Opinion ID: 409578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis: The Bay Ridge Decision

Text: 56 In appraising the Bay Ridge decision, we are faced at the outset with an interesting and unresolved question of administrative law. What is the effect of an invalidly promulgated rule upon an adjudicative decision that relies on that rule when the decision, without any rule, would have been within the discretion of the agency? In other words, we have seen that MarAd was not legally obliged to limit its discretion through rulemaking. It could have chosen to make repayment decisions on a purely ad hoc basis. But instead it chose to establish a rule governing the consideration of each application. MarAd having botched the rulemaking, the question is whether the subsequent adjudication of an application can still be upheld in its own right. 57 Appellees claim that any invalidity of the interim rule merely wipes the slate clean, as if MarAd had never even attempted to promulgate a rule. The Bay Ridge decision is, thus, a discrete exercise of (MarAd's) discretionary authority and does not stand or fall on the basis of the rule. 56 However, no relevant cases are cited to support this view. 58 Appellant stresses MarAd's express reliance on the interim rule in deciding to allow repayment of the Bay Ridge subsidy. A staff memorandum of 22 October 1980 recommending the decision explains that the Richmond application ... clearly satisfies all the factors as developed in the Board's interim rule. 57 And the 13 November letter announcing the decision cites and purports to track the rule item by item. 58 Logically, appellant claims, agency action taken in pursuance of an invalid regulation cannot stand. 59 Again, however, no supporting case law is cited. 59 The dearth of precedent on such a fundamental point is surprising. There is a Supreme Court case on point, NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 60 but its result is not dispositive. Six Justices held that a rule promulgated prospectively by the NLRB in an informal adjudication was invalid. An order subsequently based on that rule in another informal adjudication was nonetheless upheld. But only four Justices subscribed to the proposition that the invalidity of the rule did not invalidate the order based upon it. Three Justices thought the original rule was valid, while the other two, in dissent, found both the rule and, therefore, the order invalid. 60 It would serve little purpose to guess how the current Court would decide the same issue. In the absence of controlling precedent we must rely upon reason, and reason in Wyman-Gordon, despite the 4-2 head count, seems to rest entirely with Justice Harlan's dissent. He points out that SEC v. Chenery 61 established the principle that a court is obligated to remand a case if an agency has relied upon an improper basis to justify its action. Since the major reason the NLRB gave in support of its order was the invalid rule, Justice Harlan felt Chenery required remand. 61 If, as the plurality opinion suggests, the NLRB may properly enforce an invalid rule in subsequent adjudications, the rule-making provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act are completely trivialized. 62 62 One purpose of the APA's rulemaking provisions is to ensure that all of the competing considerations are canvassed before a decision is reached. If the NLRB could violate those provisions in adopting a rule and then issue an order based on the rule, without recanvassing the competing considerations, this purpose would be thwarted. Since Justice Harlan, unlike the plurality, was unwilling to speculate as to the result of a full (re)appraisal of the rule by the NLRB, he wanted to remand the order. 63 To repeat, Justice Harlan's reasoning seems inescapable. But the question remains whether it is applicable to this case. In Wyman-Gordon the challenged order followed automatically from the invalid rule. The former (Furnish the union with the names and addresses of your employees.) was but a particular instance of the latter (In an election an employer shall furnish the union ....). The NLRB did not reconsider the factors pro and con requiring employers to furnish addresses when it issued the order. Thus, the employer could rightfully claim that it was deprived of an opportunity, because of an invalid rule, fully to argue its case. 64 No such claim can be made in this case. The rule at issue here merely indicates the procedures MarAd must follow and the factors it must consider in passing on repayment applications. The rule did not dictate the Bay Ridge decision in the way the Excelsior rule dictated the order at issue in Wyman-Gordon. Rather, MarAd, in theory, was conducting the informal adjudication in an open and receptive manner within the broad confines of the rule. The key point of distinction is that ITOC has shown no way in which its interests in the adjudication were procedurally impaired by MarAd's adherence to those confines. The rule did not lead MarAd to refuse to entertain any probative evidence or sound arguments against granting Richmond's application. The factors to be considered by MarAd did not exclude any factors claimed relevant by ITOC. As we have seen, ITOC's primary complaint against the interim rule is that it left MarAd with too much discretion to reconsider and reweight all the relevant factors in considering each repayment application. Furthermore, ITOC cannot claim to have been harmed either by the threshold requirement that an applicant demonstrate a lack of opportunities in the foreign trade or by the requirement, not ordinarily found in informal adjudications, of notice to, and an opportunity for comment by, interested parties. 65 In sum, unlike the employer in Wyman-Gordon, ITOC has no claim that its interests in the informal proceeding were impaired by MarAd's adherence to an invalid rule. In fact, its interests were procedurally advanced. Thus, we cannot conclude that the invalidity of the interim rule automatically invalidates the Bay Ridge decision. We must therefore proceed to an independent evaluation of that decision.
66 Our responsibility in reviewing this informal adjudication 63 is essentially two-fold. First, we must review the record to ensure that MarAd's decision is not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 64 The critical elements of such review are clear. While MarAd's decision is entitled to a presumption of regularity, the presumption is not to shield ... action from a thorough, probing, in-depth review. 65 Thus, though we are not permitted to substitute our judgment for MarAd's, our inquiry must be searching and careful, 66 and we must ensure both that (MarAd) has adequately considered all relevant factors ... and that it has demonstrated 'a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made.'  67 67 Our second obligation is to examine the procedures MarAd employed in reaching its decision to ensure that they comply with the APA and any applicable statutory or constitutional requirements. 68 The critical elements of this review, however, are far from clear. The APA rulemaking requirements of notice, an opportunity for comment, and a concise general statement of basis and purpose do not extend to informal adjudication. And where, as here, MarAd's authorization to accept repayment applications is inferred from rather than found in the Maritime Act, there are no statutorily mandated procedures to which the court can turn. Yet, some minimum procedures are necessary to provide a record adequate for the court to perform its review. 68 The distinct and steady trend of the courts has been to demand in informal adjudications procedures similar to those already required in informal rulemaking. 69 Courts have required some explanation for agency action 70 and, to ensure the adequacy of that explanation, some opportunity for interested parties to be informed of and comment upon the relevant evidence before the agency. 71 Thus, despite the Supreme Court's dictum in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 72 that courts may not add to the procedural requirements of the APA except in extremely rare circumstances, we are justified in demanding some sort of procedures for notice, comment, and a statement of reasons as a necessary means of carrying out our responsibility for a thorough and searching review. 69 This demand is further bolstered and given a more concrete form by the interim rule adopted by MarAd. It states the procedures MarAd must follow in considering applications for total repayment of unamortized CDS for tankers of at least 100,000 DWT. 70 With respect to any such request received, the Board will publish a notice in the Federal Register, providing opportunity for comment by interested parties. After the Board has acted upon any such application, the Board will publish a concise written explanation for its action. 73 71 We have explained above why MarAd's adherence to an invalid rule should not invalidate the Bay Ridge decision. For some of the same reasons, any failure to adhere to that invalid rule should invalidate the decision. In other words, despite the procedural flaws in the promulgation of the interim rule, we hold that MarAd was bound by the requirements of that rule. 72 MarAd itself determined that, in the absence of an outcome-determinative rule, procedural protection for all interested parties was desirable. Under ordinary circumstances, that determination, embodied in a rule, would be binding on the agency. 74 The fact that MarAd failed to provide an adequate explanation for the rule (more particularly, for why it didn't provide substantive protection as well) should not relieve it of the burdens imposed by the rule. MarAd is, effectively, estopped from deriving any subsequent procedural leeway from its past procedural failings. 73 We must, therefore, ensure not only that MarAd's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, but also, as a related task, that MarAd made available for comment all relevant evidence and produced an adequate explanation for its action, canvassing the competing comments received and explaining why it resolved the differences as it did.
