Opinion ID: 2462686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The issue of subject-matter jurisdiction raised by the Highway Department is paramount and must be addressed first. Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 16-108-201 et seq. (1987), the following section is found: The term court means any circuit or chancery court of this state. The making of an agreement described in § 16-108-201 providing for arbitration in this state confers jurisdiction on the court to enforce the agreement under this subchapter and to enter judgment on an award thereunder. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-108-217 (1987). The contract provision set forth above in this opinion alludes to jurisdiction in Pulaski County Chancery Court. While it is true that the parties may by agreement consent to personal jurisdiction in a given court, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred merely by agreement of the parties. See, e.g., Flemens v. Harris, 319 Ark. 659, 893 S.W.2d 783 (1995); Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Estate of Hogan, 314 Ark. 19, 858 S.W.2d 105 (1993); Nelms v. Morgan Portable Bldg. Corp., 305 Ark. 284, 808 S.W.2d 314 (1991). Thus, if subject matter jurisdiction is appropriate, the parties may agree on the appropriate court in which to resolve disputes. Hardy Construction argues that subject-matter jurisdiction is appropriate in chancery court because the relief requested is akin to a mandatory injunction to enforce the contract or, alternatively, to specific performance of the contract provision relating to court appointment of an arbitrator. Specific performance is an equitable remedy cognizable only in equity. Arkansas State Employees Ins. Advisory Comm. v. Estate of Manning, 316 Ark. 143, 870 S.W.2d 748 (1994). Although there is no case in Arkansas that specifically addresses whether the chancery court has jurisdiction to act to enforce an arbitration agreement pursuant to statutory authority, foreign jurisdictions have treated these actions as ones for specific performance of a contract to arbitrate. See Annapolis Professional Firefighters Local 1926, IAFF, AFL-CIO v. City of Annapolis, 100 Md. App. 714, 642 A.2d 889 (1994) ( dictum ); Trubowitch v. Riverbank Canning Co., 30 Cal.2d 335, 182 P.2d 182 (1947); see also 4 Am.Jur.2d, Alternative Dispute Resolution, § 113, p. 158 (1995). For example, in Annapolis Professional Firefighters Local 1926, IAFF, AFL -CIO, supra, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals addressed by way of dictum the power of a court of equity to appoint an arbitrator under the Uniform Arbitration Act when the agreed method failed or otherwise could not be followed: Although this power, under the Act, is a statutory one, it is not foreign to or inconsistent with the general equitable jurisdiction of a circuit court. [1] Equity courts have long had the power, for example, when specifically enforcing agreements, to appoint trustees to carry out their decrees when a party proves recalcitrant or when otherwise necessary to implement the agreement. Annapolis Firefighters, 642 A.2d at 895. To support its argument that the chancery court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction, the Highway Department directs our attention to Bates v. Bates, 303 Ark. 89, 793 S.W.2d 788 (1990). In that case, this court reiterated that the General Assembly is without authority to expand the jurisdiction of chancery courts beyond that granted by the 1874 Arkansas Constitution. Bates, 303 Ark. at 91, 793 S.W.2d at 790. In Bates , we held specifically that the General Assembly could not expand the chancery court's jurisdiction to include areas of criminal law. The Bates case, though, is distinguishable from Annapolis Firefighters and the instant case because the latter situations add nothing to a court of equity's traditional responsibilities to specifically enforce agreements to arbitrate under certain circumstances. Though Arkansas does not have a precise case in point, an analogous situation arose in Arkansas Cotton Grs. Co-op. Assn. v. Brown, 168 Ark. 504, 270 S.W. 946 (1925). In Brown , we interpreted the Cooperative Marketing Act, including a provision of the Act which gave the Association the right to seek an injunction in equity against a member to prevent the further breach of the contract and to a decree of specific performance thereof. see Act 116 of 1921, § 17, codified at Ark.Code Ann. § 2-2-419(a)(1) (Repl. 1996). We stated in Brown : It is contended that the chancery court does not possess jurisdiction to prevent a breach by injunction and thereby compel specific performance of the contract. The statute creating the association contains an express provision for such relief, but it is contended that this statute constitutes an attempt to enlarge the jurisdiction of the court, which is beyond the power of the lawmakers. We do not agree to this view, for it has always been within the jurisdiction of courts of equity to grant relief where legal remedies are inadequate, and it is evident that, by reason of the peculiarity of the co-operative marketing plan, any legal remedy would be wholly inadequate. The only remedy at law would be a suit to recover damages, but this remedy is inadequate, for the reason that the recovery of damages for a failure to deliver cotton would not repair the injury done if a substantial number of the members should refuse to deliver cotton. 168 Ark. at 521-522, 270 S.W. at 953. It is clear that the chancery court had jurisdiction to enforce the contracts in this case pursuant to the Uniform Arbitration Act.