Opinion ID: 3022110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 4 The National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) has tendered an amicus curiae brief in support of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). According to its brief, the NAB is a non-profit incorporated association of radio and television broadcast stations and networks representing the nation's broadcasting industry and is committed to protecting the integrity of the spectrum used for radio and television broadcasting to ensure that the public receives the highest quality service. -7- We review a motion for judgment on the pleadings de novo. We accept as true all facts pleaded by the non-moving party and grant all reasonable inferences from the pleadings in favor of the non-moving party. Judgment on the pleadings is not properly granted unless the moving party has clearly established that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c); e.g., National Car Rental System, Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426, 428 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861 (1993); Westcott v. City of Omaha, 901 F.2d 1486, 1488 (8th Cir. 1990). EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IN DISTRICT COURT The threshold issue is which court has exclusive jurisdiction-- the district court (as Fried argues) or the court of appeals (as the government argues). The parties raise essentially the same arguments on appeal as they did in the district court. For reversal, Fried argues that the district court erred in holding that the court of appeals has exclusive jurisdiction over the in rem forfeiture action and his constitutional defenses. Fried argues that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction because the forfeiture provision, 47 U.S.C. § 504(a), specifically refers to trial de novo in the district court and that reference contemplates adjudication of all issues raised in the forfeiture action, including any and all defenses. He further argues that this specific jurisdictional provision, which particularly refers to forfeiture orders in the district courts, overrides 47 U.S.C. § 402, which is a general jurisdictional provision for judicial review in the courts of appeals of final orders of the FCC. The government argues that the courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review all final orders of the FCC, including orders deciding applications for broadcast licenses and requests for waivers. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(a); 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (the court of appeals (other than the court of appeals for the Federal Circuit) has exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to -8- determine the validity of all final orders of the FCC). The government argues that the validity of the underlying microbroadcasting regulations is not at issue in the in rem forfeiture action and that Fried cannot “bootstrap” a constitutional challenge to the microbroadcasting regulations into the forfeiture action. The government argues that, by attempting to bypass first administrative review by the FCC and then judicial review in the court of appeals, Fried is improperly seeking what essentially amounts to “pre-enforcement” review of the microbroadcasting regulations without an adequate administrative record. The government argues that Fried can raise his constitutional challenges to the microbroadcasting regulations by filing an application for a license with a request for a waiver. If his application for a license and request for a waiver are denied by the FCC, the government argues that Fried can then appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1). Alternatively, the government argues that Fried can challenge the constitutionality of the microbroadcasting regulations by filing a petition for rulemaking pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.401, and, if that petition is denied, then seek judicial review in any court of appeals, pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). This is a difficult issue, and the cases are not easy to reconcile. Nonetheless, we think Fried’s argument is persuasive. In particular, we are persuaded by the statutory analysis in Dougan v. FCC, 21 F.3d 1488. In that case, the FCC had issued a final forfeiture order against Dougan for operating a radio station without a license and for refusing to permit FCC engineers to inspect the station. Dougan filed a petition for review in the court of appeals, citing 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2342. The government contested Dougan’s right to seek judicial review of the forfeiture order in the court of appeals, arguing that the more specific forfeiture statute, 47 U.S.C. § 504(a), controlled the more general one, 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), even though 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) deals only with suits by the government to enforce forfeiture and not suits by recipients of notices of forfeiture seeking to avoid enforcement. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the government’s argument, holding that the more specific 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) “is a special review statute which vests -9- [exclusive] jurisdiction over forfeiture actions in the district court, and therefore cuts off simultaneous jurisdiction in other courts.” 