Opinion ID: 74370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of the Motel Room

Text: The Supreme Court long has recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee of freedom from warrantless searches and seizures is not premised on arcane concepts of property and possessory interests; instead, the Fourth Amendment protects an individual in those places where she can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy against government intrusion. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S. Ct. 507, 512 (1967). Such a place can include a hotel room. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S. Ct. 889, 893 (1964). Fourth Amendment rights, however, are personal, and only individuals who actually enjoy the reasonable expectation of privacy have standing to challenge the validity of a government search. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 143, 99 S. Ct. 421, 425, 430 (1978). Our initial inquiry, therefore, focuses on whether Defendants established in their motion to suppress that they 6 possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 616. See id. at 131 n.1, 99 S. Ct. at 424 n.1; United States v. Sneed, 732 F.2d 886, 888 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam). We review this mixed question of law and fact de novo. See United States v. Cooper, 133 F.3d 1394, 1398 (11th Cir. 1998). To determine whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room, courts have looked to such indicia as whether the individual paid and/or registered for the room or whether the individual’s personal belongings were found inside the room. See United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 979 (10th Cir. 1995); United States v. Carter, 854 F.2d 1102, 1105 (8th Cir. 1988). Here, Defendants’ motion to suppress did not allege such details; instead, Defendants contend their motion’s numerous references to the hotel room as “theirs” established their privacy interests. We disagree. “A motion to suppress must in every critical respect be sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that a substantial claim is presented. . . . A court need not act upon general or conclusory assertions . . . .” United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1527 (11th Cir. 1985) (internal citations omitted). Defendants’ offhanded references fall far short of meeting this standard, especially considering that Defendants’ claim to standing is founded only on their own ultimate conclusion that the hotel room was “theirs,” rather than on facts 7 demonstrating that conclusion to be true. Even after the Government raised the issue of standing in its opposition to Defendants’ motion to suppress, Defendants failed to amend their motion to provide the specific facts essential to demonstrating a reasonable expectation of privacy in a hotel room. See Sneed, 732 F.2d at 888 (acknowledging that Defendant Sneed failed to amend his motion once his standing was questioned). Moreover, the undisputed trial testimony of O’Brien, the hotel security officer, revealed that Robert Garcia was the individual who actually paid and registered for Room 616, which he later transferred to Allen Gonzalez; this evidence undermines any credible argument that Defendants were the individuals who paid or registered for the room.2 In Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96-97, 110 S. Ct. 1684, 1688 (1990), the Supreme Court held that overnight guests in the homes of third-persons can have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those premises. On appeal, Defendants argue they were the overnight guests of Gonzalez, thus entitling them to a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room. Whether the privacy interest recognized in Olson extends to the overnight guests of hotel registrants, especially 2 In their appellate briefs and at oral argument, Defendants suggest “Gonzalez” was actually an alias for either Cooper or Urbina, one of whom used a fraudulent driver’s license to check into the hotel. Defendants, however, alleged this fact neither in their motion to suppress nor at trial, and they did nothing to refute O’Brien’s testimony that Gonzalez was a distinct individual whom O’Brien witnessed check in. Because Defendants did not develop this “suggestion” in their motion to suppress, they are precluded from doing so for the first time on appeal. 8 those guests not disclosed to the hotel, is an open question in this circuit. Because Defendants did not allege in their motion to suppress that they were Gonzalez’s guests, however, we have no occasion to decide the issue.3 Again, Defendants advanced no concrete foundation for standing in their motion to suppress. To now allow Defendants to supplement their motion to suppress with new factual allegations on appeal would undermine the requirement enunciated in Richardson that motions to suppress be “definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural” when considered by the district court. We conclude Defendants’ motion to suppress was deficient of any facts that might have demonstrated that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in Room 616. The district court correctly denied Defendants’ motion for lack of standing.
3 We note that the Supreme Court has qualified the holding of Olson to some extent. In Minnesota v. Carter, __ U.S. __, 119 S. Ct. 469, 474 (1998), the Court held that in order to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in a third-party’s home, an individual must demonstrate she is a guest on the premises for a personal occasion, rather than for strictly a commercial purpose. Because the evidence in this case suggests Defendants were using the hotel room predominantly to engage in narcotics trafficking, Defendants likely would lack standing even if they had been the overnight guests of Gonzalez. 9 Defendants also appeal the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on the issue of standing, arguing that had the district court granted them a hearing, they would have demonstrated a reasonable expectation of privacy in the hotel room. We review the district court’s action for abuse of discretion. See Richardson, 764 F.2d at 1527. As this court held in Sneed: [W]here a defendant in a motion to suppress fails to allege facts that if proved would require the grant of relief, the law does not require that the district court hold a hearing independent of the trial to receive evidence on any issue necessary to the determination of the motion. 732 F.2d at 888. Based on our holding that Defendants’ motion to suppress was wholly lacking in sufficient factual allegations to establish standing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing. Defendants are not entitled to an evidentiary hearing based on a “promise” to prove at the hearing that which they did not specifically allege in their motion to suppress.