Opinion ID: 2551468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Magnetometer Screening

Text: Defendant contends that placing a magnetometer (i.e., a metal detector) at the public entrance to the courtroom violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and their equivalent guaranties in the California Constitution. The prosecution, stating that defendant had a history of violence and was reported to be a member of a well-known prison gang, some of whose members might wish to attend the trial, moved to have a magnetometer placed outside the courtroom. The motion stated that the security measure was needed to safeguard defendant himself and those who might testify against him. It stated specifically that Castillo is, as is a matter of record, in the witness protection program and past solicitations to kill him are a matter of record. The prosecution noted that it was not requesting that defendant be shackled as long as there is some reasonable assurance that spectators who may attend the court proceedings are not armed... Defendant responded to the request on procedural and substantive grounds. He requested an evidentiary hearing to refute the motion's factual allegations. He asserted that his constitutional right to due process of law compelled the trial court to convene such a hearing. And, arguing as a matter of state law, he maintained that a magnetometer's presence would prejudice the jury against him. Without calling witnesses, the trial court conducted a hearing. After hearing argument, it stated that [t]his court would be naive, and I think counsel would be naive, to assume that this court has not become aware of allegations that have surfaced concerning the membership in various gangs of various potential witnesses in this case. It's also a known fact that threats allegedly were made as to Mr. Castillo. The court also noted that one potential witnesses had claimed to have been a member of the Mexican Mafia (a prison-based gang also known as La Erne, the Spanish word for the letter M, and frequently referred to in the trial proceedings by that term), and that another may have been a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, a different prison gang. Describing a magnetometer as unobtrusive and nondiscriminatory, the court decided that it would order one to be used during the evidentiary portion of the trial. It implicitly denied defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing. Defendant apparently sought a writ of mandate against the order in the Court of Appeal, which rejected it. Thereafter he moved for the trial court to reconsider its decision, but it also refused. Instead, at his request, it instructed the jury, immediately after the alternate jurors had been sworn, to disregard the magnetometer's presence. [I]t is my policy in serious felony cases to have everyone except jurors pass through a metal detector before entering the courtroom. [¶] Therefore, you can expect that a metal detector will be placed outside the courtroom when the trial begins, and it will remain throughout the course of the trial. [¶] The practices of other judges in this courthouse differ from courtroom to courtroom. You should not view the presence of a metal detector outside this courtroom, or the absence of one outside other courtrooms, as a reflection on either party or any of the witnesses. [¶] It is solely a matter of my personal policy. In bringing his claim, defendant relies, as he did at trial, on People v. Duran (1976) 16 Cal.3d 282,127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322. Though he labels his claim one of constitutional error, its substance is of state law error, namely a violation of Duran. Through Duran and its progeny, it has become settled that because of its potentially prejudicial impact on the jury, shackling should be ordered only as a last resort and only upon a showing of a manifest need for such restraints. [Citations.] Any restraints should be as `unobtrusive as possible, although as effective as necessary under the circumstances.' [Citation.] Although these restrictions make the trial court's discretion to order restraints `relatively narrow' [citation], the court's ruling will be upheld on appeal absent a showing of a manifest abuse of that discretion. { People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 774, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) But Duran is inapposite. Here, unlike the situation in People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, defendant was not shackled. Rather, a magnetometer was placed by the courtroom door. Unlike occasions on which the government can be accused of creating a public spectacle or directing suspicion at a criminal defendant by parading him or her in shackles, or driving him or her to court in an ostentatious manner, the trial court's use of a magnetometer was, as it observed, nondiscriminatory. (Cf. Holbrook v. Flynn (1986) 475 U.S. 560, 567, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525.) In People v. Duran, supra, 16 Cal.3d 282, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322, we stated that the presence of armed guards ordinarily need not be justified by the court or the prosecutor. ( Id. at p. 291, fn. 8, 127 Cal.Rptr. 618, 545 P.2d 1322; see also generally Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, 475 U.S. 560, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 [discussing the presence of uniformed and armed personnel].) We believe that the use of a metal detector outside a courtroom, like the use of additional security forces within the courtroom, is not ... inherently prejudicial.... Unlike shackling and the display of the defendant in jail garb, the use of a metal detector does not identify the defendant as a person apart or as worthy of fear and suspicion. { People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 996, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) To the extent the metal detector's use focused attention on the proceedings, it pointed to the nature of the case, not to defendant's character. (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 114-115, 241 Cal.Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) The distinction is crucial. Nor did the magnetometer improperly highlight the nature of the case. The jurors already knew they were hearing a multiple murder trial and that the defendant appearing before them did not arrive there by choice or happenstance. ( Holbrook v. Flynn, supra, 475 U.S. 560, 567, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525.) Hence the magnetometer's presence did not objectionably dramatize the proceedings. The device was, in its neutrality, akin to that of, and indeed likely less dramatic than, the use of armed guards in the courtroom. A trial court has broad power to maintain courtroom security and orderly proceedings. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1269, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Accordingly, we review the court's decisions regarding security measures in the courtroom, including deploying a magnetometer at the entrance, for an abuse of discretion. ( Ibid. ; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th 900, 997, 95 Cal. Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) We find none. The court was entitled to rely and act on the prosecutor's representations, as an officer of the court, that bringing the case to trial posed certain risks. There was no violation of state law, and because defendant's constitutional claims are predicated on his assertion that state law was violated, they too must fail. We turn next to defendant's procedural claim: that it violated due process to install a magnetometer without an evidentiary hearing. We do not agree that due process requires a contested evidentiary proceeding. It is well known that `[d]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.' ( People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 68-69, 284 Cal. Rptr. 288, 813 P.2d 1318.) We have already explained that defendant's interest in a fair trial was unaffected by installing a magnetometer outside the courtroom: it was a neutral measure that did not focus attention on him. Holding a contested evidentiary hearing would not have been useful: it would have imposed a needless burden on the trial court, which, as we have explained, enjoys wide discretion to maintain courtroom security. It might have resulted in a wasteful minitrial at which witnesses would have had to testify about their gang affiliations or other potential for generating security problems. Neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires such consumption of the parties' and the trial court's time. Indeed, by holding a hearing of any kind, the trial court gave defendant more than he was entitled to. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1268, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.)