Opinion ID: 1933373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The right allegedly violated and whether clearly established

Text: We consider together the first two prongs of the inquiry, the nature of the right allegedly violated and whether the asserted right was `clearly established' in the `particularized' sense that `[t]he contours of the right [were] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' Id. (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Appellee's federal claim is predicated on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). [7] To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2254-55, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284, 100 S.Ct. 553, 558, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980). One cannot claim a `violation of § 1983' because the Act provides only a remedy rather than a substantive right. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1916, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). To prove the claim under § 1983, the rights violated under color of law must be those secured by the Constitution or federal law. See Woodward & Lothrop v. Hillary, 598 A.2d 1142, 1145 (D.C.1991). Appellant argues that appellee cannot prevail on his § 1983 claim because Taylor had no substantive or constitutional right to attend school. Indeed, education is not a fundamental right for which explicit protection is provided under the Constitution. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35, 37, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1297-98, 1299, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973). However, at least where state law provides an entitlement to a public education, a student's interest qualifies for protection under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74, 95 S.Ct. 729, 735-36, 42 L.Ed.2d 725 (1975); see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1165, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); see also Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F.2d 662, 668 (10th Cir.1981). In Goss, the Supreme Court determined that students entitled to an education under state law, facing temporary school suspensions, have interests which qualify for constitutional due process protection. Goss, supra, 419 U.S. at 573-74, 95 S.Ct. at 735-36. The Court held that [a]t the very minimum..., students facing suspension and the consequent interference with a protected property interest must be given some kind of notice and afforded some kind of hearing. Id. at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738-39 (emphasis in original). Such interests trigger constitutional protection because they are initially recognized by state law. Paul, 424 U.S. at 710, 96 S.Ct. at 1164-65. Goss arose in Ohio where the state had enacted a law granting a right to a free education to all residents between five and twenty-one years of age. Goss, 419 U.S. at 573, 95 S.Ct. at 735. There was also in effect in Ohio a compulsory attendance law. Id. These factors weighed in the court's determination that an interest protected by due process had been established. The District of Columbia has no comparable law extending the right of a public education to a person, who like appellee, was sixteen years of age. The ages for compulsory school attendance are between seven and sixteen years. D.C.Code § 31-401 (1988). Thus, a critical factor giving rise to a right commanding due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment which was present in Goss is not present here. Nevertheless, a claim to a benefit or entitlement may be premised on rules promulgated by state officials. Goss, supra, 419 U.S. at 572-73, 95 S.Ct. at 735. When so created, a citizen can demand due process protection. Id. At the time pertinent to this proceeding there was in effect a rule promulgated by the Board of Education that [e]ach student has a right to a meaningful public education ... 5 DCMR § 2401.1, and access to a meaningful curriculum. Id. 2401.2. Such a regulation may form the basis for a claim of entitlement which demands due process protection. However, we need not resolve that issue because, even assuming appellee's entitlement to due process protection, the undisputed facts show that appellant did not violate appellee's due process rights. [W]hether the plaintiff has been deprived of a right `secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States is the first inquiry in any § 1983 suit. Martinez, supra, 444 U.S. at 284, 100 S.Ct. at 558 (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140, 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2692-93, 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979)). The determination of that question may be dispositive. Id. The Supreme Court made clear in Goss that the interpretation and application of the Due Process Clause are initially practical matters and that `[t]he very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation' Goss, supra, 419 U.S. at 578, 95 S.Ct. at 138 (quoting Cafeteria Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 1748-49, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961)). The type of notice and hearing required necessarily depends upon appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved. Id. at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738-39. In this case, those interests include the student's right to an education without an unfair or unfounded suspension and the school's interest in ensuring an environment which will not be disruptive to the education of its students. Although holding that due process requires oral or written notice of the charges against a student faced with suspension, the Supreme Court recognized that immediate action may be necessary under some circumstances and that prior notice may not be feasible. Id. at 580, 582, 95 S.Ct. at 739, 740. A hearing should generally precede the student's suspension, but the complexity of the problems facing schools today requires recognition of the realities which the Supreme Court observed in Goss: [T]here are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot be insisted upon. Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school. In such cases, the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon as practicable.... Id. at 582-83, 95 S.Ct. at 740-41. In considering due process challenges in disciplinary matters, courts following Goss have shown the flexibility implicit in the decision. In Keough v. Tate County Bd. of Educ., 748 F.2d 1077 (5th Cir.1984), a high school senior was called into the principal's office on December 9, 1983, for failing to sit in his assigned seat in study hall. The student became angry, cursed at the principal, and left school without permission. When the student later refused to apologize, the principal gave him the choice of a paddling or a ten-day suspension. The student chose the suspension, and his parents met with the school superintendent, who informed them that a hearing would be held on January 3. The parents requested an earlier hearing (December 14) to assure that their son could take final examinations. The school board allowed the student to take his examinations, but suspended him the following semester. The Fifth Circuit concluded that [t]he informal give-and-take sessions between [the principal] and [the student] on December 9 met the procedural due process requirements for short-term suspensions. Id. at 1080. The court rejected appellant's argument that more formal procedures were required and held that `[t]he sufficiency of procedures employed in any particular situation must be judged in light of the parties, the subject matter and the circumstances involved.' Id. at 1081 (quoting Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir.1970)). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has also ruled that an informal meeting in the principal's office satisfied due process for a ten-day school suspension and a sixty-day suspension from the school's football team imposed upon the student for drinking alcohol. Palmer v. Merluzzi, 868 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.1989). The court rejected the argument of the student's father that additional procedural safeguards were required because of the athletic suspension, which the school official failed to mention in the meeting. Id. at 94. The parent claimed that the action would impede the student's chances of playing college football and obtaining a scholarship. Id. at 92. Nevertheless, the court concluded that the meeting in the principal's office satisfied due process. Id. at 96. Similarly, the informal hearing afforded Taylor by Durso in this case comports with the requirements set forth in Goss. Appellant informed Taylor at the time he was arrested that he must attend a meeting with his mother to discuss a proposed transfer. That meeting occurred only two days after Taylor was arrested and removed from the school by the police on a warrant charging armed rape. [8] Initially, it appeared that Taylor and his mother agreed to the home-study arrangement. Upon request, appellant and his mother obtained a second informal meeting with the assistant superintendent of schools. Again, Ms. Taylor indicated her assent to the home-study arrangement, and the assistant superintendent informed Taylor and his mother of her right to a further hearing on the proposed transfer. Appellee obtained that hearing on the first available date, April 28th. The two informal hearings and subsequent formal one were adequate to satisfy due process under the circumstances. See Goss, supra, 419 U.S. at 579, 95 S.Ct. at 738-39; see also Keough, supra, 748 F.2d at 1080. Appellee was provided with notice and an opportunity to state his position at informal hearings. He also received notice and a formal hearing at the earliest available date once Ms. Taylor let it be known that she and her son no longer agreed to the home-study arrangement and transfer. Although appellant subsequently disobeyed the oral order of the hearing officer by excluding Taylor from school for one day (April 29), Taylor did in fact return to school on April 30. The question is whether such a violation of the school board's ruling creates a right actionable under § 1983. [N]ot every injury in which a state official has played some part is actionable under [§ 1983]. Martinez, supra, 444 U.S. at 285, 100 S.Ct. at 559. A violation of the decision of the local school board is not the proper subject of a claim under § 1983. See Davis, supra, 468 U.S. at 194 n. 12, 104 S.Ct. at 3019 n. 12. Pollnow, supra, 757 F.2d at 501. Here appellant violated the order, resulting in a one-day suspension for appellee, but the notice and hearing requirements of due process were met. Moreover, [t]o establish a denial of procedural due process, a party must show substantial prejudice. Keough, supra, 748 F.2d at 1083. The one day that Durso excluded appellant from school following the hearing officer's oral ruling is not so substantial as to support a procedural due process claim. Id. Thus, the answer to the first factor under Martinez, 444 U.S. at 284, 100 S.Ct. at 558 and Gooden, supra, 917 F.2d at 1361, whether appellee was deprived of any constitutional right, disposes of the case.