Opinion ID: 2614079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Destruction of Physical Evidence

Text: On February 15, 1983, more than a year and a half after this court affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence in Vickers I, but before the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in Vickers v. Ricketts , Judge Bean signed an order prepared by the clerk of the court authorizing the destruction of all physical evidence relating to the Ponciano murder. Among the items destroyed were: (1) an unknown number of white sheet strips, (2) a yellow toothbrush, (3) a bloodstained leather shoe, and (4) a bloodstained white sheet. Before defendant's retrial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the case based upon the destruction of this evidence. After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case against him, thereby violating his due process rights as guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 4. We address the merits of defendant's contention  even though its resolution is not necessary to the disposition of this case  only because the issue it presents likely will be raised again on remand. The crux of defendant's claim appears to be that the physical evidence in this case was never independently tested by the defense, and therefore, any potential exculpatory value it may have had was lost when the evidence was destroyed. As this court recently held in State v. Youngblood, however, absent bad faith on the part of the state, the failure to preserve evidentiary material which could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant, does not constitute a denial of due process of law under the Arizona Constitution. 173 Ariz. 502, 508, 844 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1993). The same analysis applies to due process challenges brought under the United States Constitution. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, 337, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). In an attempt to circumvent this precedent, defendant argues that the bad faith standard enunciated in Youngblood does not apply to this case because Youngblood involved pretrial destruction of evidence, whereas this case involves post-verdict destruction of evidence. We find this argument unpersuasive. As we previously have explained, [t]he question is fundamental fairness. When the state exhibits bad faith in the handling of critical evidence, it is fundamentally unfair to allow the trial to proceed.... In contrast, where there is no bad faith it is fundamentally unfair to bar the state from our courts. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507, 844 P.2d at 1157. We fail to see how the pretrial versus post-verdict distinction advanced by defendant bears upon this issue of fundamental fairness. Indeed, given the factual circumstances of this case, such a distinction is more imagined than real  i.e., the evidence was destroyed after the verdict in defendant's first trial, but before the verdict in his second trial. As such, we do not agree that this case requires us to depart from the principle that only a showing of bad faith implicates due process. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 507, 844 P.2d at 1157. Furthermore, we note that defense counsel asked for and received a Willits instruction at trial. See State v. Willits, 96 Ariz. 184, 393 P.2d 274 (1964). The jury was therefore instructed that if it found the state destroyed evidence that might have been helpful to defendant, it could infer that the evidence would have been unfavorable to the state. Willits, 96 Ariz. at 191, 393 P.2d at 278-79. With respect to evidence which might be exculpatory, and where there is no bad faith conduct, the Willits rule more than adequately complies with the fundamental fairness component of Arizona due process. Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 506-07, 844 P.2d at 1156-57 (emphasis supplied). Defendant has not attempted to show that Judge Bean acted in bad faith when he signed the order authorizing the destruction of the evidence in this case, and we find no evidence of such in the record. Although Judge Bean testified that this was the only capital case in which he signed such an order and that he was not comfortable doing so, we will not infer from this any bad faith on his part. Rather, the evidence apparently was destroyed as a result of nothing more than inadvertence or neglect. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the case against him. DISPOSITION Because we find that defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel at trial, we reverse both his conviction and his sentence. This case is remanded to the superior court for a new trial. MOELLER, V.C.J., concurs.