Opinion ID: 1154894
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The child molestation conviction and the weight of the evidence

Text: Defendant claims that the trial court should have granted his motion for acquittal on the child molestation count made at the close of the State's case. He argues that the evidence on this count was inadequate to support all elements of the offense. See A.R.S. § 13-1410 (1989); State v. Noble, 152 Ariz. 284, 286, 731 P.2d 1228, 1230 (1987); State v. Roberts, 126 Ariz. 92, 95, 612 P.2d 1055, 1058 (1980). If reasonable minds could differ as to whether the properly admitted evidence, and the inferences therefrom, prove all elements of the offense, a motion for acquittal should not be granted. State v. Mathers, 165 Ariz. 64, 67, 796 P.2d 866, 869 (1990); Ariz. R.Crim.P. 20(a). We conduct a de novo review of the trial court's decision, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4, 859 P.2d 111, 114 (1993). Viewing the evidence in that light, the facts are: the victim was nine years old and was abducted; her hands were bound, her clothes removed, her panties hung on a tree limb, and her body left nude; a pubic-type hair similar to Defendant's was found near the body in a clump of hair that appeared to have been cut with Defendant's knife; and Defendant was not wearing underwear when arrested hours after the abduction. Although an autopsy revealed no sperm or semen, this was of little evidentiary value due to decomposition. The pathologist who performed the autopsy testified that the victim's body was completely unclothed, completely naked, and ... her hands were bound ... and I think that those two findings certainly would be indicative of some type of sexual molestation. While this is not expert evidence, or if objected to necessarily admissible as lay opinion, it states the common sense conclusion that the evidence permits an inference of molestation. See Bond v. State, 273 Ind. 233, 403 N.E.2d 812, 817-18 (Ind. 1980); see also People v. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d 176, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 276, 522 N.E.2d 1124, 1135 (1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 917, 109 S.Ct. 274, 102 L.Ed.2d 263 (1988); Hines v. State, 58 Md. App. 637, 473 A.2d 1335, 1348-49 (1984), cert. denied, 300 Md. 794, 481 A.2d 239 (1984). Other evidence links Defendant to the victim and to the crime scene. From the evidence presented, the jury could infer that Defendant had the requisite state of mind. See Noble, 152 Ariz. at 286, 731 P.2d at 1230; Roberts, 126 Ariz. at 95, 612 P.2d at 1058. Although contrary inferences are possible, a reasonable jury could have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant molested the victim. Indeed, this is the most logical explanation for the crime. There is substantial evidence to warrant conviction; nothing more is required. See Landrigan, 176 Ariz. at 4, 859 P.2d at 114. The trial court properly denied the motion for acquittal.
A new trial may be granted when [t]he verdict is contrary to ... the weight of the evidence. Ariz.R.Crim.P. 24.1(c)(1). Defendant argues that the evidence does not support the molestation conviction and that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for new trial. As noted above, there is substantial evidence to warrant conviction of child molestation. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for new trial. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. at 4, 859 P.2d at 114. Thus, we find no error. J. Statements by the victim's mother The trial court excluded the testimony of the victim's mother regarding her pre- and post-hypnotic description of the vehicles and drivers she saw the morning of the abduction. The court, however, allowed police officers and the victim's father to testify as to her pre-hypnotic statements. Defendant argues that the victim's mother became unavailable when the State failed to hypnotize her according to the requirements of State ex rel. Collins, 132 Ariz. at 210-11, 644 P.2d at 1296-97. Implicitly conceding that her pre-hypnotic statements were admissible under Ariz.R.Evid. 803(2), Defendant claims a denial of his Sixth Amendment right to confront the victim's mother. When hearsay testimony comes within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied. White v. Illinois, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 112 S.Ct. 736, 743, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992). Distraught and fearful because her daughter was missing, the victim's mother described the vehicles and their drivers to law enforcement officers shortly after she observed the passing vehicles. By so doing, she attempted to assist the officers in finding her daughter; she had every motive to be accurate and tell the truth and none at all to fabricate or alter her description. Clearly the victim's mother was speaking in a state of excitement likely to ensure spontaneity. Ariz.R.Evid. 803(2). Because the challenged testimony fit within the excited utterance hearsay exception, id., Defendant's confrontation rights were not violated. See, e.g., White, ___ U.S. at ___-___, 112 S.Ct. at 741-44; Arizona v. Lengyel, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 960, 117 L.Ed.2d 127 (1992) (remanding for further consideration in light of White ); Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2538-39, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980); State v. Yslas, 139 Ariz. 60, 65, 676 P.2d 1118, 1123 (1984). K. Dog tracking testimony James Weeks testified regarding the actions of his tracking dog, Bo, in searching for the victim and Defendant. He first scented Bo to search for the victim near the area where her bicycle was located. Later that day, Bo was used to track Defendant. Mr. Weeks testified that he scented the dog in the GMC when searching for Defendant. I brought [Bo] up to the [GMC] on the driver's side where the door was open. I immediately jumped my dog onto the floorboard of the driver's side and immediately he went to the, through the two seats in the front into the back seat. At this time I jerked my dog out of the back seat on the lead. I put him on the front seat, the driver's side. I made him sit. I scented him, told him to scent, and told him to find. The prosecutor then asked whether Bo, when used to track Defendant, was tracking the victim's or Defendant's scent (implying that the dog may have smelled the victim's scent on Defendant). Mr. Weeks answered that there was a doubt in my mind that he was working either particular one at that time. Defendant argues that this testimony was irrelevant, that there was no proper foundation for the question, and that