Opinion ID: 2612481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: predecessors of new 301

Text: Before we address the constitutional issues relating to new 301, we find it helpful to identify and describe the origins of that statute. Before new 301 was enacted by the Forty-Ninth Legislature in 1987 as part of a substantial revision of Title 7 of the Wyoming Statutes (1987 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 157, § 3), two statutory provisions occupied the field. Originally enacted in 1909, W.S. 7-13-203 (1977) (1909 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 87, § 1) (hereinafter old 203) provided probation to first-time felons who had not committed murder, sexual assault, or arson. [4] The legislature provided for probation by having the trial court delay passing sentence and place the defendant on parole. In Sorenson v. State, 604 P.2d 1031, 1038 (Wyo. 1979), this court noted that parole was a misnomer and the correct status was probation. In 1939, the legislature enacted W.S. 7-13-301 (1939 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 91, § 1) (hereinafter old 301). King v. State, 720 P.2d 465, 468 (Wyo. 1986). Old 301 provided another scheme of probation. [5] The statute applied to any criminal defendant, not just first-time felons as old 203 did, who had committed any crime, whether misdemeanor or felony, except a crime punishable by life imprisonment or death. In Peterson v. State, 586 P.2d 144, 156 (Wyo. 1978), overruled on other grounds in Crozier v. State, 723 P.2d 42, 56 (Wyo. 1986), this court held that the phrase crimes punishable by life imprisonment or death did not embrace offenses which had a sentence of less than life imprisonment as a minimum and a maximum of either life imprisonment or death. Under old 301 the legislature established four methods by which the trial court could implement the probation established by the legislature. First, with the defendant's consent, the legislature authorized the court to suspend trial and place the defendant on probation. We believe the defendant's consent feature was designed to avoid the later assertion of a speedy trial violation by a defendant whose probation was terminated for misconduct and who then faced resumption of the criminal proceedings against him. The three other methods for probation followed a plea of guilty or being found guilty following a trial. Thus, the legislature authorized the court to suspend the imposition of sentence and place the defendant on probation. In King, 720 P.2d at 468, 469, this court likened suspension of imposition of sentence to delay passing sentence, as found in old 203. In yet another method under old 301 the court was authorized to suspend the execution of all or a part of a sentence and place the defendant on probation. In Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1037, this court held that the legislature's 1971 act creating the board of parole repealed by implication the court's authority to require a defendant to serve part of a sentence, suspend execution, and place the defendant on probation as to the balance. W.S. 7-13-402 (1977) (1971 Wyo. Sess. Laws, ch. 92, § 10). See also King, 720 P.2d at 467; Williams v. State, 692 P.2d 233, 235-36 (Wyo. 1984). A final method under old 301 authorized the court to impose a fine applicable to the offense and place the defendant on probation. In Sorenson, 604 P.2d at 1038 n. 6, this court suggested that old 203 probably had been superseded by old 301, but the suggestion was retracted in King, 720 P.2d at 467, 469. In Peterson, 586 P.2d at 156, this court considered the differences between old 203 and old 301. Later, in King, 720 P.2d at 468, Justice Cardine, writing for the court, drew on Peterson and made further comparisons of the two statutes. He concluded that the legislature intended old 203 to be an alternative sentencing provision for a limited number of cases. He found that old 203 allowed the first-time felon a considerable degree of liberty, his or her actions and freedom being subject to rather minimal limitations with the possibility of no sentence at all. Id. at 468. Peterson, 586 P.2d at 156. In old 203 the legislature intended to preclude first-time felons who had committed the serious crimes of murder, sexual assault, or arson from the benefit of the possibility of no sentence at all. Id. In contrast, old 301 was much more restrictive [than old 203] since it [did] not itself specify the conditions of any probationary freedom. Id. In old 301 the legislature intended that those criminal defendants excluded from the benefits of [old 203] could be in some cases beneficially rehabilitated under the provisions of [old 301] with one exception  those guilty of `crimes and offenses punishable by death or life imprisonment.' Id. On a final point of comparison, Justice Cardine noted that under old 203 when the defendant successfully completed probation the legislature authorized the court to annul the verdict or plea of guilty. Id. In contrast, he observed, under old 301 when the defendant successfully completed probation the legislature authorized the court, under then W.S. 7-13-304 (old 304), to discharge the defendant, but no mention was made of annulling the verdict or plea of guilty. Id.