Opinion ID: 436246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of the Act

Text: 25 The defendants challenge the constitutionality of the statute on several grounds. First, they assert that it violates the equal protection guarantee of the fifth amendment 8 by holding liable agents of corporate operators but not punishing agents of noncorporate operators. The defendants concede that corporate agents do not constitute a suspect classification for equal protection analysis. The Act, therefore, must be upheld if it bears some rational relationship to a legitimate [governmental] end. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 963, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 2843, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982) (citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104-05, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)). See Richardson v. Secretary of Labor, 689 F.2d 632, 633 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2088, 77 L.Ed.2d 299 (1983). 9 26 Congress may have believed that in a noncorporate coal mining operation the threat of criminal sanctions against the operator personally would provide a sufficient incentive to comply with the mandatory safety standards. By contrast, in a corporate mining operation, those who are in control might well be insulated from criminal responsibility, the corporation being an impersonal legal entity. There is therefore a rational reason for imposing criminal sanctions upon the officers, directors, or agents who knowingly authorize, order, or carry out safety violations. It is they who are the decision-makers responsible for the commission of the unlawful acts of the corporate operators. See Richardson, supra, at 633. 10 27 In addition, the largest coal mines in the country tend to be owned and operated by corporate entities. In handling an issue, Congress may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955). Congress may have believed that the problems at the corporate mines posed the gravest immediate threat to coal miners and decided to impose personal liability on agents at these mines. A noncorporate operator may not only have a greater incentive to ensure compliance but may also have a greater ability to do so because of the smaller size and generally less diffuse managerial authority of noncorporate operations. 28 The Supreme Court has recognized that under a rational relationship test, the inquiry employs a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a legislative test and an unavoidable one. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) (per curiam). We cannot conclude that the decision by Congress to hold corporate agents personally liable for violations of health and safety standards bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. We therefore hold that the statutory distinction between corporate and noncorporate agents does not violate the equal protection guarantee. 29 The defendants also claim that the Act discriminates against agents of corporate operators and thereby violates the equal protection guarantee because an agent of an operator could be convicted on a lesser standard of proof than that required to convict his corporate employer. The basis of this assertion is that under section 820(c) agents are subject to prosecution for a knowing authorization or carrying out of a safety violation whereas operators under section 820(d) are held to a willful standard. In the circumstances we have here, however, this argument is academic and we need not explore it. Although the Government might have charged the defendants under the knowing standard of section 820(c), it deliberately chose to charge them under the willful standard of section 820(d). The defendants therefore cannot complain that they were subjected to a discriminatory standard. Furthermore, Congress might have decided that agents who personally commit a violation should be punished more readily than an impersonal corporate entity. 30 Finally, the defendants argue that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. The statute subjects an agent to prosecution upon knowingly authorizing, ordering, or carrying out a violation of a mandatory safety standard. The defendants maintain that the Act impermissibly leaves one uncertain as to whether a mere ommission [sic] to comply with the requirements of the Act is sufficient to establish criminal liability. They also claim that the statutory definition of the term agent as any person charged with responsibility for the operation of all or a part of a coal ... mine, 30 U.S.C. Sec. 802(e) (1982), improperly allows an operator to determine who may be liable under the statute through the assignment of duties at the mine. 31 The Supreme Court has ruled that criminal statutes that are vague offend due process because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, [and] we insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). See Hirschkop v. Snead, 594 F.2d 356, 370-71 (4th Cir.1979) (en banc) (per curiam). The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, however, provides fair warning to potential violators. The Supreme Court has held that one may act knowingly and willfully by failing to perform a duty as well as by performing one. See Illinois Central Railroad, supra, 303 U.S. at 244, 58 S.Ct. at 535. The statutory use of the term knowingly does not unconstitutionally fail to warn violators that they may be punished for acts of omission as well as of commission. 32 We also hold that the definition of the term agent is adequate. The Act punishes a person who, having responsibility for the operation of all or part of a mine, knowingly authorizes a violation of a safety standard. A person of ordinary intelligence should have no difficulty in understanding when he has responsibility for the operation of all or part of a coal mine. We reject the defendants' contention that the Act is vague merely because a coal operator may choose which individuals shall have responsibility over parts of the mine. The possibility that exposure to criminal liability may depend upon the operational chain of responsibility does not create a constitutional infirmity.