Opinion ID: 2597314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Warrants check on Morlock

Text: The panel majority in the instant case additionally disapproved of Deputy Cocking taking passenger Morlock's driver's license to his patrol vehicle and also then using it to check for outstanding arrest warrants on his computer. Judge Leben disagreed because Morlock's claim about the warrant check is precluded by recent United States Supreme Court cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment. 40 Kan.App.2d at 237, 190 P.3d 1002. We agree with Judge Leben that these particular Cocking actions were constitutionally permissible. Specifically, any extension of the stop was based upon Cocking's reasonable suspicion. See Moore, 283 Kan. at 350, 154 P.3d 1 (appellate court reviews to determine if substantial competent evidence supports the district court findings but reviews de novo the legal conclusion reasonable suspicionas a question of law). An officer is not required to disregard information which may lead him or her to suspect independent criminal activity during a traffic stop. When the responses of the detainee and the circumstances give rise to suspicions unrelated to the traffic offense, an officer may broaden his inquiry and satisfy those suspicions. United States v. Barahona, 990 F.2d 412, 416 (8th Cir.1993); see also United States v. Pereira-Munoz, 59 F.3d 788, 791 (8th Cir.1995) (When officers develop reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity during a traffic stop, they have 'justification for a greater intrusion unrelated to the traffic offense' and are permitted `to graduate their responses to the demands of their particular situation.'). As an aside, we observe that the fact the computer checks eventually turned up no outstanding warrants does not automatically mean that Deputy Cocking lacked legally sufficient suspicion to conduct the checks in the first place. See United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir.2006). Cocking testified without refutation that before he asked the two travel questions of O'Kelly that the panel majority disapproved, he was aware of previous narcotics arrests on Highway 54. He also found the nervousness suspicious. He testified that he noticed O'Kelly's nervousnessshaking and trembling, dropping his license into his lap, and almost dropping it to the ground when handing it to Cocking. He did admit, however, that some young drivers, like O'Kelly, may be nervous when stopped by an officer. The trial court noted O'Kelly's nervousness as contributing to its ultimate determination of reasonable suspicion to extend the stop. Judge Leben acknowledged its appearance in the reasonable suspicion calculus. See Moore, 283 Kan. 344, 154 P.3d 1 (driver's nervousness can contribute to reasonable suspicion). Cocking also noticed Morlock, whose identity was yet unknown, looking straight ahead at the dash while Cocking talked to O'Kelly. He testified that he found Morlock's behavior odd. See United States v. Brigham, 382 F.3d at 508 (officer's increasing suspicion was also fueled by ... [driver's] ... avoidance of eye contact). Cocking testified, also without refutation, that he then learned the following: the van was rented, it was rented by O'Kelly's father, and the father was the one staring intently at the dash. Judge Leben especially branded Morlock's lack of paternal reaction as strange and suspicious: What dad would rigorously try to avoid eye contact with the officer by only looking forward when his [16-year-old] son had been pulled over? 40 Kan.App.2d at 256, 190 P.3d 1002. Cocking testified to other factors that contributed to his reasonable suspicion. These factors included the later-learned discrepancy about where the van was rented. Morlock told Cocking the van was rented in Phoenix, but the rental papers showed Tucson, which Judge Leben noted was 116 miles from Phoenix. When Cocking asked Morlock why he would fly to Phoenix and rent a van from Tucson, he explained that he got it at the Phoenix/Tucson Airport and [i]t's all right there in one location, and that's where we rented the vehicle. Based upon Cocking's testimony, the trial judge found these both aroused Cocking's suspicions and thus contributed to the judge's eventual finding of reasonable suspicion. Judge Leben found this explanation merely poured gasoline on Cocking's inferno of suspicion. 