Opinion ID: 2057978
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Supreme Court's Constitutional Authority to Manage the Judiciary

Text: This case presents an irreconcilable conflict between two branches of government, each claiming to possess the exclusive constitutional authority to dictate whether or not probation officers should be armed and make arrests. The Administrative Office of the Courts contends that the Probation Officer Community Safety Unit Act infringes on the Supreme Court's exclusive constitutional prerogative to manage judiciary personnel. On the other hand, defendants argue that the Act is a public safety measure rationally related to the criminal justice goal of incarcerating probation violators and therefore a traditional expression of legislative power. In that light, defendants maintain that the presumption of validity that attaches to all legislation has not been overcome. A. In examining those respective claims, we begin with a bedrock principle of our federal and state constitutional forms of government  the separation of powers. See Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall. ) 409, 410, 1 L.Ed. 436, 437 (1792) (declaring that under the Constitution of the United States, the government thereof is divided into three distinct and independent branches, and that it is the duty of each to abstain from, and to oppose, encroachments on either); Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs. v. Mt. Hope Waterpower Project, L.P., 154 N.J. 141, 150, 712 A. 2d 180 (1998) (stating that [t]he doctrine of separation of powers is fundamental to our State government); see generally The Federalist Nos. 47, 48, 51 (James Madison) (discussing vital importance of separation of powers to stable government and free society). That principle is codified in Article III, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution: The powers of government shall be divided among three distinct branches, the legislative, executive, and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one branch shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as expressly provided in this Constitution. [ N.J. Const. art. III, ¶ 1.] The separation of powers doctrine is premised on the theory that government works best when each branch of government acts independently and within its designated sphere, and does not attempt to gain dominance over another branch. See Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 381-83, 448 A. 2d 438 (1982). Each branch of government operates within a greater framework of checks and balances that is intended to preserve our system of ordered liberty. See The Federalist Nos. 47, 48, 51, supra; Knight v. City of Margate, 86 N.J. 374, 387-88, 431 A. 2d 833 (1981). The drafters of the 1947 State Constitution were well aware that in a representative democracy the Legislature would be capable of using its plenary lawmaking power to swallow up the other departments of the Government, unless there was a balance of powers among the three branches. Gen. Assembly v. Byrne, supra, 90 N.J. at 383, 448 A. 2d 438 (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is not to create three watertight governmental compartments, stifling cooperative action among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. Rather, the aim is to guarantee a system in which one branch cannot `claim[ ] or receiv[e] an inordinate power.' Commc'ns Workers of Am., AFL-CIO v. Florio, 130 N.J. 439, 450, 617 A. 2d 223 (1992) (quoting Brown v. Heymann, 62 N.J. 1, 11, 297 A. 2d 572 (1972)). Nevertheless, to assure the proper functioning of our constitutional scheme, we have held that no deviation from the . . . separation of powers [doctrine] will be tolerated which impairs the essential integrity of one of the [three] branches of government. Massett Bldg. Co. v. Bennett, 4 N.J. 53, 57, 71 A. 2d 327 (1950). B. To determine whether the Legislature has breached the separation of powers in this case, we must first look to the powers that the State Constitution confers on the judiciary to manage its personnel. Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3 provides that: The Supreme Court shall make rules governing the administration of all courts in the State and, subject to law, the practice and procedure in all such courts. [ N.J. Const. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 3.] Additionally, Article VI, Section 7, Paragraph 1 provides that: The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall be the administrative head of all the courts in the State [and] shall appoint an Administrative Director to serve at his pleasure. [ N.J. Const. art. VI, § 7, ¶ 1.] Those two provisions give the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court sweeping authority to govern their own house. Two forms of rulemaking authority are conferred on the Supreme Court by Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3: the power to make rules governing the administration of all courts and the power to make rules  subject to law  governing the practice and procedure in all such courts. Only rules concerning practice and procedure are qualified by the words subject to law. In a tentative draft of the Judicial Article, the phrase subject to law applied to the administration of the courts. That draft provided: The Supreme Court shall, subject to law, make rules governing the administration and the practice and procedure in all the courts of the State. Winberry v. Salisbury, 5 N.J. 240, 258, 74 A. 2d 406 (Case, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877, 71 S.Ct. 123, 95 L.Ed. 638 (1950). In Article VI, Section 2, Paragraph 3's final form, however, the words `subject to law' were carefully preserved, but they were transferred so that they did not apply to the power of the court for self-administration but did apply to the control of practice and procedure. Id. at 258-59, 74 A. 2d 406. In the groundbreaking case of Winberry v. Salisbury , this Court held that subject to law meant substantive law, such as legislation and the common law, as opposed to pleading and practice. Id. at 247-48, 74 A. 2d 406. In Winberry, we held that a court rule limiting the time in which to file an appeal fell within the Court's constitutional authority over practice and procedure and that a statute conflicting with that rule exceeded the Legislature's powers. Id. at 243, 255, 74 A. 2d 406; see also George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 381-82, 86 A. 2d 8 (1952) (noting that statute [that is] wholly procedural in its operation must yield to procedural rule promulgated by Supreme Court under its constitutional authority). Contrary to defendants' argument, this case does not implicate the Court's rulemaking authority over practice and procedure, a phrase, admittedly, not