Opinion ID: 2637748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: alternative means and sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Both parties agree that: When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, the standard of review is whether, after review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the appellate court is convinced that a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Gutierrez, 285 Kan. 332, 336, 172 P.3d 18 (2007). Wright contends that the State's proof of rape by force or fear was insufficient because penetration and fear did not occur simultaneously. She does not challenge the adequacy of the State's proof on unconsciousness. Because, she asserts, one of the alternative means of committing rape was not proved, she is entitled to reversal under State v. Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 875 P.2d 242 (1994). Timley required sufficiency of evidence to support each alternative means upon which a jury is instructed, in order to protect a criminal defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict. The State, on the other hand, urges this court to affirm Dixon as an exception to the Timley rule and to hold that any gap in the State's proof was harmless error. Jury unanimity on guilt in a criminal case is statutorily required in Kansas. See K.S.A. 22-3421; Beier, Lurching Toward the Light: Alternative Means and Multiple Acts Law in Kansas, 44 Washburn L.J. 275, 277-79 (2005). This court has ruled that in an alternative means case [t]here must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime charged, but not as to the particular means by which the crime was committed. See State v. Stevens, 285 Kan. 307, 314, 172 P.3d 570 (2007). The court first addressed alternative means in State v. Wilson, 220 Kan. 341, 552 P.2d 931 (1976). In Wilson, the State argued at trial that defendant David Wilson committed first-degree murder either by `willful, deliberate and premeditated killing' [or by] `a killing in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate a robbery.' Wilson, 220 Kan. at 344, 552 P.2d 931. The district court instructed the jury on both theories, and the jury convicted Wilson of first-degree murder. Wilson, 220 Kan. at 342, 344, 552 P.2d 931. On appeal, Wilson argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury on both theories because: [I]t becomes impossible to determine which of the two theories the jury found was supported by the evidence.... [S]ome members of the jury may have found appellant guilty of a premeditated killing and others a felony murder, and ... this would not be a unanimous verdict as required by our law. Wilson, 220 Kan. at 344, 552 P.2d 931. This court, acknowledging that it faced a question of first impression, rejected Wilson's argument: When an accused is charged in one count of an information with both premeditated murder and felony murder it matters not whether some members of the jury arrive at a verdict of guilt based on proof of premeditation while others arrive at a verdict of guilty by reason of the killer's malignant purpose. In such case the verdict is unanimous and guilt of murder in the first degree has been satisfactorily established. If a verdict of [first-degree] murder can be justified on either of two interpretations of the evidence, premeditation or felony murder, the verdict cannot be impeached by showing that part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation of the evidence and part on another. (Emphasis added.) Wilson, 220 Kan. at 345, 552 P.2d 931. Although this holding from Wilson necessarily depended on the existence of sufficient evidence on each alternate theory, it is rarely cited for an alternative means rule. Instead, Timley, 255 Kan. 286, 875 P.2d 242, a 1994 case, became the lead precedent in alternative means law. In Timley, defendant Irvin Timley argued that the district court erred in instructing the jury that it could find him guilty if it found that [his] sexual act was perpetrated by use of force or fear. (Emphasis added.) Timley, 255 Kan. at 288, 875 P.2d 242. Timley contended that because some jurors could have found him guilty by force and others by fear, unanimity of the verdict was in question. Timley, 255 Kan. at 288-89, 875 P.2d 242. The court ultimately rejected Timley's argument, stating: `In an alternative means case, where a single offense may be committed in more than one way, there must be jury unanimity as to guilt for the single crime charged. Unanimity is not required, however, as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative means. [Citations omitted.] In reviewing an alternative means case, the court must determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found each means of committing the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations omitted.]' Timley, 255 Kan. at 289, 875 P.2d 242. The court then held that there was sufficient evidence to convict Timley of rape and aggravated criminal sodomy either by force or by fear; thus [t]here was no error in including both alternative means