Opinion ID: 2615592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: White's Motion in Limine

Text: White filed a motion in limine, seeking permission to cross-examine Cabrera about his prior arrests and convictions for burglaries other than those in the instant case because such prior burglary arrests and convictions would rebut Cabrera's anticipated claim that he served merely as White's lookout. Furthermore, White reasoned that Cabrera's prior burglary charges were relevant to the issues of Cabrera's opportunity to commit the charged crimes, the identity of the perpetrator, and Cabrera's credibility. The trial court rejected White's arguments, reasoning that Cabrera's prior burglary arrests and convictions were irrelevant to the instant case. Moreover, the trial court also ruled that, Even if relevant[,] the prejudice outweighs any probative value. And the only exception is that if the witness has been convicted of a crime of dishonesty, then that evidence may be used to impeach [Cabrera]. Burglary is not a crime of dishonesty. White also requested the trial court to revisit the motion court's denial of his request for the subpoenaed HPD documents regarding Cabrera's criminal history. On the same day that the trial court heard arguments on his motion in limine, White filed a motion styled EX PARTE MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF RECONSIDERATION AND DEFENDANT[']S REQUEST FOR SUBPOENAED MATERIALS FROM [HPD] (February 2, 1998 memorandum). In relevant part, the February 2, 1998 memorandum urged: [The prosecution] and your honor have argued that modus operandi, proof of identity[,] and credibility of [Cabrera], whom the defense reasonably believes committed the crimes for which [White] has been charged are irrelevant, and has hence[,] tentatively ruled that the reports which may show proof of identity of the perpetrator of these crimes, without so much as a preliminary review of the reports. [Sic] [White] contends that this unduly restricts his right of cross-examination and therefore[,] his right to [c]onfrontation under the Sixth Amendment[,] and would be reviewed using the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard. State v. Liufa, [sic] 1 Haw.App. 625, 630, 623 P.2d 1271 (1981).... By not permitting the review of these records, the defense is precluded from making offers of proof at trial and[,] therefore[,] presenting the defense theory that the person who committed these burglaries was Cabrera, not White, and that White's only involvement is that he discovered the items were stolen and should be returned and that he was unable to return the items prior to his arrest, because he had no vehicle and the vehicle of his girlfriend was in need of repair. The trial court declined White's invitation to revisit the motions court's discovery ruling and concluded that the motions court's denial of White's request for documents was the law of the case.