Opinion ID: 804143
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Loss of the IA Job

Text: We observed in Pendleton v. City of Haverhill that, to achieve a sufficient 'plus' in a loss-of-job context, words spoken must be uttered incident to the termination. 156 F.3d 57, 63 (1st Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff in that case was discharged from his position with a non-profit organization after a police officer made disparaging comments about him in a local newspaper article in connection with drug charges that had been dismissed. See id. at 61-62. We held that the plaintiff did not have a valid plus because the alleged defamation and the decision to cashier [the plaintiff] came from two separate, unrelated sources, and the former [could not] plausibly be said to have occurred incident to the latter. Id. at 63 (internal quotation marks omitted). That reasoning applies here. The alleged defamation and the decision to fire Mead came from two distinct sources. Mead argues that, despite this reasoning in Pendleton, the case is not as hostile to her claim as it might seem. It is true that a footnote in Pendleton faulted the plaintiff for -11- rely[ing] on sheer speculation and fail[ing] to establish any tangible connection between [the police officer's] statements and his ouster at the hands of [his employer's] president. Id. at 63 n.3. Perhaps with this footnote in mind (Mead does not invoke it explicitly), Mead presses for the application here of a proximate cause analysis derived from tort law. She contends that it is sufficient for her stigma plus claim if her termination by IA was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of her defamation by the DHHS employees. This contention finds some support in cases from other circuits. See Paige v. Coyner, 614 F.3d 273, 280 (6th Cir. 2010) ([O]nce there has been state action . . ., the proper test for the scope of responsibility for events flowing from that action is reasonable foreseeability, not how close the nexus is between the private actors and the state actors.); Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 89 (2d Cir. 2005) (There is no rigid requirement . . . that both the 'stigma' and the 'plus' must issue from the same government actor or at the same time.). Whatever hope Mead might find in Pendleton and these cases for her proximate cause argument, it is foreclosed by a more recent case of ours. See URI, 631 F.3d at 10 (The standard requires that the change in rights or status be directly attributable to the challenged governmental action. Where the stigma and the incremental harm - the 'plus' factor - derive from -12- distinct sources, a party cannot make out a viable procedural due process claim. (internal citation omitted)). Moreover, the plus in this case cannot be the loss of Mead's IA job with a private employer. As an alternate ground for our holding in Pendleton, we noted that the plaintiff worked for a non-governmental employer and lost a private (not a public) position. 156 F.3d at 63. We added that a violation of constitutional proportions under a stigma plus theory exists only if, and to the extent that, the opportunities lost are government benefices denied as a result of government action. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although it is regulated by, and receives funding from, DHHS, IA is a private employer. Nothing in the complaint suggests otherwise. As such, Mead's job there was not a government benefice.2