Opinion ID: 1697830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the Albright Factors.

Text: ¶ 32. Regarding this factor, the chancellor found Catherine to be a healthy seven-year-old girl with no history of medical problems, she was of an age and maturity level that either parent could care for her, and found that this factor favored neither parent. Jane argues the chancellor erred in failing to find that this factor weighed in her favor. As support for this argument, she cites to Sobieske v. Preslar, 755 So.2d 410, 413 (Miss.2000), where this Court found that the age and sex of the child weighed in favor of the mother retaining primary custody, as the child was a female and was between four or five years old at the time the custody modification action was commenced. In Sobieske, we did find that the age and sex of the child weighed in favor of the mother, but we also noted that the tender years doctrine has been weakened in Mississippi to the point that age and sex are now merely factors to be considered under Albright. Sobieske, 755 So.2d at 413. ¶ 33. In Mercier v. Mercier, 717 So.2d 304, 306-07 (Miss.1998), cited in Sobieske, the chancellor found that the age and sex of the child weighed in favor of neither parent where the female child was within weeks of her seventh birthday at the time of trial. On appeal, this Court affirmed the chancellor's finding and stated that a child of seven is long past the age that requires this type of special care from her mother. Mercier, 717 So.2d at 307. In the present case, Catherine was six when the matter initially came to trial and was seven at the time that both the first and revised divorce decrees were entered. Because Catherine was seven years old at the time the chancellor entered the challenged order, we find the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in finding that this factor did not weigh in favor of either parent, i.e., that the tender years doctrine was not applicable.
¶ 34. The chancellor's finding regarding the continuity of care for Catherine is stated as follows: The Court finds that while both parties cared for the child prior to their separation, Wife was the primary care giver from 1998 until October 2001, with Husband having some visitation. In October of 2001, at Wife's request, Child began to reside with Husband. On December 12, 2001, this Court ordered that Husband and Wife would each have the child for rotating two week periods. On July 17, 2002, this Court granted temporary custody to Husband with visitation rights granted to Wife. This factor does not favor either parent. Jane alleges that the chancellor improperly calculated the continuity of care. She testified that Tom was living in the house with her and Catherine for only fifteen months of the first two years and two months of Catherine's life, that the chancellor failed to take this fact into account, and that this failure led the chancellor to improperly find that the continuity of care factor favored neither parent. Tom, on the other hand, argues that because he is currently Catherine's primary care giver, and has been for more than three years, the chancellor should have found him to be the favored parent under the continuity of care factor. ¶ 35. The thrust of Jane's argument seems to be that if one were to calculate the total time that Catherine was in her care versus the total time Catherine was in Tom's care, Catherine was in her custody for a longer period of time and therefore this factor should weigh in her favor. Jane, however, has cited no authority that the chancellor was required to employ such logic in weighing this particular factor. ¶ 36. The essence of the chancellor's finding, as it relates to this factor, is that Jane was the primary caregiver for Catherine when she was younger, Jane and Tom each had physical custody of Catherine on a rotating two-week basis from December 12, 2001, to July 17, 2002, and that Tom has been the primary caregiver from July 17, 2002, to the date of his ruling. Therefore, it was reasonable for the chancellor to determine that because there was a distinct period when each parent was the primary care giver and there was a time when both parties equally shared parenting responsibilities, neither party should be favored under this factor. As there was sufficient evidence in the record to support his finding, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in finding that neither parent was favored as to providing continuity of care.
