Opinion ID: 198296
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Durfee's Other Convictions

Text: 30 In addition to claiming that the government failed to prove a single overarching conspiracy, Durfee has launched a sufficiency-of-the-evidence attack on the rest of his convictions. Durfee was convicted of conspiring to commit, actually committing, and using a firearm in connection with the January 3 robbery of Vista Foods in Manchester, New Hampshire, attempted robbery and use of a firearm in connection with the attempted robbery of the Market Basket in Portsmouth, New Hampshire in March of 1996, and transportation of a stolen Ford Thunderbird from New Hampshire to Vermont. 31 We believe a rational factfinder could have found Durfee guilty of these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Subocz, one of the government's cooperating witnesses, testified at length and in great detail regarding Durfee's role in the Vista Foods robbery, discussing, among other things, where they parked their car, where they hid within the store, what they wore and the weapons they carried, and what they succeeded in taking from the store. In addition, Lori Munroe, Subocz's girlfriend, testified that on that evening she saw Subocz and Durfee come home with a box with money in it. As to the attempted robberies of the Market Basket in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, Subocz testified in detail regarding the participants' roles, the equipment used and clothing worn, which gun Durfee carried, and what caused them to abort their attempts. Fournier testified to many similar details, including Durfee's reluctance to go forward with the first attempt and the theft of a 1996 Ford Thunderbird for the second attempt. Finally, as to the stolen vehicle transportation, both Subocz and Fournier testified that they, LiCausi, and Durfee drove to Vermont and left the Thunderbird in a parking lot there. 32 To support his claim of insufficient evidence, Durfee points out that his convictions rest largely on the testimony of cooperating witnesses. This may be true, but it does not help Durfee's cause. The law is clear that an accomplice is qualified to testify as long as any agreements he has made with the government are presented to the jury and the 'judge gave complete and correct instructions detailing the special care the jury should take in assessing the testimony.'  United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 13, 15 (1st Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 438-39 (1st Cir.1993)). Indeed, a conviction based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice can be upheld, as long as the jury is properly instructed and the testimony is not incredible as a matter of law. Id. (citing United States v. Andujar, 49 F.3d 16, 21 (1st Cir.1995)). 33 Here, the government elicited on direct examination the cooperation arrangements for each witness and introduced into evidence their plea agreements. The cooperating witnesses were extensively cross examined regarding their credibility, and the trial judge carefully instructed the jurors as to the caution they should use in evaluating their testimony. Finally, we do not think that the contradictions Durfee describes amount to the overwhelming evidence contemplated in Hernandez as necessary to make the witnesses' testimony unbelievable to any rational juror and therefore incredible as a matter of law. We hold, then, that the jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Durfee in fact committed the crimes of which he was accused. 34 D. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to LiCausi's Conviction for Attempted Robbery of the Warner, New Hampshire Market Basket 35 LiCausi claims that the evidence at trial was insufficient to prove attempted robbery of the Market Basket in Warner, New Hampshire. To prove attempt, the government must establish an intent to commit the substantive offense and a substantial step towards its commission that is more than preparation but less than the last act necessary to commit the crime itself. See United States v. Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d 28, 33 (1st Cir.1993) (citing United States v. Figueroa, 976 F.2d 1446, 1459 (1st Cir.1992); United States v. Manley, 632 F.2d 978, 987 (2d Cir.1980)). According to LiCausi, the evidence at trial failed to establish the substantial step. We disagree. 36 The evidence showed that on April 18, 1996 Subocz and Munroe, their daughter Brianna, and LiCausi were in the Warner area looking for potential robbery targets. The group saw the Market Basket from the highway and turned off to determine its viability as a target. Munroe and LiCausi went inside, looked over the store, and returned to tell Subocz that its arrangement was similar to that of most other Market Baskets. Subocz and LiCausi decided to rob it. LiCausi then stole a car, which they placed in a McDonald's parking lot right next to the Market Basket. Subocz and LiCausi began observing the store through binoculars, and Subocz set the radio scanner to pick up local police frequencies. At some point, the group drove in Munroe's car to a secluded area not far from the store, where Subocz and LiCausi changed into their robbery clothes, including gloves, and readied their weapons, the shotgun and the Beretta pistol. Then they returned to the McDonald's parking lot and continued to observe the Market Basket. The scanner picked up a radio transmission having something to do with a water treatment center. Concerned that this might mean a greater police presence in the area, they drove back to the area where LiCausi had stolen the car and saw some state troopers there. Unsure whether the police presence was due to the stolen car or the intercepted radio call, the group returned to the McDonald's parking lot. Subocz and LiCausi ultimately abandoned their plan because a group of people in front of the store showed no signs of leaving and because they heard another radio transmission related to the car they had stolen. 