Opinion ID: 1526397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellants' Motion for Discovery Sanctions

Text: Acting pursuant to Rule 36, M.R.Civ.P., appellants requested that appellees make a pre-trial admission of three facts: (1) That the premises contained an area less than 0.6 acres; (2) That the combination garage and barn had not been completely renovated; (3) That a For Sale sign remained on the premises from August 10, 1976, to October 10, 1976, without any notice of the pending sale. Appellees denied all three requests. Appellants established the truth of the matters at trial and moved for costs pursuant to Rule 37(c), M.R.Civ.P. [12] The trial justice denied the motion. The Court denies plaintiffs' motion for expenses and attorney's fees on grounds that, in each case, the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or the defendants had reasonable grounds to believe that they might prevail on the matter, or defendants had other good reason for failure to admit. The justice's ruling is reversible only for abuse of discretion. 1 R. Field, V. McKusick & L. Wroth, Maine Civil Practice § 37.5 (2d ed. 1970). The admissions sought in requests numbered 2 and 3 could be reasonably characterized as being of no substantial importance. They refer to two instances of conduct on the part of the appellees which, even if they were found to be unfair or deceptive acts under 5 M.R.S.A. § 207, could not have resulted in any loss of money or property by the appellants under 5 M.R.S.A. § 213. Appellees' advertisement in the Bar Harbor Times, quoted at the beginning of this opinion, was, as a result of its punctuation, open to an interpretation that the barn, as well as the house, was completely renovated. Other advertisements of the same property clearly indicated that only the house was completely renovated. By their own testimony, appellants, having inspected the barn and noted its condition during their visit in August, 1976, were not misled as to its condition. It is not necessary to consider whether the retention of the For Sale sign on the property after the execution of the Bartners' purchase and sale agreement could have constituted bait-and-switch advertising prohibited by section 207. The retention of the sign had no effect on the appellants and could not have caused them any loss of money or property. With respect to appellants' request numbered 1: Appellee Moore testified that in October of 1976, after appellants began questioning the accuracy of the representation of acreage, he personally computed the area of the lot at approximately .65 acres. Although by the time of the request for admission it was clear that the lot contained less than three-quarters of an acre, the exact area was not certain. Surveyors appearing for the appellants at the trial testified, in effect, that the exact area depended on whether the westerly lot line ran along the edge of a certain road or between certain pins that seemed to mark the corners of the lot on its westerly side. Each surveyor testified that if the lot extended to the edge of the road it contained more than .6 acres. Thus appellees may have had reasonable ground to believe that they might prevail on the matter, or at least good reason for not admitting the amount requested. The justice acted within the permissible range of his discretion in denying appellants' motion. The entry is: Appeal denied. Judgment affirmed. DELAHANTY, J., did not sit.