Opinion ID: 786761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: wong's constitutional claims

Text: 62 We are now ready to consider the merits of this appeal. 63 The qualified immunity defense `shield[s] [government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Behrens, 516 U.S. at 305, 116 S.Ct. 834 (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)) (alterations in original). In deciding whether the INS officials are entitled to qualified immunity, we must undertake two inquiries, both de novo: 18 (1) whether, [t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, ... the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right; and, if a violation of a constitutional right is found, (2) whether the right was clearly established. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151.

64 Wong alleges that by, inter alia, denying her vegetarian meals, subjecting her to strip searches, and denying her access to her followers, the INS officials subjected her to detention conditions that violated her First Amendment right to freely practice her religion and her Fourth Amendment right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures. 65 Wong correctly argues that direct, personal participation is not necessary to establish liability for a constitutional violation. See Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir.1978). The requisite causal connection can be established ... also by setting in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Id. at 743-44; see also Stevenson v. Koskey, 877 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir.1989) (causation is established where officer participates in the affirmative acts of another that, acting concurrently, result in deprivation of federal rights). The critical question is whether it was reasonably foreseeable that the actions of the particular INS officials who are named as defendants would lead to the rights violations alleged to have occurred during Wong's detention. See Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 40 F.3d 1041, 1044 (9th Cir.1994) (where official did not directly cause a constitutional violation, plaintiff must show the violation was reasonably foreseeable to him). 66 Wong's first amended complaint, however, fails to identify what role, if any, each individual defendant had in placing her in detention, much less whether any of the named INS officials knew or reasonably should have known of the detention conditions to which Wong would be subjected. Without providing the identity of the official or officials who caused the alleged violations, the complaint merely states that Ms. Wong was arrested, handcuffed and placed in detention. She was then taken to the Multnomah County Detention Center where she was subjected to a strip search, including an orifice search, on two separate occasions. Ms. Wong was imprisoned for a total of five days. 67 First Amended Complaint at ¶ 21. With respect to the individual actions of the named defendants, the complaint makes only the following allegations: 68 Beebe improperly revoked Ms. Wong's parole status, id. at ¶ 18; 69 Glover and O'Brien erroneously issued a `Notice and Order of Expedited Removal' and a Determination of Inadmissibility, id. at ¶ 19; and 70 Ms. Wong was given a letter denying her application for the adjustment of status signed by Garcia for Beebe, id. at ¶ 21. 71 The complaint thus fails to identify how the actions of the individual INS officials could foreseeably have caused the First and Fourth Amendment violations Wong is alleged to have suffered while in detention. It is possible that, upon identifying those officials responsible for placing her in detention and for overseeing detention conditions at the INS contract facility in question, Wong may be able to amend her complaint to properly allege constitutional violations by those officials. Her current complaint, however, is insufficient to allege any detention-related constitutional violations by the named INS officials, none of whom is alleged to have played a role in placing her in detention. 19 72 We conclude that the allegations of the operative, first amended complaint are insufficient to establish a constitutional violation regarding Wong's detention conditions on the part of the named INS officials. As far as the complaint demonstrates, the actions of the named INS officials were simply too far removed from the violations of which Wong complains. Accordingly, Wong's detention-related claims against the named INS officials must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 20
73 Wong appears to allege that the INS officials violated her procedural due process rights by revoking her temporary parole without first deciding her adjustment of status application. On the bare pleadings, it is difficult to ascertain the contours of this claim, and Wong's briefing before this court has not clarified the legal basis for her allegation that the parole revocation and failure to first decide her adjustment of status application violated the Due Process Clause. 74 Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth ... Amendment. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). We can discern no substantive liberty or property interest, however, in temporary parole status, and Wong has alleged none. Section 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that the Attorney General may 75 in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe ... any alien applying for admission to the United States, but such parole of such alien shall not be regarded as an admission of the alien and when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Attorney General, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States. 76 (emphasis added); cf. Sidhu v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir.2004) (adopting the BIA's more detailed entry criteria). The INA does not create any liberty interest in temporary parole that is protected by the Fifth Amendment. Rather, the statute makes clear that whether and for how long temporary parole is granted are matters entirely within the discretion of the Attorney General. See Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (explaining that to possess a property interest in a government benefit, an individual must possess a legitimate claim of entitlement to it). Compare Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 49 L.Ed.2d 451 (1976) (holding that a prisoner's interest in not being transferred to another prison facility is too emphemeral and insubstantial to trigger procedural due process protections as long as prison officials have discretion to transfer him for whatever reason or for no reason at all), with Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 377-78, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987) (holding that a state prisoner has a liberty interest in parole release where the state statute uses mandatory language creating a presumption that parole release will be granted). 77 Wong's due process claim must therefore be dismissed.
