Opinion ID: 1738282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Discharge of Seven-Member Voir Dire Panel

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court erred by granting the prosecutor's motion to discharge an entire seven-member jury panel because a prospective juror, Melito, criticized the striking of several African-American women. While the prosecutor was asking questions during voir dire, Melito told the prosecutor she was very upset over the earlier striking of black women, an act she considered racist and horrendous. The exchange occurred as follows: DA: Ms. Melito, the question is, if we presented sufficient evidence, ma'am, could you vote to impose the death penalty? Melito: I could consider it. DA: Could you vote to impose the death penalty? Melito: I don't know. I don't have no evidence against anyone. This man is innocent. DA: Ma'am, I'm not trying to upset you. Melito: I am upset about this whole situation. I mean what happened earlier is terrible. I mean what y'all did before was so horrendous to me. DA: What did we do to you? Melito: Not to me. DA: What did we do that's upset you? Melito: You hit every black woman on the panel. You did, didn't you? DA: I don't know what you're talking about. Melito: I do. I think everybody else knows that as well. And I am very upset about it, and I don't believe in death. And I don't think that you should, you know, kill another person just because that person killed a person. DA: Okay. Melito: It makes us guilty of the same thing. Later, Melito interjected herself into an exchange between the prosecutor and another prospective juror about the credibility of police testimony. Melito questioned whether the prosecutor believed everyone lied and no one was honest, but the prosecutor avoided a confrontation. The attorneys then proceeded to question other jurors. During a bench conference involving another juror, the prosecutor moved to excuse Melito for cause, although defense counsel had not yet questioned her. The prosecutor pointed to her obvious prejudice against the state and to the probability that the panel had already been infected by her remarks. The judge declined to excuse Melito at the time, but expressed his fear that the entire panel may have to be dismissed after she gets through. After further questioning of other panelists, the prosecutor again addressed Melito, as follows: DA: Ms. Melito, the comment that you made earlier, you want to take the microphone, the comment you made earlier about everyone could see what had been done about the black women being excluded Melito: I said that I could see that. DA: You said it was obvious to everyone else. Melito: To me it was. DA: No, ma'am, you said it was obvious to everyone else in the jury; those were your words. Melito: Yes. DA: What I would like to know now is, what is it that made you think that the State cut those black women? What is it that made you think we cut them? Melito: I don't think that. I didn't say that. DA: What do you think? Melito: I didn't think that was fair. DA: What was fair? Melito: Racism. DA: Okay, and what was it that made you think that anyone in this courtroom had anything to do with racism today? Melito: Because of some questions that were asked earlier. DA: And exactly what questions were those? Melito: You know, just about how we felt about race and things like that and, you know a soul has no color.... That's how I feel. DA:the Judge could tell you this but the Supreme Court requires that those questions be asked. That if those questions were not asked in a crime like this, the whole case could be reversed, if there were a conviction. Melito: I didn't know that. DA: I'm telling you now. Melito: Thank you. I appreciate that. DA: So do you still have any questions about whether there was racism in this courtroom today; and if so, I would like you to tell me why. Melito: I just did. DA: Okay, are there any other reasons? Melito: I believe that At this point, defense counsel requested that further questioning of the witness be conducted outside the jury's hearing, but the judge simply ordered the attorneys to move on to other issues. Shortly thereafter, another prospective juror, Summers, raised again the issue of the conducting of voir dire. In trying to explain Melito's distress, Summer expressed concerns over what he perceived to be attempts to change the minds of the panelists, as follows: Summers: I don't know if you wish to hear this, but to get back to what the young lady on the other end was saying, I don't think she articulated what she was really trying to say. At the end of the last panel, it was observed that you tookthe Court took all five black women who had voiced their opinion when they were questioned that they were against the death penalty, they would not impose it, and it appeared that y'all were trying to change their mind, to get them to change their mind so they would be accepted. It appearsof course you want equal representation of a minority on your jury, which is fine. But I think that was very obvious that was what was happening ... [Y]ou get them up there and try to change their mind. I don't think that's fair. DA: Try to change their minds to do what, sir? Summers: I'm just saying it appeared that you took five DA: When you say you, you're talking to me? Summers: Whoever was up there, you know, you were all up there. But all five of the black woman said they were againstthey would not impose this, and you brought all five of those up there and questioned them again. I don't thinkit appeared that you were tryingthe Court was trying to change their mind