Opinion ID: 4519828
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: “Employer” Requirement

Text: Both the original and amended LHWCA define “employer” as “an employer any of whose employees are employed in maritime employment, in whole or in part, upon the navigable waters of the United States.” 35 MMR argues that because neither Flores nor any other employee of MMR was engaged in “maritime employment” as defined by the post-1972 LHWCA’s 33 Id. at 1126 (quoting Hastings v. Mann, 340 F.2d 910, 911 (4th Cir. 1965)). See also Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 214–15 (1969) (“Since long before the Longshoremen’s Act was passed, it has been settled law that structures such as wharves and piers, permanently affixed to land, are extensions of the land.”) (emphasis added). 34 The Second Circuit has adopted a different test. In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Morganti, 412 F.3d 407, 414 (2d Cir. 2005), the court considered whether a research barge attached to a buoy rested on navigable waters. The court did not consider the permanence of the barge. Id. at 415. Instead, the court held that “a person on any object floating in actual navigable waters must be considered to be on actual navigable waters” for LHWCA coverage. Id. at 416. The test we have established in Shea and Peytavin is not as broad as the Second Circuit’s test. 35 Longshore Harbor Workers Compensation Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 92-576, § 2(b), 86 Stat. 1251 (Oct. 27, 1972); § 903(2)(4). Congress amended the employer definition in 1972 to reflect the expanded situs requirements, but the definition otherwise remained unchanged. Id. 7 Case: 19-60027 Document: 00515360634 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/26/2020 No. 19-60027 “status” test, MMR does not qualify as a statutory “employer” under § 902(4). As set forth below, we conclude that MMR was a statutory employer. Because Perini teaches us that the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA did not intend to limit coverage, the definition of both “employee” and “employer” under the Act become relevant. Before the amendments, “employee” was defined negatively to read: “[t]he term ‘employee’ does not include a master or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net.” 36 The amended LHWCA substantially changed the definition of “employee” from a negative definition to: “any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker.” 37 This new definition of “employee” became the “status” test. It is noteworthy that the pre-1972 LHWCA definition of employee did not specify the type of maritime work that qualified as “maritime employment”; we read that definition to include anyone who met the situs test, subject to the two exceptions in the “employee” definition. 38 Our pre-1972 case law confirms that if the claimant qualified as an employee under the pre-1972 Act by being injured on navigable waters where he was regularly employed, the employer also qualified as a statutory “employer” under § 902(4): the employer had at least one employee engaged in maritime employment. 39 36 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1970). 37 § 903(2)(3) (1972). The definition excludes certain employees, none of which is at issue here. 38 § 902(3) (1970). 39 See Hullinghorst Industries, Inc. v. Carroll, 650 F.2d 750, 758 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981) (“We find no decision of this circuit which holds that ‘employer’ status may not be predicated upon the status of the injured claimant as a maritime employee under the Act.”). 8 Case: 19-60027 Document: 00515360634 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/26/2020 No. 19-60027 In 1965, this court addressed the definition of “employer” in Nalco Chemical Corp. v. Shea. 40 The claimant in that case was employed as a combination airplane pilot/salesman and was injured on navigable water.41 The claimant’s sales duties required him to call on customers on rigs located on navigable waters. 42 His injury on navigable waters satisfied the Act’s situs requirement, and he was an “employee” under the pre-1972 Act. 43 Important for this discussion, the statutory “employer” requirement was also satisfied— we held that to be an “employer,” the LHWCA merely required that at least one of the employer’s employees be engaged in maritime employment “in whole or in part.” 44 The court concluded that the employee’s sales activities on navigable waters amounted to “maritime employment” under § 902(4). 45 Thus, the employer had at least one employee engaged in maritime employment and was an “employer” under the Act. In the post-1972 cases, we have followed the same analysis in our interpretation of “employer” under the LHWCA. We have held that if the injured employee meets the Act’s amended definition of “employee,” the employer is ipso facto a covered employer—it has at least one employee engaged in maritime employment. 46 MMR disagrees with this analysis and contends that it is important that the post-1972 “employer” requirement of § 902(4) be enforced and Flores be required to show that MMR has at least one employee who can satisfy the post-