Opinion ID: 2076124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Strickland/Fritz Test

Text: The right to counsel derives from the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article 1, paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution. It encompasses the right to effective assistance of counsel. State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 581, 392 A. 2d 590 (1978); see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2584, 91 L.Ed. 2d 305, 321 (1986) (the right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel). The United States Supreme Court set out a two-prong test to identify ineffective assistance of counsel, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674 (1984), which we adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 519 A. 2d 336 (1987). More recently, we affirmed our adherence to the Strickland/Fritz standard in State v. Savage, supra, 120 N.J. at 614-15, 577 A. 2d 455, and State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 561 A. 2d 1082 (1989), where we deemed the Strickland/Fritz standard applicable also to capital-murder cases. Under that test, the benchmark for determining attorney incompetency is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 686, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 692-93. To show ineffectiveness of counsel, a defendant must meet both prongs of the Strickland/Fritz test. First, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's performance was truly deficient, with such grievous errors that `counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.' State v. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52, 519 A. 2d 336 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693). Second, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel's conduct deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Specifically, a defendant alleging actual ineffectiveness must show that there is `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' State v. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52, 519 A. 2d 336 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 698). The Strickland Court fashioned its test in general terms, emphasizing the fact-specific nature of the inquiry into counsel's performance. Id. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693-94. The test is whether counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 693. The reviewing court must evaluate the conduct from the attorney's perspective at the time of trial, being careful to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694. To show reversible error based on constitutionally-deficient assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish that counsel's actions were beyond the `wide range of professionally competent assistance.' Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 695. There is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.... Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed. 2d at 694; State v. Fritz, supra, 105 N.J. at 52, 519 A. 2d 336. Even if counsel made strategy miscalculations or trial mistakes, if our adversary system is to function at all effectively, these may not be permitted to impair the binding nature of the proceedings, except in those rare instances where they are of such magnitude as to thwart the fundamental guarantee of fair trial. State v. Dennis, 43 N.J. 418, 428, 204 A. 2d 868 (1964). The Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that Bruton violations are not per se reversible errors. Therefore, to prove reversible Bruton error, a defendant must demonstrate that the joint proceeding actually prejudiced his or her defense. Without proof of actual prejudice, the error is not considered to require reversal. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 682, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436-37, 89 L.Ed. 2d 674, 685 (1986) ( Bruton error may be harmless); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed. 2d 208 (1973) (same); see also Solomon v. Harris, 749 F. 2d 1, 3 (2d Cir.1984) (failure to raise Bruton objection did not undermine defense strategy and therefore was harmless), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1087, 105 S.Ct. 1851, 85 L.Ed. 2d 149 (1985); United States ex rel. Hanrahan v. Thieret, 695 F. Supp. 372, 388 (N.D.Ill. 1988) ( Bruton error harmless because it did not affect trial outcome), vacated and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Hanrahan v. Greer, 896 F. 2d 241 (7th Cir.1990).