Opinion ID: 1707145
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the trial judge committed reversible error in denying the appellant the right to make a demonstration before the jury by trying on a pair of shoes which were admitted into evidence, without the appellant being required to take the stand as a witness?

Text: ¶ 18. Lewis also argues that he should have been allowed to don Exhibit 66 (a pair of black, Fila tennis shoes) in order for the jury to consider the fit of the shoes. There were two pairs of black, Fila tennis shoes in this case: a) Exhibit 66, size 12 shoes, which the police contended were worn by Lewis at the time of his arrest, and b) Exhibit 75, shoes with white paint on them, which the police contended were seized from Lewis' room with a search warrant. ¶ 19. Lewis' mother testified that the officers were lying or had confused the shoes, because her son wore a size 13 shoe, and she had seen him wearing Exhibit 75the work shoes (the ones with paint on them)at 7:30 the night of the murders. In addition, Lewis' mother knew that Lewis was wearing Exhibit 75 at the time of arrest, because they were his work shoes and he was arrested at work. ¶ 20. However, it is undisputed that both pairs of shoes belonged to Lewis (whether they were taken from his bedroom or his feet). The right shoe from Exhibit 66 was identified as having made the bloody footprint at the scene of the crime. ¶ 21. The record reflects that the shoes in Exhibit 66 were admitted (over objection) during the testimony of State witness, Detective Ned Garner. During cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Garner what size shoe Lewis wore. Detective Garner did not know, and defense counsel attempted to have the shoes in Exhibit 66 placed on Lewis' feet. The State objected, and the trial judge held, You certainly are entitled to make that exhibition to the jury, but not with this witness. When you have your case in chief, Mr. [Defense Attorney], you can do so. ¶ 22. Later, during Lewis' case-in-chief, the defense attorney attempted to have Lewis don the shoes. The State objected to Lewis' exhibiting the fit of the shoes, unless Lewis took the stand, under oath. The trial judge held that exhibiting the fit of the shoes would waive Lewis' Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. That is, the trial judge would allow Lewis to make the demonstration, but only if Lewis took the stand and subjected himself to cross-examination. ¶ 23. On appeal, Lewis argues that he should have been allowed to put the shoes on his feet, and that such a demonstration would not waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. Clearly, the defendant can be required to make such demonstrations, without violating the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Porter v. State, 519 So.2d 1230, 1232 (Miss.1988) (defendant can be required to demonstrate scar on his hand); McCrory v. State, 342 So.2d 897, 899 (Miss. 1977) (defendant can be required to give fingerprints and handwriting exemplar, because the Fifth Amendment only bars the compelled production of testimonial evidence, as opposed to identifying physical characteristics); Thames v. State, 221 Miss. 573, 73 So.2d 134, 137 (Miss.1954) (defendant can be required to stand). [L]ong ago, the United States Supreme Court held that an accused's Fifth Amendment rights are not offended when the accused is compelled to put on clothing identified with a crime, to see if it fits, because the prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. ... The Fifth Amendment privilege is a bar against compelling `communications' or `testimony', but that compulsion which makes a suspect or accused the source of `real or physical evidence' does not violate it. United States v. Craft, 691 F.2d 205, 206-7 (5th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). ¶ 24. Lewis argues that, because the State could have compelled him to demonstrate the fit of the shoes, he is entitled to a level playing field, and cannot be denied the right to make the same demonstration before the jury. This is a case of first impression in Mississippi. Two other jurisdictions have considered this question and held that the criminal defendant does not waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by demonstrating the fit of shoes introduced by the State. See State v. Suddeth, 306 N.W.2d 786, 787-88 (Iowa 1981); State v. Norris, 577 S.W.2d 941, 948-49 (Mo.App. 1979). ¶ 25. This authority is persuasive. The criminal defendant is allowed to make nontestimonial demonstrations, where such demonstrations are relevant. However, the case sub judice can be factually distinguished from Suddeth and Norris, because the shoes in those cases were found at the crime scene, and the ownership of the shoes was at issue. See Suddeth, 306 N.W.2d at 787-88; Norris, 577 S.W.2d at 948-49. If Suddeth or Norris had been allowed to try on the shoes, the fit would have been relevant as to whether they could have left the shoe at the scene of the crime. In the case at hand, the ownership of the shoes is not at issue. It is undisputed that the defendant was wearing the shoes when he was arrested. [2] ¶ 26. The admission of reasonably necessary and material demonstrative evidence is within the discretion of the trial court. Murriel v. State, 515 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss.1987) (quoting Gandy v. State, 373 So.2d 1042, 1047 (Miss.1979)); Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 131-32 (Miss.1991) (holding that trial court's determination of whether demonstrative evidence is appropriate and relevant will be upheld, unless abuse of discretion occurs and is prejudicial to the accused). ¶ 27. Moreover, because the types of demonstrative evidence and the purposes for which it is sought to be introduced are extremely varied, it is generally viewed as appropriate to accord the trial judge broad discretion in ruling upon the admissibility of many types of demonstrative evidence. Murriel v. State, 515 So.2d 952, 956 (Miss. 1987) (quoting McCormick on Evidence § 212 at 665 (E. Cleary 3d ed.1984)). Therefore, even though the trial court misconstrued the Fifth Amendment in excluding Lewis' proposed demonstration, the shoes were properly excluded, given the undisputed testimony of the eyewitnesses that Lewis wore the shoes at the time of his arrest. ¶ 28. That is, the trial judge properly excluded the demonstration evidence because it was not appropriate and relevant. See Murriel, 515 So.2d at 956 (discussing application of M.R.E. 404 which defines relevant evidence as evidence having a tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence). See also Lacy v. State, 629 So.2d 591, 594 (Miss.1993) (citing M.R.E. 103, which requires reversal based on exclusion of evidence, only where substantial right of party is affected). ¶ 29. Clearly, the defendant does not waive his Fifth Amendment protections by offering demonstrative evidence, if appropriate and relevant. That is, if the State could require the demonstration without violating the Fifth Amendment, then the defendant may make the demonstration without waiving his Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. However, because the demonstration requested by Lewis was irrelevant, his argument on this point is without merit.