Opinion ID: 1588052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Penalty Phase Counsel for Failure to Present Expert Mental Mitigation Evidence

Text: Burns first asserts that the postconviction court erred in denying Burns' claim that resentencing counsel were ineffective for failing to present available mental mitigation evidence. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show both that counsel's performance was deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced by that deficiency. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). An attorney's performance is deficient when it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Prejudice is demonstrated when there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In addition, [a] fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate from counsel's perspective at the time. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. This Court has stated: Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because current counsel disagrees with trial counsel's strategic decisions. Moreover, strategic decisions do not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel if alternative courses have been considered and rejected and counsel's decision was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. Occhicone v. State, 768 So.2d 1037, 1048 (Fla.2000) (citations omitted). During the sentencing phase of Burns' initial trial in 1988, Burns called Dr. Robert Berland to testify concerning mental mitigation. Dr. Berland testified that his psychological testing indicated that Burns suffered from a chronic, psychotic disturbance involving a thought disorder, psychotic thinking. Dr. Berland further testified that a thirteen-point difference between Burns' performance IQ and his verbal IQ indicated a long-term brain impairment of some significance. He thought that at the time of the murder, Burns was suffering from delusional paranoid thinking. Dr. Berland concluded that Burns was suffering from an extreme emotional or mental disturbance. The State called Dr. Sidney Merin in rebuttal. Based on Dr. Merin's review of Dr. Berland's deposition and test results, statements of Burns and eyewitnesses to the murder, and Dr. Berland's testimony, Dr. Merin concluded that Burns was not under the influence of an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. Dr. Berland did not testify at the resentencing, and there was no expert testimony presented as to mental mitigation at the resentencing. Burns argues that counsel's failure to present evidence at the resentencing hearing of Burns' brain damage and psychotic disturbance was ineffective. The resentencing record reveals that counsel considered calling Dr. Berland to testify both at the resentencing before the jury and at the Spencer [7] hearing before the judge. For example, when the State asked the resentencing court to grant Dr. Merin additional time to review Dr. Berland's testimony and testing, Tebrugge, Burns' counsel, responded by saying: I can tell the Court and the State, Doctor Berland, if he is called would not be called Monday. So Doctor Merin would not need to be here on Monday. And other than that, I'm not going to say too much. But if he does testify, I don't see any problem with him bringing his test results and copies of that to provide to the state. (Emphasis added.) During a later portion of the resentencing proceedings, counsel Tebrugge told the trial court: Doctor Berland, who the defense has retained in this case, . . . was out of town last week to tend to his father who has been very sick. While he was doing that, his grandmother passed away. The funeral for his grandmother is tomorrow and then he'll be flying back into Tampa tomorrow evening. He would be available Wednesday morning. I don't know at this point in time whether we plan to call Doctor Berland or not, and I've mentioned that to Mr. Moreland. [8] So Doctor Merin wouldn't have to be present tomorrow because Doctor Berland would definitely not be available tomorrow. We will try to make our decision with respect to calling Doctor Berland so that we can let the Court know that tomorrow so that we . . . won't come in on Wednesday and surprise you. . . . In addition, Dr. Berland testified at the evidentiary hearing that he received a letter from counsel Tebrugge before the Spencer hearing. Dr. Berland read that letter at the evidentiary hearing: As you have probably heard by now, the Jury returned a unanimous recommendation of death in Daniel Burns' case. As disappointed as I am with the verdict, I do feel confident that we will ultimately prevail on our legal issues. Judge Logan has scheduled a hearing . . . for the purpose of taking additional testimony or argument. We are considering calling you as a witness for that hearing. Please let me know if that would present a conflict for you and whether you would need a subpoena. I will try to decide within the next two weeks whether you will be called. Again, thank you for your hard work on this case. Although counsel did not present any expert testimony on mental mitigation, the defense did present over thirty witnesses at the resentencing, who were mainly family members and close friends of Burns. They testified about the important role Burns played in their family. Burns was described as a leader of the family, and many witnesses testified about the amount of support he provided to them. For example, the defendant's mother, Ethel Burns, testified that after the defendant left his family home in Mississippi, he continued to