Opinion ID: 2279780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: rights of professional employees

Text: Nothing contained herein shall be construed to deny any professional employee such rights as he/she may have under the Public School Code, or the Public Employees Relations Act 195, or other applicable state laws. As further evidence that the parties intended the Agreement to apply to job security issues, the arbitrator referred to the prior case of Donald Hirakis, in which the Association and the School did not dispute the arbitrability of a grievance involving a demotion. [4] The arbitrator held that Appellant's grievance was cognizable under Article II(A) of the Agreement, which defines the term grievance. [5] He concluded that because the statutory savings clause incorporated the Code into the Agreement, Appellant had the right to challenge the School's application of § 11-1122 of the Code through the grievance procedure. Having determined that the matter was properly before him, the arbitrator sustained Appellant's grievance on the merits. He relied on § 11-1123 of the Code, which explains the rating system used in determining whether a professional employee shall be dismissed for incompetency. Because the School did not follow proper procedure regarding the second unsatisfactory rating given on February 19, 1993, the arbitrator concluded that the School failed to establish that Appellant was incompetent or persistently negligent under the Code. Without addressing the merits of the grievance, the trial court vacated the arbitration award on the basis that the arbitrator did not possess jurisdiction. The court held that because the statutory savings clause did not contain job security provisions, it did not incorporate into the Agreement the dismissal provisions of the Code. It held that the savings clause merely provided that the Agreement did not deny any rights under the Code. The court concluded that had the parties intended to incorporate the dismissal provisions of the Code, they could have expressly done so. The Commonwealth Court affirmed. It held that because the language in the savings clause was insufficient to incorporate the Code and the Agreement was silent as to the dismissal of professional employees, a grievance was not established. It also found that the Hirakis decision, in which the School did not dispute that the issue of demotion was arbitrable, was not evidence of past practice since it was merely a single instance. The court further relied on Article XIX of the Agreement which provides that management prerogatives are not subject to arbitration. Judge Doyle dissented without opinion. As noted, we granted allocatur to determine whether the subject matter of Appellant's grievance was arbitrable. In Community College of Beaver County v. Community College of Beaver County, Society of the Faculty (PSEA/NEA), 473 Pa. 576, 375 A.2d 1267 (1977), our Court adopted the essence test as the appropriate standard of review of labor arbitration awards. Drawing its origins from federal decisional law, the essence test was first set forth in United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). The United States Supreme Court there stated that [t]he essence test requires a determination as to whether the terms of the agreement encompass the subject matter of the dispute. Where it is determined that the subject matter of the dispute is encompassed within the terms of the agreement, the validity of the arbitrator's interpretation is not a matter of concern to the court. Id. at 599, 80 S.Ct. at 1362, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1429 (footnote omitted). The rationale behind the test is that the parties bargained for the arbitrator's construction of their collective bargaining agreement and, if the arbitrator's decision concerns the construction of the contract, the court has no business overruling the decision merely because it interprets the contract differently. Leechburg Area School District v. Dale, 492 Pa. 515, 520-521, 424 A.2d 1309, 1312-1313 (1981). The Association contends that the lower courts ignored this narrow standard of review and substituted their interpretation of the Agreement for that of the arbitrator. It concedes that the savings clause does not on its face incorporate the job security provisions of the Code, but submits that the language in the clause providing that, nothing contained herein shall be construed to deny any professional employee such rights as he/she may have under the Public School Code . . . can reasonably be interpreted as incorporating those rights granted by the Code. It submits that because the Code is therefore a part of the Agreement, a dispute over the application of the Code provisions concerning professional employee dismissals constitutes a grievance as defined by the parties. The School asserts that the Agreement is silent as to job security issues and does not contain a just cause provision. It argues that the Association relies on the negative language in the statutory savings clause, which does not grant rights or incorporate the job security and dismissal procedures of the Code. The School further contends that more specific language was utilized in cases where the courts found that the Code was