Opinion ID: 2357769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Domestic Violence And The Presumption Against Custody

Text: Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g), enacted by the legislature in 2004, directs that [t]here is a rebuttable presumption that a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence against the other parent, a child, or a domestic living partner may not be awarded sole legal custody, sole physical custody, joint legal custody, or joint physical custody of a child. [18] The statute provides that a person has a history of perpetrating domestic violence . . . if the court finds that, during one incident of domestic violence, the parent caused serious physical injury or the court finds that the parent has engaged in more than one incident of domestic violence. [19] We define serious physical injury under subsection (h) as physical injury caused by an act performed under circumstances that create a substantial risk of death; or physical injury that causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, protracted loss or impairment of the function of a body member or organ, or that unlawfully terminates a pregnancy. [20] We have held that once the trial court determines that a party has a history of perpetrating domestic violence as defined by subsection .150(h), the path charted in subsection .150(g)-(i) must be followed, i.e., the rebuttable presumption against custody applies. [21] At the June 24, 2009 hearing and in its July 22, 2009 order the superior court granted primary physical and shared legal custody to Barbee should Williams relocate out of state. Williams's main argument on appeal is that it was error for the superior court to award custody to Barbee because Barbee has a history of domestic violence and failed to rebut the statutory presumption against custody. Specifically, Williams asserts that despite recognizing that Mr. Barbee had engaged in serious domestic violence the court failed to make a specific finding or clearly address the presumption that Mr. Barbee could not be awarded physical or legal custody of the child pursuant to AS 25.24.150(g). Barbee responds that the superior court found that he did not have a history of domestic violence and so did not have to address the presumption of AS 25.24.150(g).
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether the rebuttable presumption against awarding custody to a parent who has a history of perpetrating domestic violence applies in custody modification proceedings. [22] We have held that the ultimate focus in the custody modification context is the best interests of the children. [23] We conclude that applying the statutory presumption against custody is appropriate and necessary in light of this focus. First, the legislative history behind AS 25.24.150(g) strongly indicates that the legislature intended for the presumption to apply in modification proceedings. Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g) was enacted in 2004 by House Bill 385. [24] The primary purpose of H.B. 385 was to protect children from potentially adverse custody determinations in response to growing evidence that domestic violence has severe and long-lasting effects on children. [25] The bill sought to decrease the likelihood that children would be placed in the custodial household where domestic violence exists by ensuring that domestic violence was adequately and specifically included when courts analyzed a child's best interests. [26] This purpose is equally valid at a modification hearing where, just as in making an initial custody determination, a court should fully address any existence of domestic violence and avoid making a custody determination that will place a child in the custody of an abusive parent. To accomplish its goal, H.B. 385 refined the best interests analysis by requiring that courts consider the existence of domestic violence not only as part of the traditional best interests factors laid out in AS 25.24.150(c) but also as triggering a rebuttable presumption against custody where a history of domestic violence exists. [27] It follows that the presumption is properly a part of the best interests analysis in modification proceedings just as it is in initial custody determinations. [28] Adding support to our conclusion that the presumption applies in modification cases, we observe that AS 25.20.110 does not limit a superior court to consideration of only the factors under subsection (c) when determining whether modification is warranted. [29] Nor have we so limited courts making any custody determinations  our guiding concern has long been the best interests of the child and not strict adherence to the factors enumerated in the statute. [30] In addition, we recently assumed that the statutory presumption applies to a proceeding to modify visitation; there is no reason why it should not similarly apply to a proceeding to modify custody. [31] And employing the presumption where one party seeks modification is a logical extension of our cases applying the other subsections of AS 25.24.150 to modification proceedings. [32] Moreover, given that a finding that a crime involving domestic violence has occurred since the last custody determination is, as a matter of law, a changed circumstance that warrants a modification proceeding, it would make little sense to exclude the presumption against custody in modification cases. [33] The statutory purpose of protecting children would be completely unfulfilled if, in a modification hearing triggered by the occurrence of a crime involving domestic violence, the court could ignore the statutory presumption against awarding custody to the perpetrator of domestic violence. Finally, we believe that applying the statutory presumption against custody is undoubtedly appropriate in a case such as this one, where the presumption was not addressed at the initial custody determination because the custody award was made pursuant to an agreement of the parties. [34] Applying the presumption is especially necessary where the settlement agreement awarding custody was made by parties with a history of domestic violence during the marriage. [35]
