Opinion ID: 2336426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Merits of the Injunction

Text: The standard governing the issuance of an injunction was set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953): The purpose of an injunction is to prevent future violations ... and, of course, it can be utilized even without a showing of past wrongs. But the moving party must satisfy the court that relief is needed. The necessary determination is that there exists some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, something more than mere possibility which serves to keep the case alive. The chancellor's decision is based on all the circumstances; his discretion is necessarily broad and a strong showing of abuse must be made to reverse it. To be considered are the bona fides of the expressed intent to comply, the effectiveness of the discontinuance and, in some cases, the character of the past violations. Id. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894 (citation omitted); accord, e.g., Cruz-Foster v. Foster, 597 A.2d 927, 930 (D.C.1991). The crux of Mr. Mbakpuo's argument here is that the injunction was improperly granted because the appellees failed to produce any evidence establishing a reasonable probability of future harm. He insists that although he might have engaged in illegal conduct in the past, he had voluntarily ceased such activity by the time the case came to trial. In response, the appellees note that Mbakpuo admitted that he had unlawfully used their names on legal letterhead in the past and that he failed to prove that he had discontinued the practice. Mbakpuo complains that, by adopting the appellees' position, the trial court erroneously required him affirmatively to prove discontinuance, rather than placing on the appellees the burden of showing that the challenged conduct was likely to recur. Appellant's argument misconstrues the law governing the issuance of prohibitory injunctions. Because [t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways, and because there is a public interest in having the legality of the practices settled, it is well established that voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case.... W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 632, 73 S.Ct. 894 (citations omitted). While it is true that an injunction must be focused on future conduct, it is equally true that a defendant's past conduct is important evidenceperhaps the most importantin predicting his probable future conduct. Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930 (citation omitted). Thus, once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of some cognizable danger of recurrent violation, a defendant arguing that an injunction should not be issued because of voluntary cessation of the challenged activity carries the heavy burden of demonstrat[ing] that `there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.' W.T. Grant, 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894 (footnote omitted). Mr. Mbakpuo made no attempt whatever to carry that burden. As the trial court observed, he did not present a single piece of evidence, as opposed to argument, that the challenged conduct had been abandoned or was unlikely to be repeated. We also agree with the trial court that the balance of harms weighs decidedly in the favor of the appellees. See Cruz-Foster, 597 A.2d at 930-931. The injunction merely prohibits Mr. Mbakpuo from doing something that he has absolutely no right to do in the first place (and which he claims to have no intention of doing). On the other hand, the continued unauthorized use of appellees' names by Mr. Mbakpuo could very well cause irreparable harm to the reputation of their law firm. The essence of appellant's argument is that he should not be prohibited from using the appellees' names in the future because he has no intention of doing so. Before the trial began, appellant was given every opportunity to avoid the issuance of an injunction by affirming this intention under oath or by entering into a consent decree. For reasons of his own, he chose to do neither. Instead, he proceeded to trial and sought to prove that he was in fact associated with the appellees at various times prior to 1993. Even if he had succeeded in this effort, it would have had no effect on the propriety of the injunction. Mr. Mbakpuo never even attempted to contest the appellees' basic allegations that he had used their names without authorization in 1993 and 1994 and that there was some likelihood that he would continue to do so in the future. On the record presented, we hold that the trial court did not err either in denying Mr. Mbakpuo's pre-trial motion for dismissal or summary judgment or in ultimately granting appellees' request for an injunction. The order enjoining appellant from the unauthorized use of appellees' names is accordingly Affirmed.