Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Combs Kidnapping.

Text: On March 11, 1981, Combs was kidnapped by defendant at gunpoint and forced to drive from Santa Maria to Los Angeles, where defendant placed him in the trunk of his car, but subsequently let him go. The trial court ruled Combs could testify to defendant's possession of both revolvers (the Raven and the Galesi), but evidence of the kidnapping should be excluded. The evidence came in, however, during cross-examination of defendant, after he denied on direct having been convicted of any serious crimes of violence. Defendant acknowledges defense counsel's question about his convictions opened the door for the prosecutor to cross-examine defendant on the kidnapping, notwithstanding lack of a conviction for the offense. (See People v. Lanphear (1980) 26 Cal.3d 814, 833-834 [163 Cal. Rptr. 601, 608 P.2d 689], vacated California v. Lanphear (1980) 449 U.S. 810 [66 L.Ed.2d 13, 101 S.Ct. 57], reiterated People v. Lanphear (1980) 28 Cal.3d 463 [171 Cal. Rptr. 505, 622 P.2d 950].) He claims, however, counsel was incompetent for creating the situation that permitted the prosecutor to elicit evidence of the other crime. The record shows that in asking defendant about his criminal history, defense counsel misspoke. Although counsel asked defendant, Have you ever been convicted of any serious crimes of violence such as rape or mayhem or murder or anything like that? he intended to ask only whether or not defendant had ever killed anybody or raped or committed murder; indeed, until the court corrected him, this is the question counsel believed he had asked. Such a slip of the tongue does not, in our view, establish ineffective assistance of counsel. (4) The issue, in any event, is whether counsel's error prejudiced defendant. ( People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 584 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144]; People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 415 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) Although the Combs kidnapping tended to suggest defendant played a dominant role in the Benham kidnapping, in that both victims were placed in the trunk of a car, it also strongly reinforced defendant's defense that, on his own, he did not commit homicides. At defense counsel's request the jury heard Combs's prior testimony at defendant's Riverside trial, wherein Combs related how defendant, on placing him in the trunk, asked if he could breathe and later, during a stop for gasoline, asked if he was okay and ultimately released him unharmed. In light of all the other evidence connecting defendant to the Benham crime, including his admission of robbing Benham at the gas station and driving the car to the murder site, his possession of her rings, and Laughlin's testimony to his confession, it is not reasonably probable a determination more favorable to defendant would have resulted in the absence of counsel's improvident question. ( People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 425; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 584; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052].)