Opinion ID: 2631088
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wright's Interaction with Worwood Was an Investigative Detention Requiring Reasonable Suspicion of Criminality

Text: ¶ 21 The Fourth Amendment allows for three different kinds of police-citizen encounters, each permitting a different degree of intrusion and requiring a different level of justification. (1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime . . .; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense had been committed or is being committed. [22] ¶ 22 Both parties concede that the encounter between Wright and Worwood was at least a seizure, rather than a consensual interaction. Consequently, we focus on the nature of an investigative detention, also known as a level two stop, and the kinds of actions that are justified in the course of such a detention. ¶ 23 Investigative detentions are bound by the Fourth Amendment. [23] Justification for an investigative detention exists when an officer has `reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity.' [24] Reasonable suspicion requires a particularized and objective basis, supported by specific and articulable facts. [25] Courts should evaluate these facts in their totality, rather than looking at each fact in isolation. [26] Although the standard requires more than an `inchoate and unparticularized . . . hunch,' it does not require an officer to rule out innocent conduct or establish the likelihood of criminal conduct to the same degree as required for probable cause. [27] When challenged, the state has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the officer's actions during an investigative detention. [28] ¶ 24 In considering the constitutionality of an investigative detention, we remain mindful of the Supreme Court's two initial justifications for allowing seizures based on reasonable suspicion, rather than on probable cause. First, a detention based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion is justified when the need to prevent imminent criminal activity . . . outweigh[s] the . . . privacy interests implicated by a limited [investigatory] stop. [29] Second, a detention is supposed to involve a `wholly different kind of intrusion upon individual freedom' than a traditional arrest. [30] Because a detention is supposed to be less intrusive than an arrest, we are particularly cognizant of the level of coercion involved, given the suspected crime. [31] These justifications inform our analysis of the permissible boundaries of investigative detentions.
¶ 25 Our analysis of the reasonableness of an officer's actions in the context of an investigative detention requires a dual inquiry. [32] We first consider whether the officer's action was justified at its inception. [33] We next consider whether the length and scope of the detention are `strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. [34] ¶ 26 As to the first inquiry, Wright observed articulable facts that Worwood had been or was about to drive under the influence, which justified his initial stop. He saw a large water spot on the road, a crushed beer can, and later, a cooler. He saw Worwood behind the wheel of his truck. He also smelled alcohol on Worwood's breath. This evidence justified Wright's reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and some intrusion into Worwood's personal liberty.
¶ 27 We next consider the reasonableness of the investigative detention's scope and duration. Because the constitutionality of an investigative detention turns on the interconnection between the purpose of the stop and its subsequent scope, the specific means of detention used by the police in one instance does not create the outer limit for a constitutional investigative detention in every case. [35] ¶ 28 In evaluating the scope of a stop, the court should foremost consider whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly. [36] That being said, officers are not required to use the least intrusive means available in pursuing their investigation; the question is merely whether the police acted unreasonably in failing to . . . pursue alternatives. [37] The reasonableness of a detention should be evaluated on the basis of the totality of the circumstances facing the officer, not on judicial second-guessing. [38] The court should consider whether `the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action,' regardless of the individual officer's state of mind. [39] While an officer's subjective inferences based on the objective facts affect a court's determination of whether reasonable suspicion exists, improper subjective motivations do not negate what would otherwise be a reasonable search based on objectively reasonable facts. [40] ¶ 29 Given the facts of this particular investigative detention, we pause to consider the circumstances under which extending the length of an investigative detention to transport a suspect to another location is justified under reasonable suspicion. An officer's concerns about safety and security can justify extending the scope of an investigative detention. [41] Transporting a suspect to a known crime scene or to the location of a known witness is often justified as the most expeditious means of achieving the purpose of the initial stop. [42] ¶ 30 But transporting a suspect can change the level of coercion involved in an investigative detention to the degree that it is no longer justified under reasonable suspicion. An investigatory detention can become so intrusive that it escalates into a de facto arrest. [43] For instance, moving a suspect from a public place to an enclosed, police-dominated location can change the level of justification required from reasonable suspicion to probable cause. [44] On the other hand, transporting a defendant may be benign when the movement does not change the level of coercion involved in the stop. For example, an investigative detention is not necessarily transformed into a de facto arrest when the suspect is moved a short distance from one public place to another. [45] We agree with the court of appeals' analysis in State v. Chism that [i]nvestigative acts that are not reasonably related to dispelling or resolving the articulated grounds for the stop are permissible only if they do not add to the delay already lawfully experienced and do not represent any further intrusion on the detainee's rights. [46] ¶ 31 While we are cognizant that there may be circumstances when moving a suspect is necessary because of safety and security concerns, such circumstances are not evident in this case. Although the initial encounter occurred on a dirt road, Wright did not indicate that the road conditions prohibited him from conducting field sobriety tests. He made no indication that the grade, pitch, or width of the road created safety concerns that prohibited him from conducting such tests, and we find no objective facts in the record indicating that such a concern would have been reasonable. There is no indication of traffic and no indication that the weather or time of day prevented Wright from accurately conducting the tests. There is no indication that