Opinion ID: 2772259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the definition of political committee

Text: We next consider whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to BIAW. Specifically, we must decide if the plaintiffs have raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether BIAW fell within the statutory definition of a political committee during the relevant time period. We hold that they have. A. Plaintiffs Have Raised a Genuine Issue ofMaterial Fact about Whether BIAW Fell under Washington's Definition of a Political Committee During the 2007-2008 Campaign Season A political committee is required to file a statement of organization with the PDC, RCW 42.17 A.205(1), and make a variety of detailed disclosures. Id.; see also RCW 42.17 A.235. The central issue here is whether BIAW (as opposed to BIAWMSC) was a political committee and therefore violated the law by failing to file and disclose. RCW 42.17 A.005(37) defines political committee: Political committee means any person (except a candidate or an individual dealing with his or her own funds or property) having the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures in support of, or opposition to, any candidate or any ballot proposition. (Emphasis added.) Thus, under this statute, an entity becomes a political committee with reporting requirements if it expect[s] to receiv[e] contributions or mak[ e] expenditures regarding an upcoming election. !d. The statute does not say what proportion of the entity's purpose, if any, must be devoted to expect[ed] 14 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 expenditures to qualify as a political committee with reporting requirements. Id. To provide some background for our discussion of this definition and how it applies to this case, we begin by reviewing the few prior Washington decisions interpreting that statutory definition. This court has addressed the definition of political committee in only one relevant case, State v. (1972) Dan J. Evans Campaign Comm., 86 Wn.2d 503, 546 P.2d 75 (1976). 6 The relevant portion is only one paragraph, and since that paragraph represents almost all this court's jurisprudence on the issue, we quote it in full: In the instant case, the Dan Evans Committee made a single contribution of $500 to the Early Birds Fund of the Washington Republican Central Committee, a political committee obligated to disclose the contribution. The record reflects no expenditures for the purpose of supporting or opposing a specific candidate or ballot proposition. No other contributions of a similar nature were made. There is no competent evidence in the record to indicate that the Dan Evans Committee solicited, received, or even had the expectation of receiving contributions to be used in support of or in opposition to candidates or ballot propositions. To require reporting and disclosure by the Dan Evans Committee or other persons who make a single contribution to a political committee under these circumstances (in the absence of other qualitative facts) would result in an unnecessary and unreasonable duplication and extension of the act's detailed and somewhat lengthy reporting requirements. Where the surrounding facts and circumstances indicate that the primary or one ofthe primary purposes of the person making the contribution is to affect, directly or 6 We have held that the words in support of, or opposition to, any candidate in the statutory definition did not render the statute vague, but that holding is not relevant here. Voters Educ. Comm. v. Wash. State Pub. Disclosure Comm 'n, 161 Wn.2d 470, 490, 166 P.3d 1174 (2007). 15 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 indirectly, governmental decision making by supporting or opposing candidates or ballot propositions, then that person becomes a 'political committee' and is subject to the act's disclosure requirements. See Attorney General Opinion 1973, June 8, 1973. The primary purpose of the Dan Evans Committee was not to influence the political process by supporting or opposing candidates or ballot propositions through expenditures of its funds, but to pay for miscellaneous expenses incurred by Governor Evans and his staff in connection with his position as a public official. Plaintiffs contention to the contrary creates no material issue of fact. !d. at 508-09 (some emphasis added). This discussion first uses the language the primary or one ofthe primary purposes to describe what it takes to trigger reporting requirements based on election expenditures. Id. at 509 (some emphasis added). But it actually concludes that the committee in that case lacked the primary purpose[ ] of influencing an election without going on to address whether it also lacked a primary purpose of doing so. !d. (some emphasis added). Thus, although this case has been cited for adopting a looser a primary purpose test triggering filing and reporting requirements under the expenditure prong of RCW 42.17 A.005(37), rather than the more restrictive the primary purpose test as the prerequisite, the case does not clearly express that as a holding. The Court of Appeals, however, has so held, in only one case (not counting the instant case). According to the Court of Appeals: The Act sets forth two alternative prongs under which an individual or organization may become a political committee and subject to the Act's reporting requirements. 