Opinion ID: 2610235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Plaintiff's claim of general, special and punitive damages.

Text: In Carnation Lbr. Co. v. McKenney, 224 Or. 541, 356 P.2d 932 (1960), also an action for malicious prosecution, this court reaffirmed the rule that exemplary or punitive damages are not recoverable in the absence of proof of actual damages and held that this rule is also applicable in an action for malicious prosecution, contrary to the rule in some jurisdictions. [9] Indeed, the effect of that decision was to adopt (at p. 545, 356 P.2d 932) the rule of those jurisdictions which hold that there can be no recovery in an action for malicious prosecution in the absence of either some special damage to a defendant or some interference with his person or property. Later, in Alvarez v. Retail Credit Association, supra , (at 259, 381 P.2d at 501), we also distinguished that case on this question by pointing out that:    In due course, execution was levied upon Alvarez' wages. The case at bar is thus taken out of the rule in Oregon that no action will lie for bringing civil litigation that is merely vexatious, in the absence of a showing of actual damages, e.g., attachment or the like. Carnation Lbr. Co. v. McKenney et al., 224 Or. 541, 356 P.2d 932 (1960). The effect of such a rule is that when there has been interference with the property of a plaintiff by a wrongful attachment, and the other elements of an action for malicious prosecution have been proved, plaintiff is entitled to have his case submitted to the jury for an award of punitive damages without pleading or proof of special damages for the reason that the law assumes that some actual damage necessarily follows from an attachment of plaintiff's property. [10] In this case, of course, there was such an interference with the property of the plaintiff by wrongful attachment of $105.13 in wages, resulting at the least in his loss of use of that amount for a period of seven months until the attachment was dissolved. Thus, since there was also sufficient evidence of lack of probable cause and malice, plaintiff was entitled to have the case submitted to the jury, under proper instructions, on the issue of what, if any, punitive damages should be awarded. [11] It does not follow, however, under the evidence in this case that plaintiff was also entitled to have submitted to the jury his claims for $376.40 in special damages and $15,000 for general damages. Of the claim of $376.40 for special damages, $352.40 was claimed for payment of attorney fees. It is well established that in such an action the plaintiff may only recover those attorney fees incurred in securing a release of the attachment, not including attorney fees for defending the case on its merits. McInnis v. Atlantic Investment Corp., 137 Or. 648, 654, 3 P.2d 118, 4 P.2d 314 (1931). In this case, however, there was no evidence that the services of the attorney included in the bill of $352.40 for attorney fees were for any work involved in securing a release of the attachment. On the contrary, the testimony was subject to the inference that such services included preparation for defense of the case on its merits. The same is true of plaintiff's claim of $24 in lost wages as the result of taking time off to consult with his attorney in preparing to defend the case on its merits. See cases cited in 7 C.J.S. Attachment § 559. In addition, of course, the attachment was not released as the result of any efforts by plaintiff or his attorney, but was released by defendant as a condition for securing a postponement of the trial. Plaintiff's next claim, for $15,000 in general damages, includes claims for alleged injury to credit reputation and general reputation and termination of employment. Plaintiff's evidence in support of his claim of injury to his credit reputation and general reputation was clearly insufficient. Only six months before this attachment plaintiff's wages had been garnished by another collection agency. Also, his credit had been rated at the time of this second attachment as only poor to good by the loan company with which he did business and did not subsequently fall to any substantially lower rating. He had also twice previously been required to appear in court for nonpayment of child support obligations. The fact that the loan company later declined to renew a loan following a telephone call from defendant was not shown to have been the result of the attachment or claim by defendant and it subsequently renewed other loans for plaintiff. Neither is the fact that plaintiff's paying habits may have deteriorated any evidence that his reputation was damaged by the attachment. Thus, in the absence of other testimony, there was no evidence of any substantial damage to either plaintiff's credit reputation or his general reputation. Finally, on this issue, plaintiff's evidence was also insufficient to prove that the termination of his employment and the elimination of his opportunities for advancement were caused by defendant's attachment of his wages. He was not discharged for more than a year and one-half after defendant's attachment of his wages and after two subsequent wage garnishments. Also, while it is true that his employer had a general policy of discharging employees after four wage garnishments, the decision to terminate any particular employee was discretionary and plaintiff's employment record showed that he was discharged because of his inability to perform work satisfactorily because of constant financial obligations, garnishments, etc. During the interval between defendant's attachment and plaintiff's discharge he was also brought into court twice more on charges of nonsupport and spent ten days in jail for contempt of court. Under these facts we hold that while the attachment of plaintiff's wages in October 1966 may have contributed to a deterioration in plaintiff's paying habits, as he contends on this appeal, it was too remote, both in point of time and otherwise, to be properly regarded as the cause of his subsequent discharge from his employment in May 1968, much less the cause of the elimination of his opportunities for subsequent advancement. It follows that under the record in this case plaintiff was not entitled to have his claims of either special or general damages submitted to the jury. For reasons previously stated, however, we hold that because of the wrongful attachment of his wages plaintiff was entitled to have his claim to punitive damages submitted to the jury. [12]