Opinion ID: 2999846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of Terry Stop

Text: We turn now to Cady’s final argument: that the permissible scope and duration of the Terry stop were exceeded. The officers’ questioning regarding Cady’s identity and purpose were clearly appropriate. While Cady argues that his identity could not have shed any light on the legality of his conduct that morning, his identity could have helped the officers resolve the situation in a variety of ways. At least one officer believed that Cady may have been at the courthouse for a community service program. Additionally, Cady could have been a litigant at the courthouse, which could have heightened or alleviated the officers’ concerns. Finally, Cady could have been an individual with a record of mental illness who was presenting a danger to himself and others. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Nevada, Humboldt County, 542 U.S. 177, 186 (2004). In Hiibel, the Supreme Court held that states are permitted to statutorily authorize the demand for identification 10 No. 04-3518 during a Terry stop, and to require compliance with such demand.8 542 U.S. at 188. Cady’s identity was relevant to the purpose of the stop and the officers did not exceed the scope of the stop by requesting identification. Nor did the duration of the stop exceed the limited confines set forth in Terry. Cady’s contribution to the length of the stop is dispositive of this issue. When delay is attributable to the evasive actions of a suspect, the police do not exceed the permissible duration of an investigatory stop. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687-88 (1985). Cady’s refusal to provide identification aside, he engaged the officers in a dialog concerning the legal significance of Supreme Court precedents and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, asked to speak with a supervisor, failed to correct the officers’ obvious belief that he was claiming to be a federal agent,9 and threatened to sue the officers. The total length of the stop was between twenty and thirty minutes. The officers worked diligently to resolve the situation, and released Cady as soon as they determined that he was not a threat to safety at the courthouse. The permissible scope and duration of the investigative stop were not exceeded. 8 Illinois has such a statute permitting officers to demand identification during a temporary stop. 725 ILCS 5/107-14 (2006). Under Hiibel and in conjunction with 720 ILCS 5/31-1 (2006), an individual could be arrested for obstructing a peace officer for failing to identify himself during a temporary stop. 9 Cady asserts that all federal process servers are agents of the federal government. The truth or falsity of this assertion aside, he was not contributing to the swift resolution of the encounter. No. 04-3518 11