21 F.3d at 1491 (referring to enforcement suits by the government as well as suits by private individuals seeking to avoid enforcement), citing Pleasant Broadcasting, 564 F.2d at 496, 500-01. The Dougan court relied on the analysis in an earlier case, Pleasant Broadcasting, which involved consolidated petitions by two broadcast licensees who had requested that forfeiture orders entered against them by the FCC be set aside. In the first petition, the FCC had imposed a $500 forfeiture on Pleasant Broadcasting for “repeatedly” violating the over-power regulation. The sole contention was the FCC's interpretation of the word repeatedly was erroneous as a matter of law. The second petition involved the FCC finding that WIYN Radio was in repeated violation of the Personal Attack Rule, 47 C.F.R. § 73.123, which required the licensee, within seven days, to notify the party that had been publicly and personally attacked. The FCC found that a separate offense had occurred during each of the 20 days WIYN Radio had failed to notify the attacked party. Both Pleasant Broadcasting and WIYN Radio contested the FCC's interpretation of “repeatedly” and sought judicial review in the D.C. Circuit pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). The D.C. Circuit held that 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) established the district court as the exclusive forum for review of the forfeiture orders. 564 F.2d at 500 (noting that, even though that section by its terms makes no provision for initiation of judicial review by persons subjected to forfeiture order, it clearly provides such persons with opportunity to obtain full review in district court in proceeding which the government must bring to collect the monetary forfeiture). The D.C. Circuit noted that, “‘even where Congress has not expressly conferred exclusive jurisdiction, a special review statute vesting jurisdiction in a particular court cuts off other courts’ original jurisdiction in all cases covered by the special statute.’” Id. at 500-01, citing Investment Co. Institute v. Board of Governors, 551 F.2d 1270, 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Accord United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, -10- 19 F. Supp. 2d 738, 746-47 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (Bent Oak) (holding 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) is a special review statute that vests jurisdiction over forfeiture actions in the district courts and cuts off simultaneous jurisdiction in other courts); cf. United States v. Neset, 10 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1114-15 (D.N.D. 1998) (holding courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction to review FCC declaratory rulings on validity of FCC policies or practices; whether FCC policies or practices comply with paperwork reduction act or administrative procedures act are matters within primary jurisdiction of FCC). But see Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir.) (holding summarily that district courts lack jurisdiction over all challenges to FCC regulations), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1161 (1995); United States v. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equipment, 29 F. Supp.2d 393, 397-98 (E.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that district court does not have jurisdiction in forfeiture action to entertain challenge to constitutionality of FCC microbroadcasting regulations; claimant must first seek final decision by FCC and then appeal any unfavorable decision to appropriate court of appeals, citing district court decision in the present appeal). The D.C. Circuit considered the statutory scheme and concluded that it is unlikely that Congress intended for persons in the position of the licensees to have two bites at the apple, that is, to be able to challenge the forfeiture order in a court of appeals on the basis of the administrative record and, if unsuccessful, to litigate all issues de novo in the district court, with a right of appeal to the court of appeals. . . . [W]e would be reluctant to give litigants a choice of forums for review, without some support in the language or history of the forfeiture statute, or some showing that the special procedure enacted by Congress is unavailable or inadequate. 564 F.2d at 501 (noting that review of legislative history indicated that Congress was operating under assumption that any review would occur through trial de novo in the district court). -11- Another decision involving an unlicensed microbroadcaster also supports the position that the district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over forfeiture actions, including any constitutional affirmative defenses raised by the person seeking to avoid enforcement. In United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. 1235 (N.D. Cal. 1998), the government brought an action for injunctive and declaratory relief in federal district court against Stephen Paul Dunifer, the owner and operator of an unlicensed microbroadcasting radio station, Radio Free Berkeley. The government sought a ruling that Dunifer was violating 47 U.S.C. § 301 by broadcasting without a license. Dunifer did not dispute that he had been operating the radio station without a license, but he argued that he should not be enjoined from broadcasting because the FCC’s refusal to license microbroadcasters amounted to a content-based restriction on speech in violation of the First Amendment. The FCC had issued a monetary forfeiture order and Dunifer had filed an application for review of the forfeiture order, raising the same constitutional arguments. The district court denied the government’s motion for a preliminary injunction and stayed the case under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction so that the issue of the constitutionality of the microbroadcasting regulations could be decided first by the FCC, either in the context of the pending forfeiture proceeding or in FCC rule-making proceedings. 997 F. Supp. at 1238. After the FCC issued its forfeiture order holding the microbroadcasting regulations did not violate the First Amendment (or the FCC’s statutory mandate to regulate in the public interest), the government filed a motion for summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because exclusive jurisdiction over any challenge to FCC regulations is vested in the court of appeals. The district court rejected that argument, ruling that 47 U.S.C. § 401(a), which provides the district court with jurisdiction over actions by the government in which it alleges failure to comply with the Communications Act, including the charge of broadcasting without a license, granted jurisdiction to the district court over any valid defense to the charge. 