Opinion ID: 2600609
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Hill's Guilty Plea

Text: Hill was charged with first degree murder for Kesha's death. Before defendant's trial, she pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. Her sentence was one year in jail (or alternatively, six months in jail and six months in a residential care facility with counseling), plus five years' probation.

In September, defendant and Hill had had a huge argument over defendant's desire to go back to his former girlfriend, Brandi Blackburn. His relationship with Hill was up in the air in the week or two before Kesha's death. In the week before Kesha's death, defendant did not stay at the apartment at night. He would arrive at the apartment in the morning, take naps, and then come and go from there the rest of the day. The night before Kesha's death, defendant had been with Blackburn all evening. He arrived at his apartment about 8:40 a.m., crawled into a sleeping bag, and Kesha joined him. They slept until about 11:00 a.m. Around noon, Hill borrowed defendant's car to run errands with Kelly Salay, and was gone approximately two and a half to three and a half hours. During that time, defendant was with Kesha, who was fine except for having some diarrhea, for which defendant showered her without incident. Hill came back about 3:45 or 4:00 p.m. Defendant started boiling some water in a pot, and then went outside to check the oil in his car. While he was outside, he heard Kesha scream. He went back into the house and saw Kesha lying bent over in front of the refrigerator. Hill, who was standing about a foot away from Kesha, was holding a pot containing water, oil, and butter. He pushed the pot away, picked up Kesha, and turned and ran to the counter sink. But it was filled with clothes that Hill had been washing. He slipped and fell into the high chair, but he did not fall on or drop Kesha, nor did he squeeze her hard. He carried her to the shower and turned one of the knobs on, without looking to see whether it was the hot or cold water knob. He went back to the kitchen and asked Hill what had happened, but she just said she had to clean up the mess. He returned to the bathroom, turned the shower off, and began taking Kesha out of the shower. Hill then took Kesha, and said she would take care of her. Hill applied some Neosporin, said that it was not as bad as it looked, and that everything was fine. Hill dressed Kesha and asked defendant to go to the store to get juice and food for Kesha. Defendant first went to Salay's house, where he talked with Salay for about five minutes and then got into an argument with Salay's roommate's mother for about 30 to 45 minutes. Defendant then went to the store and bought the items. When he returned home, he found Kesha lying on a pillow, not crying or making any noise. He brought her the juice and she sat up and drank it. She fell asleep on his chest. He awoke when he felt her arm drop down by his side. Her body had gone limp. Hill attempted to revive Kesha by placing her in the kitchen sink. Defendant tried CPR and told Hill to call 911. Later, when the police arrived and asked defendant what had happened, he told them he had burned Kesha in the shower. Defendant denied ever having struck Kesha in a violent way the day she died. He occasionally swatted her on the hand or on the buttocks, but he mainly disciplined her by using his loud voice. Defendant acknowledged writing in the October 22, 1995 letter that he sent to Hill in jail that I wish I'd told you the truth and that we would have taken her in to be checked, she'd be alive and I believe telling you it was water and not butter you wouldn't think the burns were that bad. Defendant stated he wrote the letter to let Hill know that he was going to take the blame for Kesha's death. He stated that his earlier inconsistent statements, such as telling Salay and the people at the market that Kesha had been burned in the shower, were his attempt to take the blame for Kesha's burns. Defendant also took the blame by adopting the police investigator's suggestion that defendant had burned Kesha with the pan he used to fry the shrimp. He decided to take the blame because he knew that Hill could not physically or mentally handle being in prison, but he could. Defendant further stated he decided to take the blame because, at the time of Kesha's death, he thought it was an accident. He did not know anything about the abuse. Defendant decided to stop taking the blame after Hill showed no remorse, and he ended up in solitary confinement. Defendant denied ever kicking or punching S. or J., the children he had with Robertson. In December 1987, defendant was living with his sister-in-law and his niece Kayla, who was four months old. Defendant took Kayla to the emergency room for a broken leg, and said that it happened when 17-month-old J. grabbed Kayla while she was sitting on defendant's lap and she fell. Defendant was arrested for assault after he became furious with child protective services workers when they asked him questions at the hospital about Kayla's injury. A few months later, Kayla got some wood glue in her mouth, but defendant thought that there was no reason to go to the emergency room. Rather, he followed the directions on the back of the glue bottle and washed her mouth out with water. Defendant stipulated that in 1989 he was convicted of the felony of shooting at an inhabited dwelling.
Kenneth Long, a felon with convictions for assault with a deadly weapon and possession of methamphetamine, was a longtime friend of defendant's who testified for the defense about Hill's supervision of Kesha. On cross-examination, Long testified to a conversation he had with defendant, who phoned Long from prison after Kesha's death. Defendant told Long that Kesha had startled defendant by grabbing his leg while he was cooking with a skillet. He knocked the skillet off the stove, which fell on Kesha and burned her with oil. He picked her up and ran towards the shower, stumbled over the high chair, and fell on her.
Pathologist Dr. Sharon Van Meter reviewed the autopsy report, photographs, and other medical records. She believed the burns were caused by a quite hot liquid, which possibly might have been slightly thicker than water, but she could not unequivocally rule out water. Based on the appearance of the burns, she could not reach a conclusion whether the burns were caused accidentally or intentionally. She believed the burns were caused by one spattering or splashing event, although she could not unequivocally rule out multiple events. Dr. Van Meter agreed that Kesha had been abused. She believed that Kesha's internal injuries were blunt-force types of injuries, but she could not form an opinion as to what specific object caused them.
The defense presented several witnesses who testified they had never seen defendant strike Kesha, or any other child, in their presence:
Jo Ann Goularte got to know defendant well in late 1994 or early 1995, when he and his second wife, Jennifer, then pregnant, moved into a cabin on the Goularte property, after he got out of prison. Defendant took care of the newborn baby, and his older children would visit him. She never saw him show anger or act violently towards any of the children.
Tamara Green allowed defendant, Hill, and Kesha to stay at her house for a few weeks in April 1995, while defendant was waiting for an apartment to become available. Green described defendant's interaction with Kesha as fatherly and very loving. She thought his expectations for Kesha were too high for a child of that age, but she never saw him spank her or be violent to her. After defendant and Hill moved to a nearby apartment, Green and her two daughters, Holly, age 11, and Jennifer, age 10, continued to socialize with them. Holly could only recall one instance in which defendant hit Kesha, which was when she tried to eat bath oil and he smacked her on the hand. Jennifer never saw defendant hit or spank Kesha with any force. The only instance she could recall was when he lightly slapped Kesha's hand to stop her from playing with cigarettes.
