Opinion ID: 2647906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Certification to the Idaho Supreme Court

Text: After having lost at the district court level, the City now asks us to certify the dispositive question in this appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. We deny the request. See Micomonaco v. Washington, 45 F.3d 316, 322 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Use of the certification procedure in any given case rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “There is a presumption against certifying a question to a state supreme court after the federal district court has issued a decision. A party should not be allowed a second chance at victory through certification by the appeals court after an adverse district court ruling.” Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). To overcome that presumption, the City must demonstrate “particularly compelling reasons” why it should “be allowed a second chance at victory.” In re Complaint of McLinn, 744 F.2d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 1984). The City fails to identify such “particularly compelling reasons” in this case. The City argues that the same reasons that prompted us to certify a question in Peter-Palican v. Northern Mariana Islands, 673 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2012), should prompt certification of the question presented in this 18 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS case. However, this case differs from Peter-Palican in meaningful ways. In Peter-Palican, an ex-government official sued the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands after she was discharged from her cabinet-level position as Special Assistant to the Governor for Women’s Affairs. Id. at 1015. The position of Special Assistant was created by the Commonwealth’s constitution, which specified that the official holding that position “may be removed only for cause.” Id. Thus, the case presented the question whether the “for cause” limit on removal barred the Special Assistant’s removal indefinitely, i.e., even after the end of the term of the governor who appointed her. Id. at 1018–19. We certified that question to the Commonwealth’s Supreme Court, citing both “the importance of territorial sovereignty in matters of territorial governance and the lack of clear answers in Commonwealth law” as compelling reasons warranting certification. Id. at 1018. Taking these principles in reverse order, neither presents itself here. The Peter-Palican court concluded that Commonwealth law gave unclear answers, because there was more than one “rational construction” of the disputed constitutional provision. See id. at 1019. We acknowledge that one might also argue that there could be more than one possible construction of the statutes in this case. However, faithful application of the statutory canons of the Idaho Supreme Court compels only one conclusion—the City has not been granted extraterritorial eminent domain power for the purpose of constructing electric transmission lines. Further, this case does not implicate Idaho state sovereignty to the same extent as the constitutional provision ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS 19 at issue in Peter-Palican implicated the Commonwealth’s territorial sovereignty. In Peter-Palican, we were asked to determine the meaning of a provision in the Commonwealth’s constitution concerning a high-ranking government office. Because the ambiguity of the constitution could not be resolved by resorting to standard rules of construction, it would invariably require making a policy choice involving the operation of the Commonwealth’s government. Moreover, whatever construction we adopted would be ossified in the territory’s founding charter. The disputed question in this case can be distinguished on both points. First, the issue involves statutory construction regarding the power of Idaho’s cities to exercise their power of eminent domain. Although important, this provision does not affect the governance structure of the state. Second, we are interpreting state statutes, not the Idaho Constitution. As a result, the Idaho Legislature may change the statutes if it disagrees with our decision. Unlike in Peter-Palican, our holding here will not be ossified in the state constitution, requiring amendment to change or avoid. Thus, this case does not present the same compelling justifications for certification that were present in Peter-Palican. Therefore, in our discretion, we deny the City’s request. We can decide this case by applying principles of statutory construction that the Idaho Supreme Court has clearly enunciated. Thus, the fact that there is no Idaho Supreme Court decision directly “on point” does not constrain us. Further, the City moved this case to federal court. There, the district court gave the City the opportunity to seek certification and noted that the likely result of the district court’s decision would be an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The 20 ALLIANCE V. CITY OF IDAHO FALLS City declined the district court’s invitation; it did not request certification below. Having made the choice to “cast its lot” in the federal district court, the City—having lost there—is not entitled to “a second chance at victory” through certification. Thompson, 547 F.3d at 1065.