Opinion ID: 2320677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the retaliatory eviction defense

Text: Tenants contend that in allocating the burden of proof, the trial court failed to follow the Court's direction in Gokey v. Bessette, 154 Vt. 560, 580 A.2d 488 (1990). In Gokey, we held that the retaliatory eviction statute, 9 V.S.A. § 4465(a)(2), did not contemplate use of a subjective test for evaluating what is retaliatory conduct. Id. at 564, 580 A.2d at 491. We reasoned [a] subjective test would effectively establish such a high burden of proof for tenants that the benefit the Legislature intended to confer would be an illusion. Id. Contrary to tenants' claim here, Gokey did not relieve tenants of their burden to prove a retaliatory eviction. Instead, it relieved tenants of the obligation to establish retaliation by proving landlords' subjective intent. Gokey imposed an objective test for evaluating what is and is not retaliatory. Under this test, tenants can rely on the surrounding facts and circumstances to fulfill their burden of proving retaliatory eviction. Id. Nevertheless, tenants argue that the court's conclusion that retaliatory eviction is a statutory defense, and therefore, it is the defendants' burden to prove the defense, is erroneous. Retaliatory eviction can be raised as a separate cause of action entitling tenants to damages and attorney's fees or as a defense. 9 V.S.A. § 4465(b). In the present action, tenants raised retaliatory eviction as an affirmative defense. As the party asserting the affirmative defense, tenants have the burden of proving that defense. See V.R.C.P. 8(c); Western Land Office, Inc. v. Cervantes, 175 Cal.App.3d 724, 220 Cal.Rptr. 784, 789 (1985) (the tenant claiming the landlord is guilty of wrongdoing has burden of proving retaliatory eviction). Tenants rely on cases from other jurisdictions as support for their argument that landlords have the burden to disprove the retaliation claim or produce evidence of another legitimate, nonretaliatory motive. The cases relied on by tenants, however, interpret statutes and ordinances that codify a presumption of retaliation once a notice to vacate or quit follows a tenant complaint. See, e.g., Youssef v. United Management Co., 683 A.2d 152, 154 (D.C.1996) (statute imposes burden on landlord to come forward with clear and convincing evidence to rebut the presumption of retaliatory action); Hillview Assocs. v. Bloomquist, 440 N.W.2d 867, 871 (Iowa 1989) (in an action by or against the tenant, evidence of a complaint within six months prior to the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation); Perreault v. Parker, 490 A.2d 203, 205 (Me. 1985) (a presumption of retaliation by the landlord arises if within six months prior to the commencement of the action the tenant has made a good faith complaint of conditions affecting health and safety of apartment, and no writ of possession may issue in the absence of rebuttal of the presumption of retaliation); Barnes v. Weis Management Co., 347 N.W.2d 519, 521 (Minn.App.1984) (statute imposes burden of proving nonretaliatory purpose on landlord if notice to quit was served within ninety days of the date of any act of the tenant to secure or enforce contract or statutory rights or good faith reporting to a governmental authority); Parkin v. Fitzgerald, 307 Minn. 423, 240 N.W.2d 828, 831 (1976) (applying Minnesota statute); Fromet Properties, Inc. v. Buel, 294 N.J.Super. 601, 684 A.2d 83, 90-91 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.1996) (statute creates a presumption of a retaliatory motive under certain circumstances); Cornell v. Dimmick, 73 Misc.2d 384, 342 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (City Ct.1973) (holding city ordinance states that receipt of notice to quit a dwelling creates a rebuttable presumption that such notice is a reprisal against the tenant for making a complaint to city officials about code violation); Karas v. Floyd, 2 Ohio App.3d 4, 440 N.E.2d 563, 566 (1981) (statute shifts burden to landlord once the tenant has shown that the landlord's decision to evict was in response to the tenant's complaints regarding housing code violations). Tenants urge this Court to read into Vermont's retaliatory eviction statute a presumption of retaliation or some other burden shifting provision. The legislative history of the statute, however, does not support their contention. The first draft of the legislation establishing the rights, obligations and remedies of landlords and tenants under residential agreements, now contained in Title 9, chapter 137, included such a presumption. As originally drafted in 1985, House Bill 339, the source legislation of the current statute, contained the following provision in subsection (b): In an action by or against the tenant, evidence of an act listed in subsection (a) [containing protections identical to those found currently in 9 V.S.A. § 4465(a)(1)(3)] of this section within three months before the alleged act of retaliation creates a presumption that the landlord's conduct was in retaliation unless and until credible evidence is introduced which would support a finding of legitimate purpose for the action. Such evidence includes but is not limited to inflation, increases in municipal taxes, fees and assessments, utilities, fuel and costs of amortizing improvements. The presumption does not arise if the tenant made the complaint after notice of a proposed rent increase or diminution of services. [2] 1985, H. 339 (Vt., Bien.Sess.) This provision was deleted by the House Judiciary Committee before it was passed to the Senate for consideration. House Cal. 275-87 (Feb. 26, 1986, Vt., Adj.Sess.); Sen. Jour. 569 (April 22, 1986, Vt. Adj. Sess.). The presumption of retaliation provision was not revived in the version of H. 339 finally enacted by the General Assembly. 1985, No. 175 (Adj.Sess.), § 1. The Legislature's deliberate omission of a retaliatory presumption evinces its rejection of altering the burden of proof for the affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction in 9 V.S.A. § 4465. See State v. Cattanach, 129 Vt. 57, 60, 271 A.2d 828, 829-30 (1970). We refuse to insert into the statute a presumption expressly rejected by the Legislature. See Shea v. Pilette, 108 Vt. 446, 450, 189 A. 154, 156 (1937) (the courts are not at liberty to supply that which the lawmakers have advertently omitted) (quotations omitted). See also Western Land Office, 220 Cal.Rptr. at 789-90. (By specifically discarding a rebuttable presumption in favor of the tenant, the legislature left on the tenant the burden of proving retaliatory eviction by a preponderance of the evidence.). Accordingly, we hold that the court correctly assigned to tenants the burden of proving their affirmative defense of retaliatory eviction.