Opinion ID: 783790
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The DNA Act Serves a Law Enforcement Purpose

Text: 44 Next, the government contends, rather disingenuously, that the forced extraction of blood samples from Kincade and others similarly situated does not serve a law enforcement purpose. As we stated earlier, Edmond and Ferguson make plain that a regime of suspicionless searches is constitutionally impermissible if it is designed to serve such a purpose. 45 As an initial matter, the government, citing Knights, 122 S.Ct. at 593, argues that in reviewing the purpose of searches pursuant to the Act, we may not question the official purpose of the search. The government misreads Knights and misapplies it to the Act. In Knights, the Supreme Court, citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996), expressed its unwillingness to delve into the subjective motivations of the detective who searched Knights's apartment. 517 U.S. at 593, 116 S.Ct. 1589. In Edmond, however, the Supreme Court explicitly distinguished inquiries into the motivations of a single law enforcement official from those regarding official purpose underlying a general policy mandating suspicionless searches. [O]ur cases dealing with intrusions that occur pursuant to a general scheme absent individualized suspicion have often required an inquiry into purpose at the programmatic level. 531 U.S. at 46, 121 S.Ct. 447. The portion of the Act before us here mandates DNA collection of all persons convicted of a qualifying offense. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(2). Kincade makes no argument about the subjective intent of any individual parole officer who would forcibly extract a blood sample from him. Thus, Whren and its progeny have no application here. 46
47 In determining the programmatic purpose of searches pursuant to the Act, we consider all the available evidence in order to determine the relevant primary purpose. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81, 121 S.Ct. 1281. The government argues that two purposes of searches pursuant to the Act are to help law enforcement solve unresolved and future cases, and to increase accuracy in the criminal justice system. The government's own argument establishes that prototypical law enforcement purposes underlie the DNA searches in question. Under the government's own theory, the searches are conducted in order to collect DNA evidence samples for CODIS, so that those samples may be used in criminal investigations, to help solve crimes and prosecute the culprits, and to enable law enforcement agencies to be more accurate and effective in achieving their law enforcement objectives. 48 Moreover, a review of the Act's enforcement and its legislative history makes it equally plain that searches pursuant to the Act serve a law enforcement purpose. First, while probation officers initially collect the samples, law enforcement officers, as in the South Carolina pre-natal drug testing program at issue in Ferguson, are extensively involved thereafter. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82, 121 S.Ct. 1281. Like the program at issue in Ferguson, suspicionless searches conducted pursuant to the Act evince a penal character with a far greater connection to law enforcement than other searches sustained under [the] special needs rationale. Id. at 88-89, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). Under the Act, once Kincade's compulsorily extracted blood sample is included in CODIS, it has no other purpose than to aid law enforcement in matching his DNA to that which may be found at crime scene investigations, and thus to help determine whether Kincade is the person who has committed certain crimes and, if so, to facilitate his prosecution and conviction. 30 49 Next, it is clear that in passing the Act mandating these suspicionless searches, Congress was primarily concerned with the swift and accurate solution and prosecution of crimes generally; the legislative history is replete with references to the utility of DNA evidence in prosecuting crimes. See DNA Act House Report, at 8-11, 23-27, 32-36 (2000). For example, in addressing whether or not the DNA information collected would be used for insurance or medical purposes, the Department of Justice assured the House Committee that existing legal rules for the DNA identification system generally ensure that DNA samples and indexed information will be used solely for law enforcement identification purposes.  Id. at 25 (emphasis added); see also DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 146 Cong. Rec. S11645-02, at S11647 (2000) (Each day that DNA evidence goes uncollected and untested, solvable crimes remain unsolved, and people across the country are needlessly victimized. (quoted in Reynard, 220 F.Supp.2d at 1156 n. 15)). 50 It is also apparent that the executive branch understands law enforcement to be the primary objective of searches pursuant to the Act. See, e.g., Dep't of Justice, Using DNA to Solve Cold Cases 4 (July 2002) (stating that the DNA database system is a powerful tool for law enforcement); Dep't of Justice, No Suspect Casework DNA Backlog Reduction Program (FY 2001), at 1 (August 2001) (DNA evidence used in conjunction with the Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) is a powerful investigative tool beginning at the crime scene with the collection of evidence and ending with a judicial conclusion.); see also Justice Dep't. Acts to Clear DNA Backlog, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 2, 2001, at 19A (quoting Attorney General Ashcroft as saying DNA technology can operate as a kind of truth machine, ensuring justice by identifying the guilty and clearing the innocent.). In sum, the record overwhelmingly demonstrates that the Act mandating these suspicionless searches was enacted, is enforced, and is understood by all concerned to serve the purpose of law enforcement, and to further its objectives. 51
