Opinion ID: 2025283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The U.S. Supreme Court's Decision in Troxel

Text: Appellant's argument challenging the constitutionality of the Nebraska grandparent visitation statutes is based primarily upon the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Troxel, in which the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the State of Washington's nonparent visitation statute that permitted `[a]ny person' to petition a superior court for visitation rights `at any time,' and authorize[d] that court to grant such visitation rights whenever `visitation may serve the best interest of the child.' 530 U.S. at 60, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (quoting Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 26.10.160(3) (West 1997)). The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the Washington statute at issue was unconstitutional. According to the Troxel opinion, the grandparents in Troxel, following the death of their son, had sought two weekends of overnight visitation per month, as well as 2 weeks of visitation each summer, with their two grandchildren with whom they had had a longstanding relationship. The children's mother did not oppose all visitation, but, rather, sought to limit visitation to 1 day per month. After a trial, the trial court ruled in favor of the grandparents, stating that `it is normally in the best interest of the children to spend quality time with the grandparent.' 530 U.S. at 69, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The mother appealed, and the Washington Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the grandparents lacked standing to seek visitation under the Washington statute unless a custody action was pending. The grandparents sought further review, which was granted by the Washington Supreme Court. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed for different reasons. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the state's nonparent visitation statute unconstitutionally infringed on the fundamental rights of parents to rear their children and held that the statute was unconstitutional on its face. 530 U.S. at 63, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 530 U.S. at 76, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Souter, J., concurring). The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and, in a plurality opinion, concluded that the Washington nonparent visitation statute violated the mother's substantive due process rights and was unconstitutional as applied in that case. Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the Court in Troxel, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined. In its analysis, the plurality opinion noted that the Court had long recognized that the [14th] Amendment's Due Process Clause . . . `guarantees more than fair process.' . . . The Clause also includes a substantive component that `provides heightened protection against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.' Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 117 S.Ct. 2258, 138 L.Ed.2d 772 (1997)). The Court identified the liberty interest at issue in Troxel as the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children, and stated that this interest was perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. at 65, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923) (stating that liberty interest protected by Due Process Clause includes parents' rights to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own)). See, also, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (citing Meyer v. Nebraska, supra , and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), and stating that [i]n a long line of cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the `liberty' specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one's children); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982) (discussing [t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (stating that [o]ur jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our cases have consistently followed that course); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978) (stating that [w]e have recognized on numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (stating that [t]he history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (stating that [i]t is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children `come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements' (citation omitted)). The Court summarized these cases, stating: In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). We have recognized the fundamental rights of parents in Nebraska cases. See, In re Guardianship of D.J., 268 Neb. 239, 682 N.W.2d 238 (2004); Uhing v. Uhing, 241 Neb. 368, 488 N.W.2d 366 (1992). After reviewing its history of recognizing a parent's right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her children, the Court found the Washington statute, as applied, unconstitutionally infringed upon this right. Troxel v. Granville, supra . The plurality found it significant that the Washington statute, which the Court described as breathtakingly broad, entirely excluded the parents from the visitation decisionmaking process, noting that [o]nce the visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter placed before a judge, a parent's decision that visitation would not be in the child's best interest is accorded no deference. [The Washington visitation statute] contains no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the Washington statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands of the judge. 530 U.S. at 67, 120 S.Ct. 2054. After discussing the fact that the grandparents in Troxel had not alleged either that the mother was an unfit parent or that she had decided to cut off visitation entirely, the Court concluded that the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a `better' decision could be made and declared the Washington statute unconstitutional as applied. 530 U.S. at 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054. We observe that by virtue of the act of invalidating the Washington statute, the Court in Troxel exercised constitutional oversight in an area in which the state had intervened in the parent-child relationship, and we further observe that we have previously approved of the propriety of such oversight. See In re Adoption of Baby Girl H., 262 Neb. 775, 635 N.W.2d 256 (2001). In its decision concluding that the Washington statute infringed on the fundamental right of parents, the Court in Troxel did not articulate the level of scrutiny it applied. Moreover, the Court highlighted the circumspect nature of its opinion and noted that it was not defining a specific test by which to evaluate the constitutionality of nonparental visitation statutes. The Court stated: Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of [the Washington statute] and the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, we do not consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the Washington Supreme Courtwhether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child [if visitation is withheld]. We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context. In this respect, we agree with [the dissenting opinion of] Justice Kennedy that the constitutionality of a standard for awarding visitation turns on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best elaborated with care. . . . Because much state-court adjudication in this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant to hold that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due Process Clause as a per se matter. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Justice Souter concurred in the Court's judgment but would have affirmed on the basis that the visitation statute was facially invalid. Id. (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas also concurred in the judgment, noting that the Court had failed to identify the appropriate standard of review. 