Opinion ID: 1196919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Our Remand for Resentencing

Text: Pepper first argues [t]he scope of the remand and law of the case from Pepper II and Pepper III required [the district court] to reduce Pepper's advisory [Guidelines] range by at least 40% pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. The government disagrees and contends the law of the case doctrine does not apply because our court did not place any limitation upon the district court's discretion in resentencing Pepper. On remand for resentencing, all issues decided by the appellate court become the law of the case, and the sentencing court is bound to proceed within the scope of any limitations imposed ... by the appellate court. United States v. Curtis, 336 F.3d 666, 669 (8th Cir.2003) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Under the law of the case doctrine, a district court must follow our mandate, and we retain the authority to decide whether the district court scrupulously and fully carried out our mandate's terms. Jaramillo v. Burkhart, 59 F.3d 78, 80 (8th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). Ultimately, the scope of a remand must be determined by reference to the analysis contained in the opinion. United States v. Kendall, 475 F.3d 961, 964 (8th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Santonelli, 128 F.3d 1233, 1237 (8th Cir.1997)). When we decide to remand a case for resentencing, we have two options: (1) we may remand the case with instructions limiting the scope of the district court's discretion, or (2) we may remand without placing any limitations on the district court's discretion. See id. at 964. We used the following remand language in the conclusion of Pepper III: For the foregoing reasons, we again reverse and remand Pepper's case for resentencing consistent with this opinion. As the district court expressed a reluctance to resentence Pepper again should the case be remanded, we again remand this case for resentencing by a different judge. Pepper III, 518 F.3d at 953. Pepper III 's remand language is nearly identical to the remand language in Pepper II. See Pepper II, 486 F.3d at 413 (For the reasons stated, we reverse and remand this case for resentencing consistent with this opinion. The district court expressed a reluctance to resentence Pepper again should this case be remanded. Thus, we remand Pepper's case for re-sentencing by a different judge.). In the district court's Remand Order, which was reaffirmed by the district court in the Sentencing Order, the district court explained, The only specific restrictions on the court's decision on remand were (1) the second resentencing hearing should take place before a different judge and (2) such judge's decision should be `consistent with [ Pepper II ].' The district court observed that while our court indicated that a 40% downward departure was not an abuse of discretion[,] we did not hold that a 40% downward departure [wa]s the only reasonable outcome for [Pepper] or that the [district] court must impose a 40% downward departure on remand pursuant to U.S.S.G § 5K1.1. We agree with the reasoning of the district court. Our remand was a general remand for resentencing. Our opinions in Pepper II and Pepper III did not place any limitations on the discretion of the newly assigned district court judge in resentencing Pepper. We did not specify the district court's discretion would be restricted to considering whether a downward variance was warranted, nor did we specify the district court would be bound by the 40% downward departure previously granted. We concluded a 40% downward departure was not an abuse of discretion. In other words, a 40% downward departure was within the range of reasonableness. [2] Under the circumstances of Pepper's case, a complete resentencing without any restrictions on the district court's discretion was preferable, in contrast to a partial, piecemeal resentencing limiting the sentencing judge's discretion. We conclude neither the scope of our remand, nor the law of the case doctrine, required the district court to grant Pepper a 40% downward departure for substantial assistance.