Opinion ID: 1402780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitutionality of EPA

Text: ¶ 25 Petitioners' first contention is that the preamble to the EPA violates the separation of powers clause of the Arizona Constitution. Ariz. Const. art. 3. In relevant part, the preamble provides: C. ... When the legislature adopted the common law to provide the courts with laws of reference, it did not intend to vest the courts with the authority to establish new causes of action or to independently set forth the public policy of the state.... D. It is the intent of the legislature to establish that the courts cannot create new causes of action. Courts can apply common law causes of action to cases they adjudicate provided that they do not expand, modify or in any manner whatsoever alter the common law causes of action that were adopted by the legislature pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes section 1-201. Employment Protection Act, Ch. 140, § 1, para. C & D, 1996 Ariz. Sess. Laws 683, 684. ¶ 26 The quoted language would leave the Arizona courts with no authority to develop, modify, or expand the common law. Law in Arizona would become uniquely statutory. Declaring that courts are established to adjudicate cases by applying the laws enacted by the legislature to the facts of those cases, id., para. C, and that the adoption of the common law at the time of statehood was merely to provide courts with laws of reference, but not ... to vest the courts with the authority to establish new causes of action, id., the legislature boldly, though erroneously, asserts that this court was without constitutional authority to render its decision in Wagenseller. See id. We reject such assertion as constitutionally infirm. Courts do make law. See A.R.S. §§ 1-201 (1995), 12-122 (1992). The common law is and has been a product of the courts for hundreds of years. To adopt the common law is, by definition, to adopt the plenary role of the judiciary in its continuing development. ¶ 27 Courts also participate in the development of public policy. See Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 378, 710 P.2d at 1033; Ontiveros v. Borak, 136 Ariz. 500, 504, 667 P.2d 200, 204 (1983) (courts make public policy, though subject to legislative correction). ¶ 28 The petitioners, citing Chevron Chemical Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 641 P.2d 1275 (1982), Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976), and Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), urge that we declare the EPA unconstitutional because legislation based on the thoroughly unconstitutional purpose expressed in the preamble must itself be declared unconstitutional. We reject this argument as well. Chevron simply holds, we think correctly, that the judiciary has the power to declare existing law while the legislature has the authority to enact laws. Washington holds that a verbal skills test which disparately impacted a particular minority group was not unconstitutional on that basis alone. Employment Division suggests that a facially neutral statute may offend the constitution if it unduly burdens religion. None of these cases supports petitioners' broad assertion that because a legislative preamble sets forth notions repugnant to the constitution, the operative legislation itself is necessarily invalid. ¶ 29 To the contrary, the constitutionality of the EPA is not dependent on the preamble because the preamble is not statutory text. See Sakrison v. Pierce, 66 Ariz. 162, 172-73, 185 P.2d 528, 535 (1947); Foremost Life Ins. Co. v. Trimble, 119 Ariz. 222, 226, 580 P.2d 360, 364 (App.1978) (citing Sakrison, that where an unambiguous operative statutory section conflicts with the purpose or policy section of a statute, the operative section controls); 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction, § 20.04 (5th ed.1992). ¶ 30 The preamble is devoid of operative effect. Unfortunately, it manifests the legislature's intent to usurp judicial authority in violation of the separation of powers doctrine set forth in article 3 of the Arizona Constitution. The tri-partite separation of co-equal governmental powers among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches is a doctrine profoundly rooted in the constitutions of all fifty states, as well as in the Constitution of the United States. The judicial power in particular was defined by then Chief Justice Marshall early in the history of the Republic: It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). ¶ 31 The judicial power is not dependent on the legislative branch. The judicial mandate, intended to secure equal and substantial justice under the rule of law, is delegated to the judiciary by the constitution, not the legislature. The preamble would limit the mandate by restricting the judicial powera constitutional power sometimes neglected in the unpredictable maelstrom of partisan politics. ¶ 32 The EPA preamble is patently unconstitutional. It demonstrates a fundamental misapprehension of law. It expresses notions abandoned by the founding fathers more than two centuries ago during the constitutional debates at Philadelphia. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton). Importantly, the preamble is not law and thus does not of itself invalidate the statutory language of the EPA. We therefore disregard the preamble in its entirety and attend to the constitutionality of the statute itself.
