Opinion ID: 1384937
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Misuse of Peremptory Challenges

Text: As previously indicated, defendant contends that the prosecutor misused his peremptory challenges to exclude several Black persons from the jury. After outlining the applicable law, we discuss in some detail the factual basis for defendant's contention. (1) In People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, we ruled that peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude from a jury, solely because of a presumed group bias, all or most members of an identifiable group of citizens distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. (See also Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712]; People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711, 715-716 [230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102], and cases cited.) Under Wheeler, if a party believes his opponent is improperly using peremptory challenges for a discriminatory purpose, he must raise a timely challenge and make a prima facie case of such discrimination to the satisfaction of the court. First, ... he should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group. Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias. (22 Cal.3d at p. 280, fn. omitted; accord, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 93-100 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 85-90, 106 S.Ct. at pp. 1721-1724].) (2) In subsequent cases, we have stressed the importance of an express ruling by the trial court as to whether a prima facie case has been shown, thereby requiring some response or explanation by the party exercising the peremptory challenges. (See People v. Turner, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 719, fn. 3 [maj. opn. by Mosk, J.], 729 [conc. opn. by Panelli, J.].) Once a prima facie case has been shown, and an explanation tendered, the trial court must make a sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the ... explanation in light of the circumstances of the case as then known, his knowledge of trial techniques, and his observations of the manner in which the [counsel asserting the peremptory challenges] has examined members of the venire and has exercised challenges for cause or peremptorily, for `we rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination.' ( People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168 [197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854], quoting Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282; see People v. Turner, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 728.) Thus, in Hall, we reversed a judgment on Wheeler grounds where the trial court apparently considered itself bound to accept all of the prosecutor's explanations at face value, expressing the view that group bias is shown only when a prosecutor declares an intent to exclude all members of an ethnic group from the jury. Such abdication is inconsistent with the court's obligations under Wheeler. ... (35 Cal.3d at p. 169.) Defendant is a Black man accused of murdering a Caucasian victim. As will appear, in the present case the trial judge expressed repeated concern about the prosecutor's apparent use of peremptory challenges to exclude Black persons from the jury. Indeed, our review of the voir dire examination indicates that several Black venirepersons were excused after giving seemingly routine, acceptable responses to the prosecutor's questions. (The Attorney General concedes that, as to three of the six prospective jurors in question, the record reveals no obvious or apparent reason for excusing them.) Yet, despite defendant's repeated objections, the judge inexplicably failed to demand any explanations from the prosecutor for his apparent pattern of improper peremptory challenges. The Wheeler issue was first raised by defendant after the prosecutor peremptorily challenged Mr. Daniels, one of the three challenged prospective jurors whose responses to questioning gave no apparent cause for challenge or concern. Defense counsel interrupted the proceedings to make a record on what I believe to be a developing pattern. As far as my computations are concerned, three of the four peremptories that were exerted by the People were against what appear to be black people to me. Although it was agreed that the prosecutor had excused two Black persons (Daniels and McDade), discussion ensued as to whether a third excused individual, Bradbury, was Black. The court, unable to recall Bradbury's race, ruled that So far as the court is concerned, there have been two. There's no other way I can establish, of course, that there is a pattern. The court suggested that counsel henceforth make sure the record reflected whether challenged prospective jurors are ethnically black, and the voir dire continued. Thereafter, when prospective juror Cox was excused, the court noted for the record that she was Black. Despite defense counsel's request that the prosecutor be required to express some kind of reason for excusing the Black venirepersons, the court replied, I don't believe at this point ... that any pattern has been established. We observe that Miss Cox's responses, like those of Mr. Daniels, seemed quite acceptable from the standpoint of the prosecutor. The People have suggested no legitimate reason for excusing her. When another Black venireperson, Mrs. Porche, was being examined, the prosecutor asked her various questions regarding her ability to convict a defendant based on circumstantial evidence. As with prior jurors, the prosecutor used an example involving a boy and a missing pie. The trial court thereupon convened a conference in chambers and warned the prosecutor that his hypothetical example and questions based thereon were confusing and misleading. Significantly, the judge expressed his suspicion that the prosecutor was using the responses to these questions as a pretext for excluding some prospective jurors. Thus, the trial judge observed I'm getting concerned now about the ethnic make up of the jury and how those that are on are getting kicked.... I hope this line of questioning ... is not aiding you in getting rid of those persons. (Italics added.) The prosecutor denied any bias or selective excuse of jurors, and observed that while he had thus far passed a jury containing two Blacks, defense counsel had peremptorily excused thirteen White venirepersons. In the prosecutor's words, I think it works both ways. The court responded, It's obvious that the majority of jurors who are here are not black people. I'm not saying that those blacks that were excused that you're abusing your peremptory rights. I've ruled that way on the motion of the defense.... [¶] Now let's proceed. Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor peremptorily excused Mrs. Porche. Defense counsel again argued that a pattern of excluding Blacks had emerged, and that case law demands that some reason be stated for her exclusion. The trial court replied, Well, counsel need[s] no reason to excuse a juror. The court opined that the prosecutor probably had excused Mrs. Porche because of her responses to the circumstantial evidence questions, and observed that two Blacks remained on the jury. Next, the prosecutor excused Miss West, a Black woman whose standard responses to the voir dire examination disclosed no particular reason for her exclusion. Defense counsel once again objected, stating that It appears that it's a systematic exclusion of black jurors.... I ask the court to make that finding and I'm also requesting, pursuant to case law, that he provide the court with a reason why Miss West would not be eligible to serve.... The court denied the motion without prejudice, adding that I'm going to read the case, presumably referring to our Wheeler case, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258. (Voir dire occurred in 1981, several years after Wheeler was filed.) Immediately thereafter, and before adjourning to perform any such research, the court addressed the prosecutor, stating that it had become obvious to me that you are  Apparently every time a black person gets in there  there are two left, that's true. And I don't know what the case holds, but I don't think that the test is necessarily that you have one or two on the jury.... That's why I'm reserving any ruling. The prosecutor replied that as I understand the case, it works both ways. The defendant has systematically excluded all white persons. There has not been one minority excluded by the defense. The prosecutor continued to deny that any of his exclusions were based on race, stating I have my reasons. If ordered by the court, I will produce those reasons. (3) Despite the court's indication that the matter was reserved, the record fails to indicate any further ruling on defendant's motion until the prosecution peremptorily excused yet another Black, Mrs. Carr. Defense counsel renewed his previous objection and the court ruled simply, The motion is denied, without giving any further explanation. The net result was that the prosecution peremptorily challenged six Black venirepersons. The jury as finally constituted contained two Black persons. Initially, we observe that the prosecutor was in error in assuming that defense counsel's supposed wrongful exclusion of Caucasians in some manner justified his own exclusion of Black persons. As the People now concede, the propriety of the prosecutor's peremptory challenges must be determined without regard to the validity of defendant's own challenges. (See People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 283, fn. 30; People v. Fuller (1982) 136 Cal. App.3d 403, 418 [186 Cal. Rptr. 283].) Nor does the fact that the prosecutor passed or accepted a jury containing two Black persons end our inquiry, for to so hold would provide an easy means of justifying a pattern of unlawful discrimination which stops only slightly short of total exclusion. (See People v. Motton (1985) 39 Cal.3d 596, 607-608 [217 Cal. Rptr. 416, 704 P.2d 176].) Although the passing of certain jurors may be an indication of the prosecutor's good faith in exercising his peremptories, and may be an appropriate factor for the trial judge to consider in ruling on a Wheeler objection, it is not a conclusive factor. As we stated in Motton, supra, 39 Cal.3d 596, quoting with approval an earlier Court of Appeal opinion, The Attorney General argues that the prosecution's acceptance of the jury on three occasions, when there were one or two Blacks on the panel, rebuts defendant's prima facie showing.... `If the presence on the jury of members of the cognizable group in question is evidence of intent not to discriminate, then any attorney can avoid the appearance of systematic exclusion by simply passing the jury while a member of the cognizable group that he wants to exclude is still on the panel. This ignores the fact that other members of the group may have been excluded for improper, racially motivated reasons.' ( Id. at pp. 607-608.) In this regard, we disapprove language in People v. Davis (1987) 189 Cal. App.3d 1177, 1190-1191 [234 Cal. Rptr. 859], suggesting that the presence of two or three Blacks in the jury box following voir dire precludes the trial court from finding a prima facie case of exclusion. Davis is apparently based on the premise that if the jury panel contains at least a minimum number of members of the cognizable group to provide defendant a representative cross-section of the community, he cannot complain of the prosecutor's pattern of unlawful discrimination in the use of his peremptory challenges. Nothing in our cases, or in Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79, supports such an analysis. (4) Our review of the record, summarized above, convinces us that, at least by the time prospective juror West was excused, defense counsel had adequately demonstrated a prima facie case of group bias sufficient to require the prosecutor to explain the reasons underlying his peremptory challenges. Indeed, the trial judge on two occasions seemed to recognize that such a showing had been made, but inexplicably declined to require the prosecutor to explain his reasons. Perhaps the trial judge's candid disclosure that I don't know what the case [ Wheeler ] holds, remained true for the duration of the voir dire examination. In any event, it strongly appears that the trial judge, as in People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d 161, simply accepted at face value the prosecutor's denials of group bias, without making any sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's motives. Under Hall, [s]uch abdication is inconsistent with the court's obligations under Wheeler .... (35 Cal.3d at p. 169.) The People's primary response on appeal is that because the prosecutor used 16 peremptory challenges but excluded only 6 Blacks, the present case is distinguishable from prior cases involving a larger percentage of exclusion on the ground of race. We find the distinction untenable, especially in a case in which even the trial judge expressed serious suspicions that the prosecutor was using some of his peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks. Under these circumstances, the trial court was obligated to conduct further inquiry on the record. Wheeler error has been deemed reversible per se in light of the fundamental right involved. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, 283.) The People suggest, however, that we merely order a limited remand to permit the prosecutor to explain his reasons for excluding the prospective jurors in question. We observe that, although our court has rejected such a procedure in prior cases (see People v. Hall, supra, 35 Cal.3d 161, 170-171 [trial held more than three years before reversal of judgment]; People v. Allen (1979) 23 Cal.3d 286, 295, fn. 4 [152 Cal. Rptr. 454, 590 P.2d 30] [trial held nearly three years before reversal of judgment]), the United States Supreme Court in the subsequently decided case of Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at page 100 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 90, 106 S.Ct. at p. 1725], employed such a remand. (See also United States v. Tindle (4th Cir.1986) 808 F.2d 319 [remand after more than three years].) In Batson, the case had been tried only two years prior to reversal of the judgment. In the present case, voir dire examination commenced in November 1981, approximately six years ago. As in Hall, we believe it would be unrealistic to believe that the prosecutor could now recall in greater detail his reasons for the exercise of the peremptory challenges in issue, or that the trial judge could assess those reasons, as required, which would demand that he recall the circumstances of the case, and the manner in which the prosecutor examined the venire and exercised his other challenges. (35 Cal.3d at p. 171.) Although it is unnecessary to discuss defendant's remaining contentions, we briefly explore one further issue to assist the trial court on retrial.