Opinion ID: 1316607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: termination of parental rights and adoption

Text: Appellant contends the evidence does not support the family court's findings of fact or the decision to terminate appellant's parental rights and allow the Hoopers to adopt Anthony and his twin sisters, Candice and Shannon. We disagree. In November 1995, more than four years after her children were removed from the home, appellant asked the family court to dismiss the case and return her four children to her. Two weeks after appellant filed her motion, the Hoopers filed an action in family court seeking to terminate the parental rights of appellant and the natural father, [5] and adopt Anthony, Candice, and Shannon. The family court terminated appellant's parental rights on four grounds contained in S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572 (Supp. 1997): appellant's willful failure to pay support, severe and repetitious abuse by appellant, failure of appellant to remedy conditions in the home, and appellant's diagnosable condition. The family court decreed it was in the best interests of the children to be adopted by the Hoopers. The public policy of this state in child custody matters is to reunite parents and children. S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-20(D) (1985); Hopkins v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Services, 313 S.C. 322, 437 S.E.2d 542 (1993). When reunification is not possible or appropriate and a party moves to terminate the parents' rights, that party must prove a ground for termination of parental rights by clear and convincing evidence. Richland County Dep't of Social Services v. Earles, 330 S.C. 24, 496 S.E.2d 864 (1998); Greenville County Dep't of Social Services v. Bowes, 313 S.C. 188, 437 S.E.2d 107 (1993) (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982)). [6] In reviewing a termination of parental rights, the appellate court has the authority to review the record and make its own findings of whether clear and convincing evidence supports the termination. Richland County Dep't of Social Services, supra ; South Carolina Dep't of Social Services v. Brown, 317 S.C. 332, 454 S.E.2d 335 (Ct.App.1995). The appellate court is not, however, required to ignore the fact that the family court, who saw and heard the witnesses, was in a better position to evaluate their credibility and assign comparative weight to their testimony. Cherry v. Thomasson, 276 S.C. 524, 280 S.E.2d 541 (1981).
The family court found that appellant willfully failed to pay child support or materially contribute to the children's care for multiple six-month periods during the five years the children had been in foster care. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(4). Appellant argues she never received notice of the hearing at which she was required to pay support. Whether a parent's failure to visit or support a child is willful within the meaning of the statute is a question of intent to be determined in each case from all the facts and circumstances. The family court is given wide discretion in making this determination, which must be established by clear and convincing evidence. South Carolina Dep't of Social Services v. Broome, 307 S.C. 48, 413 S.E.2d 835 (1992). Conduct of the parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego parental duties may fairly be characterized as `willful' because it manifests a conscious indifference to the rights of the child to receive support and consortium from the parent. Id. at 53, 413 S.E.2d at 838. A family court judge ordered appellant in November 1993 to pay $174 per month in child support. The record shows appellant paid $583 in April 1994 after a judge issued a bench warrant for her arrest due to non-payment. She paid $4,475 in May 1996, one day before the hearing began on the termination of her parental rights. She made no other payments. The record refutes appellant's assertion that she never received notice of the support hearing. Although appellant initially testified she never received notice of the support hearing, she admitted on cross-examination she knew she was supposed to pay child support. While appellant needed counseling to address her mental health problems, she was capable of doing everyday tasks, psychologists testified. She had been employed in the past, including four years at a fast food restaurant and four years at a jewelry shop. Appellant testified she could not afford to pay child support because she did not have a job. She considered her effort to regain custody of her children a full-time job. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the family court's decision to terminate appellant's parental rights on this ground. Appellant could have worked and paid child support. If she could not afford to pay $174 a month, she could have asked the court to reduce it or at least materially contributed in some way to her children's support. Instead, she did nothing.
