Opinion ID: 77773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Broadspire or Coca-Cola was the Plan Administrator

Text: The plan document designates Coca-Cola the plan administrator. Oliver relies on Hamilton v. Allen-Bradley Co., in which we held that the plan document is not dispositive with respect to the identity of the plan administrator, and that it is necessary to examine the factual circumstances surrounding the administration of the plan, even if these factual circumstances contradict the designation in the plan document. 244 F.3d 819, 824 (11th Cir.2001). In Hamilton, a plan participant sued her employer, Allen, arguing that she had been wrongly denied disability benefits under the applicable ERISA plan. 244 F.3d at 822-23. Under that plan, Allen was not designated as the plan administrator; rather, an insurance company, UNAM, was the named plan administrator. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the employer, Allen, on the ground that it was not the plan administrator, and on appeal, we reversed. We held that [t]he key question was whether Allen had sufficient decisional control over the claim process that would qualify it as a plan administrator. . . . Id. at 824. In holding that Allen did have the requisite level of control to qualify as a plan administrator, we relied on several facts. First, we noted that, although UNAM was the designated plan administrator, Allen require[d] its employees to go through its human resources department in order to obtain an application for disability benefits. Id. We held that that fact place[d] Allen in sufficient control over the process to qualify as the plan administrator notwithstanding the language of the plan booklet. Id. Moreover, we observed that Allen held itself out to employees as administer[ing] the Plan, [] process[ing] all claims and appeals, and [] provid[ing] other administrative services. Id. This bolstered our determination that Allen was a de facto plan administrator. Finally, we noted that Allen did carry out its administrative designation by handing out the claim forms itself . . . and by fielding questions about the plan from employees. Id. We found that these facts comprised sufficient indicators that point[ed] to Allen as a plan administrator. Id. We also expressly rejected the approach taken by the Second Circuit in Crocco v. Xerox Corp., 137 F.3d 105, 107 (2d Cir.1998), which held that only an entity named in the plan document as an administrator could be a plan administrator. See Hamilton, 244 F.3d at 824. We have also recognized the de facto administrator doctrine in several cases in addition to Hamilton. In Rosen v. TRW, Inc., we reversed the dismissal, for failure to state a claim, of a complaint against an employer not named in the plan document as an administrator, and permitted the plaintiff to pursue the claim that the company was the de facto plan administrator and the committee was an inactive entity. 979 F.2d 191, 193-94 (11th Cir.1992). We held that if a company is administrating the plan, then it can be held liable for ERISA violations, regardless of the provisions of the plan document. Id. Similarly, in Garren v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., we stated that [t]he proper party defendant in an action concerning ERISA benefits is the party that controls administration of the plan. 114 F.3d 186, 187 (11th Cir.1997) (per curiam). Each of the foregoing cases, however, is distinguishable from the instant case in a significant respect: Hamilton, Garren, and Rosen applied the de facto administrator doctrine to employers, not to third-party administrative services providers. At issue in those cases were plans with frameworks similar to that in this case: an employer established an ERISA plan and then outsourced responsibility for administering claims to a separate entity. See Hamilton, 244 F.3d at 822-23; Garren, 114 F.3d at 187; Rosen, 979 F.2d at 192-93. In Hamilton and Rosen, plan participants brought suit against employers that had sought to avoid liability as plan administrators, not, as here, against the third-party claims administrator. Hamilton, 244 F.3d at 822-23; Rosen, 979 F.2d at 192-93. In Garren, the plaintiff brought suit against the third-party claims administrator, and the court held that the true plan administrator was the employer. 