74 On 20 October 1980 MarAd's Office of Trade Studies and Statistics presented the Office of Subsidy Contracts with a report of twenty-two, single-spaced pages on the Bay Ridge application. 75 The first three and one-half pages provide background material. There follows nine and one-half pages summarizing the various comments, replies, rejoinders, and motions of interested parties. The remainder of the report discusses the application in terms of the factors listed in the interim rule and ends by recommending its approval. 75 Two days later the Office of Subsidy Contracts presented a report to the Maritime Subsidy Board, also recommending approval of Richmond's application. 76 The report is sixty-two pages, double-spaced. After six pages of background material, the report contains forty-nine pages of analysis of the Bay Ridge application in terms of the interim rule. This analysis, though somewhat more detailed, largely tracks that of the 20 October report. In fact, large sections are taken verbatim from the earlier report. The 22 October report concludes with seven, double-spaced pages of recommended findings and determinations to be made, and actions to be taken. 76 Neither of these reports were published. They only came to light during the course of the litigation following MarAd's decision. Instead of publishing the reports, on 13 November MarAd took the last seven pages of the 22 October memorandum and, after changing the tense of the verbs so that recommendations became actions, sent them to the interested parties in a four-page, single-spaced letter. 77 Only three paragraphs of that letter, approximately one page, deal with the merits of the Bay Ridge application, and those paragraphs are wholly conclusory, mostly just repeating the language of the interim rule or stating, without any support, ultimate facts relevant to factors listed in the rule. 78 The remainder of the letter consists of background filler, deferment of other pending applications, details of the repayment transaction and a denial, in advance, of all requests for reconsideration. 77 MarAd's 13 November letter clearly falls far short of the required explanation for its action. It contains no constitutive facts and no analysis of the major issues so sharply contested by the interested parties to the proceeding. Yet no further explanation was proferred. MarAd could not have more flagrantly violated both judicial precedent and its own binding rule. 78 We have chided MarAd in the past for having clipped off the last five pages of (a staff) memorandum and recorded it as its own 'finding and determination' in the matter and sent it along, in haec verba, to appellants by letter .... 79 The admonition obviously did not strike home. 79 Appellees argue that the inadequacy of the 13 November letter as an explanation of MarAd's action is merely a technical failing remedied by subsequent disclosure of the 22 October memorandum, allegedly adopted in toto by MarAd at a 10 November meeting. 80 But it is, to say the least, very strange procedure for an agency to adopt a document as the foundation for its decision and then reveal only the last seven pages of it until forced to fuller disclosure by litigation. Moreover, the 22 October memorandum gives rise to problems of its own, both procedural and substantive. 80 Most of the controversy during the Bay Ridge proceeding centered on a single, general issue. It was not seriously disputed that there were no opportunities for the Bay Ridge in the foreign trade, or that both Seatrain and Richmond were in serious financial straits, or that the government stood to lose a great deal of money if the Bay Ridge was unable to generate sufficient income to pay off its guaranteed loans. The crucial issue was the effect that admission of the Bay Ridge would have on the domestic tanker market. Could the Bay Ridge be absorbed without noticeable effect, or would its entrance cause a tanker glut harmful to the stability of the trade? This question resolves into numerous, more specific issues such as anticipated Alaskan crude oil production, probable tanker supply, and demographics. The amount and type of shipping required turns on how much of the oil produced is consumed locally or on the West Coast, which is a short haul from Alaska, and how much proceeds to the East or Gulf Coasts via the Panama Canal, a long haul requiring transshipment at the west side of the Canal. Large vessels, VLCCs such as the Bay Ridge, are most efficiently employed in carriage from Alaska to the Canal. 81 Prior to its 22 October staff memorandum, MarAd had produced and made available to interested parties two studies of these issues. One, dated 26 August 1980, compared MarAd's own estimates as to production, tanker supply and demand with those submitted by the applicant. 81 The other, dated 24 September 1980, presented and compared two different scenarios, one based on U.S. Department of Energy forecasts and one based on projections of the California Energy Commission. 82 82 As noted, both these reports were made available. The parties were able to comment upon and respond to them, arguing either that the forecasts should be altered or, agreeing with the forecasts, that certain conclusions should be drawn from them. The facts and figures in the 22 October memorandum, however, were different from those in both the earlier reports. MarAd based its analysis on, and drew its conclusions from, a new set of forecasts without disclosing them to the parties for comment. 83 We have said before that even in an informal adjudication parties have a right to be informed of and comment on staff positions. 83 Our cases make clear the importance of such comment in allowing a court to review the action taken by the agency, as well as in facilitating informed agency decisionmaking itself. 84 This importance is augmented in cases such as this one, where MarAd has refused in advance to entertain any petitions for reconsideration. 84 Richmond claims that appellant was already familiar with most of the basic data in the 22 October report. Indeed, Richmond cites the affidavit of a vice-president of the economic consulting firm employed by ITOC, claiming that (t)he basic data in the October Memorandum were substantially in agreement with the economic analysis previously submitted by ITOC. 85 From this Richmond concludes that ITOC's only possible complaint is with MarAd's methodology and analysis. But an agency has no obligation to give the parties a preview of its analysis or statement of its tentative conclusion. 86 85 Richmond certainly has a point. An agency is not obliged to publish a tentative opinion for comment. Otherwise, an absurd and endless process could ensure: notice and comment procedures followed by a tentative opinion followed by comment followed by a new tentative opinion (necessary to take account of and respond to the new set of comments) and so on. But where an agency's analytic task begins rather than ends with a set of forecasts, sound practice would seem to dictate disclosure of those forecasts so that interested parties can comment upon the conclusions properly to be drawn from them. We do not wish to lay too much stress upon the particular point. But the failing is part of an overall picture of totally unacceptable agency practice: A staff report was produced. It differed in fundamental respects from prior staff reports to which interested parties directed their comments. (Misdirected their comments, we now should say.) MarAd relied on the report in making a decision with substantial economic consequences. But the decision was published without any explanation. The report remained buried in the bowels of the agency. 86 All standards of fairness and due process in administrative law preclude such behavior. And the only way to ensure that it will not continue is to refuse to accept the decision resulting from it.
