Opinion ID: 810136
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This Court Has Jurisdiction to Examine Errors

Text: of Law We begin our analysis with the question of jurisdiction. Section 242(a)(2)(B) of the INA generally deprives courts of jurisdiction to review discretionary denials of immigration relief. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B); see also Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 465 (7th Cir. 2006). We may review the discretionary decision to deny a waiver of 8 No. 11-2576 inadmissibility only where the petition for review raises “constitutional claims or questions of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D); see also Khan v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 513, 517 (7th Cir. 2008). As such, we lack jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion when denying a waiver of inadmissibility, but we retain jurisdiction to examine whether an error of law occurred. See Khan, 517 F.3d at 517 (citing Ali, 468 F.3d at 465). That error could be a misinterpretation of a statute, regulation, or constitutional provision, but it could also include a misreading of the BIA’s own precedent, the BIA’s use of the wrong legal standard, “or simply a failure to exercise discretion or to consider factors acknowledged to be material to such an exercise.” Huang v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 618, 620 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). That error could also be overlooking a petitioner’s evidence. Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 544 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Even though our review is deferential, the [Board] may not simply overlook evidence in the record that supports the applicant’s case.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)); Iglesias v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[A] claim that the BIA has completely ignored the evidence put forth by a petitioner is an allegation of legal error.”). B. The Immigration Judge and Bureau of Immigration Appeals Overlooked Key Evidence The grant of a waiver of inadmissibility requires both a finding of extreme hardship for a qualifying relative and No. 11-2576 9 the favorable exercise of discretion. See INA § 212(h); 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h). Here, the IJ denied the waiver on both grounds, finding that the hardship suffered by Lam’s family would not be “extreme,” and that Lam did not warrant a discretionary waiver because of his lack of rehabilitation. For us to have jurisdiction over the claim, Lam must show a colorable claim that legal error occurred with respect to both findings. Lam argues that the IJ and BIA overlooked key evidence related to the extreme hardship claim. Ms. Lin testified that she “was already depressed before [she] had the children,” and that after the birth of her first child, she “saw a spike in the problem after [her] first pregnancy” and suffered from “severe” postpartum depression. She also testified that she “cannot care for two children on [her] own, psychologically.” She stated that her doctor had recommended medication, but at the time of the hearing, she had just given birth and was reluctant and was “being cautious about medication at [that] point.” Lam submitted a letter from his wife’s psychologist, who stated that Ms. Lin suffered from “severe” postpartum depression and that she was “truly psychologically unable to care fully” for their children. Her psychologist also stated that Lam’s removal would place Ms. Lin “in extreme psychological distress.” In finding that the hardship Ms. Lin would suffer was not “extreme,” the IJ only stated that the family is “currently stressed” and that Ms. Lin faces “psychological stress” because of the removal proceeding. The IJ did not mention or discuss Ms. Lin’s depression. By only briefly 10 No. 11-2576 referencing her “stress,” and even so, only “stress” related to the removal proceeding, the IJ ignored evidence that was material to the finding of extreme hardship. As we have previously held, “failure to exercise discretion or to consider factors acknowledged to be material to such an exercise—such as the wholesale failure to consider evidence—[is] an error of law. . . .” Iglesias, 540 F.3d at 531 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Champion v. Holder, 626 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding jurisdiction and remanding to the BIA where the IJ and BIA “virtually ignored” and “failed to consider” evidence related to hardship for cancellation of removal). The government argues that the BIA considered such evidence, but the BIA only referenced Ms. Lin’s depression when discussing Lam’s ineffective assistance of counsel argument. Even then, the BIA only mentioned in passing Ms. Lin’s “depression following the birth of her child.” Ms. Lin, however, testified to depression prior to her pregnancies, throughout her second pregnancy, and after the (then recent) birth