Opinion ID: 787092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Role of the Screening Committee

Text: 45 We conclude that the Committee does not act as a judicial arm of the Appellate Division for several reasons. First, although the State Defendants have argued that the actions of the screening committee .... are essential to permitting judges ... to appoint counsel (Hearing Transcript, January 17, 2002, at 9-10), the power of a New York court to appoint counsel to represent an indigent defendant is not dependent even on the existence of an 18-B Panel, much less on the Committee's certification of attorneys to that panel. The court has inherent power — indeed, it has a constitutional obligation in a criminal prosecution — to appoint an attorney for an indigent defendant. See, e.g., In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d 433, 437-38, 369 N.Y.S.2d 87, 90-91, 330 N.E.2d 53 (1975) (no similar obligation in a matrimonial case); Stream v. Beisheim, 34 A.D.2d 329, 333, 311 N.Y.S.2d 542, 547 (2d Dep't 1970) (per curiam) (There has been no time in the governmental history of this state when the court lacked the power to assign counsel for the defense of indigent persons charged with crime....). Thus, the court is free to appoint an attorney who has not been certified to the 18-B Panel: 46 Under no circumstances can section 722 of the County Law be deemed to inhibit or override the trial court's exercise of its inherent power or the performance of its constitutional or statutory duty to furnish proper counsel to an indigent defendant.... 47 It should be emphasized that article 18-B (§§ 722-722-f) of the County Law ... is merely cumulative. [It is] ... designed to facilitate and implement the court's exercise of its inherent power. [It] serve[s] to provide a constant, ready source of available counsel; to define the amount and source of their compensation, and the manner of payment. But [it] do[es] not and cannot entrench upon the court's inherent power and fundamental duty to provide counsel to an indigent defendant. 48 Stream v. Beisheim, 34 A.D.2d at 333-34, 311 N.Y.S.2d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Committee's decisions, therefore, neither are essential to nor in any way circumscribe the court's exercise of its inherent authority. 49 Second, the Committee does not determine which attorney will be appointed in any given case. The courts' inherent power of appointment has not been delegated to the Committee. 50 Third, the New York courts do not have inherent authority to provide that an attorney so appointed will be compensated. Rather, an attorney admitted to practice law in New York has a duty ... to provide uncompensated services for the indigent. In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d at 438, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91, 330 N.E.2d 53 (emphasis added). 51 [T]he cases establishing the right to assigned counsel in criminal matters c [an]not be used to mandate compensation by public funding. Even in expanding the criminal right to assigned counsel the courts, Federal and State, never presumed to direct the appropriation and expenditure of public funds. 52 The appropriation and provision of authority for the expenditure of public funds is a legislative and not a judicial function, both in the Nation and in the State. It is correlated, of course, with the taxing power (see N.Y. Const., art XVI, § 1; US Const., art I, § 8, cl 1). 53 In re Smiley, 36 N.Y.2d at 439, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 92, 330 N.E.2d 53 (emphasis added). Because the State Legislature anticipated that the private Bar would not be able to carry the burden of uncompensated representation for the large numbers of indigent defendants facing criminal charges, the Article 18-B legislation was enacted to provide systematic representation of defendants by assigned counsel and for their compensation.  Id. at 438, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 91, 330 N.E.2d 53 (emphasis added). Thus, as described in Part I.A. above, the Legislature required municipalities to devise plans for the assignment and compensation of counsel for indigent defendants; and the City, with the approval of the State's Judicial Conference, adopted the Assigned Counsel Plan. The Plan delegates rulemaking authority, for the administration of the Plan, to the Appellate Division, First and Second Departments. And pursuant to this rulemaking grant, the Appellate Division First Department established the Committee to improve the efficiency of the Assigned Counsel Plan administered by the Court under County Law, Article 18-B. 1979 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. at 71. The mere presence of the Appellate Division in this chain does not transmute the obligation imposed by the Legislature on the City into an inherent power of the judiciary. In accordance with the Plan, the Committee assembles 18-B Panels of attorneys who, if appointed by the court to represent an indigent defendant charged with a crime, will be entitled to compensation for their services. A qualified attorney may or may not be on an 18-B Panel. For an attorney appointed to represent an indigent defendant, the difference between being on an 18-B Panel and not being on such a panel is simply the difference between being entitled to publicly funded compensation and not being entitled to such compensation. See, e.g., People v. Burns, 28 A.D.2d 1039, 1039, 283 N.Y.S.2d 678, 678 (3d Dep't 1967) (mem.) (denying application for attorney's fee on the ground that claimant was not assigned pursuant to the provisions of article 18-B of the County Law). Given that the source of the entitlement to compensation for 18-B Panel members is the Legislature, not the courts, and that assignments of counsel — whether or not from the Panel — are made by the courts, not the Committee, we cannot conclude either that the power exercised by the Committee is judicial or that the Committee is a judicial, rather than an administrative, body. 54 We note further that, although the State Defendants seem to suggest that they have been appointed by the court ( see Defendants-Appellees' brief on appeal at 24, 23) (arguing that Thomas v. Kadish 's discussion of a `state board [that was] appointed by the state supreme court' is instructive (quoting Thomas v. Kadish, 748 F.2d at 281)), the Screening Committee member appointments here in fact need not have been made by the court. While the Appellate Division has the exclusive power to extend the term of a member by re -appointment, the Appellate Division 18-B Rules provide that a Committee member's initial three-year appointment may be made by either the Appellate Division or the president[ ] of the [bar] association[ ]. N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 22, § 612.4. 