Opinion ID: 1478878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Employees Engaged in the Production of Cushion and Riprap Rock for the Highway and Railroad

Text: The question is whether the employees engaged in the production at the quarries of the cushion and riprap rock for the new segments of railroad and highway were engaged in commerce. The test under the Act to determine whether an employee is engaged in commerce, is not whether the employee's activities affect or indirectly relate to interstate commerce but whether they are actually in or so closely related to the movement of the commerce as to be a part of it. [3] In Rucker v. First National Bank of Miami, Okl., 10 Cir., 138 F.2d 699, 704, we said: Whatever may have been the doubts and differences along the way, it now seems fairly plain that the phrase `engaged in commerce,' when used to measure coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act, encompasses only employment actually in the `movement of commerce,' or activities so closely related thereto as to be practically a part of it. In other words, `engaged in commerce' means engaged in the interstate transportation or movement of commerce. In construing the in commerce provision in the Act, the Supreme Court has drawn from its decisions construing an analogous provision of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51 et seq. In Overstreet v. North Shore Corporation, 318 U.S. 125, 131, 63 S.Ct. 494, 498, 87 L.Ed. 656, the court said: The Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act are not strictly analogous, but they are similar. Both are aimed at protecting commerce from injury through adjustment of the master-servant relationship, the one by liberalizing the common law rules pertaining to negligence and the other by eliminating substandard working conditions. And, in McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 495, 63 S.Ct. 1248, 87 L.Ed. 1538, the court said: Judicial determination of the reach of the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act `in commerce' must deal with doubtful instances. There is no single concept of interstate commerce which can be applied to every federal statute regulating commerce. See Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. [517], 520, 62 S.Ct. [1116], 86 L.Ed. 1638. However, the test of the Federal Employers' Liability Act that activities so closely related to interstate transportation as to be in practice and legal relation a part thereof are to be considered in that commerce, is applicable to employments `in commerce' under the Fair Labor Standards Act. See, also, Rucker v. First National Bank of Miami, Okl., 10 Cir., 138 F.2d p. 703. If the cushion and riprap rock had been used to repair or maintain an existing operating railroad, the question here presented would be more narrow. [4] However, such rock was used in the construction of new segments of railroad and highway to take the place of segments of an existing railroad and highway that would be inundated by the lake. At the time the labor was performed, neither new segment was being used as an instrumentality of commerce. In Pedersen v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 151, 152, 33 S.Ct. 648, 649, 57 L.Ed. 1125, the court held that an employee who was injured while carrying bolts to be used in repairing a railroad bridge, over which interstate trains passed, was engaged in interstate commerce within the meaning of the Federal Employers' Liability Act. It was pointed out that the tracks and bridges were indispensable to interstate commerce, and that the work of keeping such instrumentalities in a proper state of repair while thus used is so closely related to such commerce as to be in practice and in legal contemplation a part of it. But the court was careful to distinguish between existing instrumentalities of interstate commerce and construction which had not yet become such instrumentalities, saying: Of course, we are not here concerned with the construction of tracks, bridges, engines, or cars, which have not as yet become instrumentalities in such commerce, but only with the work of maintaining them in proper condition after they have become such instrumentalities and during their use as such. The Federal Employers' Liability Act does not apply to original or new construction. [5] In Bamberger Electric R. Co. v. Winslow, 10 Cir., 45 F.2d 499, 500, we said: Where an employe is engaged in work upon or directly in connection with an instrumentality which is being used in interstate commerce, such employe is employed in interstate commerce. On the other hand, where the instrumentality, upon which the employe is at work or in connection with which he is employed, has not yet been dedicated to use in interstate commerce, although it may be intended for use ultimately in such commerce, such work ordinarily is not so closely related to interstate commerce as to be practically a part of it. In New York Central R. R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 191, 192, 37 S.Ct. 247, 248, 61 L.Ed. 667, L.R.A.1917D, 1, Ann.Cas.1917D, 629, the court said: The admitted fact that the new station and tracks were designed for use, when finished, in interstate commerce, does not bring the case within the Federal act. The test is, `Was the employee at the time of the injury engaged in interstate transportation or in work so closely related to it as to be practically a part of it?' Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558, 36 S.Ct. 188, 60 L.Ed. 436, 438, L.R.A.1916C, 797. Decedent's work bore no direct relation to interstate transportation, and had to do solely with construction work, which is clearly distinguishable, as was pointed out in Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. R. Co., 229 U.S. 146, 152, 33 S.Ct. 648, 57 L.Ed. 1125, 1128, Ann.Cas.1914C, 153. And see Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. Co. v. Harrington, 241 U.S. 177, 180, 36 S.Ct. 517, 60 L.Ed. 941, 942; Raymond v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 43, 37 S.Ct. 268, 61 L.Ed. 583. Since the new construction had not yet become instrumentalities of interstate commerce at the time the labor was performed, it is my opinion that the activities of the employees who produced the rock were not actually in or so closely related to the movement of interstate commerce as to be a part of it. [6] Counsel for the Administrator filed a brief as amicus curiae, in which a new theory of the meaning of the words in commerce is advanced. They urge that under the holdings in the so-called Ice Cases, [7] the workmen producing the rock were engaged in the production of goods for commerce. It is my view that the doctrine of the Ice Cases has no application in the instant cases. The rock was not produced to supply the needs of interstate commerce, to serve as an essential part of such commerce, nor to aid or facilitate the carrying on of such commerce by essential instrumentalities or facilities of commerce. It was produced in order to construct new segments of railroad and highway that had not yet become instrumentalities in such commerce.