Opinion ID: 2995244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Habeas Corpus and 28 U.S.C. sec.

Text: 2254(d)(1) In considering a habeas corpus petition filed by a state prisoner that challenges the prisoner’s conviction or sentence on legal grounds, federal courts employ the standards set forth in 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254(d)(1). Under this provision, a federal court may grant a writ of habeas corpus only if the adjudication of the prisoner’s claims in state court resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. As the Supreme Court explained in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), section 2254(d)(1) establishes two independent grounds on which a federal court can grant habeas corpus relief: (1) if a state court decision is contrary to clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court, or (2) if a state court decision involves an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court. Id. at 404-05; see also Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 627-28 (7th Cir. 2000). The contrary to standard requires a state court decision to be substantially different from the relevant precedent of [the Supreme Court]. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405. For example, a state court decision applying a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth by the Supreme Court would qualify, as would a decision that involves a set of facts ma terially indistinguishable from a Supreme Court case that arrives at a different result. Id. at 405-06. By contrast, a state court decision that draws from Supreme Court precedent the correct legal rule and applies it in a factually distinguishable situation will not satisfy the contrary to standard, no matter how misguided the decision’s ultimate conclusion. Id. at 406-07. Errors in the application of Supreme Court precedent are governed by the unreasonable application of standard. A state-court decision that correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies it unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner’s case qualifies as a decision involving an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Id. at 407-08. Whether an application of federal law is unreasonable is not a simple question to answer, as unreasonable is a difficult term to define without reference to a particular set of facts. Still, Williams provides guidance. First, reasonableness is judged objectively, not subjectively. Id. at 409-10. Thus, the fact that judges may disagree about the proper application of a precedent does not affect the reasonableness of a particular application of that precedent. Second, an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Id. at 410 (emphasis in original). Therefore, a federal court may not grant habeas corpus relief simply because it has independently concluded that the relevant state court decision misapplies clearly established federal law. The decision’s application of Supreme Court precedent must be so erroneous as to be unreasonable. In Williams, the Supreme Court also explained the meaning of the phrase clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. It characterized the phrase as referring to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court’s decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision. Id. at 412. There fore, in order to grant habeas corpus relief under section 2254(d)(1), a federal court must be able to point to the holding of a Supreme Court decision handed down before the state courts issued the decision under review.