Opinion ID: 2638049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Imposition of Hard 50 Sentence

Text: Finally, Jones contends that the trial court erred by imposing a hard 50 sentence on his first-degree premeditated murder conviction. He argues that the trial court erred by (1) finding that the crime was committed in a particularly heinous or atrocious manner and (2) failing to make any findings on the record regarding the mitigating factors presented by defense counsel at sentencing. Jones' arguments lack merit. Heinous, Atrocious, or Cruel Manner Jones contends that his hard 50 life sentence must be vacated because there is insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Childs' murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Our standard of review is well known: `When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of evidence for establishing the existence of an aggravating circumstance in a hard 50 sentencing proceeding, the standard of review is whether, after a review of all the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational factfinder could have found the existence of the aggravating circumstance by a preponderance of the evidence.' State v. Buehler-May, 279 Kan. 371, Syl. ¶ 12, 110 P.3d 425 (2005). State v. Washington, 280 Kan. 565, 568, 123 P.3d 1265 (2005). At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found the existence of two aggravating factors associated with Jones' first-degree premeditation conviction. The court stated: Number one is that the actions of the defendant here created a risk of death to more than one person, two . . . persons exactly. And, in fact, two people were . . . killed on this particular incident. In addition to that, the Court does find that this particular killing was particularly heinous in the sense that Ms. Childs had to have known for a period of time, I don't know exactly how long that period of time would have been, but she had to have known that she was going to be killed based upon the events that had taken place in the house, the fact that Mr. Brown was tied up and then shot in the head, and then the chase through the house and where she was ultimately apprehended and killed so that there was, in fact, a period of time where she knew what her fate was going to be, and the Court finds that . . . is particularly heinous or atrocious. K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-4635(b) provides that, when a defendant is convicted of first-degree premeditated murder for a crime committed after July 1, 1999, the court shall determine whether the defendant shall be required to serve a mandatory hard 50 term. In making such a determination, if the trial court finds that one or more aggravating circumstances exist and are not outweighed by any mitigating factors that exist, the court must impose the hard 50 sentence. K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-4635(d). K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-4636(f) describes the relevant aggravating circumstance as follows: (f) The defendant committed the crime in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner. A finding that the victim was aware of such victim's fate or had conscious pain and suffering as a result of the physical trauma that resulted in the victim's death is not necessary to find that the manner in which the defendant killed the victim was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In making a determination that the crime was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel manner, any of the following conduct by the defendant may be considered sufficient: (1) Prior stalking of or criminal threats to the victim; (2) preparation or planning, indicating an intention that the killing was meant to be especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; (3) infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death; (4) torture of the victim; (5) continuous acts of violence begun before or continuing after the killing; (6) desecration of the victim's body in a manner indicating a particular depravity of mind, either during or following the killing; or (7) any other conduct in the opinion of the court that is especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Jones argues that the evidence in this case does not support a finding that any of the first six factors were present and that no exceptional circumstances exist to support the remaining factor, i.e., any other conduct in the opinion of the court that is especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. The State responds that evidence supported both the third factor, i.e., infliction of mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death, and the fifth factor, i.e., continuous acts of violence begun before or continuing after the killing. This court recently reiterated in State v. Baker, 281 Kan. 997, 1019, 135 P.3d 1098 (2006), that [s]tanding alone, the fact that the victim was killed by gunshots fired by the defendant is generally not sufficient to support a finding that the manner of death was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. In Baker, this court vacated the defendant's hard 50 sentence where the trial court found the victim's murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner pursuant to K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-4636(f)(7). 