Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Alleged Limitation on Defendant's Right to Introduce Relevant Evidence in Mitigation

Text: (36) The trial court precluded defendant from introducing evidence that, following the disclosure of prosecutor Van Camp's unethical conduct concerning the tape recording, District Attorney Sneddon offered defendant a plea bargain which included a sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole. Defendant also was precluded from introducing evidence that Van Camp improperly had primed a potential witness, John Velo, by disclosing information to Velo during an interview. Velo was not called as a witness at the trial. The trial court did allow defendant to introduce evidence concerning the destruction of the tape recording found by Van Camp. In Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 990, S.Ct. 2954], the United States Supreme Court ruled that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. (Italics in original, fns. omitted.) In a footnote, the high court added this clarification: Nothing in this opinion limits the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense. ( Id. at p. 604, fn. 12 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 990].) In the present case, the trial court acted within its traditional authority in excluding evidence relating to Van Camp's alleged prosecutorial misconduct in interviewing a potential witness who was not called to testify, and in excluding evidence of a plea bargain offered by the prosecution but rejected by defendant. The proffered evidence did not bear upon defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense and, thus, did not constitute mitigating evidence. ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 857 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249]; People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 878 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 90]; People v. Wright (1990) 52 Cal.3d 367, 431 [276 Cal. Rptr. 731, 802 P.2d 221]; People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 138-139 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 221]; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 811 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310]; People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1210 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) Defendant contends that evidence that Van Camp used improperly suggestive techniques to interview a prospective witness was relevant to the issue of lingering doubt.... This court has held that at the penalty phase, jurors may consider any lingering doubts concerning the defendant's guilt. ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 706 [276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].) But this does not mean that the defendant may introduce evidence, not otherwise admissible at the penalty phase, for the purpose of creating a doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Defendant relies upon the holding in Jeffers v. Ricketts (D.Ariz. 1986) 627 F. Supp. 1334, 1358, that evidence of plea bargains offered by the prosecution which included lesser punishment should be considered [as a mitigating factor] under the mandates of Lockett. ... (37) Decisions of the lower federal courts interpreting federal law, although persuasive, are not binding on state courts. [Citation.] ( Raven v. Deukmejian (1990) 52 Cal.3d 336, 352 [276 Cal. Rptr. 326, 801 P.2d 1077].) As explained above, we disagree with the federal district court's interpretation of the decision in Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586. ( People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th 792, 857.) Accordingly, we decline to adopt the holding in Jeffers v. Ricketts, supra .