Opinion ID: 2599164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the judgment in several respects. [2] In reviewing a criminal conviction challenged as lacking evidentiary support, the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) The same standard applies to special circumstance allegations. ( People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 413-414, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) We conclude that the evidence was insufficient to support the kidnapping for robbery conviction and kidnapping-murder special circumstance and otherwise find sufficient evidence supports the judgment.
Defendant argues that Lonnie's testimony, even if admissible, was insufficient to support any of the convictions. We disagree for reasons similar to those we stated in rejecting similar arguments in People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 1182, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969. Lonnie's credibility was for the jury to determine, not an appellate court. His testimony, if believed, as the jury clearly did at least in large measure, provided solid evidence of defendant's involvement in these crimes. Moreover, the jury did not have to believe every detail of that testimony to find defendant guilty of the charges or even to return a verdict of death; indeed, it could have suspected that Lonnie down-played his own role while still reasonably finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Lonnie's testimony was not all that incriminated defendant. Although Lonnie alone provided the details of exactly who did what that night after the truck stopped, other evidence connected defendant with the crime. Independent evidence showed that Schultz was with defendant in the truck when last seen alive by someone other than the Hillhouse brothers; crime scene evidence supported Lonnie's testimony that the body had been dragged; Dodge saw defendant wiping fingerprints off the truck alone in the middle of the night; defendant had access to the knife missing from Dodge's kitchen that may have been the murder weapon; defendant wanted to sell Schultz's truck and then hid it; he attempted to sell and, with Lonnie's help, pawned some of the victim's tools; he also acted suspiciously and made suspicious comments to various persons after the crime, showing a consciousness of guilt. Defendant's actions, shown by independent witnesses, strongly suggest that he, not Lonnie, was the leader of the two brothers and that he took the leadership role in the crime. Accordingly, `we cannot conclude that [Lonnie's] testimony rendered either the capital conviction or the death sentence unreliable.' ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1182, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.)
The jury convicted defendant of kidnapping Schultz for robbery and found true a kidnapping-murder special circumstance. The trial court also instructed on kidnapping as a theory of first degree felony murder. As the court instructed the jury, the kidnapping count was not based on the movement in the truck, for there was no evidence that movement was against Schultz's will. Rather, the kidnapping charge was based solely on the dragging of Schultz after he was stabbed. The evidence showed defendant and Lonnie dragged him around 100-150 feet to a place difficult to see from the road. Section 209, subdivision (b), makes guilty of kidnapping for robbery Any person who kidnaps or carries away any individual to commit robbery.... Kidnapping for robbery, or aggravated kidnapping, requires movement of the victim that is not merely incidental to the commission of the robbery, and which substantially increases the risk of harm over and above that necessarily present in the crime of robbery itself. ( People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369.) Defendant argues several reasons the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction and special circumstance. We need not consider all of the arguments, for we find one to be dispositive: the evidence was insufficient to prove that Schultz was still alive at the time of the dragging. There can be no doubt that, like rape ( People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 524, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385), kidnapping in general, and kidnapping for robbery in particular, requires a live victim. The Attorney General does not argue otherwise. If one kills, then moves the body, the crimes committed do not include kidnapping. The statutory references to a person (§ 207, subd. (a)) or an individual (§ 209, subd. (b)), as the kidnapping victim, clearly contemplate someone alive. Indeed, no further harm can befall someone already dead; asportation of a corpse cannot increase the risk of harm. The evidence regarding whether Schultz was dead or alive when defendant dragged him is inconclusive, but most of it indicates he was probably already dead. Lonnie testified that all the stabbing occurred by the truck before the movement and said that the body never moved on its own or made a sound during any of the dragging. Dr. Gwen Hall, the pathologist who performed the autopsy, provided the most important testimony. Schultz died of four stab wounds, each of which independently could have been fatal. The injuries themselves indicated Schultz could have survived minutes, perhaps twenty minutes to an hour at the most. This testimony alone would suggest that Schultz might have survived during part or all of the dragging. But Dr. Hall also testified that a certain head bruise caused by hitting something like a car door or the ground (i.e., likely caused when Schultz fell after the stabbing) occurred at or about the time of death. More importantly, abrasions on the back, obviously caused during the dragging, showed no signs of bleeding. The absence of bleeding suggested to Dr. Hall that the body was already dead when it suffered the abrasions, although she could not say with absolute certainty. Thus Dr. Hall's testimony, as a whole, indicates Schultz was probably dead when his body was dragged. Citing Dr. Hall's testimony that she could not be certain exactly how long Schultz lived, the Attorney General argues that the absence of bleeding under the abrasions on [Schultz's] back is not conclusive evidence that he was dead at the time of the dragging. But, as defendant notes, the question is not whether the evidence conclusively proved Schultz was dead, but whether substantial evidence supported a finding he was alive. We see no such substantial evidence. Moreover, even if we assume