Opinion ID: 728065
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conduct within the limitations period

Text: 22 As noted above, because the indictment against Ms. Stoner was returned on March 16, 1994, she may not be prosecuted under § 371 for conduct occurring more than five years prior to that date. See 18 U.S.C. § 3282. We must therefore review the indictment to determine whether it alleges that Ms. Stoner engaged in conduct constituting a violation of § 371 after March 16, 1989. 23 The conspiracy count in the indictment lists five overt acts that were allegedly committed before March 1, 1989 (i.e. more than five years before the filing of the indictment). However, it also asserts that overt acts other than the untimely ones listed in the conspiracy count were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Aplt's App. at 3 (In furtherance of the conspiracy and to effectuate its purpose, defendant CYNTHIA M. STONER and others, committed or caused to be committed various overt acts ... including, but not limited to, the following: .... (emphasis added)). In addition, the indictment alleges that Ms. Stoner conspired to embezzle tribal funds in or about March 1988, and continuing thereafter until in or about August 1989, the exact dates being unknown to the Grand Jury. See id. at 2 (emphasis added). This statement, combined with the statement that unlisted overt acts were committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, indicates that, according to the grand jury,  'the conspiracy [was] at work'  within the limitations period and that during that period, the conspiracy was neither a project still resting in the minds of the conspirators nor a fully completed operation no longer in existence. See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 334, 77 S.Ct. 1064, 1085, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957) (quoting Carlson v. United States, 187 F.2d 366, 370 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 940, 71 S.Ct. 1000, 95 L.Ed. 1367 (1951), and describing the function of the overt act in a conspiracy prosecution). 4 Accordingly, the indictment is not subject to dismissal on its face. 5 24 We must now consider whether there was a variance between the overt acts alleged in the indictment and the evidence introduced at trial. If such a variance existed, we must then determine whether it prejudiced Ms. Stoner's substantial rights such that dismissal of the indictment is warranted. 25