Opinion ID: 701279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of DEA Experts

Text: 21
22 We now consider Mr. Anderson's claim that the district court erred in allowing government expert Melvin Schabilion to testify about the existence of clandestine PCP laboratories. We review the district court's decision to admit expert testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Amaechi, 991 F.2d 374, 377 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2980, 125 L.Ed.2d 677 (1993); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 550 (7th Cir.1991). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a district court may permit an individual qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to testify if it determines that scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or determining a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702; see Solis, 923 F.2d at 550. In deciding whether expert testimony will be helpful, the district court must evaluate the state of knowledge presently existing about the subject of the proposed testimony in light of its appraisal of the facts of the case. United States v. Brown, 7 F.3d 648, 652 (7th Cir.1993) (quotation and citation omitted); see also Solis, 923 F.2d at 550 (noting that helpfulness analysis subsumes a relevancy analysis). As we noted in Brown, [b]ecause courts have recognized that the average juror is unlikely to be knowledgeable about drug trafficking, they consistently have allowed expert testimony concerning the 'tools of the trade' and the methods of operation of those who distribute various types of illegal narcotics. 7 F.3d at 652 (collecting cases). Experts also have been permitted to comment on the typical behavior patterns of drug users and distributors. See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 451 & n. 6 (7th Cir.1991) (collecting cases). 23 Mr. Anderson does not dispute that Agent Schabilion, a group supervisor of the DEA's Clandestine Lab Enforcement Team with specialized training in clandestine laboratory operations and twenty-five years of experience, was qualified to provide expert testimony. See United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 428 (7th Cir.1991) ([F]ederal agents trained and experienced in drug-related transactions, crimes and prosecution are qualified to give expert testimony concerning the practices of those engaged in this type of criminal activity.). Rather, Mr. Anderson contends that there was no factual basis for Agent Schabilion's testimony concerning clandestine PCP laboratories. Mr. Anderson also submits that the probative value of this testimony did not outweigh its prejudicial effect. 24 Agent Schabilion testified at length about how PCP was made. He explained that approximately ninety-five percent of the chemicals Mr. Anderson acquired could be used, in combination, to make only PCP. He also discussed the methods offenders used to avoid detection. These artifices include ordering supplies from multiple suppliers, using a false shipping address, and delegating the responsibility for collecting chemicals and manufacturing the final product to different individuals. Agent Schabilion later explained that the actual manufacturing site could be quite small: 25 Anyplace [sic] the imagination can come up with, can conceive, there has been a clandestine laboratory there and they have been inside of cars, inside of trucks, in the country, forest preserves, out in the middle of a field, industrial buildings, out on boats.... A five gallon bucket and a broom handle is one of the most successful laboratories I have come across. 26 Tr. II at 136. 27 The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this testimony. Agent Schabilion's testimony aided the jury's understanding of the PCP manufacturing process. He did not speak to matters that the jury could evaluate for itself, cf. Foster, 939 F.2d at 452, but merely helped the jury in interpreting the significance of the evidence presented concerning Mr. Anderson's means of acquiring materials that could be used to manufacture PCP. The testimony thus aided the jury in evaluating whether Mr. Anderson possessed piperidine legitimately rather than with the knowledge or reasonable belief that it would be used to manufacture PCP. See Brown, 7 F.3d at 652 (noting that expert testimony is helpful when it allows average jurors to understand the evidence and resolve critical issues). Agent Schabilion did not suggest either that Mr. Anderson knew of a hidden laboratory or that one existed; he simply commented that such facilities need not be elaborate. Although this information was general, it was outside the common experience of the jurors. Accordingly, the government was permitted to supply it through expert testimony. See Brown, 7 F.3d at 652; Foster, 939 F.2d at 451. Furthermore, the probative value of Agent Schabilion's testimony outweighed its prejudicial effect. The testimony assisted the jury in resolving the ultimate question of whether Mr. Anderson innocently had acquired his chemicals and equipment or whether he had acquired them with knowledge or reason to believe that they would be used to make PCP. In addition, the district court instructed the jury that the fact that an expert has given an opinion does not mean that it is binding upon you or that you are obligated to accept the expert's opinion as to the facts. Tr. IV at 422. This instruction adequately mitigated any danger of unfair prejudice that may have resulted from Agent Schabilion's testimony. See Brown, 7 F.3d at 655 & n. 4 (citations omitted). 28
29 Mr. Anderson also contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a limiting instruction with respect to expert testimony and by failing to call rebuttal expert witnesses. These claims are without merit. The district court did provide a limiting instruction with respect to expert testimony. Tr. IV at 422. The record demonstrates that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel conducted a rigorous cross-examination of the government's experts. Neither the record nor Mr. Anderson suggests how his purported rebuttal witnesses would have testified or how they could have changed the result in this case. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Mr. Anderson's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to call these unnamed witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 875 (7th Cir.1994) (rejecting ineffective assistance claim based upon trial counsel's failure to call witnesses at trial where record did not indicate how witnesses would have testified and noting that such claims are properly raised under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255) (collecting cases), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1316, 131 L.Ed.2d 197 (1995); United States v. Ellis, 23 F.3d 1268, 1274 (7th Cir.1994) (same); see also United States v. Ashimi, 932 F.2d 643, 650 (7th Cir.1991) (indicating that self-serving speculation concerning putative witness' testimony will not sustain ineffective assistance claim).