Opinion ID: 2789949
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioners’ State Constitutional Claims

Text: In addressing whether the LGTCA damages cap circumscribes Petitioners’ state constitutional claims, we are confronted with an issue of statutory interpretation. We have long held that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature.” Williams v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr., 440 Md. 573, 580, 103 A.3d 658, 663 (2014) (citation omitted). Our primary goal “is to discern the legislative purpose, the ends to be accomplished, or the evils to be remedied by the statutory provision[.]” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Marcas, L.L.C., 415 Md. 676, 685, 4 A.3d 946, 951 (2010) (citation omitted). As we have so often explained, in undertaking this endeavor: [W]e begin with the normal, plain meaning of the language of the statute. If the language of the statute is unambiguous and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, our inquiry as to legislative intent ends ordinarily 7 (...continued) (explaining that a private right of action for damages for a violation of Article 24 exists at common law). 6 and we apply the statute as written, without resort to other rules of construction. We neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute[.] . . . We, however, do not read statutory language in a vacuum, nor do we confine strictly our interpretation of a statute’s plain language to the isolated section alone. Rather, the plain language must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute. . . . Where the words of a statute are ambiguous and subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, or where the words are clear and unambiguous when viewed in isolation, but become ambiguous when read as part of a larger statutory scheme, a court must resolve the ambiguity by searching for legislative intent in other indicia, including the history of the legislation or other relevant sources intrinsic and extrinsic to the legislative process. In resolving ambiguities, a court considers the structure of the statute, how it relates to other laws, its general purpose, and the relative rationality and legal effect of various competing constructions. In every case, the statute must be given a reasonable interpretation, not one that is absurd, illogical, or incompatible with common sense. Marcas, 415 Md. at 685-86, 4 A.3d at 951-52 (quoting Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274-76, 987 A.2d 18, 28-29 (2010)). Accordingly, we begin with the plain language of the Act. The LGTCA provides that “[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a local government shall be liable for any judgment against its employee for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions committed by the employee within the scope of employment with the local government.” CJP § 5-303(b)(1) (emphasis added). The LGTCA further provides specific limitations on a local government’s liability. Subsection (a) of § 5-303, captioned “Limitation on liability” states, in relevant part: 7 (1) Subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, the liability of a local government may not exceed $200,000 per an individual claim, and $500,000 per total claims that arise from the same occurrence for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions, or liability arising under subsection (b) of this section and indemnification under subsection (c) of this section. (2) The limits on liability provided under paragraph (1) of this subsection do not include interest accrued on a judgment. CJP § 5-303(a) (emphasis added). The LGTCA does not define the term “tortious acts or omissions.” At issue here is whether this term includes constitutional torts. Petitioners aver that the LGTCA damages cap has no application to their state constitutional claims, which arise out of violations of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Specifically, with regard to the language of the statute, Petitioners contend that the Legislature’s use of the term “tort” does not serve to encompass constitutional violations because constitutional violations are not torts within the meaning of the LGTCA. Petitioners explain that constitutional violations “are claims arising under the state constitution and not torts in the common law sense[.]” Respondents counter that the broad term “tortious acts or omissions” is plainly inclusive of all tortious conduct, including both constitutional and nonconstitutional torts. Moreover, Respondents contend that constitutional violations have been “routinely referred to as ‘constitutional torts’” by our courts. The Court of Special Appeals agreed with Respondents, explaining that “based upon the statutory language, case law, and legislative history, we see no basis to conclude that the legislature intended that the LGTCA damages cap not apply to claims involving constitutional violations.” Espina, 215 Md. App. 8 at 640, 82 A.3d at 1257. We shall eliminate any uncertainty and hold, in the present case, that the LGTCA limits the amount of damages that a local government must pay for “tortious acts or omissions committed by the [local government’s] employee[s] within the scope of employment” arising out of violations of Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The current language of the LGTCA plainly appears to encompass constitutional torts. Our prior decisions addressing the definition of “tortious act or omission,” albeit in a different context, indicate that the term encompasses state constitutional torts. For example, in Lee v. Cline, 384 Md. 245, 863 A.2d 297 (2004), this Court addressed “whether the Maryland Tort Claims Act [(MTCA)8 ] grants qualified immunity to state personnel for tortious acts or omissions, within the scope of [employment], when those acts or omissions involve violations of state constitutional rights or constitute so-called ‘intentional’ torts.” 384 Md. at 255, 863 A.2d at 303 (emphasis added). The Court explained that “the [] language of the [MTCA] plainly appears to cover intentional torts and constitutional torts[.] . . . There are no exceptions in the statute for intentional torts or torts based upon violations of the Maryland Constitution.” 384 Md. at 256, 863 A.2d at 304. Noting that there was no 8 We note, the MTCA differs from the LGTCA with respect to the protection afforded to the governmental employee. As we stated in Bd. of Educ. v. Marks-Sloan, 428 Md. 1, 31, 50 A.3d 1137, 1155 (2012), “[i]n contrast to the complete immunity from suit given to State personnel under the MTCA, local government employees are granted only an immunity from damages under the LGTCA.” See also Holloway-Johnson v. Beall, 220 Md. App. 195, 210, 103 A.3d 720, 729 (2014) (explaining that whereas the MTCA “[protects state government employees by granting them direct immunity from suit for acts or omissions committed within the scope of employment without actual malice. . . . By contrast, the LGTCA grants employees immunity from damages, but not from suit.”). 9 basis in the statutory language to exclude constitutional torts, the Court declined to do so. Id. This Court also had occasion to discern the meaning of the term “tort” in Green v. N.B.S., Inc., 409 Md. 528, 979 A.2d 279 (2009), concluding that “tortious conduct” encompassed a broad range of tortious actions. In Green, we were asked to review whether the general cap on non-economic damages contained in CJP § 11-108 served to limit recovery for damages arising from violations of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA). 409 Md. at 532, 979 A.2d at 281. In holding that a statutory cause of action under the CPA arising out of a personal injury was a “tort” contemplated by the cap, this Court, citing to the opinion of the intermediate appellate court, explained: “Tortious” is defined as “[c]onstituting a tort; wrongful.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1497 (7th ed. 1999). A “tort” is defined as “[a] civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained, usually in the form of damages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on everyone in the same relation to one another as those invovled in a given transaction.” Id. at 1496. Therefore, the term “tort” as defined by Blacks encompasses all “civil wrong,” not just wrongs that were recognized as a civil wrong at common law. 409 Md. at 542, 976 A.2d at 287 (emphasis added). The Court went on to note that our prior opinion in Lee v. Cline, supra, “at least suggests that the term ‘tortious conduct’ includes more than conduct that constituted a tort at common law.” Green, 409 Md. at 542, 976 A.2d at 287. There, we also recognized that, in the context of § 11-108, “nothing in the legislative history suggests that the General Assembly even thought of the difference between actions claiming personal injury due to common law torts as opposed to causes of action claiming 10 personal injury arising out of statutory or constitutional torts.” Green, 409 Md. at 544, 976 A.2d at 288. Importantly, we have previously referred to constitutional violations as “constitutional torts.” As this Court explained in DiPino v. Davis, “we have characterized civil violations of State Constitutional protections as ‘constitutional torts,’ which seems to be the common appellation now applied to them.” 354 Md. 18, 50, 729 A.2d 354, 371 (1999) (citation omitted). See also Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 104, 660 A.2d 447, 464 (1995) (referring to a violation of the state constitution as a “constitutional tort”). Petitioners take issue with the use of the term “constitutional tort,” suggesting at oral argument that it is “sloppy legal shorthand,” or mere “scholarly slang.” We disagree with such a characterization, because our prior statements are consistent with our reading of the term “tortious acts or omissions” in light of the language the General Assembly elected to use. Moreover, as we have explained on several occasions, “there is no exception in the [LGTCA] for constitutional torts. In fact, there is no exception in the statutory language for any category of torts.” Ashton, 339 Md. at 108 n.19, 660 A.2d at 466 n.19. See also Prince George’s Cnty. v. Longtin, 419 Md. 450, 521, 19 A.3d 859, 902 (2011) (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting) (explaining that “[w]e implied that the LGTCA damages cap should apply to constitutional claims [in Ashton v. Brown]”); Rounds v. Md.-Nat. Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, __ Md. __, __ A.3d __ (2015) (“Nothing in the [LGTCA’s] language or its legislative history indicates that the General Assembly intended to exclude 11 any category of tortious conduct committed by a local government or its employees, from the scope of the LGTCA notice requirement.”). “This Court has been most reluctant to recognize exceptions in a statute when there is no basis for the exception in the statutory language.” Lee, 384 Md. at 256, 863 A.2d at 304. Indeed, to recognize an exception not apparent in the statutory language would be contrary to our effort to “neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute.” Marcas, 415 Md. at 685, 4 A.3d at 951 (citation omitted). Notwithstanding our plain reading of the text of the statute, we do not read the plain language “in a vacuum,” instead, we also look to the statutory scheme in which it is found. Marcas, 415 Md. at 685, 4 A.3d at 951. Previously, we held that the LGTCA prevented plaintiffs from proceeding on their tort claims, including those involving state constitutional violations, where the plaintiffs failed to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement. See Rounds, __ Md. at __ A.3d at __ (holding that, where the LGTCA is applicable, a plaintiff must comply with the Act’s notice requirement in order to bring a cause of action for unliquidated damages for violations of the state constitution against a local government); Dehn Motor Sales, LLC v. Schultz, 439 Md. 460, 487, 96 A.3d 221, 238 (2014) (upholding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on plaintiff’s state constitutional tort claims for failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirements). See also Longtin, 419 Md. at 521, 19 A.3d at 902 (Harrell, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[W]e recognize, at least implicitly, that the LGTCA procedural requirements (e.g., notice) apply 12 also to constitutional tort claims.”); Williams v. Maynard, 359 Md. 379, 391, 754 A.2d 379, 386 (2000) (“The plain language of § 5-304 of the LGTCA indicates a legislative intent to make the notice requirement broadly applicable to tort actions brought directly against local governments.”). We also view the plain language in light of the statutory scheme’s purpose. Marcas, 415 Md. at 685, 4 A.3d at 951. The language of the LGTCA begins by noting, in part, that it is “[f]or the purpose of establishing a limit on the liability of the local governments of the State.” Chapter 594, Laws of Maryland 1987. As we explained previously, “[i]t is clear that the limitation on liability provision [of the LGTCA] was enacted ‘for the purpose of limiting the civil liability of local government.’” Marcas, 415 Md. at 686, 4 A.3d at 952 (quoting S. Judicial Proceedings Comm., Summary of Com. Rep., S.B. 237, at 3 (Md. 1987)). See also Balt. Police Dept. v. Cherkes, 140 Md. App. 282, 324, 780 A.2d 410, 435 (2001) (“The overarching purpose of the [LGTCA] was to bring stability to what was perceived as an escalating liability picture for local governments by containing their exposure while guaranteeing payment to tort victims of judgments against employees of local government entities in certain situations.”). Including Petitioners’ state constitutional claims within the scope of the LGTCA damages cap is clearly consistent with the Legislature’s goal of limiting civil liability. To confirm our interpretation of the term “tort” as including Petitioners’ state constitutional claims, we shall also review the legislative history as it is relied upon 13 extensively by the parties in this case. Petitioners make the dubious assertion that the legislative history is entirely devoid of any reference to constitutional violations. Our review of the legislative history demonstrates otherwise. “The [LGTCA] was passed in response to a perceived insurance crisis plaguing counties, municipalities and their employees.” Ennis v. Crenca, 322 Md. 285, 291, 587 A.2d 485, 488 (1991). Maureen Lamb, then Vice President of the Maryland Association of Counties, testified before the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee: In the Spring of 1985 the Legislative Committee of the Maryland Association of Counties became aware of the problems that local governments were having in purchasing insurance. . . . In analyzing the situation it was soon realized that the problem was greater than merely a down cycle of the insurance market. Insurance companies were not only raising prices, they were abandoning the business of insuring governments. S. Judicial Proceedings Comm., Testimony of Maureen Lamb (Feb. 25, 1987). In direct response to this perceived liability crisis, then Governor Harry Hughes established a Task Force led by then Lieutenant Governor Joseph Curran, Jr. in 1985, which ultimately proposed the LGTCA, along with the non-economic damages cap of CJP § 11-108, the subsequent year. See Maynard, 359 Md. at 391, 754 A.2d at 