Opinion ID: 54617
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard for issuing a COA

Text: Because Oliver filed his habeas petition in the district court after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, AEDPA governs his petition. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). Under AEDPA, Oliver must obtain a COA from either the district court or appellate court before he can appeal the denial 3 No. 06-70006 of habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). To obtain a COA, Oliver must make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). That is, if Oliver can show that the district court’s application of AEDPA to his constitutional claims is debatable among reasonable jurists, we will issue a COA. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. In deciding whether to grant a COA, we are limited “to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of [the petitioner’s] claims.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 327 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 481 (2000)). Our analysis “requires an overview of the claims in the habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits” rather than a “full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in support of the claims.” Id. at 336. “Because the present case involves the death penalty, any doubts as to whether a COA should issue must be resolved in [the petitioner’s] favor.” Hernandez v. Johnson, 213 F.3d 243, 248 (5th Cir. 2000). In deciding whether to grant a COA, we recognize that AEDPA imposes a deferential standard of review on a federal habeas court with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. A federal court cannot grant habeas relief unless the state court adjudication of that claim either: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520 (2003). A decision is contrary to clearly established federal law if “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law” or “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite to [that precedent].” 4 No. 06-70006 (Terry) Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). A decision involves an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent if it “unreasonably extends a legal principle from [Supreme Court precedent] to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply.” Id. at 407. We presume the facts of the case to be correct unless Oliver meets his burden of rebutting that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 2. Reasonable jurists would not debate that Apprendi is inapplicable to the mitigation special question Oliver argues that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the issue of mitigation during the punishment phase of the trial. He contends that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), extend the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury’s determination of mitigating factors that would warrant a sentence of life imprisonment instead of death. In Apprendi, the Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. Oliver contends that Texas’s capital murder statute provides for life imprisonment as the maximum penalty, and that death is the penalty only if the jury answers both “special issues” questions in the proscribed way. Therefore, Oliver claims, Texas’s statute violates Apprendi because it allows a jury to “increase” the maximum penalty to death without the State showing the absence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Texas law regarding the death penalty first requires a jury to find the defendant guilty of a capital felony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 1 (Vernon 2006). If the state seeks the death penalty, then the trial court must 5 No. 06-70006 conduct a second punishment proceeding. Id. § 2(a)(1). During deliberations on whether to impose the death penalty, the jury must answer two “special issues” questions: First, “whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society,” and second, “whether . . . there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment without parole rather than a death sentence be imposed.” Id. §§ 2(b)(1), (2)(e)(1). The court will impose the death penalty only if the jury unanimously answers the first question “yes” and the second question “no.” Id. That is, the jury must find that there are aggravating factors and insufficient mitigating factors. Reasonable jurists would not debate that Apprendi is inapplicable to the jury’s determination of mitigating factors. In Apprendi, the Supreme Court specifically distinguished between “facts in aggravation of punishment and facts in mitigation,” stating that burden-of-proof requirements are “absent” from a scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence below the maximum penalty based on mitigating factors. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16 (noting that in reducing a sentence based on mitigating factors, a judge is “neither exposing the defendant to a deprivation of liberty greater than that authorized by the verdict according to statute, nor is the judge imposing upon the defendant a greater stigma than that accompanying the jury verdict alone”); see also Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4 (noting that its decision that a sentencing judge may not, sitting alone, determine the presence or absence of aggravating factors does not extend to the finding of mitigating circumstances); Rowell v. Dretke, 398 F.3d 370, 37677 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that Ring did not apply to the burden of proof for mitigating factors because the Court “focused exclusively on certain judicial findings regarding aggravating factors”). Similarly, in Walton v. Arizona, the Court stated that “[s]o long as a State’s method of allocating the burdens of