Opinion ID: 576697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Wright's Appeal

Text: 47 Mr. Wright sought to suppress the fruits of the search of his quarters that had occurred shortly after his arrest. The district court determined that the acting base commander, who had authorized the search, had probable cause to do so. Memorandum and Order of Nov. 8, 1988 (R.28) at 4. Even though some of the information on which permission to search was granted related to the Denver bank robbery, which had occurred over one month prior to the July 6, 1987 search, the court concluded that the information was not so stale as to defeat probable cause to believe the fruits and instrumentalities of the Denver robbery would be found in Airman Wright's quarters. Id. at 5. 48 The court next considered Mr. Wright's contention that the search was invalid because it had not complied with the Oath or Affirmation Clause of the Fourth Amendment 20 and with the analogous provision of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(c). Mr. Wright contended that the involvement of civilian federal and state authorities in the search had, in effect, converted the search from a military search to a federal one requiring strict compliance with the Fourth Amendment and with Rule 41(c). The district court agreed that there had been significant involvement of civilian authorities in developing the factual basis underlying the search. R.28 at 8-9. Nonetheless, the court concluded that compliance with Military Rule of Evidence 315, which contains no oath or affirmation requirement, was adequate to protect Mr. Wright's Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 9 (citing United States v. Brown, 784 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir.1986)). The court added that there was no evidence that state and federal agents gained some improper tactical or strategic advantage by employing military procedures in this case. Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), was applicable to the search of Mr. Wright's quarters. R.28 at 9-12. 49 Finally, the district court addressed Mr. Wright's claim that seizure of documents indicating his ownership of two pistols was outside the scope of the authorized search and not permissible under the plain view doctrine. The court granted Mr. Wright's suppression motion as to those documents, but otherwise denied the motions. Id. at 14. 50 Mr. Wright now appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress bait money obtained from the search of his quarters. Mr. Wright argues that (a) the state and federal law enforcement officials' active participation in the search transformed a military search into a federal or governmental search, which required full compliance with the Fourth Amendment, and (b) even if the search was purely military and only required compliance with military search procedures, it did not meet those procedures because Special Agent Reifert presented Lt. Col. Winge with insufficient evidence to find probable cause. The facts relevant to this challenge include the following. 51 The second robbery occurred on July 3, 1987, a Friday. The following Monday, July 6, Indiana State Police (ISP) Detective Kenneth Roland, the officer in charge of the ISP investigation of the first robbery, was notified of the second robbery. That morning, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) Special Agent Steven Reifert called Detective Roland 21 to discuss the fact that three security police officers had been arrested three days earlier in connection with a bank robbery. Because Detective Roland believed the modus operandi was very similar in the two robberies, 22 he arranged to meet with Special Agent Reifert at noon that day to investigate the possibility that the three suspects captured after the second robbery--Mr. Chapman, Mr. Wright, and Mr. Pezet, all of the 305th Security Police Squadron stationed at Grissom Air Force Base--were also involved in the first robbery. Detective Roland called the FBI post in Lafayette, Indiana, and asked FBI Special Agents Otto Johnson and Walt Valentine to assist him in his investigation. 52 Detective Roland, along with FBI Special Agents Johnson and Valentine, met AFOSI Special Agent Reifert in the AFOSI office at the base at noon. Also present were AFOSI Special Agent Dave Rish, Captain William Thomas, and Acting Base Commander Lt. Colonel Gaylor Winge. Detective Roland informed everyone about the details of the second robbery and why, based on the similar modus operandi, he thought Mr. Wright, Mr. Chapman, and Mr. Pezet might have been involved in the first robbery. Detective Roland suggested that they interview all the security police officers on base who knew Mr. Wright, Mr. Chapman and Mr. Pezet. Everyone present, with the exception of Lt. Col. Winge, then broke up into investigative teams and began interviewing base personnel. 