Opinion ID: 2106827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cause of Action Against Ervin A. Weinke

Text: In the cause of action against Mr. Weinke, Mr. Candee alleges that Ervin A. Weinke, acting in his capacity as court commissioner, appointed Joseph G. Koll as a second receiver over all the property of the plaintiff; that in so doing Ervin A. Weinke did knowingly and willfully violate sec. 273.04, Stats., 1973; and that by virtue of this wrongful conduct Mr. Candee suffered damages in the amount of $500,000. To the extent that the plaintiff's claim against Mr. Weinke is based solely on an implied right of action derived from sec. 273.04, Stats., 1973, the demurrer must be sustained. However, sec. 256.24, Stats., expressly imposes civil liability upon a court commissioner who willfully violates the law in appointing a receiver. That statute states: The judges of the circuit and county courts and court commissioners shall be held personally liable to any party  injured for any wilful violation of the law in granting injunctions and appointing receivers, or for refusing to hear motions to dissolve injunctions and to discharge receivers; provided, such motions are made in accordance with the rules of law or such rules as are promulgated by the supreme court. [13] This court has never had prior occasion to construe sec. 256.24, Stats., which was enacted originally in 1849. R. S. sec. 1849, ch. 87, sec. 23. Ordinarily a judge is immune from suit for damages, even when his acts are willful. Kalb v. Luce, 234 Wis. 509, 291 N.W. 841 (1940). However, sec. 256.24 plainly abrogates this doctrine of immunity with respect to willful violation of the law in granting injunctions and in appointing receivers. Since sec. 256.24 makes actionable any wilful violation of the law, the fact that the law violated is a procedural rule is irrelevant. Under sec. 256.24 liability resulting from a court commissioner's willful procedural error is explicitly imposed. [14] In a supplementary proceeding when it appears that the judgment debtor has property liable to execution sufficient to satisfy the judgment, the court commissioner has no authority to appoint a receiver. The Second Ward Bank v. Upmann, 12 Wis. 555, 566-7 (, 509) (1860). Similarly, under sec. 273.04, Stats., 1973, the court may not order a receiver to collect exempt property. Sec. 273.04 imposes on a court commissioner the duty to make a good faith effort to ascertain the existence of other supplementary proceedings and other receiverships. Sec. 256.24, Stats., imposes liability on the commissioner for injuries resulting from a willful violation of any of these rules. [15-18] The plaintiff's complaint alleges that, in appointing Joseph G. Koll, Mr. Weinke willfully violated sec. 273.04,  Stats., 1973. It does not allege that such a cause of action is created by sec. 256.24, Stats., but public statutes like 256.24 need not be pleaded. Horn v. The Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, 38 Wis. 463 (1875). Although Mr. Weinke contends that the plaintiff is estopped from challenging the appointment of a receiver which he consented to on the record, estoppel will support a demurrer only if the facts on which it is based appear on the face of the complaint. Brogan v. State, 214 Wis. 313, 252 N.W. 566 (1934). Although the Stipulation and Order is in the record, it is not a part of the complaint, and this court cannot take judicial notice of it for purposes of the demurrer. Estate of Rosenstein, 47 Wis.2d 494, 177 N.W.2d 372 (1970). The plaintiff's complaint pleads an ultimate fact which, if proved, will constitute a cause of action against Commissioner Weinke under sec. 256.24, Stats.; therefore, it was error for the trial court to have sustained this demurrer.