Opinion ID: 669664
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Use of Expert Testimony

Text: 8 The decision to admit expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is left to the broad discretion of the district court and will be sustained unless manifestly erroneous. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1308 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 958, 108 S.Ct. 357, 98 L.Ed.2d 382 (1987). Defendants contend that the trial court committed such manifest error in admitting the expert testimony of Agent Glauner because the subject matter of his testimony was not beyond the ken of the jury. Defendants rely primarily on United States v. Cruz, 981 F.2d 659 (2d Cir.1992), and United States v. Castillo, 924 F.2d 1227 (2d Cir.1991). In both cases, we reversed the defendants' convictions because the Government improperly used expert testimony on the drug trafficking trade. 9 In Cruz, we held that expert testimony cannot be used solely to bolster the credibility of the government's fact-witnesses by mirroring their version of events. 981 F.2d at 664. In that case, a law enforcement official gave expert testimony about the conduct of brokers who arrange drug transactions between purchasers in Albany and suppliers in the Washington Heights area of Manhattan which corresponded closely to earlier factual accounts of the defendant's alleged activities. In Castillo, a detective testified about typical operating methods of Washington Heights drug dealers, describing their work apartments, the drug-related materials typically found within these apartments, and the practice of making potential customers snort cocaine. We held that the admission of this expert testimony was erroneous because the jury was capable of understanding these matters without the expert's assistance. 924 F.2d at 1233. In both cases, the Government relied heavily on the expert testimony during summation, stressing the similarities between the witnesses' version of events and the expert's description of typical drug transactions. While reaffirming our position that the operations of narcotics dealers are a proper subject for expert testimony, we cautioned that such testimony should normally be used only for subjects that have esoteric aspects reasonably perceived as beyond the ken of the jury. Cruz, 981 F.2d at 664; Castillo, 924 F.2d at 1232. 10 This case is different from the situations presented in Cruz and Castillo. Agent Glauner did not give a narrative statement of a typical drug transaction that mirrored the testimony of the Government's fact-witnesses. On the contrary, he provided brief, crisp answers to the Government's questions about several discrete topics: the purity and the weight of the cocaine seized from the defendants, the dosages this cocaine would yield for resale on the street, the wholesale price of the cocaine, the use of beepers by narcotics traffickers, the technique of using codes with beepers to signal the identity of the caller, and the use of cash and nicknames or false names by drug traffickers. In addition, Agent Glauner opined that Hernandez's composition book was an accounting record of drug sales. His substantive testimony constituted only five pages of a trial transcript that spanned 486 pages. 11 While some of the subjects about which Agent Glauner testified are more esoteric than others, his statements fell within the bounds of acceptable use of expert testimony. Testimony about the weight, purity, dosages, and prices of cocaine clearly relates to knowledge beyond the ken of the average juror. Our circuit has also previously permitted expert testimony regarding the use of beepers and code numbers by narcotics traffickers, United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 830 (2d Cir.1985), and the accounting books they keep in connection with narcotics transactions, United States v. Diaz, 878 F.2d 608, 616-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 993, 110 S.Ct. 543, 107 L.Ed.2d 540 (1989). Agent Glauner's information about the purity, weight, and value of the cocaine was relevant to proving that the drugs in this case were intended for distribution, and his testimony about the use of beepers and the accounting book was helpful in understanding the business cards found in defendants' possession and Hernandez's composition book. The admission of Agent Glauner's testimony on these subjects was therefore not manifestly erroneous. 12 We recognize that the Agent's testimony regarding traffickers' use of cash and nicknames in order to conceal their identities has a common sense aspect to it that makes its admission more troubling. However, as we indicated in Cruz, expert testimony may be used on some occasions to explain even non-esoteric matters, when the defense seeks to discredit the government's version of events as improbable criminal behavior. 981 F.2d at 664. Counsel for both defendants asserted such a defense. 13 Counsel for Tapia-Ortiz acknowledged that Tapia-Ortiz had conversations with Isaziga, appeared at the meeting at the Long Island hotel where the cocaine was delivered, and possessed business cards with phone numbers written on the back when arrested, but argued that his conduct could not have been criminal because the agents allowed him to leave the Long Island hotel without arresting him. Counsel for Velez-Morales similarly asserted that his activities were not related to narcotics. He argued that Velez-Morales's possession of a business card with Hernandez's beeper number and code number was meaningless because there was no evidence that he possessed a beeper; that although Velez-Morales wired money to Tapia-Ortiz in Florida prior to the latter's delivery of money to Isaziga, evidence of this transaction was simply an attempt to create guilt by association; that there was no way for Velez-Morales to know that there were drugs in the trunk of the car he drove away from the Long Island hotel; and that the ensuing high-speed chase occurred because anyone in those circumstances could panic. 14 Because both defendants argued that the Government's version of events did not suggest criminal activity, the Government was justified in introducing expert testimony explaining that drug traffickers employ certain techniques, such as using beepers, cash, and nicknames, in order to avoid detection. See United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 400-02 (2d Cir.1985) (police officer permitted to describe typical drug buy in Harlem, including the role of a steerer, where the accused's defense was that he was on the scene but unaware of any drug transaction), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S.Ct. 1793, 90 L.Ed.2d 339 (1986). 15 Our conclusion that no error occurred in this case is supported by the fact that the Government did not place great emphasis on Agent Glauner's testimony in its summation. While the prosecutor incorporated information about the weight and dosages of the seized cocaine into his remarks, he explicitly referred to Agent Glauner only once. In the context of discussing Hernandez's accounting book, which contained multiple references to Flaco, the prosecutor reminded the jury that Agent Glauner told you that drug dealers use nicknames. He also stated that because drug-dealing is an illegal business, traffickers will pay in cash and use beepers in order to avoid detection. These statements reflect the total use of Agent Glauner's testimony during summation. 16 Unlike in Cruz and Castillo, the prosecutor did not stress the similarities between the testimony of its fact-witnesses and an expert's description of a typical drug transaction. As such, this case simply does not present the problem of the Government impermissibly using expert testimony to bolster the credibility of its fact-witnesses by mirroring their version of events. In addition, although testimony properly admitted under Rule 702 can still be excluded under Rule 403 on the basis that its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial effect, we do not believe that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the usefulness of Agent Glauner's testimony was not outweighed by a danger of unfair prejudice. See United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d 795, 805 (2d Cir.1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 940, 111 S.Ct. 1397, 113 L.Ed.2d 453 (1991). 17 Accordingly, we deny both defendants' claims that their convictions should be vacated based on the admission of Agent Glauner's testimony. However, we caution the Government that expert testimony regarding the more elementary concepts of detection avoidance will in many instances be unnecessary and in different circumstances could lead to a finding of reversible error.