Opinion ID: 1830839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: Whether the Trial Court erred in denying the Appellant's proposed Jury Instruction D-1 and in granting the Appellee's Jury Instructions S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4, S-5, and C-2-S.

Text: ¶ 173. Hughes next attacks the trial court's denial of several of his jury instructions and the granting of several of the State's instructions. Instruction S-1 was a statement of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-11-19 (1994) explaining venue. Hughes challenges this on the grounds set out in Issue I supra. For the reasons stated in Issue I supra, this contention is without merit. ¶ 174. Instruction D-1 was a peremptory instruction of not guilty. This essentially challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence to sustain the verdict. Hughes also challenges on sufficiency of the evidence grounds State's instruction S-2 (elements of capital murder); S-3 (elements of kidnapping); and, S-5 (elements of rape). [The] peremptory instruction, motion for JNOV, and motion for new trial assail the legal sufficiency of the evidence. This Court must review the trial court's finding regarding sufficiency of the evidence at the time the motion for JNOV was overruled. The evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State. All credible evidence supporting the conviction is taken as true; the State receives the benefit of all favorable inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence. Issues regarding weight and credibility of the evidence are for the jury to resolve. Only where the evidence, as to at least one of the elements of the crime charged, is such that a reasonable and fair minded jury could only find the accused not guilty, will this Court reverse. Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 871-72 (Miss.1995)( citing Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 807-08 (Miss.1987) and McClain v. State, 625 So.2d 774, 778 (Miss.1993)); Glass v. State, 278 So.2d 384, 386 (Miss. 1973). ¶ 175. As this Court has explained, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a kidnapping charge: Mississippi's kidnapping statute makes it unlawful to forcibly seize and confine any other person or inveigle or kidnap any other person with intent to cause such person to be secretly confined or imprisoned against his or her will ... Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-53 (1994). The prosecution is required to prove each element of the underlying kidnapping offense beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the capital murder conviction to stand. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to prove the elements of kidnapping..... Underwood v. State, 708 So.2d 18, 35 (Miss.1998)( citing Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 789 (Miss.1987)). ¶ 176. In Williams v. State this Court explained [K]idnapping is not a specific intent crime, it is sufficient that the circumstances resulted in such a manner as to effect a kidnapping as opposed to an actual intent to kidnap, i.e., it is not necessary to establish the mental state of intent by direct evidence. Williams v. State, 544 So.2d 782, 790 (Miss.1987)( citing Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 809 (Miss.1984); Voyles v. State, 362 So.2d 1236, 1243 (Miss.1978)). ¶ 177. In the instant case, Hughes argues that the evidence of kidnapping is negated because Sue Greenwood testified to seeing Galloway in her store two days after she disappeared; and further, that no evidence was presented showing an abduction. Sue Greenwood did indeed testify that Galloway was in her store, but the jury was entitled to weigh the credibility of Mrs. Greenwood's identification. This Court has in numerous cases, too many to mention, said that when the evidence is conflicting, the jury will be the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony. This wise rule applies with equal force to the state's witnesses and the appellant's witnesses, including the appellant himself. We have repeatedly held that in a criminal prosecution the jury may accept the testimony of some witnesses and reject that of others, and that they may accept in part and reject in part the evidence on behalf of the state or on behalf of the accused. In other words, the credibility of witnesses is not for the reviewing court. Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1980)( citing Davis v. State, 320 So.2d 789 (Miss.1975); Wilson v. State, 264 So.2d 828 (Miss.1972); McLelland v. State, 204 So.2d 158 (Miss.1967)); see also Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300-01 (Miss.1983). ¶ 178. Examining the evidence put on by the State and giving it the benefit of the doubt, it is apparent that there was sufficient evidence to sustain a kidnapping charge. As noted previously, the circumstantial nature of that evidence was properly for the jury to weigh when determining its verdict. ¶ 179. Hughes also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence on the rape and murder. Again, direct evidence is unnecessary to support a conviction so long as sufficient circumstantial evidence exists