Opinion ID: 4518285
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: R.E. 608(b) (2017) (emphasis added).

Text: 9 Before addressing whether the district court correctly applied I.R.E. 608(b), it is important to frame Hayes’ objection in the larger context of evidence law. It is well understood that all “relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise provided by the Idaho Rules of Evidence or other rules for the courts of Idaho.” State v. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 926, 354 P.3d 462, 488 (2015). The burden is on the opponent of the evidence to establish that relevant evidence is otherwise inadmissible. Soria v. Sierra Pac. Airlines, Inc., 111 Idaho 594, 617–18, 726 P.2d 706, 729–30 (1986) (“Having offered relevant evidence for a permissible purpose, the burden is on its opponent (not on the proponent) to show that prejudice will result from its admission.”). Further, I.R.E. 608(b) is a rule of inclusion, rather than an exclusionary rule. Thus, even if the district court did not apply I.R.E. 608(b) correctly, the evidence would still be admissible if it was relevant unless there is another rule that requires its exclusion. Here, the district court determined that the proffered cross-examination was relevant and not unfairly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403, and not improper character evidence under I.R.E. 404(b). Thus, even if Hayes shows error in the district court’s application of I.R.E. 608(b), he still must demonstrate that the district court’s I.R.E. 403 or 404(b) analysis was erroneous. Hayes does not challenge the district court’s ruling that I.R.E. 404(b) did not apply. Thus, Hayes waived this issue on appeal. See Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). Because Hayes failed to demonstrate an alternative basis to exclude the evidence on cross-examination, we cannot hold that the district court erred in allowing the questions on crossexamination. Turning to the district court’s application of I.R.E. 608(b), the rule allows a witness to be questioned about prior instances of conduct on cross-examination. I.R.E.608(b). However, the rule is clear that the inquiry is limited to “the character of the witness for truthfulness or untruthfulness.” Id. Here, Hayes contends that the specific instances of conduct raised on crossexamination were not relevant to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. The prior conduct, according to Hayes, had no probative value on his propensity to lie or his veracity. Rather, Hayes argues that the prior conduct contradicts his earlier testimony on crossexamination that he was always respectful to other guards and inmates. Essentially, Hayes argues that prior conduct exhibited a character trait of disrespect instead of character for untruthfulness. This Court has not specifically addressed whether extrinsic evidence demonstrating a contradiction in the witness’s testimony is probative to character for truthfulness or 10 untruthfulness. In analyzing what extrinsic evidence is probative of character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, Idaho precedent is inconsistent. See State v. Araiza, 124 Idaho 82, 90, 856 P.2d 872, 880 (1993) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding extrinsic evidence of a witness perjuring himself in a prior trial under I.R.E. 608(b)); see also State v. Bergerud, 155 Idaho 705, 710, 316 P.3d 117, 122 (Ct. App. 2013) (holding that extrinsic evidence of a witness lying to police in the past was probative of a witness’s character for untruthfulness under I.R.E. 608(b)). Some decisions appear to limit character of untruthfulness to past instances of lying. See Bergerud, 155 Idaho at 710, 316 P.3d at 122. Others appear to deviate from that standard. For example, in Araiza, this Court upheld a district court’s decision to prevent cross-examination of a prior instance of perjury at a previous trial. See Araiza, 124 Idaho at 90, 856 P.2d at 880. Further, in State v. Guinn, 114 Idaho 30, 39, 752 P.2d 632, 641 (Ct. App. 1988), the Court of Appeals refused to “set down a hard and fast rule of admissibility” between contradictory testimony and character for untruthfulness for I.R.E. 608(b). Id. Thus, some Idaho decisions consider extrinsic evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness to be prior conduct of lying or dishonesty, while others do not employ such a strict standard. However, Idaho case law distinguishes between evidence of character for untruthfulness and impeachment evidence. For example, in Pierson v. Brooks, 115 Idaho 529, 533, 768 P.2d 792, 796 (Ct. App. 1989), the Court of Appeals distinguishes between impeachment by contradiction and reputation and opinion evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Id. The court held that “cross-examination which attacks the witness’s testimony, but which contains no personal attack on the witness’s veracity, does not trigger a right to present opinion testimony on the witness’s character for truthfulness.” Other jurisdictions draw similar distinctions between evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness and impeaching a witness’s credibility through contradiction, bias, or undue influence. See Garner v. State, 264 P.3d 811, 817–18 (Wyo. 2011); State v. Corona, 436 P.3d 174, 179 (Utah Ct. App. 2018). Given that Idaho’s precedent on 608(b) is unclear, an examination of the rule’s federal counterpart is appropriate. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) is similar to Idaho’s rule. See Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). A leading commentator on the federal rules has explained that the rule allows evidence of a witness’ general character for veracity, not whether specific testimony is correct: 11 [I]t should be clear that ‘truthfulness or untruthfulness’ refers to the general character of the witness for veracity, not whether specific testimony of the witness is correct. Thus, evidence of witness conduct can be admitted under this provision only when it is probative of truthful or untruthful character. By the same token, evidence of specific instances which is not admissible under Rule 608(b) might still be admitted to impeach by contradiction, bias, or lack of capacity. 