Opinion ID: 1788225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Christy Evidence

Text: Christy was the second person about whom Jones proffered alternative perpetrator evidence. Jones offered the following evidence about Christy: (1) he apparently had met Linda Jensen at a gym; (2) he was identified as resembling the postal carrier's sketch; (3) he was considered an early suspect by the police; (4) Drahota made statements to the police that a third person named Chandler, who had since died, told Drahota in a series of conversations many incriminating things that Christy had done and said, including statements and acts that could connect Christy to Linda Jensen's murder; (5) Drahota stated that he had been at Chandler's home on what he believed may have been the day of Linda Jensen's murder, and Christy arrived with blood on his hands and jacket and that Chandler and Christy later left with towels and garbage bags with the apparent goal of cleaning up a crime scene; and (6) statements by another woman that Christy had visited her home and told her that he had been at the Jensen home the morning of the murder waiting in a truck while an accomplice went in to rob the house. In response, the state pointed out that Christy's DNA was tested and did not match that found at the scene. As with the evidence about Beard, we conclude that the first and second pieces of evidence about Christythat he resembled the sketch and that he was an early suspectmay have been admissible if the correct evidentiary standard had been used. Similarly, Drahota's statements about what he witnessed firsthandthat Christy arrived at Chandler's garage with blood on his hands and jacket, that Chandler, Christy, and Drahota then collected new towels and garbage bags and shovels, with which Christy and Chandler later leftmay have been admissible as long as the district court determined that these statements were sufficiently relevant. The admissibility of Drahota's statements about Chandler's hearsay statements is less certain. Some of what Drahota discussed was ordinary hearsay, i.e., statements of Chandler to Drahota that implicate Christy; and some was double hearsay, i.e., statements Christy allegedly made to Chandler that Chandler repeated to Drahota. Accordingly, for the district court to admit the double hearsay statements Chandler made to Drahota discussing statements Christy made to Chandler, there would have to be a hearsay exception that would allow admission of Christy's statements and a hearsay exception that allows admission of Chandler's statements. Here, it is important to note that the district court analyzed these hearsay statements to determine if they were admissible under the catchall exception to the rule against hearsay of unavailable witnesses, Minn. R. Evid. 804(b)(5). [9] Relying on the contradictions within Drahota's own statements to investigators and the contradictory testimony of others like Chandler's wife and son, the court appeared unconvinced that Drahota's recounting of Chandler's alleged statements was reliable. The court further noted that there was no corroboration for any of Drahota's recollections of Chandler's statements. Lastly, we address the fifth piece of evidence offered about Christy, the statement by another woman that Christy had visited her home and told her that he had been at the Jensen home the morning of the murder waiting in a truck while an accomplice went in to rob the house. The court should have analyzed this evidence under ordinary evidentiary rules as hearsay, but erroneously treated it as reverse- Spreigl evidence. Accordingly, we must decide whether the exclusion of the woman's statement, as well as the exclusion of the other Christy evidence, affected Jones' substantial rights. The problem is similar to the problem we faced with respect to the Beard evidence. The district court did not use the correct evidentiary standard. We can only speculate about what foundation evidence Jones would have presented if he had not been precluded from exploring this evidence, how Christy would have responded if called to testify, and what the court would have done under any of several possible scenarios. Therefore, for reasons similar to those used in our analysis of the Beard alternative perpetrator evidence, we are unable to conclude that if properly analyzed the Christy evidence would necessarily have been excluded. If the Christy evidence was admissible, then Jones was denied the right to present exculpatory evidence to the jury that could cast reasonable doubt on the state's case and his constitutional rights were affected.