Opinion ID: 1676987
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claims against Chrysler Credit

Text: With regard to the Rhodeses' claims against Chrysler Credit, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Rhodeses, shows: Chrysler Credit financed the Rhodeses' purchase of a 1989 Chevrolet Cavalier on July 13, 1989. The Rhodeses entered into an installment purchase contract with Chrysler Credit, pursuant to which they agreed to make 60 payments of $335.96 each; and Chrysler Credit retained a security interest in the car. The first payment was due on August 12, 1989. On August 10, 1989, the Rhodeses forwarded a check for $335.96 to Chrysler Credit. That check was returned unpaid because of insufficient funds. The Rhodeses made no other payments under the installment contract. On October 2, 1989, an agent of Chrysler Credit repossessed the vehicle from the premises of David Jones Chevrolet. On October 6, 1989, Chrysler Credit mailed to the Rhodeses a notice stating that the vehicle had been voluntarily surrendered and that it would be sold at a private sale after October 16, 1989. The letter informed the Rhodeses that they should contact Chrysler Credit by telephone or by mail if they had any questions. On October 16, 1989, the Rhodeses' attorney mailed a letter to Chrysler Credit demanding the return of the vehicle. Chrysler Credit did not respond to this letter. The car was sold on November 22, 1989, leaving a deficiency of over $3,000. Chrysler Credit reported the repossession and the resulting deficiency to a credit bureau. Daniel and Sabrina Rhodes each submitted an affidavit in which they stated, Based on conversations we had with David Jones Chevrolet, Inc., and Chrysler Credit Corporation, we were informed and believed that no payment had to be made toward the purchase of the automobile until such time as the defects in the automobile were repaired. Other than these statements in their affidavits, however, the Rhodeses presented no evidence that anyone at Chrysler Credit authorized the Rhodeses to withhold payments on the installment contract until the vehicle was repaired.
The Rhodeses alleged that someone at Chrysler Credit told them that they did not have to make any payments under the installment contract until the car was finally repaired by Jones. They further alleged that this was a false representation and that they relied upon it to their detriment. The only evidence in support of this allegation is the statement quoted above from the Rhodeses' affidavits. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Chrysler Credit submitted the testimony of Joe Rovira, its employee in charge of the Rhodeses' account. He testified that he was the only person who would have had a contract with the Rhodeses regarding their delinquency. He further testified that he did not authorize the Rhodeses to withhold payment until their car was repaired. We conclude, therefore, that Chrysler Credit made a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the Rhodeses' fraud claim. Lee, 592 So.2d 1036. In contrast, the only evidence submitted by the Rhodeses in opposition to the motion for summary judgment on this count is the conclusory statements in their affidavits. In opposing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmovants cannot merely rely on the allegations in their complaint. Nettles v. Henderson, 510 So.2d 212 (Ala. 1987); Rule 56(e), A.R.Civ.P. Moreover, we have held that affidavits offered in opposition to a properly supported motion for summary judgment must be more than a mere verification of the allegations contained in the pleadings, and must present facts that would be admissible in evidence. Black v. Reynolds, 528 So.2d 848, 849 (Ala.1988) (citing Morris v. Morris, 366 So.2d 676 (Ala.1978)). The materials submitted by the Rhodeses contain no particular evidence about the alleged conversation with Chrysler Credit. That is, they do not identify the party with whom they claim to have spoken, the approximate date of the alleged conversation, or the content of the alleged conversation. Based on this paucity of evidence, we conclude that the Rhodeses failed to present substantial evidence, i.e., evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment [could] reasonably infer ( West, 547 So.2d at 871) that a representative of Chrysler Credit actually informed the Rhodeses that they did not have to make payments under the installment contract until the car was repaired. Clearly, one of the essential elements of a fraud claim is that the defendant made a false representation. Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 So.2d 1374 (Ala.1986). Because the Rhodeses failed to present substantial evidence of this essential element of their claim, the trial court properly held that there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Chrysler Credit was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3) and (e), A.R.Civ.P.
