Opinion ID: 2516950
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Elements of Inattention to Driving

Text: HRS § 291-12, Inattention to Driving, provides as follows: Whoever operates any vehicle without due care or in a manner as to cause a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may be, any person, vehicle or other property shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both. The ICA interpreted the offense to be composed of three parts: (1) operation of a vehicle, (2) without due care or in a manner as to cause, (3) a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may be, any person, vehicle or other property. As presented at oral argument, the statute is susceptible to another interpretation, in which the disjunctive or provides for two alternative means of proving the offense (the alternative means theory). [7] The ambiguity in the statutory text thus concerns whether the without due care requirement is tied to the collision/injury/damage requirement (the physical harm element) or stands alone as a sufficient basis for charging the crime. We are convinced, based on our reading of the statute in the context of the Hawai'i Penal Code, canons of statutory interpretation, and prior precedent, that the ICA's interpretation in the current case is a better construction of the statute. [8]

The alternative means theory creates problems of interpretation with regard to the first means by which the offense of inattention to driving could be committed-namely, to operate a vehicle without due care. It is a basic rule of statutory interpretation that [p]rovisions of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and reasonable interpretation . . . in order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results. State v. Bates, 84 Hawai'i 211, 220, 933 P.2d 48, 57 (1997). Under the first part of the alternative means theory, one may be prosecuted for slips in attention or other instances of inattentiveness while driving, such as momentarily taking one's eyes of the road, even when no harm results. Such possibilities show the potential for arguably absurd applications resulting from the alternative means interpretation. The alternative means theory also raises potential constitutional concerns. [W]here possible, we will read a penal statute in such a manner as to preserve its constitutionality. To accord a constitutional interpretation of a provision of broad or apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to focus the scope of the provision to a narrow and more restricted construction. Id. Interpreting the statute to apply to any driving that betokens, without more, a lack of due care raises potential problems of unconstitutional vagueness, by granting indeterminate discretion to arresting officers to apply the statute. This court has explained that [d]ue process of law requires that a penal statute state with reasonable clarity the act it proscribes and provide fixed standards for adjudicating guilt, or the statute is void for vagueness. Statutes must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what conduct is prohibited so that he or she may choose between lawful and unlawful conduct. Id. Vagueness is measured by the following standard: [A] criminal statute is void for vagueness unless it: 1) gives the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he or she may act accordingly, and 2) provides explicit standards for those who apply the statute, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and the delegation of basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis. Id. Because it fails to specify an explicit standard, the mere command that one not drive without due careregardless of any physical harm caused by such drivingraises potential problems of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. The potential of the alternative means theory to violate important penal and constitutional principles suggests that a more sensible interpretation would be preferred.
Past decisions also provide implicit disapproval of the alternative means theory in the context of inattention to driving. In State v. Mitchell , the ICA upheld a conviction for inattention to driving when the defendant's vehicle plowed into the rear of a car in front of it, which sustained rear-end damage. 94 Hawai'i 388, 401, 15 P.3d 314, 327 (App.2000). In explaining its opinion, the ICA stated that Mitchell contends, and we agree, that mere occurrence of an accident without more, is insufficient to sustain a conviction for inattention to driving. Admittedly, the record does not suffer from a plethora of evidence as to the physical circumstances of the accident. However, as detailed above, there is more in this record than the mere occurrence of an accident. Id. (citation omitted). By rejecting the possibility that a mere accident could lead to liability, the ICA also rejected, impliedly and sub silentio, the non-culpable alternative of the alternative means theory of the statute. [9] But see Momoki, 98 Hawai'i 188, 46 P.3d 1 (endorsing the alternative means theory, discussed supra note 7). Moreover, in all prior published decisions concerning HRS § 291-12, the physical harm element has been present, usually in the form of a collision. See State v. Reyes, 57 Haw. 533, 533, 560 P.2d 114, 115 (1977) (defendant, intending to make a left turn from a two-lane highway into a gravel road, moved the vehicle he was driving from the right to the left lane, where it was struck from behind by a vehicle which was overtaking a line of three cars); Mitchell, 94 Hawai'i 388, 15 P.3d 314 (rear-end collision); State v. Lee, 55 Haw. 505, 523 P.2d 315 (1974) (clarifying that the inattention to driving statute applies to activity on private roads and accordingly reversing trial court's dismissal of two cases; in both, the charge was that the defendant's vehicle had collided with another vehicle).
