Opinion ID: 867372
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Submission of (F)(2) aggravating factor to jury

Text: ¶ 13 Pandeli argues that submitting the (F)(2) aggravating factor to the jury violated his Sixth Amendment right. We disagree. ¶ 14 After receiving a new sentencing hearing to cure the error caused by allowing the judge to find the aggravating circumstances, Pandeli now claims that the jury should not have been allowed to find the (F)(2) aggravating factor because the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require a jury to determine the existence of a prior conviction. See State v. Ring (Ring III), 204 Ariz. 534, 556, ¶ 55, 65 P.3d 915, 937 (2003). Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-703.01(P) (Supp.2006), however, requires a jury to make all findings of fact in a death penalty sentencing hearing, and the fact that the Sixth Amendment allows a judge to find prior convictions does not affect that statutory mandate. Nothing in the Constitution requires that a judge find the prior serious offense aggravating circumstance, and the Arizona statute affirmatively requires that the finding be made by the jury. See A.R.S. § 13-703.01(P). ¶ 15 Pandeli also argues that it was unnecessary for the jury to find the existence of his prior conviction because a trial judge's finding in an earlier sentencing proceeding that a prior conviction exists may not be disturbed at resentencing. In support of this proposition, he cites State v. Montaño, 206 Ariz. 296, 77 P.3d 1246 (2003), and State v. Cropper, 206 Ariz. 153, 76 P.3d 424 (2003). The question in those cases differed from the one now before us. In Montaño and Cropper, we were analyzing whether the error in having a judge find aggravating factors was harmless. For purposes of the harmless error inquiry, we stated that we would not disturb the trial judge's finding that the prior serious conviction aggravating circumstance exists. Montaño, 206 Ariz. at 299, ¶ 12, 77 P.3d at 1249; Cropper, 206 Ariz. at 155, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d at 426. This language did not establish the existence of the (F)(2) aggravating circumstance as a matter of law because we vacated the death sentences and remanded the cases for resentencing. Montaño, 206 Ariz. at 301, ¶ 26, 77 P.3d at 1251; Cropper, 206 Ariz. at 158, ¶ 24, 76 P.3d at 429. Because Pandeli's death sentence was vacated, the State was obligated to re-prove the (F)(2) aggravating circumstance on resentencing. Arizona Revised Statutes § 13-703.01(P) requires that the finding be made by a jury.