Opinion ID: 2831404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Extent of the Impairment

Text: But the principal question in this case is not whether the right is a substantial one, but rather whether the application of Chapter 90 impairs the Emmites’ ability to exercise that right to an unconstitutional degree. In today’s opinion, the Court holds that the Emmites’ rights were not so impaired as to offend the Texas Constitution for two reasons. First, the Court argues that because Chapter 90 was signed into law before Joseph died, the case at bar is distinguishable from Robinson, in which the applicable statute was signed into law after the Robinsons’ cause of action accrued. 335 S.W.3d at 129–30. But this argument dissolves the distinction between the date upon which a statute is signed into law and the date upon which a statute becomes effective. Contrary to the Court’s assertion, at the time Joseph died and the Emmites’ cause of action accrued, Texas law did not require a plaintiff to produce pulmonary function testing–this change occurred after the Emmites’ cause of action accrued, just as it did in Robinson. Nor is it of any moment that the Emmites had notice that the law would change, as Joseph would have been unable to engage in pulmonary function testing in any event; the statute was signed into law one month before his death, and the MDL pretrial judge stated in his findings of fact that “[s]hortly before his death [Joseph] suffered from physical and mental limitations, which made it impossible for him to take a pulmonary function test.” The case at bar cannot be distinguished from Robinson, then, on the basis that Chapter 90 was signed into law before Joseph died. 7 Second, the Court notes that, because the Emmites had an opportunity to bring their claims before Chapter 90 went into effect, their claims were not completely extinguished. While I agree that the Emmites had a brief window during which they could have filed suit without the need for a pulmonary function test, I do not agree that two-and-a-half months is a sufficient period of time to tip the constitutional balance. Ordinarily, the statute of limitations for a wrongful death action is two years. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 16.003(b). However, the enactment of Chapter 90 had the effect of shortening that statute of limitations to two-and-a-half months in the Emmites’ case. One purpose of the prohibition on retroactive laws is to ensure that the settled expectations of litigants are not upset. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 265–66. In my view, it is not reasonable to expect the Emmites, particularly when they were mourning the loss of a family member, to have known that they would be required to investigate and file a lawsuit in only two-and-a-half months’ time. In this instance, I cannot conclude that “the heavy presumption against retroactive laws” has been overcome. Robinson, 335 S.W.3d at 126. Finally, I feel compelled to call the Legislature’s attention to a problem this case presents: though the stated purpose of Chapter 90 is to allow people with asbestos-related injuries “to pursue their claims for compensation in a fair and efficient manner through the Texas court system,” the mechanism the Legislature has chosen to effect that goal, pulmonary function testing, seems overly broad. The testimony in today’s case indicates that pulmonary function testing may be impossible for plaintiffs who are very ill. A plaintiff should not be prevented from recovering for an injury caused by exposure to asbestos because that exposure has made him too sick to complete a pulmonary function test. I respectfully urge the Legislature to reconsider the wisdom of requiring 8 pulmonary function testing even in Chapter 90’s “safety valve” provision, at least in those cases in which a doctor has concluded that such testing would be prohibitive. TEX . CIV . PRAC. & REM . CODE § 90.010(f)(1), (j).