Opinion ID: 795132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance in Failing to Investigate and to Present a Diminished Capacity Defense

Text: 22 Hoffman contends that his attorneys were deficient in failing to investigate and to raise a diminished capacity defense. We agree with Hoffman that trial counsel were deficient in failing to investigate a diminished capacity defense, and therefore that Hoffman has met the first prong of the Strickland test. We hold, however, that no prejudice resulted from his trial counsels' deficient performance. 23 To meet the first prong of Strickland, Hoffman must show that his counsel had reason to know that Hoffman's mental capacity might be at issue in the case. See Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1043 ([W]here counsel is on notice that his client may be mentally impaired, counsel's failure to investigate his client's mental condition ... without a supporting strategic reason, constitutes deficient performance.). We do not expect counsel to be trained in psychology or mental health. In this case, however, Wellman and Coulter's interactions with Hoffman provided them significant clues that would put a reasonable lawyer on notice that Hoffman's capacity to form the intent to commit first-degree murder was at issue. 24 Both Wellman and Coulter recognized that Hoffman had some level of cognitive difficulty. Both testified that their communications with Hoffman were stinted, and that Hoffman had difficulty answering questions. Wellman testified that he recognized that Hoffman had a pretty low IQ and that he had difficulty understanding their discussions. He stated: [G]enerally speaking, as I sit here today and try to put myself back into that time period of the five months or so prior to trial, it was fairly — it should have been evident to me that there were some serious psychiatric problems with Max [Hoffman]. Coulter similarly explained: [O]ver a period of a week or two or however many weeks it was ... I came to realize, just based on my own lay experience, that [Hoffman] had a problem. In fact, Hoffman's counsel testified that part of the reason they decided not to have Hoffman testify at the guilt phase of trial was because of his mental limitations. Surely, then, Hoffman's attorneys were on notice that Hoffman's mental capacity might be at issue. 25 In addition, Hoffman's explanation as to why he slit Williams's throat was facially illogical and should have indicated to counsel that Hoffman was not entirely well. Hoffman told Wellman and Coulter that when he took Williams into the cave and slit her throat, he was trying to save her life. He claimed that he believed that if he slit her throat superficially, she would stay in the cave, he could get Wages to leave, and that she could take herself to safety. The logic is, of course, faulty, given that Williams would be left bleeding in the middle of nowhere with no means of communication. This illogical explanation should have put Hoffman's trial attorney on notice that Hoffman's mental capacity might be at issue. 26 Third, counsel knew that Hoffman had a history of drug abuse. Wellman testified that he remembered clear indication of fairly steady, regular use of crank, or methamphetamine, by Hoffman. In addition, counsel knew that Hoffman had ingested significant amounts of drugs on the night of Williams's murder. The amount of drugs alone probably should have led counsel to investigate whether Hoffman might have been intoxicated and whether this intoxication might have affected Hoffman's ability to form the intent to commit first-degree murder. 27 Based on these facts, we believe that counsels' performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness because reasonable counsel in this situation would have recognized that Hoffman's capacity on the night of Williams's murder might have been affected by mental health problems, by drug use, or by some combination of the two. Once counsel was on notice that Hoffman's capacity on the night of Williams's murder was at issue, counsel had an absolute duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that [made] investigations unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1085 (9th Cir.2003) (Trial counsel has a duty to investigate a defendant's mental state if there is evidence to suggest that the defendant is impaired.). In this case, both Wellman and Coulter admitted that they did not conduct a factual investigation into Hoffman's mental capacity, nor did they research the viability of a diminished capacity defense. Wellman himself admitted that he probably didn't give the [diminished capacity] defense due consideration. This failure fell below the objective standard of reasonableness. 28 We cannot agree with the district court that such failure was tactical or that counsel made a reasonable decision that [made] investigations unnecessary. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The record does not reflect a calculated decision by counsel not to investigate a diminished capacity defense. Wellman testified that he was not sure [they] really had a good cogent theory of defense. To the extent that counsel had a theory, the theory was that Wages was the principal perpetrator of the offense because Wages had engaged in sexual intercourse with Denise Williams on the night of the murder and was trying to cover it up. That is, the theory was that because Hoffman was less culpable than Wages, then Hoffman, like Wages, should be spared the death penalty. Wellman, however, was unable to sufficiently develop this theory. And even if counsel had been able to develop this theory, the theory is not a defense to first-degree murder where an aider and abetter is just as criminally liable as the one who deals the fatal blow. See Idaho Code § 18-204 (1989); State v. Gonzalez, 134 Idaho 907, 12 P.3d 382, 384 (2000). A diminished capacity defense in Idaho could have negated the intent element required for first-degree murder, and, if successful, could have spared Hoffman's life. Thus, counsels' decision — if it can be called that — to forego a diminished capacity defense to pursue a strategy that would not result in a lesser charge falls outside the range of tactical decisions. 