Opinion ID: 682756
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Texas Whistle Blower Act

Text: 23 We turn now to Davis's claim under the Texas Whistle Blower Act. 35 The statute provides, in pertinent part: 24 A state or local governmental body may not suspend or terminate the employment of, or otherwise discriminate against, a public employee who reports a violation of law to appropriate law enforcement authority if the employee report is made in good faith. 36 25 The defendants assign a number of errors to the court's handling of the Whistle Blower claim. Because we hold that the district court's instructions to the jury were impermissibly vague regarding the causation element, we must reverse.
26 The Texas Whistle Blower Act is designed to enhance openness in government and compel the government's compliance with the law by protecting those who inform authorities of wrongdoing. 37 As a remedial statute, we construe it liberally. 38 27 The defendants raise both substantive and technical objections. As to the former, the defendants argue that the purpose of the Whistle Blower Act is to encourage employees to come forward with knowledge of the misdeeds of public officials without fear of reprisal, 39 but assert that the purpose is not furthered by the facts of this case. Castaneda, the most helpful recent construction of art. 6252-16a, clarified some ambiguities in the statute and, in so doing, expressly rejected much of the defendants' argument. 40 28 For example, the Castaneda court rejected the assertion that the plaintiff must initiate a report. Instead, the court reasoned, the statute requires only that the plaintiff report a violation of the law; that he be an initiator is not required. The court stated that the phrase reports a violation of the law includes: 29 any disclosure of information regarding a public servant's employer tending to directly or circumstantially prove the substance of a violation of criminal or civil law, the State or Federal Constitution, statutes, administrative rules or regulations. 30 In the instant case, the defendants contend, Davis brought no new facts to light; he merely attempted to purify the speculation as to his wife's motives in filing the sexual harassment suit. 31 The letter itself, underscored by our First Amendment analysis of its contents, renders that charge unpersuasive. Davis detailed for the Commissioners' Court the sexual harassment allegations and the possibility of an official coverup, plainly satisfying the requirement that the plaintiff report a violation of the law. We thus reject, as did the district court upon reinstating Davis's Whistle Blower claim, the contention that the whistle had already blown and, therefore, that the statute did not protect Davis. 41 32 The defendants' more technical or, perhaps, textual objections also are easily dispatched. They assert, for instance, that Davis has not met the in the workplace requirement: Davis reported violations alleged to have occurred in the Sheriff's department, by whom he has never been employed. Using that logic, they similarly charge that Davis's report did not concern his employer. 33 The workplace and employer in this case, however, is Ector County, not merely Davis's immediate supervisor. If we gave the statute the narrow construction that the defendants urge, a whistle blower's protection would extend only so far as his departmental assignment. Such would contravene the purpose of the statute. We conclude that Davis reported violations concerning his employer and addressed issues concerning his workplace. 42
34 Although we conclude that Davis stated a proper cause of action under the Texas Whistle Blower Act, we nonetheless must reverse the judgment of the district court because the instructions tendered to the jury were sufficiently vague as to permit uncertainty as to the correctness of the verdict. 35 The function of the reviewing court with respect to instructions is to satisfy itself that the instructions show no tendency to confuse or mislead the jury with respect to the applicable principles of law. 43 The district court has wide latitude in instructing the jury on the law and we will thus ignore technical imperfections. 44 In spite of that deference, we will reverse if we conclude that the trial court erred with respect to the instructions proffered to the jury and that, based upon the record, the error affected the outcome of the case. In other words, does the charge as a whole leave[ ] us with substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations? 45 We have that doubt here. 36 Although he was addressing a whistle blower cause of action in the private sector, Justice Doggett understood the need for a strong causation element: The reporting of these activities must have been the principal reason for the employer's retaliation. 46 Significantly, Justice Doggett added, The employer may refute the causation element by proving dismissal for reasons other than the act of whistle blowing. 47 The instructions should have communicated this to the jury. 37 The court's instructions provided, in part: 38 You are instructed that, in order to recover under this statute, the Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: 39
40 2. He was discharged after reporting violations of the law and because he made such a report; 41 3. His report was made in good faith; 42 4. The acts of the District Attorney of Ector County were a proximate cause of any damages sustained by the Plaintiff; and 43 5. The plaintiff suffered actual damages. 44 The second element focusses on causation (i.e., why Davis was fired). The defendants charge that the court erred when it failed to give an instruction that, if the District Attorney fired Davis for insubordination, the jury must find for the defendants. 48 We agree. 45 The phrase He was discharged ... because he made such a report is susceptible of two meanings. First, it could mean that Davis was fired because he brought facts to light in a report--facts that the District Attorney would have preferred to keep from the public. Under that construction, a jury properly could find that the Whistle Blower Act had been violated. 46 But the phrase has another meaning and, in the case at hand, a likely one. It could mean that Davis was fired because he made a report; i.e., for insubordination in defying the orders to stay clear of the Sheriff's office. Under this probable construction, a jury could not award damages under the Whistle Blower Act because the District Attorney's objection would not have been to the content of the letter (i.e., reporting a violation), but that, by writing a letter, Davis risked involving the District Attorney's office in his wife's lawsuit. From the District Attorney's perspective, it might be merely fortuitous that the letter reported a violation of the law. 49 47 In the Knowlton case, the district court gave jury instructions that avoided this error. After instructing the jury on the elements of a Whistle Blower claim, the court instructed the jury: 48 The defendant may rebut this presumption by offering evidence and proving the defendant fired such plaintiff for a nondiscriminatory reason. 50 49 That is precisely the instruction that should have been given here. 51 50 Davis makes the broad assertion that, if the speech in question is protected by the First Amendment, it cannot be insubordination to exercise the right to speak. The issue, however, is whether the defendants's actions violated the Texas Whistle Blower Act. If Davis was discharged for insubordination as opposed to being discharged in retaliation for exercising his protected right to speak, the cause of action would not lie. 51 Although it is impossible to say whether the jury properly understood the law, we conclude that the instruction that was given prejudiced the defense. It allowed the jury to answer the second element in the affirmative under facts that would not have supported a Whistle Blower Act claim. For that reason, we reverse and remand. 52