in one instruction to the jury. Timley, 255 Kan. at 289-90, 875 P.2d 242. The indispensable component in the court's holding was super-sufficiency of evidence, i.e., proof adequate to persuade a rational factfinder of Timley's guilt on rape by fear and rape by force. See Beier, 44 Washburn L.J. at 283, 294, 296-99 (discussing super-sufficiency). If evidence had been lacking on either means alleged, Timley's rape conviction would have been reversed. Several alternative means cases followed, adopting the Timley analytical pattern. See State v. Morton, 277 Kan. 575, 580-81, 86 P.3d 535 (2004) (sufficient evidence existed to convict defendant of first-degree murder by premeditation or felony murder); State v. Hoge, 276 Kan. 801, 813, 80 P.3d 52 (2003) (court must follow Timley's test if determining jury unanimity in an alternative means case); State v. Beach, 275 Kan. 603, 623, 67 P.3d 121 (2003) ([u]nder the alternative means analysis, `unanimity is not required... as to the means by which the crime was committed so long as substantial evidence supports each alternative'); State v. Carr, 265 Kan. 608, 963 P.2d 421 (1998) (adopting Timley ), abrogated on other grounds State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 144 P.3d 647 (2006); State v. Kelly, 262 Kan. 755, 760-61, 942 P.2d 579 (1997) (same); see also State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 896 P.2d 1059 (1995) (defendant's reliance on Timley for the rule that substantial evidence must support each alternative means of committing the offense of aggravated kidnapping is correct). Dixon struck out in a different direction. In that case, the State charged defendant Wallace Dixon with two counts of burglary, one for each time he unlawfully entered an apartment. For each count, the district court instructed: To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: 1. That [Dixon] knowingly entered or remained in a building which is a dwelling; 2. That [Dixon] did so without authority; 3. That [Dixon] did so with the intent to commit a theft and/or aggravated arson, a felony, and/or criminal damage to property, a felony therein. Dixon, 279 Kan. at 601, 112 P.3d 883. Citing Timley, Dixon argued that substantial evidence did not exist to support the first charge; the State provided no evidence indicating he had the intent to commit aggravated arson the first time he entered the apartment. Dixon, 279 Kan. at 602, 112 P.3d 883. The majority of this court agreed. Dixon, 279 Kan. at 603-04, 112 P.3d 883; compare Dixon, 279 Kan. at 622, 112 P.3d 883 (Beier, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But it quoted from a significant portion of State v. Johnson, 27 Kan.App.2d 921, 923-26, 11 P.3d 67, rev. denied 270 Kan. 901 (2000), departing from Timley: `Despite the language of Timley, courts of appeal have attained a degree of confidence in jury verdicts of guilt in cases where there is overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction under one of the alternative means. Those courts have concluded that it was harmless error in such cases for the trial court to instruct on all alternatives. `Our Supreme Court dealt with such a scenario in State v. Grissom, 251 Kan. 851, 840 P.2d 1142 (1992). The Grissom court held that a general verdict of first-degree murder could be upheld if there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant of either first-degree premeditated murder or felony murder, and the State was not required to prove both. [Citation omitted.] ` Grissom adopted the view taken by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 59-60, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991), with the following: `Jurors are not generally equipped to determine whether a particular theory of conviction submitted to them is contrary to law-whether, for example, the action in question is protected by the Constitution, is time barred, or fails to come within the statutory definition of the crime. When, therefore, jurors have been left the option of relying upon a legally inadequate theory, there is no reason to think that their own intelligence and expertise will save them from that error. Quite the opposite is true, however, when they have been left the option of relying upon a factually inadequate theory, since jurors are well equipped to analyze the evidence [citation omitted]....' `[I]f the evidence is insufficient to support an alternative legal theory of liability, it would generally be preferable for the court to give an instruction removing that theory from the jury's consideration. The refusal to do so, however, does not provide an independent basis for reversing an otherwise valid conviction.' 251 Kan. at 892, 840 P.2d 1142. . . . . `... In a Griffin situation, one can reasonably assume the jury did not behave capriciously and convict on a theory in which there was no evidence, when there was strong evidence supporting another theory.' 