Opinion ID: 2600470
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Challenge to Jury Venire

Text: Defendant claims that his jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the population in violation of Code of Civil Procedure sections 197 and 203, article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution because the methods used to summons the jury venire resulted in the elimination of a disproportionate number of Hispanics. As explained below, defendant challenged the composition of the master list that was used to summon jurors during the 1987-1988 fiscal year that ended in June of 1988. But jury selection in the present case commenced on July 21, 1988, using prospective jurors summoned using the new master jury list for the 1988-1989 fiscal year. Further, the jury commissioner adopted a suggestion by defendant that significantly increased the representation of Hispanics on this new master list. Defendant's objection to the composition of the old master jury list was rendered moot. Defendant failed to object to the composition of the new master list, and thus forfeited any objection to the composition of the master list actually used to select the jury in the present case. On January 20, 1988, defendant filed a motion to quash all existing jury panels on the ground that Hispanics were systematically underrepresented on the jury venire. [8] An evidentiary hearing spanning several days was held in April and May, 1988. Raymond Arce, Director of Jury Management, Office of the Jury Commissioner, testified that each fiscal year, usually in May, a master list of potential jurors in Los Angeles County is compiled using records from the county registrar of voters and the California Department of Motor Vehicles. A list of qualified prospective jurors is obtained based upon responses to prospective juror questionnaires sent to persons on the master list. Prospective jurors are randomly summoned from this list of qualified jurors when a court requires jurors. Dr. Raymond Weeks, a professor of sociology, was called by defendant as an expert on demographics and testified that he analyzed questionnaires of more than 10,000 persons who appeared for jury service in the Central Judicial District from August to mid-December of 1987 and noted that 14 percent identified themselves as Hispanic. Based upon the 1980 census as well as data compiled by California State University, Dr. Weeks estimated that 24.3 percent of the population in the Central Judicial District were Hispanics who qualified for jury service. Dr. Weeks further stated that the Hispanic population had increased proportionately since 1980 and estimated that by 1987, the percentage of the population of the Central Judicial District that were Hispanics who qualified for jury service was actually 26.3 percent. Thus, in Dr. Weeks's opinion, there was an absolute disparity of 12.3 percentage points between the 14 percent of persons who appeared for jury service in the Central Judicial District and identified themselves as Hispanic and the 26.3 percent of the population of the Central Judicial District who were Hispanics who were eligible for jury service. The relative disparity which is the absolute disparity (12.3 percent) divided by the percentage of Hispanics in the population (26.3 percent)was 47 percent. (See People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 492, fn. 5, 273 Cal.Rptr. 537, 797 P.2d 561.) At the time, Code of Civil Procedure section 203 provided that no juror shall be required to serve at a distance greater than 20 miles from his or her residence. (Stats.1980, ch. 81, § 9, p. 204.) Accordingly, Dr. Weeks also compiled statistics for the area within a 20-mile radius from the courthouse from which prospective jurors actually were drawn and concluded that in 1987 the percentage of Hispanics within a 20-mile radius of the Central Courthouse who were eligible for jury service was 17.5 percent. The absolute disparity between that figure (17.5 percent) and the percentage of Hispanics that appeared for jury service (14 percent) was 3.5 percent. The relative disparity (3.5 percent divided by 17.5 percent), therefore, was 20 percent. Dr. Nancy Minter, a demographics expert employed by the County of Los Angeles, testified for the prosecution and disagreed that the population of persons eligible for jury service had increased by 1987, pointing out that the growth in the Hispanic population during this period consisted primarily of noncitizens who were ineligible for jury service. According to Dr. Minter, therefore, the absolute disparity between the 14 percent of persons who appeared for jury service and identified themselves as Hispanic and the 16.3 percent of the population within the 20-mile radius who were Hispanics who were eligible for jury service was just 2.3 percent. The relative disparity (2.3 percent divided by 16.3 percent), therefore, was 14 percent. Dr. Weeks opined that the disparity between the percentage of Hispanics available for jury service and the percentage that appeared for service was caused by the jury commissioner's use of records from the registrar of voters to compile a primary list. A similar list is drawn from the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Duplicate names on the DMV list are eliminated by comparing the full last name and the first four letters of the first name on the two lists. If an exact match is found, that name is removed from the DMV list. The remaining names on the DMV list and all of the names on the registrar of voters list are combined to form the master list. Dr. Weeks testified that using the registrar of voters list as the primary list results in an underrepresentation of Hispanics, because the percentage of Hispanics who are eligible to vote and who actually register to vote is lower than for other groups in the population. Dr. Weeks also pointed out that the process of eliminating duplicate names from the