Opinion ID: 184114
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive reasonableness of Lanning's sentence

Text: Lanning does not challenge the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. We will therefore limit our reasonableness review to whether the above-Guidelines . . . sentence was substantively reasonable. See United States v. Tate, 516 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir.2008). First, Lanning argues that his sentence is arbitrary because the district court refrained from imposing an upward departure regarding his criminal history category, yet inconsistently imposed an upward variance primarily based on Lanning's history of petty crimes. We will review this substantive-reasonableness claim under the generally applicable abuse-of-discretion standard even though it was not raised below. See Penson, 526 F.3d at 337. Contrary to Lanning's assertions, the district court did not overly emphasize his criminal history and likelihood of reoffending, but rather carefully balanced the § 3553(a) factors to arrive at its upward variance. In addition to considering Lanning's prior offenses and his likelihood of reoffending, the court based its upward variance on the need for deterrence and protection of the public, the seriousness of Lanning's crime, the need to provide him with rehabilitative treatment, and Lanning's lack of respect for the law. See United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 590 (6th Cir.2009) ([E]ven if the court's departure cannot be sustained under § 4A1.3, the seriousness of Herrera-Zuniga's criminal history was not the only consideration on which the district court relied in imposing a harsher sentence. The district court also noted several § 3553(a) factors that warranted imposing a harsher sentence.). Lanning's upward variance was therefore not inconsistent with the district court's decision to refrain from raising his criminal history category under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Moreover, even though the district court concluded that Lanning's criminal history and likelihood of reoffending did not warrant an upward departure under § 4A1.3, these very same factors may properly be taken into account in the court's decision to impose an upward variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In a case from one of our sister circuits that this court has relied on, the defendant argue[d] that the district court acted inconsistently by declining to depart under USSG § 4A1.3(a) for an underrepresented criminal history and then varying upward based on [the defendant's] commission of serious crimes and his potential for recidivism. United States v. Solis-Bermudez, 501 F.3d 882, 885 (8th Cir.2007), cited favorably by Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 590. The Eighth Circuit explained that an aspect of a defendant's criminal history that does not warrant a departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a) might still form the basis for a variance under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) because these standards are not the same. Whereas § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C) broadly permit the district court to consider the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant and the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1) more narrowly permits an upward departure if the defendant's criminal history category under the advisory Guidelines  substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, unlike § 3553(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C), the Guidelines policy statement lists specific circumstances justifying an upward departure for substantial underrepresentation of criminal history. Solis-Bermudez, 501 F.3d at 886 (footnote omitted). The district court in the present case, in deciding to impose an upward variance, concluded that Lanning's criminal history shows that he has made a living as a thief. In contrast, the court did not reach such a broad characterization concerning Lanning's past crimes when deciding whether to impose an upward departure based on Lanning's criminal history. The court also connected Lanning's high likelihood of reoffending (a conclusion that the court reached earlier in the sentencing proceeding based on Lanning's criminal history) to the § 3553(a) sentencing goals of deterrence and protection of the public. As in Solis-Bermudez, the court below thus considered additional aspects of the defendant's criminal history beyond what it considered in deciding to refrain from upwardly departing under § 4A1.3(a). Moreover, even if a district court would be justified in imposing a § 4A1.3(a) upward departure based on the defendant's criminal history, the court may still determine that an upward variance based on § 3553(a)'s broader goals is the more appropriate course of action. See id. at 887 (holding that there is no inconsistency between the district court's discretionary determination that the failure to include this conduct in the criminal history scoring did not `substantially under-represent[]' the seriousness of [the defendant's] criminal history, USSG § 4A1.3(a)(1), and its decision to impose an upward variance based on the broader § 3553(a) considerations). Lanning's upward variance was therefore not an abuse of the court's discretion. Lanning also questions the extent of his upward variance. His sentence of 42 months' imprisonment was well above his advisory Guidelines range of 18 to 24 months, though considerably below the statutory maximum sentence of 60 months (5 years). Although we may consider the extent of the deviation in reviewing a district court's sentence, we must give due deference to the district court's decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586. Lanning's applicable Guidelines range was for the general crimes of theft or forgery, but these broad categories do not reflect the specific activity of repeatedly stealing individuals' checks out of their mailboxes and altering them for Lanning's pecuniary gain. The district court thoroughly reviewed the § 3553(a) factors and determined that the specific nature of Lanning's actions justified its decision to vary upward. Under these circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the upward variance to 42 months of imprisonment.