Opinion ID: 1139006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Service of Process Should Have Been Quashed?

Text: The conservators' one-page argument regarding this issue is simple. They contend that Rich has no recollection of being served; therefore, she may have been misled by the misnomer. Nevels counters that, indisputably, Rich received a summons and that her alleged lack of recollection due to alleged incompetency is unproven. Nevels adds that case law is supportive of the trial judge's refusal to quash the service of process and his order to amend all instances of Wilma Ritchie.
Southern Trucking Serv., Inc. v. Mississippi Sand & Gravel, Inc., 483 So.2d 321 (Miss. 1986) is dispositive of the issue. In Southern Trucking, the issue was one of first impression, so this Court considered the various views espoused by other jurisdictions. In sum, this Court decided to reject the admittedly harsh minority view which holds that a misnomer should mean the death-knell of a case. Id. at 323 (citing case law from other jurisdictions). This Court instead adopted the general view which holds that a misnomer is not fatal so long as the incorrectly-identified party knew what was meant. Id. (citing Bank of America v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County, 35 Cal. App.3d 555, 110 Cal. Rptr. 709, 710 (1973) (bank knew at all times the case it had to meet despite the misnomer). Thus, an amendment correcting a misnomer is permissible at any time or any stage in the proceedings. Id. at 324 (citing 67A C.J.S. Parties § 172); see also Donald v. Luckie Strike Loans, Inc., 148 Ga. App. 318, 251 S.E.2d 168, 169-70 (1978). When a judgment is amended, it is as though the entire action had been conducted in the correct name of the [party]. Southern Trucking Serv., Inc., 483 So.2d at 324. In sum, under Mississippi law, an amendment is permitted so long as the evidence does not suggest that the misnomer misled the parties into thinking that another [party] was meant. Id. (quoting Cigan v. St. Regis House Hotel, 72 Ill. App.3d 884, 29 Ill.Dec. 38, 41, 391 N.E.2d 197, 200 (1979).
In the case sub judice, no one disputes that Rich received a summons. The conservators simply explain that Rich didn't remember anything about it and that she was possibly misled by the misnomer or was not sufficiently competent to appreciate the consequences of her failure to respond. Record Vol. II, at 83. This explanation proved unpersuasive with the trial judge: There are several things that are requested, and I'm going to take them one by one as they were requested. The first thing that the Movant [the conservators] requested on behalf of Mrs. Rich was that the original process be quashed, and in determining whether or not the original process should be quashed I looked at two things: First is the summons itself in regards to the misnomer. Second, I looked at your argument as to the service. Now, in looking at the summons itself which, of course, is part of the court record, I basically was attempting to determine whether or not a person would have known they were being sued even though the name did not properly appear on the summons. The name which appears on the summons is Wilma Ritchie, R-I-T-C-H-I-E. In this case the actual name of the ward is Wilma Rich. The address is correct. The return is made by Deputy Gray, as he testified, and in accordance to his testimony he asked whether or not the person that answered the door was, in fact, Wilma Ritchie, and he certifies that he did hand deliver a copy to a Wilma Ritchie at this address. Then after looking at the summons in reviewing the complaint allegations set forth dealing with the same address, the same dates that everyone discussed, and I do find that although there is a misnomer in regards to the complaint and the summons, the same was sufficient to notify a reasonable person that they were being sued. In regards to the service I have a lot of problems with placing a burden on the Plaintiff to determine whether or not a Defendant is competent prior to the service of a process when there is no prior finding that a Defendant was in fact incompetent. So I am going to find that the service of process in this case was proper. The next thing that is requested by [the] conservators for Mrs. Rich is that the execution of process issued and served on the ward be quashed; this being the same, however, it is set out, Wilma Ritchie a/k/a Wilma Rich. I'm going to deny this request for the same reasons as set forth above in regards to the request that the other process be quashed, the original process be quashed. Id. at 162-64.
This Court concurs in this decision; the misnomer should not be deemed fatal. The record and appellant's brief are devoid of any evidence proving that the misnomer misled Rich. Most notable is Nevels' failure to claim during her testimony that the misnomer actually misled her; instead, she merely conceded that she don't remember anything about [being served]. Rich admitted that she knows Nevels and remembers the attack; thus, it seems more likely than not that she understood the summons since it correctly identified Nevels as the complainant. The process server, Deputy Ralph Gray, testified that Rich acknowledged she was indeed the individual named on the summons. According to Deputy Gray, Rich acted normal when he served her. And although several of Rich's family members testified that she was probably incompetent at the time, they did not seek to establish a conservatorship until 1989  years after Rich received her summons. Id. at 45. In sum, the evidence does not support the conservators' claim that the slight misnomer misled Rich. The judge's decision does not reflect an abuse of discretion and, therefore, this Court affirms.