Opinion ID: 185725
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Principles Governing Retroactivity

Text: The general legal principles governing retroactivity arerelatively easy to state, although not as easy to apply. Anagency may not promulgate retroactive rules absent expresscongressional authority. Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp.,488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988). A provision operates retroactivelywhen it impair[s] rights a party possessed when he acted,increase[s] a party's liability for past conduct, or impose[s]new duties with respect to transactions already completed. Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280 (1994). Inthe administrative context, a rule is retroactive if it  'takesaway or impairs vested rights acquired under existing law, orcreates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches anew disability in respect to transactions or considerationsalready past.'  Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. United States Dep't ofInterior, 177 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (quoting Ass'n ofAccredited Cosmetology Sch. v. Alexander, 979 F.2d 859, 864(D.C. Cir. 1992)). The critical question is whether a challenged rule establishes an interpretation that changes thelegal landscape. Id. (quoting Health Ins. Ass'n of Am., Inc.v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 423 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). It is undisputed here that the Secretary was not authorized to promulgateretroactive rules governing BLBA benefits determinations. Hence, the parties dispute only whether the challenged regulations are retroactive. The Secretary argues that none of the rules is retroactive,even as applied to pending claims, because all are merelyprocedural and do not confer new substantive rights orliabilities. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 275 (Changes in procedural rules may often be applied in suits arising before theirenactment without raising concerns about retroactivity.). Itis true that purely procedural rules often do not operateretroactively even when applied to transactions predatingtheir institution. This is because such rules often regulate only secondary rather than primary conduct. Id. Where aprocedural rule changes the legal landscape in a way thataffects substantive liability determinations, however, it mayoperate retroactively. See Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343,359 (1999) (noting that, in Landgraf, the Court took pains todispel the 'suggest[ion] that concerns about retroactivity haveno application to procedural rules' ) (quoting Landgraf, 511U.S. at 275 n.29). Rather than rely on procedural and substantive labels,a court must ask whether the [regulation] operates retroactively. Id. This inquiry involves a commonsense, functional judgment about 'whether the new provision attaches newlegal consequences to events completed before its enactment.'  Id. at 357-58 (quoting Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 270). Thus, where a rule changes the law in a way that adverselyaffects [a party's] prospects for success on the merits of theclaim, it may operate retroactively even if designated procedural by the Secretary. Ibrahim v. District of Columbia,208 F.3d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The Secretary argues, and the District Court agreed, thatnone of the challenged rules changes the landscape, becausethe rules merely clarify the Secretary's position or conform tocases decided by the Courts of Appeals. In analyzing eachnew regulation, we first look to see whether it effects asubstantive change from the agency's prior regulation orpractice. If a new regulation is substantively consistent withprior regulations or prior agency practices, and has beenaccepted by all Courts of Appeals to consider the issue, thenits application to pending cases has no retroactive effect. If anew regulation is substantively inconsistent with a priorregulation, prior agency practice, or any Court of Appealsdecision rejecting a prior regulation or agency practice, it isretroactive as applied to pending claims. Some of the challenged rules here codify the results of acase in one circuit while effectively reversing a case inanother circuit in which the court rejected the Secretary'spractice or policy. Such rules change the legal landscape asapplied to cases that were pending when the regulations were promulgated. See National Mining, 177 F.3d at 8 (explaining that [w]here before there was 'a range of possibleinterpretations,'  of the relevant statutes, a rule may establish  'a precise interpretation'  that changes the legal landscape) (citing Health Ins. Ass'n, 23 F.3d at 423-24). It goeswithout saying that such rules change the law for casespending in the circuit that previously rejected the Secretary'sapproach. In those cases, the operators insured against thefiled claims based on the law in effect at the time the claimswere filed. Less obviously, the regulations preclude thecourts in other circuits from adopting the view of their sistercourt rejecting the Secretary's position, a possibility that wasstill available when the cases were initially filed. Thus, to theextent that a new rule reflects a substantive change from theposition taken by any of the Courts of Appeals and is likely toincrease liability, that rule is impermissibly retroactive asapplied to pending claims. 