Opinion ID: 1767984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Justiciability and Ripeness Analysis

Text: The plaintiff labor organizations can sue on behalf of their constituent members if those members could have sued individually. Whether individual members of the unions would have standing to bring this suit in their own right depends upon whether they are able to satisfy the requirements for bringing a declaratory judgment action. Missouri Health Care Association v. Attorney General of the State of Missouri, 953 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Mo. banc 1997). A declaratory judgment action requires a justiciable controversy. Akin v. Director of Revenue, 934 S.W.2d 295, 298 (Mo. banc 1996). A case presents a justiciable controversy if: (1) the plaintiff has a legally protectable interest at stake; (2) a substantial controversy exists with genuinely adverse interests; and (3) the controversy is ripe for judicial determination. See State ex rel. Chilcutt v. Thatch, 359 Mo. 122, 221 S.W.2d 172, 176 (1949).
Proof that the plaintiff has a legally protectable interest at stake requires a showing of a pecuniary or personal interest directly at issue and subject to immediate or prospective consequential relief. Lane v. Lensmeyer, 158 S.W.3d 218, 222 (Mo. banc 2005) (internal quotation omitted). There is no litmus test for determining whether a legally protectable interest exists; it is determined on a case-by-case basis. Mager v. City of St. Louis, 699 S.W.2d 68, 70 (Mo.App.1985). Here, the plaintiffs allege that they are affected by being required to operate under an act they contend is illegal and unconstitutional and hence is invalid, and under the declaratory judgment act, any person ... whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute ... may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the ... statute... and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder. Section 527.020. In Missouri Health, this Court applied this standard to an organization representing a majority of long-term care facilities bringing a declaratory judgment to have a bill declared invalid under Missouri's constitution. 953 S.W.2d at 620. The organization alleged it had standing because the amendment, which had yet to be enforced, injured its members in that it restrained them from making representations in the course of their business for fear of triggering the disclosure requirements of the statute. Id. This Court held that [t]he interest in doing business free from the constraints of an unconstitutional law is entitled to legal protection. Id. The holding in Missouri Health is consistent with the nature of declaratory relief in that although accomplished injury is not alleged, where a dispute as to legal rights is otherwise shown, a violation of those rights is not a precondition to the availability of declaratory adjudication. Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859, 863 (Mo.App.1971). In fact, Higday noted that a plaintiff has standing to obtain declaratory relief, and to assert a legally protected interest, unless it appears that it may be said with certainty that no possible basis exists for [their] contention that they are entitled to a declaration of rights and duties under the facts alleged.... Id. at 864. Applying these principles, here, the labor organizations' quid pro quo and constitutional arguments about the act as a whole, as well as their argument seeking a determination as to how the act applies to those excluded from receiving benefits under the new amendments, present justiciable controversies as to whether the act, as amended, deprives those now excluded from it from all right to recovery under either the act or the common law, and as to whether it provides an adequate substitute for the common law rights of action that workers have given up. Their arguments about the unfairness of individual provisions and the unfairness of excluding additional workers from coming within the act under the narrowed definition of accidental injury also present justiciable controversies. To the extent that the labor organizations ask this Court to hold that specific provisions of the act as amended are unconstitutional because they are so narrow and restrictive that they provide no adequate remedy for an injured worker, they have developed no facts to support these claims, for no individual workers' compensation claims are before this Court. Rather, the attack is a general one, on the effect of the changes as a whole on the act as a whole in a hypothetical sense, without application to any particular injured worker; therefore, there is no justiciable claim as to these provisions at this time.
The second requirement for standing, that a substantial controversy exists with genuinely adverse interests, clearly is met. A genuine disagreement exists between the parties about the extent of coverage provided under the revised workers' compensation law and whether the revised law violates the workers' substantive due process guarantees by not providing them an adequate substitute remedy for work-related injuries without regard to fault, either individually or as a whole. This disagreement meets the demands of the second requirement as to those claims. See Levinson v. State, 104 S.W.3d 409, 412 (Mo. banc 2003); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas City, Inc. v. Nixon, 26 S.W.3d 218, 225 (Mo.App. 2000).
Whether any aspects of the current controversy are ripe for review at the present time presents a more difficult issue. A ripe controversy exists if the parties' dispute is developed sufficiently to allow the court to make an accurate determination of the facts, to resolve a conflict that is presently existing, and to grant specific relief of a conclusive character. Missouri Health, 953 S.W.2d at 621. In the context of a constitutional challenge to a statute, a ripe controversy generally exists when the state attempts to enforce the statute. In some situations, however, a ripe controversy also may exist before the statute is enforced. Id. The particular circumstance where this Court has allowed a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to laws occurred when the facts necessary to adjudicate the underlying claims were fully developed and the laws at issue were affecting the plaintiff in a manner that gave rise to an immediate, concrete dispute. Id., citing Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31, 34 (Mo. banc 1982). See also Borden Co. v. Thomason, 353 S.W.2d 735, 741 (Mo. banc 1962); and Tietjens v. City of St. Louis, 359 Mo. 439, 222 S.W.2d 70, 72 (1949). Again, as noted in regard to justiciability, in the absence of individual facts it is impossible to adjudicate the underlying claims that these provisions will be applied unfairly in such as manner as to be unconstitutional. Indeed, nothing in this record shows how they are being interpreted or applied or whether they have been given the draconian meaning ascribed to many of the provisions by the labor organizations. Under this Court's cases, it simply is premature to address the constitutional validity of these provisions individually, in the absence of such facts, for whether any decision in any particular case is a fair one will necessarily depend on the particular circumstance and showing made. Those issues simply are not ripe for review at the present time. Similarly, absent judicial interpretation of the individual provisions being attacked, this Court cannot compare the effect of those provisions as a whole to the act as a whole as initially enacted as an alleged fixed quid pro quo for giving up covered workers' common law claims or the claim that, considered as a whole, it violates the open courts or due process provisions of the constitution. These claims, therefore, are not ripe for review until the meaning of the provisions in question is determined in individual cases. [3]