23 After completing the interviews, they met to review what had been discovered. The group decided 24 to seek authorization to search Mr. Wright's room on base. 53 Special Agent Reifert then contacted Major Brubaker, the Staff Judge Advocate for the base, and discussed the facts of the case and the idea of searching Mr. Wright's room. Major Brubaker told Reifert that he thought there was probable cause to conduct a search. Reifert then typed up a statement of probable cause along with a Search Authorization form and presented them to Lt. Col. Winge at his residence on base. 25 Reifert was not asked to, and did not, swear to the truth of the probable cause statement, but merely told Lt. Col. Winge that the information was true to the best of his knowledge. Lt. Col. Winge found probable cause and authorized Special Agent Reifert, with the assistance of such person or persons as may be necessary, to search Mr. Wright's room for [a w]hite hooded sweatshirt with 'Kings' emblem on the front, any money stolen from the Wabash Valley Bank and Trust, Denver, IN, any handguns that may have been used in the robbery, laundry bags, a white pair of gloves and any other items of clothing possibly used in the Denver IN Bank Robbery. R.1 at 18. 54 While two Air Force security police officers secured the door to Mr. Wright's room, AFOSI Special Agent Reifert, FBI Special Agents Johnson and Valentine, and Indiana State Police Detective Roland searched the room. Among the items they found were $296 in U.S. currency, including bait money that had been taken in the first robbery, and Air Force registration papers for a 9mm pistol. Detective Roland took the seized evidence into his possession, transported it back to the State Police Post, and stored it there in an evidence locker. 55
56 Mr. Wright contends that the currency seized in the search of his quarters--particularly the bait money from the Denver robbery--should have been excluded from his trial because the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Mr. Wright contends that the involvement of state and federal law enforcement officials converted the search from a military search to a governmental 26 one requiring strict compliance with the Fourth Amendment. The district court agreed with Mr. Wright that the state and federal authorities participated in the search in a significant way. R.28 at 8-9. However, the district court held that the search met all Fourth Amendment requirements by virtue of the fact that it comported with Military Rule 315. In drawing this conclusion, the court relied upon United States v. Brown, 784 F.2d 1033 (10th Cir.1986), in which a similar conclusion was drawn. However, in Brown the search authorization not only met the requirements of Military Rule 315, it also was supported by an oath. 27 In this case, however, the request for search authorization was not supported by oath or affirmation. We cannot conclude, therefore, that Brown is directly on point. 57 On the other hand, we cannot accept Mr. Wright's argument that the situation before us is comparable to instances where federal law enforcement officers participate with state 28 or foreign country officials 29 or private entities 30 in a search that does not comport with standards embodied in the federal constitution, statutes or judicial rule. In those instances, the procedures followed did not provide the defendant with protections of the calibre contemplated by federal law. By contrast, the procedures followed here, while decidedly different from those employed by the federal government in the civilian community, are standards grounded in the federal constitution's Fourth Amendment and in the Congress' prerogative to make rules and regulations for the governance of the land and naval forces of the United States. See U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8 cl. 14 (The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces). 58 It is too late in the day to suggest that the Fourth Amendment's basic protection against unreasonable searches and seizures does not apply to members of the armed forces. 31 Nevertheless, the military implementation of that guarantee is different from that employed in civilian matters. In civilian cases, the warrant requirement has been abrogated by judicial decision only in certain carefully described situations. 32 In the military situation, Congress has primary responsibility for the delicate task of balancing the rights of servicemen against the needs of the military. Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 447, 107 S.Ct. 2924, 2931, 97 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987). Through delegation of authority to the President, 33 Congress has determined that an alternate procedure to a warrant issued by a magistrate is more compatible with the realities of military life. 59 The constitutional legitimacy of such military searches is hardly a novel proposition. 34 For instance, in United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th Cir.1964), Judge Haynsworth upheld the admissibility of evidence procured by a military search and admitted as evidence in a civilian prosecution of a servicemember. He wrote, 60 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches. Searches as authorized by a valid search warrant are not prohibited because not unreasonable. Searches reasonably incident to lawful arrests are also not prohibited, for they too are not unreasonable. And we can find no basis for holding that a search conducted by military authority, which was completely lawful and valid when made as a matter of military law, is unreasonable under the Constitution. 