Opinion ID: 2583928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Conviction is a Strike Under California Law

Text: The three strikes law imposes enhanced punishment, Notwithstanding any other law, if a defendant has been convicted of a felony and it has been pled and proved that the defendant has one or more prior felony convictions.... (§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (a).) A prior conviction for purposes of the three strikes law includes A conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that, if committed in California, is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. A prior conviction of a particular felony shall include a conviction in another jurisdiction for an offense that includes all of the elements of the particular felony as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 667.5 or subdivision (c) of Section 1192.7. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(2), 1170.12, subd. (b)(2).) Assault with a firearm, defendant's crime, is included as a prior conviction under section 667.5, subdivision (c)(8) and section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(8). The three strikes law continues: The determination of whether a prior conviction is a prior felony conviction for purposes of [this section] shall be made upon the date of that prior conviction and is not affected by the sentence imposed unless the sentence automatically, upon the initial sentencing, converts the felony into a misdemeanor. None of the following dispositions shall affect the determination that a prior conviction is a prior felony.... [¶] (A) The suspension of imposition of judgment or sentence. [¶] (B) The stay of execution of sentence. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) The three strikes law clearly provides that a prior conviction occurs upon the date of that prior conviction and is not affected by the sentence imposed. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b) (1).) The statutory language thus comports with the general California rule that `A plea of guilty constitutes a conviction.' [Citation.] ( People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 390-391, 1 Cal.Rptr. 669, 348 P.2d 102.) Indeed, it is settled that for purposes of a prior conviction statute, a conviction occurs at the time of entry of the guilty plea. ( Castello, supra, 65 Cal.App.4th at p. 1253, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 314.) As we stated in People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 203, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480, For purposes of a `prior conviction' statute, defendant suffers such a conviction when he pleads guilty. We affirmed this view with specific reference to the three strikes law in People v. Rosbury (1997) 15 Cal.4th 206, 210, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 932 P.2d 207, in which we cited with approval People v. Williams (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1632, 1636, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 448 for its holding that under the three strikes law `when guilt is established, either by plea or verdict, the defendant stands convicted and thereafter has a prior conviction.' ( Rosbury, at p. 210, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 932 P.2d 207.) But defendant claims he was placed on diversion pursuant to section 13-3601, former subdivision (H) of the Arizona Revised Statutes, the Arizona diversion statute, because he was statutorily obligated to complete a diversion program for domestic violence offenders. Upon completion of such program, his case was dismissed. Defendant therefore argues that he was not convicted under California law because the Arizona proceedings under section 13-3601, former subdivision (H) of the Arizona Revised Statutes were akin to proceedings under California's deferred entry of judgment program for drug offenders, under which a guilty plea, upon the successful completion of the program, does not constitute a conviction for any purpose. (§ 1000.1, subd. (d).) Defendant is incorrect. California has limited this statutory benefit to certain nonviolent drug offenders and, as will be shown below, has specifically excluded such a benefit where the offender has committed a crime involving domestic violence. In 1972, California enacted its drug diversion program. (§§ 1000.1-1000.4, added by Stats.1972, ch. 1255, § 17, p. 2469.) The statutory scheme provided that defendants eligible under this chapter could waive their right to a speedy trial and, by entering an approved drug diversion program, be diverted from criminal proceedings for no less than six months nor more than two years. (§ 1000.2.) No guilty plea was required. If the divertee performed unsatisfactorily, criminal proceedings were resumed. (§ 1000.3.) If the divertee successfully completed the program, criminal charges under this chapter were dismissed and the arrest upon which the diversion was based was deemed never to have occurred. (§§ 1000.3, 1000.5.) Effective January 1, 1997, the Legislature replaced California's drug diversion program with the current deferred entry of judgment program. (Stats.1996, ch. 1132, § 2.) Under the new program, an eligible defendant can enter a plea of guilty, participate in a drug rehabilitation program and, upon completion of the program, have the charges dismissed. (§§ 