Opinion ID: 729975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 12
13 Weiler's position, as stated at oral argument, is that a mental condition caused by an employer's workplace can qualify as a disability under the ADA. Weiler attributes the cause of her disability to her former employer; but for her working conditions at HFC, she would not suffer from these ailments. Once she told a representative of HFC that Skorupka was causing her stress and anxiety, she asserts, HFC had a duty to step in and transfer either her or him to alleviate her problems. In fact, Weiler argues she could have returned to work at HFC under a different supervisor. She claims that at the very least a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the TMJ disorder, anxiety, and depression substantially limit her work and thus qualify her as disabled under the Act. 1 14 Weiler's claim amounts to a charge that she is only unable to work if Skorupka is her boss. Aside from the fact that this contradicts her psychotherapist's testimony, whatever Weiler's problem was with Skorupka, it is not recognized as a disability under the ADA. The major life activity of working is not substantially limited if a plaintiff merely cannot work under a certain supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to his review of her job performance. See, e.g., Palmer v. Circuit Ct. of Cook Cty., Social Service Dep't, 905 F.Supp. 499, 507 (N.D.Ill.1995) (evidence that plaintiff had a personality conflict with her supervisor which caused her to suffer anxiety and depression not a disability); Adams v. Alderson, 723 F.Supp. 1531, 1531-32 (D.D.C.1989) (personality conflict with an antagonizing supervisor not a disability under the ADA), aff'd, 1990 WL 45737 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam). 15 Moreover, exclusion from one position of employment does not constitute a substantial limitation of a 'major life activity.'  Byrne, 979 F.2d at 565; see also Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931, 934-35 (4th Cir.1986) (plaintiff with fear of heights not disabled because condition did not substantially limit plaintiff's work, only his ability to perform particular job); Duff v. Lobdell-Emery Mfg., Co., 926 F.Supp. 799, 806-07 (N.D.Ind.1996) (employer does not regard employee as disabled simply by finding employee incapable of satisfying the singular demands of a particular job); Howard v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Co., 904 F.Supp. 922, 929 (E.D.Wis.1995) (employee did not suffer impairment that substantially limited major life activity, and thus was not disabled, because he could not operate certain piece of machinery). Rather, with respect to the major life activity of working, substantially limits must mean significantly restricts the ability to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Weiler claims she can do her job, but not while being supervised by Terry Skorupka. If Weiler can do the same job for another supervisor, she can do the job, and does not qualify under the ADA. We conclude that Weiler is not disabled as that term is used in the ADA. 16
17 Recovery under the ADA also requires a plaintiff to establish she is a qualified individual with a disability. The phrase means that an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Thus, a person with a disability is qualified if she has the requisite skills, experience, and education for a job she holds or desires and can perform the essential functions of that job with or without reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(m). 18 The undisputed facts establish that Weiler is unable to perform the essential functions of her position. Specifically, a March 2, 1993 letter from Weiler's psychotherapist stated that Weiler could not return to work at HFC in any position. Dr. Mahoney reiterated this opinion in writing on numerous occasions and sent these conclusions on to HFC. At no time did Weiler contact HFC and disagree with Dr. Mahoney on this point. In response to a request to admit, Weiler even conceded that she is no longer able to work for HFC in any capacity. She did not qualify this admission in any way. See Bombard, 92 F.3d at 564 (admission in deposition testimony that plaintiff was unable to work meant plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish genuine issue of material fact as to ability to perform essential functions of job with reasonable accommodation). Thus, Weiler's own doctor, not HFC, has concluded she could not perform her job, with or without a reasonable accommodation. Therefore, Weiler cannot establish that she is a qualified individual with a disability under the ADA--she was no longer qualified to do the job, and no accommodation would allow her to do it. The district court properly held that Weiler failed to meet her burden of proof on this requirement. 19
20 Under the ADA, an employer must reasonably accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability, unless the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the employer. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). Weiler argues that HFC took no action to accommodate her: (1) once Skorupka was told about her TMJ disorder, and (2) when Weiler told the human resources department that she could not work with Skorupka. The district court ruled that HFC offered her reasonable accommodations, which she refused. 21 Here, Weiler has not offered a consistent argument. Dr. Mahoney submitted numerous release to work (a misnomer in this case) documents from March through May 1993 stating that Weiler was not able to return to work for HFC in any position. While Dr. Mahoney repeatedly told HFC that Weiler could not work in any capacity, she asserts HFC should have accommodated her request for a transfer to another supervisor (or to transfer Skorupka to a different department). According to plaintiff, she could have come back to work--as long as it did not mean working for Skorupka. All this time, HFC's short-term disability insurance was paying Weiler on the presumption that she cannot work. 22 The facts do not support Weiler's argument. HFC allowed Weiler the time off work she requested to attend therapy sessions for her TMJ disorder. HFC provided her with short-term disability benefits for 26 weeks. It also applied for long-term disability benefits on her behalf. It allowed her to post for a new position in the company in the same salary grade. HFC's personnel manager searched for a similar position for her in the company under a different supervisor, but none was available. HFC also granted Weiler an extended leave. HFC even contacted her and offered her alternative available positions within her salary grade and invited her to interview for them. She refused. Given how HFC extended itself for Weiler in these ways, HFC acted reasonably to accommodate Weiler before and after the TMJ syndrome occurred and before and after she left HFC. 23 The ADA does not require HFC to transfer Weiler to work for a supervisor other than Skorupka, or to transfer Skorupka: 24 An employer may be obligated to reassign a disabled employee, but only to vacant positions; an employer is not required to bump other employees to create a vacancy so as to be able to reassign the disabled employee. Nor is an employer obligated to create a new position for the disabled employee. Furthermore, in order for an employer to be obligated to accommodate an employee by reassigning them to a different position, that accommodation must not impose an undue hardship on the employer. 25 Gile v. United Airlines, Inc., 95 F.3d 492, 499 (7th Cir.1996) (citations omitted). Weiler's solution is that she return to work under a different supervisor. But that decision remains with the employer. In essence, Weiler asks us to allow her to establish the conditions of her employment, most notably, who will supervise her. Nothing in the ADA allows this shift in responsibility. See Wernick v. Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 91 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir.1996) (failure to assign employee to work under different supervisor did not violate reasonable accommodation requirement of ADA and Rehabilitation Act; Indeed, nothing in the law leads us to conclude that in enacting the disability acts, Congress intended to interfere with personnel decisions within an organizational hierarchy. Congress intended simply that disabled persons have the same opportunities available to them as are available to nondisabled persons.) 26 Posting allows employees at HFC to transfer to available positions in the company. Weiler admits that she was never denied an opportunity to post. She knew how to post, as she had previously used the procedure to attain the position of branch accounting manager. In November 1993, HFC's human resources director contacted Weiler regarding five available positions in her salary grade. Weiler did not attempt to post to any of them. Her only response was a letter from her attorney that she was unable to work for HFC. HFC reasonably accommodated Weiler by giving her the various offers and opportunities to post for available positions. 27 Weiler has not demonstrated what more HFC could reasonably have done to accommodate her short of creating an entirely new position for her and waiting indefinitely for her to return to work. For good reason, the ADA makes no such requirement of an employer. An employer cannot reasonably accommodate an employee who refuses to return to work. Under the ADA, HFC properly accommodated Weiler considering her limitations.