Opinion ID: 834908
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: reyes-sanchez

Text: As noted, defendant Reyes-Sanchez contends that the hearsay testimony in his case is admissible under the residual hearsay exception, OEC 803(28)(a). The state argues, however, that OEC 803(28)(a) does not apply on the facts of this case. As we will explain, we agree with the state on that point. For convenience, we repeat the relevant portions of OEC 803(28)(a): The following are not excluded by ORS 40.455 [OEC 802], even though the declarant is available as a witness:      (28)(a) A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that: (A) The statement is relevant; (B) The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) The general purposes of the Oregon Evidence Code and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. This court explained the scope of that residual hearsay exception in State v. Campbell, 299 Or. 633, 705 P.2d 694 (1985). The defendant in that case had been convicted of sexually abusing a three-year-old child. The trial court had allowed the child's mother to offer hearsay testimony about the child's statements regarding the incidents, concluding that they fell under the residual hearsay exception of OEC 803(28)(a) (at that time numbered OEC 803(24)). This court rejected that conclusion, although a majority held that the evidence nevertheless might be admissible under a different hearsay exception. In analyzing the residual hearsay exception, this court observed that the commentary to that rule clarifies the purpose and scope of the residual hearsay exception in Oregon. Id. at 638, 705 P.2d 694. That commentary stated that the legislature `intends that these provisions be used very rarely, and only in situations where application of the hearsay rule and its other exceptions would result in injustice. These rules are not a broad grant of authority to trial judges to admit hearsay statements.' Id. at 639, 705 P.2d 694 (quoting OEC 803 Commentary (1981)). Relying on that commentary, this court then explained that the residual hearsay exception is narrow: The passage above reserved to the legislature the authority to fashion new exceptions to the hearsay rule and expressly circumscribed the authority of the judicial system to create categories of hearsay which will be admissible under the residual exception. The authority of trial courts is limited to admitting hearsay very rarely in exceptional cases where the particular circumstances of the declarant and the out-of-court statement are demonstrably trustworthy. Id. (footnote omitted). This court went on to conclude that the residual hearsay exception does not apply to those categories of evidence addressed by specific hearsay exceptions. Id.; see also 299 Or. at 661, 705 P.2d 694 (Campbell, J., dissenting) (agreeing with majority that residual hearsay exception does not permit courts to create new classes of exceptions to hearsay rule). The court noted that there was a specific hearsay exception for complaints of sexual misconduct, OEC 803(18a). Because the legislature made a conscious decision to restrict unexcited hearsay declarations of sexual misconduct by enacting OEC 803(18a), the trial court had erred in allowing hearsay testimony of sexual misconduct under the residual hearsay exception. 299 Or. at 640, 705 P.2d 694. Only after determining that the residual hearsay exception relied on by the trial court did not apply did this court consider whether the hearsay testimony was admissible under the specific requirements of OEC 803(18a). 299 Or. at 640-46, 705 P.2d 694 (explaining the limitations on the testimony). [6] Campbell demonstrates that the residual hearsay exception cannot be used to rescue hearsay statements that fall within a specific category of hearsay exception, but that fail to meet the conditions for admissibility imposed by the specific exception. In this case, the hearsay testimony that defendant Reyes-Sanchez sought to introduce falls within a specifically defined hearsay exceptionthe statement against penal interest exception of OEC 804(3)(c). The requirements of that specific exception control over the general terms of the residual hearsay exception. See ORS 174.020(2) (When a general and particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular intent.). Because the legislature made a conscious decision to restrict the admission of hearsay statements against penal interest, see Campbell, 299 Or. at 640, 705 P.2d 694, the residual hearsay exception of OEC 803(28)(a) does not apply. Having rejected defendant Reyes-Sanchez's argument that the evidence was admissible under OEC 803(28)(a), we must consider his alternative argument on review that the hearsay statements should have been admitted for the reasons articulated by the Court of Appeals. As we previously noted, the Court of Appeals in Reyes-Sanchez relied on its substantive conclusion in Cazares-Mendez that the evidence was admissible under the statement against penal interest exception of OEC 804(3)(c) as modified by application of the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Reyes-Sanchez, 234 Or.App. at 104-05, 227 P.3d 1217. In light of its holding in Cazares-Mendez that the evidence was admissible, the Court of Appeals determined that the trial court's exclusion of the evidence in Reyes-Sanchez constituted plain error under ORAP 5.45(1). 234 Or. App. at 105, 227 P.3d 1217. On review, the state does not challenge the Court of Appeals' application of the plain error rule. The only remaining issue in Reyes-Sanchez, then, is the substantive one presented in Cazares-Mendez: whether the hearsay statements in fact were admissible under OEC 804(3)(c), as modified by the requirements of due process. We turn to that question.