Opinion ID: 852583
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure To Object to a Visible Restraint as Substandard Performance

Text: Even if failure to object to the belt was not justified as a tactical decision, the issue remains whether it was below professional norms to fail to object to the use of any restraint or to the absence of any finding of necessity for restraint. The law regarding use of stun belts was not settled at the time of Stephenson's trial, and counsel are not ordinarily found deficient for failure to anticipate a change in the law. Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 690 (Ind.2005); Fulmer v. State, 523 N.E.2d 754, 757-58 (Ind.1988). Under the law at the time of Stephenson's trial, an ineffective assistance claim based on failure to object to restraints required the restraints to be visible. Failure to object to restraints is not substandard performance where the jury is unaware of the restraints. [2] But the Seventh Circuit has held that failure to object to restraints that are readily visible is substandard performance of counsel. Roche v. Davis, 291 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir.2002) (quoting Fountain v. United States, 211 F.3d 429, 435 (7th Cir.2000)). The Seventh Circuit found unreasonable [3] our conclusion that counsel was not ineffective for failure to object to shackling and failure to take steps to prevent the jury from viewing the shackles. Id. Although Roche addressed shackling, we think its reasoning is equally applicable to a stun belt. The use of a stun belt, if perceived by the jury, produces all of the results that shackling does. It sends a signal that the defendant may be dangerous and thereby impairs the presumption of innocence; it interferes with the defendant's communication with his attorney; and it has the same effect on the dignity of the process. Indeed, some courts have concluded that a stun belt, if perceived by the jury, may be even more prejudicial than handcuffs or leg irons because it implies that unique force is necessary to control the defendant. United States v. Durham, 287 F.3d 1297, 1305 (11th Cir.2002) (quoting State v. Flieger, 91 Wash.App. 236, 955 P.2d 872, 874 (1998)). Even if the jury is unaware of the belt, there remain the concerns that a stun belt could disrupt a different set of a defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Id. First, [a] stun belt seemingly poses a far more substantial risk of interfering with a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confer with counsel than do leg shackles. Id. Second, the device poses a greater threat to the defendant's Sixth Amendment and due process rights to be present and participate in his defense because [i]t is reasonable to assume that much of a defendant's focus and attention when wearing one of these devices is occupied by anxiety over the possible triggering of the belt. Id. at 1305-06. These are in substance the same points emphasized by the majority in Wrinkles in banning the belt under Indiana state law. 749 N.E.2d at 1194. In sum, in the absence of an explanation for counsel's failure to object to a stun belt that is readily visible, that failure is substandard performance.