Opinion ID: 171233
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The District Court's Failure to Grant a Continuance

Text: Mr. Pinson first argues that the court's reversal of its own ruling immediately before trial, combined with its failure to grant a continuance, made it impossible to subpoena witnesses who would testify favorably about his lack of intent. He therefore claims that his right to compulsory process was violated. The first question we must face is whether this error, if it was error, was preserved. Immediately after changing its ruling, the trial judge asked Mr. Pinson if he wished to call the witness he had previously identified as relevant to his intent: Now, Mr. Pinson, you had requested an inmate witness that you thought was relevant on this issue. Is that somebody that's necessary? Id. at 3. In response, Mr. Pinson informed the court that I think at this point it's too late. And this person's testimony just would not be substantial enough to allow the jury to decide whether a person thought the letter was a threat or not. Id. at 4. Appellate counsel, at oral argument, asked that we treat Mr. Pinson's response to the court  at this point it's too late  as a request for a continuance. While we construe a pro se defendant's submissions liberally, Ledbetter v. City of Topeka, Kan., 318 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir.2003), this proffered reading is beyond plausibility. Had Mr. Pinson said nothing else in addition to it's too late, counsel's argument might have some merit, as this statement could be interpreted as an attempt to inform the court that, given the close proximity to trial, subpoenaing the witness was impossible without a continuance. Mr. Pinson, however, did not only reply that it was too late. He also stated that this person's testimony just would not be substantial enough to allow the jury to decide whether a person thought the letter was a threat or not. R. Vol. IV at 4. This was an affirmative reassurance to the court that there was no testimony available that could assist him on the intent element. In no way can these statements, taken in totality, be construed as a request for the court to continue the trial. The question then becomes whether it was plain error for the district court not to grant a continuance sua sponte, and despite Mr. Pinson's assurance that the witness could not be substantial enough to help the jury. We think not. To be plain error, a district court's decision must have plainly been in error based on the evidence before it. See United States v. Redcorn, 528 F.3d 727, 743-44 (10th Cir.2008). Even assuming Mr. Pinson would have been entitled to a continuance if he had asserted that a potential witness was important and that he needed time to obtain his presence, it was not error for the court to proceed with the trial when it had no reason to think a potential witness could affect the outcome. Nor has Mr. Pinson shown that the testimony he would have presented was material and favorable to his case. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). While his brief lists several witnesses that he wished to call, Aplt.'s Br. 15, he has not provided us with any information regarding what their testimony would have entailed or how their testimony would have improved his case. Counsel at oral argument also shed no light on this matter. Though we do not require detailed descriptions of what has been lost, Mr. Pinson must still make a `plausible showing' that the lost testimony was material and favorable. United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1242 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440). Mr. Pinson has fallen short of this burden, and we therefore deny his claim that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated.