Opinion ID: 1967718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Drs. Fisher, Klappenbach, and Shaffer

Text: As to the defendant-appellees added by the amended complaint, we agree again with the trial court: summary judgment must be entered in favor of Drs. Fisher, Klappenbach, and Shaffer (and the professional corporation Fisher & Kanovsky, P.C.) because Berkow's claims against each is time-barred. D.C.Code § 12-301(8) (2001) establishes a three-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice actions. Colbert v. Georgetown Univ., 641 A.2d 469, 472 (D.C. 1994) (en banc). The trial court deemed these claims filed as of the date Berkow filed his motion to amend the complaint, January 16, 2001, a ruling that Berkow does not dispute. There also is no dispute that on August 28, 1996, Dr. Fleury confirmed and Berkow learnedthat Dr. Fleury had misdiagnosed the cancer. The question, then, is whether Berkow's awareness of his injury no later than August 28, 1996, began the three-year limitation period for filing suit not only against Dr. Fleury and Sibleywhom Berkow sued within the statutory period on July 14, 1999but also against the defendants newly named in the amended complaint filed more than four years after Berkow learned of the misdiagnosis. We have held that a claim accrues when the plaintiff knows of (1) an injury, (2) its cause, and (3) some evidence of wrongdoing. Cevenini v. Archbishop of Washington, 707 A.2d 768, 771 (D.C. 1998). Plaintiff's knowledge for this purpose includes not only actual notice but also inquiry notice. Diamond, 680 A.2d at 372 (opinion of Ruiz, J.). And one is deemed to be on inquiry notice if, in meeting one's responsibility to act reasonably under the circumstances in investigating matters affecting [one's] affairs, such an investigation, if conducted, would have led to actual notice. Id. Berkow contends that Drs. Klappenbach and Shaffer, Sibley pathologists who concurred in Dr. Fleury's misdiagnosis, were legally responsible as well for that misdiagnosis. And Berkow maintains that Dr. Fisher, a cardiologist, and his professional corporation, Fisher & Kanovsky, P.C. were negligent in failing to discern in 1994 that Berkow's lack of femoral pulse indicated a growth, likely cancerous, that was impeding the blood flow to his pelvisa diagnostic failure that substantially contributed to the expansion of his malignancy. Whatever the merits of these arguments, they cannot obscure the fact that on this record Berkow, after learning on August 28, 1996, about Dr. Fleury's misdiagnosis, was on inquiry notice of any wrongdoing by the other defendants here who may have contributed to his injury. That surely would include all doctors, such as Drs. Klappenbach and Shaffer, who allegedly consorted with Dr. Fleury in his misdiagnosis. Cevenini, 707 A.2d at 773; Diamond, 680 A.2d at 380. Next, as to any other physician at Sibley, such as Dr. Fisher, who had not participated in Dr. Fleury's diagnosis, we have said that a plaintiff's knowledge of one defendant's misconduct will create inquiry notice of claims against a potential co-defendant ... if (1) a reasonable plaintiff would have conducted an investigation as to the co-defendant, and (2) such an investigation would have revealed some evidence of wrongdoing. Cevenini, 707 A.2d at 773. We agree with the trial court that, if Berkow had acted reasonably, he would have investigated Dr. Fisher's role, if any, in failing to discover Berkow's cancer, and as a result would have discovered evidence, if any, of the doctor's wrongdoing. As the trial court elaborated: Once plaintiff was made aware in February 1995 that he had a cancerous tumor in his left groin area, he certainly knew that this was an area of his body about which he had complained repeatedly to Dr. Fisher of pain and swelling. He ought, then, to be held to have had an obligation to inquire whether Dr. Fisher... should have discovered the cancer at all and sooner. Certainly had plaintiff consulted an expert, the opinion that he now has from Dr. Tirganthat Dr. Fisher was negligent in failing to discover the tumor in 1994would presumably have been given sooner. Contrary to Berkow's contention, therefore, the discovery rulewhich tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintiff has sufficient knowledge of the injury, its cause, and some evidence of wrongdoing does not help him here. See Hardi v. Mezzanotte, 818 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C. 2003). The benefit of tolling under that rule ends, or perhaps more accurately is eclipsed, once a plaintiff is on inquiry notice, as Berkow was here no later than August 28, 1996, as to all defendants. See Cevenini, 707 A.2d at 771. Nor does the continuing treatment rule help Berkow. Under that rule, the limitation period for filing suit for claims arising from a doctor's treatment will be tolled until the doctor ceases to treat the patient in the specific matter at hand. Anderson v. George, 717 A.2d 876, 878 (D.C.1998). Why so? It would be ludicrous, we said, quoting a New York court, to expect a patient to interrupt a course of treatment by suing the delinquent doctor. Id. (citation omitted). But, as we made plain, the period of tolling ends once the particular treatment at hand ends, since that treatment no longer would be jeopardized by an interfering lawsuit. In this case, the trial court foundand we see no basis in the record for disturbing that findingthat Dr. Fisher did not continue to treat plaintiff for the missing pulse after December 1994, over six years before Berkow filed suit against him. It is true, however, as the trial court also found, that Dr. Fisher provided cardiac care to Berkow through December 2000. But even if we were to assume that, as part of that care, Dr. Fisher should be deemed to have been monitoring the femoral pulse after December 1994, there can be no doubt that once the malignant tumor was discovered in February 1995 by Dr. Fleury, Berkow was on inquiry notice of any role Dr. Fisher may have played in failing to detect that malignancy earlier. Furthermore, once Dr. Fleury took over treatment of that condition, there is no record evidence that Dr. Fisher's continuing treatment of Berkow's cardiac condition embraced continuing treatment germane to the malignancy. In sum, the continuing treatment rule did not toll the running of the statute of limitations to a point where there is any basis for concluding that Berkow's amended complaint of January 16, 2001 was filed within three years of the time his claim against Dr. Fisher (and his professional corporation, Fisher and Kanovsky, P.C.) accrued (February 1995 at the latest). [2] Accordingly, the judgment in favor of all defendants is Affirmed.