Opinion ID: 684357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assault Under Color of State Law

Text: 23 The traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a Sec. 1983 action have exercised power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.'  West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1042-43, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). Accordingly, acts of a state or local employee in her official capacity will generally be found to have occurred under color of state law. Id.; Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157 n. 5, 98 S.Ct. 1729, 1734 n. 5, 56 L.Ed.2d 185 (1978). This will be so whether the complained of conduct was in furtherance of the state's goals or constituted an abuse of official power. West, 487 U.S. at 49-50, 108 S.Ct. at 2255-56; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87, 81 S.Ct. 473, 482-84, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). It is firmly established that a defendant in a section 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given to him by the State. West, 487 U.S. at 49, 108 S.Ct. at 2255; Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 111, 65 S.Ct. 1031, 1040, 89 L.Ed. 1495 (1945) (Acts of [police] officers who undertake to perform their official duties are included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.). 24 It is [also] clear that under 'color' of law means under 'pretense' of law. Screws, 325 U.S. at 111, 65 S.Ct. at 1040. Thus, one who is without actual authority, but who purports to act according to official power, may also act under color of state law. In Griffin v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a deputy sheriff employed by a private park operator acted under color of state law when he ordered the plaintiff to leave the park, escorted him off the premises, and arrested him for criminal trespass. Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135, 84 S.Ct. 1770, 1772-73, 12 L.Ed.2d 754 (1964) (analyzing state action necessary for a claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). While the deputy sheriff was in actuality acting as a private security guard and as agent of the park operator rather than as agent of the state, he wore a sheriff's badge and consistently identified himself as a deputy sheriff rather than as an employee of the park, and consequently purported to exercise the authority of a deputy sheriff. Id. at 135, 84 S.Ct. at 1772. 9 The Court concluded that the privately employed deputy sheriff had been acting as a state actor, stating: 25 If an individual is possessed of state authority and purports to act under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that he might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private capacity. 26 Id. In this same vein, off-duty police officers who purport to exercise official authority will generally be found to have acted under color of state law. Manifestations of such pretended authority may include flashing a badge, identifying oneself as a police officer, placing an individual under arrest, or intervening in a dispute involving others pursuant to a duty imposed by police department regulations. See, e.g., Rivera v. La Porte, 896 F.2d 691, 696 (2d Cir.1990) (identification as a peace officer, arrest of plaintiff, and use of police car); Lusby v. T.G. & Y. Stores, Inc., 749 F.2d 1423 (10th Cir.1984) (flashing of police badge and identification as police officer working as security guard), vacated on other grounds, 474 U.S. 805, 106 S.Ct. 40, 88 L.Ed.2d 33 (1985), adhered to on remand, 796 F.2d 1307 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 884, 107 S.Ct. 275, 93 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986); Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir.1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118, 97 S.Ct. 514, 50 L.Ed.2d 269 (1976) (intervening in barroom brawl). 27 On the other hand, a police officer's purely private acts which are not furthered by any actual or purported state authority are not acts under color of state law. See Delcambre v. Delcambre, 635 F.2d 407, 408 (5th Cir.1981) (holding that alleged assault by on-duty police chief at police station did not occur under color of state law because altercation with the plaintiff, defendant's sister-in-law, arose out of a personal dispute and defendant neither arrested nor threatened to arrest the plaintiff); see also D.T. v. Independent School Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176 (10th Cir.) (finding sexual molestation of students by public school teacher/coach that occurred on an excursion unconnected to school activities during school vacation period when teacher was not employed by the school district did not occur under color of state law), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct. 213, 112 L.Ed.2d 172 (1990). While a police-officer's use of a state-issue weapon in the pursuit of private activities will have furthered the Sec. 1983 violation in a literal sense, courts generally require additional indicia of state authority to conclude that the officer acted under color of state law. Compare Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that officer who used police handgun to shoot his wife and then commit suicide did not act under color of state law even though he was required to carry the police gun at all times) with Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d at 441 (finding evidence supported determination of under color where off-duty officer intervened in barroom brawl as required by relevant police department regulations); United States v. Tarpley, 945 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir.1991) (finding requirement under color of state law met where off-duty deputy sheriff assaulted wife's alleged ex-lover in a private vendetta but identified self as police officer, used service revolver, and intimated that he could use police authority to get away with the paramour's murder), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1960, 118 L.Ed.2d 562 (1992). 28 In this case, Officers Otterbine and Echevarria were off duty when the altercation with Mr. Barna occurred, and the evidence indicates that the underlying nature of their dispute was personal. The evidence would not support a finding that the officers were acting with actual police authority during the altercation. Nor would it support a finding that they purported to be acting with police authority. 