Opinion ID: 821279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Spent Fuel Pool Waiver Petition

Text: One of Massachusetts's main claims before the NRC concerned the risk of spent fuel pool accidents. That is a Category 1 issue, addressed globally for all nuclear power plants, 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. A, app. B, through rulemaking, and that is where the NRC is dealing with this issue. Further, NRC regulations generally prohibit the challenging of such generic determinations in individual adjudicatory proceedings, see 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(a), but under certain specified conditions,17 the NRC will waive that 16 At times, Massachusetts's brief appears to make a weak argument that the NRC's procedural rules (particularly its record reopening standards) are incompatible with NEPA. However, in its reply brief, Massachusetts disavows that and asserts it is only arguing that the NRC cannot unreasonably interpret or misapply its contention admissibility standards. 17 One exception to the prohibition on a challenge in an individual proceeding is for a party to seek a waiver under 10 C.F.R. § 2.335(b), which provides that [t]he sole ground for petition of waiver or exception is that special circumstances with respect to the subject matter of the particular proceeding are such that the application of the rule or regulation (or provision of it) would not serve the purposes for which [it] was adopted. The NRC has interpreted the regulation to require a waiver petitioner to meet four factors: (1) the rule's strict application would not serve the purpose for which it was adopted; (2) there are special circumstances that were not considered, explicitly or implicitly, in the rulemaking proceeding; (3) those circumstances are unique to the facility and not common to a large class of facilities; and (4) a waiver is necessary to reach a significant safety problem. Dominion Nuclear Conn., Inc., 62 N.R.C. 551, 559-60 (2005). The NRC's decision that Massachusetts did not meet the standards was -21- rule and hear issues in a particular relicensing proceeding. Although some may doubt whether Massachusetts has explicitly, rather than implicitly, challenged the NRC's ruling on the waiver petition, we nonetheless address it briefly. In denying Massachusetts's waiver petition, the NRC permissibly reasoned that Massachusetts did not show that the spent fuel pool issues in its contention were unique to Pilgrim. Rather, they applied to all nuclear power plants and would be more appropriately handled through rulemaking. We add that onsite storage of spent fuel is one of the issues being considered in the Commission's post-Fukushima review of lessons learned, as the Commission itself has noted. We also reject the argument that NEPA was violated by the NRC decision to go ahead with relicensing. In addition to denying the waiver request and sending the spent fuel pool issue to rulemaking, the NRC also considered whether to delay relicensing, in light of the information Massachusetts presented. It stated, referring at least in part to the spent fuel pool issue, that we do not have sufficient information at this time to make a significant difference in the Pilgrim environmental review. Massachusetts has conceded that affirmative evidence of a pool fire has not emerged from the Fukushima accident. The record also reasonable. -22- supports the NRC's conclusion that there was no apparent significant damage to the spent fuel at Fukushima. C. The NRC's Denial of the Commonwealth's Position on Core Damage Issues 1. The Direct Experience Core Damage Frequency Model The second major portion of Massachusetts's contention is that the existing SAMA analysis in the EIS underestimated core damage frequency by an order of magnitude as shown by the Fukushima event and thus needed to be supplemented. The NRC rejected this portion of the contention based on its record reopening standards. It reasoned that under its record reopening standards: (1) the claim was untimely because it could have been raised from the outset, 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a)(1); and (2) the claim did not demonstrate the existence of a significant environmental issue, id. § 2.326(a)(2). These decisions, based on the reopening standards, were reasoned and we have no basis to set them aside.18 18 The NRC acted reasonably in deciding to apply its record reopening standards, a decision Massachusetts does not challenge. The ASLB closed the record in June of 2008. See Entergy Nuclear Generation Co., 68 N.R.C. at 595-96 & n.26. Although the NRC remanded a portion of another party's contention in 2010, different from the one at issue here, the record remained closed as to all other issues. Agencies are permitted to impose requirements or thresholds for parties seeking to reopen a closed record. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 554-55. Further, the NRC's reopening standards have been upheld by other courts. See N.J. Envtl. Fed'n v. NRC, 645 F.3d 220, 233 (3d Cir. 2011) (We have upheld the motion to reopen standard and deferred to the NRC's application of its rules, so long as it is reasonable.); Oystershell Alliance v. NRC, 800 F.2d 1201, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (In examining petitioners' plea to reopen the record, we rely on the same courtsanctioned test applied by the Commission . . . .). -23- It is quite clear there was nothing new about the purportedly new methodology used to determine the frequency of core damage events. The methodological issue could have been raised from the beginning of the relicensing proceeding by Massachusetts, but was not. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a)(1). Massachusetts belatedly asserts that by taking five historical core damage events (Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and three units at Fukushima) and dividing that number by the number of operating years of all nuclear power plants worldwide, the frequency of core damage events is approximately ten times higher than the estimate in the SAMA analysis. The same methodological argument could have been made before Fukushima occurred. As the ASLB and the NRC agreed, applying the purported direct experience methodology at the time the initial opportunity for a hearing was announced, pre-Fukushima, would have produced a frequency approximately five times greater than that contained in the SAMA analysis. Although Fukushima increased the order of magnitude of the frequency of core damage events if assessed under another underlying methodology -- the direct experience methodology -- the fact that the Fukushima disaster occurred is beside the point here as it did not change the fact that the underlying methodological challenge was not new. Even if it were new, the NRC reasonably concluded this methodology contention, timely or not, did not raise a significant environmental issue. 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a)(2). Indeed, it -24- reasonably concluded it was already using a better methodology. The NRC uses a site-specific and plant-specific PRA methodology, which answers three questions: (1) what can go wrong; (2) how likely is it; and (3) what are the consequences.19 The NRC had adequate evidence20 that the Pilgrim-specific PRA is expected to yield a much more accurate estimate of risk (including [core damage frequency]) than a historical rate calculation using an extremely limited set of data points that aggregates all different plant designs, operational practices, and site conditions around the world. Further, Massachusetts also did not explain how Dr. Thompson's methodology, based on a limited data set, would be used to develop a new spectrum of core damage frequencies. [A]gencies are entitled to select their own methodology as long as that methodology is reasonable, and we give deference 19 This requires an evaluation of the combinations of plant failures that can lead to core damage, and for each core damage sequence identified, an evaluation of core damage progression and possible containment failure. R. at 1216. Importantly, the PRA methodology is both site-specific and plant-specific, and takes into account hazards, the design of the plant, and plant-specific operational practices that affect how the plant responds to potential challenges. R. at 1903. The overall probability that core damage will occur at the plant is calculated by aggregating the individual probabilities of various accident scenarios. R. at 1094. 20 By contrast, Dr. Thompson's report admitted his methodology relied on a data set that is comparatively sparse and therefore does not provide a statistical basis for a high-confidence estimate of [core damage frequency]. He stated that the data set and method provided at most a reality check to the PRA estimates. -25- to that decision here. Town of Winthrop, 535 F.3d at 13 (quoting Hughes River Watershed Conservancy v. Johnson, 165 F.3d 283, 289 (4th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 2. The NRC's Denial of the SAMA Specific Issues Massachusetts's contention also raised more specific information that it said should be considered or reevaluated in a SAMA analysis, arguing that the information concerned the costeffectiveness of mitigation alternatives. The NRC rejected each one, offering a reasoned basis under the reopening and/or the admissibility standards for each, which we do not disturb. First, Massachusetts asserted that operators at the nuclear power plant at Fukushima were unable to perform mitigation actions, which could affect the probability of a radioactive release and should be considered in a SAMA analysis. Most of this portion of the contention and expert report focused intently upon spent fuel storage pools, which, as noted, the Commission had referred to the rulemaking process.21 To the extent the claim dealt with other operator mitigation issues, the NRC again required Massachusetts to meet its record reopening standard. The NRC found that the reopening standard was not met because Massachusetts had not demonstrated 21 To the extent the claim deals with environmental impacts from spent fuel pools, it failed to meet the admissibility standards because it is outside the scope of the proceedings, 10 C.F.R. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii), for the reasons we described earlier. -26- sufficiently that a materially different result (in the SAMA analysis) would have been likely had the information been considered initially. See 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a)(3). That determination is supported by the fact that operator actions not involving spent fuel pools were considered in Entergy's license renewal application, a fact which Massachusetts did not even address in its contention. Further, Massachusetts did not indicate how those already stated analyses would be affected by the proposed new information. The NRC was not arbitrary in concluding that the Commonwealth's mere pointing to a piece of information and speculating that the results of the SAMA analysis may be different was not sufficient to meet the requirement of 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a)(3). Second, Massachusetts argues the NRC's excessive secrecy regarding accident mitigation measures and the phenomena associated with spent-fuel-pool fires degrades the licensee's capability to mitigate an accident. Dr. Thompson's report explains that secrecy could result in managers and operators not having a thorough understanding of the measures they are to implement. The NRC permissibly decided this portion of the contention failed to satisfy the general admissibility standards because it fell outside the scope of the proceeding, id. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii), stating that the concerns appear to be directed more generally at policy issues governing access and categorization of non-public information. -27- Third, relying on its earlier assertion that Fukushima presents new and significant information about the likelihood of spent fuel pool accidents, Massachusetts's expert asserted that a new SAMA analysis should consider low-density, open-frame storage racks. The NRC properly determined this claim failed to satisfy the general admissibility standards because it fell outside the scope of the proceeding, id. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii), in light of its denial of the waiver petition and the referral of the rulemaking petition to its staff. Fourth, Massachusetts argues new information about hydrogen explosions during reactor accidents could alter the SAMA analysis. Dr. Thompson's report contends that the potential for such explosions has not been adequately considered in the Pilgrim license extension proceeding, and that containment venting and other hydrogen control systems at the Pilgrim plant should be upgraded, and should use passive mechanisms as much as possible. The NRC rejected this claim on two grounds: (1) under the record reopening standard, Massachusetts had not shown a likelihood of a materially different result had the hydrogen control information been considered initially, id. § 2.326(a)(3); and (2) whether or not the record was reopened, under the general admissibility standards, Massachusetts did not raise a genuine dispute with the existing SAMA analysis, id. § 2.309(f)(1)(vi). For present purposes, we deal only with the second, more merits- -28- based ground for rejection, and find it permissible. In fact, neither Massachusetts's contention nor Dr. Thompson's reports addressed the consideration of hydrogen explosions present in the existing SAMA analysis. The analysis examined the potential loss of containment integrity, including as a result of hydrogen deflagration or detonation. Massachusetts did not even attempt to explain how the extant analysis was inadequate or how the new information would alter it, and failed to raise a genuine dispute. Finally, Massachusetts raised a claim relating to filtered venting of reactor containment. Specifically, Massachusetts stated it appears likely that filtered venting . . . could substantially reduce the atmospheric release of radioactive material from an accident at the Pilgrim [nuclear power plant]. Its expert therefore recommended that filtered vents should be considered in a new SAMA analysis. The claim that the EIS was inadequate for these reasons was rejected on two grounds: (1) Massachusetts failed to demonstrate the likelihood of a materially different result under the reopening standards, 10 C.F.R. § 2.326(a)(3); and (2) in any event, to the extent that Massachusetts would require filtered vents, the general admissibility standards were not met because it was outside the scope of the proceeding, id. § 2.309(f)(1)(iii). The first ground (record reopening) is supported by the fact that Massachusetts did not discuss the costs and benefits of adding -29- filters, which is fatal to its claim because a SAMA analysis is a cost-benefit analysis. Further, the SAMA analysis did in fact consider filtered vents, finding that the cost was three times greater than the projected benefit. Massachusetts's contention and supporting materials did not acknowledge or challenge that analysis. The NRC also permissibly rejected the claim, through its admissibility standards, as outside the scope of the proceeding, because the claim was not that the consideration was inadequate, but that filtered vents were mandated. That is clearly beyond the scope. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (stating NEPA does not mandate particular results). In sum, the NRC's decision to reject the contention as to each issue raised was not arbitrary or capricious and constituted reasoned decisionmaking. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 374 (1998) (agency adjudications must be reasoned decisionmaking). Although whether the NRC complied with NEPA's hard look requirement is a separate and independent question, the process and reasoning provided by the NRC, discussed above, demonstrates that the hard look requirement was plainly met: information proffered by Massachusetts was considered before the ASLB and NRC, the agency obtained opinions from the NRC staff, and from experts outside the agency, including those of Massachusetts and Entergy. The NRC also -30- offered a reasoned explanation. This meets the requirement of taking a hard look at such information. See, e.g., Hughes River, 165 F.3d at 288 (listing obtaining opinions from agency's own experts, outside experts, giving scientific scrutiny, and offering responses to legitimate concerns as evidence of a sufficiently hard look (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378-85)). Massachusetts fleetingly argues that its rights to a hearing under the AEA were somehow violated. Not so. The hearing right provided in the AEA does not confer the automatic right of intervention upon anyone. Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 920 F.2d 50, 55 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (quoting BPI v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 502 F.2d 424, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The NRC may certainly impose procedural requirements for obtaining a hearing where the statute provides no additional guidance, and because the decision that those standards were not met was not arbitrary and capricious, as just discussed, the AEA claim fails. See Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. United States, 627 F.2d 1313, 1321 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that agencies have wide discretion in establishing and applying rules for hearings).