Opinion ID: 2171575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severability of the Option to Purchase

Text: Appellant cites Akerley v. Lammi, Me., 217 A.2d 396 (1966), for the proposition that when the intent of contracting parties is undetermined, an issue of fact is presented which renders summary judgment unavailable. Appellant contends that the option term in the Roth-Malmsten agreement was intended by the contracting parties to be independent of, and severable from, the other terms of the rental agreement. On that theory, appellant's breach of his duty to make monthly rental payments might have terminated his right to occupy the property as a lessee but did not extinguish his right to demand sale of the Roth property at any time within fifteen years after the contract was entered into. It is appellant's view that the intention of the parties regarding the exercise of the option after nonpayment of rent presented a genuine issue of fact that precluded the entry of summary judgment. When contracting parties have sought to reduce their agreement to writing and that writing is incomplete or ambiguous on its face, a trier of fact may look to parol evidence as an aid in interpreting the instrument. Lewiston Firefighters Association v. City of Lewiston, Me., 354 A.2d 154, 163 (1976). However, where the instrument appears on its face to integrate completely the understanding of the parties, and does so in unambiguous language, the intent of the parties is established by the instrument alone, so that, without reformation of the instrument, parol evidence may not be introduced over objection to prove that the language should be understood as having some extraordinary meaning. Appellant did not assert that the written agreement in question did not fully and correctly integrate the understandings of the parties. The contract contains seven paragraphs establishing the various rights and duties of the respective parties. Appellant's duty to make monthly rental payments and his right, at his option, to purchase the leased property are provided for in the same paragraph and in consecutive sentences. Appellant's option power is neither open-ended, in terms of duration, nor absolute, but is expressly limited to . . . the Fifteen (15) Years of this Lease. In the absence of anything in the lease suggesting the contrary, this language means that the appellant's right to purchase was concurrent with the lessor-lessee relationship. It follows that the continuing existence of that relationship was a necessary condition for the continuance of the right to purchase. We are not called upon to decide whether the option terminated immediately upon breach of the lease agreement or whether the breaching lessee might have had a reasonable time to exercise the option even after breach. In this case it does not appear that appellant attempted to exercise the option within a reasonable time after breach. There being no genuine issue of fact as to the parties' intent, summary judgment was properly entered for the plaintiffs.