87 As noted, the 22 October study upon which MarAd's decision was based differs in fundamental respects from the two earlier reports issued by MarAd. The first report, dated 26 August 1980, predicts surplus nonsubsidized tonnage in the Alaskan trade of 984,000 DWT in 1985 and 594,000 DWT in 1990. 87 In the domestic trade generally it predicts a surplus of 506,000 DWT in 1985 and 657,000 DWT in 1990. 88 The Report concludes that there will be sufficient nonsubsidized tonnage to meet not only the tonnage requirements for the Alaskan oil trade, but also the requirements for the other domestic trades, as well. 89 In other words, entry of the Bay Ridge would exacerbate the problem of anticipated overtonnage in the domestic trade generally and the Alaskan trade in particular. 88 The 24 September report departs from the 26 August report only in its discussion of West Coast consumption. The report compares consumption forecasts of the Department of Energy (DOE) with those of the California Energy Commission (CEC). It concludes that under the DOE scenario of declining West Coast consumption (and, hence, a greater need for long-haul carriage), the Bay Ridge and other CDS-built VLCCs would be necessary by 1985 to offset shortfalls in Jones Act tonnage, but the requirement would decline thereafter and by 1990 12-month/year operation by the Bay Ridge would generate surplus capacity. 90 Under the CEC scenario of modest growth in West Coast consumption (the scenario adopted in the 26 August study), VLCC requirements can be met throughout the period 1980-1990 by existing Jones Act tonnage ships augmented by existing CDS-built ships operating under six-month waivers. 91 89 The 22 October report, upon which MarAd relies, paints an even bleaker picture of the domestic tanker market. A chart contained in the report 92 predicts over-tonnage for the trade generally of 2.76 million DWT in 1985, over five times the excess tonnage predicted in the 26 August report, and 1.89 million DWT for 1990, almost three times the excess tonnage previously predicted. No specific figures are given for the Alaskan trade for which the Bay Ridge was destined. 93 But the text is unencouraging, prophesying a continuous decline in demand due to stagnant production levels and a gradual decline in Panama Canal oil transshipments. By 1986 ... (t)he demand for Alaska/West Coast/Panama tankers is expected to decline by 1.4 million DWT.... From 1986 to 1990 ... (this trade) is expected to decline by another 1.4 million DWT .... 94 90 Yet somehow, mirabile dictu, the report finds room for the Bay Ridge which was not there one month before. It does so by providing separate supply and demand figures for vessels of varying sizes. 91 In the prior two reports, tonnage was apparently viewed as interchangeable. The 22 October study takes a more sophisticated approach. Supply and demand figures are broken down by vessel size and, despite huge overtonnage generally, a deficit is predicted for vessels of over 100,000 DWT through 1985 of at least 244,000 DWT, just enough to accommodate the 225,000 DWT capacity of the Bay Ridge. The demand for such vessels will then rapidly decline so that a surplus of 81,900 DWT is predicted for 1988, increasing each year thereafter. 95 92 The text of the report explains why tankers of 100,000 DWT and above are treated as an insulated category. 93 These vessels are engaged exclusively in the Alaskan crude oil trades, primarily between Valdez and the Panama Canal.... Competition with the 40,000-99,999 DWT size vessels could occur in the Alaska/West Coast trades, but it is unlikely to occur in the Alaska/Panama Canal oil trades because of economies of scale inherent in the larger crude carriers. 96 94 Thus, an anticipated 1985 surplus of 1.841 million DWT in the 40,000-99,999 DWT category 97 is not thought to alleviate the shortage of the larger vessels. 95 Unfortunately, this conclusion and the chart generally are directly contradicted two pages earlier in the report, where it is predicted that shipments between Alaska and the Panama Canal will steadily decline. The partial equalization of domestic and world crude oil prices at the wellhead and the increased refining capacity for sour crude on the West Coast are expected to result in a decline of Panama transshipments to about 200,000 barrels per day. 98 Panama Canal transshipments should continue to decline to marginal levels by 1990. 