Opinion ID: 1372499
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: impeachment ruling

Text: The following occurred during recross examination of victim by appellant's attorney, Terry Tharp: Q. [Victim's first name], do you recall your appearance at the preliminary hearing, I asked you about it on my examination the last time, that was the hearing we had before in Lovell. A. Yes. Q. And you testified at that hearing that you hadn't known Mike? MR. GARRETT: I am going to object. I think she should be furnished with a copy of the transcript rather than counsel saying what she testified. THE COURT: He should use the transcript and refer to questions and answers. MR. THARP: I have a tape recording. THE COURT: Well, really the proper way to do that is to refer, as you know, to page and line number and say, on such and such a day you were asked this question and didn't you answer such and such. MR. THARP: I know, Your Honor, but the transcript of the preliminary hearing, one was never made. As a matter of fact, the copy of the preliminary hearing is, the Justice of the Peace recorded over some of it. I have portions of it, however. THE COURT: Well, based on that, the objection is sustained. Appellant contends that Rule 613(a), W.R.E. [7] authorizes the approach use by appellant in this respect, and that the trial court erred in sustaining appellee's objection. Appellee-State contends that not only was the ruling of the trial court proper, but the error, if any, was not properly preserved for consideration on appeal pursuant to Rule 103(a)(2), W.R.E. [8] We agree that the error, if one, was not properly preserved for consideration on appeal. The requirements of Rule 103(a)(2), W.R.E., were not met. Meredith v. Hardy, 5th Cir., 554 F.2d 764 (1977); Yost v. A.O. Smith Corporation, 8th Cir., 562 F.2d 592 (1977). Not only did appellant fail to make an offer of the substance of the evidence proposed to be presented if the objection were not sustained, but he advised the court that the transcript reflecting the same did not exist in a suitable or admissible form. After the court sustained the objection, appellant made no further reference to the issue  in the form of an offer of proof or otherwise. In addition to insuring that the record will be sufficiently detailed to permit appraisal by an appellate court of the scope and effect of the ruling, 1 Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 103[03], p. 103-27, the offer of proof serves the function of calling the nature of the error to the attention of the judge, so as to alert him to the proper course of action and enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective measures, Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 103 of Federal Rules of Evidence. [9] Appellant's failure to make an offer of proof prevented the attainment of these purposes. Appellant argues that the question itself was sufficient foundation as to time and place of the alleged inconsistent statement. He argues that he could have impeached the witness if she denied making the statement by allowing the prosecution to hear the tape of the testimony at the preliminary hearing or by calling as a witness someone present at the hearing. But, as of the time of the objection and ruling thereon, this presupposes the fact that such inconsistent statement was made at the hearing. These arguments are the precise items which should have been presented as an offer of proof so that this court would know whether or not from the record there was a potential for establishment of inconsistent statements, so that the trial court could appraise its ruling in context with the proposed proof, and so that opposing counsel could make the request authorized by Rule 103(a)(2). [10] In this latter respect, appellant advised the court that a transcript of the preliminary hearing was not made. He inferred that it was recorded on tape but that only portions remained and that some of the tape was recorded over. He apparently had nothing certified or verified as to accuracy. Possibly, he had enough to satisfy the opposing counsel on the precise issue; but, here again, an offer of proof as to exactly what he had was necessary to preclude speculation by us or by the trial court. Rule 103(a)(2) does make unnecessary an offer of proof if the substance of the evidence was apparent from the context within which questions were asked. Such exception was recognized before the adoption of the rules. Taylor v. MacDonald, Wyo., 409 P.2d 762 (1966) (exclusion of conversation had with defendant concerning matters otherwise presented to the jury where nature of the expected testimony clearly appears); State v. Ditzel, 77 Wyo. 233, 311 P.2d 961, reh. den. 77 Wyo. 233, 314 P.2d 832 (1957) (exclusion of defendant's testimony in embezzlement trial as to whether diversion of funds was done with approval of representative of victim where nature of testimony otherwise clearly appears); Gregg v. Gregg, Wyo., 469 P.2d 406 (1970) (exclusion of testimony of 11-year old when counsel advised testimony to corroborate mother's testimony and the nature of testimony clearly appears). In each case the nature of the testimony appeared otherwise than in the question itself. In this case the only indication of the expected testimony is in the question [a]nd you testified at that hearing that you hadn't known Mike? This does not meet the exception of Rule 103(a)(2) [11] which requires the substance of the evidence to be apparent from the context within which questions were asked. To allow the question itself, coupled with advice to the court that a transcript containing the impeachment statement did not exist and that the tape containing such was recorded over to a great extent, to set the stage for the exception would be to invite the damage which is one of the concerns of the rules of evidence and of fair trial generally and which is expressed in the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 613(a), Federal Rules of Evidence: [12] The provision for disclosure to counsel is designed to protect against unwarranted insinuations that a statement has been made when the fact is to the contrary. Affirmed.