Opinion ID: 2517324
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Evidence of Threats Against Robert James

Text: Robert James was the grandson of Doris Harris, defendant's stepmother. On October 17, 1991, a week after defendant was arrested, James gave a taped interview to police detectives. He told them that on September 23, he had walked by the park in Van Nuys with defendant. James wanted to play basketball, but defendant saw some Mexicans in the area and said they had to leave, [c]ause ... I blasted this fool in the park, and there go some of his homeboys. James said defendant later explained that he had seen some Mexicans gambling, went home to get his gun, and returned to the park with another person. They confronted the Mexicans and asked for money, then the sewer rat jumped up and I shot him. Defendant's term for Mexicans was sewer rats. At trial, although James went over his taped statement with the prosecutor in the morning on the day he testified, by the afternoon he could recall very little of what he had told the detectives. After his testimony, the prosecutor learned from a detective who drove James home that James had been threatened by defendant's sister during the lunch break. The prosecutor wanted the detective to testify, so that the jury could evaluate the discrepancy between James's statements in court and those on the tape, which would be played for the jury. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the evidence of the threat would be unduly prejudicial because the jury would likely draw the conclusion that defendant had something to do with it. The court decided to permit the detective to testify about the incident, with a limiting instruction informing the jury that the threat came from a family member, not from defendant. Detective Paul Stewart told the jury that he had been present during the interview conducted before James testified. At that time, James had recalled most of his statements in the taped interview. However, Stewart was also present when James was on the witness stand, at which time many of the things that he remembered in the morning ... he said he did not remember when he testified. Stewart testified that while he was taking James home later that day, James said that he was in the cafeteria of this building when he was approached by a woman who made the statement to him [that] you and your mother could disappear. The woman was a family member. The court cautioned the jury that Stewart's testimony was admitted only to show the state of mind [of] the witness when the witness testified, not to prove the truth of the statement that was made. The jury was told that you must not draw any inferences with respect to the defendant as to those statements, and specifically that you may not infer that ... this was made by the defendant or at the defendant's behest. It is only to indicate the state of mind of the witness at the time when [the witness] testified so that you may properly evaluate that witness's testimony and any inconsistencies that you find that there are. Thereafter, the prosecutor recalled James to the stand. She questioned him about the incident in the cafeteria, asking did someone from your family and the defendant's family approach you during the lunch hour? James said a woman had approached him, and they were bickering back and forth. With some prompting, he said the woman had told him that he better not lie on her brother and that he and his mother might come up missing. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked James about the threat, confirming that it was defendant's sister who delivered it. James said the threat had upset him at first, but did not affect his testimony in any way.
(5) Evidence that a witness is afraid to testify or fears retaliation is admissible because it bears on credibility. ( People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 869 [129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1]; accord, e.g., People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 946 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d 649]; People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1141 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321].) Defendant acknowledges this well-established rule, but raises a series of objections to its application in this case. [4] First, he contends the prosecutor failed to lay an adequate foundation for the relevance and probative value of the threat evidence. Defendant asserts that the admission of this evidence was improperly premised on the assumption that James was telling the truth in his taped statement. This is not the case; James's state of mind when he testified after hearing the threat had no necessary connection with the veracity of his earlier statement. Next, defendant contends the Burgener rationale is limited to cases of discrepancy between prior sworn testimony and later statements in court. This claim is supported by neither the cases cited in Burgener ( People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 481 [247 Cal.Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218]; People v. Feagin (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1427, 1433 [40 Cal.Rptr.2d 918]), nor those following it (e.g., People v. Gonzalez, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 945-946; People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 1141-1142). Defendant also argues there was no showing that James was indeed afraid to testify. He points to James's later testimony that the threat did not affect him. The court, of course, had no way of anticipating this testimony when it made its ruling. The court was aware of the discrepancy between the statements on the tape and James's testimony, and the relevance of the threat he received immediately before he took the stand was obvious. Defendant claims that in any event, the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by the prejudicial impact on the jury of learning that his sister had threatened a key witness and the witness's mother during trial. That determination, however, was well within the discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 869.) The jury was cautioned not to attribute the threat to defendant. Defendant claims the admonition was defective because it followed Detective Stewart's testimony, and the court spoke in terms of the evidence you have just heard and the state of mind of the witness when the witness testified. Defendant suggests the jury would have understood these references to apply to Stewart, and thus the inferences they might draw regarding the threat to James were unrestricted. The suggestion is completely meritless. The detective's state of mind was not at issue, and his testimony was focused on the impact of the threat against James. Defendant also complains that the admonition was not repeated after James was recalled and questioned about the threat. However, the court's cautionary instruction the previous week was lengthy and detailed, and promptly followed Detective Stewart's testimony, which first informed the jury of the threat. The court was not required to repeat the admonition, and defense counsel made no such request.
Regarding James's testimony, defense counsel argued as follows in his closing: He was threatened to such an extent that the People want you to believe him, and that's why he changed his testimony. Doesn't it strike you as a little odd that he wouldn't say anything before the testimony or he wouldn't want these people out of the courtroom? In her rebuttal, the prosecutor responded that it was precisely because he was threatened that James had said nothing before he testified: The exact thing about threats is they scare you. And you don't necessarily run and tell on the person who just threatened you because they threatened you. And you don't want to make them any madder. So instead you come in and try to appease them. You come in and say I don't remember. And I might have made that part up. As they are sitting here in the audience staring at him, he is back-pedaling big time.... But what we know is true is his prior statement, what he said to the police, what you hear on the tape when no one was glaring at him and no one had threatened him and the defendant wasn't sitting there looking at him. Defendant, while refraining from making a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, contends the prosecutor's reference to his presence and the threat against James in the same sentence undermined the court's limiting instruction, and exacerbated the prejudice created by the admission of the threat evidence. (6) Defense counsel made no objection or request for an admonition from the court, which could have reinforced the limiting instruction and mitigated any undue prejudice. His claim is thus barred on appeal. ( People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 454 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 461, 161 P.3d 3].) Defendant responds to the Attorney General's waiver argument by suggesting for the first time in his reply brief that the failure to object amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. The argument is as meritless as it is belated. [D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance. ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 502 [117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].) Here, while requesting an admonition was one tactical option, counsel could also have decided that objecting would focus the jury's attention on the threat incident in ways that would not be helpful to the defense. The prosecutor's comment echoed her opening argument, where she made no mention of the threat but argued that James's taped statement was credible because it was made when the defendant wasn't in the room looking at him, other family members weren't in the audience looking at him. The jury would understand that, regardless of any threat, James would have been more willing to incriminate his relative in a private interview than in open court, in the presence of defendant and other family members. Any implication in her later comment that defendant may have been involved with the threat was remote enough that counsel could reasonably have opted to let it pass without objection.