Opinion ID: 2480904
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Approbative Legislation

Text: In the present case, plaintiff echoes what the appellate court stressed: that Congress's approval of the Compact contained a proviso that prohibits Bi-State from exercising any additional powers unless and until such power or powers shall have been conferred upon the Bi-State Agency by the legislature of one of the States to the compact and concurred in by the legislature of the other and shall have been approved by an Act of Congress. Pub.L. No. 81-743, 64 Stat. 568, 571. The appellate court reasoned: Bi-State's powers are confined by the terms of the compact, and its powers cannot be altered or expanded without the consent of both Illinois and Missouri and approval from Congress. Each state gave up its sovereign right to exclusively control its portion of the District so that Bi-State could operate transportation services within the entire District for the betterment of both states. As a result, neither Illinois nor Missouri may act unilaterally with respect to modifying or expanding Bi-State's powers, duties, or obligations. Bi-State is an autonomous entity that is vested with specific powers and authority to perform specific functions independent from the control of any one state. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1023, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. According to the appellate court, Missouri and Illinois must enact identical legislation on matters involving Bi-State's powers, which Congress must approve. 393 Ill. App.3d at 1028, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. We disagree. Initially, congressional consent is not necessary in respect of each and every matter relating to or growing out of a congressionally approved `compact' or `agreement' between States. Henderson v. Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n, 362 Pa. 475, 486, 66 A.2d 843, 849 (1949) (collecting cases). Further, it is true that one party to an interstate compact may not enact legislation that would impose burdens upon the compact absent the concurrence of the other signatory states. However, the converse is widely recognized: It is within the competency of a State, which is a party to a compact with another State, to legislate in respect of matters covered by the compact so long as such legislative action is in approbation and not in reprobation of the compact. Henderson, 362 Pa. at 488, 66 A.2d at 849-50, citing Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260, 263, 42 S.Ct. 510, 511, 66 L.Ed. 930, 933 (1922); accord Kansas City Area Transportation Authority v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 173, 174 (8th Cir.1981); Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District v. Director of Revenue, 781 S.W.2d 80, 82 (Mo.1989); Roehl Transport, Inc. v. Division of Hearings & Appeals, 213 Wis.2d 452, 464, 570 N.W.2d 864, 870 (App.1997). In the present case, the appellate court failed to recognize that the express purpose of the Tort Immunity Act is to protect local public entities and public employees from liability arising from the operation of government. It grants only immunities and defenses. 745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 2006). Thus, the Act generally protects, rather than burdens, the Compact. Specifically, section 8-101(a) of the Act requires that a plaintiff commence a civil action for any injury against a local public entity or any of its employees within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2006). The purpose of the one-year limitation period contained in section 8-101(a) is to encourage early investigation into a claim against a local governmental entity when the matter is still fresh, witnesses are available, and conditions have not materially changed. Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill.2d 304, 313, 269 Ill.Dec. 188, 780 N.E.2d 660 (2001); Saragusa v. City of Chicago, 63 Ill.2d 288, 293, 348 N.E.2d 176 (1976). Such an investigation permits prompt settlement of meritorious claims and allows governmental entities to plan their budgets in light of potential liabilities. Ferguson, 202 Ill.2d at 313, 269 Ill. Dec. 188, 780 N.E.2d 660; Reynolds v. City of Tuscola, 48 Ill.2d 339, 342, 270 N.E.2d 415 (1971). Because a local governmental entity must anticipate that the number of claims made against it will far exceed those brought against a private individual, the provision of an abridged limitations period is reasonable. Ferguson, 202 Ill.2d at 313, 269 Ill.Dec. 188, 780 N.E.2d 660; Saragusa, 63 Ill.2d at 293, 348 N.E.2d 176. Clearly, the one-year statute of limitations provided by section 8-101(a) of the Tort Immunity Act furthers or supports Bi-State and does not burden it.
However, plaintiff observes, as did the appellate court, that the Tort Immunity Act must be construed as a whole, reasoning that the Act cannot apply to Bi-State because article IX of the Act cannot apply to Bi-State. Article IX concerns the payment of claims and judgments (745 ILCS 10/9-101 et seq. (West 2006)). The court noted several provisions. Article IX empowers and directs local public entities to pay tort judgments or settlements for compensatory damages and establishes the procedure therefor. 745 ILCS 10/9-102 (West 2006). Article IX requires local public entities that derive revenue from rates or charges to set such rates, or otherwise provide funds, in an amount sufficient to pay their tort judgments and settlements in accordance with article IX and their obligations under the Workers' Compensation Act (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2006)), the Workers' Occupational Diseases Act (820 ILCS 310/1 et seq. (West 2006)), and the Unemployment Insurance Act (820 ILCS 405/100 et seq. (West 2006)). 745 ILCS 10/9-106 (West 2006). Also, article IX allows local public entities to levy taxes upon all taxable property within its territory for funding expenses relating to tort liability, insurance, and risk management programs. 745 ILCS 10/9-107 (West 2006). Based on these provisions, the appellate court reasoned that article IX would grant Bi-State additional powers, or impose upon Bi-State additional burdens, duties, or obligations that are beyond Bi-State's authority. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1023-26, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. The court posited: Missouri has not consented to these additional powers or duties contained within article IX of the Tort Immunity Act by enacting identical legislation, nor has Congress granted approval. These provisions in article IX of the Tort Immunity Act, therefore, cannot validly apply to Bi-State. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1025, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. The court concluded that the Illinois legislature cannot unilaterally grant additional powers to or place additional burdens on Bi-State without an express concurrence from Missouri and congressional approval. 393 Ill. App.3d at 1026, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. The appellate court also concluded that Grady was erroneous and refused to follow it. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1029-31, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64. [6] The appellate court overlooked the nature of the Tort Immunity Act and misapprehended the effect of article IX on Bi-State. As Justice Spomer explained in his dissent: Contrary to the majority's assertions, there is nothing in article IX of the Act that is incongruent with the interstate compact which created Bi-State, and no section of article IX modifies Bi-State's powers or imposes additional obligations on Bi-State. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1036-37, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64 (Spomer, J., dissenting). Generally, the Tort Immunity Act contains no requirement that a governmental body must possess the power to tax in order to be classified as a local public entity. If the legislature intended to restrict the definition of a local public entity to those entities authorized to levy taxes, it could have defined a local public entity as an entity possessing the authority to tax. However, section 1-206 does not contain such a restriction. Carver, 203 Ill.2d at 514, 272 Ill.Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127; McQueen, 730 F.Supp. at 1454. Specifically, article IX of the Tort Immunity Act does not confer upon Bi-State the power to levy taxes. Section 9-101(c) of the Act expressly recognizes that not all public entities have the power to levy taxes by defining a local taxing entity as a local public entity that has the power to levy or have levied on its behalf taxes or assessments upon property within the territory of the entity. (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/9-101(c) (West 2006). Likewise, section 9-107 provides that [a] local public entity may annually levy or have levied on its behalf  property taxes in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of insurance and judgments against it. (Emphases added.) 745 ILCS 10/9-107(b) (West 2006). Indeed, section 9-107 does not require local public entities to levy those taxes, but simply confers the authority to do so. Further, the Compact itself confers on Bi-State the powers to have taxes levied on its behalf. Article III, paragraph 5, of the Compact provides that Bi-State shall have the power: To receive for its lawful activities any contributions or moneys appropriated by municipalities, counties, state or other political subdivisions or agencies. 45 ILCS 100/1, art. III(5) (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 70.370, art. III(5) (West 2004). Accordingly, these sections of article IX are in no way incongruent with the Compact. Moreover, article III, paragraph 3, of the Compact authorizes Bi-State: To charge and collect fees for use of the facilities owned and operated by it. 45 ILCS 100/1, art. III(3) (West 2006); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 70.370, art. III(3) (West 2004). Consistent with this express authority, the Tort Immunity Act authorizes local public entities that derive revenue from rates or charges to set such rates in an amount sufficient to pay [their] tort judgments and settlements. 745 ILCS 10/9-106 (West 2006). The appellate court's use of article IX as a means to remove Bi-State from the purview of the Tort Immunity Act was simply wrong. 393 Ill.App.3d at 1037, 333 Ill.Dec. 543, 915 N.E.2d 64 (Spomer, J., dissenting). Nothing about article IX affects our recognition that Bi-State falls within the definition of local public entity as provided in section 1-206.