Opinion ID: 2982193
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dangerous Weapon Sentence Enhancement

Text: Green argues that the district court erred in increasing his base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), which provides for a two-level increase “[i]f a dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed” during the commission of a drug offense. He disputes the district court’s holding that it was not clearly improbable that the revolver was connected to his drug-trafficking offense. Green has not carried his burden on this argument. argument that the seizure of marijuana exceeded the scope of the warrant. Besides being a Ninth Circuit case, thus nonbinding, it presents a different factual scenario. In Rettig, law enforcement acted in bad faith executing a state-issued search warrant for marijuana when their true purpose was to search for cocaine after being denied a federal warrant for that drug. Where in that case the court found that the search was not “confined to the authorization given by the magistrate” because it was “for purposes and objects not disclosed to the magistrate,” here officers searched for items authorized by the warrant–namely evidence of cocaine manufacturing. 11 United States v. Charles Green No. 11-5564 A district court’s finding that the defendant possessed a firearm during a drug offense is a factual finding subject to the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 664 (6th Cir. 2003). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous “when, although there may be some evidence to support the finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). Before a district court can apply a sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), the government must show “by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant either actually or constructively possessed the weapon.” Darwich, 337 F.3d at 665 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “Constructive possession of an item is the ownership, or dominion or control over the item itself, or dominion over the premises where the item is located.” United States v. Hill, 79 F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If the government establishes that the defendant possessed a weapon, a presumption arises that “the weapon was connected to the offense. The defendant must then show that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the crime.” United States v. Hough, 276 F.3d 884, 894 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “A defendant must present evidence, not mere argument, in order to meet his or her burden.” United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 2012). Green argues that the district court’s grant of his directed verdict motion on his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) charge confirms that it is clearly improbable that he possessed the revolver during the 12 United States v. Charles Green No. 11-5564 commission of any drug trafficking offense. However, “an acquittal under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) does not necessarily preclude a sentencing enhancement for possession of a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b).” United States v. McCall, 85 F.3d 1193, 1198 (6th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997). This rule derives from the government’s lighter burden of proof for sentencing purposes: “[A]n acquittal on a firearms carrying charge leaves ample room for a district court to find by the preponderance of the evidence that the weapon was possessed during the drug offense.” United States v. Duncan, 918 F.2d 647, 652 (6th Cir. 1990). Even though the district court found that no reasonable jury could find that Green possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking offense beyond a reasonable doubt, the district court could have logically found that Green possessed a gun during the commission of his drug trafficking offenses by a preponderance of the evidence. This court considers various factors in reviewing the question of whether the dangerous weapon enhancement was appropriate, “including the proximity of the firearm to the drugs, the type of firearm involved, whether the firearm was loaded, and any alternative purpose offered to explain the presence of the firearm.” United States v. Moses, 289 F.3d 847, 850 (6th Cir. 2002). Looking to these factors, we find the dangerous weapon enhancement appropriate. First, officers found the revolver inside the residence where Green conducted his crack cocaine trafficking activities and it was thus available to him for protection or deterrence. See United States v. Bell, 346 F. App’x 46, 47-48 (6th Cir. 2009) (upholding a § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement where “the two firearms were found in a residence that was the situs for drug activity”). Second, a .38 caliber revolver is a type of weapon more commonly associated with drug trafficking than hunting. See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 232 F. App’x 522, 524 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver . . . do[es] not suggest an innocent purpose, such as hunting 13 United States v. Charles Green No. 11-5564 or antique collecting.”). Third, the revolver was found fully loaded, indicating it was not merely present for use on occasional hunting trips. Fourth, Green’s alternative explanation, supported by self-serving testimony that he used the .38 caliber pistol “when he went hunting with a bow and arrow because of his concern about wild animals that he might encounter” is inadequate to justify setting aside the district court’s finding that Green failed to satisfy the “clearly improbable” standard. R. 176 at PageID# 1495. Moses, 289 F.3d at 851 (“[Defendant’s] selfserving testimony is inadequate to justify setting aside the district court's finding that [he] failed to satisfy the ‘clearly improbable’ standard.”). The district court’s determination regarding the connection between Green’s .38 caliber revolver and his offense was not clearly erroneous. There was no error resulting from the enhancement of Green’s base offense level pursuant to § 2D1.1(b)(1).