¶ 37. Jane alleges that the chancellor erred in finding that Tom was favored as the parent who had the best parenting skills and willingness and/or capacity to be the primary care giver for Catherine. The chancellor found that: [f]rom the evidence and testimony, [Catherine] is well taken care of by Husband and she is kept on a regular daily schedule and routine. Testimony was presented that while residing with Wife, the child was not kept on a regular routine, went to bed at irregular hours, and struggled with her kindergarten work to the point that she was promoted only on the condition that she attend summer tutoring. The testimony further showed that while residing with Husband, the child has all A's and B's, that she is worked with at home with regard to her school work. The Court must find that Husband is favored. Jane argues that the chancellor failed to consider the fact that she had been Catherine's primary caregiver from her birth until Tom took Catherine (at her request) in October of 2001. She also claims that the only period in which the care she provided for Catherine was less than ideal was from approximately the fall of 2001 until June of 2002 when she admittedly used drugs. She argues that the chancellor was wrong to base his finding that she was an irresponsible parent solely on events that occurred during one nine-month period of Catherine's life, when there was no other evidence of problems in Catherine's life either before or since the short period that Jane admitted using drugs. Jane additionally notes that the chancellor did not address the willingness and capacity of the parties to provide primary care for Catherine. ¶ 38. Tom rebuts Jane's argument by noting that the chancellor's finding was supported by evidence introduced in open court and argues that the chancellor was correct to base his finding on events during the period that Jane was using drugs, as this evidence tends to show that he was more capable of providing Catherine with a safe, stable environment than Jane. ¶ 39. The record supports the chancellor's finding that Tom keeps Catherine on a daily routine and schedule. Tom testified that Catherine has a regular bed time of 8:30 p.m. during the school year. This testimony was corroborated by Jackie Tucker and Kim Swindoll, who also testified that Catherine is regularly up by 7:00 a.m. when she is with Tom. The chancellor's finding that Catherine got good grades and had help with her schoolwork when in Tom's care was based on Tom's testimony that Catherine concluded her first-grade year with straight A's and that he helped her study at night. Catherine's first grade teacher, Kay Hill, also testified as to Catherine making A's and B's in her class. ¶ 40. The chancellor also found that when Catherine was with Jane, she did not have a regular routine and struggled in kindergarten. This finding was supported by Catherine's kindergarten teacher, Laurie Ann Evans, who testified that Catherine struggled during her second semester, she was occasionally late, and she sometimes failed to have her homework done when Jane brought her to school. Jackie Tucker, who lived with Jane for a while after Tom and Jane were separated, testified that although Jane provided care for Catherine, there was drinking, partying, and drug use going on in the house while Catherine was there (though not in front of Catherine). ¶ 41. The chancellor's factual finding that Tom provided a more stable environment was supported by credible evidence in the record. Jane complains that the chancellor discounted the care she provided to Catherine prior to using drugs and the strides she has made in her personal life since abstaining from drug use. While we note that Jane's efforts to reform were admirable, we find the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in making this finding. As this Court has repeatedly stated, it will not disturb a chancellor's factual findings unless they are manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or the chancellor abused his discretion. Hollon, 784 So.2d at 946.
¶ 42. Concerning the employment of each parent, the chancellor found as follows: The Court heard that Husband has been a certified licensed plumber since 1993, and has been employed with [Morgan] Plumbing for over three (3) years. His regular hours are 7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., but he has some flexibility if he needs to take off. The Court was presented with evidence that Wife has had several jobs with the last being a self-employed painter and employee at Park Place Entertainment for the past several months. She was not employed fore [sic] several months between 2001 and 2002. The Court must weigh this factor for Husband. The chancellor's findings regarding Tom's employment were based on Tom's own testimony. Jane argues that the chancellor erred in making this finding because Tom was not actually a licensed plumber. She sought to raise this supposed error in her Amended Motion for New Trial and/or Amendment of Judgment via an attached letter from a Tunica County Permit Clerk, which indicated that Tom had not been licensed as a plumber in Tunica County since February 2000. The chancellor denied Jane's motion, ruling that the evidence she sought to introduce was available at the time of trial, that the evidence at trial established that Tom worked as a plumber, and that the Revised Decree for Divorce would remain undisturbed. Jane now complains that because Tom did not testify about his licensure until the last day of trial, she did not have ample opportunity to go to the clerk's office and retrieve the records to impeach him. ¶ 43. Jane essentially seeks to create an issue where there is none. While the chancellor's finding may be incorrect regarding Tom being licensed, given that there is at least some post-trial evidence casting doubt on Tom's licensure as a plumber, the testimony at trial still shows that Tom has maintained a steady job with regular hours for the last three plus years, which is clearly what the chancellor found to be most relevant. ¶ 44. Jane also contends that the chancellor erred in finding that she was unemployed for several months, claiming that the testimony does not support such a finding. During the July 17, 2002 hearing, Jane testified that she was self-employed as a painter, she restored furniture, and she would be working as a guide during the upcoming hunting season. At that same hearing, Jackie Tucker testified that Jane had previously lost her job at the WIC center, although she claimed that she quit so she could spend more time with Catherine. She was presumably without employment during the roughly one month's time that she was in drug rehabilitation during July and August of 2002. At the October 28, 2002 hearing, Jane's father testified that his daughter had just started working at the Tunica Gin and he did not know how long it had been since she had previously held a job. Jane's mother testified at the hearing on March 25, 2003, that Jane had been employed most of the time since the summer of 2002, after she left rehabilitation. She also testified at that same hearing that she was not aware of Jane presently being employed anywhere, she had worked at Tunica Gin until December of 2002, and she had done some furniture refinishing for various people. At the hearing on June 24, 2003, Jane testified that she was currently working for Park Place Entertainment and had been there for almost three months. She also testified that she had been unemployed prior to getting the job with Park Place, she had previously worked at the Tunica Gin, but was unaware of how long she had been unemployed prior to starting her current job. She also admitted there had been periods of time in the past when she was not drawing an income of any kind. ¶ 45. While the evidence may not have shown she was without any employment for months at a time, the testimony from the various hearings does show that Jane held jobs sporadically, often on a seasonal basis only, and that she had gone through periods when she had no income at all. The chancellor heard this testimony and determined that Tom's work situation was more stable than that of Jane, who as of the date of the final hearing, had been in her current job less than three months. We find that Tom clearly had more stability in his employment; this was reflected in the chancellor's finding; and he did not abuse his discretion in finding Tom to be the favored parent under this Albright factor.
