Opinion ID: 1139609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: CREDIT ALLIANCE CORPORATION v. M & M BROKERAGE, INC.

Text: Credit Alliance Corporation appeals from a judgment entered against it in favor of M & M Brokerage, Inc. In its complaint, M & M alleged that Credit Alliance failed to credit it with an interest rebate when M & M made an accelerated payment of its indebtedness due on a dragline that was financed by Credit Alliance. In its pre-trial order, the trial court ruled that Credit Alliance was required under Code 1975, § 5-19-4(c), to make the disputed rebate, and it entered summary judgment against Credit Alliance. The consolidated cases later were tried before a jury on other unresolved claims of the parties. After summary judgment was entered against it, Credit Alliance moved for a reconsideration of the trial court's order, raising for the first time the defense that Georgia law controlled the dragline loan. Credit Alliance contended that under Georgia law, no refund of any time-price differential was required for early prepayment of a commercial installment debt. The trial court denied Credit Alliance's motion to reconsider and a judgment in the amount of $11,468.06 was entered against it at the conclusion of trial. Credit Alliance maintains the trial court erred by not reconsidering the order granting summary judgment against it. Under Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P., Credit Alliance points out that the grant of summary judgment was interlocutory in nature because it disposed of fewer than all the claims of the parties. Credit Alliance notes further that under Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P., the order of summary judgment against it was subject to revision at any time before final judgment on all the parties' claims. It concludes, therefore, that the trial court should have reconsidered its order, applied Georgia law, and entered judgment in its favor. For reasons discussed herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and do not reach the conflicts of law issue advanced by Credit Alliance. A party desiring to raise an issue concerning the law of another jurisdiction must comply with Rule 44.1, A.R.C.P. In pertinent part, Rule 44.1, A.R.C.P., provides that The party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of another state or of any territory or dependency of the United States or of a foreign country shall give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. Contained in that provision is the requirement that an issue of foreign law shall be raised in a timely manner. Credit Alliance did not raise the issue of the applicability of Georgia law in its pleadings. We, therefore, look to the notice provided in Credit Alliance's motion to reconsider to determine whether it timely raised its conflicts of law issue. The complaint in this case was filed by M & M on June 28, 1977. In its pre-trial order of September 27, 1979, the trial court ruled that the Mini-Code applied to the disputed transaction, and rendered summary judgment in favor of M & M. A supplementary pre-trial order was rendered on February 20, 1980. Credit Alliance, on February 27, 1980, filed its motion to reconsider and revise the trial court's ruling on summary judgment, contending for the first time that the law of Georgia controlled the dragline loan. The consolidated cases were tried before a jury beginning on March 5, 1980, and a verdict was returned on March 14, 1980. Credit Alliance's motion, thus, was filed almost three years after M & M commenced action, nearly five months after the trial court's initial pre-trial order and ruling on summary judgment, and one week before trial. This court has stated that there are two relevant factors to be considered in determining a party's compliance with the notice requirement of Rule 44.1, A.R.C.P. These factors are reasonable notice to the adversary and closeness of trial date. Semo Aviation, Inc. v. Southeastern Airways Corp., 360 So.2d 936, at 941 (Ala.1978). Under the facts of this case, we are unable to find that Credit Alliance provided timely or reasonable notice of its intention to raise the issue of the applicability of Georgia law. We discern no justifiable reason, and Credit Alliance advances none, to allow us to conclude that the issue of the applicability of Georgia law arose late in the case so as to make timely Credit Alliance's motion. We reject Credit Alliance's argument that the main issue on M & M's claim for an interest rebate was whether the Mini-Code applied to a commercial transaction, and that it properly waited until the resolution of that issue before arguing the applicability of Georgia law to the loan. Whether Georgia law applied is a defense that was capable of being raised from the beginning of this litigation. The fact that an alternate defense, or issue, concerning the applicability of the Mini-Code also existed and was being litigated did not relieve Credit Alliance of the duty to raise its conflicts of law defense in a timely manner under Rule 44.1, A.R. C.P. There is nothing improper in raising more than one defense, even though the favorable resolution of one may moot resolution of another. To hold otherwise would allow a defendant to withhold presenting potentially viable and timely defenses until the resolution of an alternate defense. The resultant delay that such a holding would foster would be inconsistent with Rule 1(c), A.R.C.P., which provides that our rules of procedure shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action. Credit Alliance correctly argues that the partial summary judgment rendered by the trial court was subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the parties' claims, rights, and liabilities, under Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P. Although it is true that the partial summary judgment in this case was subject to revision as Credit Alliance argues, such revision was not mandatory upon the trial court where Credit Alliance failed to raise its conflicts of law issue in a timely manner. Whether a trial court revises a partial grant of summary judgment, as allowed by Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P., is a matter of discretion which, absent an abuse, we will not disturb. United States v. Desert Gold Mining Company, 433 F.2d 713 (9th Cir. 1970); Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 479 F.Supp. 1130 (E.D.N.Y.1979), rev'd on other grounds, 632 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1980); See: Wheeler v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 324 F.Supp. 818 (D.S.C.1971). In this case the trial court could have properly, within its discretion, declined to entertain Credit Alliance's motion to reconsider. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. AFFIRMED.