Opinion ID: 221513
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: any judgment regarding the granting of

Text: relief under section . . . 1229b . . . of this title. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Subparagraph (D) clarifies that [n]othing in subparagraph (B) . . . shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). Since cancellation of removal is placed in the IJ’s discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b, this Court has jurisdiction over Sorcia’s appeal only if it concerns constitutional claims or questions of law. Id.; see also Jean v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 475, 479-80 (4th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court has no jurisdiction over any aspects of denial of relief under § 1229b except constitutional claims or questions of law). SORCIA v. H OLDER 13 Sorcia does not argue that his appeal presents constitutional claims. Nor, despite his contention to the contrary, does he raise a question of law. Instead, throughout his brief, Sorcia contends that the BIA should have given more weight to the positive factors and less weight to the negative factors affecting the exercise of the IJ’s discretion. For instance, Sorcia argues that [t]he IJ misapplied the law in failing to give the outstanding equity of Petitioner’s length of residence in the United States the appropriate weight compared to the relatively minor factors. Brief of Petitioner at 6-7. Sorcia also maintains that the IJ gave insufficient weight to Sorcia’s family ties and steady employment. However, a challenge to the weight attributed to certain factors relevant to immigration determinations does not present a question of law. Higuit v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 417, 41920 (4th Cir. 2006). In Higuit, the petitioner challenged an IJ’s denial of adjustment of his alien status, another form of discretionary relief addressed in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B). Id. at 419. Petitioner argued that he ha[d] raised a question of law because the IJ determined that the persecution carried out in the Philippines outweighed his commendable conduct in the United States. Id. at 420. On appeal, we concluded that we lacked jurisdiction, stating, [t]his does not present a question of law. In making the discretionary adjustment of status determination, the IJ balanced Higuit’s positive and negative attributes and did not rule in Higuit’s favor. . . . Were Higuit correct that he has presented a question of law, almost every decision denying discretionary relief would henceforth be subject to judicial review. We are not free to convert every immigration case into a question of law and thereby undermine Con- gress’s decision to grant limited jurisdiction over matters committed in the first instance to the sound discretion of the Executive. 14 SORCIA v. H OLDER Id. at 420. In Jean, we considered perhaps a more closely analogous decision by the BIA: refusal to grant a waiver of inadmissibility. Id., 435 F.3d at 480-81. The court noted Jean argues only that the immigration judge drew the wrong factual conclusions from the evidence and then determined these conclusions outweighed any factors supporting a favorable exercise of discretion. In turn, Jean contends the BIA perpetuated this error by adopting the immigration judge’s inaccurate view of the evidence. These are discretionary decisions, however, that we have no jurisdiction to review. Id. at 480. Here, as in Higuit and Jean, because Sorcia challenges only the weight given to certain factors by the IJ, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to review this assignment of error. Nonetheless, Sorcia further attempts to cast these challenges as questions of law by saying that the BIA was acting contrary to its precedent. He contends that where cases have the same or similar facts as precedent cases, it follows that the BIA should apply the same standards. Brief of Petitioner at 18. In support of his position, Sorcia cites Hernandez v. Ashcroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003). In that case, the Ninth Circuit held that where previous cases stated that the nonviability of a marriage was not a basis for rejecting a petition, the BIA’s decision to rule on that basis was contrary to law, not a discretionary determination. Id. at 847. Hernandez is distinguishable from the case before us. Here, Sorcia’s argument is not that the BIA considered improper factors, but that it gave the improper amount of weight to the proper factors. For the reasons explained above, we lack jurisdiction to consider that question. Cf. Argueta v. Holder, 617 F.3d 109, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) ([A]ll but one of Argueta’s claims lie beyond our jurisdiction because they are directed to SORCIA v. H OLDER 15 the manner in which the IJ balanced the equities in denying his application for discretionary relief . . . .). Sorcia also argues that the BIA erred as a matter of law when it considered the charge of committing a lewd act against a minor. But the BIA expressly stated, we agree with respondent that little weight should be afforded to his arrest for lewd conduct, as the case was not prosecuted and the police report entered into evidence was uncorroborated . . . . We note that the BIA cited the same case in its decision, Matter of Arreguin, 21 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1995), that Sorcia cites to argue that the scope of the BIA’s inquiry was improper. Moreover, Arreguin did not indicate that it was per se improper to consider an arrest report. See id. Rather, the BIA there stated that we are hesitant to give substantial weight to an arrest report, absent a conviction or corroborating evidence of the allegations contained therein. Id. at 42. Therefore, insofar as the BIA declined to give substantial weight to Sorcia’s charge, it was following, rather than contradicting, precedent. In sum, Sorcia asserts no constitutional claims or questions of law regarding the denial of his petition for cancellation of removal. As such, we lack jurisdiction to rule on this issue.