Opinion ID: 4552833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Stalking Order

Text: Hagar’s cyberstalking charge included a specification that he committed that offense while “in violation of a protection order as that term is defined by” 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5). Section 2266(5) defines a protection order to include “any injunction, restraining order . . . issued by a civil or criminal court for the purpose of preventing contact or communication with or physical proximity to, another person, including any temporary or final order . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 2266(5) (emphasis added). Hagar contends that the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal because the temporary stalking order was not valid under Oregon law. He claims that the temporary stalking order was not valid because he did not receive a copy of the petition when he was served with the temporary order, as required by ORS § 30.866(2). See ORS § 30.866(2) (stating that “[t]he petition and the temporary order shall be served upon the respondent with an order requiring the respondent to personally appear before the court to show cause why the temporary order should not be continued for an indefinite period”). Notwithstanding, the face of the temporary order, which Hagar admits he received, informed him that it “remained in effect” as of May 5, 2016, pending adjudication of its “indefinite” status. M.M., the Oregon prosecutor Hagar threatened, testified that temporary protective orders “will always stay in place” in the meantime.6 Moreover, the plain language of § 2266(5) includes “any temporary . . . order issued by a civil or criminal court.” L.E.A. v. Taylor does not support Hagar’s argument. It holds simply that a defendant must receive the temporary 6 M.M. explained that had Hagar failed to receive the petition along with the temporary protective order, “[h]is remedy would have been to show up in court at the date and time listed on the order, and ask the Court for the petition and tell the court . . . [that] service was deficient” and seek an extension. -15- No. 19-3591, United States v. Hagar order and underlying petition before a court may issue a final protective order. 377 P.3d 692, 693 (Or. App. 2016). Hagar does not otherwise argue sufficiency of the evidence, nor should he. The record established that (1) R.G. obtained a temporary stalking protective order on May 5, 2016; (2) the police served him with it on May 9; (3) the order directed Hagar to “stop any contact” and to not “attempt to make contact” with R.G.; (4) Hagar was ordered to appear on June 3 for a show cause hearing; and (5) the temporary order clearly stated that it “remained in effect” from May 5, 2016, pending the hearing on June 3, 2016. Hagar contacted R.G. many times after being served with the temporary protective order, including the June 2 SHOOT email. Because Hagar threatened R.G. after being served with the temporary protective order, his Rule 29 motion was properly denied.