386 (noting that the 1985 Task Force drafted the proposed LGTCA); Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342, 368-69, 601 A.2d 102, 115 (1992) (explaining that the General Assembly reviewed the 1985 Task Force Report “[i]n considering whether to enact the cap on [non-economic] tort damages” contained in CJP § 11-108). The Task Force Report, among other things, explains that the language of the LGTCA 14 “is patterned generally after the Maryland Tort Claims Act,” which as we explained above includes within its scope state constitutional violations. See Report of the Governor’s Task Force to Study Liability Insurance, 14 (Dec.1985). Moreover, the Task Force Report, which was before the Legislature in determining whether to enact the LGTCA, explicitly notes that “[i]t is obvious that the political subdivisions must have some form of liability coverage in an era when suits involving civil rights, environmental pollution, public safety and public employee performance abound.” Id. at 18 (emphasis added). We also note that the Governor’s Legislative Office prepared a briefing paper for submission to the General Assembly, stating: In January, 1986 the Maryland Municipal League [MML] conducted a survey among the cities and towns in Maryland to find out their extent of litigation. Within the last 5 years [between 1985 and 1980], nearly one half of the respondents had lawsuits filed against them. Some of the towns had multiple suits. Several of these suits asked for millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. The startling fact, however, is that while only 4 suits were filed in 1980, by 1985 the number had increased 500% to 20. The seventy lawsuits reported filed against these towns between 1980-1985 sought $106 million in damages. A summary of the MML survey, sent by MML Executive Director Jon C. Burrell on January 22, 1986, upon which the Governor’s briefing paper relied, includes the “[n]umber and kinds of issues being brought,” in addition to outlining the 500% increase in tort litigation from four cases in 1980-81 to twenty in 1984-85. Importantly, the summary notes that of the cities and towns subject to lawsuits between 1980 and 1985, there were fourteen “False Arrest/Police Injury” cases, four “Voting Rights Act” cases, and seven “Civil Rights Act” 15 cases. We also note that the primary opponent of the LGTCA, the Maryland Trial Lawyers Association (“MTLA”) (now the “Maryland Association for Justice”), raised concerns to the Legislature similar to those presented by Petitioners in this case. Indeed, when the LGTCA was first introduced to the General Assembly in 1986,9 the MTLA contended that “[i]t will impose a cap on damages in all claims against local governments.” Bill File to S.B. 557/H.B. 724 (1986) (emphasis in original). Against this legislative background, we find unpersuasive Petitioners’ insistence that the General Assembly never considered constitutionally based tort suits. Indeed, the legislative history only furthers a conclusion that the General Assembly was aware that the LGTCA would be read as covering a broad range of civil actions, and nonetheless declined to carve out any exceptions. We also find support for this proposition in the General Assembly’s response to our decision in Housing Authority of Baltimore City v. Bennett, 359 Md. 356, 754 A.2d 367 (2000). In Bennett, this Court held that the LGTCA damage cap did not apply to any tort actions where the local government itself is a defendant.10 359 Md. at 368, 754 A.2d at 373. 9 The LGTCA was reintroduced and enacted the following year. The MTLA once again opposed the Act for similar reasons. See Bill File to S.B. 237 (1987). 10 Petitioners aver that our decision in Bennett “has made it clear that the 1987 LGTCA did not apply to claims for constitutional deprivation.” Petitioners have taken the Bennett Court’s reference to state constitutional torts out of context to support a proposition for which Bennett does not stand. Specifically, Petitioners rely upon the statement in Bennett that: (continued...) 16 In direct response to our decision, the General Assembly enacted an emergency measure “clarifying that the monetary limits on the liability of a local government under the [LGTCA] apply to claims against local governments when named as defendants[.]” Chapter 286, Laws of Maryland 2001. Importantly, the General Assembly explained, in the uncodified sections 2 and 3 of the emergency legislation, that “it is the intent of the General Assembly that the total liability of a local government, directly or otherwise, in an action arising from tortious acts or omissions, may not exceed the limits on liability” and that the “Act shall apply to any claim for damages under [the LGTCA]” respectively. Id. (emphasis added). Petitioners argue that Section 3 “is nothing more than a timing provision.” We disagree with Petitioners’ reading, noting that Section 3 used the same timing provision as the original 1987 Act–namely, that the LGTCA applies to cases arising out of events occurring after its enactment on July 1, 1987. Section 3 clarifies that the LGTCA applies to “any claim for 10 (...continued) It