Opinion ID: 728766
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of the Public Accommodation Provision

Text: 24 Title III of the Disabilities Act provides that, as a General Rule: 25 No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation. 26 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). Section 12182 also includes more detailed prohibitions, such as those against the provision of unequal or separate benefits: 27 (b) Construction 28 (1) General prohibition 29 (A) Activities 30 (ii) Participation in unequal benefit 31 It shall be discriminatory to afford an individual ... on the basis of a disability ... with the opportunity to participate in or benefit from a good ... that is not equal to that afforded to other individuals. 32 (iii) Separate benefit 33 It shall be discriminatory to provide an individual ... on the basis of a disability ... with a good ... that is different or separate from that provided to other individuals, unless such action is necessary to provide the individual or class of individuals with a good, service, facility, privilege, advantage, or accommodation, or other opportunity that is as effective as that provided to others. 34 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii). Plaintiff argues that the plain language of these provisions covers insurance products, because insurance products are goods or services provided by a person who owns a public accommodation. We agree. 35 Statutory language must be given its common and ordinary meaning. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9, 82 S.Ct. 585, 590-91, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). Bearing in mind this important principle, we find that Title III of the Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability in the contents of insurance products. Insurance products clearly fall within the common and ordinary meaning of the term goods, and the provision of insurance coverage clearly falls within the common and ordinary meaning of the term service. In addition, the statute specifically includes insurance office within the definition public accommodation if the entity's operations affect commerce. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F). The Plaintiff's condition qualifies as a disability, which is defined as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Furthermore, because she suffers from a nervous/mental (rather than a physical) disability, the Plaintiff is receiving a good or service that is different ... from that provided to other individuals. Thus, the Plaintiff appears to meet the statutory criteria for establishing a claim under Title III of the Disabilities Act. 2 36 In addition to ascribing to words their common and ordinary meaning, we also note that we are bound to interpret statutory language in such a way as to avoid rendering terms superfluous. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 145, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2191, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991). Defendants' suggested statutory interpretation would do just that. To say that the Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination only as to physical access to places of public accommodation would write the terms goods and services out of the statute. In addition, we note that, even if the language were not so clear, remedial statutes are to be interpreted broadly, in a manner consistent with their stated goal. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639, 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923, 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980). The Disabilities Act was intended to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). The meaning we ascribe to the provisions today is much more in keeping with this broad goal than the constricted interpretation suggested by Defendants. 37 Numerous cases have interpreted the statute as we do today. For example, in Carparts Distribution Ctr., Inc. v. Automotive Wholesaler's Ass'n of New England, Inc. (a case the District Court in this case declined to follow without discussion), the First Circuit held that public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the Disabilities Act is not limited to actual physical structures, and thus, the act may apply to a limitation of lifetime health benefits for AIDS related illnesses. 37 F.3d 12 (1st Cir.1994). The Carparts court relied primarily, as we do, on the plain language of the statute and concluded that to limit the application of Title III to physical structures which persons must enter to obtain goods and services would run afoul of the purposes of the [Disabilities Act] and would severely frustrate Congress's intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public. Id. at 20. 38 Similarly, District Courts in the Third, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have concurred with this reasoning. In Sharrow v. Bailey, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania held that an HIV-positive patient whose surgery was delayed by one day when his doctor requested protective suits, even though they were not necessary under Center for Disease Control standards, had standing to sue under Title III of the Disabilities Act. 910 F.Supp. 187 (M.D.Pa.1995). The District Court held that in order to establish a violation of § 12182(a), a plaintiff must prove that he or she: 1) has a disability; 2) was discriminated against on the basis of that disability; 3) was thereby denied goods or services; 4) by a place of public accommodation by the owner or operator of that facility. Id. at 191. In Kotev v. First Colony Life Insurance Co., the United States District Court for the Central District of California held that a woman who was denied life insurance based on her spouse's HIV-positive status could bring an action under Title III of the Disabilities Act. 927 F.Supp. 1316 (C.D.Cal.1996). That court concluded that Congress intended to reach insurance practices by prohibiting differential treatment of individuals with disabilities in insurance offered by public accommodations unless the differences are justified. Id. at 1322-23. And finally, in Baker v. Hartford Life Insurance Co., the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held that an insurance company may be held liable under Title III of the Disabilities Act based on a denial of coverage. 1995 WL 573430 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 28, 1995). 3 39 In this case, the District Court chose to follow another District Court of this Circuit, which had held that a woman who sued her employer and her insurer when she was turned down for family health insurance because of her husband's hypertension and because her son was a paraplegic had no standing, due to the fact that the Disabilities Act prohibits discrimination in terms of physical access to places of public accommodation, not to the goods and services sold there. Pappas v. Bethesda Hosp. Ass'n, 861 F.Supp. 616 (S.D.Ohio 1994). In Pappas, the District Court reasoned that the plain language of Title III requires a nexus between the public accommodation and the alleged discrimination, which was not present in the case. Id. at 620. Thus, the court concluded that the scope of Title III is limited to discrimination in the provisions of goods, services ... or accommodations based on a disabled person's physical ability to make use of those goods, services, etc. Id. We disagree with this narrow interpretation of the Disabilities Act's provisions. We agree, instead, with the First Circuit's view that: 40 Many goods and services are sold over the telephone or by mail with customers never physically entering the premises of a commercial entity to purchase the goods or services. To exclude this broad category of businesses from the reach of Title III and limit the application of Title III to physical structures which persons must enter to obtain goods and services would run afoul of the purposes of the [Disabilities Act] and would severely frustrate Congress's intent that individuals with disabilities fully enjoy the goods, services, privileges and advantages, available indiscriminately to other members of the general public. Carparts, 37 F.3d at 20. 4 41