Opinion ID: 777272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officers' Defenses — Waiver and Immunity

Text: 18 Notwithstanding our disposition of Ienco's constitutional remedy, the defendant officers contend that summary judgment was appropriate for three additional reasons, because: (1) Ienco failed to present a due process argument to the court below; (2) the officers are entitled to absolute testimonial immunity; and (3) the officers' conduct was not explicitly proscribed by our previous opinions. 6 We reject each of these contentions in turn.
19 Although the officers contend that Ienco did not properly raise his due process claim, we disagree. First, Ienco's complaint was sufficiently detailed to put the defendants on notice of his due process claim, and he explicitly alleged that the acts complained of deprived plaintiff of his right ... not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Complt. at 98. The defendants' response and motion to dismiss explicitly recognized Ienco's due process claim, because they responded that plaintiff cannot base his claim against City upon allegations of a due process violation. City resp. at 7. 20 Further, as the district court recognized in its detailed and thorough opinion, it would have been a futile effort for Ienco to seriously pursue a due process claim prior to Newsome. 7 To that end, after the initial stages of this case were heard before the district court, Ienco conceded that Smart v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Illinois, 34 F.3d 432 (7th Cir.1994) effectively prohibited a malicious prosecution claimant from proceeding under the due process clause directly — a path that we explicitly set out for the first time in Newsome. See Smart, 34 F.3d at 434 (holding that a malicious prosecution claimant's only constitutional remedy is under the Fourth Amendment (as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth) and not under the due process clause directly). Under these circumstances, we decline to hold that Ienco waived his due process claim.
21 Next, the officers claim that they are entitled to absolute immunity because their alleged perjury is protected as a matter of law — both before and during Ienco's criminal trial proceedings. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Ienco contends that this view of the case is too narrow: he alleges that the officers actively withheld testimony and evidence — thus placing their conduct outside of the safety of trial-based immunity. We agree with the officers' general statement of law. Nonetheless, as Ienco properly contends, our inquiry does not end there. 22 If Ienco were merely claiming damages based upon the officers' perjured testimony, the officers would be entitled to absolute immunity. See Curtis v. Bembenek, 48 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir.1995). However, Ienco's claims are not based upon the officers' perjured testimony. Instead, he argues that the officers withheld exculpatory information and lied to the federal prosecutors who successfully indicted him. Neither the withholding of exculpatory information nor the initiation of constitutionally infirm criminal proceedings is protected by absolute immunity. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985 (7th Cir.1988). 8 Therefore, no absolute testimonial immunity attaches to the actions of the officers outside of trial, and they are proper defendants in this action. 9
23 Finally, there is the familiar matter of qualified immunity. To determine if immunity attaches to the actions of the officers, we undertake the two-part qualified immunity test described most recently in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). As Saucier teaches, first we ask whether Ienco has made out a violation of a constitutional right. Second, we ask whether that right was clearly established at the time that the disputed conduct took place. 24 As to the first prong of Saucier, we note that Judge Coar's meticulous and unchallenged factual findings demonstrate that the officers engaged in conduct that violated the Fourth Amendment and could also have violated Ienco's 14th Amendment due process rights. See Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d at 994 (noting at some point after a person is arrested, the question whether his continued confinement or prosecution is unconstitutional passes over from the Fourth Amendment to the due process clause). Ienco's Fourth Amendment claims expired two years after his arrest. See Newsome, 256 F.3d at 749. Accordingly, his due process claims are limited to the officers' actions (or non-actions) that occurred following his arrest and only to those actions that were not protected by testimonial immunity. As to Saucier 's second prong, if Ienco's allegations are proved, the officers' conduct violated clearly established federal law which was known or should have been known by a reasonable officer in 1995. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d at 992. Therefore, in order to determine if the officers are entitled to qualified immunity, we remand this fact-intensive issue to the district court to determine if the officers engaged in conduct that violated Ienco's due process rights.