Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted ineffective assistance of advisory counsel

Text: Defendant contends he was deprived of the effective assistance of his advisory counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and thus that reversal of the guilt and penalty judgments is warranted.
As noted above, the master calendar judge, Judge Munoz, appointed Ray Newman as associate counsel and standby counsel on November 4, 1986. Thereafter, Newman appeared in court with defendant during all pretrial proceedings. Between November 1986 and May 1987, defendant, Newman, and the court occasionally referred to Newman as associate counsel, cocounsel, or auxiliary counsel. Newman also filed several motions as attorney for defendant. In early May 1987, defendant's case was assigned to Judge Nelson. At the May 4, 1987, hearing, the court made clear that it would not permit defendant and Newman to share defendant's representation. On one occasion, when Newman attempted to object to the prosecution's argument regarding a requested continuance, the court cut him off: First of all, let's remember your status in the case. The defendant is acting in pro. per., as I understand. In response to Newman's explanation that he was associate counsel, the court stated: I don't see how a pro. per. can be chief counsel and . . . have a lawyer in effect representing him . . . . I'm not going to permit the defendant to be in pro. per. and in effect represented before the court by a lawyer. If he's going to be in pro. per., he's going to be in pro. per. ¶ If the defendant wants to be represented by a lawyer, he has that right. If the defendant wants to go in pro. per., he has that right. I see nothing wrong with having a lawyer assist the defendant in a death penalty case, but I'm not going to have a pro. per. in effect being represented by a lawyer in these proceedings. ¶ Make the choice. Does he want to be represented by an attorney? If that's the case, fine; I'll appoint you counsel, Mr. Newman, and you can go ahead and represent the defendant. If he wants to be pro. per., you may remain as advisory counsel, but you won't be co-counsel to a pro. per. After more discussion, the court addressed defendant: Now, make a decision, Mr. Blair. Do you want to represent yourself? If so, fine. You may have an advisory counsel. If you want to have Mr. Newman represent you, you may not be pro. per. And we'll go from there . . . . So let's make a decision, Mr. Blair . . . . Do you want to be pro. per., or do you want a lawyer representing you? Defendant responded: I'm pro. per. The court replied: All right. Then, Mr. Newman, you may remain as advisory counsel. At another hearing a few weeks later, Judge Nelson reiterated that Newman was not defendant's attorney, and directed Newman to let the defendant represent himself in pro. per., please. Judge Nelson remained assigned to this case until some time later that summer, when another judge was assigned. After that time, the court, the prosecutor, and the defense resumed occasionally referring to Newman as associate counsel. Subsequently, the case was assigned to Judge Candace Cooper in January 1988. Judge Cooper initially expressed some confusion concerning Newman's status. For example, on February 26, 1988, she said to Newman: I'm not sure if it's cocounsel or advisory counsel [capacity] that you are working in. Then again on January 10, 1989, she asked Newman is it advisory or cocounsel technically? Newman responded: It's been both. I'm not sure which one. At all times, however, Judge Cooper made clear that defendant was his own attorney. For example, on March 11, 1988, she stated: Mr. Blair, you are your own counsel in this matter. You have cocounsel with you. And again, on January 10, 1989, she said: Nonetheless, Mr. Blair is pro. per. I expect this matter to move along. Finally, on March 6, 1989, Judge Cooper denied a further continuance that defendant had requested based on Newman's involvement in another trial. In defendant's presence, the court addressed Newman: I understand that. You are, however, advisory counsel, not trial counsel. Mr. Blair can try this matter. He has been pro. per. and advisory counsel is not standby counsel. It is not backup counsel. It is advisory counsel. When Newman again began to argue in favor of a continuance, Judge Cooper stated: Mr. Newman, with all due respect, you keep talking like you are going to try this case [but] you are advisory counsel. Ultimately, the parties appeared for trial on March 17, 1989. Judge Cooper was unavailable, so the case was assigned to Judge Krieger. Because Newman was involved in another capital trial, the court agreed to continue the matter for a few days to allow Newman to locate additional advisory counsel. The court, however, denied a lengthy continuance, reasoning that defendant, not Newman, was counsel of record. The court reiterated to defendant, You're still pro. per. status. He [Newman] is only advising. The court also indicated it would grant a continuance if defendant gave up his in propria persona status, but defendant refused. The court explained to defendant: Well, it seems to me that with your pro. per. status then you're not engaged in another trial. If you relinquished your pro. per. status and Mr. Newman were your attorney of record, then the attorney of record is engaged in another trial or will be and, therefore, there is that distinction to be made. A few days later, the court appointed Lonzo Lucas as additional advisory counsel. The court later denied a 60-day continuance to allow Lucas to familiarize himself with the case, reasoning that defendant, as counsel, was prepared to try the case. Jury selection began on March 22, 1989. Thereafter, either Newman or Lucas, or both, was present in court on each trial day, except during jury deliberations when counsel were on call. The court ruled that only defendant would be allowed to address the court when the jury was present, and told prospective jurors that defendant was representing himself assisted by Lucas and Newman. Upon defendant's request, the court permitted Newman to deliver defendant's guilt phase closing argument, but only after defendant expressly waived any objection to any change in tactics or emphasis that Newman might make. Again upon defendant's request, and after defendant again waived his right to object to any change in tactics, defendant's additional advisory counsel, Lucas, presented the defense penalty phase closing argument. Lucas also argued the automatic motion to modify the verdict.
