Opinion ID: 2085821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Peremptory Strike of Potential Juror

Text: Defendant, who is white, argues that the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to the State's peremptory strike of Robert Thompson, a prospective juror who is an African-American. We disagree. The exercise of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges is constitutionally impermissible. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986); Hawkins v. State, 626 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ind. 1993). To raise a prima facie equal protection clause claim, a defendant must establish that: (1) the juror is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove that group's members from the jury; and (3) the facts and circumstances of this case raise an inference that the exclusion was based on race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. Defendant and the excluded juror need not be of the same race, and so, a defendant who is white may properly challenge the peremptory strike of an African-American juror. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 404, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1367, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991); Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d 570, 578 (Ind.1996). Once a defendant makes the requisite prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to provide a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory strike. Id. Then the trial court must determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 95, 106 S.Ct. at 1722. The trial court's decision on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact which is accorded great deference on appeal, because the best evidence of discriminatory intent often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-65, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1869, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); United States v. Hunter, 86 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 443, 136 L.Ed.2d 339 (1996); Williams v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1372, 1379 (Ind.1996). Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, however, the reason offered generally will be deemed race-neutral. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. at 360, 111 S.Ct. at 1866; Willoughby v. State, 660 N.E.2d at 578. The record does not reveal whether the trial court made a finding of prima facie discrimination sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion. Nevertheless, the prosecutor provided a race-neutral explanation, and the record supports the prosecutor's explanation. The prospective juror testified during voir dire that he had once given someone who had stolen something a ride. He was uncomfortable because, had the police caught the rider, he would have been implicated in the crime. In light of Mr. Thompson's experience, the prosecutor explained that he did not feel that Mr. Thompson would be able to set that aside in assessing the facts. (R. at 331.) The prosecutor also emphasized that race had absolutely nothing to do with the peremptory challenge. The court found that the State had provided a race-neutral explanation of its challenge, and that the challenge was not in any way racially motivated. Certainly here there is no discriminatory intent inherent in the prosecutor's proffered explanation, and, in fact, that explanation is logical if not compelling. It was entirely reasonable for the prosecutor to be concerned that Mr. Thompson, at the conclusion of the trial, might identify and sympathize with defendant as a result of the experience he related to the court and counsel. Because the prosecutor's explanation was race-neutral and fully supported by the record, there is no warrant for this Court to disturb the trial court's decision.