Opinion ID: 761499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BAT's Refusal to Allow Grinnell Employees to Enroll in Existing Programs

Text: 21 BAT has conceded throughout this litigation that it has directed other employers with already approved apprenticeship programs not to enroll Grinnell employees in those programs. See, e.g., ABC II, 978 F.Supp. at 342. We agree with the District Court that BAT had no statutory or regulatory authority to block Grinnell employees from participating in existing apprenticeship programs at other companies. 22 The ad hoc decision itself cites only § 29.3(h) for authority, but acknowledges, as it must, that [s] 29.3(h) is only applicable to the situation where an employer seeks to register a new apprenticeship program with BAT. Ad Hoc Decision at 2, reprinted in Grinnell App. 82J. Section 29.3 is entitled, Eligibility and procedure for Bureau registration of a program. 29 C.F.R. § 29.3 (emphasis added). Nothing in § 29.3--indeed, nothing in Part 29 of the applicable regulations--grants BAT the authority to block one company's employees from enrolling in already registered apprenticeship programs of another company. Thus, to the extent that BAT was relying upon its interpretation of § 29.3(h) for its authority to block such enrollments, that interpretation was plainly erroneous. 23 DOL's brief to this court cited no authority--other than § 29.3(h)--in support of BAT's position, and counsel gave no basis for the authority when questioned at oral argument. The only justification even mentioned at oral argument--that BAT might have been motivated by a desire to give the Union an advantage in the ongoing labor dispute--is certainly not a valid one, as counsel for DOL had to concede. See Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322, 1337-38 (D.C.Cir.1996). 24 Therefore, we affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Grinnell on this point, although we do so for slightly different reasons than those articulated by the District Court. The District Court held that BAT's refusal to allow Grinnell employees to enroll in existing programs violated the NAA because it effectively punish[es] innocent workers. ABC II, 978 F.Supp. at 342. However, we see no need to interpret the NAA here. Instead, we affirm the District Court's decision and order on this point because BAT simply had no lawful authority to do what it did. See University of the Dist. of Columbia Faculty Ass'n/NEA v. District of Columbia Fin. Responsibility and Management Auth., 163 F.3d 616, 621 (D.C.Cir.1998); Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. National Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 659 (D.C.Cir.1994) (en banc). 25