Opinion ID: 1057924
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Pre-1977 Case Law and the Limited Constitutional Convention

Text: The status of constitutional officers became an important issue in cases arising after the formation of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County. In Winter , the county clerk in Davidson County asserted that because his office was constitutionally based, his duties could not be diverted to the property assessor. 367 S.W.2d at 787-90. He argued that he had been unconstitutionally deprived of his official responsibilities in contravention of the general law. Id. at 788. This Court rejected the argument, holding that while the county clerk and other local offices are generally included in county government by the terms of our constitution, the specific duties and functions of the offices are prescribed by law and may be repealed, abolished, or transferred by a new and different law. Id. at 789. In Glasgow v. Fox, 214 Tenn. 656, 383 S.W.2d 9 (1964), this Court rejected the contention by certain election commissioners that the enabling legislation for metropolitan government abolished every local or county office not expressly retained by the statute or by the charter: No such broad effect, in our opinion, can be given this provision. When construed with the other parts of the Act, as must be done, it does not evidence a legislative intent to abolish or destroy all officers of the former consolidated governments not expressly retained. Id. at 11. This Court held that the position of constable was a constitutional office like that of sheriff, trustee, and register, and that none of these offices can be abolished by the Legislature. Id. at 10 (citations omitted); see Redistricting Cases, 111 Tenn. 234, 80 S.W. 750, 756-57 (Tenn.1904); State ex rel. Hayes v. Cummins, 99 Tenn. 667, 42 S.W. 880, 881 (1897); On the petition to rehear in Glasgow, this Court ruled that the legislature, by the Consolidation Act of 1957, did not abolish the office of constable or any other constitutional office; nor did it authorize the Charter Commission to do so. Glasgow, 383 S.W.2d at 13. The 1977 Limited Constitutional Convention changed the landscape of county government in this state. Ironically, there was a procedural glitch. The bill calling for a convention referendum was never signed by Governor Ray Blanton, who opposed the measure. Based on an Attorney General's opinion indicating that the Governor's signature was not necessary, however, the bill was deemed enacted. Tenn. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59 (1976). Although the Tennessee Court of Appeals later determined that gubernatorial assent was, in fact, required, it declined to interfere with the convention after the fact. Crenshaw v. Blanton, 606 S.W.2d 285, 289-90 (Tenn.Ct. App.1980); see Lewis L. Laska, The 1977 Limited Constitutional Convention, 61 Tenn. L.Rev. 485, 489-90 (1994). Term limits were a topic at the convention, as the delegates proposed and adopted the present two-consecutive-term limitation for the office of Governor. Journal of the Debates of the Constitutional Convention (1977) 457-58 (hereinafter  Journal ); see Tenn. Const. art. III, § 4. Proposed language that would have limited sheriffs to no more than two terms consecutively was defeated. Journal at 750, 1294, 1301. Several parties to this action have argued that the delegates to the convention opposed term limits under the charter form of government. That claim is supported by an observation by J.D. Lee, the Convention President: The next section is terms of office. Uniform four-year term for all elected officials. This is a substantive change over the current system. Presently the presiding officer over the county court, if it is a county judge, he has an eight-year term; if it is a county chairman, he has a one-year term. This would reduce the [county] judge from an eight-year term to a four-year term; board of education members are usually elected for six years, this would reduce them to four years also. Justices of the Peace as they are now known serve six-year terms. They would be reduced, hereafter known as county legislators, and serve four-year terms. Sheriffs would be increased from two to four-year terms. Constables would be increased from two to four-year terms. The Committee considered certain limitations on terms and nearly unanimously rejected any such limitation on any office. Journal at 683 (Oct. 31, 1977) (emphasis added). While the convention delegates did not recommend term limits for the constitutional county officers, however, it has been suggested that their reluctance to do so was based on a fear of the wrath of these influential officers, which could have spelled defeat for ratification. Laska, supra. at 522 (The delegates knew that without the sheriffs' support the county government provision would likely fail ratification.). The General Assembly's call of the constitutional convention in 1977 empowered that body to alter, reform or abolish, inter alia, Article VII, Sections 1 and 2 relative to county officers. 1976 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1287-96, § 1. As a result of the convention, certain offices like that of ranger, whose duty by law was to round up stray cattle, justice of the peace, coroner, and constable were deconstitutionalized. Laska, supra. at 493, 517, 521. In a 1981 opinion, the Attorney General observed that the third paragraph of article VII might allow for the exclusion of officers enumerated under Paragraph 1 (i.e., sheriff, trustee, county clerk, register of deeds, and property assessor). Tenn. Att'y Op. Gen. No. 81-118, 1981 WL 142765 at  (Feb. 24, 1981). Nevertheless, the Attorney General, after a review of the debates, opined that the convention's intent was to require the officers enumerated in Paragraph 1 to be retained even under an alternate form of government as described in the third paragraph. Id. For over 25 years, this view prevailed.