Opinion ID: 71204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retaliatory Discharge Claims

Text: Cooper also alleges that UPS unlawfully retaliated against him by 12 Case: 09-30864 Document: 00511032014 Page: 13 Date Filed: 02/22/2010 No. 09-30864 discharging him in response to his claims of discrimination. “[T]he McDonnell Douglas test . . . is also applicable to Title VII unlawful retaliation cases.” Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 427 (5th Cir. 2000). Thus, Cooper must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation before the burden of production shifts to UPS to proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. Finally, the burden falls on Cooper to show why UPS’s proffered explanation is pretext for unlawful retaliation. To establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under Title VII, Cooper must show (1) that he engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). “Close timing between an employee’s protected activity and an adverse action against him may provide the ‘causal connection’ required to make out a prima facie case of retaliation.” McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562 (5th Cir. 2007) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). “However, once the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that explains both the adverse action and the timing, the plaintiff must offer some evidence from which the jury may infer that retaliation was the real motive.” Id. Here, assuming arguendo that Cooper has established a prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, Cooper has not met his burden of showing why UPS’s proffered explanation—that he was fired after being absent from work for over a year, per the terms of the Income Protection Plan—is pretextual. UPS twice notified Cooper that the Income Protection Plan provides for administrative separation after an employee is absent for over twelve months and requested that Cooper either return to work or provide additional information; Cooper neither returned to work nor provided additional information. Finally, after nearly two years of absence from employment, UPS notified Cooper of his 13 Case: 09-30864 Document: 00511032014 Page: 14 Date Filed: 02/22/2010 No. 09-30864 administrative separation. Cooper neither disputes that the terms of the Plan provide for his separation nor argues that UPS invidiously enforces the terms of the Plan. Instead, Cooper asserts that the real reason for his termination was UPS’s failure to reasonably accommodate his disability. “Whether summary judgment is appropriate . . . depends on numerous factors, including the strength of the employee’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered.” Price v. Fed. Express Corp., 283 F.3d 715, 720 (5th Cir. 2002). We conclude that Cooper has not produced sufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could infer that Cooper was discharged as retaliation for filing claims of discrimination. Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of UPS on Cooper’s retaliatory discharge claims is appropriate. Cf. McCoy, 492 F.3d at 562 (holding that summary judgment was appropriate where plaintiff “attempt[ed] to prove pretext simply by showing that the [defendant] knew of her complaints and took an adverse employment action shortly thereafter” and did not offer reasons as to why the legitimate reasons proffered for her discharge were pretextual).