Opinion ID: 2380920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Vallion guaranty agreement.

Text: ¶ 14 Vallion signed a second guaranty agreement after creating a trust and transferring his interest in the restaurant property into the same. Vallion signed the second guaranty contract on September 21, 2004. It provides in pertinent part: Guarantor waives and agrees not to assert:... (b) the benefit of any statute of limitations affecting Guarantor's liability hereunder or the enforcement hereof; ... (e) the benefits of any statutory provision limiting the liability of a surety, including without limitation the provisions of Sections 334, 337, 338 and 344 of Title 15 of the Oklahoma Statutes; ... (g) the benefits of any statutory provision limiting the right of the Bank to any foreclosure or trustee's sale of any security for the indebtedness, including without limitation, any right to setoff under Section 686 of Title 12 of the Oklahoma Statutes.... [31] [Emphasis supplied.] ¶ 15 Vallion insists that the quoted language from the guaranty agreement is insufficient to waive his right to receive credit for the fair and reasonable market value of the real property. The contention is simply not credible. ¶ 16 The term any is all-embracing and means nothing less than every and all. [32] Utilization of the word including along with the phrase without limitation denotes an intention of non-exclusivity. [33] The term including is neither limiting nor exclusive. [34] ¶ 17 The guaranty contract provides that it waives the benefits of any statutory provision limiting the liability of a surety, including without limitation several specific statutory references. It goes on to utilize the same language in relation to 12 O.S.2001 § 686, the precise provision relating to offsets for the fair and reasonable market value of the mortgaged property. It is difficult to contemplate how the Bank could have more effectively accomplished eviscerating the guarantor's right to a setoff for the fair market value of the property. Furthermore, a reasonable interpretation of the clear language of the agreement makes it apparent that the failure to specifically refer to 15 O.S.2001 § 341, [35] limiting the obligation of the guarantor to that of the principal, does not require application of the statutory provision to the agreement. Utilization of the phrase including without limitation in the agreement most certainly was intended to extend the exclusion to the noted statutory provision. ¶ 18 The Vallion guaranty agreement specifically waived the right to setoff contained in 12 O.S. § 2001 686. [36] Furthermore, the plain, clear, unmistakable, unambiguous, and unequivocal language of the guaranty waived any and all including without limitation the statutory provisions limiting its liability. Vallion, like Kreth, is not entitled to a reduction in his obligation to Chase in the amount of $1,500,000.00, the judicially determined fair and reasonable market value of the property.