Opinion ID: 2050786
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substituted Service of Process

Text: Pickett argues that the service of process employed in this case pursuant to court order under Maryland Rule 3-121(c) violated the due process rights afforded him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Pickett sets forth several arguments, which we consider in turn, to support his claim that the substituted service ordered by the District Court and executed by a private process server failed to confer in personam jurisdiction on the court. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits States from depriving any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. Similarly, Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights states as follows: That no man ought to be taken or imprisoned or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or, in any manner, destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers, or by the Law of the land. Md.Ann.Code, Const. (1958, 1981 Repl. Vol.). [6] This Court has interpreted Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution to be in pari materia, such that the interpretations of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provided by the United States Supreme Court serve as persuasive authority for Article 24. See Pitsenberger v. Pitsenberger, 287 Md. 20, 27, 410 A.2d 1052, 1056 (1980)(citing Barry Properties v. Fick Bros., 277 Md. 15, 22, 353 A.2d 222, 227 (1976); Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, 272 Md. 143, 156, 321 A.2d 748, 755 (1974)). In order to properly challenge state action as a violation of procedural due process, the party challenging the action must show that the state acted to deprive the complainant of a property interest encompassed by the language of the due process clause. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 84, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1996, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, 572, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 177, 34 L.Ed.2d 165 (1972). Where the Court finds that the State action deprived an individual of a protected property interest, the Court must balance the interests of all parties to the matter in order to determine the level of procedural due process which is constitutionally required under the circumstances. See Golden Sands Club Condominium, Inc. v. Waller, 313 Md. 484, 496, 545 A.2d 1332, 1338 (1988); see also Tulsa Prof'l Collection Services, Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 484, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1344, 99 L.Ed.2d 565, 574-75 (1988). Central to Pickett's argument is his assertion that the substituted service of process ordered by the District Court pursuant to Rule 3-121(c) in this case, failed to meet the level of procedural due process required for conveying in personam jurisdiction. Pickett claims that the posting of the summons, complaint, and all relevant papers concerning the Sears action at his residence, while sanctioned in Maryland law for in rem proceedings, is constitutionally inadequate to convey jurisdiction on the District Court for in personam actions. He asserts that in actions where the execution of service involves posting, due process requires that the notice should be left in a conspicuous place which discourages tampering, and which will protect the papers from the elements. When interpreting the Maryland Rules, we apply the same principles used in statutory construction. See Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 264, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000); Lerman v. Heeman, 347 Md. 439, 443, 701 A.2d 426, 428 (1997). The principal aim of interpreting the Maryland Rules is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the drafters. See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Chase, 360 Md. 121, 128, 756 A.2d 987, 991 (2000). We should first attempt to ascertain [the Rules Committee's] intent from the statutory language, reading pertinent parts of the [rule's] language together, giving effect to all of those parts if we can, and rendering no part of the [rule] surplusage. Sinai Hosp. of Baltimore v. Dept. of Employment and Training, 309 Md. 28, 39-40, 522 A.2d 382, 388 (1987). The words of the rule must also be construed so as not to yield a result which is unreasonable, absurd, or illogical. See Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 418, 722 A.2d 887, 895-96 (1999). Where the words of the rule are plain and unambiguous, our inquiry ends and we need not look beyond the text of the rule. See Marsheck v. Bd. of Trustees of the Fire & Police Employees' Ret. Sys. of the City of Baltimore, 358 Md. 393, 402-03, 749 A.2d 774, 779 (2000); Long v. State, 343 Md. 662, 667, 684 A.2d 445, 447 (1996)(quoting In re Victor B., 336 Md. 85, 94, 646 A.2d 1012, 1016 (1994)). Even where the language of the rule is plain and unambiguous, however, we may consider relevant case law and appropriate secondary authority in order to place the rule in question in the proper context. See Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 265, 757 A.2d 796, 804 (2000). The basic service of process rule, contained in 3-121(a) authorizes