Opinion ID: 1667387
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Doctrine of Accretion and Mineral Rights Other Jurisdictions

Text: Other jurisdictions have concluded that mineral interests in land are subject to the doctrine of accretion. For example, in Ely v. Briley, 959 S.W.2d 723 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998), where landowners filed suit against an oil and gas lessee claiming mineral royalties from the accreted property, the Texas Court of Appeals decided that a mineral interest is a property interest irrespective of whether or not the mineral interest is constructively severed from the land. Because a constructively severed mineral estate is a property interest of equal dignity as a surface estate, it logically should be subject to accretion. Id. at 726. Likewise, another division of the Texas Court of Appeals recently adopted the same approach. Siegert v. Seneca Resources Corp., 28 S.W.3d 680 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2000). In Nilsen v. Tenneco Oil Co., 614 P.2d 36 (Okla.1980), the Oklahoma Supreme Court was asked to decide whether accretion carries with it title to the underlying minerals, when the minerals have been severed from the surface estate. The trial court had ruled that a severed mineral interest could not be lost by accretion. The Oklahoma Supreme Court disagreed based upon its view that distinguishing between severed and unsevered mineral interests would allow fee owners to convey a greater mineral estate than they themselves possess. Id. The court also noted that such a rule would inevitably result in inequities because an unsevered mineral interest would still be subject to loss by virtue of accretion; whereas, a severed mineral interest would never be subject to such loss. Id. The Supreme Court of Montana adopted the Nilsen court's analysis, holding that severed mineral interests are subject to the doctrine of accretion. Jackson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 205 Mont. 200, 207, 667 P.2d 406, 409-410 (1983). Finally, various treatises on oil and gas law agree that the majority of courts are consistent in holding that mineral rights are subject to the doctrine of accretion. 1-2 William & Meyers, Oil and Gas Law § 224.9 (2003); Eugene Kuntz, Law of Oil and Gas § 3.2(c) (2003). Stephens Production nonetheless suggests that the above-cited cases are inapposite because the appeal here does not concern the distinction between severed and unsevered mineral rights. While we agree that such a distinction is not at issue here, other jurisdictions have not extended additional protection for a working interest under an oil and gas lease. [4] In fact, the Texas Court of Appeals has acknowledged that an unsevered riparian mineral estate is subject to the doctrine of accretion. Ely v. Briley, supra . Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Ellis v. Union Oil Co. of California, 630 P.2d 306 (Okla.1981), noted that Nilsen stood for the proposition that mineral estates, whether severed or not, are like surface estates, both subject to loss or gain by the process of accretion. Id. at 309. See also, Seigle v. Thomas, 627 P.2d 417 (Okla.1981). Here, it is undisputed that the appellants own both the surface and mineral estates; that is, the mineral interests at issue are unsevered and therefore subject to the doctrine of accretion. Even those commentators who are critical of court decisions holding that severed minerals estates are subject to accretion unanimously agree that unsevered mineral estates should be subject to accretion. Daniel K. Brough, Alternatives In Accretions: Why There Is Not Yet An Appropriate Solution To The Application of Accretion Law to Mineral Estates, 2004 B.Y.U. L.REV. 169 (2004); Robert K. Kimball, Accretion and Severed Mineral Estates, 53 U. CHI. L.REV. 232 (1986). Notwithstanding the previously noted authority to the contrary, Stephens Production asserts that we should treat a leasehold working interest in a production unit differently by recognizing an oil and gas lease exception to our doctrine of accretion. As defined by Stephens Production, a leasehold working interest is automatically acquired by a lessee under an oil and gas lease, without regard to whether the mineral interest is severed or not. [5] Although Stephens Production may indeed have a working interest under the oil and gas leases, neither party has cited us to any authority that supports an exemption from the doctrine of accretion for a leasehold working interest. This court will not consider an argument without citation to authority, unless the argument is so well-established that no additional research is necessary. Kelly v. State, 350 Ark. 238, 85 S.W.3d 893 (2002); Rainey v. Hartness, 339 Ark. 293, 5 S.W.3d 410 (1999). Similarly, Stephens Productions also contends that the unique nature of leasehold working interests should override some technical interpretation of when and how title vests when riverbed lands emerge and become dry land. In other words, Stephens Production urges this court to ignore the common law doctrine of accretion and the Arkansas legislature's acknowledgment of that doctrine by the enactment of Section 22-5-404. Once again, we decline to consider an argument without citation to authority. Finally, the terms of the Davidson and Harris leases expressly acknowledge the common law doctrine of accretion. The oil and gas leases between Stephens Production and the appellants provide that the leases extend to any accretions. [6] Thus, we hold that the accreted land is subject to the appellants' respective royalty interests granted under those leases. Reversed and Remanded. THORNTON, J., not participating.