Opinion ID: 795051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objectively Reasonable Fear of Future Persecution

Text: 72 I disagree with the majority's conclusion that Gu does not have an objectively reasonable fear of future persecution. As I discussed above, because neither the BIA nor the IJ made an adverse credibility finding, we are required to accept Gu's testimony as true, including the hearsay statement of Gu's friend. See Smolniakova, 422 F.3d at 1038. Gu's friend told Gu that Chinese security officials had been looking for Gu to question him about religious materials Gu sent to China from the United States. The majority ignores the context of Gu's account and belittles his experiences when it claims that the Chinese authorities simply came to interview him. Maj. Op. at 1022. We must make reasonable inferences from the facts to which an alien credibly testifies. Ladha, 215 F.3d at 900. In this case, the visit occurred soon after Gu had sent Christian religious materials to his friends and fellow church members in China. Considering the totality of Gu's experiences—Gu's beating and detainment at the hands of security officers, the confession he was forced to sign; and his threatened termination—any reasonable person would infer that the visit to his home was not for the purpose of conducting a simple interview. Gu credibly testified that these visits serve as the basis for his fear of arrest and detainment upon return to China. In my opinion, Gu's fear of persecution is objectively reasonable and is supported by the evidence that public security officials have tried to locate him at his home in China. See Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that even a ten percent chance of persecution may establish a well-founded fear). 73 In conclusion, I believe that Gu has established that his fear of future persecution on account of his Christian religion is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. See Nagoulko, 333 F.3d at 1016. The BIA's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Evidence of his past experiences and the fact that his house in China has been visited by Chinese authorities since his departure compel a finding of a well-founded fear of future persecution. 74 For the foregoing reasons, I dissent. Notes: 1 At the hearing before the Immigration Judge (IJ), government counsel asked Gu, Were there any conditions on your release? Gu responded, They asked me to report to [the] local police station on a weekly basis. The majority adheres to the literal translation of Gu's words when it says that the police asked him to report to the police station once a week. Maj. Op. at 1018. Reading the statement in context, however, Gu was not simply asked to report to the police station. Reporting to the police station was a condition of his release; Gu was required to report to the police station. 2 The majority downplays the IJ's blatant error by stating that the BIA neither explicitly adopted this portion of the IJ's decision nor mentioned this reason as a factor in support of its denial of Gu's petition. Maj. Op. at 1020 n. 2. Under the law of this circuit, when the BIA incorporates the IJ's decision as its own, we treat the IJ's reasons as the BIA's See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 595-96 (9th Cir.2003) (examining both the oral opinion of the IJ and the written opinion of the BIA where the BIA relied on a combination of its own observations about He's testimony and other problems noted by the IJ when making an adverse credibility determination). In this case, the BIA did not have its own independent reasons for affirming the IJ's denial. The BIA stated: The record supports the Immigration Judge's conclusion that the respondent failed to demonstrate eligibility for asylum. Among the other issues cited in the Immigration Judge's decision, the respondent testified that he did not experience further problems, was able to return to his government job, and obtained a valid passport to leave China. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Thus, because the BIA did, in fact, explicitly incorporate the IJ's reasons as its own, we must also review the IJ's oral decision for substantial evidence. See He, 328 F.3d at 595-96. 3 The government argues and the majority agrees that denial of asylum is appropriate because Gu at most only suffered three days of detention and a beating with rods that left no scars or permanent injuries. This argument suggests that a similar claim from a frailer petitioner would succeed. The government has pointed to no authority supporting the proposition that the strength of a petitioner's application should be dependent upon his or her body's ability to withstand a severe beating See Mihalev v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 722, 730 (9th Cir.2004) (noting that it would be a strange rule if the absence or presence of a broken arm were the dispositive fact).