Opinion ID: 706940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: 7 An IFP petition under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1915(d) may be dismissed if the district court is satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. We review a district court's section 1915(d) dismissal under the abuse-of-discretion standard. 4
8 Prior to the Supreme Court teachings in Neitzke v. Williams 5 and Denton v. Hernandez, 6 we held in Cay v. Estelle 7 that [a]n IFP proceeding may be dismissed if (1) the claim's realistic chance of ultimate success is slight; (2) the claim has no arguable basis in law or fact; or (3) it is clear that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim. Thereafter, however, we determined that Neitzke invalidated Cay 's third prong 8 and that Denton, invalidated its first prong. 9 There is no question, however, regarding the continued validity of Cay 's second prong. 10 In both Neitzke and Denton, the Court held that a complaint is frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. 11 9 A court may dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only if the facts are clearly baseless, a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and 'delusional. 12 As Hicks' factual assertions obviously do not fall within this category, we must review Hicks' legal arguments to determine whether they have an arguable basis in law. 13 We initially examine his First Amendment claim and then his RFRA claim.
10 The rule is well established that inmates retain their First Amendment right to exercise religion; 14 however, this right is subject to reasonable restrictions and limitations necessitated by penological goals. 15 Equally clear in this circuit is the proposition that prison grooming regulations, including specifically the requirement that a prisoner cut his hair and beard, are rationally related to the achievement of valid penological goals, such as security and inmate identification. 16 Hicks does nothing to distinguish his case from the long line of cases that establish this precedent. Regardless of whether Hicks is in the general prison population or in AS, the penological goals behind the grooming requirements remain. Thus, Hicks has failed to identify an arguable basis in law for his free exercise claim; it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. 17 Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Hicks' First Amendment claim.
11 On the other hand, we conclude that the district court did abuse its discretion by dismissing Hicks' claim under RFRA. Passed by Congress in 1993, RFRA states in pertinent part: 12 Sec. 2000bb-1. Free exercise of religion protected (a) In general. Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b). 13 (b) Exception. Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person-- 14 (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 15 (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 18 16 The purpose of the RFRA is to restore the compelling interest test ... in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened. 19 Given this broad statement of purpose, we join every other circuit that has addressed this issue in concluding that RFRA clearly applies to prisoners' claims. 20 Thus the issue whether the prison violated Hicks' religious rights under RFRA must be analyzed using the substantial burden test rather than the less stringent reasonable opportunity test previously employed. 21 17 We cannot see how the district court could have validly concluded that Hicks' claim under RFRA lacks an arguable basis in law. Not passed until late in 1993, RFRA remains relatively new law; its statutory contours are vague and its legal limits and standards have yet to be defined. 22 More importantly, we have yet to address RFRA or any of its discrete standards. Although either a motion for summary judgment or the further development of case law in this circuit may ultimately defeat Hicks' RFRA claim, we hold that, at this early stage in the development of RFRA, Hicks has a fightin' chance to make some of that the law. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion when it summarily dismissed Hicks' RFRA claim as frivolous. We therefore vacate the district court's ruling on Hicks' RFRA claim and remand it for further adjudication consistent with this opinion. To facilitate future appellate review, the district court should on remand explain its analysis in some detail. III CONCLUSIONS 18 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court's dismissal of Hicks' First Amendment claim, but vacate and remand his claim under RFRA for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 19 AFFIRMED in part, and VACATED and REMANDED in part.