Opinion ID: 778212
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is Mahon disabled under the acts?

Text: 13 Mahon first attempts to show that he has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A). Both sides accept Mahon's back injury as an impairment, so the question is whether it substantially limits a major life activity. 14 Substantially limits and major life activities are terms of art under the acts. See, e.g., Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 690-91, 122 S.Ct. 681; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 481-90, 119 S.Ct. 2139. Substantially limits is difficult to define, but in the Supreme Court's words, `[s]ubstantially' in the phrase `substantially limits' suggests `considerable' or to a large degree'. Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 691 (citation omitted). Major life activities are activities that are of central importance to daily life. Id. There is no exhaustive list of major life activities, but the Supreme Court cited with approval the regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act defining major life activities to include functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. 45 C.F.R § 84.3(j)(2)(ii); see also Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 689. The Supreme Court emphasized that these terms need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 691. 15 In his complaint in the district court, Mahon asserted that he was limited in the major life activities of sitting, standing, bending, stooping, walking, climbing, lifting, and/or working. J.A. at 11. On appeal, though Mahon does not withdraw any of these claims, he chiefly argues that he is limited in the major life activity of working. 16 As a major life activity, however, working is problematic. In Sutton, the Supreme Court stated that there may be some conceptual difficulty in defining `major life activities' to include work, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139, and in Williams it stated that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may have acted beyond its mandate when it issued regulations that listed working as a major life activity for purposes of the ADA. See 122 S.Ct. at 689. TVA has not, however, challenged the validity of the regulations listing working as a major life activity, and we therefore assume without deciding that those regulations are valid. Moreover, our Court appears to have held, after Sutton, that working is a major life activity under the acts. See Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 652 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had shown evidence sufficient to withstand summary judgment that her employer regarded her as disabled in working); Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701, 709 (6th Cir.2001) (the drafters of the ADA and its subsequent interpretive regulations clearly intended that plaintiffs who are mistakenly regarded as unable to work have a cause of action under the [ADA]). Because of the problems surrounding working, however, we shall treat it as suggested by the EEOC, as a residual category resorted to only when a complainant cannot show she or he is substantially impaired in any other, more concrete major life activity. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (citing 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, Apx. § 1630.2(j)); Henderson, 247 F.3d at 650. We therefore ask first whether Mahon is substantially limited in life activities other than working. 17 a. Major life activities other than working — Although in Williams the Supreme Court directly addressed only the question of when a claimant is substantially limited in the major life activity of performing manual tasks, its decision makes clear that any impairment that only moderately or intermittently prevents an individual from performing major life activities is not a substantial limitation under the Act. See 122 S.Ct. at 691. 18 Mahon has not shown that his physical impairments considerably or profoundly limit his ability to sit, stand, bend, stoop, walk, climb, or lift. The record does show that his back impairment causes him distress and limits him in performing some activities, but based on the evidence presented we cannot say he is severely restricted in any of them. In a deposition, Mahon admitted that despite his injury he can still perform household tasks, clean gutters, fix plumbing, walk a mile, and work on his car, J.A. at 561-62, 567-68, and evidence drawn from his personal daily planner also shows that he frequently performed moderately strenuous physical activities while he worked in the reemployment initiative. J.A. at 836-76. Congress did not in the ADA intend to allow everyone with a physical impairment that precluded the performance of some isolated, unimportant, or particularly difficult manual task to qualify as disabled, Williams, 122 S.Ct. at 691, and we therefore agree with the district court that Mahon's impediments were not sufficiently severe as to render him disabled within the meaning of the acts. b. The major life activity of working — In determining whether an individual is substantially limited in the major life activity of working, we are guided by Sutton: 19 To be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, then, one must be precluded from more than one type of job, a specialized job, or a particular job of choice. If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not precluded from a substantial class of jobs. Similarly, if a host of different types of jobs are available, one is not precluded from a broad range of jobs. 20 Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139. 