Opinion ID: 2216414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: police entry into kiper's apartment was illegal under steagald v. united states

Text: This court has not previously discussed the United States Supreme Court's decision in Steagald. For that reason, we provide the following background. In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Payton, a consolidated case in which appellants challenged the constitutionality of New York statutes authorizing police officers to enter a private residence without a warrant to make a routine felony arrest. One of the appellants, Payton, was sought by police as a suspect in the murder of a gas station manager. When the police went to Payton's apartment to arrest him, they did not have either an arrest warrant or a search warrant. Hearing music playing inside the apartment, they called for emergency assistance and subsequently used crowbars to break open the door and enter the apartment. Payton, 445 U.S. at 576. Upon entry, the police discovered that no one was present; however, they did seize a .30-caliber shell casing which was later admitted into evidence during Payton's murder trial. Id. at 576-77. The trial judge found that (a) the warrantless and forcible entry was authorized by state statute; (b) the evidence in plain view was properly seized; and (c) exigent circumstances justified the police officers' failure to announce their purpose, as required by statute, before entering the apartment. Id. at 577. Reversing the New York Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, the fourth amendment prohibits the police from effecting a warrantless entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest without an arrest warrant. In particular, the Court reasoned: The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual's homea zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms: `The right of the people to be secure in their ... houses ... shall not be violated.' That language unequivocally establishes the proposition that `[a]t the very core [of the Fourth Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.' ... In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and to seizures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant. Id. at 589-90 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). In 1981, the Supreme Court extended the discussion of the right of privacy in the home to include the concerns of third parties by considering the issue of whether an arrest warrantas opposed to a search warrantis adequate to protect the Fourth Amendment interests of persons not named in the warrant, when their homes are searched without their consent and in the absence of exigent circumstances. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 212. According to the facts of the case, federal agents learned from an informant that the subject of an arrest warrant, Ricky Lyons, could be found at Steagald's home during a certain 24-hour period. The agents entered the home without consent, searching for Lyons. Lyons was not found. However, the agents discovered cocaine, which discovery led to Steagald's prosecution on federal drug charges. Prior to his trial, Steagald moved to suppress all evidence obtained during a series of searches in his home, [16] arguing that the evidence was illegally seized because the agents initially entered his home without a search warrant. Steagald's motions were denied, and he was thereafter convicted of the charges against him. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and held that, absent consent or exigent circumstances, the agents were required to secure a search warrant to enter Steagald's home to look for Lyons. In its reasoning, the Court first concluded that both consent and exigent circumstances were lacking at the time of the search. Second, the agents used the arrest warrant for Lyons as legal authority to enter Steagald's home, based on a belief that Lyons might be a guest there. Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213. Regardless of how reasonable this belief might have been, it was never subjected to the detached scrutiny of a judicial officer. Id. As a consequence, while the warrant in this case may have protected Lyons from an unreasonable seizure, it did absolutely nothing to protect petitioner's privacy interest in being free from an unreasonable invasion and search of his home. Instead, petitioner's only protection from an illegal entry and search was the agent's personal determination of probable cause. In the absence of exigent circumstances, we have consistently held that such judicially untested determinations are not reliable enough to justify an entry into a person's home to arrest him without a warrant, or a search of a home for objects in the absence of a search warrant. Id. Third, if only an arrest warrant were required in this type of situation, police would be free to search the homes of all the suspect's friends and acquaintances. Id. at 215. Finally, the Court stated that an underlying purpose of the fourth amendment was to protect against abuses by law enforcement officers similar to that experienced in the Colonies with writs of assistance: police were given the unfettered discretion to choose which homes to search. Id. at 220. Thus, [w]hatever practical problems remain ... cannot outweigh the constitutional interests at stake. Any warrant requirement impedes to some extent the vigor with which the Government can seek to enforce its laws, yet the Fourth Amendment recognizes that this restraint is necessary in some cases to protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. Id. at 222. [7] Having already held that prior to his entry Thomas did not have probable cause to believe Wanie was a resident of Kiper's apartment, we now conclude that Thomas needed a search warrant to enter the apartment to look for and execute the arrest warrant for Wanie. Thomas could not use the arrest warrant as legal authority to enter Kiper's home based on the simple belief that Wanie might be there, because that belief was never subjected to the neutral and detached scrutiny of a judicial officer. See Steagald, 451 U.S. at 213.