Opinion ID: 2046349
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were the jury instructions proper?

Text: The narrow question we must consider is whether the district court adequately instructed the jury concerning the specifications of negligence as alleged by plaintiff Herbst in her action against the defendant University. Our standard of review concerning alleged error with respect to jury instructions is for correction of errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4; Duncan v. City of Cedar Rapids, 560 N.W.2d 320, 325 (Iowa 1997). Error in giving or refusing to give a particular instruction does not warrant reversal unless the error is prejudicial to the party. Sonnek v. Warren, 522 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Iowa 1994); Coker v. Abell-Howe Co., 491 N.W.2d 143, 148 (Iowa 1992).
The rules concerning instructions by the trial court to the jury are well established. Under Iowa law, a court is required to give a requested instruction when it states a correct rule of law having application to the facts of the case and when the concept is not otherwise embodied in other instructions. Gamerdinger v. Schaefer, 603 N.W.2d 590, 595 (Iowa 1999). Parties to lawsuits are entitled to have their legal theories submitted to a jury if they are supported by the pleadings and substantial evidence in the record. Sonnek, 522 N.W.2d at 47. When weighing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a requested instruction, we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party seeking the instruction. Duncan, 560 N.W.2d at 325; Sonnek, 522 N.W.2d at 47. Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. Coker, 491 N.W.2d at 150. Instructions must be considered as a whole, and if some part was given improperly, the error is cured if the other instructions properly advise the jury as to the legal principles involved. Thavenet v. Davis, 589 N.W.2d 233, 237 (Iowa 1999). With respect to a negligence claim not involving res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must identify the specific acts or omissions relied on to generate a jury issue. Bigalk v. Bigalk, 540 N.W.2d 247, 249 (Iowa 1995). Jury instructions should be formulated so as to require the jury to focus on each specification of negligence that finds support in the evidence. Id. We explained in Bigalk that the requirement for instructing on specific acts or omissions is at least partially designed to assure that the jury will give consideration to each of the alleged acts or omissions in determining the overall question of breach of duty. Id. On this same point we have said: The purpose of requiring the jury to consider factual specifications is to limit the determination of facts or questions arising in negligence claims to only those acts or omissions upon which the court has had an opportunity to make a preliminary determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to generate a jury question. Each specification should identify either a certain thing the allegedly negligent party did which that party should not have done, or a certain thing that party omitted that should have been done, under the legal theory of negligence that is applicable. Coker, 491 N.W.2d at 151 (citations omitted). The facts of the particular case, of course, determine whether a court's instructions concerning negligence sufficiently encompass all specifications of negligence alleged by a plaintiff. For example, in Schuller v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1982), plaintiff fell over a canister ashtray in the aisle of a grocery store. Plaintiff sought submission of four specifications of negligence against the defendant: (1) blocking an aisle by placement of the ashtray; (2) placing an ashtray in a concealed location; (3) failing to place the ashtray in a safe location; and (4) failing to warn of the ashtray's location. Schuller, 328 N.W.2d at 331-32. The court, however, submitted only the issue of whether defendant was negligent in placing the ashtray stand in an aisle where customers were expected to walk. Id. at 332. On appeal, we concluded that plaintiff's first three specifications of negligence were all based on the concept of placement of the canister and that this concept was adequately incorporated in the single specification of negligence submitted to the jury. Id. In Bigalk, plaintiff was injured when she fell into an unguarded stairwell. In her suit against the property owner, plaintiff alleged that defendant was negligent in (1) failing to warn of the danger, (2) providing inadequate illumination in the area of the stairwell, (3) not covering the open stairwell, and (4) not providing a railing around the stairwell. 540 N.W.2d at 248-49. The court, however, advised the jury that the defendant was negligent in failing to make the open stairway safe or in failing to warn the plaintiff of the open stairway and the risk involved. Id. at 249. Plaintiff objected to the court's instruction, arguing that it failed to advise the jury concerning the specific acts or omissions by defendant relating to failure to provide adequate illumination, failure to cover the opening, or failure to provide a railing. Id. On appeal, we reversed, concluding that the court's instruction failed to ensure that the jury would give consideration to each of the alleged acts or omissions in determining the overall question of whether defendant breached its duty owed to plaintiff. Id. We said that plaintiff was entitled to have the jury instructed concerning each alleged act or omission that found support in the evidence. Id. at 250.
On appeal, defendant does not dispute that it owed Herbst a duty of care in this premises liability case. As above stated, the main question here is whether the district court adequately instructed the jury concerning Herbst's requested specifications of negligence that were supported by the evidence. Like the plaintiff in Bigalk, plaintiff Herbst challenges the manner in which the district court instructed the jury on her specific claims of negligence. Herbst's theory was that the University breached its duties owed to her in at least three ways, as presented in her requested jury instruction: a) permitting makeshift stairs to be used for access onto the stage at the Opera Rehearsal Hall. b) failing to provide a safe and secure set of stairs for access onto the stage at the Opera Rehearsal Hall. c) failing to provide unimpeded access to the permanent stairs for access to the stage at the Opera Rehearsal Hall. The district court, however, refused to instruct the jury as requested by Herbst. Over Herbst's timely objection, the court instructed the jury only on the following specification of negligence: The defendant, on June 17, 1995, was negligent in failing to provide safe and secure access onto the stage at the Opera Rehearsal Hall. Herbst asserts that the court's instruction failed to adequately advise the jury concerning the potential ways in which defendant was negligent, i.e., permitting makeshift stairs to be used for access to the stage, failing to provide a safe and secure set of stairs for access onto the stage, and failing to provide unimpeded access to the permanent stairs. Herbst also contends that the court's instruction allowed the jury to incorrectly find that the University satisfied its duty owed to Herbst simply by making a permanent set of stairs available. Upon our review, we generally agree with Herbst's contentions. First, the parties do not dispute the facts surrounding Herbst's fall. For instance, the record shows that although a set of portable steps was usually available for use in the opera rehearsal hall, those stairs could not be found on the day of Herbst's fall. As a result, people used various means to access the stage. Thus, substantial evidence of a negligent act exists in the record to submit Herbst's requested specification of negligence with respect to whether defendant permitted makeshift stairs to be used for access onto and off the stage. We believe it likewise follows that there was substantial evidence to support submission of Herbst's theory of a negligent omission in that the University was negligent in failing to provide safe and secure access onto and off the stage. Herbst's specification of negligence concerning unimpeded access to the permanent set of stairs would be encompassed in the above specifications. The University argues that Herbst's theories of negligence were adequately incorporated in the court's general instruction regarding safe and secure access onto the stage. We conclude, however, that the court's instruction did not adequately ensure that the jury would give separate consideration to the alleged act or omission by the University as stated above. Accordingly, we vacate the decision of the court of appeals and reverse the judgment of the district court.