114 F.3d at 187. Indeed, where a plaintiff has sought to hold a third-party administrative services provider liable, rather than the employer, we have rejected the de facto plan administrator doctrine. See Baker v. Big Star Div. of the Grand Union Co., 893 F.2d 288 (11th Cir.1989). In Baker, an employer had established an ERISA disability benefits plan, and contracted with Connecticut General Life Insurance to administer claims, though, as here, the employer reserved the right to review any and all claim denials. Id. at 290. An employee submitted a claim for benefits under the plan, and Connecticut General denied the claim. Id. Baker was informed of his right to appeal the initial benefits decision, but instead brought suit in state court claiming that Connecticut General improperly denied his claim. Id. The case was removed to federal court, and the district court ruled in favor of Connecticut General, basing its decision in part on the determination that Connecticut General was not an ERISA fiduciary and could not be held liable under ERISA for its handling of Baker's claim. Id. We affirmed, holding that [the employer] did no more than `rent' the claims processing department of Connecticut General to review claims and determine the amount payable `in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Plan.' Id. (citing the provisions of the plan). We held that Connecticut General [did] not become an ERISA `fiduciary' simply by performing administrative functions and claims processing within a framework of rules established by an employer, particularly in light of the fact that the employer made the final determination as to eligibility. Id. (citations omitted). Were we to find Broadspire a de facto plan administrator on these facts, we would undercut the ability of employers to contract out the administrative tasks associated with operating an ERISA plan, a practice we upheld in Baker. See id. at 290. Indeed, it is hard to imagine how an administrative services provider could fulfill its functions without engaging in the types of activity that, in Hamilton, triggered the application of the de facto administrator doctrine. See Hamilton, 244 F.3d at 824 (finding that employer was de facto administrator because, inter alia, it distributed disability benefit application forms and field[ed] questions about the plan from employees). The First Circuit, which also recognizes the de facto administrator doctrine in some contexts, see Law v. Ernst & Young, 956 F.2d 364, 372-73 (1st Cir.1992), has also declined to apply the de facto administrator doctrine to a third party administrative services provider in circumstances similar to those here. See Terry v. Bayer Corp., 145 F.3d 28, 35 (1st Cir.1998) ([W]hen the plan administrator retains discretion to decide disputes, a third party service provider, such as Northwestern, is not a fiduciary of the plan, and thus not amenable to a suit under [ERISA].) (citations omitted). Because Broadspire is merely an administrative services provider, and because, under the Plan, Coca-Cola, through the Committee  not Broadspire  makes the final decision on benefits claims, we are bound by Baker to hold that Coca-Cola is the plan administrator. See Baker, 893 F.2d at 289-90. Accordingly, the appropriate standard of review was arbitrary and capricious, see Hunt, 119 F.3d at 912, and the district court erred in applying de novo review. Moreover, under Baker, Broadspire is not a proper defendant in this action. 893 F.2d at 290. D. Whether Coca-Cola's Decision to Deny Oliver's Claim for LTD Benefits was Arbitrary and Capricious Under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the plan administrator's decision to deny benefits must be upheld so long as there is a reasonable basis for the decision. Jett v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., 890 F.2d 1137, 1140 (11th Cir.1989). The district court's review of the plan administrator's denial of benefits should be limited to consideration of the material available to [the administrator] at the time it made its decision. Id. To determine whether the administrator's denial of benefits was arbitrary and capricious, we begin with the language of the Plan itself. See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(D) (stating that an ERISA fiduciary shall discharge its duties in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of [ERISA]). Section 3.1 of the Plan provides: As a condition to receiving a Disability Benefit, the Disabled Participant must submit a written application on a form provided by his Employer, as soon as practicable after his Disability Date. He must include with his application a medical certification of his Disability. R1-24, Exh. 1 at CCCID0630. The relevant portion of Section 3.2(a) provides: As a condition to receiving a Disability Benefit, the Disabled Participant may be required to submit to a physical and/or mental examination by, and receive a written certification of Disability from, a licensed medical doctor selected or approved by the Administrative Services Provider. The medical doctor's opinion will be binding on the Participant, the Plan and the Administrative Services Provider. Id. Section 3.2(b) gives the employer the right to make payment of continuing disability benefits contingent on the participant submitting to periodic medical examinations. Id. Section 4.2 of the Plan provides that a disabled plan participant will receive disability benefits. Id. at