Opinion ID: 805822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transfer Alert: Who Owns the Copyright?

Text: The cornerstone of the Archbishop's argument is that the Monastery's works are in fact owned by a third party, ROCOR. The Archbishop argues that the Monastery was once a part of ROCOR and its secession in 1986 had the effect of transferring its copyrights in the Works to ROCOR. There are two ways under governing law by which a transfer of copyright may be effectuated. The first manner is by an instrument of conveyance, or a note or memorandum of the transfer, [that] is in writing and signed by the owner of the rights conveyed or such owner's duly authorized agent. 17 U.S.C. § 204(a). The Archbishop does not allege, nor does the record reveal, any writing or instrument by the Monastery showing such an intent to transfer ownership of the Works' copyrights to ROCOR or another entity. Because there is no signed writing or instrument establishing a transfer of copyright to ROCOR, we turn to the second means of copyright transfer, i.e., by operation of law, with the governing law in this case being the Monastic Statutes for Monasteries of ROCOR (the Monastic States) and the Regulations of ROCOR (the Regulations). -14- The Archbishop rests the yoke of his persuasive burden on this latter means of copyright transfer. Specifically, he contends a transfer by operation of law occurred here because, pursuant to the Monastic Statutes (to which all member monasteries must agree on joining ROCOR) the Monastery expressly accepted that if it ever ceased to be a ROCOR monastery, all of its property would transfer to ROCOR. The Archbishop cites to the following language from the Monastic Statutes for support: The articles of incorporation of the monastery, convent or community must make it clear that it will always be in the jurisdiction of the Synod of Bishops of [ROCOR] and that, in case of its closing or liquidation, its possessions will be handed over to the diocese subject to the Synod of Bishops of [ROCOR], or directly to the Synod of Bishops. (Emphasis added.) The Archbishop's argument leads us into a desert of case law on the issue of copyright transfers by operation of law. See Taylor Corp. v. Four Seasons Greetings, LLC, 403 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir. 2005) ([T]he Copyright Act does not define the phrase 'by operation of law,' and sparse case law addresses the transfer of copyright by operation of law.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Valdez v. Laffey Assocs., No. 07-CV-4566 (BMC)(LB), 2010 WL 1221404, at  (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2010) (noting sparsity of case law on transfer of copyright ownership by operation of law); Brooks v. Bates, 781 F. Supp. 202, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same). Indeed, -15- not even the Copyright Act defines what constitutes a transfer by operation of law. See Taylor, 403 F.3d at 963. The few cases addressing this question generally concern a transfer by operation of state law, with the transfers at issue typically arising from a corporate merger or dissolution, bankruptcy, foreclosure, and the like. See id. at 963-64; Valdez, 2010 WL 1221404, at . Such cases also focus on whether the author of the transfer provided express or implied consent to such change of ownership. Taylor, 403 F.3d at 963; Brooks, 781 F. Supp. at 205 (stating transfers of copyrights by operation of law . . . depend upon circumstances which establish the author's express or implied consent); see also Time, Inc. v. Kastner, 972 F. Supp. 236, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Thus, a transfer by operation of law is a voluntary transfer done on the part of the copyright owner to another. See Advance Magazine Publishers, Inc. v. Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 636 (D. Md. 2006) ([T]ransfers by operation of law are expressly limited to voluntary transfers, except in bankruptcy proceedings.). The Archbishop's argument differs from the few cases that address transfers of copyright ownership by operation of law. To begin with, the underlying law which the Archbishop asks us to interpret and apply -- ROCOR's Monastic Statutes and Regulations -- contrasts with the aforementioned cases in which state law predominantly served as the guiding light. -16- Generally, the Supreme Court has cautioned that where parties seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts[,] there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709 (1976); see also Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church et al., 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (If civil courts undertake to resolve [church property litigation disputes triggering religious doctrine and practice] . . . the hazards are ever present . . . of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.). Against this concern must be weighed the obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979). The Supreme Court often has echoed that civil courts may resolve church property disputes, so long as [such resolution] involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith. Id. (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)). Where such resolution is possible, the Supreme Court has advocated a neutral principles of law approach, developed for use in all property disputes. Presbyterian Church, -17- 393 U.S. at 449; see also Jones, 443 U.S. at 603; Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 368-70 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). A review of the record confirms that we may apply the Monastic Statutes' plain terms without treading upon religious doctrine, church governance, and ecclesiastical laws -- territory that the Supreme Court has made clear lies beyond our civil court jurisdiction. The specific section of the Monastic Statutes that the Archbishop asks us to apply provides in part: The articles of incorporation of the monastery [here, appellee] . . . must make it clear that it will always be [under ROCOR] jurisdiction . . . and that, in case of its closing or liquidation, its possessions will be handed over to the diocese . . . . Neutrally applying this plain language, we conclude that the Archbishop's position as to ROCOR's ownership holds little water. We first examine the Monastic Statute language to which the Archbishop expressly directs us. We split the statutory language in two and turn first to its requirement that a monastery's articles of incorporation clearly state ROCOR jurisdiction.