A better starting point is to analyze the elements of the inattention to driving offense according to the framework of the Hawai'i Penal Code. See HRS § 702-205 (Elements of an offense, include conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct). [10] HRS §§ 701-114(1) and 701-114(2) (1993) require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of [e]ach element of the offense, as well as [t]he state of mind required to establish each element of the offense. See also HRS § 702-204 ([A] person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense.  (Emphasis added.)). The inattention to driving statute, HRS § 291-12, is comprised, inter alia, of a conduct element and a result of conduct element. First, the statute includes a conduct element. The conduct element, itself composed of several parts, includes operation of a vehicle, [11] and the phrase without due care or in a manner. The statute concludes with a result element, as to cause a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may be, any person, vehicle or other property. . . . HRS § 291-12. Two aspects of the phrase without due care or in a manner, which modifies the type of driving punishable by the statute, should be noted. First, the phrase refers to the manner in which a vehicle is operated, or the nature of that operation. It thus describes conduct. In State v. Reyes , this court, apparently relying only on the without due care verbiage of the statute, read the phrase to suggest a state of mind requirement, and concluded that inattention to driving requires only a showing of negligence in the operation of [the] vehicle. . . . 57 Haw. 533, 534-35, 560 P.2d 114, 115-16 (1977). However, the Hawai'i Penal Code sets a higher standard for criminal negligence than the mere lack of due care. For example, HRS § 702-206(4)(a) (1993) specifies that [a] person acts negligently with respect to his conduct when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk taken that the person's conduct is of the specified nature. (Emphasis added.) HRS § 702-206(4)(d) makes clear that [a] risk is substantial and unjustifiable within the meaning of this subsection if the person's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a law-abiding person would observe in the same situation.  (Emphasis added.). [12] Gross deviation from a law-abiding person's standard of care denotes a higher level of culpability than a mere deviation from the due care standard. To the extent that the without due care designation fails to map the state of mind requirement described as negligently in the Hawai'i Penal Code, we believe that no state of mind is clearly specified by the statute. Therefore, the default states of mind of intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, would be required as to each element of the statute. See HRS § 702-204 (When the state of mind required to establish an element of an offense is not specified by the law, that element is established if, with respect thereto, a person acts intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.). Accordingly, we overrule Reyes on this point. The second important aspect of the phrase without due care or in a manner follows naturally from the above analysis, namely, that the phrase should be understood as a unitary expression of the type of driving punishable by the statute, rather than a construction establishing alternative means to prove the offense. Under this reading, the phrase in a manner as to cause is best understood as an extension of the without due care language, linking the conduct and result elements. In other words, both phrases describe the manner of operation of the vehiclewhich we have interpreted as requiring a mental state of at least recklessnessand link that manner to the result element of causing a collision, injury, or property damage. In this case, the term or is best read conjunctively. See HRS § 1-18 (1993); In re City & County of Honolulu Corp. Counsel, 54 Haw. 356, 374, 507 P.2d 169, 178 (1973) (We are of the opinion that the disjunctive `or' in the context as used in [the statute] actually imparts the meaning of the conjunctive `and'. The sense of a word which harmonizes best with the whole context of the statute and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature must be adopted.). Because under the Hawai`i Penal Code each of the two expressions, without due care and in a manner [as to cause], connote at least a reckless state of mind with respect to the conduct of operating a vehicle, interpreting them together best harmonizes the phrase with the statute as a whole. This interpretation avoids the problems outlined abovepotential absurdity and unconstitutional vaguenesswhile fulfilling the dictate that [p]rovisions of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and reasonable interpretation . . . in order to preserve its overall purpose, Bates, 84 Hawai'i at 220, 933 P.2d at 57. It also represents a sensible approach to a statute that is not a model of clarity, and is consistent with the manner in which the statute has been applied in our caselaw. Based on the foregoing, we hereby reject the alternative means theory of HRS § 291-12 expressed by the ICA in Momoki and require that the conduct and result elements all be proven, along with the requisite state of mind, to convict under the statute.
Therefore, in order to convict under HRS § 291-12, the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Bayly (1) operated a vehicle without due care or in a manner, (conduct) (2) as to cause a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may be, any person, vehicle or other property (result of conduct), HRS § 291-12, and that he did so (3) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, HRS § 702-204. [13] Bayly asserts that the ICA gravely erred in affirming his conviction of inattention to driving, because there was insufficient evidence to prove that Bayly operated a vehicle without due care or in a manner as to cause a collision with, or injury or damage to, as the case may be, any person, vehicle, or other property. Because Bayly does not dispute that he operated the truck on the night in question, we restrict our analysis to the evidence of any collision, injury, or damage caused by Bayly's driving.