Opinion ID: 2031083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Does the 1972 Statutory Amendment Exceed the Legislature's Power to Regulate Elections when First Amendment Freedoms are at Stake?

Text: The plaintiffs contend correctly that First Amendment protections are preferred to the extent that the usual presumption of validity that attaches to legislation is not operative when the Legislature seeks to curb free expression. See, generally, United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 140-141 (Rutledge, J., concurring). We must resolve the question whether the language of the recent amendment to G.L.c. 55, § 7, is sufficiently narrow so that it represents a legitimate legislative purpose consistent with the State's compelling interest to guarantee free elections or whether the statutory amendment unnecessarily encroaches upon guaranteed corporate constitutional freedoms. The Legislature has the power to regulate elections in order to prevent bribery, fraud and corruption to the end that the people's right to vote may be protected. Article 9 of the Declaration of Rights declares that All elections ought to be free.... In the Bowe case, supra, we indicated that First Amendment freedoms are subject to reasonable regulation in the interest of the public. 320 Mass. at 250. But such regulation must be narrowly drawn to meet the precise evil sought to be curbed. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296. In the analogous area of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act (18 U.S.C. § 610 [1970]) the Supreme Court of the United States has avoided ruling directly upon the constitutionality of the act. United States v. Congress of Indusrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106. United States v. International Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Wkrs. of Am. (UAW-CIO), 352 U.S. 567. Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385. Some members of the court have, however, offered their views on the constitutionality of the Corrupt Practices Act [21] when applied to curb the activities of labor unions. In United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, supra, at 155, Justice Rutledge, in his concurring opinion in which three other Justices joined, declared: A statute which, in the claimed interest of free and honest elections, curtails the very freedoms that make possible exercise of the franchise by an informed and thinking electorate, and does this by indiscriminate blanketing of every expenditure made in connection with an election, serving as a prior restraint upon expression not in fact forbidden as well as upon what is, cannot be squared with the First Amendment. Justice Rutledge also questioned the constitutionality of the act's prohibition on expenditures when applied to corporations, 335 U.S. 106, 154-155. His statement refutes the Attorney General's argument that the plaintiffs as artificial entities are not entitled to First Amendment protection. There are of course important legal and economic differences remaining between corporations and unincorporated associations, including labor unions, which justify large distinctions between them in legal treatment. But to whatever extent this may be true, it does not follow that the broadside and blanketing prohibitions here attempted in restriction of freedom of expression and assembly would be valid in their corporate applications. Corporations have been held within the First Amendment's protection against restrictions upon the circulation of their media of expression. Grosjean v. American Press Co. Inc. 297 U.S. 233. It cannot therefore be taken, merely on legislative assumption, practice or judgment, that restrictions upon freedoms of expression by corporations are valid. We agree. In United States v. International Union United Auto., Aircraft & Agricultural Implement Wkrs. of Am. ( UAW-CIO ), 352 U.S. 567, 598, Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black joined stated: The Act, as construed and applied, is a broadside assault on the freedom of political expression guaranteed by the First Amendment. It cannot possibly be saved by any of the facts conjured up by the Court. He recognized that the logic of his argument was not restricted to the act's application to labor unions alone. Some may think that one group or another should not express its views in an election because it is too powerful, because it advocates unpopular ideas, or because it has a record of lawless action. But these are not justifications for withholding First Amendment rights from any group  labor or corporate  (emphasis supplied). 352 U.S. at 597. In United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. 