incorporated into the collective bargaining agreement. For example, in Rylke v. Portage Area School District, 473 Pa. 481, 375 A.2d 692 (1977), a grievance involving a suspension of a professional employee was found to be arbitrable on the ground that a provision in the collective bargaining agreement rendered the Code a part of the agreement. That provision stated The Pennsylvania School Code includes certain job security provisions, certification, and other regulatory provisions associated with various classes of employees. The parties hereby aver that such provisions of the School Code represent their complete agreement, and that said provisions shall govern the manner in which the job security, job progression, and reduction in force practices shall be effected with respect to members of the bargaining unit. Id. at 485, 375 A.2d at 693. Similarly, in Wilson Area Education Association v. Wilson Area School Dist., 90 Pa. Cmwlth. 151, 494 A.2d 506 (1985) and North Star School District v. North Star Education Association, 155 Pa.Cmwlth. 368, 625 A.2d 159 (1993), provisions in the collective bargaining agreements expressly incorporated the job security provisions of the Code. Although the intentions of the parties in the instant matter are not as clearly set forth in the Agreement as in the aforementioned cases, we find that the language employed was sufficient for the arbitrator to conclude that the Code was incorporated into the Agreement. In Centennial School District v. Centennial Education Association, 133 Pa.Cmwlth. 382, 576 A.2d 99 (1990), the collective bargaining agreement contained language similar to that set forth in the instant savings clause. [6] The parties in Centennial agreed that the provision incorporated by reference the Public School Code and made it a part of the collective bargaining agreement. We acknowledge that because such a construction was agreed upon by the parties and was not directed by the court, it is not necessarily indicative of the intention of the parties here. However, we find this relevant as it demonstrates that the decision of the arbitrator was a rational one. An arbitration award, including the arbitrator's definition of his own jurisdiction, must be affirmed so long as the award is in any rational way derived from the collective bargaining agreement viewed in light of its language, its context, and any other indicia of the parties' intention. . . . Port Authority of Allegheny County v. Amalgamated Transit Union, Division 85, 492 Pa. 494, 497, 424 A.2d 1299, 1300 (1981), citing, Community College of Beaver County, 473 Pa. at 594, 375 A.2d at 1275. Additional evidence of the parties' intent is found in their treatment of the savings clause in a previous case governed by the Agreement. We reject the Commonwealth Court's conclusion that the arbitrator improperly considered the Hirakis case as a past practice of the parties. Relying upon a definition of past practice enunciated in County of Allegheny v. Allegheny County Prison Employees Independent Union, 476 Pa. 27, 381 A.2d 849 (1978), [7] the court found that a single instance of the School's submission to arbitration of a grievance arising out of the realignment of its professional staff was insufficient to establish a practice. Whether a past practice was established, however, is irrelevant since the arbitrator merely concluded that the parties had previously acknowledged that the Code was incorporated into the Agreement as evidenced by their submission to arbitration of a similar dispute concerning the School's application of the Code. Thus, the arbitrator cited the Hirakis decision only as evidence of the parties' intent. [8] Furthermore, we reject the argument that Article XIX of the Agreement, which provides that management functions and prerogatives are not subject to arbitration, divests the arbitrator of authority over the grievance. The court conceded that the phrase management prerogatives was not defined in the Agreement, but found that such terms include the decision to dismiss an employee on competency grounds. This argument is unpersuasive since such an interpretation is overly broad. See generally Rylke v. Portage Area School District, 473 Pa. 481, 375 A.2d 692 (1977) (Although 43 P.S. § 1101.702 provides that public employers are not required to bargain over matters of inherent managerial policy, such terms do not encompass an employee's suspension). In summary, as the subject matter of Appellant's claim is within the purview of the essence of the Agreement, judicial intrusion into the arbitration process was unwarranted. The lower courts therefore erred in substituting their interpretation of the Agreement for that of the arbitrator. Where an arbitrator has interpreted a collective bargaining agreement in favor of the admirability of the grievance before him, a reviewing court should be slow indeed to disagree. Scranton Federation of Teachers v. Scranton School District, 498 Pa. 58, 66, 444 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1982). Accordingly, the decision of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the award of the arbitrator is reinstated. NIX, former C.J., and NEWMAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. FLAHERTY, J., files a dissenting opinion.