Opinion ID: 739082
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Writ-Writing

Text: 31 Johnson is a writ writer, which is generally understood to mean a prisoner who files lawsuits, and/or assists other prisoners in the preparation or prosecution of lawsuits, usually against prison (or sometimes jail) authorities and including conditions of confinement and habeas cases and suits against law enforcement and court personnel. Johnson claims that many parole files contain some record of or reference to a prisoner's litigation activities, and that this information is considered by parole panels. Johnson contends that this information is viewed negatively by the Board and that many prisoners are denied parole at least in part due to their litigiousness. Johnson contends that the Board is in fact retaliating against him and the other prisoners who avail themselves of their constitutional right of access to the courts. Furthermore, insofar as this practice discriminates against writ writers in the general prison population, he contends that it constitutes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. B. The Magistrate Judge's Ruling 32 Reviewing the evidence, the magistrate judge found that writ writing activities were often discussed in parole interviews and that documentation of these activities often appeared in parole files. Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1214. The magistrate judge also found that prisoners were entitled to assist other prisoners in preparing writs and other legal documents. Id. at 1213. After noting that historically there has been a bias against inmates considered to be writ writers by the TDCJ-ID, the magistrate judge concluded that this bias restricts, at least as a practical matter, an inmate's access to the courts. Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1212. He likewise opined that [a]ny distinction made between inmates who seek access to the courts and those who do not violates the equal protection clause. Id. at 1213 (emphasis added). Later in his opinion the magistrate judge clarified his findings of injury, stating that this perception of retaliation has chilled, at least to some extent, inmates' exercise of their constitutionally protected right of access to the courts. Id. at 1215 (footnote omitted). 33 The magistrate judge ordered the Board to adopt by rule a policy that prohibits consideration of inmates' exercise of the constitutionally protected right of access to the courts and shall specify that such activity is wholly irrelevant to the parole decision making process. Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1215. He further required that this rule shall establish specific, enforceable sanctions for all violations thereof. Id. In addition, the order required that [a]ll existing [inmate] files be reviewed for and purged of any and all documentation related to an inmates' litigation activity as the specific inmate becomes eligible for [parole] review. Only upon written request of an inmate shall any litigation material or information be included or retained in his or her parole file. Id.(emphasis added). C. Analysis
34 The elements of a claim under a retaliation theory are the plaintiff's invocation of a specific constitutional right, the defendant's intent to retaliate against the plaintiff for his or her exercise of that right, a retaliatory adverse act, and causation, i.e., but for the retaliatory motive the complained of incident ... would not have occurred. Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1166 (5th Cir.1995) (citations omitted ), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 800, 133 L.Ed.2d 747 (1996). In this case, Johnson must prove that he and other prisoners engaged in constitutionally protected litigation activity, were denied parole, and that such action was taken in an effort to chill [prisoners'] access to the courts or to punish them for having brought suit. Enplanar, Inc. v. Marsh, 11 F.3d 1284, 1296 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 926, 115 S.Ct. 312, 130 L.Ed.2d 275 (1994). See also Serio v. Members of La. State Bd. of Pardons, 821 F.2d 1112, 1114 (5th Cir.1987). The relevant showing in such cases must be more than the prisoner's personal belief that he is the victim of retaliation. Edwards, 51 F.3d at 580. 35 It has long been recognized that prisoners generally enjoy a constitutional right of access to the courts. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 483-485, 89 S.Ct. 747, 748, 21 L.Ed.2d 718 (1969); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 547-549, 61 S.Ct. 640, 641, 85 L.Ed. 1034 (1941). This right of access for prisoners is not unlimited, however; rather, it encompasses only a reasonably adequate opportunity to file nonfrivolous legal claims challenging their convictions or conditions of confinement. Lewis v. Casey, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 2182, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). Furthermore, we held in Tighe v. Wall, 100 F.3d 41, 43 (5th Cir.1996), that [p]risoners have no right to a particular prisoner's help in legal matters as long as the putative recipient's constitutional right of access to the courts is not infringed. The relevant constitutional protection in this instance accrues to the benefit of the prisoner in whose name the lawsuit is filed, not those who assist in the preparation of that lawsuit. 15 See Lewis, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2184 (the Constitution does not require that prisoners ... be able to conduct generalized research, but only that they be able to present their grievances to the courts). Thus, neither any frivolous filings nor secondary litigation activity, i.e., legal research and writing that does not involve preparation of lawsuits challenging a writ writer's own conviction(s) or the conditions of his or her confinement, may comprise the basis of a retaliation claim. Conversely, a parole panel's consideration of such unprotected activity in denying a prisoner parole does not infringe that prisoner's constitutional right of access to the courts. Id. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2182 ([i]mpairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration). The magistrate judge did not have the benefit of either Lewis or Tighe, and, of course, is not to be faulted for failing to address them. 36 In concluding that the prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts had been violated, the magistrate judge plainly considered, and proceeded throughout on the assumption, that any and all prisoner writ writing or litigation activity was constitutionally protected. At no point did he ever distinguish between frivolous filings and secondary litigation activity on the one hand and protected filings of at least arguable merit on the other. 16 Almost all of the prisoners who testified alluded to participation in numerous lawsuits. 17 In the absence of detailed information regarding the named parties, subject matter, arguable merit, and disposition of those lawsuits, however, there is no way to determine the extent to which the prisoners' constitutional rights of access to the courts, as defined by Lewis and Tighe, are implicated. Furthermore, when a prisoner's litigation history includes both protected and unprotected activity, if a parole panel's adverse action is attributable to unprotected activity and would have occurred on that basis regardless of the exercise of protected rights, the claim fails on the element of causation, i.e., the requirement that but for the state's motive to retaliate against the prisoner for the exercise of his constitutional rights parole would not have been denied. 18 See Enplanar, Inc., 11 F.3d at 1297. 37 While the magistrate judge's use of an improper and overly inclusive legal standard (viewing any and all writ writing as constitutionally protected) alone requires reversal, we also note other inadequacies in the findings on which the judgment below depends. Because this is an official capacity lawsuit, it is a condition precedent to liability under section 1983 that the challenged conduct of the individual Board members be tied to an official Board custom or policy, formal or informal. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325-327, 102 S.Ct. 445, 454, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981). While the magistrate judge did observe that writ writing activities are frequently discussed in parole interviews and that documentation of such activities frequently appears in inmates' parole files, Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1214, he made no finding that these actions were sufficiently widespread and approved to represent the implementation of an official formal or informal custom or policy of the Board. See Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1154 (5th Cir.1982) (citation omitted ) (systemwide injunctive relief may not be predicated on individual misconduct that 'is not part of a pattern of persistent and deliberate official policy' ), opinion amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983). In the absence of this threshold finding, the imposition of liability, under either a retaliation or an equal protection theory, was premature. 38 Furthermore, while we do not directly address the sufficiency of the evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding that there has historically been a bias against writ writers by employees of the Texas prison system, we nonetheless express concern over the magistrate judge's reliance, both expressly and through apparent reliance on witness testimony, upon findings associated with the hallmark Texas prison litigation case of Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D.Tex.1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 679 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir.1982), opinion amended in part and vacated in part, 688 F.2d 266 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1042, 103 S.Ct. 1438, 75 L.Ed.2d 795 (1983). Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1212 n. 12. The findings involved in that case were made more than a decade and a half ago and involved the day-to-day administration of penal institutions run by the predecessor of the TDCJ-ID, not the parole system which is the object of this litigation. Findings that in the past (or present), employees of other state departments or agencies have exhibited a bias against writ writers do not support a conclusion that the defendants in this case, members of the Board, have acted and continue to act with retaliatory animus in denying prisoners parole. The findings of the Ruiz court are generally inapposite and of only the most marginal relevance to the current litigation. 39 In addition, we hold that the magistrate judge's findings of causation are inadequate because the mere consideration of litigation activities, even if such activities are protected under Lewis and Tighe, does not in and of itself make out Johnson's retaliation claim. Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1215-1216 n. 17. There must be a finding, adequately supported by the evidence, that pursuant to an established policy or custom (formal or informal), the Board retaliated against writ writers for engaging in protected activity by withholding parole. The causative component of this claim is an adequately supported finding that the Board's policy or custom actually played a part in its denial of parole to Johnson (and other writ writers) and that but for the Board's policy or custom Johnson (and other writ writers) would not have been denied parole. 19 Nowhere, however, does the opinion below make any such determination. Rather, the magistrate judge's opinion merely makes several references to instances where litigation activities appeared in parole files or were raised in interviews, and discusses the prisoners' perception of a linkage between parole denial and prisoner litigiousness. There is no finding whatever that adverse consideration of writ writing by the Board actually played a part in its denial of parole to any particular inmate (or any identified group of inmates). The absence of such a finding is especially significant given the background of Johnson and the other testifying prisoners, which raises substantial doubt as to whether this record would adequately support such a finding. 20 40 Finally, we regard the evidence cited by the magistrate judge to demonstrate the chilling of protected rights system-wide as inadequate. In support of his finding, the magistrate judge noted only the testimony of two witnesses: the first, a single prisoner who once refused to receive legal mail because of his own, self-generated personal belief that this would improve his chances of obtaining parole; the second, a staff attorney for the 14th District Court of Appeals in Houston, Texas, who related double hearsay statements purportedly originating from unidentified prisoners regarding their having dismissed appeals of their own convictions, supposedly for parole-related reasons. 21 Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1215 n. 19. The magistrate judge's conclusion of constitutional injury relies exclusively upon testimony concerning the subjective appraisal of prisoners, with little or nothing in the way of objective evidence of actual injury. 22 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 622-624, 97 S.Ct. 1972, 1982, 52 L.Ed.2d 617 (1977) (to state actionable retaliation claim any chill of protected rights must be more than minimal and not wholly subjective). Moreover, the findings and evidence do not identify and address in this connection writ writing which is protectable under Lewis and Tighe, as distinguished from other writ writing. There is no evidence of any specific writ writing activity protectable under Lewis and Tighe which was actually foregone because of this purported chill. The evidence discussed does not address any chill of the constitutionally protected right of access to the courts actually suffered by Johnson, the class representative, and is in any case insufficient to independently justify systemwide relief. Lewis, --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2183-2184. 