Opinion ID: 77683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Co-schemer Liability for Mail Fraud

Text: 38 Ward challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support all three substantive counts, contending that he cannot be held vicariously liable under a conspiracy theory because of the mistrial as to Count One. He argues that without the conspiracy the evidence supports neither his convictions for causing the particular mailings of Counts Two and Four nor the wire transfer charged in Count Three. 39 A factual finding will be sufficient to sustain a conviction if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). [A]ll reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of supporting the jury's verdict. United States v. Sawyer, 799 F.2d 1494, 1501 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (citing Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942)). 40 Aside from the means by which a fraud is effectuated, the elements of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, 3 and wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, 4 are identical. See Beck v. Prupis, 162 F.3d 1090, 1095 & n. 9 (11th Cir. 1998). Both offenses require that a person (1) intentionally participates in a scheme or artifice to defraud another of money or property, and (2) uses or causes the use of the mails or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme or artifice. United States v. Hewes, 729 F.2d 1302, 1320 (11th Cir. 1984) (mail fraud); United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (wire fraud). The first element—a scheme or artifice to defraud—involves the making of misrepresentations intended and reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension. Beck, 162 F.3d at 1095. As for the second element, a person causes the mails to be used within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, or the wires to be used within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, when he acts with knowledge that the use of the mails [or wires] will follow in the ordinary course of business, or where such use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954). 41 Although Ward concedes that the evidence is more than sufficient to establish his participation generally in the overall scheme to defraud, he says the government did not prove that he caused the specific mailing of the September 2000 promissory note to Rabenstein to support Count Two, the wire transfer of $45,000 on April 24, 2000, from Ellen Johns to Pipher's bank account to support Count Three, nor the mailing of the CEC investment document on January 7, 2002, to Baldwin to support Count Four. 42 Ward claims that a defendant must either personally commit each element of mail and wire fraud, or at least aid and abet another in doing so. It is not enough, he says, that the evidence sufficiently establishes that he knowingly and willfully participated in the fraudulent scheme, and that a co-schemer used the mails or wires for the purpose of executing the scheme. Ward's argument rests upon a flawed understanding of the applicable law. 43 For nearly as long as mail fraud has been a federal crime, it has been the law in this Circuit, and in the former Fifth Circuit, that a defendant may be convicted of mail fraud without personally committing each and every element of mail fraud, 5 so long as the defendant knowingly and willfully joined the criminal scheme, and a co-schemer used the mails for the purpose of executing the scheme. As far back as 1932, in Smith v. United States, 61 F.2d 681 (5th Cir. 1932), 6 a panel of the former Fifth Circuit, in construing a forerunner to 18 U.S.C. § 1341, held that [t]he guilt of the accused who were on trial was not dependent upon either of them taking part in causing the alleged use of the mails, if another accused who was a party to the alleged scheme to defraud . . . in pursuance of that scheme and for the purpose of executing it or attempting to do so, knowingly caused the alleged use of the mails. Id. at 685. Again in Belt v. United States, 73 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1934), a panel of the former Fifth Circuit wrote: 44 It may be assumed that Belt did not sign or cause to be mailed any of the letters set out in the indictment; but, since he was a party to the scheme and to the false representations, it is immaterial that all the letters designed to promote that scheme were signed and mailed by Kelly. A partnership in crime being established against both appellants, the acts of Kelly in furtherance of the common criminal enterprise were in law the acts of Belt also. 45 Id. at 889. Still again in United States v. Bright, 588 F.2d 504 (5th Cir. 1979), a panel of the former Fifth Circuit wrote: [I]t is not necessary that a defendant actually do any of the mailing so long as there is sufficient evidence to tie him to the fraudulent scheme which involves the use of the mails. Id. at 509 (quotation marks omitted). 46 This principle remains no less valid today. As a panel of this Court noted recently: It is well settled in this circuit that so long as one participant in a fraudulent scheme causes a use of the mails in execution of the fraud, all other knowing participants in the scheme are legally liable for that use of the mails. United States v. Munoz, 430 F.3d 1357, 1369 (11th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Toney, 598 F.2d 1349, 1355 (5th Cir. 1979)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ____, 126 S.Ct. 2305, 164 L.Ed.2d 816 (2006). Indeed, United States v. Funt, 896 F.2d 1288 (11th Cir. 1990), is exactly on point. Funt was acquitted by a jury of one conspiracy count as well as two counts of mail fraud, but found guilty on two other counts charging him with mail fraud and one count of wire fraud. Id. at 1291. A panel of this Court held that [a]cquittal on the conspiracy count . . . does not mean that the jury necessarily rejected the government's proof of Funt's involvement in the scheme. To the contrary, the jury's guilty verdict on the mail fraud count belies Funt's assertion. Id. at 1293. Conspiracy and mail fraud are not the same offense, and the fact that Funt was acquitted of conspiracy is not inconsistent with his being a member of a more limited mail fraud scheme. Id. at 1294 n. 4. The principle applies a fortiori in this case where the jury found Ward guilty of mail and wire fraud, but simply could not reach a verdict on the conspiracy count. Just as in Funt, the jury in this case necessarily found that Ward was involved in the fraudulent scheme, even though it could not reach a verdict on the conspiracy count. 47 Further, just as in the present case, the defendant in Funt claimed that his lack of involvement in causing a specific mailing necessitated a reversal of his mail fraud conviction: Funt argues that he had no actual knowledge of the Howard letter, did not receive it and did not cause it to be sent, and that he was totally disassociated from the Palm Beach franchise. Id. at 1294. Again, we flatly rejected the claim—the law is clear that one need not personally mail or receive mail in order to be liable under mail fraud so long as co-schemers do so. Id. 7 48