Opinion ID: 2598683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: the right to keep and bear arms is absolute within the scope of article i, section 24

Text: Appropriate constitutional analysis begins with the text and, for most purposes, should end there as well.[ [4] ] The right to keep and bear arms has long been recognized by the common law as essential to enable individuals to resist tyranny and defend themselves. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES . Discussing the rights of persons, Blackstone noted the right to keep and bear arms is a natural right of resistance and self-preservation when the sanctions of society and law are found insufficient to restrain the violence of oppression. Id. Likewise, the English Bill of Rights declares that subjects of the Crown may have arms for their defense suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law. THE ENGLISH BILL OF RIGHTS 1689 in 6 The STATUTES OF THE REALM (1225-1713) at 142-45 (1810) (orig. prtg. in Gr. Brit. by King George III) (facsim. located in Historical Collection at Gallagher Law Library, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law). In modern days, the right is among those guaranteed in numerous state declarations of rights, although the nature and scope of that right varies from state to state. [5] Unfortunately, the right has effectively been relegated to second-class constitutional status in the eyes of some errant jurists who seemingly prefer to impose their own social and political views, considering the right to keep and bear arms not deserving of the same protection as, say, the freedom of speech or the right against self-incrimination. See generally David B. Kopel et al., A Tale of Three Cities: The Right to Bear Arms in State Supreme Courts, 68 TEMP. L.REV. 1177 (1995) (critically analyzing three state constitutional decisions and concluding they were based on the courts' disfavor of the right to bear arms and view of that right as one not entitled to the same judicial protection as other constitutional rights). Notwithstanding, the right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Washington Constitution is express, mandatory, and absolute within its scope: The right of the individual citizen to bear arms in defense of himself, or the state, shall not be impaired, but nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men. Const. art. I, § 24 (emphasis added). Without doubt, this provision confers upon our fellow citizens the individual right to keep and bear arms. [6] Although we have noted the right secured in our state constitution may be broader than that provided by the second amendment to the United States Constitution, we have yet to determine the outer limits of this provision. See City of Seattle v. Montana, 129 Wash.2d 583, 594, 919 P.2d 1218 (1996); State v. Rupe, 101 Wash.2d 664, 706, 683 P.2d 571 (1984). Cf. Md. Const. Declaration of Rights art. 28; 79 Op. Maryland Att'y Gen. (Feb. 25, 1994). Yet there is no doubt each citizen enjoys equal privilege to the right guaranteed by this provision. Const. art. I, § 12; see W.J. Meyers, The Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States, 1 MICH L.REV. 286, 290-94 (1903). Equally clear is that the scope of this individual right is qualified by textual exceptions. First, the right exists only in the context of an individual's defense of himself, or the state. Const. art. I, § 24. Second, the right does not authorize individuals or corporations to organize, maintain or employ an armed body of men. Id. Not only do these textual qualifications limit the scope of the right to bear arms, but they also prove the general rule by enumerating an explicit list of exceptions expressio unius est exclusio alterius the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other. State v. Brown, 139 Wash.2d 20, 33, 983 P.2d 608 (1999); State v. Sommerville, 111 Wash.2d 524, 535, 760 P.2d 932 (1988). Accordingly, the inclusion of the two textual limitations in article I, section 24, demonstrates there is no basis to infer any other exception, certainly not one based on the State's so-called police power. This is a crucial, yet often overlooked, distinction between article I, section 24 and corresponding provisions in many other constitutions. Cf., e.g., Ill. Const. art. I, § 22 (Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.); Ga. Const. art. I, § 1, para. VIII (The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed, but the General Assembly shall have the power to prescribe the manner in which arms may be borne.); Tex. Const. art. I, § 23 (Every citizen shall have the right to keep and bear arms in the lawful defense of himself or the State; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms, with a view to prevent crime.); Utah Const. art. I, § 6 (The individual right of the people to keep and bear arms for security and defense of self, family, others, property, or the state, as well as for other lawful purposes shall not be infringed; but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from defining the lawful use of arms.). In Washington it is the police power which is subject to all of the rights specified in our Declaration of Rights, including the constitutional right of the individual citizen to keep and bear arms. Notwithstanding, courts in the relatively recent past have suggested precisely the opposite by positing without meaningful analysis this civil