Opinion ID: 770692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether District Officials are Entitled to Qualified Immunity

Text: 22 We now turn to the merits of the damage claims brought by Cole and Chris Niemeyer. Cole and Niemeyer argue the District officials violated their clearly established right to speak at the Oroville graduation without contentor view-point-based restrictions on their speech. They contend the District's graduation ceremony is a public or limited public forum, and thus the District infringed their freedom of speech by discriminating against their presentations on the basis of their sectarian viewpoints. We disagree. 23 When government officials assert the defense of qualified immunity to an action under 42 U.S.C. S 1983, a court evaluating the defense must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right and, if so, then determine  `whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.'  Wilson v. Lane, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999)); County of Sacramento v. Lewis , 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998); B.C. v. Plumas Unified Sch. Dist., 192 F.3d 1260, 1265 (9th Cir. 1999). 6 Thus, we must decide whether the District officials infringed the students' freedom of speech by refusing to allow them to give a sectarian speech or prayer as part of the Oroville graduation ceremony. 24 We conclude the District officials did not violate the students' freedom of speech. Even assuming the Oroville graduation ceremony was a public or limited public forum, the District's refusal to allow the students to deliver a sectarian speech or prayer as part of the graduation was necessary to avoid violating the Establishment Clause under the principles applied in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, U.S. 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000), and Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 837 (1995) (analyzing whether a university's viewpoint discrimination was excused by the necessity of complying with the Establishment Clause); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761-62 (1995) (There is no doubt that compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech.); see also Arkansas Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998) (noting that strict scrutiny of exclusion of speech in a government forum requires that the exclusion be  `necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the exclusion [be] narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.'  (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. , 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985))). 25 In Santa Fe, the Supreme Court held that a school district policy authorizing a student selected by a vote of fellow students to deliver a nonsectarian and nonproselytizing statement or invocation to solemnize varsity football games violated the Establishment Clause. 120 S. Ct. at 2273 n.6, 2283. The Court rejected the argument that the student's prayer was private speech, because not only did the school district authorize the invocation through its policy and allow the invocation to be held on government property at a government-sponsored school-related event, it also exercised control over the invocation by placing restrictions on its content, allowing only selected students to give the invocation and broadcasting the invocation over the school's public address system. See id. at 2275-78. The Court reasoned that the district's control over and entanglement with the invocation not only would cause an objective observer to perceive the district endorsed the religious message of the invocation, but also constituted an actual endorsement of religion in public schools. See id. at 2278-79. Thus, the Court concluded, under the principles articulated in Lee, the delivery of the invocation before school football games impermissibly applied social and peer pressure to coerce dissenters to forfeit their right to attend the games  `as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.'  7 Id. at 2280 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 596). The Court further concluded that the pregame delivery of the invocation had the improper effect of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious worship. See id.; see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 594 ([T]he government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy than it may use more direct means.). 26 In Lee, the Court held that a school district violated the Establishment Clause when it invited a rabbi to deliver a nonsectarian, non-proselytizing prayer at its graduation ceremony. 505 U.S. at 581, 599. The Court reasoned that, because the principal decided that an invocation should be given, chose the rabbi and gave her guidelines for the prayer and the school had extensive control over the graduation ceremony-including control over the contents and timing of the program, the speeches, the dress code and the decorum of the students -the prayer bore the imprint of the state. Id. at 587-90, 597. The Court noted that the singular importance of a high school graduation as a once-in-a-lifetime event and the susceptibility of adolescents to peer and social pressure left a dissenting student with the unduly coercive dilemma of participating in the prayer against her conscience or missing her own high school graduation. See id. at 592-96. Because this dilemma gave dissenting students no legitimate alternative to attending their graduation, the Court concluded the school district had in effect compelled . . . participation in an explicit religious exercise. Id. at 598.
