Opinion ID: 2062476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Daneman's Lack of Death Penalty Litigation Experience and Failure to have Co-Counsel

Text: Gilliam's claim seems to be that Daneman had insufficient death penalty litigation experience, although he acknowledges that Daneman was an experienced defense counsel. In his brief, Gilliam alleges: Daneman, sole counsel at trial and sentencing, and inexperienced in death penalty litigation, failed to conduct legal research on the issue of mitigation, stating that his legal research was `in his brain.' Daneman did not begin to contemplate the sentencing phase of Petitioner's trial until after the guilty verdict. (Footnotes omitted). Daneman has been a member of the bar since 1961 and engaged in the practice of criminal law since his admission to the bar. He has been involved in thousands of cases and lectured for the Department of Justice. Daneman had represented a previous client in a murder case where the death penalty notice was sent by the State. The post conviction hearing judge found that [b]ased upon all of the evidence and testimony this Court finds as a fact that defense counsel was experienced and more than competent to handle a capital case. This finding is well supported in the record. Gilliam's expert witness opined that representing a defendant in a capital murder without a second chair was inadequate representation as a matter of law. We disagree and further note that Daneman had more than adequate assistance. Daneman received assistance from a law clerk as well as from an associate in his law firm. Daneman also received substantial assistance from the Capital Defense Division of the Office of the Public Defender. This assistance included advice from other attorneys, assistance in retaining at least three experts, and a psychological family background assessment. All that Strickland requires is that a criminal defendant receives competent representation, falling within a professional standard of reasonableness. We find that Gilliam received such representation. Gilliam cites no case that recognizes a right to multiple counsel, and we refuse to create such a requirement. As long as a defendant receives adequate representation, it may be provided by a single attorney acting without a second chair at trial. As for Gilliam's contention that Daneman failed to conduct legal research on the issue of mitigation, there was ample evidence that Daneman did an adequate review of potential mitigating factors, and there is no indication that additional legal research would have produced any additional mitigating factors. As for Gilliam's contention that Daneman did not begin to contemplate the sentencing phase of Gilliam's trial until after the guilty verdict, this was expressly refuted by Daneman. In fact, Daneman produced an internal office memorandum dated approximately one month before the commencement of the guilt/innocence trial which reviewed mitigation theories. We also note that, between the trial and sentencing, Daneman had five months to prepare for the sentencing hearing. Finally, Gilliam contends that Daneman's failure to investigate also prevented him from establishing during the guilt/innocence phase evidence which would have supported mitigating circumstances at sentencing, namely, substantial impairment and duress. We have already noted that Daneman was justified in emphasizing only the defense of accident at Gilliam's trial. See Part I.B.2, supra.