Opinion ID: 161369
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantiality of the Government Interest in Regulation

Text: 37 The second part of Central Hudson asks whether the interests asserted by the state in order to justify the speech regulations are substantial. Again, because of the importance of First Amendment speech protections, the government bears the responsibility of building a record adequate to clearly articulate and justify these state interests. U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 182 F.3d 1224, 1234 (10th Cir. 1999). Not only is this the government's burden, but courts may not help; the Supreme Court has clearly stated that courts may not supplant the precise interests put forward by the State with other suppositions. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993). 38 As stated above, the district court found that Utah had substantial interests in the operation of liquor sales as a public business (including protecting nondrinkers), and in the public welfare, including temperance, health, and safety. On appeal, ULBA argues that Utah has identified no constitutionally substantial state interests other than temperance. Aplt's Br. at 13. It should be noted that this argument is itself tempered by ULBA's broad definition of the term. Even if temperance is understood to include essentially all public health related goals, 3 ULBA does not object to the district court's characterization of temperance as a state interest that can satisfy the second part of Central Hudson. 39 However, ULBA proposes that Utah's alleged public interest in operating a well managed public business in selling alcohol is not substantial such as to allow First Amendment infringement; that its interest in protecting nondrinkers from liquor advertising is contrary to the basic concepts of free expression; and that its goal of protecting consumers from improper claims or overreaching cannot justify general restrictions on advertising. Aplt's Br. at 13-14; Aplt's Reply Br. at 7-8. ULBA also states that Utah has failed to articulate and justify any of these state interests in a manner sufficient to satisfy Central Hudson's second part. 40 In opposition, Utah does not present new arguments in support of these interests, but merely asserts that temperance, operating a public business, protecting the public welfare, protecting nondrinkers, and all activities subsidiary to those aims were determined by the district court to be legitimate and substantial interests of the state. In support of the district court's conclusion, Utah does contend that the Twenty-first Amendment, granting the states the right to completely control alcohol in its [sic] borders, as well as the public safety, health and welfare interests and the police power all combine to make, as the court below found, these State interests 'substantial.' Aple's Br. at 19-20. 41 If the term is broadly defined to include goals such as promoting public health, discouraging underage consumption, and the like, both parties seem to agree that Utah has established temperance as an adequate basis for state regulation under the second part of the test. See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 504 (discussing a state's interest in promoting temperance, defined as reducing alcohol consumption). Operating liquor sales as a public business qualifies as an additional substantial interest, as the state's monopoly over liquor sales not only affects temperance, but also supplies revenue. 42 However, Supreme Court precedent suggests that even if protecting nondrinkers from involvement with alcohol is part of a public business, it cannot constitute a substantial state interest under Central Hudson. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Court struck down a federal statute prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements. The Court stated that the government's asserted interest, the shielding of recipients of mail from materials they are likely to find offensive . . . carries little weight. Bolger, 463 U.S. at 71. It held that: 43 In striking down a state prohibition of contraceptive advertisements in Carey v. Population Services International, [431 U.S. 678 (1977),] we stated that offensiveness was classically not [a] justificatio[n] validating the suppression of expression protected by the First Amendment. At least where obscenity is not involved, we have consistently held that the fact that protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression. We specifically declined to recognize a distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech that would render this interest a sufficient justification for a prohibition of commercial speech. 44 Id. at 71-72 (citations and footnote omitted). We can see little distinction between the offensiveness rationale that the Court deemed unsubstantial in Bolger, and that of protecting nondrinkers. Because Bolger also concerned commercial speech, we construe it to mean that protecting nondrinkers cannot constitute a substantial state interest justifying Utah's speech restriction, even as one aspect of operating a public business. 45 We conclude that Utah has identified two substantial state interests that potentially justify its speech restrictions: temperance (expansively defined), and the operation of a public business. 46