Opinion ID: 1059222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: instrument in shaheens' chain of title

Text: The crux of the Shaheens' second and third assignments of error is that the County failed to record properly the final order in the Nelson suit that established the public landing and road. Relying on § 2510 of the 1887 Code, they claim that the order should have been recorded in a deed book rather than in the County Court Minute Books. [8] Because of the alleged improper recordation of the order, the Shaheens assert that there is no instrument in their chain of title giving notice of the County's interest in the public landing and road. It is not necessary for this Court to decide whether the provisions of § 2510 of the 1887 Code required the final order in the Nelson suit to be recorded in a deed book. [9] The dispositive issue is whether there is an instrument in the Shaheens' chain of title giving constructive notice of the County's claim either to a fee simple interest or an easement in the Auburn landing and road. The issue of constructive notice implicates the provisions of § 2465 of the 1887 Code. That statute, which was in effect while the Nelson suit was pending, provided that [e]very such contract in writing, every deed conveying any such estate or term, and every deed of gift, or deed of trust, or mortgage, conveying real estate or goods and chattels, shall be void as to subsequent purchasers for valuable consideration without notice, and creditors, until and except from the time that it is duly admitted to record in the county or corporation wherein the property embraced in such contract or deed may be. See Jones v. Folks, 149 Va. 140, 144, 140 S.E. 126, 127 (1927) for a discussion of this statute. See also, Code § 55-96 (current version of former § 2465). If, as the Shaheens contend, there is no instrument in their chain of title giving constructive notice of the County's claim, then the final order in the Nelson suit establishing the public landing and road is void as to the Shaheens, who were subsequent purchasers. Code § 2465. The main purpose of recordation statutes is to give constructive notice to purchasers and encumbrancers who acquire or seek to acquire some interest or right in property. Chavis v. Gibbs, 198 Va. 379, 381, 94 S.E.2d 195, 197 (1956). [W]here a party purchases an estate which is subject to the right of another, and that right is shown by the chain of title papers, the purchaser is charged with notice of all that the title paper or papers to which they refer may disclose upon complete examination. Id. at 382, 94 S.E.2d at 197 (citing Effinger v. Hall, 81 Va. 94, 105 (1885); Burwell's Adm'rs v. Fauber, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 446, 463 (1871); Virginia Iron & Coke Co. v. Roberts, 103 Va. 661, 681, 49 S.E. 984, 986, (1905)); see also Fox v. Templeton, 229 Va. 380, 385, 329 S.E.2d 6, 8-9 (1985). However, a bona fide purchaser is charged with constructive notice of only those matters of record in the purchaser's chain of title referred to or about which the purchaser is placed on inquiry. Kiser v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 200 Va. 517, 523, 106 S.E.2d 601, 606 (1959); Providence Forge Fishing & Hunting Club v. Gill, 117 Va. 557, 560, 85 S.E. 464, 465 (1915). To constitute constructive notice, the registered or recorded instrument must afford to subsequent purchasers or [i]ncumbrancers the means of not only ascertaining with accuracy what property is conveyed or affected by the instrument registered or recorded and where it is, but its language must be such that, if a subsequent purchaser or incumbrancer should examine the instrument itself, he would obtain thereby actual notice of all the rights which were intended to be created or conferred by it; and if it contained these essential requisites the registry or recordation thereof operates as constructive notice to subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers[.] National Cash Register Co. v. Burrow, 110 Va. 785, 790, 67 S.E. 370, 371-72 (1910). Stated differently, a purchaser must look to the title papers under which he buys, and is charged with notice of all the facts appearing upon their face, or to the knowledge of which anything there appearing will conduct him. He has no right to shut his eyes or his ears to the inlet of information, and then say he is a bona fide purchaser without notice. Burwell's Adm'rs, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) at 463; quoted in Chavis, 198 Va. at 383, 94 S.E.2d at 198. Only a purchaser without notice can take advantage of a failure to record an instrument. National Mut. Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blair, 98 Va. 490, 498, 36 S.E. 513, 515 (1900). In this case, there were three instruments in the Shaheens' chain of title giving constructive notice of the County's interest in the public landing and road. The first two instruments were the 1898 lease and the 1901 deed from Morgan J. Evans, a predecessor-in-title to the Shaheens and one of the petitioners in the Nelson suit. The third instrument was the plat of the Shaheens' property. Specifically, the 1901 deed contained the following relevant language: The property herein conveyed being the same property conveyed to Morgan J. Evans. . . by. . . . Deed dated October 20, 1893 and recorded in the Clerk's Office of Mathews County, Virginia . . . , (save and except that portion of Auburn Farm now used as a public road and leading down to what is called and known as Auburn Wharf, located upon the Auburn property[)]. Although this exception appeared in the derivative clause of that deed, it, nevertheless, placed subsequent purchasers, including the Shaheens, on notice that there was a public road and landing located on the Auburn property. The 1898 lease also referred to a public road running through the lands of [Morgan Evans] and adjoining the public landing on North River. [T]he recordation of an instrument gives constructive notice of all the facts expressly stated in the instrument and other[] matters therein suggested which might be disclosed upon prudent inquiry. Chavis, 198 Va. at 382, 94 S.E.2d at 197. Since the 1898 lease and the 1901 deed both referred to a public road and landing, a prudent inquiry in this case would have led to the conclusion that the County must have acquired an interest in the road and landing