Opinion ID: 773427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Supervisory Liability Under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983

Text: 128 Plaintiffs claim that defendant Master Sergeant Michael Snyders, the former statewide coordinator of the Valkyrie program, is liable under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 for his supervision of the officers charged in this action. 13 The defendants moved for summary judgment on the supervisory liability claim, and the magistrate judge recommended granting the motion. The district court agreed and granted summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs have failed to point to any evidence linking Snyders' training to Cessna's use of race, and have failed to create a question of material fact as to whether Snyders taught state troopers to use race as a factor in their work, or facilitated or condoned racially discriminatory enforcement. Chavez, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. 129 We review de novo a grant of summary judgment, as explained above. Liability under sec. 1983 requires proof that the defendants were acting under color of state law and that the defendants' conduct violated the plaintiff's rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Lanigan v. Vill. of E. Hazel Crest, Ill., 110 F.3d 467, 471 (7th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). No one disputes that Snyders acted under color of state law, thus we move to the question of whether plaintiffs have established that he was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right. Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995). 130 The doctrine of respondeat superior can not be used to hold a supervisor liable for conduct of a subordinate that violates a plaintiff's constitutional rights. See id. Supervisory liability will be found, however, if the supervisor, with knowledge of the subordinate's conduct, approves of the conduct and the basis for it. Lanigan, 110 F.3d at 477 (citations omitted). That is, to be liable for the conduct of subordinates, a supervisor must be personally involved in that conduct. Id. (citations omitted). [S]upervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent subordinates' misconduct are not liable . . . . The supervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see. They must in other words act either knowingly or with deliberate, reckless indifference. Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted).
131 Plaintiffs allege that as head of the District Six Valkyrie team, and then as the Statewide coordinator of Operation Valkyrie, Snyders was in a position which entailed supervision and extensive monitoring of Valkyrie troopers. Yet Snyders was not in a supervisory position with respect to any of the troopers named in this case. He was not part of the police chain of command, rather, he conducted training sessions that the officers attended. Plaintiffs have proffered no support for the proposition that an individual who trains officers can be deemed to be their supervisor. It is not the obligation of this court to research and construct the legal arguments open to parties, especially when they are represented by counsel. Sanchez v. Miller, 792 F.2d 694, 703 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(9). We thus find that Snyders can not be held liable based on any alleged supervision of the Valkyrie troopers.
132 From 1990 to 1994, Snyders reviewed monthly statistics showing that African- American and Hispanic motorists comprised more than sixty percent of motorists searched by Valkyrie officers in his district, yet Snyders did not keep statewide statistics after being promoted to statewide Valkyrie coordinator. Plaintiffs assert that this creates an issue of fact as to whether Snyders failed to intervene to prevent constitutional violations. Omissions can violate civil rights, and under certain circumstances a state actor's failure to intervene renders him or her culpable under sec. 1983. Yang v. Hardin, 37 F.3d 282, 285 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Gossmeyer v. McDonald, 128 F.3d 481, 494 (7th Cir. 1997) (applying the Yang analysis to a search and seizure claim). Yang summarized the responsibility to intervene: 133 An officer who is present and fails to intervene to prevent other law enforcement officers from infringing the constitutional rights of citizens is liable under sec. 1983 if that officer had reason to know: (1) that excessive force was being used, (2) that a citizen has been unjustifiably arrested, or (3) that any constitutional violation has been committed by a law enforcement official; and the officer had a realistic opportunity to intervene to prevent the harm from occurring. 134 37 F.3d at 285 (citations omitted). 135 Presumably, plaintiffs believe that Snyders is liable under the third category of Yang. We have already found that the plaintiffs did not prove a violation of their right to equal protection. Snyders can not be held liable for failing to intervene to prevent a constitutional violation that plaintiffs have not proven. Further, even if there had been a constitutional violation, Snyders would not have been present and thus would have been unable to intervene, rendering him not liable. We thus decline to find Snyders liable based on his alleged failure to intervene. 136
137 Snyders could still be liable if he was personally responsible for the deprivation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. He will be deemed to have sufficient personal responsibility if he directed the conduct causing the constitutional violation, or if it occurred with his knowledge or consent. See Gentry, 65 F.3d at 561 (citations omitted). The magistrate judge found that the evidence fails to demonstrate that Snyders instructed, or even encouraged or consented to, the use of race as an indicator of illegal drug activity. Chavez, No. 94 C 5303, at 30 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1997). We agree. 138 Plaintiffs' assertion that Snyders instructed officers to use race as an indicator is based on two facts in the record: 1) Snyders' training sessions included references to drug distribution by Hispanics and 2) Trooper Cessna, who testified that race was one indicator to keep in mind, identified Snyders as one of two officers who participated in his Valkyrie training. 139 With respect to the first, neither the tapes of those sessions nor the written materials presented at the sessions support a conclusion that Snyders instructed officers to use race as an indicator. At the beginning of the session, Snyders explains to the officers that the training does not teach them whom to stop, but rather teaches observational skills to improve their awareness during all stops. Snyders also states that profiles are ineffective, and that if troopers waited for Mexicans driving pick-ups, they'd miss all the white guys with dope. He states that perhaps in 1989, Colombians were employing Mexicans as couriers, but that now most couriers are white males traveling alone. He relates stopping two Mexicans and seizing drugs, and also relates stopping a white family of three and seizing drugs. He tells the troopers that three of his last four seizures of drugs were from white motorists, and that the fourth seizure was from a Mexican. There is one document used in the training sessions that indicates that, in Texas, there are a high number of Hispanics involved in the drug trade. 140 Plaintiffs allege that, if all inferences from these statements are construed in their favor, there would be a disputed issue of material fact. We disagree. Even viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, the examples given by Snyders are clearly intended to illustrate that the use of race as an indicator is counterproductive. Snyders' occasional use of the term Mexican does not lead to the conclusion that he was training troopers to stop motorists on the basis of their race. The fact that one example discussed a Hispanic motorist who was stopped for drugs does not create an inference that Snyders was teaching Illinois police that Latino drivers are more likely to be transporting drugs. Chavez, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 1076. Further, the presentation of one document citing the high percentage of Hispanics in the drug trade does not support a conclusion that Snyders directed officers to racially profile. 141 The second allegation is that Snyders taught Trooper Cessna that race was one factor to be considered in determining whom to stop. Even if we were to accept that Cessna was taught to use race as an indicator--and he did not testify that he was--there is no evidence that Snyders did the teaching. Cessna's original Valkyrie training program was led by two instructors, and he also received subsequent training once a year in two to three day sessions. There is no indication who conducted these sessions. Thus there is nothing to establish that Snyders taught Cessna to use race, even if Cessna was taught to do so. As the district court noted, [t]he fact that a student allegedly discriminates . . . does not necessarily mean . . . that the student's former teacher taught the student to discriminate. Id. at 1075. 142 We will affirm the district court's grant of judgment in favor of defendant Snyders with respect to the claim of supervisory liability.