Opinion ID: 2983027
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure of Privileged Material

Text: Dobson and Gott argue that Gott’s counsel’s pretrial disclosure of Gott’s email violated their rights to a fair trial under the Fifth Amendment and interfered with their rights to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Gott also argues that the district court should have removed the prosecutors and investigators from the case to remedy the prejudice from the disclosure. This court reviews the district court’s factual findings for clear error, but reviews de novo the question of whether such facts give rise to a constitutional violation. United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 666 (6th Cir. 2001). A district court’s determination regarding disqualification of counsel “will be upheld unless ‘arbitrary’ or ‘without adequate reasons.’” United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833, 839 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Mays, 69 F.3d 116, 121 (6th cir. 1995)). Initially, we note that Dobson lacks standing to assert a Sixth Amendment violation based on the disclosure of Gott’s email. “Sixth Amendment rights are at bottom personal to the accused.” United States v. Blair, 661 F.3d 755, 772 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162, 171 n.2 (2001) (noting that “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel is personal to the defendant”). Accordingly, a defendant lacks standing to assert the Sixth Amendment rights of his co-defendant. United States v. Ramirez, 50 F. App’x 257, 258 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 4 The court sustained Defendants’ objections to the number of victims, which lowered their guidelines ranges in Defendants’ presentence reports by two levels. 10 Nos. 14-5721/5722, United States v. Dobson, et al. United States v. Sims, 845 F.2d 1564, 1568 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Even if the agents’ actions violated Olsen’s right to counsel, Sims has no standing to assert this claim.”)). Dobson was represented by separate counsel, his privileged communications were not disclosed, and the disclosed Gott email had no impact on Dobson’s relationship with his counsel. Dobson thus has no standing to assert a Sixth Amendment violation based on an alleged interference with Gott’s attorney-client relationship. In addition, Dobson fails to show that the disclosure deprived him of a fair trial. The government did not use Gott’s email in any manner at trial against Dobson or Gott. Dobson had no right to object to the disclosure, nor did he have any reason to expect that Gott would not provide incriminating information to the government. In other words, Dobson’s position was no different than if Gott had cooperated with the government and testified against Dobson. Thus, Dobson cannot show a constitutional violation. Even assuming that Dobson does have standing and agreeing that Gott does have standing to assert a Sixth Amendment claim, such a claim fails because neither Defendant can show prejudice. A defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights may be violated if the government intrudes on the attorney-client relationship and prejudice is shown. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557–58 (1977); United States v. Valencia, 541 F.2d 618, 623 (6th Cir. 1976). Most often, the government actively intrudes into the attorney-client relationship. For example, in Valencia, the government arranged for a paid informant—a defense counsel’s secretary—to interact with the defendant and his counsel. See id. at 620–21. Although some courts have suggested that the government’s intentional invasion of the attorney-client relationship, without more, can result in a violation, see Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038, 1043 (2d Cir. 1979)), this court’s precedent requires a 11 Nos. 14-5721/5722, United States v. Dobson, et al. showing of prejudice, even when the intrusion is intentional. United States v. Steele, 727 F.2d 580, 586 (6th Cir. 1984). The following factors provide some guidance in determining whether a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred: 1) whether the presence of the informant was purposely caused by the government in order to garner confidential, privileged information, or whether the presence of the informant was the result of other inadvertent occurrences; 2) whether the government obtained, directly or indirectly, any evidence which was used at trial as the result of the informant’s intrusion; 3) whether any information gained by the informant’s intrusion was used in any other manner to the substantial detriment of the defendant; and 4) whether the details about trial preparations were learned by the government. Id. at 585. Even where a violation has occurred, courts are free to impose an appropriate remedy “tailored to the injury suffered.” United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981). The issue in Morrison was whether an assumed Sixth Amendment violation required dismissal of the indictment. Id. at 365–66. The Court held that it did not because there was no “demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof.” Id. The Court explained, Our approach has . . . been to identify and then neutralize the taint by tailoring relief appropriate in the circumstances to assure the defendant the effective assistance of counsel and a fair trial. . . . Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding, which can go forward with full recognition of the defendant’s right to counsel and to a fair trial. Id. at 365. Moreover, the Court observed that the right to counsel must be balanced against “society’s interest in the administration of criminal justice.” Id. at 364. The Steele factors show that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred in this case. First, there was no intrusion, intentional or otherwise, into Gott’s relationship with his counsel. The government obtained Gott’s email by happenstance rather than some deliberate act. Second, the government did not use Gott’s email at trial. Although Defendants argue that the disclosure of 12 Nos. 14-5721/5722, United States v. Dobson, et al. the email was fatal to their defense, they fail to explain why this is so. In fact, Gott testified consistent with the defense he sought to assert—that he did not believe what he was doing was wrong. Third, there is no indication that the government used Gott’s email to either Defendant’s detriment. As both Gott’s trial counsel and the government’s counsel told the district court, the government was already aware of Smartt, had interviewed him, and knew that Smartt had discussions with Defendants in which he told them that gift funds had to come from a family member.5 While Defendants suggest that the government made some derivative use of the email, they fail to explain what information the government obtained that it did not already possess. Finally, the email disclosed no information about Gott’s counsel’s trial preparations. In short, Defendants have not met their “onerous task” of demonstrating prejudice. United States v. Moses, 337 F. App’x 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2009). For these same reasons, Defendants fail to demonstrate a due-process violation. The argument that the district court should have removed the government’s counsel and investigators and appointed a new prosecution team is without merit. Given the lack of any discernable prejudice, the district court sensibly described this request as a “radical remedy.” The prosecutors had invested a significant amount of time preparing for trial, trial was set to start in a matter of weeks, the prosecutors were already aware of most of the information in the email through other means, and a less drastic remedy was available. The district court’s remedy was thus appropriately “tailored to the injury suffered from [any possible] constitutional violation.” Morrison, 449 U.S. at 364. 5 Although at trial the government did ask Gott about his contact with other lenders, the government was already aware that Gott and Dobson had spoken to other lenders before they spoke with Smartt. Moreover, Gott opened the door to the inquiry by testifying on direct that he contacted other lenders. 13 Nos. 14-5721/5722, United States v. Dobson, et al. We are also not persuaded that the district court erred in failing to appoint new counsel for Gott or by questioning him at the hearing on the motion for judicial inquiry. Gott never requested new counsel at the hearing, and he never informed the district court that he believed that there was a conflict. Nor do we view Gott’s counsel’s failure to support Gott’s request for removal of the government’s attorneys and agents as a conflict necessitating new counsel. Gott’s request was unreasonable, and his counsel merely suggested a reasonable remedy. In addition, Gott fails to show how the district court’s questioning of him violated his rights. The district court’s questions were limited to the prejudice that might result to Gott from use of the email. The court did not delve into trial strategy, did not ask Gott questions about the substance of the email, and probed no further than necessary to fashion a proper remedy.6