Opinion ID: 2759803
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: United States Marshal Alred’s Testimony

Text: Finally, Wade argues that trial counsel should have objected to Marshal Alred’s testimony on the basis of hearsay and improper opinion. Wade contends that the postconviction court erred in determining that the cell phone data interpreted by Marshal Alred was not hearsay and that Marshal Alred was qualified as someone with particular expertise to use cell phone data to testify about the location from which calls were placed. This Court’s precedent and the record support the postconviction court’s denial of relief. Marshal Alred testified that in July 2005, he assisted the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office in their search for the Sumners or, if the Sumners were no longer alive, the individuals who kidnapped them. Marshal Alred explained that as part of that investigation, he requested records from Nextel Telephone Company regarding a cell phone that was registered to David Jackson, who was later determined to be Michael Jackson using an alias. Based on that information, Marshal Alred testified that on July 8, 2005, three calls were made to or from - 34 - Jackson’s phone using side one of the San Marco tower, and then shortly after midnight on July 9, 2005, a call was made from Jackson’s phone to the Heritage Credit Union, using the Macclenny tower. First, trial counsel did not act unreasonably by failing to raise a hearsay objection to this testimony. As recognized by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2008), phone company call lists are not out-of-court statements by a declarant. The Eleventh Circuit reasoned: We have no difficulty concluding that the statements in question are the statements of machines, not statements of persons. . . . [T]he relevant point is that no human intervened at the time the raw billing data was “stated” by the machine—that is, recorded onto Sprint’s data reels. The process by which the data was extracted from the reels and placed onto compact CDs such as Exhibit 2 was similarly fully automated. Finally, Burden did not alter the underlying data on Exhibit 2 when she created a printout of calls made to AirTran’s corporate telephone number on September 18, 2001 (Exhibit 3); she merely utilized Fonview in pre-programmed fashion to read the encrypted data on Exhibit 2 and to format the data so as to indicate the relevant portion. Id. at 1263-64 (footnotes omitted); see also Bowe v. State, 785 So. 2d 531, 532 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (“[N]either the pager nor the caller I.D. screen, like a radar or other similar machine able to give a readout, was a ‘person’ capable of being a ‘declarant’ within the definition of the hearsay rule.” (quoting § 90.801(1)(b), Fla. Stat. (2000))). In light of these authorities, trial counsel did not err by not raising a hearsay objection to the testimony about the content of the Nextel records. - 35 - Second, trial counsel did not have a basis to object to Marshal Alred’s qualifications to interpret the records. This Court has held that non-experts may testify about cell phone records. See Gordon v. State, 863 So. 2d 1215, 1219 (Fla. 2003) (determining that a witness’s testimony about the content of phone records and the locations of the calls “did not constitute expert testimony” requiring “technical, or other specialized knowledge”). B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DURING THE PENALTY PHASE 1. Presentation of Mitigating Evidence a. Mental Health Expert Wade argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not ensuring that Wade received a reasonably competent mental health evaluation and for not calling a mental health expert to testify generally about the adolescent brain. The postconviction court concluded that trial counsel was not deficient, reasoning that it was Wade’s own behavior that prevented trial counsel from presenting mental health mitigation. The postconviction court also denied relief on the basis that Wade did not prove that he was prejudiced by any alleged errors. The postconviction court concluded that the defense expert presented at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Hyman Eisenstein, was not credible and that any expert testimony about impulsiveness would not be consistent with the facts of the crimes. The - 36 - postconviction court did not err in denying relief. Wade proved neither deficiency nor prejudice. “[T]he inquiry regarding ineffective assistance and mitigation should focus on whether trial counsel’s decision was reasonable at the time the decision was made, without the benefit of hindsight.” Henry v. State, 937 So. 2d 563, 573 (Fla. 2006). In Spann v. State, 985 So. 2d 1059, 1070 (Fla. 2008), this Court concluded that trial counsel could not be deemed ineffective for failing to obtain a complete mental health evaluation of the defendant when the defendant “thwarted counsel’s efforts to seek mental health