Opinion ID: 789081
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Probable cause determinations are legal determinations.

Text: 30 When no material dispute of fact exists, probable cause determinations are legal determinations that should be made by a court. Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 194, 25 L.Ed. 116 (1878); S.P. v. City of Takoma Park, Md., 134 F.3d 260, 272 (4th Cir.1998) (When, as in this case, there is no genuine issue of material fact, the existence of probable cause becomes a purely legal question subject to de novo review.); Potts v. City of Lafayette, 121 F.3d 1106, 1112 (7th Cir.1997); Smith v. Tucker, 304 A.2d 303, 306 (D.C.1973) (It is the duty of the court when the facts are in dispute to submit the question to the jury with the instructions that if they find the facts to be one way they amount to probable cause and if they find them to be another that they do not amount to probable cause.). See Yancey, 876 F.2d at 1243. Cf. Diamond v. Howd, 288 F.3d 932, 936 (6th Cir.2002); Klein v. Long, 275 F.3d 544, 550 (6th Cir.2001); Gardenhire v. Schubert, 205 F.3d 303, 315 (6th Cir.2000); Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1995) (In general, the existence of probable cause in a § 1983 action presents a jury question, unless there is only one reasonable determination possible.) (All four of these cases discuss probable cause in the context of an arrest). 31 All of these Sixth Circuit cases stand for the proposition that a jury trial is appropriate where reasonable disputes of material fact exist on facts underlying a probable cause determination. However, where only one reasonable reading of the facts is possible, i.e., where the facts that relate to probable cause are not in dispute, the question of probable cause retains its legal character and should be decided by the judge. We admit that some of these Sixth Circuit cases are confusing and many of the factual recitals in them do not lend themselves to a clear understanding of exactly what facts were in dispute. Nevertheless, the rule that probable cause is a legal question seems clear. 32 If disputed factual issues underlying probable cause exist, those issues must be submitted to a jury for the jury to determine the appropriate facts. Similarly, with qualified immunity, a court can submit to the jury the factual dispute with an appropriate instruction to find probable cause and qualified immunity if the factual inquiry is answered one way and to find probable cause and qualified immunity lacking if the inquiry is answered in another way. However, the jury does not decide whether the facts it has found are legally sufficient to amount to probable cause or entitlement to qualified immunity. 33 For instance, in this case, if witnesses gave contradictory accounts as to whether Lysher was angry at plaintiff, a jury would have to determine if she was angry and if her anger was so great that an officer would have been unreasonable to believe her. Similarly, if conflicting testimony existed as to whether Lysher was so intoxicated or inebriated when she spoke with defendant Kart as to make reliance on her statements clearly unwarranted, a jury would have to determine her level of intoxication. The judge could instruct the jury that if they find a certain level of intoxication, they could use that factual finding to find that the officer could not rely on her statements. Omitting that information then leads to the conclusion that the officer submitted an affidavit he knew or should have known was false. That false affidavit thereby deprives the resulting warrant of probable cause. 34 Given then, that probable cause is a legal question, but that underlying factual disputes related to probable cause must be submitted to a jury, our inquiry on review must be whether sufficient facts are in dispute with respect to probable cause to require fact-finding by a jury here. If none of the facts are in dispute, we can make a final legal determination on whether plaintiff meets the second prong of the Mays test as only legal questions would remain. 35