Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Slow Plea

Text: (2a) In Bunnell, this court held that a stipulation to submit a case for decision on preliminary hearing transcripts must be accompanied by advice regarding the personal waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights to jury trial, silence, and to confront and cross-examine, i.e., Boykin-Tahl advice and waivers. ( Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1960) 1 Cal.3d 122 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449].) The Bunnell court held, the record shall reflect that he had been advised of his right to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and against self-incrimination.... Express waivers of the enumerated constitutional rights shall appear.... In all guilty plea and submission cases the defendant shall be advised of the direct consequences of conviction such as the permissible range of punishment provided by statute.... ( Bunnell, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 605.) Thereafter, in People v. Hendricks (1987) 43 Cal.3d 584 [238 Cal. Rptr. 66, 737 P.2d 1350] (hereafter Hendricks ) we held that the mandate of Boykin-Tahl applies only to pleas of guilty and submissions on the preliminary hearing transcript, or slow pleas, by virtue of which [defendant] surrenders one or more of the three specified rights. ( Id., at p. 592.) A slow plea is defined as a submission of the guilt phase to the court on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcripts that is tantamount to a plea of guilty because guilt is apparent on the face of the transcripts and conviction is a foregone conclusion if no defense is offered. ( People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487, 496 [233 Cal. Rptr. 69, 729 P.2d 260] [hereafter Wright ].) (3) Deciding whether a submission is a slow plea is often difficult, and courts generally review such pleas based on defendant's willingness to contest guilt during the court trial. Submissions that are not considered slow pleas include those in which (1) the preliminary hearing involves substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and the presentation of defense evidence or (2) the facts revealed at the preliminary examination are essentially undisputed but counsel makes an argument to the court as to the legal significance to be accorded them. ( Ibid. ; see In re Mosely (1970) 1 Cal.3d 913, 924-925, fn. 9 [83 Cal. Rptr. 809, 464 P.2d 473] [extending, in dictum, Tahl advisement and waiver requirement to cases in which defendant's submission on preliminary hearing transcript is tantamount to a guilty plea].) Defendant claims that because counsel did not argue for acquittal of all charges and presented no defense to some of the charges, his submission was a slow plea tantamount to a guilty plea. But as the Wright court observes, [a]n appellate court, in determining whether a submission is a slow plea, must assess the circumstances of the entire proceeding. It is not enough for a reviewing court to simply count the number of witnesses who testified at the hearing following the submission. A submission that prospectively appeared to be a slow plea may turn out to be part of a full-blown trial if counsel contested the sufficiency of evidence for those counts or presented another potentially meritorious legal argument against conviction. Conversely, a submission that did not appear to be a slow plea because the defendant reserved the right to testify and call witnesses or to argue the sufficiency of the evidence ( see People v. Guerra (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 534, 538 [98 Cal. Rptr. 627]) may turn out to be a slow plea if the defense presented no evidence or argument contesting guilt. [¶] If it appears on the whole that the defendant advanced a substantial defense, the submission cannot be considered to be tantamount to a plea of guilty. Sometimes, a defendant's best defense is weak. He may make a tactical decision to concede guilt as to one or more of several counts as part of an overall defense strategy. A submission under these circumstances is not a slow plea, and the trial court is not constitutionally compelled by Boykin and Tahl to administer the guilty-plea safeguards to assure that the tactical decision is voluntary and intelligent. (2b) The advisements and waivers in such a case are required only as a matter of the judicial policies that underlie our decision in Bunnell.  ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 496-497.) (1b) In the present case, defendant's submission on the preliminary hearing transcripts was not a slow plea. Defense counsel Toton conducted substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses during the preliminary hearing. Toton also called prosecution witnesses Hernandez and Detective Stratton to testify for the defense, and questioned Hernandez about whether he had agreed to testify against defendant with the intent of making a deal in his own case. In addition, following the close of the prosecution's guilt phase presentation, Toton renewed his motions to strike portions of the trial testimony of Maria Rodriguez, Detective Boggs, and William Freeman (the patrolman who seized two screwdrivers from defendant that had been stolen from the Bocanegra residence), and then moved for a judgment of acquittal of all the charges. In arguing the motion for acquittal, Toton asserted there was insufficient evidence of defendant's guilt of the robbery and murder charges, and that the People failed to charge properly the special circumstance allegations. In addition, Toton asserted that no physical evidence linked defendant to the Bocanegra murders. He argued that the prosecution presented no evidence of premeditation in those murders, and that defendant's hypothetical questions to Detective Stratton should not be used as evidence of murder. Toton also pointed out that defendant's incriminating statements to newsman Trihey implied knowledge of the crime, but not intent to kill, that there was no evidence that defendant robbed the Bocanegras or that defendant had the specific intent to kill either the Bocanegras or Tatman. Toton's closing argument following the guilt phase was equally extensive. He asserted there was insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the charged robberies and the Bocanegra murders because the testimony of Hernandez and Trihey was not credible. At best, he argued, the evidence in the Bocanegra murders supported a verdict of voluntary manslaughter. He also asserted that the prosecution had failed to prove the specific intent to kill necessary to support the special circumstance allegations. It therefore appears that defense counsel's cross-examination was substantial, and that he argued constantly that the facts as presented at the preliminary hearing should be viewed as not supporting first degree murder convictions. These facts support the People's assertion that defendant's submission on the preliminary hearing transcripts for the guilt and special circumstance phases of the trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea. ( Wright, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 496.) For submissions not tantamount to a guilty plea, a trial court's failure to advise the defendant of his right against self-incrimination is implicated only to the extent defendant surrendered the right. ( Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 592.) Through the submission stipulated to here, defendant never surrendered his self-incrimination privilege because he chose not to testify during the guilt phase proceedings. Because defendant never surrendered his right against self-incrimination, there was no requirement of a personal, on-the-record waiver. ( Ibid. )