¶ 46. Regarding the parents' mental and physical health, the chancellor found that Jane had tested positive for amphetamines, admitted to smoking and injecting methamphetamines, was admitted to drug rehabilitation, and had failed two of three drug tests that she had taken. He found that Tom had gone to treatment for alcohol addiction and depression following his father's death but did not presently have a drinking disorder. ¶ 47. Jane claims the chancellor's finding was made in error because she had failed only one drug test that was admitted into evidence. She acknowledges that she failed a drug test in June of 2002, the results of which were admitted into evidence. She admits that other drug tests were performed; however, she notes that the results were never made part of the record and argues that the chancellor should not have used those tests or their results to rule against her. Both of Jane's parents testified on March 25, 2003, that Jane had recently taken a drug test administered by Methodist Family Health Center and that they were aware of the results, but neither testified directly as to what those results were. ¶ 48. We find that it was improper for the chancellor to state in his factual findings that Jane failed two of her previous three drug tests when that evidence is not in the record. Were this a jury trial, any information regarding the results of a drug test would have to be introduced either through testimony or documentary evidence. Nothing in the record before this Court proves that Jane failed a second drug test. Notwithstanding that fact, we find the chancellor did not err in making his ultimate finding that Tom was the favored parent under this particular Albright factor. Jane has challenged none of the other facts in the chancellor's finding, and the record clearly reflects that Jane had a substance abuse problem. Though she maintains that she is now drug free, and has been for some time, the chancellor was within his discretion in considering her prior conduct to determine that Tom was the favored parent concerning the physical and mental health and age of the parents.
¶ 49. Jane does not challenge the chancellor's finding under this factor, which stated that both parents have strong bonds to Catherine and that neither party was favored.
¶ 50. The chancellor's finding concerning the moral fitness of the parties is as follows: There was no evidence that Mr. [Morgan] had been convicted of any crimes or felonies. There was evidence that he attended church, attended work every day, and that he was responsible. There was no evidence regarding Ms. [Morgan's] attending church, but Wife's mother testified that Wife was keeping company with individuals, of whom Wife's mother did not approve, at all hours of the night. Further there was evidence that Wife had friends and left Child with individuals which, by her own testimony, used illegal drugs. This factor favors Mr. [Morgan]. Jane contends that the chancellor was flatly wrong in finding there was no evidence that she attended church. She testified on June 24, 2003, that she attended First Baptist Church and had taken Catherine to church the last Sunday that Catherine was in her care. The chancellor's finding that Jane did not attend church is clearly contrary to the evidence introduced at trial. ¶ 51. Jane concedes there was sufficient evidence for the chancellor to find that she had friends who used drugs and that she left Catherine in the care of people who used drugs; however, she argues that the time period encompassing those findings was relatively brief (roughly nine months) and that this finding is unfair or inaccurate in light of subsequent testimony. She notes that in the final hearing of June 24, 2003, she testified that she no longer had any dealings with a former drug-using friend whom she admittedly let babysit Catherine in the past. Jane also testified at this hearing that she had completely changed people, places, and things from the time she was using drugs to the present. While Jane did introduce evidence of the strides she had made from date of the hearing on July 17, 2002, when she had admitted associating with fellow drug users and leaving Catherine in their care, to the final hearing, when she claimed to have put aside those old associations, the chancellor still considered Jane's prior negative actions in determining that Tom was the more morally fit parent. While Jane may think this unfair, the chancellor clearly has the discretion to weigh these actions in reaching his decision. ¶ 52. Jane also argues that the chancellor was wrong to exclude from his finding on moral fitness the fact that Tom admitted to being in an adulterous relationship with Kim Swindoll, whom he began seeing after the couple's separation but prior to their divorce. Tom rebuts Jane's argument that his relationship with Kim should weigh against him, since the testimony revealed that Jane was involved in a relationship with Billy Ray Goff after she and Tom separated. Jane has little ground to argue this point, as she herself was also engaged in the very type of activity which she claims should have weighed against Tom. ¶ 53. While the chancellor erred in finding there was no evidence of Jane attending church, this error is not so egregious as to undermine his ultimate finding that Tom was the more morally fit parent. While Jane testified that she no longer associates with former drug using friends or leaves Catherine in their care, at one time in her life she had no qualms about leaving Catherine in a house where drug use was common or allowing fellow drug users to babysit her. Such actions exhibit a disregard for the safety and well-being of the child that a chancellor must certainly consider when making a custody determination. While the chancellor's finding may reflect a greater consideration of matters from earlier hearings, we reiterate that he is vested with the power to render findings in light of all of the evidence before him. Since his finding as to the moral fitness of the parties neither runs counter to the evidence nor reflects an abuse of discretion, we affirm his finding as to this Albright factor.
