Opinion ID: 1142598
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of evidence against ufa

Text: UFA first contends that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support a verdict against it. It claims that two issues arise from this contention: first, whether the relationship of employer-employee actually existed between Anderson and UFA; and second, assuming an employment relationship did exist, whether Anderson's actions were within the authorized scope of such employment. With respect to the first issue, UFA takes the position that the evidence is not sufficient to establish an employer-employee relationship, but it is sufficient to prove that Anderson occupied the status of an independent contractor. This position is allegedly based upon the test articulated by this Court in Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton [3] for determining whether a person is an employer or an independent contractor: Speaking in generality: an employee is one who is hired and paid a salary, a wage, or at a fixed rate, to perform the employer's work as directed by the employer and who is subject to a comparatively high degree of control in performing those duties. In contrast, an independent contractor is one who is engaged to do some particular project or piece of work, usually for a set total sum, who may do the job in his own way, subject only to minimal restrictions or controls and is responsible only for its satisfactory completion. 538 P.2d at 318. UFA maintains that there is no evidence indicating that UFA had the right or ability to control or direct Anderson's work, while there is ample evidence indicating that Anderson's activities and conduct were completely unsupervised by UFA or its broker, Clan Stilson. On the basis of this evidence, UFA avers that Anderson fit the description of an independent contractor. [4] It is important to note that the question presented by this contention is not whether a relationship existed between Anderson and UFA. That a relationship of some fashion did in fact exist appears to have been established. The precise question here goes to the nature of the existing relationship, whether it be employer-employee or contractor-independent contractor. Although this question appears to be one of first impression in this state, it has been addressed in the recent past by the Supreme Court of the State of Alaska. In the case of Calvo v. Calhoon, [5] the Alaska court held: The Alaska statutory system governing real estate brokers and salespersons implies that the relationship is one of employer and employee. AS 08.88.171(c) states that a person must be employed by a real estate broker in order to be licensed as a real estate salesman. AS 08.88.331 further provides that [a] real estate salesman or associate real estate broker may make a real estate transaction only through the real estate broker who employs him. Thus, the resolution of various issues in this case are [sic] governed by principles of employer/employee relations... . 559 P.2d at 113, 114. We have reviewed this state's statutory system pertaining to real estate brokers and salespersons and find that it too contains numerous implications of an employer-employee relationship. U.C.A., 1953, § 61-2-3 defines a real estate salesman as any person employed or engaged by or on behalf of a licensed real estate broker... . Section 61-2-8, entitled Termination of Salesman's Employment,  contains the following language: When any real estate salesman shall be discharged or shall terminate his employment with the real estate broker by whom he is employed ... . Furthermore, § 61-2-10 states that [i]t shall be unlawful for any real estate salesman to accept a commission or valuable consideration ... from any person, except his employer, who must be a licensed real estate broker. [6] This latter provision implies that a real estate salesman must be in an employer-employee relationship with a licensed broker to receive compensation for his services. We therefore adopt Alaska's rule, as set forth supra, and in accordance therewith hold that the relationship between UFA and Anderson was one of employer and employee. Under the familiar doctrine of respondeat superior, UFA, as Anderson's employer, may be subject to liability for Anderson's tortious acts. This rule is stated thus: The well-settled general rule is that a principal [employer] is liable civilly for the tortious acts of his agent [employee] which are done within the course and scope of the agent's employment. [7] UFA's potential liability in this matter arises not only from its principal-agent (employer-employee) relationship with Anderson, but also from its principal-agent relationship with the plaintiff. As the listing broker of plaintiff's property, UFA became plaintiff's agent with respect to the sale of that property. Anderson's status in the relationship between UFA and plaintiff was that of a subagent. The liability of an agent for the acts of a subagent has been set forth as follows: Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is responsible to the principal for the conduct of a subservant or other subagent with reference to the principal's affairs entrusted to the subagent, as the agent is for his own conduct; and as to other matters, as a principal is for the conduct of a servant or other agent. [8] And further: An agent who employs a subagent is the latter's principal and is responsible ... to his principal for the subagent's derelictions. Thus, the agent is subject to liability to the principal for harm to the principal's property or business caused by the subagent's negligence or other wrong to the principal's interest... . [9] UFA's position with respect to the second issue arising under this point of the appeal is that even if the relationship between Anderson and UFA was one of employer and employee, Anderson's alleged tortious acts are not imputable to UFA because they were committed outside the course and scope of the agent's [Anderson's] employment, supra, and were done in furtherance of Anderson's own interests. [10] UFA alleges that the following evidence is supportive of its position: after the signing of the listing agreement (UFA concedes that it listed the subject property), neither UFA nor its broker had any involvement in the transaction; the earnest money agreement was not executed on UFA forms; UFA's attorney did not participate in the closing, nor any other stage of the subject transaction; and there were no seller's or buyer's statements furnished by UFA pursuant to its policies and procedures. In summary, UFA contends that Anderson's acts could not have been within the scope of his employment because they were in complete violation of UFA's established policies and practices. Plaintiff's position on this issue is that the facts and the evidence in this case clearly indicate that Anderson's tortious acts were committed within the scope of his employment. Such facts and evidence are: UFA, through its agent, Anderson, listed plaintiff's construction business (on a UFA listing agreement); Anderson signed the listing agreement as UFA's local representative; such listing agreement included plaintiff's house, which was to be sold together with the construction business; plaintiff's house was sold separately, and a commission thereon was split by Anderson and UFA; UFA, through Anderson, had previously listed and sold other properties (motel and office building) belonging to plaintiff, and had split sizable commissions resulting from such sales; UFA advertised the construction business in its national sales catalogue; Anderson at all times represented plaintiff's interests in this transaction, just as he had in previous transactions; and a $20,000 (ten percent) commission to which only UFA had a right, by virtue of its listing agreement, appeared on the closing statement prepared by Anderson and the purchasers. Under familiar rules of appellate review, we are constrained to view the evidence and all inferences that might reasonably be drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the judgment entered. [11] Furthermore, we will not overturn the trial court's judgment so long as it is supported by substantial evidence in the record. [12] In accordance with these review standards, it is our opinion that substantial evidence was adduced to establish that Anderson's acts were done within the course and scope of his employment. In light of our conclusions upon the issues of this first point of UFA's appeal, we hold that Anderson's tortious conduct, with respect to the sale of plaintiff's construction business, is imputable to UFA in its dual fiduciary capacity as Anderson's principal and plaintiff's agent.