Opinion ID: 779124
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Base Level for Sentencing

Text: 28 In its cross-appeal, the government argues that the district court erred in calculating defendant's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(a)(2)(A), yielding a lower base offense level and less prison time than U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A). The latter sentencing provision provides for a higher base offense level for a defendant who knowingly creates a substantial risk of death or injury to innocent persons. 29 At the threshold of the sentencing matter, the parties dispute the appropriate standard of review. The United States claims that interpretation of the knowingly requirement in the relevant sentencing guideline is subject to de novo review as a question of law, while Stevens claims the district court's decision to accept the lower base level recommended in the pre-sentence report must be reviewed only for clear error. 30 The Sixth Circuit recently addressed this issue in a case involving the same provision of the Sentencing Guidelines. See United States v. Georgia, 279 F.3d 384 (6th Cir.2002). 5 The Georgia court, although expressing some doubt on the subject, adhered to earlier Sixth Circuit precedents holding that a district court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines is subject to only clear error review. See id. at 386. Informed by Georgia, we conclude that the application of § 2K1.4(a)(2)(A) was clearly erroneous. 31 This Circuit uses a two-prong test to review a district court's sentencing determinations in an arson case: First, we examine the district court's conclusion that the defendant's actions created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. We then examine the evidence supporting the conclusion that the risk was created knowingly. Georgia, 279 F.3d at 387. 32 As to the first prong, the district court found that the fire was exceedingly intense and agreed with the Government's position that Mr. Stevens' acts placed emergency personnel and surrounding dwellings in danger. J.A. at 71, 72. However, the district court applied the lower sentencing guideline because 2K1.4(a)(2) takes that very same matter into consideration. Id. at 72. In order for the risk to fire fighters and other emergency and law enforcement personnel to warrant application of § 2K1.4(a)(1), that risk must include something more than simply responding to the fire. United States v. Brian L. Johnson, 152 F.3d 553, 556 (6th Cir.1998) (emphasis added). On the record before us, it is not clear whether the district court sentenced Stevens under the lower base offense level because he believed the danger to emergency personnel and surrounding dwellings did not pose a sufficiently substantial risk under the guidelines, or because he believed Stevens lacked the requisite knowledge of that risk. 33 The intervening decision of this Circuit in Georgia examined several arson cases and distilled from them two circumstances which commonly (but not exclusively) warrant imposition of the higher base level: Nearly all of the cases where an appellate court has affirmed the application of United States Sentencing Guideline § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A) have involved one or both of the following two clearly exacerbating circumstances: (1) the risk of a large explosion, or (2) the presence of nearby residences. Georgia, 279 F.3d at 388. Although the district court referred to the risk to firefighters, it did not address whether the quickly and intensely burning rubber roof, the storage of inflammable and possibly explosive liquids in the South Saginaw Street building, or the presence of nearby residences and people on the street constituted something more, justifying imposition of the higher base offense level. 34 The record indicates that this is not a case where the arsonist merely knew that firefighters would likely respond, but was unaware of any risk-heightening circumstances. Stevens knew, for example, that the building's roof was rubber and was likely to burn more quickly and intensely than the standard fire-resistant roof. He also knew that there were drums of transmission fluid and automobiles (presumably with gasoline in their tanks) stored in the warehouse, and that transmission fluid and gasoline are explosive fire accelerants. Indeed, he highlighted these facts to Watson and Hensley when soliciting them to commit arson. In addition, he knew that the building was located on a busy commercial street traveled by pedestrians and other passerbys with at least one residence located in the vicinity of the building. There may also have been a heightened risk of injury to pedestrians and passerbys due to the time of the fire — 7:30 in the evening — and the busy, commercial nature of South Saginaw Street. Cf. Georgia, 279 F.3d at 388 (risk of personal injury was minimal in a fire set at a vacant church at 1:24 A.M.). All of these factors support a finding that defendant's actions created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 387. 35 As to the second prong of Georgia's analysis, the district court sentenced Stevens under U.S.S.G. § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A) because there is not a preponderance of the evidence to show Mr. Stevens had knowledge or intent to harm others or other buildings around his own. Mr. Stevens' felonious intent in this matter was to collect insurance monies by burning his building. J.A. at 72. This statement confirms our impression that the district court did not sufficiently distinguish between knowingly and intentionally. The standard for knowledge under § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A) employed in this Circuit, drawn from the Model Penal Code, defines knowingly to require that a defendant be `practically certain' that conduct will cause a certain result. United States v. Robert Lee Johnson, 116 F.3d 163, 166 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting Model Penal Code § 2.022(2)(b)). Or as the Johnson court put it in other words, a defendant should be sentenced under the higher base offense level only if he was aware of the factors that elevated the degree of risk. Robert Lee Johnson, 116 F.3d at 166. See also Brian L. Johnson, 152 F.3d at 557 ([T]he arsonist must know that a specific fire for some reason poses a substantial risk of death or serious injury to fire fighters and emergency personnel who may respond.) (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added). 36 Stevens plainly intended to burn the building to collect insurance. In addition, however, he knew that burning the building would create a heightened risk of death or injury to emergency personnel or innocent bystanders. The record shows that he was aware that the building had a rubber roof and sizable quantities of flammable and potentially explosive gasoline and transmission fluid were stored in the garage area, and that he was practically certain the combination of these two factors would cause any fire to spread rapidly throughout the building. He also knew that the building was located in a commercial district, with at least one residence in close proximity across the street. This satisfies the second requirement for sentencing under § 2K1.4(a)(1)(A).