Opinion ID: 2543798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retained Jurisdiction and Water Quality

Text: Denver seeks to distinguish Clear Creek Water Users Alliance from the present case on the basis that Clear Creek Water Users Alliance concerned the use of retained jurisdiction in relation to water quantity issues, which unquestionably lie within the water court's jurisdiction, and not water quality issues. Denver rests its distinction with the fact that the WQCA grants the Department of Health and the nine-member Water Quality Control Commission (WQCC) authority over state water quality and the prevention of water pollution. See §§ 25-8-103, -201, - 202, 8 C.R.S. (2001). In order to assess the merits of Denver's distinction between water quantity and water quality with respect to retained jurisdiction, it is necessary to understand the relationship between Colorado caselaw regarding water quality, the WQCA, the Colorado Constitution, and the WRDAA.
It is true, as Denver argues, that Colorado water law has historically focused on water quantity issues so that the law regarding water quality is not well developed. See Vranesh's, supra at 471. Notwithstanding the lack of focus on water quality issues, we have protected water quality to the extent necessary to preserve the water's suitability for the uses of appropriators. See Slide Mines, Inc. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 102 Colo. 69, 73, 77 P.2d 125, 127 (1938) (finding that extraneous matter introduced into a stream by farmers that did not unfavorably affect the use of the water they were entitled to make but was beneficial to it did not constitute pollution in a legal sense). Upon rehearing its original decision in Wilmore v. Chain O'Mines, Inc., 96 Colo. 319, 44 P.2d 1024 (1934), this court defined pollution as an impairment, with attendant injury, to the use of water that [downstream appropriators] are entitled to make. Unless the introduction of extraneous matter so unfavorably affects such use, the condition created is short of pollution. In reality, the thing forbidden is injury. Thus, Chain O'Mines established a common law theory based on the prior appropriation doctrine that prohibits the discharge of contaminates into streams where doing so makes the water unsuitable for an appropriator's normal use of the water. In addition, we concluded that injury occurred where the Game and Fish Commission's diversion of water through a fish hatchery rendered the water unfit for Farmers Irrigation Company's normal irrigation and domestic use. See Game & Fish Comm'n v. Farmers Irr. Co., 162 Colo. 301, 426 P.2d 562 (1967); Farmers Irr. Co. v. Game & Fish Comm'n, 149 Colo. 318, 369 P.2d 557 (1962).
Current statutory law delegates most authority over water quality issues to the WQCC. The general assembly enacted the WQCA, §§ 25-8-101 to -703, 8 C.R.S. (2001), in response to the federal Clean Water Act. The purpose of the WQCA is to prevent injury to beneficial uses made of state waters, to maximize the beneficial uses of water, and to develop water to which Colorado and its citizens are entitled, and, within this context, to achieve the maximum practical degree of water quality in the waters of the state consistent with the welfare of the state. § 25-8-103, 8 C.R.S. (2001). Thus, the Act sought to provide the maximum protection for water quality possible without threatening the prior appropriation system and the state's policy of maximum beneficial use of the water. The general assembly also sought to conserve state waters and to protect, maintain, and improve, where necessary and reasonable, the quality [of state waters] for public water supplies, for protection and propagation of wildlife and aquatic life, for domestic, agricultural, industrial, and recreational uses, and for other beneficial uses, taking into consideration the requirements of such uses; to provide that no pollutant be released into any state waters without first receiving the treatment or other corrective action necessary to reasonably protect the legitimate and beneficial uses of such waters; [and] to provide for the prevention, abatement, and control of new or existing water pollution. Id. Thus, the WQCA expresses an intent to prevent water pollution and specifically refers to the need to protect the beneficial use of water in a variety of different contexts. The state's purpose of protecting water quality is served by a nine-member WQCC authorized by the WQCA to develop and maintain a comprehensive program for the prevention, control, and abatement of water pollution, and water quality protection. §§ 25-8-201-, -202; Vranesh's, supra at 476. Although the WQCA gives the WQCC general authority over water quality issues, the WQCA is not intended