Opinion ID: 2308051
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Materials at Issue in Plaintiffs' Cross-Appeal

Text: The district court agreed with the Government that the records related to the contents of destroyed videotapes of detainee interrogations and a photograph of high-value detainee Abu Zubaydah in CIA custody may be withheld from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3. Plaintiffs challenge the withholding of only those records relating to the CIA's use of waterboarding and the photograph. Exemption 3 permits the Government to withhold information from public disclosure provided that: (1) the information is specifically exempted from disclosure by statute; and (2) the exemption statute requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue or establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3); see Sims, 471 U.S. at 167-68, 105 S.Ct. 1881. Here, the Government contends that the records and photograph pertain to an intelligence method under section 102A(i)(1) of the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA) and CIA functions under section 6 of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949, which include the collection of intelligence through human sources, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-4a(d). [10] Plaintiffs do not dispute that these statutes qualify as exemption statutes under Exemption 3. See Larson, 565 F.3d at 865; Baker v. CIA, 580 F.2d 664, 667 (D.C.Cir.1978). Thus, our only remaining inquiry is whether the withheld material relates to an intelligence method or functions of the CIA. Larson, 565 F.3d at 865; Phillippi v. CIA, 546 F.2d 1009, 1015 n. 14 (D.C.Cir.1976). [11]
Plaintiffs contend that the records regarding the use of waterboarding in particular instances do not relate to an intelligence method because the President has declared the practice of waterboarding illegal. Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in CIA v. Sims , Plaintiffs argue that the CIA may decline to disclose only records relating to those intelligence methods that fall within the CIA's charter. Plaintiffs argue that because an illegal activity cannot be said to fall within the Agency's mandate to conduct foreign intelligence, Sims, 471 U.S. at 169, 105 S.Ct. 1881, waterboarding cannot be an intelligence method within the meaning of the CIA's withholding authorities. [12] We do not agree. Sims offers no support for Plaintiffs' proposed limitation upon the CIA's ability to protect information relating to intelligence methods. On the contrary, the Sims Court emphasized that the NSA vested in the Director of Central Intelligence very broad authority to protect all sources of intelligence information from disclosure, and that judicial narrowing of this authority not only contravenes the express intention of Congress, but also overlooks the practical necessities of modern intelligence gatheringthe very reason Congress entrusted this Agency with sweeping power to protect its `intelligence sources and methods.' Sims, 471 U.S. at 168-69, 105 S.Ct. 1881. According to the Court, the plain meaning of intelligence sources and methods in this context, may not be squared with any limiting definition that goes beyond the requirement that the information fall within the Agency's mandate to conduct foreign intelligence. Id. at 169, 105 S.Ct. 1881. [13] Here, Plaintiffs argue that the provision of the NSA requiring the Director of National Intelligence to ensure compliance with the Constitution and laws of the United States, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(f)(4), delimits the Director's obligation under section 102A(i)(1) to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure, see 50 U.S.C. § 403-1(i)(1), and the concomitant rights under FOIA to decline to disclose. The statutory language does not, however, draw any such limitation, and to do so by judicial device would flout Sims's clear directive against constricting the CIA's broad authority in this domain. Again, Sims expressly rejected any limitation on the CIA's duty to protect information beyond the requirement that the information fall within the Agency's mandate to conduct foreign intelligence. Sims, 471 U.S. at 169, 105 S.Ct. 1881. Plaintiffs' argument lacks support in either the statute's text or in the case law interpreting that text. Moreover, we are wary of the practical difficulties that would likely arise were the category of protectable intelligence methods circumscribed as Plaintiffs propose. In FOIA actions in which the government seeks to withhold information related to an intelligence method, an information officer and then the court would potentially be forced to engage in a complex inquiry to determine whether the government has sufficiently demonstrated the legality of the method to justify withholding. In this respect, we question how the court and the agency would handle varying assessments of legality. What becomes of information concerning a method that the President, on advice of counsel, considers legal, but which is later declared unlawful by a federal court or by a subsequent administration? Relatedly, is the legality of a method to be determined as of the time of the method's use or may a forward-looking proscription also apply retroactively to prevent reliance on an exemption? The matter currently before us helps illustrate the point. Even if we assumed that a President can render an intelligence method illegal through the mere issuance of public statements, or, more formally, through adoption of an executive order, and if we further assumed that President Obama's Executive Order coupled with his statements describing waterboarding as torture were sufficient in this