Opinion ID: 1763919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the claim of error under the boykin case

Text: The defendant urges that the trial court erred in allowing the introduction of prior convictions for impeachment purposes without proof of Boykinization. In State v. Roland, 379 So.2d 721 (La. 1977), a case involving the same defendants, this court determined that: ... the use for the impeachment purposes of a prior conviction void for failure to afford defendant his right to counsel, or otherwise so involuntary that the reliability of the conviction is impaired, deprives an accused of due process of law. Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 92 S.Ct. 1014, 31 L.Ed.2d 374 (1972); Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); State v. Bernard, 326 So.2d 332 (La.1976); Cf. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971). The burden of proof rests with the defendant. See Loper v. Beto, supra; State v. Bernard, supra. Our recent decisions in State v. Lewis, supra, and State v. Holden, 375 So.2d 1372 (La.1979), relative to the use of prior convictions to enhance subsequent penalties, were not intended to change the rules of law applicable to impeachment nor to shift any burden of proof in such situations to the state. (Emphasis supplied) Defendant asserts that he has met the requisite burden of proof by entering into a stipulation with the State that a search of the records of his prior convictions revealed no forms to indicate that he made a knowing and affirmative waiver of his constitutional rights. Defendant urges that the trial court's refusal to accept this proof of non-Boykinization and the consequent admissibility of his prior conviction resulted in his being unable to take the stand on his own behalf. As recently set forth by this court in State v. Lafleur, 391 So.2d 445 (La.1980): It is now well established that a guilty plea is constitutionally valid only if the record clearly shows that the defendant was informed of his constitutional rights, including the right to jury trial, the right to confront accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination, and then knowingly and voluntarily waived these rights. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The trial judge cannot rely on an assertion that the rights were explained to the defendant out of court; he must independently determine, through a direct colloquy with the defendant, whether the defendant fully understands the connotation and consequences of the guilty plea. State v. Williams, 384 So.2d 779 (La. 1980). (Emphasis supplied) Though the guilty plea here was used to impeach the defendant not to enhance his sentence, as is often the case when dealing with a Boykin question, there appears no justification, nor decision by this court, to require that a lesser standard of proof of defendant's knowing and affirmative waiver be utilized. Here, the defendant has failed to meet his burden of affirmatively showing that he was not properly Boykinized. Defendant has not demonstrated an absence of the critical direct colloquy required by Boykin. Since the proof is inadequate, the trial judge's ruling that evidence of the conviction could be introduced appears correct. There is no showing in the trial judge's ruling of error substantially prejudicial to the defendant.