Opinion ID: 2686798
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mendoza’s Claim – Performance Prong

Text: Based on the record here, Mendoza has come nowhere close to satisfying the combined Strickland-AEDPA standard requiring double deference. Mendoza has failed to show the Florida Supreme Court’s decision on the performance prong was 51 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 52 of 58 an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. “As for the [Strickland] performance prong, when a Petitioner’s claim is that his trial counsel should have done something more, we first look at what the lawyer did in fact.” Bishop v. Warden, GDCP, 726 F.3d 1243, 1257 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation marks omitted); see also Lee v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 726 F.3d 1172, 1194–95 (11th Cir. 2013), cert. denied sub nom., Lee v. Thomas, No. 13-775, 134 S. Ct. 1542 (Mar. 24, 2014). As detailed earlier, in preparation for the penalty phase, Mendoza’s trial counsel did a great deal. Trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation of Mendoza’s background and developed a penalty phase-mitigation strategy supported by the evidence that the investigation produced. Trial counsel not only thoroughly investigated Mendoza’s mental health, but also looked into other aspects of Mendoza’s background to discover mitigating evidence. As recounted above, trial counsel met with Mendoza and his family members on many occasions before trial. In fact, trial counsel Suri, an experienced criminal defense lawyer, stated that he met with Mendoza more than he met with any other client in custody and that he formed a strong relationship with Mendoza. Trial counsel, through Ms. Mendoza, also obtained Mendoza’s childhood medical records from Cuba. Trial 52 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 53 of 58 counsel called Ms. Mendoza as a witness, and she testified at length about Mendoza’s upbringing and struggles in Cuba, Peru, and the United States. Trial counsel Suri and Wax also had Mendoza examined by three mental health experts—Drs. Haber, Toomer, and Eisenstein. The record shows that all three doctors were well-qualified experts and gave a multiplicity of tests to Mendoza. All three experts issued reports with detailed facts and conclusions about Mendoza’s mental health and substance abuse. Mendoza has wholly failed to show that seeking out and obtaining the three experts and their evaluations was deficient performance. In arguing that trial counsel’s preparation and presentation of mental health expert testimony was deficient, Mendoza compares this case to Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. , 134 S. Ct. 1081 (2014). But, Hinton is entirely different. In Hinton, the Supreme Court held that trial counsel was deficient for failing “to request additional funding in order to replace an expert he knew to be inadequate because he mistakenly believed that he had received all he could get under [state] law.” Id. at 1088. Here, there is no suggestion that trial counsel considered Drs. Haber, Toomer, or Eisenstein to be anything other than competent witnesses. And, trial counsel were not under any false impressions about the resources available to him. In fact, the opposite of what happened in Hinton happened here—trial counsel 53 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 54 of 58 obtained funding for three expert witnesses. We are not persuaded by the reference to Hinton. Mendoza complains that Dr. Toomer did not conduct his mental health examinations in Spanish. Trial counsel retained Dr. Haber, who did examine Mendoza in Spanish, and reached conclusions similar to those reached by Dr. Toomer. Also, the record is replete with evidence that Mendoza spoke and understood English. Mendoza’s own 3.850 expert, Dr. Hyde, examined Mendoza in English and felt that doing so was appropriate. Mendoza also contends trial counsel were deficient for not obtaining further testing after Dr. Toomer’s pre-trial evaluation. But, counsel did obtain additional testing before the penalty hearing before the trial judge—Dr. Eisenstein examined Mendoza for the defense, and Dr. Puentes did so for the State. 22 In fact, trial counsel did what Mendoza claims should have been done. Mendoza also takes issue with trial counsel’s failure to provide Dr. Toomer with background information about Mendoza or access to Mendoza’s family members. But, at the 3.850 hearing, trial counsel Wax testified that he instructed Dr. Toomer to speak with Mendoza’s family members. Notably, Dr. Toomer met 22 Dr. Eisenstein’s testing occurred after the jury’s recommendation of death. However, trial counsel did present mental health evidence from Dr. Toomer and the medical records from Cuba to the jury. Further, Dr. Eisenstein’s testing occurred before Mendoza’s final hearing before the state trial court where the death sentence was imposed. As the jury’s verdict was only advisory and the state trial court had the ultimate sentencing authority, we cannot say that the failure to present Dr. Eisenstein’s evidence to the jury, when the evidence was presented to the ultimate sentencer, was deficient performance. 