Opinion ID: 2357769
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The statutory presumption against custody applies in modification proceedings.

Text: As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence applies in custody modification proceedings. [22] We have held that the ultimate focus in the custody modification context is the best interests of the children. [23] We conclude that applying the statutory presumption against custody is appropriate and necessary in light of this focus. First, the legislative history behind AS 25.24.150(g) strongly indicates that the legislature intended for the presumption to apply in modification proceedings. Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g) was enacted in 2004 by House Bill 385. [24] The primary purpose of H.B. 385 was to protect children from potentially adverse custody determinations in response to growing evidence that domestic violence has severe and long-lasting effects on children. [25] The bill sought to decrease the likelihood that children would be placed in the custodial household where domestic violence exists by ensuring that domestic violence was adequately and specifically included when courts analyzed a child's best interests. [26] This purpose is equally valid at a modification hearing where, just as in making an initial custody determination, a court should fully address any existence of domestic violence and avoid making a custody determination that will place a child in the custody of an abusive parent. To accomplish its goal, H.B. 385 refined the best interests analysis by requiring that courts consider the existence of domestic violence not only as part of the traditional best interests factors laid out in AS 25.24.150(c) but also as triggering a rebuttable presumption against custody where a history of domestic violence exists. [27] It follows that the presumption is properly a part of the best interests analysis in modification proceedings just as it is in initial custody determinations. [28] Adding support to our conclusion that the presumption applies in modification cases, we observe that AS 25.20.110 does not limit a superior court to consideration of only the factors under subsection (c) when determining whether modification is warranted. [29] Nor have we so limited courts making any custody determinations  our guiding concern has long been the best interests of the child and not strict adherence to the factors enumerated in the statute. [30] In addition, we recently assumed that the statutory presumption applies to a proceeding to modify visitation; there is no reason why it should not similarly apply to a proceeding to modify custody. [31] And employing the presumption where one party seeks modification is a logical extension of our cases applying the other subsections of AS 25.24.150 to modification proceedings. [32] Moreover, given that a finding that a crime involving domestic violence has occurred since the last custody determination is, as a matter of law, a changed circumstance that warrants a modification proceeding, it would make little sense to exclude the presumption against custody in modification cases. [33] The statutory purpose of protecting children would be completely unfulfilled if, in a modification hearing triggered by the occurrence of a crime involving domestic violence, the court could ignore the statutory presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic violence. Finally, we believe that applying the statutory presumption against custody is undoubtedly appropriate in a case such as this one, where the presumption was not addressed at the initial custody determination because the custody award was made pursuant to an agreement of the parties. [34] Applying the presumption is especially necessary where the settlement agreement awarding custody was made by parties with a history of domestic violence during the marriage. [35]