Opinion ID: 2427354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Rosario's remaining arguments

Text: Rosario argues pro se and for the first time on appeal that his due process rights were violated because a selected sworn juror was asleep from the inception of the trial. Rosario Supp. Br. at 8. Rosario cites to a portion of the transcript where Rosario's counsel alerted the trial court that one of the jurors was falling asleep. At the time, Rosario did not raise any due process objection, and therefore, such argument is at best forfeited on appeal, subject to review only for plain error. The trial court is not required to remove a juror who has slept and is accorded considerable discretion in handling the matter. See, e.g., United States v. Freitag, 230 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir.2000); see also United States v. Newman, 982 F.2d 665, 670 (1st Cir.1992). A sleeping juror does not violate a defendant's due process rights unless the defendant can show he was prejudiced to the extent that he did not receive a fair trial. See Freitag, 230 F.3d at 1023. Rosario's pointing out that a single juror at one point in the trial fell asleep does not by itself establish such prejudice, and does not support grant of new trial. Rosario also argues for the first time on appeal that his trial should have been severed pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. He argues that he was prejudiced by the spillover effects of evidence with respect to González and Fernández's role in the April 25, 2004 murders, in which he had no part. This argument is forfeited as he failed to raise it below. In any event, [c]o-conspirators are customarily tried together absent a strong showing of prejudice. United States v. Perkins, 926 F.2d 1271, 1280 (1st Cir.1991). On the current record, we have no reason to think that had a motion to sever been made, the district court would have been compelled to grant it. See United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 440 (1st Cir.1994) (The decision to grant or deny a motion for severance is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court and we will reverse its refusal to sever only upon a finding of manifest abuse of discretion.). [23]