Opinion ID: 547203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of the Preempted Claims

Text: 25 Since plaintiff's claims relating to the collective bargaining agreement are completely preempted, the district court properly treated them as claims arising under Section 301. Plaintiff has not challenged the district court's ruling that such claims are subject to the requirement of exhaustion of the grievance procedures provided for in the collective bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184, 87 S.Ct. 903, 913, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967) (it is settled that the employee must at least attempt to exhaust exclusive grievance and arbitration procedures established by the bargaining agreement); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 219, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 1915, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985) (If respondent had brought a contract claim under Sec. 301, he would have had to attempt to take the claim through the arbitration procedure established in the collective-bargaining agreement before bringing suit in court.). Nor has plaintiff challenged the district court's determination that there is no evidence that [plaintiff] has grieved or arbitrated his claim under the grievance procedures of the [collective bargaining agreement]. 727 F.Supp. at 750. We therefore find no error in the district court's dismissal of counts I, III, and IV. 26