Opinion ID: 1843606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Cases 1950408 and 1950409 Intervention

Text: The Pinto intervenors contend that both the Liability Phase and the Remedy Plan must be vacated for reasons in addition to those we have addressed previously in this opinion. First, they contend that in Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894 (Ala.1995), this Court granted the classes they seek to represent [4] appellate class certification.  Brief of Pinto Appellants, at 16 (emphasis added). This certification, they argue, necessarily renders the Harper class, [5] which was certified before the entry of the Liability Phase, invalid as being overbroad or insufficiently definite. The essence of this argument is that the invalidation of the Harper class retroactively invalidates the Liability Phase. In a second argument, which is similar to the first, they argue that because Pinto ultimately allowed them to intervene, the Remedy Plan, which was pending when they first sought to intervene, must be vacated. Before discussing the merits of these arguments, we note that the Pinto intervenors, unlike the State parties, have not sought permission to appeal the interlocutory Remedy Order. We will, however, suspend the Rules of Appellate Procedure as to any procedural or technical impediment to the review of the issues they present, pursuant to Ala. R. App. P. 2(b), which provides: In the interest of expediting decision, or for other good cause shown, an appellate court may suspend the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case ... on its own motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its direction.... We construe the Rules of Appellate Procedure in a manner to assure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every appellate proceeding. Rule 2(b) committee comments. The issues presented by the Pinto intervenors are inextricably linked with those presented by the State parties in their Rule 5 petition, which we have granted. Neither the interests of justice nor judicial economy would be promoted by dismissing the appeals of the Pinto intervenors, who may have miscalculated the efficacy of the trial court's Rule 54(b) certification. We will, therefore, proceed to address their arguments.
The Pinto intervenors argue that this Court certified their three putative classes ex mero motu. Consistent with this view, they proposed to Judge Greenhaw that Pinto had rendered unnecessary a motion for class certification, and, consequently, that no findings or actions by the trial court were required. Harper Brief, at 38. The trial court rejected this argument and ordered the Pinto intervenors to file a motion for class certification. Id. On October 3, 1995, the Pinto intervenors filed a motion for certification of the three classes for whom they sought intervention in Pinto. In their motion, they reiterated their argument that trial-court certification was unnecessary, and, moreover, move[d] ... to reopen the class certification of the Harper class. The Harper class responded with a motion opposing certification of the putative Pinto classes. Harper's motion challenged the Pinto intervenors' construction of this Court's holding in Pinto, stating:  No order exists certifying the Pinto class[es] as required by Rule 23(c)(1). Indeed, prior to the Pinto decision, no motion was ever filed in either this court or the Supreme Court seeking certification. The Pinto appellants in the Supreme Court did not ask the court to certify their classes. Indeed, they expressly asked the Supreme Court to leave the question up to this court on remand. Even if under Rule 23 a class could be certified by implicationand it cannot it would be inappropriate for this court to conclude that the Alabama Supreme Court impliedly granted appellants relief beyond the relief sought. The precise holding of the Supreme Court is that `Pinto and Anderton are entitled to intervene.' [662 So.2d at 900.] This holding does not even suggest, much less hold, that class certification is appropriate. Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision concerns Rule 24, not rule 23 .... The Supreme Court's opinion does contain some language about the desirability of hearing the views of the `classes' represented by Pinto. However, a fair reading of the opinion reveals that the Supreme Court was simply expressing its interest in ensuring that divergent views be heard. Given that the Pinto individuals will be represented, those views will be heard. (Emphasis added.) The motion also opposed the certification of the putative classes on the grounds, among others, (1) that no facts were alleged or demonstrated as to the considerations of numerosity, commonality, or typicality required by Rule 23; (2) that representation by the same counsel of all three classes would result in a conflict of interest; and (3) that no showing had been made as to the resources or experience of the Pinto intervenors' counsel to represent the classes adequately. On February 6, 1996, the trial court denied the Pinto intervenors' motion for certification, in an order stating in part: A motion to withdraw was filed on behalf of primary counsel for the Pinto Plaintiffs and co-counsel also filed a Motion to Continue regarding class certification on the ground that additional counsel needed to be retained. At the hearing the Pinto plaintiffs were given 30 days to associate new counsel, however, no further pleadings have been filed. Inasmuch as the requisites of Rule 23, A.R.C.P., Code of Alabama 1975, have not been met the Court cannot certify the classes the Pinto Plaintiffs seek to represent but will allow them to remain as individual ... plaintiffs.  The attorney for the Anderton Plaintiffs-Intervenor[s] was not present at the hearing and has not filed a motion requesting class certification. It is without question that individual taxpayers have standing to bring an action on behalf of other taxpayers when state funds are involved and the Anderton Plaintiffs as previously stated will also be allowed to remain as individual ... plaintiffs in this matter. (Emphasis added.) On February 7, 1996, the Pinto intervenors moved for reconsideration of that order. Their motion stated that they had been successful in associating counsel experienced in class actions and requested an opportunity to present evidence for class certification. On March 11, 1996, the trial court vacated its February 6, 1996, order to the extent that it denied class certification. The court reasoned that the issue of class certification should not be considered until the matters pending on appeal [to this Court were] resolved. As to whether this Court certified the Pinto intervenors' putative classes ex mero motu, Harper 's interpretation of Pinto is correct. That case presented no issue as to whether the requirements of Rule 23 had been satisfied. In fact, the opinion is devoid of any reference to Rule 23. Instead, we focused solely on the abstract legal question of whether this action was of the genre of actions theoretically maintainable as class actions. We merely assumed, arguendo, of course, that the putative representatives could establish all of the criteria set forth in Rule 23(a) and one of the criteria set forth in Rule 23(b). Ex parte Gold Kist, Inc., 646 So.2d 1339, 1341 (Ala.1994). Indeed, the scope and complexity of this litigation render such an approach particularly inappropriate here. The complexity and nature of this litigation raise, as Harper correctly observes, serious questions as to the experience and resources of any counsel selected to represent the Pinto intervenors' classes, as well as issues regarding potential conflicts of interest. The trial court was correct, therefore, in requiring the Pinto intervenors to comply with the mandates of Rule 23(a) and (b) in that forum. On remand of this cause, should it ultimately become necessary for the trial court to proceed further with this action, it shall then make a determination ... as to compliance with Rule 23(a) and (b), Rule 23(c), committee comments, guided not only by this Court's holding in Pinto, but also by the facts presented to it at that time. In other words, Pinto should not be understood as preempting all discretion in the trial court as to those matters committed to that court, First Alabama Bank v. Martin, 381 So.2d 32 (Ala.1980), such as the precise scope and contours of the classes. The outcome of this inquiry still turns on compliance with Rule 23 and is not compelled in its specific details by Pinto.
