Opinion ID: 1863146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BishopImplied Warranties

Text: Finally, we turn to Tucker's claims that Bishop breached the implied warranty of merchantability and the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the summary judgment for Bishop on the claim that Bishop had breached the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, and it reversed that summary judgment on the claim that Bishop had breached the implied warranty of merchantability. 1. Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose. Implied warranties are governed by Alabama's version of the UCC, codified in Title 7, Ala.Code 1975. Section 7-2-315, Ala.Code 1975, provides: Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under Section 7-2-316 an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose. As the Court of Civil Appeals pointed out in its opinion: Tucker's deposition testimony contains no evidence that the dealership knew that he was relying on the dealership's skill or judgment to furnish him with an appropriate car or that he, in fact, did rely on the dealership's skill or judgment. 769 So.2d at 902. We agree with the Court of Civil Appeals that there is no evidence in the record indicating that Tucker relied on Bishop's skill or judgment when he selected the car. Accordingly, we agree that the summary judgment in Bishop's favor is due to be affirmed insofar as it relates to the claim that Bishop breached an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. 2. Implied Warranty of Merchantability. The implied warranty of merchantability is found in § 7-2-314(1), Ala.Code 1975, which provides: Unless excluded or modified (Section 7-2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Subsection (2)(c) of that Code section provides that to be considered merchantable, goods must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used. As the Court of Civil Appeals held, [t]o establish his claim of breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, Tucker must `prove the existence of the implied warranty, a breach of that warranty, and damages proximately resulting from that breach.' 769 So.2d at 901 (quoting Barrington Corp. v. Patrick Lumber Co., 447 So.2d 785, 787 (Ala.Civ.App.1984), quoting, in turn, Storey v. Day Heating and Air Conditioning Co., 56 Ala.App. 81, 83, 319 So.2d 279, 280 (1975)). Because this case is before this Court on appeal from a summary judgment in favor of GM and Bishop, we are concerned only with whether Tucker presented substantial evidence of each of these three factors so as to create a jury question. As we have mentioned above, the only evidence in the record is Tucker's deposition and his affidavit. They contain uncontroverted evidence that Tucker purchased the car in question from Bishop. It appears undisputed that Bishop is a seller of automobiles, as that term is defined in § 7-2-103, Ala.Code 1975. Thus, § 7-2-314's requirement that the seller be a merchant with respect to goods of that kind is met, and the record shows that Tucker has presented substantial evidence of the existence of the implied warranty. The record also contains evidence tending to establish a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability, because there was undisputed evidence tending to show that the car stalled repeatedly while Tucker was driving it and that Bishop failed to correct the problem when he took the car to Bishop for repair. Bishop does not dispute that evidence indicating that the car had a stalling problem was presented; it contends that this evidence is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question whether it breached an implied warranty of merchantability. Bishop argues that to create a genuine issue of material fact, Tucker was required to present expert testimony as to why the car stalled. Bishop relies on Brooks v. Colonial Chevrolet-Buick, Inc., 579 So.2d 1328 (Ala. 1991), and Sears, Roebuck & Co., Inc. v. Haven Hills Farm, Inc., 395 So.2d 991 (Ala.1981), as support for its argument that expert testimony was necessary in this case. Bishop argues that Tucker was required to present expert testimony identifying the specific cause of his car's stalling problem in order to avoid the entry of a summary judgment. He argues: In [ Haven Hills Farm ], a fittingly [analogous] case, a buyer brought a products liability claim for a defective car tire. The Supreme Court in [ Haven Hills Farm ] equated the legal burden in a products liability case to that of the Plaintiff's burden in a breach of warranty case. [395 So.2d] at 995. In both types of cases, the Plaintiff must prove a defect, `which rendered the product not fit for its anticipated useand the defect links to the defendant.' Bishop's Brief at 11. Bishop also cites Brooks as support for its argument. Bishop's reliance on Brooks and Haven Hills Farm is, however, misplaced. Those cases involved claims brought under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD). The AEMLD doctrine is based in tort law, having evolved from negligence law and having been influenced by Restatement (Second) of Torts. Haven Hills Farm, 395 So.2d at 993-94. Under the AEMLD, a plaintiff is required to prove, among other things, that a product is unreasonably dangerous as a result of a defect and that the plaintiff suffered injury as a result of the defect. Id. at 994. We are aware, of course, that in defining defect, this Court incorporated into AEMLD law some of the analysis applicable in cases arising, as does this one, under the UCC doctrine of the implied warranty of merchantability. Id. Specifically, this Court has combined the doctrine of fitness for the ordinary purpose intended of UCC law and the tort concept of unreasonably dangerous in defining defect. See Haven Hills Farm, supra, for further discussion of AEMLD law. We do not believe the fact that this Court borrowed some principles from UCC law in developing a definition of defect, as that term is used in AEMLD cases, forces the conclusion that principles of AEMLD law are always applicable in cases involving the implied warranty of merchantability. In