Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Instruct Regarding Which Guilt Phase Instructions Applied at the Penalty Phase

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by not rereading all of the still-applicable guilt phase instructions at the penalty phase, or at least informing the jury which specific instructions remained applicable. Defendant did not raise this claim below and therefore has forfeited it. If we were to reach the merits of defendant's claim, we would conclude there was no error in the trial court's instruction as to the general continued applicability of guilt phase instructions subject to specific exceptions. ( Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1067, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 467, 140 P.3d 775; People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 73-74, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118.) We agree with defendant, however, that two limiting instructions given at the guilt phase were inapplicable at the penalty phase and should not have been included in the written instruction packet provided to the jury: a modified version of CALJIC No. 1.00, which in part instructed the jury to reach a just verdict regardless of the consequences, and a modified version of CALJIC No. 3.32, which in part instructed the jury it could consider evidence of defendant's mental condition solely for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant actually formed any intent or mental state which is an element of the crimes charged. [55] The trial court's error in failing to delete these instructions, however, was harmless under any standard. Despite the inclusion of CALJIC No. 1.00 in the packet of written instructions, as other instructions and counsel's arguments made clear, the jury's role at the penalty phase was so obviously contrary to this part of the instruction that no reasonable juror possibly could have been confused by the inclusion of the written instruction not to consider the consequences of the verdict, an instruction that was not given orally to the jury at the penalty phase. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 644, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 443, 243 Cal.Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279.) Similarly, with regard to the erroneous inclusion of CALJIC No. 3.32, the trial court, consistent with CALJIC No. 8.85, orally instructed the jury that during the penalty phase, [i]n determining which aggravating and mitigating factors are to be applied and in deciding which penalty is to be imposed on the Defendant, you are to consider all of the evidence which has been received during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial, except as you might be specifically instructed. [¶] Your consideration of that evidence and your deliberations are to be in accordance with these instructions and the instructions which I have previously given you with certain specific exceptions that I will note for you in these instructions. The court then told the jury it was to consider in mitigation any aspect of the crimes or of the Defendant's character, background and record that suggests that death is not the appropriate punishment, any sympathetic or other aspect of the Defendant's conduct or record, and any sympathetic aspect of his character, upbringing and childhood ' circumstance that the Defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offenses for which he's been convicted and, even more specifically, [w]hether the Defendant was subjected to sexual or other abuse as a child and whether such abuse contributed to his criminal conduct. This modified version of CALJIC No. 8.85 also was provided to the jury in written form. The arguments of defense counsel and the prosecutor further explained that defendant's asserted mental condition could be considered in mitigation. Accordingly, the clear import of the instructions as a whole, in conjunction with counsel's arguments, was that such evidence could be considered as mitigating evidence, beyond the limitation of its use at the guilt phase.