Opinion ID: 2273030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cochran's Testimony as to Standard of Care and Fair Market Value

Text: Next, Travis Lumber challenges Cochran's testimony on two separate issues. First, Travis Lumber alleges that Cochran's testimony on the standard of care for timber companies in verifying the validity of a deed was improper under Arkansas Rules of Evidence 701 and 702, because Cochran admitted that he was unfamiliar with the standard of care for Arkansas in 1997. Travis Lumber also maintains that Cochran's testimony on this issue lacked a proper foundation because he failed to inspect the relevant public records at the Yell County Courthouse. As stated earlier, the circuit court declined to rule on this issue at the pretrial hearing on Travis Lumber's motion in limine. However, the record reflects that Travis Lumber raised an objection on the same basis at trial prior to Cochran's testimony regarding the standard of care. This objection was overruled; therefore, the issue is properly before us. We conclude that the admission of this testimony was not an abuse of discretion, as the question of the extent of Cochran's knowledge goes to the weight, rather than the admissibility, of his testimony. Furthermore, Travis Lumber offers no authority for the proposition that a locality rule applies, such that Cochran's testimony would be inadmissible to establish the applicable standard of care in Arkansas. This court has previously held that Arkansas has no same- or similar-locality rule for any profession other than the medical profession. Carroll-Boone Water Dist. v. M. & P. Equip. Co., 280 Ark. 560, 573-74, 661 S.W.2d 345, 352-53 (1983). Therefore, the fact that Cochran's testimony may not have been tailored specifically to Arkansas timber companies was for the jury to consider in weighing the evidence. As we have often stated, it is up to the jury to resolve any conflicts in the testimony and to judge the weight and credibility of the evidence. McCoy v. Montgomery, 370 Ark. 333, 341-42, 259 S.W.3d 430, 436 (2007). Secondly, Travis Lumber contends that Cochran's testimony on the fair market value of the timber was speculative, unreliable, lacking in foundation, and confusing to the jury. More particularly, Travis Lumber complains that Cochran's estimates were based upon the fair market value of timber in southern Arkansas rather than central Arkansas. Again, we hold that this argument goes to the weight of Cochran's testimony as opposed to its admissibility. While it was controverted, Cochran did explain the basis of his estimates during his testimony. The fact that Travis Lumber and its witnesses disagreed with Cochran's estimates is no reason to exclude them. We cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion in permitting Cochran's testimony.