Opinion ID: 784676
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of the Suit

Text: 17 Since venue was not proper in Illinois, Continental is left to argue that the district court should have transferred the cases under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), rather than dismissing them and thus effectively barring them under the statute of limitations. The applicable venue statute reads: 18 The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought. 19 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (emphasis added). Our review of the district court's application of the interest of justice standard is for a clear abuse of discretion. Willis v. Caterpillar, Inc., 199 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir.1999); Hapaniewski v. City of Chicago Heights, 883 F.2d 576, 579 (7th Cir.1989). Hence, we will not second-guess the decision of a district court judge that is in conformity with established legal principles and, in terms of the court's application of those principles to the facts of the case, is within the range of options from which a reasonable trial judge would select. Platinum Home Mortg. Corp. v. Platinum Fin. Group, 149 F.3d 722, 729 (7th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). 20 The district court was justified in dismissing, rather than transferring, the suits. The district court reasoned that in a case in which all parties are commercially sophisticated and familiar with the forms of litigation in which they engage, a transfer in the interests of justice is not justified when [t]here was nothing obscure about the proper forum. (Dist. Ct. Op. 8-9.) While dismissing the suit because of a mistake that is easy to commit might be so disproportionate a penalty as to constitute an abuse of discretion, the proper penalty for obvious mistakes that impose costs on opposing parties and on the judicial system is a heavy one. Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 985 (7th Cir.1986). Dismissal was proper; filing in the Northern District of Illinois was an obvious mistake made by a sophisticated party with representation. We will not second-guess the district court when it has not clearly abused its discretion. 21 Furthermore, the dismissal of a cause of action for improper venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) after the statute of limitations has run does not, on its own, constitute an abuse of discretion. Hapaniewski, 883 F.2d at 578-80 (holding that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the suit where the plaintiffs filed in the wrong federal district court, despite the heavy cost of losing the right to sue because of statute of limitations considerations). Congress enacted § 1406(a) to avoid the injustice which had often resulted to plaintiffs from dismissal of their actions merely because they had made an erroneous guess with regard to the existence of some elusive fact of the kind upon which venue provisions often turn. Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 466, 82 S.Ct. 913, 8 L.Ed.2d 39 (1962). The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the fact upon which venue under the forum-selection clause turned — the location of Burns Harbor — was not elusive.