Opinion ID: 718674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lanham Act: Likelihood of Confusion

Text: 7 To prevail under the Lanham Act, plaintiff must prove that defendants' use of the name Saturday Daily News & Tribune creates a likelihood of confusion, deception, or mistake among an appreciable number of ordinary buyers as to the source of or association between the two papers. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) and General Mills, Inc. v. Kellogg Co., 824 F.2d 622, 626 (8th Cir.1987). 8 In determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists, we consider the following factors: 1) the strength of the trademark; 2) the similarity between the parties' marks; 3) the competitive proximity of the parties' products; 4) the alleged infringer's intent to confuse; 5) evidence of actual confusion; and 6) the degree of care reasonably expected of potential customers. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci Publications, 28 F.3d 769, 774 (8th Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 903, 130 L.Ed.2d 787 (1995). These factors do not operate in a mathematically precise formula; rather, we use them at the summary judgment stage as a guide to determine whether a reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion. Factual disputes regarding a single factor are insufficient to support the reversal of summary judgment unless they tilt the entire balance in favor of such a finding. See SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir.1980) (Resolution of [the likelihood of confusion] issue does not hinge on a single factor). Accordingly, we will separately examine each factor with its corresponding relevant facts.
9 As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether plaintiff's mark is strong enough to merit trademark protection. To do this, we must classify the mark, Duluth News-Tribune, into one of four categories: 1) arbitrary or fanciful, 2) suggestive, 3) descriptive, or 4) generic. Cellular Sales, Inc. v. Mackay, 942 F.2d 483, 485 (8th Cir.1991). An arbitrary or fanciful trademark is the strongest type of mark and is afforded the highest level of protection. Id. at 486. At the other end of the spectrum, a generic term is one that is used by the general public to identify a category of goods, and as such merits no trademark protection. See Miller Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75, 79-81 (7th Cir.1977) (holding Lite Beer to be generic), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 751, 54 L.Ed.2d 772 (1978). Suggestive and descriptive marks fall somewhere in between. A suggestive mark is one that requires some measure of imagination to reach a conclusion regarding the nature of the product. See American Home Products Corp. v. Johnson Chemical Co. Inc., 589 F.2d 103, 106 (2d Cir.1978) (holding the mark Roach Motel to be suggestive because [w]hile roaches may live in some motels against the will of the owners, motels are surely not built for roaches to live in). A descriptive mark, on the other hand, immediately conveys the nature or function of the product and is entitled to protection only if it has become distinctive by acquiring a secondary meaning. See 20th Century Wear, Inc. v. Sanmark-Stardust Inc., 747 F.2d 81, 87-88 (2d Cir.1984) (finding Cozy Warm ENERGY-SAVERS to be descriptive), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052, 105 S.Ct. 1755, 84 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). 10 We find that the district court properly classified plaintiff's mark, Duluth News-Tribune, as descriptive. The words convey meaning too directly to be suggestive, yet are too specific to be generic. The name Duluth News-Tribune notifies the reader that the product is a Duluth newspaper, but is too specific to describe all newspapers, or even all Duluth newspapers. Viewing the facts in plaintiff's favor, we will also assume that the mark Duluth News-Tribune has acquired secondary meaning meriting trademark protection. 2 11 Plaintiff attempts, however, to extend this protection beyond Duluth News-Tribune, to the term News-Tribune, on the theory that customers in the Iron Range refer to plaintiff's paper in shorthand form as the News-Tribune. Plaintiff has offered no evidence sufficient to substantiate this claim. The only direct evidence of a customer's shorthand reference to the Duluth News-Tribune is from a customer who refers to the paper as Duluth News. Moreover, the widespread use of the words news and tribune throughout the newspaper industry precludes plaintiff from claiming exclusive privilege to use these words. Thus, although the mark Duluth News-Tribune merits some level of protection, the shorthand News-Tribune merits none. 12
13 Having determined that the relevant protected mark is Duluth News-Tribune, we must consider the similarity between that mark and defendants' mark, Saturday Daily News & Tribune. The use of dominant identical words in common does not mean that two marks are similar. General Mills, 824 F.2d at 627. Rather than consider the similarities between the component parts of the marks, we must evaluate the impression that each mark in its entirety is likely to have on a purchaser exercising the attention usually given by purchasers of such products. Id. 14 Although the marks are aurally similar, when pronounced in their entirety the word Saturday and the ampersand in defendants' paper make the two distinguishable. Moreover, several significant visual distinctions distinguish the two marks. First, in defendants' paper the words news and tribune appear on different lines; in plaintiff's paper the words news and tribune appear on the same line. Second, defendants' title appears in two colors, i.e., red and black; plaintiff's title appears all in black. In addition, the size and style of type used by the two papers differs. Cf. Esquire, Inc. v. Esquire Slipper Manuf. Co., Inc., 243 F.2d 540, 542 (1st Cir.1957) (giving weight to distinctive script in avoiding likelihood of confusion). 15 The most significant distinction, however, is the defendants' placement of a blue banner reading, Publication of the Mesabi Daily News, Virginia and Daily Tribune, Hibbing beneath the title. Cf. Pignons S.A. de Mecanique v. Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir.1981) (otherwise similar marks are not likely to be confused when used in conjunction with clearly displayed name of manufacturer). These distinctions appear to be sufficient to notify an ordinary customer that the papers originate from two different publishers. 16
17 Neither party contests that both papers provide regional and local news coverage and that they directly compete in the Iron Range; thus we need not further examine this factor. 18
19 Plaintiff alleges bad faith on the part of defendants, pointing specifically to defendants' adoption of the mark Saturday Daily News & Tribune and simultaneous decision to expand the Saturday edition to provide regional news coverage shortly after plaintiff's paper extended regional coverage in its Iron Range edition. Plaintiff also points to the absence of a written agreement between Hibbing and Mesabi as evidence that defendants' joint venture explanation for the use of the words Daily News & Tribune is simply an excuse to infringe on plaintiff's mark. 20 We find these bare allegations to be unsupported by the record. The name Saturday Daily News & Tribune is a logical merger of the names Daily News and Daily Tribune. The identification of defendants' paper as a joint publication appears on each individual paper. The paper's sales extend to cover both the area served by the Mesabi paper and that served by the Hibbing paper. The paper is sold in newsstands identified as belonging to either Hibbing or Mesabi, and through subscriptions to the Mesabi or Hibbing paper. Likewise, defendants announced the formation of the joint Saturday edition in each of their respective papers, clearly identifying the source of the Saturday edition. Moreover, after plaintiff's initial letter protesting the paper's name, defendants contacted the Minnesota Newspaper Association and accepted the Association's recommendation that defendants add an ampersand between the words news and tribune. The record, then, reveals no evidence of bad faith on the part of defendants, leaving no genuine factual dispute regarding defendants' intent.