service of process by delivering to the person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it, or by mailing to the person to be served a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it by certified mail requesting: Restricted Deliveryshow to whom, date, address of delivery. Rule 3-121(a)(internal quotations omitted). In situations where an individual evades service of process, Rule 3-121(b) provides that: When proof is made by affidavit that a defendant has acted to evade service, the court may order that service be made by mailing a copy of the summons, complaint, and all other papers filed with it to the defendant at the defendant's last known residence and delivering a copy of each to a person of suitable age and discretion at the place of business, dwelling house, or usual place of abode of the defendant. Maryland's substitute service provision, effective July 1, 1984, and inserted into the rule as subsection (c) states that: When proof is made by affidavit that good faith efforts to serve the defendant pursuant to section (a) of this Rule have not succeeded and that service pursuant to section (b) of this Rule is inapplicable or impracticable, the court may order any other means of service that it deems appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably calculated to give actual notice. Rule 3-121(c). [7] The rule also contains a disclaimer provision which states that [t]he methods of service provided in this Rule are in addition to and not exclusive of any other means of service that may be provided by statute or rule for obtaining jurisdiction over a defendant. Rule 3-121(d). [8] The language of 3-121(c) contains no provision which prevents a court from designing an order for substituted service to convey in personam jurisdiction by using posting as a means of providing notice. Once a litigant has filed an affidavit showing good faith efforts to serve the defendant pursuant to 3-121(a) and that service under 3-121(b) would be inapplicable or impracticable, the court is free to customize a method of service based on the facts and circumstances restricted only by the need to be reasonably calculated to give actual notice to the defendant. This Court has long held that procedural due process requires that litigants must receive notice, and an opportunity to be heard. See Ulman v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 72 Md. 587, 591-92, 20 A. 141, 141-42 (1890)(explaining that notice ... is required to constitute due process of law in cases involving a deprivation of a property interest). For the fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard. Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394, 34 S.Ct. 779, 783, 58 L.Ed. 1363, 1369 (1914). Rule 3-121(c) contains the language reasonably calculated to give actual notice, mirroring the language of Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950), in embodying the spirit and purpose of procedural due process. In Mullane, the Supreme Court made the following pronouncement regarding service of process: An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such a nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. But if with due regard for the practicalities and peculiarities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied. Id. at 314-15, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873. (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court further refined its service of process doctrine in Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 102 S.Ct. 1874, 72 L.Ed.2d 249 (1982). The Greene case involved service of process pursuant to a Kentucky statute by posting notice in forcible entry and detainer actions. Id. at 446, 102 S.Ct. at 1876, 72 L.Ed.2d at 252. Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, described the utility of service of process by posting as follows: It is, of course, reasonable to assume that a property owner will maintain superintendence of his property, and to presume that actions physically disturbing his holdings will come to his attention. The frequent restatement of this rule impresses upon the property owner the fact that a failure to maintain watch over his property may have significant legal consequences for him, providing a spur to his attentiveness, and a consequent reinforcement to the empirical foundation of the principle. Upon this understanding, a State may in turn conclude that in most cases, the secure posting of a notice on the property of a person is likely to offer that property owner sufficient warning of the pendency of proceedings possibly affecting his interests. Id. at 451-52, 102 S.Ct. at 1879, 72 L.Ed.2d at 256-57 (internal citations omitted). The process servers in Greene, however, were aware of the fact that there were repeated problems with children removing writs from the doors of the apartment complex where the appellee's resided. See id. at 453, n. 7, 102 S.Ct. at 1880, n. 7, 72 L.Ed.2d at 257, n. 7. Under these circumstances, the Supreme Court held that service of process by posting does not satisfy minimum standards of due process. See id. at 453, 102 S.Ct. at 1879, 72 L.Ed.2d at 257. In dicta, the Court did comment that [n]otice by mail in the circumstances of this case would surely go