Opinion ID: 3010614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' Joint Rights Theory

Text: The Collinsgrus proffer a second argument, in which they contend that the analysis of whether parents may proceed pro se on behalf of their children is different under the IDEA than it is under a tort case like Osei-Afriyie. They assert that because an IDEA appeal involves the nature of the education to be afforded to their son, it is very much their own case. As parents, they are responsible for their son's education. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923) ([I]t is the natural duty of the parent to give his children education suitable to their station in life. . . .). They are entitled to make fundamental decisions regarding his education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (enjoining enforcement of Compulsory Education Act, which prevented parents from choosing to send their children to private schools); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-03 (holding that parents are entitled to control the education of their children and that the state may not arbitrarily proscribe certain areas of instruction). Accordingly, the Collinsgrus assert that they are the real parties in interest in this case. They recognize, of course, that Meyer and Pierce, which are grounded in the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution, are insufficient to confer upon them the right to represent their children, and that the IDEA itself must be the source of any such right. They contend, however, that the Act does contain authority for them to represent not only their own rights and interests, but also, albeit indirectly, those of their son in proceedings before the district court. We therefore turn to the IDEA to determine whether Congress intended to create substantive rights in the parents of disabled children.
The primary purpose of the IDEA is to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs; to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such 13 children are protected; . . . and to assess, and ensure the effectiveness of, efforts to educate children with disabilities. 20 U.S.C. S 1400(d). For the most part, the IDEA is unambiguous as to what rights it provides to parents and children. It clearly grants parents specific procedural rights, which they may enforce in administrative proceedings, as well as in federal court. Additionally, the IDEA permits parents to represent their children in administrative due process hearings before state or local agencies. 20 U.S.C. S 1415(h)(2); 34 C.F.R. S 303.422(b)(2) (providing that parents have the right to present evidence and examine witnesses in administrative due process hearings held pursuant to the IDEA). The statute also creates a right to bring a civil action in federal court following a state administrative decision on the adequacy of the child's individualized education program (the IEP). Id. S 1415(i)(2)(A). The Collinsgrus concede that the IDEA does not explicitly provide parents with the right to continue to represent their children in federal district court. Instead, they argue that the language of the IDEA, as well as the statute's underlying policy concerns, exhibit Congress's intent to create joint rights in the child and the parents to have the child educated appropriately. As we shall now explain, we do not think Congress displayed such an intent, and therefore decline to import the concept of joint rights into the IDEA byfinding that the Collinsgrus are a real party in interest in Francis's case. In any case turning on statutory interpretation, our goal is to ascertain the intent of Congress. Dole v. United Steelworkers of America, 494 U.S. 26, 35 (1990). To accomplish this goal, we begin by looking at the statute's language. If the language is plain, we need look no further. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). If the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear, we may look behind the language to the legislative history for guidance. United States v. Sherman, 150 F.3d 306, 313 (3d Cir. 1998). In this case, we will require relatively clear evidence of Congress's intent to create joint rights in the IDEA. We note 14 here that the Collinsgrus' argument is analogous to asking us to find that they possess a private right of action under the IDEA. As we have stated in the context of private rights of action, Where a statute does not explicitly create a right of action for a particular party, a court may find such a right implied only where it can confidently conclude Congress so intended. State of New Jersey v. Long Island Power Auth., 30 F.3d 403, 421 (3d Cir. 1994). See also Florida Dept. of Bus. Regulation v. Zachy's Wine and Liquor, Inc., 125 F.3d 1399, 1403 (11th Cir. 1997) (same), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1402 (1998). Compare Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 572 (1979) (noting that when Congress wished to provide a private damage remedy in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it knew how to do so and did so expressly). We also note that the Supreme Court has long since abandoned its hospitable attitude toward implied rights of action. Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 190 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). Because the case at bar is comparable to a request for a private right of action, we take heed of this guidance; only if we can confidently conclude from the text and legislative history of the IDEA that Congress intended to create joint rights will we find such rights in the Act.
