Opinion ID: 168392
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Privacy Interest in the Contents of the Video

Text: 10 The district court held that Ms. Anderson had a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the contents of the video because of its personal nature. Anderson, 2005 WL 2210222, at . This conclusion is well supported by precedent from the Supreme Court and this circuit. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to privacy includes an individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.... Relying on Whalen, we held in Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir.1986), that [d]ue process thus implies an assurance of confidentiality with respect to certain forms of personal information possessed by the state. Information is protected by the right to privacy when a person has a legitimate expectation ... that it will remain confidential while in the state's possession. Id. We have held, without listing other factors, that this legitimate expectation of privacy depends `at least in part, upon the intimate or otherwise personal nature of the material which the state possesses.' Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1387 (quoting Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839). Even if personal information is protected by the right to privacy, the state may still justify its disclosure. Disclosure of such protected information must advance a compelling state interest which, in addition, must be accomplished in the least intrusive manner. Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839 (internal citation omitted). In Sheets, we formally articulated the inquiry as a two-part test. When the state discloses information that is alleged to be protected by the right to privacy, we determine first whether the information is protected by the right to privacy, and second, whether the state can demonstrate that it had a compelling interest for disclosure and that it used the least intrusive means of disclosing the information. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1387. 11 Ms. Anderson possesses a constitutionally protected privacy interest in the video because it depicts the most private of matters: namely her body being forcibly violated. As the Sixth Circuit noted, [p]ublically revealing information regarding [sexuality and choices about sex] exposes an aspect of our lives that we regard as highly personal and private. Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 685 (6th Cir.1998). Such a conclusion is also fully justified by precedent in our own circuit. In Cumbey v. Meachum, 684 F.2d 712, 714 (10th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), we held that the constitutional right of privacy may be violated when guards watch inmates of the opposite sex undressing or showering. Later, in Eastwood v. Department of Corrections, 846 F.2d 627, 631 (10th Cir.1988), we stated more explicitly that the right to privacy is triggered when an individual is forced to disclose information regarding personal sexual matters. There, we concluded that a person may have a constitutional privacy interest in refusing to answer questions concerning sexual history posed by an employer. In Sheets, the case primarily relied upon by the district court, we held that a husband may have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his wife's diary—which was turned over to the police as part of a criminal investigation—because it contained reflections about the couple's personal relationship. 45 F.3d at 1388. 12 While there is no case in this circuit addressing whether a video depicting a rape may be within the right to privacy, it is not surprising, given our precedent, that we should reach such a conclusion. If a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a diary, in undressing before a guard, or in answering questions concerning sexual history, certainly a person has a reasonable expectation that a video of his or her rape will not be aired to thousands in a public news broadcast. In Bloch, the Sixth Circuit held that oral disclosure to the press of the intimate details of a rape violates the constitutional right to privacy absent a compelling government justification for disclosure. 156 F.3d at 686. Notably, the Bloch court relied on Eastwood and Mangels from this circuit. Other circuits have also held that unwelcome disclosure of private sexual information is protected by the right to privacy. See, e.g., Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d 190, 196 n. 4 (3d Cir.2000) ([W]e agree with other courts concluding that [forced disclosure of one's sexual orientation] is intrinsically private.); Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir.1999) (The excruciatingly private and intimate nature of transsexualism, for persons who wish to preserve privacy in the matter, is really beyond debate.). 