Opinion ID: 2977202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tangible Job Detriment Resulting From Refusal

Text: Plaintiff also must demonstrate that her “submission to [Kirk’s] unwelcomed advances was an express or implied condition for receiving job benefits[,] or that [her] refusal to submit to [Kirk’s] sexual demands resulted in a tangible job detriment.” Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. Thus, Plaintiff may 10 prevail if she demonstrates that she experienced an adverse employment action,6 and that this action occurred because of her refusal to have sex with Kirk.
While de minimis employment actions and “very temporary” actions are not materially adverse and, thus, not actionable under Title VII, Bowman, 220 F.3d at 462, those involving changes such as a termination or a suspension constitute adverse employment actions. Arendale v. City of Memphis, 519 F.3d 587, 603 (6th Cir. 2008). We have also recognized that a “loss of pay or benefits” can constitute a tangible job detriment. See Thornton v. Fed. Express Corp., 530 F.3d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 2008). The record in this case is unclear as to whether Plaintiff lost any of her hourly wages when Kirk sent her home from work in either instance. Plaintiff, however, also earned wages through tips as a day-shift bartender. As a result, Plaintiff undoubtedly lost compensation in the form of unearned tips for the days she was not at work after Kirk sent her home. Accordingly, a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff has satisfied this element of her prima facie case. 6 Defendants contend Plaintiff cannot, after arguing in district court that she was terminated, assert that the suspension constituted the adverse employment action. This argument is without merit. Plaintiff’s opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment effectively informed Defendants and the district court that Plaintiff believed she experienced a tangible job detriment when Kirk told her to leave work, and that she believes he did so because of her refusal to have sex with him. Arguments raised in a district court filing offered in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are preserved for appeal. See Vencor, Inc. v. Standard Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 317 F.3d 629, 642 n.11 (6th Cir. 2003); see also Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 522 (6th Cir. 1995) (noting that an issue presented to a district court is preserved for appeal as long as the issue was presented to the district court in a manner which “places the opposing party and the court on notice that a new issue is being raised”). Defendants further argue that, had they understood Plaintiff’s filings in the district court to encompass a claim that she experienced a tangible work detriment other than firing, they would have conducted additional discovery and argued to the district court that Kirk had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for disciplining Plaintiff, thus entitling them to relief. See Defs.’ Br. 21–22. This defense, however, is viable regardless of whether Plaintiff was terminated or merely suspended. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. 11
The only remaining question is whether a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff was disciplined because of her refusal to have sex with Kirk. See Bowman, 220 F.3d at 461. According to Plaintiff’s deposition, Kirk propositioned her for sex “every day that [she] worked with him,” (J.A. 35) he became increasingly aggressive with her as she continued to refuse his advances, and he sent her text messages stating that “if [she] didn’t have sex with him [she] wasn’t going to be employed there anymore.” (J.A. 190.) These facts are sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer that Kirk disciplined Plaintiff because of her refusal to have sex with him. Cf. Idusuyi v. State of Tenn. Dep’t of Children’s Servs., 30 F. App’x 398, 401 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding no causal relationship between refusal of sexual advances and the adverse employment action when alleged harasser did not participate in making the adverse decision). In addition, Defendants present no evidence to rebut Plaintiff’s claim that Kirk repeatedly propositioned her for sex. Defendants, however, contest Plaintiff’s claim that Kirk sent her text messages threatening to have her fired if she did not have sex with him. After Plaintiff introduced a copy of her cell phone records into evidence, Kirk stated in an affidavit that “[n]one of the numbers listed in [Plaintiff’s phone records] ever belonged to me.” Kirk’s affidavit, however, is only two paragraphs long, and does not at any point deny that he sent threatening text messages to Plaintiff, but denies only that he sent text messages to her from his own phone number. Thus, it remains unclear whether Plaintiff received text messages from Kirk, presenting a genuine issue of material fact relevant to determining whether a causal relationship existed between the adverse employment 12 action and Plaintiff’s refusals. As a result, we conclude that the district court improperly granted summary judgment to Defendants with respect to Plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim.7