Opinion ID: 712237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: larry jaynes's appeal

Text: 49 Larry Jaynes appeals his conviction on count three of the indictment, the conspiracy count. 50 Counts one and two of the indictment charged the defendants with forging and passing forged Treasury checks, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 510(a) and 2. Section 2 of title 18 provides that whoever aids or abets the commission of an offense against the United States is punishable as a principal. The jury was instructed that it could convict Mr. Jaynes on counts one and two if it found that he had aided and abetted his wife in forging and passing the forged Treasury checks. Mr. Jaynes claims that the same acts that would constitute aiding and abetting under counts one and two are also the overt acts necessary to prove the conspiracy alleged in count three. Because Mr. Jaynes was acquitted on counts one and two, he claims he could not be convicted of conspiracy, since the verdicts are inconsistent on their face. 51 The short answer to Mr. Jaynes's argument is that consistency in verdicts is not required. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 62-63, 105 S.Ct. 471, 475-476, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984); Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 190-91, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932). See also United States v. Swafford, 766 F.2d 426, 429 (10th Cir.1985) (a conspiracy conviction can stand even where the defendant is acquitted of the substantive offenses). This rule has been explained as a recognition of the jury's historic function, in criminal trials, as a check against arbitrary or oppressive exercises of power by the Executive Branch. Powell, 469 U.S. at 65, 105 S.Ct. at 476-77 (citations omitted). The jury may have thought, for example, that, while technically guilty of aiding and abetting forgery, Mr. Jaynes was not as culpable as his wife and therefore should not have been punished as a principal. See 18 U.S.C. § 2. We must therefore uphold Mr. Jaynes's conviction if there was sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict on the conspiracy charge. See Swafford, 766 F.2d at 430. 52 The evidence showed that Mr. Jaynes knew that his wife was signing her grandmother's name to Treasury checks and negotiating the checks, knew that it was wrong to do so, picked up the checks for Ms. Jaynes at her request and benefited from the proceeds of the checks. We cannot say that no reasonable jury could rationally have reached a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on the conspiracy count. See Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. at 477-78. 53 AFFIRMED.