Opinion ID: 4669093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Evidentiary Challenge

Text: Tardif contends that, during trial, the district court erred in limiting testimony regarding her personal background. Specifically, she contends that such testimony was necessary to demonstrate her commitment to social justice in order to rebut the City’s opening argument that she had exaggerated her story and was only suing for the money. In the City’s opening argument, defense counsel contended that Tardif was “inventing and exaggerating” the events surrounding each of her claims at trial, App’x at 679, and that she “want[ed the jury] to give her money for those inventions and exaggerations,” id. at 686. During Tardif’s direct examination, in addition to other background testimony regarding her involvement in the Occupy 29 Wall Street movement, her counsel attempted to elicit testimony regarding the fact that Tardif adopted two children from Honduras who were refugees, that Tardif herself was adopted from Peru, and that she worked as a sign language interpreter for hearing-impaired children. Following multiple, sustained objections by defense counsel, the district court at side bar instructed Tardif’s counsel that it did not “want [him] to elicit anything that plays upon the sympathy of jurors” but instead “to get right to the heart of matters.” Id. at 879. At the end of Tardif’s direct testimony, plaintiff’s counsel submitted an offer of proof as to how additional background testimony was necessary in order to rebut the City’s theory that her lawsuit was simply motivated by money. The district court declined the request to elicit such additional evidence, concluding that Tardif’s testimony had made clear “that her motives are pure and that she’s trying to make the world a better place” by making sure that “people who are arrested [are] treated appropriately.” Id. at 925-26. Tardif now challenges that evidentiary ruling. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion and reverse only for manifest error. See Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 247 (2d Cir. 2003). Although relevant evidence is generally admissible, Fed. R. Evid. 402, district 30 courts “may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Background evidence may provide necessary context to a witness’s substantive testimony, but district courts have “wide discretion concerning the admissibility of background evidence.” United States v. Blackwell, 853 F.2d 86, 88 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, we conclude that the district court operated well within its broad discretion in limiting the scope of the testimony regarding Tardif’s personal background. More specifically, the district court determined that the proffered testimony—namely, Tardif’s adoption of two refugee children, her own adoption as a child, and her work as a sign language interpreter for hearing impaired children—might prejudice the jury by playing upon their sympathies and would waste time. Moreover, to the extent Tardif sought to introduce these details of her “social justice commitment” to rebut the City’s accusation that she was motivated by money in making the allegations in the lawsuit, App’x at 879, Tardif was permitted to testify to other facts establishing her concerns for social justice. For example, Tardif testified about the purpose of the Occupy Wall Street movement, 31 why she became involved with the movement, how she remains a member of Occupy Wall Street, how she feels about being part of the movement, why she continued to participate in protests after November 2011, and how she contributed to the protests by “tend[ing] to” protestors injured during marches as a “street [medic].” Id. at 884-85. The district court also, over defense counsel’s objection, allowed Tardif to testify as to why she brought this lawsuit. See id. at 924 (“I had originally wanted to make things better for people in custody that had disabilities so that there would be a standard protocol to treat people instead of just throwing them to the side.”). Thus, contrary to Tardif’s argument, the district court permitted Tardif, through her testimony, to rebut any suggestion by the City that she brought this action for financial reasons. Under these circumstances, it is well within a district court’s discretion to determine, under Rule 403, that the probative value of any additional background testimony is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendants because of juror sympathy and by the additional time that would be necessary to explore that background, especially where the district court concluded that there had already been “so much wasted time from [Tardif’s] side.” Id. at 879. Accordingly, we conclude that this 32 evidentiary determination by the district court was not an abuse of discretion and provides no basis for a new trial.