Opinion ID: 1991753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction on Reckless Rate of Speed

Text: Defendant's next contention on appeal is that the presiding justice erred in instructing the jury on the offense of eluding an officer, 29 M.R.S.A. § 2051-A(3). [1] Specifically, defendant points to the justice's failure to define the phrase reckless rate of speed and his general instruction to the jury that any term that I use or word that I use, if I don't give you a specific definition for those words, they have their ordinary commonsense English language meaning. Defendant contends that the ordinary commonsense English language meaning of the phrase reckless rate of speed is not its section 2501-A(3) meaning. Instead, he contends that the correct instruction to the jury should have incorporated the definition of recklessly as established by the legislature in 17-A M.R. S.A. § 35. [2] We disagree. Section 35 of title 17-A defines culpable states of mind for purposes of the offenses of the Code. In contrast, the eluding-an-officer statute, section 2501-A(3) of title 29, uses the adjective reckless to describe a rate of speed. In spite of the fact that both title 17-A and title 29 happen to use the same base word reckless as an adverb and adjective, respectively, we can find no reason to ascribe to the legislature an intent to use the identical meaning in both very different contexts. We find no error in the court's failure to give the jury a specific definition of the commonplace term reckless rate of speed. Cf. State v. Merrifield, 478 A.2d 1131, 1133 (Me.1984) (no need to define genitals); State v. Seaburg, 154 Me. 162, 178, 145 A.2d 550, 559 (1958) (no need to define relationship). Even if there were error, since defendant failed to make any objection to the jury instructions at trial, we must review his belated contention under the obvious error standard of M.R.Crim.P. 52(b). State v. Spearin, 477 A.2d 1147, 1156 (Me. 1984); M.R.Crim.P. 30(b); see also 1 Cluchey & Seitzinger, Maine Criminal Practice § 30.5 (1985). In order to reach the threshold of obvious error, the justice's omission of a specific definition of reckless rate of speed, when viewed in light of the charge as a whole, must be so highly prejudicial to the defendant and so taint[] the proceeding as virtually to deprive the [defendant] of a fair trial. State v. Pierce, 438 A.2d 247, 252 (Me.1981). In this case, without the slightest question, defendant's contention fails to reach that threshold. Defendant never suggested to the jury that the pickup truck involved in the police encounter was driven at a nonreckless rate of speed. Rather, defendant's sole defense was that he was not the driver of the truck at the time of the encounter. Even if the jury had been instructed as to the 17-A M.R.S.A. § 35 definition of recklessly as defendant now urges, it would almost certainly have made no difference whatever in the jury's verdict. A fortiori, defendant was not deprived of any substantial right.