Opinion ID: 1691288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Miscellaneous False Affiants

Text: This block consists of 12 persons who, like those discussed in the last section, falsely swore on their on-site affidavits that they planned to be out of the county on election day. These persons, all of whom voted for Woodward, had no certain plans, at the time they executed their on-site affidavits, to be out of Jefferson County on election day, and, thus, did not execute the affidavit in good faith. These persons were: L.B., B.C., P.A.C., D.K., E.K., R.L., C.L., S.M., H.R., A.S., G.W., and S.W. The majority concedes, as it must, that these persons were not authorized by law, specifically under § 17-10-3(c), to cast on-site absentee ballots. 752 So.2d at 1157. Nevertheless, it excuses the illegality of five of these votes, namely, those of L.B., S.M., A.S., D.K., and R.L. Its stated rationale is that there was no evidence offered to prove that they acted in anything other than good faith when they cast their on-site ballots. 752 So.2d at 1160. However, these five voters all testified as to their plansor the absence thereof at the time they executed their on-site affidavits. Neither L.B., S.M., nor A.S. could testify unequivocally that at the time they executed their affidavits they planned to be out of the county. In fact, L.B. did not even suggest that he intended to be out of the county, so as to be able to use an on-site absentee ballot. The testimony of S.M. and that of A.S. indicated, at best, that they were aware of a possibility that they might be out of the county. But ambiguity does not satisfy the statute. In an election contest, such as the one presented in this case, where the voter's response is ambiguous, and there is a lack of objective evidence, even when it has been requested from the voter, to establish that the voter did in good faith plan to be out of the county on election day, the voter cannot escape the statutory out-of-the-county requirement of the statute through ambiguity. Additionally, the absentee-ballot process provides a remedy in an emergency situation, when a voter learns of unforeseen employment circumstances that require the voter to be out of the county on election day. If a voter learns, not more than five days before an election, that an out-of-county employment requirement will exist on election day, the voter can vote an emergency absentee ballot. [43] The trial court's findings as to the testimony of L.B., S.M., and A.S. are subject to the ore tenus rule, and, in view of the evidence, they were not plainly and palpably wrong. The ore tenus presumptions are especially pertinent in respect to the testimony of D.K. and the testimony of R.L., whose names and positions are well known in Jefferson County. Because the need for anonymity outweighs the need to present the most candid and detailed analysis of their testimony, I will discuss the evidence they presented in relatively general terms. As to his election-day plans, D.K. testified as follows: Q. [By Hale's counsel] And were you in Jefferson County on November 3, 1998? A. [By D.K.] Yes, sir. Q. And were you on duty that day? A. Yes, sir. Q. Okay. Did you work all day? A. I hadn't planned on it, but I did, yes, sir. Q. Okay. You said that you hadn't planned on it. What had you planned to do? A. I had planned to go play some golf out of the county that day and come back at seven-thirty that night for the [election] returns. Q. Okay. Where were you going to play golf? A. Far away from Jefferson County, sir. Q. Well, there are a lot of places `far away from Jefferson County.' A. I play in Blount County. I have gone to Cullman, different places. Q. So you were going to go play golf somewhere, but you don't know where, is that what you are saying? A. That's correct. I hadn't finalized my plans. Q. And who were you going to go with? A. I hadn't finalized my plans, sir. (Reporter's Transcript, at 497-98.) (Emphasis added.) Considering D.K.'s identity and his employment position, the trial judge could have found this testimony entirely incredible. At a minimum, the testimony suggests that at the time D.K. executed his on-site affidavit, he had no definite plans to be out of the county on election day. Because of the identity and position of R.L., his testimony was subject to the same analysis. A finding, therefore, that R.L. did not intend to be unable to vote on election day because of an anticipated absence from the county is entirely consistent with the presumptions attending ore tenus evidence. Indeed, I am convinced that the real rationale for the majority's disposition of these five votes is the same rationale that almost persuaded it to