Opinion ID: 791618
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Granting Appellees' Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: 13 Meyers contends she adduced sufficient probative evidence to have a jury determine whether the appellees violated her free speech rights. Because the record is clear that Starke and Duncan did not have the authority to transfer Meyers, we agree with the decision of the magistrate judge granting judgment as a matter of law in their favor. 14 The magistrate judge also granted Carter's Rule 50(b) motion. Carter, who did have the authority to reassign Meyers, argues that Meyers suffered no material job change and thus could not show an adverse employment action. While Meyers's title and functions changed, her salary and benefits did not. Other NHHS employees testified that Meyers was not demoted and that the child welfare responsibilities of Intake were just as important as those fulfilled by workers performing Ongoing Services or serving in other system positions. 5 15 When drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Meyers, Kipp, 280 F.3d at 896, we are left with the conclusion that the magistrate judge did not err in granting Carter's Rule 50(b) motion. The evidence, taken in the light most favorable to Meyers showed that Meyers's new position, an Intake PSW, receives reports of suspected child abuse or neglect and determines NHHS's response. An Intake PSW must have the skills to gather the information necessary to perform a thorough investigation. An Intake PSW receives seventeen weeks of specialized training. Finally, an Intake PSW must possess the identical educational background as an ongoing services worker—a bachelor's degree in the field of human services. 16 In order to establish a claim for unlawful First Amendment retaliation, a public employee must show that [she] suffered an adverse employment action that was causally connected to [her] participation in a protected activity. Duffy v. McPhillips, 276 F.3d 988, 991 (8th Cir.2002). An adverse employment action is exhibited by a material employment disadvantage, such as a change in salary, benefits, or responsibilities. Bradley v. Widnall, 232 F.3d 626, 632 (8th Cir.2000) (emphasis in original). Changes in duties or working conditions that cause no materially significant disadvantage . . . are insufficient to establish the adverse conduct required to make a prima facie case. Id. (quoting Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994)). 17 Meyers testified that in Intake, she did not have a full workload. However, Meyers's testimony is uncorroborated. A mere scintilla of evidence is inadequate to support a verdict[.] Clark v. Kansas City Missouri Sch. Dist., 375 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Larson v. Miller, 76 F.3d 1446, 1452 (8th Cir.1996)); see also O'Bryan v. KTIV Television, 64 F.3d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.1995) (uncorroborated statements are insufficient to create an issue of material fact). Meyers also testified that Intake was handled by a receptionist and a case aide. We do not find any evidence in the record for this conclusion. Meyers actually testified that the receptionist and case aide only took calls when the Intake worker was unavailable. The receptionist and case aide then turned over any information they had to the Intake PSW. The evidence clearly shows that a PSW has always worked Intake and that Anderson was the full-time Intake worker from 1998 until Meyers was reassigned to Intake. 18 For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the magistrate judge.