29 While the fact that they were off duty is not dispositive of whether the officers were exercising actual police authority, there was no evidence to indicate that the officers were on official police business. First, the officers were literally out of their official jurisdiction. New Jersey law provides that a municipal police officer's jurisdiction is limited to the municipality in which the officer was appointed. N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 40A:14-152 (West 1993); see State v. Cohen, 73 N.J. 331, 375 A.2d 259, 264 (1977). A police officer may act in his or her official capacity outside of this jurisdiction under only two circumstances: (1) when in hot pursuit of a person whom the officer believes to have committed a crime, N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2A:156-1 (West 1985), or (2) when making an arrest anywhere in the state for a crime committed in the officer's presence, N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 40A:14-152.1 (West 1993). Officers Otterbine and Echevarria, who were Perth Amboy police officers, thus could not have been acting with official authority under the facts of this case when they allegedly assaulted Mr. Barna at his home in the Town of Woodbridge. See Rambo v. Daley, 851 F.Supp. 1222, 1224 (N.D.Ill.1994) (recognizing police officers had no actual authority to conduct arrest in neighboring state and analyzing further to determine whether officers acted with purported authority); Keller v. District of Columbia, 809 F.Supp. 432, 43 (E.D.Va.1993) (same). 30 Otterbine decided to follow the Barnas to their home at the request of a relative and asked his partner, with whom he was sharing a social evening, to accompany him. The altercation began when Officer Otterbine accused Mr. Barna of hitting the officer's sister, Aunt Mary. His partner then intervened to support him and, at the end of the fracas, the two officers attempted to leave. The officers had not been called to the scene to conduct official police business, nor were they in pursuit of Mr. Barna on the belief that he had already committed a crime. Finally, the fact that they attempted to leave after the assault establishes that the officers were not trying to arrest Mr. Barna at the time they assaulted him. Thus, there was no evidence to support a finding that the officers were clothed with actual state authority during the initial phase of the altercation, prior to Mr. Barna's brandishing of firearms. 31 This situation is thus unlike that in Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 1646, 71 L.Ed.2d 876 (1982), where we concluded that an on-duty police officer may act under color of state law when he performs official duties that arose in a quasi-personal context. In Black, the plaintiff brought a Sec. 1983 claim against a police officer in connection with an arrest and prosecution that arose out of a traffic incident involving the plaintiff's and the officer's vehicles. We found sufficient indicia of state authority to uphold the denial of judgment not withstanding the verdict because the police officer was an on-duty (although plain-clothed) detective, he wore a police academy windbreaker, and he had initiated contact with the plaintiff on the belief that the plaintiff's actions warranted official investigation. Black v. Stephens, 662 F.2d at 188. Here there was no evidence that the alleged assault occurred as a result of official police concerns; on the contrary, the evidence indicates that the assault arose out of the officer's familial and personal concerns. 32 Turning to the issue of whether the officers purported to be acting with state authority when they followed the Barnas home and accosted Mr. Barna, we also find no evidence supporting the Barnas' position. The officers did not identify themselves as police officers, they did not indicate that they were acting on official police business, and importantly, they did not attempt to arrest Mr. Barna, or otherwise invoke their police authority, during the initial phase of the altercation. 33 The only arguable connections between the officers' alleged assault of Mr. Barna and the use of police authority are: (1) Echevarria's comment, I'll show you jurisdiction, made in response to Mr. Barna's statement that the officers were out of their jurisdiction, and (2) evidence that Echevarria used a state-issue PR-24 nightstick to hold Mr. Barna during the assault--a weapon that Officer Echevarria could only legally carry in New Jersey because of his position as a police officer. 10 We believe Officer Echevarria's comment regarding the officers' jurisdiction is too ambiguous to be of significant value on the issue of state authority. As noted, the officers were in fact out of their police jurisdiction. Instead of indicating that Echevarria intended to exercise official police authority, the comment could just as likely have been meant to convey that Echevarria intended, despite the lack of any real or purported authority, to put Mr. Barna in his place. 34 The use of a police-issue nightstick is undoubtedly the Barnas' strongest support for the view that the officers were acting under color of state law during the alleged assault. The nightstick was an objective indicia of police authority, and Echevarria was legally entitled to possess it only because of his position as a police officer. At the time it was used, however, Echevarria did not have actual authority to use the nightstick, since, by law, an officer may only carry the weapon while on duty or while traveling to or from an authorized place of police duty. See N.J.Stat.Ann. Sec. 2C:39-3(e), (g). Nor, under the circumstances of this case, do we view the use of the nightstick to hold Mr. Barna during the assault as an assertion by Echevarria of official authority. In short, we believe the unauthorized use of a police-issue nightstick is simply not enough to color this clearly personal family dispute with the imprimatur of state authority. 11 35 To hold otherwise would create a federal cause of action out of any unauthorized use of a police-issue weapon, without regard to whether there are any additional circumstances to indicate that the officer was exercising actual or purported police authority. We do not understand the under color requirement of Sec. 1983 to be satisfied by such a tenuous connection to state authority. See Bonsignore v. City of New York, 683 F.2d 635 (2d Cir.1982) (holding that officer who used police handgun to shoot his wife and then commit suicide did not act under color of state law even though he was required to carry the police gun at all times); cf. Rivera v. La Porte, 896 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.1990) (finding assault occurred under color of state law when officer used service revolver to beat plaintiff and then arrested plaintiff for events giving rise to the assault). The district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of Officers Otterbine and Echevarria on the assault-based claim because a jury could not reasonably find that the assault occurred under color of state law. The district court's judgment on that claim will be affirmed. 36