Opinion ID: 2380792
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: intervention in the criminal action

Text: Plaintiff argues on appeal that it should have been permitted to intervene in the criminal proceedings on remand in order to protect its interests in the tourmalines. These proceedings consisted of the entry of an order in accordance with the mandate of State v. Sweatt, supra . The court below ruled that the plaintiff had no right to intervene in a criminal proceeding. Our Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for intervention in criminal cases. Plaintiff proposes that the standards and procedures for intervention contained in M.R.Civ.P. 24 should apply to his motion, and asserts that his motion was timely and should have been granted as of right. We disagree. Rule 24 applies to civil proceedings only. We also determine that intervention is not available to one who is not a party in a criminal proceeding, such as the case here, and who claims ownership rights to seized property which is the subject of a motion for return of property and to suppress evidence under the provisions of Maine Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(e) and who has instituted civil process to establish his proprietory rights to the seized property. We do not decide the appropriateness of intervention in the absence of pending civil litigation. But cf. United States v. LaFatch, 565 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. LaFatch v. M.M. Corp., 435 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 1611, 56 L.Ed.2d 62 (1978) (court implicitly permitted intervention by alleged owner in proceeding initiated by defendant to recover suppressed property, where owner had obtained civil verdict against defendant).