Opinion ID: 1441328
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Post-Trial Rulings

Text: On November 8, 1995, the District filed a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial or remittitur. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Murtaugh, the trial court denied the District's motion on December 1, 1995. The court determined that: (1) judgment n.o.v. was not warranted because the verdict was entirely consistent with the evidence as well as plaintiff's theory of the case; (2) no new trial would be granted because, inter alia, [t]he verdict was not against the weight of the evidence; and (3) remittitur was not appropriate because the verdict was not excessive [g]iven the severity of plaintiff's injury and the claim of permanence growing out of it. The District filed a notice of appeal on January 11, 1996. [1] In response to the District's motion for an evidentiary hearing on its cross claim, the trial court requested a proffer. At a hearing on July 16, 1996, the court concluded that the District was not entitled to contribution or indemnity from Ebone. Nonetheless, for appellate purposes the trial court permitted the District to make an evidentiary proffer. After the evidentiary proffer on August 5, 1996, the trial court orally entered judgment in behalf of Ebone on the District's cross claim. Judgment was entered in open court in the presence of counsel for Ebone and the District, and was docketed on September 9, 1996. The docket entry stated in relevant part: Judgment entered for def Ebone, Inc. on the District[']s cross-claim ... reasons articulated on the record orally.... On March 4, 1997, the District filed a motion requesting that the court enter final judgment or vacate and re-enter judgment on its cross claim against Ebone. The District contended, inter alia, that no separate document had been entered as required by Super. Ct. Civ. R. 58, and that the requirements of D.C.App. R. 4(a)(3) had not been met. On April 30, 1997, the trial court granted the District's motion to vacate and reenter judgment. As grounds for its decision, the trial court stated: Notice from the Clerk's Office even by way of computer printout seems to be required under D.C.App. R. 4. The re-entered judgment was docketed on May 7, 1997, and the District noticed its appeal on May 22, 1997. Ebone filed a cross-appeal on June 9, 1997, challenging the trial court's decision to vacate and re-enter its judgment.