Opinion ID: 1103979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the avoiding arrest aggravating factor was inappropriate in this case and it was fundamental error to present it to the sentencing jury for consideration for the imposition of a sentence of death.

Text: ¶ 98. Puckett argues that there was no evidence to support the aggravating factor of avoiding arrest and that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider the aggravating factor. This issue was fully addressed on direct appeal. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 361-62. This Court pointed out that there was credible evidence upon which the jury could find that Puckett murdered Rhonda in an effort to avoid apprehension and, accordingly, the trial court did not err in allowing it to be considered by the jury. Id. at 362. Therefore, this claim is res judicata and cannot be relitigated in Puckett's application for post-conviction relief. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3); Wiley, 750 So.2d at 1200. Puckett is entitled to no relief on this claim.
¶ 99. Puckett contends that he is entitled to have his sentence vacated and a new sentencing hearing held because the trial court failed to instruct the jury on what constitutes avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or affecting an escape from custody. First, this issue was capable of being raised on direct appeal and is now procedurally barred from being considered for the first time in Puckett's post-conviction application. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-21(1). ¶ 100. Without waiving the procedural bar, this claim is also without merit. As the State properly argues, this Court has held that no limiting instruction is needed for the avoiding arrest aggravating circumstance. This Court has recently held that it was unnecessary to have a limiting instruction defining `avoiding arrest' to narrow the aggravator if the evidence reasonably inferred that avoiding arrest was a substantial reason for the killing. Brown v. State, 682 So.2d 340, 355 (Miss.1996). ¶ 101. As was just discussed in Puckett's previous claim, this Court held that there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could find that Puckett killed Rhonda in an effort to avoid detection. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 362. Accordingly, the trial court's granting of this instruction was not reversible error. Id. Puckett's claim that the instruction on the avoiding arrest aggravator was flawed because it did not define avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest is without merit. See Brown, 682 So.2d at 355.
¶ 102. In Puckett's direct appeal we stated: In accordance with Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(c) (1994), this Court must determine whether the death sentence in this case `is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.' When the sentence is disproportionate, this Court may `set the sentence aside and remand the case for modification of the sentence of life imprisonment. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 364. ¶ 103. Puckett argues that the Court's reliance upon cases listed in its holding as being factually similar under its proportionality review is misplaced and fails to consider the mandate contained in the intervening holding in Ring and also, the holdings in Apprendi. On direct appeal, this Court found that the case of Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184 (Miss.1996) [6] was useful in addressing whether Puckett's death sentence was excessive or disproportionate. Puckett, 737 So.2d at 364. This Court held that the death sentence is not disproportionate as applied to Puckett. Id. ¶ 104. Puckett argues that Blue is distinguishable from the instant case because the defendant, David Blue, admitted to the crime, [c]ommitted random acts of violence, beat, killed, robbed and after the victim's death engaged in sexual battery. Blue was indicted in the Leflore County Circuit Court for the commission of capital murder during the course of the sexual battery and armed robbery of Mary Turntine. Blue, 674 So.2d at 1192. Blue was seventeen at the time of his arrest. Id. The jury returned a sentence of the death penalty upon Blue. ¶ 105. Here, Puckett was charged with capital murder during the course of sexual battery. He testified that it was his intent to commit a burglary in the victim's home. Puckett was eighteen at the time of the murder. The jury imposed the death penalty upon Puckett. This Court did not err in relying on Blue when addressing whether Puckett's death sentence was excessive or disproportionate. ¶ 106. Puckett's reliance on Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) as intervening cases to overcome the procedural bar is misplaced. The Supreme Court held in Ring that only a jury may find an aggravating circumstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty. The Supreme Court held in Apprendi that any fact, other than a previous conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither case changes or expands the law on proportionality. The issue was considered on direct appeal and is barred by res judicata at the post-conviction level.