Opinion ID: 52848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Use of Grand Jury Testimony to Authenticate Business Records

Text: (1) Standard of Review Morgan claims that the use of Davies's grand jury testimony to authenticate the business records used against her at trial violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. This Court reviews de novo a timely Confrontation Clause objection, subject to harmless error analysis. United States v. Acosta, 475 F.3d 677, 680 (5th Cir.2007). (2) Applicable Law The Confrontation Clause gives the accused in a criminal prosecution the right to be confronted by the witnesses against him. In Crawford v. Washington, the Court held that [w]here testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). The Court declined to define testimonial, but it determined that it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations. Id. The statements at issue in Crawford were admitted at trial. Id. at 40, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Preliminary questions concerning . . . the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court. . . . In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges. FED.R.EVID. 104(a). In Bourjaily v. United States, the Court upheld the district court's consideration of hearsay during its preliminary determination on the admissibility of evidence under Rule 104(a). 483 U.S. 171, 174, 178, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987). (3) Analysis This issue centers on whether the Confrontation Clause provides the same protections to defendants at preliminary proceedings as it does at trial under Crawford. Crawford specifically defines grand jury testimony as testimonial in nature. 541 U.S. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. Davies's grand jury testimony was used as the basis for authentication by the district court in its determination that the business records in exhibits one through twelve were admissible at trial. Davies was unavailable for trial, and he was not cross-examined before the grand jury. Before Crawford, this Court held that a defendant was not denied his Confrontation Clause right when the government did not release the identity of an informant or the information supplied by the informant at a suppression hearing. United States v. De Los Santos, 810 F.2d 1326, 1334-35 (5th Cir.1987). This Court has also held that the admission of a certificate of the absence of public records at trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Mix, 446 F.2d 615, 621-23 (5th Cir.1971). Since Crawford, this Court has held that there is no Crawford violation when hearsay testimony is used at sentencing, rather than at trial. United States v. Beydoun, 469 F.3d 102, 108 (5th Cir.2006). While the Fifth Circuit has not decided whether Crawford applies to pretrial proceedings and determinations, the Seventh Circuit has held that a written certification attesting to the authenticity of business records is not testimonial. United States v. Ellis, 460 F.3d 920, 927 (7th Cir.2006). That court reasoned that since the Supreme Court had identified business records as nontestimonial, it would be odd to hold that the foundational evidence authenticating the records [falls under the Confrontation Clause]. Id. The Ninth Circuit similarly held that the routine certifications provided for public records were not testimonial in nature. United States v. Weiland, 420 F.3d 1062, 1077 (9th Cir. 2005). That court reasoned that such a certification was a routine cataloguing of an unambiguous factual matter. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Ninth Circuit further reasoned that requiring the records custodians and other officials from the various states and municipalities to make themselves available for cross-examination in the countless criminal cases heard each day in our country would present a serious logistical challenge without any apparent gain in the truth-seeking process. Id. (internal quotation omitted). Based upon pre- Crawford precedent, this Court's decision that Crawford does not apply to sentencing, and persuasive authority from the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, we hold that Crawford does not apply to the foundational evidence authenticating business records in preliminary determinations of the admissibility of evidence.