Opinion ID: 1275251
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Restriction on Scope of Defense Argument.

Text: Before proceeding with his penalty phase argument to the jury, defense counsel sought an advance ruling regarding his intention to argue the factual elements involved in certain comparable cases in which other Stanislaus County juries had returned death verdicts. [11] Counsel wanted to persuade the jury that elements present in those other cases, such as the intentional cruelty of the homicide, or its particularly barbaric or torturous nature, were lacking in this case. Counsel contended the facts of those cases were well known in Stanislaus County. The trial court concluded that while it would be improper for defense counsel to refer to what the juries in those cases did, counsel could permissibly comment on and compare the circumstances of the present case with those existing in the other cases. Defense counsel could make reference to aggravating factors present in other cases but absent from this. Thus, the court permitted defense counsel to refer to the fact this case was not a cold-blooded killing for hire, and that it did not involve rape or torture (unlike the Guzman and Easley cases, supra ). However, the court ruled defense counsel could not argue the facts of those cases in detail. (27) Defendant contends the trial court erred in prohibiting defense counsel from describing the evidence in, and outcomes of, earlier Stanislaus County capital cases. The ruling, he contends, curtailed counsel's ability to argue the relevant nonstatutory mitigating factor of disproportionate sentencing. Contrary to the argument of the Attorney General, this claim is not governed by the settled rule that our death penalty law does not encompass intercase proportionality review. (See, e.g., Pulley v. Harris (1984) 465 U.S. 37, 50-53 [79 L.Ed.2d 29, 40-42, 104 S.Ct. 871]; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 253 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302].) Defendant does not here specifically contend the jury should have been instructed to conduct intercase proportionality review, [12] or that this court should do so; rather, he complains of improper limitation on the scope of trial counsel's closing argument, an aspect of the right to counsel. (See Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 856-862 [45 L.Ed.2d 593, 597-601, 95 S.Ct. 2550].) Nevertheless, we find no error. The court's ruling fell within its discretion to control the scope of closing argument and did not preclude defendant from making his central point: that there have been murder cases involving more shocking, heinous, cruel or callous facts than those present here. A criminal defendant has a well-established constitutional right to have counsel present closing argument to the trier of fact. ( Herring v. New York, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 856-862 [45 L.Ed.2d at pp. 597-601, 95 S.Ct. 2550]; People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1184.) This right is not unbounded, however; the trial court retains discretion to impose reasonable time limits and to ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark. ( Herring v. New York, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 862 [45 L.Ed.2d at p. 600, 95 S.Ct. 2550.) We cannot say the trial court exceeded its discretion in implicitly determining that specific and detailed comparison of the facts of this case with those of other Stanislaus County capital trials would not have assisted the jury. Meaningful comparisons of this kind cannot be made solely on the basis of the circumstances of the crime, without consideration of the other aggravating and mitigating factors. Yet the trial court could properly conclude that to allow counsel to argue all such factors would consume too much time and draw the jury's focus away from the instant case. In any event, counsel was granted the latitude to argue, as he sought, that this case lacked the cruelty and callousness found in other murder cases. There was no abuse of discretion.