Opinion ID: 1724022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Gender-based Batson Challenge.

Text: The defendant's asserted gender-based Batson challenge was based upon the same peremptory strike of prospective juror Howard. During the course of his race-based Batson challenge, the defendant made several references to the fact that the three prospective black jurors that the State had used strikes against were also female. Although the defendant did not cite to J.E.B., nor expressly state that he was making a gender-based Batson challenge, in the course of his race-based challenge the defendant did state: ... [the prosecutor] has systematically excluded members of the black race and he has even narrowed it down to black members that are female of the black race. So because of the nature of our challenge it goes to all females that he's been doing that; but we feel like we have made a strong prima facie case ... Defendant correctly points out in his brief that the law of J.E.B. is applicable to this case. [4] Assuming that the defendant properly conveyed to the trial court that he was making a gender-based Batson challenge, the defendant nonetheless incorrectly argues that the trial court completely ignored and dismissed defense counsel's claim of gender discrimination ... in direct contradiction to the holding of J.E.B. Conversely, a review of the record reveals that the trial court did, in fact, consider the defendant's references to gender-based discrimination along with the defendant's express race-based Batson challenge when the court ruled that the defendant had failed to make a prima facie showing of discrimination as required by Batson and its progeny. In making its ruling, the trial court stated: In the exercise of five challenges, three of the challenges have been against blacks, two of the challenges have been against whites. For whatever gender, whatever part gender may play, all are females. I can't say that that would establish a primarya prima facie showing, that it isif it's a proper Batson challenge, and I would so rule. After noting the number of black jurors on the panel that the prosecutor did not strike, the court added, As I say in advance of that I have ruled that I don't think that that's a prima facie showing. From the court's statement, it is clear that the court did consider gender: whatever part gender may play, and subsequently ruled that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie showing. It would strain logic to say that a defendant can simultaneously assert a gender-based challenge along with a race-based challenge by simply mentioning gender within the race-based challenge, yet hold that a trial court could not likewise dispense with both. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court's finding that the defendant failed to establish a prima facie case of gender-based discrimination. Prior to the defendant's challenge, the State had accepted a total of six prospective female jurors, four of whom were eventually empaneled and an additional two whom the defendant peremptorily struck after the State had accepted them. Thus, while the State peremptorily struck five prospective female jurors, it accepted six. Considering the prosecutor's acceptance of six females, and the defendant's failure to show any pattern of discrimination beyond a bare allegation, we find that the defendant failed to make a prima facie case of gender-based discriminatory use of peremptory strikes. Based on the foregoing reasons, we find that the trial court properly ruled that the defendant failed to make a prima facie case of gender-based discriminatory use of peremptory strikes by the prosecution. Accordingly we find no merit in defendant's assignments of error twenty-one and thirty.