CCCID0634. Thus, under the terms of the Plan, a disabled participant is entitled to disability benefits. Id. Moreover, to receive those benefits, a disabled participant is required only to submit a written application on a form provided by his Employer, and provide medical certification of his disability. Neither § 3.1 nor any other provision of the Plan requires objective evidence of a disability. In addition to the requirement that the participant submit a written application and provide medical certification of a disability, the Plan permits the employer to require the applicant to submit to a medical examination by a doctor of the employer's choosing. Here, however, Coca-Cola chose not to exercise that right. Under the terms of the Plan, then, Oliver was entitled to disability payments so long as he submitted a written application and provided medical certification that he was disabled within the meaning of the Plan. Id. at CCCID0630. In seeking to provide medical certification of his disability, Oliver submitted voluminous medical documentation from at least six treating physicians (Drs. Arrowsmith, Fugedy, Bell-Wade, Mishu, Lazarus, and Mani), including records of physical examinations, treatment notes, and the results of several objective diagnostic laboratory tests including an MRI, two EMGs, and a nerve conduction test that supported his treating physicians' diagnoses. He submitted reports from Drs. Arrowsmith, Fugedy, and Mishu that concluded unequivocally that he could not work. Oliver submitted evaluations from multiple treating physicians reflecting a consistent diagnosis of chronic radiculopathy and pain of the cervical spine and right arm, as well as fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome. Oliver also submitted, inter alia, a report from Dr. Mishu that addressed how Oliver's disability related specifically to the various tasks required of him as a Systems Support Specialist, and concluded that he could not perform those tasks. We find that Coca-Cola's denial of Oliver's LTD benefits claim was arbitrary and capricious, for a number of reasons. Coca-Cola based its rejection of Oliver's claim on its contention that Oliver failed to provide objective evidence of his disability, stating that the true organic etiology of Oliver's pain had not been determined. R3-61, Exh. 30. Yet much medical evidence, especially as it relates to pain, is inherently subjective in that it cannot be quantifiably measured. Indeed, the only evidence of a qualifying disability may sometimes be the sort of evidence that Coca-Cola and Broadspire characterize as subjective, such as physical examinations and medical reports by physicians, as well as the patient's own reports of his symptoms. See, e.g., Hawkins v. First Union Corp. Long-Term Disability Plan, 326 F.3d 914, 919 (7th Cir.2003) (Pain often and in the case of fibromyalgia cannot be detected by laboratory tests.). The Plan does not exclude from its coverage pain-related disabilities, such as fibromyalgia or chronic pain syndrome, merely because they are not subject to diagnosis by objective laboratory tests. Neither Coca-Cola nor Broadspire identified any evidence that conflicted with Oliver's diagnosis of fibromyalgia and chronic pain syndrome, and their peer review doctors did not dispute those diagnoses. Nonetheless, Coca-Cola's peer reviewer, Dr. Goldberg, recommended denying Oliver's disability claim because, in his view, Oliver's medical evidence consisted of [his] own subjective complaints of his particular pain and level of activity without any objective data to support this. R1-24, Exh. 11 at CCCID0612 (18 March 2001 peer review by Dr. Goldberg). By denying Oliver's claim on the ground that he had not provided objective evidence of his pain, despite Oliver's submission of uncontroverted medical evidence of the only sort available to prove his disability  including medical reports from multiple physicians stating that his reports of pain were consistent with their diagnoses and did not appear to be histrionic or exaggerated  Coca-Cola engaged in capricious decision making. See Hawkins, 326 F.3d at 919; R3-61, Exh. 28 at TOL001206 (13 April 2000 report by Dr. Mani). Indeed, it is unclear what additional objective evidence of his pain Oliver could have provided in addition to, among other things, the medical opinions of numerous treating physicians based on examinations of Oliver, two positive EMGs, a nerve conduction test, and an MRI. Tellingly, Coca-Cola never identified what sort of objective evidence it sought. Although in some contexts it may not be arbitrary and capricious to require clinical evidence of the etiology of allegedly disabling symptoms in order to verify that there is no malingering, we conclude that it was arbitrary and capricious to require such evidence in the context of this Plan and [Oliver's diagnosis]. [5] See Mitchell v. Eastman