Opinion ID: 1433580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: People v. Municipal Court (Solberg)

Text: (4) (See fn. 6.) Appellants Judge Marie-Victoire and the municipal court do not rely on the theory upon which the former denied the People's motion to disqualify her, and it is therefore deemed waived. [6] (1b) Instead, appellants principally contend that section 170.6 is unconstitutional because it violates the doctrine of separation of powers (Cal. Const., art. III, § 3) and impairs the independence of the judiciary ( Id., art. VI, § 1). As amplified by amici curiae, [7] the contention is that because section 170.6 does not require the attorney or party to state the reasons for his allegation of prejudice, the statute in effect delegates to the representatives of the executive branch and to private litigants the legislative power to define the legal grounds for disqualification of trial judges; and because section 170.6 neither requires proof of such allegation of prejudice nor permits judicial review of its truth, the statute in effect delegates to the same persons the judicial power to determine whether such a ground in fact exists in the particular case in which it is invoked. In Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) supra, 50 Cal.2d 693, 695-696, we rejected these identical arguments in sustaining the constitutionality of the statute. We have reviewed the decision in the light of the points raised in the present appeal, and we are convinced the opinion of Chief Justice Gibson therein, properly understood, remains sound law. For the guidance of bench and bar, however, we undertake to restate his reasoning and relate it to the concerns now urged upon us. [8] (5) At the outset it seems necessary to reiterate the basic principle of government underlying the decision in Johnson : the doctrine of the separation of powers, although enshrined in the Constitution and fundamental to the preservation of our civil liberties, does not mean that the three departments of our government are not in many respects mutually dependent. ( Brydonjack v. State Bar (1929) 208 Cal. 439, 442 [281 P. 1018, 66 A.L.R. 1507].) (6) As this court explained more than half a century ago, the constitutional jurisdiction and powers of the superior court [as defined in article VI of the Constitution] can in nowise be trenched upon, lessened or limited by the legislature. While this is undoubtedly true it does not follow that the legislative department of the state government possesses no regulative power with relation to the jurisdiction of the superior courts of the state or to the method and procedure in and means of which the constitutional powers of these courts are to be exercised. On the contrary, it has been decided by this court in a long and consistent line of cases that `the procedure by which the jurisdiction of said courts is to be exercised may be prescribed by the legislature, and that the statutory regulation thereof will be upheld unless such regulations should be found to substantially impair the constitutional powers of the courts or practically defeat their exercise.' ( Sacramento etc. D. Dist. v. Superior Court (1925) 196 Cal. 414, 432 [238 P. 687].) To put the matter affirmatively and more simply, the Legislature may regulate the exercise of the jurisdiction of the courts by all reasonable means. (7) (See fn. 9.) Applying the foregoing principle in Johnson, we held that the disqualification of trial judges is an aspect of the judicial system which is subject to reasonable legislative regulation; that prejudice may properly be declared a ground of such disqualification; and that it is wholly unnecessary  we could have said it is virtually impossible  for the Legislature to attempt to list the many conceivable factors which might cause a judge to be prejudiced. (50 Cal.2d at p. 696.) [9] We then held that the method adopted by the Legislature for achieving its purpose was also reasonable. We first stressed the importance of maintaining the appearance as well as the fact of impartiality in the judicial system: the business of the courts, we observed, must be conducted in such a manner as will avoid even the suspicion of unfairness. ( Id., at p. 697.) Secondly, we recognized the inherent difficulty of proving a state of mind such as prejudice, as well as the natural reluctance of courts to declare biased a judge who asserts that he is not. From these premises we reasoned that In order to insure confidence in the judiciary and avoid the suspicion which might arise from the belief of a litigant that the judge is biased in a case where it may be difficult or impossible for the litigant to persuade a court that his belief is justified, the Legislature could reasonably conclude that a party should have an opportunity to obtain the disqualification of a judge for prejudice, upon a sworn statement, without being required to establish it as a fact to the satisfaction of a judicial body. ( Ibid. ) Much of the confusion about the rationale of Johnson would be cleared up if the last-quoted sentence were carefully read: we held the affidavit procedure to be reasonable in these circumstances not because it establishes