Opinion ID: 2629181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Withdrawal of Counsel and the Motion to Continue

Text: C.S. first contends that the termination hearing conducted by the magistrate violated her fundamental constitutional right to due process because, she asserts, she was entitled to a continuance of the December 4, 2001, hearing to find a new attorney after the withdrawal of Davis (the second court-appointed attorney). C.S. insists that in denying her motion to continue, the trial court denied her the right to counsel and, at a minimum, the court should have warned her of all the specific consequences of appearing pro se. This argument boils down to a contention that she should not have been required to proceed with the termination hearing without counsel. Given the record and the applicable statutes in this case, we are not persuaded.
A parent's right to appointed counsel in termination proceedings is secured by statute and not constitutional mandate. § 19-1-105(2), 6 C.R.S. (2003); § 19-3-202(1), 6 C.R.S. (2003); see People in Interest of V.A.E.Y.H.D., 199 Colo. 148, 152, 605 P.2d 916, 919 (Colo.1980). In Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 31, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court held that while parental termination proceedings indeed implicate a parent's fundamental liberty interests, the Constitution does not require the appointment of counsel in every case. To the contrary, the Court stated that there is a presumption that there is no right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty. Id.; see also In re Marriage of Hartley, 886 P.2d 665, 674 n. 16 (Colo.1994) (It is important to note that the constitutional right to assistance of counsel is limited to adult proceedings which are criminal in nature and equivalent juvenile cases.). The Court noted that child-custody litigation must be concluded as rapidly as is consistent with fairness. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 2153. In determining whether a parent has the right to have counsel appointed in a termination proceeding, a court is to review: whether the three [ Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)] factors, when weighed against the presumption that there is no [constitutional] right to appointed counsel in the absence of at least a potential deprivation of physical liberty, suffice to rebut that presumption and thus to lead to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires the appointment of counsel when a State seeks to terminate an indigent's parental status. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 31, 101 S.Ct. 2153. Accordingly, in reviewing a respondent parent's right to counsel, a court is to consider: whether the parent's interest is an extremely important one; whether the State shares with the parent an interest in a correct decision, has a relatively weak pecuniary interest, and, in some but not all cases, has a possibly stronger interest in informal procedures; and whether the complexity of the proceeding and the incapacity of the uncounselled parent could be, but would not always be, great enough to make the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the parent's rights insupportably high. Id. Hence, due process requires the appointment of counsel only where the parent's interests are at her strongest, where the state's interests are at their weakest, and the risks of error are at their peak. Id. Here, C.S.'s interests at stake in the proceeding were indeed extremely important. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208. However, also infused into the balance were the children's interests, which dictated that the court achieve some permanency in their lives. Both the Department and the guardian ad litem opposed any continuance as contrary to the best interests of the children. More to the point, C.S. was clearly warned on several occasions to cooperate with her appointed attorney or proceed pro se, and she was given the opportunity to contest her lawyer's withdrawal at the termination hearing. [6] The Department and the court rightly feared that C.S. was motivated by a desire to delay the proceedings. We also conclude that the risk of error was low in this case. In Lassiter, the Court determined that the risk of erroneous deprivation, as described in Eldridge, was low and thus rejected the parent's assertion that she was unconstitutionally permitted to appear pro se in a parental termination proceeding after noting that the state's evidence against her was so great as to make the presence of counsel of little benefit. Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 32-33, 101 S.Ct. 2153. The Court first remarked that no experts had testified at the hearing and there were no especially troublesome points of law, either procedural or substantive that characterized the hearing. Id. at 32, 101 S.Ct. 2153. Also relevant to its inquiry, the Court held, was the mother's failure to contest the termination proceeding and her failure to speak to her retained lawyer after notification of the hearing. Id. at 33, 101 S.Ct. 2153. Because these combinations of factors rendered the proceeding fundamentally fair, the trial court found no error in failing to appoint counsel for the mother. We conclude that, like the proceeding in Lassiter, the simplicity of the hearing and the weight of the evidence against C.S. presented at the hearing were such that the absence of counsel did not render the proceeding fundamentally unfair. The Department presented four different witnesses, all thoroughly familiar with C.S. and her children after years of involvement during the dependency and neglect proceedings. C.S., who began the hearing with counsel, had no witnesses subpoenaed for the hearing, and, like the mother in Lassiter, did not contest the motion as to three of her children. Further, the reason she had no counsel was because of her failure to cooperate with him. Given the weight of evidence and the history of the case, there was little that a third court-appointed attorney could have done in this hearing to turn the tide in C.S.'s favor. With all of those factors in mind, therefore, we conclude that the risk of erroneous termination in this instance was low. Because we conclude that C.S.'s fundamental right to the assistance of counsel was not implicated in this case, we further conclude that the court was not required in this instance to give C.S. a detailed advisement regarding her decision to appear pro se. [7] See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 237, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973) (Almost without exception, the requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver has been applied only to those rights which the Constitution guarantees to a criminal defendant in order to preserve a fair trial.); see also People v. Duran, 757 P.2d 1096, 1097 (Colo.App.1988)(Because defendant's right to counsel in [a] Crim. P. 35 proceeding is statutory and not constitutional, its waiver must be voluntary but need not be knowing and intelligent.). Indeed, it appears to us, based on the circumstances leading to Davis's withdrawal, that C.S. knew very well what risk her conduct posed. See People in Interest of D.J.P., 785 P.2d 129, 131 (Colo. 1990) (The totality of the circumstances is relevant when determining whether the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by denying a continuance.); see also People v. Arguello, 772 P.2d 87, 94 (Colo.1989)(holding that in determining whether there exists a valid waiver of the right to counsel in the criminal setting, the court may consider [a] defendant's lack of good faith in working with appointed counsel, including an unreasonable refusal to cooperate with counsel or an unreasonable request for substitution of appointed counsel, and [t]he timeliness of defendant's request for new counsel particularly when a defendant makes an untimely request for new counsel ... under circumstances which are likely to result in a continuance).
