Opinion ID: 198263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: watkins's motion for summary judgment

Text: 70 The district court made the following findings with respect to the ADA claim: 71 1. Plaintiff did not provide J & S with adequate medical certification regarding his condition and ability to return to work within the meaning of ADA requirements. 72 2. J & S made offers of other positions and was not required, for business reasons, to hold the vacant position open for Watkins. The employer was not required to wait indefinitely for plaintiff to show his ability to work in his old job or in any comparable positions. 73 3. Reasonable accommodation does not require leaving a position open or filling it temporarily when an employer offers uncontradicted evidence of the importance of such a position to its business, especially when the employer has no way of knowing when, or even if, the employee will return to work. Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1187-88 (6th Cir.1996). 74 4. Plaintiff, in failing to provide his employer with any information regarding his ability to return, demands what certainly amounts to indefinite leave. Such an accommodation is not required by the ADA. 75 ... 76 Defendant has presented a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for replacing Plaintiff. Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendant's reason was merely a pretext for illegal discrimination. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment as to the ADA claim is granted. 77 Watkins argues that J & S failed to reasonably accommodate him by refusing to hold open his position as station manager until his return from leave. The district court found that there was no direct evidence of discrimination under the Act, and that J & S was not required to hold the managerial position open for an indefinite amount of time. The district court determined that Watkins failed adequately to show that on the date of his replacement that he was able to return to work or to perform the essential functions of his job without reasonable accommodation. The court recognized that under some circumstances an employer may be required to hold a position open for some duration as a reasonable accommodation, but when the employee's absence poses an undue hardship on the employer, then leaving the position open would not be considered to be reasonable. Finally, the district judge determined that Watkins never informed [J & S] as to when he might be able to return or what accommodations he might require; in effect, he concluded that Watkins never made a specific reasonable accommodation request for purposes of the ADA. The court concluded, furthermore, that the J & S was not advised with sufficient specificity that in the immediate future, Watkins would be able to resume his job or an equivalent position, citing Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir.1995). In sum, J & S was not required, for ADA purposes, to provide accommodation to Watkins for what amounted to an indefinite leave. See Monette v. Electronic Data Systems, 90 F.3d 1173, 1187-88 (6th Cir.1996); Rogers v. International Marine Terminals, Inc., 87 F.3d 755, 759 (5th Cir.1996); Hudson v. MCI Telecommunications, 87 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir.1996). 78 Watkins argues in his brief that job termination alone involves such psychological stress that he has presented a case for jury determination. He cites no case in support of that proposition. Watkins complains that other than his FMLA damages he is left without a remedy. We impose no further requirement on the employer, under the circumstances of this case, to afford additional accommodation to Watkins whose ability to return to service when he was replaced was, at best, indefinite. 79 The difficulty in this case is allowing the recovery of substantial damages under the FMLA based on the jury verdict, while at the same time affirming the summary judgment in favor of J & S on Watkins's ADA claim. We agree with the district court that while these causes of action may interrelate, they involve separate and distinct statutory claims. There is a paucity of authority on the FMLA, and we have concluded that material factual controversies existed for a factfinder to decide. We concede particular difficulty with the jury finding that Watkins was able to perform the essential functions of an equivalent position in early November, 1994. We resolve the difficulty by giving Watkins the benefit of doubt and leaving this issue within the province of the jury. The parties' burdens are different under the two statutory schemes. Under the FMLA, J & S was responsible for restoring Watkins to an equivalent position when his leave expired. The evidence supported the jury's determination that it failed in that duty. However, under the ADA, Watkins was obligated to request a reasonable accommodation. The district court found, as a matter of law, that Watkins's request that J & S leave his original position open for an indefinite amount of time was unreasonable. We affirm both the jury's verdict and the district court's decision on those ADA claims.
80 There is a heavy burden cast upon Watkins on his claim for emotional distress under Maine law. He must demonstrate that he suffered severe stress and that the action of J & S was outrageous in nature. See Barnes v. Zappia 658 A.2d 1086 (Me.1995); see also Dewilde v. Guy Gannett Publishing Co., 797 F.Supp. 55, 63 (D.Me.1992). We find no error in the determination by the district court that Watkins failed to meet this difficult standard under the circumstances of this case. We have affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the ADA claim for the reasons indicated. The emotional distress claim is interrelated with the ADA claim with respect to the termination. We affirm the judgment on count three.