Opinion ID: 868666
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of the Private Right of Action

Text: The private right of action authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) extends to violations of § 227 and also to the regulations prescribed under § 227(b). Walburg argues correctly that if the agency's promulgation of the regulation was ultra vires or was pursuant exclusively to some statutory authority other than § 227(b), the private right of action could not reach violations of the regulation. See, e.g., Global Crossing Telecomm., Inc. v. Metrophones Telecomm., Inc., 550 U.S. 45, 47–48 (2007) (holding that Congress rather than the FCC creates the private right of action, but in linking that right of action to a regulation, Congress created a right that extends to lawfully enacted regulations as well); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290–93 2 Walburg has not attempted to challenge the validity of 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(3)(iv) either through a petition for reconsideration under 47 U.S.C. § 405(a), cf. Tri-State Motor Transit Co. v. ICC, 739 F.2d 1373, 1375 n.2 (8th Cir. 1984), or a petition for rulemaking to repeal the rule pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.401. We therefore need not consider at this juncture whether a refusal of the agency to consider a substantive challenge to the regulation would allow this court to exercise jurisdiction over such a challenge. Cf. Any & All Radio Station Transmission Equip., 207 F.3d at 463 (suggesting that a court of appeals “might” have jurisdiction under those circumstances). -10- (2001) (holding that the scope of a private right of action is limited to the scope set forth in the statutory language creating the private right of action and that no private right exists to enforce regulations promulgated under a different statutory section for which Congress did not create such a right). We hold that, on the facts of the present case, these arguments are, in effect, impermissible challenges to the regulation. For reasons that require no further elaboration, it is clear that the ultra vires argument is wholly indistinguishable from a direct challenge. A challenge that concedes the regulation's validity but asserts that the regulation was not promulgated pursuant to § 227(b) is distinct. Such a challenge, however, involves the same need for deference to the agency and nationally uniform determinations as a direct, Hobbs Act challenge. The rationale for the regulation, as set forth in the 2006 Order and as discussed in the FCC's amicus brief, arguably brings the regulation within range of what § 227(b) authorized the FCC to regulate. We do not believe that, in this circumstance, it is possible or prudent for our court to resolve this issue without the benefit of full participation by the agency. See, e.g., Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) (In the absence of specific evidence of contrary congressional intent, however, . . . review of orders resolving issues preliminary or ancillary to the core issue in a proceeding should be reviewed in the same forum as the final order resolving the core issue.).