Opinion ID: 1111406
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Our Prior Privacy Case Law: Mueller, Kam, and Baehr

Text: To date, our case law interpreting article I, section 6 has apparently established two distinct approaches to the right to privacy. [4] The first approach was applied by this court in State v. Mueller, 66 Haw. 616, 671 P.2d 1351 (1983), and later by the plurality in Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 852 P.2d 44, reconsideration granted in part, 74 Haw. 650, 875 P.2d 225 (1993). Under this approach, only personal rights that can be deemed `fundamental' or `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. Mueller, 66 Haw. at 628, 671 P.2d at 1355 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973)) (citations omitted). In determining which rights are fundamental, we must look to the traditions and [collective] conscience of our people to determine whether a principle is so rooted [there] ... as to be ranked as fundamental. ... The inquiry is whether a right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those `fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions'.... Baehr, 74 Haw. at 556, 852 P.2d at 57 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 1686, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring)) (alterations in original). If a right is determined to be fundamental, it is subject to interference only when a compelling state interest is demonstrated. Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, in 1 Proceedings of the Constitutional Convention of Hawai`i of 1978, at 1024 (1980). See also Mueller, 66 Haw. at 627, 671 P.2d at 1359. In the absence of a fundamental right, however, a statute need only satisfy the minimum rationality requirements of due process, i.e., it must have a rational basis. Id. at 628, 671 P.2d at 1359. In the past, we have applied the Mueller/Baehr approach in rejecting claims that certain acts are protected by the right to privacy. In Mueller, our first case directly addressing the scope of article I, section 6, we held that prostitution is not protected by the right to privacy because the decision to engage in sex for hire at home is not a fundamental right nor is basic to ordered liberty. Id. at 628, 630, 671 P.2d at 1359, 1360. Similarly, in Baehr, the plurality held, in an opinion written by Justice Levinson: [W]e do not believe that a right to same-sex marriage is so rooted in the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions. Neither do we believe that a right to same-sex marriage is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if it were sacrificed. Accordingly, we hold that the [plaintiffs] do not have a fundamental constitutional right to samesex marriage arising out of the right to privacy or otherwise. Baehr, 74 Haw. at 556-57, 852 P.2d at 57. It should be noted that, in applying the Mueller/Baehr approach, we have tended to focus on personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education. Mueller, 66 Haw. at 627, 671 P.2d at 1359 (quoting Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2016, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977)) (internal quotation marks and ellipses omitted). A report from the 1978 Constitutional Convention's Committee of the Whole, reflecting the consensus of the assembly, id. at 625, 671 P.2d at 1357, stated that the right to privacy is similar to the privacy right discussed in [federal] cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), etc. Comm. Whole Rep. No. 15, 1 Proceedings, at 1024. Griswold and Eisenstadt both involved contraception and Roe dealt with abortion. See Griswold, supra ; Eisenstadt, supra ; Roe, supra . Accepting the reasoning in Mueller, Justice Levinson wrote in Baehr: We ultimately concluded in Mueller that the federal cases cited by the Convention's committee of the whole should guide our construction of the intended scope of article I, section 6. Baehr, 74 Haw. at 552, 852 P.2d at 55. Therefore, [w]hile the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been marked[,] Mueller, 66 Haw. at 627, 671 P.2d at 1359 (quoting Carey, 431 U.S. at 685, 97 S.Ct. at 2016), it is clear that the framers of article I, section 6 and our own decisions have emphasized protection of intimate personal relationships such as those concerning marriage, contraception, and the family. The second approach, adopted by this court in State v. Kam, 69 Haw. 483, 748 P.2d 372 (1988), is ultimately based on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). In Stanley, the Court held