Because the denial of C.S.'s motion to continue did not affect her fundamental rights, we review the district court's order only for abuse of discretion. Importantly, in this analysis, we note that the Children's Code specifically directs the court to proceed with all possible speed to a legal determination that will serve the best interests of the child. 19-1-102(1)(c), 6 C.R.S. (2003). The Children's Code is a careful balancing of rights and interests: those of the parents whose parental rights are at issue, and those of the child himself, who needs a stable, permanent home. Because of the delicate balancing that the statute contemplates, trial courts necessarily retain significant discretion to evaluate the circumstances of the case as they unfold. In that vein, [a] motion for a continuance is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, as are a party's motion to discharge an attorney and an attorney's motion to withdraw. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1121 (Colo.1986)(internal citations omitted). Importantly, the court's ruling on such motions will not be disturbed on review in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Id. In ruling on a motion to withdraw and an interrelated motion for continuance, the trial court should consider the need for orderly and expeditious administration of justice and should balance that need against the particular facts underlying the motion. Id. The court should also weigh whether a grant or denial of the motions will result in substantial delay that would both inconvenience witnesses and subject the interested children to further uncertainty about their future. Id. Because the court concluded that the best interests of the children dictated that the hearing proceed to avoid further uncertainty and instability in their lives, and because the court ruled on the motions to continue and withdraw while weighing the need for the orderly and expeditious administration of justice against the circumstances of the case, we hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for continuance.
C.S. next argues that the district court erred in not informing her of all the possible consequences of confessing the Department's motion to terminate her parental relationship with N.A., I.S., and D.S. She explains that because the hearing affected her fundamental rights as a parent, she was entitled to a full advisement concerning the effect of her decision. While we have already affirmed that a natural parent has a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody and management of his or her child, we have also held that the General Assembly has safeguarded this fundamental interest by enacting the Termination Act. B.B. v. People, 785 P.2d 132, 136 (Colo.1990). In B.B., we determined that the Termination Act furthered the legislative purposes of preserving and strengthening family ties whenever possible while still protecting the child's welfare. Id. (recognizing that the pertinent protection has been codified under section 19-3-604, 6 C.R.S. (2003)). There, we also concluded that the detailed procedures and criteria provided under the Termination Act adequately protect a parent's fundamental rights. Id. Thus, to determine whether C.S.'s fundamental rights were protected when she confessed the Department's motion, we need only determine whether the proceedings substantially complied with the statute. See A.M.D., 648 P.2d at 631. Tellingly, C.S. alleges no particular constitutional error and no statutory violation on the part of the court in failing to detail all of the consequences of a confession of the termination petition. Furthermore, a review of all the circumstances surrounding the termination proceeding indicates that her assertion is baseless. We determine, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the dependency and neglect proceedings and the orders of termination, that C.S. knowingly and intelligently waived her right to contest the motion for termination as to N.A., I.S., and D.S. Nothing in the record suggests that she was unaware of the effect of her decision. Because C.S. was a party to the dependency and neglect proceedings for all four children in a heavily monitored process spanning nearly three years, it is inconceivable that she was unaware of the potential consequences of the termination hearing. Indeed, after each dependency and neglect proceeding began, and at every significant stage of these two cases, C.S. was provided with a written notice from the court that the irreversible termination of the parent-child relationship was a possibility. During all phases of the proceedings, C.S. was represented by counsel and at the pre-trial hearing on November 15, 2001, with counsel present, C.S. indicated to the court that she was not going to contest termination for her three oldest children. At the termination hearing, she stated that the only other option she would consider was relinquishment of the children to their maternal aunt. However, after the children's guardian ad litem, Troy Hause, who explicitly disclosed his alignment with the Department at the hearing, informed the court and C.S. that the only effect of the relinquishment would be to delay the permanent placement of her children, C.S. decided against relinquishment and confessed the termination motion. The court then informed C.S. that the termination trial would proceed and that the Department was still required to prove that termination was necessary by clear and convincing evidence. The effect of her decision at trial, the court explained, was that C.S. could not present her own evidence as to the three older children. When C.S. informed the court that she wanted to contest the termination motion concerning S.S., she said that she understood that I.S. and D.S. were likely to be permanently placed with her sister and that they would be in good hands. C.S. also stated to the court that after the termination, she would have to seek counseling in order to cope with the loss of her children. She explained that the only reason she wished to contest the termination motion concerning S.S. was that the Department sought placement outside the family. Thus, we conclude that the record, including C.S.'s own expressions, reveals a clear understanding on the part of C.S. of the effects of parental termination and her decision to confess the Department's motion. C.S. further claims that her decision to confess the motion was invalid since it was influenced by the information provided by Hause, a person with interests adverse to her own. Unavailingly, she cites to People v. Legler, 969 P.2d 691, 694 (Colo.1998), as authority for the proposition that Hause improperly counseled her on her ultimate decision not to contest termination for three of her children. Legler, however, merely acknowledged that, by statute, in a criminal investigation, a juvenile is entitled to have a non-hostile adult present during custodial interrogation. Id. Accordingly, it has no application here, and we find nothing inherently improper about the exchange between Hause and C.S. Procedurally, then, our review of the court's order presents no reversible error and we now turn to the termination order as to S.S.