99 96 Where, then, stems the exclusive need for tankers in excess of 100,000 DWT? Two hundred thousand barrels per day through the canal generates a need for 1 million DWT in tankers of over 100,000 DWT. 100 It follows that in 1986 there will be a surplus of 2.192 million DWT of ships in that category for the Panama trade, not a deficit of 161,000 DWT as the chart predicts. These extra ships will have to ply the Alaska-West Coast trade where, by the report's own admission, they will compete with surplus ships in the 40,000-99,999 DWT category. 97 Since the statistical chart is presented without any explanation for the derivation of its figures, the apparent contradiction between text and chart is impossible to resolve. In the face of this contradiction, we cannot allow MarAd's conclusion that there is room for the Bay Ridge in the domestic trade to stand. 98 A further problem is that, even if we were to accept MarAd's chart and ignore the dire predictions in text, entry of the Bay Ridge would begin to generate excess tonnage as early as 1986-87. It would contribute to an increasingly substantial problem during the latter half of the '80s through to 1990 when MarAd's forecast ends. Thus, it seems inevitable that the Bay Ridge will ultimately have a detrimental effect on the domestic trade. 99 MarAd countered this obvious point in its report by pointing to the unusually high breakeven level which makes it the marginal vessel in the trade. Thus, this vessel will be the first to become unemployed as the Alaskan tanker market softens. 101 100 The problem with this argument is that it is belied by the discussion, just six pages earlier, of the financial viability of the Bay Ridge in the Alaskan trade. The Bay Ridge already had contracts for one year and, once the repayment application was granted, they were expected to be renewed for five years. (I)t is considered highly probable that the contracts will be renewed at least until approximately 1986 when the ALPETCO refinery in Alaska is due to go on line. 102 The ALPETCO refinery was then expected to provide employment for the Bay Ridge for the remainder of its economic life pursuant to an exclusive shipping rights agreement with an operating partner of Seatrain. 103 As Richmond's repayment application notes (t)he combination of the above cargo requirements will lead to the employment of the Bay Ridge for the full 20-year period anticipated in this application for subsidy repayment. 104 Again, it seems inevitable that the Bay Ridge will ultimately have a detrimental effect on the domestic trade. 101 In its brief, Richmond has suggested that MarAd thought the advantage of redressing an existing deficit may well outweigh the disadvantages of contributing to a potential future surplus. 105 But no such statement by MarAd is to be found anywhere in the record, and we cannot uphold an agency's decision based on speculation as to what the agency would have thought if it had addressed a problem it chose, rather, to ignore. 102 MarAd's letter announcing the Bay Ridge decision expressly incorporated a finding that (t)he grant of Richmond's application will have no or, at the most, minimal adverse economic impact on the U.S.-flag ... domestic tanker fleet ( ) .... 106 We have pointed to two ways in which inconsistencies in the staff study allegedly adopted by MarAd as part of its decision undermine this finding. As a consequence, we can accept neither the finding nor the decision that stems from it. 103 The inconsistencies in the 22 October report confirm an initial suspicion, raised by MarAd's attempts to keep the report confidential and its refusal to allow any petitions for reconsideration of its decision, that more was involved here than a neutral assessment of how best to serve U.S. interests in a sound merchant marine. MarAd was obviously concerned with its own precarious financial position and the inevitable embarrassment consequent upon a public disclosure of that position. 104 Total government exposure on the Bay Ridge alone, over three-fourths of which is attributable to MarAd, was $87 million. 107 That sum marks only the beginning, however, of MarAd's interest, at the time, in keeping Seatrain solvent. 108 As noted in the 20 October report, 105 Seatrain, the parent of Richmond Tankers, Inc. (the owner of the BAY RIDGE), has guarantees covering another $273,776,000 in outstanding loans, all of which are further guaranteed by the U.S. government. Foreclosure on the BAY RIDGE, if it is unable to operate profitably and service its debt, could force Seatrain in default on obligations to its other subsidiaries. The overall effect could be to call all of the U.S. guarantees which, including the BAY RIDGE, total $354,963,000. This domino or cascading effect would be softened only by the resale of all repossessed vessels, which would probably result in only recovering a small fraction of the guaranteed amounts. Thus, the failure of the BAY RIDGE to operate and repay debt has a much higher potential loss to the Government attached to it than just the vessel's own outstanding debt. 109 106 Thus, MarAd was placed in an extremely embarrassing position. Having continuously financed unnecessary ships for an insolvent company, it was faced by losses that could not but outrage Congress and the public at large. The problem was exacerbated by the leveraged lease transactions allowed by MarAd that enabled financially sound companies like Security Equipment Leasing, Inc. and American Road Equity Corp. to dip their fingers in the subsidized pie without bearing any of the ultimate financial risk and responsibility. 