Opinion ID: 1190445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged spectator misconduct

Text: Defendant contends three instances of spectator remarks mandate reversal. We have found no California cases which reverse a judgment because of spectator misconduct. ( People v. Lucero (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1023, fn. 10 [245 Cal. Rptr. 185, 750 P.2d 1342].) This will not be the first. Any objection to the spectators' remarks was waived, and, in any event, they were not prejudicial. The three instances were brief and isolated, two of them were unrelated to defendant's guilt or innocence, and the jury was properly admonished to disregard spectator remarks.
(17) Defendant neither objected to any of the three instances of spectator remarks nor requested the trial court to admonish the jury to disregard the remarks. He also failed to move for a mistrial after any of the remarks. Defendant's failure to request appropriate ameliorative action waived his appellate challenge to the remarks. A defendant's failure to object and request a curative admonition for alleged prosecutorial misconduct waives the issue for appeal if the objection and admonition would have cured the misconduct. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 79 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388]; People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1248; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) We see no reason why the same rule should not apply to alleged spectator misconduct. Indeed, because a spectator does not wear the same cloak of official authority as a prosecutor, most instances of spectator misconduct will likely be more easily curable than those of a prosecutor. Prior decisions on spectator misconduct implicitly suggest that a defendant cannot first raise the issue on appeal. The question has invariably been whether the trial court should have granted the defendant's motion for a mistrial based on alleged spectator misconduct. ( People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1006, 1022; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 114 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; People v. Craig (1978) 86 Cal. App.3d 905, 918 [150 Cal. Rptr. 676]; People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 867, 882-883 [125 Cal. Rptr. 442]; People v. Spain (1984) 154 Cal. App.3d 845, 851 [201 Cal. Rptr. 555]; cf. People v. Horowitz (1945) 70 Cal. App.2d 675, 698 [161 P.2d 833] [failure to object to a particular spectator's presence waived issue on appeal].) In none of those cases was the issue raised for the first time on appeal. We now make explicit what has long been implicitly clear. A defendant's failure to object to and request a curative admonition for alleged spectator misconduct waives the issue for appeal if the objection and admonition would have cured the misconduct. As explained below, the spectator misconduct in this case was easily curable (and in fact was cured) by appropriate admonition. Defendant in this case requested no amelioration. His claim of spectator misconduct is waived.
Aside from defendant's waiver of the issue, his claims of reversible spectator misconduct are baseless.
(18) Dr. Thomas Rogers, a pathologist who was the first witness at trial, testified that morphine had been found in Brice's urine during the autopsy. A woman, apparently Brice's mother, interrupted the questioning as follows: Q: Do you have any idea what kind of substance it may have been that Mr. Brice had taken? A: Most likely, this would have been heroin unless he had been on prescription for  Woman in Audience: My son has never used a needle. He's never used a needle. The Court: Ma'am. Remain outside. Woman in Audience: Well, you know, he never used a needle. The Court: We'll take a moment recess please. Ask the witness [ sic ] to step outside till she composes herself. Spectator will have to remain outside until after this testimony is completed I believe. She may come back in afterwards. This comment was brief and on the first day of a guilt phase trial that spanned more than 24 calendar days. The comment had nothing to do with defendant's guilt or innocence. The court's order for the spectator to leave the courtroom made clear to the jury her remark was inappropriate. Moreover, at the end of the first day of trial, the court adequately admonished the jury that, We did have a brief statement of somebody in the audience who said something on one occasion, and maybe on a second, and I certainly admonish them and will continue to admonish all persons in the audience not to say anything. And if you did hear any words or noticed anything, any reaction by spectators, I tell you must not in any way let these things affect you. Completely disregard them. Now someone in the audience obviously is not under oath and their reactions have no value to you whatsoever as the finders of fact. As I say, hopefully, there will be no further things like that occurring, but please just disregard them. In light of the nature and circumstances of the comment and the court's forceful admonition to disregard it, there is not even a plausible basis on which we could find prejudice to defendant.
(19) Later on the first day of trial, Darlene Brice, who was Brice's wife and Anthony's mother, was being examined by the prosecutor. Q: When was the funeral? What date was the funeral of your son and your husband? A: August 21st, I believe. Q: August 21? A: Yes. Member of the Audience (unidentified): Twenty-first. The witness: Yes. (Italics added.) This is barren ground in which to root a claim of prejudice. This momentary, two-word utterance did not refer to defendant or the circumstances of the crime. Defendant contends only that the mention of the date, made it clear that members of the audience were very close to the case. We are not persuaded. The assumption is questionable and, even if true, fails to show prejudice. Moreover, the trial court immediately cautioned that, I heard something from the audience. Somebody made a statement as to the answer to a question, but somebody in the audience must not speak out in any way, shape or form. And as explained above, the jury was firmly admonished at the end of the day to disregard spectator remarks.
(20) During his closing guilt phase argument, defense counsel was interrupted as follows: [Counsel:] Michael Hill, according to his testimony, and, you know, depends on how you interpret the evidence, never had the specific intent permanently to deprive such person [the victims] of the property. Where in the evidence do you see him depriving  where in the evidence do you see anywhere of Michael Hill himself having that intent permanently to deprive the possessor of his property if he does what he says he did? You see, everything I'm saying is conditioned on Michael Hill being an aider  Member of the Audience (unidentified): Don't make it like that, him killing my kids, all I had. The Court: Ladies and Gentlemen  Member of the Audience (unidentified): That was all I had. The Court: For the record, ladies and gentlemen, someone in the audience has left the courtroom and was saying some words as she left, apparently in tears and upset. I realize it's difficult but you must lock that from your minds and consideration in all ways, shapes and forms. I'm sorry for the interruption. You may continue, counsel. (Italics added.) The record does not establish the identity of the spectator. Both respondent and defendant state that she was Brice's mother, the same spectator who spoke out on the first day of trial, and the nature of the remarks support that conclusion. We will therefore assume it to be correct for the purpose of discussion. Her identity, however, does not affect our analysis. Even if the jury somehow surmised from her comments and her prior interjection (on the first day of trial) that she was Brice's mother, there was no prejudice. In People v. Lucero, supra, 44 Cal.3d 1006, we rejected a claim of prejudicial spectator misconduct on facts far more egregious than here. As in this case, the mother of a murder victim became hysterical during the defendant's guilt phase closing argument. Her outburst was far more extensive and chilling (relating as it did to the victim's screams) than in the present case, and, as we put it, the trial court's admonition was cursory. ( Id., at pp. 1021-1022.) We found no prejudice. In the present case, the outburst was abbreviated, and the jury was promptly and thoroughly admonished. We reiterate that, In such cases [i.e., spectator misconduct] prejudice is not presumed. Indeed, it is generally assumed that such errors are cured by admonition, unless the record demonstrates the misconduct resulted in a miscarriage of justice. ( Id., at p. 1023, fn. 9.) The record in this case establishes no prejudice.