13 Despite this authority, Officer Blake argues that the video is not protected by the right to privacy because it contains evidence of a crime. He relies on Cawood v. Haggard, 327 F.Supp.2d 863 (E.D.Tenn. 2004), aff'd without opinion, Cawood v. Booth, 125 Fed.Appx. 700 (6th Cir.2005), for support. In Cawood, the district court concluded that the airing of a video documenting the plaintiff's private sexual conduct was not protected by the right to privacy. Id. at 880. The court rested its decision on three key points: (1) the video in question depicted the plaintiff's own suspected criminal activity (trading sex for a reduction in legal fees), (2) the video was destined to become public as it was to be used as evidence in a trial against the plaintiff, and (3) the plaintiff waived any privacy interest he might have in the video by describing its contents in a press conference. Id. 14 Officer Blake argues that Cawood should be read as excluding from privacy protection any otherwise personal information that contains evidence of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the party asserting the right to privacy is the one alleged to have committed a crime. Aplt. Br. at 10. He also argues that, like Cawood, the video here was bound to be made public at a trial of the perpetrator in this case, or in other cases in which the perpetrator might be charged. Id. at 8. 15 This is too broad a reading of Cawood. Cases must be read against their facts, and an obvious and critical difference between Cawood and this case is that Ms. Anderson is the victim of the crime depicted, not the perpetrator. While validly enacted laws place people on notice that engaging in certain conduct is not within the right to privacy, see Mangels, 789 F.2d at 839, we have never held that a victim cannot assert a right to privacy merely because a crime has been perpetrated against him or her. 16 To be sure, private information that otherwise would be protected by the right to privacy may nevertheless be disclosed if the government can demonstrate a compelling interest and if it uses the least intrusive means of disclosure. Sheets, 45 F.3d at 1387. But Sheets requires a fact specific inquiry into the disclosure of private information that forms the basis of the plaintiff's complaint. That private information has evidentiary value in a criminal prosecution does not give the government carte blanche to disclose the information in any manner it wishes prior to trial. As we said in Sheets concerning the diary: To turn a diary over to a limited group for what one perceives to be a limited and proper purpose is quite different than inviting publication of the material. Id. at 1388. Thus, whether a particular government need and a particular manner of disclosure are sufficient to overcome the expectation of privacy is necessarily a question of degree. Just because disclosing private information at a possible criminal trial is justified by the evidentiary nature of that information, it does not follow that disclosing the same information on a television news broadcast is similarly justified. 17 Officer Blake also suggests that because the video would have been inevitably disclosed at trial, it is beyond any legitimate expectation of privacy. 2 Again, Officer Blake asks us to ignore the fact specific nature of the Sheets test. Because there is an individual interest in avoiding disclosure, id. at 1387, the inevitable disclosure of the video at trial does not necessarily justify its release at the time and in the manner it was disclosed. Moreover, we cannot assume inevitable disclosure consistent with our obligation to accept all of Ms. Anderson's well-pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in a light most favorable to her. As it stands, Officer Blake cannot establish, based on the pleadings alone, that disclosure was inevitable. As the district court noted, [g]iven the nature of what is alleged to have been depicted on the tape, it is entirely possible that the criminal charges against plaintiff's attacker might have been resolved without a trial. Anderson, 2005 WL 2210222, at . 18 Officer Blake may yet articulate a compelling government interest for disclosing the video to the public and justify the manner of its disclosure. But at this point, aside from his argument that the video would be inevitably disclosed as part of a criminal prosecution, none appears in the district court pleadings properly considered on a motion to dismiss. In her complaint, Ms. Anderson alleges that no legitimate government interest existed for disclosure because the identity of the alleged perpetrator was already known by Officer Blake at the time the video was disclosed. Aplt.App. at 24 (Compl. ¶ 38). Officer Blake argues in his reply brief that another victim of the plaintiff's alleged attacker came forth after the airing of the video, and that, as a result, airing of the video may have caused additional victims to come forth. Aplt. Reply Br. at 5-6. He, admits, however, that this law enforcement reason was not offered in the motion to dismiss because it is a matter outside the pleadings. Id. at 6. While this reason may be considered in subsequent proceedings, we do not consider it at this juncture. 19 Relying on supplemental authority submitted prior to oral argument, see Stidham v. Peace Officer Stds. & Training, 265 F.3d 1144, 1156 (10th Cir.2001), Officer Blake also argues that Ms. Anderson has not adequately alleged an affirmative link between his conduct and any constitutional violation caused by the reporter's decision to broadcast the tape. However, Ms. Anderson alleges that Officer Blake and Lohman acted jointly and in concert, and the surrounding facts of the complaint adequately support an inference of an affirmative link.