Opinion ID: 408159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Linens' Duty to Investigate

Text: 24 An alternative ground for our decision arises from a consideration of the Union Market Clinic Supplemental Reports. The § 912(d) knowledge requirement is fulfilled if the employer knows of the injury and has facts that would lead a reasonable man to conclude that compensation liability is possible, and that he therefore ought to investigate the matter further. Butler v. District Parking Management Co., 363 F.2d at 684; Leyden v. Capitol Reclamation Corp., 2 BRBS 24, 30, BRB Nos. 74-226, 74-226A (1975), aff'd mem., 547 F.2d 706 (D.C.Cir.1978). Aggravation of a pre-existing condition may constitute a compensable accidental injury under the Act. Wheatley v. Adler, 407 F.2d at 312; Howell v. Einbinder, 350 F.2d 442, 443 (D.C.Cir.1965). 25 Linens knew that Stevenson had injured his back in September. It knew about the physical nature of Stevenson's duties; or, alternatively, about the necessity that Stevenson avoid heavy work lest he re-injure his back. Linens knew that Stevenson was under doctor's care. It knew that Stevenson was often absent from work because of back problems, at least during the month of October. And it knew that Stevenson quit work as a result of back pain on December 14, 1978. 26 Given these facts, the November 27, 1978 Union Market Clinic Supplemental Report describing a November 24 re-injury to Stevenson's back 11 and the December 15, 1978 Supplemental Report describing more severe pain for the past three weeks should have prompted Linens to investigate whether Stevenson's re-injury, aggravating the September 18 injury, occurred on the job. See Leyden v. Capitol Reclamation Corp., 2 BRBS at 30. Although the report did not describe an incapacitating injury, and said that Stevenson was able to work, the fact that Stevenson said on December 18 that he quit work because of his back should have alerted Linens to explore the possibility of liability. 27 This case is distinguished from cases where courts have not found sufficient knowledge on the employer's part to warrant further investigation. 12 In Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Walker, 590 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1978), the claimant twice certified to his insurer that his injury was not due to occupational causes. The Walker court refused to impose upon the employer the duty to double-check the accuracy of the employee's certification. In Strachan Shipping Co. v. Davis, 571 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1978), the connection between the employee's illness and his work as a bulk cargo gang foreman unloading dust boats was not as apparent to a layman as is the connection between back pain and moving heavy objects in the case at hand. Moreover, the court stressed that the employee was represented by an attorney at the time the company was notified about his illness and the attorney also failed to provide proper notification. Finally, in Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Bowman, 507 F.2d 146 (3d Cir. 1975), the employer had no notice of deterioration of the employee's hearing, which was already impaired at the start of employment. Accordingly, the court found no reason for the employer further to investigate medical reports describing the employee as deaf. 28 The facts in this case suggested in a fashion far more clear than in the cases just described the possibility that Stevenson's injury occurred at work. Given those facts, Linens should have concluded that compensation liability was possible, and should have explored whether Stevenson's injury in fact occurred at work.