Kodak Co., 113 F.3d 433, 442-43 (3d Cir.1997); see also Hawkins, 326 F.3d at 919 ([T]he gravest problem with [the peer review doctor's] report is the weight he places on the difference between subjective and objective evidence of pain.). Coca-Cola's denial of Oliver's claim for failure to provide objective evidence of his disability was also arbitrary and capricious because it was based on a mischaracterization of the evidence Oliver submitted. As noted previously, two of Oliver's treating physicians conducted EMG tests, the results of which supported Oliver's diagnosis of chronic radiculopathy. See R1-24, Exh. 11 at CCCID0040 (12 May 2000 evaluation by Dr. Arrowsmith) (citing Positive EMG for chronic [] radiculopathy); R3-59, Exh. 15 at TOL000106-107 (7 July 2000 report of Dr. Mishu) (We did perform nerve conduction/EMG examination today which revealed a C5 active and chronic radiculopathy of the right arm with myofacial pain, muscle tension and overall nerve root irritation.). These tests provided the clinical, objective evidence that Broadspire and Coca-Cola requested throughout the claims process. See, e.g., Black v. Food Lion, Inc., 171 F.3d 308, 309 (5th Cir.1999) (characterizing MRIs and EMGs as objective tests). While Dr. Goldberg noted that the EMG conducted by Dr. Mishu only tested certain muscles, he did not assert that the results of the test were invalid, [6] and neither he nor Dr. Moskowitz addressed the results of the EMG discussed in Dr. Arrowsmith's evaluation. See R1-24, Exh. 11 at CCCID0085-86 (21 September 2000 peer review by Dr. Goldberg); id. at CCCID0039 (15 June 2000 peer review by Dr. Moskowitz). Though he did not dispute the validity of the one EMG test he acknowledged, Dr. Goldberg nonetheless ignored the results of both EMGs when he later concluded that Oliver had failed to provide any objective findings in support of his disability claim, an incorrect statement and a mischaracterization of the evidence presented by Oliver. See id. at CCCID0086; see also id. at CCCID0612 (18 March 2001 peer review by Dr. Goldberg) (noting lack of any objective data to support Oliver's disability claim). Indeed, the record reveals a disturbing pattern of Dr. Goldberg disregarding evidence that would undermine his ultimate conclusion. For example, Dr. Goldberg placed great emphasis on Dr. Arrowsmith's ambiguous demarcation of a check box next to the phrase [m]arked limitation of functional capacity/capable of sedentary work, which Dr. Arrowsmith qualified by placing a question mark next to the check box. Id. at CCCID0085 (21 September 2000 peer review by Dr. Goldberg); id. at CCCID0040-43 (12 May 2000 evaluation by Dr. Arrowsmith). Yet Dr. Goldberg flatly ignored the remainder of the same evaluation form, in which Dr. Arrowsmith clarified any ambiguity by explicitly stating his opinion that Oliver was not capable of working. Id. at CCCID0043. Similarly, a common refrain in Dr. Goldberg's peer reviews was that Oliver's job was sedentary, and that therefore he was capable of performing his job functions. See, e.g., id. at CCCID0086 (21 September 2000 peer review by Dr. Goldberg); id. at CCCID0612 (18 March 2001 peer review by Dr. Goldberg). Yet Dr. Goldberg never addressed Dr. Arrowsmith's findings that Oliver was capable of sitting for only one hour at a time, or three hours per day total with periodic breaks. See id., CCCID0041-42. If Oliver could not sit for more than an hour at a time, that fact would undermine a finding that he could perform his job, which required him to sit for five hours a day, five days a week. Yet rather than address that finding in his peer review, or dispute it as unsound, Dr. Goldberg failed to mention Dr. Arrowsmith's finding that Oliver could not sit for prolonged periods of time, and proceeded to cite the sedentary nature of Oliver's position as a reason to deny Oliver's disability claim. Likewise, Dr. Goldberg did not acknowledge reports from at least two of Oliver's treating physicians stating that Oliver either could not drive a car or that he had a limited ability to do so, and failed entirely to address Dr. Mishu's 27 November 2000 evaluation that addressed in detail Oliver's inability to perform his specific job functions, due not only to his chronic radiculopathy, but also to the effects of his pain and the side effects of his medication. Similarly, the limited peer review performed by Dr. Glassman, a psychiatrist, did not provide a basis on which to deny Oliver's LTD benefits claim. Dr. Glassman did not consider any medical evidence relating to the disabilities at issue, but rather addressed only psychological issues. He concluded that Oliver was not disabled due to psychological factors, but did not address whether Oliver was physically disabled. If the foregoing were not enough to persuade us that Coca-Cola's review of Oliver's claim was arbitrary and capricious, Coca-Cola's denial letter to Oliver confirms that conclusion. Coca-Cola's denial letter to Oliver includes an itemized list of the materials Coca-Cola reviewed in deciding Oliver's claim. Though the list includes the MRI test, which did not provide conclusive support for Oliver's disability claim, conspicuously absent from the list are the two EMG tests and the nerve conduction test that Oliver's physician's relied on as clinical objective evidence of Oliver's chronic radiculopathy, and that Coca-Cola's peer review doctors did not dispute. The letter contains a discussion of some of the medical evidence provided by Oliver, and addresses the MRI, which though itself was inconclusive, did not contradict the results of the EMGs and nerve conduction test. However, the letter simply notes that the MRI did not support a finding of disability, and omits any discussion of the EMGs, nerve conduction test, and other evidence Oliver submitted that supported a finding of disability. [7] By relying on Dr. Goldberg's flawed peer review as a basis for denying Oliver's LTD benefits claim, and by failing to review relevant medical evidence that supported Oliver's claim, Coca-Cola acted arbitrarily and capriciously. Though courts may not impose on plan administrators a discrete burden of explanation when they credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician's evaluation, plan administrators may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant's reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating physician. Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834, 123 S.Ct. 1965, 1972, 155 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2003). Here, Oliver presented Broadspire and Coca-Cola with a plethora of medical evidence in support of his disability claim. Coca-Cola denied Oliver's claim not on the basis of conflicting, reliable evidence  a practice we have upheld, see Shaw v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 353 F.3d 1276, 1287 (11th Cir.2003)  rather, it simply ignored relevant medical evidence in order to arrive at the conclusion it desired. Coca-Cola does not identify any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it improperly required objective evidence of Oliver's pain, or as to whether it ignored Oliver's objective evidence of chronic radiculopathy. Accordingly, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Coca-Cola, as we must, we are compelled to find that Coca-Cola acted arbitrarily and capriciously in denying Oliver's claim for LTD benefits, and that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Oliver. E. Exhaustion of Remedies Because Oliver initiated his claim for LTD benefits during the first 24 months of his disability, the own occupation definition of long term disability applied. See R1-24, Exh. 1 § 1.11. Neither Broadspire nor Coca-Cola has considered Oliver's claim under the any occupation standard, which applies to claims for LTD benefits after the first 24 months following the onset of the disability. See id. Accordingly, we agree with Coca-Cola that Oliver did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to his claim for LTD benefits under the any occupation definition. See Perrino v. Southern Bell Tel. Co., 209 F.3d 1309, 1315 (11th Cir.2000) ([A]s a general rule plaintiffs in ERISA actions must exhaust available administrative remedies before suing in federal court.). Though the general rule in our circuit is that ERISA plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies before bringing suit, it is also well-established that [t]he decision of a district court to apply or not apply the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement for ERISA claims is a highly discretionary decision which we review only for a clear abuse of discretion. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Springer v. Wal-Mart Assocs.' Group Health Plan, 908 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir.1990)). Excusal of the exhaustion requirement is appropriate when resort to the administrative remedies would be futile or the remedy inadequate. Counts v. Am. Gen. Life & Accident Ins. Co., 111 F.3d 105, 108 (11th Cir.1997) (citation omitted). Here, under the highly deferential standard that applies, we cannot find that the district court  clear[ly] abuse[d] [its] discretion in excusing Oliver from exhausting his administrative remedies with respect to his claim for LTD benefits under the any occupation standard. See Perrino, 209 F.3d at 1315. Indeed, in an analogous case, the Sixth Circuit reversed as an abuse of discretion a district court's decision to apply the exhaustion of remedies requirement in this context. See Dozier v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 466 F.3d 532 (6th Cir.2006). In Dozier, the plaintiff was a participant in a long term disability plan and a life insurance policy through his employer. Id. at 