Opinion ID: 1345613
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: claim of denial of speedy trial

Text: Claims alleging denial of a right to a speedy trial under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution are decided on a case-by-case basis. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); State v. Grissom, 106 N.M. 555, 746 P.2d 661 (Ct. App. 1987); State v. Kilpatrick, 104 N.M. 441, 722 P.2d 692 (Ct.App. 1986). Proof of the passage of time, without more, is not determinative of allegations of denial of a speedy trial. Barker v. Wingo . In Barker, the Supreme Court enumerated four factors for courts to consider in reviewing speedy trial claims, the first of that is the length of delay. A delay which is sufficient to give rise to a presumption of prejudicial delay must exist before the other Barker factors  reason for the delay, assertion of the right to a speedy trial, and prejudice to defendant  are evaluated to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial. State v. Grissom ; State v. Kilpatrick . In this balancing test, the conduct of both the prosecution and the defense are weighed. See id. The weight to be assigned to these factors depends upon the particular facts and circumstances of the case. See Barker v. Wingo . A finding in favor of one party on any one of these factors is not necessarily dispositive of the speedy trial claim; rather, these factors are interrelated and must be considered in toto, together with other relevant circumstances of the case. See id. See also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 94 S.Ct. 188, 38 L.Ed.2d 183 (1973). Since a fundamental right is involved, courts must engage in a sensitive and difficult balancing process. Id. On appeal, we independently balance the factors the trial court considered in deciding whether a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been violated. State v. Grissom . Defendant has the burden of proving that his constitutional right to a speedy trial has been denied. State v. Tartaglia, 108 N.M. 411, 773 P.2d 356 (1989). In this case, the state and defendant agree that the length of delay gives rise to a presumptively prejudicial delay that is sufficient to trigger an inquiry into the other Barker factors. See State v. Kilpatrick . They also agree that the reasons for the delay and assertion of the right factors should be weighed in the defendant's favor. They disagree on the evaluation of and weight to be given to the remaining Barker factor  prejudice to defendant. We have independently reviewed the evidence on the first three factors, and agree with the parties that they should be weighed in defendant's favor. We note, however, that the reason for delay is not weighed heavily against the state since the delay was negligent, not deliberate. See State v. Kilpatrick . Because there is no dispute as to these factors, we need examine only the prejudice factor, and then balance all four factors.