Opinion ID: 682155
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissability of Incriminating Statements

Text: 23 Lambert next argues that the admission into evidence of incriminating statements he made to police after his arrest violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. He asserts that he was too intoxicated when making these statements to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights. 24 To be valid, a Miranda waiver must be both (1) voluntary and (2) knowing and intelligent. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987). On federal habeas review, a state trial court's determination that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights is [a factual issue] entitled to a presumption of correctness pursuant to [28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d) ], unless it is not fairly supported by the record. Collazo v. Estelle, 940 F.2d 411, 416 (9th Cir.1991) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 870 (1992). See also Derrick v. Peterson, 924 F.2d 813 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 161 (1991). On the other hand, the issue of voluntariness is a legal question subject to de novo review. Collazo, 940 F.2d at 415. Any factual conclusions underlying the voluntariness inquiry, however, are reviewed for clear error if made by a district court, and are presumed correct under section 2254(d) if made by a state court. Id. See also United States v. Lewis, 833 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir.1987). 25 The trial court did not err in finding that Lambert voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. A waiver is voluntary if it is the product of a rational intellect and a free will, whether or not it is alcohol-induced. Medeiros v. Shimoda, 889 F.2d 819, 823 (9th Cir.1989) (citations and quotations omitted), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 938 (1990). Absent evidence that the defendant's  'will was overcome and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired' because of [alcohol], his waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege [is] voluntary under [the Supreme] Court's decision in Miranda. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. at 574 (quoting Columbe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961)). 26 The state trial court found that, although Lambert may have been intoxicated when making the incriminating statements, he was not so mentally incapacitated as to be incapable of exercising his free will. This finding was based on several factual determinations that are supported by the record and entitled to the presumption of correctness. See Terrovona v. Kincheloe, 852 F.2d 424, 428 n. 3 (9th Cir.1988) (stating that subsidiary fact questions related to waiver (for example, whether intoxication affected a waiver's voluntariness) are subject to the section 2254(d) presumption), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 979 (1991). 27 Although the trial court did not make a specific finding concerning the amount of alcohol Lambert consumed prior to his arrest, the court did find that his blood-alcohol level was below .25 during interrogation. The court also noted that Lambert was fully capable of following instructions and cooperating with the police, had no difficulty communicating, and displayed no outward signs of intoxication, such as slurred speech or impaired motor abilities. 5 Moreover, testimony indicated that Lambert was able to think rationally and formulate deceptive plans in the period immediately before his arrest. 6 After his arrest and before he was interrogated, Lambert slept. 28 Assuming, as we must, all these facts to be correct, we conclude Lambert was not intoxicated to the point of being unable to exercise his free will when he waived his Miranda rights and incriminated himself. See generally Nelson v. McCarthy, 637 F.2d 1291, 1295-96 (9th Cir.1980) (holding that, based on the trial court's resolution of the factual issues pertaining to intoxication, the defendant's Miranda waiver was voluntary), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 940 (1981). 29 Nor did the trial court err in finding that Lambert's Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent. A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it is made with a full awareness both of the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Collazo, 940 F.2d at 415 (quotations and citations omitted). The court's factual determination that Lambert knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights is fairly supported by the record and deserves the presumption of correctness. The facts specified above indicate that Lambert was not so mentally impaired by alcohol as to be incapable of understanding both the rights of which he was advised and the consequences of waiving them. 30