Opinion ID: 659342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Voluntariness of the Agreement.

Text: 21 The Rumery plurality set forth four factors for determining whether a release-dismissal agreement is voluntary: (1) the sophistication of the criminal defendant; (2) whether the defendant was in custody when he made the agreement; (3) whether the defendant was represented by counsel who drafted the agreement; and (4) whether the defendant had ample time to consider the agreement before signing it. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394, 107 S.Ct. at 1192 (plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor's concurrence also weighed the criminal defendant's sophistication and the circumstances surrounding execution of the release but listed two additional factors that are relevant to a determination regarding voluntariness: (5) the nature of the criminal charges and (6) whether the agreement was formed under judicial supervision. Id. at 401-02, 107 S.Ct. at 1196-97. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). 22 The release-dismissal agreement in this case was entered voluntarily under the factors listed in Rumery. First, although Hill lacked sophistication, unlike the criminal defendant in Rumery, his lack of sophistication was offset by the presence of a knowledgeable and experienced defense attorney. Second, like the defendant in Rumery, Hill was not in custody when he made the agreement. Third, and again like the defendant in Rumery, Hill was represented by counsel capable of advising him as to the best course of action. Hill's counsel also drafted the release-dismissal agreement. 23 Fourth, Hill had over two months to consider the agreement before signing it; the defendant in Rumery had only three days in which to decide. Id. at 394, 107 S.Ct. at 1192 (plurality opinion). Fifth, the charges against Hill were relatively minor, thus limiting the coerciveness of the possibility that he would be convicted. In contrast, the defendant in Rumery faced a sentence of up to seven years in prison. Id. at 402, 107 S.Ct. at 1196 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Sixth, Hill's release was executed under the supervision of a state court judge. 2 The defendant in Rumery did not enjoy similar treatment. Id. at 403, 107 S.Ct. at 1197. In short, there is no reason to doubt that Hill's choice to enter into a release-dismissal agreement was a highly rational judgment that the certain benefits of escaping criminal prosecution exceed[ed] the speculative benefits of prevailing in a civil action. Id. at 394, 107 S.Ct. at 1192. (plurality opinion). The City has carried its burden in this regard. 24