Opinion ID: 1610587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Statement by Nixon to Tucker

Text: Two months prior to trial, the trial judge issued an order granting discovery pursuant to Rule 4.06 of the Mississippi Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice. Thereafter, the prosecutor turned over two transcribed statements of Thomas Tucker and made available the original tape recordings of Tucker's statements. Both statements were made while Tucker was a patient at Rankin County General Hospital. The prosecutor also responded that Nixon had made no statements the State knew of or intended to use at trial. At trial, Thomas Tucker was asked on direct examination to describe the events leading to his wife's shooting. Referring to John Nixon, Sr., Mr. Tucker testified: A. He reached in his coat and pulled out a pistol; and when he did, I told him, I know Joe Ponthieux hired you to kill us, but we got some money if that's what you (sic) after. He said, That's not what I'm after. The deal has already been made.  (Emphasis added). No objection was made to this testimony. On cross-examination, Tucker was repeatedly asked if and when he had told investigators of Nixon's statement The deal has already been made. Tucker testified he had revealed Nixon's statement, but he could not remember when and to whom. Later in the trial, Investigator John Edwards of the Mississippi Highway Patrol testified on cross-examination that during his numerous interviews of Tucker, Mr. Tucker had never told him of Nixon's statement that The deal has already been made. Investigator Edwards was aware, however, that Tucker had told other people of Nixon's remarks. Also during the cross-examination of Edwards, District Attorney Orbie Craft informed the court that Mr. Tucker had told him of Nixon's statement. District Attorney Craft explained, however, that it was his understanding that his obligation was to give them any memorandum of witnesses' statements, whether it be a written statement or an oral statement that was reduced to memorandum and not just our pre-trial interviews with witnesses ... and that he thought the verbal statement was not discoverable under the court's order. After several other witnesses testified, Nixon moved for a continuance based on the prosecutor's failure to reveal the alleged statement made by Nixon to Tucker. Nixon contended that had he known of the alleged statement prior to trial, he would have been better prepared to cross-examine Thomas Tucker concerning the alleged statement. Nixon requested the continuance so he could interview all the investigators who had interviewed Tucker. The Court granted Nixon's continuance and recessed early [2] with instructions to the district attorney to help locate all the investigators who had interviewed Tucker. The court was to reconvene the next day at 9:00 a.m., but Nixon was told that if he could not be ready, the court would stand by until he was ready. Nixon was also informed he would be allowed to recall any of the witnesses for further cross-examination. The next morning the defense attorney informed the court that he had interviewed all the relevant investigators but that he did not wish to recall Thomas Tucker for further cross-examination. Instead, Nixon moved for a mistrial stating that it would be more damaging to recall Tucker than not to recall him. The trial judge failed to see what damage Nixon would suffer by recalling Tucker that Nixon would not have suffered on the initial cross-examination had he known of the statement beforehand. The trial judge even offered to limit the scope of examination on Tucker's recall so the prosecutor could not introduce new matters. Still, Nixon elected not to recall Tucker. The trial judge then overruled Nixon's motion for mistrial. The analysis of this assignment of error must begin by determining whether the oral statement made by Nixon to Tucker, and later relayed by Tucker to Craft, was discoverable under Rule 4.06, Uniform Rules of Criminal Court Practice. Rule 4.06 states in pertinent part: The prosecution shall disclose to each defendant or to his attorney, and permit him to inspect, copy, test, and photograph upon request and without further order the following: (1) Names and addresses of all witnesses in chief proposed to be offered by the prosecution at trial; (2) Copy of any recorded statement of the defendants to any law enforcement officer; ..... Upon a showing of materiality to the preparation of the defense, the court may require such other discovery to defense counsel as justice may require. ..... If, subsequent to compliance with these rules or orders pursuant thereto, a party discovers additional material or information which is subject to disclosure, he shall promptly notify the other party or his counsel of the existence of such additional material, and if the additional material or information is discovered during trial, the court shall also be notified. ..... If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such party to permit the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. (Emphasis added) Oral statements made by defendants to law enforcement officers are discoverable under Rule 4.06. Moore v. State, 508 So.2d 666, 668 (Miss. 1987); Boches v. State, 506 So.2d 254, 262 (Miss. 