Opinion ID: 1181110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unwarranted Personal Attacks on Defendant's Expert Witnesses.

Text: (19a) Defendant asserts that the prosecutor also improperly attacked the integrity, motive and character of his expert witnesses by asserting that they testified solely for monetary gain and implying that they manufactured their testimony. As an implication of manufactured testimony, defendant cites the following guilt phase comment by the prosecutor: When the flatterers come to them and say we have a case for you, we have a case where, you know, you are as good, delve into the fact[s] and pull the facts out and come into court and tell us that this Manuel Babbitt didn't have any mental states that are required under the law for the crimes that he's charged with, so won't you do that? The thrust of this comment was, again, that psychologists and psychiatrists do not have any special skill that would allow them to tell the jury that an accused is not responsible for his crimes. Drawing by analogy on the story, The Emperor's New Clothes, where the tailors through overwhelming flattery succeeded in appealing to the Emperor's vanity, the prosecutor stated that we have an emperor in the form of [these] psychologists and psychiatrists who ... are vain enough to think that they have these capabilities.... [ถ] And so one day, the psychiatrists having [been] flattered to the point of thinking they have something they don't, come to court, ... they have a parade and display all these things that they claim they have, which they really don't have, ... These comments were based on Dr. Coleman's testimony about the limitations of psychiatric opinion on the issue of an accused's mental capacity to commit a crime. They did not imply a manufactured defense, but rather, a misconception on the part of forensic psychiatrists and psychologists about their expertise in making legal judgments. As such, the comments were not misconduct. In other comments the prosecutor, defendant maintains, in effect argued that the psychiatric witnesses were using the criminal justice system to advance their own business interests and that they therefore should not be trusted. The evidence showed that Dr. Blunt had been licensed as a psychologist only two years when she was employed by defense counsel, that in this time she had testified in five other cases, and that her efforts on defendant's behalf had earned her over $14,000. Dr. Globus had been in full-time private practice less than two years at the time of trial and he spent up to two-thirds of his time doing forensic examinations. He had testified in 75 to 100 civil and criminal cases. Dr. Axelrad originally discussed a fee of $120 an hour, but he agreed to receive $80 an hour for his services. At the time of his testimony he had put 117 hours into defendant's case, thus earning himself $9,360. These facts support an inference of the defense expert witnesses' economic motive to testify. (20) It is within the bounds of proper argument to attack the credibility of defense expert witnesses, and the weight to be given their testimony, based on the witnesses' compensation and the fact of their employment. (See Evid. Code, งง 722, subd. (b), 780, subd. (f); People v. Washington (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1061, 1086 [80 Cal. Rptr. 567, 458 P.2d 479], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at pp. 33-34.) (19b) The prosecutor's comments thus were not misconduct.
Relying on People v. Criscione (1981) 125 Cal. App.3d 275 [177 Cal. Rptr. 899] and related cases, defendant urges that the prosecutor improperly argued that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity would relieve him from punishment for his actions and result in his being set free forthwith. (21a) Defendant first cites the guilt phase comment that defendant is simply a criminal, ... and don't be misled by the disguise that has been attempted to be put over him to make him out something that he's not.... [ถ] Everyday common criminal. For Dr. Globus to come in here and tell us anything different is the height of intellectual arrogance. His answer simply should have been to the question put to him, hey, I don't know, I can't tell you. And for him to say that it's likely that he had diminished capacity, it gives more credence to the things that Lee Coleman was saying, that psychiatrists have this self-anointed capacity to perceive things better than other people, and all they have to do is examine a few facts and they are perfectly willing to come to court and absolve an individual such as Manuel Babbitt of all criminal responsibility on such things as another doctor's report and a hypothetical question. This comment was not improper. Dr. Globus, who testified for the defense on surrebuttal, had reviewed Dr. Blunt's report, but had not himself examined defendant. In response to defense counsel's hypothetical question concerning the mental capacity of a thirty-two year old black male who may have suffered a head injury ... and whose history paralleled defendant's history, Dr. Globus offered the opinion that the individual had diminished capacity. Because the purpose and effect of a successful diminished capacity defense is to reduce or absolve the defendant's criminal responsibility, the prosecutor's remark was a fair comment on the evidence. (22a) In the sanity phase, defendant again challenges the prosecutor's social cancer comment wherein he referred to this process of allowing psychiatrists to come in and make their moral pronouncements disguised as medical opinion in the hopes of persuading jurors to let people off the hook, so to speak, by saying that this very hard to get at type of thing, that is the person's mental state, can be definitively defined by them.... The prosecutor's reference to letting people off the hook, so to speak was nothing more than a reiteration of his earlier statement about the willingness of some psychiatrists and psychologists to testify to an individual's insanity at the time of an offense. An accused who is found to have been insane is absolved of criminal responsibility (งง 1016, 1026), and thus, in the colloquial, is let off the hook. The comment was not improper. (23a) Defendant also complains of the prosecutor's comments in the sanity phase relating to Dr. Axelrad's diagnosis of intermittent explosive disorder, as follows: Now, you know, we can all buy this little business of what diagnosis criteria Mr. Babbitt meets. But let me point out this one about the