Under the Sixth Amendment, [d]efendants who have elected self-representation may not thereafter seek reversal of their convictions on the ground that their own efforts were inadequate and amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] This rule applies whether or not the self-represented defendant has been assisted by an attorney acting as advisory counsel or in some other limited capacity. [Citations.] ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1226, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698; accord, People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 930, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) While the Sixth Amendment guarantees both the right to self-representation and the right to representation by counsel . . . a defendant who elects self-representation `does not have a constitutional right to choreograph special appearances by counsel' ( McKaskle v. Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 183 [104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122]). Thus none of the `hybrid' forms of representation, whether labeled `cocounsel,' `advisory counsel,' or `standby counsel,' is in any sense constitutionally guaranteed. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1218, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698; accord, People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 518-519, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271; People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1368, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Accordingly, [t]o prevail on a claim that counsel acting in an advisory or other limited capacity has rendered ineffective assistance, a self-represented defendant must show that counsel failed to perform competently within the limited scope of the duties assigned to or assumed by counsel [citations], and that a more favorable verdict was reasonably probable in the absence of counsel's failings [citations]. A self-represented defendant may not claim ineffective assistance on account of counsel's omission to perform an act within the scope of duties the defendant voluntarily undertook to perform at trial. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1226-1227, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698, italics in original.) However, [a]s to those aspects of the representation over which counsel retains control, counsel remains responsible for providing constitutionally effective representation, and the defendant may assert a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 157, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Defendant contends that Newman was effectively associate counsel until the eve of trial when, on March 6, 1989, the court denied the defense request for a continuance based on Newman's involvement in another trial. Defendant argues that forcing him to go to trial without Newman's assistance was analogous to removing a represented defendant's chosen attorney on the eve of trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. We disagree. [T]he powers and responsibilities which attend the representation of a criminally accused person should never be conferred jointly and equally on the accused and the attorney. Rather, in all cases of shared or divided representation, either the accused or the attorney must be in charge. Stated otherwise, at all times the record should be clear that the accused is either self-represented or represented by counsel; the accused cannot be both at once. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1218-1219, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698; accord, People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 518, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271; People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1368, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Responsibility for clarifying the record in this regard rests with the trial court. Here, the record unfortunately reflects some initial confusion as to the scope of Newman's role when the court first appointed him in November 1986, because the court used both the term associate counsel and the term standby counsel. Any initial confusion was dispelled, however, in May 1987, when Judge Nelson clarified that the court would not permit defendant and Newman to share defendant's legal representation, and that Newman was solely advisory counsel. The record suggests that defendant understood the limits of advisory counsel's role, because in arguing for a continuance based on Newman's unavailability, defendant cited People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731, 209 Cal.Rptr. 328, 691 P.2d 994, in which we explained that advisory counsel acts as an advisor or consultant only. Thus, from May 1987 forward, the record reflects no reasonable basis for defendant to have believed that he would not be expected to try the case himself. Although various judges may have expressed confusion concerning Newman's status, at each point it was made clear that defendant alone was counsel of record. As early as March 11, 1988, more than a year before the trial began, Judge Cooper emphasized that defendant was his own counsel and was therefore responsible for determining which defense motions to bring. On January 10, 1989, she reiterated that she expected the case to move along despite Newman's possible unavailability, because Mr. Blair is pro. per. And Judge Krieger, who presided over the actual trial, made it crystal clear that defendant was in charge. Judge Krieger gave defendant the option of relinquishing his in propria persona status in exchange for a continuance to allow Newman to assume defendant's representation, but defendant refused. That the court granted several continuances based on Newman's unavailability is not inconsistent with a proper understanding of Newman's limited role as advisory counsel. Before delivering the guilt phase closing argument, Newman confirmed that defendant had been in charge of trial strategy all along and that Newman, as advisory counsel, had not had the power to subpoena witnesses or to tell defendant which witnesses to call. Thus, there is no merit in defendant's contention that he somehow was deprived of appointed counsel at the last minute. Defendant contends that even if Newman was solely advisory counsel, he performed incompetently within the limited scope of the duties he had assumed. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1226, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698, italics omitted.) Below we address each of defendant's contentions that either Newman or defendant's additional advisory counsel, Lucas, performed incompetently.
