Opinion ID: 618626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Robles contends the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the drug conspiracy and argues that the district court should have granted his motion for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a). We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Janis, 556 F.3d 894, 897 (8th Cir.2009). Where a party challenges the evidence underlying his conviction, the standard of review is very strict, and the jury's verdict is not to be lightly overturned. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and we resolve any evidentiary conflicts in the government's favor. United States v. Hayes, 391 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). To convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the Government must prove that 1) an agreement existed among two or more people to accomplish an illegal purpose, 2) the defendant knew of the conspiracy, and 3) the defendant knowingly joined and participated in the conspiracy. Id. at 961. The Government is not required to prove that a defendant expressly agreed to join a conspiracy; a tacit agreement by the defendant is sufficient. Id. The elements of conspiracy may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence, and the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented about what the defendant's state of mind was when he did or said the things presented in the evidence. United States v. Cervantes, 646 F.3d 1054, 1059 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Chavez-Alvarez, 594 F.3d 1062, 1067 (8th Cir. 2010)). Robles contends there was insufficient evidence to support the charge of conspiracy to distribute five or more grams of cocaine, arguing the witnesses' testimony was not credible and that the testimony failed to establish Robles intentionally and knowingly entered into a conspiracy. Garcia testified at trial that Robles was his supplier of eight kilograms of cocaine and testified the two had an agreement to divide the profits of Garcia's sales. Ivan Rodriguez, another member of Garcia's organization, also testified that Robles was the supplier of the cocaine distributed by the organization. Robles contests the sufficiency of this evidence, arguing that Ivan Rodriguez and Garcia were not credible witnesses because they testified against him in hopes of gaining lighter sentences for themselves. At trial, defense attorneys questioned the witnesses at length about their possible biases and motives for testifying. The jury was well aware the witnesses were coconspirators and hoped for lighter sentences in exchange for testifying against Robles. However, the jury was entitled to credit those witnesses over Robles's defense. The jury is the final arbiter of the witnesses' credibility, and we will not disturb that assessment. Hayes, 391 F.3d at 961. Additionally, Robles argues Garcia's and Ivan Rodriguez's testimony failed to show that Robles had knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy. To convict a defendant of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the Government must prove that a conspiracy to distribute cocaine existed, that [Robles] knew of the conspiracy, and that [Robles] intentionally joined the conspiracy. United States v. Huggans, 650 F.3d 1210, 1222 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Williams, 534 F.3d 980, 985 (8th Cir.2008)). As stated, Garcia's and Rodriguez's testimony was sufficient to establish the existence of the conspiracy. Additionally, we have found that a defendant's repeated supply of large amounts of cocaine to a cocaine conspiracy is not a typical buyer-seller relationship but instead is indicative of knowledge and intent to join a conspiracy because of the quantity and regularity of the transactions. Id. at 1222-23. Garcia testified that Robles supplied him with multiple shipments of cocaine, totaling eight kilograms, over the course of the conspiracy. Garcia also testified that he and Robles had an agreement to split the profits from the cocaine sales. This was sufficient to establish Robles's knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy. Similarly, there was also sufficient evidence to support the separate charge that Robles was involved in a conspiracy to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine mixture. Though Robles contends he supplied only cocaine to the conspiracy, Robles's involvement with only one drug in the conspiracy does not absolve him from responsibility for the other drugs that the conspiracy sold. See United States v. Donnell, 596 F.3d 913, 924 (8th Cir.2010), cert. denied, Donnell v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 994, 178 L.Ed.2d 831 (2011). In Donnell, a defendant was charged with being a member of a conspiracy to distribute four types of drugs, though his involvement with the conspiracy was limited to a single drug, ecstasy. Id. at 923-24. The defendant argued there were multiple conspiracies at play and that the evidence failed to show that he had knowingly and intentionally joined the overarching conspiracy to sell multiple drugs. Id. Rather, he argued he was involved in a smaller conspiracy to distribute ecstasy only. Id. We noted the evidence was sufficient to show the defendant had knowingly engaged in a conspiracy to sell ecstasy and found a reasonable jury could have concluded this conspiracy was the same conspiracy that distributed the other drugs. Id. at 924. We stated a conspiracy with multiple objectives is not the same thing as multiple conspiracies. Id. (quoting United States v. Santisteban, 501 F.3d 873, 882 (8th Cir.2007)). One conspiracy may exist despite the involvement of multiple groups and the performance of separate acts. United States v. Riebold, 135 F.3d 1226, 1230 (8th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Dijan, 37 F.3d 398, 402 (8th Cir.1994)). The evidence at trial showed that Robles had entered a conspiracy with Garcia to distribute cocaine. There was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could have concluded that this was part of a larger conspiracy that also distributed methamphetamine. Members of the conspiracy testified that the conspiracy distributed both cocaine and methamphetamine. Additionally, Robles was interconnected with many of the men who sold both cocaine and methamphetamine. Detective John Guerrero testified that at the time of Robles's arrest, Robles was in possession of one ounce of methamphetamine, which he admitted belonged to him. Guerrero testified that in his expert opinion, one ounce was an amount associated with distribution, rather than with use. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Robles's possession of distribution quantities of methamphetamine indicated his involvement in the distribution ring was not limited to the organization's cocaine distribution. See United States v. Rolon-Ramos, 502 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding a defendant's possession of small amounts of methamphetamine coupled with other evidence of his connection with the conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine was sufficient to find that the defendant had conspired to distribute methamphetamine). Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury could reasonably have inferred that the conspiracy between Garcia and Robles to distribute cocaine was part of a larger conspiracy with multiple objectives, including the distribution of methamphetamine. For these reasons, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Robles's conviction for conspiring to distribute less than 50 grams of methamphetamine mixture. Additionally, there was sufficient evidence to support Robles's conviction for conspiracy to distribute greater than 50 grams of methamphetamine actual. The overwhelming evidence at trial indicated that members of Garcia's conspiracy placed 13 kilograms of pure methamphetamine in a storage locker. Although this methamphetamine was placed in the locker after Garcia's dispute with Robles began, a member of a drug conspiracy is responsible for all reasonably foreseeable actions of a conspiracy unless he withdraws from the conspiracy. [3] See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647-48, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Robles's dispute with Garcia was not an effective withdrawal. To withdraw from a conspiracy, a conspirator must either make a clean breast to the government or else communicate[] the fact of withdrawal to his co-conspirators in a manner reasonably calculated to reach them. United States v. Elk, 548 F.3d 641, 673 (8th Cir.2008). [M]ere cessation of unlawful participation is not enough to constitute a withdrawal. Id. at 676 (8th Cir.2008). Similarly, a souring of a relationship between a defendant and his coconspirators resulting in an end of the defendant's business relationship with the conspiracy is insufficient to establish a withdrawal from the conspiracy. United States v. Jackson, 345 F.3d 638, 648-49. At the time the methamphetamine was placed in the storage locker, Robles had not withdrawn from and was still engaged in and attempting to profit from the conspiracy. [4] Robles had not informed police of the conspiracy. Additionally, he had not informed Garcia of his intent to withdraw from the conspiracy. Instead, Robles was actively pursuing Garcia to recover the $100,000 in drug money owed to him. Thus, Robles is accountable for the methamphetamine found in the storage locker because it was placed there in the course of a conspiracy of which Robles was a member and from which he had not withdrawn. For these reasons, the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict, and the court did not err in denying Robles's request for an acquittal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 29(a).