Opinion ID: 1748498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: recorded oral findings of fact and reasons for revocation are sufficient to satisfy due process under morrissey

Text: In Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, and Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756, the United States Supreme Court set out the minimum requirements of due process that must be afforded a defendant at a probation revocation hearing. They include (a) written notice of the claimed violations of (probation or) parole; (b) disclosure to the (probationer or) parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a `neutral and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking (probation or) parole. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786, 93 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593) (Emphasis added). At issue in this case is requirement (f) of the Morrissey factors requiring that the trial court make a written statement identifying the evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation. It has been explained that the written statement requirement provides a basis for appellate review, as well as encouraging accuracy in fact finding. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254, 85 L.Ed.2d 636 (1985). In Romano , as here, the parolee, citing Morrissey , contended that the court which had revoked his parole had not provided an adequate written statement. Romano held, however, that [t]he memorandum prepared by the sentencing court and the transcript of the hearing provided the necessary written statement explaining the evidence relied upon and the reason for the decision to revoke probation. Id. (Emphasis added). Thus, Romano signals that something other than an explicit written order signed by the trial judge may satisfy the Morrissey requirement. In fact, in Morrissey the Supreme Court stated that it had no thought to create an inflexible structure for parole revocation procedures. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 490, 92 S.Ct. 2593. Rather, its principal concern was the absence of an adequate record which would enable judicial review of the reasons for parole revocation. Id. When Morrissey was decided in 1972, revocation hearings and lower court proceedings were frequently conducted by judges or hearing officers who were not trained in the law and often without the services of a court reporter. There existed no practical substitute for a court reporter. There was no practical means of courtroom video recording, and audio recording equipment was not generally available. The written order was, therefore, the best means of documenting for appellate review what had transpired. Without a written statement of facts, adequate judicial review was nearly impossible. Several United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have moved away from the inflexible requirement of a formalistic written order by the revoking court as the only method of satisfying Morrissey . See United States v. Gilbert, 990 F.2d 916 (6th Cir.1993) (District judge's oral recitation of findings from bench, in support of revocation of supervised release, satisfied requirement that written statement be provided, insofar as hearing was transcribed verbatim.); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829 (4th Cir.1992) (Transcribed oral finding can serve as written statement of evidence and reasons for revoking supervised release under due process claim when transcript and record compiled before trial judge enables reviewing court to determine basis of trial court's decision.); United States v. Barth, 899 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.1990) (Trial court's transcribed oral findings with respect to revocation of defendant's probation satisfied due process requirement of written statement by fact finder as to evidence relied on and reasons for revoking probation.); United States v. Yancey, 827 F.2d 83 (7th Cir.1987) (Transcript of oral findings made at time of probation revocation was sufficient to enable reviewing court to determine basis of judge's decision.); Morishita v. Morris, 702 F.2d 207 (10th Cir.1983) (Written findings are constitutionally required only if the transcript and record before the judge who revokes probation would not enable a reviewing court to determine the basis of the judge's decision to revoke probation.) We agree with the reasoning expressed in these cases explaining why something other than a written order may satisfy due process requirements. Extending the reasoning of the above cases to an untranscribed video tape recording, [4] we see no reason why oral findings made from the bench, as long as otherwise adequate, cannot satisfy the due process requirement of Morrissey , at least where, as here, we possess a video record that is sufficiently complete to allow the parties and us to determine the evidence relied on and the reasons for revoking probation. Romano, 471 U.S. at 612, 105 S.Ct. 2254; Barth, 899 F.2d at 201. The basis for requiring a written statement of facts is to ensure accurate fact finding and to provide `an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence.' Yancey, 827 F.2d at 89 (quoting Romano, 471 U.S. at 613-14, 105 S.Ct. 2254). We believe these goals are satisfied when the oral findings and reasons for revocation as recorded in the video record enable a reviewing court to determine the basis of the judge's decision to revoke probation. Id.; see also Morishita, 702 F.2d at 210; Barth, 899 F.2d at 202. Of course, we might rule differently were we faced with general conclusory reasons by the [trial] court for revoking probation, Barth, 899 F.2d at 202; Lacey, 648 F.2d at 445, or with a record from which we were unable to determine the basis of the [trial] court's decision to revoke probation. Smith, 767 F.2d at 524. But absent such situations, to demand that a trial court turn its oral findings and reasons for revocation into a written order seems unduly formalistic. Romano, 471 U.S. at 611, 105 S.Ct. 2254 (previous cases have sought to accommodate, while avoiding the imposition of rigid requirements, the probationer's interest in retaining liberty and the state's interest in preserving its discretion and assuring the accuracy of probation proceedings); Barth, 899 F.2d at 202. In this case, the trial court made an oral statement from the bench at the conclusion of the revocation hearing that provided the reason and findings for revoking probation. At the hearing, the Commonwealth presented evidence and testimony that Appellee absconded from probation supervision and Appellee presented no countervailing evidence (except for his novel defense that he was not required to report until off parole). The trial court, in turn, made findings that the evidence of Appellee absconding from probation supervision indicated that he had violated the terms of his probation. This finding matches with the condition of probation that Appellee [r]eport to the probation officer as directed and comply with all written rules, regulations or stipulations imposed by him and the Department of Corrections, Division of Probation and Parole. Thus, the recording of the probation revocation hearing in this matter provides an adequate record of the reasons for revocation and the evidence in support thereof. Further, the reasons given by the trial court to support the revocation order provide sufficient grounds to revoke Appellee's probation. Since Appellee was fully notified of the court's findings, and the basis of the revocation at the hearing, the due process requirement, as expressed in Morrissey , was satisfied. With the above said, we hasten to clarify that the intent of our holding is not to endorse an across-the-board abandonment of the Morrissey written order requirement. Such a requirement is not unduly burdensome and should be implemented as part of a trial court's routine probation revocation process. A written order facilitates efficiency for all concerned in the appellate review process, and remains the preferred practice.