Opinion ID: 1663571
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lyons and its Progeny

Text: Beginning with this Court's decision in Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co. v. Lyons, 122 Fla. 346, 165 So. 351 (1936), lower courts have seized upon the apparent rule of law that delivery of an insurance policy to an insurance agent constitutes delivery to the insured for all purposes. See, e.g., Reliance Ins. Co. v. D'Amico, 528 So.2d 533, 534 (Fla. 2d DCA 1988) (The fact that [the insured] may never have received a copy of the subject insurance policy because his insurance agent kept it on file for him is irrelevant because delivery of an insurance policy to an agent constitutes delivery to the insured. (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Latham, 207 So.2d 733 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968), which, in turn, relied upon Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Lyons, 122 Fla. 346, 165 So. 351 (1936))). However, the actual holding of Lyons was much more narrow because it addressed delivery in the context of contract formation. In particular, Lyons centered on a life-insurance coverage dispute, in which the insurer claimed that no contract had ever been formed between it and the insured. See 165 So. at 352. This case, in contrast to Lyons, does not focus on a contract-formation dispute; rather, it focuses on a situation in which an insurance contract concededly exists, but the insured disputes the fact that it received notice of certain insurance-policy exclusions. In Lyons, A.D. Lyons, the insured, purchased a life insurance policy in the sum of $1,000, payable to Martha Traylor Lyons, his wife. See 165 So. at 352. Lyons completed the application on January 6, 1933, and the insurer's Jacksonville office mailed the policy to its soliciting agent on January 13. See id. The soliciting agent received the policy on January 15 or 16, but held the policy until January 26. See id. Upon attempting delivery, the agent learned that Lyons had died earlier that same day. See id. Lyon's wife, however, tendered the first premium and continued to request delivery of the policy. The agent and insurer refused this request, and Mrs. Lyons filed a complaint seeking to require the insurer to deliver the policy. See id. The policy application stated that the company should incur no liability under it unless and until (a) it has been received and approved, (b) the policy issued and actually delivered, and (c) the premium has been actually paid to and accepted by the Company, or its authorized agent, all during the lifetime of the insured and while he is in good health. 165 So. at 352 (emphasis supplied). The insurer conceded that it received and approved Lyons' application, that it refused to deliver the policy, and that it refused to accept Mrs. Lyons' tender of the first premium payment. See id. This Court held: On the question of delivery, we do not think the company is in position to complain. When the policy was sent to the soliciting agent of the company, he became the agent of both the insurer and the insured for the purpose of delivery, and, having held it for ten or eleven days before moving to do so, we hold that delivery was in effect performed. The company should not by its conduct defeat delivery and claim an advantage by doing so. 165 So. at 353 (emphasis supplied). Thus, this Court decided Lyons solely with regard to the question of contract formation, and did not address delivery for purposes of notice of policy exclusions. When a policy-delivery dispute focuses on notice of policy exclusionsand not contract formation Lyons, and cases based upon Lyons, should not control. Rather, as explained below, a well-established insurance law presumption, used in conjunction with this Court's decision in Almerico v. RLI Insurance Co., 716 So.2d 774 (Fla.1998), should resolve these types of policy-delivery notice issues.