Opinion ID: 174884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equal Protection Claim Against MeeksQualified Immunity

Text: Plaintiffs claim a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection violation against Meeks for improperly calculating occupancy numbers for Skybar in a different manner from other establishments. On appeal, Officer Meeks argues the district court erred in denying him qualified immunity. The parties agree this is a class of one equal protection claim. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 1074-75, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). To prevail on a class of one equal protection claim, Plaintiffs must show they were intentionally treated differently from others who were similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564, 120 S.Ct. at 1074; Griffin Indus. v. Irvin, 496 F.3d 1189, 1202 (11th Cir.2007). To be similarly situated, the comparators must be `prima facie identical in all relevant respects.' Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1204 (quoting Campbell v. Rainbow City, 434 F.3d 1306, 1314 (11th Cir.2006)). [36] The district court concluded Plaintiffs had shown disparate treatment between Skybar and its two similarly situated competitors, In Italy and 1716. Grider, 628 F.Supp.2d at 1338-41. Previous class of one decisions from the Supreme Court and this Court compel our conclusion that Plaintiffs have not shown sufficient similarity between Skybar and In Italy and 1716 to state a class of one claim. For example, in Olech, a plaintiff landowner asked the village of Willowbrook to connect her property to the municipal water supply. Olech, 528 U.S. at 563, 120 S.Ct. at 1074. Although the village required a 15-foot easement from other property owners to connect, it demanded a 33-foot easement from the plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff sued, claiming the village's disparate requirement of a larger easement violated her equal protection rights. Id. In Olech, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff adequately stated a class of one equal protection claim. Id. at 565, 120 S.Ct. at 1075. In Olech, there was a single, one-dimensional standarda 15-foot vs. 33-foot easementagainst which departures, even for a single plaintiff, could be readily assessed. There was no indication ... [of] subjective, individualized determinations .... Engquist v. Ore. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 2153, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). The similarity between Olech and her neighbors was obvious because the Village, as the governmental decisionmaker, had a policy that did not involve a large number of factors in its application. Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1203. The Supreme Court's Olech decision relied on two cases that were precursors to Olech 's class of one formulation. In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Commission of Webster County, 488 U.S. 336, 109 S.Ct. 633, 102 L.Ed.2d 688 (1989), the Supreme Court concluded the defendant county denied the plaintiffs equal protection by setting their property tax assessment at 50% of market value based on recent purchase sale prices, but taxing other property owners at 50% of market value based on old appraisal values of their land (that had not been recently sold). Id. at 338-42, 109 S.Ct. at 635-37. This practice resulted in gross disparities in the assessed value of generally comparable property, thereby denying the plaintiffs equal protection. Id. at 338, 109 S.Ct. at 635. In Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 43 S.Ct. 190, 67 L.Ed. 340 (1923), the Supreme Court recognized an equal protection claim where one taxpayer's property was assessed at 100% of its value while all others were assessed at 55%, without the government articulating any differences in the properties that would justify the disparate assessments. Id. at 445-47, 43 S.Ct. at 191-92. See also Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2154 (interpreting Allegheny Pittsburgh and Sioux City Bridge). In each of Olech, Allegheny Pittsburgh, and Sioux City Bridge, the Supreme Court was able to analyze the `similarly situated' requirement succinctly and at a high order of abstraction. This was because the challenged governmental decisions were ultimately one-dimensionalthey involved a single answer to a single question. Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1203. However, later cases recognize that [t]here are some forms of state action ... which by their nature involve discretionary decisionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized assessments. Engquist, 128 S.Ct. at 2154, 2157 (class of one equal protection claims not viable in the public employment context). This Court's recent Griffin decision illustrates such a discretionary, multi-dimensional inquiry. In Griffin, the plaintiff owned a chicken rendering plant that was subject to stricter regulations by city and state officials than other plants, including odor regulations more stringent than those imposed on any other chicken rendering facility in the state and new water quality controls. Griffin, 496 F.3d at 1195. The plaintiff claimed state regulators, pressured by city officials, were selectively enforcing regulations based on animosity towards the plant. Id. The plaintiff alleged another competitor in the Georgia chicken processing business was a similarly situated comparator. Id. at 1202. This Court distinguished Olech 's one-dimensional inquiry from the multi-dimensional inquiry presented in Griffin. Id. at 1203. Where the government's regulatory action was undeniably multi-dimensional, involving varied decisionmaking criteria applied