Opinion ID: 2538890
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to withdraw the plea

Text: ¶ 18 A.N.J. sought, and the trial judge denied, a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Generally, we review this decision for abuse of discretion. State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 280, 27 P.3d 192 (2001) (citing State v. Olmsted, 70 Wash.2d 116, 422 P.2d 312 (1966)). Under the criminal rules, [t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice. CrR 4.2(f). A.N.J. stresses that he moved to withdraw his plea immediately upon learning that his juvenile conviction of a sex offense would stay on his record for the rest of his life. Before the adoption of CrR 4.2(f), this court followed a dual standard for the withdrawal of pleas. A more liberal standard was applied if the defendant moved to withdraw before sentencing. Former RCW 10.40.175 (1881), repealed by LAWS of 1984, ch. 76, § 27, provided, At any time before judgment, the court may permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn, and other plea or pleas substituted. The motion was addressed to the sound discretion of the court, to be exercised liberally in favor of life and liberty. State v. Hensley, 20 Wash.2d 95, 101, 145 P.2d 1014 (1944) (citing State v. Cimini, 53 Wash. 268, 101 P. 891 (1909)). Following the adoption of CrR 4.2(f), we abandoned the dual standard in favor of a singular, and more stringent, standard of allowing `a defendant to withdraw his plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.' State v. Taylor, 83 Wash.2d 594, 595, 521 P.2d 699 (1974) (quoting CrR 4.2(f)). We adopted the uniform standard because an examination of other rules connected to CrR 4.2(f) prevents a court from accepting a plea of guilty until it has ascertained that it was `made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea.' Taylor, 83 Wash.2d at 596, 521 P.2d 699 (quoting CrR 4.2(d)). [11] However, a claim by a defendant that he did not understand the consequences of his plea may simply be more credible if made before sentencing than it would be if the defendant rolls the dice on a favorable sentence and is disappointed. We adhere to the single manifest injustice standard. But the timing of a motion may be considered by the court together with all other evidence bearing on the issue. However, the timing of the motion should be given weight only when it is made promptly after discovery of the previously unknown consequences or the newly discovered information. Timing should be given particular weight if the motion is made before any other benefit to the defendant or detriment to the State is known, and if the motion is grounded in the core concerns recognized in Taylor, whether the plea was voluntary, knowingly and intelligently made, and made with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the please. See generally id.