Opinion ID: 2982626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Through Counsel.

Text: Writs of Habeas Corpus Ad Testificandum: Gravley’s first claim on appeal is that the District Court committed reversible error in denying his motions to compel the presence and testimony of Smith, Davis, and Bruno. His first disagreement with the Government in this regard is about the applicable standard of review: Gravley contends that this Court should review the claim de novo, and the Government asserts that the proper standard is abuse of discretion. In denying Gravley’s motion, the District Court relied on Criminal Rule 17(b). This rule provides that if a defendant shows (1) an inability to pay a witness’s fees and (2) “the necessity of the witness’s presence for an adequate defense,” a district court must issue a subpoena for that witness. Fed. R. Crim. P. 17(b). The rule also provides that the process costs and witness fees for such witnesses will be provided just as they are for the Government’s witnesses. Id. The District Court concluded that the proposed testimony of Smith, Davis, and Bruno, while possibly relevant, was not necessary to Gravley’s adequate defense. Gravley, who filed his motions pro se, does not assert that he was able to pay witness fees for Smith, Davis, or Bruno; additionally, Fleming v. Metrish, 556 F.3d 520 (6th Cir. 2009), on which Gravley relies, makes no mention of Criminal Rule 17(b). Gravley construes his claim broadly as asserting the denial of his constitutional right to present a defense, to which Fleming provides that the de novo standard of review applies. 556 F.3d at 533. Fleming, however, was a habeas case in which a state court had refused to consider certain of the defendant’s claims. Id. Here, by contrast, Gravley merely asserts that the District Court would not allow him to compel the presence of certain witnesses, on the Government’s dole, in support of his claims—witnesses whose testimony, in the District Court’s judgment, was not necessary to Gravley’s adequate defense. Accordingly, we hold that the authorities on which the Government relies, which deal - 17 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley expressly with Criminal Rule 17(b)—see, e.g., United States v. Sprouse, 472 F.2d 1167, 1168 (6th Cir. 1973) (“The trial court’s denial of this [Criminal Rule 17(b)] motion was not an abuse of its discretion, and will not be disturbed on appeal.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Rigdon, 459 F.2d 379, 380 (6th Cir. 1972) (“In th[e] determination [of whether the presence of the witness is necessary to an adequate defense of his case], the District Court is vested with a wide discretion[.]” (citing Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 414 (5th Cir. 1968)))—provide the applicable standard of review: abuse of discretion. Relying on United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1020 (6th Cir. 1977), Gravley counters that, even under Criminal Rule 17(b), a district court must compel the presence of witnesses whose proposed testimony is relevant unless a request for that testimony is “otherwise frivolous.” But Barker stated that a witness’s testimony must be both “material and useful,” in addition to being relevant, to satisfy the showing of necessity that Criminal Rule 17(b) requires. 553 F.2d at 1020 (citing United States v. Greene, 497 F.2d 1068, 1079 (7th Cir. 1974)). The District Court’s denial of Gravley’s motion for reconsideration and renewed motion to subpoena Smith, Davis, and Bruno forecloses such a finding here. As to Smith and Davis, the District Court expressly noted that it “d[id]n’t think they w[ould], either one, substantially further the resolution of the case.” And, as to Bruno, the court explained that Gravley had “articulate[d] a point that would be fair to make and would . . . survive a challenge on . . . relevancy . . .but [would not be] necessary to [Gravley’s] adequate defense[.]” Gravley contends that Bruno would have undercut the Government’s theory that Gravley had a gang-related motive by testifying to the lack of gang activity at Big Sandy. But it is difficult to see how such testimony about general relations between the various factions at Big Sandy, if relevant, would have been material or useful given the specific testimony of multiple - 18 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley witnesses—among them Johnson, Player, Woods, and Thomas—that the assault on Peterson was gang-related. Woods and Thomas, for example, both testified that Peterson’s derogatory comment about the Bloods gave rise to animus between him and Gravley. Johnson and Thomas, inmates in different facilities, both testified that Milburne would “get rank” within the Bloods for assaulting Peterson. Similarly, testimony that neither Smith, Davis, nor Bruno heard Peterson scream Gravley’s name could just as easily mean that Milburne was successful in keeping him from being heard—as Thomas testified he sought to do—as that Peterson never screamed Gravley’s name in the first place. Such testimony also would be inconsistent with the testimony of