Opinion ID: 1787107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inflaming Passions and Prejudices of the Jury

Text: The state may not seek a conviction at any price. State v. Salitros, 499 N.W.2d 815, 817 (Minn.1993). A prosecutor must avoid inflaming the jury's passions and prejudices against the defendant. State v. Porter, 526 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Minn.1995). When credibility is a central issue, we pay special attention to statements that may inflame or prejudice the jury. Id. Morton contends that the state encouraged sympathy for the victim and contempt for him in multiple ways during the opening statement and closing argument, and these actions improperly inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury. We note that Morton did not object at trial during the opening statement or closing argument, but we nonetheless review his claims under the plain error standard to ensure that the state's conduct was not so prejudicial that Morton was denied his right to a fair trial. See Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 740. Morton first argues that the state improperly inflamed the passions and prejudices of the jury by juxtaposing Klatt's life with her sudden death. The state introduced Klatt in its opening statement as a happy person and, over Morton's objection, presented a photograph of Klatt in life. The state also presented photographs of Klatt's body after her death, and encouraged the jury to revisit the photographs during deliberations. Morton argues that the state's introduction of photographs and discussion of Klatt's life and death exceeded the bounds of permissible argument. The state responds by asserting that its discussion of Klatt's life and introduction of the photographs of her in life and death has been authorized by this court, because the photographs introduced were relevant to the crime and the nature and number of photographs introduced was not excessive. We have stated that in a homicide prosecution, the state may offer information about a victim's life, but may not use such information to attempt to influence the jury to decide the case based on passion or prejudice. State v. Buggs, 581 N.W.2d 329, 342 (Minn.1998). In Buggs, the state presented the victim as a thoughtful, friendly, hard-working individual and the mother of a four-year old child, and showed a picture of her both before and after her death. Id. We concluded that this presentation did not [go] beyond the pale of giving the victim a spark of life,' and that the matter-of-fact way in which the information was presented was unlikely to inflame the jury's passions. Id. Additionally, we note that the admission of photographs is a matter left to the discretion of a district court. State v. Sullivan, 502 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn.1993). Photographs are admissible if they accurately portray anything that a witness may describe in words, or the photographs are helpful as an aid to an oral description of objects and conditions, provided they are relevant to some material issue. Id. Such photographs are not rendered inadmissible just because they vividly depict a shocking crime or incidentally tend to arouse the passions and prejudices of the jurors. Id. The introduction of photographs of Klatt in life and death, as well as the discussion of her life, are comparable to the evidence that we deemed properly within the states right to introduce in Buggs. Morton did not challenge the accuracy of the photographs of Klatt's body, and despite the graphic and grisly nature of those photographs, they were relevant to elements of the homicide crimes charged. Accordingly, we conclude that the introduction of the photographs and the state's discussion of Klatt's life did not exceed the bounds of what we have deemed permissible. Thus, because the state's conduct here did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct, we hold there was no error when the court admitted this evidence. Morton next argues that the state improperly inflamed the jury's passions and prejudices by insinuating that Morton's motive for the crime was uncontrolled sexual desire: that Morton was looking for sex, and when he did not find it, he used force to rape and kill Klatt. While the state's argument need not be colorless, it must be based on the evidence produced at trial, or the reasonable inferences from that evidence. State v. Gulbrandsen, 238 Minn. 508, 511, 57 N.W.2d 419, 422 (1953). Counsel must not speculate about events occurring at the time of the killing absent a factual basis in the record. State v. Bradford, 618 N.W.2d 782, 799 (Minn.2000), reh'g denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). In a first-degree murder prosecution, the state is not required to establish a motive; however, credibility is lent to the state's contention that the defendant committed the crime if the state can establish a motive for the crime. State v. Berndt, 392 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn.1986). Morton argues that the state improperly went beyond arguing reasonable inferences from the evidence in its closing argument. In support of this argument, Morton first asserts that the state was disingenuous and misleading when, based on Morton's response to a question that he was trying to hook up, it argued that Morton made his own luck by raping and strangling Klatt. Morton suggests that when he supposedly said If I could get lucky in response to the BCA investigator's question regarding whether Morton went uptown to try to hook up with a woman, he indicated that he merely had a generalized hope that he might be lucky enough to meet someone. Morton also asserts that the state improperly argued that Morton committed the murder because he was sexually frustrated, and that there is very little evidence to suggest that [he] was avidly seeking sex on May 28. He asserts that there was no way of knowing if [he] called Tanya Croy for the overt purpose of having sex with her, or if it was merely an unarticulated hope. He claims that his conduct that night merely suggests that he was interested in getting away from his roommates for a while and that if he happened to meet someone, that would have been nice. Based on a review of the record, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the state could reasonably have drawn inferences that Morton was looking for sex on the night of May 28. Morton's testimony that he was upset and having difficulties with his girlfriend, as well as the evidence indicating that he was checking out the bars in town that night and finding only guys, and that he called a female acquaintance at 3:00 a.m., was sufficient to establish that Morton may have been looking for a sexual encounter. Accordingly, we conclude the state's assertion that Morton was looking for sex did not constitute improper argument, and thus we hold there was no error.