Kenneth Long testified about Hill's supervision of Kesha. On one occasion, Kesha fell on her face and Hill ignored it. Another time, she appeared out of touch with reality because she started screaming at a garbage can for no apparent reason. Long's mother, Mary Paige, testified that Hill would sometimes space out, and that Hill was not aware or did not care that Kesha was crying. Marlene Cisneros hired Hill to babysit for her on several occasions, and Hill sometimes brought Kesha along. On one occasion in late September, Cisneros saw that Kesha looked very pale and had a fever. Cisneros asked Hill whether she wanted to take Kesha to the emergency room. Hill initially refused, saying that she was scared to do so because Kesha had bruises on her, but Hill finally agreed to have Cisneros drive them to the hospital.
According to Tamara Green, Kesha was sick most of the time that she saw her in 1995, and exhibited coughing, diarrhea, and vomiting. In late August or early September, Green became concerned because she saw a bruise or raised welt on Kesha's left thigh that was not healing. Kesha was clumsy when she lived at Green's house, and often fell down.
Judith Mooney testified concerning the credibility of prosecution witness D. Robertson. Mooney disputed Robertson's account of the incident underlying Robertson's misdemeanor conviction for negligently firing a firearm. Mooney testified that Robertson had in fact fired three times at Mooney and her children, after Mooney had gone to Robertson's house and Robertson had asked her to leave.

The prosecutor introduced evidence that defendant had abused his niece, Kayla, who, on December 13, 1987, when she was four months old, was taken to an emergency room for a broken leg. When police interviewed defendant about the injury, he stated he had been holding Kayla on his lap, when his 17-month-old son grabbed Kayla, causing her to fall onto an open drawer, and then the son fell on top of her. Emergency room physician Dr. Mark Shallit treated Kayla. In his opinion, Kayla's injury was the result of abuse because the femur was broken in a spiral fracture, which indicates a strong twisting force was applied. Dr. Shallit did not think that the injury could have been caused in the way defendant described. The Fresno Sheriff's Department placed a hold on Kayla because of concerns of possible child abuse. After being notified by the hospital, child protective services conducted an investigation, but its investigator, Robert Sandoval, concluded the injury was probably an accident. Dr Shallit believed the child protective services investigator was mistaken in his conclusion.
The prosecutor introduced evidence concerning the incidents that led to defendant's 1989 conviction for shooting at an inhabited dwelling (to which he had stipulated during the guilt phase). Willard Eugene Wages, who had known defendant all his life, testified that on May 10, 1989, about 8:30 p.m., he was sitting in his living room with his two young daughters, when someone shot at him through the back window of his house. A bullet, which police later recovered, struck the wall over the front door. In a separate incident, about 10:00 p.m. on the same evening, Joyce Bryce was contacted at work about a shooting at her home. Returning home, she discovered that her windows had been broken and that there were about 13 [or] 14 bullet holes in the walls of her house. In connection with the investigation, police obtained a warrant to search defendant's home, where they discovered a .45-caliber handgun and ammunition for the handgun and for an assault rifle. Defendant was arrested, and, after being told that police had recovered a .45-caliber projectile from the Wageses' residence, admitted he had shot at both residences. Four days later, he changed his story and stated that someone named Thompson committed the shooting at the Wageses' residence.

Psychologists Robert Halon and Robert Owen presented the following social history based on conversations with defendant and his relatives, and through a review of records. Defendant's mother, Yolanda, fled home at age 16 after being molested by her stepfather. She married 18-year-old Billy Joe Whisenhunt and had three children with him in rapid succession: Butch, Jack, and defendant. Billy Joe Whisenhunt beat her on a regular basis, including when she was pregnant with defendant. She eventually left him. Defendant was hyperactive as a child. His mother hated him because he looked just like his father, and she beat him frequently. She started telling him that he was exactly like his worthless, abusive, violent, explosive father. Defendant began to steal at age five and, by the time he was 12 years old, his mother was unable to handle him. She called his father, who at this point was living in Idaho, and told him to come get defendant before she killed him. His father took custody of defendant, who did not see his mother again until he was 17 or 18 years old. Defendant's two brothers stayed with their mother. Defendant's father moved around frequently, taking defendant to several states, including Idaho, Oregon, and Missouri. Defendant's father abused him, and, after about a year, when defendant was 13 years old, abandoned him to a social services agency in Missouri. This followed an incident in which defendant's father severely beat him after discovering that defendant had stolen two checks from a car dealership. Defendant became a ward of the court and was continually moved from one care facility to the next. Defendant was placed with several foster families, but eventually each sent him away or was unable to keep him. When defendant was 17 years old, the social services agency had run out of places to send him and petitioned the court to terminate its supervision of him. Defendant was given a bus ticket to California and sent out on his own. Dr. Halon testified that defendant had very few attachment patterns with other human beings during his childhood, and this was exacerbated in his teenage years because he was shuffled from one temporary home to another. Dr. Halon testified that, because defendant did not feel loved and did not have any strong social attachments, he did not develop a sense of morality. Dr. Halon was of the opinion that defendant viewed children who received love and affection from their parents as a threat because they got something he never could. Dr. Owen expressed similar conclusions in his testimony, and stressed the negative impact of the rejection and abandonment by defendant's mother and father. Dr. Owen stated that defendant was neither psychotic nor suffering from a major mental illness.
Robert Sandoval, a social worker for child protective services, testified about his investigation of defendant's possible abuse of Kayla in connection with her broken leg (of which the prosecution had presented penalty phase evidence). The reports Sandoval prepared at the time indicated that he went to the hospital and spoke to the floor nurse, but not the treating physician or any other doctor. He also went to Kayla's home to view the bedroom. After an informal hearing, child protective services decided the allegations of physical abuse were unfounded. On cross-examination, Sandoval stated that, at the time he conducted his investigation, he did not have the information that a spiral fracture (such as Kayla had suffered) requires twisting in addition to the force that breaks the bone. He stated that such information would have been important for him to have had at the time of his investigation.
James Park, a former administrator in the California Department of Corrections, testified about defendant's prospects if he were to be sentenced to life without possibility of parole, and were housed at a Level IV prison. Park was provided with a transcript of defendant's preliminary hearing and a copy of defendant's prior prison records. Based on this information, Park opined that defendant would make a good adjustment to prison, that he would perform useful work if given the opportunity, and that he would not pose a danger to prison staff or other prisoners.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his request to show prospective jurors the photographs of Kesha's injuries as part of the defense's voir dire, and thereby violated his rights to a reliable verdict, to trial by jury, and to due process, under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and corresponding provisions of the California Constitution. [2] As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying his request. Through an in limine motion, defense counsel sought to exclude from the guilt phase photographs of Kesha's injuries. The trial court ruled that such photographs were admissible and that it would permit the prosecution to use several of them, while excluding several as cumulative. [3] Defense counsel then moved to allow the defense to show prospective jurors the photographs during voir dire. Defense counsel argued the photographs were so prejudicial that the defense could not determine whether prospective jurors could be fair unless it showed them the actual photographs and asked them whether they could render a fair and impartial decision at the penalty phase after having seen the photographs. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing it was unsupported by case law and, in essence, sought to have the jurors prejudge the evidence. The trial court denied the motion, but added it would allow counsel to question prospective jurors about the photographs, as long as there was no use of actual items of evidence. The court also stated it would personally voir dire prospective jurors to determine what effect the photographs might have on them. During voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors if they would have difficulty in deciding a case that involve[d] some graphic photographs showing serious injuries. Two prospective jurors responded affirmatively, and the court excused both for cause. Subsequently, defense counsel asked the prospective jurors whether seeing graphic or gruesome photographs of a deceased child would cause them to presume that defendant was guilty or would cause them to feel that somebody should pay for the crime, regardless of the rest of the evidence in the case. None of the remaining jurors indicated they would be so affected. (1) We defer to the trial court's discretion regarding the manner of conducting voir dire. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182]; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) As we have stated, deathqualification voir dire must avoid two extremes: on the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties; on the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty. ( People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 47 [17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30].) `In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion.' ( Ibid. ) Here, the trial court expressly asked prospective jurors about the photographs, and defense counsel also made specific inquiries on the subject. Defendant presents no authority for the proposition that the trial court was required to allow the defense to show prospective jurors the actual photographs in connection with its questioning, and, on this record, we see no abuse of discretion.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in excusing Prospective Juror K.K. based on her views concerning the death penalty, and in failing to ask followup questions before dismissing her. As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not err in dismissing this prospective juror.
In her written juror questionnaire, K.K. twice stated that she was strongly opposed to the death penalty. She indicated she believed the death penalty was too often imposed and wrote: I don't feel the death penalty should be imposed at all. In response to whether she had any moral or philosophical views that would affect her ability to impose either death or life without the possibility of parole, she wrote, It would be extremely difficult for me to vote to impose the death penalty. In response to a question asking whether her views on the death penalty would cause her to refuse to find a defendant guilty of first degree murder in order to prevent the penalty phase from taking place, she wrote that, while she was morally and philosophically against the death penalty, she could never vote `not guilty' if [she] had no doubt of the defendant's guilt. She also indicated she would not vote against a special circumstance allegation that had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, just to prevent a penalty phase. In response to a question asking whether her views on the death penalty would cause her to vote automatically for life in prison without considering the penalty phase evidence, she wrote, I hope I don't have to face this question. It is not possible for me to automatically vote in any direction. This would be very, very tough for me, however. On the last question, whether she could set aside her own personal feelings regarding what the law ought to be and follow the law as the court explained it to her, she wrote yes. During voir dire, K.K. stated that she was strongly against the death penalty, but she also stated she felt she could decide the guilt phase based on the facts and law in the case without regard to penalty or punishment. In response to the question whether she could vote for death in the penalty phase, she stated she could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. The prosecutor challenged her for cause. In response, defense counsel requested that the court ask her if she could, in fact, impose the death penalty as directed by the court and as directed by the oath she had taken. The court asked her whether she would be able to consider and vote for the death penalty as an alternative to life in prison without the possibility of parole, and she replied, I could not vote for the death penalty. There was no objection or any further request for elaboration from defense counsel, and the trial court excused K.K. for cause.
(2) The federal constitutional standard for dismissing a prospective juror for cause based on his or her views of capital punishment is, `[W]hether the juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Uttecht v. Brown (2007) 551 U.S. 1, ___ [167 L.Ed.2d 1014, 127 S.Ct. 2218, 2223], citing Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844].) Applying Witt, we have stated: ``A prospective juror is properly excluded if he or she is unable to conscientiously consider all of the sentencing alternatives, including the death penalty where appropriate.' [Citation.] In addition, `[o]n appeal, we will uphold the trial court's ruling if it is fairly supported by the record, accepting as binding the trial court's determination as to the prospective juror's true state of mind when the prospective juror has made statements that are conflicting or ambiguous.' [Citations.]' ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 743 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145], quoting People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 987 [95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044].) Defendant contends the trial court erroneously excused K.K. for cause, claiming (1) the record does not support the trial court's determination that she held views that would prevent or substantially impair her ability to perform her duties as a juror, and (2) the trial court failed to make sufficient inquiries to establish whether she held such views. We conclude K.K.'s answers to the written questionnaire and during voir dire support the trial court's ruling. As noted, K.K. indicated in her questionnaire answers that she was strongly opposed to the death penalty, that she did not think the death penalty should be imposed at all, and that she was morally and philosophically against the death penalty. During voir dire, she stated she could not vote for the death penalty under any circumstances. When, at defense counsel's request, the trial court further questioned her, she again unequivocally stated she could not vote for the death penalty. The record therefore fairly supports the trial court's determination of her true state of mind. Because we conclude the record supports the trial court's ruling, we also reject defendant's contention that the trial court should have questioned the juror further before dismissing her. In essence, defendant contends the trial court failed to ask the appropriate followup question, and implies that the trial court erred by failing to ask the exact question as suggested by defense counsel (namely, could she impose the death penalty as directed by the court and as directed by the oath she had taken?). But defendant provides no authority that the trial court was obliged to so state the question. The question the trial court did ask K.K. (would she be able to consider and vote for the death penalty as an alternative to life in prison without the possibility of parole?) addressed defense counsel's request for additional inquiry into her views and elicited an answer that supported the trial court's exclusion of the juror.

