Opinion ID: 3163997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial And Verdict

Text: The trial began in October 2011. Although it lasted nearly a month, the testimony from one witness is most relevant to Hunter’s current appeal. During Philip Morris’s defense, it called Dr. Peter Lipowicz, a senior principal scientist at Altria Client Services,7 as an expert witness. Among the topics that Dr. Lipowicz testified about on direct examination was Philip Morris’s design effort, starting in the 1950s, to “make a cigarette somewhat less dangerous and a little bit safer.” Dr. Lipowicz testified that he believed that Philip Morris’s lines of cigarettes with reduced tar and nicotine yields, 6 Id. at 932-33. 7 The Altria Group owns Philip Morris USA and other tobacco operating companies. At-A-Glance, ALTRIA, http://www.altria.com/Our-Companies/At-A-Glance /Pages/default.aspx (last visited December 11, 2015). -4- 7071 including Marlboro Lights, had succeeded in that effort, and that “it was really promoted by the public health community” for years. During cross-examination, Hunter’s counsel turned to the reasons that Philip Morris no longer sold cigarettes under the name Marlboro Lights. Dr. Lipowicz testified that Philip Morris “had to take the word ‘lights’ off our cigarettes [as required by] the FDA.” Hunter’s counsel asked why federal law banned the descriptor “light,” which elicited Dr. Lipowicz’s testimony that he was “not sure [of] all the foundation for the law.” Hunter’s counsel then asked, “Are you telling us that it’s not even legal to put ‘lights’ on the package anymore?” at which point Philip Morris’s counsel objected. At that point, the superior court ended Dr. Lipowicz’s testimony for the day and discussed Philip Morris’s objection and the questions Hunter’s counsel planned to ask Dr. Lipowicz the next morning. The superior court identified two lines of conflict between the parties: whether Dr. Lipowicz’s testimony had violated Judge Kessler’s injunction, and whether Hunter’s counsel could cross-examine Dr. Lipowicz about Judge Kessler’s findings and the findings Congress had made in the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, the 2009 legislation that banned the “light” descriptor. Hunter’s counsel asked to submit a brief addressing both topics, which the superior court allowed, and Philip Morris’s counsel took the opportunity to argue that the Congressional findings were both inadmissible as evidence of the facts Congress found and beyond the scope of Dr. Lipowicz’s testimony on direct examination. The next morning Hunter’s counsel moved “for judicial notice and enforcement of [Judge Kessler’s] injunction.” This motion first argued that Dr. Lipowicz’s testimony on direct examination had violated Judge Kessler’s injunction against “falsely den[ying] . . . that its light or low tar descriptors are misleading,” and requested that the superior court enforce the injunction by offering a corrective instruction. The motion then argued that “Congress has banned ‘light’ and similar -5- 7071 descriptors because they are misleading,” and quoted Congress’s finding that “many smokers mistakenly believe that ‘low tar’ and ‘light’ cigarettes cause fewer health problems than other cigarettes.”8 At the start of the day’s proceedings, the parties again discussed the evidence Hunter’s counsel could use in his cross-examination of Dr. Lipowicz. The superior court determined that it lacked authority to enforce Judge Kessler’s injunction, as it had suggested in its pre-trial order. The superior court discussed the admissibility of Congress’s findings in greater depth and challenged Philip Morris’s counsel’s characterization of those findings as hearsay. The superior court concluded the discussion by addressing Hunter’s counsel: “Given the complications of the issue, I believe that the witness was asked yesterday if those words had to be taken off, and his answer was, ‘Yes, Congress told us to.’ And I’m going to — Mr. Bauermeister, you can — you’ll just leave it at that.” Hunter’s counsel resumed his cross-examination of Dr. Lipowicz. In accordance with the trial court’s orders, he did not directly ask why Congress and the FDA had banned certain descriptors. But he did cross-examine Dr. Lipowicz using a 2010 report from the National Cancer Institute that concluded that the existence and marketing of low-yield cigarettes may have increased the number of deaths due to smoking by encouraging smokers with health concerns to switch rather than quit altogether. Dr. Lipowicz agreed that Philip Morris did not publicly contest the National Cancer Institute’s conclusions, which were read to the jury. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a special verdict form. The jury found that Philip Morris’s product was not defective. But it further found that Philip 8 Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, § 2(38), 123 Stat. 1776, 1780 (2009). -6- 7071 Morris had made one or more false or misleading statements regarding the dangers of cigarette smoking, that it had known the statements were false or misleading when it made them, and that it intended or had reason to expect that Francis would rely on them. Finally, it found that Francis had not seen or heard any false or misleading statements by Philip Morris and therefore returned a verdict for Philip Morris. C. The Superior Court’s First Order, Granting Hunter’s Motion For A New Trial Hunter moved for a new trial under Alaska Civil Rule 59 on the grounds that the jury had been misled by false evidence, that Philip Morris’s defense had violated an injunction issued by another court, and that the jury’s findings were against the clear weight of the evidence. Hunter first asserted that the court’s evidentiary rulings at trial had impermissibly restricted her counsel’s ability to cross-examine Dr. Lipowicz about Judge Kessler’s findings, and that as a result Dr. Lipowicz had been able to mislead the jury about whether Congress had found that Philip Morris acted fraudulently. But the superior court rejected this argument. The superior court reasoned that Judge Kessler’s findings were “both hearsay and not binding on either this court or the jury,” and that Hunter’s “planned cross examination would have rested on the factual accuracy of Judge Kessler’s findings.” The superior court observed that “the fact that Dr. Lipowicz knew about [Judge Kessler’s] findings had no bearing on the content of his testimony unless one compared his testimony to the content of the findings themselves.” The superior court thus rejected Hunter’s arguments that the results of the suit in Judge Kessler’s court should have been admissible as an exception to hearsay offered for a purpose other than the truth of the matter asserted. Additionally, the superior court reasoned that because the injunction was stayed when Philip Morris removed the descriptor “light” from its -7- 7071 products, Dr. Lipowicz could have testified truthfully that the injunction had not been the cause of that change. But the superior court granted Hunter’s motion for a new trial on the ground that the jury’s finding that Francis did not see or hear any false or misleading statements was against the weight of the evidence. Its order set out the standard trial courts should consider when deciding whether to grant a new trial by citing and quoting this court’s opinions in Kava v. American Honda Motor Co.9 and Hogg v. Raven Contractors, Inc.10 Specifically, the superior court quoted the following language from Kava: [A] trial court may set aside a verdict and order a new trial in the interest of justice if the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. In deciding a motion for a new trial on this basis, the court must use its discretion and independently weigh the evidence. A court may set aside a verdict as being against the weight of the evidence even when “there is substantial evidence to support it.” The decision is a matter for the trial court’s discretion.[11] In a footnote, the superior court examined the court of appeals’ decision in Taylor v. State.12 Quoting that decision’s statement that a new trial is available “only when the evidence supporting that verdict ‘[is] so slight and unconvincing as to make the 9 48 P.3d 1170 (Alaska 2002). 10 134 P.3d 349 (Alaska 2006). 11 This quotation in the superior court order is from Kava, 48 P.3d at 1176. The internal quotation is from 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2806, at 65 (2d ed. 1995). 12 262 P.3d 232 (Alaska App. 2011). -8- 7071 verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust,’ ”13 the superior court concluded that “[t]he standard used in reviewing a motion for a new trial in the context of a criminal trial actually is somewhat more deferential than that used in a civil trial.” The superior court then applied its understanding of the new trial standard to Hunter’s contention that the jury’s finding that Francis had not seen or heard any false or misleading statements by Philip Morris was against the weight of the evidence. The court wrote that “Francis clearly was exposed to the descriptor ‘light,’ ” based on its inclusion on the packaging of Marlboro Lights, and that as defendant admitted at oral argument,[14] Mr. Francis switched to light cigarettes because they were less harsh and because he thought they were better for him. He accordingly had to have been exposed to . . . information that, as discussed below, had to have come to him directly or indirectly from [Philip] Morris. The superior court thus reasoned that the verdict “therefore necessarily was against the weight of the evidence unless the jury found that the marketing of light cigarettes was not false or deceptive.” The superior court found that, “[w]hile a close call, . . . any finding by the jury that the campaign was [not] deceptive was against the weight of the evidence.” Its order surveyed the evidence Hunter’s experts presented on the issue of light cigarette marketing and weighed it against Philip Morris’s defense, particularly the expert testimony of Dr. Peter Lipowicz. It concluded that [v]iewing the evidence as a whole in the court’s role as effectively the thirteenth juror, the court finds that Dr. Lipowicz’s testimony was not sufficiently credible to 13 This quotation in the superior court order is from Taylor, 262 P.3d at 234. The internal quotation is from Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Alaska App. 1996). 