Opinion ID: 2063068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: n.j.s.a. 19:44a-39

Text: In ordering the Authority to include plaintiffs in its Closer Look forum on the issues, the Appellate Division found an imperative of equal time running through N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39. McGlynn v. New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority, 181 N.J. Super. 577 (App.Div. 1981). The Authority claims that any equal time obligation that might have been present in this provision prior to the 1981 amendment has been eliminated by that amendment. It asserts that the statute now requires merely promoting full discussion of the election itself, with the means of doing so and decisions on the participation of individual candidates left to the Authority subject only to the constraints of Federal law. We start by examining the language of the amended provision. Nowhere does it contain the words equal time. To read a strict equal time requirement into the statute would thus be an act of judicial legislation. That is not, however, to say that the statute does not impose an affirmative duty; at very least, the Authority is required to actively cover the campaign. The question is how the Legislature meant the Authority to carry out this directive. The Authority argues that it was given unbridled discretion to promote discussions by the candidates; respondents counter that the statutory guidelines constrain the Authority's discretion. The Authority relies heavily on the reference to Federal law in N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39, as amended in 1981. The Authority argues that this demonstrates the Legislature's intent to remove any state restrictions on the amount of broadcast time each candidate was to receive. Thus, the Authority's policy would be governed solely by the Federal Communications Act, which gives maximum discretion to broadcasters. [10] The Authority seeks to buttress this position with the legislative history of the 1981 amendment, which was passed, at least partially, in response to the presence of 21 candidates on the ballot in the impending gubernatorial primaries. Realizing that the specific time provisions would hamper the Authority given the number of candidates to be covered, the Legislature delegated to the Authority the responsibility to determine how best to promote full discussions by the candidates. Thus, the sponsor's statement to the bill indicates that the amended bill would direct the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority to provide coverage of the gubernatorial primary and general election campaigns and give the authority the discretion, within the limits of Federal and State Law, as to the manner in which it does so. [emphasis added] The committee statement accompanying the bill is similar in its direction: This bill amends the election laws to permit the New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority a greater degree of flexibility in the promotion of the discussion of public issues by gubernatorial candidates in the primary and general election campaigns. This legislative history is a good indicator of what the Legislature intended the 1981 amendment to provide. Evidently, the amendment was prepared as a response to the large 1981 primary field and the effects it would have on Authority election coverage. The amendment should be read in the light of its legislative history. Clearly, the Legislature's general approach to the problem was to vest greater discretion in the Public Broadcasting Authority. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the Legislature meant to remove all limitations on the Authority's discretion. Rather, the amendment was enacted to remove the minimum coverage requirements, and only thereby to increase the Authority's discretion regarding election coverage. Several facts lead us to disagree with the Authority's argument that the State meant to repeal all constraints on Authority coverage of gubernatorial elections save those imposed by the Federal Communications Act. First, that construction renders the new provision mere surplusage, since the Authority is required to abide by the Federal Communications Act independent of N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39. [11] Such a construction is to be avoided wherever possible. In re Toms River Water Co., 82 N.J. 201 (1980); 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1973), § 46.06. Second, the mandate to promote full discussions    by the candidates denotes more than the general federal exhortation to operate in the public interest. It at least requires the Authority to actively cover gubernatorial elections, but we believe that it does more. Reading the statute in light of related statutory provisions, it is evident that the Legislature imposed a duty to promote full discussions by the candidates in a balanced, fair and equitable fashion. It is difficult to see how the legislative mandate of full discussions among the candidates can be accomplished if some of the candidates are continually excluded from the discussions, or if the opportunity to appear provided to the candidates is grossly inequitable. We believe that the Legislature did not intend such a result. The language of the statute points directly to the opposite result. It mandates discussion by the candidates ... on the ballot in any primary or general election.... N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39. This language is inclusive; it does not give the Authority the liberty to continually exclude candidates who have fulfilled the legal requirements for getting listed on the ballot. It similarly would not allow unfair or imbalanced coverage of those candidates. The concurring opinions contradict themselves in their interpretation of the State statute. On the one hand, they concede that the statute imposes a duty to promote full discussions  a duty not imposed by federal law. On the other hand, they say federal law grants the Authority complete discretion to determine the manner of compliance. Our concurring colleagues thus make the specious and groundless claim that the Legislature, while placing a legal duty upon the Authority, did not intend that the duty be enforced. Rather than recognize the legislative mandate, the concurring opinions creatively rewrite it. We are persuaded as well by the context of the statute that N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39 was meant to preclude gross imbalance in the full discussions, and that it must be read in light of the N.J.S.A. 48:23-7(h) mandate that controversial issues be presented with balance, fairness and equity and the N.J.S.A. 48:23-9 prohibition against supporting candidates. First, N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39 remains a part of major campaign spending reform legislation, the underlying theme of which is equalizing the opportunity of the candidates for governor to present their ideas to the populace. See N.J.S.A. 19:44A-27. Gross imbalance in access to television coverage would work against that goal. Second, the statement of the sponsor of the 1981 amendment stated that the Authority was granted discretion within the limits of Federal and State law. [Emphasis added] This makes clear that the Authority was meant to be subject to State regulation as well as FCC regulation. The reference must be to the other two provisions, discussed above, which deal with the content of the Authority's political programming: N.J.S.A. 48:23-7(h) and -9. We concluded earlier that those provisions mandated balance, fairness and equity in the Authority's coverage of the gubernatorial candidates. That conclusion strengthens our belief that N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39 places similar constraints on the Authority. To sum up our discussion of the New Jersey statutory scheme, we conclude that the Public Broadcasting Authority Act and the amended Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Act must be read in pari materia. The provisions of each, separately, raise a strong implication that, consistent with its broad discretion to determine broadcast content, the Authority's campaign coverage must be executed with balance, fairness and equity. Reading them together, that conclusion becomes inescapable. We therefore hold that the Authority is vested with wide discretion in determining broadcast content but that, with respect to coverage of a gubernatorial campaign, it is required by New Jersey statute to promote full discussion of the issues by the candidates, consistent with balance, fairness and equity. The great discretion we have given the Authority goes completely unnoticed by our concurring colleagues, thus preventing an accurate reading of the majority's holding. They mistakenly assert that the majority has imposed a comprehensive regulatory scheme on the Authority, making judges the new programmers of New Jersey public television. They conjure up the vision of Big Brother watching over the Authority and sitting with them at every meeting. ( Infra, at 139-140) Nothing could be further from the truth. As we have construed it, State law gives great discretion to the Authority to make programming decisions, subject only to considerations of fairness. Nor is there any basis for Justice Pollock's argument that our holding today may convert New Jersey public television into a public forum to which all citizens will have a right of access. We agree that such a result would be undesirable and was not intended by the Legislature. But we strongly reject the notion that this result follows from our holding today. We have certainly not created a general right of access to public television. Public forum is a legal designation given to certain places, such as public streets, sidewalks, and parks, L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law at 689, where historically everyone has been free to speak, subject only to time, place or manner restrictions. Id. at 689. See, e.g., United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 69 L.Ed. 2d 517 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed. 2d 505 (1976). This public forum concept has been strictly limited to those areas in which tradition mandates a right of access. See, e.g., United States Postal Service, supra (mailboxes not public forum); Greer, supra (public areas of military base not public forum); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 87 S.Ct. 242, 17 L.Ed. 2d 149 (1966) (grounds of county prison not public forum); City of New York Municipal Broadcasting System, 56 F.C.C. 2d 169 (1975) (radio and television airwaves not public forum). The requisite tradition of general public access to the broadcast media is totally lacking. Justice Pollock argues that the New Jersey statutory scheme, as we have construed it, converts New Jersey public television into a public forum. However, a place becomes a public forum only when it has been dedicated to public use. Muir v. Alabama Television Commission, 656 F. 2d 1012, 1020 (5th Cir., Sept. 1981). The right of access created by New Jersey statute is limited to candidates [for Governor] on the ballot. N.J.S.A. 19:44A-39. It thus concerns only legally qualified candidates, in only one election, which occurs only once every four years. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 101 S.Ct. 2813, 69 L.Ed. 2d 706 (1981), is directly on point. The United States Supreme Court there held that 47 U.S.C. § 312(A)(7), which gives candidates for federal office a right of access to FCC-licensed stations, does not create a general right of access. Petitioners are correct that the Court has never approved a general right of access to the media. Nor do we do so today. Section 312(a)(7) creates a limited right to reasonable access that pertains only to legally qualified federal candidates and may be invoked by them only for the purpose of advancing their candidacies once a campaign has commenced. [ Id. 453 U.S. at 396, 101 S.Ct. at 2830 (emphasis in original)] Our holding today will not give the public a general right of access to New Jersey public television.