2. Application of Legal Principles to Challenged Rules We find some of the challenged rules to be impermissiblyretroactive as applied to claims that were pending on theregulations' effective date. None of the new regulations isretroactive as to claims filed on or after the effective date. The distinction between pending and newly filed claims is oneon which appellants rely in their briefs. See Br. for Appellants at 15 n.6 (stating that the relevant date for purposes ofretroactivity is the date the claim is filed, as that is the lastdate on which the operators' and insurers' transactions areclosed and expectations are settled); Reply Br. for Appellantsat 4 (arguing that the Secretary fails to explain why keyprovisions are expressly made retroactively applicable topending and previously filed claims, while saying nothingabout claims filed after the effective date). Moreover, NMAnever affirmatively argues that the rules should be consideredretroactive as applied to claims first filed after the effectivedate. Nor would the record support such an argument. Appellants do argue that the regulations are retroactive asapplied to newly filed claims when those claims are subsequent claims. We reject this argument. Under both the new and old regulations, a miner whose claim is initiallydenied may later file a new claim if he subsequently developsblack lung disease or can show that another condition ofentitlement has changed. See 20 C.F.R. s 725.309(d). As weexplain in more detail below, a claimant bringing such a claimstill bears the burden of demonstrating that he meets all ofthe relevant conditions. For this reason, we agree with theSecretary that such claims are new claims to which theapplication of the new regulations is permissible. 20 C.F.R. s 718.104(d): The treating physician rule instructs the officer adjudicating a miner's claim to consider therelationship between the miner and any treating physicianwhose report is submitted when determining whether theminer suffers from black lung disease and whether he wastotally disabled or died because of the disease. The disputedrule instructs the officer to consider the nature of the relationship (a doctor's opinion is entitled to more weight if hehas treated the miner for pulmonary, as opposed to nonpulmonary, conditions), its duration, the frequency of treatment, and the extent of treatment in weighing the doctor'sopinion along with the other evidence. 20 C.F.R.s 718.104(d)(1)-(4). The regulation provides that in appropriate cases, the doctor-patient relationship may constitutesubstantial evidence in support of the adjudication officer'sdecision to give that physician's opinion controlling weight,but only when the weight given is based on the credibility ofthat physician's opinion in light of its reasoning and documentation, other relevant evidence and the record as awhole. Id. s 718.104(d)(5) (emphasis added). It appliesboth to pending claims and claims filed after the regulations'effective date. See id. ss 718.2, 725.4(a) (setting forth theapplicability of the regulations in Part 718). The old rule saidnothing about the relationship between the miner and theevaluating doctor. See 20 C.F.R. s 718.104 (2000). We hold that treating physician rule is not retroactive,because it codifies judicial precedent and does not work asubstantive change in the law. NMA argues that the rulecontravenes a number of court decisions. This argument isunfounded. The consensus among courts has been that an agency adjudicator may give weight to the treating physician's opinion when doing so makes sense in light of theevidence and the record, but may not mechanistically creditthe treating physician solely because of his relationship withthe claimant. For example, in Peabody Coal Co. v. McCandless, 255 F.3d 465, 469 (7th Cir. 2001), relied upon by NMA,the Seventh Circuit restated its disapproval of any mechanical rule that the views of a treating physician prevail (citingConsolidation Coal Co. v. OWCP, 54 F.3d 434, 438 (7th Cir.1995)). Instead, the Seventh Circuit has repeatedly demanded that the adjudicator explain his or her decision to creditthe treating physician in terms of a medical reason, id., orexplain why the opinion of the treating physician was viewedto be better reasoned than the opinions of non-treatingphysicians, Consolidation Coal Co., 54 F.3d at 438; see alsoAmax Coal Co. v. Beasley, 957 F.2d 324, 327 (7th Cir. 1992)(holding, in a case where both doctors agreed that coalexposure probably had not caused the miner's death, that anALJ may not disregard uncontradicted medical evidence norgive more weight to the examining physician solely becausethat doctor personally treated the claimant) (emphasis inoriginal). These holdings are codified in the news 718.104(d), which by its terms allows an adjudicator to giveweight to the treating physician's opinion only when thatdecision is supported by the opinion's reasoning and documentation in light of the other evidence in the record. 