Opinion ID: 442925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Frivolity Standard Applied to Franklin's Actions

Text: 25 We now apply our legal conclusions to the 28 cases on appeal that were dismissed as frivolous under section 1915(d). Cases Affirmed 26 We have reviewed the following cases and affirm, finding for the reasons set forth in the district court's opinion, Franklin II, 563 F.Supp. at 1325-1332, that the actions lack arguable substance in law or fact: 27 Franklin v. Hill, No. 83-3957 (Civ. No. 82-048); 28 Franklin v. Brown, No. 83-3958 (Civ. No. 82-050); 29 Franklin v. John Doe, Managers of Channel 12, No. 83-3951 (Civ. No. 82-035); 30 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3953 (Civ. No. 82-042); 31 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3954 (Civ. No. 82-044); 32 Franklin v. United States Attorney General, No. 83-3956 (Civ. No. 82-047); 33 Franklin v. Reagan, No. 83-3959 (Civ. No. 83-0698); 34 Franklin v. Attorney General Brown, No. 83-3960 (Civ. No. 83-0699); 35 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3961 (Civ. No. 83-0700); 36 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3962 (Civ. No. 83-0701); 37 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3963 (Civ. No. 83-0702); 38 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3964 (Civ. No. 83-0703); 39 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3966 (Civ. No. 83-0707); 40 Franklin v. Frohnmayer, No. 83-3967 (Civ. No. 83-0708); 41 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3968 (Civ. No. 83-0710); 42 Franklin v. Sgt. Garcia, No. 83-3969 (Civ. No. 83-0711); 43 Franklin v. Miller, No. 83-3970 (Civ. No. 83-0712); 44 Franklin v. Brurdsman, No. 83-3971 (Civ. No. 83-0713); 45 Franklin v. Everetts, No. 83-3972 (Civ. No. 83-0714); 46 Franklin v. Baker, No. 83-3973 (Civ. No. 83-0715); 47 Franklin v. Graham, No. 83-3974 (Civ. No. 83-0716); 48 Franklin v. Ermon, No. 83-3976 (Civ. No. 83-0718); 49 Franklin v. Beals, No. 83-3977 (Civ. No. 83-0719); and 50 Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3978 (Civ. No. 83-0721). 51 We also affirm the dismissal of the following actions for the reasons stated here: 83-3965 52 In Franklin v. Dr. Wilson, No. 83-3965 (Civ. No. 83-0704), we affirm the dismissal for frivolity on the ground that Franklin's medical malpractice claim has no arguable substance in law or fact against the state defendants. Absent a showing of diversity of citizenship, the district court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a medical malpractice claim against private doctors. 83-3975 53 In Franklin v. Atiyeh, No. 83-3975 (Civ. No. 83-0717), Franklin sued the Governor, the Attorney General, and the State Superintendent of Prisons for violating his civil rights by denying him access to church services. He alleges that church services were held on a floor without elevator service and that his leg and back injuries prevented him from climbing stairs. The district court dismissed the action as frivolous because it was barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of res judicata. We affirm. 54 Franklin first requested injunctive relief. In a continuing violation, the Oregon two-year limitation period runs from the last act committed. See Kosikowski v. Bourne, 659 F.2d 105, 106 (9th Cir.1981). This action does not appear to be barred by the statute of limitations because Franklin alleges that he gained access to religious services only two days before the complaint was filed. Franklin's request for injunctive relief is moot, however, because he now has received access to church services. 55 We also affirm the dismissal of Franklin's request for damages under the doctrine of res judicata. As the district court noted, Franklin has brought four previous actions to get an elevator in the prison. These actions were dismissed by the district court as so insubstantial as not to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits precludes the parties from relitigating claims which were or could have been raised in that action. Amaro v. Continental Can Co., 724 F.2d 747, 749 (9th Cir.1984). Franklin has indicated no reason why he could not have raised this legal theory in his prior actions. 10 Cases Remanded 56 Finally, we reverse and remand the following two cases dismissed as frivolous by the trial court: 83-3952 57 In Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3952 (Civ. No. 82-040), Franklin sued the State Superintendent of Prisons and staff of the Oregon State Hospital for limiting his association with other mentally and emotionally disturbed inmates. The district court suggested that Franklin's complaint stated a claim but dismissed it as frivolous. He found that this action had no reasonable chance of success on the merits because Franklin had stated in his affidavit that the staff restricted his association with other inmates on the grounds that he was interfering with their treatment program. Franklin II, 563 F.Supp. at 1327. We acknowledge that if Franklin's complaint had raised this defense, it would lack arguable substance. Upon review of the papers submitted by Franklin, however, we find that Franklin did not raise this defense. Franklin simply alleged that the hospital staff told other inmates not to associate with him and threatened to punish him if he talked with other inmates. Construing these pro se pleadings liberally, as we must, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), Franklin's pleadings arguably stated a claim for violation of his freedom of association. 58 A prison inmate retains those first amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974). However, the associational rights of prisoners may be curtailed whenever the institution's officials, in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations ... possess the likelihood of disruption of prison order or stability ... Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 132, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2541, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977). Although Franklin does not allege that the prison's limitation on his right to associate is arbitrary, he has not been notified of this defect in his pleadings and given an opportunity to amend. We therefore reverse and remand this claim to give Franklin an opportunity to amend his complaint. If, however, Franklin is unable to show that the hospital's actions were arbitrary and unnecessary to the maintenance of order in the institution, this action should be dismissed as frivolous.83-3955 59 We affirm the dismissal of one claim and reverse and remand the other claim in Franklin v. Cupp, No. 83-3955 (Civ. No. 82-046). Franklin challenges the constitutionality of Ore.Rev.Stat. Secs. 137.280(1)(a) and (d), 11 which prohibit a felon from running for or holding office and from voting while imprisoned. We affirm the court's dismissal of Franklin's challenge to the voting provision of subsection (d) on the authority of Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2655, 41 L.Ed.2d 551 (1974) (state statute disenfranchising exfelons does not violate fourteenth amendment). We reverse the court's dismissal of the challenge to subsection (a) because we find it has arguable substance in law and fact. 60 Ore.Rev.Stat. Sec. 137.280(1)(a), which bars felons from running for office, arguably violates Franklin's first amendment rights. See Minielly v. State of Oregon, 242 Or. 490, 411 P.2d 69 (1966) (en banc) (holding that a statute barring civil service employees from public office violates their first amendment right to engage in political expression). Richardson does not necessarily control because it was decided on the implicit permission to strip felons of the right to vote found in section 2 of the fourteenth amendment. Thus Franklin's claim has arguable legal substance, and his allegations that he wishes to run for Governor provide sufficient factual substance to survive dismissal. Although we do not express an opinion as to the merits of this claim, the district court should not have dismissed it as frivolous. 12