Opinion ID: 2762968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Discharge a Mandatory Duty

Text: ¶ 29. Finally, we address Skaskiw’s claim that DCF failed to discharge a mandatory duty. Skaskiw alleged that DCF failed to properly manage VSNIP funds, administer VSNIP, and conduct VSNIP in a manner that avoids the appearance of a conflict of interest. To remedy DCF’s alleged failure to discharge its mandatory duty, Skaskiw seeks to: (1) permanently enjoin DCF from awarding VSNIP contracts to VT-CAN! and any other organizations with known conflicts of interest and (2) remove VT-CAN! as the VSNIP grantee. Defendants argue, and the trial court agreed, that Skaskiw’s request to enjoin DCF from awarding contracts to organizations with known conflicts of interest is not ripe because DCF is currently administering the program directly and not through a contractor and that her request to remove VT-CAN! as grantee is moot because VT-CAN! no longer administers the program. We agree. ¶ 30. At the outset, we note the mismatch between the broad allegations of DCF’s mismanagement of VSNIP and the very limited remedies sought. The remedies focus solely on VT-CAN! and its alleged conflict of interest and address virtually none of the allegations of DCF’s mismanagement. ¶ 31. Skaskiw’s request to enjoin DCF from awarding future VSNIP contracts to VT-CAN! and any other organizations with known conflicts of interest is not ripe for review. Claims are ripe “when there is a sufficiently concrete case or controversy,” as opposed to one that is abstract or hypothetical. State v. M.W. , 2012 VT 66, ¶ 11, 192 Vt. 198, 57 A.3d 696 (quotation omitted). “[C]ourts should not render decisions absent a genuine need to resolve a real dispute,” id ., and should not render decisions on claims that are “purely speculative . . . involving events that are contingent upon circumstances that may or may not occur in the future.” In re Robinson/Keir P’ship , 154 Vt. 50, 57, 573 A.2d 1188, 1192 (1990). ¶ 32. In Robinson/Keir Partnership , the plaintiff claimed that he faced double liability for loans from a corporation to the plaintiff’s partnership: once in an arbitration award, which was at issue in the litigation, and again in a suit by the corporation. We concluded that the plaintiff’s claim was not ripe for review because the corporation had not filed a lawsuit, and thus the plaintiff’s concern about double recovery was premature. Id . at 57-58, 573 A.2d at 1192. Similarly, Skaskiw’s concern about DCF contracting with conflicted organizations to administer VSNIP is merely speculative because DCF is not now contracting for administration of VSNIP. ¶ 33. Skaskiw’s request to remove VT-CAN! as the VSNIP contractor is moot. A case becomes moot if “the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” In re Moriarty, 156 Vt. 160, 163, 588 A.2d 1063, 1064 (1991) (quotation omitted) A case that originally presented an actual controversy may become moot if the facts or circumstances of the case change such that we can “no longer grant effective relief.” Id . In Houston v. Town of Waitsfield , 2007 VT 135, ¶ 5, 183 Vt. 543, 944 A.2d 260 (mem.), we held moot the landowners’ request to enjoin the town from drilling test wells on their property because the town completed the test wells prior to the appeal. Id . ¶ 1. The landowners argued that, because the wells were an ongoing taking entitling them to damages and because the town was committing an ongoing trespass, the controversy was still live and not moot. In rejecting the taking argument, we emphasized that the only relief the landowners sought in their complaint was an injunction against the drilling and that they were not able to request damages at the appellate level that they did not request in the complaint. Id . ¶¶ 7-8. And in rejecting the trespass argument, we noted that the drilling was a discrete event that was over and could not be undone and that the town had no intention of conducting any further drilling. Id . ¶ 10. ¶ 34. Our rationale in Houston is applicable here. Skaskiw’s response to defendants’ assertion of mootness is to restate the broad allegations of mismanagement for which she sought no remedy in her complaint. The only remedy sought was to terminate the VT-CAN! contract, but that contract has expired. Since VT-CAN! no longer is administering the program, its contract was discrete, and there is no indication that DCF could reinstate that contract, we cannot grant the relief Skaskiw seeks and the claim is moot. ¶ 35. Skaskiw argues that we have recognized a mootness exception for cases that are “capable of repetition, yet evading review,” In re S.H. , 141 Vt. 278, 281, 448 A.2d 148, 149 (1982) (quoting Roe v. Wade , 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973)), and argues that it should apply here. To invoke this exception, “(1) the challenged action [must be] in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [must be] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subjected to the same action again.” State v. Tallman , 148 Vt. 465, 469, 537 A.2d 422, 424 (1987) (alteration in original) (quoting Weinstein v. Bradford , 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975)). To overcome mootness, there must be something more than mere possibility of future injury. Moriarty , 156 Vt. at 164, 588 A.2d at 1065. Skaskiw has failed to demonstrate any reasonable expectation that DCF will enter into any new contract with VT-CAN! or that any future dispute over a second contract would involve the same issues she seeks to raise in this litigation. At most, she has demonstrated only a mere possibility that DCF will reassign the contract to VT-CAN! after the dismissal becomes final. We do not agree that the exception applies. ¶ 36. Skaskiw also argues that a second mootness exception applies here: one for cases of “great public concern.” We have not recognized this exception [8] and, in any event, doubt that we would find it applicable in this situation. We therefore find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of Skaskiw’s claim of failure to discharge a mandatory duty. Affirmed . FOR THE COURT: