Opinion ID: 1298187
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Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Determining inherent dangerousness of the felony of furnishing cocaine

Text: As discussed earlier, in determining whether defendant committed an inherently dangerous felony, we must consider the elements of the felony in the abstract. ( People v. Williams, supra, 63 Cal.2d 452, 458, fn. 5.) (4a) Because Health and Safety Code section 11352 also proscribes conduct other than that involved here (furnishing cocaine), the issue still to be resolved is whether we must consider only the specific offense of furnishing cocaine or the entire scope of conduct prohibited by the statute. The Court of Appeal examined Health and Safety Code section 11352 in its entirety. It felt compelled to do so because of a series of recent cases where we held that, to determine a felony's inherent dangerousness, the statute as a whole had to be examined. ( People v. Lopez (1971) 6 Cal.3d 45 [98 Cal. Rptr. 44, 489 P.2d 1372]; People v. Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d 86; People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d 824.) However, unlike the situation here, each of those cases involved a statute that proscribed an essentially single form of conduct. In Lopez, supra, 6 Cal.3d 45, the defendant and another inmate engaged in what initially was a nonviolent escape, but which culminated in a fatal assault perpetrated by the other escaping inmate. We held the crime of escape (Pen. Code, § 4532) not to be an inherently dangerous felony for purposes of applying the second degree felony-murder rule. We rejected the People's contention that because the statute's penalty for a violent escape was greater than for a nonviolent escape it could be broken into two offenses: one violent, the other nonviolent. Although we recognized that the statute comprehends a multitude of sins, we concluded it draws no relevant distinction between such [nonviolent] escapes and the more violent variety.... (6 Cal.3d at pp. 51-52.) In stressing the statute's unitary nature, we said: The offense is escape. The circumstances of commission are relevant not to the offense committed but to the punishment to be imposed therefor. ( Id., at p. 52, fn. 9, italics in original.) In Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d 86, the defendant was accused of murder based on a death that had occurred in the course of aggravated false imprisonment. (Pen. Code, § 236.) The crime was a felony because it had been effected by violence, menace, fraud, or deceit. (Pen. Code, § 237.) [6] After analyzing the statutory scheme as a whole, we concluded: While the elements of violence or menace by which false imprisonment is elevated to a felony may involve danger to human life, the felony offense viewed as a whole in the abstract is not inherently dangerous to human life. (19 Cal.3d at p. 94.) In rejecting the People's contention that, instead of examining the statute as a whole, we consider whether the felony of false imprisonment by violence or menace was inherently dangerous, we said: The Legislature has not drawn any relevant distinctions between violence, menace, fraud, or deceit. These types of conduct are specified only as a basis for distinguishing between false imprisonment punishable as a misdemeanor and false imprisonment punishable as a felony. ( Id., at p. 95.) Finally, in Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d 824, we held that a violation of Business and Professions Code section 2053, which prohibits the practice of medicine without a license under circumstances or conditions which cause or create a risk of great bodily harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death, was not a felony inherently dangerous to human life. [7] We explained: In this examination we are required to view the statutory definition of the offense as a whole, taking into account even nonhazardous ways of violating the provisions of the law which do not necessarily pose a threat to human life. [¶] The primary element of the offense in question here is the practice of medicine without a license. The statute defines such practice as `treating the sick or afflicted.' One can certainly conceive of treatment of the sick or afflicted which has quite innocuous results  the affliction at stake could be a common cold, or a sprained finger, and the form of treatment an admonition to rest in bed and drink fluids or the application of ice to mild swelling. Thus, we do not find inherent dangerousness at this stage.... (35 Cal.3d at p. 830.) In both Henderson and Burroughs, supra, we observed that the offense in question had a primary element. In Henderson, the primary element was the unlawful restraint of another's liberty ( People v. Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 93), while in Burroughs it was the practice of medicine without a license ( People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 830). Lopez, too, involved an offense with a primary element, namely, escape. (6 Cal.3d 45.) In contrast, Health and Safety Code section 11352, the statute at issue here, has no primary element. For instance, the elements of the crime of transporting a controlled substance bear no resemblance to those underlying the offense of administering such a substance; yet these two offenses are included in the same statute. (Compare People v. Cortez (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 994, 998-999 [212 Cal. Rptr. 692] [transporting]; CALJIC No. 12.07 [administering].) The fact that the Legislature has included a variety of offenses in Health and Safety Code section 11352 does not require that we treat them as a unitary entity. Rather, we must decide whether in [r]eading and considering the statute as a whole in order to determine the true legislative intent ... we find [a] basis for severing the various types of conduct it forbids. ( People v. Henderson, supra, 19 Cal.3d at p. 95.) There are more than 100 different controlled substances that fall within the confines of Health and Safety Code section 11352. To create statutes separately proscribing the importation, sale, furnishing, administration, etc., of each of these drugs, would require the enactment of hundreds of individual statutes. It thus appears that for the sake of convenience the Legislature has included the various offenses in one statute. The determination whether a defendant who furnishes cocaine commits an inherently dangerous felony should not turn on the dangerousness of other drugs included in the same statute, such as heroin and peyote; nor should it turn on the danger to life, if any, inherent in the transportation or administering of cocaine. Rather, each offense set forth in the statute should be examined separately to determine its inherent dangerousness. For the reasons discussed above, we hold the Court of Appeal and the trial court erred in concluding that Health and Safety Code section 11352 should be analyzed in its entirety to determine whether, in furnishing cocaine, defendant committed an inherently dangerous felony. Defendant, however, argues that even the more narrow offense of furnishing cocaine is not an inherently dangerous felony and therefore the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the murder charge, despite its faulty analysis. In countering that argument, the People have asked us to take judicial notice of various medical articles and reports that assertedly demonstrate that the offense of furnishing cocaine is sufficiently dangerous to life to constitute an inherently dangerous felony. The task of evaluating the evidence on this issue is most appropriately entrusted to the trial court, subject, of course, to appellate review. We therefore direct the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings in light of this opinion. This remand does not foreclose a finding by the trial court that the crime of furnishing cocaine is not a felony inherently dangerous to life, thus justifying a dismissal of the murder charge. If, however, the trial court concludes the offense of furnishing cocaine is inherently dangerous and therefore the murder charge should not be dismissed, defendant must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea to the charges of violating Health and Safety Code section 11352, with credit for any interim time served. (See People v. Orin, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 942, fn. 7.)