Opinion ID: 782204
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clearly Established Supreme Court Law on Cross-Examination

Text: 115 The right of cross-examination, though not absolute, is one of the most firmly established principles under Supreme Court law. Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional right to cross-examine a witness includes the opportunity to expose a witness's biases and possible motives to lie. The Court held that the defendant should have been allowed to cross-examine a prosecution witness about his relationship with law enforcement, which may have provided the witness with a motive to fabricate accusations against the defendant in order to obtain leniency. Id. at 316-18, 94 S.Ct. 1105. As the Court stated, the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. Id. at 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105. This principle has been reaffirmed by the Supreme Court and our court ever since. See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Fuller, 273 F.3d at 219; Henry v. Speckard, 22 F.3d 1209, 1214 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1029, 115 S.Ct. 606, 130 L.Ed.2d 517 (1994) (The motivation of a witness in testifying, including her possible self-interest and any bias or prejudice against the defendant, is one of the principal subjects for cross-examination.); cf. United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 955 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1233, 111 S.Ct. 2858, 115 L.Ed.2d 1026 (1991) (The court should avoid any blanket prohibition on exploration of an area that is central to an assessment of the witness's reliability.). In addition to demonstrating bias, the defendant is entitled to use cross-examination to impeach the witness's recollection, ability to observe, and general credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Reindeau, 947 F.2d 32, 36 (2d Cir.1991); Harper v. Kelly, 916 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir.1990). 116 The Confrontation Clause is violated when a defendant is prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed ... `to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors ... could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.' Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105). Most of the cases involving this type of Confrontation Clause violation involve a trial court limiting cross-examination into a particular subject, see, e.g., Davis, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105; Mehler et al., FEDERAL CRIMINAL PRACTICE: A SECOND CIRCUIT HANDBOOK § 8-2, at 109 (Matthew Bender 2002) (collecting cases), where the question is whether the jury is in possession of facts sufficient to make a `discriminating appraisal' of the particular witness's credibility. United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 806 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1397, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991) (quoting United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir.1980)). 117 The impingement on the confrontation right here, where defendant was completely precluded from cross-examining the only living person to identify Cotto as the shooter, is particularly stark. The Appellate Division's decision is not objectively unreasonable only if it was reasonable to conclude that the waiver of confrontation rights can extend even to the cross-examination of a prosecution witness who actually takes the stand and testifies.