Opinion ID: 1656419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in granting michelle's motion for partial summary judgment.

Text: ¶ 43. In Jenkins v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 794 So.2d 228, 232 (Miss.2001), this Court held that on appeal a de novo standard of review applies to a trial court ruling granting summary judgment. In Prescott v. Leaf River Forest Products, Inc., 740 So.2d 301, 308-09 (Miss.1999), this Court observed: On appeal this Court reviews de novo a trial court's decision to grant a motion for summary judgment, which should only be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. M.R.C.P. 56. A fact is material if it tends to resolve any of the issues, properly raised by the parties. Webb v. Jackson, 583 So.2d 946, 949 (Miss.1991) (citing Mink v. Andrew Jackson Casualty Ins. Co., 537 So.2d 431, 433 (Miss.1988) (quoting Mississippi Road Supply v. Zurich-American Insurance Co., 501 So.2d 412, 414 (Miss.1987))). The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. If, in this view, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, then summary judgment should be granted in his favor. Otherwise, the motion should be denied. Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss.1983). Morgan v. City of Ruleville, 627 So.2d 275, 277 (Miss.1993). Rule 56(c) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment shall be granted by a court if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine issue of material fact in existence, while the non-moving party should be given the benefit of every reasonable doubt. Tucker v. Hinds County, 558 So.2d 869, 872 (Miss.1990). ¶ 44. The complaint was filed on March 20, 2000, and an amended complaint was filed on August 24, 2000. In their answers Dr. Eckman and Aurora pled affirmative defenses including Miss.Code Ann. § 85-5-7(7) (1999) which states: In actions involving joint tort-feasors, the trier of fact shall determine the percentage of fault for each party alleged to be at fault. ¶ 45. On September 13, 2001, Michelle filed a motion for summary judgment which was heard before the trial court on January 8, 2002. The motion for summary judgment asserted that Dr. Eckman had the burden of proof for his affirmative defenses. Dr. Eckman asserted in his Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment that § 85-5-7 operates as a matter of law and that invocation of the defense does not require expert testimony. Prior to the hearing, Dr. Eckman provided no information indicating that there was fault to be attributed to a third party non-defendant. After hearing arguments the trial court ruled as follows: With regard to the motion concerning Section 85-5-7, the motion will be denied except as to any parties not named in this lawsuit. I think it's clear to the Court that if the defendants request an apportionment of fault instruction concerning the respective fault of the defendants, should the jury find fault with either of these defendants, they would be entitled to that. But I don't think that I saw anything in the material submitted to me which indicates that the defendants can show that there was any fault of any third party for which the jury would be warranted in allocating or apportioning such fault to. For that reason, the motion for summary judgment concerning Section 85-5-7 will be denied, except as to any parties not actual parties to this lawsuit, named defendants. ¶ 46. Dr. Eckman argues that the trial court ruling was contrary to § 85-5-7 and case law which allows a defendant to argue liability on the part of all parties at fault whether named in the lawsuit or not. Dr. Eckman relies in part upon Dawson v. Townsend & Sons, Inc., 735 So.2d 1131 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), and Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264 (Miss.1999). In Dawson, the Court of Appeals noted: Since the date of trial the supreme court has resolved this troubling question. Estate of Hunter v. General Motors Corp., 729 So.2d 1264 (¶ 32) (Miss.1999). The court concluded that participants in an event who for some reason are not joined in the litigation, so-called phantom defendants, can nonetheless have their portion of fault assigned to them. A jury may not be instructed to consider only the parties actually sued, else the defendants who are present have been unfairly denied the benefits of our system of comparative fault. Id. For example, a claimant could settle with one defendant in order to go after a deep pocket defendant. Id. There is no indication that the legislature intended to reserve for plaintiffs the sole and exclusive right to make allegations of fault before a jury and to deprive defendants of the opportunity to persuade a jury that fault for a given accident lies elsewhere. Id. at (¶ 34). We need not further restate the analysis. 735 So.2d at 1131. ¶ 47. Michelle argues that Dr. Eckman raised the affirmative defense and, therefore, had the burden to prove any apportionment of fault. In Pearl Public School District v. Groner, 784 So.2d 911, 916 (Miss.2001), this Court stated: The District alleges that the amount of damages should have been apportioned among all potentially responsible parties. We agree. On the other hand, apportionment is an affirmative defense that must be pled and proven. This Court has held that [i]t is fundamental that the burden of proof of affirmative defenses rests squarely on the shoulders of the one who expects to avoid liability by that defense. Marshall Durbin Cos. v. Warren, 633 So.2d 1006, 1009 (Miss.1994). ¶ 48. This Court finds that the trial court did not err by granting partial summary judgment in Michelle's favor. Dr. Eckman did not provide sufficient proof that created a genuine issue of material fact. Dr. Eckman's Answer to Plaintiff's first set of Interrogatories, supplemental answers to plaintiff's interrogatories, and the deposition of Dr. Killeffer, filed as part of a supplemental exhibit, did not indicate any fault attributable to a third party. Also there were no affidavits or other information for review in the record. This issue is without merit. ¶ 49. Because this Court is reversing and remanding this case for a new trial with instructions, the remaining issues need not be addressed.