Opinion ID: 65363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Liability Holding

Text: We review a finding of intentional discrimination in a § 2 vote dilution case for clear error under Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 79 (1986) (applying Rule 52 and stating “[t]he fact that amended § 2 and its legislative history provide legal standards which a court must apply to the facts in order to determine whether § 2 has been violated does not alter the standard of review”); Velasquez v. City of Abilene, 725 F.2d 1017, 1021 (5th Cir. 1984) (“The clearly erroneous standard is applicable in . . . statutory voting dilution cases.”); see also Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 595 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e review the district court’s . . . ultimate findings on vote dilution for clear error.”). This standard dictates that “[i]f the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985); see 14 also FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (stating that a reviewing court “must give due regard to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the witnesses’ credibility”).
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act prohibits a state or political subdivision from employing any “standard, practice, or procedure . . . in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). The statute is violated if “under the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election . . . are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens.” Id. § 1973(b). Episodic practices, such as onesided absentee-ballot counting, constitute a “practice” under § 2. See Welch v. McKenzie, 765 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he statute covers episodic practices, as well as structural barriers, that result in discrimination in voting.”); Goodloe v. Madison County Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 610 F. Supp. 240, 243 (S.D. Miss. 1985) (“Section 2 on its face is broad enough to cover practices which are not permanent structures of the electoral system but nevertheless operate to dilute or diminish the vote of [minorities].”); see, e.g., Toney v. White, 488 F.2d 310, 311–12 (5th Cir. 1973) (affirming that a violation of § 2 occurred when white voters were not purged from absentee voter rolls in conjunction with the zealous purging of the black voter rolls); Brown v. Post, 279 F. Supp. 60, 64–65 (W.D. La. 1968) (holding that defendant electoral officials violated § 2 by soliciting absentee ballots from white voters without making the same opportunity available to black voters). To violate the statute, however, these practices must be undertaken with an intent to discriminate or must produce discriminatory results. See McMillan v. Escambia County, 748 F.2d 1037, 1046 (Former 5th Cir. 1984) (“Moreover, Congress intended that fulfilling either the more restrictive intent test or the results test would be sufficient to show a violation of section 2.”); S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27 (1982) (accompanying the 1982 15 amendments to the Voting Rights Act and stating that “[p]laintiffs must either prove such intent, or, alternatively, must show that the challenged system or practice . . . results in minorities being denied equal access to the political process”); see also Seastrunk v. Burns, 772 F.2d 143, 149 n.15 (5th Cir. 1985) (“Likewise, discriminatory intent of itself will normally render a plan illegal.”). Under the intent-based approach, “[r]acial discrimination need only be one purpose, and not even a primary purpose, of an official act” for a violation to occur. Velasquez, 725 F.2d at 1022. To find discriminatory intent, “‘direct or indirect circumstantial evidence, including the normal inferences to be drawn from the foreseeability of defendant’s actions’” may be considered. McMillan, 748 F.2d at 1047 (quoting S. REP. NO. 97-417, at 27 n.108). The factors set forth in Senate Report No. 97-417, oftentimes referred to as the “Zimmer factors,” supply a source of circumstantial evidence regarding discriminatory intent.10 See McCarty v. Henson, 749 F.2d 1134, 1136 (5th Cir. 1984) (“[T]he existence of the Zimmer factors might be indicative, though not conclusive, of discriminatory purpose.”). Additional circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent may include the impact of an action “bear[ing] more heavily on one race than another,” “the historical background of the decision,” the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged decision,” “[d]epartures from the normal 10 These factors include in pertinent part: b. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is racially polarized;