Opinion ID: 2071076
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: COUNT VI: SCR 20:8.4(c)

Text: ¶ 72. Finally, the disciplinary complaint alleged that Arthur violated SCR 20:8.4(c), which provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation. The referee made a number of findings in support of his conclusion that Arthur violated this rule. Some of these findings are summarized as follows: Making false statements to Ms. Doyle about his intentions with respect to his use of the Lyndon Station property, as found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. Making false statements to the Keefes about the exact location of the Doyle property line, as found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. Falsely accusing Ms. Doyle, her attorneys, and the Keefes of engaging in a conspiracy to defraud him, as found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. The Honorable Richard Wright's observation that the court has never found such a liar on the stand and would probably refer him to the DA for perjury. [P]resent[ing] a false defense and [making] misrepresentations to the court as found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. Falsely denying that he advised Zupfer to fake an illness and avoid testifying at his deposition, as found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. Falsely testifying about his net worth, as found by the Juneau County Circuit Court. Misrepresenting to the court, the Honorable Frank Crivello, that an evidentiary hearing was conducted before Judge Wright on a discovery motion, which Juneau County Circuit Court later stated that just plain isn't true. Presenting a false claim against the Keefes to the Bankruptcy Court, the Honorable Margaret Dee McGarity presiding, which warranted a referral to the U.S. Attorney. Submitting a claim to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection against the Keefes that falsely alleged a court ordered judgment entered against them in Arthur's favor. Transferring his personal assets to his wife in a marital property agreement to fraudulently avoid payment of claims, debts and judgments against him; facilitated the transfer of assets to various non-profit corporations in which he was actively involved and had received things of value to fraudulently avoid payment of claims. ¶ 73. Arthur contends that the actual verbatim transcripts do not support these findings. He blames the OLR, suggesting it deliberately engaged in conspicuously fraudulent misconduct. [8] ¶ 74. Specifically, Arthur challenges the referee's finding that he made a misstatement of fact before Judge Crivello, regarding whether an evidentiary hearing had taken place on a discovery issue. Arthur concedes that he vacillated by saying both that it was and was not an evidentiary hearing. He nonetheless maintains that no reasonable trier of fact could possibly conclude that Mr. Arthur violated SCR 20:8.4(c) by deceiving the court. He reiterates his position that the decision of the Juneau County Court in Case No. 95 CV 182 must be considered void because of Attorney Schmukler's misconduct. However, this is not an appeal from the Juneau County court decision. ¶ 75. With respect to the finding that he fraudulently conveyed his assets to his wife in order to avoid payment of debts and other claims against him, Arthur defends his actions, asserting there is nothing inherently improper about a fraudulent conveyance. ¶ 76. Arthur is adept at using various conflicting testimony from the many court proceedings to raise questions about the referee's findings of fact in this disciplinary matter. Having engaged in an independent review of the record, including individual pleadings filed by Arthur that alleged various unsupported claims against Ms. Doyle, her counsel, and others, we have no difficulty concluding that there are sufficient facts of record to support the conclusion that Arthur repeatedly violated SCR 20:8.4(c). ¶ 77. We appreciate that we may not have addressed each and every one of the arguments presented by Arthur. To the extent we have not, it is deemed denied. See Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 801, 546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (appellate court need not discuss arguments unless they have sufficient merit to warrant individual attention). ¶ 78. We turn to the question of the appropriate sanction for Arthur's misconduct. In considering the appropriate sanction, we first consider the seriousness of the conduct. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Charlton, 174 Wis. 2d 844, 875, 498 N.W.2d 380 (1993). We also consider the need to protect the public, courts, and legal system from the attorney's repetition of misconduct, to impress upon the attorney the seriousness of the misconduct, and to deter other attorneys from engaging in similar misconduct. Id. at 847. ¶ 79. The OLR seeks revocation of Arthur's license to practice law in Wisconsin. The referee observed that these proceedings were very lengthy and complete observing further: it is not possible to avoid the conclusion that there are a number of patterns of substantial improper conduct. ¶ 80. We agree. After careful consideration of the arguments of counsel, review of the extensive record, and the relevant case law, we conclude that revocation of Arthur's license to practice law is the appropriate sanction for Arthur's serious pattern of misconduct and abuse of the litigation process. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hinners, 162 Wis. 2d 728, 470 N.W.2d 309 (1991). ¶ 81. We turn to the question of the costs incurred in this matter. Although we directed the parties to brief the issue, they had relatively little to say about the costs. Suffice it to say that Arthur maintains that he should not be financially responsible for any amount of costs, but, as the OLR observes, he has failed to object to the statement of costs with specificity. It is readily apparent to this court that Arthur's own litigation tactics are the primary cause of the unusually high costs of this proceeding. As the OLR states: [This] is the same lawyer who claims on page 18 of his brief that this is a petty matter and then files over 500 pages of discovery documents to OLR, including fourteen motions, seven separate discovery demands, and a 1,000+ page pre-hearing compendium. In the process, Arthur complains in his brief on page 43 that OLR did not respond in a manner he wished concerning his pre-trial motions. Arthur has requested OLR respond to all of his demands, which it did, and now he doesn't want to pay for the time and costs involved. ¶ 82. We accept the referee's recommendation and order Arthur to pay the costs of the disciplinary proceeding. ¶ 83. IT IS ORDERED that the license of Attorney Ronald A. Arthur to practice law in Wisconsin is revoked effective the date of this order. ¶ 84. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Attorney Ronald A. Arthur comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning duties of a person whose license to practice law has been revoked. ¶ 85. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of this order Attorney Ronald A. Arthur pay to the OLR the costs of the proceeding. ¶ 86. PATIENCE D. ROGGENSACK, J., did not participate.