Opinion ID: 1265792
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Nexus between the means and the ends

Text: When the interest affected is entitled to only minimal judicial protection, the State need only show that the distinction [15] drawn bears a fair and substantial relationship to the Act's objective. Brown, 687 P.2d at 269-70; Sonneman, 790 P.2d at 705. In State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d 155, we stated that [d]espite the language in Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d [at 362], indicating this court's lower level of scrutiny will be more rigorous and less deferential than the federal rational basis test, we have invalidated only two legislative enactments under the fair and substantial relationship test since Isakson.  [16] State v. Anthony, 810 P.2d at 159. [17] CFJ's arguments regarding the third step in the equal protection analysis overlap its substantive due process claims. See Leigh, 823 P.2d at 1247 n. 15. For the same reasons discussed above in rejecting CFJ's substantive due process claim, we conclude that the provisions do not violate the constitutional guarantee of equal protection. The challenged provisions bear a fair and substantial relationship to the State's objective of ensur[ing] the quick, efficient, fair and predictable delivery of indemnity and medical benefits to injured workers at a reasonable cost to the employers. Ch. 79, § 1, SLA 1988 (emphasis added).