¶ 33 Petitioners argue that claims for wrongful termination in violation of public policy are protected by article 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution, the anti-abrogation clause: The right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated.... (Emphasis added.) ¶ 34 We have held that article 18, § 6 precludes abrogation, but not regulation. See Barrio v. San Manuel Div. Hosp., 143 Ariz. 101, 104, 692 P.2d 280, 283 (1984); Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 74, 688 P.2d 961, 966 (1984). However, it is settled that we reach the abrogation question only if the cause of action at issue is in fact protected by article 18, § 6. See Ruth v. Industrial Comm'n, 107 Ariz. 572, 575, 490 P.2d 828, 831 (1971). The first question, therefore, is whether constitutional anti-abrogation will protect the public policy cause of action in tort which the EPA expressly restricts. Stated more particularly, does article 18, § 6 of the constitution prevent the EPA's elimination of public policy tort claims where the policy which forms the basis for the claims traces its origin to the legislative enactment of ACRA and to no other source? ¶ 35 This court has held that article 18, § 6 is an `open court' guarantee intended to constitutionalize the right to obtain access to the courts.... See Boswell v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 152 Ariz. 9, 13, 730 P.2d 186, 190 (1986) (citing Barrio, 143 Ariz. at 105, 692 P.2d at 284; Kenyon, 142 Ariz. at 73-75, 79-83, 688 P.2d at 965-67, 971-75). The language of the provision is to be construed broadly and unrestrictively. See Boswell, 152 Ariz. at 13, 730 P.2d at 190. As such, article 18, § 6 prevents abrogation of all common law actions for negligence, intentional torts, strict liability, defamation, and other actions in tort which trace origins to the common law. When we considered the scope of anti-abrogation in Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 176 Ariz. 340, 861 P.2d 625 (1993), we overruled Bryant v. Continental Conveyor & Equipment Co., 156 Ariz. 193, 751 P.2d 509 (1988), and dispensed with the narrow analysis there enunciated, that article 18, § 6 did not protect a right of action for injuries occurring at a time subsequent to expiration of the twelve-year statute of repose following the sale of a defective product. Hazine declared unconstitutional the same statute of repose that Bryant upheld. ¶ 36 What we did not do in Hazine, however, is extend constitutional protection to all tort causes of action, whenever or however they may have arisen. The statute in Hazine provided that no products liability action could be commenced if the cause of action accrued more than twelve years after the product was first sold. We declared the statute unconstitutional not simply because it abrogated the right of action to recover for injuries even before the cause of action arose, see Hazine, 176 Ariz. at 344, 861 P.2d at 629, but also because a right of action for injuries caused by defective products was recognized at common law, long before Arizona's constitution was established. ¶ 37 Conversely, a tort claim alleging wrongful discharge in violation of the ACRA-based public policy is strictly statutory and thus not within the Hazine doctrine. Such a claim neither existed in 1912 when statehood was achieved, nor did it evolve from common law antecedents. The common law gave no protection to employees or others against discrimination based on race, age, or gender and recognized no such right. ¶ 38 Petitioners nevertheless make the argument that because claims for wrongful termination were recognized at English common law as early as 1562, the common law adopted by Arizona at the time of statehood must include this cause of action. See Patterson v. Connolly, 51 Ariz. 443, 445, 77 P.2d 813, 814 (1938) (the common law of Arizona included the English common law as amended by statute down to the time of the severing of the union between the colonies and the mother country); Masury & Son v. Bisbee Lumber Co., 49 Ariz. 443, 68 P.2d 679 (1937) (English common law rules regarding limitation of actions are the law of Arizona, except as modified by statute). The petitioners' reasoning is flawed, however, as it assumes the English cause of action was the pre-statehood genesis of the present tort action for wrongful discharge. We emphasize that this is not the case for the reason that American courts abandoned the English rule in favor of at-will employment during the Industrial Revolution, long before Arizona achieved statehood. See Wagenseller, 147 Ariz. at 375, 710 P.2d at 1030. ¶ 39 In sum, pursuant to the Hazine analysis, the anti-abrogation clause applies only to tort causes of action that either existed at common law or evolved from rights recognized at common law. We hold that the anti-abrogation clause is not implicated by the EPA because the cause of action which it allegedly abrogateswrongful termination in violation of public policy expressed in ACRAoriginates exclusively within the statute, would not otherwise exist, and cannot trace its antecedents to a common law right of action. See Alabam's Freight Co. v. Hunt, 29 Ariz. 419, 242 P. 658 (1926).