mitigation.” In that case, trial counsel hired a mental health expert who attempted to meet with Spann on two occasions. Spann was cooperative at the first visit but then, on the second visit, refused to complete the evaluation, despite the expert’s explanation of the importance of Spann’s cooperation. Id. In this case, the record demonstrates that trial counsel made a reasonable effort to have Wade evaluated by a mental health expert and that Wade refused to cooperate. At the evidentiary hearing, attorney Tassone testified that he hired Dr. Stephen I. Bloomfield to evaluate Wade for mental health mitigation and that Dr. Bloomfield reported back that Wade was “not cooperative with him” and “did not open up.” Tassone stated that he explained to Wade the importance of being - 37 - forthcoming with the psychologist, but Wade responded that “he had given the information that he wanted to give.” Dr. Bloomfield, a psychologist, testified that he was hired in June or July of 2006 to work on Wade’s case and that during a meeting at attorney Tassone’s office, Dr. Bloomfield reviewed records pertaining to Wade. Dr. Bloomfield described his first meeting with Wade as a normal first meeting, except that Wade was focused on his dissatisfaction with his attorneys and his desire to see the discovery in his case. According to Dr. Bloomfield, at the second meeting, Wade “didn’t want to go forward with much because he was pretty insistent on getting information from counsel, not from me.” Dr. Bloomfield testified that he was able to get some background information from Wade at the third meeting, although Wade was still reluctant. Wade told the doctor about when he was involuntarily committed as a teenager, his use of cocaine and marijuana, his employment history, and his general education diploma. Wade submitted to some competency testing but would not participate in psychological testing. Dr. Bloomfield explained that Wade was “cordial and pleasant but he wouldn’t do psychological testing. I offered and I told him I thought it was important. . . . But he didn’t want to do it.” Dr. Bloomfield opined that Wade understood the purpose of the meetings and made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary decision not to participate in - 38 - developing mental health mitigation. Additionally, Dr. Bloomfield testified that he reported to Tassone that because Wade was “reluctant” and unwilling to participate in psychological testing, Dr. Bloomfield “didn’t have at that point anything that [he] could testify to.” Based on the foregoing, the postconviction court correctly concluded that trial counsel cannot be considered deficient for failing to obtain a full mental health evaluation. The lack of evaluation was a result of Wade’s refusal to submit to an evaluation, not trial counsel’s lack of competency. Wade also failed to establish that he was prejudiced by his counsel’s inability to obtain a mental health evaluation of Wade. First, Dr. Eisenstein did not testify that his postconviction evaluation of Wade—which included neuropsychological testing and an interview—uncovered any significant mental illness or dysfunction. Dr. Eisenstein concluded that Wade is in the normal range of intelligence but that Wade’s “brain does not process information as quickly as he should be able to do.” Dr. Eisenstein explained that while Wade’s score on the perceptional subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-Fourth Edition (WAIS-IV) was in the high average range, Wade’s score on the verbal subtest was only in the average range. Similarly, there was a discrepancy between Wade’s visual learning, which was in the high normal range, and his verbal learning, which was in the borderline range on the Wechsler - 39 - Memory Scale. A third test revealed that Wade has trouble with brain variability, meaning he has difficulty focusing and regulating his impulses. Dr. Eisenstein testified that these discrepancies in Wade’s brain functioning are consistent with a diagnosis of brain damage but do not for certain indicate brain damage. Dr. Eisenstein also explained that the discrepancies could be a result of the cumulative effect of Wade’s drug use and oxygen deprivation from playing a game where Wade and his friends would choke each other to unconsciousness or that those incidents could have “exacerbated an underlying condition.” Despite Dr. Eisenstein’s opinion that Wade may have brain damage, Wade did not introduce any evidence of a PET or other brain scan that could have confirmed the suspicion of brain damage. Moreover, Dr. Eisenstein opined that Wade “certainly has enough strengths and abilities that he could have been a productive, law-abiding individual that could have been independent and very happy and productive in society.” Second, the record supports the postconviction court’s conclusion that Dr. Eisenstein’s opinions about Wade’s mental and emotional state at the time of the crimes were not credible. Dr. Eisenstein opined that at the time of the crimes, Wade was experiencing stress from brain impairment, longstanding attention deficit disorder, academic failure, feelings of abandonment, lack of stability, depression, and drug use, which cumulatively established the statutory mitigating - 40 - circumstances that Wade was suffering from extreme mental or emotional distress and that his capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. In addition, Dr. Eisenstein testified that he thought the statutory mitigating factor of substantial domination was applicable. Dr. Eisenstein concluded that due to the lack of a father figure in Wade’s life and his impulsiveness, Wade was “extremely vulnerable” to being dominated by Jackson. Despite giving these opinions about Wade’s mental and emotional state at the time of the crimes, Dr. Eisenstein did not offer any explanation of why the long-term stressors identified above would have reached an extreme level at the time of the robberies, kidnappings, and murders. Dr. Eisenstein also admitted on cross-examination that he did not discuss the crimes with Wade and he did not review the guilt phase testimony, the police reports related to the crimes, Wade’s statements to law enforcement officers, or the evidence presented at the codefendants’ trials. Dr. Eisenstein further testified that Wade never expressed to him that Wade acted at the behest of Jackson, and Wade had committed crimes before he ever met Jackson. Dr. Eisenstein’s lack of familiarity with the circumstances of the crimes and his lack of specific reasoning for his opinions support the postconviction court’s conclusion that Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony about the statutory mitigating factors was not entitled to belief. - 41 - In the second part of this claim, Wade argues that even if trial counsel was not deficient for failing to obtain a mental health expert’s evaluation of Wade, trial counsel erred by not calling Dr. Bloomfield or a similar expert to testify generally about young adult brain development. Because Wade turned eighteen shortly before the crimes, Wade asserts that such testimony would have been compelling mitigation. On this point, trial counsel made a reasonable, strategic decision to not call Dr. Bloomfield or another expert. At the evidentiary hearing, attorney Tassone explained that he knew at the time of Wade’s trial that due to the incomplete development of their brains, juveniles have difficulty with decision-making and impulsivity. Tassone testified that he was concerned, however, that presenting such evidence would be more harmful than helpful to Wade’s defense. Tassone reasoned that the State would have “some pertinent questions maybe in cross[-examination] of that expert.” He explained: What I was concerned about was the issue of impulsivity on a crime that spanned 24 or 36 or 48 hours because the planning of this, the act itself wasn’t just a five-minute or one-hour event, so impulsivity to me I didn’t—the last thing I needed was the [S]tate to beat [an expert] over the head with what are you saying, that [Wade’s] brain wasn’t developed and it was impulsive, then he had impulses for 36 or 48 hours or whatever the number of hours may be. “Trial counsel is not deficient where he makes a reasonable strategic decision to not present mental mitigation testimony during the penalty phase - 42 - because it could open the door to other damaging testimony.” Winkles v. State, 21 So. 3d 19, 26 (Fla. 2009) (quoting Griffin v. State, 866 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 2003)). In this case, expert testimony about impulsiveness and decision-making in juveniles would have allowed the State to emphasize the protracted nature of the crimes against the Sumners and point out how many opportunities Wade had to disentangle himself from the plan instigated by Jackson and Cole. Moreover, Dr. Eisenstein’s evidentiary hearing testimony did not call into question the reasonableness of attorney Tassone’s decision not to call a mental health expert to testify about the juvenile brain. On direct examination, Dr. Eisenstein explained that due to the incomplete development of the executive functioning portions of the brain, individuals at age eighteen generally have difficulty inhibiting their responses, weighing options, and processing complex information. On cross-examination, however, the State asked Dr. Eisenstein if he was aware that Wade and his codefendants contemplated the robberies and murders for days or weeks beforehand and that the Sumners’ grave was dug at least forty-eight hours before it was used. Dr. Eisenstein answered, “[p]erhaps.” When then asked if a young person’s “decision to act after all of that time has passed is not a rash decision,” Dr. Eisenstein answered, “[i]n terms of time, correct.” When invited by the defense to elaborate, Dr. Eisenstein testified: [O]ne can’t equate just because time has passed that therefore the judgment or the reasoning processes have—are in place to make a - 43 - contemplated