Opinion ID: 308716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mrs. Rosch's Unexpected Change of her Identification Testimony

Text: 11 When the robbery occurred Mrs. Bernice Ruth Rosch was the teller on duty at the El Paso National Bank. 12 At a pre-trial hearing, the prosecution made it known that Mrs. Rosch could not identify the robber or robbers. 13 In his opening statement, the Assistant United States Attorney, informed the jury: 14 I don't expect any identity from the two ladies that will be taking the stand as to who was the ones that held them up. The identification will come, I feel and believe, through the testimony that will be given to this jury by the other two individuals that held up the bank. As the Court indicated to you at the beginning of the case, Jose Felix Hernandez has plead guilty to the offense. Juan Jesus Martinez has also plead guilty to the offense, and they are going to come into this courtroom and tell you today that this Defendant Davila-Nater was the third individual involved in this robbery. 15 Mrs. Rosch soon took the stand. She had been an employee of the El Paso National Bank for a total of thirty-one years. On August 5, 1971, she had been working at the Beaumont Branch as relief for a male employee who was on vacation. She then described the robbery. Then came the surprise: 16 Q. I will ask you to take a look at the Defendant Davila. Can you identify him as being the man that held you up, Mrs. Rosch? 17
18 Q. He was one of the men? Do you recall if he was the one that actually held you up? 19 A. Well, I wouldn't want to say that, sir. 20 Mrs. Rosch then agreed that she had viewed a lineup but did not then identify the defendant. On cross examination: 21 Q. [D]o you remember seeing the Defendant there at the lineup at that time? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. My question is, at that lineup, Mrs. Rosch, you never made any indication or did you ever say that this Defendant appeared to be one of the men involved in the bank robbery, isn't that true, that you never did? 24 A. I did not, but that isn't true, that I didn't think it sir. 25 Q. I see. But you were asked several times if anyone in that lineup was involved-just a moment, let me finish my question, was involved in the bank robbery and if so, would you please point him out, and weren't you asked that question very carefully? 26 A. I was asked that question once and I said that the first one on the end looked familiar to me. 27 Q. And do you recall in which position the Defendant was? 28 A. He was the third in the lineup. 29 Q. The third in the lineup? And at no time-my question is, at no time did you tell-I am not asking what you thought, I am asking what you told in response to the question by the Federal Bureau of Investigation man, did you tell me or Mr. Turtle (emphasis added) that this Defendant appeared to be one of the men? Can you answer that 'yes' or 'no'? 30 A. No. 31 Q. Did you tell us? 32 A. I did not tell you. 33 Q. All right you kept your own reservations to yourself, is that what you are saying. 34 A. That is what I am saying. 35 Q. Wasn't it explained to you by Mr. Turtle that it was very important, the process and necessity of a lineup? 36 A. He explained it to me and told me this fellow said I could not identify him. 37 Q. Before the lineup, Mrs. Rosch, weren't you told that it was very important that you be careful to properly examine, observe and then make your identification known or non-identification known? 38 A. Right. 39 Q. And isn't it a fact that this is the first time that you have told anyone that this Defendant appears to be or is the man that robbed you that day or took part in the robbery. 40 A. I told the District Attorney and the FBI agent as we left that the third fellow on the lineup, this Davila did look familiar but his heighth was so that I was thrown off. [Davila was the fourth man]. 41 Q. Did you tell Mr. Eddie-have you talked with Mr. Edward Marquez concerning this case, the District Attorney that just interrogated you here? 42 A. I talked to him. 43 Q. Did you tell him that you could and you were going to identify Teodoro Davila-Nater as being one of the men involved in this bank robbery or did you tell him that you could not identify him? 44 A. I told him I could identify him. 45 MR. CALAMIA: Your Honor, I am going to invoke the theory and holding of Brady vs. Maryland so that if there is anything incorrect in this testimony I expect the United States Attorney to make it known to the Court and to the jury. 46 The record reveals that at the noon recess the prosecution informed defense counsel that Mrs. Rosch had, indeed, told him that she could not identify the defendant and that he was willing to take the stand and would so testify. It may be hindsight, but it seems strange to us that apparently it never occurred to either counsel that the prosecutor could have quickly filed a written stipulation of these facts and it could have been read to the jury. No one suggested this course. Failing this approach, the United States Attorney could, of course, have entered a verbal stipulation. 47 What actually happened was that, considerably later, defense counsel, without stating his purpose, asked to call the United States Attorney as a witness. Whereupon the Court announced, I won't permit you to call the District Attorney. 48 Thereafter, the defense called the F.B.I. agent, Eugene Patrick Turtle, Jr., who testified that Mrs. Rosch did not identify Davila at the lineup but was not specifically asked whether she had (as she stated) told him later that she could identify Davila. 49 In the closing arguments to the jury the prosecutor made no reference to Mrs. Rosch's testimony, but defense counsel dwelt on it at some length: 50 The Government makes an opening statement saying neither lady can identify him and they put on Mrs. Rosch and she said she told the District Attorney that she was going to identify him and she said 'I told the FBI agent and the District Attorney on the day of the lineup that I thought, yes, it was the number three man in the lineup. I didn't say it in front of the defense counsel but I told the FBI and I told the United States Attorney as we were going out.' The Government knew that the facts were otherwise. The Government did not get up and say 'Wait a minute, I want to clear this up for the jury. [Mrs. Rosch never told me that. She never told me she was going to identify the Defendant.' Why? Because why would I have said in my opening statement that neither of my witnesses are going to identify the Defendant? We had to call the FBI agent, and Mr. Calamia asked him, under subpoena duces tecum 'may I look at your record?' And he is an honest man and he said she did not identify the Defendant, that she identified number one. 'She never told me later that it was number three.' 51 Well, Mr. Davila wasn't even number three in that lineup. He was number four. Now this is the type of evidence the Government has. The witness takes the stand and they come in and they know this is the one that has been accused. It is very easy to turn over and say, 'Yeah, that is him.' 52 I say that part of her testimony should be given no consideration, now any person when they are sitting in that box, occupying the stand as a Government witness, and it is so easy to turn and say 'Yes, that is him.' Because they know who the lawyers are and they have talked with the Government and they have seen what has gone on and they came in and were sworn and the Government put on evidence that this bank meets all the requirements to come within this law, and I wonder and doubt, and I don't believe they have proved that. 53 Appellate counsel now argues most vigorously that his inability to impeach Mrs. Rosch by the testimony of the Assistant United States Attorney denied his client a fair trial. 54 He cites Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, a case in which the prosecution knew before the trial that false testimony would be used; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, where the statement was elicited from a witness that nothing had been promised him, when, in fact, it had, and this perjury was concealed; Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 78 S.Ct. 103, 2 L.Ed.2d 9, in which the witness was cautioned by the prosecution not to reveal evidence known to be favorable to the defendant; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, in which the prosecution withheld a statement beneficial to the defendant and which had been requested, and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 1972, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, requiring that favorable evidence known to any prosecutor in the office had to be revealed. 55 These eminently sound cases are not altogether analogous to the one now before us, although they undoubtedly fall in the same general category as this case. They indisputably stand for the principle that prosecutors must not, by commission or omission, wilfully commit acts causing a defendant to be denied an opportunity for a fair trial under due process of law. 56 Upon mature consideration, however, of the episode hereinabove described, we are convinced that, within the four corners of this case, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt: 57 1. The prosecutor told the jury at the very outset that he did not expect Mrs. Rosch to be able to identify the defendant; 58 2. The evidence was undisputed that Mrs. Rosch did not identify the defendant at the lineup; 59 3. Mrs. Rosch specifically declined to say that Davila was the one who actually robbed her; 60 4. There was no effort to attack the in-court identification except to try to impeach as to what had been told the prosecutor; 61 5. Without stating his reasons, defense counsel moved to put the prosecutor on the witness stand, a procedure not ordinarily looked upon with favor because the trial of a defendant, in the absence of the most compelling reasons, is not to be converted into a trial of the prosecutor, including the possible issue of his veracity in the midst of a trial which he is required to conduct; 62 6. There were other preferable methods by which the matter could have been handled, but which were not requested; 63 7. The point in controversy was whether the witness had told the District Attorney that she could identify the defendant, whereas, that official had already assured the jury that he did not expect such an identification, a statement he most surely would not have made if he had been informed to the contrary; 64 8. And it was a matter about which the defense took telling advantage in the closing argument. 65 In the main, however, these are prefatorial observations. 66 The consideration which brads the nail is the fact that both of Davila's confederates described his participation in detail. His friend, the automobile lender, recounted Davila's privately expressed admissions of guilt. No witness testified to an alibi or, in any other manner, that Davila was not present and participating in the robbery. 67 Vigilant counsel for Davila argues, however, that since the jury acquitted the defendant of robbing the State National Bank, for which the sole eyewitness identification came only from his co-defendants, and since he was convicted as to El Paso National, about which Mrs. Rosch testified, then her testimony was the cause of the conviction. This argument would be most persuasive if Mrs. Rosch had not refused to say, on the witness stand, that she identified Davila as the one who actually robbed her (that is, El Paso National). 68 From the record as a whole, viewing this incident in its entirety, and considering the overwhelmingly strong evidence of Davila's participation, we are of the view that what Mrs. Rosch swore she had told the District Attorney could not have influenced the jury on this issue. It was thus harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 69 It is well established in this Circuit that an error which might have been prejudicial in a close case does not require reversal when the evidence of defendant's guilt is strong, United States v. Lipscomb, 5 Cir., 1970, 435 F.2d 795, cert. denied 401 U.S. 980, 91 S.Ct. 1213, 28 L.Ed.2d 331, rehearing denied 402 U.S. 966, 91 S.Ct. 1635, 29 L.Ed.2d 131; Loftis v. Beto, 5 Cir., 1971, 450 F.2d 599. 70 The problem now before us has Constitutional overtones, but in Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969), a capital case, the Supreme Court declined to reverse for a Bruton error because the direct evidence of guilt was so overwhelming that the asserted error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 71 We now consider a much more difficult issue.