Opinion ID: 362246
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Mail Fraud Indictments

Text: 23 Each of the defendants was convicted on one or more counts of mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. 17 The defendants offer several grounds for challenging their indictments. 18 Their first argument, that federal prosecution of these defendants under the mail fraud statute violates principles of federalism, 19 is without merit. Although the IDPA plays a significant role in the administration of the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, the United States is responsible for fifty percent of the funding, giving the federal government a strong interest in policing the program for fraud. Use of the mail fraud statute for this purpose does not undermine state-federal relationships. Cf. Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811-12, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971). 24 The defendants also argue, however, that the application of the mail fraud statute to the use of the mails charged in the indictments unduly expands the federal criminal jurisdiction conferred by section 1341. Although each of the defendants here on appeal applied in person for AFDC benefits or made representations of eligibility during personal interviews, they received the IDPA warrants through the mail. It is the receipt of the warrants in this manner that forms the basis of the mail fraud indictments. Although the defendants themselves did not send anything through the mail, they nevertheless Caused the mails to be used in violation of section 1341. The causation element of mail fraud requires only the commission of an act with knowledge that the use of the mails will follow in the ordinary course of business, or when the use can reasonably be foreseen, even though not actually intended. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 8-9, 74 S.Ct. 358, 98 L.Ed. 435 (1954). Furthermore, the mailing of the warrants to the defendants was sufficiently related to the scheme to defraud to make the conduct punishable under the statute. The use of the mails need not be an essential element of the scheme to violate section 1341. Pereira v. United States,supra, at 8, 74 S.Ct. 358; United States v. Keane, 522 F.2d 534, 551 (7th Cir. 1975), Cert. denied, 424 U.S. 976, 96 S.Ct. 1481, 47 L.Ed.2d 746 (1976). The defendants' arguments that the alleged scheme might have been accomplished without the mails and that the mailing was merely a matter of convenience for the IDPA are therefore unconvincing. The statute requires only that the mails be used for the purpose of executing the scheme. United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 400, 94 S.Ct. 645, 38 L.Ed.2d 603 (1974); United States v. Craig, 573 F.2d 455, 482 (7th Cir. 1977), Cert. denied,--- U.S. ----, 99 S.Ct. 83, 58 L.Ed.2d 110 (1978). In United States v. Maze, supra, the Supreme Court held that the fruition of a scheme prior to the mailing removed a scheme to defraud from the scope of the mail fraud statute. The defendant in that case had been convicted of mail fraud for use of a stolen credit card to obtain lodgings. The Court noted that the mailings of credit statements at issue were merely for the purpose of adjusting accounts between the motel proprietor, the bank, and the owner of the credit card, and that the defendant's scheme reached fruition when he checked out of the motel. Id. 414 U.S. at 402, 94 S.Ct. 645. In contrast, the mailings at issue in this appeal bore a close relationship to the scheme to defraud: the defendants did not profit from their fraud until they received the IDPA warrants through the mail. See United States v. Keane, supra, at 552. Furthermore, by eliminating a number of inconvenient visits to IDPA offices, the mailing of the warrants made it easier for the defendants to retain full-time employment and decreased the chance that the schemes would be detected. 25 The defendants also argue that the indictments fail to allege a scheme to defraud cognizable under section 1341. They characterize the primary and dominant description of the scheme to defraud as a fiduciary fraud and argue that they owed no fiduciary duty to the alleged victims of the fraud. 20 As a preliminary matter, we must disagree with the defendants' assumption that we can label one part of an indictment as primary and dominant and test the sufficiency of the instrument on the basis of that part. The validity of an indictment is tested by examining the instrument as a whole. Imperial Meat v. United States, 316 F.2d 435 (10th Cir.), Cert. denied, 375 U.S. 820, 84 S.Ct. 57, 11 L.Ed.2d 54 (1963). 26 The fraudulent nature of a scheme should not be measured by a technical standard. Blachly v. United States, 380 F.2d 665, 671 (5th Cir. 1967). The law does not define fraud; it needs no definition; it is as old as falsehood and as versable as human ingenuity. Weiss v. United States,122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir.), Cert. denied, 314 U.S. 687, 62 S.Ct. 300, 86 L.Ed. 550 (1941). The defendants have relied incorrectly on the technicalities of the law of fiduciaries as barring prosecution of the defendants under this indictment. Our reading of the indictments as a whole leads us to conclude without doubt that they describe conduct which fails to match the reflection of moral uprightness, of fundamental honesty, fair play and right dealing in the general . . . life of members of society. United States v. Keane, supra, at 544-45, Quoting Blachly v. United States, supra, at 671. The mail fraud indictments here charge the defendants with making false statements to the government agencies well-knowing at the time that they were false . . ., in order to receive welfare warrants through the mail. The indictments also charge that the defendants cashed the warrants and obtained the proceeds, knowing full well that they were not entitled to receive those benefits. 27 The schemes charged in the indictments are identical to the schemes proved at the trials. The instruments thus served well their purpose to inform the defendants of the proof they would have to rebut at trial. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64, 82 S.Ct. 1038, 8 L.Ed.2d 240 (1962); Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 431, 52 S.Ct. 417, 76 L.Ed. 861 (1932). The only indication that these indictments were insufficient is the government's failure to prove that the citizens of the State of Illinois and the United States were victimized in the manner described in the indictments. Similarly, in the action against the defendant Doris Beverly, the trial court struck the language from the indictment describing these victims and the manner of their injury. 21 Although the failure of the prosecution to prove the conduct charged in the indictment may often constitute an amendment of the indictment in violation of the Fifth Amendment, Russell v. United States, supra, 369 U.S. at 770, 82 S.Ct. 1038, it is well-settled that not every change in the indictment has this effect. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 47 S.Ct. 531, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927); Salinger v. United States, 272 U.S. 542, 47 S.Ct. 173, 71 L.Ed. 398 (1926); United States v. Craig, supra; United States v. Spector, 326 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1963). The scheme alleged in the indictments remained exactly the same after the alleged amendments, and the striking did not burden the charges contained in the indictment. See United States v. Craig, supra, at 491; United States v. Spector, supra, at 347. The government could not or did not prove that the citizens of Illinois and the United States were victims of the fraud alleged in the indictments, and the striking of these victims from the indictment for failure of proof was not improper. Salinger v. United States, supra, 272 U.S. at 491, 47 S.Ct. 173; United States v. Prior, 546 F.2d 1254, 1257 (5th Cir. 1977).