Opinion ID: 1657369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Foundational Concerns

Text: The Rules of Civil Procedure recognize three procedures by which the trial court can pretermit the need for a full trial on the merits. The rules encourage use of these procedures to permit resolution of claims as early as they are properly raised in order to avoid the expense and delay of meritless claims or defenses and to permit the efficient use of scarce judicial resources. Where the pleadings fail to state a cause of action under the law or fail to state facts entitling the party to relief, the trial court may dismiss the lawsuit. Where the evidence adduced by a plaintiff at trial fails to prove the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action, a motion for a directed verdict is properly sustained. The third procedural tool, summary judgment, lies between the other two and is the subject of this case. Summary judgment is designed to permit the trial court to enter judgment, without delay, where the moving party has demonstrated, on the basis of facts as to which there is no genuine dispute, a right to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04. Summary judgment proceeds from an analytical predicate that, where the facts are not in dispute, a prevailing party can be determined as a matter of law. Rule 74.04 establishes a step-by-step procedure by which such cases can be identified and resolved. Lack of adherence to the text of the rule, however, and a lingering disfavor of summary judgment, have robbed this rule of it usefulness. This opinion, it is intended, will clarify the analysis and dispel any remaining doubt that summary judgments play an essential role in our system. In the present case we consider which party bears the burden of establishing a legal right to judgment and the absence of genuine dispute as to the material facts when the party seeking summary judgment is a claimant and the non-movant has raised an affirmative defense. ITT and Mercantile argue that they need only establish the elements of their causes of action to force the defendant to come forward with evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to his affirmative defenses. Not unexpectedly, Evert disagrees. He asserts that the movants must show the absence of any genuine issues of material fact, not only as to the elements of their claims, but also as to his affirmative defenses. Prior to considering the merits of the parties' arguments, we believe a discussion of the historical role of summary judgment in Missouri, in the context of the underlying theory of pleading, is of some assistance.
In 1849, Missouri became the second state in the union to adopt a comprehensive civil code. The Missouri General Assembly adopted the Code of 1849, based on New York's Field Code, to modernize procedures and promote a more efficient system of justice. See Mo.Laws 1848-49, pp. 73-109 (Practice in Courts of Justice). The code eliminated archaic forms of common law pleading, substituting instead a system of code pleading, or fact pleading. The code required that the first pleading in a civil case contain a statement of the facts constituting a cause of action ... in ordinary and concise language ... [and] in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended. Mo.Laws 1848-49, art. VI, § 1, p. 79. In 1943, prompted by the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the legislature requested that this Court propose appropriate revisions to Missouri's civil code. With advice from The Missouri Bar, this Court submitted proposed revisions incorporating many of the federal rules. Atkinson, Missouri's New Civil Procedure: A Critique of the Process of Procedural Improvement, 9 Mo.L.Rev. 47, 48-52 (1944). Those recommendations included the adoption of the federal system of notice pleading and a summary judgment procedure substantially similar to Federal Rule 56. Id. at 58-59, 62-63; Henry, Proposed Code of Civil Procedure, 7 Mo. L.Rev. 1, 13-18 (1942). Despite adopting the substance of many of the federal rules, the legislature chose to retain Missouri's fact pleading approach and deleted from the code revisions providing for summary judgment. See §§ 506.010, et seq., RSMo 1986 (The Civil Code of Missouri); Atkinson, 9 Mo.L.Rev. at 62-63. The 1943 Act granted this Court the power to promulgate rules for all courts of the state so long as the rules did not contravene statutes or modify existing substantive rights. 1943 Mo.L. 353, § 10.1. In 1945, the voters of Missouri broadened this power and raised it to constitutional dimensions. Article V, Section 5 of the 1945 Constitution permits this Court to adopt rules governing the practice, procedure and pleading in our courts so long as they did not change substantive rights, or the law relating to ... the right of trial by jury. This permits the court to adopt rules contrary to procedural statutes, which was not permitted by the 1943 act. In 1959, pursuant to this authority, this Court adopted Rule 74.04 to permit summary judgments. As we will show, however, application of this new rule here proceeded as though there were no difference between notice pleading and fact pleading. See II, B, 3, infra.
