Opinion ID: 757589
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Proffered Reason and Plaintiff's Pretext Evidence

Text: 21 Rather than offer a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the differential treatment between Ercegovich and his younger colleagues, Goodyear in effect denies a differential treatment. In other words, its proffered reason is that it did in fact offer Ercegovich the opportunity to transfer to other positions within the corporation. According to Goodyear, its agents sought other positions for Ercegovich and identified open positions in Washington, D.C. and Detroit, but the plaintiff was unwilling to relocate from Akron. See Def.-Appellee's Br. at 29. 22 Once Goodyear articulated a non-discriminatory reason for not reassigning Ercegovich to another position, the plaintiff-appellant bore the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered explanation was a pretext for intentional age discrimination. See Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1464. We believe a reasonable jury viewing the evidence as a whole could believe Ercegovich's version of events, which is that he was not offered the opportunity to transfer because of age discrimination. See J.A. at 402, 406-07 (Ercegovich Dep.). In her witness statement to the EEOC, Cathy Smith, a human resource consultant at Goodyear, stated that at her October 28, 1994 meeting with Ercegovich, she informed him about the available positions in Washington, D.C. and Detroit. J.A. at 989. Contradicting Smith's EEOC affidavit, Bob Morris, Personnel Manager, stated that when he spoke to Smith the day of or the day after Smith's meeting with Ercegovich, Smith told Morris that she was unaware of any available positions for which the plaintiff-appellant was qualified. J.A. at 717-18 (Morris Dep.). Goodyear also submitted to the EEOC a memo written by Fred Cooper, dated February 15, 1995, stating that on December 2, 1994, Ercegovich returned Cooper's November 30th call, at which time Cooper informed Ercegovich of an opening for a Personnel Counselor. J.A. at 375. Ercegovich's long distance phone records, however, show that he did not call Akron on December 2nd. 4 J.A. at 339-42 (Pl.'s Ex. 8). Moreover, a reasonable jury could discount Cooper's memo since it was written over two months after the alleged phone conversation between Cooper and Ercegovich took place. Ultimately, whether a jury chooses to believe the plaintiff-appellant or the defendant-appellee's version of events depends on the credibility of each party's witnesses, and credibility determinations are for the jury to decide. See Wells v. New Cherokee Corp., 58 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir.1995). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ercegovich, we believe that a genuine issue for trial exists as to whether Goodyear afforded Ercegovich the same opportunity to transfer to available positions within the company that it offered younger employees similarly affected by the reorganization of the Human Resources Development group. 23 In further support of his age-discrimination claim, Ercegovich relies on numerous age-biased statements allegedly made by several individuals occupying high positions in Goodyear's Retail Sales Division, including the vice president overseeing the entire division, Ed Gallagher. According to Ercegovich, on or about December of 1993, Gallagher remarked at a retail staff meeting shortly after his promotion to vice president that [t]his company is being run by white haired old men waiting to retire, and this has to change. J.A. at 411 (Ercegovich Dep. at 57). Ercegovich also claims that at or about the same time one of the personnel managers told him that Gallagher had directed that he did not want any employee over 50 years old on his staff. J.A. at 236 (Ercegovich Aff.). The district court concluded that even assuming the truth of Ercegovich's allegations, neither of these discriminatory remarks was relevant because solely Evert decided to eliminate Ercegovich's position. J.A. at 23 (Dist. Ct. Op. at 9). We disagree. 24 In assessing the relevancy of a discriminatory remark, we look first at the identity of the speaker. An isolated discriminatory remark made by one with no managerial authority over the challenged personnel decisions is not considered indicative of age discrimination. See McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1161 (6th Cir.1990) ([S]tatement by an intermediate level management official is not indicative of discrimination when the ultimate decision to discharge is made by an upper level official.). This court later explained, however, that the McDonald rule was never intended to apply formalistically, and that remarks by those who did not independently have the authority or did not directly exercise their authority to fire the plaintiff, but who nevertheless played a meaningful role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff, were relevant. See Wells, 58 F.3d at 237-38; see also Kelley v. Airborne Freight Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 347-48 (1st Cir.1998) (statement by head of human resources who participated closely in plaintiff's termination was admissible to show a discriminatory atmosphere); Abrams v. Lightolier Inc., 50 F.3d 1204, 1214 (3d Cir.1995) (age-related statements of corporate vice president who may have played a role in the decision to terminate the plaintiff were relevant and could properly be used to build a circumstantial case of discrimination). Similarly, the discriminatory remarks of those who may have influenced the decision not to reassign the plaintiff to other positions in the company may be relevant when the plaintiff challenges the motive behind that decision. 