Opinion ID: 2360335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Identification Challenge

Text: Mr. Diggs essentially contends that the trial court erred by not granting his motion to suppress identification testimony from one of the complaining witnesses, Mr. Knighton, because: From the time of [Mr.] Knighton's initial contact with [Officer] Griffin on W Street, to the time he was walked up from [Officer] Griffin's car to look at the two suspects, he was fed information which rendered the actual identification a mere formality. He claims that the procedure used for the show-up identification was both unnecessarily suggestive and unreliable. Similarly, Mr. Kipette argues that the identification was suggestive because of the following: Mr. Knighton was told that the police caught or got the perpetrators, Mr. Kipette was in handcuffs at the time of his identification, and was surrounded by at least ten police officers and numerous police vehicles . . ., and in view of the complainant's car jacked automobile. The government asserts that under Maddox v. United States, 745 A.2d 284 (D.C.2000), the show-up identification was not impermissibly suggestive; nor was it unreliable under the factors articulated in In re L.G.T., 735 A.2d 957, 959 (D.C.1999). While the trial court determined that there was some suggestivity in the show-up procedure, the court did not characterize it as impermissibly suggestive. Moreover, the court concluded that the procedure used was not so suggestive as to undermine the reliability and the certainty [of the identification]. With respect to reliability, the trial court specifically found that when the car jacking was committed, Mr. Diggs and Mr. Knighton were within a foot of each other. They [were] within inches of each other. And, Mr. Knighton was very focused, describing complexion, age, and build. With respect to Mr. Kipette, the judge found that Mr. Knighton saw enough, had at least a minute to view Mr. Kipette, and was asked to identify him [w]ithin an hour of the commission of the crime. A defendant who moves to suppress an identification, in order to prevail on his motion, must show that the identification procedure was `so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of misidentification.' Forte v. United States, 856 A.2d 567, 573 (D.C.2004) (citing Turner v. United States, 622 A.2d 667, 672 n. 4 (D.C.1993) (citing Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972)). [I]f the procedure is found impermissibly suggestive, the government may defeat the motion and save the identification by carrying the burden of producing evidence to show that, under all the circumstances, the identification was reliable nonetheless. Id. (citing Maddox, supra, 745 A.2d at 292) (other citations omitted). In determining whether a statement is reliable, we examine such factors as: `the opportunity of the witness to view the [suspect] at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the [suspect], the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the confrontation.' In re L.G.T., supra, 735 A.2d at 959 (quoting Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977)). We have said previously that the presence of the police at the scene of the showup identification does not necessarily manifest impermissible suggestivity. [S]omething more egregious than mere custodial status is required to establish impermissible suggestivity. Singletary v. United States, 383 A.2d 1064, 1068 (D.C. 1978) (citation omitted). In addition, the fact that appellant was handcuffed during the showup [does not] establish impermissible suggestivity. Forte, supra, 856 A.2d at 573 (citing Fields v. United States, 484 A.2d 570, 574 (D.C.1984)). Nor does a police officer's statement, made to a witness, that: [W]e got two guys in the car similar to the ones you told us about indicate undue suggestivity. Singletary, supra, 383 A.2d at 1068-69 (citing Washington v. United States, 334 A.2d 185, 187 (D.C.1975)). We must examine the showup identification in the totality of the circumstances. Consequently, [a]lthough single-suspect identifications in the presence of police are obviously suggestive to some extent, [as the trial court recognized here], `a defendant is not denied due process of law unless, in the totality of the circumstances, the on-the-scene confrontation was unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to the substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.' Forte, supra, 856 A.2d at 573 (quoting Singletary, supra, 383 A.2d at 1068 (emphasis added) (other citation omitted)). Based upon our review of the record, we are satisfied that appellants have not shown a very substantial likelihood of misidentification. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, even assuming that the showup was unnecessarily suggestive, the identification of appellants by Mr. Knighton was reliable, as the trial court found; the Chevy Tahoe truck had been stopped in Maryland soon after the car jacking and Messers Diggs and Kipette were apprehended. At the time of the crime, Mr. Knighton had a good opportunity, in a well-lit area to view the appellants, and he provided a rather detailed physical description of them. The trial court found that his level of certainty with respect to his identification was emphatic, and that the time of the identification was within one hour of the crime. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to disturb the trial court's finding of reliability. Therefore, [w]e hold that the trial court committed no error in denying appellant[s'] motion to suppress [their] identification because the decision was `supported by the evidence and in accordance with the law.' Forte, supra, 856 A.2d at 573 (quoting Turner, supra, 622 A.2d at 672 n. 3) (other citation omitted). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. So ordered.