Opinion ID: 203115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Purported Apprendi Error in Instructions as to Drug Quantity

Text: The indictment against Dickerson included two counts of possession with intent to distribute. [1] The first stemmed from drugs found in the bedroom of Dickerson's apartment and charged possession with intent to distribute five or more grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), for which the penalty is located in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). The second count related to the drugs found in Dickerson's car and charged possession with intent to distribute fifty or more grams of cocaine base, also in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), the penalty for which is located in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). Section 841(b)(1)(B) provides a maximum term of life imprisonment if a defendant has a prior conviction for a felony drug offense; § 841(b)(1)(A) provides a mandatory life sentence if a defendant has two or more prior felony drug convictions. Drug quantity and type generally must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a defendant may receive a sentence in excess of the default statutory maximum. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000); United States v. Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir.2003); cf. United States v. Collazo-Aponte, 281 F.3d 320, 324 (1st Cir.2002); United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 40-41 (1st Cir.2001). If no specific quantity of cocaine base is identified, the default statutory maximum for violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) is twenty years, or thirty years if the defendant has a prior felony conviction. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); see also Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 15; United States v. Robinson, 241 F,3d 115, 118 (1st Cir.2001). Here, the requisite drug quantities and types were both charged in the indictment and found by the jury. The verdict slip that the jury filled out expressly sought the jury's determination about the quantities of cocaine base involved. Under the caption for each of the counts, the slip stated: If you found the defendant guilty, please indicate the amount of cocaine base defendant possessed: ___ Grams. On Count One, the jury filled in 10.99 grams of cocaine base; on Count Two, 57.83 grams of cocaine base. Dickerson's claim of Apprendi error stems from the fact that the jury instructions did not specifically repeat the drug quantities and types charged and did not specify that the government needed to prove these quantities and types beyond a reasonable doubt. The district court, however, did instruct the jury as to the presumption of innocence, and it specified that the presumption of innocence remains with the defendant throughout the trial and is not overcome unless, based on all of the evidence, the jurors are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. The court instructed the jury: You cannot find the defendant guilty on the basis of probable cause, nor on the basis of a preponderance of evidence . . . [and] not even on the basis of clear and convincing evidence, which applies to some civil situations. The court then turned to the three specific counts of the indictment and laid out the elements, that the government needed to prove for each. The court did not specifically repeat that Count One of the indictment involved at least five grams of cocaine and Count Two involved at least fifty grams of cocaine base. No objections were made. The jury returned guilty verdicts on all three counts. Given Dickerson's failure to object, review of this claim is governed by the plain error standard. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860(2002); United States v. Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d 1, 46 (1st Cir.2003). A party making a plain error claim must show 1) error; 2) that is plain; 3) that affects substantial rights; and 4) that threatens the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)) (internal quotation mark omitted); see also United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319 F.3d 12, 30 (1st Cir.2003). In our view, there was no error at all, much less plain error. A special verdict form can cure a potential Apprendi problein. See Perez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 16. Indeed, we have never found an Apprendi error of the type alleged where the usual reasonable doubt instructions are given and a special verdict form is used to elicit a specific jury finding on drug quantity and type. We find no error here. It may be better practice for the district judge to instruct specifically that certain types and amounts must be found beyond a reasonable doubt, in addition to having the requisite special verdict form. However, the court did refer to the drugs found in the bedroom and the drugs found in the car, which were proxies for the quantities and types charged. It was clear from the evidence what those quantities were. The court did instruct that the government had to meet its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before there was a conviction. It is highly improbable the jurors believed that drug quantity was subject to a separate and lesser standard of proof. Even if there were, arguendo, any Apprendi error, Dickerson cannot make the necessary plain error showing. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The district court provided extensive instructions about the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt, and a special verdict form was used to elicit specific findings regarding drug quantity and type. Further, if there were an error, it did not affect Dickerson's substantial rights because the evidence overwhelmingly established the minimum drug quantities necessary to justify the statutory maximum. Thus, even if defense counsel had objected at the time, it would not have mattered; Dickerson would lose whether the appropriate appellate test were plain error or harmless error. See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 633, 122 S.Ct. 1781; Soto-Beniquez, 356 F.3d at 46.