Opinion ID: 891649
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: it would be fundamentally unfair to preclude absent class members based on pre-certification decisions

Text: {14} The district court held that it would be fundamentally unfair to apply[] preclusive effect to [the] 1990-A [litigation] with regard to the class certification issues in this case[.] We agree. In Shovelin, we held that even if the defendant had met its burden and proved that the application of collateral estoppel was appropriate, the trial court could then determine whether [the plaintiff] was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues[.] 115 N.M. at 299, 850 P.2d at 1002. This determination of fairness is within the competence of the trial court, and we review the trial court's determination for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 297, 850 P.2d at 1000; see also Sims v. Sims, 1996-NMSC-078, ¶ 65, 122 N.M. 618, 930 P.2d 153 (An abuse of discretion occurs when a ruling is clearly contrary to the logical conclusions demanded by the facts and circumstances of the case.); State v. Moreland, 2008-NMSC-031, ¶ 9, 144 N.M. 192, 185 P.3d 363 (When there exist reasons both supporting and detracting from a trial court decision, there is no abuse of discretion. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). {15} It would be unfair to preclude absent class members from pre-certification decisions because such preclusion would be inconsistent with due process guarantees. In, Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12, 105 S.Ct. 2965, 86 L.Ed.2d 628 (1985), the United States Supreme Court held that when a defendant is attempting to bind an absent plaintiff, [t]he plaintiff must receive notice plus an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation, whether in person or through counsel ... [and] requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself from the class by executing and returning an opt out or request for exclusion form to the court. (Citations omitted.) To preclude Plaintiffs in this case based on the denial of class certification in the 1990-A litigation would deny them these minimal due process rights. See Eastham v. Pub. Employees' Ret. Ass'n Bd., 89 N.M. 399, 403, 553 P.2d 679, 683 (1976) (The Advisory Committee described subdivision [Rule 23](c)(2) as not merely discretionary and added that the mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c)(2) ... is designed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action procedure is of course subject.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Richards, 517 U.S. at 797, 116 S.Ct. 1761 (discussing due process concerns and res judicata, stating that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be inconsistent with a federal right that is `fundamental in character.' (citation omitted)). Prior to a case being certified, absent class members are not offered a right to be heard, are given no notice, and are given no opportunity to opt out. To hold that these members are precluded from bringing their claims without affording them these rights would flout the due process concerns expressed in Phillips Petroleum Co. We affirm the district court's conclusion that the 1990-A litigation has no preclusive effect on Plaintiffs in the present litigation.