Opinion ID: 78521
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is this agency function preempted by the DPPA?

Text: While state agency functions are defined almost exclusively by state law, an otherwise legitimate agency function may be preempted by federal law. Under the Supremacy Clause, any state law that conflicts with federal law is preempted. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 22 U.S. 1, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). Conflict arises where compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or where state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98, 112 S.Ct. 2374, 2383, 120 L.Ed.2d 73 (1992) (internal quotes and citations omitted). Thus, even a legitimate state function is prohibited if it conflicts with the DPPA. Plaintiff-appellants claim that section 2721(a), which provides that states shall not knowingly disclose or otherwise make available to any person or entity drivers' personal information, 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a) (emphasis added), prohibits Florida from utilizing targeted advertising such as the DriverSource program. Plaintiff-appellants argue that Florida makes drivers' personal information available to advertisers by sending their targeted solicitations to non-consenting drivers. Congress wrote section 2721(a) in the disjunctive, which indicates alternatives and requires that those alternatives be treated separately. Brown v. Budget Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 119 F.3d 922, 924 (11th Cir.1997); see also United States v. Harmas, 974 F.2d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 1992) (statutes written in the disjunctive should  be interpreted as establishing two alternative means of committing a violation). The use of the disjunctive or indicates that something different or unlike disclosure is also prohibited by section 2721(a). See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1585 (3d ed.1966) (or is [u]sed as a function word to indicate an alternative between different or unlike things); Resolution Trust Corp. v. United Trust Fund, Inc., 57 F.3d 1025, 1033 (11th Cir.1995) (the disjunctive `or' gives independent meaning to the words it separates); United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1472 (11th Cir.1986) (separating terms by the disjunctive word `or,' strongly indicat[es] that Congress construed the two to be separate and distinct). Congress's use of otherwise confirms that make available means something different than, or unlike, disclosure. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1598 (3d ed.1966) (in a different way or manner). Thus, section 2721(a) generally prohibits states from disclosing personal information or using personal information in a manner that, although not disclosed, would otherwise make [it] available to any person or entity.... 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). However, section 2721(b) remains an exception to this general prohibition against disclosing or otherwise making available drivers' personal information. As such, it is unnecessary for us to reach the question of whether Florida makes drivers' personal information available to advertisers if the DriverSource program is a permissible use under section 2721(b)(1).