Opinion ID: 2184797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disclosure of Impeachment Evidence to the Jury

Text: In a related claim, defendant asserts that in addition to its disclosure obligations to the defense, the prosecution was constitutionally required to inform the jury of the circumstances of Martha Jackson's involvement in this case. In support of this argument, defendant relies, in part, on People v. Holmes, 238 Ill.App.3d 480, 179 Ill.Dec. 607, 606 N.E.2d 439 (1992). In Holmes, the court stated that [i]t is well settled that if a witness offers testimony in exchange for some beneficial treatment from the State, the State must disclose that information to the jury. Holmes, 238 Ill.App.3d at 490-91, 179 Ill.Dec. 607, 606 N.E.2d 439. The cases cited in Holmes-Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959), Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), and People v. Bolton, 10 Ill.App.3d 902, 295 N.E.2d 11 (1973)do not stand for this broad proposition. In Napue a witness at a murder trial falsely testified that he received no consideration from the State in exchange for his testimony. While the assistant State's Attorney was aware that the testimony was false, he took no action to correct it. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction. The Court noted that a conviction through the use of evidence known by the State to be false must be reversed, and the same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears. The Court further noted that it was of no consequence that the false testimony bore upon the witness' credibility rather than directly upon guilt or innocence. Similarly, in Bolton, a State's witness also falsely denied the existence of an agreement with the State, and the State failed to correct the false testimony. In Giglio, the Court held that a promise made to a witness by one attorney for the government would be attributed to the prosecution. In Giglio, the Court reversed the defendant's conviction where a prosecution witness falsely denied that any promises of leniency had been made, even though the prosecutor appearing at trial was personally unaware of the falsity of the testimony. Accordingly, in each of these cases, the prosecution's obligation to reveal the existence of an agreement with a witness arose only because of the witness' false testimony on the subject. These cases merely impose an obligation to correct false evidence. Under our adversarial system, the State is not required in the first instance to impeach its own witnesses with all evidence bearing on their credibility. In addition to Holmes, defendant cites certain federal court decisions which also appear to suggest that the prosecution has an affirmative duty to inform the jury of any agreements or promises of leniency to its witnesses. See Campbell v. Reed, 594 F.2d 4, 7 (4th Cir.1979) (stating that Giglio held that the prosecution's failure to present all material evidence to the jury constituted a denial of due process); United States v. Pope, 529 F.2d 112, 114 (9th Cir.1976) (citing Giglio as holding that [i]t is inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of a fair trial for the prosecuting attorney to fail to disclose to the court that a material prosecution witness has had the benefit of a plea bargain). To the extent these cases stand for this proposition, like Holmes, they reflect a misreading of the applicable United States Supreme Court decisions. Defendant does not contend that Martha Jackson testified falsely regarding any agreement with the State or the circumstances surrounding her involvement with this case. Accordingly, the State was not obligated to disclose this information to the jury.