Opinion ID: 2061700
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: construction of retirement act

Text: In the second assignment of error, the plaintiffs make a variety of arguments which combine to urge that the district court erred in concluding that the counties are required to contribute only 150 percent of the members' contributions to the employee accounts. The plaintiffs essentially argue that § 23-2310 is clear in stating that the member's employer account shall be equal to the account as of the next preceding January 1 increased by two hundred fifty percent of the amounts deducted from the member's compensation since the next preceding January 1.... On the other hand, the counties contend that § 23-2310 is inconsistent with § 23-2308. Section 23-2308 declares that [t]he county clerk shall pay to the primary carrier an amount equal to two hundred fifty percent of the amounts deducted from the compensation of employees.... However, § 23-2309 requires that employee accounts be increased by 100 percent of the compensation deduction, and the pre-1992 version of § 23-2310 stated that the employer account be increased by 250 percent of the compensation deduction. The obvious problem is that the retirement act instructed the county clerk to pay the primary carrier an amount equal to 250 percent of the deduction, but the sum of the contributions contemplated by §§ 23-2309 and 23-2310 together equaled 350 percent of the amount deducted. While the relevant language of §§ 23-2308 and 23-2310 was clear and unambiguous, it was in conflict. It is true that in accordance with the principle that the last expression of the legislative will is the law, in case of conflicting provisions of the same statute, or in different statutes, the last in point of time or order of arrangement prevails. Sidney Education Assn. v. School Dist. of Sidney, 189 Neb. 540, 203 N.W.2d 762 (1973); Stoller v. State, 171 Neb. 93, 105 N.W.2d 852 (1960); Markel v. Glassmeyer, 137 Neb. 243, 288 N.W. 821 (1939); Chilen v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 135 Neb. 619, 283 N.W. 366 (1939). However, the fundamental rule in construing statutes is that they shall be construed in pari materia and from their language as a whole to determine the intent of the Legislature. All subordinate rules are mere aids in reaching this fundamental determination. Wounded Shield v. Gunter, 225 Neb. 327, 405 N.W.2d 9 (1987); Malone v. Benson, 219 Neb. 28, 361 N.W.2d 184 (1985). It is the duty of a court, as far as practicable, to give effect to the language of a statute and to reconcile the different provisions of it so that they are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. Smith v. Smith, 242 Neb. 812, 497 N.W.2d 44 (1993); Malone, supra . Where it is possible to harmonize apparently conflicting statutes, such is to be done. See Sidney Education Assn., supra . As it is not possible to harmonize §§ 23-2308 and 23-2310, we look to the axiom that in order to ascertain the proper meaning of a statute, reference may be had to later as well as earlier legislation upon the same subject. Wagoner v. Central Platte Nat. Resources Dist., 247 Neb. 233, 526 N.W.2d 422 (1995). `All existing acts should be considered, and a subsequent statute may often aid in the interpretation of a prior one.' Id. at 241, 526 N.W.2d at 428. As it existed from 1965 to 1981, the retirement act provided that the member's employer account be equal to the member's account as of the next preceding January 1, increased by an amount equal to any amounts deducted from the member's salary since the next preceding January 1, that is to say, 100 percent. § 23-2310 (Reissue 1970). Section 23-2308 provided that the county clerk pay to the primary carrier an amount equal to 200 percent of the amounts deducted from a member's compensation. § 23-2308 (Reissue 1970). Thus, no contradiction existed at this point. The problem began with the amendment through 1981 Neb. Laws, L.B. 459, whereby the Legislature increased the amount to be paid by the county clerk under § 23-2308 to an amount equal to 250 percent of the amount deducted. Because L.B. 459 did nothing to change §§ 23-2309 and 23-2310, the sum of the employee and employer accounts still increased by an amount equal to 100 percent of the amount deducted from a member's compensation, that is to say, a total of 200 percent. In an attempt to remedy the inconsistency caused by the adoption of L.B. 459, the Legislature adopted 1983 Neb. Laws, L.B. 313, which amended the relevant portions of § 23-2310 as set forth in part III above. In enacting L.B. 313, the Legislature attempted to recite what the counties had contributed in the past and changed the contributions to be made by them in the future. Unfortunately, the recitation in L.B. 313 of what the act provided prior to 1981 was wrong. The counties had contributed an amount equal to 100 percent of the amount deducted from a member's compensation, not 200 percent. Thus, to remedy the problem and the conflict noted earlier, the Legislature enacted 1992 Neb. Laws, L.B. 1057, which made unmistakably clear that the 250 percent refers to the combined total of the members' contributions and the counties' contributions. In order to hold as the plaintiffs urge, we also would have to conclude that the Legislature's intention vacillated such that in 1965 it meant the counties to contribute an amount equal to the amount deducted from the members' compensation, intended in 1983 that the counties retroactively pay 100 percent more for deductions made prior to 1981, and in 1992 returned to requiring contributions equal to 100 percent of the amounts deducted from the compensation paid to members of the retirement system for this same period. Such a reading of the Legislature's intention would be absurd. In construing a statute, it is presumed that the Legislature intended a sensible, rather than an absurd, result. Slagle v. J.P. Theisen & Sons, 251 Neb. 904, 560 N.W.2d 758 (1997); In re Interest of Jaycox, 250 Neb. 697, 551 N.W.2d 9 (1996). Courts will, if possible, try to avoid a construction of a statute which leads to absurd, unjust, or unconscionable results. Coleman v. Chadron State College, 237 Neb. 491, 466 N.W.2d 526 (1991). ``In the exposition of statutes, the reason and intention of the lawgiver will control the strict letter of the law when the latter would lead to palpable injustice or absurdity.'...' Id. at 500-01, 466 N.W.2d at 533. Reading all of the Legislature's enactments in this regard together, including those adopted prior to the 1981 amendment through L.B. 459 and the amendment adopted in 1992 through L.B. 1057, we are led to the conclusion that at no time did the Legislature intend that the counties make contributions of 250 percent of the amounts deducted from the compensation paid to the members of the retirement system, but, rather, that it intended that all the contributions, those of the counties and the members together, total 250 percent of the amounts deducted from the compensation paid the members since the effective date of L.B. 459.