Opinion ID: 2621053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: As relevant to this case, EAJA provides:

Text: (A) Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, a court shall award to a prevailing party other than the United States fees and other expenses, ... incurred by that party in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort), including proceedings for judicial review of agency action, brought by or against the United States in any court having jurisdiction of that action, unless the court finds that the position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. (B) A party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection .... 28 U. S. C. §§2412(d)(1)(A), (B) (emphasis added). Petitioner argues that this provision is most naturally read to mean that it is the court before which the civil action is pending that must render the final judgment that starts the running of the 30-day EAJA filing period. Brief for Petitioner 13. We agree. As the highlighted language indicates, subsections (d)(1)(A) and (d)(1)(B) work in tandem. Subsection (d)(1)(A) authorizes the awarding of fees to parties that prevail against the United States in nontort civil actions, subject to qualifications not pertinent here. Subsection (d)(1)(B) explains what the prevailing party must do to secure the fee award. The requirement that the fee application be filed within 30 days of final judgment in the action  plainly refers back to the civil action ... in any court in (d)(1)(A). The plain language makes clear that a final judgment under § 2412 can only be the judgment of a court of law. This reading is reinforced by the contrast between § 2412 and 5 U. S. C. § 504(a). Section 504 was enacted at the same time as § 2412, and is the only part of the EAJA that allows fees and expenses for administrative proceedings conducted prior to the filing of a civil action. The pertinent language of § 504(a)(2) largely mirrors that of § 2412(d)(1)(B), with one notable exception: It states that a party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of a final disposition in the adversary adjudication,  file an application for fees. 5 U. S. C. § 504(a)(2) (emphasis added). Clearly Congress knew how to distinguish between a final judgment in [an] action and a final disposition in [an] adversary adjudication. One is rendered by a court; the other includes adjudication by an administrative agency. The Secretary's sole argument to the contrary rests on the 1985 amendments to EAJA, which added a definition of final judgment to § 2412. Traditionally, a final judgment is one that is final and appealable. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 54(a) (`Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U. S. 617, 628 (1990) (`[F]inal judgments' are at the core of matters appealable under § 1291). Under § 2412, as amended, however, a final judgment is one that is final and not appealable. 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(2)(G) (emphasis added). In the Secretary's view, [t]his significant departure from the usual characteristi[c] of a `judgment' entered by a court dictates a different understanding of how the phrase final judgment is used in § 2412(d)(1)(B). Brief for Respondent 20. The Secretary argues that under the revised statute, a final judgment includes not only judgments rendered by a court, but also decisions made by administrative agencies. Ibid. We reject this argument. Section 2412(d)(1)(B) does not speak merely of a judgment; it speaks of a final judgment in the action.  As we have explained, the action referred to in subsection (d)(1)(B) is a civil action ... in any court under subsection (d)(1)(A). The Secretary's suggested interpretation of final judgment does not alter this unambiguous requirement of judgment by a court. As for why Congress added the unusual definition of final judgment, the answer is clear. The definition ... was added in 1985 to resolve a conflict in the lower courts on the question whether a `judgment' was to be regarded as `final' for EAJA purposes when it was entered, or only when the period for taking an appeal had lapsed. Brief for Respondent 20 (footnote omitted). The Ninth Circuit had held that the 30-day EAJA filing period began to run when the district court entered judgment. McQuiston v. Marsh, 707 F. 2d 1082, 1085 (1983). The Seventh Circuit rejected this view, holding that the EAJA filing period should be deemed to begin only after the time for taking an appeal from the district court judgment had expired. McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F. 2d 311, 314 (1983). Accord, Massachusetts Union of Public Housing Tenants, Inc. v. Pierce, 244 U. S. App. D. C. 34, 36, 755 F. 2d 177, 179 (1985). Congress responded to this split in the federal courts by explicitly adopting and ratifying the McDonald approach. S. Rep. No. 98-586, p. 16 (1984) (The Committee believes that the interpretation of the court in [McDonald] is the correct one). See also H. R. Rep. No. 98-992, p. 14 (1984) (The term `final judgment' has been clarified to mean a judgment the time to appeal which has expired for all parties); H. R. Rep. No. 99-120, p. 18 (1985). There simply is no evidence to support the argument the Secretary now advances that, in defining final judgment so as to resolve an existing problem, Congress also intended, sub silentio, to alter the meaning of the term to include a final agency decision. We conclude that, notwithstanding the 1985 amendment, Congress' use of judgment in 28 U. S. C. § 2412 refers to judgments entered by a court of law, and does not encompass decisions rendered by an administrative agency. Accordingly, we hold that a final judgment for purposes of 28 U. S. C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) means a judgment rendered by a court that terminates the civil action for which EAJA fees may be received. The 30-day EAJA clock begins to run after the time to appeal that final judgment has expired. Our decision in Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 U. S. 877 (1989), is not to the contrary. The issue in Hudson was whether, under § 2412(d), a civil action could include administrative proceedings so that a claimant could receive attorney's fees for work done at the administrative level following a remand by the district court. We explained that certain administrative proceedings are so intimately connected with judicial proceedings as to be considered part of the `civil action' for purposes of a fee award. Id., at 892. We defined the narrow class of qualifying administrative proceedings to be those where `a suit [has been] brought in a court,' and where `a formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court of law' remains pending and depends for its resolution upon the outcome of the administrative proceedings.  Ibid. (emphasis added). Hudson thus stands for the proposition that in those cases where the district court retains jurisdiction of the civil action and contemplates entering a final judgment following the completion of administrative proceedings, a claimant may collect EAJA fees for work done at the administrative level. Ibid. We did not say that proceedings on remand to an agency are `part and parcel' of a civil action in federal district court for all purposes.... Sullivan v. Finkelstein, supra, at 630-631.