Opinion ID: 769649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continued Interrogation After Attempted Polygraph

Text: 17 Lewis's first point on this appeal relates to the alleged violation of his rights under Miranda to have interrogation cease and to have counsel present after he told the polygraph examiner that he wanted to talk with a lawyer. This claim was adjudicated on the merits by the Supreme Court of Indiana, which leaves us only the task of deciding whether that court reached a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. See 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(d)(1). 18 We find no such error in the Supreme Court of Indiana's decision. That court rested its conclusion on the factual finding that Lewis's request for an attorney at the time he was with Officer Szczerbik was a limited one, that pertained only to the polygraph examination itself. Lewis's able appellate lawyers in this court concede that a defendant may invoke his right to counsel for a limited purpose, under decisions such as Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987), and United States v. LaGrone, 43 F.3d 332, 336-37 (7th Cir. 1994). They urge, however, that we should adopt a presumption that once a person invokes his right to counsel, that invocation attaches for all future interrogation that may occur. This, they point out, is the rule for waivers of rights, so why should it not be the rule for invocations of rights. 19 Unfortunately, in Barrett the Supreme Court essentially foreclosed this argument, when it held that limited invocations of rights were possible. The Supreme Court of Indiana found that Lewis's statement here was limited to the polygraph proceeding. To the extent that this was a finding of fact, it is protected under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(d)(2) by an equally strict standard of review: we would have to find that the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. Id. It was not, and so we move on to the other aspect of this claim. 20 Wholly apart from the right to have counsel present during interrogation, Lewis also argues that the police had an unqualified duty to cease all interrogation once he indicated by his actions that he did not wish to talk to them. Instead, after waiting some two hours, Officer Shannon began again and ultimately extracted his confession. As Lewis's lawyers put it in their brief, [h]is confession occurred only because he was worn down by the constant interrogation of a number of officers, culminating in Officer Shannon's highly coercive interrogation. Appellant's Brief at 9. 21 The Supreme Court of Indiana considered this argument, but it found that there was no reason why the police, having stopped interrogation at the suspect's request, had to regard their duty to do so as a perpetual one, citing Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). After Lewis's direct appeals were over, and long after the events in question occurred, the Supreme Court of the United States decided Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), in which the Court held that when a suspect invokes his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, the police must immediately cease questioning unless the suspect initiates further communication. See United States v. Jackson, 189 F.3d 502, 511 (7th Cir. 1999). But Edwards was not on the books at the time the Supreme Court of Indiana considered this case, and it cannot be applied retroactively in collateral challenges to a conviction. Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 650 (1984). We must therefore decide whether the Supreme Court of Indiana's decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established pre-Edwards Supreme Court precedents. 22 Once again, Lewis's claim cannot survive that demanding standard of review. In White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1979), this court (like the Supreme Court of Indiana) declined to read Miranda as prohibiting the authorities from initiating renewed questioning following a request for an attorney. Id. at 191. Instead, we looked at the totality of the circumstances to decide whether a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel occurred. See also United States ex rel. Karr v. Wolff, 732 F.2d 615, 619 (7th Cir. 1984). White was vacated and remanded to this court in light of Edwards, see 451 U.S. 1013 (1981), but it stands as a strong indication that the view the Supreme Court of Indiana took of the interrogation process was a reasonable one under pre-Edwards law and certainly was not contrary to existing Supreme Court decisions. Thus, the district court was correct to reject this argument as well.