Opinion ID: 181032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constructive Amendment/Prejudicial Variance

Text: Next, the defendants argue that the district court's instructions, when coupled with the government's evidentiary presentation, resulted in a constructive amendment to the indictment. Constructive amendments ... occur[] when an indictment's terms are effectively altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions that `so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood the defendant [was] convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.' United States v. Combs, 369 F.3d 925, 936 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir.1986)). Here, no constructive amendment occurred. The offense charged in the indictment was bank fraud, and the district court's instructions did not add any elements extrinsic to that offense. Cf. Combs, 369 F.3d at 936 (holding that a constructive amendment had occurred where the jury instructions mixed elements of two distinct offenses). Indeed, the instructions simply clarified that one of the familiar elements of bank fraud namely, intent to defraudcould be shown through proof of intent to defraud a third party. Thus, it cannot be said that there is a substantial likelihood that either of the defendants was convicted of an uncharged offense. [53] Nor was there a prejudicial variance. A variance takes place when the charging terms of an indictment are left unaltered, but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Ford, 872 F.2d 1231, 1235 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1071 (D.C.Cir.1969)). For a variance to merit reversal, it must be prejudicialthat is, it must detrimentally affect the ability of the defendants to defend themselves. Hathaway, 798 F.2d at 910-11 (quoting United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 138 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985)). In this case, the facts proved at trial were entirely congruent with the facts delineated in the indictment. The bank-fraud counts alleged that the defendants misled merchant banks and credit-card processors about the chargeback ratio. At trial, the government introduced evidence to the same effect. Additionally, the bank-fraud counts alleged that the defendants submitted falsified applications to numerous merchant banks and credit-card processors for the purpose of establishing merchant accounts. Again, the evidence proffered at trial corresponded with the allegations. It is therefore plain that no variance occurred.