Opinion ID: 76560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carl Buice, Attorney for Defendant

Text: 40 The court heard arguments on this and other motions at a hearing on August 31, 1987. At the hearing, the court asked defense counsel whether they intended to make a motion for an examination at Central State Hospital. They answered in the negative, and asked that the court consider instead their motion for funds to hire an independent psychiatrist. The court, pursuant to Ake, ordered counsel to make a preliminary showing that Hightower's sanity at the time of the offense was likely to be a significant factor at trial. Carl Buice, one of Hightower's two attorneys, 8 offered the following: 41 May it please the Court. Where we are at this point in this issue is at a very preliminary threshold because if we were not there we would get into a very circuitous situation. Obviously in order to determine clearly what we are going to need in the way of psychiatric testimony we need the help of a psychiatrist. It is not possible to evaluate fully the mental condition of the defendant without professional assistance to assist us in doing that and if the Court would note, the Ake decision does not just have to do with the defense of insanity, but goes on to talk about whether the mental condition of the defendant is going to be a factor at the trial of the case which has to do not only with the guilt/innocence phase or any plea of not guilty or of guilty but insane or not guilty for reasons of insanity, but also in the area of litigation and extenuation in terms of whether there are any characteristics of the defendant which would be mitigating of the circumstances in the event that he was convicted. Now, the only thing we can present to the Court at this point in the absence of having expert testimony is that which is already apparent in the record. That is, that we have here a man who is charged with three murders, the murder of his wife and two stepdaughters. This comes in a situation in a life history in which there has been no previous violence. We have a situation where a person of no demonstrated erratic behavior performs an act which is in and of itself according to the charge of the district attorney, stunningly abhorrent. The event itself, the facts themselves raise the question of the mental state of the defendant and the circumstances which would lead up to such an event, not just in terms of insanity which, of course, is a legal term and not a mental health term, but in terms of all the factors in the defendant's psyche which might relate to this event and be important in the defense of his case, not only in the defense in the guilt and innocence phase, but in any phase of the trial in extenuation and mitigation. So, what we are asking for at this point in regard to this particular thing is some preliminary funds for a psychiatric evaluation on the part of a psychiatrist who is a part of the defense team who has — to whom we have access and with whom we can consult in the building of our defense of this man so that we can know what further issue we may need to raise in terms of psychiatric evaluation, what defenses we need to file in terms of this man's condition, whether we have defenses which are defenses in the guilt/innocence phase or are just issues in the extenuation or sentencing phase. All of these are matters that we cannot determine without having the benefit of counsel from a competent psychiatrist, someone trained in the mental health field who can help us know what to look for in terms of this man's personality. This is no small issue in a case of this nature. The mental state of the defendant is going to be a key factor all the way through and if we are to provide him with an adequate defense, if we are to be able to raise the issues which need to be raised in this case or at least consider the issues which may need to be raised, we need that expert assistance ab initio from the very beginning. To make us — to require us to make a showing in terms of some professional evidence in the case where we have no authority to get a professional to develop the evidence and have no resource to a professional to determine what sort of issues may be available to us, denies us of access to that whole area of defense from the very beginning. 42 In response to this statement, the court asked Buice how much money they needed for a psychiatric expert. He said they needed $750 [o]n a preliminary basis, reserving the right to ask for an additional amount in terms of what we may find as we go forward. The court granted the motion and authorize[d] [counsel] to expend up to $750. The court also left open the possibility of granting more funds in the future, but only after another hearing. 43 At this point, the prosecutor moved that Hightower be admitted to Central State Hospital for a psychological evaluation, so that the State could rebut any claim as to mental incompetency that the defense might raise at either phase of the trial. Defense counsel opposed the motion, stating that they would have Hightower evaluated by his own psychiatrist. The court asked when counsel intended to have Hightower examined by their psychiatrist. They said they planned to have him examined that very week. Buice, presumably referring to a psychiatric expert he had already contacted, added: He has already done some preliminary interviews. He is in the process. 44 In response to the prosecutor's protests that the defense was merely seeking to sandbag the State by preventing it the opportunity to examine Hightower, the court purported to grant the prosecutor's motion. But given defense counsel's representation that Hightower would soon be evaluated by his own expert, the court delayed his transportation to Central State Hospital for two weeks. 