Opinion ID: 2155367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Plead Sufficient Facts

Text: Appellees contend that, should we disagree with the trial court's conclusion that they are immune from suit, we should nevertheless affirm because CASCO failed to allege facts underlying its claim of tortious interference with either contract or business expectancy sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. We disagree. We are satisfied that CASCO pleaded facts sufficient to undergird its tortious interference with contract count. This court has stated that the elements of tortious interference with contract are: (1) the existence of a contract; (2) knowledge of the contract; (3) intentional procurement of a breach of the contract; and (4) damages resulting from the breach. Paul v. Howard Univ., 754 A.2d 297, 309 (D.C.2000) (footnote and citation omitted). The only element at issue in the instant case is the third one, intentional procurement of a breach of the contract. Appellees argue that because MIF cancelled the CASCO-MIF contract pursuant to its terms, as opposed to breaching it, CASCO cannot recover. To support this point, appellees direct our attention to Paul, supra, 754 A.2d at 309, and Sorrells v. Garfinckel's, Brooks Bros., Miller & Rhoads, Inc., 565 A.2d 285, 289-90 (D.C. 1989). Sorrells, however, actually undermines appellees' contention. In Sorrells, the court was faced with a similar situationcancellation of a terminable contract induced by a third partybut nevertheless held that the third party had tortiously interfered with Sorrells's contract. Sorrells was an employee of a department store in the District who had been terminated at the behest of a supervisory employee for diminished sales performance resulting from unique restrictions placed upon Sorrells by the supervisory employee. Sorrells filed suit, inter alia, against the department store for wrongful termination and against the supervisor for tortious interference with her employment contract with the department store. The trial court granted the department store's motion for summary judgment, and the jury returned its verdict in favor of Sorrells against the supervisor. On appeal, this court upheld both the ruling and the judgment. We observed that, in the District, employment contracts are at-will unless otherwise specified, and that, accordingly, the department store's termination of Sorrells's employment did not violate the terms of her employment contract. Sorrells, supra, 565 A.2d at 285, 288-89. Thus, there was no breach of contract. Nevertheless, we affirmed the verdict against the supervisor for tortious interference with the contract for inducing the store's termination of the contract. Id. at 289-91. In doing so, we set forth the following: One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform the contract. Id. at 290 (quoting RESTATEMENT (2D) OF TORTS § 766 (1979)) (emphasis added; emphasis in original removed). Therefore, while we have articulated the third element of tortious interference as procurement of breach, Sorrells establishes that a breach as such is not required, but merely a failure of performance, whether by the terms of the contract in question or not. [10] Thus, CASCO's pleadings are sufficient on this count, because they alleged the failure of the performance of the CASCO-MIF assignment contract. As to tortious interference with prospective business advantage, we are persuaded that CASCO pled sufficient facts to withstand a motion to dismiss on that count. The elements of tortious interference with prospective business advantage mirror those of interference with contract. Brown v. Carr, 503 A.2d 1241, 1247 (D.C.1986). To prevail, however, a plaintiff obviously need not demonstrate the existence of a contract, but merely a prospective advantageous business transaction. See id. The existence of such a prospect is not in contention here. Instead, appellees argue that, for both intentional interference counts, their actions were privileged, because they were taken merely in furtherance of their economic interests. Appellees draw our attention to case law from the Ninth Circuit and Alaska. [11] We disagree. We have specifically held that a landlord may not for economic motives reasonably refuse consent to a sublease that fully protects the landlord's bargain under the prime lease. 1010 Potomac Assocs. v. Grocery Mfrs. of America, Inc., 485 A.2d 199, 209 (D.C.1984). It is uncontroverted that CASCO sought to assume in totality the prime lease, thus protecting the RLA's bargain thereunder. If it is established that the RLA withheld its consent merely in order to leverage a better bargain for the District, that would constitute intentional interference with either a contract or business expectancy for purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.