Opinion ID: 797934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel/ Batson: Jimmy Ray and Kenneth

Text: 55 Jimmy Ray and Kenneth claim their appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the district court's decision to allow the government's peremptory challenge to a prospective juror, Carl Pratt. During jury selection, defense counsel objected under Batson, explaining that only two members of the panel were people of color and that one was already excused for cause. Defense counsel stated: There is one other person and that's Mr. Pratt. I'd say that he is a black man. I don't know for sure, but he certainly looks like a black man to me. And he has been summarily excused by the prosecution. 56 The district court then requested a response from Assistant United States Attorney Brian Delaney. Delaney responded with surprise, apparently because he and none of the people sitting with him thought that Pratt was a black man. The court then stated, Your non-discriminatory reason for challenging him is because you did not know that he was an ethic [sic] minority; is that a fair statement? Delaney responded, That's true, but we had reasons why we dismissed him that had nothing to do with race. Delaney provided four reasons: 57 [1] He is only 46 years old and he shows that he is retired. That kind of concerns me, someone who isn't working and involved in the community. [2] Another concern was that instead of getting workmen's comp if it was a back injury he had, he didn't even get any, it makes me wonder about the suspicious circumstances that might have surrounded his leaving work. Usually people who are legitimately injured get compensation for that loss, rightfully, and he did not, which makes me subject to think that perhaps there was something missing there. He said he had resigned from his employment. Just suspicious circumstances. I mean, it's not illegal to do it, but it makes me wonder about the person. [3] He failed to place in the upper-hand left corner or right corner the city from which he lived. [4] I did notice, it's just my own feelings, that he had an earring that we could notice in his left ear. I tend to kick some people off, males that have earrings, just because sometimes a lot of law enforcement officers wear them, but just as an idea of whether someone is conservative or not. That's somewhat unusual. That's the only male on the panel that's wearing an earring. And whether that is a good reason or not, it was one of the reasons. 58 The district court responded, correctly, that it doesn't have to be a good reason, it has to be a non-discriminatory reason. He then gave defense counsel an opportunity to respond. Defense counsel responded to Delaney's worker's compensation reason by pointing out that 59 Mr. Pratt told this court why he did not bother to get worker's comp. He said his wife had died last year and that he was getting over that and working through all that. There is nothing unusual about that. If Mr. Delaney is telling you that's his reason, I think it's not a good reason. I realize it's probably a non-discriminatory reason, but it's not a very good reason. 60 Defense counsel also discussed the earring: [t]he fact he has an earring, I can't believe that's a reason the government goes around getting rid of people. Defense counsel continued, explaining that he is looking for black people on my juries, especially when I look around and see eight black defendants sitting behind eight white lawyers. There ought to be black people on juries and I don't believe that this is a valid reason for peremptory challenging this juror. I think they have expressed discriminatory reasons for getting rid of this. The court then asked, What was the discriminatory reason they expressed? Defense counsel responded, The earring seems, to which the court replied, White people wear earrings. Defense counsel then attempted again to articulate a rationale for his feeling that prosecutors challenged Pratt for a discriminatory reason: 61 I can't express it, other than to say that what they've expressed is inadequate. It doesn't explain to me why they got rid of Mr. Pratt. There is no reason that I can see, other than the fact I think he is black and that's why they got rid of him. That's my belief. The court concluded as follows: 62 As far as Mr. Pratt is concerned, the Court's observations are that his race was unclear. He didn't put anything on his card, nor did he say that he was or was not a member of some race. Like Mr. Mitchell, I believe him to be a black man. But that's how I look at things. I have to accept the word of Mr. Lennon and Mr. Delaney and Mr. DiBrito when they tell me they did not think so. And for that reason the motion is denied. 63 The district court then offered defense counsel the opportunity to cross-examine or examine people from the clerk's office who selected this jury to give defense counsel the chance to investigate why there were only two black people on the panel. Defense counsel declined this opportunity. Before bringing the jury back into the courtroom, the court stated, Mr. Delaney, I'll give you a chance to reconsider on Pratt. I think he was black. I'm not going to honor the objection. But if you, now having been told he is black, want to invite him back on the jury, you may. Delaney responded, I don't agree with the assertion that he is black. I mean, I don't understand that, Your Honor, by saying now that he is black. I mean, I can only say. The court then said, 64 I'll let you in on a little tip. When I asked the question about are any of you black, he nodded affirmatively. He's the only person who did. I said, I don't think any of you are African-American, but I don't know. He clearly indicated he was an African-American. Clearly. But you had to be looking to see it. If you weren't looking, you didn't see it. 65 Delaney responded, I can only say for the record I didn't see it, it never even crossed my mind, Your Honor. The court said, Again, I'm inviting you to invite him back, but I'm not requiring you to. Delaney responded, I would still, I mean, peremptory challenge I have non-discriminatory purpose for doing it and I'm going to stand by that. The court replied, And I upheld it. Bring the jury back without Mr. Pratt. Tell him he is excused.
