Opinion ID: 2564099
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: brisbane

Text: ¶ 15 Our review is de novo. Lybbert v. Grant County, 141 Wash.2d 29, 34, 1 P.3d 1124 (2000). When the text of the statute is clear, we need go no further to interpret it. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, L.L.C., 146 Wash.2d 1, 11-12, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). However, even when the text is not ambiguous, we will consider all that the legislative body has said on the subject. Id. ¶ 16 Our task today is to determine whether the legislature intended to create broad state policy to be implemented by counties when it enacted the GMA or whether it simply intended to authorize municipalities to take some action. See generally Henry, 92 Wash.2d 878, 602 P.2d 354. How to make this sort of determination has long been a vexing problem. Clear statutory language is often absent, as legislation tends to focus on the substance of the field being legislated upon, and not on how the legislation fits within the larger constitutional structure of government. See generally Philip A. Trautman, Initiative and Referendum in Washington: A Survey, 49 WASH. L.REV. 55, 82-83 (1973). Complicating things, the GMA itself is not a model of consistent clarity. See generally Quadrant Corp. v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hearings Bd., 154 Wash.2d 224, 231-33, 110 P.3d 1132 (2005). ¶ 17 We will begin by reviewing the governing principles. We will then turn to whether this court misapplied those principles in Brisbane and whether that case should be overruled. Again, the people of this state are sovereign, and among the essential attributes of their sovereignty is the power to hold statewide referendum on certain legislative acts. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1; Paget, 78 Wash.2d at 352, 474 P.2d 247. Many home rule charters also grant this right to county residents. See, e.g., KCC § 230.40; see generally Trautman, supra, at 82-83. ¶ 18 The sovereignty of the people of individual localities gives way to the people of the State's greater sovereignty, as expressed in the state constitution, through their representatives in the Washington State Legislature, and by the people through statewide legislative acts. See CONST. art. II, § 4; Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. City of Seattle, 94 Wash.2d 740, 747, 750, 620 P.2d 82 (1980) (While the inhabitants of a municipality may enact legislation governing local affairs, they cannot enact legislation which conflicts with state law.). `The fundamental proposition which underlies the powers of municipal corporations is the subordination of such bodies to the supremacy of the legislature.' Id. at 747, 620 P.2d 82 (quoting Philip A. Trautman, Legislative Control of Municipal Corporations in Washington, 38 WASH. L.REV. 743 (1963)). ¶ 19 Within these overarching structural constitutional constraints, localities have considerable power to `conduct their purely local affairs without supervision by the State, so long as they abide[] by the provisions of the constitution and [do] not run counter to considerations of public policy of broad concern, expressed in general laws.' Henry, 92 Wash.2d at 881, 602 P.2d 354 (quoting State ex rel. Carroll v. King County, 78 Wash.2d 452, 457-58, 474 P.2d 877 (1970)). ¶ 20 It is long established that when the state legislature directs a county legislative body to take some implementing action, that action is not subject to referenda at the county level, not withstanding what the county charter would otherwise authorize. A general law enacted by the legislature is superior to, and supersedes, all charter provisions inconsistent therewith. Any charter provision, therefore, which has the effect of limiting or restricting a legislative grant of power to the legislative authority or other officer of a city is invalid. Neils v. City of Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 276, 53 P.2d 848 (1936) (citations omitted). Put another way, the voters of the county cannot alter a grant of authority to, or the imposition of responsibility onto, the local government by the state legislature. [4] ¶ 21 Thus, when the state legislature instructs a local governmental body to implement state policy, the power and duty is vested in the legislative (or executive entity), not the municipality as a corporate entity. Id.; see also State ex rel. Guthrie v. City of Richland, 80 Wash.2d 382, 384, 386, 494 P.2d 990 (1972) (when statute authorized authorities to proceed forthwith, local referendum would be inconsistent with statutory grant of power). For example, zoning ordinances and regulations are beyond the power of initiative or referendum in Washington because the power and responsibility to implement zoning was given to the legislative bodies of municipalities, not to the municipality as a whole. Lince v. City of Bremerton, 25 Wash.App. 309, 312-13, 607 P.2d 329 (1980) (citing Leonard v. City of Bothell, 87 Wash.2d 847, 854, 557 P.2d 1306 (1976)); see generally J.R. Kemper, Annotation, Adoption of Zoning Ordinance or Amendment Thereto as