Opinion ID: 173269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hearsay Statements from Confidential Informant

Text: Lopez-Medina contends his right to confrontation was violated when the court admitted hearsay statements from a confidential informant on redirect. Although a district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, whether admission of ... evidence violates the Confrontation Clause is reviewed de novo. United States v. Townley, 472 F.3d 1267, 1271 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 551 U.S. 1172, 127 S.Ct. 3069, 168 L.Ed.2d 777 (2007). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment provides [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court held [w]here testimonial [hearsay] evidence is at issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Court le[ft] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of `testimonial' but explained [w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a formal trial; and to police interrogations. Id. A confidential informant's statements to a law enforcement officer are clearly testimonial. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2527, 2532, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009); see also United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir.2004) (concluding statements of a confidential informant are testimonial because [t]ips provided by confidential informants are knowingly and purposely made to authorities, accuse someone of a crime, and often are used against the accused at trial). The government does not contend the confidential informant was unavailable for trial and does not assert Lopez-Medina had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Instead, it argues the hearsay statements were properly admitted because Lopez-Medina opened the door by questioning Officer Johnson on cross-examination about the information he received from the informant. [7] The government argues: It is ... clear that the defense made a tactical decision to explore fully the information given by the confidential informant to Officer Johnson, presumably to discredit the basis for police suspicion and investigation of Lopez-Medina. (Appellee's Br. at 47.) We agree with the government that Lopez-Medina opened the door to further questioning of Officer Johnson regarding the information he received from the confidential informant. Where, as here, defense counsel purposefully and explicitly opens the door on a particular (and otherwise inadmissible) line of questioning, such conduct operates as a limited waiver allowing the government to introduce further evidence on that same topic. See Tanberg v. Sholtis, 401 F.3d 1151, 1166 (10th Cir.2005) (When a party opens the door to a topic, the admission of rebuttal evidence on that topic becomes permissible.). Prior to Crawford, we held there was no doubt a defendant could waive his rights under the Confrontation Clause. See Hawkins v. Hannigan, 185 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Aptt, 354 F.3d 1269, 1282 (10th Cir.2004); Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1057 (10th Cir.2002). The parties do not argue Crawford changed this rule. [B]ecause there is a presumption against the waiver of constitutional rights, for a waiver to be effective it must be clearly established that there was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. Hawkins, 185 F.3d at 1154 (quotations and citation omitted). That standard is satisfied here. The government requested a sidebar conference after defense counsel asked Officer Johnson how he [came] to know that that pickup truck was a suspected truck[.] (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 185 at 84.) Defense counsel explained to the court: I think, Your Honor, [the government is] worried that I am going to bring in the confidential informant information. That's my full intention. I don't care what door we open. If I open up a door, please feel free to drive into it. But I am going to explore the entire case. ( Id. at 85-86.) It is clear from this statement that defense counsel intentionally relinquished his (or rather, his client's) confrontation right through his questioning of Johnson. This is not a case of ignorance or inadvertence and we do not decide what rule would apply in that context. The determination that a particular right has been waived does not end our inquiry. Aptt, 354 F.3d at 1281. The procedures and circumstances required for effective waiver depend on the right at stake. Id. Similar to waiver by stipulating to the admission of evidence, counsel in a criminal case may waive a client's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by opening the door, so long as the defendant does not dissent from his attorney's decision and so long as it can be said that the attorney's decision was a legitimate trial tactic or part of a prudent trial strategy. Id. at 1282 (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Dazey, 403 F.3d 1147, 1169 (10th Cir.2005) (Defense counsel's stipulation to admission of evidence effectively waives the defendant's confrontation rights unless the defendant can show that the waiver constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.). Here there is no indication Lopez-Medina dissented from his attorney's decision to open the door. Similarly, there is no indication the decision was not a legitimate trial tactic. [8] We find a Fifth Circuit case to be instructive. In United States v. Acosta, police officers discovered a large quantity of cocaine in a vehicle in which two individuals, Acosta and Marrufo, were traveling. 475 F.3d 677, 679 (5th Cir.2007). Marrufo pled guilty. He provided a statement articulating the factual basis for his plea and a statement to qualify for a safety valve sentence reduction, both implicating Acosta in the crime. The court ordered him to testify at Acosta's trial but he refused to answer several questions concerning Acosta's participation even when asked about his prior statements. On cross-examination, Marrufo answered every question posed to him. Over the government's objection, he testified he believed he would receive a more lenient sentence if he implicated Acosta. The trial court found defense counsel's questioning was designed to impeach Marrufo by illustrating a motive to lie. The court allowed the government to admit Marrufo's safety valve statement to show his trial testimony was not a recent fabrication and gave a limiting instruction to that effect. It also allowed the government to recall the police officer who conducted Marrufo's safety valve debriefing to testify to the statements he made. The Fifth Circuit held the court did not err in admitting Marrufo's written safety valve statement because it was not admitted to establish the truth of the matter asserted and because Acosta opened the door to its admission. Id. at 683. The court explained: Acosta invited the error. If a defendant injects otherwise inadmissible evidence, the defense cannot later object to such invited error. In his cross-examination of Marrufo, Acosta made a tactical decision to discredit Marrufo's safety valve statement by presenting it as a concession made to please the government and asserting that Marrufo was being evasive at trial because he feared a perjury conviction. This opened the door for the statement's admission.... Id. at 683-84 (quotations omitted). The court also rejected Acosta's argument that the court violated the Confrontation Clause when it permitted [the officer] to testify about Marrufo's prior statements. Id. at 684. The court held even if this testimony were otherwise inadmissible, Acosta opened the door to its introduction. Id. We agree with the Fifth Circuit's analysis, at least where there is an explicit waiver. The Confrontation Clause is a shield, not a sword. Here, the court advised defense counsel he could ask Officer Johnson whether he received information from the informant but could not ask what information he received. Defense counsel proceeded to ask Johnson if the informant told him about the drugs in the pickup truck and gave him Lopez-Medina's address in Layton. This opened the door to further questioning about the confidential informant's statements to Officer Johnson on redirect. It was defense counsel, not the government, who first questioned Johnson regarding the specific information he obtained from the informant. Lopez-Medina cannot now complain Johnson should not have been allowed to answer the government's related questions on redirect. Lopez-Medina relies on Cromer. On cross-examination, Cromer and his counsel introduced the existence of an informant and a description provided by that informant in an attempt to discredit the government's case. 389 F.3d at 679. Even after Cromer was warned that this line of questioning would open the door to allow the government to question [the officer] about the exact content of the informant's statements, Cromer continued in his attempt to establish that the informant's statement did not describe him. On redirect examination, the government... clarified the precise nature of the description provided by the [informant]. Id. The court held the officer's testimony on redirect violated Cromer's right to confrontation explaining: As a matter of modern evidence law, the district court may well have been correct in admitting [the officer's] redirect testimony about the description provided by the informant since Cromer, on cross-examination, had opened the door to the subject by asking about that description. Id. at 678. The pertinent question, however, is not whether the [informant's] statements were properly admitted pursuant to the law of Evidence for the time being. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1364. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Cromer's right to confront the witnesses against him was violated by [the officer's] redirect testimony. If there is one theme that emerges from Crawford, it is that the Confrontation Clause confers a powerful and fundamental right that is no longer subsumed by the evidentiary rules governing the admission of hearsay statements. Thus, the mere fact that Cromer may have opened the door to the testimonial, out-of-court statement that violated his confrontation right is not sufficient to erase that violation.... A foolish strategic decision ... will not cause the defendant to forfeit his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 679. We disagree with Cromer and, as previously stated, believe a defendant can open the door to the admission of evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause. [9] Other jurisdictions have held, subsequent to Crawford, there is no Confrontation Clause violation when the defendant opens the door to the admission of hearsay testimony. See, e.g., Tinker v. State, 932 So.2d 168, 187-88 (Ala.Crim. App.2005); State v. Birth, 37 Kan.App.2d 753, 158 P.3d 345, 355 (2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1302, 170 L.Ed.2d 122 (2008); People v. Ko, 15 A.D.3d 173, 789 N.Y.S.2d 43, 45 (N.Y.App. Div.2005); State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d 469, 492-93 (Tenn.2004). As one federal district court has noted: If the Cromer rule were correct, a defendant would be free to mislead a jury by introducing only parts of an out-of-court statement, confident that the remainder of the statement could not be introduced because the Confrontation Clause would provide a shield. Ko v. Burge, No. 06 Civ. 6826, 2008 WL 552629, at  (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2008) (Koeltl, J.). [10]