Opinion ID: 2441820
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Invocation of Witness Fear

Text: When comments by the prosecutor are allegedly improper, we review to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed legal error by allowing the comments. Irick v. United States, 565 A.2d 26, 33 (D.C.1989). When reviewing a claim of improper prosecutorial argument, we must first determine whether the prosecutor's challenged comments were improper. If the court concludes that the comments were improper, reversal may or may not be warranted; the court must evaluate the prosecutor's challenged remarks in context rather than in isolation. Included in the court's calculus should be: [1.] the gravity of the [improper comments]; [2.] [their] relationship to the issue of guilt; [3.] the effect of any corrective action by the trial judge; and [4.] the strength of the government's case. Based on these considerations, the conviction should be reversed only if the defendant suffered substantial prejudice, and we must affirm if the error was harmless. As to harmlessness, our inquiry is whether we can say with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.... Najafi v. United States, 886 A.2d 103,107-08 (D.C.2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent a factual basis for such a comment by the prosecutor, our case law has been strict in stating that suggestions of fear are forbidden. Simpson v. United States, 877 A.2d 1045, 1048 (D.C.2005) (citations omitted). Although the prosecutor did not explicitly say that Cary and Byrd were afraid of appellant, that was the clear implication from his comments. [3] Because the prosecutor's rebuttal argument suggested that Byrd and Cary changed their story out of fear of appellant, we must examine whether there was a factual basis for such a suggestion of fear. Byrd testified that she told a different story at the first trial because she felt threatened for [her] life. Although she did not specifically testify that she felt threatened by appellant, that was a reasonable inference from her testimony that she felt threatened and that she saw appellant shooting at her. [4] Byrd's testimony thus provided a sufficient factual basis for the prosecutor's argument. Cary, however, did not testify to any reason why he had changed his story. Accordingly, there was no factual basis for the suggestion that he lied at the first trial because he was afraid of appellant. The prosecutor's argument was thus improper as to Cary, and the trial court erred by allowing it. To determine whether reversal is warranted, we must balance the gravity of the [impropriety], its direct relationship to the issue of innocence or guilt, and the effect of specific corrective instructions of the trial court, if any, against the weight of the evidence of appellant['s] guilt. Murray, supra note 4, 855 A.2d at 1134 (citations omitted). [5] As in Murray, where we held that the prosecutor's improper invocation of fear in closing arguments did not warrant reversal, the improprieties challenged here did not include attempts to elicit testimony about fear, but were limited to closing argument by the prosecutor.... Id. at 1134. Also, as in Murray, the prosecutor's references to witness fear were based on something the jury might naturally have understood anyway: that witnesses to a violent crime subpoenaed to testify in court may continue to exhibit fear of those they believe were the perpetrators. Id. at 1135. Although there was not a sufficient factual basis for the prosecutor's comments in regard to Cary, the argument did not suggest that appellant did anything specific to threaten Cary nor did it point to any facts unsupported by the evidence. Additionally, the improper statements dealt with testimony regarding whether Cary had seen appellant shooting at him. Notably, whether appellant himself actually shot Cary and Byrd is immaterial to the crime for which he was convictedconspiracy. While the evidence certainly is relevant, it is not necessary for a conspiracy conviction. In any event, even without the prosecutor's improper statement, there was a great deal of evidence of appellant's guilt. While Cary and Byrd did not identify appellant as a shooter in the first trial, they did identify him as a shooter to the police and before the grand jury. Moreover, they had consistently testified that appellant was in the car with McCoy while McCoy shot at Cary and Byrd. Given the weight of the evidence, we conclude that the verdict was not substantially swayed by the prosecutor's improper suggestion that Cary changed his testimony because he feared appellant.