Opinion ID: 1801890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intrusion upon Reasonable Privacy Expectations

Text: For reasons we now explain, we cannot conclude as a matter of law that the Court of Appeal erred in finding a prima facie case on the threshold question whether defendants' video surveillance measures intruded upon plaintiffs' reasonable expectations of privacy. Plaintiffs plausibly maintain that defendants cannot prevail on this element of the cause of action simply because they never intended to view or record plaintiffs, or because defendants did not capture [plaintiffs'] images at all. Other significant factors not considered by defendants point favorably in plaintiffs' direction on this issue. (4) Our analysis starts from the premise that, while privacy expectations may be significantly diminished in the workplace, they are not lacking altogether. In Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, a reporter working undercover for a national broadcasting company obtained employment alongside the plaintiff as a telepsychic, giving readings to customers over the phone. The reporter then secretly videotaped and recorded interactions with the plaintiff and other psychics using a small camera hidden in her hat and a microphone attached to her brassiere. The taping occurred in a large room containing 100 cubicles that were open on one side and on top, and from which coworkers could be seen and heard nearby. Visitors could not enter this area without permission from the front desk. Ultimately, the plaintiff sued the reporter and the broadcasting company for violating his privacy after one of his secretly taped conversations aired on television. A jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor was reversed on appeal. The appellate court concluded that the plaintiff could not reasonably expect that actions and statements witnessed by co-workers would remain private and not be disclosed to third parties. ( Id. at pp. 911-913 & fn. 1.) Relying on the elements of the intrusion tort set forth in Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, we disagreed with the Court of Appeal in Sanders, and reversed the judgment. This court emphasized that privacy expectations can be reasonable even if they are not absolute. [P]rivacy, for purposes of the intrusion tort, is not a binary, all-or-nothing characteristic. There are degrees and nuances to societal recognition of our expectations of privacy: the fact that the privacy one expects in a given setting is not complete or absolute does not render the expectation unreasonable as a matter of law. ( Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 916.) In adopting this refined approach, Sanders highlighted various factors which, either singly or in combination, affect societal expectations of privacy. One factor was the identity of the intruder. ( Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 918, 923.) We noted that the plaintiff in that case, and other employees, were deliberately misled into believing that the defendant reporter was a colleague, and had no reason to suspect she worked undercover to secretly tape their interactions for use in a national television program. ( Id. at p. 921.) Also relevant in Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, was the nature of the intrusion ( id. at p. 918), meaning, both the extent to which the subject interaction could be seen and overheard and the means of intrusion ( id. at p. 923). These factors weighed heavily in the plaintiff's favor: [T]he possibility of being overheard by coworkers does not, as a matter of law, render unreasonable an employee's expectation that his or her interactions within a nonpublic workplace will not be videotaped in secret by a journalist. ( Ibid. ) We distinguished the situation in which the workplace is regularly open to entry or observation by the public or press, or the subject interaction occurred between either the proprietor or employee of a business and a customer who walks in from the street. ( Ibid. ) The present case, of course, does not involve an imposter or stranger to the workplace who surreptitiously recorded and videotaped conversations that were later published without the speaker's consent. ( Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 918.) Nor does it involve commercial interactions between the representatives of a business and its customers or other members of the public. Rather, defendants represent a private employer accused of installing electronic equipment that gave it the capacity to secretly watch and record employee activities behind closed doors in an office to which the general public had limited access. As we discuss later with respect to the offensiveness element of plaintiffs' claim, an employer may have sound reasons for monitoring the workplace, and an intrusion upon the employee's reasonable privacy expectations may not be egregious or actionable under the particular circumstances. However, on the threshold question whether such expectations were infringed, decisional law suggests that is the case here. (5) Consistent with Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 922, which asks whether the employee could be overheard or observed by others when the tortious act allegedly occurred, courts have examined the physical layout of the area intruded upon, its relationship to the workplace as a whole, and the nature of the activities commonly performed in such places. At one end of the spectrum are settings in which work or business is conducted in an open and accessible space, within the sight and hearing not only of coworkers and supervisors, but also of