Opinion ID: 2257596
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Condition Precedent or Statute of Limitations

Text: Historically, we have construed the limitation period prescribed in § 3-904(g) as a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action, rather than as a statute of limitations. See Waddell, supra, 331 Md. at 57, 626 A.2d at 355 (cases cited therein). In Waddell, we held that the limitations period prescribed in § 3-904(g) is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action. Id. In Waddell, an adult filed a wrongful death action approximately seventeen years after her father died from injuries sustained when his car collided with a tractor trailer. Id. at 54, 626 A.2d at 354. At the time of her father's death, the daughter was a minor. Id. The defendants moved to dismiss the wrongful death claim because it was filed more than three years after the decedent's death. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Id. On appeal the daughter argued, among other things, that the 1971 changes to § 3-904(g)(1), amending the statute from a two year limitations period to three years, changed the time period of the statute from a condition precedent to a statute of limitations. We disagreed and explained: In [ State v. Parks, 148 Md. 477, 129 A. 793 (1925),] the issue was whether the requirement in the wrongful death statute then in effect, Maryland Code (1912) Art. 67 § 2, requiring that every such action shall be commenced within twelve calendar months after the death of the deceased person, is a condition essential to the right to maintain the action given by the statute, or merely a limitation of the remedy which must be pleaded to defeat the action. Id. at 58, 626 A.2d at 356 (quoting Parks, 148 Md. 477-78, 129 A. at 793 (noting that in 1925, a claimant had twelve months to bring a wrongful death actiontoday, a claimant has ten years, or three years from the date cause of death is discovered)). Further, we explained that the wrongful death [statute] create[s] a new legal liability, with the right to suit for its enforcement, provided the suit is brought within [the statutory time prescribed], and not otherwise. The time within which the suit must be brought operates as a limitation of the liability itself as created, and not of the remedy alone. It is a condition attached to the right to sue at all.... Time has been made of the essence of the right and the right is lost if the time is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created by the same statutes, and the limitations of the remedy are, therefore, to be treated as limitations of the right. Id. at 59, 626 A.2d at 356 (alterations in original) (alterations added). In 1985, in Trimper, we held that the unambiguous language of the wrongful death statute leaves no room for judicial interpretation . . . of the discovery rule. Trimper, supra at n. 7 at 17, 305 Md. at 36, 501 A.2d at 449. The three-year period after the date of death for filing a wrongful death claim stood as an objectively determinable event or starting point. Id. at 34, 501 A.2d at 448. In addition, the wrongful death statute created a new liability not existing at common law.... The period of limitations is part of the substantive right of action. Id. at 35, 501 A.2d at 449 (citations omitted). Further, this Court has held that [a] condition precedent cannot be waived under the common law and a failure to satisfy it can be raised at any time because the action itself is fatally flawed if the condition is not satisfied. This requirement of strict or substantial compliance with a condition precedent is of course subject to abrogation by the General Assembly. Rios v. Montgomery County, 386 Md. 104, 127-28, 872 A.2d 1, 14 (2005). The statute of limitations, however, is different. [9] Judge Cole writing for this Court in Pennwalt stated: Statutes of limitations have existed in Maryland and in other common law jurisdictions for hundreds of years. See Ferguson, The Statutes of Limitation Saving Statutes, 12-14 (1978). The statutes were enacted in an effort to balance the competing interests of potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and the public. The statutory period provided by a statute of limitations represents a compromise of these interests and reflects a policy decision regarding what constitutes an adequate period of time for a person of ordinary diligence to pursue his claim. Goldstein v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 285 Md. 673, 684, 404 A.2d 1064, 1069 (1979). By creating a limitations period, the legislature determined that a plaintiff should have only so long to bring his action before he is deemed to have waived his right to sue and to have acquiesced in the defendant's wrongdoing. Limitations statutes therefore are designed to (1) provide adequate time for diligent plaintiffs to file suit, (2) grant repose to defendants when plaintiffs have tarried for an unreasonable period of