Opinion ID: 1781589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Injunction as to the TAR Receivers

Text: TFT argues that the court should have granted injunctive relief because, it argues, the contract between the State and WSI is void under Alabama's Competitive Bid Law. Specifically, TFT argues that its bid for the TAR receivers was actually lower than WSI's bid, but that TFT calculated its bid by a method different from the method WSI used, because TFT interpreted the ITB differently. This case turns on whether the ITB was a solicitation for bids as to the entire TAR system, as TFT argues, or was a solicitation for a unit-price bid as to the TAR receivers and for price quotations on the other components, as WSI claims. Before this Court, for the first time, TFT attempts to argue that the ITB was ambiguous and that the project, therefore, should be rebid. Because TFT did not raise this argument in the trial court, it cannot raise it now on appeal. Abbott v. Hurst, 643 So.2d 589, 593 (Ala.1994). The only mention of ambiguity TFT made at trial came in one sentence of TFT's trial brief, wherein TFT asserted that the AEMA and the Purchasing Division had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in allowing an inexperienced person to handle the bid process. TFT states, Not surprisingly, the ITB and the addendum he issued were ambiguous at best. (R. 350.) In Knight v. Alabama Power Co., 580 So.2d 576 (Ala.1991), this Court refused to consider an argument that was not sufficiently raised before the trial court. In Knight, the appellant had included in an amended response to a motion for summary judgment one sentence asking the trial court to adopt the doctrine of comparative negligence. The appellant in Knight had, in the trial court, presented nothing in the way of argument on the issue. Similarly, at the trial in this present case, TFT did not argue that the ITB was ambiguous, either in its pleadings or during the hearing. In contrast, TFT consistently maintained before the trial court that the ITB was a solicitation for bids as to the entire TAR system and that TFT understood what the ITB was soliciting. This Court's review is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial court. Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So.2d 409 (Ala.1992). TFT claims that had the State investigated the basis of the bids, it would have realized that TFT's bid was the lowest. Alabama's Competitive Bid Law, specifically Ala.Code 1975, § 41-16-50, does not require that the award of a public contract go to the lowest bidder, but to the lowest responsible bidder. See Advance Tank & Constr. Co. v. Arab Water Works, 910 F.2d 761 (11th Cir.1990); White v. McDonald Ford Tractor Co., 287 Ala. 77, 248 So.2d 121 (1971). This Court has stated that an agency's determination of whether the apparent low bidder on a contract is responsible should not be disturbed unless the determination was made arbitrarily or capriciously. Advance Tank, 910 F.2d at 765; Mobile Dodge, Inc. v. Mobile County, 442 So.2d 56, 58 (Ala. 1983); McDonald, 287 Ala. at 86, 248 So.2d at 127. The standard for reviewing a determination that a bidder is responsible is whether the State's actions constitute fraud or an abuse of discretion. Carson Cadillac Corp. v. City of Birmingham, 232 Ala. 312, 167 So. 794 (1936); Advance Tank, 910 F.2d at 765. This Court has also stated that the courts should not interfere with the discretion of public contracting authorities in determining who was the lowest responsible bidder unless the decision was based upon a misconception of the law, was the result of improper influence, was made in violation of law, or was based upon ignorance through lack of inquiry. McDonald, 287 Ala. at 86, 248 So.2d at 129 (cited in Advance Tank, 910 F.2d at 765). The Purchasing Division awarded the contract to WSI, based on its bid in the line-item price blank on the price sheet provided in the ITB. The face of the price sheet indicated WSI was the lowest bidder. When TFT contested the award of the contract to WSI, claiming to be the true lowest bidder, the AEMA and the Purchasing Division reviewed all of the bid responses and concluded that TFT had not provided pricing for the central-control equipment and had not complied with the instructions regarding the itemized pricing of support items. (Plaintiff's exhibit 34.) TFT argues that this conclusion was incorrect because, TFT says, it did include pricing for the central-control equipment within its bid for the receivers. TFT also maintains that even if it did not provide a separate price for the equipment, that fact should not be dispositive because the ITB did not specifically ask for the pricing of the equipment. `[H]onest exercise of discretion... will not be interfered with by the courts, even if erroneous.' Advance Tank, 910 F.2d at 765, n. 12, quoting 64 Am.Jur.2d Public Works and Contracts § 67 (1972). After reviewing the Price Sheets submitted by the three bidding vendors, this Court cannot ascertain TFT's price for the central-control equipment. Because TFT's price for the equipment is imbedded within the unit price for the receivers, the AEMA and the Purchasing Division did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that TFT did not submit a price for the equipment. The agencies properly reviewed the bid responses, pursuant to TFT's bid contest, and could not ascertain a price for the equipment. Therefore, the agencies properly inquired as to who was the lowest responsible bidder. TFT argues that the failure of the agencies to review the way in which TFT's bid was calculated constituted ignorance through lack of inquiry, making the award to WSI arbitrary and capricious. Specifically, TFT argues that, throughout its proposal, it indicated that its bid was for a system, including central-control equipment, indoor alerting