Opinion ID: 62485
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Diaz’s testimony

Text: Gonzalez Perez argues that the court abused its discretion by refusing to strike Diaz’s testimony because the prosecutor in Robles’s trial had attacked Diaz’s testimony and credibility in closing argument. He contends that his conviction cannot stand in light of the false or perjured testimony and the government’s inconsistent positions in the two cases. Alternatively, Gonzalez Perez asserts that the court erred by denying his request that the court permit him to admit the government’s closing statement from Robles’ trial into evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B) and (d)(2)(D).10 The government responds that the testimony was consistent with the earlier testimony,11 but that even if the closing statement was admissible under Rule 10 Gonzalez Perez also contends the closing statement was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(B)(2) as an adoptive admission. He did not raise this issue at trial. But nevertheless, his argument fails because the statement’s admissibility is still subject to Rule 403's balancing test. 11 There is no merit to Gonzalez Perez’s argument that the government proffered inconsistent arguments in the two trials requiring this court strike the testimony under the doctrine of judicial estoppel. “Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine invoked at a court’s discretion, designed to protect the integrity of the judicial process.” Stephens v. Tolbert, 471 F.3d 1173, 1177 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). A district court may invoke the doctrine “to prevent a party from asserting a claim in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with a claim taken by that party in a previous proceeding.” Id. “[T]he circumstances under which judicial estoppel should be invoked are not reducible to a general formulation of principle,” but courts have traditionally looked at three factors: (1) whether a later position asserted by a party was 20 801(d), it was subject to the balancing test of Rule 403, and as such was properly excluded as potentially confusing to the jury. In United States v. DeLoach, 34 F.3d 1001 (11th Cir. 1994), the defendant sought to have the court admit the government’s closing statement from the trial of a codefendant on the grounds that the statement was inconsistent with the government’s position in the current trial. This court explained that such statements are admissible where they are: “(1) ‘assertions of fact’ that are the ‘equivalent of a testimonial statement by the [client];’ and 2) ‘inconsistent with similar assertions in a subsequent trial.’” Id. at 1005 (quoting United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1984). Here, the court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to strike Diaz’s testimony. Diaz’s statements were consistent with his testimony in Robles’s trial. Upon review of the records, we agree that the sequence of events was confusing and, as the government explained, it simply misunderstood Diaz’s clearly inconsistent with an earlier position; (2) whether a party succeeded in persuading a court to accept an earlier position, “so that judicial acceptance of an inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create the perception that either the first or the second court was misled”; and (3) whether the party with an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. Id. Here, there is no reason for us to apply this doctrine. The government’s statements were consistent and nothing about the statements would mislead the court or result in an unfair advantage. 21 testimony in the earlier trial when it made the statements during closing.12 Even if this evidence was admissible under Rule 801(d), the court must balance admissibility with potential prejudice. Here, the closing argument from Robles’s trial would have confused or misled the jury. Thus, under Rule 403's balancing test, the court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the evidence.