Opinion ID: 1667817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: predicate crime must be intentional

Text: In State v. Ring, [6] we explained that use of a weapon `to commit any felony' was synonymous with use of a weapon `for the purpose of committing any felony.' Thus, the felony motor vehicle homicide presented in that case, which is by definition committed unintentionally, could not form the basis of a use of a weapon conviction. We explained that a person cannot use a weapon for the purpose of unintentionally committing another crime. [7] In State v. Pruett, [8] we similarly reversed the defendant's use of a weapon conviction where the jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter by unintentionally causing another's death during a reckless assault. The defendant in Pruett thought there was only a dummy round in the chamber, and he was trying `to mess with' his friend when he fired in his direction. [9] We explained that both manslaughter and reckless assault are unintentional crimes and thus could not be used as predicate offenses for the use of a weapon conviction. Later, in State v. Thurman, [10] we explained that while a purely unintentional crime could not form the predicate offense for a use of a weapon conviction, the predicate crime need not be a specific intent crime. Instead, the predicate offense could be a general intent crime. Thus, first degree sexual assault could be the predicate crime for the use of a weapon conviction. We noted it would be `absurd' to say a weapon was not used `for the purpose of' subjecting another to sexual penetration through the use of force, threat of force, coercion, or deception. [11] These cases make clear that Tucker's conviction of unintentional manslaughter could not form the basis of the use of a weapon conviction unless predicated on the commission of an intentional unlawful act. Reckless assault and reckless terroristic threats would be an insufficient basis for the use of a weapon conviction. In contrast, intentional terroristic threats or intentional assault could legally form the basis for an unintentional manslaughter conviction and the predicate for a use of a weapon charge.