Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Death-qualification of guilt-phase jury

Text: In Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1986), the United States Supreme Court approved of the practice of death qualifying jurors. Death qualification excludes for cause those jurors whose views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980); see also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 85-89, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2276-79, 101 L.Ed. 2d 80, 88-90 (1988)(clarifying that death-qualification entails excluding jurors who would either always oppose or always support death penalty); Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 248-56, 524 A. 2d 188 (requiring New Jersey trial courts to follow Adams test). To death-qualify jurors, the trial court informs them of the capital nature of the case and then questions them closely on their views of capital punishment. Two separate juries were empaneled for the guilt and penalty phases of defendant's capital trial because one of the aggravating factors cited by the State for the penalty phase was a prior murder conviction. To avoid the blinding impact of the prior murder on the determination of guilt, this Court has required separate juries. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-44, 594 A. 2d 172. The penalty-phase jury was fully death qualified. Prior to jury selection for the guilt phase, defense counsel made clear his objection to death qualification of the jurors who would determine guilt: Judge, as I stated on the record yesterday, my position is that there should be no mention whatsoever that this is a death penalty case. I mean, as far as I'm concerned that issue is totally irrelevant as to whether this jury determines that Mr. Loftin committed the offense or not. They're determining the guilt or innocence, not death. I agree with the State there is some impact and the impact is prejudicial. Any time you mention death penalty to jurors or prospective jurors, certain things start going on in their heads. And I think when the juror hears it's a death penalty [case, the juror might think that] this guy is guilty that's why the State is seeking the death penalty.... Ultimately, the trial court agreed not to inform the jury of the potential death penalty in the case, but decided that if a juror asked about the potential sentence, the trial court would not lie; if the juror was unable to fairly and impartially decide that issue, then that juror would be removed. Defense counsel again complained: Obviously, the only individuals that are going to say, look, your Honor, I can't sit are the individuals that are against the death penalty.... So what we're going to have, if we use that suggestion, Judge, is a jury packed with people pro-death penalty. However, no juror asked about the potential sentence, and thus the guilt-phase jury deliberated without being death-qualified. Defendant contends that the trial court's failure to sua sponte death-qualify the guilt-phase jury and inform the jurors, during voir dire and during the jury charge at the close of trial, of the potential consequences of their decision, violated his constitutional rights by dilut[ing] the jury's responsibility for the imposition of the death penalty, constituting plain error. State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 485, 662 A. 2d 308 (1995) (quoting State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 164, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II )). In Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 44, 594 A. 2d 172, we stated that we most likely will require a two-jury system for all capital cases in which the State seeks to prove [the c(4)(a)] factor. In reaching that conclusion, we recognized the differences between a jury's function in the guilt phase and in the penalty phase. Prior-murder convictions are relevant to the determination of the appropriate sentence because the sentencing phase focuses in part on the character of the defendant. The guilt phase, however, is limited to a determination of what the defendant did. See United States v. Myers, 550 F. 2d 1036, 1044 (5th Cir.1977) (A concomitant of the presumption of innocence is that a defendant must be tried for what he did, not who he is.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 847, 99 S.Ct. 147, 58 L.Ed. 2d 149 (1978). Because of the prejudice that could be engendered by voir dire prior to the guilt phase about a defendant's other murder convictions that are not otherwise admissible as evidence during that portion of the case, see Evid. R. 55, that questioning should almost invariably come only after a jury has found a defendant death eligible. See [ State v. ] Pinnell, supra, 311 Or. [98] at 108, 806 P. 2d [110] at 116 [(1991)] (finding that objective of a bifurcated trial was thwarted by voir dire before guilt phase that implied that defendant had previously been convicted of other crimes). [ Id. at 44-45, 594 A. 2d 172.] In State v. Erazo, 126 N.J. 112, 133, 594 A. 2d 232 (1991), we again stated our belief that [a] separate jury [for the penalty phase] would obviate death qualification of the guilt-phase jury. In Mejia, supra, however, we held that trial courts in capital cases must inform juries of the legal effect of their findings. 141 N.J. at 485, 662 A. 2d 308. Both Mejia and Bey II involved one jury for both the guilt and penalty phase hearings and neither involved the prejudicial impact of factor c(4)(a) on a defendant. That knowledge of a defendant's prior conviction would have a blinding impact on a defendant's subsequent conviction is undisputed. Biegenwald IV, supra, 126 N.J. at 43-43, 594 A. 2d 172. Moreover, defense counsel asserts, as have defense counsel in other cases, that death-qualifying a jury prior to the guilt phase produces conviction-prone juries. See, e.g., Lockhart, supra, 476 U.S. at 173, 106 S.Ct. at 1764, 90 L.Ed. 2d at 147 (discussing studies that purported to prove that `death qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more `conviction-prone' than `non-death qualified' juries). Whether defense counsel is correct that death qualification results in death-prone juries is a debatable issue that we need not decide in this case. Even in death-penalty cases, we have held that except in the most extreme cases, strategic decisions made by defense counsel will not present grounds for reversal on appeal. State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 93, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991) ( Marshall I ). Thus, in Marshall I, supra, we found no error when the court conducted a limited death qualification at voir dire pursuant to defense counsel's request. Ibid. Therefore, if defense counsel objects to the death-qualification of the guilt-phase jury in a case involving aggravating factor c(4)(a), a trial court shall deem such an objection to be a waiver of defendant's right to a death-qualified jury in the guilt-phase. However, in the absence of any such objection, trial courts will give guilt-phase jurors a severely restricted death qualification, specifically not informing them of defendant's prior conviction for murder. That result presents a proper balance between the concerns expressed by defense counsel that a death-qualified jury is more prone to convict and the Court's holding that jurors should be told of the legal effects of their findings. Mejia, supra, 141 N.J. at 485, 662 A. 2d 308 (quoting Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 164-65, 548 A. 2d 887). Because defense counsel made a strategic decision that a death-qualified jury might be more prone to convict and objected to the death-qualification of guilt-phase jurors, his decision does not provide grounds for a finding of plain error.