'Political committee' 16 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 means any person ... having the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures in support of, or opposition to, any candidate or any ballot proposition. RCW 42.17.020(33). Thus, a person or organization may become a political committee by either (1) expecting to receive or receiving contributions, or (2) expecting to make or making expenditures to further electoral political goals. State ex rei. Evergreen Freedom Found. v. Wash. Educ. Ass 'n, 111 Wn. App. 586, 598, 49 P.3d 894 (2002) (EFF) (alteration in original). The EFF court then stated that, according to this court in Dan J Evans, an entity will not become a political committee with filing and disclosure requirements under the expenditure prong unless it also has the support of a political candidate or initiative as the 'primary or one of the primary purposes.' Id. at 598-99 (quoting Dan J Evans, 86 Wn.2d at 509). The parties make statutory and constitutional arguments about how to interpret, and to apply, these primary purpose tests. As this summary shows, our prior precedent does not fully answer those questions. Clearly, though, an entity can meet the definition of a political committee under either the receiving contributions or making expenditures portion of the statutory definition, plus whatever purpose test might also be added on to that statutory definition. We address whether the plaintiffs' claims survive under either the contribution prong or the expenditure prong of the statute, and we deal with the controversy over the purpose test under the expenditure prong-the only prong under which BIAW 17 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 raises it.
The Court of Appeals in this case stated that the evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to the contribution prong. Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 656. It explained, The issue is whether BIAW or BIAW-MSC expected to receive and ultimately did receive the ... funds [contributions] from the local associations. Id. (emphasis added). It then concluded that because BIAW-MSC, not BIAW, ultimately received the contributions in its account and then disbursed them to a registered political committee, ChangeP AC, there was no issue of fact as to whether BIAW expected to receive contributions. Id. But the contribution prong, as the Court of Appeals stated correctly earlier in its opinion, asks whether an organization expects to receive or receives contributions toward electoral goals. Id. at 655 (emphasis added) (citing EFF, 111 Wn. App. at 599). Not whether it expects to receive and receives. That interpretation is in line with the statutory language: 'Political committee' means any person . . having the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures. RCW 42.17A.005(37). Expectation clearly applies to contributions (and also expenditures). The plaintiffs therefore have the better of the argument when they say that the ultimate disposition of the funds does not answer the contribution question; the 18 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 expectation is what matters. And here, as plaintiffs explain, they have presented evidence tending to show that BIAW expected contributions. This is clear from the statutory definition of contribution and the plaintiffs' evidence tending to show such contributions. A contribution is defined in part as a pledge, RCW 42.17 A.005(13)(a)(i), and an organization must register as a political committee within two weeks after organization or within two weeks after the date the committee first has the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures in any election campaign, whichever is earlier. RCW 42.17 A.205(1 ). The plaintiffs filed multiple contemporaneous documents soliciting pledges for BIAW as well as documents stating that pledges were made to BIAW. E.g., CP at 419, 432, 433, 435. This includes, for example, an e-mail from Daimon Doyle, then BIAW and BIAW-MSC president, dated March 12, 2007, stating, Attached are the following documents: the formal resolution (rossi-lution) that we will be asking our 15 locals to support as well as some talking points .... We ... need to be extra careful ... since Dino is not a declared candidate we can't raise money for him therefore all official references are for a '08 candidate for Governor. CP at 410. The rossi-lution itself stated: WHEREAS BIAW is committing 100% of excess retro dollars to the 2008 gubernatorial election, WHEREAS participation of local associations is necessary for success, NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED THAT, 19 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n ofWash., No. 89462-1 The following local associations pledge that all Retro Marketing Assistance funds received in 2007, beyond the amount budgeted for the year, will be sent to the BIAW and placed in the BIAW 2008 gubernatorial election account, to be used for efforts in the 2008 gubernatorial race. CP at 411. The plaintiffs also point to meeting minutes of local associations that appear to make pledges directly to BIAW. For example, [i]t was MSPU [motion, seconded, passed, unanimous] to give BIAW the excess of budgeted funds ... to help in the governor race in 2008. CP at 433. Numerous additional documents- e-mails, meeting minutes, agendas, and organizational resolutions-also state that BIAW is soliciting funds to support its candidate in the upcoming election. See generally CP at 410-55. The Court of Appeals and BIAW explain that this evidence does not prove anything about BIAW' s intentions or expectations because BIAW submitted evidence that 'BIAW' was used generically to refer to BIAW-MSC, BIAW, or both. Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 656. Therefore, [t]he documents to which Utter and Ireland point fail to create an issue of fact. I d. BIAW' s premise does not lead to its conclusion. Instead, the fact that BIAW could refer to either or both BIAW and BIAW-MSC means that the use of BIAW in the documents at issue does not clarify to which organization the documents refer. The admittedly dual meaning of BIAW means that two 20 Utter eta!. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 interpretations are possible. 7 It leaves an open question of fact about which interpretation is correct in each context. The BIAW' s officers' declarations explaining that BIAW was really asking the local organizations to pledge to ChangePAC, not BIAW, e.g., CP at 153, are not sufficient to support summary judgment in light of the plaintiffs' evidence, either. As the plaintiffs point out, the ultimate collection of the pledged funds and distribution to ChangePAC, which does seem to have been accomplished by BIA W-MSC, occurred after the date that the plaintiffs first filed their complaint with the AG's office. And, as noted above, the legal question is which organization had the expectation of receiving contributions. The ultimate acquisition of such funds may certainly be a fact relevant to determining whether an organization expected to receive funds; similarly, BIAW's practice of using BIAW to refer to both BIAW and BIAW -MSC is also a fact relevant to making that determination. But neither fact is dispositive, since BIAW itself acknowledges that BIAW sometimes really does mean just BIAW. Plaintiffs have established a genuine issue of material fact that precludes summary judgment on the contribution prong.
BIA W argues that for plaintiffs to prove BIAW is a political committee 7 See, e.g., Anthis v. Copland, 173 Wn.2d 752, 756, 270 P.3d 574 (2012) (statute subject to two reasonable interpretations is ambiguous). 21 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 under the expenditure prong, plaintiffs must show that ( 1) BIAW made or expected to make expenditures in support of a candidate and (2) BIAW had the primary purpose of supporting an election candidate or initiative. We deal with each argument in turn. 1. There Is a Material Question of Fact about Whether BIAW (as Opposed to BIAW-MSC) Expended or Expected To Expend Funds The plaintiffs argue that BIAW, not BIAW-MSC, expected to and then actually made the expenditures at issue here. The plaintiffs point to the doubtful ownership of the ROil funds (for example, if BIAW receives the funds and then gives them to BIAW-MSC with the express purpose that BIAW-MSC spend them to help elect Dino Rossi, who is expending those funds?). They also rely on a number of documents that BIAW filed with the PDC stating that BIAW was expending funds. For example, one typical document states that the Building Industry Assn ofWA expended $233,648.89 to support candidate Dino Rossi. CP at 253. BIAW responds that this expenditure, and the other documented expenditures also listing BIAW as the entity expending funds, was really made by BIA W- MSC-but there was not enough room on the PDC forms to fill in the full name . .BIAW further asserts that the PDC investigation found that it was BIAW-MSC that expended the funds, not BIAW, and that that is dispositive. 22 Utter eta!. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 The Court of Appeals agreed with BIAW. It stated that most of the plaintiffs' documents did not create any issue of fact as to the expenditure prong, 8 and it relied on the PDC report that formed the basis for the AG's decision not to sue BIA W. Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 658. 9 The concurrence/dissent similarly argues, In this circumstance, we should defer to the PDC's findings because of its expertise in this area, and particularly because of the PDC's fact-finding role, in which it weighed and evaluated conflicting evidence, in reaching its determination that only the BIAW subsidiary, BIAW-MSC, qualified as a political subcommittee. Concurrence/dissent at 4. The concurrence/dissent also states that the PDC is the agency created by and charged with enforcing the FCPA. Concurrence/dissent at 6. The Court of Appeals and the concurrence/dissent err for three reasons: first, 8 The Court of Appeals found there was a factual question as to the expenditure prong based on BIA W's 2008 Internal Revenue Service (IRS) form, which stated that BIA W made political expenditures in the amount of $165,214. Utter, 176 Wn.2d at 659. BIA W argues that was simply a mistake and therefore does not create an issue of fact. The plaintiffs have, however, likely raised an issue of fact as to who made the expenditures based on BIAW's submissions to the PDC naming itself and not BIAW-MSC. Again, BIAW' s argument that BIAW can refer to either entity or both entities seems to create, rather than resolve, the factual question. Also, BIAW' s argument that its 2008 IRS form contained a clerical error might well be accepted by a fact finder but, in light of all the other evidence, it is not sufficient to support summary judgment. 