Opinion ID: 6534115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mr. Pier's Furtive Actions

Text: [¶48] The final factors to be given consideration are Mr. Pier's action in abruptly pulling to the curb, the presence of a black pouch in his vehicle, and his attempts to conceal that pouch. I will begin with the pouch and Mr. Pier's attempts to conceal it since in my view it is the more compelling factor. [¶49] The State does not argue, and neither the majority nor the district court concluded, that the black pouch's incriminating character was so immediately apparent that it gave Deputy Colling probable cause to seize and search the pouch under the plain view doctrine. See Vassar v. State , 2004 WY 125 , ¶¶ 18-19, 99 P.3d 987 , 994-95 (Wyo. 2004) (wooden box's incriminating character was immediately apparent to officer and gave him probable cause to seize and search box). In fact, while Deputy Colling testified that in his experience people who use, carry, or sell drugs use a small pouch to carry their drugs, he agreed on cross-examination that the pouch he observed in Mr. Pier's vehicle was not the particular pouch he had seen before. In other words, the pouch itself was not distinctive and was no more than a container coupled with the unremarkable observation that persons who use or sell drugs often put them in a container. [¶50] What makes the pouch a factor in the probable cause analysis is Mr. Pier's behavior in first holding his leg in front of the pouch and then moving the pouch under the center console. [I]f the police see a person in possession of a highly suspicious object or some object that is not identifiable but which because of other circumstances is reasonably suspected  to be contraband, and then observe that person make an apparent attempt to conceal the object from police view, probable cause is then present. 2 Wayne L. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.6(d) (5th ed.) (Oct. 2017 update) (footnotes omitted). [¶51] This inference of criminality that may be drawn from an individual's furtive actions comes, however, with a caveat. The difficulty is that from the viewpoint of the observer, an innocent gesture can often be mistaken for a guilty movement. He must not only perceive the gesture accurately, he must also interpret it in accordance with the actor's true intent. But if words are not infrequently ambiguous, gestures are even more so. Many are wholly nonspecific, and can be assigned a meaning only in their context. Yet the observer may view that context quite otherwise from the actor; not only is his vantage point different, he may even have approached the scene with a preconceived notion-consciously or subconsciously-of what gestures he expected to see and what he expected them to mean. The potential for misunderstanding in such a situation is obvious. Id. (quoting People v. Superior Court , 3 Cal.3d 807 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 (1970) ). [¶52] The cases cited by LaFave in support of this rule illustrate the caution with which it is applied. For example, in State v. Thompson , 842 So.2d 330 (La. 2003), officers acting on a tip had the defendant under surveillance and observed transactions where money was exchanged and items were taken from the defendant's vehicle in exchange for money. Id. at 333 . As the officers approached the defendant, who was then outside his vehicle, he tossed what looked like a white napkin into the vehicle's open window. Id. at 334 . In holding the officers had probable cause to search the vehicle, the Louisiana Supreme Court explained: In the instant case, we find that when defendant discarded the napkin as the officers approached, the officers' reasonable suspicions ripened into probable cause. While the furtive reaction alone was certainly insufficient to provide legal justification for the search, when the act is considered together with other facts known to the officers, the officers had a particularized basis for associating the object with narcotics trafficking.    Before defendant's furtive reaction, the evidence shows that the police received a confidential tip that the defendant was selling large amounts of heroin. Indeed, all of the specific information provided to police, i.e., defendant's first name, type of vehicle he owned, and license plate number, proved to be accurate. During the course of the surveillance, police witnessed the defendant exit his residence with a white object, place the object into his car, and shortly thereafter, engage in a quick hand to hand transaction where money was exchanged for the object. Officer Selby testified that he was later informed by back-up members of the task force that the person with whom the defendant made the transaction ingested something or placed something into his mouth before running from police. Lastly, at trial, Selby recounted that before entering defendant's vehicle, he looked inside and saw a white napkin lying on the floorboard, and that otherwise the vehicle was very clean and free of any other debris or trash. We find the totality of the evidence easily supports that the officers had probable cause. Thompson , 842 So.2d at 336-37 (footnote omitted and emphasis added); see also United States v. McGehee , 672 F.3d 860 , 869-70 (10th Cir. 2012) (furtive behavior of kicking handgun under seat combined with high crime neighborhood, scent of PCP, and presence of PCP container gave officer probable cause to arrest); United States v. Gavilanas-Medrano , 479 Fed. Appx. 166 , 172 (10th Cir. 2012) (finding probable cause to search vehicle based on reliable tip describing vehicle and reporting drug transportation, drug dog's change of behavior (without actual alert) on exterior sniff, delay in defendant pulling over, defendant's nervousness, and furtive movements of passenger). [¶53] The upshot of the cases on which the LaFave-articulated rule is based is that the furtive conduct or movement is not sufficient by itself to create probable cause. The furtive  conduct must be accompanied by other information, and the cases illustrate the type of information contemplated. It must be concrete, specific, and current information that creates a reasonable belief that the defendant is engaged in criminal conduct. 