Opinion ID: 1684899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffectiveness During the Frye Hearing

Text: Overton contends that his counsel was ineffective due to the failure to participate [11] during the Frye [12] hearing, which was requested by defense counsel on December 21, 1998, and occurred on January 7, 1999. As a general rule, a frye hearing is utilized in Florida only when the science at issue is new or novel. Branch v. State, 952 So.2d 470, 483 (Fla. 2006) (citing Brim v. State, 695 So.2d 268, 271-72 (Fla.1997)). In utilizing the Frye test, the burden is on the proponent of the evidence to prove the general acceptance of both the underlying scientific principle and the testing procedures used to apply that principle to the facts of the case at hand. Ramirez v. State, 651 So.2d 1164, 1168 (Fla.1995) (emphasis added). With regard to the testing procedures used, DNA test results are generally accepted as reliable in the scientific community, provided that the laboratory has followed accepted testing procedures that meet the Frye test to protect against false readings and contamination. Hayes v. State, 660 So.2d 257, 264-65 (Fla.1995). In addition to the importance of the burden of proof, it is crucial that the Frye hearing be conducted in a fair manner. Ramirez, 651 So.2d at 1168. We conclude that the limited participation of counsel during the Frye hearing did not constitute deficient performance because it was a strategic decision made by counsel. During the evidentiary hearing, both Garcia and Smith testified that they came to the mutual decision that the defense would not participate further during the Frye hearing. Counsel was of the view that they would not participate due to the lack of discovery with regard to the procedures and protocols that the Bode Lab used in testing. [13] Consistent with this belief, both Dr. Litman and Dr. Libby, who were experts hired by Overton's counsel, expressed to overton's counsel that they could not give adequate testimony if called during a Frye hearing due to the lack of discovery. Overton's counsel asked for a continuance to provide more time to prepare, but the trial court denied the request. Based upon these circumstances, it was a reasonable decision by Overton's counsel to not participate to a greater extent. The fact that counsel may not have been prepared to fully participate during the Frye hearing does not establish they were not equipped to make a strategic decision with regard to whether they should participate to a greater extent. During the evidentiary hearing, Smith testified that the defense made a strategic decision not to participate further to properly preserve the issue of the lack of discovery with regard to the Bode Lab, which could then be attacked on direct appeal. Consistent with the strategy, appellate counsel argued the discovery issue on direct appeal, but this Court found the argument to be without merit. See Overton, 801 So.2d at 895-96. In making the strategic decision, Overton's trial counsel understood that even if they were able to prevent the STR DNA testing by the Bode Lab from being admitted into evidence, the RFLP DNA testing by the FDLE Lab would still be admitted and would similarly link Overton to the crime. Prior to the Frye hearing, even the trial court acknowledged that case law established that RFLP DNA testing results would be admitted here and the Frye hearing was unnecessary on that DNA matter. Moreover, Dr. Litman previously advised Overton's counsel that RFLP DNA evidence should be admitted in this case. Overton's counsel requested the Frye hearing to challenge only the newer STR technology. Overton correctly concedes that his counsel possessed proper discovery from the FDLE Lab to challenge the RFLP testing that the FDLE Lab conducted, but, contrary to Overton's position, there was no reason to challenge the clearly admissible RFLP DNA evidence. Moreover, despite the decision to not participate further during the Frye hearing, other attempts were made by Overton's counsel to exclude these DNA testing results. First, Overton's counsel asked that the DNA evidence be excluded and renewed the motion immediately before the Frye hearing. Second, Overton's counsel understood that the chain of custody issue would not be waived and they could still challenge witnesses during trial with regard to the alleged broken chain of custody. An alleged broken chain of custody was significant to the defense to support the defense theory that law enforcement had the opportunity to plant Overton's DNA which was found in this case. With this goal, it was reasonable for Overton's counsel to believe that an alleged broken chain of custody did not need to be addressed during the Frye hearing, but rather, should be addressed during trial. During trial, Overton's counsel thoroughly cross-examined Dr. Pope and Detective Petrick, both of whom worked for law enforcement agencies and gathered evidence from the crime scene, on the alleged broken chain of custody, which illustrated that this chain of custody issue was not waived. With regard to Pope, cross-examination on the issue included the following: (1) envelopes that were used to store DNA evidence were misdated; (2) there were no property receipts to account for the swabs that were used to obtain fluids from Susan's body at the scene; (3) the swabs were transported to his home, which was not a certified storage facility; (4) these swabs were placed in his home refrigerator; (5) the first property receipt for the envelopes of clippings, which provided a match to Overton's DNA, was dated June 10, 1994; (6) the bedding (quilt, mattress pad, comforter, and bed sheet) on which semen stains were found were placed in paper bags and transported to his home to be air dried; (7) the bedding was transported to the Key West property evidence storage room on August 26, 1991; and (8) he transported the mattress pad in a paper bag by car to Orlando to have a psychic conduct an inspection. Cross-examination of Petrick on the challenged chain of custody included the following: (1) the paper bags in which he collected evidence did not resemble the particular paper bag that allegedly had his signature on it; (2) this alleged signature on the paper bag, which read Detective R. Petrick, was not his signature; and (3) the property receipts with regard to the clippings in envelopes had writing on them that was not his writing. Contrary to Overton's assertion that the cross-examination was insufficient, Overton's counsel attacked the alleged broken chain of custody with regard to both the brown paper bag and the envelopes that contained the