Opinion ID: 324553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: voir dire examination on pretrial publicity

Text: 17 The purpose of voir dire examination is to safeguard the right to jury trial which 'guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.' 4 The requirement of impartiality demands that voir dire examination serve as a filter capable of screening out prospective jurors who are unable to lay aside any opinion as to guilt or innocence and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 5 The trial judge, acting under Rule 24(a), Fed.R.Crim.P., is accorded broad discretion to mold the manner and mode of voir dire examination, to fit the demands of the case at hand, 6 and provides no basis for reversal unless he abuses his discretion, and there is substantial prejudice to the accused. 7 18 In United States v. Bryant, this court endorsed the recommendation of the American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Fair Trial and Free Press § 3.4(a) (1968) as encapsulating the proper criteria for determining when individual voir dire examination regarding pretrial publicity is required. 8 This standard requires individual examination '(w)henever there is believed to be a significant possibility that individual talesmen will be ineligible to serve because of exposure to potentially prejudicial material.' Whether such a 'significant possibility' exists in a given case depends on such circumstances as the amount and pervasiveness of the publicity, its tone or quality, its proximity to the date of trial, and the nature of the particular case. The totality of the circumstances controls whether the likelihood of prejudice is too great to permit the jurors' avowals of impartiality to be accepted. 9 When such a likelihood exists, individual questioning is necessary to provide the trial judge with a basis for determining whether the juror will be able to lay aside any opinion as to guilt or innocence and render a verdict based on the evidence adduced at trial. 19 Appellant contends that, in light of the extensive pretrial publicity regarding the Watergate incident, such a significant possibility existed with regard to each prospective juror who admitted some prior knowledge of the case. He relies primarily on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Silverthorne v. United States, supra, which reversed a conviction because the trial judge failed to inquire into what each talesman knew about the case in order to assess the impact of the massive pretrial publicity. In that case the quantity, focus, and, most importantly, the inflammatory tone of the publicity created a substantial possibility that the prospective jurors' impartiality might have been undermined. 10 All of the sixty-five veniremen in Silverthorne confessed knowledge of the case and thirty percent of those veniremen initially questioned had formed an opinion regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused. 400 F.2d at 639. The Ninth Circuit concluded that, 'under the peculiar and difficult facts of this case' and 'in such an atmosphere,' the trial judge had abused his discretion by not employing individual questions to develop an objective basis for determining each juror's impartiality. 400 F.2d at 639--640. Like Silverthorne, the other cases which appellant relies upon to urge the inadequacy of general assurances of impartiality given by jurors in response to en masse questioning involved extreme circumstances created by pervasive, inflammatory publicity. 11 20 In United States v. Bryant, supra, this court recently approved a voir dire examination procedure involving general question addressed to the veniremen en masse supplemented by individual questioning of those prospective jurors who had formed an opinion as to guilt or innocence or who recalled details of the case. 153 U.S.App.D.C. at 76--77, 471 F.2d at 1044--1045. In Bryant only some of the jurors admitted to having prior knowledge of the case, no juror indicated an opinion as to guilt or innocence, and a few confessed recollection of details. This court concluded that the trial judge's voir dire examination was 'generally in accord with' the ABA recommendation. 12 Moreover, this court recognized the countervailing pressure, also present in the instant case, to shorten voir dire in order to reduce exposure of the veniremen, prior to empanelling and sequestration, to publicity generated by the commencement of the jury selection process. 13 21 In the present case, the trial judge used voir dire examination procedures similar to those employed in Bryant--general questions addressed to the entire array, followed by individual questioning of those who responded affirmatively to any of the initial inquiries, and thus raised the possibility they might have formed an opinion on the case. Although the trial judge recognized that the Watergate matter had been publicized extensively, 14 he did not abuse his discretion in declining the defendants' request that all the veniremen who had heard anything about the case be examined individually. 22 The trial judge, after determining that virtually all of the veniremen had some knowledge of the case, 15 did grant defendants' request to the limited extent of conducting individual questioning of eight members of the array who had acknowledged exposure to some publicity. This individual questioning indicated that most knew little about the case, few remembered even a single detail, and none had formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendants. 16 The results of the individual examinations thus served to verify prior responses to en masse questioning which indicated that few veniremen had formed an opinion regarding guilt or innocence. 