Opinion ID: 1618300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Are the plaintiffs entitled to recover continuing damages for injuries resulting from Lake's alleged negligence but accruing within six years of the date on which suit was filed?

Text: The Stevens contend that the failure of Leo Stevens, Jr.'s trust caused the Stevens partnership to suffer financial detriment throughout the 1980s, culminating ultimately in the 1987 bankruptcy. They take the position that regardless of when their cause of action for Lake's original act of alleged negligence accrued, a new cause of action accrued with each year's financial losses. Recovery should therefore be permitted, the Stevens argue, for all losses occurring during the six years preceding the filing of their complaint. In so arguing, we find that the Stevens have misconstrued the continuing injury doctrine. It is true that continuing or repeated injuries can give rise to liability even if they persist beyond the limitations period for the initial injury. See Hendrix v. City of Yazoo City, 911 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir.1990); C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 177 at 230-32 (1987). This principle applies, however, in situations where the defendant commits repeated acts of wrongful conduct, not where harm reverberates from a single, one-time act or omission: [W]here a tort involves a continuing or repeated injury, the cause of action accrues at, and limitations begin to run from, the date of the last injury, or when the tortious acts cease. Where the tortious act has been completed, or the tortious acts have ceased, the period of limitations will not be extended on the ground of a continuing wrong. A continuing tort is one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an original violation. C.J.S., Limitations of Actions § 177 at 230-31 (emphasis added); see also Hendrix, 911 F.2d at 1102 (where violation occurs outside limitations period but is closely related to violations occurring within the period, recovery is permitted on theory that all violations are part of one continuing act). The principle of continuing injury obviously does not apply to the case sub judice. If attorney Lake injured the plaintiffs, his act of negligence occurred entirely in 1979 and, so far as the record reflects, was never repeated.