1000-1000.2.) A defendant's plea of guilty pursuant to this chapter shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose unless a judgment of guilt is entered pursuant to Section 1000.3. (§ 1000.1, subd. (d).) Defendant places great reliance on this last provision, that [a] defendant's plea of guilty pursuant to this chapter shall not constitute a conviction for any purpose.... (§ 1000.1, subd. (d).) But this provision applies, by its terms, only to guilty pleas entered pursuant to this chapter. There is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended to change the general rule, discussed above, that a guilty plea constitutes a conviction. Instead, the Legislature simply decided to encourage individuals with a drug problem to enter a drug program by offering them the incentive that, upon completion of the drug program, their conviction would disappear. Indeed, the fact that the Legislature intended to limit this statutory benefit to carefully chosen nonviolent drug offenders is aptly illustrated by the fact that, in 1995, the Legislature repealed the domestic violence misdemeanor diversion program, [12] specifically because of the serious nature of domestic violence. The Legislature declared: Domestic violence is a serious and widespread crime. Between two and four million American women are beaten annually by their husbands or boyfriends; 1,400 women are killed each year by current or former husbands or boyfriends; domestic violence is the second leading cause of injury to women aged 15 to 44 years. [¶] ... Until recently, domestic violence has not received sufficient priority in public policy concerning crime and public safety. According to an analysis of state statistics, about two-thirds of those arrested for felony spousal abuse were prosecuted, with 80 percent of those cases treated as misdemeanors. [¶] ... Domestic violence has long-term effects that are disastrous for social policy and threatens the stability of the family and negatively impacts all family members, especially children, who learn that violence is an acceptable way to cope with stress or problems.... [¶] ... Diversion programs for perpetrators of domestic violence, while worthwhile in intention and sometimes effective, are inadequate to address domestic violence as a serious crime [¶] ... Therefore, the Legislature finds it important to treat domestic violence as a serious crime. (Stats.1995, ch. 641, § 1, subds.(a)-(e), p. 5069.) Our state has never had a diversion program for domestic violence felonies that involve violence, such as aggravated assault with a handgun against a spouse, the crime to which defendant entered a plea of guilty in Arizona. Defendant's analogy to our deferred entry of judgment program for drug offenders is inapt. All that remains, therefore, is to determine whether defendant's Arizona guilty plea meets the requirements of a guilty plea under the three strikes law. It does. Defendant in the prior case waived his right to a court or jury trial and entered a plea of guilty to aggravated assault pursuant to a written plea agreement. The Arizona court questioned defendant, found there was a factual basis for his plea, and accepted the plea. Defendant was placed on probation and imposition of sentence was suspended. Our three strikes law specifically provides that the suspension of imposition of sentence does not affect the determination that such prior conviction constitutes a strike. (§§ 667, subd. (d)(1)(A), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1)(A).) Defendant was ordered to comply with all 16 standard conditions of probation. The court subsequently found that defendant violated the conditions of his probation and filed a Notice of Rights of Review After Conviction, advising defendant of his right to file a petition for postconviction relief. [13] Defendant's plea of guilty to aggravated assault with a handgun constitutes a prior conviction under the three strikes law. (See §§ 667, subd. (d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(2).) As stated by the court in People v. Williams, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at page 1638, 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 448: The focus of the three strikes law is conduct: did the defendant commit a felony after having previously committed one or more serious or violent felonies? When a defendant pleads guilty to or is convicted of a felony, the law is satisfied factually that he or she committed it. When the deterrent effect of the law fails and the defendant subsequently commits another felony, he or she becomes a repeat offender and deserves harsher punishment, regardless of whether judgment and sentence have been pronounced on the initial offense. [¶] Given the focus and purpose of section 667(b)-(i), we conclude that `prior felony convictions' in section 667, subdivision (c), falls within the general rule illustrated in [ People v. Rhoads (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 56, 270 Cal.Rptr. 266]: when guilt is established, either by plea or verdict, the defendant stands convicted and thereafter has a prior conviction. As stated by the Court of Appeal, defendant's guilty plea constituted a prior conviction for purposes of the three strikes law, [and] nothing in the subsequent history of the case in Arizona may now be interposed to require a contrary conclusion.