Opinion ID: 728907
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Job Status Discrimination Claims

Text: 44 The analytical framework applicable to employment discrimination claims where there is no direct evidence of discrimination is well established. First, the employee must prove a prima facie case by demonstrating that he or she belongs to a protected class and was denied a position or benefits for which the employee was qualified. The burden then shifts to the employer to present a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action. If that is done, the employee is afforded an opportunity to prove that the proffered reason is pretextual. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Smith v. Stratus Computer, Inc., 40 F.3d 11, 15-16 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1958, 131 L.Ed.2d 850 (1995); Blare v. Husky Injection Molding Systems Boston, Inc., 419 Mass. 437, 646 N.E.2d 111, 114-17 (1995). 45 It is at this point that Massachusetts law and federal law diverge. Since Massachusetts is a pretext only jurisdiction, proof of pretext is sufficient to warrant a finding of discrimination under Chapter 151B. Blare, 646 N.E.2d at 117. In contrast, Title VII requires that, in addition to proving pretext, the employee also must prove that the employer was motivated by a discriminatory purpose. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993); Smith, 40 F.3d at 16 (employee has ultimate burden of proving (1) that the employer's articulated reason for the job action is a pretext, and (2) that the true reason is discriminatory); Woods v. Friction Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255, 260 (1st Cir.1994) (employee must prove both that the employer's articulated reason is false, and that discrimination was the actual reason for its employment action.). When the prima facie case is very strong and disbelief of the proffered reason provides cause to believe that the employer was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, proof of pretext may be sufficient. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749; Smith, 40 F.3d at 16; Woods, 30 F.3d at 261 n. 3; see also Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1218, 111 S.Ct. 2828, 115 L.Ed.2d 997 (1991). 46 Polaroid argues that it is entitled to judgment with respect to both the Chapter 151B and Title VII discrimination claims because Lattimore's evidence was insufficient to establish either a prima facie case or that Polaroid's proffered reason was pretextual. Polaroid also argues that the Title VII claim fails for the additional reason that there was no evidence of any discriminatory intent on the part of Polaroid.
47 Ordinarily, when a claim of discriminatory firing is made, the qualified prong of the employee's prima facie case consists of proof that the employee was adequately performing the job in question. However, this case is somewhat atypical because Lattimore does not claim that he was fired despite being able to work. Instead, Lattimore claims that he was denied STD status even though he was physically unable to work and that the loss of STD status resulted in his termination. Consequently, the issue is whether Lattimore's evidence was sufficient to make a prima facie showing that he was qualified for STD status. 48 Under Polaroid's STD policy, an employee must be totally disabled from performing his or her job or any other work offered by the company in order to qualify for STD status. As already noted, an employee may establish eligibility by submitting periodic reports from a physician stating that the employee is disabled. If the Medical Review Board disagrees with the physician's opinion, it may require an IME to resolve the dispute. 49 Polaroid argues that the record is devoid of any evidence that Lattimore was totally disabled. That argument is based principally on testimony by Dr. Hillier conceding that, notwithstanding his previous reports to Polaroid stating that Lattimore was totally disabled, Lattimore was able to perform limited forms of light duty work at the time his STD status was discontinued. 50 However, contrary to Polaroid's contention, that testimony does not negate Dr. Hillier's previously expressed opinion that, in August of 1989, Lattimore was disabled. Nor does it preclude a finding that Lattimore was totally disabled within the meaning of Polaroid's STD policy. 51 It is clear that, both in August of 1989 and at the time of trial, Dr. Hillier considered Lattimore totally disabled from performing his usual job and felt it inadvisable for Lattimore to work at all. The fact that Dr. Hillier also viewed Lattimore as capable of performing some light duty tasks does not undercut that opinion. Furthermore, Dr. Hillier's assessment is perfectly compatible with Polaroid's own definition of total disability because on August 23, when Lattimore was directed to return to work, he was told that, after two weeks of unspecified light duty, he would be expected to work without restriction of any kind. Thus, Lattimore was not offered work that Dr. Hillier considered him able to perform. 52 Moreover, in addition to Dr. Hillier's testimony and reports, there was testimony from Lattimore himself that he was physically unable to do any work because of his back injury. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to establish the total disability element of Lattimore's prima facie case. Any conflict between that evidence and conflicting medical evidence presented by Polaroid, in rebuttal, was a matter for the jury to resolve.
