Opinion ID: 852618
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claimed Misconduct Warranting a New Trial

Text: Outback argues that the failure to disclose Roysdon's identity and the substance of her 1997 statement in response to Outback's 1999 interrogatories violated Indiana Trial Rules 26 and 33. Second, Outback argues that Alexander's failure to inform Outback that he intended to call Roysdon and that she would recant her 2001 deposition testimony at trial violated the duty to supplement discovery responses under Trial Rule 26(E). Outback argues that these discovery abuses constitute misconduct which denied Outback a fair trial. Outback also claims misconduct by plaintiffs' counsel in closing argument. As a remedy Outback seeks a new trial at which Roysdon's testimony is excluded and recovery of its trial and post-trial attorney fees from the Markleys and/or the Markleys' counsel. As explained below, we conclude that the plaintiffs' failure to identify Roysdon as a person with knowledge of the relevant facts was a negligent if not intentional breach of its discovery obligations. Subsequently, plaintiffs failed to supplement their response with the substance of her change in testimony. As these events unfolded, these omissions cascaded into a closing argument that materially misled the jury. The cumulative effect was misconduct prejudicing Outback's defense.
Indiana Trial Rule 26 provides that parties may obtain discovery by means of written interrogatory regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject-matter involved in the pending action including the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. T.R. 26(B)(1). Information that is inadmissible under the rules of evidence may be sought if the information appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. The names and addresses of potential witnesses and persons with knowledge of material facts are squarely within the range of proper discovery. Trial Rule 33(B) provides that each interrogatory shall be answered separately and fully in writing under oath, unless it is objected to. Rule 33(C) further provides that the failure to make a timely response to interrogatories is grounds for sanction under Rule 37. The Dram Shop Act, Indiana Code section 7.X-X-XX-XX.5, imposes civil liability for knowingly furnishing alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person whose intoxication causes injury to persons or property. Under Trial Rule 26(B)(1), information is discoverable if it is relevant and not privileged. If the Markleys expected to call Roysdon as a witness, both Roysdon's identity and the substance of her 1997 statement were called for by Interrogatory 12. Her account of Whitaker's state of intoxication was obviously relevant to the Markleys' Dram Shop Act claim and is not protected from disclosure by any privilege. Indiana's Trial Rules, like earlier versions of the federal rules, do not require automatic disclosure of discoverable information. The Markleys argue that they were not required to disclose Roysdon's name and her 1997 statement because they did not intend to rely on Roysdon's testimony to support their Dram Shop claim but chose instead to rely on indirect and circumstantial evidence to prove Outback's actual knowledge of visible intoxication. The trial court agreed that the Markleys did not intend to rely on Roysdon because (1) the Markleys did not include Roysdon on their pre-trial witness list and first decided to call her mid-trial and (2) the Markleys did not rely on Roysdon's 1997 statement to oppose Outback's pre-trial motion for summary judgment on the Dram Shop Act claim. The Markleys also argue that they did not disclose Roysdon's identity because she failed to respond to attempts to contact her in the two years following her 1997 statement and therefore they did not plan to call her as a witness at trial. [6] If, as the Markleys claim, they did not expect to present direct evidence of Whitaker's intoxication through Roysdon and had no other direct evidence of Whitaker's intoxication, they would be correct that the substance of her account of Whitaker's condition at the grand opening was not required to be set forth in response to Interrogatory 12. [7] But even if we accept the claim that the plaintiffs intended to offer no direct evidence of Whitaker's conduct or condition, we think it is clear that Roysdon's identity was called for by Interrogatory 12. The Markleys' claim that they did not intend to call Roysdon is beside the point. The interrogatory called for persons with knowledge of the facts on which the Markleys relied, not for persons on whose testimony they intended to rely. It is true, of course, that the Markleys' answer to Interrogatory 12 did not cite discrete facts such as whether Whitaker was staggering, smelled of