Opinion ID: 429223
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seizure of Property--United States v. Place

Text: 41 The initial order in this appeal, filed August 27, 1982, indicated that a resolution of the issues raised was to be held in abeyance pending the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Place, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2637, 77 L.Ed.2d 110 (1983). Though our analysis of the Royer issue would, by itself, justify vacation of the judgment in this case, a consideration of Place seems appropriate in light of that order. 42 The appellant claims that even if the initial seizure of his person was justifiable on the basis of reasonable suspicion, the seizure of his luggage was not. This was the precise issue addressed by the Supreme Court in Place. Raymond Place's behavior had allegedly aroused the suspicions of law enforcement officers at the Miami International airport and again at New York's LaGuardia airport. He was briefly stopped in Miami and was further questioned when he reached New York. Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage and one of the agents told him that they were going to take the luggage to a federal judge to obtain a search warrant. When Place declined an invitation to accompany the officers, they gave him telephone numbers where they could be reached and confiscated his bags. The bags were taken to Kennedy International airport where they were subjected to a canine examination by a trained narcotics detection dog. Approximately ninety minutes elapsed between the initial seizure and the sniff test. The dog reacted positively to Place's luggage and a search pursuant to a subsequently obtained warrant revealed 1,125 grams of cocaine. 43 The Court of Appeals never considered the reasonableness of the initial stop and the Supreme Court denied certiorari on Place's cross-petition raising the issue of reasonable suspicion. Hence, the court never addressed this element of the encounter, leaving Royer to control the resolution of the first issue raised here. The Place decision does, however, provide considerable guidance for the proper resolution of the appellant's claim that the seizure of his luggage was impermissible, requiring the suppression of all evidence contained therein. 44 In an opinion authored by Justice O'Connor, the Court addressed the legality of seizures of personal effects when based on anything less than probable cause. The majority concluded: 45 When an officer's observations lead them reasonably to believe that a traveler is carrying luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry and its progeny would permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investigation detention is properly limited in scope. 46 --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2644. The limitation in scope to which the Court referred was then defined by the purpose for the seizure and the length and nature of the detention. Applying these principles to the facts before the Court, and assuming the presence of reasonable suspicion, Justice O'Connor concluded that the detention of Place's luggage was not properly limited in scope. 47 The majority opinion expressly stated that the purpose for the seizure fell within the permissible bounds of a Terry-type investigative detention, finding that the extremely limited nature of the intrusion from a canine sniff (unlike a manual search) when balanced against the governmental interest in detecting drug couriers, justified the seizure even absent probable cause. In fact, the majority reasoned that the exposure of Place's luggage to a canine sniff, while that luggage was located in a public place, simply did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The majority did conclude, however, that holding the bags for ninety minutes before the canine sniff, exacerbated by the agents' failure to give the respondent any indication of where the luggage was to be taken or when it could be retrieved, rendered the seizure unreasonable. The remainder of the Court concurred in the narrow determination that the seizure was impermissible and suppression of the evidence warranted. 14 48 Putting aside our earlier discussion in which we concluded that there was an insufficient basis upon which to justify any stop, it is at least obvious that no probable cause existed when the luggage was seized. In Place, the Court noted: 49 At the outset, we must reject the Government's suggestion that the point at which probable cause for seizure of luggage from the person's presence becomes necessary is more distant than in the case of a Terry stop of the person himself.... [W]hen the police seize luggage from the suspect's custody, we think the limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible scope of an investigative detention of the person's luggage on less than probable cause. Under this standard, it is clear that the police conduct here exceeded the permissible limits of a Terry-type investigative stop. 50 --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2645. Thus, it is clear that the pertinent point of inquiry is the point at which the luggage was seized from the appellant. 51 The government argues that Saperstein's answers to the curbside inquiries did not satisfactorily resolve the discrepancies the agents perceived and were, thus, sufficient to give rise to probable cause. Virtually the same argument was rejected by the Supreme Court in Royer. The government specifically claimed as its third and final argument, that by the time consent to search Royer's luggage was given, the responses to the ongoing investigation had given rise to probable cause. The Court was unpersuaded that Royer's unsatisfactory answers could have escalated the tenuous reasonable suspicion present to the level of probable cause permitting a search or an arrest. 15 52 The government also contends that there was probable cause to detain the bags for any length of time once Demnik learned that the appellant was of record on the NADDIS computer. 16 Even assuming that this would give rise to probable cause, an assumption which we do not concede is a justifiable one, 17 the government is still unable to justify the detention here. First, the Court in Place specifically held that events occurring after the seizure are outside the relevant time frame for determining the reasonableness of that seizure. See discussion at page 19, supra. Secondly, if probable cause had existed, there was no need to await the use of the canine search and no justification for not obtaining a warrant immediately, thus cutting short the detention. 53 Given the lack of probable cause, and proceeding on the otherwise unjustifiable assumption that sufficient reasonable suspicion existed for any stop of the appellant, the seizure must fit within the narrow bounds of Place if it is to be deemed permissible. According to the analysis in Place, the detention of the appellant's luggage must amount to no more than an investigative stop as permitted under Terry. The Place majority concluded that the submission of luggage to a trained canine was not a search under the Fourth Amendment and, hence, was a permissible purpose for which to detain personal effects under Terry. We recognize that this language was unnecessary to the Court's ultimate holding and is, thus, technically dicta. Because we conclude that the seizure was not otherwise within the legal scope of the limited type of seizure outlined in Place, we need not address the issue of whether this Court is bound by, or should choose to follow, the earlier portions of the majority's analysis. 54 The Supreme Court concluded in Place that, [t]he length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause. --- U.S. at ----, 103 S.Ct. at 2645. Place's bags had been detained for ninety minutes prior to the canine examination. While the court was unwilling to set outer limits on Terry stops, the clear implication was that the permissible time frame for stops based on less than probable cause is severely restricted. In refusing to adopt a definitive guideline the Court was referring to the ALI, Model Code of Pre-arraignment procedure Sec. 110.1(1) (1975) which recommends a maximum of twenty minutes for a Terry stop. Id. at ----, n. 10, 103 S.Ct. at 2646 n. 10. Combining this reference with the Court's failure to analyze the purpose for, or nature of the ninety minute detention, finding simply that the length of the detention was sufficient in and of itself to establish that the seizure was unreasonable, establishes an extremely limited time frame in which law enforcement officials may act in this context. 55 While we, too, see no reason to adopt a definitive time formula for every case, we have no doubt that the thirteen and one-half hour detention in this case renders the seizure impermissible and clearly warranted a suppression order. 18 Accordingly, the sentence and conviction entered by the district court is hereby vacated and the case REMANDED to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this judgment. 56