¶ 40 Though ACRA-based wrongful termination is not afforded constitutional protection under anti-abrogation, petitioners argue that the EPA nevertheless violates the constitution's non-limitation provisionsarticle 2, § 31 and the second phrase of article 18, § 6by limiting wrongful discharge claims to the remedies set forth in the statute. See A.R.S. § 23-1501(3)(b). ¶ 41 Constitutional non-limitation provisions prohibit the imposition of a statutory limit on the amount recoverable in actions for damages. Article 2, § 31 provides: No law shall be enacted in this State limiting the amount of damages to be recovered for causing the death or injury of any person. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 42 The second phrase of the anti-abrogation clause, article 18, § 6, provides: [T]he amount recovered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 43 Before addressing petitioners' argument, we dispense with Denny's contention that because the protections of article 2, § 31 merely duplicate those of anti-abrogation under article 18, § 6, the non-limitation provisions cannot be violated if there is no abrogation of a common law right. Essentially, Denny's urges us to apply our Hazine analysis, heretofore limited to anti-abrogation, to the non-limitation provisions, asking the court to conclude that because the cause of action for wrongful termination in violation of statute-based public policy is not protected by the anti-abrogation clause, it is also not protected by the non-limitation clauses. ¶ 44 While there may be merit to this approach in some contexts, [2] non-limitation under article 2, § 31 is distinct from anti-abrogation in that it protects against limitation of the amount of damages to be recovered, whereas anti-abrogation speaks to elimination of the right of action. See Roger C. Henderson, Tort Reform, Separation of Powers, and the Arizona Constitutional Convention of 1910, 35 Ariz. L.Rev. 535, 618-19 (1993). This may be a fine distinction, but were we not to make it, the non-limitation clauses in most contexts, including the instant cases, would be rendered superfluous or redundant, something we have consistently declined to do. Accordingly, we do not adopt a rigid right of action analysis when considering the applicability of article 2, § 31. We conclude, simply, that where dealing with a right to recover damages originating exclusively in a statute, the legislature may, notwithstanding the non-limitation provisions, constitutionally restrict a remedy or a theory of recovery. The governmental power to do so is more persuasive when the cause of action, as here, is not protected by the anti-abrogation clause. See generally Jimenez, 183 Ariz. 399, 904 P.2d 861 (1995); Register, 130 Ariz. 9, 633 P.2d 418; Valley Drive-In Theatre Corp. v. Superior Court, 79 Ariz. 396, 291 P.2d 213 (1955); National Sur. Co. v. Conway, 43 Ariz. 480, 33 P.2d 276 (1933). ¶ 45 It is true we have held that while the statutory cause of action for wrongful death is not protected by article 18, § 6, once the legislature, by statute, creates the right to bring a damage action, the legislature is prohibited by article 2, § 31 from placing a limitation upon recovery as found in the Worker's Compensation Act. See Halenar v. Superior Court, 109 Ariz. 27, 29, 504 P.2d 928, 930 (1972); see also Smith v. Myers, 181 Ariz. 11, 14, 887 P.2d 541, 544 (1994) (citing Halenar, 109 Ariz. at 29, 504 P.2d at 930). But we have not held that the prohibition is absolute. The constitution does not guarantee a particular amount of damages, see Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 407, 904 P.2d at 869, nor does the constitution protect punitive damages. See Downs v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec. Coop., 80 Ariz. 286, 292, 297 P.2d 339, 342 (1956). ¶ 46 We have permitted the legislature to regulate a tort action even though such regulation mayand in a few cases no doubt willadversely affect the computation of damages that the plaintiff recovers. Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 407, 904 P.2d at 869 (the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act abolishing common law joint liability did not violate the Arizona Constitution's anti-abrogation and non-limitation provisions even though the statute would operate to reduce the amount of recovery in many cases). We reasoned that to preclude such regulation would exclude the legislature from any meaningful enactment because almost any statute dealing with tort actions will affect the amount or potential of recovery. Id. at 407-08, 904 P.2d at 869-70. The legislature may, therefore, alter certain recovery schemes as long as an adequate remedy for the injury remains. See Boswell, 152 Ariz. at 18-19, 730 P.2d at 195-96. ¶ 47 The question before us is whether petitioners' ACRA-based tort remedies are impermissibly limited by the EPA. We respond in the negative. The EPA restriction pertains to a statutory right not recognized at common law. The right is now vindicated by ACRA's provision for equitable, rather than tort, relief. While the non-limitation clauses prevent limitation of the amount of damages that may be recovered, the EPA restricts only a particular remedy or theory of relief. ¶ 48 Accordingly, in Smith, supra, a