Opinion ID: 2442854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Shore Lands Property and the Circuit Court for Talbot County

Text: As we have held that the Board of Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the Council's legislative decisions not to reclassify properties for Plan purposes, we must now address whether the Circuit Court for Talbot County has such jurisdiction. In briefing this issue, Shore Lands argues that the Circuit Court has jurisdiction, and that administrative mandamus is the proper mechanism for review of the Council's action. [15] The Town of Easton rebuts these arguments for administrative mandamus, and also argues against common law mandamus. We will consider both administrative mandamus and common law mandamus as potential remedies in Shore Lands's case. The function of a writ of mandamus is to compel inferior tribunals, public officials or administrative agencies to perform their function[s], or perform some particular duty imposed upon them... [where] the party applying for the writ has a clear legal right to the performance of that duty. Casey v. Mayor & City Council of Rockville, 400 Md. 259, 317, 929 A.2d 74, 109 (2007) (quotation marks and citations omitted). In this way, a writ of mandamus is an equitable remedy, akin to specific performance. See Ipes v. Bd. of Fire Comm'rs of Balt., 224 Md. 180, 183, 167 A.2d 337, 339 (1961). Even if mandamus does not lie here, however, the Council's actions are not completely insulated from judicial scrutiny. Legislative action by a local government or agency is still subject to review by the courts, though the standard of review is extremely narrow. Judicial scrutiny of legislative action under a court's ordinary jurisdiction is limited to assessing whether [a government body] was acting within its legal boundaries. County Council of Prince George's County v. Offen, 334 Md. 499, 507, 639 A.2d 1070, 1074 (1994) (quotation marks and citation omitted). This is an even more limited standard than the already narrow review for arbitrary and capricious action, or for action unsupported by substantial evidence. Cf. Judy v. Schaefer, 331 Md. 239, 264-66, 627 A.2d 1039, 1052-53 (1993) (discussing judicial review of administrative decisions). Under this legal boundaries standard, government legislative action will be permitted to stand as long as it was consistent with relevant law. Id. If the legislative action exceeds the acting agency's legal authority, however, the courts have the power to correct the extralegal conduct pursuant to their original jurisdiction. See, e.g., Medstar Health v. Md. Health Care Comm'n, 376 Md. 1, 20-21, 827 A.2d 83, 95-96 (2003) (discussing the availability of a declaratory judgment in legal boundaries review of administrative rulemaking, a legislative action); see also Armstrong v. Mayor & City Council of Balt., 169 Md. App. 655, 666-68, 906 A.2d 415, 421-23 (2006) (holding that a court may act by issuing an injunction, a declaratory judgment, or a writ of mandamus). Thus, if mandamus does not lie as an extraordinary remedy in these cases, the Council's actions will still be subject to review, and if necessary to correction, under this narrower standard.