Opinion ID: 2975460
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of Civil Rights

Text: Finally, the complaint alleges that Correll violated appellants’ constitutionally protected property rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and conspired with Sohm to do so.9 Although Correll is a private person, the allegation that he conspired with Sohm, the Master Commissioner, to violate appellants’ civil rights suffices to raise the question of whether he acted under color of 8 The complaint does allege that the defendants knew at the time that they filed their garnishment actions that the funds sought to be garnished were “in custodia legis” and therefore not subject to garnishment. Complaint ¶ 28. However, this is not an assertion of fact but a conclusion of law, and, in any case, the legal rule asserted is incorrect. While property in the custody of the court is not subject to attachment by another court, see Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 192 (1941), it may be garnished pursuant to the order of the court in whose custody it lies, see Patton v. Kentucky, 195 S.W. 455, 459 (Ky. 1917). 9 Although the paragraphs describing these counts do not name the defendants against whom the claims are brought, the complaint contains an earlier allegation that “Defendant Sohm acted with the intent of benefitting Defendant Correll and of enabling Defendant Correll to purchase the subject property for less than its true value,” Complaint ¶ 24, which makes the matter reasonably clear. - 16 - No. 06-6131 J.P. Silverton Indus. L.P. v. Sohm state law as required by § 1983. Cooper v. Parrish, 203 F.3d 937, 952 n.2 (6th Cir. 2000) (“If a private party has conspired with state officials to violate constitutional rights, then that party qualifies as a state actor and may be held liable pursuant to § 1983 . . . .”). The constitutional right appellants allege was violated in this case is the right to be free from deprivation of property without due process of law. To show a deprivation of property without due process of law in violation of § 1983, appellants had to establish three elements: (1) that they have a life, liberty, or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . , (2) that they were deprived of this protected interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause, and (3) that the state did not afford them adequate procedural rights prior to depriving them of their protected interest. Med Corp., Inc. v. City of Lima, 296 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Hahn v. Star Bank, 190 F.3d 708, 716 (6th Cir. 1999)). Assuming for the sake of argument that the first two elements are met, appellants cannot establish (and did not allege in their complaint) that they were not provided with adequate procedures to challenge the sale of the Spring Creek Inn to Correll. The Clinton County Court held a hearing before the sale to determine whether to grant the motion to enjoin the sale, and determined that the motion should be denied both because it was not accompanied by the required notice of a hearing, and because the amount appellants had paid into the court was “not sufficient to cover the amount in controversy, the interest, the costs, advertising costs, . . . et cetera.” June 4, 2004 Tr. at 3. Thus, appellants were granted the procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause, and their claim fails. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (“We have described ‘the root requirement’ of the Due Process Clause as being ‘that an individual be given an - 17 - No. 06-6131 J.P. Silverton Indus. L.P. v. Sohm opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest.’”) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)). Even supposing that appellants’ failure to appear before the Clinton County Court were attributable to reliance on Sohm’s statements, rather than to their failure to follow Kentucky procedure for providing notice of a hearing, they cannot establish that they were denied adequate procedural safeguards. If a person is deprived of property, not “pursuant to any established state procedure,” but, for example, because of “a random, unauthorized personal vendetta against” that person by a state official, then “the State cannot be required constitutionally to do the impossible by providing predeprivation process.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 129, 130 (1990). In such a case, postdeprivation process is sufficient, id. at 129, and appellants received that process as well. The Clinton County Court held a full adversary hearing, at which both sides presented evidence, on appellants’ subsequent motion to set aside the sale. After the motion was denied, the court also considered, and denied, appellants’ motion to alter or amend the denial of the motion to set aside the sale. Appellants thus received the required postdeprivation procedural safeguards, and cannot establish that a constitutional violation occurred. Therefore, summary judgment in favor of Correll was proper with regard to the violation of civil rights and conspiracy in violation of civil rights claims as well.