Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Conduct Further Voir Dire

Text: (3a) Defendant contends that counsel were ineffective for failing to question sufficiently or at all nine potential jurors, including Cazares and Lopez, who were excused for cause  specifically, for what he terms a general opposition to the death penalty. (4) It is fundamental that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show both deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of a different outcome. ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 529 [41 Cal. Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119], citing Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-694, 697-698, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) (3b) Counsel were not ineffective. To be sure, part of the guarantee of a defendant's right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors. [Citations.] ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729 [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 503, 112 S.Ct. 2222].) But each venireperson to whom defendant refers us either made clear that he or she would never vote for death, or gave slightly more ambiguous answers from which the court and counsel could reasonably conclude that his or her ability to follow the law was, at a minimum, substantially impaired. We have already described the testimony of Cazares and Lopez. (See ante, p. 817.) To provide other examples, Josefina Docuyanan flatly testified, I will never vote for a verdict of death, and in answer to the question, Would you automatically vote for a verdict other than first degree [murder] in order to avoid having to worry about the death penalty? Pamela Elofson testified, Yes. Yes, I would. Hence, [n]othing in the record indicates that counsel lacked a plausible, tactical reason for asking these individuals few or no follow-up questions. [Citation.] Indeed, counsel might have determined from the demeanor of these prospective jurors that additional questioning would be futile. Counsel might also have reasonably concluded that any ambiguity in the answers they had already given would be beneficial and would promote retention of pro-life jurors. No constitutional deficiency in counsel's performance on voir dire has been shown. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 587 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142], fns. omitted, affd. sub nom. Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 114 S.Ct. 2630].) In the case of many of the venirepersons to whose examination defendant alludes, questioning by counsel for either party would have been superfluous, for the court effectively elicited the venireperson's opinion. At other times, it was defense counsel who confirmed what was already apparent: the potential juror was opposed to the death penalty and could not vote for it. Thus, even if counsel were deficient for not questioning each potential juror  an unlikely prospect  we cannot conclude that defendant was prejudiced. There is no reasonable probability that the court's rulings would have differed, and hence that the result might have differed, if counsel had questioned the potential jurors at length. Defendant also asserts that the potential jurors were excused solely because they opposed the death penalty. He contends that the exclusion from the guilt phase of jurors categorically opposed to the death penalty deprived him of a jury composed of a representative cross-section of the community, in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We have rejected such claims [citation], as has the United States Supreme Court.... ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 674 [276 Cal. Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278].)