Opinion ID: 1115370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Necessity of Imposing Restrictions

Text: We turn next to the necessity of imposing the restrictions of Proposition 140 on the dual rights at issue here (see Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at pp. 789-790 [75 L.Ed.2d at pp. 558-559]). Petitioners contend that a lifetime ban on candidacy was unnecessary, and that other less drastic alternatives, such as a limitation on consecutive terms, together with additional restrictions on campaign contributions to legislators, decreased fringe and pension benefits, and additional incentives for early retirement, would have been sufficient to promote and accomplish the state interests previously discussed. As will appear, we conclude that the less drastic alternatives suggested by petitioners would have been inadequate to accomplish the declared purpose of Proposition 140 to eliminate the class of career politicians that assertedly had been created by virtue of the unfair incumbent advantages referred to in that measure. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5.) Respondents stress the substantial advantages incumbent legislators enjoy in this state, advantages that permitted 92 percent of all incumbents to win reelection at this state's November 1990 General Election. Indeed, respondents note that nine of these incumbents ran unopposed. Respondents seem correct in this regard. Whether by reason of superior fund raising ability, greater media coverage, larger and more experienced staffs, greater name recognition among the voters, favorably drawn voting districts, or other factors, incumbents do indeed appear to enjoy considerable advantages over other candidates. (See Service Employees v. Fair Political Practices (E.D.Cal. 1990) 747 F. Supp. 580, 588; Watson v. Fair Political Practices Com. (1990) 217 Cal. App.3d 1059, 1074 [266 Cal. Rptr. 408], & fn. 13.) As Proposition 140's introductory statement indicates, the framers of the measure believed these substantial advantages of incumbency were unfair to other candidates and tended to create a class of career politicians, instead of the citizen representatives envisioned by the Founding Fathers. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.5.) Petitioners suggest that a more reasonable alternative existed to the measure's lifetime ban: disqualification of the incumbent for the forthcoming term, thus forcing the legislator to take one term off, before being eligible to run for the body. Yet, as respondents observe, the framers reasonably could conclude that a lifetime ban was necessary to assure that a former officeholder could not reinvoke at least some of the advantages of incumbency to gain reelection after leaving office for a term or more. Additionally, we believe the framers might well have reasonably concluded that a mere ban on consecutive terms could encourage popular career politicians to trade terms with each other, or to attempt to arrange for a caretaker candidate, such as a spouse or relative, to hold office for them during the interrupted term. For example, when in 1966 George Wallace became legally ineligible to run for reelection as Governor of Alabama because of state term limitations applicable to that office, his wife, Lurleen, successfully ran in his place, and served as Governor until her death in 1968. George Wallace was reelected as Governor in 1970 and again in 1974. (See 12 The New Encyclopedia Britannica, Micropaedia (15th ed. 1990) Wallace, George C., at p. 467.) Realistically, only a lifetime ban could protect against various kinds of continued exploitation of the advantages of incumbency captured through past terms in office. The remainder of petitioners' suggested alternatives essentially involve narrow changes in the system of providing contributions or compensation for legislators, changes that would afford career politicians with independent resources little incentive to voluntarily terminate public service.