Opinion ID: 2981540
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Talal v. Myers

Text: The district court determined that Talal v. Myers constituted a strike under § 1915(g). In that case, Taylor sued nine defendants. By agreed order, Taylor voluntarily dismissed claims against four 5 There may be a narrow set of cases where it is inappropriate to apply a strict-textualist approach, such as where a court finds an action frivolous but then erroneously styles its dismissal as an affirmance. The D.C. Circuit contemplated such a scenario and referred to it as a constructive dismissal. Thompson, 492 F.3d at 436. Talal v. White does not present such a circumstance, and therefore, we refrain from analyzing whether this court should adopt the reasoning from Thompson. - 10 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al. defendants with prejudice. After Taylor voluntarily dismissed these claims, the district court dismissed the remaining claims against three defendants for failure to state a claim and against two defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m) when these two defendants were not timely served. Taylor alleged below, and alleges now, that he voluntarily dismissed claims in Myers because he obtained a settlement from the four dismissed defendants. The district court found that “the Court’s review of [Myers] show[ed] that . . . some of [the] claims [settled].” R. 103, Dist. Ct. Order at 2, Page ID # 330. Despite finding that a settlement occurred, the court held that Myers counted as a strike because “the vast majority of his claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim.”6 Id. Based on this record, Taylor contends that Myers should not count as a strike under § 1915(g) because (1) the case was dismissed in part for non-§ 1915(g) reasons and (2) the settlement of claims prevents this court from holding that Myers was a strike under § 1915(g). However, if the district judge correctly concluded that an action can count as a strike because some of the claims were dismissed for § 1915(g) reasons, then we would not need to consider Taylor’s arguments. Also, if there were no evidence of a settlement, the district court should have considered what effect a voluntary dismissal would have under § 1915(g). Before delving into the specifics of this case, however, we begin by delineating the relevant areas of the law—the definition of action and the effect of mixed dismissals, settlements, and voluntary dismissals under § 1915(g). 6 Considering that nine claims were brought, the district court erroneously concluded that the “vast majority” of claims were dismissed for § 1915(g) reasons. - 11 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al.

Section 1915(g) speaks of appeals and actions, but not claims. Action, as it is normally used within the pleading context, refers to the entire case or suit filed by a plaintiff. See Tolbert, 635 F.3d at 650-51. Thus, a plain reading of the statute would suggest that action refers to an entire action and not individual claims. The other circuits to address the issue agree with this conclusion. See, e.g., id. (holding entire action must be dismissed for § 1915(g) reasons); Turley v. Gaetz, 625 F.3d 1005, 1008 (7th Cir. 2010) (same); Thompson, 492 F.3d at 432 (same); Banks v. U.S. Marshal, 274 F. App’x 631, 635 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that entire action must be dismissed at least in part for § 1915(g) reasons). Additionally, reading “action” to mean “claim” would undermine the purposes of the PLRA. This interpretation would deny in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who previously brought three actions, each of which contained a frivolous claim amidst several meritorious ones. Denying in forma pauperis status to a plaintiff with such a prior litigation history would undermine the purposes of the PLRA because the denial would not staunch the flow of frivolous litigation. Even if an action only has one meritorious claim amidst a sea of frivolous ones, the case cannot count as a § 1915(g) strike. As this and other courts have contemplated, if any of the claims have merit, then the case cannot count as a strike. Pointer, 502 F.3d at 375-76 (dicta); Thomas v. Parker, 672 F.3d 1182, 1183-84 (10th Cir. 2012) (dicta); Thompson, 492 F.3d at 432. The reason is simple: In these cases, the plaintiff has proved that the entirety of his action does not fall within § 1915(g). - 12 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al.
With the definition of “action” in mind, we turn to how district courts should interpret mixed dismissals under §1915(g). We begin with the most relevant Sixth Circuit case. In Pointer, the court held that a mixed dismissal counts as a strike where some claims are dismissed for reasons enumerated in § 1915(g) and others are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 502 F.3d at 373. The court noted that failing to count an action as a strike because the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to some claims would subvert the purpose of the PLRA by allowing unexhausted claims to “inject merit into the action” where all other claims fail. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that the rule advanced by the plaintiff would allow prisoners to avoid obtaining a strike by merely appending one unexhausted claim. Id. The Pointer court therefore held that if an entire action was dismissed, at least in part for § 1915(g) reasons, and if none of the claims were found to have merit, then the action counts as a strike under § 1915(g).7 See id. When the claims dismissed for non-§ 1915(g) reasons are dismissed without prejudice, the action counts as a strike unless the plaintiff proves the claims had merit by refiling any of them and proving that they do not fall within the gamut of § 1915(g). See id. at 376. 7 Taylor contends that Pointer only extends to unexhausted claims; however, this reading is too narrow. The Pointer court did not focus on the unexhausted nature of the claims; rather, the court focused on the underlying purposes of the PLRA, the fact that none of the claims were found to have merit, and the fact that the entire action was dismissed. Id. at 373-74. Limiting the Pointer holding to unexhausted claims would contradict the reasoning and holding of that case. - 13 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al. Implicit in the Pointer holding is that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a prior action did not fall within § 1915(g).8 When a prisoner’s suit is dismissed partially under § 1915(g) and partially for other reasons, the claims dismissed for non-§ 1915(g) reasons might later have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. And a prisoner should not be given the benefit of the doubt in these circumstances. Instead, when an action is dismissed in its entirety at least in part for § 1915(g) reasons, the plaintiff subsequently bears the burden of proving that the entire action did not fall under § 1915(g) by showing that claims dismissed without prejudice were not frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. Absent a plaintiff later proving this, the action counts as a strike.
