Opinion ID: 75882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Munson's Response to the Imposition of Sanctions

Text: 39 Subsequent to the district court's imposition of sanctions, Munson filed the present appeal challenging the sanctions order. Thereafter, she filed in district court the Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse Trial Judge (the Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse) and the Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Disqualify Trial Judge (the Plaintiff's Amended Motion). In the Plaintiff's Motion to Recuse, Munson argued that inappropriate remarks about racism were contained in the order levying sanctions, and that, as a result, the district judge should recuse himself both from further proceedings in the case 16 and from other race discrimination cases involving Munson. Supp. R1-122-1 (internal footnote omitted). She remarked that the district judge ha[d] taken on the stance of a protectorate for white America. Id. at 2. Elaborating, Munson commented: Plaintiff also argues that [the judge] has no cultural awareness or understanding of the cultural diversity of the litigants and, presumably, some counsel appearing before him. Id. at 3. Munson reiterated these same accusations in the Plaintiff's Amended Motion, but she also included a comment insinuating that the entire Middle District of Georgia was biased against African Americans who bring race discrimination cases: This plaintiff ... had a difficult time obtaining counsel who would take a civil rights' race case in the Middle District. Supp. R1-123-4 n. 4 (emphasis omitted). The district judge denied Munson's motions and declined to recuse himself. 17 As a consequence, Munson amended her notice of appeal of the sanctions order to include an appeal of the order in which the district judge ruled that he need not recuse himself. In the instant appeal, therefore, Munson challenges both the sanctions order and the order denying her recusal motion. 18 40 On appeal, Munson raises several arguments as to why we should vacate the sanctions order. Munson focuses on the remarks directed at opposing counsel that were contained in the Thomas and Blair affidavits and the Mercer declaration. She contends that the remarks are attributable solely to the affiants or the declarant, not to her, and that, consequently, she cannot be held personally responsible for the remarks. Munson asserts, moreover, that the mere act of filing affidavits [or declarations] that contain opinions of the witnesses that may have been offensive to others cannot meet the high threshold of bad faith, and thus cannot be sanctioned under a court's inherent powers. Munson Appellant Br. at 7. Furthermore, before the district court could find that she acted in bad faith and sanction her, Munson contends that the court had to make an explicit finding that she counseled Thomas, Blair, or Mercer to insert the remarks about opposing counsel, or that she drafted the remarks herself. Her position is that the district court, by failing to make such a factual finding or to hold an evidentiary hearing on the factual issue, abused its discretion in imposing sanctions. 41 Munson presents other arguments in her appellant brief as well. She argues that, because the remarks at issue were about how opposing counsel conducted himself during the litigation, the remarks were relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 and constituted proper personal opinion evidence under Rule 701. Munson also maintains that the district court's sanction order violates the First Amendment free speech rights of her client, and that the order is so broad that it `chills the rights' of [her] clients to have effective, unrestrained representation by an attorney of their choosing and of their own ethnic background. Id. at 8. 42 Additionally, Munson raises the recusal issue in her appellant brief and argues that the district judge erred in denying her recusal motion. As evidence of the district judge's racial bias, she points to the sanctions order itself. She alleges that, by issuing the sanctions order, the district judge assumed a stance as a protectorate of white American, and engaged in psychoanalysis by criticizing her for allegedly turning every dispute between counsel in this litigation into a racial dispute. Id. at 4. Munson, furthermore, states that, by sanctioning her but not opposing counsel, the district court's order favors the protection of one race over the other (some whites believe that there is no racism in America, and that `blacks' are constant whiners about `so-called' racism because they only want a government handout). Id. at 15. As a result of the racial bias purportedly demonstrated by the sanctions order, Munson asserts that the district judge should have recused himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455.