Opinion ID: 1059424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: selective regulation of speech based upon content

Text: It is well established that non-verbal, symbolic expression is speech, and is as fully protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as more traditional means of communication. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969) (wearing of black arm bands by high school students as a protest against the war in Vietnam). However pernicious the expression may be, [i]f there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989). Any question about the constitutional infirmity of such selective proscription of speech was resolved by the United States Supreme Court in the case of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). The Virginia cross burning statute is analytically indistinguishable from the ordinance found unconstitutional in R.A.V. R.A.V. involved the prosecution of a teenager who, with several other minors, allegedly assembled a crudely made cross and burned the cross inside the fenced yard of a black family. Id. at 379, 112 S.Ct. 2538. The City of St. Paul prosecuted under its Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance, which provided: Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990). The trial court held that the statute was unconstitutional, but the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, construing the St. Paul ordinance as limited to conduct that amounts to fighting words, namely, conduct that itself inflicts injury or tends to incite immediate violence.... In re Welfare of R.A.V., 464 N.W.2d 507, 510 (Minn.1991). Accepting the limited construction placed upon the statute by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court held that, even if the expression reached by the ordinance was proscribable under the fighting words doctrine, the ordinance was facially unconstitutional in that it prohibit[ed] otherwise permitted speech solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 381, 112 S.Ct. 2538. Noting that [t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas expressed, the Court observed that [c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid. Id. at 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (citations omitted). Exceptions to the rule include: obscenity ( e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)), defamation ( e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 72 S.Ct. 725, 96 L.Ed. 919 (1952)), and fighting words ( e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S.Ct. 766, 86 L.Ed. 1031 (1942)). But simply because particular categories of speech may be regulated does not mean that such regulation may selectively discriminate on the basis of content. As the Court in R.A.V. stated: And just as the power to proscribe particular speech on the basis of a noncontent element ( e.g., noise) does not entail the power to proscribe the same speech on the basis of a content element; so also, the power to proscribe it on the basis of one content element ( e.g., obscenity) does not entail the power to proscribe it on the basis of other content elements. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386, 112 S.Ct. 2538. The Commonwealth argues that the Virginia statute is neutral because Code § 18.2-423 applies equally to anyone who burns a cross for the purpose of intimidating anyone. The Commonwealth further dwells upon the phrase in R.A.V. which states that threats of violence are outside the First Amendment. 505 U.S. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538. This quotation is incomplete and distorts the holding of R.A.V. While a statute of neutral application proscribing intimidation or threats may be permissible, a statute punishing intimidation or threats based only upon racial, religious, or some other selective content-focused category of otherwise protected speech violates the First Amendment. Id. Emphasizing the point, the Court in R.A.V. noted: Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the government. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2538. We have long held, for example, that nonverbal expressive activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not because of the ideas it expressesso that burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable, whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is not. Id. at 386, 112 S.Ct. 2538. A State might choose to prohibit only that obscenity which is the most patently offensive in its prurience i.e., that which involves the most lascivious displays of sexual activity. But it may not prohibit, for example, only that obscenity which includes offensive political messages. Id. at 388, 112 S.Ct. 2538. And the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats of violence that are directed against the President, see 18 U.S.C. § 871since the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment (protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur) have special force when applied to the person of the President . . . . But the Federal Government may not criminalize only those threats against the President that mention his policy on aid to inner cities. Id. R.A.V. makes it abundantly clear that, while certain areas of speech and expressive conduct may be subject to proscription, regulation within these areas must not discriminate based upon the content of the message. [5] In this case, the Commonwealth seeks to proscribe expressive conduct that is intimidating in nature, but selectively chooses only cross burning because of its distinctive message. As the Court in R.A.V. succinctly stated: the government may not regulate use based upon hostilityor favoritismtowards the underlying message expressed. Id. at 386, 112 S.Ct. 2538. While not specifically stating that race, color, creed, religion or gender is the subject of proscription, the absence of such language in the Virginia statute does not mask the motivating purpose behind the statutory prohibition of cross burning. The United States Supreme Court dealt with a similar question in the flag burning cases. In Texas v. Johnson , Johnson was prosecuted under a statute making it unlawful to intentionally or knowingly desecrate the United States flag. Desecrate was defined as deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat in a way that the actor knows will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action. 491 U.S. at 400, 109 S.Ct. 2533 (quoting Texas Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (1989)). After the Supreme Court declared the Texas statute unconstitutional, Congress enacted the Flag Protection Act of 1989. In subsequent litigation concerning the Act, the government maintained that the absence of language in the Act focusing upon the content of the actor's symbolic speech cured any constitutional problems. The Supreme Court disagreed in United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315, 110 S.Ct. 2404, 110 L.Ed.2d 287 (1990)(internal quotations omitted), stating that, [a]lthough the [statute] contains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is related to the suppression of free expression. Similarly, considering the historical and current context of cross burning, and the statute's reliance on such context for the provision of an inference of intent to intimidate from the mere act of burning a cross, it is clear that the Commonwealth's interest in enacting the cross burning statute is related to the suppression of free expression as well. The virulent symbolism of cross burning has been discussed in so many judicial opinions that its subject and content as symbolic speech has been universally acknowledged. For example, the Supreme Court of South Carolina declared a statute [6] with operative language similar to ours unconstitutional and observed: a burning cross historically conveys ideas capable of eliciting powerful responses from those engaging in the conduct and those receiving the message. State v. Ramsey, 311 S.C. 555, 430 S.E.2d 511, 514 (1993). The Court of Appeals of Maryland also declared a statute [7] with operative language similar to ours unconstitutional and observed: Those who openly burn crosses do so fully cognizant of the controversial racial and religious messages which such acts impart. Historically, the Ku Klux Klan burned crosses to express hostility towards blacks and other groups it disfavored, and it is that idea which contemporary cross burners aim to perpetuate. State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 629 A.2d 753, 757 (1993). The historical context for the passage of the Virginia cross burning statute is uncontrovertible. In an atmosphere of racial, ethnic, and religious intolerance, the General Assembly acted to combat a particular form of intimidating symbolic speechthe burning of a cross. It did not proscribe the burning of a circle or a square because no animating message is contained in such an act. Initially, the cross burning proscription extended only to acts on property of another without permission. In 1968, the limitation concerning situs was removed, and in 1975, the addition of language establishing prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate from the mere act of burning a cross reaffirmed the legislative context of the statute. During oral argument, the Commonwealth maintained that the portion of the statute proscribing the burning of a cross had nothing to do with the motivation of the actor. When asked how the Commonwealth could justify the inference of intimidation provided in the last sentence of the statute, the Commonwealth relied upon the historical context of cross burning. The Commonwealth cannot have it both ways.