Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of confession to Dr. Glathe for the truth of the matter

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by instructing the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's confession to him could be considered for the truth of the matter and as evidence of guilt. The trial court did not formally instruct the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony could be considered as evidence of guilt, but did make statements in the jury's presence indicating that the testimony had been admitted for that purpose. During the cross-examination of Dr. Glathe, defense counsel asked the court whether it was correct that what the witness had been told by defendant had not been received for the truth of the matter stated. The court, in the presence of the jury, replied, No, it has been offered for the truth of the matter stated. Later during the cross-examination, the court sustained an objection to a question asked by defense counsel that may have appeared to relate to the witness's opinion concerning whether defendant had been telling him the truth. The court explained its ruling as follows: The doctor has testified to a statement made by the defendant. . . . [B]ut it's for the jury to determine whether or not that statement is to be believed. . . . [I]t's the truth or falsity of the statement that is in question and this witness cannot help us on that. Defendant asserts that the court's comments were erroneous, because under In re Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 46 Cal. Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33 ( Spencer ) defendant's statements to Dr. Glathe could be considered only as the basis for his expert opinion. We have stated, It is well settled that an expert's testimony as to a defendant's incriminating statements may not be regarded as proof of the facts described in such statements. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1327, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221, citing People v. Cantrell (1973) 8 Cal.3d 672, 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 and Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d 400, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) This rule derives from our decision in Spencer. Spencer held that a defendant may be examined by a court-appointed psychiatrist without the presence of his attorney, but established two safeguards in order to protect the defendant's right to counsel: First, the psychiatrist may not testify unless the defendant puts his or her mental state in issue. Second, if the psychiatrist testifies, the jury must be instructed that any incriminating statements made to him or her by the defendant may be considered only as the basis for an opinion, and not for the truth of the matters stated. ( Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at pp. 412-413, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) Even if Spencer is applicable (and, as discussed below, we conclude it is not), defendant has forfeited any claim that the trial court's comments were erroneous, because he did not request an instruction that Dr. Glathe's testimony could be considered only for the limited purpose of evaluating the basis of the experts' opinions. The trial court is not required to give the limiting instruction prescribed by Spencer in the absence of a request. ( People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d 672, 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256.) Defendant argues that the issue has not been forfeited because any request for a limiting instruction would have been futile. We disagree. The trial court did indicate in response to defense counsel's questions that the testimony was admissible for its truth, but defense counsel never argued that it could be admitted only for a limited purpose under Spencer. Rather, counsel argued that Dr. Glathe could not testify at all, because of the attorney-client privilege. Defense counsel also objected to Dr. Glathe's testifying on the ground that his testimony should be excluded under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative, and as cumulative. Defense counsel did not argue that the testimony, if admitted, could be admitted for a limited purpose. Even if the issue had not been forfeited, we would find no error, because Spencer applies when the defendant's admissions are made to an expert who has been appointed to report to the court, but not when the defendant's admissions are made to an expert appointed to assist defense counsel. Spencer required a limiting instruction when an expert who was appointed by the court to examine the defendant testified regarding the defendant's mental state. Spencer acknowledged that under Massiah v. United States (1964) 377 U.S. 201, 205, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246, the defendant has a right to have counsel present at such an examination, but that such presence may largely negate the value of the examination. ( Spencer, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 411, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) The court concluded that the presence of counsel at such a psychiatric examination is not constitutionally required so long as certain safeguards are afforded to defendant. ( Id. at p. 412, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) These safeguards include the following: (1) before submitting to an examination by a court-appointed psychiatrist, the defendant must be represented by counsel or must waive that right; (2) counsel must be informed of the appointment of the psychiatrist; (3) if the defendant does not place his or her mental state in issue, the psychiatrist should not be permitted to testify; and (4) if the psychiatrist does testify, the court should instruct the jurors that the psychiatrist's testimony as to defendant's incriminating statements should not be regarded as proof of the truth of the facts disclosed by such statements and that such evidence may be considered only for the limited purpose of showing the information upon which the psychiatrist based his opinion. ( Id. at p. 412, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) These safeguards are sufficient to justify the exclusion of counsel from the psychiatric examination and at the same time avoid a deprivation of defendant's constitutional rights. ( Id. at p. 413, 46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 33.) Under this formulation, a defendant's constitutional rights are amply protected, while the court, the prosecution, and the defendant will obtain the benefit of the testimony of an impartial psychiatrist as to defendant's mental condition. ( Ibid. ) Spencer's rationale is inapplicable when the psychiatrist is appointed