Opinion ID: 3011767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Split Sentence

Text: We are satisfied that the district court erred both in imposing its original sentence and in sentencing Martinez in response to his motion to correct sentence inasmuch as it did not on either occasion explicitly suspend the execution of a portion of the sentence. Although some courts of appeals have held that suspension of a portion of a sentence can be implied in a split sentence not stating specifically that the court has suspended a portion of the sentence, we have held that a split sentence that imposes probation without suspending a portion of the sentence is illegal. See United States v. Guevremont , 829 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Stupak , 362 F.2d 933, 934 (3d Cir. 1966) (The court may not r equire a defendant to submit to probationary supervision unless the execution of part of his prison term is suspended . . . . Absent such a 6 suspension the authority of the court over the defendant during the period of probation is lacking . . .. The probation order was therefore invalid.). Our holdings, though rendered on appeal fr om prosecutions in United States district courts under federal law prior to the enactment of the Sentencing Refor m Act of 1984 rather than on appeal from prosecutions in the District Court of the Virgin Islands under Virgin Islands law, are consistent with V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 3711 which provides: Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any of fense against the laws of the Virgin Islands not punishable by life imprisonment, the district court or a territorial court, when satisfied that the ends of justice and the best interest of the public as well as the defendant will be served thereby, may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such ter ms and conditions as the court deems best. Section 3711 further provides that when the maximum punishment exceeds six months for a particular of fense, the court may impose a sentence in excess of six months but provide that the defendant remain in confinement for a period not exceeding six months with the execution of the remainder of the sentence suspended and the defendant placed on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best.1 _________________________________________________________________ 1. We note that section 3711 is very similar to 18 U.S.C. S 3651, which Congress repealed effective in 1987. 18 U.S.C. S 3651 provided: Upon entering a judgment of conviction of any offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, any court having jurisdiction to try offenses against the United States . . . may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best. This splitsentence provision of 18 U.S.C. S 3651 was the sole source of the district courts' power to suspend the execution of sentences; a federal court has no inherent power to suspend sentences or place defendants upon probation. United States v. Cohen , 617 F.2d 56, 58 (3d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co. , 465 F.2d 58, 60 (7th Cir. 1972). Of course, the repeal of 18 U.S.C. S 3651 had no effect on section 7 Nevertheless, even in the absence of a written judgment reflecting that the court is suspending a part of the sentence, if the district court orally states when imposing sentence that it is suspending part of the sentence, the oral sentence takes precedence over the judgment. See United States v. Raftis, 427 F.2d 1145, 1146 (8th Cir. 1970); see also United States v. Chasmer, 952 F.2d 50, 52 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, however, there is nothing in the record suggesting that the district court orally suspended part of Martinez's sentence and the judgment was silent on the point. Yet the absence of either a judgment or an oral direction for the suspension of sentence is not necessarily fatal to the validity of a split sentence for courts of appeals have held that even if the district court does not state specifically that it is suspending a portion of the sentence when imposing a split sentence, it impliedly may have done so. For example, in United States v. Makres, 851 F .2d 1016, 1017 (7th Cir. 1988), Makres appealed from an order revoking his probation, contending that the district court failed to state specifically that it was suspending a portion of the sentence in which it imposed probation. The court of appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discr etion in resentencing Makres for violation of pr obation because it was implicit in the district court's judgment that it was suspending sentence. Id. at 1018, citing Raftis, 427 F.2d at 1146. The court of appeals reasoned that suspension and probation go hand in hand and the imposition of one without the other is illegal. Moreover, the court indicated that it is not likely that a district court ever intends to impose an illegal sentence. See Makres , 851 F.2d at 1019. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the typical defendant violating the terms and conditions of pr obation would not anticipate that the penalty merely would be a r equirement _________________________________________________________________ 3711 which remains operative. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. S 3561, however, changed the sentencing landscape for it provides for the imposition of a sentence of probation. U.S.S.G. S 5B1.1 cmt. background (2000). Thus, even though split sentences have been abolished in the district courts in prosecutions under federal law, in an appropriate case a district court may impose a sentence of probation. 8 for completion of the probation. Id. W e also point out that the carrot and stick appr oach to probation is based on the theory that rehabilitation without confinement is possible only if the court has a continuing power to impose punishment for the original offense if the defendant violates probation. See Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272, 64 S.Ct. 113, 117 (1943). McHugh v. United States, 230 F.2d 252, 255 (1st Cir. 1956), is similar to Makres as in McHugh the court held that although it is desirable that a district court expressly suspend part of a sentence when imposing a split sentence, it is not absolutely essential that it do so and that at times it can be inferred that the court suspended sentence. In that regard the court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. S 3651, repealed as of 1987, which provided for suspension of sentence and imposition of a term of pr obation, did not require an express suspension of imprisonment. The court believed that this omission supported its view that it is possible for a district court to imply that it is suspending sentence. Id. See also Raftis, 427 F .2d at 1146 ([T]he intent to suspend the sentence flows from the language used in the verbal pronouncement of the sentence and . . . impreciseness of language will not negate the court's obvious intent.). However, we have not followed the cases suggesting that a court may suspend a sentence by implication. In Guevremont, 829 F.2d at 423-24, we held that a modified sentencing order which imposed a sentence of pr obation but did not specifically suspend a part of the sentence was illegal but the court could correct it under Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(a). Similarly, in Stupak, 362 F.2d at 934, we held that a two-year period of probation, later reduced to eight months, imposed without a suspended sentence was illegal. Here, because there is no evidence that the district court explicitly stated that it was suspending the sentences it imposed either originally or on Martinez's motion for correction of sentence, the sentences wer e illegal under V.I. Code Ann. tit. 5, S 3711(a). Thus, we cannot affirm the order sentencing Martinez for violation of pr obation as the district court did not impose a valid probationary term. 9