Opinion ID: 1198884
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absent a Contrary Good Cause Finding. Larry Was Entitled to a Modification of Child Support Effective the Date He Served His Motion.

Text: Rebecca argues that if child support should have been modified when the children changed residences, the superior court had discretion to choose an effective date for the modified support order. She implies that the date she was served with Larry's motion is the earliest date, but not the mandatory date, from which child support arrearages may be calculated. Larry argues that the superior court was obligated to apply Rule 90.3 effective the date Rebecca was served with his motion to modify child support, and that any discretion to apply a later date is subject to the requirements of Rule 90.3(c). The superior court never reached this issue because it altogether denied Larry's request for an arrearages judgment and never decided his June 28, 1995, motion to modify child support. We discuss it because the court will have to reach the issue on remand. Rule 90.3(h)(2) prohibits retroactive modification of a child support arrearage. But it also provides that a modification that becomes effective on or after the date the modification motion is served on the opposing party is not considered a retroactive modification. [4] We have read Rule 90.3(h)(2) to prohibit increases or decreases in child support effective before the date the modification motion was served on the opposing party. [5] We have also read it to allow the court to increase child support only after that service date. [6] The rule implicitly permits a court to modify child support effective the date the opposing party was served. The rule's text does not express a preference or presumption that a modification become effective on the motion service date, and does not prevent the superior court from exercising its discretion and selecting a later effective date. But we are nonetheless persuaded that the motion service date should be the preferred effective date, and that the superior court should exercise its discretion in selecting a different effective date only if it finds good cause for doing so. One reason for our preference of the motion service date as the effective date of a modified child support order is that child support reflects the child's current needs. Another is that child support is both based on and paid out of the obligor's current income. [7] Ideally, a claim of changed circumstances would be immediately resolved to permit immediate relief to the movant. Delays in resolving such disputes should not disadvantage parties entitled to relief. The rule commentary, noting the prohibition on retroactive modification, urges prompt applications: Thus, either the custodial or the obligor parent should promptly apply for a modification of child support when a material change in circumstances occurs. Alaska R. Civ. P. 90.3 cmt. X. Other jurisdictions have reached the same result: We hold that a trial court has discretion to order a modification of child support effective as of the date the petition to modify is filed. Any other result would be inconsistent with the purposes of the changed circumstances rule. The needs of the children, upon which the court focuses in determining whether a substantial and continuing change of circumstances has occurred, are examined as of the date the petition is filed. If the court finds that a modification of child support is justified, then the court has discretion to order payments to be effective from that date. To grant modification of support only from the date of the court's order detracts from the purposes of the changed circumstances rule and serves to encourage and benefit dilatory tactics. Kruse v. Kruse, 464 N.E.2d 934, 939 (Ind. App. 1984). [8] Further, service of the motion gives the opposing party both fair warning that support may change and an opportunity to reassess, even before the court rules, the correct amount of support. This gives an opportunity to adjust consumption patterns in anticipation of modification, and thus minimize prejudice when relief is granted effective as of the service date. This preference does not prevent the superior court from exercising its discretion to select a later effective date if it finds good cause for doing so. But unbounded discretion to choose a later effective date could sabotage the efficacy of Rule 90.3. Logically extended, Rebecca's argument would give the court discretion to choose any date after the date of service, and would allow the choice of no date at all. We therefore reject Rebecca's argument. On remand, the superior court should calculate her arrearages beginning with the date Larry served Rebecca with his June 28 motion to modify, unless Rebecca can establish good cause for selecting some later effective date.