Opinion ID: 11538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: restriction of cross examination regarding witness bias

Text: 28 All five appellants, Cushman, Holloman, Landerman, Hanks, and Zeigler, argue that the district court violated their confrontation rights under the Sixth Amendment by improperly restricting defense counsel's cross examination that was intended to demonstrate bias on the part of Grant Ottesen, a prosecution witness. More specifically, the district court prohibited the appellants from questioning Ottesen regarding his pending felony charge in state court and any effect it might have on his motivation to testify in the instant federal proceeding. 11 The Government counters that the pending charge was not relevant to Ottesen's motive to testify against the appellants and that the appellants were otherwise allowed to fully cross examine him. 12 29 Although the scope of cross examination is within the discretion of the district court, that discretionary authority comes about only after sufficient cross examination has been granted to satisfy the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 278 (5th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 807, 115 S.Ct. 54, 130 L.Ed.2d 13 (1994). The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment is satisfied where defense counsel has been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To show an abuse of discretion, the appellants must show that the limitations imposed on cross examination were clearly prejudicial. Restivo, 8 F.3d at 278. 30 Prior to testifying at the appellants' trial, Ottesen, pursuant to a written plea agreement, pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud in connection with the offenses that are the subject of this appeal. Ottesen's plea agreement provided that [u]pon request of the defendant, [the] United States agrees to bring to the attention of any other prosecuting authority the nature and extent of the defendant's cooperation. The plea agreement was admitted into evidence. At the time he pleaded guilty to the two federal offenses, Ottesen had a pending delivery of cocaine charge in state court. The Government filed a motion in limine seeking to prohibit the appellants from questioning Ottesen regarding the pending charge, which the district court granted. 31 During the instant trial, Ottesen testified that he pleaded guilty to one count of mail fraud and one count of wire fraud and that he was awaiting sentencing. The plea agreement provided that, at sentencing, the Government would move to dismiss Ottesen's 15 remaining counts in the indictment. Additionally, the Government had agreed that, prior to sentencing, it would make known to the court the nature and extent of Ottesen's cooperation. The agreement further provided that the Government may seek a substantial assistance reduction in Ottesen's sentence under § 5K should the Defendant, in addition to full cooperation, substantially assist the United States and law enforcement agencies in investigating and prosecuting criminal matters. On cross examination, when asked whether he considered the Government's dismissal of the remaining counts a benefit, Ottesen replied that he was not putting any weight on that. He did acknowledge that the possibility of obtaining sentence reduction would be a benefit. 32 Defense counsel tendered cross examination questions regarding the pending state charge, and the district court allowed Ottesen to answer those questions outside the presence of the jury. 13 Ottesen admitted that the state case, which carried a potential life sentence, was pending when he entered into the plea bargain with the Government. When asked whether he expected the Government to make a favorable recommendation to the state prosecutor regarding his cooperation, Ottesen answered that he did not know and that it had not been discussed. 14 33 Defense counsel then offered the testimony, arguing that it showed Ottesen's motive to testify, his bias, and his prejudice. The court responded as follows: Well, I haven't heard him say anything that would cause you to think that that's so. So if that's the reason it's being offered, I will exclude the testimony. Even if it had some slight relevance, its improper or undue prejudicial effect would outweigh it. 34 Contrary to the district court's holding, [t]he partiality of a witness is subject to exploration at trial, and is always relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We acknowledge that a district court is afforded broad discretion in determining the probative value of evidence to determine its admissibility. United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 50, 105 S.Ct. 465, 468, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). Further, it is well established that a district court may impose reasonable limits on defense counsel's questioning into the potential bias of a government witness to prevent harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that [would be] repetitive or only marginally relevant. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232, 109 S.Ct. 480, 483, 102 L.Ed.2d 513 (1988). Of course, as set forth previously, until we determine that the cross examination satisfied the Sixth Amendment, the district court's discretion does not come into play. Restivo, supra. 