Opinion ID: 78599
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Underlying Protective Order

Text: In his last point of error, DuBose attacks the validity of his underlying protective order, entered on April 7, 2008, arguing that the order was void when he purchased the firearm because: (1) the government failed to prove that Drinkard, a district court judge in Marengo County, had the authority to enter any orders in a domestic relations case in the Circuit Court of Clarke County; and (2) any orders issued in the March 25, 2008 hearing before Judge Baxter were void because they were entered prior to the payment of a filing fee or the case being filed. We need not address the merits of DuBose's arguments because we hold that he cannot challenge the validity of the underlying protective order as a means of collaterally attacking his 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) prosecution. Whether a defendant can collaterally attack a protective order is a question of law we review de novo. Cf. United States v. Mikell, 102 F.3d 470, 474 (11th Cir.1996) (stating that whether a defendant can collaterally attack a prior conviction is a question of statutory interpretation reviewed de novo ). Whether a defendant may challenge the validity of the underlying state court protective order in a 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) prosecution is an issue of first impression in this court. Every other circuit to address this issue, however, has held that a defendant may not collaterally attack the underlying protective order in a Section 922(g)(8) prosecution. See United States v. Wescott, 576 F.3d 347, 354 (7th Cir.2009); United States v. Young, 458 F.3d 998, 1005 (9th Cir.2006); United States v. Hicks, 389 F.3d 514, 534 (5th Cir.2004); United States v. Baker, 197 F.3d 211, 216-17 (6th Cir.1999). In each of those cases, the court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). In Lewis, the defendant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)(1). 445 U.S. at 56, 100 S.Ct. at 916. The defendant argued that his predicate felony conviction was invalid because he was not represented by counsel at the time of his conviction. Id. at 56-58, 100 S.Ct. at 916-18. The Supreme Court disagreed, determining that under the plain meaning of the statute the fact of a felony conviction imposes a firearm disability until the conviction is vacated or the felon is relieved of his disability by some affirmative action. Id. at 60-61, 100 S.Ct. at 918. The Court thus held that the federal firearms statute intended to prevent all convicted felons from possessing firearms, even if the underlying felony conviction ultimately might turn out to be invalid. Id. at 62, 100 S.Ct. at 919. In Baker, the Sixth Circuit applied Lewis 's reasoning to affirm the conviction of a defendant who possessed a firearm while subject to a domestic violence protection order. 197 F.3d at 217. Baker attacked his Section 922(g)(8) conviction on the grounds that the civil proceeding by which he was made subject to the order did not afford him the constitutional safeguards associated with a criminal proceeding. Id. at 216. Calling the Supreme Court's decision in Lewis instructive, the court held that [r]egardless as to how Baker became subject to a domestic violence protection order, he attained that status and thus must comply with § 922(g)(8). Id. at 217. Because [a] jury, after a criminal trial featuring all required constitutional safeguards, found Baker had failed to do so, the court upheld Baker's conviction. Id. Three other circuits have since agreed. In Hicks, the defendant argued that his conviction under Section 922(g)(8) was invalid because the state court that issued the underlying protective order lacked subject matter jurisdiction. 389 F.3d at 534. The Fifth Circuit, relying on Lewis, affirmed Hick's conviction upon determining that nothing in the language of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) indicates that it applies only to persons subject to a valid, as opposed to an invalid, protective order. Id. at 535 (emphasis in original). The court then pointed out that [i]f Hicks truly believed that [the order] was invalid, he should have objected to the [county court]'s subject-matter jurisdiction at the original court hearing, appealed the order for lack of jurisdiction, or sought a writ of mandamus from the local appellate court before possessing either firearms or ammunition. Id. at 536 (emphasis in original); accord Young, 458 F.3d at 1005 (holding that defendants prosecuted under Section 922(g)(8) may only attack the validity of the underlying protective order on the grounds that they were not provided a hearing of which they were given actual notice and an opportunity to participate); Wescott, 576 F.3d at 353 (determining that, because the protective order against the defendant was issued after a hearing in compliance with Section 922(g)(8)(A), [s]o long as the Order was in effect, [the defendant] could not lawfully possess firearms or ammunition). We follow our sister circuits and hold that protective orders satisfying the Section 922(g)(8) requirements are analogous to felony convictions for the purposes of the statute's restraint on the possession of firearms. Reasoning from Lewis, the validity of an underlying protective order is therefore irrelevant to a defendant's conviction under Section 922(g)(8). Here, it is uncontested that a protective order was entered against Defendant DuBose on April 7, 2008. It is also uncontested that DuBose was present and represented himself at the hearing. Thus, the requirements that DuBose receive a hearing with actual notice and an opportunity to respond have been met. DuBose cites no authority suggesting that an invalid underlying protective order would nullify his conviction. Moreover, his attempts to distinguish the relevant precedent fail. At the time it was entered, the protective order against DuBose had as much force as the defendant's protective order in Hicks. As with the Hicks defendant, if DuBose truly believed that the order was invalid, he should have objected to the court's subject-matter jurisdiction before possessing either firearms or ammunition. Because DuBose purchased a firearm while subject to a domestic violence protective order issued after a hearing of which DuBose had actual notice and at which he had an opportunity to respond, the jury properly convicted him under Section 922(g)(8). Thus, we affirm the district court's denial of DuBose's motion for a judgment of acquittal. AFFIRMED. [3]