Opinion ID: 1195492
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The alleged refusal of the State to suspend work on days of adverse weather.

Text: The contract incorporated by reference a printed volume entitled General Requirements and Covenants, in which Subsection 8.8 (as printed) contained provisions for extension of the time fixed for performance of the contract, including extensions: (a) For delays caused by or suspension due to unsuitable weather... . (p. 40). By a special provision of the contract, the whole of Subsection 8.8 of the General Requirements and Covenants was deleted and the following was substituted: The Contractor shall complete all work within the time specified in the Proposal and the Special Provisions. No extension of time will be granted for the completion of the project and/or phases. Notwithstanding the revision of Subsection 8.8, Subsection 8.9 of the General Requirements and Conditions continued to provide in relevant part as follows:  8.9 SUSPENSION OF WORK  The Engineer may, by written order, suspend the performance of the work either in whole or in part for such periods as he may deem necessary due to: (a) Weather or soil conditions considered unsuitable for prosecution of the work, ... Any adjustment of contract time for suspension of work shall be made as provided in Subsection 8.8. The Contractor sought to show that adverse weather conditions made productive work impossible or severely hampered operations on many days during the construction period and that the State's engineer was requested to issue orders suspending work under Subsection 8.9 but refused to do so in reliance upon revised Subsection 8.8. The trial court made no findings as to the number of days on which the engineer might have properly suspended the work for reasons of unsuitable weather, but concluded that the State had no obligation to suspend the work under Subsection 8.9. We agree. The case is not similar to those relied upon by the Contractor, in which suspension of work was held to have been improperly withheld. Cf. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. United States, 439 F.2d 185, 194 Ct. Cl. 461 (1971); Urban Plumbing & Heating Co. v. United States, 408 F.2d 382, 187 Ct. Cl. 15 (1969); cert. den., 398 U.S. 958, 90 S.Ct. 2164, 26 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969); De Armas v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 605, 108 Ct. Cl. 436 (1947). In these decisions suspension of work operated as an administrative finding upon which the contractor was entitled to relief from contract requirements under the provisions of the contract, and refusal of suspension orders adversely affected the contractor's rights under the contract. In the present case, the Contractor has not attempted to demonstrate that it was adversely affected by the State's refusal to suspend work in any respect other than as its obligation to complete the work on the date fixed by the contract might have been affected. But the Contractor has wholly failed to demonstrate how, within the terms of the contract, the issuance of an order suspending work would have postponed the completion date fixed by the contract. Subsection 8.8, as revised, stands squarely in the way. Had the State's engineer issued orders suspending the work from time to time, such orders might have furnished some support for an argument that the Contractor was prevented from prosecuting the work during the periods covered by the suspensions and became entitled to corresponding relief from the fixed completion date. But we do not reach that question where, as here, the State has refused to suspend the work. We find nothing in Subsection 8.9 which strengthens the basic claim of the Contractor that it is entitled to relief from the effects of adverse weather conditions, with which claim we have already dealt. We conclude that the trial court committed no error in adjudging that the Contractor is not entitled to recover damages for delays in the work attributable to adverse weather conditions.