Unlike many cases that raise issues of statutory construction, we deal here not with a particular statutory phrase, but with language scattered throughout the statute. The Collinsgrus point to a number of words or phrases that, they argue, evidence Congress's intent to treat parents as parties in interest. First, they rely on language in S 1415 that provided attorneys' fees to the parents or guardian of a handicapped child or youth who is the prevailing party. S 1415(e)(4)(B) (1988). However, in 1997 Congress amended this section to read, . . . to the parents of a child with a disability who is the prevailing party, which suggests that it is the child who should be considered the prevailing party. Id. S 1415(i)(3)(B) (1997). Second, they point to S 1415(e)(4) (1988), which prohibits attorneys' fees for services performed after settlement offers. However, 15 S 1415(e)(4)(E) (1988) allows for the award of attorneys' fees to a parent or guardian who is the prevailing party if he was substantially justified in rejecting the settlement offer. (This section is now S 1415(i)(3)(E) (1997) and refers to a parent who is the prevailing party.) The plaintiffs contend that these subsections make clear that an IDEA suit is the parents' own case for 28 U.S.C. S 1654 pro se representation purposes. However, it is just as logical to read this language simply as a reference to the procedural cases in which parents clearly have standing as parties. Third, the Collinsgrus point to another discussion of attorneys' fees that states, [W]henever the court finds that . . . the attorney representing the parent did not provide to the school district the appropriate information in the due process complaint . . . the court shall reduce . . . the amount of attorney's fees. Id. S 1415(i)(3)(F)(iv) (emphasis added). However, in the same section, the statute places the notice requirement either on the parent of a child with a disability, or the attorney representing the child. Id. S 1415(b)(7). While the former language may be read to suggest that it is the parent's case, the latter language suggests that it is the child's case. Fourth, the Collinsgrus invoke the IDEA's introductory language, which states that one purpose of the IDEA is to assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians are protected. Id.S 1400(c) (1988) (emphasis added) (now S 1400(d)(1)(B), which states that one purpose is to ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and parents of such children are protected). However, as noted earlier, it is undisputed that parents do possess rights under the IDEA; indeed, they possess explicit rights in the form of procedural safeguards. The Collinsgrus argue that the IDEA draws no clear distinction between procedural and substantive rights, and cite Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1992), for this proposition. In Heldman, the court stated that the procedural rights, in and of themselves, form the substance of IDEA. Id. at 155. However, the Supreme Court has distinguished quite clearly between substantive and procedural rights under the Act. In Board of Education v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982), the Court stated: 16 When the elaborate and highly specific procedural safeguards embodied in S 1415 are contrasted with the general and somewhat imprecise substantive admonitions contained in the Act . . . [i]t seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process . . . as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard. Id. at 205-06. In short, the language of the IDEA is unclear on its face. Some of its language can be read to suggest that Congress intended parents and children to share the underlying substantive right -- that is, that Congress meant both to give children a substantive right to an appropriate education and to give their parents the substantive right to have their children receive an appropriate education. But it is equally logical to read the IDEA the other way. Under these circumstances, in which the Collinsgrus have not made out their case convincingly, we turn to the legislative history of the Act for further guidance.
The legislative history offers little additional guidance about Congress's purported intent to create joint rights in parents and children. On one hand, the Senate Report, in discussing a mediation option in the 1985 amendments, states, Although the law has worked very well in most cases, Congress knew that there would be instances where parents would be denied the free appropriate public education to which their handicapped child was legally entitled . . . . 131 Cong. Rec. S1979 (Feb. 6, 1985) (statement of Sen. Weicker) (emphasis added). Earlier, in considering amendments to the forerunner to the IDEA, the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA), the Senate Report stated that parents of [learning disabled] children have the right to expect that individually designed instruction to meet their children's specific needs is available. S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 10 (1975), reprinted in 17 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1434. See also id. at 32, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1456 (stating that under the Committee's bill, a state's application for federal funds shall provide that special education and related services shall be provided at no cost to the parents of a handicapped child); id. at 42, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1465 (defining free appropriate public education as special education and related services . . . to be provided at public expense, without charge to the parents or guardians of a handicapped child). On the other hand, the legislative history refers to the responsibility of the states to develop procedures for appointing the parent or another individual to represent the interests of the child, which suggests that the role of the parent is to represent solely the interests of the child, not to represent jointly held substantive rights. S. Rep. No. 105-17 (1997), 1997 WL 258948, . In addition, the Senate Report to the 1985 amendments to the EHA indicated that the Act established an enforceable right to free appropriate public education for all handicapped children. 131 Cong. Rec. S1979 (1985). The Report also noted that the right to judicial review offers protection for those rights, thus making the procedural rights of the parents appear derivative of the substantive right of the child. See id. See also 121 Cong. Rec. S37412 (1975) (remarks of Sen. Stafford) (referring to the rights of the child); S. Rep. No. 94-168, at 7, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1431 (discussing the protection of the rights of handicapped children); S. Rep. No. 105-17, 1997 WL 258948,  (stating that S 1415 simplifies the process of delivering notices to parents about their child's rights). We conclude that the legislative history sheds little light on Congress's intent to create joint rights. The above-cited comments are merely snippets plucked from broad discussions of the general statutory goals of the Act and do not arise from explicit discussions of the issue at hand. Because neither the statutory language nor the legislative history clearly implies that Congress intended parents to have joint rights with their children under the IDEA, we will not read joint rights into the Act. 18
We note here that the two other courts of appeals to consider this issue have reached the same conclusion we reach today. In Devine, the Eleventh Circuit chose not to accept the plaintiffs' argument that the IDEA and its regulations authorize parental representation. 121 F.3d at 581. Instead, the court found no indication that Congress intended to allow parents to present evidence and examine witnesses on behalf of their children in federal court proceedings. The court noted, In the absence of such intent, we are compelled to follow the usual rule-- that parents who are not attorneys may not bring a pro se action on their child's behalf -- because it helps to ensure that children rightfully entitled to legal relief are not deprived of their day in court by unskilled, if caring, parents. Id. at 582. The Second Circuit recently raised the same issue sua sponte and reached a similar conclusion. See Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 124-25 (2d Cir. 1998) (relying on the general rule that a non-attorney parent must be represented by counsel in bringing an action on behalf of her child). See also Dacyna v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. 92-CV-2428, 1992 WL 277993, at  (E.D. Pa. Oct. 2, 1992) (stating, in an IDEA case, that a non-lawyer is not entitled to represent his children in place of an attorney in federal court); Lawson v. Edwardsburg Public School, 751 F. Supp. 1257, 1258-59 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (holding that father could not represent daughter's interests in an EHA case, since he was not an attorney). While neither the Second nor the Eleventh Circuit considered the argument that the IDEA creates joint substantive rights in parents and children, we stillfind that the reasoning of these courts supports our conclusion.