Opinion ID: 2363126
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excess Delay or Lack of Diligence by Movant

Text: Contrary to what the Court of Special Appeals suggests, the time and money expended by Petitioners in preparing their defense was not the only factor the trial court considered that weighed against dismissal without prejudice. As to the second factor, excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant, the intermediate appellate court held that [t]he trial court specifically found that there was no lack of diligence on the part of appellants. This interpretation of the Circuit Court's reasoning is not accurate entirely. It is a well-established principle that `[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it properly.' State v. Chaney, 375 Md. 168, 179, 825 A.2d 452, 458 (2003) (quoting Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 206, 699 A.2d 1170, 1194 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1082, 118 S.Ct. 866, 139 L.Ed.2d 763 (1998)); see also Medical Mut. Liability Ins. Soc. of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 34, 622 A.2d 103, 119 (1993); Wagner v. Wagner, 109 Md.App. 1, 50, 674 A.2d 1, 25 (1996) ([W]e presume judges to know the law and apply it, even in the absence of a verbal indication of having considered it.). It is equally well-settled that there is a strong presumption that judges properly perform their duties, and that trial judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic. Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273, 619 A.2d 105, 110 (1993); see also Kirsner v. Edelmann, 65 Md.App. 185, 196 n. 9, 499 A.2d 1313, 1319 n. 9 (1985) ([A] judge is presumed to know the law, and thus is not required to set out in intimate detail each and every step of his or her thought process.); Zorich v. Zorich, 63 Md.App. 710, 717, 493 A.2d 1096, 1099 (1985) (Because trial judges are presumed to know the law, not every step in their thought process needs to be explicitly spelled out.); Bangs v. Bangs, 59 Md.App. 350, 370, 475 A.2d 1214, 1224 (1984) (A chancellor is not required to articulate every step in his thought processes.). Thus, [t]he trial judge need not articulate each item or piece of evidence she or he has considered in reaching a decision. . . . The fact that the court did not catalog each factor and all the evidence which related to each factor does not require reversal. John O. v. Jane O., 90 Md.App. 406, 429, 601 A.2d 149, 160 (1992); see also Cobrand v. Adventist Healthcare, Inc., 149 Md.App. 431, 445, 816 A.2d 117, 125 (2003) (holding that when a matter is reserved to the sound discretion of the trial court, a trial judge's failure to state each and every consideration or factor in a particular applicable standard does not, absent more, constitute an abuse of discretion, so long as the record supports a reasonable conclusion that appropriate factors were taken into account in the exercise of discretion.) (internal citations omitted). The trial judge here found that there had been no lack of diligence on the part of Respondents' local Maryland counsel, in representing the Skevofilaxes. The Circuit Court continued, however, that [t]here has been some discussion as to other counsel. While the trial court did not elaborate further as to other counsel, it would be reasonable to infer from discussion and documents in this record that the court was referring to Respondents' national counsel in the thimerosal litigation. It is clear from the transcript that the trial court at least considered the possible delay or lack of diligence attributable to the movant and commented tactfully upon it. We hold, therefore, that the Court of Special Appeals misinterpreted the trial court's consideration of this second factor.