Opinion ID: 1459853
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Qualified Immunity for the Remaining Defendants

Text: Cousins next argues that the district court erred in determining that the remaining defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the federal claims on the ground that he cannot show that any constitutional right that may have been violated was clearly established in law. Qualified immunity protects government officials from civil liability if their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). We consider qualified immunity using the two-step inquiry set forth in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). [2] First, we decide whether the alleged facts make out a violation of a constitutional right. Id. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. If so, we then decide whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct. Id. The inquiry into whether a right is clearly established must be undertaken in light of the specific context of the case. Id. In addition, for a right to be clearly established, its contours `must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' Id. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). In this case, the remaining defendants fully agree with Cousins that he has a broad federal constitutional right to be free from wrongful incarceration. [3] See, e.g., McNeil v. Dir., Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 246, 92 S.Ct. 2083, 32 L.Ed.2d 719 (1972) (holding that continued incarceration after the lawful basis for custody expires violates due process under the Fourteenth Amendment); Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1354 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that deliberately indifferent detention of a person beyond the term permissible by law constitutes cruel and unusual punishment proscribed under the Eighth Amendment). However, as the Supreme Court has explained: [I]f the test of clearly established law were to be applied at this level of generality, it would bear no relationship to the objective legal reasonableness that is the touchstone of [the Harlow decision]. Plaintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified immunity that our cases plainly establish into a rule of virtually unqualified liability simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.... It should not be surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been clearly established in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (citations omitted). In other words, the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999). Here, Cousins offers no decisional, statutory, or other legal basis to suggest that a reasonable official standing in the defendants' shoes would have any way of knowing that by failing to personally check all California appellate court decisions for changes in the law, failing to apply these changes to individual inmates statewide, and then failing to contact the appropriate sentencing courts, he or she was violating Cousins' constitutional rights. Although Cousins argues that [t]he CDCR operations manual is replete with references which make clear that the duties and procedures it prescribes encompass the activities which are necessary to avoid the deprivation of liberty [he] suffered, the remaining defendants are entitled to qualified immunity from the federal claims because state departmental regulations do not establish a federal constitutional violation. See Case v. Kitsap County Sheriff's Dep't, 249 F.3d 921, 930 (9th Cir.2001) (quoting Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 430 (8th Cir.1997) ([T]here is no § 1983 liability for violating prison policy. [Plaintiff] must prove that[the official] violated his constitutional right ....)); see also Gagne v. City of Galveston, 805 F.2d 558, 560 (5th Cir.1986) ([A]llegations about the breach of a ... regulation are simply irrelevant to the question of an official's eligibility for qualified immunity in a suit over the deprivation of a constitutional right.). Finally, Cousins' argument that the district court erred in dismissing the federal claims against the remaining John/Jane Doe defendants before they could be identified and impleaded through the discovery process is misplaced. Since Cousins has failed to identify, at the appropriate level of specificity, any clearly established constitutional right that has been violated, discovery would be futile. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly granted the remaining defendants qualified immunity from Cousins' § 1983 claims.