Opinion ID: 1606283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred in failing to grant a mistrial after a defense witness was arrested subsequent to testifying.

Text: ¶ 19. Roach argues that the arrest in open court of defense witness John Henry Clark, Jr. violated his Sixth-Amendment right to compulsory process because his right to present witnesses on his own behalf was violated. The State contends Roach waived his claim that the arrest of his witness, Clark, prejudiced his defense because Roach did not raise this issue at the trial level. According to the record, following Clark's testimony, the prosecutor moved the court to take Clark into custody. During a bench conference with the trial judge, defense counsel objected to the witness being taken into custody and moved for a mistrial based upon the fact that the arrest was being ordered as a result of the alleged questionable weight of the witness's testimony. The State argues the objection that based on the weight of the testimony is not the same objection raised in Roach's brief that the defense was prejudiced by the witness being taken into custody in front of the jury. The State relies on Burns v. State, 729 So.2d 203, 219 (Miss.1998), which states an objection at trial cannot be enlarged in a reviewing court to embrace an omission not complained of at trial. ¶ 20. In essence, Roach's objection is the same on appeal as his objection at trial that the arrest was a result of the trial judge usurping the jury by deeming that Clark's testimony was so incredible that it was worthy of a perjury charge and immediate arrest. From the record we can deduce that defense counsel believed that the arrest of a witness who had just testified for Roach would have a negative impact on the jury adverse to Roach. While the couching of the issue for appellate review does not track verbatim the objection made at trial, we are satisfied that Roach has sufficiently preserved this issue for appellate review. ¶ 21. To fully address this issue, it is critical to set the stage by citation to the record. At the conclusion of the State's opening statements, and prior to the commencement of the State's case-in-chief, Roach, through counsel, appropriately reserved his right to make an opening statement after the State had rested its case-in-chief. Thus, after the State had rested its case-in-chief, and prior to calling John Henry Clark, Jr., to testify in his case-in-chief, Roach, through counsel, made the following comments as part of his opening statements to the jury: And there was also a fellow by the name of John Henry Clark, Jr., who was in that house, but who ran out the back door and as he ran out the back door his package of drugs fell on the kitchen floor. He's going to come in here and he's going to tell you that those were his drugs. They are not Jimmie's drugs. They are not Petrice's drugs. They didn't know anything about it. John Henry Clark is going to come in here and take the heat. He's going to admit that those are his drugs. (Emphasis added). Upon informing the jury in opening statements that John Henry Clark, Jr., would come into the courtroom and take the heat for the crimes with which Roach was charged, Roach's attorney announced before the jury that the first witness in Roach's case-in-chief would be John Henry Clark, Jr. At this juncture, the trial judge wisely dismissed the jury and permitted Clark to be examined under oath by Roach's attorney outside the presence of the jury, thus revealing that Clark indeed was prepared to testify under oath that on the day in question, he had possessed part of the drugs which the State asserted belonged to Roach. The trial judge appropriately conducted his own examination of Clark and advised Clark of his constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent, thus not incriminating himself, and his right to legal counsel. After a thorough examination of Clark, the trial judge found that Clark fully understood his constitutional rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived his right against self-incrimination and his right to counsel. The jury was then brought back, whereupon Clark was examined by Roach's attorney and by the prosecutor. On direct examination before the jury, Clark testified that as he ran out of the house, through the kitchen, he had dropped the bag containing the 400 Dilaudid pills and cocaine which law enforcement stated was found by the refrigerator when conducting the search of the house. On cross-examination by the assistant district attorney, Clark was questioned about a previous conversation he had with the assistant district attorney a few days prior to trial. The following colloquy occurred: [PROSECUTOR]: At that time I asked you if I could speak with you and you agreed to speak with me. Do you remember that? [CLARK]: Uh-huh. [PROSECUTOR]: Is that a yes? [CLARK]: Yes, sir. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. Now at that time I also asked you if you had done anything like this before. Have you ever gone in and somebody else was charged with a crime and you claimed the drugs? [CLARK]: No, sir. [PROSECUTOR]: You have never done that before? [CLARK]: I think you asked me something about have I been to Tennessee. [PROSECUTOR]: No, I didn't. [CLARK]: Oh, you didn't? [PROSECUTOR]: No. I didn't ask you that. But for the record you have never  nobody else has ever been charged and you didn't go and claim the drugs? [CLARK]: No, sir. [PROSECUTOR]: You have never done that? [CLARK]: No, sir. ¶ 22. At this point, the prosecutor requested a conference at the bench with defense counsel, whereupon the trial court put the jury in recess for lunch. In due course the jury returned, and the assistant district attorney's cross-examination of Clark continued: [PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Clark, before we left you told the jury that you had never before gone and made a statement where someone else was charged with a crime. Is that correct? [CLARK]: No, sir. [PROSECUTOR]: That's not what you said earlier? [CLARK]: Yeah, that's what I said. [PROSECUTOR]: That's what you said earlier; right? [CLARK]: But that was not correct. [PROSECUTOR]: So you lied to the jury? [CLARK]: Did I tell the jury that? [PROSECUTOR]: The jury probably remembers that. [CLARK]: Well, I just wasn't  I wasn't for sure, but yeah, I said that I hadn't testified against someone like this. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. So I believe my question was: When someone else was charged with a crime have you ever gone in and claimed responsibility for it, something to that effect, and you told the jury, no you hadn't. Was that a correct statement? [CLARK]: No, sir. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. So your earlier statement was not truthful? [CLARK]: Right. The next several pages of the trial transcript reveal that the assistant district attorney questioned Clark at length about Clark's acquaintance with a man named Mario Jones. Clark admitted that Jones had been charged with possession of approximately 7,000 Dilaudid pills in Tennessee and that he (Clark) had stated under oath in a deposition in Jones's case that he had purchased 6,700 Dilaudid pills, thus asserting ownership of most of the Dilaudid pills which had been found in Jones's possession. When Clark was asked about whether he had lied to a Tennessee assistant district attorney in Jones's case, the following occurred: [CLARK]: I might have lied then, if I did. [PROSECUTOR]: You might have lied then? And before you took that deposition you raised your hand and swore to tell the truth; didn't you? [CLARK]: I wasn't in front of no judge. [PROSECUTOR]: But you still raised your hand  [CLARK]: I might have did. [PROSECUTOR]: You might have did. Okay. So you don't mind lying? [CLARK]: Yeah, I mind lying, just depends. [PROSECUTOR]: Okay. It depends on how much money you are being paid? [CLARK]: No. I ain't said that now. It just depends on the lie and the situation. [PROSECUTOR]: The lie and the situation? [CLARK]: Yeah. I ain't going to say I won't lie. .... [PROSECUTOR]: So you do admit that you lied in this statement? [CLARK]: Yes, sir. ¶ 23. Once Roach's attorney concluded his redirect examination of Clark, the assistant district attorney stated to the trial court in front of the jury, We ask the witness be taken into custody. Roach's attorney requested a bench conference, whereupon the following occurred in the presence of, but outside the hearing of, the jury: [ROACH'S ATTORNEY]: I just heard the prosecutor ask that the witness be taken into custody in front of the jury. [THE COURT]: Uh-huh. [ROACH'S ATTORNEY]: I don't think that's proper and I think it's grounds for a mistrial. [THE COURT]: Why? [ROACH'S ATTORNEY]: Because it goes to the weight of his testimony. [THE COURT]: The whole defense is he committed the crime. Why shouldn't he be taken into custody? [ROACH'S ATTORNEY]: Okay. Fair enough. Roach, through counsel, then continued his case-in-chief by calling his next witness. It is interesting to note that while Roach's attorney stated that he felt that the prosecutor's act of requesting in front of the jury that Clark be taken into custody was grounds for a mistrial, Roach's counsel never moved for a mistrial, nor did he request the trial court to rule on a motion for a mistrial. Once the trial judge explained to counsel at the bench conference that he felt that Clark had admitted to a crime and asked, [w]hy shouldn't he be taken into