14 Philip Morris denies having made such an admission. -9- 7071 undercut, much less to overcome, the substantial evidence indicating that defendant made false or misleading statements regarding the health risks posed by light cigarettes. Any finding by the jury to the contrary therefore went against the weight of the evidence. The order therefore granted Hunter’s motion for a new trial. D. The Superior Court’s Second Order, Granting Philip Morris’s Motion For Reconsideration And Denying A New Trial Philip Morris moved for the superior court to reconsider its decision. Its motion alleged that the court had used the incorrect legal standard in its order granting a new trial. The motion instead offered language from Mullen v. Christiansen,15 which Philip Morris argued demonstrated that “[a] new trial may be granted only ‘where the evidence to support the verdict is completely lacking or is so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust.’ ” Philip Morris further disagreed that the standard for granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence differs in the civil and criminal contexts. Philip Morris’s motion for reconsideration also contested the superior court’s findings regarding the weight of the evidence. It argued that substantial credible evidence supported its contentions that light cigarettes do present lesser health risks and that Philip Morris and the public health community believed them to present lesser health risks at the time any statements were made. It also argued that the court erred in concluding both that Francis understood the term “light” to carry health connotations and that he had acted on such information. The motion concluded that the superior court had erred in its “wholesale rejection” of Philip Morris’s “substantial and credible evidence,” and that the order granting a new trial evinced a personal disagreement with the verdict, rather than a finding that it was against the weight of the evidence. 15 642 P.2d 1345 (Alaska 1982). -10- 7071 Hunter’s opposition pointed out that the language from Mullen that Philip Morris quoted actually stated the standard an appellate court uses in its review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for a new trial, rather than the standard the trial court is to use in considering such a motion in the first instance. Hunter maintained that the superior court’s order granting a new trial had stated and applied the correct legal standard. She further argued that the superior court had correctly determined that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The superior court granted Philip Morris’s motion for reconsideration, vacating its prior order and denying Hunter’s motion for a new trial. The court explained that it “grant[ed] reconsideration because it . . . more thoroughly evaluated the relevant case law and . . . concluded that it did not apply the correct standard” in its order granting a new trial. The superior court’s second order first evaluated Mullen and concluded that the decision “explicitly identif[ied] a standard for the trial court to use in deciding whether to grant a new trial.” But because the court found that Mullen had “never been cited as the applicable standard to be applied by a trial court” and was “very difficult to square with the [Supreme] Court’s repeated holdings, for example in Kava, that a motion for a new trial can be granted even if ‘substantial evidence’ supports the verdict,” the court “conclude[d] that it would not be appropriate to rely on Mullen as the relevant standard in this case.” The superior court again examined the court of appeals’ decision in Taylor, which it characterized as using the language from Mullen and “contain[ing] some of the conceptual difficulties . . . with respect to reconciling Mullen and Kava.” Next, the superior court explained that “[i]n its order granting a new trial in this case, [it had] essentially reviewed the evidence in an almost de novo fashion,” and -11- 7071 noted that it was now convinced “that it [had] erred in doing so,” because in evaluating such motions “the court must keep in mind the importance of the jury process.” The superior court looked to our cases interpreting Rule 59 for further guidance and focused on quotations and citations from treatises on civil procedure. In Hash v. Hogan16 and in a footnote in Sloan v. Atlantic Richfield Co.,17 we cited and quoted Moore’s Federal Practice;18 the superior court reproduced these quotations. In footnotes in Kava and Hogg, we cited Wright & Miller’s Federal Practice and Procedure;19 the superior court included a quotation from that source as well.20 The superior court also considered insight from cases in other jurisdictions, including Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,21 a federal district court decision we cited in Ahlstrom v. Cummings,22 and Storey v. Camper,23 a decision by the Supreme Court of Delaware. The superior court used all of these sources to synthesize a new standard for new trial motions: 16 453 P.2d 468 (Alaska 1969). 17 541 P.2d 717 (Alaska 1975). 18 6A JAMES MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 59.08[5], at 59-155-58 (2d ed. 1974). 19 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2806, at 65 (2d ed.1995). 