27 Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear the District's refusal to allow Cole to deliver a sectarian invocation as part of the graduation ceremony was necessary to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. The invocation would not have been private speech, because the District authorized an invocation as part of the graduation ceremony held on District property, allowed only a student selected by a vote of his classmates to give an invocation and no doubt would have used a microphone or public address system to amplify the invocation to the audience at the graduation ceremony. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2275-78; see also Collins v. Chandler Unified Sch. Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 760-62 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that district policy under which principal and district superintendent gave student council permission to select a student to open school assemblies with prayer constituted impermissible government sponsorship of religious activity under the Establishment Clause). In addition, as the Court noted in Santa Fe, an invocation policy by its very terms appears to reflect an impermissible state purpose to encourage a religious message. 8 120 S. Ct. at 2277 (concluding that term invocation is a term that primarily describes an appeal for divine assistance). Furthermore, Cole's sectarian invocation would have caused a more serious Establishment Clause violation than in Santa Fe because there the invocation was required to be nonsectarian and non-proselytizing. Id. at 2273 n.6; Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 (noting that a nonsectarian prayer is more acceptable than one which, for example, makes explicit reference to the God of Israel, or to Jesus Christ); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 603 (The legislative prayers involved in Marsh did not violate this principle [against government affiliation with a particular religious sect ] because the particular chaplain had `removed all references to Christ.'  (quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 n.14 (1985))); Doe v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. , 168 F.3d 806, 809, 815 (5th Cir. 1999) (holding that a graduation policy that does not limit speakers to nonsectarian, non-proselytizing speech violates the Establishment Clause), aff'd on other grounds, 120 S. Ct. 2266 (2000). 28
29 Chris Niemeyer's valedictory speech presents a more difficult issue as to whether the speech was private or attributable to the District. As the appellants argue, the valedictorian speech policy neither encourages a religious message nor subjects the speaker to a majority vote that operates to ensure only a popular message is expressed at the graduation. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2276-77. Nonetheless, we conclude the District's plenary control over the graduation ceremony, especially student speech, makes it apparent Niemeyer's speech would have borne the imprint of the District. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 590. First, the District authorizes the valedictory speech as part of the District-administered graduation ceremony, which is held on District property and financed in part by District funds and in which only selected students are allowed to speak. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2275-76. Second, the principal retains supervisory control over all aspects of the graduation, and has final authority to approve the content of student speeches. See id. Third, the District requires the students to sign a special contract obligating them to act and dress in a manner prescribed by the District. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 597. Finally, the speech presumably is broadcast to the audience over a school microphone or public address system. See Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2279. 30 Allowing Niemeyer to give his proposed valedictory speech at the Oroville graduation would have constituted government endorsement of religious speech similar to the prayer policies found unconstitutional in Santa Fe and Lee. Because District approval of the content of student speech was required, allowing Niemeyer to make a sectarian, proselytizing speech as part of the graduation ceremony would have lent District approval to the religious message of the speech. Equally important, an objective observer familiar with the District's policy and its implementation would have likely perceived that the speech carried the District's seal of approval. See id. at 2278; Santa Fe, 168 F.3d at 817-18 ([W]hen the school `permits' sectarian and proselytizing prayers -which, by definition, are designed to reflect, and even convert others to, a particular religious viewpoint . . . -such `permission' undoubtedly conveys a message not only that the government endorses religion, but that it endorses a particular form of religion.). The District's actual and perceived endorsement of Niemeyer's proselytizing would have sent a message to dissenting members of the audience that  `they are outsiders, not full members of the political community,'  Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2279 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 667, 688 (1984)), thereby pressuring the dissenters to change their religious views to gain acceptance. 31 Including Niemeyer's sectarian, proselytizing speech as part of the graduation ceremony also would have constituted District coercion of attendance and participation in a religious practice because proselytizing, no less than prayer, is a religious practice. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 23 (1989) (noting that proselytizing is religious activity protected under the Free Exercise Clause); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576-77 (1944) (noting that proselytizing, including preaching and distribution of religious literature, is religious activity protected under the Free Exercise Clause); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1943) (same). As the Court acknowledged in Lee, our society recognizes that even simply standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to the views of others. Thus, allowing Niemeyer's speech at graduation would have compelled a dissenter's implicit participation in the proselytizing. It is no answer that some, or even most, dissenters might have believed their silence signified respectful disagreement. The critical inquiry under Santa Fe and Lee to determine if religious activity at a major public school event constitutes impermissible coercion to participate is whether a reasonable dissenter . . . could believe that the group exercise signified her own participation or approval of it. Lee , 505 U.S. at 593 (emphasis added). [T]he choice between whether to attend [a school event] or to risk facing a personally offensive religious ritual is in no practical sense an easy one. The Constitution . . . demands that [a] school many not force this difficult choice upon [its] students for `[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored religious practice.'  Santa Fe, 120 S. Ct. at 2280 (quoting Lee, 505 U.S. at 596) (final alteration in original). 32 We, like the Supreme Court, recognize the important role that public worship plays in many communities, as well as the sincere desire to include public prayer as a part of various occasions so as to mark those occasions' significance. But such religious activity in public schools, as elsewhere, must comport with the First Amendment. Id. at 2278. Cole and Niemeyer remained free to pray and to proselytize outside of school or in contexts where the District would not have been an actual or perceived party to their religious activities. Indeed, the Religion Clauses promote robust private religious debate, allowing each religion to flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma.  Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952). However,[t]he Constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the institutions of private choice, and that while some [government] involvement and entanglement are inevitable, lines must be drawn. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 589 ([P]reservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere . . . .). The requirement that religion be left to the private sphere is the product of a well-documented and turbulent history, demonstrating that in the hands of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and coerce. Lee, 505 U.S. at 591-92. This danger is most apparent here, where allowing the students to engage in sectarian prayer and proselytizing as part of the graduation ceremony would amount to government sponsorship of, and coercion to participate in, particular religious practices. 9