Opinion ID: 2537276
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Error in Penalty-Phase Arguments

Text: Wade claims that the prosecutor made two improper arguments during the penalty phase. First, he asserts that the prosecutor made an impermissible golden rule argument in addressing the applicability of the HAC aggravator. In his argument, the prosecutor first explained the definition of HAC and then recounted the facts of the crime to the jury. During that recitation of the facts, the prosecutor stated the following: How about being driven down that road, stopping for gas in a trunk not knowing what's going on, wondering where they are at, why have they stopped, are they going to be set free, what is in store for them? Was their horror over? No. It had just begun. A 35-mile drive going to where they could not know, probably 45 minutes in the trunk of their car, perhaps more. They get to somewhere else. They stop. They don't know where they're at. There are no lights. There are no friends. There's no family. The prosecutor then continued with the description of the victims being buried alive and stated that the facts of the crime were consonant with a finding of HAC. We find no error in the prosecutor's argument. A prohibited golden rule argument invites jurors to put themselves in the victim's position and then imagine the victim's final pain, terror, and defenselessness. Bailey v. State, 998 So.2d 545, 555 (Fla.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2395, 173 L.Ed.2d 1307 (2009). Here, the State's recitation of the facts of the case was accurate and did not invite the jury to put themselves in the victims' place. The HAC aggravator applies in physically and mentally torturous murders and focuses on the means and manner in which the death is inflicted and the immediate circumstances surrounding the death, rather than the intent and motivation of a defendant, where a victim experiences the torturous anxiety and fear of impending death. Barnhill v. State, 834 So.2d 836, 849-50 (Fla.2002). Thus, the prosecutor merely explained the evidence consistent with the application of the HAC aggravator. Second, Wade argues that the prosecutor improperly instructed the jurors by telling them that a vote for life would be both irresponsible and a violation of their lawful duty. During closing argument, the prosecutor stated the following: You might hear an argument about life is enough. Life is however many years he's got left and leaves that prison only when he dies. What I suggest to you is that argument tells you that this defendant should not be held fully accountable for his actions. The argument in essence says let's take the easy way out. I know life is life and I know it will be a miserable life in prison and let's give him life, but that's not the law of the State of Florida. You have to weigh and weigh this aggravation and you will find that it cries out for full accountability. Ask you[rselves] what facts that you heard in mitigation rises to the level to legally mitigate against the actions of July, 2005? Did you hear anything to outweigh, to contradict the aggravating factors? Are we saying that he was deprived, therefore, he was depraved? It's not the environment but it's how you choose to deal with the environment. Wade claims that the underlined language above is nearly identical to arguments we previously deemed impermissible in cases such as Urbin v. State, 714 So.2d 411, 421 (Fla.1998). We disagree. Although the prosecutors in Urbin and in this case both urged the jury not to take the easy way out and vote for life, there is an important difference between the two cases. In Urbin the prosecutor told the jury that it was their duty to return a recommendation of deaththat the law required them to make that recommendation. Id.; see also Rodriguez v. State, 919 So.2d 1252, 1282 (Fla.2005) (stating in a postconviction case that prosecutor's statement admonishing the jury not to do the easy thing and vote for life, which would not be the legal thing to do, was made while explaining. . . the purpose of aggravating and mitigating factors and concluding that [e]ven assuming the comment was improper it was harmless). In this case, the prosecutor correctly told the jurors that it was their duty actually to weigh the factors, but he in no way implied that the jury was required by law to return a recommendation of death. Accordingly, the prosecutor's argument does not constitute error, much less fundamental error. Having reviewed the alleged errors discussed above, we hold that none of the prosecutor's statements either individually or cumulatively constitute fundamental error.