Opinion ID: 866154
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prosecutor Referenced Prior Consistent

Text: Statements Not in Evidence. In this case, nine co-defendants with firsthand knowledge of Tucker’s drug trafficking testified against him. This testimony was the bulk of the Government’s evidence, so the case hinged a good deal on their credibility. In an attempt to undermine that credibility, Tucker’s trial counsel pointed out during cross-examination that these witnesses had a motive to lie in order to receive favorable plea agreements from the Government. The prosecutor, in turn, attempted to bolster the credibility No. 12-1281 9 of these witnesses during closing arguments by making statements that could be construed as suggesting that all nine of Tucker’s co-conspirators, immediately after being arrested, told law enforcement that Tucker was the source of their heroin supply. However, no prior consistent statements were offered into evidence during the trial so, even when viewed in isolation, it was dangerous for the prosecutor to allude to witness statements that were not offered in evidence. The more difficult question, however, is whether these improper statements warrant a new trial under the plain error standard of review. Tucker argues that the statements made by the prosecutor amount to powerfully incriminating evidence that cannot be cured. In support of this contention, Tucker relies upon United States v. Fearns, 501 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1974). In Fearns, the prosecutor told the jury during his closing argument that a Government witness made a prior statement “about these men being involved in this” and without that statement the Government “wouldn’t have even known about them.” Id. at 488. There was no objection by defense counsel. Then during rebuttal argument, the prosecutor went on to add, “[I]n connecting with the last statement [defense counsel] made about Dianne, I want to remind you again that she gave us the story before she was ever indicted.” Id. at 489. Defense counsel did object to that statement, and his objection was sustained. In evaluating whether the improper comments made by the prosecutor in Fearns warranted reversal, we stated that: 10 No. 12-1281 Even though defendants did not object when the prosecutor went outside the record in his [closing] argument, and their objection was sustained when he did so in rebuttal, the prosecutor’s gross misconduct requires reversal under the plain error rule. Fearns, 501 F.2d at 489. Two years later, relying on Fearns, we ordered a new trial in United States v. Davis, 532 F.2d 22, 28 (7th Cir. 1976). In Davis, the prosecutor commented during his closing argument that a witness relayed information to him prior to trial that was consistent with the witness’ trial testimony. Id. Defense counsel objected, and the court admonished the prosecutor to “[j]ust stick to the evidence.” Id. Compelled by our decision in Fearns, we held that the Government’s misstep was not a harmless error as “the prosecutor violated the fundamental rule that argument to a jury is limited to the facts in evidence” and ordered the case to be retried. Id. Tucker argues that Fearns establishes that prosecutorial references to prior consistent statements, that were not put before the jury as evidence, “create prejudice that could not have been eradicated by any action of the trial judge.” Fearns, 501 F.2d at 489. As our questions during oral argument in this case suggested, we believe that such an interpretation of Fearns imposes an unreasonable burden on the district court of having to listen to closing arguments with a hair trigger on the mistrial button—whether defense counsel has launched an objection or not. Generally, “a mistrial is appropriate when an event during trial has a real likeliNo. 12-1281 11 hood of preventing a jury from evaluating the evidence fairly and accurately, so that the defendant has been deprived of a fair trial.” United States v. Collins, 604 F.3d 481, 489 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing Deicher v. City of Evansville, 545 F.3d 537, 543 (7th Cir. 2008)). We will only find plain error if the district court failed to declare a mistrial when it was clear and obvious that a mistrial was necessary. United States v. Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 898 (7th Cir. 2010). Meaning, it must have been obvious to the district court both that an error occurred and that the error deprived the defendant of a fair trial. Id. However, it appears Fearns has been interpreted to impose a duty on the district court to sua sponte declare a mistrial when prosecutorial comments potentially cross the line of impropriety, without regard to the critical next step in the analysis. This result is not in harmony with the balance of our case law as we do not review allegations of prosecutorial misconduct in a vacuum, but rather in the larger context of the parties’ closing arguments and the trial itself. Id. at 896. This aspect of Fearns and Davis also invites serious double jeopardy risks, since a defendant has the right to have his trial completed by the first jury empaneled to try him, United States v. Gilmore, 454 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2006), and defense counsel may well have good tactical reasons for not objecting to a prosecutor’s mistake in closing argument. See United States v. Jozwiak, 954 F.2d 458, 459 (7th Cir. 1992). Therefore, we now overrule Fearns to the extent that it imposes such a burden on the district court, and reaffirm our position that even if we determine a comment to be improper when read in isola- 12 No. 12-1281 tion, unless the remark, when interpreted through the full context of the record, “so infects the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process,” we will not reverse under the plain error test. United States v. McClinton, 135 F.3d 1178, 1189 (7th Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted).1 As we have stated, though we may agree with Tucker that the Government’s comments were improper, when read within the full context of the record, there is nothing to suggest that these comments denied Tucker a fair trial. The district court instructed the jury that statements of the attorneys are not evidence, and “jurors are presumed to follow limiting and curative instructions unless the matter improperly before them is so powerfully incriminating that they cannot be reasonably expected to put it out of their minds.” United States v. Smith, 308 F.3d 726, 739 (7th Cir. 2002). Tucker has not provided any support to undermine that presumption. In the face of overwhelming evidence of his guilt, Tucker argues that but for the prosecutor’s unfortunate implication the jury would have discredited the corroborated testimony of his nine co-conspirators because of their pending plea agreements. We disagree. The nine co-conspirators gave detailed testimony against Tucker describing both the nature and scope of his heroin- 1 Because this decision overrules a prior decision of this court, pursuant to Circuit Rule 40(e), we have circulated it among all judges in regular active service. None of the judges requested a hearing en banc. No. 12-1281 13 distribution ring. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the result of this trial would have been different absent the prosecutor’s unfortunate remarks.