17 Under these circumstances, the trial judge acted within his broad discretion in abandoning individual questioning and continuing voir dire on an en masse basis. He complied with the ABA recommendation by examining individually all prospective jurors who indicated an opinion regarding guilt or innocence or who recalled details of the case, for only those veniremen, under the facts of this case, presented a significant possibility of ineligibility. 23 III. TRIAL JUDGE'S READING OF SLOAN'S TESTIMONY TO THE JURY 24 Immediately after Hugh Sloan testified that he did not understand the significance of Liddy's hurried statement--'my boys got caught last night'--at the time that it was made, the trial judge excused the jurors and announced that the rest of Sloan's testimony would be heard out of their presence. Following the prosecutor's completion of direct examination, the trial judge propounded 42 additional questions. (Tr. 1460--65). After the jury returned, the prosecutor asked Mr. Sloan when Liddy's June 17 remark came to have meaning to him. Defense counsel objected, and the prosecutor stopped his examination. Defense counsel put no questions on cross-examination and Sloan was excused. 25 Upon reviewing the record, the trial judge concluded that the jurors should have the benefit of the testimony taken in their absence. Three days after Sloan had completed his testimony, the trial judge informed counsel of his intention to read to the jury the transcript of Sloan's testimony beginning four pages before the jury was excused, continuing through the examination conducted out of the jurors' presence, and concluding with the final questioning of Sloan and a related bench conference which took place after the jury had returned. Prior to presenting the material to the jury, the trial judge read the entire section to counsel, indicating that several of his comments were to be excluded and allowing counsel to state objections to the procedure. The Government said it preferred that the evidence be developed by having the jury hear it from Sloan directly. The trial judge responded: 'No, Mr. Sloan might have a lapse of memory, I don't know. I would rather read it from the record.' 18 The Government acquiesced. The trial judge advised both sides that he would permit Sloan to be recalled for further questioning or cross-examination. 19 26 The Government also asked whether the judge intended to read the bench conferences. The judge indicated that he did not 'think they (were) harmful to either side' and explained that 'the jury ought to hear the testimony in sequence.' 20 Appellant's counsel objected to the entire proposal on the grounds that it would cause the jurors to place undue emphasis on Sloan's testimony and would undermine his decision not to cross-examine Sloan. He did not object to the inclusion of the bench conferences, however, until after they had been presented to the jury. 27 After recalling the jurors, the trial judge explained his decision to read the aforementioned testimony and cautioned them not to draw any inferences regarding his views from the procedure. 21 Subsequently, after Sloan's testimony was read to the jury, appellant raised objection to the disclosure of the material presented in the bench conferences. The trial judge then instructed the jurors that questions of counsel and arguments at the bench do not constitute evidence. 22 28 Appellant asserts three claims of error with regard to the trial judge's action in reading Sloan's testimony to the jury: (1) The procedure prejudiced the appellant by lending undue emphasis to Sloan's testimony. (2) The disclosure of the bench conferences exposed the jury to inadmissible material prejudicial to appellant. (3) The procedure deprived appellant of his right to confrontation and cross-examination. 29 The precepts of fair trial and judicial objectivity do not require a judge to be inert. The trial judge is properly governed by the interest of justice and truth, and is not compelled to act as if he were merely presiding at a sporting match. He is not a 'mere moderator.' 23 As Justice Frankfurter put it, '(f)ederal judges are not referees at prize-fights but functionaries of justice.' Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46, 54, 68 S.Ct. 391, 395, 92 L.Ed. 468 (1948) (dissenting in part). A federal trial judge has inherent authority not only to comment on the evidence adduced by counsel, but also--in appropriate instances--to call or recall and question witnesses. 24 He may do this when he believes the additional testimony will be helpful to the jurors in ascertaining the truth and discharging their fact-finding function. 25 What is required, however, are reins of restraint, that he not comport himself in such a way as to 'tilt' or oversteer the jury or control their deliberations. 26 30 Applying these general principles to this particular case, we conclude that, although certain problems are presented by the action of the trial judge in reading to the jury from the testimony first taken from Sloan outside the jury's presence, his overall course was neither an abuse of his judicial function nor a denial of fair trial. 31 In this case we do not have the situation that commonly leads to a claim of judicial excess, wherein the trial judge either creates an appearance of partiality by continued intervention on the side of one of the parties 27 or undermines the effective functioning of counsel through repeated interruption of the examination of witnesses. 28 Here there was no interjection by the trial judge until he excused the jury at a time when the prosecutor had almost completed his examination. And there was no questioning by defense counsel. 32 The decision of the trial judge to proceed outside the presence of the jury was announced when Sloan gave testimony that the judge found hard to credit. (Sloan said he had not appreciated at the time the significance of Liddy's 'my boys got caught' statement.) The removal of the jury was a prelude to questioning by the trial judge. The prosecutor completed his direct examination, eliciting that when Sloan initially gave information to the FBI and the prosecutors he was concerned about his liability under the campaign financing law, but was informed that, although no promises could be made, 'common sense' made charges against him unlikely. Then the trial judge put his questions to the witness. 