Opinion ID: 2281794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirement for Trial Court to Award Jail-Time Credit.

Text: In order to understand better the nature of the error in this case, we must first examine why a trial court must award jail-time custody credit in the first place. The Executive Branch, in the form of the Department of Corrections  not the judicial branch  is ultimately responsible for determining when prisoners in its custody are eligible for release. [6] But the judicial branch is statutorily required to award applicable jail-time credit to defendants. KRS 532.120 generally governs jail-time credits. Originally enacted in 1974 as part of the enactment of the Kentucky Penal Code, KRS 532.120(3) provides, in relevant part, that [t]ime spent in custody prior to the commencement of a sentence as a result of the charge that culminated in the sentence shall be credited by the court imposing sentence toward service of the maximum term of imprisonment. (Emphasis added.) The official commentary to KRS 532.120 makes plain that the trial court has an affirmative obligation to award any applicable jail-time credit: The provision imposes a duty upon the trial judge to see that this credit is properly given. This is the surest way to guarantee against oversight of the credit. [7] Unlike its predecessor statute, KRS 532.120 does not specify how a trial court can calculate the amount of pretrial jail-time credit a defendant should receive, or explicitly require the Department of Corrections to calculate jail-time credit. [8] Our research reveals, however, that the Department of Corrections is still required by law to inform a trial court about how much pretrial jail-time credit it calculates a defendant has accrued. The applicable administrative regulation, 501 Kentucky Administrative Regulation (KAR) 6:270 § 1, incorporates by reference certain policies of the Department of Probation and Parole, which is a division of the Department of Corrections. [9] Among those current policies incorporated by reference is Policy 28-01-03, effective May 26, 2005. That policy sets forth, among other things, what must be included in a PSI, which is called a presentence investigation in the policy. Section II(B)(1)(j) of the policy requires [a]ny applicable jail custody credit to be included in the body of the presentence investigation report. So the Department of Corrections is obligated by law to provide trial courts with jail-time credit calculations. Trial courts, in turn, are required to award defendants the proper amount of jail-time credit. [10] KRS 532.120 requires a trial court to award applicable jail-time credit, and the commentary to that statute describes that requirement as a duty. Although KRS 532.120 does not facially require the trial court's award of jail-time credit to be inserted into the final judgment of conviction, our precedent at least arguably requires it to be included in the final judgment. In a decision rendered shortly after the enactment of KRS 532.120, a defendant argued, among other things, that the trial court had failed to award him credit in its final judgment for time spent in custody before sentencing. Based upon that issue and the trial court's failure to obtain a recent PSI, we remanded the case to the trial court, tersely holding that KRS 532.120 entitles him to that credit and the judgment will so provide. [11] Although we need not decide in this case if it is absolutely required, it appears, therefore, that it is generally expected that the final judgment of conviction will include information as to how much, if any, pretrial jail-time credit a defendant is due. [12] If either the defendant or the Commonwealth believes the trial court's jail-time credit calculation to be erroneous, either the Commonwealth or the defendant may timely raise that issue on direct appeal. [13] Unfortunately, although Winstead and the Commonwealth both now agree that the trial court erred by awarding Winstead jail-time credit, that issue was not raised in a timely direct appeal. [14] Accordingly, the question we must answer in the appeal at hand is whether CR 60.02 is a proper procedural mechanism to challenge a trial court's allegedly improper calculation of jail-time credit once the time to file a direct appeal has elapsed.