Opinion ID: 4432764
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clark’s deprivation of the right to counsel

Text: The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal process. Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 87 (2004). In determining whether Clark’s constitutional right to counsel was violated, one important point must be addressed at the outset. The majority repeatedly relies on Clark’s statements at the competency hearing to the effect that he had previously discussed the competency hearing with his attorneys. But because Clark made those statements before his competency had been determined, we cannot rely on them in determining whether Clark’s right to counsel was violated. Cf. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966) (“[I]t is contradictory to argue that a defendant may be incompetent, and yet knowingly or intelligently ‘waive’ his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial.”). This also explains why Makidon v. Elo, cited by the majority, has no bearing on this case: in Makidon, which involved a plea hearing rather than a competency hearing, the Court relied heavily on the fact that “Makidon told the trial court that he had no further questions for counsel, that he had decided how to proceed with the advice of counsel, and that he affirmatively wished to proceed despite counsel’s absence from the courtroom.” 3 F. App’x 409, 412 (6th Cir. 2001). Moreover, the Court in Makidon found that the defendant “knowingly and voluntarily waived his counsel’s presence from the plea hearing.” Id. In contrast, Clark’s statements to the effect that he had discussed the hearing with his attorneys and wished to move forward occurred No. 18-1640 Clark v. Lindsey Page 10 at Clark’s own competency hearing—before his competency had been established—so it would defy logic for this Court to rely on Clark’s statements in reaching its decision. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that Clark’s attorneys’ failure to appear at his competency hearing did not deprive Clark of the representation he was due. The court based this finding on the fact that one of Clark’s attorneys purportedly communicated his absence and acceptance of the report to the trial court before the hearing, and “[t]he trial court accepted [Clark’s] representation that he considered the competency report with his attorneys and accepted the stipulation that [Clark] was competent.” (R. 6-14, Mich. Ct. App. Opinion, PageID # 370.) Clark argues that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision directly contradicts the Supreme Court’s decision in Cronic. In that case, the Supreme Court stated that “[t]he presumption that counsel’s assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial.” 466 U.S. at 659. In other words, the Supreme Court “has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding.” Id. at 659 n. 25. In cases where counsel was “totally absent” during a critical stage of criminal proceedings, Cronic directs courts to bypass the Strickland analysis of whether a defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s deficient performance. The majority relies on this Court’s decision in Maslonka v. Hoffner, 900 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2018). In Maslonka, this Court considered whether Cronic applied when a defendant’s attorney failed to appear during federal cooperation meetings between Maslonka and federal agents, which we assumed without deciding were critical stages of the proceedings. In addressing the petitioner’s deprivation of counsel argument, this Court stated that “a counsel’s mere physical absence from a critical stage of a proceeding, based on the counsel’s own failure to be present rather than any denial by the state,” is not sufficient to constitute denial of counsel under Cronic. Id. at 279. Instead, this Court determined that Cronic only applies if the state “played a part in preventing adequate representation.” Id. at 280. No. 18-1640 Clark v. Lindsey Page 11 The majority overlooks a crucial component of Maslonka, which recognized the ample case law demonstrating that a trial judge’s actions can serve as the role of the state in denying counsel. Id. For example, the Court in Maslonka compared that case to the earlier Sixth Circuit case Mitchell v. Mason, in which the Sixth Circuit affirmed a grant of habeas relief to a state prisoner under Cronic. Mitchell v. Mason, 325 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2003). In Mitchell, the Court found that Cronic applied when the trial court had refused to appoint new counsel despite knowing that the defendant’s counsel was not providing representation. Id. at 741–42. Maslonka explained that “in Mitchell the ‘trial court repeatedly ignored Mitchell’s entreaties for counsel who would properly prepare a defense,’ meaning that some state actor . . . played a part in preventing adequate representation.” Maslonka, 900 F.3d at 280 (quoting Mitchell, 325 F.3d at 744). Similarly, in French v. Jones, 332 F.3d 430 (6th Cir. 2003), this Court affirmed a district court’s grant of habeas to a state court prisoner under factual circumstances similar to Clark’s. The trial court in that case gave a supplemental jury instruction to deadlocked jurors while French’s counsel was absent. Id. at 434. This Court found that French had been denied his right to counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, and that he was thus entitled to a presumption of prejudice under Cronic. Id. at 436–39. This Court reached the same conclusion under nearly identical facts in Caver v. Straub. 349 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir. 2003) (“[U]nder Cronic . . . if Petitioner’s trial counsel was, indeed, absent during the re-instruction, a structural error occurred in the trial court proceeding, and either relief from judgment or a writ of habeas corpus could be properly granted on this ground. Any conclusion otherwise would be an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as stated in Cronic.”). The critical difference between Maslonka on the one hand and Mitchell, French, and Caver on the other is the involvement of the trial court in the denial of counsel. In Maslonka, the alleged deprivation of counsel occurred when Maslonka’s counsel did not attend cooperation meetings with federal authorities, which this Court assumed without deciding were “part of the critical stage of his state plea negotiations because his more-favorable state plea offer hinged on that federal cooperation.” Maslonka, 900 F.3d at 279. Federal cooperation meetings are not a stage of proceedings at which the trial court judge would normally be present, so the trial judge played no role in sanctioning Maslonka’s counsel’s absence at those meetings. In contrast, the deprivations of counsel in Mitchell, French, and Caver each involved active participation by the No. 18-1640 Clark v. Lindsey Page 12 trial court. In each case, the trial court knew of counsel’s absence and decided to continue with proceedings without them. In Mitchell, the most extreme of the three cases, Mitchell’s counsel made “no effort to consult with the client” and was suspended from practicing law before the trial, yet the trial court denied Mitchell’s repeated requests for a new attorney. Mitchell, 325 F.3d at 744. Similarly, in French and Caver, the trial court issued new jury re-instructions despite knowing that the defendants’ attorneys were not present. French, 332 F.3d at 436–39; Caver, 349 F.3d at 350. Together, these cases demonstrate that when a trial court proceeds with a critical stage despite knowing that a defendant’s counsel is not present, Cronic governs. In other words, a trial court’s decision to proceed with the critical stage despite counsel’s absence is sufficient to establish that a state actor “played a part in preventing adequate representation,” such that Cronic applies and the habeas petitioner is entitled to a presumption of prejudice. Maslonka, 900 F.3d at 280. The majority’s holding to the contrary renders Maslonka inconsistent with this Court’s earlier published cases. The facts of this case are more similar to Mitchell, French, and Caver than to Maslonka. Just as in Mitchell, French, and Caver, the trial court in this case chose to continue with Clark’s competency hearing, despite its extensive conversation with Clark and with the prosecution noting the obvious fact that Clark’s attorneys were absent. The trial court ostensibly made this decision because one of Clark’s attorneys called the trial court or the trial court’s chambers before the hearing to let the trial court know that Clark’s attorneys would not be in attendance. By allowing counsel to call ahead and assert that they would not attend the competency hearing and then deciding Clark’s competency in their absence, rather than requiring Clark’s counsel to appear at the competency hearing and state their position on the record, the trial court “played a part in preventing adequate representation” for Clark. Maslonka, 900 F.3d at 280. Thus, this case is one in which “some state actor . . . played a part in preventing adequate representation,” not one in which the lack of representation was attributable only to “the counsel’s own failure to be present.” Id. at 279–80. Cronic therefore governs. Clark suffered a “complete denial of counsel [at his competency hearing, which] mandates a presumption of prejudice.” French, 332 F.3d at 436 (quoting Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 483 (2000)). And as the Supreme Court explained in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629–30 (1993), No. 18-1640 Clark v. Lindsey Page 13 “deprivation of the right to counsel . . . requires automatic reversal of the conviction because [it] infect[s] the entire trial process.”2 The majority glosses over a crucial distinction when it asserts that the dissent relies on the fact that “our cases require relief,” rather than Supreme Court cases, as is required under AEDPA. Maj. Op. at 5. As the Supreme Court has explained, “an appellate panel may, in accordance with its usual law-of-the-circuit procedures, look to circuit precedent to ascertain whether it has already held that the particular point in issue is clearly established by Supreme Court precedent.” Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 64 (2013); see also Tolliver v. Sheets, 594 F.3d 900, 916 n.6 (6th Cir. 2010) (“We are bound by prior Sixth Circuit determinations that a rule has been clearly established.”). Mitchell, French, and Caver all found it clearly established under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Cronic that when the trial court proceeds with a critical stage of criminal proceedings despite defense counsel’s total absence, the defendant’s right to counsel has been violated. We are thus bound by our previous decisions in Mitchell, French, and Caver concluding that, under AEDPA, a state court directly contradicts Cronic when the state court finds no deprivation of counsel despite counsel’s total absence under analogous scenarios. To adhere to these decisions, as we must, is not to measure the state court’s decision against Sixth Circuit precedent, which would be improper under AEDPA—instead, it is to respect Sixth Circuit precedent interpreting the scope of the Supreme Court’s decision in Cronic. Mitchell, French, and Caver are all AEDPA cases holding that Cronic governs when the trial court proceeds with a critical stage despite defense counsel’s total absence. In sum, the Michigan Court of Appeals rendered a decision that “was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” in Cronic, when it held that Clark’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated at his 2The majority claims that this case is more like our decision in United States v. Brika, 416 F.3d 514, 525– 26 (6th Cir. 2005), than like Mitchell, French, and Caver, because in Brika, the trial court discussed its proposed actions with defense counsel before providing jury re-instruction in counsel’s absence. In Brika, the trial court engaged in a “fairly lengthy” discussion directly with defense counsel before providing jury re-instruction in counsel’s absence. Id. at 521. In contrast, in this case, the trial court apparently did not speak directly with defense counsel at all; at best, Clark’s counsel communicated their intentions with the trial court’s “office.” Moreover, the contents and nature of the communication in this case are entirely unknown, outside of the trial court’s confusing second-hand statements. Thus, while this distinction may have had some persuasive value in Brika, it does not hold water in this case. No. 18-1640 Clark v. Lindsey Page 14 competency hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Clark’s attorneys were totally absent at the competency hearing, and Cronic explains that the Supreme Court finds “constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was . . . totally absent” during the proceeding at issue. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n.25. The Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision thus directly contradicted Cronic, which this Circuit’s precedent demonstrates applies in this case. Because Clark was denied counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. For all of the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.