78 Wong alleges that the INS officials acted out of discriminatory animus in making their various decisions, including the decisions involving adjustment of status, advance parole, and revocation of temporary parole. Specifically, she alleges that the INS officials discriminated against her on the basis of her race and/or her national origin, 21 and on the basis of her religious practices, beliefs, and association. Taking her allegations in the light most favorable to her, Wong has alleged violations of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954), based on the INS officials' actions. With the exception of the advance parole claim, these allegations could be sufficient to entitle Wong to relief if she is ultimately able to prove that the INS officials' actions were motivated by unlawful discriminatory animus. 22 79 Wong's advance parole claim must fail because she has not alleged that any of the individual INS defendants were in any way involved with the decision not to grant her a waiver of the advance parole requirement. Her complaint merely states that Wong attempted to make special arrangements with the INS through her immigration attorney to see if she could leave the United States without the advanced parole, but was unsuccessful. While it is possible that Wong might be able to make out a claim against some INS official based on the allegedly discriminatory advance parole decision, her claim must be dismissed as to the named INS officials, as nothing in the complaint links any of them to unconstitutional behavior with regard to the advance parole issue. See Paine v. City of Lompoc, 265 F.3d 975, 984 (9th Cir.2001) ([I]n resolving a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, a court must carefully examine the specific factual allegations against each individual defendant.) (quoting Cunningham, 229 F.3d at 1287). Thus, the facts alleged in the complaint do not establish that any defendant officer's conduct violated a constitutional right with regard to the advance parole decision. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151. 80 As to Wong's remaining discrimination claims, the INS officials maintain that her bare allegations that the INS officials' conduct was due to discriminatory animus are legally insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. This contention is wrong. 81 As Swierkiewicz demonstrates, and as we have had occasion to reiterate recently, the government's contention is belied by federal notice pleading principles. See Edwards v. Marin Park, Inc., 356 F.3d 1058, 1061-63 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that the plaintiff's admittedly opaque[ ] allegations of discriminatory retaliation were sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss). Given the Federal Rules' simplified standard for pleading, `[a] court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.' Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S.Ct. 992 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Swierkiewicz specifically disclaimed any requirement that discrimination plaintiffs plead all the elements of a prima facie case. See id. at 510-13, 122 S.Ct. 992; see also Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1061-62. Instead, all that is required is a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 122 S.Ct. 992. Such statement must give the defendant fair notice of the basis for the plaintiff's claims. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992; Edwards, 356 F.3d at 1061. 82 Indeed, in Swierkiewicz the Court rejected the very policy argument made by the INS officials in this case: 83 Respondent argues that allowing lawsuits based on conclusory allegations of discrimination to go forward will burden the courts and encourage disgruntled [plaintiffs] to bring unsubstantiated suits. Whatever the practical merits of this argument, the Federal Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard.... A requirement of greater specificity for particular claims is a result that must be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation. 84 Id. at 514-15, 122 S.Ct. 992 (citation omitted); see also Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119, 1125 (9th Cir.2002) (applying Swierkiewicz to evaluate the complaint in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action and concluding that previous cases requiring heightened pleading of improper motive in constitutional tort cases are no longer good law). 85 The INS officials also contend that Wong alleges claims of selective enforcement which AADC held are not constitutionally cognizable. Citing concerns about judicial interference with the INS's prosecutorial discretion and the need to prevent obstruction and prolongation of the execution of removal orders, AADC indeed announced a general rule against selective prosecution claims as a defense against [ ] deportation. See 525 U.S. at 488-91, 119 S.Ct. 936. 86 Wong, however, does not assert any claims as a defense against exclusion or deportation. Indeed, her claims of discriminatory adjustment of status and parole revocation decisions cannot fairly be characterized as selective prosecution claims at all. The claims do not implicate the Attorney General's prosecutorial discretion — that is, in this context, his discretion to choose to deport one person rather than another among those who are illegally in the country. Rather, Wong alleges that the INS officials denied her various immigration benefits because of her membership in a protected class. As such, the challenged administrative actions, as construed in light of Wong's concessions in the course of this litigation, do not involve the expedited removal itself, and do not pose the threat of obstruction of the institution of removal proceedings or the execution of removal orders about which AADC was concerned. See id. Wong's discrimination claims are not precluded by AADC. 87
88 The INS officials do not contest that Wong was entitled to constitutional protections on her return despite her brief departure. They argue only that the extent of Wong's constitutional rights was not clearly established, because she was an alien lacking entry papers upon her return. As a result, the INS officials maintain, a reasonable official would not have known that Wong was entitled to the full panoply of protections offered by the Constitution. 89 Despite the limited scope of the officials' argument, we must address to some degree the extent of Wong's entitlement to constitutional rights. Saucier counsels that we must first determine whether a constitutional right has adequately been alleged by the plaintiff before turning to the clearly established prong. See 533 U.S. at 200, 121 S.Ct. 2151 ([T]he requisites of a qualified immunity defense must be considered in proper sequence.); Doe v. Lebbos, 348 F.3d 820, 828 (9th Cir.2003) (noting that although the parties did not brief the issue of whether the plaintiff had adequately alleged the violation of a constitutional right, [w]e are obligated under Saucier ... to address this issue at the outset of our qualified immunity analysis). In light of our preceding discussion concluding that only Wong's discrimination claims continue to be viable, see supra at 969, we limit our substantive constitutional analysis to her entitlement to the rights implicated by those claims. 23 90 The Supreme Court has long recognized a distinction between the constitutional rights afforded those who have effected an entry into the U.S., whether legally or otherwise, and those considered never to have entered. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001); Xi v. U.S. INS, 298 F.3d 832, 837 (9th Cir.2002). Aliens inside the U.S., regardless of whether their presence here is temporary or unlawful, are entitled to certain constitutional protections unavailable to those outside our borders. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693-94, 121 S.Ct. 2491; see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) (Whatever his status under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a `person' in any ordinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been recognized as `persons' guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369, 6 S.Ct. 1064, 30 L.Ed. 220 (1886) ([The Fourteenth Amendment's] provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.). 91 At the same time, under the entry fiction recognized in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 73 S.Ct. 625, 97 L.Ed. 956 (1953), an alien seeking admission has not entered the United States, even if the alien is in fact physically present. 24 See id. at 213, 215, 73 S.Ct. 625; see also Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228, 230, 45 S.Ct. 257, 69 L.Ed. 585 (1925) (though present in the United States, excluded alien was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United States). Applying this legal fiction, Mezei held that the procedural due process rights of an alien detained on Ellis Island were not violated when he was excluded without a hearing. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214, 73 S.Ct. 625. Mezei explained: 92 It is true that aliens who have once passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law. But an alien on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing: Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned. 93 Id. at 212, 73 S.Ct. 625 (internal citations omitted). 94 The entry fiction thus appears determinative of the procedural rights of aliens with respect to their applications for admission. The entry doctrine has not, however, been applied, by the Supreme Court or by this court, to deny all constitutional rights to non-admitted aliens. 25 As Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir.1995) (en banc), 26 explained, [w]hile it is ... clear that excludable aliens have no procedural due process rights in the admission process, the law is not settled with regard to nonprocedural rights. Id. at 1449; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (It is well established that certain constitutional protections available to persons inside the United States are unavailable to aliens outside of our geographic borders.) (emphasis added); id. at 703-04, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the entry fiction only makes perfect sense ... with regard to the question of what procedures are necessary to prevent entry, as opposed to what procedures are necessary to eject a person already in the United States). Barrera-Echavarria then went on to consider specifically whether such aliens have a constitutional right to be free from extended detention, concluding that they do not. 27 See 44 F.3d at 1449. 95 Our sister circuits have likewise posited that the entry fiction is pertinent mostly with respect to the narrow question of the scope of procedural rights available in the admissions process, and is not necessarily applicable with regard to other constitutional rights. In Lynch v. Cannatella, 810 F.2d 1363 (5th Cir.1987), for example, the Fifth Circuit held that the entry fiction determines the aliens' rights with regard to immigration and deportation proceedings[,] but does not limit the right of excludable aliens detained within United States territory to humane treatment. Id. at 1373. 96 Similarly, the Third Circuit has recognized that [e]ven an excludable alien is a `person' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment and is thus entitled to substantive due process. Ngo v. INS, 192 F.3d 390, 396 (3d Cir.1999); see also Rosales-Garcia v. Holland, 322 F.3d 386, 410 (6th Cir.) (en banc) (The fact that excludable aliens are entitled to less process ... does not mean that they are not at all protected by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 941, 123 S.Ct. 2607, 156 L.Ed.2d 627 (2003); 28 Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 n. 3 (10th Cir.2001) (noting that the entry fiction applies to procedural due process challenges such as Sierra's. This case does not involve, and we do not address, a substantive due process challenge). 