Opinion ID: 1766010
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Of course.

Text: Whether this evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to establish a factual issue with respect to an express contract by Dr. Averi to use due care, we need not decide. The evidence as a whole clearly demonstrates that a genuine issue of material fact exists on this aspect of the contract claim, and that Dr. Averi is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), A.R.Civ.P. The Moores argue that Dr. Averi, in his deposition testimony, demonstrated his incompetence and woeful ignorance of bone physiology and healing properties. They make this assertion based on the affidavit of Dr. Kermit Ary, who treated Mr. Moore after he left the care of Dr. Averi, and on the podiatric literature attached to Dr. Ary's affidavit. Dr. Averi was unable at his deposition to cite any authority supporting the method he used to treat Mr. Moore. One of the authorities cited by the Moores, O.A. Mercado, D.P.M., teaches at Illinois College of Podiatric Medicine, where Dr. Averi got his degree. Dr. Averi could not name one of his teachers who taught the method of surgery he used. Both Dr. Mercado's treatise and Dr. Ary disapproved of Dr. Averi's choice of site for surgery and his decision not to fix the bone in place during healing. Dr. Averi stated in deposition that he did not think that the choice of site for surgery was important or that it was necessary to fix the bone either with wire or in a cast. Dr. Ary also stated that, assuming as true Mr. Moore's statement that he complanied of pain after the operation, Dr. Averi's failure to take any postoperative X-rays was a deviation from the standard of care. These matters present ample evidence that Dr. Averi breached his express contract to perform as a competent podiatrist. If podiatrists are not subject to the Alabama Medical Liability Act, an action may be maintained in the appropriate circumstances against them for malpractice in contract or in tort, and, if brought in contract, the six year limitation of § 6-2-34 presumably would apply. We note that Ala.Code 1940 (Recompiled 1958), tit. 7, § 25(1), provided the following statute of limitations: (1) All actions against physicians and surgeons, and dentists for malpractice, error, mistake, or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort, must be commenced within two years next after the act or omission or failure giving rise to the cause of action, and not afterwards. Provided that if the cause of action is not discovered and could not reasonably have been discovered within such period, then the action may be commenced within six months from the date of such discovery or the date of discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to such discovery, whichever is earlier, provided further that in no event may the action be commenced more than six years after such act. (Emphasis added.) This provision was not carried into the 1975 Code due to the enactment in 1975 of the Medical Liability Act. We make no judgment whether the holding in Sellers that podiatrists are not subject to the Medical Liability Act revives the above-quoted provision with respect to actions against podiatrists, because the instant action sounding in contract was timely under either the above section or § 6-2-34. The Moores argue further that Dr. Averi expressly promised a successful outcome. Because Mr. Moore does not allege or prove fraud on the part of Dr. Averi in inducing him to execute the consent to operate form, which disavows any assurance as to the results that may be obtained, we affirm that portion of the judgment that eliminates this aspect of the Moores' contract claim. Orange v. Shannon, 284 Ala. 202, 224 So.2d 236 (1969); Snow v. Allen, 227 Ala. 615, 151 So. 468 (1933).