Opinion ID: 292748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the carriers' affirmative defenses

Text: 76 Against the foregoing authority, the carriers make the following affirmative contentions, based primarily on their interpretation of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act: (1) first, they argue that restitution to shippers is precluded under the Interstate Commerce Act as interpreted by the Supreme Court, relying on Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 55 S.Ct. 713, 79 L.Ed. 1451 (1935); (2) secondly, they argue that 304a of the Act provides an exclusive remedy of which the shippers have not availed themselves; (3) third, they argue that to order restitution in this case would contravene the express provisions of the Act that carriers may not make refunds to shippers from the published tariffs. 77
78 In Atlantic Coast Line, supra, the Supreme Court denied restitution to shippers; the facts of the controversy are as follows. Rail carriers in Florida had voluntarily established certain intrastate rates, which were later approved as maximum rates by an order of the Florida State Commission. The Interstate Commerce Commission instituted an investigation in which it found that those rates were confiscatory and resulted in discrimination against interstate commerce. It prescribed a new schedule of rates higher than those set by Florida. Florida sought judicial review of the ICC order, and the Supreme Court set aside the order on the grounds that the Commission had not made adequate findings. Florida v. United States, 282 U.S. 194, 51 S.Ct. 119, 75 L.Ed. 291 (1931). The Commission then held a new hearing, made new findings and prescribed its same higher rate schedule for substantially the same reasons as before. The Supreme Court affirmed this second order. Florida v. United States, 292 U.S. 1, 54 S.Ct. 603, 78 L.Ed. 1077 (1934). The State of Florida and other shippers meantime brought suit in the district court for restitution of the difference between the higher rates charged by the railroads and the approved state rates for the period between the issuance of the first invalid order of the ICC and the date of its ultimate reversal because of procedural defects in not supplying adequate findings justifying the order. The district court allowed partial restitution of these rates. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Cardozo, reversed, holding that the shippers were not entitled to restitution on these facts. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 55 S.Ct. 713, 79 L.Ed. 1451 (1935). 79 Justice Cardozo's opinion specifically recognized that the principle of restitution was applicable to the situation, but held that the equities of that situation favored permitting the carriers to retain the charges, '   restitution is without support in equity and conscience.' Id. 312-313, 55 S.Ct. 718. Three reasons were advanced as to these equitable considerations. First of all, the carriers had collected the higher rates by virtue of their compliance with the ICC order. The court noted that the carriers were not free to refuse obedience to the order. Secondly, the factual basis for the ICC order setting higher rates-- the discrimination against interstate commerce by the lower rates-- existed in fact at the time of that first order; and this discrimination was declared unlawful by statute. The order was invalid for procedural reasons only (incomplete and inadequate findings), not because it was based on an improper determination of the facts. In other words, the factual justification for the higher rates was in existence at all times and had been specifically approved by the ICC. Thirdly, the lower rates which the shippers contended should be the measure of restitution were confiscatory. The Court observed: 'A situation so unique is a summons to a court of equity to mould its plastic remedies in adaptation to the instant need.' 295 U.S. at 316, 55 S.Ct. at 719. Furthermore, the Court was expressly motivated in allowing the carriers to retain the higher rates by considerations of the deference due to the expertise of the ICC and of accommodation of the judicial process to the administrative process. Thus, to affirm the retention of the higher rates would be consistent with the action of the ICC, whereas to order restitution, in addition to being inequitable, would be inconsistent with the ICC's action. 80 The facts of the instant case contrast sharply with those of Atlantic Coast Line. Here, the carriers have charged higher rates, not in compliance with an ICC order, but in spite of that order and only by the use of judicial restraint subsequently held to have been improvidently granted. The ICC has ordered the increases in this case canceled, rather than ordering lower rates raised. In Atlantic Coast Line, the Commission found as a fact that the higher rates were justified, and this finding was ultimately sustained by the courts. Here the Commission found that the higher rates were not justified, and on the hearing for the interlocutory injunction, the court found that the carriers presented no evidence suggesting that this finding would likely be disturbed. The lower rates to which restitution was sought in Atlantic Coast Line were found by the Court to be confiscatory upon satisfactory proof presented by the carriers. Here the carriers contended both before the Commission and the district court that the lower rates would be confiscatory, but failed to carry their burden of proof in either forum. Finally, in Atlantic Coast Line, to order restitution would have been inconsistent with the administrative process, whereas here restitution is not only consistent, but as developed more fully below, denial of restitution would be inconsistent with the administrative process. 81 Implicit in the carriers' reliance upon Atlantic Coast Line is the assumption that that case held that under no circumstances could restitution be awarded to shippers. This assumption is without foundation either in the language of that opinion or in subsequent interpretations of that decision. Indeed, subsquent decisions of both the Supreme Court and other courts have read the case to authorize reference of certain issues to an appropriate administrative agency in order to aid courts in devising restitutional remedies for parties before them in cases involving those agencies, even where the agency itself has no authority to award such restitution. The authority for this position follows from Justice Cardozo's reliance on the first invalid ICC order finding the rates to be unjustly discriminatory. 82 The case most nearly analogous to the present situation is United States v. Morgan, 307 U.S. 183, 59 S.Ct. 795, 83 L.Ed. 1211 (1939). Involved in that case was an order of the Secretary of Agriculture under a statutory scheme of regulation of stockyards (7 U.S.C. 181-229) similar to that of the Interstate Commerce Act regulating motor carriers. The stockyard owners were required to charge rates which were 'just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory, and any unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory rate of charge is prohibited and declared to be unlawful.' Cf. 49 U.S.C. 316(d) (Motor Carriers). The rates were to be established by filing a schedule with the Secretary. The Secretary, upon complaint or on his own initiative, could investigate the schedules, and if he found that they violated the Act, could prescribe new ones for the future; but if the investigation was on his own initiative, he could not award reparations for the past rates. Acting on his own initiative, the Secretary set aside a schedule of rates and prescribed lower ones. Suit was commenced to enjoin the order, and the district court issued a temporary restraining order on the condition that the stockyard owners deposit the difference between the two rates in a fund in court. The Supreme Court held the Secretary's order invalid because the Secretary had failed to accord the stockyard owners the full hearing required by the Act, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 1288 (1936); 304 U.S. 1, 58 S.Ct. 773, 82 L.Ed. 1129 (1938). Thereupon, while new proceedings were pending before the Secretary, the district court ordered the impounded fund to be returned to the owners, on the grounds that the lower rates had been required by an invalid order. The Supreme Court reversed, relying in part on Arkadelphia, Ex parte Lincoln Gas, Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., and Inland Steel Co., all discussed above. Most significant for purpose of this discussion was its reliance on Atlantic Coast Line. 83 Two principles governed the Court's decision. First of all, judicial review of administrative action should be coordinated as nearly as possible with the agency action so as to attain the ends of the statute. Secondly, 'in exerting its extraordinary powers (as a court of equity) to stay execution of a rate order,' the court had the duty to protect both the litigants and the public. 307 U.S. at 191, 59 S.Ct. at 800. '(A) court of equity should be astute to avoid the use of its process to effectuate the collection of unlawful rates, and equally so to direct it to the restitution of rates which it has taken into its own custody, once they are shown to have been unlawful.' Id. at 194, 59 S.Ct. at 801. Of course, as the Supreme Court itself subsequently noted, the fact that in fashioning its remedy the district court had ordered payments of the fund into court is immaterial to the basic underlying principles. See Addison v. Holly Hill Co., 322 U.S. 607, 621, 64 S.Ct. 1215, 88 L.Ed. 1488 (1944). Although the Secretary himself could not order restitution, Atlantic Coast Line was read as authority for him to make a suitable order which would justify the court in awarding restitution to the customers of the stockyards. 307 U.S. at 192 et seq., 59 S.Ct. 795. 84 It would unduly prolong this already extensive opinion to discuss in detail all the other cases dealing with Atlantic Coast Line. It will be sufficient to point out that none of them has interpreted that case to preclude restitution in a case where it is clearly warranted under facts similar to the instant situation. See, e.g., Federal Power Commission v. Interstate Natural Gas Co., 336 U.S. 577, 583, 69 S.Ct. 775, 93 L.Ed. 895 (1949); Berthold-Jennings Lumber Co. v. St. Louis, I.M. & S. Ry. Co., 80 F.2d 32, 40 (8th Cir. 1935); Williams v. Washington Area Metropolitan Transit Commission, 134 U.S.App.D.C. 342, 415 F.2d 922, 942-944 (1968), cert. denied, D.C. Transit System v. Williams, 393 U.S. 1081, 89 S.Ct. 860, 21 L.Ed.2d 733 (1969); Bell v. United States, 49 F.Supp. 505 (E.D.La.1943).
