Opinion ID: 3162773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the dispositive issue addressed by the oklahoma court of civil appeals

Text: ¶12 The GTCA is the exclusive remedy to recover against a governmental entity in tort. Tuffy's, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 2009 OK 4, ¶7, 212 P.3d 1158; Teeter v. City of Edmond , 2004 OK 5, ¶21, 85 P.3d 817. Governmental immunity is waived under the GTCA subject only to specific limitations and exceptions. Title 51 O.S. 2011, § 153. The doctrine of respondeat superior is applicable under the GTCA. Tuffy's, Inc. v. City of Oklahoma City, 2009 OK 4, ¶7, 212 P.3d 1158; Decorte v. Robinson , 1998 OK 87, ¶12, 969 P.2d 358. Under this doctrine an employer is generally held liable for the willful acts of an employee acting within the scope of employment. Bosh v. Cherokee County Bldg. Authority, 2013 OK 9, ¶9, 305 P.3d 994. Scope of employment is defined in the GTCA as follows: [P]erformance by an employee acting in good faith within the duties of the employee's office or employment or of tasks lawfully assigned by a competent authority including the operation or use of an agency vehicle or equipment with actual or implied consent of the supervisor of the employee, but shall not include corruption or fraud; Title 51 O.S. 2011, § 152 (12). (Emphasis added). In Nail v. City of Henryetta, 1996 OK 12, ¶11, 911 P.2d 914, this Court determined that under the doctrine of respondeat superior one acts within the scope of employment if engaged in work assigned, or if doing that which is proper, necessary and usual to accomplish the work assigned, or doing that which is customary within the particular trade or business. ¶13 In its Brief in Chief, NRH asserts the dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by finding it was liable for an act of its employee that was made with reckless disregard for the safety of others. In the alternative, NRH asserts there was no competent evidence showing Barstow acted with reckless disregard. NRH argues acts of employees of a political subdivision done in reckless disregard for the safety of others are outside the scope of employment and if Mr. Barstow's actions were reckless then it is immune from respondeat superior liability. NRH contends it also had immunity for acts constituting mere negligence of its emergency vehicle drivers when they are responding to an emergency call while using an audible signal and lights. ¶14 The Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals held the combination of two opinions of this Court had the unintended effect of granting complete immunity to a GTCA entity from respondeat superior liability for its emergency vehicle drivers' torts based on ordinary negligence and reckless disregard. The two opinions cited are Fehring v. State Ins. Fund, 2001 OK 11, 19 P.3d 276 and State ex rel. Oklahoma Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gurich , 2010 OK 56, 238 P.3d 1. ¶15 In Fehring, we held that a claim against the State Insurance Fund for refusing to pay benefits under a workers' compensation award in a timely manner could only succeed upon showing conduct that mandated a determination its employees were not acting in good faith. Fehring, 2001 OK 11 at ¶25. We determined such conduct would necessitate a finding that it was intentional, willful and malicious and therefore not within the scope of employment. Id. at ¶28. However, we also noted that even based on a standard of culpability of reckless conduct the same result would be obtained. Id. at ¶29 . We held that [a]cts performed with reckless disregard for an individual's rights also lack good faith and are outside the scope of employment under the provisions of the GTCA. Id. ¶16 In Gurich , we established the duty of care an emergency vehicle driver owes the public while operating pursuant to 47 O.S. 2011, § 11-106. This section of law provides certain exemptions from the Rules of the Road 4 to an emergency vehicle driver when responding to an emergency call. It provides in pertinent part: A. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, when responding to an emergency call or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law or when responding to but not upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise the privilege set forth in this section, but subject to the conditions herein stated. B. The driver of an authorized emergency vehicle may: . . . . 3. Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as speeding does not endanger life or property; . . . . C. The exemptions herein granted to the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only when the driver is properly and lawfully making use of an audible signal or of flashing red or blue lights or a combination of flashing red and blue lights . . . . . . . . E. The provisions of this section shall not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others. Title 47 O.S. 2011, § 11-106. We noted this section of law was part of a Model Uniform Vehicle Code and adopting jurisdictions differed on the meaning of subsection E. Gurich , 2010 OK 56 at ¶23. The question was whether the language created a negligence standard or did it create a higher standard of care. The problem stems from its language that the exemptions found in this section shall not relieve the driver from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons, and the language nor shall such provisions protect the driver from the consequences of reckless disregard for the safety of others. Some jurisdictions found the reckless disregard language to be surplusage but we were reluctant to do so under our jurisprudence. Gurich , 2010 OK 56 at ¶25. We held that subsection E established reckless disregard as the standard of care for evaluating whether the