Opinion ID: 2559012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Failure to object to verdict slip

Text: Appellant next faults direct appeal counsel for failing to claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request that the trial court include a separate line on the verdict slip of overall not guilty, in addition to the guilty/not guilty option presented to the jury for the various charges individually. Appellant argues that since he formally pleaded not guilty, the lack of a global not guilty option on the verdict slip violated due process. Appellant notes that the prosecutor suggested inclusion of such a not guilty option as a precaution against claims of prejudice by appellant, but that the court declined the suggestion, without objection by appellant's counsel. Citing Commonwealth v. Edwards, 394 Pa. 335, 147 A.2d 313 (1959), appellant speculates that the jury may not have believed that it was empowered to simply acquit him. Appellant adds that the verdict slip deficiency was compounded by the fact that the jury received misleading information from the court crier [17] after the jury left the courtroom to begin deliberations. Appellant cites to a record exchange during which the court crier said, respecting the murder charges: When I give the verdict sheet, I explain to them [the jury] they can only select one of the two options, either first degree or third degree. Citing Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 87 S.Ct. 468, 17 L.Ed.2d 420 (1966), appellant argues that the court crier probably confused the jury regarding its ability to find appellant not guilty and that the jury was likely misled to an extent that could not have been countered by the court's instructions on the concepts of burden of proof and the presumption of innocence. [18] The Commonwealth responds that the trial court instructed the jury properly as to its ability and duty to find appellant not guilty if the Commonwealth did not meet its burden of proof. The Commonwealth notes also that the verdict slip properly listed not guilty as a possible verdict for both the first-degree and third-degree murder charges and that appellant has not shown that the jury was mistaken or confused in its completion of the verdict slip. The Commonwealth argues that Edwards is inapplicable because the trial judge there omitted not guilty from the list of possible verdicts, which was not so here. The Commonwealth adds that appellant confuses the nature of the discussion between the prosecutor and the trial court regarding the verdict slip. In actuality, the Commonwealth explains, the prosecutor had merely expressed concern, ultimately unfounded, that the layout of the jury verdict slip might lead the jury to believe that it could return convictions of both first-degree murder and third-degree murder, not just one or the other. Concerning appellant's claims as to the court crier, the Commonwealth distinguishes Parker as having presented obviously improper conduct by the bailiff, who told several jurors that the defendant was wicked and guilty and that [i]f there is anything wrong (in finding petitioner guilty) the Supreme Court will correct it. Commonwealth's Brief at 34 (citing Parker, 385 U.S. at 363-64, 87 S.Ct. 468). Here, the Commonwealth notes, court personnel did not comment on appellant's guilt, nor was the jury precluded from rendering a not guilty verdict if it had seen fit to do so. The PCRA court opined that appellant's claim respecting the court crier was not raised in any of his PCRA filings, so any such claim was waived. In a footnote, the court added that while appellant had raised an issue involving the verdict slip in his May 2002 Fourth Supplemental and Amended Petition, he had not raised in that pleading any of the issues set forth above (referring presumably to appellant's claim regarding the court crier). [19] In the alternative, on the merits, the court opined that appellant had not established any improper contact between the court crier and the jury. As such, the court concluded, all derivative claims of counsel ineffectiveness associated with the issue of the court crier's conduct were also meritless. The court did not specifically address the merits of appellant's claim alleging layered ineffectiveness arising from the alleged defect in the verdict slip. PCRA Ct. Op. at 27. The record reveals the following with respect to appellant's underlying complaints concerning the verdict slip and the court crier. First, the trial court defined both first-degree murder and third-degree murder for the jury and set forth in depth the distinct mens rea requirement for each. After describing the lesser charges against appellant, the trial court explained that appellant was presumed innocent, that the Commonwealth bore the burden of proving all elements of the crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, and that if the Commonwealth's evidence fails to meet its burden, then your verdict must be not guilty. N.T., 11/12/91, at 42-44, 50-52. The verdict slip given