Opinion ID: 687340
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immunized Testimony

Text: 17 The Montoyas argue that this prosecution is tainted because of improper use of Filiberto Montoya's immunized statements and testimony in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. 4 See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). In Kastigar, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the federal witness use immunity statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002, and held that a prosecution of a previously immunized witness is allowable, but emphasized that [t]he statute provides a sweeping proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the compelled testimony and any information derived therefrom. Id. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1664; see also id. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1661. 18 The use immunity statute provides in relevant part that: 19 [N]o testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information) may be used against the witness in any criminal case, except a prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing to comply with the order. 20 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002. The statute thus provides use and derivative use immunity, which grants immunity from the use of the compelled testimony and evidence derived therefrom. 5 Block v. Consino, 535 F.2d 1165, 1167 n. 3 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861, 97 S.Ct. 165, 50 L.Ed.2d 140 (1976). [S]uch immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 92 S.Ct. at 1661. The privilege has never been construed to mean that one who invokes it cannot subsequently be prosecuted. Id. Use immunity does not protect the substance of compelled testimony, it only protects against the use of compulsory testimony as a source of evidence. United States v. Crowson, 828 F.2d 1427, 1428-29 (9th Cir.1987) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 831, 109 S.Ct. 87, 102 L.Ed.2d 63 (1988). 21 A person compelled to testify against himself under a grant of immunity need only show that he testified in order to shift to the government 'the heavy burden' of proving an independent source for all its evidence. United States v. Mapelli, 971 F.2d 284, 288 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461, 92 S.Ct. at 1665). This burden of proof ... is not limited to a negation of taint; rather, it imposes on the prosecution the affirmative duty to prove that the evidence it proposes to use is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the compelled testimony. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461, 92 S.Ct. at 1665; see also United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1432 (9th Cir.1994); Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429. [A] good faith allegation that the evidence is not the fruit of the immunized testimony is not sufficient; the Government must show how it acquired all of the evidence. Block, 535 F.2d at 1169. The government must prove the independent source by a preponderance of the evidence, and we will uphold a district court's findings unless clearly erroneous. This court has permitted the government to meet its burden of proof as to the existence of independent, prior sources through affidavits. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429 (citation omitted). 6 22 [T]here is no per se rule requiring the withdrawal of a prosecutor or other government official who may have been exposed to immunized testimony. Id. at 1430; see also Mapelli, 971 F.2d at 287. If the prosecution team has been exposed to the immunized testimony, the Government may still use the evidence if it meets its burden of proof that the evidence is derived from independent sources. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430; Mapelli, 971 F.2d at 287-88. The question is not whether the prosecutor was aware of the contents of the immunized testimony, but whether he used the testimony in any way to build a case against the defendant. Crowson, 28 F.2d at 1430 (internal quotation omitted). The Government may protect against a claim of indirect use by assigning the case to others not exposed and barring communication between them and the prosecutors who obtained the compelled testimony. Mapelli, 971 F.2d at 288; see also Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1429-30. 23
24 The district court found that the Government obtained the evidence used to indict Montoya from independent sources. Contrary to the Montoyas' portrayal of the district court's order, the district court did find there was some overlap between the Reese and the Weiner investigations. As the district court correctly observed, however, the Government is not required to show that there was no overlap, but that all of the evidence it proposes to use was derived from legitimate independent sources. Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-62, 92 S.Ct. at 1665; see also Koon, 34 F.3d at 1432. Simply arguing that the investigations overlapped does not answer the question of the existence of legitimate independent sources for all of the evidence. Montoya's attack on the declarations of Agent Roman Chavez, Agent David Gauthier, and AUSA Reese therefore misses the mark. Even if agents and prosecutors actually participated in both investigations, and/or were exposed to immunized testimony, there is no per se rule requiring their withdrawal from the case. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430. The focus of the inquiry under Kastigar is whether the immunized testimony was in any way used to build a case against Montoya. Id. With this focus in mind, we address the Montoyas' specific complaints concerning the Government's attempt to meet its burden of proof in this case. 25
26 Agent Chavez was involved in the Reese investigation, and his declaration describes the execution of the search warrants of Montoya's properties in May and August 1988 (before Montoya was first interviewed in November 1988). As the district court observed, Chavez recited in great detail the documents and leads found as a result of these searches, as well as the resulting subpoenas issued to financial institutions. Contrary to Montoya's characterization, nowhere does Chavez state in his declaration that he was involved in both the Reese and Weiner investigations. 7 While Chavez investigated the purchase and acquisition of the properties with which the Montoya prosecution was concerned, it was done as part of the Contreras prosecution, and the evidence and resulting leads were obtained before Montoya was first interviewed. 27 Chavez states in his declaration that the majority of financial leads that I pursued had already been obtained prior to any contact with Filiberto Montoya. Chavez provides a detailed time-line for each step he took in the investigation. He lists seven investigatory actions (interviews, conversations and issuance of a subpoena) taken after the November 18, 1988, interview of Montoya, but ties each one to a lead obtained well before that date. 28 While Chavez's declaration does contain the conclusory statement that [a]t no time did I ever use any information provided by Filiberto Montoya in pursuing leads associated with the Contreras-Subias investigation, it also contains much more than this: a detailed time-line and tracing of the investigation, based on information and leads obtained in the search warrants executed before Montoya received informal immunity. Montoya's attack on this declaration does not address the detailed independent sources of information obtained in Chavez's investigation. Chavez's declaration was not limited to a negation of taint. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1665. 29
30 As the district court specifically noted in its synopsis of the declarations, Agent Gauthier was involved in the Reese investigation, but also later accompanied Agent Morris of the Weiner investigation team when she interviewed witnesses involved in the real property transactions. The Montoyas contend that this demonstrates overlap and therefore establishes taint. However, Gauthier's declaration states that he never interviewed Montoya or his wife, never reviewed or discussed any reports of [the] interview of Montoya or transcripts of his testimony, and had not had anyone impart[ ] to [him] any information purportedly derived from Montoya's statements. Furthermore, Gauthier explained his motivation to accompany Agent Morris as follows: 31 In July and November 1989 I accompanied Agent Linda Morris in a number of interviews of witnesses involved in certain real estate transactions she was investigating. Agent Morris did most of the questioning. I was motivated to accompany her by the hope that I could obtain information concerning drug trafficking suspects whose whereabouts remained unknown to us at the time. 32 Agent Morris explained in her declaration that sometime after May 19, 1989, she told Agent Gauthier of her findings involving the Montoyas and two businesses, and Gauthier informed her that in August 1988, search warrants had been served on the businesses and two properties belonging to Montoya. Gauthier did not mention that Montoya had been interviewed. Morris confirmed that she and Gauthier interviewed a number of people identified with the property transactions in question, but also stated that she had never been given any information by anyone concerning Montoya's interviews and testimony. 8 33 Agent Gauthier was never exposed to Montoya's immunized testimony. The fact that this Reese investigation team member attended a number of witness interviews with a member of the Weiner investigation team does not demonstrate that the immunized testimony was in any way used to build a case against Montoya. See Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430. 34
35 The Montoyas argue that AUSA Reese's declaration reveals that even after Montoya's testimony at the Oklahoma trial, Reese continued his investigation of Montoya by calling Roberto Guerra before the grand jury and questioning him regarding a Tuscon real estate deal involving Montoya. They then take issue with Reese's declaration statements that he did not rely on any information [he] obtained from Montoya to compose questions to Guerra, but instead used an investigative report reflecting interviews conducted by Agents Gauthier and Morris. 36 Guerra was called before the grand jury not as part of an investigation of Montoya, but during the course of an additional investigation of the Contreras drug organization. A superseding indictment in the Contreras case was returned thereafter in September 1989. Independent investigation had disclosed that Guerra, who was an acquaintance of Montoya, was the nominal purchaser of the Arizona property, but that the beneficial owner was a Contreras. Montoya advances nothing but the most tangential link between the questioning of Guerra in the Contreras-Subias investigation and the thought processes of Reese during the questioning. More importantly, these facts do not give rise to taint or reveal a lack of an independent source for all of the Government's evidence against the Montoyas. 