Opinion ID: 2807113
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Entry of the Default Judgment

Text: “A default judgment is unassailable on the merits but only so far as it is supported by well-pleaded allegations, assumed to be true.” Nishimatsu, 515 F.2d at 1206 (citing Thomson v. Wooster, 114 U.S. 104, 113 (1885)). Put another way, “[t]he defendant is not held to admit facts that are not wellpleaded or to admit conclusions of law.” Id. “On appeal, the defendant, although he may not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, is entitled to contest the sufficiency of the complaint and its allegations to support the judgment.” Id. In addition, a court “may conduct hearings . . . when, to enter or effectuate judgment,” it needs to, inter alia, “establish the truth of any allegation by evidence . . . or . . . investigate any other matter.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(C); see also 10A Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 2688 (3d ed. 1998) (“[W]hen it seems advantageous, a court may conduct a 6 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 7 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 hearing to determine whether to enter a judgment by default. . . . [T]he court, in its discretion, may require some proof of the facts that must be established in order to determine liability.”). Neither party disputes that entry of default was appropriate. The parties disagree about (1) the ADEA standard that governs Wooten’s claim; (2) the sufficiency of Wooten’s allegations; and (3) whether the district court can consider evidence presented at the hearing in addition to the allegations in supporting default judgment.
McDonald Transit contends that Wooten’s complaint insufficiently alleged the essential elements of his prima facie retaliation claim under the ADEA—in particular, membership in a protected class and qualification. The ADEA makes it unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). To establish a prima facie retaliation claim under the ADEA, a plaintiff “must show (1) that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) that there was an adverse employment action, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.” Holtzclaw v. DSC Commc’ns Corp., 255 F.3d 254, 259 (5th Cir. 2001). Holtzclaw unequivocally added a fourth element to the claim—a plaintiff who sought re-employment under the ADEA must prove as a part of his prima facie case that he was qualified for his position. Id. 2 2 The Holtzclaw court reasoned that because qualification for the job is a requirement to make a prima facie discrimination claim under the ADEA, and because “[r]etaliation claims are nothing more than a protection against discrimination,” “it would be illogical not to require one here.” 255 F.3d at 259. Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 7 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 8 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 Contrary to McDonald Transit’s position, neither § 623(d) nor Holtzclaw requires that Wooten prove he was a member of a class protected by the ADEA discrimination provisions. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 631 (defining class of individuals covered by age-discrimination provisions), with id. § 623(d) (permitting retaliation provision to apply to “any” employee). Therefore, the only elements that Wooten must sufficiently allege are (1) protected activity, (2) adverse employment action, (3) causal link, and (4) qualification. 548 U.S. 53 (2006), casts doubt on this reasoning. In that Title VII retaliation case, the Court examined the relationship between that statute’s discrimination and retaliation provisions. See id. at 61–67. The Burlington Court found that the provisions featured different language and responded to different purposes—namely, “[t]he substantive [discrimination] provision seeks to prevent injury to individuals based on who they are, i.e., their status[, whereas t]he antiretaliation provision seeks to prevent harm to individuals based on what they do, i.e., their conduct.” Id. at 63. It therefore concluded that the discrimination and retaliation provisions were not “coterminous” and “reject[ed] the standards applied in the Courts of Appeals that have treated the antiretaliation provision as forbidding the same conduct prohibited by the antidiscrimination provision.” Id. at 67. Nevertheless, because Burlington addressed Title VII rather than the ADEA, it did not “unequivocally overrule” Holtzclaw, and we remain bound to apply that case. See Tech. Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 624 (5th Cir. 1999) (“[T]his panel is bound by the precedent of previous panels absent an intervening Supreme Court case explicitly or implicitly overruling that prior precedent . . . .” (emphasis added)). We observe that our Court has not consistently required plaintiffs to prove qualification under Holtzclaw after Burlington. See, e.g., Munoz v. Seton Healthcare, Inc., 557 F. App’x 314, 321 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (citing Holtzclaw for the elements of a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADEA but omitting the qualification element); Pree v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 552 F. App’x 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (same); Miller v. Metro Ford Auto. Sales, Inc., 519 F. App’x 850, 851–52 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (same). Moreover, even