9While the trial court in this case did not explain its reasoning, its summary judgment order states that it considered the PDC's Executive Summary and Staff Analysis and the PDC's Report of Investigation. CP at 833. 23 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 the PDC's legal conclusions here concern statutory interpretation ofthe FCPA, and we therefore apply de novo, not deferential, review; second, the PDC's factual conclusions about whether a set of documents definitively establishes BIAW' s independence from BIAW-MSC is neither technical nor complex, so we need not defer; and third, the PDC's decision on this point was not an agency determination and thus once again, we do not defer. First, the PDC's conclusion that BIAW is not a political committee is based at least in part on its interpretation of the FCP A, a statute. Where statutory construction is concerned, the error of law standard applies. Pub. Uti/. Dist. No. 1 ofPend Oreille County v. Dep 't ofEcology, 146 Wn.2d 778,790, 51 P.3d 744 (2002) (citing RCW 34.05.570(3)(d)). To apply this standard, the court determines the meaning and purpose of a statute de novo, although in the case of an ambiguous statute which falls within the agency's expertise, the agency's interpretation of the statute is accorded great weight, provided it does not conflict with the statute. Id. (citing Postema v. Pollution Control Hr'gs Bd., 142 Wn.2d 68, 77, 11 P.3d 726 (2000)). Because the FCPA is not ambiguous, we need not defer to the PDC's conclusion that BIAW was not a political committee in our de novo review. Second, we recognize that the PDC based its conclusion partly on an assessment of facts; but substantial deference to agency views applies mainly to factual matters that are complex, technical, and close to the heart of the agency's 24 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 expertise. Hillis v. Dep 't of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 396, 932 P.2d 139 (1997). The question about the meaning of documents listing BIAW, not BIAW-MSC, is neither complex nor technical. The question before us-whether documents listing BIAW, not BIAW-MSC, as the entity that solicited and obtained pledges merely raises a material question of fact about whether they mean BIAW or BIAW-MSC-is even less complex or technical. The limited amount of technical knowledge required to evaluate these documents also militates against judicial deference. Finally, the PDC's investigation informing the AG of the beliefs of the PDC staff was not an agency determination to which courts must defer. It was a decision against taking action and against seeking a final determination. RCW 42.17A.755 states: (1) The commissiOn may (a) determine whether an actual violation of this chapter has occurred; and (b) issue and enforce an appropriate order following such a determination. (2) The commission, in cases where it chooses to determine whether an actual violation has occurred, shall hold a hearing pursuant to the administrative procedure act, chapter 34.05 RCW, to make a determination. Any order that the commission issues under this section shall be pursuant to such a hearing. (3) In lieu of holding a hearing or issuing an order under this section, the commission may refer the matter to the attorney general or other enforcement agency as provided in RCW 42.17A.105. 25 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 (6) An order issued by the commission under this section shall be subject to judicial review under the administrative procedure act, chapter 34.05 RCW. Thus, when the PDC chooses to determine if a violation occurred, it must either hold an official hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act or refer the matter to the AG in accordance with RCW 42.17A.105. RCW 42.17A.105(5), the only section relevant to the nondetermination at issue here, states that the PDC shall, [u]pon complaint or upon its own motion, investigate and report apparent violations of this chapter to the appropriate law enforcement authorities. A report concluding that the PDC does not believe any violation requires reporting or other agency action does not fall under any of the statutory categories that we could interpret as constituting an agency action. Indeed, as a practical matter, if the trial court can rely on the PDC's conclusions to grant summary judgment, the effect will be similar to the effect of holding that a PDC investigation alone precludes citizen suits. Such a holding would make citizen suits virtually impossible because it is precisely those situations where the PDC finds no violation occurred that the AG will likely refuse to sue. The Court of Appeals therefore erred when it deferred to the PDC report. Without deference to the PDC report, we are left with BIAW' s argument that the actual expenditures all came from BIAW-MSC, not BIAW. But RCW 26 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 42.17 A.205(1) states that a political committee must register within two weeks after the date the committee first has the expectation of . .. making expenditures in any election campaign. (Emphasis added.) And a political committee includes an organization having the expectation of . . . making expenditures. RCW 42.17A.005(37). The plaintiffs' evidence that BIAW, not BIAW-MSC, solicited pledges from its local associations, and that those local associations pledged to BIAW, not BIAW-MSC or ChangePAC, raises a question of fact as to whether BIAW had an expectation of making political expenditures, regardless of who actually ended up expending the funds. n. We Endorse the A Primary Purpose Test and Hold That There Is a Material Question of Fact about Whether BIAW (as Opposed to BIAW-MSC) Satisfied That Test a. The Reporting Statute Contains No Purpose Test At All; To Construe That Statute as Constitutional, We Must Infer a Primary Purpose Test RCW 42.17 A.005(37) does not say anything about whether an entity will be treated as a political committee even if influencing an election is a minor part of its mission. This is, however, an important First Amendment issue, and both parties seem to agree that some purpose test must be, or has been, added on to the statute to construe it properly. In this case, the Court of Appeals described the applicable purpose test as follows: an organization must have as its primary purpose, or one of its primary 27 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 purposes, to affect, directly or indirectly, governmental decision making by supporting or opposing candidates or ballot propositions. Utter, 176 Wn. App. at 657 (emphasis added) (citing Dan J Evans, 86 Wn.2d at 509). It explicitly declined to address BIAW's contention that this one of its primary purposes test violates the First Amendment. Id. at 654 n.4. The Court of Appeals correctly determined-in dicta-that the numerous statements made by BIAW officials and submitted as evidence by plaintiffs raised a question of fact as to whether a primary purpose of the BIAW was to elect Dino Rossi. But the evidence does not appear to raise a question of fact as to whether that was the primary purpose of BIAW-BIAW existed long before the 2007-2008 campaign season and has many other purposes. See, e.g., CP at 153 (declaration of Tom McCabe, former BIAW officer, stating that BIAW's main purposes are membership and education). So we cannot resolve the issue of whether there is a question of fact without determining the correct test first. BIAW argues that permitting regulation based on a primary purpose of the entity being the support or opposition of a candidate or . . . ballot proposition, RCW 42.17A.005(37), as opposed to the primary purpose of that entity, is unconstitutional under Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam). Specifically, BIAW argues that defining political committee to include organizations with a primary purpose of supporting a candidate rather 28 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 than the primary purpose of supporting a candidate violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution because it chills political speech. Plaintiffs, for their part, would also read some purpose test into the statute-they cite the a primary purpose test first stated by this court in Dan J. Evans and then adopted by the Court of Appeals in EFF, in both cases without discussion of any constitutional implications. BIA W relies on a Fourth Circuit case adopting the the primary purpose'.' test to satisfy First Amendment concerns, N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 289 (4th Cir. 2008). BIAW's Suppl. Br. at 14-15. Plaintiffs point out, however, that the exact argument BIAW makes was rejected by the Ninth Circuit two years later in Human Life of Washington Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2010). That case specifically addressed what it perceived as Washington's a primary purpose test and concluded it did not violate the First Amendment: We disagree with Human Life's reading of Buckley, and we reject its invitation to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting all regulation of groups with 'a' primary purpose of political advocacy. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1009. Brumsickle and Leake thus represent a circuit split on this issue. There is likely no question of fact about whether the primary purpose of BIAW is to support candidates or initiatives. Thus we must decide whether to expressly approve the purpose test we first enunciated, though arguably as dicta, and certainly without considering the constitutional implications, in Dan J. Evans-that 29 Utter eta!. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n ofWash., No. 89462-1 the support of a candidate or initiative must be the primary or one of the primary purposes of a person expending funds for the State to subject them to regulation as a political committee based on their expected expenditures. 