Opinion ID: 4014803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: wiggins claim—strickland prejudice prong

Text: As explained above, the prejudice prong of Strickland allows relief only if there is a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 73 “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 74 “The likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable.” 75 As indicated above, the district court appears to have lumped all of the proposed “new” evidence together for much of its analysis, which heavily focused on the character witness testimony. It is worthwhile to distinguish between Trevino’s proposed character witness testimony and his proposed FASD evidence. The character witness testimony certainly falls under the classic “double-edged” evidence distinction discussed above in connection with Burger and Darden, but the FASD evidence potentially has far greater mitigation value. Trevino’s proposed character witness testimony, as in Burger, contains only weak mitigation evidence but strong additional aggravating evidence, including Trevino’s unpredictable and violent behavior. Thus, no reasonable jurist would debate whether the district court correctly concluded that Trevino had failed to show prejudice in his trial counsel’s failure to discover and introduce the additional character witness testimony. However, that does not necessarily mean that no reasonable jurist would debate whether the district 73 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 74 Id. 75 Brown, 684 F.3d at 491. 34 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 35 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 court properly found that trial counsel’s failure to discover and introduce FASD evidence did not prejudice Trevino. The district court characterized the FASD evidence as “double-edged” in that an FASD diagnosis could tend to show that Trevino would pose a risk of future violent conduct, 76 but it did not discuss the issue at length. Notably, it also highlighted the FASD evidence as the most mitigating “new” evidence: In sum, the “new” evidence presented by Petitioner [including the character witness testimony], while admittedly containing some mitigating aspects (particularly those concerning Petitioner’s mother’s alcoholism and the likelihood Petitioner suffers from Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder), also contains a plethora of information which would have assisted the prosecution in obtaining an affirmative answer to the Texas capital sentencing scheme’s future dangerousness special issue. 77 Dismissing the FASD out-of-hand as “double-edged” is problematic for a few reasons. First, Garza v. Stephens, 738 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 2013), suggests that FASD evidence could potentially be admissible in this case. In Garza, the petitioner raised a new argument in his second state habeas petition based on FASD. The state failed to request dismissal on procedural default grounds, but the district court dismissed the claim on its merits, as did this court, reasoning: Garza contends that trial counsel was ineffective in not investigating and introducing evidence of his possible fetal alcohol syndrome. But, as the district court observed, Garza fails to provide evidence that the underlying facts concerning such a syndrome were made known to trial counsel. Trial counsel had no leads to that effect. None of the family members mentioned the mother’s alcohol or drug abuse to trial counsel; in fact, the witnesses spoke favorably of her at the punishment phase. Furthermore, such evidence was neither located in the TYC file, which contained three separate psychological evaluations of Garza, nor provided by Ferrell at any time. Given trial counsel’s investigation, and the lack 76 2015 WL 3651534 at  (citing Sells v. Thaler, 2012 WL 2562666 at ). 77 Id. 35 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 36 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 of any evidence regarding the mother’s substance use, it was entirely reasonable to not investigate the possible effects of fetal alcohol syndrome. Accordingly, Garza cannot overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s representation on this front fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. 2052. 78 Garza concerns the performance prong of Strickland rather than the prejudice prong, but it suggests that knowledge of a defendant’s mother’s substance abuse should at least cause the trial attorney to investigate further. Although the Garza panel would have excluded the evidence under those circumstances, this case is distinguishable. First, Trevino’s claim is that his trial counsel did not conduct a constitutionally sufficient investigation in the first place. The district court noted in its 2009 opinion that a “wealth” of additional information would have been discovered with “even the most minimal investigation into petitioner’s background.” 79 Second, even the single mitigation witness presented, Trevino’s aunt, testified that Trevino’s mother was an alcoholic and alluded to family problems. It is worth examining more closely the FASD evidence Trevino seeks to develop further, especially the psychological report he has offered since it was completed in 2004: the April 16, 2004 Privileged and Confidential Forensic Psychological Evaluation by Dr. Rebecca A. Dyer, Ph.D., of Forensic Associates of San Antonio. Dr. Dyer’s report sets out the foundation for her report at the outset: Based on reviews of his school records, interviews with his mother and family members, and information provided by Mr. Treviño, Mr. Futrell [one of Trevino’s federal habeas attorneys] reported that there was evidence suggesting that Mr. Treviño has a history of fetal alcohol syndrome and possible cognitive limitations as a result of prenatal exposure to alcohol. Mr. Wolf interviewed the 78 738 F.3d at 681 (emphasis added). 