Opinion ID: 1214616
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Compel Fingerprint Exemplar

Text: On the date of the theft, August 3, 1994, Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Kelly Pahio recovered several fingerprints from the stolen van. As previously stated, the fingerprint exemplar provided by Gabalis on the day of his arrest was smudged. Although the record is not clear on this point, it appears that HPD Sergeant Russell Crosson's conclusion that the fingerprint recovered from the left rear door of the van (Exhibit 6) matched Gabalis's fingerprints was arrived at by comparing Exhibit 6 with a fingerprint exemplar obtained in connection with Gabalis's July 1994 arrest on an unrelated charge. As previously stated, because the prosecution's fingerprint expert, Sergeant Crosson, was unable to utilize the smudged fingerprint exemplar, the prosecutor suggested that Sergeant Crosson compare the fingerprints recovered from the van with either (1) Gabalis's July 1994 fingerprint exemplar, or (2) a replacement exemplar. However, because Gabalis objected to Sergeant Crosson utilizing the July 1994 fingerprint exemplar as it would have alerted the jury to his prior bad acts, see Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) 404(b), the prosecution requested an order from the court requiring Gabalis to provide another fingerprint exemplar: MR. YAMADA: Your Honor, State would be asking that the Court allow the State to take an exemplar of the defendant, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. As I believed we discovered yesterday afternoon when Sergeant Crosson came in with the fingerprint cards, we discovered that the fingerprints that were taken of the defendant on August 4th when he was arrested for these matters has a problem in terms of allowing Sergeant Crosson or any expert, for that matter, to make some identification. Apparently, there's smudges on the one print that is the clearest from State's Exhibit 6, and so that was the basis upon which Sergeant Crosson used the July 1994 arrest fingerprints. And as I've said to counsel in our discussions, you can either agree to stipulate to use the July 1994 fingerprints, and the State will avoid mentioning any date of those fingerprints or you can have the defendant submit to taking another set of prints today. MR. HOLQUIN [Gabalis's attorney]: Okay. Your Honor, we would object to taking any more exemplars of the defendant's prints simply because the rule, Rule 16 allows for tests for purposes of identification to be taken by the prosecutor upon written request by the prosecutor and notice and time of the test to be taken, notice to the defense counsel. Over Gabalis's objection, the trial court ordered Gabalis to provide a new fingerprint exemplar. Later that day, Sergeant Crosson compared the fingerprint exemplar given at trial to Exhibit 6 and concluded that there was no doubt that Gabalis's fingerprints matched those recovered from the van. On appeal, Gabalis argues that the trial court's order requiring him to provide fingerprint exemplars during trial violated Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 16(c)(1). HRPP Rule 16(c)(1), a discovery rule, provides: Submission to Tests, Examinations or Inspections. Upon written request of the prosecutor, the court may require the defendant: (i) to perform reasonable acts or undergo reasonable tests for purposes of identification; and (ii) to submit to reasonable physical or medical inspection or examination of the defendant's body. Reasonable notice of the time and place for such tests, inspections or examinations shall be given by the prosecutor to the defendant and the defendant's counsel who shall have the right to be present. (Emphasis added). The procedure specified in HRPP Rule 16(c) is inapplicable to the present case because the prosecution's request for another exemplar cannot, under the circumstances of this case, properly be termed a request for discovery. Discovery is, [i]n a general sense, the ascertainment of that which was previously unknown; the disclosure of coming to light of what was previously hidden. Black's Law Dictionary, 466 (6th ed.1990). Here, the prosecution already had a set of Gabalis's fingerprints which could have, subject to certain limitations, been introduced into evidence at trial. The trial court's order compelling Gabalis to provide another exemplar was solely to accommodate Gabalis's concerns regarding the use of the 1994 exemplar. In this case, the July 1994 fingerprint exemplar formed the basis of Sergeant Crosson's conclusion that the fingerprints recovered from the stolen van matched Gabalis's fingerprints; the July 1994 exemplar, therefore, was foundational evidence for Sergeant Crosson's testimony. If, as the court proposed, all references to the date and circumstance under which the July 1994 exemplar was obtained were deleted, the court could have properly allowed Sergeant Crosson to utilize the July 1994 exemplar in his testimony. See, e.g., State v. Rodriguez, 37 Conn. App. 589, 658 A.2d 98, 112 (Under the principles of real or demonstrative evidence, authenticated fingerprints may be introduced into evidence and compared with other fingerprints found at or near the scene of a crime. The admission of a fingerprint record containing extraneous material which in itself is incompetent, however, may constitute reversible error depending on whether the evidence of past crimes has been masked or obliterated. Whenever a fingerprint card is introduced as evidence an implication of criminal history potentially arises, which, of course, should be dispelled[; therefore,] the better practice is to cover every questionable element of the card, including dates and other printed matter. (Quotation marks, ellipses, and citations omitted.)), cert. denied, 234 Conn. 916, 661 A.2d 987 (1995). The trial court's order compelling Gabalis to provide another exemplar was solely to accommodate Gabalis's concerns regarding alerting the jury to his prior bad acts. Gabalis further argues that, by ordering him to provide a fingerprint exemplar during trial, the trial judge became an advocate for the State and clearly became impartial [sic]. This contention is without merit. As previously stated, Gabalis objected to the use of the July 1994 exemplar because it would have alerted the jury to his prior bad acts. See HRE 404(b). Gabalis's objection, however, is unfounded in light of the trial judge's offer to redact from the July 1994 exemplar any reference to the circumstances under which it was obtained, including the date it was provided. We believe that the trial court's order compelling Gabalis to provide another fingerprint exemplar during trial was a reasonable accommodation of Gabalis's concerns rather than an indication of any bias against him. Finally, we discern no prejudice in the trial court's order requiring Gabalis to provide a fingerprint exemplar at trial; in particular, we do not believe that the trial court's order limited the effectiveness of Gabalis's cross-examination of Sergeant Crosson. Gabalis was notified prior to trial that Sergeant Crosson would testify, and Gabalis did not dispute the fact that his fingerprints matched the fingerprints that were recovered from the van, admitting that he once accepted a ride in the van from a friend. Gabalis' cross-examination of Crosson sought to establish that: (1) Sergeant Crosson could not establish when Gabalis left his fingerprint on the van; and (2) the police did not find any of Gabalis's fingerprints inside the van, that is, on the steering wheel or the driver's-side door. Thus, compelling Gabalis to provide another exemplar during trial did not damage the effectiveness of his cross-examination of Sergeant Crosson. Based on the foregoing discussion, we discern no error in the trial court's order compelling Gabalis to provide a fingerprint exemplar at trial.