Opinion ID: 417967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The T-Shirt Issue

Text: 6 The Company raises several arguments in support of its claim that it did not violate the Act by forbidding the T-shirts at issue. According to the Company, the wearing of the T-shirts was not a form of protected activity within the meaning of section 7 of the Act. Section 7 guarantees employees the right to self-organization ... and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. The ALJ found that in wearing the T-shirts, the employees had no legitimate or concerted purpose under section 7 because the strike was over and the employees' expression of discontent was made in a manner that can only prolong ill feelings and poor labor relations. The Board specifically disagreed, finding that the T-shirts were intended to promote employee solidarity on a matter of mutual concern to employees. According to the Board, the conclusion of the strike and the signing of a collective bargaining agreement did not render the employees' conduct unprotected. 7 We conclude that even if the T-shirts were intended to promote employee solidarity, the Company did not violate the Act by prohibiting them. There are a number of cases affirming the right of employees to display union insignia or wear apparel proclaiming union support. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 801-03, 65 S.Ct. 982, 987, 89 L.Ed. 1372 (1945). But as the Court made clear in Republic Aviation, the employees' right to display union-related messages, which is part of their right to organize, must be balanced against the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments. Id. at 797-98, 65 S.Ct. at 985; see also NLRB v. Floridan Hotel, Inc., 318 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir.1963). 8 As a general rule, the balance must tip against rules restricting employees' right to wear union-related insignia or attire, unless the employer demonstrates  'special circumstances' showing that such a rule is necessary to maintain production and discipline. Floridan Hotel, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1484, 1486 (1962), enforced, NLRB v. Floridan, supra, 318 F.2d 545. Special circumstances have been found in a variety of situations. See generally Pay'n Save Corp. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.1981) (listing examples of special circumstances); Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 200 N.L.R.B. 667, 670 (1972) (same). In Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. NLRB, 230 F.2d 357, 358-59 (7th Cir.1956), the court ruled that the employer could legitimately ban union buttons bearing the slogan Don't be a Scab, since such buttons could be a disruptive influence on work and discipline. In Davison-Paxon Co. v. NLRB, 462 F.2d 364, 368-69 (5th Cir.1972), a fashionable department store was allowed to prohibit large union campaign buttons because of the store's legitimate concern over the appearance of its sales personnel, and the possibility that the buttons would further disrupt relations between pro-union and anti-union employees. In Southwestern Bell, the Board ruled that the employer could legitimately prohibit employees from wearing sweatshirts bearing the slogan Ma Bell is a Cheap Mother. According to the Board, 9 In view of the controversial nature of the language used and its admitted susceptibility to derisive and profane construction, Respondent could legitimately ban the use of the provocative slogan as a reasonable precaution against discord and bitterness between employees and management, as well as to assure decorum and discipline in the plant. 10 Southwestern Bell, supra, 200 N.L.R.B. at 670. After reviewing much of the relevant case law in this area, the Board concluded: 11 These and other decisions reflect the general rule that when employee conduct exceeds the bounds of legitimate campaign propaganda or is so disrespectful of the employer as seriously to impair the maintenance of discipline, the discipline meted out to the offending employee, even in the drastic form of discharge, does not constitute an unfair labor practice. 12 Id. 13 The T-shirts at issue in this case could not be construed as profane. Nonetheless, as the ALJ found, the T-shirts' message was offensive in that it portrayed, by the cracked logo, that the respondent company was crumbling or disintegrating. We recognize that this is not the only conceivable interpretation of the cracked logo, but the logo could readily be so construed. Thus, even though the T-shirts did not directly comment on the quality of the employer's product, and were therefore not disparaging in the usual sense, see NLRB v. New York University Medical Center, 702 F.2d 284 at 292 (2d Cir.1983), we think that this public utility, which constantly dealt with the public, had a legitimate concern that the T-shirts might improperly suggest to the public that the Company was in some way coming apart. In a somewhat analogous case, an employer ordered two employees not to wear T-shirts bearing the slogan I'm tired of bustin' my ass, not because the employer considered the slogan vulgar, but because it thought the slogan was unfair and inaccurate, and conveyed an improper inference to outsiders. Borman's, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 1023, 1024-25 (1981). The Board held that the employer's action constituted an unfair labor practice, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that the wearing of the T-shirts did not constitute a protected activity. Borman's, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 1138 (6th Cir.1982). Cf. Davison-Paxon Co., supra, 462 F.2d at 368-69 (concern over public appearance of sales personnel in fashionable store legitimate.) There is testimony in the record that a number of the employees suspended for wearing the T-shirts had regular contact with the public while at work, and that many of them were likely to have some contact with the public during the course of the day. 14 In addition, we agree with the ALJ that the circumstances surrounding the decision to ban the T-shirts support the conclusion that the Company did not improperly interfere with the employees' protected union activities. The T-shirts bore no union insignia, but rather the Company's trademark. There was no evidence that the Company was anti-union, or that it made any effort to penalize T-shirt wearers except for the wages lost while they procured alternate apparel. Thus, the six employees who had other clothes with them suffered no penalty at all. Moreover, the T-shirts were first worn three months after the end of a 19-week strike and the signing of a collective bargaining agreement. According to one Company official, the T-shirts were a way of keeping the wounds [from the strike] open. This is particularly accurate, since the shirts referred not just to the last strike, but to two earlier ones as well. The ALJ found that the Company's conduct was legitimately motivated in order to maintain discipline and harmonious employee-management relations, a factor that in other cases has supported a finding that an employer could properly ban union-related attire. See, e.g., Southwestern Bell, supra, 200 N.L.R.B. at 670. Finally, we note that the T-shirts here had the same potential to serve as a constant irritant to management as the sweatshirts worn in Southwestern Bell. See New York University Medical Center, supra, at 290. 15 Considering all of these factors together, we think the employer had a legitimate interest in prohibiting the T-shirts, which outweighed the employees' ill-defined interest at the relevant time in promoting union solidarity in this manner. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Board on this issue. Given our resolution of this question, we need not rule on the Company's contention that the depiction of the company logo on the T-shirts constitutes a trademark infringement.