Opinion ID: 107969
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Considerations.

Text: Respondents' alternate contention is that the case presents a political question because judicial resolution of petitioners' claim would produce a potentially embarrassing confrontation between coordinate branches of the Federal Government. But, as our interpretation of Art. I,  5, discloses, a determination of petitioner Powell's right to sit would require no more than an interpretation of the Constitution. Such a determination falls within the traditional role accorded courts to interpret the law, and does not involve a lack of the respect due [a] co-ordinate [branch] of government, nor does it involve an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion. Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, at 217. Our system of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility. [86] See United States v. Brown, 381 U. S. 437, 462 (1965); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U. S. 579, 613-614 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Nor are any of the other formulations of a political question inextricable from the case at bar. Baker v. Carr, supra, at 217. Petitioners seek a determination that the House was without power to exclude Powell from the 90th Congress, which, we have seen, requires an interpretation of the ConstitutionÔÇöa determination for which clearly there are judicially . . . manageable standards. Finally, a judicial resolution of petitioners' claim will not result in multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. For, as we noted in Baker v. Carr, supra, at 211, it is the responsibility of this Court to act as the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803). Thus, we conclude that petitioners' claim is not barred by the political question doctrine, and, having determined that the claim is otherwise generally justiciable, we hold that the case is justiciable.