Opinion ID: 1853745
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Investigate and Present a Voluntary Intoxication Defense[3]

Text: Pooler claims that defense counsel, Michael Salnick, was ineffective for failing to investigate and present a voluntary intoxication defense. At the evidentiary hearing, Pooler introduced evidence relating to his alcohol use. The evidence included a police report made by Pooler two to three hours before the murder alleging that someone stole $301 from him while he was asleep in his vehicle due to intoxication. Detective Frank Alonzo of the West Palm Beach Police Department, who made the police report, testified that although Pooler smelled of alcohol at the time he came to the police department, he did not appear intoxicated, did not slur his speech, and answered all questions. Because Pooler did not seem intoxicated, Detective Alonzo did not prevent him from getting into his car and driving after making the report. Pooler also presented two handwritten letters authored by his nephews, Brian and Darren Warren, attesting to Pooler's alcohol problem. Brian's letter stated, On the morning of the shooting . . . Leroy called me [and] told me he knew Kim had been killed but he could not remember what happened. He was very upset and it seemed he was still drunk. Both nephews stated that they would have testified at trial but were not contacted by Pooler's defense team. The postconviction trial court denied this claim because the evidence did not support a voluntary intoxication defense and because Pooler thwarted any possibility of raising this defense when he refused to admit to shooting Kim Brown. We affirm the trial court's order. Although the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing suggests that Pooler may have had a history of alcohol abuse and may have been drinking the night before and soon after the murder, none of the evidence establishes that he was intoxicated at the time of the murder. Indeed, the testimony of Detective Alonzo establishes that Pooler was not intoxicated just a few hours before the murder. Pooler presented no evidence that he became intoxicated between the time he left the police department and the time he arrived at Kim Brown's house. Accordingly, he failed to establish any reasonable basis upon which to assert the affirmative defense of voluntary intoxication. See Reaves v. State, 826 So.2d 932, 938-39, n. 9 (Fla.2002) (holding that in order to successfully assert the defense of voluntary intoxication, the defendant must come forward with evidence of intoxication at the time of the offense sufficient to establish that he was unable to form the intent necessary to commit the crime charged). Moreover, Salnick made a reasonable tactical decision not to pursue a voluntary intoxication defense. See Rivera v. State, 717 So.2d 477, 485 (Fla.1998) (holding that trial counsel made a reasonable tactical decision to forego a voluntary intoxication defense because there was no evidence that Rivera was intoxicated at the time of the murder ). Salnick testified that he considered a possible voluntary intoxication defense but chose not to present it because Pooler could recall specific details regarding the day of the murder and because neither Pooler nor any of his family members mentioned that Pooler had a history of alcoholism or that he was intoxicated at the time of the murder. Additionally, the trial court found, based on competent, substantial evidence, that Pooler refused to participate in any defense that required him to admit that he did the shooting. Counsel was thus prevented from asserting the voluntary intoxication defense. See Rivera, 717 So.2d at 485 (holding that counsel's performance was not deficient because Rivera's unwavering professions of innocence short-circuited any credible voluntary intoxication defense during the guilt phase); Rose v. State, 617 So.2d 291, 294 (Fla.1993) (When a defendant preempts his attorney's strategy by insisting that a different defense be followed, no claim of ineffectiveness can be made.) (quoting Mitchell v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 886, 889 (11th Cir. 1985)). Pooler denies that he refused to admit to the killing. However, a memorandum from Salnick to Pooler on the eve of trial confirms that Pooler ultimately rejected a plea deal for a life sentence, refused to admit to shooting Kim, and directed Salnick to pursue a sufficiency of the evidence strategy. In light of this evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual finding and affirm its conclusion that Salnick was not ineffective in foregoing a voluntary intoxication defense because it would have undermined Pooler's chosen defense strategy. See Freeman v. State, 858 So.2d 319, 323 (Fla.2003) (holding that while the performance and prejudice prongs are mixed questions of law and fact subject to a de novo standard, deference is given to the trial court's factual findings which are supported by competent, substantial evidence). Pooler failed to prove any deficiency in Salnick's performance in regard to this issue. In light of this failure, we need not address the prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . . to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one.); Downs v. State, 740 So.2d 506, 518 n. 19 (Fla.1999) (finding no need to address prejudice prong where defendant failed to establish deficient performance element).