Opinion ID: 1226896
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Instructions on Defendant's Failure to Testify

Text: At defendant's request, the trial court instructed the jury, in accordance with the standard instruction set out in CALJIC No. 2.60 (4th ed. 1979 (1979 rev.)), that It is a constitutional right of a defendant in a criminal trial that he may not be compelled to testify. You must not draw any inference from the fact that he does not testify. Further, you must neither discuss this matter nor permit it to enter into your deliberations in any way. Immediately thereafter, also at defendant's request, the court told the panel, in conformity with CALJIC No. 2.61 (4th ed. 1979 (1979 rev.)), that In deciding whether or not to testify, the defendant may choose to rely on the state of the evidence and upon the failure, if any, of the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of the charge against him, and no lack of testimony on defendant's part will supply a failure of proof by the People so as to support a finding against him on any such essential element. (34) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury as it did. His attack is focused on the verb supply. He argues in substance that the sense demanded of supply by the applicable law is make up or compensate for; the word does not convey that meaning; and whatever sense, if any, it does in fact communicate renders the instructions in question improper or inadequate statements of the relevant law, and also gives rise to prejudice in itself and compounds prejudice arising elsewhere. The claim lacks merit. Defendant's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, a reasonable juror would in fact have understood the verb supply to mean make up or compensate for. We acknowledge that such a meaning appears to be obsolescent. (Compare Webster's New Internat. Dict. (2d ed. 1941) p. 2534 [listing [t]o make up or compensate for as one of the definitions of supply], with Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 2297 [not listing that definition in ipsissimis verbis ].) But it is plainly not obsolete. (See Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 2297.) More important, it is practically compelled by the context. In any event, we do not believe that a reasonable juror could have derived an improper or inadequate understanding of the pertinent law. Accordingly, we need not, and do not, consider the issue of prejudice. [11]