Opinion ID: 2045950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Refusal to Stay Arbitration.

Text: A. Finality of judgment. As an initial matter, we must consider Crisman's contention that an order denying a stay of arbitration requested pursuant to section 679A.2(2) is not a final and appealable order. In Wesley Retirement Services v. Hansen Lind Meyer, Inc., 594 N.W.2d 22, 27-29 (Iowa 1999), we held that an order granting a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration filed in a pending action was interlocutory. In that case, however, following the ruling, there remained an action in the district court that was not dismissed but only stayed as to certain counts. In contrast in the present case, the entire subject matter of the action was whether the arbitration should be stayed. The order denying the stay entirely disposed of that issue and left nothing further to be adjudicated. We conclude that the appeal has been properly taken from a final judgment. B. Issue preclusion in successive arbitrations. The thrust of Deerfield's contention on this appeal is that the district court should have stayed the second arbitration on the ground that it was precluded by the award in the first arbitration. We have recognized that arbitration awards may have preclusive effect in later litigation if the issues are identical. Westegard v. Davis County Community Sch. Dist., 580 N.W.2d 726, 728 (Iowa 1998). Courts in other jurisdictions have applied this principle to successive arbitrations. Monmouth Pub. Sch. v. Pullen, 141 Ill.App.3d 60, 95 Ill.Dec. 372, 489 N.E.2d 1100, 1103 (1985); Waterfront Marine Constr., Inc. v. North End 49ers Sandbridge Bulkhead Groups, A, B & C, 251 Va. 417, 468 S.E.2d 894, 898-900 (1996). We agree that it should be so applied. In interpreting statutes similar to our section 679A.2(2), the courts in the Monmouth Public Schools and Waterfront Marine cases concluded that in the absence of an agreement that the arbitrator is to decide issues of arbitrability, all such issues including issue-preclusion claims are to be determined by the court. Pullen, 95 Ill.Dec. 372, 489 N.E.2d at 1103-05; Waterfront Marine, 468 S.E.2d at 903. The evidence presented to the district court on the issue-preclusion contentions included an affidavit by Crisman's project manager that he was involved in the arbitration, and when the issue of the concrete repair came up, Deerfield's representative, Steve Bitzer, agreed that Deerfield would repair the damaged area thus removing that item from the list of disputed matters. Contained in the record of the arbitration is the following colloquy: MR. LANE [Crisman's attorney]: Sir, let me ask a question just about that. Is Deerfield claiming that this problem, the rough service in the lumberyard, is not their responsibility, and they're not going to fix it? MR. STEVE BITZER: No. MR. LANE: If that's true and you're going to fix it, we don't care, and we don't have to spend time now addressing it. We believe that the record adequately supports the district court's finding that the concrete repair involved in the second request for arbitration was not an element of the award in the earlier arbitration. We also believe that the district court correctly found that the roof warranty was not involved in the earlier arbitration as a disputed item. Deerfield has at no time provided any reason concerning why its contractual obligation to provide that warranty is excused. The time for providing the warranty was not ripe at the time of the earlier arbitration. No persuasive reason appears for finding that the absence of a roof warranty was a matter that would have been considered at that time. We conclude that the judgment in No. 98-1272 should be affirmed.