Opinion ID: 894601
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 239 JV's Motion for Continuance

Text: In its motion for continuance, 239 JV argued that because the case had been on file for less than two months, 239 JV had been deprived of an adequate opportunity to conduct discovery to respond to Joe's motion for summary judgment. 239 JV also explained that its lead counsel had been in trial for approximately three weeks during the pendency of 239 JV's suit and attached an affidavit from counsel in support. The trial court denied 239 JV's motion for continuance. The trial court may order a continuance of a summary judgment hearing if it appears from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(g). When reviewing a trial court's order denying a motion for continuance, we consider whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion on a case-by-case basis. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 800 (Tex.2002). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id. We have considered the following nonexclusive factors when deciding whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance seeking additional time to conduct discovery: the length of time the case has been on file, the materiality and purpose of the discovery sought, and whether the party seeking the continuance has exercised due diligence to obtain the discovery sought. Id. (diligence and length of time on file); Tenneco Inc. v. Enter. Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640, 647 (Tex.1996) (materiality and purpose); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Tex.1995) (materiality); State v. Wood Oil Distrib., Inc., 751 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex.1988) (diligence); see also Perrotta v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 47 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (using these factors to decide whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion for continuance). Here, Joe's motion for summary judgment raised a single defense to 239 JV's claims  official immunity. Official immunity protects Joe from liability if the actions of which 239 JV complains were (1) discretionary duties, (2) within the scope of Joe's authority as a city councilperson, and (3) performed in good faith under an objective reasonableness standard. Ballantyne v. Champion Builders, Inc., 144 S.W.3d 417, 422, 2004 WL 1533950 (Tex.2004); City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650, 656 (Tex.1994). In its motion for continuance, 239 JV argued that it needed additional discovery on the second element of official immunity, claiming that serious questions exist as to whether [Joe] acted as legal counsel for the City of Irving and certain of its constituents, rather than as councilman and more time was required to investigate the nature of the advice provided by [Jenkens and Joe] to the City of Irving and possibly members of the Valley Ranch Concerned Citizens Coalition, the faction of Irving citizens who oppose apartment construction. Specifically, 239 JV contended that it needed to depose Irving City Council members, members of the citizens group, Jenkens representatives with knowledge of the firm's representation of 239 JV, and the Irving city attorney. 239 JV attached the affidavit of Arthur Hewett, one of its principals, in support of these contentions. Hewett's affidavit stated that from information available to me and other representatives of 239 JV, it appears that Joe acted in the capacity as legal counsel to the City Council of the City of Irving and possibly gave legal advice to the citizens group in Irving opposing apartment construction. Attached to Hewett's affidavit was a Jenkens invoice for reimbursement of research expenses regarding the moratorium, which Hewett claims was sent to the City of Irving, and notes from a Jenkens librarian regarding research she performed on the moratorium. Finally, 239 JV attached correspondence in which attorneys for 239 JV attempted to work with opposing counsel to schedule depositions. We cannot conclude that the trial court's denial of the motion was so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. See Marchand, 83 S.W.3d at 800-01. We acknowledge 239 JV's attempts to obtain the requested discovery in the short time the case was on file and see no indication that 239 JV was merely trying to delay the summary judgment hearing. However, we do not agree that the discovery sought by 239 JV was material to its response to Joe's motion for summary judgment on official immunity. 239 JV describes its claims as arising from Joe and Jenkens's failure to disclose a conflict of interest created by Joe's involvement with the moratorium while Jenkens represented 239 JV in ongoing efforts to sell a tract of land for an apartment building and failure to disclose matters that were material to Jenkens's representation of 239 JV (including the Council's September 1994 special meeting to consider the moratorium). 239 JV argued that to respond to Joe's defense that he was officially immune from any liability from these causes of action, it needed additional discovery to determine whether Joe acted as legal counsel for the City of Irving and possibly a faction of Irving citizens who opposed apartment construction in the area and to uncover the nature of the advice Joe and Jenkens provided to the City and the citizens group. However, none of the discovery described could have raised a fact issue as to whether Joe was acting within the scope of his authority as a city councilperson as he conducted legal research on issues related to the moratorium, met with constituents, prepared for the City Council meetings, and participated in the deliberation and vote at the Council meeting. These are the type of activities that Joe has a duty to participate in as a city councilperson and therefore fall well within the scope of his authority as a public official. The fact that Joe, as a City Council member, utilized his legal experience in evaluating and discussing issues on the Council's agenda does not mean that he became the Council's attorney. We conclude 239 JV failed to identify facts essential to justify [its] opposition to Joe's motion for summary judgment, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 239 JV's motion for continuance.