Opinion ID: 2263079
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Prior False Claim Issue

Text: The defendant also argues that, by prohibiting the defense from impeaching complainant with evidence of a prior false claim of sexual assault made by her, the trial justice erroneously excluded evidence that was directly relevant to the issue of her credibilitythereby depriving him of the right to cross-examine her adequately. [23] It is a given in our system of justice that [t]he right to cross-examine adverse witnesses provides the defendant with an opportunity to test the credibility and veracity of the witnesses' testimony. [24] State v. Dorsey, 783 A.2d 947, 950 (R.I.2001); see generally Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). Moreover, evidence that a witness previously made a similar claim of wrongdoing against one or more other persons may be admissible to challenge that witness's credibilityeven if that claim was never proved false. See Dorsey, 783 A.2d at 951 ([E]vidence of a complaining witness's similar accusations of wrongdoing against others may be used to challenge a witness's credibility with respect to the pending charges, regardless of whether those prior accusations ever were proved false.). In the present case, complainant herself admitted (at defendant's probation violation hearing) that, on a prior occasion, she had lied to defendant and to others by claiming that she had been raped (in another state by another man). In our view, this prior false claim of rape is relevant because of the similarity between the two alleged acts (rape in each instance) and the fact that complainant had admitted that the earlier accusation was a lie. Therefore, it is our view that this evidence was directly relevant to defendant's effort to discredit complainant's credibility and that it was an abuse of discretion to have excluded it. We perceive no basis in the law for the state's contention that Rhode Island law requires that similar false claims by a witness about past wrongdoing must have been made to the police or to some other authority in order to be admitted for purposes of impeachment. In State v. Izzi, 115 R.I. 487, 348 A.2d 371 (1975), this Court reversed a defendant's conviction in an assault and battery case and held that the trial justice had improperly excluded the testimony of three witnesses who were prepared to testify that the complainant had repeatedly made similar unfounded false accusations of assault and battery to coworkers. The defendant in that case was an attendant at a mental health institution at which the complainant was a resident patient, and the three witnesses whose testimony was excluded were also attendants at the facility. Id. at 488, 348 A.2d at 371-72. In spite of the fact that the testimony did not involve charges made to police officers or other authority figures, this Court held that the evidence was erroneously excluded and that the defendant was prejudiced by that exclusion. In Izzi. this Court likened the assault and battery allegations at issue in that case to the prosecution of sex offenses and noted that in such cases the legal propriety of admitting evidence of similar false accusations lies, inter alia, in the fact that guilt or innocence often turns on the relative credibility of the prosecutrix and the accused especially in the absence of eyewitnesses. Izzi, 115 R.I. at 490, 348 A.2d at 372, 373. The complainant admitted at defendant's probation violation hearing that she lied to defendant and told him that she had been raped when she actually had not been. She testified as follows: Something did happen with that person, and I lied about the rape part of it because I, I liked [defendant] a lot and I didn't want him to think lower of me or something. As the state acknowledges in its brief to this Court, complainant also testified that defendant was not the only person she ever told about the incident, although she could not remember the names of the other people she told. Credibility was of enormous importance in the instant case, in which there were no eyewitnesses. The complainant's testimony that she had on a prior occasion falsely told defendant and others that she had been raped was certainly relevant to the crucial issue of her credibility and might well have had a substantial impact upon the members of the jury. Consequently, we are of the opinion that the trial justice abused his discretion in not allowing the complainant to be cross-examined about this subject.