Opinion ID: 477821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Oral Assurances

Text: 15 Plaintiff next contends that he has a property interest through an implied contract based on oral assurances from the defendant administrators that they would recall guidance counselors according to their seniority and that he would soon be recalled as a guidance counselor. Plaintiff asserts that he detrimentally relied upon these assurances. Plaintiff further argues that he had been hired by the school district as a counselor, had performed his duties capably for nearly ten years, and that when recalled as a teacher in 1981 he was qualified and certified as a guidance counselor but not as a teacher. 4 From these facts, plaintiff argues, a meeting of the minds that plaintiff was to be recalled as a guidance counselor can be inferred. 16 Count I of plaintiff's complaint states that Plaintiff was hired on [sic] or about September 1971 by Defendant School Board as a guidance counselor and held that position until his honorable discharge on [sic] or about June 1983. Plaintiff became a tenured teacher on [sic] or about April 1973. At all times during his employment as a guidance counselor, Plaintiff performed his duties in an efficient, creditable and acceptable manner. Count I, p 1. Plaintiff's complaint also alleges that the defendant administrators, acting in their official capacities, made oral promises to plaintiff that honorably discharged employees, including guidance counselors, would be returned to their former positions on the basis of seniority. Plaintiff made an implicit promise to forego and did forego various employment opportunities in reliance on Defendants' promises. Count I, p 5. 17 The defendant administrators in their answer deny that they made oral promises to plaintiff that honorably discharged employees, including guidance counselors, would be returned to their former positions according to seniority. The defendant administrators further deny in their answer that plaintiff made any implicit promise to forego other employment opportunities. The answer also asserts that the defendants have insufficient information to form a belief about whether plaintiff did forego other employment opportunities, but reiterates that the defendants never made any promises upon which plaintiff could have relied. 18 Supporting their motion for summary judgment, the defendants submitted the affidavit of defendant Harold Miller, Assistant Superintendent for Educational Services of the school district, which stated that the school district has never had a policy of awarding extra-pay positions on the basis of seniority and that the assignment of guidance counselor has at all relevant times been an extra-pay position. The defendants also submitted several sections of the school district's administrative handbook, one of which deals with the selection of personnel for extra-pay positions and the collective-bargaining contract between plaintiff's union and the school district. 19 Plaintiff argues that the defendants' denials create a genuine issue of material fact about plaintiff's claim of entitlement to his former position. The Supreme Court recently discussed the proper approach to determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists that would preclude summary judgment. In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the Court reaffirmed that in ruling on a motion for summary judgment the trial judge must accept as true the nonmovant's evidence, must draw all legitimate inferences in the nonmovant's favor, and must not weigh the evidence or the credibility of witnesses. The trial judge must decide whether there is the need for a trial--whether, in other words, there are any genuine factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of either party. Id. at 2511. 20 The Court noted that although the moving party must establish that there is no material issue of fact, the nonmoving party must in turn produce evidence that would support a jury verdict. Id. at 2511, 2514. Relying upon Rule 56(e), the Court indicated that the opposing party must present affirmative evidence in order to defeat a properly supported motion for summary judgment and may not rest upon allegations or denials of the pleading. Id. at 2514. This affirmative evidence must be such that a jury might return a verdict in that party's favor as the inquiry in a summary judgment determination is essentially whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 2512. Thus, 21 [i]f the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a directed verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. 22 Id. 23 In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, --- U.S. ---, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the Supreme Court determined that Rule 56 does not require the moving party to support its summary judgment motion with affidavits. Instead, the moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 2553. The moving party, however, need not support its motion with affidavits or other evidence negating the nonmoving party's claim. Id. Once the moving party files such a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party may oppose the motion with any of the evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except merely the pleadings themselves. Id. [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 2552-53. 24 In this case, plaintiff failed to present any affirmative evidence of these alleged oral assurances. In response to defendants' motion, plaintiff filed a brief, but did not file an affidavit or any other evidence establishing a genuine issue of fact for trial. Plaintiff therefore rested only on his allegations and did not produce any evidence that would support a jury verdict. The conclusory allegations in plaintiff's complaint alone are not sufficient to oppose a motion for summary judgment. By the time the defendants filed their motion, discovery had almost been completed. Plaintiff could have filed his own affidavit with facts such as the types of assurances made to him, approximately when the assurances were made, and approximately how many and what types of employment opportunities he let pass in reliance on those assurances. By relying only upon his complaint, plaintiff has failed to establish any material issue of fact requiring a trial, and therefore summary judgment was appropriate if the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 25 Plaintiff argues that while the defendant administrators may not have had actual authority to bind the school district by their oral assurances to plaintiff, the administrators had apparent authority and acted under color of law which is sufficient under Vail v. Board of Education, 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir.1983), aff'd, 466 U.S. 377, 104 S.Ct. 2144, 80 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). 