Opinion ID: 3061485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Summary Judgment on Count II

Text: Rance also contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to DVR on Rance’s failure-to-provide-vocational-rehabilitation-benefits claim in Count II. Specifically, Rance argues that (1) an issue of material fact exists as to whether the IPE was pending or approved, (2) the regulations do not mention the need for a supervisor, as opposed to a counselor, to approve an IPE, and (3) no law exists authorizing DVR to require Rance to take the TABE and undergo a psychological evaluation for his IPE to be approved. We are not persuaded. The Rehabilitation Act authorizes federal grants “to assist [s]tates in operating statewide . . . programs . . . [d]esigned to assess, plan, develop, and provide vocational rehabilitation services for individuals with disabilities, consistent with their strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, interests, and informed choice,” with the goal of preparing and enabling such individuals to “engage in gainful employment.” 34 C.F.R. § 361.1. Further, the Act’s purpose includes helping states operate programs of vocational rehabilitation that are “comprehensive, coordinated, effective, efficient, and 16 accountable.” 29 U.S.C. § 720(a)(2). To be eligible for these federal grants, states must submit plans that comply with 29 U.S.C. § 721. Id. § 721(a)(1)(A). The state plans under § 721 must provide for the development and implementation of IPEs for eligible disabled individuals. See id. § 721(a)(9); 34 C.F.R. § 361.45. The regulations make clear, however, that states may assess an individual’s ability to succeed with the IPE, including through intellectual, medical, and psychological evaluations. See 34 C.F.R. § 361.5(b)(6)(ii)(c) (providing that the agency may assess “the personality, . . . intelligence and related functional capacities, . . . and the medical, psychiatric, psychological, and other pertinent . . . factors that affect the employment and rehabilitation needs of the individual”). Additionally, the regulations require states to create written policies for providing services to persons with disabilities. Id. § 361.50. The statute and regulations establish certain requirements for an IPE. It must be a written document (prepared on forms provided by the state unit) that has been approved and signed by a “qualified vocational rehabilitation counselor.” 29 U.S.C. § 722(b)(2)(A), (C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 361.45(d)(1), (3)(ii). In developing an IPE, the state unit in charge of such services must “complete an assessment for determining eligibility and vocational needs, as appropriate.” 29 U.S.C. 17 § 722(b)(1); Fla. Stat. § 413.30(5). If additional information is needed to determine the nature and scope of the IPE’s services, the state unit should “conduct a comprehensive assessment of the unique strengths, resources, priorities, concerns, abilities, capabilities, interests, and informed choice” of the eligible individual. 34 C.F.R. § 361.45(f)(2)(i). The dispositive question here is whether Rance’s IPE was indeed approved within the meaning of the relevant statute. Rance’s only support for his assertion that the IPE was approved and not pending is his own assertion in his brief that it is so. However, the only available evidence—including Sapperstein’s affidavit, the IPE’s case notes, and the IPE printout—shows that Rance’s IPE was pending. Rance submitted no evidence showing that his IPE was approved and signed by even his counselor. The statute and regulations plainly state the IPE must be approved and signed by a qualified vocational rehabilitation counselor before being executed. 29 U.S.C. § 722(b)(2)(A), (C)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 361.45(d)(1), (3)(ii). Because Rance failed to present any evidence showing that the IPE was approved, summary judgment was proper. As to Rance’s argument that, as a matter of law, the statute and regulations do not require a supervisor, as opposed to a counselor, to approve the IPE, that much is true. But neither the statute nor the regulations forbid a state’s requiring a 18 supervisor to approve the IPE. Indeed, having a supervisor review a counselor’s work merely ensures that Florida’s vocational rehabilitation program is “comprehensive, coordinated, effective, efficient, and accountable.” See 29 U.S.C. § 720(a)(2). Rance has not shown how the supervisor-approval requirement violates or is inconsistent with the statute, regulations, or even the Rehabilitation Act’s purpose. And at the crux of the matter, DVR—whether through a supervisor or counselor—never approved and signed Rance’s IPE. Rance’s final argument that DVR violated the law by requiring him to take the TABE and undergo a psychological evaluation is also without merit. Again, Rance is correct that no statute or regulation required that he undergo those particular examinations. However, both the federal statute and the applicable state statute provide that once a person is deemed eligible for vocational rehabilitation services, the state unit in charge of the services must assess that individual to determine his eligibility and vocational rehabilitation needs. 29 U.S.C. § 722(b)(1); Fla. Stat. § 413.30(5). In fact, the regulations specifically allow the state unit to conduct a comprehensive assessment of an eligible individual to determine what services should be included in the IPE. See 34 C.F.R. §§ 361.45(f)(2)(i), 361.5(b)(6). This may include “an assessment of the personality . . . intelligence and related functional capacities, . . . and the medical, 19 psychiatric, psychological, and other pertinent . . . factors that affect the employment and rehabilitation needs of the individual.” Id. at § 361.5(b)(6)(ii)(c). The TABE and psychological examination were authorized under the statutory scheme. The evidentiary record also supports DVR’s use of the TABE and psychological evaluation. DVR submitted evidence showing that the use of the TABE and the psychological evaluation was reasonable considering Rance’s desired course. Rance failed to present any evidence showing that DVR’s requirements violated the statute, the regulations, or DVR’s own policies or operating procedures. For all the above reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DVR on Counts I and II of Rance’s complaint. AFFIRMED. 20