Opinion ID: 2314274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: repeated violations

Text: Under Maryland Code (1957, 1985 Repl. Vol.), Article 89, § 40(a), any employer who repeatedly violates any rule, regulation, or standard may be fined up to $10,000.00. [2] Repeatedly is not defined in the statute and has been the subject of some controversy. My disagreement with the majority is not in how it defines repeatedly, but in its rejection of the Commissioner's determination, made in accord with the overwhelming weight of authority, that a prima facie case of a repeat violation was established by Bethlehem's prior violations of the same standard. The definition of repeated violations adopted by the majority was formulated in the seminal case of Secretary of Labor v. Potlatch Corp., 1979 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 23,294 (R.C.1979). Potlatch synthesized a definition of repeated violation which was later adopted by the overwhelming majority of courts. See Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 857 n. 8 (3d Cir.1996) (stating that [s]ince Potlatch, every other court of appeals which has addressed this issue has adopted the Potlatch definition). The Potlatch definition of repeated violations is also adopted by the majority in the instant case. Potlatch both defined repeated violations and, as an integral part of the definition, established the procedure for determining how a repeated violation is established. Potlatch stated: Inasmuch as the announcement of authoritative guidelines is an important matter, we have thoroughly re-examined this issue in light of the decisions of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, and we now announce the following principles. A violation is repeated under section 17(a) of the Act if, at the time of the alleged repeated violation, there was a Commission final order against the same employer for a substantially similar violation. Potlatch ¶ 23,294 at 28,171. Immediately following the definition of repeated violation, the Potlatch opinion explained the procedure for proving a substantially similar violation. The Secretary may establish substantial similarity in several ways. In cases arising under section 5(a)(2) of the Act, which states that each employer shall comply with occupational safety and health standards, the Secretary may establish a prima facie case of similarity by showing that the prior and present violations are for failure to comply with the same standard. It is important to recognize that occupational safety and health standards range from those that designate specific means of preventing a hazard or hazards to those that either do not specify the means of preventing a hazard or apply to a variety of circumstances. Accordingly, in cases where the Secretary shows that the prior and present violations are for an employer's failure to comply with the same specific standard, it may be difficult for an employer to rebut the Secretary's prima facie showing of similarity. This is true simply because in many instances the two violations must be substantially similar in nature in order to be violations of the same standard. However, in cases where both violations are for failure to comply with the same general standard, it may be relatively undemanding for the employer to rebut the Secretary's prima facie showing of similarity.    In the absence of evidence that the antecedent and present violations concern noncompliance with the same standard, the Secretary must present other evidence that the violations are substantially similar in nature. In this regard, we think that evidence that the violations involve similar hazards would be relevant. We assign weight to the similarity of the hazards for two reasons. First, a failure to do so would re-cast the phrase `section 5 of this Act' in section 17(a) to read `section 5(a)(2)' and thus preclude the possibility that an employer could repeatedly violate section 5(a)(1). Second, to hold that characterization as repeated is limited to subsequent violations of the same standard could lead to patently absurd results. For example, if two employees performing construction work such as painting were exposed to a 20 foot fall from an unguarded scaffold, the employer would be in violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1926.451(a)(4); a subsequent citation based on exposure of the same employees to a 20 foot fall while using the same unguarded scaffold to replace light bulbs would be a violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.28(a)(3). Under the `same standard' restriction, however, the subsequent violation could not be classified as repeated. (Footnotes omitted). Potlatch ¶ 23,294 at 28,171-72. As previously noted, federal appellate courts that have confronted the issue have almost uniformly adopted the Potlatch definition, and there is no reason to believe that they would reject the Potlatch procedure of holding that there is a prima facie repeated violation when there is a second violation of the same standard. See Dun-Par Engineered Form Co. v. Marshall, 676 F.2d 1333, 1338 (10th Cir.1982) (holding that a repeat violation is prima facie established by showing that the prior and present citation are for violation of the same standard). Federal administrative decisions have uniformly adopted the Potlatch definition of repeated violations as well as the Potlatch decision holding that there is a prima facie violation when there is a prior violation of the same standard. See, e.g., Amerisig Southeast, Inc., 1996 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 31,081 at 43,362 (R.C.1996) (The Secretary may establish a prima facie case of substantial similarity by showing that the final order alleged a failure to comply with the same standard. The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut that showing.); Mautz & Oren, Inc., 1993 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 29,986 at 41,069 (R.C.1993) (Recently, the Commission reaffirmed the holding in Potlatch that the Secretary establishes a prima facie case of similarity by showing that both violations are of the same standard, as long as the standard at issue is not a general standard.); Kulka Construction Management Corp., 1992 OSHD (CCH) ¶ 29,829 at 40,687-88 (R.C.1992) (citation omitted) (stating Kulka had previously been cited for violations of the same standards at issue here..., [which] is sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the violations alleged here were repeated); Dole v. Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc., No. 89-3055 at 7 (O.S.H.R.C. Nov. 7, 1990) (available from CCH) (noting [t]he Secretary establishes a prima facie case by showing that both violations are of the same standard). The sole authority cited by the majority for rejecting the portion of the Potlatch decision pertaining to a prima facie violation is the fifteen-year-old case of Bunge Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 638 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1981). The quotation from Bunge relied on by the majority is: Under 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d), the proponent of a rule or order has the burden of proof, except as otherwise provided by statute. Absent a different allocation of the burden of persuasion by the substantive statute, both the burden of production and persuasion remain with the Secretary. 