Opinion ID: 532961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Yeah. I spoke to her when I came in the apartment.

Text: 38 Q. From your conversations with her was it also your understanding that Mr. Burnett was also an invited guest? 39 MR. FREDERICKSEN: Objection, Your Honor, lack of foundation. 40 THE COURT: Sustained. 41 Mot. Tr. at 201-02. Earlier in the hearing, however, Cameron had testified in response to a question by the prosecutor that he did not know [h]ow is it Mr. Burnett is at Wanda Burgess' place. Mot. Tr. at 190. Burnett claims that the judge improperly impeded his ability to establish Burnett's precise status in Burgess' apartment. Burnett Br. at 31-33. Reviewing the trial judge's determinations for clear error, J. Hall, Search and Seizure, Sec. 27:4 (1982) (citing cases), we dismiss Burnett's contention. 42 Our analysis proceeds under the rubric of Federal Rule of Evidence 104. 10 Normally, the admissibility of a witness' testimony depends on proof of the witness' firsthand knowledge of the events he will describe. Fed.R.Evid. 602. Admissibility is governed by Rule 104(b), which states that in making preliminary admissibility determinations, the judge shall admit the testimony upon or subject to a showing that the witness in fact had the requisite personal knowledge. See also McCormick on Evidence Sec. 69 n. 1 (E. Cleary ed. 1984). A judge may determine, however, that no evidence, or at least not the evidence proffered, would fulfill[ ] ... the condition of the witness' firsthand knowledge. See Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 198 (1972) (Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 104(b)) (trial judge makes a preliminary determination whether the foundation evidence is sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the condition). In short, except in the extraordinary situation of plain error, no error can be claimed if at the time of the judge's ruling the counsel had made no offer of proof that would have fulfilled the condition. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2), (d). 11 43 The court's ruling sustaining the first objection was appropriate. Cameron had already testified that he had no first-hand knowledge of Burnett's status in Burgess' apartment. While it is conceivable that on requestioning Cameron might have altered the answer he had already provided the prosecutor, no proffer was made that he would do so. In the absence of any showing by Burnett's counsel that Cameron actually had personal knowledge of Burnett's guest status, the judge acted within her discretion in sustaining the objection. 44 The judge's ruling on the second objection was more problematical. Having established that Cameron had engaged in conversations with Burgess, Burnett's counsel had introduced evidence to support a finding that those conversations gave Cameron a basis for his understanding about Burnett's status. Rather than asking about Cameron's understanding, Burnett's counsel should have more appropriately directed his question to the content of the conversations. Although on balance, Cameron probably should have been allowed to answer the question, the judge's exclusion of his answer was harmless. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(d); S. Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 16 (1986) (discussing plain and harmless error in context of Fed.R.Evid. 103). Burnett's decision to keep the door to his bedroom open and his belongings in a bag in another room suggests that his expectation of privacy in the apartment was low. Even if Cameron had validated Burnett's guest status, that recognition alone would not have provided a basis for Burnett's legitimate expectation of privacy in the hallway or in the tote bag. Consequently, the judge's refusal to permit the question is not a cause for reversal or remand.