Opinion ID: 856116
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Genuine Dispute as to a Material Fact4

Text: 4 We do not address whether the contract language unambiguously indicates that Koons‟ conduct, as the sole shareholder and President of the predecessor to the Named Insured, would be covered by the contract. As explained above, assessing contract language for ambiguity is a fact-based analysis, dependent on the specific circumstances of the case. Madison Constr. Co., 735 A.2d at 106. The District Court did not decide this issue, instead finding that there was insufficient evidence in the record to allow a jury to find that Koons had provided the Truck to Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC in his capacity as the owner of the predecessor of Ches-Mont Disposal. Since the District Court and the parties 7 The Andre Estate alleged Koons was liable because he owned the Truck and failed to properly maintain it. Greenwich argues that Koons‟ alleged liability is not related to his duties as part-owner and President of Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC or his ownership of its predecessor. Koons argued, and argues on appeal, that he acted within his role as an owner when he provided the Truck to Ches-Mont Disposal. The District Court found that there is “no evidence in the record from which a jury could reasonably find that [Koons] purchased and leased the truck in his capacity as the founder and sole owner of the predecessor of Ches-Mont LLC,” and based its holding on that ground. The District Court erred. In an insurance coverage dispute, “an insured bears the initial burden to make a prima facie showing that a claim falls within the policy‟s grant of coverage.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Mehlman, 589 F.3d 105, 111 (3d Cir. 2009). For summary judgment to be denied, the record need not contain direct evidence to create a genuine issue as to a material fact; circumstantial evidence which would allow a jury to find for the nonmovant is sufficient.5 See, e.g., Hozier v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 908 F.2d 1155, 1165 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[N]othing in Rule 56 prevents [plaintiffs] from creating a genuine issue of material fact by pointing to sufficiently powerful countervailing circumstantial evidence.”). did not address the issue, and since resolution of the issue is fact-dependent, it would be inappropriate for us to decide it here. 5 This is particularly true when disposition of an issue turns on the individual‟s state of mind, and the record contains circumstantial evidence of that state of mind. Schoonejongen v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 143 F.3d 120, 130 (3d Cir. 1998). Though this case does not directly turn on Koons‟ state of mind, it does implicate his purpose or motivation in purchasing the Truck. 8 Here, the issue is whether there is sufficient evidence in the record, viewing the record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to Koons, that Koons purchased the Truck in his capacity as the founder and sole owner of the predecessor of Ches-Mont LLC. We conclude that there is. The Truck is specially designed for waste disposal purposes; it is a trash truck. The Truck was purchased by Koons d/b/a Miller Concrete, even though Miller Concrete sold and installed septic tanks. At the time of purchase, Koons was also the sole owner of Ches-Mont Disposal, a waste disposal company. The fact that Koons purchased a specially designed trash disposal truck, and at the time owned both a septic tank company and a trash disposal company, would allow a reasonable jury to infer that he purchased the trash disposal truck “in his capacity as the founder and sole owner” of the trash disposal company, rather than for the benefit of the tank installment company. This conclusion is supported by other evidence in the record. Koons purchased the Truck for $136,000 on October 22, 2001, and it was delivered on November 7, 2001. Almost immediately after delivery, Koons began to “lease” the Truck to NFA, the predecessor to Ches-Mont Disposal, LLC. Though NFA d/b/a Ches-Mont Disposal was supposed to pay Koons $2657.41 per month, Koons testified that no payments were ever made to him, and there is no evidence of any payments in the record.6 Additionally, the lease expired in November 2004, but NFA and its successors continued to make 6 Koons testified that because “[he] was the company [Ches-Mont Disposal],” he was “giving the Truck to [himself],” without compensation. (App. at 408). 9 exclusive, uninterrupted use of the Truck after the end of the lease period; Koons never used the Truck for his personal benefit or for the benefit of Miller Concrete. Furthermore, the Truck vendor‟s invoice, which documented the purchase of the Truck, identified Koons as the buyer of the Truck but listed Ches-Mont Disposal as its Final User. Although this document was created over two weeks before Koons leased the Truck to NFA, it already noted that Ches-Mont Disposal was the intended Final User of the vehicle. In sum, the record establishes that Koons purchased a $136,000 trash disposal truck, almost immediately provided it to his trash disposal company, received no financial compensation for it, did not personally use it, and did not allow Miller Concrete to use it. The record shows that the trash company maintained and used the Truck exclusively and without interruption after receiving it from Koons, continued to do so after the lease period expired, and did not pay Koons anything for the use of the Truck, either during or after the lease period. This provides sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable jury to infer Koons purchased the Truck in his capacity as the owner of ChesMont LLC‟s predecessor. To conclude otherwise, we would have to hold that every reasonable jury would find that Koons had purchased the $136,000 trash disposal truck and provided it to the trash disposal company that he owned, without compensation, for reasons other than his ownership of the company. We are unwilling to do so.