Opinion ID: 2464014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: failure to sentence.

Text: Although Appellant was convicted of the kidnapping of Geordan, the jury was not instructed to fix a penalty for that conviction. Appellant did not object to this omission from the penalty phase instructions, but claims on appeal that the trial court has now lost jurisdiction to impose a sentence for that conviction. Appellant was indicted and convicted of capital kidnapping. The element which elevates kidnapping to a capital offense is that the victim was not released alive. KRS 509.040(2). Obviously, Geordan was not released alive and, unlike murder, a conviction of capital kidnapping does not require that the accused either caused or intended the victim's death. However, in order for capital punishment to be imposed, the Commonwealth must prove an aggravating circumstance. KRS 532.025(2). While murder is not a statutory aggravator for kidnapping and vice-versa, we held in Harris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 793 S.W.2d 802, 804-05 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 924, 111 S.Ct. 1319, 113 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991), that although the mere fact of the victim's death was not an aggravating circumstance, the fact that the defendant murdered the victim was an aggravating circumstance otherwise provided by law, KRS 532.025(2), sometimes referred to as a non-statutory aggravator. Another potential aggravating circumstance in this case was that the capital offense was committed while Appellant was engaged in the commission of robbery in the first degree. KRS 532.025(2)(a)2. Thus, if the Commonwealth could prove that Appellant was engaged in the commission of either murder or first-degree robbery during the course of the kidnapping of Geordan, it could seek a penalty of either death or life in prison without benefit of probation or parole for twenty-five years. Otherwise, the maximum penalty for his conviction of kidnapping would be imprisonment for life. KRS 509.040(2); KRS 532.030(1). In this case, the jury convicted Appellant of capital kidnapping and first-degree robbery, but deadlocked on whether he was guilty of murder. Appellant will be retried on that charge. Obviously, the Commonwealth could not use the murder of Geordan as an aggravating circumstance at the first trial, because the jury was unable to reach a verdict on that issue. Thus, the prosecutor was required to elect whether to proceed to a sentencing hearing without one of the two potential aggravating circumstances, or reserve sentencing until a final verdict could be reached on the charge of murder. Not surprisingly, the prosecutor elected to reserve sentencing. There is nothing in our statutory or case law which precludes this procedure. In fact, the result is the same as if the jury had deadlocked during the penalty phase of a capital trial. See Skaggs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 672, 681 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1130, 106 S.Ct. 1998, 90 L.Ed.2d 678 (1986). Criminal Rule 11.04(1) provides that [a] judgment of conviction shall set forth the plea, the verdict or findings, the adjudication and sentence, .... (Emphasis added.) Since no sentence has been imposed, final judgment has yet to be entered with respect to Appellant's conviction of kidnapping. Thus, this issue is not even ripe for appeal. RCr 12.04(2); Chambers v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 10 (1953); Lee v. Commonwealth, 310 Ky. 69, 219 S.W.2d 990 (1949); cf. Commonwealth v. Taylor, Ky., 945 S.W.2d 420, 422 (1997). A defendant is entitled to have his sentence imposed without unreasonable delay, RCr 11.02(1); and there is authority for the proposition that if the delay is unreasonable, the sentencing court may lose jurisdiction. Green v. Commonwealth, Ky., 400 S.W.2d 206, 207 (1966); Wilson v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 577 S.W.2d 618, 619 (1979). However, no unreasonable delay has occurred in this case. Except for the fact that Appellant effected a stay of proceedings by filing this appeal, he already would have been retried on the unresolved charges and sentenced on his conviction of kidnapping Geordan. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed by the Christian Circuit Court are affirmed, and this case is remanded to the Christian Circuit Court for resolution of the remaining issues raised in the indictment. All concur.