Opinion ID: 884429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Doctrine of Prior Restraint

Text: The first question we address is whether the court's order, which indirectly restrains the media's access to certain sources of information regarding the trial proceedings, constitutes a prior restraint, thereby violating the media's First Amendment rights. The doctrine of prior restraint on publication finds its roots in the United States Supreme Court decision in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson (1931), 283 U.S. 697, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357, in which the Court struck down a statute which allowed Minnesota to enjoin publication of malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspapers. The Court stated: it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the [freedom of press] guaranty to prevent previous restraints upon publication. Near, 283 U.S. at 713, 51 S.Ct. at 630. The Court held that the order entered pursuant to the Minnesota statute was an unconstitutional prior restraint of the press. A court may impose a prior restraint on the media for the purpose of protecting the integrity of criminal proceedings only if the gravity of the `evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the danger. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart (1976), 427 U.S. 539, 562, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2804, 49 L.Ed.2d 683, 699. The Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n held that a court order prohibiting publication of a criminal defendant's confession constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint on publication. In expressing its concerns about prior restraints, the Court stated, [i]f it can be said that threat of criminal or civil sanctions after publication `chills' speech, prior restraint `freezes' it at least for the time. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 2803. The Court in Nebraska Press Ass'n relied on [p]rofessional studies ... recommending that trial courts in appropriate cases limit what the contending lawyers, the police, and witnesses may say to anyone[,] Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 564, 96 S.Ct. at 2805, thereby intimating that, in lieu of prior restraints on the media, restraints on trial participants may be an appropriate means for minimizing prejudicial communications concerning trial proceedings. In the wake of Nebraska Press Ass'n, there has been considerable disagreement as to whether participant gag orders are prior restraints on the media. Those cases holding that such orders are prior restraints on the media are typified by the Tenth Circuit decision in Journal Publishing Co. v. Mechem (10th Cir.1986), 801 F.2d 1233. The Tenth Circuit, in response to a publisher's challenge, held that a court order which prohibited jurors from post-trial interviews with the media was an unconstitutional restraint upon the publisher's First Amendment right to gather news. See also CBS, Inc. v. Young (6th Cir.1975), 522 F.2d 234 (holding that a participant gag order was a prior restraint on CBS' right to gather news); Connecticut Magazine v. Moraghan (D.Conn.1987), 676 F.Supp. 38 (holding that a gag order directed at the trial attorneys constituted a prior restraint on the right to gather news and derivatively on publication and was therefore unconstitutional). Other courts take the view that an order which is not directed at the media does not constitute a prior restraint on publication. The Second Circuit employed this rationale in Application of Dow Jones & Co. (2nd Cir.1988), 842 F.2d 603, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 946, 109 S.Ct. 377, 102 L.Ed.2d 365. In Dow Jones, the trial court had prohibited parties and attorneys from making extrajudicial statements to the media. Media organizations challenged the order as being a prior restraint of their right to gather news. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608. The Circuit Court held that the determination of whether a gag order constitutes a prior restraint depends upon the status of the challenging party. A gag order constitutes a prior restraint when challenged by the individual gagged, but not when challenged by a third party. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 609. The court acknowledged that the order in question limited the flow of information readily available to the news agencies.... Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608. Nonetheless, it held that the order was less intrusive upon the media than an order which directly threatened to sanction the media. While an order directed at the media would be examined under the prior restraint standard, an indirect restraint would be permitted upon a showing of a `reasonable likelihood' that pretrial publicity [would] prejudice a fair trial. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 610. In Dow Jones, the order in question was buttressed by evidence of a threat to the administration of justice and evidence that the lower court had considered less restrictive alternatives such as change of venue, postponement of trial, extensive voir dire and jury sequestration. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 611. The Second Circuit distinguished prior restraints from participant gag orders by pointing out that participant gag orders lack the most offensive aspect of a prior restraint [which] is the censorship involved by forbidding the dissemination of information already known to the press and therefore public. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 608. It is this right to engage in the editorial process free from government intervention which is the core of the constitutional guarantee of a free press. Although participant gag orders impede the flow of communication, they do not intrude upon the prerogative of the media to publish that which it knows. Thus, the Second Circuit held that participant gag orders are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as direct restraints against the press and will be upheld if reasonable. Dow Jones, 842 F.2d at 609-610. We agree with the Second Circuit that prior restraint analysis is dependent upon the status of the party bringing the challenge. Additionally, prior restraint analysis is dependent on whether the restraint impacts the media's prerogative to publish that which it knows as opposed to its ability to acquire new information. While an order restraining the trial participants from communicating with the press may be a prior restraint upon the participants as communicators, it is not a prior restraint upon the press. Since a gag order imposed on trial participants does not prohibit the publication or broadcast of particular information or commentary, it does not constitute a previous or prior restraint upon publication of speech. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 556, 96 S.Ct. at 2801. The distinction between restraining orders directed at trial participants challenged by the press and those challenged by the trial participants themselves is illustrated by two decisions from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals involving the same restraining order. Compare Radio and Television News Ass'n v. United States District Court (9th Cir. 1986), 781 F.2d 1443 (holding that a restraining order not directed at the press does not restrain the press' First Amendment rights) with Levine v. United States District Court (9th Cir.1985), 764 F.2d 590, 595 (holding that the district court's order is properly characterized as a prior restraint on counsel's First Amendment right to free speech). As one commentator has observed, the Radio and Television decision illustrates that the prior restraint doctrine does not accommodate receiver's rights and is insensitive to restriction of the communication process as a whole. Note, A Prior Restraint by Any Other Name: The Judicial Response to Media Challenges of Gag Orders Directed at Trial Participants, 88 Mich. L.Rev. 1171, 1181 (1990). The same commentator correctly notes that the prior restraint doctrine, in that it focuses solely on the communicator rather than the receiver of the communication, does not extend any protection to the communication process as a whole. Given that the prior restraint doctrine protects only the rights of the communicator, another means of protecting the communication process as a whole, and the rights of receivers of information in particular, must be employed to safeguard the entire bundle of rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution. The primary purpose of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution is to encourage and protect an unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes.... New York Times Company v. Sullivan (1964), 376 U.S. 254, 269, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, 700. In other words, the First Amendment protects not just speech itself but the entire process of communication, including the exchange of ideas and information between speaker and listener. Although the United States Constitution, unlike the Montana Constitution, does not specifically guarantee a right to know, a right to receive information has been recognized under First Amendment principles. See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976), 425 U.S. 748, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 48 L.Ed.2d 346, in which the Court invalidated a statute which prohibited pharmacists from advertising prices of prescriptions. In holding that the ban violated consumers' First Amendment rights to receive information, the Court extended First Amendment protection to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756, 96 S.Ct. at 1823. See also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C. (1969), 395 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 23 L.Ed.2d 371, in which the Court required broadcasters to provide equal air time to competing political interests, holding that the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, ... is paramount. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390, 89 S.Ct. at 1806. Recognition of the recipient's rights is particularly compelling in Montana where there exists, in addition to the right to free speech found in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and in Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution, the Right to Know provision of Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution. The Right to Know provision grants the citizens of this state the right of access to all public documents and deliberations of public bodies. The contents of a communication which a trial participant might wish to make outside the courtroom or prior to trial, could be, under most circumstances, considered private communication rather than a governmental proceeding and thus not subject to the public's right to know. However, Article II, Section 9's guarantee of a right to know grants the public an interest in receiving information about the criminal process. Great Falls Tribune, 608 P.2d at 119; Smith, 654 P.2d at 986. This interest is broader than mere access to in-court proceedings or official court filings. Rather, the public has a right to receive information about the entire criminal law process. We hold that the right to know extends to receiving any information which pertains to the criminal law process, regardless of whether that information emanates directly from the courthouse or indirectly from those who are participating in the system as law enforcement officers, attorneys, parties or witnesses and who may wish to communicate with the public or the press about the process. Our holding that the public and press have a right to know about the entire criminal law process is buttressed by the Ohio Supreme Court decision in State ex rel. National Broadcasting Company, Inc. v. Court of Common Pleas (1990), 52 Ohio St.3d 104, 556 N.E.2d 1120. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a participant gag order, similar to the order at bar, violated the public's right of access to criminal proceedings under both the federal and state constitutions. In a previous case, the Ohio court had established that a newspaper had standing to challenge a trial court order prohibiting the public and reporters from pretrial hearings. The court in NBC, Inc. held that the same reasoning applied with no less force to the criminal case as a whole, even though an order not directed at the media was a lesser restriction on access. NBC, Inc., 556 N.E.2d at 1124. The Ohio Supreme Court relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court of California (1986), 478 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1, which held that the media had a First Amendment right of access to a transcript of a preliminary hearing, where the defendant could not show a substantial probability that his right to a fair trial would be prejudiced by releasing the information. Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 14-15, 106 S.Ct. at 2743-44. The Court in Press-Enterprise based its holding on the federal constitutional right of access to proceedings which have historically been open to the press and general public and in which public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. Press-Enterprise, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. at 2740. The Ohio Supreme Court, relying on Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (1982), 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248, held that [c]riminal trials have historically been open to the public, and public access has always been considered essential to the fair and orderly administration of our criminal justice system. NBC, Inc., 556 N.E.2d at 1124. The Ohio Supreme Court further recognized that the open courts provision of the Ohio Constitution also embraced a right of access. NBC, Inc., 556 N.E.2d at 1124. Because both federal and state constitutional principles recognized a right of access to criminal proceedings as a whole, the court held that the participant gag order as challenged by the media was subject to scrutiny under the test established in Press-Enterprise for determining the constitutionality of restrictions on access to criminal trial proceedings. NBC, Inc., 556 N.E.2d at 1125. We hold that participant gag orders, including the one at bar, do not constitute prior restraints on publication, and therefore are not subject to traditional prior restraint analysis. And, although § 46-11-701, MCA, contains a standard for reviewing indirect restraints on the media, its provisions govern only access to official court proceedings and documents. Although participant gag orders are also an indirect restraint on the media, the restraint is not as intrusive as in the case of closure of proceedings which cuts off the media's access to official court proceedings. For this reason, a lesser level of scrutiny should be adopted to determine the constitutionality of a participant gag order. The level of scrutiny must protect both the defendant's right to a fair trial and the media's right to know under Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution and the media's right to free speech under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7 of the Montana Constitution. Having recognized that Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution guarantees the media a right to receive information about criminal proceedings, it is implicit that the media should not have information about the trial process restricted except to the extent that restrictions are required to protect the defendant's right to an impartial jury under Article II, Section 24. As indicated above, the clear and present danger standard employed by the prior restraint on publication doctrine is by definition and historical usage directed at the rights of the communicator rather than the recipient and thus does not adequately protect the media's right to receive information; that is, its right to know as opposed to its right to publish that which it already knows. Accordingly, we decline to employ the common law clear and present danger standard in evaluating a participant gag order challenged by the media. We likewise decline to employ the statutory clear and present danger standard used in § 46-11-701(3), MCA, because we hold that the media has a lesser interest in communicating with trial participants than in accessing official court documents or court proceedings. By the same token, we find the reasonableness standard used by the Second Circuit in the Dow Jones decision too lenient a standard to adequately protect the right to know under Article II, Section 9. As we recognized in Great Falls Tribune, the public's right to know under Article II, Section 9 must be balanced against the defendant's right to an impartial jury under Article II, Section 24. In the context of a participant gag order, this balancing should be accomplished pursuant to a heightened scrutiny standard. Similar to the heightened scrutiny standard applied by courts for constitutional equal protection analysis, a heightened scrutiny standard applied to participant gag orders eliminates the stark choice between judging gag orders on either a reasonableness test or a clear and present danger test. The clear and present danger test, in effect, treats first amendment rights as paramount; thus making it difficult to truly balance such rights against the right to a fair trial. As Justice White expressed in his concurring opinion in Nebraska Press Ass'n, there is grave doubt that a prior restraint on the press would ever be justified under the clear and present danger test. Nebraska Press Ass'n, 427 U.S. at 570-71, 96 S.Ct. at 2808-09 (White, J., concurring). A heightened scrutiny standard employs a middle-ground approach which accommodates the competing interests of free speech and fair trial rights. Consistent with the Ohio Supreme Court's use of a heightened scrutiny test for the issuance of gag orders, we hold that where the rights of the accused to a fair trial are asserted, a gag order may issue only when the following conditions have been met: (1) the press and general public must be given an opportunity to be heard on the question before issuance of the order; (2) the court describes what reasonable alternatives have been considered and explains why those reasonable alternatives cannot adequately protect the defendant's fair trial rights; (3) the order is narrowly tailored to serve the interest of protecting the defendant's fair trial rights; and (4) the court has made specific findings that there is a substantial probability that the defendant's right to a fair trial will be prejudiced by publicity that the gag order would otherwise prevent. This test grants more protection to the defendant than allowed under traditional prior restraint analysis and at the same time guarantees greater protection of the public's right to know under Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution than offered by a reasonableness test. First, the participant speech in question must pose a substantial probability of harm to the trial process as compared with posing a clear and present danger to the trial process as is required to uphold a prior restraint or to close proceedings under § 46-11-701, MCA. Secondly, unlike the reasonableness test, the heightened scrutiny test requires an order to be narrowly drawn. Broad sweeping gag orders which restrict all counsel and Court personnel, all parties concerned with this litigation, whether plaintiffs or defendants, their relatives, close friends, and associates from discussing the case in any manner whatsoever with the media will not pass muster. CBS, Inc., 522 F.2d at 236. Employing a heightened scrutiny standard to participant gag orders challenged by the media protects the media's First Amendment rights as receivers of information and protects its right to know guaranteed under Article II, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution.