Opinion ID: 2116711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Testimony of Dr. Ganser.

Text: In view of the restrictive effect of instruction No. 10, directing the jury to consider Rennes' situation only to date, that is, September 1989 and not beyond, Dr. Ganser's opinion concerning permanency of Joyce Renne's temporomandibular joint syndrome and related future dental expense becomes the focal point in this appeal. When asked to express his opinion with reasonable medical and dental certainty on the question whether Renne's condition would improve, Dr. Ganser replied, My guess is that without intervening surgically or something, that you're probably not going to change the situation that exists now. Rennes contend that Dr. Ganser's opinion, coupled with his further testimony that Joyce Renne's condition would either be stable or probably deteriorate, establishes a submissible issue for the jury on the question of permanent injury to Renne. Moser counters that Dr. Ganser's testimony, although received without objection, is, nevertheless, a guess and is nothing more than speculation or conjecture; therefore, Dr. Ganser's testimony supplied no basis for submitting the question of permanent injury for the jury's consideration. Although an expert's opinion need not be expressed with reasonable certainty within the expert's field of expertise, but may be expressed with reasonable probability or with terminology and meaning similar to reasonable probability, the expert's opinion must be sufficiently definite and relevant to provide a basis for the fact finder's determination of an issue or question. See, Hohnstein v. W.C. Frank, 237 Neb. 974, 468 N.W.2d 597 (1991); Gilbert v. Sioux City Foundry, 228 Neb. 379, 422 N.W.2d 367 (1988); Lane v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 209 Neb. 396, 308 N.W.2d 503 (1981). In Welke v. City of Ainsworth, 179 Neb. 496, 138 N.W.2d 808 (1965), this court recognized that probably means  `[r]easonably; credibly; presumably[;] [i]n all probability; very likely,'  179 Neb. at 502, 138 N.W.2d at 812, and concluded that a physician's expression  `[i]n my opinion [the] injury and resultant disability was probably due to [the incident in question],'  id., when read in context, indicated the physician's best judgment to be that the injury was sustained in the described incident, 179 Neb. at 503, 138 N.W.2d at 812. See, also, Hare v. Watts Trucking Service, 220 Neb. 403, 370 N.W.2d 143 (1985). Later, in Lane v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., supra , the court concluded that reasonable certainty and reasonable probability are one and the same and that an attempt to differentiate those phrases was a search for  `a distinction without a difference.'  209 Neb. at 412, 308 N.W.2d at 512. In Lane, the court also observed: [T]he new Nebraska Evidence Rules, with reference to testimony by experts, do not require that medical experts testify `with reasonable certainty.' The test would seem to be whether their specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 209 Neb. at 412-13, 308 N.W.2d at 512. See, also, Neb.Evid.R. 702, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-702 (Reissue 1989) (expert's opinion to assist fact finder). In light of the foregoing, we stated in Edmonds v. IBP, inc., 239 Neb. 899, 479 N.W.2d 754 (1992): [A] medical expert's testimony need not be couched in the magic words `reasonable degree of medical certainty or reasonable probability.'  Id. at 905, 479 N.W.2d at 757 (quoting from Hohnstein v. W.C. Frank, supra ). See, also, Morton v. Hunt Transp., 240 Neb. 63, 480 N.W.2d 217 (1992); Miner v. Robertson Home Furnishing, 239 Neb. 525, 476 N.W.2d 854 (1991). Also, we have recognized that an expert's opinion must be examined in the context of the expert's entire testimony. See, Morton v. Hunt Transp., supra ; Miner v. Robertson Home Furnishing, supra ; Welke v. City of Ainsworth, supra . With that background, we turn to the word guess used by Dr. Ganser in expressing his opinion concerning prospective change in Renne's condition and the concomitant question concerning permanency of Renne's temporomandibular syndrome. Synonyms or substitutes for guess include DEDUCE, INFER, BELIEVE ... THINK. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged 1008 (1981). In Hinrichs v. Young, 403 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1966), the court considered whether a witness' use of guess in testifying about a vehicle's speed destroyed the probative value of the witness' testimony. In concluding that the testimony was appropriate for a jury's consideration, the Missouri Supreme Court stated: Use of `guess' is not necessarily destructive of a witness's testimony if it appears, for instance, from his whole testimony that the witness intended to express an opinion or judgment. 403 S.W.2d at 646. In a similar manner, the court in Collier v. St. Louis Public Service Company, 298 S.W.2d 455 (Mo. 1957), to determine whether evidence established that the plaintiff's injury was permanent, considered a physician's testimony that he did not think that the plaintiff's enlarged finger and injured shoulder would improve. The Collier court concluded: It is obvious that the word `think' as used by the doctor indicated the formation of a judgment or opinion on the issue of permanency. 298 S.W.2d at 461. Returning to Dr. Ganser's testimony, we note that the doctor was asked whether he had an opinion, with reasonable medical or dental certainty, concerning duration of Renne's condition. In answering that question, Dr. Ganser's use of guess, in the context of his entire testimony, correlated with the doctor's expression that Renne's condition was probably not going to change, was the expression of an opinion, that is, what the doctor deduced or inferred from all the information he had about Renne and what he considered his best judgment concerning Renne's condition in the future. Consequently, Dr. Ganser's use of guess, in the context of his entire testimony, did not destroy the probative value of his testimony concerning Renne's prospective condition. Moreover, Dr. Ganser's subsequent opinion that Renne's condition would either be stable or probably deteriorate conveyed relevant information that Renne's condition would remain the same with her pain and problems from the temporomandibular joint syndrome, or would probably deteriorate, that is, become worse. Dr. Ganser's description, therefore, supplied information that the jury was entitled to consider concerning permanency of Renne's temporomandibular joint syndrome. Also, Dr. Ganser's testimony supplied information about the necessity of future dental expenses as the result of adjustments in the acrylic splint Renne had to wear. In summary, Dr. Ganser's testimony was evidence concerning permanency of Renne's temporomandibular joint syndrome, an injury sustained in the auto accident, and was evidence regarding future dental expenses reasonably certain to be incurred by Renne. The weight of Dr. Ganser's testimony was a matter for the jury. Hence, it was error for the district court, in giving instruction No. 10, to limit the jury's consideration of damages to the date of Rennes' trial, effectively precluding the jury's consideration of Ganser's testimony in reference to permanency of Joyce Renne's injury, future expenses for her condition, and Darrel Renne's claim for future loss of spousal consortium. Since Moser's negligence and liability were established and not questioned in this appeal, the error by the district court prevented a fair trial for Rennes on the issue of future damages and necessitates our reversing the district court's judgment and granting a new trial to Rennes on the issue of damages.