Opinion ID: 2337278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mitigating and Aggravating Circumstances

Text: In three points of error, Storey challenges the trial court's rulings concerning the admission of evidence in aggravation and mitigation of the death penalty. Specifically, he argues that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Lavon Marshall, Karen Stepson, Trinje Reidelberger, Bobby Reidelberger, and Jody Harrison; in admitting certain victim impact exhibits; and in sustaining the State's objection to the testimony of defense expert James Aiken.
Storey first contends that the trial court erred in admitting eleven exhibits into evidence and in endorsing witnesses Trinje Reidelberger, Bobby Reidelberger, and Jody Harrison because the State disclosed the evidence after the commencement of the trial. He further argues that his rights to due process and a fair trial were violated and that at a minimum the defense would have wanted to voir dire the jury about the extraordinarily emotional and sensitive nature of the evidence involved. The basic object of the discovery process is to permit the defendant a decent opportunity to prepare in advance of trial and avoid surprise. State v. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d 57, 66 (Mo. banc 1989). We recently addressed the issue of late endorsement of witnesses in Moss v. State, 10 S.W.3d 508 (Mo. banc 2000). In Moss , the trial court granted the State leave to endorse two additional witnesses only five days before the trial. In finding no error in the trial court's decision, we considered the following factors: (1) Whether the defendant waived the objection; (2) Whether the state intended surprise or acted deceptively or in bad faith, with the intention to disadvantage the defendant; (3) Whether in fact defendant was surprised and suffered any disadvantage; and (4) Whether the type of testimony given might readily have been contemplated. Moss v. State, 10 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Mo. banc 2000).
Storey argues that the trial court's decision prejudiced him (a) in conducting voir dire and (b) in addressing the evidence at trial. When objecting to the evidence, however, defense counsel failed to relay any concerns about the jury selection process. The trial court heard the following objection concerning the evidence at issue: THE COURT: Now you wanted to make a record on something this morning, ma'm? [Defense Counsel]: Yes, your Honor. Yesterday morning before we began opening statements, we indicated to the Court that we had just moments before received from the prosecuting attorney, Nels Moss, an endorsement of four new witnesses and then a number of items, a photo album.... [T]he matters that have now been disclosed are brand new witnesses, documents, items that have not previously been disclosed until the third day of trial. We are at a significant disadvantage. THE COURT: Tell me about the first three [referring to Trinje Reidelberger, Bobby Reidelberger, and Jody Harrison].... These are basically victim character witnesses? [Prosecutor]: Basically victim character witnesses.... THE COURT: So they don't have any knowledge of the incident itself? [Prosecutor]: No, none whatsoever.... THE COURT: With respect to the first three, they are character witnesses what a good person the deceased was. I'm going to allow the endorsement of those first three witnesses, two Reidelbergers and Jody Harrison.... Is there anything further? [Defense Counsel]: Yes Judge. The physical exhibits, again, I will object to those items as having not been disclosed in a timely manner to the State.... THE COURT: I am going to deny the motion and allow it. [Defense Counsel]: If I could, just for the record, indicate that ... we have no testimony, no statements, no notes.... If we had been given timely notification of their endorsement, we would have exercised our discovery rights to depose them so we are fully prepared for the information they will provide. In light of the Court's ruling, we are going to be unable to provide effective assistance of counsel to question these witnesses on cross-examination should that be necessary. For that reason, I would request a mistrial or in the alternative, ask that these witnesses be excluded.... THE COURT: I'll make them available so that you can talk to them before they testify. (Record at 1123-1130). Defense counsel also made no further objection or statement, either at that time or at any time thereafter, that would explain why the relief provided was inadequate. Before voir dire, the State endorsed witnesses Lavon Marshall, Karen Stepson, Gladys Frey, and Timothy Frey, who all testified as victim impact witnesses. Because of these endorsements, the defense should have readily contemplated the admission of evidence related to Jill Frey's character and her work with disabled children. Nevertheless, the defense failed to ask any voir dire questions concerning the jurors' sensitivities to these issues or to the witnesses identified prior to that time. To each venireperson, the defense simply asked the following three questions in substantially the same form:

(3) If you were the foreman of the jury, could you sign a verdict sentencing Storey to life imprisonment even though eleven of the twelve jurors, including yourself, believed that he should receive a sentence of death? We do not find Storey's argument that he was prejudiced during voir dire by the untimely disclosure of these witnesses credible. There is no indication that the defense would have changed its voir dire strategy due to the endorsement of three additional victim impact witnesses when the defense did not address already identified victim impact witnesses. The mere fact that one of the witnesses was confined to a wheel chair does not alter this conclusion, as the defense was fully notified of the State's intention to introduce testimony related to the victim's work with disabled children.
We also find no indication that the defense suffered a disadvantage during the presentation of evidence or during closing arguments. Due to the timely endorsement of several other victim impact witnesses, the defense should have been prepared for this particular type of evidence. Moreover, the trial court, in its discretion, ordered a remedy to the late disclosure in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 25.16. The defense made no indication that this remedy was insufficient to prepare for the testimony or for admission of the exhibits. Finally, defense counsel chose not to cross-examine any of the character witnesses in this case, and there is no indication that an earlier disclosure would have prompted a change in this defense strategy. Where counsel is surprised by opposing evidence at trial, but deals with that evidence in precisely the same manner as if he had been fully prepared, there is no reason to exclude that evidence, however significant, based on a discovery violation. Kilgore, 771 S.W.2d at 66.
