Opinion ID: 2334846
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Elusive Definition of Substantial Completeness

Text: The parties in this case offer differing views on whether SHAB correctly interpreted the meaning of substantial completeness in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i). This Court has said that [a]lthough § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) fails (or, perhaps more accurately, does not even attempt) to define `substantial completeness' in any meaningful way, it does succeed in unequivocally establishing that information that was not included in an application prior to February 13, 2004, is excluded from SHAB's review. Town of Smithfield, 924 A.2d at 801-02. In Town of Smithfield, we held that SHAB committed an error of law when it considered information that came into existence after the developer's application was frozen in time on February 13, 2004, for the purposes of determining substantial completeness. Id. at 802, 804. In this case, the town alleges that SHAB committed a similar error by reviewing the determination of substantial completeness in the context of whether or not there would be an opportunity to continue to complete the materials in the course and conduct of a [future] hearing. The town alleges that if the legislature had wanted [SHAB] to inquire as to whether there was enough to proceed forward with additional information being supplemented at the hearing stage, it would have put such language into Section 45-53-6(f)(1). The town points to part of SHAB's deliberations on September 19, 2005, when one of SHAB's members objected to the level of detail the town demanded from Pascoag, and stated, I see th[e] issue as, is there enough information on this plan for the town at least to let the person get before a board so they can start to work on these issues. That is how it is. The town contends that SHAB's approach amounts to an impermissible standard of review for determining substantial completeness because the one stop shopping permitted under § 45-53-4 requires applicants to submit complete information and relatively finite plans for the town to review. In the town's view, SHAB could reach a determination of substantial completeness only by finding that an application was substantially complete with respect to each of the ten factors listed in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i). In response, Pascoag, Crystal Lake, and East Avenue concede that SHAB members used phraseology such as determining that there was sufficient information to conduct `meaningful review' or at least to `get started' during SHAB's September 19, 2005 hearing on the three applications. Nevertheless, respondents argue that SHAB's October 17, 2005 written decisions for the three projects include findings of fact and conclusions of law demonstrating that SHAB made a determination that thorough and complete application materials existed that warranted a finding of substantial completeness under § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i). Accordingly, respondents allege that SHAB's interpretation of substantial completeness in its written decisions does not constitute an error of law. Pascoag, Crystal Lake, and East Avenue argue that SHAB correctly interpreted the meaning of substantially complete. Relying upon principles of administrative law, respondents contend that substantial completeness is an ambiguous term and that SHAB's interpretation deserves deference from this Court. In respondents' view, requiring full compliance for each of the ten elements in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) would render substantial completeness a meaningless term, violate the canons of statutory construction, and defeat the Legislature's intent to grandfather eligible housing projects under pre-moratorium standards. Questions of statutory construction are subject to de novo review by this Court, and we are the final arbiter on such questions. Unistrut Corp. v. State Department of Labor and Training, 922 A.2d 93, 98 (R.I.2007). When a statute is clear and unambiguous we are bound to ascribe the plain and ordinary meaning of the words of the statute and our inquiry is at an end. Id. (citing Moore v. Ballard, 914 A.2d 487, 490 (R.I.2007)). However, when a statute is susceptible of more than one meaning, we employ our well-established maxims of statutory construction in an effort to glean the intent of the Legislature. Id. at 98-99 (citing Tanner v. Town Council of East Greenwich, 880 A.2d 784, 796 (R.I.2005)). Our well-established maxims of statutory construction include specific rules in the realm of administrative law. [12] Although this Court is the final arbiter of questions of statutory construction, it is also true that `we give deference to an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute that it has been charged with administering and enforcing, provided that the agency's construction is neither clearly erroneous nor unauthorized.' Rossi v. Employees' Retirement System, 895 A.2d 106, 113 (R.I.2006) (quoting Arnold v. Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training Board of Review, 822 A.2d 164, 169 (R.I.2003)); cf. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (granting deference to agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute when Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law). [13] The interpretation of a statute by the administering agency is not controlling, but it is entitled to great weight. State v. Swindell, 895 A.2d 100, 104 (R.I. 2006). This Court will accord such deference even when the agency's interpretation is not the only permissible interpretation that could be applied. Murray v. McWalters, 868 A.2d 659, 662 (R.I.2005) (quoting Pawtucket Power Associates Limited Partnership v. City of Pawtucket, 622 A.2d 452, 456-57 (R.I.1993)). Nevertheless, our interpretation of an ambiguous statute is grounded in policy considerations and we will not apply a statute in a manner that will defeat its underlying purpose. Arnold, 822 A.2d at 169; see also Parkway Towers Associates v. Godfrey, 688 A.2d 1289, 1293-94 (R.I.1997) (administrative interpretation is entitled to great deference    when    it is consistent with the overall purposes of the legislation). Further, the true measure of a court's willingness to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute `depends, in the last analysis, on the persuasiveness of the interpretation, given all the attendant circumstances.' Unistrut Corp., 922 A.2d at 101 (quoting United States v. 29 Cartons of    an Article of Food, 987 F.2d 33, 38 (1st Cir.1993)). We conclude that in this context substantial completeness is an ambiguous statutory term. The pragmatic checklist in § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i)(A) through (J) establishes a seemingly precise scorecard that, at first glance, would appear to reduce SHAB's evaluations to a rote exercise in inventory accounting, but the lack of a satisfactory explication of the determinative standard undermines the objectivity of the process. Town of Smithfield, 924 A.2d at 801. At best, § 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) is a tautology that defines substantial completeness as substantial completeness of substantially all of the ten-factor checklist in the statute. In mathematical terms, the definition constitutes a 720-degree turn, or two full revolutions around the substantial completeness circle. As we noted, [s]uch circular language renders the statute susceptible to any number of potential interpretations   . Town of Smithfield, 924 A.2d at 801. Substantial completeness, therefore, falls easily within our standard for ambiguous statutory terms. Section 45-53-6(f)(1)(i) directs SHAB to make [t]he determination of substantial completeness    on whether there was on or before February 13, 2004, substantial completeness of substantially all of the ten factors listed in the statute. SHAB was required to determine the substantial completeness of appealed applications and then remand applications found to be substantially complete to local zoning boards. Section 45-53-6(f)(1)-(2). Thus, SHAB is clearly the agency charged with administering and enforcing the fate of pre-moratorium comprehensive permit applications that appear before it on appeal. This Court will thus afford a presumption of deference to SHAB's interpretation of the phrase substantial completeness. It is an ambiguous statutory phrase and the General Assembly charged SHAB with its administration in the context of appeals of comprehensive permit applications from the actions of local zoning boards. In this case, as in Town of Smithfield, 924 A.2d at 801, SHAB's members did not adopt a definition of substantial completeness at the September 19, 2005 hearing when SHAB voted on the three projects. [14] SHAB's October 17, 2005 written decisions, however, set forth a working definition of substantial completeness. Using an ordinary and plain meaning standard, SHAB defined substantial to mean material, important, and essential, and the term complete to mean having all parts or elements. [15] In our opinion, SHAB's definition is entitled to deference, provided it is neither clearly erroneous nor unauthorized. Rossi, 895 A.2d at 113.