Opinion ID: 2630606
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Utah's Statutory Definition of Hazardous Waste

Text: ¶ 68 The District may retain immunity, however, if the vented hydrogen sulfide was a hazardous waste as defined in the Utah Code. Section 19-6-102(9) of the Utah Code defines hazardous waste as a solid waste or combination of solid wastes other than household waste which, because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious characteristics may cause or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible or incapacitating reversible illness or may pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, disposed of, or otherwise managed. Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-102(9) (1998) (emphasis added). Section 19-6-102(17)(a) defines solid waste and specifically excludes solid or dissolved materials in domestic sewage. The District concedes that its analysis suggested that the hydrogen sulfide gas and the accompanying smell might [have been] caused by a back-up of gas in the sewage system. The District maintained, however, that the hydrogen sulfide may have originated from other sources and that it did not fit within the definition of domestic sewage. The Lovendahls argue that it was plainly domestic sewage. Since the hydrogen sulfide vented by the District might have originated from one of a number of sources, there is a disputed material fact concerning the origin of the vented hydrogen sulfide. Because of this dispute, I also cannot conclude that the hydrogen sulfide vented from the elementary school was hazardous waste. Based on my examination of the statutory definition of both hazardous material and hazardous waste, I cannot conclude as a matter of law that the hydrogen sulfide at issue constituted hazardous material or hazardous waste. Therefore, I conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment. ¶ 69 In sum, under the plain language of subsection 63-30-10(18)(c), the District is entitled to immunity from the Lovendahls' suit if the hydrogen sulfide constituted hazardous material or hazardous waste as a matter of law. However, summary judgment is inappropriate on the issue of immunity because there are disputed material facts concerning whether the hydrogen sulfide vented by the District qualifies as hazardous material or hazardous waste. For this reason, I would reverse the trial court's decision granting the District's motion for summary judgment on this issue.