that the right to read or view pornographic material in the privacy of one's home is protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 565, 89 S.Ct. at 1248 (If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in the privacy of his own house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.). In Kam, we accepted the reasoning in Stanley, but additionally based the right to read or view pornographic material within the home on article I, section 6. Kam, 69 Haw. at 493-94, 748 P.2d at 378-79. We held that the right to read or view pornographic material in the privacy of one's home must be afforded the protection of the Hawaii Constitution article I, section 6[.] Id. at 493, 748 P.2d at 378-79. Furthermore, we extended the principles in Stanley to include the correlative right to purchase [pornographic] materials for ... personal use [at home]. Id. at 495, 748 P.2d at 380 (emphasis added). We reasoned that [i]t is obvious that an adult person cannot read or view pornographic material in the privacy of his or her own home if the government prosecutes the sellers of pornography... and bans any commercial distribution. Id. at 495, 748 P.2d at 379. Thus, under the Stanley/Kam approach, the right to privacy located in article I, section 6 encompasses the right to read or view pornographic material in the privacy of one's home, as well as the correlative right to purchase such materials for use in one's home. The State cannot interfere with these rights unless a compelling state interest is demonstrated. Id. It should be noted that there are two significant aspects of the Stanley/Kam approach. First, the approach focuses squarely on the home as the situs of privacy. Rather than focusing on intimate relationships, as in the Mueller/Baehr approach, the Stanley /Kam approach is tied to a specific place. Stanley repeatedly referred to the privacy of one's own home: Moreover, in the context of this case  a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy of one's home that right takes on an added dimension.... He is asserting the right to read or observe what he pleasesthe right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of his own home. ... Whatever may be the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the privacy of one's own home. ... As we have said, the States retain broad power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564, 565, 568, 89 S.Ct. at 1247, 1248, 1249 (emphases added). The Constitution extends special safeguards to the privacy of the home, just as it protects other special privacy rights such as those of marriage, procreation, motherhood, child rearing, and education. United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142, 93 S.Ct. 2674, 2677, 37 L.Ed.2d 513 (1973). The protection afforded by Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 89 S.Ct. 1243, 22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969), is restricted to a place, the home. In contrast, the constitutionally protected privacy of family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing is not just concerned with a particular place, but with a protected intimate relationship. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66 n. 13, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2640 n. 13, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973). It is true that Kam extended the principles in Stanley to include the buying and selling of pornographic materials, and such commercial activities do not take place in the home. However, we also stated in Kam that the right to purchase pornographic materials is a correlative right to the right established by Stanley. Thus, even though the material may be purchased outside the home, it still must be purchased for personal use within the home. Therefore, a crucial factor in the Stanley /Kam approach is its emphasis on the home. The second aspect of the Stanley/Kam approach is that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are strongly implicated. Pornography and obscenity deal with printed or filmed matter and, consequently, raise First Amendment concerns. Stanley was based on the First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568, 89 S.Ct. at 1249 (We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene material a crime. (Emphasis added.)). Although Kam subsequently grounded the right to read or view pornographic material within the home on article I, section 6, we cannot ignore the fact that freedom of speech and freedom of the press are essential factors in the Stanley /Kam analysis.
