Opinion ID: 1038530
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Binding Nature of Prior Precedent

Text: As a three-judge panel of this circuit, we are bound by prior panel decisions such as Lowdermilk and can only reexamine them when their “reasoning or theory” of that authority is “clearly irreconcilable” with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority. Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). “This is a high standard.” Lair v. Bullock, 697 F.3d 1200, 1207 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). The test requires us to look at more than the surface conclusions of the competing authority. The issues presented in the two cases need not be identical in order for the intervening higher authority to be controlling. Miller, 335 F.3d at 900. “Rather, the relevant court of last resort must have undercut the theory or reasoning underlying the prior circuit precedent in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.” Id. But “[i]t is not enough for there to be ‘some tension’ between the intervening higher authority and RODRIGUEZ V. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES 9 the prior circuit precedent.” Lair, 697 F.3d at 1207 (quoting United States v. Delgado-Ramos, 635 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2011)). In United States v. Lindsey, 634 F.3d 541 (9th Cir. 2011), we elaborated on the Miller standard. The prior circuit precedent at issue provided that an erroneous denial of a peremptory challenge required automatic reversal of a criminal conviction. See id. at 546–47 (discussing the automatic reversal rule of United States v. Annigoni, 96 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc)). But in Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148 (2009), the Supreme Court held that courts could review improper denials of peremptory challenges for harmless error without running afoul of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 157. Rivera only addressed peremptory challenges in state, not federal, court, and it did not foreclose the possibility that automatic reversal could be held appropriate in a federal prosecution. Lindsey, 634 F.3d at 550. Nonetheless, Lindsey held that Rivera’s reasoning was clearly irreconcilable with Annigoni’s automatic reversal rule such that the en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit had been effectively overruled. Id. (“It does not matter that the two decisions are not identical.”). Lindsey highlighted Miller’s instruction to focus on “the reasoning and analysis in support of a holding, rather than the holding alone.” Id. at 550. We noted that the result in Miller was a consequence of the Supreme Court’s having taken an “approach that [was] fundamentally inconsistent with the reasoning of our earlier circuit authority.” Id. at 548 (quoting Miller, 335 F.3d at 892) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, because the conclusion reached in our circuit precedent was no longer “supported for the reasons stated” in that 10 RODRIGUEZ V. AT&T MOBILITY SERVICES decision, our court determined that it was no longer appropriate to apply its holding. Lindsey, 634 F.3d at 551. In contrast, we held in Lair v. Bullock that a district court had erred when it eschewed our controlling circuit precedent because of a subsequent decision by the Supreme Court. 697 F.3d at 1207. Our precedent, Montana Right to Life Association v. Eddleman, 343 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2003), and the intervening higher authority, Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006), reached opposite conclusions regarding campaign contribution limits. Compare Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092–96 (upholding Montana’s campaign contribution limit) with Randall, 548 U.S. at 236–37 (holding that Vermont’s contribution limitations were unconstitutional). But that tension was not enough to overrule Eddleman because Randall “only clarified and reinforced” the principles on which our prior decision relied. See Lair, 697 F.3d at 1207 (noting that Eddleman was based on the same Supreme Court precedent on which Randall relied). We must, then, follow our court’s directive to look beyond the narrow conclusions of Lowdermilk and Standard Fire. Instead, we focus on the respective bases for those decisions to determine whether Standard Fire’s reasoning so undercuts the principles on which Lowdermilk relied that our prior decision cannot stand.