Opinion ID: 1311015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue on Appeal: Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Text: Limbrecht contends that the record sketched above contains insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for stalking. He maintains that the Christmas card and other letter, while perhaps offensive, contained no threats of harm. He claims the reported sightings of a vehicle matching his revealed no unusual driving behavior. He emphasizes that no one identified him as the driver during the first four alleged drive-bys, thus minimizing any perceived threat of danger. Finally, he contends the chase involved Perry, not Stacy, and could not reasonably be considered part of a course of conduct directed at Stacy. The fact that no weapon was found in the car, he argues, reinforces his claim that no fear-inducing conduct was established. The State counters that Limbrecht mischaracterizes both the evidence and the proof required by section 708.11(2). For the reasons that follow, we are inclined to agree. Iowa's stalking statute, section 708.11(2), contains three essential elements. They are: a. The person purposefully engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to, or the death of, that specific person or a member of the specific person's immediate family. b. The person has knowledge or should have knowledge that the specific person will be placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury to, or the death of, that specific person or a member of the specific person's immediate family by the course of conduct. c. The person's course of conduct induces fear in the specific person of bodily injury to, or the death of, the specific person or a member of the specific person's immediate family. Iowa Code § 708.11(2); State v. Bellows, 596 N.W.2d 509, 511 (Iowa 1999); State v. Neuzil, 589 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Iowa 1999). Except in circumstances not pertinent here, first-offense stalking is an aggravated misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment not to exceed two years. Iowa Code § 708.11(3)(c); see Iowa Code § 903.1(2) (penalties for aggravated misdemeanor). Limbrecht's first argument-that his writings to Perry Corey contained no explicit threats and, therefore, were not fear-producing-harkens back to the former version of Iowa's stalking statute, which required proof of a credible threat against another person. See Iowa Code § 708.11(1)(a) (1993). The 1993 statute defined credible threat as a threat made with the intent to place a reasonable person in like circumstances in fear of death or bodily injury, coupled with the apparent ability to carry out the threat. Id. § 708.11(1)(b)(1). The statute was amended in 1994. See 1994 Iowa Acts ch. 1093, § 4. The current statute requires no such proof of specific intent. Neuzil, 589 N.W.2d at 711. Instead of targeting a credible threat, the statute criminalizes a course of conduct that may or may not include threats. See Iowa Code § 708.11(1)(b) (1997). Course of conduct is defined as repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person without legitimate purpose or repeatedly conveying oral or written threats, threats implied by conduct, or a combination thereof, directed at or toward a person. Id. Repeatedly, as defined by the statute, means on two or more occasions. Iowa Code § 708.11(1)(d). The record before us furnishes persuasive proof that Limbrecht placed himself in physical proximity to Stacy on four or five occasions in mid-January 1998 without legitimate purpose. The fact that the letters preceding his drive-bys contained no explicit threats makes them no less threatening when considered in context. Stacy had experienced, firsthand, Limbrecht's voyeuristic propensities at the prison. She was familiar with his criminal record of sexually assaultive behavior. She knew that he had authored the kites, which falsely accused her of sexual misconduct with him and other inmates. Thus what might be considered a harmless infatuation in another context assumed frightening proportions here. The harmlessness Limbrecht ascribes to the drive-bys is equally unpersuasive. The Coreys had armed themselves with information about the make and model of Limbrecht's car, even traveling to his mother's home in Carroll to observe it firsthand. A sheriff's deputy testified there was no other similar Toyota Celica in the vicinity. Thus, although the Coreys could not specifically identify Limbrecht as the brown Toyota drove by their home, it was not unreasonable for them to assume Limbrecht was at the wheel. Their home was situated on a minimally traveled gravel road. Given their knowledge that Limbrecht boasted of finding out where Stacy lived and taking her husband in any confrontation, his presence in their quiet rural neighborhood was surely threatening. We thus conclude the State offered substantial evidence on the first element of the offense-a purposeful engagement in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury to a specific person, i.e., Stacy Corey. That brings us to Limbrecht's argument that, although Stacy was identified as the victim, most of the State's proof focused on conduct directed at her husband, Perry. Again, we believe Limbrecht mischaracterizes the proof. Stacy was the object of Limbrecht's voyeurism. It was about her that he boasted to other prison inmates. While the evidence suggests legitimate fear by Perry of a possible assault, it also amply supports a finding that Limbrecht's course of conduct had Stacy as its focus. Limbrecht does not seriously contest the proof tendered on the second element of the offense-that he would have known his conduct would place Stacy in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The record reveals that Stacy rebuffed Limbrecht's advances at the prison, dealing with him curtly and eventually avoiding contact with him altogether. It can be inferred from the record that he knew she would be knowledgeable about his history of sexual assault. His pursuit of her and her family, without legitimate purpose, could reasonably be inferred to have been done with the knowledge that his conduct would cause fear of bodily injury. Finally, the record amply establishes that Limbrecht's course of conduct induced fear in Stacy Corey and her family. She and her husband testified at length about safety precautions taken as a result of Limbrecht's actions, including the installation of dead bolt locks, extra lights, and motion detectors. They began carrying two-way radios. Sheriff's deputies were regularly dispatched to their home. Stacy bought a gun and learned to use it. In summary, we conclude that although Limbrecht's acts considered in isolation might be described as no more than offensive or harassing, taken together they reveal a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear physical harm to Stacy Corey. The State produced substantial evidence on each of the essential elements of stalking in violation of Iowa Code section 708.11(2). We accordingly affirm the judgment and sentence entered by the district court. AFFIRMED.