Opinion ID: 48759
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Roof Damage Claim(s)

Text: The district court determined that the Watsons’ breach of contract action, as it relates to Allstate’s denial of the Watsons’ June 2001 and August 2002 claims for roof damage, warranted dismissal on two grounds, viz., the Watsons failure to (1) provide Allstate “prompt notice” of their roof damage, and (2) file suit within the contractual limitations period. In granting Allstate’s cross-motion for summary judgment, the district court devoted most of its discussion to the question of prompt notice and only briefly addressed limitations. The parties fully briefed the limitations 1995). 9 Acceptance Ins. Co. v. Lifecare Corp., 89 S.W.3d 773, 782 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2002, no pet.). 10 Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds, 875 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994). 11 Id. at 693. 8 issue in their summary judgment pleadings, but the district court only noted conclusionally that “[the Watsons] cannot argue here that [their roof claim] was wrongfully denied because, pursuant to [their] policy, any action brought against [Allstate] must be brought within two years and one day after the action accrues.” The court then observed in a footnote that “[the Watsons] wind/hail claim was denied on October 9, 2001 and [they] brought this case on December 23, 2003.” We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, and may rest our ruling “on any basis raised below and supported by the record.”12 The record makes clear that the Watsons’ breach of contract action, as it relates to their roof damage claim, is time-barred. The Policy contained the following limitations provision: No suit or action can be brought unless the policy provisions have been complied with. Action brought against us must be started within two years and one day after the cause of action accrues.13 Texas courts routinely enforce such provisions in insurance policies.14 It is well-settled that “[l]imitations begin to run on 12 Grenier v. Medical Engineering Corp., 243 F.3d 200, 207 (5th Cir. 2001). 13 Emphasis added. 14 See, e.g, Mangine v. State Farm Lloyds, 73 S.W.3d 467, 470-71 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2002, pet. denied); Kuzniar v. State Farm Lloyds, 52 S.W.3d 759, 760 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2001, pet. denied); Pena v. State Farm Lloyds, 980 S.W.2d 949, 953 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1998, no pet.). 9 an insurance policy when the loss is denied.”15 In this case, Allstate sent two denial letters to the Watsons, one on July 12, 2001 and another on October 9, 2001. Thus, the running of the contractual limitations period was triggered no later than October 9, 2001. As the instant suit was filed in state court on October 29, 2003, the Watsons’ breach of contract claim, based on Allstate’s denial of their initial roof damage claim, is obviously time-barred. In their response to Allstate’s cross-motion for summary judgment,16 however, the Watsons insisted that their action could not be time-barred, because it did not accrue until Allstate denied the Watsons’ second roof claim in February 2003. The Watsons’ contention is founded on their erroneous belief that their second roof claim was a new claim, and not an attempt to reinstate their original roof damage claim. That conclusion, in turn, is based on the fallacious contention that Allstate denied the first roof damage claim because it found no damage. Not so: The record makes clear that, in July 2001, Allstate did in fact find roof damage; it merely denied coverage when it determined that this damage resulted from other than covered perils. The record also makes clear that 15 Pena, 980 S.W.2d at 953. 16 The Watsons fail to brief the limitations issue on appeal, but as the district court’s treatment of the issue was so brief, we will not treat their limitations argument as waived, but instead address the contentions they made in their summary judgment pleadings. 10 the Watsons made no repairs to their roof after their first claim was denied, despite reports from tenants that leaks continued. Finally, the record makes clear that Allstate denied the Watsons’ 2002 roof damage claim because it determined that the damage was caused by the Watsons’ failure either to (1) repair the roof or (2) timely notify Allstate of any putative new damage after their first claim was denied in 2001. In sum, Allstate determined in 2001 that the Watsons’ roof damage and its leaks were caused by conditions for which the Policy provided no coverage. The Watsons’ damaged roof went unrepaired and continued to worsen until the ceiling partially collapsed in 2002. No other cause intervened that would provide the Watsons’ coverage under the Policy. Consequently, instead of having opened a “new” claim in August 2002, the Watsons simply reinstated their previously denied roof damage claim, which Allstate again denied. Such a reinstatement does not re-start the limitations period for a breach of contract action.17 As the Watsons’ breach of contract 17 See Pena, 980 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. App. 1998); Pace v. Travelers Lloyds of Texas Ins. Co., 162 S.W.3d 632 (Tex. App.—Houston 2005, no pet.). In Pena, the court held that “claims for additional payments may begin the statute of limitations running anew.” 980 S.W.2d at 954. The limitations period was only reset, however, by the insurer’s reconsideration of and partial payment for the earlier denied claim. Id. Even though Allstate honored its contractual duty to investigate the Watsons’ second roof claim, the instant case more closely resembles Pace, in which the court held that a policy’s limitation period is not reset when “there is no evidence that [a denial decision] was ever expressly or impliedly withdrawn or changed, such as by making payment or otherwise taking action inconsistent with that decision.” 11 action based on Allstate’s denial of their roof damage claim was filed after the contractual limitations period had expired, it is time-barred.