Opinion ID: 1654574
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in denying morris' motion to quash the jury panel[1] due to pre-trial publicity.

Text: ¶ 9. We will find that a voir dire was sufficient to ensure a fair and impartial jury where the appellant does not present any evidence indicating that the jury was not fair and impartial and fails to show any prejudice resulting from how the circuit court conducted the voir dire. Manning v. State, 735 So.2d 323, 336 (Miss.1999). A trial court's finding that an impartial jury was impaneled will not be reversed unless the court abused its discretion. Holland v. State, 705 So.2d 307, 336 (Miss.1997). In any case, this Court will treat with deference a venire person's assertions of impartiality. Id. (citing Scott v. Ball, 595 So.2d 848, 850 (Miss. 1992)). In Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 66-67 (Miss.1998), we affirmed a finding that the jury was impartial because the panel members were asked repeatedly by the trial judge, the State's attorneys, and Gray's attorneys if they could be fair and impartial[, and there was] nothing in the record to indicate that the jurors were not fair and impartial. ¶ 10. The record shows that jurors # 8, # 11, # 14, # 16, # 19, # 26, # 28, # 35, # 37, # 39, # 45, # 48, # 51, # 53, # 57, and # 61, sixteen people out of the sixty-plus-person venire, responded affirmatively to the prosecution's question about whether they had read or heard something about the case. Jurors # 14 and # 19 were struck for cause by the circuit court. The remaining venirepersons were individually brought to the judge's chambers, where the judge, the prosecutor, and the defense questioned them further about their exposure to information about the case. Each of these people, except for Juror # 35, stated that could set aside what they had learned and be fair and impartial. Juror # 35's memory of what he had heard or read was so vague that he stated that the only thing he remembered was that the shooting occurred. Evidently, the circuit court, the prosecutor and the defense did not think that further questioning was necessary. ¶ 11. Defense counsel challenged Juror # 11 for cause because her father had been murdered 19 years earlier and because she works with senior citizens in the area where the killing occurred. Defense counsel stated, it just behooves me that she had not talked and formulate some type opinion from talking with those senior citizens over there in that area. I don't see how she could be fair and impartial. The circuit court denied the challenge for cause because Juror # 11 stated she could be fair and impartial. The defense also challenged for cause Juror # 16, stating, he said that he don't remember what he read, but then he saidhe finally said he doesn't think that anyone can say that they could actually be fair and impartial, that all they could say is `I think.' The circuit court again denied the challenge for cause, stating that he had studied Juror # 16's demeanor, and that, [i]n fact, I asked him questions after you did and I think that he was being honest with what he said and I think that he is a fair and impartial juror. ¶ 12. The defense used its peremptory strikes against jurors # 5, # 6, # 7, # 10, # 11, # 13, # 16, # 17, # 21, # 23, # 28, # 37, # 42, and # 43, meaning that only four strikes (# 11, # 16, # 28, and # 37) out of twelve were against prospective jurors who had been exposed to information about the killing. The State used one of its peremptory strikes against Juror # 26. Because # 45 was the last alternate chosen, # 48, # 51, # 53, # 57, and # 61 were dismissed. ¶ 13. The long and short of this analysis is that, out of sixteen venirepersons who stated that had been exposed to pre-trial publicity, only Jurors # 8, # 35 and # 39 were seated on the jury. Jurors # 8 and # 39, after intense questioning in chambers by the court, the prosecution and defense counsel, repeatedly stated they could set aside what they had learned and be fair and impartial. These jurors were called into chambers for individual questioning, and all of them except for # 35 stated that whatever they had heard or read would not keep them from being fair and impartial. ¶ 14. The defense then moved to quash the jury panel, stating that, because of the size of the community, it was hard for anyone not to have heard about the crime. The defense also stated that all of the venire agreed that when a child was injured, they would want to correct that wrong. He admitted that there had not been a rash of newspaper articles, but that those venirepersons who did not state that they had heard about the case were lying. The circuit court denied the motion because the panel had been repeatedly asked whether or not they could be fair and impartial and render a verdict based on the evidence and from the witness stand and the law given by the Court and they've all indicated that they could. The circuit court also noted that every juror who stated that they had read or heard something about the case was questioned individually in chambers. ¶ 15. On appeal, Morris argues that the circuit court never specifically addressed the factual question about the remaining panel's lack of honesty and forthrightness about hearing or reading something about the case, and that [b]y the sheer number of venire persons who responded to the prosecution's question affirmatively, it forced the defense to keep venire persons on the panel that admitted to reading or hearing about the case. ¶ 16. The State responds that Morris has not met his burden of showing that the panel members had substantial knowledge about matters but failed to answer affirmatively when questioned on the subject. Morris does not demonstrate that the panel members who did not answer affirmatively in fact `had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited.' Sewell v. State, 721 So.2d 129, 137 (Miss.1998). ¶ 17. We agree with the State's argument. Morris has failed to demonstrate to either the circuit court or this Court that any juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited. When the jurors failed to respond affirmatively, Morris could have questioned those jurors further. He failed to do so. Morris had the opportunity to question those jurors who he now claims suffered from a lack of honesty. If he had those concerns when they failed to answer affirmatively, he should have followed up by asking them further questions in order to make certain that had never heard of the crime or to demonstrate that they were being deceptive by failing to answer. ¶ 18. This issue is without merit.