Opinion ID: 3049593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The effect of recent Supreme Court cases

Text: After Akaka II was decided, two Supreme Court cases — Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329 (1997), and Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273 — summarized, explained, and, on some points, refined the law regarding when a statute creates a right enforceable under § 1983. The two cases are now the natural starting point for analysis of the issue. See generally Ball v. Rodgers, No. 04-16963, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 WL 2034043, at -7 (9th Cir. July 17, 2007). Nevertheless, neither “undercut[s] the theory or reasoning underlying [Akaka II ] in such a way that the cases are clearly irreconcilable.”11 Miller, 335 not only in good faith and from proper motives, but also within the bounds of a reasonable judgment, the court will not interfere; but the court will interfere when he acts outside the bounds of a reasonable judgment. Austin W. Scott & William F. Fratcher, 3 The Law of Trusts § 187 (4th Ed. 2001). 11 The state of Hawaii, as amicus, also suggests that we should reconsider Akaka II in light of City of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113 (2005). But, Abrams does not address whether a statute creates an enforceable right, as the defendants did not dispute that point. Id. at 12021. Instead, Abrams concerned whether a § 1983 remedy for an acknowledged enforceable right was foreclosed by the availability of other remedies. Id. Hawaii suggests that Abrams requires a change in Keaukaha II’s related conclusion: that the public remedy in § 5(f) does not foreclose private enforcement. But that question is beyond the scope of this appeal. It is raised only in the amicus brief and was not addressed by the district court. See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 607-08 (9th Cir. 2004). We further note that with regard to alternative remedies, Abrams simply applies two Supreme Court cases, Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) and Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), both of which pre-dated Akaka II and Keaukaha II. See Abrams, 544 U.S. at 121. 9440 DAY v. APOLIONA F.3d at 900. Whether or not we would reach the same result as the Akaka II panel today, neither Blessing nor Gonzaga so affected the reasoning of Akaka II that the case has lost its binding force. Blessing, for one, did not change the law relevant to Akaka II’s analysis. The Court in Blessing listed three factors to use in identifying which statutes create rights enforceable under § 1983: First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so vague and amorphous that its enforcement would strain judicial competence. Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. 520 U.S. at 340-41(citations and quotation marks omitted). But while this “test” has since evolved into an analytical touchstone, see, e.g., Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1056-57 (9th Cir. 2005), Blessing did not create these factors from scratch. Rather, Blessing succinctly summarized three factors that the court had “traditionally looked at . . . when determining whether a particular statutory provision gives rise to a federal right.” 520 U.S. at 340. And, Blessing drew those factors from two cases decided prior to Akaka II: Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 U.S. 418, 430-32 (1987) and Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n., 496 U.S. 498, 509-12 (1990), the latter of which discussed all three factors later summarized by Blessing. Not surprisingly, then, Akaka II’s reasoning is consistent with the three factors summarized in Blessing. By discussing the beneficiaries’ rights and the corollary duties of trustees implied by the word “trust,” the opinion addresses implicitly — and reasonably — the first and third factors in Blessing: that “Congress . . . intended that the provision in question DAY v. APOLIONA 9441 benefit the plaintiff,” and that “the statute . . . unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41; Akaka II, 3 F.3d at 1224-25. Because it is based on routinely enforced principles of trust law, Akaka II’s holding is also not “clearly irreconcilable” with the second Blessing requirement that a right be concrete enough to enforce. [3] For similar reasons, we conclude that Akaka II is also not clearly irreconcilable with Gonzaga, 536 U.S. 273. Although Gonzaga arguably shifted the focus of § 1983 analysis more than Blessing, it did not so change § 1983 law as to create an irreconcilable conflict with Akaka II. Clarifying a source of potential tension in earlier cases, Gonzaga enunciated three holdings concerning identification of § 1983 rights. First, the Supreme Court made clear that nothing “less than an unambiguously conferred right is enforceable by § 1983.” 