Opinion ID: 589408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Enhancement for More Than Minimal Planning

Text: 19 Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2), the district court imposed a two-level increase for Meek's having committed the instant offense with more than minimal planning. The government argues vigorously that Meek waived his right to appeal this issue in his plea agreement. Paragraph 6 of that agreement states: 20 Defendant hereby waives any right to raise and/or appeal and/or file any post-conviction writs of habeas corpus or coram nobis concerning any matter pertaining to the prosecution including all motions, defenses, probable cause determinations, and objections and to the court's entry of judgment against defendant and imposition of sentence under Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 (sentence appeals). The defendant retains the right to appeal his sentence if the Court imposes a two-level increase for obstruction of justice pursuant to Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines. 21 Plea Agreement at 4. During the plea colloquy, Meek indicated to the district judge his understanding of the waiver provision: 22 THE COURT: Are you waiving your rights in this plea agreement to appeal any sentence that the Court would impose? 23 MEEK: There is a stipulation, I believe. 24 THE COURT: What is--what is your understanding of the stipulation? 25 MEEK: My understanding is that I give up all rights to appeal, unless the Court in its sentence, finds it appropriate to administer an extra two level increase for obstruction of justice. 26 RT 34 (Feb. 21, 1992). 27 An express waiver of statutory appeal rights in a negotiated plea agreement is valid if knowingly and voluntarily made. United States v. Navarro-Botello, 912 F.2d 318, 321 (9th Cir.1990). We review the voluntariness of such waivers de novo. Id. at 320. 28 As Meek points out, however, the plain terms of the plea agreement reserved to Meek the right to appeal my sentence if the district court imposed a two-level increase for obstruction of justice, and those terms do not limit Meek's right of appeal to issues related to the obstruction adjustment. 29 We apply principles of contract law in interpreting plea agreements, and the terms of an agreement are determined by objective standards. United States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir.1979). Under this approach, the government is held to the literal terms of its bargain. United States v. Kamer, 781 F.2d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819 (1986); United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986); United States v. Travis, 735 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir.1984). Because Meek's plea agreement does not clearly restrict Meek's appeal rights to the correctness of the district court's obstruction of justice adjustment, we conclude that Meek has not waived his right to appeal the more than minimal planning adjustment. 2 We therefore proceed to the merits of Meek's challenge. 30
31 The term more than minimal planning is defined in relevant part as follows: 32 More than minimal planning means more planning than is typical for commission of the offense in a simple form. More than minimal planning also exists if significant affirmative steps were taken to conceal the offense.... 33 U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 application note 1(f). The district judge offered the following justification for the two-level increase: 34 It certainly took minimal planning to figure out how to cut the corners off and piece them together. My recollection is also in looking at the presentence reports that he had glue in his pocket. 35 RT at 15 (Feb. 27, 1992). 36 Meek argues that the district court erred because Meek did not do any more planning than is typical for commission of an 18 U.S.C. § 484 violation in simple form. Meek's argument has a certain intuitive appeal. Gluing together pieces of currency would seem to be the bare essence of the instant offense, and it is hard to imagine a simpler modus operandi. 37 We nevertheless conclude that the district court's determination was not clearly erroneous. At the time of his arrest, Meek possessed the raw materials necessary to produce 23 altered bills. The Sentencing Guidelines commentary states that more than minimal planning is deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time, unless it is clear that each instance was purely opportune. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 application note 1(f). Where there is evidence that a defendant has made preparations for repeated commissions of an offense, an enhancement for more than minimal planning is justified. See United States v. Martinez-Gonzalez, No. 90-50561, slip op. 5165, 5171 (9th Cir. May 5, 1992) (as amended); see also United States v. Ojo, 916 F.2d 388, 392 (7th Cir.1990) (holding that forethought and planning required in obtaining multiple false identification cards over six-month period justified sentence enhancement for more than minimal planning for defendant charged with using false Social Security to open bank account); United States v. Sanchez, 914 F.2d 206, 207 (10th Cir.1990) (affirming § 2F1.1(b)(2) adjustment where defendant used stolen credit card 15 times). 38 Meek's sentence is AFFIRMED.