Opinion ID: 836418
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Motion to Exclude Certain Prospective Jurors

Text: Defendant next challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss the prospective jurors who had heard about his previous death sentences. During voir dire, after 10 jurors had been selected, the trial court began questioning another potential juror, Denton, who stated that he had heard about defendant's case on the radio back when they had just overturned    the death sentence. Defendant objected to that statement and moved to excuse the entire jury panel and the rest of the room for cause, because they had heard excludable information. The trial court denied defendant's motion, reasoning that a cautionary jury instruction would be a sufficient remedy. Before excusing the jury for the day, the trial court gave the following instruction: We've had to excuse different peoplesome for cause it's called, where they stated they've had a specific opinion or feeling, and others on the preemptory [ sic ]. What those people say, of course, we wanted to hear because that's why we're asking for information. But, I want to make sure everybody knows that what anybody says has got to be disregarded by the jury. You can't consider what any juror has said when they have been excused, or why they've been excused. All of that is irrelevant, and not for consideration. It's not for you to take into your mind and remember. You're to disregard what any other juror has basically said. Defendant assigns error to the trial court's refusal to dismiss all the potential jurors who were present when Denton referred to defendant's earlier death sentences, arguing that their knowledge of those sentences made the jurors unable to try the case impartially. Thus, in essence, defendant argues that the jury's knowledge of his prior death sentences made them biased. A trial court's determination whether a juror in a criminal trial must be excluded for actual bias is governed by ORCP 57 D(1)(g). ORS 136.210(1). Actual bias on the part of a juror in a criminal trial is defined by ORCP 57 D(1)(g) as the existence of a state of mind on the part of a juror that satisfies the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, that the juror cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging the juror. We review trial court determinations regarding the presence or absence of actual bias under ORCP 57 D(1)(g) for abuse of discretion. State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 575, 789 P.2d 1352 (1990) ( Montez I ). In Montez I, this court noted that the trial court has the advantage, which we lack, of seeing the challenged prospective juror and observing the juror's demeanor, apparent intelligence and candor. Ibid. The court also noted that [t]he trial court's judgment as to a prospective juror's ultimate qualifications is entitled to great weight. Ibid. This court has not addressed the question whether an inadvertent and passing reference to a defendant's earlier death sentence during voir dire would require the dismissal of a jury panel. However, as the state correctly points out, several of this court's decisions arising from the denial of a motion for mistrial suggest the answer. That is so because the central issue in a motion for mistrialwhether the juror's knowledge will prejudice the defendantis substantially similar to the pivotal question under ORCP 57 D(1)(g), that is, whether the juror can try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging the juror. In State v. Pratt, 316 Or. 561, 583, 853 P.2d 827 (1993), this court held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a motion for mistrial after a witness had referred to the defendant's presence on death row. This court noted that the statement at issue was isolated and made in passing and that the state did not capitalize on the disclosure in any way. Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted); see also State v. Farrar, 309 Or. 132, 164, 786 P.2d 161 (1990) (mistrial not required where improper statement made in passing and where state did not capitalize on disclosure). Likewise, in the present case, Denton's statement was brief and inadvertent, so much so that the trial court had to refer to the transcript to confirm its contents. Also, the prosecutor did not attempt to capitalize on the disclosure. The trial court, having heard the statement in context, concluded that it did not require dismissing the jury panel. We find no abuse of discretion in that ruling. [1]