Opinion ID: 1405650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Challenged Venirepersons

Text: Because a single racial peremptory challenge calls for a retrial, we need not determine whether there was any genuine non-racial reason for striking each of the other potential African-American jurors. See Snyder, 128 S. Ct at 1208; see also United States v. Clemons, 843 F.2d 741, 747 (3d Cir.1988) (Striking a single black juror could constitute a prima facie case even when blacks ultimately sit on the panel and even when valid reasons exist for striking other blacks.); United States v. Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 1994) ([T]he Constitution forbids striking even a single prospective juror for a discriminatory purpose.). Although the strikes exercised against African-American venirepersons Isaac Tillman (Tillman), Norman Reynolds (Reynolds), James Singleton (Singleton), Ruby Parker (Parker), Chandra Livingston-Blanks (Livingston-Blanks), and Barbara Maxey (Maxey) are not as clear cut as that of Watkins, an examination of the explanations for these strikes further undermines the prosecutor's credibility and lends additional support to the conclusion that the strike of Watkins was racially motivated. See Ali, 584 F.3d at 1193; Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902 (The prosecutor's willingness to make up nonracial reasons . . . make[s] it even harder to believe his reasons for striking [the minority juror in question] were race-neutral.). First, the prosecutor's professed concern with a venireperson's disregard for the law as measured by their alleged condoning of marijuana use appeared to wax or wane depending on whether the venireperson under consideration was African-American. The prosecutor characterized Livingston-Blanks and Maxey, both African-American, as condoning the use of the illegal substances during the Batson/Wheeler hearing and argued on that basis that he believed they possessed a more general disregard for the law. However, the prosecutor expressed no such concerns about the non-African-American jurors with similar or stronger ties to drug use and allowed them to be seated. The prosecutor expressed concern with Maxey's ex-husband's marijuana use and Livingston-Blanks's admission that casual friends at social functions used illegal drugs, and her ex-boyfriend was a drug and alcohol abuser. The prosecutor claimed that these associations clearly reflected a mental state that is very suspect to us as a juror, and indicated some social acceptance of this type of activity that could lead to an unwillingness to follow the law as jurors, or some negative feelings towards the government because of the fact that it's illegal to use that product. This professed concern with drug use by friends of potential jurors is undermined by his willingness to seat six jurors who had close friends or relatives who used drugs in the past. Moreover, two jurors were allowed to sit who admitted to using drugs themselves when they were younger. [12] The prosecutor's failure to strike these non African-American jurorsor to even inquire at voir dire as to their willingness to follow the lawstrongly suggests that these concerns were merely pretextual and makes drug use a dubious basis for the prosecutor's strikes against Livingston-Blanks and Maxey. Second, the prosecutor's supposed concern with venireperson Watkins's reluctance to serve, see supra p. 14706-07, was duplicated with respect to two other African-American venirepersonsSingleton and Maxeybut again failed to manifest itself with respect to non-African-American members of the venire. Venireperson Maxey, a 41-year-old, college-educated, married African-American woman who was employed as an Associate Personnel Analyst, made a hardship request because she was due to transfer to another state agency and was unsure if she would be able to complete her work if asked to serve on the jury. The court denied her request after questioning, and the record does not reflect that Maxey protested the denial. Venireperson Singleton, an African-American college graduate and U.S. Air Force veteran, did express concern about his high blood pressure and medication, which might require frequent bathroom visits; however, the court made arrangements to ensure Singleton could sit on the jury, allowing him a corner seat and the opportunity to take breaks when needed. The prosecutor claimed to take all hardship requests seriously in terms of looking at whether a juror wants to sit, or not, whether or not a juror is going to give us their attention, and to factor in the requests when considering whether or not to peremptorily challenge a juror. This was based on a belief that a juror with a hardship request would not make a good juror for [the prosecution and] might be inclined to hurry through the process. However, hardship requests were only used as justification for the prosecutor's decision to strike African-American venirepersons; similar hardship requests did not prompt him to strike Jurors 3, 6, 10, and 12. The prosecutor's alleged concern about unwillingness to serve is further discredited by his strike of venireperson Reynolds for being too overly eager to serve. In justifying this strike, the prosecutor focused on a racial aspect of Reynolds's comments about jury duty: He appeared to be focused on a race issue by making a comment in reference to a statement he made in the questionnaire that, you know, black people have died for this opportunity, for me to sit there[in the jury]. That concerned me. I have never heard anybody quite put it that way before, in