61 Grisby, 335 F.2d at 656. 62 Under Military Rule of Evidence 315, 35 an investigatory search of a member's person or quarters may only be undertaken (absent exigent circumstances) 36 when the investigator presents the military commander with information establishing that there is probable cause to believe that the area sought to be searched contains evidence of unlawful activity. The investigator may present that information orally or in writing. There is no explicit requirement that the person presenting the information be under oath, although it appears to be the preferred practice. 37 63 The United States Court of Military Appeals, the court recognized by both the Congress and the Supreme Court as having a particular expertise in this area, 38 has explained that the military search authorization procedure is a finely tuned accommodation of the servicemember's privacy interests grounded in the Fourth Amendment and the specific needs, dictated by military necessity, for good order and discipline in the armed forces. See United States v. Stuckey, 10 M.J. 347, 358-61 (C.M.A.1981). The relationship between a member of the armed forces and a commander is different from the relationship between a civilian and a magistrate. Members of the armed forces have considerably less of an expectation of privacy while living on a military installation, and a military commander has considerably more interest in being informed of all activities in the area under his command. As the Court of Military Appeals noted in Stuckey: A military commander has responsibilities for investigation and for law enforcement that a magistrate does not possess. Also, he has responsibilities for the welfare and combat readiness of the personnel under his command. 10 M.J. at 359. Continued the court, 64 Winthrop describes custom as a uniform, known practice of long standing, which is also certain and reasonable. Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (1920 Reprint), 42. Military custom, so defined, has long granted military commanders broad powers of search and seizure. See United States v. Middleton, [10 M.J. 123 (C.M.A.1981) ]. The existence of that custom clearly imposes some limitation on a serviceperson's reasonable expectation of privacy. 65 Id. at 360. Consequently, while the authorization to search is sometimes referred to in casual parlance as a warrant and the commander is referred to as a magistrate, such terminology, noted the Court of Military Appeals, does not reflect the theoretical or practical reality of the situation. As that court wrote in Stuckey: 66 In our view servicepersons have never expected that, before authorizing a search, a military commander would comply with the warrant procedure required of a federal magistrate. Indeed, except to a literalistic and loyal reader of this Court's opinions, equating a military commander with a judicial officer would probably have seemed odd. Instead, the commander's long-recognized power to authorize searches within the area of his command is generally viewed as derived from and correlative with his position and responsibilities in the military community--which, of course, is a specialized society separate from civilian society. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2556, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). Accordingly, a commander's authorization of a search has never been equated with the judicial-type procedure which comes within the contemplation of the warrant clause of the Fourth Amendment. 67 10 M.J. at 360. 68 The oath requirement is no technical or trivial component of the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment. It is designed to ensure the truthfulness of the information considered by the magistrate by inducing the supplier of that information to consider carefully his submission. Nevertheless, in the military environment, the Warrant Clause plays no part in the determination of probable cause. The alternate procedure, the Court of Military Appeals has noted, provides its own safeguards for insuring the accuracy of the information provided. As the court noted in Stuckey, unlike the civilian magistrate, the military commander oftentimes knows a good deal about the subject of the search prior to being presented with the investigator's information. The military commander can be expected to assess the investigator's information in light of that broader background. The commander may also rely on a wider variety of sources. Chief Judge Everett wrote: 69 Unlike a civilian magistrate, the military commander who is requested to authorize a search often will already have acquired information that is relevant to a determination of probable cause. He may have seen police reports concerning a