Opinion ID: 196337
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Domina

Text: 37 A section 1983 claim does not lie absent state action. Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior Court of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 258 (1st Cir.1993); 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (providing remedy for deprivations under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any state or territory). There are two components to the state action requirement. First, the deprivation must be shown to have been caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state, or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state, or by a person for whom the state is responsible. Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 258. Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. Id. Where a private individual is a defendant in a section 1983 action, there must be a showing that the private party and the state actor jointly deprived plaintiff of her civil rights. Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 209 (1st Cir.1987); Casa Marie, 988 F.2d at 258-59; see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27-28, 101 S.Ct. 183, 186-187, 66 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980) (Private persons, jointly engaged with state officials in the challenged action, are acting 'under color' of law for purposes of Sec. 1983 actions.). 38 There was no evidence of joint discriminatory action between Leporati and Domina--whether by plan, prearrangement, conspiracy, custom, or policy--which would enable a rational factfinder to conclude that Alexis's arrest resulted from concerted action tantamount to substituting the judgment of a private party for that of the police or allowing the private party to exercise state power. Compare Wagenmann, 829 F.2d at 209-11 (close relationship between private citizen and deputy police chief, together with evidence that private actor and police collectively determined to arrest plaintiff, raised inference that private actor was more than mere complainant and that a meeting of the minds occurred between police and private defendant sufficient to warrant finding that defendant was state actor) with Carey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 823 F.2d 1402, 1404 (10th Cir.1987) (airline employee, who complained of striking airline pilot's presence in airport terminal and refusal to leave, found not to be state actor where police officer summoned to airport terminal asked pilot to leave and, upon pilot's refusal, called for three additional officers who escorted pilot to airport security station where he was arrested); see also Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1605-06, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (holding that white schoolteacher, in company of six black youths denied service at lunch counter, would be entitled to relief under section 1983 upon proof that lunch counter employee and policeman had reached an understanding to deny service to teacher because she was a white person in company of blacks). As there is no evidence in the summary judgment record from which it could fairly be inferred that Domina and Leporati had any understanding, tacit or explicit, to deprive Alexis of any right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, we conclude that the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Domina on this section 1983 claim. 8 2. Excessive Force 39 Alexis asserts an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the right to be secure in their persons ... against unreasonable ... seizures. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 1871, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (Where [an] excessive force claim arises in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment....). In the Fourth Amendment setting, a viable excessive force claim must demonstrate that the police defendant's actions were not objectively reasonable, viewed in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him and without regard to his underlying intent or motivation. Id. at 397, 109 S.Ct. at 1872 (An officer's evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer's good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.) (citations omitted). 9 40 As the Supreme Court has counseled, our inquiry must be undertaken from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872 (citations omitted). Though the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment  'is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,'  id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979)),  '[n]ot every push or shove'  will reach the level required for an actionable excessive force claim. Id. (citation omitted); Gaudreault v. Salem, 923 F.2d 203, 205 (1st Cir.1990) ([P]olice officers making arrests are often forced to make split-second decisions about the amount of force needed to effect an arrest while operating under tense, dangerous and rapidly-changing circumstances.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 956, 111 S.Ct. 2266, 114 L.Ed.2d 718 (1991). Accordingly, Graham prescribes three criteria for evaluating the objective reasonableness of the force used: (1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3) whether [the suspect] is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872; see also Gaudreault, 923 F.2d at 205. 41 All three Graham factors, viewed in the context of the totality of the circumstances, Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. at 1872; see also supra p. 346, weigh heavily in favor of Alexis. First, the crime for which she was arrested--criminal trespass--is a misdemeanor. See Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 266, Sec. 120 (maximum term 30 days). Second, there is no suggestion that Alexis posed a threat to the peace or safety of anyone, including Sergeant Leporati and Officer Fuer. Third, taking her evidence at face value, Alexis neither threatened nor attempted to evade or resist arrest. Nor did any Alexis family member pose a threat to the officers or anyone else. Yet, without even having been requested or directed to get up from the table--and though all the surrounding circumstances, individually and in combination, plainly counseled minimal force in effecting any arrest--Alexis was abruptly pulled from the booth, and across the table, with sufficient force to bruise her legs, then handcuffed with her hands behind her back and dragged and carried to a police cruiser and pushed inside. 42 Viewed in context and accepted as true, we are not persuaded that the record evidence compelled the conclusion that the force with which Leporati effected the sudden, unannounced, violent seizure and removal of Alexis's person was objectively reasonable, especially since there is no evidence or suggestion that she posed a risk of flight, attempted to resist or evade arrest, or threatened the peace, property or safety of anyone. 10 See Palmer v. Sanderson, 9 F.3d 1433, 1436 (9th Cir.1993) (finding trialworthy excessive force claim where deputy sheriff arrested, tightly handcuffed, and bruised sixty-seven-year-old man with impaired mobility who attempted to return to his car to sit down while answering officer's questions); see also Rowland v. Perry, 41 F.3d 167, 171-74 (4th Cir.1994) (finding trialworthy excessive force claim where police officer injured arrestee's leg (wrenching the knee until it cracked) after arrestee picked up five dollar bill dropped by its owner); cf. Lester v. Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 714 (7th Cir.1987) (pre-Graham case) (holding that plaintiff stated trialworthy Fourth Amendment excessive force claim when, during course of arrest for disturbing peace, plaintiff was kneed in the back, threatened with being struck, dragged down a hallway, and handcuffed tightly, causing bruises on her wrists); Patzner v. Burkett, 779 F.2d 1363, 1371 (8th Cir.1985) (pre-Graham case) (finding trialworthy excessive force claim where uncooperative double amputee--arrested at home after allegedly driving under the influence--was pulled from wheelchair to floor, then dragged through home after promising to cooperate). 11 Accordingly, the excessive force claim must be remanded for further proceedings. 12