Opinion ID: 599337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdictional Reach of Statute

Text: 13 Neither party contests Congress' ability to regulate defendant's mine. The parties disagree, however, as to whether Congress intended to exercise its full authority under the Commerce Clause when it enacted the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act. Because the proof offered by the government on the interstate commerce element of the offense seems a bit thin, we must parse the statute's jurisdictional reach to determine whether the evidence was sufficient to carry the government's burden. 14 The statute evidences a remedial purpose and should be broadly construed. Boich v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 704 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 719 F.2d 194 (6th Cir.1983). Congress' stated objective in enacting the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 was to avert deaths and serious injuries from unsafe and unhealthful conditions and practices in the coal [or other] mines. 30 U.S.C. § 801 (Congressional findings and declaration of purpose). See also H.R.Rep. No. 563, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1-3 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2503, 2503-05 (recounting recent mining disasters). Also of interest is the congressional finding that the disruption of production and the loss of income to operators and miners as a result of coal or other mine accidents or occupationally caused disease unduly impedes and burdens commerce. 30 U.S.C. § 801(f). 15 According to the Senate Report accompanying the Federal Coal Mine Safety Act Amendments of 1965, Pub.L. No. 89-376, 80 Stat. 84 (1966), an earlier reform effort extending federal regulation to smaller mines, [t]he purpose of this bill is to ... increase the protection of lives and property in all underground coal mines, to the maximum extent feasible through legislation. S.Rep. No. 1055, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2072, 2072 (emphasis added). This certainly indicates that Congress has intended to assert its full commerce power in legislation regulating coal mining. See Marshall v. Kraynak, 604 F.2d 231, 232 (3d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1014, 100 S.Ct. 664, 62 L.Ed.2d 643 (1980). Moreover, Congress understands that it exercises its full Commerce Clause authority when, as here, it enacts legislation covering activity which affects commerce. Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 859 & n. 4, 105 S.Ct. 2455, 2456 & n. 4, 85 L.Ed.2d 829 (1985); Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 571, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 1967, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977) (Congress is aware of distinction between legislation covering activities in commerce and assertion of full commerce power over all activities affecting interstate commerce); United States v. American Bldg. Maintenance Inds., 422 U.S. 271, 280, 95 S.Ct. 2150, 2156, 45 L.Ed.2d 177 (1975) (same). Accordingly, the language of the Act, its broad remedial purpose, and its legislative history combine to convince us that Congress intended to exercise its full power under the Commerce Clause.