86 Wn.2d at 509 (emphasis omitted). Seven circuits have addressed this question. Brumsickle, as noted above, considered the question in the context of Washington law. It applied the exacting scrutiny standard of review mandated by Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, and Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 366-67, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010), for evaluating the constitutionality ofthe campaign disclosure (as opposed to contribution or expenditure limit) statutes, ruled that there was a substantial relationship between Washington's informational interest and its decision to impose disclosure requirements on organizations with a primary purpose of political advocacy, and approved of what it perceived as our a primary purpose test. Brumsickle, 624 F .3d at 1009-11. Brumsickle was followed by the First Circuit in National Organization for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011). That court stated that endorsement of the the primary purpose test could yield perverse results because a small group with the major purpose of re-electing a Maine state representative that spends $1,500 for ads could be required to register as a [political action committee (PAC)]. But a mega-group that spends $1,500,000 to defeat the same candidate would not have to register 30 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 because the defeat of that candidate could not be considered the corporation's major purpose. Id. (quoting Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 723 F.Supp.2d 245, 264 (D. Me. 201 0) ). The Seventh Circuit agreed with Brumsickle and McKee and held that state campaign disclosure laws are not overbroad for lacking the major purpose test. Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 491 (7th Cir. 2012). And, most recently, the Second Circuit followed suit, stating, We join the Circuits that have considered PAC definitions in this context after Citizens United and hold that the Constitution does not require disclosure regulatory statutes to be limited to groups having 'the major purpose' of nominating or electing a candidate. Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 136 (2d Cir. 2014). Thus, four of the seven circuits that have addressed the question have found that state disclosure requirements need not be limited to organizations with the major (or primary) purpose of electioneering to comply with the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit has not directly answered the question, but it has recognized the circuit split and appears to engage in a sort of balancing test. It has held that the major purpose of an organization is an important consideration in determining the extent of permissible regulation. Iowa Right To Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 592 (8th Cir. 2013). It also found, however, that some 31 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 regulation is permissible without [the] major purpose test, depending on the type and extent of regulation. I d. at 594. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits have rejected state disclosure requirements that lack the major purpose test. The Tenth Circuit, though, does not appear to distinguish between a test that uses a major purpose and one that uses the major purpose. See Colo. Right To Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1155 (lOth Cir. 2007) (referring to legislation that used the phrase a major purp?se as including the very 'major purpose' test at issue). Thus it appears that only the Fourth Circuit has unequivocally rejected a state law that requires a primary purpose of electioneering rather than the primary purpose to subject a campaigning entity to filing and disclosure requirements. Leake, 525 F.3d at 287 (the importance the plaintiffs attach to the definite article is correct). Since Leake was decided, the First, Second, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have rejected its reasonmg. We agree with the majority of circuits that have addressed this issue. As discussed, the statutory definition of political committee contains no limitation regarding the purpose of such a committee. Reading some stringent purpose requirement, like the a primary purpose test, into our statute is necessary to satisfy First Amendment concerns. Adopting the even more stringent the primary purpose test, however, would likely contravene the intent of the voters to extend the 32 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 reach of this state's filing and disclosure requirements as much as possible and is not necessary to satisfy the First Amendment. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1009. Additionally, Washington courts have previously espoused an a primary purpose test. Dan J. Evans, 86 Wn.2d at 509; accord EFF, 111 Wn. App. at 598-99. b. Plaintiffs Have Raised a Genuine Issue of Fact under Washington's a Primary Purpose Test The plaintiffs have established a question of fact as to whether BIAW had the support of a candidate as one of its primary purposes during the 2007-2008 campaign season. For example, the plaintiffs submitted BIAW board of director meeting minutes stating that BIAW' s number one priority this campaign season would be to help Rossi get elected. CP at 608. A letter from BIA W's 2008 president Brad Spears to BIAW members whose memberships were about to expire states that BIAW is putting forth the largest political effort in the entire history of the association 'to re-elect' Dino Rossi as governor. CP at 406. Minutes of a local association's directors' meeting state, On behalf of BIAW, Brad Spears spoke to the Board [and] talked about how we have a Governor who is unfriendly to our industry .... BIA W has decided that with this scenario all of our efforts for the next two years