Opinion ID: 2367244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supervisor Liability and Claims Against Salt Lake City

Text: ¶ 77 Up until this point, our analysis of Mr. Howe's § 1983 claims were those brought against Sgt. Bryant and Ms. Werner individually. Additionally, Mr. Howe attempted to render Salt Lake City liable for a pattern of tortious behavior by the two employees. Mr. Howe also brought a separate cause of action against the former Police Chief and the Assistant Police Chief on the basis of supervisor liability. The district court dismissed these claims. We address both of these actions individually, turning first to Salt Lake City's liability as a municipality.
¶ 78 Municipalities may be held liable under § 1983 for civil rights violations. See Bd. of the County Comm'rs of Bryan County v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 137 L.Ed.2d 626 (1997) (stating that local governmental bodies are `persons' within the meaning of § 1983). In considering a revival of Mr. Howe's § 1983 action against Salt Lake City, however, we forgo an analysis of qualified immunity since the defense is unavailable to political subdivisions. See Christensen v. Park City Mun. Corp., 554 F.3d 1271, 1278 (10th Cir.2009). ¶ 79 Local governments may only be held liable under § 1983 for their own unconstitutional or illegal policies leading to an employee's tortious conduct. Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 1998). In other words, municipalities cannot be held liable under § 1983 pursuant to the traditional tort of respondeat superior. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 403, 117 S.Ct. 1382. The Supreme Court requires plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 to identify a municipal `policy' or `custom' that caused the plaintiff's injury. Id. A plaintiff may attack a municipal policy or custom in two ways. A plaintiff may attempt a facial attack on the local government's policy, alleging the policy itself is a violation of federal law. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307; see also Brown, 520 U.S. at 404, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (holding a plaintiff may attack a particular municipal action itself (emphasis omitted)). Alternatively, a plaintiff may saddle a municipality with § 1983 liability despite facially valid policies and customs by demonstrating deliberate indifference on the part of the local government. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307. ¶ 80 Mr. Howe did not bring a facial attack on any Salt Lake City policy as a violation of federal law. Thus, the only avenue left open to Mr. Howe is a theory that lawful municipal action has led an employee to violate a plaintiff's rights [by] demonstrat[ing] that the municipal action was taken with `deliberate indifference' as to its known or obvious consequences. Brown, 520 U.S. at 407, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (quoting City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). The deliberate indifference standard may be satisfied when the municipality has actual or constructive notice that its action or failure to act is substantially certain to result in a constitutional violation, and it consciously or deliberately chooses to disregard the risk of harm. Barney, 143 F.3d at 1307. This standard may be satisfied through a showing of a pattern of tortious conduct that provides city officials with notice through repeated constitutional violations. See id. The route to municipal liability under § 1983 through a deliberate indifference argument is a narrow one; the Supreme Court demands application of rigorous standards of culpability and causation ... to ensure that the municipality is not held liable solely for the actions of its employee. Brown, 520 U.S. at 405, 117 S.Ct. 1382. ¶ 81 The phrase pattern of tortious conduct has not been clearly defined. The case law suggests, however, that the local government is on notice of such a pattern only after repeated violations have harmed others in addition to the plaintiff. See Daskalea v. District of Columbia, 227 F.3d 433, 441-42 (D.C.Cir.2000) (finding a pattern of tortious conduct where the governmental entity was previously found to be deliberately indifferent to the sexual abuse of female prisoners, yet did nothing to halt the continued open and notorious sexual abuse and harassment); Barney, 143 F.3d at 1308 (stating no pattern of violations existed to put the County on notice when officials were unaware of any previous sexual assaults by a deputy); Crownover v. City of Lindsay, No. 99-6346, 2000 WL 1234852 at , 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 22390 at  (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 2000) (finding the city was not on notice of a pattern of tortious conduct because the city was unaware of any allegations of sexual assault by a deputy until after the plaintiff's allegations surfaced); Trujillo v. Shields, No. 97-1309, 1998 WL 856135 at -3, 1998 U.S.App. LEXIS 31148 at -7 (10th Cir. Dec. 11, 1998) (holding a plaintiff's allegations of nonconsensual sexual contact by a police officer with two separate women failed to show continuing, persistent, and widespread violations giving rise to deliberate indifference by city officials); Boyett v. County of Washington, No. 2:04cv1173, 2006 WL 3422104 at , 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86910 at  (D.Utah Nov. 28, 2006) (holding the fact that a prisoner died in custody is insufficient to conclude the county had ample notice of potential prisoner deaths through a pattern of tortious conduct). ¶ 82 In this case, Mr. Howe alleges the city acted with deliberate indifference to Ms. Werner's undisputed pattern of defamation and that the Salt Lake City officials failed to discipline Ms. Werner. First, we do not see how Ms. Werner's generalized criticism of the alarm industry defamed Mr. Howe or Peak Alarm. Moreover, Mr. Howe has failed to show any pattern of alleged tortious behavior that would put Salt Lake City on notice of repeated constitutional violations. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing Mr. Howe's claim against Salt Lake City because city officials did not have actual or constructive notice of unlawful acts by Ms. Werner giving rise to deliberate indifference.