Crawford—who, unlike Smith, Davis, and Bruno, was in Cell D-240—that Peterson both screamed and pleaded with Gravley to stop hitting him. Gravley also contends that Smith, Davis, and Bruno’s testimony that they were not asked to house Peterson in their cells would have bolstered his theory that BOP personnel deliberately placed Peterson in Cell D-240. But as the District Court explained in denying Gravley’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him, such evidence, “while certainly inculpatory of the BOP, is not automatically exculpatory as to Gravely.” “The most the alleged evidence [would] show[ ], described most pejoratively, is that officials at the BOP are also guilty of conspiring to murder Peterson.” Finally, Gravley contends that “[c]ost is not a factor” that the District Court should have considered in determining the necessity of Smith’s, Davis’s, or Bruno’s testimony. He refers, here, to the District Court’s observation that “in the particular case of Mr. Matthew Davis, extraordinary cost would be associated [with granting Gravley’s motion] because it would require Mr. Davis . . . to be flown here from an out-of-state location.” But neither in his principal brief, his supplemental pro se brief, nor his reply brief does Gravley cite any authority - 19 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley for the proposition that this reasoning was inappropriate, contending only that “the ‘expense’ consideration finds no basis in the Criminal Rule itself.” As the Government points out, this court expressly stated in Rigdon that courts “may consider the expense to the government and more particularly the danger to the public inherent in transporting inmates over [such] distances.” 459 F.2d at 379. Further, in this case, a consideration of cost was secondary to the District Court’s determination that the testimony of neither Smith, Davis, nor Bruno was necessary to Gravley’s adequate defense. We therefore conclude that the District Court did not abuse its “wide discretion” in denying Gravley’s motions. Id. at 380. Judicial Estoppel: Gravley’s second claim on appeal asserts that because the Government allowed Milburne to plead guilty to the second-degree murder of Peterson, it was judicially estopped from prosecuting Gravley for Peterson’s murder. According to Gravley, “[n]o party disputes that Milburne killed Peterson by strangling him. The only contested issue [i]s whether the killing was ordered by Gravley, or whether Milburne acted alone.” Thus, Gravley contends, “[t]he factual basis of Milburne’s plea agreement was inconsistent with the theory of prosecution against Gravley.” Both Gravley and the Government agree that we review this claim, which Gravley asserts as a denial of Due Process, de novo.8 See, e.g., United States v. Lawrence, 735 F.3d 385, 405 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Jones, 641 F.3d 706, 713 (6th Cir. 2011)) (explaining that constitutional challenges are reviewed de novo). 8 Whether the use of inconsistent theories of prosecution amounts to a denial of Due Process has not been settled. See Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 175, 187 (2005), rev’g Stumpf v. Mitchell, 367 F.3d 594 (6th Cir. 2004). The Supreme Court has stated, however, that a denial of Due Process is possible on such a basis, id., and this court continues to recognize that possibility, see Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2013). For purposes of analyzing this claim, we assume without deciding that the use of inconsistent theories of prosecution amounts to a denial of Due Process. - 20 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley As the District Court concluded, however, that Milburne pleaded guilty to murdering Peterson does not mean that he was not assisted by Gravley or ordered by Gravley to do it. And as the Government points out, “[Milburne’s] plea agreement does not state that [he] acted alone[.]” The plea agreement therefore does not reflect any inconsistency that “exist[s] at the core of the prosecutor’s cases against defendants for the same crime,” Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir. 2000), or that is “inherently factually contradictory,” ibid. In his reply brief, Gravley also contends that allowing Milburne to plead guilty to second-degree murder while prosecuting Gravley for premeditated murder and conspiracy to commit murder is inconsistent. But, again, he offers no authority for this proposition, and, as the District Court observed in denying this claim, “when the [G]overnment submits a proposed plea agreement that ‘drops’ previously filed charges, it is not admitting that those ‘dropped’ charges were baseless.” We hold that, assuming he adequately has stated a Due Process claim,9 Gravley has not been denied Due Process. Destruction of SHU Video Footage: Gravley’s third and seventh claims on appeal both concern the BOP’s failure to preserve the bulk of nineteen hours of video footage from the SHU corridors on November 12 and 13, 2006. In the third claim, Gravley submits that the District Court committed reversible error when it declined to