clippings. Finally, we conclude that the decision by Overton's counsel to not address a potential degradation of the DNA evidence during the Frye hearing on the basis of an alleged broken chain of custody was reasonable. First, notwithstanding that Overton's counsel had not conceded at the time of the Frye hearing that the DNA evidence taken from the scene belonged to Overton, the location of DNA evidence matching Overton would be consistent with his theory that his DNA had been planted there. See McDonald v. State, 952 So.2d 484, 495 (Fla.2006) (holding that there was no ineffective assistance for failing to hire a DNA expert because the defense's theory was that the defendant's DNA was planted so the DNA evidence would not seem to be an issue). Second, an expert (Dr. Litman) with whom Overton's counsel consulted had dismissed the dangers of degradation and false positives from an alleged broken chain of custody here. For these reasons, the strategic decision to not participate further was a reasonable decision at the time it was made; thus, we conclude that there was no deficiency. Even if the lack of participation by Overton's counsel during the Frye hearing was deficient, there was no prejudice for multiple reasons. First, the chain of custody was intact. When the evidentiary hearing concluded, the trial court found that there can be no doubt that the chain of custody was absolutely intact and well documented. This finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence. See Williamson v. State, 961 So.2d 229, 237 (Fla.2007) (This Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on issues of fact when competent, substantial evidence supports the circuit court's factual findings. . . . (quoting Smith v. State, 931 So.2d 790, 803 (Fla. 2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 587, 166 L.Ed.2d 436 (2006))). The trial court specifically noted that the Defendant uses a selective reading of the trial transcript to contend that the chain of custody was broken. The trial court specifically found that the mystery of who signed for Detective Petrick on the paper bag was resolved because Dr. Pope testified that it was his writing. Moreover, it is not necessary that evidence be immediately catalogued with a property receipt at the police station for an intact chain of custody to exist. See Taylor v. State, 855 So.2d 1, 25-26 (Fla.2003) (concluding that a piece of evidence, which was not picked up by FDLE for two weeks but instead was stored during that time in a locked cabinet that only officers had access to, was properly admitted into evidence). Although Dr. Pope stored evidence for a period of time in his personal refrigerator at his home, he testified during trial that only he had access to this evidence in his locked home. Thus, the chain of custody was in place. Second, even if the chain of custody was broken, there was not sufficient evidence to establish a probability of tampering, which would support exclusion of the evidence. See Murray v. State, 838 So.2d 1073, 1082 (Fla.2002) (Relevant physical evidence is admissible unless there is an indication of probable tampering. (quoting Peek v. State, 395 So.2d 492, 495 (Fla. 1980))). Contrary to Overton's argument, this Court has not held that a broken chain of custody alone is enough by itself to establish probable tampering. See Taplis v. State, 703 So.2d 453, 454 (Fla.1997) (acknowledging that a fair reading of Dodd v. State, 537 So.2d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988), is that the State's failure to account for a gap in the chain of custody which, when considered together with the other evidence of tampering, support[s] a conclusion of probable tampering) (emphasis added). Here, there was no evidence of tampering. On direct appeal, this Court held that there was not a scintilla of evidence that Overton's DNA was planted. Overton, 801 So.2d at 897. Moreover, during the evidentiary hearing, multiple witnesses testified that there were no signs of significant degradation of the DNA evidence. Therefore, the record does not support the contention that Overton's counsel could have established a probability of tampering, which would have arguably led to an exclusion of both the STR DNA testing and the RFLP DNA testing results, had evidence been introduced during the Frye hearing with regard to the alleged broken chain of custody. Third, we conclude that the STR DNA testing completed at the Bode Lab meets the requirements of the Frye test. Under the first prong of the Frye test, there is strong evidence that the underlying scientific principle with STR DNA testing was generally accepted at the time of Overton's trial in 1999. See McDonald, 952 So.2d at 495-96 (holding that counsel was not ineffective for failing to request a Frye hearing because there was general acceptance in the scientific community of the particular science at issue at the time of the defendant's 1995 trial). During the Frye hearing, Dr. Bever, who was employed at the Bode Lab in 1999, testified that STR testing is generally accepted in the scientific community as reliable. Thus, the first prong of Frye would have been fulfilled even if Overton's counsel presented a challenge. Additionally, under the second prong of the Frye test, there is strong evidence that the testing procedures actually used at the Bode Lab were sufficiently acceptable. See Ramirez, 651 So.2d at 1168. During the evidentiary hearing, Bever testified that in multiple Frye hearings in which he has presented testimony, his testimony on STR DNA testing results has never failed to meet the Frye standard. This is substantial evidence of the reliability of the STR DNA testing that has occurred at the Bode Lab. Moreover, this indicates that if Overton's counsel had attempted to challenge the STR DNA testing here, it is highly unlikely that the evidence would have been excluded. Additionally, Bever testified that the following protocols and procedures were in place at the Bode Lab when the testing for the MacIvor murders occurred: (1) Bode Lab had a quality assurance program in place; (2) Bode Lab was accredited; and (3) accreditation was based on the lab meeting certain guidelines. [14] From this testimony, the Bode Lab followed accepted testing procedures that meet the Frye test to protect against false readings and contamination. Hayes, 660 So.2d at 264-65. Thus, it is likely that a challenge to the protocols and procedures that were in place at the Bode Lab would have also been unsuccessful. Accordingly, there is no prejudice that resulted from the failure of Overton's counsel to participate more fully during the Frye hearing. [15]