Opinion ID: 203074
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The City's Interpretation of the MOGO in Gregoire's Affidavit

Text: The City's own interpretation of the MOGO, as expressed in Gregoire's affidavit, has been consistent with the above textual reading. And while this interpretation was formally stated only after this litigation began, plaintiffs have neither alleged nor produced any evidence that the City, before Gregoire's affidavit, requested or received from anyone similarly situated to plaintiffs (much less plaintiffs themselves), a MOGO permit in addition to a parade permit. In other words, the City's actions have at all times been consistent with the City's interpretation stated in Gregoire's affidavit that the MOGO applies only to mass gatherings at fixed locations. Deputy Chief Gregoire, who handled both types of permits for many years, testified to much experience with parades but very few mass gatherings, from which it would appear that the MOGO was not widely employed, and, one might infer, was not employed in duplicate fashion with parades. The fact that Sullivan's March 20, 2004 march took place with only a parade permit, issued without suggestion from the Police Department that he also needed a MOGO permit (which, like the parade permit, is handled by the Police Department), strongly supports the City's position, asserted in Gregoire's affidavit, that it interprets the MOGO to apply only to mass gatherings at fixed locations, not to parades and marches. It is plaintiffs' burden to establish injury-in-fact as an essential part of their standing  not the City's burden to disprove it. See, e.g., FW/PBS v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (holding that standing must affirmatively appear in the record and it is the burden of the party seeking the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute). See also Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Osediacz, 414 F.3d at 139. Here the evidence the district court saw as indicative of an ambivalent City policy to require a MOGO permit in addition to a parade permit was Gregoire's early deposition testimony, responding to a question whether a parade of 3,000 people for a mile down the street was a mass gathering. Gregoire's response was That'sI mean, that's an interpretation. I don't know. I would have to review what the ordinance said. Gregoire then went on to say, in the same response, They are moving and that type of thing. They could be considered a parade . . . (emphasis supplied). Six months later, the City submitted to the court Gregoire's affidavit stating unequivocally, The City interprets the Mass Outdoor Gathering permit to only apply to a gathering which occurs at a fixed location. Between Gregoire's earlier deposition testimony and his later affidavit stating the City's final position, we see no discrepancy such as to warrant the district court's finding that he had a change of mind. His deposition response came in answer to a question that could easily have caught Gregoire by surprise, about whether an enormous hypothetical 3,000 person parade extending for a mile would be a mass gathering. Gregoire said, in effect, he didn't know  he would have to review what the MOGO said. Even so, he then suggested that, They could be considered a parade. In the six months that followed, Gregoire had the opportunity to review the issue, to reread the ordinances, and to consult with the Police Chief and other City officials, after which his affidavit was filed stating unequivocally the City's interpretation of the MOGO. That he consulted with superiors and spoke for the City, not just himself, can be inferred from the fact that in the affidavit he purported, under oath, to speak for the City; it is only reasonable to assume that a ranking officer like Gregoire would not have purported to speak for the City in important litigation of this type without first obtaining authorization. While he was not the Police Chief or City Manager, he was the second in command in the Police Department, the agency empowered by the two ordinances to issue both parade and mass outdoor gathering permits, and, subject to the Chief, was in charge of reviewing and acting upon applications to hold parades and marches in Augusta. As we say, we can see no contradiction between Gregoire's guarded reply during his earlier deposition and his later affirmative affidavit. The earlier response at most suggests uncertainty. He said nothing directly contrary to what he later represented in his affidavit was the City's interpretation. That the City interpreted a MOGO permit to apply only to a gathering which occurs at a fixed location fits reasonably within the language of the two ordinances, supra, is consistent with the City's practices as reflected in this record, and is entitled to be taken as an authoritative representation of the City's interpretation of its own ordinance. See Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (In evaluating respondent's facial challenge, we must consider the county's authoritative constructions of the ordinance, including its own implementation and interpretation of it). This is not a case where the agency's interpretation during a lawsuit repudiates its earlier interpretation, suggesting the later-announced interpretation might be a ploy to end the lawsuit and leave the agency free to return subsequently to the very practices that caused the plaintiff to sue. There is absolutely no evidence to suggest that Gregoire's affidavit of the City's interpretation constituted a repudiation of or departure from some earlier different practice of the City, nor have plaintiffs so alleged. Compare Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (observing that defendants' cessation of challenged practice during course of litigation did not guarantee they would not return to practice after dismissal). The district court criticized the City for not establishing that Gregoire's assertion of its interpretation reflected a longstanding municipal practice, but the City's treatment of these plaintiffs has from the start been entirely consistent with the interpretation of the MOGO stated in Gregoire's affidavit, and plaintiffs, whose burden it is, have produced no evidence of any inconsistency at any time in the City's treatment of others. We see no reason not to accept the City's asserted interpretation under these circumstances. We hold that plaintiffs did not meet their burden of establishing a reasonable possibility that, in applying to hold their street marches along City streets, they were or would be held subject to the MOGO as well. We conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs lack standing to litigate the various issues they raise concerning the alleged defects in the MOGO as distinct from those in the parade ordinance. We vacate the district court's judgment insofar as it relates to any of the provisions of the MOGO. Because plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the MOGO, we need not examine the ripeness of their MOGO claims. Without standing, plaintiffs' challenges to the MOGO provisions must be dismissed.