Opinion ID: 1998744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Section 9-1(b)(11) Aggravating Factor

Text: Defendant was found eligible for the imposition of the death sentence on four aggravating factors, including section 9-1(b)(11), which provides for death sentence eligibility where the defendant was 18 years or older at the time of the offense, and where the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994). Defendant contends that this aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague on its face. Specifically, defendant contends that the use of vague language in section 9-1(b)(11), such as cold, calculated, and premeditated, violates the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, as it impermissibly fails to narrow the class of those defendants eligible for death because it requires no additional mental state beyond intent, a mental state defendant asserts is present in almost all murders. This court has repeatedly rejected the argument that the language employed by the legislature in section 9-1(b)(11) is unconstitutionally vague. In People v. Johnson, 154 Ill.2d 356, 372-73, 181 Ill.Dec. 926, 609 N.E.2d 294 (1993), this court held that the terms cold, calculated and premeditated as used in section 9-1(b)(11) provide adequate guidance for assessing death eligibility. More recently, in People v. Munson, 171 Ill.2d 158, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265 (1996), we rejected arguments virtually identical to those made by defendant at bar. In Munson, the defendant asserted that he had been deprived of a fair sentencing hearing because the terms cold, calculated and premeditated contained in section 9-1(b)(11) could apply to every defendant eligible for the death penalty [and][t]hus, this factor fails to place any inherent restraint on a capital sentencer's discretion in imposing death. Munson, 171 Ill.2d at 191, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265. In rejecting the defendant's argument in Munson, we held that the aggravating factor contained in section 9-1(b)(11) pertains to the intent to murder pursuant to a particular plan, scheme or design. It is not simply the intent to commit murder. As such, this factor is not present in every murder case. Thus, contrary to defendant's argument, the factor does place the necessary restraint on the sentencer's discretion to impose death. Munson, 171 Ill.2d at 191, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265. Although defendant in the cause at bar acknowledges that this court has previously rejected the claim for relief he is presently requesting, he nevertheless urges this court to reconsider this issue in light of a 1994 decision rendered by the Florida Supreme Court in Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85 (Fla. 1994). We decline to reconsider our previous holdings that the language employed in section 9-1(b)(11) is not unconstitutionally vague. Defendant articulates no new and compelling reason for this court to deviate from our well-established precedent. Defendant also contends in his brief to this court that the totality of the evidence at the sentencing hearing showed that the murder was not committed in a cold, calculated, and premeditated manner, but resulted from a rage erupting from [defendant's] personality structure and the victim's rejection of his request for consensual sex. Defendant maintains that this was not a carefully planned murder subject to the section 9-1(b)(11) eligibility factor. Therefore, defendant argues that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing without the section 9-1(b)(11) factor. We determine that the jury could have found that the evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the murder in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b)(11) (West 1994). The record establishes that the victim had been a longtime friend of the Grafs, and would often sleep at the Grafs' apartment a few times a month before she moved in with them during August 1993. Defendant had been living with the Grafs since the fall of 1992, and was acquainted with Maria since that time. Defendant's friend, Tom Richardson, testified that on October 31, 1992, defendant told him that defendant intended to hit Maria over the head with a crowbar, rape her, steal her car, and escape to New York City, all of which eventually transpired. In addition, Richardson testified that defendant told him that defendant planned to attack Maria after she had taken a shower in the Grafs' bathroom, which was located between defendant's room and the Grafs' bedroom, again, foreshadowing the circumstances of this crime. Richardson testified that defendant then showed him a crowbar which defendant retrieved from his dresser drawer, one end of which defendant had wrapped with electrical tape. Once again, this foreshadowed the events of the crime, to the extent that defendant used such a crowbar as the murder weapon. Richardson further testified that in April and May of 1993, defendant repeated his plan to hit Maria over the head with a crowbar, rape her, steal her car, and leave for New York City. In addition, in the course of the confession defendant gave to Detectives Van Stedum and Simo in New York City on June 10, 1994, defendant told the police officers that the year before the murder he was planning on doing the same thing. When asked if the same thing meant hitting a girl over the head, defendant replied, Right, or taking her purse or, you know   . From defendant's confession, the jury could determine that defendant had a generalized preconceived plan of attacking women by hitting them over the head with a crowbar and robbing and raping them, and, in furtherance of this scheme, purchased a crowbar, taped the end, and secreted it in his bedroom. In addition, the record supports the conclusion that defendant's actions were cold and calculated within the meaning of section 9-1(b)(11). In his confession, defendant related that after he inflicted the first blow to Maria's head, she fell back on the bed and her head started bleeding. Defendant then jumped on top of her and repeatedly struck Maria's head with the crowbar. When he thought he had killed her, he attempted to clean the blood splatters from the wall and then cleaned himself up and did his laundry. In the interim, defendant placed a pillow over Maria's head, took off her clothes, and raped her. Upon completion of the rape, defendant drove Maria's car to an Elk Grove Village pawn shop and pawned Maria's VCR. He then returned to the apartment, gathered his things, and decided to rape Maria a second time before, in defendant's words, Maria became cold and stiff. Defendant thereafter took Maria's purse and departed in her car for New York City. Therefore, the evidence supports the jury's determination that defendant murdered Maria in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take her life by unlawful means. Furthermore, defendant's repeated striking of Maria over the head with the crowbar created a reasonable expectation that she would die. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove the existence of the aggravating factor set forth in section 9-1(b)(11). In his brief to this court, defendant asserts that the totality of the evidence at the sentencing hearing reveals that this murder was not cold, calculated and premeditated within the meaning of the section 9-1(b)(11) aggravating factor. In support of this assertion, defendant argues that the testimony given by Dr. Wahlstrom during the aggravation-mitigation phase disproved the section 9-1(b)(11) statutory factor in aggravation. Even if Dr. Wahlstrom's testimony had been presented as part of the evidence during the initial, eligibility phase, we are not persuaded that it would alter the conclusion that the jury found defendant eligible for the death sentence on the section 9-1(b)(11) aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. As a final argument, defendant urges this court to adopt a standard of heightened premeditation for the aggravating factor of cold, calculated and premeditated murder. Defendant cites to decisions rendered by the Supreme Court of Florida where that court adopted the phrase heightened premeditation to distinguish the cold, calculated and premeditated aggravating factor from the premeditation element of first degree murder. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 648 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla.1994); Porter v. State, 564 So.2d 1060, 1064 (Fla.1990). Under Florida's standard, although heightened premeditation may be demonstrated by the manner of the killing, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant planned or arranged to commit murder before the crime began. Porter, 564 So.2d at 1064. As stated, this court has repeatedly upheld section 9-1(b)(11) against constitutional challenges and has found that this aggravating factor does not apply to every murder, but only to those perpetrated pursuant to a particular plan, design or scheme. Munson, 171 Ill.2d at 191, 215 Ill.Dec. 125, 662 N.E.2d 1265. Defendant offers no persuasive reason why we should depart from our previous holdings.