Opinion ID: 772750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bisbee

Text: 8 Bisbee asserts four claims of error in the assessment of the trust fund recovery penalty: (1) that the IRS was without authority to assess the penalty; (2) that the district court erred in finding that he received proper notice of the assessment and that the jury rather than the court should have made that determination; (3) that the district court erred in admitting the Certificate of Assessments and Payments and Certificate of Official Record into evidence; and (4) that even if the assessment was lawful, he is not liable for the penalty because the IRS did not assess it within the required limitations period. 9 Bisbee rests his challenge to the authority of the IRS to assess the trust fund recovery penalty on two arguments. First, he asserts that the IRS is only authorized to assess a penalty based on taxes for which a return or list was actually made, and that IMI did not prepare or file tax returns or make any lists regarding the employment taxes on which this penalty was based. See I.R.C. 6201. This argument fails because the statute requires only that taxes and penalties be assessed based on all taxes . . . imposed by this title that are not timely and properly paid. I.R.C. 6201(a). The trust fund recovery penalty is based on the employment taxes for which IMI was liable and that were not timely or properly paid. 10 Bisbee argues in the alternative that even if the Secretary of the Treasury had authority to impose this penalty, the Secretary could not properly delegate this authority to the IRS district director, who actually assessed the penalty against Bisbee in this case. He argues that the delegation of authority from the Secretary to the district director applies only to taxes authorized under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 or prior law, but does not extend to any taxes authorized by the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 26 C.F.R. (Treas. Reg.) 301.6201-1. This argument is wholly without merit. The Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, amended and redesignated the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 as the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Section two of that Act specifically declares that any reference in any law . . . or other document- to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall include a reference to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 2, 100 Stat. 2085, 2095 (1986); accord Matter of LaSalle Rolling Mills, Inc., 832 F.2d 390, 391 n.1 (7th Cir. 1987). That the regulation has not been updated to reflect the redesignated title of the Code is irrelevant because it is deemed to refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 by the terms of the law enacting that code. 100 Stat. 2085, 2095. Accordingly, the IRS district director had the authority to assess the penalty. 11 Bisbee's second claim of error concerns the district court's finding that the government provided Bisbee with the notice of the assessment that is required by I.R.C. 6672(b). Section 6672 requires that the IRS notify the taxpayer in writing at least sixty days prior to any notice and demand of the penalty that the taxpayer will be subject to such a penalty. I.R.C. 6672(b)(1), 6672(b)(2). The issue of whether the notice Bisbee received adequately complied with the statutory requirement is a question of law that we review de novo. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Commissioner, 224 F.3d 874, 880 (8th Cir. 2000). The district court's determination of the contents of the notices that Bisbee received and their interpretation are findings of fact which we overturn only for clear error. Howard E. Clendenen, Inc. v. C.I.R., 207 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000). Bisbee does not dispute that he received three timely notices of the pending assessment of the trust fund penalty. He argues instead that all of these notices included a demand for payment and thus were not the type of notice preced[ing] any notice and demand of [the] penalty that the statute requires. I.R.C. 6672(b)(2). The court found that the notices contained information explaining how to pay the penalty if the taxpayer did not wish to challenge it, that this informational notice did not demand payment, and that Bisbee therefore received sufficient timely notice. We conclude that the district court did not err in determining the content of the notices, and we agree with its conclusion that the notices complied with the statute. 12 Bisbee's third challenge involves the admission into evidence of two IRS documents. The government offered into evidence a Certificate of Assessments and Payments showing that the trust fund recovery penalty was assessed against Bisbee on February 13, 1997. This document shows the taxpayer's name and social security number, the type and amount of tax, and the date of assessment. It was offered together with a Form 2866, Certificate of Official Record, attesting to the authenticity of the Certificate of Assessments and Payments. Form 2866 was under seal and bore the signature of the manager of the certification unit of the regional service center. 13 A document bearing a seal purporting to be that of the United States and a signature purporting to be an attestation requires no extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition precedent to admission. Fed. R. Evid. 902. Bisbee argues that this rule creates only a rebuttable presumption of admissibility that he has rebutted by showing that the date of the partial abatement of the penalty as shown on the Certificate of Assessments and Payments was not the date the partial abatement was actually made. Bisbee mischaracterizes the rule. An official document that is under seal and bears a signature purporting to be an attestation is admissible. United States v. Darveaux, 830 F.2d 124, 126 (8th Cir. 1987). That Bisbee presented evidence tending to contradict the facts in the Certificate and Form 2866 does not render the properly admitted evidence inadmissible. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the certificate. 14 Bisbee claims that even if the certificate and Form 2866 are admissible, they are insufficient to establish the fact that the assessment was made on February 13, 1997. He did not, however, present any evidence specifically refuting the date of assessment or suggesting any alternative date. The district court rejected Bisbee's argument and found that the assessment was made on February 13, 1997. We find no clear error in this determination. 15 Our affirmance of the district court's finding that the assessment was made on February 13, 1997, disposes of Bisbee's final contention, which is that the IRS was barred from assessing the penalty because it did not present credible evidence that the assessment was made within the limitations period.