Opinion ID: 1860956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issue #1: was the defendant denied the effective assistance of counsel, contrary to the sixth amendment of the united states constitution, because his attorney also represented his codefendant at trial?

Text: [1-3] The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution includes the right to be effectively represented. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. A defendant is entitled to the undivided loyalty of his attorney. As the United States Supreme Court said in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942) . . . the assistance of counsel' guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment contemplates that such assistance be untrammeled and unimpaired by a court order requiring that one lawyer shall simultaneously represent conflicting interests. If the right to the assistance of counsel means less than this, a valued constitutional safeguard is substantially impaired. Neither this court nor the U.S. Supreme Court has ever held that joint representation of two codefendants by a single lawyer per se constitutes ineffective representation. Mueller v. State, 32 Wis.2d 70, 77, 145 N.W. 2d 84 (1966); State v. Medrano, 84 Wis.2d 11, 267 N.W. 2d 586 (1978). The United States Supreme Court recently said in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S. Ct. 1173, 1178 (1978): One principle applicable here emerges from Glasser without ambiguity. Requiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. This principle recognizes in some cases multiple defendants can appropriately be represented by one attorney; indeed, in some cases, certain advantages might accrue from joint representation. In Mr. Justice Frankfurter's view: `Joint representation is a means of insuring against reciprocal recrimination. A common defense often gives strength against a common attack.' Glasser v. United States, supra, 315 U.S. at 92, 62 S. Ct., at 475 (dissenting.) In Glasser, the trial court appointed Glasser's attorney to also represent a codefendant, over Glasser's objections. The trial record disclosed a conflict of interest. The attorney failed to cross-examine a government witness who linked Glasser to the conspiracy and failed to object to the admission of arguably inadmissible evidence. The court concluded that these omissions were motivated by the lawyer's desire to protect the other defendant. The court reversed Glasser's conviction, without determining whether the conflict actually resulted in prejudice to Glasser: To determine the precise degree of prejudice sustained by Glasser . . . is at once difficult and unnecessary. The right to have the assistance of counsel is too fundamental and absolute to allow courts to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising from its denial. Id. at 75-6. [4] The rule followed by this court was recently restated in State v. Medrano, supra, 84 Wis.2d at 28: In order to establish that he was denied effective representation by counsel, [the defendant] must establish by clear and convincing evidence that an actual conflict of interest existed. Hall v. State, 63 Wis.2d 304, 311, 217 N.W.2d 352 (1974). It is not sufficient that he show a mere possibility or suspicion of a conflict could arise under hypothetical circumstances. Harrison v. State, 78 Wis.2d 189, 201, 254 N.W.2d 220 (1977). However, [the defendant] does not have to show actual prejudice; once he shows an actual conflict he is entitled to relief. Hall, 63 Wis.2d at 311-312. In the instant case, the Assistant District Attorney Klinkowitz raised the issue of joint representation at trial. At that time, the following exchange took place:  Court: Mr. Eisenberg, do you feel there is any conflict of interest between your representing both of these defendants?  Mr. Eisenberg: I thoroughly discussed it between Mr. Klinkowitz and the defendants as well as I personally can see no conflict unless the Court sees one.  Court: I am making no such finding. Let's proceed. The record reveals that there was no conflict of interest at trial. [1] Frankovis and Koller had entirely consistent theories of defense. Koller's position was that he had nothing to do with the fight, that he urged that the parties break it up, and that he himself left because he did not want to become involved. Frankovis' theory was that Nauertz threw the first punch, and that he was merely defending himself in the ensuing fight. Koller's testimony that he saw Frankovis involved in the scuffle did not undermine Frankovis' fair fight theory. Frankovis supported Koller's story when he testified, I recognized the voice as being Bob saying something to the effect of let's not get involved in this. Mr. Eisenberg was vigorous in his defense of Koller. At the close of the state's case, he moved that the charges be dismissed as to Koller, but not as to Frankovis. In his closing argument, he played up Patrolman Gross's in court identification of Frankovis as the person he stopped going out the back door of the tavern, even though the man identified himself as Robert Koller. [5] Based on this record, Mr. Koller has no valid claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The appellant also asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request an instruction for the lesser included offense of theft. [6] The standard for competency of counsel was set out in State v. Harper, 57 Wis.2d 543, 557, 205 N.W.2d 1 (1973): Effective representation is not to be equated, as some accused believe, with a not-guilty verdict. But the representation must be equal to that which the ordinarily prudent lawyer, skilled and versed in criminal law, would give to clients who had privately retained his services. A lawyer has a right to select from the available defense strategies. Lee v. State, 65 Wis.2d 648, 655, 223 N.W.2d 455 (1974). The lawyer in this case may have felt that by limiting the jury's choices to guilty of robbery and not guilty of robbery, that Koller's chances of acquittal were greater. The fact that his strategy failed does not mean that his representation was inadequate. The defendant also cites as evidence of counsel's ineffectiveness his failure to object to jury instructions which omitted the language, the defendant is not required to prove his innocence. For reasons discussed below in connection with the adequacy of the jury instructions, this argument must also fail.