Opinion ID: 2684152
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The insurer argues, albeit conclusorily, that the plaintiffs lack constitutional standing to pursue their claims. One of the amici helpfully develops the argument in significantly greater detail. Although these circumstances might ordinarily give rise to questions of waiver, see, e.g., United States v. Zannino, 895 F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (explaining that issues briefed in a perfunctory manner are normally deemed abandoned); Lane v. First Nat'l Bank, 871 F.2d 166, 175 (1st Cir. 1989) (explaining that a court will usually disregard issues raised only by amici and not by parties), no such obstacle exists here. The presence or absence of -6- constitutional standing implicates a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. When an issue implicates subject-matter jurisdiction, a federal court is obliged to resolve that issue even if the parties have neither briefed nor argued it. See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 73 (1997); In re Sony BMG Music Entm't, 564 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2009). The Constitution carefully confines the power of the federal courts to deciding cases and controversies. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2661 (2013). A case or controversy exists only when the party soliciting federal court jurisdiction (normally, the plaintiff) demonstrates 'such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends.' Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)); see Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1911). In order to make such a showing, a plaintiff must establish each part of a familiar triad: injury, causation, and redressability. Katz, 672 F.3d at 71 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992)). The pivotal question here involves the injury in fact requirement. The best argument for the absence of constitutional standing is the notion that the plaintiffs did not suffer any -7- demonstrable financial loss as a result of the insurer's alleged transgressions and, therefore, did not sustain any injury in fact. Put another way, the argument is that because the plaintiffs received everything to which they were entitled under the ERISA plans, they suffered no actual harm. This argument is substantial. When confronted with essentially the same question, the Second Circuit bypassed it and asserted jurisdiction on other grounds. See Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98, 102-03 (2d Cir. 2011). The Third Circuit rejected the argument in a divided opinion. See Edmonson v. Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 725 F.3d 406, 415-17 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2291 (2014); id. at 429-33 (Jordan, J., dissenting). After careful perscrutation, we hold that the plaintiffs have constitutional standing. An injury in fact is defined as an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized; and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (footnote omitted) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). But in order to establish standing, a plaintiff does not need to show that her rights have actually been abridged: such a requirement would conflate the issue of standing with the merits of the suit. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. v. Craddieth, 442 F.3d 1018, 1024 (7th Cir. 2006). Instead, a plaintiff need only show that she has a colorable claim to such a -8- right. Id. (emphasis omitted). The evaluation of whether such a showing has been made must take into account the role of Congress. After all, Congress has the power to define the status of legally cognizable injuries. Katz, 672 F.3d at 75. These principles are dispositive here. Congress has mandated ERISA fiduciaries to abide by certain strictures and has granted ERISA beneficiaries corresponding rights to sue for violations of those strictures. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (authorizing beneficiaries to sue to obtain . . . appropriate equitable relief in order to redress . . . violations of ERISA). An ERISA beneficiary thus has a legally cognizable right to have her plan fiduciaries perform those duties that ERISA mandates. We hasten to add a caveat. It is common ground that Congress cannot confer standing beyond the scope of Article III. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 497 (2009) ([T]he requirement of injury in fact is a hard floor of Article III jurisdiction that cannot be removed by statute.). This means, of course, that an insurer's violation of an ERISA-imposed fiduciary duty does not necessarily confer standing on all plan beneficiaries: a beneficiary must show that the alleged violation has worked some personal and tangible harm to her. Hollingsworth, 133 S. Ct. at 2661. Here, however, the plaintiffs make colorable claims that they have suffered just such a harm. They contend that the insurer -9- has wrongfully retained and misused their assets. If proven, this would constitute a tangible harm even if no economic loss results. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 3 reporter's note a (2011) ([T]here can be restitution of wrongful gain in cases where the plaintiff has suffered an interference with protected interests but no measurable loss whatsoever.); see also CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 131 S. Ct. 1866, 1881 (2011). In addition, the injury — although common to a potentially wide class of beneficiaries — is particularized to the plaintiffs, each of whom claims that the insurer wrongfully retained his or her assets. The Supreme Court has often said that history and tradition offer a meaningful guide to the types of cases that Article III empowers federal courts to consider. Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 274 (2008). Although ERISA is of relatively recent origin, its administration is informed by the common law of trusts. See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496 (1996). Historically, courts have asserted jurisdiction over cases against a trustee even though the trust itself ha[d] suffered no loss. George G. Bogert et al., Law of Trusts and Trustees § 861 (2013) (citing Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 27273 (1951); Magruder v. Drury, 235 U.S. 106, 120 (1914)); see also Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 3 reporter's note a (2011). A holding here that the plaintiffs have -10- satisfied the requirements for constitutional standing would be entirely consistent with this historical practice. To say more about the issue of constitutional standing would be to paint the lily. We hold that the plaintiffs have asserted colorable and cognizable claims of injuries in fact. Nothing more is needed here, from a jurisdictional standpoint, to wrap the plaintiffs in the cloak of constitutional standing.3