Opinion ID: 1443077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the Depredation Order Conflicts with Treaties to Which the United States Is a Party

Text: Article II(A) of the Mexico Convention  the only treaty that refers specifically to cormorants  requires [t]he establishment of close seasons, which will prohibit in certain periods of the year the taking of migratory birds.... Mexico Convention, art. II, 50 Stat. at 1312. The plaintiffs interpret this provision to apply to all migratory birds  whether or not they are game birds. In their view, the Depredation Order's failure to provide for a close season renders the order contrary to the treaty and therefore in violation of the MBTA. See 16 U.S.C. § 704 (providing that the MBTA is [s]ubject to the provisions [of] and [designed] in order to carry out the purposes of the conventions). We think that the Mexico Convention itself is ambiguous regarding the question of whether the close seasons requirement applies to all migratory birds. We therefore defer to the FWS's reasonable view that the Convention requires a close season only for game birds, which the parties agree do not include the cormorant. Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty. El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168, 119 S.Ct. 662, 142 L.Ed.2d 576 (1999); see also Sumitomo Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85, 102 S.Ct. 2374, 72 L.Ed.2d 765 (1982) (Although not conclusive, the meaning attributed to treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight.). We will not create ambiguity where none exists, but the text and structure of the Mexico Convention do not express a clear intent regarding the need for a close season for all migratory birds, as opposed to game birds  a category that does not include cormorants. Article II(A) refers to the taking of migratory birds, not the taking of all migratory birds. That section, moreover, creates an exception for private game farms. And Article II(C) specifies the minimum length of a close season when their hunting would be limited, implicitly referring back to the migratory birds referenced in subpart (A). These provisions addressing hunting can reasonably be read to suggest that the migratory birds at issue in Article II(A) include only those that are hunted, i.e., game birds. The distinction drawn in Article IV between game birds and non-game birds does little to clarify the meaning of Article II(A) in this regard. The fact that the states parties to the treaty made this distinction makes it clear enough that they were aware of the differences between the two. They therefore could have specified migratory game birds at Article II(A) had they meant that the requirement of close seasons applied only to game birds. But it is also possible that they viewed this distinction as implied by the kinds of protection described in Article II, some of which clearly apply only to game birds, and some of which do not. The plaintiffs suggest that the references to hunting at subpart (C), and to game farms at subpart (A) restrict the meaning of subpart (A)'s migratory birds only for those specific purposes. The close season requirement remains applicable to all migratory birds. Even if we accept this argument, however, there is nothing in the text or structure of Article II that would foreclose the defendants' contrary interpretation. The plaintiffs' interpretation of Article II(A) is not unreasonable, but the treaty does not unambiguously require such an interpretation. The agency's view  that Article II(A) refers only to migratory game birds  is also a reasonable one, and we therefore are required to accept it. [3]
The plaintiffs contend that the FWS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the Depredation Order. In their view, the Order authoriz[ed] a full-scale assault on the protected birds in the absence of evidence that cormorants were having a widespread impact. Appellants' Br. at 46. We disagree. Although the Depredation Order applies to about half the states, depredation control efforts pursuant to the Depredation Order may take place only where cormorants are found committing or about to commit depredations and under specified conditions. See 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(c)(1). By so limiting control efforts, the Depredation Order provides a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made and is therefore neither arbitrary nor capricious. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856 (internal quotation marks omitted). As the plaintiffs observe, the FWS does not provide evidence that cormorants have a widespread impact on public resources. Appellants' Br. at 46. But it is the FWS's position that the agency was not required to make any such finding to support the Depredation Order. In its review of studies addressing the impact of cormorants on various types of public resources, the FWS noted that negative impacts are typically very site-specific and thus [cormorant]-fish conflicts are most likely to occur on a localized scale, Final Rule, 68 Fed.Reg. at 58,025; that [w]hile large-scale impacts on regional or continental bird populations have not been documented there was evidence that other bird species could be negatively impacted by [cormorants] at a site-specific level, id.; and that cormorants caused significant financial loss at aquaculture facilities and fish hatcheries, which are localized by their nature, id. at 58,026. Studies reviewed by the FWS also concluded that cormorant predation had adverse impacts in states including Wyoming, New York, and states in the Upper Midwest, South, and Mississippi Delta region, whether in the form of cormorant diets skewed heavily towards fish, or economic losses due to cormorant predation at aquaculture or hatchery facilities. As the FWS itself acknowledged, these studies did not provide a full picture of the interaction between cormorants and local resources. The FWS recognized the need for more information about [cormorants] and their impacts on resources across a variety of ecological settings and agreed with critics of the Depredation Order that better information on population status and trends is desirable. Id. at 58,023. What the FWS did establish, though, was that in a large number of states, cormorants were responsible for localized, site-specific harm to public resources, even if not on a state-wide basis. The remaining question, then, is whether the Depredation Order is a reasonable response to this evidence of harm. In light of the limited discretion afforded by the Depredation Order, we conclude that it is. The express intent of the Order is to enhance the ability of resource agencies to deal with immediate, localized [cormorant] damages. Id. And that is precisely what the Depredation Order does. It applies only to the public resources of affected states, 50 C.F.R. § 21.48(b), (c)(1), and takings are permitted only of those cormorants committing or about to commit ... depredations, id. § 21.48(c)(1). All takings must be recorded and detailed in annual reports. The FWS must be notified in advance of activity that would result in the taking of more than 10 percent of a breeding colony. The FWS may also prevent such activity if it is deemed a threat to the long-term sustainability of cormorants. These restrictions adequately limit depredation control activities under the Depredation Order to address the types of harm the FWS specifically found are caused by cormorants. Although, as discussed, there may be some uncertainty in the meaning of depredation, the discretion provided by the Depredation Order to local agencies to determine when depredations occur is not so expansive that it would render the order arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiffs also argue that instead of the Depredation Order, the FWS should have adopted a less drastic liberalized permitting scheme similar to some of the alternatives considered by the FWS. Appellants' Br. at 49. Perhaps such an approach would be a better response than the Depredation Order in providing local agencies with some degree of flexibility, addressing actual cormorant damage, and avoiding unnecessary takings of cormorants. However, the FWS has articulated adequate explanations for its choice not to adopt this, or another, alternative approach, preferring to grant local agencies a degree of flexibility that the FWS thinks will more adequately address resource damages caused by [cormorants] than permit-based approaches. Final Rule, 68 Fed.Reg. at 58,034. It is, of course, typically the case that there are several different possible responses to a given problem, more than one of which may be rational. In this case, the Depredation Order represents one rational response to the problem of cormorant depredation based on evidence available to the FWS, and the FWS has explained its reasons for choosing one rational response over others. This is the limit of our inquiry, see Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), and we therefore conclude that the FWS complied with the APA in adopting the Depredation Order.
