Opinion ID: 2380238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Voluntary Statements

Text: While incarcerated in jail awaiting trial, the defendant approached Somerset County Deputy Sheriff Robertson and described to him the events giving rise to this prosecution. Those statements were largely consistent with the version to which he has continually adhered, including that which he narrated at trial. At trial, the State called Robertson as a witness. Following a voir dire examination out of the jury's presence, the defendant moved to suppress Robertson's testimony about the defendant's statements on the sole ground that they were not made voluntarily; [9] the defendant was under medication, and Robertson described him as then being confused and agitated. The court denied this motion and permitted Robertson to testify about the incident. By buttressing their positions with cases involving the voluntariness of confessions, the parties do not appear to dispute the characterization of the defendant's statement to Robertson as a confession. For the purposes of this discussion, we thus also assume, rather than decide, that the defendant's statements may be treated as a confession. [10] A confession is inadmissible unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that it was made voluntarily. State v. Ashe, Me., 425 A.2d 191, 194 (1981); State v. Collins, Me., 297 A.2d 620, 627 (1972). The reviewing court must search the record for rational support of the lower court's determination. State v. Catlin, Me., 392 A.2d 27, 30 (1978); Collins, 297 A.2d at 625. That determination will be upheld unless the evidence renders a contrary inference to be the only reasonable conclusion which can be drawn. Catlin, 392 A.2d at 30. We find that the presiding justice did not err in finding that the statements were made voluntarily. The attending physician who worked at Somerset County jail when the defendant was incarcerated there testified out of the jury's presence that, on the date the defendant made the statement to Robertson, he was taking medication for an ulcer and a heart condition. [11] The court asked whether any of these drugs, either individually or in combination, would affect the patient's ability to tell the truth or his will to speak. The physician responded in the negative. The record thus provides rational support for the court's conclusion that the medication did not induce involuntary statements. Robertson noted in his official report that the defendant, while making those statements to him, seemed confused. At trial, he explained this to mean that the defendant looked like he wanted to say something else to me [after Robertson insisted that he, Robertson, had to return to his office], but he never got it out. The defendant was described as aggravated when talking about his son and upset when describing the shooting incident itself. However, Robertson also testified that he knew the defendant, that the defendant was alert when making the statements, that the defendant was responsive, that he had no reason to believe that the defendant was not in touch with his surroundings, and that the defendant narrated the events in an organized fashion. This record thus also provides rational support for the court's ruling that the statements were made voluntarily. While Robertson's prior description of the defendant's condition as confused is facially troublesome, the witness' explanation revealed that it could not be taken so as to generate a conclusion, to the exclusion of all others, that the defendant acted involuntarily. [12]