Opinion ID: 2512108
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prospective Juror M.R.

Text: In her juror questionnaire, M.R. stated she was against the death penalty and felt life without parole was [b]etter than death. On voir dire, M.R. continued to indicate her opposition to the death penalty, but she displayed great confusion about whether she could vote to impose that penalty, either generally or in the instant case. She first misunderstood a question whether she could vote to execute someone as asking whether she could convict a guilty person. Once that issue was cleared up, she initially stated she could not vote to execute someone in the gas chamber, but then backpedaled, indicated she wasn't really sure, and said she guess[ed] it depended on what the person did. As an example, she mentioned Charles Manson. When the court suggested her willingness to impose the death penalty in extreme cases meant she was not opposed to that penalty after all, she said, I guess not. But then she changed course again; when the court asked her whether her questionnaire response meant she could not vote to send someone to the gas chamber, she said, That's true. When the court asked her to explain her conflicting answers, she said, Well, I don't know how to explain myself, but I justMy belief, I don't thinkYou know, I don't think anybody should be executed to death penalty. Defense counsel finally got a fairly clear statement from M.R. that she could vote for death in certain deserving cases, such as Charles Manson's. Moreover, when counsel asked if M.R. could consider both penalties for someone who fatally stabbed a woman during a residential burglary and robbery, M.R. initially said, Yes. But when counsel pressed the point by asking again whether [b]oth penalties are something you would consider, M.R. said, I would consider one of them. When the court asked which one, M.R. responded, I would probably say the life. When counsel yet again tried to clarify if M.R. would seriously consider the death penalty in a case like this one, M.R. said, Not forI guess not for burglary. I know it's burglary and At this point, the court solicited a challenge from the prosecutor and, over a defense objection, excused M.R. As the court explained to defense counsel, [T]his is a failure under Wainwright versus Witt. In looking at the potential juror, listening to her responses, I am satisfied that she's a Wainwright versus Witt failure. Despite the confusion and inconsistency of her answers, M.R. made it reasonably clear that her scruples against the death penalty would probably render her unable to consider the death penalty in the case at hand. The court's impression in this regard was reinforced, as it said, by its observation of the juror. Defendant suggests the excusal was motivated by the court's inexplicable refusal to understand how a juror could be conscientiously opposed to the death penalty, yet willing to impose that penalty in particular cases. The record does not support this inference. Rather, as indicated, it suggests the court acted on its impression that M.R. was hopelessly ambivalent about her death penalty stance and, in any event, was unable to consider both penalties in the instant case. No error occurred.