Opinion ID: 1265027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel at the Guilt Phase Claim

Text: Lewis argues that he is entitled to relief from his conviction because his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to properly investigate and present his alibi defense and by not presenting a theory of self defense. More specifically, Lewis contends that his trial counsel failed to investigate documentary evidence  namely bus tickets  which supported his alibi defense, failed to contact and secure the attendance of certain alibi witnesses, and failed to properly prepare the alibi witnesses who did testify. Lewis asserts that he was prejudiced by his counsel's lack of preparation because the presentation of a weak alibi defense suggested consciousness of guilt and bolstered the Commonwealth's case. Lewis raised this ineffectiveness claim for the first time before the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal from the denial of his PCRA petition. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that this claim was waived because [t]he version of the PCRA in effect at the time [Lewis] filed the instant petition provided that an issue is waived `if it could have been raised ... in a prior proceeding,' Lewis II, 743 A.2d at 909 (quoting 42 Pa. Cons.Stat. Ann. § 9544(b)). It also explained that this particular claim was not raised before the PCRA court in [Lewis's] PCRA petition or any amendments nor in [Lewis's] Objection to the PCRA court's notice of intent to dismiss, id. at 909 n. 2, and the doctrine of `relaxed waiver' does not apply to claims made in capital PCRA petitions. Id. at 909. Although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declined to reach the merits of Lewis's claim on grounds that it was waived, we cannot conclude that this decision was based on an independent and adequate state procedural rule such that it would bar our review of the claim. Federal habeas courts `will not review a question of federal law decided by a state court if the decision of that court rests on a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment.' Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 522, 117 S.Ct. 1517, 137 L.Ed.2d 771 (1997) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). A state procedural rule is adequate if it was firmly established and regularly followed at the time of the alleged procedural default. Ford, 498 U.S. at 424, 111 S.Ct. 850. To be considered firmly established and regularly followed, (1) the state procedural rule [must] speak[] in unmistakable terms; (2) all state appellate courts [must have] refused to review the petitioner's claims on the merits; and (3) the state courts' refusal in this instance [must be] consistent with other decisions. Doctor v. Walters, 96 F.3d 675, 683-84 (3d Cir.1996). In 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced that it would no longer decline to apply ordinary waiver principles... in PCRA appeals. Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998). But for two decades prior to this decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court maintained a practice of reaching the merits of claims in PCRA petitions in capital cases regardless of the failure of the petition to meet the appropriate procedural criteria. Banks v. Horn, 126 F.3d 206, 214 (3d Cir.1997). Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled on Lewis's PCRA appeal after its decision in Albrecht, for purposes of determining whether there is a procedural bar to our review of Lewis's claim, we must look to the time at which his procedural default supposedly occurred. See Doctor, 96 F.3d at 684 (explaining that the relevant time for determining whether a rule was firmly established and regularly applied is not when the state court relied on it, but rather ... the date of the waiver that allegedly occurred). Although Lewis had the opportunity to raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in his PCRA petition, the petition was filed in 1995 (and amended in 1996) at a time when the Pennsylvania Supreme Court still applied the doctrine of relaxed waiver to PCRA appeals in capital cases. [8] Therefore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal to reach Lewis's ineffective assistance of counsel claim because of his failure to raise it in his PCRA petition does not bar our review as it was not an independent and adequate procedural rule. Because the Pennsylvania courts did not reach the merits of Lewis's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the guilt phase of his trial, we review this claim de novo. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel contains two components: First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the `counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To establish deficient performance, a defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In analyzing this first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel performed reasonably. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under this standard, we are unable to conclude that the conduct of Lewis's counsel was objectively unreasonable, and even if it were, we would be unable to conclude that the result of Lewis's trial would have been different but for his counsel's error. None of Lewis's arguments persuade us that he has overcome the presumption that his counsel performed reasonably. Despite Lewis's complaint that his trial counsel did not sufficiently prepare his alibi witnesses, the record indicates otherwise. In the middle of trial, Lewis's counsel discussed with the court the difficulties he was having in presenting the alibi defense. (App. at 1163.) He mentioned that he had $2,500 to bring witnesses in from California but he wanted to make sure the witnesses would be beneficial and have material testimony before they came to court. He also stated that he had only received the address for Lewis's brother, Michael, a week before and that he was having difficulty contacting him, adding that the phone number for Michael's wife had been disconnected. Lewis's counsel suggested that he could not go forward with the defense until he reached Michael Lewis. (App. at 1164-65.) The prosecutor commented that based on his investigator's discussions with Michael Lewis and his wife, they appeared reluctant to come to Philadelphia and serve as alibi witnesses. (App. at 1166-67.) Despite these difficulties, Lewis's counsel was able to present Michael Lewis as an alibi witness. Michael's testimony  that he met Lewis at the Trailways bus station in California on November 19  was uncomplicated and therefore undermines Lewis's argument that he was inadequately prepared. (App. at 1425.) Similarly, although Clarence Edwards stated that the first time he was contacted to be an alibi witness was the day before he testified at the trial, he also stated that Lewis's trial counsel was trying to get in touch with him, (App. at 1307-08), and his testimony  that Lewis asked for a ride to the Trailways bus station around November 14  was straightforward as well. (App. at 1285-88.) As for Lewis's contention that his counsel's failure to recognize his fiancée, Stephanie McCorey, when she entered the courtroom in violation of a sequestration order caused him to lose a crucial witness, McCorey admitted that she did not know anything about the case and that, upon entering the courtroom, she told a court officer that she was not a witness. (App. at 1090, 1094.) Lewis's counsel stated that he had met with McCorey for a few minutes the previous week and that he had listed her as a possible witness only because Lewis had given him her name. (App. at 1090, 1094.) Additionally, Lewis has not offered any affidavit from McCorey as to what testimony she could have provided at trial. [9] Likewise, with respect to potential alibi witnesses who did not testify, Lewis has not presented any affidavits describing what those witnesses would have testified about. For all of these reasons, we cannot agree with Lewis that his trial counsel's investigation and presentation of the alibi defense was objectively unreasonable. Moreover, even if we were to conclude that his counsel's performance was deficient, in light of the overwhelming evidence against him  including six eyewitnesses who knew Lewis and identified him as the assailant and the eyeglasses left at the crime scene which resembled ones that Lewis had been photographed wearing  we would not be able to conclude that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of Lewis's trial would have been different in the absence of his counsel's errors. Nor can we conclude that Lewis has demonstrated that his counsel performed unreasonably by failing to present a theory of self defense in addition to, or instead of, the alibi defense. As Lewis emphasizes elsewhere in his appeal, he has, from the time of his arrest, relied upon an alibi, and he has not provided any indication that he would have allowed his counsel to present a theory of self defense. [10] Instead, Lewis's statements during pre-trial hearings reveal an insistence on maintaining an alibi defense and, as the District Court noted, it would have been factually inconsistent to present a theory of self defense in the alternative. Moreover, the testimony of the only witness who observed the entire altercation between Lewis and Ellis would have directly contradicted a theory of self defense. (App.1113.) Therefore, Lewis has not overcome the presumption that his counsel's decision not to present a theory of self defense was a strategically reasonable one, and we reject his arguments to the contrary.