Opinion ID: 2590922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Stanfield Decision

Text: Review of Rhoten's state court litigation necessarily requires us to discuss and re-examine Stanfield because that case addressed the same issue. In Stanfield, the plaintiff first filed an action in federal district court invoking both federal questions and supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff alleged two federal trademark claims under the Lanham Act and state law claims for slander, disparagement, and misappropriation of plaintiff's name. 263 Kan. at 391-92, 949 P.2d 602. Defendants filed for summary judgment, which was granted on the federal law claims only. 263 Kan. at 393, 949 P.2d 602. The federal district court then declined supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, which was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit on appeal. 263 Kan. at 394, 949 P.2d 602. Plaintiff then filed the same state law claims in state court. Defendants moved again for summary judgment, asserting the issue preclusion doctrine as a bar to further proceedings. The district court found both issue and claim preclusion applicable. 263 Kan. at 395, 949 P.2d 602. On appeal, this court declined to address whether issue preclusion applied after determining plaintiff's claims were barred by claim preclusion. The Stanfield court held the so-called transactional approach was the test used to define what claims were precluded by the doctrine. Under this approach, a claim is defined as a natural grouping or common nucleus of operative facts. 263 Kan. at 401, 949 P.2d 602. Then, the court held the federal claims dismissed on summary judgment arose from the same nucleus of operative facts as the state law claims because the facts were identical in time and origin and required the same witnesses and proof. On this basis, the court held both the state law and federal law theories comprised the same claim, and plaintiff was precluded from relitigating the state law claims. 263 Kan. at 402, 949 P.2d 602. Next, the Stanfield court addressed whether an exception should be created because the federal district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. This court held claim preclusion applies even though the federal court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, explaining: Claim preclusion prohibits a party from asserting in a second lawsuit any matter that might have been asserted in the first lawsuit. [Citation omitted.] Thus, a legal theory does not even need to be raised in the first action, more or less considered by the court, in order for it to be precluded in a later action under the claim preclusion doctrine, if it arose out of the same claim or factual transaction which the first action determined. [Citation omitted.] The fact that the federal court did not consider the plaintiff's state law theories does not prevent claim preclusion from applying to the theories, since the theories arose out of the same claim or factual transaction which the federal court did determine. 263 Kan. at 404, 949 P.2d 602. Rhoten makes the following arguments to challenge the application of claim preclusion in her case: (1) The federal district court's orders were a not final judgment; (2) the state law negligence theories do not arise from the same claim or common nucleus of operative facts as the federal due process claim; (3) she did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate the state law claims; and (4) Stanfield should be overruled. In deciding Rhoten's case, the district court and the Court of Appeals relied upon Stanfield, and it controls several issues. But the Stanfield court did not discuss the exception recognized by the Tenth Circuit when a party did not have an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate its claims. We will need to address that point when deciding Rhoten's third argument, as well as deciding whether Stanfield remains consistent with federal law in deciding her other contentions.