20 As discussed below, the portion of Wright & Miller that the superior court quoted is not the portion of Wright & Miller that we cited in Kava or Hogg. 21 161 F. Supp. 633 (D.D.C. 1958). 22 388 P.2d 261, 262 n.2 (Alaska 1964). 23 401 A.2d 458 (Del. 1979). -12- 7071 [I]n deciding whether to order a new trial, a trial court may not simply reweigh the evidence. Rather, a trial court may only grant a motion for a new trial pursuant to Civil Rule 59 if, after independently evaluating all of the evidence in effect as the thirteenth juror, the court concludes that the weight of the evidence preponderates so heavily against the verdict that the court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. The superior court applied this new standard to the case at hand and concluded that “[w]hile again a close call, . . . a new trial [was] not warranted.” The court found that Hunter had “made a strong showing that Mr. Francis was indeed exposed to misleading information regarding light cigarettes,” and that “Mr. Francis had to have been exposed to information regarding whether light cigarettes were safe because he chose to smoke them in part because he believed they were safer.” It also recounted that “counsel for defendant had conceded [that Mr. Francis’s choice was based on perceived greater safety] at oral argument on the motion for new trial.” However, the court also found that Philip Morris “presented considerable evidence to the contrary,” including evidence of the public health community’s historical views and “testimony from a live expert witness, Dr. Lipowicz.” The superior court found that it “[could not] say as a matter of law that a rational juror could not accept Dr. Lipowicz’s expert testimony as credible,” and thus found that “a reasonable jury could have decided to believe defendant’s expert with respect to the light cigarette issue and found that defendant had not made any misleading statements regarding this issue.” The superior court concluded that “[g]iven this ambiguity, [it could not] find that it ha[d] a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made by the jury.” It therefore granted Philip Morris’s motion for reconsideration and vacated its previous order granting a new trial. -13- 7071 At the end of this order, the superior court predicted that its conflicting orders on Hunter’s motion might be appealed to us and that we would need to select the correct standard for trial courts to use in deciding motions for new trial. The superior court expressed its hope that in such an event, “the Supreme Court will not have to order a remand.” In order to avoid the need for a remand, the superior court provided its analysis in the alternative: “[I]f it were to apply the Mullen standard, then it would deny the motion for a new trial,” but if it “were to apply the standard that it used in its original order granting a new trial, then it stands by its decision that pursuant to that standard, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.” E. The Superior Court’s Third Order, Denying Hunter’s Motion For Reconsideration And Affirming The Denial Of A New Trial Hunter moved for reconsideration of the second order and reinstatement of the first. Her motion argued that the superior court had adopted a new standard for her new trial motion that contradicted this court’s decisions, and that even if the superior court’s articulated standard was correct, that court had misapplied it by including in its order an evaluation of what a “rational juror” or “reasonable jury” could believe. Philip Morris responded, urging the superior court to maintain its determination that a new trial was not warranted. The superior court denied Hunter’s motion for reconsideration in a third order. It explained that it had “relied on the test set forth in [Kava] in both its order granting the motion for new trial and then in its order denying the motion for new trial.” The superior court clarified that it had reached opposing conclusions because “Kava itself did not provide any explanation as to how the Alaska Supreme Court expected a trial court to implement the ‘weight of the evidence’ test.” Thus, the superior court had first “interpreted Kava essentially to mandate a de novo review of the evidence,” and -14- 7071 later adopted “a more deferential approach that took into account that the jury’s verdict was entitled to some measure of respect.” In response to Hunter’s claims that it had erred by considering what a “rational juror” or a “reasonable jury” could have believed, the superior court explained that this evaluation was required in the course of determining whether the verdict was supported by substantial evidence, because “[s]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”24 Therefore, the court determined that it “properly took into consideration whether a rational or reasonable juror could be persuaded” by Philip Morris’s evidence. The superior court concluded “that viewing the evidence as the thirteenth juror, the evidence [supporting the verdict] was substantial enough that the court was not left with a firm conviction that a mistake had been committed by the jury.” It therefore denied Hunter’s motion to reconsider its second order. Hunter appeals.