Opinion ID: 406813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: first amendment principles

Text: 56 Even though Michigan's qualified privilege does not apply in this case, we must determine whether any constitutional principle requires Plaintiff to prove that ABC acted with actual malice as defined in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. For the reasons below, we hold that no constitutional principle requires that Plaintiff prove actual malice. 57 The Broadcast raises the factual question of whether Plaintiff was depicted as a prostitute or could have reasonably been mistaken for a prostitute. An editorial opinion held by ABC, no matter how pernicious, would be entitled to First Amendment protection. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3006, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). 58 The First Amendment, however, does not afford ABC the same absolute protection for misstatements of fact. (T)here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Id. at 340, 94 S.Ct. at 3007. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has afforded publishers and broadcasters limited protection from liability in defamation actions. In New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, the Supreme Court held that publishers and broadcasters could not be liable in defamation actions brought by public officials unless the publisher or broadcaster acted with actual malice. It is clear that Plaintiff is not a public official. 59 The Court extended the New York Times v. Sullivan malice requirement to libel suits brought by public figures. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). (Public figures) may recover from injury to reputation only on clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342, 94 S.Ct. at 3008. See Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, 1233 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 91, 70 L.Ed.2d 83, cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 667, 70 L.Ed.2d 636 (1981); Walker v. Cahalan, 542 F.2d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 1647, 52 L.Ed.2d 357 (1977). The court in Gertz defined public figures for purposes of the First and Fourth Amendment as follows: 60 For the most part those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. 61 Plaintiff is not a public figure for all purposes. Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of (her) life. Id. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013. Plaintiff has no general fame or notoriety. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., 443 U.S. 157, 99 S.Ct. 2701, 61 L.Ed.2d 450 (1979). She also lacks any pervasive involvement in the affairs of society. See Id. at 164, 99 S.Ct. at 2705; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976). 62 Plaintiff also cannot reasonably be regarded as a limited public figure. Gertz establishes a two-pronged analysis to determine if an individual is a limited public figure. First, a public controversy must exist. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009. Second, the nature and extent of the individual's participation in the particular controversy must be ascertained. Id. at 352, 94 S.Ct. at 3013. 63 The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the elements of a public controversy. In Time, Inc. v. Firestone, however, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the defendant publisher's argument that a public controversy should be equated with all controversies of interest to the public. The plaintiff in Firestone was the wife of a scion of a wealthy industrial family. She and her husband obtained a divorce, but the defendant inaccurately described the grounds for the divorce in an article. The Court held: 64 Dissolution of a marriage through judicial proceedings is not the sort of public controversy referred to in Gertz, even though the marital difficulties of extremely wealthy individuals may be of interest to some portion of the reading public. Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454, 96 S.Ct. at 965. 65 In this case, the effects of sex-related businesses in general, and the particular effects of street prostitution on a middleclass Detroit neighborhood, may be the kind of public controversies referred to in Gertz. The public's interest in the effects of prostitution in a Detroit neighborhood are arguably greater than the divorce proceedings of a wealthy couple. Cf. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S.Ct. 958, 47 L.Ed.2d 154. 66 Even though the subject matter of the Broadcast may be the type of public controversy recognized in Gertz, the nature and extent of Plaintiff's participation in this public controversy must still be examined. The nature and extent of an individual's participation is determined by considering three factors: first, the extent to which participation in the controversy is voluntary; second, the extent to which there is access to channels of effective communication in order to counteract false statements; and third, the prominence of the role played in the public controversy. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 344-345, 94 S.Ct. at 3009; Wolston, 443 U.S. at 165-168, 99 S.Ct. at 2706-2707; Hutchison v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). See Wilson v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 642 F.2d 371 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 500, 72 L.Ed.2d 377, cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 984, 71 L.Ed.2d 119 (1981); Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d at 1234. Applying these three factors to the instant case, we conclude that Plaintiff is not a limited public figure. 67 First, Plaintiff did not voluntarily participate in the public controversy surrounding the effects of street prostitution on a middleclass neighborhood in Detroit. In Street v. National Broadcasting Co., 645 F.2d 1227, this Court held that the plaintiff, the prosecutrix and main witness in the Scottsboro rape trial, was a public figure when she appeared in a play concerning that trial. The plaintiff gave press interviews and aggressively proffered her extra-judicial version of the case. In Orr v. Argus-Press, this Court held that the plaintiff was a limited public figure because, inter alia, he voluntarily sought publicity. 68 The instant case is distinguishable from Street and Orr. Plaintiff never sought to obtain publicity for her actions or opinions. In fact, like the plaintiff in Wolston, (Plaintiff) was dragged unwillingly into the controversy. Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166, 99 S.Ct. at 2707. Plaintiff was never a prostitute, nor was she engaged in any sex-related business. Moreover, she was not a resident of the Detroit middleclass neighborhood focused on during Act III. Finally, it appears that Plaintiff was unaware that she was being photographed. ABC never requested nor received permission to film Plaintiff or include her picture in the Broadcast. 69 Second, unlike the plaintiff in Street, Plaintiff has no access to channels of effective communication in order to counteract the false statements. Following the Broadcast, the press has not clamored to interview her. Cf. Street, 645 F.2d at 1234. Moreover, she does not have the regular and continuing access to the media that is one of the accouterments of having become a public figure. Hutchinson, 443 U.S. at 136, 99 S.Ct. at 2688. Before Plaintiff's appearance in the Broadcast, she lived in relative obscurity. Her appearance during Act III did not change this fact. Therefore, she did not have any means to effectively contradict the erroneous impression that she was a prostitute. 70 Finally, as noted previously, Plaintiff played no prominent role in the subject matter which was the focus of Act III. In essence, Plaintiff was merely an incidental figure in the discussion of street prostitution. Therefore, the airing of Plaintiff's picture as she walked down the street was not relevant to any examination of the effects of street prostitution on a Detroit neighborhood. 71 The nature and extent of Plaintiff's involvement in the subject matter of Act III leads to the inescapable conclusion that she was not a limited public figure. The Supreme Court has refused to extend the actual malice requirement of New York Times v. Sullivan to plaintiffs who are neither public officials nor public figures. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789. Thus, Plaintiff is not required to prove on remand that ABC acted with actual malice.