Opinion ID: 2807807
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The court of appeals' remedy

Text: ¶40 Assuming error, we proceed to consider whether the court of appeals' remedy in this case——a remand to the circuit 20 No. 2012AP2782-CR court with instructions to enter an amended judgment of conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense and impose sentence for a seventh offense——violates Chamblis's right to due process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. ¶41 Chamblis argues that the court of appeals' remedy invalidates his guilty plea. He maintains that he entered a guilty plea to the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense with an understanding that, as a direct consequence of his decision, he faced a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. He notes that the maximum penalty commensurate with a conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense is more punitive: 10 years imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. Thus, according to Chamblis, the court of appeals' remedy renders his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary, thereby violating his right to due process by subjecting him to a greater sentence of imprisonment than that which he was told he could receive upon pleading guilty. He further contends that it would be fundamentally unfair to resentence him because he has already served the confinement portion of his originally imposed sentence. ¶42 The State argues that the court of appeals' remedy does not invalidate Chamblis's guilty plea. According to the State, the court of appeals correctly determined that Chamblis understood that he could be sentenced for a seventh offense upon pleading guilty. The State further submits that it would not be 21 No. 2012AP2782-CR fundamentally unfair to resentence Chamblis consistent with a seventh offense because he knew the State would be appealing the circuit court's evidentiary ruling. Thus, the State maintains that Chamblis cannot reasonably claim an expectation of finality in his sentence. ¶43 We agree with Chamblis that the court of appeals' remedy in this case violates his right to due process by rendering his guilty plea unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary. ¶44 The record clearly establishes that Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh offense. Initially, there was confusion regarding the direct consequences of Chamblis's plea: it was unclear whether Chamblis was pleading guilty to a sixth offense——a Class H felony carrying a maximum punishment of 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine——or a seventh offense——a Class G felony carrying a maximum punishment of 10 years imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. However, the circuit court dispelled all confusion once it engaged Chamblis in the plea colloquy mandated by Wis. Stat. § 971.08. ¶45 At the outset of the plea colloquy, the circuit court clarified that it was proceeding with a plea to the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense. It then asked Chamblis whether he understood the plea agreement. Chamblis responded I do now, sir. The circuit court informed Chamblis that the plea carried a minimum penalty of 6 months imprisonment and a $600 22 No. 2012AP2782-CR fine and a maximum penalty of 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. Chamblis stated that he understood the penalty range and pleaded guilty. ¶46 Later in the plea colloquy, the circuit court ensured that Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to the charge of operating with a PAC as a sixth offense: THE COURT: Is there anything about your case that you don't understand at this point? THE DEFENDANT: I didn't [understand] at first, but now, no, sir. THE COURT: Okay. You feel like you fully understand everything? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: And it's been sort of a complicated matter. Do you feel you have a clear understanding of what these issues are? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. THE COURT: Okay. Do you understand the Court's not bound by any sentencing recommendation or any other plea agreement or any arguments made by any of the attorneys at the time of sentencing? Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And in fact, upon your plea of guilty, the court may impose a maximum penalty in spite of any agreement? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. Of course, the maximum penalty to which the circuit court referred and Chamblis understood was that associated with a sixth offense: 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. The plea colloquy therefore demonstrates that Chamblis entered a 23 No. 2012AP2782-CR knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh offense. ¶47 However, as noted, we are not confined to the plea colloquy in evaluating Chamblis's due process challenge. Rather, we consider the totality of the circumstances in determining the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of his plea. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 258. That means we consider other portions of the record to determine if Chamblis understood that, as a direct consequence of his plea, he could be sentenced for a seventh offense. ¶48 The court of appeals found significance in the fact that defense counsel had stated on the record the minimum and maximum penalties associated with a conviction for operating with a PAC as a seventh offense. But these statements occurred prior to the circuit court's explicit determination that it would accept a plea only to the lower charge of a sixth offense. In fact, as we indicated above, the record clearly establishes that Chamblis did not understand the direct consequences of his plea at the time in which these statements were made. That is precisely why we require the circuit court to personally engage the defendant in ascertaining the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary nature of a plea. See Brown, 293 Wis. 2d 594, ¶¶50-52. Given that the circuit court later informed Chamblis that the minimum and maximum penalties he faced were those commensurate with a sixth offense, it cannot reasonably be argued that defense counsel's statements 24 No. 2012AP2782-CR demonstrate that Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to a seventh offense. ¶49 The court of appeals also found it important that the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form indicated a maximum punishment consistent with a seventh offense: 10 years imprisonment and a $25,000 fine. However, similar to defense counsel's statements, the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form is of marginal value to the present issue. Chamblis executed the form a day before his plea hearing amid the uncertainty regarding the direct consequences of his plea.13 We further note that the form did not list the minimum penalty corresponding to a seventh offense. This deficiency exemplifies why a plea questionnaire is not a substitute for the circuit court personally addressing the defendant to ensure that he or she understands the implications the plea. See id., ¶52. Put simply, the Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form, executed prior to the plea colloquy in this case, does not establish that Chamblis's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary to a seventh offense. ¶50 Considering the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that Chamblis entered into a plea agreement with an understanding that the minimum penalty he could face was 6 months imprisonment and a $600 fine and the maximum penalty he could face was 6 years imprisonment and a $10,000 fine. That 13 The Plea Questionnaire/Waiver of Rights form is dated September 18, 2012. Chamblis’s plea hearing took place on September 19, 2012. 25 No. 2012AP2782-CR means Chamblis entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea to operating with a PAC as a sixth offense, not as a seventh offense. Thus, the court of appeals' remedy which subjects Chamblis to a greater sentence of imprisonment than that which he was told he could receive upon pleading guilty violates his right to due process.