Opinion ID: 2115096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Court's Statutory Authority

Text: In the circuit court proceedings, as on appeal, Rosemary maintained that the circuit court's judgment, and the sale pursuant thereto, were void because the circuit court failed to comply with the partition act in several aspects. Since the circuit court derived its authority to sell the property from the Act, Rosemary argued that the court's failure to follow the dictates of the Act was jurisdictional. The majority does not detail the aspects in which the circuit court failed to comply with the Act nor does it consider whether the circuit court exceeded its authority by failing to comply with any particular provision of the Act. I will outline the four allegations I find most troubling. First, Rosemary alleged that the circuit court appointed a commissioner to partition the property without first ascertaining the rights, titles and interest of all the parties to the action. Section 17-105 of the Act provides: Judgment. The court shall ascertain and declare the rights, titles and interest of all the parties in such action, the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, and shall enter judgment according to the rights of the parties. 735 ILCS 5/17-105 (West 1996). Section 17-108 of the Act provides: Duty of Commissioners. The commissioners shall enter upon the premises and, if the same are susceptible of division without manifest prejudice to the rights of the parties, they shall make partition thereof, allotting the several shares to the respective parties, quality and quantity relatively considered, according to their respective rights and interests as adjudged by the court   . If the premises are not susceptible of division without manifest prejudice to the parties in interest, the commissioners shall value each piece or parcel separately. 735 ILCS 5/17-108 (West 1998). Thus, the circuit court must declare the rights of the parties and enter a judgment of partition according to those rights before it appoints commissioners to partition the premises. Indeed, the commissioners are not able to partition the premises without direction from the court regarding the rights and interest of the parties. Without such direction, the commissioners simply do not know the identities of the owners and what portion of the land each owner is entitled to. The circuit court appointed Crowley substitute commissioner on August 30, 1996. Crowley submitted his report to the court on March 11, 1997. Subsequently, in its order of October 28, 1997, the court found that the three heirs were the owners of the property, holding interest of an undivided one-third each, as tenants in common. It thus appears that the court did not comply with the requirements of the Act. Second, Rosemary alleged the circuit court failed to require that Crowley take an oath, as commissioner, to fairly and impartially partition the property. Section 17-107 of the Act provides: Oath of Commissioners. Each commissioner shall take and subscribe an oath or affirmation fairly and impartially to make partition of the premises, according to the rights and interests of the parties, as declared by the judgment of the court, if the same can be done consistently with the interests of the parties; or, if the same cannot be so divided without manifest prejudice to the parties in interest, that they will fairly and impartially appraise the value of each piece or parcel of the premises sought to be divided, and make a true report to the court. 735 ILCS 5/17-107 (West 1996). In Tibbs v. Allen, 27 Ill. 119 (1862), this court noted that the commissioners appointed by the circuit court in the partition action did not take the oath prescribed by statute. They were not sworn to make partition, `in accordance with the judgment of the court as to the rights and interests of the parties,' but only sworn to divide the land according to their own opinions of those rights and interests, without regard to the judgment of the court. Tibbs, 27 Ill. at 126-27. For this, and other reasons, this court reversed the decree for the sale of property and remanded for further proceedings. See also Sullivan v. Sullivan, 42 Ill. 315, 319 (1866) (After their appointment, and they have taken the oath required by the statute, then, and not till then, are they clothed with legal authority to act as commissioners). In the present case, the record confirms that Crowley did not take an oath as commissioner. Third, Rosemary alleged that the circuit court was not authorized to sell the property because Crowley did not report that the property could not be divided in kind. Section 17-116 of the Act provides: Sale of premises not susceptible to division. When the whole or any of the premises sought to be partitioned cannot be divided without manifest prejudice to the owners thereof, and the commissioners appointed to divide the same so report, the court shall order the premises not susceptible of division to be sold at public sale, upon such terms and notice of sale as the court directs. 735 ILCS 5/17-116 (West 1996). Thus, it is only upon a finding by the commissioners that the property is not susceptible of division that the circuit court will order a sale of the property. Crowley's report states: While the first and second combinations resulted in relatively similar values, the third combination was substantially greater. And therefore, the appraiser, acting as the court appointed commissioner, was unable to recommend an equitable distribution of these assets among three parties unless other compensation was provided to the first two combinations and/or some concession was applied to the third. (Emphasis added.) Was Crowley thereby making an unequivocal statement that the property could not be partitioned without manifest prejudice to the parties in interest, or was Crowley suggesting that the property could be partitioned subject to additional compensation to some of the owners? If the actual finding was that the property could be divided subject to owelty payments, the circuit court could not direct that the property be sold. In so doing, the circuit court would have exceeded its authority under the statute. In Peck v. Peck, 16 Ill.2d 268, 157 N.E.2d 249 (1959), this court held that a judgment of partition was invalid because it was not in conformity with the partition act. The court observed: The object of partition is to enable those who own property in common to sever their interests, so that each one may take possession of, enjoy, and improve his separate estate at his own pleasure. [Citations.] The law favors a division of land in kind, rather than a division of the proceeds of a sale thereof, and a sale under partition is proper only where a division of the premises cannot be made without prejudice to the rights of the interested parties. [Citations.] To implement this policy our statute provides for the appointment of commissioners to determine whether property is susceptible of division, [citation] and in construing such statute this court has said: `   whether the proceeding for partition is by petition under the statute or by bill in chancery, an essential prerequisite to a decree authorizing a sale is the appointment of commissioners to make partition, and a report by them that the land is not susceptible of partition;    section 16 of the Partition Act is mandatory, and    where partition is sought by either mode, a decree for sale is erroneous, unless based upon a report of commissioners.' [Citations.] Considering these established principles it is manifest that the court was in error in directing a sale of appellant's interest in the manner prescribed. Peck, 16 Ill.2d at 285-86, 157 N.E.2d 249. This court remanded the cause to the trial court for the entry of a decree in conformity with the partition statute. See also Rosenbaum v. Rosenbaum, 38 Ill.App.3d 1, 15, 349 N.E.2d 73 (1976) (The court observed that a decree of sale is erroneous unless it is based on the report of a commissioner or commissioners. Commissioners were not appointed in the case, nor did the report of a commissioner precede the lower court's order of sale. Therefore, the judgment of the court did not include nor can it be construed to include a valid partition judgment). Returning to the present facts, the property at issue consisted of 409 acres of land. The very size of the property suggests that some division in kind would have been possible. As this court observed in considering a report that 720 acres of land could not be divided: It would require much proof to induce the belief that so much land could not be divided fairly and equally, according to quantity and quality, among seven claimants. Tibbs, 27 Ill. at 128. Fourth, Rosemary alleged that the circuit court was not authorized to sell the property in any manner other than at public sale. Section 17-116 of the Act provides that the court shall order the premises not susceptible of division to be sold at public sale. 735 ILCS 5/17-116 (West 1996). The circuit court allowed the property to be listed exclusively with Dolan and Murphy. Contracts to purchase the property were submitted to Dolan and Murphy, and the property was eventually sold to Moser. There was no notice of the property's sale to the public. Nor was there a sale at auction of the property. Thus, it appears that the circuit court did not follow the dictates of the statute in conducting the sale of the property. The mechanics of the sale of the property in this case demonstrate the problems inherent in a sale which is not at public vendue. Inland's contract to purchase the property was a matter of record in the proceeding and was file stamped by the clerk of the court on July 20, 1998. Moser's contract to purchase the property was mailed to the clerk of the court the evening of August 18, 1998, and was presented to the circuit court at the hearing on August 19, 1998. The purchase price listed in Moser's contract, $3,550,000, was only $50,000 more than the purchase price listed in Inland's contract. Inland was not informed of Moser's contract, and, consequently, Inland did not increase the purchase price listed in its contract. Moreover, the circuit court refused to reopen bidding on the property. Three parties submitted contracts for the purchase of the property. These parties were vying for the right to construct new housing in an area undergoing substantial development. Surely, a public sale with all parties aware of the proposed bids would have maximized the returns to the owners of the property. The majority purports to answer Rosemary's argument in a footnote. See 197 Ill.2d at 524, 259 Ill.Dec. at 735, 759 N.E.2d at 515. Therein, the majority notes that the circuit court had jurisdiction and authority over the parties and the property. The majority also notes that a circuit court does not lose jurisdiction because it made a mistake in determining the facts, the law, or both. The majority notes correctly that a court may not lose jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in determining the facts or the law. People v. Davis, 156 Ill.2d 149, 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750 (1993). However, Rosemary did not merely argue that the circuit court made a mistake in determining the facts or the law. Rosemary argued that the circuit court failed to follow the very statute empowering the court to sell the property. As this court observed in Davis, the power to render the particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as is personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Further, a judgment or decree may be void where a court has exceeded its authority. Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750. Thus, in People v. Arna, 168 Ill.2d 107, 212 Ill.Dec. 963, 658 N.E.2d 445 (1995), this court held void a trial court order which did not conform to a statutory requirement. The trial court had jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter. However, the trial court did not have the inherent authority to enter an order imposing concurrent terms on the defendant. And in Armstrong v. Obucino, 300 Ill. 140, 133 N.E. 58 (1921), this court found that a sale made contrary to statute, and a deed executed in pursuance of such sale, were void. In so doing, this court observed: The statement has very frequently been made that where a court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter, its decree, however erroneous, can only be attacked on appeal or error; but the rule is subject to an exception equally well settled,that a decree may be void because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The bill prayed for the enforcement of the lien by a sale beyond and contrary to the powers given by the statute for enforcing mechanics' liens, and it does not follow that because the court had acquired jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter it could make such a decree as was prayed for. Courts are limited in the extent and character of their judgments, and if they transcend their lawful powers their judgments and decrees are void and may be collaterally impeached wherever rights claimed under them are brought in question. The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause, and its judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs and does not transcend in the extent and character of its judgment or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it. [Citations.] Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction, has assumed to enter a decree for a sale which goes beyond the limits of the jurisdiction and transgresses the law the decree is void, and the sale based thereon is likewise an absolute nullity. Armstrong, 300 Ill. at 142-43, 133 N.E. 58. See also In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d 53, 64, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702 (1993) (jurisdiction is the power of the court to adjudge concerning the general question involved [citation], as well as the power to grant the particular relief requested [citations]. Every act of the court beyond that power is void); People v. Wade, 116 Ill.2d 1, 107 Ill.Dec. 63, 506 N.E.2d 954 (1987); Woodward v. Ruel, 355 Ill. 163, 173, 188 N.E. 911 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting) (One of the essentials of a valid judgment is that the court have jurisdiction to render that particular judgment. Where a court, after acquiring jurisdiction of the subject matter, transcends the limits of the jurisdiction conferred, its judgment so entered is void); Maloney v. Dewey, 127 Ill. 395, 402-03, 19 N.E. 848 (1889) (where a court, having jurisdiction of the person, and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the subject matter, renders a judgment not authorized by law in that class of cases, under any possible proofs, its judgment is not an instance of mere misapplication of law to particular facts, or erroneous interpretation of rules in particular cases, but an attempt to exercise an authority which has no existence in the particular case). To answer Rosemary's contention, the majority must actually determine whether the circuit court exceeded its authority in ordering the sale of the property, and whether the circuit court's failure to follow the Act rendered its judgment void. The majority is unwilling to do so. Instead, citing In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill.2d 169, 229 Ill.Dec. 508, 692 N.E.2d 281 (1998), the majority suggests that I overlook[ed] our recent discussion explaining the distinction between `void' and `voidable' judgments. 