Opinion ID: 777088
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: New Trial Based on Jury Exposure to Extrinsic Evidence

Text: 75 The defendants also claim that the extrinsic evidence brought in by juror Baker, i.e., the information regarding his outside contact and his relationship to Robert Baker, prejudiced the jury against them. 5 76 It is well-settled that any extra-record information of which a juror becomes aware is presumed prejudicial. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). A government showing that the information is harmless will overcome this presumption. See id. Where an extraneous influence is shown, the court must apply an objective test, assessing for itself the likelihood that the influence would affect a typical juror. Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 17 (2d Cir.) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 901, 115 S.Ct. 261, 130 L.Ed.2d 181 (1994). A trial court's post-verdict determination of extra-record prejudice must be an objective one, focusing on the information's probable effect on a hypothetical average juror. United States v. Calbas, 821 F.2d 887, 896 n. 9 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 937, 108 S.Ct. 1114, 99 L.Ed.2d 275 (1988); see Bibbins, 21 F.3d at 17. The court may not inquire into the degree upon which the extra-record information was used in deliberations and the impression which jurors actually had about it. Calbas, 821 F.2d at 897 (citing Fed. R.Evid. 606(b)); see Bibbins, 21 F.3d at 17 (juror's affidavit as to how extrinsic information affected the thinking and voting of the jurors or the deliberations of the jury as a whole was inadmissible). However, in applying the objective test, the court may appropriately consider the circumstances surrounding the introduction of [the] information in making [its] determination. Calbas, 821 F.2d at 896 n. 9. 77 In the evidentiary hearing in this case, the District Court asked jurors whether the extra-record information impacted their ability to be fair and impartial. Because this was a post-verdict hearing, that line of questioning was improper. See Bibbins, 21 F.3d at 17 (under Fed. R.Evid. 606(b), [e]ven when a juror attests to receiving information outside the record, the juror may not go on to testify about the effect of that information on the juror's mental processes or the jury's deliberations); United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir.1989) (Whether the jury relied on improper evidence ... is not a question to be asked jurors....). 78 Nonetheless, the District Court also concluded that the extrinsic information would not have affected a typical juror. After making an independent determination as to this issue, Bibbins, 21 F.3d at 17, we agree. The outside contact with John Baker presented no information that could have been improperly used in deliberations. No specific details about the case were revealed, and there was no indication that the defendants arranged the call. Similarly, Robert Baker's role in the trial was minimal, and his name arose during testimony which was provided to prove two counts on which the defendants were ultimately acquitted. See Calbas, 821 F.2d at 895 (finding no prejudice in part because the extrinsic information bore most directly on the substantive count, upon which [defendant] was acquitted). Moreover, as the District Court found, the jury's complex verdict resulting in convictions on some counts and acquittals on others demonstrated its fairness. See United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 631 (2d Cir.1985) (noting that jury's impartiality was demonstrated by the nature of its verdict and careful discrimination in weighing the evidence). 79 Thus, we agree that a hypothetical average juror would not have been influenced by the extrinsic information in this case. Accordingly, the defendants' motion for a new trial based on jury prejudice resulting from extraneous information was properly denied.