Opinion ID: 1275746
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Liability Based on Mandatory Duty

Text: Analytically, although the issues are somewhat related, the question of possible statutory liability for breach of a mandatory duty ordinarily should precede the question of statutory immunity. (See, e.g., Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 978, fn. 3, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 897 P.2d 1320; Nunn v. State of California (1984) 35 Cal.3d 616, 622, fn. 4, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846.) Accordingly, we first examine the liability issue. The California Tort Claims Act provides that a public entity is not liable for injury arising from an act or omission except as provided by statute. (Gov.Code, § 815, subd. (a); see Peterson v. San Francisco Community College DisL (1984) 36 Cal.3d 799, 809, 205 Cal.Rptr. 842, 685 P.2d 1193.) Under Government Code section 815.6, as we have construed it, a public entity is liable for an injury proximately caused by its failure to discharge a mandatory duty designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury.... ( Morris v. County of Marin (1977) 18 Cal.3d 901, 904, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606 ( Morris ); see Washington v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 890, 896, 45 Cal. Rptr.2d 646; State of California v. Superior Court (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 848, 854, 197 Cal.Rptr. 914.) Whether a particular statute is intended to impose a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts. ( Nunn v. State of California, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 624, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846.) In plaintiffs' view, the state breached a mandatory duty to devise accurate testing and reporting standards for hypothyroidism. Defendant asserts in response that, under the Hereditary Disorders Act, the formulation of appropriate standards for testing and reporting test results for hypothyroidism is a discretionary function that could not properly form the basis for public liability based on breach of a mandatory duty. (See Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at pp. 910-911, fn. 6, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606 (maj. opn. of Tobriner, J.); id at p. 924, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606 (cone. opn. of Clark, J.); Searcy v. Hemet Unified School Dist. (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 792, 802, 223 Cal.Rptr. 206; cf. Gov.Code, § 820.2 [statutory immunity for discretionary acts and omissions].) Although the Court of Appeal decision stressed the mandatory language of the statutes at issue here, we were careful to explain in Morris that there are unquestionably instances in which other factors will indicate that apparent obligatory language was not intended to foreclose a governmental entity's or officer's exercise of discretion. [Citations.] ( Morris, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 911, fn. 6, 136 Cal.Rptr. 251, 559 P.2d 606; see also Zolin v. Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 1157, 1166, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 871; State of California v. Superior Court (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 954, 958, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 527 ( Ushana D.); MacDonald v. State of California (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 319, 331, 281 Cal. Rptr. 317 ( MacDonald); Tirpak v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist (1986) 187 Cal. App.3d 639, 642-647, 232 Cal.Rptr. 61 ( Tirpak). ) As will appear, the statutory scheme at issue here makes reasonably clear that the state is given substantial discretion in formulating and reporting appropriate testing standards for hypothyroidism, although the Legislature has specified certain general principles to guide the exercise of that discretion. Moreover, although the Hereditary Disorders Act included some mandatory language in describing the state's obligations, the act's provisions disclose no legislative intent to confer a private right of action for the state's breach of its statutory duties. Several factors support the view that the Legislature did not intend to permit a private action for damages against the state for its negligence in formulating standards for testing or reporting potential hereditary disorders. First, the Legislature included language in the Hereditary Disorders Act strongly suggesting that the state's formulation of those standards is a discretionary, not a mandatory, function. In Health and Safety Code former section 150 (now § 124975), the Legislature set forth a variety of findings and declarations acknowledging the importance of screening for hereditary disorders and the entitlement of all persons to adequate health services. (See Health & Saf. Code, former § 150, subds. (a), (c) [now § 124975, subds. (a), (c)].) The section also observed, however, that specific legislation aimed at alleviating the problems associated with these disorders may tend to be inflexible in the face of rapidly