Opinion ID: 2597444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does RCW 80.36.510 impose substantive duties on AOS companies separate from the regulations promulgated by the WUTC?

Text: There is no dispute that the legislature delegated authority to the WUTC to create disclosure regulations for AOS companies in RCW 80.36.520. Similarly, given a plain reading, section.510 appears simply to represent the legislature's findings regarding the need for such regulations. The source of contention upon which Judd's lawsuit is based is found in section .530. RCW 80.36.530 states that a violation of sections .510, .520, or .524 constitutes a violation of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW. On its face, however, this mandate seems at odds with the plain language of sections .510 and.520. How could section .520 itself, which merely directs the WUTC to adopt regulations, form the basis of a CPA violation? Similarly, what kind of violation can or should be divined from the amorphous legislative finding language in section.510? The primary question presented in this case, therefore, is how to interpret legislative intent in sections .510 and.520 in light of the mandate provided in section .530. Judd argues that RCW 80.36.510 provides a cause of action for failure to provide disclosure of rates for certain long distance calls that is independent from violations of WUTC regulations promulgated under RCW 80.36.520. Judd and the Court of Appeals dissent focus their interpretation of this statute on the notion that [s]tatutes must be interpreted and construed so that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or superfluous. Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wash.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d 1303 (1996) (emphasis added); Judd, 116 Wash.App. at 775, 66 P.3d 1102. In order to find an independent cause of action in section .510, however, we would be required to read section .510 without the words, `[t]he legislature finds that.' [4] Judd, 116 Wash.App. at 776, 66 P.3d 1102. Reading words out of section .510 in order to interpret the word or in section .530 would not be consistent with the notion that all words in a statute should be given effect. Instead, proper interpretation of RCW 80.36.510 requires us to read section .510 together with both sections .520 and.530. See Kilian v. Atkinson, 147 Wash.2d 16, 21, 50 P.3d 638 (2002) (In construing a statute, courts should read it in its entirety, instead of reading only a single sentence or a single phrase. (footnote omitted)); State v. Thorne, 129 Wash.2d 736, 761, 921 P.2d 514 (1996) (Each provision must be viewed in relation to the other provisions and harmonized....). Only when read together do the provisions of sections .510, .520, and .530 make sense. When the legislature employs the words the legislature finds, as it did in RCW 80.36.510, it sets forth policy statements that do not give rise to enforceable rights and duties. See Aripa v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 91 Wash.2d 135, 139, 588 P.2d 185 (1978). When considered without reference to section .510, section .520 merely requires the WUTC to act by promulgating regulations and does not impose any positive requirements on telecommunications companies. When read together with the policy statements in section .510 and the language of section .530, however, it is reasonable to conclude, as both the trial court and the Court of Appeals majority did, that the legislature intended a violation of the WUTC regulations promulgated pursuant to section .520 to constitute a violation of the CPA. The Court of Appeals dissent argues that such an interpretation does not give effect to RCW 80.36.510. To the contrary, however, the legislative policy statements in section .510 are to be considered in construing, interpreting, and administering [the statute]. Such declarations and recitals, while not operative rules of action, may play a very important part in determining what action shall be taken. Whatcom County v. Langlie, 40 Wash.2d 855, 863, 246 P.2d 836 (1952) (citations omitted). No additional meaning or effect must be read into section .510. Considering RCW 80.36.510, .520, and .530 in pari materia, the Court of Appeals majority properly concluded that in order for there to be a failure to disclose that is actionable under the CPA, the failure must violate the rules adopted by the WUTC. Judd, 116 Wash.App. at 770, 66 P.3d 1102. We affirm. Because we affirm the Court of Appeals decision that section .510 does not create a separate cause of action, we do not address whether the telephone companies provided adequate disclosure by filing rates with the WUTC.