Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Other Constitutional Objections to the Death Penalty Statute

Text: In addition to the constitutional claims discussed above, defendant raises a number of other constitutional objections to the death penalty statute identical to those we have previously rejected. These include the failure of the death penalty statute to distinguish between aggravating and mitigating circumstances ( People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005,1059, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544); the failure of the death penalty statute to require written findings from the jury as to which aggravating factors are found to be true ( People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 943, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277); the lack of intercase proportionality review ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 812, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485); the inclusion of unadjudicated violent criminal activity as a factor in aggravation ( People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 198-199, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664); the lack of a requirement of a unanimous finding that the defendant committed prior unadjudicated criminal activity before that factor is considered in aggravation ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 153, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887); the supposed vagueness of the terms extreme and substantial found in section 190.3, factors (d) and (g) ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 842, 42 Cal. Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481); the lack of any curb on the prosecutor's discretion in determining whether or not to seek the death penalty ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 189, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980); and the methods of execution ( People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1059, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544). We decline to reconsider our holdings as to these constitutional questions. Defendant also contends that the standard jury instruction regarding mitigating factors [11] is generally inadequate to define mitigation. He advances this claim not by focusing on any particular language in the instruction, but rather by citing two articles claiming that interviews with former jurors or with randomly selected subjects show that many of the subjects failed to properly understand the concept of mitigation correctly after they had been given CALJIC No. 8.88. (See Haney & Lynch, Comprehending Life and Death Matters: A Preliminary Study of California's Capital Penalty Instructions (1994) 18 Law & Hum. Behav. 411; Haney et al., Deciding to Take Life: Capital Juries, Sentencing Decisions and the Jurisprudence of Death (1994) 50 J. Soc. Issues 149.) In the latter study, for example, the authors purported to demonstrate that of 30 people interviewed who had formerly served on juries in capital cases, only 13 showed a reasonably accurate comprehension of the concepts of aggravating and mitigating, while fully one-third of our sample refocused the penalty phase inquiry entirely on the nature of the crime itself, and did so in a way that amounted to a presumption in favor of death. (Haney et al., supra, 50 J. Soc. Issues, at pp. 162,169, italics omitted.) As stated earlier, [w]e presume that jurors comprehend and accept the court's directions. ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) The presumption that the jurors in this case understood and followed the mitigation instruction supplied to them is not rebutted by empirical assertions to the contrary based on research that is not part of the present record and has not been subject to cross examination. (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 26, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301.) We accordingly reject defendant's claim.