Opinion ID: 2276022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Court of Appeals Error

Text: The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the 1994 amendments to KRS 311.621-311.643, the Kentucky Living Will Directive Act, superseded the guidelines of this Court in DeGrella . The statutes in question were not a legislative response to DeGrella , but rather a departure from any reasonable application of that case. Although there are significant factual differences, it is clear that the DeGrella majority contemplated the situation involving Woods and other individuals similarly situated. DeGrella gave clear direction to those who would be involved in future decisions involving the right to nutrition and hydration to the effect that the right to live should be respected and upheld in the absence of clear and convincing evidence as to what the individual would choose to do. The opinion states in part: At the point where the withdrawal of life-prolonging medical treatment becomes solely another person's decision about the patient's quality of life, the individual's inalienable right to life, as so declared in the United States Declaration of Independence and protected by Section One (1) of our Kentucky Constitution, outweighs any consideration of the quality of the life, or the value of the life, at stake. Nothing in this Opinion should be construed as sanctioning or supporting euthanasia, or mercy killing. We do not approve permitting anyone to decide when another person should die on any basis other than clear and convincing evidence that the patient would choose to do so. DeGrella, 858 S.W.2d at 702. Here, there was no evidence presented as to the intent of Woods to his preference for the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. Every witness testified that they did not know his intentions and there was no record of his intentions. In DeGrella , the patient had made her medical desires known prior to becoming incompetent. Woods was never competent enough to make such a choice. He was entitled to the protection of the State or of his duly appointed guardian to protect his right to live. He was extremely vulnerable, unprotected against any termination of his medical treatment. Any deprivation of life is subject to strict scrutiny. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986) overruled on other grounds by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). Any state action in interfering with a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny. See City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). When the decision is between life and death, and the state is involved, the decision maker is limited to those options conforming to the constitutional preference for life over death. In civil matters, life must be chosen. Incompetent individuals retain a right to life pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Sections One and Two of the Kentucky Constitution. Cf. DeGrella .