Opinion ID: 1868110
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Legal Accuracy of CRIMJIG 7.07

Text: After a careful examination of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.06 and 609.065, case law from other jurisdictions, and legal commentary on the forfeiture rule, I conclude that CRIMJIG 7.07 materially misstates the law in two respects. The first flaw concerns the element of causation. CRIMJIG 7.07 creates a causal nexus between the defendant's conduct and an incident, not between the defendant's conduct and the victim's use of deadly force. This is inconsistent with section 609.065, which does not authorize the victim to use deadly force in response to an incident, but only in response to an offense by the defendant that the victim reasonably believes exposes the victim to great bodily harm or death. This is also inconsistent with the notion recognized by a majority of jurisdictions that a defendant does not forfeit his right to self-defense by words alone. [2] A mere glare has also been held to be insufficient. State v. Bristol, 53 Wyo. 304, 84 P.2d 757, 766 (1938). Also, a defendant is generally not regarded as an initial aggressor merely because he armed himself or went to a place where an assault was likely. [3] The failure of CRIMJIG 7.07 to more narrowly define incident means that a jury could find that the incident was a conversation that the defendant began, which later escalated into the use of deadly force, even if the conversation did not legally cause the initiation of deadly force by the victim. The second flaw in CRIMJIG 7.07 is that it does not require a finding that the defendant was in some way culpable in beginning the incident. I agree with one commentator's observation that [w]here an actor causes the conditions of his defense but does so blamelessly, there is little justification for taking away his defense. He is no more blameworthy for causing the conditions of his defense than is the actor who has made no causal contribution. Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One's Own Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 71 Va. L.Rev. 1, 8 (1985) [hereinafter Robinson, Causing the Conditions ]. Yet, the only culpability required by CRIMJIG 7.07 is the responsibility for having begun an incident. Again, this is inconsistent with section 609.065, which does not authorize the victim to use force in response to lawful conduct by a defendant. Starting a conversation, even an angry one, would generally not be an offense that would cause the victim to reasonably believe that he was being exposed to great bodily harm or death, so as to justify the use of deadly force under section 609.065. According to LaFave, [a] nondeadly aggressor (i.e., one who begins an encounter, using only his fists or some nondeadly weapon) who is met with deadly force in defense may justifiably defend himself against the deadly attack. This is so because the aggressor's victim, by using deadly force against nondeadly aggression, uses unlawful force. LaFave, supra, § 10.4(e). And, according to Robinson: [I]n assault-defensive force situations, what would be considered culpability in causing issues can be resolved through the normal operation of the rules governing the effect of privileged conduct: justified conduct may not be lawfully interfered with, or lawfully defended against, while unjustified conduct may be lawfully resisted. 2 Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 123(b) (1984) [hereinafter Robinson, Defenses ]. The word incident in CRIMJIG 7.07 is too vague to convey the elements of causation and culpability that are required by our self-defense statutes and the common law. As a result, CRIMJIG 7.07 misstates the law.