Opinion ID: 3039101
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kymsta Introduced Evidence to Support Its

Text: Defense of Innocent Use Under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5). To establish innocent use, Kymsta had the burden to prove that it (1) adopted the “ROXYWEAR” mark without actual or constructive knowledge of Quiksilver’s prior use of “QUIKSILVER ROXY” and “ROXY,” (2) used “ROXYWEAR” before Quiksilver filed its trademark applications for the “QUIKSILVER ROXY” and “ROXY” marks, and (3) continuously used the “ROXYWEAR” mark after Quiksilver filed its applications. See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5); see also Casual Corner Assocs., Inc. v. Casual Stores of Nevada, Inc., 493 F.2d 709, 712 (9th Cir. 1974). [19] According to Quiksilver, there is or should be a fourth element to this defense: remoteness, which is an element of the common law innocent-use defense. A remoteness element would require Kymsta to prove that neither “QUIKSILVER ROXY” nor “ROXY” was known in the geographical and trade area where Kymsta first used “ROXYWEAR.” See Champions Golf Club, Inc. v. The Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d 1111, 1124 (6th Cir. 1996). However, we hold that remoteness is not an element of the innocent-use defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5). [20] The central reason for our holding is simple: The text of 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) does not contain a remoteness element. Conceding this point, Quiksilver counters that Southland Corp. v. Schubert, 297 F. Supp. 477 (C.D. Cal. 1968), incorporated a remoteness element into the statute. We do not construe Southland Corp. as supporting Quiksilver’s incorporation argument. Rather, in Southland Corp., the district court merely observed that § 1115(b)(5) “appears to be nothing more than the common law of innocence . . .” Id. at 481. This equivocal observation does not constitute a holding that § 1115(b)(5) incorporates a remoteness requirement. Indeed, the Fourth Circuit has noted that “[§ 1115(b)(5)] appears to QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. 17389 have eliminated ‘remoteness’ as a requirement for the defense.” Emergency One, Inc. v. American Fire Eagle Engine Co., 332 F.3d 264, 272 n.4 (4th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); see also GTE Corp. v. Williams, 904 F.2d 536, 54041 (10th Cir. 1990) (analyzing the common law and statutory versions of the innocent-use defense separately and discussing remoteness only when analyzing the common law version); Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc. v. Thrift Cars, Inc., 831 F.2d 1177, 1182-83 (1st Cir. 1987) (reciting and applying only the express provisions of § 1115(b)(5), with no mention of a remoteness element). We recognize that there are persuasive reasons to incorporate a remoteness element into 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5). See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 26:48 (4th ed. 1996) (iterating that § 1115(b)(5) “does not explicitly recite the element of ‘remoteness’ which is crucial to the common law defense,” and advocating the element’s incorporation into § 1115(b)(5)) (footnote reference omitted). The Sixth Circuit, in fact, has apparently incorporated a remoteness element into § 1115(b)(5). See Champions Golf Club, Inc., 78 F.3d at 1124 (instructing the district court on remand to make a threshold remoteness determination). However, in our view, amending § 1115(b)(5) “is the role of Congress, not the courts.” Conner v. Burford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1455 (9th Cir. 1988). For this reason, we decline Quiksilver’s invitation to incorporate a remoteness element into § 1115(b)(5). Absent a remoteness element, Quiksilver’s remaining challenge is to the “continuous use” element of the innocent-use defense. This element includes a “zone of reputation” component and a “continuous use” component. When Quiksilver filed its trademark applications, Kymsta’s trade area for “ROXYWEAR” was frozen; Kymsta’s continuous use assertion is limited to those areas where “ROXYWEAR” then enjoyed recognition based on its reputation, advertising, and 17390 QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. sales. See Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 690, 693-95 (5th Cir. 1995). To maintain its trademark rights in the operative areas, Kymsta also had to establish that it continuously used “ROXYWEAR” from the time Quiksilver filed its trademark applications through the time of trial. See Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 831 F.2d at 1182-83; see also Casual Corner Assocs., Inc., 493 F.2d at 712 (“To be a continuing use, the use must be maintained without interruption.”). Where usage is interrupted, the innocent-use defense “dries up,” precluding the innocent user from asserting trademark rights in those areas. Thrifty Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 831 F.2d at 1183. [21] Kymsta introduced evidence of zones of reputation. For example, Heptner testified that “ROXYWEAR” has “built up a reputation” as “a very trendy collection.” Anna Lew of Nordstrom essentially agreed, stating that she has come to expect “cute tops” from “ROXYWEAR.” Likewise, Laura O’Connor of Urban Outfitters attested that Kymsta has “a great designer and their product quality is excellent.” “ROXYWEAR” sales were also documented in the record, reflecting that “ROXYWEAR” was sold to “Merry-GoRound” in Maryland and “Contempo Casual” in Los Angeles, California, as well as various Nordstrom locations. [22] Additionally, Kymsta presented evidence of continuous use. Heptner testified that Kymsta has continuously sold “ROXYWEAR” merchandise since 1992. In response, Quiksilver submits that Kymsta cannot show continuous use of “ROXYWEAR” because Kymsta has sold, and continues to sell, certain “ROXYWEAR” product under a private label, which “dissociat[es] the ROXYWEAR mark from the product.” However, Quiksilver has not cited, and we could not find, any authority holding that continuous use is interrupted where an innocent user begins selling certain product under a private label. On the contrary, we have only concluded that interruption occurred when there was complete non-use of a QUIKSILVER, INC. v. KYMSTA CORP. 17391 mark for a one-year period, or the innocent user closed its stores without any intent to reopen them. See Casual Corner Assocs., Inc., 493 F.2d at 712-13. No comparable evidence was presented in this case. [23] As Kymsta introduced evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the continuous use element was met, granting Quiksilver’s motion for judgment as a matter of law as to Kymsta’s innocent-use defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(5) was unwarranted. III