Opinion ID: 562667
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: void for vagueness--money laundering (davis)

Text: 10 We first discuss Davis' argument that the money laundering statute under which he was convicted in counts three through five, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(1), violates his constitutional right to due process because it is impermissibly vague. The government responds that as applied to Davis the statute gave ample notice that the conduct he engaged in was prohibited. 11 In evaluating a vagueness challenge, it is not enough to conclude that Congress might, without difficulty, have chosen '[c]learer and more precise language' equally easily. United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 94, 96 S.Ct. 316, 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975) (quoting United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 7, 67 S.Ct. 1538, 1541, 91 L.Ed. 1877 (1947)). Rather, the void-for-vagueness doctrine requires only that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1858, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); see United States v. Van Hawkins, 899 F.2d 852, 853-54 (9th Cir.); United States v. Pinelli, 890 F.2d 1461, 1470 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 2568, 109 L.Ed.2d 750 (1990). The second of these two aspects is more important than the first, see id. 461 U.S. at 358, 103 S.Ct. at 1858, and bars criminal statutes of such a standardless sweep [as to] allow[ ] policemen, prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1248, 39 L.Ed.2d 605 (1974). Vagueness challenges to statutes not threatening First Amendment interests are examined in light of the facts of the case at hand; the statute is judged on an as-applied basis. Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1858, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988); see United States v. Barnes, 890 F.2d 545, 552 (1st Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1326, 108 L.Ed.2d 501 (1990). 12 As applied to Davis, we conclude that Sec. 1956 is not unconstitutionally vague. The two provisions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956 under which Davis was charged provide, in relevant part, that: 13 (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved in a financial transaction represents the proceeds of some form of illegal activity, conducts or attempts to conduct such a financial transaction which in fact involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity-- 14 (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity; or 15