Opinion ID: 1425620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: there was a genuine issue as to the falsity of rankin's statements.

Text: Irvin asserts that he disputed facts about Debbie's death presented in Rankin's article. The article included references to overwhelming evidence that Debbie did not shoot herself, to the impossibility of Debbie having held the gun in the position required to shoot herself and to the significance of chemical tests related to the discharge of the gun. Irvin contends that by this part of the article Rankin implied that Debbie did not shoot herself, that Irvin lied during the police investigation and that Irvin murdered Debbie. For purposes of reviewing the award of summary judgment, we interpret the article as implying these statements. Irvin disagrees with the trial court's characterization of the crucial portions of the article and the implications from them as statements of opinion, not statements of fact. The Supreme Court has distinguished between fact and opinion in the context of the First Amendment protection against liability for defamation: We begin with the common ground. Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on public issues. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 270, 84 S.Ct., at 721. They belong to that category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572, 62 S.Ct. 766, 769, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942). Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805 (1974) (footnote omitted); see also Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 108 S.Ct. 876, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988). The Supreme Court has also noted the difficulty of determining whether a statement is one of fact or opinion. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 104 S.Ct. 1949, 80 L.Ed.2d 502 (1984). One means of differentiating between fact and opinion in this context has been formulated by the Second Circuit: An assertion that cannot be proved false cannot be held libellous. A writer cannot be sued for simply expressing his opinion of another person, however unreasonable the opinion or vituperous the expressing of it may be. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997; Buckley v. Littell, [539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062, 97 S.Ct. 785, 50 L.Ed.2d 777 (1977)]... . Liability for libel may attach, however, when a negative characterization of a person is coupled with a clear but false implication that the author is privy to facts about the person that are unknown to the general reader. If an author represents that he has private, first-hand knowledge which substantiates the opinions he expresses, the expression of opinion becomes as damaging as an assertion of fact. Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834, 98 S.Ct. 120, 54 L.Ed.2d 95 (1977). We note with interest the doubt that has been cast by legal scholars on the reliability of attempting to distinguish between fact and opinion as a basis for decisions in defamation cases. Titus, Statement of Fact Versus Statement of Opinion  A Spurious Dispute in Fair Comment, 15 Vand.L.Rev. 1203 (1962); Note, 62 Harv.L. Rev. 1207 (1949). But cf. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 Harv.L.Rev. 601, 649-666 (1990). Titus premises his analysis on this proposition: The important consideration, then, is not whether the particular statement fits into one category or another, but whether the particular article provided sufficient information upon which the reader could make an independent judgment for himself. Titus, supra, at 1216. This proposition applies a similar focus to that of the Second Circuit in Hotchner. If it were falsely represented or implied that the author had private, first-hand knowledge which substantiated the assertions made, there would not be sufficient information upon which the reader could make an independent judgment. Using this approach to evaluate the implications of Rankin's article gives us a framework within which to determine whether the article expressed or implied defamatory statements of fact or protected statements of opinion. The crucial portions of Rankin's article that must be evaluated in this manner are: The husband stated that his wife shot herself... . The evidence collected by the Post Falls Police Department and by Det. Bohn indic[a]ting that the victim did not shoot herself  and which I have personally viewed  is overwhelming. It contains photographs indicating that it was impossible for the victim to have held the gun in the position needed to shoot herself; a laboratory chemical test by the FBI which found no antimony barium from the gun discharge on the hand swabs taken of the victim; lint on the gun indicating it had been wiped clean of fingerprints; a severe wound to the victim's mouth, which Stalder's report confirmed appeared to have come from a blow; and boxes of the victim's clothing and personal effects which had been packed indicating an intent to leave home ... and more. Rankin's statements about the FBI test of the gun, the lint on the gun, the wound to Debbie's mouth and the boxes of her clothing and personal effects provide information that would assist the reader in making a decision whether the evidence that Debbie did not shoot herself was overwhelming. The reference to photographs indicating that it was impossible for Debbie to shoot herself is more troubling. Since the photographs are not included in the article, there is insufficient information for a reader to determine whether the photographs support the statement that there was overwhelming evidence that Debbie did not commit suicide. In this context the photos take on the character of the private, first-hand knowledge that was noted in Hotchner as being a mark of defamatory opinion. Therefore, we hold that the trial court should not have concluded that Rankin's statement that the evidence was overwhelming was a matter of opinion. Treating the statement as one of fact, we must then determine whether Irvin raised a genuine issue as to its falsity. In his deposition Rankin admitted that he did not read everything in the police file, including a polygraph examination of Irvin that concluded that he was telling the truth when he said he did not shoot his wife. Rankin also admitted that he had read the FBI report concerning the testing to determine whether Debbie or Irvin had fired the gun. This report stated that it could not be determined whether Debbie or Irvin had discharged the firearm, but that this did not preclude the possibility that either of them could have discharged the gun. Rankin did not include in the article that the test was negative as to Irvin as well as Debbie or that the test was not conclusive. Liberally construing these facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in Irvin's favor, as we must in a summary judgment proceeding, we conclude that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the falsity of Rankin's statement that the evidence was overwhelming.