Opinion ID: 367258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of McCoy's Conviction

Text: 29 Compelling production of an individual's books and papers to be used against him in legal proceedings violates both the fourth and fifth amendments. Boyd v. United States, 1886, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746. However, because the privilege against self-incrimination protects only individuals, records maintained by a corporation, a partnership or a collective group are not protected from compelled disclosure. E. g., Bellis v. United States, 1974, 417 U.S. 85, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 40 L.Ed.2d 678; United States v. White, 1944, 322 U.S. 694, 64 S.Ct. 1248, 88 L.Ed. 1542 (collective group); Wilson v. United States, 1911, 221 U.S. 361, 31 S.Ct. 538, 55 L.Ed. 771 (corporation). The records of a sole proprietorship are protected from disclosure as the records of an individual. Shapiro v. United States, 1948, 335 U.S. 1, 68 S.Ct. 1375, 92 L.Ed. 1787; In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978, 3 Cir. 1979, 597 F.2d 851, 859. 30 While natural persons need not produce their personal papers, their constitutional protection does not extend to required records:  'records required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects of governmental regulation, and the enforcement of restrictions validly established.'  Shapiro, supra, 335 U.S. at 33, 68 S.Ct. at 1392, quoting Davis v. United States, 1946, 328 U.S. 582, 590, 66 S.Ct. 1256, 1260, 90 L.Ed. 1453. See generally 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2259c at 363 & n. 6 (McNaughton rev. 1961). This limit on the constitutional exemption has been explained on the basis that the public interest in obtaining such information outweighs the private interest opposing disclosure, See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2259c at 367, and the further rationale that such records become tantamount to public records. 31 However, the doctrine does not lend itself to obliteration of the privilege against self-incrimination by allowing any record to be required of any person; an individual may invoke the privilege if the records required by law do not have public aspects. See Grosso v. United States, 1968, 390 U.S. 62, 68, 88 S.Ct. 709, 713, 19 L.Ed.2d 906; Spevack v. Klein, 1967, 385 U.S. 511, 87 S.Ct. 625, 17 L.Ed.2d 574. Moreover, if the record-keeping requirement is directed at a group inherently suspect of criminal activity, and a noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry is patently not involved, the disclosure then has such a pervasive incriminatory effect that the fifth amendment may be invoked. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 1965, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d 165. 32 Professor Wigmore has suggested that it makes no difference whether the record is required by the legislature or an agency. See 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2259c at 366-67 and we agree with that view. No such distinction has been recognized by the cases, 1 and differentiating the two would not be consistent with the broad power Congress otherwise has been held empowered to confer on administrative agencies. Therefore, we conclude that the required records doctrine is not limited to records required to be kept by an Act of Congress, and includes records required by administrative regulations. 33 A Subpoena duces tecum may not be unreasonable and oppressive. Rule 45(b), F.R.C.P. It must also properly identify or describe the documents requested. United States v. Morton Salt Co., 1950, 338 U.S. 632, 652, 70 S.Ct. 357, 369, 94 L.Ed. 401; Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 1946,327 U.S. 186, 209, 66 S.Ct. 494, 506, 90 L.Ed. 614. See generally 5A Moore's Federal Practice P 45.05(2) at 45-45 & n. 43 (2d ed. 1977) and cases cited therein. This need not be with such particularity as to enable the witness to pick out a certain piece of paper and say, Here it is. However, the request must be sufficiently definite to provide guidance as to what is to be produced by standards or criteria that make clear the duty of the person subpoenaed. See 5A Moore's Federal Practice P 45.05(2) at 45-45 n. 43 (2d ed. 1977). The degree of particularity required depends, of course, on the nature, purpose and scope of the inquiry. Oklahoma Press, supra, 327 U.S. at 209, 66 S.Ct. at 506. 34 An order or a judgment of a court normally must be complied with promptly. If the order is believed to be incorrect, the remedy generally is to seek a change in the order usually by a motion to quash and, if this is denied, then to appeal and, absent a stay, promptly to comply with the order. Maness v. Meyers, 1975, 419 U.S. 449, 458, 95 S.Ct. 584, 591, 42 L.Ed.2d 574. Absent a stay, if the person at whom the order or judgment is directed refuses to comply with the order, he risks being held in criminal contempt, even if the order is ultimately ruled invalid. Ibid. 35 However, in Maness, supra, the Court recognized that (w)hen a court during trial orders a witness to reveal information . . . (c)ompliance could cause irreparable injury because appellate courts cannot always 'unring the bell' once the information has been released. 419 U.S. at 460, 95 S.Ct. at 592. The Court noted, therefore, that a person to whom such an order is directed may resist the order, and yet not be guilty of contempt if the order is declared invalid on appeal. Ibid. Although in Maness, supra, the Court referred to its consistent application of this rule in the context of orders made during trial, the Court has previously applied the same standard to disobedience of orders rendered in connection with pre-trial proceedings. See Gelbard v. United States, 1972, 408 U.S. 41, 92 S.Ct. 2357, 33 L.Ed.2d 179 (witness ordered to testify before grand jury); Malloy v. Hogan, 1964, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (witness ordered to testify before referee investigating gambling and other criminal activities); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 1920, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (company ordered to produce books and records to grand jury pursuant to subpoenas). We have previously recognized that the rationale of these cases suggests the following rule: if an order requires an Irrevocable and permanent surrender of a constitutional right, it cannot be enforced by the contempt power. United States v. Dickinson, 5 Cir. 1972, 465 F.2d 496, 512 (emphasis in original), On remand, M.D.La.1972, 349 F.Supp. 227, Aff'd, 5 Cir. 1973, 476 F.2d 373, Cert. denied, 414 U.S. 979, 94 S.Ct. 270, 38 L.Ed.2d 223. 