Subject of Referendum, 72 A.L.R.3d 1030 (2005) (surveying cases). Therefore, initiatives or referenda that attempt to graft limits onto a grant of power by the people of the State, or to modify obligations imposed on local legislative or executive authority by the people of the State, are invalid as in conflict with state law. State ex rel. Haas v. Pomeroy, 50 Wash.2d 23, 25, 308 P.2d 684 (1957) (collecting cases), overruled in part by Earle M. Jorgensen Co. v. Seattle, 99 Wash.2d 861, 665 P.2d 1328 (1983). Courts will exercise their inherent power to keep such matters from the ballot. See, e.g., id. at 25, 308 P.2d 684. ¶ 22 The GMA is a clear example of legislation that creates public policy to be implemented in large part at the local level, by representatives more attuned to the individual needs, wants, and characteristics of their areas. In Snohomish County v. Anderson, 123 Wash.2d 151, 154, 157, 868 P.2d 116 (1994), we found the legislature's intent to create broad state policy to be implemented by local governments clear, thus a proposed referendum on an ordinance adopting procedures to develop a countywide planning policy was barred, in part, because the GMA explicitly instructed the county legislative body to take that action. ¶ 23 Sometimes, the legislative intent is fairly clear, as it was in Anderson. But sometimes, the legislative intent must be gleaned from the statutory schema as a whole. Cf. Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wash.2d at 11-12, 43 P.3d 4. For example, in Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d 345, 884 P.2d 1326, this court took a broader look at the GMA and concluded that, as a whole, the legislature did not intend county implementation of GMA policies to be subject to referenda, at least in the context of the critical area ordinance presented. The court held: The purpose of the Growth Management Act, RCW 36.70A, would be frustrated if the people of Whatcom County were permitted by referendum to amend an ordinance adopted to implement the goals of a comprehensive land use plan. Under Anderson, [p]ermitting the referendum would jeopardize [the] entire state plan [as intended by the Growth Management Act] and thus would extend beyond a matter of local concern. One consequence of such a broad interpretation of the referendum power includes the potential repeal of ordinances required by the Legislature to be enacted for statewide growth management. Also, it would be difficult to balance the various interests contemplated by the Legislature. Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d at 351, 884 P.2d 1326 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Anderson, 123 Wash.2d at 159, 868 P.2d 116). In reaching the decision that the legislature did not intend to grant the power and duty to implement to the county as a corporate entity, the court relied upon the specific and repeated delegation of power and duty to municipal legislative authorities in the GMA. E.g., RCW 36.70A.040, .130(1)(a); see also generally ch. 36.70 RCW (the Planning Enabling Act, explicitly delegating to the board of county commissioners power to adopt official controls on planning, e.g., RCW 36.70.550-.660). We also considered the specific mechanisms of GMA implementation and enforcement and noted that the legislature required municipalities to follow careful procedures (which often take many years) that required extensive notice and opportunity to comment and required the sort of recursive give and take that was inconsistent with up and down votes. Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d at 350-51, 884 P.2d 1326 (citing Anderson, 123 Wash.2d at 156, 868 P.2d 116). Finally, we considered the absence of any mention of referenda in the extensive and detailed provision for public participation and public appeal, and concluded that absence was strong evidence of a legislative desire to vest the power and responsibility in the local legislative authority. Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d at 351-52, 884 P.2d 1326 (citing Anderson, 123 Wash.2d at 157, 868 P.2d 116). There were textual, structural, and policy reasons for our holding that day. ¶ 24 We turn now to McFarland's call to overrule Brisbane. Before it may be overruled, it must be shown to be both incorrect and harmful. State v. Berlin, 133 Wash.2d 541, 547-48, 947 P.2d 700 (1997). We first consider whether Brisbane was incorrect. We conclude it was not. ¶ 25 Again, Brisbane was based on a textual, structural, and policy reading of the entire GMA. See, e.g., Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d at 351, 884 P.2d 1326. McFarland argues, essentially, that this methodology was incorrect and instead, the court should have focused on the individual components of the GMA that most directly applied to the municipality's specific obligations discharged by the ordinance. Under that approach, critical areas ordinances might be subject to referenda because RCW 36.70A.060(2) directs that [e]ach county and city shall adopt development regulations, rather than saying that  the legislative authority in each county or city shall adopt development regulations. Since, he contends, the legislature signals that it does not wish ordinances to be subject to referendum by delegating the power to the legislative authority, Brisbane must be incorrect. ¶ 26 But this laser focus on the words legislative authority fails to take into account that all legislation fits within larger legislative and constitutional systems. Even the statute considered in Anderson (a case the challengers quite properly praise) makes it clear that the legislature may use the phrase legislative authority and county interchangeably. Anderson, 123 Wash.2d at 156-57, 868 P.2d 116 (citing RCW 36.70A.210). The statute at issue in that case said, among other things, [t]he legislative authority . . . shall adopt a county-wide planning policy [but]. . . . [i]f a county fails for any reason to convene a meeting. . . . RCW 36.70A.210(2)(c) (emphasis added). Nonetheless, Anderson found that ordinances passed relating to this act were not subject to referenda, and read in the larger context of the law, this holding drew not merely on the words but on the structure established by the statutory system within the greater constitutional one. Anderson, 123 Wash.2d at 156, 868 P.2d 116; accord RCW 36.70A.030(7), .035, .040, .290. ¶ 27 As Professor Trautman noted: One wonders whether the state legislature in delegating certain powers to local governments is very often thinking of the initiative and referendum when it authorizes the city council or the legislative body rather than the city to do something, or whether the particular choice of words is happenstance. One wonders whether the legislature is not more likely concerned with the subject matter of the particular legislation and the felt need for delegation of authority to the local level without thinking about who at the local level should exercise the power. . . . If, in reality, the legislature did intend that only the municipal legislative body should have power in a particular instance, that must control. The danger, of course, is that the wording in the statute will be taken at face value and will substitute for reasoning in the particular instance. Trautman, supra, 49 WASH. L.REV. at 83 (footnotes omitted). ¶ 28 We agree. Reasoning is required. We also note that the phrase legislative authority does not have a monolithic meaning in our case law, but rather has long depended on the context and purpose. In State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wash.2d 138, 155, 146 P.2d 543 (1944), for example, this court held that the legislative authority of a county could include the people acting in a legislative capacity and proposing an initiative, and thus the people were bound by the procedures laid down in the state constitution for the legislative authority when attempting to amend a municipal charter. Id. Again, the entire statutory schema must be read with care to determine the intent of the legislature. ¶ 29 Furthermore, Anderson, perhaps with Professor Trautman's injunction in mind, seemed to contemplate a case like Brisbane arising. The court went beyond merely reading the statutory language to note, for instance, that the statute directs the `legislative authority' to convene meetings and establish processes. These responsibilities cannot be performed by the exercise of a `yes/no' vote. Anderson, 123 Wash.2d at 156, 868 P.2d 116. This goes beyond the text of the statute to consider the broader structural implications of a contrary ruling. These structural implications still remain. ¶ 30 Therefore, we disagree that prior to Brisbane, the legislature consistently signaled its intent to create general state policy to be implemented locally by delegating power to the legislative authority of a county as opposed to the county as a corporate body. Instead, that language is simply one of many tools that this court has used to determine relevant legislative intent. [5] ¶ 31 Brisbane also accords with other decisions that turned on the structure of the systems established by a statutory schema. In Seattle Building & Construction Trades Council, 94 Wash.2d at 747, 750, 620 P.2d 82, for example, we did not rely on any explicit grant of authority to a local legislative body in determining that the city of Seattle's approval of the final plan for Interstate 90 (I-90) was not subject to a local vote. Instead, the court looked broadly at the statutes and history of the I-90 expansion to conclude that the legislature intended that the city's approval was a matter for the city municipal authorities. See id. at 741-45, 747-50, 620 P.2d 82. Among the many specific reasons articulated by the court for its conclusion was the fact that the legislation provided extensive provision for citizen involvement prior to the final decision making. Id. at 747, 620 P.2d 82. ¶ 32 Similarly, here, the GMA has created extensive provision for citizen involvement. RCW 36.70A.020(11), .035, .140. By way of illustration, the public participation, before these three ordinances were enacted, was extensive. They: included a mailing to 115,000 unincorporated area residents at the very start of the public review process. . . . 