In the present case, Mallan argues that the right to privacy in article I, section 6 encompasses the right to possess marijuana for personal use. We disagree. Applying the Mueller/Baehr approach, it is clear that the right to possess and use marijuana cannot be considered a fundamental right that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. We cannot say that smoking marijuana is a part of the traditions and collective conscience of our people. In Hawai`i, possession of marijuana has been illegal since 1931. See 1931 Haw. Sess. L. Act 152, § 12, at 155-56. In the rest of the United States, the possession and/or use of marijuana, even in small quantities, is almost universally prohibited. [5] Therefore, tradition appears to be in favor of the prohibition against possession and use of marijuana. Additionally, we have no reason to believe that the collective conscience of the people supports the possession and use of marijuana under the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, we cannot say that the principles of liberty and justice underlying our civil and political institutions are violated by marijuana possession laws. We dare say that liberty and justice can exist in spite of the prohibition against marijuana possession. Therefore, the purported right to possess and use marijuana is not a fundamental right and a compelling state interest is not required. Because the right to privacy is not implicated, HRS § 712-1249 need only survive the rational basis test. Generally, where no fundamental rights or suspect classifications are involved, there is a due process violation only if there is no rational basis to sustain the challenged statute.... Under the rational basis test, we inquire as to whether a statute rationally furthers a legitimate state interest. Our inquiry seeks only to determine whether any reasonable justification can be found for the legislative enactment. Estate of Coates v. Pacific Engineering, 71 Haw. 358, 363-64, 791 P.2d 1257, 1260 (1990) (citations omitted). Furthermore, we have long held that: (1) legislative enactments are presumptively constitutional; (2) a party challenging a statutory scheme has the burden of showing unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) the constitutional defect must be clear, manifest, and unmistakable. State Organization of Police Officers (SHOPO) v. Society of Professional JournalistsUniversity of Hawai`i Chapter, 83 Hawai`i 378, 389, 927 P.2d 386, 397 (1996) (citing Pray v. Judicial Selection Comm'n, 75 Haw. 333, 340, 861 P.2d 723, 727 (1993)). See also Kam, 69 Haw. at 496, 748 P.2d at 380; Mueller, 66 Haw. at 626-27, 671 P.2d at 1358. Thus, in the present case, Mallan has the heavy burden of demonstrating that HRS § 712-1249 lacks any rational basis. If Mallan fails to satisfy his burden, the statute is presumed to be constitutional and must be upheld. We believe that Mallan has failed to satisfy his burden. The stipulated evidence provided by Mallan's expert witnesses certainly support his argument that marijuana is not harmful. However, those experts would also have testified that the question whether marijuana has harmful effects is still controversial and that there are studies supporting the other side of the debate. It is well settled that when a substance has been proscribed as harmful, the presumption of constitutionality applies although there are conflicting scientific views as to its harmful effects. State v. Baker, 56 Haw. 271, 276, 535 P.2d 1394, 1397 (1975). Thus, insofar as a genuine controversy exists and scientists have not reached a consensus as to the harmful effects of marijuana, we cannot say that Mallan has sufficiently rebutted the presumption of constitutionality attached to HRS § 712-1249 and that the statute lacks any rational basis. See id. at 278, 535 P.2d at 1398; State v. Renfro, 56 Haw. 501, 503, 542 P.2d 366, 368 (1975) (holding that a marijuana possession statute's presumption of constitutionality had not been sufficiently rebutted). [6] It is not our role to make an independent legislative determination as to the harmfulness of marijuana. Our role is to determine whether Mallan has overcome the presumption of constitutionality and has proven that the statute is not supported by any rational basis at all. This we cannot say. It is also clear that the Stanley/Kam approach does not support Mallan's purported right to possess and use marijuana. The record indicates that Mallan was not in the privacy of his own home when he was arrested for possession of marijuana. Rather, he was sitting in an automobile parked in a public parking lot. Additionally, this case involves the possession of marijuana, not the possession of pornographic material. Therefore, neither of the two elements required under the Stanley/Kam approach have been met, and the right to privacy does not apply on this basis. However, we note that because Mallan relies on Kam in arguing this case, he is apparently suggesting that we extend the Stanley/Kam approach beyond the home and beyond pornography. We decline to do so. Stanley itself limited its application to cases implicating First Amendment concerns. The Court noted: What we have said in no way infringes upon the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of other items, such as narcotics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime. Our holding in the present case turns upon the Georgia statute's infringement of fundamental liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. No First Amendment rights are involved in most statutes making mere possession criminal. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 568 n. 11, 89 S.Ct. at 1249 n. 11. Thus, by its own terms, Stanley rejected any application to drug possession cases. Furthermore, by attempting to sever Stanley and Kam from the concept of privacy within the home, Mallan appears to suggest that the right to privacy should protect a defendant any time he subjectively feels that he is in privacy. In the present case, Mallan thought that he was in privacy when he was sitting in an automobile in a public parking lot. We are not prepared to extend the right to privacy this far. To do so would give talismanic effect to the phrase in privacyan approach we have rejected in the past. See Baehr, 74 Haw. at 555, 852 P.2d at 57; Mueller, 66 Haw. at 630, 671 P.2d at 1360.