Opinion ID: 712249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 19 Under Kokkonen, the district court had jurisdiction in this case only if the Dismissal Order expressly reserved authority to enforce the Agreement, or incorporated the Agreement into the order. The Dismissal Order provided that the 20 ... action is dismissed with prejudice and without costs to any party, except as set forth in the Settlement Agreement.... 21 Plaintiff says that the phrase except as set forth in the Settlement Agreement modifies the phrase dismissed with prejudice, thus in effect incorporating the Agreement into the order and providing a basis for jurisdiction. The district court, however, held that the phrase modifies not the dismissal of the action, but the phrase 'without costs to any party,'  thereby allowing plaintiff's attorney to receive the $416,710.99 in attorneys' fees provided for in the Agreement. 22 We agree with the district court that it did not have jurisdiction to enforce the Agreement. First, and most importantly, the Dismissal Order neither expressly retains jurisdiction over the Agreement nor incorporates its terms. The mere reference in the order to the Agreement does not incorporate the Agreement into the order. Miener, 62 F.3d at 1128. Second, the phrase except as set forth in the Settlement Agreement could not have meant that the court would retain jurisdiction over the entire Agreement when the court did not have the Agreement before it, and many of the terms of this complex and wide-ranging Agreement concerned matters and parties not before the court. 1 The Dismissal Order is not ambiguous in this regard. The fact that the parties in this case disagree as to its interpretation does not require a finding of ambiguity that might create a fact issue if disputed extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent existed. The court is not required to find the language ambiguous where the interpretation urged by one party would 'strain[ ] the contract language beyond its reasonable and ordinary meaning.'  Hunt Ltd. v. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc., 889 F.2d 1274, 1277 (2d Cir.1989) (alteration in original) (quoting Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Turner Construction Co., 2 N.Y.2d 456, 459, 161 N.Y.S.2d 90, 141 N.E.2d 590 (1957)). 23 Third, although the Dismissal Order was drafted by the parties and stipulated to, it was not simply a stipulation or contract between them. When Judge Motley so ordered the dismissal, the document became an order of the district court. The judge therefore was construing her own order when she held that there was no jurisdiction. While the judge did not expressly state that she had not intended to retain jurisdiction over the Agreement, this is the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from her actions. Moreover, there are few persons in a better position to understand the meaning of an order of dismissal than the district judge who ordered it. Cf. United States v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, 55 F.3d 64, 68 (2d Cir.1995). But see Hagestad, 49 F.3d at 1433 (subjective intent of district judge to retain jurisdiction is irrelevant). 24 We therefore conclude that under Kokkonen's criteria, the district court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement. We affirm the decision of the district court.