Opinion ID: 180848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Government's Conduct Violated the Terms of the Plea Agreement

Text: Larkin's contention that the government violated the plea agreement presents a question of law subject to plenary review. [8] United States v. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d 1357, 1360 (3d Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Miller, 565 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1977)). Strict compliance with the terms of a plea agreement is not only vital to the efficient function of our criminal justice system, but also required to preserve the integrity of our constitutional rights. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971). This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a constant factor is that when a plea agreement rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. Id. In applying Santobello, we strive to find a balance between the constitutional rights of a defendant and the integrity of the plea agreement. Because the defendant, by entering into the plea, surrenders a number of her constitutional rights, `courts are compelled to scrutinize closely the promise made by the government in order to determine whether it has been performed.' United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221, 236 (3d Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir.1991)). It is well settled that an analysis of whether there is a violation of the plea agreement proceeds under contract law standards. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 236. In considering whether the government kept its promise, we will not permit the government to rely upon a `rigidly literal' approach to the construction of the terms of the plea agreement. United States v. Badaracco, 954 F.2d 928, 939 (3d Cir.1992) (quoting Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1361). Rather, our consideration here is whether the government's conduct falls within the range of expectations reasonably understood by Larkin when she entered her plea of guilty. See Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 939 (Courts are to consider whether the government's conduct is inconsistent with what was reasonably understood by the defendant when entering the plea of guilty.). We undertake our review in three steps. Moscahlaidis, 868 F.2d at 1360; see also Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d at 235. First, we consider the relevant paragraphs from the plea agreement and a description of the alleged improper conduct of the government. Id. Second, we evaluate the conduct and determine whether it violates the government's obligations under the plea agreement. Id. If it is determined that the government breached its duty under the plea agreement, our third and final step is to fashion the appropriate remedy. Id. The relevant portions of the plea agreement are as follows. Paragraph 11 includes a contemplated application of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (guidelines) to Larkin's conduct which results in a guideline range between 121 and 151 months imprisonment. This assessment determines that § 2G2.1(b)(3)(B)(i), an enhancement for the use of a computer in the commission of the crime, does not apply to Larkin's sentencing conduct. Also contemplated is the applicability of certain enhancements totaling eight levels and the possibility of an adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(c) for a second victim. [9] Paragraph 11 further states: The defendant understands that none of these recommendations is binding upon either the United States Probation Office, which may make different findings as to the application of the United States Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guidelines to the defendant's conduct. The defendant further understands that the United States will provide the Court and the United States Probation Office all the information in its possession which it deems relevant to the application of the United States Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guidelines to the defendant's conduct. App. Vol. II at 112-13, ¶ 11 (emphasis added). Paragraph 27 of the plea agreement states: Nothing in this agreement shall restrict or limit the nature or content of the United States's motions or responses to any motions filed on behalf of the defendant. Nor does this agreement in any way restrict the Government in responding to any request by the court for briefing, argument or presentation of evidence regarding the application of the Sentencing Guidelines to the defendant's conduct, including but not limited to, requests for information concerning possible sentencing departures. Id. at 121, ¶ 27 (emphasis added). Paragraph 15 provides: The defendant also understands that the United States will provide to the United States Probation Office all information in its possession which the United States deems relevant regarding the Defendant's background, character, cooperation, if any, and involvement in this or other offenses. Id. at 115, ¶ 15. Paragraph 18 provides: At the sentencing, the United States will be permitted to bring to the Court's attention, and the Court will be permitted to consider, all relevant information with respect to the defendant's background, character and conduct, including the conduct that is the subject of charges which the United States has agreed to dismiss, and the nature and extent of the defendant's cooperation, if any. The United States will be entitled to bring to the Court's attention and the Court will be entitled to consider any failure by the defendant to fulfill any obligation under this agreement. Id. at 116-17, ¶ 18. According to Larkin, the government breached the plea agreement in various stages of the proceedings in this case. First, when it provided the United States Probation Office with a letter from a psychologist which supported the Probation Officer's suggestion that an upward departure for severe psychological injury may be applicable. Second, when it provided argument in favor of the application of an enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) despite an agreement that the enhancement was inapplicable. Finally, by arguing in its Response to Defendant's Objections to the Pre-Sentence Report, Sentencing Memorandum and Supplemental Sentencing Memorandum, that upward departures may be warranted. We will address these allegations in turn.