intermittent explosive disorder. And it's kind of got a little sex appeal, too. It's kind of tantalizing. Boy, that would just fit, intermittent explosive disorder. Here's this guy walking down the street, all of a sudden he gets mad and beats up on somebody. I'm going to find this guy crazy and let him go home. ... [ถ] I want to ask anybody if you lost your temper? You had intermittent explosive disorder. And let's not try to make anything out of it more than that, because if you do, everytime somebody gets mad, they are free to commit any crime they want, and they can be found not guilty by reason of insanity. Dr. Axelrad had defined intermittent explosive disorder as a mental disorder ... which would include several discrete episodes of loss of control of aggressive impulses that result in serious assault or destruction of property. For example, with no or little provocation, an individual may suddenly start to hit strangers and throw furniture.... There are no signs of generalized impulsivity or aggressiveness between the episodes. Court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. Elmer Galioni testified with respect to the intermittent explosive disorder diagnosis that Yes, there were some instances where [defendant] reacted explosively to some situations.... I think at least on one occasion he did abruptly hit his wife, when she, should I say, irritated him. But some elements of the diagnosis did not fit in that there were still some general impulsivity in between the episodes, and his violent behavior was not always in response to a precipitating factor. Based on the foregoing testimony, the prosecutor in his argument equated the asserted disorder to an individual's loss of temper and indicated that if the jurors ever had lost their tempers, then under Dr. Axelrad's analysis they too had intermittent explosive disorder, and hence were insane at the time. In asserting that they thus would be free to commit a crime, the prosecutor was referring not to a freedom from confinement, but to the freedom from criminal responsibility that follows from a finding of insanity. In light of the evidence, the prosecutor committed no impropriety in disparaging the intermittent explosive disorder diagnosis and arguing what he believed its logical extension to be. (21b), (22b), (23b) In sum, with the exception discussed below, none of the prosecutor's comments improperly suggested to the jury that if defendant were found to have been not sane at the time of the offenses, he would go free. (24) The exception is the prosecutor's statement concerning someone who gets mad and beats up on somebody, i.e., I'm going to find this guy crazy and let him go home. To the extent the prosecutor was suggesting that when an accused is found insane he is let free, his comment was improper. ( People v. Modesto (1967) 66 Cal.2d 695, 708-709 [59 Cal. Rptr. 124, 427 P.2d 788], disapproved on other grounds in Maine v. Superior Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 375, 383, fn. 8 [66 Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372] and People v. Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 721; People v. Criscione, supra, 125 Cal. App.3d at p. 293; People v. Mallette (1940) 39 Cal. App.2d 294, 299-300 [102 P.2d 1084].) The question is whether the error was prejudicial. In People v. Smith (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 51 [108 Cal. Rptr. 698], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wetmore (1978) 22 Cal.3d 318, 324, footnote 5 [149 Cal. Rptr. 265, 583 P.2d 1308], the court determined that the prosecutor's implication in summation that a finding of insanity would result in freeing the criminally insane and dangerous defendant ( id. at p. 71) was not prejudicial per se, but rather was governed by the Watson ( supra, 46 Cal.2d 818) standard of review โ i.e., whether there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of the misconduct the jury would have returned a finding more favorable to the defendant (33 Cal. App.3d at p. 71). (See also People v. Beivelman, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 75; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 36; cf. People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 214 [152 Cal. Rptr. 141, 589 P.2d 396].) Distinguishing earlier cases finding similar misconduct to be reversible error, the court first reviewed a then-recent empirical study of jury behavior in insanity trials, which determined that โ contrary to the expectations of the bench and bar โ jurors are generally aware that a criminally insane person will be confined in a mental hospital until an authorized agency declares that he has recovered. (33 Cal. App.3d at p. 74. But see People v. Moore (1985) 166 Cal. App.3d 540, 544 [211 Cal. Rptr. 856].) The court next observed that [t]here is an independent reason for holding the misconduct harmless. Penal Code section 1026 permits the bifurcated guilt and insanity trials to be heard by the same or a different jury in the discretion of the court. Defendant's sanity trial took place before the same jury which had just found him in possession of the mental capacity for premeditated and deliberate killing. The jury was now being asked to decide whether, at the time of his attack on the campers, he had been legally insane.... The array of evidence at the guilt trial had moved the jury to reject the defense of mental illness depriving him of capacity to premeditate; the same evidence supplied a strong impetus for rejection of the insanity plea. It precluded any reasonable probability that the district attorney's impropriety influenced the jury's rejection of that plea. (33 Cal. App.3d at p. 74.) Rejecting the proposition that in light of the foregoing conclusion a defendant's plea of insanity comes before a biased jury when the same jurors have already rejected his claim of diminished mental capacity, the court stated that [i]f indeed the jury is predisposed against a defendant on the insanity issue, its predisposition does not stem from its verdict at the guilt trial but from the evidence it has heard. A well-based verdict of capacity to premeditate does not foreclose a verdict of insanity, but makes it unlikely. [Fn. omitted.] The circumstantial evidence which supported the finding of undiminished capacity would be admissible on the insanity issue were the issues heard by the same or separate juries. ( Smith, supra, 33 Cal. App.3d at p. 75, italics in original.) Here, as in Smith, supra, 33 Cal. App.3d 51, any error in the prosecutor's