Opinion ID: 614579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bledsoe's Failure to Establish Jurisdiction

Text: In the present case, the Board found that Bledsoe had carried her burden as to the first three jurisdictional elements, but had not carried it as to the fourth. Specifically, the Board acknowledged that the Postal Service had fulfilled its duty to conduct a search for vacant positions in Bledsoe's local commuting area that she would be able to perform and found none. Bledsoe failed to allege any facts to refute that showing. The Board thus concluded that Bledsoe had failed to make a non-frivolous allegation of fact showing the Postal Service's action to be arbitrary and capricious and determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Bledsoe's appeal. On appeal to this court, Bledsoe argues only that the Board erred because the Postal Service did not offer her a light duty assignment and because there was work available in the facility. Petitioner Br. 1-2. The only factual averment potentially bearing on that argument is Bledsoe's supplemental jurisdictional statement contending that three door monitor positions were Necessary Work. Respondent App'x. 28. As noted above, this statement was filed not only after the close of record date established by the Board for the issue of jurisdiction, but after the Board had already dismissed Bledsoe's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.58(c) states, in relevant part, that [o]nce the record closes, no additional evidence or argument will be accepted unless the party submitting it shows that the evidence was not readily available before the record closed. The Board repeatedly informed Bledsoe that no evidence would be accepted after the close of record on the issue of jurisdiction absent a showing of good cause, and even extended the close of record by a month so that Bledsoe could provide jurisdictional allegations. Bledsoe's supplemental statement was untimely and included no showing of good cause. Indeed, while Bledsoe's untimely submission states that the information contained therein was requested from the Postal Service on August 6, 2010, it contains no statement of when Bledsoe received the information. The submission makes reference to an Exhibit B apparently containing the Postal Service's response; but this court sees no such exhibit in the record on appeal. Thus, this court has no basis upon which to conclude that the information was not readily available prior to the close of record on jurisdiction. Moreover, Bledsoe's submission was after the initial order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.111(a) states in part that the judge will prepare an initial decision after the record closes. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.112(a), further provides that [a]fter issuing the initial decision, the judge will retain jurisdiction over a case only to the extent necessary to perform enumerated functions not including consideration of untimely evidentiary submissions. Thus, the administrative judge lacked jurisdiction to consider the evidence in Bledsoe's untimely submission. Pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114, Bledsoe could have petitioned for review by the Board of the initial decision dismissing her appeal for lack of jurisdiction. But there is no evidence in the record on appeal that Bledsoe did so. And even if Bledsoe's Amended Jurisdictional Order were liberally construed to constitute such a petition, it would not have entitled Bledsoe to reopen her appeal at the Board. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d) provides in relevant part that the Board may grant a petition for review when it is established that ... [n]ew and material evidence is available that, despite due diligence, was not available when the record closed. See also Brenneman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 439 F.3d 1325, 1328 (Fed.Cir.2006) (Both this court and the Board have held that a party submitting new evidence in connection with a petition for review must satisfy the burden of showing that the evidence is material and that it could not have been obtained earlier with the exercise of due diligence.). Bledsoe's Amended Jurisdictional Order contains no statement that the information was not available when the record closed, nor does it evidence diligence on Bledsoe's part in obtaining the information. Because Bledsoe submitted new evidence after the close of record and after the initial decision dismissing her appeal, without a showing of good cause or a petition for review, the Board could not, and did not, consider it in rendering its jurisdictional decision. Bledsoe's untimely submission is therefore irrelevant to this court's substantial-evidence review of the Board's fact finding. This court finds no error in the Board's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction. The Board applied the correct legal standard in determining its own jurisdiction, and its factual determinations were supported by substantial evidence. Bledsoe did not identify any vacant position which was available within her commuting area and which she was able to perform. Nor did she in any other way make a non-frivolous allegation that the Postal Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not restoring her, even after the Board specifically ordered Bledsoe to make such a showing and afforded her the opportunity to do so. The Board's dismissal of Bledsoe's pendent discrimination claim was also correct in view of the above analysis. See Garcia, 437 F.3d at 1331 (explaining that the Board's pendent jurisdiction over discrimination claims is solely determined by considering the Board's jurisdiction over the adverse action alone (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7702)).