Opinion ID: 761518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutional Basis For Meehan's Federal Malicious Prosecution Action

Text: 13 We note as an initial matter that Meehan's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is not properly based on either a procedural or substantive due process violation. A § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution as a deprivation of procedural due process is barred where, as here, the state's tort law recognizes a malicious prosecution cause of action. See Roche, 81 F.3d at 256; Perez-Ruiz v. Crespo-Guillen, 25 F.3d 40, 42-43 (1st Cir.1994). Further, [t]here is no substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from malicious prosecution. Roche, 81 F.3d at 256 (citing Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994) (plurality opinion)); see also Perez-Ruiz, 25 F.3d at 42 (Albright would appear virtually to foreclose reliance on substantive due process as the basis for a viable malicious prosecution claim under section 1983....). 14 However, there is a possibility that Meehan's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim may be actionable under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Albright, 510 U.S. at 271, 114 S.Ct. 807 (plurality opinion) (We hold that it is the Fourth Amendment, and not substantive due process, under which petitioner Albright's claim [under § 1983 that he was prosecuted without probable cause] must be judged.); Roche, 81 F.3d at 256 n. 5 ([T]he Supreme Court left open the possibility that a malicious prosecution claim might lie under § 1983 on the basis of the Fourth Amendment....); Calero-Colon v. Betancourt-Lebron, 68 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1995). In fact, the district court proceeded under the assumption that Meehan's § 1983 malicious prosecution claim pleaded a deprivation of Fourth Amendment rights. See August 20, 1997 Memorandum and Order, at 15. As Meehan has provided no further argument on this question, this Court will treat his § 1983 claim similarly.