common law negligence action for medical malpractice, we held that a statute permitting the defendant to make periodic payments rather than the traditional lump sum payment of the verdict violated the non-limitation clause. We reasoned that the amount of the verdict had been established with certainty, and that while theories of recovery were not in question, we were concerned with insurer solvency, rigid payout schedules regardless of the rate at which expenses were incurred, and a potential windfall for the defendant should the victim die before full payout. See Smith, 181 Ariz. at 16-18, 887 P.2d at 546-48. Our decision weighed the effect of two different methods of payment on plaintiff's pre-determined recovery. Conversely, in the employment relationship, overlapping theories of recovery, including breach of contract as well as related tort and statutory claims, make the calculation of damages uncertain. And where, as here, overlapping theories do exist, a restriction on a particular remedy or theory of relief does not offend article 2, § 31. ¶ 49 This court has upheld legislative enactments which regulate a theory of recovery, and we have invalidated statutes which place a monetary cap on damages. See Jimenez, 183 Ariz. at 407, 904 P.2d at 869. The distinction has thus been made between theory of recovery on one hand, and the amount of damages on the other. We construe the EPA's exclusive remedy provision as protecting one of several theories of recovery, i.e., ACRA-based equitable relief, rather than the placement of a legislative cap on damages. ¶ 50 Importantly, the EPA does not preclude recovery of compensatory damages under federal law within parameters authorized by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1995), as amended, [3] (Title VII), nor does it preclude wrongfully terminated employees from pursuing collateral common law tort claims related to discharge from employment, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, see Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 153 Ariz. 38, 734 P.2d 580 (1987), negligent infliction of emotional distress, see Irvin Investors, Inc. v. Superior Court, 166 Ariz. 113, 800 P.2d 979 (App.1990), interference with contractual relations, see Barrow v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 158 Ariz. 71, 761 P.2d 145 (App.1988), or defamation, see Boswell, 152 Ariz. 9, 730 P.2d 186. Nor does today's decision affect such common law causes of action as assault and battery, fraud, and other protected claims. Significantly, in the case at bar, the legislature, having created a right unprotected at common law, retains much greater liberty in defining the remedy to vindicate that right. ¶ 51 In sum, while the EPA precludes petitioners' ACRA-based claims for compensatory and punitive damages for tortious wrongful discharge, a panoply of constitutionally protected common law tort remedies remains undisturbed as fully beyond the scope of the EPA.
¶ 52 Petitioners contend that the EPA violates the equal privileges clause of the Arizona Constitution, requiring that [n]o law shall be enacted granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations. Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 13. With the exception of sexual harassment cases, employers with fewer than fifteen employees are exempt from ACRA. ¶ 53 Petitioners make the argument that because the EPA protects large employers (fifteen or more employees) from wrongful discharge tort liability, the employee's sole recourse necessarily depends either on Arizona or federal statutes protecting employees from employer discrimination. They claim that because small employers are exempt from ACRA, their employees are left without any viable ACRA-based claim, and because the EPA eliminates public policy tort claims against employers, they are without any claim and thus victims of unequal treatment. See A.R.S. §§ 41-1401 through -1492; 42 U.S.C. § 2000a. Petitioners argue this circumstance violates the equal privileges clause of the constitution. ¶ 54 Because both employers, Denny's and Calvary, employ more than fifteen workers and are thus subject to ACRA, petitioners are uninjured by the perceived inequality. See A.R.S. § 41-1461(2); see, e.g., Brown v. Ford, 905 P.2d 223, 228-29 (Okla. 1995). On this record, therefore, we do not reach the equal privileges question because petitioners lack standing to raise it. Determining whether a party has standing has led us to hold that a person who is not injured by an unconstitutional provision of a statute may not raise an objection as to its constitutionality. Salinas v. Kahn, 2 Ariz.App. 181, 193, 407 P.2d 120, 132, modified on other grounds, 2 Ariz.App. 348, 409 P.2d 64 (1965). Constitutional issues will not be determined unless squarely presented in a justiciable controversy.... School Dist. No. 26 v. Strohm, 106 Ariz. 7, 9, 469 P.2d 826, 828 (1970).
¶ 55 Petitioners finally argue that the EPA impairs contractual rights in violation of article 2, § 25 of the Arizona Constitution. Article 2, § 25 provides: No . . . law impairing the obligation of a contract shall ever be enacted. ¶ 56 Neither of the petitioners makes a serious attempt to show that the issue applies to her case. We therefore decline to address the impairment question.