Opinion ID: 590281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Patterson's Failure-to-Promote Exception

Text: 16 Patterson precludes an action under § 1981 relating to the conditions of employment unless the claim involves a discriminatory failure-to-promote where the nature of the change in position was such that it involved the opportunity to enter into a new contract with the employer. In the language of Patterson, a failure-to-promote claim is actionable under § 1981 only where the promotion rises to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185, 109 S.Ct. at 2377. This case does not fit Patterson's failure-to-promote exception. 17 The district court found that Holt's desired promotions would involve simply more responsibility for the production of goods manufactured by Michigan State Industries and, presumably, increased pay and benefits. The district court held, therefore, that the desired promotions did not rise to the level of an opportunity for a new and distinct relation between the employee and the employer. See Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185-86, 109 S.Ct. at 2377. The district court contrasted Holt's situation with that of the employee in Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 104 S.Ct. 2229, 81 L.Ed.2d 59 (1984), a case cited by the Patterson court (with a Cf. signal) in conjunction with its discussion of the a new and distinct relation standard. In Hishon, a Title VII case, a law firm refused to promote an associate attorney, a woman, to the position of partner. Apparently, the Court's reference to Hishon indicates that, in the Court's view, an employer's failure to promote an employee from law firm associate to partner constitutes a new and distinct employment relation actionable under § 1981. 18 The defendants acknowledge that some district courts in the Sixth Circuit have construed Patterson's new and distinct relation standard fairly broadly. Brief of Appellee at 15. That is to say, some courts have viewed Hishon's facts to fall somewhere in the middle of a continuum of employment scenarios that give rise to new and distinct employment relations. 19 To be sure, Patterson's new and distinct relation standard admits of no simple, bright-line test. A review of cases interpreting Patterson discloses that courts have had to undertake subtle, sometimes hairsplitting analyses to determine whether a change in employment constitutes a new and distinct relation. The case at hand, however, is not so taxing. Holt seeks to move from one supervisory position (level V) to another (level VI). Though such a move brings with it increased responsibilities--for example, overseeing non-prisoner workers--and a potential pay increase, such a move constitutes an incremental change in employment of the type nearly all courts have found insufficient to establish a claim under Patterson. Holt's sought-after promotion differs in degree and kind from a promotion from a non-supervisory to a supervisory post, or a change from an hourly wage or commission-based salary to a weekly or annual salary--employment scenarios most courts have deemed actionable under Patterson. See generally Taylor v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir.1992). While the facts of Hishon do not define the entire scope of Patterson's new and distinct relation standard, we decline to extend that standard to encompass the facts of this case. 20 Accordingly, we hold that Holt's desired promotion, standing alone, would not constitute a new and distinct relation between employee and employer within the meaning of Patterson. Holt's complaint, in other words, does not establish a failure-to-promote claim under § 1981. We therefore affirm the district court's summary judgment because no genuine issue of material exists and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Canderm Pharmacal, Ltd. v. Elder Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 862 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.1988).