Opinion ID: 1952376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Principal and Agent Vicarious Liability Doctrine

Text: Fisher alleges that he was personally injured by the tortious physical conduct of Reid. Fisher further asserts that Reid is an agent of Townsends. Accordingly, Fisher seeks redress against Townsends, as the alleged principal of Reid, on the basis of vicarious liability  respondeat superior. Townsends' defense is that Reid was not its agent. When a third-party plaintiff's legal theory is based upon vicarious liability, several types of relationships must be identified and distinguished: principal/agent; master/servant; employer/employee; agent-independent contractor and non-agent independent contractor. These distinctions are important in evaluating a defendant's liability to third parties who are harmed by the tortious physical act of another. In fact, the distinctions are often outcome determinative. The principal/agent relationship is generic. An agency relationship is created when one party consents to have another act on its behalf, with the principal controlling and directing the acts of the agent. Sears Mortgage Corp. v. Rose, N.J.Supr., 634 A.2d 74, 79 (1993); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1958). One type of principal/agent relationship is characterized by the term master/servant. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2. Servants are subject to physical control by the principal and are, generally, employees of the principal. See id. All masters are principals and all servants are agents. There are some agents, however, who are not servants. All agents who are not servants are regarded as independent contractors. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1, 2, 220; see also id. § 1 cmt. d, e; id. § 2 cmt. a; id. ch. 7 tit. B Introductory Note (preceding § 219). In addition, all non-agents who contract to do work for another are also termed independent contractors. Consequently, there are agent-independent contractors and non-agent independent contractors. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14N & cmt. a, b. Two general rules establish the framework for determining vicarious liability. The first general rule is that if the principal is the master of an agent who is a servant, the fault of the agent, if acting within the scope of employment, will be imputed to the principal by the doctrine of respondeat superior. [5] Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., Del. Supr., 215 A.2d 427, 432 (1965); see Draper v. Olivere Paving & Constr. Corp., Del.Supr., 181 A.2d 565, 569-70 (1962); see also Wilson v. Joma, Inc., Del.Supr., 537 A.2d 187, 189 (1988) (identifying criteria for determining whether conduct of servant is within scope of employment). The second general rule is that an owner or contractee will not be held liable for the torts of an independent contractor which are committed in the performance of the contracted work. See Schagrin v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., Del.Super., 304 A.2d 61, 63-64 (1973); see also O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., Del.Super., 503 A.2d 661, 663 (1985); Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments, Inc., Del.Super., 318 A.2d 619, 623-24 (1974). The second general rule has been substantially eroded by numerous exceptions. See O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d at 663; Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments, Inc., 318 A.2d at 623; Schagrin v. Wilmington Med. Ctr., Inc., 304 A.2d at 64; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 410-429 (1965) [6] ; W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 71, at 509-16 (5th ed.1984). For example, if the owner or contractee retains control over the activities of an independent contractor, the owner or contractee will be held liable for the torts of the independent contractor. See O'Connor v. Diamond State Tel. Co., 503 A.2d at 663; Seeney v. Dover Country Club Apartments, Inc., 318 A.2d at 623.