Opinion ID: 4357626
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Winfield Defense

Text: Under Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996), a criminal defendant may attempt to create reasonable doubt regarding his or her guilt by asserting that a witness at trial is, in fact, a suspect – another individual who may be at fault for the crime. In order to present a Winfield defense, a defendant must proffer to the trial court a sufficiently detailed explanation that provides context “as to third-party responsibility for a crime [and avoids the] risks [of] misleading the jury by distracting it from the issue of whether this defendant is guilty or not.” Id. at 5 (emphasis in original). This proffer must suggest a “nexus between the proffered evidence and the charged crime” – and the nexus must be more than just a simple motive. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 5 (citations omitted). In ruling upon a defendant’s proffer, “the trial court should exclude Winfield evidence if it is too remote in time and place, completely unrelated or irrelevant to the offense charged, or too speculative with respect to the third party’s guilt.” Andrews v. United States, 179 A.3d 279, 295 (D.C. 2018) (quoting Turner v. United States, 116 A.3d 894, 917 (D.C. 2015)). On appeal, “[w]e review a trial court’s determination on the admissibility of a third-party perpetrator defense for abuse of discretion, and that determination ‘will be upset on appeal only upon a showing of grave abuse.’” 49 Melendez v. United States, 26 A.3d 234, 241 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266, 1271 (D.C. 1996)). In order to support a Winfield line of questioning, Ashby provided a factual proffer that stated: It’s our belief that Mr. Thomas has an extensive heroin operation that essentially ran its course . . . and ended up butting heads with the decedent’s operation. Mr. Thomas has a longstanding heroin business centered in LeDroit Park, specifically 70 W Street. We have information about his suppliers, the number of people who ran heroin for him in the area. And we know that in spite of what he says, that he was very familiar with Mr. Bolden and what operations Mr. Bolden had and what success Mr. Bolden had . . . . Although I will not be confronting him on being the actual trigger man . . . . As the Court knows, Mr. Thomas is a convicted murderer . . . . The trial court recognized that “there’s much less of a burden on the defense to make a showing than it is for the government to bring charges against the defendant,” but found that the allegations of drug dealing were not sufficient to show a “nexus to the underlying murder.” However, based on Ashby’s argument at trial that the “drug relationship” between Logan and Mr. Thomas was relevant, the court allowed questioning to establish the “friendship” between Logan and Mr. Thomas. 50 We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s holding that Winfield evidence was inappropriate as to Mr. Thomas. The evidence proffered against Mr. Thomas was remote, as nothing placed him in the vicinity of the crime or near the victims at any time near the murder, aside from testimony that Mr. Thomas was at 70 W Street on December 24, 2009, six days before the murder. It established that Mr. Thomas likely knew Mr. Bolden at one time and had been convicted of murder in the past, but was totally speculative as to Mr. Thomas’ potential involvement in the murder of Mr. Bolden. Since Ashby presented no evidence that Mr. Thomas had a viable reason to harm Mr. Bolden and Ms. Daniels, aside from an inference that Mr. Thomas and Mr. Bolden may have been competitors in the drug trade, there was no evidence of a nexus to the crime. Ashby contends that the trial court applied the incorrect standard in determining whether this Winfield evidence should be admitted, an argument based primarily on the trial court’s comment that there was no “triggering event” in the proffer as to what would have prompted Mr. Thomas to commit such a heinous crime. However, the trial court did not require the “exhaustive proffer” that Ashby claims it did; rather, it noted that there was no evidence presented that showed anything other than Mr. Thomas and the victim’s willingness to come and go from 51 70 W Street, trading in drugs. Absent any evidence – even circumstantial evidence – of a connection or motive, the trial court permissibly found that there was no evidence that tended to create a “reasonable possibility” that Mr. Thomas was involved in the crimes. Winfield, 676 A.2d at 5 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 552 A.2d 513, 516 (D.C. 1989)). We see no reason to upset the trial court’s determination on appeal.23