Opinion ID: 1725524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error in failing and/or refusing to fully instruct the jury on the law.

Text: ¶ 48. Sewell argues that the trial court's instructions to the jurors, specifically instructions S-1 through S-8, were improperly granted in that they were unsupported by credible evidence. The crux of her argument revolves around the trial judge's admission of Exhibit S-18 into evidence, which were various orders taken from the minutes of the Chancery Clerk's office that were apparently signed and presented by Sewell as attorney for the Department of Human Services. Sewell contends that the exemplars in Exhibit S-18 were indispensable to Frank Hicks in forming opinions as to the writer of the attesting witness' signatures on the ballot applications and the ballot envelopes. Sewell claims that the signatures in S-18 were not authenticated since no one saw her sign them. Therefore they were improperly admitted into evidence, thereby resulting in insufficient evidence upon which to base instructions S-1 through S-8. ¶ 49. Although this issue is framed by Sewell as an improper jury instruction, we will treat this assignment of error as an evidentiary question. If Exhibit S-18 was properly admitted into evidence, then the trial judge's jury instructions S-1 through S-8 were supported by an abundance of credible evidence. If Exhibit S-18 was not properly admitted into evidence, the jury instructions were still proper because there remained sufficient testimony and evidence to allow the jury to find that Sewell did indeed make the attesting signatures to the ballot applications and ballot envelopes. ¶ 50. As such, this Court reviews admission of evidence for an abuse of discretion. Butler v. State, 592 So.2d 983, 986 (Miss.1991); Stromas v. State, 618 So.2d 116, 119 (Miss.1993). Unless the trial judge's discretion is so abused as to be prejudicial to the accused, this Court will not reverse his ruling. Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1136 (Miss.1992); Shearer v. State, 423 So.2d 824, 826 (Miss.1982) ( citing Page v. State, 295 So.2d 279 (Miss.1974)). The discretion of the trial judge must be exercised within the boundaries of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence. Johnston v. State, 567 So.2d 237, 238 (Miss.1990). Evidentiary rulings are affirmed unless they affect a substantial right of the complaining party. Ivy v. State, 641 So.2d 15, 18 (Miss.1994); Miss.R.Evid. 103(a). ¶ 51. The signature Sandra D. Sewell appears on the attesting witness line on the ballot envelopes marked Exhibits S-1 and S-2, the heart of Counts I and II. The signature Sandra D. Sewell appears on the attesting witness line on the ballot applications marked exhibits S-3 through S-8, the focus of Counts III-VIII. The exhibit numbers correspond to the count numbersS-1 the core of Count I, S-2 the focus of Count two, etc. ¶ 52. Frank Hicks, the State's handwriting expert, testified as to the opinions a handwriting expert can give when examining a known exemplar and a questioned writing: There are two conclusive opinions that can be given. One is that the writing has been identified as having been prepared by the subject who prepared the known writing. And the other is an elimination where the examiner says that the subject did not prepare the questioned writing. In between these two extremes are a number of opinions we refer to as inconclusive opinions. If you consider the opinions that can be given to be a straight line, on one end you've an identification; on the other end you've got an elimination. Right in the middle you've got the no opinion where there's for some reason not enough evidence to warrant the formation of any opinion at all. Proceeding from this point toward identification, there are three inconclusive opinions. The weakest is that there is some reason to believe that this subject prepared the questioned writing. The stronger opinion is that there is reason to believe that the subject prepared the questioned writing. And then just shy of an identification is the opinion that there is strong reason to believe that the subject prepared the questioned writing. Then there are similar opinions going the other direction from the middle of the line toward elimination; and those opinions are some reason to doubt, reason to doubt, strong reason to doubt, and then the elimination. ¶ 53. Hicks testified that the strong reason to believe opinion was as close as you can get to an identification without actually being able to make an identification. Even when the expert's opinion does not serve to identify or eliminate a particular writer as the source of questioned writing, that opinion is helpful to the trier of fact because [a]n expert opinion regarding handwriting need not be based upon absolute certainty in order to be admissible. United States v. Herrera, 832 F.2d 833, 837 (4th Cir.1987). ¶ 54. In order for Sandra D. Sewell signatures to be authenticated by comparison, as allowed by Miss.R.Evid. 901(b)(3), state investigator Jim