Opinion ID: 2639447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appropriate standard of review governing appeals of municipal land use decisions

Text: ¶ 10 This court has long recognized that municipal land use decisions should be upheld unless those decisions are arbitrary and capricious or otherwise illegal. Gayland v. Salt Lake County, 11 Utah 2d 307, 358 P.2d 633, 636 (1961); Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704, 709 (1943). Indeed, municipal land use decisions as a whole are generally entitled to a great deal of deference. Springville Citizens for a Better Cmty. v. City of Springville, 1999 UT 25, ¶ 23, 979 P.2d 332. However, in specific cases the determination of whether a particular land use decision is arbitrary and capricious has traditionally depended on whether the decision involves the exercise of legislative, administrative, or quasi-judicial powers. When a municipality makes a land use decision as a function of its legislative powers, we have held that such a decision is not arbitrary and capricious so long as the grounds for the decision are reasonably debatable. Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709 (reviewing municipal zoning decision as legislative function and employing reasonably debatable standard); Smith Inv. Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 252 (Utah Ct.App.1998) (same). When a land use decision is made as an exercise of administrative or quasi-judicial powers, however, we have held that such decisions are not arbitrary and capricious if they are supported by substantial evidence. Xanthos v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Utah 1984) (reviewing board of adjustment decision as an administrative act and employing substantial evidence standard). ¶ 11 There is no dispute in this case that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act. Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) ([t]he passage of general zoning ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly vested in the legislative branch) (quoting Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988)). The political nature of the decision making process underlying municipal zoning demands that the power to make such decisions be vested in persons who are publicly accountable for their choices. See Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709 (noting that accountability for balancing competing interests in zoning decisions properly resides in the governing body of the city). ¶ 12 We have long recognized that zoning decisions that are made as an exercise of legislative powers are entitled to particular deference. In Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n. Inc. v. Engh Floral Co., we noted that [t]he prior decisions of this court without exception have laid down the rule that the exercise of zoning power is a legislative function to be exercised by the legislative bodies of the municipalities. The wisdom of the zoning plan, its necessity, the nature and boundaries of the district to be zoned are matters which lie solely within that discretion. It is the policy of this court as enunciated in its prior decisions that it will avoid substituting its judgment for that of the legislative body of the municipality. 545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976) (citing Marshall, 105 Utah 111, 141 P.2d 704; Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949); Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 123 Utah 107, 255 P.2d 723 (1953); Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 2d 300, 410 P.2d 764 (1966)). Given this deferential disposition, we have held that it is the court's duty to resolve all doubts in favor of the municipality, and the burden is on the plaintiff challenging a municipal land use decision to show that the municipal action was clearly beyond the city's power. Gayland, 358 P.2d at 636. ¶ 13 In light of the particular deference we accord legislative zoning decisions, we have regularly distinguished zoning decisions that are made as a function of legislative power from decisions that are made as an exercise of either administrative or quasi-judicial power. Legislative zoning decisions involve the determination and enactment of zoning policies and cannot be delegated to other governmental bodies. Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 221. Such decisions are distinct from administrative or quasi-judicial zoning decisions. For example, in Sandy City, we noted that while a municipality has the authority to formulate and implement zoning policies as an exercise of legislative power, a municipality cannot thereafter delegate some portion of that authority to a board of adjustment because a board of adjustment is a quasi-judicial body designed only to correct specific zoning errors. Id. at 220-21; see also Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist. v. Sandy City, 879 P.2d 1379, 1383 (Utah Ct. App.1994) (recognizing distinction between executive and legislative powers with respect to zoning decisions); Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034 (treating board of adjustment decision as an administrative act).
¶ 14 As mentioned at the outset, our recognition of the distinction between legislative and administrative or quasi-judicial municipal powers has consistently determined the proper standard of review applicable to municipal land use disputes. For legislative decisions, we have applied a highly deferential variation of the arbitrary and capricious standard and limited our review to the strict question of whether the zoning ordinance `could promote the general welfare; or even if it is reasonably debatable that it is in the interest of the general welfare.' Smith Inv. Co., 958 P.2d at 252 (quoting Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709); Walker v. Brigham City, 856 P.2d 347, 349 (Utah 1993) (holding that the municipality's legislative decision would be upheld unless wholly discordant to reason and justice); Dowse, 255 P.2d at 724 (holding that zoning could be attacked only if there was no reasonable basis therefor). The selection of one method of solving the problem in preference to another is entirely within the discretion of the [city]; and does not, in and of itself, evidence an abuse of discretion. Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity, 212 P.2d at 181. ¶ 15 For administrative or quasi-judicial land use decisions, however, the substantial evidence test has traditionally applied. We have defined substantial evidence as that quantum and quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990) (reviewing administrative evaluation of property for tax purposes). This standard has been applied to an array of administrative and quasi-judicial land use decisions. See e.g., Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1035 (reviewing board of adjustment's denial of a zoning variance); Brown v. Sandy City Bd. of Adjustment, 957 P.2d 207, 210 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App. 1998) (reviewing city's administrative interpretation of its zoning ordinance); Wells v. Bd. of Adjustment of Salt Lake City Corp., 936 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (reviewing board of adjustment decision denying variance); Patterson v. Utah County Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah Ct. App.1995) (reviewing trial court's finding of an arbitrary and capricious action by county in approving special exception to zoning ordinance). Thus, while municipal land use decisions in Utah are valid unless arbitrary and capricious, the specific meaning of that standard is dependent upon the nature of the land use decision at issue.