Opinion ID: 379476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Holloway v. Arkansas

Text: 151 In Holloway, three defendants were charged in connection with a rape and robbery incident. The public defender who was appointed to represent all three defendants informed the court that his clients had conflicting interests, but the trial court insisted on joint representation. The Supreme Court reversed the defendants' convictions, holding that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely objection reversal is automatic. 50 152 The facts in Holloway have a superficial similarity to those involved here. In both cases the defendants were actually represented by counsel throughout their trials. Nevertheless, the two reasons why the Supreme Court presumed that there was prejudice in Holloway, and dispensed with the requirement that the defendant show it, are plainly inapplicable here. 153 First, the Supreme Court noted that a defense counsel's statement that his clients have conflicting interests is extremely strong evidence that joint representation will prejudice them by preventing their counsel from being able to fully represent one of them at all stages of the trial. Chief Justice Burger wrote: 154 (M)ost courts have held that an attorney's request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted. . . . An attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial. State v. Davis (110 Ariz. 29, 31, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1973)). Second, defense attorneys have the obligation, upon discovering a conflict of interests, to advise the court at once of the problem. Ibid. Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, and  'when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath.'  State v. Brazile (226 La. 254, 266, 75 So.2d 856, 860-61 (1954)). We find these considerations persuasive. 155 435 U.S. at 485-86, 98 S.Ct. at 1179-1180 (footnotes omitted). In effect, the Court was able to determine from counsel's statement that the accused had been denied full representation by his counsel because of the lawyer's conflicting loyalties. Since the conflict of interest creates a presumption of prejudice, a further showing of prejudice was not required. 51 156 In addition, the Supreme Court recognized that it would be virtually impossible for an accused to show prejudice in the joint representation context. 157 (A) rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests which he and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections to the joint representation prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, even handed application. In the normal case where a harmless error rule is applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury. Compare Chapman v. California, supra, (386 U.S.) at 24-26 (87 S.Ct. 824, at 828-829), with Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (94 S.Ct. 2887, 2902, 41 L.Ed.2d 590) (1974), and United States v. Valle-Valdez, 554 F.2d 911, 914-917 (CA9 1977). But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil it bears repeating is in what the advocate finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process. It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney's failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney's representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney's options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation. 158 435 U.S. at 490-91, 98 S.Ct. at 1182. 159 These two reasons do not support a presumption of prejudice in cases that, like this one, involve allegations that defense counsel was ineffective. Unlike the joint representation cases, there is no showing that a defense lawyer's mistakes usually cause prejudice to an accused. This case is a good example in which a defendant was not even slightly harmed as a result of his counsel's alleged errors. 160 Perhaps more important, in cases involving alleged inadequacy of representation, it will not be as difficult for the defendant to prove prejudice. For example, if (as the dissent asserts) an attorney fails to undertake a thorough investigation, the defendant could readily prove prejudice simply by showing that the evidence that would have been found was exculpatory. Unlike the joint representation cases, the defendant would not be forced to engage in unguided speculation. 52 161 In short, while the facts in Holloway (the trial court ignored counsel's warning that his clients had conflicting interests) establish inherent prejudice so that a distinct showing of prejudice (was) unnecessary, 53 that ruling does not constitute a precedent for presuming prejudice from a defendant's allegations that his counsel provided ineffective representation.