Opinion ID: 775768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Public Access to Judicial Documents

Text: 29 While Martindell established a general and strong presumption against access to documents sealed under protective order when there was reasonable reliance upon such an order, see id. § 2044.1 (describing Martindell as maintaining a very restrictive attitude toward modification of protective orders), we have held more recently in United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 1995) (Amodeo I) that a subspecies of sealed documents in civil cases-so-called judicial documents-deserve a presumption in favor of access. Though Amodeo I did not refer to Martindell, it left the general rule of Martindell undisturbed. 30 Amodeo I involved a court-appointed monitor who filed sealed investigative reports with the District Court in connection with her duties overseeing a consent decree. A third-party newspaper sought access to the sealed documents. We recalled the long-established, id. at 145, but not absolute, id. at 146-47, common law right of public access to judicial documents, but also cautioned that the mere filing of a paper or document with the court is insufficient to render that paper a judicial document subject to the right of access. Id. at 145. Judicial documents, entitled to a presumption of public access, are item[s] filed [with the court that are] relevant to the performance of the judicial function and useful in the judicial process. Id. These may include documents that have been sealed. With respect to all judicial documents, however, we held that, it is proper for a district court, after weighing competing interests, to edit and redact a judicial document in order to allow access to appropriate portions of the document.... Id. at 147 (emphasis added). 10 Because the sealed reports in Amodeo I assisted the District Court in the performance of its Article III function of enforcing the consent decree, we held that the reports were indeed judicial documents and thus presumptively available to the public. Id. at 146. 31 After establishing in Amodeo I a right of access to a sealed report deemed to be a judicial document, we considered the standards that ought to be employed by a court in light of objections to disclosure of such a document. United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1049 (2d Cir. 1995)(Amodeo II). We required the District Court to determine the weight of the presumption of public access by evaluating the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts. Id. We reiterated that the public has an `especially strong' right of access to evidence introduced in trials. Id. In contrast, we reaffirmed the principle that 32 [d]ocuments that play no role in the performance of Article III functions, such as those passed between the parties in discovery, lie entirely beyond the presumption's reach and stand on a different footing than a motion filed by a party seeking action by the court, or, indeed, than any other document which is presented to the court to invoke its powers or affect its decisions. 33 Id. at 1050 (emphasis added; alterations, internal quotations marks, and citations omitted). After instructing the District Court to determine the weight of the presumption of public access, we then required it to balance [the] competing considerations against [that presumption]. Id. We identified at least two countervailing factors: (1) the danger of impairing law enforcement or judicial efficiency; and (2) the privacy interests of those who resist disclosure. 34 As we observed with regard to the first countervailing factor, 35 [o]fficials with law enforcement responsibilities may be heavily reliant upon the voluntary cooperation of persons who may want or need confidentiality. If that confidentiality cannot be assured, cooperation will not be forthcoming.... One consideration, therefore, is whether public access to the materials at issue is likely to impair in a material way the performance of Article III functions. 36 Id. 37 In describing the second countervailing factor-the privacy interest of those who resist disclosure-we concluded that the privacy interests of innocent third parties... should weigh heavily in a court's balancing equation. Id. (quoting United States v. Biaggi (In re New York Times Co.), 828 F.2d 110, 116 (2d Cir. 1987)). We also stated that the weight of the privacy interest should depend on the degree to which the subject matter is traditionally considered private rather than public. Amodeo II, 71 F.3d at 1051. Finally, we indicated that a court should consider the nature and degree of injury as well as whether there is a fair opportunity for the subject to respond to any accusations contained therein. Id.