Opinion ID: 767109
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fleming and Morgan

Text: 21 Fleming and Morgan also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because their actions did not constitute a violation of Shehee's rights. With respect to Shehee's First Amendment retaliation claims, Fleming and Morgan contend that they cannot be liable because they neither fired nor had the authority to fire Shehee from his job at the commissary, the retaliatory act of which Shehee complains. We agree. In order to set forth a First Amendment retaliation claim,a plaintiff must establish that: 1) he was engaged in protected conduct; 2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and 3) the adverse action was motivated, in least in part, by the protected conduct. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Here, Shehee's protected conduct was the filing of grievances, and the alleged adverse action taken against him was his dismissal from his commissary job. The defect in Shehee's claim is that neither Fleming nor Morgan were involved in his firing, the alleged adverse action. Despite Shehee's contention that Fleming and Morgan instigated his firing, these men did not have the ability to terminate Shehee from his commissary position. For this reason, Shehee simply does not set forth a valid First Amendment retaliation claim against Fleming or Morgan. 22 Shehee also claims that Fleming and Morgan harassed him by fabricating the alcohol allegation because Shehee refused to participate in Fleming's alleged kickback scheme. This claim does not implicate Shehee's First Amendment rights and, thus, is more properly characterized as a substantive due process claim of abuse of authority. 5 See id. at 387-88. Abuse of authority is not a constitutional violation unless the behavior shocks the conscience or is an egregious abuse of governmental power. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, -, 118 S. Ct. 1708, 1717 (1998); Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 387-88. Fleming and Morgan contend that accepting Shehee's allegations as true, their behavior did not shock the conscience. Again, we agree. Shehee admits to the presence of rotting fruit in a cooler in the commissary, but claims that Fleming and Morgan fabricated the allegation that Shehee was attempting to make alcohol from the fruit in retaliation for Shehee's refusal to participate in Fleming's kickback scheme. Shehee, however, acknowledges that Fleming and Morgan accused all seven inmates who worked in the commissary of attempting to make alcohol. We do not believe that Fleming and Morgan's actions of accusing all the inmates who worked in the commissary of attempting to make alcohol after finding rotting fruit are actions that shock the conscience, even if done with a retaliatory motive. Accordingly, Shehee's allegations do not rise to the level of an abuse of authority claim. 23 Finally, Shehee claims that his right to equal protection under the law was violated because he was treated differently from other inmates when he was fired before the other participants in the alcohol scheme were fired. We first note that Shehee has not established that he is a member of a protected class as is necessary for an equal protection claim. See Henry v. Metropolitan Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990). Shehee still can make out an equal protection claim, however, if he can show that defendants' different classification of him was not rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976). Even if Shehee could make this showing, we fail to see how the defendants can be liable for treating him differently by firing him, when they had no authority to do so. It is undisputed that Shehee was fired by Robertson, who is not a party to this appeal. Accordingly, Sheheehas failed to set forth a valid equal protection claim against the defendants.