536 U.S. at 282. In other words, “broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests’ ” are not enforceable under §1983. Id. at 283. Second, Gonzaga mandated that “implied right of action cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983,” because the two inquiries “overlap in one meaningful respect — in either case we must first determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right.” Id. Third, Gonzaga offered guidance for discerning the relevant congressional intent, emphasizing that “[f]or a statute to create such private rights, its text must be ‘phrased in terms of the persons benefited.’ ” Id. at 284 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 692 n.13 (1979)). In other words, “ ‘rights-creating’ language [is] critical to showing the requisite congressional intent to create new rights.” Id. at 287 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001)). As applied to the Admission Act, these three holdings neither dramatically change the law on which Akaka II relied nor create an irreconcilable conflict with the Akaka II reasoning. 9442 DAY v. APOLIONA Like Blessing, Gonzaga largely repeats rather than undercuts the law upon which Akaka II rested. Suter, for example, stated that the key inquiry in § 1983 cases is “whether the [statutory] language in question created ‘enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of § 1983. . . . Section 1983 speaks in terms of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities,’ not violations of federal law.” 503 U.S. at 357 (alterations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). Akaka II quoted this holding, and applied it by recognizing the right of beneficiaries to enforce trust obligations. 3 F.3d at 1224-25. Rather than suggesting an alternative form of analysis, Gonzaga repeated Suter’s observation as its first holding, stating that because “Section 1983 provides a remedy only for the deprivation of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws’ of the United States. . . . it is rights, not the broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced under the authority of that section.” 536 U.S. at 283. For similar reasons, Gonzaga’s second holding, recognizing the overlap between implied right of action cases and § 1983 cases, also did not undercut Akaka II. At issue in Gonzaga was an apparent conflict between Wilder, a case which suggested that “implied private right of action cases have no bearing on the standards for discerning whether a statute creates rights enforceable by § 1983,” Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (citing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508-09 & n.4), and Suter, which “appear[ed] to disavow” that notion, id. (citing Suter, 503 U.S. at 363-64). Gonzaga explicitly adopted the approach of Suter, the case with which Akaka II was primarily concerned. Suter also previewed Gonzaga’s third holding with regard to clear statutory language.12 Prior to Gonzaga, Suter held that 12 We note that it is not self-evident that Gonzaga’s third holding, regarding statutory language, applies to § 5(f) of the Admission Act. GonDAY v. APOLIONA 9443 rights must be conferred “unambiguously” by statutory language. See Suter, 503 U.S. at 358, 363. Specifically, Suter held that the statute at issue, the Adoption Act, did not create enforceable rights because, “[c]areful examination of the language . . . does not unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the Act’s beneficiaries.” Id. at 363. Gonzaga quoted this holding with approval, summarizing it as a recognition that “[s]ince the [Adoption] Act conferred no specific, individually enforceable rights, there was no basis for private enforcement, even by a class of the statute’s principal beneficiaries.” 536 U.S. at 281; see also id. 283 (approving Suter’s reasoning); id. at 287 (emphasizing the need for statutory language that confers individual entitlements).13 zaga’s primary concern was the creation of enforceable rights by statutes enacted under the Spending Clause of the Constitution, art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. Although much of Gonzaga’s discussion is in general terms, the Court introduced its analysis with the observations that “[w]e made clear [in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981)),] that unless Congress speaks with a clear voice, and manifests an unambiguous intent to confer individual rights, federal funding provisions provide no basis for private enforcement. . . . Since Pennhurst, only twice have we found spending legislation to give rise to enforceable rights.” 536 U.S. at 280 (citations and alterations omitted; emphasis added). Furthermore, Gonzaga cited with approval Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), which held — in contrast with Gonzaga’s focus on statutory language — that a non-Spending Clause statute could create rights by structural implication. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285; Golden State, 493 U.S. at 111-12. We do not pursue this possible distinction further, however. Doing so would entail a determination of the constitutional basis for the enactment of § 5(f) and a comparison of that basis with the Spending Clause jurisprudence, issues that have not been briefed. Instead, we assume that the third prong of Gonzaga is fully applicable to § 5(f). 