proof does not lessen the State’s burden to prove every element of the offense charged, 6 No. 06-70006 or in this case to prove the existence of aggravating circumstances, a defendant’s constitutional rights are not violated by placing on him the burden of proving mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” 497 U.S. 639, 650 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Ring, 536 U.S. at 584. More recently, the Supreme Court upheld Kansas’s death penalty scheme that placed the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors on the state but required the defendant to offer any mitigating evidence. Kansas v. Marsh, 126 S. Ct. 2516, 2524 (2006); see id. at 2527 (“Significantly, although the defendant appropriately bears the burden of proffering mitigating circumstances—a burden of production—he never bears the burden of demonstrating that mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating circumstances.”). Plainly, therefore, if a state’s scheme is constitutional when it places the burden of production for mitigating factors on the defendant, then Texas’s death penalty statute also comports with Supreme Court precedent because it leaves open who has the burden of proof for mitigating factors. This court’s cases also have upheld Texas’s scheme of not instructing the jury on who has the burden of proof for mitigating factors. See Granados v. Quarterman, 455 F.3d 529, 537 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 127 S. Ct. 732 (2006). In Granados, the court granted a COA to a death penalty habeas applicant on this very same claim and subsequently rejected the applicant’s argument after additional briefing. Id. In so doing, the court noted that death—not life imprisonment—is the maximum sentence for a capital conviction under Texas law. Id. “Put another way, a finding of mitigating circumstances reduces a sentence from death, rather than increasing it to death.” Id. Similarly, this court noted that “[n]o Supreme Court or Circuit precedent constitutionally requires that Texas’s mitigation special issue be assigned a burden of proof.” Rowell, 398 F.3d at 378; see also Ortiz v. Quarterman, No. 06-70020, 2007 WL 2936244, at  (5th Cir. Oct. 10, 2007) (rejecting a COA for this exact same 7 No. 06-70006 claim); Scheanette v. Quarterman, 482 F.3d 815, 828 (5th Cir. 2007) (same). Given the extensive Supreme Court and circuit precedent, reasonable jurists would not debate that Apprendi has no application to Texas’s scheme of leaving open who has the burden of proof for the mitigation special issue. We therefore DENY Oliver’s request for a COA on this claim. 3. Reasonable jurists would not debate that Penry II does not apply to the lack of jury instructions regarding mitigation Oliver contends that Texas’s “special issues” questions—which place the burden of proof on the State to show aggravating but not mitigating factors—sends “mixed signals” to the jury in violation of Penry v. Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 802 (2001). Oliver argues that failing to assign a burden of proof for the mitigation factors produces a confusing effect and encourages jurors to evaluate the evidence in inconsistent ways. In Penry II, the Supreme Court struck down a judicially crafted jury instruction because it was confusing and, in effect, required the jury to answer the special issues dishonestly in order to give effect to the defendant’s mitigating evidence. Id. at 801. The Court rejected the instruction as sending “mixed signals” to the jury. Id. at 802. The Court, however, implicitly upheld Texas’s current scheme: A clearly drafted catchall instruction on mitigating evidence also might have complied with [the Court’s precedents]. Texas’ current capital sentencing scheme (revised after Penry’s second trial and sentencing) provides a helpful frame of reference. Texas now requires the jury to decide “[w]hether, taking into consideration all of the evidence, including the circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s character and background, and the personal moral culpability of the defendant, there is a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circumstances to warrant that a sentence of life imprisonment rather than a death sentence be imposed.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(e)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001). . . . At the very least, the brevity and clarity of this instruction highlight the confusing nature of the supplemental instruction actually given, 8 No. 06-70006 and indicate that the trial court had adequate alternatives available to it as it drafted the instructions for Penry’s trial. Id. at 803. Far from rejecting the current scheme regarding mitigation, therefore, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed it. See, e.g., Coleman v. Quarterman, 456 F.3d 537, 542 (5th Cir. 2006), cert denied, 127 S. Ct. 2030 (2007) (quoting Rowell, 398 F.3d at 378) (“[N]o Supreme Court or Circuit precedent constitutionally requires that Texas’s mitigation special issue be assigned a burden of proof.”). Oliver has failed to make any plausible argument that Texas’s mitigation special issue does not allow the jury to consider and give effect to a defendant’s mitigating evidence. Oliver also points to no other cases to support his position. Thus, Oliver has failed to explain why the district court’s decision amounted to a violation of “clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Reasonable jurists would not debate that the district court properly rejected Oliver’s claim. We therefore DENY Oliver’s request for a COA on this claim. 