Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting challenges for cause exercised by the state.

Text: ś 153. Evans argues that the trial court erred in granting cause challenges exercised by the State on four potential jurors based on their views about capital punishment. However, other than general reference to the United States and Mississippi Constitutions, Evans cites no authority for this issue. This Court has repeatedly held that [a]n assignment of error, unsupported by any authority, `lacks persuasion' on review. Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1202 ( Miss.1996) (quoting Johnson v. State, 626 So.2d 631, 634 (Miss.1993); Smith v. State, 430 So.2d 406, 407 (Miss.1983); cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1033, 111 S.Ct. 694, 112 L.Ed.2d 685 (1991)). Despite Evans' lack of authority and argument, a review of the excluded jurors reveals no error by the trial court. ś 154. Evans first argues that the exclusion of Juror Hawkins was error. Hawkins, however, was not excused due to his views about capital punishment, but rather due to the nature of his employment and the resulting hardship that an extended period of jury service would impose. ś 155. The remaining jurors about which Evans complains were excused because they could not consider the death penalty under any circumstances. First, Evans argues the exclusion of potential juror Smith was in error. The record reveals that Juror Smith indicated that he was a pentecostal minister and could not consider the death penalty. The State then challenged Smith for cause. ś 156. This issue is clearly without merit as the record reveals that defense counsel indicated that although he would not agree to Smith's exclusion on a Witherspoon basis, he did not want Smith on the jury. After further questioning by the Court, defense counsel again stated that he did not want Smith on the jury due to Smith's statements to the court. [5] The trial court then sustained the challenge. Any error that may have resulted from the challenge for cause by the State was effectively waived by Evans when he also asked that Smith not be placed on the jury. Despite Evans' waiver, the exclusion of Smith was not error. Juror Smith's responses to questioning about the death penalty revealed that he would not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. ś 157. In Simon v. State, 688 So.2d 791 (Miss.1997), this Court set forth the guidelines utilized to determine whether a juror was properly excused on the basis of his/her beliefs concerning capital punishment as follows: Prospective jurors in capital cases may only be excluded for cause based on their views of capital punishment when those views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance [their] [sic] duties as juror[s] in accordance with [their] instructions and oath.' Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 880-81 ( Miss.1987) (quoting Wain[w]right v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.C.[Ct.] 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648[, 658], 107 S.C.[Ct.] 2045, 2051-52, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987)). As a juror's bias against the death penalty does not have to be proven with unmistaken clarity, the decision of whether or not to excuse the juror is left to the trial judge's discretion. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 943 (Miss. 1986). The juror need not expressly state that he absolutely refuses to consider the death penalty; an equivalent response made in any reasonable manner indicating the juror's firm position will suffice. Willie, 585 So.2d at 673; Williamson, 512 So.2d at 881. Due to the trial judge's presence during the voir dire process, he is in a better position to evaluate the prospective juror's responses. Williamson, 512 So.2d at 881. Finally, the determination of whether a juror is fair and impartial is a judicial question, and will not be set aside unless such determination is clearly wrong. Carr v. State, 555 So.2d 59, 60 (Miss.1989); King v. State, 421 So.2d 1009, 1016 (Miss.1982), cert. denied., 461 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 1903, 77 L.Ed.2d 290 (1983). Id. at 799. ś 158. Continuing, this Court held: The Adams-Witt standard was adopted by this Court in Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731 (Miss.1992), and Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 128 (Miss.1991), cert. denied, {504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970,] 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992). In both Balfour and Hansen, this Court consider the holding of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.C.[Ct.] 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The Witherspoon line of cases establishes the general proposition that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521[, 2526], 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) ( reaffirmed in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.C.[Ct.] 844[, 852], 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Simon, 688 So.2d at 800. ś 159. Jurors Smith, Hammond, and Brown unequivocally indicated that they could not under any set of circumstances consider the death penalty. In Simon, 688 So.2d at 800, this Court stated ... if a prospective juror is irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances, then the prospective juror can be struck from the jury. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 21; Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 881 (Miss.1987), overruled on other grounds, Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184 (Miss.1996). The trial court did not abuse his discretion. This issue is without merit.