Missouri's Rule 74.04 sets out a procedure for granting summary judgments in cases in which the movant can establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. From its inception, such a procedure has been regarded as an extreme and drastic remedy and great care should be exercised in utilizing the procedure. Cooper v. Finke, 376 S.W.2d 225, 229 (Mo.1964). Skepticism continues to this day. Ross v. AT & T Comm. Co., 836 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Mo.App.1992). At the foundation of this skepticism has been the suspicion that the procedure borders on denial of due process in that it denies the opposing party his day in court. Olson v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 700 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Mo.App.1985). Accord Miller v. United Security Ins. Co., 496 S.W.2d 871, 875 (Mo.App.1973); Kroger Co. v. Roy Crosby Co., 393 S.W.2d 843, 844 (Mo.App. 1965). To protect the rights of litigants, the rule as originally promulgated required the movant to establish his right to judgment as a matter of law by unassailable proof. Rule 74.04(h). [Emphasis added.] This requirement, though not found in Federal Rule 56, was added merely to make clear that the procedure is not applicable where there is a factual issue to be determined by the court or jury. Rule 74.04 (Committee Note1959). On the strength of this safeguard, a summary judgment entered on a properly plead and supported motion does not deny due process. Henkel v. City of Pevely, 504 S.W.2d 141, 149 (Mo.App.1973). In 1988, this Court amended Rule 74.04 to remove subsection (h) in its entirety. The rule now substantially tracks the language of the federal rule. No longer is a movant required to establish a right to judgment as a matter of law by unassailable proof. However, the movant continues to bear the burden of establishing a legal right to judgment and the absence of any genuine issue as to any material fact required to support that right to judgment. Rule 74.04(c). Our courts have found a genuine issue whenever there is the slightest doubt as to a material fact. Elliott, 423 S.W.2d at 835. With the demise of the unassailable proof standard, however, the continued viability of the slightest doubt standard has been doubted. See Martin v. City of Washington, 848 S.W.2d 487, 492 (Mo. banc 1993) (citing with approval Wood & Huston Bank v. Malan, 815 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Mo.App.1991)). But see Berneathy v. Pursley, 832 S.W.2d 524, 525 (Mo.App. 1992) (slightest doubt standard applied). Because the slightest doubt standard goes to the presence or absence of factual disputes rather than the movant's right to judgment, this requirement was not tied to the requirement of unassailable proof. Therefore, it would be disingenuous to suppose that it was affected by the 1988 amendment to the rule. Nevertheless, our examination of the slightest doubt standard has persuaded us that it must be discarded. We abandon the slightest doubt standard, not because the summary judgment rule has changed with regard to the settling of factual disputes; it clearly has not. Rather, we now reject it because we do not believe that that standard, and the way it has been applied, ensures compliance with the requirements of the rule. In reviewing the slightest doubt standard, we have discerned that it has, from time to time, been employed in such a way as to rob summary judgment of any usefulness whatsoever. Recall that slightest doubt is intended to test for genuine issues of material fact, not just issues of material fact. Genuine implies that the issue, or dispute, must be a real and substantial oneone consisting not merely of conjecture, theory and possibilities. Too often, courts have confused slightest doubt with slightest possibility. To the extent that trial and appellate courts are of the impression that the slightest doubt standard defeats summary judgment when any doubt exists, no matter how unreasonable, the standard was been misapplied and is now abandoned. The burden on a summary judgment movant is to show a right to judgment flowing from facts about which there is no genuine dispute. Summary judgment tests simply for the existence, not the extent, of these genuine disputes. Therefore, where the trial court, in order to grant summary judgment, must overlook material in the record that raises a genuine dispute as to the facts underlying the movant's right to judgment, summary judgment is not proper.
