Opinion ID: 1954604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Immunities

Text: Five different kinds of claims remain open and will need to be addressed on remand. In Count I of the Amended Complaint, grounded on § 1983, Davis charges that DiPino violated six different rights (or collection of rights) enjoyed by him under the United States Constitution: the right to free speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, the right to due process of law under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, the right to notice, assistance of counsel, and jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the right to reasonable bail under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. In Count II, Davis charges DiPino with a violation of the parallel Constitutional rights afforded under the Maryland Declaration of Rights: the right to free speech under Article 40, the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under Article 26, the right to due process of law under Article 24, the right to notice, assistance of counsel, and jury trial under Article 21, and the right to reasonable bail and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under Article 25. [3] Although in certain contexts the contours of the State Constitutional rights are not precisely those of the Federalwe have recognized some differences with regard to some of themin the context presented here they are essentially the same. See Freedman v. State, 233 Md. 498, 197 A.2d 232 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 380 U.S. 51, 85 S.Ct. 734, 13 L.Ed.2d 649 (1965); Jakanna v. Montgomery County, 344 Md. 584, 689 A.2d 65 (1997) (the freedoms protected by Article 40 are co-extensive with those protected by the First Amendment); Little v. State, 300 Md. 485, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); Gadson v. State, 341 Md. 1, 668 A.2d 22 (1995) (Article 26 is in pari materia with the Fourth Amendment); Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (1986); Kirsch v. Prince George's County, 331 Md. 89, 626 A.2d 372, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1011, 114 S.Ct. 600, 126 L.Ed.2d 565 (1993) (construing due process and equal protection rights embodied in Article 24 in pari materia with comparable rights in Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Ayre v. State, 291 Md. 155, 433 A.2d 1150 (1981); State v. Tichnell, 306 Md. 428, 509 A.2d 1179, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995, 107 S.Ct. 598, 93 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986); Lodowski v. State, supra, 307 Md. 233, 513 A.2d 299 (right to notice and assistance of counsel under Article 21 in pari materia with similar rights under Sixth Amendment); Aravanis v. Somerset County, 339 Md. 644, 664 A.2d 888 (1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1115, 116 S.Ct. 916, 133 L.Ed.2d 846 (1996) (Article 25 in pari materia with Eighth Amendment). [4] The second claim, therefore, embodies parallel rights under the State Constitution that were allegedly transgressed by DiPino. In Count III, Davis claims against the City, solely on a respondeat superior basis, for the State Constitutional violations allegedly committed by DiPino. No such claim is made by virtue of the Federal Constitutional rights allegedly violated by DiPino, because Davis acknowledges that a local governmental entity has no respondeat superior liability under § 1983. See Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Ashton v. Brown, 339 Md. 70, 112, 660 A.2d 447, 468 (1995). In Count VII, Davis does make a direct § 1983 claim against the City, based on the averment that, pursuant to official policy and custom, the City knowingly, recklessly, and with gross negligence failed to instruct, supervise, control, and discipline DiPino and prevent her from committing the wrongful conduct alleged. Finally, in Count V, Davis seeks damages from both DiPino and the City for the common law tort of malicious prosecution. Any liability of the City under that count would seem to be entirely vicarious. Sorting out the potential liability of DiPino and the City with respect to these claims requires some analysis. One set of rules, themselves not easy to fathom, applies to the § 1983 claims in Counts I and VII. Those rules have been established by the United States Supreme Court as a matter of Federal law. A second set of rules applies to the State Constitutional claims. Notwithstanding that the Federal and State rights are essentially parallel, the rules relating to redress for the violation of those rights are very different. We have consistently declined to adopt the Federal approach. Ritchie v. Donnelly, 324 Md. 344, 597 A.2d 432 (1991); Ashton v. Brown, supra, 339 Md. 70, 660 A.2d 447. There is also the overlay of vicarious liability and the effect of the LGTCA on the State Constitutional claims and on the malicious prosecution claim. [5]