suspect or know of his reputation, prior convictions, or nonjudicial punishments. Some of the commander's information may be of a hearsay nature and not admissible in court, but nevertheless of sufficient reliability so that, if properly presented in an affidavit, it would help support a search warrant. Cf. Jones v. United States, [362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960) ]; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956); Brinegar v. United States, [338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) ]. Some of the evidence already in the commander's possession may consist of documents which are not prepared under oath but which--under hearsay exceptions for official records or business entries--would be admissible at a trial to establish guilt or innocence. 70 ... Must the commander who possesses this information, in turn, refer the request for search authority to a higher echelon and then submit to the superior commander his own sworn recitation of the information which he possesses? Further, if official records or business records contain information relevant to a probable cause decision, will it be necessary that someone swear before the commander that the documents say what they purport to say, rather than merely submitting the records to the commander for his consideration? 71 10 M.J. at 363. Moreover, there are significant additional safeguards, both legal and practical, to ensure that the information presented to the commander is true and that the commander considers the information carefully. As the district court noted, a servicemember who supplies false information to a commander is subject to court-martial. Moreover, the commander is subject to significant adverse consequences for sanctioning an unwarranted invasion of privacy. As Chief Judge Everett noted: 72 In promulgating paragraph 152 of the Manual the President may also have recognized that inherent in the command structure are some safeguards against a commander's indiscriminate invasion of the privacy of his subordinates. For one thing, combat readiness of troops depends in large part upon their motivation, but discipline and punishment cannot alone develop the necessary motivation. Leadership is also required, and one aspect of successful leadership is concern for the welfare of subordinates. Loyalty in a military unit, as in other organizations, is a two-way street. A commander who approves--or even tolerates--arbitrary invasions of the privacy of his subordinates is not demonstrating the brand of leadership likely to command the loyalty or produce the high morale associated with a combat-ready organization. Accordingly, a commander has some incentive to act reasonably and with sound judgment in acting on requests for searches and seizures which involve his personnel. Moreover, repeated failures by a commander to respect the Fourth Amendment rights of his troops might become a basis for a complaint of wrongs under Article 138 of the Uniform Code, 10 U.S.C. § 938, or, in the extreme case, even for a prosecution for dereliction of duties as a commander. See Article 92, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 892. 73 10 M.J. at 359-60. 74 We need not confront in this case a situation where there is no legitimate military interest in the search and the application to the commander is simply an effort to evade the Warrant Clause. Indeed, given the obvious military interest in all matters that occur on a military installation, such a situation may be hypothetical. In this case, there is no indication that the application for permission to search directed to the base commander was intended to circumvent the warrant requirement. Nor are we confronted with a situation in which the participation of military authorities in the investigation can be considered pro forma. While the record reflects that the investigation was a joint federal, state, and military enterprise, the record simply does not support a suggestion that there was no real military investigative interest. Common sense suggests the contrary. The commission of serious crimes of violence by military personnel who are members of a unit engaged in providing security to a base containing warplanes and in providing personal security to the Vice-President of the United States 39 is a matter of utmost concern to the cognizant commander. Because a procedure contemplated by the federal constitution was legitimately implemented by those permitted to use it, the civilian federal officers were under no obligation to engage in the duplicative effort of securing a warrant from a magistrate. 75