customers, visitors, and the general public. (See Wilkins v. National Broadcasting Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1072-1073, 1078 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 329] [holding for purpose of common law intrusion tort that businessmen lacked privacy in lunch meeting secretly videotaped on crowded outdoor patio of public restaurant]; see also Acosta v. Scott Labor LLC (N.D.Ill. 2005) 377 F.Supp.2d 647, 649, 652 [similar conclusion as to employer secretly videotaped by disgruntled employee in common, open, and exposed area of workplace]; Melder v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. (La.Ct.App. 1999) 731 So.2d 991, 994, 1001 [similar conclusion as to department store employee captured on video cameras used to monitor customers as they shopped].) At the other end of the spectrum are areas in the workplace subject to restricted access and limited view, and reserved exclusively for performing bodily functions or other inherently personal acts. (See Trujillo v. City of Ontario (C.D.Cal. 2006) 428 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1099-1100, 1103, 1119-1122 ( Trujillo ) [recognizing that employees have common law and constitutional privacy interests while using locker room in basement of police station, and can reasonably expect that employer will not intrude by secretly videotaping them as they undress]; see also Doe by Doe v. B.P.S. Guard Services, Inc. (8th Cir. 1991) 945 F.2d 1422, 1424, 1427 ( Doe ) [similar conclusion as to models who were secretly viewed and videotaped while changing clothes behind curtained area at fashion show]; Liberti v. Walt Disney World Co. (M.D.Fla. 1995) 912 F.Supp. 1494, 1499, 1506 ( Liberti ) [similar conclusion as to dancers who were secretly viewed and videotaped while changing clothes and using restroom in dressing room at work].) The present scenario falls between these extremes. (Cf. Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs' Assn. v. County of Sacramento (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1482, 1487 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 834] [rejecting common law intrusion claim of jail employee secretly videotaped while handling inmate property based on accessibility of his office to others and heightened security concerns inherent in custodial setting]; see also Marrs v. Marriott Corp. (D.Md. 1992) 830 F.Supp. 274, 283 [similar conclusion as to security guard secretly videotaped while breaking into colleague's locked desk in open office used as common area by entire staff].) (6) Plaintiffs plausibly claim that Hillsides provided an enclosed office with a door that could be shut and locked, and window blinds that could be drawn, to allow the occupants to obtain some measure of refuge, to focus on their work, and to escape visual and aural interruptions from other sources, including their employer. Such a protective setting generates legitimate expectations that not all activities performed behind closed doors would be clerical and work related. As suggested by the evidence here, employees who share an office, and who have four walls that shield them from outside view (albeit, with a broken doggie flap on the door), may perform grooming or hygiene activities, or conduct personal conversations, during the workday. Privacy is not wholly lacking because the occupants of an office can see one another, or because colleagues, supervisors, visitors, and security and maintenance personnel have varying degrees of access. (See Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 917 [`visibility to some people does not strip [away] the right to remain secluded from others']; id. at pp. 918-919 [`business office need not be sealed to offer its occupant a reasonable degree of privacy'].) Regarding another relevant factor in Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 923, the means of intrusion, employees who retreat into a shared or solo office, and who perform work and personal activities in relative seclusion there, would not reasonably expect to be the subject of televised spying and secret filming by their employer. As noted, in assessing social norms in this regard, we may look at both the common law and statutory enactment. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 36.) (7) Courts have acknowledged the intrusive effect for tort purposes of hidden cameras and video recorders in settings that otherwise seem private. It has been said that the unblinking lens can be more penetrating than the naked eye with respect to duration, proximity, focus, and vantage point. ( Cowles v. State (Alaska 2001) 23 P.3d 1168, 1182 (dis. opn. of Fabe, J.).) Such monitoring and recording denies the actor a key feature of privacythe right to control the dissemination of his image and actions. (See Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 235.) We have made clear that the `mere fact that a person can be seen by someone does not automatically mean that he or she can legally be forced to be subject to being seen by everyone.' ( Sanders, supra, 20 Cal.4th 907, 916.) Not surprisingly, we discern a similar legislative policy against covert monitoring and recording that intrudesor threatens to intrudeupon visual privacy. Some statutes criminalize the use of camcorders, motion picture cameras, or photographic cameras to violate reasonable expectations of privacy in specified areas in which persons commonly undress or perform other intimate acts. Liability exists, under certain circumstances, where the lens allows the intruder to look[ ] into or view[ ] the protected area. (Pen. Code, § 647, subd. (j)(1).) [7] Of course, the intruder also cannot secretly