Opinion ID: 2003747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion from Voir Dire Examination

Text: As part of his plea bargain, Hoover accepted a 40-year prison sentence on one count of murder. He also agreed to serve a concurrent 15-year sentence for armed robbery. But prior to testifying at trial, Hoover moved to withdraw his plea. He felt that the sentence he had agreed to was too harsh. Correspondence also indicated that Hoover feared harm in jail if he testified for the State. The State believed Hoover's cooperation was in jeopardy. It sought, and was allowed, to question Hoover outside of the jury's presence to see if he would testify as he had promised. The trial judge excluded Keene from the courtroom during Hoover's voir dire. Although defense counsel was present, Keene contends that his exclusion violated his right to confront witnesses and his right to due process under the sixth and fourteenth amendments (U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV). He also claims his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. U.S. Const., amend. VI. The measure for assessing whether Keene's exclusion violated due process and confrontation clause guarantees is Kentucky v. Stincer (1987), 482 U.S. 730, 107 S.Ct. 2658, 96 L.Ed.2d 631. There, the Supreme Court considered the exclusion of the defendant from a hearing to determine the competency of two child witnesses to testify against him. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion did not violate either the sixth amendment or the fourteenth amendment. As for the right of confrontation, the Court reasoned that the exclusion did not compromise the defendant's opportunity at trial to cross-examine the witnesses. ( Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 740, 107 S.Ct. at 2664-65, 96 L.Ed.2d at 644.) The children had been subjected to both direct and cross-examination at the competency hearing. The questions asked could easily have been repeated at trial. Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. at 740, 107 S.Ct. at 2664-65, 96 L.Ed.2d at 644. Here, as in Stincer, defense counsel was present during Hoover's voir dire. This case differs in that the questioning of Hoover did not include cross-examination. But under the Supreme Court's confrontation clause analysis, the distinction is one of no material difference. The reason: it is the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses at trial, not earlier, that is determinative. So long as there is no interference with the usual opportunity for cross-examination at trial, no sixth amendment violation arises. Opportunity to cross-examine Hoover at trial was in no way interfered with by excluding Keene from the voir dire. Hoover appeared and testified in open court during Keene's trial. (See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 740, 107 S.Ct. at 2664-65, 96 L.Ed.2d at 644.) Defense counsel could have repeated any question heard earlier. (See Stincer, 482 U.S. at 741, 107 S.Ct. at 2665, 96 L.Ed.2d at 644.) Though such opportunity is not assured in every case, cross-examination being generally limited to matters raised on direct, there was no impediment to repeating the questions here. There was no violation of Keene's sixth amendment confrontation clause right. As for due process, the Court's analysis in Stincer turned on the nature of the hearing from which the defendant had been excluded. The Court noted that the competency hearing was a limited one which did not reach the substance of the child witnesses' trial testimony. ( Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745-46, 107 S.Ct. at 2667-68, 96 L.Ed.2d at 647-48.) The respondent had presented no evidence to show that his presence would aid in the competency determination. ( Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747, 107 S.Ct. at 2668, 96 L.Ed.2d at 648.) However, the Court noted in dictum that a different type of hearingone in which a witness is asked to discuss upcoming substantive testimonymight bear a substantial relationship to the defense effort at trial. ( Stincer, 482 U.S. at 746, 107 S.Ct. at 2667, 96 L.Ed.2d at 648.) If so, a defendant's exclusion from the earlier hearing might amount to a due process violation. Here, the questioning of Hoover did touch upon his upcoming substantive trial testimony in addition to whether he would comply with the plea agreement. The State asked Hoover about his arrest and inquired as to when he had met Keene and Ehlers. Other questioning permitted the State to read into the record a written recitation of the facts to which Hoover had agreed to testify. The recitation included a summary of a tape-recorded statement Hoover had given to police upon his arrest. The taped statement was played. The same factual recitation, including the taped statement's contents, had been stipulated to earlier by Hoover and had been read at the announcement of Hoover's guilty plea. The question is whether the substantive points elicited during the voir dire bore a substantial relationship to Keene's trial defense. (See Cates v. Cates (1993), 156 Ill.2d 76, 80, 189 Ill.Dec. 14, 619 N.E.2d 715 (explaining that an expression in dictum of an opinion on a point argued by counsel and decided by a court, though not essential to the case at hand, should be followed where not erroneous).) Keene had certain personal knowledge of the events. Arguably, such knowledge would have put Keene in a position, had he been present for the voir dire, to assist defense counsel in evaluating Hoover's answers. Later at trial, Keene would have been in a position to point out inconsistencies in Hoover's testimony based on the earlier answers he, Keene, had observed. In that respect, Keene's privilege of presence would not be useless, or the benefit but a shadow. Snyder v. Massachusetts (1934), 291 U.S. 97, 106-07, 54 S.Ct. 330, 332, 78 L.Ed. 674, 678. But, in fact, Keene's exclusion from the voir dire could not have hamperedor, to mirror the Court's concern, Keene's presence could not have advanced (see Stincer, 482 U.S. at 747, 107 S.Ct. at 2668, 96 L.Ed.2d at 648)the defense. A court reporter transcribed the voir dire. Hoover's answers were a part of the trial record. What Hoover had said was available for Keene to review before Hoover took the stand. Keene therefore enjoyed the opportunity to assist defense counsel in revealing falsehoods or pointing out inconsistencies in Hoover's trial testimony. Moreover, the substantive evidence of note touched on during the voir dire that regarding the events of the morning of November 12, 1992had been previously disclosed in open court when Hoover pled guilty. [1] No new substantive evidence was reached. Keene has presented no other grounds to establish a substantial relationship between the answers Hoover gave during voir dire and Keene's trial defense. Because Keene's ability to defend himself at trial was not in any way materially affected by his exclusion during Hoover's voir dire, there was no due process violation. Finally, there is the contention that Keene's exclusion violated his right to effective assistance of counsel. Keene takes no issue with what counsel actually did or did not do regarding Hoover's questioning. Rather, Keene argues that because he could not confer with counsel during the voir dire, the representation necessarily suffered. But, again, Keene's presence was, in reality, of no real consequence in view of the evidence touched upon. Defense counsel simply did not need what Keene's presence could provide: Keene's personal input. Keene suffered no prejudice sufficient to support an ineffectiveness-of-counsel claim. See Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 699 (stating that lack of prejudice is sufficient to resolve ineffectiveness claims, the performance of counsel being irrelevant in the absence of harm).