Opinion ID: 1349911
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intoxication Instructions

Text: The trial judge instructed the jury as follows: Knowingly means that a defendant acted with awareness of, or belief in, the existence of conduct or circumstances constituting an offense. .... It is no defense that the defendant was not aware of or could not believe in the existence of conduct or circumstances solely because of voluntary intoxication. (Emphasis added.) Defendant argues that the latter portion of this instruction regarding voluntary intoxication misstates the law. Initially, he notes that this instruction would be correct if the relevant mental state in this case were recklessly because A.R.S. § 13-105(6)(c), which defines recklessly, expressly provides that voluntary intoxication will not negate a reckless culpable mental state. Defendant then points out that § 13-105(6)(b), which defines knowingly, is silent as to voluntary intoxication and how it bears upon a knowing culpable mental state. From this, he concludes that the legislature has not expressly precluded voluntary intoxication from negating the culpable mental state of knowingly, and therefore, the above instruction constitutes reversible error. We disagree. In 1980, the legislature directly addressed this issue when it amended § 13-503 to provide that a jury may consider voluntary intoxication only when determining whether a defendant acted with the culpable mental state of intentionally or with the intent to. [2] And, previous decisions by this court illustrate that the law in Arizona is clear: the jury may not consider voluntary intoxication with respect to the defendant's culpable mental state [of knowingly]. State v. Schurz, 176 Ariz. 46, 55, 859 P.2d 156, 165 (1993) (emphasis added); accord State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116, 122, 765 P.2d 518, 524 (1988); State v. Ramos, 133 Ariz. 4, 6, 648 P.2d 119, 121 (1982). Defendant attempts to distinguish the above cases on grounds that they involved only the issue of whether a defendant charged with knowingly committing an offense is entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction under § 13-503. Defendant concedes that because he was charged with knowingly instead of intentionally engaging in sexual conduct with a minor, he was not entitled to a voluntary intoxication instruction. Rather, in two separate but related arguments, defendant apparently claims that the trial judge should not have given any instruction as to the effect of voluntary intoxication on culpability. Defendant first contends that, given his alleged belief that the victim was dead at the time of the sexual penetration, the trial judge erred by not instructing the jury that ignorance or mistake of fact is a defense if it negates the culpable mental state required for the commission of an offense. See A.R.S. § 13-204. [3] Alternatively, defendant argues that even if he was not entitled to an instruction under § 13-204 because he failed to request one, the instruction that the trial judge in fact gave was directly contrary to § 13-204 because that section does not expressly state that a mistake of fact resulting from voluntary intoxication cannot negate the culpable mental state of knowingly. We find both of defendant's arguments without merit. In effect, defendant's arguments are an attempt to bootstrap a voluntary intoxication defense onto a mistake of fact defense. As discussed above, a voluntary intoxication defense is not available to a defendant charged with an offense for which the culpable mental state is knowingly. The trial judge's instructions regarding the effect of voluntary intoxication on culpability were taken directly from Recommended Arizona Jury Instructions, Criminal 1.056(b) and 5.03, and we find these instructions to be consistent with Arizona law. Therefore, the trial judge committed no error when instructing the jury as to the effect of defendant's alleged voluntary intoxication on his culpability. Defendant's claim that the trial judge should have instructed the jury on ignorance or mistake of fact is likewise flawed. Defendant failed to request this instruction in the trial court, and therefore this issue has been waived. See rule 21.3(c), Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, a trial judge's failure to give an instruction sua sponte provides grounds for reversal only if such failure is fundamental error. State v. Lucas, 146 Ariz. 597, 603-04, 708 P.2d 81, 87-88 (1985). The trial judge's failure to give an ignorance or mistake of fact instruction certainly was not fundamental error because, as we stated previously, defendant's alleged mistake as to the victim's vitality provides no defense in this case to the charge of sexual conduct with a minor.