Opinion ID: 1225502
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Give Defendant's Pinpoint Instruction on Mental Disorder

Text: At the guilt phase instructions conference, defense counsel requested that the court give the jury the following special instruction: If the evidence shows that the defendant was suffering from a mental disturbance, mental disorder or mental dysfunction at the time of the alleged offense, the jury should consider this evidence in determining whether the defendant engaged in premeditation or deliberation, as those terms have been defined for you, or harbored malice aforethought. [¶] If from all the evidence, you have reasonable doubt whether defendant formed those mental states you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find he did not have such mental state. The trial court declined to give defendant's proposed special instruction. Instead, it read to the jury the following instruction, the text of which had been agreed upon by both the prosecutor and defendant's attorneys: Evidence has been received regarding a mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder of the defendant at the time of the crime charged in the Information. You may consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crimes charged in Counts One and Seven, to wit, murder and attempted murder. (8a) Relying upon our opinions in People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180, 190 [84 Cal. Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847] and People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 885 [123 Cal. Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247, 92 A.L.R.3d 845], defendant argues that because his proposed instruction pinpointed the crux of his defense and related the reasonable doubt standard of proof to particular elements of the offenses charged, he was entitled to have it given to the jury. Moreover, he argues, the instruction actually given by the trial court was flawed: Counts 1 and 7 of the information charged defendant with murder of the first degree (count 1) and nonpremeditated attempted murder (count 7), that is, attempted murder with malice aforethought only. Because the only mental element common to both of these offenses was malice aforethought, defendant's argument runs, a conscientious jury could well have reasoned, in light of the specific instruction given, that it could consider the evidence of defendant's mental state only to negate his capacity for malice. The specific prejudice resulting from such an incomplete instruction, defendant argues, was that the jurors might have concluded they were barred from relying on evidence of defendant's mental impairment or incapacity to negate the premeditation and deliberation elements of the first degree murder charge. Because defendant's only real defense to count 7 was that his capacity to premeditate and deliberate was substantially impaired by a functional brain disorder compounded by crack cocaine abuse, the practical effect of the trial court's refusal to give defendant's version of the pinpoint instruction was the denial of the opportunity to present his theory of the case, an error that, under the circumstances, violated the Sixth Amendment and was reversible per se. Considered in their totality, however, the instructions were adequate. (9) As we said in People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 [68 Cal. Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197], `[T]he correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular instruction.' (Quoting People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 538 [224 Cal. Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251]; id. at p. 539 [`The absence of an essential element in one instruction may be supplied by another or cured in light of the instructions as a whole.']; see also People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 830 [218 Cal. Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372] [[W]e must look to the entire charge, rather than merely one part, to determine whether error occurred.]; People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 630-631 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160].) The jury was instructed that in the crime[] of murder, the necessary mental states are malice aforethought, premeditation, and deliberation. [¶] In the crime of attempt[ed] murder, the necessary mental state is express malice aforethought, namely, a specific intent to kill unlawfully another human being. A mere three paragraphs later, the trial court instructed the jury that [e]vidence has been received regarding a mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder of the defendant at the time of the crime charged in the Information.... [¶] ... You may consider such evidence solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed the mental state which is an element of the crimes charged in Counts One and Seven[,] to wit, murder and attempted murder. The instructions also explained to the jury, however, that [i]f the evidence shows that the defendant was intoxicated by drugs or alcohol at the time of the alleged crime, you should consider that fact in determining whether the defendant had such specific intent or mental state, and that [i]f from all the evidence you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant formed such specific intent or mental state, you must find that he did not have such specific intent or mental state. Finally, in its closing guilt phase argument to the jury, the defense pointed out, [O]ne of the things that you have to do is look at all the evidence and make a determination for yourself as to whether or not you think the evidence is such that the intoxication and/or mental disease was sufficient at the time that Norma Painter died, that Mr. Musselwhite was unable to even form malice. [¶] ... And the burden is on the People that they not only have to prove Mr. Musselwhite is guilty, but they have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the death, the death of Norma Painter, was not as a result of such disorder. (8b) The jury instructions as a whole, we conclude, adequately informed the jury that it could consider the evidence of defendant's mental disease or defect in deciding whether the People had carried their burden of proving the mental elements of first degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt.