Opinion ID: 1185018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As interpreted by the majority, the county's discharge procedure embodies a denial of procedural due process, by authorizing the discharge of a permanent employee without a meaningful hearing.

Text: The second principal question raised by the majority opinion is whether a permanent public employee suffers a denial of procedural due process when he is discharged without a meaningful hearing. In this case, of course, petitioner was afforded a hearing, pursuant to a local resolution, at which both he and his supervisor presented evidence relating to the discharge. Under the majority opinion, however, this review procedure, while evidentially fair in all respects, cannot be termed a meaningful hearing on petitioner's discharge, because the majority conclude that the county resolution gives the review board no authority to remedy an improper discharge by reinstating the employee in his former position. As interpreted by the majority, this review procedure thus is not a hearing on the discharge at all, but is simply a hearing on an individual's eligibility for future public employment. Although the terms of the resolution are concededly ambiguous, in view of the procedural due process requirements which I conclude are applicable to the government's discharge of permanent employees, I believe the provision must be interpreted to permit the review board to order the reinstatement of an improperly dismissed employee. The majority's contrary interpretation implicitly denies that a permanent public employee is entitled to any meaningful hearing when the government terminates his employment. Although earlier United States Supreme Court decisions indicate support for such a position, [17] I do not believe such a conclusion can be reconciled with recent constitutional decisions in the procedural due process field. The past two years have witnessed an unusually heavy flurry of cases, in both the United States Supreme Court and in this court, presenting the issue of the applicability of procedural due process to a broad range of governmental action. In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. (1969) 395 U.S. 337 [23 L.Ed.2d 349, 89 S.Ct. 1820], the seminal decision of the recent procedural due process development, the Supreme Court determined that a Wisconsin prejudgment wage garnishment provision was unconstitutional because it authorized the withholding of a debtor's wages without affording the debtor the due process protections of notice and a meaningful hearing. In subsequent decisions the court has found these minimal due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to such governmental actions as the termination of welfare benefits ( Goldberg v. Kelly (1970) 397 U.S. 254 [25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011]), the public posting of any individual as an excessive drinker ( Wisconsin v. Constantineau (1971) 400 U.S. 433 [27 L.Ed.2d 515, 91 S.Ct. 507]) and the suspension of an automobile driver's license. ( Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535 [29 L.Ed.2d 90, 91 S.Ct. 1586].) Our own court, following the constitutional teachings of Sniadach, has recently recognized the necessity of affording notice and hearing when the state authorizes the prejudgment repossession of personal goods, such as television sets, refrigerators, [or] stoves ( Blair v. Pitchess (1971) ante, p. 258 [96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242]) or the prejudgment attachment of all kinds of property. ( Randone v. Appellate Department (1971) ante, p. 536 [96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13].) In light of the importance of an individual's interest in continued employment, especially when compared to the interests involved in these proceeding cases, it seems incredible that the majority can now maintain that the minimal requirement of a meaningful hearing is not applicable when the government permanently terminates that employment. (See Ricucci v. United States (1970) 425 F.2d 1252, 1256-1257 [192 Ct.Cl. 1] (Skelton, J. concurring); cf. Roth v. Board of Regents of State Colleges (W.D.Wis. 1970) 310 F. Supp. 972, 981.) The comparison of the instant case with the court's analysis in Sniadach is most revealing. In Sniadach the court emphasized the great hardships that would frequently befall a wage earner and his family as a result of the withholding of a significant portion of his earnings, and then concluded, Where the taking of property is so obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing [citation] this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process. (395 U.S. at p. 342 [23 L.Ed.2d at p. 354].) In the instant case, petitioner has been deprived not only of a portion of his wages, but of his entire livelihood; the hardships emphasized in Sniadach are thus clearly multiplied here. Moreover, even under the invalidated Wisconsin statute, the debtor in Sniadach was assured of some hearing on the merits before he was permanently deprived of his earnings; in the instant case, by contrast, under the majority's view petitioner will never receive any meaningful hearing on the validity of his dismissal. The full anomaly of the majority's position in light of recent procedural due process developments is illustrated by the most recent decision, Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 U.S. 535 [29 L.Ed.2d 90, 91 S.Ct. 1586]. In Bell, an uninsured motorist's driver's license was suspended without notice or hearing, pursuant to a Georgia statute, after the motorist was involved in an accident and failed to post security for claimed damages; in the Supreme Court the motorist challenged the provision which authorized the summary suspension of his license on due process grounds. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous court, [18] reasoned that although the state could refuse to issue licenses to all uninsured motorists [o]nce licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action that adjudicates important interests of the licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken without that procedural due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. [Citing Sniadach and Goldberg. ] (402 U.S. at p. 539 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 94].) Applying due process principles, the court invalidated the challenged statute in light of its summary operation. The due process analysis in Bell decisively points up the incongruity of a decision denying the applicability of procedural due process in the instant case. In Bell the suspension of a driver's license was recognized as affecting an interest of sufficient importance to bring the procedural due process safeguards into play, precisely because such licenses may become essential in the pursuit of a livelihood. (402 U.S. at p. 539 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 94].) In the instant case we deal not with an incidental interest, the denial of which may detrimentally affect one's livelihood, but with the question of the actual termination of the livelihood itself. Given Bell the instant matter must surely be the paradigmatic a fortiori case. The majority cannot avoid the force of these recent decisions by falling back on the claim that public employment is merely a privilege which may be withdrawn summarily. Of the recent decisions, both Goldberg and Bell involved the termination of interests which could be characterized as government largess, and yet the requirements of procedural due process were held applicable in each case; indeed, in Bell the court specifically emphasized that its recognition of the motorist's constitutional right to procedural due process upon the suspension of his license is but an application of the general proposition that relevant constitutional restraints limit state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is denominated a `right' or a `privilege.' (402 U.S. at p. 539 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 94].) Moreover, over the past decade lower federal and state courts have repeatedly recognized the constitutional necessity of affording notice and a meaningful hearing when the state withdraws governmental benefits by the expulsion or suspension [19] of a student from a public university (see, e.g., Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education (5th Cir.1961) 294 F.2d 150, cert. den. 368 U.S. 930 [7 L.Ed.2d 193, 82 S.Ct. 368]; Goldberg v. Regents of the University of California (1967) 248 Cal. App.2d 867, 877 [57 Cal. Rptr. 463]; cf. Jones v. Tennessee State Bd. of Ed. (1970) 397 U.S. 31, 32-36 [25 L.Ed.2d 27, 28-30, 90 S.Ct. 779] (Douglas and Brennan, JJ. dissenting from dismissal of writ as improvidently granted), or the eviction of a tenant from public housing. (See, e.g., Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority (2d Cir.1970) 425 F.2d 853, 861, cert. den. 400 U.S. 853 [27 L.Ed.2d 91, 91 S.Ct. 54]; Ruffin v. Housing Authority of New Orleans (E.D. La. 1969) 301 F. Supp. 251, 252; cf. Thorpe v. Housing Authority (1967) 386 U.S. 670, 678 [18 L.Ed.2d 394, 399, 87 S.Ct. 1244] (Douglas, J. concurring).) As one legal scholar has recently observed: Being fired from a government job is at least as serious a sanction as being evicted from a housing project or being suspended from college. Nor are there unique interests attending the government's function as employer that find no parallels in the responsibilities of landlord, educator and benefactor. (O'Neill, Justice Delayed and Justice Denied, 1970 Sup.Ct. Rev. 161, 207.) [20] Bell establishes that the protections of procedural due process are applicable whenever the government adjudicates important interests (402 U.S. at p. 539 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 94]). On any scale of values, an individual's interest in maintaining his employment is certainly an important interest, and thus the minimal due process safeguard of an opportunity for a meaningful hearing must be afforded. Of course, due process does not require that the government grant a discharged employee a formal trial on his dismissal, but only that he be afforded a hearing fair under all the circumstances. Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account. ( Hannah v. Larche (1960) 363 U.S. 420, 442 [4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1321, 80 S.Ct. 1502]; see Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission (1965) 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [53 Cal. Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265].) Indeed, in the instant case, most of the traditional administrative objections to the additional expense and personnel required by hearings are inapplicable, since the county has already established a full hearing procedure, before an impartial body, to review the discharge or dismissal of all permanent employees. As noted earlier, this procedure does not provide a meaningful hearing only because the majority interpret the resolution to preclude the review board from affording effective relief. In light of the constitutional considerations canvassed above, I believe Resolution No. 440-805 must be interpreted to permit the county review board to order the reinstatement of any employee it finds has been improperly discharged. Although no specific language of the resolution authorizes this relief, courts have frequently implied a right to a hearing where constitutional problems would otherwise be created. (See, e.g., Greene v. McElroy (1959) 360 U.S. 474, 506-508 [3 L.Ed.2d 1377, 1396-1397, 79 S.Ct. 1400]; Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover (1952) 39 Cal.2d 260, 269-270 [246 P.2d 656]; cf. Brotsky v. State Bar (1962) 57 Cal.2d 287 [19 Cal. Rptr. 153, 368 P.2d 697, 94 A.L.R.2d 1310]; English v. City of Long Beach (1950) 35 Cal.2d 155 [217 P.2d 22, 18 A.L.R.2d 547].) The proposed interpretation of the resolution would permit us to sustain the constitutionality of the county's enactments and does no violence to the present review procedure.