Opinion ID: 886005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statutory Inconsistency

Text: ¶57 With this background, we turn now to the Appellants’ argument that HB 28 and SB 412 are invalid based upon their inconsistency with § 15-6-101, MCA. The Appellants acknowledge that Montana’s classification scheme is statutory and not required by Montana’s Constitution, but direct this Court to Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Com’n of Webster County (1989), 488 U.S. 336, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688, as an example of a state failing to 25 apply the state’s tax law system to certain types of property, thereby violating the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection clause. ¶58 In Allegheny, the county tax assessor assessed the property of Allegheny and its successors at roughly eight to thirty-five times more than comparable neighboring property for a period of more than ten years between 1975 and 1986, consistently undervaluing the similarly situated neighboring property. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 341, 109 S.Ct. at 637, 102 L.Ed.2d at 695-96. The county assessor’s sole method of appraisal was to fix the appraised value at the declared consideration at which the property last sold. Allegheny and its successors were subjected to higher and higher appraised value each time the property was sold. The assessor made adjustments in the assessments of property not recently sold, but the adjustments were minimal and resulted in unequal taxation between the similarly situated properties. ¶59 The United States Supreme Court held that this practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally comparable property and therefore denied Allegheny and its successors equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 338, 109 S.Ct. at 635, 102 L.Ed.2d at 693. The Supreme Court referenced West Virginia’s constitutional uniformity requirement, but made no mention of West Virginia’s state law system of taxation. Regarding the county assessor’s method of assessing appraised value, the Supreme Court merely clarified that no particular method was 26 required, stating that where “two methods are used to assess property in the same class [it] is, without more, of no constitutional moment.” Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 343, 109 S.Ct. at 637, 102 L.Ed.2d at 697. The fulcrum of the equal protection violation was merely that “[t]he county’s adjustments to the assessments of property not recently sold [were] too small to seasonably dissipate the remaining disparity between these assessments and the assessments based on a recent purchase price.” Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 344, 109 S.Ct. at 638, 102 L.Ed.2d at 697. ¶60 We find that Allegheny is of no precedential value on the issue raised by the Appellants, as it does not speak of or hold that West Virginia failed to properly apply any statutorily mandated state law system of taxation. We are left, therefore, merely with the question of whether HB 28 or SB 412 are invalid based solely upon an inconsistency with § 15-6-101, MCA. ¶61 As noted above, § 15-6-101, MCA, provides that, for purposes of taxation, taxable property in this state shall be classified in accordance with said part. Coal gross proceeds and net proceeds of oil and gas, however, were not statutorily classified pursuant to § 15-6-101, MCA, but specifically taxed according to the rates provided in the newly enacted statutes. E.g. §§ 15-23-607, 15-23701, et seq., and 15-36-101, MCA (1991). ¶62 That the taxation of coal, oil and gas via particular statutes, absent classification, is in apparent conflict with the mandatory classification language of § 15-6-101, MCA, does not make the more particular provisions of the challenged statutes invalid. 27 As noted above, the Legislature is limited in its inherent power to tax only insofar as that power is limited by the Constitution, with one such limitation being the enactment of statutes to authorize taxation. Connick, 167 Mont. at 361, 538 P.2d at 1027; Toomey, 135 Mont. at 43, 335 P.2d at 1055; Art. VIII, Sec. 1, Mont. Const. (1972). ¶63 The Legislature’s constitutional power to tax is not frustrated by the enactment of conflicting taxation statutes, as a conflict between two statutes is not a reason for one to invalidate the other. General rules of statutory construction provide that when a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the particular provision is superior to the general, so that a particular legislative intent will control a general intent to the extent that there is any opposition between them. Section 1-2-102, MCA. State v. Placzkiewicz, 2001 MT 254, ¶ 18, 307 Mont. 189, ¶ 18, 36 P.3d 934, ¶ 18; In re Marriage of Kotecki, 2000 MT 254, ¶ 14, 301 Mont. 460, ¶ 14, 10 P.3d 828, ¶ 14. “Particular expressions qualify those which are general.” Section 1-3-225, MCA. ¶64 The conflict between the § 15-6-101, MCA, and the newly enacted statutes for the taxation of coal, oil, and natural gas, is subject to the same rules of statutory construction– the latter are the more particular and, therefore, superior to the former, as the latter control the specific taxation of coal, oil, and natural gas. See Placzkiewicz, ¶ 18 (holding that the specific statute of limitations for postconviction proceedings in Title 46, Chapter 21, 28 controls over the catch-all statute of limitations provisions in Title 27, Chapter 2); see also Weston v. Cole (1998), 233 Mont. 61, 63, 758 P.2d 289, 291 (holding that the shorter two-year period for filing a particular tort action such as assault and battery, § 27- 2-204(3), MCA, controls over the more general three-year statute of limitations for tort actions in § 27-2-204(1), MCA). ¶65 Applying general rules of statutory construction, we conclude that the conflict existing between the statutory provisions in HB 28 and SB 412 and § 15-6-101, MCA, does not invalidate the more specific statutes taxing coal gross proceeds and net proceeds of oil and gas. 4