Opinion ID: 1926802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sandra Crannell's Testimony About the Car-Bombing

Text: Sandra Crannell testified on the second and third days of trial. Ultimately, she was permitted to testify about her belief that defendant had bombed a truck in Florida some time before she met him. The trial court originally excluded this evidence but then ruled it admissible on rebuttal. This testimony must be analyzed under Rule 404(b), as the bombing is a bona fide bad act. Defendant argues that this testimony should have been excluded under Rule 404(b) as evidence of a prior bad act introduced solely to show that defendant acted in conformity with a criminal character, and that he did not invite the evidence by cross-examination. Defendant further argues that the introduction of this evidence was so unduly prejudicial that reversal is the only remedy. The testimony must be considered in its full context to understand the potential influence it had on the jury. Sandra testified that on August 21, 1992, defendant called her from Pennsylvania and said he was going to come to her house in Vermont. She told him she would not let him in, but he insisted he was going to see her. After receiving this telephone call, she sought a restraining order. John Kenworthy went with her and helped her request the order. She testified that she was scared, both for herself and John, because defendant had threatened to kick [the] ass of anybody that [she] went with or came around [her] place. She further testified that defendant came to her house on August 22, the morning after his telephone call. He came to the door and pleaded with her to let him in. She refused his repeated pleas, and then he went to the back of his pick-up truck. She suspected he was getting tools from the truck because he worked as a telephone lineman. She called the state police and asked them to come to her assistance, and then the telephone line went dead. When the police arrived, they found defendant still outside and told him he had to leave the property as Sandra had obtained a restraining order. They may have instructed him to reconnect her telephone line because defendant called her on the telephone ten minutes later. Defendant was angry because Sandra had gotten a restraining order. Defense counsel vigorously cross-examined Sandra, asking first whether defendant had been affectionate toward her. Counsel then asked a series of questions asserting that defendant had never assaulted her before, during, or after the marriage. Defense counsel also cross-examined Sandra about the letters defendant had sent, asking, they weren't threatening letters, were they? Then defense counsel asked about the August 22 incident, insisting defendant didn't try to come in, break in, nothing like that, correct? Counsel continued in the same vein: Didn't assault you, didn't threaten you, none of that? Sandra agreed with his questions. Then defense counsel asked whether she remembered that defendant had called to apologize. Sandra answered, He didn't apologize.... He was very angry with me. A few moments later defense counsel returned to the same theme, asking [I]n that conversation [when defendant threatened to beat people up], he didn't threatened to kill anybody, did he? Sandra said she did not interpret it that way. Then defense counsel asked whether the I'm going to kick their ass comment could have been expressed in a moment of anger? [or a] Moment of dissatisfaction? Sandra replied, I thought it was very unfair of him to feel that way. In chambers, the state's attorney argued that the cross-examination had painted Sandra as overreacting and/or lying about her fear of defendant and asked permission to rehabilitate her by allowing her to testify about her knowledge of his involvement in a car-bombing. Defense counsel argued that the information was too prejudicial and that the cross-examination had not opened the door to questions of Sandra being unreasonably afraid. The court concluded that although the evidence had originally been excluded as unduly prejudicial, the cross-examination by defendant had created an incomplete picture that the State was entitled to complete. The court noted the series of questions asked by defense counsel about her fear and defendant's threats. Therefore, the court admitted the evidence for rehabilitative purposes to give a complete picture of what her state of mind was and what the reasonableness of her fear was. The court limited the information to what Sandra had learned from defendant and barred any information about whether the bombing actually happened or whether defendant was convicted. Sandra testified that she was frightened of defendant because he had told her that he had been asked to bomb a truck for $5,000 and had done it. The court immediately instructed the jury that the evidence had been introduced only for their consideration of whether Sandra reasonably feared defendant when she obtained the restraining order. The court further instructed you may not consider it as tending to show in any way the defendant's guilt for the offense for which he is now on trial. After the conclusion of the trial, defendant moved for a new trial based on the allegedly improper admission of Sandra's