Opinion ID: 4581422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Extent of Our Jurisdiction

Text: longer be the case. 6 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C. § 717f(h) and 28 U.S.C. § 1331. There is a dispute about whether the District Court properly exercised jurisdiction at all turns, which we will address later in the opinion. There is also a dispute over whether we have jurisdiction to hear the consolidated appeals and, if so, the breadth of that jurisdiction. Regardless of the parties’ jurisdictional arguments, “every federal appellate court has a special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review.’” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) (citation omitted). A. We lack jurisdiction to review the District Court’s July 12, 2019 order. Jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 is limited to appeals from final decisions of the district courts. See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 236 (3d Cir. 2019). “A ‘final decision’ is ‘one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment.’” Id. (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). At the time Regec filed his appeal of the July 12, 2019 order, litigation in the District Court was ongoing. Jurisdiction under § 1291 was lacking.5 Since then, however, the District Court has entered final judgment. In the order consolidating the two appeals, we asked the parties to address the effect of that development, insofar as our Cape May Greene doctrine6 “permits the ripening of a notice 5 The collateral order doctrine does not support a contrary conclusion, insofar as the District Court’s July 12, 2019 order was not generative of an “important issue.” Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1259 (3d Cir. 2009). 6 See generally Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3d Cir. 1983). 7 of appeal from a decision that is not immediately appealable but that becomes appealable before we take action on the appeal.” Marshall v. Comm’r Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 840 F.3d 92, 96 (3d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see also Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 585 (3d Cir. 1999). Transco argues that the Cape May Greene doctrine is inapplicable for reasons set forth in ADAPT of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 433 F.3d 353, 365 (3d Cir. 2006) (rejecting applicability of Cape May Greene and Lazy Oil “to discovery or similar interlocutory orders,” and holding “that appeals from discovery orders do not qualify as premature appeals that may ripen upon entry of final judgment”). See Transco Br. 19-21. Transco argues in the alternative that it will be unfairly prejudiced if we consider the appeal at C.A. No. 19-2738. See Transco. Br. 21; cf. Khan v. Att’y Gen., 691 F.3d 488, 493 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that Cape May Greene doctrine applies “where there is no showing of prejudice by the adverse party and we have not taken action on the merits of an appeal”). For his part, Regec posits that we can exercise jurisdiction to review the July 12, 2019 order (among others) under § 1292(a)(1) because it is “inextricably bound up” with the order granting Transco’s motion for preliminary injunction that we reviewed back in 2017. See Regec. Br. 10 (citing SEC v. Black, 163 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1998)).7 7 Regec’s reliance on Black is misplaced. There, we held that we could immediately review under § 1292(a)(1) certain orders bearing on procedural aspects of a hearing that culminated in modification of a preliminary injunction, insofar as those orders were “part of” the appeal of the modification order. Black,163 F.3d at 194. Here, by contrast, the 8 We agree with Transco’s primary argument. The sanctions order here was purely interlocutory and could not ripen under Cape May Greene. See ADAPT, 433 F.3d at 365 (concluding that “whatever the continued viability of Lazy Oil may be, it cannot control interlocutory orders such as the discovery orders found here or the sanctions order of the nature found in [Lazorko v. Pa. Hosp., 237 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 2000)]”); cf. FirsTier Mortg. Co. v. Inv’rs Mortg. Ins. Co., 498 U.S. 269, 276 (1991) (characterizing a Rule 11 sanctions order as “clearly interlocutory”); Lazorko, 237 F.3d at 248 (same). We thus lack jurisdiction to review the July 12, 2019 order.8 Accordingly, Transco’s motion to dismiss the appeal at C.A. No. 19-2738 is granted. B. We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s October 8, 2019 order. The District Court’s October 8, 2019 order, like the July 12, 2019 order, issued before entry of final judgment. But we need not