the testimony was unfairly prejudicial. Defense counsel did not make any relevancy objection or motion to strike at trial. Thus, absent fundamental error, this issue is precluded. Gendron, 168 Ariz. at 154-55, 812 P.2d at 627-28. The question is relevant because it seeks testimony tending to connect Defendant with the victim. The answer may have had minimal relevancy, but even if it did not, we find no fundamental error. Defendant has not shown that the foundation for the tracking evidence was inadequate under Roscoe, 145 Ariz. at 220-21, 700 P.2d at 1320-21. Indeed, Mr. Weeks testified to the Roscoe foundational requirements without objection. [39] Nor do we see how Mr. Weeks' answer was unfairly prejudicial in light of the following unobjected-to foundational exchange: Q. [L]et's assume that your dog is scented to find one person and you are off searching for that person but that person is never found, in other words, your search is interrupted before the person is found. He's borrowed and then rescented on a new person. Does that cause a problem with the dog? A. Possibly there could be a problem of knowing which scent that he's actually following, yes, there could be, as far as knowing exactly which scent trail that he is following. Thus, we reject Defendant's claims. L. Outburst by the victim's father During testimony about Defendant's 1981 sexual assault and kidnapping convictions, the victim's father ran out of the courtroom and, once outside, yelled [t]hat fucking asshole. The judge, in front of the jury, stated: I think the record should reflect at this point that [the victim's father] went out of the courtroom obviously disturbed and yelled an obscenity which I'm sure the jury heard, as I did. I think it might be well to remind the jury what you are told at the beginning of the case ... which is that you are not to base your decision in this case on emotion or prejudice or sympathy, ... but to base it on the facts. You notice we don't tell you not to have emotion or not to have sympathy, just that you don't base your decision on that. You base it on the facts that are presented in court, so please disregard the outburst. I'm sure we can understand the feelings that were being vented, but that's not the way that decisions are made. As an additional remedial measure, the trial court excluded the victim's father from the courtroom for the remainder of the trial. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing that the outburst completely undermined whatever defense that we had. The trial court denied the motion: I don't think it's really the substance for a mistrial. I don't think there is any doubt in the jury's mind about how [the victim's father] feels about Mr. Bible. That's certainly been clear for days.[ [40] ] It's just the venting of that in an inappropriate way that I think troubles us. I don't think the jury is going to make its decision based on what he said. I think they will base it on the evidence. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. When a motion for mistrial is based on evidentiary concerns, we review for an abuse of discretion. Koch, 138 Ariz. at 101, 673 P.2d at 299 (citing cases). This deferential standard of review applies because the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate the atmosphere of the trial, the manner in which the objectionable statement was made, and the possible effect it had on the jury and the trial. Id. (citing cases). The cases relied on by Defendant are inapposite. In State v. Gallagher, 97 Ariz. 1, 396 P.2d 241 (1964), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 388, 395, 626 P.2d 118, 125, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 848, 102 S.Ct. 167, 70 L.Ed.2d 136 (1981), we reversed a murder conviction on grounds independent of a spectator's hostile views. Gallagher, 97 Ariz. at 8, 396 P.2d at 245-46. In Taylor v. State, 55 Ariz. 29, 97 P.2d 927 (1940), serious prosecutorial misconduct may or may not have required reversal but, when coupled with the audience's applause after the prosecutor's closing argument, reversal was required. Id. at 40, 97 P.2d at 932. In this case, we are presented with a serious but isolated incident by a murder victim's father. The court did not exclude the victim's father before the outburst, and the record suggests that some outburst may have been anticipated. Defendant, however, did not object to the presence of the victim's father during trial. Indeed, in a pretrial discussion addressing the issue, trial counsel noted that the victim's father had become a little unglued in pretrial proceedings but that he had no problem with the victim's father remaining in the courtroom after he testified. So far as this record shows, the victim's father had taken no action at trial warranting reprimand or comment prior to his outburst. The substance of his comment and its context make clear that strong emotion prompted the outburst. No information was conveyed other than the father's animosity toward Defendant, a feeling that could hardly have surprised the jurors. In light of the nature of the outburst, the prompt instruction given the jury, and the exclusion of the victim's father from the remainder of trial, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial. See Messer v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1080, 1086-88 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming denial of mistrial after victim's father lunged at and threatened defendant, when jury admonished, jurors polled as to impact of incident, and outburst not calculated to influence jury), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1088, 106 S.Ct. 864, 88 L.Ed.2d 902 (1986); see generally Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Emotional Manifestations by Victim or Family of Victim During Criminal Trial as Ground for Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 31 A.L.R.4th 229 (1984); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Disruptive Conduct of Spectators in Presence of Jury During Criminal Trial as Basis For Reversal, New Trial, or Mistrial, 29 A.L.R.4th 659 (1984). M. Fundamental error claims Defendant claims that the trial court committed several fundamental errors. As noted more fully above, see supra § A(3)(e), fundamental error is error that deprived a defendant of a fair trial. Hunter, 142 Ariz. at 90, 688 P.2d at 982. The doctrine applies in extremely limited circumstances where the error was clear, egregious, and curable only via a new trial. Gendron, 168 Ariz. at 155, 812 P.2d at 628. 