Opinion ID: 842329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: the court's companion decision in harper

Text: In its decision in Harper, the majority relies heavily on the fact that probation is one of the possible intermediate sanctions provided for in MCL 769.31(b). It believes that this fact presents a strong indication that intermediate sanction cell sentences are not really maximum sentences, despite the language of MCL 769.34(4)(a). It is true, as the majority contends, that probation is a matter of grace. MCL 771.4. It may be revoked without a jury trial or proof beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). But, again, this consideration is simply irrelevant to the question at hand. It is not relevant that a court may revoke probation without violating the Sixth Amendment. What matters is what the court may do after it revokes probation. If a probation order is revoked, the court may sentence the probationer in the same manner and to the same penalty as the court might have done if the probation order had never been made. MCL 771.4. This does not require the court to impose the same sentence it could have imposed at the initial sentencing. But after a probation violation, the court still is required to follow the sentencing guidelines. People v. Hendrick, 472 Mich. 555, 560, 697 N.W.2d 511 (2005). Therefore, the sentencing court is in the same position before and after a probation violation. A sentencing court is not free to impose any sentence it may wish after a probation violation. Instead, it must comply with the same guidelines as before probation. And just as before probation, it can impose a sentence departing from the sentencing guidelines range only if it makes judicial findings of fact that substantial and compelling reasons exist to depart. The sentencing court may consider the defendant's postprobation conduct when determining if substantial and compelling reasons exist. But the fact that probation was violated does not automatically constitute a substantial and compelling reason. See id. at 562-563, 697 N.W.2d 511. The trial court still can depart from the guidelines range only if it makes findings of fact at sentencing justifying the departure. Because of this, a probation violation changes nothing for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis. Although the trial court did not impose probation in this case, the facts of this case can be used for demonstration purposes. If only the PRVs had been scored, defendant's minimum sentence range would have been zero to 11 months. MCL 777.21(3)(a); MCL 777.65. Because the cell involved is an intermediate sanction cell, MCL 769.34(4)(a) provides that defendant's maximum sentence would have been 11 months in jail. The sentencing court could have imposed probation rather than a jail term. MCL 769.31(b). If, later, defendant had violated that probation, the court could have revoked the probation and resentenced defendant. But when it did so, it still would have had to comply with the guidelines. Hendrick, 472 Mich. at 560, 697 N.W.2d 511. Defendant again would have fallen into the zero- to 11-month guidelines range. Again, his maximum sentence would have been 11 months in jail, absent substantial and compelling reasons to exceed the maximum. MCL 769.34(4)(a). Because a maximum sentence is involved, the Blakely bright-line rule would apply. Except for a prior conviction, `any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.' Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868, quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Increasing a defendant's maximum sentence solely on the basis of judicial fact-finding violates the Sixth Amendment just as much after a probation revocation as it does before. A defendant who has violated probation could be sentenced to no more than the original maximum sentence that was based on the jury's verdict. The court has no right to impose a new maximum simply because of the violation. Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 868. In Harper, the majority relies heavily on United States v. Ray [25] to support its argument that Blakely's bright-line rule does not apply to resentencing after probation. Ray is highly distinguishable. Unlike the Michigan probation system, the federal system at issue in Ray did not mandate resentencing under the federal sentencing guidelines. It imposed a completely new sentence based on the violation. The federal criminal sentencing system has a process called supervised release. Federal supervised release differs from probation in that it is imposed in addition to imprisonment, rather than instead of it. Samson v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 2198, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006), quoting United States v. Reyes, 283 F.3d 446, 461 (C.A.2, 2002). 18 U.S.C. 3583 allows a federal court at sentencing to impose a term of supervised release distinct from the time for incarceration set by the federal sentencing guidelines. That same statute authorizes a new maximum sentence that can be imposed after revocation of supervised release. 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3). Therefore, a federal court imposing sentence after a revocation of supervised release does not return to the sentencing guidelines to impose a sentence. It turns to the new sentence allowed by 18 U.S.C. 3583. Given that the federal system allows supervised release in addition to incarceration, a defendant faces this possible sentence from the beginning. It is not a judicially created increase in the defendant's statutory maximum sentence. It is a sentence created by the Legislature and faced by a defendant from the time that he or she commits the crime.