Opinion ID: 1691288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Excluded Testimony of Dr. Roper

Text: The majority fails to identify the problem with Dr. Roper's testimony. Indeed, it focuses on a nonissue. Specifically, it identifies the question as: Who may testify as a handwriting expert? 752 So.2d at 1146. It then states: [Hale] introduced no evidence tending to call into question Dr. Roper's qualifications to testify as an expert witness in the field of handwriting analysis. The trial judge, nonetheless, ruled that Dr. Roper could not testify as an expert, apparently because he did not use a microscope in his examination of certain handwriting samples. 752 So.2d at 1146 (emphasis added). With all due respect to the majority, the issue was not whether Dr. Roper was qualified to testify as a handwriting expert. In fact, the trial court did not hold that Dr. Roper was not a qualified handwriting expert. The dispute was over the reliability of the methodology on which Dr. Roper proposed to base his testimony. In this connection, Hale did not contend that handwriting analysis has not gained general acceptance in the ... field, as required by Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C.Cir.1923), for admissibility. He did rely, however, on the well-established rule that, in addition to meeting the requirements of the Frye doctrine, the proponent of evidence must also lay[] a foundation that [the] specific test was administered reliably. Charles W. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 490.01(1) (4th ed.1991). Additionally, it must be shown that the test was conducted under conditions that render its results reliable. Id. This was the aspect of Dr. Roper's testimony that was at issue, and as to which the proponent, Woodward, failed to meet his burden of production. Specifically, Dr. Roper testified that, just prior to testifying, he had obtained, in the hallway of the courthouse, a number of the signatures about which he proposed to testify. Apparently, the challenged voters had offered their exemplar signatures in his presence. He admitted that it was  not his normal practice to ... examine signatures at the courtroom and to take handwriting exemplars himself.  (Reporter's Transcript, at 220.) (Emphasis added.) He stated: I rarely take writings myself. But atthey were done this way on my recommendation, based upon the circumstances and time constraints available.  (Reporter's Transcript, at 216.) During a colloquy between the parties before the trial judge, Woodward's counsel conceded that no evidence had been offered as to the reliability of Dr. Roper's methodology. Id. at 223-24. At that point, the trial judge began to speak of a possible means by which Dr. Roper's methodology might be examined. Woodward's counsel immediately and strenuously objected to the trial judge's comments, in a manner that the trial judge considered personal and accusatory. Id. at 224-25. In the rather pointed colloquy that followed between Woodward's counsel and the trial judge, the objection was not withdrawn. Consequently, the trial court ruled that Dr. Roper's testimony would not be admitted. The proponent of expert testimony must lay[] a foundation that [the] specific test was administered reliably. C. Gamble, supra, at § 490.01(1). Moreover, [a] ruling on the admissibility of expert testimony is largely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Tidwell v. Upjohn Co., 626 So.2d 1297, 1300 (Ala.1993). I cannot hold that, under these circumstances, the trial judge abused his discretion in disallowing Dr. Roper's testimony. Here, the expert witness admitted that the method on which he proposed to base his testimony was not his customary method. The proponent neither proposednor offeredevidence as a foundation for the admissibility of the testimony. Finally, the proponent strenuously objected to the trial court's own attempts to examine the witness's methodology. Thus, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion holding that the trial court erred in disallowing Dr. Roper's testimony. The majority's logic and fidelity to legal principles fall apart even further, however, in the disposition of the following blocks of absentee ballots.