37 Montoya next attacks Reese's failure to follow Department of Justice guidelines concerning the preservation of the ability to indict an immunized witness. He cites the failure to prepare a signed and dated memo summarizing the evidence concerning Montoya prior to his interview and testimony; the failure to ensure all of his testimony was recorded verbatim and maintained in a secure, restricted access location; and failure to maintain a record of subsequently received evidence against him. 38 However, failure to strictly comply with the United States Attorneys' Manual creates no enforceable rights. United States v. Lorenzo, 995 F.2d 1448, 1453 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 225, 126 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The lack of a memorandum of evidence available to charge Montoya as of November 17, 1988, made more work for the Government in this case; however, it was still able to create an adequate history of what information was obtained through which of the various sources and at what time. The Government showed the Weiner prosecution team was aware of the immunity problem and followed reliable procedures for segregating the immunized testimony. 9 39
40 The district court made the proper inquiry in this case, and we find no clear error in its findings that the government proved independent sources for all of its evidence against Montoya. The Montoyas' focus on overlap and alleged exposure to immunized testimony does not answer the question that we must ask in deciding this appeal. The nine detailed declarations filed by the Government establish that the indictment rested entirely on sources independent of Montoya's immunized testimony. We are satisfied that the district court's finding that there was no evidentiary use of Montoya's immunized statements and testimony was not clearly erroneous. 41
42 and testimony. 43 Montoya argues that the most glaring use of his immunized testimony was the non-evidentiary use of it in deciding to prosecute him and his wife. First, he argues that Reese used Montoya's immunized testimony in his application for permission to prosecute Montoya. Next, he argues this taint was compounded when AUSA Meza saw this application. Finally, Montoya points to a report/document either prepared by or definitely used by AUSA Weiner in the prosecution of the Montoyas, which states that Reese had been convinced that Montoya was not being truthful and Mr. Reese submitted his request to prosecute Montoya to the Attorney General ... [who later] approved the prosecution. 44 Non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony could include the decision to prosecute an immunized witness. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430. Kastigar did not expressly discuss the propriety of non-evidentiary use. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 453, 460, 92 S.Ct. at 1661, 1664-65. In Crowson, we assumed that non-evidentiary use was prohibited. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430 (A more difficult question is what proof or procedures the government must employ to carry its burden of showing that it made no non-evidentiary use of the immunized testimony.). Compare United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 856 (assuming without deciding that a prosecutor cannot make non-evidentiary use of immunized testimony), modified, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941, 111 S.Ct. 2235, 114 L.Ed.2d 477 (1991); and United States v. Byrd, 765 F.2d 1524, 1531 (11th Cir.1985) (It is our view that the privilege against self-incrimination is concerned with direct and indirect evidentiary uses of compelled testimony and not with the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.). Crowson did not answer the question of whether or not the Government meets its burden of showing no non-evidentiary use by establishing prior, independent sources for all of the evidence because there were other indications that the government did not indirectly use [the immunized] testimony for non-evidentiary purposes despite its admitted access to that testimony. Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1431. 45 As pointed out above, this circuit has not specifically decided whether non-evidentiary use comes within the prohibition of the statute. We need not decide that general issue in this case, either, but will assume that some non-evidentiary uses could come within the ban of the statute. 46 Section 6002 does not prohibit all use of immunized testimony. It proscribes its direct or indirect use against the witness. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002. 47 Montoya's claimed relationship between his immunized testimony and the decision to prosecute is too tenuous and remote. AUSA Reese was not preparing the indictment, he was seeking the approval of the Attorney General to prosecute Montoya. Reese was following internal procedures which required him to submit a request for authorization to prosecute and to obtain the express written authorization of the Attorney General before prosecution could be initiated. See United States Attorneys' Manual, Title 9, Section 23,400 (1990). As part of the departmental policy, Reese was to submit a memorandum indicating: 48 (a) the unusual circumstances which justify prosecution, (b) the method by which he/she will affirmatively establish either that all evidence necessary for a conviction was in the hands of the government prior to the date of the defendant's compelled testimony or that it came from sources independent of the witness's testimony and was not the result of focusing an investigation on the witness because of compelled disclosures, and (c) how he/she will show affirmatively that no other non-evidentiary use has been or will be made of the compelled testimony in connection with the proposed prosecution (for example, by having the prosecution handled by an attorney unfamiliar with the substance of the compelled testimony). 