Opinion ID: 2287921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: maryland history of the commission concept

Text: One may suspect that the difficulty relative to Judge Berry was the spark which produced the Commission on Judicial Disabilities. The report of the Committee on Judicial Ethics of M.S.B.A. at the mid-winter meeting of the Association held January 17-18, 1964 ( see 69 Transactions Maryland State Bar Association 401-407 (1964)) states that in the spring of the previous year the Honorable William S. James, then and now President of the Senate of Maryland, and Rignal W. Baldwin, Esq., later President of M.S.B.A., had each separately called the attention of then President Kenneth C. Proctor to an article appearing in the February, 1963, issue of American Bar Association Journal on the problem of removal of judges and how the matter is handled in various states short of impeachment or legislative address. It was Frankel, Removal of Judges: California Tackles an Old Problem, 49 A.B.A.J. 166-171 (1963). The committee report states, [t]he power of removal set forth in the Constitution is quite limited. It then refers to Art. IV, § 4 of our Constitution providing that a judge shall be removed from office by the Governor, on conviction in a Court of Law, of incompetency, of willful neglect of duty, misbehavior in office, or any other crime, or on impeachment, according to this Constitution, or the Laws of the State; or on the address of the General Assembly, two-thirds of each House concurring in such address, and the accused having been notified of the charges against him, and having had opportunity of making his defence. It also refers to Art. 33 of the Declaration of Rights which we have previously mentioned. The committee report concludes: After consideration and discussion we have reached the conclusion that there is a need for a legally constituted body with power to investigate and take or initiate action to remove or retire a judge for cause. This will necessitate the passage and adoption of an amendment to the constitution which will require careful thought and investigation in its preparation. The rather full reference to the California system of handling the subject is only illustrative of a method which in a very short period has proved very effective. We are not suggesting it or any other method. We recommend that a committee be appointed to prepare an appropriate amendment to the constitution of the State for removal or retirement of a judge for cause. Id. at 402. (Emphasis added.) In the light of our discussion of the doctrine of inherent power to effect removal of a judge for disciplinary purposes, the membership of that committee is interesting. Its chairman was Judge S. Ralph Warnken. Its members were Messrs. John T. Tucker, Ralph G. Shure, Reuben Oppenheimer, Cornelius P. Mundy, James Macgill, Thomas J. Keating, Jr., George T. Burroughs and Lester L. Barrett. Each member of that committee other than Mr. Burroughs was then either a former or an active trial judge in this State. Judge Oppenheimer, of course, ultimately became a member of this Court. It is significant that the thought that this Court had inherent power of removal apparently never crossed their minds. At the M.S.B.A. annual meeting in July Judge Warnken's committee suggested adoption of a constitutional amendment. See 69 Transactions Maryland State Bar Association 402-407 (1964). It was there proposed that there be created a commission which [i]f, after hearing, [it found] good cause ... [was to] recommend to the Court of Appeals the removal or retirement ... of [a] judge. The Court was to review the record of the proceedings on the law and facts and in its discretion [might] permit the introduction of additional evidence.... It could order removal or retirement, as it found just and proper, or wholly reject the recommendation. In the debate at that annual meeting Judge James H. Pugh made reference to the fact that under existing constitutional provisions judges had been retired for disability. ( See Const. Art. IV, § 3, 69 Transactions Maryland State Bar Association 147 (1964), and Chapter 854, Acts of 1943.) The committee's recommendation was altered materially after it reached the General Assembly in the form of a Legislative Council proposal. It was that altered proposal which entered the Constitution by amendment in 1966 to which reference has been made in the majority opinion as well as previously in this opinion and which provided for a commission appointed by the Governor. If it found good cause (misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform the duties of his office or conduct which [might] prejudice the proper administration of justice, or... disability seriously interferring with the performance of his duties, which [was], or [was] likely to become, of a permanent character), it was to recommend to the General Assembly the removal or retirement of the judge. The matter of judicial disabilities was studied by the Constitutional Convention Commission. In the bare bones draft constitution proposed by it § 5.25 of the judicial article called for removal by [t]he Supreme Court of any judge upon a finding of misconduct in office or persistent failure to perform the duties of his office.... [3] The report and its comments indicate that it was based upon the 1964 recommendation of M.S.B.A. No provision was made for a judicial disabilities commission. That Commission said, however, that it contemplated that the Supreme Court [would] by rule establish a commission of some sort for the purpose of receiving and reviewing preliminary complaints against judges and with the responsibility for recommending formal removal proceedings should the evidence justify such a recommendation. (Emphasis added.) See Report of the Constitutional Convention Commission at 205. No mention was made of censure. Then came the Constitutional Convention of 1967. The fact that the constitution proposed by that Convention was rejected by the voters on May 14, 1968, does not detract from the provision relative to judicial disability in that proposed constitution since that was not a subject of attack and it is one of a number of provisions which have since been lifted into our present Constitution. In § 5.26 of the proposed constitution a commission on judicial disability was created. The concluding sentence of § 5.27 relative to powers of that commission was: The Court of Appeals shall prescribe by rule the means to implement and enforce the powers of the Commission. The only difference between that and the last sentence of § 4B. (a) of Art. IV of our present Constitution is inclusion of a power by rule also to prescribe the practice and procedure before the Commission. That sentence reads: The Court of Appeals shall prescribe by rule the means to implement and enforce the powers of the Commission and the practice and procedure before the Commission. Unlike our present constitutional provision, removal and retirement were dealt with in separate sections. The similarity between § 5.29 in that proposed constitution and the provision of our present Constitution relative to removal becomes readily apparent when the two are placed side by side with the provision in the latter relative to disability