Opinion ID: 3050601
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 1990 Letters

Text: Goodstein asserts that he invoked the duty via the September 28, 1990 letter, which he claims gave Industrial notice of GOODSTEIN v. INDUSTRIAL INDEMNITY 15591 the fact that the DOE had declared the properties polluted.15 A review of the full record before us, however, makes clear that this position is untenable. [15] Washington courts have rejected the notion that “a tender of defense is sufficient if the insured puts the insurer on notice of the claim.” Unigard Ins. Co. v. Leven, 983 P.2d 1155, 1160 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). “[A]n insurer cannot be expected to anticipate when or if an insured will make a claim for coverage; the insured must affirmatively inform the insurer that its participation is desired.” Id.; see also Griffin v. Allstate Ins. Co., 29 P.3d 777, 782 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001); Time Oil Co. v. Cigna Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 743 F. Supp. 1400, 1420 (W.D. Wash. 1990). Goodstein’s October 22, 1990 letter went to great pains to inform Industrial that no claim had been made: “Please note, however, in case there is any confusion, we are not presently making any claims under the policies.” (Emphasis added). Far from informing Industrial that its participation was desired in any investigation, negotiation or defense regarding the extent of Goodstein’s liability for the pollution, see Unigard, 29 P.3d at 782, Goodstein specifically disclaimed any intent to invoke coverage under the policies. Goodstein cannot now claim Industrial’s duty to defend arose as a result of that early correspondence.