Opinion ID: 854116
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Evaluation of Aggravating Factors

Text: Montgomery next argues that the trial court erred in not considering that his last serious criminal offense was in 1977, and that since that time until his conviction in this case, he had been convicted of only two alcohol-related offenses. He argues that the lack of any recent violent crimes should offset the aggravating factors and weigh in favor of the presumptive sentence. Montgomery appears to be arguing that the trial court should have considered as a mitigating factor the fact that nearly twenty years had passed since his last serious offense. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(c)(6) (West 1998). A trial court must set forth on the record a description of significant mitigating circumstances if the trial court reduces the presumptive sentence or uses mitigating circumstances to offset aggravating circumstances. See Widener v. State, 659 N.E.2d 529, 533 (Ind.1995). However, while a trial court may not ignore facts in the record that would mitigate an offense, a finding of mitigating circumstances is within the trial court's discretion. See id. at 533-34. A trial court is not required to include within the record a statement that it considered all proffered mitigating circumstances, only those it consider[s] significant. Id. at 534. Moreover, a trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating circumstances as the defendant does. See id. at 533-34. In this case, the sentencing statement indicates that the trial court considered Montgomery's criminal record and the nature and circumstances of the crime to be aggravating factors. These may properly be considered as aggravating factors. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2), (a)(3)(A), and (b)(2) (West 1998). The trial court apparently did not find Montgomery's lack of recent criminal violence to be sufficiently mitigating to offset these aggravating factors. Under the circumstances, the trial court was not required to state on the record the reasons why it found this factor to be insufficiently mitigating to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. See Widener, 659 N.E.2d at 533-34. While Montgomery does not specifically challenge the third aggravating factor identified by the trial court, we note that a finding that a lesser sentence would depreciate the seriousness of the crime has application only when considering imposition of a sentence of shorter duration than the presumptive sentence, not when enhancing a sentence. See Penick v. State, 659 N.E.2d 484, 488 (Ind.1995). However, [d]espite a trial court's use of an improper aggravating circumstance to enhance a sentence, this Court will affirm if the other aggravating circumstances are adequate to support the sentence imposed. Scheckel v. State, 620 N.E.2d 681, 684 (Ind.1993). A single, proper aggravating factor may be sufficient to support an enhanced sentence. See Barany v. State, 658 N.E.2d 60, 67 (Ind.1995). In the present case, the trial court stated two valid aggravating factors. They are sufficient to support imposition of an enhanced sentence. We therefore find no error in the trial court's imposition of an enhanced sentence.