Opinion ID: 1745096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The General Assembly's Recognition of Immunity

Text: The Court of Appeals found KRS 75.070 to be unconstitutional insofar as it purported to impart personal immunity upon firefighters for negligent conduct and because fire departments were not agents of state or county government. [8] We disagree. Fire departments are agents of the Commonwealth who engage in an essential governmental function in providing for the safety and well-being of its citizens  and because there is likely no more epitomizing symbol of government function  reason dictates they must be considered an agent of the sovereign. As such, they are cloaked in immunity from suit in tort. When an entity is entitled to government immunity, the General Assembly may draft legislation recognizing that immunity. Where sovereign immunity exists by reason of the constitution, the General Assembly may extend or limit waiver as it sees fit, but where no constitutionally protected sovereign immunity exists the General Assembly cannot by statute create it. Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 329. Thus, as in Yanero where we found that the KHSAA, as an agent of the Kentucky Board of Education, was entitled to immunity, so too should the CVFD be afforded immunity as an agent of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. See Yanero, 65 S.W.3d at 530. It is an axiomatic rule of statutory interpretation that when this Court considers the constitutionality of a statute, we must draw all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of upholding the validity of the statute. See, e.g., Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Ky.2006). In Kentucky, a statute carries with it the presumption of constitutionality; therefore, when we consider it, we are 'obligated to give it, if possible, an interpretation which upholds its constitutional validity.' Commonwealth v. Halsell, 934 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Ky.1996) ( quoting American Trucking Ass'n v. Com., Transp. Cab., 676 S.W.2d 785, 789 (Ky.1984)) (emphasis added). To the extent that there is reasonable doubt as to a statute's constitutionality, all presumptions will be in favor of upholding the statute, deferring to the voice of the people as expressed through the legislative department of government. Walters v. Bindner, 435 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Ky.1968). A constitutional infringement must be clear, complete and unmistakable in order to render the statute unconstitutional. Kentucky Industrial Utility Customers, Inc. v. Kentucky Utilities Company, 983 S.W.2d 493, 499 (Ky.1998). In its Opinion below, the Court of Appeals cited to Haney and Happy for the proposition that KRS 75.070's extension of immunity to municipal fire departments was unconstitutional. Haney , however, is inapplicable because KRS 75.070 is not premised on a grant of municipal immunity. Nor does it offend Happy as it does not attempt to grant absolute immunity, but rather recognizes and extends waiver of immunity for acts carried out only in a government capacity. Moreover, considering the present statute, the General Assembly has articulated a clear public policy determination  as manifested by the passage of such legislation  that it intends for all fire departments, volunteer fire departments, and firefighters to be immune from tort liability for their governmental or official acts. We would be remiss to ignore a directive which is so clearly within the purview of this Commonwealth's legislature. In City of Louisville v. Louisville Seed Co., 433 S.W.2d 638, 640-641 (Ky.1968) ( overruled by Gas Service Co., Inc. v. City of London, 687 S.W.2d 144), wherein the constitutional efficacy of the Haney decision was challenged, this Court attempted to come to terms with how to deal with the liability of important public service providers such as fire and police departments in a post-municipal immunity judicial landscape. Therein, we noted: Public agencies engage in activities of a scope and variety far beyond that of any private business. These activities affect a much larger segment of the public than do the activities of private business. Private business carries on no activities even remotely comparable to a city street system which may cover many thousands of miles and is used by the entire public. With rare exceptions, private business carries on no function as hazardous or exacting in detail as the work of a city fire or police department These activities are so inherently dangerous that private business would hesitate to undertake them ... [but] are so important to the health, safety and welfare of the public that they cannot properly be abandoned. And, it can be readily appreciated that the imposition of broad standards of tort liability upon them might be extremely burdensome and could possibly force their curtailment or even abandonment to the detriment of the general public. For this reason, some reasonable compromise must be reached-one that will permit the isolated citizen to recover for grievous injustices imposed upon him by a negligent society, yet protect that society from what could cumulate into ruinous claims. Louisville Seed Co., 433 S.W.2d at 641 (emphasis added) ( overruled by Gas Service Co., Inc., 687 S.W.2d 144). Consequently, the Court attempted to fashion a rule, which was, incidentally, a mutation of the government/proprietary test, whereby a city would not be liable in tort for risks undertaken by agencies such as fire and police departments on the grounds that they served all members of the public generally as opposed to dealing with persons on an individual capacity. Id. As previously noted, we recognize Louisville Seed Co . was subsequently overruled by Gas Service Co . and the government/proprietary test is still the prevailing rule; however, it is significant to note the motivation and reasoning behind the formulation of such a rule represent sound judicial policy and we must acknowledge that our courts have been consistently aware of and alarmed by the need to distinguish amongst those agencies which require insulation from liability in order to ensure their continued survival. While policy determinations are generally beyond the purview of the judiciary, they are squarely within the legislative province. Thus, in response to the concerns of the courts and the public, the General Assembly enacted KRS 75.070. Shaping public policy is the exclusive domain of the General Assembly. We have held that [t]he establishment of public policy is granted to the legislature alone. It is beyond the power of a court to vitiate an act of the legislature on the grounds that public policy promulgated therein is contrary to what the court considers to be in the public interest. Commonwealth ex rel. Cowan v. Wilkinson, 828 S.W.2d 610, 614 (Ky.1992). Through its enactment of KRS 75.070, the General Assembly has articulated the public policy that firefighters and fire departments within the Commonwealth should not be liable for negligent acts committed in good faith in emergency situations while engaged in fighting a fire or responding to a call. Stated otherwise, the statute in question confers governmental immunity to fire departments and qualified official immunity to firefighters engaged in discretionary functions. Thus, the statute fully comports with constitutional law. Unless the General Assembly is prohibited by the Kentucky or Federal Constitutions from enacting such legislation, it must be free to do so. See Boone County v. Town of Verona, 190 Ky. 430, 432, 227 S.W. 804, 805 (1921). Here, it is not so prohibited. And, as noted in Berns , in the present matter, independent constitutional justification for immunity exists, as KRS 75.070 does not conflict with Ky. Const § 231. See Berns, 801 S.W.2d at 329. Accordingly, we hold KRS 75.070 is constitutional and confers governmental immunity upon municipal fire departments, fire protection district fire departments and volunteer fire departments. CVFD is therefore entitled to governmental immunity.