Opinion ID: 836572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Legal Principles to Measure 40

Text: As discussed earlier, by its terms, Measure 40 purports to amend Article I of the Oregon Constitution, by adding a new section to that article that contains procedural rights to which crime victims are entitled in the pretrial, trial, and post-trial phases of a criminal prosecution or juvenile delinquency proceeding, and by prescribing a construction methodology for sections 9 and 12. [8] Measure 40 does not otherwise expressly repeal or modify any existing constitutional provision. As explained below, however, the measure implicitly changes the existing Oregon Constitution in several respects.
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to public trial by an impartial jury in the county in which the offense shall have been committed; to be heard by himself and counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; provided, however, that any accused person, in other than capital cases, and with the consent of the trial judge, may elect to waive trial by jury and consent to be tried by the judge of the court alone, such election to be in writing; provided, however, that in the circuit court ten members of the jury may render a verdict of guilty or not guilty, save and except a verdict of guilty of first degree murder, which shall be found only by a unanimous verdict, and not otherwise[.]  (Emphasis added.) Section (1)(h)of Measure 40 permits a guilty vote of 11 to 1 in aggravated murder and murder cases, notwithstanding any other law or provision of [the Oregon] Constitution. Section (1)(h), therefore, changes the unanimous verdict requirement in murder cases, currently set out in Article I, section 11. [9] Further, section (1)(g) of Measure 40 grants crime victims the right to insist upon a jury trial. That section changes a defendant's ability to waive trial by jury under Article I, section 11, in that it specifies a circumstancea victim's desire for a jury trialin which a criminal defendant cannot waive a jury trial. [10] b. Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a). Section (1)(g) of Measure 40 also specifies certain requirements for juror qualification. [11] Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a), provides that [t]he Legislative Assembly shall provide by law for    [s]electing juries and qualifications of jurors. Thus, section (1)(g) of Measure 40 changes Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a), because it imposes constitutional limitations upon the legislature's authority to enact laws pertaining to juror qualification in criminal cases. c. Article I, section 14. Section (1)(a) of Measure 40 allows pretrial release in certain cases only upon a proper evidentiary showing. [12] Article I, section 14, which requires that crimes other than murder and treason shall be bailable by sufficient sureties, sets out a standard to determine when an arrested person may be released before trial. See generally Priest, 314 Or. at 419, 840 P.2d 65 (Article I, section 14, applies to those accused, but not yet convicted, of criminal offenses). Section (1)(a) of Measure 40 changes that standard, by adding new constitutional prerequisites for pretrial release. In other words, section (1)(a) changes the circumstances in which certain criminal defendants otherwise would be entitled to release under Article I, section 14. d. Article I, sections 9 and 12. Perhaps most notably, section (1)(f) of Measure 40 grants crime victims the right to have all relevant evidence admissible against the criminal defendant. In addition, section (2) provides that [t]he rights conferred on victims by this [measure] shall be limited only to the extent required by the United States Constitution (boldface in original) and that Section 9, Article I and Section 12, Article I of this Constitution shall not be construed more broadly than the United States Constitution. [13] The parties offer competing interpretations of section (2) of Measure 40, specifically the phrase that limits possible constructions of Article I, sections 9 and 12. Plaintiffs contend that that phrase effectively repeals Article I, sections 9 and 12, as they currently exist, together with judicial interpretations of those provisions, and replaces them with the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [14] Plaintiffs further contend that section (2) effectively modifies Article VII (Amended), section 1, [15] because it limits the judiciary's inherent power to interpret the Oregon Constitution, as well as Article III, section 1, [16] because, at the least, it modifies the separation of powers principles set out in that section. The state responds that section (2) of Measure 40 merely clarifies the scope of a crime victim's right to have all relevant evidence admissible against a criminal defendant, by instructing courts that they may suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Oregon Constitution only if the United States Constitution would require suppression. Stated differently, in the state's view, section (2) changes the remedy to be afforded for a violation of certain rights embodied in the Oregon Constitution, but does not change the nature of the state constitutional rights themselves. We need not resolve the parties' competing contentions concerning the precise intended effect of section (2) of Measure 40. Even under the state's more limited reading of section (2), that section, particularly when read in conjunction with section (1)(f) of Measure 40, would have the following effects. First, it would create a constitutional limitation upon the remedy to be afforded for violations of Article I, sections 9 and 12, by requiring that evidence be suppressed only if the Fourth or Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution require suppression. Second, and perhaps more significantly, section (2) would change the nature of the rights currently afforded under Article I, section 9, because the protections afforded by Article I, section 9, include the right to have evidence excluded if it is obtained in violation of the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. See State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Rogers, 314 Or. 114, 119, 836 P.2d 127 (1992) (the exclusion of evidence under Article I, section 9, is based on the personal right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure, in contrast to deterring police misconduct (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Davis, 313 Or. 246, 253-54, 834 P.2d 1008 (1992) (If th[e] constitutional right [under Article I, section 9] to be secure against impermissible government conduct is to be effective, it must mean that the government cannot obtain a criminal conviction through the use of evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under that provision.    Individual rights so protected are vindicated through the sanction of suppression of evidence. (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). e. Summary. Measure 40 adds a number of crime victims' rights to Article I of the Oregon Constitution and also changes the constitution in the following respects: (1) a criminal defendant's ability to waive a jury trial under Article I, section 11, is limited by the victim's new and competing right to a jury trial; (2) a unanimous verdict no longer is required in aggravated murder and murder cases under Article I, section 11; (3) the legislature's ability to enact laws pertaining to juror qualifications in criminal cases under Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a), is limited by new constitutional requirements; (4) a criminal defendant's right to pretrial release under Article I, section 14, is limited by new constitutional requirements; and (5) at the least, the constitutional remedy for violation of the rights set out in Article I, sections 9 and 12, is limited to the remedies available under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and, consequently, evidence obtained in violation of those rights can be suppressed only if the United States Constitution requires suppression. [17]
As can be seen, in addition to adding a number of crime victims' rights to Article I, Measure 40 changes five existing sections of the Oregon Constitution (Article I, sections 9, 11, 12, and 14, and Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a)), encompassing six separate, individual rights (pertaining to search and seizure, unanimous jury verdicts, waiver of jury trial, former jeopardy, self-incrimination, and bail), in addition to limiting the legislature's ability to establish juror qualifications in criminal cases. Those multiple constitutional changes effected by Measure 40 are more than sufficient to meet that part of the test for two or more amendments, discussed earlier, that inquires whether the measure at issue makes two or more changes to the constitution. See 327 Or. at 277, 959 P.2d at 64 (stating test). It is equally clear, we think, that the changes effected by Measure 40 are substantive. The remaining issue, then, is whether those changes are not closely related. Many of the constitutional provisions affected by Measure 40 are related in the sense that they pertain to constitutional rights that might be implicated during a criminal investigation or prosecution. However, not allsuch as the requirement that the jury pool in criminal cases be drawn from registered votersshare even that relationship. Further, even those provisions that are related in the sense described are not related closely enough to satisfy the separate-vote requirement of Article XVII, section 1. For example, the right of all people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, section 9, has virtually nothing to do with the right of the criminally accused to have a unanimous verdict rendered in a murder case under Article I, section 11. The two provisions involve separate constitutional rights, granted to different groups of persons. Similarly, the right of the criminally accused to bail by sufficient sureties under Article I, section 14, bears no relation to legislation concerning the qualification of jurors in criminal cases under Article VII (Amended), section 5(1)(a). Those examples alone are sufficient to demonstrate that Measure 40 contains two or more amendments to the Oregon Constitution. Accordingly, we conclude that the measure was not adopted in compliance with Article XVII, section 1. We emphasize that we express no view regarding the merits of the changes proposed by Measure 40. Indeed, this court's case law makes clear that Article IV, section 1, grants the people the power to change the Oregon Constitution as they so desire, including modifying or repealing a provision of the Bill of Rights, so long as the proposed change or changes comply with the constitutional requirements for amending the constitution. See Ex Parte Kerby, 103 Or. 612, 616-17, 205 P. 279 (1922) (through their initiative power, the people can adopt a constitutional amendment that expressly or implicitly repeals an existing constitutional provision, including a provision of the Bill of Rights); Boy'd v. Olcott et al., 102 Or. 327, 358-59, 202 P. 431 (1921) (The Constitution prescribes the method by which it may be amended, and the procedure so prescribed is the measure of the power to amend.). Our holding here simply is that Measure 40 contains two or more constitutional amendments that must be voted upon separately under Article XVII, section 1. [18]