1. Evidence obtained from the seizure of Defendant's clothing Defendant argues that it was fundamental error to admit evidence obtained from clothing taken from him when arrested. Defendant does not argue that he was improperly arrested or that the State could not take his clothes during his incarceration. Rather, Defendant argues that the State improperly tested his clothes without a warrant in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Generally, a warrant is required before a valid search or seizure can occur. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967); see also Ariz. Const. art. II, § 8. There are, of course, various exceptions to this rule. One exception is a search incident to a valid arrest. See generally United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). In this case, the clothing was not seized as evidence of the crime for which Defendant was first jailed, and the testing was performed without probable cause days after seizure of the items. Thus, Edwards is at least factually distinguishable. Arizona, however, is among the majority of courts finding that this type of warrantless seizure does not violate a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 5.3(b), at 494 n. 79 (2d ed. 1987 & 1993 Supp.) (citing cases). In the present case, the authorities merely tested that which had properly come into their possession. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 820 F.2d 1065, 1067-68, 1071-72 (9th Cir.1987) (currency properly admitted in bank robbery prosecution when defendant already in police custody on unrelated charge before becoming a suspect in bank robbery); State v. Carriger, 123 Ariz. 335, 338, 599 P.2d 788, 791 (1979) (keys properly admitted in robbery and murder case when removed from police property locker for testing, without a warrant, three months after arrest), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049, 100 S.Ct. 741, 62 L.Ed.2d 736 (1980); State v. Gonzales, 111 Ariz. 38, 44, 523 P.2d 66, 72 (1974) (clothing properly admitted in murder and rape case when defendant already in police custody on unrelated charge). There was no error in admitting the evidence and its fruits, and thus there can be no fundamental error. 2. Blood stain evidence Defendant argues that it was fundamental error to admit testimony about human blood stains found on his pants and boots. Specifically, Defendant claims that he was not linked to these stains on the day of the victim's abduction. In making his argument, Defendant relies on distinguishable cases. In State v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 98-99, 669 P.2d 68, 76-77 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073, 104 S.Ct. 985, 79 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), for example, it was error to admit a bloody shirt found near the victim's body. No testimony linked that defendant to the shirt and, accordingly, lack of relevancy precluded admission. Id. at 99, 669 P.2d at 77. In this case, however, Defendant was wearing the pants and boots when apprehended hours after the victim's abduction. Similarly, the closeness in time between the abduction and Defendant's arrest raises an inference that he wore this clothing at the time the victim was killed. Thus, the evidence was relevant and admissible; there was no error and can be no fundamental error. For similar reasons, we also reject Defendant's argument that the court erred in admitting evidence of blood stains in and under the GMC because they could not be positively identified as human blood. See Carriger, 123 Ariz. at 339, 599 P.2d at 792.
The instruction given on the child molestation count reads as follows: The crime of molestation of a child requires proof that the defendant knowingly touched directly or indirectly the private parts of a child under the age of 15 years, or caused a child under the age of 15 years to touch directly or indirectly the private parts of the defendant. Defendant claims that this instruction erroneously omitted a requirement that the act be motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent. Defendant argues that this is a necessary element of the offense. Without again addressing the issue, we will assume that it is. See In re Pima County Juvenile Appeal No. 74802-2, 164 Ariz. 25, 33, 790 P.2d 723, 731 (1990). But cf. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JV-121430, 172 Ariz. 604, 606-07, 838 P.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Ct.App. 1992). Because Defendant did not object at trial, we must decide whether this omission was fundamental error. The failure to instruct on a necessary element of an offense is not fundamental error where there is no issue as to that element. State v. Avila, 147 Ariz. 330, 338, 710 P.2d 440, 448 (1985). Initially, we note that the asserted trial defense in this case did not raise the motivation issue. Although Defendant pleaded not guilty  thus requiring the State to prove every element of the charge  his defense at trial was that he did not commit the physical act charged. Defendant did not assert that his motivation for committing the act was natural and normal or that the act was somehow privileged. The facts of this case  both those found by the jury and those undisputed in the record  show that Defendant's motivation was not in question. The guilty verdict on the kidnapping charge necessarily means that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly restrained the victim. The undisputed facts show that she was restrained by force  her hands were bound. As to the molestation charge, considering the instruction given, the guilty verdict necessarily means that the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant knowingly had sexual contact with the nine-year-old victim. Defendant was approximately twenty-six years old at the time. The age difference, the bound hands, the panties hung on a tree limb, and the nude body belie any suggestion that Defendant was motivated by anything other than an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest with respect to children. Cases with facts less compelling support this conclusion. In State v. Roberts, 126 Ariz. 92, 612 P.2d 1055 (1980), the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence for his child molestation conviction. Testimony in that case showed that the defendant moved his hands inside the diaper of a seven-year-old emotionally and physically retarded girl. Id. at 93, 612 P.2d at 1056. We affirmed the conviction, stating that [t]hese acts, by their very nature, manifest that defendant was motivated by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest or intent with respect to children. Id. at 95, 612 P.2d at 1058 (emphasis added); see also State v. Brooks, 120 Ariz. 458, 461, 586 P.2d 1270, 1273 (1978) (finding acts by their very nature manifest the required motivation); State v. Johnson, 120 Ariz. 21, 22, 583 P.2d 1341, 1342 (1978) (same). In light of Defendant's trial strategy, the facts necessarily found by the jury, and the undisputed facts of record, this case law amply demonstrates that the omission in the jury instruction was not fundamental error in this case. See Cook, 170 Ariz. at 50, 821 P.2d at 741. N. Prosecutorial misconduct Defendant claims that prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his due process rights. Prosecutorial misconduct does not require reversal unless the defendant has been denied a fair trial as a result of the actions of counsel. State v. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. 392, 400, 783 P.2d 1184, 1192 (1989) (citing State v. Hallman, 137 Ariz. 31, 37, 668 P.2d 874, 880 (1983)); accord Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). [The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.... [W]hile he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935); accord Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 103, 677 P.2d 261, 266 (1984). With this standard in mind, because no objection was made, we again review for fundamental error. 1. Comments about the jury questionnaire During voir dire, the prosecutor stated that some of the questions in the questionnaire may seem a little silly to you, and some of them are silly, as a matter of fact, but please be very honest when you fill out this form. Defense counsel told the venire that he wrote the questionnaire and took exception to its characterization as silly. While the prosecutor's comment was inappropriate, we believe that it falls far short of actionable misconduct. Furthermore, the trial court told the venire: I have gone through all of these proposed questions and approved them, so they are approved questions by the Court. Don't worry about what the attorneys think about them. I have approved them and they should all be answered by you truthfully. We find no error and, accordingly, no fundamental error. 2. Vouching for witnesses It is black letter law that it is improper for a prosecutor to vouch for a witness. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 401, 783 P.2d at 1193. Two forms of impermissible prosecutorial vouching exist: (1) when the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind its witness, and (2) where the prosecutor suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. In addition, a lawyer is prohibited from asserting personal knowledge of facts in issue before the tribunal unless he testifies as a witness. Id. (citation omitted). The prosecutor in this case made the following declaration in opening statement: I promise you that I'm gonna be honest with you, that the witnesses that I call, there is a reason for them to be here. They have something important to tell you. I'm not gonna waste your time. If there is [sic] two or three people that did the same thing in this case, you will probably only hear from one of them. It's gonna be a straightforward, no nonsense case. .... But as you know, we wouldn't be here unless what I'm about to tell you really happened. This statement clearly includes both forms of improper vouching. Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 401, 783 P.2d at 1193. If Defendant had objected, the court should have sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the remark. Such judicial action would have been appropriate even absent an objection. Cf. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 54, 68 S.Ct. at 395. There was no objection, however, and we again review for fundamental error. In determining whether a prosecutor's improper statement constitutes fundamental error, we examine, under the circumstances, whether the jurors were probably influenced and whether the statement probably denied Defendant a fair trial. See, e.g., Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 611, 832 P.2d at 628; Dumaine, 162 Ariz. at 401, 783 P.2d at 1193; Valdez, 160 Ariz. at 15, 770 P.2d at 319. The focus is on the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor. Atwood, 171 Ariz. at 608, 832 P.2d at 625; Valdez, 160 Ariz. at 15, 770 P.2d at 319. Given the entire record, we do not believe that the statement tipped the scales of justice and denied Defendant a fair trial. Thus, the prosecutor's statement, although highly improper, did not constitute fundamental error in this case. 3. Speculation that the victim was tortured In opening statement, the prosecutor suggested that the victim was perhaps tortured. In closing argument, the prosecutor stated that, after the victim's hands were tied, she may have been forced into some sort of torment. Defendant claims that these statements were unsupported by evidence and thus improper. The comment during opening statement that the victim was perhaps tortured was improper. Opening statement is counsel's opportunity to tell the jury what evidence they intend to introduce. See Charles M. Smith, Arizona Practice  Civil Trial Practice § 455, at 395 (1986). Opening statement is not a time to argue the inferences and conclusions that may be drawn from evidence not yet admitted. Id. § 455, at 395; § 457, at 396. There was no direct evidence that the victim was tortured, and the record does not indicate that any such evidence was anticipated when opening statements were made. Accordingly, the reference to torture during opening statement was improper. The comment during closing argument that the victim may have been tormented was proper. Unlike opening statements, during closing arguments counsel may summarize the evidence, make submittals to the jury, urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence, and suggest ultimate conclusions. Id. § 527, at 455-56; see also State v. Runningeagle, 176 Ariz. 59, 64, 859 P.2d 169, 174 (1993); Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 171, 800 P.2d at 1279. Given the evidence presented at trial, we find no impropriety in the prosecutor suggesting  during closing argument  that the victim had been tormented. The nine-year-old victim was abducted, taken to a remote area, her clothes removed and scattered, her hands tied, and her head beaten. Such evidence would permit a jury to infer that she had been subject to both physical and emotional torment. Thus, we hold that the comment during opening statement was improper but find no reason to reverse. While, the comment during opening statement was improper at that point, it was a reasonable inference from evidence later introduced and would have been proper during closing argument. Therefore, under the facts of this case, the improper comment did not deprive Defendant of a fair trial. We find no fundamental error.
