Opinion ID: 1384715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the co-conspirators' statements

Text: During direct examination of Officer Lauck, the prosecutor offered into evidence two audio tapes and requested that they be played for the jury. The first tape, offered in support of Count I, contained a January 17, 1985 telephone conversation between Agent Lauck and Mike Burke in which the two men set up the meeting at Decker's. The second tape, offered in support of Count II, contained a May 22, 1985 conversation between Lauck and Gus Skurdal in which Skurdal told Lauck that he could come to the Burke residence to pick up two and one-half grams of methamphetamine from appellant. The defense objected to the admission of both tapes on the grounds of hearsay and confrontation. The trial court overruled the objections, concluding that the statements were admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), W.R.E., as statements of a co-conspirator during the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy. Appellant now argues that the trial court erred in admitting the two tapes because the State did not produce sufficient evidence of a conspiracy on either count. Under the Wyoming Rules of Evidence a statement is not hearsay if [t]he statement is offered against the party and is    (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Rule 801(d)(2)(E), W.R.E. We have held that statements may be admitted into evidence under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) even if a conspiracy is not charged. Jasch v. State, Wyo., 563 P.2d 1327, 1333 (1977). In order for statements of a co-conspirator to be admitted under the rule, there must be prima facie evidence of a conspiracy independent of the co-conspirators' statements. Dorador v. State, Wyo., 711 P.2d 417, 418 (1985). This burden is met if there is sufficient evidence to permit the trial court to reasonably infer that a conspiracy existed. Id. at 418-419. Our general conspiracy statute defines the elements of conspiracy as: (1) an agreement between one or more persons to commit a crime, and (2) an overt act to effect the objective of the agreement. Section 6-1-303, W.S. 1977. [1] The existence of an agreement may be established through circumstantial evidence: One might suppose that the agreement necessary for conspiracy is essentially like the agreement or `meeting of the minds' which is critical to a contract, but this is not the case. Although there continues to exist some uncertainty as to the precise meaning of the word in the context of conspiracy, it is clear that the definition in this setting is somewhat more lax than elsewhere. A mere tacit understanding will suffice, and there need not be any written statement or even a speaking of words which expressly communicates agreement.    Because most conspiracies are clandestine in nature, the prosecution is seldom able to present direct evidence of the agreement. Courts have been sympathetic to this problem, and it is thus well established that the prosecution may `rely on inferences drawn from the course of conduct of the alleged conspirators.' (Footnotes omitted.) W. LaFave and A. Scott, Criminal Law (1972) at pp. 460-461. With respect to Count I, the State introduced the following evidence through the testimony of Agent Lauck: Lauck met with Mike Burke and Gus Skurdal and fronted the money for the drug purchase. He went to appellant's home to pick up the methamphetamine, and only appellant was there. Appellant told Lauck that her husband had acquired the methamphetamine and that it was of good quality. Appellant seemed afraid that Officer Lauck would be upset because the methamphetamine was not at the house at that time. At her own suggestion, she accompanied Lauck on a search for her husband; and, while on that search, she actively tried to find him. She continually reassured Lauck that the methamphetamine had been obtained and that he could get it from Mike Burke as soon as they found him. At this point in Lauck's testimony the trial court correctly admitted the first tape. The testimony supported an inference that an understanding existed between appellant and her husband, the understanding being that appellant would assist in delivering the methamphetamine. Her active assistance satisfied the overt-act requirement. With respect to Count II, Lauck testified that on May 22, after agreeing to purchase two and one-half grams of methamphetamine from Gus Skurdal for $200, Lauck went to appellant's residence where he and appellant consummated the transaction on the same terms he had discussed with Skurdal. At this point the trial court admitted the second tape. This ruling was also correct, as the evidence supported an inference that appellant and Gus Skurdal agreed or understood that appellant would deliver the methamphetamine to Lauck. The delivery satisfied the overt-act requirement. The tapes were properly admitted.