Opinion ID: 2457072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Accused's Statements to Police

Text: Prior to trial, Mr. Knese filed a one page motion to suppress which moved, in its entirety, to suppress any and all statements obtained from the defendant of whatever kind or nature on the grounds that such statements were obtained in violation of defendants rights against self-incrimination as numerated in the Fifth-Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Following a hearing, this motion was summarily overruled, and several of Mr. Knese's statements given while he was being treated in the hospital emergency room, which amounted to a detailed confession to the murder and attempted rape of his wife, were presented to the jury. Mr. Knese contends that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress, arguing that his waiver of his right against self-incrimination was not voluntary, knowing and intelligent. At the suppression hearing the State presented the evidence of four police officers. The first officer to speak with Mr. Knese was an evidence technician, Officer Chestnut, who collected Mr. Knese's clothes and photographed his injuries. Officer Chestnut first saw Mr. Knese at approximately 7:30 a.m. and was in his presence on and off for two hours. He did not ask Mr. Knese any questions, although Mr. Knese made several statements spontaneously that were not introduced at trial. He testified that when he initially saw Mr. Knese he was acting abnormal and that he was acting wild: He had a wide open look in his eyes, far away stare. His eyes were rolling back and forth very rapidly, staring at the ceiling. He was lying flat on his back. His body was acting like he was pacing. Although initially he was fading in and out of reality, later Mr. Knese calmed down and he seemed like he was more understanding of what was going on and understanding of what had transpired. A second officer, Sergeant Schwendemann, spoke with Mr. Knese immediately before Officer Chestnut, and described him as calm and rational at that time. The statements made by Mr. Knese to Sergeant Schwendemann also were not presented at trial. Detective Harvey, who did testify at trial, began to interrogate Mr. Knese at approximately 8 a.m. He testified that, at that time, Mr. Knese appeared very coherent and understood what [Detective Harvey] was talking about. Detective Harvey advised him of his Miranda rights, [3] and Mr. Knese indicated that he understood each of the rights. Mr. Knese then made a detailed statement describing the altercation with his wife in which he admitted choking her into unconsciousness. Detective Harvey returned at 2:20 that afternoon to have Mr. Knese repeat his confession on audio tape. Before he began the interrogation, Detective Harvey gave Mr. Knese a form advising him of his Miranda rights, read it to him as Mr. Knese read along and, after Mr. Knese had agreed, on audio tape, that he understood the rights he was waiving, had Mr. Knese sign the waiver. Mr. Knese then gave a detailed forty minute interview where he described the altercation where he killed his wife. At that time, Detective Harvey testified, Mr. Knese appeared lucid and coherent. Detective Harvey again returned to Mr. Knese's bedside at 5:20 the same afternoon. After again advising Mr. Knese of his Miranda rights, Detective Harvey asked Mr. Knese if he had had intercourse with his wife prior to killing her. Mr. Knese indicated that he had attempted to, but was unable to maintain an erection. Detective Morrissey also testified at the suppression hearing and at the trial. He testified that Mr. Knese approached him at 9:50 that morning, after he had been Mirandized by Detective Harvey, and described the incident to him in some detail. Detective Morrissey testified that during this statement and the statements made to Detective Harvey, Mr. Knese was coherent. In order for a waiver of Miranda rights to be operative, the waiver must, under the facts and circumstances in each particular case, be voluntary, knowing and intelligent. [4] Although he did not present specific grounds in his suppression motion, Mr. Knese claimed during the hearing on that motion, at trial, and in his motion for new trial that his mental condition rendered his confession unintelligent. It is not clear what Mr. Knese suggests caused this deficient mental condition. Mr. Knese presented no evidence at the suppression hearing. No evidence was produced at any time, and indeed Mr. Knese does not claim now, that any of the injuries he suffered or treatment he received were of the kind that would cause him not to understand the rights he was waiving. In fact, defense counsel, after asking for an extra week to review Mr. Knese's hospital records, reported to the trial court that although the records did contain rather significant indications... that he was in [sic] highly agitated state, he did not think their [sic] is enough in the