Opinion ID: 1058550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Discovery Depositions to Disqualify Expert

Text: Rule 3:20 states: No motion for summary judgment or to strike the evidence shall be sustained when based in whole or in part upon any discovery depositions under Rule 4:5, unless all parties to the action shall agree that such deposition may be so used. See also Code § 8.01-420. We have held that Rule 3:20 and Code § 8.01-420 impose a very specific condition; namely, the parties must agree to the use of depositions before they may serve as a basis in whole, or in part, for the entry of summary judgment. This condition requires some showing of acquiescence in the use of a deposition. Gay v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 253 Va. 212, 214, 483 S.E.2d 216, 218 (1997). Whether a trial court's actions conflict with the procedural requirements set forth in a rule of this Court or a statute is a question of law that is reviewed de novo. See Collins v. Shepherd, 274 Va. 390, 397, 649 S.E.2d 672, 675 (2007). Lloyd argues in assignment of error 1 that the trial court erred in using his expert's discovery deposition to disqualify the expert and to then grant summary judgment based on the disqualification. Although Dr. Kime did not offer deposition testimony in support of his motion for summary judgment, he did offer it in a manner that was functionally a motion for summary judgment. Gay, 253 Va. at 214 n., 483 S.E.2d at 218 n. (holding that regardless of the label, defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was functionally a motion for summary judgment and subject to Rule 3:18 [now 3:20] and Code § 8.01-420). We have held that Rule 3:20 and Code § 8.01-420 apply when a defendant files a motion in limine seeking the exclusion of the plaintiff's expert testimony, and the court's ruling excluding the testimony is followed by the defendant's motion for summary judgment predicated upon the exclusion. Parker v. Elco Elevator Corp., 250 Va. 278, 281 n. 2, 462 S.E.2d 98, 100 n. 2 (1995). In such a case, the motion in limine is functionally a motion for summary judgment. Rule 3:20 and Code § 8.01-420 therefore apply to Dr. Kime's motion to exclude Dr. Corkill's testimony in this case. Deposition testimony could not be used to support the motion in limine unless Lloyd acquiesced. Dr. Kime argues that Lloyd acquiesced in the use of the deposition by quoting it in his Argument in Opposition to the Motion to Exclude and his Motion to Reconsider. Rule 3:20 and Code § 8.01-420 state that [n]o motion for summary judgment shall be sustained when based in whole or in part on discovery depositions unless the parties agree that depositions can be used. Rule 3:20 (emphasis added). Under Rule 3:20 and Code § 8.01-420 discovery depositions cannot be used to support a motion for summary judgment unless the parties agree. The Rule and statute do not apply to the use of depositions to oppose a motion for summary judgment. See W. Hamilton Bryson, Virginia Civil Procedure § 9.05(10)(e) (4th ed. 2005). Lloyd's use of Dr. Corkill's deposition to oppose Dr. Kime's motion in limine would be a permissible use. However, based upon the record of this case, Lloyd did not object to the use of the depositions by Dr. Kime in support of the motion. [] See Parker, 250 Va. at 281 n. 2, 462 S.E.2d at 100 n. 2. Failure to object to the use of the deposition is sufficient to establish acquiescence. Accordingly, based upon the record before us, the trial court did not err in using deposition evidence in the resolution of the motion in limine and subsequent motion for summary judgment.