Opinion ID: 2670502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements to Agent Torres

Text: Oquendo seeks suppression of his statements to Agent Torres on two grounds: (1) a violation of his right to remain silent based on the quick resumption of questioning after he initially refused to make a statement, and (2) a violation of his right to counsel based on continued questioning after what Oquendo argues was an unambiguous request for an attorney.
Unlike an unambiguous request for counsel, after which questioning must invariably cease until a lawyer is provided, an -9- invocation of the right to remain silent does not automatically bar the resumption of questioning at a later time. See United States v. Andrade, 135 F.3d 104, 107 (1st Cir. 1998). Rather, in determining the appropriateness of renewed questioning, our inquiry focuses on whether the suspect's right to cut off questioning was at all times scrupulously honored. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1975). After an initial invocation of the right to remain silent, four factors are relevant to determining whether the resumption of questioning is permissible: (1) whether a reasonable period of time passed prior to the resumption, (2) whether the same officer resumed questioning, (3) whether the suspect received refreshed Miranda warnings, and (4) whether questioning concerned the same alleged crime. United States v. Lugo Guerrero, 524 F.3d 5, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-06). Beyond assessing these factors, however, our ultimate review must account for the totality of the circumstances, with an eye to determining whether the suspect retained the ability to choose whether and when to speak. Id. (quoting United States v. Thongsophaporn, 503 F.3d 51, 57 (1st Cir. 2007)). Oquendo hangs his hat on the first Mosley factor, arguing that twenty minutes is too short a passage of time to make the resumption of questioning reasonable. And indeed, Agent Torres's timing gives us pause. While Mosley did not purport to set a floor, we note that twenty minutes is some six-times shorter than -10- the time period found reasonable therein. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104 (stating that more than two hours passed between interrogations); Andrade, 135 F.3d at 106 (same). It would be both unwise and unworkable, however, to try and demarcate a one-time-fits-all limit for assessing reasonableness, which at its worst might only send interrogating officers running for their stopwatches. Such a reading of Mosley has been previously rejected by our court, see United States v. Barone, 968 F.2d 1378, 1383 (1st Cir. 1992), and we reaffirm that logic now. Rather, our analysis must account for the totality of the circumstances and must give appropriate attention to Mosley's other enumerated factors. Here, assessing the facts in their entirety, it is clear that Oquendo's right to cut off questioning was not impinged. Agent Torres, not Officer Rodríguez, conducted the second interrogation. Prior to commencing questioning, Agent Torres also provided Oquendo -- both verbally and in writing -- with a restatement of his Miranda rights. Moreover, the record is devoid of any indication that Agent Torres intimidated, threatened, or otherwise pressured Oquendo into offering a statement. Cf. Barone, 968 F.2d at 1384 ([O]fficers repeatedly spoke to Barone for the purpose of changing his mind, failed to provide new Miranda warnings, applied pressure by emphasizing the danger he would face in Boston if he did not cooperate, and took advantage of a long delay in arraignment.). Indeed, when Oquendo agreed to make a -11- statement but asked that the scope of questioning be limited, it is uncontested that Agent Torres fully abided by those boundaries. In sum, these facts support a finding that Oquendo retained control over his ability to choose whether or not to speak. Therefore, we find no violation of his right to remain silent. Nonetheless, this holding should not be read in any way to imply our acceptance of police practices that give suspects only a momentary respite after their refusal to make a statement. Although the broader context here makes clear that Oquendo's right to cut off questioning was appropriately preserved, that determination is fact dependent. Accordingly, our holding does not eliminate the very real possibility that, in another case, serious concerns may well arise when questioning resumes only twenty minutes after an initial invocation of the right to remain silent.
Immediately after a suspect has invoked the right to counsel, all questioning must cease until such counsel is provided. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981). This request for counsel must be clear and unambiguous. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). Where a request, marred by ambiguity or equivocation, suggests only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. Id. Our test is objective, requiring that the statement be such that a reasonable police officer in the -12- circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. Id.; Obershaw v. Lanman, 453 F.3d 56, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). Oquendo argues that his statement -- I do not understand this, my lawyer speaks -- was tantamount to an invocation of the right to counsel. In concert with his earlier refusal to make a statement, he continues, this request was certainly unambiguous. Finding the meaning and intent of Oquendo's statement to be less than clear, we disagree. By its express terms, my lawyer speaks does not unequivocally demand assistance, request the lawyer's presence, or otherwise clearly indicate an unwillingness to make a statement absent presence of an attorney. Cf. Obershaw, 453 F.3d at 64-65 (concluding that the question can I talk to a lawyer first? was an inquir[y as to] whether [the suspect] could talk to a lawyer not an assert[ion] that he in fact wanted to do so). Moreover, when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement it will often be good police practice for the interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney. Davis, 512 U.S. at 461; see also Nom v. Spencer, 337 F.3d 112, 118 & n.5 (1st Cir. 2003). In response to Oquendo's statement that he did not understand, Agent Torres did not ignore his answer and forge ahead with questions. James v. Marshall, 322 F.3d 103, 109 (1st Cir. 2003). Rather, Agent Torres asked what Oquendo did not understand. He then asked whether Oquendo was, in -13- fact, willing to speak without a lawyer. Oquendo answered in the affirmative. Only then did Agent Torres begin his interrogation. Highly analogous facts have been characterized by our court as precisely the kind of 'good police practice' described . . . in Davis. Id. We need press no further; Oquendo did not invoke his right to counsel in a manner sufficiently unambiguous and direct as to require the cessation of questioning. Agent Torres, confronted with an ambiguous statement, sought clarification and continued questioning only after Oquendo made clear that he was willing to proceed without an attorney. This was not a violation of Oquendo's right to counsel.