Opinion ID: 1238189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Negligent Selection

Text: Another argument made by Sipple is that PPI was negligent in hiring Starr and/or Rocket Mart to sell PPI gasoline. We have held that such a tort exists in West Virginia. There can be no doubt that this court has recognized a cause of action based upon a claim of negligent hiring.... McCormick v. West Virginia Dept. of Public Safety, 202 W.Va. 189, 193, 503 S.E.2d 502, 506 (1998). Accord State ex rel. West Virginia State Police v. Taylor, 201 W.Va. 554, 560 n. 7, 499 S.E.2d 283, 289 n. 7 (1997). We identified this cause of action for the first time in Thomson v. McGinnis, 195 W.Va. 465, 465 S.E.2d 922 (1995). We found in Thomson that a principal (in that case a real estate broker) may be held liable to a third party for civil damages if the principal is negligent in the selection and retention of a contractor, and if such negligence proximately causes harm to the third party. See Thomson v. McGinnis, 195 W.Va. 465, 465 S.E.2d 922 (1995); King v. Lens Creek Ltd. Partnership, 199 W.Va. 136, 483 S.E.2d 265 (1996). In Thomson, we noted that we are not alone in allowing a plaintiff to recover from a principal who has negligently hired a contractor: Other jurisdictions have entertained a cause of action for negligent hiring of an independent contractor, reasoning that negligently securing the services of the independent contractor falls within one of several typically recognized exceptions to the rule that an employer is not liable for the actions of his independent contractor. See Payne v. Lee, 686 F.Supp. 677, 679 (E.D.Tenn.1988), aff'd sub nom. Payne v. The Law Center, 872 F.2d 1027, 1989 WL 40258 (6th Cir.1989); Sullivan v. St. Louis Station Associates, 770 S.W.2d 352, 354-55 (Mo.App.1989). For instance, in Del Signore v. Pyramid Sec. Servs., Inc., 147 A.D.2d 759, 537 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1989), the New York court held that an action for negligent hiring of an independent contractor who assaulted concert patrons could be maintained where the employer engages an unqualified or careless contractor or, when on notice of deficient performance, fails to prevent the continuance of such negligence. Thomson v. McGinnis, 195 W.Va. 465, 471, 465 S.E.2d 922, 928 (1995) (footnotes and some citations omitted). Appellant Sipple introduced evidence that PPI knew that Starr kept a gun upon the premises, that Starr had engaged in a firefight outside of the store, and that Fields had toyed with the gun in the presence of customers before. Whether or not a jury would agree with her, we feel that Sipple has presented a genuine issue of a material fact, namely that PPI was on notice of the deficient performance of Starr and the Rocket Mart, and failed to prevent the continuance of such negligence. In Thomson, we found that the real estate broker, who volunteered to find a contractor for a furnace inspection, could be found liable for her negligent hiring of a contractor who, as it turned out, was not qualified to inspect furnaces. In the case before us, a man was killed with a gun that PPI allegedly knew was on the premises, by an employee PPI purportedly knew had brandished the gun in the past. If we found sufficient cause in Thomson to overturn a grant of summary judgment, we find ample reason in the instant case to do the same. The Thomson court confined its holding to the context of the case before it, but acknowledged the influence of section 411 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts upon its decision. See Thomson, 195 W.Va. at 471 n. 6, 465 S.E.2d at 928 n. 6; King v. Lens Creek Ltd. Partnership, 199 W.Va. 136, 140, 483 S.E.2d 265, 269 (1996). That section states: An employer is subject to liability for physical harm to third persons caused by his [or her] failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor (a) to do work which will involve a risk of physical harm unless it is skillfully and carefully done, or (b) to perform any duty which the employer owes to third persons. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 411 (1965). [11] We concur with the sentiment that a principal is liable for harm caused by his or her failure to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor, and we adopt this section of the Restatement. It remains to be seen whether a jury would find PPI negligent under this standard. However, because appellant Sipple has introduced evidence that suggests PPI did not exercise reasonable care in its selection of Starr and the Rocket Mart as retailers of its gasoline, the lower court's grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. C.