Opinion ID: 206149
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mass Marketing Enhancement

Text: U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii) provides for a two-level enhancement “[i]f the offense . . . was committed through mass-marketing.” The commentary to § 2B1.1 defines “mass-marketing” as “a plan, program, promotion, or campaign that is conducted through solicitation by telephone, mail, the Internet, or other means to induce a large number of persons to (i) purchase goods or services; (ii) participate in a contest or sweepstakes; or (iii) invest for financial profit.” Id. cmt. n.4(A). Mass marketing is not limited to the mass communication methods listed in the commentary; the definition “explicitly contemplates ‘other means’ of mass-marketing.” United States v. Magnuson, 307 F.3d 333, 335 (5th Cir. 3 Our uncertainty is exacerbated by the fact that the government cited two inapposite cases to the district court during the sentencing proceeding in support of its position that the intended loss amount should be measured by the higher billed amount. See United States v. McLemore, 200 F. App’x 342, 344 n.1 (5th Cir. 2006) (specifically noting that the defendant in that case abandoned this issue on appeal); United States v. Brown, 354 F. App’x 216 (5th Cir. 2009) (never explicitly mentioning this issue at all). Furthermore, in discussing Isiwele’s objection to the calculation of the loss amount, the Presentence Investigation Report focused on the inapposite Guidelines comment that “[t]he court shall use the gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss only if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(B), without actually addressing Isiwele’s intent in this case. 4 For example, Stephen Ward, a witness for the government, testified during the trial that “[w]hen you agree to participate in the Medicare program and provide services, you’re agreeing to a set fee schedule for whatever the services are that you’re providing.” The record reflects that Isiwele was a Medicare and Medicaid supplier. 11 Case: 10-40347 Document: 00511403702 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/07/2011 No. 10-40347 2002) (per curiam). Among these “other means” of mass marketing is face-toface marketing intended to reach a large number of persons. See United States v. Jackson, 220 F. App’x 317, 331–32 (5th Cir. 2007). On appeal, Isiwele argues that a mass marketing enhancement should not apply because his mass marketing efforts were not directed at the victims of the crime—here, Medicare/Medicaid. This ground for objection is different from that which Isiwele raised during the sentencing hearing; consequently, the plain error standard of review applies. See United States v. Medina–Anicacio, 325 F.3d 638, 643 (5th Cir. 2003). Under plain error review, the appellant must show that there was a clear and obvious error that affected his substantial rights. United States v. Andina–Ortega, 608 F.3d 305, 309 (5th Cir. 2010). If these conditions are met, the court may exercise its discretion to correct the error if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Isiwele relies on an Eighth Circuit opinion, United States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 2009), in support of his argument that the mass marketing enhancement does not apply when the marketing is not directed at the victims. In Miller, the defendant was convicted of various offenses related to defrauding financial institutions through a mortgage fraud scheme. Id. at 562–63. The defendant used television commercials to recruit borrowers to apply for mortgages, which the defendant then sold to lenders by misrepresenting the borrowers’ qualifications and property values. Id. at 562–63. The Eighth Circuit found no error in the district court’s conclusion that the enhancement did not apply because “[t]he crime was the fraud that was committed on the lenders” and “there was no[ ] mass marketing involved in that . . . .” Id. at 568 (alteration original). We find more persuasive our own recent decision in United States v. Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219 (5th Cir. 2009), in which we upheld the application of the 12 Case: 10-40347 Document: 00511403702 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/07/2011 No. 10-40347 mass marketing enhancement to a physician who conspired to defraud Medicare/Medicaid by falsely certifying that ambulatory patients needed power wheelchairs. In Mauskar, “recruiters” targeted elderly beneficiaries to escort to the defendant’s clinic for evaluations, and DME suppliers used the false Certificates of Medical Necessity supplied by the defendant to obtain payment from Medicare/Medicaid for medically unnecessary wheelchairs for thousands of beneficiaries. Id. at 224. The defendant objected to the mass marketing enhancement on the grounds that there was no evidence that he was personally involved in the mass marketing. Id. at 232–33. While this argument is different from Isiwele’s argument on appeal that the mass marketing was not directed at the victims of the fraud, the reasoning in Mauskar is instructive in upholding the enhancement here: The plain language of the Guidelines forecloses Mauskar’s argument that the mass-marketing enhancement does not apply to his conduct. The mass-marketing enhancement is applicable if an “offense . . . was committed through mass-marketing.” U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(A)(ii). “ ‘Offense’ means the offense of conviction and all relevant conduct under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct) unless a different meaning is specified or is otherwise clear from the context.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1(H). And “in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity,” relevant conduct includes “all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). Id. at 233 (alteration original). Implicit in the Mauskar court’s holding is the determination that the mass marketing efforts of the recruiters who escorted beneficiaries to the defendant’s medical clinic was “relevant conduct” constituting part of the “offense” of health care fraud, such that the mass marketing enhancement applied to the recruiters’ co-defendant. We explicitly adopt that reasoning today in holding that the district court did not err in finding Isiwele eligible for the mass marketing 13 Case: 10-40347 Document: 00511403702 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/07/2011 No. 10-40347 enhancement on the basis of Patterson’s face-to-face recruitment of Medicare/Medicaid beneficiaries.