Opinion ID: 1129838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: exclusion of jurors opposing the death penalty

Text: The prosecutor was permitted to successfully challenge for cause those jurors who said that they were opposed to the death penalty and who said further that their opposition to the penalty would prevent them from voting for that penalty in any case. [26] Eloquent and vigorous argument is made by the defendants that excluding persons who are opposed to the death penalty results in the exclusion of many of the more enlightened members of society and thus denies to the defendants a jury composed of a cross-section of society. We need not discuss this argument further than to say that it has recently been considered by the United States Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra , and there approved to this extent: The court held that a jury is improperly constituted if the court has excluded therefrom veniremen who are opposed to the death penalty but who can say that, in spite of their opposition, they could, in a proper case, impose the death penalty. The state statute under consideration in that case provided that any juror opposed to the death penalty could be challenged for cause. In its footnote 21, in Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra , the court said: We repeat, however, that nothing we say today bears upon the power of a State to execute a defendant sentenced to death by a jury from which the only veniremen who were in fact excluded for cause were those who made unmistakably clear (1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt. (p. 522) In the case before us, the six veniremen who were excluded were questioned specifically on these two matters. They all answered in the affirmative to the first question and in the negative to the second. The applicable statute in this state is RCW 10.49.050, providing: No person whose opinions are such as to preclude him from finding any defendant guilty of an offense punishable with death shall be compelled or allowed to serve as a juror on the trial of any indictment or information for such an offense. This statute was adopted in its present amended form in 1891 (Laws of 1891, ch. 28, § 67, p. 59) at which time the penalty for murder in the first degree was a mandatory death penalty, subject to the Governor's power of commutation. [27] It is apparent that this statute is not open to the objection successfully launched against the Illinois statute; that is, today it does not provide for the automatic exclusion of veniremen opposed to the death penalty, but only those whose opposition renders them unwilling in any case to find the defendant guilty. Also, the proceedings in the selection of the jury were in accord with the requirements laid down in the Witherspoon case. The defendants argue, however, that the Washington statute does not authorize a challenge for cause unless the prospective juror's opposition to the death penalty will preclude him from finding the defendant guilty. A literal reading of the statute will lead to this conclusion. However, it must be remembered that when the statute was enacted, a finding of guilty automatically resulted in the death penalty. Now, the jury returns separate verdicts on guilt and punishment, and, as the questioning of the veniremen in this case amply illustrates, an individual's opposition to capital punishment need not affect his verdict on the question of guilt. He may in good conscience find the defendant guilty, even though his conscience will not permit him to vote for the death penalty. Since the statute has not been repealed, although the first degree murder statute has been amended so as to allow the jury discretion in imposing the sentence, it can now have logical application only to the venireman's ability to vote for the death penalty. We indicated our approval of such an interpretation in State v. Aiken, 72 Wn.2d 306, 434 P.2d 10 (1967). [28] But, even assuming that the defendants are correct in their interpretation of this statute, the trial court nevertheless had discretion to sustain the prosecution's challenges for cause, under the provisions of RCW 10.49.040, which reads: Challenges for cause shall be allowed for such cause as the court may, in its discretion, deem sufficient, having reference to the causes of challenge prescribed in civil cases, as far as they may be applicable, and to the substantial rights of the defendant. Among the causes for challenge in civil actions is [A] state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the action, or to either party, which satisfies the trier in the exercise of a sound discretion, that he cannot try the issue impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging, .... (RCW 4.44.170; CR 47(e)(5).) As we indicated in State v. Aiken, supra , a juror whose opposition to the death penalty is such that he could never impose it cannot try the case impartially and without prejudice to the substantial right of the state to have the state exercise the discretion vested in it by law. Although we appreciate the earnestness with which counsel contend that a juror whose conscience will not allow him to vote for the death penalty is in fact exercising his discretion, we cannot accept their logic. A person whose mind has already settled one of the issues to be presented to him in the trial, before the trial begins, is in no position to exercise any discretion at all, much less a sound discretion. He cannot consider and evaluate the evidence, he cannot weigh conflicting factors, and he cannot consider and evaluate the opinions of his fellow jurors. A juror whose mind is made up for the very commendable reason that he is opposed to the taking of a life by society is no more able to exercise discretion on the question of penalty than is one whose mind is made up in advance that he will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case involving first degree murder, absent a showing of legal insanity. Just such a juror as the latter was successfully challenged in this case, and the defendants make no contention that he should have been allowed to serve, as a representative of that portion of society which is unalterably in favor of the death penalty. We conclude that the trial court did not err in sustaining the prosecutor's challenges for cause, based on the assertion by prospective jurors that they could not in any event vote to impose the death penalty.