Opinion ID: 1822312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Workplace Arguments

Text: Both Langeslag and Eddy admit that they were frequently involved in loud workplace arguments. Eddy testified that Langeslag often used vulgarity and yelled when they disagreed. Langeslag admitted to calling Eddy an asshole. When asked if she called Eddy this name more than once she replied, I sure did. Testimony from several KYMN employees confirms that Langeslag commonly initiated workplace arguments with Eddy. One employee testified that [Langeslag] called [Eddy] just about every unkind name I could think of. Some of the more common ones, asshole, son of a bitch, bastard, very frequently in his presence. He characterized the relationship between Eddy and Langeslag from 1997 to 1998 as [v]ery stormy, very combative. He also stated that it was primarily Langeslag who initiated the arguments. Another KYMN employee testified that the arguments would typically start out with [Eddy] saying something or asking a question of [Langeslag] about an account and, then it would immediately or very quickly turn into a very loud and aggressive shouting match between her and [Eddy] and in all cases I never saw him initiate it. I only saw [Langeslag] initiate it. Eddy also testified that Langeslag invaded his personal space during their frequent confrontations. A KYMN employee testified that Langeslag was aggressive with Eddy: [m]any times she would charge into his space and get very, very close to him and just look right up into his face within inches of each other and shout at him. Another employee testified that [Langeslag] would go toe to toe. She would step up to [Eddy's] face and yell at him. Langeslag argues that her conduct was nothing more than occurs in an everyday workplace argument, which we have found not to be extreme and outrageous in Hubbard and in Leaon v. Washington County, 397 N.W.2d 867 (Minn.1986). In Hubbard, we concluded that employment discipline consisting of verbal and written criticism of an employee's job performance, the employer requesting the employee's resignation, and the employer's statement that the employee chicken[ed] out of an assignment did not constitute extreme or outrageous behavior. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 433, 439. Accordingly, under Hubbard, an employer's criticism of an employee's job performance, even if intended to harass, does not constitute extreme and outrageous behavior. In Leaon, a deputy sheriff attended a stag party thrown by his co-workers. Leaon, 397 N.W.2d at 869. At the party, events took place that the deputy sheriff felt were inappropriate and caused him distress. He reported the stag party to authorities at work and demanded the names of the people involved. Id. The deputy sheriff was subsequently involved in a verbal altercation with two of his co-workers. The deputy sheriff maintained that the co-workers threatened him with physical violence. Id. He also claimed that his supervisor told him [y]ou are never going to work in law enforcement again. Id. We held, [a]s a matter of law these workplace events do not qualify as extreme and outrageous. Id. at 873. Hubbard and Leaon do not stand for the principle that workplace arguments can never meet the high threshold of proof necessary to establish extreme and outrageous conduct. Those cases were decided under their unique facts. Thus, we must determine whether, under these particular facts, Langeslag's conduct meets the high threshold of proof necessary to sustain an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. During a 3-year period, Langeslag frequently shouted at Eddy, used vulgar language and invaded his personal space. This conduct is bizarre, unprofessional, and more than an everyday workplace argument. However, this conduct does not satisfy the high threshold of proof required under Hubbard for an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Even when considered cumulatively, Langeslag's conduct does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct utterly intolerable in a civilized society. Hubbard, 330 N.W.2d at 440 (citation omitted). Furthermore, as the employer, Eddy is in the position of power and authority over Langeslag. Eddy could have terminated Langeslag's employment at any time, and thereby put an end to Langeslag's offensive conduct and prevented or mitigated his emotional distress. For over 3 years Eddy acquiesced to Langeslag's behavior. We conclude that under these facts the district court erred in submitting Eddy's workplace argument claim to the jury and permitting the jury to find that Langeslag's behavior was extreme and outrageous.