Opinion ID: 1353476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: subchapter i of the juvenile code

Text: The principles articulated in Section II permeate Subchapter I of the Juvenile Code, which reflects the need both to respect parental rights and to protect children from unfit, abusive, or neglectful parents. See N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-100 to -1414 (2003). As previously noted, our resolution of this case depends upon the legislative intent evident in the subchapter. We concentrate on Article 1, certain sections of Articles 2 through 10, and Article 11. Article 1 contains a declaration of legislative intent applicable to all of Subchapter I. Id. § 7B-100. Articles 2 through 10 address child custody and permanency planning matters. Id. §§ 7B-200 to -1004. Article 11 establishes the rules governing the termination of parental rights. Id. §§ 7B-1100 to -1113.
Article 1 of Subchapter I directs us to construe the rest of the subchapter in a manner that accomplishes the following purposes and policies: (1) To provide procedures for the hearing of juvenile cases that assure fairness and equity and that protect the constitutional rights of juveniles and parents; (2) To develop a disposition in each juvenile case that reflects consideration of the facts, the needs and limitations of the juvenile, and the strengths and weaknesses of the family[;] (3) To provide for services for the protection of juveniles by means that respect both the right to family autonomy and the juveniles' needs for safety, continuity, and permanence; [] (4) To provide standards for the removal, when necessary, of juveniles from their homes and for the return of juveniles to their homes consistent with preventing the unnecessary or inappropriate separation of juveniles from their parents[; and] (5) To provide standards, consistent with the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89, [4] for ensuring that the best interests of the juvenile are of paramount consideration by the court and that when it is not in the juvenile's best interest to be returned home, the juvenile will be placed in a safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time. N.C.G.S. § 7B-100. Section 7B-100 of Article 1 underscores the General Assembly's awareness of the potential tension between parental rights and child welfare. It provides for removing children from their homes, but only when necessary and consistent with fairness, equity, and the constitutional rights of juveniles and parents. Id. Our legislature values family autonomy and prefers the familial unit as usually being the best means of satisfying a child's need for safety, continuity, and permanence. Id. Even when removal is temporarily necessary, N.C.G.S. § 7B-100 urges returning children to their parents unless doing so would not be in the children's best interest. Id. This last point is crucial. For all the statute's concern with preserving families, subdivision (5) of N.C.G.S. § 7B-100 clearly makes the best interests of the juvenile the courts'paramount consideration when hearing cases arising under Subchapter I. Moreover, when reunification is against the child's best interest, subdivision (5) favors placing the child in a safe, permanent home within a reasonable amount of time. Enacted in 2003, subdivision (5) is the most recent amendment to N.C.G.S. § 7B-100. We presume the General Assembly added it either to change the substance of the law or to clarify its meaning. See Childers v. Parker's Inc., 274 N.C. 256, 260, 162 S.E.2d 481, 483 (1968). Since nothing in subdivision (5) appears inconsistent with the rest of the statute, we divine no intent to alter the substance of the law. Rather, we believe the legislature intended to emphasize that (1) when a parent has forfeited his constitutionally protected status, the child's best interest should prevail in any proceeding under Subchapter I and (2) interminable custody battles do not serve the child's best interest. This expression of legislative priorities informs our analysis.
The General Assembly's explicit desire to preserve parent-child relationships and protect children explains the fluidity of child custody proceedings under Articles 2 through 10 of Subchapter I. These proceedings afford the trial court multiple opportunities to consider and reconsider whether a child is abused, neglected, or dependent, and if so, who should have custody. They also give parents time to correct the deficiencies that led to the child's removal. Essentially, there is no such thing as a final custody order, only the most recent one. Custody proceedings are initially a two-stage process. [5] At the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court makes a threshold determination regarding the state's right to intervene. DSS must prove abuse, neglect, or dependency by clear and convincing evidence, a higher evidentiary standard than that typically applied in civil actions. [6] Id. § 7B-805. If the evidence substantiates the allegations, the court enters a written order reflecting its findings and proceeds to stage two, the dispositional hearing. Id. § 7B-807. Otherwise, the court dismisses DSS's petition with prejudice and, if the child is in DSS's custody, releases him to his parent. Id. Should a dispositional hearing be necessary, the court receives evidence and makes a discretionary decision concerning custody. [7] N.C.G.S. § 7B-901. Specifically, it enters a written order directing one of the dispositional alternatives available under N.C.G.S. § 7B-903. Id. §§ 7B-901, -903 (describing dispositional alternatives that include dismissing the case or granting custody to a parent, relative, or DSS). This decision and any subsequent custody determinations are based on the child's best interest. Price v. Howard, 346 N.C. 68, 79, 484 S.E.2d 528, 535 (1997) (Where [a parent forfeits his constitutionally protected status], custody should be determined by the `best interest of the child' test mandated by statute.). A dispositional hearing is hardly the decisive event its name implies. When, as here, the dispositional order removes custody from a parent, the court holds a custody review hearing within ninety days of the dispositional hearing and again within six months. [8] Id. § 7B-906(a). Relying on evidence adduced at these hearings, the court enters written custody review orders either continuing the current placement or modifying custodial arrangements. Id. § 7B-906(c), (d). The permanency planning process in Article 9 is meant to bring about a definitive placement plan