Opinion ID: 1057709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Protection Against Unreasonable Seizure

Text: Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. The Fourth Amendment provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . . Article I, section 7 of our own constitution similarly provides that the people shall be secure in their persons . . . from unreasonable searches and seizures. . . . The basic constitutional rule is that a warrantless search or seizure is presumed unreasonable and any evidence discovered is subject to suppression. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971); State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tenn.1997). This basic rule is subject to `a few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions[,]' `jealously and carefully drawn.' [9] Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 455, 91 S.Ct. 2022 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958)). Both provisions are designed `to prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference . . . with the privacy and personal security of individuals.' I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758, 80 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)). Neither provision, however, limits all contact between citizens and law enforcement. The courts have recognized three levels of police-citizen interactions: (1) the full-scale arrest, which must be supported by probable cause; (2) the brief investigatory detention, which must be supported by reasonable suspicion of wrong-doing; and (3) the brief police-citizen encounter, which requires no objective justification. [10] State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 424 (Tenn.2000) (citing Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975), Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)). Of the three categories, only the first two rise to the level of a seizure for constitutional analysis purposes. The Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 protections against unreasonable seizures apply to all seizures, even those of brief duration. The touchstone is reasonableness. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 360, 88 S.Ct. 507); see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); State v. Scarborough, 201 S.W.3d 607, 616 (Tenn. 2006). A police-citizen encounter becomes a seizure, thereby triggering a constitutional analysis of the police action, when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868. A seizure occurs only `if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' Delgado, 466 U.S. at 215, 104 S.Ct. 1758 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)). The law is settled that an automobile stop by the use of flashing blue lights constitutes a seizure within the meaning of both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 316; State v. Randolph, 74 S.W.3d 330, 337 (Tenn.2002); State v. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d 29, 30 (Tenn. 1993). The fact that the detention may be brief and limited in scope does not alter that fact. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391; State v. Binion, 900 S.W.2d 702, 705 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994). The State concedes that the defendant was seized at the moment Officer Tarkington turned on his blue lights. The basic question, as indicated, is whether the seizure was reasonable. Binion, 900 S.W.2d at 705 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449-51, 110 S.Ct. 2481). Whether the stop of a vehicle is considered reasonable depends on whether the officer had either probable cause or an articulable and reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants were subject to seizure for a violation of the law. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391; State v. Coleman, 791 S.W.2d 504, 505 (Tenn.Crim.App.1989). Probable causethe higher standard necessary to make a full-scale arrestmeans more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where `the facts and circumstances within their [the officers'] knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)). This determination depends upon `whether at that moment the facts and circumstances within [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the petitioner had committed or was committing an offense.' Goines v. State, 572 S.W.2d 644, 647 (Tenn. 1978) (quoting Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)). In dealing with probable cause, . . . we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. 1302. See also State v. Jefferson, 529 S.W.2d 674, 689 (Tenn.1975) (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 313, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959)), overruled on other grounds by State v. Mitchell, 593 S.W.2d 280, 286 (Tenn.1980). The level of reasonable suspicion required to support an investigatory stop is lower than that required for probable cause. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31. However, an officer making an investigatory stop must be able to articulate something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or `hunch.' Terry 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868. An officer's reasonable suspicion must be supported by specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; see also Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 30; Coleman, 791 S.W.2d at 505; State v. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d 293, 294 (Tenn.1992) (applying the Terry doctrine in context of vehicular stop). This Court has defined reasonable suspicion as a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the subject of a stop of criminal activity. State v. Binette, 33 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tenn.2000). Objective standards apply rather than the subjective beliefs of the officer making the stop. See Norword, 938 S.W.2d at 25. See also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (stating that in making a reasonableness assessment, it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard. . . .). In Pulley, this Court noted that the reasonableness of seizures less intrusive than a full-scale arrest is judged by weighing the gravity of the public concern, the degree to which the seizure advances that concern, and the severity of the intrusion into individual privacy. 863 S.W.2d at 30. Determining whether reasonable suspicion exists in a particular traffic stop is a fact-intensive and objective analysis. See generally Williams, 185 S.W.3d at 318-19 (citing State v. Garcia, 123 S.W.3d 335, 344 (Tenn.2003)). In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, an important factor in the analysis is that reasonable suspicion `is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.' Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 32 (quoting White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412). The United States Supreme Court has held that a court must consider the totality of the circumstances when determining whether a police officer's reasonable suspicion is supported by specific and articulable facts. White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412 (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)); see also Bridges, 963 S.W.2d at 492. Those circumstances include the objective observations of the police officer, information obtained from other officers or agencies, information obtained from citizens, and the pattern of operation of certain offenders. Watkins, 827 S.W.2d at 294 (citing Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. 690). Reasonable suspicion is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. White, 496 U.S. at 330, 110 S.Ct. 2412. Under circumstances where the information forming the basis for a motor vehicle stop is derived from an anonymous informant, Tennessee law requires some showing of both the informant's veracity or credibility and his or her basis of knowledge. Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31; cf. State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430, 436 (Tenn.1989) (discussing the showing required when an anonymous informant's tip is relied upon to establish probable cause for issuance of a warrant). `[E]ach prong represents an independently important consideration that must be separately considered and satisfied in some way.' State v. Keith, 978 S.W.2d 861, 866 (Tenn.1998) (quoting State v. Simpson, 968 S.W.2d 776, 781 (Tenn. 1998)); see also Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 31.