Opinion ID: 707548
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charron's First Habeas Petition

Text: 6 In his appeal from the district court's dismissal of his first habeas petition, Charron claims that the district court erred on three bases: (1) applying Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991), retroactively in this case; (2) failing to properly evaluate the effect of the Supreme Court of Missouri's summary order denying his state habeas petition; and (3) concluding that Charron had not established cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome any procedural default. We address these arguments in turn. 7 Charron argues that the magistrate judge erred in concluding that Coleman governed the procedural default analysis. The magistrate judge initially concluded that under Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 109 S.Ct. 1038, 103 L.Ed.2d 308 (1989), Charron's claims were not procedurally defaulted. However, after the parties submitted additional documents, including the complete legal files from Charron's trial and postconviction proceedings, the magistrate judge concluded that Charron's claims were in fact procedurally defaulted based on Coleman. Charron contends that Coleman constituted a new rule under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and should not have been applied to his case because Coleman was decided after his conviction became final. Instead, Charron contends, the magistrate judge correctly concluded in the first instance that Harris controls the procedural default analysis. 8 We reject Charron's claim that Coleman constituted a new rule under Teague and accordingly agree with the magistrate judge that Coleman governs the outcome of the procedural default issue. In Teague, the Supreme Court held that a new rule which arises after a habeas petitioner's conviction becomes final may not be applied retroactively on collateral review to invalidate a state court conviction unless the rule falls within two narrowly circumscribed exceptions not relevant here. 489 U.S. at 301, 109 S.Ct. at 1070. In determining whether a principle sets forth a new rule under Teague, the court must '[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed,' ... and 'determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's] claim at the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the Constitution.'  Caspari v. Bohlen, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 948, 953, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994) (internal citation omitted) (alterations in original). 9 It is thus clear from the language of Teague and its progeny that its new rule principle applies to rules of constitutional law which the states are required to observe. Coleman, however, did not set forth any new constitutional principle but merely discussed the analysis to be used in determining whether claims have been procedurally defaulted pursuant to an independent and adequate state rule, as well as the standard required to overcome that default. Further, the language from Teague and Caspari indicates that the new rule principle applies to claims made by the habeas petitioner, not procedural defenses asserted by the state. Other courts have held that the procedural default rule from Coleman and the related doctrine of abuse of the writ outlined in McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 477-97, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1461-72, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991), do not constitute new rules under Teague and therefore may be applied retroactively. See Hull v. Freeman, 991 F.2d 86, 90 (3d Cir.1993) (Coleman does not set forth new rule and may be applied retroactively); Andiarena v. United States, 967 F.2d 715, 717-18 (1st Cir.1992) (abuse of the writ doctrine not new rule and may be applied retroactively); Hudson v. Whitley, 979 F.2d 1058, 1062-63 (5th Cir.1992) (same). Thus, the magistrate judge properly applied Coleman in analyzing whether Charron's claims were procedurally defaulted. 10 Charron next argues that the magistrate judge erred by failing to evaluate the effect of the Supreme Court of Missouri's order denying his state habeas petition before the magistrate judge concluded that Charron's claims were procedurally defaulted. Charron contends that the court should have conducted an inquiry to determine whether the Supreme Court of Missouri's denial of his state habeas petition was in fact on procedural, rather than substantive, grounds. 11 Although Charron cites Byrd v. Delo, 942 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir.1991), as favorable authority, Byrd actually supports a finding that the magistrate judge did not need to conduct any extensive inquiry into the meaning of the summary denial of Charron's state habeas petition. In Byrd, the Supreme Court of Missouri summarily denied Byrd's state habeas petition, stating Now at this day, on consideration of the petition for writ of habeas corpus herein to the said respondent, it is ordered by the court here that the said petition be, and the same is hereby denied. Id. at 1229. Byrd argued that this ruling by the Supreme Court of Missouri was sufficient under Harris 5 to lift a state procedural bar and permit a federal court to review the merits of his habeas claims. Byrd, 942 F.2d at 1231. However, we rejected this argument in light of the following language from Coleman: 12 In habeas, if the decision of the last state court to which the petitioner presented his federal claims fairly appeared to rest primarily on resolution of those claims, or to be interwoven with those claims, and did not clearly and expressly rely on an independent and adequate state ground, a federal court may address the petition. 13 Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735, 111 S.Ct. at 2557). We held that the summary dismissal of Byrd's state habeas petition, which was silent as to its underlying grounds, did not  'fairly appear [ ] to rest primarily on federal law, or to be interwoven with the federal law.'  