Opinion ID: 1811437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of defense challenge for cause of juror who became foreperson.

Text: Defendant avers that several trial court rulings during voir dire skewed the jury toward the death penalty and deprived him of his right to exercise peremptory challenges, his right to a fair and impartial jury, and his right to a reliable determination of sentence. Thus, defendant complains that the trial court's rulings violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, §§ 16, 17, and 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974. The proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his views on capital punishment is whether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980). See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 515, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1773, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (holding that a prospective juror who would vote automatically for a life sentence is properly excluded); see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). In a reverse- Witherspoon  context, the basis of the exclusion is that a prospective juror will not consider a life sentence and ... will automatically vote for the death penalty under the factual circumstances of the case before him. State v. Robertson, 92-2660, (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278, 1284. [14] Jurors who cannot consider both a life sentence and a death sentence are not impartial, and cannot accept the law as given ... by the court. LSA C.Cr.P. art. 797(2),(4); State v. Maxie, 93-2158, p. 16 (La.4/10/95), 653 So.2d 526, 534-35. In other words, if a prospective juror's views on the death penalty are such that they would prevent or substantially impair the performance of duties in accordance with the instructions [or] the oath, whether those views are for or against the death penalty, he or she should be excused for cause. State v. Taylor, 99-1311, p. 8 (La.1/17/01), 781 So.2d 1205, 1214, cert. denied, 534 U.S. 844, 122 S.Ct. 106, 151 L.Ed.2d 64 (2001). A trial court is vested with broad discretion in ruling on challenges for cause and these rulings will be reversed only when a review of the voir dire record as a whole reveals an abuse of discretion. State v. Cross, 93-1189, p. 7 (La.6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683, 686. Prejudice to the defendant by a trial judge's rulings is presumed when a challenge for cause is denied erroneously by a trial court and the defendant ultimately exhausts his peremptory challenges. Robertson, 630 So.2d at 1280. In the instant case, defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges, and therefore, need only show that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his challenges for cause. Id., at 1281. An erroneous ruling depriving an accused of a peremptory challenge violates his substantial rights and constitutes reversible error. Cross, 93-1189 at 6, 658 So.2d at 686. [A] challenge for cause should be granted, even when a prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror's responses as a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment according to law may be reasonably implied. State v. Hallal, 557 So.2d 1388, 1389-90 (La.1990). The grounds for which a juror may be challenged for cause are set forth in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797. Two of these grounds are pertinent here, namely, that [t]he juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality, and [t]he juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 797(2) and (4). The defense argument we address here is based on a perceived inability of a juror to accept the law of mitigating circumstances as listed in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.5. Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying defense challenges for cause as to four prospective jurors [15] who, he alleges, refused to consider bad childhood as a mitigating circumstance. Although these prospective jurors stated they would consider the statutory mitigating circumstances, they also generally adhered to the view that a bad childhood did not excuse a defendant's criminal behavior. As bad childhood is not one of the listed mitigating factors in LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.5, it must be considered as one of the catchall factors, any other relevant mitigating factor. LSA-C.Cr.P. art 905.5(h). After careful review of the voir dire testimony of Ms. Fertitta, who ultimately became the jury's foreperson, this court concludes the record supports the trial court's decision to deny the defense's cause challenge against her. Ms. Fertitta was questioned during the Witherspoon voir dire along with 18 other prospective jurors, 7 of whom were excused after questioning by the prosecution. Ms. Fertitta indicated she believes in the death penalty, although she called it a tough decision. When asked by the prosecutor to place herself on a scale from zero to ten, with zero being completely opposed to capital punishment and ten being automatic death, she assessed herself at maybe an eight, indicating that she could vote for the death penalty [i]f I didn't have a shadow of a doubt that the defendant committed the crime. She also stated she could impose the death penalty on a 16-year-old. Then, in response to an explanation by defense counsel, Ms. Fertitta indicated she understood the death penalty was not required and a life sentence for someone convicted of first degree murder was an option. Defense counsel also explained that the law makes consideration of mitigating circumstances mandatory at the penalty phase of the trial and he read to the panel the list of mitigating circumstances on the chart placed before them. [16] LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.5. In explaining section (h) of the statute, defense counsel stated there were a lot of things that could fit into that section, specifically: Whether or not a person had a terrible home life as a baby or has a defect or something that [is] a result of their environment as they were growing up, which gave rise to their... family life being ... dysfunctional. Subsequent to that explanation, Ms. Fertitta stated she could be open to all the mitigating circumstances and would be open to the facts, take all into consideration. She could consider the sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole as the appropriate sentence. She expressed a belief in