Opinion ID: 2310083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Import of the Criminal Judgments

Text: The rule in most jurisdictions is that a judgment entered in a criminal case is not proof of anything in a subsequent civil action growing out of the same facts, except the fact of its rendition. See 50 C.J.S., Judgments § 754; 30A Am. Jur., Judgments, § 472, and 2 Freeman, Judgments, § 653 (5th ed. 1925). The rule is a carry over from the early days of the common law. See 18 A.L.R. 2d 1287. With the lapse of time, it has been recognized that the reasons for the rule are weak and outdated. A growing minority would admit the criminal record as evidence of the facts determined in the criminal proceeding unless it is excluded by statute. See, Developments in the Law Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818 (1952); Schindler v. Royal Ins. Co., 258 N.Y. 310, 179 N.E. 711 (1932), and 18 A.L.R. 2d 1287 and 1289. The federal courts have now adopted a progressive view and hold that the issues essential to a guilty verdict must be regarded as having been determined by the judgment. See, Local 167, I.B. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293 (1934); United States v. Gramling, 180 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1950); United States v. Salvatore, 140 F. Supp. 470 (1956); United States v. Doman, 255 F. 2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1958), aff'd 359 U.S. 309 (1959). . . . in Mineo v. Eureka Sec. F. & M. Ins. Co., 182 Pa. Superior Ct. 75, 125 A. 2d 612 (1956), it was held that the named insured in a fire insurance policy or his assignee was conclusively barred from recovery on the policy by the conviction of the insured on the charge of arson. Also, it has been held that a person convicted of murder cannot take as beneficiary under an insurance contract on the life of the victim. See, Greifer's Estate, 333 Pa. 278, 5 A. 2d 118 (1939). . . . The question of the involvement of Torrance, the principal on the bonds, in a conspiracy to defraud and misbehavior in office, was thoroughly explored in a long and well conducted trial. The convictions which followed necessarily established that Torrance participated in a conspiracy to defraud the commission, and that he wilfully permitted payment of vast sums of money to Manu-Mine to which it was not entitled. . . . . . . we therefore conclude, that the breach of the conditions of the bonds has been established. In Greifer's Estate, 333 Pa., supra, the Court held that a wife who was convicted of the murder of her husband could not claim the benefit of the policies of insurance upon her husband's life which were a part of an inter vivos trust created by him for her benefit. Justice (later Chief Justice) SCHAFFER, speaking for a unanimous Court, distinguished Carpenter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 A. 637, and Tarlo's Estate, 315 Pa., supra, and said (page 279): . . . She is barred by the common law principle that a person will not be permitted to profit by his own wrong, particularly by his own crime: Robinson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 69 Pa. Superior Ct. 274; Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assn. [1892], 1 Queen's Bench 147; Schmidt v. Northern Life Assn., 112 Ia. 41, 83 N.W. 800; Smith v. Todd, 155 S.C. 323, 152 S.E. 506; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591; Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N.E. 816. For complete citation of cases, see 70 A.L.R. 1539; 91 A.L.R. 1486. We imagine it would not be contended that the murderess could take under the policies of insurance if she had been directly named as beneficiary therein, instead of indirectly through the deed of trust. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 412 Pa., supra, was followed and approved in Hurtt v. Stirone, 416 Pa. 493, 206 A. 2d 624. In that case an action of assumpsit was brought by an employer to recover money extorted from him by defendant. The Court directed a verdict for plaintiff. The Court specifically ruled that since defendant has been convicted in a Federal Court of violating the Hobbs' Anti-Racketeering Act as a result of the money payments to defendant involved in the present civil action, the record of defendant's conviction was properly admitted in evidence and conclusively established the fact of defendant's extortion. The Court said (page 498): The same principles of public policy enunciated in Mineo, supra, and Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, supra, apply with equal force to the present case. The defendant was presented with more than ample opportunity to overcome the charges lodged against him while he was swathed in a cloak of presumed innocence. His case was twice presented to a federal jury which found him guilty of extortion beyond a reasonable doubt, upon the same facts which are now urged as the basis for his civil liability. To now hold that the effect of those jury determinations is nil not only would be to fly in the face of reason, but also would be a general indictment of the whole American jury system. The Slayer's Act of 1941 enunciates not only sound law, but wise public policy. As we have seen, it specifically provides (a) that No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or receive any benefit as the result of the death of the decedent and (b) that This act shall . . . be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this State that no person shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed and (c) The record of his conviction of having participated in the wilful and unlawful killing of the decedent shall be admissible in evidence against a claimant of property in any civil action. . . . The intent of the legislature and the language of the Slayer's Act are, we believe, clear  a person convicted of murder is not entitled to receive any property of the person he (or she) wilfully or unlawfully killed. Our conclusion is further strengthened by § 6 of the Intestate Act of April 24, 1947, P.L. 80. Section 6, Forfeiture  subsection (c) provides: (c) Slayer's share. Any person who participates either as a principal or as an accessory before the fact in the wilful and unlawful killing of any person shall not in any way acquire property or receive any benefits as the result of such killing, but such property or benefits shall be distributed as provided by law. The Commission's comment provides: Subsection (c). This subsection overlaps some of the provisions of the `Slayer' Act of 1941, P.L. 816, 20 P.S. §§ 3441-3456. It is not intended to supplant the provisions of the Slayer Act, but is included here for completeness and to avoid any suggestion of partial repeal of the Slayer Act. The interpretation of the Slayer's Act advocated by appellant, namely, that after a conviction of murder and judgment and sentence thereon  proved not as in civil cases by a fair preponderance of the evidence, but by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt  the issue of murder and of the guilt or innocence of the convicted slayer can be relitigated anew by a jury in the Orphans' Court or in a civil action in any other Court, would make a mockery of the law and of Justice. One other point remains for consideration  What does § 14 of the Act of 1941 mean by the record of his conviction? The Slayer's Act of 1941 provides, as above noted, that the record of Mrs. Kravitz's conviction of having participated in the wilful and unlawful killing of the decedent, shall be admissible in evidence in considering and disposing of her claim to her husband's residuary estate. The correct rule in these Slayer cases is that the record of her conviction includes the indictment, the verdict of the jury, the judgment and sentence of the Court, and any decision, order and judgment of this Court and of the Supreme Court of the United States. It is obvious that the interests of Justice, as well as long established practice, would make all of the aforesaid a part of the record. Cf. Commonwealth ex rel. McClenachan v. Reading, 336 Pa. 165, 169, 6 A. 2d 776. Considering the above-mentioned analogous cases and considering especially the language of the Slayer's Act of 1941, and the reasons for its enactment, its principal purpose and objective and the wise and salutary public policy which it proclaims  we have no doubt of the legislative intent and of the proper construction of the Act. We therefore specifically rule (1) that the record of conviction and judgment of sentence of Ethel Kravitz for the murder of her husband, is not merely prima facie evidence thereof, but is a conclusive bar to her right to take under or against her husband's will, and (2) that neither the question of murder nor her guilt or innocence of the crime can be relitigated in the Orphans' Court. Decree affirmed at appellant's cost.