Id. (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 735, 111 S.Ct. at 2557). Accordingly, we concluded that the dismissal of Byrd's petition had to have been based on Missouri's procedural rule that state habeas petitions cannot be used as a vehicle for raising questions that could have been raised on direct appeal or in a Rule 27.26 proceeding, filed initially in a state trial court. Id. at 1232. See also Jolly v. Gammon, 28 F.3d 51, 53 (8th Cir.1994) (applying Coleman and rejecting claim that unexplained summary denial of motion to recall mandate opens up the merits on defaulted claims), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 462, 130 L.Ed.2d 370 (1995); Battle v. Delo, 19 F.3d 1547, 1561 (8th Cir.1994) (procedural bar cannot be overcome by filing state habeas petition), op'n amended and adhered to on remand, 64 F.3d 347 (8th Cir.1995). 14 In this case, the Supreme Court of Missouri denied Charron's state habeas petition with language identical to that used to deny Byrd's state habeas petition. Charron's attempts to distinguish Byrd are unpersuasive. Thus, the magistrate judge committed no error in his evaluation of the Supreme Court of Missouri's denial of Charron's state habeas petition in analyzing the procedural default issues. 15 Charron finally argues that, assuming that his federal habeas claims have been procedurally defaulted, the magistrate judge erred in concluding that he had not provided cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome the default. He claims cause on two grounds: (1) ineffectiveness of his direct appeal counsel; and (2) the Missouri Court of Appeals' refusal to grant his motion for extension of time to file a supplemental brief. He claims that he was prejudiced because his constitutional claims have now been dismissed without being addressed on their merits. 16 In order for a habeas petitioner to receive federal review of habeas claims that have been procedurally defaulted in state court, the petitioner must demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. at 2565. 6 Ineffectiveness of appellate counsel may serve as cause. Id. However, in the district court, Charron's ineffectiveness claims appeared to be confined to state postconviction counsel. This would preclude us from ruling in his favor for two reasons: (1) because there is no entitlement to the effective assistance of state postconviction counsel, any ineffectiveness of that counsel may not serve as cause, id.; and (2) his claim that his direct appeal counsel was ineffective is being raised for the first time on appeal, and we do not ordinarily consider such claims, Whitmill v. Armontrout, 42 F.3d 1154, 1156 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 249, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1995). 17 Further, although the cause element may be satisfied due to ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel, Coleman makes clear that this will be found only where counsel was ineffective within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Coleman, 501 U.S. at 752, 111 S.Ct. at 2566. Our independent review discloses that direct appeal counsel was not ineffective under Strickland for failing to raise every conceivable issue on direct appeal. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 536, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 2667, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986) (the process of 'winnowing out weaker arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to prevail ... is the hallmark of effective appellate advocacy) (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 3313, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983)). 18 Moreover, even assuming that Charron's appellate counsel was ineffective, cause has still not been established because the ineffectiveness of appellate counsel may not be asserted as cause to excuse procedural default unless the petitioner has first presented this argument 'as an independent Sixth Amendment claim to the state courts, if a forum existed to make the argument.'  Whitmill, 42 F.3d at 1157 (quoting McKinnon v. Lockhart, 921 F.2d 830, 832 (8th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1208, 111 S.Ct. 2805, 115 L.Ed.2d 978 (1991)). Under Missouri law, the appropriate avenue for challenging the ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel is a motion to recall the mandate. Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1031 (8th Cir.1995); Jolly, 28 F.3d at 53. Because Charron has not filed a motion to recall the mandate challenging the ineffectiveness of direct appeal counsel (or for that matter, has not raised the claim in any state pleading or proceeding), such a claim may not serve as cause to overcome the procedural default. 19 Along the same lines, we observe that cause may include interference by officials that makes compliance with the State's procedural rule impracticable.... McCleskey, 499 U.S. at 494, 111 S.Ct. at 1470 (internal quotations omitted). Charron attempts to bring the Missouri Court of Appeals' denial of his motion for an extension of time to file a supplemental brief in his direct appeal within the rubric of this rule. We are not persuaded. We do not believe that Court's refusal to grant Charron's motion to permit him to file an untimely brief raising a myriad of additional issues satisfies this standard. Charron does not argue that state officials frustrated his attempts to raise these issues in his initial direct appeal brief, and thus we believe that compliance with Missouri's procedural rule was not impracticable. 20 Finally, in the district court Charron failed to even assert prejudice to overcome the state procedural default, and here he merely makes the broad assertion that his counsel's ineffectiveness sufficiently prejudiced him to overcome the default. To demonstrate prejudice, a petitioner must show that the errors of which he complains 'worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire [hearing] with error of constitutional dimensions.'  Jennings v. Purkett, 7 F.3d 779, 782 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1596, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)) (alteration in original). We recently observed that this standard of prejudice is higher than that required to establish ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland. Zinzer v. Iowa, 60 F.3d 1296, 1299 n. 7 (8th Cir.1995). After carefully reviewing the record, we are satisfied that Charron has not satisfied either standard of prejudice. Thus, the district court properly concluded that Charron did not establish cause and prejudice sufficient to overcome his state procedural defaults. 7