Opinion ID: 2671418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Undue Influence Count

Text: In her first assignment of error, petitioner argues that it was error for the circuit court to find that no genuine issue of material fact exists on her undue influence claim. 2 Our law regarding undue influence is well-established. “Undue influence, to avoid a will, must be such as overcomes the free agency of the testator at the time of actual execution of the will.’ Syllabus Point 5, Stewart v. Lyons, 54 W.Va. 665, 47 S.E. 442 (1903).” Syl. Pt. 10, James v. Knotts, 227 W.Va. 65, 705 S.E.2d 575 (2010). Furthermore, “[t]he influence resulting from attachment or love, or mere desire of gratifying the wishes of another, if free agency is not impaired, does not affect a will. The influence must amount to force or coercion destroying free agency. It must not be the influence of affection or attachment. It must not be mere desire of gratifying the wishes of another, as that would be strong ground to support the will. Further, there must be proof that it was obtained by this coercion, by importunity that could not be resisted; that it was done merely for the sake of peace, so that the motive was tantamount to force and fear.” Syllabus Point 6, Stewart v. Lyons, 54 W.Va. 665, 47 S.E. 442 (1903). Syl. Pt. 11, Knotts. This Court has established the threshold a plaintiff must overcome in order to succeed on an undue influence claim: “In an action to impeach a will the burden of proving undue influence is upon the party who alleges it and mere suspicion, conjecture, possibility or guess that undue influence has been exercise[d] is not sufficient to support a verdict which impeaches the will upon that ground.” Syllabus Point 5, Frye v. Norton, 148 W.Va. 500, 135 S.E.2d 603 (1964). Syl. Pt. 3, Milhoan v. Koenig, 196 W.Va. 163, 469 S.E.2d 99 (1996). Similarly, “‘[u]ndue influence cannot be based on suspicion, possibility or guess that such undue influence had been exercised, but must be proved and the burden of proof of such issue rests on the party alleging it.’ Syllabus Point 7, Floyd v. Floyd, 148 W.Va. 183, 133 S.E.2d 726 (1963).” Syl. Pt. 2, Cale v. Napier, 186 W.Va. 244, 412 S.E.2d 242 (1991). Circumstantial evidence may be used to prove undue influence. “Undue influence which will invalidate a will is never presumed but must be established by proof which, however, may be either direct or circumstantial.” Syl. Pt. 15, Ritz v. Kingdon, 139 W.Va. 189, 79 S.E.2d 123 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Syl. Pt. 6, State v. Bragg, 140 W.Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955). However, if circumstantial evidence is used, it must be inconsistent with any theory other than undue influence. “To warrant a finding of undue influence which is based on circumstantial evidence the established facts must be inconsistent with any theory other than that of undue influence.” Syl. Pt. 19, Ritz at 192, 79 S.E.2d at 126. We expressed this same principle in Floyd: “It is true that undue influence may be proved by circumstantial evidence, but to warrant the finding of undue influence from circumstantial evidence such proof must be consistent with the exercise of undue influence and inconsistent with any other theory than that of undue influence.” Id. at 195, 133 S.E.2d at 734. To support her undue influence claim, petitioner argues that the testators’ 2008 wills left substantially more to respondent than to her, unlike all other wills the testators had executed in 3 their lifetimes. Petitioner alleges that respondent dictated the will terms to Mr. Caryl. She points out that Mr. Caryl and respondent are both lawyers, have known one another for over thirty-five years, and have been partners at the same law firm since 1988. She contends that respondent communicated with Mr. Caryl about the wills and paid for Mr. Caryl’s legal services. She also asserts that the testators were of advanced age and were dependent upon respondent, who lived nearby. Petitioner asserts that by 2011, respondent had control of the testators’ finances. Respondent denies exerting undue influence. He argues that the testators had reason to change their estate plans, that these reasons were expressed to Mr. Caryl and others, and that the wills reflected their wishes. He was not present during the testator’s meetings with Mr. Caryl or when the testators executed their wills. Mr. Caryl testified that he sent the draft wills directly to the testators for their review, and the testators merely had respondent communicate nonsubstantive changes back to Mr. Caryl. Finally, the testators’ personal physician and Mr. Caryl opined that the testators were of sound mind and possessed the requisite testamentary capacity at the time they executed their respective final wills. Respondent asserts that at the time the final wills were executed in 2008, he was not yet handling his parents’ financial affairs. Petitioner’s allegations of undue influence rest entirely upon circumstantial evidence, including respondent’s proximity to their parents; respondent’s personal and professional relationship with Mr. Caryl; and respondent’s communications with Mr. Caryl about these wills. She has presented no direct evidence of undue influence exerted upon the testators, and she does not argue that further discovery is needed to obtain such evidence. As set forth above, Ritz and Floyd instruct that to warrant a finding of undue influence based upon circumstantial evidence, the established facts must be inconsistent with any theory other than that of undue influence. The circuit court found that petitioner cannot meet this burden as a matter of law, and we agree. There is evidence consistent with a theory other than that of undue influence—i.e., the testators desired to change their wills after petitioner’s divorce because they were concerned that her exhusband might obtain a share of their estates through petitioner’s daughter, and the testator wanted to leave his farm, intact, to the child who resided in the area. Relying on cases from other states, petitioner urges us to impose a presumption of undue influence whenever a beneficiary to a will participates in the drafting of the will. She also advocates for a higher burden of proof for the advocates of a will when the testator’s attorney has a professional relationship with a beneficiary. However, what petitioner proposes would conflict with our long-standing law that undue influence may never be presumed. We decline petitioner’s invitation to change our existing law. Because petitioner cannot meet her burden of proving undue influence by circumstantial evidence, we find no error in the circuit court’s award of summary judgment for respondent.