Opinion ID: 1228032
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Witness-killing Special Circumstances

Text: (21a) Section 190.2, subdivision (a)(10), defines as a special circumstance (i) the intentional killing of a victim to prevent his testimony in any criminal proceeding (when the killing was not committed during the commission, or attempted commission of the crime to which he was a witness) or (ii) the intentional killing of a victim who was a witness to a crime in retaliation for that witness's testimony in any criminal proceeding. The section obviously addresses two separate situations in which a witness-related killing will be a special circumstance. Nothing suggests that evidence supporting findings on both theories permits the People to charge and the jury to find two separate special circumstances. Indeed, the opposite seems better to reflect the drafters' probable intent: a defendant who is shown to have violated a particular special circumstance in more than one way is guilty of no more than one of such a special circumstance violation. Of course, evidence supporting the alternative theories of violation would be properly before the jury in any event; we therefore reject the People's suggestion that our construction of the statute forces the People to promote one societal interest over the other simply because both are established by a single course of conduct. The presence of evidence supporting both theories of violation can properly be emphasized by the prosecutor in order to stress to the jury the extent to which societal interests that underlie the witness-killing special circumstance have been violated. We conclude that only one witness-killing special circumstance should have been found true.