Opinion ID: 2590307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claims Against Solvay America

Text: [¶ 10] Our general standard of review is well-known: We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and using the same materials as the district court. Cook v. Shoshone First Bank, 2006 WY 13, ¶ 11, 126 P.3d 886, 889 (Wyo.2006). Thus, our review is plenary. Birt v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 2003 WY 102, ¶ 7, 75 P.3d 640, 647 (Wyo. 2003). Wyo. R. Civ. P. 56 governs summary judgments. A summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c). When reviewing a summary judgment, we consider the record in the perspective most favorable to the party opposing the motion and give that party the benefit of all favorable inferences which may be fairly drawn from the record. We review questions of law de novo without giving any deference to the district court's determinations. Cathcart v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2005 WY 154, ¶ 11, 123 P.3d 579, 586 (Wyo.2005), quoting Baker v. Ayres and Baker Pole and Post, Inc., 2005 WY 97, ¶ 14, 117 P.3d 1234, 1239 (Wyo.2005). A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would establish or refute an essential element of a cause of action or a defense that the parties have asserted. Christensen v. Carbon County, 2004 WY 135, ¶ 8, 100 P.3d 411, 413 (Wyo.2004) (quoting Metz Beverage Co. v. Wyoming Beverages, Inc., 2002 WY 21, ¶ 9, 39 P.3d 1051, 1055 (Wyo. 2002)). The party requesting a summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case for summary judgment. If he carries his burden, the party who is opposing the motion for summary judgment must present specific facts to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. We have explained the duties of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment as follows: After a movant has adequately supported the motion for summary judgment, the opposing party must come forward with competent evidence admissible at trial showing there are genuine issues of material fact. The opposing party must affirmatively set forth material, specific facts in opposition to a motion for summary judgment, and cannot rely only upon allegations and pleadings..., and conclusory statements or mere opinions are insufficient to satisfy the opposing party's burden. The evidence opposing a prima facie case on a motion for summary judgment must be competent and admissible, lest the rule permitting summary judgments be entirely eviscerated by plaintiffs proceeding to trial on the basis of mere conjecture or wishful speculation. Speculation, conjecture, the suggestion of a possibility, guesses, or even probability, are insufficient to establish an issue of material fact. Cook, ¶ 12, 126 P.3d at 890, quoting Jones v. Schabron, 2005 WY 65, ¶¶ 9-11, 113 P.3d 34, 37 (Wyo.2005). Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶¶ 8-9, 148 P.3d 8, 12-13 (Wyo.2006). [¶ 11] We have articulated a standard of review more directly applicable to claims such as the one at issue here, in somewhat more detail than our usual and more general standard of review: In support of their claim of an independent duty on the part of ARCO, Appellants emphasize their record presentation of certain evidence which they assert demonstrates genuine issues of material facts. They point to the Wyoming Workers Compensation Division record showing Sharon Fiscus to be an employee of ARCO and that the benefits she received came from ARCO's Wyoming workers' compensation account. They rely upon the fact that ARCO retained a fifty percent (50%) overriding royalty interest in the mine, and they mark the fact that the Bureau of Land Management continues to refer to mining leases relating to the Thunder Basin's Black Thunder Mine as jointly held by ARCO and Thunder Basin. Appellants contend that ARCO pays all taxes on the mine. More precisely, then, they show that ARCO officials paid visits to the mine which would average four times a day and that various ARCO officials did attend safety meetings conducted by Thunder Basin at the mine. They place a great deal of importance upon the fact that the president of Anaconda Minerals, another corporate subsidiary of ARCO, had sent a memorandum to Thunder Basin recommending the use of seat belts by the employees of Thunder Basin. Furthermore, Appellants contend that the record shows that ARCO reviewed the qualifications of, and interviewed all, safety directors before they were hired by Thunder Basin. There also is reliance upon the fact that ARCO had two representatives at the Black Thunder Mine who worked on Thunder Basin's training program and set policy in regard to training at the mine. We have adopted as the legal standard for the liability of a parent corporation the requirement that the parent assume some independent legal duty by retaining or exercising control over some aspect of the operation of a subsidiary corporation which was involved in the incident resulting in the plaintiff's injuries. Wessel v. Mapco, Inc., 752 P.2d 1363 (Wyo.1988); Fiscus, 742 P.2d 198. Essentially, this is the same test that is invoked in considering an owner's liability to the employee of a contractor. Cf. Jones v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 718 P.2d 890 (Wyo.1986); Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160 (Wyo.1986). We have rejected any doctrine of respondeat superior resulting in liability on the part of a parent corporation for acts of its subsidiary. Fiscus. Cf. Noonan. The parent company is entitled to the same legal separation from its subsidiary, as well as the resulting protection from liability, that any individual shareholder enjoys with respect to a corporation in which stock is held. United States v. Van Diviner, 822 F.2d 960 (10th Cir.1987). In light of the legal standard and the actual contentions of Appellants, we must test this case against our summary judgment standards. The essential purpose of the summary judgment procedure is to eliminate the expense and burden of a formal trial when only questions of law are involved. Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 (Wyo.1975); Vipont Mining Company v. Uranium Research and Development Company, 376 P.2d 868 (Wyo.1962). We can approve and sustain a summary judgment only when persuaded that there is no genuine issue with respect to any material fact, and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... Because summary judgment forecloses a trial on the merits, we do not lightly consider appeals from summary judgment. Larsen; Kobielusz v. Wilson, 701 P.2d 559 (Wyo.1985). Conversely, however, we recognize that the beneficial purpose of summary judgment would be defeated if cases could be forced to trial simply by an assertion that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Noonan; Johnson; Maxted v. Pacific Car & Foundry Company, 527 P.2d 832 (Wyo.1974). The process for identifying genuine issues of material fact also is familiar. The moving party has the burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and justifying its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Jones Land & Livestock Company v. Federal Land Bank of Omaha, 733 P.2d 258 (Wyo.1987). This is a significant burden, particularly when we note that we examine the record from the perspective of the party opposing the motion and grant to that party the benefit of every favorable inference and reasonable doubt. Wessel; England v. Simmons, 728 P.2d 1137 (Wyo. 1986); Jones; Roth v. First Security Bank of Rock Springs, 684 P.2d 93 (Wyo.1984). Once that showing is presented by the moving party, however, the burden then shifts to the party defending against the motion to present for the record facts in the form of admissible evidence which structure a genuine issue of material fact. Dubus v. Dresser Industries, 649 P.2d 198 (Wyo.1982); Hyatt v. Big Horn School District No. 4, 636 P.2d 525 (Wyo.1981); Moore v. Kiljander, 604 P.2d 204 (Wyo. 1979); Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P. It does not matter how genuine a factual issue is; if it does not relate to a material fact, it cannot prevent the entry of a summary judgment. Johnson, 542 P.2d 867; Gladstone Hotel, Inc. v. Smith, 487 P.2d 329 (Wyo.1971). In Johnson, 542 P.2d at 871-72, this court defined a material fact as:    [O]ne having some legal significance, that is, under the law applicable to a given case, it would control in some way the legal relations of the parties; as one upon which the outcome of litigation depends in whole or in part; as one on which the controversy may be determined; as one which will affect the result or outcome of the case depending upon its resolution; and one which constitutes a part of the plaintiff's cause of action or of the defendant's defense. A fair summary of these definitions is that for purposes of ruling upon a motion for summary judgment a fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. (Footnotes omitted.) Such a fact must in some way control, define, or modify the legal relations of the parties in some tangible manner and, thus, have the clear effect of establishing or refuting the essential element of a claim or defense asserted by the parties. Baldwin v. Dube, 751 P.2d 388 (Wyo.1988). We also are mindful of our duty to examine the evidence in the same light as it was presented to the trial court. Connaghan v. Eighty-Eight Oil, 750 P.2d 1321 (Wyo.1988). In so doing, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to appellants and, as we have noted, give them the benefit of every reasonable inference and every doubt.... In this context, the facts which Appellants contend the record will support do not directly contravene the record showing made by ARCO that it did not retain the right to control or exercise control over the safety aspects of the Black Thunder Mine, over the mining operations, or over the scraper that Fiscus operated at the time of her injuries. Appellants must rely upon inferences to be drawn from those facts in order to structure a genuine issue of material fact that will avoid the summary judgment. This court has adjusted its position over the years with respect to the reliance upon inferences to structure a genuine issue of material fact in the context of a summary judgment. In Blackmore v. Davis Oil Co., 671 P.2d 334, 337 (Wyo.1983), the court quoted from Forbes Company v. MacNeel, 382 P.2d 56 (Wyo.1963), and said:    [T]hat an inference which is contrary to direct testimony is insufficient to support a finding that a genuine issue of material fact exists:   . The court went on to say that, even if it were to assume inferences favorable to the appellants in that case, those