provide a jury instruction on concealment or destruction of evidence. This court reviews that claim for abuse of discretion. United States v. Henderson, 307 F. App’x 970, 978 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting King v. Ford Motor Co., 209 F.3d 886, 897 (6th Cir. 2000)). A district court abuses its discretion when it refuses to give a requested jury instruction (1) that is legally correct, (2) that is not otherwise substantially 9 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. - 21 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley covered by the instructions actually given to the jury, and (3) whose absence substantially impairs the defendant’s defense. Id. Here, Gravley contends that the jury instruction that he requested satisfies all three requirements. Yet again, however, he offers no supporting authority. As the District Court observed, the instruction was designed for use against defendants who have destroyed or concealed evidence, and not by defendants who are alleging the destruction or concealment of evidence. Accordingly, there is some question as to whether the requested instruction ever could be a correct statement of law under the circumstances of a case such as this one. Additionally, the District Court concluded that Gravley could establish neither that the lost footage was “materially exculpatory,” Wright, 260 F.3d at 570-71 (citing Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485), nor that it had been overwritten in bad faith, id. at 571 (citing Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58). Thus, even assuming that the instruction was a correct statement of law and not covered by the other instructions with which the jury was charged, see Henderson, 307 F. App’x at 978, the District Court’s refusal to give it likely did not impair Gravley’s defense. The District Court denied Gravley’s motion to dismiss the indictment against him, the allegations of which his seventh claim on appeal renews, for similar reasons. This court reviews the denial of Gravley’s motion to dismiss de novo, United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Cooper, 983 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir. 1993)), and reviews the District Court’s determination that Gravley did not demonstrate bad faith on the part of the BOP for clear error, United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 582, 590 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Cody, 498 F.3d 582, 589 (6th Cir. 2007)). We conclude that the District Court did not err in denying Gravley’s motion to dismiss for the reasons stated in the District Court’s opinion. Gravley can demonstrate neither that the missing footage was “materially exculpatory,” under - 22 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 485, nor that it was overwritten in bad faith, under Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 57-58. And, given the timelines of the video footage produced by Agent Schumacker and Warden Hastings and other available evidence, even if Gravley had demonstrated bad faith he would not have been able to show “that he [could not] obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means.” Branch, 537 F.3d at 590 (citing Wright, 260 F.3d at 571). Consequently, the District Court properly exercised its discretion in refusing to give the jury instruction that Gravley requested and did not err in denying Gravley’s motion to dismiss. Closing Arguments: Gravley’s fourth claim on appeal asserts an issue that he did not raise below—misconduct during the Government’s closing argument. Accordingly, we may consider the claim forfeited. See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 544 F. App’x 630, 633 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Poss v. Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 663 (6th Cir. 2001)) (“Appellate review is, of necessity, limited to issues addressed by the court below.”) In the interest of being comprehensive, however, we briefly address it. Gravley and the Government agree, again, on the standard of review that applies to such a claim: plain error. See United States v. Henry, 545 F.3d 367, 376 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 406 (6th Cir. 2001)). This standard requires Gravley to demonstrate an obvious error that prejudiced his substantial rights and “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Ibid. Here, Gravley complains that the Government improperly told the jury in closing arguments that Gravley’s statement to Milburne, “We’re going to eat his food,” meant, “It is time to attack.” He also contends that the Government improperly appealed to the passions of the jury when it told them that the inmates who testified would be labeled “snitch[es]” and that they would have “a walking death penalty” when they returned to their facilities. Finally, Gravley - 23 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley asserts that the Government improperly inflamed the passions of the jury by emphasizing the brutality of Peterson’s death when it directed them to photographs of Peterson that had been admitted