Opinion ID: 1241476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the impact of the fela on milwaukee's responsive actions

Text: The trial court ruled that even assuming the existence of a common law right to sue one's employees for negligently caused property damage, Milwaukee's counterclaim and third party claims constituted devices contrived to deprive plaintiffs of their right to an adequate recovery and operated to chill justifiable FELA claims in violation of 45 U.S.C. §§ 55, 60. We agree. Section 55 of the FELA provides in relevant part at page 484: Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose or intent of which shall be to enable any common carrier to exempt itself from any liability created by this chapter, shall to that extent be void [.] (Italics ours.) Section 60 of the FELA provides in relevant part at page 485: Any contract, rule, regulation, or device whatsoever, the purpose, intent, or effect of which shall be to prevent employees of any common carrier from furnishing voluntarily information to a person in interest as to the facts incident to the injury or death of any employee, shall be void [.] (Italics ours.) [2] Milwaukee's responsive actions violate sections 55 and 60 in two ways. First, section 60 is violated because the third party claims operate to inhibit testimony by the third party defendants as to the extent of their own negligence in causing the collision and resultant injury of Simpson and death of Stack. Since, in respondents' FELA actions, the negligence of the third party defendants is imputed to Milwaukee (45 U.S.C. § 51), the full and fair revelation of their negligence would, in turn, be largely determinative of their personal liability to Milwaukee in the third party action. As aptly observed by the trial court, the crew's testimony will be affected because they will be reluctant to testify candidly when their own pocketbooks are in jeopardy. Second, Milwaukee's responsive actions violate section 55 because the ultimate threat of retaliatory legal action would have the effect of limiting Milwaukee's liability by discouraging employees from filing FELA actions. Further, it would have the effect of reducing an employee's FELA recovery by the amount of property damage negligently caused by the employee. Milwaukee contends the FELA does not impair a common law right to sue its employees for property damage because the Act only covers claims made by employees against the railroad but is silent about railroads suing employees. Concerning this apparent silence Milwaukee urges this court to follow the reasoning of Schosboek v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R.R., 191 Wash. 425, 426, 71 P.2d 548 (1937), in which we said: An examination of the Federal employers' liability act discloses that it is silent in regard to actions by an injured employee against third parties. Hence, Congress clearly intended to preserve the common law right of action by an injured employee against third parties by not expressly abrogating the same. Schosboek is inapposite, however, The common law right of action by an employee against a third party in no way abridges any substantive right the employee may have against the employer. Lee v. Central of Ga. Ry., 252 U.S. 109, 110-11, 64 L.Ed. 482, 40 S.Ct. 254 (1920). As we have previously noted, Milwaukee's responsive actions clearly impair respondents' right to sue under the FELA. Milwaukee also contends its responsive actions do not constitute a device under either section 55 or 60 of the FELA. It is asserted that the legislative history of the FELA indicates Congress was primarily concerned with employment contract language which operated as a waiver or limitation on an employee's right to sue his or her employer. See H.R. Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess., 4436 et seq. (1908). Milwaukee attempts to distinguish this situation from the instant case wherein the railroad seeks to exercise its own right to sue. We reject such a narrow interpretation of sections 55 and 60. The trial court's broad interpretation of the term device is supported both by the purpose of the act and by case authority. In Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432, 2 L.Ed.2d 382, 78 S.Ct. 394 (1958), the United States Supreme Court stated: Congress intended the creation of no static remedy [under the FELA], but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers. More specifically, in regard to section 55 of the FELA, it has been noted: The drafters of the Federal Employers' Liability Act legislation intended that the Act provide an effective and readily available remedy for negligence-related injuries in the railroad industry.... ... [Section 55] declares a public policy to void releases or other exculpatory devices procured under circumstances that indicate an attempt to avoid Federal Employers' Liability Act liability. ... ... To the extent coercive tactics are used by railroads against their injured employees to discourage resort to Federal Employers' Liability Act litigation, the result is an impermissible chill on rights created by Congress, and which as a matter of public policy and natural law inheres in each employee as a human being. Any chilling effect can be expected to extend not only to prospective Federal Employers' Liability Act plaintiffs, but to all employees and their families. It could be expected to prevent unfavorable testimony as well as the filing of lawsuits. This result is intolerable. Kozar v. Chesapeake & O. Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335, 383-85 (W.D. Mich. 1970). We also note section 60 of the FELA prohibits any device which has the effect of inhibiting the voluntary furnishing of information by an employee. Thus, it is apparent section 60 focuses on the result of employer action, not on the precise nature of the conduct itself. Rather than unduly restrict the scope of section 60, we interpret it to prohibit any action by an employer which effectively restricts employee information as to the facts incident to an employee's injury or death. Accordingly, although Milwaukee has a common law right to sue its employees for negligently caused property damage, we conclude Milwaukee's responsive actions will operate to inhibit testimony by the third party defendants and also will have the effect of limiting Milwaukee's liability in respondents' FELA actions. Milwaukee's counterclaim and third party actions thus violate sections 55 and 60 of the FELA and are therefore void. The trial court's dismissal of Milwaukee's counterclaim and third party actions is affirmed. UTTER, C.J., and ROSELLINI, WRIGHT, BRACHTENBACH, HOROWITZ, DOLLIVER, HICKS, and WILLIAMS, JJ., concur. Reconsideration denied October 28, 1980.