Opinion ID: 1235063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search Warrant Probable Cause

Text: Jeanetta argues there was insufficient probable cause upon which to base a warrant to search his residence and the evidence seized should have been suppressed. He contends the warrant relied, in part, on the informant's controlled drug buy which took place two weeks before the issuance of the warrant. According to Jeanetta, any information gleaned by the informant during the drug buy was stale by the time it was presented to the state court in support of the warrant. On appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's historical factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law on the probable cause issue de novo. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996); United States v. Grimaldo, 214 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir.2000). The evidence as a whole must provide a substantial basis for a finding of probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant. Grimaldo, 214 F.3d at 976. Probable cause exists when the affidavit sets forth facts sufficient to create a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be found in the place to be searched. Id. (internal quotations omitted). When reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, we consider the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Searcy, 181 F.3d 975, 981 (8th Cir.1999). [W]e note that probable cause may be established by the observations of trained law enforcement officers or by circumstantial evidence, id., and [i]t is axiomatic by now that under the fourth amendment the probable cause upon which a valid search warrant must be based must exist at the time at which the warrant was issued, not at some earlier time. United States v. Button, 653 F.2d 319, 324 (8th Cir.1981) (quoting United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33, 37 (8th Cir.1975)). Courts consider the nature of the property sought in determining whether probable cause was shown to exist on the date of the warrant. For example: Although there can be no precise rule as to how much time may intervene between the obtaining of the facts and the issuance of the search warrant, in dealing with a substance like marihuana, which can be easily concealed and moved about, probable cause to believe that it was in a certain building on the third of the month is not probable cause to believe that it will be in the same building eight days later. Id. (quoting Ashley v. State, 251 Ind. 359, 241 N.E.2d 264, 269 (1968)) (other citations omitted). Standing alone, the fact the controlled buy was made two weeks before the warrant issued does not render the information in the application stale. Probable cause must exist when a warrant is issued, not merely at some earlier time, but [t]here is no bright-line test for determining when information is stale ..., and the vitality of probable cause cannot be quantified by simply counting the number of days between the occurrence of the facts supplied and the issuance of the affidavit. United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817, 822 (8th Cir.1993). Time factors must be examined in the context of a specific case and the nature of the crime under investigation. Id. Additionally, [w]here continuing criminal activity is suspected, the passage of time is less significant. United States v. Formaro, 152 F.3d 768, 771 (8th Cir.1998) ([T]he two and one-half weeks lapse did not negate the existence of probable cause....) (quoting United States v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 552 (8th Cir.1996)). In investigations of ongoing narcotics operations, `intervals of weeks or months between the last described act and the application for a warrant [does] not necessarily make the information stale.' United States v. Ortiz, 143 F.3d 728, 732-33 (2d Cir.1998) (quoting Rivera v. United States, 928 F.2d 592, 602 (2d Cir.1991)); see also United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1369 (9th Cir.1993) (With respect to drug trafficking, probable cause may continue for several weeks, if not months, of the last reported instance of suspect activity.) (quoting United States v. Angulo-Lopez, 791 F.2d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir.1986)). We conclude the two week period between the controlled buy and issuance of the warrant did not render the informant's information presumptively stale. Instead, considering the totality of the circumstances, the information supported a belief Jeanetta was engaged in an ongoing criminal enterprise and evidence of his illegal activities would be found at his residence. Therefore, we affirm the district court's denial of the motion to suppress.