Opinion ID: 721381
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count II: Pretrial Confinement in Cape Girardeau County Jail

Text: 6 Count II of Ferguson's complaint alleges that the conditions in the Cape Girardeau County Jail constituted punishment before a conviction in violation of his rights to due process of law. The district court ordered summary judgment in favor of Cape Girardeau County and Norman Copeland on two bases: 1) failure to allege that the conditions were pursuant to a county policy or that Copeland had a role in creating or maintaining the conditions, and 2) the pre-trial confinement did not constitute punishment. We affirm the summary judgment on the latter ground. Therefore, we need not address what must be alleged regarding the direct responsibility of the county or the county sheriff with respect to the conditions of the county jail. Nor do we need to address whether the district court should have permitted the plaintiff to amend his complaint to allege any such requisite facts. 7 We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See United States ex rel. Glass v. Medtronic, Inc., 957 F.2d 605, 607 (8th Cir.1992). Thus, the question before this court is whether the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 8 Specifically, Ferguson alleges that, upon his transfer to the Cape Girardeau County Jail on May 17, 1989, he was confined to a 5 1/2 by 5 1/2 foot cell without a toilet or a sink and was forced to sleep on a mat on the floor under bright lights, which were on twenty-four hours a day. Ferguson also alleges that he was denied the privileges enjoyed by other prisoners, including communication with other prisoners and yard privileges. Although there is some factual disputes as to these allegations, for the purposes of summary judgment, we take all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Ruby v. Springfield R-12 Public Sch. Dist., 76 F.3d 909, 911 (8th Cir.1996). 9 In response, the county submitted an affidavit of Robert C. Scott, the Assistant Jail Administrator during the time of Ferguson's confinement. In that affidavit, Scott asserted that Ferguson was confined upon his arrival in the vestibule area of the jail, where he could remain under constant observation, due to concern for Ferguson's medical condition (Ferguson had been complaining of chest pains) as well as the perceived danger that Ferguson represented. (Aff. of Robert C. Scott, p 13). On May 30th, Ferguson was permitted to move to a regular cell in the maximum security wing of the jail. Id. at p 24. Although there was no steel bunk in the vestibule cell, Ferguson was provided with a standard mattress and pillow. Id. at p 15. Ferguson was allowed to use bathroom facilities upon request. Id. at p 17. Despite his complaint of the constant light, he was observed sleeping ninety-three hours of the fourteen days spent in the vestibule. Id. at p 21. Ferguson was also allowed out of the vestibule for various purposes approximately forty-nine hours over the fourteen-day period. Id. at p 20. These factual assertions are uncontradicted by the plaintiff. Although the moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of fact, the nonmoving party may not rest on allegations, but must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial. See Tindle v. Caudell, 56 F.3d 966, 969 (8th Cir.1995). 10 Conditions of pretrial confinement are impermissible if they constitute punishment as determined by the due process standards of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). [I]f a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to 'punishment.'  Id. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874. In evaluating the conditions, the court must look to a number of factors, including the size of the detainee's living space, the length of the confinement, the amount of time spent in the confined area each day, and the opportunity for exercise. See A.J. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 854-55 (8th Cir.1995) (citations omitted). Ferguson alleges that he was confined to a space of just over thirty square feet. Although this figure raises the question of impermissible pretrial confinement, see Campbell v. Cauthron, 623 F.2d 503, 506-07 (8th Cir.1980), the totality of the circumstances--which include the relative short duration of the confinement, the necessity to keep the detainee under observation for both his medical condition as well as general safety concerns, and the amount of time that he spent out of the cell--supports the assertion of legitimate governmental interest, see Bell, 441 U.S. at 539, 99 S.Ct. at 1874, and therefore, does not constitute a violation of Ferguson's due process rights. Nor is the use of a floor mattress for thirteen nights, when viewed in the totality of the circumstances, a violation of Ferguson's due process rights. Cf. Kierst, 56 F.3d at 855-56. Thus, we affirm the district court's order of summary judgment on this count.