Opinion ID: 111256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Purposes Requirement

Text: The Court devotes little attention to the constitutionality of the purposes requirement, brushing aside this attempt by Congress to reconcile the interest in free expression with respect to images of the currency with the interest in protecting the integrity of that image for its primary purpose. In a paragraph, we are simply told that a determination of newsworthiness or educational value of an image of the currency must be based on the content of the message and that the Government will determine if that message is newsworthy in determining the applicability of the exception. Then the Court makes the sweeping statement that regulations permitting the Government to discriminate on the basis of content are per se violative of the First Amendment. [1] I do not interpret the provision to give the Government a license to determine the newsworthiness or the value of the substantive message being conveyed. Rather, giving it the liberal construction I think it deserves, the question is merely whether the image of the currency is used for such a purpose, or stated another way, whether the image is being used to convey information or express an idea. [2] That requirement is easily met  whenever the image is used in connection with a news article, it necessarily will comply with this condition unless the editor's use of the image bears no rational relationship to the information or idea he is trying to convey. [3] The key point is that he must be attempting to communicate: he must be using the symbol as expression protected by the First Amendment, and not merely reproducing images of the currency for some noncommunicative purpose, e. g., to facilitate counterfeiting. [4] Color and Size Requirements With respect to the cover illustrations contained in the record in this case, it would appear that Time's interest is in reproducing realistic illustrations of the currency, and the more realistic the illustration, the more effective the communication. However, the very heart of the Government's interest grows stronger the more realistic the illustration is. Stated another way, Time does not want to use illustrations of the currency which plainly appear spurious; the Government's precise legitimate interest is to permit only those illustrations which do plainly appear spurious. Time notes that one of these pictures may be worth a thousand words; the Government notes one of these pictures or negatives may be worth a thousand dollars. Time particularly objects to the color requirement  it wants to print pictures of money in its actual color. [5] Time's communicative interest in printing pictures of the currency in color seems weak. [6] We are not told that use of the actual color of the currency expresses an idea itself, aside from communicating information about the color of the currency. But that is not necessary to communicate the substantive ideas Time is attempting to convey, any more than the size of the bill must be communicated by showing its actual size. The use of the bill's actual color adds little if anything to the message, particularly because the currency itself is not especially colorful. A reproduction which meets the size requirements, to be sure, advances the Government interest in preventing deception, but the color requirement advances the interest as well, in a manner that is independent of the size requirement. Imposing both requirements reduces the likelihood of the evil Congress legitimately desired to prevent to a greater extent than imposing just one of the requirements. To argue, as does Time, that the color requirement is invalid would invalidate the size requirement as well. Time argues that the color requirement is invalid because some of its covers violate the color requirement and yet none of them has the remotest capacity for deception or could otherwise be used to make a counterfeit. Brief for Appellee 43. The same argument could be made if the covers violated the size requirement. The reasons Time points to in arguing that its covers pose no real risk as instruments for fraud  such factors as the kind of paper used for its covers, and the fact that images of the bills are partially obscured or distorted  would be equally applicable if Time violated both the color and size requirements. The point is that whatever capacity the covers have as instruments of deception is necessarily enhanced if the bill is shown in its actual color, just as it is enhanced if the bill is reproduced in its actual size. Moreover, Time all but ignores the potential variety of ways in which a negative could be used for illegitimate purposes. The size requirement is meaningless, or always met, with respect to a negative. The point, of course, is that a negative that makes a print meeting the size requirement can also make a print the exact size of a bill. If it is a black and white negative, all that can be produced is a black and white reproduction of the bill; if it is a color negative, a color reproduction may be made. The fact that the bill is partially obscured in the photographs or even in the negatives is not dispositive; the statute prohibits making color photographs of even parts of bills for a reason. [7] The statute at issue in this case is but one part of a comprehensive scheme to be sure; but that cannot render it susceptible to invalidation on the ground that the other portions of the scheme largely meet the governmental interest. The fact that there are other statutes available to punish counterfeiters does not negate the Government's interest here; Congress may provide alternative statutory avenues of prosecution to assure the effective protection of one and the same interest. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U. S. 367, 380 (1968). This statute protects the gullible as well as the shrewd, and the Government need not wait until near perfect forgeries are rolling off the presses to act. In conclusion, this statute is one weapon in an arsenal designed to deprive would-be counterfeiters and defrauders of the tools of deception and, given the strength of the state interest and the presumption of constitutionality which attaches to an Act of Congress, I believe the color and size requirements are permissible methods of minimizing the risk of fraud as well as counterfeiting, and can have only a minimal impact on Time's ability to communicate effectively. It may well be, as Time argues, that Congress can do a much better job in preventing counterfeiting than the present § 474 and § 504, Brief for Appellee 46. The question for us, of course, is not whether Congress could have done a better job, but whether the job it did violates Time's right to free expression. It does not: Time is free to publish the symbol it wishes to publish and to express the messages it wishes to convey by use of that symbol; it merely must comply with restrictions on the manner of printing that symbol which are reasonably related to the strong governmental interests in preventing counterfeiting and deceptive uses of likenesses of the currency. Accordingly, I concur in the judgment of the Court in part, and dissent in part.                  B                                A B