110 107 We do not say that MarAd cannot take account of potential government losses in passing upon a repayment application. The Supreme Court has already said that this is a relevant consideration. 111 But MarAd must be above board in its deliberations. If MarAd decides that its budgetary concerns outweigh any harm the Bay Ridge might cause the domestic trade, it must forthrightly acknowledge that decision instead of offering specious explanations for how the Bay Ridge will be readily absorbed. Moreover, MarAd cannot gloss over its financial predicament in its published decision with a single sentence, noting that (t) he financial interest of the Government ... is substantial, and warrants approval of Richmond's application. 112 Agency candor is crucial to the accountability that the APA is designed to ensure. Only thus can the court pursue its function of ensuring MarAd stays within its statutory mandate. Only thus can Congress and voters generally decide whether MarAd serves, on the whole, a useful or an inimical function.
108 The procedural and substantive failings discussed above are such that we must ask MarAd to reconsider its decision that repayment of the CDS on the Bay Ridge should be permitted with consequent lifting of the domestic trading restriction. MarAd should permit a new round of comments upon the application and publish a thorough and reasoned explanation for whatever decision is reached. 109 We wish to stress that nothing in our opinion should be read to dictate the outcome of this new proceeding. Our holding that there were substantive flaws in MarAd's decision to grant Richmond's application is not a judgment as to the merits of that application. We have merely found that an adequate explanation for granting the application was not provided. We have not found that an adequate explanation could not be provided. In particular, we have not found that inclusion of the Bay Ridge would have an adverse impact on the domestic trade. We have merely found that MarAd's discussion of the issue in its 22 October report was marred by inconsistencies. 110 The point is worth stressing. There is always the danger that a court, seriously pursuing its responsibility for review but ignorant of the technical side of a regulated trade, will be convinced by zealous litigants that there are substantive flaws in an agency's decision when, in reality, there is merely an unfortunate lack of clarity. Under such circumstances, the agency should stick to its guns, make the same decision again, observing all procedural requirements, and endeavor to substantiate it in the clearest, most coherent manner possible. 111 Three further points must be made. First, in fairness to Richmond, MarAd must take into account factors prevailing in the industry at the time of the previous decision, that is, as of 13 November 1980. At that time, everyone acknowledges, there was a severe shortage of large tankers in the domestic trade that has apparently persisted to the present day. 113 Given that the Bay Ridge could remain operational into the next century, a tanker deficit from 1980 to 1982 is not a conclusive factor, but it is certainly a factor to be considered. 112 Second, it remains within MarAd's discretion whether or not the new Bay Ridge decision should await publication of a permanent rule governing repayment applications. 113 Finally, we think that the status quo should be maintained during the pendency of these proceedings. The Bay Ridge need not cease operations in the domestic trade. Richmond need not breach its shipping contracts made in reliance upon MarAd's decision. The complicated Title XI financing that enabled repayment of the CDS need not be undone. Given a persistent shortage of large tankers in the domestic trade, the Bay Ridge will do no harm during the brief period necessary for MarAd to make its decision. 114 We thus remand the case to the district court with instructions to enter an order in accordance with this opinion. 115 So Ordered.