testimony, as well as other errors. In its order denying a new trial, the trial court noted that evidence of a prior bad act may be admitted, as it was in this case, in order to rehabilitate a witness. The court went on to explain: In this case, Sandra Crannell was a critical witness. Her testimony presented evidence for the motive of the crime. Through Sandra Crannell, the State sought to prove that the Defendant was obsessed with continuing his relationship with her and killed John Kenworthy because he believed Mr. Kenworthy stood in the way of a reconciliation. Sandra Crannell was the only witness to the Defendant's behavior toward her and her testimony was important. The Defense's cross-examination painted an incomplete picture of the Crannell[s'] relationship by making Sandra Crannell appear over-reactive and untrustworthy. In reviewing the trial court's admission of evidence under Rule 404, we must decide whether the admitted evidence satisfied Rule 403, that is, was relevant and material, and if so, whether the introduction of the evidence was so prejudicial to defendant as to outweigh its probative value. See State v. Bruyette, 158 Vt. 21, 31-32, 604 A.2d 1270, 1275 (1992). Although defendant claims that Rule 404 acts as an absolute bar to any evidence of prior bad acts, we have noted that [t]he rule recognizes that evidence that may be inadmissible for the [purpose of showing propensity] may be admitted for other permissible purposes. State v. Recor, 150 Vt. 40, 44, 549 A.2d 1382, 1386 (1988). Defendant failed to object to Sandra's testimony about obtaining the restraining order. In the context of the actual trial, defendant apparently did not consider the evidence so prejudicial that it warranted an objection. Therefore, we cannot accept defendant's argument that the prosecution opened a door by suggesting that defendant assaulted Sandra. Rather, it was the defense cross-examination attacking Sandra's testimony about defendant's frightening jealousy that opened the door. Thus, the State appropriately requested permission to complete the picture by eliciting Sandra's basis for fearing defendant. In admitting the evidence, the trial court relied on Recor, 150 Vt. at 44, 549 A.2d at 1386. There, a witness alleging that her step-father had sexually assaulted her had been instructed not to mention a previous incident of alleged assault. On cross-examination, the defense suggested that the witness was biased against the defendant and had been for some time. Due to that attack, the court permitted the State to elicit information about the earlier assault to explain that the witness's bias was reasonable. See id. at 45, 549 A.2d at 1386. The witness then testified that she had hated the defendant for several years because he had sexually assaulted her in 1982. There, as here, [d]efense counsel sought to impeach the credibility of the... witness by painting an incomplete picture of unwarranted bias. The State's response was to complete this picture with appropriate detail. The purpose of the witness'[s] testimony on redirect, thus, was not to establish the character of the defendant.... Id. at 44, 549 A.2d at 1386. See also People v. Greenhagen, 78 A.D.2d 964, 433 N.Y.S.2d 683, 685 (1980) (affirming admission of witness's testimony that defendant tried to molest her as rehabilitating her credibility after cross-examination had accused her of bias). The facts in this case are quite similar to those in Recor. Sandra had been instructed not to mention the Florida bombing and had offered other reasons for her fear of defendant's jealousy. Defense counsel attacked her on cross-examination, repeatedly asking her whether defendant had assaulted her, whether he had threatened other people, whether he had broken into her house. The court, able to gauge the impact of this questioning at the time, felt that the defense had depicted Sandra as over-reactive and untrustworthy. For the limited purpose of responding to the attack on her credibility, the court allowed her to testify that she feared defendant because he had told her he had bombed a truck in Florida. The court then instructed the jury not to consider the evidence as showing defendant's character or propensity to commit the crime at issue. As in Recor, the State's response was necessary to complete the picture painted by the defense. Other courts have also held bad-act evidence to be admissible for rehabilitative purposes. See State v. Harris, 560 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn.1997); State v. McNeill, 83 Ohio St.3d 438, 700 N.E.2d 596, 603 (1998). Others have assumed that it would be admissible in such circumstances. See State v. Montgomery, 740 A.2d 625, 627 (N.H.1999) (Had the defendant, for example, `opened the door' by directly challenging his daughters' inability to recall particular detail about the charged sexual assaults, the State may well have been able to use the uncharged sexual assaults to rehabilitate its witnesses.). In this case, the witness whose credibility was challenged testified about crucial facts suggesting a motive for the crime. The testimony was carefully limited in scope and immediately followed by a limiting instruction. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence for rehabilitation purposes.