Opinion ID: 773406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inapplicability of the Continuing Violation Theory to Phase I

Text: 91 We agree, however, with the district court's conclusion that Fitzgerald's claim of sexual harassment in Phase I was not saved by the continuing violation theory. Although Fitzgerald stated that Gerling had subjected her to unwanted sexual overtures daily from the time he arrived in August 1994 until sometime in April 1995, her assertions make it clear that his sexual advances ceased at the end of that period. Though Gerling then proceeded in Phase II to harass Fitzgerald for having rejected his propositions, the Phase II abuse was qualitatively different from his Phase I conduct. 92 While it may be difficult in some cases to pinpoint the precise time at which the supervisor ceased to make sexual advances and began to punish the employee for rebuffing those advances, Fitzgerald's version of the events presents us with no such difficulty here. None of Fitzgerald's evidence suggests that during the 2½-year period after April 1995 Gerling either made any further sexually suggestive comments to Fitzgerald or offered to abate his abuse and unwarranted criticisms of her work if she would relent and become intimate with him. 93 Accordingly, the daily abuse during Phase II and the profane and physically intimidating tirade unleashed by Gerling on September 25, 1997, even if motivated by Fitzgerald's rejection of his sexual propositions, cannot reasonably be viewed as a continuation of such propositions. We thus conclude that the Phase I claim could not be deemed timely under the continuing violation theory. Summary judgment dismissing that claim was proper. 94 In affirming the dismissal of that claim, however, we do not mean to suggest that evidence of Gerling's sexual advances and Fitzgerald's rebuffs in Phase I would not be relevant or admissible to show Gerling's motivation for his constant harassment of Fitzgerald in Phase II. A plaintiff complaining of sexual harassment must show that the treatment of which she complains was motivated by her gender. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 63-66; Galdieri-Ambrosini v. National Realty & Development Corp., 136 F.3d at 289; Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d at 1042. A statute of limitations does not operate to bar the introduction of evidence that predates the commencement of the limitations period but that is relevant to events during the period. See, e.g., Sir Speedy, Inc. v. L&P Graphics, Inc., 957 F.2d 1033, 1038 (2d Cir. 1992); Black Law Enforcement Officers Association v. City of Akron, 824 F.2d 475, 482-83 (6th Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 798 (5th Cir.) (The statute of limitations is a defense..., not a rule of evidence.... [It] has no bearing on the admissibility of evidence.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 829 (1975). A suggestion that an item of evidence relates to a period that is too remote goes to both the item's relevance and its weight. Although we would be skeptical as to the relevance of Fitzgerald's Phase I evidence if there were a significant hiatus between the end of Phase I and the start of Phase II, we have no serious doubts as to its relevance where there is evidence of a swift transition from entreaty to retribution. Any question as to the weight to be accorded the Phase I evidence in connection with the Phase II claims is, of course, a matter for the jury. See, e.g., Smith v. Lightning Bolt Productions, 861 F.2d 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1988). 95