two lists was inaccurate, because only the exact last name and the first four letters of the first name were compared. Because many members of the Hispanic community share common surnames and first names, Hispanics might be erroneously deleted from the DMV list. The accuracy of determining if names on the two lists were duplicates would be increased if, in addition to the names, the birth date and address of the prospective jurors were compared. At the urging of the defense, Arce conducted an experiment on a small sample of the registrar of voters and DMV lists, which resulted in an increase from 19 to 26 percent Hispanics when the DMV list was used as the primary list. Arce stated that in compiling the new master list for the next fiscal year, he intended to compare the entries on the registrar of voters list and the DMV list using addresses as well as names. On May 31, 1988, the trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the jury venire. The court held that, assuming the defense expert was correct that there was a 3.5 percent absolute disparity between the percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics in the area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse from which prospective jurors were drawn and the percentage of Hispanics that appeared for jury service, which amounted to a relative disparity of 20 percent, this did not appear to this court to be of constitutional significance .... The court went on to find that the petit jury selection process and procedures in Los Angeles County reasonably and practically comply with California Code of Civil Procedure sections 190, et seq. While declining to so order, the court urged the jury commissioner to improve the method used to remove duplicate names from the registrar of voters list and the DMV list by comparing the date of birth listed for duplicate names, noting that it appears all would benefit. On June 7, 1988, during a readiness conference, Raymond Arce testified that a new master list had been compiled to be used in the upcoming 1988-1989 fiscal year and that duplicate names on the registrar of voters list and the DMV list were determined by comparing both the name and the date of birth, which resulted in a master list that was ten percentage points higher in the Hispanic representation. The percentage of Hispanics on the new master list was 28.4 percent. The new list was already being used to send out juror questionnaires and jurors from the new list would begin appearing in court in mid-July. Jury selection commenced on July 21, 1988. Defendant argues that his jury was not drawn from a fair cross-section of the population in violation of former Code of Civil Procedure sections 197 and 203, article I, section 16 of the California Constitution, and the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. But the procedures to which defendant objected in the trial court, and which the trial court found did not produce a constitutionally significant underrepresentation of Hispanics, were not the procedures used to select his jury. In order to preserve this issue for review, the defendant must object to the panel or move to quash the jury venire on this ground. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 634, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Defendant objected to, and moved to quash, the master list of jurors drawn for use in the 1987-1988 fiscal year. Although the trial court overruled defendant's objection and ruled there was no significant disparity in the percentage of Hispanics, the office of the jury commissioner adopted defendant's request to improve the method by which duplicate names were eliminated, which resulted in a significant increase in the percentage of Hispanics on the new master jury list that was used to select defendant's jury. Defendant's objection to the 1987-1988 master list was rendered moot, because that list was not used to summon the jurors in the present case. Defendant did not object to, or move to quash, the new master list used to select the jury in the present case and thus has forfeited this issue. Defendant's claim also fails on the merits. At the time of trial, former Code of Civil Procedure section 197 provided: It is the policy of the State of California that all persons selected for jury service shall be selected at random from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court.... (Stats.1980, ch. 81, 7, p. 203.) Former Code of Civil Procedure section 203 stated at that time: Each court shall adopt rules supplementary to such rules as may be adopted by the Judicial Council, governing the selection of persons to be listed as available for service as trial jurors. The persons so listed shall be fairly representative of the population in the area served by the court, and shall be selected upon a random basis. Such rules shall govern the duties of the court and its attachés in the production and use of the juror lists. In counties with more than one court location, the rules shall reasonably minimize the distance traveled by jurors. In addition, in the County of Los Angeles no juror shall be required to serve at a distance greater than 20 miles from his or her residence. (Stats.1980, ch. 81, 9, p. 204.) The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed .... The California Constitution declares that Trial by jury is an inviolate right and shall be secured to all .... (Cal. Const., art. I, 16.) These provisions have been interpreted to entitle a criminal defendant to a jury selected from a fair-cross-section of the community. ( Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 359, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 855, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) `That guarantee mandates that the pools from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community. [Citation.]' ( Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 856, 129 Cal. Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1.) In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a `distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. ( Duren, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364, 99 S.Ct. 664.) Defendant satisfied the first prong of this test, because Hispanics are a distinctive or cognizable group. ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th 398, 426, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Whether defendant satisfied the second prong by showing that Hispanics were underrepresented in the jury venire depends in part upon how the community that serves as a basis for comparison is defined. Defendant introduced evidence that 14 percent of the persons who appeared for jury service identified themselves as Hispanic. Defendant compared that percentage to both the percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics living in the judicial district in which the trial was held (26.3 percent) and the percentage of jury-eligible Hispanics living within a 20-mile radius from the courthouse (17.5 percent). The trial court selected the 20-mile radius as the community to which to compare the percentage of Hispanics. This was reasonable, because this was the area from which the jurors actually were summoned. At the time, former Code of Civil Procedure section 203 stated that in the County of Los Angeles no juror shall be required to serve at a distance greater than 20 miles from his or her residence. Consequently, the jurors were summoned from the area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse. Relying upon our decision in Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 263 Cal.Rptr. 503, 781 P.2d 537, which was filed the year after the trial court ruled in the present case, defendant argues the trial court erred in using the area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse as the relevant community. But defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object to the trial court's selection of the relevant community. ( People v. Saunders (1993) 5 Cal.4th 580, 590, fn. 6, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) In any event, we did not hold in Williams that the area within a 20-mile-radius area of the courthouse could not be used as the relevant community for this purpose. The defendant in Williams had argued that the relevant community was the entire county, while the People had asserted the relevant community was the judicial district. We noted that the Court of Appeal rejected both definitions, preferring instead a provocative compromise that defines community as that area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse. ( Williams v. Superior Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d 736, 742, 263 Cal.Rptr. 503, 781 P.2d 537, fn. omitted.) We ruled that the judicial district, rather than the entire county was the relevant community, but we expressly declined to consider the Court of Appeal's alternate position, because the requirement that no juror in Los Angeles County be required to serve at a courthouse more than 20 miles from his or her residence had since been repealed ( id. at p. 742, fn. 6, 263 Cal.Rptr. 503, 781 P.2d 537): Inasmuch as the basis for the decision of the Court of Appeal has been eliminated, no purpose is served by an extended discussion of the propriety of using the 20-mile-radius community in determining the population for cross-section analysis. ( Id. at p. 742, 263 Cal.Rptr. 503, 781 P.2d 537, fn. omitted.) As in Williams, we need not decide in the present case whether the trial court erred in using the area within a 20-mile radius around the courthouse as the relevant community for cross-section analysis. Defendant may not raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Using the area within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse as the relevant community, the trial court ruled that the absolute disparity of 3.5 percent, which translated to a relative disparity of 20 percent, was not constitutionally significant. We agree. In People v. Burgener, supra, 29 Cal.4th 833, 856, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1, we observed that it was uncertain whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, was sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the Duren test. In People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 262 Cal.Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129 we did not decide whether an absolute disparity of 5 percent between the percentage of Blacks in the community (8 percent) and the percentage that appeared for jury service (3 percent) was constitutionally significantly, but we observed that [i]t does not appear that a disparity of this degree renders the representation of Blacks on jury venires less than fair and reasonable .... ( Id. at p. 527, 262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129.) Based upon these figures, the relative disparity in Bell was 62.5 percent. The trial court in the present case was correct that the 3.5 percent absolute disparity and 20 percent relative disparity between the percentage of Hispanics who appeared for jury service and the percentage of Hispanics in the area within 20 miles of the courthouse was not constitutionally significant. By the time jury selection in the present case commenced on July 21, 1988, the jury commissioner had begun utilizing an improved method for identifying and eliminating duplicate names from the lists drawn from the registrar of voters and the DMV. This change increased the percentage of Hispanics on the master list to 28.4 percent, which is more than both the 17.5 percent of the population within a 20-mile radius of the courthouse and the 26.3 percent of the population in the Central Judicial District. It is clear, therefore, that Hispanics were not systematically excluded from the venire from which defendant's jury was chosen. [9]