Opinion ID: 2401946
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Perpetration of a Felony and Multiple Murder Aggravators

Text: Appellant also argues that the jury's consideration of the perpetration of a felony and multiple murder aggravating circumstances violated his state and federal constitutional rights. More specifically, Appellant claims that submission of these aggravators was improper because they violate the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions. Appellant's argument, however, is without merit. As an initial matter, we note that the double jeopardy protections afforded by the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions are coextensive and prohibit successive prosecutions and multiple punishments for the same offense. Commonwealth v. Cosnek, 575 Pa. 411, 836 A.2d 871, 873 n. 2 (2003); Commonwealth v. Buffington, 574 Pa. 29, 828 A.2d 1024, 1029 (2003). In Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 533 Pa. 539, 626 A.2d 133 (1993), this Court explained: Aggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or offenses, but are standards to guide the making of the choice between the alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment. The judge's finding of any particular aggravating circumstance does not of itself convict a defendant (i.e. require the death penalty), and the failure to find any particular aggravating circumstance does not acquit a defendant (i.e., preclude the death penalty). Gibbs, 626 A.2d at 136 (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986)). Because this Court has recognized that aggravating circumstances do not constitute separate penalties or offenses, no double jeopardy rights were implicated by the submission of the perpetration of a felony and multiple murder aggravating circumstances to the jury. In addition, Appellant asserts that the multiple murder aggravating circumstance violates the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the context of a challenge to the breadth of an aggravator, to survive an Eighth Amendment challenge `an aggravating circumstance must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the defendant compared to others found guilty of murder.' Commonwealth v. Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 815 A.2d 563, 588-89 (2002) (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)). The multiple murder aggravator provides that it is an aggravating circumstance if [t]he defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(11). As worded, this aggravating circumstance clearly narrows the class of persons eligible for the death penalty by excluding those individuals who have not been convicted of another murder. Moreover, the multiple murder aggravator reasonably justifies the imposition of a more severe sentence because, based upon their risk of danger to general society, those individuals convicted of multiple murders warrant a harsher punishment. As such, the multiple murder aggravator comports with the necessary requirements of the Eighth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. See Commonwealth v. Cross, 508 Pa. 322, 496 A.2d 1144, 1153-54 (1985) (finding that the (d)(10) aggravating circumstance, which includes the circumstances of multiple murders, is not arbitrary and capricious). Accordingly, Appellant's constitutional claims fail.