Opinion ID: 2995295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commission of an Aggravated Felony

Text: Garcia next alleges that the court erred in finding that his 1988 Illinois conviction was an attempted theft offense that qualified as an aggravated felony for purposes of the penalty enhancement provisions of 8 U.S.C. sec. 1326(b)(2), and U.S.S.G sec. 2L1.2(b)(1)(A). The question of what constitutes an aggravated felony is reviewed de novo. Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir. 2000). Congress, in enacting the INA, listed specific crimes as well as other acts of criminal behavior that qualify as aggravated felonies, including the following: (43) The term aggravated felony means . . . (G) a theft offense (including receipt of stolen property) or burglary offense for which the term of imprisonment [sic] at least one year. . . (U) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in this paragraph. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(43)(G) and (U) (emphasis added). Since a theft offense is listed as an aggravated felony in the INA, an attempt to commit a theft offense is also an aggravated felony. The trial court judge concluded that the facts of Garcia’s 1988 state conviction properly fell within the parameters of an attempted theft offense. At Garcia’s sentencing hearing, the judge stated, no matter how you parse theft, attempted theft, no matter how small it is, and no matter how a state classifies it, is something that Congress classified as an aggravated felony if the penalty was more than a year. We agree.
Initially we note that Garcia’s 1988 burglary conviction, in spite of the title given to the crime, does not fulfill the elements of a burglary offense as set forth in the INA under our recent decision in Solorzano-Patlan v. INS, 207 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 2000), in which we held that burglary in its generic sense requires unlawful entry into a building or structure, and does not encompass unlawful entry into a motor vehicle. Garcia’s burglary conviction, like Solorzano-Patlan’s, involved unlawful entry into a motor vehicle, not a building or structure, and therefore cannot qualify as a burglary offense under the INA. However, in this case the trial court, after considering and referring to our decision in Solorzano-Patlan, properly held that Garcia’s 1988 conviction was an attempt to commit a theft offense, not a burglary offense or an attempt to commit a burglary offense.
In Solorzano-Patlan, we established a framework for determining when a defendant’s prior criminal conviction can properly be classified as an aggravated felony under the INA. In determining whether a criminal conviction falls within one of the statutory predicate offenses designated as aggravated felonies by Congress, the uniform application of federal law requires that we identify and apply the generic elements of the felonious activity involved, rather than the inconsistent titles, elements and definitions used in the statutes of the various states. Solorzano-Patlan, 207 F.3d at 873. We have previously defined a theft offense for purposes of the INA as requiring the taking of property (exercise of control over property), without the owner’s consent, with the intent to temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership. Hernandez-Mancilla v. INS, 246 F.3d 1002, 1009 (7th Cir. 2001). Garcia’s guilty plea to the 1988 burglary charge went only to an admission that he unlawfully entered a vehicle with the intent to commit a theft, but neither his plea nor the charging document encompassed an admission or charge that he completed the act of taking property from the vehicle./5
Offense Under the INA. We next consider whether Garcia’s conviction qualifies as an attempt to commit a theft offense under the INA. As previously noted, the INA’s definition of aggravated felony includes an attempt or conspiracy to commit an offense described in [8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(43)]. 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a) (43)(U). Attempt is not defined in the INA. Consistent with our two most recent cases dealing with this question, Solorzano-Patlan and Hernandez-Mancilla, we are bound to apply a generic definition of attempt that is unconstrained by the titles, definitions or elements assigned to it by the various states. See Solorzano-Patlan, 207 F.3d at 874. In answering this question we also rely on the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2001), in which the court recently analyzed the meaning of attempt as used in 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(43)(U). In Sui, the Second Circuit initiated its analysis of the meaning of the word attempt by holding that the label given to the offense by the charging jurisdiction is not alone determinative of its status as an aggravated felony. Sui, 250 F.3d at 114. We agree with the Second Circuit, because reliance on the varying state laws would inevitably lead to inconsistent results in the interpretation of the INA, as we made clear and condemned in Solorzano-Patlan. As previously noted, Congress obviously never intended the definitions of the INA’s predicate offenses to vary solely according to the conflicting titles applied in the criminal laws of the various states. See Solorzano-Patlan, 207 F.3d at 874; Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 579-80 (1990). Accordingly, the Sui court derived a generic meaning of attempt, based on common law and the Model Penal Code, consisting of (1) the intent to commit a crime, and (2) a substantial step toward its commission. Sui, 250 F.3d at 115. This definition of attempt is frequently employed in this circuit and derived from the common law. We adopt this definition for purposes of 8 U.S.C. sec. 1101(a)(43)(U). See United States v. Romero, 189 F.3d 576, 589 (7th Cir. 1999) (An attempt requires the intent to commit a crime and a substantial step toward its commission.); United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907, 915 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Rovetuso, 768 F.2d 809, 821 (7th Cir. 1985) (reciting the definition after noting the absence of a comprehensive federal statutory definition of attempt.) With this definition in mind, it is clear that the conduct admitted by Garcia in his plea of guilty to Count I of the 1988 Information fits within the parameters of an attempt to commit a theft offense. The 1988 Information charged Garcia with the intent to commit a theft, and also charged him with taking a substantial step toward the commission of the theft (unlawfully entering a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent). In pleading guilty to this charge, Garcia admitted engaging in conduct which we determine to fit within the parameters of an attempt to commit a theft offense under the INA, and the district court therefore did not err in concluding that the defendant’s 1988 conviction was an aggravated felony.