Opinion ID: 3046440
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: e., before March 19, 2003.

Text: In response, Patterson argues that AFSCME’s conduct prior to March 19, 2003, is “crucial to support her claims,” that AFSCME invoked the statute of limitations “just so that it could hide its acts,” and that AFSCME engaged in “a pattern of discriminatory behavior.” To the extent Patterson is attempting to argue that AFSCME’s post-March 19, 2003, conduct is a continuation of a course of discriminatory conduct that began prior to that date, we note that the Supreme Court has held that “each incident of discrimination and each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable ‘unlawful employment practice’” that may start a new limitations period for filing a charge. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002). Patterson raised allegations concerning AFSCME’s pursuit of at least eight separate grievances, and all but two of these grievances were disposed of before the March 19, 2003, limitations date.4 These discrete, individually-actionable instances of alleged discrimination were not 4 The final two grievances - concerning Patterson’s suspension and termination from her position with the OIG - were consolidated. Although they proceeded to a first-step hearing in February 2003 (prior to the limitations date), the second-step and third-step hearings took place after the limitations date. With regard to these grievances, Patterson’s claim is that AFSCME should have pursued her claims beyond the third-step hearing by seeking arbitration, but failed to do so. This claim survives the statute of limitations. 4 raised within the applicable limitations period, and are therefore time-barred. See O’Connor v. City of Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006). Under certain circumstances, equitable tolling of the statute of limitations may be appropriate and may bring otherwise time-barred activity under the court’s consideration. For instance, equitable tolling may be permitted “when a claimant received inadequate notice of her right to file suit, where a motion for appointment of counsel is pending or where the court has misled the plaintiff into believing that she had done everything required of her,” or when plaintiff “in some extraordinary way” was prevented from asserting her rights. See Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). Patterson failed to set forth any basis for the application of equitable tolling, and our review of the record reveals none. We therefore find no error in the District Court’s determination limiting Patterson’s claims to actions alleged to have occurred after March 19, 2003. The District Court next assessed whether Patterson’s surviving allegations were sufficient to raise a prima facie case of disability discrimination. To make a prima facie case, Patterson was required to demonstrate that she (1) is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) can perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodations; and (3) suffered an adverse employment action as a result of 5 discrimination based on her disability.5 Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 2000); Gaul v. Lucent Tech. Inc., 134 F.3d 576 (3d Cir. 1998). The District Court held that Patterson failed to establish both the first and third prongs of her prima facie case. We first will consider the District Court’s determination that Patterson failed to establish the third prong – that she suffered an adverse employment action as a result of discrimination based on her disability. Patterson claimed that AFSCME discriminated against her after March 19, 2003, when it failed to pursue two pending grievances to arbitration on her behalf. The District Court concluded that Patterson failed to show that AFSCME’s actions were because of discrimination based on her disability. To the contrary, the record established that AFSCME was prohibited from pursuing Patterson’s grievances to arbitration because it was barred from doing so by the relevant procedures. There is no dispute that AFSCME pursued Patterson’s grievances through a thirdstep grievance hearing. In addition, there is no dispute that the procedures set forth in AFSCME’s governing collective bargaining agreement provide that arbitration is available after a third-step grievance hearing only where the third-step grievance hearing results in a deadlocked decision.6 In Patterson’s case, the third-step grievance hearing did 5 The analysis of Patterson’s ADA claim applies equally to her PHRA claim, as Pennsylvania courts interpret the PHRA in accord with the ADA. See Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 6 The collective bargaining agreement, appearing in the record as Exhibit A to the affidavit of AFSCME director Michael Fox, provides that “[a]n appeal from a deadlocked decision at Step 3 may be initiated by the Union.” 6 not result in a deadlock. Rather, there is no dispute that the third-step grievance hearing yielded a unanimous decision denying Patterson’s grievances. Thus, the record demonstrates that there was no disputed issue of material fact concerning whether AFSCME was contractually barred from pursuing arbitration on Patterson’s behalf. The District Court did not err in concluding that, as a result, Patterson failed to show that AFSCME’s failure to pursue arbitration was a result of discrimination based upon her disabilities. To fulfill the first prong of her discrimination claim, Patterson was required to demonstrate that she qualifies as “disabled” by virtue of: (1) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) that she is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102. Largely because of her repeated references to a “perceived disability,” the District Court considered only whether Patterson showed that AFSCME regarded her as disabled, and concluded that she did not. On appeal, Patterson contends that this was error, arguing that she met the first definition of disabled; i.e., that she showed that she has “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” However, because we will affirm the District Court’s conclusion that Patterson failed to establish the third prong of her prima facie discrimination claim, we need not address this issue. Next, the District Court considered Patterson’s Title VII claim. Title VII prohibits 7 discriminatory employment practices based upon an individual’s “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2. A plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Although the precise contours of a prima facie showing vary depending upon the circumstances at issue, every Title VII plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that she suffered discrimination based upon her membership in a class protected under Title VII. See, e.g., Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003); Bennun v. Rutgers State Univ., 941 F.2d 154, 171 (3d Cir. 1991). Here, Patterson did not claim she suffered discrimination on the basis of a characteristic protected by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 200e-2. Rather, she argued that she suffered discrimination on account of her cognitive disabilities.7 Construing her pro se pleadings liberally, the District Court considered whether Patterson raised a Title VII claim that she suffered retaliation because she accused her former supervisor of sexually harassing her. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she engaged in a protected employee activity; (2) the employer took an adverse employment action after or contemporaneous with the protected activity; and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse action. Weston v. Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430 (3d Cir. 2001). Reporting 7 Although Patterson cites repeatedly the portion of Title VII providing that it “prohibits discrimination because of . . . race,” Patterson’s does not claim to have suffered discrimination on account of her race. 8 sexual harassment qualifies as a protected employee activity for these purposes. Id. The District Court concluded that Patterson’s claim of retaliation failed on the third prong, because she “provided no evidence, which would establish that her filing of the sexual harassment claim . . . caused the Union not to bring her final grievances to arbitration.” Indeed, as previously discussed, the record reflects that AFSCME was prohibited from pursuing her grievances to arbitration by the applicable grievance procedures. Thus, the District Court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of AFSCME on Patterson’s Title VII retaliation claim. Finally, Patterson argues that she was denied Due Process because the District Court did not permit her to present her case to a jury. This claim lacks merit. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment is proper where “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” The District Court properly determined that the record did not present a material dispute of fact requiring a trial. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1985).