20C.F.R. s 718.104(d)(5). The other cases cited by appellants similarly express theprinciples embodied in the new rule. In Sterling SmokelessCoal Co. v. Akers, 131 F.3d 438, 441 (4th Cir. 1997), theFourth Circuit vacated an award of benefits where the ALJhad mechanistically credited, to the exclusion of all othertestimony, the opinions of two examining physicians who hadonly treated the miner for a month, despite allegations thatthe two doctors had not independently evaluated the minerthemselves. The court acknowledged that the opinions oftreating physicians can be deserv[ing of] especial consideration, but rejected any requirement or presumption thattheir opinions automatically be given greater weight. Id. (quoting Grizzle v. Pickands Mather & Co., 994 F.2d 1093,1097 (4th Cir. 1993)). Likewise, the Sixth Circuit recently summarized its law inPeabody Coal Co. v. Groves, 277 F.3d 829 (6th Cir. 2002). Reviewing past cases, the court explained that opinions oftreating physicians are entitled to greater weight, but shouldnot automatically be presumed to be correct; rather, theiropinions should be 'properly credited and weighed.'  Id. at834 (quoting Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036,1042 (6th Cir. 1993)). Adjudicators must examine the medical opinions of treating physicians on their merits and ...make a reasoned judgment about their credibility. Id.; accord Griffith v. Director, OWCP, 49 F.3d 184, 186-87 (6thCir. 1995) (holding that an ALJ was not required to givegreater weight to the opinion of the treating physician wherethe physician was equivocal as to the cause of the miner'sdisease). In short, appellants do not cite a single case from anycircuit in which a Court of Appeals espoused principles atodds with the new rule embodied in s 718.104(d). As thecases demonstrate, the courts to consider the issue haveadopted the balanced policy reflected in the new rule. Thus,the rule does not upset settled expectations, and it is notretroactive as applied to pending claims for benefits. 20 C.F.R. s 718.201(a)(2): NMA argues that the new rulein s 718.201(a), which defines pneumoconiosis, is impermissibly retroactive. Section 718.201(a) parrots the statutory definition of pneumoconiosis, i.e., a chronic dust disease of thelung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonaryimpairments, arising out of coal mine employment. See 30U.S.C. s 902(b). The regulation goes on to define pneumoconiosis as including both medical or clinical pneumoconiosisand statutory or legal pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R.s 718.201(a). Legal pneumoconiosis is defined to includeany chronic lung disease or impairment ... arising out ofcoal mine employment, including any chronic restrictive orobstructive pulmonary disease arising out of coal mine employment. Id. s 718.201(a)(2). NMA challenges as retroactive the inclusion of restrictiveor obstructive pulmonary disease in the definition of pneumoconiosis. It argues that most courts require individual miners to prove the causal relationship between mining and theirobstructive lung disease, and that the new rule will changethis. This argument is misplaced. NMA concedes that therecord supports the premise that obstructive lung diseasemay be caused by mining exposure and can contribute to aminer's disability. Br. for Appellants at 17 n.8. The newrule does no more than reflect this reality. It does not, asappellants suggest, create a presumption that all or evenmost obstructive disease is caused by exposure to coal dust. The District Court correctly found that, under both the oldand new regulations, each miner bear[s] the burden ofproving that his obstructive lung disease did in fact arise outof his coal mine employment. NMA, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 79(quoting 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,938) (emphasis added). NMA also alleges that the preamble to the regulationsimpermissibly suggests that an adjudicator may ignore amedical report if the reporting doctor concludes that a miner's obstructive lung disease was caused by smoking, ratherthan mining. This objection is entirely meritless. The regulation's plain text in no way indicates that medical reports willbe excluded if they conclude that a particular miner's obstructive disease was caused by smoking, rather than mining. Indeed, the preamble itself states that the revised definitiondoes not alter the requirement that individual miners mustdemonstrate that their obstructive lung disease arose out oftheir work in the mines. See 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,938. Andappellants acknowledge that this regulatory statement is acceptable. Br. for Appellants at 17 n.8. To the extent thatappellants' objection is based on anticipated misapplicationsof the rule by agency adjudicators, it is unripe for review. Appellants may object to applications of the rule only in thecontext of concrete cases. 