26 Vail presented a significantly different situation than the one facing us, however. In Vail, the Board of Education itself was involved in hiring the plaintiff. The Board sought out the plaintiff and induced him to leave his job of ten years on the promise of a two-year contract. The plaintiff, Vail, had expressed concern to the Board's search committee about the security of the proposed job and about the length of the contract. The search committee replied that the Board determined the length of contracts and that the committee could commit to only a one-year contract. Thereafter the Board met in special session and unanimously decided to hire the plaintiff with an assurance of a two-year contract. The Board delegated the superintendent of schools to convey the offer of a one-year contract to be renewed at the end of the year. The plaintiff accepted the offer, quit his job of ten years, and moved from his home of thirteen years to the community to assume his duties. The following year the Board voted in a public session not to renew the contract. The plaintiff was not given any explanation. 27 The court affirmed the district court's finding, after a bench trial, that the Board deprived the plaintiff of his legitimate expectation of continued employment by failing to renew his contract without notice or a hearing. The district court had found, based upon the testimony of certain witnesses, that there was an implied contract for a two-year term. This court refused to overturn the district court's findings of fact. The court also found no merit in the Board's argument that an implied contract, if found, was unenforceable under the Illinois Teacher Tenure Act and the Illinois Statute of Frauds. The court then stated that [e]ven if we were to assume arguendo that no enforceable contract under state law existed between Vail and the Board, we are not prepared to hold that this alone precludes the establishment of a protected property interest. The Civil Rights Act itself speaks of actions taken under color of state law and not under authority of state law. 706 F.2d at 1440 (emphases in original). The court then reiterated that the plaintiff's expectations of continued employment were legitimate and were denied by the Board's actions. The court noted the plaintiff's reliance and the reasonableness of his reliance. 28 In this case, plaintiff does not assert that the Board of Education promised him his former position, nor that he quit his job on the strength of the alleged promise. In Vail, the Board of Education, which is authorized to appoint all teachers and certified employees, Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 122, Sec. 10-20.7 (1985), assured the plaintiff, through a representative, of a renewal of his one-year contract. In this case, the plaintiff alleges he received assurances from school administrators who were not authorized to and could not bind the school board. See Hadley v. County of Du Page, 715 F.2d 1238, 1242 (7th Cir.1983) (assurances by individual county board members not sufficient to create property interest as individual members are not authorized to bind the board), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006, 104 S.Ct. 1000, 79 L.Ed.2d 232 (1984). Plaintiff's reliance in the form of foregoing other employment also is not of the same magnitude as the demonstrated reliance of the plaintiff in Vail. See Smith, 708 F.2d at 264 ( 'It is not sufficient consideration for a contract of permanent employment to forego another employment opportunity.' ) (quoting Heuvelman v. Triplett Electric Instrument Co., 23 Ill.App.2d 231, 161 N.E.2d 875, 878 (1st Dist.1959)). Finally, even assuming that the school administrators did assure the plaintiff that honorably discharged employees, including guidance counselors, would be recalled to their former positions on the basis of seniority, that assurance amounts to no more than informal assurances similar to the assurances given the plaintiff in McElearney v. University of Illinois, 612 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.1979) (per curiam), which are to be contrasted with the definite assurance given in Vail. 29 In McElearney, the plaintiff received assurances from his department head that his progress was satisfactory. The plaintiff argued that these reassurances and a promotion from research associate to assistant professor implied that he would receive tenure. This court disagreed and affirmed the district court's dismissal for failure to state a claim. The court agreed that these assurances and an interim promotion did not create a property interest in employment against the background of formal, explicit rules governing the tenure status of faculty members. Id. at 290 app. 30 Such formal, explicit rules regarding the assignment of extra-pay positions such as guidance counselor exist in this case also. The contract between the union and the school district clearly specifies that these positions shall be contracted with the individual on an annual basis and shall not be subject to the tenure laws of the State. The Administrative Handbook for the school district echoes this language. Furthermore, the tenure provision of the Illinois statute establishes a right to continued employment with the school district, but not a right to a specific position. Lester v. Board of Education, 87 Ill.App.2d 269, 230 N.E.2d 893, 898 (2d Dist.1967) ([W]e construe section 24-11 of the School Code to provide that a superintendent in the public schools does not acquire tenure in the position of superintendent, but rather acquires tenure as a certified employee of the school district.); Newby v. Board of Education, 53 Ill.App.3d 835, 11 Ill.Dec. 560, 561, 368 N.E.2d 1306, 1307 (2d Dist.1977). The recall provision requires the Board to tender available positions to teachers removed or dismissed in a reduction-in-force so far as they are legally qualified to hold such positions. This authorized the Board to assign tenured employees to any position for which they are qualified, not just to their former positions.