Opinion ID: 1268681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: appeal of diamonds

Text: Unlike Platinum Plus and Heartbreakers, Diamonds was in operation at the time the Ordinance was passed. It therefore fell under Section 12(g) of the Ordinance which provides in part: Any sexually oriented business lawfully operating on the effective date of this ordinance that is in violation of subsection[s] (a) through (f) of this section shall be deemed a nonconforming use. The nonconforming use will be permitted to continue for a period not to exceed one (1) year... Pursuant to this subsection, Diamonds was supposed to cease operating as a sexually oriented business by February 7, 1996. However, because of the Harkins litigation, the County did not begin to enforce the Ordinance until August 2000, when the County sought an injunction against Diamonds. Diamonds counterclaimed for injunctive and declaratory relief alleging that the Ordinance is unconstitutional. The trial court granted summary judgment in the County's favor on all claims. In its statement of the issue on appeal, Diamonds argues that the Ordinance is unconstitutional as an impermissible taking because it divests nonconforming use rights, which, under statutory law, may only be divested by zoning provisions. Diamonds appears to assert that because the Ordinance is not a zoning ordinance, it cannot create a nonconforming use since a nonconforming use may only be accomplished via a zoning regulation enacted pursuant to the Comprehensive Planning Act. See § 6-29-730. We reject Diamonds' argument, because, as discussed above, the Comprehensive Planning Act does not preempt the County from enacting an ordinance, pursuant to its police power, which impacts land use. Moreover, no taking has occurred since Diamonds can continue in its existing location, the only restriction is that it cannot operate as an adult use... Restaurant Row Associates v. Horry County, 335 S.C. 209, 218, 516 S.E.2d 442, 447, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1020, 120 S.Ct. 528, 145 L.Ed.2d 409 (1999). Therefore, Diamonds cannot contend that the Ordinance has deprived it of all economically viable use of its land. See, e.g., Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 341 S.C. 297, 305-06, 534 S.E.2d 270, 274, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1029, 121 S.Ct. 606, 148 L.Ed.2d 518 (2000) (if a land-use regulation substantially advances legitimate government interests and does not deny the owner of all economically viable use of his land, it does not constitute a taking). Accordingly, Diamonds' argument that a taking has occurred is without merit.