Opinion ID: 1465793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: on remand, the trial court should enter a judgment of conviction on the lesser-included offense of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon

Text: The government, opting against a retrial of appellant on the greater offense, asks us to remand the case for entry of judgment on the lesser-included offense of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. Although appellant does not contest the right of the government to retry her before a jury on the charge of possession of a prohibited weapon, she does argue that it is too late for the government to amend the information to charge her with attempted possession of a prohibited weapon, a charge she acknowledges does not carry with it a right to a jury trial because the maximum penalty is a fine not exceeding $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than 180 days, or both. D.C.Code § 22-1803. The government responds that it does not need to amend the information because, by proving that appellant committed the completed offense of possession of a prohibited weapon, it necessarily also proved that appellant committed the lesser-included offense of attempt to possess a prohibited weapon. We agree. More than 40 years ago, this court rejected the rule that failure to consummate the crime is one of the essential elements of an attempt. United States v. Fleming, 215 A.2d 839, 840 (D.C. 1966). The court reasoned that this rule present[ed] the anomalous situation of a defendant going free `not because he was innocent, but for the very strange reason, that he was too guilty.' Id. at 840-41 (quoting Connecticut v. Shepard, 7 Conn. 54 (1828)). See also Evans v. United States, 779 A.2d 891, 894 (D.C.2001), quoting Ray v. United States, 575 A.2d 1196, 1199 (D.C.1990) (`Every completed criminal offense necessarily includes an attempt to commit that offense.'); accord, Smith v. United States, 813 A.2d 216, 219 (D.C. 2002). Here, the charge of attempt to possess a prohibited weapon is subsumed within the proof of the completed offense, and thus we reject the notion that the government must amend the information and then retry appellant on the lesser charge. To hold otherwise would eviscerate the entire theory of lesser-included offenses. The better practice undoubtedly would be for the government to make this election before trial, rather than after it realizes that the conviction for the completed offense cannot stand because appellant was neither afforded a jury trial nor the opportunity to make a knowing waiver of that right. Nonetheless, the government has proved the attempt charge (as well as the completed offense), and the trial court on remand should enter a judgment of  conviction on the attempt charge. See, e.g., Willis v. United States, 692 A.2d 1380, 1383 (D.C.1997) (quoting Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 306, 116 S.Ct. 1241, 134 L.Ed.2d 419 (1996) (adopting principle of federal appellate courts that have uniformly concluded that they may direct the entry of judgment for a lesser included offense when a conviction for a greater offense is reversed on grounds that affect only the greater offense)). Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to vacate appellant's conviction for possession of a prohibited weapon and to enter judgment against appellant on the lesser-included offense of attempted possession of a prohibited weapon. So ordered.