Opinion ID: 1604196
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: the instructions at the sentencing phase failed to guide the jury's discretion as required by article 3, section 28 of the mississippi constitution and the eighth amendment to the constitution of the united states.

Text: Chase contends that Instruction S-1 is flawed in that it shifts to the defense the burden of proving that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating circumstances. Additionally, Chase asserts that a defendant should go into the sentencing phase with a presumption that life is the appropriate punishment. Chase also argues that the jury should have been instructed that a life sentence must be presumed to be a life sentence without possibility of parole. As noted previously, Chase did not object to Instruction S-1. Contrary to Chase's argument, Instruction S-1 does not instruct the jury that the defense bore the burden of proving anything. Chase's argument on shifting the burden of proof and also on the presumption of life has been addressed by this Court previously. In Shell v. State, 554 So.2d at 904, the Court stated: This same issue was decided by this Court in Jordan v. State, 365 So.2d 1198 (Miss. 1978): Essentially Jordan contends that the guidelines of Jackson appear to require the Defendant to shoulder the burden of proof on mitigating circumstances versus aggravating circumstances. Jackson simply holds, however, that one on trial for the charge involved here must be given an opportunity to present any circumstances or combination of circumstances surrounding his life and character or the commission of the offense with which he is charged that would be reasonably relevant to the question of whether he should suffer death or life imprisonment. 365 So.2d at 1206 In Gray v. Lucas, 677 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.1982), the Fifth Circuit considered Mississippi's death penalty statute, and concluded the following: Every mandatory element of proof is assigned to the prosecution. Neither the burden of production nor the burden of proof ever shifts to the defendant. Id. at 1105-06. See, also, Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 944 (Miss. 1986). Shell also contends that under the instructions given, death, not life, is presumed to be the proper sentence. This issue was disposed of in Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645 (Miss. 1983), where this Court held that while one found guilty of capital murder occurring during a robbery becomes subject to the death penalty, this penalty is not automatic. The appellant's argument that he enters into the sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial with one strike against him is correct in one sense  i.e., if he had not been convicted of a capital offense, there would be not need for the sentencing hearing and he would simply be sentenced to serve a life term. This does not mean though that the procedure is unfair or faulty. 435 So.2d at 650. Shell's reliance on Jackson v. Dugger, 837 F.2d 1469, 1473 (11th Cir.1988) is improper. In Jackson, the jury was instructed that death was the appropriate penalty. In the case sub judice, there was no such instruction. Therefore, there was no presumption that death was the proper sentence. (emphasis in original). The other issue raised by Chase concerns a jury instruction offered and refused by the court. This proposed instruction reads: I instruct you that if it is your sentence that the defendant should suffer execution, such a sentence will result in his death. If it is your sentence that the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment, he will spend the rest of his natural life in prison. This argument has been raised in other cases and found to be without merit. See Shell v. State, 554 So.2d at 904; Wilcher v. State, 455 So.2d at 737; Johnson v. State, 416 So.2d at 390-391; Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d at 610. The proposed instruction was an erroneous statement of the law and would have mislead the jury. Chase was not indicted as an habitual offender, and a life sentence would not have been without parole. The trial court correctly refused this instruction. Chase's claim is procedurally barred, in part. There is also no merit to any of the errors assigned.