Opinion ID: 864423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the county court err in allowing the

Text: PLAINTIFF TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT? 3 ¶8. The first issue is whether the Wal-Mart suffered “actual prejudice” after Long was allowed to amend her complaint. This requires the Court to consider what bearing the federal right to removal has on the state's policy to freely allow amendments. ¶9. Although never alleged by Long, the trial court granted leave based on new medical bills. Wal-Mart stresses that no additional medical treatment has been needed and that virtually all medical treatment relating to the accident occurred in the years 1998 and 1999, well before the filing of the original complaint. Wal-Mart submits that this finding is erroneous. ¶10. Further, Wal-Mart argues that Long should have known the nature and extent of her damages but chose to file in county court. The only change in circumstances, Wal-Mart points out, is the appearance of Gray Tollison, counsel for the Long. ¶11. Counsel for Long attributes the delay to his recent association in the case and that it was not until his evaluation that it was discovered the actual medical damages exceeded $80,000. Wal-Mart emphasizes that Long had been represented by competent counsel, Gary L. Carnathan, who is still participating, and that, Tollison's evaluation was based on no new information. ¶12. The rule regarding amendments is clear. Leave to amend should be freely granted whenever justice so requires. Miss. R. Civ. P. 15 cmt.. See also Moeller, 812 So.2d at 962. Amendments should be denied only if they would cause actual prejudice to the opposite party. Id. (emphasis added). See also TGX Intrastate Pipeline Co. v. Grossnickle, 716 So.2d 991, 1011 (Miss. 1997). Applications for leave to amend pleadings should be prompt and not the result of an inexcusable want of diligence. Id. at 1011; William Iselin & Co. 4 v. Delta Auction & Real Estate Co., 433 So.2d 911, 913 (Miss. 1983) (cited in Natural Mother v. Paternal Aunt, 583 So.2d 614, 617 (Miss. 1991)). See also V. A. Griffith, Mississippi Chancery Practice § 392, at 378 (2d ed. 1950). ¶13. Amendments which are permitted in the latter stages of litigation may deny the important policy favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation. William Iselin & Co., 433 So.2d at 911. Thus, the policy to freely grant amendments is not allowed to encourage delay, laches and negligence. Id. Examples of when motion to amend may be prejudicial include: where it would burden the adverse party with more discovery, preparation, and expense, particularly where the adverse party would have little time to investigate and acquaint itself with the matter. Id. (cited in Natural Mother, 583 So.2d at 617). See also Grossnickle, 716 So.2d at 1011. ¶14. Surprisingly, only one court has specifically addressed whether the loss of the federal right to remove an action causes a defendant to suffer actual prejudice. Tyrrell v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 719 N.Y.S.2d 163 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 762 N.E.2d 921 (N.Y. 2001). In Tyrrell, a jury returned a verdict in favor of a plaintiff which exceeded the damages sought in the complaint. Tyrrell, 770 A.D.2d at 770. The defendant appealed after the judge granted plaintiff’s motion to increase the ad damnum clause. Id. The defendant argued that the trial court improperly authorized the plaintiff to amend the complaint. Id. at 772. Because the defendant failed to show that the ability to defend was in any way hindered or that the trial was manifestly unfair, the court held that the inability to remove the case was insufficient to demonstrate the kind and extent of prejudice to preclude the amendment. Id. 5 ¶15. Wal-Mart’s argument is premised on the fact that, as originally filed, the case was not removable. However, a closer examination of the original complaint and a review of federal law reveals that they are mistaken. ¶16. First, the federal courts allow defendants to remove a case even though the damages alleged by a plaintiff are less than the federal jurisdictional amount.3 In such circumstances, the Fifth Circuit adopted the “preponderance of evidence” standard. De Aguilar v. Boeing Co.,47 F.3d 1404 (5th Cir. 1995)(De Aguilar II). ¶17. In De Aguilar II, the relatives of victims of a plane crash filed a wrongful death action in state court and alleged damages less than jurisdictional limit. De Aguilar II, 47 F.3d at 1408. Concerned that plaintiffs may engage in manipulative and creative pleading in bad faith, the court applied the “legal certainty test” as set forth in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938). 47 F.3d at 1409-11. “In order for a federal court to decline jurisdiction, ‘it must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.’” Id. at 1409. The Fifth Circuit stated: [w]e hold that if a defendant can show that the amount in controversy actually exceeds the jurisdictional amount, the plaintiff must be able to show that, as a matter of law, it is certain that he will not be able to recover more than the damages for which he has prayed in the state court complaint. Such a rule is necessary to avoid the sort of manipulation that has occurred in the instant case. Id. at 1411. 3 To invoke diversity of citizenship jurisdiction, the value of the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, must exceed $75,000. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 6 [T]he plaintiff's claim remains presumptively correct unless the defendant can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy is greater than the jurisdictional amount. The preponderance burden forces the defendant to do more than point to a state law that might allow the plaintiff to recover more than what is pled. The defendant must produce evidence that establishes that the actual amount in controversy exceeds [the jurisdictional amount]. Id. at 1412. Once a defendant is able to show that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount, removal is proper, provided plaintiff has not shown that it is legally certain that his recovery will not exceed the amount stated in the state complaint. Id. ¶18. As an illustration of a “legal certainty”, the court suggested a party opposing removal file a binding stipulation or affidavit with the complaint. Id. at 1412 (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 970 F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1992)).4 ¶19. Concerned about the difficulty defendants have in satisfying their burden under the “legal certainty test,” the United States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi discussed how a defendant can ascertain that the case has become removable. McLain v. Am. Int’l Recovery, Inc., 1 F. Supp. 2d 628, 631 (S.D. Miss. 1998). The court stated: [If] defense counsel believes that the damages are in excess of the [jurisdictional limit], the defendant can have the case properly removed utilizing state court discovery rules. Specifically, the defense lawyer can have the plaintiff admit through a deposition, an interrogatory, or a request for admission that his damages do not exceed $75,000. 4 Arguing that De Aguilar II is not controlling, the dissent cites Allen v. R & H Oil & Gas Co., 63 F.3d 1326 (5th 1995) and Harris v. Benham Group, 2002 WL 31050999 (N.D. Miss. 2002). We note that both cases cite De Aguilar II and that Allen applied the principles and held similarly. 7 Id. at 631. ¶20. In the instant case, Wal-Mart’s argument that the case was not removable is incorrect. Based on De Aguilar II, Wal-Mart could have sought removal. However, they did not seek to exercise their right provided under federal law. Had they been more diligent, Long would have been required to stipulate whether the amount in controversy would exceed $75,000. Our reliance on De Aguilar II is to rebut Wal-Mart’s argument that matter was not removable. ¶21. We note that Wal-Mart still may have its day in federal court. Until recently, the federal courts were less strict in the enforcement of the amount in controversy requirement, in comparison to the one-year deadline on removal provided under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). But in Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003), the Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the applicability of equitable tolling where a plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the statutory rules. Id. at 428-29. The court stated: Section 1446(b) is not inflexible, and the conduct of the parties may affect whether it is equitable to strictly apply the one-year limit...[The Plaintiff’s] forum manipulation justifies application of an equitable exception in the form of estoppel. In enacting § 1446(b), Congress intended to reduc[e] opportunity for removal after substantial progress has been made in state court. Congress may have intended to limit diversity jurisdiction, but it did not intend to allow plaintiffs to circumvent it altogether. Strict application of the one-year limit would encourage plaintiffs to join nondiverse defendants for 366 days simply to avoid federal court, thereby undermining the very purpose of diversity jurisdiction. Id. at 426-27 (footnotes omitted). Thus in Tedford, it is apparent that the Fifth Circuit has developed its own methods for policing forum manipulation. 8 ¶22. This Court holds that the amended complaint does not cause Wal-Mart to suffer actual prejudice. Wal-Mart knew the state’s policy on amended pleadings. Based on the original complaint, Wal-Mart could have sought removal. Nevertheless, Wal-Mart chose not to protect its federal statutory right of removal and now requests the Court to oblige. This Court is not the guardian for the jurisdiction of the federal courts. ¶23. Wal-Mart has not shown how its ability to defend was hindered or how a trial in state court would be manifestly unfair. Therefore, the county court did not abuse its discretion in granting leave to amend.