time, and (3) serve society by promoting judicial economy. Pierce, 296 Md. at 665, 464 A.2d at 1026. Pennwalt, 314 Md. at 437-38, 550 A.2d at 1157-58. See State v. Sharafeldin, 382 Md. 129, 140-41, 854 A.2d 1208, 1214 (2004). Further, in contrast [to a condition precedent to maintaining an action], a statute of limitations affects only the remedy, not the cause of action. Waddell, 331 Md. at 59, 626 A.2d at 353. The defense of limitations may be waived; however, a condition precedent to liability may not be waived. Rios, 386 Md. at 127-28, 872 A.2d at 14. We must determine the legislative intent of the phrase statute of limitations in the 1986 revisions to § 3-904(g). The Legislature stated that before 1986, under the wrongful death statute, occupational disease involved latent or dormant phases that may be undiscoverable beyond the 3-year statute of limitations.  Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Summary of Committee Report, S.B. 864 at 1 (Md.1986) (emphasis added). The legislative purpose of the revisions was that the  statute of limitations [would start to run] . . . [from] the discovery of facts from which it becomes known or reasonably should become known that the occupational disease was a cause of death. Id. at 2. Unfortunately, the General Assembly did not define the phrase statute of limitations before or after its revisions, however it acknowledged that the wrongful death statute runs from the date [of death].... Id. at 2. No outward declaration was made that § 5-101 would apply to the wrongful death statute, thus we presume that the Legislature meant that the limitations period provided within § 3-904(g)(2) would apply. See supra at note 11. We were faced with the same issue in 1971, when the Legislature changed the time period to bring a wrongful death action from two years to three years, and used the phrase statute of limitations in the preamble. Waddell, 331 Md. at 61, 626 A.2d at 357; 1971 Md. Laws, Chap. 784. Judge Bell (now Chief Judge), writing for the Court in Waddell, concluded that although [the Legislature] referred to that time period as a statute of limitations in the process, that does not suffice to effect so considerable a change to render what had once been a condition precedent a statute of limitations. Had the Legislature intended such a radical change, it easily could have done so; it certainly knew how to do it. Id.; Geisz v. Greater Baltimore, 313 Md. 301, 322, 545 A.2d 658, 668 (1988) (`Even a change in the phraseology of a statute by codification will not ordinarily modify the law unless the change is so material that the intention of the General Assembly to modify the law appears unmistakably from the language of the Code.') (quoting Rohrbaugh v. Estate of Stern, 305 Md. 443, 449, 505 A.2d 113, 116 (1986)). In Waddell, the Court explained that the time period prescribed in § 3-904(g) has been construed by this Court to be a condition precedent to maintaining the action, rather than a statute of limitations. Id. The Court in Waddell interpreted the limitations period contained in subsection (g) as condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action. It also noted that the Legislature created a different time period in which to bring a wrongful death claim for deaths caused by occupational disease: Prior to 1986, subsection (g) provided only one time period in which to bring a wrongful death action. In that year, the Legislature amended that subsection to include what is now paragraph (2), providing a different time period in which to bring a wrongful death action when the death is alleged to have been caused by occupational disease. Id. at 63, 626 A.2d at 357 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). No sound reason has been advanced for us to now change our prior interpretation of § 3-904(g)(2). The limitations period prescribed in § 3-904(g)(2) is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action when death is alleged to have been caused by occupational disease. The limitations period prescribed in § 3-904(g), providing that an action shall be filed within three years after the death of the injured person, is similarly a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action for wrongful death in all other cases. Further, we hold that because the Legislature, pursuant to § 3-904(g), provided a different time period for the commencement of a wrongful death action, the general statute of limitations specified in § 5-101 does not apply. Our holdings herein are consistent with our observations in Waddell. Aside from our conclusion that the limitations period prescribed by this statute is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action, our construction of § 3-904(g)(2) alone, pursuant to the rules of statutory interpretation, is consistent with the notion that the Legislature intended to incorporate[ ] the discovery rule as judicially developed. Benjamin, 162 Md.App. at 197-98, 873 A.2d at 477.