Opinion ID: 1472584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Statute of Limitations

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court did not have an adequate record upon which to determine that the statute of limitations bars his claim. He contends that the defamatory statement was not published to him by an authority in Nigeria until February 2000, thereby triggering a new period of limitations and that the dates of publication to other individuals cannot be ascertained without discovery. Appellant also contends that his disability tolls the statute of limitations under D.C.Code § 12-302 (2001). Appellees argue that the trial court properly granted the motion to dismiss as to Mrs. Oparaugo on limitations grounds where the complaint was filed two years after the date that it is alleged that Mrs. Oparaugo wrote the defamatory statement.
A complaint for libel must be filed within one year of the accrual of the cause of action. D.C.Code § 12-301(4) (2001). In such cases, the claim arises on the date the defamatory statement was published, and the statute of limitations runs from that date. Mullin v. Washington Free Weekly, Inc., 785 A.2d 296, 298 (D.C.2001). In Mullin, this court held that where the defamation is published by a mass media defendant, the discovery rule is inapplicable. [6] See id. at 299 & n. 5. The rationale underlying this principle is that the fact of the injury is readily ascertainable upon publication because the harm occurs with publication. See id. at 298-99 (citation omitted). When a person is non compos mentis at the time the cause of action accrues, he may bring his action within the time limited after the disability is removed. D.C.Code § 12-302(a)(2) (2001). The term, non compos mentis, means generally one who is not capable of handling his own personal affairs or who cannot function in society. Hendel v. World Plan Exec. Council, 705 A.2d 656, 665 (D.C.1997) (citation omitted). The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by the party asserting it. Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 734 (D.C.2000) (citing Feldman v. Gogos, 628 A.2d 103, 104 (D.C.1993) and Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(c) (2000)). The defense may be raised in a motion under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) where the defense acts to bar the claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. (citing 2 JAMES WM. MOORE, et al, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.34[4][b] (3d ed. 1998) and Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6)). A party pleading the statute [of limitations] defense has the burden of proof unless the claim is barred on its face. Pekofsky v. Blalock, 175 A.2d 604, 605 (D.C.1961) (citing Stern Equip. Co. v. Pogue, 117 A.2d 447 (D.C.1955)).
In this case, appellant asserted the statute of limitations as a bar to appellant's claim in the motion to dismiss based upon the allegations in the complaint. The complaint alleged that Mrs. Oparaugo wrote the allegedly defamatory letter on April 4, 1998, with the help of Ms. Watts and that she caused this document to be published to various persons, both private and public, in Nigeria on various dates. The specific dates of publication are not set forth in the complaint. However, appellant states in the complaint that it was not until February 2000 that the Nigerian court permitted him access to the document and that he filed his original complaint on February 17, 2000. On these facts, he contends that the trial court's order dismissing the complaint cannot be sustained based on the one year bar of the statute of limitations because: (1) Mrs. Oparaugo's letter was republished when provided to him by a Nigerian authority in February 2000, and liability arose at that time; (2) discovery was required to ascertain the dates of publication; and (3) the period of limitations was tolled because of his disability resulting from appellant being shot in the head and neck. Appellees argue that the February 2000 publication of the letter to appellant could not give rise to a claim or commence a new period of limitations because the tort requires publication to a third party to be actionable. The original publisher of a defamatory statement may be liable for republication if the republication is reasonably foreseeable. Tavoulareas v. Piro, 245 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 116, 759 F.2d 90, 136 (1985), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 870, 108 S.Ct. 200, 98 L.Ed.2d 151 (1987) (citations omitted). However, a cause of action for defamation requires proof of publication of the defamatory statement to a third party. See Carter v. Hahn, 821 A.2d 890, 893 (D.C.2003) (setting forth elements of proof of defamation, including publication of the statement without privilege to a third party) (citation omitted). No actionable claim would arise simply by publication of the statement to appellant, the object of the defamatory statement. [7] Therefore, appellant's reliance on the date that the statement was shown to him would be insufficient in itself to save the claim from the bar of limitations as to his cause of