Opinion ID: 1852242
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: The Statute's procedural provisions The Critz and McLaurin Amendments.

Text: Beginning in 1873, and continuing through the mid-1900's, there existed no family of lawyers in Mississippi more prolific and prominent in litigation and appellate practice than the Critz family of West Point. [32] In 1885, Frank A. Critz was retained by Mrs. Willie McVey to file suit against the Illinois Central Railroad Company for the death of her husband. In filing the suit, Critz asserted claims by Mrs. McVey, as administratrix of her husband's estate under Section 1916 of the Code of 1892, and on behalf of herself and her infant child as wrongful death beneficiaries under Section 663 of the Code of 1892. The claim was also brought under Section 193 of the 1890 Constitution, which provides a remedy for injury to railroad employees. The historic documents do not explain why Critz did not file two separate suits, as conventional wisdom and the practice of the day would have suggested. [33] It is entirely possible, as suggested by later opinions of this Court, that Critz was misled by this Court's opinion in Natchez, Jackson and Columbus R.R. v. Cook, 63 Miss. 38 (1885), in which claims for both the estate and the wrongful death beneficiary were presented. However, because the parties in Cook had entered an agreement that all claims would be presented in one case, Cook was limited to its facts. Id. In any case, on February 3, 1886, this Court rejected Critz's argument and refused to allow Mrs. McVey to pursue both claims in one suit. Specifically, this Court held: The right of action which, notwithstanding the death of the party injured, survives to his personal representative ... is entirely distinct from the action given to the next of kin by [the Statute]. They may coexist, but have no connection. Railroad Co. v. Phillips, 64 Miss. 693, 2 South. 537. McVey v. Ill. Cent. R.R. 73 Miss. 487, 493, 19 So. 209, 210 (1896). Apparently, Critz viewed this Court's decision as only a temporary setback, because twelve days later, he introduced H.B. 548, [34] which proposed to amend the Statute in several respects, including a provision which not only allowed, but required, the claims of the estate and the wrongful death beneficiaries to be brought in one suit. Critz's bill was passed and became effective on March 23, 1896, only five weeks after introduction, and less than two months after losing his case before this Court. A short time thereafter, Governor Anselm McLaurin submitted a bill to the legislature which was almost identical to Critz's bill, except for Section Four, which stated: All suits pending in any court at the time of the approval of this act and which were also pending at the time said chapter went into effect, shall not be affected by any of its provisions; but all such suits shall be conducted and concluded under the laws in force prior to the time of the approval of said act, on March 23, 1896. It is unclear why Governor McLaurin introduced the bill, if not to put an end to Critz's prosecution of the McVey litigation. By its retroactive application of the Critz legislation, the McLaurin amendment would have ended any attempt by Critz to keep alive, or revive, the McVey suit. In any case, the McLaurin version of the Critz amendment was approved on January 27, 1898, and became Chapter 65 of the 1898 Mississippi Laws. This act found its way into the 1906 Code, and we find no further reference to the McVey litigation. The McLaurin version of the Critz amendment contained other procedural provisions, including one which prohibited executors and administrators from bringing the wrongful death suit unless the deceased have neither husband, or wife, or children, or father, or mother, or sister, or brother, ... This was, indeed, a curious provision since the Statute, for the first time, required the claims of the estate to be brought in the same suit as the claims of the wrongful death heirs, but then prohibited the personal representative from bringing the suit; that is, unless the decedent left no wrongful death beneficiary. It is difficult to know why such a provision would have been included. However, we are provided some insight into Critz's thinking by his brief in the McVey appeal. See McVey, 73 Miss. at 488-91, 19 So. 209. [35] Critz claimed that his amendment was the only way to bring about harmony. Whether his motivation was to simplify litigation, or to accomplish legislatively what he could not in this Court, Critz clearly, for the first time, injected procedural [36] provisions into the Statute. Thus began a one hundred and eight year struggle by those who bring wrongful death claims to identify a sensible pattern of precedent which is both instructive and workable. As the case before us today bears witness, it hasn't happened. From this Court's perspective, because the Critz amendment and its progeny were enacted by the Legislature, and because Justices on this Court have traditionally been sensitive to their obligation to follow the law, not make the law, this Court has, for over a century, attempted to guess and implement the intent of the Statute. By our opinion today, we fulfill our Constitutional obligation to bring order, understanding and predictability to the procedural aspects of the judicial pursuit of a wrongful death claim.