Opinion ID: 165371
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contempt of Court Case

Text: 90 Saiz next argues that the trial court violated her Sixth Amendment right when it prevented defense counsel from cross-examining Dr. Morall regarding a default judgment obtained against Dr. Morall, the entry of a contempt of court order for failure to appear and the resulting issuance of a warrant for her arrest, all stemming from another case in which Dr. Morall and the attorney involved evidently had a fee dispute. Saiz argues she should have been able to cross-examine Dr. Morall on this matter to impeach her credibility and her qualifications as a forensic expert. The trial court refused to let Saiz cross-examine Dr. Morall on this issue, concluding that it would lead to confusion of facts and was not really crucial in this case. Tr. of Jury Trial, R. Vol. 39 at 170. 91 The Colorado Court of Appeals upheld that refusal, stating that the ruling was within the court's permissible scope of discretion. Saiz, 923 P.2d at 204. The district court below found no basis on which to grant a writ: 92 [T]he trial court's exercise of its `wide latitude to place reasonable limits on cross-examination' based upon concerns about confusion of issues is not contrary to or an unreasonable application of the standards pertinent to the Sixth Amendment right to cross-examination articulated in Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Although the state appeals court did not cite to Van Arsdall, such citation is not required, so long as neither the reasoning nor the result of the state court decision contradicts Van Arsdall. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 123 S.Ct. 362, 365, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002). 93 Order at 23-24. After conducting our own independent review of the record, we conclude that the state court decision is not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law.