Opinion ID: 2637749
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether, Within the Meaning of AS 28.15.271(b)(3), Bradshaw's License Had Been Suspended Within the Previous Ten Years

Text: We next turn to the meaning of AS 28.15.271(b)(3). Alaska Statute 28.15.271(b)(3)(A) requires a person who applies for license reinstatement to pay a $100 reinstatement fee if the applicant's driver's license has, within the 10 years preceding the application, been suspended ... only once. [20] Bradshaw argues that DMV's $100 reinstatement fee does not apply to him because this case is based on information that is over 11 years old. Bradshaw's argument is very terse, and he is pro se. We interpret his argument as contending that the $100 reinstatement fee would only apply if he had sought reinstatement within ten years of the administrative act of suspension. Because DMV suspended his license on July 15, 1995, more than ten years before he sought reinstatement in 2007, subsection .271(b)(3)(A) does not apply to him. Therefore DMV cannot condition reinstatement on payment of the $100 fee. DMV argues that the language of the fee statute, section .271, unambiguously provides that the fee applies if the person's license was in the state of suspension at any time during the preceding ten years. It further argues that this construction is correct because the legislature did not draft section.271 to make the date of suspension the critical event, as it did in a comparable statutory provision. [21] It also argues that imposing the fee here does not create an anomalous result. [T]he threshold question in ascertaining the correct interpretation of a statute is whether the language of the statute is clear or arguably ambiguous. [22] Read in isolation, subsection .271(b)(3)(A) does not clearly indicate whether the statute's use of the phrase been suspended refers toas Bradshaw impliesthe act of suspension, oras the state contendsthe status of suspension. Suspended could be read to refer to the initial administrative act of suspending a driver's license. This would mean the $100 fee would apply only if the first day of suspension were within the ten-year period before the driver applied for reinstatement. Under this interpretation, if DMV suspended a license on January 1, 2000, DMV could not charge the $100 reinstatement fee if the driver applied for reinstatement on January 2, 2010. Alternatively, suspended could be permissibly read to refer to the status of suspension. If so, the $100 fee would apply if the driver's license had been in a state of suspension at any time in the ten years before application, even if the first day of suspension were more than ten years before. Because the statute uses the phrase has ... been suspended, this is probably the best interpretation of the statute's words. (Emphasis added.) Nonetheless, both interpretations are grammatically permissible under a plain reading of the statute, if its words are read in isolation. The legislature's use of the phrase has been suspended in another section of AS 28.15 helps indicate the most likely meaning of the phrase as it is used in AS 28.15.271. Alaska Statute 28.15.211(a) states that a person whose driver's license ... has been suspended ... may not apply for a new license ... until the expiration of  a statutorily defined period. (Emphasis added.) This subsection implies that it is the state of suspension that matters. And AS 28.15.211(c), which permits a suspended driver to seek reinstatement upon payment of fees, including a reinstatement fee, refers to the period of suspension, implying that it is the status of suspension, not the date of suspension, that is important in the context of license reinstatement. Also, as DMV argues, the legislature demonstrated when it wrote AS 28.20.150(a) that it knew how to make the date of suspension the critical event. [23] Considered together, AS 28.15.271(b)(3), AS 28.15.211, and AS 28.20.150(a) provide textual clues that the legislature considered the status of suspension to be the trigger (or at least one of the triggers) for imposing a reinstatement fee. When interpreting a statute, we look to the statutory purpose. The apparent purpose of the reinstatement provisions helps convince us that DMV's interpretation of subsection .271(b)(3) is correct. As we noted above, AS 28.15.211(c) permits a driver to seek reinstatement upon payment of the proper fees, including a reinstatement fee. Subsection .271(b)(3) specifies the applicable reinstatement fee. That subsection contains four subsections that impose different reinstatement fees, ranging from $100 to $500. [24] For example, AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A) imposes a $100 reinstatement fee and AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(B) imposes a $250 reinstatement fee. Nothing in subsection .211(c) or subsection.271(b)(3) implies that drivers seeking reinstatement of their suspended driver's licenses may be excused from paying at least the $100 reinstatement fee. Although suspensions can be for varying lengths of time, [25] all suspensions last until the applicant gives proof of future financial responsibility. [26] Interpreting subsection .271(b)(3)(A)'s ten-year period to be a special administrative statute of limitations that begins running on the date of DMV's suspending act would therefore mean no reinstatement fee could be assessed against an entire class of drivers with suspended licenses, i.e., those drivers whose licenses have been in suspended status for more than ten years. This result would appear to be contrary to subsection .211(c), which permits a suspended driver to seek reinstatement upon payment of fees, including a reinstatement fee. Subsection .211(c) appears to require any driver seeking license reinstatement to pay a reinstatement fee. Nothing in the statutory scheme implies that anyone seeking reinstatement of a suspended license may avoid paying the basic reinstatement fee of $100. It is not obvious why the passage of time would altogether excuse the holder of a suspended license from paying any reinstatement fee. Implicit in Bradshaw's apparent argument may be the assumption that subsection.271(b)(3)(A) provides suspended drivers a ten-year statute of repose, after which the DMV may not impose the $100 reinstatement fee. In this he may be relying on the phrase within the 10 years preceding the application, contained in both subsection.271(b)(3)(A) and subsection .271(b)(3)(B). To understand the meaning of that phrase, it is necessary to read the statute carefully. Subsection .271(b)(3)(A) imposes the $100 fee on drivers whose licenses have been suspended only once within the past ten years; subsection .271(b)(3)(B) imposes the $250 fee on drivers whose licenses have been suspended two or more times within the past ten years. Assuming a driver with multiple suspensions (necessarily requiring at least one prior reinstatement) can avoid the enhanced $250 fee if the prior suspension ended more than ten years before the current reinstatement application, that driver, despite the multiple suspensions, pays only the basic $100 reinstatement fee. The phrase within the 10 years preceding the application in subsection .271(b)(3)(B) sets a time period after which past suspensions do not trigger the enhanced fee. Applicants with old suspensions who do not have to pay the $250 fee must still pay the $100 reinstatement fee under subsection .271(b)(3)(A). If the legislature had not included the phrase within the ten years preceding the application in subsection .271(b)(3)(A), applicants with multiple suspensions who do not have to pay the $250 fee would also not have to pay the $100 fee because the driver had not been suspended only once. It appears that the legislature intended the phrase within the 10 years preceding the application in subsection .271(b)(3)(A) to ensure that multiple offenders would have to pay at least $100. The legislature did not intend to provide for a period of repose for applicants with suspended licenses to avoid paying the basic $100 reinstatement fee. We also consider legislative history when we interpret a statute. But the legislative history of this statute is essentially neutral. The requirement of a $100 reinstatement fee in AS 28.15.271(b)(3) was added in 1994 as part of a bill that provided for the revocation of driver's licenses of minors who illegally possessed controlled substances or alcohol. [27] The purpose of the bill was deterring teenagers from engaging in the use and abuse of controlled substances. [28] Nothing in the statutory history shows any legislative intent reflecting what suspended means in section .271. The history therefore does not conflict with our interpretation of the statute. Thus, although DMV and Bradshaw both advance grammatically permissible interpretations of the statute and AS 28.15.271(b)(3)'s meaning is not immediately self-evident, our analysis shows that DMV's reading best gives effect to the legislature's apparent intent. Furthermore, we would reach the same result even if we thought the statute were ambiguous. We give some deference to the interpretation of an ambiguous statute by the agency charged with enforcing it. [29] DMV's interpretation and application of subsection .271(b)(3) is plausible, consistent with the apparent legislative purpose, and grammatically permissible. We therefore conclude that section.271 looks to the status of suspension for the purpose of measuring the ten-year period for imposing reinstatement fees. If at any time within the ten years before reinstatement is sought, the license has been in the status of suspension, the reinstatement fee is payable. Bradshaw indicated in his application that his suspension was still in effect as of 2007. The superior court did not err in concluding that Bradshaw must pay the $100 fee required by AS 28.15.271(b)(3)(A).