Opinion ID: 613904
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Subjectivity

Text: Barber argues that the decision to terminate him was essentially subjective, and thus, suspicious. We have cautioned against the use of subjective considerations because they are easily fabricated. Chambers v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 351 F.3d 848, 858 (8th Cir.2003) (citing McCullough v. Real Foods, Inc., 140 F.3d 1123, 1129 (8th Cir.1998)). Our review of the record in this case, specifically C1's written explanation for Barber's termination, does not support the characterization that C1's decision in this case was subjective.
Barber alleges that certain events that occurred in the course of this litigation show C1's racial discrimination or pretext. We disagree. Carroll apparently attended Barber's deposition and declined to shake Barber's hand. Carroll explained: He's filed a lawsuit against my company. I don't see the need to be nice. (App. 408) In his brief, Barber asserts that Carroll had refused to shake the hands of other African American employees, including himself and Karmen Barber. In support, Barber cites only his own deposition testimony that when black people that seem to be as intelligent as [Carroll] was, as was the case with my wife and I, [Carroll] didn't even bother to shake their hands. (App. 438) Barber also testified that he did not work with Carroll, did not know him very well, and had probably seen him four or five times, or three or four.... It was very few times. We agree with the district court that this evidence does not show discrimination. Odell Jackson, a C1 employee, was also deposed. He submitted a post-deposition errata sheet stating, Ray [Barber] tried to get me to lie to EEOC for Karmen by telling her that a nickname that Mr. David Morgan gave me offended me. The name was a joke so I wasn't offended by that and Ray kept saying, just tell them the truth but this was the truth and I wasn't going to lie and say I was offended. (App. 585) Barber argues that the record supports an inference that Jackson submitted the errata sheet based on pressure from Simpson. This argument is speculative and does not support a denial of summary judgment. To survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must `substantiate his allegations with sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor based on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.' Putman, 348 F.3d at 733-34 (alterations in original) (quoting Wilson v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., 62 F.3d 237, 241 (8th Cir.1995)); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (evidence that is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, cannot be the basis for a denial of summary judgment). More importantly, though, whether Barber (or Simpson) asked Jackson to testify a certain way is not material. Neither Jackson's errata sheet, nor other statements relied on by Barber to show witness tampering, stand between Barber and a jury trial. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.). We conclude that Barber's evidence does not undermine C1's reasons for terminating him. Nor does it permit a reasonable inference that racial discrimination motivated the termination. Barber was asked to stop driving students to church. Thereafter, he drove students to church. This legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis for termination was presented to Barber at the time, to the district court at summary judgment, and on appeal. Because the proffered evidence would not support a reasonable finding of pretext or discrimination, we affirm the grant of summary judgment to C1 on Barber's claim that he was terminated because of racial discrimination.