Opinion ID: 1878930
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in concluding sufficient evidence existed to establish proof of dunn's intent to make reilly a joint tenant with rights of survivorship?

Text: ¶ 12. Crist and Ford attack the lack of donative intent on behalf of Dunn to make Reilly a joint tenant with rights of survivorship. Essentially, Crist and Ford argue that the changes to the CD's adding Reilly were made by Harold Harwood, acting pursuant to his power of attorney, and not by Dunn herself. Crist and Ford argue that the burden of proof with gifts inter vivos rests on the donee (Reilly) to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the gift is free from the taint of undue influence. See Madden, 626 So.2d at 618. However, Madden was written in the context where a donor and donee share a confidential relationship. See id. at 619. Such was not established here until several years after the three certificates of deposit were amended to name Reilly as a co-owner. ¶ 13. Undisputed is the fact that Harold placed Reilly's name on the three CD's as well as Dunn's checking account. No argument is made that Reilly and Harold shared a confidential relationship. Although Crist and Ford allege that Dunn and Reilly shared a confidential relationship at the time Harold added Reilly's name as a joint tenant, they offer no evidence to support their allegation. This Court has held in numerous cases that the burden of establishing the existence of a confidential relationship is upon the party asserting it. Norris v. Norris, 498 So.2d 809, 813 (Miss.1986). Because allegations such as the ones brought by Crist and Ford seek to declare void a facially valid instrument, the public interest requires a high level of confidence in any judicial determination that a confidential relationship exists. See id. ¶ 14. Undisputed testimony in this record established that at the time the changes in the CD's and checking account were made, approximately April of 1991, Harold was Dunn's attorney in fact and handled all of Dunn's business matters. Additional testimony, not challenged by Crist and Ford, revealed that Reilly did not know her name had been added to any of these accounts until late 1996, when Harold instructed Reilly to cash in a CD and spend some of the proceeds on personal matters. Crist and Ford argue that as Dunn was over 100 years old, lived in a nursing home, was legally blind, hearing impaired, and physically disabled, and the fact that Reilly visited her frequently and helped to look after her needs, an automatic presumption of a confidential relationship should be inferred. ¶ 15. What Crist and Ford fail to appreciate is that the time for determining the existence of a confidential relationship between Dunn and Reilly is when Reilly was made a joint tenant with rights of survivorship. In other words, what is important is whether, at the time Reilly's name was added to the CD's and checking account, there existed any evidence of fraud, duress, overreaching or undue influence. See Cooper v. Crabb, 587 So.2d at 242. The only evidence offered regarding Dunn's and Reilly's relationship in April of 1991 was that Reilly visited her great aunt every other weekend. As Crist and Ford offered no evidence that a confidential relationship existed when Reilly became a joint tenant with Dunn and Harold, we affirm the Chancellor's holding that none existed. Further, it appears that the Chancellor properly determined that, at the time the Trustmark Prime Yield account worth $21,494.83, was created, three months after Reilly became Dunn's attorney in fact under the durable power of attorney, a confidential fiduciary relationship existed between the two, thereby raising a presumption of undue influence, which Reilly failed to rebut by clear and convincing evidence. ¶ 16. The difficult issue to address is whether Harold, acting as Dunn's attorney in fact under a power of attorney, acted within the scope of his power in making Reilly a co-owner to the disputed instruments. Regarding the scope of a person designated as another individual's power of attorney, Miss.Code Ann. § 87-3-7(2)(3) (1999) states: (2) If any power of attorney or other writing (a) authorizes an attorney-in-fact or other agent to do, execute or perform any act that the principal might or could do, or (b) evidences the principal's intent to give the attorney-infact or agent full power to handle the principal's affairs or deal with the principal's property, the attorney-in-fact or agent shall have the power and authority to make gifts in any amount of any of the principal's property to any individuals or to any organizations described in Sections 170(c) and 2522(a) of the Internal Revenue Code or corresponding future provisions of federal tax law, or both, in accordance with the principal's personal history of making or joining in the making of lifetime gifts. (3) Subsection (2) as set forth above is declaratory of past and present law in the State of Mississippi, and shall be applied to all powers of attorney, whether executed before, on or after March 16, 1999. ¶ 17. It is undisputed that from the time of his wife's death until his own, Harold was Dunn's attorney in fact under a power of attorney. Also undisputed is the fact that up until his death, Harold handled all of Dunn's business affairs. Section 87-3-7(2)(3) appears to infer the grantor's intent based on the good faith actions of a duly appointed attorney. As no evidence was presented to indicate that Harold and Reilly ever shared a confidential relationship while Harold acted as Dunn's attorney, nor any proof offered that Harold acted in bad faith, the Chancellor did not err in awarding the three CD's and checking account to Reilly.