Opinion ID: 1762633
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Hartley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.

Text: The only issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in excluding the twenty-eight weeks during which Goodman was out on strike when calculating his average weekly wage. HBD relies on Hartley v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 197 Tenn. 504, 276 S.W.2d 1 (1954), to support its argument that time spent away from work due to a strike is a voluntary absence and should not be excluded in calculating the weekly wage. Goodman argues in response that Hartley is no longer good law, or, in the alternative, Hartley does not apply to the facts of this case. Specifically, Goodman argues that Hartley is more than half a century old, has never been followed, in Tennessee or anywhere else, fails to deal with the impact of federal labor law on the issue at hand, and is an anomalous relic of a prior age that should be given a merciful burial, at least insofar as the issue in this case is concerned. We agree with HBD that Hartley controls the outcome of this case, and, therefore, the twenty-eight weeks during which Goodman participated in the strike are to be included when calculating his average weekly wage. When calculating the weekly compensation rate, a trial court must first determine the employee's average weekly wage. An employee's average weekly wage is defined by statute: Average weekly wages means the earnings of the injured employee in the employment in which the injured employee was working at the time of the injury during the period of fifty-two (52) weeks immediately preceding the date of the injury divided by fifty-two (52); but if the injured employee lost more than seven (7) days during the period when the injured employee did not work, although not in the same week, then the earnings for the remainder of the fifty-two (52) weeks shall be divided by the number of weeks remaining after the time so lost has been deducted[.] Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(3)(A) (2005). The compensation rate is two thirds of that average weekly wage. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(15)(A)(viii) (2005). Deducting days not worked from the calculation of the average weekly wage benefits the employee because the wages for the fifty-two-week period will be divided by a smaller number of days worked, resulting in a higher average weekly wage. Goodman earned $11,651.24 in the fifty-two weeks prior to his injury. If we include the weeks spent on strike, Goodman's average weekly wage would equal $224.06, making the weekly rate of compensation $149.38. However, the trial court excluded the twenty-eight weeks spent on strike and awarded Goodman benefits at $388.77 per week. [2] The determination of whether days an employee does not work should be deducted from the computation of the average weekly wage is dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. Cantrell v. Carrier Corp., 193 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tenn.2006). In making this determination, we ask whether the employee lost time from work due to the employee's voluntary act, or . . . the act and choice of the employer for [the employer's] benefit and convenience. Bryant v. McAllister, 202 Tenn. 654, 308 S.W.2d 412, 414-15 (1957). Voluntary absences from work are not deducted from the fifty-two week period. Id.; see also Hartley, 276 S.W.2d at 3. By contrast, days not worked by an employee must be deducted from the fifty-two week period if the inability to work is the result of sickness, disability, or some other fortuitous circumstance. Russell v. Genesco, Inc., 651 S.W.2d 206, 210 (Tenn. 1983). Examples of fortuitous circumstances include the closing of a plant for repairs or a reduction of work due to an unforeseen shortage of material or a lack of orders. See Cantrell, 193 S.W.3d at 472 (citing Hartley, 276 S.W.2d at 4; Bryant, 308 S.W.2d at 413-14). In Hartley , this Court addressed the exact question we are faced with today: should the time the employee spent on strike against the employer be excluded when calculating an employee's average weekly wage? 276 S.W.2d at 2-3. The employee in Hartley had taken part in a sixteen-week strike against his employer. Id. at 2. Of those sixteen weeks, the plant was closed for eight weeks for repairs. Id. After returning to work, the employee was injured within the course and scope of his employment. Id. When calculating the employee's average weekly wage, the trial court deducted eight weeks, representing the eight weeks during which the plant was closed, but included the other eight weeks during which the employee was on strike. Id. We affirmed, holding that the trial court correctly deducted the eight weeks for the plant closure and that the period for the strike could not be deducted because the employee's total earnings for the year were reduced by his own voluntary act. Id. at 3. The average weekly wage of an employee should not, and is not, decreased for reasons over which he has no control, such as closing a plant for repairs[,] . . . occasional suspension of operations due to bad weather, unforseen shortage of material, lack of orders, lack of cars, slack season, etc. It is observed that all of the foregoing are occasions and conditions resulting in the cessation of operations by the employer, and should not be considered in determine the average weekly wage of an injured employee. But a strike, in which the employee voluntarily participates, does not fall within the same category. Id. Goodman acknowledges that purely voluntary absences from work should be included in the employee's average weekly wage calculation. However, he argues that his absence for work was not voluntary, and, therefore, Hartley should not apply. Goodman asserts that he was required to join the union and that, as a member of the union, he was required to participate in the strike. This assertion is incorrect. First, Tennessee Code Annotated sections 50-1-201 through 204 prohibit any requirement that an individual join or not join a union and makes a violation thereof a criminal offense. Thus, by law, Goodman could not be required to join the union as a condition to his continued employment with HBD. Additionally, Goodman acknowledged at trial that, during the strike, some of the employees chose to cross the picket line and continue working, and HBD had work available to him. Therefore, while Goodman might have felt pressured to participate in the strike, his participation was not required and was in fact voluntary. In this case, the trial court declined to follow Hartley , not because it did not apply but because the court found it unfair: the Court certainly does not wish to diminish what little this man will get for this injury. Workmans' [sic] comp pays little enough as it is, contrary to what our government thinks. The Court will hold against this [Hartley] rule in every way possible. Goodman agrees that Hartley should be reversed as it is outdated, unfair, and has never been followed, in Tennessee or anywhere else. We are unpersuaded by Goodman's arguments and find no reason to depart from the long-standing precedent established in Hartley . Since Hartley , we have not specifically revisited the issue of whether absence from work due to a strike is to be included in calculating the average weekly wage. However, Hartley has been cited with approval several times, particularly when drawing the distinction between voluntary and involuntary absences from work. See, e.g., Cantrell, 193 S.W.3d at 472; Bryant, 308 S.W.2d at 414-15. Whether the decision in Hartley has been followed in other jurisdictions is not persuasive, given the statutory nature of workers' compensation law. Not only have we chosen not to overrule the decision in Hartley , but the Legislature has also expressed its tacit acceptance of the decision, in that it has chosen not to overrule it by statute. The legislature is presumed to know the interpretation which courts make of its enactments; the fact that the legislature has not expressed disapproval of a judicial construction of a statute is persuasive evidence of legislative adoption of the judicial construction, especially where the law is amended in other particulars, or where the statute is reenacted without change in the part construed. Hamby v. McDaniel, 559 S.W.2d 774, 776 (Tenn.1977) (citations omitted); see also Biscan v. Brown, 160 S.W.3d 462 (Tenn. 2005) (holding that the legislature is presumed to know the state of the law). Because there is no valid reason to overrule Hartley , we apply the rule from that case and hold that the twenty-eight weeks during which Goodman was on strike should be included when calculating his average weekly wage. As such, his weekly benefit amount is $149.38, not the $388.77 awarded by the trial court.