Opinion ID: 4236698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Sever Tax Fraud Counts

Text: At trial, Hager moved to sever the tax fraud counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14. The district court denied Hager’s motion. We affirm. “The denial of a motion to sever is reviewed under an ‘exceedingly deferential’ abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 355 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Tarango, 396 F.3d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 2005)). This court “will not reverse a conviction based upon denial of a motion to sever ‘unless the defendant can demonstrate compelling prejudice against which the trial court was unable to afford protection, and that he was unable to obtain a fair trial.’” Id. at 356 (quoting United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 1004 (5th Cir. 1987)). The showing of prejudice must be “specific and compelling.” United States v. Ballis, 28 F.3d 1399, 1408 (5th Cir. 1994). Notably, this court has repeatedly held that severance “is not mandatory simply because a defendant indicates that he wishes to testify on some counts but not on others. . . . [S]everance for this reason, as for any other, remains in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Alvarez v. Wainwright, 607 F.2d 683, 685 (5th Cir. 1979)). “Consequently, a defendant seeking severance of charges because he wishes to testify as to some counts but not as to others has the burden of demonstrating ‘that he has both important testimony to give concerning one count and a strong need to refrain from testifying on the other.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Davis, 752 F.2d 963, 972 (5th Cir. 1985)). Hager argues that the court should have severed his tax counts because he wished to testify that that he had “specifically asked” his tax preparer about 11 No. 16-51330 the proper way to report his income from Echt, and that she had instructed him “that it would be easier to file an amended return.” The court’s denial of his motion precluded him from testifying, however, because he did not want to expose himself to cross-examination relating to the details surrounding the mail and wire fraud counts. He feared this testimony would hurt his credibility. Hager has not met his high burden. His reason for refraining from testifying—fear that cross-examination would elicit compromising evidence— is the same reason that many defendants refuse to testify: It is, after all, the nature of cross-examination to impeach witnesses and make them seem less credible. There is nothing extraordinary about this prejudice. Moreover, because his tax fraud charge and the mail and wire fraud charges are intertwined, severing the claims would not provide Hager effective relief from his concern. Cf. United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 823 (5th Cir. 2012) (severing claims where the two charges were “only tangentially relevant” to each other). After all, the Government alleged that his tax fraud was perpetuated to cover up the broader fraud. Accordingly, even if the tax counts had been severed, it is still likely that the same sort of questions would arise on cross-examination. The district court’s denial of this motion to sever was not an abuse of its discretion.