Opinion ID: 2514079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: FACIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 76-5a-3(1)

Text: ¶ 5 Both Morrison and Peterson contend section 76-5a-3(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague on its face. A constitutional challenge to a statute presents a question of law, which we review for correctness. . . . When addressing such a challenge, this court presumes that the statute is valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality. State v. Lopes, 1999 UT 24, ¶ 6, 980 P.2d 191 (citation omitted). We disagree with Morrison's and Peterson's contentions and conclude the trial courts correctly held section 76-5a-3(1) is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague.
¶ 6 Recognizing that the sexual exploitation of minors is excessively harmful to their physiological, emotional, social, and mental development, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-1 (1999), the legislature enacted section 76-5a-3 to eliminate the market for those materials [that sexually exploit minors] and to reduce the harm to the minor inherent in the perpetuation of the record of his sexually exploitive activities. Id. Section 76-5a-3 reads, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) A person is guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor: (a) when he knowingly produces, distributes, possesses, or possesses with intent to distribute, material or a live performance depicting a nude or partially nude minor for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any person or any person's engagement in sexual conduct with the minor. Id. § 76-5a-3(1). Morrison and Peterson contend this section is overly broad as it prohibits the possession of constitutionally protected materials. Yet, the mere fact that a statute is overbroad to some degree does not automatically warrant reversal. [W]here a statute regulates expressive conduct, the scope of the statute does not render it unconstitutional unless its overbreadth is not only `real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.' Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). We conclude section 76-5a-3(1) is not unconstitutionally overbroad. ¶ 7 [C]hild pornography . . . , like obscenity, is unprotected by the First Amendment. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). While the United States Supreme Court has never attempted to define `child pornography' itself, Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149 U. Pa. L.Rev. 921, 936 (2001), it has given some guidance. The Court has indicated that a depiction of a nude minor, without more, does not constitute child pornography. [3] See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 3348 (noting that nudity, without more[,] is protected expression); Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112, 110 S.Ct. 1691 ([D]epictions of nudity, without more, constitute protected expression.). Further, [a]s with all legislation in this sensitive area, the conduct to be prohibited must be adequately defined by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. 3348. Finally, the statute must include a scienter requirement. Id. at 765, 102 S.Ct. 3348. ¶ 8 With this guidance in mind, we now turn to the issue before us. As it pertains to Morrison and Peterson's challenge, section 76-5a-3(1) makes a person guilty of sexual exploitation of a minor when he knowingly . . . possesses . . . material . . . depicting a nude or partially nude minor for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any person. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3(1)(a). Morrison and Peterson assert this section is overbroad in that it prohibits possession of depictions of nude or partially nude minors, without more. [4] As Morrison and Peterson read it, a person who knowingly . . . possesses. . . material . . . depicting a nude or partially nude minor, id., is only in violation of section 76-5a-3(1) if that person possesses the material for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person. Id. This, they argue, is overly broad because material depicting only a nude or partially nude minor, without more, is constitutionally protected, see Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765 n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 3348; Osborne, 495 U.S. at 112, 110 S.Ct. 1691, and because [w]hen a picture does not constitute child pornography . . . it does not become child pornography because it is placed in the hands of the pedophile, or in a forum where pedophiles might enjoy it. United States v. Villard, 700 F.Supp. 803, 812 (D.N.J.1988), aff'd, 885 F.2d 117 (3d Cir.1989). ¶ 9 The State responds by arguing that Morrison and Peterson misconstrue section 76-5a-3(1) and that that section properly prohibits the possession of child pornography, which is not constitutionally protected. See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 764, 102 S.Ct. 3348. As the State reads it, a person who knowingly. . . possesses . . . material . . . depicting a nude or partially nude minor, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3(1)(a), is only in violation of that section if the material depicts the minor for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person. Id. Accordingly, the State contends, depictions of nude or partially nude minors, without more, are not proscribed by the statute. Rather, the statute requires that the depiction be for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person. Id. ¶ 10 We believe the State propounds the better reading of section 76-5a-3(1). The State's construction of that section is consistent with the legislature's purpose in enacting that section. The legislature stated several times that it is the proscribed materials themselves that sexually exploit minors. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-1 (emphasizing, repeatedly, the dangers of materials that sexually exploit minors). We believe this to be indicative of the legislature's intent that we look to the materials themselves, not the intent of the possessor, to determine whether they are proscribed as sexually exploitive. ¶ 11 Further, under Morrison and Peterson's interpretation, there are two scienter requirements: the person must possess the proscribed material both knowingly and for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person. Id. § 76-5a-3(1)(a). However, that a person possesses material for the purpose of sexual arousal of any person, id., necessarily presupposes that person possesses it knowingly. Thus, the scienter requirement knowingly would be superfluous. Such an interpretation ignore[s] our fundamental duty to give effect, if possible, to every word of the statute. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 252 n. 11 (Utah 1988). Indeed, `any interpretation which renders parts or words in a statute inoperative or superfluous is to be avoided.' State v. Hunt 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (quoting United States v. Rawlings, 821 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir.1987)). ¶ 12 Finally, this court has a `duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to . . . save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities.' In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, ¶ 23, 1 P.3d 1074 (quoting State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 397 (Utah 1989)). In this case, we can avoid Morrison and Peterson's constitutional concern that section 76-5a-3(1) proscribes the possession of constitutionally protected materials by construing the section as prohibiting the knowing possession of material . . . depicting a nude or partially nude minor, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5a-3(1)(a) only if the depiction is designed for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any person. Id. A defendant's criminal liability under section 76-5a-3(1) turns not on his purpose in possessing the material, but, rather, on the purpose for which the nude or partially nude minor was depicted. If his possession was knowing, and the nude or partially nude minor was depicted for the purpose of causing sexual arousal of any person, id., a defendant may properly be subject to criminal liability. Under this reading of the statute, which we are required to make under the principles of statutory construction set forth above, section 76-5a-3(1) is not unconstitutionally overbroad.
¶ 13 Morrison and Peterson next argue that section 76-5a-3(1) is unconstitutionally vague as sexual arousal is not defined. `[V]agueness questions are essentially procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute adequately notices the proscribed conduct.' Bd. of Comm'rs of the Utah State Bar v. Petersen, 937 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Frampton, 737 P.2d 183, 191-92 (Utah 1987)). Accordingly, a `statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary reader what conduct is prohibited.' Id. (quoting State v. Theobald, 645 P.2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982) (footnote omitted)). We conclude the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. ¶ 14 This court confronted a similar issue in State v. Jordan, 665 P.2d 1280 (Utah 1983). In that case, the defendants challenged, as unconstitutionally vague, a statute criminalizing depictions of minors engaged in simulated sexual conduct. While noting that simulated was not legally defined, the court found that it was recognizable in simple lay terms as `looking or acting like,' and, therefore, [t]he disputed language [was] . . . sufficiently clear to convey `warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices. The Constitution requires no more.' Id. at 1285 (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 8, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 91 L.Ed. 1877 (1947)). ¶ 15 This case is similar. Sexual arousal has a common understanding that is sufficient to put people on warning as to what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can be construed with reasonable certainty. Id. at 1286. Sexual arousal is commonly understood as erotic excitement or stimulation. Accordingly, we conclude here as we did in Jordan: [We do] not accede to [the defendants'] argument that the word [was] not precisely defined so as to apprise them of the proscribed conduct. Words are symbols of communication and as such are not invested with the quality of a scientific formula. It is enough that they can be construed with reasonable certainty. Beyond that it suffices to add that one who deliberately goes perilously close to an area of proscribed conduct shall take the risk that he may cross the line. Id. (quoting Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 340, 72 S.Ct. 329, 96 L.Ed. 367 (1952)). Section 76-5a-3(1) is not unconstitutionally vague.