Opinion ID: 887760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the District Court err in denying the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea?

Text: ¶ 14 Section 46-16-105(2), MCA (2001), permits a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, before or after entry of judgment, if good cause is shown. Section 46-16-105(2), MCA (2001). The involuntariness of a plea constitutes good cause under § 46-16-105(2), MCA (2001). State v. Lone Elk, 2005 MT 56, ¶ 19, 326 Mont. 214, ¶ 19, 108 P.3d 500, ¶ 19. ¶ 15 The question presented here is whether Chase's January 2, 2003 plea of guilty was knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entered. See Warclub, ¶¶ 17-18; see also State v. Favi, 2005 MT 288, ¶ 12, 329 Mont. 273, ¶ 12, 124 P.3d 164, ¶ 12. As we stated in State v. Ereth, 1998 MT 197, ¶ 27, 290 Mont. 294, ¶ 27, 964 P.2d 26, ¶ 27, [t]his Court will deem a guilty plea involuntary where it appears that the defendant was laboring under such a strong inducement, fundamental mistake, or serious mental condition that the possibility exists that [h]e may have plead guilty to a crime of which [h]e is innocent. Ereth, ¶ 27 (internal citations omitted); see also State v. Pelke (1964), 143 Mont. 262, 271, 389 P.2d 164, 169. ¶ 16 Convinced that he had been arrested on private property, thereby potentially negating a required element of his DUI charge, Chase disputed Neuhardt's conclusion that he had been on a way of the state open to the public when arrested. Neuhardt believed the arrest scene was a public fishing access, but Chase believed it was not. However, in light of the District Court's apparent agreement with Neuhardt, and the manner in which the issue was explained, Chase pled guilty under a belief that the public way defense was either not valid or could not be further pursued. ¶ 17 There is information in the record which provided a basis for Chase's belief in this defense. There was no dispute that the arrest site was private property, and an affidavit by Pete Lawrenson, Chief of Security and Safety for Montana Rail Link, indicated that, THE PUBLIC IS NOT ALLOWED ON THE PROPERTY (emphasis in original). No Trespassing signs were posted at the site, and area maps noted that the area was private. Law enforcement personnel were well aware that the area was closed to the public. While defense counsel visited the scene, neither railroad and nor law enforcement officials were consulted regarding the status of the property. When asked why railroad officials were never contacted regarding the property, a defense investigator gave the curious response that Chase's daughter had never given them the names and phone numbers of the officials. ¶ 18 We reach no conclusion here regarding whether Chase was on a way of this state open to the public, and likewise decline to take up the State's argument that the District Court's analysis of the issue was proper under State v. Weis (1997), 285 Mont. 41, 945 P.2d 900. As the District Court correctly noted in its order denying Chase's motion to withdraw plea, the public way issue is not the real issue before the Court today, but, rather, the issue is Chase's understanding when he entered the plea. The record information about the investigation, however, serves to demonstrate that there was a legitimate basis for Chase's belief that this defense had not been adequately pursued, giving rise to uncertainty about his guilt. ¶ 19 A significant part of the voluntariness inquiry is an evaluation of the court's plea colloquy with the defendant, the purpose of which is to ensure that the defendant had been well advised of his options and the potential consequences of his plea. Ereth, ¶ 27; see also Brady v. United States (1970), 397 U.S. 742, 755, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1472, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760. While the District Court thoroughly questioned Chase multiple times regarding his counsel's performance and his desire to plea guilty, the Court nevertheless made comments which, under the circumstances, appear to have unintentionally helped to prompt a guilty plea from Chase which was not knowing and intelligent. Specifically, Chase appeared to lack understanding about the distinction between raising the public way issue as a legal defense and raising it as a factual defense. First, with regard to Neuhardt's withdrawal of the motion to dismiss on the public way issue, the court stated: There's no question in my mind that that issue would have failed. There was no grounds for a motion to dismiss based upon the fact that you weren't on a way open to the statepublic way open to the state. I think Mr. Neuhardt made a good decision not to file the brief in support of that motion. Then, after Chase expressed resignation that I can see where it's headed, the court added: Mr. Chase, if you think you have some defenses, of course you can bring them to a jury. I believe your attorney is correct, I don't see any legal defenses that would get you out of this. There is the possibility that the State can't meet it's [sic] burden of proof, and you have the right to test that. While the court may have been correct in stating there were no legal defenses as a matter of law, it is problematic that the court confidently expressed its view on an issue which could also have been tested factually before a jury. Clearly, it was not explained to Chase by the Court that the public way issue he felt strongly about, while not constituting a legal defense to the charge, was yet available as factual defense which he could raise at trial. From our review of the record, it appears that Chase believed the issue was entirely lost, and then pled guilty based upon that incorrect understanding, evident from the uncertain exchanges during the plea colloquy: THE COURT: You were on a private road, apparently at some sort of fishing access by the Yellowstone River? CHASE: They say a fishing access, but Burlington said it's not. Apparently that don't get brought up. .... THE COURT: Do you guys agree it was a fishing access, or not? CHASE: Well, whether I disagree or not apparently ain't the point. ¶ 20 The conclusion that Chase pled guilty under the mistaken impression that he had entirely lost his public way defense is further bolstered by defense counsel's testimony at the hearing. When asked whether he had advised Chase that, even if a motion to dismiss on the public way issue was not pursued, the issue could still be raised at trial, defense counsel responded, I don't remember discussing that with him. Thus, there is no evidence that Chase had been advised or was aware of this important distinction. ¶ 21 As a result, we conclude that Chase did not enter his plea knowingly and intelligently. Rather, it appears he entered the plea on the basis of a fundamental misunderstanding which he held regarding the availability of his public way defense. We therefore reverse the District Court's denial of the motion to withdraw guilty plea. ¶ 22 Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We concur: KARLA M. GRAY, C.J., JAMES C. NELSON, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART and BRIAN MORRIS, JJ.