35 In the case at bar, after hearing Ottesen's answers to the proffered questions, the district court stated that Ottesen apparently did not interpret the clause in the plea agreement to include the state prosecuting authorities. That determination, however, should not have been made by the district court. Instead, the jury, as the trier of fact, should have been allowed to draw its own inferences regarding Ottesen's credibility and determine what effect, if any, the pending criminal charge had on Ottesen's motivation to testify. Cf. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. at 232, 109 S.Ct. at 483 (stating that speculation regarding prejudice caused by evidence of bias cannot justify exclusion of cross examination). 36 The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959)); accord Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. at 231, 109 S.Ct. at 483. Additionally, this Court has made clear that the right to cross examination is particularly important when the witness is critical to the prosecution's case. United States v. Mizell, 88 F.3d 288, 293 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 620, 136 L.Ed.2d 543 (1996). Counsel should be allowed great latitude in cross examining a witness regarding his motivation or incentive to falsify testimony, and this is especially so when cross examining an accomplice or a person cooperating with the Government. United States v. Hall, 653 F.2d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir.1981). Indeed, the right of cross examination: 37 is so important that the defendant is allowed to search for a deal between the government and the witness, even if there is no hard evidence that such a deal exists. What tells, of course, is not the actual existence of a deal but the witness' belief or disbelief that a deal exists. 38 Id. (quoting United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938, 945 (5th Cir.1976)). 39 Here, the jury was informed that Ottesen had pleaded guilty to two federal offenses and was awaiting sentencing. The district court's ruling nevertheless precluded the jury from learning of the pending state charge, which, especially in light of the plea agreement provision to relate Ottesen's cooperation to any other prosecuting authority, would allow the jury to conclude that there was considerable incentive for him to 'slant, unconsciously or otherwise, his testimony in favor of or against a party.'  United States v. Cooks, 52 F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir.1995). 40 In Cooks, the district court allowed cross examination of the prosecution witness regarding his status as a paid criminal informant and his hopes for leniency on certain charges pending in Texas in exchange for his assistance in the investigation. Id. at 103-04. However, the court disallowed cross examination regarding the witness's subsequent Louisiana arrest for purse-snatching or ... the stiff penalties [the witness] faced if convicted on either the Texas or Louisiana charges. Id. at 103. Noting that the pending Texas and Louisiana charges carried possible 99-year and 40-year sentences respectively, we recognized the obvious temptation to slant his testimony in favor of the prosecution. Cooks, 52 F.3d at 104 & n. 13. We thus held that the district court erred in keeping from the jury these pertinent facts that related to the witness's motivation to testify. 15 41 In light of the fact that Ottesen's testimony was critical to the prosecution's case 16 and the pending charge carried the potential of a life sentence, we conclude that the district court erred in prohibiting the appellants from exploring before the jury the effect that Ottesen's pending criminal charge might have on his motivation to testify. Like the jury in Cooks, the jury in the instant case was unaware of the serious pending charge against Ottesen. And given the plea agreement provision that the Government, upon Ottesen's request, would advise any other prosecuting authority about the extent of Ottesen's cooperation in this case, the denial of cross examination and the defendant's right to have the jury properly assess Ottesen's motivation is even more egregious than in Cooks. 42 Next, we must determine whether this Confrontation Clause error was harmless. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 673, 106 S.Ct. at 1438. We consider the following factors to determine whether the error was harmless: the importance of the witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and of course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case. Id. After having extensively reviewed the record, we will consider the evidence in regard to each of the five appellants.
43 It is abundantly clear that Ottesen's testimony was the most important in implicating Zeigler in the conspiracy. Ottesen testified that Zeigler was one of the five persons who were in charge of raising money and appeasing angry investors. Ottesen further testified that these five conspirators met several times a week and that Zeigler was aware that the companies were using in-house references. Ottesen described discussions he had with Zeigler regarding Cushman's falsifying drilling reports. No other witness's testimony comes close to implicating Zeigler to the extent that Ottesen's testimony does. Moreover, the prosecution's case against Zeigler was not strong. The vast majority of the prosecution witnesses neither spoke of nor implicated Zeigler in comparison to the few who testified against him. 17 We are confident that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in regard to Zeigler's conviction.
