Opinion ID: 3090869
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequate Preservation of Argument

Text: Campbell contends that she preserved her arguments both in her objections to the PSR and in her timely pro se motion filed pursuant to Rule 35(a). In reviewing her objections to the PSR, it is clear that Campbell did not raise the claims she now raises on appeal until she filed her pro se Rule 35(a) motion. Although the district court was not required to consider her pro se motion given that she was represented by counsel, the court denied the motion on the merits. The Government cites no case, and we have found none, that suggests that a district court would be prohibited from exercising its discretion to consider a pro se motion from a defendant who is also represented by counsel. Thus, even if Campbell was not entitled to file a pro se Rule 35(a) motion, the district court had the discretion to consider it on the merits. See United States v. Colomb, 419 F.3d 292, 299 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that district court has inherent power to control its own docket). We note, too, that Campbell was no longer represented by counsel when the district court entered its order. Having determined that Campbell’s Rule 35(a) motion adequately raised the issue to the district court, we must determine whether, in general, a Rule 35(a) motion allows a district court to correct the alleged error at issue here. 6 Case: 12-31172 Document: 00512501835 Page: 7 Date Filed: 01/15/2014 No. 12-31172 “Within 14 days after sentencing, the court may correct a sentence that resulted from arithmetical, technical, or other clear error.” Rule 35(a). The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 35(a) explain that Rule 35(a) was intended to codify the results in United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d 672 (4th Cir. 1989), and United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1990). Id. advisory committee’s notes (1991 Amendment). In Cook, the appellate court upheld the district court’s decision to amend a sentence that was not authorized under the sentencing guidelines as they existed at the time, and thus, “was not a lawful one.” 890 F.2d at 674–75. In Rico, the appellate court upheld the district court’s decision to correct a sentence that mistakenly applied a plea agreement and constituted an “illegal sentence.” 902 F.2d at 1068. Thus, these cases indicate that a 35(a) motion is intended to correct a sentence that was unlawful. See Rico, 902 F.2d at 1068; Cook, 890 F.2d at 674–75; see also United States v. Watkins, 450 F.3d 184, 185 (5th Cir. 2006) (determining that a Rule 35(a) motion preserved a Sixth Amendment argument). We determine, as discussed below, that Campbell’s sentence is not lawful under United States v. Hughey, 495 U.S. 411 (1990), because the restitution order exceeds the scope of the offense of conviction. Therefore, Campbell preserved her appellate claims via her Rule 35(a) motion. Thus, we review the district court’s restitution award under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Adams, 363 F.3d 363, 365 (5th Cir. 2004).