would not be a reasonable construction of the statutory language, however, to apply the monetary caps to tort actions directly against local governments when the bases for such actions are enactments of the General Assembly, state common law, the state constitution, or federal law. 359 Md. at 373-74, 754 A.2d at 376. Although the Court did refer to state constitutional torts, the opinion does not focus solely on state constitutional torts, or reach the conclusion Petitioners advance. Rather, the Bennett Court held that the LGTCA did not apply to any tort action brought against the local government directly. See Marcas, 415 Md. at 684, 4 A.3d at 950 (explaining that the holding of Bennett was “that the LGTCA’s damages cap provision does not limit the liability of a local government in a tort action in which the local government itself is a defendant”). This, the Court noted, included state constitutional torts, as well as common law or statutory based causes of actions. Bennett, 359 Md. at 373-74, 754 A.2d at 376. We decline to read this statement as giving state constitutional torts the significance Petitioners ascribe. 17 damages under [the LGTCA]” arising after its enactment. Petitioners attempt to cast doubt upon this interpretation of the 2001 legislation by noting that the Legislature used the term “tortious act or omission” in Section 2, which according to Petitioners excludes state constitutional violations. As we explained above, however, this term plainly includes Petitioners’ state constitutional claims. In the interest of completeness, we now address two additional arguments advanced by Petitioners concerning the LGTCA’s application to state constitutional violations. First, Petitioners argue strenuously that “Maryland local governments and their employees have never enjoyed any immunity for constitutional claims” and that the LGTCA, if applicable to state constitutional claims, would conflict with this longstanding principle. Petitioners’ theory is that the General Assembly could not have intended to include state constitutional violations within the scope of the LGTCA because to do so would conflict with Maryland Law. We note that this is precisely the argument made by the MTLA in opposition to the LGTCA in 1986, see Bill File to S.B. 557/H.B. 724 (1986) (“[The LGTCA] will bestow immunity upon local governments in areas in which they presently have no immunity of any sort.”), and again in 1987, see Bill File to S.B. 237 (1987) (“This Bill represents an unwarranted extension of immunities[.]”). See also Statement of John J. Sellinger to Sen. Judicial Proceedings Comm., S.B. 557 (March 14, 1986) (“This Bill will extend immunity above the cap to ‘local governments’ (and other entities which presently enjoy no immunities) for activities for which there is presently no immunity.”). Despite the concern 18 of the MTLA, the Legislature declined to carve out exceptions of any sort in the LGTCA.11 Petitioners also argue that if this Court holds that the LGTCA damage cap applies to the case at hand, “[t]here are serious implications for all constitutional claims in Maryland.” Petitioners further contend that “[t]here is, of course, no principled way to make a distinction between limiting the remedy here and limiting other constitutional claims, like takings cases[.]” We disagree for two reasons. First, our decision does not imply that all constitutional violations fall under the purview of the LGTCA. Indeed, such a holding would be contrary to our case law. See Rounds, __ Md. __ n.13, __ A.3 __ n.13 (2015) (explaining “that a cause of action may not lie for all violations of the state constitution”). Second, although we need not determine whether takings are subject to the Act’s limitations on liability, as this issue is not before us, we disagree that the LGTCA damages cap as applied in the instant case would necessarily apply where a taking is alleged. We note, without deciding, that where a taking in the constitutional sense occurs, “Art. III, § 40 [of the Maryland Constitution] [gives] rise to an implied contract between the government and a private landowner [to pay just compensation].” Widgeon v. Eastern Shore Hosp. Ctr., 300 Md. 520, 531, 479 A.2d 921, 926 (1984). As we stated in Rounds, “we do not wish to give 11 The Act limits liability of local governments for damages resulting from tortious acts or omissions entered against either the employee, where the local government is required to defend and indemnify, or against the local government itself, or both. We also note that the LGTCA eliminated the ability of the local government to “assert governmental or sovereign immunity to avoid the duty to defend or indemnify an employee” acting within the scope of employment. CJP § 5-303(b)(2). 19 the impression that a taking in the constitutional sense would implicate the provisions of the LGTCA. Indeed, we recognize that applying the LGTCA [damages cap] to a constitutionally based taking[, or inverse condemnation (e.g. Litz v. Md. Dept. of Env’t, 434 Md. 623, 76 A.3d 1076 (2013)),] could conflict with a vested right to just compensation[.]” __ Md. __, n.17, __ A.3d __, n.17 (2015).