Opinion ID: 2960198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying Plain Error Review

Text: Although Weintraub states, “[i]n general, it is the rare case in which an improper instruction will justify reversal of a criminal conviction when no objection has been made in the trial court,” 273 F.3d at 145 (alteration omitted) (quoting Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154), objection C. The original charge stated: “Persuade means to move by argument or entreaty or expostulation to a belief, position, or course of action . . . . The term ‘entice’ means to wrongfully solicit, persuade, procure, allure, attract, coax, or seduce, or to lure, induce, attempt, incite, or persuade a person to do a thing.” Here, defense counsel was arguing that the inclusion of explicit definitions or synonyms for “persuade” and “entice” lowered the burden of proof and would, in effect, allow the jury to convict without finding that Joseph persuaded or enticed. For example, under the charge, as given, the jury could convict upon finding that Joseph “wrongfully solicit[ed]” a minor. For that reason, defense counsel “ask[ed] for the plain meaning” of those terms, without any embellishment. This was the subject of his second objection (objection C), not the “more appealing” language. -42- the same is true when, as here, the objection that was made was insufficient to preserve the error. Under plain error review, we “revers[e] only if the error is clear or obvious and affects substantial rights. To affect substantial rights, an error “must have been prejudicial: It must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Ganim, 510 F.3d 134, 152 (2d Cir. 2007). “[T]he defendant bears the burden of establishing prejudice.” Logan, 419 F.3d at 179; see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993) (noting that when an error has been preserved, “a court of appeals normally engages in a specific analysis of the district court record – a so-called ‘harmless error’ inquiry – to determine whether the error was prejudicial. [Plain error review] normally requires the same kind of inquiry, with one important difference: It is the defendant rather than the Government who bears the burden of persuasion with respect to prejudice.”) Joseph cannot meet his burden because there was conclusive evidence to support the properly charged theory that, using the Internet, he “attempted to convince or influence the person he believed was a 13 year old girl to engage in a sexual act with him.” A. 158.1; see Skelly, 442 F.3d at 99 (finding no prejudice on plain error review because the government’s “primary theory [of liability] was supported by overwhelming proof”). The evidence belies any suggestion, argued by the defendant, that he was just role-playing. -43- In his online conversations with “Julie,” the FBI agent, Joseph made numerous comments demonstrating his intent to entice her into engaging in sexual acts with him. Furthermore, on multiple occasions, Joseph made statements indicating a genuine belief (prior to the day he arranged to meet Julie) that Julie was a minor. For example, on August 22, 2005, the following online exchange took place: Joseph: everyone has different things that really turn them on . . . for instance . . . i love touching and kissing . . . i could caress a girl’s body for hours, touching, kissing, slowly all over . . . every inch is like a delicious meal to be savored slowly . . . . Julie: is that what you wanna do with us? . . . . Joseph: yes, i want to touch you, caress you, kiss you . . . and show and te[]ach you things that feel good to you and me . . . but only if you want to Julie: u really do? Joseph: yes, but no one can know, because i would go straight to jail Julie: what do u mean? Joseph: you are too young for me . . . it is illegal . . . . i want to show you both how touching and kissing can be so, so hot Supplemental App. at 86-87. The next day, Joseph again chatted with Julie and described in explicit detail the sexual acts that he wanted to perform with her. He stated, “i kept thinki[n]g about having sex with you like that -44- until we both came.” When Julie asked, “do u really wanna do this in person . . . or just pretend,” Joseph replied, “i really want to . . . I’m just afraid someone will find out.” App. at 95 (emphasis added). Trying to arrange a meeting with Julie, Joseph said, “i just told lorie i have some fr[ee] time next wed in the late morning.” Julie asked, “really? . . . what do u wanna do?” and Joseph replied, “i want to see you both . . . i have to ad[]mit, I’m very nervous about it all, knowing how young you both are . . . but i am also very excited and want to see if we have chemistry . . . i know i’m going to want to have my hands all over you when i see you.” Supplemental App. at 99 (emphasis added). This conversation followed: Joseph: we need to find a private place where no one will watch us or accidentally find us Julie: like the park? Joseph: if there[ ]is good privacy there, sure. Julie: w[o]uldnt it be w[ei]rd to do that out in the open? Joseph: yes, defin[i]tely . . . not a good place for sex, but maybe some kissing and touching Julie: ok . . . so u don’t want to do sex? Joseph: i wish we could find a private indoor place . . . not outside[]in the park (until you are 18 :-)) Id. at 100-01; see also id. at 106 (“[I] just may have a problem because i am so much older than you[.]”); id. at 107 (“[P]romise me you won’t get me in trouble? . . . and have me arrested[.]”). These -45- conversations, among others, starkly refute Joseph’s claims that when he chatted with Julie, he was simply role-playing and believed that Julie was a sexually experienced adult posing as a minor. Because there was abundant evidence supporting Joseph’s conviction, there was no prejudice and therefore no plain error requiring vacatur and remand. See Skelly, 442 F.3d at 99 (“This is not a case, then, where it is impossible to determine which of two competing theories formed the basis for conviction, for it is overwhelmingly likely that any reasonable juror would have convicted on the basis of the Government’s primary theory. Accordingly, we conclude that the otherwise forfeited error in the district court’s instruction does not constitute plain error that we may notice.”). Moreover, assuming arguendo that the error did affect Joseph’s substantial rights by affecting the outcome of his district court proceedings, “the court of appeals has authority to order correction, but is not required to do so.” Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. The Supreme Court has stated that a reviewing court’s remedial discretion “should be employed in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result” – that is, if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); see also United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 415 (2d Cir. 2003). No error in the case before us calls into question the fairness, -46- integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.