Opinion ID: 2027052
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Ineffective Assistance/Sufficiency of Information

Text: Defendant contends that trial counsel was deficient in failing to file a pretrial motion to challenge the sufficiency of the information. Defendant claims that the charging document failed to specify which of the three or four separate statements made by defendant contained specific comments made to police or 911 that were false. According to defendant, this has resulted in prejudice to defendant because he cannot utilize his conviction as a double jeopardy bar. To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of counsel, the accused must satisfy the two-part test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 698 (1984). First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was so seriously deficient as to fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under the prevailing professional norms. Second, counsel's deficient performance must have prejudiced the defendant so as to deny him a fair trial. To satisfy the second prong of the test, there must be a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Here, the question is whether trial counsel's failure to file a pretrial motion to dismiss the information fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and whether it is reasonably probable that, but for this failure, defendant would not have been convicted. Under section 111-3(a) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/111-3(a) (West 2006)), a charging instrument must include: (1) the name of the offense, (2) the statutory provision (3) the nature and elements of the charged offense, (4) the date and county, and (5) the name of the accused. When evaluating the sufficiency of a charging instrument, the question is not whether additional particularity could have been added but instead whether there was sufficient particularity to allow the accused to prepare a defense. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill.2d 46, 54, 196 Ill.Dec. 646, 630 N.E.2d 811 (1994). The State must plead specific, articulable facts when charging disorderly conduct. People v. Swanson, 308 Ill. App.3d 708, 712, 242 Ill.Dec. 351, 721 N.E.2d 630 (1999). The information in this case stated: On or about the 17th day of February, 2006, WALTER IRVIN KLEPPER committed the offense of DISORDERLY CONDUCT, in violation of Chapter 720, Section 5/26-1(a)(4), of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, as amended, a Class 4 Felony in that said Defendant knowingly transmitted to Kevin Hanks, a Police Officer for Kendall County, Illinois, a report that Edward Boone had committed the offense of Reckless Driving and that Edward Boone attempted to hit the Defendant with his vehicle, knowing at the time of such transmission, that there was no reasonable ground for believing that such offense had been committed. We find the information here contained sufficient particularity to allow defendant to prepare a defense. It stated that Walter Klepper told a public officer that Edward Boone had committed the offense of reckless driving and that Boone attempted to hit Klepper with his vehicle. This specifically alleged the substance of the statement to enable the defendant to prepare a defense. People v. Meyers, 158 Ill.2d at 54, 196 Ill.Dec. 646, 630 N.E.2d 811. This information complied with the requirements of section 111-3(a). Counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge it. People v. Phillips, 215 Ill.2d 554, 565, 294 Ill.Dec. 624, 831 N.E.2d 574 (2005) (because charging instrument was not defective, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge it). Because of this finding, we need not consider the second prong of the Strickland analysis. We therefore reject defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim.