Opinion ID: 532819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: 13 We review a district court's factual findings in determining an appropriate criminal sentence for clear error. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e); United States v. Herrera, 878 F.2d 997, 999-1000 (7th Cir.1989). Whether Jordan obstructed justice within the meaning of Guidelines Sec. 3C1.1 and whether he accepted responsibility within the meaning of Guidelines Sec. 3E1.1 were essentially questions of fact for the district court to resolve from a variety of sources. The commentary to Section 3E1.1 in particular instructs a court of appeals to be especially deferential in reviewing a finding that a defendant has not accepted responsibility because [t]he sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation. Application Note 5, Manual at 3.24. 14 Because the district court works within the limits imposed by the Guidelines, however, a reviewing court must determine whether the district court correctly applied those provisions, a question of statutory construction to be reviewed under what may be a somewhat less deferential standard, as suggested by 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(2). 8 The result is that we will affirm the district court if it correctly applied the Guidelines to findings of facts that do not leave us  'with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.'  Herrera, 878 F.2d at 1000 (citations omitted).
15 We review a district court's decision to depart from the Guidelines sentencing range to determine whether it was reasonable in light of the factors dictated by the Guidelines and the district court's explanations for its departure. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(3); United States v. Missick, 875 F.2d 1294, 1300-1301 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Miller, 874 F.2d 466, 471 (7th Cir.1989). 9 As this Court stated in Miller:  'Reasonableness' implies that a sentencing judge must provide articulable reasons, of a type contemplated by the Act and the Guidelines, and based on a sufficiently sound factual foundation, to justify a departure from the guidelines. 874 F.2d at 471. 16 In addition, we agree with the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits that the Sentencing Commission did not intend to deprive district courts of sensible flexibility in deciding to depart from the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. Sturgis, 869 F.2d 54, 56-57 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059, 1068 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Roberson, 872 F.2d 597, 601, 602 n. 4 (5th Cir.1989).