Opinion ID: 1199062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Challenges to Wendy's Testimony

Text: Wendy, Sandra B.'s daughter and James's sister, who was five years old at the time of trial, was called as a witness by the prosecution. Defendant contends that Wendy was incompetent to testify as a witness, that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine her, that her testimony was unreliable and thus violated both his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable guilt determination and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process, and that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury to view Wendy's testimony with caution. We reject the contentions.
To determine her competency as a witness, the judge asked Wendy on voir dire whether she knew the difference between telling the truth and lying, and whether she would tell the truth in responding to questions. Wendy said yes to both inquiries, as well as to the question whether it would be a lie if the judge said his [black] robe was white. At that point, the judge said, unless I have objection, [the court] is satisfied that she is a competent witness. Wendy was then sworn as a witness. At the request of defense counsel, the trial court asked Wendy several questions relating to her memory of the night James died. Wendy did not remember that a police officer took her from her house to a hospital. She did, however, recall several events that occurred the night James died, including riding in an ambulance, seeing a doctor, and talking to people while she was with the doctor. (13) Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that Wendy was competent to testify, because the trial court's voir dire of her was inadequate to determine whether Wendy was capable of recounting her impressions of the pertinent events, and because the court did not impress upon her that she would be punished if she did not tell the truth. As a general rule, every person, irrespective of age, is qualified to be a witness and no person is disqualified to testify to any matter. (Evid. Code, § 700; see Pen. Code, § 1321.) A person may be disqualified as a witness for one of two reasons: (1) the witness is incapable of expressing himself or herself so as to be understood, or (2) the witness is incapable of understanding the duty to tell the truth. (Evid. Code, § 701, subd. (a).) The party challenging the witness bears the burden of proving disqualification, and a trial court's determination will be upheld in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. ( Adamson v. Department of Social Services (1988) 207 Cal. App.3d 14, 20 [254 Cal. Rptr. 667].) Here, the trial court  through its questioning on voir dire  ascertained that Wendy could distinguish between truth and falsity, and that she understood she had to tell the truth. The court repeatedly impressed upon Wendy the importance of telling the truth, and repeatedly extracted from her a promise that she would do so. Contrary to defendant's assertion, an actual direct threat of punishment for not telling the truth is not a prerequisite for a trial court's determination that a person is competent to be a witness. We have reviewed Wendy's brief testimony. Some of her statements were inconsistent. On cross-examination, defense counsel challenged those inconsistencies and Wendy's inability to recall some of the details of what had occurred the night of James's death. Inconsistencies in testimony and a failure to remember aspects of the subject of the testimony, however, do not disqualify a witness. ( Adamson v. Department of Social Services, supra, 207 Cal. App.3d at p. 20.) They present questions of credibility for resolution by the trier of fact. ( People v. McCaughan (1957) 49 Cal.2d 409, 420 [317 P.2d 974]; Adamson v. Department of Social Services, supra, 207 Cal. App.3d at p. 20; see Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 29B West's Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 701, pp. 9-10 [Deering's Ann. Evid. Code (1986 ed.) § 701, pp. 331-332].) The trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Wendy was competent to testify as a witness.
Defendant's other challenges to Wendy's testimony do not require an extended discussion. There is no merit to defendant's assertion that he was denied his right to cross-examination: defense counsel did cross-examine Wendy. Also without merit is defendant's claim that his constitutional right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and the requirement of the Eighth Amendment that a judgment of death be based on sufficiently reliable evidence were violated because Wendy's testimony was unreliable. Both the federal and the California Constitutions require certain procedure to ensure reliability in the fact-finding process. ( Ford v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 399, 411 [91 L.Ed.2d 335, 347-348, 106 S.Ct. 2595]; People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 520 [199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303, 50 A.L.R.4th 1055].) Here, defendant was fully afforded such protections. He was given an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine in a judicial forum. ( Ford v. Wainwright, supra, 477 U.S. at pp. 413-416 [91 L.Ed.2d at pp. 348-351].)
(14) We reject defendant's claim that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on its own motion that Wendy's testimony should be viewed with caution. In People v. Thomas (1978) 20 Cal.3d 457, 471 [143 Cal. Rptr. 215, 573 P.2d 433], we said that the giving of such an instruction was committed to the discretion of the trial court. When, as here, the testimony of a child is involved, the trial court is under no duty to give a cautionary instruction on its own motion. [8] (See People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1209-1210 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 565-566 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776].)