Opinion ID: 1489278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Pre-Trial Rulings

Text: Coulter argues that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Dr. Fullum's motion to preclude evidence and arguments at trial regarding his alleged failure to timely produce Coulter's medical records during discovery. At a hearing on the motion, Coulter's counsel explained that he intended to use various requests he had written to Dr. Fullum for Coulter's medical records, as well as Dr. Fullum's allegedly delayed written responses to those requests, to show Dr. Fullum's lack of credibility. Judge Combs Greene expressed concern that, if evidence about the correspondence was introduced, Coulter's counsel might have to take the stand in order to rebut Dr. Fullum's testimony on the issue, implicating Rule 3.7 of the Rules of Professional Conduct (A lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness except where ... [t]he testimony relates to an uncontested issue). D.C. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT R. 3.7(a)(1) (2007). The court's concern was well-founded. See R.D. ex. rel . Kareem v. District of Columbia, 374 F.Supp.2d 84, 91 (D.D.C.2005) (explaining that, per Rule 3.7(a)(1), an individual must choose between testifying under oath or serving as counsel and will not be permitted to do both). As Coulter has not shown how the court's ruling hampered her from proving that Dr. Fullum breached the standard of care in diagnosing and treating Coulter's cancer, we have no cause to disturb the court's ruling. Judge Combs Greene also granted, in part, Dr. Fullum's motion in limine to preclude evidence and argument related to the integrity of his record-keeping. Coulter argues that the court's ruling improperly precluded arguments that the bad record keeping was a causal factor in the allegedly negligent care that she received. However, nothing in the record suggests that Coulter would have been able to elicit testimony about such a causal relationship. As Judge Combs Greene noted, electronic record keeping was beyond the scope of the proffer for Dr. Woodyear. Dr. Pennanen did not state in her deposition that she would offer an opinion as to medical record-keeping. And, while Dr. Abel, the other expert that Coulter called at trial, stated in his deposition that Dr. Fullum's record-keeping did not meet the standard of care, Dr. Abel also stated that he could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that any deficiency in Dr. Fullum's record-keeping caused any delay in Coulter's treatment. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that the trial judge abused her discretion in granting the motion in limine or that Coulter was prejudiced by that order. [18] Finally, Coulter argues that the trial court erred in granting, in part, Dr. Fullum's motion in limine to preclude evidence and argument that Dr. Fullum violated Coulter's right to confidentiality by corresponding with Dr. Taylor about her case. The court granted the motion in so far as it sought to prevent any argument that defendant's alleged violation of plaintiff's right to privacy was the proximate cause of any damages to plaintiff. [19] As appellees argue, the invasion of an individual's right to privacy and the breach of a confidential relationship are independent torts, neither of which Coulter alleged in her first amended complaint. [20] See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel's, 492 A.2d 580, 587 (D.C.1985) (The District of Columbia has long recognized the common law tort of invasion of privacy); Street v. Hedgepath, 607 A.2d 1238, 1246 (D.C.1992) (This court ... has recognized a cause of action in tort for a breach of the confidential physician-patient relationship, based on the statutory privilege and on certain licensing statutes which generally prohibit physicians from disclosing patient treatment). The court's ruling was justified on the ground that the precluded evidence and argument were not relevant to the claims presented in the amended complaint, and, moreover, were issues as to which defendants did not have sufficient notice. Additionally, Coulter has not explained how any alleged breach of confidentiality delayed her diagnosis and treatment, or how the preclusion of evidence and argument about a breach of confidentiality impeded her presentation of evidence that defendants negligently delayed diagnosis and treatment of her cancer.