Opinion ID: 2369159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sameness of Findings Supporting Departures

Text: Under the version of Jessica's Law in effect at the time of the 2007 crimes at issue here, a defendant who is 18 years old or older at the time he or she commits aggravated indecent liberties on a child younger than 14 ordinarily is subject to a Jessica's Law hard 25 sentence for a first offense. K.S.A. 21-4643(a)(1)(C). A sentencing judge may depart from that mandatory minimum term of imprisonment if the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons, following a review of mitigating circumstances. K.S.A. 21-4643(d). The judge shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for the departure. The departure sentence shall be the sentence pursuant to the sentencing guidelines act, K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq . . . ., and no sentence of a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment shall be imposed hereunder. [A]s used in [K.S.A. 21-4643(d)], mitigating circumstances shall include, but are not limited to, the following: (1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. (2) The crime was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbances. (3) The victim was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person, and the defendant's participation was relatively minor. (4) The defendant acted under extreme distress or under the substantial domination of another person. (5) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. (6) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime. K.S.A. 21-4643(d). Once a sentence becomes a guidelines sentence, the district court is free to depart from the sentencing grid if it states on the record findings of fact and reasons justifying a departure that are supported by evidence in the record and are substantial and compelling. State v. Gracey, 288 Kan. 252, 259, 200 P.3d 1275 (2009). K.S.A. 21-4716(a) provides that a sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence under the sentencing guidelines unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure; if the judge chooses to depart, he or she shall state on the record at the time of sentencing the substantial and compelling reasons for the departure. The nonexclusive list of statutory mitigating factors includes [t]he degree of harm or loss attributed to the current crime of conviction was significantly less than typical for such an offense. K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(E). The factors explicitly listed do not include the age of the defendant, his or her lack of a significant criminal history, or family support. K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(A)-(E). The State argues that Judge Dowd erred by using the same mitigating circumstances to justify both the departure from the Jessica's Law hard 25 to the sentencing guidelines and the dispositional departure from what the judge believed to be the guidelines' presumptive prison sentence of 155 months to 36 months' probation. This issue was specifically left open in the Gracey opinion, decided under the same version of Jessica's Law applicable in this case. See Gracey, 288 Kan. at 261, 200 P.3d 1275. This argument was not made to Judge Dowd here, and the State's choice to raise the argument on this appeal might be viewed as a violation of its agreement to stand silent at sentencing. However, Spencer does not raise these objections. We therefore will address the merits of the State's argument. The State initially acknowledges that the applicable standard of review is that for statutory interpretation, which is de novo. See State v. Jefferson, 287 Kan. 28, 33, 194 P.3d 557 (2008). But it then proceeds to argue that one reason a sentencing judge should be required to differentiate between the mitigators justifying a departure from Jessica's Law and those justifying a dispositional departure from the default guidelines sentence is that the standard of review applied to one is different from that applied to the other. Citing State v. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. 157, Syl. ¶ 5, 194 P.3d 1195 (2008) (Jessica's Law), and State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan. 719, 724, 176 P.3d 160 (2008) (guidelines sentence), the State asserts that an appellate court evaluates a district court decision on whether mitigators constitute substantial and compelling reasons for departure from Jessica's Law under an abuse of discretion standard. In contrast, it argues, appellate review of a sentencing judge's performance under K.S.A. 21-4716 requires it to first examine the record to discern whether substantial competent evidence supports the articulated reasons for the departure. If that hurdle is cleared, it says, the appellate court then determines, as a matter of law, whether the reasons are substantial and compelling. See K.S.A. 21-4721(d)(1), (2). In Ortega-Cadelan, the defendant challenged the sentencing judge's denial of a motion to depart from a Jessica's Law hard 25 for a rape of a child. Justice Luckert, writing for a unanimous court, rejected a defense argument that each of the mitigators listed in Jessica's Law constituted a per se substantial and compelling reason for a departure, likening the procedure to that mandated by K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1), the general departure provision in the [sentencing guidelines]. . . . [U]nder both the [sentencing guidelines] provision and [Jessica's Law], the district court must consider whether a mitigating circumstance is a substantial and compelling reason for departure under the facts of the case. There is no formula for this determination, and the list of nonexclusive mitigating circumstances merely serves as a guide for analysis. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 165 [194 P.3d 1195]. The sentencing judge's determination that the mitigating circumstances in a particular case constitute substantial and compelling reasons to depart was then evaluated under an abuse of discretion standard. Ortega-Cadelan, 287 Kan. at 165-66, 194 P.3d 1195. It is worthwhile to note that the Gracey opinion followed Ortega-Cadelan in stating that a decision to depart is within the discretion of the sentencing court. Gracey, 288 Kan. at 260, 200 P.3d 1275; see State v. Thomas, 288 Kan. 157, 164, 199 P.3d 1265 (2009). Many others among our now-numerous Jessica's Law cases have done likewise. See State v. Plotner, 290 Kan. 774, 780-81, 235 P.3d 417 (2010); State v. Reyna, 290 Kan. 666, 689-90, 234 P.3d 761 (2010); State v. Trevino, 290 Kan. 317, 322-23, 227 P.3d 951 (2010); State v. Marler, 290 Kan. 119, 127, 223 P.3d 804 (2010) State v. Robison, 290 Kan. 51, 56-57, 222 P.3d 500 (2010); State v. Mondragon, 289 Kan. 1158, 1162, 220 P.3d 369 (2009); State v. Ballard, 289 Kan. 1000, 1009-10, 218 P.3d 432 (2009); State v. Seward, 289 Kan. 715, 721-22, 217 P.3d 443 (2009); State v. Spotts, 288 Kan. 650, 654-56, 206 P.3d 510 (2009); State v. Gilliland, 2010 WL 1379182, at , unpublished opinion filed (April 2, 2010). Further, we have specifically held that the exercise of discretion by a sentencing judge deciding a departure motion does not violate a defendant's right to procedural due process. See State v. Garza, 290 Kan. 1021, 1035, 236 P.3d 501 (2010). Justice Luckert also wrote the second decision cited by the State on this issue, State v. Blackmon, 285 Kan. 719, 176 P.3d 160, a non-Jessica's Law case. Blackmon also differed fundamentally from Ortega-Cadelan, because the issue the court examined was not whether the record supported the existence of a departure factor or whether, on the facts of the case, any cited factor qualified as substantial and compelling. Rather, the issue was whether, as a matter of law, a sentencing judge could ever rely on his or her disagreement with a jury's verdict on the level of recklessness involved in a crime to support a downward departure under K.S.A. 21-4716. The answer was no. See Blackmon, 285 Kan. at 728, 176 P.3d 160 (sentencing judge cannot be permitted to become super juror); see also State v. Martin, 279 Kan. 623, 627-28, 112 P.3d 192 (2005) (issue whether defendant's status as ringleader could ever support upward departure reviewed as a question of law; statutory interpretation required). Gracey echoed Blackmon, although it did not cite to it, relying on the de novo standard applicable to statutory construction questions to decide whether a dispositional departure was ever authorized after a departure from Jessica's Law. See Gracey, 288 Kan. at 257, 200 P.3d 1275 (citing State v. Ruiz-Reyes, 285 Kan. 650, 653, 175 P.3d 849 [2008]). Another recent non-Jessica's Law case that bears revisiting on the nature of our standard of review is State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 735, 175 P.3d 832 (2008), which was written by now Chief Justice Nuss and filed 9 months before Ortega-Cadelan. It involved an upward dispositional departure from presumptive probation; the Court of Appeals had held that the factors on which the sentencing judge relied were not valid departure factors. On the State's petition for review, we upheld the departure sentence, ruling that the defendant mother violated a special fiduciary relationship and her unique position of trust when she handed her 16-year-old son a gun and exhorted him to shoot into an occupied house. Martin, 285 Kan. at 742-43, 745-46, 175 P.3d 832. Chief Justice Nuss wrote: There is no dispute in the instant case about whether the evidence in the record supports the reasons given by the sentencing court for the departure. Rather, the dispute is whether these reasons are substantial and compelling for departure. Analysis of the present dispute consists of two parts: First, are the reasons given by the sentencing court valid departure factors and, second, `are the reasons, as a whole, substantial and compelling reasons for departure in a given case?' State v. McKay, 271 Kan. 725, 729, 26 P.3d 58 (2001). This determination is a matter of law which we review de novo. 271 Kan. at 728 [26 P.3d 58]. Martin, 285 Kan. at 739 [175 P.3d 832]. In State v. Favela, 259 Kan. 215, 911 P.2d 792 (1996), we also dealt with the appropriate standard of review on the extent of non-Jessica's Law durational sentencing departures. Such a question is subject to an abuse of discretion standard, which is defined as consistent with the `enacted purposes and principles of [the] sentencing guidelines' and `proportionate to the severity of the crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history.' Favela, 259 Kan. at 219, 911 P.2d 792 (quoting K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4719[b][1]). In short, as sometimes happens, this case exposes some failure to communicate in our previous general statements of the standards of review governing Jessica's Law and non-Jessica's Law sentencing departure cases. It appears, however, that the following synthesis is workable and true to the majority of our relevant precedent: (1) When the question is whether the record supported a sentencing judge's particular articulated reasons for departure, an appellate court's standard of review is substantial competent evidence; (2) when the question is whether a sentencing judge correctly concluded that particular mitigating factors constituted substantial and compelling reasons to depart in a particular case, including whether those mitigating factors outweighed any aggravating factors if such a balance was necessary, the appellate standard of review is abuse of discretion; (3) when the question is whether a particular mitigating or aggravating factor can ever, as a matter of law, be substantial and compelling in any case, the appellate standard of review is de novo; and (4) when the challenge focuses on the extent of a durational departure, the appellate standard of review is abuse of discretion, measuring whether the departure is consistent with the purposes of the guidelines and proportionate to the crime severity and the defendant's criminal history. Given this synthesis, the State's argument that varying standards of review command differentiation in the mitigating factors supporting a departure from Jessica's Law and those supporting a dispositional departure from the default guidelines prison sentence dissolves. The State also argues that both the character of the mitigators listed in Jessica's Law and the structure it imposes upon a judge's procedure support its view that Judge Dowd erred when he failed to distinguish two sets of mitigating factors. Regarding the character of the Jessica's Law mitigators, the State relies on the noscitur a sociis canon of statutory construction. Literally it is known from its associates, the canon requires a court to conduct a comparison of the elements of a list to determine meaning of any one item. The State posits that each of the statutory mitigators in Jessica's Law focuses on the culpability of the particular defendant, rather than a broader class of concepts relevant to a reduced need for punishment. Read in this light, the Jessica's Law mitigators are not equivalent and interchangeable with the mitigators listed or not listed in K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1). Regarding structure, the State sees significance in the requirement under Jessica's Law that a sentencing judge evaluate only mitigators before departing. It points out that K.S.A. 21-4716, again, is broader in scope, permitting a sentencing judge to evaluate both mitigators and aggravators before a decision to depart. The State also cites the requirement of a balance of aggravators and mitigators by a jury considering the death penalty and a judge considering imposition of a hard 40 or 50 life sentence, see K.S.A. 21-4624(e) (death penalty); K.S.A. 21-4635(b)(d) (hard 40, 50), to demonstrate that the sole focus on mitigators in Jessica's Law is unique. These character and structure arguments by the State are unpersuasive. There is no need to resort to a statutory canon of construction, because the plain language of the statutes tells us what we need to know about the legislature's intentions. On character, each statute explicitly provides that its list of mitigating factors is nonexclusive. See K.S.A. 21-4643(d); K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1). This means that the courts are free to develop additional mitigating factors on a case-by-case basis. In addition, not all of the Jessica's Law factors focus exclusively on a particular defendant's level of culpability, as the State insists. The third listed factor expressly mentions the role of the victim, as well as the defendant, in the crime. See K.S.A. 21-4643(d)(3). In comparison, the mitigating factors listed in K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(A) through (D) include factors focused on the level of the defendant's culpability, e.g., role in the crime, duress, compulsion, physical or mental impairment, as well as other types of factors, e.g., victim's aggression, lesser degree of harm or loss. On structure, no balance between mitigators and aggravators such as that implied in K.S.A. 21-4716 or explicitly provided for in K.S.A. 21-4624(e) or K.S.A. 21-4635(b)-(d) is necessary when Jessica's Law is the starting point. The only way for Jessica's Law to operate is to intensify, if not lengthen, a sentence. It makes 25 years a mandatory minimum, unless certain mitigators justify a departure. Simply put, there is nowhere to go but to a less-intense place. Under K.S.A. 21-4716, in contrast, departure either upward or downward is possible. Likewise, when a jury is asked to deliberate on a life sentence versus a death sentence, it is sensible and appropriate for both mitigators and aggravators to play a role in the choice between a show of mercy and the ultimate penalty; neither is the otherwise automatic sentence. The same can be said when a judge weighs mitigators and aggravators to determine whether a hard 40 or 50 sentence should be imposed. The State's final argument in favor of requiring a sentencing judge to distinguish between the mitigators that justify a departure from Jessica's Law and then a dispositional departure from the default guidelines prison sentence is an analogy to K.S.A. 21-4719(c)(2). As Spencer's brief points out, this citation actually supports defendant's position more than the State's. K.S.A. 21-4719(c)(2) deals with the situation in which the sentencing judge imposes a prison term as an upward dispositional departure. It specifically provides that, if the judge chooses to then impose a term longer than that specified in the applicable guidelines grid box, the additional prison time shall constitute an additional departure and shall require substantial and compelling reasons independent of the reasons given for the dispositional departure. K.S.A. 21-4719(c)(2). This language demonstrates that the legislature knew exactly how to provide for the procedure advocated by the State for the stacked intensity-lessening departures at issue here. It could have clearly provided that a sentencing judge must rely on separate mitigators to depart, first, from Jessica's Law and, second, dispositionally from the default guidelines sentence. It did not. In view of all of the foregoing, this court endorses the district court's undifferentiated approach to the two departures in this case. Under the statutes at issue, as a matter of law, Judge Dowd was free to use the same mitigating factors to justify both a departure from the mandatory minimum of Jessica's Law and a dispositional departure from the default guidelines prison sentence to probation.