We must also consider what effect a settlement would have on a three-strikes determination. To be sure, a settlement creates the possibility that a claim did not fall within § 1915(g). However, the mere fact of a settlement does not mean that the claim had merit or that it would have withstood scrutiny. Simply put, courts should not assume that a case has merit because it settled. Cases settle for many reasons and sometimes for reasons entirely unrelated to the merits of the case, and the mere fact of a settlement will not support a finding that the previous case would have withstood dismissal under § 1915(g). The plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the court that a case is not a strike, 8 When, as in this case, a magistrate judge recommends that the plaintiff has three or more strikes, the plaintiff bears the burden of persuading the district court that the identified cases are not strikes. See Thompson 492 F.3d at 436; Andrews, 398 F.3d at 1120; Evans v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 150 F.3d 810, 811-12 (7th Cir.1998). - 14 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al. and therefore, he must prove that the claim would not have later been dismissed under § 1915(g). A failure on plaintiff’s part to prove this would result in the action counting as a strike.
Finally, we also consider what effect a voluntary dismissal will have for purposes of § 1915(g). A plaintiff cannot avoid incurring a strike by simply voluntarily dismissing a claim. This rule would subvert the purposes of the PLRA: a plaintiff could guard against incurring strikes by filing an action with a bogus claim and then voluntarily dismissing that claim, thereby allowing inmates to easily avoid strikes even if all of their claims were meritless. And we will not assume that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice means that a case had merit.9
We must now apply these abstract principles to the facts of this case. We hold initially that the district court erred in concluding that an action counts as a strike because some of the claims were dismissed under § 1915(g). Because § 1915(g) refers to an entire action and not individual claims, a court cannot impose a strike simply because some of the “claims were dismissed for failure to state a claim”; instead, the district court should have considered whether the alleged settlement 9 Taylor argues that we should adopt the reasoning from the Fourth Circuit’s Tolbert decision. The Tolbert court imposed a categorical rule that if a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a claim without prejudice then the action cannot count as a strike. 635 F.3d at 648, 654. The court held that because the plain meaning of § 1915(g) speaks of actions and not claims, the entire action had to be dismissed for reasons enumerated in § 1915(g) to be counted as a strike. Id. at 650-52 The underlying purposes of the PLRA and the analysis of Pointer prevent us from adopting the categorical approach endorsed in Tolbert. - 15 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al. occurred because the claim had merit. Because the district court’s reasons for imposing the strike were erroneous, we must turn to Taylor’s arguments. The holding from Pointer dictates that Taylor’s first argument—because Myers was a mixed dismissal it should not count as a strike—fails. Myers was dismissed in its entirety, some claims were dismissed for § 1915(g) reasons, and Taylor never proved the claims dismissed without prejudice had merit; therefore, were this Taylor’s only argument, the action would count as a strike. Taylor could have proved the case had merit by refiling the claims dismissed for failure to timely serve, properly serving the parties, and establishing that his claim did not fall within § 1915(g). Turning to Taylor’s second argument—that a settlement of some claims in Myers establishes that it cannot count as a strike. Having concluded above that the district court erred when it imposed a strike because some claims were dismissed under § 1915(g), we assess the district court’s finding that “the Court’s review of [Myers] show[ed] that . . . some of [the] claims [settled].” R. 103, Dist. Ct. Order at 2, Page ID # 330. The district judge did not cite to the portion of the record he relied upon when finding that a settlement occurred. Indeed, our review of the entire record from Myers does not support the district court’s finding that a settlement occurred. The only support for the existence of a settlement is Taylor’s statement in his memorandum in opposition to the magistrate’s report and recommendation. In his objections, Taylor stated that the claims had settled for $500. However, an argument presented to the court is not evidence. Cf. Duha v. Agrium, Inc., 448 F.3d 867, 879 (6th Cir. 2006) (stating that “[a]rguments in parties’ briefs are not evidence”). A statement in a memo will not suffice to show that a claim settled, and the record on appeal is void of any other evidence - 16 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al. of a settlement. Based on this record, it appears likely that the district judge abused his discretion in concluding there was a settlement. If we are correct and there was no evidence presented of a settlement, but rather, there is only evidence of a voluntary dismissal with prejudice, then Myers would count as a strike as outlined above. However, though we found no evidence in the record of a settlement, there is the possibility that the district judge was presented with evidence of a settlement and simply failed to discuss that evidence. If this is the case, Taylor should not be penalized. We must remand this case to give the district judge an opportunity to explain what basis he had for determining that there was a settlement. Accordingly, on remand the district court must consider whether evidence of a settlement on the merits was presented. If the court finds that there was a settlement on the merits, then Myers does not count as a strike. Myers counts as a strike, on the other hand, if the court finds that there was not a settlement on the merits.