single improper remark implying that if found insane defendant would be free to go home, was nonprejudicial. The jury had already rejected defendant's diminished-capacity defense at the guilt phase. Dr. Coleman's guilt phase testimony, discrediting the testimony of the defense psychiatrists and psychologists and the ability of such professionals to make accurate judgments about a defendant's mental state at the time of an offense, applied as well to the testimony produced at the sanity phase. Moreover, court-appointed psychiatrist Dr. Elmer Galioni testified at the sanity phase that in his view defendant suffered from nothing more than passive-aggressive personality disorder. In Dr. Galioni's opinion, defendant did not at the time of the offenses suffer from a mental disorder that deprived him of the substantial capacity to appreciate his criminality or to conform his behavior to the requirements of law. Although at the sanity phase it was defendant's burden to prove legal insanity by a preponderance of the evidence, in the trial court's view, expressed in connection with its ruling on defendant's motion for modification of the penalty, all of the evidence in fact established the defendant's sanity beyond any reasonable doubt. (Italics added.) Additional circumstances further militate against any harm from the prosecutor's statement. Dr. Coleman, on cross-examination during the guilt phase, stated that when someone is found insane, the procedure is that they are said to be not responsible legally, and they are sent to a mental institution for an indefinite period of time, they are confined until expiration of their maximum penalty, whereupon they are released unless the state can show that they continue to be a danger, in which case they are incarcerated longer. Defense counsel in his sanity-phase argument indicated that defendant would not go free when he analogized the jury's task to the decision faced by defendant's brother, William Babbitt, when he turned in his sick brother, so that [he] could get treatment and the community would be safe. He saw that responsibility. He recognized and accepted that responsibility. He sought help and treatment, ... I expect that you will act in no less responsible way than he did. Further, the court instructed the jury not to consider the subject of penalty or punishment in its deliberations on the sanity issue and that the matter of penalty or punishment must not in any way affect its verdict. In light of these factors, we conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the prosecutor's impropriety supplied an inducing factor in the jury's election to find defendant sane. ( People v. Smith, supra, 33 Cal. App.3d at p. 75.) People v. Criscione, supra , relied on by defendant, is distinguishable. In that case there were four instances of egregious misconduct, each one clearly prejudicial. (See 125 Cal. App.3d at pp. 284-292.) In cross-examination of the defense psychiatrist and in argument to the jury, the prosecutor repeatedly suggested that the criminally insane, however violent, are immediately set free to prey upon society. ( Id. at p. 292.) Thus, the prosecutor argued: `I hope working hard doesn't mean you're crazy, because we've got to start locking up a lot of people. Of course, we don't lock them up. We just call them insane. ' ( Ibid., italics added.) The reviewing court, moreover, had not long before considered misconduct by the same prosecutor. ( Ibid. ) Based on the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the prosecutor's misconduct deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to have the jury determine his sanity at the time of the killing. ( Id. at p. 293.) In the instant case the prosecutor's comment, although improper, did not deprive defendant of a fair sanity hearing nor did it result in a miscarriage of justice.
(25a) Defendant asserts that defense counsel's failure to object to the numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct denied him the effective assistance of counsel. In light of our previous discussion, we reject defendant's premise that there were such numerous instances. Rather, we consider defendant's ineffectiveness claim with respect only to counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's questionable social cancer remarks and the improper comment find him crazy and let him go home. (26) The burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel is on the defendant. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1].) To establish constitutionally inadequate representation, the defendant must show that (1) counsel's representation was deficient, i.e., it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) counsel's deficient representation subjected the defense to prejudice, i.e., there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failings the result would have been more favorable. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839]; People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 584; People v. Pope, supra ; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-696 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-699, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) (27) When a defendant makes an ineffectiveness claim on appeal, the appellate court must look to see if the record contains any explanation for the challenged aspects of representation. If the record sheds no light on why counsel acted or failed to act in the manner challenged, unless counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation ( People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 425-426), the case is affirmed ( ibid. ). In such cases, the ineffective-assistance claim is more appropriately made in a petition for habeas corpus. ( Ibid. ; see People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 218.) (25b) Here the appellate record sheds no light on why counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's social cancer and let him go home comments. Even assuming, however, that a reasonably competent attorney acting as a diligent advocate would have objected, neither comment, as our previous discussion concludes, was prejudicial. Consequently, it is not reasonably probable that a determination more favorable to defendant would have resulted had counsel objected and sought an admonition. (Cf. People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 60 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) Defendant, therefore, has not established his ineffectiveness claim on appeal.
(28) Defendant has filed in this court a petition for writ of habeas corpus in which he asserts the same ineffective assistance of counsel claim as he advances on appeal. We consolidated the petition with the appeal and issued an order to show cause. The Attorney General filed a return, and defendant filed a denial. The factual contentions set forth in the petition are identical to those discussed in the context of the appeal and are uncontradicted. Attached to the petition is trial counsel's declaration setting forth his reasons for failing to object to the prosecutor's challenged remarks. [19] However, because our review of the entire record, as determined above, indicates that counsel's failure to object was nonprejudicial ( People v. Fosselman, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 584; People v. Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 425; see Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 697 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 699-700]), it is unnecessary to explore counsel's reasons. The order to show cause must be discharged and the petition for writ of habeas corpus denied.
(29) Relying on Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] and People v. Garcia (1984) 36 Cal.3d 539 [205 Cal. Rptr. 265, 684 P.2d 826], defendant contends that the felony-murder special-circumstance findings must be set aside because the court failed to instruct the jury that it could find the special circumstance allegations true only if it found that defendant acted with intent to kill. In People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] we reconsidered our Carlos decision. We concluded that the court need not instruct on intent to kill as an element of the felony-murder special circumstance unless there is evidence from which the jury could find that the defendant was an accomplice rather than the actual killer. ( Id. at p. 1147.) In the instant case it is undisputed that defendant was the actual killer of Leah Schendel. Failure to instruct on intent therefore was not error.

(30) Defendant argues that the prosecutor's improper remarks during the guilt and sanity phases, impugning his mental defenses and the integrity of his expert witnesses, necessitate reversal of the penalty determination because the remarks went to the issue at the core of his penalty defense: i.e., whether his conduct should be considered any less blameworthy because it was, according to the defense, the product of mental disease and Vietnam war trauma. Citing Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954] and Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869], defendant asserts that the prosecutor's misconduct deprived him of his constitutional right to have the jury consider his mental defense as mitigation. As indicated previously, most of the prosecutor's challenged remarks were made during the sanity phase of trial. The comments were directed to persuading the jury to reject defense evidence that at the time of the offenses defendant was legally insane. At the penalty phase, by contrast, the prosecutor in closing argument expressly recognized the existence and potential mitigating effect of defendant's mental problems. In addition, pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.1 the court instructed the jury to consider in determining penalty whether at the time of the offense defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance or was suffering from mental disease or defect and whether there was any other circumstance which extenuated the gravity of the crime. (CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (d), (h), (k); ง 190.3, factors (d), (h), (k).) These instructions in effect directed the jury to consider the evidence of defendant's mental problems. Consequently, any impropriety in the prosecutor's asserted broad attack against psychiatric evidence was nonprejudicial.
(31) Defendant complains that the court instructed the jury that in determining penalty it could consider all of the evidence which had been received during any part of the trial and refused to modify CALJIC No. 8.84.1 to specify that the jury could consider only evidence relevant to the statutory aggravating circumstances. In People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782], we held that in determining penalty the jury can consider in aggravation only evidence that bears upon one of the statutory listed factors exclusive of factor (k) ( id. at pp. 775-776) and that the prosecutor was not entitled to introduce in aggravation evidence of defendant's background, character, or conduct which is not probative of any specific listed factor, exclusive of factor (k) ( id. at p. 774). We stated further, however, that once the defense has presented background and character evidence admissible under factor (k), relevant and specific prosecution rebuttal evidence is admissible. ( Id. at p. 776; see also People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 790-792 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Once a defendant places his general character in issue, the prosecutor [is] entitled to rebut with evidence or argument suggesting a more balanced picture of his personality. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, at p. 791.) In Boyd we were concerned not with any perceived ambiguity in CALJIC No. 8.84.1, but with prosecution evidence and argument improperly directed to nonstatutory aggravating factors. ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 772-779; see People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 777-779 [upholding 1978 law despite failure to exclude nonstatutory aggravating factors as a basis for the death penalty].) In the instant case the prosecutor did not introduce nonstatutory aggravating evidence at the penalty phase nor did he argue that specific nonstatutory factors could be considered in aggravation. However, anticipating defense counsel's closing argument concerning defendant's background and character evidence, the prosecutor stated: Now, you may also consider the general background, character, history of Manuel Babbitt. While I'm sure there are a lot of things that Mr. Schenk [defense counsel] will rely on in saying that this [evidence] is a mitigating factor, I only point out to you that you know a little bit about Manuel Babbitt, and a lot of it isn't nice. And you may consider any of that material concerning his character and background as an aggravating factor in determining what the punishment should be.  (Italics added.) Defendant argues that the italicized comment permitted the jury to consider in aggravation such nonstatutory factors shown by evidence at the guilt phase as his theft of his brother's car, his illicit sexual relations with a woman not his wife, his fathering of two children by Theresa Babbitt without legal marriage, and his post-Vietnam consumption of illegal drugs. Defendant's failure to object compromises his argument. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 791.) In any event, the point lacks merit. It is apparent that the thrust of the prosecutor's remarks was to rebut defense counsel's anticipated argument concerning the mitigating effect of defendant's background and character evidence by reminding the jury of the negative aspects of defendant's character and history โ his prior felony convictions and his numerous acts of violence to strangers and family alike, evidence which could properly be considered in aggravation as well as in rebuttal. [20] Viewed in light of the entire record, the comment could not have misled the jury. At the outset of the penalty phase the court informed the jury that although it could consider the evidence it had previously heard, it was to view the evidence for the different purpose of determining penalty, and in considering the evidence, it was to take into account and be guided by the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors as to which it would be instructed. The prosecutor repeated this admonition, followed by enumeration of the aggravating factors the jury could properly consider. Defense counsel in closing argument also enumerated the aggravating factors the jury could properly consider. Counsel expressly informed the jury that it was not entitled to consider defendant's nonviolent criminal activity, specifically mentioning defendant's theft of his brother's car, and cited defendant's possible intoxication or use of drugs as a mitigating factor. Thereafter the court properly instructed the jury as to the factors it could consider in determining penalty. Assuming, therefore, that the Boyd directives ( supra, 38 Cal.3d 762) apply retroactively โ an issue that we have not decided (see People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 441 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279]) โ we conclude that the prosecutor's single nonspecific reference to defendant's background evidence as aggravating could not reasonably have misled the jury concerning the evidence it could consider in determining penalty. Furthermore, even were we to assume that the jury may have been misled as to the use of nonstatutory aggravating evidence, under any test of prejudice the error could not have affected the penalty verdict. In light of defense counsel's closing argument advancing defendant's possible drug use as a mitigating factor and excluding the theft of his brother's car as aggravating, the only guilt phase evidence the jury may possibly have improperly considered was the evidence related to defendant's illicit sexual relationship with a woman not his wife and his fathering of two children without benefit of marriage. Viewed in light of all the aggravating evidence properly presented to the jury โ the circumstances of the crime itself, including the defenselessness of the victim, defendant's prior felony convictions, his attack on Mavis W., his violent conduct toward his first wife and Theresa Babbitt and his other violent outbursts โ consideration of this evidence clearly was nonprejudicial.
The court instructed the jury in terms of former CALJIC No. 8.84.1 without clarifying that factor (k) of section 190.3 permits the jury to consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record as mitigating evidence. ( People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) (32a) Defendant contends that the trial court's refusal to give his proposed clarifying instruction on mitigation [21] deprived him of the opportunity to have the jury consider all his mitigating evidence as required by Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586. (33) Pursuant to Lockett v. Ohio, supra , a defendant is entitled to have the jury consider as a mitigating factor any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. (438 U.S. at p. 604 [57 L.Ed.2d at p. 990], fn. omitted.) We have determined that section 190.3, factor (k) satisfies the Lockett directive. ( People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], revd. on other grounds, California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837], see People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858, 878.) However, in order to avoid any potential misunderstanding, in People v. Easley, supra , we imposed the prospective requirement that trial courts expressly inform the jury that it may consider character and background evidence as well as mitigating evidence that relates to the crime. (34 Cal.3d at p. 878, fn. 10.) Failure of trial courts prior to Easley to give the clarifying instruction does not necessarily invalidate a death penalty verdict. Rather, our task is to review each such prior case on its own merits to determine whether in context the jury may have been misled concerning the scope of the evidence to be considered in its sentencing determination. ( People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at p. 544, fn. 17; see People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 786-787; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 102-103 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127]; see also People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 777-778 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250] [1977 law].) (32b) In the instant case nothing in the court's instructions or the prosecutor's argument suggested to the jury that it should not consider defendant's mitigating evidence. To the contrary, the prosecutor, as discussed previously, expressly informed the jury that it could consider defendant's general background, character, [and] history, and noted that defense counsel would argue that these considerations were mitigating factors. Implicitly recognizing the potential mitigating effect of the evidence, the prosecutor sought to rebut it. Addressing the testimony of defendant's family that he was a loving person, the prosecutor asserted that theirs was a distorted picture โ defendant had been on his best behavior in his contacts with his family. Addressing defense counsel's anticipated reference to defendant's combat service in Vietnam, the prosecutor stated that this would be a way of diverting attention, trying to make you feel bad, trying to make you feel responsible for the death of Leah Schendel, ... He pointed out that the war happened a long time ago and urged the jury to remember that its task was to assess the criminal responsibility of one Manuel Babbitt, and not his conduct in the Vietnam War. Is this the kind of murder where we ought to be sensitive to the needs of the person who committed it? he asked rhetorically. Is this the kind of murder where we have to be understanding about the circumstances under which it was committed? In sum, the prosecutor's argument was premised on the relevance of defendant's background and character evidence. Defense counsel's argument reinforced the premise. Factor (k), counsel argued, was the most important consideration in the weighing process. Fulfilling the prosecutor's expectation, defense counsel cited as factors in mitigation within the ambit of factor (k) that defendant's family believed him to be a loving, caring person and that starting when he was only 17 years old defendant served two tours of duty in Vietnam, earning several medals and citations. Counsel further argued that defendant is a religious person, that he loves his children and his ex-wife, and that he got Theresa Babbitt off of drugs. On this record, we conclude that there exists `no legitimate basis' for believing that the jury was misled concerning its responsibility to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. ( People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777, citing California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 546 [93 L.Ed.2d at p. 943] (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).)
