Opinion ID: 1186151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State's impeachment of own witness.

Text: Defendant also charges that [t]he prosecution's persistent efforts, through statement, inquiry, and innuendo, to blacken defendant's character in the jury's eyes denied him a fair trial. Upon examination of the record we find that in most instances of such alleged misconduct, objections by defendant were sustained and there were no motions for mistrial. The one remaining incident, however, involved error that, in our opinion, was so prejudicial as to require that defendant's motion for mistrial be granted. That error involved the attempt by the state to impeach one of its own witnesses, one Becky Mullins, who testified that she lived in an apartment across from that of the prosecuting witness; that she saw defendant there during the afternoon of the alleged rape; that she and two other persons were also there for a short time, but that she then left and that she later heard a yell or a laugh from that area. On cross-examination Ms. Mullins testified that later that afternoon the prosecuting witness said that she had been raped and that I didn't believe her. On redirect examination Ms. Mullins testified, in response to a leading question by the prosecuting attorney, that she and defendant were quite close friends. The prosecuting attorney then undertook to impeach her further by asking whether, in his office in the presence of himself and Virginia Hunt (a police officer), she said that when the prosecuting witness said that she had been raped Ms. Mullins told the prosecuting witness that she had heard he had done it so many times before that he would go to the pen. Ms. Mullins denied making that statement before defendant's attorney objected. Defendant's objection and motion for mistrial were then denied. The prosecuting attorney then called Virginia Hunt (the police officer) who was permitted to testify, over objection and motion for mistrial, that Ms. Mullins had stated in the office that she had told the prosecuting witness that if she reported the incident this was going to create problems for Mr. Jones because he had done it so many times before. After further objection by defendant, the trial judge reversed his ruling and instructed the jury to disregard the statement made by the last witness. You are directed to erase it from your mind and pay no attention to it. The court then also denied defendant's motion for mistrial. Later during the trial, and as a part of its rebuttal evidence, the state offered the record of defendant's prior convictions, including assault and battery, disorderly conduct, criminal trespass and assault, consumption in unlicensed public place, trespassing, trespassing on premises, public intoxication and disorderly conduct. No record was offered, however, of any prior conviction for rape or any other sex offense. It is contended by the state that ORS 45.590 expressly permits a party to impeach its own witness by proof of a prior inconsistent statement. It is well established, however, that when the attempted impeachment is on a collateral matter and the witness denies making the alleged statement, the party must take the answer and may not then call another witness to testify that the witness to be impeached made such a statement. State v. Johnson, 277 Or. 45, 48, 559 P.2d 496 (1977); State v. Wolfe, 273 Or. 518, 526, 542 P.2d 482 (1975); Smith v. White, 231 Or. 425, 432, 372 P.2d 483 (1972). The alleged statement by Ms. Mullins that defendant had done it before was clearly collateral to the issues in this case. Ordinarily we do not reverse a case for the denial of a motion for mistrial in which the trial court has sustained an objection to evidence and has admonished the jury to disregard it. There may, however, be cases in which the testimony which the jury is instructed to disregard is so prejudicial that, as a practical matter, the bell once rung, cannot be unrung by such an admonishment. Cf. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1934), and Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 453, 69 S.Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790 (1949), concurring opinion by Jackson, J. [3] In our view, this is such a case. This prosecuting attorney, well knowing that he had no proof that defendant has been previously convicted of rape (as indicated by the record of various other offenses offered by him in evidence), persisted in making comments and insinuations to that effect, including the clearly improper attempt to get before the jury the alleged statement by Ms. Mullins that he had done it so many times before. In a prosecution for rape in which, as in this case, the jury must decide between the credibility of the prosecuting witness and the defendant, the prejudice resulting from the admission of such evidence was so pervasive as to lead us to the conclusion that, as a result, defendant was denied a fair trial. While it is expected that a prosecuting attorney will be zealous in his efforts to convict a defendant believed by him to be guilty of a crime, it must also be remembered that the prosecuting attorney, as a representative of the state, owes a primary duty to see that all criminal defendants receive a fair trial. Cf. State v. Wederski, 230 Or. 57, 62, 368 P.2d 393 (1962). For all of these reasons, the judgment of conviction is reversed and this case must be remanded for a new trial.