Opinion ID: 1953344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Effect of Judgment

Text: We realize that Act 512 does not exist in a vacuum. The State argues, and we agree, the Act and the Chisom Consent Judgment are separate and independent methods by which the negotiated remedy was implemented. Although the Act falls by this judgment, we recognize the status quo remains intact under the Chisom Consent Judgment. Consequently, this court as it is currently composed shall continue to function as a de jure court with its actions valid and effectual. We emphasize that the court-approved settlement in Chisom, which is under the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, is not affected by this judgment. Finally, we must address an allegation of the plaintiff that has profound importance to the public and the state judicial system. Plaintiff argues a declaration that Act 512 is unconstitutional renders void all decisions by this court decided during the time the Act was effective. By applying long-established authority, we reject this contention. In State v. Johnson, 249 La. 950, 192 So.2d 135 (1966), defendants contested their convictions and sentence on appeal, arguing they were prejudiced by an unfair trial and for numerous other errors related to their murder charges. In addition, defendants contended the criminal statutes applied to them were unconstitutional and their prosecutions invalid because those laws were passed by an improperly constituted legislature. LA. CONST. art. III, sections 2 and 3 of 1921 required the legislature to reapportion itself every ten years. The defendants argued that since the legislature failed to do so, its actions while ill-constituted required invalidation of its enactments. A unanimous court in Johnson repudiated that argument by applying the de facto officer doctrine. The court reasoned that if the legislators who enacted the challenged laws were not de jure officers, they were at a minimum de facto public officers. Id., 192 So.2d at 145. Grounded in public policy, the court found the acts of a de facto officer are valid as to third persons and the public until the officer's title to office is adjudged insufficient. Id. Meanwhile, the officer's authority may not be collaterally attacked or inquired into by third persons, and their actions are clothed with the same validity as that of de jure officers. Id. at 146. Therefore, the court concluded the defendants could not avail themselves of the legislature's failure to reapportion itself to avoid prosecution. Id. In State v. Stripling, 354 So.2d 1297 (La.1978), the court reaffirmed this principle. In Stripling, defendants challenged their convictions and sentences, arguing the Commissioner who authorized the challenged search warrant was without authority to issue the warrant because the legislative act creating the Commissioner's position was unconstitutional. Id. at 1300. The defense argued the act to create the office did not pass with the requisite two-thirds of the membership of the House of Representatives as required by LA. CONST. art. 87 of 1921; therefore, the warrants served against them were unlawful. Id. Relying on Johnson, the court held the commissioner issuing the warrant was at least a de facto officer acting under color of authority. Id. The court reasoned that until the commissioner's title to the office is directly attacked and held to be invalid, the acts of a de facto official are as valid and effectual[] when they concern the public or the rights of third parties, as though he were an officer de jure and cannot be collaterally attacked. Id. at 1300-01. Thus, the court refused to invalidate the defendants' convictions and sentences on that basis. This court applied the de facto officer doctrine directly to the judiciary in City of Baton Rouge v. Cooley, 418 So.2d 1321 (La. 1982). In Cooley, defendants were charged with traffic offenses and appeared before an ad hoc judge assigned to the Baton Rouge City Court. Defendants challenged the jurisdiction of the ad hoc judge, arguing the appointment made by a duly elected City Court judge was unconstitutional under LA. CONST. art. V, section 22. The lower courts denied defendants motion to upset the ad hoc judge's jurisdiction and this court affirmed. In maintaining the ad hoc judge's jurisdiction, this court reiterated many of the de facto officer principles articulated in State v. Johnson, supra . A judge acting under color of right has the authority, capacity, and right to perform judicial duties. Id. (citing State v. Lewis, 22 La.Ann. 33 (1870)). That capacity cannot be challenged collaterally, and the acts of a de facto judge, even if not de jure, are valid and binding. Id. (citing State v. Schuermann, 146 La. 110, 83 So. 426 (1919)). Like in Cooley, the judge elected to occupy the Chisom seat under La.R.S. 13:312.4 is not a usurper of an office who acted without color of right. Rather, that judge's actions have been and will be given de jure effect under the Chisom Consent Judgment. At a minimum, the actions of the judge assigned pursuant to section 312.4 have been in the nature of a de facto officer with a judicial appointment made in conformity with a statute passed by the Louisiana Legislature. Therefore, all action of this court undertaken while that judge has been and continues to be assigned pursuant to the Consent Judgment shall be valid and effectual and not subject to attack. Based upon the foregoing, we reject plaintiff's allegation that actions taken by this court during the Chisom seat's assignment pursuant to Act 512 are defective. This court's actions are valid and effectual under well-settled law.