One conclusion that is compelled by Pinto, however, is that the scope of the Harper and other classes must be reexamined in light of our holding in that case. The Pinto intervenors correctly observe that at various times throughout this litigation, it has been alleged that some, or all, of the individuals in their putative classes were included in the Harper class, or some other class. Pinto, 662 So.2d at 899 n.3. Not only does logic dictate[] that the interests of Alabama citizens would best be served through a larger number of smaller, discrete classes than the fewer, more inclusive classes initially certified in this action, id. at 899; it also dictates that those larger classes must be narrowed to exclude those individuals who will be included in the discrete classes ultimately certified. It is clear, therefore, that the ultimate certification of the Pinto classes will necessitate the modification of the Harper class and any other classes affected. This result does not, however, compel the conclusion that the Harper class is ipso facto invalid, or that the class action was invalid ab initio, as the Pinto intervenors argue. The proper appellate remedy for class overbreadth is an order to narrow the class rather than an order to decertify the class action. Ex parte Central Bank of the South, 675 So.2d 403 (Ala.1996) (petition for a writ of mandamus denied to the extent it sought decertification of a class action; granted to the extent it sought narrowing of the scope of a class); Ex parte Gold Kist, Inc., 646 So.2d 1339 (Ala.1994) (petition for a writ of mandamus denied to the extent it sought decertification of a class action; granted to the extent it sought narrowing of the scope of a class). Thus, we hold that the scope of the Harper class does not invalidate the Liability Phase.
The Pinto intervenors argue that a reversal of a denial of intervention relates back to the time of application for intervention. Brief of Pinto Appellants, at 12. They further contend that there should be broad participation in the development of the [Remedy] plan (including the presentation of expert testimony) in order to avoid omission or violation of rights, and they hope to see removed some of the Remedy plan provisions that violate the rights of unrepresented students and parents. Id. at 16. They conclude that [t]he circuit court's refusal to vacate the remedy orders denied the Pinto Appellants due process of law [guaranteed] under the United States and Alabama Constitutions. Id. This argument is undermined by the fact that the Remedy Plan is still interlocutory in nature. See Pinto, 662 So.2d at 899. It envisions an ongoing process, 662 So.2d at 900, namely, the process of convert[ing] a system that failed to `offer equitable and adequate educational opportunities to the schoolchildren of the state ' ... into a system that succeeds in doing so. Id. at 899 (emphasis in Pinto ). The implementation of such a Remedy Plan would necessarily require  perennial revision and reassessment of the progress of [that] process. Id. (emphasis in Pinto ). That this process is ongoing and that it is long-term were, in fact, significant factors in our determination that the process could only benefit from the full party-participation of the Pinto intervenors. Id. at 900. We perceive no reason they cannot enjoy precisely the broad participation they seek in the development of the [Remedy] plan. Brief of Pinto Appellants, at 12. Certainly, they, like any other party, are entitled to present expert testimony as to aspects of the Plan they deem objectionable. Thus, Harper is correct when she argues: [T]he proper procedure in resolving the substantive objections of the Pinto intervenors is not to vacate the entire remedy order, including the portions to which all parties agree, without any evidence being heard. The proper procedure is for the Pinto intervenors to identify any particular section with which they disagree, for all parties to present evidence on that section, for the trial court to rule, and for [this Court to review that ruling pursuant to the proper procedural device]. This is also the answer to the Pinto intervenors' procedural objections that they have not been heard. They can still be heard. Harper Brief, at 17-18 (emphasis added). This appeal does not involve such a challenge, that is, a challenge to any particular provision of the Remedy Plan, and we are unpersuaded by the arguments that the Remedy Plan is invalid in toto. The judgment of the trial court as it concerns the Remedy Plan is, however, vacated, and this cause is remanded with directions to stay the action while retaining jurisdiction for one year from the date of this Court's certificate of judgment.