37 We have found the substantial step requirement satisfied in similar circumstances. In Chapdelaine, for example, the defendant and his associates had  'cased' the BayBank branch and the armored truck, positioned stolen vehicles for an escape, acquired weapons and disguises, arrived at the scene ready to commit the crime and were frustrated only by an accidental change in the truck's schedule. Chapdelaine, 989 F.2d at 33. In another case, the group's conduct in casing the bank, stealing a car, and arriving armed at the bank shortly before the Wells Fargo truck was to arrive, constituted a 'substantial step' toward the robbery that demonstrated that this [intent to commit the robbery] was no idle whim. United States v. Del Carmen Ramirez, 823 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1987). 38 The robbers in Del Carmen Ramirez were alerted to a police stakeout of the robbery location, tried to put their guns in some tall grass and leave the area on foot, and were subsequently arrested. See id. LiCausi's and Subocz's preparations were virtually identical to those in Del Carmen Ramirez. The reason for the abandonment, be it impossibility, as in Chapdelaine, or fear of capture, as in Del Carmen Ramirez, is irrelevant. The only issue is whether the actions Subocz and LiCausi took before abandoning their plans constituted the requisite substantial step. Given First Circuit precedent, we think it clear that they did. E. Denial of Fogarty's Motion to Sever 39 Fogarty claims that his pretrial motion to sever should have been allowed and that, as a result of its denial, he was significantly prejudiced by the admission of evidence relating to several crimes in which he was not involved. We find no error. 40 The government may join multiple defendants in a single indictment where at least one count alleges a conspiracy ... and the indictment separately alleges that the appellant committed a substantive offense. United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 36 (1st Cir.1998); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(d). The federal courts have long recognized that consolidated trials tend to promote judicial economy, conserve prosecutorial resources, and foster the consistent resolution of factual disputes common to properly joined defendants. United States v. Josleyn, 99 F.3d 1182, 1188 (1st Cir.1996). 41 Where, as here, multiple defendants have been properly joined for trial, a defendant may nevertheless request severance when it appears that he is prejudiced by the joinder. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. We reverse the decision to deny a motion for severance only upon a showing of strong prejudice, demonstrating a manifest abuse of discretion that deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Nason, 9 F.3d 155, 158 (1st Cir.1993). The appellants thus bear the burden of proving prejudice greater than that which necessarily inheres whenever multiple defendants ... are jointly tried. United States v. Walker, 706 F.2d 28, 30 (1st Cir.1983). They must prove prejudice so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms. United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 615 (1st Cir.1994). This high standard accords with the Supreme Court's instruction that a district court should grant a severance under Rule 14 only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). 42 We find no abuse of discretion in this case. While the jury did hear extensive testimony relating to several crimes in which Fogarty was not involved, that fact does not, by itself, create sufficient prejudice: It is well settled that, '[e]ven where large amounts of testimony are irrelevant to one defendant, or where one defendant's involvement in an overall agreement is far less than the involvement of others,' the court of appeals must be 'reluctant to second guess severance denials.'  United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 26 (1st Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir.1990)). 43 Moreover, since all three defendants were charged as coconspirators, almost all of the evidence relating to other defendants was relevant to, and therefore independently admissible in, the prosecution's case against Fogarty. As we have said, this circumstance precludes a spillover argument. See id.; see also United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 440 (1st Cir.1994)(quoting United States v. Searing, 984 F.2d 960, 965 (8th Cir.1993) (In the context of conspiracy, severance will rarely, if ever, be required.)). 44 Finally, the fact that the jury acquitted Fogarty on two counts indicates that the jury was not prevented from making reliable judgments about guilt or innocence, but was able to weigh the evidence independently against each defendant. See United States v. Flores-Rivera, 56 F.3d 319, 326 n. 2 (1st Cir.1995) (finding that acquittals suggested that the jury was able to sift through the evidence in an analytical fashion and that the alleged spillover effect did not cause the jury merely to enter a lump sum conviction); Brandon, 17 F.3d at 440 (finding acquittals to be a relevant factor in upholding a district court's denial of a severance). For all of these reasons we affirm the judge's decision to deny Fogarty's motion to sever. 45 F. Hearsay Testimony of Laura Watson and Lisa Munroe 46 LiCausi claims that certain testimony from two witnesses, Laura Watson and Lori Munroe, was inadmissible hearsay. We find error only in the admission of Munroe's testimony but find insufficient prejudice to warrant a new trial for LiCausi. 47 LiCausi challenges, first, the testimony of Watson, an acquaintance of Fournier's, as to certain statements by Fournier after the attempted robbery of the Pic-N-Pay in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Watson testified that she left work at Bickford's restaurant in Portsmouth at about 11:30 PM. She saw Fournier, who asked for a ride home and for help finding a friend he had lost near the Holiday Inn. Watson was then allowed to testify, over objection, that Fournier's friend's name was John. When they could not find John, she drove him to his residence. LiCausi argues that Fournier's statement identifying his friend as John was improperly admitted as a statement in furtherance of a conspiracy. 