Opinion ID: 1993666
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the joinder

Text: The defendant argues that there was an improper joinder in a single indictment of the counts alleging assault with intent to murder and corresponding counts of conspiracy to commit murder arising out of activity that took place between December 8, 1986, and January 8, 1987, with those counts based upon house breaks and corresponding conspiracies that occurred between April 28 and June 24, 1987, as well as three charges of arson committed in the course of the house breaks. Specifically at oral argument defendant concedes that the house breaks and the arson counts could be joined in one indictment, but he asserts that joinder with the sniping (assault-with-intent-to-murder) counts constituted prejudicial error. With this argument we are in agreement. Rule 8(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the joinder of offenses against a single defendant. The rule permits joinder of offenses in the same indictment if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. See State v. Lassor, 555 A.2d 339, 345 (R.I. 1989). In the case at bar the trial justice considered the motion for severance as a discretionary determination pursuant to Rule 14 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Whitman, 431 A.2d 1229 (R.I. 1981); State v. Sharbuno, 120 R.I. 714, 390 A.2d 915 (1978). In the instant case we believe that the trial justice was not confronted with an exercise of discretion but with a legal determination concerning whether these counts had been properly joined under Rule 8(a). An analysis of the charges and the evidence submitted in the case discloses that these offenses were not properly joined. Certainly the sniping or assault charges are not of the same or similar character as the house-breaking and arson charges. Moreover, they do not disclose any common scheme or plan. The state contends that the absence of these factors would nevertheless not require either the motion justice or the trial justice to sever the counts save in his discretion. We must respectfully disagree with this contention, since defendant was entitled to severance as a matter of right. If joinder was not authorized under Rule 8(a) in such a situations, there is no room for discretion and the rule must be applied in accordance with its terms. We cannot say that the refusal to sever in all the circumstances of this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.