Opinion ID: 2967814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Holbrook claim and the Discovery claim

Text: In his Holbrook claim, Hill maintains that he was denied his right to a fair trial because of the large number of uniformed police officers present in the courtroom and courthouse during his trial.9 More specifically, he alleges that, in an environment saturated by pretrial publicity and rampant with emotionalism in a small community, the trial court violated his right to a fair trial, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,10 by allowing a multitude of uniformed officers to be 8 The PCR Court’s finding of fact on this point is, under AEDPA, entitled to a presumption of correctness. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). 9 In utilizing the phrase the courtroom, we are referring to both the courtroom and its adjacent hallways — where the presence of uniformed law officers may have been observed by the jurors. 10 The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The right of an accused to a fair trial is an essential requirement of due process. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46 (1975). HILL v. OZMINT 15 present during the trial. Petition at 29. In the alternative, Hill asserts in his Discovery claim that the district court erred in denying the Holbrook claim without affording him an opportunity to develop the record through an evidentiary hearing or discovery proceedings. Specifically, Hill contends that an evidentiary hearing or discovery would have permitted him to establish — by way of videotape recordings of the trial — the number of police officers present during his trial, and thus show that their presence interfered with his right to a fair trial. We issued a COA on both the Holbrook claim and the related Discovery claim. For the reasons explained below, however, we reject these claims.
During voir dire, Hill asserted to the trial court that the presence of numerous uniformed law officers in the courtroom was inherently prejudicial, improperly suggesting to the jury that he was guilty. During a hearing on this issue — on Tuesday, October 24th — Hill cited two examples to support his contention. First, he maintained that, earlier that morning, six law officers were present in the hallway adjacent to the courtroom and that, as a result, the jury had to walk through a gauntlet of law officers. Second, Hill contended that the presence of security officers in the courtroom could unfairly prejudice the jury.11 Upon questioning from the court, however, Hill conceded that not all of the six individuals in the adjacent hallway were uniformed law enforcement. In fact, Hill’s count of six officers included bailiffs and individuals who worked in the prosecutor’s office. Similarly, not all of the security officers in the courtroom were in uniform. For example, an officer near the judge was dressed in a coat and tie. In these circumstances, the court rejected Hill’s contention that the presence of uniformed law officers in the courtroom was unfairly prejudicial.12 11 For example, two uniformed officers were present with Major Guerry’s widow, an officer was positioned near the trial judge, and another officer was present in a corner of the courtroom. 12 During the trial’s sentencing phase, Hill again asserted to the trial court that an array of uniformed law officers in the courtroom prejudiced the jury against him. After discussing the issue with the court, Hill’s lawyers conceded that the presence of the law officers in the courtroom would not deny Hill a fair sentencing. Hill has not further contested the trial court’s ruling regarding the presence of uniformed law officers during sentencing. Hill, 501 S.E.2d at 125. 16 HILL v. OZMINT On direct appeal, Hill contended that the presence of uniformed law officers during his trial’s guilt phase violated his constitutional right to a fair trial. Seeking support for this claim, Hill requested that the Supreme Court of South Carolina empower him to subpoena videos made by television stations that had covered his trial. The court refused to authorize the discovery of such videos because, pursuant to Rule 605 of the South Carolina Appellate Rules of Procedure, they would not have been admissible in any state court proceeding. The court also concluded that Hill had failed to make the necessary showing that he suffered actual or inherent prejudice from the presence of uniformed law officers, and it therefore rejected the Holbrook claim. Id. at 126. In denying the Petition, the district court declined to conduct an evidentiary hearing on this claim, and it also refused to authorize Hill to conduct discovery on this point, reasoning that the introduction of the videotapes would not have aided any relevant evidence not already contained within the record.13 Order at 24. The court also concluded that, in adjudicating the Holbrook claim, the state court decision was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Order at 22.
