Opinion ID: 3029762
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tribal Self-Government

Text: Tribal courts may also exercise jurisdiction over nonmembers where the conduct of nonmembers “threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.” Montana, 450 U.S. at 566 (citations omitted). The Navajo Nation and the Todecheenes contend that the Tribe’s inability to adjudicate the product liability case against Ford would adversely affect its political integrity and its ability to provide for the health and welfare of its members. [8] Despite its seemingly broad sweep, the Supreme Court in Strate clarified that the self-government exception is rather narrow: Read in isolation, the Montana rule’s second exception can be misperceived. Key to its proper application, however, is the Court’s preface: “Indian tribes retain their inherent power to punish tribal offenders, to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. . . . But a tribe’s inherent power does not reach beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.” Strate, 520 U.S. at 459 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 564) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also County of Lewis, 163 F.3d at 515 (noting the narrowness of the exception). Examination of prior court rulings reveals that the circumstances of this case fall short of the dictates of the tribal selfgovernment exception described in Montana. 318 FORD MOTOR CO. v. TODECHEENE In Hicks, the United States Supreme Court reiterated “that what is necessary to protect tribal self-government and control internal relations can be understood by looking at the examples of tribal power to which Montana referred . . . These examples show, we said, that Indians have the right to make their own laws and be ruled by them[.]” 533 U.S. at 360-61 (citations, internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). “Tribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to that right of the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them.” Id. (citation omitted). [9] In Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997), we explained that a traffic accident occurring on a road running through a reservation does not implicate the type of inherent power concerns necessary to meet the second Montana exception. In addressing this issue, we noted that the Supreme Court specifically rejected the argument “that a traffic accident injuring a tribal member sufficiently affects the economic security, political integrity, or health and welfare of the tribe. . .” Id. at 814 (internal citation omitted). The Supreme Court explained that it had rejected an identical argument in Strate, reflecting that “[u]ndoubtedly, those who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal members. But if Montana’s second exception requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.” Id. (citation omitted). Although the Wilson case involved a public highway running through a reservation and this case concerns a tribal road running through a reservation, no principled basis exists for finding that in the former instance an automobile accident implicates tribal selfgovernance and in the latter instance it does not. The dissent makes much of the fact that the second Montana exception was tailored, and precisely worded, for “cases involving conduct on non-Indian fee lands within the reservation.” Dissenting opinion, p. 323; see also p. 328. However, the contention that the Montana exceptions apply only to conFORD MOTOR CO. v. TODECHEENE 319 duct on non-Indian fee land was expressly repudiated by Hicks. See 533 U.S. at 360 (noting “that the general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land”) (emphasis added). Our colleague in dissent also reminds us that “tribal ownership of the land on which an incident occurs is a ‘significant’ factor that ‘may sometimes be dispositive.’ ” Dissenting opinion, p. 326 (emphasis added). But sometimes is not always. And this case is not one of those times when ownership should be considered a dispositive factor in the Montana analysis. There is absolutely nothing in the record to support the premise that the status of the land impacted potential liability in this case. This case does not involve encroachment upon tribal land, damage to tribal land, interference with the use of tribal land, or any other effect upon tribal land that might prove dispositive. The dissent also chastises us for not being more verbose in distinguishing McDonald. Dissenting opinion, p. 330. However, verbosity is not required to state what the McDonald panel itself recognized: the holding in McDonald is not a holding for all seasons and all reasons. As we recognized in Smith, the panel in McDonald held only “that the exercise of jurisdiction in that case was permissible under Montana.” 378 F.3d at 1052, n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). Central to McDonald’s ruling was the fact that a non-member’s horse had wandered onto the roads of the reservation, thereby impacting the interest of the tribe in keeping its roadways free from obstruction. No similar circumstance existed in this case. The McDonald panel did not purport to rule that tribal jurisdiction is mandated when an incident occurs on tribal land. Rather, its holding was limited to the facts of that particular case. As we ruled in Smith, [b]ecause the general rule of Montana applies to both Indian and non-Indian land . . . we are required to start with a presumption that the tribal court 320 FORD MOTOR CO. v. TODECHEENE did not have jurisdiction.” 378 F.3d at 1053 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). That presumption can be rebutted only if the conduct falls within one of the articulated Montana exceptions. See id. Nothing in McDonald compels a different approach. As we noted in Smith, “if the plaintiff is a member [as are the Todecheenes], the defendant is a non-member [as is Ford], and the action arises on tribal lands [as occurred in this case], the subtleties of the cases have led us to differing results . . . depending on the precise facts.” Id. (citations omitted). Under the precise facts of this case, where ownership of the land did not impact liability in any way, McDonald does not dictate the outcome. [10] That brings us to the dissent’s final criticism of the majority opinion—that it does not agree with the dissent that a rollover accident implicates the tribe’s self-government interest. Dissenting opinion, p. 331. Although the tribe does have an interest in protecting the lives of its police officers on tribal roads, unfortunately that interest does not fit within the parameters of the self-government Montana exception. That exception has been narrowly defined as encompassing events that interfere with a Tribe’s ability to enact or be governed by its own laws. See Hicks, 533 U.S. at 360-61. Although tragic, there is no indication in the record that the death of this tribal police officer in a rollover accident in any way prevented the Tribe from enacting or being governed by its laws. Evocation of a sympathetic reaction cannot erase the Supreme Court’s narrowing interpretation of the tribal government Montana exception. [11] In sum, we agree with the district court that neither of the Montana exceptions applied in this case, and no tribal jurisdiction existed. B. Exhaustion The tribal court was afforded the opportunity to make an initial determination regarding the existence of tribal jurisdicFORD MOTOR CO. v. TODECHEENE 321 tion over this case. That is all the exhaustion that is required. See Sharber v. Spirit Mountain Gaming, Inc., 343 F.3d 974, 975 (9th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Consequently, there is no need to remand the case to tribal court for purposes of exhaustion.