Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transfer to Placerville for trial.

Text: Appellant contends variously that the transfer of his trial from South Lake Tahoe to Placerville was unauthorized, denied him the right to trial in the vicinage in which the crime was committed, and denied him the right to a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of that area, both in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He also claims that the jury selection procedures denied him certain statutory rights. Although the South Lake Tahoe area is only 50 to 60 miles from the county seat in Placerville, the El Dorado Superior Court has sessions in South Lake Tahoe for actions arising in the Tahoe area and in Placerville for actions arising in the Western Slope of the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The division facilitates a continuity of proceedings during the winter months when snow, ice, and related road closures make transportation from the Tahoe region to Placerville difficult. Code of Civil Procedure section 199 accommodates that division, providing that in El Dorado County, jury venires for the superior court shall be drawn from residents of the supervisorial district, or a portion thereof, within which the court will sit for such trial and from residents of such other immediately adjacent supervisorial district or portion thereof, as may be specified by local superior court rules. Such veniremen shall serve the court sitting in the geographic portion of the county from which this section and such court rules specify trial jury venires shall be drawn, provided that such rules shall afford to each eligible resident of such county an opportunity for selection as a trial jury venireman. Such court may, in its discretion, order a countywide venire in the interest of justice. Appellant was tried before Judge Finney, who regularly sat in the South Lake Tahoe session of the court. Pretrial proceedings were conducted in South Lake Tahoe. From the outset of those proceedings Judge Finney expressed concern that extensive publicity threatened appellant's right to a fair trial. That concern arose well before the trial itself began. After the magistrate denied a defense motion to close the preliminary hearing and seal the reporter's transcript thereof, the defense sought a writ of mandate in the El Dorado County Superior Court. Judge Finney directed issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate granting the relief sought by the defense. He found a substantial likelihood that the defendant's right to a fair trial would be prejudiced if closure were not ordered and found that alternatives to closure would not protect his rights. In so doing the judge observed that there had been numerous reports about the case on radio and television, as well as in major newspapers and the local newspapers that were relied on by the community as credible news sources. The South Lake Tahoe area from which a jury panel would be summoned had a population under 40,000 people. That, in addition to the fact that the victims were local and sympathetic, the defendant had no substantial ties to the community, and the nature of the anticipated evidence created a substantial likelihood and probably a virtual certainty that a fair and unbiased jury could not be picked in the community unless the court acted to protect the defendant's right to a fair trial in the vicinage. Notwithstanding the concern appellant expressed at this stage of the proceedings, and his subsequent motion to close all hearings on suppression motions [9] he did not seek, and consistently opposed, changing the location of the trial to Placerville. Counsel explained that, notwithstanding the poisoned community at South Lake Tahoe, they believed that Placerville was a very conservative community and, all things considered, they thought it might be more advantageous to try the case in South Lake Tahoe. The trial venue was first discussed on January 7, 1988, when the prosecutor suggested that the court have defense counsel place on the record the reason no request for change of venue to another county or to move the trial over the hill to Placerville was made. The prosecutor was concerned that there might later be a claim of error or of incompetent counsel if this were not done and suggested that he need not be present and the record could be sealed to avoid revelation of defense tactics. Defense counsel stated that the matter could be discussed in chambers. [10] The District Attorney of El Dorado County then expressed concern in a letter to defense counsel dated February 16, 1988, with a copy to Judge Finney, that the case was scheduled for trial at the South Lake Tahoe session. He noted that there had been extensive publicity in the South Lake Tahoe area and that many witnesses were from that community. It would be difficult for jurors to avoid contact with the witnesses or other improper influence. The district attorney offered to confer with defense counsel. On March 4, 1988, Judge Fogerty, apparently the administrative presiding judge in Placerville, ordered the case transferred to the Placerville session of the court for further proceedings. Notwithstanding that order Judge Finney continued to conduct pretrial proceedings in South Lake Tahoe. On March 11, 1988, Judge Finney continued the trial date to a later Placerville session. Defense counsel objected to the transfer and the parties were permitted to submit briefs on the transfer question. The district attorney, by letter citing People v. Jones (1973) 9 Cal.3d 546, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705, expressed concern that, unless the defendant consented, the transfer would violate the defendant's right to a jury of the vicinage since juries drawn to serve in the Placerville sessionexcluded residents of the South Lake Tahoe area. The district attorney noted, however, that Jones suggested that if a jury is drawn from the entire county the vicinage requirement is satisfied. Judge Fogerty then advised counsel for defendant that he did not believe the defendant could receive a fair trial in South Lake Tahoe because of the extensive publicity, that he was ordering a countywide venire for jury selection, and that he had ordered that all pretrial proceedings be heard before Judge Finney at the South Lake Tahoe session of the