Opinion ID: 1473555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rejection of Possible Alternative Analysis

Text: As indicated in our preliminary observation, see supra Part III. A., theoretically, perhaps, we could have begun the analysis more narrowly by focusing on the fact that one person, Markqualifying as [a]ny person under § 16-302has filed a petition for adoption of a child for whom Bruce already had become a natural parent through earlier adoption. The burden of the analysis would then have shifted right away to § 16-312(a), appearing to present only the one question whether Mark could adopt Hillary without cutting off Bruce's parental rights. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, three justices dissenting, focused the analysis in this way on the stepparent exception and answered the question no; the first parent's rights would be cut off because the exception applied only to a married couple. See In Interest of Angel Lace M., 516 N.W.2d at 684. In considering a case in which a natural mother's same-sex life partner sought to adopt the mother-partner's child, the Wisconsin court relied on statutory language providing that an adoption will cut off all rights of the natural parent unless the birth parent is the spouse of the adoptive parent. Id. Then, applying the expressio unius maxim, the court held that no other exceptions were authorized. See id. The court declined to conceptualize the case as one essentially presenting a threshold question whether an unmarried couple could adopt a child, saying that only one member of the couple had filed the petition and thus that [t]he validity of a joint adoption [was] not before this court. Id. at 684 n. 14 It is important to note, however, that the Wisconsin statute was similar to the 1895 District of Columbia statuteunlike the 1954 statute now before this court. Wisconsin authorized adoptions by [a] husband and wife jointly, by a stepparent, or by [a]n unmarried adult. Id. at 682 n. 4. Thus, based on plain statutory language, the question whether unmarried couples were entitled to adopt would have been difficult to answer in the affirmative. But more to the point for the present case, and contrary to the Wisconsin Supreme Court's narrow conceptualization, the fundamental question is whether an unmarried couple is authorized to adopt. The answer should not depend on whether one member of the couple already has parental rights; the answer should not turn on the number of new parents the child is to receive. Furthermore, the District of Columbia adoption statute makes clear that the cutoff question is subordinate to the eligibility question. The cut-off provision, § 16-312(a), pertains to the legal effects of adoption, the lawfulness of which is established under § 16-302. While the adoption statute should be read as a whole to help derive the meaning, as needed, of each particular provision, the question has to begin with, and be answered for, the up-front provision, § 16-302, captioned persons entitled to adopt. If an unmarried couple is eligible to adopt, then the § 16-312(a) cut-off provision has to be interpreted with that authorization in mind; if an unmarried couple is not eligible to adopt, then the cut-off provision would merely reflect that fundamental reality. Broadly understood, the Wisconsin decision reflects this latter result, derived from a statute where, expressly, the only couple authorized to adopt is a husband and wife. As we elaborated earlier, the highest courts of Massachusetts, in Adoption of Tammy, and of Vermont, in Adoption of B.L.V.B., took the approach we have pursued hereand with the same result.