Opinion ID: 2338449
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mitchell/Gallmeyer True Necessity Standard Is Flexibly Applied.

Text: We now consider the State's argument that the court of appeals misapplied the Mitchell standard's first prong in Gallmeyer. The State focuses on Gallmeyer 's true necessity requirement as a part of the Mitchell standard's first prong, arguing [t]he court of appeals erred in requiring the [S]tate to establish `true necessity' in order to justify the entry. Gibson responds that `[t]rue necessity' . . . serves merely to define the term `emergency' and is in accord with this court's prior decisions. The State replies if true necessity defines emergency, the definition requires proof of a greater emergency than this court required in Stevens and its progeny. The term true necessity, in the context of the emergency aid exception, originated in People v. Smith , a 1972 case in which the California Supreme Court held a police officer's entry into an apartment was unconstitutional under both the United States and California Constitutions. [106] In concluding the search did not fall under the Fourth Amendment's emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement, the California court stated: [T]he [emergency aid] exception must not be permitted to swallow the rule: in the absence of a showing of true necessitythat is, an imminent and substantial threat to life, health, or propertythe constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy must prevail. [107] Smith 's true necessity language first appeared in Alaska case law as a footnote to Justice Boochever's Schraff concurrence. [108] Several years later, in Myers, we cited a law review article for the parenthetical proposition that `emergency aid' ordinarily requires `true necessity [] that is, an imminent and substantial threat to life, health or property.' [109] We reiterate that invocation of the emergency aid doctrine requires only that the police have objectively reasonable grounds to believe an emergency at hand creates an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property. We also reiterate that this standard does not require the existence of an emergency in fact: [T]he criterion is the [objective] reasonableness of the belief . . . as to the existence of an emergency, not the existence of an emergency in fact. [110] Gallmeyer 's true necessity language does not alter these fundamental propositions. We believe the true necessity language simply emphasizes the Gallmeyer court's recognition that different balancing of interests must arise in different factual settings: [I]n determining necessity, the probability and potential seriousness of the threatened harm must be viewed objectively and balanced against the extent to which police conduct results in a violation of privacy interests. [111] As noted above, the true necessity language first appeared in Justice Boochever's Schraff concurrence; in that case the police encountered an individual sufficiently incapacitated to justify concern for his physical safety. [112] Validity of the officers' actions turned on whether the officers had a reasonable belief a wallet search was necessary to alleviate the perceived emergency. [113] The court concluded Schraff was not so incapacitated that an emergency justifying a wallet search could be objectively seen from the circumstances. [114] In that narrow factual context, true necessityas the court of appeals used that term in Gallmeyer was lacking. But, as discussed below, where a perceived emergency's circumstances are far more undefined and the potential harm is more serious, a more liberal view of true necessity than the court of appeals used in this case must be invoked to allow the police to fulfill their duties to the public. We therefore agree with both parties to some extent. Gibson is correct that true necessity is a part of the first prong inquiry whether objectively reasonable grounds support a belief an emergency exists. But as discussed below in the context of this case, the State is also correct that the concept of true necessity does not in every case require those objectively reasonable grounds to be based on probabilities rather than possibilities. Application of the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement cannot be evaluated with across-the-board, rigid, and formalistic standards; it is a flexible doctrine that, as the court of appeals noted in Gallmeyer, must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, balancing the competing interests in light of the actual facts, perceived dangers, and circumstances encountered by police.