Opinion ID: 4124913
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dixon has established good cause because he was

Text: not represented by counsel in his state post- conviction proceeding The caselaw concerning what constitutes “good cause” under Rhines has not been developed in great detail. Blake v. Baker, 745 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir. 2014) (“There is little authority on what constitutes good cause to excuse a petitioner’s failure to exhaust.”). The Supreme Court has addressed the issue only once, when it noted that a “petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely will ordinarily constitute ‘good cause’ for him to file in federal court.” Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 416 (2005) (citing Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278). Other circuits have found good cause when, for example, the prosecution has wrongfully withheld information. Jalowiec v. Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293, 304–05 (6th Cir. 2011). We have held that good cause under Rhines does not require a showing of “extraordinary circumstances,” Jackson v. Roe, 425 F.3d 654, 661–62 (9th Cir. 2005), but that a petitioner must do more than simply assert that he was “under the impression” that his claim was exhausted, Wooten v. Kirkland, 540 F.3d 1019, 1024 (9th Cir. 2008). We do know, however, that a petitioner has been found to demonstrate “good cause” where he meets the good-cause standard announced in Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1320 (2012). Blake, 745 F.3d at 983–84. Martinez carved out an exception to the general rule, stated in Coleman v. DIXON V. BAKER 11 Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 753–54 (1991), that “ignorance or inadvertence” on the part of a petitioner’s post-conviction counsel does not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default of a claim. Specifically, the Martinez Court concluded that “[w]here, under state law, claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel must be raised in an initial-review collateral proceeding, a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing a substantial claim of ineffective assistance at trial if, in the initial-review collateral proceeding, there was no counsel or counsel in that proceeding was ineffective.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320 (emphasis added). In Blake, we concluded that the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could constitute good cause for a Rhines stay, provided that the petitioner’s assertion of good cause “was not a bare allegation of state postconviction [ineffective assistance of counsel], but a concrete and reasonable excuse, supported by evidence.” Blake, 745 F.3d at 983. The court further observed that “good cause under Rhines, when based on [ineffective assistance of counsel], cannot be any more demanding than a showing of cause under Martinez to excuse state procedural default.” Id. at 983–84. We emphasized, in response to the idea that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel could always be raised, that Rhines’s requirement that claims not be plainly meritless and that the petitioner not engage in dilatory litigation tactics “are designed . . . to ensure that the Rhines stay and abeyance is not . . . available in virtually every case,” id. at 982 (internal quotation marks omitted). Dixon was without counsel in his state post-conviction proceedings. During the pendency of his federal habeas proceedings, Dixon repeatedly asserted this fact. He then incorporated by reference all previous filings in which he 12 DIXON V. BAKER had asserted his lack of state post-conviction counsel in support of his motion to stay the case under Rhines. Based on the plain language of Blake—that good cause under Rhines “cannot be any more demanding than a showing of cause under Martinez to excuse state procedural default,” id. at 983–84—the statement that “there was no counsel” in Dixon’s state post-conviction case is sufficient to establish good cause. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. Despite Blake’s clear language, the state contends that Dixon may not rely upon Blake to demonstrate good cause because he did not marshal the same kind of evidence that was in the record in Blake. The petitioner in Blake, who was represented by counsel in his state post-conviction proceedings, proffered evidence in his federal habeas petition that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective for failing to exhaust Blake’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective. Id. at 982–83. The state argues that, because Dixon has not put forward substantially similar evidence, he has not demonstrated good cause. We find the state’s argument unpersuasive. Where a petitioner was represented by state post-conviction counsel and must establish, in his federal habeas proceedings, that counsel’s ineffectiveness for failure to exhaust, the petitioner must do more than simply make “a bald assertion” of ineffectiveness. Id. at 982. If the petitioner was without state post-conviction counsel entirely, however, the only evidence available concerning good cause would, as in this case, be the easily proven assertion that the petitioner was without counsel in those proceedings. A petitioner cannot have had effective assistance of counsel if he had no counsel at all. Requiring Dixon to come forward with additional evidence over and above the fact that he lacked counsel, as the state is arguing, is inconsistent with this court’s previous DIXON V. BAKER 13 decision in Blake and the Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez. A petitioner who is without counsel in state post- conviction proceedings cannot be expected to understand the technical requirements of exhaustion and should not be denied the opportunity to exhaust a potentially meritorious claim simply because he lacked counsel. Such a denial strikes us as unwarranted when even a petitioner who did have counsel in his state post-conviction proceedings has a path to a stay under Rhines if he alleges a plausible claim that his post-conviction counsel was ineffective. Id. at 983– 84. We recognize, of course, that many state post-conviction proceedings are conducted pro se. For this group of federal habeas petitioners, the first element of the Rhines test can easily be established to the extent that they were without counsel. But the other two elements of the test—claim plausibility and the absence of abusive tactics—will weed out plainly meritless claims and will help ensure that a dilatory litigant’s failure to exhaust his claims in state court will not be condoned. See Rhines, 544 U.S. at 278. Furthermore, habeas petitioners who can avoid a procedural default under Martinez are at least permitted to have the merits of their exhausted claims reached. In contrast, a petitioner who is excused only for a failure to exhaust under Rhines might not have the merits of his claim adjudicated even after he is given leave to exhaust the claim in state court due to the operation of another procedural bar that the state might raise. See, e.g., Hertz & Liebman, 2 Federal Habeas Corpus Practice & Procedure § 23.1 (6th ed. 2011) (noting that, in contrast to the exhaustion doctrine, which “never wholly forecloses, but only postpones, federal relief,” “[i]f a [procedural] default occurs, if the state asserts 14 DIXON V. BAKER it as a defense to habeas corpus relief, and if none of the exceptions to the procedural default rule apply, then federal court relief is foreclosed” (emphasis in original)). To have a procedural default excused is therefore of greater consequence for a habeas petitioner than to have a failure to exhaust excused. The standard for excusing a failure to exhaust should therefore not be any more demanding than the standard for excusing a procedural default. With these observations in mind, we now turn to the second factor of the Rhines test.