Opinion ID: 2226365
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bohnert v. Carrington Homes

Text: The Court of Appeals correctly overturned the award of summary disposition for Carrington. The liability of Carrington is governed by Funk, supra . Funk involved an elevated work area shared by many subcontractors and created an exception to the general rule that a general contractor is not liable for the injuries of a subcontractor's employee. We regard it to be a part of the business of a general contractor to assure that reasonable steps within its supervisory and coordinating authority are taken to guard against readily observable, avoidable dangers in common work areas which create a high degree of risk to a significant number of workmen. [ Id. at 104, 220 N.W.2d 641.] Thus, for there to be liability under Funk, there must be: 1) a general contractor with supervisory and coordinating authority over the job site, 2) a common work area shared by the employees of more than one subcontractor, and 3) a readily observable and avoidable danger in that common work area, 4) that creates a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers. Carrington seeks to avoid liability by arguing that it was not a general contractor with supervisory control over the work area. It claims merely to be one of many subcontractors hired by the homeowners. However, the president of Carrington stated in his deposition that Carrington was the general contractor. Furthermore, he admitted that he ordered the supplies Mr. Bohnert was delivering and normally supervised this type of delivery. Finally, Carrington took the position that it was the general contractor before the circuit court. Thus, considering these facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving plaintiff, there is a genuine question of material fact with regard to whether Carrington was the general contractor and had supervisory and coordinating control over the work place. Further, a question of fact exists regarding the presence of a common work area. In Erickson v. Pure Oil Corp., 72 Mich.App. 330, 249 N.W.2d 411 (1976), the Court of Appeals found that for a common work area to exist there must be an area where the employees of two or more subcontractors will eventually work. This holding was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeals in Phillips v. Mazda Motor Mfg., 204 Mich.App. 401, 408, 516 N.W.2d 502 (1994). Carrington argues that this rule unduly extends Funk, creating liability any time employees of different contractors will eventually work in the same location. The common work area, however, is only one element of Funk. The mere presence of a common work area, without supervisory control by the general contractor and a readily observable and avoidable risk to a significant number of workers, will not necessarily impose liability. Thus, Erickson was not an improper extension of Funk, but merely established the test for one of Funk 's four elements. However, there is a question of fact regarding whether employees of other subcontractors would be working in this area. The area in question appears to be the main driveway into the construction site. Mrs. Bohnert claims that this was used by all workmen on the project. Carrington simply asserts that Mr. Bohnert was the only person who worked in that area because he was the only person injured there. This dispute presents an unresolved factual question. Therefore, summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture. We also note that a factual question exists regarding the presence of a readily observable, avoidable risk to a significant number of workmen. Carrington argues that the line was in the plain view of Mr. Bohnert. Therefore, there is at least a question of fact with respect to whether it was observable to Carrington. The parties also dispute the feasibility of safety precautions that may have avoided any risk posed by the power line. Finally, there is a dispute about the number of employees exposed to any such risk. Mrs. Bohnert claims that most, if not all, the workers and their equipment passed along this driveway and directly beneath the power line. To support this claim, Mrs. Bohnert alleges that this driveway was the only feasible means of access to the construction site. Carrington asserts that this is not the case. Once again, this conflict demonstrates a question of fact that renders summary disposition inappropriate. It is consistent to impose a duty for this accident on Carrington, but not on Edison. Edison could not foresee the accident because it was not informed that Mr. Bohnert would be operating a crane-like delivery truck beneath its wires. However, if Carrington is shown to have had sufficient control of the job site, it may have been aware of the likelihood of this accident. Further, when the elements of Funk are satisfied, a general contractor is presumed to have been able to foresee that readily observable and avoidable risks will lead to accidents and injuries. Thus, this accident may have been foreseeable with respect to Carrington, but not to Edison. However, at this juncture there are material questions of fact with respect to each of the elements of Funk. Thus, summary disposition was not proper and the Court of Appeals decision reversing the judgment of the trial court is correct.