Opinion ID: 201086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delegation of Regulatory Authority Under the

Text: Magnuson-Stevens Act Cape Wind first relies on federal preemption under the Magnuson-Stevens Act. It argues that Ten Taxpayer's claims arise under federal law, and thus support removal under § 1441, because Ten Taxpayer cannot prevail without showing that Congress in fact granted to Massachusetts the authority to regulate on Horseshoe Shoals. This, Cape Wind argues, constitutes a federal question on the face of Ten Taxpayer's well-pleaded complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We disagree. In this posture, the contention that federal law does not authorize Ten Taxpayer's claims is simply a federal preemption defense available to Cape Wind. It is hornbook law that a federal defense does not confer arising under jurisdiction, regardless whether that defense is anticipated in the -14- plaintiff's complaint. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 539 U.S. at 6; Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908). That is generally true even where the asserted defense is the preemptive effect of a federal statute. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 12 (1983) (well-pleaded complaint rule may bar removal even where the only question for decision is the viability of a federal preemption defense). Cape Wind argues that the case at bar is distinguishable from an ordinary case involving a federal preemption defense because the question is not whether Congress precluded state regulation, but whether it affirmatively permitted it. The Supreme Court rejected that precise argument in Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936). In Gully, a state tax collector sued to collect taxes from a national bank. Id. at 111. The bank tried to remove the case, arguing that if the state government had the power to collect taxes from a national bank, it enjoyed that power only to the extent conferred by federal statute. Id. at 112. Therefore, the bank argued, removal was proper because the state tax collector necessarily relied on federal law in bringing the suit. Id. The Supreme Court rejected that reasoning: The argument . . . proceeds on the assumption that, because permission is at times preliminary to action, the two are to be classed as one. But the assumption will not stand . . . . Here, the right to be established is one created by the state. If that is so, it is unimportant that federal consent is the source of state authority. To reach the underlying law we do not travel back so far. By unimpeachable authority, a suit brought -15- upon a state statute does not arise under an act of Congress or the Constitution of the United States because prohibited thereby. With no greater reason can it be said to arise thereunder because permitted thereby. Id. at 116 (citations omitted). The same reasoning applies here. No matter how the argument is framed, Cape Wind's contention that Massachusetts has no power to regulate on Horseshoe Shoals does not support removal.