Opinion ID: 2072936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motions to dismiss or quash informations

Text: VI. The above holding requires us to consider trial court's action in sustaining the identical Motion to Dismiss or Quash Informations filed in each of the three criminal cases. This issue arose in the following manner. William B. Ridout, Emmet County Attorney, signed an Application for Order Appointing Special Assistant County Attorney. This application alleged the county attorney represented the potential defendant and members of his immediate family in certain civil matters, because of this representation a conflict of interest might exist in this prosecution, and requested the court to appoint William F. Raisch, assistant attorney general, to serve as special assistant county attorney without compensation pursuant to § 336.3, The Code. An order appointing Raisch to serve as special assistant Emmet County Attorney for the purposes of filing informations, prosecuting and representing the county of Emmet and State of Iowa in the above captioned matter was entered by District Judge Underwood on April 22, 1975. These instruments were on file April 28, 1975. The ground of the motion to dismiss or quash which the magistrate adopted was that the district court had no power to make the appointment because the application did not show that both the Emmet County Attorney and his assistant were under a `disability' within the purview of that provision [§ 336.3, The Code]. Section 336.3, The Code, relevantly provides: In case of absence, sickness, or disability of the county attorney and his deputies, the court before whom it is his duty to appear, and in which there may be business requiring his attention, may appoint an attorney to act as county attorney, by order to be entered upon the records of the court    and, while acting under said appointment, he shall have all the authority and be subject to all the responsibilities herein conferred upon county attorneys. Through some means not based on offered proof in this record, the magistrate found that at all times relevant to these proceedings, William J. Sanderson was a duly qualified and acting assistant county attorney for Emmet County. Through the same or another undisclosed source the magistrate determined Ridout's representation of defendant concerned matters unrelated to the prosecution. Assuming the magistrate in these circumstances had the power to reverse Judge Underwood's order, see State v. Richards, 229 N.W.2d 229, 233 (Iowa 1975), he should do so on the basis of competent record evidence so his decision might in turn be reviewed. We next examine the motion before the magistrate. A motion to dismiss an information is unknown to our criminal procedure. State v. Ramos, 260 Iowa 590, 597, 149 N.W.2d 862, 866 (1967). Where the grounds urged are such fatal infirmities as are ordinarily raised by a demurrer, such motions have been considered as such. State v. Herkleman, 251 N.W.2d 214, 215 (Iowa 1977); State v. White, 234 N.W.2d 146, 147 (Iowa 1975); State v. Berenger, 161 N.W.2d 798, 800 (Iowa 1968). But here the essence of defendant's motion to dismiss or quash informations is that the informations were not signed by a county attorney, § 769.3, or a properly appointed assistant county attorney, § 769.15. Such an issue must be raised by a motion to set aside the information. Section 769.17(1), The Code. In an analogous situation we held in State v. Girdler, 251 Iowa 1214, 1217-1218, 102 N.W.2d 872, 875 (1960): Two ready answers appear to the argument that the amended information was void because it was not approved and signed by the trial court. First, the question was not raised by a motion to set aside the information as required by Code Section 769.16 [now § 769.17], paragraph 5, I.C.A. A demurrer was filed, but it does not raise the point, nor was it the proper procedure in any event. Confronted by the proper motion under the proper statute, the magistrate could have set a time within which to correct any defect found. Section 769.18, The Code; see State v. Girdler, supra, 251 Iowa at 1217, 102 N.W.2d at 874-875 ([W]e perceive no reason why, if he may file the information in the first instance, he may not, with the permission of the court, amend it either as to matters of substance or of form); cf. State v. Fisher, 172 Iowa 462, 465-466, 154 N.W. 587, 589 (1915). In any event, it is obvious Judge Underwood properly exercised his discretion in appointing a special assistant county attorney. The county attorney had pending legal matters involving defendant and members of his immediate family. They were his clients. He had a right to disqualify himself, and, assuming existence of an assistant appointed by him, § 341.1, The Code, that assistant could properly be considered under the same disability. While we have held an interest in a civil action involving the same matter disqualifies, State v. Kittelson, 164 N.W.2d 157, 167 (Iowa 1969), this does not mean other relationships will not provide sufficient ground for appointment of a replacement. We have noted Prosecuting attorneys ought always    be above suspicion. State v. Orozco, 202 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Iowa 1972). An attorney-client relationship is significant enough to serve as a challenge for cause in jury selection. Rule 187(f), Rules of Civil Procedure. Here the county attorney was confronted with the prospect of prosecuting a client whom he was representing, or directing the assistant he appointed to prosecute the client. However well these cases were prosecuted, verdicts of not guilty may have been viewed in the community with suspicion, and a consequent disillusionment regarding the criminal justice system. The county attorney was under the duty to strive to avoid not only professional impropriety but also the appearance of impropriety. Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers, EC 9.6. He was surely cognizant of other provisions of that Code, including DR 5-105 relating to the refusal to accept employment if the interests of another client may impair professional judgment, and DR 5-105(D) which relates to the ethical ban against a partner or associate accepting such employment. While these ethical considerations and disciplinary rules may not be directly on point, they are so relevant the county attorney, examining his own conscience and the considerations involved, was justified in making application for appointment of a special assistant county attorney. Finally, appointment of a special assistant county attorney here, even if deemed not precisely within statutory requirements, was fully justified under the well-recognized inherent power of the court to take such action. The following cases recognize the inherent power of the court, independent of statute, to appoint a special assistant or prosecuting attorney when the regular prosecutor is disqualified. State v. Olson, 249 Iowa 536, 543-544, 86 N.W.2d 214, 219 (1957); State v. Lilteich, 195 Iowa 1353, 1355, 191 N.W. 76, 77 (1922); State v. Tyler, 122 Iowa 125, 127-130, 97 N.W. 983, 984-985 (1904). The magistrate overlooked these applicable principles in holding Judge Underwood's order violated § 336.3 and was entered without authority. We reverse and remand for further proceedings in conformance with this opinion. REVERSED AND REMANDED.