Opinion ID: 185893
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disabling Conflict Defense

Text: 18 The most important issue in this case concerns the Board's rejection of petitioner's disabling conflict defense. As noted above, the Board found that the General Counsel had established, consistent with the three elements set forth in FES, that Casino discriminatorily refused to hire Dooley and King, and that petitioner had not met its burden of demonstrating that it would not have hired either of them regardless of their protected status. Casino Ready Mix, 2001 WL 1039902, at -. The Board also found that Phillips had been denied work because he was a Union organizer. Casino admitted at the hearing before the ALJ that, once the company found out that Phillips was a Union organizer, company officials did not assign work to him specifically because of that fact. Id. at . The Board thus found, based primarily on [Casino's] admission, that the refusal to assign work to Phillips was discriminatory and violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1). Id. The Board also held that Casino's discrimination against Phillips because of his union status lends support to a finding of antiunion animus with respect to the complaint allegations involving Dooley and King. Id. The Board's findings are fully supported by substantial evidence in the record and, therefore, command our deference. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 464-65, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). 19 Petitioner nonetheless claims that the unfair labor practice findings should be overturned, because Phillips, Dooley, and King, as paid union organizers, had disabling conflicts. This claim is meritless. 20 In Sunland Construction Co., 309 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1228, 1992 WL 390105 (1992), the Board held that, [u]pon reexamination of our analysis of the scope of Section 2(3) in Oak Apparel [218 N.L.R.B. 701, 1975 WL 5603 (1975)] and its progeny, we conclude that the definition of `employee' encompasses paid union organizers. The Board went on to hold that: 21 While working for the employer, the paid organizer is subject to its direction and control, and is responsible for performing assigned work. The organizer's activities, like those of any employee, may be limited pursuant to lawful no-solicitation rules. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, [324 U.S. 793, 802-03 n. 10, 65 S.Ct. 982, 988 n. 10, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945)]. Outside work time, however, the organizer — like other workers — is free to solicit for the union. Id. The fact that a paid organizer may approach his nonwork time organizing activities with greater vigor than an unpaid union adherent is not an acceptable basis for denying the organizer statutory protections.... 22 If the organizer violates valid work rules, or fails to perform adequately, the organizer lawfully may be subjected to the same nondiscriminatory discipline as any other employee. See Wellington Mill Div. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579 (4th Cir.1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 882, 85 S.Ct. 144, 13 L.Ed.2d 88; Sears, Roebuck & Co., 170 NLRB 533, 1968 WL 18887 (1968). In the absence of objective evidence, however, we will not infer a disabling conflict or presume that, if hired, paid union organizers will engage in activities inimical to the employer's operations. Thus, we find no policy reason to disregard present decisional law to find that since a union organizer serves the union as well as the company he is eliminated from the definition of employee under Section 2(3) of the Act. 23 Id. at 1229-30. 24 The Board's judgment in Sunland Construction accords with the opinion issued by the Supreme Court three years later in NLRB v. Town & Country Electric, Inc., 516 U.S. 85, 116 S.Ct. 450, 133 L.Ed.2d 371 (1995). In Town & Country, the Court held that a worker may be an employee, within the terms of the NLRA, even if, at the same time, a union pays that worker to help the union organize the company. The Court's discussion of this point is illuminating: 25 [The employer] argues that, when the paid union organizer serves the union — at least at certain times in certain ways — he organizer is acting adversely to the company. Indeed, it says, the organizer may stand ready to desert the company upon request by the union, in which case, the union, not the company, would have the right ... to control the conduct of the servant. Thus, it concludes, the worker must be the servant ( i.e., the employee) of the union alone. See [RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY] § 1, and Comment a, p. 8 (agent is one who agrees to act subject to [a principal's] control). 