in a series of discretionary decisions made over an extended period of time, the similarly situated comparators `must be prima facie identical in all relevant respects. ' Id. at 1203-04 (quoting Campbell, 434 F.3d at 1314). In such cases, the government's challenged decision must be evaluated in light of the full variety of factors that an objectively reasonable governmental decisionmaker would have found relevant in making the challenged decision. Id. at 1203. This is a more difficult standard to meet. Id. at 1204; Leib v. Hillsborough Cnty. Pub. Transp. Comm'n, 558 F.3d 1301, 1307 (11th Cir.2009) (affirming dismissal of class of one claim over regulatory commission's consideration of a variegated set of factors, including aesthetics and comparison with industry standards, to determine whether Toyota Prius qualified as a luxury limousine); Douglas Asphalt Co. v. Qore, Inc., 541 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir.2008) (plaintiff paving contractor failed to allege other contractors were similarly situated in light of all the factors that would have been objectively reasonable to government officials). Similarly, in this case, the occupancy calculation for Skybar reflected a multi-dimensional decisionmaking process. Meeks was required to consider various factors including the establishment's square footage, its segments, its emergency exit capacity, its fire and sprinkler systems, and its overall compliance with the codes and regulations. As Meeks testified, his calculation of a 999-person occupancy limit is partly formulaic but also involves discretion and judgment on the part of the regulator in determining that the overall occupancy classification adequately complies with all provisions of the codes and regulations. More importantly, the overall goal of an occupancy number is safe occupancy of buildings. Plaintiffs argue Meeks miscalculated the maximum occupancy limits in several ways. The problem for the Griders is that this is not an appeal of Meeks's calculations to the City courts or relevant City authorities, but rather it is a § 1983 claim against Meeks in his individual capacity for denial of Plaintiffs' constitutional equal protection rights. To prevail, Plaintiffs must show Defendant Meeks intentionally and arbitrarily treated Skybar differently from other similarly situated entities and that there is no rational basis for this difference in treatment. Plaintiffs' equal protection claim fails for several reasons. First, other City inspectors made the on-site calculations as to the standing areas for In Italy and 1716. This difference in calculators alone is enough to negate a class of one claim. Second, the record evidence, in any event, is insufficient to show the two other establishmentsIn Italy and 1716are similarly situated to Skybar. For instance, the parties do not offer record citations showing: (1) how the emergency exits and fire-suppression systems in In Italy or 1716 compared to Skybar; (2) the layout of the exterior or interior of Skybar, In Italy, or 1716, or even how the other two facilities were organized; and (3) the square footage of In Italy or 1716, much less how it compared to Skybar. Rather, the record evidence, where any is cited, shows that Skybar was different from In Italy and 1716 at the time of Meeks's calculations because In Italy and 1716 were smaller than Skybar and were fully compliant with all Codes of the City. [37] Skybar's occupancy level was constrained by its emergency exit capacity and fire alarm system but there is no evidence that In Italy or 1716 had such constraints. Importantly, there is no evidence of the total occupancy limits of In Italy or 1716 and no evidence the other inspectors let In Italy or 1716 exceed 1000 occupants with the same type of fire alarm system Skybar had. Third, Meeks articulated a rational basis for his calculations, and Plaintiffs have not shown Meeks acted arbitrarily or intentionally denied Plaintiffs their equal protection rights. The evidence in this case overwhelmingly shows Meeks genuinely had safety concerns about customers safely exiting Skybar and the capacity of its fire alarm system. It is difficult to fathom how allowing a late-night bar to have 999 persons at one time is putting it out of business. [38] In sum, Plaintiffs have not shown an equal protection violation by Defendant Meeks (sued individually), and the district court accordingly erred in denying Meeks qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Alternatively, at a minimum, Plaintiffs have not shown Meeks violated clearly established federal law. In determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established at the time of violation, [t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry ... is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. at 2156; see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. at 741, 122 S.Ct. at 2516 (the salient question ... is whether the state of the law [at the time of violation] ... gave [the defendants] fair warning that their alleged treatment of [the plaintiff] was unconstitutional). [39] There is no case law in the U.S. Supreme Court, this Court, or the Alabama Supreme Court with similar factual circumstances (or even addressing in any way the occupancy limits for bars in Alabama) that would have put Meeks on notice of a clearly established right that Plaintiffs have claimed in this case. Nor have Plaintiffs cited any precedential authority that would have made clear to Meeks that, given the need for safety in buildings, he was violating Plaintiffs' constitutional equal protection rights. The district court accordingly erred in denying qualified immunity to Meeks on Plaintiffs' equal protection claim.