Opinion ID: 2626647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Issue 3: Limiting discovery regarding the Release

Text: [¶ 26] Before ruling that the Release was not admissible, the district court had granted a number of PRC's motions for protective orders, and denied some of Mr. Cramer's motions to compel discovery regarding the Release. On appeal, Mr. Cramer challenges these limitations on his discovery. Again, we review the district court's discovery decisions for abuse of discretion. [¶ 27] The district court's decision that the Release was inadmissible does not, by itself, mean that Mr. Cramer could not attempt to discover information about the Release. Discovery is allowed not only for admissible information, but also for information reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. W.R.C.P. 26(b)(1). For the most part, however, Mr. Cramer has not specified the discovery information he was unable to obtain, and so has not explained how that information was reasonably calculated to lead to discovery of admissible evidence. [¶ 28] The district court ruled that PRC would not be required to answer a number of interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents relating to the Release. Nowhere in Mr. Cramer's brief does he specify which of those discovery requests he claims PRC should have been required to answer, nor does he suggest how discovering that information might have helped his case. We combed though the record, and learned that several of the discovery requests not answered by PRC related to PRC's financial status. As previously reviewed, Mr. Cramer was not entitled to discover this information because he did not make a prima facie showing of a viable punitive damages claim. [¶ 29] Other discovery requests not answered by PRC included questions about who drafted the language and when, how many visitors had signed the Release over the years, what their names were, how many of them had been injured, and how many of them filed or failed to file claims against PRC. The information sought by these discovery requests may have been relevant to Mr. Cramer's punitive damages claim as first presented  that is, to his claim that PRC's use of the Release to discourage and prevent personal injury claims was illegal. But in connection with the punitive damages claim set forth in his amended complaints  that is, that the Release represented company policy that caused or contributed to Mr. Cramer's injuries  he does not explain how the answers might have led to admissible evidence. The information would not have helped Mr. Cramer establish that the actions of PRC's employees conformed to the statements in the Release, so that the Release caused or contributed to the injuries suffered by Mr. Cramer. [¶ 30] Mr. Cramer does specify certain deposition questions that he claims should have been answered. Pursuant to W.R.C.P. 30(b)(6), PRC designated a witness to testify regarding punitive damage issues. Early in the deposition, the parties renewed their disagreement about what discovery was appropriate concerning the Release. They telephoned the district court, who ruled that Mr. Cramer was entitled to inquire about what you believe is the policy reflected by that form, but that he could not ask questions about the history of the form. More specifically, the district court allowed Mr. Cramer's counsel to ask, with regard to the Release, Is this your policy? In response to that question, the witness indicated that it was not a policy. [¶ 31] Counsel for Mr. Cramer attempted to follow up with questions such as [W]as the form and the statements in it reviewed by Powder River Coal management before implementation of the form? and Do you know why PRC adopted the statements in the form that they would not, quote, `Maintain, prepare, or inspect the premises for purposes of the safety of employees of third parties'? These questions relate directly to the history of the form, and the district court had already ruled that PRC did not have to respond to such questions. In another telephone conference held while the deposition was in progress, the district court reaffirmed that the PRC witness was not required to answer these questions. [¶ 32] Mr. Cramer has not shown that the district court erred in this ruling, because he has not shown how the answers to questions about the history of the Release might have yielded or led to admissible evidence. On the other hand, Mr. Cramer was able to depose the PRC employees involved with the incident, but did not discover any evidence connecting the Release to their actions on the day of the accident. He conducted considerable discovery relating to PRC's policies and practices on inspecting and maintaining the mine site, dealing with oil spills and slipping hazards, compliance with MSHA regulations, and the like, but did not discover any evidence that the statements in the Release had influenced the actions of PRC employees. Under those circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that PRC was not required to respond to Mr. Cramer's discovery requests about the history of the Release.