Opinion ID: 2982089
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legality of the Terry Frisk

Text: A valid stop does not necessarily grant an officer the authority to perform a pat-down search. Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 822 (6th Cir. 2005). Instead, to proceed from a stop to a frisk, an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person to be searched is armed and dangerous. Johnson, 555 U.S. at 326–27. Reasonable suspicion requires that an officer have -6- No. 12-6436 USA v. Rico Tillman “articulable reasons and a particularized and objective basis” for assuming criminal activity is afoot. Joshua v. DeWitt, 341 F.3d 430, 443 (6th Cir. 2003). Absolute certainty is not required to justify a frisk; “the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. Tillman argues that once he was lawfully seized for the seatbelt violation, Delaney lacked reasonable suspicion to believe he was armed and dangerous. The district court disagreed. Finding Delaney’s observations to be “more than sufficient” to uphold the pat-down, the court concluded that Tillman’s conduct could “lead a reasonably prudent person in the same circumstances to believe that his safety was in danger.” We hold that Tillman’s actions generated the requisite reasonable suspicion for Deputy Delaney to perform the frisk. Several reasons compel this conclusion. First, Tillman did not comply with Delaney’s orders to keep his hands in plain view; second, his furtive movements were consistent with hiding or obtaining a weapon; third, Tillman was sweating and his voice was shaky; and fourth, he was driving the car of a known drug dealer. We address each of these facts individually, but construe them—as we must—based on the totality of the circumstances. DeWitt, 341 F.3d at 443. 1. Tillman did not follow Delaney’s orders to keep his hands in plain view We give significant weight to the fact that Tillman refused to heed Delaney’s instruction to keep his hands on the steering wheel. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972), a case also involving a Terry stop, the officer ordered the defendant to step out of the car so he could see the defendant’s movements more clearly. Id. The defendant ignored the officer’s order, and this provided ample reason for the officer to fear for his safety. Id. United States v. Bohannon is also -7- No. 12-6436 USA v. Rico Tillman instructive. There, a suspect acted “nervous” and twice ignored the officer’s request to keep his hands in plain view. United States v. Bohannon, 225 F.3d 615, 618 (6th Cir. 2000). We explained in Bohannon that it was reasonable for the officer to pat down the suspect to search for weapons. Id. Without question, officers must ensure that a suspect’s arms and hands do not pose a safety risk to them or others. Street, 614 F. 3d at 233. On balance, our cases suggest that when a suspect’s movements cannot be observed by the officer and the suspect does not listen to orders, the risk of danger rises, making a decision to frisk reasonable under the circumstances. Delaney testified that Tillman “wouldn’t obey my simple command of keeping his hands where I could see them, and it was making me uncomfortable . . . . There was something that concerned him so much near his leg . . . .” Consequently, Delaney was “fearful that [Tillman] had a weapon on him.” The district court found Delaney’s testimony to be credible, and we must defer to the court’s credibility determination because it was in the best position to make this assessment. Garrido, 467 F.3d at 977. Because Tillman repeatedly failed to keep his hands on the steering wheel, Delaney’s concern for his safety was not only objective and particularized, but also warranted under the circumstances. 2. Tillman made two furtive movements This court has held that an officer’s observation of a defendant reaching under the seat in addition to other factors can create reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry frisk. United States v. Graham, 483 F.3d 431, 439 (6th Cir. 2007). In Graham, an officer saw the defendant dip his shoulder, as if he were putting something under the seat. As we explained in that case, this type of “furtive movement” is consistent with an attempt to conceal a weapon. Id. Similarly, in United -8- No. 12-6436 USA v. Rico Tillman States v. Campbell, when officers conducted a traffic stop, they observed the defendant slouch down with his hands out of sight, suggestive of hiding a weapon. 549 F.3d 364, 372 (6th Cir. 2008). The pat-down in Campbell was lawful because a reasonably prudent person in this situation would have been justified to believe his safety was compromised. Id. at 373. In this case, Tillman “quickly” reached over to the passenger side of the car two times, which could have indicated that he was grabbing a weapon. He claims, however, that merely reaching across the seat was an insufficient basis for Delaney to believe he was armed and dangerous. But Tillman overlooks the fact that innocent conduct, when examined in its totality, can support a finding of reasonable suspicion. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9 (1989). Traffic stops are “fraught with danger to police officers”; they must often make split-second decisions, frequently on the basis of incomplete information. Michigan. v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1047 (1983). Even if Tillman had a legitimate reason for reaching toward the passenger side of the car, his movements reasonably caused Delaney to be concerned for his safety, especially since Delaney was the sole officer at the scene. United States v. Bost, No. 3:11–CR–139, 2012 WL 2865895, at  (E.D. Tenn. May 3, 2012) (finding that after the defendant put his hand out of the officer’s view, it was a reasonable precaution for the officer, who was alone at the scene, to pat him down). Tillman’s furtive movements are particularly unsettling because he reached over to the passenger side of the car twice, and his actions were inconsistent with a driver obtaining his licence or registration. If Tillman had his license or registration in his hands when Delaney approached the car, presumably this would have diffused the threat that Tillman procured a weapon when he reached over to the passenger side of the car. -9- No. 12-6436 USA v. Rico Tillman 3. Tillman was nervous “[N]ervous, evasive behavior is a pertinent factor in determining reasonable suspicion.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). Because a certain level of nervousness may be expected during encounters with the police, it is insufficient, by itself, to find reasonable suspicion. United States v. Mesa, 62 F.3d 159, 162 (6th Cir.1995). Officers may “draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” United States v. Shank, 543 F.3d 309, 315 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). Delaney did just that. Relying on his training, Delaney found several behaviors to be suspicions: Tillman was sweating profusely despite mild temperatures, he would not make direct eye contact with Delaney, and his voice was shaky. Tillman claims he was sweating because Delaney had his gun drawn and he feared Delaney would “blow his brains out.” This claim is not supported by the record. Delaney testified that when he approached the car Tillman was driving, he placed his weapon out of Tillman’s view. Thus, there is no evidence to suggest that Tillman was aware of Delaney’s weapon prior to the frisk. 4. Tillman was driving the car of a known drug dealer Delaney recognized that the car Tillman was driving belonged to Charlie Angell, who had been arrested for drug offenses in the past. Although association with a known criminal alone is not enough to provide the basis for reasonable suspicion, Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 73 (1968)(Harlan, J. concurring), here there was more. Tillman disobeyed multiple commands to keep - 10 - No. 12-6436 USA v. Rico Tillman his hands visible, made two furtive movements, and was nervous. His conduct, when examined cumulatively, provides an adequate basis to find reasonable suspicion. In short, the important question is “whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances” could have believed “that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. We are satisfied, as was the district court, that the combined circumstances in this case were based on objective and articulable facts to support Delaney’s belief that Tillman was armed and dangerous.