Opinion ID: 1060457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: consideration of mitigating factor in sentencing

Text: Finally, the appellant asserts that the trial court improperly sentenced him to serve the maximum sentence in the range by refusing to consider the mitigating factor that [t]he defendant's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-113(1). In response, the State argues that the sentence was proper because this mitigating factor cannot apply in cases involving possession of cocaine. We disagree. When either a defendant or the State challenges the length, range, or manner of service of a sentence, this Court conducts a de novo review of the record with a presumption that the determinations made by the sentencing court are correct. State v. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn.2000); see also Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 40-35-401(d), -402(d) (1997). This presumption of correctness, however, is conditioned upon the affirmative showing in the record that the trial court considered the sentencing principles and all relevant facts and circumstances. State v. Pettus, 986 S.W.2d 540, 543 (Tenn.1999); State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 (Tenn.1991). So long as the trial court followed the statutory sentencing procedure, imposed a lawful sentence after having given due consideration and proper weight to the factors and principles set out under the sentencing law, and [when] the trial court's findings are adequately supported by the record, then we may not modify the sentence even if we would have preferred a different result. State v. Pike, 978 S.W.2d 904, 926-27 (Tenn.1998). The appellant's greater conviction for possession of a controlled substance constitutes a Class B felony, [11] and in determining the appropriate sentence for this offense, a court begins with the presumption that the appellant should receive the minimum in the range. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c). If the court finds the presence of any enhancement or mitigating factors, the court should first increase the sentence within the range based upon the enhancement factors and then reduce the sentence as appropriate for any mitigating factors. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d), (e). On appeal, we will uphold the ultimate sentence imposed by the trial court so long as (1) it complies with the purposes and principles of the 1989 Sentencing Act, and (2) its findings are adequately supported by the record. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210, Sentencing Commission Comments; see also Ashby, 823 S.W.2d at 169. In this case, the trial court found that the State had proven three enhancement factors warranting a sentence greater than the minimum: (1) that the appellant has a previous history of criminal behavior, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1); (2) that the appellant has a previous history of unwillingness to comply with conditions of sentence involving release into the community, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(8); and (3) that the appellant was adjudicated to have committed a delinquent act or acts as a juvenile that would constitute a felony if committed as an adult, Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(20). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that all three of these enhancing factors were correctly applied. First, the appellant has a substantial adult criminal history involving convictions for aggravated burglary, theft, possession of drug paraphernalia, several weapons offenses, and other lesser misdemeanors, including evading arrest, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, criminal trespass, and driving on a revoked and suspended license. Second, the appellant has demonstrated an unwillingness to comply with previous conditions of community release as his parole for aggravated burglary was revoked. Finally, the appellant has several acts of adjudicated delinquence as a minor, which include adjudications for grand larceny, concealing stolen property, automobile theft, and possession of controlled substances. We agree with the trial court that these factors are entitled to substantial weight. With respect to the presence of mitigating factors, the trial court refused to consider the factor urged by the defendant that his conduct neither caused nor threatened serious bodily injury. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-113(1). In rejecting this mitigating factor, the trial court stated that [t]he nature of the substance involvedcrack cocaine, the substantial quantityI don't think it could be said that that did not threaten any type of serious bodily injury[,] because it is an inherently addictive and dangerous substance that he had in his possession in a very significant quantity. After a careful review of the record, we respectfully disagree that the nature of the substance justifies rejection of this mitigating factor on the facts of this case. By its plain language, the section 40-35-113(1) mitigating factor focuses not on the circumstances of the crime committed by a defendant as do many of the other mitigating and enhancing factors. Rather, this factor focuses upon the defendant's conduct in committing the crime. Although cocaine itself may well be, in the words of the trial court, an inherently addictive and dangerous substance, this fact alone says nothing about the appellant's criminal conduct, which was constructive possession of the substance located in a room several doors down from where the officers initially found the appellant. Moreover, we see no evidence in the record that the appellant actually sold or attempted to sell the drug at the time of the offense. Had either of these circumstances been present, then the dangerous nature of the drug, combined with the dangerous nature of many drug transactions, may have indeed supported the trial court's rejection of this factor as constituting a threat of serious bodily injury. As it was, however, the appellant's presence down the hall from the substance cannot be said to have threatened serious bodily injury to any person. The State notes that the Court of Criminal Appeals has split on the issue of whether a per se exclusion of this mitigating factor is warranted in cocaine possession cases, and we acknowledge that many of that court's unpublished decisions have found this factor to be inapplicable in cocaine possession cases, usually for the same reasons as cited by the trial court. Without attempting to analyze or distinguish the many and varied facts and circumstances in these cases, we conclude that when, as here, (1) the conviction for possession is based only upon constructive possession, and (2) the threat of serious bodily injury is more conceptual than real, little justification exists in having a per se rule that excludes consideration of this mitigating factor. Indeed, a per se exclusion of a particular mitigating factor to an entire class of offenses not always or not inherently involving serious bodily injury undermines the notion of individualized sentencing that underlies the 1989 Criminal Sentencing Reform Act. See State v. Dowdy, 894 S.W.2d 301, 305 (Tenn.Crim.App.1994); cf. Hooper, 29 S.W.3d at 9 (rejecting offenses that are deterrable per se  as detrimental to individualized sentencing). However, in rejecting a per se exclusion of this mitigating factor in cocaine possession cases, we do not require that this factor be accorded any especial significance in a given case. Indeed, given the facts of this case, we conclude that the mitigating factor is entitled to very little weight in the overall sentencing determination. Our review of the record indicates that the trial court appropriately assigned substantial weight to the three enhancing factors, and because the scales are tipped so far in their favor, we are unable to say that the maximum sentence in the range is improper or contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. Cf. State v. Ruane, 912 S.W.2d 766, 785 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995). Accordingly, we hold that while the trial court should have considered the section 40-35-113(1) mitigating factor in deciding upon an ultimate sentence, the sentence that it actually imposed was proper. The judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals on this issue is affirmed.