Opinion ID: 2064615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: herman's action against terrance

Text: In Schoonover v. Morton County, 267 N.W.2d 819, 821-822 (N.D.1978), this court gave a resume of its previous decisions on the law of summary judgments in North Dakota: A motion for summary judgment will be granted only if, after taking a view of the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment is demanded, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), N.D.R.Civ.P., Farmers Elevator Co. v. David, 234 N.W.2d 26, 29 (N.D.1975); Perdue v. Knudson, 179 N.W.2d 416, 420 (N.D.1970). We have also said that summary judgment is available to allow for prompt disposition of a controversy on the merits without a trial where there is no dispute as to the salient facts, or when only a question of law is involved and its purpose is to promote the expeditious disposition of cases. Zuraff v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 252 N.W.2d 302, 307 (N.D.1977); Rude v. Letnes, 154 N.W.2d 380, 381 (N.D.1967). Finally, when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in the rule for summary judgment, the adverse party may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in the rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Otherwise, if appropriate, summary judgment should be entered against him. Rule 56(e), N.D. R.Civ.P., Johnson v. Community Development Corp. of Wahpeton, 222 N.W.2d 847, 850 (N.D.1974); Ray v. Northern Sugar Corp., 184 N.W.2d 715, 718 (N.D.1971). Even absent a genuine issue as to a material fact, summary judgment might be improper. In Albers v. NoDak Racing Club, Inc., 256 N.W.2d 355, 358 (N.D.1977), this court wrote: . . . Chief Justice Erickstad in Farmers Elevator Co. v. David, 234 N.W.2d 26 (N.D.1975), said: `When the facts may not be in dispute but the inferences reasonably deducible therefrom may be conflicting, summary judgment is inappropriate.' It follows that a summary judgment should be granted only if there is no genuine issue of fact and there is no conflicting inference from the facts. [Emphasis added.] Herman bases his lawsuit against Terrance on the family car doctrine. Although this court has defined this doctrine, sometimes called the family purpose doctrine, many times in the past [see, e. g., Mertz v. Weibe, 180 N.W.2d 664 (N.D.1970); Lauritsen v. Lammars, 161 N.W.2d 804 (N.D.1968)], it has not, as this case demonstrates, resolved certain issues concerning application of the doctrine. For a summary of the various definitions propounded by this court, see Lauritsen v. Lammars, supra, 161 N.W.2d at 807-810. Numerous courts have discussed the development, purposes, and application of the doctrine. See, e. g., Michaelsohn v. Smith, 113 N.W.2d 571 (N.D.1962); Pesqueira v. Talbot, 7 Ariz.App. 476, 441 P.2d 73 (1968); Smith v. Simpson, 260 N.C. 601, 133 S.E.2d 474 (1963). See also Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1191 (1966). In North Dakota, the master-servant relationship, not consanguinity, forms the theoretical basis of the family car doctrine. See, e. g., Carpenter v. Dunnell, 61 N.D. 263, 237 N.W. 779 (1931). [18] The agency-related basis of the doctrine is a fiction dictated by considerations of public policy. Michaelsohn v. Smith, supra, 113 N.W.2d at 573. This public policy is that of giving an injured party, who is free of negligence, a cause of action against a financially responsible defendant. The doctrine was an extension of previously established rules of liability in order to `advance the dictates of natural justice.' Its application, therefore, should only be coextensive with its purpose. Michaelsohn v. Smith, supra, 113 N.W.2d at 574. To determine the applicability of the family car doctrine to this cause of action we must examine additional facts surrounding the relationship between Terrance and Eric and the acquisition of the truck by Eric. From 1973 until 1975, Eric served in our country's military. During that time, he often used Terrance's home or business address as his own home address on documents and correspondence that he considered important. Also, beginning in 1972, he maintained a checking account with check blanks listing Terrance's address as his home address. When Eric completed his term of military duty in April, 1975, he settled in the Grand Forks area. He began to work for a company owned by Terrance and he was employed by that company at the time of the collision. Upon his arrival in the Grand Forks area, he resided in Terrance's home in East Grand Forks. He then lived with his brother and a friend in an apartment in Grand Forks. Finally, in November, 1975, Eric, his brother, and a friend moved into a trailer home in Grand Forks owned by Terrance. Eric lived there until the time of the collision. Terrance charged no rent for the use of the trailer, but required that the three men pay the trailer lot rent and any utility expenses that they incurred. Sometime in 1975, Eric expressed a desire to acquire a four-wheel-drive pickup truck. When Terrance learned of this, he contacted a friend employed at a Wisconsin vehicle dealership and asked him to watch for such a vehicle. Approximately three weeks later, Terrance was informed by his friend that a used four-wheel-drive pickup truck was available for $4,600. Soon thereafter, Eric went to Wisconsin to purchase the vehicle. He paid for it with $600 of his own and a $4,000 interest-free loan from his father, which he agreed to repay at a rate of $100 per month. [19] The sales receipt and car invoice that Eric received from the Wisconsin dealer originally denominated Terrance as the purchaser of the truck, but at some time (unknown to us) Terrance's name was lined out and was replaced with Eric's name. The Wisconsin motor vehicle title denominated Eric as the purchaser of the truck. After returning to Grand Forks with the truck, Eric, in his own name, applied to and received from the North Dakota Motor Vehicle Department a certificate of title and a registration card for the truck. He obtained automobile insurance upon Terrance's advice from the same insurance agent who insured Terrance. Eric kept this insurance policy, along with assorted other personal papers related to the truck, at Terrance's place of business. Although Eric used the truck predominantly for personal affairs, he and others occasionally used it in the course of their employment at Terrance's company. This employment-related use of the truck sometimes entitled Eric to charge gasoline for the truck to Terrance's account at a Grand Forks service station. After the collision from which this case arises, Eric received a payment of $4,600 from his insurance company for the damage to his truck. He paid $3,850 of this money to Terrance in repayment of that portion of the vehicle loan still outstanding and other advances that he received from his father. The relationship between Terrance and Eric during the events herein relevant can best be characterized as a normal father-son relationship. The two men frequently engaged in joint sport activities. Eric was always welcome at Terrance's home and often dined there. It appears from the record that he frequently sought Terrance's advice on matters concerning his personal affairs.