Monastery's Articles of Incorporation Expressly Affirm ROCOR Jurisdiction An examination of the Monastery's various articles of incorporation and by-laws9 does not show language to the effect 9 Most of the copies of the Monastery's by-laws and articles of incorporation in the record do not contain a date, making it -18- that, from the date of its spiritual affiliation onward, the Monastery would permanently be under ROCOR jurisdiction or that it agreed to have its property continually fall under ROCOR's dominion and control. In fact, a review of all such articles and by-laws reveals no reference whatsoever to ROCOR or to the entities' ecclesiastical affiliation. The same holds true for a review of the certificates of registration (dating from 1986, the year the Monastery ceased its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR, on through 1997) for each of the respective Works. Each certificate expressly lists under Name of Author, Holy Transfiguration Monastery, with no mention of or reference to ROCOR. The absence of a clear or implicit agreement on the Monastery's part (whether in its articles of incorporation, by-laws, the Works' certificates of registration, or otherwise) to be permanently bound by ROCOR statutory law or to relinquish title in its property to ROCOR does not constitute the type of express or implied consent to transfer copyright ownership that courts have held sufficient to support the finding of a transfer by operation of law. Valdez, 2010 WL 1221404, at ; see also Taylor, 403 F.3d at 963.
Closing or Liquidation, the Monastery's Possessions Cede to ROCOR unclear as to how recent or old the various versions are and where they fall in relation to the period of the Monastery's spiritual affiliation with ROCOR. -19- The Archbishop argues that when the Monastery ceased commemorating the bishops of ROCOR, this act constituted a closing or liquidation under the statutes, and thus, all of the Monastery's ownership claims and property interests were transferred to ROCOR. The Archbishop likens the Monastery's termination of ecclesiastical affiliation to a corporate dissolution, merger, bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or the like, the latter of which courts have held may indicate a transfer of copyright by operation of law. Cf. Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Program Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718, 719, 721 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding transfer of copyright by operation of law where corporation merged into another, leaving one surviving company that then transferred copyright to subsidiary); U.S. Home Corp. v. R.A. Kot Homes, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 971, 976 (D. Minn. 2008) (similar); Fantasy, Inc. v. Fogerty, 664 F. Supp. 1345, 1356 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (concluding copyright transfer occurred where assets from dissolving corporation were transferred to sole shareholder). In contrast to these cases -- and even more telling, in contrast to the specific language of the statute -- the Monastery here continued to exist after it terminated its commemoration of the ROCOR bishops; it did not close, liquidate, dissolve, merge into another religious institution, or otherwise discontinue its existence. Instead, it continued to operate as it had prior to its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR, as an independent monastery. The -20- express terms of the Monastic Statutes are clear: in case of [a monastery's] closing or liquidation, its possessions will be handed over to the diocese (emphasis added). Because the Monastery never closed, liquidated, or otherwise ceased its existence, no such hand[ing] over of its possessions to ROCOR could have taken place, unless it authorized otherwise. And as we have explained, we find no such authorization or agreement in the record.
Monastic Statutes Lastly, immediately preceding the statutory language referenced and discussed above, the statute states that [t]he possessions of a monastery, convent or community are its property and registered in its name, which is why each monastery, convent and community must take steps to become incorporated as an entity (emphasis added). Reading this language, it seems clear that a monastery, on joining ROCOR, remains the owner of its possessions unless and until it becomes incorporated as an entity of ROCOR. Stated differently, if a monastery never so incorporates itself as dictated by the Monastic Statutes, its possessions will remain under the monastery's domain. Notably, a review of the record reveals no such incorporation on the part of the Monastery. The most the evidence shows is that the Monastery was founded in 1960 independently of ROCOR -- i.e., not at the order or request of ROCOR -- and incorporated in Massachusetts as a non-profit corporation on -21- January 12, 1961, before its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR. In 1965, the Monastery commenced its spiritual affiliation with ROCOR, but the only act it seems to have taken reflecting such an affiliation (the Archbishop pointing us to no contradictory evidence) is acceptance of an antimension,10 which the Monastery returned when it discontinued its affiliation with ROCOR. We are far from being authorities as to the weight the giving of an antimension to another religious body might hold under church law and offer no ruminations on the matter. But a review of the evidence reveals no other act or document confirming that the Monastery reincorporated itself under ROCOR law. The giving of a consecrated cloth does not, under civil law, ring of the type of alteration in corporate structure that a transfer in authority over the Monastery's possessions may properly be deemed to have occurred. In sum, with no evidence in the record showing a transfer of copyright ownership by operation of law, we hold that the Monastery, and not ROCOR, holds title to the copyrights at issue in this dispute.