Opinion ID: 4510923
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Proposed Accommodations

Text: The ADA requires employers to “mak[e] reasonable accommodations.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868. The plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing “that an ‘accommodation’ seems reasonable on its face, i.e., ordinarily or in the run of cases.” U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 401 (2002). The defendant then must show either “special (typically case-specific) circumstances that demonstrate undue hardship in the particular circumstances,” id. at 402, or that the proposed accommodation eliminates an essential job requirement, Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869. The reasonableness of a proposed accommodation is a question of fact. Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 634 (6th Cir. 1998). In his briefing, Fisher identifies three potential accommodations that could have aided his transition back to full-time employment: a transfer to a different position, extra breaks, or a temporary part-time schedule. If one of these three accommodations passes muster, summary judgment in Nissan’s favor is not appropriate. We begin with Fisher’s transfer requests. The Act defines reasonable accommodation to include “reassignment to a vacant position.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). To show disability discrimination in the reassignment context, a plaintiff must show either that “he requested, and was denied, reassignment to a position for which he was otherwise qualified” or that “he requested and was denied some specific assistance in identifying jobs for which he could qualify.” Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 258 (6th Cir. 2000). If an employee requests assistance in identifying vacant positions—even a request as generic as “I want to keep working for you—do you have any suggestions?”—then “the employer has a duty under the ADA to ascertain whether he has some job that the employee might be able to fill.” Id. at 257 (brackets omitted) (quoting Miller v. Ill. Dep’t of Corrections, 107 F.3d 483, 487 (7th Cir. 1997)). The employee is not required to use magic words such as “accommodation” and “disability”; rather, we ask whether “a factfinder could infer that [the interaction] constituted a request for an accommodation.” Smith v. Henderson, 376 F.3d 529, 535 (6th Cir. 2004). Then, “to overcome summary judgment, the plaintiff generally must identify the specific job he seeks and demonstrate that he is qualified for that position.” Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 870. No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 11 Fisher testified that in his “various meetings” with human resources, he always discussed his kidney failure and his need for accommodation. Fisher states that though he did not understand the ADA framework, he knew he “had some kind of right to either, you know, try to hold onto my job, you know, maybe get a little bit of assistance, help somehow, somewhere, something,” but that Nissan provided neither assistance nor explanation. The one meeting for which the record contains contemporaneous notes confirms this. When the human-resources representative asked Fisher if there was “something we can do,” Fisher said (among other requests), “Give me another job.” Nissan responded, “If you cannot come to work, what will moving you to another job accomplish?”, and then informed him of the disciplinary decision. Fisher testified that he had a friend who was injured while working at Nissan and was placed in an inspection position, checking bolts and hoods. Fisher repeatedly requested a similar move, as is shown by one interaction between Fisher and his supervisor after Fisher’s second return to work: I had a doctor’s appointment, I think it was in December, and . . . when I came back and they told me that I was—[my supervisor,] Chris [Hargrove,] told me that I was going to be wrote up for that, for missing that—for missing that day that I went to the doctor’s. I had asked him again, I mean, there has got to be something easier here. I have seen you—I have been here for 14 years. I know— you know, I could check bolts on the cars, I could check—I can go to final fit, work final fit. I mean, you have moved people all over the plant before I know ... And [Hargrove]—he said, “I feel for you, but my hands are tied. You know, there is pretty much nothing I can do.” A reasonable factfinder could conclude that these interactions constituted a request for accommodation, including both for specific transfers (to a bolt-checking position or to final fit) and for “assistance in identifying jobs for which [Fisher] could qualify.” Burns, 222 F.3d at 258; see also Smith, 376 F.3d at 535. Nissan was therefore obliged to take three steps: (1) “identify the full range of alternative positions for which the individual satisfies the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory prerequisites”; (2) “determine whether the employee’s own knowledge, skills, and abilities would enable her to perform the essential functions of any of those alternative positions, with or No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 12 without reasonable accommodations”; and (3) “consider transferring the employee to any of these other jobs, including those that would represent a demotion.” Burns, 222 F.3d at 257 (quoting Dalton v. Subaru-Isuzu Auto., Inc., 141 F.3d 667, 678 (7th Cir. 1998)). For example, in Burns itself, the employee was not qualified for the clerical position he requested, so the employer invited him to interview for a sales position. Id. at 251. There is no evidence in the record of comparable attempts by Nissan to identify suitable alternative positions for Fisher. Nissan now submits that there was no suitable position. In particular, Nissan focuses on one of Fisher’s requests, to be a so-called “offline” worker. Offline workers substitute for employees who need to step away from the production line for any reason, such as for a bathroom break. But Fisher conceded during his deposition both that “there was no opening” for an offline position and that he had been denied such a position “years ago” because he lacked seniority. Either admission suffices to deem that request unreasonable. First, if there was no opening, the position was not “vacant,” as required by 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B). C.f. Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1044 (6th Cir. 2014); Hoskins v. Oakland Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 227 F.3d 719, 729 (6th Cir. 2000). And second, it is not “reasonable in the run of cases” for a disability-related request for accommodation to “trump the rules of a seniority system.” U.S. Airways, 535 U.S. at 403. Fisher has not shown any “special circumstances” (such as the employer’s failure to abide by its seniority system), see id. at 405, that could overcome that general proposition. But in his request for accommodation, Fisher identified other positions, such as checking bolts or moving to final fit. Seniority rules did not bar such a transfer; Fisher knew of an employee junior to him who checked bolts and hoods. Like that junior employee, Fisher indicated that he was qualified to inspect vehicles, a position apparently less challenging than the jobs he had worked for more than a decade. And Fisher insisted that he could have been placed in a position checking bolts when he requested the move. The record contains no evidence to the contrary, much less any evidence showing that final fit was full or that all other inspection No. 18-5847 Fisher v. Nissan N.A., Inc. Page 13 positions were occupied. A factfinder could therefore credit Fisher’s statement that there were vacant positions.3 Nissan is then afforded an opportunity to show that Fisher’s transfer request would create an undue hardship or remove an essential function of the job. See Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869. Nissan does not do so, instead pointing out that Fisher’s earlier transfers to Closures and back to Fits proved unsuccessful. This attempt to accommodate Fisher is to Nissan’s credit but has no bearing on whether a subsequent transfer request was unreasonable. The burden is on Nissan to present fact-specific evidence of hardship, and it has not done so. Because a factfinder could conclude both that Fisher was qualified for a vacant inspection position he identified and that he requested and was denied assistance in identifying other available positions, Nissan is not entitled to summary judgment on the failure to accommodate claim. We therefore need not consider whether Fisher’s other proposed accommodations might also have been reasonable.