21 [W]hen determining whether there exists a likelihood of confusion, weight is given to the number and extent of instances of actual confusion. Life Technologies, Inc. v. Gibbco Scientific, Inc., 826 F.2d 775, 777 (8th Cir.1987). Plaintiff points to the following incidents of actual confusion: 1) plaintiff's receipt of defendants' mail and phone calls; 2) a reporter who alleges that he routinely identifies himself as working for the News-Tribune, and that on a particular occasion he was asked, which News-Tribune?; 3) plaintiff's receipt of phone calls asking whether the two newspapers are associated; 4) plaintiff's receipt of a subscription form for defendants' paper; and 5) plaintiff's receipt of a reader's letter proposing corrections to an article that appeared in defendants' paper. 22 In evaluating the evidence at the summary judgment stage, we consider only those responses that are supported by admissible evidence. Postscript Enterprises v. City of Bridgeton, 905 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir.1990). Applying this standard, we find that plaintiff's claim of actual confusion through misdirected mail and phone calls fails to raise a genuine factual dispute for two reasons. First, the vague evidence of misdirected phone calls and mail is hearsay of a particularly unreliable nature given the lack of an opportunity for cross-examination of the caller or sender regarding the reason for the confusion. See Davidson & Schaaff, Inc. v. Liberty National Fire Insurance Co., 69 F.3d 868, 871 (8th Cir.1996) (refusing to consider hearsay evidence); Vitek Systems, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 675 F.2d 190, 193 (8th Cir.1982) (affirming district court's decision to discount this type of hearsay evidence). Second, we find such evidence to be de minimis and to show inattentiveness on the part of the caller or sender rather than actual confusion. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition, § 23.2, p. 52, n. 1 (2d ed. 1984). 23 The question to the reporter who was asked to specify which News-Tribune he worked for indicates a distinction in the mind of the questioner, rather than confusion. See Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir.1980) (questions about affiliations of two companies indicate that customers were aware of different product sources). The nature of the question demonstrates an understanding that at least two newspapers contain the words news and tribune. Likewise, the calls questioning whether the two papers were associated demonstrate that potential customers do not automatically associate the words news and tribune with Duluth News-Tribune. 24 Plaintiff next points to its receipt of a subscription form for defendants' paper. This evidence is of little value to plaintiff, as upon defendants' inquiry the sender clarified that she subscribed to both papers and had inadvertently placed the subscription forms in the wrong envelopes. Moreover, the fact that her check was made out to Duluth News cuts against plaintiff's claim of actual confusion. 25 Plaintiff offers one incident of actual confusion--a letter from a reader offering plaintiff editorial suggestions regarding an article that appeared in defendants' paper. Although this incident provides some support for plaintiff's claim of likelihood of confusion, even several isolated incidents of actual confusion that occur initially upon the creation of a potentially confusing mark are insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to the likelihood of confusion. See Astra Pharmaceutical Prod. Inc. v. Beckman Instruments Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (1st Cir.1983) (holding that temporary confusion regarding the association of salesmen from the plaintiff's company with the defendant was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact); Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225, 1231 (3rd Cir.1978) (holding that nineteen misdirected letters in four years were insufficient to establish likelihood of confusion). Rather, we look to whether an appreciable number of ordinary purchasers are likely to be so misled, and here the record before us compels an answer in the negative. 26
27 In evaluating this factor, we look to the degree of care expected of an ordinary purchaser. Plaintiff argues that because of the low cost of newspapers, ordinary buyers will exercise only minimal care in selecting one. Although plaintiff's argument is not without some force when applied to the customer who makes a quick stop at a convenience store to buy a paper, plaintiff ignores the reality of defendants' distribution methods. Approximately ninety-two percent of defendants' papers are sold through home subscriptions. Customers who spend the money and effort to subscribe to a newspaper are likely to know which paper they are buying, and to complain if they get the wrong one. Moreover, an additional two percent are sold through newspaper racks that clearly identify defendants as the paper's publication source. This leaves only six percent of papers sold as potential candidates for buyer confusion, a number too small to create a genuine issue of fact regarding the likelihood that an appreciable number of customers will be confused. 28