Defendant contends that Newman could not possibly have rendered effective assistance, because he was absent from the courtroom for more than half of the trial. We disagree. We never have held that advisory counsel must be present during the entire trial. In any event, here defendant had the assistance of additional advisory counsel, Lucas, at trial; the court appointed Lucas as additional advisory counsel specifically to assume Newman's role in Newman's absence. Lucas was present on each of the days that Newman was not, and defendant points to nothing in Lucas' representation on those days that was not competent. Relying upon State v. Parson (Minn.Ct.App.1990) 457 N.W.2d 261, 263, defendant contends that advisory counsel at a minimum should be present in court during the trial. That case, however, dealt with standby counsel, not advisory counsel. The two roles are distinct. Standby counsel is an attorney appointed for the benefit of the court whose responsibility is to step in and represent the defendant if that should become necessary because, for example, the defendant's in propria persona status is revoked. ( People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 149, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561; People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1164, fn. 14, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730.) Advisory counsel, by contrast, is appointed to assist the self-represented defendant if and when the defendant requests help. ( People v. Hamilton, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1164, fn. 14, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730; see also Littlefield v. Superior Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 856, 858, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 659; People v. Kurbegovic (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 731, 757, 188 Cal.Rptr. 268.) Here, whatever Newman's status when he initially was appointed, the court subsequently made clear that he was solely advisory counsel. As such, there was no requirement that he be present at each court session, particularly because additional advisory counsel Lucas was present when Newman was not. Defendant next contends that it was Newman's job to prepare the defense experts for trial, yet Newman did so ineffectively, with the result that the defense that was supposed to be asserted, that the cause of death was not the cyanide but some other intervening cause, was never presented. In this regard, defendant observes that Judge Krieger denied defendant's request to instruct the jury on intervening cause, because there was no evidence presented to support that instruction. We first note that nothing in the record supports defendant's contention that Newman assumed full responsibility for preparing defense experts. Even assuming he had done so, defendant's claim would fail. Defendant contends in effect that Newman failed to meet in advance with the defense experts  Dr. Latif and Dr. Itabashi  and failed to provide them with sufficient information to testify effectively for the defense. We have repeatedly stressed `that [if] the record on appeal sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged[,] . . . unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the claim on appeal must be rejected.' ( People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Because claims of ineffective assistance are often more appropriately litigated in a habeas corpus proceeding, the rules generally prohibiting raising an issue on habeas corpus that was, or could have been, raised on appeal [citations] would not bar an ineffective assistance claim on habeas corpus. ( Id. at pp. 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Here, the record on appeal does not explain why Newman prepared the experts as he did, and there could be a satisfactory explanation for Newman's conduct. For example, Newman's failure to give Dr. Itabashi any of Green's medical records to review before testifying could have been a deliberate defense strategy to keep Dr. Itabashi in the dark about defendant's case so that he could testify only about a hypothetical situation. In any event, defendant does not demonstrate that he was prejudiced by any failure to prepare the experts. The jury was instructed that a proximate cause of death is a cause which, in the natural and continuous sequence, produces death and without which the death would not have occurred. Defendant does not explain how, even had the defense experts been better prepared, they could have persuaded the jury that the cyanide given to Green was not a proximate cause of her death. Defendant also contends that Newman's absence from the trial made it impossible for him to give a coherent guilt phase closing argument. Because defendant expressly waived any objection to Newman's closing argument, we decline to reach this claim. In any event, we would find the claim meritless. We note that Newman had available the daily trial transcripts for preparation of his argument. Although Newman's argument elicited objections from the prosecution for misstating evidence, on the whole Newman presented a coherent argument based upon an effort to persuade the jury to find a reasonable doubt that defendant could have placed cyanide in a sealed gin bottle or that Green died of cyanide poisoning. [15]
Defendant next contends that, in seeking the appointment of Dr. Root as the defense pathologist, Newman failed to follow the procedures set forth in section 987.9, which allow the defense to apply to the court on a confidential basis for funds for the payment of experts. Defendant contends that Newman's failures in this regard permitted the prosecution to learn of Dr. Root's unfavorable conclusions and to call him as a rebuttal witness at the guilt phase, with devastating results. At the time of defendant's trial, section 987.9 provided, as it does today in subdivision (a), that the fact that an application [by an indigent defendant for reasonably necessary funds for the payment of experts] has been made shall be confidential and the contents of the application shall be confidential. The confidentiality provision evidently was intended to prevent the prosecution from anticipating defense strategy. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1132, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Despite the existence of this confidentiality provision, Newman requested the appointment of Dr. Root in open court in the presence of the prosecutor, who informed the defense and the court that he knew Dr. Root on a social basis and had called him as a witness several times. Newman also filed an unsealed, written motion requesting the appointment of Dr. Root. After the defense had presented its case-in-chief, however, Newman informed the court that the defense would not be calling Dr. Root. The prosecutor then stated: Dr. Root is here. The defense told Dr. Root to leave. But I had a chance to talk to Dr. Root briefly, and I intend to call Dr. Root. Dr. Root then testified in the prosecution's rebuttal case that, contrary to the defense position, cyanide poisoning caused the brain damage and pneumonia that led to Green's death. Newman later informed the court that he had advised defendant against calling Dr. Root to testify, but defendant had subpoenaed him anyway. The record does not reflect whether Newman had a tactical basis for declining to keep Dr. Root's appointment confidential, and it would be proper for us to reject defendant's contention on this basis. ( People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) In any event, defendant fails to establish that the failure to keep Dr. Root's appointment confidential prejudiced him. It was defendant's own choice to subpoena Dr. Root against Newman's advice, and it was that subpoena that brought Dr. Root to court and resulted in the prosecutor's interview with him. Moreover, even had the prosecutor never learned of Dr. Root's opinion concerning defendant's case and never called him to testify, it is not reasonably probable that the outcome of the guilt phase would have been different. (See People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1226-1227, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) The prosecution presented the testimony of Green's treating physician, Dr. Becker, who testified that cyanide poisoning caused her brain damage and resulting complications. Dr. Gray, who had performed the autopsy on Green, testified that Green died of pneumonia, a complication of the brain damage caused by the cyanide poisoning. The testimony of defendant's own experts was not to the contrary. Dr. Latif agreed with Dr. Becker concerning the cause of Green's condition, and Dr. Itabashi could not say what had caused Green's death. Under these circumstances, it does not appear that a more favorable result was reasonably probable had Dr. Root not testified that cyanide poisoning caused Green's death. [16]
Defendant next contends that Lucas, who was appointed the day before jury selection began, knew nothing about the case or the defense. Defendant points to various instances in the record in which Lucas professed his ignorance about the case or acknowledged his lack of preparation. For example, after the guilt verdict was rendered, Lucas admitted to the court that he was unprepared to handle the penalty phase because he came in on this train when it was already moving. We decline to presume that Lucas was ineffective merely because he was appointed as additional advisory counsel one day before jury selection began. To establish ineffectiveness, defendant must point to specific acts within the scope of the duties assumed by Lucas that both amounted to deficient performance and resulted in prejudice to defendant's case. ( People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1226, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) Defendant does not identify any such specific act or failure to act. Defendant complains that Lucas did not conduct any penalty phase investigation, but there is no showing that defendant assigned, or that Lucas assumed, responsibility for that function. Indeed, the record is to the contrary: defendant was in charge of strategy at the penalty phase, and defendant prevented his advisory attorneys from sending the defense investigator to interview defendant's family members and other potential mitigation witnesses. Defendant also complains that Lucas began his penalty phase closing argument by reminding the jurors that they had not heard from him yet, and told the jury that he would not beg and plead for mercy and pity and sympathy for defendant. Because defendant waived any objection to Lucas's handling of the closing argument, this claim is waived. In any event, no prejudicial deficient performance appears to have taken place. (See People v. Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at pp. 1226-1227, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.)
Defendant next contends that Newman and Lucas both failed to present to the court evidence in their possession that would have raised a doubt concerning defendant's competence to stand trial. As noted above, during hearings held on May 8 and 10, 1989, outside the presence of the jurors and the prosecutor, defendant's advisory counsel Newman and Lucas expressed their belief that defendant might not be competent to waive counsel or to represent himself, and mentioned the existence of records from defendant's confinement at Atascadero State Hospital in 1972. Nonetheless, neither Newman nor Lucas submitted to the court any records or other evidence to substantiate these claims. The record reflects that defendant did not want to be examined by a psychiatrist and prevented his advisory attorneys from investigating a mental state defense. Further, in response to the court's question whether defendant wanted the court to appoint a psychiatrist to examine him, defendant specifically stated that he was not raising [ sic ] an incompetency hearing. Assuming for the sake of argument that it is within advisory counsel's role to bring to the court's attention evidence in support of a finding of incompetence even over a self-represented defendant's objection, on the present record we discern no prejudice from advisory counsel's failure to do so. The Atascadero records are not before us in the record on appeal. We thus have no way to determine whether those records would have caused the trial court to declare a doubt concerning defendant's competence to stand trial or to waive counsel. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention.