Opinion ID: 1933547
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The HIV Test

Text: The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act requires that an agency's findings be supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence, and that its legal conclusions flow rationally from the agency's findings. D.C.Code § 1-1509(e) (1992 Repl.); American University v. Commission on Human Rights, 598 A.2d 416, 420 (D.C.1991); Eilers v. Bureau of Motor Vehicles Services, 583 A.2d 677, 683 (D.C.1990). In its Final Order, the Commission held that, although the HIV test was given without petitioner's informed consent and for a discriminatory purpose, i.e., because of his sexual orientation, the claim was time-barred. [3] The Commission based its holding on its understanding that the discriminatory conduct occurred on November 15, when the test was ordered and the blood was drawn. We conclude that the Commission's ruling on this issue was erroneous. The limitation period for an action brought pursuant to the District of Columbia Human Rights Act is one year. That period begins to run at the time of the occurrence of the unlawful discriminatory practice, or the discovery thereof. D.C.Code § 1-2544(a); see also Jones v. Howard University, 574 A.2d 1343, 1345 (D.C.1990). Because petitioner did not file his claim with OHR until November 21, 1988, petitioner's claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitation if the discriminatory action is deemed to have occurred on November 21, 1987, or some earlier date. We hold that petitioner's cause of action is not time-barred, because it did not accrue until the HIV analysis was actually performed on his blood samplesome time after November 21, the date of his discharge, and therefore within the one year statute of limitation. Generally, a statute of limitation begins to run at the time the right to maintain the action accrues, i.e., from the time that all the elements of a cause of action have come into existence. DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 988 n. 14 (D.C.1980) (citing S. Freedman & Sons, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Company, 396 A.2d 195, 198 (D.C.1978)). On November 15, when the test was ordered by the attending doctor and petitioner's blood was drawn, petitioner had no right to maintain this action. At that point, petitioner had simply been informed by the Hospital that, some time in the future, his blood would be tested for the presence of the HIV antibodies. The act which the Hospital threatened was the alleged discriminatory act; however, no legal discrimination could occur until the blood was actually tested. For example, if, after petitioner's blood sample had been taken, the Hospital countermanded the plan to test his blood, petitioner would not have suffered any injury. [4] The taking of petitioner's blood, and the ordering of the HIV test, involve different concerns from the actual testing of his blood. See Government of Virgin Islands v. Roberts, 756 F.Supp. 898, 901-02 (D.V.I.1991) (compelled HIV testing involves two intrusions: the first intrusion is minor, and is occasioned by the procedure itself, while the second intrusionthe analysis of one's bloodgives rise to a graver concern, since that analysis `can reveal a host of private medical facts' about the individual being tested) (citing Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Association, 489 U.S. 602, 617, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 1412-13, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)). We are aware of no authority for the proposition that the mere threat to discriminate is equivalent to an actual act of discrimination, and the Hospital has cited no case so holding. Therefore, we conclude that petitioner's cause of action accrued on the date the HIV antibody test was conducted on his blood sample, and no earlier. [5] Thus, the Commission erred when it concluded that petitioner's claim was time-barred.