Opinion ID: 1898380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Were the four new counts added to the superseding indictment the product of prosecutorial vindictiveness requiring the dismissal of those counts?

Text: Under Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed. 2d 628 (1974), a reindictment following certain judicial action that subjects defendant to greater punishment than did a prior indictment is presumptive evidence of retaliation for the exercise of constitutional rights. Here, as a result of defendant's successful challenge to the county's jury-selection process, the prosecutor required resubmission of all death-penalty cases for superseding indictments. We do not sense any qualitative difference between the original indictment and the subsequent indictment. Both indictments charge defendant with capital murder. Defendant's superseding indictment added four charges to the original nine. The difference in the second indictment is more in form than substance. None of the four new charges could result in more severe punishment than those in the original indictment. The added armed-robbery count was a lesser-included offense of the original felony-murder charge; both merged into the murder conviction. The added attempted-murder count was of the same degree as the original aggravated-assault charge, and in fact merged into the aggravated-assault conviction. The two added weapons possession counts, both fourth-degree crimes, subjected defendant to less severe punishment than the original third-degree weapons offenses. In all, the added counts did not subject[] defendant to a significantly increased potential period of incarceration. Id. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102, 40 L.Ed. 2d at 634-35. In Blackledge v. Perry the United States Supreme Court discussed North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed. 2d 656 (1969), in which it had held that imposition of a harsher sentence following a successful appeal and reconviction violates due process unless special findings of justification overcome a presumption of vindictiveness. The Blackledge Court emphasized that its presumption required no evidence of actual vindictiveness on the part of the prosecutor. The rule's purpose was to avoid the potential for such vindictiveness and thus avoid chilling a defendant's exercise of constitutional rights. 417 U.S. at 28, 94 S.Ct. at 2102, 40 L.Ed. 2d at 634. However, the Court has been chary about extending the Pearce presumption of vindictiveness when the likelihood of vindictiveness is not as pronounced as in Pearce and Blackledge, inasmuch as its operation may effectively bar legitimate criminal prosecution. Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 566, 104 S.Ct. 3217, 3221, 82 L.Ed. 2d 424, 432 (1984). The Supreme Court has declined to apply the presumption when there is little likelihood of prosecutorial vindictiveness. In United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed. 2d 74 (1982), the Supreme Court held that the presumption was not warranted because there was no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. There the defendant at first initiated plea negotiations with the prosecutor on several misdemeanor and petty offense charges. When defendant requested a jury trial instead of pleading, the prosecutor obtained a four-count indictment, including a felony count. Id. at 371, 102 S.Ct. at 2487, 73 L.Ed. 2d at 79. The Court stated that mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule. Id. at 384, 102 S.Ct. at 2494, 73 L.Ed. 2d at 87. The facts did not establish a realistic likelihood that the prosecutor would respond to defendant's pretrial demand by bringing charges not in the public interest. Ibid., at 384, 102 S.Ct. at 2494, 73 L.Ed. 2d at 87. Also very important was the absence of facts invoking a policy central to both Pearce and Blackledge  disfavor of retrial of a decided question. 457 U.S. at 383, 102 S.Ct. at 2493, 73 L.Ed. 2d at 87. Similarly here, where the prosecutor submitted before trial a superseding indictment that did not significantly increase the potential punishment, we decline to apply a presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness. Defendant has submitted no evidence of actual vindictiveness. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's explanation that the additional counts were initially omitted inadvertently.