excuse the poll workers who falsified their affidavits. In other words, the actual rationale is that these voters could have voted a regular absentee ballot; ipso facto, they can vote an on-site absentee ballot. Under this inexplicable rationale, any voter who could vote under some provision of the absentee-ballot law is automatically entitled to vote under any provision of the absentee-ballot law. Under this rationale, the votes of L.B., S.M., A.S., D.K., and R.L. should not be excluded because they did not vote by a regular absentee ballot. Inasmuch as the majority concedes that the votes were not cast in accordance with the on-site election statute, the votes are due to be excluded for failure to strictly comply with statutory requirements, in the absence of a procedure or rule to recognize the votes as being legal. The procedure that is applied by the majority in this case is the substantial-compliance rule as set forth in Williams v. Lide, 628 So.2d 531 (Ala.1993). [44] That rule was, of course, at the center of the dispute over the 1994 race for Chief Justice. In response to loud and strident objections from various nonjudicial quarters to the substantial-compliance rule, the Legislature in 1996 made extensive revisions of the absentee-ballot law. The implications of these revisions were illustrated in Taylor v. Cox, supra, where this Court construed the absentee-ballot law in a manner that can only be understood as strict compliance. As if to emphasize that point, Justice See called attention to the history that gave rise to the [1996 amendment of Ala.Code 1975,] § 17-10-7. 710 So.2d at 409, n. 6 (See, J., concurring specially). He asserted that Roe v. Mobile County Appt. Bd., 676 So.2d 1206, 1226 (Ala.1995), had held absentee ballots could be counted even if they failed to comply with the two-witnesses-or-notarization requirement of § 17-10-7. Id. Finally, he stated: In my view, far from approving this Court's holding in Roe, [the 1996 amendment] was an express disapproval of judicial departures from the plain meaning of election statutes.  710 So.2d at 409, n. 6 (emphasis added). In this class of case, plain meaning is simply shorthand for strict compliance. In other words, the Court required strict compliance with the absentee-voter law. This Court cannot have it both ways. Either the absentee-voter law requires strict compliance, consistent with Taylor, or it requires substantial compliance, in line with Roe. As I pointed out in Part I.B.(1), which deals with the regular absentee voters, the majority required of the individuals who voted for Hale strict compliance. The majority attempts to circumvent the obvious implications of its inconsistency by avoiding the explicit use of the term, strict compliance and by describing the conduct it wishes to excuse as not implicating `essential requirements of the absentee-voting law.' 752 So.2d at 1153. Apparently, the prevention of voter fraud specifically, the execution of the on-site affidavit by a voter who does not in good faith plan to be out of the county on election daydoes not strike the majority as one of the `essential requirements of the absentee-voting law.' When I voted on this Court's August 20, 1999, remand order, see 752 So.2d at 1136, I could not have foreseen that the majority would take this approach with regard to some of the 115 on-site ballots at issue before this Court at that time. One of the issues before us at that time was whether there was any significance in the fact that 115 voters had not checked the box that appeared on the on-site affidavits to indicate the reason they were voting under that provision of the absentee-ballot law. Hale had argued that the failureor refusalof the voters to check the box was significant. He argued in effect (1) that there is a difference between saying something and saying nothing; (2) that if affiants mark the box on the on-site affidavit forms corresponding to § 17-10-7(c)(5), they affirmatively say something, thus bringing them squarely and incontrovertibly within the imprecations of the oath; (3) that if they do not mark the box, they have not given the information contained therein, and, therefore, will not beor will not feelbound by the oath or threatened by its maledictions; and (4) that as a result, the oath will fail of its essential purpose. Indeed, Eubanks's own witness, Charles Grainger, general counsel for the secretary of state, testified: And there are people who walk in thinking they can vote for any reason whatsoever. And they come there and they find out you can only vote if you are going to be out of the county on election day. And it's possible that some of these people would look at that affidavit and say well if I don't check that box, I'm not committing perjury.  (Emphasis added.) This Court rejected those arguments. Specifically, it said: In the case of an absentee ballot cast on site, however, there is only one reason entitling the voter to vote an absentee ballot; therefore, there is no need to indicate which reason the voter has for voting absentee. Simply by signing the affidavit, the voter is swearing or affirming that the single reason stated in paragraph (5) is true and correct, and the voter could be prosecuted for falsely swearing or affirming false information.  752 So.2d at 1127 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). When I voted on the August 20, 1999, opinion, I fully believed that the Court was committed to that proposition, namely, that a voter could be prosecuted for falsely swearing or affirming false information, simply by signing his or her name to the affidavit. In other words, I was convinced that voters with false intentions who did not check the boxes were just as liable to prosecution as if they had checked the boxes with false intentions. I was convinced that the Legislature deemed it unnecessary to compel a voter to check the box. To my dismay, the majority has now shifted its position, and holds, in effect, that falsely swearing or affirming false information is not a serious offense. Indeed, holds the majority, a truthful affidavit is not one of the `essential requirements of the absentee voting law.' 752 So.2d at 1128. I hasten to point out that strict compliance does not require the impossible or the absurd. A voter need not be a prophet to vote by on-site absentee ballot. The voter must, however, at the time he or she executes the affidavit, have a definite plan to be out of the county on election day. For example, R.G.L., who voted by on-site absentee ballot, but nevertheless was in the county on election day, testified as follows: A. [R.G.L.] I had a business trip planned leaving that Monday the 2nd, that afternoon, and returning Tuesday night after the polls closed. So there wasn't anything sinister. It was just that my plans changed. My father was put in the hospital and had emergency surgery on the 3rd, that Tuesday, on election day. So, I cancelled my business trip and stayed with him. Q. [Counsel for Woodward] So, on Saturday, ten days before the election, you expected to be ... A. Yes, sir. Q .... out of the county on election day? A. Yes, sir. (Reporter's Transcript, at 783-84.) J.C.B., who also voted by on-site absentee ballot, but who was in the county on election day, testified in a similar fashion. Consequently, I would hold that the votes of R.G.L. and J.C.B. are due to be counted. As I pointed out in my special writing of August 20, 1999, on-site absentee voting in Alabama is new. 752 So.2d at 1137 (Cook, J., concurring in the result). It was authorized by Act No. 96-885, 1996 Ala. Act 1699, in connection with various other revisions of the absentee-ballot law. I assume that the Legislature had valid and considered reasons for restricting the right to use an on-site absentee ballot to those whose sole reason for voting absentee is that they would be out of the county on election day. In that connection, the Legislature has this year again amended the on-site absentee-ballot law. Specifically, Act No. 99-388, 1999 Ala. Acts 615, adds, among other things, the following provision: (j) Election officers appointed to an on-site absentee balloting location shall: (1) Post a sign at the entrance of the on-site absentee voting place notifying prospective voters that they may only vote absentee at the on-site absentee balloting location if the voter will be out of the county on election day.  (Emphasis added.) Act No. 99-388 reinforces my view that the Legislature meant what it said in creating the special method of voting absentee and making it available only to those who have definite plans to be out of the county on election day. In any case, [a]ll questions of propriety, wisdom, necessity, utility, and expediency of legislation are exclusively for the Legislature and are questions with which this Court has no concern. Johnson v. Price, 743 So.2d 436, 438 (Ala.1999); see Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So.2d 810 (1944). In reasoning that voters who might have voted by regular absentee ballot are ipso facto authorized to vote by on-site absentee ballot, the majority abrogates in toto the legislative scheme authorizing on-site absentee voting. For these reasons, Woodward is not entitled to any of the 12 votes included in this block. Woodward's total is reduced by 12, yielding 106,281 votes. Hale's total remains at 106,287. Hale leads by 6 votes.