in evidence because of their “clinical nature.” None of these allegations reflects an obvious error, much less any prejudice to Gravley’s substantial rights or adverse effect on the integrity of the judicial proceedings against him. This court recognizes prosecutorial misconduct only when two circumstances have been established: (1) challenged remarks by the prosecutor were improper; and (2) the remarks were so flagrant as to require reversal. Henry, 545 F.3d at 376. In determining flagrancy, we consider whether a remark misled the jury or prejudiced the defendant; whether such remarks were extensive; whether such remarks deliberately were placed before the jury; and the overall impact of the remarks on the strength of the case against the defendant. Id. As to the first challenged statement here, Crawford expressly testified that he understood “We’re going to eat his food” to mean that Gravley and Milburne were “going to do something to [Peterson],” “[p]hysically.” No read of that testimony communicates an understanding contrary to the Government’s representation that an attack on Peterson was imminent. The second statement also is borne out by the record. As David Johnson expressly testified, murder is an understood consequence of testifying against another inmate and being labeled a “snitch” or “hot.” As for Gravley’s complaint about the Government’s commentary regarding the photographs of Peterson, he mounts no meaningful challenge to the photographs or their “clinical nature,” on the basis of which they were admitted into evidence. Under our precedent, prosecutors enjoy “wide latitude . . . during closing argument,” Henry, 545 F.3d at 377, and they may “argue the record, highlight the inconsistencies or inadequacies of the defense, and forcefully assert reasonable inferences from the evidence,” - 24 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley Bates v. Bell, 402 F.3d 635, 646 (6th Cir. 2005). Against this standard, and in tandem with the limited review that plain error inquiry affords, we hold that the challenged statements do not amount to prosecutorial misconduct, and the District Court did not err in permitting them. Woods’s Perjury: Gravley’s fifth claim on appeal asserts the basis on which he sought a new trial before the District Court—Woods’s prior perjury before a grand jury in Tennessee. Gravley and the Government agree that this court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial under Criminal Rule 33 for abuse of discretion. See United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 408 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 382 (6th Cir. 1997)). For the reasons expressed in the District Court’s denial of Gravley’s motion, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion. Woods’s perjury, while useful as impeachment evidence, was not likely material nor likely to have produced Gravley’s acquittal for at least two reasons: (1) other witnesses corroborated Woods’s testimony; and (2) the Government offered other evidence of Gravley’s guilt. Sequestration Order: Gravley’s sixth claim on appeal renews his motion for a mistrial on the basis of a purported violation of the District Court’s sequestration order, which the District Court denied. Gravley and the Government agree that our review of that denial is for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Martin, 516 F. App’x 433, 448 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing, inter alia, United States v. Rugiero, 20 F.3d 1387, 1392 (6th Cir. 1994)); United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 926 (6th Cir. 1986) (citing United States v. Faulkenbery, 472 F.2d 879, 882 (9th Cir. 1973)). Federal Rule of Evidence 615 requires a court to “order witnesses excluded [from the courtroom] so that they may not hear other witnesses’ testimony” on request by a party. As Player admitted on the witness stand, he traveled to court with Woods and Thomas for two to - 25 - Case No. 11-6123 United States v. Gravley three minutes, and the three witnesses “discuss[ed] why [they] were there.” Accordingly, Gravley contends, the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. As Gravley concedes, however, this court “is yet to take a position” “regarding whether Rule 615 extends beyond the courtroom.” Martin, 516 F. App’x at 448. Accordingly, the District Court’s conclusion that the rule “requires [only] that witnesses are not allowed to remain in the courtroom during the testimony of other witnesses” cannot have been an abuse of discretion. Even an express violation of a sequestration order “does not automatically bar a witness’[s] testimony.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gibson, 675 F.2d 825, 835-36 (6th Cir. 1982)). And even an express violation would require a showing “that the Government consented to or had knowledge of the witnesses’ coordination of testimony” and that the defendant was prejudiced thereby, neither of which Gravley has made. Id. Accordingly, on the record before the court in this case, we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Gravley’s motion for a mistrial.