Opinion ID: 1796125
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court prematurely and incorrectly grant summary judgment in favor of United and Murdock?

Text: ¶ 7. Noxubee County argues that the trial court failed to examine all the evidence as well as the briefs before granting summary judgment in favor of United and Murdock. Also, Noxubee County alleges that the grant of summary judgment was a premature approach to dispose of this litigation considering that the impending trial date was but a few weeks away from the summary judgment hearing. Thus, Noxubee County believes that the trial court's grant of summary judgment improper, and too hasty. We hold that both these contentions lack legal substance and are without merit. ¶ 8. In reaching its decision on summary judgment, the trial court referred to and relied upon Oktibbeha County Sch. Dist. v. Coregis Ins. Co., 173 F.Supp.2d 541, 543 (N.D.Miss.2001), for the proposition that a school district's failure to comply with FLSA in a manner which makes the school district liable for overtime compensation is not a loss within the meaning of a district's legal liability policy. We note that Coregis is factually similar to this case. In Coregis, Plaintiffs brought suit against the Oktibbeha County School District alleging that the school district failed to pay them overtime compensation in violation of FLSA. Id. at 542. The Oktibbeha County School District had a school board policy with Coregis Insurance Company which provided coverage for damages resulting from a wrongful act. Id. at 543. The school board argued that insurance policy issued to the school district indemnified the district for damages paid as a result of the overtime suit. Id. In Coregis, the trial court disagreed with the school district and held that the school district's failure to comply with FLSA in a manner which makes the school district liable for overtime compensation is not within the scope of coverage of the district's legal liability policy. Id. ¶ 9. In comparing the instant action with Coregis, we note that the policy language presented in this case is actually clearer than the policy language in Coregis. For instance, the policy in Coregis defined a wrongful act as any act, error or omission of an Insured constituting a breach of a duty imposed by law or a breach of an Employment Contract. Id. The policy here wrongful act as follows: [A]ny actual or alleged errors, misstatements, misleading statements, acts or omissions, neglect or breach of duty, individually or collectively including actual or alleged violations of civil rights protected under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 et. seq., or any similar federal, state or local laws, or any matter claimed against an INSURED solely by reason of their being or having been INSUREDS which were committed solely in the performance of duties for the EDUCATIONAL ENTITY ..... Likewise, the United policy defines a wrongful employment act as either the refusal to employ, the termination of employment, or coercion, demotion, evaluation, reassignment, discipline, defamation, harassment, humiliation, discrimination or other employment-related practices, policies, acts or omission. It is clear to this Court that Noxubee County's deliberate decision not to compensate its employees for overtime pay is neither a wrongful act nor a wrongful employment act within the definitions under this policy. Such a deliberate decision would certainly not give rise to coverage under these facts before this Court. ¶ 10. Further, the trial court in Coregis held that even if the Oktibbeha County overtime suit was within the meaning of a wrongful act, the policy contained two provisions which; nevertheless, excluded coverage. Id. The exclusionary provisions in Coregis are set forth below: Exclusion A: [A]ny Claim or Loss Arising Out of any Insured gaining profit, remuneration or advantage to which the Insured is not entitled is specifically excluded from coverage. Exclusion B: [A]ny claim or Loss Arising Out of any criminal, dishonest, malicious, fraudulent or knowingly wrongful act or omission. Id. Here, Noxubee County's policy contained Exclusion 12 which expressly excludes any claim for back wages, overtime, or future wages (even if designated as liquidated damages); or arising from collective bargaining agreements. ¶ 11. We hold that Noxubee County's failure to comply with FLSA in a manner which makes the school district liable for overtime compensation is neither a wrongful act nor a wrongful employment act within the meaning of a district's legal liability policy, sufficient to bar coverage. It follows that even if Noxubee County's failure to comply with FLSA would constitute a wrongful act or a wrongful employment act under the language of the policy, coverage would nevertheless be denied due to the specific exclusion of claims for back wages, overtime, or future wages as set forth in Exclusion 12. Thus, the trial court properly relied upon Coregis, and the grant of summary judgment in favor of United and Murdock was properly based upon this precedent. ¶ 12. Secondly, Noxubee County contends that the trial court reached its decision on summary judgment too quickly. After several hours of oral arguments and after reviewing Noxubee County's motion, responses, and brief, the trial judge issued a bench ruling, wherein he adopted the rationale of Coregis. We find this argument is not supported by any case law and is completely without merit. This Court has upheld a trial court's grant of summary judgment from the bench where the threshold requirements of Miss. R Civ. P. 56(c) have been satisfied. See Peden v. City of Gautier, 870 So.2d 1185, 1187 (Miss.2004) (chancellor took judicial notice of a court file in an annexation proceeding and thereafter issued a ruling from the bench granting the city's motion for summary judgment). It appears that Judge Kitchens's decision to rule on the parties' summary judgment motions was reasonable and well within his discretion. Noxubee County cites no authority from this Court which would suggest error in a trial court granting summary judgment from the bench where the familiar threshold of Rule 56(c) has been satisfied.