Opinion ID: 1190445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admission of extrajudicial statements by accomplice McCray without cross-examination

Text: McCray was called by the prosecution to testify. He refused to answer questions, invoking his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. The prosecution declined to provide McCray with immunity, and both parties acknowledged that McCray's invocation of his privilege rendered him legally unavailable as a witness. (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(1); In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 721 [114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229].) They also agreed that many of his extrajudicial statements were declarations against his penal interest and were thus admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule in light of his unavailability. (Evid. Code, § 1230.) Defendant, however, moved for permission to question McCray in the jury's presence. The motion was denied. Defendant contends on appeal that the admission of McCray's extrajudicial statements without the opportunity for cross-examination violated defendant's constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) He makes three arguments in support of this contention. As we shall explain, there was no reversible error.
(11) We reject defendant's contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to require McCray to invoke in the presence of the jury his privilege against self-incrimination. The trial court conducted an in limine hearing at which McCray, who was represented by counsel, was sworn as a witness. He was briefly questioned by both the prosecution and defense, but except for admitting that he knew defendant and identifying him in the courtroom, McCray refused to answer any questions regarding the Brice killings. It was clear that McCray would continue to assert his privilege. Both the prosecution and defense declined to continue questioning him. No valid purpose would have been served by requiring McCray to reassert his privilege in the presence of the jury. Where, as here, it is apparent that the witness would have offered no testimony in response to questions posed, it is not improper for the trial court to determine that fact in advance and excuse the witness. ( People v. Cornejo (1979) 92 Cal. App.3d 637, 659 [155 Cal. Rptr. 238].) In such instance, to require the renewal of the invocation of the privilege before the jury would merely amount to a meaningless ritual. ( People v. Johnson (1974) 39 Cal. App.3d 749, 760 [114 Cal. Rptr. 545].) The lack of any purpose to such a ritual is especially apparent in this case. The only conceivable reason for requiring McCray to invoke his privilege in the jury's presence would have been to inform them of the reason why he did not testify. The trial court, however, informed the jury that, The court is taking judicial notice of and hereby advising the jury that Michael McCray was called as a witness in this case outside the presence of the jury, and that Michael McCray with advice of his counsel refused to testify, basing his refusal upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.  (Italics added.) The jury was clearly and adequately informed of the reason why McCray did not testify. The jury was not left to speculate as to why McCray's statements were admitted into evidence without his having to testify. Requiring McCray to invoke his privilege in the jury's presence would have served no proper purpose. Rather, the only apparent purpose to invoking the privilege before the jury would have been to call McCray's credibility into question, that is, to allow the jury to infer that his extrajudicial statements were unreliable for the very reason that he was subsequently invoking his testimonial privilege. As we recently explained, however, any such inference is prohibited by Evidence Code section 913, subdivision (a). ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 441 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388]; People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 743 [280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197].) Defendant asserts a conflict in California law, relying on People v. Chandler (1971) 17 Cal. App.3d 798 [95 Cal. Rptr. 146]. His reliance is misplaced. The court in People v. Johnson, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d 749 ( Johnson ), correctly explained Chandler as follows: [T]he court held that no pretestimonial hearing is required in order to precipitate the invocation of the privilege ( People v. Chandler, supra, at pp. 804-805). That holding, however, does not stand for the proposition that such a pretestimonial hearing may not be held in order to determine whether or not the witness is entitled to the privilege. ( Johnson, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d 749, 758, original italics.) The Johnson court observed, however, that in Chandler, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d 798, the court had suggested in dictum that the privilege should be invoked in the jury's presence. We agree with the Johnson court, supra, 39 Cal. App.3d 749, that the suggestion in Chandler, supra, 17 Cal. App.3d at pages 804-805, is unpersuasive, and we disapprove Chandler to that extent. Defendant relies even more extensively on a decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. ( Commonwealth v. Sims (1987) 513 Pa. 366 [521 A.2d 391].) Like the trial court, we conclude that Sims does not support defendant's view. As in the present case, the defendant in a murder trial claimed innocence and contended one of his accusers was