by virtue of an instrument such as a deed or through a condemnation proceeding. Orders entered in county court proceedings in Mathews County were recorded in the County Court Minute Books during the period when the Nelson suit was pending. Thus, searching for the County's name in the indices to the County Court Minute Books, since general indices were not required until 1919, see former Code § 3394, would have revealed the orders in the Nelson suit that established the landing and road. Apparently, Marchant found those orders in 1955. In a report to the County's Board of Supervisors, Marchant discussed the orders and recited the volumes of the County Court Minute Books and page numbers at which those orders were recorded. He also opined that the orders appear[ed] to establish definitely that such a road and landing were opened. Similarly, the plat of the Shaheens' property not only depicted the Auburn Public Landing and road on its face but also referenced the Supervisors' Minute Book and the plat book where the 1959 Sinclair plat was recorded. Despite disclaimers regarding the 1959 plat in some of the deeds to the Shaheens' predecessors-in-title, the plat of their property and the references contained there in again provided constructive notice of the existence of a public road and landing. The scope of a prudent inquiry was at issue in Chavis. There, the owner of two tracts of real estate conveyed the tracts to a trustee to secure payment of two promissory notes. 198 Va. at 380, 94 S.E.2d at 196. The owner subsequently conveyed the property to another individual, but that deed did not mention the prior deed of trust. Id. The second owner then sold the property to C.L. Chavis. Id. The deed to Chavis, which was recorded on January 19, 1948, stated that the conveyance was made subject to the lien of the prior deed of trust. Id. at 381, 94 S.E.2d at 196. However, default occurred in the payment of the notes, and the trustee, prior to the conveyance to Chavis, sold the property to two receivers for a bank, who in turn conveyed the property to Louis C. Gibbs. Both the deed to the receivers and the deed to Gibbs were recorded subsequent to the recordation of the deed to Chavis. Id. at 380, 94 S.E.2d at 196. The issue in the case was whether Chavis or Gibbs had title to the property. Id. at 381, 94 S.E.2d at 197. Chavis contended that the deed from the trustee to the receivers was void as to him because it had not been recorded prior to the time that he had acquired the property and recorded his deed. Id. at 381, 94 S.E.2d at 196-97. Gibbs, on the other hand, claimed that the deed of trust and the recitals in Chavis' deed charged Chavis with sufficient notice to put him on inquiry, which if pursued, would have revealed the foreclosure sale and conveyance by the trustee under the deed of trust. Id. at 381, 94 S.E.2d at 197. We agreed with Gibbs. Id. at 388, 94 S.E.2d at 201. In our decision, we quoted with approval this statement from 66 C.J.S., Notice, § 11, p. 642: A person who has sufficient information to lead him to a fact is deemed conversant with it, and a person who has notice of facts which would cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire as to further facts is chargeable with notice of the further facts discoverable by proper inquiry. Id. at 385, 94 S.E.2d at 199. We concluded that the recitals in the deed to Chavis put him on inquiry regarding the deed of trust and the rights of the beneficiary. Id. If reasonable and prudent inquiry had been made and full answers obtained, [Chavis] would have discovered that because of default in the payment of the notes, the property had been sold in accordance with the provisions of the deed of trust. Id. at 387, 94 S.E.2d at 201. Thus, we held that Chavis was not a purchaser without notice and did not take title to the property. Id. at 388, 94 S.E.2d at 201. In Chavis, a prudent inquiry was not limited to facts disclosed solely within the four corners of the recorded instruments. The fact that the deed of trust was of record and remained outstanding when Chavis purchased the property placed on him a duty to inquire further about the status of the notes secured by the deed of trust. Our decision today is consistent with an analogous case decided by this Court many years ago. In Whitlock v. Johnson, 87 Va. 323, 330, 12 S.E. 614, 616 (1891), the question we considered was whether the defendants were innocent purchasers for value, with notice. Several deeds in Whitlock's chain of title contained a reference to a plat of the sub-division of E.F. Peticolas's estate, which plat is filed with the report of Commissioner W.F. Watson, in the clerk's office of the county court of Henrico, with the causes ended October, 1861. Id. at 330, 12 S.E. at 617. The referenced plat, which was only filed with the commissioner's report and not in the deed books, had the name of Dr. C.P. Johnson on lot No. 25 and the word do on each of the other lots in question. Id. at 331, 12 S.E. at 617. The deed to Whitlock did not, however, mention the plat, but it did refer to the other deeds in Whitlock's chain of title. Id. at 330-31, 12 S.E. at 617. We concluded that Whitlock was put on inquiry as to the commissioner's report which conclusively showed that Johnson purchased the lots in question. Id. at 331, 12 S.E. at 617. Although the cause in which the report and plat were filed was not specifically named in the deeds, it was sufficient that the deeds contained the term of court in which the cause was ended and referred to the plat, and that the plat named the cause in which the property was sold. Id. Thus, we held that Whitlock had constructive notice of the outstanding title of Johnson to the lots in question. Id. at 332, 12 S.E. at 617. Similarly, the instruments in the Shaheens' chain of title did not mention the Nelson suit, but those instruments provided sufficient information to put the Shaheens on constructive notice about the existence of a public landing and road. And, as we have already stated, a prudent inquiry would have led to the Nelson suit orders recorded in the County Court Minute Books. Thus, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in affirming the existence of an easement for the benefit of the public in the Auburn landing and road. The Shaheens were not innocent purchasers without constructive notice of the County's interest in the landing and road.