997 F. Supp. at 1238. -12- We find the analysis in these cases to be persuasive and hold that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction over the in rem forfeiture action, including Fried’s constitutional affirmative defenses. ISSUES ON REMAND For purposes of this appeal, we have assumed, as did the district court, that Fried filed a request for a waiver of the microbroadcasting rules in which he raised his arguments challenging their constitutionality. The FCC does have jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of its regulations. See id. at 1240, citing Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 872, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that FCC was required to respond to plaintiff’s constitutional arguments and remanding case to FCC to consider constitutionality of FCC fairness doctrine on its face and as applied), and WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (remanding FCC’s denial of applicant’s waiver request to FCC to reconsider First Amendment issue raised therein). See also United States v. Evergreen Media Corp., 832 F. Supp. 1183, 1185-86 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (district court held it had jurisdiction to hear defendant’s counterclaims challenging facial constitutionality of FCC regulation barring obscene, indecent or profane language). However, the record does not indicate that the FCC has acted upon Fried’s request for waiver. Having determined that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the in rem forfeiture action, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case to the district court with directions to consider whether to invoke the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, because the issue of the constitutionality of the microbroadcasting regulations has yet to be addressed by the FCC, at least in the context of the present litigation. (As noted above, the FCC in the Dunifer forfeiture proceeding held the microbroadcasting regulations did not violate the First Amendment.) See Bent Oak, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 744-48 (applying doctrine of primary jurisdiction and dismissing case without prejudice because no administrative -13- proceeding currently pending); United States v. Dunifer, 997 F. Supp. at 1238 (noting earlier stay of litigation under doctrine of primary jurisdiction in light of then-pending FCC forfeiture proceeding); cf. Rosenthal & Co. v. Bagley, 581 F.2d 1258, 1260 (7th Cir. 1978) (holding exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine retains its validity even when the collateral judicial action challenges the constitutionality of the basic statute under which agency functions); see also Turro v. FCC, 859 F.2d 1498 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (court of appeals review of FCC order denying request for waiver of FCC rules); WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153 (same; remanding matter to FCC for statement of reasons for denial of waiver). We hold that the district court has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate the in rem forfeiture action, including Fried’s constitutional affirmative defenses. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand the case to the district court for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should consider the issue of primary jurisdiction. MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge. I would reverse the order of the district court, but for reasons different from those elaborated in Judge McMillian's opinion. I do not believe that the defendant in this case is seeking to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend any order of the Commission, see 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), for the simple reason that no FCC order is being challenged. This is a suit initiated by the United States to forfeit Mr. Fried's property, a suit over which the district court plainly has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1345, 1355. Until today I had not supposed that anyone could plausibly maintain that any court of the United States, properly seized of jurisdiction of a suit, did not also have jurisdiction to consider constitutional defenses to that suit. Congress could, of course, provide otherwise, as, for instance, by providing streamlined forfeiture remedies that excluded certain defenses, while giving a defendant an opportunity to -14- raise those defenses in some other context. I do not see that Congress has done so in this instance. Congress knows how to give exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of a regulation when it wants to. Indeed, 28 U.S.C. § 2342 is itself directly instructive on this point. While it gives the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to set aside all final orders of the FCC (§ 2342(1)), it gives the courts of appeals the same jurisdiction to set aside all rules, regulations, or final orders of a certain kind issued by the Secretary of Transportation (28 U.S.C. § 2342(3)(A)) and the Federal Maritime Commission (28 U.S.C. § 2342(3)(B)). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2342(5) (all rules, regulations, or final orders of a certain kind issued by the ICC). It thus becomes plain that 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) does not give the courts of appeals exclusive jurisdiction to determine the validity of an FCC regulation. FCC v. ITT World Communications, Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1989), on which Judge Noonan relies, is not to the contrary, for that was a suit to enjoin a denial of a rulemaking petition. No such petition is at issue here, and the fact that Mr. Fried could file one and have his defenses adjudicated is of no moment. What we have is the case before us, and in it I see no statutory or other impediment to the consideration of Mr. Fried's defenses. I therefore join in the order reversing and remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings.