Opinion ID: 184888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attorney Fees for Work Performed by Kooritzky's Co-Counsel

Text: 36 In addition to seeking reversal of the district court's award of attorney fees for legal work performed by Kooritzky in his own case, DOL argues that Kooritzky should not have been permitted to recover attorney fees for the work of his colleagues. The Department relies primarily on our ruling in Burka that a pro se attorney-litigant must demonstrate that he and his co-counsel have a genuine attorney-client relationship and that his co-counsel are exercising independent judgment before he may be awarded attorney fees for their work under the EAJA. 142 F.3d at 1291-92. DOL argues that the rationale of Burka applies in this case even though Kooritzky's co-counsel are not employees of his law firm, as were the attorneys in Burka. DOL Reply Brief at 12. Kooritzky responds that he need only demonstrate that a valid attorney-client relationship existed between him and his co-counsel. While admitting that he never had a written agreement with any of his co-counsel, Kooritzky asserts that no such agreement is necessary for there to be a valid attorney-client relationship. 37 DOL is correct that our analysis in Burka is controlling. Our holding in Burka dictates that a pro se attorney-litigant must demonstrate that he and his co-counsel have a genuine attorney-client relationship and that his co-counsel are independent before attorney fees may be awarded. 142 F.3d at 1291-92. We concluded that this requirement followed from the Supreme Court's ruling in Kay that the term attorney used in a similarly-worded fee-shifting statute  'assumes an agency relationship'  that bars recovery of attorney fees for work performed by all those who are not independent third part[ies]. Id. at 1291 (quoting Kay, 499 U.S. at 435-36, 437). Adhering to the Supreme Court's reasoning we denied recovery of fees to a pro se attorney-litigant who (1) controlled the legal strategy and presentation in his own case, (2) was the only attorney to enter an appearance in the case, and (3) directed the work of his colleagues who were employed by the attorney-litigant's law firm. Id. We distinguished cases relied upon by the plaintiff in Burka in which pro se litigants were allowed to recover fees, noting: 38 In all three cases, the court awarded attorney's fees to a pro se attorney-litigant for the work of co-counsel. Yet, as the district court noted below, all three cases involved attorneys who were not affiliated with the litigant's law practice. As a result, these outside counsel, unlike the colleagues employed by Burka, enjoyed a genuineattorney-client relationship with the litigants, were situated to offer independent legal advice and assistance, and were presumably paid for their services by the attorney-litigants involved. This was not true here. Instead, Burka controlled the legal strategy and presentation, he was the only attorney to enter an appearance in the case, and his colleagues worked under his direction. These are material differences. 39 Id. at 1291. We concluded that, based on these factors, cocounsel in Burka lacked the requisite independence necessary for recovery of attorney fees under the fee-shifting provision found in FOIA. 40 The same analysis applies under the EAJA. A pro se attorney-litigant seeking to obtain attorney fees under the EAJA for work performed by co-counsel must demonstrate that his colleagues are situated to offer independent legal advice and assistance. As we demonstrated above, the Supreme Court's conclusion in Kay that the term attorney contemplates an agency relationship between a litigant and an independent lawyer applies not only to the fee-shifting provisions of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, but to all similarly-worded fee-shifting provisions, including that found in the EAJA. 41 Applying the test we outlined in Burka, we conclude that Kooritzky has not shown that his co-counsel evidenced the independence necessary for recovery of fees under the EAJA. We further conclude that Kooritzky and his co-counsel did not enjoy a genuine attorney-client relationship for purposes of the fee-shifting provision of the Act. As the district court noted, the relationship between Kooritzky and his cocounsel was unusual. Kooritzky I, 6 F.Supp.2d at 5. As in Burka, none of Kooritzky's co-counsel entered an appearance on his behalf during the merits phase of the case. The only appearance by co-counsel on behalf of Kooritzky occurred after Kooritzky had prevailed on the merits when the district court was determining the amount of attorney fees, if any, Kooritzky was entitled to receive. There was no formal agreement between Kooritzky and his colleagues concerning fees for legal services rendered. None of Kooritzky's alleged co-counsel ever billed him for legal services rendered. Moreover, his co-counsel did not even keep accurate records of the time they allegedly spent on Kooritzky's case. After reviewing the evidence, the magistrate judge observed that  '[n]obody expected to get paid.'  Id. (citing Magistrate Report and Recommendation at 39). 42 Indeed, as Kooritzky's counsel acknowledged during oral argument, it was only after Kooritzky had prevailed on the merits that he and his colleagues realized that they might be able--in his words--to stick the government for attorney fees. Once this realization dawned upon them, they proceeded to reconstruct the hours spent working on this case, leading to protracted litigation below concerning the amount of fees to which they were entitled. See id. at 8 (noting that plaintiff's inexperience and disorderly recordkeeping imposed an enormous and unnecessary burden on the Court and the Magistrate Judge). In engaging in such practices, Kooritzky and his colleagues ignored the admonition of the Supreme Court in Hensley that [a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation. 461 U.S. at 437. While the facts in this case differ from those in Burka in that Kooritzky's co-counsel, unlike the attorneys in Burka, are not employed by his law firm, this fact alone is not dispositive. 43 We are not holding that in every instance an EAJA litigant must show that each attorney for whom he is entitled to counsel fees entered an appearance in the case. We do however hold that such fees must be for a professional who has in fact acted in an attorney-client relationship with the fee claimant in the relevant EAJA litigation. Kooritzky has not made the necessary showing. Did the lawyers for whom he claims recompense receive or contemplate fees? According to the record they did not. Did they appear for him in the merits phase of the case? According to the record they did not. Did they enter an attorney-client relationship with reference to this litigation? So far as the record shows, they did not. They may have counseled him, they may have advised him, but they did not provide the function recognized in Kay v. Ehrler of filtering out meritless claims. 499 U.S. at 437. The litigant himself acted as sole trial counsel. He was the final filter. He, like the FOIA litigant in Burka, controlled the legal strategy and presentation, and was the only attorney to enter an appearance, at least in the merits phase of the case. 142 F.3d at 1291. Like the litigant in Burka, he cannot collect attorney fees for professionals who did not act as his attorneys. 1