Opinion ID: 494108
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: merits of sierra club's claim

Text: 52 Because a court is in general ill-suited to review the order in which an agency conducts its business, we are properly hesitant to upset an agency's priorities by ordering it to expedite one specific action, and thus to give it precedence over others. 94 Nevertheless, when as here an agency has a statutory duty to avoid unreasonable delay, we must review the ongoing proceedings to determine whether the agency's delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus. 95 It is well established that, in conducting this review, [t]he reasonableness of the delay must be judged 'in the context of the statute' which authorizes the agency's action. 96 In particular, if, as in this case, the claim is that the agency's delay deprives the petitioner of a statutory right to timely decisionmaking, then we look to see whether Congress has imposed any applicable deadlines or otherwise exhorted swift deliberation concerning the matter before us or whether the statutory scheme implicitly contemplates timely final action; whether interests other than that of timely decisionmaking will be prejudiced by delay; and whether an order expediting the proceedings will adversely affect the agency in addressing matters of a competing or higher priority. 97 When we assess these factors, we must remember that, [a]bsent a precise statutory timetable or other factors counseling expeditious action, an agency's control over the timetable of a rulemaking proceeding is entitled to considerable deference. 98 53 Turning to these considerations, we do not believe, first, that Congress has accorded any special priority to completion of the rulemaking before us. No statutory deadline limits the duration of rulemakings under either the PSD program or section 302(j). 99 Nor can we perceive in the Act a generalized congressional mandate for EPA to expedite these particular rulemakings. 100 54 Concerning, second, any interests other than timeliness itself compromised by delay of this rulemaking, we find that the Act does not instruct EPA to regulate strip mine fugitive emissions, nor does it require EPA even to consider this question. As a result, Sierra Club cannot claim a statutory right that, through delay of a regulation governing this activity, might be irreparably harmed. Moreover, although this court has required greater agency promptness as to actions involving interests relating to human health and welfare, with respect to which delay is arguably less justifiable than in the realm of economic regulation, 101 this factor alone can hardly be considered dispositive when, as in this case, virtually the entire docket of the agency involves issues of this type. In such circumstances, whether the public health and welfare will benefit or suffer from accelerating this particular rulemaking depends crucially upon the competing priorities that consume EPA's time, since any acceleration here may come at the expense of delay of EPA action elsewhere. 55 Turning to this final consideration, we must remember that Congress has assigned EPA a very broad mandate, not only under the Clean Air Act but also under a handful of other equally complex environmental statutes. Given that Congress provides EPA with finite resources to satisfy these various responsibilities, the agency cannot avoid setting priorities among them. As we have said, we can perceive no statutory command that EPA assign this rulemaking a higher priority than any of its other activities. If anything, this rulemaking might reasonably have a lower priority than many EPA activities because PSD regulation, which would be the main reason for listing strip mine fugitive emissions, pertains to regions of the country that exceed the NAAQS minimum health and welfare standards of the Act. 56 In any event, less than three years have passed since EPA initially proposed this rulemaking. During this time, EPA has prepared a Regulatory Impact Analysis, released in February 1986 102 ; conducted a number of public hearings, the latest in April 1986; and received approximately 200 written submissions that it must consider and take into account before it can issue a rulemaking decision. A simple reading of the Clean Air Act reveals that whether to impose a certain type of regulation often involves complex scientific, technological, and policy questions. EPA must be afforded the amount of time necessary to analyze such questions so that it can reach considered results in a final rulemaking that will not be arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of discretion. 103 Indeed, by decreasing the risk of later judicial invalidation and remand to the agency, additional time spent reviewing a rulemaking proposal before it is adopted may well ensure earlier, not later, implementation of any eventual regulatory scheme. Given the complexity of the issues facing EPA and the highly controversial nature of the proposal, agency deliberation for less than three years--little more than one year since the close of the public comment period--can hardly be considered unreasonable. 104 Accordingly, we refuse Sierra Club's request for injunctive relief. 105 57 For the foregoing reason, the petition for review is dismissed without prejudice to renewal should circumstances so warrant. 58 So ordered.