Opinion ID: 455812
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the oxford documents issue

Text: 19 Prior to trial, the government moved under Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c) to require Black to produce various documents and records relating to Oxford. Black opposed the government's motion on the ground that production would violate his Fifth Amendment rights. The district court inspected the requested papers in camera and sustained Black's objection to production. At trial, the government renewed its motion to require Black to produce any Oxford documents in his possession. This time the district court granted the government's request. 20 Among the records produced were confirmation slips which purported to reflect transactions in T-Bill and silver futures made by London Atlantic Market Brokers, Ltd., a commodities dealer. Oxford had sent photocopies of these confirmation slips to certain investors who requested additional documentation of the Oxford transactions. The government introduced the originals at trial. The defense unsuccessfully objected that the slips were not properly authenticated. During the government's cross-examination, Black denied that he had prepared the London Atlantic slips himself and disclaimed any knowledge of whether the slips were forgeries. Black maintained that he disassociated himself from Oxford in 1982. He testified that he had obtained the slips at the request of his attorney while visiting the Cayman Islands. 21 Following the conclusion of Black's testimony, the government showed the confirmation slips to its rebuttal witness, David Lamb. Lamb was the owner and chairman of the London & Atlantic Market Brokers. 5 Lamb testified that the purported confirmation slips were false and that London & Atlantic did not deal in T-Bill futures. 22 Black moved to strike the Oxford documents and the testimony relating to them, apparently renewing his Fifth Amendment contention. The district court denied Black's motion. Black contends on appeal that the compelled production of the documents violated his privilege against self-incrimination and that the district court allowed the slips into evidence without proper authentication, as required by Fed.R.Evid. 901.
23 Ordinarily, the self-incrimination privilege does not protect business records. E.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976). The act of producing such records, however, may be sufficiently testimonial to be privileged. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 1242-43, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410, 96 S.Ct. at 1581; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 745 F.2d 1250, 1251 (9th Cir.1984). The danger presented is that by enforcing subpoenas courts may compel tacit admissions that the papers demanded exist, that they are in the defendant's possession, and that they are authentic. See Doe, 104 S.Ct. at 1242, 1243 n. 11. The government concedes that Black may enjoy such a privilege, see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 722 F.2d 981, 986-87 (2d Cir.1983) (the act of production doctrine applies to corporate records in the hands of a former corporate officer whose relationship with the corporation has ended), but asserts that Black waived his privilege by taking the stand and testifying at trial. 24 A defendant who testifies at trial waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and may be cross-examined on matters made relevant by his direct testimony. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-56, 78 S.Ct. 622, 626-27, 2 L.Ed.2d 589 (1958); accord McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 1471, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). The scope of the defendant's waiver is coextensive with the scope of relevant cross-examination. Brown, 356 U.S. at 154-55, 78 S.Ct. at 626-27; United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1340 (9th Cir.1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1000, 98 S.Ct. 1656, 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978). Fixing the extent of cross-examination, in turn, is left to the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Miranda-Uriarte, 649 F.2d 1345, 1353 (9th Cir.1981); United States v. Panza, 612 F.2d 432, 437 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 925, 100 S.Ct. 3019, 65 L.Ed.2d 1118 (1980). 25 Black denies that he waived the privilege. He asserts that he did not make any reference to the slips on direct examination. Rather, he has consistently maintained, first, that the futures contracts reflected transactions between Oxford and its clients and not trades made on exchanges and, second, that he had disassociated with Oxford shortly after its inception. Black insists that the district court erred in concluding that he had broached the subject of the London & Atlantic confirmation slips on direct and thereby waived his privilege with respect to these slips. 26 Black unduly restricts the scope of a defendant's waiver. What the defendant actually discusses on direct does not determine the extent of permissible cross-examination or of his waiver. Hearst, 563 F.2d at 1340. Rather, the inquiry is whether the government's questions are 'reasonably related' to the subjects covered by the defendant's testimony. Id.; see United States v. Sturgis, 578 F.2d 1296, 1300-01 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970, 99 S.Ct. 464, 58 L.Ed.2d 430 (1978). In this case, Black's possession of forged Oxford documents is clearly related to the subjects raised by his direct testimony. 27 Black's testimony offered an explanation for Oxford's operations and for his role in those operations. He testified that Oxford took hedging positions with various commodities brokers in case clients wished to take actual delivery of the commodities they had purchased. E.g., 21 R.T. at 1784-85. Black further asserted that Oxford had such an account with London & Atlantic. Id. at 1785, 1787. Finally, Black testified that in any event he had not played an active role in Oxford's operations since soon after its formation. Black's account of events and his possession of forged confirmation slips purporting to show transactions made by London & Atlantic on behalf of Oxford and its clients are certainly reasonably related. Black's testimony put in issue his version of events. He has  'no right to set forth to the jury all the facts which tend in his favor without laying himself open to a cross-examination upon those facts.'  Brown, 356 U.S. at 155, 78 S.Ct. at 626 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315, 20 S.Ct. 944, 949, 44 L.Ed. 1078 (1900)). By testifying, Black waived his privilege. The district court did not err by compelling the production of Black's documents.
28 Black also contends that the district court erred by admitting the slips into evidence because the documents were not properly authenticated. The requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Fed.R.Evid. 901(a). In essence, Black contends that the government failed to make a sufficient showing that Black was responsible for the forged confirmation slips. 6 29 The question of authenticity is left to the discretion of the trial judge and is reviewed on appeal under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1476 (9th Cir.1983); United States v. Perlmuter, 693 F.2d 1290, 1292 (9th Cir.1982). The government need only make a prima facie showing of authenticity, as [t]he rule requires only that the court admit evidence if sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror could find in favor of authenticity or identification. 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence p 901(a), at 901-16 to -17 (1983). The credibility or probative force of the evidence offered is, ultimately, an issue for the jury. See id. p 901(a), at 901-22. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the slips. 30 The government must establish the connection between Black and the government's proffered exhibits. The government may prove that connection by circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence. United States v. Natale, 526 F.2d 1160, 1173 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 1724, 48 L.Ed.2d 193 (1976). In Natale, the authenticity of the evidence was supported by the presence of the defendant at the place where the evidence was discovered. Id. Similarly, in the present case the strongest support for the government's position is that the evidence was in Black's possession at the time the government sought its production. That fact alone should warrant upholding the district court's decision. Cf. Burgess v. Premier Corp., 727 F.2d 826, 835-36 (9th Cir.1984) (the court could find that exhibits were adequately authenticated by the fact of being found in the defendant's warehouse). 31 Black asserts that he obtained the documents from Oxford at the request of his attorney. This contention addresses the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Whether the confirmation slips were forgeries, whether the defendant obtained the documents in the fashion he described, or whether he was responsible for their fabrication were all issues for the jury to decide. See 5 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, supra, p 901(a), at 901-22. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the slips into evidence.