Schultz was dying but not yet dead when the dragging began and died during the dragging, before receiving the bloodless abrasions, no evidence supports a finding that the movement substantially increase[d] the risk of harm.... ( People v. Rayford, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 12, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 317, 884 P.2d 1369, italics added.) The primary harmthe four stab wounds, each alone potentially fatalhad already occurred; any additional harm was insubstantial. Accordingly, the kidnapping for robbery conviction and the kidnapping-murder special circumstance cannot stand. Finding that defendant dragged Schultz's body after, rather than before, he killed Schultz does not minimize the heinousness of defendant's deeds. It does, however, mean he was not guilty of kidnapping in addition to murder and robbery. Defendant also argues that because the court instructed the jury on kidnapping as a theory of felony murder, we must also reverse the first degree murder conviction. We disagree. As we explain, the evidence supported the robbery and robbery-murder special-circumstance findings as well as the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding. These findings show the jury necessarily concluded the killing was committed in the course of a robbery and by lying in wait. Thus, we know that the first degree murder verdict rested on at least one correct theory. (§ 189; People v. Kelly, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 531, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385; see also People v. Guiton (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1130, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45.) [3]
Defendant also argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain the robbery conviction and robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. He essentially argues that at most there was a theft, and the use of force, i.e., the killing, occurred either before or after any taking and was not accompanied by an intent to steal. (See People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 52-54, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) We disagree. Lonnie testified that defendant told him at an early stage that Schultz had money, and he was going to kill him and take it. The two brothers then took money from Schultz while driving, looked through the pockets after dragging the body, then took the truck and tools. This evidence amply supports the conclusion that defendant intended to rob Schultz from the time he began driving him to the spot where he killed him, and that robbery was an intent behind the killing.
The jury found true the special circumstance of murder by means of lying in wait, and the court also instructed the jury on lying in wait as a theory of first degree murder. Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support either the special circumstance finding or the first degree murder instruction. We disagree. The requirements of lying in wait for first degree murder under Penal Code section 189 are `slightly different' from the lying-in-wait special circumstance under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (a)(15). [Citation.] Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to both. We focus on the special circumstance because it contains the more stringent requirements. [Citation.] If, as we find, the evidence supports the special circumstance, it necessarily supports the theory of first degree murder. [¶] The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires `an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage....' [Citations.] 'The element of concealment is satisfied by a showing `that a defendant's true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct. It is not required that he be literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim.'` [Citation.] ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 388, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) We find sufficient evidence of each of these elements. Lonnie testified that defendant told him at an early stage of an intent to kill Schultz. Defendant concealed his purpose from Schultz until he struck. The evidence shows a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to actwhich arose when Schultz asked defendant to stop the truck and got out and urinated. Immediately thereafter, while the victim was still urinating  and hence particularly vulnerabledefendant attacked from a position of advantage. He took Schultz by surprise with no opportunity to resist or defend himself. Defendant notes that earlier opportunities existed for defendant to kill an unconscious Schultz in the truck. However, [a]s long as the murder is immediately preceded by lying in wait, the defendant need not strike at the first available opportunity, but may wait to maximize his position of advantage before taking his victim by surprise. ( People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1145, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 847 P.2d 55.) The jury could reasonably conclude that defendant found that the most opportune time to take Schultz by surprise came when he had stepped outside the truck and started to urinate. Stabbing him under those circumstances avoided having the victim bleed in the truck and facilitated hiding the body. Citing Lonnie's testimony that defendant said something inaudible, Schultz responded, Don't fuck with me while I'm peeing, defendant said, I ought to kill you, and only then stabbed, defendant also argues the evidence shows that the stabbing was a spontaneous reaction to a roadside disagreement with Schultz. The jury, however, could reasonably have concluded otherwisethat defendant planned the killing to rob Schultz, and he waited and watched for the opportune moment to strike, which presented itself when Schultz was urinating. Defendant also argues, and the concurring and dissenting opinion would find, that defendant's comment that he ought to kill Schultz precludes the jury from finding he attacked an unsuspecting victim by surprise from a position of advantage. In effect, he argues that the jury was required, as a matter of law, to find the comment was an advance warning that negated either surprise or his position of advantage. We disagree. The comment appears to have been virtually simultaneous with the stabbing, or so the jury could reasonably conclude. Despite the comment, the jury could reasonably find that when defendant stabbed a urinating Schultz, he took him by surprise and still had a position of advantage.