Opinion ID: 173192
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Loss of Tax-Deferred 401(k) Plan

Text: Mr. O’Toole argues that the district court erred by failing to address arguments he made regarding the amount of damages he should be awarded for no longer having his money in a tax-deferred 401(k) plan. 4 But Northrop Grumman asserts that this is a new theory of damages, and that the district court was not obligated on remand to consider this new theory or the accompanying new evidence. We agree. Mr. O’Toole did not include this theory of damages in his pretrial order, see Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 858-59; or his proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, see id. at 887-88. Mr. O’Toole did not identify this theory of damages in his testimony at trial. See Aplt. Supp. App. at 143-93 (using demonstrative exhibit and testifying item by item about damages). 5 Nor was the 4 Mr. O’Toole relies on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Oddi v. Ayco Corp., 947 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1991), to support this theory of damages. See Aplt. Br. at 37. 5 Although the demonstrative exhibit is not part of the record, there is another exhibit titled “Reimbursement to Joseph A. O’Toole” that appears to (continued...) -12- theory presented in his first post-trial brief after this court’s second remand, see Aplt. App., Vol. V at 941-58, or as part of his appeal in O’Toole III. See 499 F.3d at 1220-21 (identifying damage claims that district court awarded or denied and identifying Mr. O’Toole’s contentions on appeal). Accordingly, it was not identified as an issue for the district court to reconsider on remand. See id. at 1222-27. Mr. O’Toole first raised this theory to the district court in 1998 in his second post-trial brief on remand after O’Toole III. See Aplt. App., Vol. VI at 1043-50. But our directions to the district court on remand did not involve the reopening of the trial or the consideration of new issues. See O’Toole III, 499 F.3d at 1227 (“On remand, the district court should make specific and detailed findings regarding the matters left open by our opinion.” (emphasis added)). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to address this new theory of damages. See Mason, 182 F.3d at 1215; Otero, 628 F.2d at 1272. 5 (...continued) track most of the damages identified in the demonstrative exhibit. Compare Aplt. Supp. App. at 143-93 with Aplt. App., Vol. III at 837-38. -13- D. Prejudgment Interest on Award for Lost Principal Mr. O’Toole sought consequential damages for the one-year delay in his ability to purchase a home in the form of lost principal payments that he would have made, if he had been able to purchase a home. Relying on Mr. O’Toole’s mortgage payments once he did purchase a home, the district court concluded that this lost principal would amount to approximately $2,000. See Aplt. App. at 993, Vol. V. The district court awarded this amount without prejudgment interest, but did not offer any explanation for this part of its decision. See id. In O’Toole III, we noted that it was difficult to review the district court’s exercise of discretion on this claim because the court gave no explanation for denying prejudgment interest. See 499 F.3d at 1226. Accordingly, we remanded this claim “for further elaboration.” Id. On remand, the district court explained that the $2,000 award: was premised on actual mortgage payments which the plaintiff made at a later date when he did purchase a house. The amount was not in any way liquidated or settled at the time the plaintiff purchased his home in 1998, and of course, we have no evidence as to what he actually would have paid during the period of 1997-1998, resulting in an increase in the equity in his home. As this was essentially an estimate based upon subsequent events, the Court concluded that it would be unfair to grant the plaintiff prejudgment interest on that amount. Aplt. App., Vol. VI at 1138. Although Mr. O’Toole contends that the district court erred in denying him prejudgment interest on this claim, we will uphold a district court’s decision -14- denying an award of prejudgment interest unless the district court abused its discretion. See F.D.I.C. v. Rocket Oil Co., 865 F.2d 1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1989). We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision declining to award prejudgment interest on the award for lost principal. See id. and n.1 (explaining that district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant prejudgment interest and noting that under this standard, “a trial court’s decision will not be disturbed unless the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that the lower court made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances”).