Opinion ID: 2324489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: least restrictive alternative doctrine

Text: This case affords the Court an opportunity to incorporate the principle of the least restrictive alternative into our body of law governing criminal and civil commitments. We should accept it as a judicial interpretative tool. Under this principle, Carter would be conditionally released as a less restrictive alternative to full commitment, should it be demonstrated at a hearing that he is a fit subject for such release. The classic statement of this principle in the mental health field [6] is that of Judge Bazelon in Lake v. Cameron, 124 U.S. App. D.C. 264, 364 F. 2d 657 (D.C. Cir.1966). There an elderly woman had been found wandering around, unable to care for herself. At a hearing she was found to be suffering from chronic brain syndrome associated with aging. She was adjudged of unsound mind and committed. In an action for habeas corpus relief, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia remanded the case to the District Court for inquiry into other less drastic courses of treatment. The alternative course of treatment, said the court, should be fashioned as the interests of the person and the public require. See also Covington v. Harris, 136 U.S. App. D.C. 35, 419 F. 2d 617 (D.C. Cir.1969); Ashe v. Robinson, 146 U.S. App. D.C. 220, 450 F. 2d 681 (D.C. Cir.1971) (doctrine is applied to someone acquitted on grounds of insanity). The majority opinion here seems almost to speak to this point when it indicates that rehabilitative ends might be better served by conditional release to a more normal environment. Since Lake, at least two courts have held that those seeking involuntary commitment must, as a requirement of due process, inquire into less restrictive alternatives to incarceration. Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 473, 94 S.Ct. 713, 38 L.Ed. 2d 661 (1974); Matter of Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y. 2d 161, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. Ct. of App. 1973). Indeed, such an approach follows naturally from Jackson's due process holding that there must be some reasonable relation between the nature and duration of confinement and the purpose of which the individual is committed. VI