Opinion ID: 406749
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantial Evidence Supports the Grant of Nationwide

Text: Authority to Recreational 58 The principal argument of the protestants is that Recreational failed to proffer substantial evidence to establish a showing of public demand or need that would support a certificate granting nationwide authority. 15 The protestants allege that Recreational's sole evidence of public demand or need came from its affiliated company, Jesse F. White, Inc. Initial Brief of Petitioners at 9. The protestants concede that the supporting testimony of White is sufficient to sustain the findings of the ALJ (adopted by the Commission) in part (a) of the grant ... (but) vigorously disagree that there is sufficient evidence of record to sustain the grant of part (b), except with respect to the point of Mendon, MA. Id. at 12. In short, the protestants contend that Recreational failed to present a prima facie showing for a complete grant of its application. It made a prima facie showing for Mendon, MA, and that is all. Id. at 17. We disagree. 59 As readily acknowledged by the ALJ, Recreational did not put into evidence a strongly supported or documented factual presentation. (App. 236.) However, the fact that the application was not strongly supported does not mean that it was without sufficient support. The ALJ expressly found that the application complied with the old law and in so doing articulated the evidentiary support he discerned in the record for meeting the need and competition standards: 60 (t)here is a showing that the Jesse White distributorship is likely to use applicant in a continuing pattern of operations, provided applicant can secure backhaul traffic. Judging from applicant's experience during its emergency temporary authority operations and from Jesse White's own experience, there should be no problem in securing backhaul traffic for applicant. Jesse White does not need additional common carrier service, in the sense of lacking access to reasonably timely and responsive for-hire service from already authorized carriers. But it does have a need for transportation service which, if all goes well, the applicant corporation could either take over entirely or assist in handling. This new availability of applicant will constitute a new boat transportation service competitive in some respects, if not significantly comparable, with that service offered to Jesse White, and at least a limited number of shippers, by the protesting carriers. While applicant is not likely in the foreseeable future to make any significant financial investment in terminals or administrative support systems, as have the protesting carriers, nor, otherwise, to establish the kinds of nationwide advertising or servicing networks that the protesting carriers have, its service will be competitively available to the public from time to time, especially in providing fronthauls or backhauls for the Jesse White distributorship. 61 (App. 236.) (emphasis added). Speaking directly to the point of whether Recreational's primary reliance on White for business was a sufficient basis for granting nationwide authority, the ALJ reasoned: 62 By itself, the Jesse White record of past transportation movements would seem to indicate a justification for a service territory primarily along the east coast. But there are periodic shipments beyond this eastern territory and, on a prima facie basis at least, there seems no good reason to limit applicant's, and Jesse White's, potential flexibility in expanding their pertinent marketing operations. 63 Id. (emphasis added). The periodic shipments beyond the eastern territory which the ALJ referred to were detailed earlier in his opinion and included shipments to or from states outside New England such as Florida, Maryland, New York, South Carolina, Virginia and Wisconsin. (App. 231.) We believe that the Commission's grant of nationwide authority appears to be fully supportable based on the national character of the boat industry, 16 the demonstrated extent of White's previous and potential business, 17 and the established need for front haul and back haul loads in order to insure a viable operation. 64 Such certification is also consistent with the Commission's opinion in Art Pape Transfer, supra at 96: 65 The Commission has always sought to act under the general policy of issuing grants of authority with broad commodity and territorial descriptions to enable a carrier to render shippers and the public a complete transportation service. FoxSmythe Transp. Co. Extension-Oklahoma, 106 M.C.C. 1, 28, 29 (1967); Warren Transport, Inc., Ext.-Agric. Implements, 124 M.C.C. 641, 647-648 (1976). Broad grants of authority also take cognizance of technological modifications, changing industrial patterns, and future needs, and allow carriers to meet changing needs of shippers and receivers, market demands, and the diverse requirements of the shipping public.... 66 Similarly, when an applicant for a certificate seeks new authority to provide transportation to many localities in a large geographical area, we have not traditionally required that it demonstrate a specific need for service to each point. There is no requirement that data on public need and benefit be gathered for every village and hamlet in the area of proposed operations before a certificate of such encompassing scope be awarded. May Trucking Co. v. United States, 593 F.2d 1349, 1353 (D.C.Cir.1979). See also Miller Transporters, Inc. v. United States, 594 F.2d 463, 466-467 (5th Cir. 1979). All that is required is that applicant submit evidence which is sufficiently representative of the transportation needs of the shipping public in the relevant market to enable us to make an informed determination of the public interest in a given case. 67 Accordingly, we affirm the conclusion of the ALJ and the Commission that Recreational established a prima facie justification for a grant of nationwide common carrier authority. 68 The Commission's grant of nationwide authority was also grounded on the ALJ's determination that the protestants failed to demonstrate a justification for any regulatory protection from any competition likely to emanate from the applicant's operations. (App. 236.) It is on this point of the impact of competition on existing service-which is closely tied to eased entry-that the Commission's position had most significantly changed in interpreting the old law-even before Ex Parte No. MC-121 was formally adopted. The Commission and the courts were interpreting the Interstate Commerce Act to encourage new competition in the trucking industry before Recreational filed its application for common carrier authority. This court in May Trucking Co. v. United States, 593 F.2d 1349, 1356 (D.C.Cir.1979), stated that (i)njury to existing carriers through competition becomes relevant only when there is corresponding injury to the public. Congress designed the Interstate Commerce Act to benefit the people, not to create protected monopolies for those who profess to serve the public. We further observed in May that the loss of customers which is frequently associated with competition ordinarily serves to promote rather than injure the public interest. Id. Relying upon our statements in May, the ALJ here specifically found that the protestants had not shown that diversion of traffic or revenues from protestants operations would amount to injury to the public. (App. 236.) We have found no evidence in the record that would cause us to dispute that finding. 69 The ALJ also correctly held that the family relationship between the persons controlling Recreational and White does not constitute a basis for denying or restricting the application. See Atlantic Coast Exp. Inc., Ext.,-East Coast Ports, 132 M.C.C. 184 (1980). 70 We hold that substantial evidence supports the conclusion of the ALJ and the Commission that Recreational met its burden and that the proof offered by protestants is deficient under the liberalized policies applied by the Commission in recent years that presently favor increased competition and reduced entry requirements. It's a new ball game. The Commission's decision is therefore affirmed. 71 Judgment accordingly.