Opinion ID: 195818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Putting First Things First.

Text: 19 In the context of First Amendment challenges to government regulations that burden speech, the Supreme Court has identified two differing modes of analysis, or levels of scrutiny, that may come into play. Since entertainment constitutes a form of speech, fully protected by the First Amendment, see Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65, 101 S.Ct. 2176, 2180, 68 L.Ed.2d 671 (1981), our initial task is to determine the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny that attaches to an analysis of Article 4. We begin this endeavor by mapping the choices and putting them into workable perspective. 20 Freedom of speech is among the most precious of our constitutional rights. Thus, courts have long recognized that, when governmental action places speech in special jeopardy, special protections must apply. For this reason, a court embarking on an inquiry into the constitutionality of governmental action will devote the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that suppress, disadvantage, or impose differential burdens on speech because of its content. Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 2459, 129 L.Ed.2d 497 (1994); accord Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, ----, 112 S.Ct. 501, 508, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276, 102 S.Ct. 269, 277, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981). Strict scrutiny is desirable in these circumstances because such laws pose the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion rather than persuasion. Turner Broadcasting, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2458. Courts therefore treat content-based regulations as presumptively invalid under the First Amendment. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 2542, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). 21 In contrast, regulations that burden speech, but that are unrelated to the speaker's viewpoint or to the content of the proscribed speech, are subject to a less taxing (but nonetheless meaningful) level of judicial scrutiny. This disparate treatment is justified because, on the whole, non-content-based regulations pose a less substantial risk of excising certain ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue. Turner Broadcasting, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2459. Phrased another way, since regulations that are not content-based portend less jeopardy for freedom of speech, the special prophylaxis that strict scrutiny ensures is less necessary. 22 This dichotomy has important practical ramifications for constitutional analysis as the applicable indices of constitutionality vary according to the level of scrutiny that attaches. Strict judicial scrutiny makes it less likely that any given regulation will clear the constitutional hurdle for, in its domain, the operative test is whether a regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1729, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987). Under ordinary First Amendment scrutiny--sometimes called intermediate scrutiny in recognition of the fact that all First Amendment scrutiny is more demanding than the rational basis standard that is often used to gauge the constitutionality of economic regulations, see Turner Broadcasting, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 2458; see also Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 2537, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)--the test is less exacting in both the ends and means segments of the equation. Thus, where intermediate scrutiny pertains, restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected expression are valid provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). 23