Opinion ID: 48719
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hindering Apprehension

Text: 24 Texas Penal Code Annotated section 38.05(a), Hindering Apprehension, provides: 25 A person commits an offense if, with intent to hinder the arrest, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of another for an offense or, with intent to hinder the arrest, detention, adjudication, or disposition of a child for engaging in delinquent conduct that violates a penal law of the state, or with intent to hinder the arrest of another under the authority of a warrant or capias, he: (1) harbors or conceals the other; 26 (2) provides or aids in providing the other with any means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape; or 27 (3) warns the other of impending discovery or apprehension. 28 The deputies argue that probable cause existed to arrest Freeman for Hindering Apprehension because a reasonable person could have concluded that Freeman's actions were intended to alert Kevin to impending discovery and that she refused to consent to a search of her home in order to conceal her son's whereabouts. 29 We conclude that the deputies did not have probable cause to arrest Freeman for Hindering Apprehension. The deputies' first argument—that Freeman could have been trying to alert Kevin to the presence of the police—simply rings hollow. Before Freeman emerged from her house, the officers had already knocked on Kevin's mobile home door, called Kevin's telephone, and talked to Sheila, who was inside Freeman's house, on Kevin's cordless phone about his whereabouts. If Kevin had been inside Freeman's house at the time, he surely would have been aware that the police were present. Under these circumstances, it is implausible to suggest that a reasonable officer would think that Freeman exited the house and yelled at the deputies in order to inform someone back inside the house that the police were present. 30 Moreover, Freeman's refusal to consent to a warrantless search of her home cannot itself provide probable cause to arrest her for hindering apprehension. See Fletcher v. Town of Clinton, 196 F.3d 41, 54 (1st Cir.1999) (noting that refusal to consent to warrantless search cannot justify arrest for hindering apprehension); see also 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 3.5(d), at 235 (2d ed. 2003) ([T]he failure to permit another to intrude upon your constitutional right against unreasonable searches may not be made criminal.). Accordingly, the deputies did not have probable cause to arrest Freeman for Hindering Apprehension on the summary judgment facts found by the district court.