Opinion ID: 2798554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Participation Requirements

Text: Petitioners argue that DEC violates statutory public participation requirements by failing to provide an opportunity for public comment and to request a public hearing on a MS4's NOI and SWMP, prior to DEC's authorization of coverage under the General Permit. DEC currently provides a full public notice and comment period and an opportunity to request a public hearing on the General Permit, and DEC also affords an additional 28 day pre-coverage public comment period with respect to each NOI (see General Permit, Part II. Obtaining Permit Coverage, at 8). The majority concludes this meets all applicable legal requirements. I disagree and would find that the CWA and ECL require more precoverage public participation. Specifically, because the NOI and SWMP must contain the MS4s' pollution controls, and the SWMP must be developed in advance of the NOI, which is then submitted to obtain coverage under the General Permit, DEC must provide an opportunity to request a public hearing for any particular NOI and SWMP. Congress explicitly sought to encourage public participation in the development and implementation of the nation's water pollution control measures, and required that the - 37 - - 38 - No. 48 EPA and the states provide for, encourage, and assist with public participation in the development, revision and enforcement of any regulation, standard, effluent limitation, plan or program established by the [EPA] or any State (33 USC § 1251 [e]). The intended transparency of the process is reflected in the CWA requirement that permit applications, and the NPDES and SPDES permits themselves be made public (see 33 USC § 1342 [j]). With respect to the demand for administrative hearings, the CWA provides that the EPA may issue a permit after an opportunity for public hearing (see 33 USC § 1342 [A] [1] [emphasis added]). The ECL also mandates public participation with respect to SPDES coverage. State law requires [p]ublic notice of a complete application for a SPDES permit (ECL § 17-0805 [1] [a]), which shall include a statement that written comments or requests for a public hearing on the permit application ... may be filed by a time and at a place specified (ECL 17-0805 [a] [ix]). The public comment shall last not less than thirty days following the date of the public notice . . . during which time interested persons may submit their written views with respect to the application and the priority ranking of the permit (ECL § 17-0805 [1] [b]). Petitioners argue that the public should have the opportunity to request a hearing on the contents of the NOI and SWMP because both contain the MS4's pollution controls. - 38 - - 39 - No. 48 Petitioners are correct that an MS4 must identify and list in the NOI its chosen management practices, and it must include in the SWMP the controls to reduce the discharge pollutants in accordance with the maximum extent practicable standard. Thus, the NOI and SWMP not only affirm that the MS4 will comply with the General Permit's terms, but they also explain how the MS4s will meet legal requirements, based on the localities' unique circumstances. Indeed, to ensure for itself that an MS4 understands its duties and obligations, the DEC must refer to the NOI and SWMP. Here, DEC issued a General Permit for the specific purpose of allowing storm water pollutant discharges by a covered MS4, where an MS4 has agreed to meet conditions set forth in the CWA, ECL, federal and state regulations, and the General Permit. A cursory review of the General Permit makes clear that it is not specific to any particular MS4, but rather it is generic, intended to set forth the minimum requirements identified by DEC, which must be complied with by every MS4 seeking coverage under the General Permit. However, as DEC has vigorously contended, General Permit coverage is not automatic, but requires that the MS4 submit an NOI which DEC must then accept as complete. According to the General Permit, the NOI affirms that a SWMP has been developed. As the parties concede, the NOI and SWMP contain what DEC considers to be the mandatory limitations and measurable goals an MS4 proposes to implement in order to - 39 - - 40 - No. 48 ensure stormwater pollutant discharge reduction to the maximum extent practicable, as required by the CWA. Clearly, then, submission of a completed NOI, based as it is on an initial SWMP, is the MS4's entree to the General Permit system, and is a necessary step to securing authorization to lawfully discharge pollutants in accordance with the CWA and ECL. If the NOI, and the prerequisite SWMP, do not constitute a permit application, then what other avenue does an MS4 have to secure permit coverage and authorization to lawfully discharge pollutants? The NOI and SWMP constitute an application in everything but name. The DEC argues that the CWA and ECL public hearing requirements apply only to individual permit applications, and that public participation requirements are satisfied because the public has the opportunity to submit comments and request a public hearing regarding the General Permit itself. The EPA similarly argued in Texas Ind. Producers and Royalty Owners Assn. v E.P.A. (410 F3d 964 [7th Cir 2005]). In that case, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the EPA that the CWA did not require the agency to provide a comment period or an opportunity to request a public hearing on NOIs and Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plans (SWPPP) submitted under the EPA's Final National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System General Permit for Storm Water Discharges From Construction Activities. The Court concluded that the CWA was ambiguous as to whether NOIs and SWPPPs are permits or permit applications, and in accordance - 40 - - 41 - No. 48 with Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (467 US 837 [1984]), judicially deferred to the EPA's interpretation of those statutory terms (see Texas Ind. Producers, 410 F3d at 978). The Court accepted as reasonable EPA's argument that individual public hearings for NOIs and SWMPPPs would eviscerate the administrative efficiency of the general permit scheme (id.). In contrast, in EDC, the Ninth Circuit had previously rejected the EPA's argument that the CWA public hearing opportunity requirement did not apply to NOIs because they are not permits. Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the NOI establishes what the discharger will do to reduce discharges to the 'maximum extent practicable' and therefore is functionally equivalent to a detailed application for an individualized permit (344 F3d at 853). The majority contends that the federal courts will have to resolve this circuit split, and concludes that DEC's general permit scheme is permissible because it complies with the EPA's regulations and New York's law does not require more. I disagree because the majority's conclusion is unsupportable on the record before us. Notably, the EPA's position in both cases is counter to the EPA's own description in its stormwater regulations that a permit application is inclusive of a notice of intent for coverage under a general permit (40 CFR 122.34). This - 41 - - 42 - No. 48 inconsistently alone undermines the state's argument that the NOI is something other than a permit or permit application.10 Additionally, the majority's hands-off approach would leave this court with no authority to consider the legality of state agency conduct. That is most certainly not the law, as made plain by this Court's administrative law jurisprudence (see Seittelman v Sabol, 91 NY2d 618, 625 [1998] [invalidating state regulation that was inconsistent with the controlling Federal statute it was intended to implement]; see also Kurcsics v Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 49 NY2d 451, 459 [1980][the Court affords an agency no deference if its interpretive regulations run[] counter to the clear wording of a statutory provision]; Raritan Dev. Corp. v.Silva, 91 NY2d 98 [1997] [holding that when an [agency] interpretation is contrary to the plain meaning of the statutory language, the Court may overrule and decline to 10 The majority holds that while 40 CFR 122.34 does not appear facially consistent with the EPA's position in EDC and Texas Ind. Producers, that section of the EPA's regulations is part of a question and answer format intended to clarify requirements applicable to regulated small MS4s (see majority op at 25 n 15). Therefore, according to the majority, it is for the federal courts to determine whether the regulations are inconsistent with the EPA's position in those federal cases. However, whether the EPA has taken a position at odds with what DEC now asserts is the correct and intended interpretation of the federal regulations is, of course, relevant to this Court's analysis of DEC's defense to petitioners' claims. Turning to the regulations, it is clear from the text of 40 CFR 122.34 (d) (1) that a small MS4's NOI is a general permit application. Notwithstanding the majority's word play, there is no avoiding that the federal regulations are inconsistent with the EPA's position in EDC and Texas Ind. Producers. - 42 - - 43 - No. 48 enforce an agency's conflicting application thereof]; Matter of New York Statewide Coalition of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v New York City Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 23 NY3d 681 [2014] [striking down the New York City Board of Health's restriction on soda portions as exceeding its regulatory authority given by the legislature]).11 Moreover, absent binding precedent from the United States Supreme Court, there is no legal impediment to this Court interpreting federal law (see Flanagan v Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 67 NY2d 500, 506 [1986] [When there is neither decision of the Supreme Court nor uniformity in the decisions of the lower Federal courts . . . a State court required to interpret [a] Federal statute has the same 11 The majority argues that DEC, as the permitting agency, must follow the EPA's interpretation of the CWA, but contends that I suggest every state's high court may second-guess the EPA (see majority op at 27 n 16). However, my point is not that we can decide counter to the EPA, but rather that the Ninth Circuit already has, and we cannot ignore that fact or the Ninth Circuit's analysis, even if DEC and the majority would have it otherwise. There is also no support for the majority's concern that our review poses a potential impediment to implementation of a coherent nationwide NPDES permitting scheme (id.). The EPA provides that while SPDES permits must comply with federal regulations and the CWA, [n]othing in the [regulations] precludes a State from . . .[a]dopting or enforcing requirements which are more stringent or more extensive than those required [by the EPA] (40 CFR 123.1 [h] [i] [1]). Nor is there a legal impediment to [o]perating a program with greater scope of coverage than that required [by the federal regulations] (40 CFR § 123.1 [h] [i] [2]). Indeed, the EPA expressly requires MS4s to comply with any more stringent effluent limitations in [their State-issued] permit (40 CFR 122.34 [e] [1]). It would appear, then, that differences among the Circuit Courts are the more likely obstacles to national uniformity. - 43 - - 44 - No. 48 responsibility as the lower Federal courts and is not precluded from exercising its own judgment . . . ]). We should reject DEC's argument because under the general permit scheme the NOI and SWMP replace an individual permit application. To adopt approvingly DEC's position, and EPA's argument in Texas Ind. Producers, fails to sufficiently interrogate the general permit regulatory scheme, or fully appreciate the role of the general public in the general permitting process. Moreover, the court's conclusion that requiring public hearings for each individual NOI and SWPPP would be inconsistent with Congressional intent is not supported by the language of the CWA. The stated purpose of that statute is to restore and maintain the integrity of the nation's waters, eliminate the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters, and ensure public participation in the development and implementation of any plan or program administered under the CWA by the states. While there may be administrative efficiencies supporting the use of a general permit scheme, they do not outweigh the explicit objectives and goals of the CWA to protect the country's waters. In any event, because the EPA regulations allow for individual permits even where a general permit is in place, the efficiency argument propounded by the DEC and EPA is underwhelming (see 40 CFR 122.28 [b] [3] [i]). What is actually counter to the intent of the CWA is to provide an opportunity to request a public hearing in cases - 44 - - 45 - No. 48 involving individual permits, while denying the same under a statewide general permit scheme involving pollutant discharges from hundreds of MS4s. The latter potentially implicates the integrity of local water bodies more significantly than the actions of any single polluter, and therefore requires the type of public scrutiny and engagement envisioned by the CWA (see 33 USC § 1342 [a] [1] [the EPA may issue a NPDES permit only after opportunity for public hearing]). Therefore, DEC's determination that neither the CWA nor the ECL requires an opportunity for a public hearing on the NOIs and SWMPs, prior to DEC granting permit coverage, ignores the obvious purpose and role of these documents, and undermines the CWA's public participation requirement. As such, DEC's interpretation is not entitled to deference, and is, for the reasons I have stated, arbitrary and capricious. Therefore, the NOI and SWMP should be subject to statutory public participation requirements that include the opportunity to request a public hearing.