Opinion ID: 2085464
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Challenge to Admission of Prior Consistent Statement

Text: Finally, defendant argues that the trial justice erred when he ruled that testimony given by Lucy, the family friend, about a statement Amy made was admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence as a prior consistent statement. Rule 801(d)(1) provides that a statement is not hearsay if [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is    (B) consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive   . A proponent must show, however, that the prior consistent statement was made `prior to the existence of circumstances relied upon to discredit the credibility of the witness's testimony.' State v. Kholi, 672 A.2d 429, 438 (R.I.1996) (quoting State v. Damiano, 587 A.2d 396, 401 (R.I.1991)). In other words, Rule 801(d)(1)(B) includes a temporal requirement that the consistent statements must have been made before the alleged influence, or motive to fabricate, arose. State v. Briggs, 886 A.2d 735, 751 (R.I.2005) (quoting Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 158, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995)). Specifically, defendant argues on appeal that Amy's prior consistent statement to Lucy, the family friend, did not antedate the asserted improper influence exerted upon her by her mother and her cousin, Kim. In this case, when defense counsel cross-examined Amy, he elicited testimony from her that when she first visited the CAC in November, she did not disclose the abuse, but that she did so during her second visit in January. Then, defendant's counsel questioned Amy about whether she spoke to her mother or to Kim about her father in between the two CAC visits. [10] As a result, the prosecution sought to admit Lucy's testimony that Amy revealed the abuse to her on November 4, 2003. After defense counsel objected, the state explained that it sought to admit the testimony to rebut an implication of recent fabrication or improper influence. Defense counsel then argued: [the state] is trying to get the testimony in of Lucy    in an attempt to make the allegation that I established though my cross-examination of [Amy], that there was either a fabrication or improper influence or motive in her testimony as it related to her second visit in January with the Advocacy Center, because I established through her testimony that she spoke to [Kim] and her mother prior to the second  prior to the second conference at the Advocacy Center. It is my position that I don't think I impeached her credibility whatsoever. And if that testimony is going to be allowed, I'm requesting that it only be used to rehabilitate the credibility of [Amy] and not to establish validity to the facts that she asserts as to the touching. The state responded that even though the statement should be admitted for the truth of the matter, it would not object to an instruction limiting the use of the prior consistent statement to rehabilitate Amy's credibility. The trial justice then found that the thrust of the cross-examination was to demonstrate that at the first CAC visit Amy did not remember the abuse, but then at the second visit, after she had spoken to her mother and Kim, she did disclose the event to the counselor. The court held that the prior consistent statement was admissible because it occurred before the alleged fabrication. The trial justice also opined that Amy's statement would be admissible substantively, but in an abundance of caution, the trial justice said he would give a limiting instruction to the jury. [11] In response, defense counsel said: All right. [12] This dialogue clearly illustrates that the defendant did not preserve for appeal the argument he makes to this Court. Our well-settled raise-or-waive rule provides that when a party fails to make a specific objection at trial, one that is sufficiently focused so as to call the trial justice's attention to the basis for said objection, then the issue may not be considered on appeal and claims of trial error are considered waived. State v. Toole, 640 A.2d 965, 972-73 (R.I.1994). At the defendant's own request, the trial justice provided the jury with a limiting instruction to which the defendant acquiesced. As a result, the statement was not admitted into evidence for the truth of the matter asserted, but for the limited purpose of rehabilitating the credibility of the witness. To the extent the defendant's objection was based on hearsay, such a claim of error cannot prevail on appeal when the evidence was not admitted for its truth. See State v. Feole, 748 A.2d 239, 243 (R.I.2000). To the extent the evidence was used to rehabilitate Amy's credibility, the trial justice accommodated the defendant's request and the defendant did not object to the substance of the requested instruction. Therefore, we see no merit whatsoever in the defendant's argument that Lucy's testimony was admitted wrongfully. See State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465, 477 (R.I. 1998) (holding alleged error on appeal waived when the defendant failed to raise a bolstering objection at trial). [13]