Opinion ID: 777088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: In Camera Questioning of Prospective Jurors for Hardship Excuses

Text: 50 The defendants assert that the District Court committed reversible error by excluding the parties and counsel from in camera meetings with the venire members relating to jury service hardship excuses. We disagree. 51 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) provides that a criminal defendant shall be present at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury. Fed.R.Crim.P. 43(a); see also Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 38-39, 95 S.Ct. 2091, 45 L.Ed.2d 1 (1975) (criminal defendant has a right to be present from the time the jury is impaneled until its discharge after rendering the verdict); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 374, 13 S.Ct. 136, 36 L.Ed. 1011 (1892) ([T]he trial commences at least from the time when the work of empanelling the jury begins.). 52 We have held, however, that routine administrative procedures relating to jury selection are not part of the true jury impanelment process in which parties and counsel have a right to participate. In United States v. Woodner, 317 F.2d 649, 651 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 903, 84 S.Ct. 192, 11 L.Ed.2d 144 (1963), we affirmed a conviction after the district court questioned potential jurors about hardship excuses at the bench in sight of, but outside the hearing of, the parties and counsel. The district court in that case also met with two jurors privately in chambers without a court reporter present to further discuss the jurors' hardship reasons. We fail[ed] to see the remotest possibility of prejudicial error in [that] procedure, and refused to presume that prejudice resulted in the absence of some plain showing to that effect. Id. at 651-52. Rather, we emphasized our confidence in the integrity and fairness of the District Judges to assume that they will not make unfair remarks to jurors while undertaking administrative duties of this nature. Id. at 652. 53 Since Woodner, we have reaffirmed that hardship questioning is not a part of voir dire — and thus not a critical stage of the trial during which the parties and counsel must be present. In United States v. Williams, 927 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 307, 116 L.Ed.2d 250 (1991), the defendant challenged the practice of the jury clerk, rather than the trial judge, excusing certain venire members on hardship grounds. We upheld the constitutionality of that practice, distinguishing such an `administrative impanelment process' from voir dire. Id. at 97 (quoting Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 874, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (distinguishing voir dire, which represents jurors' first introduction to the substantive factual and legal issues in a case, from the administrative impanelment process)). 54 Similarly, in Tankleff v. Senkowski, 135 F.3d 235, 247 (2d Cir.1998), we labeled the in camera questioning of jurors to eliminate those who had been prejudiced by pretrial publicity tedious, routine screening. See also United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 31 (1st Cir.1999) (If a judge does no more than what a jury clerk is authorized to do in excusing jurors, that may raise an issue of allocation of court resources but does not raise an issue of impropriety.), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1055, 120 S.Ct. 1559, 146 L.Ed.2d 463 (2000); United States v. Calaway, 524 F.2d 609, 615-16 (9th Cir.1975) (affirming conviction after trial court questioned jurors about hardships in camera without parties, counsel, or reporter present), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967, 96 S.Ct. 1462, 47 L.Ed.2d 733 (1976). 55 The defendants' reliance on United States v. Bordallo, 857 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 818, 110 S.Ct. 71, 107 L.Ed.2d 38 (1989), is misplaced. In Bordallo, the Ninth Circuit concluded that either the defendant or his counsel should have been present when the district court excused prospective jurors. See id. at 523. In Bordallo, however, it was clear that the prospective jurors knew which specific case they would hear, and some were excused due to factors related to [the defendant's] particular cause. Id. This, the Ninth Circuit held, made the situation more analogous to voir dire than to mere administrative impanelment. See id. 56 Here, the District Court questioned the prospective jurors prior to announcing the case. As was made clear to the parties, the process employed by the court was standard in Vermont. Accordingly, at least to the extent that the District Court addressed routine administrative matters with the jurors, we fail to see any error in its exclusion of the parties and counsel. 57