Opinion ID: 1767578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Disputed-Accomplice Liability Instruction

Text: For his final point on appeal, Hickman argues that the circuit court erred in denying him the instruction on disputed-accomplice liability, AMI Crim.2d 403. [2] He maintains that the evidence demonstrated that Caleb was an accomplice and that his testimony required corroboration. He contends that the jury should have been permitted to determine Caleb's status as an accomplice, citing to Robinson v. State, 11 Ark.App. 18, 665 S.W.2d 890 (1984). The State responds that Caleb was not charged with the burglary of Ms. Haddad's home, nor was there any testimony presented that connected him with the burglary. It contends that although Caleb was traveling with Hickman and the others, there was no testimony even suggesting that he aided or advanced the crime in any way. This court has repeatedly stated that if there is some evidentiary basis for a jury instruction, giving the same is appropriate. See Henderson v. State, 349 Ark. 701, 80 S.W.3d 374 (2002). A party is entitled to an instruction if there is sufficient evidence to raise a question of fact or if there is any supporting evidence for the instruction. See id. There is no error in refusing to give a jury instruction where there is no basis in the evidence to support the giving of the instruction. See id. In determining whether the circuit court erred in refusing an instruction in a criminal trial, the test is whether the omission infects the entire trial such that the resulting conviction violates due process. See id. Here, Hickman bore the burden of proving that Caleb was an accomplice whose testimony required corroboration. See, e.g., King v. State, 323 Ark. 671, 916 S.W.2d 732 (1996). Our law is well settled that a witness's status as an accomplice is a mixed question of law and fact and that when the status of a witness presents issues of fact, the defense is entitled to have the question submitted to the jury. See id. The question must be submitted to the jury where there is any evidence to support a jury's finding that the witness was an accomplice. See id. In this case, Hickman sought to have the jury instructed in accord with AMI Crim.2d. 403, which provides: A person cannot be convicted of a felony upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. [An accomplice is one (who directly participates in the commission of an offense or) who, with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of an offense: (Solicits, advises, encourages or coerces another person to commit it;) (or) (Aids, agrees to aid, or attempts to aid another person in planning or committing it;) (or) (Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make a proper effort to do so.)] It is contended that the witness[es] _____________ (name(s)) [was] [were] [an] accomplice(s). If you find that [he was] [they were], then __________ (defendant(s)) cannot be convicted of _______ (felony(s) being submitted) upon testimony of [that] [those] witness[es], unless that testimony is corroborated by other evidence tending to connect __________ (defendant(s)) with the commission of the offense(s). Evidence is not sufficient to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice if it merely shows that the offense(s) [was] [were] committed and the circumstances of the commission. [The testimony of one accomplice is not alone sufficient to corroborate the testimony of another accomplice.] The sufficiency of the corroborating evidence is for you to determine. [You may, however, convict (the)(a) defendant of ________ ( misdemeanor ) upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice, because that offense is only a misdemeanor.] AMI Crim.2d 403. We, then, must determine whether there was any evidence to support the giving of the instruction. After reviewing the record, we hold that even if there was any evidence to support the giving of the instruction, Hickman has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the circuit court's failure to give the instruction. We have held that we will not presume prejudice when error is alleged and that an appellant must show prejudice because we do not reverse for harmless error. See Gatlin v. State, 320 Ark. 120, 895 S.W.2d 526 (1995). Here, the testimony of Sammy Douglas sufficiently corroborated Caleb's testimony that he witnessed James Earl passing a television to Hickman over the fence. Accordingly, even if the circuit court's failure to instruct the jury on disputed-accomplice liability was error, it was harmless. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Hickman's conviction and sentence and reverse the court of appeals. Affirmed; court of appeals reversed.