Opinion ID: 2027679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Foster Care Requirement.

Text: As noted above, the court must hold a permanency hearing when a child has been placed in foster care for a period of twelve months. Id. § 232.104. Marcy claims that this prerequisite was not met here because the children's placement with their paternal grandmother was not a placement in foster care. Her second argument is that even if foster care includes placements with relatives, foster care contemplates a change in custody. She contends that Tony already had custodial rights when the court transferred custody to him so there was no change in custody and therefore no foster care placement at that time. We disagree with the mother's interpretation of section 232.104 because we think the legislature intended the term foster care to encompass any out-of-home placement. The reasons for our conclusion follow. Chapter 232 does not define the term foster care. Although Iowa Code chapter 237, Child Foster Care Facilities, defines child foster care for purposes of that chapter, it contains no definition of foster care. See Iowa Code § 237.1(4) (1993) (excluding care provided by relatives and guardians from the definition of child foster care). We do not find the definition of child foster care illuminating on the issue before us. The goal of chapter 237 varies significantly from the goals of chapter 232. A narrow definition of child foster care which excludes relative-provided care is understandable in chapter 237 because the purpose of chapter 237 is to regulate the care provided to children who are not in the homes of parents, relatives or guardians. See id. § 237.2. In contrast, as we discuss later, a broad definition of foster care is most consistent with the goals of chapter 232 to provide for the child's welfare and promote placement with parents or relatives. Finding no statutory definition of foster care, we look to rules of statutory construction for guidance in defining this term. One relevant rule is that we consider the goals of the statute and the consequences of a particular construction. The Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Texaco Refining & Mktg., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 536 (Iowa 1995); Iowa Code § 4.6 (1993). The ultimate goal of chapter 232 is to best serve the child's welfare. Iowa Code § 232.1 (1993); In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d 311, 317 (Iowa 1984). Additionally, the purpose of section 232.104 is to allow a secure and permanent placement when the court decides that is what the child needs. See Iowa Code § 232.104 (1993). If we interpret foster care to include only nonrelative placements, a child who lives with relatives for twelve months or longer is ineligible for a permanency order even though a permanent placement may be in that child's best interest. Such a consequence does not promote the child's welfare. Another adverse consequence of interpreting section 232.104 as not applying to children placed in the home of a relative is that of encouraging nonrelative placements. Iowa Code section 232.99 requires the court to make the least restrictive disposition appropriate considering all the circumstances. The home of a relative is considered less restrictive than placement in a private agency, facility or institution or placement with the department of human services. Id. §§ 232.99(3), .102(1). Thus, chapter 232 favors relative placements over nonrelative placements. Yet if children placed with relatives would not be eligible for an order establishing a permanent placement, the court would be forced to remove a child from a suitable relative placement for twelve months in order to issue an order establishing permanency. Such a result is irreconcilable with the goals of chapter 232 to act in the best interest of the child and to favor relative placements. A review of the prior language used in section 232.104 provides further support for our interpretation of that statute. See id. § 4.6 (in determining the intent of the legislature, court may consider legislative history and former statutory provisions). In its original form, section 232.104(1) read If custody of a child has been transferred for placement pursuant to section 232.102 for a period of twelve months.... 1987 Iowa Acts ch. 159, § 4 (emphasis added). In 1989 the statute was amended to its current languageIf a child has been placed in foster care for a period of twelve months.... 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 229, § 6. The 1989 amendment did two things. First, it eliminated the requirement that there be a prior transfer of custody. Second, it removed the limitation to placements made under section 232.102. We think the legislature intended these changes to broaden the cases in which a court could establish permanency for a child. The original version of section 232.104(1) applied only to placements made under section 232.102. Section 232.102 allows the court to transfer custody to a relative or other suitable person, a private agency, facility or institution, or DHS. Iowa Code § 232.102 (1993). However, not all children removed from their home are placed pursuant to section 232.102. Iowa Code section 232.101 also allows the court to place a child with a parent who has legal custody but did not previously have physical custody of the child. In re J.R.H., 358 N.W.2d at 319. Before the 1989 amendment to section 232.104, a child taken from the home of one parent and placed in the home of the other parent pursuant to section 232.101 would not be eligible for a permanency hearing. By removing the references to section 232.102 and to a transfer of custody, the amendment to section 232.104 broadened the cases in which the court could establish permanency to include children placed with a custodial parent pursuant to section 232.101. To conclude that section 232.104 does not encompass parental and other relative placements would make the 1989 amendment meaningless. This broad interpretation of the term foster care is also consistent with the meaning given to that term by our appellate courts. We presume the legislature knows the meaning given to a particular term by the courts when it uses that term in a statute. The Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd., 526 N.W.2d at 536. Therefore, our usage of the phrase in prior cases is relevant to our analysis. A review of our case law shows that we have never expressly defined the term foster care. However, Iowa appellate courts have implied that foster care is not limited to homes of nonrelated caretakers by using phrases such as placement in permanent foster care with O.H., the maternal grandmother, In re L.S., 483 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Iowa 1992), place Joshua in foster care with [his uncle and aunt], In re Mann, 293 N.W.2d 185, 187 (Iowa 1980), and placed in non-relative foster care, In re D.B., 483 N.W.2d 344, 345 (Iowa Ct.App.1992). Finally we note that the California Supreme Court, faced with a situation similar to the one here, concluded that the term foster home included placement with relatives. In re Laura F., 33 Cal.3d 826, 191 Cal.Rptr. 464, 662 P.2d 922 (1983) (en banc). In that case, the California court considered whether a child who was placed with her aunt and uncle for over two years had met the statutory requirement of spending two or more years in one or more foster homes. Id. at 466, 662 P.2d at 924. The court concluded that a narrow definition of foster homes was not consistent with the statute's purpose of serving the welfare and best interest of a child. Id. at 467, 662 P.2d at 925. Consequently, the court held that foster homes included placement with relatives. Id. In summary, we conclude that interpreting foster care to include a relative placement most effectively accomplishes the goals of chapter 232 to promote the best interests of the child, to encourage relative placements, and to establish a secure and permanent placement within a reasonable time. This definition of foster care is also most consistent with our prior usage of that term. Therefore, we hold that the term foster care as used in section 232.104 includes out-of-home placements with relatives, including parents who did not have physical custody at the time the CINA petition was filed. [2] Applying this definition, we hold that the placement of Marcy's sons with their paternal grandmother and father for over one year falls within the statutory prerequisite of placement in foster care for twelve months. Thus, the juvenile court did not err in conducting a permanency hearing.