alcohol, slurred his speech, or danced on the table. It is peculiar, to say the least, that plaintiffs' 1999 interrogatory answers made no such allegations, given Roysdon's 1997 statement to Alexander. It is also notable that plaintiffs made no effort in Roysdon's 2001 deposition to shake her testimony that Whitaker was fine. At oral argument the Markleys' appellate counsel suggested, based on facts not of record, that difficulties in communication between Alexander and McClellan, who handled Roysdon's deposition, may have been a factor. That may be true. And the Markleys may have discredited Roysdon's 1997 account and therefore intended not to call her because they believed she was unreliable. Nevertheless, Roysdon was obviously present at the grand opening and was a person with knowledge of the facts the Markleys' response asserted. As a result of her 1997 visit, Markleys' counsel knew this. So in that respect the 1999 interrogatory answer was patently deficient under any supposition as to the underlying reasons for that deficiency. If the Markleys' attorneys had any doubt about this, it is resolved by the obligation to construe an interrogatory fairly. Interrogatories should not be interpreted with excessive rigidity or technicality, but a rule of reason should be applied. Pilling v. Gen. Motors Inc., 45 F.R.D. 366, 369 (D.Utah 1968); see also Dotson v. Bravo, 321 F.3d 663, 667 (7th Cir.2003) (incomplete or evasive responses to interrogatories support dismissal of an action); 7 Moore, supra, at § 33.101. Additionally, answers to interrogatories must be responsive, full, complete and unevasive. Pilling, 45 F.R.D. at 369. This commonsense approach to the interpretation of interrogatory requests furthers the purposes of discovery, namely, to allow parties to obtain evidence necessary to evaluate and resolve their dispute based on a full and accurate understanding of the true facts, to promote settlement, to remove surprise from trial preparation, and to narrow the disputed issues and facts requiring trial. 6 Moore, supra, at § 26.02; Canfield v. Sandock, 563 N.E.2d 526, 528 (Ind.1990); Pierce v. Pierce, 702 N.E.2d 765, 767 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied; Hatfield, 676 N.E.2d at 399. The Markleys point out that even if they did not disclose Roysdon's identity or her 1997 statement in response to Interrogatory 12, they disclosed Roysdon's name in response to a different interrogatory asking for facts supporting their habitual drunkard claim. This is not an answer. Whitaker and Roysdon had worked together at another restaurant before the grand opening, and Roysdon may well have had information about Whitaker's past but known nothing of his condition at the grand opening. In short, the facts related to Whitaker's being a habitual drunkard are obviously different from those bearing on his state of intoxication at the Outback grand opening. The immediate effect of omission of Roysdon as a person with knowledge of the facts supporting the claim of visible intoxication is speculative. If Roysdon had been identified by the plaintiffs in response to Interrogatory 12, a number of scenarios might have evolved. Outback might have deposed her earlier than it did, and her testimony might have adhered to the version she gave Alexander in 1997. Whether or not this is the case, if the plaintiffs had identified her as a person with knowledge bearing on Whitaker's state of visible intoxication, Outback might well have asked Roysdon about any conversations she had with plaintiffs' attorneys. All of this is conjecture on our part. The significant point is that, as subsequent events developed, Outback makes a persuasive claim that the trial would have unfolded differently if the Markleys' attorneys had discharged their initial discovery obligations. The parties dispute, and the record does not resolve, whether the failure to disclose Roysdon's identity and 1997 statement in response to Interrogatory 12 was an act of carelessness, failure of communication between plaintiffs' attorneys, or part of an intentional scheme to defraud Outback and deceive the court and jury. Outback contends that the plaintiffs' attorneys intentionally suckered it into positioning itself as disingenuous before the jury by a purposeful concealing of Roysdon's testimony. If so, and if the Markleys intended from the outset to present Roysdon as a witness for the plaintiffs, they were required to disclose both Roysdon's identity and the substance of her 1997 statement. Indiana discovery rules are specifically designed to avoid surprise and the trial by ambush that Outback charges was designed by the plaintiffs. See Canfield, 563 N.E.2d at 528. We have consistently rejected a gaming view of the litigation process. In Johnston we held that a default judgment must be set aside under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) for misconduct where the plaintiff's attorney filed suit and pursued a default judgment without notifying the attorneys whom she had been advised in writing were representing the defendant in the matter. 