In order to adopt the Depredation Order, the FWS was required by NEPA to prepare an EIS that would provide full and fair discussion of significant environmental impacts and ... inform decisionmakers and the public of the reasonable alternatives which would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the quality of the human environment. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1; see 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C). NEPA is a procedural statute that mandates a process rather than a particular result.... [It] does not command an agency to favor any particular course of action, but rather requires the agency to withhold its decision to proceed with an action until it has taken a `hard look' at the environmental consequences. Stewart Park & Reserve Coal., Inc. (SPARC) v. Slater, 352 F.3d 545, 557 (2d Cir.2003) (internal citation omitted). The court's role is to ensure that NEPA's procedural requirements have been satisfied, not to interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action to be taken. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where there is uncertainty regarding the potential effects of an agency action, speculation in an EIS is not precluded, [but] the agency is not obliged to engage in endless hypothesizing as to remote possibilities. County of Suffolk v. Sec'y of Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1379 (2d Cir.1977). Even where this uncertainty arises from disparate state and local regulation that may affect federal action, we have not required detailed information regarding the effects of these regulations in an EIS where such information would be of little or no utility in determining the impact of state and local exercise of regulatory powers, since each of the states and municipalities affected could change its regulations ... between the publication of the EIS and the time when such local regulations would affect the federal action. Id. The plaintiffs point to the lack of site-specific or localized analysis in the EIS as evidence that the FWS violated NEPA's requirement to examine and permit the public to comment on the environmental impact of the proposed Depredation Order. But under the order, the FWS did not commit itself to any site-specific actions, and it would have been largely speculative for the FWS to identify the specific, localized areas where control efforts under the order would take place. We therefore do not think that the FWS was obligated under NEPA to include site-specific analyses in the EIS. Under the Depredation Order, local agencies have discretion to select the particular sites at which to pursue depredation control efforts, subject of course to the constraints set forth in the Depredation Order. The Depredation Order does not itself mandate that local agencies utilize their authority under the Order. And, because cormorant depredation is highly localized, and because the Depredation Order limits control efforts only to those cormorants found committing or about to commit depredation, the exact locations where local agencies might act pursuant to the Depredation Order could not be known with any certainty by the FWS in advance. These compounded uncertainties would render any site-specific EIS virtually impossible to prepare. Not only would it be uncertain where control efforts under the Depredation Order could take place, it would remain uncertain whether any control efforts actually would take place there. The FWS had no means of reliably identifying the relevant sites, let alone ascertaining whether any actions under the Depredation Order would be warranted at that site. Effects that are not reasonably foreseeable need not be included in an EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (including as effects for EIS purposes those which are caused by the action and are later in time or farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable); Suffolk County, 562 F.2d at 1378 (If the additional information would at best amount to speculation as to future event or events, it obviously would not be of much use as input in deciding whether to proceed.). The FWS therefore did not violate NEPA by omitting site-specific analyses in this case. In the absence of any certain site-specific action, then, it was sufficient for the FWS here to prepare only a programmatic EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(c) (Environmental impact statements on broad actions may be prepared [g]enerically, including actions which have relevant similarities, such as common timing, impacts, alternatives, methods of implementation, media, or subject matter.); see also Friends of Yosemite Valley v. Norton, 348 F.3d 789, 801 (9th Cir.2003) (NEPA requires a full evaluation of site-specific impacts only when a `critical decision' has been made to act on site development  i.e., when the agency proposes to make an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of the availability of resources to [a] project at a particular site. The determination of whether a `critical decision' has been made begins with an accurate description of the [agency's] proposed action. (emphases, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted)). Any site-specific actions to which the FWS or any other agency subsequently committed would require the preparation of a site-specific EIS  even if the action were undertaken pursuant to the Depredation Order  if the programmatic EIS is insufficient to address the environmental impact of the site-specific action. See Nat'l Audubon Society v. Hoffman, 132 F.3d 7, 13 (2d Cir.1997) (citing Manatee County v. Gorsuch, 554 F.Supp. 778 (M.D.Fla.1982)). But because the Depredation Order itself does not commit FWS to any site-specific control efforts, its adoption did not require any corresponding site-specific EIS. The FWS did not violate NEPA in adopting the Depredation Order.