We agree that the state court’s decision on the Holbrook claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). It is true, of course, that an accused is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at trial, and not on grounds of official suspicion, indictment, continued custody, or other circumstances not adduced as proof at trial. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978). Thus, for example, absent an essential state 13 In the alternative, the district court ruled that Hill was barred from using the videotapes in federal court because the state court had refused to consider them on the basis of a state procedural rule. Order at 25. Because we conclude that Hill has failed to make the necessary showing required to obtain discovery or to obtain an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, we need not consider whether he was procedurally barred from using the videotapes as evidence. HILL v. OZMINT 17 interest, it is inherently prejudicial and unconstitutional to compel a defendant to wear shackles in the presence of a jury. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970). Applying the principle enunciated in its Taylor decision, the Court has also concluded that a roomful of uniformed and armed policemen might pose [a threat] to a defendant’s chances of receiving a fair trial. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570-71 (1986). In Holbrook, the Court acknowledged that, unlike the use of courtroom shackles, the presence of identifiable security officers does not inherently prejudice a defendant. Id. at 569. The Court recognized that [j]urors may just as easily believe that the officers are there to guard against disruptions emanating from outside the courtroom or to ensure that tense courtroom exchanges do not erupt into violence. Id. Accordingly, in ascertaining whether the presence of uniformed law officers during a criminal trial was so overwhelming as to be unconstitutional, a reviewing court must assess whether there was an unacceptable risk . . . of impermissible factors coming into play. Id. at 570 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, a Holbrook claim is difficult to establish, and a reviewing court must assess the scene presented to jurors and determine whether what they saw was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Id. at 572. In support of his Holbrook claim, Hill relies primarily on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Woods v. Dugger, 923 F.2d 1454 (11th Cir. 1991). There, the petitioner had been convicted of murdering a prison guard in Florida. The crime had occurred in a tightly-knit community that was intimately tied to the prison, and, following the murder, over five-thousand people signed a petition supporting the execution of those who kill prison guards. Id. at 1457-58. Moreover, the murder and the resulting trial received vast publicity. Finally, and most importantly, approximately forty-five uniformed prison guards were present in the courtroom during significant portions of Woods’s trial, for no apparent reason other than to view the proceedings. The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, in those circumstances, the courtroom presence of the prison guards conveyed the unmistakable message that Woods was guilty and deserved the death penalty. The court thus ruled that the pretrial publicity combined with the large number of 18 HILL v. OZMINT uniformed spectators rose to the level of inherent prejudice, thereby depriving the petitioner of a fair trial. Id. at 1460. In Hill’s case, however, the presence of law officers in the courtroom did not brand Hill with an unmistakable mark of guilt. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 571 (internal quotation marks omitted). We recognize, of course, that the community of Georgetown was greatly impacted by the horrible death of Major Guerry.14 Likewise, that crime and Hill’s subsequent trial were highly publicized. That said, however, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the courtroom was filled with an array of police officers. Further, the officers present were dispersed throughout the courtroom. In other words, they were not positioned so as to create the impression that Hill was dangerous. See United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1131 (6th Cir. 1996) (denying relief because marshals were spread around the courtroom). Finally, the jurors may well have believed that the officers seated in the courtroom were waiting to testify. The judge did not sequester the trial witnesses, and at least seventeen officers testified. In such circumstances, the presence of officers in the courtroom did not create a scene that was so inherently prejudicial as to pose an unacceptable threat to [the] right to a fair trial. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 572.15 It necessarily follows that the state court’s decision to deny the Holbrook claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 14 The members of the Georgetown police force, as well as other law enforcement personnel in South Carolina, were also impacted by Guerry’s tragic death. Such officers were entitled, absent a Holbrook problem, to be present at Hill’s trial. 15 Indeed, the facts underlying this claim are materially indistinguishable from those before the Court in Holbrook, where no due process violation was found. 475 U.S. at 472. In Holbrook, the defendants maintained that they had been denied a fair trial when four uniformed troopers sat behind the defendants in the first row of the courtroom’s gallery. They contended that the troopers’ presence was an unmistakable indication that they were guilty. Id. In rejecting their claim, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that the four troopers tended to brand the [defendants] with an unmistakable mark of guilt. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). HILL v. OZMINT 19 Our ruling on this issue, however, does not end the matter. Hill also contends that, if the current record does not entitle him to relief on the Holbrook claim, he is entitled to develop the record further. We thus turn to the Discovery claim, i.e., whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Hill an evidentiary hearing and in failing to authorize discovery on the Holbrook claim.
In seeking habeas corpus relief on his Holbrook claim, Hill requested the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or authorize discovery so that he could obtain videotapes of his trial. The district court denied the Discovery claim, reasoning that the introduction of the videotapes would not have aided any relevant evidence not already contained within the record. Order at 24. Hill now maintains that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing and failing to authorize discovery on his Holbrook claim. As explained below, the court was within its discretion in rejecting the Discovery claim, and we affirm. To obtain authorization to conduct discovery, Hill is obliged to make[ ] a specific allegation that shows reason to believe that [he] may be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. Quesinberry v. Taylor, 162 F.3d 273, 279 (4th Cir. 1998). Hill has failed to make the required showing, however, in that he has failed to provide any plausible indication that the videotapes he seeks might demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under Holbrook. In particular, there is nothing in the record indicating that these tapes may reveal a constitutionally inappropriate array of uniformed officers in the courtroom during his trial. Indeed, Hill acknowledges that it is unclear what the videotapes would establish. At best, he asserts that one of them might contain an image of the entire courtroom. This assertion is entirely speculative, however, in that there is no indication that the cameras taping the trial ever panned the courtroom. Similarly, Hill has not made the showing required to obtain an evidentiary hearing. In order to secure an evidentiary hearing, Hill was obliged to allege facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. See McCarver v. Lee, 221 F.3d 583, 598 (4th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Just as he is unable to demonstrate that he is entitled to dis20 HILL v. OZMINT covery, Hill has failed to make the showing necessary to obtain an evidentiary hearing. In short, he has not pointed to any evidence that, if believed, would entitle him to relief. In other words, he has not alleged that such a hearing would resolve facts that, if true, would establish a due process violation. In these circumstances, the district court was within its discretion not to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Absent a specific allegation providing reason to believe that either an evidentiary hearing or discovery proceedings may demonstrate that Hill is entitled to relief under Holbrook, we are unable to conclude that the district court abused its discretion in either denying Hill’s request to conduct discovery or declining to award him an evidentiary hearing. See Thomas v. Taylor, 170 F.3d 466, 474-75 (4th Cir. 1999) (stating that petitioner was not entitled to discovery because he had failed to show that discovery would reveal that he was entitled to relief). We therefore affirm the district court on the Discovery claim.