Opinion ID: 1481170
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Breaking and Entering Sentence

Text: Mr. Coleman first argues that his twelve-and-a-half-year sentence for breaking and entering was grossly disproportionate to the five-year breaking and entering sentence that Mr. Alston received after his first trial. Initially, both Mr. Coleman and Mr. Alston received fifteen-year sentences for their breaking and entering convictions. Mr. Coleman, however, was ordered to serve twelve-and-a-half years, with two-and-a-half years suspended, while Mr. Alston was ordered to serve five years, with ten years suspended. Mr. Coleman's argument relies on the initial seven-and-a-half-year disparity between Mr. Coleman's time to serve and Mr. Alston's time to serve after his first trial. That comparison, however, is no longer meaningful because Mr. Alston's first conviction was vacated, and his first sentence has become a nullity. After Mr. Alston's first conviction was vacated, and after he was convicted a second time, he received a total of forty years imprisonment. Of that forty-year sentence, Mr. Alston was sentenced to serve ten years imprisonment on the breaking and entering charge. Thus, the difference between Mr. Coleman and Mr. Alston's breaking and entering sentences is a mere two-and-a-half years. This Court has held that confederates need not receive equal sentences for the same crime. See State v. Flores, 637 A.2d 366, 366-67 (R.I.1994) (disparity between confederates' sentences permissible where sentence mirrored culpability); State v. Holley, 623 A.2d 973, 974 (R.I.1993) (five year difference between sentences of two confederates not grossly disproportionate). Here, the two-and-a-half-year disparity between the sentences that Mr. Coleman and Mr. Alston received for breaking and entering is not grossly disproportionate. Further, although Mr. Coleman received two-and-a-half years more on the breaking and entering charge than Mr. Alston, Mr. Alston received a total of forty years imprisonment, compared with Mr. Coleman's twenty years imprisonment. Mr. Coleman's argument that his sentence was grossly disproportionate to Mr. Alston's is therefore meritless. Next, Mr. Coleman argues that his fifteen-year breaking and entering sentence was excessive because it exceeds the sentence as set forth in the Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks. The crime of unlawful breaking and entering of a dwelling house is punishable under § 11-8-2(a) by imprisonment for not less than two (2) years and not more than ten (10) years for the first conviction, and for the second and subsequent conviction shall be imprisoned for not less than four (4) years and not more than fifteen (15) years   . In addition to the sentence imposed by statute, the Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks recommend a one-to-four-year sentence for breaking and entering into an unoccupied dwelling. Superior Court Sentencing Benchmark 3. Although, when sentencing a defendant, a trial justice may use benchmarks as a guide to the proportionality of a term, [s]he is bound only by the statutory limits. State v. Bettencourt, 766 A.2d 391, 394 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Gordon, 539 A.2d 528, 530 (R.I.1988)). In formulating a fair sentence, a trial justice `considers various factors including the severity of the crime, the defendant's personal, educational, and employment background, the potential for rehabilitation, social deterrence, and the appropriateness of the punishment.' Id. (quoting State v. Brigham, 666 A.2d 405, 406 (R.I. 1995)). The sentencing benchmarks allow departure when substantial and compelling circumstances exist. Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks, Using the Benchmarks 1. If a trial justice sentences a defendant outside the recommended range, the benchmarks instruct the trial justice to give specific reasons for the departure on the record. Id. Examples of compelling circumstances provided in the sentencing benchmarks include a defendant's prior criminal record, lack of remorse, whether the defendant testified, and if he or she testified and gave patently false testimony, and other substantial grounds which tend to mitigate or aggravate the offender's culpability. Id. at 1.(q). Further, the sentencing benchmarks explicitly allow for a sentencing departure based on a defendant's criminal history. Superior Court Sentencing Benchmarks, Departure from Benchmarks. Here, because this was Mr. Coleman's second breaking and entering conviction, the maximum sentence he could receive under § 11-8-2 was fifteen years, a term which the trial justice imposed. Acknowledging her departure from the benchmarks in sentencing Mr. Coleman to fifteen years with twelve and a half to serve, the trial justice listed myriad reasons for doing so: (1) that the breaking and entering by Mr. Coleman was not comparable to the breaking and entering into an unoccupied dwelling because there was no indication that the house was going to remain vacant, as was demonstrated by the Lavens' return home in the midst of the break-in; (2) that the breaking and entering turned into a crime of violence; (3) that Mr. Coleman was a career criminal and was a poor candidate for rehabilitation; (4) that he refused to take personal responsibility for his crimes; (5) that he lacked any remorse; and (6) that he lied on the stand at his trial. She further stated that she found it in the best interests of the community for Mr. Coleman to be removed from society for twenty years. These specific findings, in addition to the fact that this was Mr. Coleman's second breaking and entering conviction more than fully justify the trial justice's departure from the benchmarks. Thus, we see no reason to disturb the sentence imposed.