76 Mr. Wright's second challenge is to the district court's ruling that Lt. Col. Winge had probable cause to authorize the search. Mr. Wright contends that the evidence that Special Agent Reifert presented to Lt. Col. Winge was both insufficient and stale. 77 Regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, the probable cause standard under Military Rule of Evidence 315(f) is the same totality of the circumstances standard that the Supreme Court adopted in Illinois v. Gates: 40 78 The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 79 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The district court's task in this case was therefore also defined by Gates: simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. Id. (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960)). We review de novo the district court's judgment on this matter. United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir.1991); United States v. McKinney, 919 F.2d 405, 408 n. 2 (7th Cir.1990). 41 80 As the district court noted, AFOSI Special Agent Reifert submitted a statement to Lt. Col. Winge that alleged that (1) Mr. Wright, along with Mr. Chapman and Mr. Pezet--all members of the 305th Security Police Squadron--had been arrested for bank robbery by the Indiana State Police; (2) Mr. Chapman has also been involved in a bank robbery five weeks earlier in Denver, IN; (3) in the earlier robbery, Mr. Chapman had an accomplice who matched Mr. Wright's description; (4) Mr. Chapman and Mr. Wright were close friends and spent considerable time together; (5) there was a similar modus operandi for both robberies; (6) Mr. Wright owned a 9mm gun such as those recovered when Mr. Wright, Mr. Chapman, and Mr. Pezet were arrested for the later robbery; 42 and (7) Mr. Wright had been issued white gloves for his work as a gate guard, and white gloves were used in the earlier robbery. The information provided Lt. Col. Winge with more than substantial basis for concluding that a search of Mr. Wright's quarters would reveal money stolen from the banks as well as other items connected with the robberies. 81 Nevertheless, Mr. Wright contends that the information that Special Agent Reifert provided to Lt. Col. Winge was stale and therefore could not have supported a finding of probable cause that items from the May 29 robbery would still be in Mr. Wright's quarters on July 6, the date of the search. Although only three days had passed since the July 3 robbery, thirty-seven days had passed since the May 29 robbery. In particular, Mr. Wright contends that in the context of a bank robbery, a highly consumable item such as cash is not likely to remain in one place. In support of this argument, Mr. Wright cites United States v. Steeves, 525 F.2d 33 (8th Cir.1975), in which the Eighth Circuit remarked that eighty-seven days after a bank robbery there was little reason to believe that any of the bank's money or the money bag would still be in the [defendant's] home. Steeves, 525 F.2d at 38. 43 In response, the government cites United States v. Jackson, 756 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir.1985), in which the Ninth Circuit upheld a home search for stolen bank currency two months after the robbery. The two month interval between the robbery and the search of [the defendant's] apartment did not dispel the probability that the currency, or some of it, remained in [the defendant's] apartment. Id. 82 The district court properly noted that this court has recently limited the role that staleness plays in the probable cause calculus. United States v. Certain Real Property, Commonly known as 6250 Ledge Road, Egg Harbor, WI, 943 F.2d 721, 724 (7th Cir.1991). 44 The district court was also correct to rely on the fact that Mr. Wright had just been apprehended for his participation in the later robbery, and thus this case involved continuing criminal activity. As we have said,  'where the affidavit recites facts indicating ongoing, continuous criminal activity, the passage of time becomes less critical.'  Lamon, 930 F.2d at 1188 (quoting United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 984 (10th Cir.1986) (dicta)). 83 Furthermore, because Mr. Wright was an airman stationed on base, Lt. Col. Winge was aware that Mr. Wright had few places other than his quarters available to him to hide the stolen money and few inconspicuous opportunities to consume large amounts of cash on base. In light of these facts and the fact that the evidence suggested that Mr. Wright was involved in a continuing criminal activity, we conclude that the thirty-seven-day-old information regarding the first bank robbery was not old enough to undermine Lt. Col. Winge's substantial basis to believe that a search of Mr. Wright's quarters would reveal money stolen from the Denver bank as well as other evidence of that crime. 84
