Opinion ID: 2631151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Magistrate's Determination

Text: We conclude that the magistrate erred by improperly denying Clark's motion to dismiss for violation of his speedy trial rights under I.C. § 19-3501(3). In this case, the magistrate granted a continuance beyond the statutory limit without a showing of good cause by the State. The State argues that the delay was attributable to witness unavailability, which it asserts is a valid reason justifying the continuance of the trial date. We disagree, not because unavailability cannot substantiate a finding of good cause, but because French does not qualify as an unavailable witness. The State equates French's unavailability with that of a missing witness, which the Supreme Court in Barker identifies as a valid reason to justify an appropriate delay. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. But the record in this case indicates that French was neither missing in any sense of the word, nor was she actually unavailable. There is an enormous difference between being inconvenienced and being unavailable. True unavailability suggests an unqualified inability to attend, while inconvenience merely implies that as in a case such as this, attendance at trial would be burdensome. Here, French could have attended the September 22 trial, and in fact was compelled to do so by the magistrate's previous order. The State, however, not wishing to have French travel from out of state only to face postponement of the trial, requested that Clark's trial either be given top priority on September 22 or moved to a date in which the trial would have first priority. But the desire to accommodate French's schedule cannot be said to comprise a reason that rises to the level of a legal excuse for the delay. The Court recognizes that French is both a witness and the victim in this case and is thus conscious of her right to attend the trial, as well as the importance of her presence. See Idaho Const. art. I, § 22 (`Victims' Rights Amendment). But French's right to be present at the proceeding should not overshadow Clark's right to a speedy trial, which is a fundamental right protected by the United States and Idaho Constitutions and by I.C. § 19-3501. See Klopfer v. State of North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967); State v. Lindsay, 96 Idaho 474, 475, 531 P.2d 236, 237 (1975). Accordingly, we conclude that Clark's right to a speedy trial under I.C. § 19-3501(3) has been abridged. The State has not shown any additional justification other than its wish to make concessions for French's schedule for its failure to prosecute Clark during the mandatory six-month period. What is more disturbing about Clark's case, however, are the magistrate's statements concerning court congestion, which the State alternatively argues should justify the continuance. Rather than address whether the State in this case could show legal excuse for the eight-month delay in Clark's trial, the magistrate erroneously concluded that the court's congested calendar prevented a first priority trial setting within the six-month limit. Upon addressing Clark's motion on December 15, the magistrate stated that there is present Idaho case law, Supreme Court decisions, that specifically tell me that as a consequence of court congestion there basically isn't a right to a speedy trial. This statement unequivocally suggests that court congestion may substitute as good cause for a delay beyond the six-month limit, even if the State cannot demonstrate adequate justification for the delay. We strongly disagree. Contrary to the magistrate's belief, this Court has never stated that criminal defendants do not have a speedy trial right because of court congestion. When examining the reasons for the delay, this Court has consistently maintained that overcrowded courts are to be a neutral factor which `nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant.' See Cotant, 123 Idaho at 789 n. 3, 852 P.2d at 1386 n. 3 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192); Russell, 108 Idaho at 61, 696 P.2d at 911.