Opinion ID: 731269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intentional Interference Under Section 510

Text: 18 The district court found that Vickers had not discharged Jefferson with the intent to interfere with his pension rights. It therefore entered judgment in favor of the defendants on Jefferson's section 510 claim. Jefferson asserts this finding was erroneous. 19 Claims brought under section 510 of ERISA are analyzed under the three-stage burden-shifting paradigm articulated by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824-26, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Rath v. Selection Research, Inc., 978 F.2d 1087, 1089-90 (8th Cir.1992). The district court found that Jefferson had established a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, thus creating a presumption of discrimination. The court went on to find that Vickers had rebutted that presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Jefferson's discharge in that it was undergoing a reduction in force. Jefferson does not challenge that finding on appeal. 20 Section 510 plaintiffs are required to present evidence that [an employer] acted with specific intent to interfere with their rights to overcome an employer's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason. Brandis v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 47 F.3d 947, 950 (8th Cir.1995). This specific intent can be shown with circumstantial evidence, but must be more specific than mere conjecture. Kinkead v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 49 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir.1995). Jefferson has failed to adduce this evidence of intent. 21 Jefferson relies on three facts to establish specific intent. First, he argues that Vickers' offer to extend his benefits in exchange for a release is evidence of intentional interference. An employer does not violate ERISA when it conditions the receipt of early retirement benefits upon the participants' waiver of employment claims. Lockheed Corp. v. Spink, --- U.S. ----, ----, 116 S.Ct. 1783, 1791, 135 L.Ed.2d 153 (1996). The requested release alone does not establish the intent to violate ERISA. 22 Second, Jefferson argues that Vickers' intent is demonstrated by the extensions granted other employees who did not execute a release. As noted above, Jefferson submitted no evidence to support his assertion that other employees received extensions without executing releases. Furthermore, even if proven, the incidents would not impose section 510 liability. As the court in McGath v. Auto-Body North Shore, Inc., 7 F.3d 665 (7th Cir.1993) explained: 23 Because the plan must be administered according to its terms, [plaintiff] cannot complain because he is held to those terms; this is true even if the rules were bent for another individual. ERISA § 510 affords protection from discrimination that interferes with the attainment of any right to which such participant may become entitled under the plan. [Plaintiff] does not have a right to treatment that is contrary to the terms of the plan, even if those terms are breached for others. 24 Id. at 670 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Vickers offered to allow Jefferson to vest in benefits to which he was not legally entitled. An employer does not violate ERISA by offering a gratuity to one employee that is less generous than a gratuity bestowed on another. Such an offer itself does not establish intentional interference with ERISA rights. 25 Finally, Jefferson claims that Vickers' refusal to pay his (now admittedly) vested Part A Plan benefits is evidence of intent to interfere with his pension rights. Jefferson offers no evidence on this point other than Vickers' failure to pay. Were this evidence alone enough to state a claim under section 510, every error in determining entitlement to benefits would be actionable under section 510. That is clearly not the purpose of this section of ERISA.