Opinion ID: 2351755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the appropriate sanction under the unique circumstances of this case

Text: Respondent contends that application of pertinent guidelines, as delineated in the ABA Standards, [12] with or without consideration of the mitigating factors present in this case, would authorize a sanction no greater than a public reprimand. Because the Permanent Retirement Sanction is more severe than a public reprimand, Respondent argues that it must logically suffice as an appropriate sanction. The Board rejected the proffered Permanent Retirement Sanction, concluding that a private admonition would be inappropriate in this case.
This Court has exclusive authority and wide latitude in determining disciplinary sanctions over lawyers. Agostini, 632 A.2d at 81. While the Board is empowered to recommend a sanction to the Court, it is the ultimate responsibility of this Court to impose sanctions. In the Final Report, a majority of the Board recommended a public, three-year suspension to run concurrently with the Respondent's voluntary withdrawal from practice. In deciding to accept or reject the Board's recommendation, we recognize that each case is fact-sensitive. In determining an appropriate sanction, this Court must `protect the interests of the public and the [B]ar while giving due consideration to the interests of the individual involved.' In re Tos, Del.Supr., 610 A.2d 1370, 1372 (1992) (citation omitted); see also ABA Standards Preface (listing such relevant policy considerations as protecting the public, ensuring the administration of justice, and maintaining the integrity of the profession). The primary purpose of the disciplinary system is to protect the public. ABA Standard 1.1 cmt. As we stated in In re Tos, however, [a]lthough protection of the [public] ... is a primary purpose of disciplinary action, there are other important purposes to be served by lawyer discipline. Disciplinary proceedings also serve to foster public confidence in the Bar, to preserve the integrity of the profession, and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct. Tos, 610 A.2d at 1373 (citing In re Sullivan, Del. Supr., 530 A.2d 1115, 1119 (1987)). The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized that preservation of the integrity of the bar and maintenance of the public's perception of the bar are valid objectives of state regulation of attorneys. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 2371, 2380, 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995). Though the Court may consider the deterrent effect of the various proposed sanctions, Agostini, 632 A.2d at 81, and ABA Standard 1.2 cmt, the lawyer disciplinary system is not penal or punitive in nature, see, e.g., In re Rich, Del.Supr., 559 A.2d 1251, 1257 (1989); In re Bennethum, Del.Supr., 161 A.2d 229, 236 (1960). Of significant weight in determining the appropriate sanction, however, is the impact the chosen sanction will have on the preservation of the integrity of the Bar and the public's perception of the Bar. The general framework for determining an appropriate sanction for a violation of the DLRPC includes consideration of the following four factors: (i) the nature of the duty violated; (ii) the attorney's mental state; (iii) the actual or potential injury caused by the misconduct; and (iv) the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See Agostini, 632 A.2d at 81 n. 2 (citing ABA Standard 3.0). The available sanctions vary in degrees of severity. Suspensions may be imposed for a period of up to three years. Bd.Prof.Resp.R. 8(a)(2); Barrett, 630 A.2d at 657 (suspending lawyer for a period of three years). At the end of a suspension period exceeding six months, a lawyer may apply for reinstatement. Bd. Prof.Resp.R. 23(a). Similarly, a disbarred lawyer may apply for reinstatement after five years. Bd.Prof.Resp.R. 23(d). Under either scenario, reinstatement will be allowed only upon a produc[tion of] clear and convincing evidence of professional rehabilitation, fitness to practice, and competence, In re Reed, Del.Supr., 584 A.2d 1207, 1209 (1990) (interpreting Rule 23 of the Rules of the Board on Professional Responsibility) (emphasis omitted), and that the resumption of the practice of law within Delaware will not be detrimental to the administration of justice[,] Bd. Prof.Resp.R. 23(f). Lawyers, not originally successful, may reapply for reinstatement. See In re Clark, Del.Supr., 406 A.2d 28 (1979) (denying disbarred lawyer's first petition for reinstatement); In re Clark, Del.Supr., 430 A.2d 1082 (1981) (denying second petition); In re Clark, Del.Supr., No. 170, 1984, McNeilly, J. (Sept. 24, 1984) (ORDER) (denying third petition); In re Clark, Del.Supr., 607 A.2d 1230, 1236-37 (1992) (granting fourth petition, but only upon satisfaction of enumerated conditions); see also Bennethum, 278 A.2d at 832-834 (granting third reinstatement petition by disbarred lawyer). We conclude that Respondent's conduct, in light of the 1982 private censure, warrants a suspension of three years. Respondent has already voluntarily withdrawn from the practice of law and has not practiced since December 31, 1991, although he has not resigned from the Delaware Bar. Accordingly, the effect of the suspension will be mitigated so that Respondent may apply for reinstatement upon compliance with the conditions of the Judgment of the Court set forth at the end of this Opinion. It would not advance the public's perception and acceptance of the disciplinary system to permit immediate and unconditional reinstatement, and it would not be fair to Respondent to give him no credit for his voluntary withdrawal from the practice of law. Crediting Respondent with the period of his voluntary withdrawal from practice is an equitable result under the circumstances here, because the durational requirement of a suspension is only one requirement. We agree with the recommendation of the Board that, as a condition of reinstatement, Respondent must show by clear and convincing evidence ... professional rehabilitation and fitness to practice law and competence, as well as a showing that the resumption of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the administration of justice. Supra p. 995. That showing must include a recognition by Respondent of the wrongfulness of his conduct and appropriate remorse.