Larkin contends that the government violated the terms of the plea agreement by submitting a letter from a psychologist, which supported the application of an upward departure based upon the severe injury likely suffered by Larkin's daughters as a result of her conduct, to the United States Probation Officer charged with preparing the Pre-Sentence Report. The plea agreement plainly states that the government may provide the Court and the United States Probation Office all information it deems relevant to the application of the United States Sentencing Commission Sentencing Guidelines to the defendant's conduct. Id. at 113, ¶ 11. A letter from a psychologist detailing the impact of Defendant's conduct on her daughters' mental health is relevant to Larkin's conduct assessment and application of the Guidelines. In addition, while the government may be precluded from arguing in favor of an enhancement based upon these facts, passing this information along to the Probation Officer is within its obligations set forth in Paragraph 17, which details the right of the victims to be heard. See, e.g., United States v. Stemm, 847 F.2d 636, 639 (10th Cir.1988) (Disclosure of information as to the nature of the offense and each defendant's role is proper and within the Government's duty to provide, despite a promise that the Government would make no recommendation as to sentence.) (citations omitted). Paragraph 17(b) expressly permits the government to consult with the victims and to make the views of the victims regarding sentencing known to the Court. App. Vol. II at 116, ¶ 17. In addition, the record demonstrates that Larkin was informed on several occasions that the government was not precluded from providing the Court and/or the Probation Office with relevant information and that Paragraph 17 meant that the victims ... can present their views to the court through our office. Id. at 146 (Pre-Sentence Conference May 2006); Supp.App. at 107 (Sentencing Memorandum); App. Vol. II at 216 (Sentencing Hearing May 2009). The conduct of the government was permitted under a plain reading of the plea agreement and should have been reasonably expected by Larkin. Indeed, Larkin agreed that the government could present evidence related to the impact her conduct had on her daughters. THE COURT: Well, you always have the right to object to it. And, you know, as it goes to a victim impact statement, you know setting aside your more technical argument that the United States can't present any testimony on potential enhancements, which I think we've dealt with, I don't think you can argue that they can't present victim impact information. MS. SHAPIRO: No, I don't think I can. Supp.App. at 72 (Pre-Sentence Conference August 25, 2008). More importantly, the government never expressly argued in favor of an enhancement on this ground, nor can its actions fairly be construed as an implicit violation of the terms of the plea agreement. As a result, we find that the government did not breach the plea agreement by supplying the Probation Office with the psychologist report.
Larkin next argues that the government violated the plea agreement by supplying briefing on the applicability of the sentencing enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). Paragraph 11 of the plea agreement specifically states that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) is inapplicable. Neither in the written submissions filed with the District Court nor during the course of any of the hearings does the record reflect that the government advocated for the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). However, at the behest of the District Court, the government provided an assessment of the law and the relevant facts that would support application of the enhancement. On May 24, 2006, the District Court conducted a Pre-Sentence Conference during which it considered several objections, made by Larkin, to the Pre-Sentence Report, including an objection to the Probation Office's recommendation that an enhancement was warranted under § 2G2.1(b)(3). As a result of Larkin's objection, the following exchange took place: THE COURT: Well, I guess the point is, you know, is the government going tois the government going to contest theI understand the criminal history area, but that's different. I mean, we can'tit is what it is. But as to this particular enhancement, this two level enhancement, having looked at it briefly, and only briefly, it appears that there is substantial unclarity in this area and I'm going to have to resolve it. But I don't have to resolve it if you don't want to fight it, because I think it's purely a judgment call. THE GOVERNMENT: And that's the problem. I think it's sothe lack of clarity, if the Probation Office thinks it's [the computer enhancement] appropriate, we'll explain their views as to why it's appropriate. THE COURT: All right. Well, the bottom line is it should be briefed and then we'll allow you to do that. THE GOVERNMENT: I mean, if the Probation Office, after this meeting, thinks it better to withdraw that, that's fine too. That's their position and we'll explain to the court to the best of our abilities their beliefs. App. Vol. II at 140 (Pre-Sentence Conference May 24, 2006). The government's