Opinion ID: 4179141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Elements of Ms. Ross’s Claim

Text: For both theories, Ms. Ross must satisfy four elements: 1. The University of Tulsa had actual notice of a substantial risk that Mr. Swilling would commit an act of sexual harassment (such as sexual violence) against a student. 2. The University of Tulsa was deliberately indifferent to that risk. 3. The sexual harassment was severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive. 4. The sexual harassment deprived Ms. Ross of access to the university’s educational benefits or opportunities. See Murrell v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 186 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 1999). The University of Tulsa challenges only the first and second elements. On the first element, the University of Tulsa could obtain notice only through an appropriate person. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998). An appropriate person “is, at a minimum, an official 4 of the [university] with authority to take corrective action [on behalf of the university] to end the discrimination.” Id. On the second element, a university is “deemed ‘deliberately indifferent’ to acts of student-on-student harassment only where the [university’s] response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 648 (1999). III. Ms. Ross’s First Theory (Prior to the Alleged Rape of Ms. Ross) Ms. Ross’s first theory involves what happened before her alleged rape: According to Ms. Ross, the University of Tulsa failed to adequately investigate two reports in 2012 that Mr. Swilling had raped J.M. 1 For this theory, Ms. Ross points to evidence that in 2012, two football players had reported a rape of J.M. to campus security and J.M. then confirmed the rape. But at J.M.’s behest, campus-security officers dropped the matter. Ms. Ross contends that dropping the matter left Mr. Swilling free to sexually assault others at the university. 1 Courts are split on whether notice can consist of prior reports. See Rost ex rel. K.C. v. Steamboat Springs RE-2 Sch. Dist., 511 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2008); Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1153 (10th Cir. 2006). But we need not weigh in on this split, as the university does not deny that notice can theoretically consist of prior reports of sexual harassment. For the sake of argument, we assume that prior reports can be sufficient. Even with that assumption, Ms. Ross’s first theory would fail as a matter of law. 5 Like the district court, we reject this theory as a matter of law. But our reasoning differs from the district court’s. In the district court’s view, a fact-finder could reasonably conclude that two high-ranking campus-security officers were appropriate persons. But the district court held that (1) J.M.’s report was too vague to provide notice and (2) even if J.M.’s report had provided such notice, the University of Tulsa’s response would not have been clearly unreasonable. To support the second holding, the district court observed that  J.M. had declined to press criminal charges against Mr. Swilling or file a student-conduct complaint and  J.M. had indicated that she did not want disruption in her life prior to her upcoming graduation. Thus, the court reasoned, it was not clearly unreasonable for the university to drop the matter. We take a different view. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Ross, a fact-finder could justifiably infer that campussecurity officers had learned of the reported rape. That knowledge could reasonably suggest that dropping the investigation was clearly unreasonable, leaving a potential predator free to sexually assault others at the university. But based on Ms. Ross’s arguments, a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that the campus-security officers had authority to take corrective action. In the absence of such authority, Ms. Ross’s first theory fails as a matter of law. 6 A. The reports by the football players and J.M. could have provided campus-security officers with actual notice. The threshold inquiry is whether the campus-security officers obtained actual notice in 2012 of a substantial risk to individuals on campus. In our view, a reasonable fact-finder could infer such notice. “‘[A]ctual notice requires more than a simple report of inappropriate conduct . . . .’” Escue v. N. Okla. Coll., 450 F.3d 1146, 1154 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Doe v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D. Me. 1999)). Here, however, the reports provided far more. In our view, these reports could have led a fact-finder to reasonably infer actual notice on the part of campus-security officials. 1. A reasonable fact-finder could infer that J.M. had characterized her sexual encounter as a rape. In 2012, two football players called campus security and reported that their friend, J.M., had been raped in her campus apartment by Mr. Swilling. The football players explained that they had learned of the rape from J.M.’s roommate. According to the football players, the roommate had overheard the rape. Following this report, J.M. spoke with campus-security officers. The parties disagree over what J.M. shared with campus security. According to Ms. Ross, J.M. confirmed that she had been raped the prior night; according to the University of Tulsa, J.M. stated that the sexual encounter 7 had been consensual. Ms. Ross’s position is supported by at least three evidentiary items. The first is a recorded conversation in 2014 between J.M. and a campus-security officer, Sergeant Zach Livingston. During this conversation, J.M. acknowledged that (1) Mr. Swilling had sexually assaulted her in 2012 and (2) she had reported the assault shortly thereafter to campus-security officers. The conversation included this exchange: Sergeant Livingston: I’m just trying to figure out because when, you know, everything that we’ve discovered about it has said that when you came in that you said it was a consensual deal. J.M.: No. Appellant’s App’x, vol. V at 1201, 3:16-3:28 (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 12). 