33 The majority of the questions put by the trial judge to Sloan were a retraverse of subjects covered on direct--the mechanics of the 'laundering' of the Mexican checks; the cash payments to Liddy; the relation between Sloan and the prosecutor. The trial judge went beyond the ground covered in the prosecutor's direct examination in one respect. The judge asked Sloan to testify why the cash payments were made to Liddy. While the prosecutor elicited from Sloan on direct that cash payments had been made to Liddy, he did not inquire as to the purpose of those payments. And so the record as it stood left the jury only with the testimony of a prior witness, Jeb Stuart Magruder, the deputy campaign director of CRP, that substantial sums had been paid to Liddy in cash for the intelligence gathering functions that Magruder had assigned to Liddy, and that he, Magruder, had not known of the plans for wiretapping and burglary. This left the jury with the prosecutor's approach that Liddy was the mastermind of both the intercept plan and the unlawful entry to implement it. The judge acted well within his discretion in seeking information of the accuracy of this approach from a witness who was likely to have such information. Magruder's testimony did not foreclose further inquiry. There were gaps in the record even assuming Magruder had been accurate. (a) Magruder only purported to testify that on being consulted by Sloan concerning a large sum drawn by Liddy, he assumed the funds related to Liddy's indication that 'he needed a considerable amount up front to get his intelligencegathering operation into being' (Tr. 1415). (b) Magruder testified as to a 'large sum' but not necessarily to all of the $199,000 Sloan paid out to Liddy. The questioning in some detail about the $199,000 in cash which Sloan had turned over to Liddy reflects the trial judge's evident skepticism that such a large sum would have been made available by Sloan without any explanation of the purpose for which it was to be used. 34 In response to the judge's questioning as to the purpose of the cash withdrawals by Liddy, Sloan could only say that he was not informed by Magruder, who gave the authorization, as to the purpose of the withdrawals. Magruder had established that the finance committee, although nominally a separate committee, had the function of making disbursements on the authorization of CRP. Sloan testified that he had verified Magruder's authority with former Secretary Stans, director of the finance committee, who in turn checked with former Attorney General Mitchell of CRP (Tr. 1443). Sloan also testified that eventually he made a full accounting to Stans of the cash he had disbursed (Tr. 1450). Although the judge's questions to Sloan went beyond Magruder's responses, the testimony given by Sloan was congruent with that previously given by Magruder. 35 We cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion either in the questioning of Sloan, or in submitting to the jury the information elicited in its absence. 36 Where a trial judge is concerned with a witness's reliability, he may insist on supplemental questioning--and the procedure for withdrawal of the jury in the first instance may serve to prevent irreparable prejudice to the trial. The judge is not confined by the fact that the questions he has in mind were not put by counsel. 37 The judge's latitude to insist on further questions to a witness must be judged prospectively. It is therefore not undercut by the fact that, with regard to Sloan, the supplemental questioning in court produced no evidence that significantly affected the testimony given on direct. 38 Liddy's contention of prejudice would have more force if it were predicated on questioning by the judge that had passed outside judicial discretion to an inquisitorial undertaking. While it is ironic that Judge Sirica, concerned as he was with perjury at the trial, did not question Magruder, whose perjury was later developed in the massive, historic inquiry by Congress, this development serves to underline that the judges's questioning of Sloan did not portray a wide-ranging probe of witnesses that transcended the judicial province. We are not here concerned with any indications the judge may have given before or after the trial as to the public need for a broader investigation. So far as the questioning of Sloan is concerned, this was apparently triggered by what seemed to be the improbability of his account as given. It may well be that all that was involved as to Sloan was naivete, and the willingness of an A.B. in history, not versed in law or economics, to follow the instructions of senior officials of the political committee, including a former cabinet member, and to make large disbursements of cash without further inquiry. But the matter must be judged prospectively; there was certainly basis for the trial judge's concern at the time that Sloan was holding back, and that supplemental questioning was needed to prevent pollution by perjury of the trial he was conducting. 39 Even though the supplemental questioning did not significantly affect the thrust of Sloan's direct testimony, the trial judge had discretion, on reviewing that testimony, to conclude that its presentation to the jury would help it discharge its responsibility. He might well have concluded that the evidence regarding Sloan's relationship with the prosecutors and the more detailed development of matters raised in previous testimony would better equip the jury to digest the substance of Sloan's testimony, to assess its bearing on Sloan's credibility, and to appraise the weight the evidence should be accorded. 29 40 Separate problems are raised by the procedure used to present Sloan's testimony to the jury, as distinguished from the fact of its presentation. Sound and accepted doctrine teaches that the trial judge should avoid extensive questioning of the witness and should rely on counsel to develop testimony for the jury's consideration. 30 Here the trial judge not only failed to seek an alternative to personal intervention, he declined the prosecutor's request to elicit the additional testimony by further questioning of Sloan in the jury's presence. 31 A reopening of the record to enhance appraisal of credibility would ordinarily be furthered by presenting the witness, and his demeanor, if available. The problems are certainly not resolved by the trial judge's comment that Sloan 'might have a lapse of memory, I don't know.' 41 Nevertheless, we feel that the procedure did not infringe upon the requirement of fair trial. The impact of the extensive questioning by the trial judge was muted. He did not interrupt the direct examination with his inquiries. Reading a record already made tends to have less impact than question and answer by the witness. The judge's editing excised comments that might have been construed as an expression of an opinion regarding the credibility of the testimony given by Sloan. 42 The case would stand in a different posture if defense counsel had urged the trial judge to recall the witness for additional testimony. But here it was the prosecutor and not the defendant who asked that Sloan testify in person. Appellant's counsel clearly indicated that he did not want any further testimony from Sloan. In response to questioning at oral argument on appeal he stated: 43 Oh, let there be no misunderstanding about that your Honor. I did not intend to have my position understood as being that I wanted Sloan brought back. I don't believe that, however, my choices should be that I should join with the prosecutor in either having the matter read back or having the witness brought back. I don't think that covers the entire spectrum of choices. I think there is another choice, that it should be left alone. 44 As to appellant's claim that the entire procedure was invalid because undue emphasis was accorded Sloan's testimony concerning Liddy's statement of June 17 that 'my boys got caught last night,' we are convinced by the Government's response that 'no reasonable jury would have overlooked or forgotten such testimony.' 32 Sloan's initial testimony about the June 17 remark given before the jury on direct examination and the Government's highlighting of the admission in summation and rebuttal rendered de minimis the effect of its inclusion at two points in the 22 pages of the record read to the jury. We also take note of the cautionary instruction given to the jury prior to the reading of the testimony. 33 45 Although prejudicial information contained in bench conferences may serve as grounds for reversal if the remarks are overheard by the jury, 34 the inclusion of two bench conferences in the portion of the record read to the jury also fails to support reversal in this case. 46 Colloquy like that heard in bench conferences is often spoken in open court. An examination of this record and these conferences validates the trial judge's determination that the conferences were not harmful to either side. 35 Although the dry run of the trial judge included the bench conferences before they were read and the Government specifically asked whether bench conferences would be read, defense counsel did not object to their inclusion. As soon as the point was raised, the trial judge instructed the jury that statements made during bench conferences are not evidence to be considered by the jury. 36 47 We turn to appellant's claim that the reading of Sloan's testimony deprived him of his right to cross-examination. The trial judge afforded appellant an opportunity to cross-examine Sloan and counsel steadfastly declined to exercise this right. 37 He urges that the right to cross-examine includes the right to refuse to cross-examine, and that this right was undercut by the trial judge's action. This is the kind of point that establishes resourcefulness of counsel, but not legal error. Although defense counsel may exercise his discretion regarding cross-examination, he has no absolute right to prevent further testimony by a witness. 48 In sum, defense counsel has no right to preclude recall of a witness. A judge not only has power of recall, but latitude to use it to remove or dilute the pollution of a trial by testimony he believes to be perjurious or highly questionable. He may supplement the examination by counsel in order to draw out more information from a witness and to enhance the perspective for appraising his testimony. 38 The public interest in safeguarding a record from taint is particularly keen when the case involves the integrity of the nation's political system--as can fairly be said when persons in the campaign of one major political party used clandestine contributions to penetrate the internal process of the other--and is consequently of moment in both the daily press and history. Judge Sirica's palpable search for truth in such a trial was not only permissible, it was in the highest tradition of his office as a federal judge. And although his execution of this objective presented problems, as must be acknowledged, they were not of a kind that deprived defendants of a fair trial. 'A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one.' Lutwak v. United States,344 U.S. 604, 619, 73 S.Ct. 481, 490, 97 L.Ed. 593 (1953). The vitality of this precept is attested by e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Assuming for discussion that the problems already noted reflect error by the trial judge, it must be ranked as harmless rather than prejudicial error. 49