45 We now place ourselves in the position of the trial court and evaluate the evidence as it was submitted. In doing so, we make several observations. First, defense counsel made no issue of Hightower's present sanity, i.e., his competency to stand trial. 9 They opposed the prosecutor's attempt to have Hightower evaluated by a state psychiatrist, and from the record, it does not appear that the State ever had him evaluated. Second, by the time of the hearing, his lawyers had engaged the services of an unnamed mental health expert, and this expert had already done some unspecified preliminary work on the case. Third, presumably because they had already chosen their own expert, counsel requested only that the trial court grant them funds. They never raised the option of an appointed psychiatrist. Fourth, unlike in Ake, in which the trial court was so concerned about the defendant's peculiar behavior that he ordered a psychiatric examination sua sponte, neither the court, the prosecutor, nor defense counsel ever made an issue of Hightower's behavior at the hearing. 10 Fifth, defense counsel failed to offer any fact bearing upon Hightower's mental status apart from the mere occurrence of the crime itself. At the hearing, they merely pointed out that Hightower was accused of three abhorrent murders even though his behavior had never before been violent or erratic. 46 Based upon these observations, we conclude that Hightower had at this stage failed to satisfy his preliminary burden under Ake. The trial court had no evidence upon which to conclude that his sanity at the time of the offense [was] to be a significant factor at trial. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096. Despite this, the court gave his attorneys precisely the sum they requested for a psychiatric expert. No constitutional error had yet occurred. 47 b. 48 As far as the record discloses, it was not until some three months later that the trial court dealt in any way with defense counsel's requests for expert psychiatric assistance. In an order dated November 25, 1987, the court, citing its authorization of $750 for the payment of a psychiatric expert, ordered the county to pay $440 to Dr. N. Archer Moore. Attached to the order is an itemized billing record detailing services Dr. Moore rendered in Hightower's case, which were as follows: (1) a one-hour interview with Hightower on August 25, 1987; (2) a two-hour interview with Hightower on August 28, 1987; (3) a two-hour interview with Hightower on August 31, 1987; (4) a one-hour interview with Hightower on November 16, 1987; and (5) a two-hour conference with Hightower's attorneys on November 17, 1987. 49 At this point, the court could discern the following. First, defense counsel had taken a portion of the funds they had received and used it to employ an expert of their choice, Dr. Moore. Second, Dr. Moore was a psychologist, not a psychiatrist. 11 Third, Dr. Moore had taken the opportunity to evaluate Hightower on four separate occasions for a total of six hours. Fourth, defense counsel had not yet exhausted the $750 that they had received for the specific purpose of hiring a psychiatric expert. 50 No additional funds were requested at this stage, and no error had yet occurred. 51 c. 52 Another three months passed before defense counsel presented the trial court with any additional information regarding a need for expert psychiatric assistance. On February 8, 1988, they filed a motion, which reads as follows: 53 Motion for Additional Funds to Hire Psychiatrist 54 1. On August 31, 1987, this Court granted the Defendant the sum of Seven Hundred Fifty ($750.00) [sic] to hire a psychologist and/or psychiatrist to evaluate the Defendant herein. 55 2. Defendant's counsels retained Dr. Archer Moore, of Macon, Georgia, to evaluate the Defendant. On the advise [sic] of Dr. Moore, Defendant's counsels were advised to seek a psychologist or psychiatrist who had extensive experience in dealing with family violence to evaluate the Defendant. 56 3. Dr. Emanuel Tanay, M.D., has been contacted by Defendant's counsel and has advised us that he would be able to provide forensic psychiatric services to Defendant. A copy of a letter from Dr. Tanay and a copy of his vitae is attached hereto as Exhibit A and is made a part hereof by reference. 57 4. Defendant requires the services of Dr. Tanay, if he is to adequately present not only his defense but to assist Defense counsel in the preparation of Defendant's case in the guilt/innocence phase as well as in the sentencing phase. To deny these services is to violate Defendant's constitutional rights under the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Georgia. 58 WHEREFORE, Defendant herein moves that this Court order that Dr. Tanay [sic] services be ordered and that this Court sign an order providing that his services would be reimbursed up to Six Thousand ($6,000.00) Dollars. 59 This 8th Day of February, 1988. 60 /s/ Hulane E. George B. Carl Buice 61 The first attachment to the motion was a letter to defense counsel from Dr. Emanuel Tanay, M.D., dated February 1, 1988. In this letter, Dr. Tanay, writing in response to an extensive telephone conference with defense counsel, expressed his willingness to provide forensic psychiatric services for Hightower at a reduced rate of $150.00 per hour plus expenses. Dr. Tanay estimated that his evaluation of Hightower would take at least twenty hours, and said that he required a court order to guarantee that he would be paid on an hourly basis for his testimony. In closing, Dr. Tanay stated that he could not evaluate Hightower before April 11, 1988. 