Opinion ID: 2513995
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alaska Statute 36.30.685 and our ruling in Danco Exploration v. State preclude Quality's recovery of prejudgment interest.

Text: Quality first argues that because its contract claim is of the type allowable under AS 09.50.250, prejudgment interest is recoverable under AS 09.50.280. [29] The state responds that Quality's contract claim is the type required to be filed as an administrative appeal under AS 36.30.685. [30] The state therefore argues that Quality cannot bring an action under AS 09.50.250. Quality appealed the commissioner's decision under AS 36.30.685(a) and Alaska Rule of Appellate Procedure 602(a)(2). Quality asserts that AS 36.30 merely states an exhaustion requirement and simply require[s]... claimants to exhaust their administrative remedies before bringing suit under AS 09.50.250. We addressed a similar situation in Danco Exploration, Inc. v. State. [31] Danco was the winning bidder in a state lease sale. [32] A division of the Department of Natural Resources informed Danco that it forfeited its leases because Danco was late returning documents to the state. [33] Danco appealed this decision to the commissioner of natural resources, who rejected Danco's claim. [34] Danco then appealed the commissioner's decision to the superior court, which reversed the commissioner's decision. [35] Danco attempted to recover prejudgment interest under AS 09.50.280 after the superior court ruled in Danco's favor in its administrative appeal. [36] We held: Danco's claim that it could have sued the State in tort or in contract lacks merit. Oil and gas lessees and lease bidders which have grievances with the State must pursue ... administrative procedures[.]... A party who brings an appeal from a commissioner's decision to the superior court is bound by the result of such an appeal and may not maintain a separate action under [AS 09.50.250]. [37] Quality argues that Danco is distinguishable because [Quality's] claim is undisputedly a `contract claim.' We disagree. This is not an instance in which the difference between bringing a claim under alternative statutes is merely a matter of form. Quality did not have the option of bringing its claim under AS 09.50.250; that statute expressly provides that a person who may bring [a procurement action] may not bring an action under [AS 09.50.250] except as set out in AS 36.30.685. [38] But AS 36.30.685(a) did not authorize Quality to file a contract claim under AS 09.50.250. Instead, AS 36.30.685(a) addresses administrative appeals, the process Quality followed. We assume for discussion's sake that a procurement claim prosecuted in the superior court at a trial de novo under AS 36.30.685(b) is the procurement claim to which AS 09.50.250 refers when it states that a person who may bring [a procurement action] may not bring an action under [AS 09.50.250] except as set out in AS 36.30.685.  (Emphasis added.) We therefore also assume for discussion's sake that a claimant who successfully pursues a procurement claim in a superior court trial de novo under AS 36.30.685(b) may recover prejudgment interest under AS 09.50.280. [39] But we do not have to decide here precisely what type of superior court proceeding would entitle a successful procurement claimant to prejudgment interest because Quality's superior court proceeding was clearly an appeal under AS 36.30.685(a), and was therefore governed by Danco. Quality next argues that the real issue presented for review is whether the agency had the authority to award prejudgment interest to [Quality] on its claim, as the DOT did in the administrative claims proceedings. Quality tries to distinguish its claim by arguing that the state and the superior court wrongly perceived the issue as being whether the court could award prejudgment interest. Quality explains that [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity applies only to judicial actions brought against the State, and has no application to administrative proceedings. But we have previously held that unless interest is specifically authorized by legislative enactment, it may not ordinarily be assessed against the State in any action. [40] Because Quality could not maintain its claim under AS 09.50.250 and because the state had not specifically authorized prejudgment interest for this type of claim when Quality brought its administrative appeal, the superior court correctly vacated the prejudgment interest award. [41]