Opinion ID: 2331594
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The prosecutor's remarks in this case amounted to plain error.

Text: Applying these standards to the present case, we conclude that there was plain error. First, there is no evidence that Adams's failure to object was strategic. In Dorman v. State , we explained that where a defendant neither injected the issue of his silence into the case nor obtained a benefit from the prosecutor's inculpatory comment, there is no basis for inferring that the failure to object was tactical unless it is implied that defense counsel invited error for the purpose of obtaining a reversal on appeal. [78] Such a conclusion, we cautioned, is not one which should be lightly inferred in any case, for it would preclude review of the most fundamental defects under the plain error doctrine. [79] We have already determined that Adams did not inject the issue of his silence into the case, [80] and Adams did not obtain any discernible benefit from the prosecutor's comments. This case turned chiefly on credibility, and the prosecutor argued that Adams was a less credible witness because he did not talk to the police. The State argues that Adams cannot . . . show that defense counsel did not make a tactical decision to refrain from objecting to the prosecutor's references to Adams'[s] silence because [d]efense counsel was well aware that Adams'[s] silence could not be used against Adams . . . during the first part of the state's case-in-chief. But the prosecutor's remarks during cross-examination occurred four days after the sidebar discussion about Adams's silence during the State's case-in-chief, and his remarks during closing argument occurred a full month later. Defense counsel's awareness of Adams's rights during the State's case-in-chief is not enough to show that his failure to object later in the trial was tactical. [81] Second, the error in this case was obvious. The major cases establishing that Alaska law protects a defendant's pre- and post-arrest silence were all decided in the 1980s; [82] Adams was tried in late 2005. Thus, the law protecting Adams's right to silence was well established at the time of his trial and the prosecutor committed an obvious violation of that right by expressly arguing that Adams's silence diminished his credibility. [83] Third, the prosecutor's comments affected Adams's substantial rights. As explained above, any comment on Adams's post-arrest silence would affect substantial rights because it would violate article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution. But those comments that were limited to Adams's pre-arrest silence also affected his substantial rights. As the court of appeals explained in Silvernail v. State , whether grounded in the Alaska constitution or the rules of evidence, the prohibition on using evidence of a defendant's silence is motivated by the same concern: The underlying rationale of the constitutional bar against admitting evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is the concern that such evidence is only minimally probative, while possessing a high potential for prejudice to the defendant's case. This is the same basic concern expressed in Alaska Rule of Evidence 403. [84] To put it another way, the introduction of evidence of a defendant's silence, whether pre- or post-arrest, affects substantial rights in precisely the same wayby admitting evidence that has an inherently low probative value but a high potential for unfair prejudice. Admission of such evidence threatens the fairness of the proceeding and therefore affects substantial rights. Finally, the prosecutor's comments were prejudicial. We conclude that the State has not shown that the prosecutor's improper questions and comment about post-arrest silence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And even if our analysis is limited to the non-constitutional claim that the prosecutor commented on Adams's pre-arrest silence, we conclude that Adams has shown that there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of the case. Our decisions in Dorman and Gunnerud and the court of appeals' decisions in Van Hatten and Silvernail identify several factors that should be considered when determining whether a prosecutor's comments on a defendant's silence were harmless error. First, of course, is the strength of the State's other evidence. Gunnerud and Silvernail instruct that comment on a defendant's silence is more likely to be prejudicial if the conviction depended primarily on conflicting witness testimony. [85] This case hinged primarily on the conflicting testimony of Adams and K.S. The elements of the crime at issue were whether K.S. was unaware of the sexual act and whether Adams knew that she was unaware. Adams testified that K.S. was aware and consented to the sexual act. K.S. testified that after going to see Emma Hawley, the next thing she remembered was waking up with Adams on top of her engaged in intercourse, and that she did not consent. The State's other chief witness was Mae Adams. Some parts of Mae Adams's testimony did contradict Adams's testimonyfor instance, Mae testified that K.S. was just lying on the bed with her eyes open, while Adams testified that K.S. was actively participating. But other aspects of Mae's story corroborated Adams's testimony, and Adams attempted to impeach Mae's credibility based on the fact that she accepted a plea bargain on the eve of trial that allowed her to serve minimal jail time and avoid sex offender registration in exchange for her testimony. Second, in Dorman we observed that comments on a defendant's silence are more likely to be prejudicial if they occur, as they did here, during closing argument. [86] In Dorman, we noted that plain error review of such comments was appropriate in part because of our doubts concerning the effectiveness of an objection made during final argument. [87] We explained: A timely objection could have prevented the evidence from ever reaching the jury. However, an objection during final argument is not so effective. The prejudicial comment is before the jury before the objection can be made, and the curative effect of an admonition of the court to disregard the comment is of debatable value.[ [88] ] The court of appeals in Van Hatten also recognized that comments on a defendant's silence are more likely to be prejudicial if the comment was express rather than a brief and passing reference and if the evidence was directly elicited by the prosecutor's questioning. [89] All of these circumstances are present here; the prosecutor first directly elicited evidence of Adams's silence on cross-examination, and then he expressly commented on that silence during his closing argument. We conclude that Adams has shown that there is a reasonable probability that the prosecutor's comments on pre-arrest silence affected the jury's verdict and that the State has not shown that the comments on post-arrest silence were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus there was plain error as to the comments on both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence.