Opinion ID: 202005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arthur Andersen

Text: 26 In Arthur Andersen, the Supreme Court reversed a corporation's conviction for obstruction of justice, obtained under 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(2), and in so doing clarified some of the evidentiary requirements of that statute. 2 Arthur Andersen established two things about § 1512(b)(2). First, the Court concluded that in the statutory phrase 27 Whoever knowingly uses intimidation . . . or corruptly persuades another person, or attempts to do so, or engages in misleading conduct toward another person with intent to— 28 knowingly modifies corruptly persuades. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2136. 29 Second, the Court held that a `knowingly . . . corrup[t] persuade[r]' cannot be someone who persuades others to shred documents when he does not have in contemplation any particular official proceeding in which those documents might be material. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2137. Consequently, in a prosecution under subsection (b)(2), the government cannot succeed if it fails to show a nexus between the `persua[sion]' to destroy documents and any particular proceeding. Id. at 2136. The Supreme Court recognized in Andersen that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1) (2002) 3 , an official proceeding `need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense.' Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court cautioned, It is . . . one thing to say that a proceeding `need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense,' and quite another to say that a proceeding need not even be foreseen. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2137. The Supreme Court analogized the situation in Arthur Andersen to the situation it had faced in United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995), where it found a similar nexus requirement in prosecutions for corruptly endeavoring to influence, obstruct, and impede a . . . grand jury investigation under [18 U.S.C.] § 1503. Arthur Andersen, 125 S.Ct. at 2137 (internal quotations and brackets omitted). In Aguilar, the Court said that, under § 1503, if the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. 515 U.S. at 599, 115 S.Ct. 2357. 30