Opinion ID: 6496841
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Much Less Intrusive Alternatives Were Readily

Text: Available and No Warnings Were Given. The reasonableness of de Vries’s vehicle maneuver is not assessed with 20/20 hindsight, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, but courts do consider “the availability of less intrusive alternatives to the force employed and whether proper warnings were given,” Rice, 989 F.3d at 1122. De Vries did not verbally command Seidner to stop, and he gave no warning to Seidner before suddenly swerving in front of the bicycle. De Vries argues that blocking the roadway with the SUV was “the least forceful way he could have stopped [Seidner],” but this is clearly not the case. Nothing prevented de Vries from pulling beside Seidner and ordering him to stop. See Gravelet-Blondin v. Shelton, 728 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining “the absence of a warning of the imminent use of force, when giving such a warning is plausible, weighs in favor of finding a constitutional violation”). Most important, nothing prevented de Vries from stopping the SUV farther in front of Seidner to reduce the chance of a collision. This factor weighs heavily against the use of deadly force because at least two notably less intrusive alternatives were readily available to de Vries’s sudden swerve in front of Seidner’s bicycle. 3. Graham Factor Three: There is Little to Balance. The final step in the Graham analysis requires balancing the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the government’s need for that intrusion. See Rice, 989 F.3d at 1121. De Vries’s use of his vehicle to effectuate a traffic stop of Seidner’s bicycle constituted the use of deadly force 34 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES because it created “a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.” See Smith, 394 F.3d at 693. But that only accounts for Graham’s first factor: the type and amount of force used. Depending on the government’s need for the intrusion, the use of deadly force is sometimes justified. Under the circumstances of this case, however, the other Graham factors provide a woefully insufficient counterweight to justify the use of this degree of force. We have made clear that any force must be balanced by the need for that force. See Meredith v. Erath, 342 F.3d 1057, 1061 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Bryan, 630 F.3d at 825 (explaining that “all force . . . must be justified by the need for the specific level of force employed”). De Vries argues that his use of force was reasonable because “far more serious uses of force” have been found reasonable to stop fleeing motorists. But Seidner was not a fleeing motorist. (Indeed, under the appropriate standard of review, our court is not even permitted to treat him as a fleeing bicyclist.) De Vries primarily relies on two out-of-circuit cases, neither of which aid his cause. See Abney v. Coe, 493 F.3d 412 (4th Cir. 2007); Coitrone v. Murray, 642 F. App’x 517 (6th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 7 In Abney, an officer tried to stop a motorcyclist for a traffic violation, but the motorcyclist failed to stop and proceeded to run another car off the road. 493 F.3d at 414. The motorcyclist wove through oncoming traffic, on a highway and other roads, in a chase that went on for eight miles. Id. at 413–14. The 7 The Coitrone case is unpublished, but the Sixth Circuit “permits citation of any unpublished [cases],” Sixth Circuit Rule 32.1(a), and may find them persuasive, see United States v. Keith, 559 F.3d 499, 505 (6th Cir. 2009). Unpublished Sixth Circuit cases have no precedential authority. See id. SEIDNER V. DE VRIES 35 parties in Abney disputed whether the officer intentionally used his vehicle to stop the motorcyclist, but their vehicles collided and the motorcyclist brought a § 1983 claim. Id. at 413–15, 417 n.1. The court deemed the officer’s use of deadly force justified because, even if the officer had intentionally used his vehicle to stop the motorcyclist, the motorcyclist’s flight endangered the lives of others. Id. at 420–21. Coitrone involved similarly dangerous surrounding circumstances that justified the use of deadly force. An officer tried to pull over a motorcyclist after running his license plate and discovering outstanding warrants for kidnaping, rape, and other serious crimes. Coitrone, 642 F. App’x at 518. The motorcyclist failed to stop and exceeded the speed limit as he traveled in and out of the wrong lane to pass vehicles. Id. The parties in Coitrone disputed whether a second officer intentionally used his car to stop the motorcyclist, but their vehicles crashed. See id. at 519–20. Whether the police car struck the motorcycle or the motorcycle struck the police car, the driver was launched into a cement culvert. See id. at 519. The motorcyclist recovered from a coma and brought a § 1983 claim. Id. Not surprisingly, the court determined that the officer’s potentially intentional use of deadly force was objectively reasonable because Coitrone led the police on a chase that substantially and immediately risked serious physical injury to others. Id. at 521. The circumstances surrounding Seidner’s arrest were nothing like those in Abney or Coitrone. Far from weaving in and out of oncoming traffic on a motorcycle, exceeding the speed limit, and causing a chase that endangered other lives, Seidner was riding a bicycle on a well-lit deserted street, posing no safety threat to anyone. 36 SEIDNER V. DE VRIES At the time de Vries stopped Seidner, it was clearly established that a seizure occurs when the government terminates freedom of movement through means intentionally applied. See Lewis, 523 U.S. at 844. This includes the use of roadblocks where suspects in motorized vehicles do not have an opportunity to avoid a collision. See Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–99. On appeal, de Vries wisely abandons the argument that he did not intend to seize Seidner, but he continues to argue that the force he used was reasonable. I agree with the majority that we have no case law addressing the use of a police car to stop a bicycle, but we have an obligation to provide guidance where it is possible to do so, and I do not see room for debate about whether using an SUV to block the path of a bicycle, without allowing sufficient distance for the bike to avoid a collision, “creates a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily injury.” I would so hold. I would also rule that de Vries’s use of force was constitutionally excessive as a matter of law given application of the Graham factors to the surrounding circumstances. 8 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s Fourth Amendment excessive force analysis. 8 “Summary judgment at the appellate level is proper even though the prevailing party on the appeal did not move under Rule 56.” Wright & Miller, 10A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2716 (4th ed.). Indeed, we have ruled that an officer’s use of force was excessive even when the plaintiff did not file a cross-motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1284 (9th Cir. 2001) (determining that an officer’s deadly force was excessive on appeal); see also Donovan, 17 F.3d at 949–51 (same).