Opinion ID: 2582
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Categorical Inquiry: Connecticut Statute

Text: Assuming the government has not waived the issue, [4] cf. Rosa, 507 F.3d at 154 & n. 11, we conclude that a conviction under the Connecticut Statute cannot categorically qualify as a controlled substance offense within the meaning of Guidelines § 4B1.2(b) because the Connecticut Statute criminalizes some conduct that falls outside the Guidelines' definition. Under Connecticut law, the statutory definition of `sale' as applied to illegal drug transactions is much broader than [the] common definition of a sale as an exchange of an object for value. State v. Myers, 101 Conn.App. 167, 921 A.2d 640, 648-49 (2007), certification granted on other grounds by 927 A.2d 919 (Conn.2007). Under this broad statutory definition of sale, a `Sale' is any form of delivery[,] which includes barter, exchange or gift, or offer therefor .... Conn. Gen.Stat. § 21a-240(50) (emphasis added); see State v. Wassil, 233 Conn. 174, 658 A.2d 548, 557 (1995). Thus, as the government appears to recognize, the statute plainly criminalizes, inter alia, a mere offer to sell a controlled substance. [5] Other state courts have interpreted similar statutory definitions of sale to include a mere offer to sell a controlled substance. See, e.g., State v. Allen, 292 A.2d 167, 170, 171 (Me.1972) (statutory definition of sale to include barter, exchange, or gift, or offer therefor covers mere offer to transfer a controlled substance); Porter v. Sheriff, Clark County, 87 Nev. 274, 485 P.2d 676, 676 (1971) (same); People v. Robinson, 14 Ill.2d 325, 153 N.E.2d 65, 69 (1958) (under same definition, a simple offer or agreement to sell ... constitutes a sale of narcotics); see also State v. Hairiston, 33 Conn.Supp. 183, 369 A.2d 255, 256 (1976) (Connecticut's controlled drug statute contains a definition of sale which includes gifts or offers.). Further, under Connecticut law, there is no requirement that one be in possession of goods or have control over them in order to sell them. State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 301 A.2d 547, 553 (1972); cf. United States v. Palacios-Quinonez, 431 F.3d 471, 476 (5th Cir.2005) (Someone who offers to sell need not have possession as required by the guidelines. Rather, one can misrepresent ownership or control of the offered goods, such as where one is offering to sell the proverbial Brooklyn Bridge.). We agree with the Fifth Circuit that a mere offer to sell, absent possession, does not fit within the Guidelines' definition of a controlled substance offense. United States v. Price, 516 F.3d 285, 288-89 (5th Cir.2008). An offer to sell can be fraudulent, such as when one offers to sell the Brooklyn Bridge. See Palacios-Quinonez, 431 F.3d at 476. In such a circumstance, the offer to sell is fraudulent in the sense that the person offering the bridge or the drug does not have the intent to distribute or sell the item. As we have held, a crime not involving the mental culpability to commit a substantive narcotics offense [does not] serve as a predicate `controlled substance offense' under the Guidelines. United States v. Liranzo, 944 F.2d 73, 78-79 (2d Cir.1991). [6] Thus, the Connecticut statute, by criminalizing a mere offer to sell, criminalizes more conduct than falls within the federal definition of a controlled substance offense.