Opinion ID: 1667685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stanjeski

Text: John and Patricia Stanjeski divorced in 1981, and the court awarded custody of their child to Mrs. Stanjeski, along with child support in the amount of $40 per week. In December, 1986, Mrs. Stanjeski allowed Mr. Stanjeski physical custody of the child, and the child remained with Mr. Stanjeski up to the time of the commencement of this action. At the time that Mr. Stanjeski received physical custody of the child, he petitioned the circuit court to change custody of the child to shared parental custody, with Mr. Stanjeski having primary custody. He also asked the court to eliminate any further child support since the child was residing with him. Mr. Stanjeski ceased making child support payments while his child was living with him, during the pendency of the petition. Seven months after the change of custody, on July 22, 1987, while the petition was pending on the court calendar, Jed Pittman, Clerk of the Circuit Court for Pasco County, issued to Mr. Stanjeski a Notice to Obligor of Delinquency, pursuant to section 61.14(5), Florida Statutes (1987), notifying him that his support payment was delinquent and that a judgment would be rendered against him by operation of law if he failed to pay the delinquent payment within thirty days of July 3, 1987. Mr. Stanjeski filed a petition to enjoin the entry of the judgment. The trial court granted the petition on October 14, 1987, and directed the clerk not to enter a judgment under the statute. The trial court subsequently entered a final judgment in that proceeding, finding that section 61.14(5) violates due process and deprives the petitioner of his right of access to the courts. It further directed the clerks of the circuit court for Pasco and Pinellas Counties to not record or file any final judgments pursuant to the statute and to refrain from enforcement of those judgments. On appeal, the district court affirmed. In so doing, it noted that Stanjeski is prevented from challenging payments which have accrued prior to the time of the filing of a motion to set aside, alter, or modify an existing support order. Although the statute does give the obligor the right to file a response to the notice of delinquency, it is silent as to the procedure to be followed upon the filing of the response. Thus, the clerk of the court could enter judgment and file a lien against the obligor's property regardless of the fact that the obligor had filed a response. The silence of the statute on the effect of the filing of a response, coupled with the provision in subsection (d) that the trial court does not have the power to set aside, alter, or modify any support payment that has accrued, works to deny an obligor his day in court to raise any equitable defenses he may have to the delinquency. Stanjeski, 541 So.2d at 1216. That court also distinguished People ex rel. Sheppard v. Money, 124 Ill.2d 265, 124 Ill.Dec. 561, 529 N.E.2d 542 (1988), stating that the Illinois statute was held to satisfy due process requirements because, inter alia, `[p]rejudgment and postjudgment hearings are provided for by the Act... . Thus, the obligor has the right to challenge any determination through the courts... .' Stanjeski, 541 So.2d at 1217 (quoting Money, 124 Ill.2d at 276, 124 Ill.Dec. at 566, 529 N.E.2d at 547 (citations omitted)).