Opinion ID: 1446352
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Abrogation or Rescission of Conveyance.

Text: From what we have said it is clear that judgment for plaintiff was not authorized under any theory heretofore discussed. But it is claimed by plaintiff that the conveyance was canceled, rescinded, abrogated, or abandoned by the parties and that the judgment was authorized on that theory under the testimony. The judgment of the trial court does not indicate upon what theory it was rendered. It is unfortunate that no request for findings of fact and conclusion of law were asked. If such request had been made, it might have saved this court a good deal of trouble. It may be that the trial court did not render its judgment upon the theory here advanced by counsel for the plaintiff, and so discussion may be entirely superfluous. But in view of the record, and the contention of counsel for plaintiff, it would seem to be necessary for us to discuss the matter. We might incidentally mention in this connection, which also applies to the previous point here considered, that plaintiff itself introduced the conveyance to Johnston in evidence. It would seem, accordingly, that plaintiff vouched for it as to its binding effect, insofar as it on its face permitted it to be binding, and it seems somewhat strange that plaintiff should in this action be permitted to attack it and claim that it was no longer in existence, that is to say, canceled abrogated, rescinded, waived, or abandoned. See 32 C.J.S. § 1040, p. 1104. We shall not, however, base this decision on that theory. There is testimony in the record by Mileski that, in October 1955, he told Johnston the transaction with the latter was terminated, and that Johnston admitted, which was denied by the latter, that it was no longer legally effective. Mankin testified, the time not appearing, that he told Johnston he was through and that Johnston did not object. A memorandum was introduced, exhibit 5, dated November 12, 1955, which related to 49 claims and the interest of Mileski in the Jake claims. What interest in the Jake claims was intended is equivocal and does not appear from the memorandum. It might have been the unpaid amount due Mileski on the agreement or conveyance of July 6, 1955, or the whole interest of Mileski prior to July 6, 1955. On its face and standing alone, it does not refer to any of Mankin's interest. Counsel for plaintiff claim that under this evidence it should be held the agreement or conveyance of July 6, 1955, was at an end. There seems to be some inconsistency in the testimony of Mileski and Mankin. On the one hand they claim that Johnston had nothing but an option for ninety days. If that is true, it expired at least by October 6, 1955. No agreement for abrogation, rescission, and so forth, of the conveyance was then necessary, so that the testimony as to abrogation and so forth would seem to admit there was in fact more than an option for the period mentioned. Counsel for defendant Johnston contend that the parol evidence rule applies to the contention made here, so that it would make no difference whether objection to the testimony was made or not. They have assigned the admission of exhibit 5 as error. The authorities distinguish situations. It is stated in 32 C.J.S. § 964, p. 930, as follows: Further, parol evidence is admissible to show that the written agreement between the parties has been repudiated, rescinded, abrogated, or abandoned in whole or in part, at least where the written agreement does not involve matters required to be in writing. However, parol evidence of a rescission or cancellation of a written agreement may be rejected where the written agreement is one required to be in writing. See also 32 C.J.S. § 1005, p. 1011: The general rule is that evidence of a subsequent parol agreement is inadmissible to prove a modification of a written contract which is required to be in writing. The general rule is usually inapplicable, however, where the subsequent agreement has been executed, or where acts amounting to an estoppel are shown. If our statute of frauds has any application, it would seem to be § 5-101, W.C.S. 1945, subdivision 5, which states that Every agreement or contract for the sale of real estate, or the lease thereof, for more than one year must be in writing. Is the relinquishment of an interest in the uranium claim, or the cancellation or rescission of a conveyance thereof, an agreement or contract for the sale of real estate? The arguments of counsel are entirely silent on that point. We think it best not to decide it without full argument thereon. However, while the theory of counsel for defendant as to inadmissibility of the foregoing testimony may be wrong, still it would seem that if it was inadmissible in this action on any theory, defendant should not be bound thereby. The right to have an instrument canceled, rescinded, or