Opinion ID: 794660
Heading Depth: 3
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Text: 77 2. Any responses should be forwarded to the defendant directly and the defendants standby counsel/counsel withholding responses to motion and motions made by the USA violates defendants due process. 78 WHEREFORE, the defendant respectfully demands that the motion/Defendant invokes, et al. be GRANTED. 79 App. 1439 (capitals in original). We must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of the right to counsel, United States v. Stubbs, 281 F.3d 109, 117 (3d Cir.2002) (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)), and observe that an inquiry into the nature of an alleged request to proceed pro se at sentencing need not be as exhaustive and searching as a similar inquiry before the conclusion of trial. Salemo, 61 F.3d at 219 (emphasis added). With this in mind, we conclude Banks's written request did not require any action on the part of the District Court. 80 The first step of the Peppers inquiry requires an investigation into whether the defendant clearly and unequivocally asserted his request. Here, while Banks's request was titled, Defendant Invokes his Constitutional Right to Represent Himself prose, Banks in actuality requested only temporary self-representation in that he stated he would engage Attorney Chontos to represent him as soon as AUSA Hull ceased ignoring his other pro se motions. We view this only as an expression of Banks's frustration with AUSA Hull's refusal to respond to his other pro se motions and not as a clear request to proceed pro se, further noting that Banks was complaining only about AUSA Hull and not about his own counsel. See Buhl v. Cooksey, 233 F.3d 783, 792 (3d Cir.2000) (noting concern with permitting a defendant's waiver of counsel based on mere musings on the benefits of self-representation). Hence, we read Banks's motion as an expression of his frustration with our judicial process's requirement that communications take place between attorneys, not between parties and attorneys, and not as a clear request for self-representation. Cf. Jackson v. Ylst, 921 F.2d 882, 888-89 (9th Cir.1990) (The trial court properly may deny a request for self-representation that is `a momentary caprice or the result of thinking out loud.') (citation omitted). 81 In addition, Banks does not identify any motions to which AUSA Hull failed to respond after Banks filed his motion for pro se representation, and, when asked, expressed no dissatisfaction with his counsel's performance at sentencing. See App. 1337. Accordingly, we conclude, on the facts of this case, that Banks's written request was not sufficiently clear so as to trigger any duty on the part of the District Court to address the request as a bona fide motion to proceed pro se and perform a full Peppers inquiry.