videotape, film, photograph, or record anyone in that private place where various conditions exist. (§ 647, subd. (j)(3)(A); see Trujillo, supra, 428 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1119 [statute intended to protect visual privacy of persons in various states of undress].) Other statutes authorize civil damages for certain invasions of privacy that involve either a physical trespass or other offensive conduct for the purpose of capturing a picture of someone engaged in personal or familial activities. The focus of such provisions is on the intent to capture a visual image (Civ. Code, § 1708.8, subd. (a)), or on the attempt to do so ( id., subd. (b)). [8] Failure to capture or record the subject image is no defense to a statutory violation in this context. (§ 1708.8, subd. (j); see Richardson-Tunnell v. Schools Ins. Program for Employees ( SIPE ) (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1063 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 176] [statute protects against aggressive, paparazzi-like behavior of tabloid journalists].) As emphasized by defendants, the evidence shows that Hitchcock never viewed or recorded plaintiffs inside their office by means of the equipment he installed both there and in the storage room. He also did not intend or attempt to do so, and took steps to avoid capturing them on camera and videotape. While such factors bear on the offensiveness of the challenged conduct, as discussed below, we reject the defense suggestion that they preclude us from finding the requisite intrusion in the first place. (See Shulman, supra, 18 Cal.4th 200, 232 [requiring either a physical or sensory penetration into a private place or matter, or the gaining of unwanted access to private information].) In particular, Hitchcock hid the video equipment in plaintiffs' office from view in an apparent attempt to prevent anyone from discovering, avoiding, or dismantling it. He used a camera and motion detector small enough to tuck inside and around decorative items perched on different bookshelves, both high and low. Plaintiffs presumably would have been caught in the camera's sights if they had returned to work after hours, or if Hitchcock had been mistaken about them having left the office when he activated the system. Additionally, except for the one day in which Hitchcock removed the camera from plaintiffs' office, the means to activate the monitoring and recording functions were available around the clock, for three weeks, to anyone who had access to the storage room. Assuming the storage room was locked, as many as eight to 11 employees had keys under plaintiffs' version of the facts (depending upon the total number of program directors at Hillsides). In a related vein, plaintiffs cannot plausibly be found to have received warning that they would be subjected to the risk of such surveillance, or to have agreed to it in advance. We have said that notice of and consent to an impending intrusion can inhibit reasonable expectations of privacy. ( Hill, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1, 36; accord, Sheehan, supra, 45 Cal.4th 992, 1000-1001.) Such factors also can `limit [an] intrusion upon personal dignity' by providing an opportunity for persons to regulate their conduct while being monitored. ( Hill, supra, at p. 36.) Here, however, the evidence shows that no one at Hillsides told plaintiffs that someone had used Lopez's computer to access pornographic Web sites. Nor were they told that Hitchcock planned to install surveillance equipment inside their office to catch the perpetrator on television and videotape. Moreover, nothing in Hillsides's written computer policy mentioned or even alluded to the latter scenario. As noted earlier, the version in effect at the relevant time made clear that any monitoring and recording of employee activity, and any resulting diminution in reasonable privacy expectations, were limited to use of Company computers in the form of e-mail messages, electronic files, and web site data. Foster performed this administrative function when he used the network server to produce the list of pornographic Web sites accessed in both the computer laboratory and Lopez's office, and showed such computer-generated data to Hitchcock. There is no evidence that employees like plaintiffs had any indication that Hillsides would take the next drastic step and use cameras and recording devices to view and videotape employees sitting at their desks and computer workstations, or moving around their offices within camera range. In sum, the undisputed evidence seems clearly to support the first of two basic elements we have identified as necessary to establish a violation of privacy as alleged in plaintiffs' complaint. Defendants secretly installed a hidden video camera that was both operable and operating (electricity-wise), and that could be made to monitor and record activities inside plaintiffs' office, at will, by anyone who plugged in the receptors, and who had access to the remote location in which both the receptors and recording equipment were located. The workplace policy, that by means within the computer system itself, plaintiffs would be monitored about the pattern and use of Web sites visited, to prevent abuse of Hillsides's computer system, is distinguishable from and does not necessarily create a social norm that in order to advance that same interest, a camera would be placed inside their office, and would be aimed toward a computer workstation to capture all human activity occurring there. Plaintiffs had no reasonable expectation that their employer would intrude so tangibly into their semiprivate office. [9]