13 public meetings attended by 550 people, Web information resources that received more than 6,000 visits, an e-mail list of nearly 200, mailings to those who provided comments, and a stakeholder group with representatives from such diverse interests as environmental groups, builders and realtors, agriculture, forestry and rural residents . . . . . Hearings were conducted almost weekly and most hearings allowed for an opportunity for public comment. The King County Council also conducted at least five public meetings in rural areas of King County and heard from hundreds of citizens throughout King County. CP at 272-74 (Decl. of Harry Reinert). Requiring so much public input into the development of the regulations and the comprehensive plans is itself evidence that the legislature intended to leave the ultimate power in the hands of the legislative body. Accord Seattle Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 94 Wash.2d at 747-50, 620 P.2d 82. [6] ¶ 33 Furthermore, as noted by the Master Builders in their amicus brief, the current GMA establishes very strict time schedules for challenging ordinances and regulations that a referenda would upset, without any sort of allowance for that possibility. See RCW 36.70A.280. As a result, property owners and builders have reasonable predictability about the regulations which will govern their land and businesses. Allowing select GMA regulations to be subject to referenda means that property owners will never know at what point they can safely undertake the considerable expense of planning and engineering that is inherent in land development and building processes because they will face the risk that at any time, an interest group of some kind could sponsor an initiative or referendum that would drastically alter their plans. Amicus Curiae Br. of Master Builders Ass'n of King & Snohomish Counties at 15. This would be inconsistent with the general legislative policy recognized by this court that land use decisions should reach finality quickly. See generally Habitat Watch v. Skagit County, 155 Wash.2d 397, 120 P.3d 56 (2005); James v. Kitsap County, 154 Wash.2d 574, 115 P.3d 286 (2005) (both stressing importance of complying with time limits in the land use context). Additionally, it would put counties at risk of losing eligibility for grants, loans, pledges, or financial guaranties from the State. RCW 36.70A.130. ¶ 34 By both explicit goal and by structure, the GMA seeks coordinated planning. RCW 36.70A.010 (legislative findings), .130(2)(b) (requiring comprehensive plan proposals to be heard by governing body concurrently). [7] This court has already concluded that allowing referenda is structurally inconsistent with this mandate, especially since a referendum in many jurisdictions does not merely act as a veto, but in some counties can strike individual portions of ordinances. See Brisbane, 125 Wash.2d at 347, 884 P.2d 1326 (noting that the referendum sought to eliminate parts of an ordinance); cf. Pierce County Charter §§ 5.60, 5.70; Snohomish County Charter §§ 5.60, 7.80; Whatcom County Charter §§ 5.50, 5.60. That is inconsistent with integrated, comprehensive planning. ¶ 35 Finally, we note that even though reasonable jurists disagreed at the time of Brisbane, legislative acquiescence may also shed light on legislative intent. If the legislature does not register its disapproval of a court opinion, at some point that silence itself is evidence of legislative approval. State v. Coe, 109 Wash.2d 832, 846, 750 P.2d 208 (1988). [8] ¶ 36 Our legislature has had ample opportunity to inform this court that it wishes ordinances implementing responsibilities under the GMA to be subject to referenda. Despite amending the GMA every year since the publication of Brisbane; despite amending the specific portion of the GMA that Brisbane interpreted multiple times since then; and despite the introduction of specific legislation that would have indicated legislative disapproval, it has not elected to do so. See LAWS of 2005, ch. 423, § 6; LAWS of 2002, ch. 154, § 1; LAWS of 2000, ch. 36, § 1; LAWS of 1998, ch. 171, §§ 1, 4; H.B. 1823, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.1995); S.B. 6586, 54th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.1996). This lack of action is at least some evidence that the legislature believes this court accurately divined its intent. ¶ 37 Brisbane was well grounded in law. We note that less than a year after its publication, the author of Anderson, Justice Robert F. Utter, signed Brisbane. The absence of specific magic words in every statute relevant to the exercise of authority does not create a presumption that the legislature intended local ordinances passed pursuant to state statutes be subject to local referenda. Instead, we must look to the entirety of the statutory schema established by the legislature. Viewed as a whole, the GMA contemplates that public participation will be channeled through its systems. We decline to overrule Brisbane, and any change to the appropriate procedures governing public participation in GMA ordinances must come from the legislature.