Opinion ID: 4658989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Analysis of Parties' Arguments: B. Construing the Statutes by the Parties and the Standard of Review

Text: ¶14 The parties disagreed on which canon of statutory construction should apply. The county assessor argued postjudgment interest language in 12 O.S.Supp.2013 § 727.1 conflicted with § 2884. Further, because 68 O.S. § 2884 is a specific statute for ad valorem tax protest procedure its language controlled the more general statute, 12 O.S. § 727.1, which the taxpayers invoked to support their view. However, taxpayers argued no conflict existed between 68 O.S. § 2884 and 12 O.S. § 727.1, and the statutes must be construed in harmony by construing § 2884 as authorizing prejudgment interest and § 727.1 as authorizing postjudgment interest. ¶15 Legislative intent controls statutory interpretation. 21 This intent is usually expressed by the plain meaning of the statutory language. 22 We examine a whole legislative act in light of its general purpose and object, 23 and give effect to the legislature's intent by construing and applying the language in a manner which does not destroy the obvious purpose and design of the statutory language. 24 We start with a reading of the statutory language which gives full force and effect to each relevant statutory provision expressing the legislature's intent by the plain meaning of the language therein. 25 We employ rules of statutory construction when legislative intent cannot be ascertained as in a case of ambiguity, conflict, or uncertainty in meaning, and a statute contains an ambiguity if it is susceptible to more than one meaning. 26 ¶16 A well-known canon of statutory construction states a specific statute controls a general statute on the same subject. 27 This canon only applies if the two statutes conflict with one another when they may not be harmonized. 28 This analysis starts with the language of the statutes at issue, and whether statutory language is ambiguous, conflicting, or its meaning uncertain, and this analysis presents a question of law reviewed de novo by the Court. 29 ¶17 Taxpayers do not expressly state § 2884 is ambiguous, but such is the effect of their argument. They argue the term interest in 68 O.S. § 2884 means prejudgment interest. In other words, the legislature omitted the qualifying term prejudgment in the different enacted versions of § 2884, and accrued interest is an ambiguous term when § 2884 does not distinguish between prejudgment and postjudgment interest. Taxpayers rely on the presence of this ambiguity in § 2884 as a basis for their argument no conflict exists between interest awarded by 12 O.S. § 727.1 and interest awarded by 68 O.S. § 2884. ¶18 The assertion of ambiguity in § 2884 is presented by taxpayers in the context of their argument stating any doubt as to possible meaning in § 2884 must be resolved in favor of the taxpayers. Taxpayers rely on In re Holt , 1997 OK 12, 932 P.2d 1130, 1134, and Video Gaming Techs., Inc. v. Tulsa Cty. Bd. of Tax Roll Corrs. , 2019 OK 84, ¶ 11, 455 P.3d 918, 921, and statements stating doubts concerning tax laws are to be resolved in favor of a taxpayer. ¶19 This argument for a construction of a tax statute in favor of these taxpayers is not applicable for several reasons, three of which we may immediately note since they are necessarily raised by taxpayers' argument. First, when language is ambiguous, uncertain, conflicting, or creating doubt in a tax statute exacting a tax, then the language may be construed against the state when such construction may be accomplished without a discriminatory effect. 30 We have stated an explanation for this rule: The rule means that the provisions of statutes levying taxes will not be extended by implication beyond the clear import of the language used. 31 The 68 O.S. § 2884 controversy presented by taxpayers does not involve the imposition of a tax by implication upon these particular taxpayers. 32 ¶20 Secondly, doubts must arise from ambiguous, conflicting, or uncertain statutory language in the tax law itself, and not from a failure by a party in applying the plain and ordinary meaning of language in a tax statute. 33 As we explain herein, the tax statute at issue, 68 O.S. § 2884, contains no ambiguity, uncertainty, or internal conflict because the term interest therein was designed by the legislature to provide interest during the entire time a tax protest appeal is being litigated, with the legislative goal of providing what is essentially a combined prejudgment and postjudgment interest. ¶21 Thirdly, this Court has previously explained the ad valorem tax remedy procedures provide exclusive means for judicial redress of a legal claim within the scope of the ad valorem statutory remedies. 34 The exclusivity of this ad valorem statutory procedure over a general civil statutory procedure occurs, for example, when the ad valorem statute is not silent on the legal issue, i.e. , the legislature has affirmatively stated in the ad valorem statute how the legal issue should be determined. 35 Again, we explain herein the legislative goal in § 2884 is to provide interest during the entire time an ad valorem protest appeal is prosecuted by the taxpayer, and this § 2884 procedure for interest is part of the exclusive ad valorem tax protest remedy. ¶22 The county assessor's appellate briefs rely on legislative amendments to section 2884 dating from 1988. Language in § 2884 has an historical context relating to a taxpayer's equitable claim to accrued interest in certain tax protests, and as we explain herein this context supports the assessor's construction of § 2884. The historical context supports the conclusion that in a successful tax protest § 2884 paragraph (E)(1) provides accrued interest payable to the taxpayer calculated from the time the protested payment is deposited into the interest-bearing account until after the county assessor computes and certifies to the county treasurer the correct amount of taxes payable by the taxpayer as determined by the District Court, and when the taxpayer files a proper verified claim therefor. ¶23 The assessor's conduct required by § 2884 in computing and certifying the proper ad valorem assessment for the treasurer to use when computing accrued interest occurs at the conclusion of the protest proceeding, and in our case today it occurred after an appellate remand to the District Court. ¶24 When we consider taxpayers' argument relying on the phrase upon final determination of the appeal, and the absence of the qualifying term prejudgment in § 2884, we may not limit our analysis to these words alone and we must consider the context of the terms. 36 When we consider the county assessor's argument alleging a conflict in statutes, we include an examination of the intent of the legislature to determine if an actual conflict exists, and this examination may include the historical context of the legislation, 37 including court opinions and previous codified versions of the legislation at issue explaining this context. 38 We must construe a statute to accomplish the legislative goals intended by the legislature. 39 Taxpayers' argument raises the issue whether their view of § 2884 accomplishes or destroys the legislative goals in § 2884.