Opinion ID: 2207621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Application of Data Processing And Its Progeny

Text: The refinement of the Data Processing test has had a long and varied history. However, the United States Supreme Court has clearly enunciated the definitive statement on its application in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). [16] In Lujan the Court folded the first two parts of the Data Processing test into one, and held that two additional criteria had evolved. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. First, a party must have suffered an injury in fact, which is the invasion of a legally protected interest within the zone of interest sought to be protected or regulated by the statute. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. The invasion must be 1) concrete and particularized, and b) actual or imminent, not `conjectural' or `hypothetical' Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted). Second, there must be actual connection between the injury and the conduct complained of  the injury has to be `fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.' [17] Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted). Finally, it must be likely that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, rather than merely speculative. Id. at ___, 112 S.Ct. at 2136. Here, WSI fails the first part of the standing test as to an injury in fact and its zone of interest. In reaching this conclusion we consider the facts pleaded by the party asserting standing. WSI contends first that it has an interest in water quality and navigation. (App.Br. at 3). More specifically, WSI states that it is concerned about surface water runoff, the effects that dredging might have on water quality in the Delaware River, and fugitive air emissions from the Oceanport site. (App. Appendix at 4). WSI has filed no affidavits or other documents providing further details about its first standing claim. WSI's second claim is that the increased oil tanker traffic caused by the opening of the Oceanport facility will increase the likelihood of an oil spill. (App.Br. 4). WSI is concerned that such a spill would close the Delaware River to shipping traffic, and thereby cause economic damage to its interests. (App.Br. 3). WSI specifically asserts that the Oceanport facility will also increase the likelihood of any kind of shipping accident, which could close the Delaware River and cause economic damage to WSI. (App. Br. 3-4). Oceanport urges us to deny standing to WSI based upon its claims of both environmental and economic injury. Oceanport asserts that such alleged injuries in an environmental case automatically divest a party of standing. Federal case law is clearly to the contrary, and we adopt it. That, however, does not advance WSI's position. A party's asserted claim to standing may include both economic and environmental injuries, and a pecuniary interest will not defeat standing where there is a bona fide environmental claim. Overseas Shipholding Group, 767 F.Supp. 287, 292; See also Pack v. Corps of Engineers, 428 F.Supp. 460 (M.D.Fla.1977). Courts should be reluctant to dissect a plaintiff's motivations for bringing a ... claim. `It is not part of [the] court's function to weigh or proportion' conflicting monetary and environmental interests. Id. at 295 (citing National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650, 655 (10th Cir.1971)). On the other hand, courts should deny standing to businesses asserting... claims only when `the companies are motivated solely by protection of their own pecuniary interest and [] the public interest aspect is so infinitesimal that it ought to be disregarded altogether.' Id. at 295 (citing National Helium, 455 F.2d at 655) (emphasis added). In this case, it is clear that the persuasive federal case law will not divest WSI of standing based simply upon a mixed claim of injury. The real issue is whether WSI's interests are sufficient to confer standing. Considering WSI's environmental claim first, it is clear the asserted injury is not sufficiently specific to withstand challenge. Thus, WSI's claim of environmental injury fails subpart (a) of the first part of the standing test  that the alleged injury must actually affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual manner. The mere allegation of a sincere interest in an environmental problem is not sufficient to confer standing. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1368, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972). In order to comply with the Sierra Club mandate, the party claiming standing must show that the alleged environmental injury will actually affect it. Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990). [18] WSI's second claim is based on pecuniary loss. While it may satisfy the injury in fact test, it fails the zone of interest test. WSI has alleged that it will suffer a particularized and concrete injury  that increased shipping traffic on the Delaware River will lead to a greater likelihood of a spill closing the River to shipping traffic, and that such closure will cause it a pecuniary loss. Clearly, such an injury, if it occurs, would have a direct impact upon WSI, thereby satisfying subpart (a) of the first part of a standing analysis. The claim also satisfies subpart (b) of the first part of the standing test. The claim is not conjectural or hypothetical. Although contingent, it is based upon the chance occurrence of some event which WSI has demonstrated will be appreciably increased by the opening of the Oceanport facility. It is not necessary for the event about which the plaintiff complains to have actually occurred; only that it not be so conjectural as to be more creative imagination than fact. See Overseas Shipholding Group, 767 F.Supp. 287. [19] While WSI's claimed injury is not conjectural or hypothetical it plainly fails the zone of interest test. Thus, we examine whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute ... in question. Data Processing, 397 U.S. at 153-154, 90 S.Ct. at 829-830. Arguably, 7 Del.C. § 6001(a)(1) contemplates an economic interest: The development, utilization and control of the land, water, underwater and air resources of the State are vital to the people in order to assure adequate supplies for domestic, industrial, ... other beneficial uses ... However, this statement of purpose by the General Assembly does not place WSI's economic interest within the zone of interest of the statute. It is indisputable that the goal of the relevant statutes is the protection of the environment. 7 Del.C. §§ 6001(b), 6020 and 7201. Each statute refers to the protection of natural resources and preservation of the environment as the main thrust of those acts. Id. The provisions of § 6001 quoted above do not even mention the protection of economic interests as a goal of the statute. 7 Del.C. § 6001(a)(1). Rather, it states that the goal of the statute is to preserve natural resources for beneficial uses, without defining such beneficial uses. For this reason, the Agrico case is again instructive. Agrico, 406 So.2d 478. That case turned on whether it was appropriate for the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation to deny a construction permit. Id. In determining the appropriateness of the action, the court was required to interpret Fla.Admin.Code Rule 17-2.03(1)(A), which states, 1) In making the determination [of whether to issue a permit], the Department shall give due consideration to ... (d) the social and economic impact.... Even in this case where the rule is more appreciably geared toward economic interests, the Florida Court of Appeal for the Second District found that an economic interest standing alone did not confer standing. Id. at 482-483. That reasoning is sound. The statutes in question are designed to protect the environment, not economic interests. Reading the statutes as a whole, it would contravene the basic legislative intent to confer standing to challenge decisions made under those statutes based upon the sole claim of economic injury. Had WSI sufficiently asserted its environmental injury, or satisfied the elements of organizational standing, then the result might well be different. But WSI has not done so. In summary, WSI has not satisfied organizational standing to proceed on behalf of its employees. Nor has it satisfied the injury in fact requirement for its environmental claim. Finally, WSI has not satisfied the zone of interest requirement for its economic claim.