the killer. ( Id., at p. 371 [521 A.2d at p. 395].) The accuser, Hilton, was granted immunity from prosecution and testified at trial against the defendant. The defense attorney sought to cross-examine Hilton as to communications by Hilton to his attorney. These communications were protected from disclosure by that state's statutory attorney-client privilege. The defendant contended, however, that the witness should have been compelled to claim his `attorney-client privilege' in front of the jury. ( Ibid. ) The court agreed because ... the invocation of that privilege before the jury could have reasonably provided the basis for that tribunal to question the accusations made by that witness against the accused. ( Ibid. ) The jury in the present case, however, was informed that McCray had invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. The potential unfairness that concerned the Sims court did not arise in the present case. More important, the Sims court, supra, 513 Pa. 366 [521 A.2d 391], explicitly limited its decision, noting that a jury may not draw any inference from a witness's exercise of a constitutional right and that ... here we are not concerned with a constitutional privilege but rather one that is of statutory origin. ( Id., at p. 377, fn. 1 [521 A.2d at p. 396].) The privilege against self-incrimination is, of course, constitutionally mandated. On its face, Sims does not support defendant's claim. Indeed, after Sims was decided, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court rejected the precise claim made by defendant. A witness was called to testify against the defendant, but as in the present case, the witness invoked his privilege against self-incrimination when questioned outside the jury's presence. Relying in part on Sims, the court held, We find no merit in appellant's contention that he was denied the right of confrontation because the trial court refused to allow DeLeo's [the witness's] invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination before the jury. ( Commonwealth v. Yabor (1988) 376 Pa.Super. 356, 361 [546 A.2d 67, 69].) We hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to require McCray to invoke his privilege against self-incrimination in the presence of the jury.
(12) Defendant contends his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him was violated because he was not allowed to cross-examine McCray regarding his extrajudicial statements that were admitted into evidence. He relies principally on Chambers v. Mississippi (1972) 410 U.S. 284 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 93 S.Ct. 1038] for the court's observation that the right of cross-examination is implicit in the constitutional right of confrontation.... ( Id., at p. 295 [35 L.Ed.2d at p. 309].) That principle is, of course, indisputable under both the federal and California Constitutions. ( Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 682-683, 106 S.Ct. 1431]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) The question raised by defendant, however, is whether his constitutional right to confront the witnesses against him supersedes the witness's constitutional right against self-incrimination. The answer is clear. In Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920], the court held that the federal constitutional right to compulsory process for obtaining witnesses (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.) applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The court cautioned, however, that Nothing in this opinion should be construed as disapproving testimonial privileges, such as the privilege against self-incrimination. ... (388 U.S. at p. 23, fn. 21 [18 L.Ed.2d at p. 1025], italics added.) Defendant was not entitled to have McCray deprived of McCray's constitutional right against self-incrimination.
(13a) By his own characterization, defendant's main objection to McCray's extrajudicial statements is that their admission violated defendant's constitutional rights of confrontation and cross-examination as defined in Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 126-127 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 479-480, 88 S.Ct. 1620] ( Bruton ), and People v. Aranda (1965) 63 Cal.2d 518, 528-530 [47 Cal. Rptr. 353, 407 P.2d 265] ( Aranda ). The principle is well established: [A] nontestifying codefendant's extrajudicial self-incriminating statement that inculpates the other defendant is generally unreliable and hence inadmissible as violative of that defendant's right of confrontation and cross-examination, even if a limiting instruction is given. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1120 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306], italics added.) The facts of this case arguably might bring it within the Bruton-Aranda proscription ( Bruton, supra, 391 U.S. 123; Aranda, supra, 63 Cal.2d 518). McCray, having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination, did not testify at trial. There is authority for the view that McCray's status as an uncharged accomplice rather than as a codefendant is of no consequence. ( People v. Coble (1976) 65 Cal. App.3d 187, 194 [135 Cal. Rptr. 199].) McCray's extrajudicial statements to the police clearly inculpated defendant, and respondent does not contend otherwise. There is no other apparent reason why the prosecution introduced the statements. We need not and do not decide, however, whether the statements should have been excluded if defendant had timely and specifically objected on the Bruton-Aranda grounds. Defendant, however, made no such objection, thereby waiving his present