Opinion ID: 3014747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Jacobs in custody during her statements?

Text: 8 Jacobs claims only that she was in custody during her April statements. Thus we address only that custody issue. As noted, it is undisputed that Sullivan did not advise Jacobs of her Miranda rights before her April statements. If Miranda warnings are not given before a person “in custody” is questioned, evidence resulting from the questioning must be suppressed.7 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45. An individual is in custody when he or she has been “deprived of his [or her] freedom of action in any significant way.” Id. at 444; see also United States v. Leese, 176 F.3d 740, 743 (3d Cir. 1999). In Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004), the Supreme Court gave the following description of the Miranda custody test: Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt that he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. Once the scene is set and the players’ lines and actions are 7 However, “[s]tatements made by a defendant in circumstances violating . . . [Miranda] are admissible for impeachment if their trustworthiness . . . satisfies legal standards.” Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 397-98 (1978) (second omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 reconstructed, the court must apply an objective test to resolve the ultimate inquiry: was there a . . . restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Id. at 663 (quoting Keohane, 516 U.S. at 112) (emphases added) (quotation marks omitted). In this context, there are at least three differently worded tests for when a person is in custody: (1) when the person has been deprived of her or his freedom in some significant way; (2) when a reasonable person would perceive that she or he was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave; and (3) when there is a restraint on the person’s freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. More clear is that the determination of custody is an objective inquiry (that is, what a reasonable person would believe) based on the circumstances of the interrogation. Leese, 176 F.3d at 743. The District Court correctly noted three factors that are among those that should be weighed to determine if an individual was in custody. Jacobs, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 627-28. One is the location of the questioning. We have stated that “all ‘station house’ interrogations should be scrutinized with extreme care for any taint of psychological compulsion or intimidation because such pressure is most apt to exist while a defendant is interviewed at a police station.” Steigler v. Anderson, 496 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir. 1974). A second factor is the information known by the officer concerning the 10 suspect’s culpability. “‘The more cause for believing the suspect committed the crime, the greater tendency to bear down in interrogation and create the kind of atmosphere of significant restraint that triggers Miranda, and vice versa.’” Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Hall, 421 F.2d 540, 545 (2d Cir. 1969)). And a third factor is whether the officer revealed his or her belief that the suspect was guilty. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (“An officer’s knowledge or beliefs may bear upon the custody issue if they are conveyed, by word or deed, to the individual being questioned.”). The District Court applied these factors to the facts of the case and concluded that Jacobs was in custody during the April 4 interview because: (1) the questioning took place at the FBI Offices; (2) Sullivan believed Jacobs was guilty; (3) Jacobs was summoned to FBI offices without explanation; (4) Sullivan’s questions were confrontational and intimidating; (5) he used interrogation tactics, including placing the incriminating suitcases in Jacobs’ view8 ; (6) Sullivan communicated to Jacobs 8 Sullivan acknowledged that displaying evidence to a suspect is an interrogation technique and that he placed the suitcases that were seized during Stewart’s arrest near his desk because he “wanted [Jacobs] to see the suitcases in the hopes that she would come around and tell us everything that she knew.” The use of interrogation techniques in a police-station setting was one of the very reasons why the Supreme Court held in Miranda that a suspect must be advised of his or her 11 that he thought she was guilty; and (7) Jacobs felt obligated to come to and stay at the questioning because she was reasonably under the impression that she was still an FBI informant. Jacobs, 312 F. Supp. 2d at 628. On appeal, Jacobs suggests two additional reasons: (8) she was not specifically told she was not under arrest before questioning began, citing Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (a factor indicating the defendant was not in custody was that he was specifically told he was not under arrest); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1122 (1983) (same); and (9) she did not agree to meet with Sullivan with knowledge of the fact that questioning about a criminal offense would take place, see United States v. Kim, 292 F.3d 969, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In determining whether suspects were ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes, the Supreme Court has considered whether they voluntarily approached or accompanied law officers understanding that questioning would ensue.” (emphasis in original)). According to the Government, Mathiason suggests that Jacobs was not in custody on April 4. In that case, a police officer investigating a burglary left a note with the defendant asking him to call because the officer wanted “‘to discuss something with [him].’” 429 U.S. at 493. The defendant called and a meeting was set up at the state parole office. Id. At the meeting, after advising the defendant that he was not under constitutional rights before questioning begins. 384 U.S. at 44855. 12 arrest, the officer told him that the police believed he had committed the burglary and (falsely) that his fingerprints were found at the scene. Id. A few minutes later, the defendant confessed to the crime and was sent home shortly thereafter. Id. at 493-94. The Supreme Court held that Mathiason had not been in custody, stating that there was “no indication that the questioning took place in a context where [Mathiason’s] freedom to depart was restricted in any way.” Id. at 495. It did so because Mathiason (1) had come to the station voluntarily, (2) was informed that he was not under arrest, and (3) left the interview without hindrance. Id. at 495.9 To suggest that Mathiason implies that Jacobs was not in custody reaches too far. The first factor found relevant by the Supreme Court was that Mathiason had come to the station voluntarily. In Jacobs’ case, by contrast, Sullivan called Jacobs and told her that he “need[ed] to see [her] at the office right away.” When Jacobs tried to find out why Sullivan wanted to see her, he did not answer the question and instead stated, “I will talk to you about it when you get here.” Furthermore, Jacobs was led to believe she was still an informant and thus likely felt an obligation to follow the directions of her handler, particularly because Sullivan had paid her and used his position to influence the criminal justice system to help her previously. 