79 678 F. Supp. 2d at 497. 36 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 37 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 attorney who was the ‘Lead Defense Counsel’ at Carlos Treviño’s Capital Murder trial--Mr. Mario Treviño (not related), who acknowledged that information regarding Carlos’ childhood, including his pre-natal exposure to alcohol, was not explored or presented as potential mitigating factors in the punishment phase of Carlos’ trial. In the affidavit provided by Attorney Mario Treviño to Carlos’ habeas attorneys, Mario Treviño, indicated that the defense did not attempt to uncover mitigating evidence about Carlos Treviño’s life, as “mitigation experts were not used very much at the time of the trial.” It was requested that I evaluate Carlos Treviño regarding the possibility of fetal alcohol syndrome and the effects of prenatal alcohol exposure on his cognitive functioning at the time of the capital offense. The opinions presented in this report are based on approximately twelve and a half hours of face-to-face contact with Mr. Treviño, all of which occurred at the Polunsky Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. During this time, I interviewed Mr. Treviño and I administered a comprehensive battery of psychological tests. Dr. Dyer also conducted interviews with a mitigation specialist, with Trevino’s mother (face-to-face), and with the senior warden at the Polunsky unit. She reviewed a number of documents, including Trevino’s school records (from prior to the trial), juvenile probation records (from prior to the trial), detention records (from prior to the trial), various sworn affidavits and statements (post-trial), and miscellaneous documents largely concerning psychological tests and correspondence (apparently all post-trial). Based on all of the above, Dr. Dyer wrote the following summary and opinion: Review of Mr. Trevino’s history indicates a number of factors that likely had a negative impact on his cognitive, behavioral and emotional development. Most notable is his heavy prenatal exposure to alcohol. Prenatal exposure to alcohol has been associated in the literature with the development of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS), a term that was first coined in 1973. Fetal Alcohol Syndrome is diagnosed when there is apparent facial dysmorphology, growth restriction, and central nervous system and neurodevelopmental abnormalities, with or without confirmed 37 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 38 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 prenatal exposure to alcohol. Additionally, extensive research has documented that individuals who were exposed to alcohol prenatally may present with some, but not all of the characteristics of FAS, which is described as being someone with Fetal Alcohol Effects (FAE). This term is frequently used to describe adults who were not identified with FAS as children, as longitudinal studies have found that as individuals age, some of the characteristic signs of FAS become less prominent, particularly the facial dysmorphology and growth restriction characteristics. However, studies have shown that individuals with signicant [sic] prenatal exposure to alcohol tend to demonstrate varying degrees of cognitive, academic, attentional and behavioral difficulties throughout child and adulthood. Based on my extensive interviews with Mr. Treviño, the results of a comprehensive battery of psychological tests, my interview with his mother, and my review of the documents associated with his medical, developmental, social and academic history, it is my opinion that Mr. Treviño presents with the characteristics of FAE. Though not clearly conclusive, his facial features include notable distinguishing eye characteristics. His stature is slightly below the norm for his age and ethnic group, although this finding is obviously a less distinguishing feature. His prenatal exposure to alcohol was significant, as was his low birth weight. It is unfortunate that early childhood medical records are unavailable, although Mr. Treviño’s mother admits that she largely neglected to obtain regular medical consultation and check-ups, as well as medical evaluation and treatment in the case of illness or what she determined to be minor, non-life threatening injuries. The results of the intellectual assessments indicate that Mr. Treviño is functioning within the low average range of intellectual functioning. His verbal, performance and full scale IQ scores are consistent with those found in individuals with FAE. Other characteristics consistent with FAE include a history of employing poor problem-solving strategies, attentional deficits, poor academic functioning, memory difficulties, and history of substance abuse, all characteristics that are present in Mr. Treviño’s history and test results. Although many of these characteristics are also consistent with a history of physical abuse, neglect, and other clinical and behavioral disorders, it is important to note that research has indicated that only individuals with FAS/FAE tend to present with long term problems with adaptive 38 Case: 15-70019 Document: 00513587138 Page: 39 Date Filed: 07/11/2016 No. 15-70019 functioning, regardless of home background, history of childhood abuse or trauma, social background, or history of clinical and/or behavioral problems. In essence, individuals with histories of significant prenatal exposure to alcohol have been shown to present with deficits in adaptive behavior, poor judgment, attentional deficits, and other cognitive deficits throughout childhood, adolescence and into adulthood, which is not the finding in individuals with other childhood difficulties. In addition, the deficits found in FAS/FAE children tend to become more debilitating as these individuals get older.