Opinion ID: 3133564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Petition to Set Aside Termination Order

Text: On July 29, 2010, more than eight years after the judgment had been entered terminating her parental rights, Mother filed, through counsel, a petition seeking to set it aside as void for lack of personal jurisdiction. Mother alleged that, because Father had received the marital home in the final divorce decree, he knew she was not residing at that address when the summons was issued. Mother also alleged that Father could have located her through her friends and family, or through his own knowledge of the drug houses she frequented, had he made any effort to do so. Finally, Mother alleged that Father‘s attempt at constructive service by publication was ineffective because he had failed to file an affidavit detailing the diligent efforts he had made to locate her, as required by statute. On September 1, 2010, Father filed an answer to Mother‘s petition, and an initial hearing was held on December 16, 2010, but the matter was not resolved. Mother obtained new counsel after this initial hearing, and on March 7, 2011, filed a memorandum of law, in which she relied upon Rules 55.027 and 60.028 of the Tennessee 7 The text of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 55.02 states: ―For good cause shown the court may set aside a judgment by default in accordance with Rule 60.02.‖ Mother‘s initial motion incorrectly cited Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 55.01. 8 The text of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 provides in relevant part as follows: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the party‘s legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (3) the judgment is void . . . . The motion shall be made within a reasonable -6- Rules of Civil Procedure in support of her petition. Mother also advised the trial court that, during discovery, Father had admitted to having known that Mother was not residing in the marital home when the summons was issued to that address and to having made no effort, beyond consulting with counsel, to locate Mother before having the summons issued to the marital home address. Based on these admissions, Mother argued that constructive service by publication had been ineffective to give the trial court personal jurisdiction over Mother, and as a result, the default judgment terminating her parental rights was void. Mother also argued that terminating her fundamental parental rights without providing her with notice of the petition to terminate violated her Due Process rights. In an April 14, 2011 memorandum, Father argued that Mother‘s petition was barred by the one-year statute of repose applicable to judgments terminating parental rights and should be dismissed as a matter of law. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(q) (2014) (―[I]n no event, for any reason, shall a termination of parental rights be overturned by any court or collaterally attacked by any person or entity after one (1) year from the date of the entry of the final order of termination. This provision is intended as a statute of repose.‖). On May 18, 2011, Mother filed a response, arguing that the statute of repose does not apply to her petition because it challenges the default judgment as void ab initio for lack of personal jurisdiction. Alternatively, Mother argued that applying the statute of repose to bar her challenge to the void default judgment terminating her fundamental parental rights would render the statute unconstitutional. Three months later, Mother notified the Tennessee Attorney General and Reporter (―Attorney General‖) of her constitutional challenge to the statute of repose. 9 On August 18, 2011, an agreed order was entered allowing the Attorney General to intervene for the limited purpose of defending the constitutionality of the statute of repose. In a brief filed January 24, 2012, the Attorney General argued that the statute of repose does not apply to void judgments. As a result, the Attorney General argued that, if time, and for reasons (1) and (2) not more than a year after judgment, order or proceeding was entered or taken. (Emphasis added.) 9 Rule 24.04 provides: When the validity of a statute of this state[s] or an administrative rule or regulation of this [s]tate is drawn in question in any action to which the State or an officer or agency is not a party, the court shall require that notice be given the Attorney General, specifying the pertinent statute, rule or regulation. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 24.04. -7- the default judgment terminating Mother‘s parental rights were determined to be void, Mother would lack standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of repose because it would not apply to bar her challenge. The trial court held a second hearing on Mother‘s petition on March 18, 2012, at which the following facts were established as undisputed, either by reference to the record or by uncontroverted testimony or discovery admissions. Father knew Mother was not residing at the marital home when the summons was issued to that address on July 15, 2001. Father made no attempt to locate Mother before resorting to constructive service by publication, other than consulting with his attorney. Because of her relapse to drug use, Mother had not contacted Father or the children or provided the children with financial support since January 3, 2000, almost eighteen months before Father filed the petition to terminate her parental rights. In his testimony at the hearing, Father denied having any knowledge of Mother‘s whereabouts or any contact information for her friends and family that would have enabled him to locate her. Father explained that he had visited Mother‘s family in California once in 1997, for less than two weeks, and had not recalled their names or contact information four years later when he filed the termination petition. Father was not asked, and therefore did not explain, why he had failed to attempt personal service on Mother at the address her own attorney had used when sending notice of the hearing on his motion to withdraw. In her testimony, Mother admitted losing contact with ―everybody‖—including her children, Father, her siblings, and her parents—after relapsing into drug abuse in January 2000. Mother said that, from the time of her relapse until November 2004, when she entered a drug-treatment program, she ―[had] stayed here and there, wherever [she] possibly could.‖ Although Mother named three male friends with whom she had sporadically resided during this period, she conceded that she had not given their names, phone numbers, or contact information to Father. Nevertheless, Mother testified that Father could have located her at drug houses in Fayette County, which they had frequented together during their marriage, or contacted her through her family members, who had the addresses of the male friends with whom she was residing. Mother stated that Father either had contact information for her family or easily could have obtained it. She explained that, although her family members resided in California, her grandmother‘s California telephone number had remained the same for sixty-five years. Mother stated that Father had visited her grandmother in 1997, knew her grandmother‘s surname, and could have obtained her telephone number simply by calling directory assistance in California. Mother maintained that, had Father simply contacted her family, her sisters could have located her, as they did in April 2000, when they notified Mother -8- of her own mother‘s death.10 Mother explained that her sisters reached her then by contacting Charlie Fosset, Sr., one of the male friends with whom she had sporadically resided and with whom she was residing in July 2001. Mother was not asked, and therefore did not explain, whether she had received the notice of a hearing on her attorney‘s motion to withdraw, which her attorney sent to Mr. Fosset, Sr.‘s address on May 3, 2000. Mother testified that she has been drug-free and ―clean‖ since entering a drugtreatment program in November 2004. After her release from the treatment center, Mother moved to Memphis and did not return to Fayette County. Mother had been working at a barbeque restaurant in Memphis since 2005, and by the time of the 2012 hearing on her petition, Mother held a manager position at the restaurant. According to Mother, she learned her parental rights had been terminated in 2008, but waited two years to file her petition because she could not afford to hire a lawyer. Mother admitted that she had made no attempt to contact, visit, or financially support the children since her last visitation with them on January 3, 2000. Two of Mother‘s sisters testified on her behalf as well.11 Like Mother, JT testified that the California telephone number of Mother‘s grandmother had not changed in sixtyfive years and Father easily could have obtained it from California directory assistance. JT testified that, although she would have been unable to provide Father with Mother‘s address, she would have given him Mr. Fosset, Sr.‘s telephone number, which Mother had given her. By calling Mr. Fosset, Sr., JT testified that Father could have located Mother, as JT did in April 2000, when their mother passed away. Another of Mother‘s sisters, VT, testified that Mother had no regular contact with her family from the time of her relapse in 2000 until after Mother entered the drugtreatment program in 2004. VT stated that Mother was ―[w]allowing in the street,‖ and going ―from this drug house to that drug house, until that person got tired of her and kicked her out.‖ VT explained that the family had been able to notify Mother of her own mother‘s death only because ―this good person, Charlie [Fosset, Sr.] managed to find someone to hunt her down on the streets‖ and ―let her know that her mother [had] passed away.‖ VT testified that when Mother telephoned her family from Mr. Fosset, Sr.‘s home, arrangements were made for VT to travel to Tennessee and escort Mother back to California for their mother‘s funeral. According to VT, when she and Mother boarded their flight to California, Mother was ―so on drugs to where the people wanted to kick [them] off the plane.‖ Mother returned to Tennessee by bus, and her family did not hear 10 Although Mother and her sisters testified that their mother died in April 2001, the program from their mother‘s funeral was introduced at trial and establishes that she died on April 24, 2000. 11 For brevity and clarity, we refer to Mother‘s sisters, Joyce and Veronica Tullous, by their initials. -9- from her again until 2004. VT acknowledged that she had moved several times since Father visited California in 1997, had been imprisoned for nine months on a probation violation, and had no telephone of any sort until 2003. Nevertheless, like her sisters, VT testified that her grandmother‘s California telephone number had not changed for many years and that the family would have put Father in contact with Mother had he located their grandmother‘s number through directory assistance and called her. Two other witnesses, former babysitters for Mother and Father, testified that they could have located Mother had Father contacted them, but these witnesses were unable to provide any specific address or location where Mother was residing at the time Father filed the termination petition. Father admitted knowing these witnesses but testified that he had not known, and had no reason to believe, they would have had information about Mother‘s whereabouts. On July 18, 2012, the trial court granted Mother‘s petition and set aside the default judgment terminating her parental rights.12 The trial court first found that, because Father had known Mother was not residing at the marital residence, his attempt at personal service at that address was, at best, futile, and at worst, bad faith. The trial court also found, however, that Mother had no permanent address during the relevant time and that Father had no information about where she was staying. Nevertheless, the trial court ruled that, while Father had no obligation to search for Mother at drug houses, he was obligated to make some attempt to locate her family and through them ascertain her whereabouts. The trial court did not rule on Father‘s argument that Mother‘s petition should be dismissed as barred by the one-year statute of repose or Mother‘s argument that the statute of repose would be unconstitutional if applied to bar her petition. On August 14, 2012, Father filed a notice of appeal from the trial court‘s ruling. The Court of Appeals thereafter dismissed the appeal without prejudice, finding that the trial court‘s order was not final because it had not adjudicated the issues concerning the applicability of the statute of repose. The trial court subsequently ordered Mother, Father, and the Attorney General to brief the statute of repose issues and conducted another hearing. On July 17, 2013, the trial court agreed with the Attorney General and ruled that, because the judgment terminating Mother‘s parental rights is void ab initio, the statute of repose does not apply to bar Mother‘s petition. Father filed a second notice of appeal on August 12, 2013. After granting Father‘s motion to consolidate the appellate records from the two appeals, the Court of Appeals, on January 17, 2014, affirmed the trial court‘s decision setting aside as void the default judgment terminating Mother‘s parental rights. Turner v. Turner, No. W2013-01833-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 3057320,  (Tenn. Ct. App. July 7, 2014). The Court of Appeals did so reluctantly and with the recognition of the ―profound consequences for not only the parties, but the minor children 12 Aside from the procedural history already recited, there is no explanation in the record for the two-year delay between the date Mother filed her petition and the trial court‘s decision. -10- at issue.‖ Id. at . The Court of Appeals explained, however, that under the circumstances of this case, Mother‘s petition is not barred by the doctrine of laches. Id. Additionally, the Court of Appeals declined to consider whether the statute of repose bars relief because Father had failed to argue that the statute of repose ―bars relief from a void judgment.‖ Id. at . Although the Court of Appeals‘ decision was unanimous, one judge wrote separately and urged this Court to grant review, should an application for permission to appeal be filed, to ―reverse‖ the Court of Appeals‘ decision, and to ―clarify the law.‖ Id. at  (Summers, Sr. J., concurring opinion). Father filed an application for permission to appeal. Tenn. R. App. P. 11. We granted Father‘s application, and in addition, directed the parties to address in their briefs the following issues: ―whether [Mother] was required under [Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure] 60.02 to file her petition to set aside within a reasonable time and, if not, whether exceptional circumstances exist in this case that require a different rule.‖ Turner v. Turner, No. W2013-01833-SC-R11-CV (Tenn. Nov. 20, 2014) (order granting the application and directing supplemental briefing).