Opinion ID: 437194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Limitations on Military Suits

Text: 65 Finally, the majority suggests that because Lauritzen could not bring a Bivens action for monetary damages against her military commanders, her suit is not analogous to a suit under section 1983. See Majority Op. at n. 10. The Supreme Court in Chappell v. Wallace, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983), held that military personnel may not sue their superior officers for monetary damages in a Bivens-type action. Id. at 2367. The Court expressly left available, however, access to the courts for military personnel to seek nonmonetary redress of constitutional wrongs. Id. In the instant case, Lauritzen sought injunctive relief as well as damages for the military's denial of her first amendment rights. She obtained a preliminary injunction in the district court, which the court eventually dissolved when the case became moot, but Lauritzen was awarded no damages. Her suit, therefore, does not fall within Chappell 's prohibition against monetary awards, and we need not address the difficult issues such an award might raise. Cf., e.g., Beller v. Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788, 795, 798 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 905, 101 S.Ct. 3030, 69 L.Ed.2d 405 (1981) (court has jurisdiction to review discharge by military for homosexual activities). 66 A party may be considered prevailing for purposes of attorney's fees under section 1988 if he or she obtains an injunction. See, e.g., White v. City of Richmond, 713 F.2d 458, 460 (9th Cir.1983); Fitzharris v. Wolff, 702 F.2d 836, 838-39 (9th Cir.1983) (temporary restraining order that remained in effect until case became moot and served same function as preliminary injunction); Teitelbaum v. Sorenson, 648 F.2d 1248, 1249 (9th Cir.1981) (per curiam). In fact, if a party succeeds on any significant issue in the litigation which achieves some of the benefit the party sought, and establishes a clear causal relationship between the litigation and the practical outcome, he or she may be considered prevailing even without obtaining formal relief. Lummi Indian Tribe v. Oltman, 720 F.2d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir.1983); Rutherford v. Pitchess, 713 F.2d 1416, 1419 (9th Cir.1983); American Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 188 (9th Cir.1981). Lauritzen is a prevailing party under the definition. Her suit resulted in a preliminary injunction, and the trial court found that the final outcome, reversal of the discharge by the BCNR, was prompted by the litigation. That finding is not clearly erroneous and the majority does not so contend. Lauritzen's action is directly analogous to an action under section 1983 and accordingly warrants an award of attorney's fees under section 2412(b).