Opinion ID: 1961916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: state's failure to disclose

Text: The conversation between Solevo and assistant state's attorney John Durham on January 1, 1980 was tape-recorded by Durham. On January 2, 1980 there was a conference in chambers following which Anthony Lasala, DeMartin's attorney, disclosed in open court that the day before he had received a call from someone, whose name he felt that he could not disclose because it came within the area of the attorney-client privilege, informing him that Solevo wanted to talk to him, that he immediately contacted the state's attorney's office and ultimately spoke to Durham, that he planned to talk to Solevo but because of the delicate nature of the situation would like to have the conversation in the presence of someone from the prosecutor's office. Durham disclosed that he had spoken to Solevo on January 1 but did not disclose at that time that the conversation had been tape-recorded. On January 22, 1980, some five days after Solevo refused to answer questions upon his being recalled to the witness stand, Durham disclosed to the defendants the contents of his tape-recorded conversation with Solevo. The defendants neither raised a claim of suppression of exculpatory information nor did they move the court for a continuance or for other relief. It is a violation of due process for the prosecution to suppress material evidence favorable to the accused. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed.2d 215 (1963). To come within the strictures of Brady, however, it must appear (1) that the prosecution suppressed evidence after a request by the defense; (2) that the evidence was favorable to the defense and (3) that it was material. Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95, 92 S. Ct. 2562, 33 L. Ed.2d 706, reh. denied, 409 U.S. 897, 93 S. Ct. 87, 34 L. Ed.2d 155 (1972). Although we may assume that at least superficially Solevo's statement was both favorable to DeMartin and material, because it was disclosed to the defendants during the trial it was not suppressed as that term is used in Brady. State v. Olds, 171 Conn. 395, 400, 370 A.2d 969 (1976). When the prosecutor offered the taped conversation it was excluded upon objection by the defendants. Furthermore, the defendants requested neither a continuance nor the recall of any witnesses. Even if we assume that the taped conversation constituted Brady material and assume further that the twenty day delay was not justified it does not follow that the only appropriate sanction was either striking Solevo's earlier testimony or a mistrial. Whether acting wittingly or unwittingly defendants cannot decline to avail themselves of appropriate procedural motions at the trial at a time when curative action may be taken and then expect this court to afford them relief on appeal without making a clear showing of a denial of a fundamental constitutional right, in this case that the delay in disclosure deprived them of a fair trial. No such showing has been made here.