Opinion ID: 4526150
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Havis

Text: Alternatively, McClain argues that TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a)(4)’s possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver includes possession with intent to attempt to deliver, meaning that possession with intent to deliver encompasses attempts. See Appellant Br. at 15–17. And, appearing to apply the categorical approach, he asserts that individuals “can be convicted” of this crime in Tennessee based on Tennessee’s pattern jury instructions. Id. The clear, though unstated, implication of this argument is that McClain’s conviction for possession with intent to 8 No. 19-5963, United States v. McClain deliver is barred by Havis because attempt crimes may not serve as controlled-substance offenses under § 4B1.2(b). See Appellant Br. at 10. His arguments do not prove successful, however. As a preliminary matter, McClain relies on Havis for the proposition that Tennessee’s statutory definition of “delivery” includes attempted delivery. See id. at 7, 13–15, 16–17; Reply Br. at 1. In Havis, we accepted the parties’ agreement that delivery under § 39-17-417(a)(2) includes attempted delivery. See Havis, 927 F.3d at 385. McClain takes Havis one step further by asserting that possession with intent to deliver under § 39-17-417(a)(4) includes an attempt offense, possession with intent to attempt to deliver, based on this definition of delivery. See Appellant Br. at 16–17. The government raises a variety of arguments as to why the definition of “delivery” does not include attempted delivery, many of which were raised by the concurring opinion in the denial of en banc reconsideration in Havis, United States v. Havis, 929 F.3d 317, 318–20 (6th Cir. 2019) (Sutton, J., concurring). See Appellee Br. at 10–12. McClain responds to none of them, and so we lack the benefit of responsive briefing to address this question. Fortunately, we need not attempt to do so because even crediting McClain’s argument that Tennessee’s definition of “delivery” includes attempted delivery, he does not show that there is a realistic probability that TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-417(a)(4) would be applied to possession of a controlled substance with intent to attempt to deliver the controlled substance. McClain’s hypothesized possession-with-intent-to-attempt-to-deliver offense is inconsistent with Tennessee law. There is no realistic probability that Tennessee would apply subsection (a)(4) to possession of a controlled substance with intent to attempt to deliver. In Tennessee, an individual commits a criminal attempt who: 9 No. 19-5963, United States v. McClain (1) Intentionally engages in action or causes a result that would constitute an offense, if the circumstances surrounding the conduct were as the person believes them to be; (2) Acts with intent to cause a result that is an element of the offense, and believes the conduct will cause the result without further conduct on the person’s part; or (3) Acts with intent to complete a course of action or cause a result that would constitute the offense, under the circumstances surrounding the conduct as the person believes them to be, and the conduct constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-101(a) (2019) (emphasis added). In other words, a defendant must intentionally act, or intend to “to complete a course of action or cause a result.” State v. Mateyko, 53 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tenn. 2001) (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-12-101, cmts.); see also State v. Hall, --- S.W.3d ----, No. M2015-02402-SC-R11-CD, 2019 WL 117580 , at  (Tenn. Jan. 7, 2019) (applying the criminal-attempt statute). Tennessee does not appear to recognize an intent to attempt an offense as a permitted mental state for criminal attempts. This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that McClain has not provided a case, nor can we find one, recognizing intent to attempt as a state of mind—in any context, criminal or otherwise— or a case in which Tennessee prosecuted possession of a controlled substance with intent to attempt to deliver. The only cases prosecuting subsection (a)(4) for an attempt do so on the basis of attempted possession with the intent to manufacture, sell, or deliver. See, e.g., State v. Champion, No. W2019–00230–CCA–R3–CD, 2020 WL 504826, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 30, 2020). Based on the arguments presented, we cannot conclude that there is a realistic probability that Tennessee would apply subsection (a)(4) to possession of a controlled substance with intent to attempt to deliver the controlled substance. 10 No. 19-5963, United States v. McClain McClain points to Tennessee’s pattern jury instructions, Appellant Br. at 15–17, but the instructions do not demonstrate a realistic probability that Tennessee would apply subsection (a)(4) to possession with intent to attempt to deliver. The instructions only repackage the text of TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-17-417(a)(4) and 39-17-402(6). See 7 TENN. PRAC. PATTERN JURY INSTR. T.P.I- CRIM 31.04 (Westlaw Oct. 2019). For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the district court erred when it permitted McClain’s conviction under § 39-17-417(a)(4) for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver to serve as a predicate offense for the application of Guideline § 4B1.2.2