Opinion ID: 2507169
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Washington State cases concerning suspicionless searches

Text: ¶ 31 Though we have not considered drug testing in public schools, we have a long history of striking down exploratory searches not based on at least reasonable suspicion. State v. Jorden, 160 Wash.2d 121, 127, 156 P.3d 893 (2007) ([T]his court has consistently expressed displeasure with random and suspicionless searches, reasoning that they amount to nothing more than an impermissible fishing expedition.); Robinson, 102 Wash.App. at 815, 10 P.3d 452 (Our Supreme Court has thus not been easily persuaded that a search without individualized suspicion can pass constitutional muster.). In Mesiani, this court held a random roadblock sobriety checkpoint program initiated by Seattle police was highly intrusive search and violated the right to not be disturbed in one's private affairs guaranteed by article I, section 7. Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d at 458-60, 755 P.2d 775. [21] In Kuehn, this court held a search of student luggage required by school officials as a condition of participation in a school-sponsored trip to Canada violated both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7. Kuehn, 103 Wash.2d at 595, 694 P.2d 1078. We opined, [i]n the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the search is a general search. `[W]e never authorize general, exploratory searches,' (alteration in original) and such searches are anathema to the Fourth Amendment and Const. art. 1, § 7 protections. Id. at 599, 694 P.2d 1078 (quoting State v. Helmka, 86 Wash.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115 (1975)); id. at 601-02, 694 P.2d 1078. ¶ 32 The few times we have allowed suspicionless searches, we did so either relying entirely on federal law or in the context of criminal investigations or dealing with prisoners. In Meacham, 93 Wash.2d at 738-39, 612 P.2d 795, we upheld mandatory blood tests of putative fathers. In Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d at 90, 847 P.2d 455, we upheld mandatory HIV tests of convicted sexual offenders. In Olivas, 122 Wash.2d at 83, 856 P.2d 1076, we upheld blood tests of convicted felons without individualized suspicion. And recently in State v. Surge, 160 Wash.2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007), we held a DNA sampling of convicted felons did not violate article I, section 7. That case allowed for warrantless testing without individualized suspicion because we asserted such testing did not disturb a reasonable right to privacy. But these cases present far different factual situations from drug testing student athletes. A felon has either already pleaded guilty or been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a serious crime; a student athlete has merely attended school and chosen to play extracurricular sports. Most troubling, however, is that we can conceive of no way to draw a principled line permitting drug testing only student athletes. If we were to allow random drug testing here, what prevents school districts from either later drug testing students participating in any extracurricular activities, as federal courts now allow, or testing the entire student population? ¶ 33 We cannot countenance random searches of public school student athletes with our article I, section 7 jurisprudence. As stated earlier, we require a warrant except for rare occasions, which we jealously and narrowly guard. We decline to adopt a doctrine similar to the federal special needs exception in the context of randomly drug testing student athletes. In sum, no argument has been presented that would bring the random drug testing within any reasonable interpretation of the constitutionally required authority of law. See Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d at 458, 755 P.2d 775. ¶ 34 Accordingly, we hold the school district's policy 3515 is unconstitutional and violates student athletes' rights secured by article I, section 7. Therefore we reverse the superior court. The York and Schneider parents shall recover their costs. WE CONCUR: GERRY L. ALEXANDER, C.J., SUSAN OWENS, TOM CHAMBERS, JJ. MADSEN, J. (concurring). ¶ 35 While I agree with the majority's holding that the school's drug testing program does not withstand constitutional scrutiny, I disagree that article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution categorically prohibits our adoption of the special needs exception. The majority's analysis sweeps far too broadly, casting doubt on the validity of even suspicion-based school searches. As noted by Justice J.M. Johnson in his concurring opinion, even before the United States Supreme Court issued New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985), this court sanctioned school searches on less than probable cause in view of the unique responsibilities of school officials and the diminished privacy interests of students. Concurrence (J.M. Johnson, J.) at 16. I believe that a narrowly drawn special needs exception also is consistent with Washington law. However, I concur in the result reached by the majority because on this record there is no special need that justifies suspicionless drug testing of Wahkiakum School District's student athletes. In particular, the school district has failed to show that a suspicion-based regime of drug testing is inadequate to achieve its legitimate objectives. ¶ 36 Article I, section 7 prohibits the government from intruding on a citizen's private affairs without authority of law. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. As this court has held, authority of law may be supplied by an exception to the warrant requirement that is rooted in `well-established principles of the common law.' State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343, 350, 979 P.2d 833 (1999) (quoting City of Seattle v. McCready, 123 Wash.2d 260, 273, 868 P.2d 134 (1994)). One such well-established common law principle is that a warrantless search may be permissible when the purpose of the search is other than the detection or investigation of a crime. For example, a warrantless inventory search of an automobile is permissible under article I, section 7 for the purposes of preventing property loss and protecting the police from liability. State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 155, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980). Similarly, under the community caretaking exception, a warrantless search may be permissible when necessary for the purpose of rendering aid or performing routine health and safety checks. State v. Thompson, 151 Wash.2d 793, 802, 92 P.3d 228 (2004); State v. Acrey, 148 Wash.2d 738, 754, 749, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) (police justified in detaining 12-year-old shortly after midnight in an isolated area and transporting him home at mother's request) (citing and quoting Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) (enunciating community caretaking function[] exception to warrant requirement); State v. Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d 373, 386, 5 P.3d 668 (2000) (same), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1104, 121 S.Ct. 843, 148 L.Ed.2d 723 (2001)). ¶ 37 Another well-established common law principle is that a warrantless search may be permissible when adherence to the warrant requirement would be impracticable under the circumstances. Thus, we have recognized that warrantless searches may be permissible under article I, section 7 when certain exigent circumstances require immediate action to avoid the destruction of evidence or the flight of a suspect. State v. Cardenas, 146 Wash.2d 400, 405-07, 47 P.3d 127, 57 P.3d 1156 (2002) (warrantless entry to motel room in hot pursuit of armed robbery suspects); State v. Johnson, 128 Wash.2d 431, 454, 909 P.2d 293 (1996) (exigency created by ready mobility of vehicles supports warrantless automobile search); State v. Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 147, 151, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (same); State v. Baldwin, 109 Wash.App. 516, 523, 37 P.3d 1220 (2001) (exigent circumstances may justify warrantless blood drug test of DUI (driving under influence) suspect). ¶ 38 Contrary to the majority's view, the special needs exception is rooted in these well-established common law principles. See In re Juveniles A, B, C, D, E, 121 Wash.2d 80, 100, 847 P.2d 455 (1993) (recognizing the `special needs' exception is among the `few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions' to the warrant requirement (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 580, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 114 L.Ed.2d 619 (1991))). We recently addressed the special needs exception in State v. Surge, 160 Wash.2d 65, 156 P.3d 208 (2007). In that case, we held that suspicionless DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) testing of convicted felons is permissible under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applying either the special needs exception or the exception for minimally intrusive searches. Id. at 81, 156 P.3d 208. Because we concluded such testing does not intrude on a convicted felon's private affairs, we had no need to address whether the special needs exception would have provided the necessary authority of law under article I, section 7. However, nothing in the plurality and concurring opinions suggests the special needs exception to the warrant requirement is inconsistent with article I, section 7, although the plurality suggests the scope of the exception must be narrowly drawn. See also State v. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d 73, 856 P.2d 1076 (1993) (recognizing special needs exception to warrant requirement allows suspicionless DNA testing of convicted felons under the Fourth Amendment, while declining to decide the issue under article I, section 7 for inadequate briefing). ¶ 39 The special needs exception encompasses a closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309, 117 S.Ct. 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (1997). There are two threshold requirements to establish a special need. First, the need must be special in the sense that it serves a purpose other than the ordinary need for effective law enforcement. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619, 109 S.Ct. 1402; see, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (special need to detect drug use by armed customs officials to deter malfeasance where test results may not be used in a criminal prosecution absent employee's consent); cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (no special need for nonconsensual drug testing of pregnant hospital patients where results are conveyed to law enforcement); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S.Ct. 447, 148 L.Ed.2d 333 (2000) (no special need for suspicionless highway checkpoint stops where primary purpose was crime control). Second, and more importantly, the traditional requirement of a warrant and probable cause must be inadequate to fulfill the purpose of the search. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66, 109 S.Ct. 1384; see, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-61, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976) (inability to detect contraband in passing vehicles justifies suspicionless border stop); cf. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 321, 117 S.Ct. 1295 (no special need for drug-testing political candidates who are subject to intensive public scrutiny). In determining whether a special need justifies a warrantless search, courts evaluate the nature of the privacy interest involved, the character of the governmental intrusion, the need and immediacy of the government's concerns, and the efficacy of the means chosen to meet those concerns. ¶ 40 Remarkably, the term special needs first appeared in a Supreme Court opinion adopting the view of this court (among others) that the special needs of the school environment justify warrantless searches by school authorities who have a reasonable suspicion the search will unearth a student's illicit activity. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 332 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 733 (citing State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 558 P.2d 781 (1977)). In McKinnon, id. at 80, 558 P.2d 781, we recognized school officials must be free to maintain order and discipline in the school environment in order to carry out their duties of both educating and protecting the children in their care. We observed that maintaining discipline and order often requires immediate action, which is incompatible with a warrant requirement. Accordingly, this court adopted a flexible approach to evaluating the propriety of a school search, involving a fact-intensive inquiry that takes into account the child's age, history, and school record; the seriousness of the illicit activity; the need for immediacy; and the reliability of the information provided. And, in Kuehn v. Renton School District No. 403, 103 Wash.2d 594, 694 P.2d 1078 (1985), although we disallowed suspicionless searches of the personal luggage of student band members, we held that such searches would be permissible based on a reasonable belief of wrongdoing. ¶ 41 Thus, we have