Opinion ID: 3011009
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wiretap Obstruction

Text: As a foundation for this charge, Customs Agent James Delia testified that the Giampa Crew wiretaps were reviewed every ten days by the district court that authorized them. Davis does not contest this, but argues that a wiretap is not a pending judicial proceeding within the meaning of S 1503. This is an issue of first impression in the federal courts. We conclude that the wiretap was at bottom an element of the Customs investigation and that it could not be a pending judicial proceeding within the scope of the statute. Courts have repeatedly held that an investigation simpliciter is not enough to trigger S 1503. For example, intentionally interfering with the execution of a search warrant by warning its target to conceal or dispose of evidence does not involve a pending judicial proceeding and therefore falls outside of S 1503. See United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 1982). Investigation by agents of the Treasury Department or some other like instrumentality of the United States does not constitute a pending proceeding. United States v. Perlstein, 126 F.2d 789, 792 (3d Cir. 1942); see also United States v. Simmons, _________________________________________________________________ 1. We do so because Davis's acts indicated that he surmised the existence of the Customs wiretap, and he interfered with its success. By contrast, there was no evidence that he had any idea that the FBI wiretap existed, and the government did not argue that his acts interfered with its success. It was evident in context that the charged wiretap obstruction involved the Customs investigation, just as the grand jury obstruction did. 8 591 F.2d 206, 208 (3d Cir. 1979) ([T]he obstruction of an investigation that is being conducted by the FBI, or by any similar governmental agency or instrumentality, does not constitute a S 1503 violation because such agencies or instrumentalities are not judicial arms of the government `administering justice.' ). Even probation supervised by court-appointed officers does not constitute a pending proceeding. See Haili v. United States, 260 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1958). Thus a wiretap, which is generally part of an investigation conducted by agents of the executive branch, would seem to fall within Perlstein's and Simmons's description of investigations that are insufficient to invoke S 1503. The government nonetheless argues that a wiretap investigation may constitute a judicial proceeding within the meaning of S 1503 where it is monitored actively by a federal district court, citing United States v. Aguilar, 515 U.S. 593 (1995), and United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1975). However, Aguilar does not support the government's claim. Indeed, in that case, the government charged the defendant's wiretap-related conduct under a separate statutory provision that prohibits revealing the existence of a wiretap, 18 U.S.C. S 2232(c); his S 1503 obstruction charge related to conduct specifically involving a grand jury. The government's theory is drawn from our caselaw, which has heretofore focused on when a grand jury investigation progresses to a stage where it can be said to be pending. Describing the level of involvement a grand jury must have with an investigation to triggerS 1503, we wrote: Appellant would have us adopt a rigid rule that a grand jury proceeding is not pending until a grand jury has actually heard testimony or has in some way taken a role in the decision to issue the subpoena. He offers no authority for such a rule, and we are not inclined to adopt it. Appellant is correct in his observation that a grand jury subpoena may become an instrumentality of an investigative agency, without meaningful judicial supervision. Nevertheless, the remedy against potential abuses is not to establish a rule, easily circumvented, 9 by which some formal act of the grand jury will be required to establish pendency. The remedy is rather to continue to inquire, in each case, whether the subpoena is issued in furtherance of an actual grand jury investigation, i.e., to secure a presently contemplated presentation of evidence before the grand jury. Walasek, 527 F.2d at 678 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The government seizes upon the phrase judicial supervision to argue that, because the wiretap was subject to judicial supervision, it is sufficiently analogous to a grand jury investigation to qualify as a pending judicial proceeding. The flaw in the government's argument is that judicial supervision is not the test; the test is whether there is a judicial proceeding. Walasek considered the role of the grand jury in investigations, and we decline to read one phrase in that decision as authorizing a sweeping expansion in the concept of pending judicial proceedings, one for which the government has no other support. Fundamentally, a wiretap order is an investigative method used by the executive branch, not an element of the judicial process. See United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974) (discussing the history of wiretapping regulation). Judicial supervision pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. SS 2510-2520, does not make wiretaps a function of the judicial branch, but rather ensures that wiretaps-- searches--are carried out within the confines of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Cafero, 473 F.2d 489 (3d Cir. 1973). We conclude that a wiretap order is more like a search warrant than it is like a grand jury and that its pendency does not constitute the administration of justice within the meaning of S 1503. See Brown, 688 F.2d at 598. It follows that Davis cannot be convicted of violatingS 1503 for intentionally interfering with a wiretap.