liberty is subject to reasonable regulation by the state under its so-called police power. See, e.g., Rupe, 101 Wash.2d at 707 n. 9, 683 P.2d 571; State v. Spencer, 75 Wash.App. 118, 122, 876 P.2d 939 (1994); Sabala, 44 Wash.App. at 449, 723 P.2d 5 (citing Rupe ); Johnson, 94 Wash.App. at 892, 974 P.2d 855 (same); Taylor, 74 Wash.App. at 124, 872 P.2d 53 (same). The origin of this heresy seems to be the 1945 decision in State v. Krantz, 24 Wash.2d 350, 353, 164 P.2d 453 (1945). See also Rupe, 101 Wash.2d at 707 n. 9, 683 P.2d 571. Krantz upheld the uniform short firearms act against a challenge under article I, section 24, opining that statute was a reasonable exercise of the State's police power. Krantz asserted [i]t has long been recognized that this constitutional guarantee is subject to reasonable regulation by the state under its police power. Krantz, 24 Wash.2d at 353, 164 P.2d 453 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 59 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed. 1206 (1939); English v. State, 35 Tex. 473, 1872 WL 7422 (1872); Pierce v. State, 42 Okla.Crim. 272, 275 P. 393 (1929); People v. Persce, 204 N.Y. 397, 97 N.E. 877 (1912); Hill v. State, 53 Ga. 472, 1874 WL 3112 (1874); Page v. State, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 198 (1871)). It is now time to critically reevaluate that overly broad assertion. Notably, each of the cases relied on by Krantz was based on constitutional provisions far different from article I, section 24, in terms of the interplay between the right to keep and bear arms and the State's police power. Miller, English, and Persce all involved challenges under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 176, 59 S.Ct. 816; English, 35 Tex. 473, 1872 WL 7422 at ; Persce, 97 N.E. at 879. In contrast to article I, section 24, of the Washington Constitution, which guarantees Washington citizens an individual right to keep and bear arms, the Second Amendment is often claimed to grant only a collective right, as its text suggests: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed. U.S. Const. amend. II. See Hickman v. Block, 81 F.3d 98, 102 (9th Cir.1996). See also supra at p. 645 n. 6. Moreover, the Second Amendment was originally a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon that of the States. Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265, 6 S.Ct. 580, 584, 29 L.Ed. 615 (1886). Pierce involved a challenge to an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the carrying of firearms under article II, section 26, of the Oklahoma Constitution. Pierce, 275 P. at 394. Unlike article I, section 24, of the Washington Constitution, the constitutional provision at issue in Pierce expressly provides for regulation of firearms by the legislature: The right of a citizen to keep and bear arms in defense of his home, person, or property, or in aid of the civil power, when thereunto legally summoned, shall never be prohibited; but nothing herein contained shall prevent the Legislature from regulating the carrying of weapons. Okla. Const. art. II, § 26. Similarly, Page involved a challenge under article I, section 26, of the Tennessee Constitution, which also expressly allows the legislature to regulate how firearms may be borne: That the citizens of this State have a right to keep and to bear arms for their common defense; but the Legislature shall have power, by law, to regulate the wearing of arms with a view to prevent crime. Tenn. Const. art. I, § 26. [7] Lastly, Hill was based on article I, section 14, of the Georgia Constitution of 1868, which spoke in language very similar to that of the Second Amendment: A well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; but the general assembly shall have power to prescribe by law the manner in which arms may be borne. Hill, 53 Ga. 472, 1874 WL 3112, at . The Georgia provision not only expressly subjects the right to bear arms to the legislature's regulatory powers; it also seems to provide for a collective rather than individual right to keep and bear arms, unlike article I, section 24, of our constitution. Our constitutional guaranty of the individual right to keep and bear arms contains no textual qualification subjugating that right to police power regulations. See supra at pp. 646-647. And we must be ever mindful that we are not at liberty to disregard this text as [t]he provisions of this Constitution are mandatory, unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise. Wash. Const. art. I, § 29. Moreover, as previously stated, the mandatory provision in article I, section 24 is strengthened, not defeated, by the two textual exceptions to the otherwise absolute right to keep and bear arms, which by implication permit no other unmentioned restrictions on, or exceptions to, the otherwise absolute right to keep and bear arms. Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Puget Sound L.Rev. 491, 509-10 (1983) (the express mention of one thing in a constitution implies the exclusion of things not mentioned). Article I, section 24, obviously is not subservient to the State's police power by its text. Krantz fails to honor that text, wherefore it is erroneous, harmful, and destructive to our civil liberties. Moreover, Krantz is inconsistent with the very structure of liberty secured by our Declaration of Rights by its claim that any of our declared civil liberties are ever subject to the police power.
OUR DECLARATION OF RIGHTS ENUMERATES EXCEPTIONS TO OTHERWISE LEGITIMATE GOVERNMENT ACTIONS, INCLUDING POLICE POWER ACTIONS A proper resolution of this case also requires an accurate understanding of the constitutional nature of our state government and the structural role of our Declaration of Rights with respect thereto. As originally expressed by Alexander Hamilton when advocating adoption of the federal constitution absent a national Bill of Rights, a declaration of rights serves only one function: to delineate exceptions to otherwise legitimate exercises of governmental powers. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Books 1982). I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and in the extent in which they are contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed constitution, but would even be dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers which are not granted: and on this very account, would afford a colourable pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why for instance, should it be said, that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be imposed? Id. (emphasis added). Clearly, in the view of the founders, the very purpose of a declaration of rights is to except from the reach of government any power to abridge the rights secured thereby. If the rights guaranteed by a declaration of rights are not exceptions to governmental power, including the police power, those rights are illusory because the government has no power to exceed its legitimate functions in any event. By its nature and placement then, article I, section 24, as any other civil liberty enumerated in our Declaration of Rights, is meaningful only to the extent it sets forth an exception to an otherwise legitimate exercise of power by our state government. Open Door Baptist Church v. Clark County, 140 Wash.2d 143, 178-79 & n. 3, 995 P.2d 33 (2000) (Sanders, J., dissenting). The origin and development of former RCW 9.94A.125 shows this statute, if properly construed, is indeed not only a legitimate exercise of the State's police power but outside the article I, section 24, exception thereto. The deadly weapon enhancement statute was enacted and repeatedly amended out of a desire to protect the public from those who would use firearms not in defense of themselves or the State, but to violate the rights of others. The stated purpose expressed in I-159 clearly evidences this intent. It was enacted to: (a) Stigmatize the carrying and use of any deadly weapon for all felonies with proper deadly weapon enhancements. (b) Reduce the number of armed offenders by making the carrying and use of the deadly weapon not worth the sentence received upon conviction. (c) Distinguish between the gun predators and criminals carrying other deadly weapons and provide greatly increased penalties for gun predators and for those offenders committing crimes to acquire firearms. Laws of 1995, ch. 129, § 1(2). See also RCW 9.94A.010(4). Cf. Markham Advert. Co. v. State, 73 Wash.2d 405, 421-22, 439 P.2d 248 (1968) (noting the State may exercise its police power to `prescribe laws tending to promote the health, peace, morals, education, good order and welfare of the people' (quoting Shea v. Olson, 185 Wash. 143, 153, 53 P.2d 615 (1936))). Properly construed former RCW 9.94A.125 is consistent with Schelin's right to keep and bear arms as defined by article I, section 24, because that civil liberty is limited to defensive uses and does not protect the commission of armed crime. But here the State attempts to apply the statute against mere possession of a firearm. Even the State conceded at oral argument that it was simply unable to reconcile its proposed application of the statute to the text of article I, section 24. Audio tape 1 of 1: Wash. State Supreme Court oral argument, State v. Schelin, No. 70710-3 (Sept. 25, 2001) (on file with clerk's office) (conceding, in response to a question from the bench on how to reconcile the State's position with the plain language of the constitution, that the State does not have a reconciliation at this point). That should end the matter.