Opinion ID: 226301
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Two Counts

Text: 12 1. Defendant admits that he violated 8 U.S.C.A. § 746(a)(1) when, on May 26, 1945, and June 2, 1945, in a preliminary hearing upon his petition for naturalization he falsely stated under oath that he had not been a member of the Communist Party. His sole defense to these counts is that the indictment was barred by the statute of limitations. 13 2. Before the Act of June 25, 1948, 29 revising the Criminal Code (Title 18), the period of limitations for the prosecution of many crimes had been three years. But former 8 U.S.C.A. § 746(g) had fixed a five-year period as to conduct made a felony in the Nationality Code. 30 The 1948 Act expressly repealed this section, substituting § 3282 of revised Title 18. That new section reads: Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, no person shall be prosecuted, tried, or punished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found or the information is instituted within three years next after such offense shall have been committed. The Reviser's Note to this section, says that the 5-year period of limitation for violations of the Nationality Code, provided for in said section 746(g) of title 8, U.S.C.    is reduced to 3 years. There seemed no sound basis for considering 3 years adequate in the case of heinous felonies and gross frauds against the United States but inadequate for misuse of a passport or false statement to a naturalization examiner. The Act of June 25, 1948, became effective September 1, 1948. 31 Section 21 of that Act expressly repealed many sections of several statutes, including 8 U.S.C.A. § 746(g). Such a repeal, without more, would have been a legislative pardon or amnesty as to all past offenses under § 746(a) (1). 32 However, the repeal section, Section 21 of the 1948 Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-370, p. 275, contained a saving clause preserving any right or liabilities now existing under the repealed sections. Were we facing here merely a question of the government's right to punish or a defendant's liability to punishment, under a repealed substantive section imposing criminal liability for an offense, the answer obviously would be that this saving clause preserved the right and liability even after September 1, 1948, provided they were not then barred by the statute of limitations. But here the pertinent substantive section, 8 U.S.C.A. § 746(a) (1), under which defendant was indicted, was not repealed. It was retained, with unimportant changes in phraseology, as § 1015(a) of revised Title 18. 14 However, as previously noted, § 746(g) — the statute of limitations pertaining to offenses under § 746(a) (1) — was repealed; it is designated in the schedule attached to the repeal section — Section 21 — of the 1948 Act. The question here, then, is whether the words, right or liabilities now existing, in the saving clause of that repeal section, included periods of limitation and so served to keep alive the former five-year limitation period with respect to offenses committed within five years of the effective date of the new Act, i. e., September 1, 1948. 15 The government says it does. The defendant says that, despite the repeal, the five-year period continued to govern from June 25, 1948, when the Act was enacted, until September 1, 1948, when the Act took effect, so that, in that interval, he could have been validly indicted for the crimes he admittedly committed on May 26, 1945, and June 2, 1945, and for which he was indicted in the first two counts. But, says defendant, on and after September 1, 1948, the three-year period governed, and therefore prosecution for those crimes was barred when the indictment was filed on September 28, 1948, i. e., more than three years after the commission of those crimes. For defendant contends that the words, rights or liabilities now existing, found in § 21 of the 1948 Act, relate only to substantive rights and liabilities, and therefore did not save from the three-year bar of new 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282 any prosecutions not commenced before September 1, 1948. 16 3. In considering this contention, we must take into account three statutory provisions which were in effect on September 28, 1948, when the indictment was filed: (a) New 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282; (b) § 21 of the 1948 Act; (c) 1 U.S.C.A. § 109. To understand these provisions, we must go into their history. 17 The Revised Statutes of 1874 contained the following sections: 18 Sec. 5598. All offenses committed, and all penalties or forfeitures incurred under any statute embraced in said revision prior to said repeal, may be prosecuted and punished in the same manner and with the same effect, as if said repeal had not been made. 19 Sec. 5599. All acts of limitation, whether applicable to civil causes and proceedings, or to the prosecution of offenses, or for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures, embraced in said revision and covered by said repeal, shall not be affected thereby, but all suits, proceedings or prosecutions, whether civil or criminal, for causes arising, or acts done or committed prior to said repeal, may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time as if said repeal had not been made. 20 Sec. 13. The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the repealing act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability. 33 21 The significant point, for our purposes, is that Congress considered a separate section — § 5599 — essential to preserve statutes of limitation: It did not consider them saved (1) by the general saving clause, § 13, which included the words any liability; or (2) as to criminal offenses, by the specific saving clause, § 5598. 22 In 1909, in enacting the Criminal Code, 34 Congress — without repealing R.S. sections 13, 5598 and 5599 — included the following two sections which, in slightly altered form, corresponded in wording to sections 5598 and 5599, and which recognized the same distinction between criminal offenses and statutes of limitation. 23 § 533. All offenses committed, and all penalties, forfeitures, or liabilities incurred prior to January 1, 1910, under any law embraced in, or changed, modified, or repealed by sections 1 to 553, 567, 568, and 571 to 573 of this title, may be prosecuted and punished in the same manner and with the same effect as if the said sections had not been passed. 24 § 534. All acts of limitation, whether applicable to civil causes and proceedings, or for the recovery of penalties or forfeitures, embraced in, modified, changed, or repealed by sections 1 to 553, 567, 568, and 571 to 573 of this title, shall not be affected thereby; and all suits or proceedings for causes arising or acts done or committed prior to January 1, 1910, may be commenced and prosecuted within the same time and with the same effect as if said repeal had not been made. 35 25 4. By the Act of March 3, 1933, 36 Congress repealed, as obsolete, many sections of the Revised Statutes, including R.S. § 5598. But R.S. § 5599, which, at first both Houses had proposed to repeal, was retained, on the suggestion of the Secretary of War and the Attorney General. 37 The Secretary said that, because of Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 6 S.Ct. 209, 29 L.Ed. 483, repeal of that section might, and probably would, revive certain claims arising in the Civil War and since, now barred by limitation. Significantly he added, It is thought that the language of the concluding proviso of § 3 of H.R. 9877 38 would not avoid this result, since that proviso refers only to `rights' and `liabilities' and not to remedies, recourse to which may be barred by limitations. 39 Section 3, to which he referred, became Section 3 of the 1933 Act. It read: No inference shall be raised by the enactment of this Act that the sections of the Revised Statutes repealed by this Act were in force or effect at the time of such enactment: Provided, however, That any rights or liabilities existing under such repealed sections shall not be affected by their repeal. 40 The Attorney General concurred in the recommendation that R.S. § 5599 be retained. 41 It should be noted that Section 3 of the 1933 Act, regarded as not affecting limitations statutes, is almost identical with § 21 of the 1948 Act. 26 5. In 1947, 42 both R.S. § 13 and § 5599 were incorporated in the U.S.C.A., as 1 U.S.C.A. §§ 109 and 110. Since § 110 — which covers only repeals embraced in the Revised Statutes of 1874 — cannot conceivably apply to the repeal in 1948 of 8 U.S.C.A. § 746(g), we turn to § 109, formerly R.S. § 13. 43 27 As we have already pointed out, because this section was made part of the Revised Statutes of 1874 together with § 5599, we think Congress did not regard § 13, now 1 U.S.C.A. § 109, as covering the subject of statutes of limitation. Moreover (in line with the views expressed by the Secretary of War above quoted), the Supreme Court, in three cases interpreting former § 13, has held that it saves existing substantive rights and liabilities from repeal but does not preserve remedies or procedure prescribed in the repealed statute. 28 In Great Northern Railway Co. v. United States, 208 U.S. 452, 28 S.Ct. 313, 317, 52 L.Ed. 567, this question arose: The Elkins Act of 1903 had been amended in June 1906 by the Hepburn Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 41 et seq., which changed the procedure before the Interstate Commerce Commission and modified the means of enforcing the Commission's orders in the courts. Section 10 of the Hepburn Act provided: That all laws and parts of laws in conflict with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, but the amendments herein provided for shall not affect causes now pending in courts of the United States, but such causes shall be prosecuted to a conclusion in the manner heretofore provided by law. The defendants were indicted in November 1906, after enactment of the Hepburn Act but for violations of the Elkins Act which had occurred in 1905. The defendants contended that the indictment was barred by the Hepburn Act because the indictment was not pending when that Act became a law. They argued that new § 10 was inconsistent with R.S. § 13 which was therefore wholly inapplicable, so that the only rights and liabilities saved were those described in new § 10, i. e., those with respect to which suits were pending when the new statute became effective. The Court rejected this argument. It said that R.S. § 13 and new § 10 dealt with different subjects: (1) R.S. § 13 preserved only the liabilities incurred for past offenses under the repealed statute, and did not preserve the old remedies. (2) New § 10 preserved the old remedies, but only as to cases pending in the courts; as to other cases — including prosecutions (for past offenses) saved by R.S. § 13 — the remedies under the new statute would apply. 44 29 In Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 218, 30 S.Ct. 621, 625, 54 L.Ed. 1001, the Court said: The repealing act here involved includes a saving clause, and if it necessarily, or by clear implication, conflicts with the general rule declared in § 13, the latest expression of the legislative will must prevail. In the case of Great Northern Railway Company v. United States    the question was whether the saving clause in the Hepburn act was so plainly in conflict with the rule of construction found in § 13 as to limit the actions or liabilities saved to those enumerated therein; but the court held that, as the later clause applied to remedies and procedure, it was not, by implication, in conflict with the general provision of § 13, which saved penalties, forfeitures, and liabilities. 