Opinion ID: 3010542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Injury from bar examination requirements

Text: Each state retains the authority to decide what applicants may take its bar examination and may be admitted to the bar.7 Accordingly, MSL's argument that the ABA received “carte-blanche delegated authority to decide who can take bar exams,” MSL reply br. at 19, is simply wrong. See cases cited supra note 7. Many, but not all, states consider the accreditation decisions of the ABA in their legal education requirement (one of many requirements) for taking the bar examination. Yet, every state retains the final authority to set 7. See, e.g., Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 569, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 1996 (1984) (“Pursuant to the State Constitution the Arizona Supreme Court has plenary authority to determine admissions to the bar.”); In re Murphy, 393 A.2d 369, 371 (Pa. 1978) (bar admission “exercised [] exclusively by the Supreme Court”); In re Hansen, 275 N.W.2d 790, 796 (Minn. 1978) (“We have not delegated our authority to the ABA but, instead, have simply made a rational decision to follow the standards of educational excellence it has developed.”); Potter v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 403 F. Supp. 1036, 1040 (D.N.J. 1975) (State's adoption of “the standards of an approving body does not support a conclusion that such adoption is an abrogation or delegation of the power or duty to supervise the practice of law in this State pursuant to the mandate of the State Constitution.”), aff’d, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976). 20 all the bar admission rules, and individual applicants or law schools can petition the states for waivers or changes. To the extent that MSL's alleged injury arises from the inability of its graduates to take the bar examination in most states, the injury is the result of state action and thus is immune from antitrust action under the doctrine of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. at 352, 63 S.Ct. at 314. The ABA does not decide who can take the bar examinations. Rather, it makes an accreditation decision which it conveys to the states, but the states make the decisions as to bar admissions. Without state action, the ABA's accreditation decisions would not affect state bar admissions requirements. Because the states are sovereign in imposing the bar admission requirements, the clear articulation and active supervision requirements urged by MSL are inapplicable. See Quinn v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1226, 1240 (D. Del. 1985). In short, this case does not involve a delegation of state authority. To the contrary, the states use the ABA to assist them in their decision-making processes. Thus, we have here a government action case. Our holding is consistent with current antitrust jurisprudence. The Supreme Court held in a challenge to Arizona's bar admissions policies that the conduct in question was in reality that of the Arizona Supreme Court, and thus immune under Parker. Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 573-74, 104 S.Ct. 1989, 1998 (1984). Further, the Supreme Court has held that when a state supreme court adopts a state bar rule banning legal advertising, and retains final enforcement authority over 21 it, Parker immunity applies. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 361, 97 S.Ct. 2691, 2697 (1977) (“The Arizona Supreme Court is the real party in interest; it adopted the rules, and it is the ultimate trier of fact and law in the enforcement process.”). This case is entirely analogous. The states do not adopt the ABA's accreditation processes, but they do adopt and give effect to the results.8 Thus, the cases cited by MSL (Midcal, Patrick, ant Ticor) are inapplicable because they dealt with situations where private parties were engaging in conduct, whether price-fixing (Midcal and Ticor) or denying hospital privileges (Patrick), which led directly to the alleged antitrust injury. Here, the state action setting the bar examination requirements led to the alleged injury.9 Our holding is also consistent with several court of appeals and district court decisions applying the principles of Noerr. In Lawline v. American Bar Ass’n, 956 F.2d 1378 (7th Cir. 1992), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held under Noerr that the ABA could not be held liable for any antitrust injury resulting from the Illinois Supreme Court's adoption of ethical standards developed and promulgated by the ABA. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court opinion in Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian head, Inc, 486 U.S. 492, 108 S.Ct. 1931 (1988), is also consistent with our holding because it specifically excluded from consideration any injury resulting from the adoption of the challenged standards by any government and dealt only with the independent marketplace effect of the defendant's conduct. Id. at 500, 108 S.Ct. at 1937. 9. In its reply brief, MSL continues to miss the crucial point that it is the direct action of the states which causes its injury and continues to discuss cases where private conduct caused the alleged antitrust injury. MSL reply br. at 11-15. 22 1383. Similarly, in Sessions Tank Liners, Inc. v. Joor Mfg., Inc., 17 F.3d 295, 299 (9th Cir. 1994), the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a defendant which convinced a private association to produce a code that was adopted by or relied upon by a number of municipalities, and that injured the plaintiff, was immune from antitrust liability because the “injuries for which [plaintiff] seeks recovery flowed directly from government action.”10 Id. at 299. These cases cannot be distinguished effectively from this case. In another analogous case, an organization that accredited chiropractic schools was held immune from Sherman Act liability for denying a school's accreditation because of a dispute over educational philosophy, when the alleged injury resulted from state decisions to deny licenses to graduates of unaccredited schools and from the effects of lobbying in favor of those state decisions. Sherman College of Straight Chiropractic v. American Chiropractic Ass’n, 654 F. Supp. 716, 722-23 (N.D. Ga. 1986), aff'd, 813 F.2d 349 (11th Cir. 1987). See also Zavaletta v. American Bar Ass'n, 721 F. Supp. 96 (E.D. Va. 1989) (dismissing suit by students at unaccredited law school because of Noerr immunity). In these circumstances, MSL's claim that the ABA's conduct injured it because its graduates cannot take the bar examination in most states fails.