Opinion ID: 198984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severance of the Cases of Rios-Rios, Collazo-Aponte, and Merced-Morales

Text: 46 Severance motions made pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14 are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. This Court will interfere with the exercise of that discretion only upon a demonstration of manifest abuse. United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir. 1990); see alsoUnited States v. Cresta, 825 F.2d 538, 554 (1st Cir. 1987);Talavera v. Pena, 668 F.2d 625, 630 (1st Cir. 1982). Accordingly, in order to prevail, appellants must make a strong showing of prejudice. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246 (quoting United States v.Porter, 764 F.2d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 1985)). In this context, prejudice means more than just a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial. United States v. Martinez, 479 F.2d 824, 828 (1st Cir. 1973). As we have previously stated: 47 This is a difficult battle for a defendant to win. There is always some prejudice in any trial where more than one offense or offender are tried together -- but such garden variety prejudice, in and of itself, will not suffice. Even where large amounts of testimony are irrelevant to one defendant, or where one defendant's involvement in an overall agreement is far less than the involvement of others, we have been reluctant to secondguess severance denials. 48 Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246 (citations omitted); see also Cresta, 825 F.2d at 554-55 ([T]he fact that the defendant plays a minor role and that a substantial portion of the evidence is not directly related to the defendant, does not make it 'automatically unlawful to try him with more important figures.' (quoting United States v.Mahomud Rawwad, 807 F.2d 294, 295 (1st Cir. 1986)). 49 Here, Rios-Rios, Collazo-Aponte, and Merced-Morales contend that they suffered prejudicial spillover from the murder evidence presented in this case. We are well aware of the potential for prejudice in a complicated conspiracy trial involving several defendants. See, e.g., United States v. Smolar, 557 F.2d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 1977); Gorin v. United States, 313 F.2d 641, 646 (1st Cir. 1963). Nonetheless, in this case we see little beyond the type and degree of prejudice customary in virtually all high-profile trials of multiple defendants and charges. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246. Here, as in Boylan, [t]here is nothing to suggest that the number of defendants and charges was so large that the jury could not distinguish among them. Id.; see also United States v. Luna, 585 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1978). Furthermore, the trial court gave appropriate limiting instructions as to the admissibility of evidence against particular defendants and as to the need to determine guilt on an individual basis. See United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1452 (1st Cir. 1992) ([E]ven assuming some evidentiary spillover, any prejudice was minimized by the limiting instructions given before and after the closing arguments.); see also Boylan,898 F.2d at 246; Smolar, 557 F.2d at 21. 1 Under these circumstances, we hold that appellants have failed to make a strong showing of prejudice. Boylan, 898 F.2d at 246 (quoting Porter, 764 F.2d at 12). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants' Rule 14 motion. 50