Opinion ID: 482068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conflict with the Second Circuit

Text: 8 The opinion's fulcrum is its determination that, by not stationing an immigration examiner in the Philippines for those nine months, the Attorney General [denied] a class of eligible servicemen--in this case Filipinos--the benefits of the Act. 796 F.2d at 1098. But the Act did not give Filipino servicemen a right to citizenship. As the Second Circuit concluded in Olegario, [a]t most, the statute provided [them] with an opportunity to become ... citizen[s]. Olegario, 629 F.2d at 224 (emphasis added). 9 The Act gave the INS and the Attorney General considerable discretion in implementing the naturalization program. 1940 Act Secs. 702-03. The question is whether the Attorney General abused this discretion in responding to the concerns of the soon-to-be-independent Philippine government. The Second Circuit carefully considered the question and concluded that he had not:The executive decision at issue here was thus based on policy considerations traditionally, although not exclusively, associated with the executive branch. The authority granted to the Commissioner and the Attorney General, to implement the Act without specific guidelines or restrictions, was sufficient to permit the executive to exercise some discretion when confronted with a seemingly delicate foreign affairs matter.... The decision to withdraw the naturalization examiner from the Philippines was not clearly beyond the limits of the Attorney General's discretion or contrary to Congress's vision of the executive's role in implementing the Act. 10 629 F.2d at 227. See also id. at 228 ([t]he decision to withdraw all naturalization authority from the Philippine Islands for a nine month period was not a manifest abuse of ... discretion). 11 Our panel's contrary conclusion is based on its assertion that there is little room for doubt that the Attorney General's revocation of ... authority [to perform naturalizations in the Philippines] was 'incompatible with the expressed will of Congress.'  796 F.2d at 1099 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637-38, 72 S.Ct. 863, 871, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). The panel errs; there is plenty of room for doubt. 12 Section 702 of the Act speaks in mandatory terms only in describing the steps the naturalization petitioner must take in applying for citizenship: The petition for naturalization of any petitioner under this section shall be made and sworn to before, and filed with, a representative of the Immigration and Naturalization Service designated by the Commissioner or a Deputy Commissioner.... 1940 Act Sec. 702. In all other respects the statute speaks in the permissive, leaving it to the Commissioner, with the approval of the Attorney General, to establish the procedures for implementing the Act. Id. Sec. 705. 13 The panel's conclusion that the Attorney General's action was contrary to the will of Congress, and therefore represented the lowest ebb of executive power, is simply wrong. Nothing in the Act compelled the Attorney General to place immigration examiners in any one place at any one time. The panel's focus on snippets from the statute, generously punctuated with emphasis, 796 F.2d 1099-1100, cannot nullify the very broad discretion that the statute gave the Attorney General in implementing the naturalization program. So long as he acted out of a proper motive, and foreign relations surely is a proper concern of the executive branch, [t]he decision to withdraw the naturalization examiner from the Philippines was not clearly beyond the limits of the Attorney General's discretion or contrary to Congress's vision of the executive's role in implementing the Act. Olegario, 629 F.2d at 227. 14 The panel derives much comfort from a statement in INS v. Miranda, 459 U.S. 14, 18, 103 S.Ct. 281, 283, 74 L.Ed.2d 12 (1982), that the Attorney General's decision to withdraw naturalization authority from the Philippines was clear error. 796 F.2d at 1099, 1102 & n. 15. But such heavy reliance on a stray remark made by the Court in an unrelated context by way of illustrating an entirely different point is misplaced. It is inconceivable that the Court resolved this important and difficult question in such an off-hand manner in a case where it was not argued, briefed or even at issue. 15