expanding medical knowledge, underscoring the need for flexible approaches to coping with genetic problems (Health & Saf.Code, former § 150, subd. (g) [now § 124975, subd. (g)], italics added), and provided that state policy in this area should be constantly reviewed to consider changing medical knowledge and ensure full public protection (Health & Saf.Code, former § 150, subd (h) [now § 124975, subd. (h)]). Following up on this theme of caution, flexibility, and constant review of changing medical knowledge, the Legislature vested the Director of Health Services (Director) with the duty to establish such rules, regulations, and standards for hereditary disorders programs as the director deems necessary to promote and protect the public health and safety, in accordance with the principles established herein. (Health & Saf.Code, former § 151 [now § 124980], italics added.) This language points forcefully toward the conclusion that the Legislature left the selection of necessary and appropriate testing and reporting standards to the sound discretion of the Director, guided by certain principles that the Director should consider in drafting those standards. One of these statutory principles, on which plaintiffs rely, is that Clinical testing procedures... be accurate, provide maximum information, and that the testing procedures selected produce results that are subject to minimum misinterpretation. (Health & Saf. Code, former § 151, subd. (d) [see new § 124980, subd. (d)].) Contrary to plaintiffs' argument, we think this provision creates no affirmative mandatory duty of care to other persons, but instead represents only a general principle or policy to guide the state's discretion in formulating appropriate testing and reporting standards. Similarly, a separate section sets forth the state policy of making every effort to detect, as early as possible preventable heritable or congenital disorders. This section charges the state with promoting a statewide testing program in accordance with accepted medical practices. Tests under the program shall be administered to each child ... at such time as the state department has established appropriate regulations and testing methods. (Health & Saf.Code, former § 309, subd. (a) [now § 125000, subd. (a)], italics added.) Once again, mandatory statutory language is tempered by reference to the state's discretion in formulating appropriate testing standards. Neither of the provisions on which plaintiffs rely imposes a duty to notify parents or physicians of test results showing particular TSH levels. Read together, all these provisions indicate the Legislature intended that the Department, after considering the ever-increasing and changing information concerning heritable and congenital defects, as well as expert and public views on testing, would exercise discretion in selecting necessary and appropriate testing and reporting standards. We find it highly unlikely the Legislature intended that an asserted breach of the guiding principles or policies would afford a basis for state liability under Government Code section 815.6. The drafting of rules, regulations and standards by the governmental agency charged with that responsibility would unquestionably fall in the category of discretionary basic policy decisions for which governmental agencies usually are insulated from civil liability. (See Johnson v. State of California (1968) 69 Cal.2d 782, 793-794, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 ( Johnson ), italics omitted.) Although, as we have observed, the question of state immunity from suit is a separate issue, discussed below, cases such as Johnson, involving claimed immunity for discretionary acts (see Gov.Code, § 820.2), obviously are instructive in determining whether mandatory acts liability should be imposed. As we stated in Johnson, this immunity is usually extended to the planning rather than the operational levels of decisionmaking, i.e., those areas of quasi-legislative policy-making which are sufficiently sensitive to justify a blanket rule that courts will not entertain a tort action alleging that careless conduct contributed to the governmental decision. ( Johnson, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 794, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352, fn. omitted; see also Caldwell v. Montoya, supra, 10 Cal.4th at pp. 979-984, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 842, 897 P.2d 1320; Nunn v. State of California, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 622, 200 Cal.Rptr. 440, 677 P.2d 846 [promulgation by state agency of regulations governing firearm use by licensed private patrol agency employees necessarily involves discretionary planning decisions rather than nondiscretionary operational or street level ones]; Kemmerer v. County of Fresno (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1426, 1437-1438, 246 Cal.Rptr. 609; Burgdorf v. Funder (1966) 246 Cal.App.2d 443, 449, 54 Cal.Rptr. 805 [generally, discretionary act involves exercise of judgment or choice].) We think that a state officer or agency entrusted with the important task of drafting appropriate