Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denying Motions to Substitute Counsel

Text: Larkin was appointed to represent defendant August 21, 1985, and on November 14, 1985, Carney was also appointed to represent him. Four times defendant moved to replace them. The court denied each motion. On May 9, 1986, defendant complained in court about the lax and unconscientious performance of my attorneys.... A few minutes later he asked that a competent attorney be assigned. I feel both these attorneys are incompetent. They haven't been doing their job. The court called his request ludicrous.... They are both competent attorneys. Before the hearing concluded, he also complained that his counsel hasn't had the time to come down and see me, even.... I haven't gotten copies of motions, I haven't gotten copies of the discovery material. He hasn't interviewed witnesses I've requested for seven and eight months, now. On May 20, 1986, defendant evidently wrote to the court about counsel, and on June 6 it decided to consider his motion to appoint new counsel pursuant to People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 [84 Cal. Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44] ( Marsden ). Defendant asked that counsel be appointed for the Marsden hearing. The court refused. Defendant declared that his lawyers had failed to give him copies of all discovery materials, discuss and allow him to veto trial strategies, give and explain to him pretrial motions before filing them, keep him informed about the case, investigate avenues that might lead to new evidence, adequately communicate with him, and promptly file a motion in which he was particularly interested. He appeared to be especially concerned about counsel's failure to interview new potential witnesses, some 90 to 100 of whom were relevant to the pretrial motions and defense in this case.... In response, Carney, Larkin's assistant, acknowledged that he had lost a page of notes defendant had given him. Aside from that minor error, Carney said he had been almost excessively meticulous in preparing pretrial motions, a task on which he had spent many hours. He had tried four capital cases and in effect said that he was aware of the gravity of a capital trial and of the need for a diligent defense more than Mr. Memro appears to realize. He said that he would never allow defendant, or any defendant, to have the final say on strategy. He would ordinarily tell a client so. Carney explained aspects of the defense's plans and indicated that the defense would not pursue some avenues defendant had demanded, as they were just straw issues ... not of significant consequence [as] to whether or not he is going to get a fair trial, or with respect to pretrial motions. Defendant was uncooperative when Carney asked for family background information that might help at a possible penalty phase. (See ante, pp. 816-817.) Larkin also responded in detail to each allegation. Defendant had free access to call his office and did so several times a week, at Larkin's expense. He had visited him in jail at least 15 times. He tried to be responsive to his requests and complaints and to keep him informed. He discussed the case strategy with him. He filed some motions to which defendant was opposed because in his judgment they were necessary. He had an investigator working on the case. There were difficulties because the crimes had occurred so long ago, but the defense was trying to surmount them. Larkin stated that defendant did not want any defense at the penalty trial if one were to occur, but that he would be afforded one anyway. Both counsel denied that the relationship with their client was steadily deteriorating  his Marsden motion was a surprise to Larkin. While Carney would not characterize defendant as a malingerer or a[n] obstreperous individual, he warned that he might refuse to cooperate with future counsel if his whims are not answered and they don't go down and hold his hand.... In response, defendant said that counsel were not being diligent or keeping him informed and that Larkin had promised him the final say in strategy. The court ruled against defendant. It pronounced itself satisfied that the attorneys are doing everything they can for you; that they are both qualified and competent.... The court urged him to cooperate with them for his own sake. Defendant responded by asking to be removed from the courtroom. On November 3 and November 5, 1986, another Marsden hearing was held before temporary Judge John A. Torribio, who had replaced Judge Eugene J. Long in presiding over the trial. Defendant indicated initially that his complaints were no different from those he had brought before Judge Long  [t]he problem is that it is continuing. He inaccurately told Judge Torribio, who did not have a transcript of the prior hearing, that Judge Long had told his lawyers they did not have to speak with him or show him discovery materials  in sum, [t]hey can do whatever they want to, and they are going to defend this case however they want to. He again complained that his lawyers were refusing to interview witnesses who he thought might be helpful. The court decided not to obtain a copy of the transcript of the hearing before Judge Long. It reasoned that it would take too long and would impair defendant's right to a speedy trial, which he had been insisting on for some time. It stated that there would not be any continuances[,] because I respect your right to have a speedy trial.... Instead it