Opinion ID: 2301462
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enforcement of Foreign Judgments

Text: Article IV § 1 of the Constitution commands that Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. Thus, `the judgment of a state court should have the same credit, validity, and effect, in every other court of the United States, which it had in the state where it was pronounced.' Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life and Acc. and Health Ins. Guaranty Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 704, 102 S.Ct. 1357, 71 L.Ed.2d 558 (1982) (quoting Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 235, 4 L.Ed. 378 (1818)). Pursuant to this [constitutional] provision and in furtherance of federalism and national unity, Fehr v. McHugh, 413 A.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C.1980), Congress has mandated that judgments `shall have such faith and credit. . . in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are taken.' Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 687 (1940)). [10] We have recognized that, [u]nder the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution, a judgment properly authenticated and issued by a court having jurisdiction is entitled to the same degree of recognition in a sister state as would be afforded by the state of original rendition. Id. at 1286 (citing, e.g., Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 71 S.Ct. 474, 95 L.Ed. 552 (1951)). These principles are embodied in the codified law of the District of Columbia. In 1990, the District of Columbia adopted the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJ), D.C. Law 8-173, D.C.Code § 15-351 et seq. (2001), which sets out the procedures and standards for enforcement of foreign judgments in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. [11] Section 2 of the UEFJ, D.C.Code § 15-352, provides: A foreign judgment filed with the Clerk [of the Superior Court] shall have the same effect and be subject to the same procedures, defenses, or proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of the Superior Court and may be enforced or satisfied in the same manner. D.C.Code § 15-352. The UEFJ's general purpose is to obtain uniformity with the rulings of sister state courts. Carr v. Bett, 291 Mont. 326, 970 P.2d 1017, 1024 (1998). The Council of the District of Columbia explained that its purpose in adopting the Uniform Act was to provide an expeditious and simple procedure to enforce foreign judgments in courts of the District of Columbia. Council of the District of Columbia, Committee on the Judiciary, Committee Report on Bill No. 8-56, The Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1990 (June 20, 1990), at 2. In adopting the UEFJ, the Council intended to create an efficient mechanism to enforce foreign judgments upon the mere act of filing, without the need for another trial, as if the judgment were a domestic one. Id. [12] Section 15-352, however, must be read in harmony with the constitutional mandate to accord full faith and credit to the judgments of sister states. It cannot be interpreted in a manner that subjects foreign judgments to the same range of collateral attack as a judgment of the receiving court; to do so would defeat the purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Thus, [t]he rights and defenses preserved by the Act are only those which the debtor may constitutionally raise. Data Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. EDP Corp., 709 P.2d 377, 381 (Utah 1985) (emphasis added); see Marworth, Inc. v. McGuire, 810 P.2d 653, 657 (Colo.1991) (Most states have interpreted these restrictions to mean that the UEFJA may not create defenses to a foreign judgment that violate the full faith and credit clause.); Wooster v. Wooster, 399 N.W.2d 330, 333 (S.D.1987) (noting that the nature, amount, or other merits of the judgment cannot be relitigated in the state in which enforcement is sought); see also Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 188, 67 S.Ct. 657, 91 L.Ed. 832 (1947); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233, 54 S.Ct. 690, 78 L.Ed. 1227 (1934) (The power of a state to determine the limits of the jurisdiction of its courts and the character of the controversies which shall be heard in them is, of course, subject to the restrictions imposed by the Federal Constitution.). Because the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause overrides the local regulation of access to the procedures of state courts for the purpose of enforcing foreign adjudications, Data Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 709 P.2d at 381, the language in the UEFJ that calls for applying to foreign judgments the same procedures, defenses, or proceedings for reopening, vacating or staying that apply to local judgments, D.C.Code § 15-352 (Section 2 of the UEFJ), must be read narrowly and may not be used to defeat the purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause. Data Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 709 P.2d at 381 (noting that allowance of motion under Rule 60(b) pursuant to Section 2 of UEFJ should not be interpreted in a manner which defeats the Full Faith and Credit Clause). Properly read, section 15-352 recognizes only a limited caveat to the application of the Full Faith and Credit clause because the structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers, dictates some basic limitations on the full-faith-and-credit principles. Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co., 455 U.S. at 704, 102 S.Ct. 1357. Thus [f]ull faith and credit shall be given. . . `only if the court in the first State had power to pass on the meritshad jurisdiction, that is, to render the judgment.' Id. (quoting Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 110, 84 S.Ct. 242, 11 L.Ed.2d 186 (1963)); see Vickery v. Garretson, 527 A.2d 293, 299 (D.C.1987). In addition to lack of subject matter and personal jurisdiction of the state rendering the judgment, there are other, limited exceptions to the obligation to give full faith and credit to another state's judgment. We join the consensus of courts in jurisdictions that have adopted the UEFJ and have held that a foreign judgment does not have to be accepted for enforcement in the receiving jurisdiction if the court rendering the judgment lacked jurisdiction or if the foreign judgment resulted from proceedings lacking in essential due process safeguards or was procured by fraud on the court. [13] See Jones v. Roach, 118 Ariz. 146, 575 P.2d 345, 348 (App.1977) (noting that a sister state need not give full faith and credit to another state's judgments if the rendering state lacked jurisdiction over the person or subject matter, the judgment was obtained through lack of due process, the foreign court was incompetent to render the judgment, the judgment was the result of extrinsic fraud or if the judgment was invalid or unenforceable); Carr, 970 P.2d at 1024 ([F]raud in the procurement of the judgment, lack of due process, satisfaction, or other grounds that make the judgment invalid or unenforceable may be raised by a party seeking to reopen or vacate a foreign judgment.); Fungaroli v. Fungaroli, 53 N.C.App. 270, 280 S.E.2d 787 (1981) (the final judgment of another jurisdiction may be collaterally attacked if it was fraudulently procured); Schwartz v. Schwartz, 113 Ohio App. 275, 173 N.E.2d 393 (1960) (stating that where the judgment of a sister state is obtained through fraud, the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply). In joining this consensus, we further the UEFJ's purpose to make uniform the law of jurisdictions that enact it. D.C.Code § 15-357. We now apply these principles to the motions filed in this case.