Opinion ID: 2580978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deliberate Cruelty

Text: When the offender's conduct during the commission of the crime manifests deliberate cruelty to the victim, the trial court may impose an exceptional sentence. See former RCW 9.94A.390(2)(a) (1998). Deliberate cruelty consists of gratuitous violence or other conduct that inflicts physical, psychological, or emotional pain as an end in itself. State v. Copeland, 130 Wash.2d 244, 296, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996). To justify an exceptional sentence, the cruelty must go beyond that normally associated with the commission of the charged offense or inherent in the elements of the offenseelements of the crime that were already contemplated by the legislature in establishing the standard range. See State v. Ferguson, 142 Wash.2d 631, 647-48, 15 P.3d 1271 (2001). See also State v. Armstrong, 106 Wash.2d 547, 551, 723 P.2d 1111 (1986) (holding that the burns inflicted on the 10-month-old victim by defendant's throwing boiling coffee on the child and plunging the child's foot in the coffee were injuries accounted for in the offense of second degree assault and could not justify an exceptional sentence). Tili contends that his conduct during the rapes does not amount to deliberate cruelty and that his violent acts are elements of first degree rape, done in order to exact compliance. Tili claims that his demand that L.M. say she liked it when he penetrated her anus and vagina does not rise to the level of gratuitous conduct which inflicts pain as an end in itself. In support, Tili cites Delarosa-Flores, in which Division Three of the Court of Appeals did not uphold a finding of deliberate cruelty where defendant slapped the 67-year-old victim's thighs leaving bruises, called her stupid lady during the rapes, and brandished a small pair of scissors. State v. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wash.App. 514, 518-19, 799 P.2d 736 (1990). The court justified this holding by stating that this conduct was not significantly more serious or egregious than is typical of other rapes. Id. at 519, 799 P.2d 736. The Delarosa-Flores court went on to distinguish its facts from those in State v. Falling, 50 Wash.App. 47, 49, 747 P.2d 1119 (1987), where an exceptional sentence based on deliberate cruelty was upheld when the defendant repeatedly called his victim bitch while raping her, threatened to kill her both during and after the rape, and penetrated her twice. Delarosa-Flores, 59 Wash.App. at 519, 799 P.2d 736. The commission of the acts in Falling lasted 20-30 minutes. Falling, 50 Wash.App. at 49, 747 P.2d 1119. The facts of this case are more analogous to those recognized by Division One of the Court of Appeals in Falling. In his petition for review, Tili attempts to distinguish his conduct from Falling's. In doing so, Tili points out the factors the Falling court used in upholding that defendant's exceptional sentence on the basis of deliberate cruelty: that he had repeatedly threatened to injure or kill the victim, penetrated her orally and vaginally during a 20-30 [minute] period of time, and repeatedly called her `bitch.' Pet. for Review at 13. The primary distinction Tili attempts to make is the disparate lengths of time between his rapes and Falling's. His distinction is without effect. Tili's acts against L.M. are more similar to than different from Falling's. Tili threatened to kill her and, in fact, did injure her when he repeatedly struck L.M. in the head with a heavy pan until she fell to her knees. He penetrated her vaginally and anally, and further degraded L.M. when he forced her to say she liked it. These are all similar to those factors deemed sufficient to find deliberate cruelty in Falling. The disparate length in time between Tili's rape and that in Falling is not critical. Notably, the Falling court did not reference the total length of the sexual assault when it listed the factors supporting its finding of deliberate cruelty. Falling, 50 Wash.App. at 55, 747 P.2d 1119. This court too, in Cannon, has upheld a finding of deliberate cruelty where the defendant repeatedly hit the victim's head with his fist, penetrated her multiple times, and verbally humiliated her. State v. Cannon, 130 Wash.2d 313, 333, 922 P.2d 1293 (1996). Like the defendant in Cannon, Tili exhibited gratuitously violent behavior. Tili forced L.M.'s head back onto the floor such that she could not breathe when she tried to move her head to the side because of extreme pain. Before fleeing and before police entered L.M.'s apartment, Tili delivered gratuitous blows to L.M.'s head with his fist and had bitten her back. As the State concludes, the record reveals that [Tili] was more intent on brutalizing [L.M.] than on reasonably using only that quantum of force necessary for her submission. Br. of Resp't at 15. We agree that Tili's conduct was more serious than that contemplated by the legislature for first degree rape. The Court of Appeals also relied on Tili's multiple penetrations as evidence of deliberate cruelty. State v. Tili, 108 Wash.App. 289, 301-02, 29 P.3d 1285 (2001). In support it cited rape cases where multiple penetrations had been used as such. However, in each, the defendant was charged with only one count of rape. Id. See State v. Vaughn, 83 Wash.App. 669, 924 P.2d 27 (1996) (utilizing multiple penetrations as evidence of deliberate cruelty when defendant charged with one count of first degree rape), review denied, 131 Wash.2d 1018, 936 P.2d 417 (1997); State v. Herzog, 69 Wash.App. 521, 849 P.2d 1235 (same), review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1021, 863 P.2d 1353 (1993). There are key differences between this case and the foregoing. First, Tili was convicted of three counts of rape and sentenced concurrently. Second, the rapes in Vaughn and Herzog took place over extended periods of time which played a role in the determinations made in those cases. Third, this court determined in Tili I that the rapes were so close in time as to be the same criminal conduct. Thus, on the facts of this case, we decline to reach the issue of whether the multiple penetrations may also be used as evidence of deliberate cruelty since there is sufficient evidence of deliberate cruelty without resort to the multiple penetrations. We also think the issue of Tili's multiple penetrations is better addressed under the multiple offense policy discussion below. There being ample evidence to support a finding of deliberate cruelty, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the finding is not clearly erroneous and that the exceptional sentence was thereupon justified as a matter of law.