removed. [4] They read: Section 5.29. Removal by Court Section 4B. Power of Commission of Appeals. on judicial disabilities; procedure; removal or retirement of judge by Court of Appeals. (a)    Upon recommendation of the (b) Upon recommendation Commission on Judicial of the Commission that a judge be Disabilities that a judge be removed from office ... the Court removed from office, the Court of Appeals, after a hearing and upon of Appeals, after a hearing and a finding of misconduct while in upon a finding of misconduct office, or of persistent failure to while in office, or of persistent the duties of his office, or of perform failure to perform the conduct prejudicial to the proper duties of his office, or of administration of justice, may remove conduct prejudicial to the proper the judge from office or may administration of justice, may censure him.... A judge removed remove the judge from office or under this section, and his surviving may censure him. A judge removed spouse, shall have the rights and under this section, and his privileges accruing from his judicial surviving spouse, shall have the service only to the extent prescribed rights and privileges accruing by the order of removal.... No from his judicial service only to judge shall sit in judgment in any the extent prescribed by the order hearing involving his own removal. of removal. No judge shall sit in ... judgment in any hearing involving his own removal. Note that in each instance we are permitted to remove a judge or censure him, but there are two conditions precedent to such removal or censure, first there must be a recommendation of the Commission that a judge be removed, and then there must be a finding by us of misconduct while in office, or of persistent failure to perform the duties of his office, or of conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice.... I was a member of the Committee on the Judicial Branch of the 1967 Constitutional Convention. The minutes of William H. Adkins, II, Esq., the staff advisor to that committee, show that the original action of that committee called for this Court to have power to remove any judge from office upon a finding, after hearing, of misconduct in office.... Under that provision this Court was by rule or order [to] implement and enforce [that] section by establishing a commission of mixed lay, lawyer and judicial composition to conduct hearings and make recommendations to this Court for removal or retirement if justified by the evidence. What emerged from the committee and went to the floor of the convention in the form of Committee Recommendation No. JB-1 was a proposal that gave this Court power to remove or censure upon recommendation of the Commission ... that the judge be removed and upon a finding, after hearing, of misconduct while in office, persistent failure to perform the duties of his office, or conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice. (Emphasis added.) Although substantial changes were made in the judicial article by the Committee of the Whole, no changes appear to have been made in that particular proposal. The Committee on Style, Drafting and Arrangement did make changes in the wording for stylistic purposes and there was some renumbering of sections. No change was made in the actual meaning, however. The report of the majority of the Committee on the Judicial Branch accompanying Committee Recommendation JB-1 is significant. It states in pertinent part: Although there was some difference of opinion in the Committee, the highest court is given the right to censure, in addition to the right to remove or retire, but the draft provides that only cases warranting removal or retirement are referable to the Court. The proceedings before the Commission are confidential, but there is not, and could not properly be, a requirement that they be kept confidential, in the event of referral for trial. (Emphasis added.) In the progression of things we come next to Chapters 789 and 791 of the Acts of 1969. These proposed constitutional amendments each included in identical terms language creating a commission on judicial disabilities. Chapter 789 was ratified by the people on November 3, 1970, and is the source of our present Commission. Chapter 791 was rejected. At that same 1969 session Delegate Orlinsky introduced House Bill No. 1126. It called for a constitutional amendment repealing the provisions relative to the Commission on Judicial Disabilities and providing in lieu thereof a Commission on Judicial Qualifications to investigate complaints against any judge and to recommend decisions as to the retirement or removal of judges. Under that provision the General Assembly was to provide by law further duties and responsibilities for the Commission. House Bill 1125, a companion bill, proposed adding a new section to Art. 26 of the Code providing for a Commission on Judicial Qualifications with power to conduct hearings concerning the censure, removal or retirement of a judge, in addition to the right to administer oaths, etc. It was to have the power to recommend to the Court of Appeals the censure, removal or retirement of a judge. Under that proposed act this Court would have had the power upon the recommendation of the Commission or upon our own motion after hearing and upon a finding of misconduct while in office, or of persistent failure to perform the duties of his office, or of conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, [to] remove the judge from office or censure him. Next in the order of things came a proposal from the Legislative Council, Item 164(6), to the 1970 session of the General Assembly to withdraw Chapter 791 of the Acts of 1969 and to submit in lieu thereof a constitutional amendment dealing solely with judicial disabilities. The Commission was to have power to make recommendations to [us] concerning the removal, retirement, or censure of a judge. (Emphasis added.) We were to have power [u]pon a recommendation of the Commission that a judge be removed from office, that he be retired, or that he be censured ... after a hearing and upon a finding of misconduct while in office, or of persistent failure to perform the duties of his office, or of conduct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice, [to] remove the judge from office or [to] censure him.... That too failed of passage. In short, from this recital it may be said that the legislative history of our present constitutional provision does not show an intention that the Commission should have the power to recommend censure. In fact, bearing in mind that the present provision, as I have demonstrated, is almost word for word from the constitution proposed by the Constitutional Convention in 1968, the report of the Committee on the Judicial Branch is rather conclusive evidence that the Constitutional Convention, at least, intended that there reach us only cases [which in the opinion of the Commission] warrant[ed] removal or retirement. If, however, we thought after due consideration that the ultimate sanction of removal or retirement was too harsh, then we were to have the right to censure. I point out that under the existing constitutional provision we have no power to initiate before us an action leading to removal or retirement.