Opinion ID: 1547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Habeas Corpus Standards

Text: The majority essentially concedes a Strickland violation and that Rosario would be entitled to relief if this case arose on direct review but denies the writ out of deference to the state court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, a federal court may not grant a writ of habeas corpus to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Under this principle of deference, habeas relief may not be granted merely upon a conclusion that counsel's performance was constitutionally inadequate. Carrion v. Smith, 549 F.3d 583, 591 n.4 (2d Cir.2008). Rather, petitioner must identify some increment of incorrectness beyond error in order to obtain habeas relief. Jones v. West, 555 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting Sorto v. Herbert, 497 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2007)). Moreover, as the majority notes, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that standard. Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1411, 1420, 173 L.Ed.2d 251 (2009). Nevertheless, the increment of incorrectness beyond error need not be great; otherwise, habeas relief would be limited to state court decisions so far off the mark as to suggest judicial incompetence. Georgison v. Donelli, 588 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal brackets omitted) (quoting Hoi Man Yung v. Walker, 468 F.3d 169, 176 (2d Cir.2006)). A close review of the state court's decision makes it entirely clear, however, thateven affording the state court its due deferenceits decision rejecting Rosario's claim was an unreasonable application of Strickland and should not stand. At the outset, I note that the state court's use of the meaningful representation standard led it to focus on certain factors that have little bearing on a proper Strickland analysis. And it appears to have done so at the expense of determining whether the undisputed mistakes made by Rosario's defense counsel fell below objectively reasonable standards and, moreover, whether they caused him prejudice, as required under Strickland. Indeed, the state court relied heavily upon its finding that Rosario's pre-trial and trial attorneys represented [him] in a thoroughly professional, competent, and dedicated fashion. It emphasized that [b]oth attorneys filed all appropriate motions; within the scope of the information that was then available to them, an investigation was conducted; witnesses were examined and cross-examined adeptly, professionally and with clarity; Mr. Kasier's opening and closing statements were concise and to the point; and, most importantly, a credible alibi defense was presented to the jury. The state court went on to emphasize that counsel's mistake as to the denial of the application for investigative fees was not deliberate and does not alter the fact that both attorneys represented defendant skillfully, and with integrity and in accordance with the standards of `meaningful representation' defined by [the New York state] appellate courts. It wrote: Defendant has tried to second-guess his trial counsel at almost every level of their representation. He has questioned the depth of their investigation, the scope and focus of cross-examination and argued that his alibi defense could have been better if they had only followed through on [the state trial court's fee] order. His criticisms ignore the fact that Ms. Hartsfield and Mr. Kaiser ably, and professionally represented him at every stage of the case with integrity and in ways that were consistent with the standards of `meaningful representation' described above. ... And Mr. Kaiser at trial was prepared, skillful, purposeful, thoughtful and creative. This type of analysis is entirely at odds with Strickland and is not dispositive of whether Rosario's defense counsel were ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. It is axiomatic that, even if defense counsel had performed superbly throughout the bulk of the proceedings, they would still be found ineffective under the Sixth Amendment if deficient in a material way, albeit only for a moment and not deliberately, and that deficiency prejudiced the defendant. See, e.g., Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 72 (2d Cir.2005) ([R]eliance on counsel's competency in all other respects[ ]... fail[s] to apply the Strickland standard at all. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1040, 126 S.Ct. 1622, 164 L.Ed.2d 334 (2006); cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 386, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (noting that while [i]t will generally be appropriate ... to assess counsel's overall performance throughout the case in order to determine whether the identified acts or omissions overcome the presumption that a counsel rendered reasonable professional assistance, a failure to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary, may be constitutionally deficient irrespective of trial performance (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is far from clear whether the state court realized this basic principle. In fact, the state court noted in a footnote that New York case law, in particular People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 (1998), expressly rejected Strickland 's requirement that, but for the attorneys['] errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. This footnote, viewed in context with the entirety of the court's decision, begs the question whether the state court understood that New York state's ineffective assistance cases have departed from the second (`but for') prong of Strickland,  only to adopt[ ] a rule somewhat more favorable to defendants. People v. Turner, 5 N.Y.3d 476, 480, 806 N.Y.S.2d 154, 840 N.E.2d 123 (2005) (emphasis added) (citing People v. Caban, 5 N.Y.3d 143, 155-56, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 (2005); People v. Stultz, 2 N.Y.3d 277, 284, 778 N.Y.S.2d 431, 810 N.E.2d 883 (2004); Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d at 713-14, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584). That is, it is unclear whether the state court appreciated that even if prejudice in the Strickland sense is not shown, a defense attorney can be found ineffective under the New York State Constitution if his performance was so below par that he did not provide meaningful representation to his client. See Caban, 5 N.Y.3d at 156, 800 N.Y.S.2d 70, 833 N.E.2d 213 ([U]nder our State Constitution, even in the absence of a reasonable probability of a different outcome, inadequacy of counsel will still warrant reversal whenever a defendant is deprived of a fair trial.... [O]ur state standard thus offers greater protection than the federal test....). On a different note, at one point in the decision the state court sharply detoured into an analysis regarding newly discovered evidence. It wrote: In order to prevail on a motion for a new trial based on a claim of newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that evidence has been discovered since the trial which could not, with due diligence, have been produced at trial, and which is of such a character that, had it been presented at trial, there is a probability that the verdict would have been more favorable for him.... .... ... [T]he existence of these witnesses was not new evidence discovered since the trial. They were known to defendant, who immediately gave their names to the police after his arrest, to his attorneys at their first and subsequent meetings, and to Jesse Franklin. Efforts were made to speak [to], and interview them and the substance of their testimony was known to the parties before the trial began. It is unclear when, if ever, the court returned to the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, and, more importantly, to what extent this detour infected that analysis. If this newly discovered evidence analysis did in fact bleed over to the ineffective assistance of counsel analysis, the harmful effect is patent, considering the obvious tension between a newly discovered evidence claim and an ineffectiveness claim based on an attorney's failure to investigate an alibi that was disclosed to him by his client prior to trial. It is true that a New York state court's application of the meaningful representation standard does not necessarily result in error affording a petitioner habeas relief because the standard, properly construed, is more favorable to defendants. See Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d at 68-71. It is also true that we do not grant habeas relief when a state court is merely inartful or unclear in its reasoning. But, in this case, it is entirely unclear to what extent the state court abandoned the Strickland analysis for a rule less favorable to defendants. Such an error would clearly be contrary to Strickland. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The majority aptly pinpoints the danger of New York's meaningful representation standard: though generally more protective of defendants' rights than Strickland, it risks leading a court that misunderstand[s] the New York standard to look past a prejudicial error as long as counsel conducted himself in a way that bespoke of general competency throughout the trial. Ante at 126. The state court's opinion provides strong indications that this is precisely what happened here. Yet the majority fails to address the very real likelihood that the state court fell victim to the danger it identified, merely concluding that, in general, when properly applied, the New York standard is not contrary to Strickland. Id. at 126. Nevertheless, I need not make a determination under the `contrary to' clause, for [I] conclude that the ... Court's rejection of [Rosario's] ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was at least an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. Henry, 409 F.3d at 71. It is clear from the record that the state court not only unreasonably focused on counsel's overall performance and minimized their mistakes, but also unreasonably discounted the alibi evidence adduced at the post-conviction hearing and thus undervalued its prejudicial effect. In terms of Strickland's performance prong, the state court recognized that counsel's failure to complete their investigation was neither strategic nor the result of any sound trial strategy, but rather a mistake. The state courtas well as the majorityappears to excuse this mistake because it was not deliberate, counsel's performance was otherwise skillful[ ], and counsel conducted some investigation leading to the presentation of a putatively credible alibi defense. But none of this excuses the fact that counsel essentially turned a blind eye to the existence of substantial potentially exculpatory evidence of which it was aware and, moreover, did so not on the basis of any reasonable professional judgment, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052, but rather as a result of pure inadvertence. Such conduct clearly falls below the threshold of minimal competence and, to the extent the state court found otherwise, I conclude that was an unreasonable application of Strickland. With respect to prejudice, in relevant part, the state court reasoned: [A]n alibi defense was presented through the two witnesses who had the best reason for remembering why defendant was present in Florida on June 19[,] 1996the birth of their sonan event that was more relevant for them than the events relied upon by the other witnesses .... Moreover, the alibi evidence offered by defendant at the hearing was in some cases questionable and in others raised issues which could have created questions for a deliberating jury. For example, two of the witnesses Lisette Rivero [sic], and Denise Hernandezcould not say where defendant was on June 19 and 20. And Fernando Torres, when questioned about the purchase of auto parts years later, changed the date to three or four days before his grandson was born.... ... It may not be cumulative to evidence presented at the trialwhich largely was the case hereinand it must not be merely impeaching evidence.... For instance, Chenoa Ruiz recalled defendant's presence in the Torres' apartment on June 18 and 19, the two days prior to the birth of their child. And, Fernando Torres testified that he was with defendant and his son the day before his daughter-in-law gave birth. That testimony was cumulative to his son John's trial testimony. .... An investigator was not sent to Florida to interview witnesses. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the People's case was strong, which was acknowledged by the Appellate Division when it affirmed the conviction herein. The prospective witnesses now before the court, studied closely, were, for the most part, questionable and certainly not as persuasive as the two witnesses who did testify, and were rejected by the jury. First, the state court's finding that a credible alibi defense was presented to the jury is hardly relevant to whether there is a reasonable probability of a different result had defense counsel presented a substantially more credible alibi defense. Second, the state court's recognition that an alibi defense was presented through the two witnesses who had the best reason for remembering why defendant was present in Florida on June 19, 1996the birth of their sonan event that was more relevant for them than the events relied upon by the other witnesses also misses the point. It overlooks the fact that John and Seda were subject to impeachment as interested witnesses, and at least seven additional witnesses were available, a number of whom were less interested in the outcome of the trial, to corroborate their testimony, as well as add additional facts. Third, although the court did find that the alibi evidence offered by defendant at the hearing was in some cases questionable and in others raised issues which could have created questions for a deliberating jury, it provided just three examples from a voluminous record in support of this finding, none of which bear scrutiny. It noted that two of the witnessesLisette Rivero [sic], and Denise Hernandezcould not say where defendant was on June 19 and 20. But, as discussed, these witnesses testified to additional, non-cumulative facts that placed Rosario in Florida around the day of the murder. See ante at 135-36. The relevancy of this evidence is indisputable. The court also noted that Fernando Torres, when questioned about the purchase of auto parts years later, changed the date to three or four days before his grandson was born. This is simply not supported by the record. In fact, when asked whether he told Rosario's post-conviction counsel that he went looking for car parts with his son and Rosario three or four days before his grandson was born, Fernando responded, No, I don't recall that at all, and maintained that the excursion occurred on June 19. Fourth, the state court found that the additional alibi witnesses were largely ... cumulative. To the extent that the additional alibi evidence corroborated John's and Seda's testimony, it is only reasonable to conclude that this militates in favor of a showing of prejudice. Again, John's and Seda's credibility was attacked by the prosecution. Corroboration was thus desperately needed. See, e.g., Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir.2000) (Evidence is cumulative when it `supports a fact established by existing evidence,' Black's Law Dictionary 577 (7th ed.1999), but Washington's whereabouts on the day of the robbery was far from established it was the issue in the case. The fact that Pickens had already testified to facts consistent with Washington's alibi did not render additional testimony cumulative.). Finally, the state court characterized the People's case as strong. But, the fact remains that it was based solely on the eyewitness accounts of two strangersthe type of evidence that this Court has repeatedly characterized as weak. At bottom, the problem with the state court's decision is its application of the reasonable probability standard. Contrary to the state court's apparent belief, this standard does not require that the reviewing court be convinced of Rosario's alibi defense. [T]he reasonable-probability standard is not the same as, and should not be confused with, a requirement that a defendant prove by a preponderance of the evidence that but for error things would have been different. Wilson v. Mazzuca, 570 F.3d 490, 507 (2d Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 n.9, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995))). A reviewing court looks instead to whether the probability of a different result is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceeding. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 83, 124 S.Ct. 2333 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052)); see also Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 447, 455-56, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009) (per curiam) (We do not require a defendant to show `that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome' of his penalty proceeding, but rather that he establish `a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in [that] outcome.' (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94, 104 S.Ct. 2052)). Under the present circumstances, it is unreasonable to conclude that the probability of a different result is not sufficiently likely so as to undermine the confidence in the verdict. Defense counsel failed to investigate Rosario's alibi defense and, as a result, did not call at least seven additional alibi witnesses. Instead, they proceeded with only two witnesses, both of whom were impeached as interested. In a credibility battle, such as this case, there is, to some extent, power in numbersthat is, if presented with the additional evidence at trial, the jury would have had to disregard a total of at least nine defense witnesses claiming to have seen Rosario in Florida on and around the day of the murder, as opposed to just two interested witnesses. As discussed, the additional alibi witnesses would have provided further context to and corroboration of Rosario's alibi defense, would have testified to non-cumulative facts, and a number of them would have been less subject to impeachment than John and Seda. The prosecution's principal argument is that the additional alibi witnesses are not as reliable or credible as John and Seda. It emphasizes that Fernando, Chenoa, Rivera and Godoy provided less detailed accounts of their recollection during interviews prior to the 440.10 hearing than they did on the stand during the actual hearing. We have noted, however, that such silence is so ambiguous that it is of little probative force. Victory v. Bombard, 570 F.2d 66, 70 (2d Cir.1978) (quoting United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176, 95 S.Ct. 2133, 45 L.Ed.2d 99 (1975)). The prosecution also emphasizes that Chenoa did not recollect certain facts, such as when Rosario traveled back and forth between Florida and New York during his previous trips and the precise date he left Florida at the end of June 1996. The fact that witnesses do not remember all relevant details is hardly surprising and certainly not dispositive as to whether they are reliable witnesses to the ultimate fact at issue, such as Rosario's whereabouts on or about June 19, 1996 particularly where, as here, there is a significant independent event to anchor memories surrounding the relevant date. The prosecution also argues that any harm created by defense counsel's failure to call additional alibi witnesses is overwhelmed by the harm that Rosario caused himself by what it characterizes as lying on the stand when he did not disclose that he was incarcerated for part of March and April of 1996. This argument seems to cut the other way, however. That is, to the extent that the jury believed that Rosario was being deliberately deceptive, additional alibi witnesses were all the more necessary. At bottom, the prosecution's brief takes each witness's testimony in isolation, picks it apart, and makes an assessment as to whether there is a reasonable probability that the inclusion of that particular witness's testimony would have affected the outcome of the trial. We cannot engage in such a piecemeal analysis. Rather, we must analyze the cumulative effect of counsel's failure to call any of the additional alibi witnesses. See Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191, 199 (2d Cir.2001) (Strickland directs us to look at the `totality of the evidence before the judge or jury'.... We therefore consider these errors in the aggregate. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96,104 S.Ct. 2052)). This principle, which the majority's analysis seems to overlook, is essential to the proper application of Strickland, as we were yet again reminded by the Supreme Court in Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 447, 453-54, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009) (per curiam). I find defense counsel's performance and the resulting prejudice in this case very troubling. [T]here is nothing as dangerous as a poorly investigated alibi. An attorney who is not thoroughly prepared does a disservice to his client and runs the risk of having his client convicted even where the prosecution's case is weak. A poorly prepared alibi is worse than no alibi at all. 2 G. Schultz, Proving Criminal Defenses ¶ 6.08 (1991), quoted in Henry v. Poole, 409 F.3d 48, 65 (2d Cir.2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1040, 126 S.Ct. 1622, 164 L.Ed.2d 334 (2006); cf. United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir.1974) (It is axiomatic that exculpatory statements, when shown to be false, are circumstantial evidence of guilty consciousness and have independent probative force.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105, 95 S.Ct. 775, 42 L.Ed.2d 801 (1975). Defense counsel put forth a half-baked alibi defense, leaving substantial additional alibi evidence unexplored, and Rosario is paying the price. For all the foregoing reasons, I would grant the writ of habeas corpus on a conditional basis, providing the State with sufficient opportunity to commence a new prosecution against Rosario prior to his ordered release. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. I note that I agree with the majority's implied denial of habeas relief on the basis of Rosario's actual innocence claim. While I conclude it is unreasonable to hold that defense counsel performed adequately and that there is no reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different had the additional alibi witnesses testified at trial, I do not think that Rosario has surmounted the extraordinary hurdle required to succeed on an actual innocence claim, assuming such a claim exists under federal law. Finally, I would not so quickly dismiss Rosario's claim of racial discrimination in the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges; however, I need not reach the merits of this claim, because I would grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus based upon Rosario's receipt of ineffective assistance of counsel, which would warrant a new trial or his release from custody the same or greater relief that would be provided by a successful Batson challenge.