20 C.F.R. s 718.201(c), 725.309(d): Section 718.201(c) statesthat pneumoconiosis is recognized as a latent and progressive disease which may first become detectable only after thecessation of coal mine dust exposure. Appellants argue that this regulatory statement is impermissibly retroactive, because the question whether pneumoconiosis is latent andprogressive is unsettled. This contention is based on a falsereading of the rule. Appellants acknowledge that at least one rare type ofpneumoconiosis is both latent and progressive, but argue thatthe more common simple pneumoconiosis is not. Br. forAppellants at 17. During oral argument, the Secretary conceded that the most common forms of pneumoconiosis are notlatent. Moreover, the Secretary acknowledged that latentand progressive pneumoconiosis is rare, occurring in a smallpercentage of cases by all accounts. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 52-55. Nothing in the disputed rule says otherwise. The rule simplyprevents operators from claiming that pneumoconiosis is never latent and progressive. The medical literature makes itclear that pneumoconiosis may be latent and progressive, andappellants do not dispute this point. NMA's concern about the definition of pneumoconiosis aslatent and progressive is tied to the fact that, under 20 C.F.R.s 725.309(d), a claimant whose claim was previously deniedmay file a subsequent claim. The subsequent claim will bedenied unless the claimant demonstrates that one of theapplicable conditions of entitlement has changed since theclaim was denied. Id. The applicable condition must beone of the conditions on which the claim was denied in thefirst place. Id. s 725.309(d)(2). Thus, a miner who wasoriginally found not to suffer from black lung disease may fileagain if he develops the disease subsequently. Any suchclaimant, however, must still prove that he now has pneumoconiosis and that his disease arose out of employment in coalmines. On its own, s 725.309(d) is not retroactive. First, it appliesonly to claims filed after the regulations' effective date andhas no application to pending subsequent claims. See id.s 725.2(c). In any event, the new regulation, in relevant part,mirrors the prior s 725.309(d), which provided that a subsequent claim will be denied unless the deputy commissionerdetermines that there has been a material change in condi- tions. 20 C.F.R. s 725.309(d) (2000). Counsel acknowledged at oral argument that, under the old regulatory regime,a claimant who had been denied benefits could reapply whenrelevant conditions changed. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 39. Thenew rule does not allow anything more. Because it is notsubstantively new, it does not change the legal landscape. Nor is s 725.309(d) retroactive in combination with the rulerecognizing that pneumoconiosis can be latent and progressive. While appellants express concern that the regulationsallow claimants to relitigate old claims under an irrebuttablepresumption that the miners' pneumoconiosis is progressive,the rules afford no such presumption. The fundamentalrequirement that the claimant must prove a change in arelevant condition (such as whether he developed pneumoconiosis after his claim was denied) has not changed. A minerwill only be successful in his subsequent claim if he hasactually developed pneumoconiosis or another relevant condition of entitlement in the interim. 20 C.F.R. s 718.204(a): The total disability rule providesthat nonpulmonary diseases that cause[ ] an independentdisability unrelated to the miner's pulmonary or respiratorydisability, shall not be considered in determining whether aminer is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis. The contested language does not appear in the prior version of theregulation. We find that the rule is retroactive as applied topending cases, because it changes the legal landscape in away that is likely to affect liability determinations. NMA contends that the rule's purpose and effect is tooverrule a Seventh Circuit decision in Peabody Coal Co. v.Vigna, 22 F.3d 1388 (7th Cir. 1994). The record supports thissuggestion. See 62 Fed. Reg. at 3344-45 (stating that thenew regulation makes clear the Department's disagreementwith the holding in [Vigna] and was designed to ensure thatthe Seventh Circuit's view will not be applied outside thatcircuit to cases arising under part 718). The District Courtheld that the regulation codified existing law and the Secretary's prior interpretation. NMA, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 67-68(citing many cases and adding a But see citation to Vigna). In Vigna, a miner who had mined for forty years suffered astroke and became totally disabled. 