Opinion ID: 2584145
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the supreme court has inherent constitutional authority to stay the death penalty in this case

Text: {19} The New Mexico Constitution vests judicial power in the courts of this state. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 1. This power has been interpreted as granting courts the inherent power to exercise authority essential to their function and management of their caseloads. State v. Gonzales, 2002-NMCA-071, ¶¶ 21-22, 132 N.M. 420, 49 P.3d 681. An essential function of the courts is to serve as the ultimate guardians of an indigent defendant's constitutional rights. State v. Brown, 2006-NMSC-023, ¶ 23, 139 N.M. 466, 134 P.3d 753. As guardians of the constitution, we must enforce the rights guaranteed by the constitution and further the intent of its provisions. State ex rel. Udall v. Pub. Employees Ret. Bd., 120 N.M. 786, 793, 907 P.2d 190, 197 (1995). {20} We have previously exercised our broad authority to enforce constitutional rights by ordering that indigent defendants represented by pro bono counsel are entitled to apply for and receive expert witness fees from the Public Defender Department. Brown, 2006-NMSC-023, ¶ 25, 139 N.M. 466, 134 P.3d 753. In State ex rel. CYFD v. Kathleen D.C., 2007-NMSC-018, ¶ 16, 141 N.M. 535, 157 P.3d 714, we held that an indigent parent is entitled to the appointment of an expert witness at the State's expense in an abuse and neglect proceeding. {21} Although we have not considered whether low compensation of attorneys in capital cases is unconstitutional, other states have addressed the subject, in both capital and non-capital cases, with varying remedies. Some courts have ordered additional compensation. See, e.g., White v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Pinellas County, 537 So.2d 1376 (Fla.1989); Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So.2d 1109 (Fla.1986); People ex rel. Conn v. Randolph, 35 Ill.2d 24, 219 N.E.2d 337 (1966); N.Y. County Lawyers' Ass'n v. State, 196 Misc.2d 761, 763 N.Y.S.2d 397 (Sup.Ct.2003); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla.1990); Bailey v. State, 309 S.C. 455, 424 S.E.2d 503 (1992). Others have threatened to dismiss the charges. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 442 Mass. 228, 812 N.E.2d 895 (2004); State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo.1981). Yet others have stayed the prosecutions. State v. Citizen, 898 So.2d 325 (La.2005). Proactive steps may be necessary when the present compensation scheme raises serious concerns about whether [the defendants] will ultimately receive the effective assistance of trial counsel. Lavallee, 812 N.E.2d at 904; State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, 159 W.Va. 805, 227 S.E.2d 314, 323 (1976). Some of these courts applied their decisions only to their specific cases, while others set new state-wide standards. Common among these decisions, however, is the courts' exercise of inherent authority to ensure that indigent defendants receive constitutionally adequate assistance of counsel. See, e.g., Citizen, 898 So.2d at 336. {22} In the present case, the defendants have suggested three remedies. First, defendants ask that counsel be allowed to withdraw. Although it was appropriate for these attorneys to seek permission to withdraw because the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden, the trial court could not grant permission because withdrawal would have material adverse effect on the interests of the client. Rule 16-116(B)(5) NMRA. As noted, this case has been pending for several years, and the attorneys have interviewed dozens of witnesses and reviewed thousands of pages of documents. The prosecution itself has spent considerable resources on this case. It would be detrimental to the interests of the defendants and of the system of justice to permit the attorneys to withdraw, leaving it for new counsel to learn the details of this complex case from the beginning. Moreover, the evidence is undisputed that, despite good faith efforts, the PD has not been able to find substitute counsel. {23} The second remedy urged by defendants is to require the PD to compensate counsel at a reasonable hourly rate. At present, the PD has funding to pay each defense team an additional $100,000 plus the offered contractual amendments. This amount remains inadequate. Defense counsel represented to this Court that an additional $200,000 per defense team, in addition to the $870,000 in costs and offered contractual amendments, would suffice to reasonably compensate defense counsel through the conclusion of these capital cases. The legislature, for reasons that are unknown, declined to appropriate $200,000 per defense team. It may very well be that the legislature decided to appropriate $100,000 without prejudice to the PD's right to seek an additional $100,000 as the case approached a conclusion. Nevertheless, in our judgment, the amount requested by defendants will avert a constitutional challenge to the effectiveness of their counsel based on inadequacy of resources. {24} We acknowledge the importance of the legislature's role in this case. The legislature appropriated $100,000 per defense team for these cases in 2005. While this is an important first step, the two defense teams before us have represented, without contradiction, that they require an additional $200,000, or $100,000 per team, payable at $75.00 per hour, to adequately represent their clients through the end of these cases if they are tried as death penalty cases. As a result, we conclude that this additional money is essential to protect defendants' constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel so long as the State continues to pursue the death penalty. Based on the current funding scheme, this $200,000 must come from legislative appropriations. Although defendants have asked that we dismiss the death penalty in this case, we believe the more prudent course is to stay the death penalty, affording the PD an opportunity to pursue supplemental funding. Therefore, unless and until such amount is made available by the PD, pursuit of the death penalty against defendants Young and Lopez by the State is stayed. {25} We acknowledge that staying the death penalty, rather than dismissing it, may affect defendants' right to a speedy trial if the death penalty is reinstated after a delay in appropriating the additional funds. Determination of when the delay will become prejudicial is necessarily imprecise and `dependent upon the peculiar circumstances of the case.' State v. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 56, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (quoting Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-31, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)); see also State v. Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028, ¶ 8, 121 N.M. 798, 918 P.2d 714 (defining the balancing test for evaluating speedy-trial claims). This is a question best left initially to the trial court. Coffin, 1999-NMSC-038, ¶ 56, 128 N.M. 192, 991 P.2d 477 (citing Manzanares, 1996-NMSC-028, ¶ 9, 121 N.M. 798, 918 P.2d 714). {26} If the State is able to obtain the requisite funding as outlined herein, each defense team will be paid at a rate of $75.00 per hour per attorney, not to exceed $200,000 per team, plus the previously offered contractual amendments of $27,000 for each first-chair attorney and $12,500 for each second-chair attorney. Should the State be unable to obtain the requisite funding as outlined herein, then each defense team will be paid at the same rate, not to exceed $100,000 plus the offered contractual amendments. We note that defense counsel has conceded that this amount will be sufficient to reasonably compensate them for the defense of all pending charges, provided the death penalty is no longer available. To receive payment, counsel must submit time sheets or invoices to the Public Defender Department to support the number of hours reasonably spent on the defense. Because counsel have not received payment since termination of the original contract on November 1, 2003, counsel may submit requests for payment retroactive to that date.