Opinion ID: 1444019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rights Protected by the PFLA

Text: ¶ 20. Plaintiff's second claim on appeal is that, assuming she is eligible for PFLA leave, the trial court erred in holding that the statute permits her to be fired for performance reasons during the leave period. She argues that the statute protects an employee on leave unless her job has been eliminated due to a reduction in force or other economic reason. She claims that six other jurisdictions with similar statutes have prohibited firing employees while they are on parental leave, and that the statutory language of the Vermont PFLA supports the same construction. We reject all of plaintiff's arguments and hold that the PFLA does not protect an employee from being fired, as long as the employer's decision withstands scrutiny that the firing is not related to the leave. ¶ 21. The statute provides, in § 472(f), that there is no right to reinstatement if the employer can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that during the period of leave the employee's job would have been terminated or the employee laid off for reasons unrelated to the leave or the condition for which the leave was granted. Plaintiff reads the phrase job would have been terminated as referring to situations where a position has been eliminated due to reorganization, essentially synonymous with the phrase employee laid off. We are not convinced by plaintiff's construction because it assumes a redundancy in the statute, that is, it treats the phrase job would have been terminated as a special variation on the reasons that an employee could be laid off. We conclude the more plausible construction is that an employer may deny reinstatement to an employee if the employee would have been terminated for reasons not related to the leave or the condition for which the leave was granted. See State v. Baldwin, 140 Vt. 501, 512, 438 A.2d 1135, 1141 (1981) ([W]e are reluctant to discard statutory language as inadvertent or as mere surplusage when it is not necessary in order to effectuate what we conceive to be the intent of the legislature ....); see also State v. Tierney, 138 Vt. 163, 165, 412 A.2d 298, 299 (1980) (In construing a statute, this Court . . . if possible, gives effect to every word, clause and sentence.); State v. Ben-Mont Corp., 163 Vt. 53, 57, 652 A.2d 1004, 1007 (1994) (Our interpretation must . . . if possible, give meaning and effect to all the statutory language.). ¶ 22. Our interpretation furthers a fair and rational result. See Ben-Mont, 163 Vt. at 57, 652 A.2d at 1007 (holding that this Court's interpretation of a statute must further fair, rational results). As the State argues, an interpretation of the PFLA that does not allow dismissal while an employee is on leave would require an employer who discovers evidence of serious misconduct or unacceptable performance when the employee is on leave to reinstate that employee no matter how clear the evidence might be of wrongdoing. We cannot find that intent in the statutory language. See Braun v. Bd. of Dental Exam'rs, 167 Vt. 110, 117, 702 A.2d 124, 128 (1997) (statutes construed with presumption that the Legislature does not intend an interpretation that would lead to absurd or irrational consequences). ¶ 23. Moreover, no other court has interpreted a similar statute to prohibit discharge for performance problems during leave. Upon examination of the six jurisdictions cited by plaintiff that she claims prohibit dismissal during leave except in cases of economic necessity, none so hold. [5] ¶ 24. Finally, our construction is sensible in light of the heavy burden the Legislature placed on employers to prove that the discharge of an employee on leave was unrelated to the reason for the leave. In other words, the teeth of the statute is in the employer's burden of proof, rather than in an absolute protection not to be fired while on leave. See 21 V.S.A. § 472(f). ¶ 25. Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard to the record before us, we cannot uphold summary judgment for the State, bearing in mind that this is an appeal from a grant of summary judgment in which the employee must be given the benefit of all reasonable inferences. We note initially that the trial court does not mention the high burden of proof and does not appear to place that burden on the employer; instead, the trial court indicates that the burden is on plaintiff to establish an entitlement to the protection of the PFLA by a preponderance standard. Whatever the trial court meant, however, our review of summary judgment is de novo, and therefore we undertake a review of the evidence, placing the burden of proof on the State. ¶ 26. The State has offered affidavits from Robin Orr, plaintiff's supervisor, and Richard LeBus, the person who held the position of business manager before plaintiff and had been asked to train her in budget matters when he was hired for a new position as a computer information specialist. Both assert that plaintiff did not have the background or skills needed to perform the job of business manager and made numerous mistakes throughout the period of her employment that caused them not to trust her work. The State's lack of written documentation of plaintiff's performance during the time she worked at the Department consigns it, however, to reliance on after-the-fact accounts of plaintiff's performance. Moreover, its extension of her probationary period to October and its failure to take action against plaintiff prior to leave remains unexplained. See Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., 151 F.3d 591, 604-05 (7th Cir.1998) (holding that a jury could reasonably find that the timing of employer's firing of employee days after she requested medical leave was not merely a coincidence). The State is correct that the timing of discharge might not be sufficient, in and of itself, to prove that the firing was unlawful, but the additional unexplained facts are sufficient to place the burden of proof on the State. ¶ 27. The State asserts in response, through Robin Orr's affidavit, that it made additional discoveries about the extent of plaintiff's performance problems after plaintiff's leave began, such as the discovery that plaintiff had told two other employees to stop paying bills because of a budget deficit erroneously predicted by plaintiff, and that plaintiff's termination occurred because of these new discoveries. Plaintiff has denied giving this instruction to employees and offers evidence showing that the employees in question were not in the office on the day she completed the erroneous budget calculations. The record does not include affidavits from either employee about this issue. Plaintiff also asserts that she knew the figures in the budget did not reconcile, but because she had scheduled her labor to be induced that afternoon, she did not have time to fix them. She claims to have informed LeBus prior to her departure that there was a problem with the budget that needed further work. Orr alludes to other problems as well, but they are not in the record before us. Thus, we cannot conclude on this record that the State has met its burden. If, on remand, the State is able to prove that it made additional discoveries demonstrating plaintiff's poor judgment or incompetence, or resolve the factual issues that now exist, the evidence may meet the clear and convincing evidence standard, but the evidence is too confused and contradictory at this point to make a finding in favor of the State. ¶ 28. To the extent that plaintiff claims that her performance problems were due to her pregnancy, we clarify that the PFLA neither excuses performance problems caused by the condition for which PFLA leave is taken nor requires an employer to give an employee an opportunity to show improved job performance following leave. Plaintiff is essentially attempting to bootstrap a discrimination claim of the kind that could be brought under the Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), 21 V.S.A. §§ 495-496, into her PFLA claim. We have held that pregnancy discrimination qualifies as sex discrimination under FEPA, if employers treat workers who request accommodation for pregnancy disability differently from workers requesting accommodation for other disabilities. Lavalley v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 166 Vt. 205, 210-12, 692 A.2d 367, 370-71 (1997). If plaintiff felt unable to perform her job because she was disabled by her pregnancy, she was entitled to ask the State to accommodate her, but any rights plaintiff may have had to accommodation under the FEPA do not provide a legal excuse to her discharge while on pregnancy leave under the PFLA.