Opinion ID: 1878856
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Coastal's Legal Sufficiency Challenge

Text: Coastal argues that there is no evidence in the record to support Crown Central's allegation of gross negligence. In Transportation Insurance Co. v. Moriel, we explained that gross negligence involves two components: (1) viewed objectively from the actor's standpoint, the act or omission complained of must involve an extreme degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others; and (2) the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 23 (Tex.1994). In this case, the parties' dispute centers on the second prong C specifically, whether there was evidence that Coastal was consciously indifferent to the risk of harm. Crown Central argues that the testimony of its trucking-safety expert, Arthur Atkinson, provides some evidence of conscious indifference; Crown Central notes that Coastal did not object either to Atkinson's qualifications or to the reliability of his testimony. Crown Central argues that a particular colloquy, in which Atkinson opined on the elements of gross negligence, provided some evidence of each of the elements of gross negligence: Q: When viewed objectively from Coastal's point of view at the time of the September '93 incident, in your opinion, did Coastal's failure to stop using probes that could have [sensor failure] problems, did that involve a high degree of risk, considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to others? A: Yes, it did, very high. Q: In your opinion, did Coastal have an actual subjective awareness of the risk involved in failing to stop using probes that can have [sensor failure] problems? A: Yes, again and again. Q: And in your opinion, did Coastal nevertheless proceed with conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others? A: That's the only conclusion I can draw. Coastal, on the other hand, argues that Atkinson's testimony amounted to no more than a bare conclusion that was factually unsubstantiated and therefore constituted no evidence of conscious indifference to support Crown Central's gross negligence claim. Relying upon our opinion in Maritime Overseas, the court of appeals held that Coastal waived its right to assert that such expert testimony constituted no evidence to support a finding of gross negligence because it did not object to the quoted colloquy as unreliable. 38 S.W.3d at 190. We disagree that an objection is needed to preserve a no-evidence challenge to conclusory expert testimony. We noted in Burrow v. Arce that, although expert opinion testimony often provides valuable evidence in a case, it is the basis of the witness's opinion, and not the witness's qualifications or his bare opinions alone, that can settle an issue as a matter of law; a claim will not stand or fall on the mere ipse dixit of a credentialed witness. Burrow v. Arce, 997 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex.1999). Opinion testimony that is conclusory or speculative is not relevant evidence, because it does not tend to make the existence of a material fact more probable or less probable. See Tex.R. Evid. 401. This Court has labeled such testimony as incompetent evidence, and has often held that such conclusory testimony cannot support a judgment. Cas. Underwriters v. Rhone, 134 Tex. 50, 132 S.W.2d 97, 99 (1939) (holding that a witness's statements were but bare conclusions and therefore incompetent); see also Wadewitz v. Montgomery, 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex.1997) ([A]n expert witness's conclusory statement ... will neither establish good faith at the summary judgment stage nor raise a fact issue to defeat summary judgment.). Furthermore, this Court has held that such conclusory statements cannot support a judgment even when no objection was made to the statements at trial. [1] Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Gossett, 156 Tex. 252, 294 S.W.2d 377, 380 (1956) (It is well settled that the naked and unsupported opinion or conclusion of a witness does not constitute evidence of probative force and will not support a jury finding even when admitted without objection.); Rhone, 132 S.W.2d at 99 (holding that bare conclusions did not amount to any evidence at all, and that the fact that they were admitted without objection add[ed] nothing to their probative force); see also Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 712 (Tex.1997) (When the expert `brings to court little more than his credentials and a subjective opinion,' this is not evidence that would support a judgment.... If for some reason such testimony were admitted in a trial without objection, would a reviewing court be obliged to accept it as some evidence? The answer is no.). Crown Central concedes that, under our earlier cases, even unobjected-to conclusory testimony cannot be some evidence to support a judgment. Crown Central argues, however, that our decision in Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402 (Tex.1998), overruled this earlier line of cases and required an objection to preserve a no-evidence complaint with regard to expert testimony. In Maritime Overseas, we held that [t]o preserve a complaint that scientific evidence is unreliable and thus, no evidence, a party must object to the evidence before trial or when the evidence is offered. Id. at 409. Crown Central argues that an objection is necessary to protect the trial court's discretion as a gatekeeper ... responsible for making the preliminary determination of whether the proffered testimony meets reliability standards. Id. at 409. We believe that Maritime Overseas is distinguishable, however. In that case, the expert's underlying methodology was at issue: the defendant argued that the court of appeals should have examined whether any well-founded scientific methodology supported the jury's actual damages award. Id. at 405. We concluded that examination of the expert's underlying methodology was a task for the trial court in its role as gatekeeper, and was not an analysis that should be undertaken for the first time on appeal. Id. at 412. This rule allows the trial court to exercise its discretion in making a determination of whether the expert testimony is sufficiently reliable. Id. It also ensures that a full record will be developed, and that appellate courts will be able to evaluate the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence without looking beyond the appellate record. Id. Even in Maritime Overseas, however, we recognized that an objection to the admissibility of the expert testimony may not be needed to preserve every noevidence challenge; instead, we drew a distinction between challenges to an expert's scientific methodology and no evidence challenges where, on the face of the record, the evidence lacked probative value. Id. at 412. When the expert's underlying methodology is challenged, the court necessarily looks beyond what the expert said to evaluate the reliability of the expert's opinion. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712. When the testimony is challenged as conclusory or speculative and therefore nonprobative on its face, however, there is no need to go beyond the face of the record to test its reliability. We therefore conclude that when a reliability challenge requires the court to evaluate the underlying methodology, technique, or foundational data used by the expert, an objection must be timely made so that the trial court has the opportunity to conduct this analysis. However, when the challenge is restricted to the face of the record C for example, when expert testimony is speculative or conclusory on its face C then a party may challenge the legal sufficiency of the evidence even in the absence of any objection to its admissibility. Because we conclude that Maritime Overseas did not change the general rule that bare conclusions C even if unobjected to C cannot constitute probative evidence, we hold that Coastal did not waive its noevidence challenge in this case. With regard to the conscious indifference prong of Crown Central's gross-negligence claim, we agree that the Atkinson testimony quoted above was too conclusory to defeat a motion for a directed verdict. We therefore review the record to see if there is other evidence of conscious indifference to support Crown Central's gross-negligence claim.