Opinion ID: 3173985
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coates’s Discriminatory Motivation

Text: A plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent under the ADEA by relying on either the direct method of proof or the indirect method of proof.4 Atanus v. Perry, 520 F.3d 662, 671 (7th Cir. 2008). Under the direct method of proof, the plaintiff may rely on either direct evidence or circumstantial evidence to show discriminatory motivation. Rudin v. Lincoln Land Cmty. Coll., 420 F.3d 712, 720–21 (7th Cir. 2005). Direct evidence, which is quite rare, is “an acknowledg‐ ment of discriminatory intent by the defendant.” Id. (quoting Troupe v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994)). 3 The Council is a legal entity separate from the Board. 105 ILCS 5/34‐2.1. It follows then that the Council can be sued in its own name for its con‐ duct in not renewing a principal’s contract. See Asllani v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 845 F. Supp. 1209, 1219–20 (N.D. Ill. 1993). 4 Bordelon does not rely on the indirect method of proof, which would proceed under the familiar burden‐shifting framework of McDonnell‐ Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 8 No. 14‐3240 Circumstantial evidence is evidence that “allows the trier of fact to infer intentional discrimination by the deci‐ sionmaker.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). We have recog‐ nized four types of circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination: (1) suspicious timing; (2) ambiguous statements or behavior towards other employees in the protected group; (3) evidence, statistical or otherwise, that similarly situated employees outside of the protect‐ ed group systematically receive better treatment; and (4) evidence that the employer offered a pre‐ textual reason for an adverse employment action. Dickerson v. Bd. of Trs. of Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 522, 657 F.3d 595, 601 (7th Cir. 2011). Because Bordelon has chosen to proceed under the direct method of proof, he must point to admissible evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, of Coates’s discriminatory motivation based on age.
Before the district court—and on appeal—Bordelon re‐ lied on several pieces of circumstantial evidence that he claims give rise to an inference of Coates’s age discrimina‐ tion. First, he points to Everhart’s testimony that Coates “more or less suggested … [t]hat it was time for [Bordelon] to give it up.” This comment was made at a Council meeting in December 2010—shortly before it would vote on whether to renew Bordelon’s contract. Bordelon contends that this is an ambiguous statement akin to a company’s remarks that it would “not keep[] employees on until they reached sixty‐ five.” Robinson v. PPG Indus., Inc., 23 F.3d 1159, 1164–65 (7th Cir. 1994). This “express remark[] about Plaintiff’s age” and No. 14‐3240 9 its suspicious timing, Bordelon argues, could lead a trier of fact to infer that Coates held an age animus. (Appellant’s Br. at 5.) Coates’s statement is not an express remark about Bor‐ delon’s age. Nor is it an ambiguous remark sufficient to give rise to an inference that Coates was motivated by age. Ever‐ hart clarified that he thought this statement was referring to the school’s poor academic performance, not Bordelon’s age. Council member Chantelle Allen testified that Coates did not make any statements about Bordelon’s age at the meet‐ ing. The statement made, unlike Robinson, does not even mention age. Coupled with the testimony of Everhart and Allen, no rational trier of fact could draw the inference that Coates was motivated to discriminate against Bordelon based on his age because of this statement. Bordelon also points to Sanders’s testimony that Coates had a list of five or six “older black principals to be disci‐ plined.” This list does not support an inference of intentional discrimination based on age. First, there was a younger prin‐ cipal included on the list; Lennox was only 48. Second, the two principals that Sanders identified as having been on the list were both, like Bordelon, in charge of poorly performing schools. Third, Sanders did not testify as to who the other two or three principals on the list were. Finally, the mere fact that older principals appeared on the list does not support an inference of age discrimination where most of the princi‐ pals in Area 15 were older—only two of the sixteen principals were under 40 years old. Bordelon has offered no explana‐ tion as to why these principals were on this list or whether they merited discipline. Therefore, Sanders’s testimony 10 No. 14‐3240 about the list does not give rise to an inference of age dis‐ crimination by Coates. Additionally, as evidence that Coates favored younger workers, Bordelon relies on Sanders’s testimony that Coates fired her and replaced her with someone “younger and brighter.” Sanders explained, however, that she meant that her replacement must have “more education, or maybe she has a field in that position, she could do a better job.” This testimony does not give rise to an inference that Coates was motivated by age discrimination where Sanders expressly disavowed that she was replaced because of her age. Instead, she testified that she was replaced by someone who could do a better job. Her impression that Coates wanted someone younger, without more, does not give rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
