Opinion ID: 2537725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Batson v. Kentucky

Text: ¶ 23 Lastly, Thomas argues that the striking of juror 33, the lone African-American juror on the venire, was a violation of his rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Pet. for Review at 17-18. At the hearing on the Batson issue, the prosecution agreed with the defense as to the accuracy of the Batson standard and then proceeded to make a record regarding the statements made by Juror No. 33. 7 VRP (Oct. 31, 2005) at 120. Excerpts from voir dire transcripts show that juror 33 stated as follows: MR. THORNTON [defense counsel]: But you agree that there's some sort of, when you walk in, human nature that we make a judgment? .... JUROR NO. 33: I think that's a stupid question. I mean Ted Bundy, did he look guilty? Jeffrey Dahmer, next-door neighbor, did he look guilty or act guilty? That's more of a racist statement than anything else. I mean, I look at this jury pool. Look at that. Is this really a makeup of Tacoma or Pierce County? This is bizarre, man. MR. THORNTON: You agree with that statement? JUROR NO. 33: You have more dark in the bailiff than we have in this jury pool, and that's the way the prosecutors want it. VRP (Supp. Oct. 27, 2005) at 3-4. ¶ 24 The prosecution characterized the juror's comments as clearly was hostile toward the State and as such, gave a race-neutral reason for the State's exercise of the challenge. 7 VRP at 120-21. Thomas's counsel argued that the statement, `I think the State would like it that way,' was not a sufficient race-neutral reason for striking the juror. Id. at 121. After this exchange, the trial judge applied the law as it was stated in State v. Ashcraft, 71 Wash.App. 444, 459, 859 P.2d 60 (1993), that the exclusion of the lone representative of a constitutionally cognizable class from the venire is generally insufficient to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory intent and denied Thomas's Batson challenge. 7 VRP at 122. ¶ 25 A defendant's right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria is founded in the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citing Martin v. Texas, 200 U.S. 316, 321, 26 S.Ct. 338, 50 L.Ed. 497 (1906)). A defendant challenging the State's action in venire selection must ultimately show `a racially discriminatory purpose' on the part of the prosecutor. Id. at 93, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (quoting Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976)). The defendant's burden can be met by showing that the totality of the relevant facts in his case gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose. Id. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712 (citing Davis, 426 U.S. at 239-42, 96 S.Ct. 2040). After this showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging the juror. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. After both sides have made their arguments, [t]he trial court then [has] the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. ¶ 26 This court has held that a trial court is not required to find a prima facie case [of discriminatory purpose] based on the dismissal of the only venire person from a constitutionally cognizable group, but they may, in their discretion, recognize a prima facie case in such instances. State v. Hicks, 163 Wash.2d 477, 490, 181 P.3d 831 (2008). The recognition that trial courts may but are not required to find a prima facie case on the basis of the State's strike of the lone remaining juror of a constitutionally cognizable group afford[s] a high level of deference to the trial court's determination of discrimination. Id. at 493, 181 P.3d 831. This deference is necessary because findings of discrimination largely turn on an evaluation of credibility, Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712, and because a reviewing court ... analyzes only the transcripts from voir dire [and] is not as well positioned as the trial court is to make credibility determinations. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 339, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). Even where a trial court [finds] a prima facie case out of an abundance of caution, if the prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation, the ultimate issue of whether or not a prima facie case was established does not need to be determined to uphold the trial court's refusal to find a Batson violation. Hicks, 163 Wash.2d at 492-93, 181 P.3d 831; see also State v. Luvene, 127 Wash.2d 690, 699, 903 P.2d 960 (1995) (if the prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation and the trial court has ruled on the question of racial motivation, the preliminary prima facie case is unnecessary) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)). A trial court's ruling on a challenge for cause is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Gregory, 158 Wash.2d 759, 814, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006) (citing State v. Brown, 132 Wash.2d 529, 601-02, 940 P.2d 546 (1997)). ¶ 27 At the time of Thomas's retrial on aggravating factors, neither the trial court, nor the parties had the benefit of our decision in Hicks. Although the court was mistaken as to the standard for establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, the trial court heard the State's reasons for striking the juror and found them to be race-neutral. This finding of a race-neutral motivation for striking juror 33, after hearing arguments in support of and against, is a correct application of the law: that a prima facie determination need not be had where the State has offered a race-neutral reason for exclusion of a juror from the venire. Hicks, 163 Wash.2d at 492-93, 181 P.3d 831; Luvene, 127 Wash.2d at 699, 903 P.2d 960. The trial court's decision to reject Thomas's Batson challenge was not an abuse of discretion.