Opinion ID: 546213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Reimbursement.

Text: 76 Reimbursement is a matter of equitable relief, committed to the sound discretion of the district court. Burlington II, 736 F.2d at 801; see also Brookline, 722 F.2d at 921. Though the courts possess extensive powers to tailor remediation to meet the exigencies of specific cases, reimbursement is usually reserved for parties who prevail at the end of a placement dispute. 11 See Gregory K., 811 F.2d at 1315; Burlington II, 736 F.2d at 799 (noting availability of equitable reimbursement to a prevailing party as a general matter). In the typical situation, [r]eimbursement must be denied to the parents if the school system proposed and had the capacity to implement an appropriate IEP. Burlington II, 736 F.2d at 799. 77 As the case before us aptly illustrates, placement disputes may take years to wind their way through the administrative/judicial labyrinth. Pending completion of adversary proceedings, the Act mandates that unless the State or local educational agency and the parents or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then current educational placement.... 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1415(e)(3). While the law does not require parents to keep a child in a program they feel is inappropriate, it operates in such a way that parents who unilaterally change their child's placement during the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of State and local school officials, do so at their own financial risk. Burlington, 471 U.S. at 373-74, 105 S.Ct. at 2004. Parents win the gamble if, and to the extent that, the placement they preferred is ultimately adjudged appropriate and the IEP inappropriate. See id., at 370, 105 S.Ct. at 2002; Brookline, 722 F.2d at 921. Elsewise, the costs arising out of a unilateral placement are not shifted. 78 Applying these tenets, the district court acted lawfully in reversing the partial reimbursement order. The BSEA stated, supportably, that Landmark was not [to] be considered the last agreed upon placement for the purpose of section 1415(e)(3). Therefore, Matthew's parents bore the financial risk of paying Landmark's tuition if they failed to show that Concord's IEP was inappropriate. See Burlington, 471 U.S. at 374, 105 S.Ct. at 2004 (If the courts ultimately determine that the IEP proposed by the school officials was appropriate, the parents [are] barred from obtaining reimbursement for any interim period in which their child's placement violated Sec. 1415(e)(3).); Burlington I, 655 F.2d at 433. The court below did no more than implement this well settled principle.