Opinion ID: 201433
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Do the allegations add up to a constitutional violation?

Text: 13 Whalen contends that he had a property right in continued employment that was created by state law and that, consequently, he had a right to procedural due process that was violated when he was given neither notice of the specific reasons for his layoff nor opportunity to respond. We agree that these allegations generally describe a constitutional injury and conclude, for reasons we shall explain, that the constitutional claim remains viable even when examined more particularly. 14 Our court consistently has held that an employee who under state law can be terminated only for just cause has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. See, e.g., Wojcik, 300 F.3d at 102; Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d 257, 260 n. 2 (1st Cir.1996); Perkins v. Bd. of Dirs., 686 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1982); see also Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29, 117 S.Ct. 1807, 138 L.Ed.2d 120 (1997) ([W]e have previously held that public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process.); Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538-39, 105 S.Ct. 1487 (property right to continued employment created by statute that gave `classified civil service employees' the right to retain their positions `during good behavior and efficient service,' with dismissal conditioned on `misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office'). The two Massachusetts statutes at issue here, certainly when taken together, fit this model, specifying that an assistant court clerk has the right to retain his position during good behavior and to be removed only for cause. See supra p. 22 (discussing Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 218, § 10 and ch. 211B, § 8). 15 Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976), defendants assert that the Massachusetts statutes, rather than creating an enforceable expectation of continued employment, simply set out procedures to govern removal of employees. In Bishop, the Supreme Court accepted the interpretation of a local ordinance by a North Carolina judge who had concluded that an employee was terminable at will, even though the applicable ordinance [o]n its face ... may fairly be read as conferring ... a guarantee to continued employment. See id. at 345, 96 S.Ct. 2074. The Court noted that it had in the past accepted an interpretation of state law in similar circumstances even if an examination of the state-law issue without such guidance might have justified a different conclusion. Id. at 346, 96 S.Ct. 2074. 16 No such contrary interpretation of the Massachusetts statutes has been cited by defendants in this case, and their reliance on Bishop is therefore misplaced. We see no basis upon which to depart here from our ordinary conclusion that a guarantee of tenure in the absence of good cause for removal creates a constitutionally protected property interest. Whalen thus had a property right to continued employment as an assistant clerk. 17 Whether that property interest gave rise to a right to procedural due process, however, is another matter. Although a property right and procedural due process typically go hand-in-hand — triggering a requirement for some kind of a hearing before discharge, Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 & n. 7, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) — we have recognized a limited reorganization exception to due process that eliminates the need for a hearing where a reorganization or other cost-cutting measure results in the dismissal of an employee. See Duffy v. Sarault, 892 F.2d 139, 147 (1st Cir.1989); see also Misek v. City of Chicago, 783 F.2d 98, 100-01 (7th Cir.1986); Hartman v. City of Providence, 636 F.Supp. 1395, 1409-10 (D.R.I.1986) (Selya, J.); cf. Milne v. Sch. Comm. of Manchester, 381 Mass. 581, 582-83 & n. 3, 410 N.E.2d 1216 (1980) (statutory notice and hearing requirements inapplicable to dismissal of tenured teacher due to decline in enrollment). 5 Defendants assert that, even if Whalen has a property right, this precedent establishes that no constitutional violation occurred. Additionally, defendants contend that Whalen was not removed from his job for cause, but merely laid off, and so the due process procedures were not triggered. 18 Defendants' arguments would have considerable force if an entirely neutral layoff were at issue, i.e., if the layoff decision were unrelated to individual qualifications. The case law that requires a pre-termination hearing for an employee with a state-protected property interest in his job reflects a balancing of the competing interests at stake when an employee with a legitimate claim to permanence faces a for cause loss of his position. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487. The government's interests in the expeditious removal of unsatisfactory employees and the avoidance of administrative burdens are countered not only by the employee's significant interest in retaining employment but also by the interest in avoiding an erroneous termination. Id. at 542-43, 105 S.Ct. 1487. 19 [S]ome opportunity for the employee to present his side of the case is recurringly of obvious value in reaching an accurate decision. Dismissals for cause will often involve factual disputes.... Even where the facts are clear, the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge may not be; in such cases, the only meaningful opportunity to invoke the discretion of the decisionmaker is likely to be before the termination takes effect. 20 Id. at 543, 105 S.Ct. 1487. 21 When the termination at issue is in good faith directed at positions rather than individuals, Hartman, 636 F.Supp. at 1409, however, the hearing contemplated by the Supreme Court's due process precedent loses its relevance. In such cases, since there are no charges against the employee... involved, there would be no occasion for a hearing, and it would be idle to hold one. Kusza v. Maximonis, 363 Pa. 479, 482-83, 70 A.2d 329, 331 (1950) (quoted in Hartman, 636 F.Supp. at 1411). In addition, because reorganizations often affect numerous employees, the governmental interest in efficient administration may weigh more heavily in such circumstances. See, e.g., Mayfield v. Kelly, 801 F.Supp. 795, 798 (D.D.C.1992) (A RIF [reduction-in-force] involves a large number of employees ... for whom it is impossible to have pre-termination hearings.) (quoted in Wash. Teachers' Union Local # 6 v. D.C. Bd. of Ed., 109 F.3d 774, 780 (D.C.Cir.1997)). 22 Under this precedent, if the Trial Court had in good faith eliminated the position of assistant clerk, Whalen clearly would have no constitutional claim. Similarly, if the three assistant clerks originally selected for layoff had been chosen entirely based on factors unrelated to personal performance — for example, seniority or job location — the reorganization exception case law would be on point. Likewise, the distinction that defendants draw between a removal for cause and a layoff — the latter connoting an absence of performance factors — would be pertinent if Whalen's selection had been directed solely at his position rather than at him. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 31, § 1 (a layoff is a temporary discontinuance of employment for lack of work or lack of money). 23 Here, however, the record indicates that performance factors played a role in Whalen's selection for layoff. As noted above, CJAM Dortch-Okara authorized managers to take into account a variety of qualitative factors in choosing which three assistant clerks to lay off. Those individualized considerations took on even greater significance for Whalen when funds became available to retain one of the three clerks initially selected for termination, and he was passed over in favor of someone with considerably less experience who even lacked sufficient tenure to claim a property interest in his job. On these facts, it seems inescapable that Whalen's job performance was a deciding factor in his selection. And certainly, for purposes of considering the legal questions before us, we must presume that that was so. 24 Consequently, we conclude that Whalen had a right to the minimal procedural protections of notice and an opportunity to respond. As the Supreme Court has observed, the requisite procedures need not be elaborate, Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487, and the opportunity to hear and respond to the employer's reasons could be accomplished either in writing or in an informal face-to-face meeting, id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487. 6 It is fundamental, id., however, that some process is due when an employee with a protected property interest in his job is terminated in a person-directed rather than position-directed personnel action[], Hartman, 636 F.Supp. at 1412. 7 25 We thus conclude that Whalen satisfied the first prong of the qualified immunity inquiry by stating a constitutional due process violation. 26