terms of wanting to be a juror, and it concerned me that he may be overly focused on the issue of race. That immediately raised my senses that he might be sympathetic to and relate to two of the defendants that are African-American here. The prosecutor inferred from Reynolds's statement that Reynolds would be sympathetic to African-American defendants because they were of the same race. There is simply no basis for an inference that African-Americans who appreciate the progress in civil rights of the past century are, on that basis, unable to participate in trials involving other African-Americans. This rationale is so broad that it could exclude nearly all African-Americans from the jury and cannot form a legitimate basis for a peremptory strike. See Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 168, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005). The prosecutor's strike for both alleged reluctance and overeagerness to serve on the jury, and his failure to strike similar non-African-American venirepersons, cast doubt on the legitimacy of this proffered reason for striking venirepersons Maxey, Singleton, and Reynolds. A prosecutor truly concerned that Maxey and Singleton would be inclined to hurry through the process would also have struck other potential jurors who expressed similar concerns. A prosecutor unmotivated by race would not have considered Reynolds's positive attitude about serving on a jury a troubling factor weighing in favor of a strike. The inconsistent application of the proffered rationale and the lax treatment of seated jurors on the issue, as with the others discussed above, reinforces the impression that race was a substantial or motivating factor in jury selection. See Miller El II, 545 U.S. at 252, 125 S.Ct. 2317 (The whole of the voir dire testimony subject to consideration casts the prosecution's reasons for striking [the struck venireperson] in an implausible light. Comparing his strike with the treatment of panel members who expressed similar views supports a conclusion that race was significant in determining who was challenged and who was not.). Third, as the district court found in the case of Watkins, the prosecutor's inferential presumption that . . . [African-American venirepersons] would be race conscious in [their] deliberations if chosen to be a juror is highly problematic and suggests that the prosecutor exercised challenges in part with a discriminatory mindset. The prosecutor struck Livingston-Blanks, a 36-year-old, divorced African-American woman, because her employment in human services might indicate a liberal viewpoint, or [that she would be] more inclined to be sympathetic, especially given the age of these defendants. He based this on her temporary employment in clerical roles with the Sacramento County Department of Human Services and Child Protective Services. However, the prosecutor did not strike Juror 15, a registered clinical social worker and nurse. If Livingston-Blanks's clerical position truly indicated a liberal viewpoint sufficient to support a strike, Juror 15's direct experience as a social worker should also have supported a strike. The prosecutor's failure to treat Juror 15 similarly substantially undermines his proffered reason and raises serious doubts about the legitimacy of his strike. If a prosecutor's proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination. Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317; see also McClain v. Prunty, 217 F.3d 1209, 1220 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that the prosecutor's motives may be revealed as pretextual where a given explanation is equally applicable to a juror of a different race who was not stricken by the exercise of a peremptory challenge). Overall, the validity of the prosecutor's decision to strike Tillman, Reynolds, Singleton, Parker, Livingston-Blanks, and Maxey is a close question. However, in light of the strike of Watkins, the prosecutor's proffer of these questionable explanations for the strikes of the African-American venirepersons, as in Ali, take on a significance that they otherwise might lack. 584 F.3d at 1195; see also Lewis, 321 F.3d at 831 (The proffer of various faulty reasons and only one or two otherwise adequate reasons, may undermine the prosecutor's credibility to such an extent that the court should sustain a Batson challenge.). At a minimum, these dubious explanations reaffirm our conclusion that impermissible biases were a substantial or motivating factor in the peremptory challenges and, therefore, the Batson motion should have been granted. See Snyder, 128 S.Ct. at 1212. Even if considered under AEDPA's deferential standard, the California courts erred by failing to consider comparative evidence in the record that contradicted the prosecutor's purported motivations, leading them to render an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The district court believed that the Batson issue turned on whether a substantial or motivating factor test or a but for causation requirement is applied. Although the district court found the prosecutor's discriminatory reason tainted the peremptory strike of venireperson Watkins and would therefore satisfy the substantial or motivating factor test, it nevertheless denied petitioner's habeas petition, feeling bound to apply the but for causation requirement as well. Cook, No. CIV S-02-2240 LKK GGH P, 2008 WL 1701690, at . [13] What we should be doing here is remanding to the district court to apply the proper standard. Instead, the majority substitutes its own judgment for that of the district court.