Opinion ID: 2517672
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: James Moss

Text: Petitioner alleges that after the murders, James Moss had a conversation with Boyd in which Boyd said he was angry with petitioner because petitioner had failed to show up for something, that Boyd had to go in his place, that Marcus had to drive the getaway car, and that Boyd later told Moss to forget the conversation. Moss, who now lives in Tennessee, testified that he lived at the Vose Street apartments in 1981 and knew Boyd as well as Boyd's wife, Arzetta Harvey. Moss testified that sometime after the crimes, after he had learned of Reilly's arrest for the murders, Moss, Boyd and Marcus were milling around the swimming pool at the apartment complex when Boyd said he was angry because petitioner had not shown up to do something he was supposed to do and Boyd had to go in his place. Boyd criticized petitioner's courage, saying he was too chicken shit to go along. Boyd was angry because he needed his part of the money to get the drugs that he wanted and needed. Marcus added that petitioner mess[ed] the whole thing up because he didn't go, [and] that if they got caught, [petitioner] would get away free because he did notyou know, he did not go, he did not show up to do what they was supposed to do. Boyd echoed this sentiment, saying that if Boyd were arrested, petitioner would walk away free because he did not do anything. Marcus said that as a result of petitioner's failure to show up, he (Marcus) had to drive the getaway car. Sometime after the poolside conversation, Boyd told Moss to forget it had taken place. Moss admitted on cross-examination that, at the time, he did not know what Boyd and Marcus were talking about and did not know they may have been referring to the murders. Boyd specifically denied Moss's account of the alleged conversation. The referee specifically credited James Moss's testimony on this point, concluding that, [i]n testifying at the reference hearing, Boyd made a number of statements which were shown to be false[, including] ... that he did not threaten, bully, pressure or otherwise try to intimidate any of the Vose Street residents ... [and] that he did not tell ... James Moss that he had participated in the planning and/or the carrying out of the murders in this case. Respondent denies that Moss heard Boyd make these incriminating comments, noting that Moss admitted he did not know what Boyd was talking about and that Moss had a motive to testify falsely because his present wife, then 21 years old, had had a one-day affair with Boyd's stepson, who was only 15 or 16 years old at the time. In addition, respondent alleges Moss's failure to come forward until now undermines his credibility. Respondent takes exception to the referee's findings on these same grounds. The referee concluded that although Boyd denied making the statements reported by Moss, Boyd generally lacked credibility. The referee's decision to credit Moss's testimony and not Boyd's is a credibility determination to which we must defer if supported by substantial evidence. We conclude that it is, namely, the testimony of James Moss himself and that of Sandra Harris Moss, who testified that she had immediately apologized to Arzetta Harvey about her affair with Harvey's son and that their friendship was back to normal within 24 hours. Respondent takes exception to the referee's finding concerning Moss's testimony recounting Boyd's admissions, contending the comments were inadmissible hearsay. Respondent failed to object on this ground and thus failed to preserve the issue for our review. Were we to overlook this forfeiture and address the claim, we would find Boyd's comment, warning Moss that he should forget the conversation he had heard, was admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. (See discussion, ante, at pt. IV.B.1.a.) Like the threat to Ginsburg, Boyd's warning to Moss was an attempt to shield the conspiracy from discovery. ( People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1231, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163.) Boyd's other comments, overheard by Moss, that petitioner had not shown up for something he was supposed to do, that Boyd went in his place, that petitioner was too chicken shit to go along, and that Boyd needed his part of the money to get the drugs that he wanted and needed require a different analysis for they do not appear to have been uttered in furtherance of the conspiracy. We find, however, that these comments were admissible because they recounted Boyd's prior inconsistent statements. Evidence Code section 1235 provides in part: Evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing. Boyd testified at trial that he did not kill the victims, had not agreed to kill the victims, was never asked to do it, had never told Reilly that Marcus had backed out or that he (Boyd) would do the killing, and that no agreement existed whereby he was to receive money in return for the murders. At the evidentiary hearing, he similarly maintained he was completely innocent of the murders and uninvolved in the conspiracy. In light of these denials, James Moss's testimony was admissible under Evidence Code section 1235 as evidence of Boyd's prior inconsistent statements. Even if respondent had preserved this issue, therefore, the referee would properly have admitted the evidence over the hearsay objection. We thus overrule respondent's exceptions and adopt the referee's conclusions regarding James Moss's evidence.