In determining an appropriate sanction, the Court is guided by its own prior precedent. Barrett, 630 A.2d at 656. Involuntary disbarment is not appropriate here in view of all the circumstances, including the Board's finding (which we do not disturb, see n. 8, supra ) of no violation by Respondent of Rule 8.4(b) relating to criminal conduct. Examples of disbarment cases include the following: In re Higgins, Del.Supr., 582 A.2d 929, 932 (1990) (feloniously converting client trust funds); In re Rich, 559 A.2d at 1257 (making repeated misrepresentations to clients, substantially neglecting client's interest, conversion of client funds and disregarding court orders); Sullivan, 530 A.2d at 1119 (failing to maintain client accounts, violating court order prohibiting his handling of fiduciary funds, commingling and misappropriating client funds and making misrepresentations to court regarding misappropriations); In re Kennedy, Del.Supr., 503 A.2d 1198, 1209 (1985) (knowingly using perjured testimony, charging excessive fees, failing to cooperate with disciplinary investigation, and violating court order imposing suspension); and In re Sanders, Del.Supr., 498 A.2d 148, 150 (1985) (failing to file state income tax returns for three years). A mere public reprimand, as in such cases as In re Williams, Del.Supr., No. 307, 1989 (August 23, 1989) (failing to maintain client accounts), and In re Vaughn, Board Case No. 23, 1988 (Dec. 29, 1989) (representing two clients in same transaction, with conflicting interests), is too lenient here. Although there is no comparable reported case, In re Barrett is relevant. In Barrett, 630 A.2d 652, a lawyer (who had already retired after substantial experience for reasons apparently not connected to the disciplinary proceeding) was suspended for three years for negligent failure to account for and deliver proceeds from a wrongful death settlement to a client. Id. at 657. The lost proceeds equaled $13,000 and had a present value of $30,000 at the time of the disciplinary proceeding. Id. at 656. Although the client was reimbursed by the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection, this fact did not count in Barrett's favor. In fact, client loss weighed heavily against Barrett. Id. at 656-57. In the instant case, there was no client loss, but the principal aggravating factor is that Respondent's conduct at issue here is in the nature of a repeat offense. As noted above, in 1982 Respondent resigned from his Prior Firm and received a private censure from the Board for unethical billing practices. Other aggravating factors include: substantial experience as a lawyer; refusal to admit the wrongfulness of the conduct at issue; exposure in this case and the 1982 case was as a result of firm scrutiny and action, not Respondent's voluntary admission; and multiple instances of misconduct. See ABA Standard 9.22. Factors tending toward mitigation in this case include: Respondent's timely, good faith effort to rectify the consequences of the misconduct and make restitution; the absence of client harm or loss; full cooperation with the disciplinary authorities and other relevant parties; reputation for good character and professional skill in the legal community; voluntary effort to seek rehabilitation to overcome the awaiting personal challenge; voluntary withdrawal from the practice of law since December 31, 1991; and the impact of a public reprimand on his wife and young children. [13] See id. 9.32. In light of the above considerations and prior case law, the Court determines that the appropriate sanction is a three-year suspension. The Court approaches the specific issue in this case  whether or not to accept the proffered Permanent Retirement Sanction in lieu of the public, three-year suspension  against the backdrop of the policy considerations discussed above.