recognized the school setting requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search based upon the special needs in this environment. Of course, a suspicionless search is qualitatively different from a search based on individualized suspicion. Nevertheless, I agree with Justice J.M. Johnson that suspicionless drug testing may be permissible if the requirements necessary to meet the special needs exception are met. ¶ 42 However, I disagree with the test he proposes for evaluating whether a special need justifies a suspicionless search. According to Justice J.M. Johnson, a constitutional program of random suspicionless drug testing of student athletes should advance compelling interests, show narrow tailoring, and employ a less intrusive method of testing. Concurrence (J.M. Johnson, J.) at 1019. Although a special needs analysis is similar to such strict scrutiny, it differs in important ways. In particular, an indispensable component of the special needs analysis is the impracticality of adherence to the traditional requirements. Regardless of the strength of the government's need for a search, or the closeness of the fit of the means chosen to achieve the state's legitimate goals, a search cannot be justified under the special needs exception absent a showing that adherence to the requirement of a warrant and probable cause would be impracticable under the circumstances. See, e.g., Barlow v. Ground, 943 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir.1991) (nonconsensual HIV (human immunodeficiency virus) test of man who bit police officer unjustifiable as a special need because there was no immediate need to test without a warrant). ¶ 43 A balancing test that omits this requirement threatens to turn special needs into an exception that swallows the general rule prohibiting warrantless searches. [B]alancing tests without carefully prescribed limits can be inherently dangerous because `when an individual's suspected harmful conduct is balanced against societal interests, individual privacy losses will appear negligible in relation to government's efforts to protect society.' Olivas, 122 Wash.2d at 105 n. 88, 856 P.2d 1076 (Utter, J., concurring) (quoting Kenneth Nuger, The Special Needs Rationale: Creating a Chasm in Fourth Amendment Analysis, 32 SANTA CLARA L.REV. 89, 95 (1992)). Thus, in Juveniles, Justice Utter warned that recognizing a special need for a suspicionless search without first finding an individualized suspicion standard unworkable in the particular context would create a potentially unlimited exception. Juveniles, 121 Wash.2d at 102, 847 P.2d 455 (Utter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Similarly, in Olivas, Justice Utter took issue with the majority's application of the special needs test in the context of DNA testing of convicted felons, reasoning a search must be truly divorced from ordinary law enforcement purposes to fall within the exception. Olivas, 122 Wash.2d at 107-08, 856 P.2d 1076 (Utter, J., concurring). ¶ 44 In Surge, 160 Wash.2d at 81, 156 P.3d 208, we indicated our agreement with Justice Utter (Certainly the concurring opinion in Olivas is more consistent with our cases interpreting article I, section 7. (citing Olivas, 122 Wash.2d at 107-08, 856 P.2d 1076)). Consistently with our decisions relating to other warrant exceptions, we suggested the scope of the special needs exception is more narrowly drawn under article I, section 7 than under the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Thompson, 151 Wash.2d 793, 92 P.3d 228 (limiting scope of community caretaking function); Kinzy, 141 Wash.2d at 395, 5 P.3d 668 (police exceeded scope of community caretaking function by detaining minor longer than necessary to assure her safety); State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 114, 960 P.2d 927 (1998) (scope of consent search); State v. White, 135 Wash.2d 761, 768, 958 P.2d 982 (1998) (limiting automobile inventory searches to unlocked compartments); State v. Williams, 102 Wash.2d 733, 689 P.2d 1065 (1984) (limiting scope of community caretaking function); Stroud, 106 Wash.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (scope of exigent circumstances as applied to automobile searches); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash.2d 814, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (scope of search incident to arrest). ¶ 45 The reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment permits a balancing approach as an alternative to a warrant under a broader range of circumstances than does article I, section 7. State v. Chenoweth, 160 Wash.2d 454, 463-64, 158 P.3d 595 (2007). Thus, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564 (1995), a majority of the United States Supreme Court reasoned that a random, suspicionless drug test would be better than a suspicion-based test as a policy matter, not that an individualized suspicion requirement was unworkable in the school context. Instead of examining the impracticality of a suspicion-based search, the Court asked only whether the government's interest was important enough to justify the privacy invasion at issue. And in Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002), the Supreme Court expanded the special needs exception even further. Rather than requiring that a school demonstrate an actual problem with student drug abuse, the Court essentially took judicial notice of the issue, observing that the war against drugs is a pressing concern in every school. Id. at 834, 122 S.Ct. 2559. Moreover, the court justified suspicionless drug testing for the purpose not of protecting others, but of protecting the drug-abusing student from his or her own illicit conduct. Id. at 836, 122 S.Ct. 2559. ¶ 46 In contrast to the Fourth Amendment, article I, section 7 protects privacy interests without express limitation and exceptions to the warrant requirement must be narrowly applied. Chenoweth, 160 Wash.2d at 463-64, 158 P.3d 595. In particular, a warrant exception applies only when the reason for the search fall[s] within the scope of the reason for the exception. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d at 357, 979 P.2d 833 (article I, section 7 prohibits pretextual traffic stops); see also Houser, 95 Wash.2d at 154, 622 P.2d 1218 (inventory searches must be conducted in good faith, not as a pretext for criminal investigation). Thus, article I, section 7 does not necessarily require us to follow the lead of the United States Supreme Court in expanding the scope of the special needs exceptions to encompass a broad range of applications where the State has failed to establish the traditional requirement of individualized suspicion is impracticable.