45 30 In Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 36 S.Ct. 202, 203, 60 L.Ed. 409, a suit had been begun to establish title to an allotment made to an Indian. The determination of such questions had at one time been left exclusively to the Secretary of Interior, but subsequently this power was taken from the Secretary and transferred to the federal courts. Thereafter, and while the suit was pending, the exclusive power to pass on such issues was again given to the Secretary. The statute made no exception for pending litigation. It was urged that, under R.S. § 13, the statute should be construed so as to save the pending suit. The Supreme Court, answering this contention said: It made his [the Secretary's] jurisdiction exclusive in terms, it made no exception for pending litigation, but purported to be universal, and so to take away the jurisdiction that for a time had been conferred upon the courts of the United States. The appellant contends for a different construction on the strength of Rev.Stats. § 13,    that the repeal of any statute shall not extinguish any liability incurred under it (Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 216, 30 S.Ct. 621, 54 L.Ed. 1001, 1006), and refers to the decisions upon the statutes concerning suits upon certain bonds given to the United States (U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 306, 28 S.Ct. 537, 52 L.Ed. 804). But, apart from a question that we have passed, whether the plaintiff even attempted to rely upon the statutes giving jurisdiction to the courts in allotment cases, the reference of the matter to the Secretary, unlike the changes with regard to suits upon bonds, takes away no substantive right, but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case. 46 31 Since 1 U.S.C.A. § 109, formerly R.S. § 13, saves merely substantive rights and liabilities, we think it does not save limitation statutes as to past offenses. For usually, a statute of limitations is considered no part of a right or liability, but as affecting the remedy only. 47 On that basis, it has been held that, until the expiration of the period named in such a statute, the period may validly be lengthened or shortened by a later statute, 48 and that, where no criminal liability is involved, 49 the legislature may revive a right barred by a former statute of limitations. 50 In other words — except in the unusual instances where the statute creating a substantive right makes the period of limitation a part or qualification of the right itself 51 — a limitation statute establishes no vested substantive right or unalterable substantive liability. 52 We know, of course, that the words substance, procedure, and remedies have no fixed, invariant, meanings, and that what they signify depends upon the particular context. 53 We think, however, that, for the reasons we have canvassed, the context of 1 U.S.C.A. § 109 and § 21 of the 1948 Act shows that they were not intended to include, in rights or liabilities, statutes of limitation. 54 32 6. Language necessary to save both substantive rights and liabilities and their remedies, including statutes of limitation, has often been used where that was the Congressional purpose. Thus in the 1906 Nationality Act Congress said: For the purpose of the prosecution of all crimes and offenses against the naturalization laws of the United States which may have been committed prior to the date when this Act shall go into effect, the existing naturalization laws shall remain in full force and effect. 55 Substantially the same language appears in the 1926 and 1940 Naturalization Acts. 56 Had Congress had a similar intention here, it would have been so easy to have said so. 57 33 7. We note, without adopting or rejecting, this additional suggested ground for the conclusion that the three-year statute governs: The Reviser's Note to § 3282 of new 18 U.S.C.A. states: Section 582 of title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., and section 746(g) of title 8, U.S.C., 1940 ed.,    were consolidated.    The proviso contained in the act of 1927 [i. e., 18 U.S.C. § 582] `That nothing herein contained shall apply to any offense for which an indictment has been heretofore found or an information instituted, or to any proceedings under any such indictment or information,' was omitted as no longer necessary. 58 This may mean that new § 3282 includes all that had been contained in the omitted proviso, just as if the proviso had been re-enacted in § 3282. If so, it is arguable that, since there were saved only those proceedings, for past offenses, which had been begun before the effective date of the new Act, Congress did not intend to save proceedings — like that in the present case — not yet begun on that date. 59 34 8. The government contends, however, that, in any event the War Time Suspension of Limitations Act 60 preserved its right to prosecute this action. That Act, so far as pertinent, is substantially the same as the Acts interpreted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Noveck, 271 U.S. 201, 46 S.Ct. 476, 70 L.Ed. 904, 61 United States v. McElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 47 S.Ct. 219, 71 L.Ed. 451, 62 and United States v. Scharton, 285 U.S. 518, 52 S.Ct. 416, 76 L.Ed. 917. 63 As so interpreted, it suspends a statute of limitations only when fraud or attempted fraud against the United States (or one of its agencies) is an ingredient under the statute defining the offense, and does not, absent such a statutory definition, apply to perjury or false swearing, even when the United States is directly interested. 64 Nothing in 8 U.S.C.A. § 746(a) (1), under which defendant was indicted, makes fraud an ingredient of the crime. 35 Accordingly, we reverse as to the first two counts, but affirm as to the third count. Since the two-year jail sentences on all three counts run concurrently, the only practical effect of the decision is to relieve defendant of the $1000 fine imposed as to the first count.