Opinion ID: 1771774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 42

Heading: Capital Murder v. Simple Murder

Text: ś 97. Puckett argues that the State failed to establish the underlying felony of sexual battery; therefore, the charge against him should have been reduced from capital murder to simple murder. Specifically, Puckett maintains that notwithstanding the evidence of injury to the victim's vagina, there was no evidence whatsoever of libidinal gratification or sexual behavior [13] as required by this Court's holding in Roberson v. State, 501 So.2d 398 (Miss.1987). Puckett contends [t]he language of this Court's decision in Roberson is clear: in order to meet the definition of sexual penetration announced in Section 97-3-97 of the Mississippi Code of 1972, as amended, an essential element of the crime of Sexual Battery, the activities in question must be the `product of sexual behavior or libidinal gratification.' ś 98. On the other hand, the State maintains that Roberson did not create an additional element of proof that is not contained within the statute. The State further maintains that Roberson specifically addressed innocent insertion of an object into a child's anal or vaginal openings such as would be performed during clinical examinations or domestic, parental functions. ś 99. In Roberson, this Court considered whether the definition of sexual penetration was vague and thus violative of due process. The defendant in Roberson maintained the statutory definition of sexual penetration includes any penetration and therefore subjects physicians and parents to criminal prosecution for innocent insertion of an object into the child's genital or anal openings, even if it is done for clinical examinations or domestic, parental functions. However, this Court stated Although, on its face, the definition of sexual penetration announced in § 97-3-97 encompasses any penetration, the Court holds the parameters of the definition of sexual penetration are logically confined to activities which are the product of sexual behavior or libidinal gratification, not merely the product of clinical examinations or domestic, parental functions. As stated in U.S, v. Harriss, 347 U.S. [612] at 618, 74 S.Ct. [808] At 812, 98 L.Ed. [989] at 996 [(1954)], [I]f [the] general class of offenses can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction of the statute, this Court is under a duty to give the statute that construction. Roberson, 501 So.2d at 400-01. ś 100. This Court agrees that Puckett's reliance on Roberson is misplaced. The defendant in Roberson was convicted of sexual battery of a child under the age of twelve. [14] Accordingly, the holding in Roberson was limited to § 97-3-95(1)(c), that portion of the statute dealing with sexual penetration of a child. Furthermore, Roberson merely announced that innocent insertion of objects into a child's vagina such as for the purpose of clinical examinations or domestic, parental functions does not violate the statute. It is unfathomable for this Court to imagine that anyone could claim that the forceful insertion of a wooden club or other instrument into a woman's vagina without her consent could ever be innocent so as to fit within the parameters of the Roberson decision. ś 101. The statute clearly prohibits the insertion of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body without his or her consent. See Miss.Code Ann. §§ 97-3-95(1)(c) and 97-3-97(a). Puckett's assertion that the lack of seminal fluid was sufficient evidence that the act was not the product of sexual behavior or libidinal gratification is futile. It is rather obvious that seminal fluid is not the natural by-product of inserting an object into the genital or anal opening of another person's body. There was sufficient evidence of sexual penetration notwithstanding the lack of seminal fluid. Dr. Haynes testified that the bleeding from the vaginal vault was due to numerous lacerations and trauma that was consistent with a blunt object being inserted with force into the vaginal opening. ś 102. Although it may be difficult for the average citizen to consider the insertion of such an object into a women's vagina as sexual behavior, the statute contemplates such behavior and specifically prohibits such behavior that is performed without consent. Accordingly, there is no merit to this assignment of error.