Opinion ID: 2632784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts relevant to speedy trial

Text: Brown was arraigned on June 4, 2003, and was taken into custody on that date. The court set the case for jury trial to begin August 20, 2003. On July 30, 2003, Brown's attorney filed a motion to continue the trial in order to retain an expert witness. On August 1, 2003, the trial court granted the motion and reset the trial to October 27, 2003. The journal entry granting the motion stated: The time is assessed to the defendant. On October 27, 2003, the county attorney was ill. This caused the trial court to vacate the trial date and set the case for a trial rescheduling conference to be held November 6, 2003. As a result of this conference, the trial was reset for November 20, 2003. On November 13, 2003, Brown filed a motion for discharge pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402 alleging that the statutory 90-day period expired on November 9, 2003. Brown contended that the delay caused by his continuance commenced to run on August 20, 2003, the original trial date. The State countered that the delay attributable to Brown's continuance should be computed from August 1, 2003, the date the continuance was granted. If the 19 days between the date the motion was granted and the originally scheduled trial date are assessed to the defendant, then only 82 days elapsed between arraignment and trial. If the 19 days are assessed to the State, then 101 days had elapsed. For convenience, the following chart shows the relevant chronological events and the period in dispute: NO. OF CHARGEABLE TO: DATE(S) EVENT DAYS STATE DEF. DISPUTED 1. 6/4/03 Arraignment; case set for 57 57 0 No to jury trial 8/20/03. 8/1/03 2. 8/1/03 Defendant's motion for 19 ? ? Yes to continuance to retain 8/20/03 expert granted; jury trial reset for 10/27/03. 3. 8/20/03 Period of time between 68 0 68 No to original trial date and 10/27/03 rescheduled trial date. 4. 10/27/03 Trial date vacated due to 25 25 0 No to county attorney's illness; trial 11/20/03 rescheduled for 11/20/03. Trial commenced 11/20/03. TOTALS 169 82 68 19 The trial court assessed the 19 days in dispute to Brown, holding: Because the continuance was sought by defendant it seems logical that the time chargeable to defendant should be from the time his motion was granted (August 1, 2003) to the continued trial date (October 27, 2003). The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of the motion for discharge, with two members of the panel holding that the delay from the date the continuance was granted until the rescheduled trial date was chargeable against the defendant for speedy trial purposes pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3402(1). State v. Brown, 34 Kan.App.2d 746, Syl. ¶ 2, 124 P.3d 1035. The dissent disagreed, contending that the period of delay should be computed from the originally scheduled trial date.