Opinion ID: 195655
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Admission of Bank Employee's

Text: Testimony and Its Denial of Appellant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal on Bank Robbery Counts Appellant argues that the district court improperly admitted the testimony of bank employee Debbie Haskins, who testified with respect to First N.H.'s federally insured status and its involvement in interstate commerce. Appellant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the 19 The Court notes that while Flynn's belated motion for continuance was denied, Attorney Wilson still conducted his representation at trial. -36- jury's guilty verdicts on the bank robbery counts. Appellant first argues that Haskins' testimony should not have been admitted because she lacked personal knowledge of the bank's FDIC status or its involvement in interstate commerce as required by Fed. R. Evid. 602 (witness may not testify to a matter without evidence that she had personal knowledge of the matter). In particular, Appellant argues that Haskins, who worked as an insurance compliance specialist for First N.H., did not commence her employment until a month after the robbery, so her testimony was based on records that she was exposed to in the course of her later employment and not on knowledge formed at the time of the robbery. Evidence is inadmissible under Rule 602 only if in the proper exercise of the trial court's discretion it finds that the witness could not have actually perceived or observed that which he testified to. Hallquist v. Local 276, Plumbers & Pipefitters Union, 843 F.2d 18, 24 (1st Cir. 1988). Personal knowledge can include inferences and opinions, so long as they are grounded in personal observation and experience. United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 223 (1st Cir. 1992). Haskins testified that her job brought her into contact with records, including certificates provided by the FDIC, which indicated that the Stratham, New Hampshire branch of First N.H. was federally insured, although she had not personally seen such a certificate posted at the branch on the date of the robbery. She also testified that bank records to which she was exposed indicated that the branch had -37- customers in Vermont and Massachusetts and a correspondent banking account in Massachusetts. This Court finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Haskins' testimony because it was limited to information that she actually perceived or observed as an insurance compliance specialist and did not attest to circumstances beyond her personal knowledge.20 Appellant also argues that the guilty verdicts on the bank robbery counts were not supported by a sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the elements of FDIC insurance status and involvement in interstate commerce.21 As the Government points out, Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal on these counts on the basis of other arguments and did not argue below that dismissal should be granted on the above-cited grounds. Consequently, Appellant has waived this argument on appeal unless the bank robbery convictions are clearly and grossly unjust. United States v. L pez, 709 F.2d 742, 746 (1st Cir.), cert. 20 Appellant's argument that Haskins' knowledge was not formed on the basis of information that she possessed on the date of the robbery may have diminished the value of her testimony, but such an argument does not implicate Rule 602. 'The extent of a witness' knowledge of matters about which he offers to testify goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the testimony.' Hallquist, 843 F.2d at 24 (quoting Nielson v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 570 F.2d 272, 277 (8th Cir. 1978)). 21 Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation insured the deposits of First N.H. is an essential element of the crimes alleged in Counts 3, 4, and 5, regarding the robbery of First N.H. in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2113. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt that robbery of First N.H. had some effect on interstate commerce is an essential element of the Hobbs Act violations alleged in Counts 16, 17, and 18. 18 U.S.C. 1951. -38- denied, 464 U.S. 861 (1983). Even under the less rigorous standard governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims, however, we affirm the convictions. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, could have persuaded a rational trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt that First N.H. was FDIC-insured and involved in interstate commerce.22 Hence, the district court's denial of Flynn's motion for acquittal on the bank robbery counts is affirmed.