Opinion ID: 2516621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Is RCW 9A.44.115 void for vagueness?

Text: Glas and Sorrells both contend that the voyeurism statute is void for vagueness. We disagree. A statute is void for vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Luvene, 118 Wash.2d at 844, 827 P.2d 1374 (citing City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wash.2d 171, 177, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)). A vagueness challenge is rooted in principles of due process: the need to define prohibited conduct with sufficient specificity to put citizens on notice of what conduct they must avoid, and the need to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement. Id. (citing Webster, 115 Wash.2d at 642-43, 802 P.2d 1333; State v. Smith, 111 Wash.2d 1, 4-5, 759 P.2d 372 (1988)). The Court of Appeals in Glas determined that the statute was not vague because the court could define hostile intrusion, even though it was not defined in the statute, and any ordinary person would understand that taking a picture up a woman's skirt would constitute a hostile intrusion. Glas, 106 Wash.App. at 904-06, 27 P.3d 216. This interpretation could mean that any place where a woman believed that someone should not look up her dress would be a location where a person would possess a reasonable expectation of privacy. Almost everywhere would be included, both public and private places, leading to potential overbreadth. Such an interpretation could ostensibly criminalize lustful thoughts since the statute covers viewing a person, defined as the intentional looking upon of another person for more than a brief period of time, in other than a casual or cursory manner, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire. RCW 9A.44.115(1)(d). A court will presume that a statute is constitutional and it will make every presumption in favor of constitutionality where the statute's purpose is to promote safety and welfare, and the statute bears a reasonable and substantial relationship to that purpose. Eze, 111 Wash.2d at 26, 759 P.2d 366; State v. Lee, 135 Wash.2d 369, 390, 957 P.2d 741 (1998). Following this general rule, we need only interpret the statute as written, giving meaning to all of its provisions. In doing so, we need not rely on the definition of hostile intrusion, to the exclusion of a casual intrusion to determine that the statute is not vague. If the statute is read as written, then casual or hostile intrusion refers to the place where the intrusion occurs, not the intruder's mental intent. Accordingly, the statute would not be vague because it would encompass a place where a person would not expect either a casual or hostile intrusion, including a living room in a private domicile or an enclosed office, but not a public place. Accordingly, we conclude that RCW 9A.44.115 is not void for vagueness.