Opinion ID: 1119802
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: gates' claims for damages

Text: The superior court granted summary judgment for the city on Gates' claims for damages on the theory of municipal immunity under AS 09.65.070(d)(2) and (3). The city defends this conclusion, saying that both its decision to relocate Gates' fence and any consequences from that decision are immunized from damage claims, even if the decision or the consequences resulted from bad faith. Gates argues there is no municipal immunity in Alaska. Further, she points out that AS 09.65.070(d) does not bar suits for declaratory relief, and argues that hers is such a claim (concerning destruction of an archaeological site). There is no merit to Gates' argument that immunity should not apply because her claim is for declaratory relief. Had she sued for declaratory or injunctive relief to challenge the city action before the fence was moved, that suit would not have been barred by municipal immunity. A suit for damages caused by a municipal decision, however, falls within the provisions of AS 09.65.070(d)(3). Furthermore, Gates is wrong when she says there is no municipal immunity in Alaska. The cases she cites for that proposition, City of Fairbanks v. Schaible, 375 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962), and Scheele v. City of Anchorage, 385 P.2d 582 (Alaska 1963), were decided prior to the addition of sections (d)(2) and (d)(3) to AS 09.65.070. The only question is whether those sections are properly applied to this factual situation. We discussed AS 09.65.070(d)(3) in J & L Diversified Enterprises v. Municipality of Anchorage, 736 P.2d 349 (Alaska 1987). We held that the purpose of the statute is to relieve municipalities from the threat of suits for damages resulting from licensing, permitting, and zoning decisions. Of course, a party threatened with damage from such procedures may sue for injunctive or declaratory relief against the decision, thus protecting the individual's right to relief from a wrongful decision ... and preventing the possibility that the threat of a lawsuit may influence a municipal decision. Id. at 352. Such was not the nature of Gates' suit. We conclude that the city's decision to revoke Gates' permit is immunized under the plain language of AS 09.65.070(d)(3). Thus, summary judgment as to any damage claims resulting from the city's decision to move the fence is affirmed. The city also argues that it is similarly immunized against a suit for any damages resulting from the act of moving the fence, regardless of whether it was performed negligently. The city recognizes the distinction we have drawn between planning and operational decisions in evaluating the exercise of discretion in the sovereign immunity context, and specifically under AS 09.65.070(d)(2). See Urethane Specialties v. City of Valdez, 620 P.2d 683, 687-89 (Alaska 1980). It argues, however, that in this case, its planning decision to relocate the fence and its operational decision as to how to do so are indistinguishable. This argument is not persuasive. No evidence suggests that there is only one way to remove a fence. A decision to order its removal is not equivalent to a decision regarding the removal method employed. While the city's discretionary policy decision to have Gates' fence removed is immunized, any decisions as to how that fence was to be removed are operational, and not protected. If the fence was removed negligently, for example, AS 09.65.070(d)(2) would not immunize the city against a suit for damages caused by that negligence. [4] Gates is not entitled to any damage to the real property where the fence stood or stands, however, regardless of whether the city performed its work negligently. That is because the fence always stood and still stands on the right-of-way owned by Tenakee Springs. Despite Gates' protests as to the legitimacy of the survey, there is no genuine issue of material fact on the question of her property boundaries. The only evidence to contradict the findings of the licensed surveyor is Gates' bare assertion that the fence was on her property. Leaving aside the question of whether this is an issue on which a lay opinion would be sufficient to controvert an expert survey, we affirm the superior court's finding of no issue of material fact because Gates' assertion of ownership was abandoned on appeal. There is, however, a material issue of fact as to how much damage to Gates' property was caused by the method by which the city decided to remove Gates' encroachment. Gates alleges the following seven items of damage to her property: (1) damage to plants, including a rose bush hedge; (2) blockage of entry to her property from Tenakee Avenue; (3) spillage of fuel oil on her property; (4) destruction of a culvert, walkway, and retaining wall; (5) contamination of her property as a result of the placement of a creosote stringer at her gate; (6) removal of her soil, cement, and shovel; and (7) damage to the fence and fence posts. We must therefore remand the case to determine whether any of these alleged damages were the result of negligent removal of Gates' encroachment. [5] The city had argued for summary judgment on Gates' damage claims regardless of municipal immunity because she did not mitigate her damages. It is the universal rule that a wronged party must use reasonable efforts to avoid the consequences of injury done by another. University of Alaska v. Chauvin, 521 P.2d 1234, 1239 (Alaska 1974). A plaintiff's duty to make reasonable efforts to mitigate damages does not extend to subjecting oneself to undue risk and expense, however, and whether efforts were reasonable or potential risk and expense were undue are questions of fact for the trial court. West v. Whitney-Fidalgo Seafoods, 628 P.2d 10, 18 (Alaska 1981).