decision, a rational decision in terms of inhibiting a response or regulating a response. Time is not—is not the same thing equated here as a thinking process, so there’s no way to know that thinking processes were rational and the ability to judge and to process that information. That’s—you can’t equate the two. As attorney Tassone anticipated, the cross-examination of Dr. Eisenstein made the expert appear evasive. Moreover, Dr. Eisenstein’s attempt to testify about the juvenile brain demonstrated that such testimony would have highlighted the fact that—without the benefit of a psychological evaluation of Wade—a mental health expert could not actually provide the jury with insight about Wade’s thinking processes at the time of the crimes. b. Intoxication at Time of Crimes Wade argues that defense counsel was ineffective for not calling Carmen Massanet and Nixon to testify about Wade’s drug and alcohol use at the time of the crimes. The postconviction court concluded that Massanet would not have been a helpful witness and Nixon’s testimony at the evidentiary hearing was not credible. Again, the postconviction court did not err. The record supports the trial court’s conclusion that Massanet would not have been a helpful witness. In an October 16, 2007, letter from private investigator Michael Hurst to attorney Eler, Hurst summarized his investigative interview with Massanet. Hurst wrote that Massanet agreed that she had a relationship with Jackson and with Wade. Massanet answered “yes” when asked if - 44 - she heard of an incident in which Jackson pointed a gun at Wade. Massanet added, however, that she heard this story from both Jackson and Wade “but doesn’t know whether to believe it or not because they were friends and might have just told her that.” According to Hurst, Massanet stated that she “never saw [Jackson] or [Wade] with a gun;” “she didn’t want anything to do with either one of them . . . and that they were both liars;” and she was “scared of [Jackson].” Wade’s postconviction counsel was unable to secure Massanet’s attendance at the evidentiary hearing. Given this record, the postconviction court did not err in concluding that Massanet would not be a helpful witness. There is no record support for Wade’s allegation that Massanet had knowledge of Wade’s drug and alcohol use near the time of the crimes. Moreover, while Massanet likely would have testified that she was frightened of Jackson, she also had a negative opinion of Wade and expressed doubt about whether Jackson had actually threatened Wade. “[A]n attorney’s reasoned decision not to present evidence of dubious mitigating value does not constitute ineffective assistance.” Gore v. State, 846 So. 2d 461, 470 (Fla. 2003). Turning to Nixon, “[s]o long as its decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact and, likewise, on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to the evidence by the trial court.” Windom v. State, 886 So. 2d - 45 - 915, 921 (Fla. 2004) (quoting Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 917, 923 (Fla. 2001)). Here, the postconviction court’s conclusion that Nixon’s evidentiary hearing testimony was not credible, is entitled to deference. Nixon’s evidentiary hearing testimony contradicted his trial testimony. At the evidentiary hearing, Nixon testified that during the two- or three-day period in which the group robbed, kidnapped, and murdered the Sumners, Wade was “messed up the whole time” on cocaine, alcohol, and “pills.” Nixon also stated that the group was smoking, by which it appears that he meant marijuana, not tobacco. In contrast, at Wade’s trial, the trial court asked Nixon a question drafted by the jury: “Regarding drugs and or alcohol, were drugs and or alcohol involved prior to the robbery or kidnapping?” Nixon answered: “We smoked weed and we drank Lord Calvert.” Wade’s argument for why this Court should reject the postconviction court’s credibility determination is that no questions were posed to Nixon during Wade’s trial that asked specifically about Wade’s drug use. While the intended subject of the jury’s question was ambiguous, Wade ignores that Nixon’s answer was about the group’s use of drugs and alcohol, not solely his own use. Nixon testified that “[w]e smoked weed and we drank Lord Calvert.” (Emphasis added.) Nixon’s testimonies were inconsistent, and thus, the record supports the postconviction court’s conclusion that Nixon’s postconviction testimony was not entitled to belief. - 46 - c. Other Mitigation Evidence Wade asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating mitigation leads identified by the defense’s mitigation specialist. Specifically, Wade contends that trial counsel erred by failing to call penalty phase witnesses who could have presented evidence that Wade: (1) once threatened to commit suicide; (2) suffered from depression, low self-esteem, stagnated development, and head trauma; (3) suffered from parental abandonment and neglect and had a dysfunctional family; (4) lacked