Opinion ID: 1477292
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Strict Scrutiny for Sex-Based Classifications Even Where Facially Neutral

Text: On the basis of Rand and its progeny, and cases in sister states interpreting similar constitutional provisions, Judge Eldridge in Burning Tree I concluded that the E.R.A. renders sex-based classifications suspect and subject to at least strict scrutiny, with the burden of persuasion being upon those attempting to justify the classifications. Burning Tree I, 305 Md. at 98, 501 A.2d at 840 (emphasis in original). Therefore, [i]n this respect, the E.R.A. makes sex classifications subject to at least the same scrutiny as racial classifications. Id. (emphasis added). Even a facially neutral statute can implicate strict scrutiny if the purpose and effect of the classification are discriminatory, Judge Eldridge concluded. Id. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841. Indeed, [i]f the purpose and effect of the primary purpose provision had related to single race rather than single sex clubs, the provision, regardless of any alleged neutrality in the language, would clearly fall under the principles of Hunter v. Underwood [ [31] ]; Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. [ [32] ]; Gomillion v. Lightfoot [ [33] ], and similar cases. Id. at 102, 501 A.2d at 842 (emphasis added). In Judge Eldridge's view, Section 19(e)(4)(1), which prohibited discrimination on the grounds of race, color, creed, sex, or national origin, but permitted sexual discrimination when the country club's primary purpose was to serve or benefit members of a particular sex, was unconstitutional both on its face and in its effect. Id. at 99-102, 501 A.2d at 840-42. Because at all times from the enactment of the primary purpose anti-discrimination provision, until the time the case was litigated, Burning Tree was the only entity to which the provision applied, id. at 100, 501 A.2d at 841, it was undisputed that the purpose and effect of Section 19(e)(4)(1) were to permit one country club to maintain its discriminatory policy while continuing to receive a substantial state benefit. Id. at 101, 501 A.2d at 841. In that respect, Burning Tree I was indistinguishable from a line of Supreme Court cases that invalidated ostensibly neutral laws the effects of which were patently discriminatory on grounds of race. See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 227, 233, 105 S.Ct. 1916, 1919-20, 1923, 85 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-28, 231 (1985) (facially neutral state constitutional provision disenfranchising disproportionate numbers of African-Americans held in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823-24, 18 L.Ed.2d 1010, 1017-18 (1967) (facially neutral anti-miscegenation statutes held in violation of Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42, 81 S.Ct. 125, 127, 5 L.Ed.2d 110, 113 (1960) (local law altering municipal boundary to exclude nearly all African-American voters constitutionally suspect). To summarize, in Burning Tree I, a majority of this Court interpreted our prior cases to mandate a robust interpretation of the ERA. Henceforth, government action resulting in sex-based classifications would be subject to strict scrutiny, with the burden placed on the proponents of the classifications to demonstrate they were narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. This Court took special care to look beneath ostensibly neutral classifications to their underlying purpose and effect, in order to ferret out state sanctioned discrimination masquerading as facially neutral law.