Opinion ID: 2209506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Foreseeability and State's Duty to Woollen

Text: We have noted: ``Duty' is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the sameto conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk.... `A duty, in negligence cases, may be defined as an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, Limited Duty § 53 at 356 (5th ed.1984). `Foreseeability is a factor in establishing a defendant's duty, or, as expressed by Justice Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 394, 111 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1916): [F]oresight of the consequences involves the creation of a duty[.] ...' Lemke, 243 Neb. at 648-49, 502 N.W.2d at 90, quoting Union Pacific RR. Co. v. Kaiser Ag. Chem. Co., 229 Neb. 160, 425 N.W.2d 872 (1988). See, similarly, Popple v. Rose, 254 Neb. 1, 573 N.W.2d 765 (1998). Whether a legal duty exists for actionable negligence is a question of law dependent on the facts of a particular case. Id.; Schmidt v. Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 245 Neb. 776, 515 N.W.2d 756 (1994); Lemke, supra . For Woollen to recover, it was necessary that Woollen establish that the State could have foreseen the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred. The record on appeal amply demonstrates `[f]oresight of the consequences,' Lemke, 243 Neb. at 649, 502 N.W.2d at 90, sufficient to create a duty for the State to repair the deep ruts, i.e., a localized defect, and to warn of or minimize the dangers created by the inadequate clear zone between the edge of the highway pavement and the culvert headwall. With respect to the ruts, the State's foresight arose as a result of, inter alia, its promulgation of safety standards, multiple and varied examinations of Highway 136 which confirmed its unacceptable noncompliance with State safety standards at the accident site, and the State's actual knowledge of other automobile accidents, including those caused by hydroplaning, which occurred at the same location where Woollen lost control of his car. With respect to the concrete headwall, the State's foresight arose primarily from the evidence establishing the State's adoption of the safety standard's clear zones. The record contains evidence that a factor to be considered in analyzing the State's duty to repair and maintain a roadway is the existence of an adequate clear zone. A clear zone is an area beyond the roadway within which a fixed object, such as a utility pole or culvert headwall, is considered a hazard to vehicles. According to the evidence, when a hazard is identified in a clear zone, the State ordinarily has three alternatives: remove the hazard, relocate the hazard beyond the clear zone, or shield motorists from the hazard, customarily using a guardrail. According to the evidence, once a clear zone is identified, it should be maintained clear of hazards because conduct of drivers, including misconduct of drivers, causing vehicles to leave the roadway is anticipated. The concept of a forgiving highway has been developed to allow for driver error, including a driver's leaving the roadway and traveling off the shoulder or into the median. Goodermote v. State, 856 S.W.2d 715 (Tenn.App.1993). See, also, Martin v. Missouri Highway and Transp., 981 S.W.2d 577 (Mo.App. 1998). The safety standards in evidence in this case provide for a clear zone in the area of the accident because it is foreseeable that drivers will leave the roadway and an unimpeded clear zone reduces injuries. Thus, the trial court concluded, the State had a duty to adhere to its clear zone standards by warning of or minimizing the danger of the concrete headwall. We conclude, as did the trial court, that the likelihood of an automobile accident at this location was foreseeable, thus creating a duty for the State to repair the deep ruts and to warn or minimize the dangers to motorists of the hazards precipitated by the narrow clear zone. See Maresh v. State, 241 Neb. 496, 489 N.W.2d 298 (1992).