Opinion ID: 4311816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: lack of miranda warnings

Text: ¶15 Because he did not receive the Miranda warnings prior to making his confession to police, Mr. Fullerton contends that the district court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the confession. We begin by discussing the relevant standards for determining when a Miranda warning is necessary. Then we turn to whether the district court erred in determining that Mr. Fullerton was not entitled to Miranda warnings, consequentially denying his motion to suppress.
¶16 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Malloy v. Hogan, the United States Supreme Court applied this protection to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment. 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964). ¶17 Two years later, in the landmark case of Miranda v. Arizona, the Court established significant procedural safeguards against self-incrimination for suspects in police custody. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court explained that “the constitutional foundation underlying the privilege” against self-incrimination is an “essential mainstay of our adversary system,” and “require[s] the government ‘to shoulder the entire load’” of producing evidence against a defendant. Id. at 460 (citation omitted). “[T]o respect the inviolability of the human personality,” the government must “produce the evidence . . . by its own independent labors” and may not extract such evidence from a person “by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own mouth.” Id. (citing Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 235–38 (1940)). ¶18 The Court held “that without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.” Id. at 467. In such an environment, “no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice.” Id. at 458. To counteract these pressures and safeguard a suspect’s constitutional protection against self-incrimination, he must be given a Miranda warning prior to any questioning. Id. at 479. That 6 Cite as: 2018 UT 49 Opinion of the Court warning must inform the suspect that “he has the right to remain silent,” “anything he says can be used against him in a court of law,” “he has the right to the presence of an attorney,” and “if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.” Id. ¶19 These Miranda safeguards apply “when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning.” Id. at 478. In 1983, we adopted four factors that we deemed the “most important factors in determining whether an accused who has not been formally arrested is in custody.” Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). These “Carner factors” include “(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the accused; (3) whether objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length and form of interrogation.” Id. ¶20 The district court relied on the Carner factors when analyzing Mr. Fullerton’s motion to suppress. And Mr. Fullerton uses these factors to challenge the district court’s determination that he was in custody. However, the State contests rigid reliance on these factors, arguing that they are out of step with the federal totality of the circumstances standard and urging us to abandon Carner. ¶21 To a certain extent, we agree with the State. The United States Supreme Court has recently made the two-step test for the custody analysis clear. To determine whether a person is in custody for the purposes of Miranda, “the initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of the objective circumstances of the interrogation, a reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 509 (2012) (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). If “an individual’s freedom of movement was curtailed,” the focus turns to “whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.” Id. ¶22 The first part of this inquiry—whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave—requires “examin[ing] all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation” to determine “how a suspect would have gauge[d] his freedom of movement.” Id. (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal 7 STATE v. FULLERTON Opinion of the Court quotation marks omitted). Declining to “demarcate a limited set of relevant circumstances,” the United States Supreme Court requires courts to look at “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, including any circumstance that would have affected how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would perceive his or her freedom to leave.” J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270–71 (2011) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court has also made clear that “the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned are irrelevant.” Id. at 271 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994) (“[T]he initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.”). 4 __________________________________________________________ 4 The State mounts a separate challenge to the second Carner factor, alleging that the factor was completely disavowed by the United States Supreme Court in Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994). The State’s argument overstates the holding in Stansbury. While the Stansbury court did directly consider a challenge to factors identical to the Carner factors, it only rejected the second factor to the extent that the factor required looking at the subjective beliefs of either the individual being interrogated or the officers. Id. at 326 (“[A]ny inquiry into whether the interrogating officers have focused their suspicions upon the individual being questioned (assuming those suspicions remain undisclosed) is not relevant for the purposes of Miranda.” (emphasis added)). But it also emphasized that an officer’s views concerning the nature of an interrogation, or beliefs concerning the potential culpability of the individual being questioned, may be one among many factors that bear upon the assessment whether that individual was in custody, but only if the officer’s views or beliefs were somehow manifested to the individual under interrogation and would have affected how a reasonable person in that position would perceive his or her freedom to leave. Id. at 325. 