inferences could not stand against uncontroverted testimony to the contrary. This concept was applied in Reed v. Getter Trucking, Inc., 735 P.2d 1370 (Wyo.1987). It also had been invoked in Spurlock v. Ely, 707 P.2d 188 (Wyo.1985). In Kobielusz, 701 P.2d at 560-61, the court recognized the Blackmore case, but appeared to temper it with the following language:    Although we have held inferences contrary to direct testimony may not ordinarily support a finding, Blackmore v. Davis Oil Company, Wyo., 671 P.2d 334 (1983); Forbes Company v. MacNeel, Wyo., 382 P.2d 56 (1963), that determination usually depends upon the quality of evidence creating the inference and the direct testimony. In Matter of Estate of Roosa, 753 P.2d 1028 (Wyo.1988), the court attempted to resolve any apparent conflict between Blackmore and Kobielusz, noting the following additional language from Kobielusz, 701 P.2d at 562-63: `A reasonable inference is as truly evidence as the matter on which it is based, and is not a mere presumption or guess; appropriate inferences from proved facts are not a low order of evidence, but are just as valid as evidence as statements of eye-witnesses and are to be weighed by the jury along with the other evidence before it and may be strong enough to outweigh positive and direct oral statements. Whether or not they should be permitted to overcome positive and direct testimony depends, in every case, on the relative strength of the one or the other.' 32A C.J.S. Evidence § 1044. In Roosa, the court considered the concept of sequential inferences in the context of summary judgment and adopted the Wigmore view (1A Wigmore, Evidence § 41 (Tiller's rev.1983)) to the effect that an inference may be drawn from a fact that itself was inferred when the circumstances demonstrate no other reasonable theory or alternative inference with respect to the initial fact. Perhaps this is simply another way of comparing the quality of the inferred fact with the direct testimony. Kobielusz. Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield, 773 P.2d 158, 160-62 (Wyo.1989). [¶ 12] The district court issued a detailed decision letter which we set out below [2] : The above-entitled case is currently before the Court on Defendant Solvay America's motion for summary judgment. Solvay America, Inc. asserts that, as a parent corporation to Solvay Chemicals, it owes Plaintiff Jose Loredo no legal duty for the alleged negligence that resulted in his injuries. This Court finds that Solvay America did not exercise control over a particular aspect of the Solvay Chemicals operation to such an extent that Solvay Chemicals was not entirely free to do the work its own way and that was involved in the incident which resulted in Plaintiff's injuries. The motion for summary judgment is granted for the following reasons: I. BACKGROUND This case is a personal injury case resulting from a mining accident at the Solvay Chemicals, Inc. trona mine near Green River, Sweetwater County, Wyoming. On August 14, 2002, while operating the mine roof bolter, Jose Loredo, Plaintiff, was rendered quadriplegic when he was struck by a slab of rock falling from the ceiling of the mine. Defendant, Solvay America, is the parent company of Solvay Chemicals. Defendant asserts that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, as it did not control an aspect of the Solvay Chemicals operation that resulted in Plaintiff's injury. II. DISCUSSION Defendant Solvay America's motion for summary judgment focuses upon a single, main issue. Defendant asserts that in light of Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield, 773 P.2d 158 (Wyo.1989), it did not exercise control over a particular aspect of Solvay Chemicals that was involved in the incident which resulted in Plaintiff's injuries. The Court agrees, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and summary judgment shall be granted. The immediate question before the Court is whether Solvay America owed a legal duty to Plaintiff for the alleged negligence that resulted in Plaintiff's injury. A negligence claim is built by four elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. Franks v. Indep. Prod. Co., Inc., 2004 WY 97, ¶ 9, 96 P.3d 484, 489 (Wyo.2004). The question of duty is whether, upon the facts in evidence the interest of the plaintiff which has suffered invasion was entitled to legal protection at the hands of the defendant. Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d 8, 13 (Wyo. 2006) (citations omitted). Summary judgment would be appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. W.R.C.P. 56(c) (LexisNexis 2007). Defendant, the moving party, bears the burden to justify its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. An award of summary judgment is rare in negligence cases, Franks, ¶ 9, 96 P.3d at 489; however, the surest route to summary judgment in negligence actions is the failure to establish the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant, Hatton, ¶ 10, 148 P.3d at 13 (citations omitted); Krier v. Safeway Stores 46, Inc., 943 P.2d 405, 408 (Wyo. 1997). Defendant Solvay America asserts it owes no duty to Plaintiff as the parent company of Plaintiff's employer, Solvay Chemicals. The mere fact that Solvay America is the parent company to Solvay Chemicals neither immunizes nor automatically subjects Solvay