Opinion ID: 2222068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the Solicitation Statute to Juvenile Offenders

Text: Respondent contends that the indecent solicitation of an adult statute does not apply to juveniles because the legislature intended to protect minors by criminalizing the acts of adults who arrange sexual penetration or sexual conduct between adults and children. In support, respondent cites brief portions of the record in the state General Assembly indicating that the original impetus for the bill was the difficulty a State's Attorney experienced in prosecuting an adult who had lured juveniles into sexual encounters with other adults. From this, respondent generalizes that the statute was not intended to apply to juveniles who arrange similar contacts, relying on In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d 300, 307, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218 (2002), for his approach to statutory interpretation. As an issue of statutory construction, respondent's argument is subject to de novo review. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill.2d 510, 514, 270 Ill.Dec. 23, 782 N.E.2d 217 (2002). In Lieberman, this court reiterated our long-standing principle that the primary objective of a reviewing court is to determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature, subordinating all other rules of construction. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 307, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. We emphasized that `the most reliable indicator' of that intent is the language selected by the legislature, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218, quoting Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill.2d 493, 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528 (2000). In addition, we noted that specific provisions must be read in relation to the entire statute, with all words being construed in relation to other relevant sections. Whenever possible, each word should be construed to avoid rendering it superfluous. With those fundamental concepts in mind, we indicated that courts may sometimes consider both the statutory language and the reason and necessity for the law, the evils sought to be remedied, and the purpose to be achieved. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 308, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. We then examined whether the definition of a `[s]exually violent offense' as used in the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 207/1 et seq. (West 1998)) included the now-repealed crime of rape. Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 310, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218. In looking beyond the literal language of the statute, we explained that `[w]here the spirit and intent of the General Assembly in adopting an act are clearly expressed and its objects and purposes are clearly set forth, courts are not bound by the literal language of a particular clause which would defeat the obvious intent of the legislature.' Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 312, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218, quoting People v. McCoy, 63 Ill.2d 40, 45, 344 N.E.2d 436 (1976), quoting Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago v. Illinois State Toll Highway Comm'n, 42 Ill.2d 385, 395, 251 N.E.2d 253 (1969). Finding that the exclusion of a conviction for rape from the category of sexually violent offenses would lead[ ] to absurd results and prejudice[ ] the public interest in keeping citizens safe from violent sexual offenders, we held that the legislature's omission of the repealed crime was an apparent oversight and that a contrary interpretation would `frustrate the spirit of the statute and the intent of the legislature.' Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 320, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218, quoting Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill.2d 52, 59, 67 Ill.Dec. 850, 445 N.E.2d 330 (1983). Here, adopting respondent's construction of the solicitation statute would produce a similarly absurd result and frustrate both the intent and the spirit of the legislation. The plain language of the statute broadly states: [a] person commits indecent solicitation of an adult if the person  arranges for someone over the age of 17 to commit an act of sexual penetration or other sexual conduct with a child under the age of 13 or between the ages of 13 and 17. (Emphases added.) 720 ILCS 5/11-6.5(a) (West 2000). Thus, the statute expressly defines the requisite ages of the person who would actually commit the sexual conduct as well as of the minor who is the intended victim, but not the age of the person who arranges for the illicit contact. As respondent readily acknowledges, the clear intent of the statute is to protect children. In his argument, he attempts to bring himself within that protected group based solely on his status as a person under the age of 17 at the time of the offense. Respondent's argument fails to recognize, however, that the plain meaning of the language shows that this particular statute was designed to protect children from certain specified evils, namely, sexual penetration or sexual conduct with adults. There is no hint that the statute was intended to protect children from prosecution for their criminal acts. Here, respondent was not in danger of becoming the victim of either of the evils noted in the statute. Quite to the contrary, he was judicially found to have been the instigator of those targeted evils by arranging for sexual conduct involving an adult (E.J.) and a minor (A.T.). To read the statute as protecting respondent from prosecution due to his age would not only violate the plain meaning of the statutory language but also lead[ ] to absurd results and prejudice[ ] the public interest as well as `frustrate the spirit of the statute and the intent of the legislature.' Lieberman, 201 Ill.2d at 320, 267 Ill.Dec. 81, 776 N.E.2d 218, quoting Gill, 94 Ill.2d at 59, 67 Ill.Dec. 850, 445 N.E.2d 330. We hold that the indecent solicitation of an adult statute is equally applicable to both persons under and over the age of 17.