send money home. One family member described him as a role model. One of his sisters stated that he was smart, loving and caring. The defense witnesses at resentencing also repeatedly noted that Burns was not a violent person and that this crime was completely out of character for him. Albert Rance, a family friend who had known the defendant since he was a child, testified that he had never known Burns to be violent or have a temper. Barbara A. Burns, the defendant's niece, testified that she had never heard him behave improperly or even yell. Burns' co-counsel, Elliott Metcalfe, stated that the strategy at resentencing was: [T]o show that Daniel Burns had no significant history of prior criminal activity; that he had lived a life of overcoming . . . [an] extremely difficult poverty-ridden childhood to be a hardworking man; that he had very strong ties to his family. . . . And [that Burns] was the supporter of all the people in that family and aided and assisted them, including his children. The defense also called Dr. Michael Radelet, a sociology professor at the University of Florida. Dr. Radelet testified regarding the ability of a prisoner to adjust to confinement and future dangerousness. Dr. Radelet noted that in making assessments of a prisoner's potential future dangerousness, he takes into account seven factors, one of which is substance abuse or a history of mental hospitalizations. He noted: You can tell if somebody's had problems with alcohol or drug abuse or mental hospitalizations, especially mental hospitalizations. They're more difficult to predict about what's going to go on. He noted that if a prisoner was psychotic, that leads to unpredictability. Dr. Radelet stated that he believe[d] very, very strongly that Mr. Burns shows all the traits necessary in order for me to be able to predict that he will be able to make a satisfactory adjustment to life in prison should he be sentenced to life in prison, and that he would do so without threatening guards or other inmates or being at all disruptive to the life in the prison. During closing arguments, resentencing co-counsel Metcalfe summarized this evidence: It would be difficult for me to imagine being able to present this much mitigating evidence on behalf of any defendant. This is a rare case where we have a human being, Daniel Burns, who has touched so many lives, so many people. . . . . Even more importantly in this case, Members of the Jury, is all of the evidence presented about Daniel Burns' life, his background, his character, and his family. A man must be judged on his whole life, not just on one incident. And all of the evidence that we've presented demonstrates that this crime was totally out of character for Dan Burns, and that is why this evidence is so important. . . . . The central fact we've established through the testimony of all of his brothers and sisters is that Daniel Burns has occupied a leadership role in his family. . . . You've heard from each of the nieces . . . that [Burns] was also a surrogate father. . . . [E]ach of these kids, he was a dad to, a brother to, and an uncle to. To his younger brothers and sisters . . . [Burns] was a teacher, a counselor, a source of love. A source of love, affection and emotional support. And he even continues to do that to this day. . . . . We have also established that Daniel Burns will likely be a model prisoner in the future and not pose a danger to anyone. Now, of course, it is difficult to predict the future that Michael Radelet has completed study after study on this phenomena of future dangerousness, and he has identified, as you recall, seven certain fixed criteria. In every single case, with all seven, [Burns is] at the best end of the scale. And not only will Daniel not be a danger in the future, he can provide guidance and support to the younger inmates who might be incarcerated there. The postconviction court denied this claim, noting that it relied on this record evidence from the resentencing for its conclusion that counsel's decision to not call Dr. Berland was strategic: In Burns' case . . . the alleged mental mitigation evidence was actively sought out, evaluated by counsel with knowledge of the likely rebuttal evidence and, as the . . . transcript . . . demonstrate[s], a reasoned decision was made not to present the testimony in light of the other theme evidence presented on Burns' behalf. The record in this case strongly supports and convinces this Court to find that Resentence Counsel's alleged failure to present a mental illness factor was not an oversight but, rather, was a tactical choice. Postconviction Order at 12. At the evidentiary hearing, Burns presented testimony in an attempt to challenge this record evidence. Burns' resentencing counsel Tebrugge testified that after reading Dr. Berland's testimony from the first sentencing, he decided that he would call Dr. Berland for the purpose of presenting mental mitigation testimony. Tebrugge testified that there was no strategic reason why Dr. Berland or another mental health expert did not ultimately testify at Burns' resentencing. He recalled that Dr. Berland was not called because Dr. Berland had a death in his family. Tebrugge could not explain why he did not inform the trial court of the situation, other than to say that he was just maybe a bit overwhelmed by the entire proceedings. Co-counsel Metcalfe also testified at the evidentiary hearing. Although Metcalfe believed that Dr. Berland was going to be called as a resentencing witness, he maintained that whether to call