America to a negligence suit. Horowitz v. Schneider Nat'l, Inc., 708 F.Supp. 1579, 1580 (D.Wyo. 1989). For a parent corporation to be liable for an injury to its subsidiary's employee, the parent corporation must have assumed some independent legal duty by retaining or exercising control over some aspect of the operation of a subsidiary corporation which was involved in the incident resulting in the plaintiff's injuries. Fiscus, 773 P.2d at 160. Whether the parent corporation has retained the right to control is ordinarily a question of fact for the trier of fact, but becomes one of law when only one reasonable inference can be drawn. Noonan v. Texaco, Inc., 713 P.2d 160, 164 (Wyo.1986). In Fiscus v. Atlantic Richfield, the court found that the parent corporation owed no duty to its subsidiary's employee who was injured while operating a piece of heavy equipment owned by the parent corporation. 773 P.2d at 158. The employee asserted that the parent corporation owed her an independent duty because the parent corporation had assumed affirmative duties with respect to safety at the mine where the employee worked. Id. at 159. The court found no inference of a retention of a right of control or the exercise of control over the activities though the parent corporation retained an overriding royalty interest in the mine, paid all taxes on the mine, unified its accounting procedures with the subsidiary, and frequently sent its officials into the mine. Id. at 162. The court refused to infer that the mine visits were exclusively for the purpose of supervising operations as there are many other valid purposes for those visits, id., or to infer control over safety operations by the mere availability of parent corporation representatives to assist with the subsidiary's training program, id. at 163. The court upheld summary judgment and found that the circumstances relied upon by the employee failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the parent corporation's assumption of some independent legal duty. Id. Because a parent corporation is analogized to an owner of a work site, Horowitz, 708 F.Supp. at 1580, whether the parent corporation shall be shielded from liability, is essentially the same test that is invoked in considering an owner's liability to the employee of a contractor, Fiscus, 773 P.2d at 160. The court has held that an employer who retains the right to direct the manner of an independent contractor's performance or assumes affirmative duties with respect to safety owes a duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor even if the employee is injured doing the very work the contractor was hired to perform. Jones, 718 P.2d at 896. In order for there to be a demonstration of the employer's assumption of affirmative duties with respect to safety there must be such a retention of a right of supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work his own way. Stockwell v. Parker Drilling Co., Inc., 733 P.2d 1029, 1033 (Wyo.1987) ( quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414, cmt. c (1965)). Where, for example, the owner of the work site requires safe equipment and workmanship or even disciplines employees for unsafe practices but does not direct the method of the contractor's work performance, it does not retain sufficient control over the details of safety to render it liable. Jones, 718 P.2d at 896; Noonan, 713 P.2d at 167. It is not enough that [the work site owner] has merely a general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and deviations. Stockwell, 733 P.2d at 1033 ( quoting Rest[atement] 2d Torts § 414, cmt. c) (emphasis omitted). Reserving the right to require safe equipment, material, and supplies to be used by the contractor, the owner of the work site can merely be assured that the work will be performed efficiently, in a good workmanlike manner, at a reasonable cost, and that the final result is as good as possible. Noonan, 713 P.2d at 167. In such a case, the owner of the work site owes no duty of reasonable care to an employee of the independent contractor. Jones, 718 P.2d at 896. The court found that the owner of the work site, Chevron, had retained enough real control to raise a duty of reasonable care for the injury of an employee of its independent contractor in Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d at 897. The employee had been injured while painting a metal platform between two power poles when electricity from nearby transformers arced through the employee and knocked him to the ground. Id. at 892. Chevron discouraged the de-energization of the electric line and made permission for de-energization difficult to obtain; consequently, the court found that Chevron retained control over energizing the power lines and that Chevron prohibited the independent contractor from controlling that safety aspect of its work. Id. at 896-897. As a result, Chevron had retained enough real control to raise a duty of reasonable care for the employee's injury. Id. at 896. In Jones, Chevron retained control directly over the element of safety that caused the employee's injuries. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the denial of summary judgment where inferences from the evidence raised a question as to whether a parent corporation retained responsibility for mine safety in a case in which a coal mine employee was injured by a piece of rock falling from the mine ceiling. Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1481 (10th Cir.1987). The evidence suggested that the parent corporation may have retained control over some aspect of mine safety matters. [The employee] contended that roof control was, to some extent, left to the discretion of the mine foreman, but that there was evidence that various employees of [the parent corporation] were assigned to the Beaver Creek mine from time to time who were given responsibility for safety matters, including roof control problems. Id. at 1483. The court found that an inference could be made from the evidence that the parent corporation was providing safety advice and services; consequently, whether the subsidiary had delegated responsibility for safety to the parent corporation and whether the parent corporation had negligently performed it, precluded summary judgment. Id. at 1488-1489. The test in finding whether Solvay America assumed an affirmative duty is not whether it operated any control in the mine, but whether Solvay America controlled the aspect of the mining operation that was involved in the incident that resulted in Plaintiff's injuries to such a degree that it directed how that aspect should or should not be done. Fiscus, 773 P.2d at 160; Wayts v. Peter Kiewit Sons, Inc., 936 F.2d 584 (10th Cir.1991), 1991 WL 114736,  ( unpublished disposition ). Such a question of fact may be created by a reasonable inference drawn from the evidence, the relative strength of which has been weighed against positive and direct testimony and found strong enough to overcome direct testimony. Fiscus, 773 P.2d at 162 (citations omitted). Plaintiff has placed much emphasis upon Solvay America's safety audits, safety recommendations, and other involvement at the Wyoming mine, however, the evidence does not raise an inference that Solvay America controlled an aspect of the mining operation that was involved in the incident that resulted in Plaintiff's injuries to such a degree that Solvay Chemicals was not free to operate as it saw fit. Plaintiff argues that Solvay America's safety audits and recommendations allow an inference that Defendant retained control over safety issues in the Solvay Chemicals mine. The evidence demonstrates that Solvay America personnel regularly visited the Wyoming mine, performed safety audits, and made recommendations to correct mine safety deficiencies. (Hughes Dep. at 74, ll. 1-4, ll. 11-12; Vendetti Dep. at 33, ll. 18-19.) About every third year, Solvay America performed safety audits at the mine to ensure compliance with the established safety policies, to secure improved safety performance, and to examine whether the mine responded with corrective measures to any accident causing an injury. (Neville Dep. at 23, ll. 23-25; p. 43, ll. 4-15.) Ronald Hughes, Mine Manager at Solvay Chemicals, testified that Solvay Chemicals was obligated to either implement a safety recommendation or to supply a good reason why [it] chose not to. (Hughes Dep. at 72, ll. 3-17.) Hughes could not recall a time in which Solvay Chemicals ignored a safety recommendation, but he assumed that there would be negative consequences for ignoring such a recommendation. (Hughes Dep. at 75, ll. 4-7, ll. 14-16; p. 76, ll. 2-3.) Although Solvay America discouraged unionization, David Birney, C.E.O. of Solvay America, testified that Solvay America merely opposed unionization to avoid the inflexibility of a collective bargaining agreement rather than for the purpose of depriving employees of safety negotiations. (Birney Dep. at 74-76.) The evidence demonstrates that Solvay America offered only general safety recommendations which could be rejected or applied by Solvay Chemicals in accordance with Solvay Chemicals' needs. The evidence indicates that Solvay Chemicals had the last word on safety issues and procedures. When performing a safety audit, Solvay America personnel applied general safety philosophies and recommended general, generic corrections to safety deficiencies. (Adamson Dep. at 135, 11. 15-19.) Michael Neville, a former Health Safety and Environmental Advisor and a current consultant for Solvay America, testified that Solvay America expected its subsidiaries to develop individual safety policies in accordance with subsidiary needs under the direction of Solvay America's established procedural policies, generic guidance on how to write policies, and safety audits. (Neville Dep. at 22, ll. 23-25; p. 23, ll. 1-16.) Solvay America's Corporate Safety and Security Manager, Randy Thompson, testified that Solvay Chemicals was free to implement or reject safety recommendations, which it often adopted, but that there was no specific method to achieve compliance with regulatory requirements. (Thompson Dep. at 121, 11.2-20.) Thompson noted, As long as they get there and it's improved safety and it's legal and ethical, that's acceptable. (Thompson Dep. at 121, ll. 15-20.) Robert Adamson, a former Solvay Chemicals Safety Training Advisor, testified that any safety deficiency was to be corrected; however, Solvay Chemicals viewed Solvay America's safety advice as welcomed assistance to be taken under advisement and used when applicable. (Adamson Dep. at 134, 11. 12-16.) In fact, in the event of an injury in the mine, Solvay Chemicals performed its own investigation to determine [its] next course of action. (Neville Dep., p. 42, 11.8-12.) Solvay Chemicals was not required to inform Solvay America when equipment needed to be replaced, as the people that work the mine were better experienced to make decisions to replace unsafe equipment. (Thompson Dep. at 83, 11. 23-24, p. 84, 11. 1-8.) David Birney testified that Solvay America would occasionally guarantee its subsidiaries' leases of equipment and would, at times, guarantee the debts of its subsidiaries, but he did not suggest that Defendant retained control over the purchase of safe equipment. (Birney Dep. at 84-85.) Kent Adamson testified that if new safety equipment were needed, cost would be considered, but there was no requirement or tradition of discussing the purchase or its cost with Solvay America. (Adamson at 109, 11. 10-24.) Michael Montoya, who coordinates and directs the Solvay Chemicals mine engineering group, testified that he was not required to contact Solvay America with information requiring day-to-day operational issues or with requests to remove unsafe equipment from operation. (Montoya Dep., p. 45, 11. 13-22.) He testified, If a piece of equipment is unsafe and needs to be replaced, we will take it out of service immediately. (Montoya Dep. at 26, 11. 13-15.) The evidence does not leave an issue of material fact as to whether Solvay America retained control over safety at the Solvay Chemicals mine to such a degree that Solvay Chemicals was not entitled to manage safety according to its own methods. In light of case law, these facts are not enough to create the inference of control by Solvay America. To impose liability upon Solvay America, it is not enough that Solvay America exercised a general right to inspect the mine or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations which were not necessary to follow, or to prescribe alterations and deviations to the work. Stockwell, 733 P.2d at 1033 ( quoting Rest[atement] 2d Torts § 414, cmt. c) (emphasis omitted). Control over Solvay Chemicals' safety issues cannot be inferred from Solvay America's safety training, provision of safe equipment, or even a threat of discipline for safety infractions. Noonan, 713 P.2d at 167. Case law precludes the inference of control by Solvay America where it operated in merely an advisory role. Wayts, 1991 WL 114736,  1. The strength of direct testimony in this case outweighs any reasonable, contrary inference and leaves no issue of material fact. Fiscus, 773 P.2d at 162. Unlike the evidence presented in Jones v. Chevron, 718 P.2d 890, or Smith v. Atlantic Richfield, 814 F.2d 1481, there remains no issue of fact as to whether the parent corporation, Solvay America, retained exclusive control over the aspect of safety that resulted in Plaintiff's injury. Unlike the Jones case where control was retained directly over the de-energization of power lines, which resulted in the employee's electrocution, 718 P.2d at 896, Solvay America did not preclude Solvay Chemicals' independent control over safety issues in its work, id. at 897. Similarly, unlike the Smith case where a question of fact remained as to whether the parent corporation retained responsibility for safety issues with the mine ceiling, the instrumentality causing the employee's injury, 814 F.2d at 1483, there is no question of fact as to whether Solvay America's safety advice amounts to the delegation of responsibility for Safety by Solvay Chemicals, id. at 1488-89. The evidence and circumstances relied upon by Plaintiff fail to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Solvay America assumed some independent legal duty. Fiscus, 773 P.2d at 163. [¶ 13] We conclude that the district court's analysis is sound and that it was correct in concluding that Solvay America, as parent corporation of Solvay Chemicals, was not so involved in the day-to-day operations of Solvay Chemicals, as they related to the event that caused Loredo's injuries, so as to pose a genuine issue of material fact whether Solvay America assumed a independent legal duty vis-à-vis Loredo. See generally, Annotation, Workers' Compensation Immunity as Extending to One Owning Controlling Interest in Employer Corporation, 30 A.L.R.4th 948 (1984 and Supp.2008); 6 Larson's Workers' Compensation Law, DIGEST: Ch. 112, § 112.01D (2007). [¶ 14] We briefly note that Solvay America contends that the affidavit of Loredo's expert, Lewis Barbe, is not admissible so as to defeat summary judgment in its favor. In response, Loredo asserts that the admissibility of that affidavit was not considered in the district court and should not be considered in this appeal. Under the governing standard of review we consider only those papers that were considered by the district court. Hence, we will not consider Barbe's affidavit in our analysis. [¶ 15] Evidence was brought forward in the district court of remedial efforts made by Solvay America and Solvay Chemicals following Loredo's injuries. Solvay America makes passing reference to the application of W.R.E. 407 which provides: When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken previously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. Our perusal of the record indicates that the district court did not consider such evidence below and we, likewise, will not consider it in this appeal.