the Ten Commandments, an accountability for personal actions, and a credo of Do unto others as you would have them do unto you. However, when defense counsel delved into her views on situations where the death penalty should not be imposed, Ms. Fertitta responded: MS. FERTITTA: I think what the mitigating circumstances are, some things, yes. The state of mind the person was in, do they clearly have an understanding of what they were doing. I don't think that how you are brought up and your surroundings should come into that. I think DEFENSE COUNSEL: Well, let me go back. You couldn't adopt the bottom one then, the relevant mitigating circumstance of how you were brought up? PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, I am going to object to that question, because, first of all, the law says a relevant mitigating circumstance. There is no requirement that any juror put any particular weight on any mitigating circumstance, and it is up to each juror to decide for themselves, after hearing evidence, of what's relevant and what's not. I think the question calls for some sort of commitment on the part of this particular juror. I would ask that it be phrased in a proper manner. THE COURT: Sustained. Why don't you rephrase the question. DEFENSE COUNSEL: Ms. Fertitta, do you think that a person's family life, the way they grew up, is a relevant mitigating circumstance? MS. FERTITTA: Not to me. After that response, defense counsel did not ask Ms. Fertitta any more questions. During the selection session at the bench, counsel sought to excuse Ms. Fertitta for cause. [17] The judge denied the defense cause challenge, stating that while she may have a personal viewpoint with regard to the issue of a bad childhood that ... does not mean she would not consider all of the defense['s] mitigating factors. At the bedrock of the United States Supreme Court's evolving capital punishment jurisprudence over the past quarter century is the principle that the jury must be able to consider and give effect to any mitigating evidence relevant to a defendant's background and character or the circumstances of the offense. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-328, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Accordingly, the sentencer may not be precluded from considering, and may not refuse to consider, any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 276, 118 S.Ct. 757, 761, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998) (Emphasis supplied.) A difficult family history and an emotional disturbance are well recognized mitigating circumstances typically introduced in some cases; such evidence may properly be given little weight. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). At the voir dire stage of the trial, the prospective juror has no indication of what weight evidence of family history and emotional disturbance will receive in light of other factors of the case. While the defendant may not commit a prospective juror to according any particular weight to the evidence he might offer, a juror must commit himself or herself to keeping an open mind with respect to not only the statutory mitigating circumstances, but also any non-statutory circumstance the defendant proffers as the basis for returning a sentence less than death. We note that defense counsel did not demonstrate to the trial court that Ms. Fertitta would exclude consideration of the mitigating factor of defendant's family history. Perhaps counsel's rather vague questioning of Ms. Fertitta resulted from the court's sustaining the State's objection; defense counsel did not preserve an objection to this particular ruling. We note Ms. Fertitta's answers to defense counsel's question concerning the way [the defendant] grew up came after the State objected to defense counsel's seeking a commitment from the prospective juror. Compare the more specific question defense counsel asked of another prospective juror who was on the same panel as Ms. Fertitta: You would be open-minded even if we got to the second phase, the penalty phase of the trial, you could be open-minded to these circumstances and any thing else that we could show you that would individualize the defendant as a person? Answer: Yes. That Ms. Fertitta, during voir dire and in the abstract, rejected family history as a mitigating circumstance did not necessarily mean that she would not consider actual proof during the penalty phase of a salient component of that family history, i.e., the fact that as the result of parental abandonment and neglect, the defendant had consumed lead paint in sufficient quantities to have poisoned his system and caused brain damage, which could qualify as a statutory mitigating circumstance. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.5(e) (At the time of the offense the capacity of the offender to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication.) The trial court was convinced by the entirety of Ms. Fertitta's responses that the juror's personal viewpoint with regard to the issue of a bad childhood ... in an isolated context did not mean that she would not consider all of the defense mitigating factors. Given the breadth of discretion traditionally accorded a trial judge's rulings on cause challenges, the ruling with regard to Ms. Fertitta withstands scrutiny on appeal. See State v. Lee, 93-2810, p. 9 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 102, 108. (A trial judge is accorded broad discretion in ruling on cause challenges because he or she has the benefit of seeing the facial expressions and hearing the vocal intonations of the members of the jury venire as they respond to questioning by the parties' attorneys.) As Ms. Fertitta ultimately served on the jury, she had the benefit of the court's instructions to the jury following the penalty phase, in which the judge quite clearly ordered the jurors that they must also consider any mitigating circumstances before you decide that a sentence of death should be imposed. The judge then read the statutory mitigating circumstances under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 905.5(a)-(h), and then added that in addition to the list just read you must also consider any other relevant mitigating circumstance. You are not limited only to these mitigating circumstances which are defined. You may consider any other relevant circumstances which you feel should mitigate the severity of the penalty to be imposed. This assignment of error is without merit.