Opinion ID: 1536017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Factual Basis for Guilty Plea

Text: Next, defendant argues that the factual basis for his guilty plea was inadequate. First, defendant contends that there was no factual basis to support his statement that he was the gunman because the State lacked sufficient evidence to identify the trigger person. Second, defendant argues that the court erred when it failed to make a factual finding that the evidence corroborated defendant's claim that he was the trigger person. We reject both claims. Rule 3:9-2 provides, in pertinent part, that [t]he court, in its discretion,... shall not accept [a] plea without first ... determining by inquiry of the defendant and others ... that there is a factual basis for the plea. See, e.g., State v. Eisenman, 153 N.J. 462, 471, 710 A. 2d 441 (1998) (observing that defendant may provide factual basis for guilty plea during plea colloquy). When a defendant is charged with capital murder, however, no factual basis shall be required from the defendant as long as the court is satisfied that a factual basis for the plea has been established from the proofs presented. State v. Jackson, 118 N.J. 484, 488, 572 A. 2d 607 (1990); see also State v. Davis, 116 N.J. 341, 372, 561 A. 2d 1082 (1989) (stating a capital defendant should not be disadvantaged by a plea requirement that he or she furnish the factual basis for the plea). The purpose of the Rule is to avoid forcing defendant[s] exposed to the death penalty ... to state anything that can support an aggravating factor. Jackson, supra, 118 N.J. at 489, 572 A. 2d 607; see Davis, supra, 116 N.J. at 371, 561 A. 2d 1082. In the present case, there was not only a factual basis to support defendant's guilty plea, but also the trial court expressly made a factual finding that the evidence supported defendant's claim that he was the gunman. During the plea hearing, defendant specifically stated that he exited the passenger side of the vehicle to talk to the officer, that Staples was driving, and that he had been out of the car less than 10 [seconds]4, 5 seconds, 6 maybe ... [s]omewhere in that [range], before he shot the officer twice. He informed the court that Sergeant Gonzalez was going for his gun and I just wanted him away from me ... I went for mine and shot him. Defendant even admitted firing his gun within six feet or so of the victim. Further, the evidence from the scenes of the murder and the arrest support defendant's statement that he was the passenger because he exited the vehicle from the passenger's side at the scene of the arrest. Defendant was in possession of the murder weapon when he ran from the vehicle. Forensic evidence supports defendant's statement that Sergeant Gonzalez was shot twice and that he was shot from a distance of six feet or less. The trial court recognized all of the similarities between defendant's statements at the plea hearing and the extrinsic evidence. After listening to defendant's plea statements, reviewing a transcript of a taped statement recorded by Sergeant Clay just a few hours after the shooting, Clay's investigative report, and the autopsy report, the trial court observed: I'm satisfied that [Simon] has provided a sufficient factual basis to establish, along with the exhibits that have been submitted in evidence, that he is guilty. I'm satisfied that with respect to the capital murder count that he did, without any justification, whatsoever, knowingly and purposefully fire 2 shots into the body at close range, within several feet, standing within 6 feet and with his armshis arm that was holding the gun partially extended, fired these 2 shots into the body of Sergeant Gonzalez and that he did so, therefore, by his own conduct. We, therefore, agree with the trial court that there was a sufficient factual basis for defendant's guilty plea and that the corroborating evidence establishes that defendant's admission that he was the trigger person was trustworthy. See State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 229, 680 A. 2d 634, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1021, 117 S.Ct. 540, 136 L.Ed. 2d 424 (1996) (holding evidence and inferences to be drawn from the evidence were sufficient for the jury to determine that the confession was trustworthy).