conducive to a facile definition. [1] Rules of practice and procedure in the courts cover a wide array of subjects from dismissal and directed verdict motions, see George Siegler Co., supra, 8 N.J. at 381-83, 86 A. 2d 8, to the diversion of criminal defendants into pretrial intervention programs, see State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 367-68, 375 A. 2d 607 (1977). See generally Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules (2006) (cataloging multitude of rules of practice and procedure that apply to court system). However elastic the phrase practice and procedure may be, it is the Court's power over administration that permits it to define the terms and conditions of employment of judiciary personnel and the functions they serve within the court system. See, e.g., Passaic County Probation Officers' Ass'n v. County of Passaic, 73 N.J. 247, 374 A. 2d 449 (1977). The Court's administrative authority is far-reaching and encompasses the entire judicial structure [as well as] all aspects and incidents related to the justice system. Knight v. City of Margate, supra, 86 N.J. at 387, 431 A. 2d 833; see also 2 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of 1947, at 1180 (vesting courts with [e]xclusive authority over administration). That authority includes not only responsibility for the overall performance of the judicial branch, In re Mattera, 34 N.J. 259, 272, 168 A. 2d 38 (1961), but also all facets of the internal management of our courts. Lichter v. County of Monmouth, 114 N.J.Super. 343, 349, 276 A. 2d 382 (App.Div.1971). The Supreme Court's administrative policies are pronounced through Court opinions, orders, rules, and directives. See State v. J.M., 182 N.J. 402, 415-16, 866 A. 2d 178 (2005). Because their administrative rulemaking authority cannot be circumscribed by legislation, the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice exercise exclusive and plenary power over the governance of the judiciary. See Passaic County, supra, 73 N.J. at 252, 374 A. 2d 449 (stating that Court's authority over court administration is unfettered and plenary, in contrast to its authority over practice and procedure, which is subject to law (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mt. Hope Dev. Assocs., supra, 154 N.J. at 150, 712 A. 2d 180 (Article VI, Section 2, paragraph 3. . . has been broadly defined to vest this Court with the exclusive jurisdiction to administer the courts of this State.); CWA Local 1044 v. Chief Justice, 118 N.J. 495, 497, 501, 509, 511 n. 1, 572 A. 2d 613 (1990) (per curiam) (describing Court's power over administration of state court system as exclusive). C. This Court's constitutional mandate to make administrative rules governing the court system brings within its compass probation officers, who historically have been considered an integral part of the judiciary. Passaic County, supra, 73 N.J. at 253, 255, 374 A. 2d 449. In Passaic County Probation Officers' Ass'n v. County of Passaic , we held that the control of probation officers and of the whole statewide system of probation, seemingly entrusted to the Judiciary by the terms of the Constitution, [cannot] be in any way diluted or modified by legislation[.] Id. at 254, 374 A. 2d 449. We reaffirmed this Court's authority not only to set the terms and conditions of employment of judiciary personnel, but also to determine their functions within the court system. See id. at 250-57, 374 A. 2d 449. In that case, a Passaic County court directive extended the work hours of that county's probation officers. Id. at 249, 374 A. 2d 449. Because the Passaic County court refused to negotiate a modification of working conditions with the probation officers' bargaining unit, the probation officers contended that the court's unilateral action violated the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act. See id. at 250, 374 A. 2d 449. We made clear that if a legislative enactment is at odds with the Court's constitutional responsibility to superintend the administration of the judicial system, the Court would be constitutionally compelled not to yield. Id. at 255, 374 A. 2d 449. On the other hand, [i]t has . . . been the practice of this Court, with only occasional deviation, to accept and adopt legislative arrangements that have not in any way interfered with this Court's constitutional obligation. Ibid. Thus, as a matter of comity and commonsense, we have respected legislative enactments which have not directly conflicted or interfered with the operation of the judiciary. Ibid. In Passaic County, supra, out of respect for a legislative enactment and a constitutional provision that permits public employees to make known their grievances, we permitted the plaintiff bargaining unit to present its grievance to the County Court judges who were expected to engage in good faith discussions. Id. at 256-57, 374 A. 2d 449. After Passaic County, supra, we have had occasion to restate that it is our policy to defer to legislation that touches on court administration unless it interferes with the effective functioning of the courts. CWA Local 1044, supra, 118 N.J. at 501, 572 A. 2d 613. In Knight v. City of Margate, supra , we addressed whether the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law, which severely restricted the dealings that members of the judiciary could have with casino licensees, violated the separation of powers. 86 N.J. at 377-78, 390-91, 431 A. 2d 833. In that case, we again affirmed that the constitutional authority of the Supreme Court over the judicial branch of government is preeminent. Id. at 389, 431 A. 2d 833. We also recognized that the principle of separation of powers is not inconsistent with the notion of cooperation among the several branches toward the common goal of achieving responsible government. Id. at 388-89, 431 A. 2d 833. In view of the interdependence of governmental powers, we have allowed for the exercise of legislative authority that serves a legitimate governmental purpose and does not interfere with judicial prerogatives. Id. at 389-90, 431 A. 2d 833. Stated differently, the Supreme Court's ultimate power to accept or reject [legislative] action[ ] turn[s] upon the legitimacy of the governmental purpose of that action and the nature and extent of its encroachment upon judicial prerogatives and interests. Id. at 391, 431 A. 2d 833. In Knight, supra, we found that the New Jersey Conflicts of Interest Law not only served a significant governmental purpose, but also was consistent with ethical strictures in the Court's Canons of Judicial Conduct. Id. at 391-93, 431 A. 2d 833. Because the legislation did not interfere with the Supreme Court's administration of the court system, we upheld its constitutionality as applied to judges. Id. at 394-95, 431 A. 2d 833.