Opinion ID: 1839972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: overview of other jurisdictions

Text: In 1957, England statutorily abolished the common-law distinction between licensees and invitees and imposed upon the occupier a common duty of care toward all persons who lawfully enter the premises. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 62 (5th ed.1984). Shortly thereafter, in 1959, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the classifications would not apply in admiralty law, stating that the classifications created a semantic morass. See, Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale, 358 U.S. 625, 631, 79 S.Ct. 406, 410, 3 L.Ed.2d 550 (1959); Keeton et al., supra. In 1968, the Supreme Court of California decided the landmark case Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 (1968), which abolished the traditional duty classification scheme for licensees, invitees, and trespassers and replaced it with ordinary negligence principles. A number of jurisdictions have followed California in abandoning all classifications, including that of trespasser. The jurisdictions that have followed California are: Hawaii ( Pickard v. City & County, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969)); Colorado ( Mile High Fence v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971)); Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C.Cir.1972), cert. denied 412 U.S. 939, 93 S.Ct. 2774, 37 L.Ed.2d 399 (1973); Rhode Island ( Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975)) (but see Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I.1994) (restoring status category of trespasser)); New York ( Basso v. Miller, 40 N.Y.2d 233, 352 N.E.2d 868, 386 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1976)); New Hampshire ( Ouellette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364 A.2d 631 (1976)); Louisiana ( Cates v. Beauregard Electric Cooperative, Inc., 328 So.2d 367 (La.1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 833, 97 S.Ct. 97, 50 L.Ed.2d 98); Alaska ( Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977)); Illinois ( Keller v. Mols, 129 Ill.App.3d 208, 84 Ill.Dec. 411, 472 N.E.2d 161 (1984) (only with regard to child entrants)); Montana ( Limberhand v. Big Ditch Co., 218 Mont. 132, 706 P.2d 491 (1985) (construing Montana statute to require duty of ordinary care to all)); and Nevada ( Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 110 Nev. 320, 871 P.2d 935 (1994)). A number of states have abolished the distinctions between licensees and invitees but retained limited duties to trespassers. Prosser and Keeton explain the rationale for retaining a separate rule for trespassers thus: [I]n a civilization based on private ownership, it is considered a socially desirable policy to allow a person to use his own land in his own way, without the burden of watching for and protecting those who come there without permission or right. Keeton et al., supra, § 58 at 395. Furthermore, invitees and licensees enter another's lands under color of right, [but] a trespasser has no basis for claiming extended protection. There remains the possibility that the abandonment of the status of trespasser would place an unfair burden on a landowner who has no reason to expect a trespasser's presence. Poulin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846, 851 n. 5 (Me.1979). The states that have abandoned the classifications with regard to licensees and invitees but retained them with regard to trespassers are: Minnesota ( Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972)); Massachusetts ( Mounsey v. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973)) (see, also, Schofield v. Merrill, 386 Mass. 244, 435 N.E.2d 339 (1982) (trespasser exclusion reaffirmed by vote of 4 to 3)); Wisconsin ( Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 70 Wis.2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975)); North Dakota ( O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D.1977)); Maine ( Poulin v. Colby College, supra ); Oregon ( Ragnone v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 291 Or. 617, 633 P.2d 1287 (1981)); Tennessee ( Hudson v. Gaitan, 675 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn.1984)); Wyoming ( Clarke v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993)); Kansas ( Jones v. Hansen, 254 Kan. 499, 867 P.2d 303 (1994)); and New Mexico ( Ford v. Bd. of County Com'rs, 118 N.M. 134, 879 P.2d 766 (1994)). Many states have altered the common-law categories without abrogating them altogether. Missouri and Kentucky apply a duty of reasonable care once the presence of a visitor is known. While this approach does not expressly abrogate the common-law classifications, once a landowner or occupier knows of the presence of a licensee or trespasser, the landowner owes him or her the same duty of care that he owes to an invitee. Therefore, this approach is similar to the California rule and may have developed from the discovered trespasser rule, which provides that an occupier must exercise reasonable care for a trespasser's safety once his or her presence is known. See Keeton et al., supra, § 58. Other states have passed legislation altering the common-law categories. Connecticut was the first state to do so by providing that the landowner owed the same duty of care to social guests as he owed to invitees. See, Joseph A. Page, The Law of Premises Liability (2d ed.1988); Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 52-557a (West 1991). Other states have given the social guest the status of an invitee. See, Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991); Ferguson v. Bretton, 375 A.2d 225 (Me.1977). Illinois eliminated the classifications by statute in 1984. See Ill.Ann.Stat. ch. 740, para. 130/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993). However, the majority of states have retained the common-law distinctions. Thirty-six states and the District of Columbia have reconsidered the common-law classification scheme. Of the 37 jurisdictions reconsidering, 23 have abolished either some or all of the categories. Fourteen states have expressly retained the categories. Another 14 jurisdictions have simply continued to apply the common-law classifications without specifically addressing their continuing validity. We have been among the states continuing to follow the distinctions without specifically rejecting them.