711 N.E.2d at 1260-61. In response to the plaintiff's argument that provision of notice would make it nearly impossible to obtain a default judgment against health care providers, we stated that default judgments are not traps to be set for unsuspecting litigants and rejected the gaming view of the legal system presented by the plaintiff's argument. Id. at 1264; see also McCullough v. Archbold, 605 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ind.1993) (citing Mauricio v. State, 476 N.E.2d 88, 95 (Ind.1985) (De Bruler, J., dissenting) (The State may not insist that trials be run as a `search for truth' so far as defense witnesses are concerned while maintaining 'poker game' secrecy for its own witnesses.)); Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 419, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ([D]iscovery is not a game.); United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682, 78 S.Ct. 983, 2 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1958) (the purpose of pretrial discovery is to make a trial less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent); Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317-18 (4th Cir.2002) (There was a time when concealment and gamesmanship were accepted as part and parcel of the adversarial process of the criminal justice system. . . . [W]e decidedly rejected this system long ago. . . .). However, whether the omission was intentional or negligent, and even if, as appears here, only the attorneys and not the Markleys are responsible for the nondisclosure, we readily conclude that the initial omission was a violation of Indiana Trial Rules 26 and 33 and therefore misconduct within the meaning of Rule 60(B)(3). Whether it was prejudicial remains to be explained.
Outback argues that a second instance of misconduct occurred when the plaintiffs failed to supplement their interrogatory response when they decided to call Roysdon as a witness. The Markleys respond that Outback waived any objection by choosing to cross-examine Roysdon on her change in testimony. The Markleys also argue that they decided to call Roysdon only after the trial had started and that the duty to supplement discovery does not continue during trial. They further contend that the information relating to Roysdon was work product. As explained below, none of these responses is adequate.
Trial Rule 26(E) provides several exceptions to the general rule that there is no continuing duty to supplement discovery responses that were complete when made. Among these is Trial Rule 26(E)(2)(a), which provides that a party has a duty to supplement a prior discovery response if he obtains information upon the basis of which he knows that the response was incorrect when made. Under Rule 26(E)(2)(b), there is also a duty to supplement a response that was correct when made but is no longer true if, under the circumstances, a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. At the point the plaintiffs determined to present Roysdon's testimony, the omission of the substance of that testimony from their answer to Interrogatory 12, even if correct when made, became no longer true and a knowing concealment as those terms are used in Rule 26(E)(2)(b). The Markleys first argue that the duty to supplement discovery does not continue during trial. Outback cites federal authority for the proposition that the duty to supplement under FRCP 26(e) is an ongoing obligation. See Smith v. Ford, 626 F.2d 784, 795 (10th Cir.1980) (citing Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 457 (2d Cir.1975)). Indiana Trial Rule 26 does not explicitly address whether a party's duty to supplement continues during trial. But, importantly, it does not say this duty ceases at the onset of trial. We see no reason why the duties imposed by Trial Rule 26(E)(2)(a) and (b) stop at the outset of trial. To permit a party discovering its own error or omission to remain silent would permit that party to benefit from its own concealment or error. Whether the initial response to Interrogatory 12 was intentionally or inadvertently incomplete, the duty to supplement was triggered by either subsection (a) or subsection (b). Trial Rule 26(E) requires that a supplemental response be seasonably made. This suggests a need for timely response. We think it also indicates that it may be reasonable and appropriate to modify the method of supplementing a discovery response if new information is discovered on the eve of or during trial. Here no effort at all was made. That is surely inadequate by any measure.
