Opinion ID: 2066834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intent Element of Iowa's Stalking Statute.

Text: Neuzil is on solid ground in asserting the State must prove all the essential elements of the crime charged, and that the court must clearly communicate those essential elements to the jury. See State v. Burns, 181 Iowa 1098, 1101-02, 165 N.W. 346, 348 (1917); State v. Hoffer, 383 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1986). The question is whether the court erred when it classified stalking as a general-intent crime and instructed the jury accordingly. We are persuaded the court committed no error. Neuzil correctly argues that the term specific intent designates a special mental element which is required above and beyond any mental state required with respect to the actus reus of the crime. State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996); Eggman v. Scurr, 311 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 1981). He also concedes that the determination of whether a statute requires general or specific intent turns on the language of the act, read in the light of its manifest purpose and design. See Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d at 294. When a statute is plain and its meaning clear, courts are not permitted to search for meaning beyond its express terms. State v. Chang, 587 N.W.2d 459, 461 (Iowa 1998). Neuzil claims section 708.11 requires the State to prove a course of conduct done with the specific intent to induce fear in another. He misreads the statute. By its terms, the crime of stalking merely requires proof of purposeful conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear injury to that specific person or members of her family. See Iowa Code § 708.11(2)(a). The statute's focus is not on the defendant's mental state but on the result defendant's purposeful acts cause in a reasonable person. Cf. Chang, 587 N.W.2d at 460 (interpreting statutory words damage ... done intentionally as requiring State to establish that defendant intended to cause the damage). We agree with the State's contention that if the Iowa legislature intended to make stalking a specific-intent crime, it would have defined the offense as a course of conduct intended to place the victim in reasonable fear of bodily injury or death. See Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d at 294. In the absence of such express terminology, we presume the legislature intended to criminalize the proscribed act itself, without further proof related to the defendants subjective desires. Id. We believe our interpretation of the plain language of section 708.11 is in keeping with evident legislative intent. Iowa's stalking statute incorporates the language recommended by the National Institute of Justice in its model code on stalking. See National Institute of Justice, Project to Develop a Model Anti-Stalking Code for States 43-48 (1993) [hereinafter N.I.J.]. Commentators have interpreted the model code to contain a general-intent provision. See Christine B. Gregson, Comment, California's Antistalking Statute: The Pivotal Role of Intent, 28 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. 221, 244-45 (1998) [hereinafter Gregson]; N.I.J., at 47-48. As already noted, the statute as written simply requires the stalker to purposefully engage in a course of conduct that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily injury or death in another. The statute makes no mention of proof that the stalker actually. intended to cause fear in the victim, but rather that the stalker consciously engaged in conduct that he knew or should have known would cause his victim to be afraid. Gregson, 28 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. at 244-45 & n. 153; N.I.J., at 47-48. The legislative choice of general over specific intent reflects sound public policy. The reason underlying the choice has been summed up this way: Stalkers may suffer from a mental disorder that causes them to believe that their victim will begin to return their feelings of love or affection if properly pursued. If this is the case, the stalker's intent may not be to cause the victim to be afraid, but to establish a relationship with or express his feelings to the victim. The drafters of the Model Code believed that the stalker's behavior, rather than his motivation, should be the most significant factor in determining whether to press charges. The Model Code's general intent requirement holds the accused stalker responsible for his intentional behavior if, at the very least, he should have known that his actions would cause the victim to be afraid. A stalker should know that his actions are unappreciated if he was served with a court order or if he was told by the victim that she no longer wishes to be contacted. By placing the focus on the stalker's behavior, the Model Code effectively eliminates the possibility that a stalker could assert a successful defense by claiming that he did not intend to cause the victim to be afraid, but was instead expressing his feelings and opinions. Gregson, 28 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. at 244-45 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added); see N.I.J., at 48; Brian L. McMahon, Comment, Constitutional LawUnreasonable Ambiguity: Minnesota's Amended Stalking Statute is Unconstitutionally Vague, 24 Wm. Mitchell L.Rev. 189, 204 (1998) (arguing greater difficulty in meeting specific-intent element in stalking statute where stalker merely sends flowers or notes professing love or devotion or where stalker attributes behavior to that of loving husband trying to save marriage or maintain contact with children). Reading a specific-intent requirement into the statute would allow an accused stalker to avoid conviction by asserting an emotional inability to form the requisite specific intent. Here, for example, Neuzil sought to convince the jury that his conduct stemmed from his love for Sheetz, and the hundreds of phone calls placed to her home were either the product of his depression or attempts to contact his children. To excuse his harassing conduct on these grounds would effectively negate the purpose of the anti-stalking statuteto enable law enforcement to get involved in a harassing situation before physical confrontation results. See Gregson, 28 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. at 229, 239. We thus hold that the crime of stalking, section 708.11, is a general-intent crime. The court committed no error in submitting a jury instruction on general intent. Accordingly we find no merit in Neuzil's argument that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue a jury instruction on the issue of specific intent. We affirm the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.