flfteen to twenty-five year sentences for each conviction. Petitioner William Mark J ohilSon was senten~ed in a different court and ,by a different judge than Elwood Johnson. The sentencing' judge had discretion to detennine the appropriate punishment. Accordingly, Petitioner's assertions are without merit and the Court denies the requested relief on this ground. E. Habeas counsel Higgins did address the statements made by prosecutor Hopkins. Petitioner alleges that [aJppellate and habeas counsel failed to fully address the issues , 1 of the prejudicial statements rq.ade by the trial proseyutor Hopkins in closing statements. (Am. Pet. at 14, Civil Action No. 02-C-42.) The Court flnds that first habeas cOlmsel Higgins was not 18 .' .' -::-. inetIective because he did raise this ground in the first habeas proceeding and Judge Halbritter found it was not supported by the record and without merit. (feb. 20, 1997 Opinion at 13, Civil Action No, 90-C-361.) Judge Halbritter wrote that [t]he petitioner also asserts that defense counsel failed to object on many of the errors made by the Assist~t Prosecuting Attorney during the opening and closing argument to the jury. The record does not support this assertion, The Court fmds this assertion to be without merit. (ld.) Therefore, this Court finds that habeas counsel Higgins did raise th~s ground and it has been fiilly and finally adjudicated on the merits. The Court denies Petitioner relief on this ground. F. Habeas counsel Higgins was not ineffective for fai~g to raise the ground that the same trial prosecutor was present when Lt. Zain testified differently at Elwo-od Johnson's ~~ , Th~ Court fmds that all Zain issues have been fully and fInally adjudicated on the merits and a judgment was rendered denying relief: In its August 23, 1995 Opinion, the Circuit Court of Preston County found that ··the remaining evidence after disregarding the evidence of Zain was sufficient to support the conviction. The State's evidence in this case was very, very strong. (Aug. 23, 1995 Opinion at 5~ Civil Action No. 93 NC·405.) The Court fmds this judgment was appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, which refused to hear it by Order dated July 15, 1998. On December 10,2010 (and· reissued for purposes of appeal on January 7,2011), the Circuit Court of Preston County issued an Order Denying Petition for Habeas Corpus as it pertained to all issues raised under Zain 1. , (Dec. 10, 2010 Order Denying Pet. for Habeas Corpus at 14.) Assuming, arguendo, that habeas counsel Higgjns was ineffective for not raising the issue asserted by Petitioner, this Court would nevertheless flnd that he cannot prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have 19 , J changed the outcome. 3 As this Court stated in the December 10, 2011 Order Denying Petition for Habeas Corpus, it concurs i.¥ith Judge ·Halbritter's finding that Zain's testimony did not have a pre~udicial effect on the jury. The State's case was extremely.strong. l ' (Id. at 14-17.) G. Habeas counsel Higgins was not ineffective for failing to raise the issue of the Court's denial of a continuance. Peti tioner asserts that first habeas counsel Higgins was ineffective because he did not address the Court's denial of a continuance because his trial attorney was not prepared to go forward. (Am. Pet. at 17, Civil Action No. 02-C-42.) Petitioner asserts that the denial of this continuance request was extremely prejudicial to the client[.] (ld.) In Carrico v. Griffith, the appellant appealed a circuit court's denial of relief in habeas corpus. The appellant asserted, inter alia, that he ~&.s denied a fair and impartial trial because the trial court erred in refusing a continuance. Carrico v. Griffith, 165 W. Va. 812,821,272 S.E.2d 235,240 (1980). The Supreme Court of Appeals affmned the trial court's denial of habe~ relief and stated that [hJabeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal but 'ill lie to test a denial of a coilstitutional right. The matters relied upon are fair subjects for appeal, but not habeas corpus. jd. The Court finds Carrico v. Griffith directly on point. Here, Petitioner Johnson asserts that his first habeas counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the trial court's denial of a continuance. The Court finds that Petitioner's first habeas counsel is not ineffective because this issue was not appropriate for habeas corpus. Accordingly, the Court finds that Petitioner's assertion is without merit. --------------~.------ . J The Cowi is not making a finding that attorney Higgins was ineffective. 20 ,, H. Petiti{)ner's assertion that Higgins was ineffective for failure to raise the issue that trial counsej failed to convey all plea offers is without merit. On December 17, 2012, Petitioner, through counsel, tiled a Motion for New Hearing to Submit Additional Evidence Following Partial Remand and New Case Law: In that Motion, Petitioner requested that he be allowed to present new evidence so the Court could determine whether the principles announced in iviissouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper were violated. The Court, after a hearing on December 18,2012, granted the Motion and an evidentiary hearing was held on May 17,2013. Petitioner Johnson appeared in person and by counsel Melissa Giggenbach. The Warden appeared by Preston County Prosecuting Attorney Melvin C. Snyder Ill. In A1issouri v. Frye, the United States Supreme Court held that «as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to cOIIlI11unicate formal offers from the prosecution to ac~ept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to the accused. 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). Counsel's failure to convey a plea offer to a defendant d[oes] not render the effective assistance the Constitution requires. ld. . . Flye simply extends a protection under the Sixth Amendment of the COIfstitution of the United States what Article III, § 14 ofthe Constitution of the State ofWest Virginia already provides. Objective professional standards dictate that a criminal defense attorney, absent extenuating circumstances, must communicate to the defendant any and all plea bargain offers made by the prosecution. The failure of defense counsel to communicate any and all plea bargain proposals to the defendant constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, absent extenuating circumstances. Syl. pt. 3, Becton v. Hun, 205 W. Va. 139,516 S.E.2d 762 (1999). The requirement that defense counsel convey all plea offers to the accused to render effective assistan.ce has been the law in West Virginia for over a decade before the United States Supreme Court decided Frye. 21 ,; . In Lafler v. Cooper, the United States Supreme Court held the following: : '. If a plea bargain has been afTered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it. If that right is denied, prejudice can be shown ifloss of the plea opportunity led to a trial resulting in a conviction on more serious charges or the imposition of a mme severe sentence. Lajler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct. 1376, 1387 (2012). In Lafler, the question presented to the Court was not whether the advice given was ineffective. Trial counsel in that case advised the defendant to not accept the plea offer because counsel believed the state could not prove the intent clement of first degree murder because the defendant shot the victim below the waist. Both parties in the appeal to the Supreme Court concec;ied this advice was ineffective. lei. at 1383. In Petitioner's case, this Court must decide whether habeas counsel Higgins was ineffective for failing to raise the issue that trial counsel did not convey all proposed plea offers, and under Lafler, whether trial counsel's advice rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. In the first instance regarding possible issues under Missouri v. Frye and Becton v. Hun, the Circuit Court of Preston COlmty found in Civil Action No. 90-C-361 that defense counsel informed the petitioner of the state's proposed plea offer and that defense counsel discussed with the petitioner that the state would have a different view of any possible plea offer if the victim was interviewed. After the discussion, the petitioner told counsel to go ahead and interview the victim. (Feb. 20, 1997 Opinion at 10, Civil Action No. 90~C-361.) Accordingly, any assertion that trial counsel failed to convey this proposed plea offer,has been fully and finally adjudicated and is barred by the principles of res judicata. R~garding the second plea offer, Petitioner Johnson testified: 1 don't remember him talking with me about it. But, evidently he did, because I signed a Motion to Withdraw that he had filed. (H!'g Tr. 35, May 17,2013.) Accordingly, Petitioner has not shown by a 22 I I \1 '. , preponderance of the evidence that the plea offer was not conveyed. His testimony dcmons1:rates that he cannot remember. As to the potential Lafler issue, Petitioner must prove the allegations contained in his petition by a preponderance ofthe.evidence. At the May 17,2013 hearing in which Petitioner was afforded the opportunity to place new evidence in the record, trial counsel David Brown testified that he knew he would have discussed the flrst plea offer with Petitioner and that he left the decision to Petitioner. 4 Trial counsel Brovvn speci1:ically stated, I don't believe he decided it the same day. He let me Imow later that he wanted me to go ahead and proceed to interview the child.s (Hr'g Tr. 18, May 17,2013.) TIus Court finds that Petitioner has failed to meet his burden ofproving by a preponderance of the evidence that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in considering t}~·:}~·. r;.:: ..>.~:.' whether to take either plea offer. He testified at the May 17,2013 hearing that trial counsel told him that if he did not take the flrst plea offer, then they were going to court and he was going to get life and 300 years. (Hr'g Tr. 35, May 17,2013.) After going to trial and being convicted of multiple charges, Petitioner Johnson received what is essentially a life sentence. Thus, Petitioner's ovm testimony reflects that trial counsel's advice was accurate. Lafler does not afford Petitioner relief for advice be received on the first plea offer. Petitioner has further failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the advice he received regarding the second plea offer was constitutionally ineffective. Petitioner testified he ~ Rule 1.2(a) ofthe West Virginia Rules of Professional Conduct places the decision ofwhether to accept a plea squarely with the client. . j The first plea agreement required the Petitioner to plead guilty to one count of s~cond-degree sexual assault and was contingent upon Petitioner not interviewing the alleged victim. Trial counsel Brown testified that he believed tbat type of plea c'ffer, which essentially told us we shouldn't investigate further, was an unethical type ofplea bargain. (Hr'g Tr. 26, May 17,2013.) He filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel because he wanted to make sure it was presefted on the reco!d for anyone who wanted to appeal it, in case he was convicted: ... ([d.) Becau~e a defendant is not entitled to a plea offer as a matter of right, see Missouriv. Frye, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1410 (2012), this Court is not addressing the ethical questions raised by the plea offer. 23 '. I I could not remember the conveyance of the second plea offer but it must have occurred. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to prove that the specific advice was ine±l'ective. La:fler does not afford Petitioner relief for advice he received on the second plea offer.