Opinion ID: 805977
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fairness of the Original Trial

Text: Mr. Hooks’s third and final ground for habeas relief is that counsel was ineffective during the guilt and sentencing phases of his original trial in 1989. This claim comes to us in Appeal No. 03-6049 and was not adjudicated on the merits in state court. Accordingly, we do not view the claim through the lens of AEDPA and instead exercise our “independent judgment.” McCracken, 268 F.3d at 975. “[W]e review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings, if any, for clear error.” Spears, 343 F.3d at 1225. “[I]f the district court based its factual findings entirely on the state court record, we review that record independently.” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1167 (quoting Bland, 459 F.3d at 1010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Any state-court findings of fact relevant to a federal habeas claim are presumed correct unless clearly and convincingly rebutted. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d at 1223. The familiar two-prong standard of Strickland applies to Mr. Hooks’s ineffective assistance claim. He “must show both that his counsel’s performance ‘fell below an -75- objective standard of reasonableness’ and that ‘the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’” Byrd, 645 F.3d at 1167 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88). Because we are reviewing this ineffective-assistance claim de novo, we judge the reasonableness of counsel’s performance without applying AEDPA’s double dose of deference. To preview our analysis below, we reject Mr. Hooks’s claim that counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial. However, we conditionally grant habeas relief with respect to his death sentence because counsel rendered deficient, prejudicial performance during the sentencing phase.
Mr. Hooks claims that counsel was ineffective during the guilt phase of his trial because counsel failed (1) to pursue an insanity defense, and (2) to secure witness Carol Hill. We conclude that counsel was not ineffective during the guilt phase.
Mr. Hooks argues that counsel was deficient for failing to investigate and pursue an insanity defense. In his view, such a defense, even if ultimately unsuccessful, would have opened the door to expert testimony on his mental state, which in turn would have helped establish that he had killed in the heat of passion rather than with malice aforethought. In particular, according to Mr. Hooks, his counsel was ineffective because he misunderstood the legal standard for insanity. Prior to trial, Mr. Hooks’s attorney, Ron Evans, requested a competency evaluation for Mr. Hooks. Mr. Hooks was examined by Dr. Edith King and declared -76- competent. Thereafter, Mr. Evans retained Dr. King and the aforementioned Dr. Murphy to assist him at trial. In light of the fact that Mr. Hooks had unquestionably killed Ms. Blaine, Mr. Evans’s strategy was to attempt to negate the intent-to-kill element of the first-degree murder charge. See Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 206. To that end, he put on three witnesses at trial: Scott Cannon, a police officer, to testify about a statement by Mr. Hooks six days after the murder that he “didn’t mean to kill her [i.e., Ms. Blaine],” 3 Trial Tr. at 440 (internal quotation marks omitted); and Drs. King and Murphy, to establish through expert testimony that Mr. Hooks had committed the murder in the heat of passion or with a depraved mind, rather than with malice aforethought. All such testimony was ultimately excluded, however. The State objected to Officer Cannon’s testimony on the ground that Mr. Hooks’s statement (“I didn’t mean to kill her”) was self-serving hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection. See id. at 442–43. When Mr. Evans began direct examination of Dr. Murphy, the State objected to his testimony, as well as to the proposed testimony of Dr. King, on the ground that it would invade the province of the jury. See id. at 447–56, 473–74. The trial court sustained those objections, too. See id. at 456, 474. The court recognized that psychiatric testimony was permissible to help establish a defendant’s insanity, but because an insanity defense was not being pursued, Mr. Hooks’s state of mind was “a question of fact peculiarly left within the exclusive province of the jury.” Id. at 455. Mr. Hooks vigorously argues that the information available to Mr. Evans should have prompted a reasonable attorney to pursue an insanity defense and that he was -77- prejudiced by Mr. Evans’s failure to do so because, even if he did not prevail on his insanity defense, “[t]here is a reasonable probability the insanity evidence would have eliminated an intent finding, the essential requisite for a first degree murder conviction.” Aplt. Opening Br. at 81. Indeed, there was no dispute that Mr. Hooks killed Ms. Blaine; the salient question was whether he acted with the requisite intent to constitute firstdegree murder. See Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d at 1231 (separate opinion of Ebel, J.) (“From the outset of trial Hooks admitted that he caused Shalimein’s death, and sought only to challenge the state’s assertion that he did so intentionally.”). We conclude, however, that Mr. Hooks cannot prevail on this claim of error. Mr. Evans had considered presenting an insanity defense but opted not to because, as he would later explain at the federal evidentiary hearing, he “didn’t think that there was a factual basis for it.” Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 173 (Test. of Mr. Evans). Oklahoma follows the M’Naghten rule, under which “[t]he defendant must demonstrate at trial that during the commission of the crime he was suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him unable to differentiate between right and wrong, or unable to understand the nature and consequences of his acts.” Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982) (emphases added). As a leading commentator helpfully observes: The M’Naghten test consists of two elements which logically can be separated. The first portion [concerning an inability to understand the nature and consequences of one’s actions] relates to an accused who is psychotic to an extreme degree. It assumes an accused who, because of mental disease, did not know the nature and quality of his act; he simply did not know what he was doing. For example, in crushing the skull of a human being with an iron bar, he believed that he was -78- smashing a glass jar. The latter portion of M’Naghten [involving an inability to differentiate between right or wrong] relates to an accused who knew the nature and quality of his act. He knew what he was doing; he knew that he was crushing the skull of a human being with an iron bar. However, because of mental disease, he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. He believed, for example, that he was carrying out a command from God. 2 Charles E. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 101, at 12–17 (15th ed. 1994) (footnotes omitted); see also 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 99, at 128 (1989) (noting that under the M’Naghten test “there exist two distinct and independent bases upon which a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity might be returned”).25 Under Oklahoma law, “a defendant is presumed to be sane and the burden is upon him to produce sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt as to his sanity.” Wooldridge v. State, 801 P.2d 729, 733 (Okla. Crim. App. 1990); accord Garrett v. State, 586 P.2d 754, 755 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978). Ordinarily, we indulge a “‘a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,’ and that ‘the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Fairchild, 579 F.3d at 1140 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). As it relates to the portion of the M’Naghten rule involving an alleged inability to know right from wrong, we conclude on this record that Mr. Evans 25 The first portion of the M’Naghten rule discussed in the quoted passage above customarily is stated using the phrase “nature and quality,” when referring to a defendant’s understanding of his actions, whereas Oklahoma uses the phrase “nature and consequences.” However, the term “quality” and “consequences” are apparently intended to embrace the same concept, focusing on a defendant’s comprehension of the “harmfulness” of his actions. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 103, at 134. -79- reasonably could have concluded that he did not have the evidence to satisfy his burden. First, Mr. Hooks’s initial lies to cover up the murder, his attempt to hide evidence, and his seeking medical attention for Ms. Blaine indicate that he knew right from wrong.26 Cf. Garrett, 586 P.2d at 756 (“The evidence that the defendant looked ‘wild’ or ‘berserk’ or her own testimony of loss of memory is not evidence that brings the defendant within the above rule to show that she did not know right from wrong.”). Second, Mr. Evans unquestionably would have been aware that there would be evidence introduced in the trial that, prior to the murder of Ms. Blaine, Mr. Hooks had not infrequently beaten her (sometimes viciously). See 2 Trial Tr. at 417, 420 (Test. of Ms. Dinh). Such evidence could have cast doubt on an assertion that, at the time that he killed Ms. Blaine, Mr. Hooks did not know right from wrong. See Kobyluk v. State, 231 P.2d 388, 393 (Okla. Crim. App. 1951) (“We think that evidence of the actions, conduct, and general demeanor of defendant toward his wife, showing a continuous course of abuse from 1945 until the date of the alleged assault in 1948, was competent as tending to show the state of mind of defendant at the time of the assault. It should be borne in mind that the only issue in this case was the question as to whether defendant knew right from wrong at the time of the shooting . . . .” (citations omitted)). Third, nothing in Mr. 26 Mr. Hooks disputes this, pointing out that insanity is judged at the time that one commits an offense, not afterwards. However, the actions one takes immediately after committing a crime are surely probative of one’s legal sanity at the time of the act. See Frederick v. State, 37 P.3d 908, 945 (Okla. Crim. App. 2001) (relying in part on the fact that the defendant had attempted to conceal his crime to conclude that the defense of insanity was unsupported by the evidence). -80- Evans’s interaction with Mr. Hooks or in the experts’ reports gave him any other reason to believe that an insanity defense (on the right-from-wrong ground) would be successful. See Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 208–09 (Test. of Mr. Evans). Finally, an insanity defense would have allowed the State to put on its own experts, and as Mr. Evans was aware, the mental-state evidence was not a slam-dunk for Mr. Hooks. See id. (discussing Dr. King’s report, which detailed Mr. Hooks’s ability to understand and communicate, and admitting that it was “not good evidence for an insanity defense”); see also Hooks Habeas I, slip op. at 6–8. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that Mr. Evans rendered constitutionally deficient representation in electing not to pursue such a defense. However, with respect to M’Naghten’s second theory, the picture is more complicated. Mr. Evans was apparently unaware of this theory. At the federal evidentiary hearing, he described the M’Naghten rule as “basically not knowing the difference between right and wrong.” Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 173 (Test. of Mr. Evans). It was pointed out to him that the definition is disjunctive and also includes an inability to understand the nature and consequences of one’s actions, to which he responded, “I think that goes hand-in-hand with not knowing right from wrong.” Id. When his understanding was corrected, he admitted, “I guess I was wrong.” Id. at 174. The ordinary presumption discussed above—that an attorney’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and that his conduct might be deemed sound trial strategy—dissipates when an attorney has a “demonstrated ignorance of law directly relevant to a decision.” Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1049 (10th Cir. -81- 2002). Counsel’s mistake of law will often, though not always, mean that “counsel performed in an objectively deficient manner.” Id. at 1050. Nonetheless, we need not opine on Mr. Evans’s performance with regard to his failure to advance M’Naghten’s nature-and-consequences insanity theory. Even if we were to conclude that, because of his apparent lack of knowledge of this M’Naghten theory, Mr. Evans could not have made a reasonable decision not to pursue it, and thus his representation in this regard was constitutionally deficient, we would determine under Strickland’s second prong that Mr. Hooks did not suffer any prejudice from this deficient representation. Giving appropriate consideration to the OCCA’s findings, the record would not have supported a jury verdict of insanity under the M’Naghten’s nature-and-consequences theory (which was apparently beyond Mr. Evans’s ken). In support of his claim, Mr. Hooks relies heavily on the testimony of Dr. Murphy. Among other things, Dr. Murphy apparently was prepared to testify that Mr. Hooks was “suffering from a severe chronic psychosis, which has a recurrent and episodic nature,” 3 Trial Tr. at 459, and that when he killed Ms. Blaine, “[h]e acted in the heat of passion in a delusional state,” id. at 463. However, in upholding the trial court’s exclusion of the guilt-stage testimony of Dr. Murphy, as well as Dr. King, the OCCA found: Both doctors’ testimony significantly omitted an assessment of Hooks’ sanity, i.e., whether, at the time of the murder, he had the mental capacity to distinguish right from wrong or to understand the nature and consequences of his acts. Dr. Murphy testified Hooks was probably not in touch with reality when he murdered Ms. Blaine, but did not say -82- whether Hooks could have distinguished right from wrong or appreciated the nature and consequences of his acts. Dr. King testified Hooks has a “tendency not to pay attention to consequences but just impulsively to act.” Choosing to ignore consequences is clearly different from being incapable of understanding those consequences. Hooks v. State, 862 P.2d at 1278 (citation omitted). These factual findings of the OCCA are entitled to a presumption of correctness, rebuttable only by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Hooks v. Ward, 184 F.3d at 1223. Mr. Hooks has failed to rebut that presumption. Consequently, we cannot conclude that a rational factfinder could have determined that Mr. Hooks suffered from such an extreme form of psychosis that he was unaware of the nature and consequences of his actions, as contemplated by the M’Naghten rule. Indeed, although opining that Mr. Hooks was delusional when he beat Ms. Blaine to death, Dr. Murphy never asserted that, because of mental illness, Mr. Hooks actually thought he was inflicting his lethal blows on anyone—or anything—other than Ms. Blaine. With an insufficient factual foundation under M’Naghten’s nature-andconsequences theory, Mr. Hooks would not have been allowed to place “insanity evidence,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 81, supportive of this theory before the jury. Nor could a rational trier of fact possibly have concluded under this theory that Mr. Hooks was insane. Thus, even if Mr. Evans’s ignorance of the second half of the M’Naghten rule rendered his representation objectively unreasonable, Mr. Hooks has failed to establish that he was prejudiced. -83-
Mr. Hooks also alleges that his attorney was deficient for failing to secure Carol Hill as a witness. According to Mr. Hooks, Ms. Hill was a friend of his who would have testified favorably for him and undermined the damaging testimony of Shanna Dinh, one of the witnesses for the prosecution. Mr. Evans spoke with Ms. Hill on several occasions prior to trial and took detailed notes of their conversations. See Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 180–87 (Test. of Mr. Evans). Mr. Evans thought Ms. Hill was “very interested in his case,” and he expected her to testify. Id. at 187 (“She never expressed an unwillingness to come to court, to my memory.”). But when the time came, Ms. Hill did not appear. Mr. Evans “was surprised when she didn’t show up” and concedes he “should have subpoenaed her.” Id. The district court found that Mr. Evans’s failure to subpoena Ms. Hill “was not professionally unreasonable” because “[t]here is no evidence that Evans knew, or should have known, that Hill would not be available to testify at the trial.” Hooks Habeas I, slip op. at 9. However, we plant our conclusion on different ground and hold that Mr. Hooks was not prejudiced by Ms. Hill’s absence. When counsel’s failure to call or subpoena a witness can be traced to a reasoned strategic judgment, we generally find counsel’s performance reasonable under the first prong of Strickland. See, e.g., Bunton v. Atherton, 613 F.3d 973, 982–83 (10th Cir. 2010); Parker v. Scott, 394 F.3d 1302, 1323 (10th Cir. 2005). On the other hand, when -84- neglect or an incomplete investigation accounts for the failure to secure a witness, counsel’s performance is more likely unreasonable, and the inquiry often turns to prejudice. That analysis is inherently fact-dependent and must take in the totality of evidence adduced at trial. See Welch, 639 F.3d at 1015. In Snow v. Sirmons, for example, we held that it was unreasonable for counsel to fail to call three witness, all of whom would have testified that a certain Mr. Allen, rather than the defendant, committed the murder in question. 