Opinion ID: 531294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Relevant Testimony

Text: 31 The trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling upon the relevancy and admissibility of evidence. Its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of clear abuse of that discretion. Such discretion does not, however, extend to the exclusion of crucial relevant evidence necessary to establish a valid defense. United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir.1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). When 'proffered evidence is of substantial probative value, and will not tend to prejudice or confuse, all doubt should be resolved in favor of admissibility.'  United States v. Wasman, 641 F.2d 326, 329 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (quoting Holt v. United States, 342 F.2d 163, 166 (5th Cir.1965)). Where evidence is excluded as irrelevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 402 in violation of this standard, the conviction must be reversed. Wasman, 641 F.2d at 329-30; see also United States v. Riley, 550 F.2d 233, 237 (5th Cir.1977). 32 At trial, Kelly sought to testify regarding his understanding of his professional obligations as an attorney, and how that understanding affected his conduct. After Kelly's counsel asked him a few preliminary questions in this regard, including a question regarding Kelly's understanding of his duties of confidentiality as to Figueroa and Restrepo, the district court intervened, stating: [T]his is utter nonsense. I'm not going to listen to this. This is not relevant evidence. He's not charged with having revealed or not having revealed a confidence disclosed to him by a client. Kelly's counsel explained that the defense was trying to establish that what he did in this case is permissible because he acted legitimately as a lawyer with clients, both Figueroa and Restrepo. The court concurred with the prosecutor's assertion that the standards of conduct had nothing to do with the criminal charges, except insofar as it might relate to the protection of a client. Kelly's counsel specifically objected that the proffered testimony also relates to [Kelly's] intent and his state of mind. 33 It is true, as the district court observed, that Kelly was not directly charged with failing to perform an act that would itself have violated his professional duties, such as revealing a client confidence. We agree with Kelly, however, that the excluded testimony was very relevant to his intent and state of mind regarding his dealings with both Restrepo and Figueroa. Kelly's duty of attorney-client confidentiality, combined with his duty to counsel his clients against committing further crimes, forms the basis for his primary defense: that he acted not with criminal intent but within the legitimate bounds of legal representation. 20 The proffered testimony was thus crucial to Kelly's defense, and its exclusion substantially hindered him from articulating this defense. 21 34 We have previously noted the relevance of ethical and professional standards of behavior for lawyers in evaluating criminal intent. See United States v. DeLucca, 630 F.2d 294, 301 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 983, 101 S.Ct. 1520, 67 L.Ed.2d 819 (1981). DeLucca, like the present case, involved a lawyer convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. In DeLucca, the lawyer arranged and was present at a meeting of the conspirators where they discussed the criminal scheme. We assessed his failure to report or withdraw from the conspiracy in light of his duties as a lawyer, holding that it is appropriate to consider the canons of professional responsibility as a factor in determining DeLucca's willing participation in crime. Id. Other circuits have also upheld the relevance of professional standards for attorneys where offered by the Government to help prove criminal intent on the part of lawyer-defendants. See United States v. Machi, 811 F.2d 991, 999-1000 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 512, 520 (4th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 908, 100 S.Ct. 1835, 64 L.Ed.2d 261 (1980); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1028-29 (8th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116, 99 S.Ct. 1022, 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979). It would be incongruous to admit such evidence when tendered in support of guilt, but not when offered for exculpatory purposes. 35 We also find instructive the case of Riley, supra, where we reversed a bank official's conviction for embezzlement because he was not permitted to introduce evidence of the bank's established custom and practice of issuing cashier's checks to trusted customers without requiring contemporaneous payment. Although we found this purported standard of business conduct to be a funny way to run a bank, 550 F.2d at 235, we held that the proffered evidence was relevant to a determination of appellant's intent to injure and defraud the bank. Id. at 236. In a statement we find applicable to this case, Riley concluded: [This] defense may or may not be reasonable to a [factfinder] but we believe he should have the right to present it. Id. at 238. 36 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's exclusion of Kelly's proffered testimony constituted reversible error.