Opinion ID: 169642
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorney Fee Analysis

Text: Pro Products also challenges the district court's denial of its motion for attorney fees and costs. We review a district court's decision on whether to award attorney fees for abuse of discretion, but we review de novo the district court's application of the legal principles underlying that decision. Nat'l Ass'n of Prof'l Baseball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 1146 (10th Cir.2000). For the following reasons, we conclude the district court erred.
Under the American rule, parties to a lawsuit ordinarily pay their own attorney fees. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975). There are several exceptions to this principle. Most notably, there are certain statutory fee-shifting provisions that permit a court to order one party to pay the fees and costs of another. Bennett v. Coors Brewing Co., 189 F.3d 1221, 1238 (10th Cir. 1999). Typically, these statutes allow courts to award fees to the prevailing party. See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2000) ([T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . .). Less commonly, the CAA, and other federal statutes, allow courts to award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate. 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d); see also Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of Volusia County, 307 F.3d 1318, 1322 n. 5 (11th Cir.2002) (collecting statutes). While this court has not had occasion to address when an award is appropriate under the CAA, the Supreme Court has held that absent some degree of success on the merits by the claimant, it is not `appropriate' for a federal court to award attorneys' fees. . . . [8] Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 694, 103 S.Ct. 3274, 77 L.Ed.2d 938 (1983); id. at 682, 103 S.Ct. 3274 (We conclude that the language of the section, read in the light of the historic principles of fee-shifting in this and other countries, requires the conclusion that some success on the merits be obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee award under § 307(f).). The Supreme Court has also interpreted the attorney fee provision of the CAA as a less stringent standard than that of other civil rights statutes that award attorney fees to prevailing parties, stating that the attorney fee provision of the CAA was meant to expand the class of parties eligible for fee awards from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties  parties achieving some success, even if not major success. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 688, 103 S.Ct. 3274 (emphasis in original). Thus, one does not have to succeed completely on a CAA claim to achieve some success which would, in turn, merit the award of fees and costs. Here, Pro Products instituted its CAA action to enforce the provisions of the Act which ban certain aerosols. As noted, the district court entered an order concluding that, as a matter of law, Airosol's manufacture, sale, and distribution of Black Knight violated the Clean Air Act. Appx. at 73. Subsequently, the district court declined to penalize Airosol for its violations of the Act. Under the less exacting standard of the CAA attorney fee provision, we conclude that a plaintiff achieving a judicial holding that a party violated the Act is some degree of success on the merits. To the extent the district court concluded otherwise, it erred.
Courts have also held that an appropriate award of attorney fees under the citizen suit provision under the CAA also requires the movant to serve the public interest by assisting in the proper interpretation, or implementation of the statute. Sierra Club v. EPA, 769 F.2d 796, 800 (D.C.Cir.1985) ([T]he party must have served the public interest by assisting in the proper implementation of the statute.); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Costle, 683 F.2d 941, 942 (5th Cir.1982) (noting that the legislative history of the CAA indicates that its purpose is to encourage litigation which will assure proper implementation and administration of the Act or otherwise serve the public interest). The district court denied Pro Products' request for attorney fees because it brought suit under the Clean Air Act's citizen suit provision and [stood] to gain significant financial interest in doing so. Appx. at 414. We agree with Pro Products that the district court erred by relying on Pro Products' financial motivation in denying its request for fees. The Congressional commentary surrounding the passage of the CAA demonstrates that Congress intended that attorney fees should be awarded to plaintiffs who, by bringing an action against an alleged violator of the Act, minimize the amount of pollution in the atmosphere, and thus promote the Act's goal. See generally Del. Valley Citizen's Council, 478 U.S. at 560, 106 S.Ct. 3088. This legislative background, as well as persuasive case law from other circuits, causes us to conclude that CAA plaintiffs who serve the public interest by assisting in the proper implementation of the statute are entitled to fees for litigating the claims on which they obtained at least a modicum of success. Sierra Club, 769 F.2d at 800-802. Here, Pro Products brought suit to enforce the CAA's ban on Class II substances. In bringing this action in which it was partially successful, Pro Products has promoted the enforcement of the Act and assisted the EPA in achieving the Act's statutory goals. We conclude that the public interest element is satisfied. We acknowledge that there is some persuasive authority suggesting that it may not be appropriate to award a party attorney fees under the CAA when that party brought suit only to serve its own economic interests. See, e.g., W. States Petroleum Ass'n v. EPA, 87 F.3d 280, 286 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the legislative history of the CAA indicates that Congress neither intended to subsidize all litigation under the Clean Air Act nor contemplated that § 307(f) would benefit financially able parties who, out of their own substantial economic interests, would have litigated anyway, so that it is not appropriate to award litigation costs to a financially able, nongovernmental party having no more than its own economic interests at stake). However, we conclude that there is no basis for disqualifying a party from receiving an award of attorney fees merely because that party is solvent and has a financial interest in the outcome of the litigation. Costle, 683 F.2d at 943. If we were to hold otherwise and prohibit plaintiffs with an economic interest in the outcome of a CAA citizen suit from recovering attorney fees, we would weaken the enforcement of the Act, because competitors are most likely to have a substantial financial interest in ensuring that their peers are CAA compliant, and they are also the most informed regarding the products offered and sold by their peers. Thus, because Pro Products assisted in the implementation of the Act by proving to the satisfaction of the district court that Airosol had violated the CAA, the public interest has clearly been served by its citizen suit. Airosol also argues that an award of attorney fees would be inappropriate here because the facts at issue fall into the special circumstances exception that we set forth in Browder v. City of Moab, 427 F.3d 717, 721 (10th Cir.2005). There we noted that sometimes an attorney fee award to a prevailing party is unjust, despite the fact that a prevailing party is presumably entitled to an award of attorney fees. Id. Nonetheless, this argument lacks merit because the cases we cited in Browder as having special circumstances are factually distinguishable from the instant action. See, e.g., Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186, 1200 (10th Cir.1998) (explaining that plaintiffs can give up their statutory entitlement to fees as part of the settlement arrangement); Stewart v. Donges, 979 F.2d 179, 185 (10th Cir.1992) (limiting the extent of attorney fee award to prevailing plaintiff because he was responsible for the district court proceeding with the trial without jurisdiction). In the present case, no special circumstances have been identified which would cause an award of attorney fees to be unjust.