Whether or not to accept a tendered resignation, as part of or in lieu of a sanction, is solely within this Court's discretion. Reed, 429 A.2d at 994. Whether a resignation is accepted is dependent on the [C]ourt's assessment of the impact that the resignation will have on public policy interests such as the integrity of the legal profession, the administration of justice, and the protection of the public. Lori J. Henkel, Annotation, Propriety of Attorney's Resignation From Bar in Light of Pending or Potential Disciplinary Action, 54 A.L.R.4th 264, 278 (1987). Under the Permanent Retirement Sanction, Respondent would never again be permitted to practice law or to reapply for admission to this Bar or the bar of any other state. That is a significant distinction which differentiates this case from Clark or Bennethum. The Permanent Retirement Sanction offered here is a sanction that can be imposed only if voluntarily offered. It is not an available involuntary sanction under Board on Professional Responsibility Rule 8 (Rule 8). Theoretically, it is more severe than suspension or disbarment. The question is whether this sanction should be substituted for a public sanction consisting of a three-year suspension, on condition of anonymity. This question involves important policy considerations and careful balancing. Rule 8 sets forth the types of sanctions available in a disciplinary action. For purposes of this case, the pertinent ones include disbarment, suspension for a fixed period up to three years, a public reprimand, private admonition, assessment of costs, and limitation on future practice. It is understandable that the Board feels constrained to reject Respondent's proffer of the Permanent Retirement Sanction in exchange for a private admonition. First, the Rules fail to provide specific authorization for such a result. Second, a private admonition is not appropriate for one entering permanent retirement. An admonition is a form of non-public discipline which declares the conduct of the lawyer improper, but does not limit the lawyer's right to practice. ABA Standard 2.6. Admonition implies advice to correct. [14] This concept does not fit the instant case because it makes no sense to instruct a permanently retired lawyer to correct a fault in his or her practice. Moreover, the serious misconduct here should not receive any sanction which this Court considers a mild rebuke. Respondent contends that he is reluctant to give up the practice of law. He believes that he is a good lawyer and wants to continue practicing law. We assume these facts, arguendo, but we infer from this record that the Respondent's offer to retire from the Bar voluntarily is a rationalization emanating from the inevitability of a severe sanction, the difficulty of rehabilitating a credible practice and the hope of successfully convincing the Court to grant anonymity in exchange for permanent retirement. An overarching issue here, however, is the impact a private sanction will have on the integrity of the profession, the public's perception of the profession and the credibility of the regulators of the Bar as instruments to control and sanction unethical conduct  and in this case, repeated unethical conduct. The Permanent Retirement Sanction is a certain way of preventing further wrongdoing by the permanent removal from the practice of law of this apparently healthy, relatively young (53), skilled miscreant. The alternative, a public suspension with Respondent being eligible to seek reinstatement to the Bar of this Court, does not provide the same tenured insulation of the public from Respondent's availability to perform legal services. Nevertheless, the public sanction imposed here will better advance the interests of the lawyer disciplinary system as a whole than anonymity even with permanent retirement. As we stated in In re Figliola, when deciding upon the appropriate sanction the Court must consider that `[t]he primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings is to protect the public; to foster public confidence in the Bar; to preserve the integrity of the profession; and to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.' In re Figliola, 652 A.2d 1071, 1076 (1995) (quoting Agostini, 632 A.2d at 81). Moreover, the public's perception of the legal profession and its ability to regulate itself is essential to the proper functioning of the Bar as a whole, and is quite distinct from the impermissible objective of punishment. As the United States Supreme Court recently held, [t]he Bar has [a] substantial interest both in protecting injured [members of the public] ... from invasive conduct by lawyers and in preventing erosion of confidence in the profession that such repeated invasions have engendered. Went For It, Inc., ___ U.S. at ___, 115 S.Ct. at 2380. The ABA Standards discuss extensively the propriety of publicly disciplining lawyers who breach ethical obligations. Private admonitions are generally reserved for cases of minor misconduct, when there is little chance of repetition. Cf. In re Clyne, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1118, 1126 (1990); ABA Standard 1.2. In severe instances, as here, public censure is appropriate. The guiding principle in determining whether a sanction should be public or private remains the protection of the public. See ABA Standard 1.2. Lawyers naturally want to avoid the public stigma and embarrassment associated with a public sanction, both for their