Opinion ID: 2068058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Phillips' Statement

Text: On October 13, 1983 appellant was arrested by the police at his home. That same afternoon the police interrogated appellant after a full advisement and waiver of his Miranda rights. Appellant stated that he did not have any knowledge about the Smith homicide and then announced that he did not wish to discuss it any further. The police immediately ceased this interrogation and then booked defendant on the present charges. Three days later defendant told the jail commander that he wanted to speak with either Officer Martin Eby or Officer David Becher about his case. Becher came to the police station. Since he did not have an advice of rights form with him at the time, Becher advised appellant orally that: he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be used against him in court, that he could have an attorney present during questioning, and that he could terminate the interview at any time. Becher did not inform appellant prior to this second interrogation that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed. Phillips stated that he understood the rights of which he was orally advised and that he remembered the constitutional rights which were read to him prior to the first interrogation. At this second interrogation appellant first recited a story which the police did not believe. The police again told defendant that Lee Drew would testify at trial that Drew, appellant, and Littlejohn had committed this burglary and homicide. Phillips then told the police that while he was ransacking the house he was warned by someone that the owner was home. Phillips then heard two gunshots as he was fleeing from the residence. The police requested that appellant give them a formal written statement admitting his participation in the burglary and homicide of Smith. Phillips refused. On October 20th, the police interrogated defendant a third time after giving him a full recitation of his constitutional rights and obtaining a signed waiver. Becher testified that he wanted to give Phillips the opportunity to tell the truth since they had received information that a witness could identify him as the person who was seen outside the Smith residence. Phillips made a short statement that the police did not have any evidence against him and that he would see them in court. Appellant argues that the incriminating statement which he gave at the second interrogation was inadmissible because the police did not advise him prior to the interrogation that if he could not afford an attorney one would be appointed. However, since Phillips had already been advised of all his rights on the day of his arrest and chose to remain silent, the issue is whether the police resumed interrogation improperly. Warning the accused that he has the right to remain silent is an absolute prerequisite in overcoming the inherent pressures of the interrogation atmosphere. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 468, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 720. The Supreme Court has prescribed the procedures which police must follow after the accused has been advised of his constitutional rights: Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-1628. The circumstances under which an interrogation may be resumed was not addressed directly in Miranda. The Court did note that if the accused invoked his right to remain silent when his attorney was present that further questioning might be proper in the presence of his counsel. [1] However, it also suggested that the presence of an attorney may not always be required as a condition to further questioning of the accused. Procedures differ depending upon which right is invoked. When an attorney is requested, interrogation must cease until an attorney is present; when a defendant indicates he wishes to remain silent, interrogation must cease. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 86 S.Ct. at 1627-1628. The Court later held that the admissibility of statements obtained from a custodial interrogation conducted subsequent to the accused's invocation of his right to remain silent is dependent upon whether his right to cut off questioning was scrupulously honored. [2] Michigan v. Mosley (1975), 423 U.S. 96, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313. The facts in Mosley are similar but not dispositive of the case at bar. In Mosley, the police advised the accused of his Miranda rights before questioning him about a robbery. The defendant stated that he did not want to answer any questions about the robbery and the interrogation was promptly ceased. Later that same day Mosley was again advised of his Miranda rights and then interrogated by another detective about an unrelated homicide. At this time the defendant made a statement implicating himself in the murder. The Court found that Mosley's right to terminate questioning was scrupulously honored. The Court relied on three facts from the record in reaching this conclusion: (1) The first interrogation (robbery) was immediately terminated upon Mosley's invocation of his right to remain silent. (2) The officer who conducted the first interrogation did not try to resume questioning or to pursuade Mosley to reconsider his position. (3) Mosley was fully apprised of his constitutional rights before the second interrogation which focused on an unrelated homicide. The U.S. Supreme Court has not dealt directly with the issue presented by Phillips. However, there are several cases from that Court and this one which examine the resumption of questioning when the accused has invoked his right to the assistance of counsel. Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488; Solem v. Stumes (1984), 465 U.S. 638, 104 S.Ct. 1338, 79 L.Ed.2d 579; Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983), 462 U.S. 1039; 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405; Wyrick v. Fields (1982), 459 U.S. 42, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214; Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378; Moore v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 710; Clark v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1090; Romine v. State (1983), Ind., 455 N.E.2d 911. The language and logic of these opinions are helpful in analyzing resumption of interrogation after an accused has invoked his right to remain silent. When an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during the custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right is not established by showing that he responded to police-initiated interrogation after being again advised of his rights. Edwards, supra . [3] If the accused initiates a second dialogue with the police, then any volunteered statements are admissible at trial. Edwards, supra . However, the accused may not be subjected to further interrogation until counsel has been made available or the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Edwards, supra ; Accord, Watkins v. Virginia, ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1503, 89 L.Ed.2d 903 (1986) (Dissenting opinion to the denial of certiorari). This is a prophylactic rule designed to protect the accused in police custody from being badgered by the police officers. Bradshaw, supra . The accused's initiation of a dialogue with the police does not suffice ex proprio vigore to show a waiver of the previously invoked right. A separate inquiry to determine whether the accused knowingly and intelligently waived his rights is required. Bradshaw, supra . When the accused invokes his right to counsel or the right to remain silent, he may be subjected to further interrogation only when: (1) the accused himself initiates dialogue with the authorities, and (2) the accused makes a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right he had previously invoked. Smith, Bradshaw, Edwards, supra . The initial inquiry is whether the accused initiated dialogue with the police. An inquiry arising out of the routine incidents of the custodial relationship does not constitute an initiation by the accused. Rather, the accused's act of initiation should represent a desire on the part of the accused to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation. Bradshaw, supra . If the State establishes that the accused initiated a dialogue with the police after invocation of his right to counsel or the right to remain silent, then the State must also show a valid waiver of the previously invoked right. The knowing and intelligent waiver is based upon the standard enunciated in Johnson v. Zerbst (1938), 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461; Edwards, supra . See also, James v. Arizona (1984), ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 398, 83 L.Ed.2d 332 (dissenting opinion to the denial of certiorari). The waiver must constitute a knowing and intelligent relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. It is dependent upon the particular facts and circumstances of each case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. The waiver determination is made by reviewing the totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the accused initiated the subsequent dialogue with the police. Bradshaw, Edwards, supra . [4] If the State can satisfy this dual standard, then the accused's right to remain silent has been scrupulously honored. Therefore, any statements made during the dialogue with the police are properly admissible. A renewed advisement of all of the Miranda rights is not required in order to establish that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his previously invoked right to remain silent. Under the totality of circumstances standard, a prior invocation of the right to remain silent can be considered as evidence that the accused is fully aware that he controls when questioning occurs, the subjects discussed, and the duration of the questioning. This evidence is available as proof that he has made a knowing and intelligent decision notwithstanding the inherently coercive pressures of custodial interrogation. In this case, the dual standard of dialogue initiated by the accused and a knowing and intelligent waiver was clearly met. The defendant told the jail commander that he wished to talk to the detectives about this case. This act demonstrated Phillips' desire for a generalized discussion of the present charges. While the police did not advise defendant that he had the right to appointed counsel if he could not afford an attorney, they did advise him once again that he had the right to remain silent and that he could terminate questioning at any time. The police recited to Phillips a full advisement of his constitutional rights before his first interrogation. This first interrogation was immediately terminated when defendant invoked his right to remain silent, and the police did not approach defendant to resume interrogation. Rather, Phillips initiated the second dialogue. Appellant stated that he remembered the constitutional rights of which he had been advised three days earlier at the first interrogation. He also indicated that he understood the constitutional rights of which he had been orally advised to him prior to the second interrogation. He then proceeded to talk with the police. Reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we find that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent. The incriminating statement which Phillips gave to the police during the second interrogation was properly admitted into evidence.