Opinion ID: 2365084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Feel Doctrine

Text: The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a plain feel exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, analogous to the plain view exception, that permits warrantless seizures of obvious contraband discovered during the course of a lawfully conducted frisk or search. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 374-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993). If a police officer lawfully pats down a suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour or mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons; if the object is contraband, its warrantless seizure would be justified by the same practical considerations that inhere in the plain-view context. Id. at 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added). This court recognized the plain feel exception in ( Kenneth) Dickerson v. United States, 677 A.2d 509 (D.C.1996). For a seizure of contraband under the plain feel exception to the warrant requirement, 1) the pat-down must be permissible under Terry, 2) the contraband must be detected in the course of the Terry search, and 3) the incriminating nature of the object perceived to be contraband must be immediately apparent to the officer. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 375-76, 113 S.Ct. 2130; State v. Bridges, 963 S.W.2d 487, 494 (Tenn.1997). Immediately apparent for purposes of plain feel analysis does not mean that an officer must know for certain that the item felt is contraband, only that there is probable cause to associate the item with criminal activity. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 741, 103 S.Ct. 1535 ([T]he use of the phrase `immediately apparent' was very likely an unhappy choice of words, since it can be taken to imply that an unduly high degree of certainty as to the incriminatory character of evidence is necessary for an application of the `plain view' doctrine.); State v. Wonders, 263 Kan. 582, 952 P.2d 1351, 1362 (1998) ([T]he same construction of the `immediately apparent' requirement in plain view situations should be applied to those involving plain feel.); People v. Champion, 452 Mich. 92, 549 N.W.2d 849, 855 (1996) (`[I]mmediately apparent' means that without further search the officers have `probable cause to believe' the items are seizable. (quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. at 741-42, 103 S.Ct. 1535)). Thus, as we noted in (Kenneth) Dickerson, [A]n officer must possess probable cause that the item is contraband or evidence of a crime to seize the object lawfully. 677 A.2d at 513 n. 5. See also Christmas v. United States, 314 A.2d 473, 479 (D.C.1974) (finding seizure illegal absent probable cause to believe medicine vial contained contraband or endangered officer's safety at the time of the initial intrusion).