Opinion ID: 1353585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's absence from the competency hearing.

Text: Appellant claims it was reversible error to conduct the competency hearing in his absence. The hearing was held on October 2, 1997, at the courthouse in Mt. Sterling, Montgomery County, Kentucky. On that date, Appellant was a medicated, mostly bedfast patient at a nursing home in Frenchburg, Menifee County, Kentucky. Defense counsel explicitly waived Appellant's presence at the hearing, explaining: In my opinion, it would endanger him to try to move him. It would certainly place him in a great deal of pain to try to move him over here for this hearing. Appellant does not contest the accuracy of this statement and does not claim that his attorney was acting without his authorization. Nor does he suggest how he was actually prejudiced by his absence from the hearing. He does not assert that his counsel inadequately presented the evidence in his behalf or inadequately cross-examined the witnesses for the Commonwealth. He does not describe how he could have assisted counsel or what additional testimony he would have presented so as to avoid the judge's ultimate determination that he was competent to stand trial. In fact, Appellant's ability to provide such assistance might well have prejudiced his claim of incompetency, i.e., that he lacked the capacity to appreciate the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to participate rationally in his defense. In other words, his ability to assist his counsel at the hearing may well have proved the Commonwealth's contention that he was competent to stand trial. The sum and substance of Appellant's claim with respect to this issue is that there should be a bright line rule that no one can waive a defendant's right to be present at his own competency hearing except the defendant, him/herself. [T]he right to be present at every critical stage of the trial, RCr 8.28(1), protects a defendant against purposeful or involuntary exclusion, e.g., Price v. Commonwealth, Ky., 31 S.W.3d 885, 892 (2000), but not voluntary exclusion. Even [t]he most basic rights of criminal defendants are ... subject to waiver. New York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 114, 120 S.Ct. 659, 663, 145 L.Ed.2d 560 (2000) (quoting Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 2669, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991)). Although it would be preferable that the waiver come directly from the defendant, himself, there is no constitutional requirement to that effect. Clark v. Stinson, 214 F.3d 315, 324 (2nd Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1116, 121 S.Ct. 865, 148 L.Ed.2d 778 (2001); Polizzi v. United States, 926 F.2d 1311, 1322 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied, sub nom., Palazzolo v. United States, 495 U.S. 933, 110 S.Ct. 2175, 109 L.Ed.2d 504 (1990). Unlike RCr 9.26, which requires that waiver of the right to trial by jury be in writing, there is no rule or statute specifying the proper method for waiving the right to be present at every critical stage of the trial. In Richmond v. Commonwealth, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 642 (1982), this Court unanimously held that an attorney could waive a defendant's right to attend a pretrial deposition that would be used as testimony against him at trial (as opposed to here, where none of the testimony elicited at the competency hearing was used at trial). Although it is asserted that it was the defendant in Richmond , not his attorney, who waived his right to be present at the deposition, the opinion does not support that assertion. Richmond himself was not present, but it is abundantly clear that he could have been if his attorney had so chosen. Id. at 644 (emphasis added). Appellant primarily relies on the plurality opinion in Dean v. Commonwealth, Ky., 777 S.W.2d 900 (1989). Dean does not mention Richmond , much less purport to overrule it. And suffice it to say that [a] minority opinion has no binding precedential value ... [and] if a majority of the court agreed on a decision in the case, but less than a majority could agree on the reasoning for that decision, the decision has no stare decisis effect. Ware v. Commonwealth, Ky., 47 S.W.3d 333, 335 (2001) (quoting 20 Am.Jur.2d, Courts, § 159 (1995)). Nor do the other cases cited by Appellant support his proposition. Sturgis v. Goldsmith, 796 F.2d 1103 (9th Cir.1986), only held that the defendant had a right to be present at his competency hearing but did not address the issue of waiver of that right. Hill v. Commonwealth, Ky., 474 S.W.2d 95 (1971), did not involve a competency hearing, but a post-trial evidentiary hearing at which twenty-eight witnesses testified with respect to the merits of the defendant's post-trial motions. The defendant and her counsel were not notified of the hearing and did not attend. The trial judge denominated the hearing a court of inquiry. When an associate of the defendant's attorney learned of the ex parte proceedings and requested an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, his request was denied on grounds that the hearing was an investigation, not a trial. Id. at 98. That is a far cry from a failure to appear at a hearing pursuant to an explicit waiver by counsel on grounds of a debilitating physical disability. Appellant cites Conley v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 569 S.W.2d 682 (1978), for the proposition that an accused has the right to be present and to cross-examine witnesses, but Conley was referring to courts of inquiry and lunacy inquests. There was no court of inquiry or lunacy inquest involved in this action. Appellant was not about to lose his liberty by being involuntarily committed to a mental institution. Id. at 685. The holding of the Court of Appeals on this issue was that Appellant was not entitled to a hearing on his competency to enter a guilty plea because [t]he trial judge had no `reasonable doubt' concerning appellant's sanity to stand trial or to plead guilty. Id. at 686. Conley did not involve an issue of voluntary waiver. In Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629 (D.C.Cir.1963), the defendant was present at the beginning of his trial, then voluntarily absented himself from the courtroom, but remained in custody in an adjacent United States Marshal's office. Cross merely holds that the judge should have determined whether the defendant's absence was voluntary. The Government does not attempt to explain how, under Rule 43 [F.R.Cr.R. 43 is virtually identical to RCr 8.28], a person in continuing physical custody can `voluntarily absent' himself. Id. at 631. None of these cases support the proposition that defense counsel cannot waive his client's presence at a pretrial competency hearing. Thus, the crux of this issue is whether we should follow our unanimous opinion in Richmond or the plurality opinion in Dean . We conclude that Justice Leibson's dissent on this issue in Dean makes far more sense than the inflexible rule urged by Appellant in this case: Here, the waiver was explicit, and was made by counsel, presumably competent to judge whether his client was needed. I see no reason, constitutional or otherwise, to create a rule that counsel cannot waive his client's presence at depositions [or, as here, at a pretrial competency hearing]. Dean v. Commonwealth, supra, at 910 (Leibson, J., concurring in part).