Opinion ID: 757566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative History and Congressional Intent

Text: 23 Among the broadly stated purposes of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b), is the intent to invoke the sweep of congressional authority ... in order to address the major areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with disabilities. Id. § 12101(b)(4). This comes after a specific finding by Congress that discrimination against individuals with disabilities persist in many critical areas, including health services. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3). Indeed, there is little doubt that Congress intended the ADA as a comprehensive remedial statute with broad ramifications. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 414 (6th Cir.1997). 24 Navigating the sea of the ADA's legislative history and supporting documentation is a considerable task, but several important beacons emerge as to what Congress intended to cover under Title III as opposed to Title I of the ADA. First, it is evident that Congress sought to regulate disability discrimination in the area of employment exclusively through Title I, notwithstanding the broad language of Title III. As the Senate report makes clear, Title III is not intended to govern any terms or conditions of employment by providers of public accommodations or potential places of employment; employment practices are governed by [T]itle I of this legislation. S.Rep. No. 101-116, at 58 (1989). See also Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 612 (3d Cir.1998); Parker v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 1006, 1014 (6th Cir.1997) (en banc); Motzkin v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 938 F.Supp. 983, 996 (D.Mass.1996). Similarly, the House Report states that Title I sets forth prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of disability by employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, or joint labor-management committees ... with respect to hiring and all terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 54 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 336; see also id. at 99, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 382. Accordingly, it is apparent that Congress did not intend Title III--despite the breadth of its language--to govern discrimination within the employment setting and we cannot construe Title III in a manner that would eviscerate such a salient legislative mandate. 25 Our conclusion is reinforced by Congress' 1992 amendment of the Rehabilitation Act, providing that [t]he standards used to determine whether [section 504] has been violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination under this section shall be the standards applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d). The Senate Report explains that this and similar provisions, see 29 U.S.C. § 793(d), were intended to ensure uniformity and consistency of interpretations. S.Rep. No. 102-357, at 71 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3712, 3782. 26 Apart from the potential intersection between Title I and Title III, the legislative history sheds little light on the intended meaning of an individual who is denied the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation as those words are used in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). What is clear, however, is that the legislative use of the phrase customers or clients of the covered public accommodation that enters into a contractual arrangement was not intended to restrict the general class of persons entitled to sue under Title III, contrary to the district court's conclusion. The House Report observes that in restricting the term individuals to clients or customers of the covered public accommodation, the intent was to ensure that a public accommodation's obligations are not extended or changed in any manner by virtue of its lease with another entity. H.R. Rep. 101-485, pt. 2., at 104 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 387. To illustrate, the report states: 27 [A] store located in an inaccessible mall or other building, which is operated by another entity, is not liable for the failure of that other entity to comply with this Act by virtue of having a lease or other contract with that entity. This is because, as noted, the store's legal obligations extends only to individuals in their status as its own clients or customers, not in their status as the clients or customers of other public accommodations. Likewise, of course, a covered entity may not use a contractual provision to reduce any of its obligations under this Act. 28 Id. Thus, Congress intended the phrase customers or clients of the covered public accommodation that enters into a contractual, licensing or other arrangement, 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) (emphasis added), to encompass the relatively narrower situation where several entities enter into a contractual or other relationship. See H.R. Rep. 101-485, pt. 2., at 101 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 384 (The section has never been intended to encompass the clients or customers of other entities.) (emphasis in original). It is therefore not surprising that the term clients or customers does not appear in Title III or its legislative history other than in reference to contractual or other arrangements. Indeed, the clients or customers limitation set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) does not directly apply to the general rule established in section 12182(b) but instead covers the instances of discrimination described in sections 12182(b)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), all of which encompass contractual, licensing, or other arrangement. 29 Finally, the legislative history to the ADA demonstrates that in enacting Title III, Congress intended to extend the scope of protection afforded to those individuals under the Rehabilitation Act. The House Report, for example, states that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 prohibits Federal agencies and recipients of Federal financial assistance from discriminating against persons with disabilities. The purpose of [T]itle III ... is to extend these general prohibitions against discrimination to privately operated public accommodations and to bring individuals with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life. H.R.Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 99 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 381-82. Much of the remaining legislative history echoes this intention. See generally 1 Henry H. Perritt, Americans with Disabilities Act Handbook § 1.2, at 4 (1997) (collecting examples). The ADA itself states that [N]othing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). Courts, including our own, have accordingly examined Rehabilitation Act precedent in examining the scope of coverage under the ADA. See Yeskey v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dep't of Corrections, 118 F.3d 168, 170 (3d Cir.1997), aff'd, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 1952, 141 L.Ed.2d 215 (1998); 1 Perritt, supra, § 1.2, at 4.