53 Lattimore's effort to prove pretext consisted principally of evidence that, in discontinuing his STD status and later terminating his employment, Polaroid deviated from its established policies and practices. Polaroid argues that any such irregularities were insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove pretext. 54 Most of the deviations cited by Lattimore amount to little more than quibbling over semantics (e.g., whether there was a disagreement between Polaroid and Dr. Hillier that justified Polaroid's request for an IME). However, there was evidence from which a jury reasonably could have found that the decision to discontinue Lattimore's STD status was made before the Medical Review Board had obtained the results of Dr. Ramos' IME. As already noted, Dr. Ramos' report was not issued until approximately one week after the Board's decision and Williams' testimony that he learned of the results via a telephone conversation with Dr. Ramos, was contradicted by Dr. Ramos. In addition, Vincent Pina, a Polaroid director, testified that, under Polaroid's STD policy, it was unimaginable that an employee who had provided physicians' reports indicating disability would be removed from STD status before the Board reviewed the IME results. 55 There, also, was evidence suggesting that the results of the IME may have been preordained. If a jury determined that Williams never talked with Dr. Ramos about his findings, it could infer that, in alluding to those findings in his August 23 letter, Williams must have known, in advance of the IME, what those findings were going to be. Lattimore's testimony that the examination was a perfunctory one, although disputed by Dr. Ramos, and the evidence that Dr. Ramos did not perform any diagnostic examinations or review Lattimore's medical records could provide additional support for such an inference. 56 In short, although the evidence of pretext is thin, disputed and susceptible to varying interpretations, it is sufficient to create a jury question. Accordingly, since Massachusetts law provides that an employee may prevail upon proof of pretext, alone, the District Court did not err in denying Polaroid's motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the Chapter 151B claim.
57 As already noted, Title VII requires proof of something more than pretext. It also requires proof of discriminatory intent. Polaroid argues that there is no evidence that its decisions to discontinue Lattimore's STD status and, later, terminate his employment, were motivated by any discriminatory intent. We agree. 58 Lattimore's claim of discriminatory intent is based entirely upon allegations that Mitchell was involved in the decisions and upon the fact that Polaroid's human resources administrator was called to the scene when Lattimore returned to the plant on August 24 and the discussion between him and Williams apparently became heated. 59 As already noted, Polaroid presented evidence that the decisions at issue were made by the Board and by Montes. In support of his assertion that Mitchell participated in those decisions, Lattimore cites evidence that, until shortly before Lattimore's termination, Mitchell retained custody of Lattimore's time cards and received copies of all medical reports regarding Lattimore's physical condition. However, that evidence does not tend to prove anything other than that Mitchell may have continued to be Lattimore's supervisor during that period. That fact, alone, has little significance inasmuch as Lattimore was out of work and not being supervised. By itself, it is insufficient to support a reasonable inference that Mitchell participated, in any way, in the decision to remove Lattimore from STD status or to fire him. Nor does it provide any basis for concluding that any alleged racial prejudice on Mitchell's part infected those decisions. 60 Similarly, the fact that Florence Ramos-Jones, Polaroid's human resources administrator, was asked to participate in the discussion with Lattimore on August 24 does not establish any reasonable ground for finding that Polaroid's decision was motivated by racial animus. Lattimore argues that, because Ms. Ramos-Jones dealt with racial issues, her participation is evidence that Polaroid viewed Lattimore's termination as a racial matter. However, there was no evidence regarding why Ms. Ramos-Jones became involved in that discussion. If, for example, she became involved because Lattimore, himself, raised the question of racial bias, her participation would not provide any basis for inferring that Polaroid's decision was discriminatory. 61 In the absence of any evidence regarding Mitchell's involvement in the termination decisions or the circumstances and nature of Ms. Ramos-Jones' participation in the August 24 discussion, there is no justification for the inferential leap urged by Lattimore. Submitting the issue of discriminatory intent to a jury on this record would amount to nothing more than an invitation to speculate. Therefore, Polaroid is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Title VII status discrimination claim.