44 Ottesen's testimony also implicated Hanks in the conspiracy. Ottesen testified that he spoke with Hanks regarding the use of in-house references for the company. He further testified that we had Dave Hanks come in as an independent, [when] he was actually working for the company to appraise this rig and get the rig value over a million dollars, because that's what we were planning on raising. Although other witnesses testified regarding the value of the rig versus the appraisal amount, the other witnesses' testimony was not nearly as inculpatory. 18 We thus conclude that the error was not harmless.
45 Similarly, Ottesen's testimony against Landerman appears significant, if not necessary, to the jury's verdict. Ottesen testified that Landerman basically told [Cushman] how to set up the corporations to funnel the money through and things of that nature, and he tried to get the Hartford set up with a joint venture where we weren't security. He also testified that when Landerman first started coming to the Bedford office Landerman would be standing up on the sales floor and cringe and tell people that you can't be saying that [to the potential investors]. However, [a]s time passed, [Landerman] got a little bit more lenient toward misrepresentations and would just shake his head and laugh about any misrepresentations he overheard the sales brokers make. Landerman admitted to Ottesen that the money used to start Exciting Tans was funneled out of Hartford. Finally, Ottesen testified that Landerman was aware that they were using in-house references. 46 Other witnesses did testify that Landerman structured the financial transactions that form the basis of the two money laundering convictions. Of course, in order to constitute money laundering, the proceeds involved in the transactions must have been from the mail and wire fraud offenses, and the most damning testimony regarding Landerman's knowledge of the fraud came through Ottesen. We therefore cannot conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
47 In regard to Holloman, Ottesen testified that, in Holloman's presence, Cushman stated that the Twin Elephant would not have any production and that he did not intend to spend any more money than had already been spent. Ottesen also asserted that Holloman was one of the five people basically in charge of raising the money and that this group of five met several times a week from December 1990 to December 1991. 19 Ottesen further testified that Holloman was involved in conversations regarding in-house references being used in the company. 48 In contrast to Ottesen's testimony, a fair reading of the entire transcript leaves one with the impression that after the company was formed, Holloman spent virtually all his time at the well site attempting to drill for oil and gas. Indeed, even the Government witnesses testified that Holloman appeared competent while performing his duties at the well sites. Additionally, contrary to Ottesen's testimony, Landerman and Zeigler testified that they did not consider Holloman to be part of the management. 49 Ottesen's testimony regarding Holloman's knowledge of the use of in-house references may be viewed as somewhat cumulative of other witnesses' testimony. Nevertheless, after comparing Ottesen's testimony with the rest of the Government's evidence, we are not prepared to find this error harmless.
50 Finally, we consider Ottesen's testimony against Cushman. Although there was sufficient evidence to convict Cushman without Ottesen's testimony, that is not the appropriate inquiry. As set forth above, Ottesen testified that Cushman stated he knew the Twin Elephant would not have any production and that he did not intend to spend any more money than had already been spent. Ottesen further testified that Cushman confessed that the Twin Elephant wouldn't [amount to] a popcorn cart. Ottesen's testimony was, by far, the most damaging testimony against Cushman. This is the only testimony that we have found that directly shows that Cushman believed the oil and gas projects were simply a sham. 51 Further, closing arguments reveal the importance of Ottesen's testimony against Cushman. The prosecutor relied heavily on Ottesen's testimony to set forth the case against Cushman. In response, Cushman's attorney argued that the only witness that they really base all their case on is--what was that guy's name, the one that talked so fast and--Ottesen. Although it is a close question, after a most careful reading of the record of this multi-week trial, we are not persuaded that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 Therefore, the convictions of Zeigler, Hanks, Landerman, Holloman, and Cushman are vacated.