Opinion ID: 2008637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal from Denial of Allowance to Amend

Text: In Gabriel v. O'Hara, 368 Pa.Super. 383, 534 A.2d 488 (1987) and Barr v. General Accident Group Ins., 360 Pa.Super. 334, 520 A.2d 485 (1987), this Court held that order denying complainant's allowance to amend pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1033 to add a new cause of action arising from the same transaction or occurrence, effectively put the complainant out of court on the claims, and were therefore final and appealable. The instant case, though also involving an appeal from an order denying allowance to amend under Pa.R.C.P. 1033, is nonetheless materially distinguishable. In Gabriel and Barr the effect of the order denying allowance to amend under Pa.R.C.P. 1033 was to preclude the complainant from complying with the compulsory joinder rule of Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d)(1 & 4) which provides that: (d)(1) If a transaction or occurrence gives rise to more than one cause of action against the same person, including causes of action in the alternative, they shall be joined in separate counts in the action against any such person.       (4) Failure to join a cause of action as required by subdivision (d)(1) of this Rule shall be deemed a waiver of that cause of action as against all parties to the action. The effect of a failure to comply with Pa.R.C.P. 1020(d)(1) is a waiver of any cause of action not so joined. Hence, the denial of a motion to amend under Pa.R.C.P. 1033 to assert a claim covered by the compulsory joinder rule has the effect of a disposition of such a claim by dismissal on the merits. In the instant case, it is the defendant who appeals from an order denying allowance to amend the answer and new matter to assert a permissive counterclaim. While the denial of allowance to amend will result in a certain degree of duplication of efforts and consequent cost both to the parties and to the court system, Davis Cookie is not out of court on its claim. This Court recently explained in Bender's Floor Covering Co. v. Gardner, 387 Pa.Super. 531, 564 A.2d 518 (1989): In this case, the trial court's denial of appellants' petition to amend and to present a new counterclaim did not serve to put appellants out of court as to that claim, nor is the claim in danger of being irreparably lost as a result of the order. Succinctly, appellants may, without impediment, file that same claim in front of the same or a different court (providing such a court has proper venue and subject matter jurisdiction) within the limitations period, without jeopardizing their rights. Thus, appellants are not out of court on the merits of their counterclaim by reason of the trial court's interlocutory order. In comparison, had appellants appealed a pre-trial order denying leave to amend an answer so as to assert an affirmative defense, it would be deemed a final order for purposes of appeal. Unlike counterclaims, affirmative defenses are compulsory, and therefore must be timely pleaded, or they are forever lost. Zarnecki v. Shepegi, supra, [367 Pa.Super. 230] 532 A.2d [873] at 875 [(1987)], citing Posternack v. American Casualty Co. of Reading, 421 Pa. 21, 218 A.2d 350 (1966); see also Pa.R.C.P. 1030, 1032. The permissive nature of counterclaims in Pennsylvania is the controlling distinction in this case. 387 Pa.Superior Ct. at 535-536, 564 A.2d at 520-21. (Emphasis in original). Rule 1033 motions for leave to amend in order to present permissive counterclaims are thus materially distinguishable from Rule 1033 motions for leave to amend in order to comply with the compulsory joinder rule or the rule requiring affirmative defenses to be plead in new matter. As in Bender's Floor Covering Co. v. Gardner, supra , we are constrained to quash the appeal from the trial court's interlocutory order denying leave to amend.