Opinion ID: 4415837
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obesity is an impairment under the WLAD

Text: As this is a question of statutory interpretation, we look first to the text of our statute. The WLAD makes it an unfair practice for any employer . . . [t]o refuse to hire any person because of. . . the presence of any sensory, mental, or physical disability . . . unless based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. ROW 49.60.180(1). The statute provides that it is not discrimination to refuse to hire a person whose disability prevents the proper performance of the particular worker involved. Id. Disability is defined as a sensory, mental, or physical impairment that: (i) [i]s medically cognizable or diagnosable; or (ii) [ejxists as a record or history; or (iii) [i]s perceived to exist whether or not it exists in fact. RCW 49.60.040(7)(a). A disability can be temporary or permanent, common or uncommon, mitigated or unmitigated and can exist regardless of whether it limits the ability to work generally or at a particular job, or limits any other activity in this chapter. RCW 49.60.040(7)(b). Impairment includes, but is not limited to: (i) Any physiological disorder, or condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more ofthe following body systems: Neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory, including speech organs, cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitor-urinary, hemic and lymphatic, skin, and endocrine; or Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc., No. 96335-5 (ii) Any mental, developmental, traumatic, or psychological disorder, including but not limited to cognitive limitation, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities. RCW 49.60.040(7)(c). The parties in this case debate whether obesity is a physiological disorder, or condition under this definition. 2. The history of the statute and its interpretation This is not the first time that we have been asked to interpret this statute, and the history ofthis statute provides insight into our legislature's intent in adopting it. The original version of the WLAD did not define the term disability. See Hale v. Wellpinit Sch. Dist. No. 49, 165 Wn.2d 494, 500, 198 P.3d 1021 (2009). Instead,the WLAD created an agency, now known as the Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRC), to administer the law. The HRC is charged with formulating policies and adopting rules to effectuate the WLAD. RCW 49.60.110, .120(3). The HRC has explained that a person will be considered to be disabled by a sensory, mental, or physical condition if he or she is discriminated against because of the condition and the condition is abnormal. WAC 162-22-020(2)(c). In 2000,this court wrestled with how to apply HRC's definition in reasonable accommodation cases. Pulcino v. Fed. Express Corp., 141 Wn.2d 629, 641, 9 P.3d 787 (2000). When a plaintiff makes a disparate treatment claim, the plaintiff need not show that they are actually suffering from an impairment. Instead, it is enough to show that the employer discriminated against the plaintiff because it perceived the 7 Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, /«c., No. 96335-5 plaintiff to be suffering from an impairment. RCW 49.60.040(7)(a)(iii). But in a reasonable accommodation case, the employee must show that they are actually suffering from an impairment and that the employer failed to reasonably accommodate them. RCW 49.60.040(7)(d). In Pulcino, we concluded that the HRC definition was unworkable in reasonable accommodation claims because it would require an employee to show that the employer failed to accommodate the employee (i.e., discriminated against him or her) because of the employee's abnormal condition. This implies that the employer accommodates other employees; but, obviously, employees who are not disabled do not require such accommodation. 141 Wn.2d at 641. Therefore, we adopted a different test, holding that in a reasonable accommodation case, the employee can prove that they are actually disabled if(1)[they have]/had a sensory, mental, or physical abnormality and(2)such abnormality has/had a substantially limiting effect upon the individual's ability to perform his or her job. Id. We explained that [a]n employee can show that [they have] a sensory, mental or physical abnormality, by showing that [they have] a condition that is medically cognizable or diagnosable, or exists as a record or history. Id. (citing former WAC 162-22-020(2) (1999)). We also expressly recognized that the WLAD's definition ofdisability is broader than the definition in the ADA.Id. at 641 n.3. Taylor v. Burlington N. R.R. Holdings, Inc., No. 96335-5 Six years later, this court rejected the HRC's definition of disability altogether and instead held that the ADA's definition applies to all disability discrimination actions brought under the WLAD. McClarty v. Totem Elec., 157 Wn.2d 214, 228, 137 P.3d 844(2006). We explained that the HRC's definition was confusing and that although courts often defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of the statutes they are charged with administering, the HRC's definition was not a rational and sensible interpretation ofthe term 'disability.' Id. We rejected that definition in favor of a definition better supported by the WLAD's text, the legislature's intent, and our jurisprudence—^the definition found in the ADA.Id. We held that as under the ADA,a plaintiff bringing suit under the WLAD establishes that he has a disability if he(1)has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of his major life activities,(2)has a record of such an impairment, or(3)is regarded as having such an impairment. Id. We noted that if we adopted the federal definition, we could look to the abundance of authority interpreting the ADAto assist us in construing and applying similar provisions in the WLAD.Id. at 229 n.lO.