Opinion ID: 1720569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: This leaves for discussion the question of governmental immunity.

Text: Defendant argues it was entitled to a directed verdict because it was engaged in a governmental activity and cannot be held liable for negligence committed during such an undertaking. For the purpose of our discussion we assume that defendant performed a governmental, as opposed to proprietary, function when it availed itself of the permissive authority in chapter 376 to establish and maintain the public comfort station where plaintiff was injured. We consider and decide this matter on the law as it existed on the date of the accident, although municipal immunity from tort liability was, with certain exceptions, later abolished by chapter 405. Laws of the 62nd General Assembly (chapter 613A, Iowa Code Annotated.) Defendant claims this case must turn on whether a public comfort station is within the term public squares and commons in section 389.12, Code of Iowa. If not, defendant insists the city had no duty to keep it in a safe condition. In other words defendant asserts the city's only responsibility in performing governmental functions is founded on section 389.12. We agree with defendant that a public comfort station established under chapter 376, Code of Iowa, does not fall within the definition of a public square or common as used in the statute referred to. However, that does not answer our problem. We cannot accept defendant's argument that municipal liability begins and ends with section 389.12. It must be conceded our pronouncements in this area have not always been consistent. We said in Hall v. Town of Keota, 248 Iowa 131, 135, 79 N.W.2d 784, 786, and repeated in Gorman v. Adams, 259 Iowa 75, 81, 143 N.W.2d 648, 652, The question of the extent of governmental immunity from liability for torts is a difficult one. That it has perplexed this court for many years is apparent from a study of the many decisions found in our reports.   We think the governing principle in this class of cases has emerged in our later cases, that it is right in theory and should be followed. This principle, while it may have emerged in our later cases, actually had an early inception in Soper v. Henry County, 26 Iowa 264, 268, where we said, Thus, incorporated cities and towns,   with power to grade and improve their streets    are held liable, without any statute expressly giving the action, for injuries caused by unsafe and defective streets. (Emphasis added.) In Florey v. City of Burlington, 247 Iowa 316, 319, 73 N.W.2d 770, 772, we said, The municipal corporation is not liable for negligent acts of its employees engaged in performing governmental functions but it is liable, as is a private corporation, for their negligence in performing proprietary duties; and it is not immune from liability for damages due to dangerous conditions resulting from its own misfeasance or non-feasance in governmental matters. (Emphasis added.) We also said at page 320, It [municipal immunity] is not complete immunity from judicial accountability such as is accorded the state only freedom from the rule of respondeat superior where the servant is engaged in governmental activity. (Emphasis added.) The Florey decision then refers to section 389.12, Code of Iowa, in this manner: In many of our cases it seems to be assumed the municipal liability for tort springs from the statutory mandate embodied in the last clause of the statute. [section 389.12] We agree however with Judge Dillon's statement [in Soper v. Henry County] above quoted that it arises from the delegation of power and failure to maintain highways and public premises in safe condition for use by the public. With equal logic it applies in cases of public parks. (Emphasis added.) We may add it also applied with equal logic to a public restroom established under statutory authority. This conclusion is fully supported by Soper v. Henry County, supra; Florey v. City of Burlington, supra; Hall v. Town of Keota, supra; Lindstrom v. Mason City, 256 Iowa 83, 126 N.W.2d 292, and Gorman v. Adams, 259 Iowa 75, 143 N.W.2d 648. These opinions make it clear the city's duty arises because authority and control over a particular activity have been delegated to it. Here the delegation was under chapter 376, rather than section 389.12. The fact that section 389.12 defines the city's standard of care while chapter 376 does not has no effect on the city's duty. It is the delegation of power which establishes that. It must be remembered this action is not bottomed on the doctrine of respondeat superior but on the municipality's own negligence in failing to keep the restroom in a safe condition. The distinction is clearly pointed out in Florey v. City of Burlington, supra, at page 323 of the Iowa Reports, 73 N.W.2d at page 773: The decision [Mardis v. City of Des Moines, 240 Iowa 105, 34 N.W.2d 620] aptly illustrates the distinction between cases, on the one hand, of municipal nonliability for injury inflicted by public servants while negligently performing their governmental functions, and on the other, municicipal liability for injury caused by dangerous conditions due to the municipality's own negligent failure to perform its delegated duty.    In fact, while not always spelled out, the principle laid down by Judge Dillon [in the Soper case] will be found to underlie and explain most of our cases concerning either streets or parks. (Emphasis in original.) Here the trial court instructed the jury the city had a duty to use ordinary care in maintaining the premises in a safe condition for those rightfully using them. This was a correct statement of defendant's obligation. That it arose under chapter 376 rather than section 389.12 was under these circumstances of no importance. We find no merit in defendant's claim of governmental immunity and hold this case was properly submitted to the jury on the issue of the city's negligence. For the reasons set out in Division II we reverse and remand this case for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. All Justices concur, except GARFIELD, C.J., and SNELL and STUART, JJ., who concur specially.