Opinion ID: 499416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: wiretap minimization

Text: 26 The standard governing compliance with 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(5)'s requirement that agents minimize the tapping of innocent conversations is one of reasonableness, United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1018 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied 419 U.S. 1020, 95 S.Ct. 495, 42 L.Ed.2d 294 (1974), and is satisfied if  'on the whole the agents have shown a high regard for the right of privacy and have done all they reasonably could to avoid unnecessary intrusion,'  id. (quoting United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764, 784 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 63, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973)) (emphasis added in James ). 27 Application of the standard varies with the real-world problems confronting the investigators. The courts have recognized that investigation of a large, complicated conspiracy justifies a relatively intensive surveillance of calls. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 142, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1725, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978) (In a case such as this, involving a wide-ranging conspiracy with a large number of participants, even a seasoned listener would have been hard pressed to determine with any precision the relevancy of many of the calls before they were completed) (footnote omitted); United States v. James, 494 F.2d at 1019 (Where the criminal enterprise under investigation is a large-scale conspiracy with many participants, it may be necessary for the government to monitor more conversations with greater intensity than when the investigation is more limited); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir.1972) (continuous wire tap found not to violate minimization requirement where the object of the investigation was an organized criminal conspiracy of large proportions), cert. denied 417 U.S. 918, 94 S.Ct. 2623, 41 L.Ed.2d 223 (1974). 28 The investigation leading to the taps in question presented just this sort of challenge. As set out in a sixty-page wiretap application, the government's investigation concerned a massive criminal enterprise believed to exist among a large number of participants. The affidavit supporting the initial wiretap application specifically described the criminal activities of ten persons whose identities were unknown. Furthermore, as the district court noted, [b]ecause the alleged conspirators used a colloquial code, it was difficult to determine which calls would be criminal in nature. J.A. at 680. 29 Defendants' complaint, insofar as they even try to give it concrete meaning, seems to revolve around the government's having (1) failed to switch off the bug when a conversation plainly outside the scope of the wiretap order [began], Brief for Appellants at 44, and (2) listened to and recorded conversations relating to crimes not specifically mentioned in its application and conducted by persons not mentioned by name. The second claim depends on the first, and both are without merit. 30 The fact that the monitored conversations often started with discussion of non-criminal matters did not require the government to plug its ears. Participants in the conspiracy under investigation often discussed personal and criminal matters in the same conversations. See, e.g., J.A. at 665 (supervising agent notes the practice of such intermingling, illustrating it with observation that defendant Wilson often began with discussion of personal subjects such as possible pregnancy or baby sitting duties, and thereafter turned to discussion of criminal activity such as welfare fraud.). Appellants' conversations were relatively short and the agents could reasonably have believed that the subject of the conversation might turn at any moment to the criminal activities being investigated or that the participants would change and criminal activities would then be discussed. (Both of these possibilities occurred during the investigation.) In addition, the end parts of the conversations turned to new crimes, including welfare fraud, which the government specifically identified as a new area of search in an application to extend the investigation's scope. 31 Of course the government may not monitor without limit and still meet the minimization requirement. Here, in fact, the innocent beginnings of conversations led the agents to cut short their listening to 16 percent of the calls. Defendants have not seriously endeavored to show that there was any pattern of inadequate readiness to do so. Obviously a blanket rule that the agents must always turn off after X minutes of innocent conversation would create a privileged sanctuary for illegal conversations. 32 Minimization does not require such impractical forbearance. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. at 140, 98 S.Ct. at 1724 (statute does not forbid the interception of all nonrelevant conversations); United States v. James, 494 F.2d at 1019 (where participants discuss both innocent and criminal activity, agents may be justified in monitoring all conversations); United States v. Cox, 462 F.2d 1293, 1301 (8th Cir.1972) ( '[I]t is often impossible to determine that a particular telephone conversation would be irrelevant and harmless until it has been terminated.... It is all well and good to say, after the fact, that certain conversations were irrelevant and should have been terminated. However, the monitoring agents are not gifted with prescience and cannot be expected to know in advance what direction the conversation will take.' ) (quoting United States v. LaGorga, 336 F.Supp. 190, 196 (W.D.Pa.1971)). 33 This leaves defendants' second theory without support. The fact that neither appellants nor their crimes were identified in the initial wiretap application does not negate a finding of reasonableness in this case. One of the aims of the investigation itself was to identify participants in the conspiracy. See United States v. James, 494 F.2d at 1019 (Identification of the contours of the conspiracy and the participants may be the government's principal objective.) (footnote omitted). 34 The district court's close monitoring of the conduct of the wiretap supports our finding that the government's surveillance was reasonable in this case. The assistant United States attorney in charge of the wiretap surveillance submitted detailed reports to Judge Oberdorfer every seven days. Where a court has required and reviewed interim reports from the investigating agents, a court is more likely to find the government's behavior reasonable. See United States v. James, 494 F.2d at 1021. 35 Accordingly, we uphold the district court's finding that the minimization requirement was satisfied in this case. 36