Opinion ID: 2385250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parker Claim

Text: The claim of Parker, the plumbing and heating subcontractor under the contract between Albright and decedent, is based upon a partial assignment by Albright of the amount that would be due him at the completion of his contract with decedent. A formal assignment was executed January 10, 1950 and was accepted on the same date by Judge Kraft as decedent's attorney. However, appellant Parker argues that the assignment became effective on July 28, 1948, by virtue of a letter from Jobson to Parker, approved by decedent, setting forth substantially the same guarantee and conditions for payment as contained in the letters of June 23 and July 15 in the Guerrina claim. The letter provided that payment would be made directly to Parker by voucher issued by Jobson on Albright's authorization against the amount that would be due Albright upon completion of the contract. The court below, without passing upon the validity of this contention held that although there was an assignment from Albright to Parker at least as of January 10, 1950, Parker's claim was against the bankrupt estate of Albright and that all questions relating to its payment were to be determined in the bankruptcy proceedings. We believe that the letter of July 28 represented a partial assignment to Parker and that notice of acceptance of the assignment on decedent's part is clear. However, the ultimate question for our determination is whether the claim is payable directly from the sum agreed to be owed by decedent to Albright or whether Parker must proceed through the trustee in bankruptcy. Since there is no question of Albright's execution of a valid partial assignment to Parker long prior to the four month period preceding the bankruptcy of Albright, there is no reason to award the sum due Parker to the trustee in bankruptcy. Albright, by his assignment to Parker, divested himself of that portion of the final amount that would be due him under the contract and, in the absence of a voidable preference, the trustee in bankruptcy cannot be placed in any more favorable position than the bankrupt, Albright, would have been. Wood v. Kerkeslager, 225 Pa. 296, 74 A. 174; Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 253 Fed. 473. We, therefore hold that appellant Parker is entitled to receive payment from the sum of $25,000 presently held by the estate as final settlement under the contract between decedent and Albright. [5] However, since the payment of the Parker claim was contingent upon final settlement between Boyd and Albright at the completion of the contract and not merely upon the placing of the permanent mortgage, the interest claimed by Parker from the date of the mortgage settlement to the date Albright was adjudged a bankrupt is denied.