1987); Franklin v. State, 460 So.2d 104, 106 (Miss. 1984). The fact that the statement was made, not to a law enforcement officer, but to a victim during the course of the crime is of no moment. The victim relayed the statement to the district attorney. Others told law enforcement officers of it. The prosecution team had knowledge of Tucker's statement before trial. Mississippi Highway Patrol Investigator Edwards was aware Tucker had told other people of Nixon's remarks. While Edwards was on cross-examination, the district attorney stated he was aware of the statement. The prosecution had an obligation to disclose what any member of its team knew. Smith v. State, 500 So.2d 973, 980 (Miss. 1986); White v. State, 498 So.2d 368, 370 (Miss. 1986); Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 56 (Miss. 1985). There is an independent reason why the prosecution was obligated to produce the statement. On March 13, 1986, the district attorney told the defense in writing that Nixon had made no statements, but that if such statements did come to the attention of his office, such statements would be furnished to the defendant. The statement was discoverable. Our question becomes, what consequences flow from the fact that it was not disclosed to the defendant until the middle of the trial. We decide such questions according to the so-called Box guidelines [3] adopted and followed in a number of recent cases. See Cole v. State, 525 So.2d 365 (Miss. 1987); Griffin v. State, 504 So.2d 186 (Miss. 1987); Watts v. State, 492 So.2d 1281, 1290 (Miss. 1986); Gray and Nations v. State, 487 So.2d 1304, 1313-14 (Miss. 1986); Henry v. State, 484 So.2d 1012, 1014 (Miss. 1986); and Jones v. State, 481 So.2d 798, 803 (Miss. 1985). The Box guidelines are: First In cases where the state seeks to offer into evidence that which it ought to have disclosed pursuant to a discovery request but didn't, it is first incumbent upon the defendant to make timely objection. If this be done, the court's initial response should be a directive that the defense be given a reasonable opportunity to interview the newly discovered witness, to examine the newly produced documents, photographs, etc. The court should not be grudging in this allowance. Second If, after examining the evidence involved or interviewing the would-be witness, the defendant is of the opinion that he has been subjected to unfair surprise and that his defense will be prejudiced if the evidence is offered without his having had the opportunity to investigate independently the credibility of the evidence and possible responses thereto, it should then be incumbent upon him to request expressly that the court grant a continuance. In most instances this will necessitate a declaration of a mistrial. In any event, and in such a situation and absent unusual circumstances to the contrary, the trial court ought conditionally grant the requested continuance, at which time the matter is checked back to the state. Third If the state is of the opinion that for whatever reason it wants to use the witness or the evidence in its case against the defendant, the order for a continuance must stand. At this point, however, the state should have the election. If the state withdraws its offer of the evidence in dispute and agrees to proceed wholly without use of this evidence, the order for continuance should be withdrawn and the trial should proceed as in the ordinary course. Box, 437 So.2d at 23-24. Defendant Nixon's principal failure under these guidelines is that he failed to make a timely objection when the statement was offered. Despite that failure, the trial judge later, once the point was brought to his attention, complied fully with the spirit of the guidelines, and allowed the defendant time to interview the investigating officers to obtain whatever information the defense needed. The trial judge also offered to allow Nixon to recall any witness for further cross-examination. Nixon declined to recall Tucker judging the recall would do more harm than good. After an overnight recess, defense counsel merely moved for a mistrial. When certain circumstances arise as enumerated in the guidelines, the defense is automatically entitled to a mistrial or continuance. To obtain access to that entitlement, the defendant under the first guideline had to make a timely objection. Defendant did not do this. In fact, he made no objection until several witnesses later. In any event, the trial judge ordered a break in the action. Nixon was given an overnight recess. The judge told the defense counsel that, if he could not be ready at 9:00 a.m. the next morning, the court would stand by until the defense was ready. The guidelines contemplate this sort of continuance. See Foster v. State, 484 So.2d 1009, 1011 (Miss. 1986) (in some cases even an hour or two will suffice). A combined consideration of these two points  Nixon's failure to object in a timely manner and, notwithstanding, the generous continuance he was granted  weakens the force from this assignment of error. Moreover, this case may not be distinguished from other capital cases in which we have enforced the Box guidelines against defendants. See Cole v. State, supra ; Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 343 (Miss. 1985). The assignment of error is denied.