¶ 54. The chancellor found Tom to be the favored parent under this factor, relying on the same reasoning he employed under the parenting skills factor. Because Jane has offered no new argument on this factor, we rely on our analysis regarding parenting skills (see factor three, supra), and affirm the chancellor's finding that Tom is the favored parent under this factor.
¶ 55. Jane contends that the chancellor erred in making his finding as to the stability factor by misstating facts and/or overlooking other relevant evidence. She claims that the statement that she lived in three difference residences from 2001 to 2002 is inaccurate. She notes that she testified to living at 1190 Kenny Hill in Tunica from the time she separated from Tom in 1998 until she moved to 1102 Round Street for a period of roughly eight months before moving back to the Kenny Hill address where she has continued to live up to the present time. She claims that these are the only two addresses where she has lived since 2001, yet her assertions are rebutted by Jackie Tucker, who testified at the hearing on July 17, 2002, that Jane had spent a period of time living in Jabbo Beard's house at the Tunica cut-off. Based on this testimony, the chancellor has sufficient evidence before him to find that Jane did in fact reside at three different addresses during the period in question. ¶ 56. Jane also complains that the chancellor's finding that [u]nder the care of Wife, [Catherine] does not stay with Ms. Connell [a day care provider], but instead the evidence has led this Court to believe that [Catherine] was left with an individual who, by wife's on [sic] testimony, used illegal drugs is a mis-characterization of the facts which unfairly caused him to weigh the stability factor in favor of Tom. She admits that the finding is factually correct but argues that the period of time in which she let drug-using friends babysit or take care of Catherine was no more than nine months prior to the July 17, 2002 hearing, and the chancellor's failure to make mention of the fact that she is currently drug free leaves the unfounded impression that she still leaves Catherine in the care of questionable people. Testimony introduced at the final hearing did reflect that Jane would now leave Catherine with her (Jane's) father when she had to work and Catherine was in her custody, she no longer had contact with former drug-using friends, and Tom even admitted that many of his previous concerns regarding Jane's custodial care of Catherine had subsided. While this additional testimony tends to show that Jane has gotten better since the initial hearing, the record also reflects that she was using drugs and leaving Catherine with questionable babysitters prior to the nine-month time frame in which she has admitted to drug use. Jackie Tucker testified on October 28, 2002, that Jane was using drugs in June of 2000 when he returned to Tunica from boot camp and that Catherine was left at Jane's house with her drug using friends at that time. Despite Jane's protestations to the contrary, the evidence before the chancellor is sufficient to find that Tom has provided a more stable environment for Catherine than Jane. ¶ 57. Jane also takes issue with the chancellor's finding under this Albright factor because the chancellor made no mention of how extended family affected the stability in Catherine's life. She points out that Tom has no extended family close by, as both of Tom's parents are dead and his stepmother lives in Texas. On the other hand, the testimony clearly reflected that Jane's parents lived in Tunica and were involved in both Jane's and Catherine's lives, especially when Catherine was in Jane's custody. She contends that this is pertinent information that the chancellor should have considered in weighing this factor because the presence of extended family is a legitimate factor to support awarding custody to a parent. See Messer v. Messer, 850 So.2d 161, 167 (Miss.Ct. App.2003). ¶ 58. While this information may have been pertinent to the chancellor's analysis, his failure to include it in his findings does not undermine his ultimate finding as to which parent provides a more stable environment for Catherine. As the evidence shows, Tom has lived at the same address and been employed in the same job since he returned to Mississippi in 2001. He has had custody of Catherine from the fall of 2001 until the present, except for a seven-month period when he and Jane had custody of Catherine on an alternating two-week basis. Tom has also dated the same girlfriend, Kim Swindoll, from the time of the initial hearing until the present time, and the two have plans to marry. Though the fact that Jane's parents live in Tunica and are willing and able to help support both Jane and Catherine may weigh in her favor, there is more than ample evidence in the record to support the chancellor's finding that Tom can provide a more stable home environment for Catherine. Therefore, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in making this finding. ¶ 59. Regarding the above Albright analysis, Jane has introduced some evidence to show that the chancellor may have erred in making some of his individual factual determinations. However, we find that the chancellor's ultimate findings under each Albright factor are supported by credible evidence in the record, so his decision to award Tom physical custody of Catherine does not reflect an abuse of discretion and must be affirmed.