The Markleys argue that the substance of Roysdon's 1997 statement to Alexander is protected as attorney work-product. This claim is neither preserved nor correct. In the first place, they made no work-product objection to the interrogatory. In any event, work-product is not a valid ground for the plaintiffs' omissions. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument on the ground that work-product is limited to documents or tangible things and Roysdon's statement was never memorialized in writing. We do not agree that work-product is limited to tangible items. An attorney cannot be forced to disclose the attorney's mental impressions, etc., whether or not they are reduced to writing. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947) (the work product of a lawyer reflected in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and countless other tangible and intangible ways is protected). But Roysdon's statement is not attorney work-product for a more fundamental reason. The purpose of the privilege is to protect the mental impressions and legal theories of attorneys and their clients. Roysdon's statements to Alexander do not reveal mental impressions or legal theories. They are simply potential evidence that enjoys no privilege. Accordingly, they are not protected as work-product. Kristoff v. Glasson, 778 N.E.2d 465, 471 (Ind.Ct.App. 2002).
In reliance on our decision in O'Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 948 (Ind.2001), the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Outback's decision to cross-examine Roysdon waived any objection based on the failure to supplement discovery. In O'Connell we held that when a party is confronted with a surprise witness, ordinarily the proper remedy is to move for a continuance and the failure to move for a continuance may waive any alleged error. O'Connell dealt with a witness who had not been identified by either side and came forward with relevant evidence after the trial had started. The defendant objected to the witness at trial, and the trial court allowed a continuance to permit the defendant to depose the witness. The State had made no attempt to conceal the witness from the defense, and the defense had not deposed the witness before the trial. Under this circumstance a continuance is ordinarily appropriate to permit the defendant to pin down the testimony that could be expected of the new witness. Here, however, Outback had no reason to seek a continuance. The Markleys presented a witness whom the defense had expected to call. This was a surprise only in that the plaintiffs, not the defendants, had called her. At the time she was called, Outback had no reason to believe she would not adhere to her 2001 deposition testimony. Outback also argues that its decision to cross-examine Roysdon and impeach her with her 2001 deposition testimony did not forfeit other remedies (a continuance, a mistrial, exclusion of Roysdon's testimony) because Outback was unaware of Roysdon's 1997 statement when it elected to cross-examine Roysdon. Outback argues that it was disadvantaged in cross-examining Roysdon because its ignorance of the 1997 statement prevented it from showing the jury that she had flip-flopped more than once. Outback notes that Alexander in closing argument portrayed Roysdon as a courageous witness who, after feeling guilty for years, decided at the last minute to be guided by her conscience, stop lying, and tell the truth. Outback argues that the jury would have considered Roysdon's testimony less admirable if it had known of Roysdon's 1997 statement and the fact she had changed her story twice, not just once. We doubt that Roysdon's testimony would have been less credible if all the facts were on the table, but we agree that Outback cannot be charged with waiver when it is ignorant of all relevant facts due to misconduct on the part of its opponent. We think that the most important reason why Outback's decision to cross-examine Roysdon did not waive its objection to the belated disclosure of Roysdon's recanting of her deposition testimony is that Outback was not advised in advance of Roysdon's change in testimony and, therefore, had no time to evaluate whether to seek a continuance, move for a mistrial, or redepose Roysdon to explore the circumstances of her change of heart. A proper supplement to plaintiffs' response to Interrogatory 12 would have identified Roysdon and stated the substance of what she would say. That information was intentionally withheld from Outback by plaintiffs' attorneys. Without it no waiver can be claimed.
Outback raises a final claim of misconduct by plaintiffs' attorney based on closing argument. David Markley was driving the motorcycle. His blood alcohol tested at .07% or .08% over an hour after the collision with Whitaker. [8] The facts made clear that he had not ingested alcohol in the period of time after the collision and before the blood test that was administered at the hospital at 12:13 am on July 22. The parties agreed that Outback would not claim comparative fault on the part of either of the Markleys and in exchange the plaintiffs would claim no punitive damages. At closing argument, in asking for a $120 million damage award Alexander argued: My clients didn't want anybody punished. Good thing, because this is the perfect case for punitive damages . . . Outback contends that this breached the agreement not to seek punitive damages. They urge this as a freestanding ground for finding misconduct on the part of the plaintiffs. Viewed in isolation, we would agree that this argument is not a basis for overturning a jury verdict. But later in his closing, Alexander attacked the credibility of Outback's counsel: Remember when counsel for the Defendant (inaudible) Outback Steakhouse bar stood up here in opening and he told you what the evidence was going to show? . . . Patrice Roysdon, she's going to come in here, she's their witness, and she's going to tell you he wasn't drunk. He made you all kinds of promises about the evidence. Now he wants to stand up here and act like he didn't do that, and by the way, we're real sorry for these people, just don't give them nothing. Sometimes it's embarrassing to be in this business. The plaintiffs' counsel's shortcomings in discovery that had not yet come to light were the basis of the claim that the defendant was disingenuous. In this context, this argument constituted misconduct by Alexander. B. Prejudice to Outback's Ability To Present Its Case In order to obtain a new trial based on the Markleys' counsel's misconduct, Outback must establish that the misconduct prejudiced its right to a fair trial. Outback argues that it would have handled this case differently had Roysdon's 1997 statement been disclosed in 1999 in response to Outback's interrogatories and had it known that Roysdon planned to recant her 2001 deposition testimony at trial. Specifically, Outback claims that if it had known of Roysdon's 1997 statement it would have evaluated the case differently and attempted to settle. Without the benefit of this information, Outback's view of the case was that plaintiffs had no direct evidence that Outback knew Whitaker was visibly intoxicated and that the plaintiffs' circumstantial evidence of Outback's knowledge was insufficient to impose liability. Roysdon's testimony was critical to the Markleys' Dram Shop Act claim. She was the only witness who testified to Whitaker's visible intoxication at Outback and, critically, to Outback's employee's knowledge of Whitaker's condition. Without Roysdon's testimony, the only evidence the Markleys offered of Outback's knowledge was the testimony of various individuals who attended the grand opening. They established only that Outback served free alcoholic drinks at the grand opening and did not keep track of how many drinks each attendee consumed. This in itself establishes nothing as to Whitaker's condition, and Whitaker himself testified that he had three or four drinks at Van's after he left Outback. Based on the perceived weakness of the plaintiffs' case with respect to Whitaker's intoxication and Outback's knowledge of visible intoxication, Outback says it decided to litigate. We assume Outback is correct in claiming that Roysdon's story would have affected its assessment of its liability. It remains entirely speculative whether the case would have been settled. We have no basis to conclude that the parties would have agreed on a damage award even if liability were conceded. We think the more persuasive point is that counsel for Outback, based on Roysdon's 2001 deposition testimony, told the jury in opening statement that no witness establishing Whitaker's visible intoxication would be produced and that Roysdon would testify that he was not intoxicated. Alexander in closing pounded on the claimed embarrassing conduct by Outback's counsel. Roysdon's undisclosed change of story thus simultaneously destroyed not only Outback's theory of the case but also its credibility with the jury. Outback therefore credibly contends that its handling of the case would have been substantially different, and the damages, if not the liability, would have been materially different if plaintiffs' counsel had discharged their obligations. Outback contends that the Indiana Trial Rules acknowledge the importance of finality of judgments, but Rule 60(B)(3) also recognizes the importance of fairness and integrity of the fact-finding process. At oral argument appellate counsel for the Markleys offered as an explanation for the failure to identify Roysdon lack of communication between trial counsel for the Markleys. Assuming this is correct, it nonetheless imposed on Outback the consequences of plaintiffs' counsel's shortcomings. As already noted, negligent as well as intentional misconduct is sufficient under Trial Rule 60(B)(3). Moreover, some of the misconduct is difficult to explain as oversight. Alexander, in closing, purposely took unfair advantage of the defendants' ignorance of the whole story.