to the jury, which is titled Verdict Report Form, reads as follows: Possible Verdicts: Murder1st Degree Guilty or Not Guilty or Murder3rd Degree Guilty or Not Guilty Possessing Instruments of CrimeGenerally Guilty or Not Guilty Aggravated Assault (victim: N.M.) Guilty or Not Guilty Verdict Report Form, 11/12/91. Thus, the verdict slip specifically reserved the option of guilty or not guilty with respect to each charge. After the jury had retired to deliberate, the court asked if there were any additions or corrections to the verdict slip. The following exchange then occurred: Court: Are there any additions or corrections to the verdict slip? Assistant District Attorney (A.D.A.): The only thing I would suggest, if [the court crier] will alter it, as I have seen in the past for the murder bills, it says one of the above verdicts, guilty, guilty murder first degree, guilty murder third degree, not guilty. Court: Let me see that. A.D.A.: It would require them [the jury] actuallyfor instance, if they acquit the defendant, they would have to find him not guilty of first, not guilty of third. In the alternative they may find the defendant guilty of first and third degree murder, and to me it just seems simpler and more straightforward if the verdict slip says one of the above three verdicts. Court [presumably directed to the court crier]: [T]he Commonwealth has requested the verdict slip be altered to read, You may select one of the possible three verdicts. Court Crier: The jurors know that. When I give the verdict sheet, I explain to them they can only select one of the two options, either first degree or third degree. That is explained to the jurors. A.D.A.: I understand that, but as I say again, that verdict slip doesn't have one line for not guilty. They could require them to circle not guiltyI don't want any claim of prejudice to arise against the defendant. Court: This verdict slip as written by [the court crier] has withstood the test. Court Crier: It has or, first or [third]. Court: That is correct. I'll leave it the way it is. N.T., 11/12/91, at 62-64. Appellant's counsel raised no objection. When the jury returned and announced its verdict of guilt, it had executed the verdict slip as follows: the jury wrote the word guilty in the blank after first-degree murder; left empty the blank after third-degree murder, and wrote the word guilty in the blanks after both possession of an instrument of crime and aggravated assault on N.M. Appellant's claim that counsel was obliged to object to the verdict slip, and to forward an argument along the lines of the suggestion made by the trial prosecutor, lacks merit. First, it must be remembered that the verdict slip exists to record the result of the jury's deliberation; it is not the deliberation itself, and the jury's deliberation is guided by the court's charge. The verdict slip here, as drafted and as executed by the jury, was consistent with the trial court's charge and instructions to the jury. Thus, contrary to appellant's assertions, the verdict slip made clear that a not guilty verdict was available as to each of the charges. Although offering the jury a global not guilty option is possible, nothing in the law requires that sort of redundancy on the verdict slip, and counsel could trust in the court's charge as well as the fact that the slip made clear that individual not guilty verdicts were available. Furthermore, it is difficult to discern any prejudice arising from the lack of a global not guilty option on the verdict slip. Notably, there was no communication from the jury to the court during its deliberations indicating any confusion or difficulty. Any claim of prejudice arising from the verdict slip rests on pure speculation. The Edwards case appellant cites in challenging the propriety of the verdict slip does not advance his claim. The dispute in Edwards did not involve a verdict slip, but rather the more important issue of the accuracy of the trial court's instructions regarding possible verdicts. Edwards admitted shooting his friend's abusive father (who survived the shooting), but claimed insanity. The trial court instructed the jury that it could find Edwards guilty of first-degree murder with the death penalty, first-degree murder with life imprisonment, second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, or not guilty because of insanity. However, the jury instruction did not present the option of a simple not guilty verdict. This Court reversed and ordered a new trial, concluding that even though Edwards had admitted the shooting, he was still entitled to the presumption of innocence and it was for the jury to decide whether he had a justification or excuse for the shooting such that outright acquittal was appropriate. Edwards reaffirms the importance of accuracy in the court's charge. In this case, it is undisputed that the court's instructions made clear that a verdict of not guilty was available. Moreover, as noted, the verdict slip itself made clear the availability of a not guilty verdict on