Opinion ID: 2585163
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of the Correct Standard

Text: In this case, the court instructed the jury that the plaintiff must show that the employer engaged in harassing conduct directed toward the plaintiff; that sex was a motivating factor for the harassment; that this conduct was unwelcome and sufficiently severe or pervasive that it had the purpose or effect of altering the conditions of Plaintiff's employment and creating an intimidating, hostile, abusive, or offensive working environment; the environment created by the conduct would have been perceived as intimidating, hostile, abusive, or offensive by a reasonable person in the same position as Plaintiff; that Plaintiff did in fact perceive the environment as intimidating, hostile, abusive or offensive; and this environment caused plaintiff injury, damage, loss, or harm. In order to prevail on a claim of discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment, Plaintiff has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the terms, conditions or privileges of employment were altered by creating a work environment that was hostile or abusive. Mere isolated incidents of harassment are not sufficient. In determining whether an environment is hostile or abusive, you must consider all the circumstances. These may include frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interfered with Plaintiff's work performance. Instruction No. 9. As previously stated, Nelson contends that the foregoing Instruction No. 9 was confusing and erroneous. For the reasons set forth below, we agree with Nelson. First, the trial court instructed the jury, without clarification, that the plaintiff must show that sex was a motivating factor for the harassment. Instruction No. 9 incorrectly implies that the plaintiff must show that the offender was motivated by a desire to have sex with the victim. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80, 118 S.Ct. 998, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998) ([H]arassing conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an inference of discrimination on the basis of sex.). Inasmuch as Nelson admitted that neither Dr. Ho nor Dr. Buxton made any sexual advances toward her, this instruction could have affected the jury's verdict. Second, Instruction No. 9 did not accurately reflect the elements of a HESH claim under Hawai`i law. See Steinberg, 88 Hawai`i at 18, 960 P.2d at 1226; HAR § 12-46-109(a)(3); see also supra section II.B.3. Nelson was required to establish, as one element of a HESH claim, that the alleged conduct had the purpose or effect of either (a) unreasonably interfering with work performance, or (b) creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. Id. Nelson was not required to prove any tangible effect upon her work or alteration in the condition of her employment in addition to the creation of an intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 11 and accompanying text. Instruction No. 9 indicated that Nelson was required to prove that the conduct had the purpose or effect of both altering the conditions of employment and creating an intimidating, hostile, abusive, or offensive working environment. Thus, the instruction may have led the jury to believe, incorrectly, that Nelson was required to prove some alteration in the conditions of employment beyond the creation of a hostile, abusive, or offensive work environment. Lastly, by instructing the jury that [m]ere isolated incidents of harassment are not sufficient, the court incorrectly suggested that a single act, even if it was severe, could not establish a claim. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 878 ([T]he required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.) (Citing, inter alia, King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wisconsin Sys., 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that a single act can be enough)). Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court's jury instruction regarding the elements of a HESH claim, when considered as a whole, was prejudicially erroneous and misleading.