Opinion ID: 781722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Bully Charge on Circumstantial Evidence of Intent

Text: 270 Yousef complains that the District Court erred when it gave the jury charge on inferring intent based on circumstantial evidence. Specifically, he alleges that the District Court's illustration of the concept of intent, by using an example involving a bully, was improper because it assumed the guilt of the bully and implied that Yousef was the bully. 271 In charging the jury, the Court told the jury that it should take circumstantial evidence into account to determine intent. To illustrate how the jury could discern intent, the Court used the following example: 272 You remember when you were in school, there was one kid who was a bully. Every school had a bully. He'd step on some other kid's foot, and then he'd laugh, and if he was caught he'd say: Oh, that's an accident. Well, the direct evidence was that he claimed his intent was an accident, and yet everybody knew from the circumstantial evidence what he really intended. Well, ladies and gentlemen, grown-up life is much the same. 273 Thus, it should be clear that direct evidence is never required to prove intent or knowledge. Direct evidence, in fact, on that particular score is often misleading. Here circumstantial evidence is quite sufficient, but it's one of those things, ladies and gentlemen, that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 274 ATr. 5611-12. As Yousef concedes, neither he nor his attorney-advisor objected to this charge. See Yousef Br. at 267 n. 231. 275 Where a defendant has not objected to a jury charge at trial, we may reverse only if there has been plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Ciak, 102 F.3d 38, 45 (2d Cir.1996); Fed. R. Crim P. 52(b). Despite this rule, Yousef argues that we nevertheless should review the instruction de novo because he was a pro se defendant. Although some appellate courts grant special consideration to pro se defendants, such deference is inappropriate in this case because, despite his pro se status, Yousef was assisted by an attorney-advisor who proved capable of objecting to other portions of the jury charge. 61 Cf. Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 82 n. 4 (2d Cir.2001) (holding that pro se attorneys cannot claim the special consideration which the Courts customarily grant to pro se parties); Harbulak v. County of Suffolk, 654 F.2d 194, 198 (2d Cir.1981) (same). 276 Even if we were to review the jury charge de novo, as Yousef urges us to do, we would still conclude that the bully charge does not merit reversal. First, although we stated in Salameh I that a district court would be[] better advised to use a neutral example in describing the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence to prove culpable knowledge, 152 F.3d at 142, we concluded that the use of this very same hypothetical example was not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. 62 Id. Nonetheless, Yousef argues that the instruction was more damaging in the instant case than in Salameh for two reasons. First, he claims that the charge in the case at hand was not mitigated — as it was in Salameh — by a more neutral description of the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence illustrated with an example from Robinson Crusoe. Second, Yousef argues that the bully example is more harmful to him than it was to the defendants in Salameh because, throughout the trial, the Government tried to portray Yousef as the mastermind of the operation or, by implication, the bully. 277 Yousef's first argument is plainly wrong. The very same Robinson Crusoe example given in Salameh was also given by the District Court in the case at hand. 63 In addition, any potential for misimpression by the jury based on the bully charge was likely mitigated because the District Court made a point to clarify in its charge that the jury was free to draw whatever inferences it thought appropriate based on the evidence in this case. 64 Furthermore, the District Court properly instructed the jury about circumstantial evidence generally: 278 Let me start off by explaining the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is something that a witness sees, hears, tastes, touches, something that comes directly to his knowledge through his senses. Circumstantial evidence is evidence of facts and circumstances from which one may infer connected facts which reasonably follow in the common experience of mankind. Circumstantial evidence is evidence which tends to prove a disputed fact by proof of another fact or other facts which have a logical tendency to lead the mind to the conclusion that the disputed fact has been established. 279 ATr. 5578. Moreover, as in Salameh, the Government in the present case adduced overwhelming evidence of the defendants' guilt, so any possible error arising from the bully charge was harmless. See Salameh I, 152 F.3d at 143. 280 For all of the reasons stated above, we conclude that the use of the bully charge in the instant case does not require reversal. 281