Opinion ID: 1721531
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defense to nuisance suits provided by Iowa Code section 352.11(1).

Text: Nuisance restriction. A farm or farm operation located in an agricultural area shall not be found to be a nuisance regardless of the established date of operation or expansion of the agricultural activities of the farm or farm operation. The subsection does not apply if the nuisance results from the negligent operation of the farm or farm operation. This subsection does not apply to actions or proceedings arising from injury or damage to person or property caused by the farm or farm operation before the creation of the agricultural area. (Emphasis added.) Under Iowa Code section 352.6, an agricultural area is created by the owner submit[ting] a proposal to the county board for the creation of an agricultural area within the county.... The proposal shall include a description of the proposed area, including its boundaries. The territory shall be as compact and as nearly adjacent as feasible. Land shall not be included in an agricultural area without the consent of the owner. Agricultural areas shall not exist within the corporate limits of the city.... Agricultural areas may be created in a county which has adopted zoning ordinances. Except as provided in this section, the use of the land in agricultural areas is limited to farm operations. 2. The merits. The Wolffs maintain that the language of section 352.11(1) is clear on its face and requires no interpretation by us. The statute, they say, prohibits any award for damages for nuisance actions after the affected property has been included in an agricultural area as defined by section 352.6. The Wolffs do not dispute that the district court's $9000 award to the Weinholds for special damages occurring before October 8, 1991, was proper. (On October 8, 1991, the county board of supervisors approved the Wolffs' property as an agricultural area.) The Wolffs do, however, contend the $36,000 award for special damages occurring on and after October 8, 1991, was improper. The $36,000 award is improper, the Wolffs assert, because those damages occurred after the county had approved the Wolffs' property as an agricultural area. The Wolffs insist the legislature intended that a party should not recover for nuisance damages which occur after the county has approved the property as an agricultural area. The Weinholds agree section 352.11(1) is clear on its face, but they argue the statute plainly favors their claim. The Weinholds contend their nuisance action arose out of injury created and damage sustained before the county approved the Wolffs' property as an agricultural area. In short, the Weinholds rely on the following language in section 352.11(1): This subsection does not apply to actions or proceedings arising from injury or damage to person or property caused by the farm or farm operation before the creation of the agricultural area. Section 352.11(1) is a right to farm law designed to protect agricultural operations by giving those operations meeting the statutory requirements a defense to nuisance actions. See Neil D. Hamilton, A Livestock Producer's Legal Guide to: Nuisance, Land Use Control, and Environmental Law 21 (1992). All fifty states have enacted right to farm laws in various forms. Id. Negligent operation of the farm resulting in the nuisance defeats the defense. Additionally, the defense does not apply to actions or proceedings arising from injury or damage to property caused by the farm operation before the agricultural area is established. Our interpretation suggests that the legislature has determined that farming operations like the Wolffs' are sufficiently important to the state to warrant protective state laws like section 352.11(1). The practical effect of these laws, of course, is to limit the ability of persons affected by the operation to sue operators for nuisance. The purpose clause of Iowa Code chapter 352 supports our interpretation. See Iowa Code § 352.1. Section 352.1 states in pertinent part: The general assembly recognizes the importance of preserving the state's finite supply of agricultural land. Conversion of farmland to urban development, and other nonfarm uses, reduces future food production capabilities and may ultimately undermine agriculture as a major economic activity in Iowa. It is the intent of the general assembly to provide local citizens and local governments the means by which agricultural land may be protected from nonagricultural development pressures. This may be accomplished by ... establishment of agricultural areas in which substantial agricultural activities are encouraged, so that land inside these areas ... is conserved for the production of food, fiber, and livestock, thus assuring the preservation of agriculture as a major factor in the economy of this state. (Emphasis added.) The problem in this case is that the Wolffs started their operation about a year before their land was approved as an agricultural area. As we see it, the parties' contentions are resolved by whether the nuisance was permanent or temporary. Before beginning our analysis, we need to distinguish between these types of nuisances. The distinction has been explained this way: An action in damages may be maintained for the creation of a nuisance and a subsequent and separate action may be maintained for the continuance of such nuisance. The determination of whether a single right of action or successive rights are created by a nuisance for damages depends primarily upon whether the cause of injury is permanent or temporary. The nature of the damages, as being temporary or permanent, is determined by the character of the nuisance to which the land is subjected and not by the quantity of resultant damages. The question generally is one of fact for the jury. If injuries from a nuisance are of a permanent character and go to the entire value of the estate, there can be but one action, and all damagespast, present, and futureare recoverable therein; in such a case, one recovery is a grant or license to continue the nuisance, and there can be no second recovery for its continuance. Stated otherwise, damages for permanent nuisances are not dependent upon any subsequent use of the property but are complete when the nuisance comes into existence.... Where the injury from the alleged nuisance is temporary in its nature, or is of a continuing or recurring character, the damages are ordinarily regarded as continuing, and one recovery against the wrongdoer is not a bar to successive actions for damages thereafter accruing from the same wrong. In such a case, every day's continuance is a new nuisance. That is, each repetition of the nuisance creates further liability, and gives rise to a new cause of action. If the nuisance does not involve the entire destruction of the estate or its beneficial use, but may be apportioned from time to time, separate actions must be brought for each recurring injury, and recovery may be had for damages sustained within the period of the statute of limitations applicable to the action. That is, where a nuisance is temporary, damages to property affected by the nuisance are recurrent and may be recovered from time to time until the nuisance is abated. A temporary nuisance may in some circumstances give rise to permanent damages, as well as temporary damages. .... The rule applicable where the nuisance is permanent has been applied in cases where the court does not deem it just and equitable to order the thing which causes the injury to be removed, although it is removable, since, under such circumstances, the plaintiff must in one action recover his damages and the defendant must pay all the damages suffered, both past and present, unless the defendant removes the thing before the time of trial, in which case damages are recoverable only up to the time of such removal. 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisances §§ 273-75 (1989). For reasons that follow, we think contrary to the district courtthe unique facts of this case dictate that we consider the nuisance permanent. We characterize the facts here as unique to emphasize that [t]he terms permanent and temporary are somewhat nebulous in that they have practical meaning only in relation to particular fact situations and can change in characterization from one set of facts to another. Mel Foster Co. Properties v. American Oil Co., 427 N.W.2d 171, 175 (Iowa 1988) (quoting Note, Stream PollutionRecovery of Damages, 50 Iowa L.Rev. 141, 153 (1964); holding that chemical contamination of land encompassed aspects of both a temporary and permanent nuisance; injury was temporary in the sense that the cause of pollution had been discovered and abated, and harmful effects would eventually dissipate; injury was permanent in the sense that it constituted damage to ground itself and would continue for an indefinite but significant period of time; court used measure of damages applicable to permanent nuisance). First, there is no record evidence that, short of shutting down the operation, the Wolffs can or will abate the nuisance in the future. The district court speculated that technology would eventually solve the odor problem. There was, however, no record evidence that odor control breakthroughs were near. A knowledgeable expert in this area testified that more research was necessary on how to detect and control odor. Mr. Wolff testified he used an odor control additive in the waste basin. He also testified, however, that he stopped using the additive because the additive was ineffective. The engineer who designed the waste system for the Wolffs offered no evidence that there were any technological breakthroughs on the horizon to control odor. We agree with the Weinholds' assessment of the district court's finding on this issue: The court's rationale that the nuisance was not permanent due to rapidly developing technology that would `hopefully' aid in the control of odor was unsupported by anything other than wishful thinking. Moreover, the Wolffs offered no evidence that they intended to cease the operation in the foreseeable future. The evidence, in fact, points the other way because the Wolffs built the waste basin with the capacity to double