Opinion ID: 726140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extension of Time for Filing of Commonwealth's Answer

Text: 9 Before reaching the merits of the issues on appeal, we must resolve a procedural issue. Jenkins challenges the district court's grant of Commonwealth's motion to extend the time for the filing of its answer. The complaint was served on Commonwealth on June 17, 1993. Commonwealth moved in state court on July 7, prior to the expiration of the twenty-day period in which its answer was due, for a fourteen-day extension. A hearing on Commonwealth's motion was scheduled for July 21. On July 16, however, Commonwealth filed its notice of removal; on August 6 it renewed in federal court its state-court motion for an extension of time, which the district court eventually granted. 10 Rule 6(b) commits to the district court's discretion the decision to enlarge the time in which a party must perform an act required or allowed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, so this court reviews such decisions for an abuse of discretion. Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 867, 115 S.Ct. 185, 130 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994). 11 Commonwealth's initial request for an extension was filed in state court before the deadline for the filing of its answer expired, Haw. R. Civ. P. 12(a), and the state court had discretion to grant the extension for cause shown, Haw. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1). While the request was pending, Commonwealth removed the case to federal court. The longstanding principle is that [a]fter removal, the federal court 'takes the case up where the State court left it off' , Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 436, 94 S.Ct. 1113, 1122, 39 L.Ed.2d 435 (1974) (quoting Duncan v. Gegan, 101 U.S. 810, 812, 25 L.Ed. 875 (1880)). See also Butner v. Neustadter, 324 F.2d 783, 785 (9th Cir.1963); Savell v. Southern Ry. Co., 93 F.2d 377, 379 (5th Cir.1937) (When a case is removed the federal court takes it as though everything done in the state court had in fact been done in the federal court). Therefore Commonwealth's request for an extension in state court before the state deadline for Commonwealth's answer had passed was properly treated, upon removal, as a pending motion filed before the deadline for Commonwealth's answer in federal court. Thus, because Commonwealth's request for an extension of the period in which to file its answer to Jenkins' complaint was made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed for the filing, the district court had the discretion to extend the deadline for cause shown. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b)(1). 12 The district court did not abuse its discretion in enlarging the time for the filing of Commonwealth's answer for cause shown under Rule 6(b)(1). Commonwealth's attorney submitted declarations indicating (1) that she had requested that Jenkins' stipulate to an extension but that he had refused, (2) that she was lead counsel for Commonwealth in a 21-party case in state court which was set for trial on August 24 and which had a strict discovery deadline of July 23 that required her to be in Kona for depositions and motions, and (3) that she therefore had not had an opportunity to discuss the complaint with Commonwealth and to review its files on the matter. On these facts, the district court's enlargement of the time for the filing of Commonwealth's answer was not an abuse of discretion.