of her second child. We do not find such a passing reference in the ineffective assistance context to be consideration of this critical component of the “extreme hardship” analysis. Where the IJ and BIA overlook such evidence, an error of law occurs and the proper remedy is a remand for reconsideration. Champion, 626 F.3d at 956-57; see also Kone v. Holder, 620 F.3d 760, 763-64 (7th Cir. 2010); Huang, 534 F.3d at 620 (stating that a failure to consider factors acknowledged to be material to an exercise of discretion amounts to legal error). No. 11-2576 11 C. The Immigration Judge Relied on Improper Evi- dence We turn next to the IJ’s discretionary denial of the § 212(h) waiver. The IJ found that Lam failed to show rehabilitation because he was not “forthright and credible in his testimony about the activities which culminated in his conviction.” At the hearing, Lam’s counsel asked him about his 2002 federal fraud conviction. Lam testified that a friend named “Oliver” had paid him $200 to pick up an Isuzu at Oak Park Suzuki. Ac- cording to Lam, Oliver had given the dealership a fake name. When Lam went to retrieve the car, he signed Oliver’s name on the vehicle registration card and was subsequently arrested by the Oak Park Police. At the hearing, Lam’s counsel introduced into evidence a four-page document that appears to be the second of two reports from the Chicago field office of the United States Secret Service summarizing an investigation that followed Lam’s arrest by authorities in Oak Park, Illinois. That document states that Lam contacted Gateway Chevrolet-Oldsmobile in April 2001 about the purchase of a car. On April 3, 2001, Ken Mizdrak, a salesman at the dealership, met with Lam’s co-signer, an “Aaron Meyer.” A week after Lam purchased a 1997 Lexus ES300, he began having difficulty with the engine. Mizdrak offered to replace the vehicle with an Isuzu Vehicross and met with Meyer to get the necessary paperwork signed. Although the document notes that federal authorities arrested Lam for fraud on June 4, 2001, it does not indicate what the act of fraud was. A 12 No. 11-2576 separate arrest report in the record shows that local police arrested Lam on May 11, 2001, in Oak Park on a forgery charge. The government did not submit at the hearing (or on appeal) the full record of conviction from Lam’s guilty plea, so there is no plea agreement or colloquy that might shed light on the facts leading to Lam’s conviction. The indictment only states that on May 11, 2001, in Oak Park, Illinois, Lam “knowingly used, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person . . . with the intent to commit, and to aid and abet, an unlawful activity that constituted a felony under the laws of the State of Illinois, namely forgery.” The judgment does not provide the factual basis of the plea either. At oral argument, the government did not have any further insight to offer about the actual events that led to Lam’s conviction and conceded that on the basis of the current record, the underlying facts of Lam’s conviction are unknown. We have held that an IJ may rely on hearsay evidence “so long as it’s probative and its use is not funda- mentally unfair.” Ogbolumani v. Napolitano, 557 F.3d 729, 734 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Olowo v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 2004)). Here, the lack of probative value of the Secret Service document is clear on its face: it has to do with events at a Gateway ChevroletOldsmobile dealership—a dealership that Lam acknowledged in his testimony (and the government does not contest) is located on North Milwaukee Avenue in the Jefferson Park neighborhood of Chicago, approximately No. 11-2576 13 nine miles north of Oak Park and under the jurisdiction of the Chicago Police Department. Given that the indictment states that the events underlying the federal charge occurred in Oak Park, Illinois, the Secret Service document was not a proper source on which to rely to find discrepancies in Lam’s testimony regarding his federal conviction. The government argues that Lam’s testimony on crossexamination itself is enough to support the IJ’s exercise of discretion and strip us of jurisdiction. But the only thing that Lam’s testimony reveals is his (and possibly the government’s) confusion regarding the Gateway dealership incident. It is clear from the record that there were two dealerships involved and that the IJ relied on improper evidence in making his discretionary determination that Lam failed to exhibit rehabilitation. Because Lam is not disagreeing with the weight that the IJ and Board placed on the evidence, see Huang, 534 F.3d at 621, but on mischaracterization of the document as impeachment evidence, we have jurisdiction over Lam’s claim. We find that reliance on the document was improper. It is not clear to us whether the IJ’s discretionary determination would stand without reliance on the improper evidence, so we remand to the BIA for reconsideration.