to assist the defense and the communications between defendant and the psychiatrist are, hence, protected by the attorney-client privilege. When, as in the present case, the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense and operates under the attorney-client privilege, the state has not interfered in any way with the defendant's right to counsel. The defendant and his or her attorney may decide whether the attorney should be present when the psychiatrist interviews the defendant and may decide whether or not to use the results of the examination at trial. Even if the defendant places his or her mental state in issue, the defendant does not thereby waive the attorney-client privilege. ( People v. Lines, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 514, 119 Cal.Rptr. 225, 531 P.2d 793.) The psychiatrist may testify only if the defendant calls the psychiatrist as a witness or waives the privilege in some other manner. Defendant cites this court's decision in People v. Morse (1969) 70 Cal.2d 711, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607 ( Morse ) for the proposition that the safeguards set out in Spencer apply even when the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense. Morse sometimes has been cited for that proposition, and on occasion we have assumed that Spencer does apply to defense psychiatric experts. ( See, e.g., People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th 950, 1008, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [jury was admonished not to consider statements made by defendant to defense psychiatrist for the truth of their contents; defendant's claim that evidence was misused for its substance was rejected]; People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d 672, 683-684 & fn. 2, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 [finding no error in the court's failure to give a limiting instruction under Spencer, because the defendant had not requested one when three psychiatrists, called by the defense (one of whom had been selected by the defendant's counsel to advise the defense), testified concerning the defendant's incriminating statements]; see also People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 167, fn. 7, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480 [trial court admonished jury to consider defense expert's testimony concerning the defendant's admissions only as bearing on his opinion and not as evidence of guilt].) Nevertheless, Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d 711, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607, does not hold that the Spencer safeguards apply whenever the psychiatrist has been appointed to assist the defense. In Morse, a psychiatrist testified for the defense and gave an opinion concerning the defendant's mental state at the time of the offense. During cross-examination, the psychiatrist admitted he had reviewed a transcript of an interview between the defendant and police officers. The trial court previously had ruled this interview inadmissible because it was conducted in violation of the defendant's right to counsel. Nevertheless, the trial court permitted the prosecutor to question the psychiatrist about several of the statements made by the defendant during the police interview but admonished the jury that it could consider those statements only for the purposes of testing the psychiatrist's credibility and opinion. ( Id. at p. 725, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) On appeal the defendant argued that, because the interview had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights, it could not form the basis of cross-examination without infringing upon those same rights. ( Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 725, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) Analogizing to Spencer, this court rejected the defendant's argument, because the jury had been admonished to consider the statements only for the purpose of impeaching the expert and not for their substance. ( Morse, supra, 70 Cal.2d. at p. 726, 76 Cal.Rptr. 391, 452 P.2d 607.) This court indicated that the circumstances that the psychiatrist involved was appointed specifically to aid the defense, and that there were other differences between the two cases, do not render our Spencer rationale inapplicable. ( Ibid. ) In both situations the defendant's interview with the court-appointed psychiatrist without the presence of counsel in Spencer, and the defense experts' consideration of the defendant's statements to the police made without counsel in Morse defense counsel has consented to the use of incriminating statements for the purpose of psychiatric evaluation. . . . In either situation the defense can have no cause for complaint when the incriminating statements are brought to light as one of the bases of the expressed opinion, provided of course that the proper limiting instruction has been given. ( Ibid. ) The Spencer rationale that applied in Morse was Spencer's conclusion that a defendant's right to counsel is not violated if a limiting instruction is given. A violation of the defendant's right to counsel in Morse occurred because he was interviewed by the police without his counsel being present, not because he was interviewed by the defense psychiatrist without his counsel being present. Morse does not support the proposition that the defendant's right to counsel, or any other constitutional right, is violated when a defense psychiatrist testifies concerning statements made to him or her by the defendant. Neither Spencer nor Morse supports the conclusion that a limiting instruction must be given even when the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel is not at issue. Accordingly, the trial court was not required by Spencer to instruct the jury that Dr. Glathe's testimony concerning defendant's statements could not be considered as proof of the truth of the matter stated. [15] Furthermore, we cannot conclude that the absence of a limiting instruction denied defendant a fair trial. Defendant's confessions to other witnesses already were properly before the jury. It was permissible for the jury to consider the fact that defendant made a confession to Dr. Glathe for the nonsubstantive purpose of rebutting the defense experts' theory that his similar confessions to other witnesses were false. Under these circumstances, a limiting instruction would have had little or no effect. ( People v. Cantrell, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 683, 105 Cal.Rptr. 792, 504 P.2d 1256 [absence of a limiting instruction required by Spencer did not deny the defendant a fair trial when incriminating statements he made to psychiatrists were essentially the same as those he made to other witnesses].)