Opinion ID: 160822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Impairment of major life activity (working).

Text: The first of these challenges—to Mr. Hall’s evidence that he suffered an impairment of a major life activity—is based upon the principle that “‘[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.’” Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 904 (10th Cir.1997) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). Instead, “in order [t]o demonstrate that an impairment ‘substantially limits’ the major life activity of working, an individual must show significant[ ] restrict[ion] in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities.” Bolton v. Scrivner, Inc., 36 F.3d 939, 942-43 (10th Cir.1994) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)). EEOC regulations provide definitions of the relevant terms. They state that a “class of jobs” includes “[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(B). A broad range of jobs includes “[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii)(C); see also Bolton, 17 36 F.3d at 942 (discussing definitions). The regulations also list three factors that “should be considered” in determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity and three factors that “may be considered” in making that determination. The three factors that should be considered are: “[t]he nature and severity of the impairment”; (ii) “[t]he duration or expected duration of the impairment”; and (iii) “[t]he permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2). The three additional factors that “may be considered” are: (1) “[t]he geographical area to which the individual has reasonable access”; (2) “[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of jobs utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment”; and (3) “[t]he job from which the individual has been disqualified because of an impairment, and the number and types of other jobs not utilizing similar training, knowledge, skills or abilities, within that geographical area, from which the individual is also disqualified because of the impairment.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). Here, Sheriff Claussen himself argued that Mr. Hall’s disability significantly restricted his ability to perform several jobs in law enforcement. In particular, Sheriff Claussen contended that Mr. Hall’s disability rendered him unqualified for the position of patrol officer and presented evidence in support of that contention. When Mr. Hall 18 inquired about a position in courthouse services, Sheriff Claussen informed him that his need to make frequent visits to the bathroom disqualified him from consideration for that position. Additionally, Sheriff Claussen contended that Mr. Hall could not perform the regular duties required of an investigator, although Mr. Hall did offer evidence to rebut that contention. According to a May 18, 1995 memorandum from Captain Gardner to Mr. Hall, the Sheriff’s Department’s view was that Mr. Hall “cannot be placed in any position of employment where [he] [did] not have immediate access to toilet facilities.” Aple’s App. vol. II, at 381. Mr. Hall also presented evidence to the jury regarding the severity, duration, and impact of his impairment. In June 1994, the physician who examined him concluded that he was suffering from chronic prostatitis that had been aggravated by the stress and activity level involved in a patrol deputy’s job. That physician recommended long-term antibiotic therapy and reduced physical activity. Over a year later, a second physician examined Mr. Hall and concluded that he had “a urological problem that [was] responsible for him needing to void very frequently and it comes on rather precipitously.” Id. at 392. Accordingly, this physician concluded that “there [was] a substantial need to have . . . immediate access to a restroom facility.” Id. The same physician examined Mr. Hall during the following month. He reported to the Sheriff’s Department that Mr. Hall continued to suffer from “rather precipitous urinary urgency over which he has no control.” Id. at 394. He characterized Mr. Hall’s problems as 19 “very legitimate and very unusual.” Id. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Mr. Hall, we conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support his contention that his urological condition substantially impaired the major life activity of working, as that term is defined under the ADA. Based on Sheriff Claussen’s own arguments, a jury could have reasonably concluded that there was a broad range of jobs in law enforcement that could not be performed adequately if one required frequent and immediate access to a bathroom, as Mr. Hall did. Thus, the district court properly denied Sheriff Claussen’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on this basis.