Opinion ID: 2339307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Third Set of Remarks

Text: Bennington's final argument involves the following remarks made during the rebuttal portion of the prosecutor's closing argument: The victim's not here to show, to tell you her side of the story, and so we have to rely on hearsay; and Use your common sense, please, and remember what the DNA is doing for us here. It's speaking for [ V.B. ]. It's telling us who committed these crimes. Bennington argues these comments improperly appealed to the jury's sympathy for the deceased victim. `Prosecutors are not allowed to make statements that inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury or distract the jury from its duty to make decisions based on the evidence and the controlling law.' [Citations omitted.] State v. Magallanez, 290 Kan. 906, 915, 235 P.3d 460 (2010); see State v. Henry, 273 Kan. 608, 621, 44 P.3d 466 (2002) (prosecutor's comment urging jury to think about Mother's Day, how victim's mother felt inflamed passion, prejudice of jury); but see State v. Cravatt, 267 Kan. 314, 336, 979 P.2d 679 (1999) (prosecutor's comment that jury should not let defendant get away with killing 21-year-old victim not improper; State asking jury to seriously consider the nature of the defendant's act toward the victim). Here, the Court of Appeals found the prosecutor's remarks were not an attempt to create sympathy but were an attempt to support the State's case, despite its inability to present testimony from the victim. Bennington, 2009 WL 981683, at . We reach the same conclusion. Further, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded the prosecutor's remarks were acceptable rebuttal to defense counsel's attack on the State's evidence. Bennington, 2009 WL 981683, at ; cf. State v. McKinney, 272 Kan. 331, 347, 33 P.3d 234 (2001), overruled on other grounds by State v. Davis, 283 Kan. 569, 158 P.3d 317 (2007) (in determining if remarks are within latitude allowed in closing argument, appellate court may consider whether questionable remarks made by a prosecuting attorney are provoked and made in response to previous arguments or statements of defense counsel). In defense counsel's closing argument, he directly attacked the State's case on the basis of the second-hand information upon which it relied. For example, defense counsel made the following remark: Ladies and gentlemen, I would just simply submit to you that this case is not as easy as what the State wants you to make it out to be. The fact that [V.B.] is no longer with us certainly makes the case a lot more difficult. You don't get to hear from her. You don't get to see her demeanor as she testifies. You don't get to see how she holds up under cross-examination. You're expected just to take the word of other people that have talked to her and then find this man guilty. In response, the prosecutor reminded the jury the DNA spoke, even though the victim could not, and linked Bennington to the scene. It was appropriate for the prosecutor to urge the jury to consider the physical evidence, even if the jury were to ignore the hearsay evidence. Further, as the State argues in its appellate brief, the prosecutor's DNA remark could also have referred to the fact the DNA evidence could identify the perpetrator even though V.B. was not available to do so. In summary, the three remarks during closing argument were not improper and were within the wide latitude allowed during argument. Hence, we need not address the second step of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded there was no prosecutorial misconduct during Bennington's trial. Bennington, 2009 WL 981683, at .