Opinion ID: 614603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Count Five: A Materially False Statement in a Matter Within the Jurisdiction of the United States

Text: King was convicted under Count Five of making a materially false . . . statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). King does not contest that he made a materially false statement to John Klimes when he said that the buried valve at Well Five led to an irrigation pivot. In actual fact, the valve led to Well Five and allowed water to flow into the well. However, King contends that his conviction under § 1001(a)(2) must be set aside because Klimes is an Idaho agricultural inspector. King contends that his statement to Klimes was therefore not in a matter within the jurisdiction. . . of the United States. We disagree. A false statement need not be made to a federal agent to support a conviction under § 1001(a)(2). See United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 65, 104 S.Ct. 2936, 82 L.Ed.2d 53 (1984); United States v. Facchini, 874 F.2d 638, 640-41 (9th Cir.1989) (en banc). Jurisdiction is not defined in the statute, but the most natural, nontechnical reading of the statutory language is that it covers all matters confided to the authority of an agency or department. United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 479, 104 S.Ct. 1942, 80 L.Ed.2d 492 (1984). Jurisdiction is construed broadly to protect the integrity of official inquiries. Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64, 70, 90 S.Ct. 355, 24 L.Ed.2d 264 (1969). The statute is intended to cover those deceptive practices which might result in the frustration of authorized government functions. United States v. Green, 745 F.2d 1205, 1210 (9th Cir. 1985). Section 1001(a)(2) jurisdiction extends wherever the federal government has the power to exercise authority. Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 479, 104 S.Ct. 1942. Jurisdiction requires a direct relationship between the authorized functions of an agency and the false statement. Facchini, 874 F.2d at 641. We agree with King that § 1001(a)(2) cannot be read so broadly as to incorporate any false statement made to anyone regarding matters pertinent to the federal government. But this case does not exceed the outer boundaries of the statute. The most analogous case is United States v. Oren, 893 F.2d 1057 (9th Cir.1990). In that case, we upheld a § 1001(a)(2) conviction against a defendant who forged an offer letter to the Trust for Public Lands in a scheme to induce the trust to purchase several hundred acres of undeveloped land at an inflated cost that would eventually be repurchased by the National Park Service. We held that the statement to the Trust was within the jurisdiction of the federal government for purposes of § 1001, even though the Trust was a private entity, and even though the letter was never transmitted to the Park Service by the defendant. We upheld the conviction because the Park Service could have been led to purchase the land based on the false statement. Id. at 1064-65. In this case, there is a closer connection between the false statement and the federal government than there was in Oren. King knew that the Idaho Department of Agriculture had the authority to examine his wells and injection procedures. He also knew that the Department was trying to determine whether he was injecting water into deep wells without a permit. King lied to Klimes, one of the investigators, in order to defeat the investigation. A willful injection of fluid into a deep well without a permit from the State of Idaho is a federal crime under the SDWA. Therefore, King made a false statement in a matter within the jurisdiction of the United States.
King moved for a new trial after the return of the jury's verdict. He asserted two grounds. First, he contended that on four occasions during trial prejudicial references were made to waste in violation of a pretrial order. Second, he contended that the government manipulated the testimony of John Chatburn in order to leave jurors with the false impression that Mr. King had lied. The district court denied the motion. We discuss King's arguments in turn.
The government originally indicted King for willfully injecting liquid waste without a permit. However, a superseding indictment alleged only that King willfully injected water without a permit. The district court entered a pretrial order precluding any references, in evidence presented to the jury, to wastewater, manure, or waste material, on the ground that such references could be prejudicial to King. Despite the pretrial order, three government witnesses briefly referred to waste in their testimony. In addition, the government displayed a diagram on a screen for a few seconds on which the source of the water was labeled waste pond. The district court found that the three references and the brief display were inadvertent. After the first reference to waste, the court gave a limiting instruction. King did not request limiting instructions after the other references or after the display. In its final instructions to the jury, the district court instructed the jury not to consider evidence that it had been instructed to ignore. A joint stipulation by the parties, presented to the jury, stated that the injections consisted of surface water from creeks. The district court held that its limiting instruction and the stipulation cured any possible prejudice that might have been caused by the three references and brief display. The district court did not abuse its discretion in so holding.
During a pretrial suppression hearing, Chatburn testified that on two occasions King denied injecting waste water into wells at Double C. The district court's order forbade any reference to waste in testimony before the jury. Chatburn testified at trial that on the first occasion he spoke to King about allegations that fluids were being injected. He testified that on the second occasion King denied what had been alleged. King contended in his motion for a new trial, and contends here, that the government unfairly manipulated Chatburn's testimony. He points out that Chatburn testified at trial that King denied injecting fluids, but that King had denied only injecting waste water, leaving open the possibility that he had not denied injecting clean water. Therefore, according to King, Chatburn's testimony gave a false impression to the jury. King's argument is too clever by half. It was King who insisted on the protective order that prevented Chatburn from testifying to what King had actually said. King is now seeking to take unfair advantage of the order by characterizing the good-faith replacement of waste water with fluid in Chatburn's testimony as manipulation. Further, we note that King was not charged in the indictment with lying to Chatburn. Rather, he was charged with lying to Klimes. The purpose of Chatburn's testimony was to show that King injected fluids willfully. Chatburn's testimony was only a small part of the evidence presented to the jury that King acted willfully. If there was any error in presenting Chatburn's testimony (which we hold there was not), it was clearly harmless.