Opinion ID: 778660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exclusion of Potentially Mitigating Evidence

Text: 86 Vialva contends that the district court impermissibly prevented him from introducing relevant mitigating testimony about a childhood incident of racial discrimination. Vialva's mother, Lisa Brown, testified extensively regarding her personal background and Vialva's childhood experiences. Ms. Brown described her sheltered childhood, her troubled and often abusive relationships with men and her difficult pregnancy with Vialva. She also discussed Vialva's childhood illnesses, his attention deficit disorder and Vialva's difficult familial relationships with his Mother's partners. Ms. Brown also testified about Vialva's struggle with his racial identity resulting from his having one black and one white parent and various conflicts Vialva faced due to his mixed racial background. 87 Vialva now challenges the district court's rulings in the following exchange, which occurred after the testimony described above: 88 Q: Is [Vialva] getting into fights? 89 A: Yes. 90 Q: And are those fights, you believe, the result of his mixed racial background? 91 A: Yes. There were kids that called him zebra. 92 MR. FRAZIER: I'm going to object to that, Your Honor. This witness wouldn't have — 93 THE COURT: It's speculation. Sustain the objection. 94 R.V.24 at 2949-50. 95 Vialva contends that the district court violated his constitutional right to introduce relevant mitigating testimony by excluding Ms. Brown's testimony regarding this single incident of childhood racial harassment. Vialva relies on Skipper v. South Carolina, 18 and related authority, arguing that the district court erred by precluding the sentencing jury from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 3, 106 S.Ct. 1669. Vialva also asserts that the district court violated the FDPA by excluding Ms. Brown's testimony on the basis of speculation, because the FDPA provides that the rules of evidence cannot be used to exclude relevant mitigating information. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). 96 The district court's exclusion of Ms. Brown's speculative statements, even if error, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. As explained above, the district court allowed Ms. Brown to testify at length about the racial tension in Vialva's life. Additionally, the district court admitted expert testimony regarding the effect of racial harassment on Appellant. 19 In closing argument, Vialva's counsel, relying on the evidence of racial harassment, argued that Vialva's childhood racial experiences mitigated his moral culpability for his crime. The jury was not, therefore, precluded from considering racial discrimination and harassment as a potential mitigating factor in Vialva's background. In light of substantial evidence in the record regarding Vialva's racial background, any arguable error in the exclusion of one instance of childhood harassment was harmless. See Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 398-99, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987) (exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence invalidates death sentence unless such exclusion was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).