26 As Town & Country correctly notes, in the context of reviewing lower courts' interpretations of statutory terms, we have said on several occasions that when Congress uses the term employee in a statute that does not define the term, courts interpreting the statute `must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of th[at] ter[m].... In the past, when Congress has used the term employee without defining it, we have concluded that Congress intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship as understood by common-law agency doctrine.' ... At the same time, when reviewing the Board's interpretation of the term employee as it is used in the Act, we have repeatedly said that [s]ince the task of defining the term `employee' is one that `has been assigned primarily to the agency created by Congress to administer the Act,' ... the Board's construction of that term is entitled to considerable deference.... In some cases, there may be a question about whether the Board's departure from the common law of agency with respect to particular questions and in a particular statutory context, renders its interpretation unreasonable.... But no such question is presented here since the Board's interpretation of the term employee is consistent with the common law. 27 Town & Country's common-law argument fails, quite simply, because, in our view, the Board correctly found that it lacks sufficient support in common law. The Restatement's hornbook rule (to which the quoted commentary is appended) says that a 28 person may be the servant of two masters ... at one time as to one act, if the service to one does not involve abandonment of the service to the other. Restatement (Second) of Agency § 226, at 498 (emphasis added). 29 The Board, in quoting this rule, concluded that service to the union for pay does not involve abandonment of ... service to the company. 309 N.L.R.B. at 1254. 30 And, that conclusion seems correct. Common sense suggests that as a worker goes about his or her ordinary tasks during a working day, say, wiring sockets or laying cable, he or she is subject to the control of the company employer, whether or not the union also pays the worker. The company, the worker, the union, all would expect that to be so. And, that being so, that union and company interests or control might sometimes differ should make no difference. As Prof. Seavey pointed out many years ago, [o]ne can be a servant of one person for some acts and the servant of another person for other acts, even when done at the same time, for example, where a city detective, in search of clues, finds employment as a waiter and, while serving the meals, searches the customer's pockets. W. Seavey, Handbook of the Law of Agency § 85, p. 146 (1964). The detective is the servant both of the restaurateur (as to the table waiting) and of the city (as to the pocket searching). Ibid. How does it differ from Prof. Seavey's example for the company to pay the worker for electrical work, and the union to pay him for organizing? Moreover, union organizers may limit their organizing to nonwork hours.... If so, union organizing, when done for pay but during nonwork hours, would seem equivalent to simple moonlighting, a practice wholly consistent with a company's control over its workers as to their assigned duties. 31 Id. at 93-95, 116 S.Ct. at 455-56. Although Sunland Construction was decided before Town & Country, it is perfectly consistent with the Court's views. And the Board has followed this line of analysis in its subsequent decisions. See, e.g., Braun Elec. Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 1, 1997 WL 416472 (1997); M.J. Mech. Servs., 324 N.L.R.B. 812, 1997 WL 667581 (1997). 32 Under Braun Electric, M.J. Mechanical Services, and Sunland Construction, it is clear that individuals seeking jobs from an employer pursuant to a union's salting program are statutory employees entitled to protections under the Act. Braun Elec., 324 N.L.R.B. at 3; M.J. Mech. Servs., 324 N.L.R.B. at 816. The fact that individuals are being subsidized by a union or are on the job to organize does not deprive them of the Act's protections. Braun Elec., 324 N.L.R.B. at 3; Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1225-26. Moreover, even when a salting campaign is intended in part to provoke an employer to commit unfair labor practices, union organizers retain their status as employees. M.J. Mech. Servs., 324 N.L.R.B. at 813-14; see also Godsell Contracting, 320 N.L.R.B. 871, 874, 1996 WL 85840 (1996). 33 This is not to say that the law treats paid union organizers like other company employees in every labor law context. Town & Country, 516 U.S. at 97, 116 S.Ct. at 457. Thus, for example, in Sunland Construction the Board held that an employer should not be required during a strike to hire a paid organizer whose role is inherently and unmistakably inconsistent with employment behind a picket line. Sunland Constr. Co., 309 N.L.R.B. at 1230 (internal quotations omitted). The Board reasoned that 34 an employer faced with a strike can take steps aimed at protecting itself from economic injury. For example, an employer can permanently replace the strikers, it can lock out the unit employees and it can hire temporary replacement for the locked-out employees. Consistent with these principles, we believe that the employer can refuse to hire, during the dispute, an agent of the striking union. 