From the earliest days of summary judgment practice in Missouri, this Court has stated that the federal decisions construing Rule 56 [of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] are particularly persuasive in applying the Missouri rule [74.04]. Cooper, 376 S.W.2d at 228. See also Elliott, 423 S.W.2d at 835. When Cooper and Elliott were decided, courts applied the federal rule and the Missouri rule nearly identically. Missouri rule language requiring unassailable proof did no more than acknowledge federal rules decisions on summary judgments to that effect. Cooper, 376 S.W.2d at 229. See, e.g., Armco Steel Co. v. Realty Investment Co., 273 F.2d 483, 484-485 (8th Cir.1960) (summary judgment not proper except where [the movant] is entitled to its allowance beyond all doubt; only where the conceded facts establish [the movant's] right with such clarity as to have no room for controversy; with all reasonable doubts touching the existence of a genuine issue ... resolved against the movant). [Emphasis added.] Despite the apparent commonality of these summary judgment rules, however, the systems of federal pleading and Missouri pleading which underlie those rules proceed from antithetical philosophical bases. The modern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are founded on notice pleading principles. A plaintiff need only plead sufficient information to enable the defendant to understand the claim being pursued. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). The federal rules assume that discovery will narrow and identify the issues for trial. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-501, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388-89, 91 L.Ed. 451 (The new rules ... restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial). Time has revealed, however, that the change to notice pleading in the federal system has produced a result in summary judgment practice incompatible with our fact-pleading regime. The United States Supreme Court has fashioned a new role for summary judgment as a by-product of its notice pleading system. Before the shift to notice pleading accomplished by the Federal Rules, motions to dismiss a complaint or to strike a defense were the principal tools by which factually insufficient claims or defenses could be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources. But with the advent of notice pleading, the motion to dismiss seldom fulfills this function any more, and its place has been taken by the motion for summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554-55, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). [Emphasis added.] This new role for federal summary judgment was exhaustively articulated in what has come to be known as the Celotex trilogy. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Missouri is not a notice pleading state. Beginning with Article IV of the Civil Code of 1849, requiring that the petition contain a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action, [emphasis added], Missouri has remained a fact pleading state. Given a clear opportunity in 1942 to adopt the federal system of notice pleading, the General Assembly purposefully avoided this approach and, not coincidentally, any procedure permitting summary judgment. The Civil Code, as adopted, requires that the petition contain a short and plain statement of the facts showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. § 509.050.1(1), RSMo Supp.1992; Rule 55.05(1). Compare Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) (petition shall set forth a short and plain statement of the claim). Most recently, the Civil Rules Study Committee of this Court has completed its massive task of proposing revisions to our Civil Rules and did not propose any change to notice pleading for Missouri. In Missouri, motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim have substantially more bite under our fact pleading rules than they have under the federal system of notice pleading. Compare Sofka v. Thal, 662 S.W.2d 502, 509 (Mo. banc 1983) (where petition contains only conclusions and neither the ultimate facts nor any allegations from which to infer those facts, motion to dismiss is properly granted), with Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102-03, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (lack of specific facts does not invite dismissal so long as complaint give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests). As there is no need for our Rule 74.04 to fill in for an ineffectual motion to dismiss, the role of summary judgment in Missouri differs significantly from that in current federal practice. Where the federal courts now use discovery to identify the triable issues, Conley, 355 U.S. at 48 n. 9, 78 S.Ct. at 103 n. 9 such has always been the role of the pleadings in Missouri. Where the federal courts now use discovery to identify the facts upon which the plaintiff's claim rests, id.; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55 such has always been the role of pleadings in Missouri. Finally, where the federal courts rely on summary judgment procedures to dispose of baseless claims, Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53, such continues to be the role of motions to dismiss in Missouri. In sum, Missouri and federal summary judgment practice correspond only in language, not in function. The purpose of summary judgment under Missouri's fact-pleading regime is to identify cases (1) in which there is no genuine dispute as to the facts and (2) the facts as admitted show a legal right to judgment for the movant. Because federal summary judgment serves a different purpose, it is difficult to view the federal cases construing the federal rule as particularly persuasive any longer; thirty years of experience within our own system of fact pleading is sufficient to define the scope of summary judgment under our Rule 74.04 and its role in our pretrial practice. Therefore, federal cases are to be considered no more, though certainly no less, persuasive than any other nonbinding authority in the determination of summary judgment motions which are, by their very nature, susceptible primarily of a case-by-case analysis. [1]