Opinion ID: 844212
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suggestion defendant was required to establish mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt

Text: (21) Defendant, citing the trial court's statement that it found no factors in mitigation proven beyond a reasonable doubt, contends the court misunderstood the standard by which it was to review the jury's determination of penalty, requiring reversal of the judgment of death. Defendant is correct that because the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not functional, it is not susceptible to a burden of proof quantification; neither the prosecution nor the defense has the burden of proof during the penalty phase. ( People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 415; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 767 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754].) Thus, it would be error to deny a motion for modification because the defendant failed to prove the existence of mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. But that is not what happened here. The trial court opened the proceedings by explaining it was required to review the evidence, taking into account and being guided by the aggravating and mitigating factors referred to in Penal Code section 190.3, to make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts were contrary to law or to the evidence presented. (See Pen. Code, § 190.4, subd. (e).) The court stated it agreed with the jury's findings that the aggravating factors were so substantial in comparison with the mitigating factors that the penalty of death was warranted, and it found the jury had correctly determined that the robbery-murder special circumstance was true. The court explained that after conducting the requisite review of the evidence, it found the evidence of defendant's guilt and the special circumstances to be overwhelming; the victim's family had suffered as a result of the crime; defendant had suffered numerous prior convictions, most of which were armed robbery of homes, businesses and banks; and at least 20 separate robbery victims had testified about the violent crimes defendant had committed against them. Defendant had offered no factors in mitigation, but the court, referring to the factors listed in Penal Code section 190.3, nonetheless observed that defendant had not committed murder while acting under extreme duress or any mental or emotional disturbance or defect; defendant's age at the time of the murder, 47, was not a mitigating factor; the victim had not participated in defendant's homicidal conduct and had not consented to the conduct; there were no circumstances defendant might reasonably have believed to have provided a moral justification or extenuation for his conduct; there were no circumstances that might extenuate the gravity of the crime; and defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or the requirements of the law had not been in any way impaired as the result of mental disease, defect, or the effect of any intoxicants or drugs or a combination thereof. The record therefore reflects that the court thoroughly understood its statutory obligation and carefully analyzed the evidence in light of that obligation. When considered in context, the court's further statement that it found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty and there were aggravating factors and no mitigating factors appears to have been made to emphasize the absence of any evidence of mitigating factors, not to suggest defendant was required to prove their presence beyond a reasonable doubt. But even if the court misstated the law, the misstatement seems to have been no more than a slip of the tongue. In People v. Mayfield (1993) 5 Cal.4th 142, 196 [19 Cal.Rptr.2d 836, 852 P.2d 331], we rejected a claim of error after recognizing that the trial court had correctly applied the law even if it had not correctly and consistently pronounced it. We reject defendant's claim here for the same reason. We conclude the trial court carefully and conscientiously performed its duty under Penal Code section 190.4. (See People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 640 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302].)