Opinion ID: 874279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: This Court affirms the district court's award of attorney fees and costs and awards attorney fees and costs on appeal.

Text: The district court required the Board to pay attorney fees to the Gardiners under I.C. § 12-117(1). Idaho Code § 12-117(1) provides: Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. The Board claims that the award of attorney fees was unwarranted. The Board cites Ralph Naylor Farms v. Latah County, 144 Idaho 806, 172 P.3d 1081 (2007), Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n v. Bd. of Com'rs of Valley Cty., 132 Idaho 551, 976 P.2d 477 (1999), and Idaho Potato Comm'n v. Russet Valley Produce, 127 Idaho 654, 904 P.2d 566 (1995), to demonstrate that even if it was improper for the Board to grant a special use permit, the ruling of the Board was reasonable. The Gardiners argue that Chapter 7, Section 1(E) conflicts with the unambiguous meaning of I.C. § 67-6512(a), and in light of its clear meaning, the Board's interpretation was unreasonable. This Court exercises free review over a district court's application of I.C. § 12-117. Fischer v. City of Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 352, 109 P.3d 1091, 1094 (2005). The prevailing party is entitled to attorney fees under I.C. § 12-117 if they show that the state agency `acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law.' Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand & Gravel, 140 Idaho 115, 118, 90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004). This Court affirms the award of attorney fees by the district court. This case is similar to Lane Ranch P'ship v. City of Sun Valley, 145 Idaho 87, 88-91, 175 P.3d 776, 778-80 (2007), and Fischer, 141 Idaho at 356, 109 P.3d at 1098, because in both cases an agency ignored the plain and unambiguous language of a statute or ordinance, which led to the award of attorney fees. Likewise, the grant of attorney fees to the Gardiners is affirmed because the Board acted contrary to an unambiguous state statute and a local ordinance. In addition, the cases cited by the Board can be differentiated. In each case cited by the Board, this Court held that even though the respective boards' application of a state statute or local ordinance was erroneous, the board did not act without a reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Potato Comm'n, 127 Idaho at 661, 904 P.2d at 573; Payette River Prop. Owners Ass'n, 132 Idaho at 556-7, 976 P.2d at 482-83; Ralph Naylor Farms, 144 Idaho at 810-11, 172 P.3d at 1085-86. Idaho Code § 67-6512(a), however, is clear on its facea special use permit may only be granted if the use is prescribed in advance by the ordinance under which the special use permit was granted. Furthermore, when considering whether the operation of a gravel pit qualifies as a conditional use, as discussed in Section I[B], the definition of commercial is clearly expressed, leaving no room for ambiguity.