66 Defendants raising claims of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel must meet Strickland 's two-prong test. McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 699 (6th Cir.2004). In the appellate context, the court must first assess the strength of the claim appellate counsel failed to raise. Counsel's failure to raise an issue on appeal could only be ineffective assistance if there is a reasonable probability that inclusion of the issue would have changed the result of the appeal. Id. As the court in McFarland explained, [i]f there is a reasonable probability that [the defendant] would have prevailed on appeal had the claim been raised, we can then consider whether the claim's merit was so compelling that appellate counsel's failure to raise it amounted to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Id. at 700. In order to assess the effectiveness of Jimmy Ray's and Kenneth's appellate counsel, then, the court must first consider whether a Batson claim on appeal had a reasonable probability of success. Applying this court's precedent to the facts in the record, a Batson claim had little probability of success. 67 The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In assessing Batson claims, we employ a three-step analysis: Under Batson, a defendant must first establish a prima facie case showing that the prosecution exercised peremptory strikes on the basis of race. If the defendant satisfies this requirement, the prosecution must articulate a race-neutral explanation for the challenges. The trial court must then decide if the defendant has carried the burden of proving purposeful discrimination. United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712). 68 In assessing the prosecutor's articulated reasons, the Supreme Court has provided, and the district correctly recognized, that [t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible. . . . [T]he issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation. Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767-68, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995). Our review of the district court's resolution of the ultimate issue— whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination—is limited: [b]ecause this determination turns largely on the evaluation of credibility, reviewing courts give the findings of the district court great deference. United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 586 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712). We may reverse that finding of fact only where we find clear error. United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 369, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court counseled in Purkett, the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769. 69 Although the district court in this case could have provided a more precise analysis of the issue, the record reveals no clear error in the court's finding that there was no discrimination. The prosecutor articulated several reasons, none of which contained discriminatory undertones or implications. The district court considered the government's reasons and provided defense counsel the opportunity to meet his burden by showing a discriminatory implication in Delaney's statements, but defense counsel did not meet his burden and instead merely said that he had a belief that the government's reasons were discriminatory. This belief does not meet defense counsel's ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation[, which] rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike. Id. The district court ultimately denied the objection, stating that Pratt's race was unclear and he had to accept the word of the prosecutors that they were unaware of Pratt's race and thus did not strike him for that reason. In other words, the district judge found Delaney's explanation credible, and this kind of determination is given great deference. Harris, 192 F.3d at 586 (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712). Therefore, the district court's Batson ruling was not clear error. 3 Given this conclusion, Jimmy Ray's and Kenneth's in effective-assistance-of-appellate-counsel claims must also fail, as they cannot show that their appellate counsel failed to include an issue that had a reasonable probability of changing the result of the appeal. See McFarland, 356 F.3d at 699.