Opinion ID: 2399351
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Associational Standing Dover Historical Society

Text: The recognition of the legal concept that an association has standing to assert its members' injury first developed in the United States Supreme Court in the early to mid-1900s. [52] A majority of justices directly recognized the doctrine in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Paterson. [53] The modern doctrine of associational standing has emerged from a series of subsequent cases. [54] The federal courts now recognize a three-part test to determine associational standing: [A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. [55] In Vassallo v. Penn Rose Civic Ass'n., [56] this Court set forth the following factors for determining whether a particular group has standing to challenge a zoning matter: (1) whether the organization is capable of assuming an adversary position in the ultimate litigation; (2) whether the size and composition of the organization indicates that it is fairly representative of the neighborhood; (3) whether full participating membership in the organization is available to all residents and property owners in the community; and (4) whether the adverse effect of the challenged decision in the group represented by the organization is within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the zoning law. [57] Thereafter, in Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores , this Court recognized the broader federal three-part test to determine associational standing. [58] The Dover Historical Society alleges that it is a civic entity acting as a representative body in this action for individuals who own land and/or reside in the Historic District. The petition of the Dover Historical Society states that one of its purposes is to encourage the preservation of buildings, gardens and memorabilia of historic value and importance. The petition further alleges that the Historical Society and each of the individuals that it represents have an enforceable right in the aesthetic benefit derived from the Historic District as a whole. The only assertion made by respondents in support of their motion to dismiss the Historical Society's claims, and the sole reason stated by the Superior Court in granting that motion, was that the group represented by the Historical Society lacked the requisite standing to challenge the determination of the Planning Commission that an architectural review certificate be issued. In this opinion, however, we have held that the individuals who own land and/or reside in the Historic District  petitioners Horsey, H. Johnson and C. Johnson  do have standing to challenge the Planning Commission's action. Thus, the legal basis for the Superior Court's dismissal as to the Historical Society is obviated. The powers of the Planning Commission that are applicable to this action were established to protect the Historic District from development that would contrast with the historical and architectural aesthetics of the Historic District. As for the Historical Society, the petition alleges facts that satisfy the three-part test to determine organizational standing. [59] Therefore, the Superior Court judgment that the Historical Society does not have standing to challenge the determination of the Planning Commission is reversed.