Opinion ID: 1964962
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: On appeal, Hull contends that the violation-hearing justice acted arbitrarily and capriciously in finding a violation based upon the evidence presented. This Court has long held that at a probation-revocation hearing, the standard of proof is lower than in a criminal case: namely, reasonably satisfactory evidence instead of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 721 A.2d 847, 849 (R.I. 1998) (per curiam). Our review is limited to a consideration of whether the violation-hearing justice acted arbitrarily or capriciously in finding a violation. See id. Furthermore, it is the function of that justice, not this Court, to determine the credibility of witnesses. See State v. Sparks, 667 A.2d 1250, 1251 (R.I.1995) (per curiam). Here, the violation-hearing justice evaluated the victim's testimony and found her credible. He concluded that she had no motive to lie, noting that she was imprisoned and that her testimony had not been induced by any promises or rewards from the state. He stated that [t]here was no evidence whatsoever that indicated that her testimony at this hearing was in any way premised on some promise the State had made in connection with the sentence she's presently serving. Thus, the justice was reasonably satisfied that Hull had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. See State v. Kennedy, 702 A.2d 28, 31 (R.I.1997). This determination, we conclude, was within the violation-hearing justice's sound discretion, was neither arbitrary nor capricious, and was based upon the evidence.