Sentencing Memorandum does not request the application of the enhancement, but it does present the correct legal standard and offers facts relevant to the determination of whether U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) is applicable. Paragraph 27 expressly permitted the government to respond to the District Court's request for briefing on any issue related to the application of the guidelines to Larkin's conduct, including the relevancy of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). Larkin challenges this language as overly broad and argues that it cannot be used in a manner to undermine the more specific provisions in the agreement. See United States v. Rivera, 357 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir.2004) (citing Corbin on Contracts § 24.23 (revised ed. 1998) (If the apparent consistency is between a clause that is general and broadly inclusive in nature and one that is more limited and specific in its coverage, the more specific should ... be held to prevail over the more general term); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 203(c) (specific terms and exact terms are given greater weight than general language)). In more specific terms, Larkin submits that Paragraph 27 cannot be construed in a manner that relieves the government of its burden to adhere to the stipulation regarding U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). We are not convinced that Paragraph 27 is overly broad or was used in the manner described by Larkin. Importantly, the government's ability to provide information to the Court on possible sentencing departures is contingent upon a request from the District Court, and not the product of a catch-all provision that allows the government to take any position as to sentencing issues. This fact distinguishes the case sub judice from the plea agreement in Rivera, relied upon by Larkin. In Rivera, the inclusion of a general provision in the plea agreement that reserved the right to take any position with respect to the appropriate sentence did not permit the government to argue in favor of a role enhancement where it had stipulated to a specific Base Offense Level. 357 F.3d at 295. Because the Offense Level was specifically stipulated to, whereas the government's right to advocate a role enhancement was not, the government's endorsement of an enhancement that would raise the Offense Level above the stipulated level contravened the plea agreement. Moreover, to the extent there is ambiguity caused by the little bit of poor draftsmanship conceded by the prosecutor, we must construe the agreement against the government as drafter. Id. Here, Paragraph 27 does not give the government the same unfettered authority as the language in the Rivera plea agreement. Nothing in Paragraph 27 permitted the government to abandon specific stipulations in its response to the District Court's request for briefing; as a result, unlike Rivera, the government could not take any position. Cf. id. Parsing the language in a plea agreement is more than a semantical exercise, as we have consistently recognized the fine, but important, distinction between a promise to take no position and a promise to make no recommendation. See United States v. Hall, 515 F.3d 186, 198 (3d Cir.2008); United States v. Hayes, 946 F.2d 230, 234 (3d Cir.1991). The difference between the two terms is elementary, for the promise not to recommend is narrow, speaking only as to the sentence to be imposed, whereas a promise to take no position speaks to no attempt at all to influence the defendant's sentence. Miller, 565 F.2d at 1275. The government's obligations here were not impeded by a promise to take no position. Instead, the government agreed to recommend a sentence within the applicable guideline range and it was obligated to inform the District Court of all information in its possession which it deems relevant to sentencing. App. Vol. II at 113, ¶ 11. The government fulfilled its obligation to recommend a sentence within the guideline range and the plea agreement specifically permitted the government to supply the District Court with the information relevant to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3). See United States v. Horsfall, 552 F.3d 1275, 1282 (11th Cir.2008) (Because the agreement permitted the government to introduce such information and the government did not explicitly oppose a sentence within the guideline range, the government did not violate the plea agreement.) (citation omitted). Although Paragraph 27 permits the government's response to the District Court's inquiry, it does create a tension between the District Court and the parties because it leaves open the possibility that a stipulation can become the subject of discussion at the request of the District Court, thereby creating an opportunity for the government to circumvent the plea agreement. Here, the oral argument and the brief submitted by the government do not cross the line between providing an analysis, which is expressly permitted by Paragraph 27, and impermissibly advocating for application of the enhancement. Cf., United States v. Hawley, 93 F.3d 682, 693 (10th Cir.1996) (Finding statements that do more than merely state facts or simply validate those facts found