Opinion ID: 429483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions on Limited Warranty.

Text: 16 PNOC claims that the trial court made several prejudicial errors in its instructions regarding Garrett's limited warranty on the JetStar. Some of the alleged errors concern the so-called second step portion of the warranty, which provided that 17 (b) if [Garrett] is unable to repair or replace defective or nonconforming Articles or parts within a reasonable time after receipt thereof, Buyer [i.e., PNOC] shall be credited for their value at the original purchase price. 18 The trial judge's instructions to the jury on the second step portion of the warranty were 1 19 ... The second step was that in the event that the first step could not be carried out, the Philippine National Oil Company would be paid the value of the defective article or part at its original price, and Garrett would get to keep the article or part.I now instruct you that the second step of the limited remedy involving a refund of the original purchase price is inapplicable to the present case because the second step procedures were never invoked by either party. Therefore, the jury should focus on the first step of the limited remedy, the repair and replacement clause. 20 PNOC contends that both these instructions were erroneous. First, it claims that there was no basis for the court's statement in instruction 33 that Garrett would get to keep the article or part, although it does not clearly state how this language in the instruction, even if erroneous, prejudiced PNOC. Whether erroneous or not, PNOC waived any objection to this instruction, because it failed to object at trial to instruction 33. Jury instructions that are not objected to may not be assigned as error on appeal. Fed.R.Civ.P. 51; Rudick v. Prineville Memorial Hospital, 319 F.2d 764 (9th Cir.1963). 21 PNOC's next objection is to instruction 34, in which the court said that the second step procedure was inapplicable to this case because neither party invoked it. PNOC contends that the second step is not something to be invoked by PNOC; rather, it claims that the second step was to go into effect automatically if Garrett did not repair or replace a defective part within a reasonable time. PNOC argues that Garrett failed to repair or replace the defective engine within a reasonable time, and that PNOC thus is entitled, under the second step provision, to a refund of the purchase price of the engine. Garrett responds that PNOC's position at trial was that the second step provision had no place in this case at all. 22 At trial, PNOC stated in its objections to Garrett's proposed jury instructions that the second step provision has no role in this case. At any rate, PNOC again failed to object properly to the instruction if it was not correct. PNOC's objection to instruction 34 did not claim that the second step procedure was in fact applicable; rather, it said only that the second step procedure was not applicable because Garrett, and not PNOC, failed to invoke it. Since PNOC did not object at trial that the second step procedure was applicable, it cannot raise the point on appeal. 23 PNOC's final contention regarding the trial court's warranty instructions concerns the instruction on failure of essential purpose. The California Commercial Code provides that if a limited warranty fails of its essential purpose, the buyer is entitled to the full range of UCC remedies. Cal.Com.Code Sec. 2719(2). 24 PNOC objects to the trial court's instruction regarding failure of essential purpose. The trial court, in instruction 36, instructed the jury that the warranty failed of its essential purpose if Philippine National Oil Company did not receive a fair quantum of remedy for any breach of warranty. PNOC argues that this instruction was too general, and that it was entitled to a more specific instruction tailored to the facts of the case since PNOC presented substantial evidence showing that Garrett had failed to repair or replace the engine within a reasonable time. PNOC contends that it was entitled to the following instruction, which it requested at trial: 25 You may find that GARRETT's repair and replacement remedy failed of its essential purpose if you determine that after repeated attempts, GARRETT was not able to repair the JetStar's defects even if GARRETT's repeated repair attempts were diligent and made in good faith. 26 Again, PNOC does not present a winning argument. PNOC did object to instruction 36, but it objected only to the use of the word quantum. Its objection read: This instruction is confusing; the word 'amount' should be substituted for the word 'quantum' on the last line of this instruction. PNOC did not object that the instruction was too general or that it was entitled to an instruction tailored to the facts of this case. 27 Moreover, the instruction that PNOC requested does not accurately state the law. The requested instruction speaks only of failure to repair after repeated repair attempts. However, the law is that a repair or replace remedy fails of its essential purpose only if repeated repair attempts are unsuccessful within a reasonable time. Even the cases that PNOC cited at trial in support of its requested instruction state that there must be a failure to replace or repair within a reasonable time. PNOC's requested instruction makes no mention of failure within a reasonable time. One recent Ninth Circuit case does state that a limited repair remedy fails of its essential purpose if warranted goods fail to perform ... despite the seller's efforts to repair.... Consol. Data Term. v. Applied Digital Data Systems, 708 F.2d at 392, without specifying that the failure to repair must be after a reasonable time has passed. But since this case does not speak to the reasonable time issue at all, we decline to read it as abolishing the reasonable time requirement. 28 Finally, in this case the evidence was that Garrett did repair the faulty engine. Therefore PNOC must argue that although the engine was repaired, this repair failed of its essential remedial purpose because it did not come within a reasonable time. PNOC's requested instruction did not do this. 29 The judgments are affirmed.