Opinion ID: 1355314
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hearsay Evidence and Instruction.

Text: The main contention made in this case is that five witnesses for the state were permitted to testify to statements made by deceased the evening previous to and on the morning of the day of the homicide; that these statements were all hearsay testimony and should not have been admitted. These witnesses are Bennett, Slagle, Parks, Winninger and Moran. We have heretofore set out the testimony of the witness Bennett. The objection made to his testimony is that he stated to the deceased not to argue with the defendant when he would get up. We can see no objection to this testimony. The defendant was drunk and the statement by Bennett was a natural statement made by anyone under these circumstances. Nor can we find any harm in the statement. It is objected also that the testimony of Slagle, the deputy sheriff, should not have been admitted. That testimony relates to a conversation and request of the deceased that he accompany her to her home at the ranch; that she did not want to go alone, and that she wanted him to accompany her. We see no objection to testimony of that sort. It was admissible if for no other reason than to show that she had no intention of committing suicide. The testimony of the other witnesses is of a different nature. Mrs. Parks testified that Mrs. Kump had told her that defendant had come home on the evening of February 19 with a bottle of wine, had drunk part of it and then stated, I am going to get rid of you, if you don't leave, I'll kill you. I'll choke you to death. I'll give you $3000. I will give you time to pack up your clothes and leave, that he had thrown a platter of eggs at her which hit the wall; that the deceased had also stated, Frank, I am not leaving you. You are forcing me to go. The witness Mrs. Winninger was permitted to testify that the deceased stated to her that defendant had run her out and that defendant had thrown eggs at her. The witness Moran was permitted to testify that Mrs. Kump told him during the morning of February 20 that the defendant had threatened to kill her; that he was going to kill her by choking her, and that he had forced her to leave the place the preceding night, and that it was impossible to continue the marriage relationship. In other words, the nature of the testimony objected to is the testimony that the deceased was permitted to relate the hostile attitude of the defendant toward the deceased, including threats which the defendant had made against the deceased. At various times objection to this hearsay testimony was made by counsel for defendant. The attitude of the court in this connection is shown by the statement made by the trial court during the trial of this case as follows: I am going to sustain the objection as to statements made by the deceased at any time prior to within 24 hours of the time of the killing. Any statements, I believe, made by the deceased bearing upon the relationship between the parties to show their relationship and leading up to the events of the killing, I think, might be competent. I am going to let them in. Again the court stated to one of the witnesses: You will testify only to what the deceased told you on the night before the day of her death. You may state what she told you. In instruction 16 the court instructed the jury as to such testimony as follows: Certain witnesses have been permitted to testify during the trial of this case as to statements made to such witnesses by the deceased within the twenty-four hour period preceding her death. The jury is reminded that the evidence shows these statements were not made in the presence of the defendant and were not made under oath and therefore such statements are not acceptable as evidence in a Court of Law for the purpose of establishing as true the facts related to such witnesses by the deceased, and such statements will be so regarded by the jury. The statements were admitted in evidence by the Court for the sole and only purpose of showing or tending to show the attitude of mind of the deceased towards the defendant at the time of her death and the jury will limit their consideration of these statements to this purpose. (Italics supplied.) It may be noted the court shifted its position in this instruction from the thought expressed during the trial. In other words during the trial the testimony was admitted to show the relationship of the parties, but in the instruction it was limited to show the attitude of the mind of deceased toward defendant at the time of her death. We know of no rule of law that statements of the deceased, of the nature above mentioned, made within twenty-four hours previous to the homicide are admissible in a case such as this. The attitude of the mind of deceased toward the defendant as evidenced by outward manifestations, such as declarations, is at times relevant when the defendant pleads self-defense. I Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., § 286. Knight v. State, 215 Miss. 251, 60 So.2d 638; Miller v. State, 9 Ga. App. 599, 71 S.E. 1021. In such case the attitude of mind is to show the hostile attitude of the deceased which would justify self-defense or perhaps reduce the degree of the crime, or the severity of the sentence. That is not the situation in the case at bar. The important fact here is the attitude of mind of the defendant, not that of deceased. The attitude of mind of the deceased toward the defendant was immaterial. The instruction states an incorrect rule of law, although, it must be admitted it took some of the sting out of the admitted testimony. The state has not attempted to defend the instruction, nor have we found