22 F.3d at 1390. Theminer was also a longtime smoker. Id. The Seventh Circuitheld, contrary to the ALJ's finding, that the coal companysuccessfully rebutted the presumption that the miner's disability arose from his coal mine employment. Id. at 1394. The court found that the evidence left no doubt that theminer's employment did not contribute to his stroke, whichwas the cause of his total disability. Id. At the time of thestroke, there was no evidence that the miner had pneumoconiosis. Id. Under the new rule, the adjudicator would not be able toconsider a nonpulmonary condition (such as a stroke) at all indetermining whether the miner was totally disabled due topneumoconiosis. Instead, the adjudicator would have to determine whether the miner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis without considering his unrelated, nonpulmonarydisability. The new regulation thus changes the legal landscape by precluding adjudicators from considering unrelatedmedical disabilities, reversing the rule in the Seventh Circuit,and precluding any other circuit from adopting the SeventhCircuit's interpretation. It cannot be said to be merelyprocedural, because it has a direct effect on the determination of liability. In finding the rule to be impermissibly retroactive asapplied to pending cases, we do not, of course, intend to affectthe law in circuits that have adopted or might adopt positionsthat conform with the Secretary's interpretation. See, e.g.,Cross Mountain Coal, Inc. v. Ward, 93 F.3d 211, 217 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that the fact that claimant may, or may not,also be disabled by a back injury is not grounds for denyinghis claim for benefits). Instead, the effect of our ruling is toleave the state of the law on this question exactly as it wasprior to the regulations' promulgation for cases that hadalready been filed when the regulations were promulgated. 20 C.F.R. s 725.701: The rule embodied in s 725.701 creates a rebuttable presumption that when a miner who iseligible for black lung benefits receives medical treatment for a pulmonary disorder, the disorder is caused or aggravatedby the miner's pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. s 725.701(e). The employer may rebut the presumption with credibleevidence that the medical service or supply provided was fora pulmonary disorder apart from those previously associatedwith the miner's disability or was beyond the treatmentnecessary to treat the covered disorder, or was not for apulmonary disorder at all. Id. The regulation codifies theso-called Doris Coal presumption, named for a Fourth Circuitcase that adopted the presumption before it was included inthe new regulations. See Doris Coal Co. v. Director, OWCP,938 F.2d 492, 496-97 (4th Cir. 1991) (Since most pulmonarydisorders are going to be related or at least aggravated bythe presence of pneumoconiosis, when a miner receives treatment for a pulmonary disorder, a presumption arises that thedisorder was caused or at least aggravated by the miner'spneumoconiosis, making the employer liable for the medicalcosts.). The Fourth Circuit later reaffirmed and clarifiedthe presumption, using language that was mirrored in thenew regulation. See Gulf & W. Indus. v. Ling, 176 F.3d 226,233 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the employer can rebut thepresumption by producing credible evidence that the treatment rendered is for a pulmonary disorder apart from thosepreviously associated with the miner's disability, or is beyondthat necessary to effectively treat a covered disorder, or isnot for a pulmonary disorder at all). NMA argues that the regulation codifying the judicialpresumption is retroactive as applied to pending cases, andwe agree. The rule is not reflected in the prior regulation,even though it may reflect the Secretary's longstanding policy. See Doris Coal, 938 F.2d at 496-97. Moreover, the rulecontradicts the Sixth Circuit's holding in Glen Coal Co. v.Seals, 147 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 1998). In that case, the courtheld that the Doris Coal presumption is permissible underthe APA, because it only reallocates the burden of production,not the burden of proof. Id. at 512-13. Nonetheless, thecourt struck down the presumption as inconsistent with SixthCircuit law, in part