Opinion ID: 751576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: validity of inventory search

Text: 6 We review the district court's factual findings on the motion to suppress for clear error. United States v. Holloway, 128 F.3d 1254, 1255-56 (8th Cir.1997). The district court's ultimate ruling on a motion to suppress represents a legal ruling reviewed de novo. Id. 7 Best argues that the inventory search performed by Trooper Byrd exceeded the permissible scope of a warrantless inventory search. The government contends that Trooper Byrd reasonably searched in an effort to protect the police against damage claims once he determined the automobile's windows would not operate properly. 8 A warrantless inventory search of an automobile in police custody does not violate the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1173-74 (8th Cir.1993) (citing South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3097, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). The Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Opperman articulated the following three justifications for an inventory search: (1) protection of the owner's property while in police custody; (2) protection of the police from claims of lost, stolen or damaged property; and (3) protection of the police from potential danger. 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S.Ct. at 3097. However, these justifications for an inventory search do not justify an unlimited search of the automobile. The fourth amendment requires that an inventory search be reasonable in scope. United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir.1980). 9 A warrantless inventory search must be done pursuant to standard police procedures and for the purpose of protecting the car and its contents. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372, 373, 96 S.Ct. at 3098, 3099. The Tenth Circuit concluded in a case similar to the present case that a search exceeded the proper scope of an inventory search and suppressed cocaine. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit opined: 10 [a]lthough the permissible scope of an inventory search has not been well-defined, searching behind the door panel of a vehicle does not qualify as standard police procedure, and does not serve the purpose of protecting the car and its contents under any normal construction of those terms, at least on the evidence in this record. 11 United States v. Lugo, 978 F.2d 631, 637 (10th Cir.1992) (footnote omitted) (citing Opperman, 428 U.S. at 372, 373, 96 S.Ct. at 3098, 3099). 1 12 We conclude that Trooper Byrd's search of Best's automobile does not fall within the permissible scope of an inventory search. Trooper Byrd at the suppression hearing testified that the Arkansas State Police inventory policy includes inventory of the contents of the automobile including the opening of any opaque containers but does not specifically allow looking inside door panels. More importantly, Trooper Byrd's use of a flashlight to look inside the window and his opening Best's door panel did not serve the purpose of protecting the car and its contents. Best would not have a legitimate claim for protection of property hidden in the door panel and therefore Trooper Byrd did not have a legitimate interest in seeking such property. Trooper Byrd could have simply indicated that the power windows did not work properly. Accordingly, Trooper Byrd's continued search exceeds the permissible scope of an inventory search and constitutes an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.