Opinion ID: 2812600
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constructive Amendment (Instruction 17)

Text: Mr. Kalu next contends the district court’s mail fraud instruction constructively amended the superseding indictment. Although the indictment alleged Mr. Kalu “devised 14 Mr. Kalu argues that if we reverse any convictions on Counts 1-64—which encompass the mail fraud convictions—we must also reverse his money laundering convictions on Counts 65-95. Because we do not reverse any convictions on Counts 1- 64, we do not reach this argument. -19- and intended to devise a scheme,” ROA, Vol. 1 at 92, Instruction 17 required the jury to find only that he “knowingly participated in a scheme or plan to obtain money or property from another person through false representation,” ROA, Vol. 1 at 485. In Instruction 18, the court specified that, to convict Mr. Kalu, “it is not necessary that the Government show that Mr. Kalu created the scheme or plan himself or with others, only that he purposefully took part in helping to operate the scheme or plan.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 486. Mr. Kalu observes the grand jury only charged him with devising or intending to devise a scheme, and contends the district court constructively amended the indictment by allowing him to be convicted for merely participating in it. “[I]t is a fundamental precept of federal constitutional law that a court cannot permit a defendant to be tried on charges that are not made in the indictment.” Hunter v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 598 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotations omitted). A court constructively amends the indictment “if the evidence presented at trial and the instructions raise the possibility that a defendant may have been convicted on a charge other than that alleged in the Indictment.” Davis, 55 F.3d at 520-21. We have identified two dangers of constructive indictments: (1) the defendant must answer a charge that had not been brought by a grand jury, and (2) the defendant is denied sufficient notice to present and prepare an adequate defense. See Hunter, 916 F.2d at 599. We conclude the district court did not constructively amend the indictment and did not err in its instruction. In this instance, the jury instructions reflected the charges in the -20- superseding indictment. The indictment, like the mail fraud statute, referred to Mr. Kalu’s “having devised or intending to devise” a scheme, while the jury was instructed it could find him guilty if he “knowingly participated” in the scheme. Because the Tenth Circuit has construed the phrase “devised or intending to devise” to include knowing participation in a scheme, Mr. Kalu has not shown the district court broadened the charge in the indictment. “[U]nder well-established Tenth Circuit precedent a defendant may be convicted under [§ 1341] if the government shows that the defendant joined a scheme devised by someone else, as long as the defendant possessed the intent to defraud.” Prows, 118 F.3d at 692; see also United States v. Washita Constr. Co., 789 F.2d 809, 817 (10th Cir. 1986); Gamble, 737 F.2d at 856; United States v. Gann, 718 F.2d 1502, 1505 (10th Cir. 1983) (holding a defendant “may be convicted of mail fraud if he knowingly and willfully participates in a fraudulent scheme created and set in motion by others”).15 The use of the term “knowingly participated” instead of “devised or intended to devise” did not alter any of the essential elements of a § 1341 offense,16 nor did it 15 Prows, Washita Construction, and Gamble suggest the defendant may be convicted for participation in a scheme under § 1341 if they have the intent to defraud. Gann, however, merely references knowing and willful participation in a scheme. As discussed above, the evidence at trial would support conviction as a participant in a scheme under either the intent or knowledge standard. 16 As noted above, the relevant elements are “(1) a scheme or artifice to defraud or obtain property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, (2) an intent to defraud, and (3) use of the mails to execute the scheme.” Welch, 327 F.3d at 1104. Whether a person devises or participates in the scheme is not an element of the offense. -21- prejudice Mr. Kalu’s defense at trial. The superseding indictment specified how Mr. Kalu participated in the scheme in its description of the mail fraud offense, detailing the precise acts at issue.17 All of these acts were based on Mr. Kalu’s participation, and none were based on Mr. Kalu having devised or intended to devise the scheme. In light of our precedent and the superseding indictment, Mr. Kalu has not demonstrated “the evidence presented at trial and the instructions raise the possibility that [he] may have been convicted on a charge other than that alleged in the Indictment.” Davis, 55 F.3d at 52021; see United States v. Farr, 536 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 144 (1985)). Because Mr. Kalu has not demonstrated that the district court constructively amended the indictment, we do not identify any error. We conclude the district court’s instructions were proper. We need not proceed to the remaining steps of plain error review. 3. Knowledge or Reckless Disregard (Instruction 23) Mr. Kalu alleges the jury instructions misstated the necessary mens rea for encouraging or inducing an alien. Mr. Kalu was convicted under 8 U.S.C. § 1324, which states in relevant part that if a person “encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such 17 The indictment also charged the defendant with aiding and abetting, putting Mr. Kalu on notice that he could be criminally liable for participation in the scheme. Zar, No. 13-1111, Slip Op. at 25. -22- coming to, entry, or residence is or will be in violation of law,” and does so “for the purpose of commercial advantage or private financial gain,” that person shall be fined, imprisoned for up to 10 years, or both. 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv), (a)(1)(B)(i). The superseding indictment charged Mr. Kalu in accordance with the statute, indicating he did encourage and induce the aliens identified below to come to, enter, and reside in the United States, knowing and in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, and residence was or would be in violation of the law, and for the purpose of commercial advantage and private financial gain. ROA, Vol. 1 at 97. The district court did not instruct the jury with the knowledge or recklessness standard used in the statute and indictment. Instead, Instruction 23 used a knowledge or negligence standard, and indicated the evidence must show that “Mr. Kalu knew or should have known that the person’s entry into or residence in the United States would be in violation of the law.” Id. at 492. In Instruction 24, the court clarified that “[i]n determining whether the Government has proven that Mr. Kalu ‘knew or should have known’ that a person’s entry into or residence in the United States would be contrary to law,” the jury should consider Instruction 19, which defined what it means to act “knowingly” and explained the good faith defense. Id. at 493. It also defined “should have known,” noting “[a] person ‘should have known’ of a fact if that person knew of circumstances that would lead a reasonable person to conduct a further inquiry into a matter, and such further inquiry, had it been conducted, would reasonably have resulted in the person learning of the fact.” Id. at 493. -23- Mr. Kalu contends the “should have known” instruction was insufficient and inconsistent with the statute, our pattern instructions, and the instruction proposed by the Government. See Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions 2.03, 2.04. Mr. Kalu contends that a mens rea of knowledge or recklessness is an element of the crime charged, and the jury instructions allowed him to be convicted on a negligence standard. UrestiHernandez, 968 F.2d at 1045-46. The Government disagrees, and argues that because the statute does not define the words “reckless disregard,” it is sufficient that a defendant is merely “aware of” the alien’s status and acted willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation. See United States v. Franco-Lopez, 687 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2012). The Government contends the district court’s instruction was not plainly erroneous. a. The district court erred by instructing the jury with a “should have known” standard We conclude Mr. Kalu is correct that the district court erred by instructing the jury with a negligence standard rather than the actual knowledge or reckless disregard standard specified in the statute. A finding of “actual knowledge or reckless disregard” is an element of a § 1324 offense. Demonstrating Mr. Kalu “should have known” of the foreign nationals’ status, which is equivalent to a negligence standard, does not suffice under the statutory text, our case law, or the case law in other circuits. First, we note the statute itself specifies the encouragement or inducement at issue must be “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that such coming to, entry, or -24- residence is or will be in violation of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). The only mens rea specified is knowledge or recklessness—not negligence. Second, the Tenth Circuit has not suggested a violation of § 1324 is established by anything less than knowledge or reckless disregard. The case cited by the Government— Franco-Lopez—relied on the Tenth Circuit’s en banc decision in United States v. Barajas-Chavez, which said a determination “that the defendant was aware of the alien’s status” and “that the defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law” were both elements of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii). 162 F.3d 1285, 1287 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (quotations omitted).18 The Government suggests the term “aware of” is ambiguous and could permit a “should have known” mens rea, but neither BarajasChavez nor the decisions it cites are ambiguous about the required mens rea. In BarajasChavez, the court made clear that “[t]he statute requires that a defendant know or act in reckless disregard of the fact that an individual is an illegal alien, and that defendant’s transportation or movement of the alien will help, advance, or promote the alien’s illegal entry or continued illegal presence in the United States.” 162 F.3d at 1288. The decisions from the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits that are cited by Barajas-Chavez are similarly clear. See Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d at 1287 (citing United 18 Barajas-Chavez, 162 F.3d 1285, and Franco-Lopez, 687 F.3d 1222, dealt with other forms of bringing in and harboring foreign nationals prohibited under related subsections of § 1324. Because §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)-(iv) all contain an identical “actual knowledge or in reckless disregard of the fact” element, however, we consider these cases instructive when construing that element of § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). -25- States v. Parmelee, 42 F.3d 387, 391 (7th Cir. 1994); United States v. Diaz, 936 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hernandez, 913 F.2d 568, 569 (8th Cir. 1990)). All of these decisions required a determination the defendant acted knowingly or recklessly. See Parmelee, 42 F.3d at 391 (“[W]e hold that a defendant’s guilty knowledge that his transportation activity furthers an alien’s illegal presence in the United States is an essential element of the crime stated in [§ 1324].”); Diaz, 936 F.2d at 788 (“The alien’s status is an essential element, as is the defendant’s knowledge of the illegal status and her knowing and intentional furtherance of the violation of the law by the alien.” (citations omitted)); Hernandez, 913 F.2d at 569 (identifying “four elements to show a violation” of § 1324, including that “the alien was in the United States in violation of the law,” “this was known to defendant,” and “the defendant acted willfully in furtherance of the alien’s violation of the law”).19 Any ambiguity is further clarified by the Tenth Circuit pattern jury instructions for § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), which include as an element that “the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that [name of alien] was not lawfully in the United States.” Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03; see also Tenth Circuit Pattern 19 Only the Fifth Circuit’s decision specifically referred to the defendant being “aware of” the foreign national’s status, and it clarified that knowledge of unlawful status and knowing and intentional furtherance of the violation were both essential elements of the offense. See Diaz, 936 F.2d at 788. -26- Jury Instruction 2.04 (requiring knowledge or reckless disregard under § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)).20 Third, the other cases the Government cites require a similar showing of knowledge or reckless disregard. The Government misreads United States v. Kendrick, which did not use an “aware of” standard divorced from the proper mens rea. See 682 F.3d 974, 984 (10th Cir. 2012) (specifying “the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant . . . knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the alien had not received prior official authorization to come to or enter the United States,” and explaining that “[t]o act with ‘reckless disregard’ means to be aware of, but consciously and carelessly ignore, facts and circumstances clearly indicating that the person transported was an alien who had entered or remained in the United States in violation of law” (quotations omitted)). Other decisions that use the “aware of” language unambiguously require that a defendant know or act with reckless disregard. See, e.g., United States v. Guerrero-Damian, 241 F. App’x 171, 173 (4th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Barajas-Chavez but reviewing whether the defendant “knew or acted with reckless disregard of the fact that the aliens were in the country illegally”); United States 20 The Tenth Circuit does not have pattern jury instructions for the specific subsection at issue, § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). The pattern instruction for § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), which prohibits other forms of bringing in and harboring foreign nationals under the same statute, specifically states that “‘[r]eckless disregard’ means deliberate indifference to facts which, if considered and weighed in a reasonable manner, indicate the highest probability that the alleged aliens were in fact aliens and were in the United States unlawfully.” Tenth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 2.03. -27- v. Williams, 132 F.3d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The defendant’s knowledge of the alien’s illegal status is an essential element of the offense.”). The Government cites no authority suggesting the use of the term “aware of” allows the prosecution to satisfy the essential elements of the offense by demonstrating a defendant “should have known” an alien’s entry or residence would be illegal. The statute, our decision in Barajas-Chavez, and case law from other circuits do not support the contention that a defendant acts in “knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact[s]” when they merely “should have known” an alien’s coming to, entry, or residence in the United States is illegal. The phrase “aware of” in our precedents is not satisfied by showing Mr. Kalu “should have known” the aliens’ coming to, entry, or residence in the United States would be illegal. Under the jury instructions provided by the district court, the jury was allowed to convict Mr. Kalu under a less demanding mens rea than contained in the statute—negligence rather than knowledge or recklessness—and that constituted error. b. The error was plain In light of the consistent use of a knowledge or recklessness mens rea in the statute, our case law, and the case law of other circuits—and in the absence of any authority suggesting a negligence standard would suffice—we consider the error in this instance plain. The instructions did not “correctly state the governing law,” and the error was “clear or obvious under current law.” United States v. Bader, 678 F.3d 858, 868 -28- (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). We thus proceed to the remaining steps of plain error review. c. The erroneous instruction does not warrant reversal Having determined that the district court plainly erred, we must determine whether the error affected Mr. Kalu’s substantial rights or seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. We do not believe Mr. Kalu has made this showing and thus do not consider the error reversible under plain error review. The erroneous jury instruction does not satisfy the third element of plain error review because there is not “a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. (quotations omitted). Mr. Kalu has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different if the jury had been required to find Mr. Kalu acted with knowledge or in reckless disregard of the foreign nationals’ illegal entry or residence. The prosecution presented substantial evidence of Mr. Kalu’s actual knowledge at trial. The evidence demonstrated Mr. Kalu knew the nurses’ immigration status, advised them in the visa process and their interactions with immigration officials, and coordinated their transportation into the United States. It showed he was informed of the requirements for the nurses to lawfully obtain an H-1B visa and the conditions he needed to satisfy for their entry and presence in the United States to be legal. Finally, the evidence revealed Mr. Kalu actively concealed from his attorney aspects of the foreign nationals’ proposed employment that would have disqualified them from entering the -29- country. Mr. Kalu was not a peripheral player in the fraud. He oversaw every step of the process before, during, and after the foreign nationals’ entry into the United States. This is not a case where a defendant “had a plausible defense to the charges against him primarily because of his professed lack of knowledge and alleged detachment from the process of hiring the workers in question and verifying their immigration status.” De Oliveira v. United States, No. 5:09-CR-50035, 2014 WL 2873888, at  (W.D. Ark. June 24, 2014).21 Because the evidence demonstrated Mr. Kalu had actual knowledge that the foreign nationals’ entry into or residence in the United States would violate the law, the error did not affect his substantial rights. Mr. Kalu has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that the plain error in Instruction 23 affected the outcome of his trial. We therefore conclude Mr. Kalu has not satisfied the third step of plain error review and affirm the district court. 4. Threat of Serious Harm (Instruction 31) Mr. Kalu further argues the jury instructions incorrectly defined “serious harm,” thereby lowering the threshold for a forced labor conviction. Mr. Kalu was convicted under the forced labor statute, which prohibits knowingly providing or obtaining labor or services by a variety of means, including “serious harm or threats of serious harm.” 18 U.S.C. § 1589(a). The statute defines “serious harm” to include 21 In De Oliveira, the defendant admitted he “should have known” foreign nationals were unlawfully present in the country, and the court said this did not meet the statutory standard of actual knowledge or reckless disregard. 