Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Specific Intent/Assignment of Error 11

Text: Defendant asserts the trial court erred in allowing the State to improperly instruct the jury panels on specific intent and in failing to provide the panels with a curative instruction. Specifically, defendant alleges the State improperly instructed the jury as to the definition of specific intent in violation of Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), without a curative instruction by the judge. [5] We note at the outset defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's statements regarding intent and did not request a curative instruction. In Taylor, 93-2201 at p. 7, 669 So.2d at 369, this court held the scope of review in capital cases will be limited to alleged errors occurring during the guilt phase that are contemporaneously objected to, and alleged errors occurring during the sentencing phase, whether objected to or not. In Cousan, 94-2503 at p. 8-9, 684 So.2d at 388, and in State v. Roy, 95-0638, p. 15, n. 7 (La.10/4/96), 681 So.2d 1230, 1240, n. 7, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1474, 137 L.Ed.2d 686 (1997), we noted this court had not yet decided whether Taylor should be extended to bar review of unobjected-to alleged errors which occurred during voir dire, and pretermitted the issue in those cases. We again find it unnecessary to reach this issue herein, however, because we find the statements made by the prosecutor in this case were not misstatements of the law, and, even if they were, did not prejudice defendant as the jurors were subsequently correctly charged by the court. In Sandstrom, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether, in a case in which intent is an element of the crime charged, the jury instruction, the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts, given at the close of the guilt phase, violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held the language of the instruction, and particularly the word presumes, gives the jury the impression the presumption is mandatory rather than a permissible inference, improperly shifting the burden of proof from the State to the defendant on the issue of intent. The prosecutor in the instant case did not misstate the law in violation of Sandstrom. Although the word presume was used, when viewed in context, the remarks reflect an accurate statement of the law and did not contain a mandatory presumption of the type prohibited in Sandstrom. Furthermore, even if the remarks did misstate the law, [a] misstatement of the law by the prosecutor does not prejudice a defendant if the judge subsequently admonishes or correctly instructs the jury. Roy, 95-0638 at p. 14-15, 681 So.2d at 1239. In the instant case, defense counsel never requested an admonition and, therefore, the district judge never admonished the jury. However, the judge ultimately read the impaneled jurors a correct statement of the law when they were instructed at the conclusion of the guilt phase of the trial. This assignment of error has no merit.