Opinion ID: 686479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kelm Failed to State a Claim for Damages

Text: 36 Next, we must address Kelm's claim for monetary damages. The Supreme Court has held that where state proceedings can not address a party's claim for monetary relief, abstention is improper for this claim. See Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 108 S.Ct. 523, 98 L.Ed.2d 529 (1988) (the District Court has no discretion to dismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief that cannot be redressed in the state proceedings). In Litteral v. Bach, we applied Deakins and held that a district court erred by dismissing a money damages claim on abstention grounds. 869 F.2d 297, 298 (6th Cir.1989). Here, although the district court dismissed the entire case on abstention grounds, the district court did not err because, as discussed below, Kelm failed to state a viable claim for damages. 37 Kelm sought damages pursuant to Sec. 1983 for the service and execution of the April 12 CPO which, according to Kelm, constituted a breach of the peace and a wrongful arrest thus depriving him of liberty and property without due process of law. Because Kelm specifically dismissed defendants Parkhurst and Weber from his damages claim, we must examine whether he stated a viable claim against the remaining defendants--the seven Columbus police officers who served and executed the CPO, and his wife, Amy Kelm. 38
39 First, assuming the validity of Kelm's allegations, the Columbus police officers are nonetheless protected by qualified immunity. Public policy and well established law grant qualified immunity to those government officials who perform discretionary functions and whose conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 808, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732-33, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217-18, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). Whether an official protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful action generally turns on the 'objective legal reasonableness' of the action assessed in light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time it was taken. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). 40 Clearly, citizens must be afforded due process before a deprivation of life, liberty or property. Here, however, when the officers executed the CPO, Sec. 3113.31 was constitutional and its procedures were presumed adequate. Thus, there was no clearly established law with which the officers failed to comply. Instead, the officers rightfully executed a CPO pursuant to a presumably constitutional statute. The officers, therefore, are entitled to qualified immunity and Kelm's damages claim against them must fail.
41 Although Kelm never specifically included Amy Kelm within his damages claim, he alleged that she invoked the jurisdiction of the domestic relations court in obtaining a CPO through perjury, [and] notified police officers to enforce it through material misstatements about prior service and an immediate threat of violence. Construing this complaint broadly, we read these allegations as an attempt to seek damages from Amy Kelm. 42 Kelm correctly notes that in some instances Sec. 1983 extends to private parties. To establish a viable claim under Sec. 1983, however, Kelm must prove first that Amy Kelm deprived him of a guaranteed right under color of the challenged statute, and second that her actions were properly attributable to the state, i.e. that she qualified as a state actor. Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1733, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978); see also Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir.1992). Here, although Amy Kelm utilized a state statute, Kelm can not prove that she qualifies as a state actor. 43 In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., the Court found that private parties can be deemed to be acting under the color of state law when acting in conjunction with state officials in garnishment or attachment proceedings. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482 (1982). The Court further noted, however, that even where a private party utilizes an allegedly unconstitutional state statute, courts must focus not on the terms of the statute but on the character of the defendants to the Sec. 1983 suit. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S.Ct. at 2754-55. The Court explained that [a]ction by a private party pursuant to this statute, without something more, was not sufficient to justify a characterization of that party as a 'state actor.'  Id. 44 Whether a party qualifies as a state actor varies with the circumstances of each case. Thus, the Court has articulated several tests to be used in different contexts. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953) (public function test); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 66 S.Ct. 276, 90 L.Ed. 265 (1946) (state compulsion test); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1615, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (nexus test); Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978) (joint action test for cases of prejudgment attachments). Even when we stretch the above tests to their outer limits, Amy Kelm does not qualify as a state actor. Thus, Kelm's damage claim against her must fail. We, therefore, sua sponte dismiss Kelm's damage claim for failure to state a claim.