Opinion ID: 2334691
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In Furtherance of Attempted Robbery

Text: At the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief, the defense moved to dismiss Count II (felony murder). The motion was based on the defense's application of this Court's holding in Williams v. State [6] to the evidence presented by the State. The defense's motion was denied by the trial judge. Hassan-El renews the same arguments in this appeal. When this homicide was committed in 2001, title 11, section 636(a)(2) of the Delaware Code provided that a person is guilty of felony-murder when [I]n the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony or immediate flight therefrom, the person recklessly causes the death of another person. This statute was subsequently amended. [7] Hassan-El notes that although any felony or attempted felony will suffice, the statute also required that the death must be in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commission of a felony. . . . [8] In this case, the attempted felony was robbery. Hassan-El acknowledges that the murder was clearly in the course of the attempted robbery, and submits that the real issue is whether the murder was also in furtherance of the attempted robbery. The meaning of the in furtherance of requirement in the felony-murder statute was explained by this Court in Williams: In our view, the statutory language of the Delaware felony murder statute not only requires that the murder occur during the course of the felony but also that the murder occur to facilitate commission of the felony. To the extent that the Chao [9] opinion states that the in furtherance of language of the statute addresses solely the identity of the person who is committing the actual killing, it is overruled. Accordingly, we adhere to the holding of Weick [10] and hold that the felony murder language requires not only that the defendant, or his accomplices, if any, commit the killing but also that the murder helps to move the felony forward. [11] Applying the Williams test, Hassan-El frames the question presented in this appeal as: How did the murder help to move the felony (attempted robbery) forward? In denying Hassan-El's motion for acquittal, the trial judge reasoned that the killing did satisfy the in furtherance of requirement in Williams: The killing of Mr. Alameri, since he no longer would be in a position to prevent the robbery from taking place, in essence, has furtherancehas furthered the robbery process, has moved the robbery process along. Now, simply because the defendants, either because they got scared, or they decided it wasn't worth it anymore, moved on, and did not complete the robbery, I don't believe has any bearing upon the Williams decision. Once the murder has taken place, it has facilitated and moved forward the robbery. It is the defendant's decision at that point in time to complete the act. But Williams doesn't say it prevents a felony murder from proceeding forward. Hassan-El argues that the trial judge's interpretation of the in furtherance of requirement allowed a conviction for felony murder based entirely on the supposition that the killing cleared the way for the underlying felony of robbery to proceed to completion. According to Hassan-El, the trial judge's reasoning ignores what actually happened. If the killing was intended to further the commission of the robbery, then why did Zayas, Hassan-El and Guy all run away after the shots were fired? Hassan-El's argument fails to recognize that the felony-murder charge was based upon an attempted robbery not a completed robbery. Hassan-El's contention is contrary to the express statutory language that makes homicides during an attempted felony the crime of felony murder. The discussion concerning the law of attempts in Hassan-El's opening brief explains why the homicide in this case served to further the attempted robbery and was, therefore felony murder. Under the Criminal Code, an attempt to commit a crime occurs when the defendant's conduct is a `substantial step' in a course of conduct planned to culminate in the commission of the crime. [12] A substantial step, in turn, is defined as an act or omission which leaves no reasonable doubt as to the defendant's intention to commit the crime. [13] The law of attempts under the Criminal Code seeks to prevent even the preparations from crime by threatening punishment prior to the completion of the crime. [14] In other words, the crime of attempt is completed whenever the defendant has taken a substantial step toward the commission of the crime, whether or not the crime itself ever actually occurs. [15] Hassan-El and Guy were clearly engaged in an attempted robbery because they had taken substantial steps toward the commission of a robbery when the homicide occurred. The record reflects that Hassan-El and Guy both approached the ice cream truck with their faces covered by shirts. They each carried loaded handguns. They both fired their weapons immediately upon reaching the ice cream truck. The General Assembly anticipated the fact that every intended felony (in this case robbery) might not be completed. The felony-murder statute expressly provides that a homicide committed during an attempted felony can constitute felony murder. When Hassan-El attempted to commit a robbery of the ice cream man, the homicide that resulted was felony murder because it occurred in the course of and in furtherance of the . . . attempted commission of a felony, even if the separate felony of robbery was not accomplishedfor whatever reason. In a related argument, Hassan-El contends the homicide must have been an accident since the robbery was never completed and an accidental killing is insufficient to satisfy the state of mind needed by the in furtherance of requirement in the felony-murder statute. Hassan-El correctly notes that this Court has recognized that a defendant's claim of accident is a defense that the defendant's culpable state of mind was a lesser degree than that required for a conviction of felony murder. [16] The fact that Hassan-El or any other defendant could present a state of mind defense based upon a claim of accident, however, does not mean the defendant is entitled to have a felony-murder charge dismissed as a matter of law. The State's evidence presented a strong case that Hassan-El was guilty of felony murder because the homicide occurred in furtherance of an attempted robbery. Hassan-El's state of mind was a question for the jury to decide. The record supports the trial judge's ruling that the jury could rationally conclude the shooting occurred in furtherance of the attempt to commit a robbery.