prejudice as a fact but because it expresses the belief of a litigant that he cannot have a fair trial before the assigned judge. (8) Indeed, section 170.6 explicitly recognizes such belief as a sufficient ground for disqualification: although subdivision (1) speaks generally of establishing by affidavit that the judge in question is prejudiced, subdivision (2) explains that prejudice will be deemed established for this purpose if the party or his attorney swears he cannot or believes that he cannot have a fair and impartial trial or hearing before such judge (italics added). It is thus a misreading of Johnson to charge that the decision is based on the fiction that the affidavit proves the judge is actually prejudiced, or that we there created an irrebuttable presumption of actual prejudice from the mere filing of such affidavit. Neither is true, for the reason that actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to invoking the statute. As we recently emphasized, It is well recognized that in enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 the Legislature guaranteed to litigants an extraordinary right to disqualify a judge. The right is `automatic' in the sense that a good faith belief in prejudice is alone sufficient, proof of facts showing actual prejudice not being required. (Italics in original.) ( McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) supra, 12 Cal.3d 512, 531.) The affidavit is thus simply a formal means of expressing such belief; and in order to preserve public confidence in the impartiality of the courts, the belief alone will justify disqualification. [10] It is earnestly contended, however, that Johnson is distinguishable because it addressed only the facial validity of section 170.6, and that the experience of the courts with the actual operation of the statute during the past two decades reveals such widespread and persistent abuses thereof as to warrant reconsideration of the question and a holding that section 170.6 is now unconstitutional as applied. The abuses which are said to have occurred may be divided into two principal categories. First, section 170.6 has assertedly been invoked for the purpose of judge-shopping, i.e., of removing the assigned judge from the case on grounds other than a belief that he is personally prejudiced within the meaning of the statute. It is conceded that a litigant is not entitled to insist on a judge of his choice. But it is argued that removal of a judge on unauthorized grounds artificially reduces the pool of qualified judges available to hear the case, injects an element of lawlessness into the judicial process, and operates in each case to abridge the neutrality of the judiciary. Among the unauthorized grounds most commonly invoked, it is charged, is the disqualification of a judge because of his views on the law or on the exercise of judicial discretion. [11] Such a disqualification assertedly has the chilling effect of discouraging judicial creativity in fashioning new rules of law, and violates the spirit of the settled principle that prior legal rulings do not constitute actual bias warranting removal of a judge for cause. ( Calhoun v. Superior Court (1958) 51 Cal.2d 257, 260-261 [331 P.2d 648]; Kreling v. Superior Court (1944) 25 Cal.2d 305, 310-312 [153 P.2d 734], and cases cited.) Disqualification motions are also filed, it is alleged, when the party or his counsel believes the assigned judge is not professionally, emotionally, or physically competent to preside over the particular case, or has exhibited undesirable personality traits such as injudiciousness or irascibility to a degree which threatens to impair the conduct of the proceedings. Not only are these considerations improper under the statute, but it is claimed that such a decision tends too easily to turn on the litigant's opinion as to whether the judge's prior rulings were wise or correct; and in serious cases, disqualification on any of these grounds assertedly impinges on the constitutional powers of the Commission on Judicial Performance to censure, remove, or retire a judge in appropriate circumstances. (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 18.) Second, section 170.6 is said to have been invoked for a variety of purely tactical advantages. In a single-judge court a litigant who files a motion to disqualify automatically obtains a significant delay while an outside judge is brought into the case. Some delay inevitably ensues even in multi-judge courts; and in multi-branch courts, a disqualification may also result in a desired change in the place as well as the date of trial. In addition, in courts with specialized departments  such as a psychiatric or juvenile department  the statute has been used to remove the judge regularly sitting in that department in the hope of benefiting from the substitution of a less experienced judge. Finally, it is charged the statute has been invoked to intimidate judges generally and in certain cases even to influence the outcome of judicial election campaigns (see, e.g., Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 386-387 [66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372]). We need not lengthen this