Opinion ID: 1659535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Psychiatric Records of Witness For Cross-Examination

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel access to the confidential psychiatric records of Shannon Stewart for cross-examination. Toward the end of the State's examination of Stewart, defense counsel informed the court that he had just learned that morning that Stewart was presently undergoing psychiatric care at Cumberland Hall Psychiatric Hospital in Nashville. As a result, defense counsel moved to review Stewart's records from this hospitalization before beginning cross-examination to ascertain if his mental condition interfered with his memory of past events. After reviewing Stewart's prior statements and his testimony at Roger Brewington's trial, the trial court found that they were consistent with and contained no substantial variation from his testimony at this trial to warrant turning the records over to the defense, and denied defense counsel's motion. For the purposes of appellate review, however, the trial court ordered a transcript of Stewart's testimony at the Brewington trial and a sealed copy of his psychiatric records to be made exhibits to the trial record. The defendant contends that the trial court's failure to allow counsel to examine Stewart's records deprived him of the opportunity to confront witnesses against him, in violation of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Article I, § 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. In addition, the defendant contends that he was entitled to review the records under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Tenn.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(D). The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which is applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965), provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The corresponding provision of the Tennessee Constitution provides [t]hat in all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath the right ... to meet the witnesses face to face. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. Although the language is not identical, this Court has previously adopted the standards of the U.S. Supreme Court under the Sixth Amendment in determining whether there has been a violation of the confrontation clause of Article I, § 9. State v. Armes, 607 S.W.2d 234, 237 (Tenn. 1980). The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment provides two types of protection for criminal defendants: the right to physically face those who testify against him, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S.Ct. 989, 998, 94 L.Ed.2d 40, 53 (1987). The right to cross-examine witnesses, however, does not include the power to require the pretrial disclosure of any and all information that might be useful in contradicting unfavorable testimony. Id., 480 U.S. at 53, 107 S.Ct. at 999, 94 L.Ed.2d at 54. Therefore, the right to confront witnesses is satisfied if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to cross-examine, because the confrontation clause only guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Id. (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 294, 88 L.Ed.2d 15, 19 (1985)). In this case, we find that the defendant was not denied the opportunity to effectively cross-examine Shannon Stewart. The trial court denied defense counsel's motion without conducting an in camera inspection of the records to determine what, if any, probative information they contained. This was error because the psychiatric records pertained to the mental instability of a witness that existed within a reasonable time before the testimony was given, which is relevant in determining veracity. State v. Barnes, 703 S.W.2d 611, 617-18 (Tenn. 1985). However, the error was harmless because if the trial court had reviewed the records, as we have done, it would have found that they contained very little information probative of Stewart's credibility. The records indicate that Stewart was hospitalized at the time of trial for what were essentially behavioral problems. As a result, the information contained in the records had little relevance to Stewart's credibility or the probative value of his testimony. In addition, there is nothing in the trial record to demonstrate that defense counsel was prevented from asking Stewart about his hospitalization. We therefore conclude that the defendant was not denied the opportunity to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 355 (1974). The defendant next argues that his counsel was entitled to review the psychiatric records under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Brady , the Supreme Court held that it is a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to an accused after a request for disclosure where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id., 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. Since there has been no showing that records contained any material evidence favorable to the defendant, we find no merit to this argument. The final argument raised by the defendant regarding the psychiatric records is that he was entitled to review them under Tenn.R.Crim.P. 16(a)(1)(D), which provides that: [u]pon request of a defendant the state shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations, and of scientific tests or experiments, or copies thereof, which are within the possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the district attorney general and which are material to the preparation of the defense or are intended for use by the state as evidence in chief at the trial. We find no merit to this argument because there is no evidence that Cumberland Hall is connected in any way with the State so that the records could be considered within the possession, custody or control of the state for discovery purposes under Rule 16(a)(1)(D). State v. Fox, 733 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1987). In addition, there has been no showing that the information contained in the records was material to the preparation of the defense. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's decision to deny counsel for the defendant access to Shannon Stewart's confidential psychiatric records.