Ala.Code 1975, § 7-9-503, provides in relevant part: Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed by action. With regard to collateral such as automobiles, § 7-9-504(3) provides that reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor. We have held that selling collateral without satisfying the notice requirements of § 7-9-504(3) constitutes conversion. Simmons Machine Co. v. M & M Brokerage, Inc., 409 So.2d 743, 751 (Ala.1981). The Rhodeses argue that the notice Chrysler Credit sent to them failed to fulfil the purpose of § 7-9-504(3) and that the repossession of their car was wrongful and constituted conversion. Specifically, they point out that the notice stated that the car had been voluntarily surrendered, whereas it was actually repossessed from the premises of David Jones Chevrolet. We conclude that the notice at issue in this case clearly met the formal requirements of § 7-9-504(3) and fulfilled the purpose of that provision. We note, in the first place, that the Rhodeses concede in their brief that Chrysler Credit met the formal requirements of § 7-9-504(3). The notice must inform the debtor whether the sale of the collateral is to be private or is to be public. Lavender v. AmSouth Bank, N.A., 539 So.2d 193, 195 (Ala.1988). In the case of a private sale, § 7-9-504(3) requires only reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale is to be made. Id. See also, White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code: Practitioner's Edition, § 27-12 at 600-01. The notice in this case met these requirements. The Rhodeses principally argue that the notice failed to fulfil the purpose of § 7-9-504(3). We disagree. In considering the sufficiency of notice in another case, the Court of Civil Appeals stated: The purpose of the notice is to enable the debtor to protect his interest in the property by paying the debt, finding a buyer, being present at the sale to bid on the property or have others do so, in order to keep from sacrificing the collateral at a secret sale at less than its true value. Wells v. Central Bank of Alabama, N.A., 347 So.2d 114, 120 (Ala.Civ.App.1977). See, Lavender, 539 So.2d at 195; Simmons, 409 So.2d at 749. As stated above, Chrysler mailed the notice on October 6, 1989; the Rhodeses' attorney on October 16, 1989, mailed a letter demanding the return of the car; and the car was privately sold on November 22, 1989. It is undisputed that between October 16 and November 22 the Rhodeses made no attempt to bring their account with Chrysler Credit current. In fact, other than the October 16 letter, neither the Rhodeses nor their attorney had any further communication with Chrysler Credit until after the car was sold. Considering the contents of the notice sent by Chrysler Credit, we reject the Rhodeses' contention that they were not informed that the car had been repossessed and that it would be privately sold. Even if the phrase voluntarily surrendered misstates the means by which Chrysler Credit took possession of the car, it is undisputed that the Rhodeses knew that Chrysler Credit had, in fact, taken possession of it and that Chrysler Credit intended to sell it. The Rhodeses make no other arguments in support of their claim for damages for conversion and wrongful possession. In light of our holding that the notice in this case complied with both the letter and the spirit of § 7-9-504(3), we conclude that as to the conversion and wrongful repossession claims the trial court properly granted Chrysler Credit's motion for summary judgment.
In Count VII of their complaint, the Rhodeses allege that by engaging in extreme and outrageous conduct Chrysler Credit caused the Rhodeses to suffer severe emotional distress. See, American Road Service Co. v. Inmon, 394 So.2d 361 (Ala.1980). The Rhodeses have failed to present any argument or to cite any authority in challenging the summary judgment on this count. Accordingly, as to this count the summary judgment is affirmed. Rule 28(a), A.R.App.P. In Count VIII of their complaint, the Rhodeses seek damages from Chrysler Credit because, they claim, in reporting this incident as a repossession to the credit bureau, [Chrysler Credit damaged] the credit rating and reputation of the Plaintiffs. The Rhodeses have failed to present any argument or to cite any authority in support of their claim that Chrysler Credit wrongfully engaged in conduct that harmed their reputation. Therefore, as to this claim also the summary judgment is affirmed. Rule 28(a), A.R.App.P.