Opinion ID: 3012330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analogous Sentencing Guideline

Text: There is no specific sentencing guideline for 49 U.S.C. S 46507. Therefore, pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2X5.1, the most analogous guideline should be applied. The circuits are split vis-a-vis the standard of review applicable here. In United States v. Osborne, 164 F.3d 434 (8th Cir. 1999), the court provided a comprehensive and cogent analysis of the standard to be applied. The court first noted that 18 U.S.C. S 3742(e) provides the standard of review for guideline appeals.1Id. at 437. The court then _________________________________________________________________ 1. The relevant portion of the statute provides:[t]he court of appeals . . . shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and shall give due deference to the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts. 18 U.S.C. S 3742(e). 5 looked at the background note to U.S.S.G. S 2X5.1, which states specifically, ‘The court is required to determine if there is a sufficiently analogous offense guideline and, if so, to apply the guideline that is most analogous.’  Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 2X5.1, cmt. background (1998)). The court noted that there is a two-step process involved: first, the district court must determine whether there is a sufficiently analogous offense guideline, and, if there is, it then must determine which guideline is most analogous. Id. The court held that the first step, determining whether there is a sufficiently analogous guideline, is a legal question and is reviewed de novo. Id. Contra United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 968 n.6 (2d Cir. 1996) (whether there is a most analogous offense guideline involves applying guideline to facts and receives due deference review). Because determining whether there is an analogous guideline is substantially interpreting and applying the guidelines, the Osborne court was correct and review of that first determination should be plenary. If there is more than one sufficiently analogous offense guideline, the second step requires the district court to apply the most analogous one. Osborne, 164 F.3d at 437. The Osborne court held that this determination is more factual than legal and thus should be reviewed with due deference. Id. at 438. The court noted that in choosing the most analogous guideline, the district court must take into account all the circumstances of the case and make factual findings to support its choice. Id. The district court then must decide which guideline is most analogous based on the factual findings. Id. The court further stated that choosing the most analogous guideline involves more than mere interpretation, but rather involves evaluating which of two or more legal standards is most akin to the facts. Id. The court found this to be an application of the guidelines to the facts, and worthy of due deference pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 3742(e). Id.; accord United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 150 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1158 (1st Cir. 1993).2 The Osborne analysis is _________________________________________________________________ 2. Courts to the contrary that apply de novo review are: United States v. Couch, 65 F.3d 542, 544 (6th Cir. 1995) (de novo review); United States v. Norman, 951 F.2d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 1991) (same). 6 logical, United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 363 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001), and is the one we accept. The Presentence Investigation Report in this case prepared by the probation officer recommended applying U.S.S.G. S 2K1.5 as the most analogous guideline.3 Section 2K1.5 is the guideline applicable to Possessing Dangerous Weapons or Materials While Boarding or Aboard an Aircraft, and provides for a base offense level of 9. The District Court demurred, finding S 2A6.1 theappropriate section to apply to [Cothran’s] conduct. Section 2A6.1 is the guideline applicable to Threatening or Harassing Communications, and provides for a base offense level of 12. Section 2A6.1 is the more analogous guideline. First, in contrast to S 2K1.5, it accurately embodies Cothran’s conduct. Cothran was convicted of conveying a false threat, not of possessing dangerous weapons while on an aircraft. Moreover, there is a scienter element present in the base offense level for S 2A6.1 that is not present in the base offense level of S 2K1.5. That is, a defendant sentenced pursuant to the base offense level of S 2A6.1 has knowingly conveyed a threat, while a defendant sentenced pursuant to the base offense level of S 2K1.5 has not boarded the aircraft knowing that he has a dangerous weapon. If such a boarding takes place with actual knowledge of the presence of dangerous weapons, the base offense level of 9 increases 15 levels to 24. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 2K1.5(b)(1) (2000). To most accurately analogize Cothran’s act under S 2K1.5, we would therefore have to increase his base offense level to 24 because he knowingly conveyed the false threat. Thus, speaking strictly in terms of base offense levels, S 2A6.1 is the more analogous guideline. Cothran cites United States v. Norman, 951 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1991), as support for applying S 2K1.5. Norman involved a defendant who falsely reported that his ex-wife’s suitor had boarded an aircraft with a handgun and _________________________________________________________________ 3. At sentencing, the probation officer renounced his original position, stating, in retrospect, I would agree with the Government that Section 2A6.1 is more analogues [sic] to the actual statute that defendant was found guilty of. 7 explosives. Id. at 1183. The district court had applied S 2A6.1 as the most analogous guideline during sentencing, and the appellate court reversed, ruling that it should have applied S 2K1.5. See Id. As its rationale, the court stated that [t]he offense of threatening communications, codified in 18 U.S.C. SS 871, 876, 877, 878(a), and 879, is committed by making threats against a President, using the mail to make threats, making threats against foreign dignitaries and officials, and making threats against a former President. Id. at 1184. The court found that the defendant’s conduct implicated none of those offenses and that S 2K1.5 was therefore the most analogous guideline. Id. We reject the Norman court’s analysis. Although it is true that 18 U.S.C. S 871, 876, etc. are enumerated in S 2A6.1’s commentary, U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL S 2A6.1, cmt. (2000), the statutory list is not exhaustive, but merely illustrative. Immediately following the list of statutes, the commentary provides, [f]or additional [applicable] statutory provision(s), see Appendix A (Statutory Index). Id. Appendix A provides for application of S 2A6.1 to, inter alia, violations of 18 U.S.C. S 35(b). U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, app. A (2000). Title 18 U.S.C.S 35(b) provides criminal liability if a person, willfully and maliciously . . . imparts or conveys or causes to be imparted or conveyed false information, knowing the information to be false, concerning an attempt . . . to do any act which would be a crime prohibited by this chapter. 18 U.S.C.S 35(b). In the same chapter as S 35(b) is 18 U.S.C. S 32, which provides criminal liability for the destruction of an aircraft. Furthermore, S 35(b)’s language closely tracks that of 49 U.S.C. S 46507, the provision under which Cothran was convicted. When we look at these sections and S 32, the statutory provisions aim at the heart of Cothran’s crime: conveying false information about an attempt to destroy an aircraft. Accordingly, S 2A6.1 is the most analogous guideline applicable to Cothran’s crime.