Opinion ID: 795705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Transfer of the Converted Petition

Text: 40 In short, § 1252(b)(2) is a venue provision, not a jurisdictional one. We therefore are not compelled to dismiss or transfer the petition, and in the circumstances here presented, we decline to do so. Moreno-Bravo, having been in the custody of the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement since March 2001, has also waited over three and a half years for a federal court to adjudicate his claims. The district court, indeed, has already provided him with one round of judicial review in a thorough opinion, albeit one that has been rendered a nullity by REAL ID. See Duvall, 436 F.3d at 386. Moreover, like the virtually identical cases in the Third and Fifth Circuits, Moreno-Bravo's appeal already has been thoroughly briefed and argued before this Court, see Jama, 431 F.3d at 233; Bonhometre, 414 F.3d at 446 n. 5, not once but twice, pursuant to our order for supplemental briefing and appointed counsel. In these rather unique circumstances, dealing as we do with one of a handful of habeas petitioners whose cases the passage of the REAL ID Act left in procedural limbo, Amunikoro, 432 F.3d at 385, we agree with our sister circuits that have considered this precise issue that it would be a manifest injustice to now transfer this case to another court for duplicative proceedings, Jama, 431 F.3d at 233. 41 In making this determination, we also are informed by the analogous scenario in which a court of appeals is faced with the decision whether to transfer a case for want of jurisdiction pursuant to its authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1631. In certain circumstances, § 1631 requires transfer of such a case unless it [i]s not in the interest of justice to do so. Paul, 348 F.3d at 46. However, even when a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the merits of the appeal, the court may, in the interest of justice, 28 U.S.C. § 1631, decide not to transfer if it concludes that the case is a sure loser on the merits. [W]hether or not the suit has any possible merit bears significantly on whether the court should transfer, and if it does not, the court should not waste the time of another court by transferring it. Phillips, 173 F.3d at 610-11; see, e.g., Adeleke v. United States, 355 F.3d 144, 152 (2d Cir. 2004). The case sub judice, of course, does not involve § 1631 because we do in fact have jurisdiction to consider the merits, being concerned only with venue and convenience. But the utter meritlessness of Moreno-Bravo's claims, discussed infra, and therefore the futility of permitting him another round of review in the Fifth Circuit, certainly bears on our decision to deny transfer. 42 We express no opinion, however, on whether the course we have chosen in this case would be appropriate in a different context — for instance a petition for review brought in the first instance under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and not complicated by the transitional rules of REAL ID. In this regard we only observe that there may well be circumstances in which a court should not permit asylum applicants to waive or forfeit venue objections, and that a court may raise them sua sponte. See, e.g., Stich v. Rehnquist, 982 F.2d 88, 89 (2d Cir.1992) (per curiam); cf. Jama, 431 F.3d at 233 (declining to raise sua sponte issue concerning defective venue under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)). And, of course our opinion is inapplicable to the quite different situation where a petition for review is incorrectly filed in the district court. But, with respect to cases like Moreno-Bravo's, we are in somewhat unchartered waters, as we, unaided by express instructions from Congress or the REAL ID Act, attempt to impose order on these sui generis appeals. III Merits 43 Often for a court, determining the scope of its own powers — with regard to jurisdiction or venue, for instance — proves a more complex task than determining the rights of the parties before it. That is true here, as Moreno-Bravo's substantive arguments for relief are utterly without merit and may be quickly disposed of. 44 In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court held that relief of the sort Moreno-Bravo seeks — discretionary relief pursuant to the now-repealed § 212(c) of the INA (formerly codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1994)) — remains available for aliens . . . whose convictions were obtained through plea agreements and who, notwithstanding those convictions, would have been eligible for § 212(c) relief at the time of their plea under the law then in effect.  533 U.S. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271 (emphasis added). Appellant declares that under the law in effect on December 11, 1996 (the date of his plea agreement), his conviction for second-degree robbery did not constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of INA § 212(c) — ergo, he remains eligible for § 212(c) relief. 45 Such premise is demonstrably wrong. Under the law in effect on December 11, 1996, his crime of second-degree robbery did constitute an aggravated felony for purposes of the INA. On September 30, 1996, nearly three months prior to plaintiff's plea agreement, Congress amended the INA's definition of aggravated felony to include crimes of violence and theft, like Moreno-Bravo's, for which the imprisonment term was at least one year. See IIRIRA § 321(a)(3), 110 Stat. at 3009-627 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F)-(G)). Moreover, the new definition applied regardless of when the conviction was entered, and to any administrative action taken on or after September 30, 1996 (Moreno-Bravo's removal proceedings were initiated in February 2001). Id. § 321(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-628 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(U) (Supp. II 1996)) (Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any effective date), the term [`aggravated felony'] applies regardless of whether the conviction was entered before, on, or after [September 30, 1996].); id. at § 321(c) (amendments to aggravated felony definition apply to actions taken on or after [September 30, 1996], regardless of when the conviction occurred); see Brown v. Ashcroft, 360 F.3d 346, 353-54 (2d Cir. 2004); Kuhali, 266 F.3d at 110-11; see also Guaylupo-Moya, 423 F.3d at 131; Gelman v. Ashcroft, 372 F.3d 495, 499 (2d Cir.2004); Gousse v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 91, 99 (2d Cir.2003). Thus, even as of December 11, 1996, petitioner was deportable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). 46 He was not, however, eligible for § 212(c)'s discretionary relief — even under the law in effect at the time of his plea agreement. Several months prior to Moreno-Bravo's guilty plea, Congress enacted a separate law, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (effective April 24, 1996), which rendered an alien convicted of an aggravated felony — regardless of the length of imprisonment — ineligible for § 212(c) relief. See id. § 440(d), 110 Stat. at 1277; see also Khan v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 2003). Hence, when this petitioner entered into his plea agreement, he could not have had any reasonable reliance on the continued availability of § 212(c) relief under the holding of St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 324, 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271, because his conviction would already preclude him from such relief. 47 Consequently, for purposes of the INA, Moreno-Bravo's conviction qualifies as an aggravated felony for which he is removable pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (stating that an alien who is convicted of an aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable); see Gousse, 339 F.3d at 98, and his arguments to the contrary are without merit.