Opinion ID: 1423997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gaddy's Confession

Text: Gaddy first argues that the district court should have suppressed his confession. He notes that he had not slept the night before and that he consumed alcohol and drugs several hours before he waived his rights. He contends that the STAR team's dynamic entrance was designed to confuse him and that the resulting confusion meant he could not consent voluntarily. Finally, Gaddy contends that Agent Peasley's position, sitting on a weight-lifting bench above Gaddy, was coercive. These factors, Gaddy argues, support the conclusion that he did not voluntarily waive his Miranda rights. A waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is valid if the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We accept the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. We review the ultimate determination that the accused knowingly and voluntarily waived these rights de novo. United States v. Makes Room, 49 F.3d 410, 414 (8th Cir.1995). A waiver is voluntary if it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. United States v. Harper, 466 F.3d 634, 643 (8th Cir.2006) (internal quotation omitted), cert. denied, 549 U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1504, 167 L.Ed.2d 242 (2007). In order to determine whether a confession was voluntary, we look to the totality of the circumstances and must determine whether the individual's will was overborne. United States v. Castro-Higuero, 473 F.3d 880, 886 (8th Cir.2007) (internal quotation omitted). Sleeplessness, alcohol use and drug use are relevant to our analysis, but [i]ntoxication and fatigue do not automatically render a confession involuntary. United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir.1990). Instead, the test is whether these mental impairments caused the defendant's will to be overborne. Id. For instance, we have upheld the conclusion that a suspect who recently used methamphetamine and had not slept for five days voluntarily waived his Miranda rights where police officers testified that they had no knowledge of these alleged impairments and the suspect did not act intoxicated. Id. Similarly, we have upheld a district court's conclusion that a suspect who used methamphetamine the evening before and marijuana the day he waived his rights consented voluntarily because police officers testified he appeared sober and in control of his facilities. United States v. Contreras, 372 F.3d 974, 977 (8th Cir.2004). Deputy Powell and Agent Peasley each testified that Gaddy appeared awake and coherent, and Gaddy did not tell them that he was tired, intoxicated or under the influence of drugs. Agent Peasley testified that he advised Gaddy of his Miranda rights, that Gaddy acknowledged that he understood them, and that he wanted to make a statement. The district court accepted Deputy Powell's and Agent Peasley's testimony as credible. See United States v. Annis, 446 F.3d 852, 856 n. 2 (8th Cir.2006) (Credibility assessments are for the fact-finder.). The evidence also supports a finding that Gaddy was not confused or disoriented after the STAR team's dynamic entry and that an adequate period of time, at least twenty minutes, elapsed between its entry and Gaddy's waiver. Deputy Powell testified that Gaddy looked calm, fairly quiet and was very compliant after the STAR team left. Agent Peasley testified that Gaddy understood his Miranda rights, agreed to waive them and appeared cooperative and calm. About forty minutes later, Agent Peasley again asked Gaddy if he wanted to speak with him, and Gaddy said that he did. These are not traits of someone who was confused or disoriented by the STAR team's dynamic entrance. In addition, Gaddy had extensive contact with law enforcement on prior occasions. See United States v. Gallardo-Marquez, 253 F.3d 1121, 1123 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding that armed entrance at 6:30 a.m. did not render statements involuntary when, among other reasons, defendant had extensive prior contact with law enforcement). Agent's Peasley's position, sitting on a weight-lifting bench above Gaddy, also was not sufficiently coercive to make Gaddy's consent involuntary. See Harper, 466 F.3d at 644 (finding that two officers standing closely over the defendant as he lay on the ground handcuffed shortly before he made a statement was not coercive). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in refusing to suppress Gaddy's confession because its findings that his will was not overborne is not clearly erroneous and the waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary. Therefore, we affirm its decision not to suppress Gaddy's confession.