2014 WL 2873888, at . -30- any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2) (emphasis added). The superseding indictment charged Mr. Kalu in accordance with the statute. Mr. Kalu argues the district court erred by defining “serious harm” in such a way that it encompassed acts that caused, rather than compelled, the nurses to continue performing labor to avoid incurring harm. Instruction 31 defined “serious harm” as any harm, whether physical or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to cause a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm. ROA, Vol. 1 at 500 (emphasis added). Mr. Kalu argues the district court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury he could only be found guilty under the forced labor statute if his threats compelled—rather than caused—the nurses to provide labor involuntarily. Mr. Kalu contends that the definition of “compel” is narrower than the definition of “cause,” and that the error allowed the jury to convict Mr. Kalu without requiring the Government to prove each element of forced labor beyond a reasonable doubt. The Government argues the jury instructions on the forced labor counts were not plainly erroneous. It urges us to consider Instruction 32, which generally advised the jury that, to determine whether labor or services were provided “involuntarily,” they should -31- consider whether “as a result of Mr. Kalu’s use of the unlawful means discussed above, the person named in the count continued to provide labor or services where, if Mr. Kalu had not resorted to those unlawful means, the person would have declined to perform additional labor or services.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 501. Instruction 32 also directed the jury to consider all of the surrounding circumstances when determining whether the nurses “chose to perform the labor or services voluntarily or involuntarily,” whether they were “compelled to keep working,” and whether they provided labor or services “involuntarily.” Id. The Government argues any distinction between the terms “compel” and “cause” did not undermine Mr. Kalu’s defense because the jury was still required to find that the nurses would not have performed the labor and services in the absence of Mr. Kalu’s threats and other unlawful means. See id. It maintains that, in light of the instructions as a whole, any potential distinction between causing and compelling would be a distinction without a difference. We conclude Mr. Kalu has not demonstrated the district court erred in its instruction. First, Mr. Kalu does not cite any authority indicating that harm that “causes” but does not “compel” a person to provide labor falls short of a violation of § 1589. His cited authorities repeat the definition of “serious harm” contained in the statute, including the word “compel,” but do not suggest that inflicting harm sufficiently serious to “cause” a person to continue performing labor would fall short of that standard. See, e.g., United States v. Dann, 652 F.3d 1160, 1169-70 (9th Cir. 2011) (paraphrasing the statutory definition of “serious harm” without discussing whether compulsion and causation -32- differ); Garcia v. Curtright, No. 6:11-06407-HO, 2012 WL 1831865, at 3-4 (D. Or. May 17, 2012) (unpublished). Indeed, one of Mr. Kalu’s authorities uses causation language to define a violation of § 1589. David v. Signal Int’l, LLC, No. 08-1220, 2012 WL 10759668, at  (E.D. La., Jan. 4, 2012) (determining “the concept of . . . forced labor turns on whether the victim rendered labor because of the verboten physical force or legal coercion” (emphasis added)). The evidence at trial demonstrated Mr. Kalu repeatedly threatened the foreign nationals with legal action, revocation of their visas, deportation, and financial ruin, and some individuals testified he put them in fear of physical harm. These are precisely the types of threats that could “compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same circumstances to perform or to continue performing labor or services in order to avoid incurring that harm. 18 U.S.C. § 1589(c)(2). Mr. Kalu does not cite any authority suggesting that “causing” and “compelling” are materially different in this context or that “causing” someone to provide labor by means of physical or nonphysical harm is permissible under the statute while “compelling” someone is not. Second, the jury instructions as a whole are not erroneous. Instruction 32 advised the jury to consider whether “as a result of Mr. Kalu’s use of the unlawful means described above, the person named in the count continued to provide labor or services where, if Mr. Kalu had not resorted to those unlawful means, the person would have declined to perform additional labor or services,” and encouraged the jury to “consider all of the attendant circumstances in determining whether the person chose to perform the -33- labor or services voluntarily or involuntarily.” ROA, Vol. 1 at 501. Although these instructions were given to aid the jury in determining “whether the Government has proven that ‘because of Mr. Kalu’s actions, the person named in the count provided that labor or services involuntarily,’” id., and although the latter phrase was never included in any other instruction, the inclusion of the involuntariness instruction adds to the overall message in the instructions that the jury had to determine Mr. Kalu’s threats of harm were sufficiently serious to compel the nurses’ labor. This ends the inquiry. Mr. Kalu bears the burden of demonstrating error and showing that error is plain. He has not demonstrated the use of the word “cause” instead of “compel” when defining “serious harm” was erroneous, much less plainly erroneous, and his argument accordingly fails.