Opinion ID: 1863292
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Szteinbaum

Text: In Szteinbaum, the Third District addressed the question of whether a complaint filed by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation may be amended to cure this deficiency. Szteinbaum, 476 So.2d at 247. The plaintiff in Szteinbaum, a corporation, filed and served a complaint without the signature of an attorney. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and the trial court granted the motion with leave to amend. Thereafter, the corporate plaintiff filed an amended complaint signed by an attorney and served it by mail on the defendant's attorney. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint contending that because the original complaint filed by a non-attorney was a nullity, personal service of the amended complaint was required. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, the Third District, citing the policy favoring the resolution of cases on the merits and the liberal rules governing the amendment of pleadings, [4] held the complaint defective but not a nullity and therefore correctable by amendment. Nevertheless, the Third District qualified this right to amend by borrowing from the excusable neglect approach pertinent to motions to set aside defaults: As in the default cases, the decision of whether to dismiss a complaint without leave to amend should be controlled by considerations of the fault and diligence of the plaintiff corporation and the prejudice to the defendant as they appear in the individual case. In the present case, there is no indication that the errant complaint prejudiced the defendant in any way or that the plaintiff corporation acted with knowledge that it was improper for it, without counsel, to prepare and file the initial complaint. On the other hand, there is a strong indication that the plaintiff corporation acted with diligence in immediately obtaining counsel after being given leave to do so. Szteinbaum, 476 So.2d at 252. The respondents argue that the Szteinbaum approach can be distinguished and limited to the corporate setting because unlike a corporation, here the petitioner as a natural person could have signed the complaint herself. The policies guiding the Szteinbaum decision, however, are not susceptible to such a limitation. The respondents further argue that allowing a complaint signed by an attorney not licensed to practice in the state to be amended would render the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law meaningless. As noted by the Szteinbaum court, however, the nullity rule is ill-suited to promote the policy served by the rule against the unauthorized practice of law: To be sure, the protection of the public from incompetent, unethical, or irresponsible representation, through the prevention of the unauthorized practice of law is a compelling public policy. We suggest, however, that this latter policy is not served by a rule of law that declares that a complaint filed by a non-attorney on behalf of a corporation cannot be cured by the later appearance of counsel to represent the corporation and, moreover, that such a rule disserves the policy that cases should be decided on their merits. Id. at 249-50 (citation omitted); see also Telepower Communications, Inc. v. LTI Vehicle Leasing Corp., 658 So.2d 1026 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (allowing the appellant corporation an opportunity to amend its notice of appeal signed by a non-attorney in accordance with Szteinbaum ). As emphasized by the Third District in Szteinbaum, the nullity rule truly places the burden on the unwary litigant, not the offending attorney: Indeed, prohibiting amendment and dismissing as a nullity the complaint would yield the ironic result of prejudicing the constituents of the corporation, the very people sought to be protected by the rule against the unauthorized practice of law. Szteinbaum, 476 So.2d at 250. A similar observation was made by the Fourth District Appellate Court of Illinois in McEvers v. Stout, 218 Ill.App.3d 469, 161 Ill.Dec. 194, 578 N.E.2d 321 (1991). The McEvers court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their medical malpractice complaint after the expiration of the statute of limitations where the original complaint was dismissed as a nullity because it was filed by an attorney not licensed to practice in Illinois. The court concluded that the nullity rule exacted too harsh a penalty on litigants: [W]e find the Fruin [ [5] ] rule provides a result that is too harsh.... Underlying our decision is the recognition that a nullity rule appears to punish the litigant rather than the offending attorney. This might be advisable, if we could legitimately assume that litigants are aware of the rules relating to the practice of law. Assuming such would be unreasonable. Id., 161 Ill.Dec. 194, 578 N.E.2d at 322. We conclude that there are better suited mechanisms available to discourage the unlicensed practice of law. An attorney engaging in the unlicensed practice of law is subject to injunctive relief and indirect criminal contempt under Chapter 10 of the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, which governs the investigation and prosecution of the unlicensed practice of law. [6] Additionally, an offending attorney would presumably be subject to disciplinary action in his or her home jurisdiction. [7] These mechanisms, unlike the nullity rule, appropriately focus on the misconduct of the offending attorney rather than unduly penalizing litigants with dismissal of their complaints. Finally, the respondents argue that the petitioner is not entitled to relief under Szteinbaum because, as the trial court concluded, the petitioner has not established excusable neglect. While the trial court determined that the petitioner did not establish excusable neglect, the court does not appear to have considered the other factors weighed by the Szteinbaum court of prejudice to the opposing parties and the policy favoring resolution of cases on the merits. Nevertheless, although we agree with the Szteinbaum court's rejection of the nullity rule, we believe that the policy of allowing cases to be decided on the merits whenever possible and the protection of litigants from the dangers associated with the unlicensed practice of law are best served by a rule of law that allows amendment of these defective pleadings without requiring the establishment of excusable neglect. Accordingly, consistent with the liberal rules regarding the amendment of pleadings, [8] we conclude that a trial court must allow litigants a reasonable amount of time to amend their complaints with the appearance of authorized counsel. A dismissal should only be granted if the party fails to timely amend his or her pleading. Consistent with this approach, we quash Torrey and approve Szteinbaum to the extent consistent with this decision and remand for proceedings consistent therewith. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., concurs in result only.