Opinion ID: 2327368
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Employers' Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Motion for Summary Judgment

Text: On April 11, 2008, Employers filed in the Superior Court for Providence County a petition for declaratory judgment, seeking a declaration that Arbella had a duty to defend and indemnify Viking Stone in connection with the Destremps' complaint. In its petition, Employers alleged that, upon information and belief, Arbella had provided commercial general liability coverage to Viking Stone from at least March of 1999 through 2002 Employers contended that, because the Destremps' complaint in the underlying civil action [3] alleged that Viking Stone began its quarry operation in or about 2001 and further alleged that since that time Viking Stone had caused water to come onto and damage their property, Arbella's defense obligations with respect to the Destremps' complaint were triggered under Arbella's liability policy. Employers alleged that Arbella had failed to provide a defense to Viking Stone, and it further alleged that Employers had been providing a defense to Viking Stone given Arbella's breach of its defense obligations. Accordingly, Employers sought a declaration that Arbella had breached its duty to defend and indemnify Viking Stone, and it requested that the court declare that Arbella's defense obligations [were] primary to those of Employers and that Employers should therefore be reimbursed for defense costs it ha[d] incurred due to the wrongful breach by Arbella of its duty to defend Viking Stone. On December 8, 2008, Employers filed a motion to amend its petition for declaratory judgment so as to include a second count. In that second count, Employers alleged that the facts as alleged in the underlying complaint filed by the Destremps trigger one occurrence under the Arbella policy and as such no coverage is afforded to Viking Stone under [Employers'] policy. Employers further averred that, as a result, it did not owe a defense or indemnity to Viking Stone    given that there is only one trigger of occurrence, which is under Arbella's policy, for the damages claimed in the underlying complaint. For that reason, Employers requested that the court declare (1) that the facts claimed in the Destremps' complaint triggered one occurrence under Arbella's policy and (2) that, accordingly, no coverage is afforded to Viking Stone under Employers' policy with respect to the claims made in the underlying complaint against Viking Stone. The defendants did not object to Employers' motion to amend; and on February 3, 2009, an order entered granting the motion. On April 20, 2009, Employers filed a motion for summary judgment with respect to both counts of its amended petition for declaratory judgment. It stated that it was seeking a declaration (1) that Arbella owed a duty to defend and indemnify Viking Stone in connection with the Destremps' complaint and (2) that the facts claimed in the Destremps' complaint triggered one occurrence under the Arbella policy and that, for that reason, no coverage was afforded to Viking Stone under the Employers policy. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Employers stated that the central issues presented were: (1) whether the property damage alleged by the plaintiffs in the underlying complaint is the result of one occurrence or multiple occurrences and (2) when did the alleged property damage occur for the purpose[] of insurance coverage. As a starting point, Employers noted that its insurance policy, which provided coverage to Viking Stone from March 30, 2004 to March 30, 2008, provided liability protection for property damage only if the damage was (1) caused by an `occurrence,' the latter term being defined as an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions, and (2) the damage occurred during the policy period. Employers further noted that the Arbella policy, which provided coverage to Viking Stone from March 30, 1999 to November 6, 2002, contained identical provisions with respect to coverage for property damage. Employers contended that, in order for there to be any potential coverage under the [Employers] policy, the damage as alleged by the [Destremps] must fit the definition of `property damage' caused by an `occurrence' as defined in the [Employers] policy, which occurrence took place during the policy period. Employers contended that there existed no potential for such coverage because the Destremps' complaint alleged that contaminated water had flowed onto their property and caused damage since 2001. According to Employers, the facts alleged in the Destremps' complaint therefore related to a single occurrence that took place before the Employers policy period began in 2004; Employers asserted that, as a result of the foregoing considerations and pursuant to the clear terms of its policy, it had no duty to defend or indemnify Viking Stone and was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. C