Opinion ID: 215090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mobley's Testimony

Text: Burns also claims that he was denied procedural due process when Hearing Officer Canino denied his request to call Mobley as a witness. The prison's policy allows an inmate to call up to three relevant witnesses, including one staff member. Burns requested only Mobley's testimony. From what we have already stated, it should be clear that an inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that inmates are not entitled to the full panoply of constitutional rights. Here again, the inmate's right must be balanced against concerns that are endemic to a situation of one inmate testifying against another: Relationships among the inmates are varied and complex and perhaps subject to the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner. It is against this background that disciplinary proceedings must be structured by prison authorities; and it is against this background that we must make our constitutional judgments. . . . Id. at 562, 94 S.Ct. 2963. Here, Burns' desire to have Mobley testify was certainly reasonable since Mobley was the victim of the assault and presumably saw his assailant. Hearing Officer Canino appropriately responded by asking Mobley to testify. However, as we have noted, Mobley refused to testify either at the hearing or in camera. He also refused to provide any kind of written testimony. Canino did not explain why Mobley refused to testify, and it is not clear that she even knew Mobley's reasons or inquired into them. Canino therefore conducted the hearing and rendered a decision without having the benefit of hearing what the victim knew about the identity of his attacker. The Supreme Court has explained that it would be useful for the [prison disciplinary hearing officer] to state [his or her] reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in individual cases. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963. However, the Court has also cautioned that institutional concerns, including the possibility of retaliation, may make it wholly impractical to compel an inmate's testimony at a disciplinary hearing. Id. at 567, 94 S.Ct. 2963. We will therefore not conclude that a hearing officer must always record the reason for permitting an inmate to refuse to testify. That may sometimes be as problematic as reporting that an inmate refused to testify out of fear of retaliation. These institutional concerns override Burns' interest in being able to call Mobley as a witness. If Burns had been the assailant, Mobley would either have had to testify truthfully and risk retaliation or perjure himself and thereby become the vehicle by which his assailant would escape sanction. In Dalton, the inmate wished to call prison officials to testify, but under prison policy they could not be compelled to testifyas noted earlier, all testimony had to be voluntary. Dalton, 713 F.2d at 77. While we agree with the Fourth Circuit that the right to call only voluntary witnesses is no right at all, we find no justification for extending this analysis so far that it would force a victim inmate to testify against his/her assailant, nor is Dalton to the contrary. The court was there concerned with a per se prohibition that did not allow for inmates to require testimony of anyone (including corrections officers), even when that testimony presented no institutional concerns that would have counseled against it. The Commonwealth's interest in protecting Mobley and managing the difficult relationships within the prison setting far outweigh Burns' right to call Mobley as a witness. Wolff requires a case-by-case analysis of the calling of involuntary witnesses. See Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 317 (7th Cir.1992). Here, we conclude that the special circumstances involving an inmate victim, and the concerns about the unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform on a fellow prisoner, Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562, 94 S.Ct. 2963, outweigh the right Burns may have otherwise had to call an unwilling witness. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's finding that there was no due process violation in allowing Mobley not to testify, but we will reverse the court's finding that Burns' due process right was not violated by the hearing examiner's failure to view the videotape that may have recorded the incident.