Opinion ID: 736229
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine in

Text: Civil Rights Cases 9 Appellant's first argument is that the district court should have granted judgment as a matter of law based on Nix and Heck. We need not address the factual basis for this argument because it is clear to us that the inevitable discovery doctrine is no bar to a § 1983 suit when there has been no prior state trial. 10 The Supreme Court in Heck held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. Heck, 512 U.S. at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. This rule rests not on an abstract notion that a conviction somehow erases the harm done by unconstitutional state action, but on the concrete principle that a prisoner may not circumvent the procedural hurdles of modern habeas corpus law by using § 1983 to bring what is essentially a habeas petition. See id. at 478, 114 S.Ct. at 2368 (This case presents the question whether a state prisoner may challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.); id. at 486, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 ([C]ivil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments.); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (Congress has determined that habeas corpus [28 U.S.C. § 2254] is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement, and that specific determination must override the general terms of § 1983.). Heck extends the Preiser rule to include § 1983 suits which request monetary, rather than injunctive, relief, for reasons of finality, consistency, and comity. Heck, 512 U.S. at 484, 114 S.Ct. at 2371 (This requirement 'avoids parallel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt and it precludes the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort action after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction.' ) (quoting 8 S. SPEISER ET AL., AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 28:5, p. 24 (1991)) (internal punctuation omitted); id. at 481-82, 114 S.Ct. at 2369-70 (Preiser controls where establishing the basis for the damages claim necessarily demonstrates the invalidity of the conviction.). Where there has been no state trial these concerns do not arise, and Heck does not apply. 11 Moreover, the reasoning which supports the use of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the related inevitable discovery doctrine in criminal cases does not apply in civil rights actions. The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is in large part designed to deter unconstitutional police behavior. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 446, 104 S.Ct. at 2510 (noting that the essential purpose of [Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule] is to deter police misconduct); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492, 96 S.Ct. 3037, 3051, 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976) (Evidence obtained by police officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded at trial in the hope that the frequency of future violations will decrease.). The rule largely reflects a balance between protecting society from police misconduct and the state's interest in prosecuting criminals. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443, 104 S.Ct. at 2508 (This Court has accepted the argument that the way to ensure such protections is to exclude evidence seized as a result of such violations notwithstanding the high social cost of letting persons obviously guilty go unpunished for their crimes.). Where the exclusionary rule would not significantly advance this deterrent interest, then, the courts have declined to enforce it. See id. at 446, 104 S.Ct. at 2510 (In these circumstances, the societal costs of the exclusionary rule far outweigh any possible benefits to deterrence....). A necessary part of this calculus is that there are other effective deterrents against police misbehavior which dwarf any incremental gain to be had from excluding evidence, most notably the possibility of civil liability. Id. (Significant disincentives to obtaining evidence illegally--including the possibility of departmental discipline and civil liability--also lessen the likelihood that the ultimate or inevitable discovery exception will promote police misconduct.). To hold that money damages are not available in such situations would turn Nix on its head and both eliminate an important disincentive to police misconduct and leave victims of unreasonable police action without any remedy. Cf. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 2004, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (That damages may be obtained for injuries consequent upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment by federal officials should hardly seem a surprising proposition. Historically, damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion of personal interests in liberty.); id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005 (The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). 12 For the same reasons, Heck would likely not apply even if Chatman had been convicted of a drug offense. A judicial determination that the search of Chatman's wallet and the subsequent arrest were both unconstitutional would make prosecution of his case difficult but would not have to negate an element of the offense of which he has been convicted, and would thus not create the conflicts at the heart of Heck. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 n. 6. The elements of an offense are, in general terms, the actus reus and the mens rea. A judicial determination that Unger violated Chatman's Fourth Amendment rights would not prove, or even suggest, that Chatman lacked either of these. See Stone, 428 U.S. at 490, 96 S.Ct. at 3050 (A claim of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is crucially different from many other constitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence seized can in no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means of its seizure ....) (citation omitted); id. at 492 n. 31, 96 S.Ct. at 3051 n. 31 ([I]n the case of a typical Fourth Amendment claim, asserted on collateral attack, a convicted defendant is usually asking society to redetermine an issue that has no bearing on the basic justice of his incarceration.). An illegal search or seizure affects only what evidence the state may introduce, not whether a prosecution may go forward and a conviction be obtained. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52-53, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981-83, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970) (affirming conviction because if there was error in admitting the [evidence], the error was harmless); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975) ([I]llegal arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction.). In a case such as this one, it is likely that Heck would not apply. See Heck at 487, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 ([I]f the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed.); id. at 487 n. 7, 114 S.Ct. at 2372 n. 7 ([A] suit for damages attributable to an allegedly unreasonable search may lie even if the challenged search produced evidence that was introduced in a state criminal trial resulting in the ... conviction.). Because we decide the case on other grounds, we need not resolve whether a conviction in this case would have barred this action. 13