Opinion ID: 2283611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Biggs's Constitutional Challenges to Section 491.075

Text: The constitutional validity of a statute is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. City of Arnold v. Tourkakis, 249 S.W.3d 202, 204 (Mo. banc 2008). Section 491.075 allows the hearsay statements of a minor less than 14 to be admitted as substantive evidence if: (1) Defendant is charged with committing a violation of RSMo Chapters 565, 566, 568 or 573; (2) The statements relate to the offense; (3) The child either testifies, or is unavailable as a witness, or is otherwise physically available as a witness but the court finds that significant emotional or psychological trauma would result from testifying in the personal presence of the defendant. Section 491.075, RSMo Supp 2006. Pursuant to this statute, the child's mother, Hancock, Ringgold and Happel testified regarding the boy's statements concerning his father's abuse. Biggs argues that section 491.075 is unconstitutional because: (1) it violates the confrontation clause, (2) it violates Biggs's due process rights and (3) it violates Biggs' right to equal protection of the law.
The Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause says, In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Missouri Constitution echoes this statement, guaranteeing that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to meet the witnesses against him face to face. MO. CONST. art. I, sec. 18(a). If a witness does not testify at trial, prior testimonial statements are admissible only where the declarant is unavailable and only where defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. State v. Perry, 275 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Mo. banc 2009) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004)). If, however, the declarant testifies at trial, there are no constraints on the use of his prior testimonial statements. Id. Biggs admits that his son was available to testify, but argues that he was unavailable because of his testimony that he could not remember, it did not happen or he did not know to all essential elements of the offense. Biggs argues that because the boy was essentially unavailable, Biggs was denied his opportunity for meaningful cross-examination of his son and, therefore, the admission of the section 491.075 testimony violates the confrontation clause. The fact that a witness's testimony is unsatisfactory does not render the witness unavailable. [3] The confrontation clause only guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559, 108 S.Ct. 838, 98 L.Ed.2d 951 (1988); Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 739, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631 (1987). Because the child was on the stand, answered Biggs' attorney's questions and was cooperative, the boy was available. Superficially, of course, the boy's testimony at trial was favorable to his father, but the jury obviously did not believe it. In any event, the evidence did not violate the confrontation clause.
Biggs argues that section 491.075 is unconstitutional because it violates the due process clause by allowing a criminal defendant to be convicted on unreliable and incompetent evidence. U.S. CONST. amend. V.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; MO. CONST. art. I, sec. 10. It should be noted that section 491.075 requires the court to find that the content and circumstances of the statement provide sufficient indicia of reliability. Section 491.075. In the section 491.075 hearing the trial judge found that the hearsay statements were reliable, and the record supports that conclusion. Biggs, therefore, was not convicted on unreliable or incompetent evidence. Because the evidence was reliable, the allegation of a due process violation fails. Moreover, the prevalent theme in due process cases is that in a criminal prosecution the accused must be allowed to present a complete defense. State v. Williams, 729 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Mo. banc 1987); State v. Wright, 751 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Mo. banc 1988). This Court has held that admitting evidence under section 491.075 does not prevent a defendant from presenting a complete defense. Wright, 751 S.W.2d at 53. Biggs presented a complete defense to the jury. His due process rights were not violated.
Biggs next claims that section 491.075 violates the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment that says no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Biggs argues that section 491.075 affects the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute a crime, a right Biggs argues is fundamental for equal protection purposes. This Court need not reach the equal protection question because section 491.075 does not implicate the right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt the statute in no way diminishes the state's burden of proving every element of the crime. Section 491.075 serves a legitimate state purpose and does not violate the equal protection clause.