197 Ill.2d at 530, 259 Ill.Dec. at 739, 759 N.E.2d at 519. The majority educates: In Mitchell we stated that `[t]he question whether a judgment is void or voidable depends on whether the court entering the challenged order possessed jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter. [Citation.] If jurisdiction is lacking, any subsequent judgment of the court is rendered void   .' In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill.2d 169, 174 [229 Ill.Dec. 508, 692 N.E.2d 281] (1998), quoting People v. Davis, 156 Ill.2d 149, 155-56 [189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750] (1993). Significantly, the dissent does not dispute that the trial court in the present case had both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction over the parties. For this reason, the judgment is not `void.' This is true even if we were to assume that the trial court failed to strictly follow the provisions of the Act. 197 Ill.2d at 530-31, 259 Ill.Dec. at 740, 759 N.E.2d at 520. Thus, according to the majority, a judgment rendered by a court lacking the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved is not void but merely voidable. I note that Mitchell relied primarily upon Davis, a decision which affirmed that the power to render the particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as is personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750. I also note that Mitchell nowhere states that it is overruling Davis or the precedent from which Davis is derived. See also Wade, 116 Ill.2d at 5, 107 Ill.Dec. 63, 506 N.E.2d 954; Woodward, 355 Ill. at 173, 188 N.E. 911 (Stone, J., dissenting); Maloney, 127 Ill. at 402, 19 N.E. 848. I am confident that Mitchell was not intended to overrule settled precedent on the elements of jurisdiction. Assuming, however, that Mitchell created some confusion as to the continued validity of the requirement that a court have inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, such confusion was dispelled in City of Chicago v. Roman, 184 Ill.2d 504, 510, 235 Ill.Dec. 468, 705 N.E.2d 81 (1998), a decision issued 10 months after Mitchell, and one which the majority fails to acknowledge. In Roman, 184 Ill.2d at 510, 235 Ill.Dec. 468, 705 N.E.2d 81, this court reiterated that [a] void judgment is one entered by a court that lacks, inter alia, the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. See also People ex rel. Waller v. McKoski, 195 Ill.2d 393, 401, 254 Ill.Dec. 729, 748 N.E.2d 175 (2001) (Because the concurrent sentences imposed upon defendant by the circuit court were not authorized by section 5-8-4(b), those sentences are void). I submit that Mitchell is not this court's latest pronouncement on jurisdiction. I also submit that it is the majority, not this dissent, which has failed to acknowledge recent precedent of this court. The majority offers two distinctions. First, the majority states:  Davis discusses jurisdiction `in the context of criminal proceedings.' Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156 [189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750]. Criminal proceedings that involve the power to render judgments or sentences address a separate set of concerns not at issue in the present matter. 197 Ill.2d at 532, 259 Ill.Dec. at 740, 759 N.E.2d at 520. The majority does not elaborate on the nature of these concerns or explain why these concerns require a different application in the context of a criminal proceeding. Also, the majority does not cite any law in support of the distinction it seeks to draw. I note that Davis cites Thayer v. Village of Downers Grove, 369 Ill. 334, 339, 16 N.E.2d 717 (1938), a case involving special assessments and bonds, in support of the proposition that the power to render the particular judgment or sentence is as important an element of jurisdiction as is personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction. Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750. I also note that Davis cites Armstrong, 300 Ill. at 142-43, 133 N.E. 58, a mechanics' lien case, in support of the proposition that a judgment or decree may be void where a court has exceeded its jurisdiction. Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750. Thus, Davis does not draw a distinction between criminal and civil proceedings and does not provide support for the proposition advanced by the majority. Further, Mitchell, 181 Ill.2d 169, 229 Ill.Dec. 508, 692 N.E.2d 281, the centerpiece of the majority's analysis on jurisdiction, does not support a distinction between jurisdiction in criminal and civil proceedings. At issue in Mitchell was the validity of a child support order which expressed the support level as a percentage of income, instead of a dollar amount. As noted above, Mitchell relied primarily upon Davis in its discussion of jurisdiction. Thus, Mitchell, a civil case, relied upon the holding of Davis, a criminal case, without drawing any distinction between civil and criminal proceedings. McKoski, 195 Ill.2d at 401, 254 Ill.Dec. 729, 748 N.E.2d 175, Roman, 184 Ill.2d at 510, 235 Ill.Dec. 468, 705 N.E.2d 81, Arna, 168 Ill.2d at 113, 212 Ill.Dec. 963, 658 N.E.2d 445, and Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750, all stand for the proposition, as stated in Roman, that: A void judgment is one entered by a court that lacks, inter alia, the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. This holding cannot be overlooked or disposed of on the ground that Davis was a criminal proceeding. Next, the majority draws a distinction between cases adopted before, and after, the reform to the judicial system in 1964. The majority concedes that the inherent authority requirement was a part of this state's jurisprudence before 1964, and applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by our circuit courts. See 197 Ill.2d at 529-30, 259 Ill.Dec. at 739, 759 N.E.2d at 746. However, the majority maintains that, with the implementation of the reform to the judicial system, the circuit courts derive jurisdiction from the constitution and need not act in conformance with statutory authority in order to exercise jurisdiction. The majority explains: The dissent mistakenly relies upon a rule of law not applicable to the present circumstances. The `inherent authority' requirement existed before reform to the judicial system in 1964. Effective January 1, 1964, an amendment to article VI replaced limited jurisdiction: `Circuit Court[s] shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters.' Ill. Const. 1870, art. VI, § 9 (amended 1964); accord Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 9 (`Circuit Courts shall have original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters except when the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction'). This amendment created a single integrated trial court vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies. [Citation.] Thus, the `inherent power' requirement applies to courts of limited jurisdiction and administrative agencies. 197 Ill.2d at 529-30, 259 Ill. Dec. at 738, 759 N.E.2d at 518. The majority concludes that: a circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction, which need not look to the statute for its jurisdictional authority. 197 Ill.2d at 530, 259 Ill.Dec. at 739, 759 N.E.2d at 746. This court has rejected the notion that a court of general jurisdiction, which derives its jurisdiction from the constitution, may proceed in derogation of statutory authority. In In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d at 65, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702, this court observed: [I]t is by reason of our constitution that our circuit courts acquire power to adjudge   . However, it is by reason of the statute that the justiciable matter exists, and the circuit court must proceed within the strictures of the statute. In re M.M., 156 Ill.2d at 65-66, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702. The distinction the majority draws is unavailing. To date, this court has steadfastly recognized that the circuit court must have the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved. Roman, 184 Ill.2d at 510, 235 Ill.Dec. 468, 705 N.E.2d 81. This court has also recognized that a judgment or decree may be void where a court has exceeded its authority. Davis, 156 Ill.2d at 156, 189 Ill.Dec. 49, 619 N.E.2d 750, citing Armstrong, 300 Ill. at 142-43, 133 N.E. 58. The majority misapprehends my dissent. The majority states: The dissent maintains that the trial court lacked authority to order the sale because it failed to comply with the Act, and that this rendered the judgment `void.' According to the dissent, failure to follow the Act is fatal to the circuit court's jurisdiction. The Act, the dissent argues, gives the circuit court the `inherent authority' to adjudicate the controversy and, therefore, failure to follow procedure under the Act divests the court of jurisdiction and renders the order `void.' 197 Ill.2d at 529, 259 Ill. Dec. at 738, 759 N.E.2d at 518. I make no pronouncement in my dissent as to the validity of the circuit court's order and the resultant sale. My objective is more modest. I merely ask that the majority address Rosemary's contention that the circuit court's judgment, and the sale pursuant thereto, were void because the circuit court failed to comply with the Act in several aspects. The majority, however, declines to address or outline those irregularities because they are secondary to Rule 305(j). 197 Ill.2d at 529, 259 Ill.Dec. at 738, 759 N.E.2d at 518.