abrogated may at times give rise to an original cause of action, that is to say, the right to file a petition or complaint. In such case no intelligent petitioner or complainant would do otherwise than to plead the facts, adding a prayer that the instrument be canceled, rescinded, or abrogated, so that the judgment may be supported by pleadings as it should be, for as stated in 49 C.J.S. § 40, p. 95:    as a general rule pleadings are essential to support the judgment of a court of record, and are as necessary a basis for a valid judgment as is evidence. There is, of course, no reason why the rule should not be the same when the right of cancellation, rescission, abrogation, waiver, or abandonment is claimed by plaintiff as a defense to a written conveyance as in the case at bar. If the judgment herein is based on such defense, then it should be supported by proper pleadings. It is stated in 17 C.J.S. § 551, pp. 1187, 1188, as follows: Since at any time before a breach    the parties to a written contract may dissolve, waive, discharge, or qualify the contract, or any part thereof, by a new contract, such a new contract may be set up in defense, provided it is specially pleaded. A modification or a rescission of the contract must be specially pleaded if relied on as a defense; and the same is true of a discharge of the contract by agreement. So, also, where defendant relies on a waiver of a stipulation in the contract sued on, he must plead it. If abandonment is claimed the rule is the same. I.C.J.S. Abandonment § 6, p. 14. The rule should of course apply to the conveyance to Johnston, and we shall assume, without deciding, that upon compliance with the rule an absolute conveyance of an interest in real property may be shown by parol evidence to have been abrogated or rescinded. See Anderson v. Anderson, 128 Wash. 504, 223 P. 323, 38 A.L.R. 292 and annotation. In the case at bar there is a total lack of pleading in this connection. What is the effect thereof under the evidence in this case? Most of the evidence in this case relating to the abrogation or rescission of the transaction between Johnston and Mileski and Mankin, was admitted without any objection or the proper objection. When exhibit 5 was introduced, Mr. Bentley, counsel for defendant, stated: Your Honor, we will object to it on the grounds that it's indefinite, it's uncertain and, also, it, of course, is not acknowledged. Now, I don't know if counsel means, by introducing this unacknowledged instrument, to alter or show the terms of the previously acknowledged instrument, or not. Whatever counsel meant, it was not an objection that the instrument was immaterial and irrelevant because it was not within the issues of the case. This court has held a number of times that when testimony is introduced without objection, but not strictly within the issues of the case, the pleading may be considered as amended. See for instance Urbach v. Urbach, 52 Wyo. 207, 73 P.2d 953, 113 A.L.R. 889. An elaborate opinion on the subject is contained in Claughton v. Johnston, on rehearing, 47 Wyo. 536, 41 P.2d 527, where the test is stated to be as to whether or not prejudice results from lack of allegations. We have, however, never held that amendments may be deemed to be made when there is a total lack of pleading on the subject in question, for if there is such total lack, there is nothing to amend or can be deemed to be amended. On the contrary, we said in Claughton v. Johnston, 47 Wyo. 447, 536, 545, 41 P.2d 527, 530: Of course, even under the rule of these cases, a pleader must, doubtless, inform the opponent of his claim in some reasonable way, as otherwise it could probably seldom, if ever, be said that no prejudice resulted. That, we think, applies in this case, otherwise the rule above stated that a judgment must be sustained by pleadings would be entirely ignored. While the rules of pleading have become more liberal than they were in the past, still it would seem that a party is entitled to a fair warning of what the vital contentions of the opponent are, so as to be able to meet them if possible. We might incidentally mention the fact that it is held in Southern States Co. v. Long, 15 Ala.App. 286, 73 So. 148, that a waiver of an existing right must be supported by sufficient consideration. A number of cases are cited. On the other hand it is held in Rodgers v. Rodgers, 235 N.Y. 408, 139 N.E. 557, citing authorities, that a contract to cancel and rescind a former agreement needs no further consideration other than the mutual consent of the parties. We do not think that we need to decide the point. The judgment herein accordingly cannot be sustained on the theory here discussed. It follows from what we have said that the judgment of the trial court must be, and is, reversed. The case is remanded to the trial court of Campbell County, Wyoming, for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded.