Opinion ID: 199581
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retaliation for filing a charge of discrimination

Text: 18 Sullivan further claims that Raytheon violated his rights under chapter 151B, § 4(4) 4 by engaging in retaliatory discrimination in not reinstating him after he filed a charge of discrimination with the MCAD. To establish a prima facie case for retaliation, Sullivan had to show that: (1) he engaged in conduct protected under Massachusetts or federal law; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection existed between the protected conduct and the adverse action. McMillan v. Mass. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 140 F.3d 288, 309 (1st Cir. 1998). Sullivan's claim falters on the third prong of this test. He has not demonstrated a causal connection between his protected conduct - filing a charge of discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination in October 1996--and Raytheon's refusal to reinstate him to his position as a security guard in July 1996. Indeed, Sullivan concedes this chronology in the facts section of his brief when he states: When Sullivan was not given disability benefits, and was not reinstated to a suitable position at Raytheon, he filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination on October 9, 1996. Because Sullivan's protected action - filing a charge of discrimination - occurred after the adverse employment action, we affirm the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Raytheon on the retaliation claim. 19