Opinion ID: 1192598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Revival or Re-creation of the First Easement.

Text: Breliant contends that the district court erred in concluding that, as a result of the circumstances surrounding the severance of the two properties, the First Easement was re-created and/or revived either expressly or by implication. When an easement has been extinguished by the joining of the dominant and servient tenements, the easement does not come into existence again merely by severance of the united estates; nevertheless, upon severance, a newly created easement authorizing a use corresponding to the use authorized by the extinguished easement may arise. Restatement of Property § 497 cmt. h (1944). According to the Restatement, [s]uch a new creation may result . . . from an express stipulation in the conveyance by which the severance is made or from the implications of the circumstances of the severance. Id. In the present case, there is no language in any of the relevant instruments expressly reviving or re-creating the First Easement (or a corresponding easement for thirty unspecified parking spaces). However, both the quitclaim deed releasing Fisher's interest in the PEC Property and the deed granting the second easement recite the same legal description of the PEC Property as was contained in the deed by which Laird and Fisher had originally acquired the PEC Property  including the description of the First Easement. We conclude that the mere reference to an extinguished easement in a deed is insufficient, as a matter of law, to revive the easement. See Capital Candy Co. v. Savard, 135 Vt. 14, 369 A.2d 1363 (1976) ([T]he mere reference in a deed to an earlier right-of-way which was extinguished by law does not constitute the re-creation of that right.). Accordingly, we hold that the reference to the extinguished easement in the deeds effecting the severance of the two properties  and, consequently, in the deed by which PEC presently holds title to the PEC Property  conveyed a nonexistent easement and thus provides merely color of title in the First Easement. [3] We also conclude that the district court's conclusion that the First Easement was re-created by implication is not supported by the evidence. This court has held that an easement may be revived or re-created after severance, by implication, where there is apparent and continuous use and the asserted easement is necessary to the proper or reasonable use of the dominant tenement. Jackson v. Nash, 109 Nev. 1202, 1213, 866 P.2d 262, 270 (1993). In deciding whether an implied easement by necessity has been established, the court looks to conditions at the time of severance. See Id. As a preliminary matter, we conclude that, because Breliant has established that the First Easement was extinguished and that the reference to the First Easement in PEC's deed provides PEC mere color of title, Breliant, as the holder of good title in the Breliant Property, is entitled to the presumption in favor of the record title holder. See Biasi v. Leavitt, 101 Nev. 86, 692 P.2d 1301 (1985). Consequently, we conclude that PEC, as the adverse claimant, must bear the burden of proving better title in itself through an implied revival or re-creation of the First Easement. Because neither Laird nor Fisher, nor anyone else having personal knowledge of the conditions at the time of severance, testified at trial, the only evidence of an implied easement by necessity is that which can be gleaned from the recital of the extinguished First Easement in the quitclaim deed to Fisher, the concomitant grant of the Second Easement, and the existence of the office complex itself. We conclude that this is weak evidence, at best, of an apparent and continuous use at the time of severance. More importantly, however, we conclude that there is nothing in this evidence to support a finding of necessity. PEC argues that the parking spaces provided by the First, as well as the Second, Easement were necessary to the compliance of the PEC Property with local zoning ordinances regarding the number of parking spaces for commercial buildings. See Clark County Code § 29.44.080 (as amended January 13, 1978). The district court based its finding of easement by implication, at least in part, on this argument. We note that the parking spaces provided by the Second Easement alone were sufficient to bring the PEC Property into compliance with the pre-1978 zoning requirements, which would have continued to apply to the PEC Property. [4] PEC, nevertheless, argues that the additional parking spaces were necessary so that PEC could comply with the post-1978 zoning requirement should future events make reconstruction, enlargement, or major repairs necessary. Clearly, the flexibility to deal with future zoning-related contingencies, which a legal surplusage of parking spaces would have provided, would have been a benefit to the owner of the PEC Property. However, we disagree with the contention that a potential future need for more parking created a necessity for unneeded parking at the time of severance. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, and finding no other evidence of necessity, we conclude that the district court's finding that the First Easement was revived or re-created by implication is not supported by substantial evidence. Because we find insufficient evidence in the record to support a conclusion that an easement for thirty parking spaces was re-created at the time of severance, either expressly or by implication, we conclude that the district court erred in concluding that the First Easement is still in existence.