474 F.3d 693, 729 (10th Cir. 2007). But the failure was not prejudicial because the witnesses’ testimony could have been admitted only to impeach Mr. Allen’s own testimony, not as substantive evidence, and in light of other evidence at trial—particularly the defendant’s “own confused and wavering testimony”—a different outcome was not reasonably probable. Id. at 730. In a similar vein, in Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1323 (10th Cir. 1998), while not reaching the question of counsel’s performance, we held that the failure to subpoena a witness for trial was not prejudicial. There was no showing that the witness was a key witness “based on some meaningful connection between [the witness] and the crimes for which [the defendant] was convicted,” and the witness’s putative testimony would not have “significantly furthered” the defense’s theory. Id. When a witness is “crucial” to the defense, failure to secure that witness is often both unreasonable and prejudicial. This is especially true when the witness is an alibi witness or a disinterested bystander with exculpatory information, or when the -85- government’s case rests primarily on eyewitness testimony that would have been directly refuted by the witness’s own testimony. See Hodgson v. Warren, 622 F.3d 591, 600–01 (6th Cir. 2010); Adams v. Bertrand, 453 F.3d 428, 437–38 (7th Cir. 2006); Goodman v. Bertrand, 467 F.3d 1022, 1030–31 (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Andrews, 953 F.2d 1312, 1327 (11th Cir. 1992); Coleman v. Brown, 802 F.2d 1227, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 1986). Based on our review of the record, we do not believe that Ms. Hill was a crucial witness or that there is a reasonable probability that her testimony would have altered the outcome of the trial. Although Mr. Hooks argues that her testimony would have “completely undermined” the testimony of Shanna Dinh, Aplt. Opening Br. at 83, we disagree. Admittedly, Ms. Dinh’s testimony on behalf of the prosecution was damaging to Mr. Hooks. She testified that she had a child with him, prostituted for him, turned over her welfare checks to him, and received beatings from him (one of which caused her to have a miscarriage). See 2 Trial Tr. at 410–15 (Test. of Ms. Dinh). She also testified that Mr. Hooks beat Ms. Blaine and did not want her to have his child. See id. at 416–20. In the main, this testimony concerned Ms. Dinh’s personal interactions with Mr. Hooks and her personal observations of his relationship with Ms. Blaine. Ms. Dinh mentioned Ms. Hill a few times in her testimony. According to Ms. Dinh, Ms. Hill was one of Mr. Hooks’s girlfriends and prostituted for him, id. at 416–17, and also received beatings from him, id. at 417. By contrast, Ms. Hill apparently would -86- have testified that she had a good relationship with Mr. Hooks, was not one of his girlfriends, did not receive beatings from him, and never saw him act violently toward Ms. Blaine. See Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 182, 184–85 (Test. of Mr. Evans). She also would have told the jury that Ms. Dinh was “a dirty little girl” and “want[ed] revenge on Victor.” Id. at 181–82 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based upon this evidence, we would be hard-pressed to conclude that Ms. Hill would have undermined Ms. Dinh’s testimony and credibility in anything but minor ways. The controverted points of Ms. Dinh’s testimony were isolated ones. Nothing about Ms. Hill’s putative testimony would have undercut the most damaging information that Ms. Dinh relayed to the jury: her own violent and twisted relationship with Mr. Hooks. And, although Ms. Hill would have told the jury that she never saw Mr. Hooks beat his wife, the potency of that testimony would have been diminished by the circumstances of the crime in this case. Because Ms. Hill’s testimony would have been of limited utility, Mr. Evans’s failure to subpoena her to testify, even if professionally unreasonable, was not prejudicial. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of habeas relief as to Mr. Hooks’s conviction.27 27 Mr. Hooks does not articulate a separate cumulative-prejudice claim with respect to the alleged errors of trial counsel during the guilt phase. Cumulative error is a substantive claim just like any other and must be affirmatively raised by a party. See Smith, 534 F.3d at 1217. We therefore do not consider cumulative prejudice here. Even if we did, it would not change our conclusion. -87- 2. Counsel’s Performance During the Sentencing Phase While we entertain “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance,” Matthews, 577 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), we nevertheless apply “closer scrutiny when reviewing attorney performance during the sentencing phase of a capital case,” Cooks, 165 F.3d at 1294; see also Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 n.12 (10th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he minimized state interest in finality when resentencing alone is the remedy, combined with the acute interest of a defendant facing death, justify a court’s closer scrutiny of attorney performance at the sentencing phase.”). We judge counsel’s performance by reference to “prevailing professional norms,” which in capital cases include the ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (“ABA Guidelines”). Young v. Sirmons, 551 F.3d 942, 957 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523). “Among the topics defense counsel should investigate and consider presenting include medical history, educational history, employment and training history, family and social history, prior adult and juvenile correctional experiences, and religious and cultural influences.” Id. Counsel has a duty to conduct a “thorough investigation—in particular, of mental health evidence—in preparation for the sentencing phase of a capital trial.” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1083. We recently had occasion to expound on this principle, drawing on a trilogy of Supreme Court cases—Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), Wiggins v. -88- Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (2003), and Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005)—involving ineffective assistance at capital-sentencing proceedings. Surveying those cases, we divined “three important principles”: First, the question is not whether counsel did something; counsel must conduct a full investigation and pursue reasonable leads when they become evident. Second, to determine what is reasonable investigation, courts must look first to the ABA guidelines, which serve as reference points for what is acceptable preparation for the mitigation phase of a capital case. Finally, because of the crucial mitigating role that evidence of a poor upbringing or mental health problems can have in the sentencing phase, defense counsel must pursue this avenue of investigation with due diligence. Our own Circuit has emphasized this guiding principle. In Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 942 (10th Cir. 2004), we held that it was “patently unreasonable” for trial counsel to fail to present evidence of Smith’s borderline mental retardation, brain damage, and troubled childhood, and stated that this type of mitigating evidence “is exactly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from jurors.” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1084–85 (citations omitted). If we find that counsel’s performance at sentencing was deficient, we must then analyze the prejudicial effect on Mr. Hooks’s defense. Prejudice means “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. To assess prejudice arising out of counsel’s errors at a capital-sentencing proceeding, we must “reweigh the evidence in aggravation against the totality of available mitigating evidence.” Young, 551 F.3d at 960 (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534) (internal quotation marks omitted). If “there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance,” -89- Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537—viz., that “at least one juror would have refused to impose the death penalty,” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1124 (Hartz, J., concurring)—prejudice is shown. Based on these principles, we find that counsel’s performance during the sentencing phase was woefully inadequate. Not only did he mount “an extraordinarily limited case in mitigation,” Anderson v. Sirmons, 476 F.3d 1131, 1146 (10th Cir. 2007), but his own statements and the statements of his testifying expert served to villify Mr. Hooks in the eyes of the jury. These failures raise a reasonable probability “that at least one juror would have empathized with Mr. [Hooks]” and chosen life over death. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1095. a. Counsel’s mitigation case The sentencing phase was brief. It began shortly after the guilt phase had concluded. The State sought the death penalty, positing three aggravating circumstances: (1) Mr. Hooks’s previous conviction for a felony involving the use or threat of violence, (2) the “especially heinous, atrocious or cruel” nature of the murder, and (3) the probability that Mr. Hooks constituted a continuing threat to society. 3 Trial Tr. at 501–02. The State successfully moved to incorporate all evidence presented during the guilt phase. Id. at 509. In addition, it called a single witness, Idabel, Oklahoma police officer Buck Ray, who testified that Mr. Hooks had been convicted on a charge of armed robbery of a liquor store in 1982. Id. at 507 (Test. of Mr. Ray). His testimony suggested that in the course of the robbery, Mr. Hooks had cut the store clerk’s hand with a knife. -90- See id. at 508. The State then rested. Id. at 509. Mr. Evans then called three witnesses: Mr. Hooks’s sister, Vargus Hooks; his mother, Clara Hooks; and Dr. Murphy. Vargus Hooks’s testimony fills little more than a page of the trial transcript. See id. at 511–12 (Test. of Vargus Hooks). After preliminaries, Mr. Evans asked Vargus just four questions: whether she would stay in contact with Mr. Hooks if the jury spared his life, whether she would visit him in prison, whether she and Mr. Hooks were close growing up, and whether she had stayed in touch with Victor over the past few years. Id. She answered affirmatively to all four questions then stepped down. Id. Clara Hooks’s testimony was only slightly less brief. See id. at 512–14 (Test. of Clara Hooks). Mr. Evans asked her about a car accident in which Mr. Hooks was involved when he was younger. Id. at 512. Clara stated that an eighteen-wheeler had hit her son and “caused quite a bit of damage to” him. Id. He had nightmares, trouble sleeping, and headaches as a result. Id. at 513. Mr. Evans then asked a few questions about the relationship between Mr. Hooks and Ms. Blaine. Id. Clara testified that her son and Ms. Blaine loved each other, that they frequently came to visit her, and that she (Clara) desired a relationship with their infant daughter. Id. Finally, Mr. Evans asked whether Clara would stay in touch with Mr. Hooks if the jury spared his life. Id. at 514. She said she would do so “constantly,” then stepped down. Id. Finally, Mr. Evans called Dr. Murphy, who testified about psychological -91- examinations of Mr. Hooks that he had administered. Dr. Murphy opined that Mr. Hooks suffered “from a chronic form of psychosis, where he’s going to have recurrent repeated episodic breaks with his ability to tell reality from fantasy.” Id. at 518 (Test. of Dr. Murphy). He described Mr. Hooks as “violent,” id. at 522, and “crazy,” id. at 519, 530, and said he occasionally exhibited a “crazy grin” or “smirk” characteristic of psychotic patients, id. at 523. Dr. Murphy also detailed a number of psychotic and delusional symptoms that Mr. Hooks exhibited while spending time at a mental health facility in 1981 and 1982. Id. at 522–26. Dr. Murphy noted that these past mental-health problems were consistent with his own evaluation. Id. at 526–29. At the end of his testimony, Dr. Murphy opined that, given his diagnosis of chronic