Opinion ID: 1441960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preemption Discussion

Text: ERISA applies, inter alia, to all employee benefit plans established or maintained by any employer engaged in interstate commerce or in any industry affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1) (1982). Summa meets the statutory interstate requirement and the plan in question is clearly an ERISA plan. [1] The question of whether particular state action is preempted by federal law involves interpreting the language of the statute in accordance with congressional intent. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1909-10, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). It is well established that the breadth of ERISA preemption is unique among federal statutes. See, e.g., Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 2216, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborer Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n. 26, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2854 n. 26, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). The original ERISA bill draft contained limited preemption language. This limited language was consciously rejected by the conference committee and ultimately altered to reflect the more expansive approach now contained in the law. Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-100, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2899-2902, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983). The accompanying legislative history clearly shows the extensive preemptive effect Congress intended ERISA to have. Id. The Supreme Court has consistently maintained an expansive construction of ERISA preemption even to the extent of making ERISA claims an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66-67, 107 S.Ct. 1542, 1547-1548, 95 L.Ed.2d 55 (1987); Hartle v. Packard Elec., 877 F.2d 354, 355 (5th Cir.1989). An additional illustration of ERISA's preemptive scope can be found in Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 101 S.Ct. 1895, 68 L.Ed.2d 402 (1981), where the court held that a New Jersey law which prohibited the set-off of workmen's compensation benefits against employee retirement benefits was preempted even though the law was directed at worker's compensation benefits. The court noted that the Act (ERISA) was designed to occupy fully the field of employee benefit plans and to establish it as exclusively a federal concern. Id. at 523, 101 S.Ct. at 1906. Similarly, in Shaw the court unanimously struck down a New York law requiring compensation for pregnancy-related disability that would have gone uncompensated under the existing plans were it not for the New York requirement. The court said that Congress meant the relate to language in the statute to have the normal sense meaning that the state law claim is preempted if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan. Id. at 97, 103 S.Ct. at 2900. [2] This encompasses direct regulation as well as regulation by implication. Id. at 96-99, 103 S.Ct. at 2899-2901. The Shaw court did note that some state actions might be too tenuous or peripheral to satisfy the relate to language of the statute. Id. at 100 n. 21, 103 S.Ct. at 2901 n. 21. [3] The most recent Supreme Court ERISA cases retrenched the preemption aspect somewhat but not in a manner that affects the outcome of this case. Fort Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 107 S.Ct. 2211, 96 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987); Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 108 S.Ct. 2182, 100 L.Ed.2d 836 (1988). In Fort Halifax, the court decided that ERISA preemption of a Maine plant closing statute requiring lump sum severance payments would not serve the purposes of ERISA and, therefore, in recognition of the state's interest declined to allow preemption. Similarly, in Mackey, a Georgia state law which allowed garnishment of ERISA employee welfare benefits was not preempted despite the fact that the law clearly impacted an ERISA plan. Here, the district court primarily based its decision on its interpretation of 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1140, and 1132 (1982). [4] ERISA provides, with exceptions that do not apply to these facts, [5] that it shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan [within the Act's coverage]. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982). State law is defined broadly enough to encompass almost any imaginable legislative, judicial or administrative action a state might take. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1), (2) (1982). Given the plain meaning of the statutory language and the broad construction accorded ERISA preemption, Marcoz's claims appear to relate to an employee benefit plan. If § 1144(a) were the only applicable section, we would have to determine whether the relationship was too tenuous given the state interest. However, any uncertainty on the point is resolved when that section is read in conjunction with § 1140. Section 1140 provides: