Opinion ID: 550158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is SNEA a representative under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(o)?

Text: 21 In Nevada Highway Patrol Assoc. v. State of Nevada, 899 F.2d 1549 (9th Cir.1990), we considered whether the State of Nevada was in violation of section 7(o ) of the FLSA by offering a choice of compensatory leave or overtime pay that could be deferred in the absence of cash to employees who were members of the Nevada Highway Patrol Association (NHPA). The plaintiffs, members of the NHPA, charged that because the NHPA was a representative, the State of Nevada could not offer compensatory leave for overtime work unless there was an agreement or memorandum of understanding between the State of Nevada and the NHPA. In Nevada Highway Patrol Assoc., we held that although the NHPA was not a representative for purposes of the FLSA, SNEA was, and we remanded to the district court to determine how many of the plaintiffs were members of SNEA. Id. at 1555. We stated: The appellants correctly argue that the NSEA [SNEA] is a lawfully recognized state employee representative. Therefore, a compensatory time-off policy in lieu of overtime compensation cannot be enacted without an agreement with the NSEA [SNEA]. Id. 22 Defendant the State argues in the case at bar that the language in Nevada Highway Patrol Assoc. is merely dicta, not binding on this case. However, a close examination of the arguments in this case affirms the ruling that SNEA is a representative for purposes of the FLSA. 23 The general terms of the FLSA provide that all employers must pay employees one and one-half the regular rate for any hours worked above a forty-hour workweek. 2 However, as an exception to this general provision, a state may provide leave time as compensation for overtime work when such compensation is determined by a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding, or an agreement between the employees' representative and the employer. 3 Section 7(o ) of the FLSA states: 24 Employees of a public agency which is a State, a political subdivision of a state, or an interstate governmental agency may receive, in accordance with this subsection and in lieu of overtime compensation, compensatory time off at a rate not less than one and one-half hours for each hour of employment for which overtime compensation is required by this section. 25 (2) A public agency may provide compensatory time under paragraph (1) only 26 (A) pursuant to-- 27 (i) applicable provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, memorandum of understanding, or any other agreement between the public agency and representatives of such employees; or 28 (ii) in the case of employees not covered by subclause (i), an agreement or understanding arrived at between the employer and employee before the performance of the work and 29 (B) if the employee has not accrued compensatory time in excess of the limit applicable to the employee prescribed by paragraph (3). 30 In the case of employees described in clause (A)(ii) hired prior to April 15, 1986, the regular practice in effect on April 15, 1986, with respect to compensatory time off for employees in lieu of the receipt of overtime compensation, shall constitute an agreement or understanding under such clause (A)(ii). Except as provided in the previous sentence, the provision of compensatory time off to such employees for hours worked after April 14, 1986, shall be in accordance with this subsection. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(o ) (emphasis added). 31 The State argues that SNEA was not a representative of the State employees and thus that the State was correct in reaching individual agreements with the State employees regarding payment for overtime work. Because the individually named plaintiffs began work before April 15, 1986, the regular practice in effect before they began work should apply if SNEA is not a representative. See Nevada Highway Patrol Assoc., 899 F.2d at 1553. The regular practice in effect in the case at bar is the current practice of the State. 32
33 The State argues that SNEA was not the representative of the employees for purposes of Sec. 7(o ) because SNEA was not a recognized representative under Nevada law. The State argues that Congress specifically intended that under Sec. 7(o ) the definition of representative be a recognized representative. SNEA does not contest the definition of the term representative as a recognized representative, but argues that SNEA is a recognized representative as a matter of Nevada law and practice. 34 Although Sec. 7(o ) of the FLSA does not specifically mention the term recognized representative, there are three sources from which the court drew this interpretation of Sec. 7(o ): the legislative history concerning Sec. 7(o ), the regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor to implement Sec. 7(o ), and a letter written by the sponsors of the 1985 amendments which included Sec. 7(o ). 35 Because the statute is silent as to the definition of representative, this court must examine the Committee Reports to determine the legislative intent of the bill. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76, 105 S.Ct. 479, 483, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) (cites omitted). However, the House and Senate Reports offer different views of the meaning of Sec. 7(o ). Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132, 135 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 854, 107 L.Ed.2d 848 (1990). The House Report states: Where employees have selected a representative, which need not be a formal or recognized collective bargaining agent as long as it is a representative designated by the employees, the agreement or understanding must be between the representative and the employer.... H.R.Rep. No. 331, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1985), quoted in Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d at 135 (emphasis added). The Senate Report states: Where employees do not have a recognized representative, the agreement or understanding must be between the employer and the individual employee. S.Rep. No. 159, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1985 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 651, 658 (emphasis added). 36 The Secretary of Labor has promulgated regulations to implement the FLSA. 29 CFR Part 553 (1988). The pertinent regulations state: In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement applicable to the employees, the representative need not be a formal or recognized bargaining agent as long as the representative is designated by the employees. 29 CFR Sec. 553.23(b)(1). In response to concerns that the statute might conflict with an individual state's law which prohibits collective bargaining with state employees, the Secretary of Labor stated:The Department recognizes that there is a wide variety of State law that may be pertinent in this area. It is the Department's intention that the question of whether employees have a representative for purposes of FLSA section [7(o ) ] shall be determined in accordance with State or local law and practices. Application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to Employees of State and Local Governments, 52 Fed.Reg. 2012, 2014-15 (1987). 