7 [¶54] A furtive gesture, even one of concealing an object, is once again not a factor that may form the foundation for a probable cause determination. In this case, Mr. Pier's furtive actions, whether that be the concealing of the pouch or the abrupt pulling of his vehicle to the curb, were not accompanied by the type of evidence required to give furtive gestures weight. This case is instead more like the situation addressed in  People v. Goessl , 186 Colo. 208 , 526 P.2d 664 (1974). In Goessl , the following occurred: Defendant was stopped for speeding after Police Officer Leonard determined he was traveling at 40 miles per hour in a 30 mile per hour zone. At this time, the officer had no reason to suspect that defendant had committed any other offense. When the defendant stopped his auto, he walked 'abruptly' back to the police car, and he appeared to be nervous according to the officer's testimony. On the officer's request, the defendant readily presented his operator's license. He reentered his vehicle and began to search in the glove compartment for the vehicle registration when the officer requested it. In the course of this search, defendant removed from the glove compartment a leather pouch and placed it behind him. The officer also observed in the glove compartment a brown wooden pipe which the defendant surrendered to the officer on request. The defendant twice refused to surrender the leather pouch to the officer who thereupon seized and searched it. It contained a single white pill, which later proved to be an amphetamine. Following this discovery, the officer radioed for assistance, and was shortly joined by a detective. The defendant was arrested, and thereafter a thorough search of the vehicle was conducted. It revealed a single marijuana cigarette, and a brown paper bag containing LSD tablets. Goessl , 526 P.2d at 664-65 . [¶55] The Colorado Supreme Court rejected the state's argument that the pouch combined with the defendant's furtive actions gave the officer probable cause to search the defendant's vehicle. The People further contend that the wooden pipe and leather pouch which were seen by the officer are sufficient to establish probable cause for the search. But neither the pipe, nor the pouch, are contraband. The fact that both items could be used in an unlawful manner does not negate the fact that the normal use of either item is lawful. It is well established that probable cause must stand on firmer ground than mere suspicion. In People v. Ware , 174 Colo. 419 , 484 P.2d 103 (1971), this court ruled that a package of hashish wrapped in tin foil must be suppressed. The following rationale which we expressed in Ware is fully applicable here. '... The People rely on the Officers' knowledge that dangerous drugs are often packaged in tinfoil. However, even if dangerous drugs are often packaged in tinfoil, so many other, legitimate items-such as foods or tobacco-are packaged in tinfoil that a tinfoil package is not a suspicious circumstance....' Finally, the People argue that the furtive gestures of defendant in attempting to conceal the leather pouch from the view of the officer creates probable cause. Yet a mere furtive gesture is subject to such varied interpretations, that it would be folly to allow great weight to be afforded such actions without more specific knowledge on the part of the officer. Sibron v. New York , 392 U.S. 40 , 88 S.Ct. 1889 , 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968) ; People v. Superior Court of Yolo County , 3 Cal.3d 807 , 91 Cal.Rptr. 729 , 478 P.2d 449 (1970). Here, the officer testified that before stopping the defendant for speeding, he had never seen him before and had no information about him. Goessl , 526 P.2d at 665 . [¶56] Deputy Colling likewise had no current, reliable, corroborated information concerning Mr. Pier that would implicate him in criminal conduct. Without that, Mr. Pier's furtive behavior was insufficient to establish probable cause to search his vehicle. [¶57] When I consider the totality of the relevant circumstances in this case, I am left with no doubt that Deputy Colling had the required reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. Pier. Those suspicions, however, lacked the definition, specificity, and reliability required to rise to the level of probable cause. 8  [¶58] I understand and embrace this Court's rejection of rigid rules, bright-line tests, and mechanistic inquiries in favor of a more flexible, all-things-considered approach to probable cause. Phippen , ¶ 14, 297 P.3d at 108 (quoting Florida v. Harris , 568 U.S. 237 , 133 S.Ct. 1050 , 185 L.Ed.2d 61 (2013) ). That said, cases like Tucker and Borgwardt illustrate that while we do not demand certainty in a probable cause analysis, we do expect the information on which law enforcement relies to be current, or at least recent, and to have a heightened level of specificity and reliability. See also Gronski v. State , 910 P.2d 561 , 562-63, 565 (Wyo. 1996) (finding probable cause to search vehicle based on reliable informant's corroborated report that defendant had eight pounds of marijuana in a green duffle bag in a blue Lincoln Continental). [¶59] I also recognize that in evaluating the factors in a probable cause analysis, this Court must look to the totality of the circumstances, and not parse each individual factor in a divide-and-conquer approach to the analysis. Jennings v. State , 2016 WY 69 , ¶ 14, 375 P.3d 788 , 791-92 (Wyo. 2016). That said, I am unwilling to gloss over deficiencies in the information relied upon to find probable cause. However, neither may a court arrive at probable cause simply by piling hunch upon hunch. Thus, in assessing the totality of the circumstances, a reviewing court must examine the facts individually in their context to determine whether rational inferences can be drawn from them that support a probable cause determination. United States v. Valenzuela , 365 F.3d 892 , 897 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Martinez-Cigarroa , 44 F.3d 908 , 911 (10th Cir. 1995) ). [¶60] When I consider the circumstances in this case individually and in their totality, I must conclude the district court clearly erred  in finding probable cause to search Mr. Pier's vehicle.