Opinion ID: 848785
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tortious Interference With Business Expectations

Text: Although we maintain reservations about the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding the claim of tortious interference with business expectations, concerning the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and any market participant exception to that doctrine, we need not review those issues here. The trial court awarded damages for lost business profits under alternative theories of defamation and tortious interference with business expectations based on defamation. Attorneys fees were awarded pursuant to M.C.L. § 600.2911(7), which pertains to defamation actions. In light of our reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals regarding defamation and the resulting reinstatement of the trial court's decision on that claim, the full judgment amount awarded by the trial court to plaintiff is restored. Accordingly, our disposition of the remaining federal constitutional issues raised by the parties and decided by the Court of Appeals will not alter the ultimate resolution of this case. This Court will not unnecessarily decide constitutional issues, People v. Riley, 465 Mich. 442, 447, 636 N.W.2d 514 (2001), and it is an undisputed principle of judicial review that questions of constitutionality should not be decided if the case may be disposed of on other grounds. MacLean v. Michigan State Bd. of Control for Vocational Ed., 294 Mich. 45, 50, 292 N.W. 662 (1940). For these reasons, we decline to address the federal constitutional issues presented concerning the Noerr-Pennington doctrine and the suggested market participant exception to that doctrine. Although we question the analysis of the Court of Appeals regarding those issues, our resolution of the case makes it unnecessary for us to address them.