Opinion ID: 1889683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Criminal Contempt and Degrading Speech

Text: Despite its origins deep in the common law, the elements of criminal contempt are not well developed. Reported cases of jury trials are hard to find; only in relatively recent years has the United States Supreme Court held that persons cited for contempt where serious punishment is sought must be afforded the right of trial by jury. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968). [9] For purposes of determining whether the constitution requires a right to a jury trial, serious punishment means incarceration in excess of six months. Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325-26, 116 S.Ct. 2163, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996). Criminal contempt proceedings with no incarceration or incarceration of fewer than six months are considered petty crimes, and no right to jury trial exists. Id. In criminal contempt cases where there is no specified maximum punishment, [10] courts may use the penalty actually imposed to determine the character of the offense and whether the right to jury trial existed. Bloom, 391 U.S. at 211, 88 S.Ct. 1477. Examining whether there is a right to a jury after the case is tried, however, seems awkward; a trial court needs to know before trial whether a jury is needed. [11] The answer is that if the prosecution seeks a commitment exceeding six months, a jury constitutionally is required  regardless of the penalty actually imposed after trial. See Right to Jury TrialUnder Particular Circumstances, 7A FED. PROC., L. ED. sec. 17:17 (2010) (citing cases). If a court conducts a contempt hearing without a jury, Bloom limits the incarceration time to six months. Id. The First Amendment has been held to trump restrictions on lawyers' speech. Gentile v. State, 501 U.S. 1030, 111 S.Ct. 2720, 115 L.Ed.2d 888 (1991). This Court does not accept the proposition that First Amendment rights bar punishment of contemptuous speech, [12] but does recognize that the values and limits of the constitutional right must inform the development of the elements of criminal contempt. This is especially true of cases of indirect contempt, which do not take place in the court's presence. The state, on behalf of the respondents Judge Witt and Sheriff Pace, argues that it is sufficient to sustain Smith's conviction for contempt because a jury found that Smith's statements degraded and made impotent the authority of the Circuit Court of Douglas County, Associate Circuit Division and impeded and embarrassed the administration of justice. Smith argues that his statements are protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and, therefore, a judgment of contempt for these statements is improper. The parties cite no Missouri reported case, nor can the Court find one, where a contempt-of-court charge was tried to a jury. In fairness to the parties, the law of indirect contempt as applied to lawyers is confusing and unclear both in this state and throughout the nation. [13]