Opinion ID: 1666085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellant's Confessions were Properly Admissible as they were Voluntarily Given.

Text: Appellant's fourth assignment of error is that his taped confessions should have been suppressed as they were involuntary and the product of coercion. We disagree. In Bailey v. Commonwealth, we recognized that the Due Process Clause requires confessions be made voluntarily in order to be admissible, noting that `[if the defendant's] will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, the use of [the] confession offends due process.' 194 S.W.3d 296, 300 (Ky.2006) ( quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). The standard for assessing the voluntariness of a confession is the totality of the circumstances in which the confession was given. Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 481 (Ky.1999). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that the ultimate test of voluntariness is whether the confession [was] the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice by its maker[.] Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. In this regard, this Court has stated that when determining if a confession is a result of coercion, one must look at the totality of the circumstances to assess whether police obtained evidence by overbearing the defendant's will through making credible threats. Henson v. Commonwealth, 20 S.W.3d 466, 469 (Ky. 1999). Thus, in making this determination, the Court should consider three factors in determining whether a confession was coerced: (1) whether the police activity was `objectively coercive,' (2) whether the coercion overbore the will of the defendant, and (3) whether the defendant has shown that the coercive police activity was the `crucial motivating factor' behind his confession. Id. ( quoting Morgan v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Ky. 1991)). Upon review of the record, it is abundantly clear that Appellant's confessions were voluntarily given and were not the product of coercion. Appellant was arrested on Friday, September 4th, after turning himself in to the Mayfield Police Department. On September 5th, Appellant indicated that he wanted to speak with Detective Jackson. During their initial contact, it had been discovered that Jackson was a friend to a relative of Appellant. Jackson met with Appellant, read him his rights, and confirmed Appellant understood them. During the taped interview, which was played before the trial judge, Jackson informed Appellant that he has some other charges coming, including some big ones, that things don't look good, and that the current matter was a capital offense. Jackson also told Appellant that he believed he committed the offense and if he killed his wife, he should come clean to keep himself out of the chair. Appellant then asked for counsel, whereupon the interview immediately ceased. On September 7th, Appellant again asked to speak with Detective Jackson. Jackson came to meet with Appellant and again read him his rights, confirming that he understood them. Upon this meeting, Appellant asked Jackson to allow him to view his wife's body to refresh his memory as to what happened. Appellant confessed to the murder during this interview. Later that same day, Appellant was taken to view his wife's body at the funeral home where it was located. While there, Appellant once more confessed to the murder in a taped audio and video confession. Appellant now alleges that his confessions were involuntary as they were the product of coercive police activity. Principally, Appellant claims that police engaged in overreaching behavior by indicating to him (and allegedly some family members) that he could face the death penalty. Also, Appellant argues that the delay in receiving appointed counsel, despite his immediate request, exacerbated the overreaching nature of police activity. [1] However, in light of the totality of the circumstances under which Appellant's confessions were made, we find their admission proper. We find nothing in the record to indicate the police activity was objectively coercive, that it overbore the will of the defendant, or that the tactics utilized were the crucial motivating factor behind the confession. See Henson, 20 S.W.3d at 469. As such, Appellant's confessions were the free and independent choice of their maker. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. There was nothing improper about the police's conduct in this instance, or their truthful, non-coercive advisement of potential penalties. See Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1133 (8th Cir.2001). Moreover, a suppression hearing was held below, at the conclusion of which, the trial judge made detailed findings on the record and denied Appellant's motion to suppress, noting that Appellant had initiated contact with Jackson and waived his rights by speaking with him. When a trial judge's decision on a motion to suppress is supported by substantial evidence, and is correct as a matter of law, such findings are conclusive. Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920, 923 (Ky.Ct.App.2002); RCr 9.78.