Opinion ID: 1902568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inconsistent Deed Descriptions

Text: [¶ 8] The Markleys claim title to their property pursuant to a deed from Richard Hobson. That deed describes the Markleys' property as a three-sided parcel: [b]eginning at two crotched white oak trees near land formerly owned by Nahum Thompson, thence running westerly 40 rods to land of Heirs of Benjamin Day, thence Southerly by said Day land about 70 rods to land of Heirs of Joseph L. Benson, thence by said Benson heirs land to the place of beginning. Dunlap testified that the Hobson-Markley deed is deficient ... in terms of its specificity. It does give us clues as to where to place it ... and given ancillary information and background information for placing it, it is possible to place it, but on its face, it's very difficult to tell the dimensions or the location... of the parcel. [¶ 9] The description set forth in the Hobson-Markley deed is substantially similar to the descriptions set forth in several other deeds in the property's chain of title: the 1913 deed from William Hobson to Ralph Hobson; the 1897 deed from Violet Benson to William Hobson; and the 1893 deed from John Linscott to Violet Benson. However, the 1827 deed from James Gillpatrick to Joseph Linscott contains a different description, one that describes a six-sided parcel: begining [sic] at an oak at Daniel Johnsons [sic] corner, thence runing [sic] South forty five and one half degrees West twenty four rods to a yellow oak, thence south eight degrees west, fifty two rods to a stake, thence Northeast forty two roads to an oak, thence southeast five rods to a white oak, thence Northeast fifteen rods to an oak stake, thence to the first mentioned bounds.... In contrast, the 1806 deed to James Gillpatrick from the Town Proprietors, the original deed in the Markleys' chain of title, describes a four-sided parcel: [b]eginning at the W. corner of lands of Joseph Linscott's land on Waterborough line running N. 11½ W. 50 rods to lands of James Johnson's [sic], thence N.E. about 30 rods to lands of Carrol Tarbox, thence S.E. about 40 rods to the N. corner of said Linscott's land, thence S.W. 45 rods to Waterborough line.... Dunlap testified that he did not believe that the Proprietors-Gillpatrick deed described the same tract of land as did the Gillpatrick-Linscott deed. [¶ 10] In his Surveyor's Report, Dunlap described the deeds in the Markleys' chain of title as containing substantial and unexplained variation in the language. According to Dunlap's report: [i]t has been said that the early settlers marked off their claims and received subsequent deeds from the Proprietors, thus lending a great amount of weight to the position of stone walls which may well have pre-dated the deed language and by which the settlers actually expected to claim. It is helpful in this case to note the pattern of walls which conform in many respects to the deed from Gillpatrick [sic], upon which this survey is based. The deed from the Proprietors seems to indicate a rectangle of larger acreage and the loss of this pattern cannot be explained. Dunlap noted that he had relied upon stone walls in his analysis as corroborative evidence of where the boundaries lie. He testified, however, that stone walls had purposes other than demarcating property boundaries; for instance, they sometimes were used by a single owner to delimit his or her holdings for certain uses. None of the deeds in the Markleys' chain of title contain any references to stone walls. [¶ 11] Dunlap testified that he was unable to locate physically any of the monuments referenced by the Gillpatrick-Linscott deed. Each reference in that deed is to a monument that no longer exists; the deed makes no reference to abutters. He nevertheless believed that he had discerned the location of the former oak at Daniel Johnston's corner. During cross-examination, however, Dunlap acknowledged that as of June 30, 1827, the date of the transfer from Gillpatrick to Linscott, Daniel Johnston did not own the property at which Dunlap had pinpointed the location of the former oak at Daniel Johnston's corner. That property was transferred to Daniel Johnston by James Johnston pursuant to a December 25, 1827, deed. Dunlap admitted that he had not researched whether Daniel Johnston had owned any other property in Hollis as of June 30, 1827. The Semles then introduced into evidence a May 9, 1816, deed from Nathaniel Smith to Samuel Hodsdon and to Daniel Johnston, demonstrating that as of June 30, 1827, Daniel Johnston did own other property in Hollis. In response to this testimony, the court observed that it seems that we need to know where the Nathaniel Smith to Hodsdon and Johnston piece is, whether that's in this general area or whether it's in ain a whole different part of town, to see whether it creates an ambiguity or not. [¶ 12] On redirect, Dunlap opined that the Smith-Hodsdon/Johnston deed did not appear to describe any land in the area of the Markleys' and the Semles' properties because it mentioned a mill privilege and he was not aware of any mills in that area. He also explained that [i]t may very well be that Dan Johnson [sic] was a tenant of that land, and since the last two names are both Johnson [sic], there may be in a [sic] familial relationship. Dan Johnson [sic] may have occupied that land and everyone in the neighborhood may have known that that was where his corner was, Dunlap indicated that he had seen similar phenomena in his experience as a surveyor, often not, but it happens.... [¶ 13] The Markleys contend that these inconsistencies in the deed descriptions are not fatal to Dunlap's analysis. They note, for example, that Dunlap attempted to reconcile the Hobson-Markley deed's description of a three-sided parcel with the Gillpatrick-Linscott deed's description of a six-sided parcel. Dunlap testified that the call, thence Southerly by said Day land about 70 rods to land of Heirs of Joseph L. Benson, in the Hobson-Markley deed equates to the calls, thence runing [sic] South forty five and one half degrees West twenty four rods to a yellow oak, thence south eight degrees west, fifty two rods to a stake [for a total of 76 rods], in the Gillpatrick-Linscott deed. Dunlap's hypotheses may have been sufficiently credible to permit a finding by the trial court that despite the deeds' inconsistencies, Dunlap's analysis successfully identified the location of the common boundary. In the absence of a request for findings of fact, however, we must assume that the court made the findings necessary to support the conclusion that Dunlap's analysis was not persuasive. We cannot conclude that the court was compelled to accept Dunlap's explanations of the variations.