Opinion ID: 2974032
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: due process and ex post facto

Text: Anderson was sentenced on March 14, 2005, one month after the Supreme Court issued its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005). Anderson claims that applying the remedial portion of Booker, violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution because under Booker he will receive a longer maximum sentence. The ex post facto clause is implicated where a law punishes retrospectively. “A law is retrospective if it ‘changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date.’” United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 347 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 433 (1987)). Anderson argues that this Court should United States v. Anderson, Case Nos. 05-5569/05-5697 page 5 of 11 apply the mandatory Guidelines to his sentence, so that he will not receive a higher sentence under the remedial Booker holding. The government contends that Anderson improperly seeks a sentence that would comport with the Sixth Amendment requirements of Booker, but avoids the possibility of a higher sentence under Booker’s remedial holding. Recently, this Court in United States v. Ediger, 166 F.Appx. 218 (6th Cir. Feb. 14, 2006) (unpublished) rejected a similar ex post facto argument. In Ediger, the defendant argued that because he engaged in criminal activity before Booker, the district court’s application of Booker to his sentence violated his due process rights and the rule against ex post facto laws. This Court summarily rejected Edigar’s argument stating that: [t]he Supreme Court also explicitly held that its decision would apply to all cases on direct review, cases where the defendants necessarily completed their criminal activities before Booker was decided. If Booker applies to the sentences of defendants who have already been sentenced (but whose cases are on direct appeal), it is undisputable that Booker must also apply to the sentences of defendants like Ediger who committed crimes before Booker but were sentenced after Booker. Id. at 225 (emphasis added). Other circuits have rejected similar ex post facto claims. See United States v. Jamison, 416 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Dupas, 417 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lata, 415 F.3d 107 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Scroggins, 411 F.3d 572 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2005); United States v. Lucania, 397 F.Supp.2d 288 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“post-Booker courts have uniformly rejected this argument”); United States v. Green, __ F.3d __, No. CR-2-01-072, 2005 WL 1460176 (S.D. Oh. June 21, 2005); United States v. Null, slip op., No. 04-253, 2005 WL 1527747 (E.D.Pa. June 28, 2005); United States v. Gray, 362 F.Supp.2d 714 (S.D.W.Va. 2005). United States v. Anderson, Case Nos. 05-5569/05-5697 page 6 of 11 Anderson argues that he pled guilty based on the facts of his indictment without signing a plea agreement relying on the fact that he would be sentenced within a certain Guideline range. In Booker, the Supreme Court held that (1) the constitutional rule announced in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), applies to the Guidelines; and (2) the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, but advisory. Booker, 543 U.S. at 220. The Supreme Court clearly instructed that both holdings should be applied to all cases on direct review. Id. at 268. This Court must apply both portions of the Booker holding, including the remedial portion, to Anderson’s sentence which does not violate the ex post facto clause. Accordingly, we reject Anderson’s argument that his sentence violates the ex post facto clause.