Opinion ID: 2621328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reformulating Nevada's approach

Text: Forman 's conclusion that the initiative's use in zoning is unconstitutional, because property owners have a Fourteenth Amendment due process right to notice and a hearing in matters affecting property rights and the initiative process does not afford affected persons notice and a hearing, is fundamentally flawedas the California Supreme Court observed in San Diego Building Contractors Ass'n. [61] On this point, the California court quoted Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who wrote the following for a unanimous United States Supreme Court in Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado : [62] Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few people, it is impracticable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not require all public acts to be done in town meeting or an assembly of the whole. General statutes within the state power are passed that affect the person or property of individuals, sometimes to the point of ruin, without giving them a chance to be heard. Their rights are protected in the only way that they can be in a complex society, by their power, immediate or remote, over those who make the rule. Citing several notable United States Supreme Court cases regarding due process, the California court pointed out that they clearly establish that the due process requirements of notice and hearing apply only to governmental actions of an adjudicatory nature. [63] Forman 's conclusion that voters cannot bypass statutory notice and hearing requirements and enact zoning measures through the constitutional initiative process is also fundamentally flawed. Nevada's Constitution reserves to the people the power to propose, by initiative petition, statutes and amendments to statutes and the constitution, and to enact or reject them at the polls, and further reserves the initiative and referendum powers to the registered voters of each county and municipality as to all local, special and municipal legislation of every kind in and for the county or municipality. [64] By its plain terms, this reservation of power is limited to legislation, but it necessarily includes zoning legislation. Hurst, Dewey and Forman reason essentially as follows: the local initiative and referendum power can be no greater than the local legislative body's power; state zoning laws limit the local legislative body's power procedurally; since the local legislative body cannot pass zoning laws without complying with statutory procedural restrictions, the people's power is similarly limited; the initiative process is hopelessly inconsistent with statutory zoning requirements because no public hearing is held before the planning commission or the local legislative body; and because the initiative procedure does not encompass these steps, it cannot be used to enact zoning legislation. [65] This reasoning does not give the constitutional provisions the authority they deserve. As the California Supreme Court recognized when it reconsidered Hurst 's holding, although the state legislature can specify the manner in which local legislative bodies enact zoning ordinances, legislation that permits council action but effectively bars initiative action would likely be unconstitutional. [66] In other words, if a county board of commissioners or city council can enact zoning legislation, the county and city voters can do the same by initiative. This interpretation truly gives the voters the same legislative authority as the local governing body. It also recognizes that the initiative process offers protections generally equivalent to statutory notice and hearing requirements. The filing and circulation of an initiative petition, and the adversary nature of a political campaign, provide ample opportunity for all viewpoints to be heard. [67] Other states that prohibit zoning by initiative or referenda generally do so on the basis of Hurst or Dewey or both, [68] or by construing a specific statutory grant of zoning authority as taking precedence over a general statutory, not constitutional, grant of initiative and referenda power. [69] We decline to follow this line of authority. Although we conclude that due process is not a concern and the electorate is not bound by the statutory requirements that the local legislative bodies must follow, Nevada's initiative and referendum powers are still limited by the Constitution to legislation. Forman 's general discussion of the distinction between legislative matters and administrative matters is sound, though limited in scope. But to the extent that Forman can be read to suggest that once a county or city adopts a zoning policy under a statutory grant of authority, all changes are administrative, its reasoning is flawed. Virtually all local government actions are taken pursuant to statutory authority, either directly or indirectly, so characterizing local zoning action as administrative based solely on this factor renders the legislative-administrative distinction practically meaningless. [70] Zoning is not an end in itself, but rather a means of achieving various community objectives, and as a community's goals and beliefs change, so too must its land use policies. Zoning measures should be subjected to the same tests as other measures. Consequently, based on the foregoing analysis, we overrule Forman to the extent that it holds that: (1) the initiative power does not extend to the zoning processes of counties and cities, or other matters legislatively delegated to local governments; (2) due process requirements of notice and hearing apply to general zoning legislation by initiative; and (3) all changes to established zoning policies are administrative in nature. We reaffirm Forman 's holding that the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people are very broad, but are limited to legislation. In addition, we reaffirm Forman 's test for distinguishing between legislative and administrative measures, and we reaffirm our recent clarifications of the Forman test in Glover v. Concerned Citizens for Fuji Park [71] and Citizens for Train Trench Vote v. Reno . [72] Applying Forman 's test here, we consider whether the sustainable growth initiative measure changes the course of policy for the guidance of Douglas County's citizens or their officers and agents, and is therefore legislative, or whether it simply executes established policies, and is therefore administrative. [73] We conclude that the sustainable growth measure is legislation. The Douglas County Master Plan anticipated a future limitation on growth, but it did not establish one. The initiative's proponents evidently decided that the time was ripe, and chose to change the Master Plan by establishing a general building cap on residential units to regulate growth. This change is policy-driven, and is legislative in character. Executing this new policy will be an administrative matter. Having decided that the sustainable growth initiative meets the threshold constitutional requirement that it propose legislation, we decline to address the County's and Nevada Northwest's other arguments regarding the measure's substantive validity in this proceeding. We reiterate that, although an initiative or referendum is subject to pre-election challenge to its threshold validity, [74] when a proposed initiative or referendum meets all threshold procedural requirements, pre-election review of substantive challenges is not generally permitted. [75] The County and Nevada Northwest are not left without a judicial remedy, however, since the substantive validity of all legislation may be challenged after it is enacted.