Opinion ID: 785776
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Castle's Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 121 Castle contends that he was denied the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Specifically, Castle claims that counsel should not have (1) stipulated to Castle's signature on four government trial exhibits or (2) advised Castle to pursue safety-valve consideration at sentence, pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2. 122 This court is generally disinclined to resolve ineffective assistance claims on direct review. See United States v. Khedr, 343 F.3d at 99-100 (and cases cited therein). As the Supreme Court recently reminded us, in most cases a motion brought under § 2255 is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance because the district court is best suited to developing the facts necessary to determining the adequacy of representation during an entire trial. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 123 S.Ct. 1690, 1694, 155 L.Ed.2d 714 (2003). Nevertheless, direct appellate review is not foreclosed. As we stated in United States v. Morris, [w]hen faced with a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal, we may: (1) decline to hear the claim, permitting the appellant to raise the issue as part of a subsequent petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255; (2) remand the claim to the district court for necessary factfinding; or (3) decide the claim on the record before us. 350 F.3d 32, 39 (2d Cir.2003). The last option is appropriate when the factual record is fully developed and resolution of the Sixth Amendment claim on direct appeal is beyond any doubt or in the interest of justice. United States v. Khedr, 343 F.3d at 100 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is such a case. 123 A defendant seeking to overturn a conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel bears a heavy burden. He must demonstrate both (1) that counsel's performance was so unreasonable under prevailing professional norms that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); and (2) that counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced the defendant such that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Accord United States v. Campbell, 300 F.3d 202, 214 (2d Cir.2002); United States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019, 1029 (2d Cir.1997). In applying this standard, a reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound [legal] strategy.' Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955)). Paramount to any review of a claim of ineffectiveness is whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Id. at 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Castle cannot satisfy the strict criteria of Strickland. 124 Castle faults his attorney for stipulating to his signature on four trial exhibits: two postal forms relating to a post office box in his name, a signature card for his bank account, and his FBI fingerprint card. As a rule, counsel's decision to stipulate to certain evidence, like his decisions to offer or object to evidence, involves a strategic choice, which is virtually unchallengeable if made after thorough investigation. Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see United States v. Berkovich, 168 F.3d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir.1999) (holding counsel's decision to enter into a global stipulation part of a reasonable trial strategy); see also Brown v. Artuz, 124 F.3d 73, 77 (2d Cir.1997) (identifying `what evidence should be introduced, what stipulations should be made, what objections should be raised, and what pre-trial motions should be filed' as matters that `primarily involve trial strategy and tactics' (quoting United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525, 1531 (11th Cir.1992) (en banc))). 125 Castle does not contend that counsel's decision to stipulate was not adequately investigated. Instead, he relies on counsel's statement to the district court that he would not have entered into the stipulation if he had known that the government would not call an FBI handwriting expert as a witness. Counsel explained that the four stipulated signatures had been submitted to the FBI expert as known exemplars of Castle's handwriting for comparison with a disputed signature on a National Car Rental receipt. Counsel entered into the stipulation as a convenience, expecting to cross-examine the handwriting expert at trial about the qualified nature of her conclusions with respect to the rental receipt signature. Trial Tr., Sept. 25, 2001, at 1887. Some time after the stipulation was read to the jury, the prosecution opted not to call the expert, leaving the jury to make its own comparison of the stipulated signatures and the one on the rental receipt. Counsel complained: had Al Castle known ... that the expert was not going to be coming in, [he] clearly would not have stipulated to anything. Id. at 1888. 126 Even if we accept counsel at his word, this hardly demonstrates that his stipulation decision was objectively unreasonable at the time it was made. In evaluating the performance prong of an ineffective assistance claim, we do not view the challenged conduct through the distorting lens of hindsight but from counsel's perspective at the time. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 371-72, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993) (reiterating contemporary assessment rule in applying first prong of Strickland ). Experienced defense attorneys routinely stipulate to undisputed facts in order to maintain credibility with the jury when challenging other aspects of the prosecution case. Castle's trial counsel cannot be deemed constitutionally ineffective for stipulating to his client's undisputed signatures on certain exhibits simply because he failed to anticipate a change in prosecution tactics with respect to a disputed signature on another exhibit. 10 127 In any event, Castle cannot show that he was prejudiced by the stipulation. Certainly, he does not assert that the government could not have proved that the four stipulated signatures were, in fact, his. Indeed, he cannot even demonstrate prejudice from the prosecution's failure to call the handwriting expert. The district court permitted the defense to elicit testimony that the rental receipt signature had been submitted for handwriting analysis and then to urge an adverse inference in summation from the prosecution's failure to call a handwriting expert. Further, whatever question there may have been about Castle's signature on the rental car receipt, Gahr's testimony and Castle's own credit card records constituted powerful evidence linking him to the Buick sedan from which 285 pounds of marijuana were seized. 128 Castle further faults counsel for advising him to pursue safety valve consideration after the jury returned its guilty verdict. Section 3553(f) of Title 18 and its implementing guideline, U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2, provide a safety valve from the mandatory minimum sentences applicable in some drug cases, permitting courts to impose lesser sentences upon satisfaction of five criteria. See generally United States v. Jeffers, 329 F.3d 94, 97-98 (2d Cir.2003). One such requirement is that a defendant, prior to sentencing, truthfully proffer to the government all information and evidence pertaining to his offenses and any related conduct. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2(a)(5). To satisfy this provision, Castle admitted that for four years prior to his arrest he had purchased marijuana from Gaskin and then resold it. He further admitted traveling to San Diego in April 1999 with Gaskin, Ruffin, and Gahr for the purpose of acquiring marijuana and transporting it back to Rochester. He admitted renting the Buick used to transport the marijuana seized in Illinois. He also admitted bringing money to Gaskin in San Diego to pay for marijuana that Kevin Miller was supposed to transport. 129 Castle's admissions plainly inured to his benefit. The district court sentenced him to a term of 46 months' incarceration, fourteen months less than he would have received without safety valve consideration. A defense attorney does not render objectively unreasonable representation when he advises his client to act in a way that secures a reduced sentence. 130 Castle nevertheless insists that he was prejudiced by counsel's advice because his proffer now undermines his ability to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. He is wrong. This court addressed his sufficiency challenge in Part II.C of this opinion by reference only to the evidence that was before the jury, giving no consideration to Castle's post-verdict admissions. 131 Castle's ineffective assistance claim is thus without merit.