Opinion ID: 1947702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of Public Funds o Under KRS 31.185.

Text: The post-conviction petitioner in Stopher sought a writ to compel the trial court to conduct an ex parte hearing under KRS 31.185 to seek funds for an expert to support petitioner's motion. [7] We held that the issue of whether KRS 31.185 provided expert funds for post-conviction petitioners was a matter of first impression and that the resolution of that issue was nothing more than a matter of statutory interpretation. [8] We focused upon the defending attorney language in subsections (1) and (2) of KRS 31.185 and held that that language evidenced the General Assembly's intent to limit the use of funds or facilities allowed under KRS 31.185 to attorneys representing an indigent defendant at trial. [9] Or, in other words, the plain meaning of KRS 31.185(2) indicates that it only applies to trial and does not apply to post-conviction proceedings. [10] Later in the opinion, however, we ventured further and flatly declared that KRS 31.185 [in its entirety] does not apply to post-conviction proceedings. [11] In Paisley , the trial court ordered the Finance and Administration Cabinet to pay $5,000 for private mental health testing of a post-conviction petitioner in order to determine if that petitioner was mentally retarded and, thus, ineligible for the death penalty. [12] The Commonwealth petitioned this Court for a writ to prohibit the trial court from ordering it to pay for that private mental health testing. [13] We noted that [t]he establishment of mitigating circumstances at the penalty phase is of the greatest importance when a defendant is facing the death penalty. [14] So we held that the trial court properly ordered mental health testing to be performed on the petitioner. [15] But we held that the trial court erred when it ordered the Commonwealth to pay for private mental health testing without petitioner having first shown that the use of the state mental health facilities for the testing was impractical. [16] And we held that the Commonwealth was entitled to a writ because it would have been unable to recoup the $5,000 from the indigent petitioner once those funds had been expended, and the Commonwealth faced the potential of having to pay for private funding, for numerous post-conviction petitioners. [17] Confusion in our law has resulted from the fact that Stopher seemed to establish a bright line rule that no funds were available under KRS 31.185 for indigent postconviction petitioners while Paisley , without even mentioning Stopher, seemed to open up the possibility for expert funding for a postconviction petitioner. This confusion is magnified by the fact that Paisley , rather than quoting our earlier holding in Stopher that KRS 31.185 had no application to post-conviction petitioners, instead relied upon KRS 31.185the very same statute discussed at length in Stopher for the proposition that a post-conviction petitioner may be entitled to public funds for the hiring of an expert witness if the postconviction petitioner could show that the use of the state facilities was impractical. [18] Although much confusion could have been avoided if Paisley contained a discussion of Stopher, the core holdings of the two opinions are not entirely irreconcilable. The post-conviction petitioner in Stopher asked us to issue a writ to order the trial court to hold a hearing on whether the petitioner was entitled to expert funds under KRS 31.185 to bolster the petitioner's recently filed RCr 11.42 motion. [19] At the time we issued our opinion, no Kentucky court of competent jurisdiction had determined that the post-conviction petitioner in Stopher had presented a known grievance necessitating a hearing, meaning that it would have been premature to order expert funds for a hearing on an RCr 11.42 motion when the RCr 11.42 motion itself may not have even stated grounds sufficient to necessitate a hearing. [20] In Paisley , however, the trial court had already determined that the petitioner's RCr 11.42 motion could not be resolved without an evidentiary hearing. [21] So the issue of expert funding in Paisley was properly before the Court because an evidentiary hearing was going to be held. All that was truly at issue in Paisley was whether the trial court could order public funds to be expended for the post-conviction petitioner to have an independent expert mental health evaluation without having first shown that the state examination facilities were impractical for that purpose. [22] When read in conjunction, Stopher and Paisley jointly hold that an indigent postconviction petitioner may not receive public funds under KRS 31.185 unless a court of competent jurisdiction, whether at the trial or appellate level, has determined that the post-conviction petition sets forth allegations sufficient to necessitate an evidentiary hearing. Or, in other words, the threshold requirement for an indigent post-conviction petitioner to receive funds under KRS 31.185 is for a court of competent jurisdiction to order that a hearing be held on the allegations contained in the petition. Given that holding, it is clear that we went too far in Stopher when we said that KRS 31.185 has no application to post-conviction proceedings. Thus, to the extent that Stopher holds that KRS 31.185 is never available as an avenue for indigent post-conviction petitioners to obtain public funds, Stopher is overruled. [23] The mere fact that an indigent postconviction petitioner meets the threshold to receive public funds under KRS 31.185(3) and (6), however, is not an automatic funding entitlement for every out-of-county witness whose name appears on the petitioner's witness list. Rather, the trial courts in the Commonwealth have the inherent authority to control the proceedings before them to eliminate unjustifiable expense and delay. This inherent authority includes discretion to examine the post-conviction petition and the list of proposed witnesses submitted by indigent post-conviction petitioners to determine what is reasonably necessary for those petitioners fully to present their claims. In the case at hand, Hodge has apparently sought travel-related expenses for twenty-three out-of-county witnesses. The fetcher Circuit Court has the inherent discretion to scrutinize that proposed witness list and, after giving Hodge an opportunity to be heard in the matter, to authorize travel expenses for those out-of-county witnesses reasonably necessary for Hodge to present his claims fully. If the trial court finds that some of the persons Hodge desires to call as witnesses would present repetitive testimony or are otherwise unnecessary for Hodge's claims to be presented fully, the trial court may refuse to authorize travel expenses for those unnecessary witnesses. Finally, we firmly reject the Commonwealth's contention that an out-of-county witness called on behalf of an indigent post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate indigency before being eligible for travel expense reimbursement. A person need not lay bare his or her financial status in order to perform his or her civic duty by testifying at an official court proceeding. Our conclusion is reinforced by the fact that witnesses on behalf of the Commonwealth are not required to prove indigency before being eligible for reimbursement. Out-of-county witnesses called on behalf of indigent post-conviction petitioners are entitled to reimbursement in the same manner, as are witnesses for the Commonwealth. [24] In short, we hold that indigent postconviction petitioners are entitled to public funds for travel expenses for their out-of-county witnesses under KRS 31.185(3) and (6), provided that a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that an evidentiary hearing is necessary in order to resolve the allegations contained in the postconviction petition. A ruling to the contrary would deprive those indigent postconviction petitioners of their right to present fully their non-frivolous claims to the court. The trial courts must, exercise discretion to review the post-conviction petitioner's proposed witness list and to authorize travel reimbursement only for those out-of-county witnesses reasonably necessary for the post-conviction petitioner to present fully his claims. Travel expenses for the witnesses who reside out-of-county shall be paid from the special fund established by KRS 31.185(4)-(5) and shall be governed by the same general rules, regulations, and limits that are applicable to out-of-county witnesses called on behalf of the Commonwealth, regardless of the financial status of the witnesses.