Opinion ID: 2053836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the state equal protection claim

Text: A. Judge Ciparick and I conclude that the plaintiffs have stated a valid State equal protection claim. New York's historical and constitutional commitment to public education establishes education as an integral and substantial right of every citizen in our State, and a heightened level of scrutiny should be applied to review the current system of financing public education. In the procedural posture of this case, the allegations of the amended complaint are sufficient to allege that plaintiffs' equal protection rights, guaranteed by article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution, have been violated by the State's funding methodology which denies New York City public school students a minimum adequate education. Therefore, for the current educational aid scheme to withstand intermediate review, defendants must demonstrate that the State's method of funding public education is substantially related to the important educational needs of its public school students. While Judge Ciparick and I recognize that the distribution of educational aid is traditionally the bastion of the Legislature, we cannot overlook the allegations of the deleterious consequences of years of inequitable funding which have led to inadequate and substandard educational services. The allegation is that a substantial number of New York City public school students do not receive the type of basic education necessary to equip them to exercise all of their established rights under the Federal and State Constitutions and to adequately function in society. In the 13 years since this Court's decision in Levittown , the gross disparities presaged by the Levittown majority are, allegedly, now a reality, [6] and, plaintiffs argue, it is painfully apparent that the Legislature refuses to address what has evolved into an epic constitutional problem, [7] rendering the application of heightened scrutiny particularly appropriate in this case (see , San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez , 411 US, at 99, 108 [Marshall, J., dissenting], supra; Dandridge v Williams , 397 US 471, 519-521 [Marshall, J., dissenting], reh denied 398 US 914; Bismarck Pub. School Dist. No. 1 v State of North Dakota , 511 NW2d 247, 259; Hubsch, The Emerging Right to Education Under State Constitutional Law , 65 Temp L Rev 1325 [1992]; accord , Levittown , 57 NY2d, at 39, supra; but see , Levittown , 57 NY2d, at 50, n 9, supra) . Assuming the truth of plaintiffs' allegations that New York City public school students are receiving an education below minimum standards because of an educational aid scheme that disparately impacts minority students through an inequitable distribution of public moneys, [8] the focus of the inquiry of our dissent in this aspect of the case is whether New York's funding scheme which includes direct State funding and property-based funding furthers a substantial or important State interest to justify the discriminatory effects. It is alleged that the disparities in educational opportunities for urban public school children are a reality because the State's method of distributing aid bears no relationship, substantial or rational, to the educational needs of students or the costs of educating students in a particular district. Since the State is constitutionally charged with providing an educational system that offers a sound basic education ( Levittown , 57 NY2d, at 48, supra; NY Const, art XI, § 1), the failure to adequately fund New York City schools allegedly denies New York City public school students equal protection of the laws of this State in contravention of article I, § 11 of the New York State Constitution, [9] by depriving them of equal access to educational opportunities. [10] Under the current financing methodology, the quantum of taxable property in a school district bears an immediate and direct correlation to the student's access to education. Yet, according to plaintiffs, it is not the existence of disparities among districts that produces the unconstitutional inequity, but the fact that the financing scheme employed by the State to fund the system of free common schools perpetuates profound inequality of educational opportunity. Equal protection is not addressed to the minimal sufficiency but rather to the unjustifiable inequalities of state action. ( San Antonio School Dist. v Rodriguez , 411 US, at 89 [Marshall, J., dissenting], supra. ) Pointing to Levittown , respondents contend that the disparities in funding among districts is the justifiable consequence of local control, [11] long recognized as the legitimate State interest underlying the complex school aid allocation formula. [12] However, these disparities, it is alleged, directly translate into a constitutionally unacceptable result  disparate and diminished educational opportunities for school children who, to their misfortune, reside in districts penalized under the current school aid allocation formula. It is this result  lesser educational opportunity which denies a sound, basic education, based on wealth discrimination  that allegedly transgresses the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution, and would require respondents to demonstrate at trial that the current school funding scheme bears an important and substantial relationship to the State's interest in preserving the current funding scheme and its rationale, which interest cannot be achieved through a less intrusive alternative (see, e.g. , Montgomery v Daniels , 38 N.Y.2d 41, 61; Matter of Lalli , 43 N.Y.2d 65, affd sub nom. Lalli v Lalli , 439 US 259; People v Whidden , 51 N.Y.2d 457, 460; Califano v Webster , 430 US 313, 316-317; Craig v Boren , 429 US 190, 197, reh denied 429 US 1124; Alevy v Downstate Med. Ctr. , 39 N.Y.2d 326, 336, supra) . This would be no easy task for respondents, complicated by strongly conflicted viewpoints and policies among the very agents who administer educational policy in New York. The Commissioner of Education and the Board of Regents have characterized the school funding scheme as inequitable, charging that it undermines New York's educational policies. The Commissioner and Board of Regents have assailed the current financing formula for its arbitrariness, asserting that the current methods for allocating State education aid are ineffective and preclude attainment of proposed educational goals. [13] Even under the benign gaze of rational review, the discriminatory impact of the current financing scheme on school children who reside in districts unable to commit substantial tax dollars to education, a fact exacerbated under the current school aid allocation formula, if proved, could not rationally be countenanced as furthering a legitimate State interest. Plaintiffs should be given the opportunity to prove their allegations in this aspect of the case as well as the one sustained by a majority of the Court. Accordingly, I would reinstate the second cause of action alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Judge Ciparick and I would reinstate the second cause of action insofar as it asserts a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the State Constitution. Order modified, without costs, in accordance with the opinion herein and, as so modified, affirmed.