Opinion ID: 768136
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Directive to Sentencing Commission.

Text: 21 (1) The United States Sentencing Commission shall promulgate guidelines or amend existing guidelines to provide that a defendant 21 years of age or older who has been convicted of an offense shall receive an appropriate sentence enhancement if the defendant involved a minor in the commission of the offense. 22 (2) The Commission shall provide that the guideline enhancement promulgated pursuant to paragraph (1) shall apply for any offense in relation to which the defendant has solicited, procured, recruited, counseled, encouraged, trained, directed, commanded, intimidated, or otherwise used or attempted to use any person less than 18 years of age with the intent that the minor would commit a Federal offense. 23 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 140008, 108 Stat. 2033 (1994). At first blush, it appears, as Retic alleges, that Congress intended--and provided in unambiguous terms--for sentence enhancement for solicitation of a minor to commit crime only for defendants age 21 and older. A clearer expression of congressional intent is unimaginable. 24 However, Congress' expression of intent as to § 3B1.4 did not begin and end with its enactment of § 140008. When the Commission drafted § 3B1.4 to reflect the congressional directive set forth in § 140008, it did so by proposing Amendment 527 to the Sentencing Guidelines. See USSG App. C. (1998). In accordance with statutory procedures regarding the proposal of amendments to the Guidelines, the Commission then submitted Amendment 527, along with many other proposed amendments, to Congress on May 1, 1995, and specified an effective date of November 1, 1995. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for the United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25074, 25086 (May 10, 1995). Significantly, in submitting Amendment 527, the Commission stated as the reason for its proposal that the amendment implements the directive in Section 140008 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 (pertaining to the use of a minor in the commission of an offense) in a slightly broader form. 60 Fed. Reg. at 25086. On October 30, 1995, Congress considered and rejected some of the amendments proposed on May 1, 1995, see Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 334 (1995), but did not act to modify or disapprove Amendment 527. 1 Thus, Amendment 527, codified as § 3B1.4, became effective on November 1, 1995. See USSG App. C. 25 Against this historical backdrop, Retic essentially invites the Court to hold that in spite of its inaction when faced with Amendment 527, Congress intended, as it originally stated in § 140008, that sentence enhancements for the involvement of minors in crime should apply only to defendants who are 21 years of age and older. Given the context, Retic's invitation cannot be accepted. The provision that allowed Congress six months to review and displace Amendment 527 resembles the report and wait provision of the enabling acts for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence. See United States v. Scampini, 911 F.2d 350, 353 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v. Smith, 713 F. Supp. 1315, 1318-19 (D. Minn. 1989)). The Supreme Court has long affirmed the validity of report andwait procedures and the significance of congressional inaction under such procedures, observing in a case challenging the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that: 26 The value of the reservation of the power to examine proposed rules, laws and regulations before they become effective is well understood by Congress. It is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the action under the delegation squares with the Congressional purpose. Evidently the Congress felt the rule was within the ambit of the statute as no effort was made to eliminate it from the proposed body of rules, although... [t]he Preliminary Draft of the rules called attention to the contrary practice..., as did the Report of the Advisory Committee and the Notes prepared by the Committee to accompany the final version of the rules. That no adverse action was taken by Congress indicates, at least, that no transgression of legislative policy was found. We conclude that the rules under attack are within the authority granted. 27 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., Inc., 312 U.S. 1, 15 (1941). The Court has continued to find valid the enactment of rules through report and wait provisions. See, e.g., Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 690 & n.12 (1987); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 935 & n.9 (1983). 28 These cases instruct that Congress reserved for itself the opportunity to review proposed amendments to guidelines through a report and wait provision, and that by failing to act to modify or disapprove Amendment 527 even when notified that it was different from the directive enacted in § 140008, Congress, in effect, approved of Amendment 527 as an appropriate reflection of its policy on the sentencing of those who involved minors in their crimes. Cf. United States v. Munoz-Realpe, 21 F.3d 375, 377 (11th Cir. 1994) (concluding that by allowing an amendment to the Guidelines to take effect, Congress gives its imprimatur to the new guideline). Thus, although the initial intent of Congress would have been at odds with § 3B1.4, the history behind the passage of § 3B1.4 compels a finding that the intent of Congress changed. While at first Congress expressly directed the Commission to exclude defendants under the age of 21 from this sentence enhancement, through its inaction under the report and wait provision of § 994(p), Congress ultimately failed to express disagreement with expansion of the enhancement to include defendants under the age of 21. This is not the situation in which the intent of Congress and the position adopted by the Sentencing Guidelines are at odds; therefore, the enactment of § 3B1.4 was valid, and the Commission did not overstep the bounds of its authority.