Opinion ID: 1248143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the State's Evidence Show Defendant Was Aware of the Legal Duty to Register with Iowa Authorities?

Text: The trial information in the present case charged defendant with failure to register as a sex offender in Johnson County, Iowa, and thus we must consider defendant's argument within the context of his legal duty to register there. Defendant testified that no one in the Illinois court system or correction system had advised him of a legal duty to register as a sex offender in another state should he establish residence there and otherwise denied knowledge of such duty. The State contends that we may infer that the contrary is true because, under Illinois law, corrections officials were required to so advise defendant when he was released from prison in that state. Our examination of the statutory law on which the State relies does not expressly support that claim. When defendant was released from prison in Illinois in December of 1993, the applicable Illinois sex-offender-registration statute provided in relevant part: Any child sex offender as defined by this Article, who is discharged or paroled from a prison, hospital or other institution or facility where he was confined because of a conviction of one of the offenses defined in subsection (B) of Section 2 of this Article shall prior to discharge, parole or release, be informed of his duty to register under this Article, by the facility in which he was confined. The facility shall require the person to read and sign such form as may be required by the Department of State Police stating that the duty to register and the procedure for registration has been explained to him. The facility shall further advise the person in writing that the failure to register or other violation of this Article shall result in revocation of parole, mandatory supervised release or conditional release. The facility shall obtain the address where the person expects to reside upon his or her discharge, parole or release and shall report the address to the Department of State Police ... which shall notify the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction where the person expects to reside upon his or her discharge, parole or release. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 154/4 (1986). Noticeably absent from that statute is any reference to advising the offender of a duty to register in another state upon moving there. This omission was cured by an amendment to the statute effective January 1, 1996, which provided: The facility or institution shall also inform any person who must register that if he or she establishes a residence outside of the State of Illinois, is employed outside of the State of Illinois, or attends school outside the State of Illinois, he or she must register in the new state within ten days after establishing the residence if that state has a registration requirement. Ill. Pub. Act 89-8 art. 20, § 20-20 (effective January 1, 1996). It appears that, at the time defendant was released from prison in 1993, Illinois correctional officials were not expressly tasked to advise him concerning the duty to register in another state to which he might move. Irrespective of the requirements of Illinois law, the State's argument based on the probability that defendant would have been advised by Illinois correction authorities of a duty to register in a new state of residence is based on an unsupported presumption. If such advice had been given to defendant, there should have been a source of evidence for the State to produce at trial. The failure to produce such evidence does as much or more to suggest that defendant was not advised of a duty to register in another state than any presumption the State might rely upon does to suggest that he was so advised. The State's only other contention concerning defendant's awareness of a legal duty to register is a reliance on the fact that he has moved from place to place since his discharge from prison. The State suggests that this was an effort to avoid registration. The State cannot circumstantially prove the existence of a fact by relying on a circumstance that is itself dependent upon the fact's existence. In order to tie defendant's nomadic tendencies to an attempt to avoid registration, the State would have to independently establish that he knew of the registration requirement. Standing alone, defendant's frequent moves from place to place are not indicative of that knowledge. When the record is viewed as a whole, the State's evidence is insufficient to establish that defendant was aware of a duty to register. The verdict should have been directed in his favor. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgment of the district court must be reversed. The case is returned to that court for entry of judgment of acquittal. REVERSED.