Under these facts, Storey did not suffer prejudice. The point is denied. We do not approve, however, the untimely endorsement of witnesses during the penalty phase hearing, without a showing of good cause. Trial courts should take care to protect the integrity of our process from such sloppy or disingenuous tactics. Nonetheless, a new trial is not warranted without some indication that Storey might have done things differently or that a different result might otherwise have occurred.
Storey next claims that certain victim impact evidence exceeded the boundaries of permissible victim impact evidence as discussed in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). He assigns error to the admission of certain testimony and to the admission of certain exhibits. We address each in turn.
The State introduced the testimony of two victim impact witnesses, who testified about the physical, emotional, employment, and marital problems that resulted from Frey's death. Lavon Marshall testified that her apartment shared a common bedroom wall with Frey's apartment. She recounted that on the day of the murder she heard Storey murder Frey, but failed to call the police. Marshall told the jury that the murder severely traumatized her, forcing her to undergo four years of counseling and to give up her job. Defense counsel objected to Marshall's testimony. The State also introduced the testimony of Karen Stepson, a close friend of Frey. She testified that she discovered Frey's body after the murder and that the experience caused her great fear and anxiety. She also told the jury that Frey was a well-liked person who was valued as a teacher of handicapped children. Stepson testified that Frey's students continually looked for her after her death and were confused that she never returned to school. The defense did not object to Stepson's testimony. Victim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). As a general rule, the trial court `has discretion during the punishment phase of trial to admit whatever evidence it deems helpful to the jury in assessing punishment.' State v. Winfield, 5 S.W.3d 505, 515 (Mo. banc 1999) (quoting State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 331 (Mo. banc 1996)). Both Marshall and Stepson testified as to the specific harm caused by the defendant. Payne, 501 U.S. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding this evidence helpful to the jury in assessing punishment. The point is denied.
The State also introduced eleven exhibits related to the structures and events that were dedicated to Frey following her death. The challenged evidence includes a photograph of Frey with her first class of handicapped students, a photograph of a memorial garden that was built in Frey's memory, a photograph of a memorial plaque commemorating the garden, a photograph of a balloon release ceremony by the children at the United Services school, a sketch of Frey that hung in the school as a memorial, a special edition of the school newsletter commemorating Frey's death, a picture of the inscription on Frey's tombstone, a poem written by Trinje Reidelberger that she read to the jury, and a eulogy written by Jody Harrison that she read to the jury. Victim impact evidence is admissible under the United States and Missouri Constitutions. State v. Deck, 994 S.W.2d 527, 538 (Mo. banc 1999); see also section 565.030.4, RSMo 1994. [J]ust as the defendant is entitled to present evidence in mitigation designed to show that the defendant is a `uniquely individual human being,' the State is also allowed to present evidence showing each victim's `uniqueness as an individual human being.' Id. at 538 (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 822-23, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). Victim impact evidence violates the Constitution only if it is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 927 (Mo. banc 1994) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 824-26, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). Storey argues that the United States Supreme Court decision in Payne does not authorize the plethora of exhibits created after Frey's death. Storey has failed, however, to show how the specific evidence admitted in this case prejudiced him in such a way as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. A number of the exhibits were properly admitted. The photographs of Frey with her class, the balloon release, and the memorial garden serve to illustrate Frey's value to the community and the impact of her death upon her friends and co-workers. In other words, the exhibits help the jury to see the victim as something other than a faceless stranger. State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 389 (Mo. banc 1994). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting these exhibits. Likewise, the newsletter, poem, and eulogy each describe Frey's unique characteristics and the contributions that she made to society. Though reading a poem or eulogy may not be appropriate in every case, the writings in this case were read into evidence by their respective authors. Clearly, either author could have testified about the victim without the aid of a writing. The prosecutor's choice to use the recorded recollection simply does not result in unfair prejudice under these facts. Only one exhibit reached beyond the scope of proper victim impact evidence. The photograph of Frey's tombstone was not relevant to show the impact of Frey's death, and it inappropriately drew the jury into the mourning process. Nevertheless, an analysis of improperly admitted victim impact evidence must focus on fundamental fairness. State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759, 771-72 (Mo. banc 1999). Though a photograph of a victim's tombstone will rarely be admissible, there is no reason to treat it any differently than other types of evidence. Id. As with all errors in the admission of evidence, this Court reviews the admission of victim impact evidence for prejudice, not mere error, and will reverse only if the error was so prejudicial that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Mo. banc 1998). The question, then, is whether the error in this case so infects the sentencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair. Knese, 985 S.W.2d at 772. In light of the other properly admitted evidence establishing the particularly senseless and brutal nature of the murder of Jill Frey, we simply can not conclude that the erroneous admission of an irrelevant photograph deprived Storey of a fair trial. The point is denied.
In his next point, Storey argues that the trial court erred in excluding certain testimony of defense expert James Aiken. Specifically, Aiken testified that the classification of maximum security inmate would remain with Storey for the rest of his life because the sentence and the crime that he committed will never ever change. The trial court sustained the State's objection based on the speculative nature of Aiken's statement. It is within the trial court's sound discretion to admit or exclude an expert's testimony.... State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593, 603 (Mo. banc 1991). Whether the Department of Corrections' classification system will ever change is a matter of speculation. Moreover, the Governor of Missouri retains the power to grant Storey clemency and reduce his sentence. Mo. Const. art. IV, section 7. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the speculative testimony. The point is denied.