Opinion ID: 2135417
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Heading: Variance in Trial Information.

Text: The purpose of an indictment or information is to apprise the defendant of the crime charged so that the defendant may have the opportunity to prepare a defense. State v. Willet, 305 N.W.2d 454, 457 (Iowa 1981); see also State v. Kirby, 391 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1986). The requirement that the State prove an offense in the manner charged is not an end in itself but merely a means of protecting a defendant from being misled by the charging instrument. Kirby, 391 N.W.2d at 245. Generally an information need not detail the manner in which the offense was committed. See State v. Johnson, 162 N.W.2d 453, 455 (Iowa 1968); Iowa R.Crim.P. 4(7). If the State specifies one way of committing a crime, however, the offense must be proved to have been committed in the way charged. Willet, 305 N.W.2d at 457. In this case, the State accused Grice of second-degree robbery without specifying that it would prove a particular action that Grice took to further the intended theft or her escape from the premises. See, e.g., Willet, 305 N.W.2d at 456-57 (defendant charged with third-degree sexual abuse by force or against the will of the victim, while proof at trial was based on the ages of the participants). Additionally, the information complied with our short form of indictment for robbery. Iowa R.Crim.P. 31, Form 10. We find no variance on this ground. Thus, we are left with the narrow question of whether there was a fatal variance between the information and the proof because the actual victim of the intended theft, Hy-Vee, was not identified in the information. We note that robbery requires an intent to commit a theft. Iowa Code § 711.1. Theft as defined in Iowa Code section 714.1(1) includes taking possession or control of the property of another, or property in the possession of another.... We believe an allegation that the victim was the owner of the property taken means no more than that the person named had a better right of possession than the robber. 67 Am.Jur.2d Robbery § 70, at 123 (1985); see also People v. Jordan, 155 Cal.App.3d 769, 203 Cal.Rptr. 172, 180 (1984); State v. Jackson, 306 N.C. 642, 295 S.E.2d 383, 390 (1982). Here the State's evidence clearly establishes both the existence of the Hy-Vee store as the theft victim and of the relationship between Hy-Vee and Johnston. See State v. Matlock, 289 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1980). The record shows that Grice intended to take cartons of cigarettes from the store which were under the control of Johnston as a store employee. Id. at 628-29. Grice had no right of possession as against Johnston or any other employees. We therefore hold that an allegation that the property taken was owned by one person and proof that it was owned by another does not give rise to a fatal variance in a robbery case. 67 Am.Jur.2d Robbery § 70, at 123; see also Jordan, 203 Cal.Rptr. at 181. Since the adoption of the short form indictment, Iowa courts consider both the indictment or information and the minutes filed when determining the adequacy of the allegations to apprise the accused of the crime charged. State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 765 (Iowa 1975); see also Kirby, 391 N.W.2d at 245. The minutes of testimony attached to the information clearly indicate the State's theory of the case. We can find no basis upon which Grice could have been misled with respect to the robbery charge. Any variance between the crime charged and the proof at trial was not prejudicial. See Willet, 305 N.W.2d at 457; Iowa R.Crim.P. 4(7). We hold that the court erred in dismissing the charge against Grice. However, the judgment of acquittal is final as to Grice. See State v. Timmer, 260 Iowa 993, 995, 151 N.W.2d 558, 559 (1967). We therefore reverse the judgment of acquittal but do not remand the case. REVERSED.