Wright was concerned about his safety, having come upon the situation while off-duty, in his private car, and unarmed. Further, there is no indication that Worwood was belligerent or even uncooperative. Although the record is silent on these potentially determinative factors, had any of them been present, a more expansive detention may have been justified under reasonable suspicion. ¶ 32 Next, Worwood was not detained and transported to expedite the conclusion of the investigatory detention; if anything, Wright's actions prolonged the investigative detention with no justifiable purpose. After ascertaining that Worwood had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes and smelled of alcohol, the next reasonable step to confirm or dispel Wright's suspicions was to conduct field sobriety tests. Instead of taking this step, Wright instructed Worwood to get into Wright's truck, drove him down Deep Canyon, and detained him at Wright's private residence until an on-duty officer arrived to conduct field sobriety tests. These actions were unreasonable because there is no indication in the factual record that Wright was unable to conduct field sobriety tests at the initial scene of the stop. ¶ 33 Finally, the facts of Worwood's detention in their totality push the coercive nature of this detention beyond the narrow bounds of a constitutional investigative detention. Wright's statement to Worwood that we'd better have a trooper look at you before you drive anymore indicates that compliance was mandatory. Worwood was then detained in Wright's vehicle, and his truck was driven away by a stranger  Skylar Fautin  while Worwood remained in Wright's truck. Wright drove Worwood to Wright's personal residence to await the arrival of Officer Kevin Wright. Whether Worwood sat in the back or front of Wright's vehicle and whether Worwood was detained inside or outside of Wright's residence are unknown facts that may also bear on the level of coercion. Had concerns about safety, security, or the need to expedite the investigation justified Wright's movement of Worwood, these unknown facts may have been critical. In this case, however, the fact that Worwood was placed in Wright's truck and moved to Wright's private residence increased the level of coercion without justification. Consequently, we find that Wright's detention of Worwood exceeded the permissible scope of a constitutional investigative detention.
¶ 34 Because Worwood's detention amounted to a de facto arrest, we now consider whether there was probable cause to justify an arrest. Probable cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed. [47] ¶ 35 During the course of the stop, Wright smelled alcohol and observed Worwood's bloodshot eyes and slurred speech. Utah courts generally find that probable cause for DUI exists when slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, and the smell of alcohol are accompanied by failed field sobriety tests. [48] However, in American Fork City v. Singleton, the court of appeals found probable cause for DUI without the benefit of field sobriety tests when the suspect had glassy, bloodshot eyes, swayed when he walked, and became belligerent when asked to take a field sobriety test. [49] But there was more evidence of the suspect's possible drunkenness in Singleton than was present here, including at least one piece of evidence typically garnered from a traditional field sobriety test: unsteady walking. ¶ 36 We conclude that Worwood's bloodshot eyes and slurred speech and the smell of alcohol did not provide sufficient trustworthy information for Wright to conclude that Worwood had exceeded the legal alcohol limit. Consequently, there was no probable cause for Worwood's de facto arrest. Further, concluding otherwise would essentially eliminate any incentive for officers to conduct field sobriety tests, a policy outcome that would introduce needless subjectivity and potential abuse into drunk driving assessments.
¶ 37 Before proceeding to our suppression analysis, we pause to consider the dissent's contention that Worwood's challenge below was so ill-defined that the State could not adequately address his suppression motion. After carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Worwood made and preserved before the trial court the arguments that he later made on appeal. In his initial memorandum in support of his motion to suppress, Worwood established multiple bases for challenging the constitutionality of Wright's stop. First, Worwood argued that Wright's actions constituted a seizure. Second, after reciting the appropriate legal standard and the specific facts surrounding this stop, Worwood argued that the officer lacked sufficient objective facts to constitute reasonable suspicion or probable cause to arrest. Third, Worwood alternatively argued that if the court finds reasonable suspicion, the detention was unreasonable as to scope and length of time. Finally, Worwood argued that he was unconstitutionally arrested because he was taken into custody . . . and not free to leave at the scene of the police encounter. ¶ 38 Throughout its opposition to Worwood's suppression motion, the State never argued that Worwood's federal challenge was vague, incomplete, or lacking requisite specificity. Additionally, at the preliminary hearing on the suppression motion, the State and Worwood had equal opportunity to illicit relevant facts from both Kevin Wright and Korey Wright. We accordingly reject the dissent's suggestion that Worwood's suppression motion was inadequate or that the State viewed it as such. ¶ 39 It has long been the law that once a defendant adequately challenges a warrantless seizure, the State bears the burden of proving the reasonableness of law enforcement's action. In order to meet his initial burden of production, [50] a defendant seeking to suppress evidence must articulate how law enforcement's action infringed the Fourth Amendment. [51] On the basis of our review of the record, we find that Worwood's Fourth Amendment challenge was quite adequate. He clearly challenged the constitutionality of the initial stop, as well as the scope of the stop, and supported that challenge with factual references. ¶ 40 Once a valid constitutional challenge is made, the burden shifts to the State to prove that its warrantless action was justified. [52] And a dearth of evidence cannot be assumed to support the reasonableness of an officer's actions during an investigative detention. Such an assumption turns this well-established proof requirement on its head. The United States Supreme Court has long held that [i]t is the State's burden to demonstrate that the seizure it seeks to justify on the basis of a reasonable suspicion was sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure. [53] Officers, and consequently the state, are burdened by the requirement of reasonableness throughout an investigative detention because of the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures. [54] This burden is not contingent on what specific evidence is challenged in a defendant's suppression motion, but rather on the nature of the constitutional challenge.