Opinion ID: 795375
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficient Evidence Exists to Convict Defendant of Conspiracy

Text: 71 Defendant contends that there is insufficient evidence of both conspiracy to insider trade and conspiracy to obstruct justice. His primary argument is seemingly that the act of tipping does not evidence a conspiracy to insider trade inasmuch as a conspiracy requires proof of an agreement to act jointly for a common purpose and the act of tipping does not evidence an agreement. Unfortunately for Defendant, there is sufficient evidence of at least two such agreements to trade on insider information: one with the Stephan family and one with Kelley Hughes and Kevin Stacey. Similarly, there is sufficient evidence of an agreement between Defendant, Stephan-Blackwell, and the Stephans to obstruct an agency proceeding. 72
73 Section 371 of Title 18 of the United States Code makes it illegal for two or more persons [to] conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose. To prove conspiracy, the government must establish: (1) the existence of an agreement to violate the law; (2) knowledge and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) an overt act constituting actual participation in the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 402 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir.2005). A tacit or material understanding among the parties to a conspiracy is sufficient to establish the agreement [, and] conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence which may reasonably be interpreted as participation in a common plan. United States v. Walls, 293 F.3d 959, 967 (6th Cir.2002) (internal citations omitted). 74
75 First, there is sufficient evidence of an agreement to trade on insider information between Defendant, Stephan-Blackwell, and the Stephans. Defendant, knowing that tipping was illegal, encouraged Stephan-Blackwell to share the tip with the Stephans. Defendant then gave the Stephans money to buy WF stock, which the Stephans subsequently used to purchase WF stock. Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, Stephan-Blackwell, and the Stephans agreed to work together to help the Stephans trade on insider information. 76 Second, there is sufficient evidence that Defendant agreed with Hughes and Stacey to trade on inside information. Hughes, a friend and employee of Defendant, bought huge amounts WF stock in the three month period after Defendant learned of the buyout and before the buyout occurred. She made these purchases, in part, with a $30,000 loan from the Defendant. These facts permit the inference that Hughes, Stacey, and Defendant agreed to work together to help Hughes violate the law, and a reasonable juror, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, could conclude the existence of such an agreement was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 77
78 Third, there is also sufficient evidence that Defendant agreed with Stephan-Blackwell and the Stephans to obstruct an agency proceeding. Stephan-Blackwell testified that she and Defendant agreed not to volunteer information on and to obscure relationships with persons who bought WF stock. Thereafter, Stephan-Blackwell coached the Stephans to lie and deleted contacts from RBA's database with Defendant's knowledge. Knowing that Stephan-Blackwell had deleted the information, Defendant nonetheless failed to correct the deletions before giving the documents to the SEC. Based on this information a reasonable juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, Stephan-Blackwell, and the Stephans agreed to work together to obstruct agency proceedings. Accordingly, Defendant's conspiracy convictions should stand. 79