Opinion ID: 2457072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Mitigating Instruction on Defendant's Inability to Appreciate the Criminality of His Conduct

Text: Mr. Knese next argues that the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on the statutory mitigating factor of whether his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired. [66] Mr. Knese contends that evidence of his cocaine use at the time of the incident, his turbulent relationship with his wife and his passionate reaction to their argument all amount to the conclusion that the court should have included this mitigating factor in the jury instruction. Knese did not raise this point in his motion for new trial; we review for plain error only. The instruction on mitigation submitted to the jury was: INSTRUCTION NO. 21 As to Count 1, if you unanimously find that the facts and circumstances in aggravation of punishment, taken as a whole, warrant the imposition of a sentence of death upon the defendant, you must then determine whether there are facts or circumstances in mitigation of punishment which are sufficient to outweigh the facts and circumstances in aggravation of punishment. In deciding this question, you may consider all of the evidence presented in both the guilt and punishment stages of trial. As circumstances that may be in mitigation of punishment, you shall consider: 1. Whether the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity. 2. Whether the murder of Karin Knese was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. 3. The age of the defendant at the time of the offense. You shall also consider any other facts or circumstances which you find from the evidence in mitigation of punishment. Mr. Knese relies on Lockett v. Ohio for the proposition that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution prohibit a sentencer from being precluded from considering relevant mitigating evidence as a basis for a sentence less than death. [67] The instruction at issue here, however, does not preclude the jury from considering the evidence to which Mr. Knese refers in determining whether to impose the penalty of death. To the contrary, the court instructed the jury to consider any other facts or circumstances ... [found] from the evidence in mitigation of punishment. The only issue is, therefore, whether the facts warranted an instruction to the jury of the mitigating factor outlined in section 565.032.3(6). Mr. Knese first argues that evidence of his cocaine use warranted the instruction. The State points out that in this case, Knese did not offer any evidence, for example, psychiatric testimony, to demonstrate that his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct was substantially impaired as a result of drug use. The only testimony that approached such a contention was the testimony that Mr. Knese had taken cocaine, his wild behavior after the murder and his claimed delusion of being chased by the devil. This Court has recently held that it was not erroneous for the trial court to refuse to offer this instruction even where there was evidence of intoxication and some amount of bizarre behavior after a murder. [68] Given the slight evidence presented here of Mr. Knese's alleged failure to comprehend the criminality of his conduct due to cocaine use, there was no manifest injustice in the failure to give the requested instruction, especially since the extreme mental disturbance mitigating instruction was given. [69] Mr. Knese also argues that his turbulent relationship with his wife, magnified by the argument the two had just prior to Ms. Knese's murder, further bolsters the conclusion that the trial court should have given the substantially impaired instruction. In support of this argument, Knese relies on Cheshire v. State, where the Supreme Court of Florida held that evidence that the defendant suffered from, among other things a perceived affront to his family status and the emotional distress that accompanies a failing marriage commanded that the trial court give an instruction on mitigating factors. [70] However, Cheshire is distinguishable from the present case. Cheshire focused on the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on Florida's analogue to Missouri's extreme mental or emotional disturbance mitigating factor, which as noted, was given to the jury. The trial court's decision not to instruct the jury on the mitigating factor of whether the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired did not constitute plain error.