Opinion ID: 449271
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conclusion

Text: 38 We conclude that section 3288 does not bar reindictment after the passage of the statute of limitations when the original indictment is dismissed for a legal defect such as the nonintentional failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Since the second indictment was obtained within the six month statutory period, it was both timely and proper. Further, the district court did not err by refusing to dismiss the indictment on the grounds of excessive preindictment delay. Horowitz failed to prove that he was actually prejudiced by the preindictment delay. In the absence of proof of actual prejudice, preindictment delay cannot successfully support a motion to dismiss an indictment. 39 In addition, contrary to appellant's assertions, consistency between verdicts of a multi-count indictment is not required. The district court thus did not err by refusing to grant appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal because of allegedly inconsistent jury verdicts. Finally, there was sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could have reasonably found Horowitz guilty of subscribing to a false income tax return. 40 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.