need to be expended on electing a new Governor in 2008. CP at 418-19. And an issue ofBIA W's newsletter, Building Insight, contains an article titled An 33 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 Open Letter to all [Master's Building Association] Members from BIA W Senior Officers, which states: As the Building Industry Association of Washington's (BIAW) 2008 Senior Officers, it is a pleasure and an honor to serve as the leaders of this great association. Our primary goal this year has been to unify BIAW members and local associations behind a coordinated, all out effort to elect Dino Rossi as Governor . . . . BIAW is running an aggressive and truthful campaign to elect Dino. It is our hope and desire that you will join us in this endeavor and encourage your local association (MBA of King and Snohomish Counties) to actively participate with us to achieve this goal. CP at 368 (emphasis added). BIAW argues that all the statements by BIAW officers about BIAW were in fact statements in their capacities as BIAW-MSC officers about BIAW-MSC. We discussed this argument above; it is an argument for the trier of fact. The BIAW officer declarations saying that BIAW's main purposes are membership and education, CP at 153, are not sufficient to support a grant of summary judgment in light of the plaintiffs' evidence. B. The Decision in WBBT Does Not Collaterally Estop BIA W from Denying That It Owns the Funds at Issue Here The parties argue about whether a recent case, In re Washington Builders Benefit Trust, 173 Wn. App. 34, 45, 293 P.3d 1206 (WBBT), review denied, 177 Wn.2d 1018 (2013), conclusively proves thatBIAW owned the ROil funds that were handled through BIAW-MSC's accounts. WBBT concerned a trust established by 34 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 BIAW, the Washington Builders Benefit Trust, for the purpose of holding and investing the ROil funds BIAW got from L&I under its retro program. The WBBT case is extremely complicated and involved complaints by participants in the retro program that BIAWand BIAW-MSC, trustees of the trust, were retaining interest earned on deposited funds, commingling funds, and failing to provide statutorily required accountings as well as violat[ing] their fiduciary duties under the trust agreement in expending funds earmarked for marketing and promotion of the plan. WBBT, 173 Wn. App. at 43. Part of the case involved determining what organizations controlled the funds that were supposed to go into the trust and when they controlled them. WBBT found, for example, that [i]n July of each year, the BIAW-Member Services Corporation transferred an additional 10 percent marketing assistance fee to its money marketing accounts, which fee was distributed to BIAW. !d. at 50-51. The plaintiffs argue that BIAW is collaterally estopped from denying it owns the funds at issue here because that issue was litigated in WBBT and BIAW lost. But, as BIAW points out, a prerequisite to application of collateral estoppel is that the identical issue was litigated. BIAW is correct that the issue in WBBT is not identical to the issue here: who controls funds for purposes of determining whether a trustee violated fiduciary duties or contractual obligations is not the same issue as who expended or expected to expend funds for political committee registration 35 Utter eta!. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 purposes. In addition, in the absence of collateral estoppel, plaintiffs cannot rely on WBBT to create an issue of fact any more than BIAW can rely on the PDC investigation to argue that there is no issue of fact. C. We Do Not Reach BIAW'S Argument That Reporting Requirements for Political Committees Would Be Unconstitutionally Onerous as Applied to BIAW BIAW argues that the reporting requirements for political committees would be unconstitutionally onerous as applied to BIAW if it were considered a political committee. As discussed above, BIAW is correct that political committee registration requirements are subject to exacting scrutiny. Brumsickle, 624 F .3d at 1005 (citing Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67). Under exacting scrutiny, the question of whether any applicable registration requirements, as applied to BIAW during any relevant time period, would have resulted in an unconstitutionally onerous burden involves a strong factual component-it would require a court to address the specific reporting requirements and balance the burden of the disclosure requirements for the specific time period in that particular case against the government's interest in providing the public with campaign finance information. See Brumsickle, 624 F .3d at 1008, 1013. We do not have a sufficient factual record to determine whether any applicable reporting requirements as applied to BIAW at the relevant time would have been onerous or would have been substantially related to the government's 36 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 interest, nor have the parties briefed this issue in depth. This constitutional issue is thus not ripe for review. D. The ''Attribution Statute Applies Only to Aggregate Contributions and Not to the Definition of Political Committee Plaintiffs argue that the FCPA permits automatic attribution of contributions or expenditures by one organization to a parent or controlling organization for purposes of defining a political committee. BIAW argues that the FCPA permits such automatic attribution only for purposes of contribution limits and not for purposes of determining whether an organization has received contributions or made expenditures that require it to register as a political committee. 