Opinion ID: 2777610
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wright’s Motion to Suppress

Text: As in Franz, our analysis here focuses on the culpability of the agents and prosecutors who failed to ensure that a list of items to be seized was attached to the warrant that was executed. Wright does not argue that anyone deliberately or recklessly violated his Fourth Amendment rights. He argues instead that Agent Taylor was grossly 7 negligent and, consequently, that deterrence is worth the price of suppression. Franz is instructive but not directly on point. In both Franz and this case, the agents obtained valid warrants in consultation with federal prosecutors and seized only those items authorized by their warrants. In Franz, however, Agent Nardinger was inexperienced, and he understood the magistrate judge’s sealing order as prohibiting him from giving Franz the list of items to be seized. We cannot say the same about Agent Taylor, who has extensive experience with search warrants and did not interpret the magistrate judge’s sealing order as excusing compliance with the particularity requirement. This is significant for two reasons. First, an “officer’s knowledge and experience” bears on whether it was objectively reasonable for that officer to believe that the search was legal. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 145. Second, the Supreme Court has held that the exclusionary rule does not apply when an officer “reasonably relie[s] on the Magistrate’s assurance that the warrant contain[s] an adequate description of the things to be seized and [i]s therefore valid.” Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 564 (2004) (describing Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984)). “Even though Nardinger was mistaken, his reliance on the sealing order mitigate[d] the blame that necessarily follow[ed] his error.” Franz, 772 F.3d at 149. As a result, Agent Taylor is arguably more culpable than Agent Nardinger. The agents’ relative culpability does not, however, answer the question of whether Agent Taylor’s conduct meets the standard for gross negligence. “‘Gross negligence’ is a nebulous term that is defined in a multitude of ways, 8 depending on the legal context and the jurisdiction.” 57A Am. Jur. 2d Negligence § 227. This Court has explained that gross negligence has “been described as the want of even scant care and the failure to exercise even that care which a careless person would use.” Fialkowski v. Greenwich Home for Children, Inc., 921 F.2d 459, 462 (3d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, ordinary negligence “means no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Whether Taylor was “grossly” negligent or merely negligent in the “ordinary” sense is difficult to assess if we consult only the hornbook formulations of these terms. Did Taylor fail to exercise “reasonable care,” or did his failure to read the warrant before executing it demonstrate the absence of even “scant care”? Fundamentally, the precautions we would expect an officer to take depend largely on what might happen if he failed to take them. The probable consequences of the failure to exercise care are certainly relevant to the value of deterrence. In addition, “the value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to commit the forbidden act.” Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006). Accordingly, it makes sense to consider (1) the extent to which the violation in this case undermined the purposes of the Fourth Amendment and (2) what the Government gained from the violation. The requirement that warrants particularly describe the things to be seized has a number of purposes. First, it provides “written assurance that the Magistrate actually found probable cause to search for, and to seize, every item mentioned.” Groh, 540 U.S. at 560; see also Tracey, 597 F.3d 9 at 146. Second, it prevents “general searches” by confining the discretion of officers and authorizing them to seize only particular items. Tracey, 597 F.3d at 146. Third, it “informs the subject of the search ‘of the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of his power to search.’” Id. (quoting Groh, 540 U.S. at 561). The violation at issue here did not undermine the first two purposes of the particularity requirement. This was no general search, as Agent Taylor oversaw it and “assured that the [other] officers acted in accordance with the warrant’s limits.” United States v. Wright, Criminal No. 09-270-ALL, 2013 WL 3090304, at  (E.D. Pa. June 20, 2013). Wright does not argue that these limits were exceeded in any way. Furthermore, we can be confident that the magistrate judge found probable cause to search for and seize every item listed in Agent Taylor’s affidavit. When the warrant was approved, the affidavit was attached and expressly incorporated by reference in the space for identifying the items to be seized. Indeed, in addition to signing the warrant, the magistrate signed the affidavit, albeit for the purpose of certifying that Agent Taylor had sworn to it. See United States v. Allen, 625 F.3d 830, 839 (5th Cir. 2010) (noting that “the magistrate judge’s signature on the affidavit reduces the concern that he did not agree to the scope of the search as defined and limited therein”). Wright’s reliance on Groh, 540 U.S. 551, and Virgin Islands v. John, 654 F.3d 412 (3d Cir. 2011), is misplaced for this reason. In Groh, the Supreme Court denied qualified immunity to officers who relied on a warrant that failed to particularly describe the items to be seized. The portion of the 10 warrant that called for a description of the items to be seized instead described the house to be searched. Although an attached affidavit contained a list of items to be seized, it was not expressly incorporated into the warrant itself. Consequently, “[t]he mere fact that the Magistrate issued [the] warrant d[id] not necessarily establish that he agreed that the scope of the search should be as broad as the affiant’s request.” Id. at 561. In John, the agent’s affidavit was “‘so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.’” 654 F.3d at 418 (quoting Tracey, 597 F.3d at 151). Here, by contrast, there is no reason to believe that any aspect of the search was unsupported by probable cause. The failure to retain the list of items to be seized did undercut the third purpose of the particularity requirement, as Wright was not informed of the limits of the agents’ power to search. Here, too, Franz presents a more compelling case for application of the good-faith exception: Agent Nardinger verbally explained to Franz what items the warrant authorized him to search for and seize. See Franz, 772 F.3d at 148. The importance of this distinction is, however, questionable. The Supreme Court has observed that “neither the Fourth Amendment nor Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41” requires “the executing officer [to] present the property owner with a copy of the warrant before conducting his search.” United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2006). The Fourth Amendment “protects property owners not by giving them license to engage the police in a debate over the basis for the warrant, but by interposing, [before the search], the ‘deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . between the citizen and the police,’ and by 11 providing, [after the search], a right to suppress evidence improperly obtained and a cause of action for damages.” Id. at 99 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-482 (1963)). It is therefore unclear how Wright was harmed by his inability to peruse the list of items the Government intended to seize at the time of the raid on his apartment. It follows that the Government gained nothing from the Fourth Amendment violation. Even if the list of items to be seized had been present at the scene, the agents would have collected precisely the same evidence, and Wright would have been unable to stop them. The violation in this case had no impact on the evidence that could be deployed against Wright at trial. Wright is undoubtedly correct to point out that suppression would incentivize the Government to carefully scrutinize each warrant before it is executed. The purpose of imposing tort liability for negligence is, after all, to encourage individuals to exercise reasonable care. In the context of suppression, however, the Supreme Court has unequivocally held that deterring isolated negligence is not worth the social cost of excluded evidence. See Herring, 555 U.S. at 144 n.4, 147-48. Only if mistakes of this nature recur with some frequency will a criminal defendant be in a position to argue that the calculus has changed. See id. at 144.