Opinion ID: 1936175
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court was correct in denying the motion for j.n.o.v./new trial motion because there was sufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages?

Text: RKW first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support an award of punitive damages. For punitive damages to be awarded, the injuries must have some element of aggression or some coloring of insult, malice, or gross negligence, evincing ruthless disregard for the rights of others, so as to take the case out of the ordinary rule. Finkelberg v. Luckett, 608 So.2d 1214, 1220 (Miss. 1992). That is, the plaintiff is entitled to recover punitive damages only if he has demonstrated a willful or malicious wrong or the gross, reckless disregard for the rights of others. Boling v. A-1 Detective & Patrol Service, Inc., 659 So.2d 586, 588 (Miss. 1995); Strickland v. Rossini, 589 So.2d 1268, 1273 (Miss. 1991); see also Miss. Code Ann. § 11-1-65 (Supp. 1995). In determining the propriety of submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury, the trial court decides whether, under the totality of the circumstances and viewing the defendant's conduct in the aggregate, a reasonable, hypothetical trier of fact could find either malice or gross neglect/reckless disregard. Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Murphree, 653 So.2d 857, 863 (Miss. 1994), citing Colonial Mortg. Co., Inc. v. Lee, 525 So.2d 804, 808 (Miss. 1988). RKW argues that there was no evidence of malice or ill will of any kind in this case. Indeed, the Chairman of the Board of RKW testified that he liked Joe Henson, and thus, the granting of punitive damages was error. However, there was also evidence to suggest that if RKW's customers filed too many claims, RKW could lose the business of the insurance companies. The claim arising from Joe's death would be a factor in determining RKW's loss ratio, and there was testimony that keeping the loss ratio low was an important factor in being selected to be an agent for insurance companies. Furthermore, malice or ill will is not necessary for a punitive damages award. As discussed above, punitive damages are also appropriate where the defendant acts with reckless disregard for the rights of others. RKW knew that AAA's workers' compensation policy was in effect when Joe died. There was testimony that RKW was informed that Joe's death occurred during the scope and course of his employment. RKW represented that there was no policy in effect to cover Joe's death, and thereby acted with reckless disregard for the Hensons' rights. Application of punitive damage `principles are not ironclad.' Whether a particular act or conduct justifies assessment of punitive damages `cannot come from a precise formula, but rather must come from the trial judge's life experience.' Finkelberg, 608 So.2d at 1220 (citations omitted). A breach of fiduciary duties has been recognized by this Court as an extreme or a special additional circumstance where punitive damages can be allowed. Fought v. Morris, 543 So.2d 167, 173 (Miss. 1989). Based on the foregoing analysis, there was sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the issue of allowing a punitive damage award.
RKW next argues that the amount of punitive damages in this case was unconstitutionally excessive. There is no hard and fast rule regarding the maximum amount of punitive damages that can be awarded. Indeed, no `yardstick' could possibly be created to measure such awards since totality of the circumstances attendant a case varies on an ad hoc basis. Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1191 (Miss. 1990). The standard for reviewing punitive damages is to give due consideration to the degree and nature of transgression from reasonable and lawful practices and the likely harmful effect upon the individual litigant and the public. Id. (citations omitted). In the context of insurance policy interpretation, this Court has noted that only a very small percentage of policy holders are actually cognizant of the provisions of their policies and many of them are ignorant of the names of the companies issuing the said policies... . [C]ourts, while zealous to uphold legal contracts ... should not be slow to aid the confiding and innocent. Crawley v. American Public Life Ins. Co., 603 So.2d 835, 841 (Miss. 1992). The evidence is uncontradicted that the Hensons totally relied on RKW to take care of their insurance needs and paid substantial sums to RKW over a course of many years. RKW's actions in this case harmed the Hensons, and that harm could be visited upon other unsuspecting insurance customers in the future. RKW made a misrepresentation to the Hensons and their legal representatives about coverage. This Court acts to deter such wrongdoing in the future. Under current Mississippi law, the quantum of a punitive-damages award is measured upon consideration of certain general factors. First, the amount awarded should serve to punish the insurer and to deter it from committing similar offenses in the future. Second, the amount should serve as an example set to deter others from committing similar offenses. Third, the amount awarded should account for the insurer's pecuniary ability and financial worth. And fourth, the amount constitutes compensation for the plaintiff for his or her public service in bringing the action. Williams, 566 So.2d at 1190. RKW argues that they had a negative net worth and that, therefore, the award of punitive damages in this case was improper. However, net worth is only one factor to consider. Moreover, the record also reflected that RKW had $943,522 in assets. Measurement of the amount [of punitive damages] is a matter solely committed to the jury's fettered discretion. Generally, the jury's determination will remain undisturbed. However, an award may be vacated or reduced in some cases for exceptional reasons. Id.; Fought, 543 So.2d at 173. Those reasons can include the fact that the amount is arbitrary or unreasonable, against the overwhelming weight of the evidence, or evinces passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience. Williams, at 1190-91. There is no evidence that any of these reasons are present in this case. Of utmost significance, a jury verdict will not be disturbed simply because it seems `too high' or `too low.' Id. (citations omitted). There was sufficient evidence to support the jury's award of punitive damages in this case.