37 The regulations promulgated by the governmental body responsible for interpreting or administering a statute are entitled to considerable respect. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Cenance, 452 U.S. 155, 158 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2239, 2241 n. 3, 68 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981). See also, Chemical Mfrs.' Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.S. 116, 125, 105 S.Ct. 1102, 1107, 84 L.Ed.2d 90 (1985) (in absence of clear Congressional intent to contrary, court cannot substitute judgment for EPA's where the interpretation of a complex statute is rational). 38 The last source, a letter written by the congressional sponsors of the 1985 amendments to the FLSA, states that the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of Sec. 7(o ) is correct and that the representative mentioned in Sec. 7(o ) need not be a recognized representative. Abbott, 879 F.2d at 136. However, post-enactment letters from Congressmen are afforded little deference. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35, 102 S.Ct. 1510, 1517, 71 L.Ed.2d 715 (1982) ([O]ne isolated remark by a single Senator, ambiguous in meaning when examined in context, is insufficient to establish the kind of affirmative congressional expression necessary to evidence an intent....); Brock v. Writers Guild of America, 762 F.2d 1349, 1356 (9th Cir.1985) (post-enactment statement by Congressman opposing legislation given little weight). 39 Aside from these sources, the State offers a policy rationale for rejecting the district court's approach: if there is no requirement for a recognized representative, different employees might choose alternate representatives or the same employee might switch representatives, resulting in chaos. 40 The district court in the case at bar accepted the State's interpretation of the statute regarding the definition of representative, holding: the Court concludes that the term 'representative of such employees' in section 207(o )(2)(A)(i), 29 U.S.C. means a representative recognized by the employer. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment, at 15, Excerpts of Record. Although the district court accepted the State's definition of representative as a recognized representative, the district court held that SNEA is a recognized representative and thus has been authorized to enter into an agreement with the State on behalf of the State employees. 41
42 The State argues that SNEA is not a recognized representative because Nevada state law prohibits recognition of any collective bargaining unit to represent State employees. We held in Nevada Highway Patrol Assoc. that any question of whether an entity was a representative for the FLSA should be resolved by reference to state law. Id. at 1554. The State cites the decisions in Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 879 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 854, 107 L.Ed.2d 848 (1990), in which the Fourth Circuit held that because Virginia state law did not allow collective bargaining with a representative of public employees, there was no recognized representative for purposes of Sec. 7(o ). In Abbott, the district court held that the City of Virginia Beach was not in violation of the Sec. 7(o ) by offering police officers the choice between compensatory pay or leave for overtime work. Abbott v. City of Virginia Beach, 689 F.Supp. 600, 604 (E.D.Va.1988), aff'd, 879 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 854, 107 L.Ed.2d 848 (1990). The City of Virginia Beach had reached no agreement with Virginia Beach Police Benevolent Association, the entity plaintiffs charged was the recognized representative of the police officers. Id. The district court concluded that because Virginia law specifically prohibited collective bargaining with representatives of the city's employees, citing Commonwealth v. City Board of Arlington County, 217 Va. 558, 232 S.E.2d 30 (1977), there could be no recognized representative of the City's employees. 689 F.Supp. at 603-604. 43 The State argues that similarly, because the State cannot enter into collective bargaining agreements with any representative of its employees, there is no recognized representative as a matter of Nevada state law. However, we recognized in Nevada Highway Patrol Assoc. that whether Nevada state employees were barred from collective bargaining was unclear and that even if barred from collective bargaining, there was no prohibition against designating a representative to enter into agreements with the State. Nevada Highway Patrol Assoc., 899 F.2d at 1554, n. 6. 44 The district court held that SNEA is a recognized representative under Nevada law because the Nevada legislature recognized SNEA in Assembly Concurrent Resolution No. 29 and in subsequent legislation appointing SNEA to the Merit Award Board and the group insurance committee. Nevada Revised Statutes Sec. 285.030 and Sec. 287.041. 45 The State argues that these resolutions and statutes merely recognized SNEA for the purposes of discussion, not bargaining, and thus cannot constitute recognition for the purposes of Sec. 7(o ) of the FLSA. Abbott, 689 F.Supp. at 603 (recognition of a representative group for the purposes of discussion only did not define that group as a recognized representative for purposes of Sec. 7(o )). 46 The State's arguments are not supported by the legislative history or the regulations. There is no definition of recognized representative which supports the State's position that the recognized representative must be an agent authorized by law to act as a collective bargaining agent. The House Report and the Secretary of Labor's comments specifically state that the representative need not be an agent authorized for collective bargaining. H.R.Rep. 331; 29 CFR Sec. 553.23(h)(1). Even the Senate Report, which specifically refers to a recognized representative, does not define a recognized representative as an agent authorized to participate in collective bargaining in the state. 47 The Secretary of Labor's further comments support the district court's finding that the recognized representative is not necessarily an agent authorized for collective bargaining: 48 In addition, to clarify the fact that the representative of the employees need not be formal or recognized collective bargaining agent, the Department has modified Sec. 553.23(c)(1), as suggested by the National Education Association (NEA) to add the words or otherwise designated between the words recognized and representative since collective bargaining is not a necessary condition for establishing an agreement between an employer and an employee representative. 52 Fed.Reg. at 2014. 49 In conclusion, the language of the legislative history and the examination of Nevada law indicate that SNEA is a recognized representative for the purposes of Sec. 7(o ) of the FLSA. Therefore, we AFFIRM the ruling of the District Court in finding that the State was in violation of section 7(o ) of the FLSA by offering compensatory leave for overtime work without a memorandum of understanding or agreement between the State and SNEA. 50