Opinion ID: 668541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sentencing Contentions

Text: 69 Rivera contends that he is entitled to be resentenced because the district court (1) erred in finding that more than 100 kilograms of heroin were attributable to him, and (2) improperly denied his attorney an opportunity to be heard prior to sentencing. These contentions need not detain us long. 70 The presentence report (PSR) prepared on Rivera determined that the quantity of heroin attributable to him in connection with the organization's activities was 100-300 kilograms. With this determination, and with the other adjustments required by the federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), the Guidelines prescribed a sentence of life imprisonment. Rivera contested the PSR's quantity determination, contending that he was responsible for only 30-100 kilograms. If his contention were upheld, the prescribed range of imprisonment would have been 360 months to life. The district court found that the government had well documented the evidence supporting a conclusion that more than 100 kilograms of heroin were attributable to Rivera, that Rivera had failed to cite to any evidence to support his request for a finding of a smaller quantity, and that, even if the court accepted Rivera's contention, it would make no difference in the sentence imposed: 71 I will make a finding that upon the record as I see it, massive amounts were being dealt that this man was responsible for. That's number one. 72 Number two, I will make a finding that the record can be read appropriately to say that the massive amounts come over 100 kilos. 73 Even if it were under 100 kilos I can tell you the result would be the same. 74 (Rivera Sentencing Transcript at 10.) 75 On appeal, Rivera again contends that he was not responsible for more than 30-100 kilograms. Though our review of the record persuades us that a preponderance of the evidence supported the district court's finding that 100-300 kilograms of heroin were attributable to Rivera, we need not even reach this issue because the district court indicated that it would have sentenced Rivera to life imprisonment even if he were responsible only for the quantity he conceded. 76 Where the Guidelines provide overlapping ranges of imprisonment, and the sentence actually imposed is in the area of overlap and the sentencing court has indicated that it would have imposed the same sentence whichever range applied, there is no basis for reversal on appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 936 F.2d 648, 656 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 595, 116 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); United States v. Bermingham, 855 F.2d 925, 934-35 (2d Cir.1988). Here, the Guidelines' recommended imprisonment range for Rivera if he were responsible for 30-100 kilograms of heroin, as he contended, would have been 360 months to life. Since the court sentenced him to life imprisonment, as prescribed for one in his position who was responsible for more than 100 kilograms, and stated that the sentence would have been the same even assuming the lesser quantity, the sentence imposed by the district court was within the area of overlap and must be affirmed. 77 Rivera's further contention that the district court denied him an opportunity to be heard in connection with sentencing, in violation of Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1) ([b]efore imposing sentence, the court shall ... afford counsel an opportunity to speak on behalf of the defendant), is frivolous. The record shows that the district court gave Rivera's counsel an opportunity to speak and that counsel did so at length. The court also asked Rivera whether he wished to speak before it imposed a sentence. The court pronounced sentence only after Rivera's attorney had concluded his plea for lenience and Rivera had declined to speak.
78 Aponte-Vega argues that the district court erred in imposing on him a $100,000 fine despite his representations that he had no money to pay the fine. We disagree. 79 Guidelines Sec. 5E1.2(a) provides that the court shall impose a fine in all cases, except where the defendant establishes that he is unable to pay and is not likely to become able to pay any fine. Id. Sec. 5E1.2(a). The defendant bears the burden of showing that he is unable to pay the fine. See United States v. Marquez, 941 F.2d 60, 66 (2d Cir.1991). He can satisfy this burden by an independent showing, or by reference to his presentence report. United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 895 (2d Cir.1992). The sentencing court may not base the imposition of a fine on its mere suspicion that the defendant has funds. See, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 985 F.2d 1175, 1188 (2d Cir.1993) (imposition of fine vacated where counsel had been appointed to represent defendant because of indigence, PSR had concluded that defendant had no ability to pay, and court simply speculated that defendant could pay); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d at 895 (same where PSR concluded that defendant appeared to lack ability to pay and government offered no proof to the contrary); United States v. Seminole, 882 F.2d 441, 444 (9th Cir.1989) (same where PSR confirmed that [defendant] was indigent and recommended against the imposition of a fine). The court, however, is surely not required to accept uncritically a representation by the defendant that he has no assets. United States v. Marquez, 941 F.2d at 66. 80 In the present case, the PSR prepared on Aponte-Vega stated, in pertinent part, that Aponte-Vega 81 reported that he has forfeited all of his cash and property to the Government. The defendant stated that the house located ... [in] Florida is in his wife's name and had a value of approximately $65,000 but was destroyed during the hurricane disaster this year forcing his wife and children to reside with relatives in Kendall, Florida. The defendant did not submit any additional financial information. 82 The PSR did not, however, conclude that Aponte-Vega lacked the ability to pay a fine. 83 Nor did Aponte-Vega submit evidence of indigence thereafter. Indeed, at the sentencing hearing, he stated, through his court-appointed attorney, that he wishe[d] to retain counsel for this sentencing and for the appeal. (Aponte-Vega Sentencing Transcript at 2 (emphasis added).) While ultimately counsel was not retained, the fact that Aponte-Vega was contemplating such a move suggested that he was not without assets. 84 At sentencing, the district court ruled that Aponte-Vega had failed to show his inability to pay any fine, stating as follows: 85 The statute also calls for a potential fine, it says from $25,000 to $4 million. My understanding is that most of your ill-gotten goods have now been forfeited to the government in connection with their forfeiture program. I will impose a fine of $100,000 just in case anything is left over. 86 (Id. 6.) The possibility that there might be [some]thing ... left over was not mere speculation, given the indication that Aponte-Vega had sufficient assets to consider hiring an attorney of his own choosing. 87 There being no evidence of indigence other than Aponte-Vega's own self-serving statements that he was without assets, we cannot say that the court erred in rejecting those statements.