custody, Roach's attorney replied, [o]kay, [f]air enough. ¶ 24. There is no further explanation as to why the prosecutor called for Clark's arrest or why the trial judge ordered the arrest. The record does not note at what point Clark was arrested, nor does the record reveal whether Clark was arrested in the presence of the jury or outside of the presence of the jury. Nor do we know, assuming arguendo, that Clark was taken into custody before the jury, whether Clark was handcuffed or shackled before the jury. In fact, Roach does not assert that any restraining devices were put on Clark in the presence of the jury. We only know from the record that Roach's attorney, in his closing arguments before the jury, described the arrest as having taken place in front of the jury: Now what I don't understand is they [the State] call him a liar and they say that his testimony is incredible, is absolutely without credibility. However, that same testimony is what they are going to use [to] justify taking him into custody which occurred right here in front of you yesterday. .... My point here is: How can the state, which is what these gentlemen represent, and these officers who testified yesterday, they represent, how can they say, Mr. Clark, your testimony is credible, therefore, we are going to arrest you right here in front of this jury, we are going to take you into custody right here in front of this jury and the next day, less than 24 hours they come in here and they tell you his testimony is not credible. [8] (Emphasis added). ¶ 25. Roach argues that the State arrested Clark for perjury, and that while the State has the right to charge a witness with perjury, the State does not have the right to arrest a witness in the presence of the jury. An arrest of a witness for perjury in the presence of the jury may constitute reversible error. Brandon v. State, 75 Miss. 904, 906, 23 So. 517, 518 (1898) (arrest of witness in presence of jury pursuant to statute providing for arrest of palpable perjurers was fatal error based on very doubtfully balanced state of the testimony). See e.g., Stephens v. State, 592 So.2d 990 (Miss. 1991) (finding no reversible error where bench warrant was issued for defense witness for perjury before conclusion of trial but outside of jury's presence); Chase v. State, 75 Miss. 502, 22 So. 828 (1897). There is no precedent on whether an arrest in the presence of the jury for an offense other than perjury may constitute reversible error. ¶ 26. At the bench conference outside the hearing of the jury, the trial judge stated, The whole defense is [Clark] committed the crime. Why shouldn't he be taken into custody? Thus, from the record, it is apparent that the trial judge was having Clark arrested, not for perjury, but for admitting under oath to a felony offense, namely possession of 400 Dilaudid pills and a half ounce of crack cocaine. Also, it is important to remember that during his closing arguments to the jury, Roach's attorney stated, how can [the State] say, Mr. Clark, your testimony is credible, therefore, we are going to arrest you right here in front of this jury, we are going to take you into custody right here in front of this jury and the next day, less than 24 hours they come in here and they tell you his testimony is not credible. Thus Roach's attorney claims that Clark was arrested because the State believed that his testimony was credible (meaning that the State believed Clark's testimony that the drugs attributable to Roach were indeed Clark's drugs). In his closing arguments, Roach's attorney argued to the jury the State's inconsistency for, on the one hand, requesting Clark's arrest because of his credible testimony of admitting to a crime, namely possession of the drugs, and on the other hand, coming before the jury in the State's closing arguments and claiming that Clark's testimony about the drugs belonging to him was an absurd story. ¶ 27. Although not wholly applicable to today's case, we note that, even in cases where a defendant has appeared before the jury shackled or handcuffed, we have not found that the defense was prejudiced. As this Court stated in Wilcher v. State, 863 So.2d 719 (Miss.2003), Generally, we have not found the right to a fair trial to have been abridged where the defendant has been seen in the courtroom by the jury in shackles or handcuffs. Wilcher, 863 So.2d at 744 (quoting Brown v. State, 690 So.2d 276, 287 (Miss.1996); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1329 (Miss.1987)). Furthermore, if anything, Clark's arrest for possessing drugs recovered from the Roach residence bolstered the defense's theory that Clark, not Roach, had been in possession of at least some of the drugs. Accordingly, this issue is without merit.