contention. As explained above, defendant's response to the introduction of McCray's statements was that McCray should have been subjected to cross-examination or, alternatively, been required to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege in the jury's presence. Even now on appeal, defendant contends he was denied the right to cross-examine McCray, that McCray should have been granted immunity and compelled to testify, and that at a minimum McCray should have been required to invoke his privilege before the jury. These arguments miss the mark. Faced with evidence that is inadmissible on Bruton-Aranda grounds, the proper objection is to exclude the statements, not to subject the declarant to cross-examination. If the declarant is properly subject to cross-examination, no Bruton-Aranda problem arises in the first instance. The record does not show that defendant specifically objected on Bruton-Aranda grounds to admission of McCray's statements. Absent a timely and specific objection on the ground defendant now asserts on appeal, his contention is deemed waived. ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1044 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277] [finding waiver of Bruton-Aranda objection]; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 786, fn. 7 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].) Not only did defendant withhold his objection to the statements, defendant himself agreed to, indeed sought, their admission. After McCray was called as a witness and made clear that he would invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege, the prosecution and defense agreed that McCray was unavailable as a witness under Evidence Code section 1230 and that his extrajudicial statements could be admitted to the extent they were declarations against his penal interest. In a discussion with the trial court, the prosecution stated his understanding that defendant wished to introduce such statements by McCray. Defense counsel did not contend otherwise, and in fact, shortly thereafter, he confirmed his intent to introduce McCray's statements. The trial court, prosecution, and defense proceeded to review McCray's statements in detail to determine which of them were admissible as declarations against penal interest. Defense counsel informed the court that the only disagreement would be as to which of McCray's statements were inculpatory and therefore against his penal interest. At no time during this process did defense counsel object to any of McCray's statements in whole or in part based on the Bruton-Aranda rule. (14)(See fn. 3.), (13b) Defendant has waived any objection on that ground. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1044.) [3] Even if the objection had been timely raised, the record amply demonstrates that the admission of McCray's statements was not prejudicial to defendant. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711].) The most telling sign of an absence of prejudice is that defendant himself sought to rely on McCray's statements in large part, for the obvious reason that defendant thought they would help exculpate him. When the statements were reviewed with the trial court and the prosecution, defense counsel stated, I foresee that we won't really have too much of a problem in deciding what are penal interest, which are declaration[s] against penal interests. The prediction proved correct. Defense counsel made very few objections to the admitted portions. He contends on appeal that, The fact appellant used certain statements made by McCray does not constitute a waiver of all statements made by McCray. Defendant, however, fails even now to identify which portions of McCray's statements were allegedly prejudicial. In effect, defendant asks this court to speculate as to which portions he wanted admitted and which portions were allegedly prejudicial to him. It is not incumbent on us to do so. In an abundance of fairness to defendant, however, we have carefully reviewed the portions of McCray's statements that were admitted to the jury and the process by which they were admitted. The record reflects that, with only two minor exceptions, defense counsel either actively sought or acquiesced without objection to all portions that were admitted. Trial counsel's desire  or, at a minimum, willingness  to put such evidence to the jury weighs heavily against the claim on appeal that the evidence was prejudicial. Moreover, the trial court carefully considered the few objections raised by counsel, and as a result, only two brief portions of McCray's statements to the police were admitted over defendant's objection. One was as follows: Q: What did you tell Anthony to do, er now, I mean Michael [the defendant] to do regarding the bill he owed you? A: He was gonna pay it. He said he was going to pay cash. The other portion admitted over objection was: Q: Did you give Mike [defendant] a gun on that occasion [the day of the killings] when he came by? A: When he came by? No, he had it. I don't know if he had it on him then or not. Q: Did Mike give it back to you and you give it back to Mike? A: Then? Q: Yeh. A: No, after he came he tried to give it back to me. In light of the extensive other evidence against defendant, we conclude these two isolated portions of McCray's statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because they could not have contributed to the verdict. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711].) The fact that defendant requested or acquiesced in the admission of much more extensive and arguably more damaging portions of McCray's statements further supports our conclusion.