8 Cite as: 2018 UT 49 Opinion of the Court ¶23 Strict or sole reliance on the Carner factors is inconsistent with the totality of the circumstances analysis prescribed by federal law. While these four factors may, at times, be relevant in a custody analysis, misplaced reliance on these factors can be highly problematic, especially where such reliance leads to conflicts with controlling law. 5 Each of the Carner factors should be considered when relevant, ignored when not, and given appropriate weight according to the circumstances. ¶24 Proper use of the Carner factors requires considering them in conjunction with all other relevant circumstances. As our court of appeals eloquently put it: We . . . consider the Carner factors, as well as any additional factors indicated by the Supreme Court, within the broader contextual picture . . . . And when, as a background matter, a person is subject to extensive, state-imposed restrictions on freedom of movement, the custody analysis should address all of the features of the interrogation, including the manner in which the interrogation [was] conducted. __________________________________________________________ 5 A recent series of cases from this court illustrates this same problem. In State v. Shickles, we demarcated factors that a district court should consider when determining whether evidence should be excluded under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. 760 P.2d 291, 295–96 (Utah 1988), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997). After recognizing that “a number of courts have relied heavily on this list of factors in weighing evidence under rule 403,” we abandoned rigid application of the Shickles factors. State v. Lucero, 2014 UT 15, ¶ 32, 328 P.3d 841, overruled on other grounds by State v. Thornton, 2017 UT 9, 391 P.3d 1016. We acknowledged that “while some of [the Shickles] factors may be helpful in assessing the probative value of the evidence in one context, they may not be helpful in another.” Id. Thus, it is “unnecessary for courts to evaluate each and every factor and balance them together in making their assessment . . . because courts are bound by the text of rule 403, not the limited list of considerations outlined in Shickles.” Id. We do the same thing here—we are de-Shickleizing the Miranda custody analysis. Courts are bound by the totality of the circumstances test, not the Carner factors. 9 STATE v. FULLERTON Opinion of the Court State v. Reigelsperger, 2017 UT App 101, ¶ 47, 400 P.3d 1127 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶25 The Supreme Court recently highlighted some potentially relevant factors to consider, many of which are similar to the Carner factors: “the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (citations omitted). And other Supreme Court cases have highlighted additional circumstances that may be relevant. See, e.g., Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (considering other factors such as whether the police transported the interviewee to the station or required him to arrive at a specific time, whether the police threatened him with arrest, the focus of the questioning, and whether he wanted breaks). ¶26 Therefore, the proper initial step in determining whether an individual is entitled to Miranda warnings must start and end with whether a reasonable person, based on all of the objective circumstances surrounding the interrogation, would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. Because we conclude that Mr. Fullerton would have felt free to leave, the first step of the custody analysis has not been met, we do not consider the second step.
¶27 Having set out the applicable standard for determining whether an individual is in custody for the purposes of Miranda, we turn to the core inquiry here—whether, based on “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” “a reasonable person [in Mr. Fullerton’s position] [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (second alteration in original) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). ¶28 Mr. Fullerton does not present a challenge under the totality of the circumstances. In fact, even though he claims that the Carner factors are controlling, he only discusses two factors. Ultimately, Mr. Fullerton points to three facts that he alleges show that he was in custody and was entitled to receive a Miranda warning: the officers’ focus on him as a suspect, the accusatory nature of the questioning, and Captain Golding’s suggestions that Mr. Fullerton would serve his best interests by cooperating with 10 Cite as: 2018 UT 49 Opinion of the Court the investigation because it would allow the Captain to tell the prosecutor and the judge that Mr. Fullerton told the truth.6 ¶29 The requirement of a Miranda warning is not “imposed simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.” Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). And while the Supreme Court has recognized that “when investigatory questioning shifts to accusatory questioning, the existence of custody is likely because this often indicates to the defendant that he or she is not free to leave,” we have said that even this factor alone is not enough to create custody. State v. Levin, 2006 UT 50, ¶ 36, 144 P.3d 1096; see also Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325 (“Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue, for some suspects are free to come and go until the police decide to make an arrest.”). Additionally, although it may be relevant, reminding a person being interrogated that a judge or prosecutor may take his or her truthfulness into consideration does not automatically equate to a finding of custody by itself. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493, 495 (finding “no indication that the questioning took place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way” even though the officer told the defendant “his truthfulness would possibly be considered by the district attorney or judge”). ¶30 Simply put, Mr. Fullerton’s factual allegations to show custody, on their own, stand on very shaky grounds. When these allegations are considered as part of the totality of the __________________________________________________________ 6 Specifically, Mr. Fullerton points to the following statement by Captain Golding: You’ve got one opportunity to help yourself out of this situation that you’ve gotten yourself into. We know that you’re accountable; we know that you’re responsible. We are just trying to figure out the degree to where you put your hands on that – that baby and caused the injuries that you caused. We know you caused the injuries, but we’re still coming up short on how. Exactly what happened. Additionally, Mr. Fullerton alludes to other, similar statements made during the interview. 11 STATE v. FULLERTON Opinion of the Court circumstances, it becomes clear that a reasonable person in Mr. Fullerton’s position would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. ¶31 At an officer’s request, Mr. Fullerton voluntarily had his father drive him to the police station; and his father waited at the station for him the entire time. Cf. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664 (noting that certain facts weighed against finding the defendant was in custody, including that “[t]he police did not transport [him] to the station or require him to appear at a particular time” and his “parents remained in the lobby during the interview”); State v. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 45, 332 P.3d 937 (“[T]he fact that the interrogation took place in a police car is not dispositive of the custody issue and must be weighed against the defendant’s voluntary choice to enter the car.”). When Mr. Fullerton arrived at the station, he was escorted to an interview room where the door was shut, but, to his knowledge, never locked; he was never placed in handcuffs and no weapons were ever drawn. Cf. id., 2014 UT 29, ¶ 48 (“No handcuffs were used, no guns were drawn, the doors to the car were unlocked, and [the defendant] voluntarily spoke with officers.”). ¶32 Upon his arrival, Mr. Fullerton was assured at least three times that he was not under arrest and was free to leave—and each time he acknowledged the assurance and indicated understanding. 7 Cf. Howes, 565 U.S. at 515 (“[R]espondent was told at the outset of the interrogation, and was reminded again thereafter, that he could leave and go back to his cell whenever he wanted.”); Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495 (recognizing that the defendant “was immediately informed that he was not under arrest” as an “indication that the questioning [did not take] place in a context where respondent’s freedom to depart was restricted in any way”); United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir. __________________________________________________________ 7 To begin the interview, Captain Golding made the following statements to Mr. Fullerton: “I need to make sure you understand a few things, okay? One, you’re not under arrest.”; “You came in here voluntarily. We want to talk to you. You’re free to leave at any time. Do you understand that?”; “So if you tell me you want to walk, that’s okay.”; and “[Y]ou understand you’re free—you know, you’re not in custody, okay?” Mr. Fullerton responded affirmatively to all these statements. 12 Cite as: 2018 UT 49 Opinion of the Court 1990) (“The most obvious and effective means of demonstrating that a suspect has not been taken into custody . . . is for the police to inform the suspect that an arrest is not being made and that the suspect may terminate the interview at will.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 49 (acknowledging the importance of the defendant being “told that he could leave at any time”). 8 ¶33 Over the next ninety minutes, two plain clothes officers took turns questioning Mr. Fullerton, although they were never both in the room at the same time. Cf. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 438 (1984) (“The fact that the detained motorist typically is confronted by only one or at most two policemen further mutes his sense of vulnerability.”); id. (noting that “the aura of authority surrounding an armed, uniformed officer . . . exert[s] some pressure on the detainee to respond to questions”). In fact, they came in and out freely at least nine times during the interview— never locking the door behind them. Initially, the questions were all directed towards Mr. Fullerton helping the officers figure out what happened. Cf. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 664 (“Instead of pressuring [the defendant] with the threat of arrest and prosecution, [the officer] appealed to his interest in telling the truth and being helpful to a police officer.”). At the beginning of the interview, the officers “[thought] the child [was] going to be ok,” and just “need[ed] to figure out what happened.” According to the district court, the officers’ investigation was “still in its early stages” and they “had not yet ruled out any of the other people at the house as possible suspects.” Cf. Fuller, 2014 UT 29, ¶ 48 (noting that the defendant “was not the initial focus of the investigation, as officers learned that [the defendant] may have __________________________________________________________ 8 At least one circuit court has suggested that this factor should be given heightened consideration. In United States v. Czichray, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that repeated assurances of a suspect’s freedom “should not be treated merely as one equal factor in a multi-factor balancing test.” 378 F.3d 822, 826 (8th Cir. 2004). The court also noted that “no governing precedent of the Supreme Court . . . holds that a person was in custody after being clearly advised of his freedom to leave or terminate questioning.” Id. 13 STATE v. FULLERTON Opinion of the Court been involved only after he openly admitted to possessing ‘inappropriate’ material”). ¶34 As the interview went on, it became clear to the officers that Mr. Fullerton was providing them an ever-evolving and inconsistent story. As the district court here noted, the officers did not identify Mr. Fullerton “as ‘a likely criminal culprit’ . . . until [Mr. Fullerton’s] account of the facts became inconsistent.” At that point, the nature of the questions turned more accusatory. But even then, the officers never raised their voices. Moreover, as the district court highlighted, even when the officers suspected that Mr. Fullerton was lying, “the questioning was predominantly couched in terms of obtaining a rational explanation for [N.L.’s] injuries.” ¶35 Although the officers never repeated their reassurances that Mr. Fullerton was free to leave, cf. Howes, 565 U.S. at 515, the officers never contradicted these assurances, nor did Mr. Fullerton make any request to leave or cease the questioning. After admitting that he had “pushed on [N.L.’s] back” and “something cracked,” Mr. Fullerton said, “[b]ut now I’ll probably go to jail and everything else.” Detective Olmstead did not refute this statement; nor did he confirm it. 9 Mr. Fullerton was not formally placed under arrest until the conclusion of the interview. ¶36 Against the backdrop of all of the circumstances of the interview, we conclude that the district court correctly determined that Mr. Fullerton was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. Given the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave, despite being the target of the investigation and on the receiving end of accusatory questions. Therefore, we affirm the district court.