Opinion ID: 219211
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Lay Witness Opinion Testimony

Text: We begin by noting these witnesses were not testifying as experts. The Federal Rules of Evidence limitbut do not barlay witnesses' ability to testify as to their opinions and inferences, even about ultimate issues in the case. [2] In some situations, even lay opinion testimony as to the mental state of another is indeed competent, United States v. Bogan, 267 F.3d 614, 619 (7th Cir.2001) ( quoting United States v. Guzzino, 810 F.2d 687, 699 (7th Cir.1987)), and it is within the discretion of the trial judge to determine whether such testimony is helpful under Rule 701 and appropriate under Rule 403's balancing test, Bohannon v. Pegelow, 652 F.2d 729, 732 (7th Cir.1981). Our analysis, then, turns not on whether the witnesses' testimony obliquely implicated Locke's intent. Instead, we look to Rule 701's helpfulness requirement to assess the witnesses' testimony in this case. [3] We ask whether the district court rightfully could have determined, in its broad discretion, that these lay witnesses' testimonies were helpful to the jury and not meaningless assertions. See United States v. Allen, 10 F.3d 405, 415 (7th Cir.1993). Locke argues that the witnesses' answers should have been stricken because their opinions, which bordered on legal conclusions, were inherently unhelpful. She cites United States v. Van Eyl, 468 F.3d 428, 432-33 (7th Cir.2006), for the proposition that the court plainly erred in permitting witnesses to testify using the words fraud or misrepresentation. In Van Eyl, the district court had granted the defendant's in limine motion to exclude lay opinion testimony on conclusions of fraud because the court feared the jury would conclude that if others thought the conduct was wrong, then Van Eyl must have possessed the intent to defraud. Id. at 437. We found that the exclusion was well within the district court's discretion, id., but we did not simultaneously deem inadmissible all lay opinion testimony that possibly implicates intent. Locke also relies upon an isolated line from our decision in United States v. Noel for her argument that lay witnesses' legal conclusions are impermissible: We have held repeatedly that lay testimony offering a legal conclusion is inadmissible because it is not helpful to the jury, as required by 701(b). 581 F.3d 490, 496 (7th Cir.2009). But she neglects to read that phrase within the context of the testimony challenged in Noel and the cases we cited for supportcontext that needs to be considered as we evaluate the testimony in each case. In Noel, a detective serving as a prosecution witness described various photographs found on the defendant's computer and opined that they fit the statutory definition of child pornography. Id. at 494. We held the testimony was not helpful to the jury because it amounted to nothing more than a statement that the photos were illegal. Id. at 496-97. We decline Locke's invitation to glean too broad a rule from Noel. Properly read, Noel underscores two points relevant to this case. First, a lay witness's opinion or inference testimony must be helpful to the finder of fact in order to be admissible. Id. at 496. Second, a witness's opinion that the facts in a case meet the elements of the charged crime will likely constitute unhelpful testimony because it merely tells the jury what result to reach. Id. at 497. Neither of these two propositions shows that the district court committed any clear or obvious error here.