Opinion ID: 2514606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Court of Appeal unduly relied on sections 425.16 and 1021.5

Text: (4) Notwithstanding its observations, the Court of Appeal gave the phrase public interest in section 425.17(b) the same expansive meaning as it has in section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute. Under section 425.16, a defendant may move for dismissal under the anti-SLAPP statute if the defendant's underlying speech activities are in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); see id., subd. (e)(3).) The Legislature has also directed that section 425.16 shall be construed broadly given that the anti-SLAPP statute protects speech about important public issues. (§ 425.16, subd. (a).) (5) The public interest referred to in section 425.17(b), does not simply describe topics that members of the public might find interesting. Instead the term public interest is used to define suits brought for the public's good or on behalf of the public. To qualify under section 425.17(b)'s exception, suits must be brought solely to secure this public benefit. In reaching its contrary conclusion the Court of Appeal relied on case law involving section 1021.5, the private attorney general statute. Section 1021.5 awards attorney fees to a party whose action has resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest. [8] The Court of Appeal referred to section 1021.5 because the Legislature, when drafting section 425.17(b), stated that it was borrowing from section 1021.5 and noted that the two statutes were similar. (Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 515 (2003-2004 Reg. Sess.) pp. 11-12.) Analogizing to section 1021.5, the Court of Appeal concluded that when a plaintiff has a personal stake in the litigation, such as having his or her statement included in the voters' pamphlet, the litigation could still include an important legal issue of public interest that transcends the plaintiff's personal stake and would benefit the public interest as a whole. While section 425.17 is similar to section 1021.5 in certain respects, the two statutes are also different in significant ways. First, unlike the private attorney general statute, the text of section 425.17(b) requires that an action be brought solely in the public interest, and cannot seek any relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general public. (§ 425.17(b)(1).) Section 1021.5 does not contain these limitations. The two statutes also involve different functions. Section 1021.5 is an attorney fees statute. It authorizes a trial court at the end of litigation to determine whether attorney fees should be awarded to a prevailing party. Section 425.17(b) comes into play at the outset of litigation and pertains to a special motion to strike. The viability of the underlying action itself is at issue in an anti-SLAPP motion and in the public interest exception to the anti-SLAPP statute. Attorney fees are separately available to a prevailing party in such instances under the anti-SLAPP statute. (§ 425.16, subd. (c).) Because of these functional differences, section 425.17(b) cannot simply be intended to parallel the private attorney general statute. (6) The plain language of section 425.17(b) is dispositive here. The Court of Appeal erred in reaching beyond it to interpret the language in a contrary fashion. Even if the statute's language were ambiguous, reliance on the private attorney general fee statute and cases is flawed because of the disparities noted above.