Opinion ID: 1863568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tort of OutrageThe DHR Claim

Text: Count VII alleged that Waddell and/or Georgia induced one or more other unknown persons (fictitiously named defendants John Doe 1 through John Doe 11) to contact the Dale County Department of Human Resources (DHR) and, the plaintiffs say, to falsely accuse Charlie and Lori of heinous treatment of their three children. The complaint alleged that an investigation by DHR revealed no deficiencies, but that Charlie, Lori, and the children have suffered extreme emotional distress as the result of what they say was intentional wrongful conduct by these defendants. In Alabama, the actionable intentional infliction of emotional distress is termed the tort of outrage. See American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala.1980). In response, these defendants simply argue that Ala.Code 1975, § 26-14-9, provides absolute and total civil liability for one who reports child neglect or abuse. That section states: Any person, firm, corporation or official participating in the making of a report or the removal of a child pursuant to this chapter, or participating in a judicial proceeding resulting therefrom, shall, in so doing, be immune from any liability, civil or criminal, that might otherwise be incurred or imposed. In Brown v. Pound, 585 So.2d 885 (Ala.1991), this Court held that § 26-14-9 provides absolute immunity from liability for reporting suspected child abuse, except as to claims alleging damage not related to the reporting of suspected child abuse. We conclude that the plaintiffs' claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress relates directly to these defendants' alleged reporting of suspected child abuse. Accordingly, the immunity provided by § 26-14-9 applies. The summary judgment was proper as to this claim.