to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1252 (Miss.1993). In a circumstantial case, the prosecution bears the burden in a circumstantial evidence case of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of all reasonable hypotheses consistent with innocence. Lester v. State, 692 So.2d 755, 796-97 (Miss.1997)( citing Sanders v. State, 286 So.2d 825, 828 (Miss.1973)). Here, the jury was properly instructed concerning the circumstantial nature of the State's proof. The Court instructs the Jury that if the Jury can deduce from the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, either from the evidence or lack of evidence, any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the innocence of the Defendant, then there is a reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt, and the Jury must return a verdict of not guilty. ¶ 180. Examining the evidence in this case, the trial judge was correct in refusing to grant D-1 and in granting S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-5. The evidence in this case was certainly legally sufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on all elements charged. ¶ 181. Hughes also argues that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the aggravators found in Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5) by allowing Hughes' previous fondling conviction to count under § 99-19-101(5)(a) [t]he capital offense was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment., and § 99-19-101(5)(b) [t]he defendant was previously convicted of another capital offense or of a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person. Hughes argues that this improperly allowed the jury to doubly count his prior conviction for fondling. In support of this contention, Hughes cites Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660 (Miss.1991). Hughes is incorrect. ¶ 182. In Willie, this Court noted that in many circumstances the underlying motive for robbery is in fact pecuniary gain. Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 681 (Miss.1991). Thus, this Court held that it was improper to give both § 99-19-101(5)(d) (robbery) and § 99-19-101(5)(f) (pecuniary gain) as separate aggravators. Willie, 585 So.2d at 680. ¶ 183. This is not the case here because here the State did not use the conviction for the § 99-19-101(5)(a) aggravator, but the fact that Hughes was currently under a prison sentence. As this Court explained in Blue v. State, a conviction and prison sentence are not identical: We agree that robbery by definition is committed for pecuniary gain and therefore robbery and pecuniary gain cannot be used as two separate aggravating circumstances. The case sub judice however is an entirely different situation than Willie. It does not follow that having a prior conviction of a felony involving the use of threat or violence by definition means that one is under a sentence of imprisonment. An individual can have a prior conviction involving the use of threat of violence and not be under a sentence of imprisonment. Likewise, an individual can also be under a sentence of imprisonment, and not have a prior conviction involving the use of threat or violence. Thus, these two factors are separate and distinct. In the instant case, it just so happens that Blue's prior aggravated assault conviction was the same conviction for which he was still under sentence of imprisonment. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1219-20 (Miss.1996). ¶ 184. Similarly, in Taylor v. State, this Court noted that it was permissible to use § 99-19-101(5)(a) and § 99-19-101(5)(b) as separate aggravators even though they were premised on the same conviction. Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1276 (Miss.1996). For this reason, Hughes' contention is without merit. ¶ 185. Hughes further argues that the instruction given on the § 99-19-101(e) aggravator, [t]he capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody, was not supported by the evidence. ¶ 186. This Court has made clear that in order to support a § 99-19-101(e) aggravator, there [must be] evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to `cover their tracks' so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities. Taylor, 672 So.2d at 1275. ¶ 187. Here there was clearly enough circumstantial evidence to justify an instruction on this aggravator. Galloway's body was covered with debris and hidden under the flooring of an abandoned house in a remote area of Quitman County. Her chest was burned, impeding the investigation into the cause of her death. There was evidence that Hughes knew Galloway, and that shortly after the disappearance, Hughes had his hair cut short. When coupled with Hughes prior convictions for sex crimes, it is a reasonable and permissible inference that he killed Galloway to avoid her identifying him as the rapist. ¶ 188. In short, taking the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, there was ample evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hughes left work, saw Galloway, picked her up, raped and then killed her. Put slightly differently, there was sufficient evidence as a matter of law to submit the evidence, albeit circumstantial, to the jury.