10 The plaintiffs rely mainly on just one sentence from RCW 42.17A.455, which states, in relevant part: For purposes of this chapter: ... All contributions made by a person or political committee whose contribution or expenditure activity is financed, maintained, or controlled by a trade association, labor union, collective bargaining organization, or the local unit of a trade association, labor union, or collective bargaining organization are considered made by the trade association, labor union, collective bargaining organization, or local unit of a trade association, labor union, or collective bargaining organization. 10 The following organizations have submitted an amici briefing in support of BIA W's argument on this particular point: Washington State Labor Council, SEIU Healthcare 775NW, UFCW 21, Washington Education Association, SEIU Healthcare 1199NW, and SEIU Local 925. 37 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 RCW 42.17 A.455(2). The plaintiffs assert that this statute applies to the definition of political committee-any person ... having the expectation of receiving contributions or making expenditures in support of, or opposition to, any candidate or any ballot proposition. RCW 42.17 A.005(37). 'Expenditure' includes a ... contribution. RCW 42.17 A.005(20). Thus, plaintiffs argue that since [a]ll contributions made by a person or political committee whose contribution or expenditure activity is ... controlled by a trade association ... are considered made by the trade association, RCW 42.17 A.455(2), if BIAW-MSC made contributions or expenditures and plaintiffs show BIAW controlled BIAW-MSC, then all of BIAW-MSC's contributions or expenditures are automatically attributed to BIAW. Plaintiffs' argument is largely based on the fact that RCW 42.17 A.455 begins, For purposes of this chapter and the chapter is all of chapter 42.17 A RCW. They point out that there is no good reason to apply this attribution statute only to contribution limits, except that it would be very inconvenient for the defendants. BIAW counters that the attribution statute does not apply to the definition of political committee but only to limits on campaign contributions. BIAW points out that the statute at issue was created by a citizens' initiative 20 years after the definition of political committee was codified (also as a result of a citizens' initiative), and that the text of the initiative in the voter's pamphlet gave no indication that the initiative was intended to expand registration obligations. Rather, BIAW 38 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 argues, the initiative was labeled AN ACT Relating to the regulation of political contributions and campaign expenditures. LAWS OF 1993, ch. 2, § 1 (Initiative Measure No. 134, approved Nov. 3, 1992). Part III of the initiative, where the attribution rule appears, is labeled CONTRIBUTIONS. Id. § 4. And the other sections in Part III address contribution limits, not reporting requirements. Further, BIAW argues that the legislation contains a statement of the voters' intent (which also appeared in the language of the initiative}: (2) By limiting campaign contributions, the people intend to: (a) Ensure that individuals and interest groups have fair and equal opportunity to influence elective and governmental processes; (b) Reduce the influence oflarge organizational contributors; and (c) Restore public trust in governmental institutions and the electoral process. RCW 42.17 A.400 (emphasis added). 11 The Court of Appeals agreed with the BIAW that the attribution statute did not apply to the definition of political committee but only to caps on campaign 11 BIA W also contends that our court has acknowledged that the attribution statute was intended to apply to contribution limits, not to the determination of who is a political committee. We did state that [RCW 42.17A.455] specifies a relationship between entities in which those entities are considered a single entity for purposes of campaign contribution limits. Edelman v. State ex rel. Pub. Disclosure Comm 'n, 152 Wn.2d 584, 590, 99 P.3d 386 (2004) (emphasis added). However, that statement was likely dicta-the court in Edelman was not presented with the question whether the attribution statute could apply outside the campaign contribution limits context. 39 Utter et al. v. Bldg. Indus. Ass 'n of Wash., No. 89462-1 contributions. The Court of Appeals and BIAW rely heavily on American Legion Post No. 149 v. Washington State Department of Health, 164 Wn.2d 570, 192 P.3d 306 (2008), to reach this conclusion. In American Legion, this court ignored a statutory provision resulting from an initiative that stated that the statute applied to '[t]his chapter.' Id. at 586-91 & n.7. But we held that the phrase did not mean what it said because such a reading would eviscerate much of the [Smoking in Public Places] Act[, ch. 70.160 RCW,] and interfere with the express intent of the voters. !d. at 588-89. Those are strong words. And even so, there was a vigorous