Opinion ID: 2625328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Divisional Split on Requirements for a Common Scheme or Plan

Text: At issue here is the proper factual foundation for the admission of evidence of prior bad acts as proof of a common scheme or plan under ER 404(b). This court reviews the correct interpretation of an evidentiary rule de novo as a question of law. See State v. Walker, 136 Wash.2d 767, 771-72, 966 P.2d 883 (1998). Once the rule is correctly interpreted, the trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 856, 889 P.2d 487. A trial court must always begin with the presumption that evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible. ER 404(b) prohibits admission of evidence to prove a defendant has a criminal propensity. The rule states that: [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ER 404(b). The State must meet a substantial burden when attempting to bring in evidence of prior bad acts under one of the exceptions to this general prohibition. We have established the analysis for admission of evidence of prior bad acts to prove a common scheme or plan in Lough, 125 Wash.2d 847, 889 P.2d 487. The prior acts must be (1) proved by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) admitted for the purpose of proving a common plan or scheme, (3) relevant to prove an element of the crime charged or to rebut a defense, and (4) more probative than prejudicial. Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 852, 889 P.2d 487. The third step is at issue in this case. Because the issue is whether the crime occurred, the existence of a design to fulfill sexual compulsions evidenced by a pattern of past behavior is probative. Therefore, prior bad acts may be admitted to show a plan or design if they satisfy the substantial threshold articulated in Lough. We are asked to determine whether that threshold from Lough allows prior acts to be admitted which are similar to the charged crime but are not unique or uncommon. As indicated, the divisions of our Court of Appeals have differed on this issue. Division Two has interpreted Lough to require that the similarities between the prior bad acts and the facts of the charged crime must be unique or uncommon to the way the crime is typically committed. State v. Dewey, 93 Wash.App. 50, 58, 966 P.2d 414 (1998). Dewey examined the facts in Lough and concluded that [t]he common features pointed to by the court as evidence of the plan were features not common to most rapes.... Dewey, 93 Wash.App. at 56, 966 P.2d 414. Dewey further reasoned that if the common features were not unique or uncommon to the way in which the crimes are typically committed[,]... it is difficult to imagine a case in which evidence of prior misconduct would be excluded. Dewey, 93 Wash.App. at 57, 966 P.2d 414. [2] In the present case, Division One disagreed and held that uniqueness was not a requirement for admitting prior bad acts as evidence of a common scheme or plan. Division One interpreted Lough to require that the prior bad acts be similar enough to be naturally explained as individual manifestations of an identifiable plan. DeVincentis, 112 Wash.App. at 159-61, 47 P.3d 606. Division One agreed, as do we, that caution is called for in application of the common scheme or plan exception as defined in Lough. DeVincentis, 112 Wash.App. at 159, 47 P.3d 606. Random similarities are not enough. Division One reasoned, however, that by requiring that the similarities be unique or uncommon, Division Two confuses the common scheme or plan exception to ER 404(b) with the modus operandi exception, which is used to prove the identity of the perpetrator, not whether the charged crime occurred. DeVincentis, 112 Wash.App. at 159, 47 P.3d 606. We agree with Division One's interpretation. In Lough we recognized two types of evidence of a common scheme or plan admissible under ER 404(b). The first type involves multiple crimes that constitute parts of a larger, overarching criminal plan in which the prior acts are causally related to the crime charged. An example of this type is a prior theft of a tool or weapon, which is used to perpetrate the subsequent charged crime, such as a burglary. The issue in Lough was the admissibility of evidence of a second type of common scheme or plan, which involves prior acts as evidence of a single plan used repeatedly to commit separate, but very similar, crimes. We held that evidence of this second type of plan may be admissible if the State establishes a sufficiently high level of similarity: To establish common design or plan, for the purposes of ER 404(b), the evidence of prior conduct must demonstrate not merely similarity in results, but such occurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which the charged crime and the prior misconduct are the individual manifestations. Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 860, 889 P.2d 487. Although this burden is substantial, our holding focused on the similarity between the prior acts and the charged crime rather than the uniqueness of the individual acts. Lough looked to other jurisdictions for guidance in reaching this conclusion. We first looked to a California case, People v. Ewoldt, 7 Cal.4th 380, 867 P.2d 757, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646 (1994). Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 855-56, 889 P.2d 487. We quoted language from Ewoldt in formulating our analysis. This language includes the requirement that the defendant committed `markedly similar acts of misconduct against similar victims under similar circumstances.' Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 856, 889 P.2d 487 (quoting Ewoldt, 7 Cal.4th at 399, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757). Also, the acts must have `such a concurrence of common features that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan of which they are the individual manifestations.' Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 856, 889 P.2d 487 (quoting Ewoldt, 7 Cal.4th at 402, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 646, 867 P.2d 757). We also looked to a case from the Minnesota Supreme Court, State v. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d 235 (Minn.1993). Wermerskirchen involved whether to admit prior acts of sexual misconduct under Minnesota's own ER 404(b), which is substantially similar to Washington's. Wermerskirchen, 497 N.W.2d at 236, 239. The Minnesota high court explained that ... the preferred approach is for the trial court to focus on the closeness of the relationship between the other misconduct and the charged crimes in terms of time, place and modus operandi. Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 858, 889 P.2d 487. Although a unique modus operandi is one factor to consider, the crux of the inquiries in Ewoldt and Wermerskirchen is similarity, not uniqueness. We emphasize that the degree of similarity for the admission of evidence of a common scheme or plan must be substantial. Wigmore's treatise on evidence supports this conclusion. When the existence of the criminal act is at issue, evidence of substantially similar features between a prior act and the disputed act is relevant. Wigmore explains, however, that admission of this kind of evidence requires more than merely similar results. Wigmore gives the following example to illustrate when prior acts are admissible as common scheme or plan evidence: So, on a charge of assault with intent to rape, where the intent alone is disputed, a prior assault on the previous day upon the same woman, or even upon another member of her family, might have probative value; but if the assault itself is disputed, and the defendant attempts, for example, to show an alibi, the same facts might be of little or no value, and it might be necessary to go further and to show (for example) that the defendant on the same day, with a confederate guarding the house, assaulted other women in the same family who escaped, leaving the complainant as the only woman accessible to him for his purpose. 2 John H. Wigmore, Evidence § 304, at 249 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed.1979) (emphasis added). This heightened level of similarity does not require that the evidence of common features show a unique method of committing the crime. Division Two acknowledged that Lough did not expressly require uniqueness but conducted its own analysis of the facts of Lough and determined that the features similar to the prior acts and the charged crime were uncommon to most rapes. Dewey, 93 Wash. App. at 56, 966 P.2d 414. Dewey reflects a misreading of Lough because our analysis in Lough requires similarity of the acts, not uniqueness. The Dewey court also confused the common scheme or plan exception under ER 404(b) with the unique modus operandi exception, as Division One recognized. Evidence of unique modus operandi is relevant when the focus of the inquiry is the identity of the perpetrator, not whether the charged crime occurred. As we have recently established, when identity is at issue, the degree of similarity must be at the highest level and the commonalities must be unique because the crimes must have been committed in a manner to serve as an identifiable signature. State v. Thang, 145 Wash.2d 630, 643, 41 P.3d 1159 (2002). In contrast, the issue in the present case was not the identity of the perpetrator, but whether the crime occurred. Although a unique method of committing the bad acts is a potential factor in determining similarity, uniqueness is not required. In sum, admission of evidence of a common scheme or plan requires substantial similarity between the prior bad acts and the charged crime. Such evidence is relevant when the existence of the crime is at issue. Sufficient similarity is reached only when the trial court determines that the various acts are naturally to be explained as caused by a general plan.... Lough, 125 Wash.2d at 860, 889 P.2d 487. Applying this analysis to this case, in order to admit V.C.'s testimony, the trial court had to find a level of similarity between DeVincentis' acts against V.C. and those against K.S., such that the two incidents were naturally explained as individual manifestations of a general plan. In a lengthy oral ruling supplementing the written findings and conclusions, the trial court applied the four part analysis required by Lough. The trial court evaluated whether V.C.'s testimony indicated that the prior acts were (1) proved by a preponderance of the evidence, (2) offered for the purpose of proving a common plan or scheme, (3) relevant to prove an element of the crime charged or to rebut a defense, and (4) more probative than prejudicial. The trial court noted that the first step was not in dispute because the conduct with V.C. was the basis of a prior conviction. The trial court also noted that the conduct with V.C. was offered to prove a common scheme or plan. The court ruled that V.C.'s testimony was relevant to show that the act was committed, a corpus delicti purpose ... where the defendant denied the event. RP at 220-21. The trial court explained that the evidence involving [V.C.] is relevant to show that the defendant had devised a scheme to get to know young people through a safe channel, such as a friend of his daughter, or ... as a friend of the next-door neighbor girl.... RP at 221. This led to greater familiarity occurring in his own home.... This plan allowed DeVincentis to bring the children into an apparently safe but actually unsafe and isolated environment so that he could pursue his compulsion to have sexual contact with these ... prepubescent or pubescent girls. RP at 221. The girls were both between 10 and 13 years old. Other similarities that the trial court noted included walking around his house in an unusual piece of clothingbikini or g-string underwear. On both occasions, the trial court found that DeVincentis indicated he... intended by the casual wearing of almost no clothes to reduce the children's natural discomfort or negative reaction to such behavior.... RP at 222. With both girls, DeVincentis asked for a massage or gave [a] massage, asked or directed the child to a secluded spot such as a bedroom, directed or asked that clothes be taken off.... RP at 223. Finally, in both instances, he had the girls masturbate him until climax. The trial court concluded that this was relevant to support K.S.'s testimony. The trial court then balanced the probative value against the prejudicial effect. The trial court recognized that substantial probative value is needed to outweigh the prejudicial effect of ER 404(b) evidence. Oral argument on this issue before the trial court reflected that court's understanding of relevant factors used in balancing, such as the age of the victim, the need for the evidence, the secrecy surrounding sex abuse offenses, [t]he vulnerability of the victims, the absence of physical proof of the crime, degree of public opprobrium associated with the accusation,... [and the] general lack of confidence in the ability of a jury to assess the credibility of child witnesses. RP at 130. After balancing these factors, the trial court found that the testimony of V.C. was the main evidence corroborating the testimony of K.S. No less inflammatory documentation or corroboration that the crime occurred was available. Although K.S. was old enough to clearly testify, on balance the probative value of V.C.'s testimony outweighed the prejudicial effect. The trial court discussed a limiting instruction, despite the fact that it was a bench trial, reflecting the court's understanding of the limited purpose for which it would use V.C.'s testimony. [3] In closing argument, DeVincentis' counsel further discussed the limited use of V.C.'s testimony, while acknowledging that judges are more able to limit their use of ER 404(b) evidence than are juries. When this analysis is scrupulously applied by the trial court, it effectively prohibits mere propensity evidence. The present case exemplifies this. Although the State moved to admit several other prior occasions of sexual abuse of girls by DeVincentis, the trial court rejected them for lack of similarity with the charged crimes against K.S. In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted V.C.'s testimony under ER 404(b) because it meticulously applied the law and had tenable grounds and reasons for its decision.