In opening statement, after mentioning that Defendant deserved a fair trial, the prosecutor added that your goal is not necessarily just to give Ricky Bible a fair trial. Your goal in this case is going to be justice. And justice doesn't mean just giving Ricky Bible a fair trial. It means looking at the rights of other people, too, like [the victim], and those rights include those that are enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. And there won't be any of that for [the victim]. Remarkably, during closing argument, the prosecutor made a more detailed reference to the victim's rights: [T]he defendant and all defendants have rights and a right to a fair trial. There has been a fair trial. But there are other rights. All of us have rights, including [the victim]. Perhaps the most succinct rights, the most succinct discussion of the sort of rights that we all, including [the victim], have, were described in the Declaration of Independence in 1776. .... [The victim's] rights were terminated on June 6 of 1988. She has no right to life. That was terminated with blows to her head. There is no liberty for a nine-year-old girl who is taken off of her bike, tied up and taken away from her family. And there certainly is no pursuit of happiness from the grave.... Your duty is to protect the defendant's rights and also [the victim's] rights. Defendant challenges these statements. It cannot be doubted that victims of crime, and their families, have certain rights. See Ariz. Const. art. II, § 2.1; A.R.S. §§ 13-4401 to 13-4437. It is equally clear, however, that these rights do not, and cannot, conflict with a defendant's right to a fair trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI, XIV; Ariz. Const. art. II, § 4; see generally State ex rel. Romley v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 232, 836 P.2d 445 (Ct.App. 1992). The jury finds facts and applies the law through the judge's instructions. A trial is fair when, according to legal principles and requirements, a jury's determination is based on the evidence admitted and the instructions given. Appeals to the jury's innate sense of fairness between a defendant and the victim may have surface appeal but cannot prevail. A jury in a criminal trial is not expected to strike some sort of balance between the victim's and the defendant's rights. The judge, not the jury, balances conflicting rights; the jury must find the facts and apply the judge's instructions. Accordingly, the clear weight of authority shows the impropriety of the prosecutor's statements. See, e.g., McNair v. State, 1992 WL 172200, at []17-[]19, ___ So.2d ___, ___-___ (Ala.Cr.App.Ct. July 24, 1992); Jennings v. State, 453 So.2d 1109, 1113-14 (Fla. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 470 U.S. 1002, 105 S.Ct. 1351, 84 L.Ed.2d 374 (1985); People v. Henderson, 142 Ill.2d 258, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 815-16, 568 N.E.2d 1234, 1264-65 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 233, 116 L.Ed.2d 189 (1991); State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 586 A.2d 85, 171 (1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 1306, 122 L.Ed.2d 694 (1993); Bell v. State, 724 S.W.2d 780, 802-03 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1046, 107 S.Ct. 910, 93 L.Ed.2d 860 (1987). The statements encouraged the jury to decide the case on emotion and ignore the court's instructions. The statements should have been stricken and followed with corrective jury instructions. Because there were no objections, however, we again look for fundamental error. The cases cited above, under their facts, found that improper references to victim's rights did not result in reversible error. See McNair, 1992 WL 172200, at []19, ___ So.2d at ___; Jennings, 453 So.2d at 1113-14; Henderson, 154 Ill.Dec. at 815-16, 568 N.E.2d at 1264-65; Marshall, 586 A.2d at 171; Bell, 724 S.W.2d at 803. In this case, the preliminary and final jury instructions focused the relevant inquiry and helped ensure that Defendant received a fair trial. These instructions, coupled with the strength of the evidence against Defendant, show that Defendant was not denied a fair trial. See State v. Slemmer, 170 Ariz. 174, 178, 823 P.2d 41, 45 (1991); Cook, 170 Ariz. at 50, 821 P.2d at 741. Thus, the victim's rights statements did not constitute fundamental error in this case. O. Death sentence issues In sentencing Defendant on the murder conviction, the trial court found three aggravating circumstances: 1) that Defendant previously had been convicted of felonies involving the use or threat of violence; 2) that he committed the murder in an especially cruel manner; and 3) that he was an adult and the victim was less than fifteen years of age. Finding that no mitigating circumstances outweighed these aggravating circumstances, the court sentenced Defendant to death. Defendant makes several challenges to the imposition of the death penalty. [W]e must review carefully and with consistency death penalty cases and not engage in a `cursory' or `rubber stamp' type of review. State v. Watson, 129 Ariz. 60, 63, 628 P.2d 943, 946 (1981). We independently search the record to determine whether the death sentence is appropriate. See State v. Lopez, 174 Ariz. 131, 153, 847 P.2d 1078, 1090 (1992). In making our independent review, we obey the principle that the Eighth Amendment requires the State to `channel the sentencer's discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.' Arave v. Creech, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 1534, 1540, 123 L.Ed.2d 188 (1993) (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 774, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3099, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990)). We also bear in mind that Arizona's system of capital sentencing must perform a genuine, narrowing function. It is not enough that an aggravating circumstance is determinate; the sentencing scheme must `genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty.' Creech, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1542 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983)). Thus, aggravating circumstances must enable our trial judges to distinguish those who deserve capital punishment from those who do not ... [and] must provide a principled basis for doing so. Creech, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1542. 1. Aggravating circumstances
Defendant claims the court erred in finding that his 1981 convictions for kidnapping and sexual assault were felonies involving the use or threat of violence on another person. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). If, under the statutory definition of the crime, the defendant could commit or be convicted of the crime without the use or threat of violence, the prior conviction cannot qualify as a statutory aggravating circumstance. State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 549, 804 P.2d 72, 82 (1990); accord Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 333, 819 P.2d at 919. The State initially asks that we overrule Fierro and Schaaf. We decline to do so and reaffirm their rule. See Schaaf, 169 Ariz. at 333, 819 P.2d at 919 (refusing similar request to overrule State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985)). The State concedes, and we find, that kidnapping under A.R.S. § 13-1304(A) may be committed without the use or threat of violence. See A.R.S. § 13-1301(2). Thus, we turn to the sexual assault conviction. In 1981, sexual assault was defined as intentionally or knowingly engaging in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person not his or her spouse without consent of such person. A.R.S. § 13-1406(A). Although without consent included use or threats of force, A.R.S. § 13-1401(5)(a), it also included intentionally deceiving a victim, A.R.S. §§ 13-1401(5)(c), (d). Furthermore, a victim was incapable of valid consent by reason of mental disorder, drugs, alcohol, sleep or any other similar impairment. A.R.S. § 13-1401(5)(b). Thus, neither the use nor the threat of violence was a necessary element for sexual assault. As a result, the trial court erred by relying on the 1981 kidnapping and sexual assault convictions in finding an aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2).
