Opinion ID: 1801790
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First degree felony-murder instruction

Text: Defendant contends that, because the information charged him only with murder in violation of section 187, subdivision (a) (which defines second degree murder), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try him for first degree murder and prejudicially erred in instructing the jury on the uncharged crime of first degree felony murder. We reject this contention. (5) We have held for nearly a century that if the charging document charges the offense in the language of the statute defining murder (§ 187), the offense charged includes murder in the first degree and murder in the second degree. ( People v. Witt (1915) 170 Cal. 104, 107-108 [148 P. 928] ( Witt ).) Thus, defendant's underlying premise that the information charged him only with second degree murder is incorrect. ( People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 362 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 289, 181 P.3d 105]; People v. Harris (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1269, 1294-1295 [78 Cal.Rptr.3d 295, 185 P.3d 727]; People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 21 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620, 178 P.3d 1113].) (6) Defendant further argues that, under People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441 [194 Cal.Rptr. 390, 668 P.2d 697], felony murder and premeditated murder are separate crimes, and that Dillon implicitly overruled Witt, supra, 170 Cal. 104 (defendant may be convicted of felony murder even though information charged only murder with malice). We have consistently rejected that same claim ( People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 593, 617 [67 Cal.Rptr.3d 753, 170 P.3d 129]; People v. Harris, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 1294-1295; People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 591 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104]; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 369 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432]) and continue to do so. Thus, the trial court correctly instructed on felony murder and the jury, in returning a general verdict for first degree murder, did not convict defendant of an uncharged offense.