343 Md. at 34, 684 A.2d at 853 (quoting Bunge, 638 F.2d at 838). That statement, incidently, is dicta because Bunge sustained the finding of a repeated violation. 638 F.2d at 837. There are several reasons why the only case cited by the majority should not be considered persuasive authority in Maryland. It is obvious from the quotation that the statutory authority that is cited and relied on by the Bunge court is 5 U.S.C.A. § 556(d). As the majority acknowledges, there is no Maryland counterpart to that cited federal statute. Further, the majority cites no other court or administrative decision that follows Bunge, and as I have indicated, there are many, many decisions that disagree with Bunge `s rejection of Potlatch `s holding that a prima facie case of a repeated violation is established by a second violation of the same standard. In addition, Bunge `s rejection of Potlatch may no longer be good authority as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S.___, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996). In 1976, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. O.S. & H.R. Com'n, 540 F.2d 157, 162 (3d Cir.1976), adopted a definition of a repeated violation that differed from the Potlatch definition. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Smiley v. Citibank, supra , the Third Circuit repudiated its prior decision and adopted the Potlatch definition. In Reich, supra, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals explained why it was no longer following its decision in Bethlehem Steel and instead was following Potlatch stating: Recently, the Supreme Court reemphasized that courts must defer to an agency's interpretation of statutes that the agency is charged with administering, explaining why such a high degree of deference is owed: `It is our practice to defer to the reasonable judgments of agencies with regard to the meaning of ambiguous terms in statutes they are charged with administering.... We accord deference to agencies ... not because of a presumption they drafted the provisions in question, or were present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree of discretion the ambiguity allows.... [T]he whole point of Chevron is to leave the discretion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing agency.' Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., ___ U.S.___,___ _ ___, 116 S.Ct. 1730, 1733-34, 135 L.Ed.2d 25 (1996). Reich, 90 F.3d at 859-60. It is conceivable that the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals may reexamine its prior decision, which differs from Potlatch, in the same manner that the Third Circuit reexamined its prior decision that differed from Potlatch. The final reason why Bunge should be rejected in Maryland is that, less than three weeks after the Court of Special Appeals handed down its opinion in the instant case, this Court rejected the foundation for the Bunge holding in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Comm. of Labor, 339 Md. 323, 662 A.2d 256 (1995) (hereinafter Bethlehem I ). The foundation for the Bunge opinion is its view that [a]bsent a different allocation of the burden of persuasion by the substantive statute, both the burden of production and persuasion remain with the Secretary. Bunge, 638 F.2d at 838. This is not the law in Maryland. In Bethlehem I, an analogous, if not controlling, case involving the same employer, Bethlehem Steel Corp., this Court expressly sanctioned shifting the burden of production and persuasion from the Secretary to the employer by, in effect, implying a prima facie case. In Bethlehem I, the issue was similar, if not identical, to the issue in the instant case; we held that when an employer is charged with a violation of a MOSHA specific duty safety standard that contains a method by which work hazards could be abated, the burden of proof could be shifted from the Commissioner to the employer to prove the impossibility or infeasibility of compliance with the standard's abatement method. We made it clear that the issue was whether the burden of production could be shifted to the employer, and we stated: The issue is whether, under a citation charging violation of the machine guarding requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 1910.212(a)(1), the burden is on the employer to prove infeasibility of compliance as an affirmative defense. Bethlehem I, 339 Md. at 325, 662 A.2d at 257. In determining that the burden of persuasion and production could be shifted to the employer, we followed the federal administrative practice, stating: MOSHA and the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 through 678, are substantially similar. When interpreting federal regulations enforced under MOSHA, we look to federal cases for guidance. J.I. Hass Co. v. Department of Licensing & Regulation, 275 Md. 321, 330, 340 A.2d 255, 260 (1975). (Footnote omitted). Bethlehem I, 339 Md. at 328, 662 A.2d at 258. Our holding in Bethlehem I should be our holding in the instant case. In Bethlehem I, our specific holding was: Applying the weight of authority under the federal precedents, we hold that the Commissioner correctly placed on Bethlehem the burden of proof that is in dispute. 339 Md. at 340-41, 662 A.2d at 264. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, when an employer has previously been adjudicated guilty of violating a safety standard and is subsequently adjudicated guilty of violating the same safety standard, it makes sense to say that the second violation is at least prima facie evidence of a repeated violation and the burden ought to be on the employer to show, as an affirmative defense, why the second violation should not be found to be a repeated violation. Twice before Bethlehem was adjudicated in violation of the same safety standard for failure to correct recognized hazards in electrical equipment that were capable of electrocuting its employees. When again Bethlehem Steel failed to correct a recognized hazard in a piece of electrical equipment that in fact electrocuted an employee, it is appropriate to conclude that there is at least a prima facie repeated violation, and the burden ought to be on Bethlehem to establish, as an affirmative defense, that its prior and present violations of the same standard are not substantially similar. These standards are designed to protect employees, and the third instance of ignoring equipment with a recognized risk of causing death or serious physical injury by electrocution ought to at least establish a prima facie case of a repeated violation. There is no reason to reverse the Commissioner's finding of a repeated violation. I respectfully dissent. Judges RODOWSKY and RAKER have authorized me to state that they join in the views expressed in this concurring and dissenting opinion.