Opinion ID: 853198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waived Claims

Text: We note that Wentz also presents a blanket claim of inadequate preparation to support his ineffective assistance of counsel argument. However, except for the contentions addressed above, Wentz never explains why the other instances of inadequate preparation he cites satisfy either prong of Strickland. Specifically, Wentz does not explain how his counsel's case preparationadequate or notresulted in prejudice to the outcome of his case. At no point does he make a cogent argument in support of a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of his trial would have been different. Therefore, he has waived appellate review of this claim. Ind.App. R. 46(A)(8); Dye v. State, 717 N.E.2d 5, 13 (Ind.1999). Wentz also contends his counsel was ineffective by failing to make timely objections, allowing the State to ask leading questions, and allowing the State to use exhibits in opening argument and during trial that had not been admitted into evidence. However, Wentz cites the entirety of the record to support these contentions and fails to make any argument as to why these instances constituted deficient representation or how they were prejudicial to the outcome of his case. Therefore, appellate review of these claims is also waived. Id. Wentz contends that his trial counsel elicited damaging testimony from him as well as other defense witnesses. However, Wentz fails to explain why the cited portions of the elicited testimony were damaging. We presume he means that the testimony given, primarily by him and his father, helped establish the fact that Wentz owned a shotgun and BB gun. However, these facts were given in the context of an attempt to establish that Wentz used them for hunting and camping purposes, and that Wentz's plan when he left home on July 25 was to go camping, not to commit murder. Wentz also argues that his testimony established that he committed crimes. However, the cited portions of testimony, though establishing Wentz's role in the commission of some crimes, are largely explanations attempting to limit his role compared to Henson's. In any event, the judgment to, in effect, concede responsibility for lesser offenses in an effort to avoid a murder conviction is not per se deficient representation. Finally, Wentz claims that, during a break in his cross-examination by the State, his counsel told him to change his prior testimony as to when he saw the shotgun taken out of the car at the murder scene. However, he fails to explain how this action prejudiced the outcome of the trial. Our review of Wentz's changed testimony finds only a brief exchange with the prosecutor where Wentz states he wants to clarify earlier testimony. There is no intimation by the prosecutor in the course of that exchange, however, that Wentz had lied. The postconviction court concluded that Wentz failed to meet his burden in claiming that Mr. Wentz changed his account or testified in any manner based on his attorney's suggestions. We agree.