regard, we would be left with the difficult task of determining what retroactive effect, if any, to assign that designation. In our view, such an illegality inquiry is clearly beyond the scope and purpose of FOIA. See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 77. Finally, we also note that prior courts faced with similar questions have declined to address the legality of an intelligence method as part of a FOIA analysis. In ACLU v. U.S. Department of Defense, the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the very argument raised by Plaintiffs here: that an interrogation technique formerly authorized for use on high-value detainees is no longer a protectable intelligence method for FOIA purposes if the President bans its future use. See 628 F.3d at 622. After noting that Sims says nothing suggesting that the change in the specific techniques of intelligence gathering by the CIA renders unprotected sources and methods previously used, the court held that the President's prohibition of the future use of certain interrogation techniques. . . does not diminish the government's otherwise valid authority to. . . withhold [information] from disclosure under exemptions 1 and 3. Id. In Wilner v. NSA , our Court considered whether the government could refuse to confirm or deny the existence of records obtained under the since-discontinued Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP). 592 F.3d at 64-65. The plaintiffs in Wilner claimed that the government had illegally obtained information about them through the TSP. They argued that the NSA improperly refused to disclose this information because any such records would have been obtained in violation of the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 77. In concluding that the government properly withheld the information at issue under FOIA Exemption 3, we declined to reach the legality of the underlying Terrorist Surveillance Program, reasoning that this question was beyond the scope of the plaintiffs' FOIA action. Id. at 77. We recognize that the plaintiffs in Wilner did not make the precise argument advanced here: that the statutory meaning of intelligence methods precludes the government from employing that label for a technique that the President has declared to be unlawful and thus outside the CIA's charter. But in our view, Wilner's principle is equally applicable herea judicial determination of the legality of waterboarding is beyond the scope of this FOIA action. For the foregoing reasons, we reject Plaintiffs' argument that the Government could not withhold information relating to waterboarding on the grounds that waterboarding is now illegal and therefore beyond the CIA's mandate. According substantial weight to the CIA's declarations, see Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374, we have no difficulty in concluding that the records in question, which we have reviewed in camera, relate to an intelligence method within the meaning of the NSA, and, accordingly, may be withheld. The parties agree that waterboarding was an interrogation method used by the CIA in connection with its foreign intelligence-gathering activities. Because the CIA's declarations are not contradicted by the record or undermined by any allegations of bad faith, [14] the Government has sustained its burden of proving that the records relating to the CIA's use of waterboarding are exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3. See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 73, 76-77.
Plaintiffs contend that the CIA failed to provide any justification for withholding a photograph of Abu Zubaydah taken while he was in CIA custody abroad and that the post hoc explanations offered by the Government's counsel do not suffice to justify the withholding. We disagree. In a June 8, 2009 unclassified declaration, Director Panetta explained that all of the records he reviewed in connection with his invocation of FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, including the photograph, are related to the contents of 92 destroyed videotapes of detainee interrogations that occurred between April and December 2002. Panetta Decl. ¶ 3, June 8, 2009. Director Panetta further declared that miscellaneous documents in the sample records, including the photograph, contain[] TOP SECRET operational information concerning the interrogations of Abu Zubaydah. Id. ¶ 5. On appeal, the Government has expanded upon Director Panetta's justification for withholding by explaining that the photograph necessarily relates to an intelligence source or method because it records Abu Zubaydah's condition in the period during which he was interrogated. We have reviewed the photograph in camera. Our examination has been informed by our contemporaneous review of other sample records. Like the district court, we observe that a photograph depicting a person in CIA custody discloses far more information than the person's identity. We agree with the district court that the image at issue here conveys an aspect of information that is important to intelligence gathering, J.A. 1115, and that this information necessarily relates to an intelligence source or method. The Government's justification for withholding the photograph is thus both logical and plausible. See Wilner, 592 F.3d at 75. Moreover, Director Panetta's declaration is entitled to substantial weight, see Wolf, 473 F.3d at 374, and this Court must adopt a deferential posture in FOIA cases regarding the uniquely executive purview of national security, Wilner, 592 F.3d at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's conclusion that the Government has adequately justified its withholding of the photograph under FOIA Exemption 3.