25 We must therefore determine whether a reasonable jury could conclude that Gallagher was in a position to influence the alleged decision to deny Ercegovich the possibility of transferring to available positions within the company. When asked whether Gallagher reviewed the decision to eliminate Ercegovich's position, Lauritzen stated that Gallagher was involved in some parts of the discussion. J.A. at 700 (Lauritzen Dep. at 59). Moreover, we note that Gallagher, as head of the entire Retail Sales Division, was in a position to shape the attitudes, policies, and decisions of the divisions's managers, including Evert and Lauritzen. See Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir.1996) (biased remarks corroborate plaintiff's discrimination claim where remarks were made by top policymakers in the company ... who [we]re ultimately responsible for the company's employment practices); Tuck v. Henkel Corp., 973 F.2d 371, 376-77 (4th Cir.1992) (biased statements of head of corporation's R & D Group were probative evidence of age discrimination against plaintiff where speaker may have influenced actual decisionmakers), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 1276, 122 L.Ed.2d 671 (1993). When a major company executive speaks, 'everybody listens' in the corporate hierarchy. Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 546 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Lockhart v. Westinghouse Credit Corp., 879 F.2d 43, 54 (3d Cir.1989)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826, 114 S.Ct. 88, 126 L.Ed.2d 56 (1993). Therefore, we conclude that a genuine issue of fact exists as to whether Gallagher was involved in the employment decisions adverse to Ercegovich, and we must assume for purposes of summary judgment that Gallagher did in fact play a meaningful role in those decisions. Gallagher's statements thus cannot be excluded under the McDonald rule, and the district court erred in concluding otherwise. 26 Our consideration of a speaker's role in the employment decision adversely affecting the plaintiff does not end our inquiry. We must also examine the substance of the discriminatory remarks in determining their relevancy to a plaintiff's claim that an impermissible factor motivated the adverse employment action taken against him or her. Isolated and ambiguous comments 'are too abstract, in addition to being irrelevant and prejudicial, to support a finding of age discrimination.'  Phelps v. Yale Sec., Inc., 986 F.2d 1020, 1025 (6th Cir.) (quoting Gagne v. Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314 (6th Cir.1989)), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 861, 114 S.Ct. 175, 126 L.Ed.2d 135 (1993). Goodyear argues that discriminatory remarks are irrelevant unless the plaintiff demonstrates a nexus between the discriminatory remarks and the adverse employment action. See Def.-Appellee's Br. at 19-21. Although we believe a direct nexus between the allegedly discriminatory remarks and the challenged employment action affects the remark's probative value, the absence of a direct nexus does not necessarily render a discriminatory remark irrelevant. See La Pointe v. United Autoworkers Local 600, 8 F.3d 376, 380 (6th Cir.1993) (supervisor's ageist remarks about oldtimers constitute direct evidence of age discrimination even though the comments were not specifically about or directed to the plaintiff). In addition, neither of Gallagher's alleged remarks (this company is being run by white haired old men waiting to retire, and this has to change and that he does not want any employee over 50 years old on his staff) can be fairly characterized as ambiguous or abstract. Both remarks on their face strongly suggest that the speaker harbors a bias against older workers. Moreover, when assessing the relevancy of an allegedly biased remark where the plaintiff presents evidence of multiple discriminatory remarks or other evidence of pretext, we do not view each discriminatory remark in isolation, but are mindful that the remarks buttress one another as well as any other pretextual evidence supporting an inference of discriminatory animus. Cf. Wells, 58 F.3d at 237 (holding manager's discriminatory remark indicative of age bias where buttressed by other evidence of discrimination and thus remark was not an isolated comment). Viewing Gallagher's remarks in the light most favorable to Ercegovich and against a backdrop of other evidence of pretext, we conclude that Gallagher's remarks support the inference that age-discriminatory animus entered in Goodyear's alleged decision to deny Ercegovich the opportunity to transfer to available positions within the company. 