Opinion ID: 3157592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Litigation – Past and Present

Text: In 1993, Clemons was convicted of murdering Julie and Robin Kerry and given two death sentences. All of his claims of error were rejected by this Court, State v. Clemons, 946 S.W.2d 206 (Mo. banc 1997), and the Supreme Court of the United States declined to review those claims, 522 U.S. 928 (1997). All claims that Clemons could have raised and did not raise in this appeal were waived. Matthews v. State, 175 S.W.3d 110, 115 (Mo. banc 2005). Rule 29.15 provided Clemons with the “exclusive procedure” for raising claims that his death sentences exceeded the maximum punishment allowed by law, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose those sentences, or that his convictions or sentences resulted from a violation of his rights under the state or federal constitutions. Rule 29.15(a). With the help of new lawyers, Clemons asserted more than 25 of these “post 6 conviction” claims and acknowledged that, pursuant to Rule 29.15(d), he was waiving all claims other than those he raised. After extensive discovery and a hearing, Clemons’ Rule 29.15 motion was overruled. This Court affirmed that decision, Clemons, 946 S.W.2d at 221, and the Supreme Court declined to review Clemons’ post conviction claims. 522 U.S. 928 (1997). Clemons then moved to the federal courts. There, another new group of lawyers challenged many of this Court’s rulings and asserted various new claims that had never been presented to this or any other state court. After more discovery and another hearing, the federal district court denied all of Clemons’ claims – save one. Clemons v. Luebbers, 212 F. Supp. 2d 1105, 1122 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (vacating Clemons’ death sentences because certain jurors were excluded who stated they could not sentence Clemons to death if he did not actually push one of the two victims to her death). On appeal, however, that claim – and all of the others – were denied, Clemons v. Luebbers, 381 F.3d 744 (8th Cir. 2004), and the Supreme Court declined to review those claims, 546 U.S. 828 (2005). The trail of litigation described above leads to Clemons’ current petition for writ of habeas corpus, which was filed in this Court on June 12, 2009 (the “2009 Petition”). Given Clemons’ many opportunities to litigate his claims (all of which have been denied at least twice, and some as many as four times), and given that he long ago waived all unasserted claims, one may reasonably ask, “What’s left?” The answer, properly, is: “Not much.” 7 First, an inmate is entitled to relief – even at this late date – if he discovers “new evidence” (i.e., evidence that was not – and through the exercise of reasonable diligence could not have been – known earlier) constituting “clear and convincing” proof that he did not commit the crimes. 1 State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548 (Mo. banc 2003). This type of claim is referred to as a “freestanding” claim of actual innocence because the inmate does not have to show that his conviction resulted from a constitutional violation. Clear and convincing proof of actual innocence, standing alone, is sufficient to merit relief. Id. An inmate may also raise a new constitutional claim at this point if, but only if, the inmate can establish an adequate excuse for failing to raise the claim earlier. There are only two such excuses: (1) proof of actual innocence that, though it does not meet the Amrine standard of “clear and convincing,” is sufficient to show that the inmate’s actual innocence is “more likely than not,” Sclup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 315 (1995); or (2) proof that there was both (a) an external “cause” that prevented the inmate from asserting the claim earlier and (b) extraordinary “prejudice” that resulted from the constitutional violation, Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485-87 (1986). Accordingly, after all state and federal reviews are finished, an inmate can only assert a new constitutional claim if 1 Once an inmate has exhausted his rights to trial, to direct appeal, to move for post conviction relief, to appeal if that motion is overruled, and to further review in the federal trial and appellate courts, a compelling argument can be made that no conviction should ever be set aside except upon a clear and convincing showing of actual innocence. See Clay v. Dormire, 37 S.W.3d 214, 218 (Mo. banc 2000) (“actual innocence component is all the more appropriate for Missouri cases given the fact that defendants are already afforded an initial habeas-like post-conviction relief proceeding … in which constitutional claims … like those that so often appear in habeas corpus petitions may be presented”). 8 he can pass through either the gateway of “actual innocence” or the gateway of “cause and prejudice.” In the 2009 Petition, Clemons raises only the first category of claims, i.e., a so-called “freestanding” claim of actual innocence. By the time final arguments were presented to the Master, however, Clemons was asserting new constitutional claims under both the “actual innocence” and “cause and prejudice” gateways. These claims are addressed separately below. 2