Opinion ID: 71999
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invocation of Prosecutorial Expertise

Text: 85 Cargill next argues that the prosecutor improperly invoked his prosecutorial expertise in asking the jury to believe that this case was appropriate for the death penalty. 86
87 The first improper instance here was, as Cargill describes it, that [t]he prosecutor told the jury that based, inter alia, on 'experience ... we feel [death] to be the appropriate punishment.'  Cargill pulls the prosecutor's assertion out of its setting. The actual context of this statement was as follows: 88 You will have to elect or select between the death penalty and the life sentence. We are obviously encouraging the death penalty. That is no revelation. We are going to make some remarks to you and show you, based on experience, based on the circumstances of this crime, based on the circumstances of this defendant why we feel this to be the appropriate punishment. 89 Viewed in their totality, these remarks were not improper. We agree with the appellee that the prosecutor was merely prefacing the underlying bas[e]s on which a death sentence should be imposed and clearly let the jury [know] that it was a decision for the jury to make. Consequently, these remarks cannot contribute to Cargill's constitutional claim. See Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1403 (comments that are not improper can never be unconstitutional). 90
91 Cargill's argument as to two other comments, however, has more force. Cargill accurately asserts that the prosecutor had no record support for his statement that [s]o seldom do we see crimes so cold-blooded and not one but two bullets fired into the heads. This remark, invoking the expertise of the prosecutor to suggest the special seriousness of the crime, was improper. Tucker, 762 F.2d at 1505; see also Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1413 (The argument improperly suggested that the prosecutor had canvassed all murder cases and selected this one as particularly deserving of the death penalty....). We note, however, that although Cargill's counsel objected (not contemporaneously, but after the jury had retired to deliberate) to several alleged instances of the prosecutor's comment[ing] upon ... evidence he did not introduce, this was not one of them. This, as well as other factors discussed below, indicates to us that the remark--considered in the context of the prosecutor's entire closing argument--did not have much, if any, prejudicial effect. 92 Cargill also argues that the prosecutor improperly invoked his expertise when making the following commentary: 93 [A]nd then we came to the preacher. This is not the first time I've stood in front of a jury for a heinous crime, and there's always a judge; there's always a court reporter; there's always a defendant; there's always defense attorneys; there's always prosecutors; and there's always a preacher. I don't know why we always have to have a preacher, and everybody who gets in jail and gets into trouble has got to find the Lord. And I am not disparaging a true and fundamental belief in God or Jesus Christ, or whatever god you believe in. I will express some reservations. I will disparage acute onset religion, where people try to use Almighty God just like a monkey wrench, when you're in trouble, you've got to have it, you go get it; and when the pipe's fixed or when the trouble's over, you put it right back and forget until the next time you need it. 94 Defense counsel objected to these comments, though in a non-contemporaneous fashion. Assuming arguendo that this commentary was improper, but see Bowen v. Kemp, 769 F.2d 672, 680 (11th Cir.1985), reinstated in relevant part, 832 F.2d 546, 547 n. 2 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc ), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 970, 108 S.Ct. 1247, 99 L.Ed.2d 445 (1988), its prejudicial effect is far from clear. Although the prosecutor should not have referenced his experience and other cases not in evidence, we agree with the appellee that the thrust of his statements was to focus the jury's attention on whether [Cargill's] invocation of religion was genuine. This, of course, was a legitimate subject for the prosecutor to address. 95 On the whole, we are convinced, after reviewing the totality of the prosecutor's closing argument, defense counsel's closing and the court's instructions to the jury, that the jury labored under no misperception as to its role; the jury clearly understood that it alone bore the responsibility for deciding whether [Cargill] should live or die. Brooks, 762 F.2d at 1414. 96