35 Id. at 1231. Moreover, in M.J. Mechanical Services and Braun Electric, the Board indicated that salting also may be found to be unprotected if the purported organizational activity is a subterfuge used to further purposes unrelated to organizing, undertaken in bad faith, designed to result in sabotage, or designed to drive the employer out of the area or out of business. Braun Elec., 324 N.L.R.B. at 3 n. 3; M.J. Mech. Servs., 324 N.L.R.B. at 813-14. 36 In the instant case, petitioner claims that the ALJ improperly denied it an opportunity to offer evidence to demonstrate that the Union salts sought to engage in unprotected activity and, thus, were properly denied work because of their disabling conflicts. The Board found no merit in this claim. Given the somewhat imprecise boundaries of activities that constitute unprotected disabling conduct, an ALJ normally would be expected to allow evidence in permitting an employer to make an argument on disabling conflict based on slightly different facts than have been previously recognized as making out the legal defense. Still, we have little difficulty in agreeing with the Board that petitioner's proffer here does not raise a serious issue. The Board noted that 37 [Casino] sought to establish that (1) Phillips filed applications with several employers at the same time in April 1997 and that in October 1997, while employed by the [petitioner], he engaged in a short economic strike and a subsequent unfair labor practice strike; (2) that after being denied employment, Dooley attempted to convince an employee of the Respondent to go to work for a union contractor; and (3) that 30 applicants appeared outside the Respondent's office when King and Dooley applied for work. 38 Casino Ready Mix, 2001 WL 1039902 at  n. 7. The Board, citing Town & Country, M.J. Mechanical Services, and Braun Electric, held that Casino's proffer was properly rejected by the ALJ, because the evidence offered would not have demonstrated disabling conflicts. Id. The Board plainly did not err in this conclusion. The Board's judgment rests on the agency's reasonable interpretation of employee. And as the Court in Town & Country noted, the Board's construction of [`employee'] is entitled to considerable deference. 516 U.S. at 94, 116 S.Ct. at 455 (internal quotations omitted). 39 Before this court, Casino argues that the Board should be reversed, because its holding in this case impermissibly extends established precedent. To support this claim, petitioner notes that, at the hearing before the ALJ, the Board's General Counsel argued that the employer's offer of evidence should be rejected, in part, because a union's campaigning or organizational tactics as they relate to other employers are completely irrelevant. Counsel for the Acting General Counsel's Motion in Limine at 2, App. 22. The ALJ, appearing to agree with the General Counsel, rejected petitioner's evidentiary proffer, because, in his view, 40 the current state of the law is merely that a salter will lose his protected status during the time that he is engaged in bad faith activity. Nothing more. I see no warrant for me to go further and find that a salter who may have engaged in bad faith activity in some other situation at some other place with some other employer in the past has lost his protected status for all time, much less in the specific case I am hearing. 41 Order Denying Motion in Limine at 5, App. 55. 42 The ALJ's holding does not correspond with prevailing law, so it is unsurprising that the Board did not endorse either the General Counsel's or the ALJ's view of the law regarding the standards governing salting activity and the evidence necessary for an employer to establish a disabling conflict. The Board did not hold that evidence regarding a union's campaigning tactics is irrelevant, nor did the Board hold that evidence that a salter who may have engaged in bad faith activity in some other situation at some other place with some other employer in the past is always immaterial. Rather, the Board merely found no merit in [Casino's] contention that the [ALJ] improperly limited its ability to prove that [the union organizers] were not protected by the Act. Casino Ready Mix, 2001 WL 1039902, at  n. 7 (citing Town & Country, 516 U.S. 85, 116 S.Ct. 450, 133 L.Ed.2d 371; M.J. Mech. Servs., 324 N.L.R.B. at 813-14; Braun Elec., 324 N.L.R.B. at 3). As noted above, neither Town & Country, M.J. Mechanical Services, nor Braun Electric endorses the contested views of the General Counsel or the ALJ, so the Board apparently knew what it was doing in citing those authorities, and not the ALJ. The Board obviously meant only to apply the principles enunciated in those cases to uphold the ALJ's evidentiary exclusion. 43 On the merits, we can find no fault with the Board's judgment. The evidence that the employer proffered did not purport to show a Sunland Construction economic strike situation, or any other potentially disabling conflict, such as subterfuge, bad faith, sabotage, or an attempt to drive the employer out of the area or out of business. Thus, even if the evidence were admitted, it would not have been sufficient to establish a disabling conflict. See Casino Ready Mix, 2001 WL 1039902, at  n. 7.