Opinion ID: 1308078
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: disclosure of the informant

Text: Prior to trial, the appellant by motion sought disclosure of the name of the confidential informant, so that he might interview him for possible use as a witness at trial. The State opposed the disclosure. After a hearing, the court found that the informant did not participate in the sale in any way, and that disclosure of his name would endanger him and undermine law enforcement efforts, and overruled the motion. The appellant now contends that the court's refusal to order this disclosure violated his rights to due process and to compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses. We disagree. A common law privilege is accorded the government against the disclosure of the identity of an informant who has furnished information concerning violations of law to officers charged with enforcement of the law. However, disclosure may be required where the defendant's case could be jeopardized by nondisclosure. Syl. pt. 1, State v. Tamez, W.Va., 290 S.E.2d 14 (1982), quoting, syl. pt. 1, State v. Haverty, W.Va., 267 S.E.2d 727 (1980). See also Syl. pt. 2, State v. McCourt, W.Va., 283 S.E.2d 918 (1981); State ex rel. Lykens v. Bouchelle, 122 W.Va. 498, 11 S.E.2d 119 (1940); State v. Paun, 109 W.Va. 606, 155 S.E. 656 (1930). In Tamez, supra, we held that in ruling upon a motion for disclosure the trial court must balance the State's need for nondisclosure against its consequences upon the defendant's ability to receive a fair trial. The resolution of the disclosure issue shall rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, and only an abuse of discretion will result in reversal. 290 S.E.2d at 21. In State v. Walls, W.Va., 294 S.E.2d 272 (1982), we said that disclosure might be required where the informant was a direct participant in, or a material witness to, the crime. Appellant contends that he should have been allowed to interview the informant, as a potential witness. The transcript of the hearing on appellant's motion, however, shows that the informant merely introduced Kirk to the appellant, and did not witness nor participate in the sale. Therefore, appellant has not been deprived of a witness. We find nothing in the record to indicate that appellant's defense would have been aided by the disclosure, or that it was necessary to ensure a fair trial. In support of the State's position, Trooper Kirk testified that disclosure of the informant's name would endanger his life and force the premature termination of several ongoing investigations. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not err, and did not abuse its discretion in overruling appellant's motion for disclosure of the confidential informant.