Opinion ID: 1780026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Statutory Authority and Relevant Case Law

Text: ¶ 15. A chancellor must look to several statutory provisions as well as established case law when determining whether to terminate a natural parent's rights and permit a contested adoption. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 93-17-6 dictates when a father has a right to object to an adoption. The relevant sections state: (4) Proof of an alleged father's full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood would be shown by proof that, in accordance with his means and knowledge of the mother's pregnancy or the child's birth, that he either: (a) Provided financial support, including, but not limited to, the payment of consistent support to the mother during her pregnancy, contributions to the payment of the medical expenses of pregnancy and birth, and contributions of consistent support of the child after birth; that he frequently and consistently visited the child after birth; and that he is now willing and able to assume legal and physical care of the child; or (b) Was willing to provide such support and to visit the child and that he made reasonable attempts to manifest such a parental commitment, but was thwarted in his efforts by the mother or her agents, and that he is now willing and able to assume legal and physical care of the child. (5) If the court determines that the alleged father has not met his full responsibilities of parenthood, it shall enter an order terminating his parental rights and he shall have no right to object to an adoption under Section 93-17-7. (6) If the court determines that the alleged father has met his full responsibilities of parenthood and that he objects to the child's adoption, the court shall set the matter as a contested adoption in accord with Section 93-17-8. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-6 (2002). ¶ 16. When a natural parent objects to the adoption of his or her infant child, a chancellor may nonetheless permit the adoption if the objecting parent has abandoned or deserted such infant or is mentally, or morally, or otherwise unfit to rear and train it, including, but not limited to, those matters set out in subsection (2) of this section. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-7(1) (2002). The criteria to be considered by the chancellor are set forth in the statute, and include in relevant part: (b) The parent has not consistently offered to provide reasonably necessary food, clothing, appropriate shelter and treatment for the child. (c) The parent suffers from a medical or emotional illness, mental deficiency, behavior or conduct disorder, severe physical disability, substance abuse or chemical dependency which makes him unable or unwilling to provide an adequate permanent home for the child at the present time or in the reasonably near future based upon expert opinion or based upon an established pattern of behavior. (d) Viewed in its entirety, the parent's past or present conduct, including his criminal convictions, would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical, mental or emotional health of the child. (f) The enumeration of conduct or omissions in this subsection (2) in no way limits the court's power to such enumerated conduct or omissions in determining a parent's abandonment or desertion of the child or unfitness under subsection (1) of this section. Miss.Code.Ann. § 93-17-7(2). ¶ 17. In a contested adoption, Mississippi Code Annotated Section 93-17-8(1)(c) requires the chancellor to determine first whether or not the objecting parent is entitled to so object under the criteria of Section 93-17-7 and then shall determine the custody of the child in accord with the best interests of the child and the rights of the parties as established by the hearings and judgments. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-17-8 (2002). ¶ 18. Mississippi adheres to the natural parent presumption, which states, [t]here is a presumption that a natural parent is the proper custodian for their [sic] child. In re the Custody of M.A.G., 859 So.2d 1001, 1003 (Miss.2003) (citing Logan v. Logan, 730 So.2d 1124, 1125 (Miss.1998)). The petitioners carry the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the objecting parent has either abandoned or deserted the child or is mentally or morally or otherwise unfit to rear or train the child. Petit v. Holifield, 443 So.2d 874, 877 (Miss.1984) (emphasis added). ¶ 19. In Ainsworth v. Natural Father, 414 So.2d 417, 420 (Miss.1982), this Court distinguished abandonment from desertion, stating, abandonment has to do with the relinquishment of a right or claim, whereas desertion involves an avoidance of a duty or obligation. We have defined abandonment as any conduct by a parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all duties and relinquish all parental claims to the child. Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d 614, 618 (Miss.1991). The test is an objective one: whether under the totality of the circumstances ... the natural parent has manifested [his] severance of all ties with the child. Ethredge v. Yawn, 605 So.2d 761, 764 (Miss. 1992). ¶ 20. The Fosters argue Harris' parental rights should be terminated and the adoption allowed to proceed based on two grounds  that he abandoned Elizabeth and that he is mentally and morally unfit to rear and train Elizabeth. The chancellor carefully considered the Fosters' evidence and found it failed to reach the necessary clear and convincing standard. So long as credible proof supports the chancellor's findings of fact, we must affirm the decision. It is not this Court's role to substitute its judgment for that of the chancellor. Lee v. Lee, 798 So.2d 1284, 1290 (Miss.2001)