27 In addition to Gallagher, the plaintiff alleges that other members of the Retail Sales Division's senior management made age-biased remarks. According to Ercegovich, on August 25, 1994, during the 1995 Budget/Business Plan meeting, Gordon Hewitt, Director of Finance for the Retail Sales Division, remarked that there were some people losing their jobs and they will--but they will be replaced by younger college grads at less money. J.A. at 413 (Ercegovich Dep. at 66). Finally, Ercegovich claims that George Campbell, former Director of Human Resources, informed his personnel managers during a meeting in August of 1993 that there will be no more promotions of anyone--to different departments--for anyone over age 51. J.A. at 72 (Ercegovich Dep. at 70). See also J.A. at 236 (Ercegovich Aff. p 40) (stating that Campbell had directed that no one over 51 years of age would be cross-trained for development due to age.). Both Hewitt and Campbell reported directly to Gallagher. J.A. at 504 (Pl.'s Ex. 3 (Organizational chart for Retail Sales Division)). 28 The district court concluded that Hewitt and Campbell's statements were irrelevant to the plaintiff-appellant's claims because neither speaker participated in the decision to eliminate Ercegovich's position. J.A. at 23 (Dist. Ct. Order at 9). Although discriminatory statements by a nondecisionmaker, standing alone, generally do not support an inference of discrimination, the comments of a nondecisionmaker are not categorically excludable. See Walden v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 126 F.3d 506, 521 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1516, 140 L.Ed.2d 669 (1998). Circumstantial evidence establishing the existence of a discriminatory atmosphere at the defendant's workplace in turn may serve as circumstantial evidence of individualized discrimination directed at the plaintiff. See Parker v. Secretary, U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 891 F.2d 316, 322 (D.C.Cir.1989). While evidence of a discriminatory atmosphere may not be conclusive proof of discrimination against an individual plaintiff, such evidence does tend to add 'color' to the employer's decisionmaking processes and to the influences behind the actions taken with respect to the individual plaintiff. Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 597 (1st Cir.1987); cf. Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 610 (8th Cir.1997) ([S]uch comments are surely the kind of fact which could cause a reasonable trier of a fact to raise an eyebrow, thus providing additional threads of evidence that are relevant to the jury. (quotations omitted)). 29 Discriminatory statements may reflect a cumulative managerial attitude among the defendant-employer's managers that has influenced the decisionmaking process for a considerable time. Thus, management's consideration of an impermissible factor in one context may support the inference that the impermissible factor entered into the decisionmaking process in another context. See Conway, 825 F.2d at 597-98. We therefore believe that evidence of a corporate state-of-mind or a discriminatory atmosphere is not rendered irrelevant by its failure to coincide precisely with the particular actors or timeframe involved in the specific events that generated a claim of discriminatory treatment. Conway, 825 F.2d at 597. This is especially true when the discriminatory statement is not an off-hand comment by a low-level supervisor but a remark by a senior official evidencing managerial policy. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir.1995). 30 We do not mean to imply that any ageist comment by a corporate executive is relevant as evidence of a discriminatory corporate culture. Rather, the courts must carefully evaluate factors affecting the statement's probative value, such as the declarant's position in the corporate hierarchy, the purpose and content of the statement, and the temporal connection between the statement and the challenged employment action, Ryder v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 128 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1052, 140 L.Ed.2d 115 (1998), as well as whether the statement buttresses other evidence of pretext. Cf. Wells, 58 F.3d at 237. Both Hewitt and Campbell occupied senior positions in the Retail Sales Division. Their alleged statements, both of which occurred in the context of meetings attended by individuals in higher management, evidence a managerial policy hostile to the Division's older workers. Hewitt's alleged comment occurred only two months prior to Ercegovich's termination, while Campbell's alleged remark was made fourteen months prior to the elimination of the plaintiff's position. Finally, we note that the alleged hostility on the part of the most senior managers of the Retail Sales Division may stem from the top, as evidenced by the allegedly discriminatory remarks of Gallagher, the head of the Division. Accordingly, we conclude that the alleged ageist remarks of Hewitt and Campbell are not too attenuated to support a finding that age bias motivated Goodyear's allegedly differential treatment of Ercegovich, as compared to Evert and Cohn. We therefore hold that the statements of both Hewitt and Campbell constitute relevant circumstantial evidence for the jury's consideration, and that the district court erred in concluding that their statements were of no evidentiary value. 5 31 We hold that Ercegovich established a prima facie case of age discrimination regarding his failure-to-transfer claim. We also hold that he produced sufficient evidence contradicting Goodyear's proffered legitimate reason to establish that there are genuine issues of fact concerning whether Ercegovich was denied transfer opportunities because of age discrimination. Therefore summary judgment on the refusal-to-transfer claim was inappropriate.