29 Moreover, pursuing a diminished capacity defense is not inconsistent with trial counsels' theory of the case. Rather, a showing that Hoffman was suffering from psychosis or intoxication would have furthered counsels' argument that Wages was the more culpable of the two, and could only have supported counsels' sentencing strategy. We can see no tactical disadvantage to investigating a diminished capacity defense, a defense with a plausible factual basis that might have allowed Hoffman to escape first-degree murder and would have, in any event, furthered counsels' strategy. 30 The State tries to paint counsels' behavior as a strategic decision of where to focus money and resources. This is contradicted by counsels' own admissions that they did not have a clear theory of defense, and that they were just kind of spinning in the weeks and months before trial. Moreover, if Wellman and Coulter failed to develop a diminished capacity defense because they lacked funds, this evidences a more serious deficiency: a failure to understand controlling law. Wellman testified that they did not ask for an investigator or for a mental health expert because they did not think the judge would have granted such a request. But in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Supreme Court held that where an indigent defendant can demonstrate that his mental capacity is likely to be a significant issue at trial or capital sentencing, he has an absolute right to be provided with psychiatric and psychological expert assistance. We agree with the district court, then, that standards of professional competent assistance required [counsel] to request funds which would allow for adequate investigation or to preserve the issue for appeal. Thus, the failure to investigate and present a diminished capacity defense at trial cannot be forgiven based on the lack of resources available to Wellman and Coulter. 31 For these reasons, we conclude that Hoffman has met the first prong of Strickland; he has shown that it was objectively unreasonable for counsel not to investigate a diminished capacity defense. 32 But this is not enough for Hoffman to succeed on his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. He must also show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had counsel investigated his mental capacity. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Where counsels' deficiency involves the failure to investigate a possible defense, we evaluate whether there is a reasonable probability that a competent investigation would have turned up evidence bearing on that defense that would have affected the outcome of trial. See Stankewitz v. Woodford, 365 F.3d 706, 717-19 (9th Cir.2004) (focusing the prejudice inquiry on the information that a reasonable investigation would have unearthed). 33 It is apparent that Hoffman suffered and continues to suffer some degree of mental disability. Eight years before Williams was murdered, Hoffman was committed for six days in the Metropolitan State Hospital in Norwalk, California, where he was diagnosed as suffering from psychosis manifested by delusional and violent behavior. At the habeas hearing, before the district court, Hoffman offered the expert testimony of three doctors who each testified that Hoffman likely had some degree of psychotic thought disorder in 1989. The doctors also agreed that this illness might affect Hoffman's ability to reason. As Dr. Merikangas, a psychiatrist and neurologist, explained, psychosis is a formal thought disorder where the person's thinking is not consistent with reality and with logical thought as experienced by normal people. It is generally characterized by problems with logic, problems with abstracting ability, sometimes with hallucinations. More important for our purposes, Dr. Merikangas testified that congenital brain damage visible on MRIs taken in 1996 and in 2001 could have been detected had an MRI been taken of Hoffman's brain in 1989. 34 This expert testimony of these three doctors is supported by the testimony of Dr. Sanford, the psychologist who examined Hoffman before his sentencing hearing in 1989. Dr. Sanford wrote, in his 1989 report, that his initial meeting with Hoffman left him with the impression that some brain damage or neurological problem [might be] responsible for the types of difficulties he was showing on the initial assessment, especially his difficulty in communicating. After further testing, Dr. Sanford concluded that Hoffman's symptoms were consistent with brain damage to the left hemisphere. This report is as close to a contemporaneous mental health evaluation as exists, and indicates that a reasonably competent investigation in 1988 could have adduced evidence to support a diminished capacity defense during the guilt phase. 35 The State presented the testimony of Dr. Smith, a neurosurgeon, who opined that the MRI scans fell within the normal range. At the same time Dr. Smith admitted that he rarely read MRIs and that it was not his specialty. While the evidence is somewhat ambiguous, we believe Hoffman probably could have presented some evidence that would have supported a finding that he suffered from some degree of psychosis at the time of Williams's murder. 36 In addition to evidence of psychosis, there is significant evidence that Hoffman's IQ fell within the range of mental retardation. The clinically-accepted range of mental retardation is an IQ score of 70, with a five point margin of error. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 309 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Hoffman's IQ has fluctuated between 72 when tested in 1989 and 74 when tested in 2001. The district court properly concluded, then, that Hoffman was borderline retarded. This evidence could have been presented in 1989. 37 In addition, Hoffman had a significant history of drug abuse. Counsel knew that Hoffman used methamphetamine and cocaine at least four times on the day of Williams's murder. Expert testimony was presented in the district court about the effect of drug use on a person with psychosis: that drug use frequently induces a person with psychosis to have more florid psychosis and delusions. This evidence also could have been presented at the guilt phase of trial in 1989. 