97 The decisions of courts confronted with the everyday reality of the great number of non-admitted aliens living and working in the American community reflect an understanding that such aliens are undeniably persons entitled to constitutional protection, especially with respect to areas not implicating the government's plenary power to regulate immigration. Several courts have held, for example, that non-admitted aliens in the criminal justice system may not be punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in conformance with due process of law, a Fifth and Sixth Amendment safeguard available to citizens and aliens alike. See Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 962 & n. 6 (9th Cir.1991) (considering whether detention of excluded Cuban refugee violated his substantive due process rights, and noting that Fifth and Sixth Amendments apply to aliens as well as citizens); Lynch, 810 F.2d at 1374 ([W]hatever due process rights excludable aliens may be denied by virtue of their status, they are entitled under the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to be free of gross physical abuse at the hands of state or federal officials.). Courts have held that non-admitted aliens are entitled to Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogations. See, e.g., United States v. Moya, 74 F.3d 1117, 1119 (11th Cir.1996); United States v. Henry, 604 F.2d 908, 914 (5th Cir.1979). 98 The Supreme Court has also indicated that the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause extends to non-admitted aliens. In Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976), the Court considered whether a statute conditioning eligibility for medicare benefits on five years of continuous residence and admission for permanent residence violated the equal protection rights of Cuban refugees granted temporary parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). See 426 U.S. at 75 n. 7, 77-83, 96 S.Ct. 1883. Mathews explained that 99 [t]here are literally millions of aliens within the jurisdiction of the United States. The Fifth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment, protects every one of these persons from deprivation of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful, involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection. 100 Id. at 77, 96 S.Ct. 1883 (citations omitted). The Court's sweeping language clearly applied to aliens temporarily paroled into the United States, as two of the plaintiffs were so paroled. See id. at 75 n. 7, 96 S.Ct. 1883. Mathews' significance for present purposes is that the entry fiction does not preclude substantive constitutional protection, including protection under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, for aliens paroled into the country after having been stopped at the border. 101 The cases discussed above indicate that the entry doctrine does not categorically exclude non-admitted aliens from all constitutional coverage, including coverage by equal protection guarantees. Recognizing such a logical endpoint to the entry fiction prevents its application from becoming an exercise inconsistent with our basic constitutional values. It also vitiates the perverse incentive that would otherwise exist for aliens to evade immigration checkpoints altogether and thereby acquire constitutional protections. The entry fiction is best seen, instead, as a fairly narrow doctrine that primarily determines the procedures that the executive branch must follow before turning an immigrant away. Otherwise, the doctrine would allow any number of abuses to be deemed constitutionally permissible merely by labelling certain persons as non-persons. As Justice Marshall forcefully articulated in his dissenting opinion in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985), addressing a question the majority declined to reach: 102 [T]he principle that unadmitted aliens have no constitutionally protected rights defies rationality. Under this view, the Attorney General, for example, could invoke legitimate immigration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all detained aliens. He might argue that scarce immigration resources could be better spent by hiring additional agents to patrol our borders than by providing food for detainees. Surely we would not condone mass starvation. 103 Id. at 874, 105 S.Ct. 2992 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 704, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (I am sure[deportable aliens] cannot be tortured, as well....). 104 In light of these considerations, Justice Marshall concluded in Jean that Mezei's determination with respect to procedural due process rights is not applicable to the separate constitutional question whether the Government may establish a policy of making parole decisions on the basis of race or national origin without articulating any justification for its discriminatory conduct. Jean, 472 U.S. at 879, 105 S.Ct. 2992 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his view, in the absence of any reasons closely related to immigration concerns, the government may not discriminate against unadmitted aliens on the basis of race or national origin. Id. at 881-82, 105 S.Ct. 2992. 105 We are persuaded by the considerations outlined above, and by Justice Marshall's opinion addressing essentially the same question presented here, that the entry fiction does not preclude non-admitted aliens such as Wong from coming within the ambit of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. We cannot countenance that the Constitution would permit immigration officials to engage in such behavior as rounding up all immigration parolees of a particular race solely because of a consideration such as skin color. 29 Although Congress has `plenary power' to create immigration law, and ... the judicial branch must defer to executive and legislative branch decisionmaking in that area, .... that power is subject to important constitutional limitations. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 695, 121 S.Ct. 2491; cf. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 793 n. 5, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977) (Our cases reflect acceptance of a limited judicial responsibility under the Constitution even with respect to the power of Congress to regulate the admission and exclusion of aliens....). We can imagine no proper governmental interest furthered by the purely invidious discrimination alleged to have been carried out by individual INS officers in this case. 106 Were there any doubt regarding this general proposition, our decision in this case that the allegations of racial, ethnic, and religious discrimination with regard to decisions concerning temporary parole and adjustment of status are sufficient to state a claim of constitutional violation might still be compelled by both the procedural posture of this case and several considerations particular to Wong. Again, Wong's equal protection claim cannot be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S.Ct. 992 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99 ([A] complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.). Wong alleges that she resided in the United States continuously for seven years, before her brief departure undertaken under exigent circumstances. She left the country for only eighteen days — a period far briefer than Mezei's protracted stay abroad of nineteen months. See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 214, 73 S.Ct. 625; Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491 (discussing Mezei's extended departure). More importantly, Wong alleges that her failure to obtain advance parole or a waiver of the requirement was due to invidious discrimination by immigration officials prior to her departure, at which time she undisputedly had a right to be free from such discrimination. 30 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 2382. Had Wong been granted such a waiver, she would have returned to the United States with the same immigration status she held prior to her departure, and her entitlement to equal protection would have been unquestioned. Under these circumstances, Wong would more properly be viewed as an alien to whom the entry fiction does not apply, as she would have been allowed to enter on her return, and therefore as an alien who is for constitutional purposes within the United States ... whether [her] presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693, 121 S.Ct. 2491. We are for that reason as well unable to conclude that it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514, 122 S.Ct. 992 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 107 We therefore conclude that Wong's allegations of invidious discrimination are sufficient at this pleading stage to make out a Fifth Amendment discrimination claim arising out of the INS officials' actions with respect to revocation of Wong's temporary parole status and post-return rejection of her adjustment of status applications.
108 Even where a constitutional violation has occurred, whether an official asserting qualified immunity may be held liable generally turns on the `objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in light of the legal rules that were `clearly established' at the time it was taken. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (internal citation omitted). Because of the uncertainty surrounding the constitutional status of an alien in Wong's unusual position during the period after her return, we conclude that Wong has not alleged violations of clearly established law. 109 `[C]learly established' for purposes of qualified immunity means that `[t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.' Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614-15, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034) (alterations in original); see also Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc) ([W]hat is required is that government officials have `fair and clear warning' that their conduct is unlawful.) (citation omitted). In other words, in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (quoting Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034) (internal quotation marks omitted). 110 A reasonable INS official very well could have been unsure of the level of constitutional protection against discrimination afforded to aliens in Wong's rather unique circumstances. 31 Although we suggested in Barrera-Echavarria that aliens in Wong's position might have some constitutional rights, we have never squarely held that such aliens are entitled to equal protection guarantees, nor has the Supreme Court. 111 Indeed, a dispute over the very issue whether the government can discriminate in granting parole to non-admitted aliens on the basis of race divided the Eleventh Circuit en banc court in Jean, see Jean v. Nelson, 727 F.2d 957 (11th Cir.1984) (en banc), and led to Justice Marshall's dissent on the question when the Supreme Court majority declined to reach the issue. See Jean, 472 U.S. at 868-82, 105 S.Ct. 2992 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Under these circumstances of constitutional uncertainty regarding race discrimination against nonadmitted aliens, the contours of any constitutional doctrine we now recognize were not sufficiently clear that a reasonable INS officer would have realized that Wong after her return was entitled to Fifth Amendment equal protection with regard to immigration-related decisions. 32 112 Further, while we have concluded that Wong's particular circumstances support the conclusion that it was unconstitutional to discriminate against her on the basis of race, ethnicity, or religion, the complaint does not allege that the present defendants knew that she had been discriminated against with regard to the advance parole or waiver decisions. In the absence of such knowledge, the present defendants were not aware of this reason why Wong could not be discriminated against in violation of the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause. 113 We therefore conclude that the INS officials are entitled to qualified immunity on Wong's remaining discrimination claims.