Opinion ID: 772012
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Court Construction of Stalking Statute

Text: 59 Respondent contends that the district court's overbreadth analysis is based upon an erroneous conclusion that the Michigan Court of Appeals narrowed the statutory exemptions to include only labor picketing and other organized protests. 'In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a federal court, must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or enforcement agency has proffered.' Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982)); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 110 (1972); see also Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916 (1997) (Neither this Court nor any other federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one rendered by the highest court of the State.);Gooding, 405 U.S. at 520 (holding that United States Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction authoritatively to construe state legislation). 60 The Michigan Court of Appeals in this case summarily rejected Staley's overbreadth challenges based on that court's earlier decisions, including White, supra 15 . In People v. White, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that [b]oth §411h(1)(c) and § 411(i)(1)(d) state that '[h]arassment does not include constitutionally protected activity or conduct that serves a legitimate purpose,' and such protected activity or conduct has been defined as labor picketing or other organized protests. White, 536 N.W.2d at 883 (citing Pallas v. Florida, 636 So.2d 1358, 1360 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994) (emphasis added)). 61 As noted, the district court held that the White court's reference to labor picketing or other organized protests was a deliberate statement by the state court that only those activities are exempted from the definition of harassment. See Staley, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 784 16 . Based on this interpretation, the district court concluded that these phrases rendered the statute unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. See id. at 788. The court then posited various situations in which the stalking statute might be applied in a manner at odds with the First Amendment. See id. at 787-88. 62 As Respondent contends, there is no indication that the White court's reference to labor picketing and other organized protests were the only activities excluded by the limiting language. In fact, the portion of the Pallas opinion White refers to is simply a quotation of that state's exemption in its stalking law: Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of 'course of conduct.' Such constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests.Pallas, 636 So. 2d at 1360 (quoting Fla. Stat.§ 784.048(1)(a)-(c)(Supp. 1992)). TheFlorida statute does not limit the term constitutionally protected activity. Rather, it expressly states that such constitutionally protected activity includespicketing or other organized protests. Id. (quoting the Florida statute). Thus, the statutory language indicates that the list is illustrative, not exhaustive. See also Bouters v. State, 659 So. 2d 235, 237 (Fla. 1995) (holding that Florida stalking statute was neither unconstitutionally overbroad nor unconstitutionally vague; observing that [t]he conduct described at length in the stalking statute is clearly criminal and is unprotected by the First Amendment), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 894 (1995) 17 . 63 In addition, it is apparent that the White court also read the terms as illustrative not exhaustive, because, in its overbreadth analysis, it concluded that the statute could not be applied to entirely innocent conduct. White, 536 N.W.2d at 883. Presumably, had the White court found that the terms in the exclusion covered only picketing and other organized protests, it would have held that the statute could be applied to entirely innocent conduct. Further, the White court rejected the argument that the defendant's harassing phone calls served a legitimate purpose, to attempt to reconcile, on the grounds that threats of violence are not protected speech, not because the conduct was not labor picketing or other organized protest. 64 From subsequent opinions it is also apparent that the Michigan Court of Appeals does not perceive White as limiting the statutory exemption to apply only to labor picketing and other organized protests. In People v. Coones, 550 N.W.2d 600 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996), the Michigan Court of Appeals stated that the statutory exemptions have been defined to include labor picketing and other organized protests. Id. at 602 (citing White and Pallas). There, the defendant argued that he did not harass the victim because he acted with a legitimate purpose - to communicate with his wife and preserve his marriage. The Coones court did not reject the defendant's claim on the grounds that the statutory exclusions applied only to labor picketing or other organized protests, but held that the defendant's conduct was illegitimate because it was clearly in violation of the temporary restraining order and the conditions of the defendant's bond. 65 Similarly, in People v. Kieronski, 542 N.W.2d 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995), the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the defendant's conduct was not exempted under the harassment definition because, although he may have had legitimate business at the public places at which he threatened his victim, the court could discern no legitimate purpose in approaching or confronting the victim in those places. See id. at 343. Had the statutory exemptions been limited by White, as the district court found, there would have been no reason for the Kieronski court to discuss whether the defendant's behavior was exempted. 66 In short, the district court clearly misread the White court's reference to labor picketing or other organized protests, which as we will discuss, improperly colored its analysis of the overbreadth issue. 67 Respondent also challenges the district court's conclusion that the statute is vague. The district court stated that had it not found the White court's reference to labor picketing and other organized protests so limited the reach of the statute's exemption, it would find the law unconstitutionally vague because the statute provides no guidance as to what constitutes a legitimate purpose. Staley, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 786 n.4 18 .