Opinion ID: 3011356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent Requirement for Expatriating Acts

Text: This conclusion does not, however, terminate our consideration of this difficult case. We have determined that 21 Johann Breyer should have been entitled to American citizenship from the date of his birth, but is he still so entitled? Even though we conclude that S 101(c)(2) is constitutionally invalid, must we ignore Johann Breyer's activities during World War II and the impact that the decisions he made during that period may have had on his present claim to citizenship? Let us begin our further consideration by reviewing the reason for which Congress amended the statute in 1994 in the way in which it did. Congress based the exclusionary provisions of S 101(c)(2) on denaturalization, deportation or exclusion grounds, rather than on the grounds for expatriation. The reason for this is that a denaturalization, deportation, or exclusion action against an alien can be taken without any proof that the alien intended to commit the acts that qualify him for the sanction; there is no intent requirement. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that a citizen cannot be expatriated without an intent to surrender United States citizenship. See Terrazas, 444 U.S. at 270. The decision in Terrazas grew from the holding in Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967), in which the Supreme Court ruled that Congress could not take away citizenship simply on the basis of certain actions a citizen may have taken, without a citizen voluntarily renouncing it or giving it up. Arguably, Breyer could not have intended to surrender his American citizenship if he did not realize that he was entitled to it. Nevertheless, we see an important distinction between the facts of cases like Terrazas and Afroyim and the situation before us. Beys Afroyim was born in Poland and naturalized as an American citizen when he was a young man. After 34 years he went to Israel where he voted in an election for the Israeli Knesset. When he went to the American Embassy to renew his passport, the Department of State refused to do so on the ground that he had lost his American citizenship by virtue of S 401(e) of the Nationality Act of 1940, which provided that a citizen would lose his citizenship if he voted in a political election in a foreign state. Afroyim challenged this decision, and ultimately the Supreme Court held that Congress could not deprive him of his citizenship unless he voluntarily relinquished it. 22 Laurence Terrazas held American and Mexican citizenship from the time of his birth in the United States as the son of a Mexican citizen. When he was a student in Mexico at the age of 22, he executed an application for a certificate of Mexican nationality expressly renounc[ing] United States citizenship, as well as any submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to that of the United States of America . . .. 444 U.S. at 255. He obtained a certificate of Mexican citizenship that provided that he had expressly renounced all rights inherent to any other nationality, as well as all submission, obedience, and loyalty to any foreign government, especially to those which have recognized him as that national. Id. Terrazas later brought suit against the Secretary of State for a declaration of his U.S. nationality. The government argued that Terrazas had knowingly sworn allegiance to Mexico and renounced his allegiance to the United States. The Supreme Court held that when a statutory expatriating action is proved by a preponderance of the evidence, it is constitutional to presume the action to have been voluntary until and unless proved otherwise by the actor. Id. at 270. If the actor succeeds in proving the act was not voluntary, he will not be expatriated. If he fails, the court must determine whether the expatriating act was performed with an intent to relinquish citizenship. Id. Terrazas's case was remanded for the District Court to make furtherfindings on voluntariness. The acts committed by Johann Breyer are very different from those of Afroyim and Terrazas. During World War II, when Germany was at war with the United States, Breyer joined first the Waffen SS and then the Death's Head Battalion. The Waffen SS was a voluntary organization.9 The Death's Head units were composed of volunteers from other SS units.10 Apparently, Breyer may have made a knowing and voluntary decision to join each of these groups. Some historians assert that such a commitment _________________________________________________________________ 9. Apparently until approximately mid-1942, no one was compelled to join any part of the SS organization. Enlistment was genuinely voluntary. See HELMUT KRAUSNICK ET AL., ANATOMY OF THE SS STATE 387 (1965). 10. Id. at 570. 23 was knowing and voluntary. One commentator has described the situation as follows: So anyone who joined the SS later than 1934 must have known what he was doing. Naturally the extent to which a man realized the significance of his action depended in some degree upon his educational level and political background; a yokel joining a Totenkopf Sturmbann in 1937 is not to be equated with a barrister entering the SD at the same period. Nobody joining the SS could of course know that he would later be ordered to take part in organized mass murder; nevertheless anyone must have been aware that he was joining an organization where he would have to carry out illegal orders. By the mere fact of joining he was accepting certain principles and practices which could not but lead on occasions to culpable action. No one of course who lives under a totalitarian system can be sure that he will not one day be forced into a tragic situation for which he may be held guilty. Entry into the SS, however, implied that a man accepted this risk with his eyes open. The nearest to an exception was the man who joined the SS-Verfugungstruppe; it was, of course, part of the praetorian guard but nevertheless its training was clearly exclusively military and it had nothing to do with the political duties of the Allgemeine SS, with political police matters or with concentration camps. Everybody, however, who joined the SS was forsaking the sphere in which obligations were simply those of the normal loyal citizen and entering that in which the ideological order was paramount. By the mere fact of joining the SS every man was giving his ideological assent and declaring himself ready to do more than his duty.11 The above description of the knowing commitment made by a member of the Death's Head Battalion, during a period when Germany was at war with the United States, demonstrates a loyalty to the policies of Nazi Germany that is wholly inconsistent with American citizenship. Although when he took his oath of allegiance first to the Waffen SS _________________________________________________________________ 11. Id. at 390. 24 and then to the Death's Head Battalion, Johann Breyer was not aware of his right to American citizenship, one could conclude that he voluntarily made a commitment that, had he known of this right, clearly would have repudiated it. Afroyim and Terrazas do not deal with such a situation where a knowing commitment to a foreign nation at war with the United States is accompanied by voluntary acts that plainly disclaim any allegiance to the United States and the political principles for which it stands. We conclude that Johann Breyer may have made such a disclaimer of allegiance to the United States by a voluntary enlistment in the Waffen SS and then again in the Death's Head Battalion. Under Terrazas, Breyer has the burden of proving that his expatriating acts were not voluntary.12 If these acts were voluntary, however, the court must determine whether they were performed with an intent to relinquish citizenship. We conclude that a voluntary oath of allegiance to a nation at war with the United States and to an organization of that warring nation that is committed to policies incompatible with the principles of American democracy and the rights of citizens protected by the American constitution-- an organization such as the Death's Head Battalion-- is an unequivocal renunciation of American citizenship whether or not the putative citizen is then aware that he has a right to American citizenship. We will, therefore, remand this case to the District Court to make further findings concerning the circumstances under which Breyer joined the Waffen SS and the Death's Head Battalion to determine if his actions constitute a voluntary and unequivocal renunciation of any possible allegiance to the United States of America, a renunciation made in a time of war against the United States that demonstrated an allegiance to Nazi Germany and a repudiation of any loyalty -- citizen or not -- to the United States. Cf. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 68 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting and stating that some actions may be so inconsistent with the retention of citizenship as _________________________________________________________________ 12. Entering the armed forces of a foreign state or serving in its government is an expatriating act. See 8 U.S.C. S 1481(a)(4) and (5). 25 to result in loss of that status.). On remand, the District Court must determine whether Breyer's acts constitute such a renunciation. Because of our conclusion on the unconstitutionality of S 101(c)(2), we do not need to consider Breyer's due process and bill or attainder arguments. Concerning Breyer's contention that he should have had the right to amend his complaint for a second time, Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) allows a party to amend his complaint once as a matter of right. Subsequent amendments are at the discretion of the court; courts may deny leave to amend on grounds such as undue delay, dilatory motive, bad faith, prejudice, and futility. In Re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d at 1434. Courts are advised to grant leave to amend if justice so requires. Id. Breyer appeals the District Court's failure to grant him leave to amend his Petition a second time, after he amended it once as a matter of right. The District Court's refusal to grant Breyer leave to amend a second time was based on its determinations that the amendments were predicated upon a dilatory motive, and in any event, would be futile. The District Court's reasoning regarding Breyer's request to amend is set forth in a lengthy and thoughtful memorandum. After reviewing the record in this case and the court's Memorandum and Order denying the motion to amend, we find no cause to disturb the District Court's conclusions. Therefore, we find that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in failing to allow Breyer to amend his Petition a second time.