12 62 The second attachment to the motion was Dr. Tanay's curriculum vitae. It showed, among other things, that Dr. Tanay was a psychiatrist licensed in Michigan, Ohio, and Georgia, and that he was certified by the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and by the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry. In addition, the curriculum vitae listed Dr. Tanay's numerous publications, some of which appeared by their titles to address legal issues related to insanity, mental illness, forensic psychiatry, and psychic trauma. 63 The trial court held a hearing on defense counsel's motion on February 9, 1988. At the hearing, counsel informed the court of the following: 64 We have had Mr. Hightower evaluated by our psychiatrist, Dr. Archer Moore, and he advised us that we really needed someone who was an expert in family violence. And we have combed the United States, and we have been advised that this man — if you will look at his eight page vitae which is just a part of his vitae, you can see he is very well qualified. I spoke to Dr. Tanay and as he said in his letter, he could not evaluate Mr. Hightower until April the 11th of 1988, and he states that he will reduce his regular fee to $150 per hour plus expenses. His expenses includes [sic] coming from Detroit to Atlanta and renting a car. I figure probably somewhere around $6,000 for total expenses for Dr. Tanay. We desperately need his input in this case. We need it not only in the guilt-innocent phase but we need it in the sentencing phase. We need someone to evaluate Mr. Hightower and to give us some clues as to the causes of this tragedy. And he seems — according to everyone that we can talk to — is just about the only one in the United States that is available. 65 The prosecutor responded that the court had bent over backwards already in meeting Hightower's requests for psychiatric assistance, and had gone further than Ake  required in this regard. Defense counsel answered: 66 We are not asking or dealing with the issue of minimum requirement of the appellate courts. We're asking for substantial justice on the part of Mr. Hightower. To use just an ordinary psychologist in a case of this sort where the issues of domestic violence, a very specialized field, are at stake is rather analagous [sic] to using a general practitioner for brain surgery. If any accused person in Mr. Hightower's situation, who had the funds to do so, were in his place, certainly a specialist of this sort would be used. The only reason for not using a specialist of this sort in this sort of case would be a lack of funds. And if Mr. Hightower is therefore refused — denied the access to this sort of specialist simply because of lack of funds, we submit that it would be tantamount to a failure of due process. 67 The court then asked counsel if they could cite any authority that required the provision of additional funds. They could not. Instead, they reminded the court that they had received $750 at the last hearing, and that, as they understood it, they were entitled to come to the court again if [they] needed more. The court then asked counsel how much money it had given them to spend at [their] discretion. Counsel answered: We have $5,000 — $5,750. And we've divided that into Dr. Moore's bill which was I think $450 which has been paid. 68 We had — we have hired a jury specialist and we have hired a special investigator and that will wipe out all of that money. 69 Without further argument, the court denied the motion for additional funds. 13 70 We pause once again to consider whether the court committed error at this stage. We evaluate the additional evidence now available to the court and discern how it should have affected its actions. Several things are worth noting. 71 First, the court knew nothing of Dr. Moore's evaluation of Hightower save the dates and durations of the interviews. It was unclear at this point as to (1) whether Dr. Moore had been able to diagnose Hightower, (2) why Dr. Moore had advised defense counsel to seek an expert in family violence, and (3) whether and in what phase defense counsel intended that Dr. Moore testify at trial. 72 Second, the court knew nothing about the probable value of Dr. Tanay's assistance. It knew only that (1) Dr. Tanay, unlike Dr. Moore, was a psychiatrist, and (2) defense counsel perceived Dr. Tanay to be an expert in the unexplained field of family violence. Defense counsel made no issue of the former distinction, 14 but instead grasped upon the latter distinction without explaining its significance. The most the court could glean from counsel's representations was that family violence was a specialty of psychology or psychiatry dealing with violent behavior in the context of family relationships. While a specialist of this kind might have been useful to Hightower, his attorneys essentially conceded at the hearing that their own notions of justice, rather than the requirements of law, demanded the provision of such an expert. 73 Third, defense counsel provided no additional facts upon which to make an issue of Hightower's mental state. Indeed, although Dr. Moore had evaluated Hightower months beforehand, counsel still did not indicate that they would offer an insanity defense at trial. 74 Fourth, Hightower had not behaved peculiarly at any proceeding. 75 Based upon these observations, we conclude that Hightower still had not satisfied his preliminary burden under Ake. Months after they made their initial request for funds for a psychiatric expert, defense counsel still had not shown the court that Hightower's sanity was likely to be an issue at trial. That they had received expert funds in spite of this deficiency did not entitle them to more. No error had yet occurred. 76 d. 77 The issue next arose in the context of Hightower's motion for a continuance, filed March 2, 1988. This motion contained no additional requests for funds for psychiatric assistance. Instead, in support of the request for a continuance, the motion offered the following information: 78 Defendant has requested Dr. Emanuel Tanay to evaluate him as regards his defense and in the sentencing phase of this trial. Dr. Tanay has indicated to this Court that the first time he would evaluate Defendant would be on the week of April 18, 1988. Dr. Tanay would need time then to prepare his evaluation and discuss same with the defense counsel. There would not be enough time to accomplish this prior to the scheduled trial date. Dr. Tanay's testimony will be vital to Defendant's case in chief and to the sentencing phase. 79 On March 9, 1988, the court heard arguments on Hightower's motion. At the hearing, defense counsel told the court that they had sought Dr. Tanay's help, but that Hightower's family was unable to come up with the money to pay him. Counsel represented that Dr. Tanay [had] to have at least $7,000 in his hand and that he [had] to have it, you know, like yesterday. 15 Counsel did not at this point request additional funds. Rather, they offered this information in support of their request for a continuance. 80 In opposing the motion for a continuance, the prosecutor argued that (1) the court had already given defense counsel a lump sum of money ... a blanket amount that could be used for anything they wanted to use it for, including expert psychiatric assistance; (2) defense counsel had not made any showing to the trial court that Hightower was psychiatrically deprived; and (3) as a result, defense counsel must have wanted a psychiatric expert for mitigation purposes. In any case, the prosecutor argued, defense counsel had already received ample time in which to secure the services of a psychiatrist. 81 The court denied the motion for a continuance, but said it would reconsider it if circumstances later made it appear that the trial could not proceed as scheduled. 82 We distill the record to its essence to determine what additional evidence the court received at this stage regarding Hightower's need for a psychiatric expert. First, counsel still tentatively planned to retain Dr. Tanay, though they were uncertain as to how they would pay him. Second, they offered no additional facts bearing upon the issue of Hightower's mental state. Third, Hightower's behavior at the pretrial proceedings remained normal. Fourth, except in contending that Dr. Tanay's testimony would be vital to both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial, 16 counsel had said nothing about a possible insanity defense. 83 Defense counsel did not at this stage request any additional funds for a psychiatric expert, and the trial court had not erred. 84 e. 85 On April 15, 1988, the court held a hearing on various matters. In support of a renewed motion for a continuance, defense counsel told the court that they had secured a psychologist who [would] be working with [them] in the preparation of [the] defense, and that this psychologist's involvement in a murder trial elsewhere in the state might cause him to miss Hightower's trial. The court denied the motion nevertheless. 86 Defense counsel then made a lengthy oral statement in support of their view that the court's rulings on their requests for funds for experts had rendered their assistance to Hightower ineffective as a matter of law. As for their requests for funds for psychiatric assistance, counsel stated that they had been unable to hire Dr. Tanay because of the court's denial of their February 2, 1988, motion for additional funds. In response, the prosecutor stated: 87 But, Your Honor, there has been absolutely no indication on counsel's part that they intend to use insanity, a special plea of insanity, not guilty by reason of insanity or any of the other accepted defenses in this case which would even trigger the necessity of the Court appointing psychiatrists or rendering money to the defendants for a psychiatric review in this case. It is my understanding that what counsel is relying on in this case based on their statement is the mitigating circumstance testimony by a psychiatrist or a psychologist and counsel says that has been arranged. 88 At the end of the prosecutor's remarks, the court said that it would adhere to all ... former rulings on the issues that defense counsel had raised. The parties then addressed other pretrial matters. As far as the record discloses, Hightower's behavior at the hearing was unremarkable. 89 Once again, we evaluate the evidence put before the trial court. First, defense counsel had abandoned the idea of hiring Dr. Tanay, and had instead engaged the services of another psychologist in addition to Dr. Moore. Second, counsel offered no additional facts bearing upon Hightower's mental state. Although the case was now proceeding under the new indictment, 17 and in spite of the fact that trial was set to begin in only two weeks, 18 defense counsel still had said nothing about relying on an insanity defense. Third, because they had not expressed an intention to present an insanity defense, the court could infer that at least one of the two psychologists that counsel had engaged would testify during the sentencing phase. Fourth, nothing suggested that Hightower might be incompetent to stand trial. 