Opinion ID: 2747138
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prospective juror Brown

Text: After defendant questioned and passed prospective juror Brown, the prosecutor asked: “Q. Mr. Brown, before anybody here at counsel table had a chance to talk to you, it looks [from your questionnaire] like you actually strongly disagree with the death penalty. Even if the facts and laws justify it, you disagree. Before any lawyers talked to you. “A. I may disagree, but like I stated in my questionnaire, I believe in the rule of law. If I felt that strongly about it I would protest against it until the law changed. I really haven’t done that. So I do feel that there are extenuating circumstances which would call for the death penalty and be justified. “Q. You mentioned it. It must be the only course of action remaining. And of course that’s not the case. There are three [sentencing] options. “A. Yes. “     “Q. —would you look for the other options. “A. Well, I think that what I feel as a person in society is one of the things I’ve used to measure the decision. The next step is what happens after the court is done. What happens to the defendant? What happens to how she integrates into society and how she should live in society? What her intentions are that she has to society and those that would be affected. I think that the knowledge just isn’t in here. This is a continuing— “Q. Understood. “     “Q. There are two other [sentencing] options, though. “A. Yes. 472 State v. McAnulty “Q. Based on what you’re telling me it doesn’t look like to me as though you’d ever consider the death penalty, because you wouldn’t have to. “A. That is true. But this is an issue I would have to consider. But if the other 11 jurors are strongly in favor of [the death penalty], I would have to take a moment to understand why is it I might be coming from a different perspective. And then I would do my job to either understand what they’re saying and why they feel that way or to give it some more thought. But with that said, I have not heard the specifics of the case. And when I say it must be the only option and it must be the only option that is efficient. The only option that is expedient. “     “Q. What if one of the questions is    should the defendant receive the death penalty, not the cause-andeffect analysis, or what if you’re not given any of that information. You just have to decide based on what she did, whether she should die. Could you do it? “A. I certainly could. But I’m not going to give you a statement right now. “Q. It’s something that is certainly important for all of us up here to know before you be chosen as a juror whether or not you would be able to make that decision. “A. Yes. I understand. Like I said, if a person presents a clear and present threat to society, there’s no way that she could be rehabilitated, there’s—it’s so grievous a crime that no one—she can’t be suffered to live, I would say yes. “Q. Can you think of such a crime? “A. If I were to say I would never choose the death penalty as an option, I would have stated that. I’m leaving the chance open for that to be a possibility. I’m leaving the chance open for that decision to be made. But it is true that I’m strongly slanted against the death penalty for the reasons I have stated. “Q. Do you think the State would have a fairly uphill battle to overcome your personal bias? “A. I think that’s fair to say.” At that point, the court explained that neither cost nor efficiency were “a legal basis” for deciding whether to Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 473 impose the death penalty. The prosecution resumed with the following questions: “Q. With regard to that fourth question, whether or not the defendant should receive the death penalty, given the other options, would there ever be a reason you would decide the death penalty? “A. I can’t state for sure in this case to answer the specifics, but again, if the crime was so grievous that there was no—it seemed like the only solution was the death penalty, I can see that situation occurring. I’m not going to wallow in some type of fantasy to try and describe how that might occur. Again, I’m not so closed to the death penalty that I would say it’s not an option. “Q. And your strong bias, do you feel that that would at least impair—would that be a better word—your ability? Would that be more fair to say? “A. I would say that just as much as you are fighting— if that’s what I’m hearing, that you are fighting for the death penalty, then I would say just as much that I am fighting to have justice served that would probably not include the death penalty.” The prosecutor then moved to excuse Brown for cause. The defense attempted to rehabilitate Brown: “Q. And we’ve been back and forth and I don’t want to pick on you any longer, but can you sit on the jury, take an oath, and consider all three as possible sentences after you’ve heard the evidence, of course? “A. Well, I think what seems to be—there is no legal guidance on what the penalty should be. And I think a person must have some sort of framework with which to decide what is appropriate. And what I’m being clear to you is that my framework put the death penalty below the time in prison, or the other two [possible sentences], basically. That’s all I’m saying. “Q. But that doesn’t eliminate it from your considered decision? “A. Not at all. “Q. All right.” The trial court ultimately excused Brown for cause. 474 State v. McAnulty Defendant argues that Brown expressed an abil- ity and a willingness to follow the court’s instructions and consider all potential sentences, notwithstanding his disapproval of the death penalty. Defendant contends that Brown’s statements reflect the gravity with which jurors properly should treat such a decision. However, just before Brown was examined, the court had granted, over the state’s objection, defendant’s motion to exclude a juror who had said that she was “for [the] child” and that defendant would have a huge uphill battle getting her to impose a penalty other than death. After the court’s ruling, the state asked to speak with the court. The state pointed out its understanding that, “even if a juror is leaning toward one result or another, that doesn’t necessarily disqualify them,” as long as the juror agrees that the juror will consider all the options, and that that standard “cuts both ways.” The court responded by explaining why its practice was to retain some but not all jurors who agree that they will consider all of the sentencing options. The court said that, when jurors come into the evidentiary process with an expressed position on one option or another, the court was inclined to accept that as “a very accurate and sincere statement of how they look at the case,” and that, although there could be “wrestling” to get jurors to commit to being fair and impartial, “moving them semantically” did not necessarily give the court an accurate view of the jurors’ beliefs. The court stated, to be blunt, “the idea that somebody who expresses an opinion one way or the other can sort of be talked back to the middle I don’t find it particularly helpful unless it is clear to me that their first statement of how they feel or their initial statements or their explanation somehow did not correctly reflect how they feel” about imposing the death penalty. That is the case with Brown. He stated on the juror questionnaire that he filled out before coming to court that he “strongly disagreed” with the death penalty. Although on questioning Brown stated that he would consider sentencing defendant to death, he also said that he would “fight” to “have justice served that would probably not include the death penalty.” The trial court did not err in deciding that Brown’s opinions would substantially impair his ability to decide the case fairly and impartially. The trial court treated Brown’s Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 475 statements that he would consider imposing the death penalty in the same way it had treated the statements of the prior juror who stated that she would consider imposing a sentence other than death—that is, as statements that did not accurately reflect Brown’s true feelings. In the circumstance in which a juror expresses such a strong opinion for or against the death penalty as did Brown, the trial court acts within its discretion in declining to credit the juror’s commitment to impartiality.