55 Nor can the present case be analogized to Thomas v. Kadish or Allstate on the theory that the Committee's determinations are the equivalent of a special master's recommendations or of a state court's interlocutory decisions that are to be further reviewed by the state courts. Although judicial review of the Screening Committee's determinations is to a limited extent available in a state-court Article 78 proceeding, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1994), we are unpersuaded, for two reasons, that the availability of such review provides a basis for deeming the Committee's decisions to be essentially those of a court. 56 First, we note that the Appellate Division 18-B Rules contain no provision for review of a Committee decision and that the Committee's bylaws provide that [t]he action of the Committee is final and non-appealable, Screening Committee Bylaw 2.7. To be sure, that bylaw provision and the silence of the Rules cannot entirely foreclose an Article 78 proceeding, for [e]ven where judicial review is proscribed by statute, the courts retain jurisdiction in an Article 78 proceeding to make certain that the administrative official has not acted in excess of the grant of authority given ... by statute or in disregard of the standard prescribed by the legislature. New York City Department of Environmental Protection v. New York City Civil Service Commission, 78 N.Y.2d 318, 323, 574 N.Y.S.2d 664, 666, 579 N.E.2d 1385 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Bryer v. Family Court Panel Plan, 205 A.D.2d 406, 613 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1st Dep't 1994) (mem.) (entertaining, but ultimately denying, an Article 78 petition to annul denial of recertification to 18-B Family Court Panel). But the absence of any provision for judicial review in a regulatory scheme tends to negate a key consideration that might otherwise support the view that the agency is acting as a judicial arm of the state court. Cf. Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201, 208-09 (5th Cir.1990) ( Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar federal district court's consideration of a challenge to a public reprimand issued to a sitting judge by the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct, where no appeal from [such] reprimands was available). And the availability of an Article 78 proceeding, which is the customary procedural vehicle for review of administrative determinations, Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 231, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68, 72, 401 N.E.2d 190 (1980) (emphasis added), does not serve to distinguish the Committee's decisions from the acts of other state administrative agencies that could not be considered judicial, see generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 Practice Commentaries C7801:1 (For the most part, Article 78 proceedings are used to challenge action (or inaction) by agencies and officers of state and local government.). 57 Second, although the State Defendants contend that Mitchell could have asserted his claims of racial discrimination and retaliation in an Article 78 proceeding, that contention is inconsistent with their position that the Committee functions as an arm of the judiciary qua judiciary. Article 78 proceedings seeking review of action or inaction by a court, as contrasted with an administrative agency, have been permitted only for petitions seeking review of orders that summarily punished contempts committed in the court's presence, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801(2), and for petitions in the nature of prohibition to restrain a judicial officer from acting without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, see Town of Huntington v. New York State Division of Human Rights, 82 N.Y.2d 783, 786, 604 N.Y.S.2d 541, 542-43, 624 N.E.2d 678 (1993) (mem.), and mandamus to compel a court's performance of a ministerial act, see Legal Aid Society of Sullivan County, Inc. v. Scheinman, 53 N.Y.2d 12, 16, 439 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884, 422 N.E.2d 542 (1981). See generally N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801(2) (Except where otherwise provided by law, a proceeding under ... article [78] shall not be used to challenge a determination ... which was made in a civil action or criminal matter unless it is an order summarily punishing a contempt committed in the presence of the court.); see, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 Practice Commentaries C7801:3 (the rationale for permitting mandamus review is that [i]f the challenged matter is the performance or nonperformance of an official duty in the nature of a ministerial or clerical act, no `determination' is being reviewed). Thus, if the decisions of the Committee were to be viewed as judgments of a court, Mitchell's claims would not fit within any of the categories for which Article 78 review is permitted. 58 We note also that Mitchell's claims, if cognizable in an Article 78 proceeding, could not have been fully adjudicated in that proceeding because in such a proceeding, a plaintiff may normally seek only declaratory or injunctive relief; damages are available only when they are `incidental to the primary relief sought.' Keane v. New York Law School, 186 A.D.2d 453, 453, 589 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (1st Dep't 1992) (mem.) (quoting N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7806). Because in the usual civil rights action the damages requested cannot be characterized as incidental, such damages could not be obtained in an Article 78 proceeding. See generally Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 238-39 (2d Cir.2000); Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 N.Y.2d 343, 347-49, 690 N.Y.S.2d 478, 481-82, 712 N.E.2d 647 (1999). 59 In sum, the Screening Committee's members need not have been appointed by the court; the Committee does not exercise any inherent power of the courts; its certifications are not essential to the exercise of any of the courts' inherent powers; its failure to certify a given attorney does not prevent a court from appointing that attorney; and its decisions are not reviewable pursuant to Article 78 as decisions of a court, except to the extent that they may be considered ministerial rather than judicial. The Committee's certification decisions merely indicate who may, pursuant to the State's enabling legislation and the City's Plan, receive compensation for appointments that may be made by the courts in the future. We conclude that the Committee, in making its certification decisions, is acting as an administrative aide to the court, rather than as a judicial arm of the court. 60