Opinion ID: 203629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction and Multiple Conspiracy issue

Text: Dunbar next raises two challenges related to his argument that the trial evidence tended to show only a series of stand-alone triangles, quadrangles, and binary transactions and not an interconnected conspiracy. First, Dunbar argues that there was a prejudicial variance between the evidence and the indictment. Second, he argues that the district court erred when it refused to give the instruction he requested.
A prejudicial variance occurs when: `(1) the facts proved at trial differ from those alleged in the indictment; and (2) the error affects the defendant's substantial rights ...' United States v. Rodríguez, 525 F.3d 85, 102 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Pomales-Lebrón, 513 F.3d 262, 269 (1st Cir.2008)). A claim that the Government's proof varied impermissibly from the charges contained in the indictment is essentially a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Id. As with all such claims, `we canvass the evidence (direct and circumstantial) in the light most agreeable to the prosecution and decide whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences extractable therefrom, enables a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime.' Id. (quoting United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2003)). Dunbar argues that he objected to the alleged variance between the indictment and the trial evidence, but the record reveals only that he requested jury instructions on the conspiracy issue. He made no motion for acquittal on this ground. Accordingly, we review only for plain error. See United States v. DeCicco, 439 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir.2006). The plain-error standard is met if (1) the district court erred; (2) the error was plain that is, clear or obvious; (3) the error affected the defendant's substantial rights and (4) the error `seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.' United States v. Torres, 541 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Brandao, 539 F.3d 44, 57 (1st Cir.2008)). Here, there is no error, let alone plain error. The indictment charged Dunbar with participating in a conspiracy, from in or about January 2000 to in or about March 20, 2002, to distribute and possess certain illegal drugs. The indictment also charged Dunbar with participating in a conspiracy, from in or about the spring of 2001 to in or about January 2002, to import certain illegal drugs. The evidence at trial was sufficient to show that Dunbar conspired with a number of individuals to distribute illegal drugs and that he conspired with a number of individuals to import drugs. See Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 7. Thus, `a plausible reading of the record supports the jury's implied finding that he knowingly participated in the charged conspiracy.' United States v. Balthazard, 360 F.3d 309, 315 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 5). Dunbar argues that the evidence shows that he engaged in several drug operations with different individuals at different points in timethus that there were multiple conspiracies rather than one large conspiracy. The government responds by pointing to connections between the different drug operations, including Boisvert's relationship with a number of other witnesses. But even if certain drug operations did not involve all of the various conspirators, it is clear that each operation involved Dunbar. In fact, Dunbar's own appellate brief concedes as much. Thus, even if there were multiple conspiracies, there was no risk that the jury would have held Dunbar guilty for the acts of a different conspiracy. United States v. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 139 (1st Cir.2008) (`[I]n the context of alleged multiple conspiracies, the defendant's main concern is that jurors will be misled into attributing guilt to a particular defendant based on evidence presented against others who were involved in a different and separate conspiratorial scheme.' (quoting United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 450 (1st Cir. 1994))). Put another way, multiple conspiracy is not a defense unless it creates a reasonable doubt about whether the defendant is guilty of the charged conspiracy. Balthazard, 360 F.3d at 316. Thus, even if Dunbar belonged to certain drug conspiracies in which he was the only member in overlap with certain other conspiracies, he would still have engaged in the conspiracy charged in the indictment. There was no prejudicial variance, and thus no error. [2]
Dunbar also objects to the district court's refusal to give his proposed jury instruction on the conspiracy charges. Review of jury instructions is for abuse of discretion. De La Cruz, 514 F.3d at 139. The trial court's failure to give a proffered instruction will not be reversed unless that instruction is (1) substantively correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge actually given; and (3) concerned an important point such that the failure to give it seriously undermined the defendant's ability to present a particular defense. Id. (quoting Brandon, 17 F.3d at 448). On appeal, Dunbar fails to specify which particular proposed instructions he argues were erroneously omitted. Nonetheless, we need not parse his proposed instructions line by line. The substance of his argument on appeal, and of a number of his proposed instructions, was that the jury should acquit if it found conspiracies separate from the single, overarching conspiracy charged. As stated above, this proposition is incorrect. Balthazard, 360 F.3d at 316. The district court acted correctly in rejecting this proposed instruction and instead telling the jury to convict only if it found the existence of the conspiracies charged in the indictment.