Opinion ID: 330165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction to Consider the Constitutionality of Section 8(g)(1)

Text: 24 The second basis for the trial court's dismissal of this action was section 8(i), which purports to withdraw the jurisdiction of any court to  affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such notice or order. 25 The Corporation places great reliance upon Hykel v. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., 317 F.Supp. 332 (E.D.Pa.1970), a three-judge case involving a statutory scheme analogous to the one at issue here. In Hykel, the three-judge court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the validity of a provision identical in language to section 8(g)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 1730(h), and based its decision to dismiss on a withdrawal provision substantially similar to section 8(i). 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(2). Thus Hykel clearly supports the Government's argument that the trial court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of section 8(g)(1). 26 It is crucial, however, to remember the standard with which we must review the trial court's decision to deny appellant's request for a three-judge court. Although Hykel supports the Government's position, a single adverse decision in another circuit does not by itself meet the standard of foreclosure enunciated in Ex parte Poresky ; American United, Inc. v. Walters, and Bulluck v. Washington, supra. 11 27 It is not disputed that a single district judge may dismiss an application for a three-judge court for lack of standing or jurisdiction without determining the substantiality of the constitutional questions presented. Dawkins v. Mitchell, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 213, 437 F.2d 646 (1970); National Council on the Facts of Overpopulation v. Caplin, 224 F.Supp. 313 (D.D.C.1963). See also Note, The Three-Judge District Court and Appellate Review, 49 Va.L.Rev. 538, 557 (1963). However, it is impossible in this action to fully separate jurisdictional issues from constitutional ones. Appellant does not argue that section 8(i) is unconstitutional on its face or that jurisdictional withdrawal provisions are automatically inapplicable where constitutional claims are involved. Appellant's Br. at 28-30. Rather, appellant maintains that the section 8(i) withdrawal provision compounds the seriousness of his plight by purporting to cut off all review of an allegedly unconstitutional statute. In sum, appellant's claim is that the combined effect of sections 8(g)(1) and 8(i) exceeds the broad bounds of congressional power to limit judicial review of administrative action because, if section 8(g)(1) operates to deprive appellant of liberty and property without due process, then section 8(i) serves to insulate an unconstitutional statute from any judicial review whatsoever. Although it is well established that Congress possesses broad powers to determine the jurisdictional limits of lower federal courts, See Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 Harv.L.Rev. 1362 (1953); P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro & H. Wechsler, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System, 360-75 (2d ed. 1973), it is also well established that Congress may not exercise that power to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. St. Joseph Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 51-52, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936); Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948), Cert. denied, 335 U.S. 887, 69 S.Ct. 236, 93 L.Ed. 425 (1948). See also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 444, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834 (1944); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598 (1932); Faulkner v. Clifford, 289 F.Supp. 895, 899 (E.D.N.Y.1968), Appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046, 89 S.Ct. 676, 21 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969). 28 The Supreme Court recently lent some support to appellant's arguments in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974), a case involving the scope of the anti-injunction provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). Although the Court specifically held that jurisdictional withdrawal provisions are not automatically inapplicable where constitutional claims are raised, it qualified this holding by stating: 29 This is not a case in which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial review. Were that true, our conclusion might well be different. 30 Id. at 746, 94 S.Ct. at 2050. Unlike the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code before the Court in Bob Jones University, the Federal Deposit Insurance Act makes no provision whatsoever for administrative review before issuance of section 8(g)(1) suspension orders. Nor does appellant have recourse to anything resembling the refund suit available to persons seeking judicial review of administrative denials of refund claims. Thus appellant is faced with the Draconian choice of risking criminal prosecution or allowing the suspension order to go unchallenged. Appellant's Br. at 33-34. 12 31 We conclude that, if section 8(g)(1) were determined to be unconstitutional, a substantial question would be raised as to the constitutionality of the section 8(i) withdrawal provision insofar as it operates to insulate section 8(g)(1) from any form of judicial review. Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, --- U.S. ---, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975) With Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S.Ct. 1160, 39 L.Ed.2d 389 (1974). There is no sharp dichotomy here between jurisdictional and constitutional issues. In effect, to dismiss appellant's constitutional challenge to the section 8(g)(1) order on the basis of the section 8(i) withdrawal provision is to decide the merits of his constitutional claims.