Opinion ID: 1133623
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: OBJECTIVE vs. SUBJECTIVE STANDARD

Text: In the present case, the appellants specifically concede that PCR did not act with deliberate malice toward them. Therefore, the first part of the disjunctive test announced in Fisher, which focuses on whether an employer deliberately intended to injure an employee, is not at issue. Instead, appellants assert that under the second part of the Fisher test, PCR intentionally created a situation where injury or death was a substantial certainty. Having clarified and reaffirmed our holdings in Fisher, Lawton, and Eller, we still must examine the proper standard courts should use to apply the second part of the disjunctive test referred to in those cases in order to determine whether an employer has committed an intentional tort against an employee. In other words, we consider whether, under that second alternative, an employee must establish that the employer actually knew (subjective standard) or rather the employer should have known (objective standard) that the conduct complained of was substantially certain to result in injury or death. Under an objective test for the substantial certainty standard, an analysis of the circumstances in a case would be required to determine whether a reasonable person would understand that the employer's conduct was substantially certain to result in injury or death to the employee. Under this approach, the employer's actual intent is not controlling. On the other hand, a subjective approach essentially requires a determination as to whether an employer actually knew or intended the consequences of its conduct. Under this approach, there would actually be no alternative basis for recovery against an employer. Rather, an employee would be limited to actions where the employer engaged in conduct that the employer actually knew would be harmful to the employee. In fact, some courts have read the second part of the Fisher test to require the element of intent to cause harm, thus restricting the test to true intent rather than objective evaluations of the circumstances. See, e.g., Welsh, 659 So.2d at 1236 (holding that, to survive a motion for summary judgment, a complaint sounding in intentional tort must allege that the employer knew that injury or death was a virtual certainty); Thompson v. Coker Fuel, Inc., 659 So.2d 1128, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (finding that the employee's death was not the expected or intended result of the procedure that killed him). As noted above, this subjective evaluation appears identical to the first part of the disjunctive test adopted in Fisher, i.e., a deliberate intent to injure. The second part of the alternative test in Fisher comes from Spivey v. Battaglia, 258 So.2d 815 (Fla.1972), in which this Court cited the Second Restatement of Torts for the proposition that [w]here a reasonable man would believe that a particular result was substantially certain to follow, he will be held in the eyes of the law as though he had intended it. Spivey, 258 So.2d at 817. Hence, it is apparent that an objective test was contemplated in Spivey. Further, although the substantial certainty test has been harshly criticized, it appears that these same critics agree that those jurisdictions which have adopted it should interpret it using an objective standard. See, e.g., Larson & Larson, supra, § 68.15(c) (The only reason for adopting [the substantial certainty test] would be to substitute a measure of objectivity for the subjectivity of `intention.' The trouble with this is that this quest for objectivity succeeds only to the degree that the component of the employer's belief is downplayed.) (emphasis added). Because it is apparent that adoption of a subjective analysis would result in the virtual elimination of the alternative test for liability set out in Fisher, [5] we conclude that adoption of an objective standard is more in accord with the policy of the alternative test we adopted in Fisher. We also note, as did Justice Adkins' dissent in Fisher, [6] that section 440.09(1), Florida Statutes (1991) provides compensation for injury by accident: Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in respect of disability or death of an employee if the disability or death results from an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. Injury is defined in section 440.02(17), Florida Statutes (1991) as personal injury or death by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. Accident is further defined in section 440.02(1), Florida Statutes (1991) as only an unexpected or unusual event or result, happening suddenly. Conversely, therefore, under the plain language of the statute, it would appear logical to conclude that if a circumstance is substantially certain to produce injury or death, it cannot reasonably be said that the result is unexpected or unusual, and thus such an event should not be covered under workers' compensation immunity. Similarly, since the workers' compensation scheme is not intended to insulate employers from liability for intentional torts, and is not to be construed in favor of either the employer or the employee, workers compensation should not affect the pleading or proof of an intentional tort. Therefore, an employee-plaintiff should not be held to a higher standard than any other plaintiff in a non-work-related intentional tort case. Indeed, the plain language of section 440.015, Florida Statutes (1997), suggests that the Legislature did not intend workers' compensation immunity to be used to create a shield for employers to block intentional tort suits at the summary judgment phase. See Schwartz v. Zippy Mart Inc., 470 So.2d 720, 725 (Wentworth, J., specially concurring) (I perceive no legislative intent to shield employers, individual or corporate, from direct civil liability for intentional torts or actions based on employer conduct which might inferentially support a finding of willful intent.).