Opinion ID: 2995671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Supp. at 1369, aff’d, 837 F.2d at 1278.

Text: We agree with the Fifth Circuit and therefore hold that Section 125.16(D)(2)’s font and color restriction and Section 125.16(E)’s Painting Restriction are appropriate in order to prevent a decline in the values of surrounding properties./13 SDJ, 636 F.Supp. at 1369, aff’d, 837 F.2d at 1278. However, we invalidate the Signage Restriction in Section 125.16(D)(1), which limits signage to only the legal name of the enterprise, because it is substantially broader than necessary to achieve Mishawaka’s goals. Mishawaka fails to articulate a single reason why it is necessary to limit a sexually- oriented business’ signage solely to displaying its name. Under Section 125.16(D)(1), a sexually-oriented business will not be allowed to notify the public about what type of store it operates or what its hours of operation are. Such a drastic restriction on signage cannot be sustained without some sort of evidentiary support. In Cumberland, 228 F.3d at 853, we struck several provisions of a licensing scheme because the city neither conducted nor cited any study establishing its basic premise that those provisions were necessary to achieve the desired goal. Such provisions were substantially more broad than necessary to combat secondary effects. See id. As in Cumberland, Mishawaka cites no study nor provides any argument showing the Signage Restriction in Section 125.16(D)(1) to be narrowly tailored. We invalidate Section 125.16(D)(1) because we conclude that restricting a business to displaying only its name burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further Mishawaka’s goal of combating deleterious secondary effects such as urban blight and a decline in property values. Ward, 491 U.S. at 799. Mishawaka’s reliance on Excalibur and SDJ for the proposition that Section 125.16(D)(1) is narrowly tailored is misguided. For instance, while the Eighth Circuit upheld a challenge to the signage restrictions in Excalibur, 116 F.3d at 1218-19, the statute at issue there only addressed the size, shape and location of the advertising. As opposed to Section 125.16(D)(1), the statutes at issue in Excalibur and SDJ did not limit signage to solely displaying the business’ name as does the Ordinance, cf. 116 F.3d at 1218-25; SDJ, 636 F.Supp. at 1384-85, and we conclude that such a limitation is impermissible under Ward. See 491 U.S. at 799 (holding regulation may not burden more speech than is necessary to advance government’s interest). F. Booth Restrictions Plaintiffs next challenge Section 125.14 of the Ordinance (the Open Booth Restrictions). Plaintiffs acknowledge that this court has upheld similar open booth restrictions in the past. See, e.g., Matney v. County of Kenosha, 86 F.3d 692, 700 (7th Cir. 1996). In Matney, we concluded that a Kenosha ordinance similar to the Ordinance constituted a constitutional manner restriction. See id. at 698. Plaintiffs assert that the Ordinance is more stringent than theKenosha ordinance and therefore violates the First Amendment./14 In Matney, we held that Kenosha’s open booth restrictions were content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions and served the legitimate governmental interest of combating the spread of communicable diseases and promoting safe and sanitary conditions. See id. at 695- 96. We thus asked whether the Kenosha open booth restrictions were narrowly tailored to further that interest. See id. The plaintiffs contended that there were alternatives to the Kenosha open booth requirements that were less speech- intrusive. See id. at 696. We rejected that contention, noting that a regulation need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of achieving the government’s legitimate, content-neutral interests. See id. Rather, the Kenosha open booth restrictions promoted a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the restrictions and the restrictions were not substantially broader than necessary to achieve that interest. See id. Further, because the open booth restrictions left open alternative channels of communication, we upheld the Kenosha ordinance in its entirety. See id. at 697-98. Plaintiffs concede, as they must, that the Open Booth Restrictions are content neutral. The plain language of the preamble to the Ordinance makes clear that it was passed for purposes of preserv[ing] the health, safety and welfare and preventing the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. The Ordinance is aimed at the secondary effects of private viewing booths--the possible spread of disease and the creation of unsanitary, unhealthy conditions--and not at the content of the films that are shown in the booths. See id. at 696. Turning to the second criterion under Ward, plaintiffs also admit that the Open Booth Restrictions serve a legitimate government interest. Fighting the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and maintaining safe, sanitary conditions constitute a significant government interest. See id. Moreover, Open Booth Restrictions further that interest. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the Ordinance is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest. We are satisfied that Mishawaka’s goals of preventing the spread of disease and maintaining sanitary and safe conditions at sexually-oriented businesses would be achieved less effectively absent the [open booth] regulation. Id. In the present case, plaintiffs make the same mistake as the plaintiffs in Matney did by contending that the restrictions are not narrowly tailored . . . because they believe there are less speech-infringing possibilities. Id. For example, plaintiffs propose that video cameras or roaming security guards would accomplish Mishawaka’s legitimate goals as effectively as the Open Booth Restrictions contained in the Ordinance. While this may be true, the possibility of less-speech-restrictive alternatives is, of course, not the proper inquiry under Ward. See Matney, 86 F.3d at 697. We thus conclude that the Open Booth Restrictions are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s interest. Ward, 491 U.S. at 800. Moving on to the final Ward factor, we have repeatedly held that regulations like the Open Booth Restrictions leave open ample alternative channels of communication. See Matney, 86 F.3d at 697 (listing cases). Plaintiffs do not persuade us to disregard the holding in Matney. Therefore, we hold that the Open Booth Restrictions are constitutional time, place, or manner restrictions.