Opinion ID: 3063901
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Acuna’s Sentence

Text: The jury found that Acuna committed numerous predicate acts as part of a pattern of racketeering activity, including several acts of gambling, conspiracy to murder and the murder of Ernesto Torres, and conspiracy to murder Idalia Fernandez. On appeal, Acuna argues that his life sentence is unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, because the court failed to account adequately for his age, poor health, and low likelihood of recidivism. “We review the sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness.” 30 United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 785 (11th Cir. 2005). Reasonableness review requires that the appellate court review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, __ U.S. __, 128 S.Ct. 586, 594, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). As the Supreme Court recently instructed, we: must first ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range. Id., ___ U.S. ___ , 128 S.Ct. at 597. In providing a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed, the district court “[s]hould set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita v. United States, __ U.S. ____ , 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2468, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). If the district court’s decision is procedurally sound, our analysis then turns to the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. See Gall, ___ U.S. at ___, 128 S.Ct. at 597. “In reviewing the ultimate sentence imposed by the district court for reasonableness, we consider the final sentence, in its entirety, in light of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Thomas, 446 F.3d 1348, 1351 (11th Cir. 2006). The § 3553 (a) factors include: 31 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide restitution to victims. Talley, 431 F.3d at 786 (summarizing 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)). However, “nothing in Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005). Instead, an explicit acknowledgment that the district court has considered the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553 (a) factors will suffice. Id. at 1329-30. “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of both [the] record and the factors in section 3553(a).” Talley, 431 F.3d at 788. Nothing in the record suggests that the court committed clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors and arriving at Acuna’s sentence. The sentence is reasonable in light of the crimes he committed in furtherance of the RICO conspiracy, the need to provide just punishment, and the need to protect the 32 public. The court explicitly found that the evidence established that Acuna was an enforcer for the enterprise and that he committed the murder of Torres and engaged in the conspiracy to murder Fernandez at the direction of Battle, Sr. Here, Acuna has not met his burden of demonstrating that his within-range sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Therefore, we affirm.