Opinion ID: 1288500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Examining the Purpose of Military Involvement in the Instant Case

Text: In an effort to advance its argument that the primary purpose of the joint civilian-military investigation in the instant case was to further valid military interests, the prosecution contends that many of the circuit court's FOF are clearly erroneous. With the exception of its claims regarding FOF 9 and 15, the prosecution merely asserts that the court fail[ed] to recite certain facts about the incidents at issue in this case. However, the alleged omissions in FOF 3, 7, 8, 10, 12 and 16 merely reflect elements that the prosecution either failed to present at the suppression hearing, or that are insignificant to the court's ruling. [9] In other words, the prosecution did not produce sufficient evidence to support its contention that the military's investigation of the Defendants-Appellees was for a valid military purpose. Army CID Agent May's otherwise pertinent testimony was only admitted as an example of what happens. See supra at 457-458, 896 P.2d at 913-914. [10] Concerning FOF 9, [11] the prosecution argues that this finding represents a material misstatement of fact ... inasmuch as it leaves the impression Defendants[-Appellees] were subjected to an overbearing and unlawful military presence which was clearly not the case. However, the record expressly supports FOF 9, the prosecution's criticism notwithstanding. The prosecution makes a similar claim with respect to FOF 15, [12] asserting that the circuit court's finding is clearly erroneous because [p]ossession and distribution of cocaine are violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice[.] Be that as it may, [a]ll of the persons `targeted' by the aforesaid undercover DST operation involved herein were civilians; no military personnel were involved as `targets' of the investigation.  FOF 12 (emphasis added). The military does not have jurisdiction over civilians in peacetime. See Schleuter, Military Criminal Justice 152 (3rd Ed.1992). Furthermore, article I, section 16 of the Hawai`i State Constitution (State Constitution) provides that [t]he military shall be held in strict subordination to the civil power. See also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 325, 66 S.Ct. 606, 616, 90 L.Ed. 688 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring). [13] There is substantial evidence in the record to support the finding in FOF 12 that the undercover operation conducted by military investigators only targeted civilians. Furthermore, the record does not reflect any attempt to connect the sale of drugs by the Defendants-Appellees to any military personnel other than the controlled sale to Army CID agent Foster; nor is there any evidence that the Army CID made any attempt to follow drug trafficking between the Defendants-Appellees and the base. Prior to the controlled purchases in the instant case, the only suggestion of an on-base connection was the claim by the Army CID's informer, Tanya Slaten, a military dependent. [14] See supra note 2 (indicating that the prosecution failed to establish a sufficient connection between the Defendants-Appellees and any military personnel or installation). The only evidence arguably suggesting a primary military purpose is the affidavit of an Army CID operations officer that contains the bare, unsupported assertion that [a]t all times, [the Army CID]'s primary purpose in participating in joint off-post drug investigations is to investigate the distribution of illicit drugs to soldiers and to halt the introduction of those drugs onto military installations. But see supra note 10. In light of the record as a whole, we are not convinced that any of the challenged circuit court findings are clearly erroneous. The prosecution nevertheless argues that State v. Hayes, 102 N.C.App. 777, 404 S.E.2d 12 (1991), which validated the incidental enhancement of local law enforcement efforts by military investigators, should persuade us to validate the Army CID's involvement in this case. In Hayes, an AWOL soldier under investigation for drug-trafficking told an undercover Army CID agent that he could acquire cocaine from a person he knew in the military, presumably at a residence located off-base. The agent contacted local law enforcement and went with the AWOL soldier to the residence in an attempt to purchase drugs from the suspected military dealer. At the apartment, Hayes identified himself as a member of the military and, in conjunction with two other individuals, sold several ounces of cocaine to the undercover Army CID agent. Unaware that the agent had set up a controlled buy, the AWOL soldier bagged the drugs, carried them out, and was subsequently arrested by local law enforcement. The Army CID agent later identified the other participants in the transaction. The North Carolina Court of Appeals subsequently held that the military assistance did not violate the PCA. Id. 404 S.E.2d at 15. Hayes is clearly distinguishable from the instant case because the target of the investigation was a member of the military. See also United States v. Thompson, 30 M.J. 570 (A.F.C.M.R.1990), affirmed, 33 M.J. 218 (C.M.A.1991) (involving a joint civilian/military investigation of a member of the Air Force). The Alaska Court of Appeals also upheld the incidental enhancement of civilian law enforcement efforts by military investigators in Moon, supra . In Moon, a lieutenant in the Anchorage Police Department (APD) sought the assistance of the Army CID for a narcotics investigation because the local dealers seemed to target military personnel. 