41 In sum, we conclude that due to the application of an improper legal standard concerning the extent to which the right of access to the courts protects particular litigation activities of prisoners, the judgment finding merit in Johnson's retaliation claim must be reversed and remanded for further consideration. On remand, findings must be made regarding the extent to which Johnson, the only named plaintiff, has engaged in constitutionally protected litigation activities and whether a Board custom or policy (formal or informal) authorizing or endorsing punitive retaliation for that protected activity actually played a part in its denial of his parole. 23 And, if he would have been denied parole notwithstanding such consideration, an actionable claim is not established. On the basis of these findings, the trial court should determine whether Johnson has suffered any injury which gives him standing to pursue relief in his capacity as class representative. Lewis, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2183; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 262-266, 97 S.Ct. at 562-563; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 502-503, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2207, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). 42 If Johnson is found to have suffered redressable injury in his capacity as class representative, particularized findings will also be needed regarding the nature and scope of the litigation activities and constitutionally cognizable injuries, if any, suffered by contemporary class members. Any conclusion that there is an actionable class injury sufficiently widespread to warrant systemic relief, whether under a retaliation theory or an equal protection theory, must rest on substantially more than the historical findings of other courts, such as the Ruiz court, and the subjective perceptions of class members. Lewis, --- U.S. at ----, 116 S.Ct. at 2184. Finally, any relief ordered under any theory is to be narrowly confined to remediation of any proven constitutional violation; no ordered relief may prohibit the Board's consideration of frivolous lawsuits or other nonprotected litigation activities in making parole determinations.
43 The generally applicable legal standards are noted in our discussion under subpart II(C), supra. And, much of what we have said regarding the writ writer retaliation theory is likewise applicable to the writ writer equal protection theory, including the fact, fatal to the judgment below, that the magistrate judge proceeded on the erroneous assumption that any and all writ writing was constitutionally protected. We assume, arguendo, that a viable sub-class of the prison population--i.e. those who engage in constitutionally protected writ writing--may be shown. 24 To properly prove his claim under this theory, Johnson had to show that because of his constitutionally protected writ writing he was treated unfairly compared to other prisoners who were [otherwise] similarly situated. Hilliard v. Board of Pardons and Paroles, 759 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir.1985) (citation omitted). The magistrate judge stated that [a]ny distinction made between inmates who seek access to the courts and those who do not violates the equal protection clause. Johnson II, 910 F.Supp. at 1213. 44 However, the magistrate judge made no finding that in the case of Johnson, or of any other specific inmate, adverse consideration by the Board of his writ writing--much less his constitutionally protected writ writing--actually played a part in its denial of parole to him. Nor does the evidence show this. Further, no findings were made respecting the treatment meted out by the Board to comparable segments of the nonlitigious prison population, and the record does not provide an adequate basis for any such finding. There is no statistical or similar evidence whatever in the record comparing the parole rates of litigious and nonlitigious prisoners, let alone a comparison of those who engage in constitutionally protected writ writing and those who do not. Even were Johnson able to show that the Board had a largely negative view of writ writing in general, he does not appear to have demonstrated any actual disparate impact upon any class of those engaging in constitutionally protected writ writing. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-293, 107 S.Ct. at 1767 (part of Equal Protection challenge is proof that purposeful discrimination 'had a discriminatory effect' ), quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608-609, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). 45 We further note that although litigation related activity tangentially defines the parameters of the allegedly aggrieved class, the practice actually challenged directly affects only parole consideration and not a prisoner's ability to file a lawsuit or assist another in doing so. Compare Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 637-642, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 2729-2731, 91 L.Ed.2d 527 (1986); Richard v. Hinson, 70 F.3d 415, 417 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 2522, 135 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1996); Wayne v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 730 F.2d 392, 403-404 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1159, 105 S.Ct. 908, 83 L.Ed.2d 922 (1985). And, not all prisoner litigation activity is protected. Lewis; Tighe. Thus, any burden which customary consideration in the parole process of litigation activity generally may impose upon a fundamental right is incidental and does not warrant strict scrutiny under an equal protection analysis. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-874, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2818-2819 (1992); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 49-52, 91 S.Ct. 746, 753-754, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Hence, for equal protection purposes only a conceivable rational relationship is required. Stern, 778 F.2d at 1054. It is simply not irrational to consider general litigiousness, or the filing (or aiding in the filing or the fomenting) of frivolous law suits, or concentration on being a jail house lawyer, or the like, as anti-social activity which may to some extent interfere with and adversely reflect on a prisoner's rehabilitation. 25 If in a rare, given instance such a general approach happens to result in the Board's adverse consideration of a given inmate's constitutionally protected writ writing activity having actually played a part in its denial of parole to that particular inmate, 26 then that may be addressed and redressed under standards essentially comparable to those applicable to the retaliation theory. 46 We accordingly reverse and remand the magistrate judge's ruling on the writ writer claim.