90 The court had not yet received any indication that Hightower's sanity at the time of the offense would be an issue at trial, and had not erred. 91 f. 92 We have surveyed all pretrial proceedings at which Hightower presented the trial court with information bearing upon his need for a psychiatric expert. He has failed to identify any point in those proceedings at which the court, given the evidence then available, acted contrary to the requirements of federal law. 93 We are not unconcerned about putting the proverbial cart before the horse in cases of this kind. Without question, defense counsel may be unable fully to understand and explain his client's mental state until an evaluation is performed. But Ake does not require defense counsel to guide the trial court through the depths of the defendant's psyche; all it requires is a minimum threshold showing that the defendant's sanity at the time of the offense is likely to matter at trial. No such showing was made in this case. 2. 94 Even if we assume that Hightower made the showing Ake requires, we hold that the trial court met its constitutional obligation under Ake by providing Hightower with defense funds that could have been spent on the services of a psychiatric expert. 95 In addition to the $750 it granted specifically for a psychiatric expert, the court gave Hightower a lump sum of $5,000 for defense expenses. In Hightower's view, it would have been improper under the circumstances for his lawyers to use any portion of this lump sum for a psychiatric expert. The Georgia Supreme Court decided to the contrary on direct appeal, finding instead that Hightower could have used this lump sum for a special investigator or other such expert assistance as [he] might choose. Hightower v. State, 259 Ga. 770, 386 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1989). This finding of fact is entitled to a presumption of correctness, one that Hightower can rebut only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 96 The thrust of Hightower's argument before us is that the court awarded the lump sum specifically in response to counsel's requests for funds for nonpsychiatric experts, i.e., demographers, jury specialists, and special investigators. Hightower points to the following exchange that took place between defense counsel and the court at the pretrial hearing on August 31, 1987: 97 THE COURT: All right. How much money are you asking for insofar as the special investigator is concerned? 98 MS. [sic] BUICE: Your Honor, I think that what we would like to have would be a sum of $5,000 to be able to proportion this between an investigator as well as a jury specialist. I had contacted a jury specialist and they have not called me back at this point. I believe the last information I got their fee was somewhere around $2,500, $1,500 to $2,500. 99 THE COURT: Well, I am going to deny your motion for a jury selection specialist. I am going to deny your motion for a demographer. What else did you ask for? 100 MS. GEORGE: Special Investigator. 101 THE COURT: I am going to grant your motion for a special investigator and authorize you to expend up to $5,000. Now, I am not going to require you to — if you want to spend your $5,000, part of it on a jury selection specialist, that's up to you. I'm just not going to provide any further compensation beyond the $5,000 without an additional hearing. 102 According to Hightower, this dialog definitively establishes an understanding between his attorneys and the court that the $5,000 lump sum could be used for an investigator and a jury consultant, but not for any other purpose. 19 We disagree. Whatever one might conclude from reading this dialog in isolation, the record taken as a whole amply supports the supreme court's finding. First, at the hearings on February 9, 1988, March 9, 1988, and April 15, 1988, counsel referred to their defense funds as discretionary. 20 Second, Hulane George testified before the Butts County Superior Court that she and Buice could [have] allocate[d] [the $5,000] however [they] wanted. 103 Third, the record shows that counsel actually used a portion of the $5,000 lump sum to pay for the services of a psychologist who testified on Hightower's behalf at trial. Dr. Howard Albrecht, Ph.D., testified for the defense during the sentencing phase of the trial. 21 After the trial concluded, George prepared, 22 and the court signed, an order for payment of Dr. Albrecht's services, which we reproduce here: ORDER FOR PAYMENT OF PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATION 104 This Court having found the above-named Defendant indigent, and, 105 HAVING ORDERED on August 31, 1987, the payment of Five Thousand ($5,000.00) Dollars for costs incurred in the defense of the above-styled case and the attached invoice in the amount of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars being received from Dr. Howard Albrecht, Ph.D.; 106 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the County Commissioners of Baldwin County, Georgia pay over to said Dr. Howard Albrecht the sum of One Thousand ($1000.00) Dollars on the behalf of John Hightower, indigent. 107 This 17th Day of May, 1988. 108 /s/ William A. Prior, Jr., Judge Baldwin County Superior Court This Order prepared by: Hulane E. George MILLEDGEVILLE, GEORGIA 31061 109 Attached to the order is Dr. Albrecht's Invoice for Professional Services, addressed to defense counsel and dated May 18, 1988. 23 Without itemizing costs, the invoice merely recites a balance due of $1000 for Forensic Psychological Consultation on the John Hightower case. Thus, defense counsel not only understood that they could use the $5,000 lump sum for a psychiatric expert — they actually did in the case of Dr. Albrecht, a psychologist who, like Dr. Moore, they had chosen themselves. 24 110 The record is therefore replete with evidence showing that defense counsel could, and in fact did, pay for a psychiatric expert out of the $5000 lump sum the trial court granted for defense expenses. 111 Ake makes clear that no criminal defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096. To the extent that Hightower claims the trial court should have granted him funds sufficient to hire Dr. Tanay, therefore, he is mistaken. In giving Hightower $5,750 in discretionary defense funds, the court went further than Ake requires. There was no error. B. 112 Hightower also claims that the trial court violated his due process rights under Ake by permitting the prosecutor to attend and participate in hearings on his requests for funds for psychiatric experts. In Hightower's view, Ake demands that such hearings be conducted ex parte. Because Hightower raised this claim unsuccessfully on direct appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court, our review is once again limited by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 25 113 This issue first arose at the hearing on August 31, 1987, when defense counsel argued their August 6, 1987 Motion for Funds to Hire Independent Psychiatrists. Citing Ake, they argued that they were entitled to present this motion without either the presence or participation of the [prosecutor]. The court rejected this interpretation of Ake and permitted the prosecutor's presence at this and every subsequent hearing at which counsel requested funds for a psychiatric expert. 26 114 In support of his claim, Hightower points to the following language in Ake: When the defendant is able to make an ex parte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is likely to be a significant factor in his defense, the need for the assistance of a psychiatrist is readily apparent. 470 U.S. at 82-83, 105 S.Ct. at 1096. Hightower has expended substantial effort in seeking to convince us that the Supreme Court, through this single sentence, incorporated the ex parte requirement into Ake 's central holding. This effort is misdirected. Since Hightower raised this claim on direct appeal, we focus upon how the Georgia Supreme Court disposed of it, rather than how we would dispose of it on first impression. 115 The supreme court held simply that Hightower [had] not shown any harm from the denial of an ex parte hearing on the funds issue. Hightower v. State, 259 Ga. 770, 386 S.E.2d 509, 511 (1989). Thus, the court, which cited no authority in support of its holding, did not in this case pass directly on the question of whether Ake requires ex parte hearings. 27 Instead, the court, in our understanding, held that even if Hightower had a right to be heard ex parte, he suffered no prejudice from the denial of this right. It is implicit in this reasoning that the right that Hightower claims, if it even exists, is subject to a harmless error analysis. Viewed in this light, his ex parte claim fails both in principle and in application. 116 First, Hightower has not shown that the supreme court committed legal error in implicitly holding that the denial of ex parte hearings can be harmless. We express no opinion as to whether this holding is correct. 28 Our review is instead limited to whether this holding was contrary to or an unreasonable application of the clearly established precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States. We hold that it was not. Hightower does not cite, and we cannot find, any clear Supreme Court precedent stating that the denial of ex parte hearings on requests for expert psychiatric assistance is beyond harmless error analysis. 117 Second, Hightower has not shown that the Georgia Supreme Court erred on the question of prejudice. He contends that, as a result of the trial judge's refusal to conduct ex parte hearings on his requests for expert psychiatric assistance, the prosecutor became privy to defense strategies and to potential weaknesses in the defense's case. 29 Specifically, he asserts that his attorneys were forced to disclose that Dr. Moore had declared himself unqualified to offer a diagnosis, and were required to provide an accounting of the funds they had spent in his defense. The record betrays these assertions. Counsel never revealed that Dr. Moore was unqualified; they merely told the court at the February 9, 1988 hearing that Dr. Moore advised [them] that [they] really needed someone who was an expert in family violence. This mirrors the representation they made in their motion of February 8, 1988, which they served upon the prosecutor. 30 Furthermore, the court never demanded at these hearings that the attorneys provide an accounting of the funds they had spent. Instead, in support of their requests for additional funds counsel merely volunteered that they had already earmarked their existing funds. 31 We cannot say that Hightower suffered prejudice as a result of this disclosure. 118 To maintain absolute secrecy, Hightower's attorneys could have filed their Ake motions under seal and requested that they be reviewed in camera. 32 But as the matter stands before us, given our narrow scope of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), there is no basis upon which to upset the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. We therefore proceed to a discussion of Hightower's remaining claims.