Opinion ID: 1874591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Controlling Constitutional Principles.

Text: It is well established that the Sixth Amendment right `to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation' is a component of the `due process of law' that is guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to defendants in the criminal courts of the States. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2532, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 572 (1975) (citations omitted); accord State v. Hernandez-Lopez, 639 N.W.2d 226, 241 (Iowa 2002) (At the very least, due process requires the defendant to receive formal notice of the charges against him. . . .); Comm. on Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Iowa 1979) (stating due process requires that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation). As this court has said, It is axiomatic that a defendant must have adequate notice of the charges in order to defend against them. State v. Jeffries, 430 N.W.2d 728, 734 (Iowa 1988); accord State v. Marti, 290 N.W.2d 570, 577 (Iowa 1980) (stating the defendant should be apprised of the crime charged with sufficient certainty to enable him to prepare his defense). The defendant contends the constitutionally required notice was deficient here because the fact of death or serious injury was not alleged in the complaint. He relies on a series of United States Supreme Court cases construing the effect of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments on the procedures required for applying sentencing enhancements. We will not review each of these authorities in detail, but we will briefly highlight the most pertinent aspects of this line of cases. In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 119 S.Ct. 1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311 (1999), the United States Supreme Court, construing a federal statute, held the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment required that any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 526 U.S. at 243 n. 6, 119 S.Ct. at 1224 n. 6, 143 L.Ed.2d at 326 n. 6. In Apprendi, which involved a state criminal prosecution, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment commanded the same answer. 530 U.S. at 476, 120 S.Ct. at 2355, 147 L.Ed.2d at 446. Specifically, the Court stated: Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at 455. Moreover, the Court held, an additional fact that serves to increase the maximum sentence otherwise statutorily authorized is the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one covered by the jury's guilty verdict. Id., 530 U.S. at 494 n. 19, 120 S.Ct. at 2348 n. 19, 147 L.Ed.2d at 457 n. 19. In a subsequent case, a plurality of the Court observed that when Apprendi and an earlier decision, McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), are [r]ead together, they mean that those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis. Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 567, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2419, 153 L.Ed.2d 524, 544 (2002); see also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2441, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, 574 (2002) (stating government's characterization of a fact or circumstance as an `element' or a `sentencing factor' is not determinative of what constitutional protections apply). More recently, the Court defined what the statutory maximum penalty was for purposes of determining whether a fact considered at sentencing was an element required to be submitted to the jury. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004). The Court held: Our precedents make clear . . . that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. Id. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. at 2537, 159 L.Ed.2d at 413-14 (citations omitted). Thus, if a defendant's authorized punishment may be increased upon the finding of a fact, that fact  no matter how the State labels it  is treated as an element of the crime for constitutional purposes. Ring, 536 U.S. at 602, 122 S.Ct. at 2439, 153 L.Ed.2d at 572 (holding factual finding authorizing death penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt); accord United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 749, 160 L.Ed.2d 621, 642-43 (2005) (holding federal sentencing guidelines are subject to jury trial requirements of Sixth Amendment).