Opinion ID: 792823
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State Culpability

Text: 29 In Kallstrom, we characterized the third element of the state-created-danger theory as a requirement that [t]he state must have known or clearly should have known that its actions specifically endangered an individual. 136 F.3d at 1066. We have since clarified that the plaintiff must demonstrate that the state acted with the requisite culpability to establish a substantive due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2002). The government's conduct must be so `egregious' that it can be said to be `arbitrary in the constitutional sense,' but the standard is `no calibrated yard stick.' Id. (quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846, 847, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998)). The guiding principle seems to be that a deliberate-indifference standard is appropriate in `settings [that] provide the opportunity for reflection and unhurried judgments,' but that a higher bar may be necessary when opportunities for reasoned deliberation are not present. Bukowski, 326 F.3d at 710 (quoting Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 511 n. 5). Here, deliberate indifference is the appropriate standard because Judd had the opportunity to reflect and to deliberate before deciding to leave Smith and several children unsupervised in the classroom. Although public schools are busy places, Judd did not need to make a split-second decision that merits applying a higher standard. See Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 511 (discussing Lewis, in which the Supreme Court required a showing of malice and intent to harm for police involved in a high-speed vehicle chase, and Claybrook v. Birchwell, 199 F.3d 350 (6th Cir. 2000), in which we required a showing that the police acted maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm in the context of a shootout, id. at 359). 30 We have equated deliberate indifference with subjective recklessness, Ewolski, 287 F.3d at 513, which means that the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference, Sperle v. Mich. Dep't of Corr., 297 F.3d 483, 493 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). Subjective recklessness can be proven circumstantially by evidence showing that the risk was so obvious that the official had to have known about it. Bukowski, 326 F.3d at 710. 31 McQueen argues that, based on Smith's history of behavioral problems, Judd knew that Smith might violently assault another student and acted recklessly in conscious disregard of that risk by leaving leaving Smith and several other children unsupervised in the classroom. The district court rejected this contention. 32 McQueen has failed to produce any evidence showing that Judd acted with deliberate indifference. It is difficult to put it better than Judge Friedman ably did in his decision below: 33 [A]lthough Judd was aware of [Smith's] disruptive and sometimes violent behavior, no reasonable fact finder could conclude that she knew [Smith] would use a gun to kill another student if left unsupervised for a few minutes. Plaintiff does not claim that [Smith] ever specifically threatened to kill or seriously injure decedent [Doe] or any other student. Nor does plaintiff claim that prior to February 29, 2000, [Smith] had ever brought a gun or other dangerous weapon to school. Absent such evidence, it is impossible to conclude that defendant was on notice of a substantial risk to the students left alone in the classroom. 34 J.A. at 57 (Dist. Ct. Op. and Order at 11). McQueen has not alleged that Judd knew or even suspected that Smith had a gun, knife, or other similarly dangerous weapon with him on the day of the shooting, nor did Smith's history of behavioral problems suggest that he would escalate from hitting with fists, feet, and pencils to such weapons. Absent such evidence, McQueen cannot show that the risk [of such a violent attack by Smith] was so obvious that [Judd] had to have known about it. Bukowski, 326 F.3d at 710. Therefore, McQueen has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to state culpability. 35