Opinion ID: 415604
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues

Text: 30 Lipscomb, relying on Crawford, contends that without knowing the circumstances of a prior conviction, the district court cannot, in all but exceptional cases, determine if the conviction is probative of credibility at all or how probative it is. Therefore, the prosecution, which has the burden of establishing admissibility, must submit such evidence. Without it, admitting the conviction is an abuse of discretion. 24 Lipscomb also argues that the district court should not have considered the post-trial evidence and that this evidence does not in any event justify admitting the convictions. 25 31 The government, relying on Jackson and Lewis, argues that under Rule 609(a)(1), all felony convictions less than ten years old are per se probative on the issue of credibility. It further contends that inquiry into the underlying facts would be burdensome, time-consuming, and generally unhelpful, and therefore should not be permitted. 26 Finally, the government argues that even if the district court must inquire into the underlying facts, the court did so after the trial and found ample basis for admitting the convictions. 27 32 This court heard oral argument and then sua sponte set the case for reargument en banc to reconcile the tension between Crawford, Jackson, and Lewis. 33 Part II of this opinion concludes, based on the language and legislative history of Rule 609, that all felony convictions less than ten years old have at least some probative value on the issue of credibility. Part III concludes that the district court has discretion to determine when to inquire into background facts and when not to. We neither require the court generally to conduct such an inquiry nor discourage it from doing so. Finally, in part IV, we consider the facts of this case and find no abuse of discretion.