Opinion ID: 2779443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses

Text: The Defendant next contends that the spiritual treatment exemption violates the Federal Establishment and Equal Protection Clauses, as well as the comparable provisions in article I, section 3 and article XI, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. According to the Defendant, the spiritual treatment exemption improperly favors certain religious groups—particularly Christian Scientists—while denying protection to other religious groups whose practices do not comport with the requirements of the statute. The Defendant contends that she “should not be denied the benefits afforded to Christian Scientists.” The State has not taken a position as to whether the spiritual treatment exemption violates these constitutional provisions. Instead, relying upon State v. Murray, 480 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 1972), the State contends that this Court should affirm the conviction without addressing the Defendant’s claim because even if the exemption violates the Establishment Clause or the Equal Protection Clause, the result would be to strike the exemption without invalidating the entire child abuse and neglect statute. The statute at issue in Murray made it a crime to sell or conceal property subject to a security interest, but exempted from prosecution any person who satisfied the underlying debt prior to being arraigned for trial. Id. at 356 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-1957 (amended 1989)). Murray, who was indicted for the improper sale of a Buick, claimed that the exemption portion of the statute violated article I, section 18 of the Tennessee Constitution, which prohibits imprisonment for debt. Id. This Court held that under those circumstances, there was no need to address the constitutionality of the exemption because, -14- even assuming that the exemption was unconstitutional, the only remedy would be to elide the exemption in its entirety, which would not entitle Murray to relief. Id. at 356-57. The main principle underlying the holding in Murray is that “[t]his Court will not pass on the constitutionality of a statute, or any part of one, unless it is absolutely necessary for the determination of the case and of the present rights of the parties to the litigation.” Id. at 357; accord State v. Mangrum, 403 S.W.3d 152, 169 n.14 (Tenn. 2013) (citing State v. Taylor, 70 S.W.3d 717, 720 (Tenn. 2002)). Thus, the determinative inquiry is whether the Defendant would be entitled to relief in the event of a successful challenge. The Defendant has presented two alternative arguments for relief: (1) that the unconstitutionality of the spiritual treatment exemption would preclude altogether her prosecution under the child abuse and neglect statute; and (2) that she would qualify for the spiritual treatment exemption once this Court elides the offending terminology. In response, the State contends that if the spiritual treatment exemption were unconstitutional, the proper remedy would be to elide the exemption in its entirety, leaving in effect the portion of the statute prohibiting child abuse and neglect. We agree with the State. “The doctrine of elision allows a court, under appropriate circumstances when consistent with the expressed legislative intent, to elide an unconstitutional portion of a statute and find the remaining provisions to be constitutional and effective.” State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823, 830 (Tenn. 1994) (citing Lowe’s Cos. v. Cardwell, 813 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tenn. 1991)). Furthermore, the General Assembly has approved the practice of elision through the enactment of a general severability statute, which provides as follows: It is hereby declared that the sections, clauses, sentences and parts of the Tennessee Code are severable, are not matters of mutual essential inducement, and any of them shall be exscinded if the [C]ode would otherwise be unconstitutional or ineffective. If any one (1) or more sections, clauses, sentences or parts shall for any reason be questioned in any court, and shall be adjudged unconstitutional or invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remaining provisions thereof, but shall be confined in its operation to the specific provision or provisions so held unconstitutional or invalid . . . . Tenn. Code Ann. § 1-3-110 (2014). This legislative endorsement of elision “does not automatically make it applicable to every situation; however, when a conclusion can be reached that the legislature would have enacted the act in question with the unconstitutional portion omitted, then elision of the unconstitutional portion is appropriate.” In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 189 (Tenn. 1999); see also Tester, 879 S.W.2d at 830 (“The rule of elision applies if it is made to appear from the face of the statute that the legislature would have -15- enacted it with the objectionable features omitted . . . .” (quoting Gibson Cnty. Special Sch. Dist. v. Palmer, 691 S.W.2d 544, 551 (Tenn. 1985))). Applying these principles, we reject the Defendant’s contention that the invalidity of the spiritual treatment exemption would preclude altogether the enforcement of the statute prohibiting child abuse and neglect. The General Assembly enacted the child abuse and neglect statute in 1989 without a spiritual treatment exemption. The law remained in effect with no exemption until the 1994 Act. There is clearly a compelling state interest to protect children from abuse or neglect, and there is no indication that the General Assembly would have repealed the statute had it been unable to enact the spiritual treatment exemption. Under these circumstances, we hold that enforcing the child abuse and neglect statute without the spiritual treatment exemption is “consistent with the expressed legislative intent.” Tester, 879 S.W.2d at 830. We must next consider whether the Defendant would be entitled to relief if we were to elide the allegedly unconstitutional terminology within the spiritual treatment exemption. This would require the deletion of the words “alone in accordance with the tenets or practices of a recognized church or religious denomination by a duly accredited practitioner thereof.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-15-402(c) (Supp. 2001). Eliding the statute in this manner would extend the exemption to any parent who “provide[s] treatment by spiritual means through prayer . . . in lieu of medical or surgical treatment.” Id. The State maintains—and we agree—that eliding the statute in this way would expand the scope of the exemption beyond what was intended by the General Assembly. While broadening the statutory exemption might serve to address any constitutional deficiencies, we cannot say that our legislature would have enacted an exemption so broad that it would encompass all instances in which a parent claims reliance upon prayer in lieu of medical treatment for a child. The doctrine of elision is not a proper means “to completely re-write or make-over a statute.” Shelby Cnty. Election Comm’n v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774, 778 (Tenn. 1988); see also Tester, 879 S.W.2d at 830 (declining to use elision to expand the scope of an unconstitutional work release statute because to do so would amount to “indulging in judicial legislation”). Thus, application of the doctrine of elision in this instance would eliminate entirely the spiritual treatment exemption while preserving the terms of the statute prohibiting child abuse and neglect. See Boone v. Boozman, 217 F. Supp. 2d 938, 952 (E.D. Ark. 2002) (eliding entire religious exemption to compulsory immunization because it was improper “to re-write the immunization statute to fashion a broader exemption that the General Assembly may not have contemplated or intended”). Because the elision of the spiritual treatment exemption and the preservation of the remainder of the child abuse and neglect statute is consistent with the expressed legislative intent, the Defendant would not be entitled to relief even if we were to hold that the spiritual treatment exemption violates the Establishment Clause or the Equal -16- Protection Clause. Accordingly, we must affirm the Defendant’s convictions without ruling on these constitutional claims.8