Opinion ID: 2599073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Appropriateness of death penalty beyond a reasonable doubt

Text: Since neither capital defendants nor noncapital defendants have their penalties fixed under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof, the death penalty does not in that respect violate principles of equal protection. ( People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 936, 269 Cal.Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676.) Defendant's claim that the jury must be required to find the death penalty appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt has been repeatedly rejected. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 842, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 536, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779.) Defendant nonetheless cites the high court's recent decision in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 as requiring that California juries find the death penalty appropriate beyond a reasonable doubt. Not so. In Ring the high court held that Arizona's death penalty scheme was unconstitutional to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. ( Id. at p. 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428.) In People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123, we explained that the rationale of Ring does not apply to the penalty phase of a capital murder trial in California. ( Id. at p. 263, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) That is because once a defendant has been convicted of first degree murder and one or more special circumstances have been found true under California's death penalty statute, the statutory maximum penalty is already set at death. ( Ibid. ) Thus, the high court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435  that any facts used to increase the maximum penalty must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt  does not apply and, accordingly, its subsequent holding in Ring is likewise inapplicable. As we explained in Prieto, Because any finding of aggravating factors during the penalty phase does not `increase[] the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum' ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348), Ring imposes no new constitutional requirements on California's penalty phase proceedings. ( Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 263, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; see also People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 221, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, fn. 32, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.)