Opinion ID: 665979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appropriateness, Nature and Severity of Sanctions

Text: 21 The procedure for determining whether a sanction should be imposed and, if so, its nature and severity, is left in the first instance to the trial court's sound discretion. Linder contends that the district court abused its discretion, see Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. at 2460, by unnecessarily convening a hearing on the request for Rule 11 sanctions. See also Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 advisory committee's note (sanctions procedure depends on circumstances and severity of sanction under consideration); Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc., 838 F.2d 600, 607 (1st Cir.1988) (similar). He argues that there was no reason to conduct a Rule 11 hearing once the court found no legal basis for the complaint, see Silva, 745 F.Supp. at 803, since sanctions were mandatory under the pre-amendment version of Rule 11, Jensen v. Frank, 912 F.2d 517, 524 n. 6 (1st Cir.1990). 22 Linder once again mischaracterizes the proceedings below. The grant of summary judgment against plaintiffs did not preordain the imposition of any Rule 11 sanction against Linder. Rather, the hearing was necessary to determine whether Linder had violated Rule 11 and, if so, to determine an appropriate sanction. Additionally, defendants requested a fee award against plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988 as well, which the court considered at the same hearing and later denied. The claim that the district court abused its discretion by conducting a hearing to resolve defendants' fee requests under Rule 11 and section 1988 is frivolous. 23 Linder has fallen far short of a showing of abuse of discretion. 9 Rule 11 contemplates giv[ing] effect to [its] central goal of deterrence, Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. at 2460, while avoiding unnecessary satellite litigation; the proper balance is left to the reasoned discretion of the district court, id. Cf. Fashion House, 892 F.2d at 1082 (district court is in best position to determine appropriate remedy). The hearing was necessary for two reasons: to determine whether there was a proper basis for assessing attorney fees against plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988, and whether Linder's filing of the groundless complaint warranted imposition of a Rule 11 sanction. Silva, slip op. at 2-3 (Nov. 5, 1992); Silva, 745 F.Supp. at 806. Thus, among the matters at issue in the Rule 11 sanctions hearing were whether Linder: (1) brought the action for an improper purpose and (2) after reasonable inquiry, could have formed a reasonable belief that the complaint was well grounded in fact and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11 (1987); see Lancellotti, 909 F.2d at 19. The court found that Linder failed to make a reasonable inquiry to determine that the complaint was well founded in fact ... [and] even more important [the] lawsuit was baseless as a matter of law. Silva, slip op. at 17 (Nov. 5, 1992). See Unanue-Casal v. Unanue-Casal, 898 F.2d 839, 841-42 (1st Cir.1990) (Rule 11 sanctions against counsel warranted for filing frivolous removal petition with no plausible legal basis and for improper purpose). 10
24 Linder's remaining claim is that the attorney fee award is excessive. Compensatory sanctions under Rule 11 must be reasonable in amount. 11 Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1427 (citing cases). 25
26 The district court awarded the City 12 $53,528.81 in attorney fees and costs incurred during the merits phase of the litigation by all defendants, representing approximately 487 hours devoted to legal services by counsel appearing for the five individual defendants, and by the City Solicitor in behalf of the City and the same five individual defendants in their official capacities. Linder does not challenge the individual fee applications, but asserts that the aggregate hours were not reasonably required because defendants did not take proper measures to mitigate fees by delegating jointly-required in-court services and submitting unitary filings to avoid unnecessary duplication of services. See Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1427 (compensatory sanctions allowed only for costs reasonably incurred) citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Services, Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 879 (5th Cir.1988); see also Dubisky v. Owens, 849 F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir.1988) (similar). 27 The district court rejected Linder's argument, finding instead that if plaintiffs' case had not been so utterly without merit, this 'redundant' representation might have proved essential to these defendants, Silva, slip op. at 13 (May 6, 1993), and therefore that the employment of multiple attorneys during the merits phrase was reasonably required. We agree that it was reasonable for the five defendants, in their individual capacities, to obtain representation by their own counsel while the merits of plaintiffs' claims remained in litigation, since counsel to the City represented the individual defendants in their official capacities only. Linder points to no authority for the implicit assumption that reasonable mitigation efforts require that the private interests of parties sued in their individual capacities must go unrepresented. Cf. Mariani, 983 F.2d at 8 n. 5. Nor has he shown that the respective private interests of these individual defendants during the merits phase did not conflict to the point that mutual representation was precluded. 13 Cf. Brandt v. Schal Assoc., Inc., 960 F.2d 640, 648 (7th Cir.1992) ([w]e have little sympathy for the litigant who fires a big gun, and when the adversary returns fire, complains because he was only firing blanks). 28 The court further found that the total time spent by each attorney on the merits was not excessive. Silva, slip op. at 13 (Nov. 5, 1992). The court also disallowed all fees for legal services, except those services directly rendered to the City, after the point in time when it became clear that no conflicts of interest precluded the individual defendants' joint representation by counsel to the City. See Brandt, 960 F.2d at 649 (no failure to mitigate where sanctioned attorney's broad complaint necessitated investment of extensive attorney time in defense and district court carefully monitored procedure). A party is required to mitigate expenses only insofar as is reasonable. Our review of the record discloses no basis for supposing that the district court abused its discretion by allowing a $53,528.81 reimbursement to the City for legal services rendered during the merits phase. See Navarro-Ayala, 968 F.2d at 1426 (When the district court settles upon a monetary sanction and fixes a dollar amount, a reviewing tribunal should defer, within broad limits, to the district court's exercise of its informed discretion. Nevertheless, the court of appeals must be careful not merely to 'rubber-stamp the decisions of the district court.' ) (citation omitted). 29
30 The district court disallowed all fees requested in relation to the sanctions phase of the litigation except for those incurred by the City. 14 The court found that counsel to the individual defendants had been notified in advance that the City no longer believed there existed any conflict of interest precluding joint representation. Thus, the court allowed only $21,821.15 in total fees and costs for 188 out of over 1500 hours expended by all counsel representing defendants during the sanctions phase. Linder does not challenge the reasonableness of the fees incurred by the City in the sanctions phase. 15 31 We therefore affirm the district court judgement. 32 Affirmed.