Opinion ID: 2468742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Return to Work/Education Level Distinction

Text: Again, plaintiffs are correct in their assertions that the statute distinguishes between workers who are able to return to work and those who cannot and between workers with various levels of education. Making a distinction does not necessarily result in an equal protection violation. Defendants argue that the educational level distinction is reasonable because the less educated worker is likely to encounter greater difficulty re-entering the job market after an injury. We agree. The factors in Tennessee Code Annotated Section 50-6-242 merely recognize that older or less educated workers with no transferable job skills or no reasonable employment opportunities may have a higher vocational disability so as to warrant a higher workers' compensation award. The different treatment of workers who satisfy this criteria is based upon a reasonable difference. Thus, there is a rational basis for the distinction. Similarly, it is reasonable to treat the worker who returns to work making as much or more than before the injury differently than the worker whose injuries prevent the return to work at the before-injury wage. The fact that a worker's income has declined is relevant to the determination of vocational disability. The statute allows the Court to consider the factor by allowing an increase in an award for such an employee. Indeed, even before Section 241 was enacted, the fact of re-employment after an injury was relevant in determining the extent of vocational disability. Corcoran v. Foster Auto GMC, Inc., 746 S.W.2d at 459. The statute is consistent with the common law. It encourages employers to retain injured workers at wages equal to or greater than wages received prior to the injury by providing for smaller disability awards if the employee is retained. Re-employment of injured workers is a legitimate state objective which justifies the distinction between those injured employees who are returned to work and those who are not. The distinction has a rational basis. In sum, we hold that plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden of showing that Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 50-6-241 and 242 are not reasonably related to any legitimate state interests. See Fritts v. Wallace, 723 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tenn. 1987) (party attacking the constitutionality of statute must demonstrate its unconstitutionality); see also Shelby Cty. Election Com'n v. Turner, 755 S.W.2d 774, 777 (Tenn. 1988) (if any reasonable construction satisfies constitutional requirements, courts have an obligation to uphold the statute); Marion Cty. Bd. v. Marion Cty. Election Com'n, 594 S.W.2d 681, 684 (Tenn. 1980) (any doubt as to the constitutionality of a statute should be resolved in favor of finding it constitutional); Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 223 Tenn. 415, 446 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1969) (a strong presumption in favor of constitutionality exists when a statute is challenged). [9] The impairment rating model of Tennessee Code Annotated Sections 50-6-241 and 242, including the multipliers, use of the AMA Guides and the other factors in the statute, and the escape provisions in section 242, assist courts in determining the extent of vocational disability, provide a measure of uniformity and fairness, foster predictability, encourage employers to return injured employees to work, and may aid in controlling the rising costs associated with work-related injuries. The statutes are rationally based. They do not violate equal protection. Therefore, the trial court erred in finding the statutes unconstitutional.