Opinion ID: 2259835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review the record mindful that the evidence adduced need not compel a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It is sufficient if the government produces enough evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Byrd v. United States, D.C.App., 388 A.2d 1225, 1229 (1978); Curley v. United States, 81 U.S. App.D.C. 389, 392, 160 F.2d 229, 232, cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837, 67 S.Ct. 1511, 91 L.Ed. 1850 (1947). On appeal, we must give full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact. Byrd v. United States, supra at 1229; see Banks v. United States, D.C.App., 287 A.2d 85, 87 (1972). [9] While it is true that the government did not negate every possible inference of innocence, this is not required in order to find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Chaconas v. United States, D.C.App., 326 A.2d 792, 798 (1974); Banks v. United States, supra ; In re T. J. W., D.C.App., 294 A.2d 174, 176 (1972). Although entirely circumstantial, the competent evidence introduced in this case was nonetheless ample for the jury to draw the reasonable and permissible inference that appellant was guilty of the crime charged. The following evidence was adduced supporting the government's theory of the case. The imprint on appellant's chest and the markings on his neck, coupled with the fact that the broken shoestring necklace was found inside the apartment, would allow the jury to infer that decedent and appellant had engaged in a struggle after he returned home. It is quite possible that the imprint, which matched the shape of the cross on the necklace, was made as the decedent tried to push appellant away. The jury could also infer that appellant changed his shirt and hid his bloody outer shirt at the bottom of a pile of clothes in his closet. Appellant continued to wear his tee shirt, which was bloodstained, under his new, clean shirt. All of this could have happened, in addition to the removal of the television and radio and disposal of the murder weapon, before appellant reported the death at approximately 9:30 a. m. Even though appellant may have been highly intoxicated, the jury could infer that at least four hours is sufficient time in which to accomplish these tasks. Furthermore, witness Mills' direct testimony that she had heard vehement arguments between decedent and appellant permitted the inference that appellant had a motive for the killing. We also find significant appellant's exculpatory accounts which were frequently changed. Such explanations of conduct, when proven to be false, not only destroy a defendant's credibility but also can be used to infer consciousness of guilt. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 620-21, 16 S.Ct. 895, 898-99, 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896); United States v. Matousek, 483 F.2d 286, 287 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Lacey, 459 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Kilpatrick, 458 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Pistante, 453 F.2d 412 (9th Cir. 1971). As Wigmore cogently observed: [F]abrication . . . is receivable against him as an indication of his consciousness that his case is a weak or unfounded one; and from that consciousness may be inferred the fact itself of the cause's lack of truth and merit. The inference does not apply itself necessarily to any specific fact in the cause, but operates, indefinitely though strongly, against the whole mass of alleged facts constituting his cause. [II Wigmore, Evidence § 278(2) at 120 (3d ed. 1940).] The falsity of the exculpatory statements, which provides the inference of consciousness of guilt, typically is proven by independent direct evidence, not by defendant's subsequent admissions. See, e. g., United States v. Matousek, supra . However, the inference of consciousness of guilt should be no less strong where the exculpatory statement is proven to be false by a subsequent inconsistent statement, or changed story, by the defendant himself. Cf. United States v. Lacey, supra (defendant's first exculpatory statements were contradicted by his own admission to police officer a half hour later, and again later by yet another inconsistent statement to secret service agent). We are satisfied that this evidence was sufficient to permit a guilty verdict. We do not, however, find the evidence so strong as to justify a conclusion that the erroneously admitted hearsay testimony was harmless in its impact on the jury deliberations. Whether, absent this item of evidence, a jury would nonetheless convict appellant is a speculation which we are neither prepared nor willing to undertake. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial. Reversed and remanded.