psychosis and Mr. Hooks’s detachment from reality, it was “difficult to imagine” that Mr. Hooks could, “in a fully rational, cold-blooded, premeditated fashion, . . . have a plan to murder.” Id. at 529. On cross-examination, Dr. Murphy admitted that he had not read the police reports pertaining to Ms. Blaine’s murder, had not listened to Mr. Hooks’s tape-recorded confession, and had not seen any of the photographs in the case that depicted Ms. Blaine after her death. Id. at 531. He stated only that the photographs had been orally described to him by Mr. Evans. Id. Following Dr. Murphy’s testimony, the defense rested its mitigation case. See id. at 536. -92- b. Counsel’s failures Mr. Evans’s mitigation case failed to meet the standards we have set out for counsel in capital-sentencing proceedings. Indeed, the presentation was sub-par in almost every relevant respect. Evidence of family and social history was sorely lacking; the mental-health evidence presented was inadequate and quite unsympathetic; and Mr. Evans not only failed to rebut the prosecution’s case in aggravation but actually bolstered it by his own statements. Family and social history. The testimony by Mr. Hooks’s family members was perfunctory, to put it mildly. Mr. Evans made no attempt to educate the jury, through the testimony of Clara and Vargus Hooks, on Mr. Hooks’s life circumstances and his tragic, chaotic upbringing. Even the most minimal investigation would have uncovered a life story worth telling: a premature birth, an openly abusive father, frequent moves, educational handicaps, and personal family tragedies.28 We have previously recognized 28 Mr. Hooks was born premature and spent his first three months in a hospital. Fed. Evid. Hr’g at 10 (Test. of Clara Hooks). His childhood was traumatic and chaotic. His father was physically abusive toward both him and his mother, prone to binge-drinking, and often hauled away by police after abusive episodes. Id. at 11–15; id. at 45–46 (Test. of Victor Hooks). As a result of the abuse, Clara left her husband a number of times and moved to California, only to return home later. See id. at 16. She would take the children with her on these often unplanned moves, forcing Mr. Hooks and his siblings to withdraw from school. See id. at 16, 21. Mr. Hooks’s life was also shaped by personal tragedy. When he was a young teenager, his brother Michael, with whom he was close, was killed in a motorcycle accident. Id. at 9, 47–48. A few years later, Mr. Hooks and his father were in a severe car accident with an eighteen-wheeler. Id. at 28, 50–51. Mr. Hooks almost went through (continued...) -93- that “this type of evidence ‘is exactly the sort of evidence that garners the most sympathy from jurors.’” Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1147 (quoting Smith, 379 F.3d at 942). The information was readily available from Clara and Vargus, but Mr. Evans neglected even to ask. See id. at 1145 (finding counsel deficient for failing to investigate and present defendant’s family background at a capital sentencing proceeding). Mental-health evidence. While Dr. Murphy’s testimony may have helped the jury see that Mr. Hooks suffered from mental problems, it was troubling in a number of respects. First, throughout the testimony, Mr. Evans made little effort to connect Dr. Murphy’s diagnosis to the circumstances of the crime. The importance of counsel’s role in this regard cannot be overstated, as we have repeatedly recognized. Counsel in capital cases must explain to the jury why a defendant may have acted as he did—must connect the dots between, on the one hand, a defendant’s mental problems, life circumstances, and personal history and, on the other, his commission of the crime in question. See Fairchild, 579 F.3d at 1150–51; Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1148; Smith, 379 F.3d at 943. 28 (...continued) the front window and suffered a head injury. Id. Thereafter, he was unable to play sports and began to experience headaches, nightmares, and trouble sleeping. Id. Tragedy struck again in 1978 when his father died in a car accident. Id. at 16–17. A year later, Mr. Hooks saw his brother Evan come home, covered in blood, and pass out. Id. at 18–20. He had been shot, and both Mr. Hooks and his mother (mistakenly) thought Evan was dead. Id. at 19. At the federal evidentiary hearing, Clara described Mr. Hooks’s fear and panic as he pleaded with a comatose Evan to “please wake up.” Id. at 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thereafter, Mr. Hooks’s mental and emotional problems continued, and he suffered from depression. Id. at 21–22. Clara took him to see a psychiatrist, and he was later hospitalized. Id. -94- Here, in listening to Dr. Murphy, the jury was left with almost no explanation of how Mr. Hooks’s mental problems played into the murder of Ms. Blaine (both the fatal beating he administered, and his apparent remorse and attempt to secure help immediately thereafter). Absent this explanation, Dr. Murphy’s testimony at several points actually worked in the State’s favor. See Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1146–47 (noting that “the case in mitigation presented by trial counsel played into the prosecution’s theory”). He repeatedly referred to Mr. Hooks as “violent,” see 3 Trial Tr. at 522 (Test. of Dr. Murphy)—even once as “very, very violent,” id.—and “crazy,” id. at 519, 523, 530. True, Dr. Murphy did opine at one point that Mr. Hooks could not have committed “coldblooded, premeditated” murder. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 398 (emphasizing the importance of mental-health evidence showing that “violent behavior was a compulsive reaction rather than the product of cold-blooded premeditation”). But that aspect of his testimony was significantly undermined when the jury learned, on cross-examination, that Dr. Murphy knew almost nothing about Mr. Hooks’s case—that he had not read the police reports, had not listened to Mr. Hooks’s confession, and had not seen the photographs. See 3 Trial Tr. at 531. Mr. Evans totally failed to prepare his witness, thus strongly diminishing the potential mitigating impact of the testimony. Further investigation into readily available evidence also would have revealed that the mental-health problems were enduring. Since childhood, Mr. Hooks had struggled in -95- school, was frequently evaluated for mental retardation, and was placed in specialeducation classes. Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 20–21 (Test. of Clara Hooks), 49 (Test. of Victor Hooks). While he may not meet the legal definition of mentally retarded under Oklahoma law, no one disputes that by the time of trial he had been clinically diagnosed with mild or borderline mental retardation. See Hooks Atkins Appeal, 126 P.3d at 640–41. Evidence of Mr. Hooks’s educational handicaps was surely relevant to the jury’s appraisal. It was readily available and should have been part of Mr. Evans’s mitigation case. See Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1143. Even more importantly, Mr. Hooks’s premature birth, the head injury he suffered in an eighteen-wheeler accident, and the problems he experienced thereafter were clear markers for organic brain damage. See Alverson, 595 F.3d at 1162 (noting that “severe head trauma and/or sudden changes in behavior after such trauma” may point to the existence of organic brain damage). Five years after conviction and sentencing, Dr. Gelbort diagnosed Mr. Hooks with diffuse organic brain damage and testified at the 1997 federal evidentiary hearing that Mr. Hooks has damage to his frontal lobes, the “gas pedal and the brake pedal of behavior.” Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 101 (Test. of Dr. Gelbort). Evidence of organic brain damage is something that we and other courts, including the Supreme Court, have found to have a powerful mitigating effect. See Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 392; Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1094; Smith, 379 F.3d at 942–43. “Diagnoses of specific mental illnesses . . . , which are associated with abnormalities of the brain and can be treated with appropriate medication, are likely to [be] regarded by a jury as more -96- mitigating than generalized personality disorders . . . .” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1094. And for good reason—the involuntary physical alteration of brain structures, with its attendant effects on behavior, tends to diminish moral culpability, altering the causal relationship between impulse and action. See Bryan v. Mullin, 335 F.3d at 1244 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[Counsel’s] performance left the jury no reason even to consider as a possibility that [the defendant] might not be morally culpable enough, as the result of his involuntarily adduced organic brain disorder, for the death penalty.”); see also Caro v. Woodford, 280 F.3d 1247, 1258 (9th Cir. 2002) (“By explaining that [defendant’s] behavior was physically compelled, not premeditated, or even due to a lack of emotional control, his moral culpability would have been reduced.”); cf. Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1093 (“[D]efendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to . . . emotional or mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Neither Mr. Evans nor Dr. Murphy looked into the possibility of organic brain damage. Had they done so, as Dr. Gelbort did, Mr. Evans could have sketched a more sympathetic figure of Mr. Hooks, one less deserving of death. Responding to the prosecution’s case in aggravation. The State called Officer Ray to testify as to Mr. Hooks’s prior armed-robbery conviction, one of three aggravating circumstances presented by the prosecution. Even a cursory investigation into the circumstances surrounding this crime would have revealed a much less sordid tale than -97- the one suggested in Officer Ray’s testimony. At a liquor store in 1982, Mr. Hooks took $35 from a cash drawer and returned home with it, along with a sack containing a handgun. Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 32–33 (Test. of Clara Hooks).29 He immediately told his mother what he had done. Id. at 33. Clara Hooks took the gun and marched her son straight to the police station to speak with the chief of police about what happened. Id. This information would have been important to a jury. Although it would not have entirely negated the violent-felony aggravator, it certainly would have softened its edge. Mr. Evans did not cross-examine Officer Ray on these surrounding circumstances (indeed, did not cross-examine him at all), nor did he ask Clara to explain them when she was on the witness stand. “[I]t is difficult to see how counsel could have failed to realize that without examining th[is] readily available [information, he was] seriously compromising [his] opportunity to respond to a case for aggravation.” Rompilla, 545 U.S. at 385.30 29 On the record before us, it is not clear where the handgun came from. Clara Hooks testified that the handgun was under the cashier’s counter and that Mr. Hooks grabbed it when he swiped the $35. Fed. Evid. Hr’g Tr. at 32 (Test. of Clara Hooks). The State calls this “not credible,” although it offers no alternative explanation. Aplee. Br. at 80. This dispute has no bearing on our analysis. There is also a dispute about the source of the cut on the cashier’s hand in connection with the robbery. At trial, Officer Ray offered an elliptical account of the events, saying only that he saw the cashier’s cut and the knife blade lying on the floor. 3 Trial Tr. at 508 (Test. of Mr. Ray). Mr. Hooks suggests that the knife was “laying on the counter” and the cut was an accident. Aplt. Opening Br. at 94. The State calls this “highly improbable.” Aplee. Br. at 80. Again, this dispute has no bearing on our analysis. 