Dr. Berland was Tebrugge's decision to make. Metcalfe did not feel that Dr. Berland's testimony would be inconsistent with the testimony of other mitigation witnesses. Dr. Berland also testified at the evidentiary hearing. He noted that he would have given testimony in 1993 similar to his testimony in 1988: that Burns suffers from a chronic ambulatory psychotic disturbance, has a brain injury, and suffered from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder. [9] Dr. Berland testified that the effect of Burns' mental illness on Burns during his confrontation with the victim was a very delicate area to walk on but felt that whatever misunderstanding occurred between Burns and the victim, Burns' reaction would have been significantly inflamed by his mental illness. The final witness at the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Henry Dee, testified that he performed a neuropsychological evaluation of Burns. Dr. Dee believed that at the time of the murder, Burns was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired. In denying this claim, the postconviction court considered the above evidence but still rejected Burns' ineffective assistance claim, noting: At the evidentiary hearing, neither Tebrugge nor Metcalfe could offer any explanation for their failure to call Dr. Berland at the resentencing proceeding. As well, Dr. Berland had absolutely no independent recollection of why he was not called to testify, either at the resentencing hearing or at the Spencer hearing. Given the lack of recollection by the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, CCRC's allegations as to Dr. Berland's unavailability to testify as to Resentence Counsel's strategy must be evaluated from counsel's perspective at the time of the resentencing proceeding. Postconviction Order at 9. There is competent, substantial evidence to support the postconviction court's finding that resentencing counsel made a strategic decision not to present mental mitigation evidence. Porter v. State, 788 So.2d 917, 923 (Fla.2001) (So long as its decisions are supported by competent, substantial evidence, this Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on questions of fact. . . .). The postconviction court's finding is supported by the transcript of the resentencing, which indicates that Tebrugge considered but eventually rejected the idea of calling Dr. Berland. The record of the resentencing demonstrates that the defense strategy was as co-counsel Metcalfe stated it to be, which was to show that Burns had been a productive member of society who supported and led his family. Counsel also showed through Dr. Radelet that Burns could continue to lead a productive life in prison. Dr. Berland's testimony that Burns suffered from a psychotic disturbance would have undermined the positive traits accentuated by the mitigation evidence presented and vitiated Radelet's resentencing testimony predicting that Burns would make an excellent adjustment to prison life. The sum of the resentencing evidence does not support counsel's postconviction testimony. Rather, the evidence supports the postconviction court's factual finding that Burns' resentencing counsel were considering calling Dr. Berland but subsequently made a strategic decision not to do so. The fact that resentencing counsel testified that there was not a strategic reason for not presenting mental mitigation does not require the postconviction court to find ineffective assistance. See Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 877 n. 3 (Fla.1997) ([A]n attorney's own admission that he or she was ineffective is of little persuasion in these proceedings.). We do not find error with the postconviction court's decision because it is based on competent, substantial evidence and it is consistent with the evidence in the trial record. [10] The evidence presented at the postconviction hearing would have conflicted with resentencing counsel's trial strategy. Moreover, we agree with the postconviction court that Burns failed to prove the prejudice prong of the Strickland analysis. The court wrote: The mental mitigation evidence that Burns alleges should have been offered at the resentencing proceeding would have contradicted the testimony of the numerous lay witnesses who espoused nothing but positive role model traits to humanize Burns. The testimony of the numerous lay witnesses at the resentencing proceeding revealed that those who knew Burns thought he was a good person who had never exhibited any violent behavior. The proposed mental mitigation evidence would also have detracted from the expert testimony of Professor Radelet, who characterized Burns as a productive person who would be able to make a satisfactory adjustment to a life sentence in prison. As well, had Resentence Counsel called Dr. Berland, they would have had to negate the testimony of the State's rebuttal expert witness, Dr. Merin, who would have testified, in accord with his testimony at the original trial, that there was no evidence that Burns was psychotic and that he was not under an extreme emotional or mental disturbance at the time he shot Trooper Young. . . . This Court is also mindful that far less lay testimony was presented at the original trial and both Dr. Berland and Dr. Merin testified. Yet, the jury returned an advisory sentence of death, and the Court imposed a death sentence on Burns. Postconviction Order at 13. We find no error in the trial judge's determination on prejudice. We thus affirm the postconviction court's denial of this claim.