Opinion ID: 2621822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Successive Petition

Text: The prohibition on successive PRPs found in RCW 10.73.140 [3] limits the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals but does not limit this court's jurisdiction. In re Pers. Restraint of Johnson, 131 Wash.2d 558, 565, 933 P.2d 1019 (1997). RAP 16.4(d) [4] bars consideration of a second petition for similar relief without a showing of good cause, but this court has already indicated that Stoudmire's claim does not fall within the scope of similar relief contemplated by the rule: [P]etitioner may resubmit this claim in a subsequent petition. RAP 16.4(d) bars consideration of a second petition for similar relief without a showing of good cause. Following the definition of similar relief in Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 14, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963), this court in In re Personal Restraint of Haverty, 101 Wash.2d 498, 502-03, 681 P.2d 835 (1984) stated that a successive petition could be dismissed only where the prior application had been denied on grounds previously heard and determined on the merits. Since we are dismissing on procedural grounds petitioner's claim to withdrawal of his guilty pleas to second and third degree rape, we did not consider it on its merits. Stoudmire, 141 Wash.2d at 350-51, 5 P.3d 1240. Thus, this PRP is not barred as a successive petition.