785 P.2d at 46. Before the military authorities actually entered into a joint investigation with the APD, they obtained independent verification of illicit drug activity involving military personnel. Specifically, members of the Army's drug suppression team observed other soldiers buying drugs in the vicinity of the area under investigation and saw vehicles with Fort Richardson registration stickers parked nearby. Id. The [joint] investigation was not begun until the military was satisfied that drug dealers at the Palace Hotel had targeted military personnel as a market. It was also reasonable to infer that a substantial quantity of illicit drugs was finding its way onto the base. Id. at 48 (citing Harker v. State, 663 P.2d 932, 936 (Alaska 1983)). Unlike the instant case, a sufficient military connection was clearly established in Moon. See also Hawes, 921 F.2d at 103 (involving drug purchase by Naval Investigative Services agent across the street from a naval base, after a sailor who was found in possession of cocaine apparently identified that location as the place of purchase; court stated that agent's activities were much like those of an undercover civilian cooperating with the police in a controlled drug transaction). The prosecution claims that the Army CID possessed information identifying Defendants[-Appellees] as traffickers in significant amounts of drugs to military personnel who brought the drugs back to the installation. The prosecution also makes the unsupported assertion that Ms. Slaten's information was reliable. [15] However, the admissible evidentiary facts of this case reveal that the prosecution merely showed that the Army CID requested and received approval to initiate the investigation. Army CID agent May's testimony and the prosecution's Exhibits were not admitted to prove the truth of the underlying facts presented to the Army CID's command. See supra note 2. Given the state of the record, the prosecution has not shown that the military had reasonable grounds to believe that military personnel had violated the U.C.M.J. when the investigation was authorized. Cf. State v. Sherlock, 70 Haw. 271, 768 P.2d 1290 (1989) (reversing lower court's order suppressing evidence obtained under a search warrant after inquiring into the informant's reliability and noting that the police corroborated the information given by the unnamed informant before requesting the search warrant). [16] Where the target of a military investigation is a civilian and there is no verified connection to military personnel, the PCA prohibits military participation in activities designed to execute civilian laws. People v. Tyler ( Tyler I ), 854 P.2d 1366 (Colo.App. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, 874 P.2d 1037 (Colo.1994) ( Tyler II ). [17] Cf. State v. Propios, 76 Hawai`i 474, 879 P.2d 1057 (1994) (affirming a circuit court order suppressing evidence obtained in a probationary search that was conducted for the subjectively improper purpose of criminal prosecution). In fact, the apparent justification for the military involvement in the instant case was to facilitate the enforcement of civilian laws. See supra note 10. In Tyler I, the Colorado Court of Appeals stated: before the military may directly participate in an undercover investigation of these civilians and their off-base activities, the state carries the burden of demonstrating that there exists a nexus between drug sales off base by civilians to military personnel and the military base at which the purchasers are stationed. See Moon v. State, supra . Hence, the prosecution has a duty to present evidence to show that, when a military investigation was undertaken, the targeted drug transactions involved military personnel or were connected to sales conducted on a military installation. 854 P.2d at 1369 (emphases added and citations omitted); see also Moon, 785 P.2d at 46-47 (citing two conditions that must be met in order for the military to investigate persons not subject to the U.C.M.J.). [18] Furthermore, we agree with the observation in Chief Justice Rabinowitz's dissent in Kim v. State, supra ; he observed that an independent military interest in the health and safety of its personnel does not establish a military function or primary [military] purpose under 32 C.F.R. § 213.10(a)(2)(i). 817 P.2d at 471 & 471 n. 10. That the military has a valid interest in ferreting out those who supply drugs to military personnel, [19] does not automatically qualify its aid to civilian drug law enforcement as having the primary purpose of furthering a military... function[.] Id.; cf. Propios, supra . Accord, Taylor v. State, 645 P.2d 522, 525 (Okla. Crim.1982) (involving a military police officer who violated the PCA by actively participating in an undercover drug operation, arrest, and search  including the act of drawing his gun during the arrest, participating in a subsequent search, and processing the evidence seized therein). [20] Although the Army CID apparently received authorization from military command to initiate an undercover investigation of civilians and their off-base activities, this fact alone cannot justify the military's participation in the instant case. Cf. Tyler I, 854 P.2d at 1370 (noting that the prosecution failed to present any evidence purporting to establish the necessary nexus to military personnel or on-base effects). The approval request and authorization documents themselves suggest a primary purpose of facilitating civilian law enforcement, see supra note 10; consequently, the stated military purpose in the instant case is merely incidental to an improper objective. [21] At the hearing on Defendants-Appellees' motion to suppress for alleged violation of the PCA, the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence was on the Defendants-Appellees to support the claim that a joint civilian-military investigation violated the PCA. See State v. Scanlan, 65 Haw. 159, 160-61, 649 P.2d 737, 738 (1982). The Defendants-Appellees' burden was met in the instant case through the testimony of Army CID agent Foster and, ironically, the approval request and authorization documents that defense counsel objected to during the suppression hearing. See supra notes 1 and 10. Absent evidence to support the prosecution's claim of a primary military purpose, we must uphold the circuit court's conclusion that the joint civilian-military investigation violated the PCA, 10 U.S.C. § 375, and relevant federal regulations. For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the circuit court's holding that there is nothing here which indicates that this military operation was `taken for the primary purpose of furthering a military ... function of the United States.' Order at 6 (original emphasis omitted). Therefore, the only question remaining is whether the evidence must be suppressed.