for the abused, neglected, or dependent child. Within twelve months of its initial custody order removing a child from his parent, the court must conduct a permanency planning hearing to develop a plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a reasonable period of time. Id. § 7B-907(a). The permanent plan may include, inter alia, returning the child to his parent, legal guardianship, or adoption. See N.C.G.S. § 7B-907. The court enters a written order memorializing the permanent plan and continuing or modifying custodial arrangements accordingly. Id. § 7B-907(c). Even the permanent plan is not immutable, however. Follow-up hearings every six months enable the court to review progress and, if necessary, formulate a new permanent plan. N.C.G.S. § 7B-907(a). Nowhere is the flexibility of the custody process more pronounced than in Article 10. In addition to the aforementioned mandatory review hearings, this article endows the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to modify or vacate custody orders in light of changes in circumstances or the needs of the juvenile. Id. § 7B-1000(a). The interlocutory quality of custody orders would normally preclude their immediate appeal except in conformity with N.C.G.S. § 1-277. See Travco Hotels, Inc. v. Piedmont Natural Gas Co., 332 N.C. 288, 291, 420 S.E.2d 426, 428 (1992). Because of the importance of the interests involved in custody proceedings, however, Article 10 makes many custody orders subject to immediate appeal. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1001. Furthermore, although N.C.G.S. § 1-294 ordinarily divests a trial court of jurisdiction over cases pending appeal, section 7B-1003 of Article 10 allows trial courts to enter temporary order[s] affecting ... custody or placement while a custody order awaits appellate review. Id. § 7B-1003. [9] Obviously, this statutory scheme could result in protracted custody proceedings that leave the legal relationship between parent and child unresolved and the child in legal limbo. Such an outcome would thwart the legislature's wish that children be placed in ... safe, permanent home[s] within a reasonable amount of time. Id. § 7B-100(5). In order to avoid this, Subchapter I mandates that DSS initiate proceedings to terminate parental rights at certain stages in the custody process. Id. § 7B-907(d), (e). Of particular relevance is N.C.G.S. § 7B-907(e), which directs DSS to file a termination petition or motion within sixty days of the permanency planning hearing if termination is necessary to perfect the permanent plan (for example, when adoption is the plan). Additionally, N.C.G.S. § 7B-907(d) requires DSS to request termination of parental rights whenever a child in its custody has been placed outside the home for twelve of the twenty-two most recent months. This leads us to a brief discussion of the grounds and procedures for terminating parental rights found in Article 11 of Subchapter I.
Unlike the loss of custody possible under Articles 2-10, the dissolution of parental rights under Article 11 is decisive. Termination orders completely and permanently terminate[] all rights and obligations of the parent to the juvenile and the juvenile to the parent arising from the parental relationship. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1112. Aside from its effect, Article 11 differs from Articles 2 through 10 in other important respects. It contains its own provisions regarding legislative intent, jurisdiction, standing, notice, hearing, and appeal. Id. §§ 7B-1100 to -1113. The article includes a host of procedural requirements that, consistent with due process, ... protect the various interests of the parties involved. Montgomery, 311 N.C. at 108, 316 S.E.2d at 251. These provisions encompass notice requirements and the right to counsel, even legal representation at the state's expense for indigent parents. N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1106.1,-1109(b). Section 7B-1111 of Article 11 sets forth nine grounds for terminating parental rights, the sixth of which applies here, namely, a parent's inability to provide for the proper care and supervision of a child and the reasonable probability that such incapability will continue for the foreseeable future. Id. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Abuse or neglect constitutes merely the first ground for termination. Id. § 7B-1111(a)(1). As described, Subchapter I requires DSS to seek termination of parental rights in certain instances. Notwithstanding these, DSS has standing to file a petition or motion in the cause to terminate parental rights whenever it has custody of a child from a court order or surrender for adoption. Id. § 7B-1103. Among others, judicially appointed guardians and persons who have filed for adoption also have standing to seek termination. Id. Termination proceedings have adjudicatory and dispositional phases analogous to, but independent of, those in custody proceedings. [10] See N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-1109 to -1110. During the adjudicatory phase, the court takes evidence, makes findings of fact, and determines the existence or nonexistence of grounds for termination. Id. § 7B-1109(e). The burden of proof is on DSS in this phase, and the court's findings must be based on clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. [11] Id. § 7B-1109(f). Assuming a judicial finding that a ground for termination exists, the trial court's decision in the dispositional phase is discretionary. See id. § 7B-1110. The court need not order termination if it further determines the best interests of the juvenile require that the parental rights of the parent not be terminated. Id. Parties may appeal a termination order pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1113. Proceedings to terminate parental rights are considerably more streamlined than custody proceedings. Once a petition or motion to terminate parental rights has been filed, the court must hold a termination hearing within ninety days absent good cause shown. N.C.G.S. § 7B-1109. Should the court order termination, the order must be written, signed, and entered within thirty days of the hearing. Id. § 7B-1110. Although trial courts possess some authority to modify termination orders that have been appealed and affirmed, there is no requirement under Article 11 that the courts periodically review them. Id. § 7B-1113. Thus, unencumbered by appeals of the sort at issue here, termination proceedings offer speed and finality not found in custody proceedings.