each charge. Because appellant's underlying claim challenging the verdict slip lacks merit, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective. Appellant's claim regarding the court crier warrants closer analysis, though not necessarily for the reason appellant specifies. A court crier's responsibilities are properly limited to logistics and purely ministerial functions, such as escorting the jury in and out of the courtroom. Instructions on the law, and the deliberative process, should come from the court alone, and should be on the record. The verdict slip falls in a gray area. As noted, the slip is intended merely to record the result of the jury's substantive deliberation. Nevertheless, the fact remains that the slip is with the jury during deliberations, and it should be accurate, so as not to mislead, just as special interrogatories should be carefully considered for accuracy and usefulness before submission in a civil case. Given this fact, the better course is for the trial court to explain to the jury, in open court and on the record, the mechanics of recording its verdict on the jury slip. That instruction should not be delegated to a court officer, particularly where the communication is off the record. Our review of the court's charge to the jury here reveals no discussion of the verdict slip. See N.T., 11/12/91, at 42-62. Unfortunately, it appears, the court here left it to the court crier to distribute and explain the slip. For the reasons set forth above, we caution against that practice. Turning to the substance of the court crier's off-the-record interaction with the jury concerning the verdict slip, the court crier's account could indeed be problematicwhich confirms our concern that such a task should not be delegated to a court officer. If the court crier meant to convey that he had informed the jury that it was to render a verdict on only one of the murder options on the verdict slip, that advice would be accurate only for purposes of recording a murder conviction; an acquittal on both murder charges would require the jury to pass upon both charges, and the slip should be executed to reflect verdicts on both charges. But, the court crier's account was posed in response to the trial court noting the prosecutor's concern that it would be simpler if the jury were told that it could render one of three possible verdicts on the murder charges ( i.e., guilty of first-degree murder, guilty of third-degree murder, or not guilty of either). Notably, the court crier began his response by saying, [t]he jurors know that, and then recounting that he had informed the jurors that they could only choose first-degree or third-degree murder, which, presumably, was the court crier's way of addressing the conviction scenario. Counsel obviously could have lodged an objection at this point, pursued the matter further with the court crier on the record, and/or asked for supplemental instructions from the court itself concerning execution of the verdict slip. At a minimum, an objection would have afforded the prospect of a better record concerning exactly what the jury was told out-of-court. Nevertheless, we do not believe appellant has proven the Strickland prejudice he alleges on this record. Appellant speculates that the court crier's comment to the jury that they can only select one of the two options, either first degree or third degree was harmful because it confused the jury into believing that it could not render a verdict of not guilty. But, given the context of the exchange we have set forth above, it is not clear that that is what the crier conveyed to the jury; it is just as likely that all he conveyed was that any recorded guilty verdict for murder had to be limited to first-degree or third-degree murder, and not both. More importantly, appellant's suggestion of juror confusion during deliberation over the availability of a not guilty verdict on both murder charges conflates the verdict slip with the court's charge. As noted above, the verdict slip exists merely to record the jury's conclusion after it has deliberated. The verdict slip does not frame deliberations; the court's charge does. Nothing in the truncated explanation of the court crier, or in appellant's proffer, suggests that the court crier's communication with the jury, concerning the mere logistics of recording the verdict on the slip, affected the court's charge or the actual deliberative process of the jury. Furthermore, for purposes of prejudice analysis on collateral review, the fact remains that the court's charge and the verdict slip both made clear to the jury the availability of a verdict of not guilty as to each charge, the jury indicated no confusion with its task, and its verdict as announced was clear and unambiguous. There has been no showing of actual prejudice arising from the trial court's admittedly unfortunate practice of permitting the court crier to explain the logistics of executing the verdict slip. Thus, appellant's layered claim of counsel ineffectiveness fails. [20]