106, 121, the United States Supreme Court construed the act's prohibitions not to encompass the distribution of a union in-house newspaper, and noted: If § 313 [predecessor to § 610] were construed to prohibit the publication, by corporations and unions in the regular course of conducting their affairs, of periodicals advising their members, stockholders or customers of danger or advantage to their interests from the adoption of measures, or the election to office of men espousing such measures, the gravest doubt would arise in our minds as to its constitutionality (footnote omitted). We have previously recognized the necessity of protecting freedom of press and expression on issues of public concern. In Bowe v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 320 Mass. 230, 252, we said: One of the chief reasons for freedom of the press is to insure freedom, on the part of individuals and associations of individuals at least, of political discussion of men and measures, in order that the electorate at the polls may express the genuine and informed will of the people. The people's right to cast their votes freely is the correlative of the Legislature's power to ensure the freedom of elections. The plaintiffs' right not to be silenced completely on referenda issues that materially affect them promotes the people's right to exercise an informed will at the polls. We believe that corporations are not entirely unprotected by the First Amendment in the circumstances before us. The exercise of an informed vote by the electorate is essential to the freedom of elections. United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, 335 U.S. at 144 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Assuming arguendo that massive influence of the vote from any one sector of the society is an evil to be restrained, nevertheless any law that seeks to curtail a source of expression on election questions must be narrowly drawn. It must provide the least restrictive alternative available to accomplish its ends. See United States v. Congress of Industrial Organizations, supra, at 146 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Although a corporation's expression on political issues is subject to some restraint, we hold that in the absence of a compelling State interest showing that any amount of corporate expression, however small, on election questions results in undue influence over the electoral process, corporations may not be totally prohibited from expressing their views on issues that materially affect them. The voters have a right to be informed on referenda issues. The statutory amendment does not meet the requirements of a narrowly drawn law, circumscribing only the evil to be curtailed. On the record before us we do not reach the general question of the manner, mode and extent to which corporate expression may be limited to ensure free elections. [22] In the circumstances of the case we hold that the 1972 amendment to G.L.c. 55, § 7, which effectively prevents any expression by the plaintiffs on the proposed constitutional amendment amounts to impermissible censorship and thus encroaches upon the plaintiffs' freedom of expression in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and art. 16 of the Declaration of Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution. We have thus far addressed ourselves only to the constitutionality of the 1972 amendment of G.L.c. 55, § 7. By striking down that amendment alone and leaving the remainder of the statute operative ( Ashley v. Three Justices of the Superior Court, 228 Mass. 63, 81) the plaintiffs no longer suffer threat of prosecution for their intended actions. Since we have ruled that the plaintiffs' business interests are reasonably considered to be materially affected by the proposed constitutional amendment, the remaining statute provides no curb to the plaintiffs' proposed publication of their views on the forthcoming referendum. Having resolved the controversy before us we need not, at this time, consider the plaintiffs' attacks upon the face of the statute. As we noted in the Bowe case, supra, at 245-246, In many cases it would be difficult or even impossible to say abstractly and unconditionally that a statute is or is not constitutional. In part its provisions may be unconstitutional, yet the remainder may be constitutional.... A statute may be unconstitutional as applied to some states of fact, but constitutional as applied to others.... Only when the impact of a statute upon particular individuals, who have both the opportunity and the incentive to defend their rights by argument, and upon a set of definite facts established after genuine controversy, has been shown, can a court decide a constitutional question with confidence that relevant considerations have not been overlooked. Having struck down the 1972 statutory amendment as constitutionally offensive, we no longer have before us proposed activity that is prohibited by the statute and the controversy no longer exists. Our statutory authority to give declaratory relief under G.L.c. 231A, § 1, inserted by St. 1945, c. 582, § 1, is circumscribed by the requirement that an actual controversy has arisen and is specifically set forth in the pleadings. We think that it is clear from the pleadings that the actual controversy between the parties focused specifically on the plaintiffs' intended publication of their views on the proposed constitutional amendment. The plaintiffs do not indicate that they wish to contribute to political campaigns generally or to aid, promote or prevent the nomination or election of any person to public office, nor indeed do they indicate that they wish to violate any of the provisions of § 7 except the 1972 amendment which we have held unconstitutional. Questions as to the constitutionality of c. 55, § 7, as it now remains there may be, but we reserve our consideration or decision of such questions for an appropriate case. [23]