Opinion ID: 2208616
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the court's failure to disclose the jury's numeric breakdown constitutes error.

Text: [¶ 9] A criminal defendant has a fundamental right, protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, to attend all stages of the trial. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975) ([T]he Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment gives the accused a right to be present at all stages of the proceedings where fundamental fairness might be thwarted by his absence.). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment renders this constitutional principle applicable to the states. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 338, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970); see also ME. CONST. art. I, § 6; State v. White, 285 A.2d 832, 835-36 (Me. 1972) (recognizing a defendant's right, in Maine, to attend every stage of the criminal trial except discussions outside the jury's presence concerning questions of law). [¶ 10] Maine has codified the essence of this constitutional right in M.R.Crim. P. 43. See State v. Pullen, 266 A.2d 222, 227 (Me.1970) (This rule ... serves to implement our constitutional provision and is merely declaratory of basic principles of our common law.), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brewer, 505 A.2d 774, 777 & n. 5 (Me.1985). The Rule provides, in relevant part, [t]he defendant shall be present at the arraignment, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury, and the return of the verdict[.] M.R.Crim. P. 43. The purpose of Rule 43 is to ensure that all defendants have the opportunity to (1) present evidence, (2) confront adverse witnesses, and (3) receive a fair and just trial. See 2 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 43.2 at IX-9 (1995); State v. Fernald, 248 A.2d 754, 759 (Me.1968). Neither the constitutional right, nor Rule 43, however, demands the defendant's presence at all times. [5] [¶ 11] The Supreme Court has interpreted the federal rule of criminal procedure 43(a) [6] to require a trial court to answer jury communications in open court, so that a defendant may be afforded an opportunity to be heard before the court implements a course of action. Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975); see also State v. McCarthy, 355 A.2d 923, 924 n. 2 (Me.1976) (noting the trial court appropriately advised counsel of a jury note in conformance with Rogers ). The preferred method for handling such communications, as developed in the federal circuit courts of appeals, includes general adherence to the following steps: (1) the jury's communiqué should be reduced to writing; (2) the note should be marked as an exhibit for identification; (3) it should be shown, or read fully, to counsel; ... (4) counsel should be given an opportunity to suggest an appropriate rejoinder[;] and (5) the court should inform counsel of the substance of its response to the jury. United States v. Maraj, 947 F.2d 520, 525 & n. 7 (1st Cir.1991); accord United States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d 931, 934 (2d Cir.1981). [¶ 12] In this case, we are asked to consider whether the defendant's right to be present includes the right to be informed of jury communications made to the court during deliberations, including those that improperly reveal the precise extent of the jury's division. The Superior Court erred by refusing to disclose the jury's preliminary vote on both counts of the State's gross sexual assault charge to counsel. [¶ 13] Initially, we note that the court should not inquire into the jury's numerical standing and the trial court correctly told the jurors not to provide such information. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 450, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926) (Such procedure serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained by questions not requiring the jury to reveal the nature or extent of its division.). When the jury improperly volunteers its division, however, the court necessarily relies and acts upon such information in determining its subsequent course of action. See United States v. Hotz, 620 F.2d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1980). For this reason, the court must also apprise counsel so that counsel may respond to the exigencies of the moment, Maraj, 947 F.2d at 526, and help the court craft a meaningful response to the jury's inquiry. The fact that the note, in this case, did not contain an inquiry into a substantive issue of fact or law, e.g., People v. O'Rama, 78 N.Y.2d 270, 574 N.Y.S.2d 159, 579 N.E.2d 189, 191 (1991), [7] or that the court informed counsel of the note's general substance and only failed to read a portion, e.g., Maraj, 947 F.2d at 525, is immaterial. Without knowledge of the jury's numerical split, Tremblay held less than all the facts disclosed to the court and, therefore, was not afforded an opportunity to be adequately heard before the court responded to the inquiry  a critical stage in the proceedings. See Rogers, 422 U.S. at 39, 95 S.Ct. 2091 (holding trial court committed prejudicial error when it answered a jury inquiry during deliberations without the defendant's knowledge or presence).