any cases to sustain it. The state claims the statements of the deceased, showing a hostile attitude of the defendant, including threats, were admissible as part of the res gestae. So we shall turn to consider that matter, and we should do so in view of what has been said even if for no other purpose than that the Bench and Bar of this state may have a more correct view of the matter, although the limited time at our disposal does not enable us to go into the subject fully, and we must confine our discussion to the rule as applicable under the facts in this case. 6 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 1767, p. 182, states: The phrase `res gestae' has long been not only entirely useless, but even positively harmful. It is useless, because every rule of Evidence to which it has ever been applied exists as a part of some other well established principle and can be explained in the terms of that principle. It is harmful, because by its ambiguity it invites the confusion of one rule with another and thus creates uncertainty as to the limitations of both. It ought therefore wholly to be repudiated, as a vicious element in our legal phraseology. No rule of Evidence can be created or applied by the mere muttering of a shibboleth. Notwithstanding this statement, text books, encyclopedias, including Corpus Juris Secundum and American Jurisprudence, and cases continue to discuss what evidence is admissible under the theory of res gestae. 31 Yale Law Journal, p. 229, states that the term is used as a substitute for reasoning. In Carnes v. State, 14 Okl.Cr. 585, 179 P. 475, 478, citing Price v. State, 1 Okl.Cr. 364, 98 P. 450, it is stated that as to what constitutes res gestae is possibly the most complex and difficult question in criminal law. See full discussion in 31 Yale L.J. 229; 12 Washington L.R. 91; 1 University of Chicago L.R. 394; 42 Illinois L.R. 88; 2 Kansas Law Review 41, 121, 246. In 40 C.J.S. § 243, p. 1180, it is stated: As a general rule, statements and declarations by deceased are not evidence either for or against accused, unless they come within some of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Declarations of the victim before the homicidal act are admissible where they were so connected therewith as to form a part of the same transaction and illustrate and explain the killing. See also 22 C.J.S. § 672, p. 1063. See the definition of res gestae in 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., § 279. In Montag v. People, 141 Ill. 75, 30 N.E. 337, 339, it is held that a statement made by the deceased fifteen minutes before the homicide and in the absence of the defendant, as to threats made by defendant, is not admissible as part of the res gestae. The court in discussing the subject before us stated as follows: The witness Ida Hoerneffer was allowed to give a conversation she had with the deceased which occurred 10 minutes after defendant had left the store, and 15 minutes before he returned: `Mr. Neely: What did deceased say to you after he had been out ten minutes? Answer. She told me that he warned her, if he couldn't come and see her that night, he would kill her. I ask her if she wasn't afraid, and she said, No.' Any declarations or threats that the defendant may have made were competent evidence against him; and, if the witness had heard the defendant make the statement which the deceased narrated to the witness, she might have given that statement to the jury. But the declaration was not that of defendant, but of the deceased, and we are aware of no principle upon which it was admissible, unless it was part of the res gestae. Anything said or done by the deceased or the defendant at the time of the homicide was competent as part of the act itself. 1 Greenl. Ev. § 108, says: `The principal points of attention are where the circumstances and declarations offered in proof were contemporaneous with the main fact under consideration, and whether they were so connected as to illustrate its character.' And in the note to the text it is said: `Declarations to become a part of the res gestae, must have been made at the time of the act done which they are supposed to characterize, and have been well calculated to unfold the nature and quality of the facts they were intended to explain, and to so harmonize with them as obviously to constitute one transaction.' See also, Weyrich v. People, 89 Ill. 96; People v. Clarkhuff, 24 Cal. 640; Cheek v. State, 35 Ind. 492; Montgomery v. State, 80 Ind. 388; State v. Pomeory, 25 Kan 349. Here the declarations of the deceased were made in the absence of the defendant. It is true he appeared 15 minutes after the declaration of the deceased, and committed the homicide, but if what the deceased said 15 minutes before is admissible as part of the act, upon the same principle what she may have said 6 hours or 24 hours before was also admissible. In Montgomery v. State, supra, in speaking in regard to the admission of dying declarations, the question under consideration is also discussed. It is there said: `Matters which do not form part of the res gestae are not provable by dying declarations. The rule is confined to a statement of the circumstances connected with the fatal act, and forming a part of the same transaction, it is quite well settled that what occurs before or after the act has been done does not constitute a part of the res gestae, although the interval of separation may be very brief.' The same doctrine is announced in State v. Pomeroy, supra.    The testimony admitted was of the most damaging character. Here was a deliberate threat, made a short time before the shooting, to take the life of the deceased, and when this evidence was admitted for consideration of the jury, with the sanction and approval of the court, it doubtless had an important bearing on the minds of the jury in determining the punishment that should be inflicted upon the defendant for the crime he had committed. Indeed, the evidence could not do otherwise than have a controlling influence with the jury. In Holland v. State, 162 Ala. 5, 50 So. 215, 217, 218, it was held that testimony by the deceased of threats made by the defendant five minutes before the homicide was not admissible and was reversible error. The court in that case said: The conversation between the deceased and Annie Liggan before the killing, and while the defendant was absent from the house, was not admissible. Neither should the trial court have permitted Mrs. Taylor to testify that deceased told her, about five minutes before the difficulty, and before the defendant had returned to the house, that `Holland told him he was going after a gun and was coming back to kill him, and that he could not defend himself.' This was all hearsay evidence and was not a part of the res gestae. State v. Stallings, 142 Ala. 115, 38 South, 261; Fonville v. State, 91 Ala. 39, 8 South. 688. In the case of Fitch v. Commonwealth, 267 Ky. 646, 103 S.W.2d 98, a statement by the deceased tending to show the hostile relationship with defendant made a short while before the homicide was held to be error and the court should have promptly sustained the objection thereto. In Adams v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 714, 120 S.W.2d 237, 240, the wife was charged with the killing of her husband. A witness was permitted to testify that the deceased, the husband, had stated, `John, I am willing to support her, but I cannot live with her. She is dangerous, goes to sleep with a hammer under her pillow. I have never had any home life.' The testimony was held to be incompetent. In the case of Shoemaker v. Commonwealth, 218 Ky. 721, 292 S.W. 307, syllabus 1 of the case is as follows: In prosecution of three defendants for murder, admitting testimony of widow of deceased that deceased came into house and said defendants were after him to kill him, made in absence of defendants and 4 or 5 minutes before any shooting was done, held prejudicial error; testimony being incompetent. See similar in effect State v. Beeson, 155 Iowa 355, 136 N.W. 317, Ann.Cas. 1914D, p. 1275; State v. Goodwin, 127 S.C. 107, 120 S.E. 496; People v. Creasy, 236 N.Y. 205, 140 N.E. 563; State v. Ridgely, 2 Har. & McHen., 1 Am.Dec. 372; Wooten v. State, 220 Ark. 750, 249 S.W.2d 968, 970; State v. Bigham, 133 S.C. 491, 131 S.E. 603. The cases, on the subject are collected under the heading of Homicide in Century Digest § 349 and Decennial Digest §§ 169 (8). It is said the approach of death produces a state of mind at which the utterances of the dying persons are to be taken as free from all ordinary motives to misstate facts. 5 Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Ed., § 1438. Yet it seems to be a universal rule that dying declarations tending to show the state of feeling that existed between the accused and the deceased prior to the homicidal act are not admissible. 40 C.J.S. § 300, p. 1279. That rule was approved by this court in the case of Foley v. State, 11 Wyo. 464, 72 P. 627, 629, 630. The court stated: In Hackett v. People, (54 Barb. 374), one of the declarations was that the defendant had often threatened to kill the deceased. It was held to have been erroneously admitted, and the judgment was reversed upon that ground. In this case the dying declarations of deceased that he and defendant had had frequent quarrels, and that defendant had, in effect, challenged him to fight with pistols some days before the transaction which resulted in the killing, were clearly inadmissible; and, as they strongly tended to show malice and a motive for the killing, we cannot very well see how the error could fail to prejudice the defendant's case. If threats and hostile demonstrations, as related by dying declarations, are not admissible, as mentioned above, it would seem clear that they are not admissible where related by deceased prior to the homicide as in the case at bar. The inhibitions against stating falsehoods existing in the case of dying declarations would be much stronger than they would be in other cases. Relationship of the parties may often be shown. 26 Am.Jur. § 321, p. 371. But whether that relationship may be shown by hearsay testimony is a different question. So the question of remoteness of testimony often arises in a criminal case, 22 C.J.S. § 639, p. 977, but that must not be confused with the question as to whether or not hearsay testimony is part of the res gestae. Declarations to be part of the res gestae must be substantially contemporaneous with the main fact  the homicide in this case  and must be so closely connected with it as to illustrate its character. State v. Stallings, 142 Ala. 112, 115, 38 So. 261; 6 Wigmore on Evidence § 1776; 1 Greenleaf on Evidence § 108. In Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Uhter, 212 Ill, 174, 72 N.E. 195, 199, citing Pennsylvania Co. v. McCaffrey, 173 Ill. 169, 50 N.E. 713, we find the succinct statement of res gestae to be: `That which occurs before or after the act is done is not a part of the res gestae, although the interval of separation is very brief.' In the case at bar the threats and hostile attitude of defendant mentioned in the statements of the deceased the previous evening and the morning of the day of the homicide were not contemporaneous with the act of the homicide. They did not illustrate that act of homicide. The transactions, or acts, were entirely separate and distinct and were erroneously admitted in evidence.