Opinion ID: 2089358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The constitutional claim of the children

Text: The remaining issue is whether the intervention of the children as parties in the divorce action of their parents with an attorney of their choice is constitutionally required. Relying on the procedural due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the Miller children contend that they have a significant liberty interest in the outcome of their parents' divorce because of the custodial issues involved. Assuming, arguendo, that the Miller children have a liberty interest in the outcome of their parents' divorce, [6] we must determine whether representation by a court-appointed guardian ad litem responsible for advocating for their best interests satisfies the requirements of procedural due process. The test we use for evaluating procedural due process claims was set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See Fichter v. Board of Envtl. Protection, 604 A.2d 433, 437 (Me. 1992) (applies Eldridge factors to due process challenge to denial of permit by Board of Environmental Protection); Porter v. Hoffman, 592 A.2d 482, 487 (Me.1991) (applies Eldridge factors to due process challenge to adoption proceedings). It consists of three factors which must be balanced against each other: (1) the private interests affected by the chosen procedure; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of those interests by the chosen procedure and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the countervailing state interest(s) supporting use of the challenged procedure. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903. The interests involved in a divorce case include those of the divorcing parties and, if they have children, those of the children. The interests of the divorcing parents are financial, custodial, and emotional. As a result of divorce, financial and custodial rights and obligations are reconfigured. In addition, divorce terminates a legal partnership. For the children, there is an emotional fallout from the divorce, and an interest in the financial bargain struck by the divorcing parties, especially on child support. The most immediate interest of the children, however, is in the custodial outcome. [7] The position of the Miller children confirms this immediacy. They do not want to intervene in their parents' divorce because of the potential impact on them of the property, alimony, or child support bargains that will be struck. Rather, the Miller children wish to participate in the reconfiguration of their family and advocate their preferences because their custody is at stake. They argue that this interest is not and cannot be met by the guardian ad litem, who is duty-bound to represent their best interests as she sees them. [8] They emphasize that the guardian ad litem's recommendations on custody are directly contrary to their wishes. [9] In making this point, the Miller children link their custodial interest in the outcome of the divorce to forceful advocacy of their preference by independent counsel representing them as parties, and cite the absence of such advocacy as increasing the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation of their custodial interest. Implicit in that argument is the further contention that the preference of the children should have primacy when the court makes its custody determination. We reject that proposition. The best interest standard set forth in 19 M.R.S.A. § 752(5) appropriately makes the preference of the child only one of many factors that the court must consider. [10] The exclusion of children as parties in the divorce of their parents, and the related possibility that there will be no forceful advocacy for the custodial preference of the children, does not increase the risk of erroneous custody determinations that disserve the best interests of children. The guardian ad litem is already an advocate for the best interest of the children in all of its complex dimensions. [11] The narrow focus of an attorney for the children, who would be obligated to carry out their preferences regardless of the wisdom of such a course, might well increase the likelihood of a custody determination that is not in the best interest of the children. Finally, the State has a substantial interest in divorce proceedings that do not include children as parties represented by counsel. Divorce litigation would be complicated exponentially by the involvement of children as parties. Children could object to any settlement offer. They would have the right to participate in discovery and at hearings to present witnesses on their own behalf and cross-examine witnesses called by the other parties. Multiple children could insist on multiple representation. The occurrence of any or all of these probabilities would protract divorce litigation beyond current bounds, and result in a substantial additional financial burden on both the parties and our court system. [12] In our view, the use of guardians ad litem to protect the best interests of children in divorce proceedings fully satisfies any federal constitutional requirements. Accordingly, the Miller children are not entitled to intervene in the divorce action of their parents and be represented by independent legal counsel. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court with instruction to enter an order denying the children's motion to intervene and for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. All concurring.