went through defendant's list of complaints with him and his counsel to determine which were new and which not. Those raising issues that Judge Long had decided the court declined to hear. The court reviewed counsel's performance on the remaining issues. In essence, it asked them whether they were keeping defendant informed and were investigating information that might lead to new evidence. Thereafter it denied the motion without explanation. Defendant immediately asked, Why does the court seem to be so concerned about my rights to a speedy trial but so unconcerned about my rights to a fair trial? The next day, the court granted counsel a continuance to February 18, 1987. The defense used this time to file, on February 6, 1987, motions to strike a prior felony conviction as an aggravating factor; to discover certain information from the South Gate Police Department interrogating officers' personnel files; to dismiss the charges for nonpreservation of evidence, for failure to comply with a 1979 discovery order, and for failure to preserve the officers' records; to exclude the testimony of jailhouse informants; to exclude psychiatric testimony; to suppress certain evidence under section 1538.5; and to waive a jury at the penalty phase, if any. On February 6, 1987, a continuance until March 25, 1987, was granted, and on March 18, 1987, the court ordered jury selection to begin April 1. On March 25, 1987, there was another Marsden hearing, at which defendant again complained that counsel had failed to locate witnesses and were unwilling to demand the personnel records of other South Gate police officers, and that he did not want counsel to admit that he was guilty of second degree murder for Carter's killing. Calling Larkin a respected and capable attorney, the court denied the Marsden motion. On June 3, 1987, just before the penalty trial began, defendant made his final Marsden motion. He wanted counsel either to be relieved or to be ordered not to mount a penalty defense. To him, the death penalty would be preferable [to] life without parole. He declared that counsel would not tell him their plans for the defense. Counsel acknowledged that defendant would not be told the names of specific witnesses for him, but explained that he was trying to get witnesses not to cooperate when he learned of their identity. The court implicitly denied the motion. (30a) Defendant contends that the court erred each time it denied his motion to appoint new counsel. He maintains that there was a complete and utter breakdown of the attorney client relationship occasioned by counsel's failure to contact material witnesses regarding the pre-trial motions and to prepare his case in a timely manner. We review the court's rulings for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th at p. 1070 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].) We shall explain that none occurred. (31) A defendant may be entitled to an order substituting appointed counsel if he shows that, in its absence, his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel would be denied or substantially impaired. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1070, citing Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118.) The law governing a Marsden motion is well settled. `When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate specific instances of the attorney's inadequate performance. [Citation.] A defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result [citations].' [Citations.] ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 204 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) (30b) The court's rulings were reasonable. The record makes plain that counsel were representing defendant diligently and well. The great substance and weight of his appeal to this court, which contains 46 claims of error, was made possible by tenacious litigation of his cause before, during and after trial. The record also reveals that the court carefully inquired into defendant's reasons for requesting substitution of counsel, which proved to be either groundless or patently insufficient to demonstrate `such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation [was] likely to result.' ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 206.) To be sure, defendant made plain that he did not like his lawyers and did not think highly of them. That, however, was not enough [to show a conflict of interest]. `[I]f a defendant's claimed lack of trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel, defendants effectively would have a veto power over any appointment and by a process of elimination could obtain appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not the law.' ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1070.) (32) Defendant also asserts that, over his objection, counsel implicitly entered a plea of guilty to Carter's murder when they conceded at closing argument that he killed him. He implicitly argues that doing so over his objection reveals an irreconcilable conflict. Counsel did not, however, plead defendant guilty to any offense. At closing argument, he conceded the obvious: that defendant had killed Carter. At one point his tongue slipped and he called Carter's killing a murder, but he then argued, In looking at the charges you have to again, as I stated, look at the malice instructions to determine whether malice has even been shown, number one. Because if there's no malice, no malice aforethought, it's not a murder. It could be a manslaughter. The jury had just been instructed on voluntary manslaughter. We think that counsel's concession, read as a whole, was only that defendant had killed Carter, not that he had murdered him. To acknowledge that fact was not to enter a plea of guilty on his behalf. As Judge Posner explained in a case with a similar posture, [t]he lawyer was trying to enhance his credibility with the jury by conceding his client's guilt of the offense of which the evidence was overwhelming, and to focus his efforts on the weakest link in the state's case, the charge that [defendant] had attempted to have sex with his victim, an essential element.... [¶] ... The lawyer did not plead Underwood guilty; he merely acknowledged the weight of the evidence of criminal confinement in order to contrast it with the lack of direct evidence of an intent ... to have intercourse with the victim. ( Underwood v. Clark (7th Cir.1991) 939 F.2d 473, 474; see also People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1139-1140 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) Defendant next contends that the court erred in failing to admonish him and obtain his waiver of his rights to confrontation, to a jury trial, and against self-incrimination (see Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 243 [23 L.Ed.2d 274, 279-280, 89 S.Ct. 1709]; In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132-133 [81 Cal. Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449]) before counsel entered a plea of guilty to Carter's murder. As stated, however, counsel entered no such plea. (30c) If defendant is arguing that counsel's concession caused an irreconcilable conflict, we disagree. He may not have welcomed their approach, but he was not entitled to claim that an irreconcilable conflict had arisen merely because he could not veto their reasonable tactical decisions. ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 520 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640].) This was a reasonable tactical decision (see Underwood v. Clark, supra, 939 F.2d at p. 474): defendant's confession would have made any argument that he did not kill Carter wholly unpersuasive, and counsel were wise to maintain credibility with the jury by acknowledging the obvious. (See People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 292-293 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149] (plur. opn.).) Defendant also contends that by denying his motion to appoint counsel for him to help him prosecute his Marsden claims the court deprived him of rights he asserts to due process of law and to the effective assistance of counsel. We acknowledge that some courts have appointed independent counsel to press a Marsden claim. ( People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 132 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781].) However, defendant cites no authority requiring such an appointment, and indeed the rule is to the contrary. ( People v. Douglas, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 521.) What our decisions have consistently required is that the court listen to and evaluate a defendant's claim that counsel are failing to perform adequately. The court did so, and defendant was entitled to no more. Defendant further maintains that the court deprived him of due process of law when it used his assertion of [his] speedy trial rights as a pretext to deny him the opportunity to prepare fully for the Marsden hearings. It will be recalled that the court ruled that because it would interfere with the case proceeding to trial, no transcript of the first hearing could be prepared, yet the next day it granted counsel a continuance. Even assuming that there was some inconsistency in those rulings, we are unpersuaded that there was a violation of any possible right to due process of law. Defendant, counsel, and the court went through defendant's list of complaints and determined jointly which ones had already been adjudicated before Judge Long. We discern no denial of due process in this procedure. Finally, defendant contends that when the court denied his Marsden motion between the guilt and penalty trials it failed to apply the proper standard to such a motion, at least to the extent of appointing new counsel to investigate its basis. In his view, the standard following the verdict of guilt was less burdensome to him than that articulated in Marsden 's progeny, which requires that `the record clearly show[] that the first appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result....' ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th 173, 204.) Rather, he asserts that after the guilt trial he need have presented only a colorable claim that he was ineffectively represented at trial ( People v. Stewart (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 388, 397 [217 Cal. Rptr. 306]) to have the court appoint independent counsel to investigate and bring the motion. However, after he filed his opening brief we held that the standard actually articulated in Stewart is the Marsden standard. ( People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 693-694 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 863 P.2d 192].) Under that standard, as we have already concluded, no abuse of discretion appears in denying the motion. Defendant wanted to be put to death; his lawyers desired a different outcome for him; their choice cannot be faulted, nor that of the court in refusing to relieve them.