recital by recounting further examples of asserted abuse of section 170.6; they are doubtless known to the bench and bar. For present purposes we assume the charges are true. We do not condone such practices, nor do we underestimate their effect on the operation of our trial courts. (1c) Nevertheless for a number of reasons we are not persuaded that we should reconsider Johnson on this ground and hold the statute invalid as applied. [12] To begin with, it is inaccurate to assert that we did not know of these abuses when we decided Johnson. It is true that section 170.6 had then been in effect for somewhat less than a year. (See fn. 20, post. ) But the statutes of our sister states upon which it was modelled had been operational for many years, and we were well aware of the experience thereunder. (See cases collected at pp. 697-698 of 50 Cal.2d.) For example, one of the decisions on which we relied was the leading case of U'Ren v. Bagley (1926) 118 Ore. 77 [245 P. 1074, 46 A.L.R. 1173], which upheld the constitutionality of a disqualification statute essentially identical to section 170.6 ( id., at pp. 1074-1075). More than three decades before Johnson the Oregon court acknowledged it was not unmindful that this law has been shamefully abused, and listed as examples the removal of judges because of their views on the law, disruptions of judicial assignments, and delays in bringing cases to trial. ( Id., at p. 1077.) Nevertheless the court discounted the legal effect of such practices, reasoning that these are matters which may be more appropriately addressed to the Legislature. We are not justified in declaring a statute unconstitutional merely because of its abuse. ( Ibid. ) We closely echoed these words in Johnson, declaring that The possibility that the section may be abused by parties seeking to delay trial or to obtain a favorable judge was a matter to be balanced by the Legislature against the desirability of the objective of the statute.... [A]nd the fact that some persons may abuse the section is not a ground for holding the provision to be unconstitutional. (50 Cal.2d at p. 697.) It is a further misreading of Johnson to take this passage to refer only to hypothetical abuses potentially occurring in the future. Although we did not pause to catalog the various misuses of the statute, the practices now complained of were clearly within the contemplation of the court. The experience of the ensuing years has added quantitatively but not qualitatively to our understanding of the problem. In these circumstances Johnson cannot fairly be distinguished on the ground that it sustained only the facial validity of section 170.6. Secondly, a case can be made for the proposition that some of the abuses condemned by amici judges are self-limiting. For example, a lawyer who practices in a single-judge court must realize that an improper use of section 170.6 in one or more cases risks antagonizing the very judge before whom he must inevitably appear in all the other cases he has and will have in that court. It is true that an individual litigant may not share his concern, but the lawyer's self-interest should give him ample incentive to dissuade his client from demanding an unjustified disqualification. In a multi-judge court this risk is attenuated but not negligible; and in both settings it is compounded by the real possibility that the substitute judge who enters the case may be even less satisfactory to the lawyer or his client than the judge whom they disqualify. In that event there is no escape from the dilemma  short of undertaking the often difficult task of attempting to prove actual bias under section 170  because subdivision (3) of section 170.6 declares that under no circumstances can a party or his attorney make more than one motion pursuant thereto in each case. The latter provision, of course, is one of the several statutory safeguards which we characterized in Johnson as designed to minimize such abuses. (50 Cal.2d at p. 697.) The others are ( ibid. ) that the section requires that the party or his attorney show good faith by declaring under oath that the judge is prejudiced, and provides for timely making of the challenge before trial, for strictly limited granting of continuances, and for reassignment as promptly as possible. We do not share amici judges' pessimistic view of the effectiveness of these safeguards. As to the affidavit requirement, we recognize that some minimal degree of false swearing may be unavoidable in any contemporary judicial system. But this does not mean the requirement is a hollow formality, or that substantial numbers of members of the bar are so neglectful of their personal and professional honor that they repeatedly perjure themselves merely to gain an uncertain advantage in litigation. We therefore reaffirm the belief we expressed in Johnson that We cannot properly assume that there will be a wholesale making of false statements under oath (50 Cal.2d at p. 697). Next we emphasize the important fact that in the years since Johnson the courts of this state have been vigilant to enforce the statutory restrictions on the number and timing of motions permitted. Thus decisions of the Courts