Opinion ID: 2509528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Flaws in Majority's Analysis

Text: ¶ 43 The majority bases its conclusion regarding the proper unit of prosecution, in part, on the placement of robbery in our current criminal code, the rationale employed by Division One in prior factually analogous cases, and finally a policy rationale based on the potential ramifications for criminal defendants convicted under the unit of prosecution proffered by Division Two below. I address each in turn. ¶ 44 Placement of Robbery in Criminal Code: In support of its conclusion, the majority finds that the legislature's classification of robbery in the chapter entitled Theft and Robbery, suggests that the legislature has indicat[ed] a focus on the nature of robbery offenses as crimes against property. Majority at 732-733. This placement is not compelling evidence of the legislature's intent. First, by our jurisprudence, the chapter title does not express legislative intent and, with respect to the crime of robbery, the legislature clearly indicated the same in the 1975 revisions to the criminal code. See LAWS OF 1975, 1st Ex.Sess., ch. 260, § 9A.04.010 (Chapter, section, and subsection captions are for organizational purposes only and shall not be construed as part of this title.), codified at RCW 9A.04.010(5). Second, the majority itself notes that our legislature's definition of the crime of robbery has not been meaningfully amended since at least as far back as 1881. See majority at 734 ( comparing CODE OF 1881, § 829 with RCW 9A.56.190). Moreover, it is insightful to compare today's definition with that enacted by the legislature in 1909, which set forth: Robbery is the unlawful taking of personal property from the person of another, or in his presence, against his will, by means of force or violence or fear of injury, immediate or future, to his person or property, or the person or property of a member of his family, or of anyone in his company at the time of the robbery. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking.... Former RCW 9.75.010 (LAWS OF 1909, ch. 249, § 166). Wordsmithing aside, the legislature's 1909 definition was exactly the same as that which exists today. Compare RCW 9A.56.190. Unlike the 1975 revisions, in 1909 our legislature further indicated, in the session law, specific categorical groupings under which it classified crimes. Unlike ordinary Larceny (LAWS OF 1909, ch. 249, § 349, at 997), which was set out under the chapter heading Crimes Against Property. Crimes Against State Property. ( id. at 986), the legislature purposefully placed Robbery ( id. § 166, at 938) under the chapter heading Crimes Against the Person. Suicide. ( id. at 929), adjacent to Assault and Duels. Id. §§ 161-65, 167-70. As the legislature has not meaningfully amended its definition of robbery since 1909, there is no reason to infer that it no longer thinks of the crime as one primarily against the person. ¶ 45 The majority further contends that this court's decisions in In re Personal Restraint of Percer, 150 Wash.2d 41, 51-52, 75 P.3d 488 (2003) and State v. Calle, 125 Wash.2d 769, 780, 888 P.2d 155 (1995) support the proposition that this court has looked to the legislature's placement of an offense within the criminal codes as evidence of the legislature's intent. See majority at 733 n. 2. This claim is not persuasive in the context of the present issue before the court. Both Percer and Calle concerned whether two different statutory crimes were the same offense. See Percer, 150 Wash.2d at 48-49, 75 P.3d 488 (second degree felony murder and vehicular homicide); Calle, 125 Wash.2d at 778, 888 P.2d 155 (first degree incest and second degree rape). Consequently, it was logical to rely on the legislature's placement of the two crimes in the criminal code to determine whether the legislature intended to authorize multiple punishments for those offenses. Percer and Calle are not instructive in the context of a single crime. ¶ 46 Division One's Analysis in Molina and Johnson: The majority concludes that Division One's analysis in State v. Molina, 83 Wash.App. 144, 920 P.2d 1228 (1996) and State v. Johnson, 48 Wash.App. 531, 740 P.2d 337 (1987) best carries out the legislature's intent and is instructive in this context. Majority at 734. I disagree. Division One did not examine RCW 9A.56.190 to determine the legislature's intended unit of prosecution for robbery in either Molina or Johnson. Rather, it applied the then-accepted same evidence test to reach its conclusions. Molina, 83 Wash.App. at 146-47, 920 P.2d 1228; Johnson, 48 Wash.App. at 535, 740 P.2d 337. Because this court has since adopted the unit of prosecution analysis for cases where a defendant claims his double jeopardy rights were violated when the State charges him with several violations of a single statute, Division One's rationale seems no longer viable. Contrary to Division One's analysis, this court has rejected use of the same evidence test in this context and established that the proper inquiry ... is what ` unit of prosecution ' has the Legislature intended as the punishable act under the specific criminal statute. Adel, 136 Wash.2d at 634, 965 P.2d 1072 (emphasis added). ¶ 47 Resulting Effect of Unit of Prosecution: Finally, the majority claims that the unit of prosecution approved of by Division Two here, which I would affirm, would lead to `incongruous results.' Majority at 735 n. 4 (quoting Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 177, 79 S.Ct. 209, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958)). The majority reasons that a considerable disparity would exist in instances where a defendant orders five employees in a restaurant to lie on the floor at gunpoint while he takes money from a register under the joint control of all five employees, in comparison to cases where a defendant enters a restaurant with only one employee present and takes money from the same register. Id. The majority mistakenly and with apparent disregard of the victims of robbery crimes, concludes that [t]here is no difference in the defendant's conduct, id, choosing to ignore the fact that the defendant in the first scenario has, by his intentional act, chosen to place five people in fear of their lives. [7] It is not incongruous to punish this defendant more harshly where he intended to place the lives of a greater number of employees in jeopardy in order to take the cash from a register for which they were all jointly responsible.
¶ 48 Accordingly, I would hold that in the event a defendant takes property by the use of or threat of force from the person or presence of multiple victims against their will, and the victims enjoy a joint ownership, representative, or possessory interest in the stolen property, a defendant may be convicted of counts of robbery equal to the number of victims. I believe this is the unit of prosecution the legislature intended in enacting RCW 9A.56.190-.210. I would thus affirm the Court of Appeals conclusion that Tvedt could be convicted of four counts of robbery in connection with his robberies of two commercial establishments each with two employees who both enjoyed a representative interest in the cash taken by Tvedt. See State v. Tvedt, 116 Wash.App. 316, 323-24, 65 P.3d 682 (2003). OWENS, CHAMBERS, JJ., and IRELAND, J.P.T., concur.