Opinion ID: 2015105
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: disclosure of alibi witnesses

Text: On appeal, Woods claimed that the trial court erred in ordering her to disclose the identity of her alibi witnesses. The statute providing a notice-of-alibi requirement in Nebraska is § 29-1927, which states: No evidence offered by a defendant for the purpose of establishing an alibi to an offense shall be admitted in the trial of the case unless notice of intention to rely upon an alibi is given to the county attorney and filed with the court at least thirty days before trial, except that such notice shall be waived by the presiding judge if necessary in the interests of justice. By the plain language of this statute, Woods was required only to give notice of her intent to rely on an alibi defense and was not required, as the trial court ordered, to provide information regarding the witnesses she intended to call to support that alibi. The trial judge, nonetheless, in ordering disclosure of Woods' alibi witnesses, stated that the defendant is obligated to disclose witnesses; that is, to identify witnesses, otherwise the thirty-day notice requirement to the alibi statute doesn't make much sense. The trial court's reasoning, however, does not take into consideration certain basic tenets of statutory interpretation. We first note that when statutory language is plain and unambiguous, no judicial interpretation is needed to ascertain the statute's meaning, so that, in the absence of a statutory indication to the contrary, words in a statute will be given their ordinary meaning. State v. Sorenson, 247 Neb. 567, 529 N.W.2d 42 (1995); State v. Salyers, 239 Neb. 1002, 480 N.W.2d 173 (1992). A statute, rule, or regulation is open for construction only when the language used requires interpretation or may reasonably be considered ambiguous. Kimball v. Nebraska Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 255 Neb. 430, 586 N.W.2d 439 (1998); Vinci v. Nebraska Dept. of Corr. Servs., 253 Neb. 423, 571 N.W.2d 53 (1997). It is not within the province of a court to read a meaning into a statute that is not warranted by the legislative language; neither is it within the province of a court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of a statute. Father Flanagan's Boys Home v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 255 Neb. 303, 583 N.W.2d 774 (1998); State v. Burlison, 255 Neb. 190, 583 N.W.2d 31 (1998). It is clear that the plain and ordinary language of § 29-1927 does not include a requirement that the defendant disclose the identity of alibi witnesses. It is not for the courts to supply missing words or sentences to a statute to make clear that which is indefinite, or to supply that which is not there. State v. Jansen, 241 Neb. 196, 486 N.W.2d 913 (1992); State v. Salyers, supra . Moreover, notice-of-alibi statutes are in derogation of the common-law traditions of criminal procedure. The common law recognized no right of discovery in a criminal case by either the prosecution or the defendant. See Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974). See, also, generally, 2 Wayne R. La-Fave and Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 19.4 (1984); Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 958 (1972 & Supp.1998). In Nebraska, the prosecution has not been granted a right of discovery except as permitted by the court, with limitations clearly defined by statute. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 29-1916 and 29-1917 (Reissue 1995). Additionally, in the absence of a statute, Nebraska has not required defendants to plead defenses in advance. See State v. Clayburn, 223 Neb. 333, 389 N.W.2d 314 (1986) (holding that in absence of statute, defendant was not required to plead self-defense in advance of trial). Since Nebraska's notice-of-alibi statute effects a change in the common law, it must be strictly construed. Statutes which effect a change in the common law or take away a common-law right should be strictly construed, and a construction which restricts or removes a common-law right should not be adopted unless the plain words of the statute compel it. Stoneman v. United Neb. Bank, 254 Neb. 477, 577 N.W.2d 271 (1998); Mandolfo v. Chudy, 253 Neb. 927, 573 N.W.2d 135 (1998). We therefore hold that in the absence of a specific statutory directive, § 29-1927 does not allow a court to order the disclosure of the identity of a defendant's alibi witnesses prior to trial. This holding is consistent with the holdings of other appellate courts faced with similar circumstances. See, e.g., State v. Miller, 289 S.C. 316, 345 S.E.2d 489 (1986); Reynolds v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 12 Cal.3d 834, 117 Cal.Rptr. 437, 528 P.2d 45 (1974); Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.App.3d 493, 88 Cal.Rptr. 154 (1970) (holding that in absence of statute, courts were not empowered to adopt rule providing for discovery of alibi witnesses). Contra, Commonwealth v. Edgerly, 372 Mass. 337, 361 N.E.2d 1289 (1977). It is understandable why the trial court may have questioned the efficacy of § 29-1927 without the requirement that a defendant disclose the identity of alibi witnesses. However, as an appellate court, we are often called upon to apply the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language, and our task is not to pass on the wisdom or efficacy of the statute as written. The Court of Appeals properly noted that § 29-1927 became effective in 1993long after the federal rules of criminal procedure adopted an alibi notice rule, long after numerous other jurisdictions adopted alibi notice rules, and long after Nebraska adopted other notice rules such as the hearsay exception notice rule contained in Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-804(2)(e) (Reissue 1995). See State v. Woods, 6 Neb.App. 829, 577 N.W.2d 564 (1998). Observing that § 29-1927 was not modeled after the language of any of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals wrote: Fed. Rule of Crim. P. 12.1 requires the defendant in a criminal case, upon written demand of the government, to file a written notice of intention to offer an alibi defense. Rule 12.1 further requires that [s]uch notice by the defendant shall state the specific place or places at which the defendant claims to have been at the time of the alleged offense and the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the defendant intends to rely to establish such alibi. Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals noted in a 1983 decision that, at that time, [a] requirement for notice of an alibi defense, with identification of proposed alibi ... witnesses, now exists under statute or rule of court in 35 of our sister states and in the District of Columbia. Taliaferro v. State, 295 Md. 376, 387, 456 A.2d 29, 35 (1983). The Nebraska alibi notice statute, § 29-1927, as noted above, was adopted in 1993. The Nebraska statute, however, does not contain an explicit requirement similar to that in the federal system or the other jurisdictions referenced above which would require a defendant, in addition to providing notice of intention to rely upon an alibi, to also provide the names and addresses of the witnesses upon which the defendant intends to rely in establishing the alibi defense. In addition to the fact that this Nebraska statute was adopted after the federal and other state statutes, such that the Legislature could have modeled the Nebraska statute after those statutes, we note that the Nebraska Legislature did require notice of the names and addresses of witnesses when it enacted § 27-804(2)(e). The Legislature stated that a proponent who desires to use the catch-all hearsay exception must make known to the adverse party his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. As such, it is apparent that the Legislature was fully aware of how to require such disclosure if it had desired to also require it in § 29-1927. State v. Woods, 6 Neb.App. at 834-35, 577 N.W.2d at 568. We agree. Section 29-1927 requires only that the defendant disclose his or her intention to rely on an alibi defense. We specifically decline to infringe on the Legislature's province by adding disclosures not required by the language of the statute, especially when other constitutional and statutory construction issues may be implicated. Therefore, we conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the trial court erred in ordering Woods to disclose the identity of her alibi witnesses, based on the plain and unambiguous language of § 29-1927.