Opinion ID: 103352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Arguments to the Jury by Government Counsel.

Text: Respondents complain of certain statements made to the jury by government counsel. Their objections are that government counsel (1) appealed to class prejudice; and (2) requested a conviction regardless of the evidence because the prosecution was convinced of respondents' guilt and because a conviction was the wish and the desire of the highest officials in the Government of the United States. Under the first of these, they point to the opening statement that this conspiracy involved some of the biggest men in the country  big in the sense of controlling vast volumes of financial influence; and that it is a terrible thing that a group of influential, wealthy millionaires or billionaires should take over the power, take over the control, the power to make prices. At the close of those opening remarks and on objection of defense counsel the court counselled the jury that any reference to the wealth of any of the defendants is entirely immaterial. A man of wealth has just as much standing in a court as a man that is poverty stricken. But respondents complain that in the closing arguments the same matter was referred to again as follows: A hundred lawyers employed  the very cream of the American Bar, the very best legal talent that these people can obtain  every one of them working night and day with suggestions as to how the red herring can be drawn across the clear cut issue in this case; that it should not be taken for granted that these more powerful people are above the law and can't be reached and can't be brought to book; that the fear of corporate power in combination is part of the American tradition as illustrated by a speech made in 1873 by a Wisconsin judge, who said: There is looming up a new and dark power . . . The accumulation of individual wealth seems to be greater than it ever has been since the downfall of the Roman Empire. The enterprises of the country are . . . coldly marching, not for economic conquests only, but for political power . . . money is taking the field as an organized power. The question will arise . . . which shall rule, wealth or man? Which shall lead, money or intellect? Who shall fill the public stations, educated and patriotic free men, or the futile serfs of corporate capital? But as to these statements no objection was made at the time by defense counsel. There were other such references e.g., malefactors of great wealth, eager, grasping men or corporations who take the law into their own hands . . . without any consideration for the under-dog or the poor man . . . We are going to stop it, as our forefathers stopped it before us and left this country with us as it is now, or we are going down into ruin as did the Roman Empire. Counsel for the defense objected to these statements as improper and prejudicial. The court overruled the objections stating it would deal with the matter in its charge to the jury. In its charge the court warned against convicting a corporation solely because of its size or the extent of its business; that it was your duty to give these corporations the same impartial consideration as an individual or small corporation would receive; and instructed the jurors not to be concerned with the financial condition of any of these defendants. Whether a man be rich or poor, he is entitled to the same consideration in this Court. On this phase of the matter several observations are pertinent. In the first place, counsel for the defense cannot as a rule remain silent, interpose no objections, and after a verdict has been returned seize for the first time on the point that the comments to the jury were improper and prejudicial. See Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361, 364. Of course appellate courts in the public interest, may, of their own motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160. But as we point out hereafter, the exceptional circumstances which call for an invocation of that rule are not present here. discuss corporate power, its use and abuse, so long as those statements are relevant to the issues at hand. For that subject is material to the philosophy of that Act. Its purposes and objectives are clearly legitimate subjects for discussion before the jury. But, thirdly, appeals to class prejudice are highly improper and cannot be condoned and trial courts should ever be alert to prevent them. Some of the statements to which respondents now object fall in this class. They were, we think, undignified and intemperate. They do not comport with the standards of propriety to be expected of the prosecutor. But it is quite another thing to say that these statements constituted prejudicial error. In the first place, it is hard for us to imagine that the minds of the jurors would be so influenced by such incidental statements during this long trial that they would not appraise the evidence objectively and dispassionately. In the second place, this was not a weak case as was Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, where this Court held that prejudice to the accused was so highly probable as a result of the prosecutor's improper conduct that we are not justified in assuming its non-existence. (p. 89.) Cf. New York Central R. Co. v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 310. Of course, appeals to passion and prejudice may so poison the minds of jurors even in a strong case that an accused may be deprived of a fair trial. But each case necessarily turns on its own facts. And where, as here, the record convinces us that these statements were minor aberrations in a prolonged trial and not cumulative evidence of a proceeding dominated by passion and prejudice, reversal would not promote the ends of justice. Under the second of these objections, respondents complain of the plea to the