Opinion ID: 2006536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Status of plaintiff.

Text: What is being construed here is a federal statute. 5 USCA, page 26, sec. 8705 (a), provides that under the circumstances of this case the policy proceeds must go to the parents of the employee. The word parents is not defined in the statute. The words widow or widower and child or children are also used in and undefined by that statute. However, there are several cases dealing with that statute [1] which have interpreted the child-children and widow-widower clauses. These cases are in conflict as to whether state or federal law should be employed in determining who is entitled to the policy proceeds. Those cases holding that state law applies have relied upon the traditional rule of conflicts which states that rights created under an insurance policy are determined by the law of the state where the insured was domiciled when he applied for the policy. [2] The purpose of sec. 8705 was to allow federal employees to be: ... `better enabled by this low-cost life-insurance protection to carry out their responsibilities to their families.' ... Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Thompson (3d Cir. 1966), 368 Fed. 2d 791, 793. In the instant case, where no dependents of the insured are involved, we think it is appropriate to apply the general rule of resorting to state law in determining the status of the parties. Therefore, since it would not defeat the legislative purpose of sec. 8705 to apply Wisconsin law and since there is no federal law of domestic relations, we conclude that Wisconsin law is determinative of the outcome of this case. Appellant asserts two alternative theories why a reversal, or at least a new trial, should be ordered in this case. Appellant first contends that as a matter of technical definition an illegitimate father does not occupy the status of parent under Wisconsin law. Appellant relies on sec. 48.02 (11), Stats., and this court's decision in State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N. W. 2d 56. If the court rejects the technical definition approach and decides the word parent should be given its common and ordinary meaning, then appellant requests a new trial wherein she would have an opportunity to produce evidence showing that the respondent never performed the duties nor exercised the privileges ordinarily and commonly associated with the meaning of the word parent. In support of the technical definition approach, appellant cites the Lewis Case, supra, and quotes from the final paragraph of the majority opinion, at page 434: ... (2) that the putative father of a child born out of wedlock does not have any parental rights; ... We think the above quote is not applicable to the instant case. Lewis involved no written contract and the father in Lewis was putative. The facts in this case are different. Next, appellant relies on sec. 48.02 (11), Stats., which states: `Parent' means either a natural parent or a parent by adoption. If the child is born out of wedlock, `parent' means the mother. If the statute were properly applicable to this case, then clearly the mother would be entitled to all the proceeds of the policy. However, we think it would be improper in this case to apply the definition of parent found in sec. 48.02 (11), Stats., for the following reasons: First, all sections in ch. 48, Stats., are limited in their application by sec. 48.01 (2), wherein the legislature clearly states its intent and purpose in adopting ch. 48. Sec. 48.01 (2), Stats., states that the intent of ch. 48 is to promote the best interests of the children of this state. In sec. 48.01 (3), the legislature declares: CONSTRUCTION. This chapter shall be liberally construed to effect the objectives in sub. (2). The best interests of the child shall always be of paramount consideration, ... In this case, the purpose for which ch. 48, Stats., was enacted is impossible of fulfillment. The daughter is deceased and was not a child at the time of her death. Her best interests are not at issue in this case. Secondly, sec. 48.02, Stats., begins by stating:  In this chapter the following words and phrases have the designated meanings: (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 48.02 (11), Stats., then gives the designated meaning of the word parent. The words In this chapter quoted above clearly indicate that the definition of parent in ch. 48 was intended to apply only to matters related to ch. 48 and was not intended to encompass every legal dispute of any nature arising in this state. The first principle which governs the court's approach to this contract is that the words of an insurance contract are to be given the common and ordinary meaning which they have in the minds of the average layman. Mittelsteadt v. Bovee (1960), 9 Wis. 2d 44, 100 N. W. 2d 376; Charette v. Prudential Ins. Co. (1930), 202 Wis. 470, 232 N. W. 848. On the basis of the above rule alone, it would be improper to resort to technical and statutory definitions. We must determine, what is the common and ordinary meaning of the word parent as used in this life insurance contract? Both the trial court in its decision and the respondent on this appeal rely on case law and other authorities which state that the word parent or parents means the natural parents or one who begets. There can be no doubt but that the word parent does carry that meaning in common parlance. But the question is whether that is all the word means. We think the word parent in common and ordinary usage comprehends much more than the mere fact of who was responsible for a child's conception and birth. The word is also commonly understood to describe and refer to the person or persons who share a mutual love and affection with a child and who supply the child support and maintenance, instruction, discipline and guidance.