Opinion ID: 1428244
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Employees Are a Captive Audience

Text: In addition to high court authority recognizing free speech limitations at the workplace, another analytical strand that recurs frequently in Supreme Court decisions is relevant here. The Supreme Court has in a number of cases recognized that when an audience has no reasonable way to escape hearing an unwelcome message, greater restrictions on a speaker's freedom of expression may be tolerated. Stated differently, even if the speaker enjoys the right to free speech, he or she has no corollary right to force people to listen. The relevance of a captive audience to determining the scope of First Amendment protection of speech is exemplified by Frisby, supra, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420. In that case, the Supreme Court upheld an ordinance that prohibited focused picketing in front of an individual's home. Although picketing is generally characterized as core political speech ( Carey v. Brown (1980) 447 U.S. 455, 460, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263; Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham (1969) 394 U.S. 147, 152, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162) and was so in Frisby (the resident was targeted because he was a physician who performed abortions), the Supreme Court explained that [t]he First Amendment permits the government to prohibit offensive speech as intrusive when the `captive' audience cannot avoid the objectionable speech. ( Frisby, supra, at p. 487, 108 S.Ct. 2495.) The high court responded to similar concerns in Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser (1986) 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 ( Bethel School ). In Bethel School, the high court upheld discipline imposed on a high school student who gave a speech laced with sexual innuendo at a school assembly that many students were required to attend. Although relying largely on the presence of children at the assembly, the high court also stated that school authorities acting in loco parentis [should] protect children especially in a captive audience from exposure to sexually explicit, indecent, or lewd speech. ( Id. at p. 684, 106 S.Ct. 3159, italics added.) That the presence of a captive audience is important in determining the proper degree of First Amendment protection was also discussed in Rowan v. Post Office Dept. (1970) 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 ( Rowan ). In Rowan, the appellants challenged the constitutionality of a federal law that permitted householders to request their name be removed from mailing lists so they might not receive sexually themed mailings. The Supreme Court upheld the law, stating: We ... categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right to press even `good' ideas on an unwilling recipient. That we are often `captives' outside the sanctuary of the home and subject to objectionable speech... does not mean we must be captives everywhere. ( Id. at p. 738, 90 S.Ct. 1484.) In addition to Frisby, Bethel School and Rowan, numerous other cases have cited an audience's captivity as a factor justifying limitations on free speech. ( FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978) 438 U.S. 726, 748-750, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (plur.opn.) ( Pacifica ) [possibility that nonconsenting adults might inadvertently tune in to radio broadcast containing indecent speech justified precluding broadcast during the day]; id. at p. 759, 98 S.Ct. 3026 (cone. opn. of Powell, J.) [Although the First Amendment may require unwilling adults to absorb the first blow of offensive but protected speech when they are in public before they turn away ..., a different order of values obtains in the home.]; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville (1975) 422 U.S. 205, 209, 95 S.Ct. 2268, 45 L.Ed.2d 125 ( Erznoznik ) [restrictions on speech are justified when the degree of captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure]; id. at p. 218, 95 S.Ct. 2268 (cone, opn. of Douglas, J.) [endorsing view that a narrowly drawn ordinance could be utilized within constitutional boundaries to protect the interests of captive audiences]; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 302, 94 S.Ct. 2714 (plur.opn.) [recognizing riders of public transit are a captive audience to advertising placed inside the cars]; id. at pp. 306-307, 94 S.Ct. 2714 (cone. opn. of Douglas, J.) [also recognizing bus riders are a captive audience]; Cohen v. California, supra, 403 U.S. at pp. 21-22, 91 S.Ct. 1780 [noting those objecting to the defendant's objectionable message, exhibited on his jacket, could simply avert their eyes].) The relative captivity of plaintiffs here supports the restriction on defendant Lawrence's speech. Plaintiffs were not present at their job because they wished to hear Lawrence's particular views on their Latino heritage, but neither were they reasonably free to walk away when confronted with his racial slurs. Although plaintiffs could have avoided the undesired speech by quitting their jobs and seeking employment with more racially tolerant supervisors, the cases discussed above indicate the captive audience doctrine is not reserved for situations in which listeners are physically unable to leave, such as passengers on airplanes or inmates in prison. The Constitution does not require plaintiffs to sacrifice their employment to avoid a racially clamorous work environment any more than the doctor in Frisby, supra, 487 U.S. 474, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 was required to move from his home, the students in Bethel School, supra, 478 U.S. 675, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 were required to leave school, or the passengers in Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, supra 418 U.S. 298, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 were required to walk home. People need not engage in heroic efforts before We will conclude they have sufficiently averted their eyes and plugged their ears. People need to work; expecting them to walk past someone handing out leaflets on the sidewalk without accepting and reading the flyer is not the same as requiring them to walk off their job to avoid unwanted speech. So long as avoiding unwelcome speech isas heresufficiently impractical ( Erznoznik, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 209, 95 S.Ct. 2268), we can conclude listeners constitute a captive audience, with the result that courts will show greater solicitude for their privacy and their right not to be forced to listen to unwelcome speech. Most of the cases cited above concededly did not solely concern a captive audience. Frisby, Pacifica and Rowan relied in addition on the increased privacy interest in one's home. ( Frisby, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 484-485, 108 S.Ct. 2495; Pacifica, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 731, fn. 2, 748-749, 98 S.Ct. 3026; Rowan, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 738, 90 S.Ct. 1484 [emphasizing the sanctuary of the home]; cf. Wilson v. Layne (1999) ___ U.S. ___, ___, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ [The Fourth Amendment embodies this centuries-old principle of respect for the privacy of the home....].) Bethel School and Pacifica relied also on the presence of children. ( Bethel School, supra, 478 U.S. at pp. 683-684, 106 S.Ct. 3159; Pacifica, supra, at pp. 731, fn. 2, 749-750, 98 S.Ct. 3026.) Pacifica, Rowan and Erznoznik involved, as well, lewd or indecent speech. ( Pacifica, supra, at pp. 739-740, 98 S.Ct. 3026; Rowan, supra, at p. 730, 90 S.Ct. 1484; Erznoznik, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 207, 95 S.Ct. 2268 [ordinance prohibited drive-in theater with screen visible from public street from exhibiting any film portraying nudity].) The applicability of the captive audience doctrine to harassing speech in the workplace is, moreover, debated by legal commentators. (Compare Volokh, Workplace Harassment, supra, 39 U.C.L.A. L.Rev. at pp. 1832-1843 [captive audience doctrine should not apply to the workplace], with Sangree, No Collision in Sight, supra, 47 Rutgers L.Rev. at pp. 515-518 [rejecting Professor Volokh's argument], and Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, supra, 47 Rutgers L.Rev. at pp. 571-572 [replying to Professor Sangree]; cf. Cohen v. California, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 21, 91 S.Ct. 1780 [Of course, the mere presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving offense.].) Nevertheless, the Supreme Court authority discussed above firmly establishes, at the least, that the relative captivity of an audience is a relevant and important, if not dispositive, factor in determining whether government restrictions on speech in the workplace are permissible under the First Amendment. Applying that concept here, I find that although defendant Lawrence may desire to offer his apparently low opinion of the Latino workers at his place of employment, plaintiffs apparently do not wish to hear it. Further, plaintiffs were not free to walk away easily from Lawrence's speech, avert their eyes, cover their ears or otherwise avoid hearing his unwanted message. I conclude plaintiffs' status as forced recipients of Lawrence's speech lends support to the conclusion that restrictions on his speech are constitutionally permissible in the circumstances at hand, where the regulation of speech is limited solely to the workplace and the offended recipients constitute a captive audience.