Opinion ID: 2344491
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Issue 2: The issue of whether the Board's decision to amend the zoning regulations violates the Commerce Clause is remanded to the district court.

Text: We ordered the parties in their supplemental briefing to thoroughly address all steps in the analysis of whether the Board's decision to amend its zoning regulations violated the dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution: (1) discrimination against interstate commerce and (2) burden on interstate commerce. We also ordered them to thoroughly address why, or why not, future discovery was necessary to resolve the Board's alleged violation of the Commerce Clause. Plaintiffs and Intervenors both contend the district court erred in dismissing their claim that the Board's decision to amend the zoning regulations violates the dormant Commerce Clause. Specifically, Plaintiffs claim the Resolution formally reflecting the Board's decision to amend facially discriminates against interstate commerce because it permits wind generation for personal use ( i.e., SWECS) but prohibits wind generation for commercial use ( i.e., CWECS). Interveners agree, adding that even if the ordinance is not facially discriminatory, it excessively burdens interstate commerce in relation to the local benefit. In finding no dormant Commerce Clause violation, the district court, Judge Klinginsmith, explained: The Commerce Clause precludes local legislation that benefits in-state commerce while unfairly burdening out-of-state competitors. Resolution 04-18 makes no distinction between providers whose energy is transported across state lines and those whose energy remains within the boundaries of the county or the State of Kansas. It does not therefore violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.