Opinion ID: 2460452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Psychological Evaluation of Victim

Text: Sellers argues that the district judge erred in denying his motion for a psychological evaluation of M.R.C. On appeal, the State responds by saying that Sellers was unable to satisfy his burden to show the evaluation was compelled under State v. Gregg, 226 Kan. 481, 602 P.2d 85 (1979). Our standard of review of the district judge's decision on such a motion is abuse of discretion. See Price, 275 Kan. at 80, 61 P.3d 676 (quoting State v. Rucker, 267 Kan. 816, 821, 987 P.2d 1080 [1999]). Discretion is abused when judicial action is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, which is another way of saying that discretion is abused only when no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Price, 275 Kan. at 83, 61 P.3d 676 (citing State v. Saiz, 269 Kan. 657, 667, 7 P.3d 1214 [2000]). Most recently, in State v. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, 568, 243 P.3d 352 (2010), this court stated that the determination of whether compelling circumstances existed to support an order for a psychological evaluation requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances in the case, considering the following nonexclusive list of factors: (1) whether there was corroborating evidence of the complaining witness' version of the facts, (2) whether the complaining witness demonstrates mental instability, (3) whether the complaining witness demonstrates a lack of veracity, (4) whether similar charges by the complaining witness against others are proven to be false, (5) whether the defendant's motion for a psychological evaluation of the complaining witness appears to be a fishing expedition, and (6) whether the complaining witness provides an unusual response when questioned about his or her understanding of what it means to tell the truth. Here, Sellers does not argue that the fourth, fifth, or sixth factors apply. He focuses his arguments on the first three factors, which we discuss in order below. On the first factor, corroboration, Sellers argues that there is little or no corroborating evidence in this case. Although we agree that M.R.C.'s repetition of her story to her aunt, her mother, and investigators was only repetition and did not qualify as corroboration in the strictest sense of the word, we note that the district judge's decision to deny the psychological evaluation came at the end of the second preliminary hearing. In that hearing, M.R.C.'s mother testified that she confronted Sellers with M.R.C.'s allegations, and he responded that M.R.C. had given him access to her breasts and moved her hips. Further, when M.R.C.'s mother asked Sellers why he had touched M.R.C., she reported that he had said, I don't know[;] I'm sick[;] maybe I like them like that. M.R.C.'s mother's testimony also supported peripheral details from M.R.C.'s recitation of her memories from the critical Thanksgiving 2007 weekend. For example, C.M. testified that she lay down for a nap that weekend and that M.R.C. and Sellers eventually joined her on the bed. Regarding mental instability, Sellers relies in part on M.R.C.'s conflict with him and with her mother. To the extent he does so, a reasonable person could certainly conclude that he is unrealistic in his expectation of constant adolescent equanimity. Heated disagreements between adults and teenagers are more a norm than an aberration; and the existence of such disagreements, without more, does not demonstrate mental instability on the part of the teenagers. M.R.C.'s testimony at trial that her mother had suggested counseling for herself, her mother, and Sellers also does not make a compelling case for teenage mental instability. And we note that the suggestion that M.R.C. could benefit from counseling originated with defense counsel at the first preliminary hearing. Also in support of the second factor, Sellers asserts that M.R.C. may have been bipolar, but this assertion is nothing more than rank speculation. M.R.C.'s aunt testified at trial that bipolar disorder ran in M.R.C.'s family, and there was discussion during the first preliminary hearing of M.R.C.'s mother's depression upon return from her military deployment. There is no testimony anywhere in the record that M.R.C. was ever tested for or diagnosed with this potentially serious mental illness. The mental instability factor demands demonstrable evidence of a mental condition that requires further investigation, not the mere allegation of some untoward mental condition. Berriozabal, 291 Kan. at 581, 243 P.3d 352. As to the third factor, lack of veracity, Sellers points to two inconsistencies in M.R.C.'s versions of the Thanksgiving touching. First, he relies upon M.R.C.'s change of datefrom the Saturday before Thanksgiving 2007 to the Saturday after Thanksgiving 2007which followed his service of notice of an alibi defense for the first date. Second, he relies upon M.R.C.'s initial statement to Lowe that she and Sellers were alone on the Thanksgiving weekend when Sellers simply walked up to her and touched her, as compared to her statement to Yoder and repeated later testimony that she was on her mother's bed with her mother when Sellers touched her. The district judge made findings that guide our view of each of these inconsistencies, and the record on appeal supplies vital additional information. On the date change, the district judge found that M.R.C.'s mother first suggested the November 17 date and that, upon M.R.C.'s further reflection, the date was corrected to November 24. From this finding and the totality of circumstances revealed by the remainder of the record on appeal, it is apparent that M.R.C. was eventually able to pinpoint the date exactly because she remembered additional details about the weekend after Thanksgiving, including the visit of a friend from out of town. With regard to the second inconsistency, the district judge found that M.R.C. testified clearly about the circumstances surrounding the Thanksgiving touching and who was present. We also note that the record reflects Lowe's pertinent characterization of his task in interviewing M.R.C. He testified that he merely took an initial report from M.R.C. and avoided getting too many specific details so that she could tell her story to a detective. In other words, Lowe's mission was limited. His interview was designed only to determine whether there was an allegation that a crime occurred before referring the case to an investigator. He employed yes or no and leading questions to get the necessary information because M.R.C. did not volunteer information herself. The single inconsistency between the story told to him and the subsequent story may have been an artifact of varying interview techniques. Our Price case considered an allegation of lack of veracity of a complaining witness and noted that the issue was whether the alleged untruthfulness related to the victim's contact with the defendant. Price, 275 Kan. at 88, 61 P.3d 676. Here, the inconsistencies Sellers relies upon do relate to M.R.C.'s contact with him. However, a reasonable person could regard the two inconsistencies at issue here as isolated or occasional rather than indicative of general lack of veracity such that a psychological examination was compelled. See Berriozabal, 291 Kan. 568, Syl. ¶ 6, 243 P.3d 352 (merely occasional inconsistent statements by complaining witness do not compel psychological evaluation). We are also appropriately mindful that the district judge, who found no indication of lack of veracity on M.R.C.'s part, had the advantage of observing her demeanor on the witness stand. We, of course, do not. Having fully reviewed and considered Sellers' arguments on the three factors relevant to this issue, we hold that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a psychological evaluation of M.R.C. Sellers did not meet his burden to demonstrate a compelling need for such an evaluation, under the totality of circumstances present in this case.