Opinion ID: 6345898
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Any violations of the Act or of these regula-

Text: tions constitute interfering with, restraining, or denying the exercise of rights provided by the Act. … Interfering with the exercise of an employee’s rights would include, for exam- ple, not only refusing to authorize FMLA leave, but discouraging an employee from using such leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(a)–(b) (emphasis added). Section 2615(a)(1) is not ambiguous about whether denial is required to show a violation, so Chevron deference does not apply here. See Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Commissioner of Indiana State Dept. of Health, 699 F.3d 962, 980 (7th Cir. 2012) (“In the absence of ambiguity, Chevron deference does not come into play.”), citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). But the FMLA vests the Secretary of Labor with broad authority to issue regulations implementing the FMLA, and his regulatory interpretation is further persuasive evidence that the best reading of § 2615(a)(1) is that actual denial is not required. 29 U.S.C § 2654. 5 5 At this court’s invitation, the Department of Labor submitted an amicus brief on the question whether “a plaintiff pursuing a claim of interference with rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. No. 19-3435 15