of Appeal too numerous to cite have insisted on strict compliance with the requirement (subd. (2)) that if the assigned judge is known ten days before trial the motion must be made at least five days before that date. (See, e.g., Hospital Council of Northern Cal. v. Superior Court (1973) 30 Cal. App.3d 331, 338-340 [106 Cal. Rptr. 247].) The limitation of the statute to one motion for each side (subd. (3)), as amici judges concede, reduces the quality and quantity of the injury caused by the section. We enunciated a test for invoking this restriction in Johnson (50 Cal.2d at p. 700), and applied it in a criminal context in Pappa v. Superior Court (1960) 54 Cal.2d 350, 353-356 [5 Cal. Rptr. 703, 353 P.2d 311]. In the same case we construed the limitation of one motion in any one action (subd. (3)) to bar a second motion made on retrial. ( Id., at p. 353.) And we construed the requirement that the motion be filed before trial of the cause has ... commenced (subd. (2)) to prohibit making a motion for the first time in post-trial matters which are essentially a continuation of the main proceeding, such as hearings on orders to modify ( Jacobs v. Superior Court (1959) 53 Cal.2d 187 [1 Cal. Rptr. 9, 347 P.2d 9]) or enforce ( McClenny v. Superior Court (1964) 60 Cal.2d 677 [36 Cal. Rptr. 459, 388 P.2d 691]) the original judgment. In the latter case we warned that We cannot ignore in defendant's position the potentiality for abuse of section 170.6. (9) (See fn. 13.) We cannot permit a device intended for spare and protective use to be converted into a weapon of offense and thereby to become an obstruction to efficient judicial administration. ( Id., at p. 689.) [13] Appellants and amici judges propose three additional constructions of section 170.6 to deal with the problem of abuse. As will appear, however, each would rewrite the statute in the guise of construing it, would introduce procedural complications resulting in delay, and would contravene the fundamental policies articulated in Johnson. Thus appellants urge that section 170.6 be construed to create a rebuttable presumption shifting the burden of proof to the challenged judge: under this view, if a motion to disqualify is filed the judge must recuse himself unless he can prove to a reasonable degree of certainty that the motion is actually based on a disagreement with his prior rulings or on other improper considerations. But the proposal would require us to read out of the statute the express provision (subd. (3)) that when a motion is duly presented and an affidavit filed, thereupon and without any further act or proof another judge must be assigned to the case. (10) When statutory language is thus clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction, and courts should not indulge in it. ( Caminetti v. Pac. Mutual L. Ins. Co. (1943) 22 Cal.2d 344, 353-354 [139 P.2d 908], and cases cited.) In any event the proposal would be wholly impractical in operation, as it would require the judge to prove facts on a subject which is not within his knowledge but within the knowledge of the moving party, i.e., the latter's motives for seeking to disqualify him. Amici judges propose two alternative constructions of the statute. First, they urge that we adopt the federal practice on judicial disqualification. [14] Under federal law, a trial judge must disqualify himself when a party files an affidavit alleging he has a personal bias or prejudice against the affiant. (28 U.S.C. § 144.) In addition, however, the statute expressly decrees that The affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that bias or prejudice exists, and the cases require this statement to be detailed and specific as to time, place, persons, and circumstances. The statute has consistently been interpreted to mean that although the judge must assume the truth of the facts asserted, he nevertheless has the right to determine whether they are legally sufficient to constitute the kind or degree of bias warranting his disqualification; if he finds them insufficient, he may decline to recuse himself. ( Berger v. United States (1921) 255 U.S. 22 [65 L.Ed. 481, 41 S.Ct. 230]; see generally Wright et al., 13 Federal Practice and Procedure (1975) § 3551, pp. 373-382.) [15] Again the suggestion would require us to rewrite section 170.6, this time by reading into subdivision (2) thereof a requirement that the affidavit state the specific facts and circumstances which gave rise to the affiant's belief of prejudice. Such a construction would also be inconsistent with subdivision (5), which directs that all affidavits filed under the statute be substantially in the form which it then sets forth. [16] (11) The form makes no provision for a detailed statement of facts, and it is reasonable to infer the Legislature did not intend to impose such a condition. Moreover, the proposal would compel the litigant to spread the details of his charges of judicial prejudice on the public record. (See, e.g., Berger v. United States (1921) supra, 255 U.S. 22, 28-29 [65 L.Ed. 481, 483-484].) We see no net benefit to be gained by this additional step. Because the judge would not be permitted to rule on the truth or falsity of such