Opinion ID: 1698030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims based upon bad faith, malice, or willfulness

Text: Peace officers are not entitled to absolute immunity under § 6-5-338(a); rather, immunity from tort liability under § 6-5-338(a) is withheld if an officer acts with willful or malicious intent or in bad faith. Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So.2d 1168, 1178 (Ala.2003). See also Gary v. Crouch, 867 So.2d 310, 313 (Ala. 2003) ([W]here a municipal police officer is engaged in a discretionary function with respect to the conduct complained of, he or she would be immune under § 6-5-338, `unless his [or her] actions were conducted with willful or malicious intent or in bad faith.') (quoting Ex parte City of Montgomery, 758 So.2d at 570). Cf. Cranman, 792 So.2d at 405 (holding that a State agent is not entitled to immunity when the State agent acts willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, in bad faith, beyond his or her authority, or under a mistaken interpretation of the law). Arnold alleges that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith in arresting her in that they may have fabricated or concocted the warrant after she was arrested. The petitioners argue that John Moon and Theodore Moon are immune from liability as to this claim under § 6-5-338(a). If John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith, with malice, or with willfulness in arresting Arnold, however, they are not entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a). See Borders, 875 So.2d at 1178. Cf. Swan, 920 So.2d at 1081 (holding that a municipal police officer was entitled to immunity under § 6-5-338(a) although he arrested the wrong person, because the plaintiff did not allege that his arrest was made in bad faith, with malice, or willfully). John Moon stated that Arnold was present at the municipal court complex when the employee in the clerk's office notified him that there was an outstanding warrant for Arnold's arrest. In contrast, Arnold claims John Moon could not have verified the existence of the warrant as he claimed he did in his affidavit because she was arrested immediately upon entering the foyer of the municipal court complex. Arnold also alleges that John Moon refused to let her see the warrant when he arrested her. In addition, Arnold alleges that after she was released from jail she returned to the municipal court complex to obtain a copy. However, Arnold states that no one in the municipal court clerk's office could provide her with a copy. Arnold further states that she did not actually receive a copy of the warrant until after she filed her initial complaint in the state court. Lastly, Arnold alleges that her arrest may have been made in bad faith or that the warrant may have been fabricated or concocted by John Moon or Theodore Moon because of a previous dispute Arnold had had with Theodore Moon. In 1996, Arnold's granddaughter was severely injured and suffered permanent brain damage while she was in the care of a babysitter, and Theodore Moon was assigned to investigate the case. No arrests were made, and Arnold believed that Theodore Moon had failed to properly investigate the cause of her granddaughter's injuries. Arnold complained to the district attorney and the attorney general's office about Theodore Moon's work on the case. Therefore, Arnold alleges, her arrest may have been made in bad faith by Theodore Moon because of their previous dispute. The petitioners have no clear legal right to the order sought as to Arnold's claims that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted with malice and bad faith in arresting her because it is possible that Arnold could prove facts showing that the officers are not entitled to immunity. See Butts, 775 So.2d at 178 (`[i]t is not for this court to determine, based on the complaint, whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only if he may possibly prevail.' . . . It is conceivable that [the plaintiffs] could prove facts that would show that [the petitioners]. . . acted willfully, maliciously, fraudulently, [or] in bad faith . . . .) (quoting Patton v. Black, 646 So.2d 8, 10 (Ala.1994)). See also Burdeshaw v. Snell, 350 F.Supp.2d 944, 952-53 (M.D.Ala.2004) (holding that on the basis of the complaint there isor can bea factual basis which divests [the defendant police officer] of his statutory immunity because the officer arrested the plaintiff for possession of drugs but failed to investigate the plaintiff's claim that he had a valid prescription for the drugs); and Walker v. Briley, 140 F.Supp.2d 1249, 1263 (N.D.Ala.2001) (denying summary-judgment motion filed by a police officer who argued that he was immune under § 6-5-338(a) from a claim of false arrest because the evidence suggested that the officer had no grounds to believe [the plaintiff] had committed any offense whatsoever and a reasonable jury could determine that the arrest was in bad faith). The determination whether John Moon and Theodore Moon are entitled to immunity as to Arnold's claim that the officers acted willfully, maliciously, or in bad faith is dependent upon the specific facts of this case. After discovery, the trial court can determine whether Arnold can produce sufficient evidence showing that the officers acted in bad faith, with malice, or willfully so that a summary judgment on the basis of immunity under § 6-5-338 should not be entered. See Department of Mental Health, 837 So.2d at 814 (After the parties have had the opportunity to conduct discovery, [the petitioner] will have the opportunity to seek a summary judgment on the ground that she is entitled to State-agent immunity.). Because there is no clear legal right to an order directing the trial court to stay discovery and conduct a hearing on the summary-judgment motion as to the claim that John Moon and Theodore Moon acted in bad faith or with malice when they arrested Arnold, the petition for the writ of mandamus is due to be denied as to this claim.