Defendant contends insufficient evidence supported the jury's first degree murder conviction and torture special circumstance finding. As we explain, we conclude that substantial evidence supported the jury's findings. At the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the defense filed a motion for a judgment of acquittal pursuant to section 1118.1, which the trial court denied. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in connection with the trial court's denial of his section 1118.1 motion. The standard applied by the trial court under section 1118.1 in ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal is the same as the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432, fn. 2 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not determine the facts ourselves. Rather, we `examine the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidenceevidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.] [¶] The same standard of review applies to cases in which the prosecution relies primarily on circumstantial evidence and to special circumstance allegations. [Citation.] `[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury's findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.' [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or reevaluate a witness's credibility. [Citation.] ( People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1129.) The prosecution offered two theories of first degree murder: premeditated and deliberate murder, and murder by torture. Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence that defendant entertained the requisite mental state for either theory of first degree murder. In particular, defendant contends that, under People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation for either theory. For a killing with malice aforethought to be first rather than second degree murder, the intent to kill must be formed upon a preexisting reflection and have been the subject of actual deliberation or forethought. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 26.) In contrast, murder by means of torture, a statutorily listed type of first degree murder (§ 189), does not require an intent to kill, but requires the intent to torture, and requires the same proof of deliberation and premeditation as is required of other kinds of first degree murders. ( People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 546 [128 Cal.Rptr. 161, 546 P.2d 665].) The elements of torture murder are: (1) acts causing death that involve a high degree of probability of the victim's death; and (2) a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or another sadistic purpose. [Citations.] ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 602 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492].) As discussed below, the evidence produced at trial provides sufficient evidence of both theories of first degree murder argued by the prosecutor. The evidence of Kesha's wounds support first degree murder by torture. The evidence indicates that she was brutally kicked or punched, and that, after she was incapacitated, the perpetrator methodically poured hot cooking oil onto various portions of her body, repositioning her body so as to inflict numerous burns throughout her body, including her genital region. As we have stated, the jury may infer the required mental state for murder by torture from the condition of the victim's body. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 433.) Here the condition of the body, with the numerous methodical burn wounds inflicted, abundantly supports the jury's finding that defendant had the willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain or suffering for a sadistic purpose. The methodical infliction of the burn wounds also supports first degree murder on a theory of premeditated and deliberate intent to kill, especially in combination with the other evidence presented at trial indicating defendant's intent to kill Kesha. Evidence of Kesha's injuries in the period prior to the murder indicated that defendant continually abused her. As the prosecutor argued, defendant's continuing and escalating acts of abuse showed his premeditated and deliberate intent to eventually kill her. [4] Furthermore, on the day of the murder, defendant took deliberate advantage of Hill's absence, and the fact that Kesha was alone with him, to inflict his most extreme abuse in the form of the blows and burning oil torture that caused her death. Evidence of defendant's actions after he inflicted the fatal wounds also supports the inference that he deliberately intended to kill Kesha. When Hill returned home to find her daughter grievously injured, defendant initially dissuaded Hill from seeking medical help by lying to her about the nature and extent of Kesha's injuries, and then actively prevented her from calling 911 until after Kesha died. Defendant contends our discussion in People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pages 26 through 27, indicates there was insufficient evidence to support a showing of premeditation and deliberation under either theory of first degree murder. We disagree. As we have observed, the Anderson factors are simply an aid for the reviewing court, and an [u]nreflective reliance on People v. Anderson is inappropriate. ( People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 517 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101].) Defendant contends that, because the child abuse inflicted by defendant appears senseless and inexplicable, there is insufficient evidence to support first degree premeditated murder. But the lack of a discernable rational motive does not preclude a conviction for first degree premeditated murder. (See People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 814 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436].) We previously have upheld the sufficiency of a first degree murder conviction in the context of child abuse and torture. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 432-436.) As discussed above, the evidence in this case likewise supports the jury's finding of first degree murder. Finally, we conclude sufficient evidence supported the jury's true finding on the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation. The special circumstance requires that a murder be intentional and involve[] the infliction of torture. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18); see People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 479 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968] [the requisite torturous intent is an intent to cause cruel or extreme pain and suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or for any other sadistic purpose].) As the above analysis shows, the evidence supports the jury's conclusion that the murder both was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior acts of physical abuse against children, in violation of Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352. As we explain, we conclude that the evidence was properly admitted.
Through an in limine motion, the prosecutor sought the admission of testimony from defendant's ex-girlfriend, D. Robertson, that defendant had kicked and hit his two children from that relationship, S. and J., when they were young. Defense counsel objected that the evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352. The trial court tentatively ruled the evidence involving S. and J. admissible to show intent, motive, and absence of accident, and that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Later, at trial, in a sidebar conference during Robertson's testimony, the prosecutor stated he was seeking admission of the evidence in order to show intent and absence of accident, but not motive. The trial court so instructed the jury immediately before Robertson's testimony. As summarized above, Robertson testified defendant hit and kicked S. and J. when they were one and three years old, respectively.
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), permits the admission of other-crimes evidence against a defendant when relevant to prove some fact (such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident ...) other than his or her disposition to commit such an act. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 145 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357].) Section 1101 prohibits the admission of other-crimes evidence for the purpose of showing the defendant's bad character or criminal propensity. ( Ibid. ) Like other circumstantial evidence, its admissibility depends on the materiality of the fact sought to be proved, the tendency of the prior crime to prove the material fact, and the existence or absence of some other rule requiring exclusion. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 705 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289].) On appeal, the trial court's determination of this issue, being essentially a determination of relevance, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Kipp (1998) 18 Cal.4th 349, 369 [75 Cal.Rptr.2d 716, 956 P.2d 1169].) As noted, the trial court admitted defendant's prior acts of child abuse to show intent and absence of accident. Treating intent and absence of accident as distinct and separate bases for admissibility, defendant first contends that evidence of his intent in his prior acts of child abuse was irrelevant to any element of intent required for the charged crimes of first degree premeditated murder and first degree murder by torture. Defendant contends that the evidence he kicked and hit his two children showed neither premeditation, intent to kill, nor intent to torture. But the trial court's use of intent and absence of accident merely reflects two ways of describing the same relevant issue, namely, that defendant performed the acts that killed Kesha intentionally rather than accidentally. The prosecution's burden of proving all the elements of the charged offenses included the threshold showing that the acts that caused Kesha's death were performed intentionally rather than accidentally, and defendant's prior acts of violence against other children were relevant to proving this. As to absence of accident, defendant acknowledges that Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), permits the admission of other-crimes evidence to show absence of accident, but he contends such evidence can only be admitted when a defendant has introduced accident as a defense. Defendant argues that he never offered an accident defense. Rather, he contends his defense was that Hill caused the fatal wounds, and that, even if his defense was that she might have done so accidentally, this did not amount to an accident defense for himself. Defendant construes the purpose of absence of accident evidence too narrowly. Certainly, when a defendant admits committing an act but denies the necessary intent for the charged crime because of mistake or accident, other-crimes evidence is admissible to show absence of accident. ( People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 879 [248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355].) But we have never limited evidence of absence of accident to such instances. Rather, a defendant's plea of not guilty puts in issue all the elements of the charged offense. ( People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at pp. 705-706; People v. Balcom (1994) 7 Cal.4th 414, 422-423 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 666, 867 P.2d 777].) Furthermore, defendant declined to stipulate that Kesha's wounds were caused intentionally. (See People v. Roldan, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 706, fn. 24.) Indeed, defendant offered expert testimony to support the theory that Kesha's burns were caused accidentally. We also note that the defense opening statement raised the possibility that defendant accidentally caused Kesha's fatal internal injuries when he slipped and fell while carrying Kesha to the shower following the burns allegedly caused by Hill. This expressly placed the question of accident in issue for the prosecution's case-in-chief, notwithstanding that, when defendant ultimately testified, he denied falling with Kesha. Finally, defendant contends that, even if the other-crimes evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), the evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the probability that it would cause undue prejudice. Defendant essentially contends that evidence of child abuse is intrinsically highly inflammatory. But, as discussed above, the evidence was probative of the issue of intent and absence of accident. The prior child abuse evidence was far less inflammatory than the evidence of Kesha's injuries, and this decreased the possibility that the jury's passions were inflamed by the evidence of defendant's uncharged child abuse. (See People v. Ewoldt (1994) 7 Cal.4th 380, 405 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757].) Defendant also contends the prior child abuse evidence should have been excluded because the events took place between seven and 10 years before the date of the charged murder. But, on this record, we cannot conclude that the passage of time significantly lessened the probative value of the evidence. (See, e.g., ibid.; People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 612 [55 Cal.Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590].) Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to permit the defense to present significant evidence impeaching prosecution witness D. Robertson, which violated Evidence Code section 352. As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the impeachment evidence.
As discussed in the immediately proceeding part, prosecution witness Robertson testified to defendant's past acts of child abuse. On crossexamination, the trial court allowed defense counsel to impeach her credibility by eliciting testimony that she had; (1) accused defendant of sexually abusing their daughter, even though the accusation did not result in criminal charges being filed against him; (2) failed to attend a court-ordered appointment for counseling in connection with those allegations; (3) failed to report to the police or seek medical attention for defendant's acts of abuse towards her children; and (4) been arrested in connection with a shooting incident in 1989. The trial court, however, sustained the prosecutor's objections under Evidence Code section 352 to defense questioning about whether defendant had broken up with Robertson because he had caught her in bed with one of his friends, Dean Morgan. In the sidebar discussion about the objection, defense counsel argued Robertson's affair with Morgan was relevant because it explained why defendant had left Robertson and therefore cleared up any misconception the jury might have formed that Robertson left defendant because he abused their children. The court agreed with defense counsel that evidence about who left whom first and for what reason was relevant, and the court allowed the defense to so inquire, but restricted defense counsel from going into detail about any affairs. In his cross-examination, defense counsel established that defendant left Robertson before she made her allegations that defendant was abusing the children. Defense counsel then asked her whether she and defendant had separated because she was having an affair with someone else, and she answered no. The trial court also sustained the prosecutor's relevance objections to certain defense questions connected to Robertson's 1989 shooting incident, namely (1) whether she was having an affair with a man named James Mooney in 1989; (2) whether she shot towards Mooney's wife, Judith Mooney, during the incident; (3) whether she lied to the police and her probation officer about the shooting incident; and (4) whether, when the police investigated the shooting incident, she only agreed to come out of her house after a SWAT team arrived. On redirect examination, the prosecutor established that Robertson was convicted of a misdemeanor for the 1989 shooting incident. On recross examination, Robertson stated she fired two shots from a .270-caliber deer rifle at a location near Judith Mooney's car while Judith Mooney's children were in the car, but she denied shooting at Judith Mooney. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's relevance objection when defense counsel asked her whether her case was originally charged as a felony. Later, when Judith Mooney was scheduled to testify as part of the defense case, the prosecutor objected on Evidence Code 352 grounds to any testimony by Judith Mooney concerning the details of the 1989 shooting incident, which, as Robertson already admitted, had resulted in a misdemeanor conviction against her. Defense counsel opposed the restriction. He argued that Robertson had lied both at the time of the shooting and on the witness stand, and he contended that the defense was entitled to impeach her credibility by calling both Judith Mooney and a police officer named Fontecchio to testify about the incident. Defense counsel made an offer of proof that Judith Mooney would testify that when she had gone to Robertson's residence, Robertson fired shots directly at Mooney and her seven-year-old child while they were both in their car, and that Robertson had pointed the weapon at Mooney's child. Defense counsel said that Officer Fontecchio would testify that he responded to the scene and found three shell casings, that one bullet had struck the ground close to Mooney's car, and that Robertson told him that she shot into the air rather than at anyone in particular. The trial court ruled that Mooney's testimony would be more probative than prejudicial but also stated that, while it would permit Mooney to briefly recite the facts of the shooting incident, it would not allow a detailed examination of the subject. As to Officer Fontecchio, the court found that the probative value of his testimony was outweighed by the risks of consuming undue time, and confusing the jury and the issues to be decided. It therefore sustained the prosecutor's objections to his testimony. As summarized above, Judith Mooney testified that in 1989, Robertson fired three shots from a rifle at Mooney and her children when Mooney went to Robertson's house to talk to her.