before Burlington, a panel of our Court “decline[d] to extend the Holtzclaw requirements” to a case involving wrongful discharge, though that case was before us on appeal from judgment as a matter of law and there “ha[d] been no determination that [the plaintiff] . . . was not qualified.” EEOC v. Dunbar Diagnostic Servs. Inc., 92 F. App’x 83, 84–85 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). We need not decide whether Holtzclaw remains viable, however, because—as explained below—we hold that Wooten’s complaint satisfies the minimal pleading requirements of Rule 8 regardless of whether “qualification” is a necessary element of his prima facie case. 8 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 9 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 2. The Sufficiency of the Pleadings to Support the Judgment We begin by determining whether Wooten’s complaint, either standing alone or considered together with his testimony at the hearing, supplied an adequate foundation for the default judgment. We conclude that Wooten’s complaint, although admittedly light on factual details, advanced a colorable claim for relief and provided McDonald Transit with the requisite notice to satisfy Rules 8 and 55. Given that the complaint itself met the minimum standards of Rule 8, we decide that the testimony at the prove-up hearing served the limited purpose of “establish[ing] the truth of [the] allegation[s] by evidence,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)(C), and therefore may be considered in assessing the entry of default judgment without implicating the Nishimatsu quandary, see 515 F.2d at 1206 n.5. Despite announcing that a default judgment must be “supported by wellpleaded allegations” and must have “a sufficient basis in the pleadings,” the Nishimatsu court did not elaborate on these requirements. See id. at 1206. Nothing in the record or the parties’ briefs discusses how to determine what is “well-pleaded” or “sufficient,” and we have found no guidance in our own cases. Nevertheless, we draw meaning from the case law on Rule 8, which sets forth the standards governing the sufficiency of a complaint. Rule 8(a)(2) requires a pleading to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The purpose of this requirement is “to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The factual allegations in the complaint need only “be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (footnote and citations 9 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 10 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 omitted). “[D]etailed factual allegations” are not required, but the pleading must present “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 3 Wooten’s complaint contains the following factual allegations: (1) Wooten is a former employee of McDonald Transit; (2) Wooten was employed by McDonald Transit from 1999 until May 1, 2011; (3) at the time he was fired, Wooten was a Class B mechanic earning $19.50 per hour, plus benefits; (4) in October 2010, Wooten filed an age-discrimination claim with the EEOC, after which McDonald Transit “discriminated and retaliated against [Wooten], and created a hostile work environment, until such time that [Wooten] was constructively discharged on or about May 1, 2011”; and (5) McDonald Transit’s unlawful conduct caused Wooten harm, including damages in the form of lost wages and benefits, mental anguish, and noneconomic damages. We hold that these allegations, while perhaps less detailed than McDonald Transit would prefer, are nevertheless sufficient to satisfy the low threshold of Rule 8. Wooten’s complaint provides McDonald Transit with “fair notice” of his claim that McDonald Transit engaged in conduct prohibited by the ADEA—discrimination and retaliation—in response to the age-discrimination charge he filed with the EEOC. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. The allegations are a far cry from the sort of “unadorned, the-defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation” decried in Iqbal. See 556 U.S. at 678. 3 Although most cases addressing Rule 8 arise in the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we recognize that a defendant ordinarily must invoke Rule 12 in order to avail itself of that rule’s protections. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (“[A] party may assert the following defenses by motion . . . .”). Accordingly, as a default is the product of a defendant’s inaction, we decline to import Rule 12 standards into the default-judgment context. Cf. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). 10 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 They indicate that Wooten worked for McDonald Transit for twelve years; he filed an EEOC charge accusing McDonald Transit of age discrimination during his eleventh year of employment; McDonald Transit took adverse actions against Wooten in retaliation for that charge; and within seven months Wooten found his work conditions so intolerable that he was constructively discharged. Admittedly, Wooten’s complaint could have specified the nature of the discrimination and the retaliation he experienced; but his allegations are not so vague that McDonald Transit lacked notice of the contours of Wooten’s claim. Indeed, as Wooten points out, the illustrative civil rules forms published with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide even less factual detail than the complaint at issue here: Form 11, a sample complaint for negligence, alleges only that “[o]n date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff” and “[a]s a result, the plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income, suffered physical and mental pain, and incurred medical expenses of $_____.” Fed. R. Civ. P. app. Form 11. The content of this form also undermines the premise that the complaint must explicitly include every element of the plaintiff’s prima facie case to satisfy Rule 8; the form contains no reference to a legal duty or proximate cause, two elements of a prima facie case for negligence. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Physical and Emotional Harm § 6 cmt. b (2009). Rather, all elements of the cause of action are present by implication. The same holds true here: Wooten’s complaint alleges (1) a protected activity (filing an EEOC charge), 4 (2) adverse employment actions (discrimination, retaliation, and Filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC qualifies as a protected activity 4 under the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d). 11 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 creation of a hostile work environment), 5 (3) a causal link (the adverse actions commencing after Wooten filed the EEOC charge and occurring, at most, seven months later), 6 and (4) qualification (twelve years of continuous employment). 7 Moreover, if McDonald Transit believed that Wooten’s allegations were inadequate to support the requested relief or even to enable an intelligent response, it simply could have moved for a more definite statement or to dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), (e). In view of the above, we hold that Wooten’s complaint is “well-pleaded” for default-judgment purposes. As such, we have little difficulty concluding 5 To establish an adverse employment action, the plaintiff must show that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68 (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 In Clark County School District v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam), the Supreme Court made clear that a narrow band of retaliation claims can establish causation by the “very close” temporal proximity alone. See id. at 273 (collecting cases fulfilling this requirement based on three- and four-month delays). But see Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802, 808 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Breeden makes clear that . . . temporal proximity alone, when very close, can in some instances establish a prima facie case of retaliation. But we affirmatively reject the notion that temporal proximity standing alone can be sufficient proof of but for causation.” (citation omitted)). 7 Although Holtzclaw made qualification for the job an additional requirement, it did not explain how to evaluate that requirement. See 255 F.3d at 260. Nevertheless, a review of our ADEA jurisprudence indicates that “qualified” has a broadly colloquial meaning in this context; it refers to objective job qualifications (e.g., training, experience, and physical capacity), not “essential functions” or any other term of art associated with the term’s counterpart in the Americans with Disabilities Act. See, e.g., Berquist v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 500 F.3d 344, 349–50 (5th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case of ADEA discrimination by showing that he “possessed the same job qualifications when [his employer] terminated him as when [it] assigned him to [his last] position,” as evidenced by the employee meeting “the objective criteria listed in a job posting” and holding a similar job title for two years); cf. Bienkowski v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1503, 1506 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that “a plaintiff challenging his termination or demotion [under the ADEA] can ordinarily establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that he continued to possess the necessary qualifications for his job at the time of the adverse action” and explaining that “[b]y this we mean that plaintiff had not suffered physical disability or loss of a necessary professional license or some other occurrence that rendered him unfit for the position for which he was hired”). 12 Case: 13-11035 Document: 00513074575 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/10/2015 No. 13-11035 that the evidence received at the damages prove-up hearing served a permissible purpose under Rule 55(b)(2)—to “establish the truth of any allegation by evidence” or “investigate any other matter”—and we deem Nishimatsu’s complaint-supplementation hypothetical inapplicable, see 515 F.2d at 1206 n.5. Wooten’s testimony simply added factual details that fleshed out his claim: for instance, his testimony that he had never been disciplined served as further proof of his qualification, and his testimony that he was demoted, given menial work, and denied opportunities for workrelated certification for approximately six months after he filed his EEOC charge added specificity to the adverse-employment-action and causal-link elements of his case. Considering this evidence in addition to the allegations in Wooten’s complaint, we see ample grounds for the entry of default judgment, and we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in entering that judgment.