Opinion ID: 2637598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disproportionate Sentencing Concerns and Legislative Designation of Robbery Statutes as Offenses Against Property

Text: The court of appeals based its holding in significant part on the concern that if a defendant is convicted and sentenced on multiple counts of aggravated robbery based upon the number of victims in control of the property, disproportionate sentencing may occur. Borghesi, 40 P.3d at 21. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), a court must sentence a defendant to consecutive sentences if he is convicted of two or more separate crimes of violence arising out of the same incident. While this concern for possible disproportionate sentencing is understandable, we reason that it is misplaced in this context. Considerations of disproportionate sentencing are legally irrelevant to a double jeopardy multiplicity analysis. Once it has been determined that a defendant can be punished for his wrongful conduct, the manner in which his conduct is divided into separate units for purposes of calculating his total sentence is of no constitutional significance except for deciding whether the total sentence is excessive.... Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1978 Sup.Ct. Rev. 81, 114. [13] The constitutional determination of whether a sentence is excessive arises not under the Double Jeopardy Clause, but instead, under the Eighth Amendment, which the defendant did not and does not raise in this case. Under the Eighth Amendment, no sentence is per se constitutional. Although courts afford a great deal of deference to legislative determinations regarding sentencing, a defendant is still entitled to an abbreviated proportionality review upon request for each separate sentence imposed under the crime of violence statute. Close v. People, 48 P.3d 528, 540 (Colo.2002); see also § 18-1.3-406(2)(a)(I). If an abbreviated proportionality review gives rise to an inference of gross disproportionality, a defendant is then entitled to an extended proportionality review. Close, 48 P.3d at 541, see also People v. Deroulet, 48 P.3d 520, 527 (Colo.2002). Additionally, statutory provisions exist to provide courts with sufficient discretion to mitigate disproportionate sentences when appropriate. Pursuant to section 18-1.3-406(1)(a), courts have the discretion to modify sentences for violent crimes in unusual and extenuating circumstances. See also Borghesi, 40 P.3d at 25 (Nieto, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Although convicted defendants must still serve modified sentences consecutively, courts may modify sentences below the statutory range, even to include probationary sentences, if the defendant is eligible. [14] Id., People v. Byrum, 784 P.2d 817, 818 (Colo.App.1989) (holding that evidence of defendant's mental problems, lack of prior convictions, regular medical treatment, and model prison behavior warranted a downward modification of a mandatory sentence). The defendant argues that the statutory designation of robbery as an offense against property as opposed to an offense against the person indicates the legislature's intent to treat our robbery statutes primarily as protective of property. [15] We are not persuaded. Such designations are generally left to the revisor of statutes, who possesses no authority to make substantive statutory changes. Hence, we may draw no implications or presumptions of legislative intent. Even if we assume arguendo that this designation reflects the will of the General Assembly, we deem it of limited value because the statutes incorporate both larcenous and assaultive elements. On balance, we reason that the legislative designation of the crime of robbery as an offense against property is less persuasive than the common law principles of robbery upon which our statute is based and our own precedent, both of which emphasize the assault element and deemphasize the theft element. Other jurisdictions support our rationale that the violent nature of the taking merits the treatment of robbery as an offense against the person, even though the crimes are classified under the code heading of offenses against property. [16] Hence, we conclude that Colorado's robbery statutes are intended primarily to protect persons, not property. Charging, convicting, and sentencing a robber on multiple counts of robbery based upon the number of persons in control of the property taken does not offend multiplicity principles because each person who is subject to force and intimidation constitutes a victim of a separate offense under our robbery statutes. We hold, therefore, that a robber may be convicted of more than one count of robbery for a single taking of property from more than one person. [17]