Opinion ID: 1498211
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The court erred in its instructions to the jury.

Text: The only instruction to which exception was taken by the appellants in the court below and which is now being pressed before us, was the following: While I have not commented on the evidence, there is just one question before the jury as I said, a question of fact  the approximately 260,000 points, did they come from an unlawful acquisition or did they receive them in accordance with, you might say, the testimony of the defendants, or was there an unlawful acquisition? The appellants maintain that this instruction in view of the evidence, prejudiced the jury in that the Government had totally failed to prove that the defendants or either of them had anything to do with the bank deposits, but on the contrary had proven affirmatively that neither of them had anything to do with the bank deposits. As we have heretofore endeavored to show, the presence of a terrific number of counterfeit ration stamps in the bank deposits of the Hollywood Ranch Market, owned and controlled by the appellants, taken in connection with the testimony of Jones and Becker that the appellants purchased those stamps, was a circumstance that could be taken into consideration by the jury. There was no error in the instruction of which the appellants complain. The appellants in their main brief urge several objections to the court's instructions, although no exceptions to such instructions were saved in the court below. Furthermore, in their reply brief, they object to several additional instructions, as to which they admit that no exceptions were taken. They insist, however, that this court should on its own motion notice instructions which are so erroneous as to constitute a denial of justice. In our view, the court gave no instructions, whether excepted to or not, that were so erroneous as to afford grounds for reversal. While in some instances the court, in an endeavor to meet counsel's captious criticisms, restated with less clarity certain propositions of law that had previously been unexceptionably expounded, we believe that the jury understood the court's meaning and were in no way misled by any imperfections of phraseology. It has long been the settled rule in Federal courts that an instruction by the court must be excepted to before the case is submitted to the jury in order to be availed of on appeal. This is no merely technical requirement, but is founded upon reason, justice and expediency. If the error is seasonably called to the court's attention, the court can correct it forthwith and thus obviate the necessity of a new trial. Tucker v. United States, 151 U.S. 164, 170, 14 S.Ct. 299, 38 L.Ed. 112; St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 153, 14 S.Ct. 1002, 38 L.Ed. 936; Lindsay v. Burgess, 156 U.S. 208, 210, 15 S.Ct. 355, 39 L.Ed. 399; Howland v. Beck, 9 Cir., 56 F.2d 35, 37; Brevard Tannin Co. v. J. F. Mosser Co., 4 Cir., 288 F. 725, 730; Meadows v. United States, 4 Cir., 144 F.2d 751, 753. We have carefully examined the judge's charge in its entirety, and have found in it no reversible error. In this connection, it should be noted that more than one-half of the appellants' reply brief is taken up with a criticism of the court's instructions that were not referred to in its opening brief or in the appellee's brief. The pretext for this departure from the standards of good brief-writing is that the appellee's contention that appellants have not sufficiently specified the erroneous instructions is without merit. Though no page reference to the appellee's brief is given, we assume that the appellants refer to the appellee's discussion of a single instruction dealing with the necessity of a transfer of food for the acquisition of ration stamps. That instruction in reality was part of the instruction already considered hereinabove, being given during a colloquy with counsel. Such discussion by the appellee did not open the door to the criticisms of other instructions. New material does not belong in a reply brief. Its introduction violates the spirit if not the letter of our Rule 22, which provides that, in oral arguments, a fair opening of the case shall be made by the party having the opening and closing argument. Certainly the use of new material in a reply brief transgresses against the canons of fair forensics. 9. The evidence is insufficient to sustain every material element of the offenses for which the appellants were convicted and therefore the verdict was contrary to law and the facts. 10. The evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict of guilty against Nathan Gilbert on Counts Nine, Ten and Eleven, or on any of said counts. 11. The evidence is insufficient to justify the verdict against William Fredrick on Counts Nine, Ten and Eleven, or on any of said counts. These three factual counts can be considered jointly  and briefly. We have already given a careful summary of all the salient evidence adduced by the appellee. We need not rehearse it again. An examination of our summary will show that each of the appellants either personally committed acts that culminated in the purchase of stamps from Becker, or aided his partner in doing so. Many of the stamps thus purchased were counterfeit. A large number of counterfeit stamps found their way into the appellants' bank deposits. There was enough evidence to go to the jury.