Opinion ID: 1191255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the question of the insurance company's right to be a party to a determination of liability and damages

Text: Since we hold that the default judgment rendered against John Doe is void, the question of whether the insurance company is entitled to re-litigate the issues of liability and damages is moot. Boughton v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, Okl., 354 P.2d 1085 (1960) is inapplicable. Regardless of the insurance company's actions in seeking dismissal from the original action against John Doe and the insurance company, we cannot say that the insurance company does not have a substantial interest in the default judgment. There has never been a valid adjudication of liability and damages in this case. The defendant is entitled to his day in court on these essential issues. The insurance company did not waive that right when it asked to be dismissed from the original action under Holt v. Bell, supra . Therefore, the trial judge was correct in determining that the default judgment was void. The trial judge also properly overruled plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings. There remained to be determined proof that plaintiff had a policy of insurance in force, and that an accident and loss thereunder occurred. The trial court, however, apparently relied on the rule in Holt, supra, that the plaintiff is not legally entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist clause until the amount of damages is ascertained. That rule applies only in a case, like Holt, involving an identified uninsured motorist. The rule has no application where an unidentified hit and run driver is the tortfeasor. Our holding in the Holt case would not prevent the insured under an automobile policy containing an uninsured motorist clause from suing solely the insurer where, as in the present case, neither the driver, nor the owner, of the damaging vehicle can be identified sufficiently to obtain a valid judgment against him. If this Court were to require the claim against a hit-and-run driver to be liquidated before a suit was brought against the insurance company under the insurance contract, the purpose of both the uninsured motorist clause in the policy and 36 O.S. 1971, § 3636, requiring the uninsured motorist clause would be obviated. It was the obvious intent of the legislature in enacting the uninsured motorist statute that persons injured by hit-and-run drivers be protected. The insured pays for the coverage, and the insurance company will not be permitted to escape liability by procedural tactics. Other states which have uninsured motorist statutes similar to Oklahoma's, have allowed the plaintiff to sue the insurance company directly where a hit-and-run vehicle is the tortfeasor. Walsh v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 91 Ill. App.2d 156, 234 N.E.2d 394 (1968); Riemenschneider v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 20 N.Y.2d 547, 285 N.Y.S.2d 593, 232 N.E.2d 630 (1967). The insurance company will be given the chance to defend the question of liability and damages and, depending on the outcome, the plaintiff will be allowed to prove its right to recover under the contract. Court of Appeals reversed in part, affirmed in part. Trial Court reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate plaintiff's action for trial. DAVISON, C.J., WILLIAMS, V.C.J., and IRWIN, BERRY, HODGES, LAVENDER and BARNES, JJ., concur.