Opinion ID: 348544
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the co-conspirator issue

Text: 26 Klein was indicted along with Eli Hellman and Jerry Merolis for conspiracy to import cocaine into the United States. For reasons which do not appear in the record, only Klein and Hellman were prosecuted. Merolis was never brought to trial and did not testify at Klein's trial. Hellman, the only co-conspirator tried along with Klein, was granted a new trial by the district court; Klein's motion for a new trial was denied. Klein now argues that by virtue of rules peculiar to the co-conspirator situation, his motion for a new trial should have been granted because a similar motion by Hellman was granted. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot agree with this contention. 7 27 This Court has followed the general rule that the conviction of only one defendant in a conspiracy prosecution will not be upheld if all other alleged co-conspirators are acquitted. The reason for the rule is obvious: at least two persons must join in an unlawful enterprise in order for a conspiracy to exist. United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1144 (5th Cir. 1974) (citations omitted). We have also held that when the conviction of all the conspirators except one is reversed, the conviction of that one should also be reversed, since, in conspiracy cases, at least two must be convicted or none. Otherwise it might well be that the sole convicted defendant might be the only one ever convicted in violation of this rule. Cofer v. United States, 37 F.2d 677, 680 (5th Cir. 1930). Klein asks that we extend these rules to the situation where all co-conspirators but one are granted new trials. Cf. Klein v. United States, 472 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1973). This case, however, does not present such a situation. 28 We have held that a person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names are unknown so long as the indictment asserts that such other persons exist and the evidence supports their existence. United States v. Goodwin, 492 F.2d 1141, 1144 (5th Cir. 1974); Jenkins v. United States, 253 F.2d 710 (5th Cir. 1958). This is true even when co-defendants are known and not prosecuted. United States v. Cabrera, 447 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1971); Rosecrans v. United States, 378 F.2d 561 (5th Cir. 1967). United States v. Lance, 536 F.2d 1065, 1068 (5th Cir. 1976). Here, the indictment named Jerry Merolis as a co-conspirator. 8 If the evidence at Klein's trial supported the assertion that Merolis was a member of the conspiracy, Klein's conviction can stand regardless of the past or future disposition of Hellman's case. Cf. United States v. Gardner, 475 F.2d 1273, 1277 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 835, 94 S.Ct. 178, 38 L.Ed.2d 70. 29 Sufficient evidence was adduced at Klein's trial for the jury to have found that a person whose name phonetically matched that of Jerry Merolis was a member of the alleged conspiracy to import cocaine. 9 Hellman told Gillis that he had called his friend Jerry in Colombia and that Jerry had the cocaine and all we had to do was go down there. T.R. 322. In a tape recorded telephone conversation between Gillis and Hellman on the same day, Hellman talked about going to Colombia with Gillis to receive a delivery from Jerry. T.R. 328ff. Gillis testified in detail about his trip to Cali, Colombia, with Hellman, during which they met with Jerry and negotiated for several hours with regard to a cocaine deal. At one point, according to Gillis, Hellman and Jerry went to Jerry's brother's house to examine some cocaine. After four hours, Hellman returned alone with a small vial of cocaine. 10 30 Without disputing the evidence of Merolis' involvement, Klein argues that Merolis did not share the common object of importing cocaine into the United States but rather was an arms-length supplier of cocaine to an alleged member of the conspiracy . . . (Third Brief of Appellant at 18). This contention is without merit. In United States v. Mendez, 496 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974), we stated the following rules: 31 No formal agreement between the parties is essential to the formation of a conspiracy, for the agreement may be shown by concerted action, all the parties working together understandingly with a single design for the accomplishment of a common purpose. Beland v. United States, 5 Cir. 1938, 100 F.2d 289, cert. denied, 1939, 306 U.S. 636, 59 S.Ct. 485, 83 L.Ed. 1037. However, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval without cooperation or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy. McDaniel v. United States, 5 Cir. 1928, 24 F.2d 303. In order to fasten guilt on one accused of being a co-conspirator it is necessary to prove that he actively participated in the conspiracy charged. Young v. United States, 5 Cir. 1931, 48 F.2d 26. Mere association with conspirators is not enough to establish participation in the conspiracy. Roberts v. United States, 5 Cir. 1969, 416 F.2d 1216. Id. at 130. 32 The evidence amply supports a finding that Merolis was familiar with and actively cooperated to achieve the object of the conspiracy. Merolis knew that Hellman and Gillis were from America and did not intend to remain in Colombia. 11 It is thus fair to infer that he expected the cocaine to be taken out of Colombia. Furthermore, Merolis knew of the plan to convert the cocaine powder into liquid, which would serve no purpose except to facilitate its passage through customs. 12 This knowledge, considered in light of Merolis' negotiations with Gillis and Hellman and his furnishing a sample of cocaine to Hellman, refutes the notion that Merolis was an arms-length supplier and not a member of the conspiracy. Cf. McDaniel v. United States, 24 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1928). On the basis of the evidence adduced, the jury was entitled to find that Klein and Merolis participated in a single conspiracy to import cocaine. 13 See Sigers v. United States, 321 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1963); Poliafico v. United States, 237 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1956), cert. denied 352 U.S. 1025, 77 S.Ct. 590, 1 L.Ed.2d 597 (1957). 33 Because of co-conspirator Merolis, whose participation was alleged in the indictment and is supported by evidence adduced at the trial, Klein's conspiracy conviction does not depend on a final adjudication of Hellman's guilt. Hellman's successful motion for a new trial, the reversal of his second conviction, and even a possible future acquittal are irrelevant to Klein's conviction because the evidence supports a finding that Klein conspired with Merolis. We hold that the district court did not err in refusing to grant Klein's motion for a new trial. 34 The judgment of conviction appealed from is accordingly 35 AFFIRMED.