(34) The jury was instructed pursuant to former CALJIC No. 8.84.2 that If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose a sentence of death. Defendant argues that the mandatory language of this instruction precludes the jury from making the individualized sentencing determination required by Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) 428 U.S. 280, 304-305 [49 L.Ed.2d 944, 961, 96 S.Ct. 2978] (plur. opn.), Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990], and Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. 104, 110-112 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8-9]. In People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at page 544, we upheld the 1978 death penalty statute against a challenge that it withdraws constitutionally compelled sentencing discretion from the jury. (See also People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1279, fn. 38 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) To forestall any possible confusion we directed trial courts in the future to instruct the jury as to the scope of its discretion and responsibility in accordance with the principles set forth in Brown. We stated that whether the jury in a pre- Brown case has been misled so as to prejudice the defendant depends on a case-by-case analysis. ( People v. Brown, supra, at p. 544, fn. 17.) The prosecutor in the instant case referred extensively to the jury's weighing function and the difficulty of its ultimate decision. He first stated that the jury had an awesome and a grave decision to make, ... one ... that will cause you all some emotional turmoil, ... However, he stated, you can simply retreat to the safe haven of the law and catalog the aggravating factors and consider them, consider what weight they have, and catalog whatever mitigating factors you might find, and consider what weight they have, and then attempt to make a balancing.... Later, after reciting what he believed were the applicable aggravating and mitigating circumstances, he concluded that when you weigh the factors, I think the scale will clearly bottom out in favor of the aggravating factors. The prosecutor then discussed at length the jury's responsibility to determine the appropriate punishment for defendant. For three pages of transcript he emphasized that this difficult responsibility had befallen the jurors, that they must not shirk their duty, that justice is ultimately in the hands of individual citizens who are called upon to be jurors. The issue, he urged, is whether they, the jurors, will have the courage to put aside the emotions of their hearts and to make the necessary decision in this case, the individual and collective good judgment to find the true, just, and appropriate punishment. They were, he stated, in effect the conscience of the community. Their individual consciences would best be served by making the hard decision that must be made with your head and not your heart. He urged those of the jury who found their way to the just and necessary decision more readily than others to have compassion and patience for those of you for whom it will be a more difficult decision, because each of you must struggle within yourselves to find that little corner of yourself that will allow us to do what is the right thing in this case.... Defense counsel similarly emphasized the jury's weighing function and the individual discretion of each juror to reach a conclusion which he or she thought just. What is the concept of outweigh? Is it a quality or a quantity of outweigh? Is this something you put in a computer ...? I don't think so. [ถ] Should one mitigating factor outweigh all the aggravating when you're considering taking a man's life? I believe it's a qualitative evaluation. And you are required to consider it in that light. [ถ] There is no statement in the law of this State that says death is automatic.... The law does not require it. It gives the decision to you. There is no road that leads directly to death. [ถ] The oath of a juror does not require you to be a faceless executioner of Manny Babbitt. It does not require. And a unanimous decision is required. In light of the arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel, the jury could not have been misled by the unadorned instruction about its sole responsibility to determine, based on its individualized weighing discretion, whether death was appropriate in this case. (See People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1278-1280; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 104.)