21 To determine if the claimant is precluded from a substantial class or broad range of jobs, we compare his access to jobs to the access available to a non-injured individual with similar training and experience, looking specifically to the labor market in the claimant's geographic vicinity. See id. at 491-92, 119 S.Ct. 2139; Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., 222 F.3d 247, 253-54 (6th Cir.2000). 22 Mahon asserts that his back injury precludes him from a substantial class of jobs, but it is not clear what class he believes himself excluded from. At one point he refers to the steamfitter class of jobs, Appellant's Br. at 34, but elsewhere claims his injury prevents him from performing all manual building trade jobs, id. at 32. Apart from his own assertions, Mahon's main evidence that he is precluded from a broad range of jobs is an affidavit from a vocational counselor and disability analyst, Nancy Crumpton, Ed.D. Based on Mahon's work restrictions, his assertion he cannot perform the work required of a steamfitter, and a study of the Chattanooga labor market, Dr. Crumpton concluded that he is not qualified to work as a steamfitter or to perform work requiring use of similar skills, tools, processes, or materials. J.A. at 168. Overall, she found Mahon had suffered a 47 % loss of access to his job market. Id. 23 Our Court has in the past allowed claimants to assert they were substantially limited in the major life activity of working when they showed their impairments barred them from a significant percentage of available jobs. In Burns v. Coca-Cola Enterprises, Inc., we affirmed a district court's decision that a plaintiff was disabled under the ADA because his injury precluded him from performing at least 50% of the jobs he was qualified to perform given his education, background and experience. 222 F.3d at 253. But this was before the Supreme Court's decision in Williams, which emphasized that the term substantially limits should be read strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled. 122 S.Ct. at 691. We would be using a less-than-demanding standard were we to find Mahon substantially limited in working when he is still qualified for over half the jobs he was qualified for before his injury. There is also reason to discount Dr. Crumpton's study. Her analysis began with the assumption that Mahon is now unable to work as a steamfitter. J.A. at 467. After his injury in 1988, however, Mahon worked as a steamfitter for TVA, albeit with restrictions. In 1998, he asserted that he was still qualified to work as a steamfitter (with restrictions), and protested when TVA did not reemploy him in that position. J.A. at 782-83, 827-28. Each of these factors militate against Mahon's assertion he was substantially limited in working; together they justify the district court's conclusion that he was not substantially limited in the activity of working.
24 Mahon also asserts that he can make out his prima facie case because TVA regarded him as disabled. Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, an individual who is regarded as disabled counts as disabled for purposes of the acts. See § 12102(2)(C). This part of the Act is intended to allow individuals to be judged according to their actual capacities, rather than through a scrim of myths, fears, and stereotypes accruing around a perceived impairment. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-90, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (citation omitted). 25 To determine whether an individual is regarded as disabled, we apply the test laid out in Sutton: 26 There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life activities. 27 527 U.S. at 489, 119 S.Ct. 2139. To run afoul of the act, then, a covered entity must hold a mistaken belief that a claimant is disabled within the meaning of the acts. See Ross, 237 F.3d at 709. 28 Mahon has not shown that TVA regarded him as disabled under the statutes because he has not shown that TVA held any mistaken belief about him. In his briefs, Mahon does not detail exactly how TVA misapprehended him, stating simply that TVA regarded him as disabled. By this he may be asserting that TVA regarded him as disabled in the concrete major life activities of sitting, standing, bending, stooping, walking, climbing, or lifting. The only evidence tending to show this, however, is that TVA altered Mahon's work requirements to take into account his injury. But in so doing TVA was not wrongly viewing Mahon through a stereotype of disability, but rather follow[ed] the specific recommendations of [a] treating physician, the course the Supreme Court says is the correct one in Williams.  Cannon v. Levi Strauss & Co., 29 Fed.Appx. 331 (6th Cir.2001) (citing 122 S.Ct. at 691). There is thus no evidence to show that TVA regarded Mahon as significantly impaired in these major life activities. 29 Mahon may also be claiming that TVA regarded him as disabled in the major life activity of working. There is certainly evidence that TVA deliberately segregated reemployment initiative participants from its regular workforce, which under other circumstances could signal that TVA thought participants unable to work. According to Mahon, however, TVA separated workers' comp recipients from other workers as part of a plan to establish falsely that program participants were rehabilitated and so no longer eligible for workers' comp. If this claim is true, it shows that TVA did not treat Mahon differently because it mistakenly regarded him as disabled. Rather, under Mahon's own theory TVA treated him differently because it correctly regarded him as a recipient of workers' compensation. Thus, TVA held no mistaken views of Mahon, and he cannot show he is disabled under this prong of the act. 30 Because Mahon cannot show he is disabled under the Rehabilitation Act, he cannot make out a necessary element of his prima facie claim. His suit against TVA thus fails.