Opinion ID: 2285207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: state's appealboth cases

Text: After their arrest on May 3, 1974, the defendants were each charged in a multiple count information with a number of offenses. The first count charged them with robbery while armed with a deadly weapon in violation of General Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2). Subsequently the defendants were indicted in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut for bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113. [6] After a trial to the jury the defendants were convicted of the federal charges and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment. The defendants filed motions to dismiss the robbery count on the ground of double jeopardy and on the ground of denial of equal protection of the laws. The trial court, O'Sullivan, J., after hearing evidence ruled that [b]ecause of the historical background of prosecutions in this court, and because of the fact that it does not seem fair to the court to try the defendants twice for the same act, regardless of which constitutional label is used, each motion to dismiss the first count of the substituted information is granted. While we may agree with some of the trial court's premises, we do not agree with its conclusions. The constitutional protection of accused persons against double jeopardy is intended to protect against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, against a second prosecution after conviction, and against multiple punishments for the same offense. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 165, 97 S. Ct. 2221, 53 L. Ed. 2d 187 (1977). But these protections apply only against a single sovereign authority. There is no constitutional prohibition against a state prosecution for the same acts which resulted in a federal prosecution; Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S. Ct. 676, 3 L. Ed. 2d 684, reh. denied, 360 U.S. 907, 79 S. Ct. 1283, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1258 (1959); or vice versa. Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 79 S. Ct. 666, 3 L. Ed. 2d 729 (1959). In State v. Moeller, 178 Conn. 67, 420 A.2d 1153, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 950, 100 S. Ct. 423, 62 L. Ed. 2d 320 (1979), we held that neither federal nor state law barred sequential prosecution in our state courts for an offense for which the defendant had been acquitted or convicted in a federal court. That holding is of such recent vintage, and nothing having occurred in the interim to warrant reconsideration of this holding, we are not inclined to disturb it. We recognize that the problem does not arise in the federal courts because there the Attorney General of the United States, out of consideration of fairness to defendants and out of regard for efficient and orderly law enforcement, has foreclosed federal prosecutions once a person has been tried and acquitted or convicted in a state court for an offense that is also an offense against the United States. Petite v. United States, 361 U.S. 529, 80 S. Ct. 450, 4 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1960). Were a similar policy to be adopted by the several state's attorneys as a matter of reciprocity as well as a matter of fairness, judicial assistance for the implementation of this policy would seem to be indicated. Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29, 98 S. Ct. 81, 54 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1977). It must be recognized, however, that what may be highly desirable is not necessarily required. The Petite policy was designed to limit the exercise of the power to bring successive prosecutions for the same offense to situations comporting with the rationale for the existence of that power. Although not constitutionally mandated, this ... policy serves to protect interests which, but for the `dual sovereignty' principle inherent in our federal system, would be embraced by the Double Jeopardy Clause. (Emphasis added.) Rinaldi v. United States, supra, 28-29. It is well to remember that the state's attorney, although appointed by the judges of the Superior Court; State v. Moynahan, 164 Conn. 560, 568, 325 A.2d 199, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S. Ct. 291, 38 L. Ed. 2d 219 (1973); derives his authority from the common law. State v. Keena, 64 Conn. 212, 215, 29 A. 470 (1894). As a representative of the people of the state, he is under a duty not solely to obtain convictions but, more importantly, (1) to determine that there is reasonable ground to proceed with a criminal charge; State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 581, 18 A.2d 895 [1941]; (2) to see that impartial justice is done the guilty as well as the innocent; and (3) to ensure that all evidence tending to aid in the ascertaining of the truth be laid before the court, whether it be consistent with the contention of the prosecution that the accused is guilty. State v. Moynahan, supra. In the discharge of the functions of his high public office he has broad discretion in determining what crime or crimes to charge in any particular situation. State v. Chetcuti, 173 Conn. 165, 168, 377 A.2d 263 (1977). So long as he acts within the jurisdiction of his office it is not appropriate for a court to set policy for the performance of his prosecutorial function. State v. Carr, 172 Conn. 608, 610-11, 376 A.2d 74 (1977). Nor does prosecution of these defendants on the robbery charge deny them equal protection of the laws. Absent a showing of a selection deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification, none of which is shown here, conscious selectivity in enforcement of the law is not in itself a constitutional violation. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S. Ct. 501, 7 L. Ed. 2d 446 (1962). A defendant claiming discriminatory prosecution must show (1) that others similarly situated have generally not been prosecuted and that he has been singled out and (2) that he is the victim of invidious discrimination based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, or the exercise of a constitutionally protected right. United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974). The defendants' claims fail to meet this test. According to the trial court's finding, the present incumbent, Arnold Markle, has been state's attorney since 1968. It is the policy of his office to prosecute bank robberies which may also be subject to federal prosecution occurring within its jurisdiction where firearms are used, that is, where people are shot at by firearms. The state is proceeding with the prosecution for bank robbery in the present case because in the process of robbing the bank, the defendants indiscriminately shot at people. There is no case in Markle's tenure where a robbery of a bank was prosecuted by the state after a federal conviction except the present case. Markle would not have prosecuted the bank robbery charge in this case were it not for the shootout which followed. In 1974, there were six bank robberies in New Haven County, including the present case. Two remain unsolved, two were prosecuted in the federal court and two were prosecuted in the state court. In 1973, a white male was sentenced in the Superior Court for a bank robbery which occurred in 1972 and in which no weapons were used; there was no federal conviction. In 1973, two white males were convicted in the federal court for bank robbery. They were subsequently charged in the Superior Court, in companion cases, with attempted murder arising out of a flight from the scene of the bank robbery. They were not charged with bank robbery. There are two instances where white males who were prosecuted for bank robbery in the state court were not subsequently prosecuted in the federal court. We may attribute the state-federal situations to an application of the Petite policy. Their citation is therefore of little assistance to the present discussion. We are thus left with two cases, involving in reality a single policy decision, where arguably it could be claimed that following federal prosecution for bank robbery the state, while prosecuting the bank robbers on other related charges, did not also charge them with bank robbery. The short observation to the defendants' historical recitation is that one swallow does not a summer make. Although the defendants claim that their prosecution for bank robbery (indeed their prosecution for the several gun battles) was because of their race, their membership in the Black Liberation Army and their radical political views, these claims are not factually supported. The trial court specifically found that the federal prosecution was brought on the basis of facts without regard to the identity of those who were the subject of the prosecution and that the federal prosecution was not brought so as to heighten the fear of the people against the Black Liberation Army. Also, the court found that the defendants were prosecuted because they broke the law and not because they called themselves freedom fighters and that the race of the defendants was not a factor in their federal indictment or their federal trial, nor were they prosecuted for their religious or political beliefs. Furthermore, it found that there was no conspiracy between the state and federal prosecutors and no plan to ensure that the defendants would be prosecuted by both the state and federal courts. There is no finding by the trial court that the defendants' race, affiliation with the Black Liberation Army, their religion or their political beliefs were factors in their prosecution on state charges. Whatever the labels on the outside, to make out a case of discrimination requires the presentation of more than a box of accusations. There is no error in the defendants' appeals; there is error in the state's appeals, the judgments dismissing the robbery counts in these cases are set aside and the cases are remanded for further proceedings according to law.