Opinion ID: 420789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Refusal to Remand.

Text: 15 We consider first the district court's denial of Lewis's motion to remand the case to state court because of the presence of Lucky Stores and the unserved Does as defendants. The district court found a near certainty that joinder was fraudulent. It held that that possibility, plus general first amendment concerns, demanded that it retain jurisdiction. It left open the possibility of remand if plaintiff can demonstrate at any time prior to trial that a bona fide claim has been stated against Lucky, or that facts exist which raise a real possibility of liability. 83 F.R.D. at 466. Lewis never made such a showing, and did not serve any other defendant Does. He did not seek interlocutory appeal of the denial of his motion to remand. 16 Lewis cites numerous cases to the effect that federal courts should remand to state court when there is the merest showing of a claim stated against a non-diverse defendant. His appeal fails, however, because after removal, when there is no appeal of a denial of a remand motion and the case is tried on the merits, the issue on appeal is whether the federal court would have had jurisdiction had the case been filed in federal court in the posture it had at the time of the entry of the final judgment. Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 1972, 405 U.S. 699, 702, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 1347, 31 L.Ed.2d 612; Sheeran v. General Electric Co., 9 Cir., 1979, 593 F.2d 93, 97-98. See Libhart v. Santa Monica Dairy Co., 9 Cir., 1979, 592 F.2d 1062, 1066 (dictum); J. Moore, B. Ringle & J. Wicker, 1A Moore's Federal Practice p 0.157 [11.-3] (1983 ed.). Here, when the final judgment was entered, only TIME, a non-California corporation, remained as a defendant. Thus, diversity jurisdiction existed at that time. 17