13 “In response to the Court’s reasoning in Suter, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-2, sometimes called the “Suter fix”. See Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006); ASW v. Oregon, 424 F.3d 970, 977 n.11 (9th Cir. 2005). Section 1320a-2 did not change the analysis in Suter applicable here and thus has no pertinence to the issues in this case. 9444 DAY v. APOLIONA As Suter was decided before and discussed in Akaka II, and Gonzaga on this point simply reaffirms Suter, we are not at liberty to disagree with Akaka II’s holding that the Admission Act’s language clearly creates an individual right. The state nevertheless argues that Akaka II’s reasoning is irreconcilable with Gonzaga’s command to identify unambiguous statutory language. Even if we had authority to consider that question, we would see no such resounding conflict. [4] In accordance with Gonzaga’s emphasis on statutory language, Akaka II’s analysis is based on the Admission Act’s explicit use of the term “trust.” The opinion’s conclusion that the word “trust” refers unambiguously to a body of law describing the rights of individual beneficiaries to enforce the § 5(f) terms with regard to any particular expenditure of the § 5(f) funds may not be the only reasonable conclusion, but it is certainly colorable, and thus, reconcilable with Gonzaga. Gonzaga’s emphasis on an unambiguous conferral of rights is essentially a clear statement rule that, like such rules in other contexts, reflects the principle that, “[i]n traditionally sensitive areas, such as legislation affecting the federal balance, the requirement of clear statement assures that the legislature has in fact faced, and intended to bring into issue, the critical matters involved in the judicial decision.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 (1971)); see, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (regarding federal preemption of states’ authority to choose their own officers); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985) (regarding abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 99 (1984) (same); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (regarding imposition of conditions on states under Spending Clause statutes). But Gonzaga does not signal that comprehensive statutory enunciation of a right and of its beneficiaries is always essential. Instead, Supreme Court precedent shows that statutory cross-references, references to DAY v. APOLIONA 9445 established legal principles, and other devices that, when followed to their sources, supply a clear message, can suffice to create a right. As discussed above, supra note 12, Gonzaga cites with approval Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. 103 (1989), a case in which the Supreme Court concluded that a statute created rights by structural implication. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 285. Gonzaga makes no mention of Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133-34 (1994), but that case reaches a conclusion similar to that of Golden State. Both Golden State and Lividas recognized a principle that could conflict with some readings of Gonzaga: “A rule of law [regarding the rights imposed by a statute] that is the product of judicial interpretation of a vague, ambiguous, or incomplete statutory provision is no less binding than a rule that is based on the plain meaning of a statute.” Golden State, 493 U.S. at 112 (quoted in Lividas, 512 U.S. at 134 ). But unless and until the Supreme Court says otherwise, we must assume that this principle from Golden State is consistent with Gonzaga and remains good law. Once Gonzaga is understood in light of the Golden State line of cases, it becomes clear that Akaka II’s analysis is reconcilable with Gonzaga’s clear statement rule. Under the Golden State principle, Akaka II’s analysis — based on judicial interpretation of the term “trust” — is undoubtedly sound. Akaka II relies on a much more straightforward, languagebased statutory analysis than did Golden State. Furthermore, the term “trust,” when paired with the statutory reference to “breach of trust” actions and in light of the common law consequences that attached to the use of the term, is reasonably read to indicate plainly that the trustees have a duty not to breach the trust and that the trust’s beneficiaries have corresponding rights to enforce it with regard to each expenditure of § 5(f) funds. Indeed, Akaka II is nothing more than a straightforward application of a statutory inter9446 DAY v. APOLIONA pretation rule that the Supreme Court discussed in the context of another clear statement analysis: Where [a legislature] borrows terms of art in which are accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 312 n.35 (2001) (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1952) and applying the rule to confirm that a statutory limitation on “judicial review” is not a “clear” limitation on courts’ authority to issue writs of habeas corpus); see also id. at 311-12 (analyzing the history and context of the term “judicial review” before reaching a conclusion about its meaning).