52 The government also asserts that even if the ultimate objective of searches pursuant to the Act is law enforcement, their immediate purpose is to fill a gap in the CODIS database. In Ferguson, the Court held that the hospital's testing policy was not justified by a special need because its immediate purpose was law enforcement, even if its ultimate purpose was to help those mothers who were substance abusers and their children. 532 U.S. at 82-84, 121 S.Ct. 1281. Here, the government's explanation of the searches' immediate purpose is in no way supported by Ferguson 's distinction. First, Ferguson said that the government could not disclaim a law enforcement purpose by pointing to an ultimate purpose and ignoring an immediate purpose. It did not suggest that the reverse would be any less objectionable — that the courts could ignore the ultimate law enforcement purpose if the government could point to an immediate other purpose. To the contrary, if either the immediate or the ultimate objective serves a law enforcement purpose, the special needs doctrine is inapplicable. Second, the immediate purpose of searches pursuant to the Act, as we have understood the intent of legislation in other cases, is to gather evidence for criminal investigation, not to put evidence into a database. The purpose of these searches is no more to put samples into CODIS than is the purpose of finger-printing to place cards into index files. 31 Accordingly, we reject the government's suggested distinction. Both the immediate purpose and the ultimate objective of searches under the Act are to further law enforcement ends. 53
54 Finally, the government suggests that searches pursuant to the Act not only help to convict the guilty but also serve the commendable purpose of ensuring that the innocent will not be wrongly convicted. We would hope so. However, even if we were to assume that the clearing of the innocent is not a function of law enforcement—and that would be a troubling assumption, indeed—exoneration would still not serve to supplant the primary law enforcement objective of these searches—the solving of crimes and the prosecution of those responsible. The presence of a benign motive cannot justify a departure from Fourth Amendment protections, given the pervasive involvement of law enforcement. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85, 121 S.Ct. 1281. Otherwise, a regime of suspicionless searches for law enforcement purposes would nearly always be permissible. See id. at 84 n. 22, 121 S.Ct. 1281 ([U]nder respondents' approach, any search to generate evidence for use by the police in enforcing general criminal laws would be justified by reference to the broad social benefits that those laws might bring about (or, put another way, the social harms that they might prevent).). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the special needs cases provide a narrow exception to the ordinary Fourth Amendment requirements, not a convenient means by which to avoid the strictures of the Constitution. 55 Recent experience has proven the efficacy of DNA testing to exonerate the wrongfully convicted, and we do not doubt the importance of DNA collection for this worthwhile purpose. 32 Those who claim wrongful conviction or even wrongful accusation, however, may volunteer their DNA for this purpose; equally important, an act that required the states and federal government to collect and analyze the DNA when requested by such persons would not offend the Fourth Amendment. To the contrary, such an act would well serve some of the objectives the Department of Justice endorses here. 33 The DNA Act, as presently constituted, however, provides no choice to those from whom it requires that DNA samples be collected, and no option to others not covered by the Act who might be able to benefit greatly from its provisions. Accordingly, it is difficult to accept the government's representation of its concerns regarding the innocent. See also Miles, 228 F.Supp.2d at 1139 (It is disingenuous for the government to state that it needs to exonerate people who do not want to be exonerated.). 56 Whatever benign secondary purposes these searches may happen to serve, the primary purpose is to provide law enforcement officials, both at the state and federal level, with information about individuals that can be used to identify them as criminals and to prosecute them for their crimes. Kincade, should he be subjected to such a search, in effect will have been compelled to provide evidence with respect to any and all crimes of which he may be accused, for the rest of his life. Kincade has completed his sentence, and the court has ordered a term of supervised release for three years. The forced extraction of his blood with the subsequent categorization of his DNA would affect him for the rest of his life. Thus, he is entitled to the protection afforded by the Fourth Amendment.