Opinion ID: 77353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the District Court Erred in Denying Appellants' Due Process Claims

Text: 21 Next, the appellants contend that the Board's application of a de facto 90% policy violated their due process rights. A state parole system creates a liberty interest in parole that is subject to the protections of the Due Process Clause only when it establishes a legitimate expectation of parole. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). In Sultenfuss v. Snow, we held that the Georgia parole system does not create a legitimate expectation of parole. Sultenfuss v. Snow, 35 F.3d 1494, 1503 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc). 22 The appellants contend that the district court erred in relying on Sultenfuss because the Supreme Court's intervening decisions in Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000), and California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995), overruled the test Sultenfuss used to determine whether the complainant had a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Instead, the appellants argue that we must analyze their liberty interest in light of the real concerns undergirding the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483 n. 5, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418 (1995). 23 Contrary to appellants' argument, Garner cited Sultenfuss favorably, and we consistently have applied Sultenfuss even after Garner and Morales. Because Georgia's parole system does not create a legitimate expectation of parole, the appellants cannot establish a due process violation here. Accordingly, even assuming that the Board applied a de facto 90% policy, the appellants' claim fails. 24