Opinion ID: 610035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parker's Physical Impairment

Text: 22 We review a claimant's allegations of disabling pain under a two-pronged test. First, we examine whether there is objective evidence of an underlying medical condition. If such evidence exists, we then examine: (1) whether the objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged pain arising from the condition; or (2) whether the severity of the objectively established medical condition is such that it can reasonably be expected to produce the alleged pain. Duncan v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 853 (6th Cir.1986). 23 The ALJ determined that ample evidence existed to document Parker's impairment related to her back. This finding is supported by substantial objective medical evidence. However, the objective medical evidences does not confirm the severity of the alleged pain arising from Parker's back condition. Accordingly, Parker does not meet even the first prong of the statutory standard, although there is objective medical evidence of an underlying medical condition. The ALJ found that the evidence failed to identify an impairment that would account for Parker's allegations of severe pain. This finding is also supported by substantial objective medical evidence. 24 After Parker fell in September 1987, x-rays showed a compression fracture, but by March 1988, x-rays revealed that the fracture had healed. At that time, Dr. Reilly recommended that Parker engage in an exercise program, and he also concluded that Parker be placed in a job situation with limited bending and lifting. Thus, Dr. Reilly's assessment contradicts Parker's claim of debilitating pain. 25 In addition, as the government points out, physical examination findings have been consistently normal. Shortly after her fall, Parker had a normal sensory and motor examination. Later examinations produced no evidence of neurological deficits, muscle spasms, atrophy, significant reflex deficits, or substantially decreased range of motion. Cf. Crouch v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 909 F.2d 852, 857 (6th Cir.1990) (absence of significant neurological deficits and atrophy supported Secretary's conclusion that claimant's allegation of severe pain was not confirmed by the objective medical evidence); Duncan, 801 F.2d at 854 (medical evidence showed no neurological deficits, indicating that claimant's diagnosed infirmities are not so severe that they could reasonably be expected to produce disabling pain). Moreover, Parker's intermittent use of Talacen and Medipren--relatively mild pain medications--belies her allegation of disabling pain. See Kimbrough v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 801 F.2d 794, 797 (6th Cir.1986) (evidence that claimant took mild medication does not bear out the severity of claimant's alleged pain); Kirk v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 538-39 (6th Cir.1981) (finding that claimant could perform full range of sedentary work upheld even though claimant prescribed Darvon and Darvocet, medication for mild to moderate pain), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983). In sum, substantial evidence existed that would allow a determination that objective medical evidence did not substantiate Parker's claims of disabling pain. 26 Parker next argues that appropriate weight was not given to the opinions of Drs. Reilly and Fragatos, her treating physicians. As Parker indicated, we have previously reaffirmed that the medical opinions and diagnoses of treating physicians are entitled to substantial deference, particularly if those opinions are uncontradicted. King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir.1984). However, the ultimate determination of disability rests with the Secretary, and not with the treating physician. Duncan, 801 F.2d at 855. Treating physicians' opinions must be grounded in objective medical evidence, and no deference need be afforded to those opinions if they are simply conclusory. Id. (citations omitted). We believe that in this case the Secretary properly considered the opinions of Drs. Reilly and Fragatos as conclusory and unsubstantiated. 27 Dr. Reilly's January 1991 opinion that Parker was totally disabled suffers from two defects. First, it was not supported by the objective findings in Dr. Reilly's own report. Dr. Reilly found Parker to be a basically healthy individual who walked with a normal gait. Parker complained of tenderness in her neck, and Dr. Reilly noted that she had some restriction of motion. However, he found no spasms, atrophy, or asymmetry of the shoulders. Dr. Reilly also observed some tenderness in the lumbosacral spine region, but again found no spasms present. Neurological testing of the upper and lower extremities also revealed nothing. Dr. Reilly also reviewed x-rays, which showed minimal degenerative changes to the cervical spine. Dr. Reilly also found no evidence of any disc herniation in the lumbar spine. Thus, Dr. Reilly's conclusion that Parker was totally and permanently disabled is not supported by his medical findings. See Blacha v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 927 F.2d 228, 230-31 (6th Cir.1990) (without corroborating medical evidence, reviewing court will generally defer to ALJ's assessment of a treating physician's opinion). 28 Second, Dr. Reilly's January 1991 report contradicts his March 1988 report which recommended that Parker could return to work in a job that did not have heavy bending or lifting. However, none of Dr. Reilly's underlying medical findings in his later report detail significant changes in Parker's overall condition, rendering his January 1991 opinion suspect. Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir.1988) (ALJ properly rejected later opinion of physician that was inconsistent with earlier opinion and that was unsupported by new findings of significant changes in claimant's condition). Therefore, the ALJ could properly discount Dr. Reilly's changed opinion. 29 The Secretary did not commit error in refusing to defer to Dr. Fragatos' opinions dating from October and November of 1989 that Parker was totally disabled. Dr. Fragatos' opinions conflicted with Dr. Reilly's initial conclusion in March 1988 that Parker could resume working, and the Secretary had the duty to weigh such evidence. See Richardson, 402 U.S. at 399-400. Dr. Fragatos also did not refer to objective medical evidence when making his determination, and his opinions were reached after making conclusory statements regarding Parker's condition. 1 An ALJ may discredit such unsubstantiated conclusions without fear of reversal by a reviewing court. See Sizemore v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 865 F.2d 709, 711-12 (6th Cir.1988) (opinion not entitled to deference when not supported by specific test results or diagnostic procedures). 30 Finally, Parker challenges the ALJ's determination that her testimony was not credible because it contained inconsistencies. Specifically, the ALJ found Parker's testimony of disabling pain unsupported by the medical evidence, her daily activity schedule inconsistent with a finding that she could not continue to work, and her testimony regarding her fall inconsistent with the medical report because at the hearing Parker failed to state that she was drunk at the time of her accident. If the latter incident were the only testimony which the ALJ found inconsistent, his decision that Parker's testimony was less than credible might deserve closer scrutiny. However, we have discussed previously the fact that an ALJ could find that Parker's allegations of disabling pain were not supported by the available medical evidence. Thus, the ALJ's treatment of Parker's testimony was proper. Substantial evidence did exist to support his findings that Parker's physical impairment did not preclude her from performing past relevant work.