Opinion ID: 273485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: In Camera Proceedings

Text: 12 Defense counsel, having shortly after the trial learned of the serious infirmity in the State's case, namely, that its chief witness was a convicted perjurer, clearly should have informed Ingram of this fact. To Ingram this would have been crucial information, for had he been told of Capes' conviction, he would doubtless have wished to appeal-- and not without some hope of success. 13 The fact that, following the trial, Ingram was kept in ignorance of the motion for a new trial, its basis, and its disposition in the judge's chambers compounded the effect of the nondisclosure of the evidence of the perjury conviction at the trial. He was denied the opportunity to consider whether to seek redress in a higher state court. His failure to act earlier was due to no fault of his, sixteen years having passed before he even knew of the court's action. 14 Numerous decisions have held that a defendant does not lose his right of appeal where he gave his attorney instructions to appeal but the latter neglected to act. See e.g., Coffman v. Bomar, 220 F.Supp. 343 (M.D.Tenn. 1963); People v. Tucker, 61 Cal.2d 828, 40 Cal.Rptr. 609, 395 P.2d 449 (1964); Note Effective Assistance of Counsel for the Indigent Defendant, 78 Harv.L.Rev. 1434, 1446-47 (1965). If the right of the defendant are protected in such cases, the same result should follow a fortiori where the lawyer and the trial judge, in possession of not insubstantial grounds for appeal, seal off the information from the defendant. 3 15 Virginia adheres tenaciously to the rule that a defendant has the right to the present at every stage in a felony trial, meaning that the accused must be present in person at any proceeding which might affect his interest. Noell v. Commonwealth, 135 Va. 600, 115 S.E. 679, 30 A.L.R. 1345 (1923). See Near v. Cunningham, 313 F.2d 929 (4th Cir. 1963). This right to be present at every stage of the trial is considered so fundamental that it may not be waived. Hopt v. People of Terrotory of Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed. 262 (1884). Virginia courts have expressly held that the defendant's presence is required when a motion for a new trial is heard or argued. Powel v. Commonwealth, 182 Va. 327, 28 S.E.2d 687 (1944); Staples v. Commonwealth, 140 Va. 583, 125 S.E. 319 (1924); Bond v. Commonwealth, 83 Va. 581, 3 S.E. 149 (1887). It was strongly asserted in the last-cited case that whatever the rule might be in other localities, 'it is the absolute rule of law in Virginia' that in felony cases a prisoner 'must be present in court when his motion for a new trial is made, and when it is acted on by the court.' Id. at 586-587, 3 S.E. at 151. It is worth noting that the matter under discussion in the judge's chambers was no abstruse technical point a defendant might not be expected to comprehend, but a fact which he would readily grasp and one which doubtless would have influenced his decision in respect to an appeal. What happened here illustrates the wisdom of Virginia's strict rule requiring a defendant's presence when a motion for a new trial is heard.