(35) Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.1, at the conclusion of the penalty phase the court instructed the jury that it shall consider ... if applicable each of the enumerated statutory aggravating and mitigating factors (ง 190.3). Defendant contends that the trial court's failure sua sponte to delete reference to inapplicable mitigating factors permitted the jury to treat the absence of such factors as aggravating factors. We previously have rejected the contention that the trial court is required to delete inapplicable mitigating factors from CALJIC No. 8.84.1. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, at pp. 104-105; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 776-777.) Although the absence of any of the statutory factors should not be considered aggravating ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861]), implicit in our previous decisions is the conclusion that CALJIC No. 8.84.1 does not of itself suggest to the jury that it may consider the absent statutory mitigating factors in aggravation. In the instant case there was no instruction given nor prosecution argument made that might have led the jury to the improper use of absent mitigating factors. Indeed, the prosecutor made no reference to the absent factors, discussing only the mitigating factors relied on by defendant. Defense counsel, in turn, went through the entire list of factors, informing the jury which of the mitigating factors did not apply.
(36a) Pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.84.1, the court instructed the jury that it should consider and take into account the defendant's age at the time of the crime. (See ง 190.3, factor (i).) Observing that age cannot be deemed an aggravating factor ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 789), defendant argues that CALJIC No. 8.84.1 is defective in that it permits the jury to consider a defendant's age in aggravation, a mistake, he asserts, that the trial judge in this case made. (See post at p. 723.) We decline to find the instruction fatally ambiguous. In People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 316 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149], in rejecting the claim that a failure to specify which of the factors were aggravating and which mitigating made former section 190.3 invalid, we stated, We believe that the aggravating or mitigating nature of these various factors should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case. We see no reason to conclude otherwise concerning the almost identical provisions of the 1978 law. (37) It is true that mere chronological age ... should not of itself be deemed an aggravating factor. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 789, italics deleted.) Neither should it be deemed a mitigating factor. ( People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 302 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) Age alone is plainly `a factor over which one can exercise no control' ( Rodriguez, supra, at p. 789) and as such is not relevant to the issue of penalty. ( Lucky, supra . ) Rather, as we explained in Lucky, supra, age as used in statutory sentencing factor (i) is a metonym for any age-related matter suggested by the evidence or by common experience or morality that might reasonably inform the choice of penalty. Accordingly, either counsel may argue any such age-related inference in every case. (45 Cal.3d at p. 302.) (36b) Here the prosecutor observed that sometimes it's kind of hard to determine whether or not a person's age should be a mitigating factor or aggravating factor. Continuing, he stated that defendant, 31 years old at the time of the offenses, was not a young person in their early twenties or eighteen, nineteen years old, that you might consider the fact of their relative immaturity.... [ถ] By the same token, he isn't so far down the line to an older age where you might want to consider his relatively advanced age. He's really in that age where he should know better and has no excuse for committing the crimes that he's committed. These remarks were not error. ( People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 302.)
(38a) Defendant claims that the trial court's failure sua sponte to instruct the jury as to which of the guilt and sanity phase instructions applied in the penalty phase denied him a fair penalty phase trial. He asserts that if the jurors ignored all the guilt and sanity phase instructions in their penalty deliberations, then it left the jury without guidance as to how to assess witness credibility [22] and created the possibility of an adverse inference from defendant's failure to testify. If, on the other hand, the jury believed that the guilt and sanity phase instructions applied at the penalty phase, defendant was denied a fair penalty determination because the jury was instructed at the guilt phase not to be influenced by sympathy for defendant and to disregard the consequences of its decision. (39) We first observe that in the penalty phase, as in the guilt phase, the trial court has no sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on the defendant's failure to testify. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 758-759 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) (38b) Further, we question defendant's premise that at the penalty phase the jury either applied or rejected in toto all of the guilt phase instructions. The language of the no-sympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) refers specifically to deciding a defendant's guilt or innocence. [23] The instructions on witness credibility (CALJIC No. 2.20) [24] and the defendant's failure to testify (CALJIC Nos. 2.60, 2.61), [25] by contrast, make no reference to the issue of guilt or innocence. The jury therefore could reasonably have understood that the former did not apply to the penalty phase, whereas the latter did apply. (See People v. Gates (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1209 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) The question, in any event, is whether the jury may have been misled into applying the antisympathy guilt phase instruction at the penalty phase. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 785; see People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 624 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854]; People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 761; cf. California v. Brown, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 544-546 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837](conc. opn. by O'Connor, J.).) As discussed earlier, both the prosecutor and defense counsel argued the weight of defendant's mitigating evidence, specifically including evidence relating to his background, character and history. The jury was not told that it could not consider sympathy. Nor is there any indication that it may have been misled into applying the antisympathy guilt phase instruction at the penalty phase. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 786.) We conclude that the trial court did not err in failing to give additional clarifying instructions on the subject of sympathy at the penalty phase. ( People v. Ruiz, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 624; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 102-103.) (40) We similarly reject defendant's argument that there was a prejudicial carryover effect from the final portion of CALJIC No. 1.00, which read you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. As with the guilt phase antisympathy instruction (se People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 785), the potential for confusion from the guilt phase instruction to disregard the consequences is attenuated at the penalty phase. Consequently, the question is whether on review of the record as a whole it appears that an abstract possibility of prejudice may have been realized. (See People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 759-760; cf. People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 785.) Here both the prosecutor and defense counsel emphasized to the jury the gravity of its decision. Thus, the prosecutor stated, [Y]ou have an awesome and a grave decision to make, ... [one] that will cause you all some emotional turmoil. Defense counsel stated: You are going to have to consider the fate of Mr. Babbitt.... [Y]our decision, should it be death, is a premeditate[d], deliberate, cruel, calculated killing. All twelve of you can decide to kill someone.... [ถ] You are going to have to face your decision.... We conclude that the jury could not have been misled as to its responsibility to consider the consequences of its decision. [26]
(41a) Defendant contends that the trial court's failure sua sponte to modify CALJIC No. 8.84.1 improperly permitted the jury to consider the circumstances of Leah Schendel's death under both factors (a) and (b) and his 1973 Massachusetts robberies under both factors (b) and (c), [27] thereby increasing the likelihood that the jury would find that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating and would therefore return a death sentence. (42) It is settled that factors (b) and (c) of section 190.3 pertain only to criminal activity other than the crimes for which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. ( People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 105-106; see also People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 764.) We have also determined, however, that section 190.3 contemplates the dual consideration of a prior felony conviction under factors (b) and (c) when the underlying felony involved violence. ( People v. Melton, supra, at pp. 765-766; cf. People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 201 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480] [explaining the difference between factors (b) and (c)].) This is because factors (b) and (c) are directed to distinct aspects of the defendant's character: his propensity to violence and his failure to respond to correction. To consider each in aggravation does not artificially inflate the aggravating factors, but, rather, truly reflects the defendant's particularized circumstances ( Jurek v. Texas (1976) 428 U.S. 262, 274 [49 L.Ed.2d 929, 939, 96 S.Ct. 2950]). (See People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 765-766.) It cannot seriously be disputed that a defendant whose prior conviction involved violence is more culpable than one whose did not, nor that a defendant whose prior violent activity resulted in conviction is more culpable than one who has not previously been punished by the criminal justice system. (41b) In the case at bench, in any event, there could have been no confusion concerning the application of the three factors. The prosecutor in closing argument explained that the circumstances of the crime referred to the nature of the attack on Leah Schendel, any prior felony convictions referred to defendant's two convictions for armed robbery, and other violent criminal conduct by defendant referred to the attack on Mavis W. and defendant's other specified assaultive behavior. Defense counsel covered the same ground.
(43) Defendant argues that the trial court's instructions relating to mental disturbance improperly limited consideration of his mental condition in violation of the principle that the jury must be permitted to give weight to all aspects of a defendant's character and record and the circumstances of the offense. (See Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. 586, 604 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 989-990]; Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. 104, 110 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8].) Pursuant to factors (d) and (h) of CALJIC No. 8.84.1, the jury was instructed to consider in determining penalty (d) whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and (h) whether or not at the time of the offense the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication. Defendant maintains that factor (d), by requiring an extreme condition, impermissibly excludes consideration of a lesser mental disturbance. He further maintains that the similarity between factor (h) and the test for legal insanity [28] would mislead the jury, which at the sanity phase of trial had found defendant sane, to believe that it could not consider defendant's mental disease or defect in mitigation. In People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 776, we rejected the contention that the provision of the 1977 death penalty law which referred to extreme mental or emotional disturbance deprived the defendant of his right to have the jury consider all his mitigating evidence, in light of the further catchall provision of the statute, which directed the jury to consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime (former ง 190.3, factor (j); see now ง 190.3, factor (k)). We determined that under the latter instruction the jury could take into account a mental condition of the defendant which, though perhaps not deemed `extreme,' nonetheless mitigates the seriousness of the offense. (43 Cal.3d at p. 776.) The same is true under the 1978 law. In the instant case, no argument was made that defendant's mental or emotional disturbance could be considered only if extreme, the prosecutor recognized that defendant had mental problems, and defense counsel expressly argued that defendant was under duress or emotional disturbance. Nor do we agree with defendant that factor (h) suggested to the jury that, having found defendant sane, it could not consider his asserted mental defects or disease in mitigation. Whereas the insanity instruction requires that a defendant lack substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law, factor (h) requires only that his capacity to do so be impaired. The difference between the two standards is readily apparent. Further, both the prosecutor and defense counsel informed the jury that defendant's mental condition could properly be considered even though the jury had found him to be legally sane. [29] Moreover, in response to an inquiry from the jury during deliberations as to whether instruction (i) โ the age of defendant at the time of the crime โ referred to chronological age or state of mental development, the court instructed the jury that state of mental development is provided for under (h) and/or (k). On the record before us there is nothing to suggest that the jury failed to give full consideration to defendant's evidence of his mental or emotional state at the time of the offense.