4. Reasonable jurists would not debate that the district court did not err in rejecting Oliver’s parole instruction claim Oliver argues that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury that a life sentence would require Oliver to spend forty years in prison before becoming eligible for parole violated the Eighth Amendment’s requirement of heightened reliability in the jury instructions. He rests his argument on an “evolving standard regarding parole instructions” that he claims mandated his requested jury charge. Specifically, he argues that during his trial, in April 1999, the Texas legislature considered, and then passed, a law requiring an instruction that notified the jury that the defendant would not be eligible for parole for forty years. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(2)(B) (Vernon 1999).1 1 The new instruction (now no longer in effect), for crimes committed after September 1, 1999, read: 9 No. 06-70006 This law became effective for crimes committed on or after September 1, 1999. Act approved May 21, 1999, 76th Leg. R.S., ch. 140, § 2, 1999 Tex. Sess. Law. Serv. 140 (Vernon). Oliver correctly concedes that the amended statute does not apply retroactively to his trial and instead argues that the legislative hearing that culminated in the revised jury instruction represented an “evolving standard” that required the jury to know, even before the law took effect, of Oliver’s ineligibility for parole for forty years. In Simmons v. South Carolina, the Supreme Court ruled that a capital defendant has a constitutional right to inform the jury of his ineligibility for parole when the state’s statute provides for a life sentence without the possibility of parole as the alternative to the death penalty. 512 U.S. 154, 168-69 (1994) (plurality opinion). The plurality specifically exempted from its decision those state statutes that provide for the possibility of parole. Id. at 168 (“In a State in which parole is available, how the jury’s knowledge of parole availability will affect the decision whether or not to impose the death penalty is speculative, and we shall not lightly second-guess a decision whether or not to inform a jury of information regarding parole.”). In Ramdass v. Angelone, the Court reiterated that the Simmons rule applies only when the defendant is ineligible for parole Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to imprisonment in the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice for life, the defendant will become eligible for release on parole, but not until the actual time served by the defendant equals 40 years, without consideration of any good conduct time. It cannot accurately be predicted how the parole laws might be applied to this defendant if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life because the application of those laws will depend on decisions made by prison and parole authorities, but eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(e)(2)(B) (Vernon 1999). Texas has since amended its statutes to provide for life without parole as the alternative to the death penalty and to instruct the jury of this fact. See id. § 2(e)(2)(B) (Vernon 2006) (The Court shall “charge the jury that a defendant sentenced to confinement for life without parole under this article is ineligible for release from the department on parole.”). 10 No. 06-70006 for life under state law. 530 U.S. 156, 166-67 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding that the trial judge did not have to provide a jury instruction on a life sentence under Simmons because the defendant was not actually parole ineligible at the time of his capital sentencing). Although the Supreme Court decided these cases under due process rationale and not the Eighth Amendment, we find them instructive as to the lack of an evolving standard requiring a jury instruction regarding a Texas statute that allowed for the possibility of parole. Indeed, we have rejected similar claims from other habeas petitioners. See Thacker v. Dretke, 396 F.3d 607, 617 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Since Simmons was decided, we have repeatedly held that neither the Due Process clause nor the Eighth Amendment requires Texas to allow presentation of parole eligibility issues, because Texas does not offer, as an alternative to capital punishment, life imprisonment without possibility of parole.”) (footnote omitted); Rudd v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 317, 320-21 (5th Cir. 2001) (rejecting a COA for this exact same claim); Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106, 112 (5th Cir. 1995) (“We have consistently held . . . that neither the due process clause nor the Eighth Amendment compels instructions on parole in Texas.”). Given this precedent,2 reasonable jurists would not debate that there is no “evolving standard” that required the trial court to provide Oliver’s requested jury instruction. See Thacker, 396 F.3d at 617 (“Thus, settled precedent makes pellucid the reasonableness of the state court’s rejection of [the habeas petitioner’s] argument that Simmons and its progeny require that he be able to raise parole eligibility with the jury. The district court’s denial of his claims, 2 The only case that Oliver cites to support his position is Clark v. Tansy, 882 P.2d 527, 533 (N.M. 1994), where the New Mexico Supreme Court held that due process required a jury instruction that notified the jury as to the length of incarceration the defendant would face before becoming eligible for parole if he is not sentenced to death. Clark provides little support, however, because the court explicitly chose not to decide the case on Eighth Amendment grounds. Id. at 490. Moreover, even if Clark supports Oliver’s position, it is hardly enough evidence to constitute an “evolving standard.” 11 No. 06-70006 therefore, is not reasonably debatable and cannot justify the issuance of a COA.”). We therefore DENY Oliver’s request for a COA on this claim.3