Opinion ID: 2347772
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether, in Fact, the Prosecutor's Actions Prejudiced Defendant

Text: We have concluded that the government took unfair advantage of the informal discovery process to prevent a timely trial court determination of any right defendant may have had, before taking the stand, to see the complete grand jury testimony of Officer Clay. Defendant's conviction, nevertheless, must not be upset unless the prosecutor's actions were prejudicial. We turn now to that inquiry. It is clear, beyond doubt, that the prosecutor intended to catch defense counsel off guard. Appellate counsel for the government conceded at oral argument that the only conceivable reason why the prosecutor had withheld the disputed portion of the grand jury transcript until after defendant had testified was his hope to use it precisely as he did to impeach defendant. The prosecutor was aware that only complainant and defendant knew what had happened in the alley, and that defendant would have to testify if complainant's version were not to prevail by default. The prosecutor, therefore, knew that the case would turn on their relative credibility, so he laid a trap for defendantand caught him. Even the most marginal dent in defendant's credibility could have tipped the case for the jury. When Rosser took the stand, he testified that he merely had entered the abandoned building to roll up some marijuana, leaving Cavender in the alley. Rosser added that as he as coming out of the building Cavender had said `I'm going to leave out of here' or something. Rosser then grabbed him by his arm in an effort to reassure him that there was no danger. The defense further claimed that Rosser then followed Cavender into the street for the friendly purpose of persuading him to return for his discarded belongings. If there had been foul play, Rosser asks, why would he have chased Cavender into the open? Rosser's version of the events was not implausible. His impeachment with the statement he made to the police, however, could well have influenced the jury not to believe him. Thus, we hold, after a complete review of the record, that the prosecutor's informal delivery of a partial transcript of Officer Clay's grand jury testimonyfrom which defendant's inculpatory statement had been excisedwas prejudicial. It is therefore a basis for reversal; it cannot be considered harmless. Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a narcotics conviction in a similar situation. In United States v. Lewis, supra , defense counsel filed a motion to suppress all verbal or written statements by defendant on Miranda grounds. The government filed a response that `the defendant did not make any statements at the time of his arrest which the government intends to use against him'. Id., 167 U.S.App.D.C. at 233, 511 F.2d at 799. There was no pretrial hearing on the motion. In its direct case the government introduced no evidence of any statement by defendant. After defendant had testified, however, the prosecutor called a police officer as a rebuttal witness to reveal that defendant had stated at the time of his arrest that he customarily shot heroin into his ankle. Defendant moved for a mistrial on the ground that he had been misled by the prosecutor's earlier representation. The government replied that any misunderstanding had been harmless because the statement in question was not discoverable under Rule 16(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as its substance had never been written down or recorded. Id. at 235, 511 F.2d at 801. The trial court denied defendant's motion; the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. It is of the utmost importance that the government respond accurately and unambiguously to defense counsel's inquiries and motions relating to statements, both written and oral, made by a defendant to the authorities. The government's answer to the defense motion to suppress, that [t]he defendant did not make any statements at the time of his arrest which the government intends to use against him, was an equivocation. Taken together with the pretrial conference between [defense counsel] and [government counsel], as well as with the grand jury testimony, the preliminary hearing testimony, and a second police reportnone of which indicated any statement by Lewis,it was only natural and reasonable that [defense counsel] would construe the government response to mean that no such statement would be used at any time during the trial. [ Id. ] Cf. United States v. Padrone, 406 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1969). The Circuit Court's analysis is most appropriate to the present case. It was only natural and reasonable that defense counsel here would construe the prosecutor's response at the status hearing, as well as the informal pretrial delivery of grand jury testimony and police reports, to preclude any possibility of impeachment by an undisclosed statement of the defendant to the police. The government protests, nevertheless, that the present case differs from Lewis. Here, defense counsel failed to ask for his client's statements when he learned about them at the September 25 hearing, four weeks prior to trial. Moreover, defendant has not even claimed on appeal that the September 25 hearing had misled him. The government suggests, therefore, that under these circumstances defendant should be held responsible for his own failure to press the matter further. He allegedly prejudiced himself. We cannot agree that defense counsel was obliged to doubt, and thus test, the prosecutor's word by demanding a copy of defendant's statements. Counsel especially cannot be faulted here, for the prosecutor represented that all statements were oral and thus implicitly not recorded. The prosecutor had the greater burden on September 25the burden of telling the truth in every respect. If, at the status hearing, he had responded correctly that defendant had made an inculpatory statement reflected in a police officer's grand jury testimonyor, more simply, that the government possesses materials requiring in camera inspection we must assume that both defense counsel and the court would have probed further, with the inevitable result of a timely, carefully evaluated Rule 16 determination. To assume otherwise would be grossly unfair to defendant, especially because the government, under the rules of discovery, retained the burden of correcting its own error. It is also true that defendant has not cited the September 25 hearing as a basis for his Rule 16 contention on appeal. Apparently, he forgot about it and did not have the benefit of a September 25 transcript when he later prepared the appeal. [8] As we see it, however, the only possible significance of this omission cuts in defendant's favor. It suggests that the prosecutor's ploy indeed workedthat defense counsel was lulled into a false sense of security on September 25 about his client's statements to the police. The truth remains undiminished: on September 25 the prosecutor misstated a critical fact which, under the rules, he had a continuing obligation to correct. Instead, he compounded the error by excising the grand jury minutes before delivering them to defendant. Defense counsel's failure to discover the September 25 issue until after the government had quoted from the record of that hearing in its appellate brief merely confirms the success of the prosecutor's tactic. We agree that if defense counsel had been put on notice, before defendant took the stand, that his client had made incriminating statements to the police and failed to request them, he would have found it difficult if not impossible to demonstrate error from the government's eventual use of those statements to impeach defendant. See United States v. Arcentales, 532 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1976). Nor is it likely that prejudicial error could have been shown if the improperly withheld statement, used for impeachment, merely had corroborated other statements in the hands of the police that defendant already knew about. See United States v. Johnson, supra . [9] Nor, finally, would there have been the requisite prejudice for reversal if the case against the defendant had been so formidable that failure to produce the statement amounted to harmless error. [10] United States v. Arcentales, supra at 1049; United States v. Johnson, supra at 1005. In the present case, however, the government threw defense counsel off the track by characterizing defendant's statement as exculpatory when its primary thrust was inculpatory. [11] Defendant's statement, in fact, was neither peripheral to the government's case nor cumulative. Absent its use for impeachment, we cannot conclude from the record that defendant's conviction was assured. [12]