to interfere with the water court's role in adjudicating water rights administered by the State Engineer. Section 25-8-104(1) of the WQCA explicitly provides that: No provision of this article shall be interpreted so as to supercede, abrogate, or impair rights to divert water and to apply water to beneficial uses in accordance with sections 5 and 6 of article XVI of the constitution of the state of Colorado, compacts entered into by the state of Colorado, or the provisions of articles 80 to 93 of title 37, C.R.S., or Colorado court determinations with respect to the determination and administration of water rights. § 25-8-104(1) (emphasis added). [5] We read these provisions of the WCQA to allow the WCQA to work within the context of the prior appropriation system. See City of Thornton v. Bijou Irr. Co., 926 P.2d 1, 66 (Colo.1996) (holding that the legislature clearly intended that authority over water quality not be exercised in a manner that significantly compromises the appropriative rights of present or future water users). Because the WQCA explicitly provides that it is not to interfere with the water court's role in adjudicating water rights, we conclude that the general assembly did not intend the WQCA to interfere with the water court's ability to protect senior water appropriators as set forth in sections 37-92-304(6) and 37-92-305(5). The WQCA explicitly preserves the water court's authority over the question of injury to senior appropriators and the appropriate remedies for such injuries. Section 25-8-104 also provides: Nothing in this article shall be construed, enforced, or applied so as to cause or result in material injury to water rights. The general assembly recognizes that this article may lead to dischargers choosing consumptive types of treatment techniques in order to meet water quality control requirements. Under such circumstances, the discharger must comply with all of the applicable provisions of articles 80 to 93 of title 37, C.R.S., and shall be obligated to remedy any material injury to water rights to the extent required under the provisions of articles 80 to 93 of title 37, C.R.S. The question of whether such material injury to water rights exists and the remedy therefor shall be determined by the water court. § 25-8-104(1) (emphasis added). We conclude from this provision that the water court's role in assessing injury and preserving appropriators' water rights in augmentation plan proceedings remains intact despite the WQCC's role in protecting the quality of the state's waters.
The WRDAA explicitly requires the water court to consider water quality issues in the case of an augmentation plan in which water is being actively substituted into a stream for the use of other appropriators. See § 37-92-305(5); Bijou Irr. Co., 926 P.2d at 66. The substituted water must be of a quality and continuity to meet the requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator has normally been used. § 37-92-305(5). The WRDAA provides that the water court must approve an augmentation plan if it will not injuriously affect the owner of or persons entitled to use water under a vested water right or a decreed conditional water right. § 37-92-305(3). Despite the general assembly's assignment of water quality issues to the WQCC, the language of the WQCA clearly expresses a legislative intent for water quality issues to remain within the purview of the water court as set forth in the WRDAA. See § 25-8-104(1). Section 25-8-104(1) explicitly states that the water court retains authority over the question of whether material injury to water rights exists and the remedy for such injury. Id. Injury occurs under the WRDAA where the water provided by an augmentation plan is not of a quality and quanity so as to meet the requirements for which the water of the senior appropriator has normally been used. See § 37-92-305(3), (5). The WRDAA and the WQCA therefore preserve the common law standard that the introduction of pollutants into a water supply constitutes injury to senior appropriators if the water is no longer suitable for the senior appropriator's normal use because of the substitute supply. See § 25-8-104(1). This court has recognized that Colorado's division of responsibility over water matters between the water courts and the WQCA limits the ability of both the water court and water quality control agencies to address certain water quality control issues. Bijou Irr. Co., 926 P.2d at 66. Nevertheless, the WQCA and the WRDAA guarantee the right of senior appropriators to a substitute water supply suitable for their normal use of the water prior to the implementation of the augmentation plan, despite the role of the WQCC over general water quality issues. § 25-8-104(1); XX-XX-XXX(5).