Opinion ID: 1510164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gibbs' Rights Denied

Text: The Superior Court has broad authority to terminate probationary sentences at any time. [8] The Superior Court also has the authority to revoke Gibbs' probation notwithstanding his acquittal of criminal charges involving the same conduct that gave rise to the violation of probation hearing. [9] In Gibbs' case, this Court must determine whether the circumstances of the VOP hearing comported with the requirements of Rule 32.1 and if fundamental fairness required the appointment of counsel. The record reflects that the violation of probation hearing conducted by the trial judge failed to comport with the requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 32.1. According to the VOP hearing transcript, the trial judge did not give Gibbs an opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf or even require the State to present any adverse witnesses for cross-examination regarding the alleged violation of probation on which the original report was based. Instead, acknowledging that Gibbs had been acquitted on the criminal charges involving the same alleged conduct, the trial judge sua sponte decided to base his probation violation decision on the evidence presented at the May 27th criminal trial. Consequently, the trial judge simply began the violation of probation hearing by announcing that he found by a preponderance of the evidence heard at the criminal trial that Gibbs had committed the criminal conduct for which he had been acquitted, thus violating his probation. The record reflects that, after the trial judge summarily announced his sua sponte finding of a violation of probation based on what he heard at Gibbs' May 27th trial, it became clear that Gibbs did not understand the violation of probation proceedings. Nevertheless, the trial judge did not appoint counsel for Gibbs and reopen the hearing. Only after revoking Gibbs' probation did the trial judge decide to provide Gibbs with appointed counsel. That appointment of counsel was only to provide representation for Gibbs during the determination of the Risk Assessment Tier Level to which he should be assigned as a violent sex offender. Although a probationer accused of a violation is not entitled to a formal trial, [10] the person may be entitled to be represented by counsel in an extraordinary case where fundamental fairness so requires. [11] When a violation of probation hearing follows an acquittal after a criminal trial for the same alleged conduct, it is one of the exceptional VOP proceedings in which fundamental fairness requires that the State provide the probationer with counsel. The Superior Court abused its discretion by not appointing an attorney to represent Gibbs at the violation of probation hearing, following his acquittal at the prior criminal trial. The record of events at the June 4th VOP hearing compels our conclusion that the assistance of counsel was necessary to protect Gibbs' due process rights. An attorney could have responded to the trial judge's sua sponte summary finding of a violation of probation without the presentation of any evidence. An attorney would best be able to argue why the facts that led to Gibbs' acquittal also supported a finding of no probation violation, even with the lesser preponderance standard of proof requirement.