A trial court may restrict defense cross-examination of an adverse witness on the grounds stated in Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 623 [66 Cal.Rptr.2d 609, 941 P.2d 788].) Defendant, however, contends the trial court abused its discretion by excluding testimony concerning Robertson's alleged affairs and Officer Fontecchio's testimony on the 1989 shooting incident. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding both areas of testimony. ( People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 372 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, 133 P.3d 534].) As to the evidence of Robertson's alleged affair with Dean Morgan, the trial court allowed defense counsel to cross-examine Robertson about defendant's motive for leaving her, namely, that it was because of an alleged affair on her part (which she denied). The trial court's ruling allowed the defense to explore the issues relevant to the breakup of defendant and Robertson while properly excluding the irrelevant inquiry into the specifics of her alleged affair with Morgan. Similarly, the trial court properly excluded questioning about Robertson's alleged affair with James Mooney. The relevance of defense counsel's inquiry into the 1989 shooting incident with Judith Mooney was to impeach Robertson for moral turpitude on the basis of a criminal act, which was the shooting, not her alleged affair with James Mooney. Robertson's alleged affair with James Mooney might have revealed the source of the animosity between Robertson and Judith Mooney that may have led to the shooting. But this was a collateral issue properly excluded by the trial court. The court also properly excluded the testimony of Officer Fontecchio. The court allowed Judith Mooney to testify about the shooting incident in connection with the limited issue of Robertson's credibility. As the court noted, what was relevant was a brief recitation by Mooney of the facts of the conduct involved, not a detailed examination or a retrial of the shooting incident. The testimony of Officer Fontecchio would have resulted in precisely such a retrial of a prior offense that Robertson had already admitted. Furthermore [a] trial court's limitation on cross-examination pertaining to the credibility of a witness does not violate the confrontation clause unless a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of the witness's credibility had the excluded cross-examination been permitted. ( People v. Quartermain, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 623-624.) Here, the additional impeachment value of the excluded evidence was minimal in relation to the major areas of impeachment already raised by the admitted evidence, and a reasonable jury would not have received a significantly different impression of Robertson's credibility even if the excluded evidence had been permitted.
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of his prior acts of physical abuse against Kesha, in violation of Evidence Code sections 1101, subdivision (b), and 352. As we explain, we conclude the evidence was properly admitted.
Through an in limine motion, the prosecutor sought the admission of evidence of injuries Kesha suffered in the months before she was killed. The prosecutor stated he was filing his motion in response to the trial court's order that the prosecution reveal all evidence proffered under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). The prosecutor, however, contended that, although proffered evidence of defendant's acts of physical abuse towards children other than the murder victim (i.e., defendant's biological children, S. and J.) implicated Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), evidence of past injuries to the murder victim did not. Rather, citing People v. Aeschlimann (1972) 28 Cal.App.3d 460 [104 Cal.Rptr. 689], the prosecutor contended that evidence of past injuries to the murder victim was independently admissible as part of the res gestae of the murder by torture charge. The defense objected to the admission of evidence of Kesha's past injuries on the ground that there was no evidence defendant had inflicted the injuries, and that they were too remote in time to be relevant. The trial court ruled the evidence was admissible under both Evidence Code section 352 and section 1101, subdivision (b).
Defendant contends the evidence of Kesha's past injuries was not admissible under either of the two theories raised below: (1) to show intent or absence of accident under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), or (2) as part of the res gestae of the crime of murder by torture. In arguing against the admissibility of this evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b), defendant makes the same contentions he made in arguing against the admissibility of evidence of defendant's past acts of physical abuse against his biological children, discussed above. (See ante, at pp. 203-205.) He contends the evidence of Kesha's prior injuries did not show an intent to torture or kill, and that such evidence therefore was not admissible to show absence of accident, because defendant did not offer an accident defense. For the same reasons stated above, we reject defendant's contentions and conclude the trial court properly admitted the evidence under Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (b). Defendant's prior acts of violence against the victim are indisputably relevant to showing intention and absence of accident. (See People v. Zack (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 409, 415 [229 Cal.Rptr. 317].) Finally, we need not, and therefore do not, reach the prosecutor's alternate argument that the evidence was also admissible as part of the res gestae of the crime of torture murder.
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously permitted the prosecution to cross-examine defendant about his acts of child abuse against his niece, Kayla, in violation of Evidence Code section 352. As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the cross-examination.
During in limine motions, the prosecution sought the admission of several prior acts of child abuse committed by defendant, including two separate incidents involving defendant's niece, Kayla, in which he had intentionally broken her leg and put glue in her mouth. Defense counsel opposed the admission of any evidence of defendant's past acts of child abuse, including the incidents involving Kayla. The trial court tentatively ruled that all the proffered incidents of child abuse were admissible except the glue incident, which the court ruled was more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. Notwithstanding the trial court's ruling, the prosecution did not call any witness during its guilt phase case-in-chief to testify about the incident involving Kayla's broken leg. Later, as part of his guilt phase defense, defendant testified on his own behalf and stated that he was a barker, who disciplined children with his loud voice rather than with physical violence. During cross-examination, the prosecutor sought to refute defendant's description of himself as nonviolent by questioning him about his acts of violence against his former wives and girlfriends, including his ex-wife Dorina, who was the mother of defendant's niece, Kayla. [5] Defense counsel objected under Evidence Code section 1101 and relevance grounds to any questions concerning defendant's acts of violence against his former wives and girlfriends. The prosecutor argued for the admissibility of defendant's past acts of violence against women as refuting defendant's testimony, and also reminded the court of its ruling on the in limine motion allowing the use of evidence of Kayla's broken leg. The court sustained defense objections against questions about defendant's acts of violence against adult women, but ruled that it would stand by its previous ruling on the in limine motion involving acts of child abuse and stated if you have violence against children, I'll allow that in. The prosecutor then questioned defendant about an incident 10 years earlier when he was left in charge of his four-month-old niece Kayla and her left femur was broken. As set forth above, defendant testified that Kayla broke her upper femur after she fell from his lap. Defendant became furious when child protective services workers asked him questions about the incident, and he was arrested for assault. The prosecutor then cross-examined defendant about the incident a few months later when Kayla, once again left in defendant's care, ended up with wood glue in her mouth. Defendant testified he did not think it was necessary to take her to the emergency room. Rather, as suggested on the glue bottle, he washed out her mouth with water.
