Opinion ID: 195639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Officer Sullivan C. Officer Sullivan

Text: The district court found appellee Sullivan to be protected by qualified immunity from appellant's 1983 claim. Appellant challenges the finding of qualified immunity, first arguing that Sullivan was not engaged in a discretionary function when he participated in the pursuit of appellant and Demoranville. His actions were not discretionary, she argues, because the Town of Freetown had in effect high speed guidelines which governed his conduct. In its landmark case establishing qualified immunity doctrine, the Supreme Court indeed stated that government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages 10. We do not consider to what extent, if any, appellant's claim of a Fourth Amendment seizure is weakened by her status as a mere passenger on the motorcycle, not the motorcycle operator being pursued by the police for violation of traffic laws. See Landol-Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 795-96 (1st Cir. 1990). -20- insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (emphasis supplied). But in spite of the reference to discretionary functions, it has never since been clear exactly what role, if any, this concept is supposed to play in applying qualified immunity. Judge Cummings, writing for the Seventh Circuit, warned that it would be unwise to engage in a case by case determination of Section 1983 immunity based upon the ministerial versus discretionary nature of the particular official act challenged. Coleman v. Frantz, 754 F.2d 719, 727 (7th Cir.