36 The Maness court did not limit its holding to orders that would require the surrender of constitutional rights, and while Dickinson, supra, held that this rule would apply to surrender of any constitutional right, the court did not preclude its application to the surrender of other rights. We hold the rule applicable to orders requiring the surrender of other rights or privileges, such as the attorney-client privilege and the attorney-work-product doctrine, where disclosure would cause irreparable injury and the rationale of Maness, supra, is equally compelling. 2 37 Applying the foregoing principles, we first discuss whether the documents sought from McCoy are records that he was required by law to maintain for his business. Section 111.21 of Title 19, Code of Federal Regulations (1978), requires each customshouse broker to 38 . . . keep current in a correct, orderly, and itemized manner records of account reflecting all his financial transactions as a broker. He shall keep and maintain on file a copy of each entry made by him with all supporting papers, except those documents he is required to file with Customs, and copies of all his correspondence and other papers relating to his Customs business. 3 39 This provision has been in force, without change, since before 1971. The records it requires to be kept must be maintained within the customs district to which they relate for at least six years after the date of entry, 19 C.F.R. § 111.23(a), and must be made available for inspection by Customs field auditors or special agents. 19 C.F.R. §§ 111.25, 111.26. 40 The subpoena on its face seeks more than the required records described in Section 111.21; item number 3 demands, without qualification, All financial statements and related papers, and is not limited to customshouse brokerage records. The request patently includes McCoy's personal records, which are private papers sheltered by the privilege against self-incrimination. Items 4 and 9 refer to the business and might be presumed to relate only to McCoy's customshouse brokerage, but this is by no means clear and must be deduced from the fact that the subpoena on its face is directed to an unnamed Authorized Custodian. 41 This address, on which the government heavily relies as narrowing all of the subpoena to required records, is of course some indication that the subpoena sought from the Authorized Custodian only the records of McCoy's business, not his personal documents. However, the apparent logic of the inference is undermined by the fact that the original subpoena undeniably included references to McCoy's personal financial records, thus making the address ambiguous. 42 McCoy properly asserted his claims by motion to quash the subpoena. Although he did not promptly appeal from the denial of his motion or seek a stay of the court's order compelling disclosure pending the outcome of an appeal, he was entitled to resist the Court's order because his objections to the subpoena's breadth and lack of specificity were valid, and any complete response would have irrevocably 4 infringed his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The subpoena was invalid because, under the circumstances, the panoramic sweep of its command threatened infringement of McCoy's fifth amendment privilege and his fourth amendment or due process right 5 to disobey an order that required him (1) to do, at least in part, what he had a right to refuse, and (2) to determine at his own peril what he could or could not safely do. For these reasons, the court should have quashed the subpoena and permitted the prosecutor instead to issue one limited to required records of the customshouse business. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of contempt, without prejudice to the issuance of a subpoena that complies with the requirements of this opinion. 43 McCoy contends that, even if the subpoena were limited to required records, he would be privileged from producing the records because the mere act of producing them would be, in effect, testimonial (I. e., he would implicitly be authenticating them as those records sought by the subpoena). While our decision vacating the contempt order makes it unnecessary to decide that question at this time, the issue has been argued, briefed by both parties, and it will doubtless be urged again should the subpoena be limited in accordance with this opinion and reissued. Therefore we deem it appropriate to avoid a further appeal by stating our views. 44 In Fisher v. United States, 1976, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39, the Court considered a similar assertion. It recognized, as has Professor Wigmore, 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2264 at 379-80, that the act of production could itself have communicative aspects: responding to the subpoena could be implicit acknowledgement of the existence of the documents and their possession or control by the taxpayer. 425 U.S. at 410, 96 S.Ct. at 1581. Furthermore, although it noted that (i)t is doubtful that implicitly admitting the existence and possession of (papers prepared by another) rises to the level of testimony within the protection of the Fifth Amendment, 425 U.S. at 411, 96 S.Ct. at 1581, its approach suggests that production of one's own papers might be testimony protected by the Fifth Amendment. See 425 U.S. at 411-14, 96 S.Ct. at 1581-82; See also In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978, 3 Cir. 1979, 597 F.2d 851, 861 n. 24. 45 However, these expressions in Fisher were not directed at the production of required records. The proper designation by the government of certain records to be kept by an individual necessarily implies an obligation to produce them, and limited implied testimonial authentication. These obligations to keep and produce the records are in a sense consented to as a condition of being able to carry on the regulated activity involved. In this respect, the mere response by production is no more a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination than requiring the creation of the record itself, for it is the record, presumably, that might incriminate. 6