action against Mrs. Oparaugo and Ms. Watts, who allegedly assisted Mrs. Oparaugo. [8] Appellant argues that the statute of limitations was tolled because of his disability. Specifically, he alleged in his complaint and amended complaint that he sustained nine gunshot wounds to the head and neck and that he has seven pellets still lodged in his head. He alleged that the shooting occurred the same year that Mrs. Oparaugo allegedly wrote the defamatory letter. Further, he alleged that [t]he injury was compounded by the state of [his] health, and [he] was not in a position, recovering from gunshot wounds to the head, to come to the United States.... Appellees do not challenge appellant's allegation that he sustained the injuries as claimed; however, they contend that appellant testified under oath in a domestic relations case that he recovered from the surgery related to his gunshot wounds in June 1999, thereby making his claim untimely. [9] Appellees argue that the Superior Court can take judicial notice of its records. See Renard v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 673 A.2d 1274, 1276 (D.C.1996) (noting that [g]enerally, a court may take judicial notice of its own records). In this case, the records that appellees rely upon do not appear to have been presented to the trial court, and they are not a part of the record on appeal. Omission of the material from the record on appeal would preclude its review on appeal. See Mbakpuo v. Ekeanyanwu, 738 A.2d 776, 781 (D.C.1999) (holding that review on appeal cannot be based upon statements of counsel that are not supported by the record). Appellees contend, nevertheless, that this court can take judicial notice on appeal of trial transcripts in another case to refute appellant's claim of disability. We need not decide whether this court can take judicial notice of trial records in a different case because there is another reason that we cannot do so here. Our review of the record indicates that appellees never requested the trial court to take judicial notice of the material it now seeks to use on appeal as evidence to refute appellant's claim of a qualifying disability. Points not raised and preserved in the trial court will not be considered on appeal, except in exceptional circumstances that are not present here. See Cannon v. Igborzurkie, 779 A.2d 887, 888 (D.C.2001) (citing D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 48 (D.C.1988)) (in turn quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)) (declining to address a constitutional bar to application of a statute retroactively where not presented in the trial court where no good reason was shown for making an exception, without the benefit of development of a trial record). A party asserting an affirmative defense has the burden of proving it. See Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Carter, 549 A.2d 1117, 1119 (D.C.1988) (holding that the affirmative defense of contributory negligence must be pleaded and proved by the party asserting it). Thus, a plaintiff must prove that he or she was under a disability. See 51 AM. JUR. 2D § 234 (Limitation of Actions) (2000); see also McCracken v. Walls-Kaufman, 717 A.2d 346, 349, 355 (D.C.1998) (implying that the plaintiff must prove the existence of the disability). In this case, appellees sought to demonstrate by their motion to dismiss under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6) that appellant's claim was time-barred on its face. See Executive Sandwich, supra, 749 A.2d at 734 (citations omitted) (stating that defense of limitations asserted in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion seeks to bar the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). The amended complaint alleges, and the parties do not dispute, that appellant had been shot in the head several times near the time that the allegedly defamatory statements were made and still had bullets in his head and neck. On this record, it is not clear that appellant could present no set of facts that would entitle him to relief from the limitations bar based on a claim of disability. See Atraqchi v. GUMC Unified Billing Servs., 788 A.2d 559, 562 (D.C.2002) (citing Fingerhut v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., 738 A.2d 799, 803 (D.C.1999)) (setting forth standard that [a] pleading should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [his] claim which would entitle [him] to relief). Given appellant's allegations in the complaint that he sustained head and neck injuries such that he was not in a position to take steps to correct appellees' defamatory statements, he may be able to show that he was non compos mentis at the time a substantial portion of his right of action accrued. See McCracken, 717 A.2d at 355 (reversing grant of summary judgment where affidavit raised a question as to whether plaintiff was disabled). Therefore, it was premature to dismiss the case against Mrs. Oparaugo based on a claim of the bar of limitations upon appellees' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) before appellant had an opportunity to prove that he had a qualifying disability that tolled the statute of limitations.