Opinion ID: 709549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Language of Sec. 9604

Text: 24
25 Plaintiffs appropriately begin their analysis with the language of the statute. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 559, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2547, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988) (instructing that in applying statutes courts should turn first to the language and structure of the relevant statute); Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984 F.2d 1015, 1019 (9th Cir.) (applying rule to interpretation of CERCLA), cert. dismissed, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 652, 126 L.Ed.2d 609 (1993). Plaintiffs note that Congress instructed the ATSDR to effectuate and implement the health related authorities  of CERCLA. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(1) (emphasis added). The HDC argues that when Congress characterized the ATSDR's responsibilities as health related authorities, it meant to distinguish them from Sec. 9604 response authorities. Thus, the HDC concludes, because ATSDR activities are distinguished from response authorities, and response authorities are defined as removal or remedial actions, ATSDR activities are not removal or remedial actions. 26 Plaintiffs' reading of the statute impermissibly isolates and extracts statutory language that must be read in context. Indeed, [w]hen we look to the plain language of a statute in order to interpret its meaning, we do more than view words or sub-sections in isolation. We derive meaning from context, and this requires reading the relevant statutory provisions as a whole. In re Rufener Constr., Inc., 53 F.3d 1064, 1067 (9th Cir.1995). Part of that context is the title of the section in which the relevant language appears. See Greyhound Corp. v. United States, 495 F.2d 863, 868 (9th Cir.1974) (noting that statutory titles can be very useful tool[s] in resolving the ambiguity); see also Oregon Pub. Util. Comm'n v. I.C.C., 979 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir.1992) (noting that although section title may not control the plain meaning of a statute, the title can be used to resolve ambiguity); United States v. Cha, 837 F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir.1988) (same). 27 In this case, the language cited by plaintiffs appears within Sec. 9604, which is entitled [r]esponse authorities. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604. Thus, Congress characterized the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance authorities found in Sec. 9604 as both response authorities and as health related authorities. We now turn to a discussion of congressional intent. 28 Reading the Sec. 9604 health related authorities language cited by plaintiffs in conjunction with Sec. 9604's heading rather than in isolation indicates that, at the very least, Congress did not intend to distinguish ATSDR activities from other CERCLA response authorities. There is no indication that Congress' characterization of ATSDR authorities as health related was intended to render the Sec. 9604 response authorities section heading superfluous as to ATSDR actions. Instead, the most natural reading of the two statutory provisions is that the ATSDR's health related authorities are, in effect, a subset of a broader set of CERCLA response authorities. Thus, because Congress gave no indication that the universe of CERCLA response authorities cannot include both the health and non-health related activities found in Sec. 9604, we begin with the presumption that Congress did not intend to nullify Sec. 9604's response authorities heading by describing the ATSDR's authorities as health related. 29 This presumption is strengthened here because the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance actions are not the only health related authorities found within Sec. 9604. Indeed, Congress not only included provisions relating to the public health in other Sec. 9604 subsections, but also specifically characterized actions taken to effectuate other public health authorities as response measures. In Sec. 9604(a)(1), Congress provided that the President may take any other response measure ... necessary to protect the public health or welfare or environment. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(a)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(b)(1) (authorizing President to begin health assessment and surveillance activities whenever President believes public health is threatened). Thus, Congress clearly did not believe actions taken to secure the public health were different in kind from response authorities contained in Sec. 9604. Rather, Congress envisioned situations in which the President would have to take response measure[s], which would almost certainly include health assessment and surveillance activity, to protect the public health. 8 In sum, we find that Congress' single reference to ATSDR authorities as health related should be read narrowly as a means to distinguish between different types of response authorities, rather than interpreted broadly as an effort to differentiate ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activity from response actions protected by the Timing of Review provision. 30 However, we do not hold that all CERCLA activities found under Sec. 9604's response authorities heading are per se removal or remedial actions for purposes of CERCLA's Timing of Review provision. In some instances, giving Sec. 9604's response authorities heading binding effect would be inconsistent with Sec. 9601's definition of removal or remedial action, or would conflict with CERCLA's remedial purposes. 9 Moreover, the application of a provision stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction must rest on more than the thin reed of a section heading. Accordingly, we turn to an examination of whether the ATSDR's health assessment and surveillance activities, which are presumptively response authorities by virtue of their position within Sec. 9604, independently satisfy CERCLA's definition of removal or remedial activity.b. ATSDR Activities and the Definition of Removal Action 10 31 CERCLA defines removal actions as measures necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances ... or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(23). We hold that the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities at Hanford satisfy the definition of removal action. 32 A plain reading of the statute supports the conclusion that the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities at issue in this case fall within the statutory definition of removal actions. Removal action under the statute includes those activities that are deemed necessary to prevent hazardous releases from adversely affecting the public health. The ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities challenged by the HDC, in turn, are a necessary part of the government's efforts to safeguard the public health at NPL sites. The ATSDR is responsible not only for assessing whether the health surveillance program sought by the HDC is appropriate at Hanford, but also must coordinate its efforts with other federal agencies to facilitate a cleanup that most effectively protects the health of those exposed to hazardous materials. The ATSDR's involvement at Hanford is mandated by CERCLA, and no other federal agency is responsible for evaluating what action should be taken in response to the historical releases of radioactive iodine at Hanford. The ATSDR, in short, is an integral part of Congress' effort to protect the health of those exposed to hazardous releases from facilities listed on the NPL. 33 We have held, however, that the definition of removal does not encompass all activity related to protecting the public health from hazardous releases. In Durfey v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours Co., 59 F.3d 121 (9th Cir.1995), and Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011 (9th Cir.1994), we held that private party medical monitoring activities, initiated and coordinated independently of ongoing CERCLA cleanup efforts, were not Sec. 9601 removal or remedial actions. 