Defendant argues that the prosecutor did not show that the murder was especially cruel. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). [41] To properly find cruelty, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was conscious and suffered pain or distress at the time of the offense. State v. Jimenez, 165 Ariz. 444, 453, 799 P.2d 785, 794 (1990). The pain or distress may be mental or physical. See State v. Hinchey, 165 Ariz. 432, 438, 799 P.2d 352, 358 (1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 963, 111 S.Ct. 1589, 113 L.Ed.2d 653 (1991); State v. Libberton, 141 Ariz. 132, 139, 685 P.2d 1284, 1291 (1984). If the evidence of consciousness is inconclusive, no cruelty has been shown. See State v. Medrano, 173 Ariz. 393, 397, 844 P.2d 560, 564 (1992). The trial court found that the victim suffered both physical and mental pain prior to death. The State's medical expert could not say that the victim was conscious during or after any of the blows to her head. Thus, this evidence cannot support a cruelty finding. See Jimenez, 165 Ariz. at 454, 799 P.2d at 795. Other facts do support the finding. The victim's clothes were removed intact, without being torn or cut, thus indicating her hands were tied after she was naked. The fact that her hands were bound indicates that she was conscious and tied-up to prevent struggling. There would be no need to bind an unconscious victim. Her hands were bound tightly, leaving indentations on her wrists observable more than three weeks later. Reasonable inferences from this evidence are that the victim was alive, conscious, and stripped before she was bound and that she was conscious when bound. This evidence strongly supports a finding that a conscious nine-year-old victim suffered physical and, even more, mental anguish before being killed. Obviously, the victim would have been terrified. Nor can it be argued that the mental and physical pain inflicted was unforeseen or fortuitous. Thus, we find that the killing was especially cruel. See Roscoe, 145 Ariz. at 226, 700 P.2d at 1326; cf. State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 285, 645 P.2d 784, 800 (1982) (There was no evidence of suffering by the guards. The autopsy revealed no evidence that they had been bound or injured prior to being placed in the water.).
There is no question about the third aggravating circumstance. When the victim was killed, she was less than fifteen years old and Defendant was an adult. Thus, the A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(9) aggravating circumstance was present. See State v. Stanley, 167 Ariz. 519, 528, 809 P.2d 944, 953, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 660, 116 L.Ed.2d 751 (1991). 2. Mitigating circumstances Defendant argues that the trial court erred in considering mitigating evidence. Specifically, Defendant claims that the court improperly rejected four mitigating circumstances: 1. Defendant's ability to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired; 2. Defendant was intoxicated and suffering from withdrawal symptoms at the time of the offense; 3. Defendant's difficult family history; and 4. Defendant's substantial family support. We consider Defendant's claims in turn. The trial court must consider the factors in A.R.S. § 13-703(G) as well as any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether a sentence less severe than death is appropriate. State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 169, 823 P.2d 22, 36 (1992) (citing cases). Defendant must prove factors supporting mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Brewer, 170 Ariz. 486, 504, 826 P.2d 783, 801, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 206, 121 L.Ed.2d 147 (1992). We independently examine the mitigating evidence to determine whether the death sentence is justified. Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 551-52, 804 P.2d at 84-85. The one statutory mitigating factor argued by Defendant is that his capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). Defendant argues that his substance abuse contributed to the offense and is a mitigating circumstance. Defendant's medical expert indicated that absent drug consumption and withdrawal symptoms, it was less likely that Defendant would have killed and that addiction and withdrawal made it more difficult for him to conform to the requirements of law. Other testimony indicated that Defendant had a history of drug use and that, absent drug use, he is a caring person. Defendant's expert admitted that the drug history he relied on came largely from Defendant. This expert had reservations about Defendant's truthfulness regarding his criminal activities and admitted that nothing indicated Defendant was unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions. Although Defendant claimed to have been deprived of alcohol and drugs for several days before the murder, his expert admitted that Defendant had been drinking during that time period. Furthermore, when arrested, the GMC Defendant was driving contained eighteen full mini-bottles of vodka. There was no evidence Defendant was suffering from alcohol deprivation. Nor does the record support a claim that Defendant was intoxicated when the offense was committed; testimony indicated that he acted normally both before and after his arrest. There is no evidence that Defendant used drugs or, absent the two empty 50-milliliter vodka bottles, consumed alcohol the day of the murder. In sum, there is little evidence supporting Defendant's mitigation claim under A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). On this record we find no substantial impairment of Defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. See, e.g., Stanley, 167 Ariz. at 528-31, 809 P.2d at 953-56; State v. Wallace, 160 Ariz. 424, 426, 773 P.2d 983, 985 (1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1047, 110 S.Ct. 1513, 108 L.Ed.2d 649 (1990); Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. at 172-73, 624 P.2d at 850-51. Thus, Defendant did not establish the A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1) mitigating factor. We must now determine whether there is other mitigating evidence to weigh, even though it may not constitute an enumerated statutory mitigating factor. See State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 101-02, 664 P.2d 637, 645-46, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 858, 104 S.Ct. 180, 78 L.Ed.2d 161 (1983). As noted, there was no real evidence that Defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense. The evidence addressing historical familial abuse was marginal and equivocal as to its causal connection with the murder. Defendant's mother did not indicate that Defendant was abused or neglected when he was growing up, and Defendant made no showing that any difficult family history had anything to do with the murder, see Wallace, 160 Ariz. at 427, 773 P.2d at 986. Although Defendant's support and love for and by family and friends might have some mitigating force, it does not require a finding of mitigation sufficient to call for leniency. See State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 162, 692 P.2d 991, 1011 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L.Ed.2d 864 (1985). In