Opinion ID: 787077
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Resolution of a Circuit Conflict

Text: 54 Chief among the circumstances we examine when deciding whether to apply an amendment retroactively is the role of the amendment in harmonizing previously conflicting circuit precedent. An amendment that resolves a circuit split generally clarifies and does not modify existing law. Sanders, 67 F.3d at 857. Other circuits, similarly, emphasize the resolution of conflicting interpretations of ambiguous provisions in the Sentencing Guidelines when deciding whether to apply an amendment retroactively. See Hartz, 296 F.3d at 599 (listing, among factors to consider, whether the amendment resolves an ambiguity in the original wording of the guideline). 55 As noted above, the interest-exclusion amendment resolved a conflict between two equally reasonable interpretations of the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of loss. As the First Circuit explained in Goodchild: 56 This is a close issue and we must acknowledge that there is to some degree a conflict between the cited cases and the language of the Commentary. The conflict is due to a clash between the ambiguous language used in the Commentary and the complexity of what constitutes interest and when it is an integral part of the value of the money, property or services unlawfully taken. Our holding will not solve the problem; such resolution lies with the Sentencing Commission. 57 25 F.3d at 65-66 (citation omitted). Because the challenged amendment is the result of the Commission's efforts to resolve a circuit conflict, and a reasoned and reasonable conflict at that, this factor weighs heavily in favor of concluding that the amendment is a clarification. 58 Although acknowledging that the amendment was intended to resolve a circuit split, the government contends that the amendment nonetheless is a substantive change in the law because the amendment changed the law of this circuit. In Johns, 5 F.3d at 1270, we concluded that an amendment to the Guidelines was a substantive change in the law, in part because the amendment overruled circuit precedent and retroactive application might violate the ex post facto clause. However, we later held that, when the ex post facto clause is not implicated, an amendment may be considered clarifying notwithstanding the fact that the amendment changes the law of this circuit. Sanders, 67 F.3d at 857. Sanders ' holding is a sound one. If all amendments that overruled a circuit's own precedent were deemed substantive, an amendment would be a clarification, and therefore retroactive, only in those circuits whose prior case law already was consistent with the amendment. Any benefit of retroactive application would be entirely illusory, and the Commission's resolution of the circuit split would create uniformity more slowly. 59 Amendment 617 made several substantive and clarifying changes to the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of loss for financial crimes. In amending the Guidelines' commentary to make explicit that the exclusion of interest applies to both contractual and opportunity cost interest, the Commission intended to resolve a circuit conflict between two equally reasonable interpretations of the loss definition in the earlier version of the Guidelines. In view of that intention, and the ambiguity of the earlier definition, we hold that the amendment was a clarification of existing law. Reading § 2F1.1 in the light of application note 2(D), we conclude that the district court erred by including interest and finance charges in the amount of loss under § 2F1.1.