devices, and support activities. TFT also included the following statement in its summary: This bid is in response to the State of Alabama's request for 12,000 UHF Indoor Alerting Devices, including installation and one year's support, and 2 sets of Central Control Equipment. TFT contends that this statement and other similar statements throughout its proposal provided notice to the agencies that its bid included the cost of central-control equipment and support activities, as well as the cost of the receivers. TFT further contends that through proper inquiry the agencies would have been able to determine the separate prices for these items. This Court has never set forth rigid standards delineating what constitutes an adequate or proper inquiry in the context of the Competitive Bid Laws. The determination of whether a proper inquiry has been conducted will depend on the situation presented. TFT erroneously asserts that this Court discussed what a proper inquiry consists of in International Telecommunications Systems v. State, 359 So.2d 364 (Ala.1978). In that case, this Court upheld the award of a contract for replacement radio crystals to General Electric Corporation (GE) because GE's crystals were superior in quality. Even though International Telecommunications Systems (ITS) submitted the lowest bid, ITS was not the lowest responsible bidder, because its brand of crystals was unsatisfactory. The ITB had specified GE parts or equal, and when the bids were opened the ITS representative agreed to supply samples of its crystals for testing, to determine if the crystals were of a quality equal to that of GE crystals. The engineer evaluating the bids then wrote to ITS, stating that the State had not received the samples or a warranty. TFT points to that case as an illustration of proper inquiry, suggesting that in this present case the State should have contacted TFT for further information about its bid. However, the issue in International Telecommunications Systems was not whether the State had conducted a proper inquiry, but whether the State had acted arbitrarily and capriciously in testing the crystals by a method different from the method a professional testing laboratory might have used. This Court never stated that to make an adequate inquiry the State must contact a bidder for further information. In this present case, the State agencies properly reviewed the bids in response to TFT and Federal Signal's contest and concluded that TFT's bid did not comply with the ITB's pricing format. Nowhere in TFT's bid or in its bid protest does TFT explain how its unit price was calculated. Even if the agencies were on notice that TFT's bid included the price of other components within the unit price of the receivers, because TFT did not provide a price matrix listing the item-by-item price of each component the State could not ascertain the price of the individual components. WSI specifically listed the pricing for individual aspects of the central-control equipment and the operating-support system, giving the State the option to purchase some or none of those components. In its price matrix on central-control equipment, WSI provided separate prices for Site 1 and Site 2 primary and backup control equipment. For operating support, WSI provided separate prices for logistic support and other project charges, as well as prices for three different levels of installation, separate prices for different shifts depending on the time and day of the week, and separate prices for on-site replacement based on the number of months after installation. In contrast to WSI's detailed price matrix, TFT's prices were wrapped up into one unit price, with no delineation as to how much of the cost was for the central-control equipment and how much was for the operating-support system, much less any indication of separate prices for the individual aspects making up these components. The State might have been able to compare the prices for these components had TFT separately listed its prices. However, TFT failed to comply with the pricing instructions of the ITB and its Addendum, which requested an item-by-item listing of the price of each component. Contrary to TFT's suggestion, the State should not be required to contact TFT to request clarification of a bid that was not responsive to the State's request. Therefore, we cannot say the award of the contract to WSI was an abuse of discretion based on ignorance occurring through lack of inquiry. Further, TFT's bid did not comply with the ITB's technical specifications. The ITB specifically required a rechargeable lead-acid or gel storage battery. TFT's bid contained a compliance table that expressed an exception, offering a NiCad battery instead. Conformity with the specifications of the ITB is one standard for determining who is the lowest responsible bidder. See Advance Tank, 910 F.2d at 765. From the record, it appears that the agencies initially awarded the contract to WSI solely because WSI submitted the lowest bid on the price sheet. However, pursuant to the bid contest, the agencies examined the bids and found TFT's bid to be nonresponsive, based on its failure to comply with technical and pricing specifications. TFT's bid did not properly provide a price for the receivers on the price sheet, did not provide a price matrix as requested in the Addendum to the ITB, and did not meet the technical specifications with regard to the type of battery. We cannot say that the AEMA and the Purchasing Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining that WSI was the lowest responsible bidder. The single most important requirement of the Competitive Bid Law is the good faith of the officials charged in executing the requirements of the law. McDonald, 287 Ala. at 86, 248 So.2d at 129. Therefore, we affirm the order denying an injunction as to the TAR receivers.