Opinion ID: 1754101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dunn v. Alabama State University Board of Trustees

Text: In Dunn, we considered this provision in the context of the appointments of Ross Dunn and Jo Ann Paddock to the board of trustees of ASU. 628 So.2d at 521. Their appointments were referred to the Senate Committee on Confirmations (the Committee), which voted against the appointments. Id. (emphasis added). When the Committee declined to `report' the appointments to the full senate for a vote, that body adjourned sine die without further action on the appointments. Id. Thus, the issue we considered in Dunn was whether the Committee's rejection of the appointments constituted adverse[] act[ion] within the meaning of that phrase in § 16-50-20(a). We held that it did. Dunn, 628 So.2d at 525. This case, however, involves no adverse action, either by the whole Senate or by the Committee. On the contrary, the whole Senate never considered the nomination of Donald Watkins, and the Committee voted to approve his nomination. This case is unlike Dunn in that in this case the only action taken in the Senate was favorable not adverse; it is adverse action that the statute requires to invalidate a nomination. Thus, Dunn is distinguishable from this case. In this connection, I conclude that, in regard to the appointment process under § 16-50-20(a), adjournment sine die is not adverse actionit is merely in action. In that respect, the process is not, as was suggested by ASU during oral argument, analogous to the process by which a bill becomes law. In the latter case, Ala. Const.1901, § 63, provides that no bill shall become a law, unless ... a majority of each house be recorded ... as voting in its favor. (Emphasis added.) See also Ala. Const.1901, § 125 (Every bill which shall have passed both houses of the legislature, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall be presented to the governor....). Obviously, a bill is of no force or effect until the extensive legislative process expressly set forth in the Constitution has been exhausted. Section 16-50-20(a), however, contemplates that an in-session gubernatorial appointment is effective until, and unless, there is affirmative, adverse action by the Senate. In this connection, it was conceded by all parties that Watkins assumed the duties of trustee immediately upon his appointment by the Governor and that he was entitled to do so. Thus, the process governed by § 16-50-20(a) has no functional similarity to the ordinary process of enacting legislation. Also inapplicable to this case is James v. Langford, 695 So.2d 1158 (Ala.1997), which involved the appointment of Auburn University trustees, pursuant to Ala. Const.1901, Amend. No. 161. As I pointed out in Part I of this writing, Amend. No. 161 does not contain the unique language involved in this case. For these reasons, I agree that the Senate's adjournment sine die, without having confirmed Watkins's appointment by an affirmative vote, does not invalidate his appointment. The question whether the Senate can again consider the appointment is not ripe for decision in this case. The issue presented has been resolved without our addressing the procedure of the Senate; thus, there is no basis for the Court to reach and address the question whether the Senate can again consider this appointment. However, Watkins contended in the trial court that there is no way for the Senate to again bring up his name for a vote in a subsequent session, and that he therefore can now serve out the remainder of the term to which he was appointed. I do not view our opinion today as deciding that issue. Nonetheless, I believe Watkins was quite correct in stating at oral argument in this Court that the language of the statute does not prevent the Senate from again considering the appointment.