Opinion ID: 6325355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction & Legal Standards

Text: Our court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals of preliminary injunctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Plaintiffs contend that the district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, two of the issues that we must address—whether Plaintiffs have standing and whether sovereign immunity bars Longoria’s claim—are threshold jurisdictional questions. See Air Evac EMS, Inc. v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 851 F.3d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 2017) (standing); Texas v. Caremark, Inc., 584 F.3d 655, 658 (5th Cir. 2009) (sovereign immunity). Therefore, before we can reach the ultimate issue on appeal of whether the district court correctly granted Plaintiffs’ request for preliminary relief, we must first determine whether the district court had jurisdiction. We conclude that certifying three questions to the Texas Supreme Court will significantly aid us in resolving those jurisdictional issues.3 To determine whether certification is appropriate, we weigh three factors: (1) “the closeness of the question[s]”; (2) federal-state comity; and the appeal. Therefore, Longoria’s potential criminal liability is not before us on appeal, and the preliminary injunction remains in place as to that portion of the lawsuit. 3 The Texas Constitution grants the Supreme Court of Texas the power to answer questions of state law certified by a federal appellate court. Tex. Const. art. V, § 3-c(a). Texas rules provide that we may certify “determinative questions of Texas law” that have “no controlling Supreme Court [of Texas] precedent.” Tex. R. App. P. 58.1. Although neither party requested certification in this case, we can certify questions to the Supreme Court of Texas on our own motion, and that court has graciously accepted our request to do so in the past. See, e.g., Norris v. Thomas (In re Norris), 413 F.3d 526, 527 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), certified question answered, 215 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. 2007). 5 Case: 22-50110 Document: 00516247507 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/21/2022 No. 22-50110 (3) “practical limitations,” such as the possibility of delay or difficulty of framing the issue. Swindol v. Aurora Flight Scis. Corp., 805 F.3d 516, 522 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted). Those factors have supported our decision to certify important questions of Texas statutory interpretation in the past. See, e.g., JCB, Inc. v. The Horsburgh & Scott Co., 912 F.3d 238, 241 (5th Cir. 2018), certified question answered, 597 S.W.3d 481 (Tex. 2019).