Williams maintains on appeal that Barbee has a history of domestic violence as evidenced by his conviction and his own testimony and that the trial court recognized that Mr. Barbee has a history of domestic violence. Citing to the same page of the transcript as Williams, Barbee responds that the superior court found that he did not have a history of domestic violence, and so did not have to address the statutory presumption against custody. The transcript suggests that neither party is entirely correct  the superior court did not make any express finding regarding a history of perpetrating domestic violence under AS 25.24.150(h). While the trial court's dialogue did include the phrase history of domestic violence, read in context, it appears that the term history of domestic violence referred to the best interests of the child criteria found at AS 25.24.150(c)(7) rather than a separate analysis under subsection .150(h). [36] We have held that when the record shows that domestic violence has occurred and the trial court so finds, it is plain error for the court not to make findings as to whether the domestic violence amounted to a history of perpetrating domestic violence. [37] In Puddicombe v. Dreka , we concluded that it was error for the superior court to fail to evaluate whether there was a history under AS 25.24.150(h) after the court found when discussing the seventh best interests factor that both parties had engaged in domestic violence. [38] The evidence of domestic violence in Puddicombe consisted of plaintiff's allegations (presented without witness testimony) that defendant punched, sexually assaulted, choked, and threatened to kill her along with extensive testimony about several altercations that occurred between the parties, though most of the evidence regarding physical violence was from the parties themselves and was highly contested. [39] Even so, because the superior court found that domestic violence had occurred, it was required to explicitly address whether it was serious enough to be a history of perpetrating domestic violence under the definition set out in subsection .150(h). [40] Addressing this same issue, we recently concluded that a trial court must determine whether domestic violence amounted to a history under AS 25.24.150(h) even when evidence of domestic violence is less overwhelming than in Puddicombe. [41] In Michele M. v. Richard R . the superior court did not find any relevant, recent domestic violence incidents and may have implicitly determined that [defendant's] past acts of domestic violence were neither numerous nor significant and so did not amount to a `history of perpetrating domestic violence.' [42] Still, we remanded, stating that it was plain error for the court not to further determine whether [defendant's] previous acts of domestic violence constituted a history under the statute. [43] We hold today that where a superior court finds that domestic violence occurred, it must make express findings regarding whether the incident or incidents of domestic violence constitute a history of perpetrating domestic violence under AS 25.24.150(h). At the June 24, 2009 hearing, the superior court made some comments about both the single substantiated incident and Williams's other alleged incidents but did not expressly state whether they amounted to a statutorily defined history of abuse. First, the court referred to the incident that resulted in Barbee's assault conviction and recognized that it was one really big deal incident here where you choked her terribly. Crucially, however, the superior court did not explain whether chok[ing] her terribly amounted to causing a serious physical injury such that the single incident constituted a history under subsection .150(h). Serious physical injury in the context of the presumption against awarding custody means physical injury caused by an act performed under circumstances that create a substantial risk of death; or physical injury that causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health, protracted loss or impairment of the function of a body member or organ, or that unlawfully terminates a pregnancy. [44] The absence of a finding in this case is especially problematic because Williams claimed that she feared for her life during the incident, and the charging document, which was based upon a review of [the] police report indicates: [Williams] reported that her husband tackled her from behind and put her in a headlock. She said that he used both arms and strangled her to the point she thought she would lose consciousness. She stated that after he let go, she began vomiting and had difficulty breathing. She stated that her voice was hoarse and continued to have trouble swallowing on the morning of the 18th when she called the police. The officer observed that she had pet[e]chia on her neck and behind both ears. The officer noted what appeared to be blood pooled behind both of her lower eyelids and red marks on her right arm and wrist. On remand the superior court must make an explicit finding whether this choking incident, standing alone, amounts to a history of domestic violence under AS 25.24.150(h). We next turn to Williams's many additional allegations of domestic violence in her pleadings to the superior court. Even if the superior court determines on remand that the single choking incident did not amount to a history of domestic violence, if Williams's evidence warrants a finding that there were additional incidents of domestic violence, then there was a history of perpetrating domestic violence, and the superior court must address the rebuttable presumption against custody.
In Parks v. Parks , we concluded that AS 25.24.150(g) requires trial courts to consider alleged incidents of domestic violence and that it is appropriate to question the pro se litigants about facts relevant to the issue to determine whether an alleged event was an incident of domestic violence. [45] We reaffirm this position here and conclude that it was error not to give Williams an opportunity to put forth evidence to support her allegations. In Parks, a husband admitted during a custody hearing that he had thrown water in his wife's face; the trial court found that this was not an incident of domestic violence for purposes of triggering the statutory presumption against custody because there was no evidence that the wife was afraid. [46] We clarified on appeal that the water-throwing would constitute domestic violence if the husband was attempting to place his wife in fear of imminent physical injury. [47] We then remanded to the superior court for additional findings, explaining: Alaska Statute 25.24.150(g) requires trial courts to consider alleged incidents of domestic violence, and here the trial court was in a position to question the pro se litigants about facts relevant to the issue. On remand, the trial court should solicit from the parties the information it needs to determine whether the water-throwing incident was an act of domestic violence.[ [48] ] In this case, Williams's pleadings to the superior court contained numerous allegations of domestic abuse. Williams detailed in her motion to modify custody that during their marriage Barbee had anger issues and that arguments would end with Barbee abusing Williams, including choking, hitting, kicking, and throwing Williams to the ground. Yet, the superior court did not take testimony from Williams about the individual incidents alleged in her motion to modify custody. [49] Nor did the trial court ask Williams to provide additional information that would have allowed the court to determine whether the alleged events were acts of domestic violence. [50] The superior court should have inquired into the details of the events and provided an opportunity for Williams to present evidence in support of her allegations of abuse in order to determine whether the events were acts of domestic violence. We remand for the superior court to allow and evaluate such evidence.