Opinion ID: 3186961
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Apparent-Authority Instruction

Text: During Dvorin’s trial, Dvorin attempted to create reasonable doubt regarding his “intent to defraud” by showing that he relied on Derrington’s apparent authority to approve his checks. Dvorin thus requested that the district court give the following instruction: “In order to prove that the defendant had the intent of tricking the bank, the government must show that the defendant did not rely on the apparent authority of one or more bank officials.” Rather than insert Dvorin’s proposed apparent-authority instruction, the court largely accepted Dvorin’s proposed good faith instruction: The word “willfully” . . . means that the act was committed voluntarily and purposely, with the specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law. A defendant does not act willfully if he believes in good faith that his conduct does not violate the law. This is so even if that belief is objectively unreasonable. The district court also instructed the jury that “[o]fficers, directors, or other employees of a financial institution cannot validate a fraud on the institution. Therefore, the knowledge of bank fraud by officers, directors, or other employees of the institution is not a defense to the charge of bank fraud.” Dvorin insists that the charge did not adequately address his apparentauthority defense because the good faith instruction was abstract rather than specific to the facts presented by Dvorin’s defense, and further argues that the district court’s instruction regarding an official’s inability to validate a fraud 6 Case: 15-10142 Document: 00513429336 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/18/2016 No. 15-10142 Cons. w/ No. 15-10183 undermined his apparent-authority defense. The government counters that the district court did not err because the court’s charge substantially and accurately covered the content of the proposed instruction. We conclude that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on apparent authority because the district court’s good faith instruction makes clear that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Dvorin acted with the specific intent to violate the law. See United States v. Aubin, 87 F.3d 141, 147–48 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the district court’s good faith instruction adequately preserved the defendant’s ability to argue that he relied on the apparent authority of the bank official, such that an agency instruction was not necessary in spite of the court’s instruction regarding an official’s inability to validate a fraud on the bank). This instruction preserved Dvorin’s ability to argue that he had a good faith belief that the bank authorized Derrington to enter into the check-kiting arrangement with Dvorin, and in fact, Dvorin’s attorney made this argument during trial. The jury simply rejected Dvorin’s theory. Because the court’s charge substantially covered the content of Dvorin’s proposed instruction, we hold that the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury specifically on Dvorin’s apparent-authority defense.