Opinion ID: 204583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether Hopson’s Sentence Was Reasonable

Text: Finally, Hopson contends that the district court abused its discretion in sentencing him to a term of imprisonment of 105 months. Hopson points out that the district court rejected the government’s characterization that he was a career offender, yet then varied upward based upon career offender factors. Hopson claims that because he was not a career offender, the district court should have sentenced him to a range of 33 to 41 months. Our appellate review proceeds in two stages. It begins by “ensur[ing] that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improper ly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We do not presume that a district court considered the factors solely because the sentence falls within the Guidelines range. United States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 329-30 (3d Cir. 2006). If a district court has not committed any procedural error, “we then, at stage two, consider its substantive reasonableness.” United States v. Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). Our substantive review requires us not to focus on one or two factors, but on the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597; United States v. Howe, 543 F.3d 128, 137 (3d Cir. 2008). At both stages of our review, the party challenging the sentence has the burden of demonstrating unreasonableness. Cooper, 437 F.3d at 332. Where, as here, a district court decides to vary from the Guidelines’ recommendations, we “must give due deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.” Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 597. “We afford deference to the District Court because it is in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence in light of the particular circumstances of the case.” United States v. Dragon, 471 F.3d 501, 506 (3d Cir. 2006). Here, the district court found that Hopson’s criminal history demonstrated that he was someone who “consistently violates” society’s laws. The court pointed out that Hopson had four prior serious drug offenses (noting that one of them was too old to count against him under the guidelines). The court observed that the three drug trafficking crimes for which he was sentenced had been counted as a single sentence rather than separately because the offenses were not separated by intervening arrests, even though the three cases involved completely separate crimes. The court pointed out that had Hopson been arrested rather than showing up on his own pursuant to a summons, he would have qualified as a career offender. The court also noted that Hopson committed a stalking offense just months after he was released from serving most of a serious 3 to 6 year sentence of imprisonment for his three other prior drug trafficking crimes. The court reasoned that if a six year sentence did so little to deter Hopson’s criminal activities, a 33 to 41 month sentence would have little to no impact. Accordingly, the district court imposed a lengthy sentence because of its concern that Hopson had demonstrated his proclivity for recidivism. We can find nothing unreasonable about the sentence that was imposed and the court did not commit any legal error in imposing it.