Opinion ID: 867281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Juror Replacement in Penalty Phase

Text: ¶ 65 Garcia challenges the trial court's decision to release a juror after the aggravation phase and replace him with an alternate. He argues that the court failed to determine whether the alternate juror agreed with the jury's earlier findings, and that he was thus deprived of his right to a unanimous verdict on death eligibility and aggravation. Garcia further contends that the juror replacement impermissibly allowed the alternate juror to shift responsibility for the ultimate verdict to the replaced juror. ¶ 66 We review a trial court's dismissal of a juror for abuse of discretion. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. at 371 ¶ 63, 111 P.3d at 413. Garcia's constitutional claims are reviewed de novo. State v. Pandeli, 215 Ariz. 514, 521 ¶ 11, 161 P.3d 557, 565 (2007). ¶ 67 At the close of the aggravation phase, the trial court designated four jurors as alternates. That afternoon, the jury found that the State had proved two aggravators and that Garcia was death-eligible under Tison. The alternates did not participate in this decision. On the first day of the penalty phase, a juror called in sick and was excused by the State and defense counsel. Before the jury retired to deliberate, the court designated one of the alternates, Juror Sixteen, to deliberate with the panel on the penalty phase issues. ¶ 68 Garcia first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in releasing the sick juror and replacing him with Juror Sixteen. Although it is preferable to complete a defendant's trial with the same jury that began it, Roseberry, 210 Ariz. at 372 ¶ 69, 111 P.3d at 414, Garcia is not constitutionally entitled to have the same jury render verdicts in each phase, id. Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.5(i) provides that [i]n the event a deliberating juror is excused during the aggravation or penalty phases due to inability ... to perform required duties, the court may substitute an alternate juror... to join in the deliberations. The newly constituted jury need not deliberate anew about a verdict already reached and entered. Id. Only if the juror substitution occurs during actual deliberations must the jurors begin anew for the phase of the sentencing that they are currently deliberating. Id.; see also Roseberry, 210 Ariz. at 373 ¶ 72, 111 P.3d at 415. ¶ 69 The trial court's dismissal of the flustricken juror thus comported with Rule 18.5(i). Not only did the court properly replace the juror with an alternate, it correctly determined that the newly constituted jury was not required to revisit the questions of death eligibility under Tison or aggravation. A verdict had already been entered in the aggravation phase, and the penalty phase jury was not required to deliberate anew on these issues. Cf. A.R.S. § 13-752(K) (providing that jury newly impaneled during penalty phase shall not retry issues of guilt or aggravation determined by prior jury). ¶ 70 Nor was the trial court required to ascertain whether Juror Sixteen agreed with the jury's prior findings. In Roseberry, we noted that the trial court took precautions to ensure that Juror Twelve, the alternate who replaced Juror Eight, was able to deliberate for the penalty phase, by allowing the State to ask Juror Twelve a series of questions to establish his understanding that (1) the jury had deliberated without him, (2) the jury had previously found the defendant guilty, (3) the jury had also found aggravating circumstances, and (4) those verdicts had to be his as well. 210 Ariz. at 372 ¶ 67, 111 P.3d at 414. ¶ 71 Contrary to Garcia's assertion, our decision in Roseberry does not require a trial court to engage sua sponte in a similar dialogue with an alternate juror, nor does it suggest that an alternate's agreement with a jury's earlier findings is a prerequisite to deliberation. And, while it may be wise for a court to discuss with an alternate juror his role in the proceedings, Juror Sixteen was well aware that his duty was to deliberate on sentencing alone. In its instructions, the trial court reminded the jury that in the guilt phase of [the] trial, [Garcia] was found guilty of first degree murder, and that in the aggravation phase, two aggravators were found to exist. The sentencing phase jury, including Juror Sixteen, thus had a duty to determine only whether [Garcia] should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death for his conviction of first degree murder. These instructions served the same purpose as the State's questions in Roseberry: they established that Juror Sixteen was to accept the jury's prior findings as his own and deliberate only on sentencing issues. ¶ 72 Garcia also argues that because Juror Sixteen did not decide his death qualification in the aggravation phase, he impermissibly abdicated responsibility for his ultimate decision to the juror he replaced. Garcia notes that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). ¶ 73 No impermissible shifting of responsibility occurred here. The trial court informed the jurors that their duty was to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment or death for his conviction of first degree murder. The court also instructed the jury that its sentencing decision [wa]s not a recommendation. [Its] decision [would] be binding. If [its] verdict [wa]s that the defendant should be sentenced to death, the defendant [would] be sentenced to death. If [its] verdict [wa]s that the defendant should be sentenced to life, he [would] be sentenced to life. Given these instructions, Juror Sixteen was fully aware that he bore responsibility for determining the appropriate sentence. See also Dann, 220 Ariz. at 360-61 ¶¶ 29-30, 207 P.3d at 613-14 (rejecting defendant's argument that use of different sentencing jury improperly shifted responsibility between the two juries because the second sentencing jury received clear instruction that it alone would determine the appropriate sentence).