Opinion ID: 2650680
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dickens’s Request for an Evidentiary

Text: Hearing We also reject the state’s argument that, even if Martinez applies to the standard for Dickens to show cause, 36 DICKENS V. RYAN § 2254(e)(2) will bar Dickens from introducing the new evidence to the district court. Petitioners seeking habeas relief cannot obtain an evidentiary hearing on their claims unless they comply with § 2254(e)(2). Section 2254(e)(2) severely restricts a petitioner’s ability to obtain a hearing on a claim for relief where the petitioner “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court proceedings” due to “a lack of diligence, or some greater fault, attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner’s counsel.” See Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1206 (9th Cir. 2011). A petitioner’s attorney’s “fault” is generally attributed to the petitioner for purposes of § 2254(e)(2)’s diligence requirement. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 437–40 (2000). Section 2254(e)(2), however, does not bar a hearing before the district court to allow a petitioner to show “cause” under Martinez. When a petitioner seeks to show “cause” based on ineffective assistance of PCR counsel, he is not asserting a “claim” for relief as that term is used in § 2254(e)(2); indeed, such a claim of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel is not a constitutional claim. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1319–20. Instead, the petitioner seeks, on an equitable basis, to excuse a procedural default. See id. A federal court’s determination of whether a habeas petitioner has demonstrated cause and prejudice (so as to bring his case within Martinez’s judicially created exception to the judicially created procedural bar) is not the same as a hearing on a constitutional claim for habeas relief. See Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750 (recognizing the “cause and prejudice” exception to procedural default); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 91 (2006) (“[H]abeas law includes the judge-made doctrine of procedural default”); Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 394 (2004) (describing the “various exceptions to the procedural default doctrine” as “judge-made rules”). DICKENS V. RYAN 37 Therefore, a petitioner, claiming that PCR counsel’s ineffective assistance constituted “cause,” may present evidence to demonstrate this point. The petitioner is also entitled to present evidence to demonstrate that there is “prejudice,” that is that petitioner’s claim is “substantial” under Martinez. Therefore, a district court may take evidence to the extent necessary to determine whether the petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel is substantial under Martinez. The facts and procedural posture of Dickens’s case illustrate this point. Dickens had a new claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Because the claim was new, it was procedurally defaulted (thus technically exhausted). However, if Dickens can show cause and prejudice to excuse a procedural default, AEDPA no longer applies and a federal court may hear this new claim de novo. Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160 (9th Cir. 2002). Martinez may provide a means to show “cause” to overcome the default and reach the merits of the new claim. Because § 2254(e)(2) by its terms does not prevent consideration of the substantive evidence of the claim to the extent necessary to determine if Dickens has successfully proven “cause,” Dickens will have a fair opportunity to show cause and prejudice so as to overcome the procedural bar of the otherwise defaulted claim. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317.17 Thus, § 2254(e)(2) does not 17 The state argues that Martinez does not apply, because the assertion of ineffective assistance of PCR counsel as cause must itself be exhausted or it is procedurally barred. It is true that “the exhaustion doctrine . . . generally requires that a claim of ineffective assistance be presented to the state courts as an independent claim before it may be used to establish cause for a procedural default.” Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488–89 (1986) (citation omitted). However, the case law in light of Martinez now indicates that there is no requirement that a petitioner assert an ineffective 38 DICKENS V. RYAN bar a cause and prejudice hearing on Dickens’s claim of PCR counsel’s ineffectiveness, which requires a showing that Dickens’s underlying trial-counsel IAC claim is substantial.