Opinion ID: 1956793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: issues on appeal from conviction of counts i and ii (capital rape and sexual battery)

Text: ¶ 26. Foley asserts that the trial court's admission of a photograph of K.F. into evidence was in error. However, Foley did not contemporaneously object to the introduction of such evidence and cannot now complain about something which he did not object to in his trial. A failure to object at trial waives any error which may have been presented, even in capital cases. Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1245 (Miss.1994) (quoting Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 859 (Miss.1994)); Smith v. State, 724 So.2d 280, 316 (Miss. 1998). Foley's argument is procedurally barred and thus without merit.
¶ 27. Foley also questions the sufficiency of the evidence offered to uphold the jury verdict in this case. A question of sufficiency of the evidence is one best examined by considering whether the defendant committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; specifically: in considering whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction in the face of a motion for directed verdict or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the critical inquiry is whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction. Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968). Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005). ¶ 28. The relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We find, after reviewing all the evidence in the most favorable light to the prosecution, that there was sufficient evidence to convict Foley of capital rape and sexual assault. The State offered the testimony of a number of medical and counseling professionals indicating that K.F.'s statements were consistent with those of a sexual abuse victim. K.F. named Foley as the perpetrator, and the State offered physical evidence in the form of medical diagnoses and test results as well as many of the objects K.F. stated Foley utilized in his abuse of her. Because of such evidence, we find that a rational juror could have found Foley guilty of both crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, we will not disturb the jury's verdict or reverse the trial court's decision to refuse to grant a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
¶ 29. The next assignment of error Foley makes is what he refers to as the circuit court's erroneous allowance of other crimes of Foley to be presented to the jury. Specifically, during the cross-examination of Houck, Foley's ex-wife, counsel for Foley questioned Houck about a restraining order against Foley which she had requested. Houck had been called by the defense as an adverse witness. Subsequent questioning of Houck by the prosecution also involved the restraining order. Foley objected to such questioning, but the circuit judge overruled the objection pointing out that the defense had initially asked Houck about the restraining order and could not block the prosecution's questions concerning a document the defense had brought to light in questioning. Foley's contentions of a wrongful introduction of other crimes or bad acts fails because, once a defendant opens the door and invites questioning on a matter, then that defendant may not complain of such alleged errors invited or induced by himself. Caston v. State, 823 So.2d 473, 502 (Miss.2002) (quoting Singleton v. State, 518 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss.1988)); see also Evans v. State, 547 So.2d 38, 40 (Miss. 1989); Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84, 90 (Miss.1983). Based on the foregoing authority, the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the prosecution's questions about areas already reached by questions of Foley's counsel.
¶ 30. During his trial, Foley called Houck as an adverse witness. Counsel for Foley began questioning Houck about her son's counseling for sexual issues and her intimate relationship with a man. The State objected on grounds of relevance and improper impeachment. Foley's counsel made a number of ambiguous statements about the relevancy of the line of questioning to aid in the establishment that other men or youth could have caused K.F.'s injuries. Foley wanted to bring in information that Houck had committed adultery and the like. The circuit judge refused to allow Foley's attorneys to question Houck about the man to whom she is now married because the circuit court found that this testimony had no relevance. [T]he scope of cross-examination though ordinarily broad, is within the sound discretion of the trial court and the trial court possesses inherent power to limit cross-examination to relevant matters. Heflin v. State, 643 So.2d 512, 518 (Miss.1994). See also Carr v. State, 655 So.2d 824, 847 (Miss.1995). Foley's assertions simply are not substantiated by the record, and we find that the circuit court judge did not abuse his discretion in finding that the questions being asked failed to meet basic relevance requirements concerning either the son or the father.
¶ 31. Foley also alleges error based on the circuit court's restricting his counsel's closing arguments. Specifically, the circuit court sustained an objection by the State made upon defense counsel's statements that [W]e didn't hear from [G.F.] Nobody knows where he is. His mother testified he was up in Memphis. The objection alleged that defense counsel was, in effect, testifying as to G.F.'s failure to appear at trial as a witness. Foley was attempting to show that G.F., Deborah Houck's son, could have been the perpetrator and cast doubt on the State's evidence that Foley was the one responsible for the acts against K.F. Before he sustained the objection, the circuit judge called counsel for both sides to the bench. The bench conference was not transcribed in the record. After a brief talk, the circuit judge announced that the statement was to be disregarded by the jury. The judge said, [T]hat's not an appropriate argument under the law. They could have gotten him if they wanted to, could have attempted it anyway. [T]he standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice ... so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Eckman, 876 So.2d at 994. ¶ 32. Both Foley and the State focus their arguments on the availability of Houck's son, G.F., and whether it was permissible to comment upon his absence as a witness in closing arguments. Foley points out that there was an attempt to subpoena G.F., but from the judge's comments, it is apparent that the circuit court determined that Foley had not adequately attempted to secure G.F. as a witness. The trial court also made reference to the statements not being appropriate under the law. Indeed, [t]he general principle is that `the failure of either party to examine a witness equally accessible to both is not a proper subject of comment before the jury by either of the parties.' Brown v. State, 27 So.2d at 840 (citing Heafner v. State, 196 Miss. 430, 17 So.2d 806, 808 (1944)). Burke, 576 So.2d at 1241. ¶ 33. Foley fails to show why the witness was unavailable. Simply failing to have a witness under subpoena does not render them unavailable. The circuit judge obviously found evidence that Foley could have obtained G.F.'s presence in court with some amount of reasonable effort but failed to do so. Foley asks us to find that the trial court judge's reasoning was flawed, but did nothing to preserve the judge's objectionable reasoning in the record for appeal. A presumption of equal access to both parties arises when the record provides no proof of the absent witness's accessibility or inaccessibility. Ross v. State, 603 So.2d 857, 864 (Miss. 1992) (citing Madlock v. State, 440 So.2d 315, 318 (Miss.1983)); see also Holmes v. State, 537 So.2d 882 (Miss.1988). We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the circuit judge since we have not been presented with a showing of prejudice to Foley and has not been shown why the circuit court's judgment was incorrect in finding that G.F. could have been found through reasonable effort by Foley. Foley's complaint to the alternative is without merit.
¶ 34. Foley challenges the authority of the circuit court to impose a life sentence for the conviction of his crime under Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(1)(b) (Rev.2000). The State and Foley point to statutory guidelines for sentencing for a statutory rape conviction in § 97-3-65(2)(c). However, the accurate subsection is Miss.Code Ann. § 97-3-65(3)(c) (Rev.2000) for statutory rape convictions, and concerning sentencing states that [I]f eighteen (18) years of age or older and convicted under paragraph (1)(b) of this section, to imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary or such lesser term of imprisonment as the court may determine, but not less than twenty (20) years (emphasis added). It was the intent of the state legislature, Foley argues, that the jury determine his sentence and not the judge. Foley makes reference to § 97-3-79 of the Mississippi Code which covers the crime and sentencing of the commission of a robbery with a deadly weapon. Foley points to the fact that a person convicted of robbery with a deadly weapon is entitled to have the jury decide his sentence. [4] It is obvious from the language in § 97-3-79 that the jury was intended to arrive at a sentence for a convicted defendant. In contrast, though, the Legislature used words indicating judicial discretion would be the determination for crimes of statutory rape in § 97-3-65(2)(c). Foley assertions to the contrary are without merit.