a male role model; (5) came from a family with a history of Asperger’s syndrome, mental disorders, and drug use; and (6) had a history of drug and alcohol abuse and was intoxicated at the time of the crimes. Most of the potentially mitigating factors that Wade contends were overlooked were explored at the penalty phase. Wade’s penalty phase was not one in which trial counsel presented only a meager amount of mitigating evidence. Rather, Wade’s trial counsel called Wade’s mother, Wade’s half-sister, a childhood friend’s mother, the assistant principal of Wade’s middle school, Wade’s youth pastor, and Nixon as penalty phase witnesses. Through these witness, trial counsel gave the jury a detailed account of Wade’s life beginning from the time of his parents’ divorce when Wade was around eight years old. - 47 - Wade is correct that no evidence was presented to show that Wade may have suffered a head trauma from playing a choking game; Wade’s mother may have suffered from bipolar disorder; Wade’s father suffered from depression; two members of Wade’s family were diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome; Wade’s half-brother was addicted to crack and heroin; and another brother suffered from a suspected chemical imbalance. But these few pieces of noncumulative mitigating evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing—even if considered in conjunction with Dr. Eisenstein’s testimony that Wade might have brain damage—are not so significant as to undermine confidence in Wade’s death sentences. As for the possibility of a head trauma from the choking game, Nixon and Wade’s childhood friend, Vanessa Wilkinson, each testified that they had played the game with Wade on numerous occasions. Neither witness, however, expressed that he or she experienced any known brain injury as a result of the game. In addition, Dr. Eisenstein found no conclusive proof that Wade suffered from brain damage and testified that although any oxygen deprivation hinders the normal development of the brain, the choking game is “mild in terms of a spectrum head injury.” Thus, Wade did not demonstrate that he suffers from brain damage that could have been presented to the jury as a mitigating circumstance. As for Wade’s family history, Wade has not demonstrated that at the time of his trial, any of his family members had been diagnosed with Asperger’s - 48 - syndrome. While neither witness mentioned Asperger’s syndrome during their penalty phase testimony, Wade’s mother testified at the evidentiary hearing that two members of the family—Wade’s brother and Wade’s niece—were recently diagnosed with Asperger’s syndrome, and Wade’s half-sister similarly testified about her young daughter’s diagnosis. Still, neither witness addressed whether those diagnoses were made before or after Wade’s 2007 trial. “Trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to present evidence that did not exist at the time of trial.” Clark v. State, 35 So. 3d 880, 888 (Fla. 2010). Trial counsel did have reason to know at the time of the trial that Wade’s mother was suspected of being bipolar, Wade’s father was depressed, Wade’s halfbrother Robert had been addicted to crack and heroin, and that his brother Andrew was thought to have a “chemical imbalance.” This information was included in a report drafted by Shreya Mandal, who was hired by trial counsel as a mitigation specialist. Trial counsel did not present evidence of the mental health history of Wade’s family at the penalty phase. Nevertheless, while defense counsel could have presented evidence about the mental health of Wade’s relatives, Wade has not shown that this evidence would have been material. At the penalty phase, the trial court and jury heard evidence that Wade was raised by absentee parents—including a mother who frequently kicked him out of the family home beginning at the age of fourteen. - 49 - The jury was also informed that Wade was emotionally scarred by his father’s absence, once threatened to commit suicide, and abused drugs and alcohol to the extent that he once went to a rehabilitation center. Based on this evidence, the trial court found and gave weight to the statutory mitigating factor that Wade’s capacity was substantially impaired and several nonstatutory mitigating factors relating to Wade’s difficult childhood, substance abuse, and mental health. See Wade, 41 So. 3d at 866. As a result, the previously unpresented evidence about the possibility of brain damage or about the mental health of Wade’s family members would not have proven a new mitigating factor but, at most, would have led to slightly more weight being given to the mitigating factors that were considered by the jury and found by the trial court. This possibility that additional weight would have been given to the mitigating factors does not undermine confidence in Wade’s death sentences. Despite giving “great weight” to the factor of Wade’s age at the time of the offense, id., and varying weight to numerous