jury not to let your Government and the United States and its citizens and society down, and that government counsel believe to the bottom of their hearts in the justice of the cause that they espouse here. No objection at that time was made by defense counsel. But they did object at the trial to the statements by government counsel, . . . do you honestly think that these boys here (government counsel) . . . would be trying to convict these men unless that was the wish and the desire of the highest officials in the government of the United States?; You don't think the government of the United States would allow four or five lawyers to come out here and prosecute this case against them, against their wishes, or that the Secretary of the Department of the Interior would allow us to do it, if he didn't want it done? The court overruled the objections stating, I suppose we have a right to assume that they are here under the instructions of the Attorney General of the United States. Respondents further complain of the statements that the evidence is so overwhelming and overpowering that it doesn't even leave the trace or the shadow of a doubt; that if you are going to say they are not guilty on this evidence, then you take the responsibility, I won't; you get an alibi, I won't; that the hundreds of thousands of dollars spent by the government in trying to get before you the facts should not be thrown to the winds nor should these men go clear. But no objection was made at the time by defense counsel. As respects the statement that it was the wish and the desire of the highest officials in the government to have defendants convicted, some background should be given. This came near the end of the closing arguments. In the opening statement, during the trial, and in the closing arguments the defense continuously emphasized the knowledge and acquiescence by government officials of the buying programs. As we have noted, that was one of the main lines of defense. From the beginning of the trial to the end, the defense sought to prove, not official approval in the legal sense, but official acquiescence or at least condonation. Bald statements were made that respondents were conducting a program which resulted from the instigation and inducement of the Government itself; after the Schechter case they endeavored to stabilize marketing practices at the instance of officials of the Oil Administration; what was done by these defendants was done for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives and purposes of the National Industrial Recovery Act, and was undertaken at the request and pursuant to the authorization of the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Ickes, the Administrator of the Petroleum Code; respondents acted to carry out the purposes and objectives sought by the Government and initiated by the Government . . . They were objectives defined by the President of the United States. They were purposes, the accomplishment of which the Secretary of the Interior had been charged, under his oath, to seek to obtain; with all this backing and all this help from the government, and all this urging from the government, are you going to brand these men as just selfish individuals? On innumerable instances the impression was sought to be conveyed by subtle intimation, inference or suggestion that responsibility for these buying programs should be placed on the shoulders of high government officials. Government counsel accordingly justified his statement on the grounds that it denied what the defense had continuously stated, viz., that the buying programs were conducted with the consent and approval of the Secretary of the Interior. At a subsequent point in the closing arguments government counsel again referred to the matter. On objection of defense counsel he withdrew the statement. And the court instructed the jury to disregard it, saying This prosecution was commenced at the instigation of the Attorney General of the United States. In view of these various circumstances we do not think that the above statements were prejudicial. Standing by themselves they appear to be highly improper. Even as a rebuttal to the defense which had been interposed throughout the trial, they overstep the bounds. But in view of the justification which respondents sought to establish for their acts, the subject matter of these statements was certainly relevant. The fact that government counsel transgressed in his rebuttal certainly cannot be said to constitute prejudicial error. For a reading of the entire argument before the jury leads to the firm conviction that the comments which respondents now rely on for their assertions of error were isolated, casual episodes in a long summation of over 200 printed pages and not at all reflective of the quality of the argument as a whole. Respondents further urge as prejudicial error the assertions by government counsel of personal knowledge in contradiction of the record for the purpose of discrediting an important defense witness. The statement of government counsel was that in 1935 and 1936, you couldn't get a rowboat up the Mississippi River, north of Winona. Respondents contend that testimony as to navigability of that river was vitally material as establishing such outside competition as would have prevented them from raising prices to artificial and non-competitive levels. But such testimony was wholly irrelevant, since the reasonableness of the prices was not properly an issue in the case. Furthermore, when objection was made to the remark, counsel withdrew it and the jury was instructed to disregard it. That must be deemed to have cured the error if it could be considered such. As stated in Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498, If every remark made by counsel outside of the testimony were ground for a reversal, comparatively few verdicts would stand.