Opinion ID: 2632308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to instruct sua sponte on the doctrine of unreasonable defense of others

Text: Defendant contends the court should have instructed on its own motion that if he killed JoAnn in the actual but unreasonable belief that the killing was necessary to protect Christina from JoAnn's physical and sexual abuse, then he would only be guilty of voluntary manslaughter. Defendant relies by analogy on the established doctrine of unreasonable or imperfect self-defense. Under the doctrine of imperfect self-defense, when the trier of fact finds that a defendant killed another person because the defendant actually, but unreasonably, believed he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, the defendant is deemed to have acted without malice and thus can be convicted of no crime greater than voluntary manslaughter. ( In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 771, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574.) As we explained in People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 200-201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531, imperfect self-defense is not an affirmative defense, but a description of one type of voluntary manslaughter. Thus the trial court must instruct on this doctrine, whether or not instructions are requested by counsel, whenever there is evidence substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury that under this doctrine the defendant is guilty of voluntary manslaughter. (Id. at pp. 194, 201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) If it were a true affirmative defense, however, an instruction would be required only if it appears that the defendant was relying on the defense, or that there was substantial evidence supportive of the defense, and the defense was not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. (Id. at p. 195, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531; see People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) The doctrine of unreasonable or imperfect defense of others, in contrast to the doctrine of unreasonable or imperfect self-defense, is not well established in California law. It has been recognized in only one decision, People v. Uriarte (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 192, 198, 272 Cal.Rptr. 693, and there the court found the doctrine inapplicable because Uriarte did not present evidence that he believed (reasonably or unreasonably) that the asserted danger to his wife was imminent or that shooting the victims was necessary to rescue her. Uriarte was decided two months after this case was tried. Thus at the time of the trial here, there was no California authority recognizing a doctrine of imperfect defense of others. Because defendant did not submit an instruction on unreasonable defense of others, he can only argue here that the trial court should have given such an instruction on its own motion. The trial court, however, has no duty to so instruct on doctrines of law that have not been established by authority. People v. Flannel (1979) 25 Cal.3d 668, 680-681, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1 explained: [E]ven in the absence of a request, a trial court must instruct on the general principles of law governing the case, i.e., those principles relevant to the issues raised by the evidence, but need not instruct on specific points developed at trial. `The most rational interpretation of the phrase general principles of law governing the case would seem to be as those principles of law commonly or closely and openly connected with the facts of the case before the court.' [Citations.] [¶] ... Given the unique nature of [the] rule [urged by the defendant], obfuscated by infrequent reference and inadequate elucidation, we conclude that heretofore it could not be so considered. (Fn.omitted.) Flannel held that a trial court was not required to instruct on imperfect self-defense until that defense was recognized by California decisions. { People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 680-683, 160 Cal. Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1.) Applying the same analysis, courts have refused to require a trial court to instruct on its own motion that an unreasonable belief one is acting under duress is a partial defense to robbery ( People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 125-126, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559 (Bacigalupo I )); that imperfect self-defense is a defense to the crime of torture ( People v. Vital (1996) 45 Cal. App.4th 441, 446, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 676); or that imperfect self-defense is a defense to the crime of mayhem ( People v. Sekona (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 443, 451, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 606). This reasoning governs here. At the time of defendant's trial, the concept of imperfect defense of others was not a commonly known and established defense. We acknowledge that this concept follows logically from the interplay between statutory and decisional law. Section 197 provides that [h]omicide is ... justifiable when committed by any person ...: [¶] ... [w]hen resisting any attempt to murder any person, or to commit a felony, or to do some great bodily injury upon any person. Innovative counsel could view that statute in light of Flannel 's analysis of imperfect self-defense (see People v. Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 674-680, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1), and propose an instruction on imperfect defense of others. But the trial court here was not required to so instruct on its own motion, because the doctrine of imperfect or unreasonable self-defense was not a wellestablished legal doctrine under California law. It is also doubtful whether defendant was entitled to an instruction on imperfect defense of others, or whether the failure to give such an instruction could be found prejudicial. Defendant's problem is that both self-defense and defense of others requires a fear of imminent harm ( People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1), so presumably imperfect self-defense or imperfect defense of others would require an unreasonable belief that harm was imminent. But when defendant committed the homicide, Christina was at Broad Horizons, a youth detention facility, and murder victim JoAnn was asleep in her apartment. The record does not indicate when Christina would next be released to visit JoAnn, but even if it was the next day it is doubtful that the facts would show that defendant believed, reasonably or unreasonably, that any threatened danger to Christina was imminent.