decide whether the Cape May Greene District Court’s July 12, 2019 order played no part in the process leading up to or effecting the District Court’s much-earlier order granting Transco preliminary injunctive relief. Instead, the District Court’s July 12, 2019 order was directed at Regec’s contumacious litigation conduct. Jurisdiction under § 1292(a)(1) is thus lacking. Cf. In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d 383, 393 (3d Cir. 2006) (“Instead of being injunctive in character, the orders from which PGI appeals are better understood as being ‘restraints or directions . . . concerning the conduct of parties or their counsel,’ unrelated to the substantive relief sought. We have deemed orders of such character to fall outside of section 1292(a)(1).”) (internal citation omitted). 8 Even assuming, arguendo, that the July 12, 2019 order were potentially reviewable under the merger rule, see In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under the ‘merger rule,’ prior interlocutory orders merge with the final judgment in a case, and the interlocutory orders (to the extent that they affect the final judgment) may be reviewed on appeal from the final order.”), that rule does not apply here because Regec did not appeal the District Court’s final judgment. 9 doctrine permits review. The FAA provides grounds for immediate appeal distinct from principles of ‘finality’ under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Mountain Valley Prop., Inc. v. Applied Risk Servs., Inc., 863 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2017). Certain of those grounds— codified in 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(E) and 16(a)(3)—are present here because the District Court adjudicated the parties’ competing motions to enforce and vacate the arbitration award. Cf. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 86 (2000) (“Section 16(a)(3) . . . preserves immediate appeal of any ‘final decision with respect to an arbitration,’ regardless of whether the decision is favorable or hostile to arbitration.”); V.I. Hous. Auth. v. Coastal Gen. Const. Servs. Corp., 27 F.3d 911, 913 (3d Cir. 1994) (observing that where a district court has “simply vacated” an arbitration award, its order doing so is “clearly appealable under subsection 16(a)(1)(E)”). We thus have jurisdiction under the FAA to review the District Court’s October 8, 2019 order. C. We do not have jurisdiction to review any other orders as part of these appeals. In Regec’s opening brief, he identifies several orders from the District Court, entered after October 8, 2019, that he would like reviewed as part of these appeals. In particular, he references the District Court’s December 4, 2019 order approving additional sanctions against Regec, its December 6, 2019 order striking Regec’s motion to file an amicus brief, its December 11, 2019 judgment order, its December 20, 2019 order vacating the original judgment order and authorizing an amended judgment, and its 10 April 24, 2020 order marking the amended judgment satisfied. See Regec Br. 1.9 At the same time, Regec concedes that the Court’s “jurisdiction does not extend to the District Court’s subsequent final judgment because the Cape May Greene doctrine does not permit an appeal to ripen into an appeal from an order entered after the notice of appeal was filed.” Regec Br. 9 n.9 (citing Marshall, 840 F.3d at 96). Regec’s concession is well taken. He did not file a notice of appeal relative to any of the orders listed above, and the appeals at issue here were and remain incapable of performing that future work. See Marshall, 840 F.3d at 98 (“Even when the Cape May Greene doctrine permits the ripening of a premature appeal from a decision that is not yet appealable, it does so only to permit review of that decision once it becomes appealable. It does not permit review of subsequent rulings that were not (and could not have been) designated in the notice of appeal.”). Critically, and as previously noted, Regec did not appeal the District Court’s entry of final judgment. And the window in which to do so has been closed for months. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). As a consequence, the merger rule is unavailable to Regec. We thus cannot review any orders—including those at issue in previously dismissed appeals, see, e.g., C.A. Nos. 18-2071 (Aug. 28, 2018 order dismissing appeal); 17-3521 (Feb. 16, 2018 order dismissing appeal)—other than the one entered on October 8, 2019.10 9 Regec also avers that his appeal at C.A. No. 19-1345 is “still pending.” Regec Br. 1. It is not. On August 21, 2019—long before Regec filed his opening brief—we granted Transco’s motion to dismiss that appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction. 11