Opinion ID: 2519950
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State v. Vigil

Text: ¶ 20 Ten years later we decided Vigil, holding that Utah does not recognize attempted second degree murder under the depraved indifference alternative of the murder statute. [6] Using a plain language analysis to determine the meaning of culpability and intent in the two paragraphs of the attempt statute, we determined that to give the fullest possible effect to the terms of paragraphs (1) and (2), we construe the culpability requirement in paragraph (1) to refer to the attendant circumstances, if any, of the underlying offense and construe the intent language in paragraph (2) to limit the attempt statute to offenses with a mental state of intent. In other words, attempt can be found for uncompleted offenses that require intent, even though those offenses have attendant circumstances that require lesser mental states. Vigil, 842 P.2d at 845-46 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). We held that the word `intent' as used in ... the attempt statute should be read to mean `conscious objective or desire.' This meaning of the word `intent' obviously is distinguishable from knowledge of the proscribed conduct or result, which is the mental state required for depraved indifference homicide. Id. at 847 (emphasis added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (defining intentional conduct)). ¶ 21 Following this analysis of the language of the attempt statute, we held that to convict a defendant of attempted second degree murder, the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a conscious objective or desire to cause the death of another. Id. at 848. Accordingly, in a footnote to the Vigil case, we overruled the Maestas decision to the extent it held that a defendant could be convicted for an attempt crime if he or she acted with the same level of culpability necessary to support a conviction for committing the completed crime. See id. at 848 n. 5. ¶ 22 However, we created some confusion by noting in the same footnote that the Vigil holding did not overrule the second rationale we used in Maestas to uphold the conviction for attempted murder. In the second rationale, we assumed that since intent to commit the particular offense was already an element of murder, it was also an element of attempted murder, but in this discussion, we overlooked the fact that murder could also be committed knowingly. In Vigil, we magnified this mistake by specifically stating in dicta that Maestas is still good law insofar as it authorizes prosecution for attempted aggravated murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 76-5-202(1) or attempted murder under the intentional or knowing formulation of section 76-5-203(1)(a). Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the dicta in this footnote, contrary to the holding expressed in the main body of the opinion, provided that a person may be convicted of attempted murder if evidence showed that he or she acted knowingly or intentionally. Based on this footnote in Vigil, the trial court and the court of appeals denied Casey's challenges to the jury instructions concerning attempted murder.