Opinion ID: 1881490
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the capital sentence.

Text: As previously stated, Appellant was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years for the murder conviction. This was the same sentence received by Mark Downey, the triggerman. Appellant claims his sentence is unduly disproportionate to the crime charged and to the sentence received by Downey and, thus, constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. He also argues that his capital sentence should be reversed because the trial court failed to state the aggravating circumstance in writing. Both of these issues were unpreserved; thus, they are reviewed only for palpable error. RCr 10.26. In reviewing a sentence of death, this Court is required by statute to determine whether the sentence is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. KRS 532.075(3)(c). Appellant was not sentenced to death but merely complains that he received the same sentence as a more culpable codefendant. The Eighth Amendment requires only that the trial court focus on the defendant's own culpability for the crime charged, not the culpability of a codefendant. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 798, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982). Murder is a capital offense for which a defendant may receive a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. KRS 507.020(2); KRS 532.030(1). Only when the offense and the punishment are greatly disproportionate will the punishment be considered cruel and unusual. Workman v. Commonwealth, Ky., 429 S.W.2d 374, 378 (1968). Despite the fact that Appellant did not pull the trigger, the trial court found that he intended that the Finks would be killed during the course of the burglary. Generally, if the punishment given is within the maximum prescribed by statute, a reviewing court will not disturb the sentence. Mills v. Commonwealth, 305 Ky. 44, 202 S.W.2d 1005 (1947); Weber v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky. 56, 196 S.W.2d 465 (1946). The Kentucky penal code sets minimum and maximum limits on the penalties that may be imposed for a capital offense, and Appellant's sentence fell within those parameters. The sentence imposed in this case was neither disproportionate to his conduct nor cruel and unusual. Under KRS 532.025(3), if the judge decides to impose a capital sentence, he/she is required to designate, in writing, the aggravating circumstance which he/she found beyond a reasonable doubt to exist. Bevins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 712 S.W.2d 932, 937 (1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 963, 93 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1987). We have previously held that trial courts should strictly comply with that statute. Askew v. Commonwealth, Ky., 768 S.W.2d 51, 55 (1989). In this case, the trial judge did not spell out the aggravating circumstance in his order. However, the order referenced the videotaped record at the exact point at which he orally found the aggravating circumstance to exist beyond a reasonable doubt. The oral findings were incorporated by reference into the written order. The trial court specifically stated on the record that the Commonwealth had sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt with respect to the aggravating circumstance of burglary in the first degree. KRS 532.025(2)(a)(2). Although the court did not recite the findings of fact word for word in the written order, there is no possibility that, absent the error, the result would have been different. Thus, no manifest injustice resulted. Jackson v. Commonwealth, supra .