Opinion ID: 1443930
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to suppress incriminating statements

Text: When an ineffective assistance claim is based upon counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the prejudice prong must be established by a showing that the claim was meritorious and that there was a reasonable likelihood that the exclusion of the evidence would have changed the result of a trial. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2582-83, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986). [4] We conclude that the same analysis applies when the ineffective assistance claim is based upon counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress a confession. To be admissible, a confession must be made freely and voluntarily, without compulsion or inducement. Passama v. State, 103 Nev. 212, 213, 735 P.2d 321, 322 (1987). A confession must be the product of a free will and rational intellect. Id. at 213-14, 735 P.2d at 322. Physical intimidation or psychological pressure constitute coercion, making a confession involuntary. Id. at 214, 735 P.2d at 322-23. The voluntariness of a confession must be determined from the effect of the totality of the circumstances on the defendant's will. Id., 735 P.2d at 323. This court has listed the following factors to be considered: the youth of the accused; his lack of education or his low intelligence; the lack of any advice of constitutional rights; the length of detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Id. We now address, based on the above standards, the merits of Kirksey's claims that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to challenge the voluntariness of Kirksey's incriminating statements. Kirksey made two incriminating statements to detectives in Riverside, California and one incriminating statement to detectives in Las Vegas. The Riverside statements were made on December 23 and 24, 1988. At this time, Kirksey was in custody on a warrant for the murder of Gayette Davis. Before the Riverside detectives interviewed Kirksey on December 23, Kirksey was advised of his Miranda rights. Kirksey stated that he understood and waived those rights. Thereafter, Kirksey described his involvement in a Las Vegas murder. Riverside Detective Frogue testified before the grand jury that he thought Kirksey might have been high during the December 23 interview. After learning from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) that Kirksey had been arrested and released on a murder charge, the Riverside detectives reinterviewed Kirksey on December 24. At the beginning of the interview, the detectives asked Kirksey if he remembered his rights and was still willing to waive them. Kirksey responded in the affirmative. Kirksey then related substantially the same information he had given on the previous day. After Kirksey was returned to Nevada, LVMPD Detective Dibble interviewed him on February 8, 1989. Dibble advised Kirksey of his Miranda rights prior to the interview. Kirksey waived his rights. Kirksey then responded to questions and recounted the beating in great detail. Kirksey argues that his first statement to the Riverside detectives could have been suppressed based upon Detective Frogue's grand jury testimony that Kirksey appeared to have been under the influence of a drug when he made the statement. Kirksey also relies on his medical records from September 7, 1987 through December 1988 to show that he may have been suffering from symptoms of cocaine addiction and withdrawal during all of the statements. Finally, Kirksey suggests, without any explanation or support in the record, that all of the statements were the result of coercion. The defendant's intoxication alone does not automatically make a confession inadmissible. See, e.g., United States v. Casal, 915 F.2d 1225, 1229 (8th Cir.1990) (methamphetamine use for four days prior to arrest and confession), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 941, 111 S.Ct. 1400, 113 L.Ed.2d 455 (1991); Graves v. United States, 878 F.Supp. 409, 414 (N.D.N.Y.) (alcohol consumption), aff'd, 89 F.3d 826 (2d Cir.1995); State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 733 P.2d 1090, 1096-97 (1987) (alcohol consumption); Espinosa v. State, 899 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex.Ct.App.1995) (alcohol consumption). A confession is inadmissible only if it is shown `that the accused was intoxicated to such an extent that he was unable to understand the meaning of his comments.' Rivera, 733 P.2d at 1097 (quoting State v. Hicks, 133 Ariz. 64, 649 P.2d 267, 275 (1982)). Similarly, a confession by a defendant suffering from drug withdrawal may be involuntary when the withdrawal results in a confession which is not the product of a rational intellect and a free will. Pickworth v. State, 95 Nev. 547, 549, 598 P.2d 626, 627 (1979). In Pickworth, this court concluded that the defendant's confession was voluntarily made where the withdrawal symptoms were minor, and the defendant was coherent, able to recall facts in great detail, and showed no signs of discomfort. Id. We conclude that the evidence presented by Kirksey was not sufficient to successfully challenge the voluntariness of any of his incriminating statements. There is no indication that Kirksey was so intoxicated on December 23, 1988, that he was unable to understand the meaning of the statement he made. Moreover, there is no indication that Kirksey was uncomfortable or incoherent. In each of the statements, he recounted the incident in essentially the same words. He was responsive to the questions posed by the officers in each interview and there was little variation in his story. Before each statement, Kirksey was advised of his Miranda rights and agreed to waive them. None of the interviews was of inordinate duration. Finally, although Kirksey suggests that each statement was the product of coercion, he presented no evidence to support this contention. Accordingly, we conclude that this issue is without merit.