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in allowing the prosecution to cross-examination defendant about the two incidents involving Kayla. As a preliminary matter, respondent contends defendant has forfeited this claim on appeal because the only Evidence Code section 352 objection defense counsel made to the crossexamination concerned questions about defendant's acts of violence against adult women (which was sustained); defense counsel, however, failed to object to the trial court's ruling as it pertained to the Kayla incidents, either during the sidebar conference or during the actual cross-examination itself. But the issue is preserved on appeal because, as summarized above, during in limine motions, defense counsel had objected to the admission of both Kayla incidents on Evidence Code section 352 grounds. The issue is preserved because (1) a specific legal ground for exclusion was advanced through an in limine motion and subsequently raised on appeal; (2) the in limine motion was directed to a particular, identifiable body of evidence; and (3) the in limine motion was made at a time, either before or during trial, when the trial judge could determine the evidentiary question in its appropriate context. ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190 [279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d 588].) Indeed, the trial court referenced its in limine ruling concerning child abuse at the crossexamination sidebar conference. In any event, on the merits, both Kayla incidents were relevant to the cross-examination of defendant. Both incidents were probative of the issue of defendant's credibility, since he described himself as someone who would never administer violent physical discipline or abuse to a child, and both incidents involved possible acts of violent physical discipline or abuse to a child. Furthermore, as with the other instances of defendant's past acts of child abuse discussed above (see ante, at pp. 203-205), the probative value of either incident was not outweighed by the probability that it would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice.
Defendant contends that admitting photographs of Kesha's injuries was an abuse of the trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352. As we explain, we conclude the trial court properly admitted the photographs.
As recounted above (see ante, at pp. 196-197), through an in limine motion, defense counsel sought to exclude the prosecution's evidence of photographs of Kesha's injuries. Defense counsel contended the prejudice created by the photographs outweighed their probative value because they were inflammatory, they were not relevant to any disputed material issue, and they were cumulative of other prosecution evidence. Finally, defense counsel urged that any photographs the court permitted should be black and white instead of color. In opposing the motion, the prosecutor emphasized that his burden in proving a torture-murder theory of first degree murder entailed showing that defendant committed the murder with the intent to cause cruel suffering and extreme pain, and contended that the photographs were particularly relevant to that issue. The trial court allowed the admission of 12 photographs, finding that their probative value outweighed their prejudicial effect. But it denied the admission of 13 other photographs on the grounds they were cumulative, and that their probative value was therefore outweighed by their prejudicial effect.
To determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, we address two factors: (1) whether the photographs were relevant, and (2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the probative value of each photograph outweighed its prejudicial effect. ( People v. Hoyos (2007) 41 Cal.4th 872, 908 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 162 P.3d 528].) `The court's exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal unless the probative value of the photographs clearly is outweighed by their prejudicial effect. [Citations.]' ( Ibid. ) Here the photographs were clearly relevant to the determination of many disputed facts at the guilt phase, particularly the murder by torture theory. (Evid. Code, § 210.) We have examined the photographs and conclude they are not of such a nature as to overcome the jury's rationality. ( People v. Hoyos, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 909; People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 625 [123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224].)
Defendant contends the trial court erroneously refused to instruct on the offense of being an accessory after the fact to a felony. As we explain, we conclude the trial court did not err in refusing the instruction.
Defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 6.40, which defines the offense of being an accessory after the fact to a felony, within the meaning of section 32. [6] Defense counsel based his request on defendant's testimony that Hill had caused Kesha's injuries, and that, in order to protect Hill, defendant had lied to police officers and others about the cause of the burns. The prosecutor opposed this request because he had not charged defendant with such a crime. The trial court ultimately refused the requested instruction because the evidence did not show that defendant had the intent required to be an accessory at the time he made the statements, and because the evidence on which he was relying was exculpatory. The court noted, however, that defense counsel was free to argue to the jury that the evidence at most showed that defendant was guilty of being an accessory, an uncharged offense, and that defendant should therefore be acquitted. Defense counsel did not present this argument in summation.
Defendant contends the trial court's refusal to instruct on being an accessory after the fact denied him a constitutionally adequate opportunity to present a defense because an accessory instruction was part and parcel of the defense theory of the case. We have previously rejected a similar contention. ( People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 291-292 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451].) An accessory instruction was not essential to defendant's defense. Through defendant's testimony and defense counsel's closing argument, the jury was fully apprised of the defense theories that it was Hill rather than defendant who caused Kesha's fatal injuries and that defendant lied in order to protect Hill. (See ibid. )
The trial court did not instruct with CALJIC No. 3.19, which asks the jury to determine whether a specified witness is an accomplice and requires the defense to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the witness was an accomplice in the charged crime. [7] Defendant contends the trial court's failure to instruct on CALJIC No. 3.19 denied him the benefit of state law requiring that a jury view an accomplice's testimony with caution and not convict a defendant unless such testimony is corroborated. As we explain, although the trial court erred by failing to instruct with CALJIC No. 3.19, the error was harmless.
