Opinion ID: 866006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “medical use” of marijuana

Text: As stated, § 7(a) of the MMMA provides that “[t]he medical use of marihuana is allowed under state law to the extent that it is carried out in accordance with the provisions of [the MMMA].” The MMMA specifically defines “medical use” in § 3(e) as the acquisition, possession, cultivation, manufacture, use, internal possession, delivery, transfer, or transportation of marihuana or paraphernalia relating to the administration of marihuana to treat or alleviate a registered qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition or symptoms associated with the debilitating medical condition.[37] At issue in this case is whether the sale of marijuana is an activity that falls within this definition of “medical use.” The definition specifically incorporates nine activities relating to marijuana as “medical use,” but it does not expressly use the word “sale.” Because of this omission, plaintiff argues, and the Court of Appeals held, that the sale of marijuana falls outside the statutory definition of “medical use”: [T]he sale of marijuana is not equivalent to the delivery or transfer of marijuana. The delivery or transfer of marijuana is only one component of the sale of marijuana—the sale of marijuana consists of the delivery or transfer plus the receipt of compensation. The “medical use” of marijuana, as defined by the MMMA, allows for the “delivery” and “transfer” of marijuana, but not the “sale” of marijuana. MCL 333.26423(e). We may not ignore, or view as inadvertent, the omission of the term “sale” from the definition of the “medical use” of marijuana.[38] 37 MCL 333.26423(e). 38 McQueen, 293 Mich App at 668. 11 Defendants claim that the Court of Appeals erred by excluding sales from the definition of “medical use.” In determining whether a sale constitutes “medical use,” we first look to how the MMMA defines the term “medical use.” In particular, the definition of “medical use” contains the word “transfer” as one of nine activities encompassing “medical use.” The MMMA, however, does not itself define “transfer” or any of the other eight activities encompassing “medical use.” Because undefined terms “shall be construed and understood according to the common and approved usage of the language,”39 it is appropriate to consult dictionary definitions of terms used in the MMMA.40 A transfer is “[a]ny mode of disposing of or parting with an asset or an interest in an asset, including a gift, the payment of money, release, lease, or creation of a lien or other encumbrance.”41 Similarly, a sale is “[t]he transfer of property or title for a price.”42 Given these definitions, to state that a transfer does not encompass a sale is to ignore what a transfer encompasses. That a sale has an additional characteristic, distinguishing it from other types of transfers, does not make it any less a transfer, nor 39 MCL 8.3a. 40 People v Morey, 461 Mich 325, 330; 603 NW2d 250 (1999). 41 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed), p 1535 (emphasis added); see also Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed, 1997), p 1366 (defining “transfer” as “to convey or remove from one place, person, or position to another”). 42 Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed), p 1364 (emphasis added); see also Random House Webster’s College Dictionary (2d ed, 1997), p 1143 (defining “sale” as “transfer of property for money or credit”). 12 does that additional characteristic require that the definition of “medical use” separately delineate the term “sale” in order for a sale to be considered a medical use. Nor do other provisions of the MMMA limit the definition of “medical use” to exclude sales. For instance, § 4(e) allows a registered primary caregiver to “receive compensation for costs associated with assisting a registered qualifying patient in the medical use of marihuana,” but states that “[a]ny such compensation shall not constitute the sale of controlled substances.”43 While this section specifically contemplates that a registered qualifying patient may compensate his caregiver, it does not narrow the word “transfer” as used in the § 3(e) definition of “medical use.”44 Rather, § 4(e) independently describes the relationship between a registered caregiver and his registered qualifying patient and provides an additional protection for the patient-caregiver relationship by emphasizing that it is not a criminal act for a registered qualifying patient to compensate a registered primary caregiver for costs associated with providing marijuana to the patient.45 Additionally, § 4(k) establishes criminal sanctions for a patient or caregiver “who sells marihuana to someone who is not allowed to use marihuana for medical purposes under [the MMMA] . . . .”46 This provision is also irrelevant to understanding the 43 MCL 333.26424(e). 44 MCL 333.26423(e). 45 Defendants claim that this provision excludes a caregiver’s reimbursement from the provisions of the General Sales Tax Act, MCL 205.51 et seq. Because it is well beyond the scope of this case, we need not address that issue. 46 A registered qualifying patient or registered primary caregiver who violates § 4(k) “shall have his or her registry identification card revoked and is guilty of a felony 13 definition of “medical use” in § 3(e). Any transfer to a person who is “not allowed to use marihuana for medical purposes”47—whether for a price or not—is already specifically excluded from the definition of “medical use,” which requires a medical use to have the specific purpose to “treat or alleviate a registered qualifying patient’s debilitating medical condition or symptoms associated with the debilitating medical condition.”48 Thus, rather than inform the definition of “medical use,” § 4(k)49 simply provides an additional criminal penalty for certain actions that already fall outside the definition of “medical use” and that are already barred under the Public Health Code.50 Therefore, we hold that the definition of “medical use” in § 3(e) of the MMMA includes the sale of marijuana. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise, and we reverse that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment defining “medical use.” Nevertheless, this definition of “medical use” only forms the beginning of our inquiry. Section 7(a) of the act requires any medical use of marijuana to occur “in accordance with the provisions of [the MMMA].” That limitation requires this Court to look beyond the definition of “medical use” to determine whether defendants’ business operates “in punishable by imprisonment for not more than 2 years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both, in addition to any other penalties for the distribution of marihuana.” MCL 333.26424(k). 47 MCL 333.26424(k). 48 MCL 333.26423(e) (emphasis added). 49 MCL 333.26424(k). 50 MCL 333.1101 et seq. 14 accordance with the provisions of [the MMMA].”51 Absent a situation triggering the affirmative defense of § 8 of the MMMA,52 § 4 sets forth the requirements for a person to be entitled to immunity for the “medical use” of marijuana. It is entitlement to that immunity—not the definition of “medical use”—that demonstrates that the person’s medical use of marijuana is in accordance with the MMMA. Therefore, we turn to § 4 to determine whether patient-to-patient sales are entitled to that section’s provision of immunity.