9 That the officer had falsely told Mathiason that his fingerprints were found at the scene was held irrelevant to the custody analysis. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96. 13 Finally, the FBI informant admonition forms stated that “the source must abide by the instructions of the FBI” (emphasis added). Thus, while Jacobs was not physically forced to go to the FBI offices on April 4, her decision to go cannot fairly be said to have been “voluntary” in the sense that it was for Mathiason. In addition, Mathiason was told he was not under arrest. As Jacobs was not told anything regarding her arrest status, pro or con, this factor falls somewhat in her favor. Another factor was that Mathiason left the interview without hindrance. Jacobs also left the interview without hindrance. However, the test for custody is not whether the police in fact let a suspect leave at the end of the questioning without hindrance. Rather, it is whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that during the questioning he or she could leave without hindrance. Thus, if this factor is useful at all, it is only an indicator of what the circumstances during the questioning would have made a reasonable person believe. Furthermore, just because an officer lets a suspect leave after he or she has gotten all the desired incriminating evidence does not mean the officer would have let the suspect leave (or, to be more precise, it does not mean the officer made the suspect believe she or he could leave) during the questioning. Thus, the first two Mathiason factors cut against the 14 Government (acknowledging that the second factor favors Jacobs tepidly). The third factor (the weakest) is only marginally helpful to its case. The Government also argues that Beheler suggests that Jacobs was not in custody on April 4. In Beheler, police were investigating a homicide arising out of an attempted robbery by Beheler and his co-conspirator, Wilbanks. 463 U.S. at 1122. After the homicide, Beheler called the police, who came to the crime scene. Id. He told the police that Wilbanks had killed the victim. Id. Later, although the police specifically told Beheler he was not under arrest, he voluntarily agreed to accompany police to the station house. Id. There, Beheler agreed to talk about the murder. Id. After less than thirty minutes, he was allowed to return home. Id. The Beheler Court held that Mathiason controlled, as it “involved a factual context remarkably similar to the present case . . . .” Id. at 1123. However, as previously explained, the first two Mathiason factors cut against the Government, and only the weakest of the three factors, the third, is somewhat helpful to it. The Supreme Court also noted that “Miranda warnings are not required simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Id. at 1125 (quotation omitted). That either of these two factors alone does not per se indicate custody hardly means that both of these factors in concert with seven other factors do not indicate custody. To recap, in 15 Jacobs’ case, in addition to (1) the questioning taking place at the FBI offices, and (2) Sullivan believing Jacobs was guilty, the following additional factors were present: (3) Jacobs was summoned to FBI offices without explanation; (4) Sullivan’s questions were confrontational and intimidating; (5) he used interrogation tactics, including placing the incriminating suitcases in Jacobs’ view; (6) he communicated to Jacobs that he thought she was guilty; (7) Jacobs felt obligated to come to and stay at the questioning because she was reasonably under the impression that she was still an FBI informant; (8) she was not specifically told she was not under arrest before questioning began; and (9) she did not agree to meet with Sullivan with knowledge of the fact that questioning about a criminal offense would take place. None of these factors was present in Beheler. Thus it hardly requires us to conclude that Jacobs was not in custody on April 4.10 10 The Government also cites Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 430-31 (1984), for the proposition that a suspect is not necessarily in custody when compelled to appear at a meeting with a probation officer. First, this proposition surely cannot be generalized to mean being compelled to be somewhere can never indicate custody. In fact, the very definition of being “in custody” is essentially being “compelled to be somewhere” (two of the three tests for when a person is in custody are (1) when the person has been deprived of his or her freedom in some significant way, and (2) when a reasonable person would perceive that she or he was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave). Presumably Murphy should be limited 16 In sum, nine factors indicate that Jacobs was in custody during her April statements. The two cases on which the Government primarily relies—Mathiason and Beheler—do not support its position nearly as strongly as it argues, and in any event do not overcome our conclusion of custody. Thus we affirm the District Court on this issue. to the probation context, in which the “baseline” is that the probationer will be required to attend meetings. Cf. id. at 432 (“[T]he nature of probation is such that probationers should expect to be questioned on a wide range of topics relating to their past criminality.”). Further, unlike Jacobs’ April 4 interview, a “probation interview [is] arranged by appointment at a mutually convenient time.” Id. at 433. Finally, the two cases that the Government relies on most, Mathiason and Behler, rest largely on the fact that the suspect came to the station voluntarily (that is, he was not compelled). This implies that if a suspect is compelled to go to the station, it would be a factor in favor of custody. The Government further argues that Murphy suggests that when a suspect is familiar with an interviewer and the interview situation, concluding there was custody is inappropriate. See id. (“Murphy’s regular meetings with his probation officer should have served to familiarize him with her and her office . . . .”). But while Jacobs and Sullivan had a ten-year relationship, it was a cooperative one. While Jacobs was familiar with having conversations with Sullivan, nothing in the record shows she was familiar with Sullivan accusing her of federal offenses, asking her confrontational and intimidating questions, and using interrogation tactics on her. 17