Opinion ID: 59430
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Isolate a Specific Employment Practice

Text: The district court identified Lufkin's subjective decision-making process in awarding promotions as the employment practice that caused a disparate impact on black employees. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under a disparate-impact theory, a plaintiff must show: (1) an identifiable, facially neutral personnel policy or practice; (2) a disparate effect on members of a protected class; and (3) a causal connection between the two. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). Ordinarily, a plaintiff must demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact. Yet, Title VII provides that if the complaining party can demonstrate to the court that the elements of [the employer's] decision making process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decision making process may be analyzed as one employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). Lufkin challenges two factual findings underlying the court's liability determination: that its decision-making process is subjective; and that its decision-making process could not be separated for analysis into components that were objective and non-racially biased. We address each in turn.
Lufkin argues that its promotion system is in fact overwhelmingly objective, and that the district court's finding of subjective decision making lacks support. We review this finding for clear error. See Kona Tech. Corp. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 225 F.3d 595, 601 (5th Cir.2000). [3] In Watson, the Supreme Court defined subjective decision making as employment decisions based on the exercise of personal judgment or the application of inherently subjective criteria. 487 U.S. at 988, 108 S.Ct. 2777. The Court indicated that a system which incorporates a mixture of subjective and objective criteria should generally be treated as subjective. Id. at 989, 108 S.Ct. 2777 (However one might distinguish `subjective' from `objective' criteria, it is apparent that selection systems that combine both types would generally have to be considered subjective in nature.). At Lufkin, promotions within the hourly ranks are putatively governed by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Lufkin and three unions. Under the CBA, the company must post bid sheets for each new hourly opening. Seniority is the main criterion for promotion. However, plaintiffs offered evidence that promotions are not rigidly awarded according to seniority. Class members Sylvester McClain and Florine Thompson testified that they were personally bypassed for promotion in favor of a less senior white employee. Plaintiffs presented additional evidence that approximately half of all promotions were not awarded to the most senior bidder. Moreover, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) contains an ability clause that allowed Lufkin to fill positions on the basis of ability, regardless of seniority. The evidence indicates that ability determinations were not governed by objective standards. Paul Perez, Lufkin's Vice President of Human Resources, agreed that the ability determination was subjective. McClain testified that supervisors did not always truly evaluate ability when awarding promotions under the ability clause, but simply gave the position to the candidate they favored. Billy Webb, the union's chief spokesman, testified that the union had taken issue with the ability provision in past contract negotiations because it did not think that the ability clause was always administered fairly. The CBA also provides for a ten-day trial period following promotion. According to the testimony of one of its managers, Lufkin has no written guidelines or formal tests for determining which employees pass this trial period. Plaintiffs also offered evidence that Lufkin permitted its managers to apportion training opportunities subjectively, a process that disadvantaged black employees who sought promotions. Perez testified that the CBA does not govern employees' daily work assignments, and he acknowledged that daily job assignments are not made on the basis of seniority. Perez testified that there are no written policies determining who is to receive on-the-job training, and Lufkin does not track how such training is allocated among employees. In addition, McClain testified that white employees were given more training in areas that were relevant to the jobs he sought. McClain explained that when white managers and supervisors . . . see a man they want to put on a particular job, . . . they'll tap him for training after his shift, or for external training. According to McClain, the employee who received the extra training would be the most qualified and would therefore receive the promotion once the job became available. The district court also heard testimony that Lufkin's allegedly objective measures for determining which employees were eligible to bid, such as attendance and discipline records, are subject to variance and manipulation. Lufkin has a computer program that tracks attendance, but both McClain and Thompson testified that the system was manipulable. If an employee was absent or tardy and the supervisor did not want the employee to lose credit, Thompson stated that the supervisor could non-schedule the employee or use the employee's vacation days to skew the records. With respect to discipline records, Steve Reynolds, a Lufkin supervisor, testified that there are no written criteria for determining when a rule violation should be written up. He stated that this decision is left to individual supervisors. The evidence also supported that Lufkin engaged in subjective decision making when awarding promotions in the salaried ranks. Salaried positions are not governed by the CBA, and company managers admitted that they were unaware of any guidelines, criteria, or documentation for the process of making promotions to salaried positions. Rather, most promotions in the salaried ranks are awarded through an interview process. [4] In light of this evidence, we are not left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court erred in finding subjective decision making in Lufkin's promotion system. See United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). Although Lufkin offered some testimony during the bench trial that would tend to refute the court's finding, it was within the province of the district court to accord this testimony less credibility than that of the class members and their experts. The reviewing court oversteps the bounds of its duty under Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate the role of the lower court. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Accordingly, we cannot say the court's finding of subjective decision making in promotions amounted to clear error.
Lufkin also challenges the district court's finding that its promotion practices are not capable of separation for review. Lufkin argues that if the court had isolated the objective factors in promotions  e.g. Lufkin's bidding practices and seniority  the court could not have found a discriminatory impact. As explained above, Title VII permits a plaintiff to demonstrate that the elements of the employer's decision-making process are not capable of separation for analysis and thus that the process should be analyzed as one employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i). This court has not addressed the precise conditions under which employment practices are not capable of separation for analysis. But where a promotion system uses tightly integrated and overlapping criteria, it may be difficult as a practical matter for plaintiffs to isolate the particular step responsible for the observed discrimination. See Munoz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir.2000). Some guidance is also provided by trial court decisions interpreting the provision. In Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., the district court held: Where the system of promotion is pervaded by a lack of uniform criteria, criteria that are subjective as well as variable, discretionary placements and promotions, the failure to follow set procedures and the absence of written policies or justifications for promotional decisions, the court is not required to pinpoint particular aspects of [the system] that are unfavorable to [the protected group]. 803 F.Supp. 259, 335 (N.D.Cal.1992) (citation omitted); see also Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, 1997 WL 605754, at  (N.D.Cal. Aug. 29, 1997) (unreported) (where employer delegated decisions to store managers who made subjective judgments about candidate's qualifications without written criteria, decision-making process not capable of separation for analysis); Schallop v. N.Y. State Dept. of Law, 20 F.Supp.2d 384, 402 (N.D.N.Y.1998) (entire process may be characterized as a single employment practice when employment decisions are made based on variable, subjective criteria); Bannister v. Dal-Tile Int'l, Inc., No. 3:02-CV-2498, 2003 WL 21145739, at  (N.D.Tex. May 14, 2003) (plaintiff not required to pinpoint specific employment practices where the factors of a defendant's decision-making process are so interwoven that they are incapable of separation). There is no indication that the district court applied incorrect legal principles in determining that Lufkin's practices were incapable of separation. This finding of fact must be reviewed for clear error. See Kona, 225 F.3d at 601. Lufkin lists various ways in which its employment practices were analytically separable, but the court's express findings preclude separation according to those factors. Lufkin argues, for example, that the plaintiffs' expert could have separated the challenged employment practices from its legitimate seniority system. The expert included in his analysis numerous promotions that contributed to the statistical shortfall in black promotions, even though these jobs were indisputably awarded to the most senior candidate. This argument ignores the district court's finding that Lufkin affords management considerable discretion in deciding whether to follow seniority in promotions. Plaintiffs could not statistically analyze the actual practice they challenge  subjective and discretionary application of the seniority provisions  by excluding promotion based on seniority. Seniority, the court found, was likely to have been irrelevant to the promotion. Lufkin also contends that the plaintiffs should have separated out instances in which candidates were properly denied promotions because of unsatisfactory attendance. This argument, too, runs afoul of the court's finding that managers have substantial discretion in applying attendance rules. In such a system, a denial of promotion for poor attendance is not helpful to Lufkin where promotions may also have been awarded following non-uniform interpretation of employee attendance rules. Finally, Lufkin contends that its paper bid sheets provided additional information that plaintiffs could have separated for analysis. [5] To the contrary, the district court rejected the bid data, which Lufkin prepared for purposes of this litigation, as unreliable and incomplete; ample evidence supports this finding. Lufkin has not suggested any viable way, consistent with the court's findings, in which the plaintiffs could have separated the promotion criteria for review nor has it shown the district court clearly erred in so finding.