Opinion ID: 61659
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Political Question Doctrine General Principles

Text: Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 170, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). This political question doctrine reflects the principle that, under our Constitution, there are some questions that cannot be answered by the judicial branch. Out of due respect for our coordinate branches and recognizing that a court is incompetent to make final resolution of certain matters, these political questions are deemed nonjusticiable. See Baker, 369 U.S. at 198, 82 S.Ct. 691. A declination of jurisdiction under the doctrine presupposes that another branch of government is both capable of and better suited for resolving the political question. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004); Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 229-30, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986). Political questions are labeled nonjusticiable because there is an undeniable difference between finding no federal jurisdiction at the outset of a case and declaring that a particular matter is inappropriate for judicial resolution only after some consideration of the merits. Baker, 369 U.S. at 198, 82 S.Ct. 691. In the instance of nonjusticiability, consideration of the cause is not wholly and immediately foreclosed; rather, the Court's inquiry necessarily proceeds to the point of deciding whether the duty asserted can be judicially identified and its breach judicially determined, and whether protection for the right asserted can be judicially molded. Id. The Baker analysis is not satisfied by semantic cataloguing of a particular matter as one implicating foreign policy or national security. Instead, Baker demands a discriminating inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular case before a court may withhold its own constitutional power to resolve cases and controversies. Id. at 216, 82 S.Ct. 691. To aid courts in the discriminating inquiry, the Supreme Court identified formulations that may help determine whether a particular case raises a political question, which we enumerate though the Supreme Court did not: (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; (6) or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691. [T]he inextricable presence of one or more of these factors will render the case nonjusticiable under the Article III `case or controversy' requirement. ... Occidental of Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir.1978). At the outset, we acknowledge that the Plaintiffs' claims are set against the backdrop of United States military action in Iraq. Thus, these cases are at the very least in sight of an arena in which the political question doctrine has served one of its most important and traditional functions  precluding judicial review of decisions made by the Executive during wartime. At one time, the Supreme Court appeared to have categorically removed disputes implicating the conduct of foreign relations from judicial purview. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918). Later, the Court declared that it is not the function of the Judiciary to entertain private litigation  even by a citizen  which challenges the legality, the wisdom, or the propriety of the Commander-in-Chief in sending our armed forces abroad or to any particular region. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789, 70 S.Ct. 936, 94 L.Ed. 1255 (1950). And in Gilligan v. Morgan, in the course of declaring nonjusticiable a challenge to readiness decisions made and orders given by the Ohio National Guard, the Court made the following observation: It would be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the political branches.... Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence. The complex subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches. The ultimate responsibility for these decisions is appropriately vested in branches of the government which are periodically subject to electoral accountability. 413 U.S. 1, 10, 93 S.Ct. 2440, 37 L.Ed.2d 407 (1973). This court has followed the command that matters implicating foreign relations and military affairs are generally beyond the authority or competency of a court's adjudicative powers. E.g., Farmer v. Mabus, 940 F.2d 921, 923 (5th Cir.1991); Occidental, 577 F.2d at 1203. On the other hand, not all questions touching foreign relations are nonjusticiable. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211, 82 S.Ct. 691; see Can v. United States, 14 F.3d 160, 163 (2d Cir.1994) (The political question doctrine must be cautiously invoked. ...). Indeed, the Court warned that it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Id. Before declaring cases such as these to be nonjusticiable, a court must undertake a discriminating analysis of the particular question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the possible consequences of judicial action. Id. at 211-12, 82 S.Ct. 691; see Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 235-36 (5th Cir.1975). With these principles in mind, we turn to the district court's application of the Baker formulations to these particular cases.