Opinion ID: 1621727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the prosecution and defense counsel to waive race and gender objections during voir dire

Text: ¶ 46. Watts' first trial ended in a mistrial after a jury could not be seated. At the second trial, after voir dire was completed, the circuit court asked the parties how they wished to proceed with regard to peremptory challenges pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The following exchange took place: THE COURT: Now, let's see. On the jurors what is going to be the defense and the State's position as to Batson ? MR. BROADHEAD: Your Honor, at this time we would waive Batson. Co-counsel and I, Mr. Sweatt, have talked in detail about this between ourselves first and then with Mr. Watts. And with the experience of last time trying to pick a jury and notthe defense was put in a spot in a couple of instances with jurors where we wanted them off the jury, but were unable to state race neutral or gender-neutral reasons. And because of that experience we do intend to waive Batson at this time. THE COURT: What about the State? MR. DOUGLASS: Well, we would invoke Batson if the defense did. And since they did not want to, then we will not invoke. ¶ 47. Watts now charges that the circuit court willingly and intentionally permitted the prosecution and defense to engage in race-based and gender-based jury selection. It is clear from the record, however, that it was the defense's idea to waive Batson  to avoid having to come up with gender- or race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges. The State agrees with Watts' assertion that the circuit court should not have allowed the parties to waive Batson. However, it suggests that Watts intentionally waived Batson objections in order to discriminate and that but for Watts' request to waive Batson, no waiver would have occurred. Moreover, the State questions the propriety of Watts now challenging an error that he, himself, invited for his own benefit. ¶ 48. In Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261 (5th Cir.1996), vacated in part on other grounds, 105 F.3d 209 (1997), the Fifth Circuit addressed a similar agreement made to impact jury selection and declared that despite the fourteenth amendment violation that resulted, a new trial was not warranted because of the defendant's willing participation in the agreement. Mata, who is Hispanic, was convicted of killing a black prison guard at the Texas Department of Corrections facility where he was an inmate. At trial in 1986, counsel for the defense and the prosecution expressly agreed to exclude all eight black members of the venire panel. Mata, 99 F.3d at 1268. The trial judge effectively approved the agreement by allowing the parties to strike each black without stating any reason or exercising any of their peremptory challenges. Id. ¶ 49. The Fifth Circuit noted the various concerns raised by the parties, who, as in the case sub judice, raised the issues of public confidence in the jury system and violation of jurors' rights, but refused to adopt a per se rule reversing a case whenever individuals have been excluded from a jury because of race. Id. at 1270. Instead, considering Mata's willing participation in the constitutional violation, the court denied his claim for a new trial on that ground. Id. at 1270-71. Similarly, in the case sub judice, we find that a new trial is not warranted on the basis of the Batson issue since it was waived by the defendant.