Opinion ID: 771581
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Importance of the Issues Remaining

Text: 47 In support of its assertion that negotiations had reached impasse, Grinnell points to allegedly unresolvable issues that remained, emphasizing the significance of those issues. It also points out that, when the issues separating the parties are of great importance to one or both of them, a finding of impasse is more likely. See Hyatt Regency Memphis, 296 N.L.R.B. 259, 315-16 (1989), enforced, 944 F.2d 904 (6th Cir. 1991) ([impasse] may be reached even after a few bargaining sessions where the subject of the change is of supreme importance to an employer with respect to its ability to compete.). 48 Here, Grinnell urges that it repeatedly sought wage relief and a new targeting program that would give it (rather than the Union) the uni- lateral right to reduce wages on jobs with non-union bidders. Grinnell consistently maintained that a fixed targeting rate was essential for a settlement. The Union, on the other hand, insisted on retaining the right to control targeting. Purporting to have seen no movement on these key issues, Grinnell made its final contract offer to the Union on April 12, 1994. This offer increased the targeting rate and enhanced health and pension benefits. The Union countered with a proposal substantially similar to the one it had made earlier that day, with minor modifications. Based on its perception that the Union was not making any movement, Grinnell argues that itreasonably and objectively concluded that the parties were deadlocked. 49 Grinnell's characterization of the negotiations is unavailing. As the Board properly concluded, this was a typical labor dispute over a matter of dollars, and there was no reason to believe that the parties' disagreements could not be resolved with further bargaining. Indeed, the parties had made significant strides towards reaching an agreement during the period that Preuett functioned in his role of chief Union negotiator. For example, Grinnell had increased its proposed targeting rate from 65% to 80%. On health, welfare, and pension contributions, Grinnell had retreated from its proposal to implement the Tyco regime, indicating that it would accept the Union's proposal if the company's contributions were reduced. 50 The Union had also demonstrated continuing willingness to com- promise. It had made two proposals that reduced Grinnell's health, welfare, pension, and SIS contributions. It had also brought in Green, a benefits expert, to study the Tyco plan. 11 On wages, the Union had proposed that local wage rates be fixed by mutual agreement, and it later dropped a proposal for a wage increase. Lastly, at the final bargaining session on April 12, 1994, the Union proposed wage reductions in some states and asked for identification of those states where Grinnell needed further reductions. In sum, on April 12, 1994, as the Board found, the Union's positions were clearly flexible. Further negotiations could well have led to an agreement encompassing all the outstanding issues. 12 51