Opinion ID: 1467363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prior Consistent Statements and the Testimony of Law Enforcement Officers

Text: Mr. Taylor complains that the trial court permitted the government to introduce evidence  much of it through police officers and a prosecutor who carried the authority of their office  intended to vouch for the integrity of the investigation generally and to attest to the ultimate `truth' of the witness' in-court testimony. Specifically, Mr. Taylor contends that the government's case turned on the credibility of Ms. Johnson, who used cocaine, and Mr. Mason, a drug seller who had five open cases at the time of [Mr. Taylor's] trial, one of which was pending sentence. Mr. Taylor asserts that to strengthen the testimony of these witnesses, the government not only improperly allowed them to testify as to their prior statements, but also used the testimony of MPD Detectives Gutherie and Robert Alder, and Officer Dennis, as well as the testimony of Assistant United States Attorney Patrick Rowan to `artificially strengthen[] a marginal case.' The government argues that the trial court properly admitted the testimony of its witnesses as substantive evidence under D.C.Code § 14-102(b) (2001), did not abuse its discretion in allowing Ms. Johnson and Mr. Mason to relate certain of their prior consistent statements as prior identification testimony or to rebut impeachment evidence, and the Assistant United States Attorney and police detectives and officer to explain cooperation and plea agreements with the witnesses, as well as the course of their investigation into Mr. Richardson's murder. The government contends that even assuming error on the part of the trial court, the error was harmless since its case was compelling. Evidentiary rulings by a trial court are reviewed for abuse of discretion and will be reversed only if the court's exercise of discretion is clearly erroneous. Brown v. United States, 840 A.2d 82, 88 (D.C.2004) (citations omitted). However, we consider a question concerning the application of an exception to the hearsay rule de novo. Id. Generally, prior consistent statements of a witness are inadmissible and their exclusion... is intended to avoid the prejudice of unfairly bolstering the witness' credibility. Porter v. United States, 826 A.2d 398, 410 (D.C.2003) (citing Daye v. United States, 733 A.2d 321, 327 (D.C.1999)). The prior identification exception to the [general] rule[...]allows the admission of out-of-court statements through the testimony of either the identifier or a third party who was present when the identification was made. Brown, supra, 840 A.2d at 88 (citations omitted); see also D.C.Code § 14-102(b)(3) (2001) (A statement is not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement and the statement is ... an identification of a person made after perceiving the person. Such prior statements are substantive evidence.). The prior identification exception applies to statements of identification, but not to detailed accounts of the actual crime; the declarant's `description of the offense itself is admissible under this exception only to the extent necessary to make the identification understandable to the jury.' Brown, supra, 840 A.2d at 89 (quoting Porter, supra, 826 A.2d at 410). Furthermore, we have also said that: [P]rior consistent statements may still be admitted to rehabilitate a witness in at least two exceptional situations, namely, (1) where the witness has been impeached with a portion of a statement and the rest of the statement contains relevant information that could be used to meet the force of the impeachment, and (2) where there is a charge of recent fabrication. Jacobs v. United States, 861 A.2d 15, 18-19 (D.C.2004) (citation omitted). Here, the trial court determined that prior description testimony [was] admissible under the identification theory. The record before us reveals that the trial court was careful in its application of the prior identification exception, and limited what the government could elicit from its witnesses with respect to that exception. On this record, we see no abuse of discretion with respect to the prior identification testimony of Felicia Johnson, Mr. Mason, Detectives Gutherie and Alder, and Officer Dennis. Mr. Taylor also contends that the trial court improperly permitted the government to introduce testimony through Detectives Gutherie and Alder, Officer Dennis and Assistant United States Attorney Rowan that vouched for the government's evidence or the credibility of Felicia Johnson and Mr. Mason, and hence artificially strengthened a marginal case. The record reflects that the trial court allowed these witnesses to provide testimony regarding the course of the investigation, including the government's plea agreement with Mr. Mason and its interaction with Felicia Johnson. And it also allowed jurors to pose questions to Mr. Rowan regarding his view of certain actions by the police detectives, such as the payment of money to Ms. Sellers which she shared with Ms. Johnson. The trial court concluded that prior consistent statements could not come in to rehabilitate the government's witnesses on the ground that there was a charge of recent fabrication, but could come in to rehabilitate a witness where a witness's testimony ha[d] been impeached by a portion of a statement containing relevant information that could be used to meet the force of the impeachment. The record shows that the trial judge both sustained and overruled defense counsel's objections to the prosecutor's lines of questioning with respect to the testimony of the police detectives and officer, and the Assistant United States Attorney. Much of the challenged testimony was designed to rehabilitate the government's witnesses, especially Felicia Johnson and Mr. Mason, who had been subjected to rigorous and vigorous cross-examination, and in the case of Ms. Johnson re-cross-examination twice. In short, the trial court allowed this testimony to meet the force of the impeachment. Jacobs, supra, 861 A.2d at 19. Some of the testimony concerned investigative procedures, and generally, [e]vidence outlining the background of an investigation is admissible as non-hearsay, Perritt v. United States, 640 A.2d 702, 705 (D.C.1994) (citations omitted). Even assuming, however, that in some instances the government was allowed to introduce prior consistent statements of witnesses (including statements made to the prosecutor during case preparation) that exceeded the proper limits of the cited hearsay exceptions, see, e.g., Daye, supra, 733 A.2d at 324-26, we are convinced that this error [would] not have [had] a `substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' Daye, supra, 733 A.2d at 323 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). We said in Porter, supra, that only in a case where the government's proof of guilt was marginal have we thought the prejudice from this impermissible bolstering enough to warrant reversal without more. Id. at 410 (quoting Daye, supra, 733 A.2d at 327) (quotations and citation omitted). We are satisfied that the government's proof of guilt in this case was not marginal. Indeed, we can say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. Daye, supra, 733 A.2d at 328 (quoting Kotteakos, supra, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239). The government presented eyewitness testimony from three persons, Felicia Johnson, Mr. Mason and Mr. Adolphus that Mr. Taylor was in the car from which bullets were fired at Mr. Richardson. Ms. Johnson believed that more than one gun was in use. Both Ms. Johnson and Mr. Mason identified the car as a red Ford Escort. The keys to a Ford Escort which belonged to Mr. Mason's mother were found in his apartment. In addition, Mia Lawrence saw Mr. Taylor with a revolver and an automatic weapon after he was pistol-whipped by Mr. Richardson and before the July 31, 1997 shooting. There was also less compelling but important ballistics evidence  cartridge casings from a .9mm automatic gun were found at the scene where Mr. Richardson was shot, and at least two bullets were extracted from Mr. Richardson's body which probably came from a revolver. Thus, although defense counsel's cross-examination elicited impeachment evidence, we are convinced that the government's evidence in the aggregate was strong enough to neutralize the prejudice from any arguable misuse by the prosecution of the right to introduce prior consistent statements.