Opinion ID: 2109108
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Statements of Agent Soppeland

Text: Next we must determine whether the admission of false statements made by Agent Soppeland during his interview with appellant was error. [10] Appellant argues that the statements were both inadmissible hearsay and violative of the Confrontation Clause. While the admission of Agent Soppeland's audiotaped statements was not objected to at trial, we have the discretion, on appeal, to determine whether the admission of such evidence constituted plain error affecting substantial rights. State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 740 (Minn.1998); see Minn. R. Evid. 103(d); Minn. R.Crim. P. 31.02. The plain error standard requires appellant to show that: (1) there was error, (2) it was plain, and (3) the error affected appellant's substantial rights. Id. In order to prove the third prong, appellant bears a heavy burden of persuasion to show that the error was prejudicial and affected the outcome of the case. Griller, 583 N.W.2d at 741. If appellant proves each prong of the plain error test, we must then assess[ ] whether [we] should address the error to ensure fairness and the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Id. at 740. The state argues that our holding in State v. Tovar, 605 N.W.2d 717 (Minn.2000), should control the outcome of this case. In Tovar, we held a defendant's taped interview with a law enforcement agent, where the law enforcement agent repeated exaggerated statements of codefendants implicating defendant's guilt and embellished his knowledge of facts surrounding the crime, to be admissible. However, Tovar is distinguishable from this case in several important respects. First, the law enforcement agent in Tovar was cross-examined and admitted to the jury that during interrogations the police often make more of the evidence they have to illicit information from suspected criminals, and specifically testified that police would often claim that other persons had told them that the suspect has details about the crime not commonly known, giving a specific example of a point in the interrogation at which he had done so. Id. at 725. This is different than the present case, where Agent Soppeland made false statements during the interview, and the jury was never told that those statements were not true. Further, and important to our analysis, while the law enforcement agent in Tovar admitted that he exaggerated his knowledge of facts regarding the crime during the interrogation, the exaggerated facts turned out to be true. Id. at 725. In this case, a tape was played in which Agent Soppeland made a false statement that others implicated appellant in the murder. The jury was never told that this statement was not true  not on cross-examination, not in a limiting instruction, and not in closing arguments. Therefore, Tovar is distinguishable from this case in important respects, and our plain error analysis should control the determination of this issue. The admission of the statements in this case is error that is plain because the statements, by the application of well-settled law, constitute inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is defined as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Minn. R. Evid. 801(c). In this case, Agent Soppeland's statements that Ecklund and McCollum allegedly implicated appellant in the murder of Pool were made outside of the trial, and because there was no objection, cross-examination, or limiting instruction, the statements were before the jury as statements supporting the truth of such implications. Further, even if otherwise admissible, our rules state that relevant evidence may be excluded at trial if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice   . Minn. R. Evid. 403. As an initial matter, it is difficult to characterize false evidence as relevant evidence. But assuming that it is relevant, in a case such as this, based heavily on circumstantial evidence, statements by a law enforcement agent that others have implicated appellant come closer to direct evidence than anything else the jury heard. Consequently, the unfair prejudice of allowing the jury to hear the false statements largely outweighs their probative value, especially considering the fact that the only probative value of the evidence, as argued by the state, was to allow appellant's denials to be heard by the jury. The jury had already heard appellant's repeated denials to accusations that he directed the murder of Pool in the balance of the properly admitted portions of appellant's interviews with Agents Soppeland, McDonald, and Russell, and Officer Schuette. Therefore the probative value of admitting appellant's denials in response to Agent Soppeland's false statements is de minimus, if it exists at all. Having concluded that the admission of Agent Soppeland's questions was error that was plain, we must decide what effect the error had on appellant's substantial rights. Here, the jury heard a law enforcement agent state that McCollum and Ecklund directly implicated appellant in the murder of Pool, when in truth McCollum and Ecklund implicated each other in the murders. The jury was never told that this information was false. Given the weight and sparseness of the balance of the evidence, it is inconceivable that the false statements did not influence the jury and, in turn, affect appellant's substantial rights. Moreover, the error within the context of the entire trial undermines the fairness and integrity of the judicial proceedings. The alleged accusations of two accomplices were, taken together, the most compelling piece of evidence  and it was false. We therefore hold that the admission of portions of Agent Soppeland's interview with appellant at issue here was plain error.