mitigating factors pertaining to Wade’s background and mental status—both historically and at the time of the crimes—the trial court concluded that the seven aggravating factors applicable to each murder far outweighed the mitigating circumstances, id. at 867. Given this overwhelming amount of aggravation, more information about Wade’s background would not have tipped the scale in favor of life sentences. - 50 - 2. Concession of Aggravating Factors a. Pecuniary Gain Wade contends that his trial counsel erred by conceding the aggravating factor that the murders were committed for pecuniary gain. Trial counsel did not err but instead made a reasonable, strategic decision to concede that aggravating factor. During his penalty phase closing argument, attorney Tassone conceded that Wade was convicted of the murders and that Wade was motivated by greed. He argued: “There was no good reason to murder Reggie and Carol Sumner and [Wade] only did it to get money and indeed greed is the reason that Reggie and Carol Sumner are dead and greed is the reason that Alan Wade sits here today.” At the evidentiary hearing, Tassone testified that he made a strategic decision to concede the pecuniary gain aggravating factor. Attorney Tassone explained that he felt that pecuniary gain as a motive was proven by the evidence and that—in light of the jury’s decision to convict Wade of robbery—conceding the factor would be a method of maintaining some credibility with the jury. Tassone summarized: “I’m not clever enough . . . to figure out how to argue that it wasn’t pecuniary gain on a robbery conviction.” This Court’s precedent demonstrates that attorney Tassone’s strategic decision was reasonable. In a similar case where the codefendants stole the - 51 - victim’s car and wallet, this Court agreed with the postconviction court’s conclusion that “ ‘it would have been preposterous’ for penalty-phase defense counsel to argue that no facts in the record established pecuniary gain when the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt,” that the defendant was “guilty of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and murder in the first degree.” Gamble v. State, 877 So. 2d 706, 716 (Fla. 2004). b. HAC Wade contends that trial counsel conceded the aggravating circumstance of HAC when he argued: “I suggest to you that Alan Wade’s acts were evil itself, that there was no moral justification for the acts of anyone that was in that group.” Trial counsel’s closing argument can be reasonably interpreted as conceding HAC, but any such concession did not prejudice Wade. The evidence established that the victims were buried alive, and Wade offers no explanation of how trial counsel could have coherently argued to the jury that the murders were not “conscienceless or pitiless and unnecessarily torturous to the victim.” Diaz v. State, 860 So. 2d 960, 966 (Fla. 2003) (quoting State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 9 (Fla. 1973)). In light of the jury’s guilt phase decision to convict Wade of the murders and the evidence that the Sumners experienced torturous deaths, any inadvertent concession by trial counsel does not undermine confidence in the applicability of the HAC aggravating factor. - 52 - C. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE DURING VOIR DIRE In his final claim on appeal, Wade argues that the postconviction court should have concluded that Wade’s trial counsel performed ineffectively during voir dire. Wade’s arguments are without merit. 1. Misstatement of Florida Law Wade contends that trial counsel was ineffective for misleading the prospective jurors during voir dire by creating the impression that if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, the jurors would have to recommend the death penalty. Wade did not prove that he was prejudiced by trial counsel’s allegedly improper comments. The jurors in a capital case should not be told that if they conclude that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, then the law requires them to recommend a death sentence. Such a comment is a “misstatement[] of law because ‘a jury is neither compelled nor required to recommend death where aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors.’ ” Franqui v. State, 804 So. 2d 1185, 1192 (Fla. 2001) (quoting Henyard v. State, 689 So. 2d 239, 249-50 (Fla. 1996)). Regarding prospective juror Green, Wade has not demonstrated any error. After prospective juror Green stated that she had feelings against the death penalty, defense counsel attempted to rehabilitate her. Defense counsel asked Ms. Green several questions, including: “I take it then that you could if the aggravating - 53 - circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances apply the law and if the case were appropriate vote death?” Defense counsel’s question did not misstate the law. Defense counsel did not state or imply that a death vote is required where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances but only that in such a circumstance, the death penalty may be appropriate. See Davis v. State, 136 So. 3d 1169, 1207 (Fla. 2014) (“[T]he prosecutor correctly informed the jury that a death sentence is legally permitted where the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances without improperly diminishing the jury’s discretion to recommend less than the legally allowable sentence.”). Regarding prospective juror Butler, when being interviewed by the State, Ms. Butler gave answers suggesting that she would hold the State to a higher burden of proof in a death penalty case and, when asked by the defense, indicated that her support for the death penalty was at a level two out of five. In an effort to avoid juror Butler being struck for cause on the basis that she could not vote for the death penalty, trial counsel asked her: “[I]f [the State] presented aggravation, factors that beyond a reasonable doubt outweighed the mitigators, then you could apply the law and follow the law and vote death, is that right?” Defense counsel’s question to Ms. Butler—while not expressly stating that the jurors would be required to vote for death if the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating - 54 - factors—could have caused a lay person to equate “follow the law” and “vote death.” But even if defense counsel’s question to Ms. Butler was improper, Wade cannot demonstrate prejudice. This Court has concluded that a misstatement during voir dire about the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors does not satisfy the Strickland prejudice prong where the jury is properly instructed on the issue by the trial court. See, e.g., Krawczuk v. State, 92 So. 3d 195, 207 (Fla. 2012) (“As noted by the postconviction court, the record indicates that the jury was properly instructed. Accordingly, we find that Krawczuk has not demonstrated prejudice.”); Anderson v. State, 18 So. 3d 501, 517-18 (Fla. 2009) (similar). In the instant case, the trial court properly instructed the jury: “If one or more aggravating circumstances are established you should consider all of the evidence tending to establish one or more mitigating circumstances and give that evidence such weight as you feel it should receive in reaching your conclusion as to the sentence that should be imposed.” As a result, Wade has not demonstrated prejudice. 2. Failure to Preserve Issue for Appeal Wade argues that the postconviction court should have concluded that trial counsel was ineffective because trial counsel failed to properly preserve for review the trial court’s denial of two challenges for cause made by the defense. Wade contends that trial counsel erred by not identifying a juror whom he would have - 55 - stricken if granted additional peremptory challenges. This claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is insufficiently pleaded. Wade does not allege which juror trial counsel should have identified as being objectionable. 3. Questioning of Jurors and Juror Challenges In his final claim on appeal, Wade argues that the postconviction court should have concluded that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately explore the feelings about the death penalty of four members of the jury—jurors Isleib, Baesler, Smith, and Bragg—and for failing to challenge for cause or use a peremptory challenge to remove those jurors. Wade is not entitled to relief. Wade’s claim that “there would have been a basis for a for cause challenge if counsel had followed up during voir dire with more specific questions is speculative.” Green v. State, 975 So. 2d 1090, 1105 (Fla. 2008). Wade offers no reason to believe that if the jurors were asked in more detail about the relative burdens of proof and the weighing process, they would have given answers that raised doubt about their fitness to serve. Wade also fails to establish that trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging for cause or using a peremptory strike to remove jurors Isleib, Baesler, Smith, and Bragg. As set out in Carratelli v. State, 961 So. 2d 312, 324-25 (Fla. 2007), where a defendant “alleges that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to raise or preserve a cause challenge, the defendant must demonstrate that a juror - 56 - was actually biased.” “Under the actual bias standard, the defendant must demonstrate that the juror in question was not impartial—i.e., that the juror was biased against the defendant, and the evidence of bias must be plain on the face of the record.” Id. at 324. Wade cited to no evidence on the face of the record that indicates that any of the above listed jurors were actually biased against him. Each of the four jurors stated that, in general, on a scale of one to five—five being the most in favor of the death penalty as a potential punishment for first-degree murder—they supported the death penalty at a level five. But despite identifying themselves as level-fives, each juror expressed a willingness to make an individualized sentencing recommendation.