40 Kan. App.2d at 257, 190 P.3d 1002; cf. State v. DeMarco, 263 Kan. 727, 739, 952 P.2d 1276 (1998) (discrepancies in travel plans can contribute to reasonable suspicion); United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1534-35 (10th Cir.1996) (apparent contradiction between dates on defendant's car rental agreement and alleged travel plans contributed to reasonable suspicion). Cocking further found suspicious the discrepancies on whether father and son were going to see Morlock's girlfriend or simply a woman Morlock met on the internet, and whether they actually saw the woman. O'Kelly told him they were in Phoenix visiting his dad's girlfriend while Morlock said they didn't make contact with the internet woman. The trial judge found the uncertainty about Morlock's relationship with the woman an inconsistency that contributed to Cocking's suspicion. Judge Leben also found the inconsistency significant. See United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir.2001) (dubious or inconsistent answers can contribute to reasonable suspicion). When Cocking appropriately asked Morlock whyafter flying to Phoenixhe instead rented a van to return to Kansas City, Morlock replied he did not have the money to buy plane tickets. Cocking additionally found suspicious the combination of taking a one-way flight to Phoenix to visit a woman but then not make contact at all, and then renting a van to return to Kansas City because of a money shortage. 40 Kan.App.2d at 256, 190 P.3d 1002. Cocking testified he believed that one-way vehicle rentals are very expensive too: it would cost just as much to fly back. The trial judge found both factors contributed to his finding reasonable suspicion, first noting that this person was not even contacted in Phoenix, even though they traveled all the way from Kansas City to Phoenix for that stated purpose. Judge Leben agreed. As mentioned, the trial court next noted the one-way rental agreement supported his finding of reasonable suspicion, and Judge Leben found this fact particularly significant, given Cocking's testimony based upon his training and education about the drug smugglers' fly, then rent method. Cf. United States v. Bradford, 423 F.3d at 1157-58 (reasonable suspicion based in part upon the financial illogic of purchasing a series of one-way plane tickets and one-way car-rentals). Cocking also testified that the short duration of the trip contributed to his suspicion, particularly given the flight to Phoenix and the driving of an expensive rental van back to Kansas City 2 days later. Short duration was acknowledged by Judge Leben as a factor in the calculus, and we agree. 40 Kan. App.2d at 256, 190 P.3d 1002; see United States v. Contreras, 506 F.3d at 1036 (Contreras drove 1,200 miles to see her family, only to turn around within a day and begin the 1,200 mile drive backseemed suspicious at best and incredible at worst.); United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d at 1260 (implausible travel plans can form a basis for reasonable suspicion). We conclude as a matter of law that this information known to Cocking, coupled with his 15-year experience in law enforcement and recent experience with drug interdiction, is sufficient to justify taking Morlock's license to the patrol vehicle and using it to run a warrant check. See Moore, 283 Kan. at 350, 154 P.3d 1 (appellate court reviews to determine if substantial competent evidence supports the district court findings but reviews de novo the legal conclusionreasonable suspicionas a general question of law). We expressly do not consider in our calculus the factor of the four bags in the van, only because as the panel majority pointed out, Cocking acquired that information after he had already decided to take Morlock's license to his patrol vehicle. Finally, Morlock's counsel has submitted a letter under Rule 6.09(b) (2008 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 47) contending that a July 17, 2009, opinion of the Court of Appeals, State v. Diaz-Ruiz, 42 Kan.App.2d 325, 211 P.3d 836 (2009), contains persuasive rationale. Morlock argues that Cocking failed to comply with the legal statement contained in that opinion's Syl. ¶ 1 which provides: When analyzing whether an officer's actions have exceeded the scope or duration of a traffic stop, the court considers whether the officer diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel the officer's suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant. 42 Kan.App.2d 325, Syl. ¶ 1, 211 P.3d 836. More particularly, Morlock argues that Cocking did not diligently pursue the investigation to quickly address his suspicions because he did more than simply obtain O'Kelly's driver's license, run a computer check on him, and write a citation. Morlock's contention is best addressed by simply noting we earlier held that Cocking developed increasing amounts of suspicion during the stop. This warranted his continued investigation which resulted in an increase in detention length. We cannot say Cocking failed to diligently pursue his investigation to quickly address his suspicions, especially when, as Judge Leben points out, the entire stop took only 12 minutes. See 40 Kan.App.2d at 243, 190 P.3d 1002. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The decision of the district court is affirmed.