a long way toward providing the constitutionally required assurance that the State has not allowed its power to be invoked against a person who has had no opportunity to present a defense despite a continuing interest in the resolution of the controversy. See id. at 455, 102 S.Ct. at 1880, 72 L.Ed.2d at 258. See also Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 462 U.S. 791, 800, 103 S.Ct. 2706, 2712, 77 L.Ed.2d 180, 188 (1983)(Notice by mail or other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interests of any party, whether unlettered or well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable.). We recognize the need for flexibility in the application of due process, for the process that is due may change according to the circumstances. Miserandino v. Resort Properties, Inc., 345 Md. 43, 65, 691 A.2d 208, 218 (1997). While personal service is the preferred method, Rule 3-121(c) allows the District Courts to customize a method of service for situations where good faith attempts at personal service have been made unsuccessfully and prove futile. In Miserandino, we held that original service of process by first-class mail did not satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process under Maryland law. Id. at 56, 691 A.2d at 214. Miserandino, however, involved the original effort at service of process pursuant to the Commonwealth of Virginia's long arm statute as applied to defendants residing in Maryland. See id. at 52, 691 A.2d at 212. In the matter now before us, the District Court heeded the caution of the Greene case and ordered a two-fold service of process involving posting notice at Pickett's residence and mailing a copy of the same to him through first-class mail, colloquially known as nail and mail, to inform Pickett of the proceedings instituted against him by Sears. Pickett has presented no such evidence in this case which would inform the Court that posting at his residence would not be reasonably calculated to give him actual notice. The record shows that Sears made good faith attempts to personally serve Pickett pursuant to the requirements of Rule 3-121(a) and offered proof of its efforts and of the impractical nature of attempting service under Rule 3-121(b) given the circumstances of this case. Furthermore, the District Court order did not sanction service by first-class mail alone; it also required posting at Pickett's residence. While the plain language of Rule 3-121(a) and our holding in Miserandino mandate that use of the nail and mail procedure for service of process would be insufficient as the primary attempted method of service, where the facts and circumstances warrant substituted service pursuant to Rule 3-121(c), service by nail and mail may be ordered by the District Court. The record in this case fails to support Pickett's arguments concerning the constitutional adequacy of the substituted service of process he received in this case. A proper return of service serves as prima facie evidence of valid service of process. See Sheehy v. Sheehy, 250 Md. 181, 185, 242 A.2d 153, 155 (1968). The process server's return was filed at the July 14, 1997 hearing on Pickett's Motion to Quash Service of Process in accordance with Rule 3-126. [9] The return stated that a copy of the summons and complaint had been posted at Pickett's residence at 170 Baughmans Lane, Frederick, Maryland on April 3, 1997, and by mailing a copy of the summons and complaint by first class mail, effective March 31, 1997. At no time during the course of this protracted litigation had Pickett denied that 170 Baughmans Lane was his address. Pickett would have to make more than a mere denial of service of process or a broad assertion that it was invalid in order to rebut the presumptively valid return of process. See Ashe v. Spears, 263 Md. 622, 627-28, 284 A.2d 207, 210 (1971) (internal citations omitted). In weighing the alternative methods of service of process, a court ordering substituted service under Rule 3-121(c) must be careful that the method prescribed in the court order is not substantially less likely to bring home notice than other of the feasible and customary substitutes. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. at 658, 94 L.Ed. at 874. In the instant case, the District Court was presented with an affidavit documenting the good faith efforts of a private process server to effect personal service on Pickett on at least five separate occasions. Service had also been attempted by certified mail with restricted delivery on two occasions, which was returned unclaimed. Thus, the usual and customary methods of service would not suffice. Confronted with these facts, the District Court struck a constitutionally sufficient balance between the interests of Sears in obtaining a judgment against Pickett for the debt owed to it on Pickett's consumer credit account and Pickett's right to receive notice and be heard on the issue by ordering service of process by mailing notice and posting at Pickett's residence. See Golden Sands Club, 313 Md. at 496, 545 A.2d at 1338. We find, therefore, that the District Court's order for substituted service of process by first-class mail and posting at Pickett's residence was reasonably calculated under the circumstances