Opinion ID: 2973181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Termination of Services

Text: Finally, Diamond argues that MRS violated the “stay put” requirement of § 722(c)(7) by terminating the services listed in her May, 2000, IPE and the “de facto” services (i.e., services provided to her, though not listed in her IPE) before the conclusion of her administrative hearing. The district court found that the stay put provision only applies to services received under a valid IPE. Accordingly, the district court found that MRS did not violate the stay put provision because, although Diamond was receiving substantial services, she was not receiving them under a valid extant IPE. The Act defines vocational rehabilitation services as “any services described in an individualized plan for employment.” 29 U.S.C. § 723(a). Because Diamond’s IPE expired in November, 2000, none of the services provided to her for the following two years meet the definition of vocational rehabilitation services under the Act. Thus, regardless of whether the services MRS terminated in March, 2002, were listed in Diamond’s expired IPE, the termination could not violate the Act’s stay put provision because the provision only applies to services under an extant IPE. See Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F.2d 1460, 1468 (6th Cir. 1990) (“The stay-put provision applies only to services included in the child’s IEP.”) (decided under a similar statutory “stay put” provision in the Education for all Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S. C. § 1400 et seq.). As of November, 2000, Diamond did not have an IPE from MRS.9 Thus, when MRS terminated Diamond’s services prior to her administrative appeal, it did not violate the Act’s stay put provision. Therefore, the district court’s opinion should be affirmed.