Opinion ID: 448868
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The FMIA and the PPIA

Text: 32 Whether the New York law as applied to meat and poultry products that contain alternative cheese is also preempted requires us to determine whether the reach of the preemption provisions of the FMIA and the PPIA extends to the New York labeling requirements. This inquiry requires us to decide, also, whether the USDA's adoption of the FDA's regulatory definition of imitation was valid. 33 New York argues that the adoption was improper because it was not in accordance with the rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 551 et seq. (1982). The district court determined, and the federal parties agree, that the USDA's imitation food policy is more akin to a statement of general policy or an interpretive rule than to a rule which requires formal notice and comment proceedings. 581 F.Supp. at 665. The federal agencies also claim that the USDA's action could be correctly characterized as an express adoption of a standing policy through adjudication. 34 It is well established that an agency may adopt prospective rules of general effect through either rulemaking or adjudication; the choice of method rests within the discretion of the agency. E.g., NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 668, 96 S.Ct. 1806, 1810, 48 L.Ed.2d 284 (1976); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 290-95, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1769-72, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 1580, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947); New York State Commission on Cable Television v. FCC, 669 F.2d 58, 62 n. 9 (2d Cir.1982). In support of its claim of adoption through adjudication, the USDA cites In re Castleberry's Food Co., 40 Agric. Dec. 1262 (1981), a USDA adjudicative proceeding under the FMIA, which expressly adopted what it identified as agency practice: use of the FDA definition of imitation in the case-by-case approval of food labels. Id. at 1277-78. Indeed, as the court in Swift & Co. v. Walkley, 369 F.Supp. at 1200, indicated, the agency had begun narrowing the application of the term imitation as early as 1970, just after the issuance of the White House Report. Moreover, formal notice and comment rulemaking procedures concerning the practice were initiated on or about August 5, 1983. 48 Fed.Reg. 35,654 (1983). The initiating notice explained that 35 [t]he proposed disclosure requirement for substitute and imitation cheese ingredients would not affect current requirements for imitation labeling. Thus, for example, in addition to the disclosure statement concerning its cheese content, any standardized meat product whose required ingredients include cheese would still be required to bear imitation labeling, if the use of imitation cheese caused the product to be nutritionally inferior to the standardized product. 36 Id. at 35,658. 37 Even if it should be classified as an interpretive rule or a statement of general policy, rather than as a formal rule adopted via adjudication, the USDA's practice of following the FDA definition of imitation when reviewing meat and poultry product labels is valid. The distinctions between formal rules and interpretive rules or general statements of policy are often vague. Noel v. Chapman, 508 F.2d 1023, 1029-30 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 824, 96 S.Ct. 37, 46 L.Ed.2d 40 (1975); Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. FPC, 506 F.2d 33, 37-40 (D.C.Cir.1974). But we need not explore the nuances. If the USDA's practice is merely interpretive, it is a reasonable interpretation and therefore entitled to judicial respect. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 566, 100 S.Ct. 790, 797, 63 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980); National Nutritional Foods Association v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 827, 96 S.Ct. 44, 46 L.Ed.2d 44 (1975). And, while we recognize that we are not bound by interpretive rules, American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 707 F.2d 548, 560 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1594, 80 L.Ed.2d 126 (1984); Board of Education v. Harris, 622 F.2d 599, 612-13 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1124, 101 S.Ct. 940, 67 L.Ed.2d 110 (1981), we discern no reason to reject the USDA's longstanding interpretation of the FMIA and PPIA misbranding provisions. Cf. United States v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 565, 102 S.Ct. 805, 811, 70 L.Ed.2d 768 (1982) (Although not determinative, the construction of a statute by those charged with its administration is entitled to great deference, particularly when that interpretation has been followed consistently over a long period of time.) Consequently, the New York requirements are different from the federal requirements, as administered, and they are therefore preempted. 38 Notwithstanding the conflict created by its use of imitation, the New York law imposes other labeling requirements that are in addition to[ ] or different than the federal requirements. The preemption language of the FMIA, essentially identical to that in the PPIA, was addressed by the Supreme Court in Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. at 528-32, 97 S.Ct. at 1311-13. The Court had before it the federal and California standards of accuracy for net weight labeling. California's inspection sampling technique implicitly permitted the inevitable slight deviations resulting from the manufacturing process. But it did not allow for weight loss resulting from moisture loss during the course of good distribution practice. Id. at 531, 97 S.Ct. at 1312. In contrast, the USDA had interpreted the FMIA to permit reasonable variations, including such moisture loss. Id. at 529, 97 S.Ct. at 1311. Thus, the Court held that the California regulations were explicitly preempted by the FMIA. Id. at 532, 97 S.Ct. at 1313. 39 Analogously, New York's section 63 mandates the precise size of the letters in and relative location of the word imitation on package labels. These requirements do not comport exactly with the federal specifications. 4 Therefore, the state requirements are preempted.