Additional evidence that Bordelon cites on appeal was ei‐ ther excluded by or not raised in front of the district court. Because Bordelon has not argued on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in excluding the following evi‐ dence, he has waived any argument about its exclusion be‐ ing improper. Lucas, 367 F.3d at 726. Assuming arguendo that Bordelon had not waived these arguments, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding this evidence, nor does the evidence to which he directs us give rise to an inference of discriminatory motiva‐ tion sufficient to withstand summary judgment. Sanders testified that Coates would “pick on” principals sixty years of age or older “by saying that their paperwork was wrong.” Sanders testified that Coates would “make No. 14‐3240 11 negative remarks about older principals to her team” but would not treat younger principals that way. Bordelon points to the similar testimony of Velma Cooksey, another older principal supervised by Coates. Cooksey testified that Coates “humiliated the only [sic] older principals” and “showed favoritism for the younger workers against the old‐ er workers.” In Lucas, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding statements that the supervi‐ sor “treated African‐Americans ‘more harshly’ … [or] that African‐Americans were asked to change rail ties more fre‐ quently, work longer sections of the track and were written up for reasons that non‐African‐Americans were not.” Lucas, 367 F.3d at 726. Cooksey’s and Sanders’s testimony is as conclusory as the testimony rejected in Lucas. Neither offers specific facts upon which to conclude Coates treated older principals in a dis‐ criminatory manner. Instead, just like the statements exclud‐ ed in Lucas, Sanders and Cooksey only offered sweeping generalizations about the way the protected class was treat‐ ed. Because this evidence is not sufficient to preclude sum‐ mary judgment, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. Finally, Bordelon points to the affidavit of Clarice Berry, president of the Chicago Principals and Administrators As‐ sociation. Berry’s affidavit stated that “Coates treated older principals, including Plaintiff, in a discriminatory manner by giving schools with older principals less support than schools with younger principals. I know this from discus‐ sions I had with older principals in Area 15. Younger princi‐ 12 No. 14‐3240 pals did not mention to me that they experienced a lack of curriculum support from Coates.” Berry’s testimony is inadmissible hearsay and was properly excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), 802. Bordelon argues that Berry’s testimony is not hearsay because it falls under the exclusion from hearsay for an opposing party’s state‐ ment. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2). The opposing party in this case is the Board. Berry’s testimony comes from statements made by other principals in Area 15. Bordelon has not alleged that the Board adopted the other principals’ statements or au‐ thorized the principals to speak on its behalf. Presumably, Bordelon is arguing that these constitute statements made by Board employees “on a matter within the scope of that rela‐ tionship,” and so their statements should be admissible against the Board under Rule 801(d)(2)(D). To fall within the exclusion from hearsay, however, the statements made by the other principals must be within the scope of their employment relationship with the Board. “[N]ot everything that relates to one’s job falls within the scope of one’s agency or employment.” Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 950 (7th Cir. 1998). An employee “need not have been personally involved in that action, but her duties must encompass some responsibility related to ‘the deci‐ sionmaking process affecting the employment action.’” Ste‐ phens v. Erickson, 569 F.3d 779, 793 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Simple v. Walgreen Co., 511 F.3d 668, 672 (7th Cir. 2007)). In Williams, we held that the complaints of sex discrimi‐ nation made by five other female employees did not fall within Rule 801(d)(2)(D) because “[n]one of the women were agents of [the defendant] for the purpose of making mana‐ gerial decisions affecting the terms and conditions of their No. 14‐3240 13 own employment.” 137 F.3d at 950. The same is true in this case. The complaints of age bias made by the other princi‐ pals do not fall within the scope of their employment be‐ cause they did not have authority to make managerial deci‐ sions on behalf of the Board regarding their own employ‐ ment. Accordingly, the exclusion from hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2) is inapplicable, and the district court properly ex‐ cluded Berry’s testimony. In conclusion, Bordelon has not constructed “a convinc‐ ing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that [would] allow[] a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmak‐ er.” Makowski v. SmithAmundsen LLC, 662 F.3d 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Board.