Opinion ID: 1160484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Diana's Prior Inconsistent Statements

Text: As previously indicated, Diana testified at trial that she had stabbed herself in the chest. Thereafter, the prosecutor attempted to impeach Diana's testimony and establish the fact that Diana had been stabbed by Clark. In addition to confronting Diana with her tape recorded statement to Detective Swann, the prosecution introduced extrinsic evidence of Diana's prior inconsistent statements and elicited the testimony of the individuals to whom Diana had given prior inconsistent statements. On appeal, Clark contends that, once Diana admitted making statements inconsistent with her trial testimony, the admission of Diana's statements to others and the playing of the tape [recorded statement] were plain error and prejudicially affected [Clark's] substantial rights.
Pursuant to Hawai`i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 802.1 (1993), which provides for substantive use of most prior inconsistent witness statements[,] State v. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i 131, 136, 913 P.2d 57, 62 (1996) (quoting Commentary to HRE Rule 613), Diana's tape recorded statement to Detective Swann was admitted into evidence, over Clark's objection. HRE Rule 802.1 provides in pertinent part: Hearsay exception; prior statements by witnesses. The following statements previously made by witnesses who testify at the trial ... are not excluded by the hearsay rule: (1) Inconsistent statement. The declarant is subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement, the statement is inconsistent with the declarant's testimony, the statement is offered in compliance with rule 613(b),[ [3] ] and the statement was: . . . . (C) Recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other means contemporaneously with the making of the statement[.] `The intent [of HRS 802.1] is to include in paragraph (1) all written or recorded statements that can be fairly attributed to the witness declarant.' Eastman, 81 Hawai`i at 136, 913 P.2d at 62 (quoting Commentary to HRE Rule 802.1). The Eastman court further stated: The trustworthiness of statements defined in paragraph[] . . . (C) is further assured by the requirement that the witness-declarant be subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the statement. The situation envisioned is one where the witness has testified about an event and his [or her] prior written statement also describes that event but is inconsistent with his [or her] testimony. Since the witness can be cross-examined about the event and the statement, the trier of fact is free to credit his [or her] present testimony or his [or her] prior statement in determining where the truth lies. Because the witness is subject to cross-examination, the substantive use of his [or her] prior inconsistent statements does not infringe the sixth amendment confrontation rights of accused in criminal cases, see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 [90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489] (1970). Id. (citing to the Commentary to HRE Rule 802.1). In order for the recorded statement of a witness to be admitted as substantive evidence of a defendant's guilt, HRE Rule 802.1(1)(C) requires the following: (1) the witness must testify about the subject matter of his or her prior statement so that the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of the prior statement; (2) the witness's prior statement must be inconsistent with his or her testimony; (3) the prior inconsistent statement must be recorded in substantially verbatim fashion by stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other means contemporaneously with the making of the statement; and (4) the prior inconsistent statement must be offered in compliance with HRE Rule 613(b), which, as previously noted, requires that, on direct or cross-examination, the circumstances of the prior inconsistent statements have been brought to the attention of the witness and that the witness has been asked whether he or she made the prior inconsistent statements. See Eastman, 81 Hawai`i at 137, 913 P.2d at 63 (outlining the requirements for admission of prior inconsistent statements pursuant to HRE Rule 802.1(1)(B)). The admission of Diana's prior statement to Detective Swann complied with the foregoing requirements. First, at Clark's trial, the prosecution directly examined Diana as a witness and elicited testimony from her regarding the circumstances surrounding the September 6, 1993 incident and her prior statement to Detective Swann wherein she had stated that Clark stabbed her in the chest. Such testimony, thus, made Diana subject to cross-examination concerning the subject matter of her prior statement to Detective Swann. Second, although Diana testified at trial that the stab wound to her chest was self-inflicted, Diana alleged in her statement to Detective Swann that Clark had stabbed her in the chest. Thus, Diana's statement to Detective Swann was inconsistent with her testimony. Third, the record shows that Diana's statement to Detective Swann was recorded in substantially verbatim fashion on audio tape, and Diana, at trial, acknowledged that she had given a recorded statement to Detective Swann. Finally, after Diana testified on direct examination by the prosecution that the stab wound to her chest was self-inflicted, the prosecutor brought to Diana's attention the circumstances of her statement to Detective Swann. At that point, Diana admitted making the statement, but testified that her prior inconsistent statement was a total lie. Thus, Diana's prior inconsistent statements to Detective Swann were offered in compliance with HRE Rule 613(b). Under cross-examination by Clark's counsel, Diana explained that her prior inconsistent statements were not true because she (1) does not take responsibility for anything and (2) was strung out on drugs at the time. Diana's cross-examination satisfied constitutional and trustworthiness concerns over admitting into evidence her prior inconsistent statements to Detective Swann because it afforded Clark the opportunity to have Diana fully explain to the trier of fact why her in-court and out-of-court statements were inconsistent, which, in turn, enabled the trier of fact to determine where the truth lay. See Eastman, 81 Hawai`i at 139, 913 P.2d at 65. We therefore hold that the trial court did not err in admitting Diana's tape recorded statement to Detective Swann as substantive evidence of Clark's guilt.
In response to the prosecutor's questions on direct examination, Diana testified that she had spoken with Officer Kuaana when he arrived at the condominium complex and told the officer that Clark had cut her with a knife and had pushed her. Diana contended, however, that what she told Officer Kuaana was untruthful. When asked by the prosecutor what she had stated to the medical personnel who treated her, Diana admitted that she also told the medical personnel that Clark had stabbed her, but explained that by then she was on a roll of keeping this accusation alive about [Clark] and was therefore not being truthful. Clark failed to object to the introduction of extrinsic evidence of Diana's prior inconsistent statements, namely, the testimony of Officer Kuaana, Drs. Brunel and Mitchell, and Nurse Klotz. In State v. Wallace, 80 Hawai`i 382, 910 P.2d 695 (1996), we explained that [i]t is the general rule that evidence to which no objection has been made may properly be considered by the trier of fact and its admission will not constitute ground for reversal. It is equally established that an issue raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered by the reviewing court. Only where the ends of justice require it, and fundamental rights would otherwise be denied, will there be a departure from these principles. [Hawai`i Rules of Penal Procedure (]HRPP[)] Rule 52(b) (1994). . . . Id. at 410, 910 P.2d at 723 (quoting State v. Naeole, 62 Haw. 563, 570-71, 617 P.2d 820, 826 (1980)). HRPP Rule 52(b) provides that [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. Clark contends that the admission of the extrinsic evidence of Diana's prior inconsistent statements should have been accompanied by instructions limiting their purpose to impeachment. HRE Rule 613(b) (1993) governs the use of extrinsic proof or prior inconsistent statements for the purpose of impeaching a witness. As previously noted, HRE Rule 613(b) provides that [e]xtrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible, unless, on direct or cross-examination, (1) the circumstances of the statement have been brought to the attention of the witness, and (2) the witness has been asked whether the witness made the statement. If, as Clark contends, the extrinsic evidence concerning Diana's prior inconsistent statements was admissible only for purposes of impeachment, then the failure to instruct the jury that the evidence was not to be considered as substantive evidence of Clark's guilt may have been error. HRE Rule 105 (1993) provides that, [w]hen evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly. Clark argues that, because Diana's prior inconsistent statements constituted hearsay, the jury should have been instructed that it was to consider the statements for impeachment purposes only. `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial . . ., offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, HRE Rule 801(3) (1993), and [h]earsay is not admissible at trial unless it qualifies as an exception to the rule against hearsay. Eastman, 81 Hawai`i at 136, 913 P.2d at 62; see also HRE Rule 802 (1993) (Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Hawaii supreme court, or by statute.). For the reasons discussed below, we believe that Diana's prior inconsistent statements to the police and medical personnel qualify as excited utterances and were thus admissible as substantive evidence of Clark's guilt without a limiting instruction. HRE Rule 803 (1993) provides in pertinent part: The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness: . . . . (b) Other exceptions. . . . . (2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. In State v. Moore, 82 Hawai`i 202, 921 P.2d 122 (1996), we explained that: The assumption underlying [the excited utterance] exception is that a person under the sway of excitement precipitated by an external startling event will not have the reflective capacity essential for fabrication and that, consequently, any utterance will be spontaneous and trustworthy. 4 J.B. Weinstein & M.A. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, ¶ 803(2)[01], at 803-101 (1994). [L]ack of capacity to fabricate, rather than lack of time to fabricate is the justification for this rule. Id. at 803-105. The basis for the excited utterance exception, ... is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820 [110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638] (1990) (citations omitted). Three foundational requirements are imposed by HRE Rule 803(b)(2) and recognized by courts applying identical rules. The proponent of the statement must establish that: (1) a startling event or condition occurred; (2) the statement was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition; and (3) the statement relates to the startling event or condition. See, e.g., United States v. Sowa, 34 F.3d 447, 452-53 (7th Cir.1994); United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 570 (7th Cir.1986); State v. Whalen, 520 N.W.2d 830, 831-32 (N.D. 1994); State v. McLaughlin, 642 A.2d 173, 175 (Me.1994); see also 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 at 215-16 (4th ed.1992); M.H. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6753 at 571 (interim ed.1992). Moore, 82 Hawai`i at 218-19, 921 P.2d at 138-39. In this case, the prosecution clearly established that a startling event or condition occurred, that is, that Diana suffered a life-threatening stab wound to her chest, and that the statements made by Diana to the police and medical personnel clearly related to the startling event. Thus, the first and third foundational requirements were satisfied. Our inquiry therefore focuses on the second and most crucial requirement  whether the statement was made under the stress of excitement caused by the startling event or condition. Moore, 82 Hawai`i at 219, 921 P.2d at 139. `In all cases, the ultimate question is whether the statement was the result of reflective thought or whether it was rather a spontaneous reaction to the exciting event.' Moore, 82 Hawai`i at 219, 921 P.2d at 139 (quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 272 at 218). In considering whether a statement was made under the stress of excitement, we explained in Moore that, in addition to the elapsed time between the startling event and the statement, courts consider the nature of the event, the age of the declarant, the influences of intervening occurrences, and the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. Moore, 82 Hawai`i at 221, 921 P.2d at 141 (citations omitted).
Officer Kuaana testified that, when he arrived at the condominium complex, just minutes after the stabbing, Diana was crying, holding her upper left chest area and that he could see blood on Diana's gown and her right hand. After informing Officer Kuaana that she needed to go to the hospital, Diana stated that she and Clark had gotten into an argument, during which Clark punched her in the back with a closed fist[,] grabbed her by the clothes[,] grabbed a kitchen knife, then he stabbed her in the chest. Officer Kuaana further testified that, when Diana made these statements, [s]he was really shaken. It was obvious she was scared, terrified. She was trembling. She was just starting to cry. She couldn't really say much more after that.
Dr. Brunel, the attending emergency room physician at St. Francis West Medical Center on September 6, 1993, testified that, when he treated Diana for her injuries, she appeared to him to be distressed and in pain. He related that Diana informed him that her husband had stabbed her in her chest. Similarly, Dr. Mitchell, who treated Diana in the St. Francis emergency room approximately an hour after the stabbing, testified that Diana was crying and terribly frightened. She was very agitated, very nervous. She presented as if she had been extremely traumatized. She was very jumpy when you approached her, afraid to let you touch her, extremely fearful from the moment she entered the department and through her course there. Just stating over and over that she was very very frightened. Under the totality of the circumstances, particularly the violent nature of the startling event and the severity of Diana's injuries (Dr. Mitchell testified that Diana's injuries were life-threatening), we hold that Diana's statements to Officer Kuaana, Dr. Brunel, and Dr. Mitchell were made while under the stress of excitement caused by the stabbing and were not the product of reflective thought. The three foundational requirements of HRE 803(b)(2) having been met, we further hold that Diana's statements to Officer Kuaana, Dr. Brunel, and Dr. Mitchell were admissible as substantive evidence of Clark's guilt under the hearsay exception for excited utterances and not subject to a limiting instruction.
Unlike the statements made to Officer Kuaana and Drs. Brunel and Mitchell, Diana's statements to Nurse Klotz present a close question. Nurse Klotz testified that (1) she had treated Diana approximately three hours after the stabbing, (2) Diana was crying, and (3) Diana had informed her that her husband had stabbed her in the chest. However, Nurse Klotz further testified that Diana appeared alert and oriented. We need not decide, however, whether Diana's statements to Nurse Klotz qualify as excited utterances because, even if we were to assume that the stress of excitement caused by the stabbing had dissipated by the time Diana spoke with Nurse Klotz, any error in the admission of Nurse Klotz's testimony was harmless. Because we hold that Diana's statements to Officer Kuaana, Dr. Brunel, and Dr. Mitchell were properly presented to the jury, Nurse Klotz's testimony was merely cumulative.