Opinion ID: 1217183
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: defendant koch

Text: In granting defendant Koch's motion for directed verdict, the trial judge concluded, as he had for defendant Albanese, that Koch owed no duty to plaintiff. In reviewing this conclusion we note that Koch occupied the positions of both builder and vendor of the apartments. We agree that Koch, as a vendor, did not owe a duty to plaintiff since the lack of the handrail was known to both defendant Stearns, the vendee/landlord, and plaintiff. See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 352-353 (1965). Koch's status as a builder, however, presents a different question. As a builder, Koch owed a common-law duty of ordinary care, to perform his work in a workmanlike manner. Every person has a general duty to use due or ordinary care not to injure others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him, and to do his work, render services or use his property as to avoid such injury. Whitt v. Jarnagin, 91 Idaho 181, 188, 418 P.2d 278, 285 (1966) (citations omitted) (quoted approvingly in Harper v. Hoffman, 95 Idaho 933, 935, 523 P.2d 536, 538 (1974)). Therefore, we hold that defendant Koch did owe a duty to plaintiff and that plaintiff presented adequate evidence to have the jury determine whether Koch breached this duty by failing to construct the apartments in compliance with the plans. Koch contends that any negligence on his part was superseded by intervening causes. As we previously stated, in part III. A. of this opinion, such a determination is for the jury to make. Lastly, Koch asserts that plaintiff was as a matter of law, at least fifty percent negligent thus barring recovery from any of the defendants. However, this question is also one which should be left to the jury unless the facts are undisputed and only one reasonable conclusion can be drawn therefrom. Deshazer v. Tompkins, 93 Idaho 267, 460 P.2d 402 (1969). Here the facts are disputed, thus presenting a jury question. Plaintiff has argued that defendant Koch was also negligent per se for violating the building code, contained in a Boise ordinance, which required at least one handrail on the stairway in question here. [2] We have previously alluded to the fact that violation of an ordinance may constitute negligence per se in the same manner as does violation of a statute. See Bale v. Perryman, 85 Idaho 435, 443, 380 P.2d 501, 505 (1963); State ex rel. McKinney v. Richardson, 76 Idaho 9, 15, 277 P.2d 272, 275 (1954). In addition, this appears to be the majority rule. See W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 36, p. 201 n. 28 (4th ed. 1971); 57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence §§ 269-270 (1971); 65 C.J.S. Negligence 19(3)b.(b) (1966). In order for the violation of an ordinance to be considered negligence per se, the ordinance must be applicable; that is, the ordinance must be designed to protect (1) the class of persons in which the plaintiff is included (2) against the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a result of its violation. Kinney v. Smith, 95 Idaho 328, 331, 508 P.2d 1234, 1237 (1973) (setting out the test for whether a statute is applicable). In our view, it is clear (and none of the parties have raised it as an issue) that the ordinance in question was designed to protect users of stairways from the very type of injury suffered here; i.e., injuries resulting from falling down stairways. Therefore, the ordinance is applicable and violation of the ordinance constitutes negligence per se. Of course, plaintiff must prove in addition that the negligence was the cause of the injury  a question we have determined to be for the jury. See Part I., supra. Therefore, we reverse the directed verdict in favor of defendant Koch and remand for a new trial of plaintiff's negligence action against defendant Koch.