Opinion ID: 149086
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did Wellington Communicate to Dr. Jonsson a Serious Threat of Imminent Physical Violence Against the Plaintiffs?

Text: The Plaintiffs argue that even if Section 117 applies, summary judgment was nevertheless inappropriate. Under the statute, a mental-health professional shall not be held civilly liable for failure to predict [a patient's] violent behavior, except where the patient has communicated to the mental health care provider a serious threat of imminent physical violence against a specific person or persons. Id. § 13-21-117 (emphasis added). Upon receiving such a communication, the provider must mak[e] reasonable and timely efforts to notify any person or persons specifically threatened, as well as notify[] an appropriate law enforcement agency or. . . tak[e] other appropriate action including, but not limited to, hospitalizing the patient. Id. The Plaintiffs contend that Wellington communicated a threat and that Dr. Jonsson is therefore liable because it is undisputed that she did not warn either the Plaintiffs or the probation department. The Plaintiffs do not say that there is any evidence that Wellington told Dr. Jonsson that he intended imminent violence against them. They argue, however, that Dr. Jonsson nevertheless had a duty to warn them because any reasonable psychologist in her position would have known from Wellington's history that he posed a serious risk of violence to them. They assert that in determining whether a threat was made, Dr. Jonsson ought to have looked to Wellington's four-year history of stalking the Plaintiffs, his felony stalking conviction, his suicidal breakdowns, his past deviant sexual thoughts, and his probation violations; and they add that Dr. Jonsson should have taken into account the Columbine High School murdersuicides, and other historical pertinent medical and socio-historical data. Aplt. Br. at 39. We disagree with the standard articulated by the Plaintiffs. Section 117 requires that the threat be communicated to the mental-health provider. As commonly understood, to communicate means to make known; inform a person of; convey the knowledge or information of. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 460 (2002). A person communicates a threat when he expresses the threat. The Plaintiffs would have us hold that Wellington communicated to [Dr. Jonsson] a serious threat of imminent physical violence so long as the information available to Dr. Jonsson (however she obtained it) would tell a reasonably prudent psychologist that Wellington posed such a threat. But this interpretation of communicate would contradict the statutory language that mental-health providers shall not be . . . liable for failure to predict [a patient's] violent behavior. Colo. Rev.Stat. § 13-21-117. Under Plaintiffs' reading, the statute becomes internally inconsistent, stating that mental-health providers shall not be held civilly liable for failure to predict [a patient's] violent behavior, [ except when they should be able to predict the violent behavior ]. We reject this nonsensical interpretation. A much more reasonable interpretation of the statute is that the mental-health provider has a duty to warn only when the patient himself predicts his violent behavior (by communicatingthat is, expressinghis threat to the mental-health provider). McCarty v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 15 P.3d 1122 (Colo.Ct.App.2000), on which the Plaintiffs rely, is not to the contrary. McCarty told his psychologist about a problem he had had the previous day with his [work] supervisor, described his strong negative feelings about his supervisors, and expressed concern that he might not be able to control his anger. Id. at 1125. He said that he was `feeling sort of homicidal,' and, when discussing his supervisor, that he knew martial arts and, if provoked, could kill someone. Id. He further stated that they don't deserve to die, they do deserve to have their ass kicked. Id. (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The psychologist concluded that based on McCarty's comments to him, he had a duty under Section 117 to warn McCarty's supervisors. He warned them, and McCarty was fired. See id. at 1124. McCarty sued his psychologist for professional negligence. See id. McCarty contended that the psychologist was not protected by Section 117 because he (McCarty) had never communicated a serious threat of imminent violence. The Colorado Court of Appeals disagreed, observing that McCarty's statements to the psychologist were sufficient to demonstrate as a matter of law that the psychologist had a duty to warn [McCarty's] supervisors. Id. at 1125. McCarty is readily distinguishable from this case because Wellington, unlike McCarty, did not tell his psychologist that he was dangerous. It is undisputed that Wellington never told Dr. Jonsson that he presently intended to harm or threaten the Plaintiffs. He told her that he used to harbor violent fantasies involving the Plaintiffs, but that he no longer harbored such fantasies. Because the Plaintiffs have not pointed to any evidence that Wellington communicated to Dr. Jonsson a serious threat of imminent physical violence against a specific person or persons, Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-117, Dr. Jonsson is not subject to liability under Section 117 and summary judgment was appropriate.