533. Under the plan, a participant could receive LTD benefits if he satisfied the own occupation standard of disability. Id. The life insurance plan offered a waiver-of-premium benefit for participants who satisfied the any occupation definition of disability. Id. Dozier applied for LTD benefits, which required that he satisfy the own occupation standard, and his claim was denied on the ground that his position was sedentary. Id. at 534. He brought suit under ERISA in federal district court, seeking both LTD benefits and the premium waiver benefit. Id. The district court dismissed without prejudice his claim for the premium waiver benefit, on the ground that Dozier had not exhausted his administrative remedy with respect to that claim, because he had not sought to show that he was disabled from performing any occupation. Id. The Sixth Circuit reversed as abuse of discretion the district court's dismissal of Dozier's premium waiver claim. Id. It found that it would have been futile for Dozier to exhaust his administrative remedy with respect to his claim for the premium waiver benefit, which required him to prove he was disabled from performing any occupation, after the plan administrator had already determined he was not disabled from performing his own occupation. Id. at 535. The court observed that [i]n denying the long-term-disability claim, Sun Life had made a final determination that Dozier was able to perform `the Material and Substantial Duties of his Own Occupation.' . . . That determination necessarily precluded him from arguing with a straight face to the same insurance company that he was `unable to perform the material and substantial duties of any occupation. . . .' Id. (emphasis in original). The Sixth Circuit further found that an appeal of the waiver-of-premium claim [would not] have advanced any of the purposes of the judicially-created ERISA exhaustion requirement, including, inter alia, promoting the consistent treatment of claims and minimizing unnecessary costs during the claims process. Id. at 536 (citation omitted). Because here, as in Dozier, it would have been futile for Oliver to seek benefits from Broadspire and Coca-Cola under the any occupation definition of disability where those same decision makers had already denied benefits under the own occupation standard, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding not to apply the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. See id. at 536; Perrino, 209 F.3d at 1315. F. Damages Coca-Cola argues that, even if Oliver is awarded LTD benefits under the Plan, § 4.2(a) requires that his benefits be reduced to account for benefits he receives from other sources, such as Social Security. Section 4.2 is entitled Offset for Other Disability Benefits, and subsection (a) provides: Reduction in Disability Benefit. The monthly Disability Benefit payable from this Plan to the Participant who receives disability benefits from any source described in Subsection (b) will be reduced as necessary so that the total of his monthly Disability Benefit from this Plan equals no more than the following amount: (1) 70 percent of his Average Compensation . . . minus (2) the amount of his monthly disability benefits payable from all other sources; provided that . . . the offset for other disability benefits will not serve to reduce the Disability Benefit under this Plan to an amount less than 60 percent of the Participant's Average Compensation. . . . R1-24, Exh. 1 § 4.2(a). This section of the Plan is far from a paragon of clarity, and contains seemingly inconsistent provisions. On one hand, § 4.2(a) provides that benefits should be reduced so that benefits received under the Plan plus benefits received from other sources total no more than 70 percent of a participant's average compensation. On the other hand, it provides that the offset will not reduce benefits received under the Plan to an amount less than 60 percent of a participant's average compensation. Yet under § 4. 1, the standard, non-offset benefit rate is set at 60 percent of average compensation; thus, if the final sentence of § 4.2(a) is read literally as placing a floor of 60 percent on any offset, there could be no reduction in benefits, and the offset provision would be meaningless. Neither Coca-Cola nor Oliver attempts to explain how these provisions should be reconciled. Each litigant merely quotes the language they favor, while ignoring the remainder of § 4.2(a). Because Coca-Cola is granted discretion to interpret the Plan's provisions, however, its construction of § 4.2 is entitled to limited deference, within the framework we articulated in HCA Health Services of Georgia, Inc. v. Employers Health Insurance Co., 240 F.3d 982, 993-94 (11th Cir.2001). In HCA Health Services, we set forth a multi-step approach for reviewing a plan administrator's interpretation of a plan provision, where the plan