2 The second evidentiary item is a recorded conversation between J.M. and an investigator from the Tulsa County District Attorney’s Office. During this conversation, J.M. said that in 2012, she had told campussecurity officers: “Patrick [Swilling] had taken advantage of me,” “it was not with my . . . acknowledgement,” and “I just don’t want to even think 2 The record of this interview, like others cited in this opinion, is available only as an audio recording. Our citations for the audio recordings provide the page numbers where the recordings are indexed and the time stamps of the relevant material. The parentheticals provide the titles of the exhibits as given in the table of contents to the appendix. 8 about it anymore.” Appellant’s App’x, vol. V at 1202, 39:02-39:47 (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 13). J.M. also indicated that she had explained her preference not to pursue the matter with Mr. Swilling because  she had only one semester remaining before graduation,  she did not want her private life to be publicized, and  Mr. Swilling’s father was a powerful figure who had played professional football. J.M. added that the campus-security officers had agreed that Mr. Swilling’s father was a prominent figure. The third evidentiary item is a recorded conversation between a former campus-security officer and a Tulsa police detective. The detective stated: “[T]he other thing was that [J.M.] said that you guys knew . . . that . . . when she filled out [a written report] that . . . she put in there that she was raped.” Appellant’s App’x, vol. V at 1203, 13:43-13:54 (Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Partial Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit 14). 3 3 Some summary-judgment evidence indicates that campus-security officers destroyed J.M.’s written statement. In light of this potential destruction of evidence, Ms. Ross argues that “it was inappropriate for the district court to have credited [the University of Tulsa] with [J.M.]’s report being too ‘vague’ to require further action when the precise content of that complaint is no longer available due to [the University of Tulsa’s] own destruction.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 34. We need not address this 9 The University of Tulsa points to contrary accounts from current and former campus-security officers. According to these accounts, J.M. reported in 2012 that the sexual activity had been consensual. Although a fact-finder could reasonably credit these accounts, we must resolve this factual dispute favorably to Ms. Ross. See Part I, above. Doing so, we conclude that a fact-finder could reasonably determine that J.M. had told campus security in 2012 that she was raped by Mr. Swilling. 2. The fact-finder could reasonably infer that the reports by J.M. and the football players had been sufficiently specific to supply actual notice. In our view, the fact-finder could justifiably infer that (1) J.M.’s report was sufficiently detailed and (2) the reports by the football players added specificity to J.M.’s report. The district court reached a different conclusion, concluding for four reasons that J.M.’s report was too vague to provide actual notice. We disagree with the court’s reasoning. First, the district court noted that J.M. had been reluctant to speak with campus security in 2012. But J.M.’s reluctance need not mean that her report was vague. Second, the district court noted that J.M. had not used the words “rape” or “assault” when talking to campus-security officers. This observation is immaterial, for J.M. denied telling campus-security officers argument because the district court’s vagueness analysis was otherwise flawed. See Part III(A)(2), below. 10 that the sexual encounter had been consensual. See Part III(A)(1), above. Thus, a fact-finder could justifiably conclude that J.M. had described a rape. See Ferris v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 132, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2001) (accepting for purposes of summary judgment that a woman had reported a rape to her employer even though the woman had not used the word “rape”). In addition, the football players added clarity, stating that J.M. had been raped by Mr. Swilling. Third, the district court stated that J.M. had not provided campus security with “facts or details.” Ross v. Univ. of Tulsa, 180 F. Supp. 3d 951, 968 (N.D. Okla. 2016). But, from the reports by J.M. and the football players, the campus-security officers could ascertain “the basic facts, the who, what, when, and where.” See United States v. Fusaro, 708 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1983). For example, a fact-finder could justifiably conclude that the campus-security officers had known  who was reportedly involved (J.M. and Mr. Swilling),  what reportedly happened (Mr. Swilling raped J.M.),  when the rape reportedly occurred (the prior evening), and  where the rape reportedly occurred (in J.M.’s campus apartment). A fact-finder could justifiably conclude that these basic facts provided campus-security officers with actual notice. 11 The University of Tulsa appears to argue that greater specificity is required when the alleged harasser was a student rather than a teacher. But, even if this were true, the reports here were sufficiently specific to provide actual notice to the university. Fourth, the district court asserted that J.M. had not accused Mr. Swilling of any specific misconduct. But, as discussed above, a fact-finder could justifiably conclude that J.M. had reported a rape. See Part III(A)(1), above. 4 Rejecting the district court’s four rationales, we conclude that the fact-finder could reasonably view the reports by J.M. and the football players as sufficiently specific to constitute actual notice to campussecurity officers.