Opinion ID: 1197060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Plaintiffs' Expenses and Attorney Fees

Text: {26} Finally, Plaintiffs request attorney fees. Generally, absent statutory or other authority, each party is responsible for their own attorney fees. See Montoya v. Villa Linda Mall, Ltd., 110 N.M. 128, 129, 793 P.2d 258, 259 (1990) (New Mexico adheres to the so-called American rule that, absent statutory or other authority, litigants are responsible for their own attorney's fees.); Martinez v. Martinez, 101 N.M. 88, 93, 678 P.2d 1163, 1168 (1984) (stating that the rule for the award of attorney fees is that each party to litigation must pay his [or her] own counsel fees); Norton v. Board of Educ., 89 N.M. 470, 472, 553 P.2d 1277, 1279 (1976) (denying attorneys fees in a claim challenging constitutionality of fee collection for public school students). {27} Plaintiffs request this Court to award them discovery sanctions, relying on Rule 1-037 NMRA 1999 (failure to make discovery, allowing reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees), because Plaintiffs' counsel and paralegal volunteers invested a large amount of time in discovery attempting to make sense of the City's raw data on juvenile crime and victimization, struggling with the numerous errors in the data which the City could not explain. The City contends that discovery rules compelled it to provide the requested data, but did not require the City to expend additional time and money analyzing, compiling and creating new statistical reports solely for the benefit of the recipient. We agree with the City. We review whether the district court erred in denying attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. See Gardner v. Gholson (In re Estate of Gardner), 114 N.M. 793, 845 P.2d 1247, 1258 (Ct.App.1992). We conclude that the district court's decision was not contrary to logic and reason, and thus was not an abuse of discretion. See New Mexico Right to Choose/NARAL v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, ¶ 6, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450. {28} Plaintiffs' second claim is based on the City's alleged bad faith. Plaintiffs argue that the City's reliance on Qutb was in bad faith because the curfew at issue in Qutb was based upon persuasive statistical evidence supporting their curfew and the City knew it lacked a statistical basis for a night-time juvenile curfew. According to Plaintiffs, the City made the Curfew permanent even though the Chief of Police advised that he could not show a statistical correlation between the Curfew and juvenile crime. The City then allegedly implemented the Curfew through the STOP program without statutory or constitutional requirements. Again, we are unpersuaded. The bad-faith exception applies to conduct which occurs before the court or in direct defiance of the court's authority. State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway and Transp. Dep't v. Baca, 120 N.M. 1, 6, 896 P.2d 1148, 1153 (1995). Because these allegations did not concern conduct before the court or in defiance of the court's authority, this argument is inapplicable. Id. at 7, 896 P.2d at 1155 (noting that a court cannot award attorneys fees as a sanction for pre-litigation conduct, conduct that gave rise to the underlying cause of action). {29} Plaintiffs request this Court to recognize the private attorneys general doctrine, which permits an award of expenses and attorneys fees in cases where private enforcement has become necessary and the magnitude of the resulting burden is therefore borne by private litigants whose efforts vindicate important public policies. Similarly, Plaintiffs request this Court to recognize the substantial benefit doctrine, based on the principle that where a successful suit confers a substantial benefit on the members of an ascertainable class, the costs of the litigation should be borne proportionately by all those benefitted. Plaintiffs' argument is unsupported by New Mexico law. See Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, ¶¶28-32, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450, (rejecting similar arguments, and concluding that application of the private attorney general doctrine would require the Court to look beyond the proceedings before it to determine which rights are of more societal importance than others, which classes of litigants have protected such rights, and which classes of people have benefitted from such protection). We decline Plaintiffs' invitation in this case to expand the award of attorney fees.