Opinion ID: 63008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: On appeal, Dr. Sabater argues that the district court erred in denying qualified immunity because: (1) Bias failed to allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right; (2) Dr. Sabater’s conduct was objectively 5 No. 05-10890 reasonable in light of the clearly established law;3 and (3) Bias failed to state or prove a claim other than negligence. We review a district court’s conclusions of law de novo. See Water Craft Mgmt. LLC v. Mercury Marine, 457 F.3d 484, 488 (5th Cir. 2006). We may not set aside a district court’s factual findings unless it is clearly erroneous. See Crawford v. Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 131 F.3d 1120, 1124 (5th Cir. 1997); FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a). Government officials performing discretionary functions are protected from civil liability under the doctrine of qualified immunity if their conduct does not violate “clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” See McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 322 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). Federal courts apply a two-step analysis to qualified immunity claims. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). First, “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right?” Scott v. Harris, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774 (2007) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201). If the answer is yes, the court inquires whether the officer’s conduct was objectively reasonable in light of the law that was “clearly established” at the time of the alleged violation. Goodson v. City of Corpus Christi, 202 F.3d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 2000). Bias argues that Dr. Sabater violated his constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause allows an inmate to obtain relief after being 3 Dr. Sabater separately questions whether the relevant law was “clearly established,” but that question is part and parcel of the objective reasonableness analysis. See Williams v. Kaufman County, 352 F.3d 994, 1002 n.12 (5th Cir. 2003) (“The district court, however, unnecessarily decoupled the clearly established/objective unreasonableness test of the Supreme Court. That is, if a right is clearly established enough to impart fair warning to officers, then their conduct in violating that right cannot be objectively reasonable.”). 6 No. 05-10890 denied medical care if he proves that there was a “deliberate indifference to [his] serious medical needs.” Banuelos v. McFarland, 41 F.3d 232, 235 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). Deliberate indifference requires a showing that Dr. Sabater (1) was “aware of facts from which an inference of excessive risk to the prisoner’s health or safety could be drawn,” and (2) that she “actually drew an inference that such potential for harm existed.” Herman v. Holiday, 238 F.3d 660, 664 (5th Cir. 2001). Such a showing requires evidence that prison officials “refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wonton disregard for any serious medical needs.” Domino v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 107). A prisoner’s disagreement with his medical treatment is not actionable under § 1983 absent exceptional circumstances. See Banuelos, 41 F.3d at 235. Under exceptional circumstances, a prison official’s knowledge of a substantial risk of harm may be inferred by the obviousness of a substantial risk. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842 & n.8 (1994). “[I]t remains open to the officials to prove that they were unaware even of an obvious risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 844. After applying the facts to the relevant legal standards, the district court made the following findings: Dr. Sabater was not entitled to qualified immunity because “a reasonable person would have known that her conduct in ordering the transportation of an inmate in Bias’[s] condition to a prison unit 150 miles away, rather than providing immediate medical attention, would cause a significant delay, if not a complete denial, of medical care;” Bias’s medical condition on May 22, 1997, was “open and obvious” and “an exceptional circumstance obviously requiring immediate medical attention;” Dr. Sabater “was aware of facts from which an inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed;” Dr. Sabater “actually drew that inference;” and “her intentional failure 7 No. 05-10890 to act caused a prolonged delay in medical care and resulted in substantial injury to Michael Bias;” and Dr. Sabater was “deliberately indifferent” to Bias’s “serious medical needs” and her conduct resulted in his injuries. After thoroughly reviewing the briefs and relevant portions of the record, we find no clear error in the district court’s factual findings and affirm for essentially the same reasons stated by the district court in its written order. AFFIRMED. 8 No. 05-10890