Opinion ID: 2584137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of cunningham

Text: {22} We have no choice but to conclude that Frawley's sentence was altered upwards in contravention of the Sixth Amendment and that we must overrule Lopez. In New Mexico the basic sentence for a noncapital felony shall be imposed unless the court alters such sentence. Section 31-18-15(B). The only relevant factors our Legislature took into account in establishing the basic sentence were the basic elements for each felony. See Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 16, 810 P.2d 1223, 1236 (1991) ([T]he elements of the offense are ipso facto incorporated by the legislature into the base level sentencing for the offense.). A sentencing judge may exercise discretion to increase the basic sentence only after the judge finds aggravating circumstances. Section 31-18-15.1(A). And, notwithstanding the broad statutory language implying that a judge in New Mexico may alter a sentence upward in any case, the actual fact is that a judge's discretion to do so is quite limited. Long ago, we construed Section 31-18-15.1 to mean that the State must actually seek enhancement of a basic sentence on grounds of aggravating circumstances by filing a pleading so that the defendant may have notice of the specific aggravating factors on which the state intends to rely.  Caristo v. Sullivan, 112 N.M. 623, 631, 818 P.2d 401, 409 (1991) (emphasis added). In other words, in actual day-to-day operation of our sentencing laws, it is the State's discretion, rather than the judge's, that must be exercised before a sentence may be aggravated. In summary, once a sentencing judge in New Mexico is asked by the State to exercise discretion to increase a basic sentence, the aggravation cannot be based on elements of either the offense for which the defendant was sentenced or a separate, but contemporaneous, conviction, Swafford, 112 N.M. at 16, 810 P.2d at 1236, and the judge must state on the record his or her reasons for increasing the sentence to facilitate appellate review, State v. Segotta, 100 N.M. 498, 501, 672 P.2d 1129, 1132 (1983). {23} Thus, adhering to the Supreme Court's repeated admonishments in Cunningham regarding the bright-line nature of its rule first established in Apprendi, we recognize that the Sixth Amendment is violated any time a defendant is sentenced above what is authorized solely by the jury's verdict alone. See Cunningham, ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 868. Taken literally, the Supreme Court's mandate means that any sentence above the basic sentence contained in our sentencing statutes as written violates the Sixth Amendment because, based solely on the jury verdict (or plea agreement admitting only to the elements of the crime), a judge may not alter the basic sentence upwards without affirmatively establishing facts. [8] Put another way, the question before us is simply whether [our] law forbids a judge to increase a defendant's sentence unless the judge finds facts that the jury did not find (and the offender did not concede). Rita, ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 2466. Because it is undeniable that the answer to that question is yes, we overrule Lopez and hold that Frawley's aggravated sentences are unconstitutional. [9] {24} In Lopez the majority sought to rely on legislative intent in order to hold our sentencing scheme constitutional. See Lopez, 2005-NMSC-036, ¶ 55, 138 N.M. 521, 123 P.3d 754. As the Supreme Court emphasized in Cunningham, however, legislative intent is of no consequence here. See Cunningham, ___ U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 871 n. 16 (disregarding the California court's construction of California law). While it may be a fact that our Legislature intended a scheme that passes constitutional muster, that is an entirely separate question from whether it in fact does so. [10] Thus, we hold that Frawley was unconstitutionally sentenced when the judge aggravated his third-degree felony sentences from two years to three years based on his findings of certain aggravating circumstances.