Opinion ID: 1672263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Submissible Case?

Text: Plaintiff made a submissible case on the charge of negligence by his own personal testimony; that of his witnesses Robert Marshall, Carol Gowert and Reid Braswell, and the contractor's answers to interrogatories. The pertinent testimony given by plaintiff personally was as follows: Plaintiff was sitting on the edge of the back seat, holding onto the back of the front seat, looking over the front seat, where he could see and did observe the speedometer. Within the distance of a block of the collision the car was traveling 40-45 m. p. h. Plaintiff looked up and saw barrels across the road. Asked Did you see a barricade or sign or barrels in the roadway? he answered Yes, sir, and later testified that all he saw was just the barrels across the road, 60-70 feet away. When plaintiff saw the barrels he yelled at Blevins and they went off, rolled off, turned off, the road and hit an embankment, still traveling at 40-45 m. p. h. There was no change in the speed of the car. On the vital question of lights plaintiff testified as follows: Q What else did you see, if anything, across the road there except the barrels? A Just the barrels. Q Did you see any blinking or flashing lights? A No, sir. Q Were you looking for any? A I was looking for some when I seen barrels across the road. Q Pardon? A I looked but I didn't see any.    Q    [T]he barrels,    you said you saw no lights on them or around them? Is that true? A Yes. Robert Marshall, who lived roughly two miles from the place where the accident occurred and was familiar with the intersection, testified as follows: He traveled over Highway 21 at the Kempf Road intersection two, three, possibly four times a week, both during the day and during the evening, during the first two weeks in August, 1967. There was a barricade across Highway 21. He came up to that barricade in the nighttime at least once a week in the first two weeks of August. Asked whether on these occasions there were any lights (any highway warning lights or flashers consisting of blinking yellow or amber light or a potted type with a flame or a red-type flasher) leading up to the point of this barricade coming from south to north, he answered [i]f there were any I didn't see them. They could have been there and out but there was nothing showing. He described the barricade (a wooden slatted affair, roughly four feet high and almost the width of the highway,    [n]o particular design, just a bunch of slats nailed together    a standard type barrier to keep somebody from running into the dirt embankment or at least let you know you were approaching it). He saw barrels along the edge of the highway but could not remember any signs posted; there were no markers. The barricade was illuminated with a reflective type of paint. Asked on cross-examination whether he ever saw flashing or blinking lights in front of that barricade he answered, At this time, right here, if you ask me that I can't remember if I did and I'm pretty sure I did not.    To the best of my knowledge. I can't recall seeing any working lights. He thought the dust and dirt would affect the reflector paint on the barricade, but would not totally cover it. His memory refreshed by showing him a statement he had signed shortly after the accident, Marshall testified    I could not remember about when I was asked if there were any flashing lights and to the best of my knowledge I recall there was flashing lights but they were not working the majority of the times.   . (The statement said there were some blinking lights out there but they were not working.) He would not deny that blinking lights were working on the night of the accident because he was not there that night, but he testified, I'd say the majority of the times I went by while I was taking my boys back and forth from ball games, the majority of the times there were no lights working. Carol Gowert, who lived a city block from the intersection and was familiar with the construction going on at the intersection, testified as follows: She passed the intersection at least once and normally two or three times a day, and in the evening after dark. She described the barricade. Asked whether in the week or ten days prior to August 12, 1967 there were any lights, in the nature of yellow caution lights or blinkers or flashers or pots; whether she was familiar with whether there were any of those lights out there in the evening which would be operating, to which she answered There weren't    [a]ny flashers or what you call them, smoke pots, or anything. Quoting from the transcript: Q Do you recall seeing any yellow blinking or flashing lights? A No, I don't. No. There were some. They had all their equipment in the part that was not opened yet. Q Do you know whether or not there were any lights leading up to this barricade A There weren't, no. Q at that time and under those circumstances? A No, there weren't. On cross-examination this took place: Q When you got about five feet from Kempf Road do you remember a diamond shaped sign showing an arrow going to the right and two amber flashing lights on a bar on this sign? A No, I don't. Q Do you deny it was there? A Well, I was in and out of there two, three times a day and I don't recall seeing it.    