Opinion ID: 1338683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: American Foods v. Ford

Text: In 1980, this Court found that an employee's injury sustained while welding hydraulic lines aboard a ship anchored in navigable waters at Cape Charles was encompassed within the federally-created doctrine of maritime but local. Ford, 221 Va. at 562, 272 S.E.2d at 190. In accordance with the decision of Sun Ship, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715, 100 S.Ct. 2432, 65 L.Ed.2d 458 (1980), this Court then held that, when considering injuries designated maritime but local, federal law was not the exclusive remedy and did not preempt state law; rather, such injuries were subject to concurrent jurisdiction and were, therefore, compensable under both the VWCA and the LHWCA. Ford, 221 Va. at 561, 272 S.E.2d at 190. There are no facts in this case which, for jurisprudential purposes, would differentiate Mizenko's injury from that suffered by Ford. Mizenko's injury occurred while he was repairing a ship in navigable waters, just as Ford's did. Mizenko, like Ford, was a Virginia resident. Mizenko's employer, Abacus Temporary Service, Inc., a Virginia corporation which provided professional temporary services, sent him to Metro Machine Corporation. Metro in turn assigned Mizenko, a pipefitter, to repair pipe on the U.S.S. COMPTE DE GRASSE. Electric Motor and Contracting Company, also a Virginia company, was performing repairs to gas turbine generators of the ship pursuant to its subcontract with Metro. None of these facts detracts from the virtual identity of circumstances relevant to the injuries of Ford and Mizenko, circumstances which in the former case supported this Court's conclusion that the injury and its concomitant state interest invoked the doctrine of maritime but local. The reasoning in Ford, then, would seem to compel the conclusion that Mizenko's injury was maritime but local in nature and subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the VWCA and the LHWCA. Nevertheless, the majority holds today that the injury is not maritime but local, and avoids reconciling its conclusion with that of Ford by determining that neither Ford nor Sun Ship is controlling. The majority reads Ford and Sun Ship as creating a zone of concurrent jurisdiction only for workers' compensation claims. Ergo, as Mizenko's claim is not one for workers' compensation, it is not within or subject to the zone of concurrent jurisdiction. However, consideration of the rights and remedies afforded by either or both acts to injuries subject to their jurisdiction is not predicated on, or limited to, claims for workers' compensation benefits. McBride did not involve a claim for workers' compensation, yet the injured employee's injury and remedy, therefore, was subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the LHWCA and the VWCA. Furthermore, in my opinion, the concept of maritime but local injuries as discussed in Ford is not addressed by the majority. Analysis of this concept is based on the circumstances of the injury such as where it happened, the nature of the employment, and the applicability of state and/or federal statutory law; it has little if anything to do with the type of recovery sought by the injured party. To conclude, as the majority does today, that Mizenko's injury is not maritime but local, and that his injury or claim is not within the zone of concurrent jurisdiction, is at complete odds with the decision of this Court in Ford. I respectfully cannot subscribe to the majority's novel application of the terms concurrent jurisdiction and maritime but local. Those terms, and the legal concepts which they represent, as I understand them, are discussed in the following section. II.