Opinion ID: 4578624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: The district court did not err by allowing Mr. Tabaho to decline to testify. Almost all of defense counsel’s questions for Mr. Tabaho called for potentially incriminating responses. See generally ROA, Vol. 3 at 1040-50; see, e.g., id. at 1044 (“Did you cut [Mr. Dodge’s] face? . . . Did you punch Mr. Dodge?); id. at 1047 (“[B]efore you tried to cut up Mr. Dodge, did Mr. Whiteplume ask you to wrap up the body and try to put it in a crawl space?”). It is not “‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the circumstances in the case,’ that [Mr. Tabaho] ‘is mistaken’ and his answers could not ‘possibly have’ a ‘tendency to incriminate.’” Rivas-Macias, 537 F.3d at 1279 (quoting Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 488). Mr. Oldman argues Mr. Tabaho faced no authentic danger because he had “already given all of this information not only to FBI agents, but to the trial prosecutor himself, as part of his ‘cooperation.’” Aplt. Br. at 48. And he already had pled guilty to being an accessory after the fact to second-degree murder. But Mr. Tabaho had not been sentenced in his case when he was called to testify in Mr. Oldman’s trial, and could “fear incurring additional criminal liability through compelled testimony.” Castorena-Jaime, 285 F.3d at 931. Mr. Oldman also argues that Mr. Tabaho faced no authentic danger because he entered a cooperation agreement with the government providing immunity. But the cooperation agreement protected Mr. Tabaho against further prosecution for statements he makes while cooperating with the government. He was not cooperating with the 33 government when Mr. Oldman called him as a defense witness against the Government at trial. Moreover, the plea agreement said only that Mr. Tabaho’s statements will not be used against him. It did not immunize him from prosecution based on additional evidence his statements reveal. See Rivas-Macias, 537 F.3d at 1280 (holding that a witness may refuse to testify to avoid the possible “use of his compelled answers and all evidence derived therefrom in any subsequent criminal case in which he is a defendant” (quotations omitted and emphasis added)). Finally, Mr. Oldman claims “the Government substantially interfered with the presentation of the defense” by not granting Mr. Tabaho immunity and not calling him as a prosecution witness. Aplt. Br. at 48-49. But Mr. Oldman has failed to show the Government had any obligation to do either, and he has not shown substantial interference such as “threaten[ed] prosecution, intimidation, or coercive badgering.” Dalton, 918 F.3d at 1130. In short, Mr. Oldman has not shown the court erred in allowing Mr. Tabaho to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. D. Mr. Oldman’s Other Arguments Mr. Oldman also argues (1) the district court judge engaged in improper ex parte communications with the jury, (2) mishandled the spousal privilege, and (3) that his counsel was ineffective. We reject each argument. 34 1. Ex Parte Communication Mr. Oldman argues the following colloquy with counsel for both parties revealed that the district court engaged in improper ex parte communications with a juror: THE COURT: Just for the record, I want to note Juror Number 52. She’s been paying attention, but she’s had a box of Kleenex and has - some of the pictures have been particularly tough and challenging for everyone. We have verified she’s okay. She’s good to go. She just doesn’t want to draw attention and verify that she’s capable of going forward. So I don’t see any need to do anything further. [Government], any concerns? [GOVERNMENT’S COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: [defense counsel]? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No, Your Honor. ROA, Vol. 3 at 960. As Mr. Oldman acknowledges, “the district court did not identify who the ‘we’ was who spoke with Juror 52.” Aplt. Br. at 34. Because the record does not show whether the judge communicated with any jurors ex parte, “plain error review is not possible because [Mr. Oldman] has failed to develop the record sufficiently for such review.” United States v. Charles, 576 F.3d 1060, 1066 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1279 n.14 (10th Cir. 1999) (rejecting an argument that “the lack of a record is itself indicative that improper ex parte communications occurred between the judge and jury”); United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509, 1515 35 (10th Cir. 1992) (reviewing for plain error when the defendant failed to object to allegedly improper ex parte communications between the judge and jury). In any event, the court gave the parties “the opportunity to pursue the matter further,” and they declined, thus precluding plain error. United States v. McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1525 (10th Cir. 1991); see id. (finding no plain error based on the court’s ex parte communication with the jury because “[d]efense counsel was not left in the dark as to what occurred” and indicated she “felt no prejudice existed at that time”).11 2. Spousal Privilege Mr. Oldman argues the district court erred when it (a) declined to strike the testimony of Dionne Addison—his wife at the time of trial—which she gave before he invoked spousal privilege, and (b) required him to invoke spousal privilege in front of the jury. But Mr. Oldman did not object on these grounds at trial and he does not argue plain error on appeal, so these issues are waived. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he failure to argue for plain error and its application on appeal[] surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not first presented to the district court.”); United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1199 (10th Cir. 2019). His arguments fail in any event. First, he cites no case requiring a court to strike testimony given before the defendant invokes spousal privilege. Second, Federal Rules 11 Mr. Oldman also contends that “no further inquiry was made of all the jurors to determine whether they, too, were capable of going forward.” Aplt. Br. at 36 (quotations omitted). But that has nothing to do with the alleged ex parte communication. 36 of Evidence 103(d) and 104(c)(3), on which he relies, require courts to prevent jurors from hearing inadmissible evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 103(d), and to hold hearings on preliminary questions out of the jury’s presence “if justice so requires,” id., 104(c)(3). Neither requires a court to prevent the jury from hearing a defendant invoke spousal privilege. 3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Finally, Mr. Oldman argues we should find ineffective assistance of counsel if we determine his trial attorneys failed to preserve any of the issues he raises on appeal. We decline to consider this argument. Ineffective assistance claims “should be brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal,” and Mr. Oldman fails to identify an applicable exception. United States v. Galloway, 56 F.3d 1239, 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).