Opinion ID: 550741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Two-thirds Vote for Conviction

Text: 22 Defendant's first argument that a two-thirds vote for conviction violates due process is based on a belief that three-fourths of the court-martial must vote to convict for a crime with a mandatory life sentence. Defendant bases his argument on the fact that the Uniform Code of Military Justice requires a three-fourths vote to impose any sentence over ten years. No person may be sentenced to life imprisonment or to confinement for more than ten years, except by the concurrence of three-fourths of the members present at the time the vote is taken. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 852(b)(2) (1988). Defendant argues that because his life sentence was mandatory, he was entitled to a three-fourths vote on his conviction. 23 Although defendant's suggested requirement might be a sensible solution to a possible statutory inconsistency, we are constrained by the explicit language of the statute. The statute requires only a two-thirds vote to convict for any crime for which the death penalty is not mandatory. No person may be convicted of any [crime for which the death penalty is not mandatory], except ... by the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present at the time the vote is taken. 10 U.S.C. Sec. 852(a)(2) (1988). 2 Thus, conviction for a crime with a mandatory life sentence requires only a two-thirds vote, regardless of any requirements imposed by the sentencing statute. Sentencing and conviction are separate acts, based on separate facts and issues. These [conviction and sentencing] provisions of the Code are plain and clear, and set out the number of votes required to convict and to sentence under different subsections. This is appropriate, for findings and sentence are separate functions, a court-martial being unique in that the court members perform both. United States v. Walker, 7 C.M.A. 669, 23 C.M.R. 133, 137 (1957). See also Stout v. Hancock, 146 F.2d 741, 744 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 850, 65 S.Ct. 1086, 89 L.Ed. 1971 (1944); In re Campo, 71 F.Supp. 543, 545 (S.D.N.Y.1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 213 (2nd Cir.1947); Hurse v. Caffey, 59 F.Supp. 363, 365 (N.D.Tex.1945). 24 This court has specifically upheld the two-thirds requirement necessary for conviction on at least two previous occasions. In Mendrano v. Smith, 797 F.2d 1538 (10th Cir.1986), we considered a due process challenge to the two-thirds requirement. [W]e conclude that the two-thirds rule of Article 52 satisfies the requirements of due process in this case. Mendrano, 797 F.2d at 1544. In an earlier case we concluded that where the charge is murder and the sentence is life imprisonment ... it is sufficient if two-thirds or more of the members of the court concur in the conviction.... Anderson v. Hunter, 177 F.2d 770, 771 (10th Cir.1949). 25 We recognize the inconsistency created by a statute that requires a two-thirds vote to convict for a crime carrying a mandatory life sentence and that also requires a three-fourths vote to sentence an individual to life imprisonment. Indeed, we believe that a sensible statutory scheme would require the same percentage vote for conviction and sentence where the sentence is mandatory. 3 Unfortunately, we do not have the power to rewrite the statute. Only Congress can change the existing voting requirements. 26 Merely because we might believe that consistent percentages would be desirable does not clothe us with power to change the statute to make them correspond. While criminal statutes covering the same general subject should be construed so as to make them harmonize, courts are not legislative bodies and that canon of statutory construction cannot be employed to construe an act contrary to a clearly expressed Congressional intent. 27 Walker, 23 C.M.R. at 138. Thus, the conviction by the court-martial requiring only a two-thirds concurrence is affirmed. Such a vote does not violate due process.