Opinion ID: 1686201
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the trial court in error in restricting individual voir dire?

Text: In the case of Grooms v. Commonwealth, Ky., 756 S.W.2d 131 (1988), which arose from the same circuit court as the case sub judice, this Court described the issue of the right of counsel to conduct individual voir dire examination. We said: We do not hold that counsel for appellant had any absolute right to question prospective jurors ... because the extent of direct questioning by counsel during voir dire is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Grooms at 134. In relation to the questioning of jurors, in the presence of other jurors, as to what a prospective juror has heard about the case, we have said that such questioning poses the danger of bringing that information to the ears of the other prospective jurors. The better procedure is to question jurors separately and out of the presence of each other on such matters.  Id. (Emphasis added.) In other words, the ultimate question of whether individual voir dire is to be conducted is within the discretion of the trial court. However, in this case, where the prior knowledge of the case is the subject matter, the better practice is for the line of questioning to be conducted outside of the presence of other jurors (whether conducted by the court or by counsel). Grooms was decided following the trial of this case. The first twenty-five venirepersons were questioned as a group, and then by individual counsel. It is a fair statement that most of the individual voir dire inquiries covered capital punishment and pre-trial publicity. The trial court  in advance  precluded counsel from asking what kind of evidence or crimes would justify a death penalty, as well as, under what circumstances a sentence less than death would be appropriate. Following the exhaustion of the first panel, the trial court, apparently impatient at appellant's counsel's questioning on the two restricted issues, ruled that the next fifteen venirepersons could not be individually examined about pretrial publicity on the death penalty. The trial judge, himself, questioned that venire about the issues. The court explained that this change of procedure was out of convenience to the jurors and because he believed counsel were asking inappropriate questions. While we have some questions about the reason given by the trial court for changing horses in the middle of the stream, it is clear that the court adequately questioned the second venire about pre-trial publicity and about their view on the death penalty. That fact, coupled with our familiar rule that the conduct of individual voir dire is within the sound discretion of the trial court, leads us to conclude that there was no error here. We suggest, on any retrial, that the voir dire be conducted following what we consider to be the better practice.