Opinion ID: 864313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: is it premature to examine whether grist meets

Text: THE STATUTORY QUALIFICATIONS FOR DISTRICT ATTORNEY UNDER MISS. CODE ANN. § 25-31-1 WITH RESPECT TO WHETHER GRIST IS A PRACTICING ATTORNEY (OR FOR THAT MATTER WHETHER GRIST IS A LICENSED ATTORNEY) WHEN GRIST HAS NOT YET BEEN ELECTED TO THE OFFICE OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY IN ANY PRIMARY OR GENERAL ELECTION? ¶14. The qualifications for the office of district attorney are found in Miss. Code Ann. § 25-31-1 (Rev. 2003): The district attorney shall possess all the qualifications of county officers and, in addition thereto, shall be a regular licensed and practicing attorney and shall have been duly admitted to practice before the supreme court of the State of Mississippi for a period of two years. ¶15. The circuit court cited In re Williamson, 838 So.2d 226 (Miss. 2002), and Darby v. Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions, 185 So.2d 684 (Miss. 1966), in support of its finding that Grist was not presently engaged in the practice of law. However, the circuit court also found that whether Grist was a practicing attorney at the time of election was determinative based on this Court's decision in State ex rel. Plunkett v. Miller, 162 Miss. 149, 137 So. 737 (1931). Plunkett and Warrington were elected trustees of the Yazoo County school district. They then failed to pay taxes on some of their property, and it was alleged that they were disqualified to hold office. As trustees they were: public officers, and under section 250 of the Constitution must be, to be eligible, qualified electors at the time of their election or selection. In Roane v. Matthews, 75 Miss. 94, 21 So. 665, this court construed section 250 of the Constitution, and held that the eligibility referred to therein, at which time the qualification must exist, was eligibility at the time of the election. In the course of the opinion, page 99 of the official report (21 So. 665), the 6 court said: The qualification of an elector, so far as the payment of his taxes is concerned, as prescribed by section 241, Const. 1890, depends upon the fact of the actual payment of such taxes, and not the party's thought or supposition or belief, however honestly entertained, that the taxes have been paid; nor upon any agreement he may have with any one that one shall pay them for him. The right to vote as an elector rests upon no such shadowy grounds as these. Section 250 of the constitution provides that 'all qualified electors, and no others, shall be eligible to office, except as otherwise provided in this constitution.'  The 'eligibility to office' meant in section 250 is eligibility at the time of election. Unless then eligible by the payment of taxes, a candidate cannot become so by paying the taxes afterwards. This is the manifest meaning of the constitution, and any other construction leads to the most absurd results. .... The Constitution, as construed by Roane v. Matthews, supra, means that the qualification must exist at the time the officer is elected or selected; the status of his qualification to hold office is determinable as of that date. Plunkett, 137 So. at 738. ¶16. Plunkett and Roane v. Matthews, 75 Miss. 94, 21 So. 665 (1897), both cite Article 12, § 250 of the Mississippi Constitution, which states: All qualified electors and no others shall be eligible to office, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution; provided, however, that as to an office where no other qualification than that of being a qualified elector is provided by this Constitution, the legislature may, by law, fix additional requirements for such office. The Legislature has fixed additional requirements for the office of District Attorney through § 25-31-1. ¶17. The Fareses cite Miss. Code Ann. § 23-15-299(7) (Rev. 2001), which states: (7) Upon receipt of the proper fee and all necessary information, the proper executive committee shall then determine whether each candidate is a qualified elector of the state, state district, county or county district which they seek to serve, and whether each candidate meets all other qualifications to hold the office he is seeking or presents absolute proof that he will, subject to no contingencies, meet all qualifications on or before the date of the general or special election at which he could be elected to office. The committee also shall determine whether any candidate has been convicted of any felony in a court of this state, or has been convicted on or after December 8, 1992, of any offense in another state which is a felony under the laws of this state, or has been convicted of any felony in a 7 federal court on or after December 8, 1992. Excepted from the above are convictions of manslaughter and violations of the United States Internal Revenue Code or any violations of the tax laws of this state unless the offense also involved misuse or abuse of his office or money coming into his hands by virtue of his office. If the proper executive committee finds that a candidate either (a) is not a qualified elector, (b) does not meet all qualifications to hold the office he seeks and fails to provide absolute proof, subject to no contingencies, that he will meet the qualifications on or before the date of the general or special election at which he could be elected, or (c) has been convicted of a felony as described in this subsection, and not pardoned, then the name of such candidate shall not be placed upon the ballot. Where there is but one (1) candidate for each office contested at the primary election, the proper executive committee when the time has expired within which the names of candidates shall be furnished shall declare such candidates the nominees. (emphasis added). ¶18. The circuit court’s interpretation of Plunkett would negate the statutory process of qualification as provided in § 23-15-299. The Fareses cite Hinds County Election Commission v. Brinston, 671 So.2d 667 (Miss. 1996), where the residency requirement in the circuit clerk's election was considered and decided before the election. We find that the procedure provided in § 23-15-299(7) is controlling in this case. The circuit court's finding that Grist was not a practicing attorney is supported by the testimony of the hearing, as previously set out in this opinion, as is the finding that Grist did not supply absolute proof that he would meet that qualification of the office of district attorney on or before the date of the general election. The circuit court's judgment is affirmed on this basis.