Opinion ID: 4563208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ronnie Daniels

Text: The majority asserts that Daniels “told a grand jury that Burks confessed to killing Wright but refused to repeat the testimony on the stand during the trial.” Maj. Op. at 3. Ignoring the district court’s credibility determination and assuming that Daniels told the truth, it is a leap to conclude that Burks confessed to a murder in his exchange with Daniels. According to Daniels’s grand jury testimony, Burks stated, “I’m gonna do you like I did that N-word at C- Ray’s.” R. 1321, PID 10223. If Burks did make this statement, given that Gaskin testified that a group of Gangster Disciples (GDs) jumped Wright, “swinging on him and kicking him,” Burks could have been referring to a beating rather than a murder. R. 1483, PID 12803. Or, given that Daniels did not testify that Burks mentioned Wright, the history of violence between the GDs and Bloods, and the Bloods’ close association with C-Ray’s, Burks could have been referring to an altogether separate incident not involving Wright. This is not to say that this court may reweigh the evidence and determine that one conclusion is correct, but only that the record supports the district court’s decision to discount Daniels’s testimony and Burks’s purported “confession.” Further, the majority’s dismissal of the district court’s credibility determination in favor of its own inferences is unmoored from the record. Daniels did not simply testify “that he could not remember his grand jury statements.” Maj. Op. at 5. Daniels repeatedly testified that he previously cooperated with the government because he “was nervous and [he] was scared,” and he “was saying whatever [he] had to say to go home.” R. 1412, PID 10966, 10976. And Daniels testified that just because he said something before the grand jury, “it does not make it true.” Id. at 10969-70. These statements, combined with the district court’s ability to observe the witness, provide ample support for the conclusion that Daniels lacked credibility at trial, before the grand jury, or both. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in discounting Daniels’s testimony.1 1And the majority ignores altogether that the government brought charges against Daniels for perjury based on his testimony: “On August 14, 2019, the government indicted one of the witnesses who testified at trial in this case (Ronald Marion Daniels, II) on two counts of perjury, in connection with his trial testimony and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1623.” R. 1622, PID 14702. No. 19-6010 United States v. Burks Page 12 The majority also asserts that “[t]he jury had what it needed to make an assessment” and that “[i]t’s for the jury to decide how much weight to give this evidence, and it’s for the jury to decide whether Daniels’ refusal to repeat the testimony in open court casts doubt on its veracity.” Maj. Op. at 5. But on a Rule 33 motion, our caselaw establishes that the district court “may appropriately ‘act as a thirteenth juror, assessing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.’” Dimora, 750 F.3d at 627-28 (quoting United States v. Hughes, 505 F.3d 578, 593 (6th Cir. 2007)). The majority fails to explain how the district court abused its discretion in fulfilling its proper role under our caselaw. And by asserting that “[i]t’s hard to see what judges know, and jurors do not, when it comes to deciding whether to credit this grand jury testimony,” Maj. Op. at 5, the majority leaves little room for the operation of Rule 33, which allows the district court to assess credibility, weigh the evidence, and “vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires,” Fed. R. Crim. P. 33.