Opinion ID: 2070277
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Heading: Was the Van Lawfully Impounded?

Text: Evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amendment may not be used in a criminal proceeding against the victim of an illegal search and seizure. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347, 94 S.Ct. 613, 619, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 (1974); State v. Leto, 305 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Iowa 1981). Law enforcement personnel may conduct a reasonable inventory of the contents of a lawfully impounded vehicle without either a search warrant or probable cause for a warrantless search. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000, 1005-06 (1976). Moreover, the State may use incriminating evidence found during a valid inventory search. See State v. Roth, 305 N.W.2d 501, 508 (Iowa), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 870, 102 S.Ct. 338, 70 L.Ed.2d 174 (1981). The State concedes, however, that the legal validity of an inventory search depends upon the lawfulness of the underlying impoundment. State v. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 1984); see United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir.1980). The State has the burden of proving that its officers had reasonable cause to impound the vehicle, absent a statute or ordinance authorizing it. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d at 431. Iowa Code section 321.89 (1983) does set forth many circumstances in which law enforcement personnel may impound vehicles deemed abandoned, such as when a vehicle has remained illegally on public property for more than seventy-two hours or when a vehicle has been unlawfully parked on private property or has been placed on private property without the consent of the owner or person in control of the property for more than twenty-four hours. The State, however, does not rely on that statute as authority for its impoundment of the van, and defendant does not argue that the statute provides exclusive grounds for impounding abandoned vehicles. The State maintains that reasonable cause for impoundment of the van was established by three factors present in this case: (1) the van's temporary registration card was incomplete and therefore suspect; (2) the van appeared to have been abandoned by its occupants; and (3) the officers needed to place the garden tractor in safekeeping. We measure the actions of each officer by an objective test: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search `warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate? Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968); see Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 56 L.Ed.2d 168, 177 (1978). A. The Van's Temporary Registration Card. One of the police officers testified that the van was impounded because of its incomplete paper card, explaining that the van was not legally registered because its temporary plate did not contain the V.I.N. and year of manufacture. We conclude, however, that the officer was mistaken in his understanding of the legal requirements for a temporary license card. Iowa Code section 321.25 (1983) provides: A vehicle may be operated upon the highways of this state without registration plates for a period of twenty days after the date of delivery of the vehicle to the purchaser from a dealer if a card bearing the words registration applied for is attached on the rear of the vehicle. The card shall have plainly stamped or stenciled the registration number of the dealer from whom the vehicle was purchased and the date of delivery of the vehicle.... Defendant's van had in its rear window the paper card we here reproduce: This card entirely satisfied the statute's requirements. Even though there were places on the card for inserting the year of the vehicle and V.I.N., the statute did not require any more information than that displayed on the card in this van's rear window. We decline the State's invitation to rewrite the statute by expanding the amount of information a temporary plate must contain. The statute is unambiguous and its meaning plain. Roosevelt Hotel, Ltd., v. Sweeney, 394 N.W.2d 353, 355-56 (Iowa 1986); Phillips v. Iowa District Court, 380 N.W.2d 706, 710 (Iowa 1986). The facts concerning the temporary registration card gave these officers no reasonable basis for impounding the van. B. Abandonment of the Van. Peace officers may impound and inventory a motor vehicle if the occupants or other complaining parties have abandoned it and thus retained no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle and its contents. United States v. Wilson, 472 F.2d 901, 902 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 868, 94 S.Ct. 176, 38 L.Ed.2d 116 (1973). Abandonment will not be presumed and must be established by clear, unequivocal and decisive evidence. Friedman v. United States, 347 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 946, 86 S.Ct. 407, 15 L.Ed.2d 354 (1965) (quoting Linscomb v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 199 F.2d 431, 435 (8th Cir.1952)). The expectation of privacy with respect to an automobile is significantly less than that relating to a home or office. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367-68, 96 S.Ct. at 3096, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1004-05; Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d at 59. Nevertheless, abandonment cannot be predicated solely on the fact that the object of a seizure is an automobile. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2035, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 580 (1971) (The word `automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the fourth amendment fades away and disappears.). Courts have found vehicle abandonment in circumstances where motor vehicles have been deserted following high speed police chases. See United States v. Edwards, 441 F.2d 749, 752-54 (5th Cir.1971) (driving at speeds of up to 110 miles per hour, defendant ran car partially off the pavement and fled on foot leaving the lights on and the engine running); State v. Childs, 110 Ariz. 389, 390-91, 519 P.2d 854, 855-56 (1974) (crashing during high speed chase with police and driver seen fleeing on foot); State v. Schutte, 117 Ariz. 482, 486, 573 P.2d 882, 886 (Ct.App.1977) (accelerating past a partial police road block, car left in open desert with back door open and no one inside); Cooper v. State, 174 Ga. App. 464, 465-66, 330 S.E.2d 402, 403-04 (1985) (flight on foot leaving both doors open and car backed onto another public road); Henderson v. State, 695 P.2d 879, 881-82 (Okla.Crim.App.1985) (occupant escaped on foot after police pursuit of car). In the absence of a police chase, courts have considered other factors in finding abandonment. See, e.g., United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 866 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 950, 95 S.Ct. 1683, 44 L.Ed.2d 104 (1975) (only one out-of-date license plate, flat tire, snow shoveled up around car, doors open, and testimony that it had been there for a long time); United States v. Angel, 201 F.2d 531, 533 (7th Cir.1953) (stolen car mired in mud); Hawley v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 479, 483, 144 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 910, 86 S.Ct. 894, 15 L.Ed.2d 665 (1966) (defendant left car in motel parking lot saying he would return for it in three or four days and had not come for eight days). The facts in those cases differ markedly from the facts disclosed in the record here. The State has not met its burden to show that defendant and his companion intended to or did abandon the van. Here there was no police chase. The police officers did not pursue the van's occupants, and this record does not even show that the men exiting the van were aware of the presence of the marked police car and two policemen at the truck stop. Moreover, the van was lawfully parked, with ignition off and doors closed, in a designated parking area. See United States v. Abbott, 584 F.Supp. 442, 451 (W.D.Penn.1984) (no abandonment shown where police officers discovered vehicle parked on private lot with engine off, doors closed, and keys gone despite fact that it was improperly parked and had earlier been involved in a chase). Granted these events took place at an early morning hour, nevertheless defendant and his companion had been away from the van for only twenty to thirty minutes. Defendant did not relinquish his reasonable expectation of privacy in the van and its contents by leaving the van unattended for twenty to thirty minutes at this interstate highway truck stop. We find no merit in the State's contention that the van could lawfully be impounded as an abandoned vehicle. C. The Need for Safeguarding the Garden Tractor. The State also argues the officers had reasonable cause for impoundment because they needed to protect the garden tractor in the rear of the van. In its brief the State argues that the officers could reasonably conclude that impoundment of the van was the most reasonable means of ensuring the safety of the tractor from theft or other loss. The State cites only Opperman and relies on the Court's reference to the caretaking activities of police and the need to keep a vehicle's contents safe from theft or other loss. 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d at 1005. Opperman, however, does not suggest that a need to safeguard the contents of a vehicle justifies impoundment. The inventory which follows a lawful impoundment, not the impoundment itself, is the safeguarding practice which may protect police officers from claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and also may protect the owner of the property from potential theft or vandalism. In Opperman impoundment was lawful because the defendant had violated a parking ordinance. That case provides no support for the State's contention here that impoundment was necessary to safeguard the tractor within the van. The facts in this record do not support the State's theory that the officers were merely undertaking to safeguard this garden tractor. One police officer testified that it's not normal for me, I guess, to see a garden tractor being hauled around in something at that time of the morning unless it's being transported, you know, for some reason or in my case what I felt was the possibility of it it being stolen. That's why I pursued it. It is apparent the officer had in mind not protection of defendant's property but his suspicion that the garden tractor might be a stolen one. But there had been no report of a stolen garden tractor. The mere presence of a garden tractor in the back of this parked van did not provide an objectively reasonable basis for the officers' belief that the van could lawfully be impounded. The seizure of the van was, at best, premature. See Lovett v. State, 403 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1981). The officers' intuitive suspicion of misconduct was not here enough to warrant impoundment. The State has not carried its burden of demonstrating that the police officers had reasonable grounds to impound the van.