Opinion ID: 2594735
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense Counsel's Failure to Request Instructions on Lesser Included Offenses

Text: Defendant contends trial counsel should have requested jury instructions on lesser offenses necessarily included in the crimes of robbery, rape, and arson, the offenses on which his felony-murder conviction and the special circumstance findings were based. An instruction on a lesser included offense must be given only when the evidence warrants such an instruction. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 424, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) To warrant such an instruction, there must be substantial evidence of the lesser included offense, that is, evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the lesser offense. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40.) Speculation is insufficient to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense. ( Ibid.; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 941, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) In addition, a lesser included instruction need not be given when there is no evidence that the offense is less than that charged. ( People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 195, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Defendant argues counsel should have requested an instruction on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. He asserts the jury could have concluded that the force or fear element of robbery was not proven because the jury might have found that defendant did not form the intent to steal until after his attack on victim Litovich. Defendant's argument is based on speculation, not evidence, and we therefore reject it. ( People v. Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 941-942, 13 Cal. Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 276-277, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Defendant faults counsel for not asking the trial court to instruct on assault, battery, and assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury as lesser offenses included in the crime of rape. He argues that the jury might have concluded there was someone else in Litovich's house who raped her after defendant assaulted her. Defendant relies on the absence of evidence matching the semen found in the victim to him, the absence of his fingerprints at the scene, the lack of any physical evidence from the victim (such as her hair or blood) on defendant's body at the time of his arrest, and the short period of time in which the crimes were committed. Even if we were to assume that the crimes of assault, battery, and assault by force likely to cause great bodily injury are necessarily included in the offense of rape and that the evidence was sufficient to permit a jury to conclude there was more than one perpetrator inside Litovich's home, we cannot accept defendant's argument. There is no evidence that the assault on Litovich and the rape of Litovich were committed by different people. Defendant's argument to the contrary is pure speculation. In addition, there is no evidence that the offense committed is less than the rape charged. Finally, defendant contends counsel should have requested an instruction on unlawfully setting fire to an inhabited structure (§ 452) as a lesser included offense of arson. He argues the record is more consistent with a conclusion that the Litovich home burned as a result of reckless conduct in setting fire to the victim's bed, than a conclusion that there was an intentional burning of the house itself. Defendant relies on evidence that the fire was started at the foot of the bed to which the victim was tied and it spread from there. Assuming for the sake of argument that unlawfully setting fire to an inhabited structure is a lesser included offense of arson, the evidence here was insufficient to require the trial court to instruct on that offense. The evidence of the cause and nature of the fire, as presented by arson investigator Anthony Jakubowski, established that the flammable liquid used to start the fire was poured on the bed and distributed throughout the room. The evidence here is not substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury of the possibility that defendant recklessly set fire to a bed on which he had tied the victim without intending also to burn the house. (See People v. Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 195, fn. 4, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) For the reasons given, we conclude that defense counsel was not incompetent for failing to request instructions on theft, assault, battery, assault with intent to inflict great bodily injury, and unlawfully causing a fire to an inhabited structure.