Opinion ID: 1644822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Error is assigned in admitting evidence defendant says pertained to speculative development of the 342 acres.

Text: The engineering department of the Great Western railroad prepared for the development company a plat (exhibit 1) showing lead and spur railroad tracks that could be built and used for industrial purposes for which, it was said, its tract was adapted. The plat was received in evidence without objection. Quite a little testimony was admitted as to adaptability of the 342 acres for industrial usemuch of it without objection. This assignment of error seems to be based largely on admission of the plat and the other testimony as to adaptability of the lands of both plaintiffs for industrial purposes. Defendant may not complain of receipt of the plat or of much of the other evidence referred to because of lack of timely objection upon the trial. We will say, however, the evidence was proper. It is true the trackage shown on exhibit 1 had not been built although some preliminary work had been done on it. Nor had either tract ever been actually used for an industrial purpose. But the evidence was not too speculative.    the owner is entitled to have the jury informed of all the capabilities of the property, as to the business or use, if any, to which it has been devoted, and of any and every use to which it may reasonably be adapted or applied. And this rule includes the adaptation and value of the property for any legitimate purpose or business, even though it has never been so used, and the owner has no present intention to devote it to such use. (citations). Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids, 134 Iowa 563, 565-566, 111 N.W. 1027, 1028. To like effect are Hamer v. Iowa State Highway Comm., 250 Iowa 1228, 1230, 98 N.W.2d 746, 748; Nedrow v. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co., 245 Iowa 763, 770, 61 N.W. 2d 687, 691; Kukkuk v. City of Des Moines, 193 Iowa 444, 457, 187 N.W. 209; 18 Am.Jur., Eminent Domain, section 244. V. Error is claimed in admitting evidence of the sale price of about 150 acres sold by Marquis to the Boss Hotel interests in late 1958 (deed dated January 10, 1959) because, it is said, the land was enhanced in value by the contemplated interstate highways and the ruling indirectly violates the rule that evidence of the price paid by the condemnor for other property is inadmissible because not a fair indication of market value. The rule referred to is stated in Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 718, 728, 31 N.W.2d 393, 398; Basch v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 250 Iowa 976, 979, 95 N.W.2d 714, 716; Stortenbecker v. Iowa Power & Light Co., 250 Iowa 1073, 1077, 96 N.W.2d 468, 470. The first inquiry concerning the sale from Marquis to Boss was in defendant's cross-examination of plaintiffs' value witness Hall. The price was not then shown but it was testified to on plaintiffs' redirect examination of Hall and their direct examination of Neal, also on plaintiffs' cross-examination of defendant's value witness Rouze but without objection by defendant. Since the evidence now complained of was received at least in this last instance without objection defendant could have suffered little, if any prejudice from admission of like testimony by Hall and Neal. Bohnsack v. Driftmier, 243 Iowa 383, 396, 52 N.W.2d 79, 86, and citations; State v. Mabrey, 245 Iowa 428, 432-423, 60 N.W.2d 889, 892, and citations; State v. Olson, 249 Iowa 536, 560, 86 N.W.2d 214, 229; 5A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1731a. Moreover, we are not persuaded evidence of the sale price of this 150-acre tract was inadmissible upon the ground now urged. The sale was from one private party to another. It does not appear the 150-acre tract was then necessarily enhanced in value by the contemplated interstate highways. It would seem the question of such increase in value would go to the weight of the evidence rather than to its admissibility.