Opinion ID: 199420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lifting as an Essential Function of Phelps's Position

Text: 9 The district court held that the ability to lift fifty pounds on a consistent basis was an essential function of the clinical nurse position. Phelps does not disagree with this determination, nor does she suggest that the court erred in its conclusion that she was unable to lift that amount of weight on a consistent basis. Instead, she argues that she was not technically a clinical nurse, but that she held a nursing position that had been created specifically for her physical limitations. The district court found no evidentiary support for such an argument: It appears to be undisputed that Phelps was working in a clinical nurse I position, shared with her sister, at the time her employment was terminated. Phelps, 2000 WL 1513782, at . The evidence overwhelmingly supports the district court's conclusion. 10 First, Phelps testified that she was no longer a medication nurse at the time of her termination, and that although she had not considered what her job description was at the time of her termination, she assume[d] [that she] was a staff RN. Phelps then indicated that the technical job description clinical nurse I was essentially synonymous with the shorthand staff nurse. 4 Second, CMC Human Resources Manager Mary Ann Flatten testified that Human Resources had to approve changes to job descriptions or the creation of new positions. It is undisputed that Human Resources never approved, nor was even aware of, the altered nurse position that Phelps describes. All of the differences between her position and that of the other nurses were a result of understandings between Phelps, Simon, and other nurses in the rehabilitation unit, and none were in writing. Third, Phelps testified that there were occasions in which nurses other than her sister had to assist her in nursing duties. The fact that Phelps and Lemire would occasionally work on different shifts suggests that there was no formal and permanent job-sharing arrangement. In short, the evidence clearly indicates that Phelps held the position of clinical nurse, albeit with unwritten modifications aimed at allowing her to fulfill most job duties despite her disability. 11 Although this Court has not yet addressed the issue, several other courts have indicated that -- even when an employer and employee have made arrangements to account for the employee's disability -- a court must evaluate the essential functions of the job without considering the effect of the special arrangements. See, e.g., Basith v. Cook County, 241 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2001) (delivery of medicine remained essential function of job despite special assignment allowing employee not to deliver medicine for period of time); Pickering v. City of Atlanta, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1374, 1378-79 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (temporary assignment of prison guard to light duty because of her disability does not change essential functions of prison guard position). The fact that an employee might only be assigned to certain aspects of a multi-task job does not necessarily mean that those tasks to which she was not assigned are not essential. Anderson v. Coors Brewing Co., 181 F.3d 1171, 1175-76 (10th Cir. 1999) (relevant functions are those of TPO position for which employee was hired, as opposed to can-sorter position to which she was assigned); Miller v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 107 F.3d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1997) (essential functions of prison guard position included all functions required of prison guards, even when plaintiff had been allowed to rotate only between certain assignments). 12 Phelps's basic counter-argument is that the accommodations offered by Simon, her sister, and the rest of the nursing staff distinguished the essential functions of Phelps's position from those of the other nurses; i.e., that for Phelps's nursing position alone, lifting was not an essential function. However, we agree with the Seventh Circuit that evidence that accommodations were made so that an employee could avoid a particular task merely shows the job could be restructured, not that [the function] was non-essential. Basith, 241 F.3d at 930. To find otherwise would unacceptably punish employers from doing more than the ADA requires, and might discourage such an undertaking on the part of employers. See Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1998); Sieberns v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 125 F.3d 1019, 1023 (7th Cir. 1997); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1528 (11th Cir. 1997); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 545 (7th Cir. 1995). In short, even though her co-workers had allowed Phelps to avoid having to lift more than fifty pounds, the ability to do so remained an essential function of her position.