Gilliland (Gilliland) obtained handwriting samples, or exemplars, from Sewell on June 30, 1992, pursuant to court authorization. Sewell's exemplars were entered into evidence as composite Exhibit S-16. ¶ 55. After examination of the requested exemplars collected by Gilliland of Sewell in Exhibit S-16, Hicks then asked for additional collected exemplars, since it might then be possible to form a more conclusive opinion. Warren Emfinger went to the Wilkinson County Chancery Clerk's office and made copies of court documents from the Chancery Court minutes bearing the signature Sandra D. Sewell, compared the copies with the original, and produced these compared copies [6] at trial where they were admitted into evidence as Exhibit S-18. ¶ 56. Hicks conducted additional examinations of the Sandra D. Sewell signatures in Exhibits S-1 through S-8 using both the requested samples in Exhibit S-16 and the collected exemplars in Exhibit S-18. He upgraded his opinion by positively identifying the writer of the standards in Exhibits S-16 and S-18 (Sewell) as the writer of the questioned attestation signatures in Exhibits S-3 through S-8 (Sewell). Hicks's original opinion that there was a strong reason to believe that the writer of the S-16 exemplars was the writer of the questioned Sandra D. Sewell signatures in Exhibits S-1 and S-2 was unchanged after his additional comparison of the collected exemplars in Exhibit S-18. ¶ 57. Miss.R.Evid. 901 governs the authentication requirements for evidence. The requirement for authentication is ... satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. Miss.R.Evid. 901(a). Additionally, [c]omparison by the trier of fact or by expert witnesses with specimens which have been authenticated is permitted for authentication. Miss.R.Evid. 901(b)(3). A person's handwriting may be authenticated by a handwriting expert or by a lay witness with a prior familiarity with that person's handwriting. Hentz v. State, 542 So.2d 914, 917 (Miss.1989). ¶ 58. In the instant case, the trial judge was well within his discretion in admitting Exhibit S-18 into evidence. First, the collected writings comprising Exhibit S-18 were compared with other writings properly authenticated, i.e., the requested samples in Exhibit S-16 obtained by Gilliland pursuant to court order. He testified that he was present when she signed her name to the cards which were admitted as Exhibit S-16. Hicks compared the two writings and concluded that they were written by the same person. This satisfies the requirement of authentication set forth by Miss.R.Evid. 901(b)(3) and Hentz. ¶ 59. Second, the Miss.R.Evid. permits the trier of fact, in this case, the jury, to compare specimens with authenticated specimens for determination of their authenticity. See United States v. Fields, 923 F.2d 358 (5th Cir.1991), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.1993). Here, the writings in Exhibits S-16 and S-18 were admitted for the jury to compare with the questioned signatures. Beyond those writings, Sewell's signature appears on her Application for Notary Public Commission, and this document was available for the jurors' comparison as Exhibit S-17. ¶ 60. Third, the State cites a liberal preference for admission of evidence as the approach for authentication and identification under Rule 901(a) on the federal level, after which our rule is patterned. [T]here need be only a prima facie showing, to the court, of authenticity, not a full argument on admissibility. Once a prima facie case is made, the evidence goes to the jury and it is the jury who will ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not the court. The only requirement is that there has been substantial evidence from which they could infer that the document was authentic. United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 328-29 (3rd Cir.1992) ( quoting Link v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, 788 F.2d 918, 928 (3rd Cir. 1986)). ¶ 61. In the instant case, the documents with Sewell's signature which comprise Exhibit S18 were taken from the minutes of the Chancery Court. Each of the documents were signed Sandra D. Sewell as the attorney for the Department of Human Services. An attorney signature line appears on each order and judgment, preceded by either Presented to the Court:, or Prepared for the Court By:, or Approved as to Form. Kenny Middleton, a self employed attorney who also serves as Mayor of Fayette, testified that these sections are customarily used by the attorney who presents the document to the court. Jimmy Reese, a life-long resident of Wilkinson County, testified that Sewell served as attorney for the Department of Human Services during the period when these orders and judgments were signed. We find that the judge was well within his discretion in the admission into evidence of Exhibit S-18. ¶ 62. Based on the foregoing discussion, we find that there was indeed sufficient evidence in the record to support the granting of jury instructions S-1 through S-8. This assignment of error is without merit.