Opinion ID: 391158
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: HRL and Title VII

Text: 26 We turn next to the airlines' contention that Title VII 12 preempted the HRL during the periods at issue here. Title VII forbids employers to discriminate against their employees because of ... sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), (2). Generally speaking, the statute prohibits not only those employment practices designed to discriminate on proscribed grounds, but also those facially neutral practices that have the effect of discriminating on such grounds. 13 See generally Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Plaintiffs argue that by compelling employers to provide disability benefits for their pregnant employees, all of whom are necessarily female, the HRL mandated discrimination against male employees because of ... (their) sex, in violation of Title VII. If the HRL mandated discrimination that was unlawful under Title VII during the relevant time period, then, of course, it was invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 14 We hold, however, that the HRL was entirely lawful under Title VII. 15 27 In contending that the HRL contravened Title VII, the airlines rely primarily on General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, supra, in which the Supreme Court held that the exclusion of pregnancy from coverage under a disability plan did not discriminate against women in violation of Title VII. In reaching this conclusion, the Court observed that the package of fringe benefits provided under the employer's plan was facially nondiscriminatory in the sense that '(t)here is no risk from which men are protected and women are not.'  429 U.S. at 138, 97 S.Ct. at 409, quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 2491-92, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974) (see note 4 supra). In addition, the Court noted that the plan did not have a discriminatory effect upon women: 28 As there is no proof that the package (of insurance benefits) is in fact worth more to men than to women, it is impossible to find any gender-based discriminatory effect in this scheme simply because women disabled as a result of pregnancy do not receive benefits; that is to say, gender-based discrimination does not result simply because an employer's disability-benefits plan is less than all-inclusive.... (P)regnancy-related disabilities constitute an additional risk, unique to women, and the failure to compensate them for this risk does not destroy the presumed parity of the benefits, accruing to men and women alike, which results from the facially evenhanded inclusion of risks. 29 429 U.S. at 138-39, 97 S.Ct. at 409-10 (emphasis in original). 30 From the quoted language, the airlines derive their two principal arguments. First, they argue that the pre-1979 inclusion of pregnancy as a covered condition under their disability plans would have been unlawful under Title VII because it would have destroyed the plans' facially evenhanded inclusion of risks. Second, they contend that the provision of pregnancy benefits would render the package of benefits under a plan more valuable to women than to men, so that the plan would have the unlawful effect of discriminating against men in their compensation because of their sex. 31 The airlines' first argument is easily disposed of. That Gilbert held the exclusion of pregnancy benefits to be nondiscriminatory does not compel the conclusion that the inclusion of such benefits is necessarily discriminatory. The Gilbert Court itself, quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, supra, 417 U.S. at 496-97 n.20, 94 S.Ct. at 2491-92 n.20, explicitly observed that classifications based on pregnancy are not facially discriminatory: 32 Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition. 33 The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The program divides potential recipients into two groups pregnant women and non- pregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members of both sexes. 34 429 U.S. at 134-35, 97 S.Ct. at 407-08. Therefore, the inclusion of pregnancy benefits is no more discriminatory per se than was their exclusion. 35 To evaluate plaintiffs' second argument, that a disability plan complying with the HRL has a discriminatory effect upon men, we must review the allegations of the complaint. The airlines alleged, and we must therefore accept as true for these purposes, that the disability benefits provided their male and female employees during the relevant period were fairly equivalent in value in terms of dollar benefits paid per salary dollar, and that their employees were covered equally under the (disability) plans, regardless of sex, for all disabilities unrelated to pregnancy. They alleged further that the provision of pregnancy benefits pursuant to the HRL would have increased the value of the disability package to women without providing a corresponding increase to men. Therefore, plaintiffs conclude, the New York statutes had the unlawful effect of mandating discrimination against men on the basis of their sex. 36 This argument is unfounded. Although we must accept plaintiffs' factual allegations as true, we need not assume the truth of conclusions of law or unwarranted factual inferences that they have pleaded. See generally 2A Moore's Federal Practice P 12.08, at 2266-69 (2d ed. 1980). The airlines' characterization of the value of disability benefits to their employees falls into the latter category. The value of a disability plan as an item of compensation for an individual worker is not the amount of benefits payable to that worker in the event of disability. Rather, it is the worker's pro rata share of the total cost of providing disability coverage, which in turn equals the sum of the plan's total payout and expenses. 16 Plaintiffs have not alleged that the HRL would require male employees to pay greater individual pro rata shares of the total cost of coverage. The increase in total cost occasioned by the inclusion of pregnancy benefits, and the corresponding increase in the plan's value as an item of compensation, is uniformly spread among all employees. Because this increase is uniform for all, it can hardly be said to have a discriminatory effect upon men. Cf. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, supra. 37 Similarly, we reject the airlines' contention that a plan complying with the HRL has a discriminatory effect upon men because they will never receive the pregnancy benefits for which they have paid. Large numbers of women will be equally empty-handed. Under the HRL, all workers bear the cost of payments to the comparatively few who become disabled through pregnancy. The cost of these benefits does not depend upon the number of women in the employer's labor force, but upon the number of women who become pregnant. The latter variable is not a function solely of their sex, as the airlines would have it, but as well of age and marital status. 17 In short, the HRL did not require employers to discriminate against men on the basis of their sex and was therefore not unlawful under Title VII.