Opinion ID: 890182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err by overruling Roger's objection to the prosecutor's statement during closing argument?

Text: ¶ 23 [A]lthough counsel may comment on the burden of proof as it relates to facts presented in trial, it may not go outside the record or misrepresent the law as instructed by the judge. State v. Stewart, 2000 MT 379, ¶ 40, 303 Mont. 507, 16 P.3d 391 (citation omitted). In determining whether a prosecutor's statement requires reversal, we first examine whether the comments were improper. State v. Kolb, 2009 MT 9, ¶ 10, 349 Mont. 10, 200 P.3d 504; State v. Sanchez, 2008 MT 27, ¶ 51, 341 Mont. 240, 177 P.3d 444. If so, we then determine whether the comments prejudiced the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial. Kolb, ¶ 10 (citing Sanchez, ¶ 51). Statements made during arguments are considered in the context of the entire argument. State v. Roubideaux, 2005 MT 324, ¶ 15, 329 Mont. 521, 125 P.3d 1114 (citing State v. Miller, 1998 MT 177, ¶ 37, 290 Mont. 97, 966 P.2d 721, State v. Hart, 191 Mont. 375, 384, 625 P.2d 21, 26 (1981)). ¶ 24 Roger argues the following statement by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument was prejudicial and violated his right to a fair and impartial trial: [Prosecutor]: The standard of beyond a reasonable doubt is in your Jury Instruction No. 3, of such convincing character that a reasonable person would rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs, the third numbered paragraph. The most important of his or her own affairs. Let me suggest another that I believe is one of our most important affairs, and that's caring for our children. With what you know, would you hire him as a baby[sitter]? That's another way to look at it. [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Your Honor, that's not an accurate statement of the burden of proof. It relies on fears about somebody, not ration. The Court: Well, it's final argument. [Prosecutor]: Thank you. Given that, what I'm asking you to do is to tell this defendant that what he did was unacceptable. And the way we say that, the only way a jury can say it, is by saying the word guilty to the aggravated assault and guilty to the family member assault, the lesser crime of family member assault.... Roger argues that by tying the concept of reasonable doubt to whether jurors would hire Roger as a babysitter, the prosecutor violated Roger's right to a fair and impartial trial by making reasonable doubt something akin to any doubt or the slightest doubt. He argues that [p]arents do not reject or fire a babysitter if beyond a reasonable doubt that person is bad. Parents terminate or refuse to employ a babysitter if the slightest possibility exists that the person is bad. A slight doubt about a person is all that's needed for a parent to keep them away from their child(ren). The prosecutor turned reasonable doubt on its head.... ¶ 25 The State argues that the prosecutor's statement was not improper but, even if it was, the jury instructions made clear that the jury was to take the law only from the court, and not counsel. The State reasons that if the jury had misunderstood the concept of reasonable doubt and thought it was something less than what was instructed, then the jury surely would have convicted Roger of aggravated assault instead of acquitting him of that charge. ¶ 26 The District Court instructed the jury that [p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would rely and act upon it in the most important of his or her own affairs. Beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean beyond any doubt or beyond a shadow of a doubt. ¶ 27 It is improper for a prosecutor to misstate the law. Sanchez, ¶¶ 52-54; Stewart, ¶ 40. The prosecutor argued that the jurors deciding whether to leave their children in the defendant's care was an example of one of the most important of his or her own affairs referenced in Jury Instruction 3, the reasonable doubt instruction. To the extent that this statement would be considered improper, we would then determine whether the statement was prejudicial to Roger's right to a fair and impartial trial. Sanchez, ¶ 51. ¶ 28 The jury was also instructed that [y]ou should take the law in this case from my instructions alone. You should not accept anyone else's version as to what the law is in this case ... Counsel, however, may comment and argue to the jury upon the law as given in these instructions.... The jury members were able to take a copy of the judge's jury instructions to the deliberation room with them. American jurisprudence depends on a jury's ability to follow instructions. Sanchez, ¶ 57. It is a well recognized principle of law that juries are presumed to follow the law as given them. State v. Turner, 262 Mont. 39, 55, 864 P.2d 235, 245 (1993) (citations omitted). ¶ 29 We conclude that Roger has not rebutted the presumption that the jury followed the court's instructions nor demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the prosecutor's statement. See Sanchez, ¶ 58. The comment was brief, and the prosecutor did not return to this theme following the objection. The statement was made in argument, and the jury received and took with them the instruction requiring that they take the law from the court only. ¶ 30 Affirmed. We concur: JAMES C. NELSON, PATRICIA COTTER, BETH BAKER and MICHAEL E. WHEAT.