Opinion ID: 1123050
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statutory Scheme as a Whole

Text: The words of the statute must be construed in context, keeping in mind the statutory purpose, and statutes or statutory sections relating to the same subject must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible. ( Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction, that `every statute should be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.' ( Landrum v. Superior Court (1981) 30 Cal.3d 1, 14 [177 Cal. Rptr. 325, 634 P.2d 352].) The California Constitution empowers the Legislature to authorize the governing boards of all school districts to initiate and carry on any programs, activities, or to otherwise act in any manner which is not in conflict with the laws and purposes for which school districts are established. (Cal. Const., art. IX, § 14, 2d par.) The Legislature has exercised this power and granted local school districts broad authority, both generally, and specifically regarding hiring coaches. It enacted a statute substantially identical to California Constitution, article IX, section 14. (Ed. Code, § 35160.) It also found and declared that school districts ... have diverse needs unique to their individual communities and programs. Moreover, in addressing their needs, common as well as unique, school districts ... should have the flexibility to create their own unique solutions. (Ed. Code, § 35160.1, subd. (a), italics added.) It went on to state expressly its intent to give school districts  broad authority to carry on activities and programs ... which, in the determination of the governing board of the school district, ... are necessary or desirable in meeting their needs.... It is the intent of the Legislature that Section 35160 be liberally construed to effect this objective. (Ed. Code, § 35160.1, subd. (b), italics added.) Consistent with this broad general grant of authority to local districts to act as local conditions dictate, the Legislature spoke on the specific question here, hiring coaches: Each school district governing board shall have general control of, and be responsible for, all aspects of the interscholastic athletic policies, programs, and activities in its district, including, but not limited to, eligibility, season of sport, number of sports, personnel, and sports facilities. (Ed. Code, § 35179, subd. (a), italics added.) In Barozzi, the Court of Appeal cited this language to find that the Board of Education had no authority to require the annual review provided in Regulation 5592. ( Barozzi, supra, 230 Cal. App.3d at p. 1383.) In combination, these statutes express a clear legislative policy: Personnel decisions regarding athletic programs are solely for local school districts to make, considering local needs and conditions. Section 44919(b) must be interpreted in light of this clear policy. Did section 44919(b) dramatically restrict the authority of local school districts over coaching personnel decisions, or did it merely require advance posting and an opportunity for teachers to compete? The latter interpretation is consistent with the entire statutory scheme, the former a jarring departure. Yet another statute supports a narrow reading of section 44919(b). Education Code section 44923 provides: In the event a permanent employee of a school district has tenure as a full-time employee of the district, any assignment or employment of such employee in addition to his full-time assignment may be terminated by the governing board of the district at any time. (Italics added.) This language reaffirms the district's authority over coaching assignments, even as to tenured teachers. My interpretation of section 44919(b) meshes neatly with section 44923. Teachers and nonteachers compete equally, and the district may hire and terminate all equally. Granting teachers a right of first refusal or other hiring preference would raise many problems. If section 44919(b) forces a district to hire a teacher rather than a superior nonteacher candidate, could the district then immediately terminate[] that assignment under section 44923? If so, must it then rehire the same teacher to fill the newly created vacancy? Or does section 44919(b) give a teacher only a one-time preference (which interpretation would effectively render section 44919(b) nugatory, while requiring the charade of hiring, then firing, a teacher in order to hire a superior nonteacher candidate)? The CTA's and the majority's interpretations place sections 44919(b) and 44923 in perpetual war with one another. Mine harmonizes them.