allegations, they would stand unchallenged no matter how divorced from reality they might be. Not only could this present to the public a distorted picture of judicial impartiality, but the judge would be compelled to accept the charges as true even though he may have personal knowledge they are false. [17] And even the limited judicial review contemplated by this suggestion could produce sharp disputes in open court over whether particular judicial behavior is or is not sufficient to demonstrate bias. We can only believe the consequences would be a diminution in public respect for the judicial system, needless friction between judges and the attorneys who appear before them, and further delays in bringing cases to trial. Each of these defects is also present in the alternative proposal of amici judges, which is to adopt the Oregon practice on judicial disqualification. [18] The Oregon statute requires a judge to recuse himself upon the filing of an affidavit of prejudice; the affidavit need not include a statement of the facts giving rise to the belief in bias, but it must include a statement by the affiant that the motion is made in good faith and not for the purposes of delay. (Ore. Rev. Stat. § 14.260.) In State v. Weiss (1967) 250 Ore. 252 [430 P.2d 357], the Oregon Supreme Court construed the latter requirement to permit the judge to question whether the motion was in fact made in good faith. The burden then shifted to the affiant to come forward with some evidence, hearsay or otherwise, from which a reasonable person could conclude that anyone possessed of such evidence might reasonably question the trial judge's impartiality in a matter. ( Id., at p. 360.) To adopt this interpretation would compel a somewhat different judicial revision of section 170.6. Although our statute does not call for a specific allegation of the affiant's good faith, we have repeatedly held that the motion nevertheless requires a good faith belief in the judge's prejudice on the part of the individual party or counsel.... (Italics in original.) ( McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) supra, 12 Cal.3d 512, 538, fn. 13.) (12) To so hold does not add anything to the statute, because the requirement is already implicit in the necessity for making the motion under oath: the objective of a verification is to insure good faith in the averments of a party ( ibid. ). Conversely, for purposes of this statute good faith is sufficiently established by the act of verification itself: as noted hereinabove, we explained in Johnson that section 170.6 requires that the party or his attorney show good faith by declaring under oath that the judge is prejudiced (italics added; 50 Cal.2d at p. 697). To oblige the affiant to go behind his oath and prove his good faith as a matter of fact would therefore constitute a substantial departure from the statutory scheme. Furthermore, it appears to us that in practice the showing of good faith required under the Oregon system would not be significantly different from the specific allegations of prejudice necessary under the federal procedure: an affiant desiring to show he acted on evidence from which a person might reasonably question the trial judge's impartiality ( State v. Weiss, supra, at p. 360 of 430 P.2d) would naturally be led to state the facts and the reasons for [his] belief that bias or prejudice exists (28 U.S.C. § 144). (See, e.g., State ex rel. Strain v. Foster (1975) 272 Ore. 464 [537 P.2d 547, 549-551].) To the extent this is so, of course, the Oregon system shares the above-discussed defects of the federal procedure. [19] It is next contended that Johnson is distinguishable because it ruled on the constitutionality of section 170.6 only in a civil setting, [20] and that in a criminal context the statute should be declared invalid primarily because of an asserted difference in the nature of the parties and their counsel. The argument is that in all criminal actions the plaintiff and its attorney remain the same, i.e., the People of the State of California represented by the district attorney; the defendant is different in each case, but in most instances is represented by the same counsel, the public defender. [21] This uniformity of either party or counsel assertedly permits the institutionalization of many of the abuses discussed herein, and in particular the abuse known as the blanket challenge. The practice occurs when as a matter of office policy a district attorney or a public defender instructs his deputies to disqualify a certain disfavored judge in all criminal cases of a particular nature  such as those involving prostitution or illegal narcotics  or in all criminal cases to which he is assigned. The former policy will prevent the judge from hearing any cases of that type, while the latter policy will force his removal from the criminal bench and his reassignment to a civil department. [22] Upon close analysis we conclude this contention is different not in kind but only in degree from the arguments rejected in Johnson, and that the difference does not warrant a contrary result. To begin with, we do not believe the self-limiting aspects of abuse of section 170.6 discussed