30 The State suggests that Mr. Hooks’s confession to his mother would have been inadmissible hearsay at the sentencing proceeding under Okla. Stat. tit. 12, (continued...) -98- For his part, Mr. Evans bolstered the prosecution’s case in aggravation by effectively conceding the continuing-threat aggravator in his opening statement. As he prepared the jury to hear from Dr. Murphy, Mr. Evans noted: Some of the things that Dr. Murphy will tell you will scare you about Victor, in all honesty. Some of the things that Victor will tell you will indicate to you that he’s a continuing threat to society. . . . Some of the things that Dr. Murphy will tell you will indicate that Victor is a continuing threat to society, which is one of the allegations against him. 3 Trial Tr. at 504–05. Subsequently, not only would the jury hear of Mr. Hooks’s armedrobbery conviction, unaccompanied by any description of its mitigating context; it would also hear from Dr. Murphy that Mr. Hooks was both “crazy” and “very, very violent.” Id. at 522, 530 (Test. of Dr. Murphy). We recognize that conceding a continuing-threat aggravator is not necessarily deficient performance and may even help build credibility with the jury. See Hooker v. Mullin, 293 F.3d 1232, 1246–47 (10th Cir. 2002). But it is particularly unreasonable when, as here, counsel presents a beggarly mitigation case and, worse, reinforces the conceded aggravator both by failing to challenge the government’s 30 (...continued) §§ 2801–2802. Section 2802 makes hearsay—an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” id. § 2801(A)(3)—generally inadmissible, id. § 2802. We think Clara Hooks’s testimony as to her son’s confession would have been admissible non-hearsay on at least two bases. First, it would have been admissible for the fact of confession, regardless of the truth or falsity of its constituent statements, in order to show Mr. Hooks’s remorse and to humanize him to the jury. Second, it would have been admissible to explain Clara’s reaction to the events, specifically her marching her son up to the Idabel police station to tell the chief of police what happened. See Dodd v. State, 100 P.3d 1017, 1034–35 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004); Smallwood v. State, 907 P.2d 217, 226–27 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). -99- case in aggravation (impeachable though it was) and by characterizing the mitigation evidence, as well as his client, as “scar[y].” Conclusion. With so much mitigating evidence available and so little of it unearthed by counsel, we are compelled to conclude that Mr. Hooks was denied constitutionally effective assistance of counsel and, thus, a fair sentencing. Counsel did not undertake the reasonable investigation that our decisions require. See Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1084. He presented almost no family-history evidence, and the mental-health evidence that was presented was inadequate, unsympathetic, and even counterproductive at times. This evidence was reasonably available to Mr. Evans and “highly relevant to the question of moral culpability,” Anderson, 476 F.3d at 1147, and its absence “left the jury with a ‘pitifully incomplete’ picture” of Mr. Hooks, id. at 1148 (quoting Smith, 379 F.3d at 944). As the Supreme Court and we have repeatedly found, the failure to investigate and develop this kind of evidence at sentencing constitutes deficient performance.31 These deficiencies were only punctuated by counsel’s failure to respond to the State’s case in aggravation. The State was able to present Mr. Hooks’s armed-robbery 31 We recently reached a contrary conclusion in DeRosa v. Workman, 679 F.3d 1196, 1211–21 (10th Cir. 2012), where the defense put on a much more extensive mitigation case, including evidence of petitioner’s alleged organic brain damage and his troubled and dysfunctional upbringing and family dynamics. We held that additional mitigating evidence that petitioner alleged should have been introduced by trial counsel was, “in large part, duplicative of the evidence actually presented by [petitioner’s] trial counsel.” Id. at 1218. Even a cursory survey of the mitigation case in DeRosa underscores the woeful inadequacy of the mitigation case put on here by Mr. Hooks’s counsel. -100- conviction as evidence of his dangerousness and tendency toward violence, but the jury never heard the rest of the story from Clara Hooks. Further, counsel’s effective concession that Mr. Hooks was a “continuing threat to society” was not grounded in any strategic calculus and was particularly damaging in light of the otherwise paltry mitigation case. We conclude, moreover, that counsel’s unreasonable performance prejudiced Mr. Hooks within the meaning of Strickland. “There is no doubt that the . . . murder[] in this case w[as] callous and brutal.” Id. at 1146. But in his painfully brief case for mitigation, Mr. Evans missed the opportunity to “humanize and explain,” to “individualize,” Mr. Hooks to the jury. Romano v. Gibson, 239 F.3d 1156, 1180 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The jury “never received an explanation for [Mr. Hooks’s] behavior.” Smith, 379 F.3d at 943. It heard precious little about his family and educational background, and the mental-health evidence that was presented was either counterproductive or of little mitigating value. As a result, jurors faced with an especially brutal crime were left with almost nothing to weigh in the balance. A proper presentation of the family-history and mental-health evidence, not to mention the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hooks’s armed-robbery conviction, would have been “powerful mitigation.” Wilson, 536 F.3d at 1093. “Had the jury been able to place” this evidence “on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror would have struck a different balance.” Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 537. Accordingly, we find that counsel rendered -101- deficient, prejudicial performance and denied Mr. Hooks the “fundamental right to a fair trial” that the Sixth Amendment assures. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684.