Opinion ID: 672144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dominguez's Motion for Mistrial

Text: 31 Dominguez contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant his motion for a mistrial. He argues that the district court improperly allowed a government witness to testify concerning an alleged post-arrest statement that the government withheld from him prior to trial, in violation of Fed.Rule Crim.P. 16(b) and the district court's standing discovery order. 32 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b) and the district court's standing discovery order imposed a duty on the government to disclose Dominguez's post-arrest statements made in response to any government agent's interrogation that the government intended to use at trial. Prior to trial, the government only disclosed to Dominguez's lawyer the following post-arrest statement made to DEA Agent Cynthia Schultz: 33 When asked about the foot lockers that Sanchez had, Dominguez said that he had looked inside them and that they contained kilos. He said that he didn't want anything to do with them. Dominguez also said that he had touched the kilos in the footlocker. 34 Based on this disclosure, Dominguez's lawyer prepared a trial strategy emphasizing that Dominguez's statements clearly revealed that he didn't want anything to do with the cocaine that Sanchez offered to him and properly told her to take it away. Thus, at the beginning of trial, Dominguez's lawyer made the following opening statement: 35 No, no, I don't want it. No, no way. These will be the words that you will hear out of the mouth of my client, Santos Dominguez.... When Santos Dominguez, at the very tail end of this thing, was offered to buy what was believed to be fifty kilograms of cocaine by someone else, because they needed to find a buyer, he said, no. Just say no.... [T]hat person was told to leave, and left the apartment building with the supposed cocaine in the trunk. 36 Yet, during the government's direct examination, Agent Schultz revealed for the first time that Dominguez said [t]hat he had touched the kilos inside the trunk and said they were strange. (Emphasis added.) 37 Dominguez moved for a mistrial alleging that the government committed a discovery violation because it failed to disclose prior to trial that Dominguez said that the kilos were strange. 38 A discovery violation under rule 16(a)(1)(A) or a standing discovery order is reversible error only when it violates a defendant's substantial rights. See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1566 (11th Cir.1991); United States v. Silien, 825 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Barragan, 793 F.2d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir.1986). Substantial prejudice exists when a defendant is unduly surprised and lacks an adequate opportunity to prepare a defense or if the mistake substantially influences the jury. United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1566; United States v. Barragan, 793 F.2d at 1259. Inadvertence does not render a discovery violation harmless; rather, the purpose of rule 16 is to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial rather than to punish the government's non-compliance. United States v. Noe, 821 F.2d 604, 607 (11th Cir.1987); United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 654 (11th Cir.1986); United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560, 560-61 (2d Cir.1969). 39 Upon a review of the record, we hold that the government substantially prejudiced Dominguez's defense when it failed to disclose that Dominguez told Agent Schultz that the kilos were strange. First, as announced in his opening statement, Dominguez's lawyer intended to use the government's previously disclosed post-arrest statements to convince the jury that Dominguez had no experience with and wanted nothing to do with the proffered kilos of cocaine. Yet, Agent Schultz's trial testimony that Dominguez said the kilos were strange after touching them, shattered this defense because a person would not know a kilo of cocaine felt strange unless the person had some experience with the feel of true packages of cocaine. Moreover, the government drove home this inference in its closing argument. 1 40 Second, Agent Schultz's testimony unexpectedly corroborated Sanchez's testimony that Dominguez said the kilos felt funny. Prior to trial, Dominguez motioned to sever his trial from Sanchez's trial because she planned to testify that Dominguez stated that the kilos felt funny. 2 In response, the government promised not to elicit testimony from Sanchez concerning that statement. Thus, the government led Dominguez to believe that the government would not corroborate Sanchez's trial testimony that Dominguez told her the kilos felt funny. 41 Based on the government's assurances and Dominguez's recorded post-arrest statement, Dominguez planned to impeach Sanchez if she testified that Dominguez said the kilos felt funny. Nevertheless, Agent Schultz's testimony eroded the effectiveness of this trial strategy when she unexpectedly testified that Dominguez also said in his own post-arrest statement that the kilos were strange. If Dominguez had known the government would present such testimony, Dominguez could have adjusted his trial strategy accordingly. For example, he could have moved to suppress the statement or he could have subpoenaed the DEA agents who recorded Dominguez's post-arrest statements to explain why their written account differed from Agent Schultz's recollection. 42 These facts sufficiently demonstrate under this court's precedent that the government's discovery violation substantially prejudiced Dominguez's defense. See United States v. Noe, 821 F.2d 604, 607 (11th Cir.1987) (nondisclosure of a tape recording was reversible error because it attacked the very foundation of the defense strategy); United States v. Rodriguez, 799 F.2d 649, 654 (11th Cir.1986) (nondisclosure of documents was reversible error because the defendant did not have the opportunity to prepare to meet that evidence). 43 Moreover, in reaching this conclusion, we reject the government's contention that Dominguez's subsequent attempt to impeach Agent Schultz's testimony served to cure the government's discovery violation. We cannot penalize the appellant and reward the government for the appellant's reasonable attempts to mitigate the government's breach of the discovery rules.