Opinion ID: 1952329
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Heading: The Motion to Suppress the Confession

Text: On October 15, 1991, prior to his trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the audio- and videotape of his March 1, 1990, statements to Leddy and McKenna. The defendant argued on appeal that the admission of his confession into evidence violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution [2] and that the videotaping failed to comply with provisions of G.L. 1956 (1981 Reenactment) chapter 5.1 of title 12 (Interception of Wire and Oral Communications), and therefore admission of the confession constituted reversible error. In determining whether the confession was voluntary, the trial justice, outside the jury's presence, conducted an independent hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his confession, as required by State v. Amado, 424 A.2d 1057, 1061 (R.I. 1981). The trial justice concluded that defendant's confession was voluntary and thus denied the motion to suppress the confession.
On appeal, defendant maintained that because his confession was produced by misleading and coercive tactics during interrogation, admission of the self-incriminatory portions of the audio- and videotape violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The admissibility of defendant's confession rests on the voluntariness of the confession and on compliance with the mandates of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). A voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights must be shown by the state before comments made by a defendant during custodial interrogation can be admitted into evidence. State v. Pacheco, 481 A.2d 1009, 1023 (R.I. 1984). The invocation of Miranda, therefore, generally hinges entirely upon whether, at the time of his confession, the accused was formally arrested or whether the person's freedom of movement is restricted to the degree associated with formal arrest.    Absent a formal arrest the determination of whether a person is subjected to restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest turns on how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would understand the situation. State v. Caruolo, 524 A.2d 575, 579 (R.I. 1987). Applying these principles to the March 1, 1990, interrogation of defendant, we are of the opinion that the record contains ample evidence to support the trial court's conclusion that until defendant confessed to the arson, he never was in custody so as to trigger the prophylactic Miranda rule. Furthermore, there is no evidence of unlawful coercion during the interrogation. The taped record of the interrogation disclosed that defendant was reminded, on several occasions, that he was free to leave at any time; defendant indicated that he grasped the import of this freedom and acknowledged that he was at the station voluntarily. See State v. Kennedy, 569 A.2d 4, 7 (R.I. 1990). The noncustodial atmosphere was not converted into a custodial one simply because the questioning occurred at a police station, or because defendant may have been a suspect, California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275, 1279-80 (1983); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977), or because an unarticulated investigative plan by Leddy and McKenna may have focused on defendant, Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3151, 82 L.Ed.2d 317, 336 (1984); Caruolo, 524 A.2d at 580 n. 2. Until the moment of his confession, at which time he was placed under arrest, defendant was not in custody, see Kennedy, 569 A.2d at 7; cf. State v. Smith, 317 N.C. 100, 104-05, 343 S.E.2d 518, 520 (1986) (where the defendant was transported to station and told he would be charged, the defendant was in custody), and admission of his confession into evidence did not, therefore, require compliance with the Miranda mandates. On the facts of this case, however, even if defendant's confession had occurred during custodial interrogation, its admission into evidence would not be precluded by Miranda because defendant had been informed of his rights at least three times: when he signed a polygraph-examination consent form that contained the requisite Miranda warnings; when he passed a written Miranda -rights test administered by Leddy; and when he was read his rights by McKenna, just before making his confession. Ultimately defendant showcased an understanding of his rights by invoking his right to counsel shortly after his confession when he was asked to sign a written statement acknowledging his confession. The defendant also argued on appeal that his confession should have been suppressed because it was the product of an illegal arrest. Although it is true that statements obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest are fruits of the poisonous tree and are to be excluded at trial, State v. Burns, 431 A.2d 1199, 1205 (R.I. 1981), our determination that defendant was not placed into custody until after incriminating himself establishes that until that time, no arrest, illegal or otherwise, had taken place. Thus defendant's argument fails. Both the Rhode Island and the Federal Constitutions bar the use in a criminal trial of a defendant's involuntary statements. State v. Griffith, 612 A.2d 21, 25 (R.I. 1992). A defendant's statement is voluntary when it is `the product of his free and rational choice.' Amado, 424 A.2d at 1062. But a confession extracted by coercion or improper inducement, including threats, violence, direct or indirect promises, or undue influence, is considered involuntary. Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97 S.Ct. 202, 203, 50 L.Ed.2d 194, 197 (1976); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513, 83 S.Ct. 1336, 1343, 10 L.Ed.2d 513, 521 (1963); Griffith, 612 A.2d at 25. When reviewing the voluntariness of a confession, all facts and circumstances surrounding the confession must be taken into account in determining whether, overall, the confession was freely and voluntarily made. State v. McLaughlin, 621 A.2d 170, 180 (R.I.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 168, 126 L.Ed.2d 128 (1993). We are not, though, required to find that the accused wanted to confess or that his confession was `completely spontaneous, like a confession to a priest, a lawyer, or a psychiatrist.' Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989, 107 S.Ct. 585, 93 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986). In support of his contention that his confession was involuntary, defendant primarily relied upon several specific occurrences during the interrogation. He argued that by informing him of the polygraph results, Leddy impermissibly coaxed him into confessing. This court has never expressly addressed the voluntariness of confessions made before, during, or after polygraph examinations. Other courts, however, have considered this issue and have concluded that polygraph examinations are not inherently coercive. See, e.g., People v. Cummings, 706 P.2d 766, 770 (Colo. 1985). `Where the evidence shows that before he confessed the defendant took a lie detector test, if it was taken willingly, neither the fact it was given nor the fact that the defendant was told by the test giver it revealed in his opinion that defendant was not telling the truth, inherently demonstrates coercion.' People v. Brown, 119 Cal. App.3d 116, 127, 173 Cal. Rptr. 877, 884 (1981). Moreover, if law enforcement officials are not permitted to inform polygraph examinees of their test results, an effective investigatory use of the polygraph in criminal matters would be severely curtailed. Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 349, 479 N.E.2d 1371, 1380 (1985) (quoting State v. Clifton, 271 Or. 177, 181, 531 P.2d 256, 258 (1975)); Young v. State, 670 P.2d 591, 594 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983). We conclude, therefore, that confessions prompted by polygraph results are not automatically rendered involuntary as a matter of law. Medeiros, 395 Mass. at 348, 479 N.E.2d at 1380. See Clifton, 271 Or. at 181, 531 P.2d at 258. Rather, the totality of circumstances must be examined by the trier of fact in order to establish whether a confession was coercively produced. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 286-87, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1252, 113 L.Ed.2d 302, 315-16 (1991); McLaughlin, 621 A.2d at 180. In this case, we are of the opinion that the confession was not coerced. The defendant also contended that Leddy improperly urged him to admit that he had set the fire by telling him that a confession would render him generally better off and by informing him that by confessing, he could get some help and could even get [away with] probation. And McKenna, defendant argues, impermissibly urged him that telling the truth would instill a good feeling, like going to confession. Moreover, defendant contended, McKenna misled him into confessing by falsely informing him that everyone who entered the storage room where the fire began had been recorded by a surveillance camera; the surveillance tape, when developed, would then reveal who had set the fire, and therefore, a confession would make things easier. Although [t]he line between proper and permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at best, a difficult one to draw, Haynes, 373 U.S. at 515, 83 S.Ct. at 1344, 10 L.Ed.2d at 521, we are of the opinion that none of defendant's additional contentions rendered his confession inadmissible. It is well-established that admonitions by the police to tell the truth do not render a subsequent confession involuntary. United States v. Ballard, 586 F.2d 1060, 1063 (5th Cir.1978). Law enforcement agents are also permitted to tell an accused that his cooperation would be helpful to him, United States v. Davidson, 768 F.2d 1266, 1271 (11th Cir.1985), and that a confession would make it better, State v. James, 459 So.2d 28, 30-31 (La. App. 1984). Accord State v. Arrington, 14 Ohio App.3d 111, 115, 470 N.E.2d 211, 216 (1984); State v. Drogsvold, 104 Wis.2d 247, 275, 311 N.W.2d 243, 256 (1981). It is permissible for an interrogator to promise an accused help in exchange for a confession. Martin v. Wainwright, 770 F.2d 918, 925 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 909, 107 S.Ct. 307, 93 L.Ed.2d 281 (1986). A confession is not rendered involuntary, as a matter of law, by law enforcement officials promising a defendant, in exchange for a confession, that they would reduce the charges, United States v. Harris, 914 F.2d 927, 933 (7th Cir.1990); or that the defendant would receive more lenient treatment, United States v. Guarno, 819 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir.1987); or that the defendant would be confined in an out-of-state prison. Pacheco, 481 A.2d at 1026. Finally, law enforcement officers may inform a suspect, truthfully or otherwise, of the evidence against him. See Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1425, 22 L.Ed.2d 684, 693 (1969); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1138 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1081, 110 S.Ct. 1139, 107 L.Ed.2d 1044 (1990); United States v. Broccolo, 797 F. Supp. 1185, 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Viewed against this background, it is clear that although the tactics allegedly employed by Leddy and McKenna are factors to consider in determining voluntariness, see Wainwright, 770 F.2d at 925-26; State v. Fuentes, 433 A.2d 184, 189 (R.I. 1981), per se they were not impermissible. Our review of the audio- and videotape of the interrogation affirms the trial court's finding that defendant was relaxed and, even though he was left unattended in the polygraph room repeatedly during the approximately two-and-one-half-hour period, defendant made no attempt to leave the room or even to rise from his chair. Maintenance of composure supports a finding of voluntariness, see