Opinion ID: 765509
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: liberty interest under the due process clause

Text: 13 The Supreme Court has consistently held that [a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected is within the sentence imposed upon him and is not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate's treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 468 (alteration in original) (quoting Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242 (1976)). Thus, a prisoner does not have a liberty interest in remaining in a preferred facility within a state's prison system. See Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242; Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25 (1976). In Meachum the Court explained that given a valid conviction, the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty to the extent that the State may confine him and subject him to the rules of its prison system . . . . The Constitution does not . . . guarantee that the convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison. Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224. 14 On the other hand, the Court has found protected liberty interests after an inmate is released from institutional confinement. In Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), the Court recognized a parolee's liberty interest in remaining conditionally free on parole: [H]e can be gainfully employed and is free to be with family and friends and to form the other enduring attachments of normal life. . . . [H]is condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison. Id. at 482. Relying on Morrissey, the Court in Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997), held that an inmate enrolled in Oklahoma's pre-parole program also had a protected liberty interest entitling him to due process before he could be removed from the program. There the pre-parolee was released from prison before the expiration of his sentence. He kept his own residence; he sought, obtained, and maintained a job; and he lived a life generally free of the incidents of imprisonment. Id. at 148. While the Supreme Court recognized that the pre-parolee's freedoms were limited--[h]e was not permitted to use alcohol, to incur other than educational debt, or to travel outside the county without permission--the limitations were equivalent to those of the parolee in Morrissey, and thus, did not render such liberty beyond procedural protection. Id. 15 Asquith argues that New Jersey's community release program affords a degree of liberty substantially similar to the liberty protected in Young and that the district court improperly focused its attention on the restrictions imposed on community release participants and ignored the degree of liberty to which plaintiff was entitled while he was in community release status. We recognize that Asquith's liberty was significantly greater while he lived in the halfway house than it was while in prison. In addition to leaving the halfway house for work, Asquith could obtain passes to visit family, shop, eat at restaurants, or go to the local YMCA. Such liberties are similar to those of the pre- parolee in Young. 16 Unlike the pre-parolee in Young, however, Asquith never left institutional confinement. In Young the pre-parolee lived in his own home. See id. Asquith lived in a strictly monitored halfway house. While at the facility, he was subject to a curfew and had to stand count several times a day. He was also required to submit to urine monitoring and his room could be searched. Asquith could leave the house, but had to sign in and out, and his weekend passes were limited to two nights every seven days. VOA would monitor the time it took Asquith to travel to and from the halfway house, and he was required to take public transportation. While away, he was also required to check in by phone several times each day. If he could not be contacted within two hours, he would be deemed an escapee. 17 These restrictions are dispositive because they amount to institutional confinement. Cf. Brennan v. Cunningham, 813 F.2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that a prisoner in a halfway house remains under confinement in a correctional institution). The Supreme Court has consistently held that while a prisoner remains in institutional confinement, the Due Process Clause does not protect his interest in remaining in a particular facility. See Montanye, 427 U.S. at 242 ([T]he Due Process Clause by its own force [does not] require[ ] hearings whenever prison authorities transfer a prisoner to another institution . . . [a]s long as the conditions or degree of confinement to which the prisoner is subjected are within the sentence imposed upon him . . . .); Meachum, 427 U.S. at 224-25 (Neither, in our view, does the Due Process Clause in and of itself protect a duly convicted prisoner against transfer from one institution to another . . . .). Thus, Asquith's removal from the halfway house did not trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause. 18 While the fact that Asquith remained in institutional confinement is dispositive, we note that New Jersey's community release program is unlike parole in another way. In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that one incident of the parolee's liberty is the the implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if the he fails to live up to the parole conditions. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482 & n.8; see also Young, 520 U.S. at 150-51 (emphasizing the lack of evidence on the record showing that the pre-parolee's continued participation was contingent upon extrinsic events). Here, there was no implicit promise that Asquith's limited freedoms might not be arbitrarily revoked. The program agreement which Asquith signed provided that return to a correctional facility would terminate his participation, and New Jersey's regulations required that if a program member was merely charged with a major violation, he would be returned to a correctional facility. See N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.21. Moreover, the Commissioner is authorized at any time [to] transfer an inmate from one place of confinement to another. See N.J.A.C. 10A:20-4.2. Thus, Asquith's continued participation was dependent upon extrinsic events, and he could have no expectation that he would remain in the program once charged with a major violation.