Opinion ID: 350234
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the grant of immunity.

Text: 9 Berardelli's principal claim is that his refusal to testify was justified because the immunity granted to him under 18 U.S.C. § 6002 2 was inadequate, on the facts of this case, to protect his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Specifically, he claims that if he had given truthful testimony at the Castellano trial, it would have been inconsistent with his testimony before the Grand Jury. Berardelli's fear was that the government would use his truthful, immunized testimony against him in a prosecution for either (1) perjury or making a false declaration before the Grand Jury, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1621, 1623(a), 3 or (2) making a declaration before the Grand Jury that was inconsistent with his testimony at the Castellano trial, 18 U.S.C. § 1623(c). 4 These prosecutions would be allowed, he argues, under the exception in the immunity statute for prosecutions for perjury and giving false statements. See note 2. We hold that Berardelli's fears were illusory and, therefore, that his refusal to testify was unjustified. 10 Berardelli's first argument is based on an unduly broad reading of the exception in § 6002. That exception was included to make it clear that false testimony given under a grant of immunity was not immunized. See United States v. Housand, 550 F.2d 818, 822 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Tramunti, 500 F.2d 1334, 1344-46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1079, 95 S.Ct. 667, 42 L.Ed.2d 673 (1974). The immunity grant is only intended to protect those who testify truthfully. See United States v. Tramunti, supra,500 F.2d at 1342. A witness' truthful testimony, given under a grant of immunity, may not be used to prove either a later perjury, Cameron v. United States, 231 U.S. 710, 718-24, 34 S.Ct. 244, 58 L.Ed. 448 (1914), or, as here, an earlier perjury, United States v. Alter, 482 F.2d 1016, 1028 (9th Cir. 1973). Thus, Berardelli had all the protection to which he was constitutionally entitled in connection with any lies he may have told to the Grand Jury. He was, of course, not entitled to any immunity from prosecution for any lies he might have told at the Castellano trial. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 142, 32 S.Ct. 71, 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911); United States v. Tramunti, supra, 500 F.2d at 1343. 11 The possibility of an inconsistent declarations prosecution is more troublesome. The immunity statute excepts prosecutions for giving a false statement, see note 2, and, under § 1623, which proscribes the making of false declarations, it is unnecessary for the government to prove which of two inconsistent declarations was false. § 1623(c). If the government could have used Berardelli's truthful trial testimony to prove an inconsistent declarations case, then his apprehensions would not have been illusory, and his refusal to testify would have been justified. We hold that the immunity statute would not have permitted the use of Berardelli's trial testimony unless it were first shown to be false. Therefore, we conclude that Berardelli's refusal to testify was not excused. 12 If the immunity statute created an exception for false declarations prosecutions, it would cover a prosecution for making inconsistent declarations. Instead, § 6002 creates an exception for perjury (and) giving a false statement. We think it is clear from this language that Congress intended to reach only those who lie when testifying under a grant of immunity. Because a prosecution for making an inconsistent declaration would not require proof that the testimony given under the grant of immunity was false, such a prosecution is not included in the exception and would be barred by the immunity statute. Accord, United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 384-86 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1551, 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977). 13 United States v. Tramunti, supra, does not require a different result. In that case, a criminal defendant elected to take the stand in his own defense. We held that his prior Grand Jury testimony, which had been given under a grant of use immunity eight years earlier, had properly been used to impeach his credibility. It had not been discovered that the prior testimony was immunized until after the trial. At that point, the trial judge had the benefit of hindsight in determining that the prior Grand Jury testimony was in fact false. Nothing in the Tramunti decision suggests that the result in that case would be the same if it could not have been independently determined that the immunized testimony was false. In United States v. Moss, 562 F.2d 155, 164-165 (2d Cir. 1977), this Court treated the Tramunti decision as being thus limited. The Third Circuit gave Tramunti the same reading in United States v. Frumento, 552 F.2d 534, 543 n.16 (3d Cir. 1977); cf. United States v. Housand, supra, 550 F.2d at 822-23 & nn.8 & 9. Tramunti was correctly interpreted in Housand, Moss and Frumento, and it does not prevent us from embracing the sound principles adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Patrick. 14