Opinion ID: 2216795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: did the district attorney violate his obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense?

Text: Dr. Mercer, the court's expert witness, spoke with the district attorney on two occasions prior to trial. His testimony at the post conviction hearing states in part: . . . The question may have been raised by me as to whether the defense had considered pleading guilty to a lesser charge, and in my recall, that the district attorney, Tom Fox, had some real doubt in regard to whether he could consider a lesser charge. . . . Well, I think that it may have come into the context of my feeling that there were a number of factors which did diminish Mr. Roe's ability to be responsible for his actions, and that in that context I may have asked Mr. Fox if the defense had considered a plea other than that, whether they had considered another plea other than not guilty by reason of insanity, and considered a guilty plea on a lesser charge. . . . I had preparations. Mr. Fox had preparations. I had to consult with other colleagues in regard to whether there was any alternative other than the charge of first degree murder. Dr. Mercer also testified that he did not discuss the legal appropriateness of the first-degree murder charge with the district attorney. He said that he did not consider himself that knowledgeable concerning the distinction between the varying degrees of murder and manslaughter. In addition, the district attorney's own expert psychiatric witness stated that he raised the question with the district attorney as to whether first-degree murder was an appropriate charge and whether the killing was in reality a case of manslaughter. We are dealing in this case with the defendant's right to a fair trial mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). The defendant's trial attorney made a general demand for all exculpatory evidence in the state's possession prior to trial in addition to a more specific demand for certain items of evidence. It is admitted that the comments of the psychiatrists to the district attorney would not fall within the scope of the requests for specific items of evidence. In such situations, [i]f there is a duty to respond to a general request of. . .[this] kind, it must derive from the obviously exculpatory character of certain evidence in the hands of the prosecutor. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 107. Both the nature of the allegedly exculpatory evidence, and the overall evidence in the record concerning guilt, must be examined. [7] It necessarily follows that if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112-113. [8] The opinions of the psychiatrists regarding the appropriate degree of criminal responsibility with which to charge the defendant were not of a magnitude to create a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist. The medical opinions of the psychiatrists, based on their examination of the defendant, were disclosed to the defendant's counsel prior to trial. The psychiatrists are not legal experts, they are medical experts, and although they may testify as to the ultimate facts at issue, when a proper foundation for their testimony has been laid, they are not competent to give an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant as to any particular degree of murder or manslaughter. Sec. 907.04, Stats. (1977); [9] accord, Rabata v. Dohner, 45 Wis.2d 111, 172 N.W.2d 409 (1969). The statements of the psychiatrists amounted to nothing more than an expression of . . . [their] general belief as to how the case should be decided. . . . McCormick, Handbook On The Law Of Evidence, sec. 12 (2d Ed. 1972); Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diner's Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1977); Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Ia. 328, 5 N.W.2d 646 (1942). [7] Thus, we conclude that the opinions of the psychiatrists were not exculpatory because they were not probative of the defendant's innocence of the crime charged. We also note that the evidence in the record of this case was overwhelming that Mr. Roe was guilty of first degree murder. Thus, the district attorney had no duty to disclose these statements by the psychiatrists. The final alleged error concerns the failure of the prosecutor to disclose a note written by a police officer in Iron River. The note confirmed that an unidentified individual called the F.B.I. in Milwaukee from Iron River saying that the whole town was against him. This note was not revealed to defense counsel before trial. The existence of the note was brought out on cross-examination of one of the state's witnesses during the insanity phase of the trial. Evidence that the call had been made by Mr. Roe was presented at trial by more than one witness, but it is alleged here that the memorandum was exculpatory and requires reversal. The note merely confirmed what information the defendant's counsel already had acquired and which was presented to the jury. No error occurred in the failure of the district attorney to produce the note at trial. By the Court.  Judgment and order affirmed. CALLOW, J., took no part.