49 Id. Assistant United States Attorneys are instructed that, 50 [i]n weighing the public interest in prosecuting a person for an offense first disclosed in, or closely related to, his/her compelled testimony, the attorney for the government should take into account, inter alia, the importance of encouraging free and full disclosure by witnesses whose testimony is compelled. He/she should also take into account the extent to which the potential defendant had testified freely and fully in compliance with the order.... [L]ess than complete testimony should not appear to be rewarded by a declination of prosecution in a case where independent evidence clearly exists and the situation otherwise warrants prosecution. 51 Id. 52 Reese's application for permission to prosecute Montoya does not contain a summary or complete overview of Montoya's grand jury or trial testimony. It does not detail the real estate transactions that were later used in the instant indictment. Rather, the application describes two incidents involving Montoya's testimony which led the Government to believe Montoya was not being completely cooperative or candid. First, before the grand jury Montoya initially denied knowledge concerning the leader of the drug organization. The memorandum then details why it was believed that Montoya deliberately withheld information about his acquaintance with the drug ring leader, thus prompting the suspicion that Montoya would tell the Government only what he believed was already known. Second, while testifying at the Oklahoma trial, Montoya effectively denied knowledge of certain summaries of expenses of the properties which had been found during the course of the investigation. Apparently, Montoya had previously given the Government more information about the realities underlying preparation of the summaries, which tended to demonstrate management and control of the properties by the Contreras family, rather than the nominal owners. Reese characterized Montoya's trial testimony as thus becoming essentially neutral. 53 This information was clearly included to demonstrate why prosecution of Montoya was justified. Reese explained that [i]n sum, it appears that immunity has not encouraged complete testimony from Montoya and he should not be rewarded by declining prosecution where independent evidence exists, and the situation otherwise warrants prosecution. While this memorandum does contain a one paragraph, basic overview of the Montoyas' scheme, the memo then goes on to detail the independent sources of evidence necessary to prosecute Montoya. 54 As the DOJ instructions point out, there is a public interest component to the decision to prosecute an immunized witness. The Government is interested in encouraging free and full disclosure. Thus, the AUSA is exhorted to consider the extent to which the potential defendant had testified freely and fully in compliance with the order. But after considering these factors, less than complete testimony should not appear to be rewarded.... 55 The requirement of a showing to the Attorney General that sufficient independent evidence exists to support a prosecution addresses the question of whether a witness could be successfully prosecuted. Absent some analysis of the witness's actual testimony and how it squares with what the Government knew of the ability of the witness to say more, there would be no analysis of whether there should be a prosecution. In addition to constraining the Attorney General's exercise of her discretion, a rule that foreclosed her consideration of whether a prosecution should take place would not be in the best interest of immunized witnesses in general, and contrary to the public interest identified in the DOJ manual. 56 Reese needed to communicate to his superiors the unusual circumstances justifying prosecution. Cf. Byrd, 765 F.2d at 1530 (Kastigar made no mention of any burden on the government to erect an impenetrable barrier between the prosecutors who hear or read the immunized testimony and those who decide to indict, even though the potential problem was an obvious one.). This could not be done by simply reciting the nontestimonial evidence against Montoya. We conclude that Reese's involvement in requesting permission to prosecute was too remote from the criminal proceeding against Montoya to constitute non-evidentiary use of the immunized testimony against him. 57 The fact that AUSA Meza read the application for permission to prosecute, even if it had contained an actual summary of Montoya's testimony, would not mean she would have had to withdraw from participation in the case. See Crowson, 828 F.2d at 1430. Nor does it demonstrate anything other than a remote and tenuous connection to the decision to initiate a prosecution against Montoya. That Meza read the application does not demonstrate that the Government made non-evidentiary use of Montoya's immunized testimony. 58 The report prepared or relied upon by AUSA Weiner, describing how Reese was convinced Montoya was not being truthful, did not involve improper use of immunized testimony. As the district court pointed out, the various reports in the Montoya case are just reiterating a generalized opinion that the Government believed Montoya lied to the grand jury. This does not in any way indicate that Weiner had access to the contents of Montoya's statements and testimony. Without significant exposure, Meza and Weiner could not have made significant nonevidentiary use, permissible or impermissible. See North, 910 F.2d at 860.