281 Kan. at 1018, 135 P.3d 1098. The victim, a paraplegic, was shot in the head, but there was no evidence that the victim was terrorized or knew he was going to die prior to being shot. The trial court erroneously focused on the victim's defenselessness alone. See also, e.g., State v. Holmes, 278 Kan. 603, 608, 638-39, 102 P.3d 406 (2004) (reversing hard 40 sentence because firing a single shot through victim's heart was not especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel); State v. Cook, 259 Kan. 370, 401-03, 913 P.2d 97 (1996) (reversing hard 40 sentence because defendant's act of shooting victim twice was not especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel); State v. Reed, 256 Kan. 547, 562-63, 886 P.2d 854 (1994) (concluding that shooting victim in the head was not especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and other testimony supporting the finding amounted to conjecture and speculation, but upholding hard 40 sentence based on another aggravating factor). Jones argues that this case is similar to State v. Flournoy, 272 Kan. 784, 36 P.3d 273 (2001). There, the defendant walked into the living room with a gun and shot his grandmother, despite his girlfriend telling him, [D]on't do that, put that up. The girlfriend then ran into the kitchen and told the defendant to stop. Flournoy said, I have to put her out of her misery, and fired again. A forensic pathologist testified that the victim suffered five gunshot wounds, all of which most likely occurred in less than 1 minute. 272 Kan. at 794, 36 P.3d 273. Observing that the victim was neither chased down nor forced to lie on the floor awaiting death, this court held that the evidence did not support a finding that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. 272 Kan. at 794, 36 P.3d 273. Flournoy followed the general rule, but this court has permitted exceptions to that rule based on particular facts. In State v. Alford, 257 Kan. 830, 838, 896 P.2d 1059 (1995), the trial court concluded the murder was heinous, atrocious, or cruel where the defendant chased the victim into the lobby of a restaurant, shot her twice, and forced her back into the kitchen. When the victim attempted to escape, the defendant shot her again, dragged her around the corner of the kitchen, and fired two final shots. 257 Kan. at 838, 896 P.2d 1059. In State v. Brady, 261 Kan. 109, 123-24, 929 P.2d 132 (1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 970 P.2d 42 (1998), the victims were forced to lie face down on the floor for 15 minutes not knowing what was going to happen while the defendant paced the room holding a gun before ultimately shooting them both in the head. In both Alford and Brady, this court upheld the trial court's finding that the murders were committed in a heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. See also State v. Washington, 280 Kan. 565, 123 P.3d 1265 (2005) (murder committed in heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner where defendant shot victim several times, victim attempted to hop away crying out for help, and victim was chased and suffered substantial mental anguish). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Alford and Brady are more germane under the facts of this case. After arriving at Childs' apartment with a gun and arguing with her about who burglarized his apartment, Jones told both victims to go upstairs. Once upstairs, Jones took Childs into a bedroom and shut the door. After 5 or 10 minutes, Jones and Childs came out of the bedroom and Jones took Brown into the bedroom. While Brown was being hog-tied in the bedroom, Childs was in the bathroom with Kyea, crying and pleading for her life. Childs sat in the bathtub, and Kyea stood in the doorway. Although he was not certain, Kyea testified that he might have had the gun again at that time. After about another 5 minutes, Jones came into the bathroom, got the gun from Kyea, returned to the bedroom, and shot Brown. When Kyea went into the bedroom to take a look, Childs followed. When she saw what happened to Brown, Childs screamed and ran down the stairs. Jones chased after her and struggled with her in the living room. Before Jones shot her in the head, Childs was on the floor, screaming and holding her hands up near her face. Although the shooting occurred in a relatively short period of time, the victim clearly was chased and suffered mental anguish as demonstrated by her cries while being held in the bathroom before she was murdered. Therefore, a preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Childs' murder was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel manner. Mitigating Factors Jones also contends that the trial court erred in failing to make findings regarding the mitigating factors submitted by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing. This court reviews the trial court's weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances for abuse of discretion. State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 144, 119 P.3d 1148 (2005). At sentencing, defense counsel argued that the trial court should consider Jones' age at the time of the crime, Jones' being under the influence of alcohol and drugs, Jones' ultimate cooperation with detectives, and the short amount of time between the two murders. The trial court, however, made no reference or findings concerning any mitigating factors during its pronouncements from the bench. As previously discussed, in imposing the