Opinion ID: 4187625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ex Post Facto Laws Generally

Text: Before turning to the history of Pennsylvania sex offender laws and the specific provisions of SORNA at issue in this appeal, we first explain the general purpose of ex post facto prohibitions. The central concern in incorporating ex post facto clauses in both federal and state constitutions was to “assure that federal and state legislatures were restrained from enacting arbitrary or vindictive legislation” following the American Revolution. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 429 (1987), citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 391 (1798). However, as noted by Chief Justice Chase in Calder, the term ex post facto “had been in use long before the Revolution.” Calder, 3 U.S. at 391. The clauses were thus also directed at the separate concern, relevant here, that individuals are entitled to “fair warning” about what constitutes criminal conduct, and what the punishments for that conduct entail. Miller, 482 U.S. at 430; see also Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 805 (Pa. 2015), quoting W AYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 116, 121 (5th ed. 2010). The United States Supreme Court, in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981), succinctly articulated this idea in stating, “Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual’s right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” Id. at 30. Based on both these concerns, Chief Justice Chase set out four categories of laws that violate such prohibitions: 1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and [J-121B-2016] - 6 receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. Calder, 3 U.S. at 390. Furthermore, “two critical elements” must be met for a criminal or penal law to be deemed ex post facto: “it must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it.” Weaver, 450 U.S. at 29 (footnote omitted). As such, “[o]nly those laws which disadvantage a defendant and fall within a Calder category are ex post facto laws and constitutionally infirm.” Commonwealth v. Young, 637 A.2d 1313, 1318 (Pa. 1993) (emphasis in original). The ex post facto clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions are implicated here because a holding rendering the effects of SORNA’s registration requirements punitive would place the statute into the third Calder category: application of the statute would inflict greater punishment on appellant than the law in effect at the time he committed his crimes. IV. History of Pennsylvania Sex Offender Laws, Applicable Case Law, and SORNA A. History of Pennsylvania Sex Offender Laws Prior to SORNA In Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003) (Williams II), this Court provided a history of Pennsylvania’s sex offender registration laws up until the time of that decision: In 1995, the General Assembly amended the Sentencing Code by adding Subchapter H, entitled “Registration of Sexual Offenders,” codified at 42 Pa.C.S. §§9791-9799, and generally referred to as “Megan’s Law” (hereinafter, “Megan’s Law I”). Among other things, Megan’s Law I established a procedure for adjudicating certain offenders—namely, those that committed one of the predicate offenses listed in the statute—as “sexually violent predators.” The mandated procedure included a postconviction, pre-sentence assessment by the Board, followed by a hearing before the trial court. At the hearing, the offender was presumed to be a sexually violent predator and bore the burden of rebutting such presumption by clear and convincing evidence. If the individual was adjudicated a sexually violent predator, he was subjected to an enhanced maximum sentence of life imprisonment for the predicate offense, as well [J-121B-2016] - 7 as registration and community notification requirements that were more extensive than those applicable to an offender who was not adjudicated a sexually violent predator. In Commonwealth v. Williams, … 733 A.2d 593 ([Pa.] 1999) (Williams I), this Court struck down the sexually violent predator provisions of Megan’s Law I based upon the conclusion that a finding of sexually violent predator status under that enactment entailed a “separate factual determination, the end result of which is the imposition of criminal punishment,” i.e., increasing the offender’s maximum term of confinement above the statutory maximum for the underlying offense. See id. … at 603. ... Notably, in view of the punitive nature of the increased maximum prison sentence, the Williams I Court invalidated the challenged provisions without reaching the question of whether the enhanced registration and notification requirements constituted criminal punishment. See id. … at 602 n.10. After Williams I was decided, the General Assembly passed Megan’s Law II, which was signed into law on May 10, 2000. Although the stated legislative policy remained the same as in Megan’s Law I, the General Assembly altered the manner in which an individual convicted of a predicate offense was adjudicated a sexually violent predator. The critical distinction, for present purposes, is that, under Megan’s Law II an offender convicted of an enumerated predicate offense is no longer presumed to be a sexually violent predator. ... Additionally, persons adjudicated to be sexually violent predators are no longer subjected to an automatic increased maximum term of imprisonment for the predicate offense. Instead, they are required to undergo lifetime registration, notification, and counseling procedures; failure to comply with such procedures is penalized by a term of probation or imprisonment. Under Megan’s Law II, any offender convicted of a predicate offense, whether or not he is deemed a sexually violent predator, must: (1) register his current residence or intended residence with the state police upon release from incarceration, parole from a correctional institution, or commencement of an intermediate punishment or probation; (2) inform the state police within ten days of a change in residence; and (3) register within ten days with a new law enforcement agency after establishing residence in another state. State police officials then forward this data, together with fingerprint and photographic information obtained from the sentencing court to the chief of police of the locality where the offender will reside following his change of address or release from prison. For sexually violent predators, the police chief in turn notifies the individual’s neighbors, as well as day care operators and school officials within the municipality. The data sent to these recipients includes the offender’s name, address, offense, and photograph (if available), as well as the fact [J-121B-2016] - 8 that he has been determined by a court to be a sexually violent predator, “which determination has or has not been terminated as of a date certain.” The sexually violent predator’s name and address, including any subsequent change of address, is also sent to the victim of the offense, until the victim requests that such notification be terminated.