Opinion ID: 1354921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: felonious obtainingcounts 1, 3, 4, 5 & 6

Text: We now turn to counts 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of the indictment, concerning the appellant's felonious obtaining of a controlled substance (Tylox). These counts charge that the appellant obtained possession of the Tylox on these occasions for his own use by misrepresentation, fraud, deception or subterfuge, in violation of W.Va. Code, 60A-4-403(a)(3) [1971]. [23] As set forth above in subsection I(C) of this opinion, the State's theory was that the appellant on these occasions wrote Tylox prescriptions in the names of Jones and Gentry, picked up the Tylox at the drugstores himself, ostensibly on behalf of these patients, but appropriated the Tylox to his own use, instead of actually delivering the Tylox to the patients. The State's evidence that the appellant picked up and appropriated the Tylox to his own use was, with one exception, entirely circumstantial. [24] This Court, in syllabus point 2 of State v. Phillips, ___ W.Va. ___, 342 S.E.2d 210 (1986), reiterated the general rule in this jurisdiction on the prosecution's burden of proof with respect to circumstantial evidence: `Circumstantial evidence will not support a guilty verdict, unless the fact of guilt is proved to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis of innocence; and circumstances which create only a suspicion of guilt but do not prove the actual commission of the crime charged, are not sufficient to sustain a conviction.' Syl. pt. 2, State v. Dobbs, 163 W.Va. 630, 259 S.E.2d 829 (1979). Accord, syl. pt. 2, State v. Gum, 172 W.Va. 534, 309 S.E.2d 32 (1983). Under this principle we conclude that the convictions under counts 3, 4, 5 and 6 must be set aside. The circumstantial evidence as to these particular occasions created only a suspicion of guilt, as there was no evidence from which the jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant, as opposed to someone else, picked up the Tylox. On the other hand, with respect to count 1, the jury resolved the conflicting testimony as to whether the appellant, who admittedly picked up the Tylox, later delivered the same to Jones. In light of the fact that the appellant's office records on Jones, otherwise detailed, do not contain any reference to any delivery of Tylox to, or office visit by, Jones on the date of the alleged delivery to him at the appellant's office, we believe there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction under count 1 of the indictment. [25]