Opinion ID: 2636660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant frankenburg

Text: ¶ 37 Prior to trial, the lower court granted, in part, Defendants' motion for reconsideration. In granting the motion, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of defendant Mr. Frankenburg by dismissing the claims of defamation and intentional interference with economic relations. Mr. Ferguson argues that the entry of summary judgment was procedurally and substantively incorrect. Again, we disagree. ¶ 38 In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we review the lower court's legal conclusion for correctness, granting no deference therein, and review the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Automated Geographic Reference Ctr., 2008 UT 88, ¶ 12, 200 P.3d 643. We will affirm the granting of summary judgment only in the absence of any genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id.; see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). ¶ 39 Mr. Ferguson contends first that the trial court lacked authority to consider the motion for summary judgment because it was brought as part of a motion for reconsideration of summary judgment outside the scheduling order of the case. Implicit in this contention is the pretrial nature of the motion. ¶ 40 A district court has the discretionary power to reconsider or decline to reconsider its decisions within a case before entering final judgment. IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D & K Mgmt., Inc., 2008 UT 73, ¶ 27, 196 P.3d 588; see also Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶ 10, 135 P.3d 861 (recognizing a district court's discretion to reconsider its decisions prior to final judgment). As rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, where multiple claims and multiple parties are involved, any order of the court, in the absence of a final judgment, is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. Because of the multiple claims and parties at issue here and the lack of a final judgment, the trial court could reconsider its earlier summary judgment ruling. ¶ 41 Mr. Ferguson next contends that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. However, Mr. Ferguson points to no contested facts. The factual basis underlying these defamation and intentional interference claims stems from UMIA turning Mr. Ferguson's caseload over to Mr. Frankenburg after the termination and from Mr. Frankenburg contacting Mr. Ferguson's new law firm to inform them of potential conflicts Mr. Ferguson might have. Defendants did not dispute these facts; rather, they showed that Mr. Ferguson acknowledged in his deposition that the statements regarding potential ethical conflicts were not defamatory. Mr. Ferguson also admitted in his deposition that at least one express conflict existed and the questions regarding the other potential conflicts were legitimate. ¶ 42 The legitimacy of these concerns precluded Mr. Ferguson from proving either claim. Mr. Ferguson cannot prove defamation because the concerns regarding ethical conflicts were either true or legitimately raised. In this state, truth is an absolute defense to an action for defamation. Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). Neither can Mr. Ferguson prove intentional interference as he, again, cannot establish the element of improper means or improper purpose. See Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 2008 UT 55, ¶ 18, 192 P.3d 858. A legitimate inquiry regarding ethical conflicts is not improper means. Protecting the legitimate interests of a firm's client, without evidence of predominating ill will, is not an improper purpose. The trial court thus did not err procedurally or substantively in granting Defendants' motion for reconsideration and entering summary judgment in favor of defendant Frankenburg.