38 But even if we were to assume that all of the above testimony could have been presented at trial, there is not a reasonable probability that such evidence would have altered the outcome of the guilt phase of Hoffman's trial. Idaho's law is more demanding than most states' laws on the question of mental capacity. In Idaho, at the time of Hoffman's trial (as now) there was no diminished capacity, intoxication, or insanity defense. See Idaho Code § 207(a) (1989). Rather mental capacity was folded into the element of intent: the prosecution was required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had the mental capacity to form the intent to commit the crime charged. See State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081, 1085-86 (1991). Section 18-115 of the Idaho Code, as it existed at the time of Williams's murder, states that intent is manifested by the circumstances connected with the offense, and the sound mind and discretion of the accused.  Idaho Code § 18-115 (1989) (emphasis added). Thus, diminished capacity and intoxication are not general excuse[s] for crime, but the jury can consider such factors as they relate to whether the defendant was able to form the intent to commit the crime for which he was charged. See State v. Hall, 111 Idaho 827, 727 P.2d 1255, 1262-63 (1986). 39 Hoffman was charged with first-degree murder and with aiding and abetting first-degree murder, and the jury was instructed on both theories. Accordingly, to find prejudice, we would have to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that evidence of Hoffman's mental capacity would negate not only the intent to murder Williams, but would also negate the intent to knowingly assist [or] facilitate Williams's murder. See State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31, 40 (1983). We cannot do so. 40 First, we note that Hoffman had the mental capacity to complete several intentional acts on the night of the murder. Hoffman drove around for several hours, and he changed a flat tire on a car. While there was testimony presented to the district court that a person in a drug-induced psychosis can perform certain simple motor functions, this is nonetheless good evidence that Hoffman had some level of mental functioning on the night of Williams's murder. In addition, on that same night, Hoffman destroyed evidence of the murder: he burned his, Williams's, and Wages's clothing, he helped to clean the car, and he cut up the weapon. Such behavior indicates some level of cognitive planning — a recognition of criminal behavior — and cuts against a diminished capacity defense. 41 Second, Hoffman bragged about the murder to his cohorts. Hoffman told Ricky Williams, a cellmate, that he had slashed Williams's throat, and that he had killed Williams. Hoffman also told Kenneth Hunnicutt, a friend and cellmate, that he cut Williams's throat, and that because she wouldn't die Wages threw a rock at her. Victor Gezzi, another friend, testified that Hoffman told him that Williams was took care of and that he had cut Williams's throat. Hoffman's act of telling others that he was the perpetrator of the crime is inconsistent with his testimony that he was trying to help Williams by slitting her throat. Thus, Hoffman's admissions would likely have discredited a diminished capacity defense in the jury's mind. 42 Third, if Hoffman had contested his capacity to form the intent to participate in Williams's murder, evidence of a subsequent crime that Hoffman committed could have been admissible. Four months after Denise Williams was murdered, Hoffman, Holmes, and Wages together kidnaped a man named Ricky Simonis. On that occasion, Hoffman drove the car, and later held Simonis while Wages beat him. Hoffman then held a gun to Simonis's head while Simonis signed the title of his car over to Holmes. See State v. Hoffman, 116 Idaho 480, 776 P.2d 1199 (1989). Evidence of this kidnaping was excluded at the trial, but might have been admitted under Idaho law if Hoffman had challenged the element of intent in the instant case. See State v. Dayley, 96 Idaho 527, 531 P.2d 1172, 1173-74 (1975) (holding that where a defendant challenges his mental capacity to form criminal intent, other criminal actions may be admissible to prove the defendant's intent or rationality at the time of the crime); see also Idaho R. Evid. § 404(b); State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680, 688-89 (1991), rev'd on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991) (affirming admission of both prior and subsequent bad acts under Idaho R. Evid. 404(b)). Williams's murder was not Hoffman's first foray into the criminal justice system — a fact that would have come to light had Hoffman raised a diminished capacity defense. 43 Finally, we consider Wellman's evaluation, that his experience with the makeup of the juries in Owyhee County led [him] to believe that it was not the type of jury makeup that would be attracted to a more mental-capacity-oriented case. Wellman stated that he doubted that he could persuade a bunch of farmers and ranchers that [there was] voluntary intoxication to the point that you [could not] form the intent to commit the crime. While Wellman's statement might be discounted somewhat, given his lack of experience in capital cases, Wellman had been a member of the Idaho criminal bar for ten years before he represented Hoffman, and his evaluation about the likelihood that the jurors would accept this defense is entitled to some weight. 5 44 While it is impossible to divine exactly what might sway a jury in any given situation, we do not believe that a jury would have found that Hoffman was not capable of forming the intent to murder Williams, or at least to knowingly participate in her murder. The fact that he had the cognitive ability to recognize that he should cover up evidence of Williams's murder, that he was able to perform functions such as driving and changing a tire, and that he was involved in Simonis's kidnaping during the same period indicate that Hoffman probably had sufficient capacity to know what he was doing and what the end result of his conduct would be. We do not believe there is a reasonable probability that a jury would have found otherwise. Accordingly, we conclude that Hoffman was not prejudiced by his counsels' deficient performance in failing to investigate and present a diminished capacity defense. 45