Opinion ID: 1467272
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Did the Parole Commission properly consider exculpatory evidence in its decision to continue to deny Furnari parole?

Text: Furnari claims that the Parole Commission's findings regarding the credibility of the information from various informants are arbitrary, capricious, and without a rational basis. We already have held that the Parole Commission had a rational basis for its factual findings with respect to Furnari's alleged involvement in uncharged murders. Furnari, 125 Fed. Appx. at 437. Nevertheless we will consider this contention inasmuch as the Government does not contend that Furnari is abusing the writ by advancing the claim. Congress has given the Parole Commission great discretion concerning matters of parole. See 18 U.S.C. § 4203. In addition, applicable regulations permit the Parole Commission to use all relevant, available information in making parole determinations. Thus, 28 C.F.R. § 2.19(c) provides that: The Commission may take into account any substantial information available to it in establishing the prisoner's offense severity rating, salient factor score, and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, provided the prisoner is apprised of the information and afforded an opportunity to respond. If the prisoner disputes the accuracy of the information presented, the Commission shall resolve such dispute by the preponderance of the evidence standard; that is, the commission shall rely upon such information only to the extent that it represents the explanation of the facts that best accords with reason and probability. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(c) permits the Parole Commission to grant or deny release on parole notwithstanding the guidelines of that section so long as it has good cause for doing so and it furnishes the prisoner with written notice stating with particularity the reasons for its determination. Good cause requires substantial reasons for the Parole Commission's action and includes only grounds which are not arbitrary, irrational, unreasonable, irrelevant or capricious. Harris v. Martin, 792 F.2d 52, 55 (3d Cir.1986). Good cause may include considerations of factors such as whether the prisoner was involved in an offense with an unusual degree of sophistication or planning or has a lengthy prior record, or was part of a large scale conspiracy or continuing criminal enterprise. Romano v. Baer, 805 F.2d 268, 270 (7th Cir.1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Although the Parole Commission's decisions must have a factual basis, judicial review is limited to whether there is some evidence in the record to support its decision. Maddox v. United States Parole Comm'n, 821 F.2d 997, 999 (5th Cir.1987). When there is conflicting information available to the Parole Commission, it must resolve disputes about the information by a preponderance of the evidence. Gambino v. Morris, 134 F.3d at 168. See Campbell v. United States Parole Comm'n, 704 F.2d 106, 114 (3d Cir.1983). Clearly we cannot overturn the Parole Commission's credibility determination if there is a basis for its decision. See Hackett v. United States Parole Comm'n, 851 F.2d 127, 131 (6th Cir.1987). Moreover, the Parole Commission is entrusted with the power to determine the weight to be accorded mitigating factors. Furnari asserts that the Parole Commission improperly discredited an affidavit of George Zappola and an autobiography of Salvatore Gravano that support his position minimizing his role in violent mafia criminal activity while assigning too much credit to adverse information from Thomas Carew in its November 23, 2005 Notice of Action on Appeal. In that notice, the Board explained its decision regarding its assessment of the credibility of conflicting information in the record: The Board rejects your claim and finds that the affidavit does not prove that you had nothing to do with the murder of Richard Taglianetti. The Board finds Zappola's affidavit not to be credible because it was submitted so late, five years after you made this argument at your initial hearing in 2000, and because it is not corroborated, whereas the reason for Taglianetti's murder on which the Commission relied was corroborated by several individuals. Further, Zappola affirms in his affidavit that `Taglianetti was killed only because of what he did to my wife' (Exhibit X), but that assertion is contradicted by evidence in your Exhibits V and W. The Board finds more credible the contradictory evidence contained in the exhibits. First, according to the testimony of an FBI agent set forth in Exhibit V, Taglianetti's argument with his sister-in-law was not the sole or even the most important reason for his murder, but was simply the event that caused the Lucchese Family to more vigorously pursue the still existing contract that you put out on him in 1983 when you were the Lucchese consigliere. [Testimony from FBI Agent Byrne omitted.] Second, as shown in Exhibit W, when Zappola pleaded guilty to Taglianetti's murder, he never mentioned avenging his wife's honor or her being `slapped around' by Taglianetti as a reason for the murder. He affirmed that the murder was to advance his position in the racketeering enterprise. Zappola testified at the plea hearing that he conspired with others to murder Taglianetti `for the purpose of maintaining and increasing my position in an association in fact enterprise, consisting of myself and others, which enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.' App. at 121. It is clear from the above that the Board considered the evidence concerning Furnari's uncharged conduct and found that the information Furnari claims exculpates him from criminal conduct attributed to him is less credible than that which implicates him in mafia related murders and beatings. Id. Furnari attempts to analogize his case to Gambino in which we found that the Parole Commission's denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious and thus remanded the case for reconsideration. 134 F.3d at 165. But this case is distinguishable from Gambino because we based our conclusions there in part on the fact that the Parole Commission relied on information from unnamed sources, a procedure that deprived the prisoner of the opportunity to rebut the information. Thus, in Gambino the Parole Commission proceedings denied the prisoner due process of law. Id. at 163. Moreover, in Gambino the Parole Commission relied on facts previously found to be erroneous without information to suggest otherwise. Id. at 162. In Furnari's case, however, there is considerable information supplying good cause for the Parole Commission's decision. Furnari is disappointed by the limited weight and credibility that the Parole Commission and the Board afforded the Zappola affidavit, but it is apparent it had a factual basis for its determination. The reports from the Board are thorough and reasonable. Furthermore, the Parole Commission considered Furnari's information and articulated a rational basis for rejecting its credibility, a determination solely within its discretion. Accordingly, the District Court properly denied Furnari's exculpatory evidence claim of the habeas petition.