Opinion ID: 2618250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: other charged violations

Text: The Bar requests that, on de novo review, this court reject the remainder of the trial panel's findings and find the accused guilty of the other charged violations alleged in its complaint. The Bar concedes that its case against the accused on the additional charges rises or falls on whether the accused knew that Larry was not Farrah's father in May 1985 when he prepared the paternity affidavit or, in relation to some of the charges, had such knowledge and in April and May 1986 when he prepared the three dissolution affidavits. We thus proceed to consider the evidence in the record concerning the other charged violations. In its first cause of complaint, the Bar alleges that, by having the Clarks execute the 1985 paternity affidavit when he knew that Larry was not Farrah's father, the accused engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation; that he knowingly made a false statement of fact; and that he counselled or assisted his clients in conduct he knew was illegal or fraudulent. The Bar alleges that this conduct violated former DR 1-102(A)(4) (current DR 1-102(A)(3)) [8] and former DRs 7-102(A)(5) and (7). [9] In order for the Bar to prevail on its first cause of complaint, it must show by clear and convincing evidence that at the time the accused prepared the 1985 paternity affidavit, he knew that Larry was not Farrah's father. In his responses to the Bar's investigation, the accused asserted, and at the disciplinary hearing he testified, that Shawnnette told him on May 2, 1985, that Larry was Farrah's natural father, that at least up until May 5, 1986, Larry represented to him that Larry was Farrah's father, and that he was not aware before May 5, 1986, that Larry was not, in fact, Farrah's father. To prove that the accused knew that Larry was not Farrah's father, the Bar relies on the testimony of Shawnnette, Larry, and Olive. The trial panel concluded that the testimony of the Bar's witnesses was not persuasive on this issue. The trial panel noted numerous discrepancies in the testimony of Shawnnette, Larry, and Olive. Moreover, Larry and Olive both testified that Shawnnette lies and cannot be believed. The panel found that there was not clear and convincing evidence that when the accused prepared and had the Clarks sign the paternity affidavit in May 1985 he knew that Larry was not Farrah's father. Where, as here, the testimony of the witnesses is so divergent, a resolution as to who is telling the truth is usually best left to an assessment of credibility. Notwithstanding this court's de novo review in a disciplinary proceeding, we normally defer to the trial panel's assessment of credibility because it saw and heard the witnesses. In re O'Neal, 297 Or. 258, 270, 683 P.2d 1352 (1984). Similarly, where the credibility of a witness is a material issue in a disciplinary proceeding, we place substantial reliance on the trial panel's findings of fact. In re Samuels & Weiner, 296 Or. 224, 226, 674 P.2d 1166 (1983). We agree with the trial panel's findings as to the Bar's first cause of complaint. In its third cause of complaint, the Bar alleges that, in 1986, the accused sought to conceal the falsity of the 1985 paternity affidavit by preparing and having Larry sign three 630 affidavits stating or implying that Larry was Farrah's father, which then were filed in the dissolution proceedings. The Bar alleges that this conduct violated former DR 1-102(A)(4) (current DR 1-102(A)(3)), DRs 7-102(A)(5) and (7)) [10] and DRs 7-102(A)(4) and (6). [11] In order for the Bar to prevail on its third cause of complaint, it must show by clear and convincing evidence that, in 1986, when the accused prepared and had Larry sign the three affidavits stating or implying that Larry was Farrah's father, he knew that Larry was not Farrah's father. The accused testified that Larry maintained that he was Farrah's father until the commencement of the dissolution proceeding. The accused does not deny that the three affidavits that he prepared and filed in April and May 1986, asserting that Larry was Farrah's father, were, in fact, false. The issue, therefore, is whether at the time he prepared and filed those affidavits the accused knew that Larry was not Farrah's father. The accused testified that the first time he became aware or even had an inkling that, perhaps, Larry was not Farrah's father was on May 5, 1986, during Shawnnette's testimony at the temporary custody hearing where she testified that Larry was not Farrah's father. The accused stated that, at that time, he became concerned and thought the issue of Farrah's paternity required further investigation. The accused testified that, up to that time, Larry had always stated, I'm the father, I want custody of both these kids. The accused also testified that Shawnnette told him on May 2, 1985, that Larry was Farrah's father. To prove that the accused knew the truth about Farrah's paternity in 1986, when he prepared and filed the three affidavits in the dissolution proceeding, the Bar relies on the testimony of Larry and of Patricia Rose, who had provided childcare for Farrah and Kelley for several years. The trial panel expressly concluded that Larry's testimony was at times unclear or contradictory and unconvincing: The evidence was clear that [Larry] loved and treated both [Farrah and Kelley] equally and, in fact, wanted custody of both of these children. This was confirmed by the testimony of Patti Rose and Olive Clark, his mother. That testimony supports the accused's testimony that [Larry] wanted custody of these children and that the accused understood and believed that [Larry] was the natural father of [Farrah]. That conclusion was made in reference to the relevant time period in 1986. We defer to the trial panel's assessment of Larry's credibility. The Bar argues, however, that Patricia Rose told the accused that Larry was not Farrah's father. The accused met with Larry and Rose in 1986, after Shawnnette filed her temporary custody motion. Shawnnette had attached an affidavit to her motion stating, among other things, that during her relationship with Larry, he had beaten her, that he was a heavy drinker and a drug abuser, and that, because he was not Farrah's father, he was vindictive toward that child. Larry told the accused that the statements in Shawnnette's charges against him were untrue. Rose also disputed many of Shawnnette's charges against Larry. Rose testified that she knew that Larry was not Farrah's biological father because Shawnnette had told her so and because she had seen Farrah's birth certificate. Rose's comments to the accused, however, must be placed in context. During that time, Larry had been telling the accused that Larry was Farrah's father. Normally, Larry would be a more credible source of that information than Rose. The accused already believed that Shawnnette was lying in her 1986 affidavit about Farrah's paternity. The last name Moore on Farrah's birth certificate, as the mother's maiden name, would not be uncommon for a child born out of wedlock, as the accused testified, and was not inconsistent with Larry's paternity. [12] In context, we find that Rose's statements to the accused were not sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the accused knew, in April and May 1986, that Larry was not Farrah's father. We agree with the findings of the trial panel as to the Bar's third cause of complaint. In its fourth cause of complaint, the Bar alleges that the accused had a conflict of interest because the accused had an interest in concealing the falsity of the paternity affidavit so that the accused's professional judgment was affected by his own self-interest and to his client's Larry Clark's detriment because it was to Larry Clark's best interest to avoid liability for child support payments for Farrah   , but to do so, [Larry] would have to deny he was [Farrah's] father   . The Bar also alleges that the accused failed to disclose fully the conflict or to gain Larry's consent to continue the representation. The Bar alleges that this conduct violated former DR 5-101(A). [13] In order for the Bar to prevail on its fourth cause of complaint, it must show by clear and convincing evidence that, at the time the accused prepared and had the Clarks sign the May 1985 paternity affidavit the accused knew that Larry was not Farrah's father and that he continued to conceal the falsity of that affidavit in 1986. Based on its finding that the accused was not guilty under the first cause of complaint, the trial panel found that the Bar had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the allegations of its fourth cause of complaint. We agree with trial panel's findings as to the Bar's fourth cause of complaint. In its fifth cause of complaint, the Bar alleges that the accused failed to respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from the disciplinary counsel's office and the Local Professional Responsibility Committee in that at the relevant times the accused denied knowledge that Larry was not Farrah's father and asserted that Larry at all times maintained to the accused that Larry was Farrah's father. The Bar alleges that this conduct violated DR 1-103(C). [14] The trial panel concluded: The accused has claimed in all of [his] letters and responses to the Bar that [Larry] has either stated or implied that he was the father of both [Farrah and Kelley] and that the affidavits that the accused prepared on behalf of [Larry] were based on that information. The accused denies that he was ever informed that [Larry] was not [Farrah's] father and his testimony at the time of trial before this Trial Panel has been consistent with those responses. Based on its findings that the accused was not guilty under the Bar's first, third, and fourth causes of complaint, the trial panel concluded that the Bar had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the allegations of its fifth cause of complaint against the accused. We agree with the trial panel's findings as to the Bar's fifth cause of complaint. In summary, we agree with the trial panel's findings as to each of the Bar's causes of complaint against the accused.