Opinion ID: 1746202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: boykin and neal

Text: The petitioner now contends, echoing the dissenting opinion in the intermediate court, that the but for ruling in Neal cannot be invoked to deny relief in this case, and we agree. Soon after the release of Neal , we acknowledged in reviewing another alleged Boykin error that [t]he `but for' expression in [ Neal ] should not be read to impose an additional burden upon the petitioner. Johnson v. State, 834 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tenn. 1992). Indeed, it appears from the reliance in Neal on the United States Supreme Court opinions in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985), and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), that the but for rule is properly applied only in those cases in which the alleged invalidity of a prior guilty plea is attributable to ineffective assistance of counsel. To the extent that the language of Neal appears to hold otherwise, it cannot be considered good law. [4] But, the principal thrust of our ruling in Neal , concerning the burden of proof in a post-conviction action challenging the validity of a guilty plea and the effect of substantial compliance and harmless error on the validity of such a plea, is consistent with relevant federal law and is thus applicable to this case. [5] The guilty pleas at issue here are subject to scrutiny solely under the standards of Boykin , because of their timing. All of them were entered prior to this Court's opinion in State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), in which we imposed additional safeguards in the taking of a guilty plea, beyond the scope of Boykin . We did so as a matter of state law, in order better to assure that such pleas are entered voluntarily and intelligently. Id. at 340-41. The pleas in this case also predate the promulgation in 1978 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 11 of which sets up the approved procedure for accepting guilty pleas in the trial courts of this state. And, the pleas at issue in this case were entered before our opinions in State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Gilam, 732 S.W.2d 600 (Tenn. 1987); Rounsaville v. Evatt, 733 S.W.2d 506 (Tenn. 1987); State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1989); and State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1989). In all these cases, we have tried to shed light on the requirements for the entry of a valid guilty plea, and to explicate the nature and extent of relief available to a petitioner who alleges and proves that the process to which he was subjected falls short of the constitutional mark. The proliferation of reported cases up to and including Neal and Montgomery suggests, however, that our past efforts may not have been completely successful. In any event, this case presents a Boykin issue and that issue alone. We thus focus again on what is required to satisfy the principles set out in Boykin . The contours of that case should, by now, be clear enough. In Boykin , the United States Supreme Court noted that [a] plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment. 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. at 1711. In discussing the prerequisites of a valid guilty plea, the Boykin court quoted at length from its prior opinion in McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1171, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), as follows: A defendant who enters such a plea simultaneously waives several constitutional rights, including his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers. For this waiver to be valid under the Due Process Clause, it must be `an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right of privilege.' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 [58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461] (1938)... . Consequently, if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. Endorsing this formulation, the Boykin court held that the waiver of such fundamental constitutional rights cannot be presumed from a silent record, and that reversible error occurs when the record does not disclose that the defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his pleas of guilty. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1713. The first principle that must guide an understanding of Boykin is perhaps self-evident: in determining whether a guilty plea is voluntary and intelligent for purposes of the federal constitution, the governing standard ... is a question of federal law. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 431, 103 S.Ct. 843, 849, 74 L.Ed.2d 646 (1983) (citing Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976), and Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274). Although the Tennessee cases have tended to focus rather narrowly on whether an accused was advised explicitly of his right to trial by jury, his right against self-incrimination, and his right to confrontation, it is clear under federal law that Boykin does not require separate enumeration of each right waived and separate waivers as to each [of the three rights]. Fontaine v. United States, 526 F.2d 514, 516 (6th Cir.1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 973, 96 S.Ct. 1476, 47 L.Ed.2d 743 (1976). Instead, the core requirement of Boykin is that no guilty plea be accepted without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary, Fontaine, 526 F.2d at 516, which showing becomes a matter of constitutional concern precisely because the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights is implicated when an accused enters a plea of guilty. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970), the United States Supreme Court established the following rule for determining the voluntariness of a guilty plea: [A] plea of guilty by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes). Or, as the Boykin court put it, a plea is not voluntary if it is the product of [i]gnorance, incomprehension, coercion, terror, inducements, [or] subtle or blatant threats... . Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242-3, 89 S.Ct. at 1712. In order to find that the plea was entered intelligently or knowingly, Boykin requires that the trial court canvass[] the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequences.  Id. 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712 (emphasis added). As the United States Supreme Court noted in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S.Ct. 160, 164, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), decided the year after Boykin , The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. The federal courts recognize that the decision to plead guilty is often heavily influenced by the defendant's appraisal of the prosecution's case against him and the likelihood of securing leniency through a plea bargain. Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d 784, 786 (6th Cir.1983), quoted in Caudill v. Jago, 747 F.2d 1046, 1052 (6th Cir.1984). It was undoubtedly this sort of influence that was at work in the 1972 plea proceeding now under review. But, the mere existence of such an inducement to plead guilty does not constitute grounds for invalidating Blankenship's 1972 pleas. Instead, a court charged with determining whether those pleas were voluntary and intelligent must look to various circumstantial factors, such as the relative intelligence of the defendant; the degree of his familiarity with criminal proceedings; whether he was represented by competent counsel and had the opportunity to confer with counsel about the options available to him; the extent of advice from counsel and the court concerning the charges against him; and the reasons for his decision to plead guilty, including a desire to avoid a greater penalty that might result from a jury trial. Caudill v. Jago, 747 F.2d at 1052. Federal law recognizes the well-established [principle] that a plea of guilty cannot be voluntary in the sense that it constitutes an intelligent admission that the accused committed the offense unless the accused has received `real notice of the true nature of the charges against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process'. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 852 (citation omitted). Hence, there must be a full explanation of the offense to which the defendant is pleading and nothing to indicate that he was incompetent or otherwise not in control of his mental facilities at the time the plea is entered. Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d at 788 (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 756, 90 S.Ct. at 1473). Finally, in addition to an understanding of the charges, the defendant must be aware of the direct consequences of his guilty plea. Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d at 788; see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 755, 90 S.Ct. at 1472 (accused must be fully aware of the direct consequences of his guilty plea). The most obvious direct consequence of a conviction is the penalty to be imposed. It is, therefore, well-recognized that the defendant must be apprised of the sentence that he will be forced to serve as the result of his guilty plea and conviction. By contrast, some consequences are considered collateral, rather than direct. For example, the federal courts are split on the question of whether parole eligibility constitutes a direct consequence of a guilty plea. See Brown v. Perini, 718 F.2d at 788-89 n. 4; but see Sparks v. Sowders, 852 F.2d 882, 885 (6th Cir.1988) (gross misadvice concerning parole eligibility can amount to ineffective assistance of counsel). However, there is no federal authority for the proposition that the subsequent use of the conviction to enhance a future sentence is a direct consequence of the guilty plea that forms the basis for that conviction. Hence, the failure of the trial court to inform Blankenship that the guilty pleas he entered in 1972 might later be used to establish his status as a repeat-offender does not affect the constitutional validity of those pleas under Boykin . [6]