Opinion ID: 2508088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sufficiency of the evidence regarding damages

Text: Mainor and Harris assert that there was no legal or evidentiary basis for the jury's determination that Jason was entitled to a larger share of the settlement proceeds because the Naults failed to show proximate causation. Mainor's efforts resulted in a $17 million settlement, which provided Jason with more than enough to meet his needs for the rest of his life. Mainor and Harris assert that, while Jason's life expectancy had changed since the time of the settlement, it was still very short and there was no evidence that his annuity was insufficient to meet his needs. This court will overturn a jury verdict if substantial evidence does not support it, assuming that `the jury believed the evidence favorable to [the prevailing party] and made all reasonable inferences in [that party's] favor.' [60] The required elements of a legal malpractice claim are: (1) an attorney-client relationship; (2) a duty owed to the client by the attorney to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity possess in exercising and performing the tasks which they undertake; (3) a breach of that duty; (4) the breach being the proximate cause of the client's damages; and (5) actual loss or damage resulting from the negligence. [61] Mainor and Harris contend that the evidence regarding damages was too speculative to constitute substantial evidence to support the jury's $3.25 million verdict against them. We agree. Mainor and Harris objected, by a motion in limine, to testimony that Jason should have recovered 80 percent of the total settlement, as speculative and lacking foundation. Mainor and Harris also objected at trial to testimony that Jason's annuity would fall short of his medical expenses thirty-five years in the future. The district court admitted the testimony over Mainor and Harris's objections. Although Mainor and Harris do not specifically raise on appeal the admissibility of that evidence, the error is apparent on the record, and we may take cognizance of plain error sua sponte.  [62] The record reveals that one of the Naults' expert witnesses, a Los Angeles attorney, testified that Jason should have received 80 percent of the global settlement. At trial, in the presence of the jury, the expert discussed this court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Bush. [63] The expert informed the jury that, in Bush, the jury awarded the injured husband, whose condition was virtually identical to Jason's, $3,000,000 and awarded the wife $500,000 for her loss of consortium claim. The expert informed the jury that the wife's award in Bush equated to 14 percent of the verdict. In the present case, however, Jason received only 14 percent of the settlement. The expert therefore testified that the current division of the settlement was unreasonable and that Jason, as the injured party, should have received 80 percent of the global settlement. We believe that the expert's reliance on Bush is misplaced. We determined in Bush that the injured party's wife was entitled to a separate award for loss of consortium and that it did not amount to a double recovery. Nowhere in our opinion in Bush, do we compare the wife's award with her husband's, nor did we approve any formula ratio between the two. Therefore, we believe that the expert's reliance on Bush was inappropriate and his discussion of the case during trial was misleading. We also believe that this testimony was highly speculative and lacked foundation in that it was not based on any treatise of law or on Nevada law regarding apportionment of settlement proceeds between an injured spouse and his wife. Furthermore, testimony indicated that, at the time of the medical equipment failure and when the settlement sum was allocated, Jason was not expected to live very long. One doctor predicted that Jason would survive for one year at most. Based on this information, the attorneys, in allocating the settlement proceeds, did not anticipate that Jason could have lived as long as he has, much less that he might live thirty-five more years. Although another expert witness testified that Jason's medical needs thirty-five years in the future would significantly exceed his monthly annuity, the attorneys' and Louise's decision to purchase an annuity that could potentially fall short of expenses thirty-five years from the date of Jason's injury should not be evaluated with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight [64] that Jason would live much longer than the doctors expected. Nor was it unreasonable for the attorneys to rely upon the doctors' predictions. Jamie Chrisman, the attorney who had represented Southwest Airlines in the medical malpractice action, testified that he monitored Jason's care and medical expenses during the medical malpractice suit. Chrisman testified that it was he who hired experts to determine Jason's future medical costs if he were to receive the best care that was available. According to Chrisman, the settlement exceeded their target by more than three times, as they had hoped for a $5 million settlement. Chrisman also testified that the attorneys worked to achieve Louise's goal of having some start-up funds to buy a house, modify it for a disabled person and purchase necessary medical equipment for Jason. Additionally, trial testimony established that Jason's annuity was not taxable. The evidence also showed that the approximately $2.5 million lump sum payment to Louise was not taxable, but, if it had been paid to Jason, approximately $800,000 would have been taken as tax. Furthermore, Wendy Nault, Jason's mother and co-guardian, conceded that, although little was left over per month from Jason's annuity, all of Jason's needs had been met by his annuity. She also admitted that she and her husband bought a new house for Jason using his annuity, but took title in their names, and that they pay $5,000 per month on the mortgage from his annuity. Wendy admitted that the family court subsequently ordered them to convey title to the real property to Jason. She also testified that they had added a pool and jacuzzi to the house, upon the recommendation of Jason's physical therapist, out of Jason's annuity. Wendy further testified that, initially, she and her husband paid themselves $4,500 per month from Jason's annuity as a case management fee, but that the family court had ordered them to reduce that fee to $1,500 per month as of January 2001. We conclude that the district court erroneously admitted the speculative damages testimony and, therefore, no substantial evidence supports the jury's finding that Jason, through his guardians, met his burden of proof with regard to the damages element of his legal malpractice claim.