in the Pre-Sentence report [but rather] ... provide a legal `characterization' of those facts, and `argue the effect' of those facts to the sentencing judge violated the terms of the plea agreement.). The brief sets forth the proper legal considerations in a straightforward manner. See United States v. Svacina, 137 F.3d 1179, 1185 (10th Cir.1998) (The government cannot be penalized for correctly stating the legal issue to be addressed by th[e] court.). In addition, the facts identified in the government's brief were well known to the District Court, as they were a boiled down recapitulation of the facts detailed in Larkin's Pre-Sentence Report. [10] Viewed against the entire factual backdrop of the proceedings in front of the District Court, the government's submission does not constitute a thinly veiled attempt to otherwise influence the District Court to apply the enhancement and did not offend its obligations under the plea agreement. To the contrary, the government expressly advocated for a sentence within the guidelines at various stages in the proceedings before the District Court. App. Vol. II at 142 (Pre-Sentence Conference May 24, 2006); Supp.App. at 56 (Pre-Sentence Conference July 25, 2007); Id. at 107 (Sentencing Memorandum); App. Vol. II at 216 (Sentencing). We also find that the government's conduct falls within the realm of actions Larkin would reasonably expect under the plea agreement. The government's written and oral responses to the District Court's inquiry related to U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) were contemplated by Paragraph 27 and did not infringe on its obligations pursuant to Paragraph 11. See, Hall, 515 F.3d 186. The plea agreement expressly permitted the government to introduce the information it provided to the District Court and the government never argued, explicitly or implicitly, that U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) should be applied. In sum, nothing the government did can aptly be characterized as impermissibly advocating for the application of U.S.S.G. § 2G2.1(b)(3) or violating the spirit of the agreement. See Badaracco, 954 F.2d at 940. The government's actions were permitted by the plea agreement and we find no breach. See Horsfall, 552 F.3d at 1282 (citing United States v. Levy, 374 F.3d 1023, 1030-32 (11th Cir.2004) (finding no breach where the government was permitted by the plea agreement to introduce certain evidence and it upheld its obligation to make a specific sentencing recommendation)).
Larkin's final argument also implicates Paragraph 27 and alleges that the government made an impermissible argument on applicable upward departures in its Sentencing Memoranda. [11] Although the parties each submitted two briefs to the District Court, the record before us contains only the government's submissions, filed with the District Court on March 26, 2009 and April 17, 2009. Larkin characterizes specific statements within these two briefs as advocating for upward departures from the stipulated guideline range. During its discussion on Larkin's offense level, the government's brief informed the District Court that other pertinent details are not included in this assessment which are worth noting when considering the seriousness of the offense and the need to provide just punishment for the offense. Supp.App. at 14. The government then offered that a factor not considered by the guidelines but reflective of the seriousness of the offense is its duration which spanned intermittently approximately one year. Id. at 15. Other examples in the brief include the fact that Larkin sent the pictures for pecuniary gain and that the victims of her crime suffered. Taken together, Larkin argues that the implicit message to the District Court was that the applicable guideline range was inadequate. All of these arguments were made with respect to the non-guideline sentencing considerations set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-50, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007) (directing that the sentencing of federal criminal defendants must include detailed consideration of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553). While the plea agreement sets forth a contemplated guideline range, the government never agreed to recommend a specific sentence within that range. Thus, its inclusion of other factors not considered by the guidelines is consistent with its burdens under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and can fairly be construed as providing a factual basis for a sentence at the higher end of the range. To the extent that these factors are also the basis for upwardly departures, because the government was responding to a request from the District Court consistent with Paragraph 27, it did not step outside the bounds of the plea agreement. [12] Inasmuch as the government's declarations do not inherently violate its obligations under the plea agreement, the fact that they were made in response to the District Court's request provides additional propriety for their inclusion in the written submissions. Moreover, the government consistently argued for a sentence within the applicable guideline range. For all of these reasons, we find no breach of the plea agreement.