Opinion ID: 1376259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Viability of the Tort of Intentional Spoliation of Evidence

Text: We answer the third certified question in the affirmative and hold that West Virginia recognizes intentional spoliation of evidence as a stand-alone tort when done by either a party to a civil action or a third party. Our reasoning for the need to hold third parties liable for negligently spoliating evidence is also applicable here. That is, recovery under a separate tort is necessary because a third party is not subject to an adverse inference instruction or discovery sanctions. In regard to a party to a civil action, we believe that intentional spoliation of evidence is misconduct of such a serious nature, the existing remedies are not a sufficient response. [11] West Virginians have a fundamental constitutional right to use the State's court system to seek justice. See W.Va. Const., Art. III, § 17. This Court has recognized that [b]asic to the administration of justice is the search for the truth. Page v. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc., 198 W.Va. 378, 386, 480 S.E.2d 817, 825 (1996). The search for truth breaks down, however, when parties do not have the opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence at trial. [12] [S]poliation ... undermines the search for truth and fairness by creating a false picture of the evidence before the trier of fact. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1, 9, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 253, 954 P.2d 511, 516 (Cal.1998). Also, it may leave the trial record incomplete, may impact the apparent relevancy of other evidence, and may increase litigation costs as litigants scramble to `reconstruct the spoliated evidence or to develop other evidence, which may be less accessible, less persuasive, or both.' Levine, 104 W.Va. L.Rev. at 420, quoting Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court, 18 Cal.4th 1, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 248, 954 P.2d 511, 515 (1998) (footnote omitted). Therefore, [d]estroying evidence can destroy fairness and justice, for it increases the risk of an erroneous decision on the merits of the underlying cause of action. Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 18 Cal.4th at 8, 74 Cal. Rptr.2d at 252, 954 P.2d at 515. For these reasons, intentional spoliation of evidence has been rightly characterized as highly improper and unjustifiable. See Coleman, 120 N.M. at 649, 905 P.2d at 189 ([T]he intentional destruction of potential evidence in order to disrupt or defeat another person's right of recovery is highly improper and cannot be justified.); Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, 18 Cal.4th at 4, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d at 249, 954 P.2d at 512 (Intentional spoliation of evidence is a grave affront to the cause of justice and deserves our unqualified condemnation.); Wilhoit, 46 UCLA L.Rev. at 663-64 ([T]here is a need to condemn a party who takes advantage of the adversarial system by destroying evidence that is essential to an adverse party's lawsuit.... Likewise, in order to preserve the integrity of the adversarial system, courts must deter parties from destroying evidence that may weaken their cases. (Footnote omitted)). Simply put, such highly improper and unjustifiable conduct ought to be actionable. In defining the parameters of the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence we look to the several states that currently recognize this tort. Intentional spoliation of evidence is defined as the intentional destruction, mutilation, or significant alteration of potential evidence for the purpose of defeating another person's recovery in a civil action. Coleman, 120 N.M. at 649, 905 P.2d at 189. Most states that have adopted the tort have agreed that intentional spoliation of evidence consists of the following elements: (1) pending or probable civil litigation, (2) knowledge of the spoliator that the litigation is pending or probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence, (4) intent of the spoliator to interfere with the victim's prospective civil suit, (5) a causal relationship between the evidence and the inability to prove the lawsuit, and (6) damages. Levine, 104 W.Va.L.Rev. at 422 (footnotes omitted). See, e.g., Coleman, 120 N.M. at 649, 905 P.2d at 189 (In order to prevail on an intentional spoliation of evidence theory, a plaintiff must allege and prove the following: (1) the existence of a potential lawsuit; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the potential lawsuit; (3) the destruction, mutilation, or significant alteration of potential evidence; (4) intent on part of the defendant to disrupt or defeat the lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the act of spoliation and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages.(Citations omitted)); Oliver v. Stimson Lumber Company, 297 Mont. at 352, 993 P.2d at 22 ([I]ntentional spoliation of evidence consists of the following elements: (1) the existence of a potential lawsuit; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the potential lawsuit; (3) the intentional destruction of evidence designed to disrupt or defeat the potential lawsuit; (4) disruption of the potential lawsuit; (5) a causal relationship between the act of spoliation and the inability to prove the lawsuit; and (6) damages.(Citation omitted)); Smith v. Howard Johnson Company, Inc., 67 Ohio St.3d at 29, 615 N.E.2d at 1038 ([T]he elements of a claim for interference with or destruction of evidence are (1) pending or probable litigation involving the plaintiff, (2) knowledge on the part of defendant that litigation exists or is probable, (3) willful destruction of evidence by defendant designed to disrupt the plaintiff's case, (4) disruption of the plaintiff's case, and (5) damages proximately caused by the defendant's acts[.]). Therefore, we hold that the tort of intentional spoliation of evidence consists of the following elements: (1) a pending or potential civil action; (2) knowledge of the spoliator of the pending or potential civil action; (3) willful destruction of evidence; (4) the spoliated evidence was vital to a party's ability to prevail in the pending or potential civil action; (5) the intent of the spoliator to defeat a party's ability to prevail in the pending or potential civil action; (6) the party's inability to prevail in the civil action; and (7) damages. Once the first six elements are established, there arises a rebuttable presumption that but for the fact of the spoliation of evidence, the party injured by the spoliation would have prevailed in the pending or potential litigation. The spoliator must overcome the rebuttable presumption or else be liable for damages. We caution that the party injured by spoliation must show more than the fact that potential evidence was intentionally destroyed. The gravamen of the tort of intentional spoliation is the intent to defeat a person's ability to prevail in a civil action. Therefore, it must be shown that the evidence was destroyed with the specific intent to defeat a pending or potential lawsuit. The intent with which tort liability is concerned... is an intent to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way that the law forbids. Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 8 at 36 (5th ed.1984). See also Torres v. El Paso Elec. Co., 127 N.M. 729, 987 P.2d 386, 405 (N.M.1999) ([W]e believe that the tort recognized in Coleman [ v. Eddy Potash, Inc., supra ] seeks to remedy acts taken with the sole intent to maliciously defeat or disrupt a lawsuit.). The rule for the determination of compensatory damages in intentional spoliation actions shall be the same as that set forth above for use in actions where evidence was negligently spoliated by a third party. Finally, in addition to compensatory damages, punitive damages may be awarded in cases where evidence was intentionally spoliated. This Court has held: In actions of tort, where ... willful ... conduct ... affecting the rights of others appear, or where legislative enactment authorizes it, the jury may assess exemplary, punitive, or vindictive damages; these terms being synonymous. Syllabus Point 4, in part, Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W.Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895). This Court has recognized that punitive damage awards achieve a number of important objectives. Among the primary ones are: (1) to punish the defendant; (2) to deter others from pursuing a similar course; and, (3) to provide additional compensation for the egregious conduct to which the plaintiff has been subjected. Harless v. First Nat. Bank in Fairmont, 169 W.Va. 673, 691, 289 S.E.2d 692, 702 (1982). These objectives certainly may be applicable when a person intentionally destroys evidence for the purpose of defeating a lawsuit.