because it found that the creation of suchjudicial presumptions ran afoul of the BLBA's statutory goal of uniformity. Id. at 513-14 (citing Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267 (1994)). The regulation changesthe outcome for cases that have already been filed in theSixth Circuit and any other circuit that would have rejectedDoris Coal. Our holding is, of course, not intended to affectthe law in the Fourth Circuit or any other circuit that wouldhave embraced the Doris Coal presumption. That judicialpresumption remains the law in the circuits that adopt it. Our holding simply prevents the Secretary from imposing thepresumption, in the form of a new regulation, on all of theother circuits for cases that were filed before the regulationswere promulgated. 20 C.F.R. s 725.101(a)(6): The rule propounded ins 725.101(a)(6) defines benefits to include any expensesrelated to the medical examination and testing authorizedpursuant to s 725.406, which requires the Department ofLabor to provide each applicant for benefits with a pulmonaryevaluation at no expense to the miner. The news 725.101(a)(6) conforms the regulatory definition of benefits to s 725.406, both the old and new versions. The priorversion of s 725.406(c) already provided that the cost of themedical examination would be paid by the Fund and that theFund would be reimbursed by an operator, if any, foundliable for the payment of benefits to the claimant. 20 C.F.R.s 725.406(c) (2000). Likewise, the new s 725.406(e) providesthat the cost of the medical examination will be paid by theFund and that the Fund will be reimbursed by an operator,if any, found liable for the payment of benefits to the claimant. NMA argues that s 725.101(a)(6) retroactively shifts to theemployer the cost of the medical examination provided unders 725.406. NMA recognizes that the cost always has beenshifted under s 725.406 when an operator is found liable forthe payment of benefits. Its challenge is based on themisperception that the new rule shifts the cost of the medicalexamination even when the miner does not prevail. This isincorrect. The cost shifts to the employer only when benefits are awarded. When no benefits are awarded, the cost ofthe examination presumably will continue to be paid by the Fund, as set forth in s 725.406. Appellants have not pointedto anything in the new definition that departs from thesystem already in place under the old s 725.406(c). Thus, thenew definition changes nothing and is not impermissiblyretroactive. 20 C.F.R. s 725.101(a)(31): The rule in s 725.101(a)(31)provides that [a] payment funded wholly out of generalrevenues shall not be considered a payment under a workers'compensation law. This provision is significant because thebenefits payable under the BLBA must be offset by anyamount the miner receives for his black lung disability undera state or federal workers' compensation law. See 30 U.S.C.s 932(g). NMA agrees that the new rule reflects prioragency practice, but argues that it is nonetheless retroactiveas applied to pending cases because at least one Court ofAppeals has rejected the agency's practice. We agree. In Director, OWCP v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp., 54F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 1995), the Third Circuit declined to defer tothe Director of the OWCP's policy of not reducing a miner'sBLBA benefits by the amount that he received from generalrevenues under a state occupational disease compensation act. The court agreed that the statutory reference to workers'compensation law was ambiguous. However, the old regulation said nothing about payments funded out of generalrevenues, so the court declined to exclude workers' compensation payments funded out of general revenues. Id. at 147-49; 20 C.F.R. s 725.101(a)(4) (2000). The court suggested thatthe Secretary rewrite the regulations to achieve the agency'sregulatory goal. Id. at 149. This is exactly what the Secretary did in promulgating 20 C.F.R. s 725.101(a)(31). It wouldbe impermissibly retroactive, however, to apply the newregulation to claims that were already pending when the newregulation took effect. It would also be retroactive to applythe regulation to adjust the payments being made on settledor resolved claims. Of course, other circuits remain free toapply the Secretary's longstanding interpretation of the priorregulation to pending claims. The regulation is not impermissibly retroactive as applied to claims filed after the regulations' effective date. 20 C.F.R. ss 725.204, 725.212(b), 725.213(c), 725.214(d),725.219(c), (d): These regulations, as applied to claims otherthan those filed after the regulations' effective date, areimpermissibly retroactive, because they expand the scope ofcoverage by making more dependents and survivors eligiblefor benefits. For example, the new s 725.204 describescriteria for determining