Opinion ID: 78507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Whether Pardo was denied his right to adversarial testing during the guilt phase by the prosecutor's withholding of material evidence.

Text: Pardo argues that he was denied his due process rights under Brady because the prosecution withheld Ribera's videotaped statement which was crucial impeachment evidence. He contends that the prosecution's failure to disclose this evidence prejudiced him by limiting his tools to successfully move for suppression of the search warrant because the tapes make it clear that Ribera's interview and polygraph exams were orchestrated to support a search warrant. He maintains that the tapes show that Ribera was a liar and was provided with information by the Metro-Dade police officers. He claims that the tapes show that Ribera was coached, told how to take the tests, and provided with the test questions when he continued to fail. He also states that the inconsistencies between Ribera's taped statements and his trial testimony could have been used for impeachment. He asserts that the tapes show that Ribera changed his statements regarding Pardo's role in the crimes and where he learned about Pardo's involvement. He suggests that the Ribera's physical appearance on the tapes indicates that he as actually impaired from drug use during his statement. He also argues that the suppression of the tapes deeply impaired the defense's investigations and preparation for trial. He comments that, if the tapes had been available, a reasonable doubt, instead of insanity, strategy might have been used. He maintains that the Florida Supreme Court's denial of this claim was an unreasonable application of the law. During the post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Pardo's attorney testified that, although he probably tried to develop different legal theories for the defense, [r]easonable doubt . . . was certainly not viable. R1-10, Exh. App. N, Vol. 29 at 144. He explained that he investigated Ribera and learned that he was thought of as crazy, a fabricator, a person of ill repute, and a person who mistreated his own family. Id. at 146-47. He confirmed that, during the trial, he asked Ribera whether he was an unadulterated liar and made similar attacks on Ribera's credibility. Id. at 156. He explained that he might have used Ribera's contradictory statements for impeachment but would have made that determination based on the circumstances. Id. at 159, 164. He explained that he would not have used the tape testimony if it was not relevant, unless he had little else. Although Pardo alleged that the search warrant falsely stated that Ribera provided details of the crimes that were not known to the public, the search warrant affiant outlined numerous details of the crimes that Ribera knew but did not indicate his source. R1-10, Exh. App. L, Vol. 3 at 144-49. In the videotape, Ribera said that, after hearing from Pardo and Ribera that they had killed two victims at an identified apartment complex, he saw a report about the murders at that same apartment complex on television the next morning and began to believe the stories that Pardo and Garcia were telling him. R1-10, Exh. App. N, Vol. 31, Exh. F, Tape 2 at 19; Tape 4 and 5 at 26-27. Ribera specifically denied being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the videotaping. Id., Tape 1 at 27-28. The trial court denied this claim finding that the tapes could not have placed the entire case in a different light because Pardo's attorney had evidence that Ribera was a habitual liar, and used that evidence to attack Ribera's credibility during the trial. Based on Pardo's attorney's possession of similar impeachment evidence at the time of the trial and Pardo's insistence on testifying that he committed the murders, the trial court held that the confidence in verdict was not undermined. Before addressing the issues raised in Pardo's post-conviction appeal, the Florida Supreme Court explained that it needed to distinguish Pardo's case from that of his co-defendant, Garcia, in which it ruled that the nondisclosure of the Ribera videotapes required a new trial. Pardo III, 941 So. 2d at 1066. It stated that Pardo's trial testimony admitting the killings places the nondisclosure in a far less prejudicial light than in Garcia's case and that other evidence, not present in Garcia's case, also strongly implicated Pardo, including a projectile fired from one of the murder weapons and removed from Pardo's foot; a spent casing fired from the same murder weapon and matching a casing under one of the murder victims found in Pardo's closet; blood and bullets connected to another murder found in Pardo's car, and a diary in Pardo's handwriting and containing newspaper articles about the murders found in Pardo's apartment. Id. It concluded that the nondisclosure of the Ribera videotapes did not result in prejudice warranting a new trial because Pardo's counsel made no showing of how the videotapes would have led to suppression of the evidence obtained via the search warrant, the search warrant affidavit was not based solely on Ribera's testimony, there was ample evidence connecting Pardo to the murders which was not seized under the search warrant, and Pardo's motivation in testifying was to claim credit for the vigilante killings and refute . . . Ribera[`s suggestion] that Pardo was a drug dealer and was unrelated to the incriminating nature of the evidence seized from his apartment. Id. at 1068. It again noted that Pardo's in-court confession in his own trial negates any prejudice from the nondisclosure of the Ribera videotapes and that there were no inconsistencies in Ribera's testimony that undermined the verdict. Id. at 1068-69. It observed that several of Ribera's statements, including his description of Pardo as the killer, were not inconsistent and were buttressed by the physical evidence against Pardo. It also found that Pardo had failed to establish that disclosure of the videotapes would have effected his decision to testify because it was clear from his trial testimony that he did so, not to contest Ribera's testimony in general or his implication of Pardo in the nine murders, to challenge Ribera's testimony that he benefitted financially from them and because he did not testify in support of his counsel's position at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1069-70. Reviewing each of Pardo's claims as to the nondisclosure, the district court found that the Florida Supreme Court's rejection of [Pardo's] Brady claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. Pardo IV at 23. In order to state a Brady claim, the defendant must show that (1) the evidence is favorable as exculpatory or impeaching; (2) the evidence was suppressed either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) prejudice resulted. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (1999). To be prejudicial, the evidence must be such at that disclosure of it would have created a reasonable probability that the proceeding result would have been different. Id. at 280, 119 S. Ct. at 1948. The non-disclosure of cumulative or repetitious evidence is not sufficient to establish a Brady claim. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 96, 110 n. 16, 96 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 n.16 (1976). Although Pardo may be able to meet the first two prongs, he is unable to show prejudice. He failed to show that production of the videotape would have prevented him from confessing his guilt or otherwise altered his trial strategy. Pardo's claims that the affidavit contained false information is incorrect, and thus production of the tape would not have led to a motion to suppress the warrant. Ribera did not change his position regarding Pardo's role in the murders. Pardo's attorney was aware of Ribera's credibility issues and addressed it during the trial.