Opinion ID: 2408540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Killing Kenley is Justified

Text: The prosecutor argued: Think about Sheriff Pierce and Deputy Keown as they are out there with headlights on the car when he loads his weapon and starts firing at the police and how they fired back. And if one of those bullets had found its mark, Sheriff Pierce would have been lauded a hero. If Truman Gaultney when he came out with his shotgun instead of pointing it at the radiator had raised it up a couple of inches and had killed this man then, the headline would have screamedMan defends wife, kills murderer. If the clock had struck 4:00 at the Potosi Correctional Center and Paul Delo would have tackled Ms. Robart, officers would have come in and they were ordered to shoot and kill this man in order to defend themselves. And yes, there would have been an investigation and it would have been determined actions justified. Kenley contends that this argument is identical to the argument in Storey, supra, at 901-02, which this Court found to be reversible error. In Storey , the prosecutor argued that the victim's brother would have been justified in killing the defendant if he had witnessed the brutal murder. Id. at 902. We held that argument improper for four reasons. First, it argued facts outside the evidence because the brother did not see the murder. Id. Second, the argument was calculated to inflame the jury based on the vivid image of a brother seeing his sister brutally murdered. Id. Third, the argument equated the jury's sentencing function with self-defense in the specific crime. Id. Fourth, the hypothetical argument was irrelevant and induced the jury to apply emotion. Id. This case is clearly distinguishable. The argument here was not based upon facts outside of the record. The factual basis of each scenario argued was admitted into evidence. Second, the argument did not involve the brother/sister relationshipor any other relationship intended to inflame emotions as in Storey . Although the argument did equate the jury's sentencing function with self-defense, it did not equate it with self-defense in the murder of Mr. Felts. See Shurn, supra, at 465 (general reference to self-defense not mentioning this crime is permissible). Therefore, even though the prosecutor argued some facts outside the evidence, the argument did not rise to the level of that in Storey . The argument was not improper and counsel was not ineffective for failing to object.