Opinion ID: 1913449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: pecuniary loss instruction

Text: In the first assignment of error, Flye asserts that the district court erroneously instructed the jury as to what constitutes pecuniary loss and that the error prejudiced him. We note at the outset that Flye did not object to the instruction; on the contrary, at the instruction conference, he affirmatively told the district court that he had no objection to its proposed instructions. Absent plain error indicative of a probable miscarriage of justice, the failure to object to a jury instruction after it has been submitted for review precludes raising an objection on appeal. State v. Myers, 244 Neb. 905, 510 N.W.2d 58 (1994); State v. Drinkwalter, 242 Neb. 40, 493 N.W.2d 319 (1992); State v. Lohman, 237 Neb. 503, 466 N.W.2d 534 (1991). However, an appellate court always reserves the right to note plain error which was not complained of at trial or on appeal but is plainly evident from the record, and which is of such a nature that to leave it uncorrected would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, or fairness of the judicial process. Myers, supra ; Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-1919 (Cum.Supp.1992). Thus, the question is whether the district court's definition of pecuniary loss constituted plain error such as to prejudice Flye. The defendant in State v. Pierce, 231 Neb. 966, 439 N.W.2d 435 (1989), was convicted of criminal mischief for intentionally driving his automobile into another's pickup truck. A repairman testified that the fair and reasonable cost of repairing the damage to the truck was $595.94; no evidence of the predamage market value of the truck was adduced. Arguing that pecuniary loss for purposes of the criminal mischief statute should be determined by the civil rule measuring damage to personal property, i.e., the lesser of the cost of repair or replacement, Pierce objected to any instruction which did not refer to the predamage market value of the truck. The trial court in Pierce nonetheless instructed the jury that pecuniary loss meant the `loss in the form of money, property, commercial interest, or anything else, the primary significance of which is economic loss.' Id. at 970, 439 N.W.2d at 439. Recognizing that there is no universal and comprehensive formula or method of determining the extent of pecuniary loss for the purposes of the criminal mischief statute, we rejected use of the civil damages rule and defined pecuniary loss with respect to criminal mischief as being the monetary loss suffered by another as the result of the defendant's conduct which constitutes criminal mischief under § 28-519. Id. at 975, 439 N.W.2d at 442. Concluding that the Pierce instruction did not conform with this definition and permitted the jury to speculate about various losses, including a loss of a commercial interest `or anything else' which involved `economic loss,' we held the instruction to have been incomplete and misleading and that, as such, it constituted prejudicial error. Id. at 976, 439 N.W.2d at 443. While the district court's definition of pecuniary loss in this case is the same as was the definition used by the trial court in Pierce, the circumstances in this case are quite different. The Pierce record did not disclose what the jury found the pecuniary loss to have been. Here, not only does the record reveal that figure, it establishes the figure to be consistent with the evidence presented by the State as to the cost of repairing or replacing the broken fixtures in the jail cell Flye damaged. Thus, although, in light of our holding in Pierce, the district court should have used an instruction which followed the definition of pecuniary loss set out in that opinion, it is clear that the jury was not misled by the instruction. In an appeal based on the claim of an erroneous instruction, the appellant has the burden to show that the questioned instruction was prejudicial or otherwise adversely affected a substantial right of the appellant. State v. Messersmith, 238 Neb. 924, 473 N.W.2d 83 (1991); State v. Jasper, 237 Neb. 754, 467 N.W.2d 855 (1991); State v. Harney, 237 Neb. 512, 466 N.W.2d 540 (1991). Under the circumstances, Flye was not prejudiced by the erroneous instruction; thus, there is no merit to the first assignment of error.