Opinion ID: 1456355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vouching for Witness's Credibility

Text: McClellon also argues that the government improperly vouched for Christofferson's credibility through the use of a written plea agreement and statements made during closing argument. Improper vouching may occur when the government: (1) refers to facts outside the record or implies that the veracity of a witness is supported by outside facts that are unavailable to the jury; (2) implies a guarantee of truthfulness; or (3) expresses a personal opinion about the credibility of a witness. United States v. Benitez-Meraz, 161 F.3d 1163, 1167 (8th Cir.1998).
In this circuit, a confederate's guilty plea or plea agreement is admissible on the government's direct examination of the witness as evidence of the witness' credibility or of his acknowledgement of participation in the offense. United States v. Drews, 877 F.2d 10, 12 (8th Cir. 1989). Whether to admit a written plea agreement into evidence is committed to the district court's discretion. United States v. Morris, 327 F.3d 760, 762 (8th Cir.2003). In response to a defendant's argument that admission of a plea agreement of a witness unfairly bolstered the witness['s] credibility because [its] terms required [the witness] to testify truthfully, this court has stated: [W]hile the existence of a plea agreement may support the witness' credibility by showing his or her interest in testifying truthfully, the plea agreement may also impeach the witness' credibility by showing his or her interest in testifying as the government wishes regardless of the truth. Introduction of the entire plea agreement permits the jury to consider fully the possible conflicting motivations underlying the witness' testimony and, thus, enables the jury to more accurately assess the witness' credibility. Drews, 877 F.2d at 12 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Thus, evidence of the existence, the terms, and the witness's understanding of a plea or witness immunity agreement is not vouching. United States v. Santana, 150 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.1998) (internal quotations, citation, and alteration omitted) (holding that there was no impermissible vouching when witness, when asked to explain terms of his plea agreement, replied Just to tell the truth.); see also United States v. Tulk, 171 F.3d 596, 600 (8th Cir.1999) (holding that, where government admitted into evidence unredacted plea agreement in which witness had stipulated to involvement with the defendants in possessing and distributing methamphetamine, such evidence did not bolster the credibility of the government witnesses because [e]vidence showing the existence of a plea agreement, its terms, and a witness' understanding of the agreement is not improper); United States v. Kamerud, 326 F.3d 1008, 1017 (8th Cir.2003) (The prosecutor did not improperly vouch for the government's cooperating witnesses merely by asking them about the plea agreements they had reached with the government, part of which included the government's agreement to move for downward departures on their sentences in exchange for truthful testimony.). Here, Christofferson's plea agreement contained provisions requiring Christofferson's cooperation with the government and requiring her testimony to be truthful. Our circuit's precedent permits admission of such plea agreements as evidence of the witness's credibility and leaves the matter to the sound discretion of the district court.
McClellon argues that the prosecutor improperly vouched for Christofferson's credibility during closing argument. But McClellon failed to object to the prosecutor's statement at trial. Therefore, we review for plain error. Tulk, 171 F.3d at 599. [McClellon] must therefore show that the error was plain, meaning clear or obvious; and that the error affected his substantial rights, which requires a showing that the error was prejudicial and affected the trial's outcome. Id. (internal quotations, alterations, and citation omitted). Even clear errors will only matter if a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result that might seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Id. Reversal for prosecutorial misconduct is not required unless it prejudicially affected an individual's substantial rights and deprived him of a fair trial. Id. Factors to consider in assessing prejudice include the cumulative effect of any misconduct, the strength of the properly admitted evidence, and any curative actions taken by the trial court. Id. Attempts to bolster a witness by vouching for his credibility are normally improper. United States v. Jackson, 915 F.2d 359, 361 (8th Cir.1990) (internal quotations and citation omitted). But [w]here the prosecutor, his witnesses, or the work of the government agents is attacked by defense counsel, the District Attorney is entitled to make a fair response and rebuttal. United States v. Williams, 97 F.3d 240, 246 (8th Cir.1996) (internal quotations, alteration in Williams, and citation omitted) (rejecting defendant's argument that the prosecution improperly vouched for its witnesses where the prosecutor, during closing argument, rebutted defense allegations of witness perjury by noting that the witnesses had not yet been sentenced for their roles in the conspiracy); see also United States v. Beaman, 361 F.3d 1061, 1066 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding that prosecutor did not improperly vouch for a witness's credibility when he argued that he would not risk his career to threaten a witness to get her to change her story; argument was made in rebuttal to defense argument that witness only changed her story when threatened with prosecution and granted immunity); United States v. Lee, 743 F.2d 1240, 1253 (8th Cir.1984) (Where the District Attorney's remarks are prompted by statements of defense counsel, it has been held that there is no reversible error.). In the present case, McClellon's defense counsel made the following statement during closing argument: Well, when was it that Ms. Christofferson had her meeting with the government? They went over these photographs, it was just last Saturday, so she is pretty aware of what the evidence is and what the issues are in this case and I am not accusing the government of coaching her or saying anythingtelling her what to say, but I think that you could reasonably assume that if she wants to get out of jail, she better say whatever is necessary in order to try to make sure that Mr. McClellon is convicted so that she can get her reduced sentence. In response, the government argued in rebuttal: So you can take into account her Plea Agreement and I ask you to look at those Plea Agreements and there's two sections in that Plea Agreement, Government's Exhibit 127, you can look at that when you go back, her written Plea Agreement. The defendant wants you to believe only if she testifies favorably does she qualify for a sentence reduction. You will notice a couple paragraphs in this Plea Agreement, there's one on page five which talks about her cooperation. Part of that paragraph notes that she agrees to answer all questions and will not withhold any information. She will neither attempt to protect any person or entity through false information or omission or falsely implicate any person, but she doesn't get to testify falsely to accuse someone and get the benefit of this Plea Agreement. On page six, Paragraph 15, a paragraph called Truthful Testimony. Part of that notes that the defendant agrees to tell the truth at all times whether it be during this investigation or as a witness at trial regardless who asks the questions, the prosecutor, the law enforcement agent, the judge, or the defense attorney. So while the government is not asking you not consider that Plea Agreement, it is part of it and there's no big surprise that people in jail would really like to get out early. Here, as in Williams, Beaman, and Lee, the government's rebuttal statement was made in response to defense counsel's argument that Christofferson would provide false testimony for the government in order to get a reduced sentence in her plea deal. Thus, the government could respond by asking the jury to consider the terms of the written plea agreement in assessing the truthfulness of Christofferson's testimony. The prosecutor did not express a personal opinion but instead asked the jury to consider the actual terms of the plea agreement, which was admitted into evidence. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying McClellon's motion for a new trial.