Opinion ID: 6321236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appropriate Framework

Text: The ADA prohibits discrimination against a qualified individual based on disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability discrimination includes a failure to make reasonable accommodations. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Employees can prove discrimination in two ways, either directly or indirectly, and each has its own test. Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 891-92 (6th Cir. 2016)). The parties dispute which test applies to Blanchet’s failure to accommodate claim. Charter contends that the district court correctly applied the indirect evidence test. However, Blanchet argues that the direct evidence test should have been applied. The distinction between when to apply the direct versus the indirect evidence test is “vital because the framework for analyzing the two kinds of cases differs.” Since failure to accommodate is expressly listed in the Act’s definition of disability discrimination, see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A), “claims premised upon an employer’s failure to offer a reasonable accommodation necessarily involve direct evidence (the failure to accommodate) of discrimination.” Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 868 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted and emphasis added). We therefore apply the direct evidence test to failure to accommodate claims. See, e.g., Fisher v. Nissan North Am., Inc., 951 F.3d 409, 416 (6th Cir. 2020); Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 811 (6th Cir. 2020). Although Charter argues that we cannot apply the direct evidence test because Blanchet did not plead a failure to accommodate claim, this reasoning is incorrect. Under our precedent, the plaintiff needs only to allege facts premised upon an employer’s failure to accommodate for this court to apply the direct evidence test at summary judgment. See Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868. In Blanchet’s complaint, she alleged that she “requested an extension of her leave as a workplace accommodation” from October 1, 2016, through February 3, 2017. Blanchet also argued that Charter “unlawful[ly] fir[ed]” her because her termination was “effective” during her approved accommodation. Since the record reflects that Blanchet’s claim was based on Charter’s failure to accommodate, it necessarily involves direct evidence of discrimination under the ADA. Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868. No. 21-5073 Blanchet v. Charter Comm’ns, LLC Page 6 Charter also argues that Blanchet “waived” the applicability of the direct evidence standard by failing to raise it below. Claims can be “either forfeited or waived—the former is a party's ‘failure to make the timely assertion of a right’ while the latter ‘is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.’” Ohio State Univ. v. Redbubble, Inc., 989 F.3d 435, 443 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762, 767 (6th Cir. 2019)). Nothing in the briefing below indicates that Blanchet contested the application of the direct evidence standard, so Blanchet did not waive her argument. It is also unclear whether Blanchet forfeited the application of the direct evidence standard, considering that her original complaint encompasses a failure to accommodate claim. And as noted above, a failure to accommodate claim necessarily implicates the direct evidence standard. Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 868. The district court therefore erred in applying the indirect evidence test to Blanchet’s failure to accommodate claim. See Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 853. Even if Blanchet did forfeit her argument that the direct evidence test should apply, courts have discretion to consider forfeited arguments in “exceptional cases” or when application of the rule would produce a “plain miscarriage of justice.” Redbubble, 989 F.3d at 445 (quoting Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Kurzon Strauss, LLP, 759 F.3d 522, 528 (6th Cir. 2014). The forfeiture rule “is justified by two main policy goals. First, the rule eases appellate review by having the district court first consider the issue. Second, the rule ensures fairness to litigants by preventing surprise issues from appearing on appeal.” Cooley, 759 F.3d at 528 (quoting Rice v. Jefferson Pilot Fin. Ins. Co., 578 F.3d 450, 454 (6th Cir. 2009)). Here, the policies underlying the forfeiture rule do not apply. The issue at the heart of this case is whether the leave Blanchet requested was a reasonable accommodation for her disability, and thus whether her firing was lawful. Because the McDonnell Douglas standard requires a plaintiff to show that she is qualified “with or without a reasonable accommodation,” the issue of the reasonableness of Blanchet’s requested leave was fully briefed before and considered by the district court. It was also fully briefed before this court—indeed, Charter addressed its argument under the proper standard in its brief. Even if this claim were forfeited, this would be an “exceptional case” justifying the court’s discretion to consider it under the correct legal framework. No. 21-5073 Blanchet v. Charter Comm’ns, LLC Page 7