Opinion ID: 1766379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: IS CHICKASAW COUNTY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY OF WHICH McCULLOUGH IS A MEMBER?

Text: McCullough's Supplemental Brief argues that the statutory definition of governmental entity works in his favor. 25-4-103(h). I submit that that definition in fact works in the state's favor. McCullough's argument is based on the premise that the board of supervisors is the body of the county. He argues that since the chancery court clerk is constitutionally also the clerk of the board of supervisors but has no voting power, that he is not a member of the board of supervisors, which has exclusive sovereign power at the county level. He asserts that since he is not a member as required in the statute in issue, the judgment should be affirmed. Miss. Code Ann. 25-4-103(g) apparently places a county board of supervisors within the definition of the word government. Section 25-4-103(h) places only the state, a county, municipality, or political subdivision under the definition of the word governmental entity. The statute requires merely that he be a member of the governmental entity. And the statute has already defined governmental entity as the county, municipality, or political subdivision, not merely the mayor, city council, board of supervisors, or other executive officials. 25-4-103(h). And the statute specifically at issue here, 25-4-105(3)(a), states that he be a member of that entity, not a member of the board of supervisors of that entity. Furthermore, since the legislature used the general word member in the phrase, the governmental entity of which he is a member, instead of a more specific word such as officer, it does not stretch the meaning of the statutory language to include the chancery clerk as a member of the county governmental entity. McCullough's interpretation, that this public servant is excluded from the definition, is further away from the plain language of the statute. The majority opinion focuses heavily on the meaning of member because it ignores the first words of § 25-4-105(3). It states, (3) No public servant shall: ... (a) Be a contractor ... with the governmental entity of which he is a member... . Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-105(3) (1972) (emphasis added). Section 25-4-103( o ) defines public servant liberally; the term includes any elected official, any officer, director, commissioner, agent or employee. Hence, when substituting one of these words for public servant, the statute at issue here becomes the following: No employee shall be a contractor with the governmental entity of which he is a member. Accordingly, the linguistical significance of member becomes merely functional. It is a tool employed by the drafters to explicitly say the obvious, that a conflict of interest happens in cases where the public official deals with the county of which he is associated, not where he deals with those governmental entities of which he is not a member. For example, the legislature included member here in order to make certain that John Doe, an employee of Hinds County, is prohibited from having a business relationship with Hinds County; but he may do business with Warren County, or the City of Ridgeland, or Yazoo County, i.e., governmental entities of which he is not a member. Note also, that § 25-4-3, a section of definitions not specifically designated for the statute at issue, may nevertheless be helpful in defining member. It states that public official shall mean ... (ii) Any member, officer, director, commissioner, supervisor, chief, head, agent or employee ... of any political subdivision... . My point is that since member is used in series with terms such as officer and supervisor, then the drafters of this legislation must have understood that member had a different, or more general meaning than terms such as officer or supervisor. The majority seems to heavily rely on what the Assistant Attorney General said during oral argument in a related case. There is no caselaw on this statute, and thus, even though the attorney himself should be held to consistency in his arguments, the statute and positive law of Mississippi is not bound by the arguments made by attorneys. The majority wishes to make a distinction between those who make policy and those whose jobs are merely ministerial. Even though there is good reason for such a rule, and there is analogous caselaw in other areas of law making such a distinction, this Court cannot make such a distinction in this case. The reason is that the opportunity to make such a distinction occurred when the legislature passed this law. It has already decided the policy; once that has happened, this Court's role is to apply that policy to the facts. Furthermore, the statute in question here further precludes this Court from active policy making, in the legislative purpose section. It states, among other things, that public servants shall endeavor to pursue a course of conduct which will not raise suspicion among the public that they are likely to be engaged in acts that violate the public trust. This legislature declares that elective and public office and employment is a public trust... . The majority's suspicion is admittedly raised by the acts of McCullough in this case. Whether his motives were good or bad, he certainly did not endeavor to pursue a course of conduct which will not raise suspicion among the public. Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-101 (1972). This case is analogous to Mississippi's Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys. A lawyer cannot place his client's money in his own bank account; he must place it in a separate account. Rule 1.15. For many attorneys, this rule is unnecessary, because they are responsible and can be trusted to keep accurate records and such, so that their client's funds are not mishandled. However, the rule exists and must be followed, even by those who would otherwise act with the utmost good faith and responsibility, in order to ensure that mishandling of a client's funds rarely happens. Without such rules, the few who would act in bad faith would scar the entire legal profession, and in effect, ruin the vital public trust in its officers of the court. As assignee, McCullough has legal rights which are enforceable against the county. Even though in his capacity as clerk of the Board of Supervisors, he does not vote, he still has a special advantage due to his position; that is, he has opportunity to gain knowledge which would put the county at an unfair bargaining position, if a breach of contract is alleged and litigation begins. It yields the appearance of impropriety, a set of facts similar to insider trading. Whether a violation of the public trust occurred in fact is irrelevant, since this yields the suspicion that a violation has occurred. Hence, McCullough's involvment in this case does reflect unfavorably upon the state and local governments. Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-101 (1972). The chancery clerk is a member of the county entity, because he is subordinate to the county government and within the county's bureaucratic structure. Therefore, he is a member. He is not a member of the city, because its government has no authority over him. The word member in its common usage refers to a part of the whole, not a part of a specific division of the whole. The entity here is the county; McCullough is the Chancery Clerk of Chickasaw County, which is a governmental entity of which he is a member. The majority states that McCullough is not a member of the board of supervisors; this is true, but the statute prohibits membership in the governmental entity, which, here, is not merely the county board of supervisors, but the county itself. Miss. Code Ann. § 25-4-103(h) (1972). In fact, the business relationship in existence here is not one with the board of supervisors, but one with the county itself, because the board acts on behalf of the county.