Opinion ID: 3151870
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: It is Always Train Time at a Railroad Crossing

Text: Petitioner argues the trial judge erred in charging the jury that it is always train time at a railroad crossing15 because the charge misstates the respective duties of a motorist and the railroad company at crossings. Petitioner maintains that the charge, coupled with the judge's refusal to charge his proposed instruction No. 9,16 improperly placed a higher duty of care upon motorists at railroad crossings. Although the text of this segment of the judge's charge may be found in a series of cases decided in 1936 and 1940,17 a careful review of these decisions 15 This portion of the charge states: I further charge you it is the law of this state it has been well said that it is always train time at a railroad crossing. The law regards a railroad crossing as a place of danger. The very presence of such a crossing is notice to the person approaching or attempting to cross it of the danger of colliding with a passing engine or train. 16 Petitioner's proposed instruction No. 9 provides: A driver of a motor vehicle is under no absolute duty to stop, look, and listen before going on the track at a railroad crossing, unless the exercise of ordinary care and prudence under all surrounding facts and circumstances requires the adoption of such a course. 17 See, e.g., Bingham v. Powell, 195 S.C. 238, 245, 11 S.E.2d 275, 278 (1940) (We are not unmindful of the principles long established by this Court that it is reveals that the quoted language constitutes dicta and conflicts with case law that correctly assigns a mutual duty to a motorist and a railroad company at railroad crossings. See Chisolm v. Seaboard Air Line Ry., 121 S.C. 394, 401, 114 S.E. 500, 503 (1922) (A railroad company and a traveler on a highway crossing are charged with a mutual duty of keeping a lookout for danger, and the degree of vigilance required of both is in proportion to the known risk; the greater the danger, the greater the care required of both.). Due to the erroneous charge, the jury may have improperly assigned a higher duty of care to Colvin or shifted the duty of care entirely to Colvin. Accordingly, we find that Petitioner was prejudiced by this error.