Opinion ID: 6328139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sleep Deprivation

Text: Mr. Sperry also claims an Eighth Amendment violation from the deprivation of sleep. The alleged sleep deprivation consisted of constant lighting of every cell and wakening of every inmate throughout the night. The district court dismissed this claim for two reasons: (1) Mr. Sperry hadn’t alleged the participation of any of the defendants, and (2) the sleep interruptions hadn’t deprived Mr. Sperry of the minimal measures of life’s necessities. Even if we were to reject the second reason, Mr. Sperry hasn’t questioned the first reason for dismissal of this claim. By failing to challenge that reason, Mr. Sperry waived his opportunity to show personal participation of the defendants. See Moya v. Garcia, 895 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir. 2018) (stating that the plaintiff must allege facts showing how each defendant “had been personally involved in the underlying violations through their own participation or supervisory control”). 11 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 12 D. Withholding of a Book, Magazines, and a Photograph Prison authorities prevented mail delivery of a book, three magazines, and a photograph. 8 Based on the inability to obtain these materials, Mr. Sperry alleges violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. On this claim, the district court reasoned that prison authorities had a legitimate penological objective to withhold the book, magazines, and photograph. But the court ruled on a motion to dismiss, which limited the universe of facts to those alleged in the amended complaint. See Part I, above. 9 In the amended complaint, Mr. Sperry needed only to “plead facts from which a plausible inference [could] be drawn that the action was not reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest.” Gee v. Pacheco, 8 In the complaint, Mr. Sperry also alleged withholding of a second book (Full Blast by Janet Evanovich and Charlotte Hughes). But he acknowledged in district court that this incident had fallen outside the limitations period. 9 Prison officials relied on an investigative report (otherwise called a “Martinez report”) for their summary-judgment motion, but the district court ruled on the motion to dismiss rather than the motion for summary judgment. When ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a valid claim, the court can consider investigative reports only if “the plaintiff challenges a prison’s policies or established procedures and the [investigative] report’s description of the policies or procedures remains undisputed after plaintiff has an opportunity to respond.” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1112 (10th Cir. 1991)). As the defendants point out, Mr. Sperry hasn’t challenged the prison’s policies or procedures. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 25. So we cannot consider the investigative report. 12 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 13 627 F.3d 1178, 1188 (10th Cir. 2010). Mr. Sperry’s allegations satisfied this standard. He alleges five facts: 1. Authorities seized a Us Weekly magazine because it contained an advertisement for drink recipes, but  there’s no rule against possession of publications containing drink recipes and  authorities allowed many other publications containing the same advertisement. 2. Authorities withheld an issue of Wired Magazine, stating that it posed a threat to the security of the facility. But Mr. Sperry’s family saw nothing in the magazine that could remotely threaten security. 3. Authorities seized a second issue of Wired Magazine , but never gave a reason for seizing it. 4. Authorities seized the book The Target and identified five pages as improper. These pages contained fictional discussions  about the length of a prisoner’s incarceration,  between two death-row inmates,  about vetting of CIA agents, and  about the selection of two CIA agents for a mission. 5. Authorities seized a photograph of a sexily dressed female, but it was not pornographic. The amended complaint contained nothing to suggest a penological objective to seize these materials. So the district court erred in dismissing the First Amendment claim for withholding Mr. Sperry’s mail. 13 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 14 The resulting issue is which defendants should remain on this claim. Mr. Sperry alleged direct involvement by K. Lee, Bill Shipman, Hannah Booth, and Robert Sapien. So these defendants should remain on this claim. But Mr. Sperry also asserted this claim against Raymond Roberts, Johnnie Goddard, Douglas Burris, Rex Pryor, James Heimgartner, and Collette Winklebauer based on their failures to properly address administrative appeals. Those alleged failures would not constitute personal participation. See Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (stating that “a denial of a grievance, by itself without any connection to the violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under [42 U.S.C.] § 1983”). So the dismissals were correct for Mr. Roberts, Mr. Goddard, Mr. Burris, Mr. Pryor, Mr. Heimgartner, and Ms. Winklebauer. The district court also properly dismissed the Fourteenth Amendment claim. The court reasoned that (1) Mr. Sperry could have the materials sent elsewhere and (2) he had an adequate remedy in state court. On appeal, Mr. Sperry does not say what was wrong with the reasoning on the Fourteenth Amendment claim. We thus affirm the dismissal of this claim. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating 14 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 15 that even unrepresented litigants must present an argument citing the record and providing legal authority). E. Denial of Access to a Law Library or Persons Trained in the Law Mr. Sperry also alleges denial of court access from his inability to use the law library or consult individuals trained in the law. 10 But these denials would have crossed a constitutional line only if they had hindered Mr. Sperry’s effort to litigate a nonfrivolous claim. Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). The district court reasoned that Mr. Sperry had failed to explain how better legal access would have allowed him to pursue another claim. He points to a state court’s rejection of his motion attacking a criminal sentence. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60–1507. Under Kansas law, however, this statute imposes a strict deadline and restricts the filing of second or subsequent motions. Id. § 60–1507(c), (f). Based on these restrictions, the Kansas Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal of his motion as both untimely and successive. Sperry v. State, No. 112,143, 2016 WL 2942280 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (unpublished; per curiam). 10 In district court, Mr. Sperry also claimed that this denial of court access had constituted retaliation, deprivation of due process, and denial of equal protection. On appeal, however, Mr. Sperry doesn’t reassert these claims. 15 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 16 In reviewing the constitutional claim for denial of court access, the district court reasoned that Mr. Sperry hadn’t said how better legal access would have changed the outcome in state court. On appeal, Mr. Sperry doesn’t address this reasoning. So we must affirm this ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that even unrepresented litigants must present an argument citing the record and providing legal authority). F. Seizure of Personal Property The prison restricted every inmate’s personal belongings, stating that they had to fit in two small boxes. Based on this restriction, the defendants allegedly seized Mr. Sperry’s belongings, including his legal materials. Based on these alleged seizures, Mr. Sperry claimed violations of the First Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, 11 a conspiracy to violate these amendments, and violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 11 In the complaint, Mr. Sperry also claimed a denial of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. But on appeal, he doesn’t reassert this claim. 16 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 17 The district court didn’t address the First Amendment claim. We’d ordinarily remand for consideration of this claim, see Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703 F.3d 1206, 1227 (10th Cir. 2013), but a remand is unnecessary because the claim was facially deficient, see Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1262 (10th Cir. 2006). As noted above, the First Amendment was violated if the seizure had hindered Mr. Sperry’s effort to litigate a nonfrivolous claim. Penrod v. Zavaras, 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (per curiam). And on this claim, Mr. Sperry referred only to the state appellate court’s rejection of his motion attacking a criminal sentence. See Sperry v. State, No. 112,143, 2016 WL 2942280 (Kan. Ct. App. 2016) (unpublished; per curiam). But again, Mr. Sperry hasn’t shown how the seized materials would have helped him obtain a better outcome in that state-court appeal. We thus reject Mr. Sperry’s reliance on the First Amendment. See Part II(E), above. On the Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court reasoned that the defendants had supplied due process by allowing Mr. Sperry to tell authorities where to send the seized items. Mr. Sperry doesn’t question this reasoning, so we must affirm the ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that even 17 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 18 unrepresented litigants must present an argument citing the record and providing legal authority). On the claims involving conspiracy and violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Mr. Sperry says only that the seizure of his property “states a claim upon which relief could be had for . . . conspiracy to violate his rights by targeting his legal files for suits against [the Kansas Department of Corrections] and its agents, and RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1964.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 9. 12 For a conspiracy claim, Mr. Sperry had to “allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants.” Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003, 1024 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998)). The district court regarded the conspiracy allegations as conclusory, and his appellate argument is no more specific. The same is true of the claim involving violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. We thus uphold the rulings on the claims involving a conspiracy and violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of 12 Mr. Sperry also pleaded conspiracy claims in connection with his other constitutional theories. But in his appeal brief, he refers to the conspiracy claim only in connection with his placement in administrative segregation and the seizure of his belongings. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 5, 9. 18 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 19 the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”); Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[I]n examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we will disregard conclusory statements and look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.”); Cummings v. Dean, 913 F.3d 1227, 1235–36 (10th Cir. 2019) (declining to consider an argument consisting of “single conclusory sentence”); Birch v. Polaris Indus., Inc., 812 F.3d 1238, 1249 (10th Cir. 2015) (declining to consider an argument that was “inadequately briefed” because it was “vague, confusing, conclusory, and unsupported by record evidence”). G. Loss of Belongings after Their Seizure Mr. Sperry also claims that authorities lost his belongings, violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. 13 The district court rejected this claim, reasoning that Mr. Sperry had adequate postdeprivation remedies. Mr. Sperry doesn’t challenge this reasoning, so we affirm this ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 13 In the complaint, Mr. Sperry also claimed a denial of equal protection. But on appeal, he doesn’t reassert this claim. 19 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 20 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that even unrepresented litigants must present an argument citing the record and supporting legal authority). H. Lack of Fairness in Disciplinary Proceedings Mr. Sperry also claims that his disciplinary proceedings were unfair. The district court rejected the claim, reasoning that the proceedings hadn’t affected the duration of the sentence. Mr. Sperry again fails to address the district court’s reasoning, so we must uphold the ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”); see also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that even unrepresented litigants must present an argument citing the record and providing legal authority).
In the complaint, Mr. Sperry also alleges that prison authorities made a mockery of the grievance system. The district court rejected these allegations, concluding that Mr. Sperry had failed to show hindrance to a nonfrivolous claim or a constitutional right to a grievance system. Mr. Sperry again fails to address the district court’s reasoning, so we affirm the ruling. See Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (stating that the appellant must “explain what was wrong with the reasoning that the district court relied on in reaching its decision”); see 20 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 21 also Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that even unrepresented litigants must present an argument citing the record and providing legal authority).
In his appeal brief, Mr. Sperry invokes the Kansas Tort Claims Act and asserts claims for battery, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, and outrage. These claims were properly dismissed. A. Battery In Kansas, a battery takes place only if the defendant makes contact or puts another in apprehension of contact. Wilson v. Meeks, 98 F.3d 1247, 1253 (10th Cir. 1996). But the complaint lacks any allegations of a touching or threatened touching by any of the defendants. So the district court properly dismissed this claim. Mr. Sperry argues on appeal that he was touched by the roaches and likens the roaches to dogs, insisting that a dog owner can incur liability for a battery when a dog attacks someone. But a dog owner owns and controls the dog, and the prison doesn’t own or control the roaches. Given this difference, the district court properly dismissed the battery claim. B. Other State–Law Claims In his appeal brief, Mr. Sperry also sprinkles references to various other causes of action under Kansas law: 21 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 22  “If mistreatment of a confined person is a crime, it certainly constitutes a violation of the Prison officials[’] fiduciary duty to protect Plaintiff from criminal abuse, and a jury could certainly find that torturing prisoners with roaches for 2½ months constitutes outrageous conduct.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 6.  “For the same reasons as the roach infestation, sleep deprivation constitutes the torts of battery, breach of fiduciary duty, outrageous conduct and negligence.” Id. at 7.  “[Seizure of his belongings] clearly states a claim upon which relief could be had for . . . state torts . . . .” Id. at 9.  “He is also protected from loss by [Kansas Department of Corrections] and its agents due to intentional or negligent seizure, damage or loss of his property by [the Kansas Department of Corrections’] agents. K.S.A. 75–6101 et seq.” Id.  “[T]he Kansas Tort Claims Act protects him from these corrupt disciplinary proceedings as this is a diversity jurisdiction case. 75–6101 et seq.” Id. at 10.  “These privileges and rights [available to inmates in general population and denied to inmates in administrative segregation] are protected by the Kansas Tort Claims Act under K.S.A. 75– 6101 et seq.” Id. at 11. In these statements, Mr. Sperry does not adequately develop an argument involving the Kansas Tort Claims Act or a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, or outrage. We thus do not consider these references as distinct arguments. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 22 Appellate Case: 21-3009 Document: 010110664499 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 23 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998) (“Arguments inadequately briefed in the opening brief are waived . . . .”). 14
We reverse and remand on (1) the First Amendment retaliation claim against defendants Wildermuth and Lucht and (2) the First Amendment claim against defendants Lee, Shipman, Booth, and Sapien for withholding of his mail. On the remaining dismissals, we affirm. 15 Entered for the Court Robert E. Bacharach