administrator is granted discretion. Id. First, we must determine de novo whether the administrator's interpretation was wrong. Id. at 993. If so, we then must determine whether the claimant has proposed a reasonable interpretation of the plan. Id. at 994 (internal quotation omitted). If the administrator's interpretation is wrong, and the claimant's interpretation reasonable, we then decide whether the [plan] administrator's wrong interpretation is nonetheless reasonable. Id. If it is, then this wrong but reasonable interpretation is entitled to deference even though the claimant's interpretation is also reasonable. Id. Under the HCA Health Services analysis, we find that Coca-Cola's interpretation of the Plan is both wrong and unreasonable, and that Oliver's interpretation, while rendering the offset provision largely toothless, is nonetheless reasonable, given the text of § 4.2(a). With respect to the first step, we find that Coca-Cola's interpretation is wrong, in that it ignores the final sentence of § 4.2(a). See id. at 993. That sentence plainly states that the offset for other disability benefits will not serve to reduce the Disability Benefit under this Plan to an amount less than 60 percent of the Participant's Average Compensation. R1-24, Exh. 1 § 4.2(a). We further find that Oliver's interpretation, which gives effect the full text of § 4.2(a), is a reasonable interpretation of a flawed contractual provision. See HCA Health Servs., 240 F.3d at 994. Finally, we find that Coca-Cola's wrong interpretation of § 4.2(a) is not reasonable, as it requires excising from the Plan part of the text of § 4.2(a). See id. Because the construction of § 4.2(a) urged by Coca-Cola is both wrong and unreasonable, while Oliver's proposed interpretation is simply a straightforward reading of § 4.2(a)'s poorly drafted text, we accept Oliver's interpretation, and affirm the district court's holding that § 4.2(a) prohibits Coca-Cola from reducing Oliver's LTD benefits below 60 percent of his average compensation. The district court also awarded Oliver interest on his LTD benefits. Coca-Cola does not appeal the award of interest, and the issue is therefore waived. See Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n. 6 (11th Cir.1989) (stating that an issue not raised on appeal is waived). G. Attorney's Fees and Expenses Coca-Cola also appeals the district court's award of attorney's fees and expenses in favor of Oliver under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1). Coca-Cola essentially urges us to make a de novo determination as to whether attorney's fees and expenses are appropriate in this case, and argues that we should reverse the award because the district court did not find that Coca-Cola acted in bad faith. Awards of attorney's fees under ERISA, however, are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wright v. Hanna Steel Corp., 270 F.3d 1336, 1344 (11th Cir.2001) (citation omitted). In deciding whether to award attorney's fees, a district court considers: (1) the degree of the opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) the ability of the opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorney's fees; (3) whether an award of attorney's fees against the opposing parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting attorney's fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; (5) and the relative merits of the parties' positions. Id. (alteration and citations omitted). No one of these factors is necessarily decisive, and some may not be apropos in a given case, but together they are the nuclei of concerns that a court should address. In particular types of cases, or in any individual case, however, other considerations may be relevant as well. Id. at 1345 (quotation, alteration, and citation omitted). In Wright, we upheld a district court's award of attorney's fees to an ERISA plaintiff, despite a finding by the district court that the defendant did not act in bad faith, and where the plaintiff acted solely for his own benefit, not for the benefit of other plan members. See id. at 1344. We held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees because it considered the relevant factors, and based its award in part on the culpable conduct (though not bad faith) of the defendant. Id. at 1345. We find the instant case indistinguishable from Wright. Though the district court did not make a finding that Coca-Cola acted in bad faith, it based its award of attorney's fees in part on the need to deter fiduciary decision-making of the sort found in this case, R5-117 at 1-2, a clear reference to Coca-Cola's arbitrary and capricious decision making in denying Oliver's claim, and an appropriate basis for an award of attorney's fees under 29 U.S.C. § 1332(g)(1). Accordingly, we cannot find that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney's fees and expenses to Oliver.