Opinion ID: 2773704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review

Text: THE DISTRICT COURT’S DENIAL OF MR. MIGLIORE’S RENEWED RULE 60(b) MOTION ¶16 Mr. Migliore argues that the court of appeals erred when it determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the district court’s order denying Mr. Migliore’s renewed rule 60(b) motion. Though Mr. Migliore did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days of entry of that order, he maintains that the order was not a final appealable order because it did not fully resolve the issues between the parties. Specifically, Mr. Migliore argues that it was not final because it did not dispose of Livingston’s request for attorney fees or the order to show cause as to potential rule 11 sanctions. Accordingly, the first issue we must consider is whether the district court’s order denying the renewed rule 60(b) motion was final and appealable. ¶17 Utah appellate courts do not “have jurisdiction over an appeal unless it is taken from a final judgment.” Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 10, 37 P.3d 1070; see also UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a) (“An appeal may be taken from . . . all final orders and judgments . . . .”). “For an order to constitute a final judgment, it must end the controversy between the litigants.” Loffredo, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 12; see also Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 10, 5 P.3d 649 (“To be final, the trial court’s order . . . must dispose of all . . . claims to an action.”). “It is well settled that an order denying relief pursuant to Rule 60(b) is generally a final appealable order.” Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 946 (Utah 1987). Thus, the district court’s order would generally be appealable. But the question before us is whether the district court’s sua sponte order to show cause or Livingston’s subsequent request for attorney fees pursuant to section 78B-5-825 of the Utah Code rendered the order nonfinal and therefore not appealable. ¶18 For the reasons discussed below, we hold that the district court’s sua sponte order to show cause precluded entry of final judgment until the court resolved it. As a result, the order denying the renewed rule 60(b) motion was not final and appealable until the 6 Cite as: 2015 UT 9 Opinion of the Court district court finally resolved the pending order to show cause.2 ¶19 We previously adopted a rule that a judgment is not final until resolution of any outstanding requests for attorney fees. ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, ¶ 12, 998 P.2d 254. We reasoned that judicial economy is best served “by enabl[ing] an appellant to appeal all issues, including an award of attorney fees, in a single notice of appeal.” Id. ¶¶ 14–15 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In so reasoning, we expressly rejected the contrary federal rule, under which a decision on the merits of the case is final regardless of any pending request for attorney fees. Id. ¶ 13 (rejecting the federal rule announced in Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 196 (1988)). ¶20 Mr. Migliore urges us to extend the ProMax rule to the context of pending rule 11 sanctions contemplated in an otherwise final order. He argues that the logic underlying the ProMax rule is equally applicable to rule 11 sanctions in this context. We agree. A party appealing a judgment on the merits is also likely to appeal any rule 11 sanctions imposed by the court. Thus, requiring a party to separately appeal the imposition of rule 11 sanctions would necessitate piecemeal appeals, a needlessly wasteful endeavor. Accordingly, we extend ProMax to apply to requests for rule 11 sanctions raised before or contemporaneously with the entry of a final appealable judgment.3 ¶21 We are aware that we have previously referred to rule 11 sanctions as a collateral matter that have “no relationship to the disposition of the case on its merits.” Clark v. Booth, 821 P.2d 1146, 1148 (Utah 1991). In Clark, we held that the imposition of rule 11 sanctions did not affect the finality of a decree of foreclosure. Id. Our reasoning there paralleled that of the federal courts, which hold that the imposition of rule 11 sanctions is a collateral issue that has 2 Because we hold that the district court’s order to show cause precluded entry of final judgment on the order denying the renewed rule 60(b) motion, Livingston’s subsequent request for attorney fees is best characterized as a prejudgment request for fees. And our precedent establishes that a prejudgment request for attorney fees must be resolved prior to the entry of a final appealable order. See Loffredo v. Holt, 2001 UT 97, ¶ 13, 37 P.3d 1070. 3 A judgment that is final and appealable when entered does not lose that status as a result of a subsequently filed motion for rule 11 sanctions. 7 MIGLIORE v. LIVINGSTON FIN ., LLC Opinion of the Court no effect on the finality of a judgment on the merits. Id.; see also Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395–96 (1990) (“Like the imposition of costs, attorney’s fees, and contempt sanctions, the imposition of a Rule 11 sanction is not a judgment on the merits of an action. Rather, it requires the determination of a collateral issue . . . .”). But we decided Clark prior to ProMax. In light of our holding in ProMax, and our rejection of the federal rule in that case, we hereby repudiate the approach taken in Clark. The ProMax rule applies to all requests for attorney fees, including pending requests for rule 11 sanctions, whether instigated by the court or the parties. ¶22 The district court’s order denying the renewed rule 60(b) motion was not final and appealable until the district court resolved the pending order to show cause. Thus, we hold that the court of appeals erred when it determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the denial of Mr. Migliore’s renewed rule 60(b) motion. In the interest of judicial economy, we elect to exercise our discretion to consider the merits, rather than remanding the case to the court of appeals.