Opinion ID: 168502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Termination/Suspension

Text: 31 McGowan argues the City suspended her for supporting Lollis's discrimination claim. The district court concluded that because the suspension came over two years after her support of Lollis and was based on a legitimate reason (her responsibility for a prison suicide), McGowan had failed to show the requisite causal connection. McGowan claims she has demonstrated circumstantial evidence of causation by alleging in her amended complaint that she was fired the day after giving a deposition in her Title VII lawsuit. We agree. 32 Testifying in a Title VII lawsuit—including one's own—can be protected activity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Robbins v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist., 186 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir.1999) (acknowledging that Title VII extends protection to those who testify in proceedings related to their own Title VII action even if the action is without merit); Glover v. South Carolina Law Enforcement Div., 170 F.3d 411, 413 (4th Cir.1999) ([I]t is [] plain that testifying in a deposition in a Title VII case generally constitutes protected activity under [Title VII's] participation clause.). 33 Moreover, the required link between the protected activity and subsequent adverse employment action can be inferred if the action occurs within a short period of time after the protected activity. See O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir.2001) (Unless there is very close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct, the plaintiff must offer additional evidence to establish causation.); Haynes v. Level 3 Commc'n, 456 F.3d 1215, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting O'Neal for same proposition). Here, McGowan was fired the day after she gave deposition testimony in this case. While proximity alone may not always support an adverse inference of retaliation, McGowan's deposition testimony containing allegations of wrongful conduct by current police department employees suffices to establish an inference of causation. 34 Having found sufficient circumstantial evidence of causation, we turn to the remaining analysis under the McDonnell-Douglas framework. Where a Title VII plaintiff has made a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff. McDonnell-Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). 4 35 The City provided two related non-discriminatory reasons for firing McGowan— (1) a prisoner suicide that occurred on her watch as jailer, and (2) McGowan's perceived dishonesty in the investigation following the suicide. McGowan responds that the City's proffered non-discriminatory reason for terminating her was actually a pretext for discriminatory behavior. She claims that pretext can be inferred in two ways: (1) she was treated differently than a similarly situated officer who booked the prisoner involved in the suicide, and (2) the stated reasons for her firing by Chief Osmond were not sincere. 36 Disparate Treatment. McGowan argues she was treated differently than Officer Dawson, the jailer who booked the prisoner who hanged himself, but failed to remove the prisoner's belt. To show disparate treatment, McGowan must establish she was similarly situated to Dawson in all relevant respects. Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir.1997). Similarly situated employees are those who deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards governing performance evaluation and discipline. Id. In determining whether two employees are similarly situated, a court should also compare the relevant employment circumstances, such as work history and company policies, applicable to the plaintiff and the intended comparable employees. Id. Moreover, even employees who are similarly situated must have been disciplined for conduct of comparable seriousness in order for their disparate treatment to be relevant. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir.2000). 37 Applying this standard, McGowan was not similarly situated to Dawson. Although they both reported to Osmond and monitored prisoners in the City jail, their jobs that night were very different. Dawson was the booking officer, while McGowan was the jailer. He admitted the prisoner, she ultimately was responsible for his safety. 38 In addition to having different responsibilities, McGowan and Dawson engaged in different conduct and made different mistakes that contributed to the suicide. First, McGowan was obliged under state law and City policy to visually observe prisoners. Based in part on an independent investigation by the Oklahoma Bureau of Investigation (OSBI), Osmond determined that McGowan, as jailer, was more culpable in the hanging than Dawson, the booking officer. Dawson was found to have violated an internal police department policy, in failing to remove the prisoner's belt at booking, but Osmond concluded Dawson was truthful and cooperative in the OSBI investigation. McGowan, by contrast, was found to have violated both state law and City policy, 5 falsified the jail register regarding her visual inspections, and been uncooperative during the OSBI investigation. 39 In sum, because McGowan and Dawson were (1) not performing the same job, (2) not subject to the same policies, statutes and findings of wrongdoing, and (3) different in their relative level of culpability, they were not similarly situated. Additionally, even if they were similarly situated, McGowan's conduct was not sufficiently similar to Dawson's to allow an inference of pretext on the basis of their disparate treatment. 40 Proffered Reasons. In an attempt to show the City was insincere in finding her more culpable, McGowan argues that Osmond lied about his reasons for the termination. In a letter recommending her termination, he stated that McGowan attempted to deceive OSBI investigators regarding the number of times she checked on the prisoner in person. She maintains that the OSBI report does not conclude that she lied to investigators. 41 We find the OSBI report and Osmond's letter to be consistent. The report stated McGowan told investigators she had conducted two or three in-person checks of the prisoner in the four hours between his booking and the discovery of his body. The report also noted that Oklahoma law and regulations required at least one in-person check per hour by the jailer on duty. Osmond's letter cited the report and concluded on the basis of the report and evidence from the department's jail video of the day in question that McGowan had not made a physical inspection of the prisoner's cell until four hours after she came on duty. 42 Osmond also based his decision to fire McGowan on McGowan's admitted failure to make the required four in-person hourly checks on the prisoner. Nothing in the record suggests this rationale was insincere. In other words, the City's proffered non-retaliatory reason was not so incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory that a rational fact finder could conclude the reason[] was unworthy of belief. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1076 (10th Cir.2004). Accordingly, McGowan has not shown that the City's non-discriminatory reason for her discharge was pretextual. 6 43 In sum, we agree with the district court that McGowan did not show disputed facts that would establish pretext based on disparate treatment. 44