Opinion ID: 382337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Restrictions as to Manner

Text: 19 Subparagraphs 4, 6, and 7 regulate the manner of use of sound amplification equipment. The first of these provisions requires sound trucks to move at a speed of at least 10 m. p. h. unless impeded or stopped by the flow of traffic and to cease broadcasting one minute after being stopped. The city argues that the operation of a sound truck in any other manner would constitute a traffic hazard and create danger for both motorists and pedestrians. At the same time, the city offers no evidence to support this broad claim. Such a generalization is undoubtedly true in certain times, places and situations-but not always. The city may define a traffic hazard or an unsafe speed of operation for any vehicle and apply the same standard to a sound truck. But if other vehicles are allowed to move slowly or stop on a certain street, a sound truck may also do so until it has actually created, or imminently threatens to create, the same kind of material disruption or danger to traffic and pedestrians that would be objectionable if caused by any other vehicle or activity. This subparagraph is not narrowly tailored to protect the city's legitimate interests, and is accordingly void for unconstitutional overbreadth. 20 Subparagraph 6 requires the volume of sound amplification to be controlled so that it is not unreasonably loud, raucous, jarring, disturbing, or a nuisance to persons within the area of audibility. The district court found that the terms unreasonably and nuisance are imprecise, do not give the ordinary person fair notice of prohibited conduct, and allow arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by officials. The court therefore found this subparagraph to be void for vagueness under the Fourteenth Amendment. We disagree. The Supreme Court has approved the use of the word unreasonably in similar statutes that are otherwise precise and narrowly drawn. Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 615-16, 88 S.Ct. 1335, 1338, 20 L.Ed.2d 182 (1968). The Court has also approved the terms loud and raucous as standards of prohibited sound amplification. Though these words are abstract, they have through daily use acquired a content that conveys to any interested person a sufficiently accurate concept of what is forbidden. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 79, 69 S.Ct. 448, 450, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). 11 We approve the words jarring and nuisance on the same grounds, even though they fall short of providing mathematical certainty. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 110, 92 S.Ct. at 2299. Flexibility and reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity, is acceptable in this area. Id. 21 The remainder of the prohibitory language in subparagraph 6, disturbing ... to persons within the area of audibility, presents a closer question. The Supreme Court has expressed reservations about the word disturbs in a similar ordinance. But in the expectation that a state court would interpret the term objectively to mean actual or imminent interference with ... 'peace or good order' , the Court eventually found the term not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109-112, 92 S.Ct. at 2299-01. We have a similar expectation with regard to subparagraph 6. If actual experience with the ordinance were to demonstrate that it represents a subjective standard, prohibiting a volume that any individual person within the area of audibility happens to find personally disturbing, we would not hesitate to change our judgment accordingly. Taking subparagraph 6 as a whole, we must at this time reverse the district court's finding that it is unconstitutionally vague. 22 Subparagraph 7 prohibits the operation of any sound amplification equipment with an excess of twenty (20) watts of power in the last stage of amplification. At trial the plaintiff made much of the fact that a regulation based upon decibels at the point of hearing, rather than watts at the point of amplification, would more precisely relate to the city's interest in keeping sound within non-disruptive levels. That is undoubtedly true, and the district court used the existence of this least restrictive means as the basis of finding subparagraph 7 unconstitutionally overbroad. But the requirement that a statute be narrowly tailored is only one factor in answering the ultimate question whether the regulation is reasonable. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 116-17, 92 S.Ct. at 2303. Consequently, a city is not required to adopt the least restrictive means of regulation no matter what the consequences, but the reasonableness of its decision will be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). Administrative convenience is certainly a proper factor for the City of Houston to weigh in choosing one standard of regulation over another. International Society for Krishna Consciousness v. Eaves, 601 F.2d 809, 829-30 (5th Cir. 1979). The plaintiff's own expert testified that enforcement of a decibel-based regulation is a very, very complex issue due to the infinite number of points of measurement, as was demonstrated in U.S. Labor Party v. Pomerleau, 557 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1977). The record clearly supports the city's contention that a watts-based regulation is reasonable: the small gain in precision is more than offset by a substantial loss of administrative convenience. We therefore disagree with the district court's holding that a wattage-based regulation is inherently overbroad. 23 But the number of watts chosen as the point of regulation must also be reasonable. The district court made no finding as to this issue because it invalidated subparagraph 7 solely on the grounds that it is wattage-based. Our examination of the record shows that the plaintiff's expert witness testified that sound amplification in excess of 20 watts could be non-disruptive. The city did not offer any contrary evidence, and thus conclusively failed to meet its burden of justifying the regulation. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. at 738. Accordingly, we must declare subparagraph 7 unconstitutionally overbroad to the extent that it is limited to 20 watts.