so you could get representation of more blacks on the jury. That's the way it appeared. That's what I think she was trying to say. Summers thus seemed troubled by the counter-intuitive voir dire process in capital cases whereby each party seeks jurors who are sympathetic while portraying them as not so sympathetic as to be disqualifiable. [7] The prosecution moved to strike the panel on the basis that the jurors believed the prosecutor had done something wrong in terms of race relations. The trial court deferred its ruling after defense counsel asked for an opportunity to clear up any confusion by explaining the voir dire process to the jurors. After further voir dire, [8] however, the prosecutor reurged his motion, and the court dismissed the entire panel. Defendant argues that the trial court, by striking the entire panel for cause, essentially gave the prosecutor extra peremptory challenges in violation of La.Code Crim. Proc. art 800 B. [9] Defendant also contends the trial judge should have allowed further questioning of each remaining panelist to determine the effect of the exchange between Melito and the prosecutor. Whether or not to strike a single juror or an entire panel is committed to the discretion of the trial judge. United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir.1990). A review of jurisprudence from various jurisdictions reveals that striking an entire jury panel occurs rarely and is usually sought by a criminal defendant. [10] The Supreme Court of Missouri has observed, Normally, the disqualification of an individual juror for the expression of an opinion, or for making remarks indicating bias, is not a sufficient ground for the challenge of the entire panel. State v. Williams, 630 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Mo.App. 1981) (quoting State v. Weidlich, 269 S.W.2d 69 (Mo.1954) and citing other cases). On the other hand, the court in Callaway v. State, 208 Ga.App. 508, 431 S.E.2d 143, 145-46 (1993), noted that sufficiently prejudicial remarks could mandate dismissal of entire panel. In a case recently before this court, State v. Connolly, 96-1680, pp. 7-9 (La.7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810, 816-17, a prospective juror said she had heard that the defendant had molested children other than the one he murdered. The judge dismissed that panelist for cause, but denied the defendant's challenge for cause of the rest of the panel after asking each remaining panelist individually whether the remarks caused him or her to form a fixed opinion. Defendant argues that the trial judge in this case should have done as the judge did in Connolly. In the present case, six of the seven members of the panel were questioned to some degree after the comments of Melito and Summers. The judge did not curtail examination, insofar as this record shows, and there was no objection in this regard. Further examination by the judge specifically addressed to the effect of the comments may have been desirable, but there was no request on the record for such questioning, and the judge apparently perceived, from early in the questioning, that Melito's belligerent attitude toward the death penalty and the prosecutor adversely affected the entire panel. The common and most significant thread running through the jurisprudence in this area of the law is that an appellate court must give due deference to the trial judge who has seen and heard the jurors and has determined whether a remark has prejudiced or tainted the panel. See, e.g., State v. Browner, 587 S.W.2d 948, 951-52 (Mo. Ct.App.1979) (noting that an appellate court must recognize the fact that the trial court is in a better position to observe what effect, if any, the juror's allegedly prejudicial statement had on his or her fellow jurors); State v. Gash, 572 S.W.2d 240, 241-42 (Mo.Ct.App.1978) (emphasizing that the trial judge is in best position to evaluate the effects of a juror's remarks); State v. Murphy, 533 S.W.2d 716, 717-18 (Mo.Ct.App.1976) (The trial court, having heard both the venireman's words and his tone of voice, was the best judge of any possible prejudicial impact on the jury.). In the present case, both Melito and Summers expressed concern over the integrity of the voir dire process itself. Each attributed the previous dismissal of five black females to some wrongdoing on the part of the attorneys, especially the prosecutors. The prospective jurors had observed the earlier proceedings and heard Melito's interpretation of the events. They also heard Summers' impression that the attorneys were trying to change the minds of the prospective jurors in order to obtain minority representation on the jury. Even defense counsel, who asked for (and was afforded) an opportunity to clear it up for the jurors, conceded that the situation was unusual and that there appeared to be an air of confusion among the jurors. The transcript as a whole suggests certain elements of confusion, disarray and hostility after Melito's comments. Nonetheless, we do not read between the lines of the transcript either to agree or disagree with the trial judge's rulings, because that is beyond the scope of appellate review. Rather, we defer to the trial judge's decision, in the absence of clear evidence that he abused his discretion in the conduct of the voir dire so as to deprive defendant of a fair trial. Given the trial judge's broad discretion and the fact that he observed the demeanor of the entire panel during the remarks by Melito and Summers, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse that discretion by dismissing the entire panel. [11]