Opinion ID: 359526
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Degree of intent required.

Text: 11 To sustain a conviction on a charge of conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States the government must prove at least the degree of criminal intent necessary for the substantive offense, Ingram v. U. S.,360 U.S. 672, 678, 79 S.Ct. 1314, 1319, 3 L.Ed.2d 1503, 1508 (1959); See U. S. v. Feola, 420 U.S. 671, 686, 95 S.Ct. 1255, 1264, 43 L.Ed.2d 541, 554 (1975), in this case the substantive offense of exporting a weapon on the Munitions List. Section 1934(c) provides: 12 Any person who Willfully violates any provision of this section or rule or regulation issued under this section . . . shall upon conviction be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 13 22 U.S.C. § 1934(c) (emphasis added). In Etheridge v. U. S., 380 F.2d 804 (CA5, 1967), we sustained convictions under an indictment charging that the defendants knowingly, wilfully, and unlawfully exported articles on the Munitions List without having obtained an export license or written approval from the State Department. We said that the count set forth all of the elements of the offense. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, however, we stressed, Evidence of facts and circumstances introduced at the trial afforded adequate support for a finding by the jury that each of the defendants Knew it was unlawful to export (an article on the Munitions List). 380 F.2d at 807 (emphasis added). Thus Etheridge suggests that specific intent is required, even though the opinion did not squarely address the question of degree of intent. In U. S. v. Lizarraga-Lizarraga, 541 F.2d 826 (CA9, 1976), the Ninth Circuit held that § 1934's requirement of wilfulness connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. Because the items covered by the statute are spelled out in administrative regulations and include items not known generally to be controlled by the government, the Ninth Circuit inferred that Congress did not intend to impose criminal penalties on innocent or negligent errors. We are persuaded by this analysis and agree that § 1934 requires specific intent. 2 14