Opinion ID: 1300630
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Factor (j)-(k).

Text: (12) Defendant also contends the standard instruction based on section 190.3, factor (k) (former ง 190.3, factor (j)), which directs the jury to consider [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, failed to inform the jury it should consider the evidence of defendant's character and background in mitigation. In Easley, supra, we recognized this potential ambiguity and directed future trial courts to instruct penalty juries that they may consider any evidence in mitigation the defendant presents. (34 Cal.3d at p. 878, & fn. 10, citing Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at p. 604 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 990].) Inasmuch as the trial court did not give this expanded factor (j)-(k) instruction, defendant claims his jury was misled into believing his character evidence was irrelevant. In evaluating such arguments, we have taken our cue from the United States Supreme Court's decision in California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538. The high court there stressed the necessity of analyzing the record in each case to determine whether the jury instructions, taken as a whole, and read in conjunction with the prosecutor's arguments, adequately informed the jury of its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. [Citations.] ( Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777.) Initially, no supplemental ameliorative jury instructions were given in this case. However, after refusing the jury's request for a definition of first degree murder, the court commented: As far as the facts of the event, you have heard all that and that's before you, and you are to make your decision based upon all the evidence presented at the trial.  (Italics added.) This supplemental instruction arguably directed the jury to consider defendant's character evidence. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 510 [244 Cal. Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803].) In addition, the prosecutor's closing argument clearly implied the evidence of defendant's background and history should be considered. The thesis of the prosecutor's argument was that these considerations did not outweigh the factors in aggravation. For example, the prosecutor spent much of his argument pointing out that defendant's PCP intoxication defense was unbelievable. He then averred, I acknowledge some little impairment. How do you weigh that against the lives of three people? Later the prosecutor asked, How many points do you give him for being young? How many points can you give him for a non-violent life? How many points can you give him for not being caught before when he was only nineteen or twenty? How can you weigh that against the willful and deliberate killing of three people? It is obvious the prosecutor assumed the jury could consider defendant's background and character evidence, whether or not it related directly to the seriousness of the capital crime, but that the evidence simply was insufficient to justify mercy in this case. We thus conclude the jury was not misled by the trial court's failure to deliver an expanded factor (j)-(k) instruction.