54 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 55 of 58 with Mendoza four times and Mendoza fully related his social, medical, and educational background. At trial, Dr. Toomer testified that he did not need more background information to reach his conclusions. Mendoza also claims that trial counsel failed to discover that he had PTSD. But, trial counsel did arrange for Mendoza to be tested by Drs. Haber, Toomer, and Eisenstein. None of those doctors even recommended further PTSD testing. Notably, Dr. Rothe’s PTSD diagnosis, made in 2007—at least 25 years after Mendoza suffered trauma in Peru—was tentative and suspect. For example, Dr. Rothe testified that he thought Mendoza spent 12 years in Peru. But, the trial evidence showed that Mendoza was in Peru for only two years and three months. This discrepancy reveals that Dr. Rothe had a false impression of how much trauma Mendoza had experienced. Additionally, Dr. Rothe himself acknowledged that Mendoza may have been malingering. 23 As for Mendoza’s substance abuse, both Ms. Mendoza and Dr. Toomer testified about this abuse, and Dr. Eisenstein’s report and deposition included details about substance abuse as well. Trial counsel tried to find an additional source of testimony about substance abuse—Dr. Tropp, an addictionologist—but the state trial court denied that request. Further, the 3.850 evidence casts doubt on 23 Notably, too, PTSD evidence—including testimony that Mendoza was “impulsive” and “prone to engaging in . . . violent out-of-control behaviors”—was a double-edged sword and may not have helped Mendoza anyway. 55 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 56 of 58 just how bad Mendoza’s substance abuse problem actually was. For example, Mendoza’s expert, Dr. Rothe, testified that Mendoza had only tried crack cocaine and did not like it because it made him nauseous. Dr. Hyde, another defense expert, testified that Mendoza was not under the influence of a controlled substance at the time of the crime and was not so addicted to alcohol that he would experience withdrawal symptoms. Even if the jury credited Mendoza’s substance abuse evidence, it is not clear that the evidence would have helped Mendoza. We have previously noted that “even when there is a factual basis for it, a showing of alcohol and drug abuse is a two-edged sword which can harm a capital defendant as easily as it can help him at sentencing.” Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999); see Grayson v. Thompson, 257 F.3d 1194, 1227 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[W]e note that emphasizing [the petitioner’s] alcoholic youth and intoxication may also have been damaging to [the petitioner] in the eyes of the jury.”); see also Pooler, 702 F.3d at 1274–75. This is because substance abuse evidence “provides an independent basis for moral judgment by the jury.” Cade v. Haley, 222 F.3d 1298, 1306 (11th Cir. 2000). The record suggests that trial counsel Suri and Wax were aware of the potential harm that substance abuse evidence could do to their mitigation case. Before trial, they obtained Dr. Haber’s report, which described Mendoza’s use of 56 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 57 of 58 acid for almost a full year and Mendoza’s experimentation with Quaaludes and black beauties. Dr. Haber also noted Mendoza’s “homicidal ideations” and that he experienced hallucinations when using drugs. Not surprisingly, trial counsel decided not to call Dr. Haber as a witness, and thus, the jury did not hear about Mendoza’s use of these drugs—acid, black beauties, and Quaaludes—and the effects they had on him. Mendoza also argues on appeal that more should have been said about his times at the Peruvian embassy in Havana and at the refugee camp in Peru. As outlined above, Ms. Mendoza did testify about these experiences. In any event, Ms. Mendoza and petitioner Mendoza were the ones who lived in these places and knew all about their experiences there. If Mendoza’s attorneys were less than informed about Mendoza’s experiences in these places, it was because Mendoza and his mother were less than forthcoming. “An attorney does not render ineffective assistance by failing to discover and develop evidence of childhood [troubles] that his client does not mention to him.” Anderson v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 752 F.3d 881, 905 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted), pet. for reh’g denied, (11th Cir. July 11, 2014); Puiatti v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 732 F.3d 1255, 1281 (11th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases), pet. for cert. filed, No. 131349 (U.S. May 8, 2014). 57 Case: 13-14968 Date Filed: 07/31/2014 Page: 58 of 58 Mendoza even argues that his attorneys should have gone to Cuba or Peru in search of mitigating evidence. But, the 3.850 evidence made clear that, in 1994, it was not within the prevailing professional norms at the time for attorneys representing Cuban immigrants to travel abroad to track down mitigating evidence about their clients. To the extent Mendoza claims trial counsel should have called expert witnesses to testify about the historical events in which he participated, Mendoza offered no testimony to show that it was common (or even uncommon) practice in 1994 for defense attorneys to attempt to offer expert testimony about historical events when representing defendants who actually lived through those events. Given the record and the combined Strickland-AEDPA deferential standards, we conclude that Mendoza has not shown that the Florida Supreme Court’s decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.