Opinion ID: 203259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Inconsistent Verdicts Claim

Text: When reviewing claims of inconsistency between general civil jury verdicts, we do not have the compulsion of a specific procedural rule to determine the existence of an inconsistency. Merchant v. Ruhle, 740 F.2d 86, 89 (1st Cir.1984). We are, however, reluctant to order a new trial on the basis of inconsistent jury verdicts. Connelly v. Hyundai Motor Co., 351 F.3d 535, 540 (1st Cir.2003). When a party claims that jury verdicts are inconsistent, we attempt to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis if necessary. Acevedo-Diaz v. Aponte, 1 F.3d 62, 74 n. 15 (1st Cir.1993). This exercise involves determining whether the jury could have, consistent with its instructions, rendered the challenged verdicts. See Merchant, 740 F.2d at 91. In undertaking this analysis we view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id. Hodgson claims that the jury's general verdicts were inconsistent in two ways.
First, Hodgson argues that the jury's finding in his favor on Davignon's, Gouveia's, and Miller's § 1983 individual capacity claims is inconsistent with its finding that those same plaintiffs were entitled to judgment on their intentional interference with advantageous relations [10] claims. In this argument, Hodgson relies on the fact that the jury specifically found that he did not act willfully, maliciously, or with reckless indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights and consequently did not award punitive damages to the plaintiffs on their § 1983 claims. In analyzing this claimed inconsistency we look to distinctions between the federal punitive damage standard under § 1983 and the elements a plaintiff must prove exist to recover on a state intentional interference claim. Under § 1983, a jury may levy punitive damages when a defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); see also Iacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 25-26 (1st Cir.1999). In Iacobucci, we emphasized that the evil motive, intent, or reckless or callous indifference pertains to the  defendant's knowledge that [he] may be acting in violation of federal law.  Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 26 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As for the state law claim, in order for a plaintiff to recover for intentional interference with advantageous relations he must prove, among other elements, that the defendant intentionally interfered with the employment relationship and that this interference was improper in motive or means. See Weber v. Cmty. Teamwork, Inc., 434 Mass. 761, 781, 752 N.E.2d 700 (2001). Where the defendant is a supervisor the plaintiff must also show that the improper motive or means rose to the level of actual malice and was the controlling factor in the defendant's interference. Id. Whether Hodgson possessed actual malice depends on whether he had a `spiteful, malignant purpose, unrelated to the legitimate corporate interest' of the employer, id. at 782, 752 N.E.2d 700. Put differently, the question is whether the defendant was personally hostile or harbored ill will toward the plaintiff. Sklar v. Beth Isr. Deaconess Med. Ctr., 59 Mass. App.Ct. 550, 554, 797 N.E.2d 381 (2003)(citing Weber, 434 Mass. at 783, 752 N.E.2d 700). The jury's verdicts on the § 1983 and intentional interference claims can be reconciled. The court specifically instructed the jury that it could award punitive damages if it found that the defendant acted willfully, maliciously, or with reckless indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.  (emphasis added). The jury could have determined that Hodgson had a spiteful, malignant purpose, namely, to silence those speaking out in favor of the union, but that he believed that silencing them was permissible under federal law. See Kolstad v. ADA, 527 U.S. 526, 537, 119 S.Ct. 2118, 144 L.Ed.2d 494 (noting punitive damages inappropriate where employer believes actions are lawful); see also Iacobucci, 193 F.3d at 26. Moreover, the jury may have determined that, First Amendment issues aside, Hodgson was hostile towards the plaintiffs. See Weber, 434 Mass. at 783, 752 N.E.2d 700. Those plaintiffs who recovered on the intentional interference claim, Davignon, Gouveia, and Miller, all testified that Hodgson was hostile toward them at roll call. All three testified to his threatening remarks regarding their employment status, and Davignon and Gouveia additionally stated that Hodgson stared at them when referencing troublemakers. The jury could have reasonably construed such behavior as evidencing hostility.
