Opinion ID: 574013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Join Additional Defendants

Text: 18 The district court correctly denied Dean's motion to join the Jefferson County Commissioners as additional defendants. The decision to join additional parties is left to the discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed unless that court has abused its discretion. Cf. Fritz v. American Home Shield Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1154 (11th Cir.1985). 19 Dean alleges in his joinder motion that, because the Jefferson County Commission has control of all county-owned property, the Commissioners knew or should have known of the conditions at the county-owned Jefferson County Jail. He further alleges that this presumed knowledge shows deliberate indifference to alleged constitutional violations. These allegations, even under a liberal construction, support no cause of action under section 1983 because Dean attempts to hold the Commissioners liable in their supervisory capacity. While a supervisor may be held liable under section 1983 if the supervisor had personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or if a sufficient causal connection exists between the supervisor's conduct and the constitutional violation, Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir.1989), Dean alleges no personal involvement or sufficient causal connection to support a section 1983 cause of action. Dean's allegations amount to no more than an attempt to hold the Commissioners liable under the respondeat superior theory, which is unavailable under section 1983. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036. The district court, therefore, acted within its discretion in denying Dean's motion to add the Commissioners as defendants. 20 The district court erred, however, by denying Dean's motion to join the John Doe defendant. The district court said that the Doe defendant was an inadequately identified fictitious party. We stated at the outset that pleadings of pro se complainants are treated with special care. Here, Dean attempted to add as a defendant the Chief Deputy of the Jefferson County Jail--what Alabama calls the Chief Correctional Officer. See Record at Tab 7 (Affidavit of S.W. Latta, Chief Correctional Officer). Dean expressly stated in his joinder motion that he had yet to receive Sheriff Bailey's special report. Had Dean received this report before moving the court to join additional defendants, he would have been able to name Latta as the Chief Correctional Officer of the Jefferson County Jail. 21 It is important to distinguish suing fictitious parties from real parties sued under a fictitious name. There may be times when, for one reason or another, the plaintiff is unwilling or unable to use a party's real name. 6 Also, one may be able to describe an individual (e.g., the driver of an automobile) without stating his name precisely or correctly. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 832 F.2d 1080, 1096 n. 19 (9th Cir.1987) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 22 Under the circumstances in this case, Dean should have been allowed to add Chief Deputy of the Jefferson County Jail John Doe as a defendant. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir.1980) (allowing use of unnamed defendant where it was clear that discovery would uncover defendant's identity). Dean described with sufficient clarity the head of the Jefferson County Jail as his additional defendant and brought to the attention of the court that Dean had yet to receive Sheriff Bailey's report, which would have provided Dean with the information needed to specifically name the Chief. Further, Dean's description was sufficiently clear to allow service of process on the Chief. See Keno v. Doe, 74 F.R.D. 587, 588 n. 2 (D.N.J.1977) ([C]omplaint should state that the name is fictitious and provide an adequate description of some kind which is sufficient to identify the person involved so that process can be served.), aff'd without opinion, 578 F.2d 1374 (3rd Cir.1978). Especially in the light of Dean's status as a pro se complainant and the adequate clarity in his joinder motion, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion by denying Dean's motion to add the Chief of the Jefferson County Jail as a defendant. The denial is therefore vacated and remanded for further consideration. 23 While we hold that the district court erred in relying on fictitious-party practice to deny Dean's motion to add the Chief as a defendant, we do not hold that Chief Latta is a proper defendant in this case. We leave that to the district court to reconsider. For example, Dean's joinder motion alleges Latta's personal and direct involvement; should further development of facts show that, in truth, Dean seeks to hold Latta liable only in his supervisory capacity, Latta would not be a proper defendant. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, 98 S.Ct. at 2036 (respondeat superior unavailable in section 1983 action).