driver of an emergency vehicle breached the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. Id. In addition, we determined that public policy demanded a standard higher than mere negligence for situations involving emergency vehicles. Id. at ¶26. This higher standard was found to be more consistent with the balancing of the benefit of the emergency service with the risk to the public. Id. at ¶27. ¶17 The effect of these two decisions, Fehring and Gurich, led the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals to one conclusion: if an emergency vehicle driver must be found to have acted in reckless disregard, not just merely negligently, in order to be liable in tort, and an employee acting in reckless disregard acts outside of their scope of employment, then an employer covered under the GTCA could never be liable for the torts of their emergency vehicle drivers committed while acting pursuant to 47 O.S. 2011, § 11-106. Although the logic is understandable, we disagree. ¶18 In Fehring, the tort at issue required proof of an element that necessarily excluded good faith conduct. This was also true of the two cases discussed in Fehring; Parker v. City of Midwest City , 1993 OK 29, 850 P.2d 1065 and McMullen v. City of Del City, 1996 OK CIV APP 46, 920 P.2d 528. In Parker the cause of action was for malicious prosecution. We held Midwest City could not be liable for the actions of its police officer because the tort required a showing of malice which includes some degree of bad faith. Parker, 1993 OK 29 at ¶¶12 -14. In McMullen the plaintiff pleaded a claim for the intentional tort of outrage. The court noted the tort required extreme and outrageous conduct that went beyond all bounds of decency and there is no way to prove such claim if the defendants had acted in good faith. McMullen 1996 OK CIV APP 46at ¶¶7-8. The viability of the torts in each of these cases was dependent on showing the defendants engaged in conduct that would be considered bad faith. These cases are distinguishable from the present case. ¶19 The trial court in the present matter found Mr. Barstow was both negligent and reckless due to the speed he traveled through this particular intersection. The trial court did not say reckless disregard in her order but we are convinced that could be the only meaning. It is clear from the trial transcript that the trial court was aware that in order to find NRH liable it must find Mr. Barstow acted with reckless disregard; not mere negligence. 5 ¶20 The Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction 5.6 defines reckless disregard as follows: The conduct of [Defendant] was in reckless disregard of another's rights if [Defendant] was either aware, or did not care, that there was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [his/her/its] conduct would cause serious injury to others. In order for the conduct to be in reckless disregard of another's rights, it must have been unreasonable under the circumstances, and also there must have been a high probability that the conduct would cause serious harm to another person. OUJI (Civil) No. 5.6. This instruction further provides that punitive damages may be awarded if the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence the defendant acted in reckless disregard or acted intentionally and with malice. The instruction defines malice as involving either hatred, spite, or ill-will, or else the doing of a wrongful act intentionally without just cause or excuse. Id. Although both reckless disregard and intentional acts of malice may be the basis for a punitive damages award the OUJI instruction clearly distinguishes the two. Additionally, the two are distinguished in statute. The statue concerning punitive damages provides lesser damages for acts constituting reckless disregard than for acts constituting malice. 6 ¶21 It is apparent that reckless disregard is distinguishable from acts that clearly show malice or bad faith. Acts performed with reckless disregard do not automatically rise to a level constituting malice or bad faith. That is not to say that malice or bad faith can never be inferred from conduct exhibiting reckless disregard for the rights of others. Such determination, however, shall be made on a case-by-case basis. Fehring is hereby overruled to the extent that its holding provides that acts performed with reckless disregard for an individual's rights automatically lack good faith in cases where the tort at issue does not require proof of an element that necessarily excludes good faith conduct or requires a showing of malice. ¶22 This case concerns an automobile accident. An element exhibiting bad faith or malice is not required. This is true even though Mr. Barstow's conduct was found to have been reckless. The trial court did not find that Mr. Barstow acted with malice or bad faith. The trial court's finding that he was acting within the scope of his employment is reasonable under the circumstances of this case. Mr. Barstow was a paramedic supervisor responding to an emergency call with lights flashing and siren activated. He is allowed by law to exceed the speed limit as long as it does not endanger life or property. Even though his act of speeding through this particular intersection was found to be reckless his actions leading up to the collision were naturally incident and in furtherance of his duties to his employer. There is no indication that his actions, although having been found unreasonable under the circumstances, were so extreme that they unlawfully usurped any power he did not rightfully possess as an emergency vehicle driver. See Decorte v. Robinson , 1998 OK 87, ¶12, 969 P.2d 358. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's ruling that Mr. Barstow was acting within the scope of his employment.