48 As we discussed earlier, a hearsay statement is admissible against a defendant if the trial court finds that it is more likely than not that (1) the defendant was a coconspirator of the speaker; (2) the conspiracy existed at the time the statement was made; and (3) it was made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Rivera, 68 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1977)). A district court's findings of fact in applying this test must be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous. See United States v. Fields, 871 F.2d 188, 193 (1st Cir.1989). 49 Given our discussion as to the conspiracy counts, supra, we have no difficulty accepting the trial court's finding that a conspiracy existed and that both Fournier and LiCausi were members of it. The closer question is whether the trial judge permissibly found that Fournier's statement identifying his friend as John was in furtherance of the conspiracy. We have observed in the past that there is no 'talismanic formula for ascertaining when a conspirator's statements are 'in furtherance' of the conspiracy.'  See id. at 194 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 798 F.2d 380, 384 (10th Cir.1986)). The statement is admissible if it tends to advance the objects of the conspiracy as opposed to thwarting its purpose. United States v. Fahey, 769 F.2d 829, 838 (1st Cir.1985). We accept that looking for LiCausi was in furtherance of the conspiracy. To help by identifying him as John may have been of questionable value, but it was presumably so intended. We are not left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Mitchell v. United States, 141 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir.1998). 50 We come to a different conclusion regarding the admissibility of Munroe's testimony as to certain statements by Subocz. Before going to Ohio with Fogarty to rob a supermarket, Subocz told her that he was going away to do a carpet job. Sometime after he returned, he told her that at one point he and Fogarty had been in a supermarket with a gun but did not attempt a robbery because it did not feel right. Subocz also told Munroe details of what happened during the Saugus Star Market robbery attempt, the Nashua Market Basket robbery, and the Portsmouth Pic-N-Pay robbery attempt. These statements cannot fairly be considered in furtherance of the conspiracy. All but one were made after the crimes they described took place, and they do not appear to have yielded significant enough information to constitute reports to a coconspirator, assuming Munroe could be considered as such. Rather, they appear to us to be instances where Subocz was merely blowing off steam or venting anxiety. Subocz's lie about his trip to Ohio is a closer call, but we think that it is more appropriately characterized as made simply to avoid an argument with his girlfriend. Thus, we think the statements were not made to advance the conspiracy and were inadmissible. 51 While these statements may have been improperly admitted, we do not think they worked such prejudice that a new trial is necessary. The testimony was cumulative and the weight of the additional evidence overwhelming. That additional evidence pointed to LiCausi's deep involvement in the conspiracy and the individual crimes that Subocz discussed with Munroe. The government elicited extensive testimony on those topics, some of which was corroborated by toll records and other evidence. Accordingly, we think it highly probable that the error in admitting Lori Munroe's hearsay testimony did not contribute to the verdicts. See United States v. Rose, 104 F.3d 1408, 1414 (1st Cir.1997). The error therefore need not concern us. 52 G. Admissibility of Special Agent Mulvaney's Testimony 53 Durfee claims that the trial court erroneously allowed FBI Special Agent John Mulvaney to testify regarding a telephone call, charged to Munroe's account, made on January 2, 1996 to that number. Based on investigation he conducted on April 9, 1997, Agent Mulvaney testified that the number from which the call was made was that of a pay phone located at the Vista Foods supermarket in Manchester, New Hampshire. According to other testimony, Subocz and Durfee attempted to rob that supermarket on January 3, the day after the call was made. Durfee argues that Agent Mulvaney's testimony was erroneously admitted because disclosure of Agent Mulvaney's report after Subocz had testified regarding the Vista Foods robbery attempt deprived defense counsel of the opportunity to cross examine Subocz regarding the call, because the testimony was irrelevant given Subocz's testimony that no advance planning occurred before the attempt, and because the evidence was more prejudicial than probative. We reject all three contentions. 54 First, we see no prejudice in the disclosure of the projected testimony after Subocz had testified. Durfee apparently had the phone records and an investigator and could have made his own investigation had he deemed it necessary. In addition, he had no right to the results of Agent Mulvaney's investigation under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, see Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(2) (including as information not subject to disclosure reports, memoranda, or other internal government documents made by the attorney for the government or any other government agent investigating or prosecuting the case), nor was the information Brady or Jencks Act material. Absent a special right to disclosure of information, the trial lawyer must make judgments about what information is significant and what information is not. Then, based on those judgments, he must prepare to meet what he thinks opposing counsel will present as evidence. When the lawyer miscalculates, he risks being caught unprepared. That is apparently what happened here, and we will not recast defense counsel's tactical decision (or oversight, perhaps) into a trial error. 55 Moreover, the trial judge invited defense counsel to recall Subocz if he wished, but defense counsel failed to do so. He contended during oral argument that, assuming the nondisclosure was improper, this remedy was inadequate because later cross examination would be less effective. But the opportunity was there, and, given this and all of the circumstances, we fail to see how Durfee's due process rights have been violated. 56 Durfee's second argument, that the results of Agent Mulvaney's investigation were irrelevant, fares no better. The test for relevance is, of course, whether the piece of evidence sought to be introduced has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 401. The occurrence of a phone call from the Vista Foods parking lot charged to Subocz's telephone account and made to Durfee's residence clearly is circumstantial evidence tending to make it more probable that Subocz cased the supermarket, that he told Durfee it was a good robbery target, and that the two ultimately robbed it. Subocz's testimony that they committed this robbery with no planning, radios, lookout, safe car, or drop car does not change matters. It does not follow automatically from that acknowledgment that Subocz and Durfee were simply walking by the store and decided without prior discussion to rob it. While the pair did not make the same preparations that became standard operating procedure in other robberies, testimony did establish that Subocz did case the store and tell Durfee about it. In light of this evidence we think that testimony as to the location of the number listed in the toll records was most certainly relevant. 57 Nor do we believe that the testimony was more prejudicial than probative. See Fed.R.Evid. 403. We review such a claim only for abuse of discretion, United States v. Cruz-Kuilan, 75 F.3d 59, 61 (1st Cir.1996), and find none here. Durfee argues that the government created an unfair inference as to the call's content and significance by merely presenting evidence of the call and failing to question Subocz as to its contents. However, the evidence of the call was circumstantial evidence of Durfee's participation in the robbery, evidence upon which the jury was entitled to rely in determining Durfee's guilt. Such evidence is, of course, always prejudicial to the defense, and we do not think that the government's failure to question Subocz regarding the phone call, whether by oversight or by design, made Agent Mulvaney's testimony unfairly prejudicial such that Rule 403 mandated exclusion. 58 H. Admissibility of Matthew O'Brien's Testimony 59 LiCausi claims that the trial judge erred in admitting as the government's rebuttal evidence the testimony of Matthew O'Brien. O'Brien testified that he had seen Fogarty and LiCausi at the Hillsborough County Jail while he was awaiting sentencing for an unrelated offense. Fogarty and LiCausi, who were being held pretrial, asked him to tell Fogarty's lawyer that Fournier told him that Fournier's brother and Subocz's brother, not LiCausi and Fogarty, had been involved with Subocz and Fournier in the armed robberies. LiCausi claims here that the evidence was not proper rebuttal and was so inflammatory that allowing its admission at such a late stage of the case amounted to an abuse of discretion. We disagree. 60 Rebuttal evidence may be introduced to explain, repel, contradict or disprove an adversary's proof. United States v. Laboy, 909 F.2d 581, 588 (1st Cir.1990). The fact that testimony would have been more appropriately offered during the proponent's case-in-chief does not preclude its admission as rebuttal evidence. See United States v. Clotida, 892 F.2d 1098, 1107 (1st Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Luschen, 614 F.2d 1164, 1170 (8th Cir.1980)). Rather, the decisions as to what constitutes proper rebuttal evidence and the order in which the parties present their evidence lie within the sound discretion of the trial judge and are subject to substantial deference. See id.; United States v. Thuna, 786 F.2d 437, 444 (1st Cir.1986). 61 In this case, Subocz testified in great detail regarding the attempted robbery of the Saugus Star Market in the early morning hours of February 2, 1996 and the events of the evening before. He also testified in detail regarding the robbery of the Nashua Market Basket that evening. He named LiCausi as a participant in both incidents. Munroe also testified that LiCausi was with Subocz the night and early morning of the Star Market attempt. Fournier also testified as to LiCausi's involvement in the two incidents. 62 In his defense, LiCausi called several alibi witness who testified that LiCausi was out with friends almost all night on February 1 and arrived at his sister's house between 5:30 and 6:00 PM on the evening of February 2 to babysit her children. Accepting this testimony over that of Subocz, Munroe, and Fournier would mean that LiCausi could not have participated in the Star Market attempt or the Market Basket robbery. 63 We note first that Matthew O'Brien's testimony had no particular connection to any defense witness, and therefore as a practical matter could not be offered during cross examination. As such, the evidence could have been offered only during the government's case-in-chief or as rebuttal. The potential admissibility during the case-in-chief is not controlling, of course, and we find no abuse of discretion as to its admission on rebuttal. Matthew O'Brien's testimony, while not directly contradicting the testimony of LiCausi's alibi witnesses, certainly tended to disprove or refute their testimony by undermining its credibility. Given these facts, we do not think that the trial judge abused his broad discretion in allowing O'Brien to testify.