fact, this Court has continued to recognize the clear distinction between AEMLD law and UCC law. See Yarbrough v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 628 So.2d 478 (Ala.1993), and Shell v. Union Oil Co., 489 So.2d 569 (Ala.1986). Finally, we note that this Court has previously affirmed judgments entered against defendants in breach-of-warranty cases where the plaintiffs did not present the kind of expert testimony Bishop argues is required here. See Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Dillard, 579 So.2d 1301 (Ala.1991), and Ford Motor Co., Inc. v. Phillips, 551 So.2d 992 (Ala.1989). Alabama law does not require that an expert witness testify in every case involving an alleged malfunction of a product where the plaintiff has sued alleging a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability. Given the uncontradicted evidence in this case, we conclude that Tucker presented substantial evidence of a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and of damage and thereby created a genuine issue of material fact. However, there is an additional issue raised in this casewhether the doctrine of spoliation of evidence requires that the summary judgment be affirmed. On the advice of his attorney, Tucker stopped making payments on his automobile loan. Although Tucker's deposition testimony is somewhat unclear as to what happened after he stopped making the payments, his affidavit indicates that GMAC repossessed the car. Bishop argues that because Tucker allowed the car to be repossessed, it was unavailable, and Bishop's technicians were prohibited from examining it. Bishop further argues that such an examination is essential to its defense. Bishop points to Capitol Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smedley, 614 So.2d 439 (Ala.1993), as support for its argument that, because it no longer has access to the car, the summary judgment in its favor is due to be affirmed. In Capitol Chevrolet, the plaintiff had purchased a van from a Montgomery Chevrolet dealership. Five months later the van caught fire and was rendered unusable. The plaintiff's insurer, Auto Owners Insurance Company, investigated the fire and eventually paid benefits to the plaintiff. The plaintiff then signed a subrogation agreement, and he and Auto Owners sued the dealership and GM, the manufacturer of the van. Before suit was filed, however, Auto Owners allowed the van to be destroyed, in order, it claimed, to save the cost of storage. The trial court entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. This Court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the dealership and GM were entitled to have the case dismissed, under the spoliation-of-evidence doctrine. This Court noted that Auto Owners had known that the cause of the fire was likely to be an issue in litigation. Nonetheless, Auto Owners ordered the destruction of the van 11 months before an action was filed against GM and the dealership. This present case is distinguishable from Capitol Chevrolet. Here, the evidence is undisputed that Tucker repeatedly took the car to Bishop for repair. In contrast to Capitol Chevrolet, where the defendants had had no opportunity to inspect the van, Bishop's mechanics had multiple opportunities to inspect Tucker's car and to correct the problem that ultimately led to this lawsuit. In fact, Tucker took the car to Bishop specifically so that its mechanics could determine the cause of the stalling problem and repair the car. A closer parallel might be found between this case and Iverson v. Xpert Tune, Inc., 553 So.2d 82 (Ala.1989). However, we conclude that this case is distinguishable from Iverson. In Iverson, the plaintiff had taken his automobile to Xpert Tune. Xpert Tune told the plaintiff his fuel pump was faulty, and it replaced the fuel pump. The repair was not satisfactory, and the plaintiff reclaimed the old fuel pump and had it reinstalled. The plaintiff later sued Xpert Tune, claiming that the fuel pump Xpert Tune had replaced was, in fact, not defective and alleging that Xpert Tune had committed fraud. After Xpert Tune asked to be allowed to examine the original fuel pump, the plaintiff allowed another mechanic to replace it, and it was destroyed or discarded. This Court noted that dismissal is the most severe sanction that a court can apply; nevertheless, it concluded that a dismissal was warranted because the plaintiff had willfully allowed the fuel pump to be discarded or destroyed after Xpert Tune had moved for production of the fuel pump. Here, there is no evidence that Tucker willfully allowed the car to be destroyed after the defendants requested access to it. Further, the nature of the claims involved in each case is different. In Iverson, the plaintiff alleged fraud, breach of contract, and misrepresentation based on what the plaintiff said was a false statement by the defendant regarding a particular part in his car. The plaintiff claimed that the part was not, in fact, defective, and it was essential to the defendant's case to be able to prove to the jury that its diagnosis was correct and that the part was defective. To do that, the defendant needed access to the original fuel pump. In this case, Tucker does not allege that Bishop misrepresented that a particular part in his car was not functioning. He alleges rather that the car Bishop sold him was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, because of the constant stalling problem, and, thus, that in selling him the car Bishop had breached the implied warranty of merchantability. It is undisputed that Tucker repeatedly complained to Bishop of the car's stalling problem during the time he owned it, and it is further undisputed that Tucker took the car to Bishop on several occasions asking that Bishop repair whatever problem was causing the stalling. Under these facts, we cannot conclude that the doctrine of spoliation requires that the summary judgment be affirmed. [3] Therefore, we affirm the Court of Civil Appeals' reversal of the summary judgment entered in favor of Bishop on Tucker's breach-of-implied-warranty-of-merchantability claim.