Opinion ID: 2172088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Section 354 Indictments

Text: Defendant initially attacks his convictions for theft by deception on the ground that each section 354 indictment fails to allege all essential elements of the offense. Each indictment under section 354 of the Maine Criminal Code charged: On or about the ____ day of May, 1976, at ____, in the County of Kennebec and State of Maine, Linwood Barker, with intent to deprive [a named business person] of its [his] property, did obtain or exercise unauthorized control over the property of the said business or person, to wit, ____ dollars ($____), by falsely promising through his agent, [name omitted], to place a commercial ad in a publication entitled the Megaphone. None of the defendant's section 354 indictments directly and positively avers that the promise made by the defendant, through his agent, was unconditional and made without present intention of performance. Under the pre-Code counterpart of section 354, 17 M.R.S.A. § 1601 (1964), it was necessary for the State to allege and prove that a promise bore both those characteristics in order for it to constitute a false pretense within the meaning of that statute. [4] State v. Austin, 159 Me. 71, 188 A.2d 275 (1963). Contrary to defendant's assertions, however, the State's failure expressly to plead those facts in the section 354 indictments does not render those instruments fatally defective. Section 354 makes a person . . . guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises unauthorized control over property of another as a result of deception and with an intention to deprive him thereof. (Emphasis added) On its face, each of defendant's indictments alleges unequivocally that the defendant, through his agent, obtained or exercised unauthorized control over the property of another with the intent to deprive the owner thereof and that the property was obtained by him as a result of deception, i. e., by falsely promising. [5] Furthermore, each indictment here involved goes further than merely to allege the essential element of deception in general conclusory terms. [6] Each indictment specifically alleges that the defendant obtained the property by falsely promising . . . to place a commercial ad in a publication entitled the Megaphone. That language amply serves to describe the means of deception allegedly utilized by the defendant in carrying out the thefts charged. Section 354(2)(A) assists us in reaching that determination. That paragraph provides: For purposes of this section, deception occurs when a person intentionally: Creates or reinforces an impression which is false and which that person does not believe to be true, including false impressions as to law, value, knowledge, opinion, intention or other state of mind. Provided, however, that an intention not to perform a promise, or knowledge that a promise will not be performed, shall not be inferred from the fact alone that the promise was not performed. . . . (Emphasis added) In contrast to the former statute, which only in recent times was amended to permit any promise whatsoever to constitute a false pretense, the definition of deception under the code offense embraces any intentional conduct which has the proscribed effect of creat[ing] or reinforc[ing] an impression which is false and which the actor does not believe to be true. . . . The definition of deception is unrestricted as to means. Clearly, a promise falls within the statute, and equally clearly, it is no longer material whether that promise is conditional or not. Under section 354 the false impression created or reinforced by the defendant can relate to an intention or any other state of mind of the actor. The deception is complete if the false impression as to intention is given to a third person and, in the terms of the statute, the actor does not subjectively believe at the time of promising that he intends to carry out the promise. The commentary to the analogous provision of the Model Penal Code, [7] obviously the model for our section 354, sheds light upon the meaning of the latter requirement: If the actor in fact believes in the accuracy of the impression created or reinforced, he is not guilty of deception even though his belief was stupid or unreasonable. But it is not necessary for the prosecution to prove that the actor affirmatively disbelieved; if he created the impression that he believed something to be true, when in fact he had no belief on the subject, he has deceived. (Emphasis added) Model Penal Code § 206.2, Comment at 66 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1954). Of course, when the actor's deception consists of creating a false impression by means of a promise that he intends to perform in accordance with that promise, the State must plead and prove not only that the actor did not believe in his intention to perform, but also, because of the requirement that the actor's impression of intention be false, that the actor did not in fact intend to perform at the moment of making his promise. From this analysis we conclude that the phrase by falsely promising adequately states the means of deception allegedly employed by the defendant. That language charged the defendant, through his agent, with having created, by means of a promise, an impression in the minds of the third parties named that he intended to publish a commercial advertisement in Megaphone, at some unspecified date, in exchange for the consideration paid. The word falsely suffices to connote both that the impression created was false, i. e., that the defendant did not in fact intend to publish at all and, by necessary implication, that the defendant did not at the time of promising believe that he intended to publish as promised. Cf. State v. Thibodeau, Me., 353 A.2d 595 (1976); Logan v. State, Me., 263 A.2d 266 (1970). [8] We find no infirmity in defendant's indictments for theft by deception under section 354 of the Maine Criminal Code.