28 Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6118 (2d ed. 2019). Federal courts also consistently distinguish between impeachment by contradiction and evidence of a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. In United States v. Castillo, 181 F.3d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999), the Ninth Circuit held that “impeachment by contradiction is not governed by [Rule 608(b)].” Id. The Ninth Circuit further explained: Rule 608(b) prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence of conduct to impeach a witness’ credibility in terms of his general veracity. In contrast, the concept of impeachment by contradiction permits courts to admit extrinsic evidence that specific testimony is false, because contradicted [sic] by other evidence [of] direct examination testimony containing a broad disclaimer of misconduct sometimes can open the door for extrinsic evidence to contradict even though the contradictory evidence is otherwise inadmissible under Rules 404 and 608(b) and is, thus, collateral. Id. at 1132–33 (quoting 2A Charles A. Wright & Victor J. Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure § 6119 (1993)). Thus, the Ninth Circuit recognizes a distinction between evidence governed by Rule 608(b) and evidence offered to impeach by contradiction. Id. at 1133; see also United States v. Chu, 5 F.3d 1244, 1249 (9th Cir. 1993). The Ninth Circuit also views character of untruthfulness to be prior instances of lying or fraud. See United States v. Gay, 967 F.2d 322, 328 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Evidence of prior frauds is considered probative of the witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness.”). After examining this Court’s precedent and interpretations of the federal rules, we conclude that I.R.E. 608(b) applies to prior instances of conduct that bear on a witness’s character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. These situations are limited to prior instances where the witness lied, committed fraud, or otherwise acted untruthfully. See Wright § 6118. Further, 608(b) does not apply to admit evidence of impeachment by contradiction, which is distinguished from evidence of a witness’s character for untruthfulness. See Pierson, 115 Idaho at 533, 768 P.2d at 796; see also Castillo, 181 F.3d at 1132. Here, the prior instances of Hayes’ conduct elicited on cross-examination were not probative to his character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. None of the prior instances of 12 conduct placed his veracity in question. In other words, none of the prior instances pertained to a situation in which Hayes lied, perjured himself, or acted dishonestly. Instead, the instances of conduct depicted Hayes as aggressive, disrespectful, and threatening towards correctional officers and fellow inmates. For example, the prior instances of conduct involve Hayes threatening an officer, saying that he was going to knock her through a wall, and yelling a racial slur at another inmate. Thus, these instances are not probative of Hayes’ character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. Instead, the prior instances of conduct are evidence of impeachment by contradiction. Rather than demonstrate character of truthfulness or untruthfulness, the evidence of prior conduct directly contradicts statements that Hayes made on the witness stand that he was always respectful of guards and other inmates. Thus, the district court misapplied I.R.E. 608(b) in allowing the state to inquire into Hayes’ prior instances of conduct. Despite the district court’s misapplication of I.R.E. 608(b), the evidence was still admissible. After examining the record, the prior instances of conduct were admissible evidence of impeachment by contradiction. When the district court ruled on the prior instances of conduct, it rejected Hayes’ objections on based on I.R.E. 403 and 404(b). The district court found that the evidence was relevant and probative to Hayes’ credibility, and that it was not unfairly prejudicial under I.R.E. 403. All relevant evidence is admissible, unless otherwise provided by the I.R.E. or other Idaho court rules. Ehrlick, 158 Idaho at 926, 354 P.3d at 488. Hayes bore the burden of establishing that the relevant evidence was otherwise inadmissible. Soria, 111 Idaho at 617–18, 726 P.2d at 729–30. Hayes failed to meet that burden. The district court rejected Hayes’ two bases for exclusion: I.R.E. 403 and I.R.E. 404(b). Thus, despite the district court’s incorrect application of I.R.E. 608(b), the evidence of Hayes’ prior conduct was nonetheless admissible. Idaho Rule of Evidence 607 states that “[a]ny party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s credibility.” I.R.E. 607. The State had no burden to demonstrate that the relevant evidence was admissible. Soria, 111 Idaho at 617–18, 726 P.2d at 729–30. Rather, Hayes bore the burden to oppose the evidence and provide a basis for exclusion. As explained below, Hayes’ alternative basis for exclusion—I.R.E. 403—also fails. Thus, the prior conduct was admissible to attack Hayes’ credibility through impeachment by contradiction. Hayes argues that the State failed to raise I.R.E. 607 as grounds for admission at trial. Hayes argues that the State cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the evidence would be 13 admissible under I.R.E. 607. We disagree. At trial, the burden was on Hayes to exclude the evidence, not on the State to provide a basis for admission. Thus, the State’s failure to raise I.R.E. 607 at trial does not change the analysis here. Accordingly, Hayes’ prior instances of conduct were admissible as impeachment evidence despite the district court’s improper application of I.R.E. 608(b). 2. Hayes’ Rule 403 challenge. Alternatively, Hayes argues that district court abused its discretion in finding that his prior instances of conduct were not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under I.R.E. 403. Hayes asserts that the evidence was “extremely prejudicial and far outweighed” any probative value to his character for truthfulness. We disagree. When the district court considered this evidence at Hayes’ trial, I.R.E. 403 provided: “Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”