hard 50 sentence, the trial court found the existence of two aggravating circumstances. In a hard 50 proceeding, the trial court is to determine whether one or more aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt and whether the existence of such aggravating circumstances is not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances which are found to exist. The court shall designate in writing the statutory aggravating circumstances it found to exist. K.S.A.2005 Supp. 21-4635(d). K.S.A. 21-4637 enumerates eight mitigating factors which may be considered in a hard 50 proceeding, but this list is noninclusive: (1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (2) The crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances. (3) The victim was a participant in or consented to the defendant's conduct. (4) The defendant was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person, and the defendant's participation was relatively minor. (5) The defendant acted under extreme distress or under the substantial domination of another person. (6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. (8) At the time of the crime, the defendant was suffering from post-traumatic stress syndrome caused by violence or abuse by the victim. Jones contends that, because the trial court did not make findings concerning the mitigating factors presented at his sentencing hearing, any appellate argument and appellate review is hindered. As this court observed in State v. Gideon, 257 Kan. 591, 609, 894 P.2d 850 (1995), nothing in the Kansas statutes requires the trial court to find the existence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt or to specify what mitigating circumstances are found. In Gideon, the trial court imposed a hard 40 sentence after finding the existence of three aggravating circumstances. Then, the trial court stated: `The court further finds the following mitigating factors exist: First, the defendant has expressed remorse. Secondly, the defendant has accepted responsibility for his actions. And, thirdly, that the defendant eventually aided the authorities in winding up the investigation and at least putting some finality to the acts that he committed.' 257 Kan. at 610, 894 P.2d 850. On appeal, Gideon pointed to evidence that supported mitigating factors other than the three mentioned by the trial court. The Gideon court noted that the trial court did not make any findings regarding the additional mitigating factors relied upon by the defendant. The defendant argued that the trial court erred in failing to state its findings and that the failure to state the other mitigating circumstances violated the Due Process Clause, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, Section 9 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, and the need for individual consideration during sentencing. 257 Kan. at 610, 894 P.2d 850. The Gideon court pointed out that the trial court did not refuse to consider the proffered evidence in mitigation; instead, the court merely failed to indicate whether it found those three factors in mitigation. 257 Kan. at 611, 894 P.2d 850. This court determined that the defendant failed to show that the hard 40 sentence was imposed arbitrarily or in violation of his constitutional or statutory rights with respect to mitigating circumstances. The court stated: Nothing in the hard 40 statutes requires the finder of fact to specify what mitigating factors are found; only aggravating factors must be designated. 257 Kan. at 611, 894 P.2d 850. It was ultimately held that, [i]n light of the overwhelming evidence of aggravating circumstances, we cannot say that the court erred in failing to find and specify these three statutory mitigating factors on the record. 257 Kan. at 611, 894 P.2d 850. Likewise, in State v. Higgenbotham, 264 Kan. 593, 957 P.2d 416 (1998), the defendant appealed his hard 40 sentence. The trial court based the imposition of the hard 40 sentence on two aggravating circumstances pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4636(e) and (f). Defense counsel argued that one mitigating circumstance applied: The victim was a participant in or consented to the defendant's conduct. K.S.A. 21-4637(c). 264 Kan. at 610, 957 P.2d 416. On appeal, this court determined that the two aggravating circumstances existed. As for the mitigating circumstance, this court stated: The district judge made no finding that the mitigating factor of K.S.A. 21-4637(c) (victim consented to the defendant's conduct) existed. Thus, no mitigating factors are present. 264 Kan. at 612, 957 P.2d 416. The defendant's hard 40 sentence was upheld. As in Gideon, the trial court in the present case did not refuse to consider the proffered mitigation arguments; the court merely failed to indicate whether or not it found those factors in mitigation. The hard 50 statutes do not require the sentencing court to make any findings on the record regarding the mitigating factors relied upon by a defendant. While it would have been a better practice for the trial court to make such findings at Jones' sentencing, it is not required and Jones fails to show that the hard 50 sentence was imposed arbitrarily or in violation of his constitutional rights. In light of the evidence supporting the aggravating circumstances, the trial court did not err in failing to make findings regarding Jones' proposed mitigating circumstances on the record.