Opinion ID: 2322058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Memorandum of Decision

Text: On April 22, 2008, a Memorandum of Decision was issued. In that document, the trial justice summarized the travel of the case, as well as the testimony and evidence presented at trial. The trial justice also made certain credibility determinations with respect to each witness. He determined that Ms. Trager was completely candid and credible and that Elisa was credible with regard to her account of the relevant facts of this case. The trial justice then proceeded to make certain additional factual findings, which he indicated had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Among those findings were the following: (1) that defendant administered corporal punishment to the victim by spanking or otherwise striking the victim on his buttocks; [9] (2) that [i]n administering corporal punishment upon the victim   , the [d]efendant inflicted injuries to the buttocks of the victim; (3) that [t]he corporal punishment administered by [d]efendant to the victim caused bruising to victim's buttocks; and (4) that [d]efendant acted intentionally, purpose[fully], and knowingly each time he administered corporal punishment to the victim. The trial justice proceeded to indicate that [t]he sole remaining issue to be resolved involve[d] a determination of whether [d]efendant's administering of corporal punishment to the victim was excessive within the meaning of the law (emphasis added) and that [r]esolution of that issue would begin with an analysis of the relevant portions of Brendan's Law. [10] In so doing, the trial justice observed that, in a 1995 version of the statute, the term serious physical injury was defined as any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment. He then stated that [t]he definition has remained constant through the years up to and including the present time. (Emphasis in original.) The trial justice noted that legislation which was enacted in 2001 shows a strikethrough of the word `serious' in the definition section dealing with the term `serious other physical injury.' He concluded his analysis of the statutory provisions as follows: The Public Laws of 2001, Chapter 109 depicts that the definition remains exactly the same. An examination of the underlying legislation, including the original draft as well as the final amended form of the bill again reveals no change to the definition that has been in existence since the very beginning. To construe any change to the definition based upon what is depicted in the Public Laws of 2001 would amount to a repeal of the crime of second degree child abuse. This is clearly not the Legislature's intent and would amount to an absurd result. (First emphasis in original; second emphasis added.) Accordingly, the trial justice's ruling of law with respect to the statute was that the definition of the term other serious physical injury in (b)(2) of § 11-9-5.3 (the section pertaining to second degree child abuse) was the same as the definition for other physical injury which was provided in (d), despite the fact that the term in (b)(2) contained the word serious. Having so ruled, the trial justice proceeded to determine whether or not the bruising on Jacob's buttocks constituted any injury, other than a serious bodily injury, which arises other than from the imposition of nonexcessive corporal punishment. He first determined that the bruising clearly qualifie[d] as `any injury.' He next determined that, as set forth in the testimony of the witnesses, the bruising on the victim's buttocks [did] not rise to the level of a `serious bodily injury.' (A serious bodily injury is what would be required for a charge of first degree child abuse.) The trial justice then proceeded to engage in an analysis of whether or not Jacob's injury arose from excessive corporal punishment. The trial justice relied primarily on this Court's decision in State v. Thorpe, 429 A.2d 785 (R.I.1981), for guidance with respect to what constitutes excessive corporal punishment. The trial justice's Memorandum of Decision reads in pertinent part as follows: There is no inflexible rule that defines what, under all circumstances, is unreasonable or excessive force. The accepted degree of corporal punishment must vary in relation to the sensitivity and character of the child, the child's age, sex, physical condition, as well as in relation to the particular offense for which punishment is to be meted out. The word `excessive' is sufficient to convey the meaning that a parent may inflict corporal punishment to discipline and correct the child, but may not do so to vent his/her anger or frustration on the child. The test of unreasonableness is met at the point at which a parent ceases to act in good faith and with parental affection and acts immoderately, cruelly, or mercilessly with a desire to inflict pain, rather than make a genuine effort to correct the child by proper means. (Internal citation omitted.) Having set forth the general parameters of the definition of excessive in the context of corporal punishment, the trial justice made a determination with respect to the evidence and testimony presented at Mr. Sampson's trial. His ruling provided in pertinent part as follows: [T]he [c]ourt finds beyond a reasonable doubt that [d]efendant's actions were excessive. The corporal punishment that left the bruises    is excessive. The punishment, in leaving such bruises, goes beyond usual, necessary, right, proper, or just considering the situation in its complete context. The extent of the punishment, as evidenced by the bruises, is out of proportion to the offenses for which the punishment was meted out.    [T]he [c]ourt finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the [d]efendant was motivated by anger and frustration in administering the particular corporal punishment to the extent he did. The trial justice's Memorandum of Decision concluded with the following adjudication of guilt:  GENERAL FINDING Because the [c]ourt has found the corporal punishment administered by the [d]efendant to be excessive beyond a reasonable doubt[,] the [c]ourt finds that the [d]efendant is guilty as charged. (Emphasis added.) On May 2, 2008, defendant filed a motion for new trial. On June 17, 2008, defendant's motion was heard and denied; and defendant was sentenced to five years, with fifteen months to serve and the remainder suspended with probation. A judgment of conviction entered on June 27, 2008. The defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.