its current holdings. See Mel Foster Co. Properties, 427 N.W.2d at 175 (permanent in legal sense does not mean foreverindefinitely long is sufficient); Patz, 196 N.W.2d at 562 (permanent easement is one of such character that it will be reasonably certain to continue in the future). Second, we can abate the odor by ordering closure of the earthen basin. This is not an equitable and practical solution because our closure order would result in closing the whole operation. See 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisances § 275 (The rule applicable where the nuisance is permanent has been applied in cases where the court does not deem it just and equitable to order the thing which causes the injury to be removed, although it is removable....). In addition, such a result would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of chapter 352. Last, without the removal order, the Wolffs would have, in effect, a license to continue the nuisance. See 58 Am.Jur.2d Nuisances § 274. Because of the section 352.11(1) defense against nuisance suits, the Weinholds would have no corresponding right to recover for the continuing nuisance. In these unique circumstances, equity dictates that the Weinholds recover in this action all of their past, present, and future damages. See Wesley v. City of Waterloo, 232 Iowa 1299, 1303, 8 N.W.2d 430, 432 (1943) (in the case of a permanent nuisance, plaintiff may maintain only one action; plaintiff is therefore allowed to recover all damagespast, present, and futurein the one action). We reach the critical issue in this case: Did the legislature intend to cut off the Weinholds' cause of action to recover damages because of a permanent nuisance? We think not. Our conclusion is borne out by the plain language of section 352.11(1). As mentioned, section 352.11(1) gives owners of operations within approved agricultural areas a defense against nuisance suits. The defense does not, however, apply to actions or proceedings arising from injury or damages to person or property caused by the ... farm operation before the creation of the agricultural area. Iowa Code § 352.11(1) (emphasis added). Iowa Code section 352.2(9) defines nuisance action or proceeding to mean an action, claim, or proceeding, whether brought at law, in equity, or as an administrative proceeding, which is based on nuisance.  (Emphasis added.) An action in its usual legal sense means a lawsuit brought in a court; ... [t]he legal and formal demand of one's right from another person or party made and insisted on in a court of justice. Black's Law Dictionary 28 (6th ed. 1990). The Weinholds' lawsuit meets the definition of nuisance action in section 352.2(9). This lawsuit is an action because they brought it in a court and are demanding their right to relief for damages from the Wolffs. Additionally, the Weinholds' lawsuit is based on nuisance. Under Iowa law, causes of actions accrue when the wrongful act produces loss or damage to the claimant. McKiness Excavating & Grading, Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 507 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1993). Here the nuisance created by the Wolffs' operation caused the Weinholds damage long before the county approved the Wolffs' land as an agricultural area. Because the nuisance is a permanent one, the Weinholds' damages were complete at the time the nuisance arose. This is so because a permanent nuisance contemplates that [the nuisance] is at once necessarily productive of all the damages that can ever result from it. Patz, 196 N.W.2d at 562 (citation omitted). See also Wesley, 232 Iowa at 1303, 8 N.W.2d at 432 (in the case of a permanent nuisance, plaintiff may maintain only one action; plaintiff is therefore allowed to recover all damages past, present, and futurein one action). We have held that we should not construe a statute as taking away common law rights existing at the time of enactment unless that result is imperatively required. Ford v. Venard, 340 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 1983) (citation omitted). Our interpretation that section 352.11(1) does not take away the Weinholds' nuisance action is consistent with this rule of statutory construction. Moreover, we see evidence in Iowa Code chapter 352 to support our interpretation. Iowa Code section 352.6(1)(a) provides that nonconforming preexisting residences may be continued in residential use in an approved agricultural area. So not only was the legislature concerned about conserving farmland for agricultural purposes, it was also concerned about preserving private residential property. Our interpretation allowing the Weinholds to recover all of the damages they are entitled to strikes a balance between these two competing interests. Finally, our interpretation would not affect the overall legislative scheme in chapter 352 because, as the Weinholds point out, it is unlikely that many hog farms are nuisances before farmland is approved as an agricultural area. We hold therefore that section 352.11(1) did not afford the Wolffs a defense to the Weinholds' nuisance action for past, present, and future damages.