whether a claimant qualifies foraugmented benefits as a miner's spouse. The new version ofthe regulation eliminates a provision in the prior version thatessentially prevented a miner from having more than onequalifying spouse for purposes of augmented benefits. Compare 20 C.F.R. s 725.204(a)(4) with 20 C.F.R. s 725.204(d)(1)(2000). Similarly, under the new 20 C.F.R. s 725.212(b) ands 725.214(d), a miner could have more than one survivingspouse if he divorced and remarried during the pertinentperiod. Sections 725.209 and 725.219 address the determination of the miner's dependent children. Section 725.213(c)provides that a surviving spouse or surviving divorced spousewhose entitlement to benefits is terminated because sheremarries may thereafter again become entitled to benefits,either by divorcing or through the death of her successorspouse. The Secretary recognizes that the new definitions expandthe scope of liability, but defends the expansion as necessaryto conform to the 1990 amendments to the Social SecurityAct, portions of which are incorporated into the BLBA. See30 U.S.C. s 902(a)(2), (e) (incorporating various Social Security Act definitions found at 42 U.S.C. s 416). The DistrictCourt agreed, holding that the revisions bring the regulations into conformity with changes made by Congress in 1990to the Social Security Act's definitions of dependent wifeand other key terms. NMA, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 69. The Secretary's position as to the new provisions' application remains unclear. In its brief, the Secretary suggeststhat the expanded definitions apply to all BLBA claims filedafter the 1990 amendments to the Social Security Act. Presumably, this could even affect payments made on claims thatwere finally adjudicated before the new regulations werepromulgated. In a post-hearing chart submitted pursuant to an order of this court, the Secretary stated that the provisions would apply to all claims pending on the new regulations' effective date, as well as to claims filed after that date,and to all benefit payments made after that date, includingstill-open claims filed on or after, or pending on, August 18,1978. See also 20 C.F.R. s 725.2 (setting forth the applicability of the provisions). In either case, we hold that it would be unlawfully retroactive to apply the definitions to any claims other than thosefiled on or after the regulations' effective date. Before theeffective date, mine operators had no notice of the newdefinitions, for they were never incorporated in the old regulations. The Secretary and intervenors contend that theSecretary had changed the functional definitions as early as1994 to conform with the 1990 Social Security Act amendments, by changing the Department of Labor's proceduralmanual. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 80-84. There are two problemswith this argument. The first is that counsels' citation to therecord does not bear out the claim. Counsel cited 65 Fed.Reg. 79,964 in support of the argument that the Secretaryhad already adopted these new definitions as far back as1994. But the cited page states only that, since 1994, theSecretary's procedure manual has provided that when a surviving spouse and a surviving divorced spouse both qualify,each is entitled to full benefits. This citation does notaddress the other challenged regulations, such as those dealing with surviving children and those addressing survivingspouses who become ineligible and then become eligibleagain. The second problem is that the Secretary's priorpractice was encapsulated only in a manual, not in a regulation promulgated pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. There is nothing to indicate that the cited manualpurported to state substantive rules or that it was generallyknown by and available to regulated parties. The Secretarycannot bind parties to substantive rules of which they had nonotice. The Secretary argues that application of the revised definitions to all claims filed after the 1990 amendment date ismerely a correct application of the law in effect since that time. The Secretary relies on Regions Hospital v. Shalala,522 U.S. 448, 456 (1998), in which the Court held that thegovernment's reaudit rule was not impermissibly retroactivebecause it merely called for the correct application of thecost-reimbursement principles in effect when the costs wereincurred. By contrast, the instant regulations would actuallychange the scope of liability for claims that were filed at atime when these rules were not in effect. The decision inRegions Hospital does not support an argument that theSecretary may apply newly updated regulations retroactivelyto pending claims that were initiated before the change. Claims that have been resolved or settled, and claims thatwere filed after the effective date of the new rules, are notaffected by this holding.