Opinion ID: 553870
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the recalcitrant witness statute

Text: 21 Witness raises two claims on appeal with regard to the imposition of civil contempt under the Recalcitrant Witness Statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1826(a). At oral argument, counsel for Witness alleged that the memorandum opinion and order of the district judge issued at the conclusion of the show cause hearing failed to address Witness's Sec. 1826(a) claim, thus denying Witness an opportunity to be heard. In his brief, Witness alleges that fear for his safety, and the safety of others, establishes just cause to refuse to comply with a court order to testify, thus precluding civil contempt under Sec. 1826(a). We find no merit in either argument. 22 At the outset we note that Witness's fifth amendment right to refuse to testify before the grand jury is absolute. United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d 1001, 1003 (6th Cir.1978). However, once a witness waives that right, or is granted immunity from prosecution, he is subject to the contempt power of the court for failing to fully comply with the underlying subpoena. Id. The court derives its civil contempt power from 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1826(a), which provides in pertinent part: 23 Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United States refuses without just cause shown to comply with an order of the court to testify ... the court, upon such refusal, or when such refusal is duly brought to its attention, may summarily order his confinement at a suitable place until such time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or provide such information. 24 At oral argument, counsel for Witness claimed that the district court had failed to make a specific finding as to the merits of Witness's just cause claim. Following oral argument this Court received a complete record of the district court proceedings, which contained a November 2, 1990, order issued by the district court. That order stated that the court had conducted a full evidentiary hearing on the matter and had found that [Witness] has failed to demonstrate 'just cause' for his refusal to comply with the Court's October 15, 1990, Order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1826(a). We find this order to preclude Witness's claim that he was denied an opportunity to be heard. 25 We also disagree with Witness's assertion that fear for his safety and the safety of others satisfies the just cause standard of Sec. 1826(a). Because the term 'just cause' is not defined in the statute and there is no pertinent legislative history[,] courts have been left to their own devices to determine whether or when fear is or may be a sufficient grounds upon which to preclude civil contempt following a refusal to testify under Sec. 1826(a). Matter of Grand Jury Proceedings Empanelled May 1988, 894 F.2d 881, 884 (7th Cir.1989). Prior to the enactment of Sec. 1826(a), the Supreme Court stated, albeit in dicta, that such concerns would not provide a legal basis for a refusal to testify. Piemonte v. United States, 367 U.S. 556, 559 n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1720, 1722 n. 2, 6 L.Ed.2d 1028 (1961). This Court has applied that reasoning to criminal contempt actions under Rule 42(a), Fed.R.Crim.Pro., holding that despite evidence of reprisals, fear for the safety of one's self or others is not a ground for refusing to testify. United States v. Damiano, 579 F.2d at 1004. The same policy concern for judicial effectiveness that fueled our decision in Damiano, and that underlie the decisions of the other circuits that have reached this issue, require us to hold that fear is not a just cause to excuse the obligation to testify under Sec. 1826(a), particularly before a grand jury. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 862 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir.1988); Matter of Crededio, 759 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir.1985); Simkin v. United States, 715 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir.1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 652 F.2d 413, 414 (5th Cir.1981); Dupuy v. United States, 518 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.1975); In re Kilgo, 484 F.2d 1215, 1221 (4th Cir.1973). To hold otherwise would be to irreparably damage the subpoena power of the federal grand jury. 26 All other issues raised by Witness are without merit. 27 Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. The stay issued by this Court on November 29, 1990 is to be lifted immediately.