Opinion ID: 1454558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: garmon preemption

Text: Assuming the majority is correct that there may be issues constituting unfair labor practices the Board should decide, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Cy. Dist. Coun. of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 56 L.Ed.2d 209, 98 S.Ct. 1745 (1978) and Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra , compel the conclusion that Beaman's cause of action is not preempted under Garmon even where the unfair labor practice violations fall within section 8 of the NLRA. As in those cases, the relationship between Beaman's claim and any potential violation of section 8 is too attenuated to justify preemption. Garmon preemption protects the primary jurisdiction of the Board in determining what constitutes an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Majority opinion, at 704 (quoting Garmon, at 244-45). Under Garmon, where an activity is arguably subject to section 7 or 8, state action is preempted by the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. Garmon, at 245. In interpreting the scope of this phrase, the Supreme Court has stated: Our cases indicate ... that inflexible application of the [ Garmon ] doctrine is to be avoided, especially where the State has a substantial interest in regulation of the conduct at issue and the State's interest is one that does not threaten undue interference with the federal regulatory scheme. (Italics mine.) Sears, at 188 (quoting Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 430 U.S. 290, 302, 51 L.Ed.2d 338, 97 S.Ct. 1056 (1977)). Thus, the Court has refused to apply Garmon in a literal, mechanical fashion and instead has determined whether preemption is appropriate by focusing upon the nature of the particular interest being asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of permitting the state court to proceed. Sears, at 188-89 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180, 17 L.Ed.2d 842, 87 S.Ct. 903 (1967)). The Sears Court held that the touchstone or critical inquiry under Garmon is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application, but whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to or different from that which could have been presented to the Board. Sears, at 197; see also majority opinion, at 708. It is only in the former situation that a state court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably prohibited branch of the Garmon doctrine was designed to avoid. Sears, at 197. Thus, accepting arguendo Valley's assertion that violations of sections 8(a)(5) or (d) may have occurred, preemption is not warranted unless the resulting unfair labor controversy was identical to or at least roughly similar to Beaman's individual breach of contract claim. In that regard, the majority concludes that resolution of Beaman's contract claim might involve discussion of potential violations of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the NLRA. Those sections govern the collective bargaining process between employer and union. They impose a mandatory duty upon the employer to meet with and bargain in good faith with a representative of the union. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d); majority opinion, at 705-06. Consequently, to justify preemption under Garmon, Beaman's breach of contract claim must be identical to the issues of impasse, good faith bargaining, and the status of the final offer that would be reserved for the Board. The majority not only fails to show that the controversy would be identical, it fails to show that there is a controversy. Beaman's claim is based upon Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wn.2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984). See majority opinion, at 700. Under Thompson, to sustain his claim, Beaman must establish a promise of specific treatment in specific situations, that the promise induced the employee to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, and that the promise was breached. Thompson, at 230. Because consideration by the individual employee is required to establish a contract under Thompson, unilateral implementation of an offer alone cannot establish a right based upon the contract. Given these considerations, a state court would be concerned with whether there was a valid employment contract between Valley and Beaman under Thompson and whether Valley breached that contract. In contrast, the Board would be concerned with whether the union and Valley collectively bargained in good faith, whether impasse was reached in good faith, and whether the final implemented offer contained Katz unilateral changes. Consideration of one is wholly irrelevant to the resolution of the other. Thus, preemption is inappropriate. Moreover, Belknap supports the conclusion that preemption is not warranted. See Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 77 L.Ed.2d 798, 103 S.Ct. 3172 (1983). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld state court adjudication of a claim brought by an employee alleging wrongful discharge. The facts of Belknap support preemption far more strongly than do the facts in Beaman's case; nevertheless, the Court found no preemption. In Belknap, the union engaged in a strike after impasse was reached during the renegotiation of an expired collective bargaining agreement. The employer hired replacement workers and told them that the jobs were permanent positions. The strike was subsequently settled and the employer fired some of the replacement workers to make room for returning strikers. Belknap, at 494-96. Under the provisions of the NLRA, the employer is obligated to reinstate employees who strike to protest unfair labor practices. Belknap, at 508 (citing Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 278, 100 L.Ed.2d 309, 76 S.Ct. 349 (1956)). Thus, because the strike could be characterized as one to protest unfair labor practices, the employer arguably had to fire the replacement workers to avoid unfair labor charges. Belknap, at 