Opinion ID: 902845
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Post-Trial Ruling

Text: After the jury awarded Joyce $15,000 in compensatory damages, she sought reimbursement for $167,855 in attorney's fees and $4,993 in other costs. The Town objected on the ground that the amount sought was unreasonable and excessive, and it again asserted that special circumstances rendered any award of fees unjust. In arguing for a finding of special circumstances, the Town cited Joyce's last-minute notice of her desire to play in the May 2007 men's tournament and her failure to engage with the defendants about her concerns.22 22 The defendants specifically noted Joyce's refusal to attend the GAC meetings at which her complaint was discussed and her failure to respond to either defense counsel's phone calls or the Town's settlement offer in February 2011. -31- Although the district court found the defendants' arguments compelling, it concluded that Joyce was entitled to modest attorney's fees . . . commensurate with the results she obtained and mitigated by the factors present in this case. Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 288. In its analysis, the court described the degree of success obtained as [t]he 'most critical factor' in determining the reasonableness of a fee. Id. at 289 (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114 (1992)). It reiterated its view that Joyce had achieved limited results and stated that the lawsuit could have easily been avoided or resolved well before trial. Id. at 290. The court deemed the results of the lawsuit minimal because the Town had changed its policy for 2008 before Joyce filed suit and because the court had limited its summary judgment ruling to this case only. Id. Against this backdrop, the court concluded that the requested fee of more than ten times the jury award is excessive and unreasonable. Id. The court also criticized the plaintiff and her counsel for refusing the defendants' reasonable settlement offer of $35,001, which, in the court's view, obviated the need for a jury trial[,] which alone accounted for 60 hours billed by plaintiff's counsel. Id. at 291.23 The court invoked Federal Rule of Civil 23 The court stated that the refusal by plaintiff's counsel to accept the settlement offer was unreasonable. Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 291. We do not understand this statement as an assertion that counsel made the settlement decision without consulting Joyce -- a violation of ethical rules, see Mass. R. -32- Procedure 68, which requires a plaintiff who recovers less at trial than was offered in a formal pre-trial settlement proposal to pay the opposing party's post-offer costs, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d), and prevents shifting of post-offer attorney's fees and other costs, see Bogan v. City of Boston, 489 F.3d 417, 430 (1st Cir. 2007). The court noted that Rule 68 did not technically apply, but concluded that its purpose to promote settlement and avoid the expense of trial made it reasonable to award Joyce none of the costs or fees that accrued after the defendants' offer on February 4, 2011.24 Joyce, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 291. The court observed that imposing on the defendants the full burden of this avoidable litigation would encourage similarly situated plaintiffs to refuse all reasonable settlement offers and proceed to trial. Id. at 292. The court also found that the number of hours claimed by plaintiff's counsel was excessive for the case as a whole and for Prof. C. 1.2(a), 1.4 -- but we instead construe the court's unfortunate phrasing to reflect the view that counsel had advised Joyce against accepting the offer. 24 It is undisputed that the defendants made a formal offer under Rule 68. The court presumably, and correctly, characterized the rule as inapplicable because, based on the ruling it was about to issue, Joyce would be recovering an amount well in excess of the $35,001 offer, which was inclusive of attorney's fees and costs. She was awarded a total of $49,600: $15,000 in compensatory damages, $30,000 in attorney's fees, and $4,600 in other costs. See Bogan, 489 F.3d at 431 (stating that the calculation under Rule 68 includes only the jury award and the pre-offer fees and costs actually awarded by the court, not the amount requested). -33- particular tasks, and it speculated that a significant portion of the hours enumerated relate to the bickering between counsel over media coverage. Id. In the court's view, many of the hours spent on the litigation were unjustified because the case involved a relatively simple and straightforward fact pattern and . . . an uncomplicated legal theory. Id. at 291. The court acknowledged that the defendants shared the blame for prolonging the case, noting that they had opposed summary judgment and failed to offer a formal settlement until just before the trial's start date. Nonetheless, the court placed most of the responsibility for the length of the proceedings on Joyce and her counsel: [T]he Court finds that a fair and reasonable solution is to reduce plaintiff's requested fee award substantially, taking into account not only the limited results obtained but also the fact that the plaintiff was largely responsible for the unnecessary protraction of this litigation. For the reasons already elucidated, the Court finds that the number of hours spent and the costs incurred by plaintiff's counsel were wholly unreasonable given the interests at stake and the benefit gained. Id. The court thus concluded that there were abundant reasons for substantially reducing the requested fees and expenses, and it determined that $30,000, plus $4,600 in costs, was a reasonable award. Id. at 292. -34-