Opinion ID: 1700511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Federal Law Analysis of (1)(d)

Text: The U.S. Supreme Court has held the words heinous, atrocious, and cruel to be unconstitutionally vague in an Oklahoma sentencing statute which is very comparable to Nebraska's § 29-2523(1)(d). See Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). See, also, Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 1764, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980) (holding Georgia's `outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman' aggravating circumstance to be unconstitutional because the Georgia court failed to limit the statute in such a way as to provide a principled distinction between death penalty and non-death-penalty cases). In both Maynard and Godfrey, the defendant was sentenced to death by a jury which had been instructed in only the bare language of the sentencing statute or in language which was similarly vague. Likewise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has found the text of Nebraska's aggravating circumstance (1)(d), standing alone, to be constitutionally insufficient. Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d 1226 (8th Cir.1990), reh'g denied 951 F.2d 895 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied 504 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1995, 118 L.Ed.2d 591 (1992). However, a state supreme court may salvage a facially-vague statute by construing it to provide the sentencing body with objective criteria for applying the statute. Moore v. Clarke, 904 F.2d at 1229. The Eighth Circuit, in several recent cases, has looked beyond the text of § 29-2523(1)(d) to determine whether (1)(d) has been limited and defined by this court in such a way as to provide sentencing bodies in Nebraska with objective criteria for the application of that aggravating circumstance. The Eighth Circuit has held that the first prong of aggravating circumstance (1)(d) of § 29-2523, narrowed by this court's decisions defining the phrase especially heinous, atrocious, cruel to mean unnecessarily torturous to the victim, satisfies the constitutional requirements of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); Godfrey v. Georgia, supra ; and Maynard v. Cartwright, supra . See Harper v. Grammer, 895 F.2d 473 (8th Cir.1990). However, even as limited and defined by this court, the exceptional depravity language of the second prong of aggravating circumstance (1)(d), has failed to pass constitutional muster in the federal courts. In Moore v. Clarke, supra , the Eighth Circuit found that a sentencing body could glean only subjective and unilluminating fragments from existing [Nebraska] case law. 904 F.2d at 1232. That court held that the language of the second prong, even as defined and limited by case law, remained unconstitutionally vague and provided insufficient guidance to a sentencing body called upon to determine whether a particular murder `manifested exceptional depravity.' 904 F.2d at 1233. See, also, Holtan v. Black, No. CV 84-L-393, 1986 WL 12479 (D.Neb. Nov. 5, 1986), vacated on other grounds 838 F.2d 984 (8th Cir.1988). Importantly, though, the Eighth Circuit held in Harper that the invalidity of the second prong of (1)(d) does not vitiate the efficacy of the first prong. Harper's sentencing court had relied upon facts supporting both the first and second prongs of aggravating circumstance (1)(d). Because aggravating circumstance (1)(d) was constitutional at least in part and had been validly established by the first prong, the court held that it was unnecessary to resentence Harper. In Williams v. Clarke, 40 F.3d 1529 (8th Cir.1994), the Eighth Circuit again upheld a defendant's death sentence even though the sentencing panel had relied partially upon the unconstitutional second prong of (1)(d). The court found that the defendant's sexual assault of his murder victim was sufficient to support the constitutional first prong. Quoting Harper, the court noted that ` [t]he two prongs are not separate factors; each of the prongs simply purports to be justification for the application of the aggravating factor.' (Emphasis supplied.) 40 F.3d at 1535. We therefore hold that aggravating circumstance (1)(d) is facially constitutional to the extent that the first prong has been narrowed and defined by this court. We now determine whether aggravating circumstance (1)(d) has been constitutionally applied to Ryan.