Opinion ID: 2973594
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: This is a reverse sex discrimination case

Text: The proper legal standard has been a rather thorny issue in this case. The district court sua sponte analyzed the case as a reduction in force case, which alters the analysis under the forth prong. Before deciding whether this is a reduction in force case, however, the parties and the district court failed to note that this is a reverse sex discrimination 10 case. On appeal, however, the ODJFS cites the standard applicable to reverse discrimination cases, but concedes that it did not cite this standard to the district court. In adapting the McDonnell Douglas test to cases of reverse discrimination, this Court has held that, under the first prong, a plaintiff must demonstrate “background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.” Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (quoting Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981)); see also Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Community College, 314 F.3d 249, 256 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that such evidence “justifies a suspicion that incidents of capricious discrimination against whites because of their race may be likely”). To satisfy the fourth prong, a plaintiff must show that the defendant treated differently employees who were similarly situated but were not members of the protected class. Sutherland v. Mich. Dept. of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir. 2003). There can be no question that the standard applicable to reverse discrimination cases must be applied to this case because Wilson is a male.