Opinion ID: 705181
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legal Basis of Workers' Compensation Exclusivity

Text: 55
56 Because the workers' compensation provisions were enacted prior to the FEHA to provide a specific remedy for employer discrimination based on work-related injuries, the California Supreme Court, prior to the 1992 amendments to the FEHA, interpreted Labor Code Sec. 132a broadly as the exclusive remedy for any type of employer discrimination against workers because of injuries occurring in the course of and arising out of their employment. Judson Steel Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 22 Cal.3d 658, 150 Cal.Rptr. 250, 586 P.2d 564 (1978); accord, Palmer v. Roadway Express, Inc., 664 F.Supp. 458 (N.D.Cal.1987); see Labor Code Secs. 3600-3602 and Sec. 132a. Several California appellate courts held specifically that the workers' compensation laws preclude a cause of action based on the physical disability provisions of the FEHA. See, e.g., Denney v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 10 Cal.App.4th 1226, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 170 (1992); Fortner v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 229 Cal.App.3d 542, 280 Cal.Rptr. 409 (1991), review denied (1991); Pickrel v. General Telephone Co., 205 Cal.App.3d 1058, 252 Cal.Rptr. 878 (1988), review denied (1989). 57 We cannot, however, decide whether workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on work-related injury without considering the California Supreme Court's decision in Shoemaker v. Myers, 52 Cal.3d 1, 276 Cal.Rptr. 303, 801 P.2d 1054 (1990), and its progeny. Elaborating on its opinion in Cole v. Fair Oaks Fire Protection Dist., 43 Cal.3d 148, 233 Cal.Rptr. 308, 729 P.2d 743 (1987), the court exempted employer conduct that does not stem[ ] from a risk reasonably encompassed within the compensation bargain from the workers' compensation exclusive remedy provisions. Shoemaker, 276 Cal.Rptr. at 313, 801 P.2d at 1064. The court has since applied the Shoemaker test to find that several types of conduct may fall within the exception to workers' compensation exclusivity. See, e.g., Fermino v. Fedco, Inc., 7 Cal.4th 701, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 872 P.2d 559 (1994) (holding that a claim of false imprisonment by an employer is always outside the scope of the compensation bargain); Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal.4th 1083, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680 (1992) (holding that a claim for retaliatory dismissal for supporting a coworker's claim of sexual harassment is not precluded by workers' compensation remedies); Livitsanos v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 744, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 808, 816, 828 P.2d 1195, 1203 (1992) (suggesting that an employee's emotional distress injury may fall outside the exclusivity provisions). 58 The California appellate courts, in cases decided after the Shoemaker decision, have specifically held that the workers' compensation provisions preclude a cause of action pursuant to the physical disability provisions of the FEHA. See, e.g., Langridge v. Oakland Unified School District, 25 Cal.App.4th 664, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 34, 36 (1994) (finding that discrimination based on a work-related physical disability is a risk included in the compensation bargain); Angell v. Peterson Tractor, Inc., 21 Cal.App.4th 981, 26 Cal. Rptr.2d 541 (1994) (finding that workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for an employee with a work-related heart condition who was discharged wrongfully), review denied (1994); Usher v. American Airlines, Inc., 20 Cal.App.4th 1520, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 335 (1993) (finding that workers' compensation provides the exclusive remedy for an employee claiming constructive termination because of a work-related injury), review denied (1994). These courts grounded their interpretation on the specificity of the workers' compensation provisions and the decision by the legislature to place[ ] work-related disability discrimination within the scope of the workers' compensation laws. Langridge, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d at 36. 8 These recent appellate court decisions are persuasive. 59
60 Jimeno also contends that the 1992 amendments to the FEHA, which became effective for cases pending before the Fair Employment and Housing Commission on or after January 1, 1993, see, e.g., Stats. ch. 913 Sec. 44, 1992 Cal.Adv.Legis.Serv. 3837, 3885 (Deering), eliminate any possibility of workers' compensation exclusivity. Jimeno argues, in effect, that the Legislature's strengthening of the FEHA to incorporate provisions of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-336 (codified as amended in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. Sec. 12101 et seq.), whenever those provisions provide more protection, and the omission of any language explicitly exempting workers with work-related disabilities should be interpreted to mean that the FEHA precludes exclusive application of the workers' compensation provisions. 61 Jimeno cites the Legislative Counsel's Digest for the bill before the California legislature, which indicates that [t]he bill would specify that the act's provisions are not superseded by provisions of other laws relating to workers' compensation and insurance. See Stats. ch. 913, Legislative Counsel's Digest (15), 1992 Cal.Adv.Legis.Serv. 3837, 3850 (Deering) (discussing Assembly Bill 1077). This comment accompanied a proposed new section 12994, 9 which would have eliminated workers' compensation exclusivity, but that provision was never enacted into law because the Senate deleted it in the Senate's June 1, 1992 version of the bill. As a result, the amendments as enacted did not include any new language providing that the FEHA should supersede workers' compensation exclusivity. See Assembly Bill 1077, 1991-92 Legis., Reg.Sess. (as amended in the Senate, June 1, 1992). 62 When, as here, the state high court has not addressed the explicit question at issue, the role of the panel is to determine how that court would rule. Skillsky v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 893 F.2d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir.1990). Although the panel may look for guidance to decisions by intermediate appellate courts, those decisions are not binding if the panel is convinced that the state's supreme court would rule differently. Martinez v. Asarco, Inc., 918 F.2d 1467, 1473 (9th Cir.1990) (disregarding two Arizona appellate decisions). 63 California courts give substantial weight to the deletion of a provision during the drafting stage. The rejection by the Legislature of a specific provision contained in an act as originally introduced is most persuasive to the conclusion that the act should not be construed to include the omitted provision. Rich v. State Board of Optometry, 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 45 Cal.Rptr. 512, 522 (1965); accord, People v. Gangemi, 13 Cal.App.4th 1790, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 462, 466-67 (1993). 64 The Legislature, in enacting the broad, anti-discriminatory provisions of the FEHA, was aware of the more specific workers' compensation provisions and could have included explicit statements exempting FEHA claims from the exclusivity provisions. Instead, the Legislature declined to enact such a provision as part of the 1992 amendments. Therefore, we hold that the deletion of the provision explicitly eliminating workers' compensation exclusivity makes impossible what was already dubious--the plaintiff's contention that the amendments that were adopted in 1992 had any effect on such exclusivity. Because we find that the 1992 amendments do not eliminate the exclusivity of the workers' compensation remedy, we need not address Jimeno's arguments for retroactive application of the amendments to this case. 65 Therefore, we find that the California workers' compensation provisions provide the exclusive remedy under California law for a work-related physical disability discrimination claim. We must now consider whether Mobil has met its burden to show that a work-related injury was the cause of its decision to terminate Jimeno, thus invoking the exclusive workers' compensation remedies.