11 In each case, we held that excluding private medical monitoring programs from CERCLA's definition of removal actions was appropriate for two reasons. 12 First, we distinguished private medical monitoring programs from the five examples of removal actions provided by Congress in Sec. 9601(23), noting that those examples principally concern the threats posed by the physical removal of hazardous waste rather than medical monitoring of the long-term health effects of past hazardous releases. See Durfey, 59 F.3d at 125 (quoting Price ). Second, we determined that the relevant legislative history evinced a clear congressional intent to exclude private medical monitoring activity from CERCLA. See id. 34 The reasoning in Durfey and Price does not apply to health assessment and surveillance actions engaged in by a governmental agency pursuant to explicit CERCLA provisions. A careful examination of the specific examples of removal actions provided by Congress convinces us that ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities are within the scope of Sec. 9601(23). 13 Among the examples of removal action cited in the statute is any action taken under section 9604(b). 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9601(23). Section 9604(b), in turn, provides that the President may act whenever there is reason to believe that 35 a release has occurred ..., or that illness, disease, or complaints thereof may be attributable to exposure to a hazardous substance ... he may undertake such investigations, monitoring, surveys, testing, and other information gathering as he may deem necessary or appropriate to identify ... the extent of danger to the public health or welfare. 36 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(b)(1). This example of removal activity differs from the ATSDR's health related authorities in only one notable respect: the President rather than the ATSDR is taking the action. Even if we felt this difference was material, which we do not, it is significantly diminished because the President subsequently delegated these functions to the ATSDR. See Exec.Order No. 12580, Sec. 2(a), 52 Fed.Reg. 2923 (Jan. 23, 1987), amended by Exec.Order No. 12777, Sec. 1(a), 56 Fed.Reg. 54757 (Oct. 18, 1991), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9615 (Historical and Statutory Notes). 14 Furthermore, the President was not the first to recognize the functional link between the President's health related authorities and the activities of the ATSDR. Congress provided in Sec. 9604(i) that: 37 [I]f a health assessment or other study carried out [by the ATSDR] contains a finding that the exposure concerned presents a significant risk to human health, the President shall take such steps as may be necessary to reduce such exposure and eliminate or substantially mitigate the significant risk to human health. 38 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9604(i)(11). 39 Clearly, Congress did not believe that health assessment and surveillance activity pursued as part of the government's response to past or present hazardous releases fell outside the statute's definition of removal action. Rather, by explicitly including the President's Sec. 9604(b)(1) health related responsibilities within the scope of Sec. 9601(23), Congress demonstrated that it considered identifying and ameliorating the public health effects of hazardous releases to be among CERCLA's core removal functions. Moreover, because the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities are inextricably linked to the President's responsibilities by both executive order and the plain language of Sec. 9604(i)(11) we hold that the ATSDR's health assessment and surveillance authorities also satisfy Sec. 9601(23)'s definition of removal action. 40 Our interpretation of the scope of CERCLA removal actions is rooted in the distinction Congress drew between public and private efforts to monitor the public health. Congress expanded the role of the ATSDR as part of the 1986 Amendments to CERCLA specifically to address concerns that the original Act had not done enough to monitor, assess, and evaluate the public health effects of hazardous releases: 41 During the reauthorization debates that resulted in the passage of the SARA amendments to CERCLA, one prominent issue addressed by Congress was the need to better define the health risks presented by hazardous waste sites. There was substantial sentiment in both houses of Congress that inadequate attention had been given to the health effects of contaminants found at Superfund sites, as well as the risks to local residents posed by hazardous waste sites. To remedy the perceived inadequacies of the 1980 enactment, Congress created an expanded role for the [ATSDR] to provide medical examinations and testing of exposed individuals. 42 Ambrogi v. Gould, Inc., 750 F.Supp. 1233, 1249 (M.D.Pa.1990); see also 4 William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law: Hazardous Wastes and Substances, Sec. 8.2, at 482 (1992) (noting that ATSDR health assessment provisions were meant to address the failure of the original Act to adequately protect the public health). Congress clearly did not believe when it amended CERCLA in 1986 that the activities of the ATSDR bore an insignificant relationship to the physical cleanup of CERCLA sites. Rather, Congress meant to codify its understanding, gained through six years of experience with the operation of CERCLA, that Superfund removal and remedial activity must include an effective public health component. 43 Congress' decision to expand the role government health assessment and surveillance activity would play at CERCLA sites stands in stark contrast to Congress' treatment of private medical monitoring programs. As we noted in both Durfey and Price, Congress intentionally deleted all personal rights to recovery of medical expenses from CERCLA. Durfey, 59 F.3d at 125 (quoting Price, 39 F.3d at 1017 (quoting Daigle v. Shell Oil, 972 F.2d 1527, 1536-37 (10th Cir.1992))); see also Daigle, 972 F.2d at 1537 (The deleted provisions, however, dealt with a personal right of recovery for medical expenses, not the comprehensive ATSDR health assessment procedures enacted under the 1986 SARA Amendments.). Congress omitted the recovery of private medical monitoring costs from CERCLA based on a determination that CERCLA was not a proper vehicle for facilitating either private medical monitoring efforts or the toxic tort actions that often accompany such efforts. See Ambrogi, 750 F.Supp. at 1238 (In passing [CERCLA] ... Congress did not intend to make injured parties whole or to create a general vehicle for toxic tort actions.). 44 We believe the language of CERCLA, supported by a close examination of the relevant legislative history, establishes that the ATSDR health assessment and surveillance activities at NPL sites are removal actions, and thus are eligible for Sec. 9613(h)'s jurisdictional protection.