Opinion ID: 4535311
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Operative Decision

Text: [¶11] In order to determine which municipal decision is the operative decision for our review on the merits, we must first determine whether the BOA’s review pursuant to the Site Plan Review Ordinance is de novo or appellate. See Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 ME 22, ¶¶ 5, 7, 868 A.2d 161. When the BOA conducts a de novo review, acting as “factfinder and decision maker,” the BOA’s decision is the operative decision. Id. ¶ 7 (quoting Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 4, 757 A.2d 773). However, when the BOA conducts an appellate review, the decision of the Planning Board, or other previous tribunal, is operative. Id. 3If the BOA had instead upheld the Planning Board’s permit denial, rather than directing the Planning Board to grant MacQuinn’s request for approval, MacQuinn would be correct that the time period for appeal would have been within 45 days of the BOA decision. Section 2691(3)(H) provides, “Any denial of the request for approval by the board of appeals is considered a final decision even if other municipal administrative approvals are required for the project and remain pending. A denial of the request for approval by the board of appeals must be appealed within 45 days of the date of the board’s vote to deny . . . .” 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(H) (2020) (emphasis added). 8 [¶12] In determining the nature of the BOA’s review, “we look to state statutes and to the municipality’s own ordinances.” Yates v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 2, ¶ 11, 763 A.2d 1168. Pursuant to 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(C), the default review for a board of appeals is de novo, but a town’s ordinance may establish an appellate standard instead. Under a de novo review, the BOA can receive evidence, see 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(C)-(D), but in an appellate review, the BOA “limit[s] its review on appeal to the record established by the [planning] board” and “may not accept new evidence,” 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(3)(C). [¶13] Turning to the Ordinance’s language, we examine section M of the Site Plan Review Ordinance, which governs appeals and provides: 1. If the [Planning] [B]oard disapproves an application or grants approval with conditions that are objectionable to the applicant or to any abutting landowner or any aggrieved party, . . . or when it is claimed that the provisions of this section do not apply, or that the true intent and meaning of the ordinance has been misconstrued or wrongfully interpreted, the applicant, an abutting landowner, or aggrieved party . . . may appeal the decision of the [Planning] [B]oard, as follows: a. A written appeal must be filed within 30 days of the time the applicant receives a written notice of the [Planning] [B]oard’s decision. 9 b. Appeals involving administrative procedures or interpretation of this ordinance may be heard and decided by the [BOA] as detailed below. c. When errors of administrative procedure are found by the [BOA], the case shall be referred back to the [Planning] [B]oard for rectification. d. When errors of interpretation are found, the [BOA] may modify the interpretation or reverse the order of the [Planning] [B]oard but may not alter the conditions attached by the [Planning] [B]oard. All changes in conditions, other than changes made by the granting of a variance, shall be made by the [Planning] [B]oard in accordance with the [BOA’s] interpretation. e. Appeals involving conditions imposed by the [Planning] [B]oard, or a decision to deny or approve, shall be made to the Superior Court, when such appeals do not involve administrative procedures and interpretation which shall first be heard and decided by the [BOA], as detailed above. Site Plan Review Ordinance § M (emphasis added). [¶14] MacQuinn argues that rather than creating an appellate standard, the Ordinance merely narrows the types of appeals that the BOA can hear. We do not dispute MacQuinn’s observation that the Ordinance limits the BOA’s jurisdiction,4 but we disagree with its contention that the BOA’s limited jurisdiction dictates de novo review for appeals over which it has jurisdiction. 4 The ordinance limits the BOA’s jurisdiction to matters involving “administrative procedures or interpretation.” Lamoine, Me., Site Plan Review Ordinance § M(1)(b) (March 16, 2011). Matters that involve “conditions imposed by the [Planning] [B]oard, or a decision to deny or approve,” and not 10 [¶15] MacQuinn also argues that the language in the Ordinance is not specific enough to abrogate the statutory default of de novo review. See Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 11, 757 A.2d 773. A town need not use particular language, such as the word “appellate,” in establishing appellate review. We have on numerous occasions construed an ordinance that did not use the word “appellate” to nonetheless require the appeals board to undertake appellate, rather than de novo, review. See, e.g., Mills v. Town of Eliot, 2008 ME 134, ¶ 15, 955 A.2d 258. What is important is the function that the ordinance’s language prescribes. “If the ordinance prescribes an appellate function, the [BOA] will review the record of the proceedings before the previous tribunal, review the evidence presented to that body, review the tribunal’s written or recorded findings, hear oral or written argument of the parties, and determine whether the lower tribunal erred in reaching its decision.” Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 8, 757 A.2d 773. [¶16] In a number of cases involving similar ordinances, we held that the following or nearly identical language “explicitly authorize[d] a board of appeals to undertake appellate review”: the “[BOA] may modify or reverse action of the planning board or code enforcement officer . . . only upon a finding questions of administrative procedure or ordinance interpretation, must be appealed directly to the Superior Court. Id. § M(1)(e). 11 that the decision is clearly contrary to specific provisions of this chapter.”5 Mills, 2008 ME 134, ¶ 15, 955 A.2d 258 (quotation marks omitted) (citing Gensheimer, 2005 ME 22, ¶ 11, 868 A.2d 161, and Yates, 2001 ME 2, ¶¶ 12-13, 763 A.2d 1168). [¶17] In another decision, we recently held that an ordinance “limit[ed] the BOA to reviewing a decision of the Planning Board in an appellate capacity only” where it enabled appeals where the “Planning Board disapproves an application or grants approval with conditions that are objectionable . . . , or where it is claimed that the provisions of this chapter do not apply, or that the true intent and meaning of this chapter have been misconstrued or wrongfully interpreted.” MSR Recycling, LLC v. Weeks & Hutchins, LLC, 2019 ME 125, ¶¶ 10-11, 214 A.3d 1 (emphasis added) (quotation marks omitted). The emphasized language is akin to the Site Plan Review Ordinance’s language limiting appeals to legal questions of interpretation and procedure. See Site Plan Review Ordinance § M. 5 Further, unlike the ordinances in Stewart and Yates, which contained language suggestive of both types of review, the Site Plan Review Ordinance contains no language suggestive of de novo review. See Stewart v. Town of Sedgwick, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 11 & n.6, 757 A.2d 773 (observing that the ordinance included the mandate that BOA decisions include a statement of “findings” and that the appellant would have the “burden of proof”); Yates v. Town of Southwest Harbor, 2001 ME 2, ¶¶ 12-13, 763 A.2d 1168 (comparing the ordinance with the one in Stewart and concluding that, although the ordinances contained similar provisions indicating de novo review, the ordinance in Yates provided the board of appeals with authority to conduct appellate review). 12 [¶18] Contrary to MacQuinn’s contention, because the Ordinance limits the BOA’s jurisdiction to questions of legal interpretation and procedure and prevents the BOA from altering conditions set by the Planning Board, it cabins the BOA’s review to the factual record created by the Planning Board. Such a limitation of the review to the record that was before the prior tribunal is inconsistent with a de novo review, in which original fact-finding is a defining feature. See Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶ 7 & n.2, 757 A.2d 773. We conclude that the Ordinance requires the BOA to conduct appellate review of the site plan permit decision, and thus that the BOA applied the proper standard here. Accordingly, the operative decision for our review is the Planning Board’s December 11, 2017, decision denying the Site Plan Review Ordinance permit.6 See id. ¶ 4 (“If . . . the [BOA] acted only in an appellate capacity, we review 6At oral argument, MacQuinn suggested that of the two Planning Board decisions, the operative decision for review should instead be the Planning Board’s July 2018 decision, which followed the BOA’s reversal of the Planning Board’s December 2017 decision. We disagree. The July 2018 Planning Board decision was made on remand pursuant to the mandate from the BOA. Had the Planning Board disregarded the BOA’s instructions on remand, it would have acted improperly given the BOA’s appellate authority. See Fitanides v. City of Saco, 2015 ME 32, ¶ 10, 113 A.3d 1088. Underlying our doctrine identifying the operative decision for review is the aim that the operative decision represent the decision of the fact-finding tribunal. See Stewart, 2000 ME 157, ¶¶ 4-5, 7 & n.2, 757 A.2d 773 (explaining that the BOA decision will be the operative decision for review where the BOA acted as a tribunal of original jurisdiction by conducting de novo review, but otherwise the previous tribunal’s decision will be operative). In this case, the operative decision for our review is the Planning Board’s initial decision, pursuant to which it conducted its original fact-finding. See Fitanides, 2015 ME 32, ¶ 9, 113 A.3d 1088 (concluding that where the Planning Board had conducted two votes, the operative decision was its initial decision, in which it granted conditional approval and issued the permits, rather than its later decision to keep the permits unchanged). 13 directly the decision of the Planning Board, or other previous tribunal, not the [decision of the BOA].”).