Opinion ID: 2599628
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contract formation in this case

Text: The language of the motion suggests that the motion was itself an offer. The motion's relevant language reads:  MOTION by Turner and seconded by Kimball to offer a retirement incentive.... The employee must notify the District by April 30, 1996 if they plan to participate. The district nearly concedes this point, noting that whether the motion was an offer turns on whether under the circumstances the Plaintiffs were justified in viewing it as one. Assessing the underlying context of the offer implicates three circumstances: (1) whether and how the offer was conveyed to the teachers; (2) the official structure of the school district; and (3) the history of past dealings. Restatement section 26 is concerned with the state of mind of the recipient of the offer. It asks whether the person to whom it is addressed knows or has reason to know that the person making it does not intend for it to be considered an offer. [23] The district asserts that it was not reasonable to view the motion as an offer. The district contends that the offer was not conveyed to the teachers, although it concedes that those persons attending the meeting, hearing of the meeting, or in possession of the minutes could be said to have received the `offer.' The teachers do not argue that the district conveyed the offer more clearly after the board passed the motion. They contend that at least one of them attended the April 2 school board meeting and heard the board pass the motion, but it is not clear from the record how many of the six teachers were present. The conveyance circumstance slightly favors the district. By publicizing the meeting's agenda in advance, the district might be said to have taken extra steps to convey the offer. But there are other valid reasons the district might have publicized the agenda (e.g., to promote public comment) without intending to convey an offer by passing a motion. And while an offer was not directly conveyed to the teachers merely because the school board passed the motion at a public meeting, it was indisputably made public knowledge. The second circumstance here is the structure of authority in the school system. For purposes of this case, that structure is determined by Alaska statute and board bylaws and manuals. Alaska Statute 14.14.090 contains an incomplete list of school board duties. It empowers school boards, among other things, to set total compensation levels: In addition to other duties, a school board shall ... determine and disburse the total amount to be made available for compensation of all school employees and administrative officers.... [24] The statute governing district bylaws provides that school board policies relating to management and control of the district shall be expressed in written bylaws adopted at board meetings. [25] Alaska Statute 14.14.130 creates the position of the chief school administrator. [26] It empowers the administrator to administer the district, and to control school personnel decisions: (b) [T]he [chief school] administrator shall administer the district in accordance with the policies that the school board prescribes by bylaw. (c) [T]he [chief school] administrator shall select, appoint, and otherwise control all school district employees that serve under the chief school administrator subject to the approval of the school board. [27] The Copper River School District policy manual states that the Board has exclusive responsibility for all school policy. The Superintendent shall have the responsibility for executing the policy of the Board.... The manual also states that the Superintendent is the chief executive officer of the school system and has, under the direction of the Board, general supervision of all of the public schools and of all the personnel ... of the school system. The Superintendent is responsible for management of the schools under the Board's policies, and is accountable to the Board. These provisions support the general conclusion that the superintendent is charged with carrying out the district's executive functions, while the school board acts as a legislative policymaker. Under this scheme, board actions are more likely delegations than offers. This circumstance strongly supports the district. The third circumstance concerns past dealings. There is some dispute about whether teachers had previously negotiated personnel issues with the superintendent and administrators, or with the school board itself. The teachers offered inconclusive affidavits, in which they affied that they had dealt directly with the school district. But these assertions do not explain whether the negotiations were with the school board or with the district's administrators. While there is some evidence that the teachers negotiated with the administrators, the evidence cited by both sides on this point is meager, particularly considering the importance of this issue. In sum, it is unclear to what extent the school board normally delegates executive and negotiating authority to district administrators. If it has been standard practice to require the administrators to take executive action in order for the district to enter into contracts, a statement by the board should be considered a direct offer only if it clearly and specifically rejects or suspends that pattern of action. In this case, the motion to offer the retirement incentive was not accompanied by any such extraordinary language. Ultimately, the relationship between the board, the administrators, and the teachers here is a fact question for the fact finder. Each side cross-moved for complete summary judgment. Each side thus certified that no genuine, material fact disputes precluded favorable summary judgment. Although neither side asserted that genuine fact disputes required denial of the other side's motion, each side advanced an account of the parties' past dealings that was irreconcilable with the other side's account. Under these circumstances, summary judgment was inappropriate because material questions of fact exist as to whether the context of the April 2 motion made it unreasonable for the teachers to consider it an offer. We remand to determine whether there was an offer within the meaning of Restatement sections 24 and 26.