Opinion ID: 1658441
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the regulation, and therefore, the stop, invalid under state law?

Text: The fact that we have pronounced the regulation free of infirmity vis-a-vis the federal Constitution does not end our inquiry. A procedure may be perfectly in accord with the United States Constitution and yet run afoul of state constitutional or statutory requirements. Pinkton v. State, 481 So.2d 306, 309 (Miss. 1985); Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1983). Drane argues that the Commission, being a mere administrative agency, has no authority to prescribe search and seizure regulations, and that by doing so it has usurped the prerogative of the legislature. Our leading case on such problems is Strong v. Bostick, 420 So.2d 1356 (Miss. 1982). This was a case involving a regulation banning the use of dogs as an aid for hunting deer in certain areas of the state. This Court held that: The commission has the authority, and under certain situations the duty to promulgate rules and regulations ... where they do not conflict with an existing statute. (Emphasis added) (420 So.2d at 1362) The state's brief asserts that the appellant does not contend the regulation impermissibly conflicts with an existing statute. This is not correct. Appellant's brief refers to MCA § 49-1-43 (Supp. 1985). This section defines the duties and powers of state director of conservation and state conservation officers. The statute says in part, the state director of conservation and each of his conservation officers shall have power and it shall be the duty ... of such conservation officer ... to make search where such conservation officer ... has cause to belief and does belief that animals, birds or fish ... are possessed in violation of law or regulation; and in such case to examine without warrant the contends of any boat, car, automobile or other vehicle... . (Emphasis added) Strong made it clear that the rule-making authority of the commission must be exercised subject to any statute. The pertinent statute imposes a requirement of probable cause as a pre-requisite to a warrantless search of a vehicle. Insofar as the regulation permits the search of vehicles by an officer who has no cause to believe that a violation has been committed, it obviously conflicts with the statute. However, this does not decide the issue in the appellant's favor. The statute deals with searches, not with seizures. The stop of a vehicle legally constitutes a seizure. By its terms, MCA § 49-1-43 (Supp. 1985) applies only to searches; the question is whether the legislature intended that it apply to seizures as well. There is good reason to believe that it did not. Where possible, this Court will interpret statutes so as to realize their purposes rather than defeat them. Brady v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 342 So.2d 295, 303 (Miss. 1977). Nor will this Court impute an unjust or absurd purpose to the legislature when any other reasonable construction can save it from such an imputation. Baker v. State, 327 So.2d 288, 291 (Miss. 1976); Aikerson v. State, 274 So.2d 124, 127 (Miss. 1973). When two statutes on the same subject matter apparently conflict the court has the duty to harmonize them if possible, so as to effect the underlying policy. Western Line Consol. School Dist. v. Greenville Mun. Sep. School Dist., 433 So.2d 954, 958 (Miss. 1983); Surles v. State, ex rel., McNeel, 357 So.2d 319, 320-21 (Miss. 1978). § 49-1-43 must be harmonized with § 49-1-29, the section which sets for the powers and duties of the commission on wildlife conservation. That section states in pertinent part that the commission is hereby authorized to make such rules and regulations ... as it may deem necessary to carry out the purposes and provisions of this chapter. It is difficult to see how those purposes can be effected if game wardens were not empowered to make routine stops of vehicles in wildlife management areas. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the legislature intended the probable cause requirement to apply to searches alone. To sum up: the game wardens' stop of Drane in the present case was permissible despite the technical flaw in the department's regulation. The initial stop was authorized under the necessary and proper clause of § 49-1-29, and the ensuing search was permissible under § 49-1-43 because probable cause existed after the warden detected the odor of marijuana.