Opinion ID: 2463591
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The parental presumption

Text: The United States Supreme Court has long recognized that there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (plurality opinion). Therefore, when a nonparent requests visitation with a child, courts must accord at least some special weight to the fit parents' wishes. Id. at 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Nevada's nonparent visitation statute also provides such deference to the parent, providing that after a parent has denied or unreasonably restricted visits with the child, there is a rebuttable presumption that the [nonparent's] right to visitation . . . is not in the best interests of the child. NRS 125C.050(4). NRS 125C.050(6) lists the threshold requirements for overcoming this presumption. The statute is silent on whether the same presumption applies when a parent seeks to modify or terminate visitation rights that the district court previously granted to a nonparent, but this court has previously determined that parents do not get the benefit of the presumption when nonparents obtain court-ordered custody of a child. See Hudson v. Jones, 122 Nev. 708, 713, 138 P.3d 429, 432 (2006). We now extend this holding to judicially approved nonparent visitation arrangements. In Hudson, a grandmother obtained joint legal and primary physical custody of her grandchild after the child's mother was killed in a drive-by shooting related to the father's gang involvement. Id. at 709-10, 138 P.3d at 430. The court determined that the father was an unfit parent and that sufficient extraordinary circumstances existed to overcome the parental preference. Id. at 710, 138 P.3d at 430. Ten years later, the father sought to modify the district court's order granting custody to the grandmother, contending that he had turned his life around and was fit to be a parent to his child. Id. The district court found that the father had indeed significantly changed his lifestyle. Id. Thus, the district court felt bound to apply the parental preference presumption, and it granted the father's request to modify the custody arrangement with the child so that he would have sole legal and physical custody. Id. We reversed the district court, holding that the parental presumption does not apply to a previously litigated custody dispute because applying the parental preference to modifications would only `weaken the substantial change requirement.' [3] Id. at 713, 138 P.3d at 432 (quoting C.R.B. v. C.C., 959 P.2d 375, 380 (Alaska 1998), disagreed with on other grounds as stated in Evans v. McTaggart, 88 P.3d 1078, 1085 (Alaska 2004)). We recognized that when there is a court-ordered custody arrangement, the nonparent has effectively rebutted the parental presumption, after which the child's need for stability becomes a paramount concern. Id. at 713-14, 138 P.3d at 432-33. Thus, we concluded that the same test should apply to requests to modify court-ordered parent-nonparent custody arrangements as to proposed modifications of parent-parent arrangements. Id. at 713, 138 P.3d at 432. We are persuaded that this rationale also applies to requests to modify or terminate judicially approved nonparent visitation. [4] When a nonparent obtains visitation through a court order or judicial approval, they have successfully overcome the parental presumption and are in the same position as a parent seeking to modify or terminate visitation. Declining to apply the parental presumption once the court has approved nonparental visitation not only gives deference to a court's order, but it also promotes the important policy goal of stability for the child. Ellis, 123 Nev. at 151, 161 P.3d at 243 (recognizing that stability is an important concern in making custody and visitation determinations); In re V.L.K., 24 S.W.3d 338, 343 (Tex.2000) (stating that modification suits raise additional policy concerns such as stability for the child and the need to prevent constant litigation in child custody cases). If parents can unilaterally modify or terminate visitation with nonparents, with whom a child has had an ongoing relationship, and which exists because the court has adjudicated and approved a visitation schedule, the order would serve no legal or policy purpose. Thus, we adopt the test we enunciated in Ellis for modifying custody arrangements among parents and apply it to modifying or terminating judicially approved nonparent visitation rights. In Ellis, we concluded that modification of primary physical custody is warranted only when (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child's best interest is served by the modification. 123 Nev. at 150, 161 P.3d at 242. In applying this test, the district court should evaluate the two prongs without regard to the parental preference. [5]