Opinion ID: 2508037
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hearsay Evidence of Lourdes's Identification of Defendant

Text: Over defendant's hearsay objection, the trial court permitted Sergeant Twiford to give the following testimony concerning Lourdes's identification of defendant just after the crimes occurred. Twiford was the first police officer to arrive at the crime scene. He observed a male comforting Lourdes, who had what appeared to be gunshot wounds to the face and chest and looked like she was going to lapse into unconsciousness or else going to die right on the spot. Twiford approached and asked Lourdes who did it. She responded by identifying three individuals: Shawn Berry, Michael Berry and a male Negro by the name of Jesse. [6] The court permitted Twiford's testimony on the ground that Lourdes's statements were admissible under Evidence Code section 1240 as spontaneous statements. On appeal, defendant renews his contention that Lourdes's statement of names to Twiford as to who did it constituted inadmissible hearsay. The erroneous admission of this hearsay, he argues, requires reversal of both his conviction and death sentence because, had that hearsay not been admitted, it is reasonably probable he would have garnered a more favorable result. To qualify for admission under the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule, an utterance must first purport to describe or explain an act or condition perceived by the declarant. (Evid.Code, § 1240, subd. (a).) Secondly, the statement must be made spontaneously, while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by the perception. ( Id., subd. (b).) ( People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 901, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940 ( Farmer ), disapproved on other grounds in People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724, fn. 6, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) For purposes of the exception, a statement may qualify as spontaneous if it is undertaken without deliberation or reflection. (See Farmer, supra, at p. 903, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940.) Although we have acknowledged that responses to detailed questioning are likely to lack spontaneity, we also have recognized that an answer to a simple inquiry may be spontaneous. ( Id. at p. 904, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940, citing cases.) The trial court must consider each fact pattern on its own merits and is vested with reasonable discretion in the matter. ( Id. at p. 904, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940.) Defendant argues that [a]lthough the fact Lourdes had just been shot would support a finding that the statement was sufficiently `spontaneous' and `excited' to satisfy the requirements of [Evidence Code] section 1240, subdivision (b)[,] the problem here is that a statement identifying someone in response to a police officer's question is not a statement `narrating,' `describing,' or `explaining' anything. Moreover, even if it were a statement describing a person by virtue of providing a name rather than a physical description, a person is not an `act, condition, or event.' We disagree. Lourdes's spontaneous statement of names as to who did it described the event she perceived, that is, she saw Shawn Berry, Michael Berry and a male Negro by the name of Jesse participate in the crimes in her house on the date in question. Contrary to defendant's assertions, courts have found or recognized that statements purporting to name or otherwise identify the perpetrator of a crime may be admissible where the declarant was the victim of the crime and made the identifying remarks while under the stress of excitement caused by experiencing the crime. (See, e.g., Farmer, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 904-905, 254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940 [statements of shooting victim in response to questioning of police dispatcher and officer at the scene helped describe the crime by identifying the perpetrator]; People v. Anthony O. (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 428, 433, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 794 [seconds after shooting, victim stated to police officer, `I just been shot. You got the wrong car. It was Sharky from El Sereno.']; In re Damon H. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 471, 474, 476, 211 Cal.Rptr. 623 [in response to his mother's question why his buttocks hurt, crying minor stated, `[b]ecause Damon put his weenie in my butt']; People v. Jones (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 653, 659-662, 202 Cal.Rptr. 289 [when a treating physician asked a burn victim, 30-40 minutes after his injury, what had happened, victim responded that the person `I live with threw gasoline on me'].) Defendant's efforts to distinguish the circumstances here  on the basis that Lourdes not only described defendant generally as a male Negro but also identified him specifically by his first name  are without merit. Moreover, where the spontaneous declarant is available as a witness, as Lourdes was here, the existence and truth of the declaration may be explored in an examination under oath. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 150, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) Finally, defendant's position is not aided by People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388 ( Hines ), which concluded that the trial court there should have excluded the testimony of Jiy Williams that he asked Donna Roberts (the crime victim) over the telephone, `Who is there in the house with you?' ( Hines, supra, at p. 1035, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) The trial court there, however, had found inadmissible Williams's testimony that Roberts had answered his question with the statement that the defendant was at the house. (See id. at p. 1034, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Given the trial court's decision barring admission of Roberts's answer, Hines observed that [t]he mere fact that Williams asked the question was irrelevant, and telling the jury he had done so might have led it to speculate that Donna Roberts had answered by telling Williams that defendant was present. ( Id. at p. 1035, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388) Hines's conclusion regarding the irrelevant nature of Williams's inquiry to Roberts has no bearing on the legal issue here; indeed, neither side in that case had even argued the spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule to the trial court. [7] In closing, we note defendant does not contend that the trial court's evidentiary ruling violated his federal constitutional right to confront a witness against him. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 [holding that out-of-court statements by witnesses in response to police questioning are testimonial and therefore barred under the federal confrontation clause, unless such witnesses are unavailable and the defendants had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them].) Nor could he successfully do so, in any event. ( Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1369, fn. 9 [when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements].)