Q Ma'm did you ever see in front of this barricade across Highway 21 a series of amber battery operated flashing lights from the two weeks in August prior to August Twelfth until the barricade was removed? A No. Q You never saw them there? A No. Q Do you deny they were present? A Yes, I do. Reid Braswell, who lived roughly a mile from the intersection in question, traveled back and forth every day from his home to his restaurant in St. Louis. After referring to the barrels and a saw horse affair at the intersection, he testified as follows: He went by there after dark on the nights of August 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. He would not leave his place of business until 9:30 or 10 p. m. Q In the, let's say, four or five days before August 12th, leading up to August 12th, did you observe any yellow lights or flashers or lighting at all leading up to this saw horse affair that you have told us about? A I saw no lights. Q Do you recall whether or not there were any blinking lights at all on the barricade up there? A I didn't observe any lights. Asked if he remembered a sign with an arrow pointing to the right, with two amber flashing lights on a bar beneath it, he answered, If it was dark I think I would have seen the amber lights. He would not deny that there was a sign with blinking lights on a sign with an arrow, but he did not remember seeing it. Further: Q Sir, when you went by there at night will you tell the jury whether or not, in front or ahead of this wooden barricade and whatever else you saw, whether or not there were blinking lights, the battery operated kind, extending across the front of the barricade and the highway? A I observed no blinking lights when I passed there. Q Do you deny there were any? A I doat the intersection, I do. Q Do you deny they were there even on nights you were not there? A No, when I passed there; I said there were no blinking lights. Q On August Twelfth you don't know what was there because you were not there? A No.    I could have passed by there August Twelfth but I didn't keep a record of the dates. The contractor gave the following answers to interrogatories: Question: Were any changes made around the area of the collision or within one mile south of the collision, in either the location or type of sign, light or barricade, within 7 days before the collision; 6 days before the collision; 5 days before the collision; 4 days before the collision; 3 days before the collision; 2 days before the collision; 1 day before the collision. Answer: Defendant states it does not believe there were any changes made within the week preceding the accident. Question: If so, state exactly each and every change and describe the type of signs, lights or barricades involved. Answer: See the answer above. The foregoing evidence is sufficient competent substantial evidence to go to the jury on the issue of the negligence charged. Plaintiff's personal testimony was direct eyewitness testimony. That of the other three witnesses, concerning the absence of lights on nights during the week or two preceding the accident, connected up by the answers to the interrogatories showing that there were no changes in the light situation within the week preceding the accident, was substantial evidence to prove the negative. A negative fact may be proved by negative evidence. Westlake v. Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964 (Mo.1947); Furman v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 338 Mo. 884, 92 S.W.2d 726 (1936); Nall v. Brennan, 324 Mo. 565, 23 S.W.2d 1053 (1929); Dodd v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 108 S.W.2d 982 (Mo. App.1937). In Dodd the driver of an automobile struck by a train said he was listening for a bell and could have heard it but that he did not hear a bell. This testimony was held not without probative force; that it constituted substantial evidence of the negative fact to be proved; that the issue raised was one for the jury to determine, and that the court properly ruled in denying defendant's request for a directed verdict. The contractor, however, contends that the barricade itself and the signs and lights used at the barricade and preceding it, provided excellent warnings of northbound drivers, and constituted adequate warning as a matter of law. The contractor introduced substantial evidence that the barricade was visible for 1200 to 1400 feet south of the intersection; that it had red reflectors on it and was painted with reflectorized paint; that there were signs ROAD CLOSED, DETOUR, KEEP RIGHT (with arrow pointing the way to Kempf Road), on the barricade; barrels; nine amber flashing lights across the width of the highway, 9 inches in diameter, battery powered, and that they blinked or flashed; that each light was mounted on its own free standing metal horse and stood about 3 feet above the ground; that this condition prevailed on the night of August 12, 1967 and was seen by an eyewitness to the collision, and by a highway patrolman who arrived at the scene thirty minutes later; that one mile south of Kempf Road there was a 4 foot by 4 foot black on yellow sign reading ROAD CONSTRUCTION AHEAD; that 100 feet north of that sign there was a black and white sign 6 feet square which read PLEASE DRIVE CAREFULLY NEXT 1.7 MILES; that 700 feet further north there was another black and white sign 8 feet by 4 feet reading HIGHWAY FINANCED ONE HUNDRED PER CENT BY MISSOURI HIGHWAY USERS; that 1,000 feet south of Kempf Road there was a 4 by 4 foot sign reading DETOUR AHEAD and that 500 feet south of Kempf Road there was a diamond-shaped black on yellow reflectorized sign showing a black arrow turning to the right, with two blinking amber lights under it. The contractor confidently assumes the truth of the testimony it introduced concerning lights, signs and precautions, ignoring the rule that the appellate court must accept as true the evidence favorable to the prevailing party, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, and ignore contradictory evidence. Under this rule we cannot declare as a matter of law that the evidence introduced by the contractor establishes compliance with the duty of warning. The evidence as to lights was contradicted. Likewise, the existence of the signs was disputed by witnesses Gowert and Braswell. In this situation the existence, adequacy and sufficiency of lights were issues for the jury to resolve. The display of signs en route to the barricade and their display at or on the barricade would not as a matter of law dispense with the necessity of adequately lighting the barricade to notify the public of the location of the barricade. The contractor also raises the question of causation, contending that as a matter of law the condition of the highway was not a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries; that there was no evidence that Blevins ran off the highway because of highway conditions or inadequate signs or warnings. The contractor invokes the rule that where the injury could have resulted from several causes for some but not all of which the defendant is liable, and one is as probable as another, there must be substantial evidence tending to show that the cause for which defendant would be liable was the actual cause of the occurrence, otherwise the causal connection remains conjuctural and speculative and plaintiff's case must fail. The contractor argues that the cause may have been Blevins' inattention, speed, or intoxication and that the contractor is not liable for these causes and therefore the case was never removed from the realm of conjecture and speculation, and further that it is impossible to conclude that additional warnings would have averted the accident. The test is whether the facts show that the charged negligence was the proximate cause of the injury. Direct proof of the fact is not required, it being sufficient that the facts proved are of such a nature, and are so connected and related to each other, that the conclusion therefrom may be fairly inferred. Settle v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., 127 Mo. 336, 30 S.W. 125, 126 (1895), or as more recently stated in Swanson v. Godwin, 327 S.W.2d 903, 910 (Mo.1959), that the facts and circumstances proved `fairly suggest' negligence as the proximate cause, in the light of ordinary experience. And as pointed out in Swanson v. Godwin plaintiff's evidence need not exclude all those causes for which defendants would not be liable. The facts and circumstances in this case are not so conclusive that the court may pronounce one way or the other, as a matter of law, on the question of causation. There are too many variables. Whether Blevins was traveling at 40 or 60 m. p. h.; whether he was intoxicated or sober (there was evidence both ways); whether the barricade was lighted and if so whether the light was sufficient to make the barricade visible in time to have slowed or stopped the automobile short of collision; whether there was sufficient warning to notify travelers of the existence of the barricade and the consequent danger of collision, etc., are matters of fact open to a reasonable difference of opinion on the question of causation and therefore are peculiarly suited to resolution by a jury. This point is ruled against the contractor for the reason that there is sufficient evidence for reasonable minds to differ as to whether the conduct of the contractor was a substantial factor in causing the harm to plaintiff. Restatement of Torts 2d § 434(2)(a). The contractor next raises the question whether Blevins' actions were an intervening proximate cause, or the sole proximate cause, of the accident. Was Blevins guilty as a matter of law of negligence or drunkenness which intervened between the creation of the condition and the injury and thereby broke the chain of causation? The contractor argues that the highway was well marked with warning signs; that Blevins' erratic driving in failing to heed the signs and running off the road was the proximate cause of the accident, and that the highway conditions were only a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate cause. Again, we cannot decide the question of intervening proximate cause as a matter of law, for the reason that there was an issue of fact on contradictory evidence on the questions of speed, sobriety and negligence. It was a question for the jury whether Blevins' act in turning off the highway was a normal consequence of a situation created by the contractor's negligent conduct, i. e., whether Blevins acted in normal response to the stimulus of a suddenly-appearing unlighted barricade. The intervention of a force which is a normal consequence of a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm which such conduct has been a substantial factor in bringing about. Restatement of Torts 2d § 443. In this connection see McWhorter v. Dahl Chevrolet Co., 229 Mo.App. 1090, 88 S.W.2d 240, 248[12-14] (1935).