Hodgson also contends that the jury's finding in his favor on Morris's § 1983 individual capacity claim renders inconsistent the verdict in favor of Morris on his MCRA claim. Hodgson says first that, as to all plaintiffs, the jury found him liable only in his official capacity and not in his individual capacity. Further, with the exception of Morris, the jury found that Hodgson did not violate the plaintiffs' rights under the MCRA. Hodgson argues that these findings in his favor were tantamount to finding that he was entitled to qualified immunity. It follows, the argument goes, that the jury's verdict in favor of Morris on his MCRA claim was erroneous and inconsistent with the verdicts in Hodgson's favor under § 1983. Hodgson also argues that the MCRA requires Morris to establish that Hodgson interfered with his exercise or enjoyment of rights by threats, intimidation or coercion, and that Morris failed to prove the existence of one of these additional elements. The plaintiffs have two responses. First, they say that a finding of qualified immunity is irrelevant to Morris's MCRA claim because the claim is based on a separate incident in which Hodgson was not acting under the color of state law, a necessary ingredient for qualified immunity. Specifically, they cite an incident where Hodgson confronted Morris outside the correctional facility and chastised him for not wearing a hat. If Hodgson was not acting under the color of state law, they argue, he could not avail himself of the qualified immunity defense. See Burke v. Town of Walpole, 405 F.3d 66, 76 (1st Cir.2005) (noting that qualified immunity applies when a person's rights are infringed by state actors )(emphasis added)(internal citation omitted). Second, the plaintiffs argue that Morris proved Hodgson interfered with his constitutional rights by threats, intimidation, or coercion by presenting evidence that Hodgson, during the hat incident, addressed Morris in an aggressive, angry, and arrested manner. We agree with the plaintiffs that the jury's verdicts are indeed susceptible to a consistent, albeit strained, reading. First, the jury could have, as the plaintiffs argue, found that Hodgson was not acting under the color of state law and thus was not shielded by qualified immunity. This theory is viable because, even though the MCRA claim may be thought of as a state law analogue to the federal § 1983 claim, and even though courts have held the same qualified immunity standard applies to both laws, the MCRA does not require state action. [11] In resolving the under color of law question in the past we have examined the totality of the circumstances, to determine whether the state actor's conduct occurs in the course of performing an actual or apparent duty of his office, or ... is such that the actor could not have behaved in that way but for the authority of his office. Martinez v. Colon, 54 F.3d 980, 986 (1st Cir.1995). Admittedly, a finding that Hodgson was not acting under the color of law during this incident required the jury to engage in mental gymnastics. For one thing, looked at in isolation there is little evidence in the record about the hat incident, and the facts that are present, such as the fact that the incident occurred in the vicinity of the correctional facility, seem to cut against a finding of no state action. See Zambrana-Marrero v. Suarez-Cruz, 172 F.3d 122, 125 (1st Cir.1999)(noting location of incident relevant to analysis). Nevertheless, the jury could have found that Hodgson, when chastising Morris for not wearing his hat, was not enforcing any official duties given that departmental policy, according to testimony at trial, did not require Morris to wear a hat. In the end, we accord the jury's conclusion respect, especially since determining whether a defendant acted under color of state law can often be particularly elusive, id., and reminding ourselves of our duty to read the jury's verdicts consistently if possible. See Malm v. United States Lines Co., 269 F.Supp. 731, 731-32 (S.D.N.Y.1967), aff'd, 378 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.1967) (recognizing jury's right to idiosyncratic position provided the challenged verdict is based on the evidence and the law). As to Hodgson's second contention  that Morris did not establish threats, intimidation or coercion,  the jury could have reasonably found that Hodgson's behavior towards Morris amounted to intimidation, and thus that Morris met one of the three additional requirements under the MCRA. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has defined intimidation as putting in fear for the purpose of compelling or deterring conduct. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. Inc. v. Blake, 417 Mass. 467, 474, 631 N.E.2d 985 (1994) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 868, 115 S.Ct. 188, 130 L.Ed.2d 122 (1994). Morris testified that Hodgson, spun the wheels of his car, before getting out of the car and confronting him in an aggressive, angry, and arrested manner. Morris also testified that Hodgson's behavior intimidated him. Given that Morris held a position on the negotiating subcommittee, the jury could have rationally concluded that Hodgson intended to intimidate Morris in order to frustrate his associational rights. Accordingly, we affirm the verdict in favor of Morris on his MCRA claim.