Opinion ID: 2182774
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was there a Miranda violation?

Text: Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because it is clear that [he] had his lawyer and wanted to get in touch with him before any interrogation would begin and that Detective Campbell admitted that he interrogated appellant. In Miranda v. Arizona, supra note 8, the Supreme Court held that the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Such safeguards require that the defendant be informed of his Fifth Amendment right to have an attorney present during interrogation. If the defendant invokes that right, no further questions may be asked without an attorney present unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981); see Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 99, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975); Townsend v. United States, 512 A.2d 994, 1001 (D.C.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1052, 107 S.Ct. 2188, 95 L.Ed.2d 843 (1987). However, custodial interrogation is limited to questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. It is uncontested that Mr. Gilmore invoked his Sixth Amendment right to have an attorney present during questioning. In addition, the record is clear that Mr. Gilmore was under arrest  and thus in custody  at the time he made his statements. The only issue for us to consider, therefore, is whether the statements were the product of police interrogation. That issue involves questions of both fact and law. The trial court's factual findings  that Mr. Gilmore voluntarily initiated the discussion with Detective Campbell and that Campbell did not question him about the offense with which he was charged  may not be disturbed unless they are plainly wrong or without support in the evidence. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1997); see, e.g., Stewart v. United States, 668 A.2d 857, 863 (D.C.1995). We are fully satisfied that such support exists in the record. The only evidence presented at the suppression hearing was the testimony of Detective Campbell. He said that Gilmore began talking spontaneously and asking questions very soon after he was advised of his Miranda rights and invoked his right to counsel. Campbell testified that he tried to answer most of Gilmore's questions and, in the course of doing so, had to have asked him one question or something. He could not remember what that one question might have been, but he did state that, whatever it was, Gilmore did not respond to it. Detective Campbell was almost certain that he did not ask Gilmore about the contents of the bottle from which he made the Molotov cocktail because Campbell already knew what was in it. The trial court, finding Detective Campbell to be credible, found that Gilmore had spontaneously volunteered his inculpatory statements and that Detective Campbell did not ask him specific questions about the offense. Because Detective Campbell's testimony was uncontroverted and was not on its face inherently incredible, we readily sustain the trial court's findings of fact. The court's ultimate ruling that Detective Campbell's conduct did not constitute interrogation is a conclusion of law that we review de novo. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 A.2d 31, 34-42 (D.C. 1989) (en banc); Derrington v. United States, 488 A.2d 1314, 1327-1328 (D.C. 1985). We sustain that ruling as well. The Supreme Court has defined interrogation for Miranda purposes in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980): [T]he term interrogation refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Id. at 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682 (footnotes omitted); see Spann v. United States, 551 A.2d 1347, 1349 (D.C.1988); United States v. Alexander, 428 A.2d 42, 51 (D.C.1981). It is well established that questioning initiated by the accused is not interrogation in the Innis sense. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. at 484, 101 S.Ct. 1880. At the very least, the police must have asked a question that was probing, accusatory, or likely to elicit an incriminating response before a court may conclude that there was interrogation. Hairston v. United States, 500 A.2d 994, 997 (D.C.1985). Moreover, any administrative questions that Detective Campbell may have asked in order to process Mr. Gilmore did not constitute interrogation; at least, that is what Campbell's testimony shows, and there is nothing in the record to suggest otherwise. This court has held that routine booking questions are not interrogation for Miranda purposes. Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 (D.C.1999) (citing Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (plurality opinion), and noting that the routine booking question exception has been uniformly recognized since Muniz by the federal and state courts). Therefore, given the trial court's findings that Mr. Gilmore initiated all discussion with Detective Campbell and that Campbell asked only routine booking questions, we hold that the court did not err in concluding that Gilmore's Miranda rights were not violated because he was never subjected to interrogation.