508; 528 (Brennan, J., dissenting). (It should be noted that the majority did not disagree with this statement. See Belknap, at 508.) The fired replacement workers sought damages in state court alleging misrepresentation and breach of contract. Belknap, at 496-97. The employer argued that resolution of the claims would necessarily involve section 8 of the NLRA and, thus, Garmon preemption should apply. The Supreme Court disagreed. Reasoning that the issues arising under section 8 and the breach of contract claims were not identical, the Court found no preemption, even though success in state court would ultimately result in damage awards for the firing of the employees, which was arguably compelled by the NLRA. Belknap, at 510. As in Sears, the Court identified the identical controversy inquiry as the crucial factor, with the results of that inquiry determining no preemption. Belknap, at 510. As in Belknap and Sears, allowing Beaman to proceed in state court would not interfere with the jurisdiction of the Board. An award of damages for breach of contract would not in any way preclude the Board's determination of potential unfair labor practices. Allowing employees to benefit from the terms of individual contracts does not conflict with the need to protect the collective bargaining process. J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, supra . The Supreme Court has explicitly held that such individual contracts may exist and be enforceable in the collective bargaining context, stating: Men may continue work after a collective agreement expires and, despite negotiation in good faith, the negotiation may be deadlocked or delayed; in the interim express or implied individual agreements may be held to govern. J.I. Case, at 337. It is important to note that such contracts could not justify a refusal to bargain collectively, nor could they supersede the terms of an existing collective bargaining agreement. J.I. Case, at 339. In short, individual contracts may not be used to defeat the policies of the NLRA. J.I. Case, at 337. Since no collective bargaining agreement exists, however, Beaman's contract claim cannot create such a conflict. In J.I. Case, the J.I. Case Company had entered into individual employment contracts with its employees. Subsequently, after the contracts were in effect, the union was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees. It asked the company to bargain; however, Case refused. J.I. Case, at 333-34. The Board found this refusal to bargain collectively constituted an unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court agreed; but it modified the Board's order so that the contracts would not in any way limit the individual employee's right to bargain collectively. J.I. Case, at 341. In doing so, the Court carefully preserved the employees' right to recover for breaches of individual contracts unless those contracts were superseded by a collective bargaining agreement. J.I. Case, at 342. Thus, J.I. Case not only permits an employee to seek damages for breach of promises made while collective bargaining negotiations are ensuing, it allows the employee to proceed in state court even where the employer committed an unfair labor practice in making the promise. Moreover, Beaman's claim is of peripheral concern to the NLRA. See Belknap, at 509. Washington's interest in applying Thompson as a method of providing a remedy to its citizens for breach of contract outweighs the Board's discrete concern with unfair labor practices. Belknap, at 512. Finally, in the wake of Belknap, the Michigan Court of Appeals found no preemption of a wrongful discharge claim based on a unilateral contract theory. See Roberts v. Automobile Club, 138 Mich. App. 488, 360 N.W.2d 224 (1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 889 (1986). Like Beaman, Roberts based his cause of action on a Michigan case which, like Thompson, modifies the employment-at-will doctrine through a unilateral contract theory. Roberts, at 491 (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)). Roberts squarely rejects the argument that sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) preempt a wrongful discharge claim made under Garmon, the precise claim at issue here. The Michigan court recognized that in resolving Roberts' claim, the state court would determine whether there was an implied employment contract and whether it was breached. Roberts, at 497. In contrast, it noted that the Board's focus would involve whether the defendants had bargained in good faith. It further concluded, in accordance with Belknap, that the states' interest in adjudicating contractual disputes outweighed any possible interference with the federal labor laws. Roberts, at 497. Not only does the majority summarily dismiss Roberts, in which the issues are substantially similar to the issues in this case, it fails to apply properly the Sears-Belknap identical controversy test which the Supreme Court has identified as critical. It attempts to distinguish Sears by suggesting that there was no management-labor relationship between Sears and the union picketers. Majority opinion, at 709-10. It incorrectly contrasts this alleged lack of relationship to that between Valley and Beaman and concludes that because a management-labor relationship exists between them, Sears is distinguishable. Contrary to the majority's position, the Sears Court specifically stated that sections 7, 8(b)(4)(D) and 8(b)(7)(C) arguably applied to the picketers, thus treating the relationship as one between management and labor. Further, union attempts to secure employer compliance with prevailing wage standards, to gain recognition, and to force the employer to hire union members are all aspects of labor-management relations. See Sears, at 185-87. The majority also points out that the replacement workers in Belknap did not base their argument on a current or expired agreement between the employer and the union. Significantly, neither does Beaman. Rather, he bases his claim upon his supervisor's promise to him. Majority opinion, at 700.