Opinion ID: 1702618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection-Rational Basis Analysis

Text: ¶ 14 The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). Due process `bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions.' State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶ 80, 308 Wis.2d 615, 748 N.W.2d 447 (quoting State v. Radke, 2003 WI 7, ¶ 12, 259 Wis.2d 13, 657 N.W.2d 66). Substantive due process forbids a government from exercising power without any reasonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective. Quintana, 308 Wis.2d 615, ¶ 80, 748 N.W.2d 447. To have a rational basis, substantive due process requires only that the means chosen by the legislature bear a reasonable and rational relationship to a legitimate government interest. McManus, 152 Wis.2d at 130, 447 N.W.2d 654. Smith's substantive due process argument is grounded in the notion that there is no rational basis for requiring him to register as a sex offender because his conviction was not sexual. ¶ 15 The equal protection clause, on the other hand, is designed to assure that those who are similarly situated will be treated similarly. Treiber v. Knoll, 135 Wis.2d 58, 68, 398 N.W.2d 756 (1987). The equal protection clause requires that the legislature have reasonable and practical grounds for the classifications that it draws and when determining if there is a rational basis, we must presume that the legislative action is valid. Quintana, 308 Wis.2d 615, ¶ 79, 748 N.W.2d 447 (citing McManus, 152 Wis.2d at 130, 447 N.W.2d 654). [T]he state retains broad discretion to create classifications so long as the classifications have a reasonable basis. McManus, 152 Wis.2d at 131, 447 N.W.2d 654 (citing Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971)). Smith's equal protection claim is grounded in the notion that there is no rational basis for requiring those in his class  criminals who are convicted of false imprisonment of a minor where the crime is not of a sexual nature  to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 because requiring such individuals to register as sex offenders diminishes the registry's usefulness. [11] ¶ 16 Although substantive due process and equal protection may have different implications, [t]he analysis under both the due process and equal protection clauses is largely the same. Quintana, 308 Wis.2d 615, ¶ 78, 748 N.W.2d 447. Accordingly, as a practical matter, the rational basis analysis applicable to Smith's substantive due process challenge is also relevant to his equal protection challenge. The question for this court to resolve is whether we can conceive any facts upon which the legislation as applied to Smith could be reasonably based. Stated differently, we must determine whether we can conceive of any rational basis for requiring Smith, who was convicted of false imprisonment of a minor, to register under Wis. Stat. § 301.45 even though his crime was not of a sexual nature. ¶ 17 The rational basis test is a deferential one. The United States Supreme Court has described it as a paradigm of judicial restraint. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). ¶ 18 Thus, for purposes of our constitutional analysis, we owe great deference to legislative action, and Smith bears the high burden of proving that Wis. Stat. § 301.45 as applied to him is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.