Opinion ID: 1784672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Doctrine of Administrative Deference

Text: We have long recognized that the contemporaneous administrative construction of the enactment by those charged with its enforcement and interpretation is entitled to great weight, and courts generally will not depart from such construction unless it is clearly erroneous or unauthorized. Gay v. Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla., 59 So.2d 788, 790 (Fla.1952) (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 25 Cal.2d 918, 156 P.2d 1, 2 (1945)). Stated positively, this doctrine means that a reviewing court must defer to an agency's interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial, competent evidence. Pub. Employees Relations Comm'n v. Dade County Police Benevolent Ass'n, 467 So.2d 987, 989 (Fla.1985). Courts defer to the implementing agency out of respect for the institutional competence and expertise of agencies charged with implementing legislation. Agencies have more expertise about matters within their jurisdiction than courts, which consider a wide variety of issues. While the courts always remain the final authority on the interpretation of statutes  an authority that, under the separation of powers in the Florida Constitution, no Legislature may remove  we certainly can benefit from an agency's unique combination of technical knowledge and practical experience. The Legislature, by authorizing an agency to implement a statute, encourages us to accord[ ] considerable persuasive force to the agency's judgments. State ex rel. Szabo Food Servs., Inc. of N.C. v. Dickinson, 286 So.2d 529, 531 (Fla.1973). We have done just that. Under our precedents, deference usually will be accorded an administrative agency's interpretation of matters entrusted by statute to its discretion or expertise. Palm Harbor Special Fire Control Dist. v. Kelly, 516 So.2d 249, 250 (Fla.1987) (citing Pub. Employees, 467 So.2d at 987, and Daniel v. Fla. State Tpk. Auth., 213 So.2d 585 (Fla.1968)). [9] Although we occasionally depart from agency interpretations, it is only for the most cogent reasons. Fidelity Constr. Co. v. Arthur J. Collins & Son, Inc., 130 So.2d 612, 613 (Fla.1961) (citing Gay, 59 So.2d at 790). We do not defer to an agency's interpretation that attempts to enlarge, modify, or contravene a statute. Campus Commc'ns, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 473 So.2d 1290, 1296 (Fla.1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Administrative Procedure Act, not to mention the separation of powers, prohibits such actions. See § 120.52(8)(c), Fla. Stat. (2005) (stating that a rule is invalid if it enlarges, modifies, or contravenes the specific provisions of law implemented). We also do not defer to an agency when it exceeds its authority by act[ing] outside the scope of its powers and jurisdiction. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC v. Jacobs, 841 So.2d 447, 450 (Fla.2003). Only the agency charged with implementing the statute is entitled to our deference, and only when acting as the Legislature authorized it to act. But for these narrow exceptions, however, we defer to the implementing agency's interpretation of the statute. The majority gives no hint that these exceptional circumstances are present in this case. As I explain below, they are not.