Opinion ID: 2385362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Driving Under the Influence as Recklessness or Criminal Negligence Per Se.

Text: At the conclusion of four days of jury-waived trial, the Superior Court justice took the case under advisement and the next morning delivered his decision. After reciting his findings of fact, he stated his conclusions of law. His first conclusion was: [D]riving under the influence is both reckless and criminally negligent driving, per se.  Defendant contends that applying a per se rule to determine a culpable state of mind would be erroneous. We appreciate that the words of the trial justice's conclusion are susceptible to several interpretations, not all of which would require vacating the judgment in this case. The justice may have meant that the evidence he had heard proved that defendant's behavior (which clearly constituted operating under the influence) had been reckless and criminally negligent. Such an interpretation of the justice's statement is consistent with the settled Maine law that operating under the influence is relevant evidence which the factfinder may consider in determining whether the operator of a motor vehicle is guilty of criminal negligence. State v. Carter, 443 A.2d 958, 961 (Me.1982). See also State v. Rhoades, 380 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Me.1977). However, the per se rule interpretation of the justice's comment is at least as likely. Since we cannot be sure, defendant is entitled to a remand so that the trial justice may, on the existing record, make fresh findings of fact. In making his redetermination of innocence or guilt, the justice will not be restricted by any legal rule that operating under the influence automatically constitutes reckless or criminally negligent conduct as defined by our Maine Criminal Code. To be guilty of manslaughter a person must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have [r]ecklessly, or with criminal negligence, cause[d] the death of another human being. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203(1)(A). The terms recklessly and, alternatively, with criminal negligence are used by the code to identify the defendant's culpable mental state that the State must prove as a necessary element of the crime of manslaughter. Both terms involve a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable and prudent person would observe in the same situation. Id., § 35(3) (definition of recklessly); id., § 35(4) (definition of criminal negligence). The criminal code calls for an individualized determination by the factfinder in each case whether the State has sustained its burden of proof as to the defendant's mental state. See 17-A M.R. S.A. § 34 (1983). The conditions that make a driver guilty of operating under the influence in violation of 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (Supp.1983-1984) are defined quite differently from the criminal code's definitions of recklessly and with criminal negligence. A person is guilty of the Class D crime of operating under the influence if his mental or physical faculties are impaired however slightly, i.e., to any extent. See State v. Bean, 430 A.2d 1109, 1110-11 (Me.1981). No culpable state of mind is required to establish the offense of operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Accordingly, a death caused by one operating a motor vehicle while under the influence is not ipso facto the result of recklessness or criminal negligence as these culpable states of mind are defined in the criminal code. The justice's statement that driving under the influence is per se reckless and criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle is subject to the interpretation that he failed to use the appropriate standard for determining the existence of the necessary culpable state of mind. Accordingly, we remand to the trial justice for a new determination of defendant's innocence or guilt of the manslaughter charge based upon a review of the evidence previously presented at the jury-waived hearing. On any subsequent appeal from a conviction, defendant's present claim of insufficiency of the evidence will be open for this court's review. The entry is: Judgment of conviction on the manslaughter count vacated; remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings on that count consistent with the opinion herein; and Judgments of conviction for leaving the scene and operating after suspension affirmed. All concurring.