Opinion ID: 1725297
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the board of supervisors

Text: The Mohundros assert that Dixon and the other supervisors, in their individual capacities, are not entitled to qualified immunity under the facts of this case. Generally, supervisors have been found to be immune from liability for injuries resulting from the negligent maintenance of public roads. Coplin v. Francis, 631 So.2d 752, 753 (Miss. 1994); Webb v. County of Lincoln, 536 So.2d 1356, 1358-1360 (Miss. 1988). However, this qualified immunity only affords protection against suits arising out of the performance of discretionary duties. Coplin, 631 So.2d at 753; Davis v. Little, 362 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss. 1978). A supervisor or other public official has no immunity to a civil action for damages if his breach of a legal duty cause injury and (1) that duty is ministerial in nature, or (2) that duty involves the use of discretion and the governmental actor greatly or substantially exceeds his authority and in the course thereof causes harm, or (3) the governmental actor commits an intentional tort. Grantham v. Mississippi Dept. of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 225 (Miss. 1988). A duty is ministerial in nature when the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion.... Coplin, 631 So.2d at 754, quoting Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 865, 158 So. 922, 923 (1935); See also, T.M. v. Noblitt, 650 So.2d 1340, 1342 (Miss. 1995). Miss. Code Ann. § 65-21-1 (1972) sets out the following requirements for the placement of culverts: All culverts hereafter built, rebuilt, or placed in any public road in this state shall be not less than the full width of the crown of the roadway, and shall have guide or warning posts on either side. In the case at bar Dixon stated in his deposition that the culvert in question extended beyond the roadbed by approximately 12 feet on both sides. There was no evidence concerning the placement of guide or warning posts. In Coplin this Court opined: We now resolve the questions regarding the applicability of ministerial/discretionary function dichotomy to the construction of bridges left unanswered in Fortune. Boards of supervisors are vested with full jurisdiction over the roads, bridges and ferries in their respective counties. Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-41 (1972). We long have maintained that a county has no liability except as authorized by state. Leflore County v. Big Sand Drainage District, 383 So.2d 501 (Miss. 1980). In Webb v. County of Lincoln, 536 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Miss. 1988) and State for the Use and Benefit of Brazeale v. Lewis, 498 So.2d 321, 323 (Miss. 1986), we recognized that Miss. Code Ann. § 19-13-51 [2] partially abrogates the immunity of boards of supervisors in their capacity as overseers of a county's roads and bridges. However, in Lewis, we noted that the statute does in fact, reinforce the discretionary-ministerial distinction by allowing the board as a whole the authority to make discretionary decisions with regard to the general condition and state of maintenance of county roads and bridges, thus leaving intact the board's qualified immunity for such decisions. Id. at 323. In finding that road maintenance and repair are discretionary rather than ministerial functions, we stated in Lewis: Assuming arguendo that an individual member of the board of supervisors has a ministerial duty or function to maintain the roads of his district, we recognize that, for various reasons, at least some roads may be in a state of disrepair from time to time, particularly due to lack of funds, which would, of course, require that the main, heavily-traveled roads receive the supervisor's immediate attention. Certainly, making the determination as to which roads should be the better maintained under such conditions would be a discretionary matter with the individual member of the board, absent some personal tort committed by him. In Lewis the plaintiff alleged that her injuries were caused by numerous holes, indentations, and rough spots along the road which culminated in creating a hazardous condition. Id. at 321-322, and in Webb we relied on Lewis to find that the repair of a fallen stop sign, which the plaintiffs alleged caused the one-car accident in which they were injured, was also a discretionary function. Coplin, 631 at 754-55. The minimum requirements of the construction of culverts is specified in Miss. Code Ann. § 65-21-1 leaving no room for discretion in meeting the minimum standards set out there. There is no evidence that these standards were not met; therefore, there was no breach of a ministerial duty on the part of the board as a whole, Dixon or any of the other individual supervisors. The law is not clear as to whether an individual supervisor has a ministerial duty or function to see to the repair and maintenance of the roads and bridges within his district or whether that duty is only one of the Board of Supervisors as a whole. In Coplin, we found that the supervisor in that case did have a such a duty and we reversed summary judgment. The decision to replace the existing bridge on Mathis road with a culvert was a discretionary function, but there may be a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Dixon substantially exceeded his authority in making that decision. He made the decision on his own without consulting the rest of the board or a professional engineer to see if a culvert would be sufficient. See Coplin, 631 So.2d at 755. Miss. Code Ann. § 19-3-41 (1972) vests the board of supervisors of a county with full jurisdiction of roads, bridges and ferries. Dixon knew of the washout in Mathis Road on Sunday morning and was admittedly worried that someone might drive into it. Even though he was cognizant of the dangerous condition, by the time Mohundro drove off into the pit Monday morning, Dixon still had made no effort to warn the public other than to post unilluminated signs. Although whether to erect a barricade or some other type of warning device is dependent upon the public official's judgment and discretion, if it may be shown that Dixon acted with such gross neglect or callous indifference to the safety of Mohundro and the public as a whole such that his conduct may be fairly described as constructively intentional, he is not entitled to immunity. See McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871, 881 (Miss. 1989). The Mohundros give no authority nor can we find any to support their argument that the supervisors in their individual capacities breached a ministerial duty by allowing Dixon to make decisions concerning the repair and maintenance of county roads on his own.