health and safety rules or standards certainly is engaged in quasi-legislative policy-making involving the exercise of judgment or choice as to basic policy decisions, for which tort immunity is usually deemed justified under the authorities cited. (Cf. Cal. Government Tort Liability Practice 3d (Cont.Ed.Bar 1992) General Liability and Immunity Principles, § 2.119, p. 225 [Discretionary immunity obtains if the action challenges the authorized prescription by legislative or executive-level management of institutional rules or decisions calculated to affect persons generally, rather than ad hoc decisions intended to apply such general rules or policies to specific individuals or factual events.].) We note that the statutory guiding principles on which plaintiffs base their cause of action are themselves quite general and broad and are subject to considerable interpretation. Rather than requiring the state specifically to notify parents or physicians of test results showing low TSH component factors, these statutes simply call for development of testing programs that produce accurate results and maximum information in accordance with accepted medical practices. (Health & Saf.Code, former §§ 151, subd. (d), 309, subd. (a) [now §§ 124980, subd. (d), 125000, subd. (a)].) We doubt the Legislature intended through this general language to open the courts to wide-ranging claims attacking the accuracy or medical acceptance of state-developed testing and reporting standards. None of the legislative history materials the parties submitted discloses any such intent. Defendant had cited to the Court of Appeal several appellate decisions holding that, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent, a governmental entity's breach of a statutory duty phrased in mandatory terms nonetheless did not give rise to a private cause of action. ( Ushana D., supra, 8 Cal.App.4th at p. 958, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 527; MacDonald, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 331, 281 Cal. Rptr. 317; Tirpak, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 642-647, 232 Cal.Rptr. 61.) The Court of Appeal found these cases distinguishable because each involved statutory mandates created for the protection of the general public. In the present case, according to the Court of Appeal, the Legislature had a narrower focus in establishing the newborn screening program, namely, to advise and assist parents of infants born with heritable or congenital disorders that require early intervention. The fact remains, however, that the program at issue here is also explicitly aimed at relieving the general public of the economic and social burdens of hereditary disorders and promoting medical understanding of those disorders. (See Health & Saf.Code, former § 150, subds. (b), (c); [now § 124975, subds. (b), (c)].) Moreover, we question the Court of Appeal's characterization of Ushana D., Mac-Donald, and Tirpak as involving only laws directed toward protecting the general public. A close reading of the statutes at issue in those cases indicates they were narrowly aimed at protecting children from, respectively, molestation ( Ushana D., supra, 8 Cal. App.4th at p. 956, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 527), injury by licensed daycare facility operators ( Mac-Donald, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 331, 281 Cal.Rptr. 317), and unjustified suspension from school ( Tirpak, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 641-642, 232 Cal.Rptr. 61). Mac-Donald is particularly apposite because it involved the state's failure to perform a mandated on-site visitation of any daycare facility that had been the subject of citizen complaints. The court found that the statute at issue merely expressed a general declaration of policy goals ( MacDonald, supra, 230 Cal.App.3d at p. 330, 281 Cal.Rptr. 317), and did not create a private cause of action on behalf of children injured by daycare personnel ( id. at p. 322, 281 Cal.Rptr. 317; see also Gray v. State of California (1989) 207 Cal. App.3d 151, 155-157, 254 Cal.Rptr. 581). We conclude that the general statutory principles and policy goals plaintiffs cite in the present case likewise fail to comprise a mandatory duty to select or impose any particular testing or reporting standard or component, and that the Director's allegedly negligent exercise of discretion in selecting a particular standard will not support a cause of action under Government Code section 815.6. The Hereditary Disorders Act's creation of a limited right of action for any individual whose confidentiality has been breached by a violation of the act, in the same section that imposed a duty on the Director to establish a testing program, supports this conclusion. (Health & Saf.Code, former § 151, subd. (k) [now § 124980, subd. (k)].) The Legislature's failure to specify any other private cause of action arising under the act may indicate that none was intended. (See, e.g., Faria v. San Jacinto Unified School Dist (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1939, 1945, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 72.)