Opinion ID: 215176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: N.S. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183, 191 (1984).

Text: 20 Mrvica v. Esperdy, 376 U.S. 560, 568 (1964). 21 486 F.3d 1362 (9th Cir. 2007). 22 94 F.3d 1270 (9th Cir. 1996). 23 486 F.3d at 1363. 8 No. 09-60862 the Ninth Circuit held that the alien’s March 1985 voluntary departure rendered him “ineligible for legalization because he had not resided continuously in the United States since at least January 1, 1982.”24 In Espinoza-Gutierrez, the alien had departed, without receiving advance permission from the INS, for a four-day trip to his hometown in Mexico to check on some property for his parents while his application for LPR status was pending.25 The Ninth Circuit examined whether this trip interrupted the LPR requirement that he have been physically present in the United States since November 6, 1986.26 Consequently, the analysis in Espinoza-Gutierrez is distinct from ours today because that case involved both a different provision and a different type of departure.27 As the Ninth Circuit clarified, “[H]e was not subject to a deportation hearing, nor is he subject to an order of deportation. He was the subject of an exclusion proceeding [upon reentering the United States after his four-day trip].”28 As a general matter, in fact, the Ninth Circuit has embraced reasoning contrary to that urged by Ramos-Torres, concluding that a voluntary departure does not differ from a deportation order vis-à-vis interruption of continued presence: An administrative “voluntary departure” under the statute is something that occurs with the permission of the Attorney General in lieu of removal proceedings. . . . While the statute provides some 24 Id. at 1365. 25 94 F.3d at 1271-72. 26 Id. at 1274. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(3). 27 The Ninth Circuit accordingly remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the trip was “brief, casual, and innocent” in accordance with the standard for determining which absences interrupt continuous physical presence. See Espinoza-Gutierrez, 94 F.3d at 1279. 28 Id. at 1278. 9 No. 09-60862 incentives to an alien to apply for voluntary departure and thus avoid removal proceedings and removal, nothing there suggests that an alien who commits to departure in order to avoid such proceedings is nevertheless entitled to continue accruing “presence” so as to become eligible for other discretionary relief.29 The decisions of the Ninth Circuit, therefore, do not lend support to RamosTorres’s argument. Ramos-Torres also asserts that “Congress intended the remedial provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1255a, targeted exclusively and specifically at illegal aliens, to be generously construed in order to relieve applications of unintended consequences,” and points to the waivers of absence provided for by the statute. But again, the waivers of absence are only provided in the Attorney General’s discretion for “brief temporary trip[s] abroad required by emergency or extenuating circumstances.”30 In contrast, the record here confirms that (1) Ramos-Torres signed an order of voluntary departure, agreeing to return to Mexico, and (2) his criminal sentence suggested that he was not to reenter the United States for three years. His trip was not brief or temporary; neither was it required by an emergency or the type of extenuating circumstances excused by the Attorney General. Such a departure is equally significant, under threat of deportation or under an order of deportation,31 and either breaks an alien’s continuous 29 Vasquez-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 343 F.3d 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). The statute providing for voluntary departures prior to 1996 provided, in relevant part, that the “Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation proceedings . . . to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e)(1) (1994). 30 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(C). 31 According to the law at the time of Ramos-Torres’s voluntary departure, we determined that such a departure under threat of deportation “significantly interrupt[ed]” an alien’s presence in the United States and thus that such departure was “a significant departure from the United States.” Vargas-Gonzalez v. I.N.S., 647 F.2d 457, 458 (5th Cir. 1981); Segura-Viachi v. I.N.S., 538 F.2d 91, 92 (5th Cir. 1976). 10 No. 09-60862 residence to the same extent. The inescapable fact is that Ramos-Torres left the United States for an unknown period of time after agreeing that he would not illegally return to the United States for at least three years. He did not briefly depart for reasons of emergency or extenuating circumstances; rather, he departed because he was convicted of a crime and sentenced to three years of probation, which required his departure from the United States. The LPR provision at issue here falls into a subsection of the INA entitled “Absences caused by deportation or advanced parole.”32 Ramos-Torres’s absence was surely caused by the imminence of his deportation, even if deportation proceedings had not yet commenced against him. Consequently, his voluntary departure in lieu of deportation interrupted his alleged continuous residence as a matter of fact and as a matter of law. In sum, there are no compelling indications that the BIA incorrectly concluded, as a matter of law, that Ramos-Torres was ineligible for LPR status based on his 1982 voluntary departure from the United States and that he is now ineligible for LPR cancellation of removal.