Opinion ID: 675731
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reimburse us to the extent of our payment.

Text: 21 McLain, 599 So.2d at 878. This provision parallels the reimbursement clause in Miller, in which the plaintiffs had agreed to reimburse intervenor 'any amount that I receive from a third person for payment of medical expenses to the extent that the plan may have already paid me for the same medical expenses'. See Miller, 611 So.2d at 833 (reprinting decision of lower court in appendix). 22 The Miller court held that the insurer and the insured were not co-owners of a right to recover medical expenses, because the relationship between them was premised on a contractual right of reimbursement from the plaintiffs rather than via subrogation against the defendant. Id. at 831. McLain explicitly based its holding upon the language of the subrogation and reimbursement clause. The Labiches' insurance policy contains no such reimbursement clause. 23 Our discussion of McLain does not stop there. McLain went on to say: 24 Our conclusion is bolstered by language used by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Company v. Sonnier, 406 So.2d 178 (La.1981), a case involving partial subrogation of medical payments. In Sonnier, the supreme court stated that the subrogor and the subrogee, in a partial subrogation, each enjoys an independent substantive right which may be exercised against the debtor. Thus, they are not co-owners of the same property right. 25 McLain, 599 So.2d at 879. 26 McLain 's reliance upon Sonnier is misplaced. Sonnier, which predated Moody, did not address whether a partially subrogated insurer and its insured are co-owners of the cause of action against the tortfeasor; it dealt with preferential rights between the subrogee and the subrogor. What Sonnier held was that, although the subrogor and the subrogee may exercise their rights against the tortfeasor independently, a subrogor who has been paid only in part may exercise his right for the balance of the debt in preference to the subrogee. Sonnier, 406 So.2d at 181. 27 Sonnier is inapplicable to the instant controversy, because the rights of the subrogor and subrogee against the debtor are roughly parallel to the rights of the workers' compensation employer or its insurer and the employee against a third-party tortfeasor. Under Louisiana's workers' compensation law, the employer and the employee each have what could be termed an independent substantive right which may be exercised against the debtor. If an employer files suit against a third party tortfeasor for employment-related injuries before the employee files suit, the employee may still maintain a separate action for damages and need not intervene in the employer's pending suit. Roche v. Big Moose Oilfield Truck Serv., 381 So.2d 396 (La.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 808, 101 S.Ct. 54, 66 L.Ed.2d 11 (1980). 28 Louisiana's workers' compensation law also provides that [n]o compromise with such third person by either the employer or the injured employee or his dependent shall be binding upon or affect the rights of the others unless assented to by him. LA.R.S. 23:1103. And if an employer's and employee's rights are not completely independent under Louisiana's workers' compensation law, neither are a subrogor's and subrogee's rights as independent as Sonnier implies. For example, in Audubon Ins. Co. v. Farr, 453 So.2d 232 (La.1984), the court held that a subrogor could release the subrogee's claims against a third party and thereby bar suit by the subrogee against the third party. Sonnier simply does not address whether a cause of action is co-owned under Moody. 29 McLain also argues that Louisiana courts have resisted efforts to extend Moody beyond the workers compensation setting. We find this argument particularly unpersuasive in the context of partial subrogation in light of the fact that the two cases McLain cites for this proposition, Band and Moore, assume that a subrogee is normally liable for a pro rata share of legal expenses but distinguish the special case of charity hospitals. See McLain, 599 So.2d at 879. 30 We therefore conclude that Moody applies in cases of partial subrogation. The rationale given in Moody for creating the system of apportionment is that both a worker injured by a third party tortfeasor and an employer obligated to pay workers' compensation have a property right to recover damages from the defendant. Moody, 498 So.2d at 1084-85. As they are co-owners of this property right, the recovery must be apportioned between them. 31 Such is also the case where an insured contractually surrogates his claim to the insurer. The Moody court intended to prevent an intervenor insurance company from free riding on the plaintiffs' attorney by not paying any portion of the attorneys' fees. Moody appears to be based not upon any special principles of workers' compensation law, but on principles applicable to partial subrogation generally. Moreover, the Louisiana Supreme Court has given no indication that it intends to limit Moody to the workers' compensation setting. 32 We recognize that the task of predicting the final course to be taken by the supreme court of a state is a difficult one. The Erie guesses made under circumstances such as presented in this case are many times wrong. We have no assurance that the predictions we make today will ultimately fare better than the notable similar forays into diversity jurisdiction that have missed the mark. We conclude, however, that the district court correctly applied the Moody formula to this case. We therefore AFFIRM the judgment. 33