Opinion ID: 3038134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Access Ramp

Text: We review de novo a district court’s order granting summary judgment. Navellier v. Sletten, 262 F.3d 923, 938 (9th Cir. 2001). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we must determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Id. [1] For at least two reasons, Title III of the ADA requires that the Appellees in this case control the grassy strip of land in order to be subject to liability for failing to build a ramp over that land. First, the operative rule in Title III provides: “No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added). It is undisputed that the Appellees do not own or lease the grassy area at issue here. The City of Chico owns that land. Since the Appellees do not own or lease the strip of grass, they must “operate” the strip of grass in order to be liable under Title III. In this context, “operate” means “to put or keep in operation,” “to control or direct the functioning of,” or “to conduct the affairs of; manage.” Lentini v. Cal. Ctr. for the Arts, Escondido, 370 F.3d 837, 849 (9th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). 8410 PICKERN v. PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.), INC. [2] Second, “discrimination” includes “failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities . . . where such removal is readily achievable.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2) (A)(iv) (emphasis added). According to the Department of Justice’s (“DOJ”) regulations implementing the ADA, “[t]he definition of ‘facility’ only includes the site over which the private entity may exercise control or on which a place of public accommodation1 or a commercial facility is located.” Department of Justice Preamble to Regulation on Nondiscrimination of the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B at 681 (2005) (emphasis added). [3] The Appellees do not manage the strip of grass, mow it, or maintain it in any manner. There is no evidence at all that the Appellees engage in any conduct that would demonstrate that they control or otherwise operate the grassy strip.2 In fact, although Pickern originally argued that the Appellees control the grassy strip of land, in her reply brief, she conceded that the Appellees do not control or manage the grassy strip. 1 The issue of who operates the grassy strip is related to the issue of whether the disputed property even qualifies as a place of public accommodation. The DOJ has stated that [f]acilities operated by government agencies or other public entities as defined in this section do not qualify as places of public accommodation. The actions of public entities are governed by title II of the ADA and will be subject to regulations issued by the Department of Justice under that title. 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B at 681 (emphasis added). All of the evidence in the instant case supports the conclusion that the City of Chico, a public entity, operates the strip of land at issue. 2 Relying on a tortured interpretation of guidelines that were never adopted by the DOJ, Pickern argues for the first time on appeal that the grassy strip is part of the “site” because it is a park and the definition of site includes a park sandwiched in between a private property owner’s property line and a public road or sidewalk. This argument is not only illogical and incorrect, but irrelevant. Regardless of the definition of “site,” to be liable, the Appellees must control the grassy strip. PICKERN v. PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.), INC. 8411 Pickern now claims that it is sufficient if the appellees could control or manage the grassy strip and she advances multiple arguments designed to prove that the Appellees could obtain control over the grassy strip. We need not determine whether the Appellees could obtain such control. Section 12182(a) prohibits discrimination only by people who own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation. The statute says nothing about liability by persons who could operate a place of public accommodation. Pickern’s insistence that the ADA requires the Appellees to seek permission from the City of Chico to build an accessible route over the City’s land finds no support in the law. In fact, the DOJ has made it clear that private entities are not required to seek such permission. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, App. B at 715 (“[T]here is no obligation for a private entity subject to title III of the ADA to seek or ensure compliance by a public entity with title II . . . . and any involvement by a private entity in seeking cooperation from a public entity is purely voluntary in this context.”). Given that the Appellees do not control or otherwise operate the grassy strip, Pickern’s other arguments are irrelevant. Pickern attempts to rely on Disabled Rights Action Comm. v. Las Vegas Events, Inc., 375 F.3d 861 (9th Cir. 2004) and Independent Living Res. v. Oregon Arena Corp., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1998) to support her claim that the Appellees can be held liable under the ADA even though the strip of land is owned by the City of Chico. These cases clearly are inapposite. Both cases simply stand for the proposition that private entities who enter into contractual agreements with public entities to lease or to manage, maintain, or otherwise control property owned by a public entity may be subject to Title III liability under certain conditions. See Disabled Rights, 375 F.3d at 872-76 (holding that private entity that operated a public accommodation on public property pursuant to a contract with a public entity could be liable under Title III of the ADA); Independent Living, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1148 8412 PICKERN v. PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.), INC. (holding that the private entity that had, pursuant to a contract with the city, designed and built walks that failed to comply with ADA design standards, could be held liable under the ADA even though a small part of these walks was outside the boundary of the private entity’s site).3 [4] There is nothing in these cases to support the proposition that a private entity may be held liable under the ADA for discrimination that takes place on property it has not owned, leased, or controlled.4 These cases simply do not apply to the instant case because there is no evidence that the Appellees own, lease, or control the grassy strip of land. Unlike the defendants in these cases, the Appellees in the instant case have not entered into contractual agreements with the City that would have provided them with control over the grassy strip. [5] We therefore hold that the district court properly ruled that the Appellees were not required to build an access ramp across the grassy strip. 3 The issue in the instant case is who, if anyone, is responsible under the ADA for designing and installing a route where one does not already exist. The issue in Independent Living was quite different. There, the court was determining whether a private entity that had constructed and designed a route could be held liable for improper design standards. See Independent Living, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. The court held that the private entity was liable for its faulty design of the walks. Id. The court did not provide any citations to law in reaching these conclusions, but the liability was based on the fact that the private entity was the designer of the walks. See id. Therefore, the legal principles applicable there would not be applicable in the instant case. 4 In fact, in Independent Living, the court did not impose liability on the private entity for the inadequate design of routes on public property where the private entity had not controlled the design and construction of those routes. Independent Living, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 1148. PICKERN v. PIER 1 IMPORTS (U.S.), INC. 8413