Opinion ID: 613956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Factual Record Fails To Satisfy Even the Panel's Reduced Standing Standard

Text: After pronouncing a reduced standing standard at odds with Supreme Court precedent, the panel allows plaintiffs to satisfy that standard on a negligible factual record. The panel identifies actual present injury based on plaintiffs' sworn assertions that it has become more difficult and expensive to practice their professions as a result of the enactment of the FAA. Lynch, J., Op., ante at [168 n. 6]; see Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d at 133. It is no coincidence that the panel summarizes the assertions referenced. A review of the declarations submitted by plaintiffs reveals them to be notably lacking in the requisite specific facts. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (internal quotation marks omitted). [15] Two declarants conclusorily report only that they will have to travel at unspecified future times to avoid FAA interception of their conversations with foreign sources. See Mariner Decl. ¶ 10 (stating that, as a result of FAA, I will have to travel abroad to gather information that I would otherwise have gathered by telephone or e-mail); Klein Decl. ¶ 9 (stating that, as a result of FAA, I will have to travel to gather information that I previously might have gathered by telephone or e-mail). Two other declarants imply actual travel without providing any particulars. See Hedges Decl. ¶ 9 (reporting that FAA has made my work very difficult and often requires me to travel to see those who have information and that [t]he financial cost and time required to speak with many of my contacts is now immense); McKay Decl. ¶¶ 8, 10 (stating that, after FAA was enacted, [w]henever possible, declarant and law partner collect information in person rather than by telephone or email ... [which] requires travel that is both time-consuming and expensive). Finally, one declarant who resides in Washington, D.C., asserts that, [m]ost recently, she traveled to New York City to meet with a French barrister to discuss her representation of a Guantanamo Bay detainee. Royce Decl. ¶ 7. Assuming that the declarant incurred costs for this tripa fact not specifically assertedthose costs cannot constitute FAA injury because the statute would not have permitted interception of electronic communications with a French national who was in New York. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1) (precluding targeting of any person known to be in United States). Thus, while the panel's identification of self-incurred costs as the actual present injury in this case is legally unsupportable for reasons discussed in the previous section of this opinion, it also lacks the requisite foundation in specific facts, even without considering the much more convincing factual showing required of a non-target. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 561-62, 112 S.Ct. 2130. [16] The panel further concludes that, whether as a matter of causation or actual future injury, plaintiffs demonstrate a reasonable, i.e., not fanciful, irrational, or clearly unreasonable, fear of FAA interception because their fear is based on a reasonable interpretation of the challenged statute and a realistic understanding of the world. Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d at 139. But how reasonable can it be to interpret the FAAa statute that, on its face, requires all interceptions conducted thereunder to be consistent with the Fourth Amendmentto authorize, on its face, interceptions that invariably will violate that amendment? And what is the basis for plaintiffs' realistic view of the world of foreign intelligence surveillance, particularly with respect to the executive's classified targeting priorities and practices? Plaintiffs do notand indeed cannotprofess personal knowledge of such matters. Thus, their identification of foreign contacts as likely targets for FAA interception, id. at 126, is completely speculative and not admissible evidence, see Fed.R.Evid. 602; Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(4). [17] To justify its reliance on these and other similarly unsubstantiated or conclusory assertions by plaintiffs, the panel observes that the government did not object. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d at 127 n. 10, 129 & n. 13, 133. But the panel could not relieve these non-target plaintiffs of their particularly heavy evidentiary burden, nor could it forgo its own duty to conduct a rigorous inquiry into plaintiffs' standing simply by noting the government's supposed failure to object. See Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 129 S.Ct. at 1152-53 (rejecting dissent view that an assertion that no one denies must be accepted as established in evaluating standing). The panel was under an independent obligation to assess plaintiffs' standing, even if the government did not call it into question at all. Arizona Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S.Ct. at 1454. In fact, a glimpse into the actual world of foreign intelligence targeting is afforded by unredacted portions of the FISA Court of Review's opinion in In re FISA Section 105B Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, and that world appears quite different from the one hypothesized by plaintiffs. That case presented an as-applied challenge to now-expired amendments to FISA effected through the PAA, which allowed the executive to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance on targets (including United States persons) reasonably believed to be located outside the United States, subject to specified criteria, including the adoption of targeting and minimization procedures akin to those now required by the FAA, but with no prior court review. Id. at 1006-07 (internal quotation marks omitted). After holding that foreign intelligence surveillance is not subject to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, see id. at 1012, the court addressed a Fourth Amendment reasonableness challenge based on the PAA's failure to require particularity, judicial review of probable cause, or adequate proxies for these omitted protections, see id. at 1013. Before rejecting the claim, the court reviewed the actual procedures adopted by the executive to satisfy PAA requirements and found that they in fact afforded protections above and beyond those specified in the statute, id. at 1007, and adequately allayed any particularity or probable cause concerns, see id. at 1013-14 & n. 7 (specifically noting that procedures adopted by executive to comply with PAA incorporated executive order that required Attorney General to determine in each case, based on information provided pursuant to Department of Defense regulations, that probable cause existed to believe that targeted person is foreign power or agent of foreign power). Such scrupulous oversight rebuts any general assumptions, unsupported by specific facts, that the executive will instinctively abuse its targeting discretion under the FAAa statute that goes further than the PAA in subjecting executive targeting and minimization procedures to judicial review and in conditioning court orders on a specific finding that the procedures are consistent ... with the fourth amendment. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A). Further, it reinforces the need for this court to clarify en banc that, consistent with Supreme Court precedent, plaintiffs' standing depends on their showing actual or imminent FAA interception.