Opinion ID: 1902406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Juror Excused for Cause and Voir Dire Inquiry

Text: The appellant contends that a prospective juror was improperly excused for cause after the following colloquy: THE COURT: Mrs. Holenda and Mrs. King, did I ask you these questions also with respect to the penalty? VENIREWOMAN HOLENDA: You didn't ask. I'm sorry, I don't believe that I could be impartial. I'm against capital punishment. THE COURT: Well, here again, as I indicated to Mr. Farmer, even though you are against capital punishment, the jury itself would not be imposing the same. You would be asked to reach a verdict based upon the testimony, the evidence, and the law based as to his guilt or innocence as to each of the charges, and then as to the punishment as it relates to capital punishment. You would then be asked to vote to advise the Court as to what the jury feels would be the proper punishment. I would not be bound by your opinion, however. VENIREWOMAN HOLENDA: I understand, but I do feel strongly about it. I'm sorry, but that's exactly how I feel. After this juror was excused, a bench conference was requested, at which time counsel for the appellant and the state, together with the court, discussed the appropriate type of question that should be asked a prospective juror who appeared to oppose the imposition of the death penalty. The Witherspoon requirements were reviewed, and, at the conclusion of the conference, counsel for the appellant commented: MR. RONDOLINO: ... I just wanted to make sure we aren't excluding a group of people that shouldn't be excluded from a jury trial. There's no  doesn't appear to be a serious problem at this time, but if it would continue, I think we'd get  THE COURT: What you are saying is that the question should be under no circumstances could they vote to impose the death penalty. MR. RONDOLINO: Right. [Emphasis added.] We faced a similar issue in Witt v. State, 342 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1977), in which we stated: It is proper to exclude prospective jurors who state that their reservations about capital punishment would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt ... [or] who say they could never vote to impose the death penalty or that they would refuse even to consider its imposition in the case before them. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 513-14, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1772, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, 780 (1968) (footnotes omitted). See Portee v. State, 253 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1971). We find the venirewoman was properly excused. Her response to the court's inquiry was sufficient to indicate that her reservations about capital punishment would prevent her from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. See Jackson v. State, 366 So.2d 752 (Fla. 1978). The record also clearly reflects that counsel did not object or believe there was a serious Witherspoon problem concerning this juror. The appellant further argues that it was error for the trial judge to sustain an objection to appellant's general questioning of prospective jurors on voir dire. The controversial exchange was: MR. RONDOLINO: Mrs. Maltese, would you be in favor of having a mandatory death penalty for certain crimes? VENIREWOMAN MALTESE: No, sir. MR. RONDOLINO: Would anybody here be in favor of having a mandatory death penalty  MR. MEISSNER: Your Honor, I'm going to object. That's not proper voir dire. THE COURT: Sustained. We find the form of inquiry to be improper. The question was asked collectively of the prospective jurors, and this is proper only if both the state and the defendant consent. See Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.300(b). In addition, the objection also would have been sustainable on subject matter grounds. The purpose of voir dire examination is to obtain a fair and impartial jury to try the issues in the cause. Cross v. State, 89 Fla. 212, 103 So. 636 (1925). The subject question, however, did not address the juror's impartial application of existing law, but rather it concerned her conception of what laws should exist. We find the trial judge was clearly within his discretionary authority in sustaining the objection to the proposed inquiry.