hereinabove are inoperative in the criminal context. A district attorney or a public defender must realize that his practice tends to be concentrated in a particular court, and that if he or his deputies file unwarranted blanket challenges against a particular judge the effect may well be to antagonize the remaining judges of the court, one of whom will be assigned to replace their unseated colleague, and the presiding judge, who will make that assignment. Moreover, the delay attendant on such a substitution should not commend itself to the prosecutor whose duty and self-interest urge prompt disposition of pending cases, or to any defense counsel whose client has not been released on bail and for that or other reasons benefits from speedy trial requirements. More importantly, the issue of blanket challenges is not new to this court. In McCartney v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications (1974) supra, 12 Cal.3d 512, we reviewed a recommendation that a judge be permanently removed from office because of various acts of misconduct. One of those acts was to engage in angry and excited dialogues with deputy public defenders who filed affidavits of prejudice against him under section 170.6. ( Id., at p. 529.) Among the judge's proffered defenses was a claim that the affidavits were filed pursuant to a policy of the public defender's office to prevent him from presiding over criminal trials. ( Id., at p. 537.) We acknowledged (at pp. 537-538) that the entire policy itself may have been an affront to the court's dignity if it stemmed from public defenders' dissatisfaction with [Judge McCartney's] `hard line' performance as a district attorney rather than a good faith belief in prejudice. (Italics deleted.) In a footnote at this point (fn. 13) we recited that within a few months after Judge McCartney began his term of office the public defender directed his deputies in writing to file affidavits of prejudice in all criminal proceedings assigned to the judge thereafter. We were unable to determine the exact reason for this policy from the record, finding equally strong the inferences that the deputy public defenders were either seeking to remove Judge McCartney from the criminal bench or were legitimately concerned that he would be partial to the prosecution or would take an inordinate time to try their cases. We felt compelled, nevertheless, to speak to the blanket nature of these filings. We explained that under section 170.6 the affiant must hold the required good faith belief in prejudice in each particular case in which he invokes the statute, and we concluded that The `blanket' nature of the written directive issued by the public defender arguably contravened this requirement of good faith by withdrawing from each deputy the individual decision whether or not to appear before [Judge McCartney]. To phrase it another way, the office policy predetermined that prejudice would be claimed by each deputy without regard to the facts in each case handled by the office, thereby transforming the representations in each affidavit into bad faith claims of prejudice. ( Ibid. ) There is thus no doubt that in McCartney we strongly disapproved of the practice of blanket challenges, and we reaffirm that position herein. But it is also manifest from McCartney that we do not believe the practice vitiates the statute: despite our disapproval we concluded (at p. 538), even assuming arguendo that the evidence was clear and convincing, i.e., that the motions were blanket challenges made on unauthorized grounds, the practice could not justify Judge McCartney's injudicious response because the Legislature clearly foresaw that the peremptory challenge procedure[ [23] ] would be open to such abuses but intended that the affidavits be honored notwithstanding misuse. (See Johnson v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal.2d 693, 697....) In short, the possibility of the filing of blanket challenges does not distinguish the present criminal proceeding from Johnson, and the reasoning of that decision is equally applicable to the current version of the statute, governing both civil and criminal cases. (Accord, Journey v. Superior Court (1975) 47 Cal. App.3d 408, 411 [120 Cal. Rptr. 897].) (1d) We conclude that to the extent that abuses persist in the utilization of section 170.6 they do not, in our judgment, substantially impair or practically defeat the exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction of the trial courts. Rather, it may be helpful to view them as a relatively inconsequential price to be paid for the efficient and discreet procedure provided in section 170.6. The statute thus remains a reasonable  and hence valid  accommodation of the competing interests of bench, bar, and public on the subject of judicial disqualification. We do not doubt that should future adjustments to this sensitive balance become necessary or desirable, the Legislature will act with due regard for the rights of all concerned. The motion to appoint a referee and take evidence is denied. In S.F. 23449, let a peremptory writ of mandate issue as prayed. In S.F. 23469, the appeal is dismissed. All parties shall bear their own costs.