Opinion ID: 1572420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Standing of the Working Plaintiffs

Text: In the trial court, the Working plaintiffs asserted that they have standing to bring their claims in this case based on their status as residents and taxpayers of Jefferson County whose taxes go to the general fund of the County. [5] They alleged that their status in this regard gives them standing to challenge the expenditure of moneys from the general fund for conducting an election not authorized by law. In their February 21 motion to dismiss, the Election Commission and Sheriff Hale argued to the trial court that the Working plaintiffs did not have standing to pursue their claims because (1) Working and Erdemir were not residents or voters of district 1 and (2) McGinnis, although a district 1 voter, had not stated or shown with particularity the injury in fact necessary to grant him standing to challenge the constitutionality of 1977 Ala. Act No. 784. [6] The motion to dismiss did not specifically address the Working plaintiffs' status as taxpayers of Jefferson County or whether that status contributed to their standing to obtain the relief they sought. In proposed conclusions of law submitted to the trial court in preparation for the final hearing and in arguments presented at that hearing, the Working plaintiffs reasserted their position that their status, particularly as taxpayers, gave them standing to pursue their claims. As noted, however, in its final judgment, the trial court ruled against the Working plaintiffs on the issue of standing. Specifically, it held that because neither Working nor Erdemir were residents of district 1 they did not suffer a legal injury as a result of the special election. Among other things, it agreed with the Election Commission and Sheriff Hale that McGinnis lacked standing because he had not stated or shown with particularity [an] injury in fact. The trial court did not directly address the issue of taxpayer standing. On appeal, the Working plaintiffs again assert their status as residents and taxpayers of Jefferson County and again contend that that status gives them standing to pursue this case. In response, the Election Commission and Sheriff Hale urge this Court to uphold the trial court's ruling as to standing on the same grounds cited in the trial court's opinion; they make no substantive argument as to the issue of taxpayer standing. We note at the outset of our analysis that the fact that neither the defendants nor the trial court has directly addressed the Working plaintiffs' argument as to the issue of taxpayer standing does not provide us with a reason to conclude, by default, that such standing exists. Standing is a component of a court's subject-matter jurisdiction and, as such, is not subject to waiver. See Waite v. Waite, 959 So.2d 610, 613 (Ala.2006); RLI Ins. Co. v. MLK Ave. Redev. Corp., 925 So.2d 914, 918 (Ala.2005). See also United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742, 115 S.Ct. 2431, 132 L.Ed.2d 635 (1995). Whether a party has standing turns on `whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected right ' so as `to ensure that he will vigorously present his case. ' State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d 1025, 1027-28 (Ala. 1999). This Court has said that a party has standing where, among other things, there is an actual, concrete and particularized `injury in fact'  `an invasion of a legally protected interest.' Alabama Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd. v. Henri-Duval Winery, LLC, 890 So.2d 70, 74 (Ala. 2003) (relied upon in Town of Cedar Bluff v. Citizens Caring for Children, 904 So.2d 1253 (Ala.2004)). We conclude that the Working plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims. In a long line of decisions this Court has recognized the right of a taxpayer to challenge, either as unconstitutional or as not conforming to statute, the expenditure of public funds by county officers. Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So.2d 761, 763 (Ala.1977) (quoted with approval in Henson v. HealthSouth Med. Ctr., 891 So.2d 863, 866 (Ala.2004)). See also Alabama State Florists Ass'n, Inc. v. Lee County Hosp. Bd., 479 So.2d 720, 722 (Ala.1985); Court of County Revenues for Lawrence County v. Richardson, 252 Ala. 403, 412, 41 So.2d 749, 754 (1949); Reynolds v. Collier, 204 Ala. 38, 39, 85 So. 465, 466 (1920). In Broxton v. Siegelman, 861 So.2d 376 (Ala. 2003), this Court stated: [T]he right of a taxpayer to sue ``is based upon the taxpayer's equitable ownership of such funds and their liability to replenish the public treasury for the deficiency which would be caused by the misappropriation.'' Hunt v. Windom, 604 So.2d [395] at 396-97 [(Ala. 1992)] (quoting Zeigler v. Baker, 344 So.2d 761, 763 (Ala.1977), quoting in turn, Fergus v. Russel, 270 Ill. 304, 314, 110 N.E. 130, 135 (1915)). 861 So.2d at 385 (emphasis omitted). The standing of taxpayers to challenge the expenditure of public funds extends to funds expended for holding elections not authorized by law. In City of Mobile v. Mobile Electric Co., 203 Ala. 574, 578, 84 So. 816, 819 (1919), the Supreme Court held that an election to adopt or reject a municipal ordinance would be improper and that the complainant, as a taxpayer, had the right to enjoin the same. See also Dennis v. Prather, 212 Ala. 449, 103 So. 59 (1925) (citing City of Mobile with approval). We also take note of the result in Petree v. McMurray, 210 Ala. 639, 98 So. 782 (1923), a case in which an appointed county superintendent of education challenged an election that was to be held pursuant to a local law that he contended was in violation of Ala. Const. 1901, § 175. The Court affirmed the trial court's order overruling a demurrer [7] to the complaint, which contained the following allegations: [N]otwithstanding the invalidity of said act, respondents, acting as an election commission, [were] threatening to and [were] about to advertise and call a special election, to appoint inspectors, clerks, etc., in the various voting precincts, and to purchase election supplies, all of which [was] without warrant of law, and it [was] alleged that the pay vouchers for the proposed election officers and the purchase of supplies [would] constitute illegal claims and expenses against the county, to the detriment of [the plaintiff] as a taxpayer; and that the holding of said election [would] tend to interfere with the proper discharge of the duties of his office. 210 Ala. at 640, 98 So. at 782. Other jurisdictions also hold that a taxpayer has standing to challenge an election paid for with tax funds. For example, in Bulgo v. Maui County, 50 Haw. 51, 430 P.2d 321 (1967), a taxpayer challenged the holding of an election that was based on a newly enacted law providing for a special election to fill the term of a county chairman-elect who dies before assuming office. Describing the taxpayer's contention with regard to his standing to challenge the election, the Supreme Court of Hawaii wrote: Plaintiff bases his standing to sue on the fact that he pays real property tax to the county of Maui, which tax goes into the county general fund out of which the expenses of the special elections are payable. He claims the requested relief on the ground that the challenged provision is a special law, violative of Article VII, Section 1, of the State constitution, and, unless restrained by the court, defendant will irreparably damage plaintiff by illegally expending funds raised by taxation in holding elections under an invalid statutory provision. Bulgo, 50 Haw. at 54, 430 P.2d at 324. The Court held that this was sufficient to confer standing on the plaintiff to pursue his challenge of the election: We hold that plaintiff has a standing to sue in this case. We base this holding on Castle v. Secretary of the Territory, 16 Haw. 769 [(1905)]. Although defendant urges that Castle, as a controlling authority on the point at issue, has been eroded by Wilson v. Stainback, 39 Haw. 67 [(1951)]; Munoz v. Commissioner of Public Lands, 40 Haw. 675 [(1951)]; Air Terminal Services v. Matsuda, 47 Haw. 499, 393 P.2d 60 [(1964)]; and Helela v. State, 49 Haw. 365, 418 P.2d 482 [(1966)], and should be overruled, we see no reason for doing so. Plaintiff has alleged sufficient personal interest in the controversy to entitle him to a day in court. 50 Haw. at 55, 430 P.2d at 324. See also, e.g., Board of Supervisors of Elections of Anne Arundel County v. Smallwood, 327 Md. 220, 233 n. 7, 608 A.2d 1222, 1228 n. 7 (1992) ([I]ndividual taxpayers in each county also contested the proposed amendments' validity. Individual taxpayers have standing to sue for an injunction against submitting a proposal to the electorate; otherwise, they would be `put to wrongful expense for the publication of the referendum and the printing of it on the ballots of the next general election.'). [8] In the present case, it is clear that Jefferson County incurred costs in holding the special election for the district 1 county commission seat that it otherwise would not have incurred in administering the presidential-preference primary election on February 5, 2008. Section 17-16-4, Ala.Code 1975, provides that [t]he State of Alabama shall reimburse a county for all sums expended by the county in payment of expenses incurred in holding and conducting an election in which only candidates for federal or state offices are nominated or federal or state officials are elected. [9] (Emphasis added.) Section 17-16-2 defines, but also limits, the expenses for which the State must reimburse counties: As used in this chapter, the term `expenses' shall include the following items, and no other: (1) The per diem and mileage provided by law for election officials. (2) The per diem provided by law for the clerk or other official acting in his or her stead for handling absentee ballots. (3) The costs of ballots, supplies, and other materials required by law to be furnished to election officials and certified by the judge of probate as chief election official of the county. In those counties where electronic voting machines are used, such voting equipment shall not be considered as ballots, supplies, or materials, as herein used. (4) The costs of absentee ballots, supplies, and other materials required by law to be furnished to the official handling absentee ballots. (5) The cost of preparing and furnishing the lists of qualified electors to the election officials as required by law. Ala.Code 1975, § 17-16-2. Even as to the specific expenses listed in § 17-16-2, however, § 17-16-4 does not obligate the State to reimburse a county for all sums expended by the county if the election is one in which candidates or officials for other than federal or state offices are to be nominated or elected. As to an election in which candidates for both federal or state and county offices are nominated or elected, § 17-16-3 governs. It provides that the State of Alabama is required to reimburse the county only for one half of all sums expended by the county in payment of expenses incurred in holding and conducting the election. Ala. Code 1975, § 17-16-3. [10] Finally, we note that, consistent with all of the above-discussed statutory provisions from Chapter 16, the parties stipulated as follows to the trial court: 46. Jefferson County's General Fund is used to pay persons to administer elections at the direction of the Jefferson County Election Commission, including the February 5, 2008, presidential preference primary election. As a result of the Election Commission's resolving to conduct an election, monies appropriated from Jefferson County's General Fund pay for the printing of ballots used during the February 5, 2008, presidential preference primary election. As previously noted, this Court has stated that standing turns on `whether the party has been injured in fact and whether the injury is to a legally protected right. ' State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So.2d at 1027. On the basis of the foregoing, we conclude that the Working plaintiffs had standing to bring their claims.