Opinion ID: 853682
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jarboe and Celotex

Text: In Jarboe, this Court held that Indiana summary judgment law requires the movant to establish the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue. Jarboe v. Landmark Community Newspapers, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994). This requirement was explicitly stated to be different from the federal standard as enunciated in Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). See Jarboe, 644 N.E.2d at 123. Jarboe was this Court's response to a concern that the Celotex federal summary judgment standard had been broadly interpreted by some courts as shifting the burden of production on summary judgment to the party having the burden of proof at trial. Jarboe rejected that view under Indiana Trial Rule 56. See id. (Merely alleging that the [non-movant] has failed to produce evidence on each element of [the claim or defense] is insufficient to entitle the [movant] to summary judgment under Indiana law.). It is now clear that the better-reasoned opinions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 also reject this interpretation. See, e.g., Logan v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 96 F.3d 971, 978-79 (7th Cir.1996) (explaining some misapplications of the Celotex standard to shift the burden in summary judgment proceedings to the non-movant). Indeed, Justice White, who provided the essential fifth vote for the Celotex majority, was careful to avoid such a broad reading: [T]he movant must discharge the burden the Rules place upon him: It is not enough to move for summary judgment without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (White, J., concurring). [1] To be sure, many cases under Federal Rule 56 and its state counterparts cite Celotex and then leap to a discussion of the non-movant's failure to carry a burden it will have at trial without first dealing with the movant's initial obligationsometimes called a burden of productionunder Rule 56. [2] See, e.g., Baulos v. Roadway Express, Inc., 139 F.3d 1147, 1150-51 (7th Cir.1998); Phillips v. Marist Soc'y, 80 F.3d 274, 275-76 (8th Cir.1996); Short v. Little Rock Dodge, Inc., 297 Ark. 104, 759 S.W.2d 553, 554 (1988) (placing burden of proof on non-movant); Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (1992) (summary judgment is proper if the plaintiff cannot offer proof of a material element of the claim); Tucher v. Brothers Auto Salvage Yard, Inc., 564 N.E.2d 560, 562 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (reciting the correct standard, but addressing only the non-movant's burden); Poplaski v. Lamphere, 152 Vt. 251, 565 A.2d 1326, 1329 (1989). Many of these cases are correctly decided on their facts, but do not explicitly articulate each step in reaching the ultimate conclusion. [3] This occurs where, as is often the case, the undisputed facts establish as a matter of law either the case for the movant or the case for the non-movant. Not all cases fall into this either/or category. Where the facts are not in dispute as to an element of a claim or defense, there may be at least three potential circumstances: (1) the undisputed facts support the movant's claim; (2) the undisputed facts support the non-movant's claim; or (3) the undisputed facts establish that we cannot determine whose version is correct. The issue presented here, and in Celotex, is the requirement for summary judgment to be rendered against the party who has the burden of proof at trial in the third circumstance. Under a correct reading of Celotex, the non-moving party is required to point to evidence supporting its claim or defense only after the moving party has either (1) established the non-movant's inability to prevail as a matter of law or (2) offered evidence that supports the movant's argument that the non-movant cannot carry its burden of proof at trial. See 11 James Wm. Moore & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Moore's Federal Practice § 56.13[1] (3d ed.1999); 10A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727 (3d ed.1998). Although under Indiana Trial Rule 56 Jarboe clearly rejected the view that a party seeking summary judgment could simply point to the opponent's burden of proof at trial and prevail unless the non-movant produced evidence supporting its claim or defense, Jarboe did not disable summary judgment as a tool to resolve matters as to which there is no genuine issue of material fact. Rather, as explained below, in my view under Indiana Trial Rule 56, as under federal practice, it is sufficient for summary judgment to establish on undisputed facts either that: (1) the non-movant will be unsuccessful as a matter of law or (2) the non-movant will be unable at trial to establish an essential fact on which the non-movant carries the burden of proof.