Opinion ID: 2359155
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Are There Grounds For Overruling Hartwell

Text: The State urges us to overrule our decision in Hartwell. Stare decisis compels us to approach overruling one of our prior decisions carefully. [S]tare decisis is a practical, flexible command that balances our community's competing interests in the stability of legal norms and the need to adapt those norms to society's changing demands. [27] We will overrule a decision only when convinced: (1) that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changed conditions, and (2) that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent. [28] We conclude that both criteria are met here.
The State argues that changes in the past 40 years since Hartwell was decided render it no longer sound. These changes include the constitutional recognition of victims' rights as part of the criminal justice process and the growing number of states that have rejected abatement. To support a departure from precedent on the grounds of changed conditions, a party must show that related principles of law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine, [or] facts have so changed or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application. [29]
Both the State, and the National Crime Victim Law Institute and Alaska Office of Victims' Rights in their amicus briefs, note the dramatic shift in the 40 years since Hartwell was decided to provide substantial constitutional and statutory rights to crime victims during all phases of the criminal justice process. This shift has taken place throughout the country. [30] The State and amici argue that the constitutional and statutory rights of crime victims, increasingly recognized since Hartwell, constitute a changed condition that supports reconsideration of Hartwell and abandonment of the doctrine of abatement ab initio. In Alaska, the rights of crime victims were first given legal recognition in 1984, when the Alaska legislature added a statutory provision enumerating those rights. [31] In the same act, the legislature directed judges and parole boards to consider the interests of crime victims when imposing felony sentences or considering the release of prisoners. [32] Five years later, the legislature passed a comprehensive Alaska Crime Victims' Rights Act. [33] The Act codified the rights of crime victims not only to be informed of criminal proceedings but to participate in sentencing and parole decisions. [34] The legislature has continued to promulgate and refine statutes concerning the rights of crime victims, for example defining a restitution order as a civil judgment, thus allowing a victim to use civil collection procedures to enforce a restitution order. [35] In 1994 Alaska's voters overwhelmingly approved the Rights of Victims of Crime Amendment to the Alaska Constitution. [36] The amendment added article I, section 24, providing that victims of crimes have the right to be treated with dignity, respect, and fairness during all phases of the criminal and juvenile justice process and the right to restitution from the accused, among other rights. [37] The amendment also revised article I, section 12, which enumerates the goals of the criminal justice system. Prior to the amendment, this section provided that [p]enal administration shall be based on the principle of reformation and upon the need for protecting the public, [38] a statement on which we relied in Hartwell. [39] The 1994 amendment expanded the goals of [c]riminal administration to include community condemnation of the offender, the rights of victims of crimes, [and] restitution from the offender. [40] Hartwell 's assertion that the underlying principles of penal administration in Alaska are reformation and protection of the public is thus no longer complete. Alaska's statutes and its constitution now also require the criminal justice system to accommodate the rights of crime victims. The abatement of criminal convictions has important implications for these rights. Therefore, the expansion and codification of victims' rights since Hartwell provides the changed conditions needed to satisfy the first element of the test for overruling precedent.
While the doctrine of abatement ab initio was the majority rule in federal and state courts when Hartwell was decided, the State argues that a steadily growing number of state courts have rejected the doctrine. [41] According to the State, these state courts have pointed to the unfairness to crime victims of abating criminal convictions and the doctrine's inconsistency with the presumption of guilt following a jury conviction. Further, the State suggests that more states have rejected abatement to some degree (22 states) than have retained it fully intact (19 states and the District of Columbia). The Public Defender Agency responds that [a]lthough a few state courts have moved away from the majority rule in the last few decades, a far greater number of state courts have directly affirmed their continued adherence to the doctrine during this same time. [42] The Public Defender Agency points out that two states, Montana and Mississippi, have actually adopted abatement ab initio for the first time in the last few decades. [43] By the Public Defender Agency's count, a majority (or near majority) of state courts that have addressed the abatement issue continue to apply a strict rule of abatement ab initio.  The State and the Public Defender Agency's primary source of disagreement is in how to group the approaches to abatement taken by each state. [44] The Public Defender Agency separates states into four categories: (1) those that dismiss the appeal and abate the criminal conviction (21 states and the District of Columbia); (2) those that dismiss the appeal and do not abate the criminal conviction (five states); (3) those that allow the appeal to continue in certain circumstances but otherwise abate the criminal conviction (seven states); and (4) those that allow the appeal to continue in certain circumstances but otherwise do not abate the criminal conviction (four states). Under the Public Defender Agency's analysis, a solid majority of the states that have addressed the issue (21 of 37) abate criminal convictions in all instances and an additional seven states abate criminal convictions in some instances. The State, in contrast, argues that all approaches other than a strict application of the abatement ab initio doctrine should be grouped together. It further challenges some of the Public Defender Agency's categorizations. Under the State's analysis, only 19 of 41 states continue to dismiss the appeal and abate the criminal proceedings in all cases. It is not necessary, or even useful, to choose between these two analyses. Under the characterization of either party, it is clear that the legal landscape is very different than it was when Hartwell was decided. Our own count, using slightly different categories than either the State or the Public Defender Agency, confirms this. It appears that the highest courts in 41 states have addressed abatement in some manner. The courts in 19 states have continued to apply strictly the doctrine of abatement ab initio. [45] Eight states generally dismiss a deceased defendant's appeal but leave the conviction intact. [46] Two states have unique approaches; Alabama places a particular notation in the deceased defendant's record, [47] while Oregon gives judges discretion both to dismiss the appeal and to vacate the judgment. [48] Eight states allow some mechanism for the appeal to continue with substitution; if no substitution occurs some of those states abate the conviction while others allow it to stand. [49] Two states simply proceed with the appeal. [50] This new diversity of opinions among the high courts of states throughout the country is another reason to conclude that the changed conditions element of the test for overruling precedent is satisfied. [51]
Because the State has successfully demonstrated changed conditions, we must consider whether more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent in this instance. [52] In analyzing this element, we must balance the benefits of adopting a new rule against the benefits of stare decisis: providing guidance for the conduct of individuals, creating efficiency in litigation by avoiding the relitigation of decided issues, and maintaining public faith in the judiciary. [53] These countervailing interests do not weigh heavily in this case. It is unclear how an individual would rely on the rule adopted in Hartwell. That is, it is unlikely that a person would commit a crime because he believed that, upon his death while his appeal was pending, his conviction would be abated. As for the efficiency rationale, while it is true that overturning Hartwell would result in some additional litigation of the continued appeals of deceased defendants, the number of such cases should be small. As for the third factor, public faith in the judiciary, allowing continued appeals will protect both victims and defendants by providing the opportunity to have criminal charges fully litigated and decided.