85 We turn now to the contention that restitution is precluded in this case because an exclusive remedy is provided by 49 U.S.C. 304a. This section of the Act was passed in 1965 in response to the Supreme Court's decision in T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 79 S.Ct. 904, 3 L.Ed.2d 952 (1959), upon which the carriers also rely as precluding restitution. In order to understand fully this contention, it is necessary to examine the legislative history of Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. 301 et seq. 86 As originally passed in 1887, the Interstate Commerce Act established the Interstate Commerce Commission to regulate rail transportation. That statute is now Part I of the Act, 49 U.S.C. 1-300. In 1935, the powers of the Commission were significantly expanded to encompass the regulation of motor carriers by the passage of the Motor Carrier Act, now Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act. In many ways, the two sections of the Act were parallel, but in other ways significant to the instant problem they were substantially different. Rights and remedies of common carriers and their customers had been the subject of a considerable body of common law devised by the courts. One of the problems faced by the Congress was how to reconcile this common law doctrine with the new statutory regulatory scheme. Part I of the Act contained several sections providing for both judicial and administrative remedies for persons damaged by failure of the railroads to comply with the Act. 49 U.S.C. 8, 9, 13(1), 16. In contrast, Part II provided only a remedy for overcharges by a motor carrier, overcharges being charges in excess of the filed rates. 49 U.S.C. 304a. Both sections of the Act also contained savings clauses relating to common law remedies which differed considerably. 49 U.S.C. 22, relating to rail carriers provides that 'nothing in this chapter contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this act are in addition to such remedies.' On the other hand, the savings clause relating to motor carriers, 49 U.S.C. 316(j), is more restrictive: 'nothing in this section shall be held to extinguish any remedy or right not inconsistent herewith.' 87 For purposes of this discussion, the remedies with which we are most concerned are those for overcharges, reparations, and restitution. The differences between the three are significant. As noted above, overcharges are charges made by carriers in excess of the published tariffs, and both parts of the Act provided specific remedies for these. Tariffs under both sections of the Act are required to be just and reasonable. Reparation is a remedy for damages to the extent that the filed rates exceed a just and reasonable rate. Since primary jurisdiction to determine a just and reasonable rate rests with the Interstate Commerce Commission, any proceeding involving reparations, whether administrative or judicial, requires a finding of that Commission as to what a specific just and reasonable rate is. Under the remedial sections of Part I cited above, reparations may be recovered from rail carriers through either administrative or judicial proceedings. If the judicial avenue is chosen, a suit is filed in the district court, then there is a reference to the ICC for a determination of the just and reasonable rate, after which the suit is decided in accordance with this determination. No comparable provisions for reparations were originally included in the motor carrier part of the Act, but for some time it was assumed that the savings clause of 316(j) allowed a comparable judicial proceeding with respect to motor carriers. See 2 U.S.Code, Cong. & Adm.News, pp. 2936-2941 (1965). The T.I.M.E. case held that such a remedy was not preserved by the savings clause. This decision was countered by legislative action in 1965 when Congress amended the Act to provide a reparation remedy by judicial proceedings in 304a(2). 88 We turn now to an analysis of T.I.M.E., Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464, 79 S.Ct. 904, 3 L.Ed.2d 952 (1959), and its effect on the survival of a restitutional remedy. Interpretation of the T.I.M.E. decision is not without difficulty; it was a 5 to 4 decision and both the majority and minority relied on the same case in reaching their conclusions-- Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 27 S.Ct. 350, 51 L.Ed. 553 (1907). Further difficulties are encountered by the gloss put upon the T.I.M.E. decision in the case of Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 371 U.S. 84, 83 S.Ct. 157, 9 L.Ed.2d 142 (1962), and Pensick & Gordon, Inc. v. California Motor Express, 371 U.S. 184, 83 S.Ct. 264, 9 L.Ed.2d 227 (1962). Mr. Justice Harlan, the author of the T.I.M.E. decision dissented with two other justices, in the latter two cases. 89 The Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co. case involved a state court proceeding in which the state court determined that certain railroad rates, charged in accordance with tariffs filed with the ICC, were unreasonable and awarded reparations to shippers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state court had no jurisdiction to determine the reasonableness of rates, since that was within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC. As pointed out by Mr. Justice Black in the T.I.M.E. dissent, following the Abilene decision, reparations proceedings were often brought in courts which referred the issue of reasonableness to the ICC and then decided the suit in accordance with the ICC finding. Nevertheless, he majority in T.I.M.E. read Abilene to hold that courts may not adjudicate issues which are within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC. (See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in Hewitt-Robins, 371 U.S. at 90, 83 S.Ct. 157. As to the availability of the reference procedure with respect to motor carriers, T.I.M.E. held that this could not be utilized because it would permit the ICC to accomplish indirectly what Congress had not given it the authority to accomplish directly. Although not specifically discussed by the majority, apparently the reference procedure in rail carrier cases is justified because the ICC has direct reparation authority. Also, the court pointed out that shippers had some protection in the motor carriers' rate-making process, because rates could be changed only on thirty days notice, shippers could protest the change and be heard in the subsequent administrative proceeding, and the ICC had authority to suspend the changes for up to seven months, by which time ordinarily a final determination would have been made. 90 Lower courts initially interpreted T.I.M.E. to mean that no common law remedies survived in motor carrier cases where primary jurisdiction rested with the ICC. Pensick & Gordon, Inc. v. California Motor Express, Ltd., 302 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1962); Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Eastern Freight-ways, Inc., 293 F.2d 205 (2nd Cir. 1961). But this notion was dispelled by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. In the review of the Hewitt-Robins case, 371 U.S. 84, 83 S.Ct. 157, 9 L.Ed.2d 142 (1962), involving a misrouting practice, the Court held that survival of a remedy against a carrier, even if the practice was within the primary jurisdiction of the ICC, depended solely on whether the remedy was consistent or inconsistent with the Act. T.I.M.E. was explained on the grounds that to allow reparations would interfere with the stability of the rate structure. No specific test of consistency was suggested, but the Court was influenced primarily by the following factors: 91 'Unlike rate making there is no statutory procedure by which routing practices may be challenged in advance of shipment.    92 '   The allowance here of a damage action nowise hampers the efficient administration of the Act, unlike the allowance of such an action as to unreasonable rates.    Moreover, the allowance of misrouting actions would have a healthy deterrent effect upon the utilization of misrouting practices in the motor carrier field, which in turn would minimize 'cease and desist' proceedings before the Commission. Finally, and not to be overlooked, the absence of any judicial remedy places the shipper entirely at the mercy of the carrier, contrary to the overriding purpose of the Act. The allowance of such actions would, on the contrary, given neither an unfair advantage.' 371 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct. at 159. 93 The result in Hewitt-Robins was to allow survival of a remedy for misrouting practices. The Pensick & Gordon case, supra, was vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Hewitt-Robins, 371 U.S. 1848 83 S.Ct. 157, 9 L.Ed.2d 142 (1962), and on reconsideration the Ninth Circuit allowed survival of a remedy against a motor carrier for refusal to render service. Pensick & Gordon, Inc. v. California Motor Express, 323 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984, 84 S.Ct. 517, 11 L.Ed.2d 472 (1964). These cases do not dispose of the instant case, because we do have involved here a rate-making proceeding. But since the remedy at issue, restitution, is not the same as that involved in T.I.M.E., reparations, we must determine whether that remedy survives under 316(j), in light of the criteria to be distilled from T.I.M.E. and Hewitt-Robins. 94 According to our reading of these two cases, the following criteria determine the survival of a remedy: (1) Does application of the remedy involve adjudication of an issue within the primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission? (2) Does the remedy enable the Commission to accomplish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly? (3) Does the remedy interfere with the stability of the rate structure? (4) Does the remedy otherwise hamper the efficient administration of the Act? We conclude that under none of these criteria is restitution precluded. 95 The key problem with respect to the first criterion is 'adjudication.' In a suit for reparation because of an unreasonable rate or one for damages because of unreasonable routing practices or for refusal to render services, the basic issue is obviously one within the primary jurisdiction of the Commission. But in awarding restitution under the facts of this case-- i.e. for the period of the temporary restraining order-- it is difficult to see that the court is adjudicating anything involving the primary jurisdiction of the Commission. We are of course determining the effect of a Commission order, but that does not involve a factual determination which brings the primary jurisdiction doctrine into play. Insofar as we decide that a proper construction of the Commission's order requires restitution, we are deciding a question of law to which the Commission's expertise does not reach. See 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 19.02 at p. 8 (1958). Furthermore, the primary jurisdiction problem ordinarily arises only when a court is requested to act initially on a problem; but here we are proceeding on review of an order where the Commission has already acted. 3 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 19.01. Thus it does not appear that this remedy is barred because of the primary jurisdiction of the ICC. 96 As to the second criterion, allowance of restitution would not permit the Commission to accomplish indirectly what it cannot accomplish directly. As we view the situation, to allow restitution merely gives effect to the Commission's order of cancellation, and clearly this order was within its power. 97 Whether allowing restitution would interfere with the stability of the rate structure is a somewhat more difficult problem. It is not at all clear what 'interference' the Supreme Court saw in the reparation remedy in the T.I.M.E. case, especially since it was exactly that remedy which was restored to the statute in the Congressional amendment to 304a. In any event, since the carriers concede that the remedy under 304a could be pursued in this case, there would seem to be no more interference in allowing restitution. The stability of the ratemaking process which the court referred to in T.I.M.E. involved the process of filing rates, publishing, giving notice, an opportunity for protest, holding hearings and issuing a final order. Here that whole process has been completed. Where either party then seeks review of that process, and particularly where a stay of the Commission order is granted, there is necessarily a certain amount of interference. The problem which the court faces then is to determine how that interference can be kept to a minimum. The solution to the problem is to accord sufficient remedies to both parties to insure protection upon the ultimate resolution of the agency action. Thus, in appropriate cases, the correlative remedy to the temporary restraining order is a bond and restitution. 98 The final criterion to be investigated is whether allowance of the remedy interferes with the efficient administration of the Act. Since the carriers admit that the 304a remedy is available, the real question here is whether remitting the shippers to that remedy is preferable to allowing restitution. We see numerous reasons for preferring restitution under the circumstances of this case. 99 First of all, permitting restitution will avoid a multiplicity of suits in a case such as this where it is ancillary to a suit instituted by the carriers. Many, if not most, of the issues to be decided in the carriers' review proceeding would be determinative of the issues involved in a subsequent proceeding for either 'reparations' or restitution-- e.g., the validity of the Commission's order, the validity of the rates, the amount of the recovery. To remit the shippers to the 304a remedy would require the filing of a new lawsuit, a reference to the Commission, and subsequent judicial proceedings on the Commission's findings. 100 Secondly, to require this procedure in a case such as this would require double litigation before the Commission of the same rates-- once in the challenge to the tariff and again in he reparation proceeding. This seems to us to be an unwarranted burden on the Commission's resources. The apparent purpose of the reparation remedy was to allow shippers to recover damages from rates which had been filed with the Commission, but which were for some reason unlawful and which had not been subject to the ordinary processes of agency review. Where those rates have gone through the proper agency channels, and where the Commission has finally acted, it would seem more efficient to allow any proper judicial remedies upon subsequent judicial review of that action. 101 Thirdly, to require the reparation remedy would result in depriving the shippers of just those protections in the ratemaking process which the Supreme Court found so important in the T.I.M.E. case. Here the shippers have successfully challenged the carriers' rates in the administrative proceeding. In the course of that proceeding, they had to pay the higher rates which were ultimately ordered canceled for over 18 months. The carriers failed to comply with the Commission's order. To hold that the shippers have no remedy for this failure of compliance, except to litigate the whole issue all over again, would make a mockery of the statutory process for challenging carrier-made rates. 102 Finally, allowing restitution in this case would have the advantage of protecting not only the instant parties to the litigation, but also to some extent the general public. It is reasonably certain that many members of the general shipping public, who ultimately bore the burden of the higher rates in force by virtue of the temporary restraining order, will be unable for practical reasons to recover these charges. To the extent that allowing restitution in cases where the carrier fails to successfully prosecute his challenge to the administrative order will deter challenges of doubtful merit, the purposes of the Act in protecting the general public will be served. 103 We conclude that the principles of T.I.M.E. do not preclude restitution on this case, nor is 304a an exclusive remedy. 104
105 We turn now to the carriers' contention that allowing restitution would contravene the policy of the Act prohibiting carriers from making refunds from published tariffs and that the only published tariffs are the ones from which the shippers seek restitution. This argument derives from 49 U.S.C. 317(b) which provides: 'No common carrier by motor vehicle    shall refund or remit in any manner or by any device, directly or indirectly, or through any agent or broker or otherwise, any portion of the rates, fares or charges so specified    in its tariffs.   ' Violation of this provision subjects the carrier to criminal sanctions under 322(a). In order to make this section applicable, the carriers must adopt the position, as indeed they do, that under no circumstances can a refund from published tariffs be awarded, even where the Commission has specifically ordered cancellation of existing rates and the carrier has filed to comply with this order. Alternatively, it is implied in several instances in the carriers' brief that the lower court's action validated collection of the published tariffs. Either position is manifestly untenable. 106 In their brief, the carriers argue the first position as follows: 107 '   The only lawful rates which may be collected by the carriers are those in duly published tariff schedules.    The schedules can be changed only upon publication of new schedules by the carriers. This is true even when the Commission orders a rate canceled.    Carrier compliance, not the Commission order, makes the new rate effective' (Carriers' Br., p. 24.) 'It is clear, as all here must agree, that the carrier initiates the rate, that the Commission may order the rate cancelled, but that such cancellation becomes effective, not by Commission order, but by carrier compliance with the Commission order. Failure of compliance is punishable, but does not render the rate unlawful.' (Carriers' Br., p. 45.) 108 Before discussing the law on this issue, we take note of certain practical implications of the carriers' position. The proposition that a carrier may wilfully ignore an order of the Commission and collect charges under a tariff that the Commission has ordered canceled without any liability to shippers is on its face highly questionable. As Justice Cardozo noted in the Atlantic Coast Line case, supra: 109 'The carrier was not at liberty to take the law into its own hands and refuse submission to the order without the sanction of a court. It would have exposed itself to suits and penalties, both criminal and civil, if it had followed such a path.    Obedience was owing while the order was in force.' 295 U.S. at 311, 55 S.Ct. at 717. 110 Furthermore, this proposition is totally inconsistent with the carriers' actions and contentions in all the proceedings prior to this appeal. Lest there be any misunderstanding, we emphasize here that we are not implying any 'estoppel' of the carriers to assert this proposition in this court, simply because of their prior position. But where a contention is prima facie doubtful, and where all parties to a proceeding, including the one now standing on the contention, have acted exactly opposite to the position now taken, that is strong evidence of what the legal situation is in fact. The record before us shows quite clearly that the carriers, the shippers, the Commission, the district judge who granted the temporary restraining order, and the Three-Judge Court which denied the temporary injunction all operated on the assumption that unless there was a stay of the Commission's order, the carriers would be unable to charge the rates in the tariff which was ordered canceled. The evidence in the record to this effect is voluminous, of which the following samples are indicative. 111 First of all, we note the repeated attempts, some of which were successful, of the carriers to obtain postponement of the Commission's order. If the carriers were free to ignore the Commission's order, there would seem to be no urgency in getting these postponements. Secondly, the motion for the temporary restraining order, filed concurrently with the complaint to set aside the Commission order, specifically alleged that if the order became effective they would suffer substantial loss of revenue and be required to offer transportation services for noncompensatory rates. Obviously, this could not occur if they could continue to charge the existing tariffs. The district judge, in granting the temporary restraining order, expressly found that 'unless enforcement (of the order)    is restrained by this Court, and the effective date thereof suspended, immediate and irreparable injury, loss and damage will result of (carriers).   ' Again, their could be no such injury if the carriers could ignore the order without having to make refunds. 112 In the judicial proceedings below, the carriers consistently maintained the position that unless they were awarded temporary relief, the Commission order was self-executing and they would suffer a loss of revenue. The following excerpts from the hearing to extend the temporary restraining order are indicative of the argument of carriers' counsel: 113 'We are talking about a tariff that    but for the temporary relief and very urgent relief obtained from this Court, would have been cancelled as of Monday of this week. 114 'Once this order becomes effective, this matter, this application (for review of the Commission order) is at an end. The order is self-executing.    'It is a perfectly lawful charge that has been made, and it continues lawful until for one reason or another the effective date of the Commission's order comes about.' 115 In granting the extension of the temporary restraining order, with the protection of a $300,000 bond, the district judge again did so on the specific finding that unless the order were restrained the carriers would suffer an immediate loss of revenue. 116 In the hearing before the Three-Judge District Court on the granting of the interlocutory injunction, the carriers again took the position that unless the relief were granted, the order was self-executing and they would not be able to charge the rates prescribed in the tariff. After spending some time arguing the merits of the Commission's order, carriers' counsel was urged by the Court to set to the immediate issue of the necessity for the preliminary injunction. He did so as follows: 117 'Mr. Evarts: The last sentence of the order says that on one day's notice the carrier shall publish new rates, and these proceedings shall be discontinued. There is nothing left. We have nothing to review because the Commission order has in effect executed itself.    And so the only way that we can get a review is to stay the effect of the Commission's order so that this Court can determine whether or not we were in fact denied a fair hearing by the Commission and if the Commission acted improperly. We have no other remedy. We have exhausted administrative remedy and without this order staying in effect we are denied judicial review which Congress says we have a right to.    118 'Judge Blackmun: I take it, Mr. Evarts, your mootness argument is that if the temporary injunction is denied, then the Commission's order is self-executing   . 119 'Mr. Evarts: That is one result that would follow.' 120 In denying the interlocutory injunction, the Three-Judge Court did so in part on the grounds that staying the Commission's order would cause considerable loss and injury to the general public. There could have been no such finding were it not the consensus of all the participants that the effect of the Commission's order was to prevent the carriers from charging the higher rates. 121 Were we to uphold the carriers' contention that no restitution is possible from these tariffs because they had not published any others, that holding would itself be a conclusive argument against the granting of any temporary restraining order against a Commission order like the one in this case. For if the carriers are free to charge the rates in a tariff ordered canceled, without any liability to shippers resulting, then there can be no showing of irreparable injury which is a necessary prerequisite to the granting of a temporary restraining order under 28 U.S.C. 2284. According to the provisions of this section a temporary restraining order may not be issued against the Commission, unless the district court makes 'a specific finding, based upon evidence submitted to such judge and identified by reference thereto, that specified irreparable damage will result if the order is not granted.' To the carriers' suggestion that the temporary restraining order is necessary in order to obtain an 'orderly review' (apparently in the absence of irreparable damage), this section provides a complete answer. It is not necessary. Equally explicit is 28 U.S.C. 2324, which provides that the pendency of an action to review a Commission order shall not of itself operate as a stay of that order. It is abundantly clear that 'orderly review' can be obtained without a stay of the Commission's order. A stay is justified only if there is irreparable damage, and there is no such damage in the instant case if the carrier may charge rates which have been ordered canceled without liability. 122 The case law on this issue reveals the fallacy of the carriers' argument. A rate which is filed with the Commission is not ipso facto a lawful rate. It is the applicable rate which the carrier must, under the compulsion of 317(b), charge to shippers in the regular course of business. The reason for the requirement is plain. Requiring payment of rates according to published tariffs without question reduces the possibility that carriers will prefer some shippers over others, keeps interstate traffic flowing speedily without interruptions for on-the-spot disputes over rates, and encourages the channelling of those rate disputes that do arise to the Commission and the courts for adjudication. But merely because the carrier is bound to charge the filed rate, it does not follow that he is necessarily entitled to keep it. 123 This distinction was made abundantly clear by the Supreme Court in the case of Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 284 U.S. 370, 52 S.Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932): 124 'In order to render rates definite and certain, and to prevent discrimination and other abuses, the statute required the filing and publishing of tariffs specifying the rates adopted by the carrier, and made these the legal rates; that is, those which must be charged to all shippers alike. Any deviation from the published rate was declared a criminal offense, and also a civil wrong giving rise to an action for damages by the injured shipper. Although the Act thus created a legal rate, it did not abrogate, but expressly affirmed, the common-law duty to charge no more than a reasonable rate, and left upon the carrier the burden of conforming its charges to that standard. In other words, the legal rate was not made by the statute a lawful rate-- it was lawful only if it was reasonable. Under section 6, the shipper was bound to pay the legal rate; but, if he could show that it was unreasonable, he might recover reparation.' 284 U.S. at 384, 52 S.Ct. at 184. 125 Even where the Interstate Commerce Commission has conducted a full review of a filed rate, and refused to find it unlawful, it is not thereby converted into a lawful rate: 126 'The finding of the Commission that the proposed schedules 'are not shown to be    unlawful'.    has been held by the Commission not to constitute an approval or a prescription of the rates.    They stand only as carrier-made rates which, under the Commission's decisions, leaves them open to possible recovery of reparations.' Interstate Commerce Commission v. Inland Waterways Corp., 319 U.S. 671, 686-687, 63 S.Ct. 1296, 1305, 87 L.Ed. 1655 (1943). 127 Reparations proceedings inevitably involve a refund from published tariffs, regardless of any provisions in the Act preventing the carrier from making such refunds personally. Cf. National Motor Freight Traffic Assoc. v. United States, 268 F.Supp. 90 (D.C.1967), aff'd, 393 U.S. 18, 89 S.Ct. 49, 21 L.Ed.2d 19 (1968). 128 Just as published tariffs are not a bar to a refund by means of reparations proceedings if they are not lawful, so the published tariffs are not a bar to an appropriate judicial remedy if for some reason they are not lawful. Several cases illustrate this principle. Thus in Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 59 S.Ct. 415, 83 L.Ed. 557 (1939), shippers claimed advantage of a tariff which had been ordered set aside by the ICC, but which had remained in effect by virtue of a court order. The shippers contended that the statutory requirement that published tariffs be observed entitled them to the lower rates, even though those rates were in contravention of a Commission order. The Supreme Court answered this contention: 129 'The published tariff had contained the unlawful allowance solely because of the court's injunction. To sustain the contention of appellant that the provision for allowances in the published tariff limited the authority of the court to prevent their payment would be to clothe a published tariff, in existence solely by reason of equitable intervention, with an immunity from equity itself. The Interstate Commerce Act grants no such immunity. Cf. Merchants Warehouse Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 501, 511, 51 S.Ct. 505, 75 L.Ed. 1227.' 306 U.S. at 159, 59 S.Ct. at 419. 130 Similarly, in Chicago, M., St. P. & P.R. Co. v. Alouette Peat Products, Ltd., 253 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1957), the court ordered the Commission to award to shippers the difference between a tariff which had not been published on the statutory 30-day notice, and the immediately prior published tariff, even though the Commission had refused to award reparations on the finding that the rates were not unjust or unreasonable. There the Commission had authorized the carriers to publish specified increased rates on five days notice. The carriers published rates higher than those authorized. When the shippers protested, the Commission found that the higher rates were justified and refused to order reparations. The Ninth Circuit expressly recognized that the new tariffs were the applicable ones which the carrier was bound to collect. But it also held that the carrier was not entitled to keep them where it had not complied with the ICC order. So here the carriers were entitled to collect the higher rates, but were not entitled to keep them when they have not complied with the ICC order. 131 Finally, the Accelerated Transport case, 227 F.Supp. 815, discussed above, recognizes the same principle. There the carriers charged rates in tariffs ordered canceled by the Commission while those tariffs were in effect during the period of the temporary restraining order. Following affirmance of the Commission's order and dissolution of the temporary restraining order, the Court ordered a refund (implemented as described in the discussion above) from the published tariffs. 132 For the proposition that the carriers may collect and retain charges from published tariffs which are in violation of a Commission order without liability, the carriers cite several cases, none of which support the contention and most of which support the exact opposite. One such case is Alouette Peat, discussed above. Another is Chase & Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 I.C.C. 398 (1937), and cases cited therein. Apparently the carriers are referring to the following language in the Commission's opinion: 133 'Rates filed with the Commission and published in the manner provided by law are the applicable rates even though they differ from the rates prescribed in an outstanding order of the Commission. Ralston Purina Co., Inc. v. Atlanta, B. & C.R. Co., 174 I.C.C. 722, by division 5; Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 185 I.C.C. 233, by division 2; Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 188 I.C.C. 97, by division 5; Texas Produce Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 209 I.C.C. 113, by division 3.' 220 I.C.C. at 400. 134 But in that case the Commission was only recognizing the rule emphasized here, that the published rate is the applicable rate which may be collected during shipment. It did not hold and did not purport to hold that the published applicable rate was the lawful rate which the carrier was entitled to keep. In every single case cited by the Commission, where a timely action was brought by the shippers, and where the carriers published tariffs which were found to have violated a Commission order, the Commission ordered reparations. In the Chase case itself, the Commission found that the carriers had complied with its order and refused reparations. 135 The carriers also cite Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. v. International Milling Co., 43 F.2d 93 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 885, 51 S.Ct. 89, 75 L.Ed. 781 (1930), decided by our Circuit. The case is of doubtful relevance to this situation, but to the extent that it is relevant it also is contrary to the carriers' position. There the carriers apparently had on file two tariffs applicable to the same shipment. The later filed tariff set lower rates than the earlier one. The carriers accepted a shipment at the lower rates and then sued to collect the higher rates in the earlier tariff, contending that it was the applicable tariff because they had not complied with a Commission rule requiring that a new tariff specifically state which prior tariffs were canceled. We held that the lower rate was applicable. There the carriers contended that they were entitled to collect a higher rate because they had not complied with a Commission rule. Here the carriers contend that they are entitled to keep a higher rate because they have not complied with a Commission order. In neither case is the contention sound. 136 Only a few words need be said concerning the suggestion that the carriers are entitled to keep the charges because the tariffs remained in effect because of the temporary restraining order. The language quoted from the Supreme Court's Inland Steel decision, supra, disposes of this contention, as do most of the cases discussed above relating to the general principles of restitution. See also Socony Mobile Oil Co. v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 299 F.2d 692 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 887, 83 S.Ct. 182, 9 L.Ed.2d 121, affirming Brooklyn Union Gas Co. v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 201 F.Supp. 679 (S.D.Tex.1960).