Opinion ID: 1579136
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lack of Control Determination.

Text: Garrett also argues that the SVPA violates his due process rights because it does not require a finding that an alleged sexually violent predator has serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413, 122 S.Ct. 867, 870, 151 L.Ed.2d 856, 862 (2002); see also Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-58, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2080, 138 L.Ed.2d 501, 512-13 (1997). In In re Detention of Barnes, we considered the very same issue Garrett raises and determined the SVPA definition of mental abnormality must be defined as including and requiring a showing of a serious difficulty in controlling behavior to ensure the SVPA's constitutionality. 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003). To this end, we suggested that future SVPA proceedings use a jury instruction that embodies the lack of control requirement: As used in this instruction, mental abnormality means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Missouri, 74 S.W.3d 789, 792 (Mo.2002)). Ultimately, the jury instructions used in Barnes did not allow for a clear determination that Barnes had a serious difficulty in controlling behavior, and were thus constitutionally infirm. Id. Garrett's case went before the jury in July 2002, after the Supreme Court defined and clarified the serious difficulty in controlling behavior due process requirement, but before our decision in Barnes. See Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. at 870, 151 L.Ed.2d at 862 (2002); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357-58, 117 S.Ct. at 2080, 138 L.Ed.2d at 512-13 (1997); Barnes, 658 N.W.2d at 101 (2003). Nevertheless, one of the questions posed to the jury on the special verdict form was: Has the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the mental abnormality causes the respondent to have serious difficulty in controlling his sexually dangerous behavior? The jury answered, Yes to this question. Although this special verdict form question does not track precisely the jury instruction on mental abnormality that we suggested in Barnes, we believe that the question provoked a thoughtful consideration by the jury of whether Garrett has serious difficulty in controlling behavior. 658 N.W.2d at 101; accord Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. at 870, 151 L.Ed.2d at 862. Unlike the instruction in Barnes, which reflected only the SVPA's precise language, the question in this case went beyond the statutory language to encapsulate the due process requirement that had been recognized by the Court and which we would later recognize in Barnes. Moreover, the jury specifically found beyond a reasonable doubt that Garrett has serious difficulty in controlling [his] behavior. Barnes, 658 N.W.2d at 101; accord Crane, 534 U.S. at 413, 122 S.Ct. at 870, 151 L.Ed.2d at 862. Although we continue to stand behind the jury instruction we suggested in Barnes for further SVPA proceedings, we believe the special verdict form in this case ensured that Garrett was accorded due process.