Opinion ID: 789384
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Rights

Text: 17 Woolfolk next argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by the delay following the issuance of the federal detainer on January 9. The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. In order to prove a Sixth Amendment violation in this context, a defendant must show first that the Amendment's protections have been triggered by `arrest, indictment, or other official accusation.' Thomas, 55 F.3d at 148 (quoting Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992)). 18 If the Sixth Amendment protections apply, we must make four separate [i]nquiries: whether delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the government or the criminal defendant is more to blame for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suffered prejudice as the delay's result. 8 Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651, 112 S.Ct. 2686. In addition to being a factor, the first inquiry is also a threshold requirement, because [s]imply to trigger a speedy trial analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed the threshold dividing ordinary from presumptively prejudicial delay. Id. at 651-652, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (quotation marks omitted). After the defendant makes this threshold showing, he must ... show on balance, that the four inquiries weigh in his favor. Thomas, 55 F.3d at 148. 19 Under Thomas, the filing of the detainer, warrant and complaint on January 9, 2003, triggered Woolfolk's Sixth Amendment speedy trial rights. See Thomas, 55 F.3d at 149 (holding that the combination of the criminal complaint, the arrest warrant, and the federal detainer were sufficient to implicate the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment). He was indicted on August 7, almost eight months later, and pleaded guilty on December 19, almost a full year after his Speedy Trial rights attached. 20 The Supreme Court has counseled that postaccusation delay [is] presumptively prejudicial at least as it approaches one year. Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652 n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686. One year is the point at which courts deem the delay unreasonable enough to trigger the Barker [i]nquiry. Id. The Supreme Court, however, has never offered guidance on what the phrase postaccusation delay  encompasses, and in this case it is unclear whether the time from January 9 to December 19, or from January 9 to August 7, is the proper measure. 9 Even assuming, however, that the relevant period of postaccusation delay is the period from the serving of the detainer, arrest warrant, and complaint on January 9 to the filing of the indictment on August 7, we believe that Woolfolk has met the threshold Barker requirement. As one commentator explains, it may generally be said that any delay of eight months or longer is presumptively prejudicial. 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2(b)(2d ed.1999) (quoting Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 611, 623 n. 71 (1980)). Although the eight month threshold is a general rule and not a rigid requirement, see United States v. Cope, 312 F.3d 757, 778 (6th Cir.2002) (finding eight month delay was substantial but not presumptively prejudicial in two-defendant, eleven-count case that involves multiple allegations of attempted murder), given the fact that Woolfolk's case involves little complexity, we see no reason to deviate from that general rule here. Thus, regardless of whether the relevant period of postaccusation delay is from January 9 to August 7 or from January 9 to December 19, the postaccusation delay in this case was presumptively prejudicial and Woolfolk has satisfied the threshold Barker requirement. 21 Although Woolfolk has satisfied the threshold requirement, that fact by no means ends our Barker inquiry. We have previously found no Sixth Amendment violation in cases involving time periods much greater than that at issue here. See United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 827 (4th Cir.1998) (thirty-five months); Thomas, 55 F.3d at 149-150 (two and a half years). At this stage in the analysis, we typically would examine the remaining Barker inquiries in order to determine if Woolfolk's Sixth Amendment rights were violated. On the record before us, however, we believe that a remand to the district court is more appropriate. The Barker inquiry is a fact-intensive inquiry, Cope, 312 F.3d at 778, and, given the uncertainty regarding the cause of Woolfolk's detention after April 10, we believe that the district court is in the best position to conduct a full Barker analysis.