Opinion ID: 2582129
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Retroactive Application of Adkins to Semancik

Text: Because our decision establishes a new rule, we must consider whether to apply it retroactively to Semancik. We consider three factors when deciding whether to apply a new rule retroactively or prospectively: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule; (2) the extent of reliance on the old rule; and (3) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new rule. [43] The new rule's purpose, the first factor in the test for retroactivity, is to conserve justice system resources by preventing the reversal of a conviction due to a technical defect in the indictment when the defect is challenged for the first time on appeal. Application of the new rule to Semancik promotes this policy. The second factor, the extent of reliance on the old rule, supports retroactive application. While it is true that a defendant may have relied on the old rule, realizing that an indictment was defective prior to trial but waiting until the verdict before raising an objection to it, a defendant's ability to pull the ace from his sleeve [44] is not the type of reliance we want to encourage as a matter of policy. The third factor, the effect on the administration of justice, also supports retroactive application; the new rule will not burden the trial court, as it permits trial judges to correct technical defects prior to trial and prevents indictments from being challenged on this basis for the first time on appeal. Thus, all three factors favor application of our decision to Semancik. Because we are applying our decision retroactively we must also determine whether Semancik's rights were prejudiced due to lack of notice. Criminal Rule 7(c) confines the ability to challenge a judgment based on defects of form in an indictment to those defects that tend to prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant. [45] While Semancik points out that the prosecutor repeatedly referred to Semancik's intent to commit a crime without specifying the intended crime, the record suggests that Semancik was not prejudiced by the omission, and he fails to present any evidence to the contrary. Semancik was charged with seven counts of assault in the third degree along with his attempted burglary charge, providing Semancik with notice of the State's theory of the underlying crime and allowing Semancik to prepare his defense. [46] Moreover, Semancik's defense at trial was that he did not intend to commit any crime: In his closing, Semancik's attorney argued to the jury that [Semancik's] intent to get into the house was to go get his dog. That was his intent, not to commit a crime. Thus, there is no evidence that Semancik's substantial rights were prejudiced by the defect of form in the indictment.
Because we apply the new rule retroactively and because Semancik's rights were not prejudiced by the indictment, we REVERSE the court of appeals's decision.