Opinion ID: 4416348
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Roberts' appellate counsel raised the same issues, supported by the same arguments, in another case, Stewart v. State, 309 Kan. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (2019) (No. 115,149, this day decided), which was on the same docket. In Stewart, we reiterated that a 60-1507 movant has no constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in the postconviction proceedings, but that, under some circumstances, a statutory right to counsel exists for such a collateral attack. Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 7-9. Specifically, pursuant to K.S.A. 22-4506(b), a district court has a statutory duty to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent 60-1507 movant whenever the motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact. Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 9. Stewart clarified that the protocol set forth in Lujan does not require the appointment of counsel when the district court discerns a potentially substantial issue, albeit the court has the discretion to do so. In other words, the district court may, but is not required to, appoint an indigent 60-1507 movant an attorney during the period the court is making its determination of whether the motion, files, and record present a 8 substantial question of law or triable issue of fact. Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 11-12. On the other hand, however, if the district court conducts an actual hearing to determine whether substantial issues are presented by the motion, files, and records, at which the State is represented by counsel, due process of law requires that the movant be represented by counsel unless he or she has waived the right to counsel. Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 12. But Stewart specifically rejected Roberts' argument that the district court's consideration of the State's response, standing alone, is the functional equivalent of the court conducting a hearing at which the State is represented by an attorney. Stewart, 309 Kan. at ___, slip op. at 16. In short, the district court did not determine that Roberts' motion, and the files and records of the case, presented a substantial question of law or triable issue of fact. Consequently, the district court was not statutorily required to appoint Roberts an attorney. Further, the district court did not conduct a hearing at which the State was represented by counsel, so as to trigger Roberts' due process right to appointed counsel. The Court of Appeals' holding on Roberts' appointment-of-counsel issue is affirmed. SUMMARY DENIAL OF THE K.S.A. 60-1507 MOTION The district court summarily denied Roberts' motion as untimely, noting that Roberts had failed to request or establish an exception to the applicable time limits. Alternatively, the district court denied the motion as being successive, and Roberts failed to establish any exceptional circumstances that would excuse his failure to previously raise the issues before the district court or on direct appeal. Roberts concedes that he did not allege that manifest injustice or exceptional circumstances warranted review of his current, untimely, and successive motion. But he contends that he should be able to argue those exceptions on remand because he has raised several claims concerning trial 9 counsel's deficient representation that prejudiced his trial and violated his statutory speedy trial right.