27 Kan.App.2d at 7, 997 P.2d 737. Dixon, 279 Kan. at 605-06, 112 P.3d 883. The court then determined that there was strong evidence supporting at least one theory of each burglary and no evidence of at least one other theory and that the erroneous burglary instructions were harmless. Dixon, 279 Kan. at 606, 112 P.3d 883. The same day that Dixon was filed, this court handed down State v. Kesselring, 279 Kan. 671, 112 P.3d 175 (2005). Kesselring mentioned neither Dixon nor Timley but followed Timley's alternative means analysis. In Kesselring, defendant Michael W. Kesselring argued that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree murder under a theory of either premeditation or felony murder. Kesselring, 279 Kan. at 678, 112 P.3d 175. This court, quoting the alternative means test from Timley as outlined in State v. Hoge, 276 Kan. 801, 813, 80 P.3d 52 (2003), held that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of first-degree murder under either theory and that the prosecutor's argument consistent with the test was proper. Kesselring, 279 Kan. at 679-82, 112 P.3d 175. Since 2005, this court has acknowledged the tension between Timley and Dixon, but not resolved it. See State v. Cook, 286 Kan. 1098, 191 P.3d 294 (2008) (appearing to rely in part on Dixon ); compare Stevens, 285 Kan. at 316, 172 P.3d 570 (citing Kesselring for posing issue whether sufficient evidence supports both means of committing driving under the influence). This decision does so. Although Dixon has obvious pragmatic appeal, it simply cannot coexist with Timley peacefully, providing a benign route to harmless error.... [A] reversal mandated by Timley is a reversal for insufficient evidence. An insufficiency error cannot be harmless because it means the State failed to meet its burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a most basic guarantee of due process in criminal cases. [Citation omitted.] The Timley super-sufficiency condition evolved for a good reason. It evolved because we recognized that we were allowing uncertainty as to how the State persuaded each juror. We were comfortable with this uncertaintyat that particular level of generality in the jury's factfindingonly because we insisted on assurance that each juror's vote was supported by a means for which there was sufficient evidence. Without that assurance, we are back to where we were before Timley. We have no guarantee that the jury was unanimous at the level of factual generality that matters most of all: guilt v. innocence. Beier, Lurching Toward the Light: Alternative Means and Multiple Acts Law in Kansas, 44 Washburn L.J. 299. We are now persuaded that the Timley alternative means rule is the only choice to ensure a criminal defendant's statutory entitlement to jury unanimity. Any contrary language in Dixon is specifically disapproved. We now turn to application of the Timley rule to the facts of this case. Wright argues that the State's proof of the alternative means of force or fear was inadequate. As mentioned above, she insists that the initial vaginal penetration had to be contemporaneous with J.L.'s fear. K.S.A. 21-3502 provides: Rape is: ... [s]exual intercourse with a person who does not consent to the sexual intercourse, ... [w]hen the victim is overcome by force or fear. K.S.A. 21-3501(1) defines sexual intercourse as any penetration of the female sex organ by a finger,.... Any penetration, however slight, is sufficient to constitute sexual intercourse. Analyzing K.S.A. 21-3501(1) and K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A), this court in State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 412, 133 P.3d 14 (2006), determined that [K.S.A. 21-3502(a)(1)(A)] proscribes all nonconsensual sexual intercourse that is accomplished by force or fear, not just the initial penetration. Although the facts of this case can be distinguished from those in Bunyard the victim in Bunyard initially consented to the sexual intercourse but withdrew her consent after initial penetrationits holding has application here. Moreover, Bunyard recited that the majority of our sister states had agreed that rape could be accomplished at some point in time after initial penetration. See Bunyard, 281 Kan. at 411-13, 133 P.3d 14; see also State v. Baby, 404 Md. 220, 240, 946 A.2d 463 (2008) (crime includes post-penetration vaginal intercourse accomplished through force or threat of force and without the consent of the victim, even if the victim consented to the initial penetration). The evidence in this case was sufficient to find Wright guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of committing rape by force or fear. J.L. testified that she woke to the realization that Wright was digitally penetrating her vagina and was paralyzed with fear. Under Bunyard, it does not matter that the initial penetration by Wright may not have been temporally coincidental with J.L.'s fear; it is enough that the penetration and fear were eventually contemporaneous. There is no error under the Timley alternative means rule here, because the evidence of each means of committing rapeby force or fear or by unconsciousnesswas sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict on the rape charge.