Opinion ID: 2981906
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brandishing Firearm Enhancement

Text: We review the sentence imposed by the district court for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We consider “not only the length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination.” United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 383 (6th Cir. 2005). To be considered procedurally reasonable, the district court must “properly calculate the guidelines range, treat the guidelines as advisory, consider the § 3553(a) factors and adequately explain the chosen sentence.” United States v. Presley, 547 F.3d 625, 629 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and quotation marks omitted). We review legal conclusions concerning application of the Guidelines de novo and factual findings in applying the Guidelines for clear error. United States v. Coleman, 664 F.3d 1047, 1048 (6th Cir. 2012). A fact is clearly erroneous only where the record as a whole leaves us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Moon, 513 F.3d 527, 540 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
When holding a defendant accountable for the actions of a co-conspirator under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the district court must make particularized findings: “(1) that the acts were within the scope of the defendant’s agreement; and (2) that they were foreseeable to the defendant.” United States v. Campbell, 279 F.3d 392, 399–400 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks 5 No. 12-6252 omitted). “In order to determine the scope of the defendant’s agreement, the district court may consider any explicit agreement or implicit agreement fairly inferred from the conduct of the defendant and others.” Id. at 400 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 cmt. n.2. Whether a defendant can be held accountable for a co-conspirator’s conduct is a factual determination which is reviewed for clear error. See id.; United States v. Dupree, 323 F.3d 480, 490 (6th Cir. 2003).
We do not find any error in the district court’s conclusion that Defendant should be held accountable for Kerr’s conduct in brandishing a firearm during the attempted robbery of the Red Roof Inn. Defendant primarily argues that Kerr and Dedeaux’s conduct was not within the scope of his agreement or reasonably foreseeable because they did not include Defendant in the decision to rob the Red Roof Inn, and that had he known, Defendant would not have: (1) used his real name to reserve the room, (2) told the security guard that he was not involved, or (3) fled the scene on foot while his co-conspirators fled in Defendant’s girlfriend’s car. But, as the district court stated, that is just evidence of a poorly executed robbery and bad friends. Despite Defendant’s contention otherwise, the attempted robbery of the Red Roof Inn was within the scope of his agreement with Kerr and Dedeaux; Defendant admits that he agreed to drive Kerr and Dedeaux to whatever business they wanted to rob. His agreement to rob a to-be-determined establishment was broad and without any exclusions. Although Defendant arguably was not aware that the Red Roof Inn was the specific business of choice, Kerr’s conduct was nonetheless in furtherance of Defendant’s general agreement to rob some establishment. 6 No. 12-6252 Moreover, Defendant’s conduct on the day in question reasonably demonstrated an agreement with this specific robbery, further supporting that it was within the scope of his agreement. See Campbell, 279 F.3d at 400. The district court found that Defendant was not only present when Kerr attempted to rob the Red Roof Inn, but that he also participated. Indeed, it was Defendant who drove the threesome to the Red Roof Inn. And although Defendant legitimately reserved a room, once Kerr entered the establishment with a firearm, the Red Roof Inn’s security guard recognized that Defendant was involved in the robbery. The guard ordered both Defendant and Kerr to get on the floor, yet Defendant did not comply, indicating that he was with Kerr. Instead, both Defendant and Kerr disobeyed that order and walked towards the guard, forcing the guard to discharge his weapon in defense. It was not clear error for the district court to find that the robbery of the Red Roof Inn was within the scope of Defendant’s agreement. See id. And finally, the robbery and Kerr’s brandishing of a weapon was reasonably foreseeable. Defendant agreed to drive Kerr and Dedeaux around and help them find a business to rob, and they found one. It is reasonably foreseeable that during the course of the drive, Kerr would find a location and attempt to rob it. It was also foreseeable that in the course of the robbery, Kerr would brandish a weapon.3 See United States v. King, 915 F.2d 269, 273 (6th Cir. 1990) (finding that possession of a weapon by a co-conspirator during a bank robbery was reasonably foreseeable); see also United States v. Brown, 55 F. App’x 753, 754 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (finding enhancements proper 3 We need not reach the question whether ordering robbery victims to the ground at gun point is alone sufficient to impose a physical restraint enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(4). Even assuming, arguendo, that the two-level enhancement would not apply, the applicable Guidelines’ range would not be affected because the new range of 63 to 78 months is still above the statutory maximum of 60 months. See United States v. Bacon, 617 F.3d 452, 457 (6th Cir. 2010). 7 No. 12-6252 where the defendant’s partner brandished a weapon and shot an off-duty security guard during robberies); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, cmt. n.2. (advising that a defendant can be held accountable for a coconspirator who assaults a robbery victim despite the defendant’s forewarning not to hurt anyone). In sum, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Defendant was accountable for his co-conspirator’s conduct where such conduct was both within the scope of the robbery Defendant agreed to and was reasonably foreseeable. The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying the five-level enhancement for brandishing a firearm under U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2) or imposing the 60-month maximum sentence.