Opinion ID: 2531898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Miranda's Impact Within the Fourth Amendment Totality-of-the-Circumstances Analysis

Text: Having rejected the Fourth District's conclusion that Miranda warnings will always result in a seizure during an on-the-street police encounter, we must determine to what extent, if any, Miranda warnings increase the coercive nature of such an encounter. On one hand, the warnings are intended as a protective measure to guard against violations of a suspect's constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. A citizen to whom the warnings are given, then, is at the very least aware that he has the right to remain silent and to decline to answer an officer's questions. On the other, the warnings are required only during an arrest or custodial interrogation. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam). Thus, in the context of an on-the-street police encounter, the warnings could operate as a show of authority on the part of the officer indicating to a reasonable person that he or she is not free to leave. In Caldwell, the Second District took the position that Miranda warnings serve to protect the rights of a citizen during a police encounter. This conclusion is certainly consistent with the intent behind the warnings. In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court reasoned that a citizen will be protected from surrendering his or her rights out of ignorance of those rights where the citizen is first made aware of them. The citizen is also placed on guard that the waiver of those rights may have negative consequences: [W]hatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of the interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual knows he is free to exercise the privilege at any point in time. ... Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced with a phase of the adversary systemthat he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Under this line of reasoning, citizens who are first given Miranda warnings should be better able to protect their constitutional rights, regardless of the context. See, e.g., Luna-Martinez v. State, 984 So.2d 592, 601 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (explaining that Miranda warnings weighed in favor of the conclusion that the defendant had voluntarily consented to a search because he had been informed that he was not required to talk to police). In part due to the protective nature of the Miranda warnings, some courts have declined to interpret them as a restraint on freedom in the context of a consensual interview with law enforcement personnel. See, e.g., Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168 (4th Cir.1985) (declining to hold that a suspect was in custody during a police station interview, despite the reading of Miranda warnings, where no other action by the officers was coercive or established custody); United States v. Charles, 738 F.2d 686, 694 n. 6 (5th Cir.1984) (agreeing with the conclusion of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis that Miranda warnings do not help produce a custodial interrogation); United States v. Lewis, 556 F.2d 446, 447-48 (6th Cir.1977) (finding that the giving of Miranda warnings prior to an otherwise voluntary police station interview is not evidence of formal arrest and does not contribute to a finding that a suspect is in custody for Miranda purposes). These courts have reasoned that if Miranda warnings alone entitled a suspect to additional constitutional protections, officers would be given an incentive to refrain from informing suspects of their rights. See Davis, 778 F.2d at 172 (noting that such a holding would convert admirable precautionary measures on the part of officers into an investigatory obstruction). Conversely, other courts have determined that at the very least, the Miranda warnings are a factor to be considered in evaluating whether a suspect has been placed in custody under the Fifth Amendment. [7] In Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 638-39 (7th Cir.1996), a suspect was given Miranda warnings shortly after officers arrived at his home to execute a search warrant. In evaluating whether the suspect had been placed in custody before he revealed physical evidence to the police, the court noted that by reading the warnings, the officers had followed a formality of custodial arrest without actually informing the suspect that he was not under arrest. Id. at 642. While not dispositive, this fact provided at least some support for the inference that the defendant was in custody. See id.; see also United States v. Erving L., 147 F.3d 1240, 1248 n. 5 (10th Cir.1998); United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir.1998); Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 516 n. 10 (11th Cir.1990). We believe that the same reasoning applies in the context of a Fourth Amendment investigatory stop. Miranda warnings are a formality of arrest and are required only at the time of an arrest or prior to custodial interrogation. Further, the warnings are associated in the public mind with the spectacle of an individual being placed under arrest. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that an individual who is given Miranda warnings during what begins as a consensual encounter may interpret those warnings as a restraint on his or her freedom. [8] For this reason, courts that have considered the application of Miranda in the context of an on-the-street police encounter have generally found it to be at least a factor in determining whether an individual has been subjected to an illegal investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Poitier, 818 F.2d at 683; United States v. Lara, 638 F.2d 892, 898 n. 10 (5th Cir.1981) (Giving Miranda warnings in a police-citizen encounter which is otherwise a nondetention interrogation may very well elevate such an encounter to a seizure within the meaning of Terry in light of the public's association of Miranda warnings with an arrest.); see also United States v. Montgomery, 377 F.3d 582, 587 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that the district court listed the reading of Miranda rights as one factor indicating that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have felt free to leave). This conclusion on the part of a reasonable person would be further supported by the fact that outside the context of an arrest or custodial interrogation, not all of the stated rights apply. In particular, Miranda requires that suspects be advised that they have the right to an attorney and that if they cannot afford an attorney one will be provided for them. See Traylor, 596 So.2d at 965-66. While this advisory warning is true during a custodial interrogation, it is not true during a consensual encounter or investigatory stop. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S.Ct. 1602; Salvo, 133 F.3d at 949. This reasoning was adopted by the Fourth District in Raysor, which noted that [t]he only way appellant could have felt free to leave would have been for him to have assumed that the officer was wrong in advising him that he was entitled to court appointed counsel if he could not afford counsel right there and then. 795 So.2d at 1072. Based on our above discussion, we believe that the reading of Miranda warnings during a consensual police encounter might add to the coercive nature of that encounter under at least some circumstances. For example, what begins as an on-the-street consensual encounter may take on characteristics of a seizure where the warnings operate more as a show of authority that would indicate to a reasonable person that he is not free to leave. By contrast, during a voluntary interview at a police station in which the atmosphere is more formal and the citizen may already be aware that he or she is suspected of criminal activity, the reading of Miranda rights may serve as intended, i.e., as a protective measure placing the citizen on guard that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his interest. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469, 86 S.Ct. 1602. As with every other factor under the Mendenhall test, whether an erroneously given Miranda warning contributes to a seizure finding under the Fourth Amendment must be decided on a case-by-case basis.