Opinion ID: 460324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues raised by dean

Text: 43 On September 6, 1979, Officer Fleming of the Pennsylvania State Police, Chief Stankovich, FBI Agent Scupien, and several other officers conducted a search of the Dean residence. The search uncovered, inter alia, a Groucho Marx-type false nose and glasses, sneakers with imprints matching those left at the Finleyville bank, and boots resembling those worn by one of the Bentleyville robbers. The sneakers and boots were introduced into evidence against Dean at trial. 44 Prior to trial, Dean moved to suppress the fruits of the search, claiming that his mother Audrey Dean, who signed a consent form provided to her by Officer Fleming, did not voluntarily consent to the search. After a hearing, the district court denied the motion, stating, without elaboration, that Mrs. Dean's written consent was voluntary and that the oral consent also obtained from Dean at the time was likewise voluntary. Our discussion of the suppression issue will relate only to our disposition of Dean's appeal of the conviction for the Finleyville robbery. As to the Bentleyville robbery, we conclude that the other evidence introduced against Dean, see discussion supra at pp. 7-8, is so overwhelming that the presentation to the jury of evidence that Dean's boots were similar to the boots shown in the surveillance photograph was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 17 45 Officer Fleming, the government's principal witness on the suppression issue, testified that, as part of an investigation he was conducting into several house burglaries in the Washington County area, he obtained from a Washington County District Justice a search warrant covering the Dean residence. 18 Along with Chief Stankovich, Agent Scupien, and three other officers, Fleming proceeded to the Dean home. 46 In response to Fleming's knock, Mrs. Dean answered the door. According to Fleming, he advised Mrs. Dean that he was investigating a number of local burglaries and requested that she give him consent to search the house. He testified that he did not mention the warrant, in accordance with his usual practice of attempting first to obtain consent for a search and only if unsuccessful, executing the warrant. However, when Mrs. Dean asked Stankovich whether the officers could search the house if she did not sign the consent, Stankovich replied that they could obtain a search warrant. 19 Fleming further stated that Mrs. Dean inquired of Chief Stankovich--whom Mrs. Dean evidently knew and to whom she referred at one point as Willie--whether things would go better for her son if she signed the form; Fleming's recollection of Stankovich's answer to this question is not on the record. He testified only that she ... asked Chief Stankovich as to whether or not--whether or not it would be better if she sign the voluntary consent, and then she went along and signed it. 47 Although appellant Earl Dean was not present at first, Officer Fleming stated that he requested that Mrs. Dean call him to come downstairs. According to Fleming, she called and Dean came. At that point, Officer Fleming read the contents of a voluntary consent form aloud to Mrs. Dean. Fleming testified that Mrs. Dean signed the form, stating that she had nothing to hide. He further stated that Earl Dean was present when the consent form was read and signed, and that he gave oral consent for the search. 48 Mrs. Dean told quite a different story, as the following excerpt of her testimony demonstrates: 49 Q When [the officers] came to your door and you asked--you invited them in, what did they say? 50 A They wanted to see my older son. 51 Q That's Earl Dean? 52 A That's Earl. 53 Q Did they say anything else to you? 54 A They said they wanted to search the house. 55 Q And what was your response? 56 A I asked them why, and then they--and then I asked them if--he said he had a search warrant. He did say he had a search warrant. 57 I says, Can you search if I don't sign? And he said yes. Then I asked him if I signed, would it be better; and he said Yes, it will go easier on your son. 58 Q Who was saying this? 59 A Mr. Fleming, I don't know his rank. 60 Q He told you he had a search warrant?A He said he could--he said, I have a search warrant. I can search if you don't sign. 61 Tr. of Pretrial Hearing at 240-241 (reprinted in Dean Appendix at 90a-91a). Mrs. Dean also testified that at the time she signed the consent form, she was not rational.... really totally wiped out. She denied that she read the consent form before she signed it, or that it was read to her. She further testified that her son Earl was not present with her and the police until she called him from the upstairs of the house, and that that was after she had signed the form. 62 If either Audrey Dean or Earl Dean consented to Officer Fleming's search of the premises, the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress the fruits of the search. See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that consent was voluntary in light of the surrounding circumstances. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. The record contained evidence which, if credited by the district court, would support a finding of voluntariness. In many cases, a conclusory finding of consent by the district court would be sufficient to allow appellate review of the issue of whether a person voluntarily consented to a search, cf. United States v. Compton, 704 F.2d 739, 741-42 (5th Cir.1983) (where district court made no specific findings on voluntariness of consent, court of appeals reviewed record to determine whether denial of motion to suppress was clearly erroneous). However, in this case there are at least two critical unresolved factual issues that prevent us from properly reviewing the district court's finding. 63 The first concerns Mrs. Dean's testimony that Fleming told her that he had a warrant. Since the district court never discredited this testimony, we cannot be sure whether the district court's conclusory finding of consent was informed by an acknowledgement that, under Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), a consent that followed a representation that the police officer had a warrant might be invalid. 64 In Bumper, the defendant's grandmother allowed the police to search her house after an officer announced I have a warrant to search your house. At the suppression hearing, the government declined to rely on a warrant, which apparently had been issued, to justify the search. The Supreme Court held that [w]hen a law enforcement officer claims authority to search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the search. The situation is instinct with coercion--albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is coercion, there cannot be consent. Id. at 550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792. The Court further stated that the conclusion would be the same if the warrant were invalid, if there were in fact no warrant at all, or if the government did not attempt to rely on the warrant. Id. at 549, 88 S.Ct. at 1792. 65 Bumper does not establish a blanket rule that, whenever police possess an invalid search warrant or falsely claim that they can obtain one, voluntariness is necessarily vitiated; indeed Schneckloth mandates consideration of all the surrounding circumstances. In a situation like that in Bumper, however, the government bears an especially heavy burden, as this court noted in United States v. Molt, 589 F.2d 1247, 1251-52 (3d Cir.1978): 66 When evidence exists to show ...--that a defendant believed he must consent--such evidence weighs heavily against a finding that consent was voluntarily given. And when that belief stems directly from misrepresentations by government agents, however innocently made, we deem the consent even more questionable. 67 We note that it is quite possible that the consent at issue here was not at all tainted by the sort of government misrepresentation condemned in Bumper and Molt. In this case, unlike those, the law enforcement officials had a warrant. If indeed that warrant was supported by probable cause, even a statement by Officer Fleming that he could obtain, not merely attempt to obtain, a warrant, see discussion infra, would stand on a different footing. In these circumstances, the representation would not constitute deceit or trickery, but only a fair and sensible appraisal of the realities facing Dean and his mother. United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1974). 68 Another area of concern that is muddied by the lack of specific findings is that framed by Fleming's testimony that he informed Mrs. Dean that he could obtain a search warrant if she refused to give consent. To the extent that some versions of this statement suggest that acquiring the warrant would be a foregone conclusion, they might have conveyed to Mrs. Dean and Earl Dean the impression that they had no choice but to consent. On the other hand, if the district court found that Fleming clearly indicated to Mrs. Dean that, absent consent, he would only seek to obtain a warrant, and that a magistrate would first have to determine that probable cause existed, such a finding would not militate at all against a finding of voluntary consent. See e.g., United States v. White, 617 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir.1980) (consent upheld where agent said that if he failed to gain consent he would have to demonstrate probable cause to search before a magistrate); United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1132 n. 13 (1st Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979) (consent not involuntary where officer asserted that if defendant did not consent to the search of his luggage he would seek a warrant). Again, the district court made no specific finding, and without knowing which portions of Fleming's testimony the district court chose to credit, we cannot assess the coercive impact, if any, of those statements. See United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 61 (2d Cir.1980). 69 In view of the lack of specific findings we cannot say with assurance that the search was not unlawful. 20 We will therefore vacate Dean's conviction with respect to the Finileyville robbery and remand for further proceedings, at which time the issues addressed herein can be explored. 21 The court may wish to conduct a further hearing, or simply make more explicit findings as to who said what to whom, as to the validity of the warrant, et alia. 22 If the motion to suppress is granted, the district court will consider what further relief is in order. If it is denied, it will reinstate the conviction.