Opinion ID: 2767065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Free Association Claims

Text: In order to state a claim for retaliation based on the First Amendment right to freedom of association, a plaintiff must show: “(1) he suffered an adverse employment action, (2) his interest in ‘associating’ outweighed the [employer’s] interest in efficiency, and (3) his protected activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action.” Hitt v. Connell, 301 F.3d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 2002). The First Amendment protects two broad categories of association. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617 (1984). The first protects “choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships.” Id. Those intimate human relationships include marriage, the begetting and bearing of children, child rearing and education, and cohabitation with relatives. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Durate, 481 U.S. 537, 545 (1987). The second category is association for the purposes of engaging in other activities protected by the First Amendment, such as speech or the free exercise of religion. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618. If Cockerham’s, Banks’s, and Lenton’s claimed association is to be protected under the First Amendment, it must fall under the first category. The types of association properly characterized as “intimate human relationships” are limited to “relationships that presuppose deep attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal aspects of one’s life.” Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1051–52 (5th Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). These relationships “are distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship.” United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 620. The First Amendment “does not include a generalized 16 Case: 13-20582 Document: 00512890884 Page: 17 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 No. 13-20582 right of social association.” Wallace, 80 F.3d at 1051 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, we have previously held that association in certain private clubs was protected under the freedom of association, but that a college basketball coach’s relationship with his players was not. See id. at 1052. It therefore follows that “[r]elationships with colleagues ordinarily are not afforded protection as intimate associations.” Hernandez v. Duncanville Sch. Dist., No. 3:04 CV 2028 BH(B), 2005 WL 3293995, at  (N.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 2005) (citing Swanson v. City of Bruce, Miss., 105 F. App’x 540, 542 (5th Cir. 2004) (unpublished)); see also Martsolf v. Christie, 552 F. App’x 149, 152 (3d Cir. 2013) (unpublished); Colbert v. City of McKinney, No. 4:12cv612, 2013 WL 3368237, at  (E.D. Tex. July 3, 2013). Here, Cockerham, Banks, and Lenton have not alleged sufficient facts to state a freedom of association claim. They have alleged that they “exercised protected association with Caleb, in that they constituted members of what Majlat [had] characterized . . . as Caleb’s ‘clique.’” However, without more, this “association” appears to be nothing more than a group of close work colleagues. While the complaint does allege that “Cockerham and Lenton were members of a small group of individuals chosen by Caleb to . . . move with her [to Kashmere]” and that Caleb was “highly selective of those with whom she chose to . . . go with her to Kashmere,” such selectivity is no different from any manager’s prudent hiring decisions. These allegations are consistent with a relationship amongst colleagues and fail to suggest an intimate relationship protected by the First Amendment. Caleb’s claims against Kroger, Majlat, and Frizell also fail. Caleb’s freedom of association claim derives from the second category of protected association—association for political purposes. She alleges that her right to political association was violated as the Appellees retaliated against her for associating with a state representative, Representative Dutton, at the town 17 Case: 13-20582 Document: 00512890884 Page: 18 Date Filed: 01/06/2015 No. 13-20582 hall meeting on November 12, 2009 and with HISD Board Member Carol Mims Galloway. Aside from conclusory allegations, the only facts asserted in the complaint that could plausibly be understood to relate to Caleb’s relationships with these individuals are that Majlat stated that Caleb had “friends in high places” and that, if anyone reported her to the HISD board, Caleb would find out about it immediately. Yet even assuming those statements referred to Dutton and Galloway, merely noting that Caleb had those relationships does not plausibly suggest that Majlat, much less Frizell and Kroger, took any action against Caleb based on that association. As such, Caleb has failed to state a claim against Kroger, Frizell, and Majlat based on her First Amendment rights to freedom of association.