families and themselves. The public at large and the profession as a whole benefit from making public the sanctions imposed in serious cases such as this one. The public benefits because other lawyers are deterred from engaging in misconduct in the future. The profession benefits because such censure fosters the public's knowledge of, and confidence in, the profession's ability to police itself. Id. 1.2 cmt. [15] Moreover, anonymity under the circumstances of this case would not be fair to other lawyers who have been publicly sanctioned and suspended. [16] The Court agrees with these general principles and has determined that they are well served by the disposition in this case. [17] The ABA Standards recognize the common practice of private admonitions in certain minor cases. [18] The misconduct here certainly is not minor, and involves a repetition of similar, prior misconduct. A private admonition is inappropriate in this case. Its equivalent, anonymity, is likewise inappropriate, even if the anonymity is coupled with the Permanent Retirement Sanction. Neither party points to any case that is parallel to the unique circumstances of this case. A number of states have, however, faced the question of whether to accept an individual's retirement from the bar in lieu of disbarment. Most recently, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma disallowed such a retirement because the respondent in that case requested resignation before a full record was available on all pending charges and allegations. State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Gasaway, Okla.Supr., 863 P.2d 1189, 1195 (1993); accord In re Sands, 86 A.D.2d 96, 449 N.Y.S.2d 219, 220 (1982). The Gasaway court found that [t]he purposes of accepting a resignation during discipline do not include keeping allegations of unprofessional conduct from the Court or secreting the allegations from the public eye. Gasaway, 863 P.2d at 1195. Other cases allowing resignation when the lawyer was subject to disciplinary proceedings include: In re Hanson, Minn.Supr., 486 N.W.2d 752, 752-753 (1992); In re Harper, Fla.Supr., 84 So.2d 700, 703 (1956); Florida Bar v. Summers, Fla.Supr., 197 So.2d 291, 292 (1967); see also Carter v. Walsh, 122 R.I. 349, 406 A.2d 263, 265 (1979) (ordering mandatory retirement). Cases where retirement was not permitted to supersede disbarment proceedings include: In re Coe, 302 Or. 553, 731 P.2d 1028, 1032-33 (1987); In re Snyder, 127 Wis.2d 446, 380 N.W.2d 367, 369 (1986); In re Peck, Minn.Supr., 302 N.W.2d 356, 359 (1981); In re Ditri, 71 N.J. 173, 364 A.2d 545, 545-46 (1976); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Herrmann, 475 Pa. 560, 381 A.2d 138, 140 (1977). The egregiousness of Respondent's misconduct in light of his earlier offense is inexcusable and very disturbing to this Court. [19] To shelter such conduct from the light of public scrutiny does violence to the policies underlying the lawyer disciplinary system and undermines public confidence in the profession which traditionally has been built on trust and self-regulation. Dispensing a non-public sanction in this case runs a substantial risk of damaging the reputation of the Bar and the Court with the community at large, and provides an improper message to practitioners that egregious misdeeds may be engaged in without fear of public opprobrium. Moreover, Respondent's proposed result here may result in a dangerous and sometimes unworkable precedent, and would be unfair to other publicly sanctioned lawyers. Imposition of the Permanent Retirement Sanction may create the appearance that Respondent has been allowed to choose his own sanction, even though it would not be Respondent's unilateral choice because the Court would have to accept the offer. This Court alone is vested with discretion to determine the appropriate sanction to be dispensed in a particular case of attorney misconduct. In this case, a public reprimand is the sanction prescribed by the ABA Standards. See ABA Standard 1.2. This is the sanction this Court has prescribed in cases of similar misconduct. See, e.g., Barrett, 630 A.2d 652. To deviate now from the pattern of past cases would be wrong. In choosing to impose a public sanction in this case, the Court takes cognizance of Respondent's argument that there may be a chilling effect on the reporting of misconduct in the future. It is, of course, the duty of professional colleagues to correct and report unethical practices of another. DLRPC 8.3(a). The Court commends the Respondent's partners in both the Firm and the Prior Firm for honoring their ethical obligations and reporting the Respondent's unethical conduct. By highlighting the professionalism and integrity of Respondent's partners, the Court hopes to foster the fulfillment of the ethical duty of prompt and voluntary reporting of ethical breaches by those in positions to know of their occurrence. See ABA Standards Preface (noting that one of the most significant problems in the disciplinary system is the overall reluctance of lawyers and judges to report misconduct). In the instant case, Respondent's own partners dutifully and promptly reported the misconduct to the ODC, at the risk of the Firm incurring additional liability and reduced credibility in the eyes of present clients, potential clients, and the public. Their conduct was in the highest tradition of the professionalism for which the Delaware Bar has a notable and honorable national reputation.