Opinion ID: 895210
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was Brite's first suit filed with intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction?

Text: Section 16.064 will not save a later-filed claim if the first action was filed with intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.064(b). USAA contends that is what happened here, while Brite asserts that a jury must decide whether he intended to evade jurisdiction, given that he vigorously denies doing so. We agree with USAA. Noting [t]he importance of simplifying Court procedure, the Texas Judicial Council in 1930 drafted the tolling statute. See SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE TEXAS CIVIL JUDICIAL COUNCIL TO THE GOVERNOR AND SUPREME COURT, Bill No. 6, at 10-12 (1930). The Legislature made a single changeextending the refiling period from thirty to sixty daysand passed the bill. See Act approved Apr. 27, 1931, 42d Leg., R.S., ch. 81, 1931 Tex. Gen. Laws 124, 124, current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.064; see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 186 S.W.2d 306, 310 (Tex.Civ. App.-Austin 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.). In its recommendation accompanying the bill, the Council noted [t]hat the wrong court is frequently and in good faith chosen by capable lawyers, [as] evidenced by the hundreds of cases cited in the annotations upon the subject given in Vernon's Annotated Texas Statutes,9 pages upon Justice Court, 17 pages upon county court and 29 pages upon district court jurisdiction. SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, at 11. The Council explained that the Texas bill was based on a Kentucky statute that tolled limitations for actions commenced in due time and in good faith in a court that lacked jurisdiction. Id. (citing CARROLL'S KY. STAT. § 2545 (1922)). The Council stated that its bill was like that of Kentucky in substance, but ... a definition of `good faith' [is] supplied. Id. at 11-12. It is that definition that is at issue here. As we noted in Brite I, [t]he jurisdictional statute for county courts at law values the matter in controversy on the amount of damages `alleged' by the plaintiff. ... Brite I, 215 S.W.3d at 402-03 (quoting TEX. GOV'T CODE § 25.0003(c)(1)). Here, Brite's petition omitted the statement required by our rulesthat the damages sought are within the jurisdictional limits of the court, TEX.R. CIV. P. 47(b)and instead pleaded only that his damages exceeded $500. Brite has never contended that he was unaware of or confused about the county court's jurisdictional limitation. See, e.g., Clary Corp. v. Smith, 949 S.W.2d 452, 461 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (noting that 16.064 did not apply because there [was] no evidence of mistake here, as plaintiffs have neither alleged nor presented evidence that they were unaware of the trial court's amount in controversy limits). While such confusion would be understandable, as other statutory county courts (even those in one county adjacent to Bexar County) [10] have no such restriction, he instead argued that the amount in controversy should not be calculated by the damages originally sued for, but instead by the amount of damages that, more likely than not, the plaintiff would recover. Brite I, 215 S.W.3d at 402. We rejected that argument, concluding that [t]he amount in controversy in this case exceeded $100,000 at the time Brite filed suit. Id. at 403. The parties disagree about the proper standard for intentional disregard under the tolling statute, which requires that USAA show[] in abatement that the first filing was made with intentional disregard of proper jurisdiction. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE § 16.064(b). Brite contends that intent is always a fact issue, inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment, while USAA asserts it has met its burden through circumstantial evidence of Brite's intent and that Brite is charged with knowledge of the law. We have never before addressed this issue. We agree, in part, with USAA. Once an adverse party has moved for relief under the intentional disregard provision, the nonmovant must show that he did not intentionally disregard proper jurisdiction when filing the case. As it is the nonmovant who has this information, he should bear the burden of producing it. Cf. Brown v. Shores, 77 S.W.3d 884, 889 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (Brister, J., concurring) (noting that, because diligent-service question focuses almost entirely on the efforts and thoughts of plaintiff's counsel, so the initial burden of presenting evidence should rest there, too; [o]therwise, every one of these numerous cases will begin with the defendant sending a notice to depose plaintiff's counsel and a subpoena for all files). We disagree, however, that a plaintiff's mistake about the court's jurisdiction would never satisfy the requirement. Section 16.064's intent standard is similar to that required for setting aside a default judgment, see Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939) (requiring new trial if defendant proves three elements, the first of which is that default was neither intentional nor due to conscious indifference), and we have held that a mistake of law may be a sufficient excuse, Bank One, Tex., N.A. v. Moody, 830 S.W.2d 81, 84 (Tex.1992). Moreover, section 16.064 was drafted precisely because capable lawyers often make good faith mistakes about the jurisdiction of Texas courts. See SECOND ANNUAL REPORT, at 11; see also CITIZENS' COMMISSION ON THE TEXAS JUDICIAL SYSTEM, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS-INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY, at 17 (1993) (No one person understands or can hope to understand all the nuances and intricacies of Texas' thousands of trial courts.). But while the tolling statute protects plaintiffs who mistakenly file suit in a forum that lacks jurisdiction, it does not apply to a strategic decision to seek relief from such a courtwhich is what happened here. Hotvedt v. Schlumberger, Ltd. (N.V.), 942 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply section 16.064 because [i]t is clear ... that errors in [an attorney's] tactical decisions were not meant to be remedied by the savings statute); Clary, 949 S.W.2d at 461 (holding that [s]ection 16.064 was not intended to remedy ... tactical decisions); see also Brite I, 161 S.W.3d at 586 (Duncan, J., dissenting) (noting that the record, taken as a whole, establishes that Brite's trial attorney filed the Original Petition with full knowledge that Brite sought far more than $100,000 in actual damages and purposefully drafted the Original Petition to conceal that fact by omitting the statement required by Rule 47(b)). Because Brite unquestionably sought damages in excess of the county court at law's jurisdiction, it matters not that he subjectively anticipated a verdict within the jurisdictional limits. For that reason, limitations was not tolled. His second suit, filed long after the expiration of the two-year statute, is therefore barred.