Opinion ID: 2381536
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Defendant contends that the evidence presented at the guilt phase was insufficient to establish first degree murder or the torture-murder special circumstance. He further asserts that basing a conviction or special circumstance finding on the insufficient evidence presented at his trial violated the narrowing principle of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and his right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The law governing sufficiency-of-the-evidence challenges is well established and applies both to convictions and special circumstance findings. ( People v. Valdez (2006) 32 Cal.4th 73, 104 [8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296]; People v. Elliot (2005) 37 Cal.4th 453, 466 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 759, 122 P.3d 968] ( Elliot ).) In reviewing a claim for sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt. We review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses sufficient evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesupporting the decision, and not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) We neither reweigh the evidence nor reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. ( People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27 [82 Cal.Rptr.3d 323, 190 P.3d 664].) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury reasonably could deduce from the evidence. ( Ibid. ) If the circumstances reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal of the judgment is not warranted simply because the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. ( Ibid. ) (1) In the present case, the trial court instructed the jury concerning three alternative theories of first degree murder advanced by the prosecution murder by poison, murder by torture, and premeditated murderand the verdict does not specify which theory the jury relied upon in finding defendant guilty. A jury may convict a defendant of first degree murder, however, without making a unanimous choice of one or more of several theories proposed by the prosecution .... ( People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 92 [279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311].) As we explain below, the record discloses sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that defendant was guilty of first degree murder on each of these three theories. There also is sufficient evidence to support the torture-murder special-circumstance finding. Because defendant's corresponding constitutional claims rely upon the alleged insufficiency of the evidence and related arguments that we reject, they necessarily must fail as well.
Defendant contends he could not have been convicted of first degree murder by poison, because the jury found the poison-murder special circumstance not true, and because Michelle, not defendant, administered the fatal poison and there is no evidence she intended to kill Arthur. We disagree. Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, there is ample evidence to support defendant's first degree murder conviction on the basis of murder by poison. (2) As we previously have noted, it is not the case that the elements of the murder-by-poison special circumstance merely repeat the elements that render a homicide a first degree murder when committed by means of poison. ( People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 158 [109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357] ( Catlin ); see § 189 [All murder which is perpetrated by means of ... poison ... is murder of the first degree.]; § 190.2, subd. (a)(19) [defining the poison-murder special circumstance as a first degree murder in which [t]he defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of poison].) The special circumstance allegation, unlike the definition of first degree murder by poison, requires proof that the defendant intentionally killed the victim. For the purpose of a first degree murder conviction based upon an unlawful killing by means of poison, proof of implied malice would suffice .... ( Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 158.) Therefore, even if we were to assume the jury rejected the murder-by-poison special circumstance because it was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that either defendant or Michelle intended to kill Arthur by means of the drugs, the jury still could have reasonably found defendant guilty of first degree murder by poison if it found that either codefendant acted with implied malice. ( People v. Diaz (1992) 3 Cal.4th 495, 568 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 353, 834 P.2d 1171] [A defendant acting with implied malice who kills his or her victim with poison is guilty of first degree murder even if the defendant lacks the intent to kill.].) The trial court instructed the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.11 concerning implied malice, as follows: Malice is implied when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act; [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. (3) Defendant does not dispute that the natural consequences of administering three powerful sedatives to a five-year-old child are dangerous to human life, or that furnishing the drugs to Arthur was a cause of his death. The only issue in terms of implied malice, therefore, is whether there was sufficient evidence for a reasonably jury to have found that defendant `had full knowledge that his conduct endangered the life of decedent, but that he nevertheless deliberately administered the poison with conscious disregard for that life.' [Citation.] ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 745 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145].) The evidence presented at trial reasonably established the following sequence of events. On the morning of February 4, 1996, defendant directed Michelle to go to the store to purchase over-the-counter sleeping pills to give to Arthur. [9] When she returned, Michelle gave Arthur two Unisom sleeping pills, as well as one Valium, at defendant's direction. Defendant gave Arthur additional pain pills, which included Vicodin. Arthur died later that day as a result of combined drug toxicity and acute and chronic abuse and neglect. A box of Unisom sleeping pills in child-resistant packaging found at defendant's home was entered into evidence. In response to a juror question, [10] the instructions on the back of the package were read out loud by Dr. Sheridan. The instructions indicated that the proper adult dosage was one tablet daily and warned in pertinent part: Do not take this product if presently taking any other drug without consulting your physician or pharmacist.... For adults only. Do not give to children under age twelve years. Keep this and all medications out of the reach of children. (Italics added.) Multiple childproof containers of Vicodin and Valium that had been prescribed to defendant also were entered into evidence and shown to the jury. In the joint interview, defendant altered his story several times and admitted lying to the detectives on numerous occasions. In evaluating the evidence pertaining to poisoning, the jury was not required to accept, and was entitled to reject, the claims that defendant administered the drugs to Arthur in an effort to get him better, that defendant did not know much about the drugs, and that he didn't think about what effect the drugs would have on Arthur. To the contrary, the jury could have inferred exactly the opposite from defendant's remarks about killing Arthur, the acknowledgement that Vicodin and Valium made defendant feel sleepy and numb, his claim that he halved or quartered the prescription pain pills before giving them to Arthur, and the admission by defendant that he probably killed Arthur by [a]busing him and the medication and stuff like that. This evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that defendant deliberately administered the drugs to Arthur, and directed Michelle to do the same, with full knowledge that such conduct endangered Arthur's life and with conscious disregard for that life. (4) Defendant attempts to parse his involvement from Michelle's role in the administration of the drugs, ignoring the circumstance that he was charged and tried as an aider and abettor, as well as a direct perpetrator. [11] Aider and abettor liability is premised on the combined acts of all the principals, but on the aider and abettor's own mens rea. If the mens rea of the aider and abettor is more culpable than the actual perpetrator's, the aider and abettor may be guilty of a more serious crime than the actual perpetrator. [¶] Moreover, the dividing line between the actual perpetrator and the aider and abettor is often blurred. It is often an oversimplification to describe one person as the actual perpetrator and the other as the aider and abettor. When two or more persons commit a crime together, both may act in part as the actual perpetrator and in part as the aider and abettor of the other, who also acts in part as an actual perpetrator. ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].) The evidence described above was sufficient for a reasonable jury to have found that defendant poisoned Arthur, or that he aided and abetted Michelle in poisoning Arthur, or that both occurred. Therefore, even assuming for purposes of argument that the sleeping pills administered by Michelle were the sole cause of Arthur's death, and that the additional drugs and torture were not concurrent causes, a reasonable jury still could have found defendant guilty of first degree murder by poison as an aider and abettor. In any event, there is sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction of first degree murder on the theory of murder by poison.
Defendant claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of first degree murder on a murder-by-torture theory. (See § 189 [All murder which is perpetrated by means of ... torture ... is murder of the first degree.].) He does not contend that the evidence of his physical abuse of Arthurwhich included burning Arthur's hand on the stove, giving him black eyes, hitting him with a two-by-four, violently shaking and banging Arthur's head against the wall, kicking him in the midsection, duct-taping his mouth and hands, smothering him, and hitting Arthur in the back of the head with a fireplace shovelwas insufficient to establish torture. Rather, defendant contends that even assuming he tortured Arthur, there is insufficient evidence that his torture was the but for cause of Arthur's death, which defendant attributes to the drugs. We disagree. There was sufficient evidence presented at trial from which a reasonable juror could have found that defendant's acts of physical violence and deliberate starvation of Arthur were concurrent causes of Arthur's death. [12] As such, the evidence is sufficient to support a conviction of first degree murder by torture. (5) The elements of first degree murder by torture are: (1) acts causing death that involve a high degree of probability of the victim's death; and (2) a willful, deliberate, and premeditated intent to cause extreme pain or suffering for the purpose of revenge, extortion, persuasion, or another sadistic purpose. [Citations.] ( People v. Cook (2006) 39 Cal.4th 566, 602 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492].) The prosecution need not establish that the defendant intended to kill the victim ( ibid. ), but must prove a causal relationship between the torturous acts and the death ( People v. Chatman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 344, 392 [42 Cal.Rptr.3d 621, 133 P.3d 534] ( Chatman )). The finding of murder-by-torture encompasses the totality of the brutal acts and the circumstances which led to the victim's death. [Citations.] The acts of torture may not be segregated into their constituent elements in order to determine whether any single act by itself caused the death; rather, it is the continuum of sadistic violence that constitutes the torture. ( People v. Proctor (1992) 4 Cal.4th 499, 530-531 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 340, 842 P.2d 1100].) (6) If a defendant's acts of torture were a concurrent cause of the death, it is no defense that the conduct of some other person contributed to the death. `When the conduct of two or more persons contributes concurrently as the proximate cause of the death, the conduct of each is a proximate cause of the death if that conduct was also a substantial factor contributing to the result. A cause is concurrent if it was operative at the time of the death and acted with another cause to produce the death.' [Citation.] ( People v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 847 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 129, 29 P.3d 209]; see also 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Elements, § 37, p. 243 [The defendant may also be criminally liable for a result directly caused by his or her act, even though there is another contributing cause.].) To be considered the proximate cause of the victim's death, the defendant's act must have been a substantial factor contributing to the result, rather than insignificant or merely theoretical. ( People v. Briscoe (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 568, 583-584 [112 Cal.Rptr.2d 401].) [A]s long as the jury finds that without the criminal act the death would not have occurred when it did, it need not determine which of the concurrent causes was the principal or primary cause of death. ( Catlin, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 155.) (7) For this reason, defendant's focus upon but for causation, and whether the drugs were the primary cause of Arthur's death, is misplaced. But for or sine qua non causation provides that [t]he defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would have occurred without it. (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 41, p. 266, fn. omitted.) [13] By comparison, the substantial factor rule for concurrent causes was developed primarily for cases in which application of the but-for rule would allow each defendant to escape responsibility because the conduct of one or more others would have been sufficient to produce the same result. (Prosser & Keeton, at p. 268.) As we have stated in the civil context, the tests for but for and substantial factor causation usually produce the same result, but the substantial factor standard states a clearer rule that subsumes and reaches beyond the but for test to more accurately address situations in which there are independent concurrent causes of an event. ( Lineaweaver v. Plant Insulation Co. (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1415 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 902]; see also Viner v. Sweet (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1232, 1239-1240 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 70 P.3d 1046].) (8) In the present case, there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that defendant's torture was at least a substantial factor in Arthur's death. Dr. Sheridan testified that the cause of Arthur's death was attributable to the entire problem that it, the drugs, the physical injuries, and the malnutrition and emaciation  all working together to bring about the resulting death. (Italics added.) Additionally, the expert toxicologist and Dr. Sheridan both concluded that the dosage of Unisom that was administered to Arthur was sufficient to account for Arthur's death in light of his age and weight. The jury reasonably could have inferred from this evidence that defendant's physical abuse and purposeful starvation of Arthur contributed to the lethal effect of the pills, and therefore was a substantial factor in his death. Defendant contends, however, that the jury could not properly consider starvation as an aspect of torture, because there was insufficient evidence that defendant deliberately withheld nourishment from Arthur. We disagree. Wilma S., Arthur's aunt, testified that when she returned Arthur to his parents in November 1995, he weighed 64 pounds and was in good health. In the weeks leading up to his death, neighbors reported that Arthur appeared thin and undernourished, despite the circumstance that the Jenningses had ample food in their home. When offered food or drink, Arthur gulped it down and asked for additional portions, suggesting he had not eaten recently. When he died on February 4, 1996, Arthur weighed only 35 pounds, having lost nearly half of his body weight in less than three months. Dr. Sheridan, who conducted the autopsy, testified that Arthur's body had almost no fat beneath the skin, had broken down muscle tissue for energy, and lacked food in the stomach at the time of death. Arthur also suffered from acute pneumonia and from a breakdown of his immune system due to emaciation. The jury was shown photographs of Arthur taken between November 1995 and February 1996, including some taken at the autopsy, which demonstrated his decline. Dr. Sheridan further testified there was no medical reason for Arthur's dramatic weight loss over this short a period of time. The foregoing constitutes substantial evidence from which the jury reasonably could find that the Jenningses deliberately starved Arthur. This evidence, along with the evidence of chronic and acute physical abuse, is sufficient to support defendant's first degree murder conviction on the basis of murder by torture.
Defendant contends that he was improperly convicted of first degree premeditated murder, because there is no evidence he killed Arthur by means of a deliberate and premeditated act. (See § 189 [All murder which is perpetrated ... by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first degree.].) As demonstrated above in response to defendant's claims related to murder by torture and murder by poison, however, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury reasonably could have found that defendant caused Arthur's death. Additionally, as demonstrated below in response to defendant's torture-murder special-circumstance claim, there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could have found that defendant intended to kill Arthur. The only remaining question for purposes of the present claim is whether there is sufficient evidence of deliberation and premeditation. (9) An intentional killing is premeditated and deliberate if it occurred as the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 543 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182].) In this context, `premeditated' means `considered beforehand,' and `deliberate' means `formed or arrived at or determined upon as a result of careful thought and weighing of considerations for and against the proposed course of action.' ( People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 767 [60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485].) We normally consider three kinds of evidence to determine whether a finding of premeditation and deliberation is adequately supportedpreexisting motive, planning activity, and manner of killingbut [t]hese factors need not be present in any particular combination to find substantial evidence of premeditation and deliberation. ( Stitely, supra, at p. 543.) If the evidence of preexisting motive and planning activity by itself is sufficient to support the first degree murder conviction on a theory of premeditation and deliberation, we need not review the evidence concerning the manner of killing. ( People v. Jurado (2006) 38 Cal.4th 72, 119 [41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400].) In the case before us, the evidence of preexisting motive clearly supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation. After returning to the Jennings residence, Arthur soon proved to be a difficult child with significant problems, and defendant and Michelle quickly found themselves ill-equipped to handle Arthur's fits and were unable to manage or control his behavior. Although Wilma S. clearly had said she would take Arthur back at any time, defendant did not pursue this option, nor did he pursue the course of giving Arthur up for adoption. Instead, he attempted to discipline Arthur by inflicting repeated physical punishment that left Arthur's body covered in bruises, and by purposefully withholding food to the extent that Arthur lost nearly half his body weight in less than three months. The situation quickly deteriorated to the point that defendant spoke about getting rid of, shooting, or otherwise killing Arthur. The evidence of planning activity also supports a finding of premeditation and deliberation. On the day Arthur was killed but before he was dead, Michelle and Art, Sr., went out at defendant's behest to survey the mine shaft where Arthur later was found. Two days before Arthur's death, defendant and Michelle had driven around the desert looking for a place to dump Arthur's body. A few days before that, defendant devised the story he later would use to explain Arthur's disappearance, telling a neighbor that Arthur got up in the middle of the night and ran out into the desert, and that defendant and Michelle had spent three hours looking for Arthur before finding him hiding behind a bush. After killing Arthur, the Jenningses went to the sheriff's station with a similar story, claiming that Arthur had run away in the middle of the night. Moreover, in the days leading up to Arthur's death, defendant refused to add Arthur to the family's medical insurance policy, stating he wouldn't be in the house long enough to need it. Finally, the manner of killing supports the conclusion that Arthur's death was the result of preexisting thought and reflection rather than unconsidered or rash impulse. Arthur was systematically starved and continuously abused, and a potentially lethal dose of prescription and over-the-counter sedatives was deliberately administered. This conduct is entirely consistent with a preconceived design to kill, and the jury was not required to accept defendant's claims to the contrary. In light of the foregoing, we conclude the evidence presented at trial was sufficient for a reasonable jury to have found that the killing of Arthur was premeditated and deliberate. As such, there is sufficient evidence to support defendant's first degree murder conviction on the basis of premeditated murder.
Defendant claims there is insufficient evidence to support the jury's torture-murder special-circumstance finding. Reviewing the entire record in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we conclude a rational trier of fact could have found true beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of the torture-murder special-circumstance allegation. (10) Under the applicable statute, first degree murder is punishable by death or life in prison if the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).) Proof of a murder committed under the torture-murder special circumstance requires (1) proof of first degree murder, (2) proof that the defendant intended to kill and torture the victim, and (3) proof of the infliction of an extremely painful act upon a living victim. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 271 [221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) The torture-murder special circumstance thus is distinguished from first degree murder by torture in that it requires defendant to have acted with the intent to kill and applies where the death involved the infliction of torture, regardless of whether the acts constituting the torture were the cause of death. (See § 190.2, subd. (a)(18); People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 842-843 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152] ( Bemore ).) Defendant, focusing entirely on Michelle's allegedly innocuous intent in giving Arthur the sleeping pills, argues there was insufficient evidence of his intent to kill. The relevant inquiry, however, is whether defendant harbored an intent to kill when he tortured Arthur. The nature of the torture inflicted upon Arthurthe continuous infliction of serious and possibly life-threatening physical injuries while deliberately and systematically starving Arthur to the point of emaciationis sufficient to suggest that defendant had such intent. In evaluating the evidence regarding intent to kill, the jury was not required to credit, and was entitled to reject, defendant's repeated claims to the contrary. Defendant admitted that one of his last acts of torturehitting Arthur on the back of the head with a shovel so hard that it caused a large, gaping woundmight have killed Arthur, suggesting this was his intent. Defendant also admitted he was more than angry that Arthur had witnessed defendant kissing a neighbor, and when asked by a detective, You had to finish him off. True or not true?, defendant responded, I guess true. The evidence further established that prior to the incident involving the shovel, defendant on more than one occasion spoke about killing Arthur, kept him off the family's medical plan because he wouldn't be in the house long enough to use it, searched the desert for a place to dispose of Arthur's body two days before his death, and went to great lengths to conceal Arthur's death, including planning the runaway story he would tell the authorities. This evidence is sufficient to support a finding, in connection with the torture-murder special circumstance, that defendant intended to kill Arthur. (11) Defendant also argues there is insufficient evidence that Arthur's murder involved the infliction of torture. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(18).) In resolving above the claim by defendant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction of first degree murder under a theory of murder by torture, we found sufficient evidence to establish that the torture perpetrated by defendant was a concurrent cause of Arthur's death. Unlike first degree murder by torture, however, the special circumstance does not require that the acts constituting the torture cause the death. ( Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 843.) Rather, `some proximity in time [and] space between the murder and torture' will suffice. ( Ibid. ) Whatever the `outer limits' of the torture-murder special circumstance might be in this regard, the proximity requirement is satisfied when the acts of torture also were a cause of death. ( Chatman, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 394.) Even absent the evidence of concurrent causation, the record in this case discloses a close connection between the torture and the murder. ( Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 843.) Arthur had received several fresh injuriesincluding the head wound defendant admitted to inflicting with a shovel and the facial injuries consistent with a smothering attemptshortly before his death. Finally, defendant argues that the torture-murder special circumstance is unconstitutional because the acts of torture are not required to be the sole or primary cause of the victim's death. As he acknowledges, however, we previously have rejected this argument. ( Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 843.) We find no compelling reason to revisit the issue.
Defendant claims that even if there is sufficient evidence to support his conviction for first degree murder, the conviction violates his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. We conclude that the jury's first degree murder verdict did not violate any of defendant's constitutional rights. (12) Defendant argues that his first degree murder conviction makes him death eligible in a case in which he did not cause the death and the death was unintentional, in violation of the principle that a state's death penalty scheme must meaningfully narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. (See, e.g., Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862 [77 L.Ed.2d 235, 103 S.Ct. 2733]; Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625 [65 L.Ed.2d 392, 100 S.Ct. 2382]; Godfrey v. Georgia (1980) 446 U.S. 420 [64 L.Ed.2d 398, 100 S.Ct. 1759]; Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954]; Gardner v. Florida (1977) 430 U.S. 349 [51 L.Ed.2d 393, 97 S.Ct. 1197].) This argument fails for three reasons. First, there is sufficient evidence, as outlined above, from which a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the torture inflicted by defendant caused Arthur's death. Second, we have held that imposition of the death penalty upon one who lacks the intent to kill is not cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (See, e.g., People v. Diaz, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 569; see also Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 157-158 [95 L.Ed.2d 127, 107 S.Ct. 1676].) Third, it was defendant's first degree murder conviction in conjunction with the jury's true finding on the torture-murder special circumstancewhich required an intent to kill that ultimately made defendant eligible for the death penalty. (13) The United States Supreme Court has held that California's requirement of a special circumstance finding adequately limits the death sentence to a small subclass of capital-eligible cases. ( Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 53 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 104 S.Ct. 871].) More specifically, we have held that [t]he special circumstance of intentional murder involving the infliction of torture sufficiently channels and limits the jury's sentencing discretion consistent with Eighth Amendment principles [citation], and meaningfully narrows the group of persons subject to the death penalty [citations]. ( People v. Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1162-1163 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 121, 954 P.2d 384]; see also People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 900 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712] [torture murder is particularly reprehensible because the defendant intends to cause cruel suffering].) (14) Defendant next argues that any interpretation of the evidence in this case that renders him guilty of first degree murder violates the well-settled constitutional principle prohibiting punishment determined under vague, arbitrary, or illegitimate standards. (See, e.g., Kolender v. Lawson (1983) 461 U.S. 352, 357 [75 L.Ed.2d 903, 103 S.Ct. 1855]; Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346 [65 L.Ed.2d 175, 100 S.Ct. 2227].) The existence of substantial evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt the essential elements of first degree murder, as well as the torture-murder special circumstance, satisfies the due process clause of the United States Constitution, as well as its counterpart in article I, section 15, of the California Constitution. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 99 S.Ct. 2781]; People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1083 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40].)