Opinion ID: 2603660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Although I recognize and accept a decision of the majority of this court that resolution of this appeal can be concluded on the simplistic criteria of an agency following its own rules, I further believe that the constitutional and statutory questions presented both justify and require consideration. The broad based subjects here properly in dispute will not permanently leave with the present, almost summary conclusion. Those subjects are adequacy of representation and reasonable compensation for appointed attorneys presented here by an administrative rule to limit both. I address the constitutional and statutory problems intrinsic to this appeal where a $50 per hour cap for appointed counsel legal fees is calculated and where the statutory system also controls bargaining rights of the injured worker in his search for competent representation. Consequently, I specially concur to address the underlying issues of validity of the rule arbitrarily limiting legal fees to an obviously unreasonably low maximum amount. Constitutional issues are overtly presented since the Wyoming Workers' Compensation Division in appeal challenges only judicial review of the administrative agency award of legal fees which were not reasonably compensatory and incurred costs that were not reimbursed. [1] The initial decision is whether any appellate review should be pursued beyond the affirming decision that no factual basis for denial of the requested fee was provided and, consequently, the action of the hearing examiner, as an administrative agency, was arbitrary and capricious even under his own rule as a matter of law. The problem with this limitation for decision is that the basic justification for decision, even if it was not followed, was the adopted Section 4, where, within its application in the fixed uniform amount of $50 per hour, awarded fees are less than reasonably compensable for most lawyers in Wyoming today and, in some cases, are less than customary office overhead for the practicing lawyer. See 1989 Survey on Member Attitudes, XIII Wyoming Lawyer 7 (February 1990), reflecting that only 3.9 percent of the state's lawyers charge $50 per hour or less and 18.3 percent charge under $71 per hour. See likewise State v. Boyken, 196 Mont. 122, 637 P.2d 1193 (1981) and State v. McKenney, 20 Wash. App. 797, 582 P.2d 573 (1978). The issue is whether an unreasonable rule by amount limitation can serve to justify a non-compensable legal fee decision. Since the rule adopted and applied is central to decision, the question of its validity in use by the agency in my opinion should be considered. [2] An initiation in basics is foundational to assess the rights of the injured employee to secure legal representation and the obligation to provide compensation for the services consequently rendered. [3] In adopting the worker's compensation amendment in 1914, two objectives were identified. First, the employer was to be provided an immunity from litigation, which interest is obviously significant considering the prevalence of amendments to the statute and present status of litigative objection. See Pool v. Dravo Coal Co., 788 P.2d 1146 (Wyo. 1990) and Brebaugh v. Hales, 788 P.2d 1128 (Wyo. 1990). The second objective was to secure a prompt, cheap and summary tribunal to settle disputes and secure benefits. See Governor Joseph M. Carey's address to the Twelfth Wyoming State Legislature, 6 House Journal at 40 (1913). See also n. 4, infra. While the first objective was secured, the second still eludes success. One of the reasons voiced to justify the 1986 recodification was that the benefit payments were excessive and the system was being misused by extraordinary and perhaps unnecessary medical procedures. In the process, the agency was further transformed from a stakeholder status into that of an advocate in resisting payment by becoming an adversary against many injured workers. Since the state and the employer come heavily armed with expensive legal assistance, due process cannot be achieved without a similar opportunity afforded to the injured worker. Other states either provide legal fees to appointed counsel, comparable to private legal fees, or a much higher contingent fee arrangement. Inevitably, the indispensable criteria of a constitutional system demonstrable by the voluminous case law, is competent representation by adequately compensated counsel. As frequently recognized in a multitude of failed pro se representation cases, with almost minimal exceptions, a man who represents himself, has a fool for a client. Furthermore, the injured worker is even less well presented if he is forced to rely on the advocacy dispensation of opposition counsel, albeit employer or the state fund, or to expect that the hearing examiner simultaneously will provide representation and fair and disinterested adjudication. James L. Brown would never have recovered his award in this case had it not been for the enthusiasm, ingenuity and persistence of the excellent counsel by whom he was assisted. The state fund's argument raises both a statutory and a constitutional concern when approval of a reasonable fee is requested. Our analysis should necessarily address both the sufficiency of the services provided to the injured worker if there is a right to legal assistance and the correlative right of the practicing bar to be reasonably paid for services rendered in worker's compensation cases equally with other participants, including specifically, health care professionals. Cline v. Warrenberg, 109 Colo. 497, 126 P.2d 1030 (1942). It could not have been the legislative intent to place the amount to be allowed as attorney's fees on such a low and unreasonable level as would foreclose a claimant from obtaining the legal services of competent counsel. It is difficult to conceive that regulatory powers of an administrative board, without express legislative sanction, are to be so exercised as to prevent the obtaining by a claimant of the assistance of competent counsel. To arbitrarily deny a claimant the right of competent legal representation, by fixing unreasonably low remuneration for services rendered by attorneys, is a serious matter, and may amount to a denial of due process.    From experience gained in reviewing judgments in such cases, we know that controversies arising under the Workmen's Compensation Act sometimes are highly technical, and where such is the case a claimant requires the assistance of counsel possessed of skill and learning. The insurer in such cases usually is represented by very able and expert counsel, and in the administration of justice a measure of equality in ability of counsel representing the litigants is a great aid in arriving at a just solution of the issues involved. Id. at 1031.