Opinion ID: 2284813
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant's third contention is that Appellees presented insufficient evidence that the fetus was viable and, therefore, Appellant was entitled to a directed verdict. However, Appellees did present expert testimony that a fetus delivered at 31 weeksthe point at which Appellant discovered Hillman's high blood pressure could survive. Specifically, Dr. Fields, an obstetrician and gynecologist, testified that on August 7, Hillman was approximately 31 weeks pregnant. According to Dr. Fields, If you deliver that baby at 31 weeks, its statistics are overwhelmingly in favor of its survival and its survival intact. Dr. Fields also testified that his opinion was based on a reasonable degree of medical certainty. Appellant urges that such expert testimony was insufficient in light of allegedly contradictory testimony about the serious health risks to a child born prior to 37 weeks of pregnancy. These two assertions are not contradictory. The fact that a baby might be subject to major health risks does not necessarily make it unviable. [T]he expression `viable fetus' means the baby has reached such a state of development that it can presently live outside the female body as well as within it. Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d 901, 905 (Ky.1955). Viability is not a guarantee that baby will live outside the womb; it is only a claim that the fetus has developed sufficiently that it is possible to survive. An unhealthy baby may still be a viable one. Viability would only be undercut by testimony of certain death resulting from a premature birth. No such testimony was offered here. Even if it had, the Appellees offered testimony to the contrary, which would have been sufficient to avoid a directed verdict. Similarly, even if testimony about health risks that was introduced at trial did contradict other evidence of the viability of the fetus, the controversy would not entitle Appellant to a directed verdict, removing it from the purview of the jury. On the contrary, it is precisely the jury's role to resolve such factual disputes. Cf. Dixie Ice Cream Co. v. Ravenna Grocery Co., 306 Ky. 182, 184, 206 S.W.2d 824, 825 (1947) (jury determines which witnesses' testimony to believe). With direct expert testimony that the fetus was viable, there is no doubt the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude the same.