Vargas v. Brown, 512 F. Supp. 271, 277 n. 7 (D.R.I. 1981), as does the fact that defendant had completed the eleventh grade and thus had the capacity and knowledge to understand what he was doing, see Battle v. Armontrout, 814 F. Supp. 1412, 1428 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (finding mere eighth-grade education supported finding of voluntariness). Finally, although defendant argued that McKenna impermissibly intimidated him by interrogating him at close quarters and right up to [his] face    in a position blocking the exit, we concur with the trial justice's finding that overall, McKenna and Leddy treated defendant with courtesy and respected his rights throughout the questioning. Indeed, as soon as defendant invoked his right to counsel, all interrogation stopped. In summary, when viewed in the context of the whole interview, the tactics used by Leddy and McKenna were aimed at inducing defendant to confess, but they did not cause him to make a statement against his will. In reviewing a trial justice's decision on a motion to suppress, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the state and applies the clearly erroneous rule. State v. Collins, 543 A.2d 641, 650 (R.I. 1988); State v. LaRosa, 112 R.I. 571, 576, 313 A.2d 375, 377 (1974). Findings of fact will not be disturbed unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence or otherwise was clearly wrong. Ocean Road Partners v. State, 612 A.2d 1107, 1111 (R.I. 1992). The trial justice found that the videotaping provided an objective recording of words, demeanor, and timing, all of which contributed to his determination that the confession was voluntary, and consequently, he denied defendant's motion to suppress. We find no error in that decision.
We next address whether admitting the audio- and videotaped confession into evidence violated defendant's Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. We conclude that it did not. Relying primarily upon Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 88 S.Ct. 507, 512, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 583 (1967) (FBI's action violated the privacy upon which [the caller] justifiably relied while using [a public] telephone booth and thus constituted a `search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment), and reasoning that a person's right to privacy continues to surround him wherever he goes, defendant argued that audio- and videotaping him at the police station violated his Fourth Amendment rights and his statutory rights set forth in chapter 5.1 of title 12, because the recording was conducted without his consent and without prior judicial approval. We disagree. In State v. Maloof, 114 R.I. 380, 384, 386, 389-91, 333 A.2d 676, 678, 681-82 (1975), this court relied upon the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Katz and held that both the Fourth Amendment and the Declaration of Rights specified in the Rhode Island Constitution safeguard one's privacy from unwarranted and unauthorized intrusion by wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping. Such Fourth Amendment protection, however, accompanies only a justifiable expectation of privacy, for [w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511, 19 L.Ed.2d at 582. For example, we upheld the admission into evidence of a statement made by a defendant, in custody, during a telephone conversation overheard by a conveniently located police officer. State v. Gelinas, 417 A.2d 1381, 1387, 1388 n. 8 (R.I. 1980). In this case, defendant signed a polygraph-examination consent form which provided in pertinent part, I consent to the use of electronic hearing and recording devices. See State v. O'Dell, 576 A.2d 425, 427 (R.I. 1990) (consensual search is constitutionally valid). Moreover, he was informed of his Miranda rights, including his right to remain silent. Nevertheless, defendant spoke openly to detectives McKenna and Leddy during a two-and-one-half-hour interview even after having been informed that he had failed the polygraph exam. Under these circumstances, defendant did not have a justifiable expectation of privacy. See Gelinas, 417 A.2d at 1388 n. 8; State v. McAdams, 559 So.2d 601, 602 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Hence, the Fourth Amendment was not a bar to admissibility of the audio- and videorecording even though it was produced without defendant's knowledge. See United States v. James, 496 F. Supp. 284, 288 (W.D. Okla. 1977) (holding that [t]apes of an accused's conversation with law enforcement officers, voluntarily made    [e]ven if    made without the accused's knowledge    may be admissible).
We find no merit to defendant's contention that his confession should have been suppressed pursuant to chapter 5.1 of title 12, which sets forth the procedure that law enforcement officials must follow in order to lawfully intercept wire or oral communications. State v. Ahmadjian, 438 A.2d 1070, 1079 (R.I. 1981). Section 12-5.1-12 permits aggrieved persons to move to suppress the contents of any intercepted wire or oral communication or evidence derived therefrom. As defined in § 12-5.1-1(a), as amended by P.L. 1986, ch. 3, § 1, the term wire communications means any communication made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, or other like connection. Clearly, defendant's statements at the police station were not wire communications as defined in § 12-5.1-1(a). Furthermore, the term oral communications, as defined in § 12-5.1-1(b), means any oral communication uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation. As discussed supra, defendant did not have a justifiable expectation that his statements to Leddy and McKenna would remain private. Therefore, he should not have formed any reasonable expectation that his statements would not have been intercepted. Accordingly, we conclude that the recording of the interview with defendant did not require compliance with the mandates of chapter 5.1 of title 12.