Opinion ID: 1257752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The UCCJA as Pertinent to Middleton

Text: It will be remembered that the children had been retained in Virginia by the father beyond the agreed period of summer visitation and the trial court decided that it was a more convenient forum than England to decide the custody issue. The mother-appellant recognizes that, even though the Middleton children had been removed from Virginia, the trial court had continuing jurisdiction to change or modify its decree as to their custody. See Code § 20-108; Kern v. Lindsey, 182 Va. 775, 780-81, 30 S.E.2d 707, 709 (1944). The mother argues that the court below, nonetheless, should have declined to exercise jurisdiction under UCCJA § 20-130. The statute provides, as pertinent here: A. A court which has jurisdiction under this chapter to make an initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum. .... C. In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into account the following factors, among others: 1. If another state is or recently was the child's home state; 2. If another state has a closer connection with the child and his family or with the child and one or more of the contestants; 3. If substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships is more readily available in another state:.... We are of opinion, considering the best interests of these children, that a proper application of the three statutory criteria required the trial court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction under these facts, given the principle that the general policies of the UCCJA extend to the international area. Code § 20-146. And we are not reluctant to endorse an international deferral to the courts of England because Virginia's jurisprudence is deeply rooted in the ancient precedents, procedures, and practices of the English system of justice. Oehl v. Oehl, 221 Va. 618, 623, 272 S.E.2d 441, 444 (1980) (pre-UCCJA case in which we granted discretionary comity to the order of an English court modifying the visitation clause of a child custody order entered in a Virginia court). As we measure the evidence against the statutory factors, it is manifest, in the first place, that Virginia was not the children's home state within the meaning of the UCCJA. Home state is defined, in part, as the state in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a parent, a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months. Code § 20-125(5). The Middleton children had lived with their mother in England since before entry of the initial custody award to the mother and for approximately seven years (1974 to 1981) before the father instituted the present custody proceedings. They had been in Virginia for only short periods of visitation during those seven years. But under a technical reading of the UCCJA, England was not the children's home state because state is defined as any state, territory, or possession of the United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of Columbia. Code § 20-125(10). Nevertheless, we give the UCCJA a liberal interpretation in order to accomplish the general purposes of the Act. In Oehl, we stated that the English procedural and substantive law of child custody was reasonably comparable to the law of Virginia. 221 Va. at 624, 272 S.E.2d at 444. Consequently, because of the statutory mandate that the general policies of the UCCJA extend to the international area, Code § 20-146, we will treat England as the equivalent of a statutory home state under the forum non conveniens provisions of the Act. In the second place, England had a closer connection with the children and one or more of the contestants, the mother. The children had only sporadic contact with Virginia during brief visitation periods, at a time when they were living permanently with their mother in England. Thirdly, substantial evidence concerning the children's present care, protection, training, and personal relationships was more readily available in England. The father has attacked the mother's moral conduct, relying on acts committed in England. Surely, the witnesses to support, and refute, such charges were physically present in England. He alleged she had mistreated the children. Certainly, the evidence to confirm, or deny, that charge was more readily available in England where the children had spent most of their time since 1974. Furthermore, evidence about the home, neighborhood, school, juvenile, and adult influences on the children was more readily available in England. Additionally, we cannot overlook the child snatching aspect of the case in order to be consistent with the general purposes of the UCCJA. While the father did not snatch the children in the true sense of the word, he engaged in an equivalent act by refusing to return them in violation of a visitation agreement; he procured a tactical advantage by his conduct. If we approve the retention of jurisdiction by the trial court, it will tend to encourage such conduct in the future, contrary to one of the principal purposes of the UCCJA. See Code § 20-131(B). Thus, we hold that the chancellor erroneously applied the pertinent provisions of the UCCJA and abused his discretion in refusing to decide that the courts of England provided a more appropriate forum for decision of the custody issue. The August 24, 1982 order appealed from will be vacated; the custody, child support, and visitation provisions of the October 1977 divorce decree will be reinstated nunc pro tunc August 24, 1982; and the cause will be remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. The trial court will, of course, be guided by the provisions of Code § 20-130(E) in reaching a decision whether to dismiss or stay the Virginia proceedings, depending on the current status of the custody proceedings in the English court. [3]