Opinion ID: 2431316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: So What?

Text: The apparent self-curing nature of the issue under discussion helps to demonstrate the absence of logic and reason in the impeachment rule adopted in the Blitz line of cases. The catch-22 [4] nature of the problem is demonstrated by the majority's decision in this case that any error in allowing the use of a non-credibility misdemeanor to impeach is not prejudicial because speeding has no bearing on credibility. This answer will always be available for this problem. In effect, the majority responds to this issue with the rhetorical question, So what? In one sense this answer is always available in any situation involving the admissibility of irrelevant, nonprejudicial evidence. The rules of relevancy are just common sense, which the jury is sensitive to, even if the law is not. If a judge improperly overrules a hearsay objection, then the jury can and will usually go ahead and use the evidence for its improper purpose. On the other hand, an item that is not relevant to any issue in the lawsuit cannot be made relevant, no matter how non-prejudicial the ruling of the judge to admit such evidence. There is no intelligent way to use non-relevant evidence. Moreover, the jury will likely ferret out relevancy problems because relevancy is really just common sense about how and to what extent that evidence moves the issue forward on some material issue in the case. So, does this solve the problem? The following section analyzes three common scenarios in which this type of evidence is encountered and attempts to answer the question, So what? To illustrate the range of problems created by allowing the use of a non-credibility misdemeanor to impeach the credibility of a witness, assume impeaching evidence similar to that in the present case. Specifically, assume the defendant in each of the following three lawsuits had a conviction for speeding near Columbia, Missouri, on January 1, 1990. Assume this impeachment evidence is used in three different lawsuits as follows: Lawsuit A is a suit for breach of contract; Lawsuit B is a civil action for personal injuries arising out of an accident which occurred in Kansas City, Missouri, on July 4, 1991, in which it is claimed that defendant was exceeding the 55 mph speed limit on I-29 near the Kansas City International Airport; and Lawsuit C, which is for personal injuries arising out of an accident near Columbia, Missouri, on January 1, 1990, and in which it is claimed defendant was speeding. In Lawsuit C, the speeding conviction sought to be used for impeachment arose out of the very accident in which the plaintiff's personal injuries were sustained. Admitting the speeding conviction to impeach the defendant in any of these lawsuits is illogical and irrational. There is no connection between being convicted of a traffic violation, such as speeding, and truth telling. There is nothing about a speeding conviction that indicates any mistaken belief or lack of truthfulness by the witness with regard to his substantive testimony. What small amount of disrespect for the law that may be involved in a traffic violation, such as speeding, is not indicative of a person willing to intentionally swear falsely under oath, i.e., commit perjury. By and large, the rationale supporting the law of evidence is well grounded in human experience and, given a reasonable explanation, usually makes sense to a jury. As I pointed out above, this is particularly true with respect to rules of relevancy, which really are just common sense. Whenever the rules of evidence deviate from practical experience, jurors will be tempted to treat them as technical obstructions to the search for truth and ignore them. Even more damaging is the fact that illogical rules of evidence may confuse and mislead jurors, who may conclude that they do not understand the issues in the case when they are presented with evidence that does not have a readily apparent, logical use in the lawsuit. All of these risks are present in admitting the speeding conviction in Lawsuits A, B and C. Admitting the speeding conviction in Lawsuits B and C is not only illogical and confusing but also highly prejudicial. There is a substantial risk that the jury will be led to believe that the speeding conviction is being offered as substantive evidence of speeding on the occasion of the accident in issue. In Lawsuit B, the fact that the defendant was speeding in January of 1990 is in no way probative of the proposition that he was speeding at the time of the accident in July of 1991, and it would not be admitted for that purpose. In the present case, which is like Lawsuit B, the fact that plaintiff Lewis pled guilty to a speeding charge on a prior occasion clearly is not relevant to whether he was speeding at the time of this accident. Because the defendant's main claim of fault against the plaintiff in this accident is speeding, it would have been natural for the jury to misuse this evidence if it had been admitted. In Lawsuit C, the fact that the defendant was convicted of a traffic offense for speeding at the same time and place where the accident in issue occurred would not be admissible as substantive evidence that he was, in fact, speeding because it is in the nature of hearsay. [5] The trial judge most likely will instruct the jury when the evidence of the conviction is admitted that it can be used for impeachment but not as proof that the party was speeding at the time of this accident. The distinction between using the speeding conviction to impeach (which use is contrary to common sense) while not using it to prove speeding on the occasion of this accident (which is direct evidence but is also hearsay) is a sophisticated and technical distinction, and it is unlikely that any juror would understand, much less accurately apply, any limiting instruction short of a full-blown lecture on relevancy and hearsay. Missouri's rule which allows non-credibility misdemeanors to be used for impeachment is further complicated by an exception to the rule. This exception excludes violations of municipal ordinances as opposed to violations of state statutes. The rationale for the exception is that violations of municipal ordinances are in the nature of civil violations and, therefore, are not criminal convictions and are not admissible for impeachment purposes. Meredith v. Whillock, 173 Mo.App. 542, 158 S.W. 1061, 1063 (1913). This exception makes perfect sense when one considers the long line of cases in this state holding that a violation of a city ordinance is not a criminal offense for other purposes. Kansas City v. Neal, 122 Mo. 232, 26 S.W. 695, 696 (1894) (holding that the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to enter a writ of error because violation of a city ordinance is not a crime and, thus, not a felony); Ex parte Hollwedell, 74 Mo. 395 (1881) (violation of a city ordinance is not a criminal offense; therefore, Article II, Section 12, of the Missouri Constitution, requiring prosecution by indictment or information, is not applicable because an indictment or information is only necessary for a criminal offense); State v. Muir, 164 Mo. 610, 65 S.W. 285 (1901) (defendant indicted under Missouri statute for gaming, and defendant had previously been convicted for the same offense under an ordinance of the city of Mexico; because prosecution under a civil ordinance is a civil action, there is no double jeopardy problem when the state acts to enforce a statute, and both actions may be brought regardless of any particular order). This exception also makes perfect sense when one views it as an effort by the Missouri courts to avoid the application of section 491.050 and its illogical and inflexible rule allowing impeachment with a non-credibility misdemeanor. However, try to explain to jurors or parties to a lawsuit why it is that if they get a speeding ticket from a city police officer it is not admissible to impeach their credibility, but if they get a speeding ticket from a highway patrolman, this somehow has a bearing upon whether or not they will be truthful witnesses under oath in court. This distinction between state and municipal convictions leads to the further complicating issue of who has the burden of proving whether the conviction is under a state statute or a municipal ordinance. Where the evidence of the violation is the testimony of the impeached party or an answer to an interrogatory, as opposed to a formal record of the conviction (which would show on its face whether it was a violation of a municipal ordinance or a state statute), the burden is on the impeached party to show a violation of a municipal ordinance. Otherwise, the impeaching party has an absolute right under the statute to admit the impeaching evidence. [6] Smile v. Lawson, 506 S.W.2d 400 (Mo.1974), Forbis v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 513 S.W.2d at 766. The difficulty of explaining the striking difference in excluding violations of municipal ordinances while admitting convictions of non-credibility misdemeanors is substantially eased by the solution proposed herein, which would construe the statute to admit for impeachment purposes only those convictions which are relevant to credibility. Nearly all violations of municipal ordinances are, likewise, not relevant to credibility. Therefore, continuing to treat violations of municipal ordinances as inadmissible for impeachment purposes would correspond with the rule proposed herein.