Opinion ID: 2995191
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discharge-Indirect Method

Text: In order to establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under the indirect method, Logan must demonstrate that: 1) she was within a protected class; 2) she was performing to the employer’s legitimate expectations; 3) she suffered an adverse employment action (discharge); and 4) Kautex treated similarly situated employees of a different race more favorably. See Oates v. Discovery Zone, 116 F.3d 1161, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997). We agree with the district court that Logan failed to establish a triable issue as to the fourth element--whether Kautex treated similarly situated persons not in the protected class more favorably. (Without deciding, we also cast doubt on whether Logan could satisfy the second element-- that she was meeting her employer’s legitimate expectations--because being a team player was one of Kautex’s expectations). The undisputed evidence shows that during the relevant time period Kautex discharged eight white probationary employees who were voted out by their co-workers. Three of the eight were hired immediately prior to or after Logan’s termination, and were voted out within a month of their hire dates, just like Logan. Because we have found that Logan cannot make out a prima facie case, we need not proceed further under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. See Hoffmann v. Primedia Special Interest Publ’ns, 217 F.3d 522, 525 (7th Cir. 2000).
To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Logan must prove that: 1) she engaged in statutorily protected expression, 2) she suffered an adverse employment decision, and 3) there is a causal link between the two. See Oates, 116 F.3d at 1172. In some instances, the fact that a plaintiff was fired two weeks after her complaints to management can be a short enough time to establish the necessary causal link. See McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796-97 (7th Cir. 1997) (collecting cases). However, Logan’s counsel conceded at oral argument that we cannot make much of the timing because there was no evidence that Kautex ever ordered a vote at any time other than within 30 days of an employee’s start date. If that is so, the fact that the vote was taken shortly after Logan’s complaints does not raise a presumption that it was in response to her complaints. Nevertheless, because the summary judgment standard requires us to draw all inferences in favor of Logan, and there was such a short time, we will assume without finding that Logan has established a prima facie case. However, Logan’s claim ultimately fails because we also find that Logan has failed to establish that Kautex’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason was pretextual. Pretext under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method of proof does not mean a mistake, but a phony reason for some action. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir. 1995). Logan must show that Kautex’s reason for discharging her was unworthy of credence. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000). That is, Logan must provide ’evidence tending to prove that the employer’s proffered reasons are factually baseless, were not the actual motivation for the discharge in question, or were insufficient to motivate the discharge.’ Gordon v. United Airlines, Inc., 246 F.3d 878, 888- 89 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting Adreani v. First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 154 F.3d 389, 395 (7th Cir. 1998)). To satisfy this burden, Logan asserts that Kautex gave multiple reasons for her discharge (bad attitude, sabotaging tanks, performance, and absenteeism), and this inconsistency is enough for a jury to infer that the proffered reason was not the actual reason for her discharge. Our review of the record convinces us that the reasons asserted by Kautex (other than absenteeism) were not as different as Logan claims. For example, Justice’s statement that, in her opinion, Logan was voted out because she sabotaged tanks was an example of Justice’s belief that Logan had a bad attitude. (See Justice Deposition, pp. 6-7.) Additionally, the performance box checked on the discharge form was one of a few generic boxes Kautex used when it discharged an employee. Reading further down the form in the space where a specific description for the reason behind the discharge is provided, Kautex wrote that Logan was voted out by her team. Attached to the separation form were the evaluations of the employees identifying each of their reasons why Logan should not be retained. As for absenteeism, Kautex disputes that it told Logan’s criminal probation officer that Logan was fired for that reason, but we must accept this assertion as true. Nevertheless, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Logan was terminated for any reason other than that she was voted out by her team. We recognize that labeling an employee as having an attitude can be a camouflage for race discrimination in certain cases, see Perfetti v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 457 (7th Cir. 1991), but Logan has failed to point to any objective evidence that this subjective evaluation was a mask for discrimination. See Sattar, 138 F.3d at 1170-71. For example, there is nothing to show that similarly situated employees were treated better, that the other co- workers harbored animus toward Logan, or that Finley somehow controlled the actions of the other co-workers who voted Logan out. See id. Accordingly, the district court properly found that Logan failed, under the indirect method of proof, to demonstrate a triable issue of fact on her retaliation claim.