Opinion ID: 73592
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breach of Section 2

Text: On reconsideration, the district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of EPL concerning USA’s failure to pay timely for support services for the first month and a half of 1994, or the remainder of the Initial Support Period, and EPL’s subsequent termination of the agreement. As an initial matter, we note that EPL did not file a motion for summary judgment on this issue. “[D]istrict courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary 11 judgments sua sponte, as long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 326; see also Massey v. Congress Life Ins. Co., 116 F.3d 1414, 1417 (11th Cir. 1997) (“District courts unquestionably possess the power to trigger summary judgment on their own initiative.”). The record indicates that USA was on notice and had the opportunity to come forward with evidence of whether EPL terminated the agreement prematurely.6 Thus, the district court had the power to grant partial summary judgment. EPL submitted an invoice to USA on January 1, 1994, and again on January 14, 1994, for support services between January 1 and December 31, 1994. The Initial Support Period commenced in mid-February 1991 and lasted 36 months; thus, the Second Support Period began in mid-February 1994. Therefore, a gap existed between January 1 and February 15, 1994, for support services under the Initial Support Period. The invoice, however, detailed charges for the entire year and indicated a higher charge than previous years – which USA computed as charges under the Second Support Period. USA tendered payment on February 18, 1994. The district court found that a separate agreement between the parties established “the first day of each year of the Initial Support Period as the due date for services to be provided during that year.” The district court further found that USA owed EPL a pro rata portion of the annual $25,000 fee for the first month and a half of 1994 under the Initial Support Period. Thus, the district court framed the issue as whether EPL’s demands on January 1 and 14, 1994, 6 USA filed: (1) a motion for partial summary judgment on the issue; (2) a brief in response to EPL’s motion for summary judgment; (3) a response to EPL’s response to USA’s motion for summary judgment; (4) a response to EPL’s motion for reconsideration; and (5) a motion for reconsideration. Further, the district court afforded USA additional time for further briefing on EPL’s motion for reconsideration. 12 complied with paragraph 4.06(a)(i), giving EPL the right to terminate the contract for nonpayment. The district court, citing Considine Co. v. Turner Communications Corp., held that “under Georgia law a demand for payment of debt, part of which has matured and part of which has not, is a valid demand for payment of the matured amount.” See 273 S.E.2d 655, 656 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980). Because the agreement obligated USA to pay for services under the Initial Support Period between January 1 and February 15, 1994, and because this obligation had matured as of the date EPL demanded payment, the district court held that EPL’s demand was legally sufficient to trigger payment for the services and that EPL terminated the agreement lawfully pursuant to paragraph 4.06(a)(i) after USA failed to pay timely. A material issue exists, however, as to whether EPL’s invoice was a valid demand for payment for services during the Initial Support Period and complied with paragraph 4.06(a)(i). First, the district court found and EPL admitted that the invoice was for the Second Support Period, and did not demand payment for services under the Initial Support Period, i.e., between January 1 and February 15, 1994. The letter agreement adopted the first day of each year as the due date for yearly services under the Initial Support Period. Second, the invoice indicates the amount USA owed as $33,375 for all of 1994, not the pro rata share that USA owed for services between January 1 thru February 15, 1994 (the Initial Support Period); thus, EPL failed to provide USA with the “sum owed” for the Initial Support Period pursuant to paragraph 4.06(a)(i). Third, the invoice failed to divide the amount USA owed into matured and unmatured components, and instead appeared to USA as a bill for services for 1994 under the Second Support Period (a wholly unmatured amount). USA has thus designated specific facts that show a genuine issue for trial. See Celotex, 577 U.S. at 334. We hold that the district court erred in granting partial summary judgment in favor of EPL, and that a “fair-minded” jury could find that 13 EPL’s invoices did not constitute valid demands for payment for services under the remaining Initial Support Period and thus did not comply with paragraph 4.06(a)(i) of the agreement. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242.