to apprise Pickett of the action brought against him by Sears. See Miserandino, 345 Md. at 53, 691 A.2d at 212; Golden Sands Club, 313 Md. at 495-96, 545 A.2d at 1338 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873). Pickett further argues that even if substituted service by nail and mail would be constitutionally sufficient under the circumstances of this case, any substituted service involving posting must be executed by a sheriff or other officer of the court, rather than by a privately employed process server. His argument is based on the historically required use of sheriffs to execute posting for in rem proceedings. See Rule 2-122(a); Arnold v. Carafides, 282 Md. 375, 378-79, 384 A.2d 729, 731 (1978). The plain language of the Maryland Rules regarding substituted service of process and who may serve process, however, impose no such requirement for actions which historically would have been characterized as in personam proceedings. See Rule 3-121, 3-123. [10] This Court has held steadfast to the principle that when interpreting rules of procedure or statutes, we are confined to the language as written, such that we cannot and will not supply omissions or remedy possible defects of the statute by inserting exceptions or amendments which were not contemplated by the this Court. See Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 350, 772 A.2d 1225, 1238 (2001); Morris v. Gregory, 339 Md. 191, 199, 661 A.2d 712, 716 (1995); Wheeler v. State, 281 Md. 593, 596, 380 A.2d 1052, 1054 (1977). We explained this principle in Chesapeake Amusements, Inc. v. Riddle, 363 Md. 16, 766 A.2d 1036 (2001), as follows: Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in that language, nor may it construe the statute with forced or subtle interpretations that limit or extend its application. Id. at 28-29, 766 A.2d at 1042 (internal citations and quotations omitted). In his commentary on Rule 2-123, the circuit court equivalent of Rule 3-123, Judge Niemeyer observed: Section (a) states the general rule that process can be served by either a sheriff or a competent private person who is eighteen years of age or older, including an attorney of record, but not by a party to the action. This rule effects no substantive change in Maryland practice, but merely combines several former rules. Although the new rule eliminates the wording in Former Rule 116a that the person shall have the same power and duty to execute such process as the sheriff, that power would seem to be implied. Section (b) limits section (a) by restricting service by a private person to cases in which process is simply to be delivered, mailed, or published. Consequently, writs of execution, replevin, or attachment of property or person must still be served by the sheriff. Unlike the former rule, the new rule explicitly authorizes the court to order service by a private person when service by the sheriff would otherwise be required. Paul V. Niemeyer, Commentary on the New Maryland Rules of Civil Procedure, 43 Md.L.Rev. 669, 719 (1984). The District Court was not restricted to ordering the service of process to be executed by a sheriff, because the Sears action did not involve a writ of execution, replevin, or attachment of property or person. The District Court's order in this case did not specify by whom the service should be executed. Under the facts of this case, Sears's selection of a private process server to execute the posting and mailing of the notice falls within the parameters of the general service provision of Rule 3-121(a), which covers in personam actions. Thus, we find no error in the District Court's decision to give Sears the discretion to employ a private process server in its order directing substituted service of process. Finally, Pickett respectfully suggests that based upon the affidavit attached to [Sears's] motion for substituted service, [Sears] should have been required to effectuate service of process under Rule 3-121(b), inasmuch as [Sears] clearly had alleged facts which indicated that [Pickett] was attempting to evade service. (Pet. Brief at 25). The various sub-parts of Rule 3-121, however, do not require that an individual actually attempt service by the modified service requirements set forth in subsection (b) prior to setting forth facts in an affidavit to the court that service pursuant to that subsection would be inapplicable or impracticable. Pickett has admitted to evading service of process in this action, as he asserted that the process server's affidavit of good faith clearly establishes that Appellant was evading service. He suggests that the Maryland Rules be interpreted to include requirements which the Court did not see fit to include in the language as enacted simply to provide additional obstacles for his creditors seeking judicial relief. As the Supreme Court explained in Mullane, [a] construction of the Due Process Clause which would place impossible or impractical obstacles in the way could not be justified. 339 U.S. at 313-14, 70 S.Ct. at 657, 94 L.Ed. at 873 (1950). We conclude, therefore, that the substitute service of process ordered by the District Court in this case was reasonably calculated to give actual notice to Pickett of the action brought against him by Sears.