Opinion ID: 773225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the denial of fees to aubrey

Text: 28 We vacate the denial of fees to Aubrey. Under normal circumstances, the district court's denial of fees under the substantially justified standard would necessarily preclude the award of fees under the more taxing standard set forth above. See United States v. Truesdale, 211 F.3d 898, 909 (5th Cir. 2000) ([I]f a movant is unable even to establish that the prosecution was not substantially justified, he certainly cannot establish that it was vexatious, frivolous, or brought in bad faith.). Here, however, we cannot resolve the issue so easily, as the district court's conclusions regarding Blaze Construction and Aubrey appear to be internally inconsistent. 29 It is not clear from the record why fees were awarded to Blaze Construction but denied to Aubrey. During the period in question, Aubrey was the president and sole shareholder of Blaze Construction. There is no evidence before us to suggest that Aubrey was acting outside the scope of his duties, nor any reason to prevent his actions from being imputed to Blaze. 30 Likewise, the court's reason for awarding fees to Blaze appears to conflict with its rationale for denying them to Aubrey. In awarding fees to Blaze, the court stated that the government misapprehended the issue of the mortgage financing and the reason why it was not accomplished. But in denying fees to Aubrey, the court found that [t]he government proceeded on the reasonable theory that Aubrey received $5.5 million to build 66 houses, yet only 51 houses were built. 31 Thus, on remand the district court should consider whether the actions of Aubrey are coextensive with those of Blaze, and to what degree the evidence overlaps. Unless there is an articulable reason to treat the two parties differently, fees should be awarded to both Aubrey and Blaze, or to neither. 32