Opinion ID: 1741039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The new plea withdrawal procedure

Text: ¶ 88 The majority accepted Lackershire's invitation to decide the case based on the factual basis requirement. Majority op., ¶ 5 n. 4. ¶ 89 The majority not only accepted Lackershire's invitation to decide the case on the factual basis requirement, it makes it seem as though the factual basis requirement has been one of Lackershire's primary arguments all along. For example, in explaining Lackershire's arguments, the majority states the following: [S]he argues that the circuit court failed to satisfy the `factual basis' requirement under Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b). Majority op., ¶ 2; see also id. ¶ 5 n. 4 (In addition to [Lackershire's] factual basis argument . . .), id., ¶ 26 (Lackershire asserts that her plea colloquy was defective . . . in two ways. . . . Second, the circuit court failed to satisfy the `factual basis' requirement . . .), and id., ¶ 30 (In her second argument, Lackershire advances that the circuit court did not satisfy the factual basis requirement . . . ). ¶ 90 The record in this case tells a different story: Lackershire never alleged that the plea-taking court failed to satisfy the factual basis requirement. Lackershire failed to present any argument related to the factual basis requirement in her motion to the circuit court. Having failed to raise it in her motion to the circuit court, not surprisingly she did not make any such argument to the court of appeals. Similarly, she did not petition this court to review an issue about the factual basis requirement. Lackershire sensibly did not make an argument related to the factual basis requirement in her primary briefs to this court, given that we did not grant a petition to review for such an issue. Only in a supplemental brief answering a question about whether rape constitutes an affirmative defense to the crime to which she pleaded guilty did Lackershire stumble upon the factual basis requirement. ¶ 91 In the face of the well-established plea withdrawal procedure that requires that the defendant make a motion with a prima facie showing of a violation of § 971.08(1) or other court mandated duty, the majority decides that a prima facie showing may spring from the record itself. Majority op., ¶ 38. It stated that: there is a substantial question as to whether these facts, which form the basis of Lackershire's plea, constitute the offense charged. That substantial question obligated the circuit court to make additional inquiry, pursuant to § 971.08(1)(b), to ensure that Lackershire in fact committed the crime charged. Resolving that question is vital to fulfill the purpose of the factual basis requirement. Id., ¶¶ 41-42. No need for a motion that raises the substantial question. The presence of a substantial question somewhere in the record seems to be enough to obligate a judge reviewing a plea colloquy to address it. [3] (Such a new procedure makes one wonder if a new claim is around the corner: ineffective assistance of judge.) ¶ 92 Previously, the plea withdrawal procedure empowered defendants to make a motion alleging how a plea-taking court failed to satisfy a plea colloquy duty. That motion permitted the defendants to have the court deal with their allegation directly. Now, judges considering defendants' motions have the added obligation to be on the lookout for substantial questions and red flags in the record of the plea colloquy. That role used to be fulfilled by the defendants and their counsel. ¶ 93 It seems the majority fails to completely grasp the change it is making. Majority op., ¶ 42 n. 11. While noting that bringing to light the new obligation on judges is a disservice, conjecture and hyperbole, the majority states the following: The requirement that judges establish a factual basis is statutory, Wis. Stat. § 971.08(1)(b), and does not come from this opinion. Id. This misses the point. ¶ 94 A judge having an obligation to satisfy the statutory and other court mandated duties when taking a plea is not new. However, the new obligation I am pointing out has nothing to do with the taking of a plea. ¶ 95 The new obligation affects judges considering a defendant's plea withdrawal motion. Before, such a judge would focus on the allegations made in the defendant's motion. Now, such a judge will have to be on the lookout for substantial questions and red flags in the record, even if the defendant did not raise them. ¶ 96 Nonetheless, the majority of this court has decided that spotting all the potential grounds for withdrawal in the record is an acceptable obligation. We are, after all, discussing protecting defendants' constitutional rights. Reading the majority opinion, one may even be left with the impression that this record raised such an obvious red flag and substantial question that the new obligation can hardly be labeled an obligation. See majority op., ¶¶ 4, 38, 41, 46. That would be a mistake. ¶ 97 Consider the actions of those involved with this case that did not benefit from hindsight. First, Lackershire's own attorney did not spot the red flag. He even received the two extensions he requested to file Lackershire's motion to withdraw. The extra time to review the record apparently did not help him identify the seemingly substantial issue related to the factual basis requirement. ¶ 98 During oral argument to this court, Lackershire's attorney did mention a red flag: Certainly I just think this is less than a routine case and there are enough red flags here on the element issue that I think in this case the plea-taking itself didn't go far enough to satisfy the trial judge or to inform this particular defendant as we find her with her various difficulties, also which were noted in the record. The red flag mentioned related to Lackershire's understanding of the elements, not the judge's satisfaction of the factual basis requirement. A red flag, but apparently the wrong one for the majority. Majority op., ¶ 5 n. 4. ¶ 99 Only after this court requested supplemental briefs on an unrelated issue, did Lackershire's attorney mention the factual basis requirement. If the factual basis requirement were such an obvious grounds for further inquiry, why did Lackershire's own attorney not stumble upon it until after oral argument before this court? ¶ 100 Lackershire's attorney was not the only one who failed to spot the red flag that the factual basis requirement purportedly presented. A panel of three court of appeals judges did not identify the factual basis requirement as one that needed to be addressed. [4] Additionally, none of the seven justices on this court noted the factual basis requirement during the oral argument. The court even issued an order after oral argument that requested supplemental briefing on three questions, none of which mentioned the factual basis requirement. ¶ 101 If the defendant, the circuit court judge, three court of appeals judges, and seven supreme court justices failed to spot the substantial question in this case, it seems the majority is imposing a more unrealistic obligation on circuit court judges than it appreciates. The unrealistic obligation also unnecessarily undercuts the burdens already in place for the plea withdrawal procedure.