Opinion ID: 199478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Statute of Conviction.

Text: 11 Maxwell asserts that because section 1382 criminalizes entry onto the grounds of a military or naval installation for any purpose prohibited, the government must show that a defendant had an improper purpose in entering such a facility. Because the government failed to prove this element, his thesis runs, the instant conviction cannot stand. We review the district court's construction of a federal statute de novo. SeeUnited States v. Carroll, 105 F.3d 740, 744 (1st Cir. 1997). 12 We accept Maxwell's premise: purpose is indeed an element of a section 1382 offense. But the case law is consentient that an unauthorized entry itself can constitute the prohibited purpose necessary to sustain a conviction under section 1382. See Parrilla Bonilla, 648 F.2d at 1377; United States v. Mowat, 582 F.2d 1194, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 1978); United States v. Floyd, 477 F.2d 217, 225 (10th Cir. 1973); see also Sharpton, 252 F.3d at 538-39 (accepting rule subsilentio). 13 This statutory construction blunts the main thrust of Maxwell's argument, but it does not completely refute that argument. The Parrilla Bonilla opinion emphasized that when a prosecution proceeds on the theory that a defendant purposes to enter a restricted military reservation without authorization, the government must show that the defendant had knowledge or notice, actual or constructive, that such entry was prohibited. Parrilla Bonilla, 648 F.2d at 1377. Absent such knowledge or notice, the showing of purpose is incomplete. 14 This requirement, too, has been satisfied. The Department of the Navy now has promulgated regulations, 32 C.F.R. §§ 770.35-770.40, closing all naval installations in Puerto Rico to the public, id. § 770.37. These regulations make pellucid that entry upon any U.S. Navy installation or property in Puerto Rico at anytime, by any person for any purpose whatsoever without the advance consent of the Commanding Officer . . . is prohibited. Id. at § 770.38. In Sharpton, 252 F.3d at 539 n.2, we left open the question of whether the Navy, by adopting these regulations and publishing them in the Federal Register, 46 Fed. Reg. 22,756 (Apr. 21, 1981), satisfied the knowledge or notice requirement as to naval installations in Puerto Rico. Today, we answer that question affirmatively. 15 The filing of a document with the Office of the Federal Register is (with an exception not relevant here) sufficient to give notice of the contents of the document to a person subject to or affected by it. 44 U.S.C. § 1507. It follows inexorably that section 1382's knowledge or notice requirement may be satisfied by the publication of a regulation specifically forbidding unauthorized entry. See Mowat, 582 F.2d at 1199-1203. Because the regulations cited above give explicit notice that any unauthorized entry onto the grounds of a naval installation situated in Puerto Rico is forbidden, all that is presently needed to satisfy section 1382's purpose requirement is proof that Maxwell's entry was deliberate. 16 The government unquestionably carried that modest burden in this case. The trial judge specifically found that Maxwell intentionally entered Camp Garcia, and the record fully supports that finding. Accordingly, Maxwell's contention that the government failed to prove each element of a section 1382 offense lacks merit. 1 17 Maxwell also presents a variation on this theme. He asserts that the district court should have allowed him to introduce the proffered expert testimony because of its relevance to section 1382's purpose requirement. This argument is jejune. 18 The appropriate standard for reviewing the admission or exclusion of expert testimony is abuse of discretion. United States v. Hernandez-Vega, 235 F.3d 705, 710 (1st Cir. 2000). Maxwell's expert was prepared to testify, inter alia, that nuclear-armed Trident submarines (which Maxwell speculates were taking part in the Navy's exercises at Vieques) are illegal under international law and that individuals have a right to take steps that otherwise might transgress domestic law in order to prevent their deployment. In Maxwell's view, this testimony would have shown that his purpose in entering Camp Garcia preventing a violation of international law -- was lawful (and, therefore, could not constitute the prohibited purpose that the statute requires). 19 As is evident from what we already have said, this argument misconstrues the level of purpose that need be shown under section 1382. Where, as here, unauthorized entry is prohibited by duly promulgated regulations, the only state of mind that section 1382 requires is a purpose to enter. See Parrilla Bonilla, 648 F.2d at 1377; Mowat, 582 F.2d at 1203-04; Floyd, 477 F.2d at 225. Since Maxwell does not dispute that he had such a purpose -- nor could he, on this record -- his specific reason for trespassing is irrelevant. See Parrilla Bonilla, 648 F.2d at 1377 (explaining that no specific intent to violate the law need be shown to satisfy section 1382); Mowat, 582 F.2d at 1203-04 (similar). Thus, the expert testimony -- which Maxwell offered to furnish support for the legitimacy of his specific reason for entering the base -- was irrelevant, and the district court acted appropriately in excluding it. 20