Opinion ID: 778537
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Has Congress Directly Spoken to the Precise Question at Issue?

Text: Despite its acknowledgment that neither the text nor the legislative history of the MMWA clearly indicates whether the informal dispute settlement procedures provided for in § 2310 are intended to be the exclusive alternative to litigation available for breach of written warranty claims under the Act, the majority nonetheless finds that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Initially, the majority points to the fact that, fifty years prior to the passage of the MMWA, Congress expressed a general policy favoring arbitration of contractual claims in a different statute. The majority apparently finds that this general policy expressed in the FAA is indicative of Congress's intent in enacting the MMWA. The Supreme Court has indicated that a reviewing court considering whether Congress has specifically addressed a question under the first prong of Chevron should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation but should instead read the words of the statute in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. F.D.A. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132-33, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.2d 121 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809, 109 S.Ct. 1500, 103 L.Ed.2d 891 (1989)). For example, in Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 115 S.Ct. 552, 130 L.Ed.2d 462 (1994), the Court considered a Department of Veterans' Affairs regulation that interpreted the term injury in a veterans' benefits statute to include only intentionally inflicted injuries. The Court concluded that Congress had directly spoken to the question at issue, based in part upon the Court's finding that the word injury was used in other portions of the same veterans' benefits statute and in analogous statutes dealing with service-related injuries in ways clearly indicating a reference to both intentional and unintentional injuries. See id. at 118, 115 S.Ct. 552. Similarly, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged that a court considering whether Congress has specifically addressed a particular question under the first prong of Chevron may glean Congress's clear intent regarding an earlier statute from subsequent statutes addressing the same subject matter. As the Brown & Williamson Court recognized: At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of plausible meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape or focus those meanings. The classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time, and getting them to make sense in combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute may be altered by the implications of a later statute. This is particularly so where the scope of the earlier statute is broad but subsequent statutes more specifically address the topic at hand. As we recognized recently... a specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control our construction of the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been expressly amended. 529 U.S. at 143 (internal citations and quotations omitted, alterations in original). Based in part on this reasoning, the Brown & Williamson Court concluded that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act did not permit the Food and Drug Administration to regulate tobacco products, because Congress had expressed its intent regarding the appropriate regulation of such products in the six tobacco-specific pieces of legislation it enacted subsequent to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. See id. at 143-57, 120 S.Ct. 1291. In the instant case, the majority has not gleaned clear congressional intent from the use of similar words in related statutes, as did the Court in Gardner. Nor has the majority found such clear intent by examining Congress's refinement of a general statute in a subsequent, more specific statute, as did the Brown & Williamson Court. Instead, the majority bases its conclusion that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question of how to interpret § 2310 of the MMWA on a general policy expressed in a prior, less specific statute. The Supreme Court has never invoked similar reasoning in applying the first prong of the Chevron inquiry. However, even assuming, arguendo, that this method of statutory construction would be appropriate in some circumstances, it is clearly problematic in the context of the instant case. As the Supreme Court has consistently recognized, the presumption of arbitrability established by the FAA is not absolute and may be overridden by a contrary congressional command in the statute creating the right at issue. Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226, 107 S.Ct. 2332, 96 L.Ed.2d 185 (1987); see also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26, 111 S.Ct. 1647, 114 L.Ed.2d 26 (1991). The question in the instant case is whether the informal dispute settlement mechanism provisions in § 2310 of the MMWA express such a contrary congressional command. The majority, however, concludes that Congress did not intend to express such a command in the MMWA, based on indicia of congressional intent expressed in the FAA. Such circular logic is unpersuasive: the presumption of arbitrability becomes relevant after it is established that there is no contrary congressional command. It is inappropriate to apply the presumption in ascertaining whether the statute in question contains such a command. The majority further argues that Congress could not possibly have intended for § 2310's provisions regarding informal dispute settlement procedures to govern arbitration proceedings because binding arbitration is not normally thought of as an informal procedure. Unlike the majority, I am extremely hesitant to conclude that Congress has directly addressed an apparent statutory ambiguity based on a judicial assumption about what a term normally means. In addition, even assuming the majority's understanding of the generally accepted meaning of informal procedures was persuasive indicia of Congress's intent in enacting the MMWA, it is not at all clear that the majority's conclusion that arbitration is not normally thought of as an informal procedure accurately reflects how arbitration was perceived at the time of the MMWA's enactment in 1974. As numerous commentators have recognized, the formality of arbitration proceedings has increased notably in the latter half of the twentieth century, particularly in the period since the Supreme Court revitalized the FAA by clarifying its applicability to statutory claims in the late 1980s. See, e.g., Edward Brunet, Replacing Folklore Arbitration with a Contract Model of Arbitration, 74 Tul. L. Rev. 39, 42-47 (1990) (describing the shift from the folklore arbitrations that were common in the early part of the twentieth century, wherein informal procedures dominated, there was little or no discovery and [e]vidence rules were inapplicable to modern arbitrations which resemble litigation in the sense that there can be routine discovery, motion practice, application of substantive legal rules, [and] written discursive awards with findings of fact and conclusions of law); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an Adequate Substitute for the Courts?, 68 Tex. L. Rev. 509, 534 (1990) (Historically, commercial and labor arbitration have shared a basically informal approach to the actual fact-finding and adjudication process.... In response to recent Supreme Court decisions encouraging the use of commercial arbitration, however, and as part of a general effort to ensure that arbitration procedures adequately protect substantive rights, commercial arbitration institutions have begun to reform their procedures and have added considerable formality to their proceedings.); cf. Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198, 203, 76 S.Ct. 273, 100 L.Ed. 199 (1956) (describing commercial arbitration proceedings in 1956 and concluding that [a]rbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their proceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial review of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial). Moreover, even today, arbitration undoubtedly constitutes a more informal procedure than litigation. Thus, to categorize arbitration as formal or informal largely begs the question of the appropriate basis of comparison. Under these circumstances, even if the majority is correct that most people would characterize arbitration as a formal procedure at this point in time, this perception hardly provides conclusive evidence that the 1974 Congress did not intend to address arbitration proceedings in enacting MMWA provisions governing informal dispute resolution proceedings. Neither the text of § 2310 nor the statutory context of this provision conclusively indicates whether § 2310 applies to arbitration proceedings (i.e., whether § 2310-governed informal dispute settlement procedures are intended to be the exclusive alternative to litigation under the Act). While the legislative history contains some indication that Congress did intend for § 2310 procedures to be the exclusive non-judicial forum available under the Act, 6 these indicia are not sufficiently illuminating that the legislative history can be deemed conclusive regarding congressional intent. Moreover, there are no subsequent congressional enactments addressing written warranties that clarify this issue. Under these circumstances, there is no basis for this court to conclude that Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Because I conclude that Congress has not directly spoken to the question we face today, I find it is necessary to reach the second prong of the Chevron inquiry — namely, whether the Commission's interpretation of § 2310 is based on a permissible construction of the statute.