sum, our independent review of the record shows no significant mitigating evidence. Cf. State v. Herrera, Jr. I, 176 Ariz. 21, 35, 859 P.2d 131, 145 (1993); Cook, 170 Ariz. at 64, 821 P.2d at 755. [42] P. Should this court reweigh or remand for resentencing? Having independently determined that one of the three aggravating circumstances found by the trial court does not exist, and that the trial court correctly characterized the lack of mitigating evidence, we must decide whether this court should reweigh to either affirm or reduce the death sentence or whether the case should be remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Our obligation is to independently decide whether the death sentence is appropriate. See Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 153, 847 P.2d at 1090; Watson, 129 Ariz. at 62-63, 628 P.2d at 945-46. We do so to ensure that the death penalty will not be imposed arbitrarily or on an aberrant basis and is reserved for truly exceptional cases, setting the defendant apart from others guilty of first degree murder and making death the appropriate sanction. See Creech, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1542; Stephens, 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. at 2742; State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 195-96, 560 P.2d 41, 50-51 (1976). In some cases, and this is one, we have found that the trial court erred in its conclusions regarding aggravating circumstances. See, e.g., Hinchey, 165 Ariz. at 440, 799 P.2d at 360; State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 116, 786 P.2d 959, 967 (1990); State v. Wallace, 151 Ariz. 362, 369, 728 P.2d 232, 239 (1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1011, 107 S.Ct. 3243, 97 L.Ed.2d 748 (1987). In other cases, we have found that the trial court incorrectly evaluated or failed to recognize important mitigating evidence. See, e.g., State v. Marlow, 163 Ariz. 65, 71-72, 786 P.2d 395, 401-02 (1989); State v. Rockwell, 161 Ariz. 5, 15-16, 775 P.2d 1069, 1079-80 (1989); State v. Stevens, 158 Ariz. 595, 599, 764 P.2d 724, 728 (1988). In such cases, our response has been more consistent in theory than in practice. See Karen L. Hinse, Note, Appellate Review of Death Sentences: An Analysis of the Impact of Clemons v. Mississippi in Arizona, 34 Ariz. L.Rev. 141, 157 (1992) (Hinse, 34 Ariz. L.Rev.). In Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution do not prevent a state supreme court, engaged in appellate review of a death sentence, from reweighing the evidence and affirming even though the court finds that the trial judge erred in the sentencing process. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748-49, 110 S.Ct. at 1448-49. Indeed, the United States Constitution allows state courts to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence at any stage of the proceeding. See Richmond v. Lewis, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). Although Clemons and Richmond state that the United States Constitution allows us to reweigh at the appellate level, they do not compel us to do so. See Clemons, 494 U.S. at 754, 110 S.Ct. at 1451. Both before and after Clemons, some states adopted a procedure of appellate reweighing for altered aggravation or mitigation findings. Compare Sellers v. Oklahoma, 809 P.2d 676, 691 (Okla. Crim.Ct.App.) (post- Clemons reweighing on appeal), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 310, 116 L.Ed.2d 252 (1991) with Stouffer v. State, 742 P.2d 562, 564 (Okla. Crim.Ct.App. 1987) (pre- Clemons reweighing on appeal), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1036, 108 S.Ct. 763, 98 L.Ed.2d 779 (1988); State v. Otey, 236 Neb. 915, 464 N.W.2d 352, 361 (post- Clemons reweighing on appeal in post-conviction relief case), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2279, 115 L.Ed.2d 965 (1991) with State v. Peery, 199 Neb. 656, 261 N.W.2d 95, 102 (1977) (pre- Clemons reweighing on appeal), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 882, 99 S.Ct. 220, 58 L.Ed.2d 194 (1978). In Arizona, however, even after Clemons, we have continued to focus on whether the record compels a particular finding in light of the correct assessment of mitigating and aggravating factors. Compare Medrano, 173 Ariz. at 398, 844 P.2d at 565 (Because one of the two statutory aggravating circumstances found by the trial court must be set aside, and we can only speculate whether the court would have found mitigation sufficient to overcome the single remaining aggravating circumstance, we remand for another hearing and resentencing.) with Robinson, 165 Ariz. at 60, 796 P.2d at 862 ([T]he elimination of one aggravating factor does not mandate a remand to the trial court for resentencing when the record compels a finding on the issue as a matter of law.). The State has urged this court to eliminate remands for resentencing and reweigh all cases as part of the review process. From an efficiency standpoint, this would be useful by saving time and expediting the process. Of more weight, perhaps, is the argument that remand for resentencing exposes survivors and members of the victim's family to additional emotional trauma. The State has argued that, if we find the trial court erred in sentencing, it would be better in some cases to reduce the sentence to life rather than remand for a new sentencing hearing. This may well be so, and we urge the State to be candid with this court when such issues arise in the future. Matters as important as life or death, however, cannot be decided by using efficiency and convenience as the best and only tests. Painstaking care and pursuit of accuracy and justice are much more desirable. Notwithstanding the trauma to surviving family members, there are cases in which remand is unavoidable. When additional evidence is available or required, that evidence must be presented to the trial court. This court has neither facilities for, nor any custom of, taking evidence, and we cannot decide questions of fact affecting the imposition of sentence by means of evidentiary affidavits. Cf. State v. Rumsey, 136 Ariz. 166, 168-75, 665 P.2d 48, 50-57 (1983) (discussing similarity between capital sentencing hearing and trial and finding that double jeopardy clause applies to sentencing), aff'd, Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). In any capital case where additional evidence is to be received, remand is required. [W]e perform as an appellate court, not as a trial court, Rumsey, 136 Ariz. at 173, 665 P.2d at 55, and we have repeatedly rejected the State's arguments to the contrary, see, e.g., Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 555, 804 P.2d at 88; Hinchey, 165 Ariz. at 440, 799 P.2d at 360; Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 516, 662 P.2d at 1023. Some cases will not require the submission of additional evidence but only the reweighing and balancing of the evidence. Many of these cases will involve situations in which the trial judge erred with respect to aggravating or mitigating circumstances and in which there is mitigating evidence of some weight. In these cases, too, remand for resentencing is the better rule. As the United States Supreme Court noted, we have an appellate task in reviewing death sentences and we have placed the sentencing authority in all criminal cases, and especially capital cases, with the trial judge. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 209-10, 104 S.Ct. at 2309. Law and policy would indicate that the trial judge should again make the [sentencing] determination. Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 516, 662 P.2d at 1023. There are important reasons for this procedural rule. First, this court's jurisdiction is appellate. Rumsey, 136 Ariz. at 173, 665 P.2d at 55. We have very limited original jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5, cls. 1-4. In capital cases on direct appeal, we review for error and to determine whether the penalty is appropriate. Even in those cases in which this court is the ultimate finder of fact, we proceed through a master, committee, or commission. See La Paz County v. Yuma County, 153 Ariz. 162, 163-64, 735 P.2d 772, 773-74 (1987); Ariz.R. Civ.P. 53; Ariz.R.Sup.Ct. 47, 48; Ariz.R.P.Comm.Jud.Conduct 11, 12. On appeal, in many cases it is simply impossible to determine how the trial judge  who heard the evidence and saw the witnesses  evaluated and weighed that evidence and testimony. Without these imperative determinations, the aggravating and mitigating factors cannot be balanced. See, e.g., Lopez, 174 Ariz. at 155-56, 847 P.2d at 1092-93 (Feldman, C.J., specially concurring). This is especially true because the trial judge is required by statute to consider at sentencing all evidence admitted at trial. A.R.S. § 13-703(C). Furthermore, the process of weighing is not scientific but, rather, inherently subjective. There is no mathematical formula to apply and none is required. Cf. Creech, ___ U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 1544. The weighing process conducted in sentencing contains no linear equation allowing us to determine, with much certainty, the effect an error may have had on the outcome. The sentencing statute provides that, following a first degree murder conviction, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered ... shall conduct [the] sentencing hearing. A.R.S. § 13-703(B) (emphasis added). The only exception to this mandate is when the trial judge dies, resigns, or is incapacitated or disqualified. Id. This directive certainly reflects a legislative desire that, when possible, the same judge who personally saw and heard all of the evidence must evaluate and weigh that evidence for sentencing. Even if this court could somehow recreate the many valuable intangibles accompanying live testimony, the practicalities of our docket do not allow us to do so. Although capital cases have a priority, the sheer volume of cases we must process each week, month, and year curtails our review process. The volume of other judicial work, as well as the voluminous nature of the record in capital cases (in this case more than 120 volumes of testimony and numerous exhibits and filings easily exceeding 15,000 pages) simply prevents each Justice of this court from making a personal, intensive, complete, and time-consuming study of the entire record of each case. This is not to imply that the record goes unreviewed. The court and its staff review and read every word of the record in each capital case. The evaluation of the facts of a case, however, is in part based on staff review of the record. Thus, in a practical sense, the trial judge is by far the best person to bear the responsibility for sentence imposition. Other than the defendant and the attorneys, the trial judge  the one individual who received every single exhibit and heard every word uttered in court  is by far a better tool of justice to determine the appropriate sentence. In addition, part of the rationale on which Clemons relied was the fact that reviewing courts usually conduct proportionality reviews and are therefore capable of providing individualized and reliable sentences. Clemons, 494 U.S. at 748-50, 110 S.Ct. at 1449; see also Hinse, 34 Ariz. L.Rev. at 152. This court, however, has concluded that proportionality reviews no longer should be a part of appellate review in capital cases. See Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 416-17, 844 P.2d at 583-84. Finally, as is often said, the death sentence is different from any other criminal penalty. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 294, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3012, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). No system based on human judgment is infallible. Thus, with the death penalty, we have taken, and should continue to take, the extra step  indeed walk the extra mile  to ensure fairness and accuracy in criminal cases. In light of the trial judge's unique familiarity with the facts of the case, remand is an extra step that should be taken in all but the rarest cases. In sum, we conclude that when new evidence must be received or reweighing and balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors and evidence are required, the best approach is our traditional method. The trial judge is in the best position to evaluate credibility and accuracy, as well as draw inferences, weigh, and balance. This, after all, is the careful method that we follow in civil appeals and, we believe, is even more appropriate in capital cases. Therefore, in those cases in which the trial judge has erred in the sentencing process and there is mitigating evidence of more than de minimis weight, we will remand unless the State concedes that sentence reduction is preferable to remand. With these principles in mind, we turn to the facts of the present case. The trial judge found three aggravating circumstances. We conclude that one of those was improperly found. Two aggravating circumstances, however, were correctly found. Furthermore, the trial judge properly found nothing of value by way of mitigation. Although Defendant's two previous convictions do not qualify as an aggravating circumstance, they certainly do not constitute mitigating evidence. From our review of the record, nothing submitted to the trial court qualifies as more than de minimis evidence of mitigation. We do not believe that Defendant's habitual drug use is of any value as mitigation in this case, given the fact that there was no evidence it significantly impaired his capacity to control his conduct on the day in question. There is simply nothing to weigh or balance in this case. Thus, in light of the unusual facts of this case, we are able to affirm the imposition of the death sentence even though we have found that one of the three aggravating circumstances was inapplicable. Q. Other issues Defendant raises a number of other issues, all of which we have considered. The analysis applicable to these issues does not merit express discussion in this long opinion. Thus, we reject these claims without express discussion. See State v. Gillies, 142 Ariz. 564, 573, 691 P.2d 655, 664 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1059, 105 S.Ct. 1775, 84 L.Ed.2d 834 (1985). DISPOSITION We have examined the record for fundamental error pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-4035 and have found none. Accordingly, we affirm Defendant's convictions and sentences. MOELLER, Vice C.J., and CORCORAN, ZLAKET and MARTONE, JJ., concur.