records to justify submitting them as part of the motion to suppress the confession. The fact that Mr. Knese may have used cocaine earlier in the day or that Officer Chestnut observed that he was fading in and out of reality some time before waiving his rights are not sufficient to render his waiver unintelligent: a deficient mental condition, whether manifested by delusional behavior or a positive drug test, does not by itself render a statement unintelligent. A defendant does not have the constitutional right `to confess to his crime only when totally rational and properly motivated.' [5] Given that Mr. Knese repeatedly waived his Miranda rights over a period of many hours and gave detailed, coherent statements over that time, the trial court did not err in overruling defendant's motion to suppress the confessions as being the product of an unintelligent waiver. Mr. Knese also claims, for the first time on appeal, that the confession was inadmissible since the waiver was unknowing and involuntary. These issues are not preserved for review. To preserve an objection to evidence for review, the objection must be specific, and the point raised on appeal must be based upon the same theory. [6] There was no plain error in not finding the waiver involuntary or unknowing. As to knowledge of the rights waived, Mr. Knese stipulated at the suppression hearing that the officers who questioned him properly advised him of the substance of his Miranda rights. As to voluntariness, Mr. Knese analogizes this case to Mincey v. Arizona, [7] where the United States Supreme Court held a confession involuntary because police officers had interrogated a suspect while he was being treated for a gunshot wound. While Mincey is distinguishable because the defendant's injuries in that case were much more serious that Mr. Knese's (Mr. Mincey was nearly in a coma), [8] the primary difference between the two cases is that, in Mincey , the defendant was repeatedly interrogated, despite his grave physical condition and his repeated insistence that he did not want to answer questions. [9] Here, unlike in Mincey , Mr. Knese never expressed any desire to remain silent or to have an attorney present. Indeed, on several occasions Mr. Knese spontaneously made incriminating statements to police officers who never questioned him at all. Despite the fact that he was in the hospital at the time, there is not the slightest evidence in the record that Mr. Knese's numerous statements were anything less than voluntary, and the trial court did not plainly err in failing to exclude the confession on this basis. Mr. Knese also argues that the trial court erred in failing to specifically make a factual finding on the record that his waiver was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and requests that the court remand for such findings. This Court has repeatedly emphasized the requirement that the record be clear that the trial court did make such findings, especially with regard to voluntariness. [10] It is equally clear that this is not a formal requirement, and it is not necessary that the specific words knowing and intelligent must be used in the trial court's ruling. [11] While the Court has remanded for findings on the issue of whether a confession is knowing and intelligent, this has only been where, as in Bittick , the trial court's ruling was ambiguous on this issue. In that case, the trial court had expressed some confusion about the state of the law in its oral findings and appeared to suggest that a finding of voluntariness was, by itself, sufficient to allow the confession. [12] Here the sole issue presented to the court at the suppression hearing was whether the confession was intelligent. Given that, and the overwhelming testimony presented at that hearing that Mr. Knese intelligently waived his rights, we find the court's one sentence ruling to be a clear indication that the court found Mr. Knese's waiver intelligent. The issue of voluntariness merits some discussion, since this Court has often emphasized that once the defendant objects to a confession's admission, there must be, prior to its admission into evidence, a clearcut determination that the confession was in fact voluntary, and that conclusion must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity. [13] We continue to adhere to this principle, but note that, in order to implicate this rule, the defendant must object to the voluntariness of the confession. Where, as here, there was no claim made to the trial court or evidence presented that a confession was involuntary, requiring the trial court to make such findings would amount to no more than an exercise in empty formalism. Given that the sole objection interposed to the admission of the confession was that the waiver was unintelligently made, it was not error for the trial court to fail to specify with more particularity its reasons for overruling defendant's motion to suppress.