court. Appellant opposed the transfer by motion for reconsideration of the March 4 transfer order. He argued that the transfer denied him equal protection of the law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution as he was the only criminal defendant alleged to have committed a crime in South Lake Tahoe to be forced to undergo trial in Placerville with a jury drawn from the entire county since the South Lake Tahoe session began in 1977. He also claimed denial of his right to be tried by a jury drawn from and comprising a representative cross-section of the community. Because many South Lake Tahoe residents had been exposed to the extensive publicity, they would face obstacles to jury service not shared by residents of other parts of the county. They would also face the hardship of daily travel of at least 130 miles over the Sierra Nevada Mountains for three months in order to serve in Placerville, all of which would result in a jury panel that would be inordinately underrepresentative of the South Lake Tahoe community, denying defendant the right to be tried by a jury comprising a cross-section of the community. At this point the district attorney opposed the motion for reconsideration, observing that Code of Civil Procedure former section 206c (Stats.1977, ch. 229, § 1, p. 1026, now Code Civ. Proc., § 199), permitted countywide trial jury venires. He argued that the countywide venire satisfied constitutional vicinage and district concerns and that O'Hare v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 86, 233 Cal.Rptr. 332, 729 P.2d 766, and People v. Jones, supra, 9 Cal.3d 546, 108 Cal.Rptr. 345, 510 P.2d 705, were dispositive. On April 14, 1988, the court indicated that defense counsel had explained in chambers that the process to determine if a fair trial could be had in South Lake Tahoe. Judge Finney denied reconsideration of the transfer order and directed the jury commissioner to prepare a panel of 300 prospective jurors randomly selected from the entire county. [11] Judge Fogerty offered to try the case or to have someone cover his court if Judge Finney elected to try it. The trial was held in Placerville with Judge Finney presiding. Appellant moved to quash the jury venire when only 30 of the 300 prospective jurors in the first two panels were from the Lake Valley Judicial District that encompasses the Lake Tahoe area. An evidentiary hearing on the issue of random selection was held on June 27, 1988. [12] Appellant offered evidence that there were 72,000 names on the source list from which jury venires were selected, of which 19,000 persons were Tahoe area residents. In selecting potential jurors for this trial, 6,000 persons were excluded because their names had appeared on other venires during the past year. Of those excluded persons, 3,000 were from the Tahoe area and were excluded even though they were not ineligible to serve. Of the 2,061 persons selected in the computer run, 502 had Tahoe area ZIP codes, and 1,559 had ZIP Codes from the Western Slope. Responses to questionnaires sent to those persons totaled 339 from the Tahoe area and 1,235 from the Western Slope. After reviewing the questionnaires as they came in and eliminating the persons who were ineligible to serve, the jury commissioner placed them in a stack as they came in and used the first 300, in three groups of 90 and one of 30, to create four panels for this trial. [13] Of the 90 persons in the first panel, 5 were from the Tahoe area. Of the 90 persons in the second panel, 21 were from the Tahoe area. The third panel of 90 included 12 persons from the Tahoe area; the 30-member fourth panel had no one from the Tahoe area. Appellant also offered testimony by an expert in mathematics and statistics that one would expect that a random sample of the entire county would produce 80 persons from the Tahoe area, based on 19,000 potential jurors in the Tahoe area and 52,700 others, or 26.7 percent from the Tahoe area. Excluding the 3,000 names from each area that had been dropped, a random selection should produce 74 prospective jurors from the Tahoe area. Even considering only those from the Tahoe area who responded to the jury questionnaire, one would expect 64.6 panelists from the Lake Tahoe area in a random selection. After considering that a higher number of Tahoe area persons was excused by the jury commissioner than Western Slope persons, the witness concluded that there was one chance in 800 that the selection process was random. The witness acknowledged that the disparity might be attributable to the manner in which the names were selected from the questionnaires as they were received, those from the Placerville area being received earlier, and might be affected by the percentage of Tahoe area persons excused by the jury commissioner because they were ineligible to serve as jurors or had another excuse. [14] From a mathematical viewpoint, because persons from the Tahoe area do not respond as quickly as those on the Western Slope, the expert did not consider the method by which jurors were selected for this trial to be an appropriate means by which to achieve randomness. Appellant argued that the evidence established that the venire did not include a representative cross-section of the Tahoe area population. He acknowledged being unable to demonstrate that the disproportionate number of hardship excuses granted persons from that area was improper. Ultimately, the only defect in the selection procedure identified was use of the first 300 questionnaires returned from the 2,000-plus source list to which they had been mailed as the venire. That, counsel argued, was not a random sample. Judge Finney was not persuaded. He noted that the questionnaires were returned by individuals acting independently, whenever the individuals decided to fill them in and mail them, and they had been stacked as they came in. That, he reasoned was probably as random as you can get. The judge also concluded that appellant's real complaint was not about randomness, but lack of representation from the vicinage. Defense counsel insisted that the motion to quash was based on both grounds. The court rejected this challenge to the venire pretrial and again posttrial when offered as one basis for a motion for new trial. [15] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, grants a criminal defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law. When the Legislature has specified a county as a judicial district, a jury drawn from an entire county satisfies the vicinage right that is thereby guaranteed. ( Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713, 717, 263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547.) As we explained in Hernandez: Vicinage and cross-section representation are guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Although sometimes erroneously used interchangeably, vicinage and cross-section representation are discrete principles of criminal jury trials. The right to cross-section representation is a demographic requirement, which assures a criminal defendant a trial by a jury selected without systematic or intentional exclusion of cognizable economic, social, religious, racial, political and geographical groups. [Citations.] It is designed to protect the right to be tried by an impartial jury. [Citations.] [¶] The vicinage right is a geographic requirement. It is the right of a criminal defendant to be tried by a jury drawn from the area in which the crime occurred. [Citation.] It is unrelated to the ideal of impartiality [citation] and has nothing to do with the defendant's place of residence. Although the vicinage right is assertable by a defendant in a criminal trial, in the present day criminal justice system the vicinage requirement also protects the right of the offended community to pass judgment in criminal matters. ( Hernandez v. Municipal Court, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 716, fn. 1, 263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547.) There is no merit in appellant's contention that the judicial district in which these offenses were committed was the supervisorial district from which the jury venire was drawn for the South Lake Tahoe session of the superior court. The Legislature may determine the size of the area from which a jury may be drawn by establishing judicial districts. At the time of appellant's offenses in 1987, as now, El Dorado County had only one judicial district  the entire county. The Legislature had not authorized division of the county into smaller districts, and based on population, such division was impermissible. (Gov.Code, §§ 69640-69650.) [16] Thus, for vicinage purposes, the entire county was the district previously ascertained by law within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The designation of a South Lake Tahoe session, or sitting of the court, could not change that controlling law. Although Government Code section 69751.5 authorizes the establishment of superior court sessions in cities more than 30 miles from the county courthouse if the city has a population exceeding 7,000 persons, designating a session of the superior court does not change the district for purposes of vicinage. In fact, the only reference to district in the superior court rule that established the South Lake Tahoe session was in a provision making the boundaries for the session identical to the boundaries of the municipal court district then in effect. (Super.Ct. El Dorado County, Local Rules, former rule No. 1, pt. 3; see now id., rule 2.00.09 [South Lake Tahoe session to hear actions arising in South Lake Tahoe Area, as defined].) [17] Appellant was accorded a jury drawn from the vicinage in which his crimes were committed. Neither the Sixth Amendment nor the California statutory scheme for jury selection was violated by the countywide draw. We also reject appellant's claims that he was not tried by a jury selected from a venire representing a fair cross-section of the community and that the jury selection process was not random. He argues that only 12.3 percent of the 300-person venire was from the South Lake Tahoe area and notes the testimony of his expert who opined that the disparity showed that the selection process was not random. He does not make any argument based on those asserted facts, however, but ultimately claims that trial before the wrong jury, a jury that had no residents of the South Lake Tahoe area, was structural error that requires per se reversal without a demonstration of prejudice. The evidence did not support these claims and no basis for reversal appears in the jury selection process. The jury was drawn from a panel selected randomly from the entire county. There was no systematic or intentional exclusion of jurors from the South Lake Tahoe area. We need not decide here whether the court erred in moving the trial to Placerville over the objection of defendant or whether the concerns of the prosecutor and judge that defendant might not receive a fair trial in South Lake Tahoe constituted good cause for the transfer within the meaning of the local rules of the El Dorado County Superior Court. [18] Defendant was tried in the district specified by the Legislature. The possible violation of a local rule is not a basis for reversal. Contrary to appellant's belief, the due process considerations upon which a criminal defendant's right to a hearing on the defendant's motion for a change of venue are founded (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 841; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 804, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865) have no applicability to assignments within judicial districts which may be made for administrative purposes or other good cause. Even assuming such a right, appellant was granted a full hearing on his motion for reconsideration of Judge Fogerty's order. We also reject defendant's claim that the transfer order denied him equal protection and resulted in cruel and unusual punishment. No imposition of punishment attends an order changing the location of a trial. It is true, as defendant argues, that under section 1033, subdivision (a), the trial of a defendant who objects may not be moved to another county. It does not follow, however, that a defendant who objects to trial within the district in which the charged offense occurred but in another city is denied equal protection as against a defendant objecting to transfer to another county. Defendants do not have the right to trial in a particular court within the district. The assignment of cases for trial is among the administrative responsibilities of the court. (See Gov. Code, § 69508; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 205.)