Opinion ID: 2049573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to instruct on accomplice testimony

Text: The judge's denigration of the alibi defense in the instant case must be compared with his failure to properly caution the jury on accepting the testimony of the accomplice.
The dangers inherent in receiving the testimony of an accomplice are spelled out in 30 Am Jur 2d, Evidence, § 1148, p 323 (notes omitted): The facts that the testimony of accomplices is not of the most satisfactory character and that it is attended with serious infirmities are matters recognized by the decisions and are too obvious and well understood to call for extended exposition. Testimony of an accomplice has been held to be fraught with weakness due to the effect of fear, threats, hostility, motives, or hope of leniency. The consideration of the infirmities of this kind of testimony goes to the credibility of the evidence and the law requires that such testimony be closely scrutinized and accepted with caution. From Crown political prosecutions, and before, to recent prison camp inquisitions, a long history of human frailty and governmental overreaching for conviction has justified distrust in accomplice testimony. It has been said that a skeptical approach to accomplice testimony is a mark of the fair administration of justice. This Court has recognized that defendant has a right to have a special cautionary instruction given to the jury concerning such testimony. We think it is the duty of a judge to comment upon the nature of such testimony [of an accomplice], as the circumstances of the case may require; to point out the various grounds of suspicion which may attach to it; to call their attention to the various temptations under which such witness may be placed, and the motives by which he may be actuated; and any other circumstances which go to discredit or confirm the witness, all of which must vary with the nature and circumstances of each particular case. People v Jenness, 5 Mich 305, 330 (1858). This forthright position has been nibbled at, as my Sister M.S. COLEMAN has so ably noted, to the point that it is probably fair to say that the matter is within the discretion of the judge, People v Dumas, 161 Mich 45; 125 NW 766 (1910), except that once requested, a charge should probably be given. [1] E.g., People v Zesk, 309 Mich 129; 14 NW2d 808 (1944), where we stated, [t]he trial judge probably would have charged the jury to carefully consider the weight of the accomplice's testimony had defendant's counsel made the request. 309 Mich 129, 133. [2] While no definitive rule has appeared in the Federal courts, the omission of a cautionary instruction as to uncorroborated accomplice testimony has constituted reversible error in the first, second, third, fifth, eighth, ninth, tenth circuits, and the District of Columbia. [3] 17 ALR Fed 249, 291-292. [T]he court must instruct the jury that testimony of accomplices must be carefully scrutinized, weighed with great care, and received with caution. United States v Birmingham, 447 F2d 1313, 1317 (CA 10, 1971).
This was a case where the only evidence the prosecutor offered linking defendant with the crime was an eyewitness who could not make a positive identification of the defendant and testimony of an accomplice who was positively identified and who later pled guilty to the lesser charge of second-degree murder. While defendant and his witness testified that they had been watching television at the witness's house all day, the prosecutor's witness, the accomplice, placed him at the crime. It is no exaggeration then to say that the prosecutor's case rested on the uncorroborated testimony of this accomplice and his credibility as a witness. The issue, therefore, came down to whom to believe, the defendant and his witness or the accomplice. The jury was told by the judge that the alibi should be regarded with skepticism; to examine carefully the evidence on that point, scrutinize any evidence in relation to the alibi. An alibi is a defense that is easily proven and hard to disprove. Therefore you will be careful and cautious bearing upon the question of alibi. Testimony of the comparable witness on the prosecution's side was not limited by any such cautionary instructions. While the judge offered instructions advising the jury to weigh the credibility of all witnesses, only the defense witness was singled out by an instruction denigrating his testimony. While a general instruction may, conceivably substitute for a special cautionary instruction, it is error to give only selective cautionary instructions. Defendant has the right to have a balanced presentation made to the jury.