Opinion ID: 698699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Use of Prior Felonies in Sentencing Shulze Under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(1)

Text: 27 After Shulze was found guilty of three counts under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), the district court enhanced his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(1) to the mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years upon determining that he had four prior burglary convictions under North Dakota law. Shulze argues that the district court erred in enhancing his sentence pursuant to Sec. 924(e)(1) because he says two of his four prior burglary convictions do not qualify as predicate convictions, thereby leaving him one conviction shy of the three predicate offenses required under the statute. Specifically, Shulze argues that because his civil rights have been restored under North Dakota law with respect to these two disputed convictions, under the dictates of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(20), these offenses may not be used for enhancement pursuant to Sec. 924(e)(1). The government argues that Shulze's right to possess firearms has never been restored under North Dakota law since his first burglary conviction in 1978 and, therefore, the two disputed convictions do qualify as predicate offenses for sentence enhancement under Sec. 924(e)(1). 28 Our review of this issue of statutory construction is de novo. Thompson v. United States, 989 F.2d 269, 270 (8th Cir.1993). As noted above, Shulze was convicted of three violations of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 922(g)(1), which makes it unlawful for any person who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to possess firearms or ammunition. The district court enhanced Shulze's sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(1), which provides for a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony.... A violent felony is defined in part as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and the definition specifically includes burglary. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e)(2)(B). In outlining what constitutes a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, section 921(a)(20) states in pertinent part: 29 What constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction ... for which a person ... has had his civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such ... restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms. 30 18 U.S.C. Sec. 921(a)(20). 31 [S]tate law determines what constitutes a prior state conviction for purposes of federal firearms statutes, including the effect of any state pardon, expungement or restoration of civil rights. United States v. Wind, 986 F.2d 1248, 1250 (8th Cir.1993). In addition, [w]e have noted that for a person to have his civil rights restored by a state for the purposes of section 921(a)(20), the relevant state must actually have restored the felon's right to possess firearms. United States v. Gipson, 985 F.2d 412, 414 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 81, 126 L.Ed.2d 50 (1993). [A] prior conviction is used for sentence enhancement if the defendant may not legally possess the firearm in the state that convicted him. United States v. Wind, 986 F.2d 1248, 1249 (8th Cir.1993) (Magill, J., concurring). Thus, in assessing whether Shulze has had his civil rights restored with respect to either of the disputed convictions, we must determine whether North Dakota has restored his right to possess firearms with respect to those offenses. 32 North Dakota law provides that one who has been convicted of a felony involving violence is prohibited from owning or possessing firearms for ten years, see N.D.Cent.Code Ann. Sec. 62.1-02-01(1) (Michie Supp.1993), while one convicted of any other felony is under the same prohibition for five years. See N.D.Cent.Code Ann. Sec. 62.1-02-01(2) (Michie Supp.1993). These prohibitions against possessing firearms run from the date of conviction or release from incarceration or probation, whichever is the latter. N.D.Cent.Code Ann. Secs. 62.1-02-01(1)-(2) (Michie Supp.1993). While Shulze's burglary convictions are no doubt felonies under North Dakota law and, while it is clear that they are also defined as violent felonies under federal law for the purposes of the enhancement under Sec. 924(e)(1), it is not clear whether these convictions qualify under North Dakota law as violent felonies triggering the ten-year state firearms prohibition or as any other felony triggering the five-year state prohibition; we will assume for the purposes of deciding this case that Shulze's North Dakota burglary offenses are nonviolent felonies under North Dakota law, and that the five-year state firearms prohibition is applicable. 33 Shulze's Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) indicates that he was sentenced in March of 1978 for the first burglary conviction and was ultimately released from incarceration for this offense in April of 1979; therefore, he was prohibited from possessing firearms with respect to this offense until April of 1984. Before that date, however, in March of 1981, Shulze was simultaneously sentenced for three separate burglary convictions and two separate convictions for theft of property. He received a five-year consecutive sentence on each of the five charges, for a total of 25 years of imprisonment; ten years of this sentence was suspended with a term of probation imposed. Shulze was paroled on these charges in November 1986 to a consecutive sentence for an unrelated escape offense and was subsequently released from incarceration on parole on April 1, 1987. He remained on parole until March 19, 1991, at which time he commenced his ten-year period of probation for the suspended sentence; his probation was terminated early in March of 1992. On that date, North Dakota's five-year firearm prohibition began. Shulze will not be authorized to possess firearms under North Dakota law until March of 1997. 34 Due to the overlap of the firearms prohibitions caused by his multiple offenses, Shulze has continuously been prohibited from possessing a firearm since he was sentenced for his first burglary in March of 1978. However, Shulze argues that we should not look to the overlap effect of the firearms prohibitions but instead should examine each offense in isolation to determine whether his right to possess firearms has actually been restored with respect to that particular offense. Shulze would have us ignore the fact that since his 1978 conviction, he has never been allowed to possess a firearm in North Dakota. 35 Shulze's interpretation of Sec. 921(a)(20) was rejected in United States v. Clark, 993 F.2d 402 (4th Cir.1993). The Fourth Circuit, faced with this same type of view in isolation argument, adopted an approach which requires effective and actual restoration of the right to possess firearms as opposed to merely formal restoration of that right in order for Sec. 921(a)(20) to preclude use of a prior conviction. Id. at 405. The court ruled that as a matter of federal law [ ] a state conviction for a violent felony is not excluded from consideration under Sec. 924(e) by the provisions of Sec. 921(a)(20) until the law of the relevant state effectively restores to the defendant the right to possess firearms. Id. See also United States v. Burns, 934 F.2d 1157, 1160-61 (10th Cir.1991) (holding that because Burns' right to possess firearms had not been effectively restored, three prior burglary convictions qualified as violent felonies under Secs. 921(a)(20) and 924(e)(2)(B), serving as a proper basis for enhancing his sentence under Sec. 924(e)(1)), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1124, 112 S.Ct. 1246, 117 L.Ed.2d 478 (1992). We agree with the reasoning of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits and require effective and actual restoration of the right to possess firearms in order for a conviction to be excludable under Sec. 921(a)(20). 36 In this case, the overlap of the five-year firearms prohibitions which accompanies each of Shulze's convictions has barred him from possessing firearms since his first burglary conviction in 1978. Shulze's right to possess firearms in North Dakota has never effectively been restored since that date. Therefore, all of his burglary convictions since that date may be considered for enhancement under Sec. 924(e), and the district court committed no error in using the two disputed convictions to enhance his sentence.