530 U.S. at 80, 120 S.Ct. 2054 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Thomas would have struck down the Washington statute under a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. Justices Stevens, Scalia, and Kennedy each dissented on different grounds. Justice Stevens criticized the Washington Supreme Court's analysis relative to the any person provision and the statute's absence of a provision requiring a finding of harm to the child if visitation was withheld, preferring an as applied analysis rather than resolution of constitutionality based on a facial analysis. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia would have reversed the Washington Supreme Court's decision. He described the parental rights at issue as unenumerated and stated that he would prefer that the area of family law implicated in Troxel be prescribed by state legislatures and not the federal judiciary. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated that the 14th Amendment included a substantive due process right to parent children without undue state interference, but he recognized the potential for tension between this right and the best interests of the child. Justice Kennedy would have remanded the cause to the state courts to engage in an as applied analysis. Troxel v. Granville, supra (Kennedy, J., dissenting). The Troxel plurality decision for the most part was limited to the specific infirmities of the State of Washington visitation statute as applied to the facts in that case. It has been observed, and we agree, that the Troxel Court left to state courts the task of developing the law relative to the resolution of child visitation disputes arising between a parent and nonparent. See Denise v. Tencer, 46 Va.App. 372, 617 S.E.2d 413 (2005). We note that since the Troxel decision, the U.S. Supreme Court has declined additional opportunities to define the scope of a parent's due process right in the nonparent visitation context, which may mean that state courts are expected to adjudicate the matter on a case-by-case basis. See, Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, No. 04-1235, 362 Ark. 232, 2005 WL 1041158 (May 5, 2005), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 424, ___ L.Ed.2d ___; Galjour v. Harris, 795 So.2d 350 (La.App.2001), cert. denied 534 U.S. 1020, 122 S.Ct. 545, 151 L.Ed.2d 422; Blixt v. Blixt, 437 Mass. 649, 774 N.E.2d 1052 (2002), cert. denied 537 U.S. 1189, 123 S.Ct. 1259, 154 L.Ed.2d 1022 (2003); Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 827 A.2d 203 (2003), cert. denied 540 U.S. 1177, 124 S.Ct. 1408, 158 L.Ed.2d 78 (2004); Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 836 N.E.2d 1165 (2005), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1474, 164 L.Ed.2d 248 (2006). The lack of a precise standard in Troxel has been criticized by some authorities. See, e.g., Developments in the Law  The Law of Marriage and Family, IV. Changing Realities of Parenthood: The Law's Response to the Evolving American Family and Emerging Reproductive Technologies, 116 Harv. L.Rev. 2052, 2056 (2003) (stating that [t]he plurality opinion in Troxel, one of six opinions issued in the case, failed to deliver a clear, unambiguous standard under which to assess nonparental visitation statutes and has been the source of much confusion and debate); Paula A. Lorfeld, Comment, Have State Judiciaries Become Legislatures When Grandma Comes to Court?: State Court Decisions in the Post- Troxel Era, 5 Marq. Elder's Advisor 241, 242 (2004) (referring to Troxel opinion's vagueness). Nonetheless, other authorities have identified certain guiding principles in Troxel. Chief among these principles is a recognition that inherent in the Court's refusal to globally hold that nonparental visitation statutes violate [parental substantive due process rights] and the Due Process Clause as a per se matter, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), is a tacit approval of nonparental visitation statutes that meet substantive due process imperatives. See Developments in the Law  The Law of Marriage and Family, supra. See, also, Blixt v. Blixt, supra ; Deem v. Lobato, 136 N.M. 266, 96 P.3d 1186 (Ct.App.2004). Despite the absence from Troxel of precisely enunciated criteria for awarding nonparental visitation in the face of parental disapproval, the Court offered guidance on several points when considering the constitutionality of statutes governing nonparental visitation. First, in determining whether the nonparental visitation should occur, the plurality opinion declared that there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. Second, the plurality opinion stated that if a fit parent's decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own determination. 530 U.S. at 70, 120 S.Ct. 2054. The Troxel Court did not explain the nature of this special weight. See, Robinson v. Ford-Robinson, No. 04-1235, 362 Ark. 232, 2005 WL 1041158 (May 5, 2005), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 424, ___ L.Ed.2d ___; In re R.A., Jr., 121 P.3d 295 (Colo.App.2005). Nonetheless, several authorities have defined it as a degree of deference to the parents' decision. Developments in the Law  The Law of Marriage and Family, supra at 2057; Blixt v. Blixt, supra ; Blakely v. Blakely, 83 S.W.3d 537 (Mo.2002). Third, the Troxel Court noted the failure of the Washington trial court to base its order awarding grandparent visitation on any special factors that might justify the State's interference with [the parent's] fundamental right to make decisions concerning the rearing of her [children.] 530 U.S. at 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054. It has been observed that this comment indicates that there are factors that might override a parent's decision and, therefore, implicit in Troxel is the underlying recognition of the rebuttable nature of the presumption that fit parents act in their children's best interests. See Troxel v. Granville, supra (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although not expressly stated in the plurality opinion, the Troxel Court's acknowledgment that this presumption can be rebutted with the appropriate evidence has been noted by many authorities. See In re R.A., Jr., 121 P.3d at 298 (stating that [c]ourts recognize that, in light of the rebuttable nature of the presumption [that fit parents act in their children's best interests], the `special weight' requirement does not insulate parental wishes from judicial review). See, also, Deem v. Lobato, 136 N.M. 266, 270, 96 P.3d 1186, 1190 (N.M.App.2004) (stating that [t]here is nothing in Troxel or the resulting case law to suggest that the Supreme Court considered the presumption that a fit parent acts in the best interests of his or her child to be other than a rebuttable presumption); Harrold v. Collier, 107 Ohio St.3d 44, 51, 836 N.E.2d 1165, 1172 (2005), cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1474, 164 L.Ed.2d 248 (2006) (stating that while Troxel states that there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interest of their children, nothing in Troxel indicates that this presumption is irrefutable). Accord Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 96-97 (Ind.App.2001) (stating that under Troxel, a grandparent seeking visitation has the burden of rebutting the presumption that a decision made by a fit parent to deny or limit visitation was made in the child's best interest). In summary, certain principles emerge from the plurality opinion in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000), with respect to a parent's due process rights in the context of a nonparent visitation statute that are useful for our current analysis. Those principles are as follows: (1) There is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. (2) In light of this presumption, a fit parent's decision concerning the denial of grandparent visitation must be accorded at least some special weight. (3) Notwithstanding the special weight to be accorded a fit parent's decision, the presumption in favor of fit parents is rebuttable under the appropriate circumstances. With the guidance of these three principles, we examine Nebraska's grandparent visitation statutes.