The family court found the children had been physically harmed in the home and, due to the severity or repetition of the abuse or neglect, it was not reasonably likely appellant could make the home safe within twelve months. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(1). Appellant argues the record does not support that conclusion. She also asserts that repeatedly dunking a child in bath water does not constitute physical injury as defined in S.C.Code § 20-7-490(6) (Supp. 1997) (physical injury means death or permanent or temporary disfigurement or impairment of any bodily organ or function). In reaching its conclusion, the family court relied upon the testimony of law enforcement officers who found Anthony frightened, dripping wet, and bruised when they were called to appellant's home in April 1991. One officer testified that appellant admitted she had dunked Anthony to punish him. Three clinical psychologists, a psychiatrist, and a professional counselor testified they believed Anthony, Candice, and Shannon had been physically abused. The children were extremely anxious about life generally, they were frightened and angry when appellant visited them, and they did not want to return home. All agreed that returning the children to appellant's home would be the wrong decisiona devastating occurrence in the counselor's words. All believed adoption by the Hoopers was the right decision. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the family court's decision to terminate appellant's parental rights on this ground. Furthermore, repeatedly dunking a seven-year-old child in icy bath water constitutes physical injury under Section 20-7-490(6) because it temporarily impairs the child's ability to breathe and, if it continued, would drown the child. Cf. Florence County Dep't of Social Services v. Ward, 310 S.C. 69, 425 S.E.2d 61 (Ct.App. 1992) (affirming family court's finding that foster parent did not physically abuse or mentally injure child as result of punishing child by splashing cool or cold water on him; there was no evidence that child suffered any permanent or lasting physical damage from the isolated incident, and record reflected that manner of punishment had been recommended by authority in field of child discipline).
The family court found that the children had been out of the home for six months and appellant had not remedied the conditions which caused the removal. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(2). Appellant contends the record does not support such a finding. In reaching its conclusions, the family court pointed to the repeated efforts of DSS and the multiple opportunities appellant had to obtain mental health counseling and comply with treatment plans. DSS developed at least a dozen treatment plans and the primary goal from 1991 to 1993 was to reunite the family. But appellant repeatedly refused to sign treatment plans, attend counseling to address her personality disorder, pay support, or even sign release forms for DSS to obtain information from the mental health professionals who examined her. The record shows that appellant refused to acknowledge she had any problems, but instead blamed everyone in sight. She was twice held in contempt for refusing to comply with treatment plans. She believed law enforcement, DSS, school officials, the family court, the guardian ad litem, and the mental health professionals all were engaged in a continuing conspiracy to steal her children and possibly sell them on the black market. Appellant testified the April 1991 incident involving Anthony was nothing more than a major misunderstanding, and denied her children were ever abused in any way. Rockwell, appellant's husband, also testified at length about the alleged conspiracy. In one bizarre example, appellant accused law enforcement and DSS officials of taking her children out of school to go on a train ride and to a state park. An investigation revealed there were no trains anywhere in the area where she allegedly saw it, and one alleged participant in the outing was in prison at the time. The numerous allegations against law enforcement eventually prompted the Fairfield County sheriff to turn the entire case over to the State Law Enforcement Division. We conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports the family court's decision to terminate appellant's parental rights on this ground. See South Carolina Dep't of Social Services v. Broome, supra (affirming decision to terminate rights of mother who suffered from a chronic mental condition where mother failed to visit or support the child).
The family court found that appellant had a diagnosable condition not likely to change within a reasonable period of time, and the condition made her unlikely to provide minimally acceptable care for the children. See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1572(6). Appellant does not challenge this conclusion on appeal. Accordingly, it is the law of the case. E.g., Dobyns v. South Carolina Dep't of Parks, Recreation, and Tourism, 325 S.C. 97, 480 S.E.2d 81 (1997) (unchallenged ruling by the trial court becomes law of the case).
The family court signed an adoption decree allowing the Hoopers to adopt Anthony, Candice, and Shannon. Appellant argues the record does not support the family court's decision. In order for the court to issue a valid adoption decree, it must appear that the parent has consented or otherwise forfeited his or her parental rights. Gardner v. Baby Edward, 288 S.C. 332, 342 S.E.2d 601 (1986). Consent or relinquishment for the purpose of adoption is not required of a parent whose rights have been terminated pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. §§ 20-7-1560 to -1582 (1985 & Supp.1997). See S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-1695(A)(1) (Supp.1997). The burden of proving, by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence, that adoption is the proper course of action rests upon the party who wishes to adopt a child. See D'Augustine v. Bush, 269 S.C. 342, 237 S.E.2d 384 (1977). Adoptions are equitable proceedings, and therefore, this Court has jurisdiction to find facts in accordance with its view of the preponderance of the evidence. Adoptive Parents v. Biological Parents, 315 S.C. 535, 446 S.E.2d 404 (1994); Phillips v. Baker, 284 S.C. 134, 325 S.E.2d 533 (1985). Anthony, now fourteen years old, and Candice and Shannon, now thirteen years old, have lived with the Hoopers for the past seven years. The record shows the Hoopers have provided a stable, caring home for the children. The mental health professionals who evaluated appellant, her husband, and the children, as well as the children's guardian ad litem, believed adoption by the Hoopers was the best choice for the children. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the family court.