85 The district court held that, even if the search of Mr. Wright's quarters violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the evidence would be admissible under the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984), and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 104 S.Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984). R.28 at 9-12. On appeal, Mr. Wright contends that this is not a viable alternative basis for the district court's holding because the statement that AFOSI Special Agent Steven Reifert submitted in support of his request for authorization to search Mr. Wright's quarters was  'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render an official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'  Appellant Wright's Br. at 30 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 924, 104 S.Ct. at 3421). However, as we have already determined, supra pp. 1372-1373 (listing items in probable cause statement), the substance of Special Agent Reifert's statement was more than sufficient to provide probable cause to believe that evidence relating to the first robbery could be found in Mr. Wright's quarters. Also, Mr. Wright offered no evidence that Special Agent Reifert was dishonest or reckless in preparing the statement. For these reasons, we agree with the district court that, even if the search of Mr. Wright's quarters violated the Fourth Amendment, the investigating officers' reasonable good-faith reliance on that authorization justified the district court's denial of Mr. Wright's motion to suppress. 45
86 Finally, Mr. Wright contends that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow him to present surrebuttal testimony in support of his alibi defense. In his case in chief, Mr. Wright and his parents testified that, at approximately the time of the Denver bank robbery, he was at their home in Indianapolis. He also presented evidence that he had received a collect call at their home at 6:07 p.m. from the Grissom Air Force Base home of John and Terri Stout. Mr. Wright claimed that Ms. Stout had made the collect call and that they were involved at the time, but not romantically. Tr. of June 26, 1989 at 774; Tr. of June 27, 1989 at 827. In rebuttal, the government presented the testimony of both Mr. Stout and his former wife, who testified as Terri Lombardo. Both Mr. Stout and Ms. Lombardo testified that Mr. Wright actually placed the collect call to his parents' home on the afternoon of the robbery. Ms. Lombardo also testified that she and Mr. Wright had become close friends as problems developed in her marriage, but she denied having an affair with him. Id. at 910. Ms. Lombardo acknowledged calling Mr. Wright a number of times to discuss her marital problems, but testified that she had never placed a collect call to his parents' residence. 87 Following Ms. Lombardo's testimony, Mr. Wright sought to present surrebuttal in the form of the testimony of his sister, Lori Compton. Ms. Compton would have testified that, shortly after Mr. Wright was arrested in July 1987, Ms. Lombardo indicated that she was in love with Mr. Wright and that she was concerned about him. Tr. of June 28, 1989 at 963. Mr. Wright's counsel contended that the proffered statements would be admissible under the state of mind exception to the hearsay rule and they are relevant to her bias or her ulterior motive for her statement in July of 1987 which she has continued to adopt through her trial testimony. Id. Asked by the court why Ms. Lombardo's being in love with Mr. Wright would have created bias, defense counsel responded, She was married to John Stout at the time. It gave her a motive to conceal the actual events of May 29th, 1987, as I see them. Id. The court, however, concluded that this theory of bias was not a reasonable inference. Id. Furthermore, the court observed that Ms. Lombardo's testimony about her relationship with Mr. Wright was quite consistent with Mr. Wright's own testimony. Id. at 964. The court therefore refused to allow the proffered surrebuttal. 88 We shall not reverse a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of surrebuttal testimony unless the trial court abuses its discretion. See United States v. Gaertner, 705 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir.1983) (Indeed, great deference is accorded to the discretion and judgment of the trial court when granting and/or denying a party's motion for rebuttal or surrebuttal testimony.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct. 979, 79 L.Ed.2d 216 (1984). District courts are authorized to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment. Fed.R.Evid. 611(a). 89 There was no abuse of discretion in this case. As did the district court, we see little significant difference between Mr. Wright's and Ms. Lombardo's testimony regarding their relationship. Therefore, assuming arguendo that the proffered testimony would have been admissible, 46 it is indeed speculative whether it would have demonstrated a bias against the defendant. In any event, the jury was aware that Ms. Lombardo and her husband were having marital difficulties during the period just after the robberies; it also was aware that Ms. Lombardo and Mr. Wright were seeing each other socially and talking on the telephone a good deal. Furthermore, during closing arguments, Mr. Wright's counsel told the jury that Ms. Lombardo came up with this story about Jack making a collect call. She came up with it on July 29th, 1987 as a further effort to conceal her relationship with my client and she has clung to that. Tr. of June 28, 1989 at 1012. Therefore, even if the district court did commit error in refusing to admit the statement, the issue was still before the jury and, given the weight of the evidence against the defendant, any error was clearly harmless.