Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Random Jury Selection

Text: (7) Defendant next challenges the method by which the trial judge selected the initial group of 21 prospective jurors to be voir dired from among the 84 venire persons. Apparently concerned that the traditional method of narrowing the group of venire persons for voir dire  i.e., a random draw of 12 names from a trial jury box  would inconvenience the 84 venire persons since the courtroom could only seat 48 people, the trial judge decided to designate the first 21 venire persons who came through the courtroom door as the first group. Defense counsel objected to this procedure, claiming it violated his right to a randomly selected jury. Specifically, counsel argued that cliques of venire persons might enter the courtroom together, resulting in all or no persons of any such group being included amongst the first 21 people to enter the courtroom. In addition, counsel speculated that a venire person with an aggressive personality might self-select himself by entering first due to his eagerness to serve. Finally, after the first 21 prospective jurors were seated, counsel noted (out of the jury's hearing) that no Blacks were in that group, and that several Black venire persons were seated together in the back of the room. The trial court indicated its belief that the chosen method of selecting prospective jurors was no less random than if the names were to be drawn from the box in the traditional manner, and overruled the defense objection. The prosecutor suggested an alternative procedure which would have addressed the logistical problems of the small courtroom while perhaps better ensuring a random draw. The trial judge admitted the solution is a good one, but I don't think it's necessary, and commenced to implement the first-come, first-served procedure. Later, the prosecutor expressed his misgivings, telling the judge he believed the Penal Code required a random draw of names from the trial jury box. By that time several prospective jurors had been voir dired, and defense counsel had noted his objection to any irregular procedures. After reviewing the Penal Code, the trial judge concluded that the relevant provisions did not direct a specific method of picking jurors, and overruled all the objections. Defendant now argues that the trial court's actions abrogated his right to a randomly selected jury. We conclude, however, that although the jury selection procedure utilized below was unorthodox, reversible error is not shown. Trial juries for criminal actions are formed in the same manner as trial juries in civil actions. (§ 1046.) Once the panel of prospective jurors is drawn in a manner to insure random selection (former Code Civ. Proc., § 246), the panel is sent to the trial court in order to select a jury therefrom. Former Code of Civil Procedure section 600 (which applies here) provided the applicable procedure: the clerk must draw from the trial jury box of the court the ballots containing the names of the jurors, until the jury is completed, or the ballots are exhausted. Of course, a party is constitutionally entitled to a petit jury that is as near an approximation of the ideal cross-section of the community as the process of random draw permits. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 277 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) However, failure to comply with the procedures set forth in former Code of Civil Procedure section 600 does not automatically require reversal. A challenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the forms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury in civil actions.... (Former § 1059, italics added.) Defendant relies on People v. Johnson (1894) 104 Cal. 418 [38 P. 91], in which case the jurors, as here, were not selected by a random draw of names from the the trial jury box. In that case the bailiff selected 12 prospective jurors from among the venire persons present in the courtroom, and those 12 persons ultimately served on the jury without objection from defense counsel. Although this court held that the failure to object waived any claim of error, we noted that [t]his mode of impaneling a jury differs materially from that prescribed in the statutes of the state, and if it had been done against the objection of defendant it would have constituted sufficient reason for reversal. ( Id. at p. 419.) Defendant urges that the instant case contains an error virtually identical to that in Johnson, supra, 104 Cal. 418. We disagree. Since the bailiff in Johnson personally chose the jury from among the venire persons, the draw was not random, but was instead subject to the biases, both conscious and unconscious, of the person making the selections. In contrast, the selection procedure utilized here was not controlled by any one individual. We are unpersuaded that Johnson is controlling on these facts. What must be determined is whether the selection procedure employed here constitutes a material departure from that set forth in former Code of Civil Procedure section 600. We conclude that it does not. While the scenarios postulated by defense counsel in support of his objection to the procedure raise some legitimate concerns, the record reflects that several panels of venire persons were ultimately utilized for selection of the jury in this case. Moreover, to the extent the procedure had the potential to manifest some subtle bias, that potential was de minimis since, after the first 21 venire persons were questioned, selection of jurors from all the remaining venire persons was accomplished by the traditional method. Significantly, unlike the case in Johnson, supra, 104 Cal. 418, selection of the initial group of 21 prospective jurors was not undertaken by a single person, and there is no evidence that persons in that group were aware that the order in which they entered the courtroom would determine whether they would be included in the initial group to be voir dired. Moreover, the record shows defense counsel was able to fully question the venire persons and exercise his peremptory challenges in an informed manner. Although we do not endorse the jury selection procedure employed here, we conclude that, on these facts, there was no material departure from the statutory procedure such as would require sustaining a challenge to the composition of defendant's jury.