Opinion ID: 1374241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: attempted robbery as statutory aggravating circumstance

Text: Humphries first argues the trial court erred in instructing the jury that an attempted armed robbery accompanying murder is sufficient to constitute an aggravating circumstance under S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20 (Supp.1995). We disagree. S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20 includes as an aggravating circumstance allowing imposition of the death penalty any murder carried out while in the commission of ... robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. The question in this case is whether the language in the commission of ... robbery while armed with a deadly weapon requires the robbery to be completed or includes attempted armed robbery. Humphries argues that under the rationale of State v. Childs, 299 S.C. 471, 385 S.E.2d 839 (1989), the crime accompanying the murder must be completed in order to constitute a statutory aggravating circumstance. Childs is inapposite. Childs was convicted of conspiracy, murder, and armed robbery and was sentenced to life without parole for thirty years. On appeal, he argued that the evidence against him was not sufficient to sustain the aggravating circumstance of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon. This Court held evidence money was missing from the Hess station where the victim was killed was sufficient to submit the case to the jury on the question of whether there had been ... [a] murder while in the commission of an armed robbery. Id. at 479, 385 S.E.2d at 844. In Childs, we did not reach the issue before us in this case because we did not need to do so. Because there was evidence that an armed robbery was completed, the question whether the statutory language of section 16-3-20 includes attempted armed robbery was not properly before us there. Therefore, Childs is not relevant to the resolution of the present issue. No South Carolina case squarely addresses the propriety of using an attempted crime accompanying murder as an aggravating circumstance supporting a request for the death penalty. However, courts from other jurisdictions have construed similar statutes to allow certain attempted felonies to constitute aggravating circumstances to murder. People v. Ramirez, 98 Ill.2d 439, 75 Ill.Dec. 241, 250, 457 N.E.2d 31, 40 (1983), construed the Illinois death penalty statute, which provides that a defendant in a murder case is eligible for the death penalty if the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if ... the felony was ... armed robbery. The defendant argued this language requires the other felony to be completed. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed. It found: Whether the murder is committed in association with the actual completion of the aggravating felony or only with the attempted felony is not crucial. The aggravating factor which triggers the application of the death penalty statute is that the murder be committed ` in the course of the aggravated felony. A murder may be committed `in the course of an armed robbery whether or not the actual armed robbery is consummated. Id. (initial emphasis added) (quoting People v. Walker, 91 Ill.2d 502, 64 Ill.Dec. 531, 535, 440 N.E.2d 83, 87 (1982)); see also Amadeo v. State, 243 Ga. 627, 255 S.E.2d 718 (finding that in the commission of language does not require the felony at issue to have been completed), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 974, 100 S.Ct. 469, 62 L.Ed.2d 389 (1979). The Illinois court also rejected the defendant's argument that the statute would have included attempts expressly if the legislature had intended for attempted felonies to constitute aggravating circumstances justifying imposition of the death penalty. The court reasoned that the felony itself did not constitute the aggravating circumstance; rather, the aggravating circumstance was the commission of murder in the course of an aggravated felony. Ramirez, 75 Ill.Dec. at 251, 457 N.E.2d at 41. In Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 433, 130 L.Ed.2d 345 (1994), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit construed the same statute at issue in Walker and Ramirez. The Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's contention the statute was void for vagueness when applied to a man sentenced to death for a murder committed in the course of an attempted rape. The Illinois Supreme Court had not yet decided Walker, when the defendant in Free v. Peters committed the murder for which he was sentenced to death. Defendant argued, therefore, that the statute did not give him reasonable notice that he could be subject to the death penalty even if he did not complete the rape. Writing for the Seventh Circuit, Judge Posner held the statute gave the defendant all the notice to which the Constitution entitled him. Id. at 702. Judge Posner defended the Illinois Supreme Court's construction of the statute on the grounds that both the statutory language and policy concerns supported the court's interpretation. Specifically, the federal court of appeals found it an unimportant detail whether the killing occurs before or after the last act necessary to complete the accompanying felony. Id. We agree with the rationale of Walker, Ramirez, Amadeo, and Free. The phrase while in the commission of implies acts that are concurrent with the murder. That the murder may occur before an armed robbery actually is completed does not mean that a robbery was not taking place. Accordingly, we uphold the instruction given by the trial judge.