At the request of the defense, the trial court read to the jury several standard instructions regarding accomplice testimony, including CALJIC No. 3.10 (AccompliceDefined), CALJIC No. 3.11 (1990 rev.) (Testimony of Accomplice Must Be Corroborated), CALJIC No. 3.12 (Sufficiency of Evidence to Corroborate an Accomplice), CALJIC No. 3.14 (Criminal Intent Necessary to Make One an Accomplice), and CALJIC No. 3.18 (Testimony of Accomplice to be Viewed with Distrust). But the court did not give CALJIC No. 3.19 (Burden to Prove Corroborating Witness Is an Accomplice). [8]
Section 1111 prohibits conviction on the testimony of an accomplice unless the testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1270 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645].) Section 1111 defines an accomplice as one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant.... (See People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1270.) When the evidence at trial would warrant the jury in concluding that a witness was an accomplice of the defendant in the crime or crimes for which the defendant is on trial, the trial court must instruct the jury to determine if the witness was an accomplice. If the evidence establishes as a matter of law that the witness was an accomplice, the court must so instruct the jury, but whether a witness is an accomplice is a question of fact for the jury in all cases unless `there is no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom.' [Citation.] ( Id. at pp. 1270-1271.) In the instant case, the trial court gave a series of accomplice instructions, including those prohibiting the use of uncorroborated accomplice testimony to convict defendant. The court, however, neither instructed the jury that it had to determine that Hill was an accomplice nor that she was an accomplice as a matter of law. Because the court was required to do one or the other, it erred. (See People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1270-1271.) Instructional error is subject to harmless error review. ( People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 490, 502-504 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869].) Because the omitted instruction is based on section 1111, the asserted error is one of state law, subject to the reasonable probability standard of harmless error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836-837 [299 P.2d 243]. (See People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 875 [48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135].) Defendant contends the failure to give CALJIC No. 3.19 made the other accomplice testimony instructions pointless and entirely removed the accomplice issue from the case. We disagree. This is not a case in which all accomplice testimony instructions were omitted. The trial court extensively instructed the jury on how to treat accomplice testimony, but failed to give the instruction, CALJIC No. 3.19, that would have made it explicit that Hill was the accomplice witness for whom the accomplice testimony instructions applied. In essence, defendant's claim is that the one missing instruction made the application of the other accomplice instructions unclear to the jury. When reviewing ambiguous instructions, we inquire whether the jury was reasonably likely to have construed them in a manner that violated the defendant's rights. ( People v. Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 873.) Applying this standard to the instructions given in the instant case, we conclude it was not reasonably likely the jury failed to understand that it was to apply the accomplice testimony instructions to Hill. [9] Hill was the only possible accomplice indicated by the evidence. Indeed, her own testimony showed she was an accomplice. She testified she had been charged with first degree murder in connection with Kesha's death and ultimately pleaded guilty to involuntary manslaughter. Furthermore, even where there is a failure to instruct on accomplice testimony, such error is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1271.) Corroborating evidence may be slight, may be entirely circumstantial, and need not be sufficient to establish every element of the charged offense. ( Ibid. ) Sufficient corroborating evidence was provided in this case by the expert testimony about Kesha's injuries, Kelly Salay's testimony that she was with Hill and that defendant was in charge of Kesha during the afternoon that Kesha died, the neighbor's testimony that defendant verbally abused Kesha that afternoon (apparently in the midst of inflicting the fatal injuries), and defendant's own admissions that he was responsible for causing Kesha's death.
The trial court refused to instruct on second degree implied malice murder. As we explain, because there was no substantial evidence of second degree murder on an implied malice theory, the trial court properly refused the instruction.
During the discussions on jury instructions, defense counsel asked the trial court to instruct on second degree murder. The court initially stated that if it were to give second degree murder instructions, it should read instructions on both unpremeditated express malice murder (CALJIC No. 8.30, Unpremeditated Murder of the Second Degree) and implied malice murder (CALJIC No. 8.31, Second Degree MurderKilling Resulting from Unlawful Act Dangerous to Life). The prosecutor objected that the evidence did not support the implied malice murder instruction, CALJIC No. 8.31. He pointed out that paragraph 3 of that instruction requires the act be deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for human life. The prosecutor contended that the acts by which defendant killed Kesha were torturous acts, and that, if the jury determined defendant deliberately performed those acts, the jury necessarily would find defendant guilty of first degree murder by torture because first degree murder by torture does not require an intent to kill, but only requires that the torturous acts cause the death and be willfully performed with premeditation and deliberation. Defense counsel agreed. The trial court concluded it would not read CALJIC No. 8.31, but would give the jurors a modified version of CALJIC No. 8.32 (Second Degree Felony Murder) concerning second degree murder committed in the commission of the crime of torture. When the trial court instructed the jury, it read CALJIC Nos. 8.30 and 8.32, but not CALJIC No. 8.31. The court also read, at defendant's request, CALJIC No. 8.45, which defined involuntary manslaughter, and CALJIC No. 8.72, which instructed the jury to find a homicide to be manslaughter if it had a reasonable doubt whether the crime was murder or manslaughter.
Implied malice murder is defined by CALJIC No. 8.31 as follows: Murder of the second degree is [also] the unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural consequences of which are dangerous to human life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that the act would result in the death of a human being. Defendant acknowledges the correctness of the prosecutor's argument that, if defendant committed torturous acts and those acts were done deliberately, an instruction on second degree implied malice murder would be inapplicable based on those torturous acts, since those acts would necessarily support a first degree murder by torture verdict. But defendant contends that the second degree implied malice murder instructions should have been given based on an entirely different intentional act deliberately performed by defendant, namely, defendant's intentional failure to take Kesha to the hospital after she was fatally wounded. Defendant contends that, although he denied inflicting the wounds that killed Kesha, he effectively admitted that he intentionally failed to take Kesha to the hospital, even though he knew she was gravely injured, because he wanted to protect Hill and did not want the authorities involved. Defendant contends his testimony supports the elements of second degree implied malice murder as follows: (1) the killing resulted from an intentional act (i.e., his failure to take Kesha to the hospital); (2) the natural consequence of failing to get medical treatment was obviously dangerous; and (3) it was done deliberately, in spite of the fact defendant knew that Kesha was severely injured. Defendant's theory of second degree implied malice murder based on his failure to act was not raised in the trial court. Respondent contends the claim is forfeited. However, the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 162 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].) But even though defendant's claim was not forfeited, we conclude there was no substantial evidence for defendant's theory of implied malice murder. As to the first element, defendant provides no authority that a failure to act can, on its own, constitute an intentional act for implied malice murder. [10] Certainly, if a defendant has a duty to provide aid to a victim, his or her failure to do so resulting in the victim's death can give rise to involuntary manslaughter. (See People v. Oliver (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 138, 147-148 [258 Cal.Rptr. 138].) But, as noted above, the jury was instructed on involuntary manslaughter, and it nonetheless found defendant guilty of first degree murder. As to the second and third elements, defendant's testimony does not provide substantial evidence that he knew that not immediately taking Kesha to the hospital would result in her death. Certainly, if one assumes that defendant in fact intentionally inflicted the fatal injuries through brutally striking Kesha and torturing her with hot oil, and therefore knew the severity of the wounds he had personally committed, then one could also plausibly assume he knew that failing to seek immediate medical care for her would result in her death. But defendant's implied malice theory is based on his testimony that he did not inflict the fatal wounds. The most that defendant's testimony indicates is that he was vaguely concerned about Kesha's condition immediately after Hill allegedly inflicted the burn wounds, despite her alleged minimizing of the significance of the burns. Defendant testified he did not become seriously concerned about Kesha's condition until several hours later, when Kesha's arm went limp while she was sleeping on his chest, at which point, according to his testimony, he immediately gave her CPR and told Hill to call 911.