Opinion ID: 2632418
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Heading: Application of section 20001(c) to an aider and abettor

Text: Calhoun concedes he is guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter as an aider and abettor. We conclude he is also subject to the flight enhancement. Section 20001, subdivision (a) provides, The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to any person, other than himself or herself, or in the death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident and shall fulfill the requirements of Sections 20003 and 20004. Section 20001(c), at issue in this case, provides in relevant part: A person who flees the scene of the crime after committing a violation of . . . subdivision (c) of Section 192 ... of the Penal Code, upon conviction of . .. th[is] section[], in addition and consecutive to the punishment prescribed, shall be punished by an additional term of imprisonment of five years in the state prison. [2] (Italics added.) The question here is whether an aider or abettor, like a direct perpetrator, can commit[] manslaughter within the meaning of the enhancement. Calhoun argues that by using the term commit[], the Legislature limited the enhancement to direct perpetrators and barred its application to aiders and abettors. The argument fails. Both aiders and abettors and direct perpetrators are principals in the commission of a crime. Penal Code section 31 defines principals as [a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, ... whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission... (See Pen.Code, § 971[[A]11 persons concerned in the commission of a crime, who by the operation of other provisions of this code are principals therein, shall hereafter be prosecuted, tried and punished as principals....].) We have observed, the dividing line between the actual perpetrator and the aider and abettor is often blurred. It is often an oversimplification to describe one person as the actual perpetrator and the other as the aider and abettor. When two or more persons commit a crime together, both may act in part as the actual perpetrator and in part as the aider and abettor of the other, who also acts in part as an actual perpetrator. ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210.) Here it is unnecessary to parse Calhoun's involvement. We conclude that by creating an enhancement for those who flee the scene after committing manslaughter, the Legislature intended the enhancement to apply to all principals, both aiders and abettors as well as direct perpetrators. We first consider the statutory language. Nothing in section 20001(c) limits application of the enhancement to direct perpetrators of the underlying crime. Rather, the Legislature enacted an enhancement that applies to any person who flees the scene of the crime after committing certain forms of manslaughter. Likewise, in People v. Lee (2003) 31 Cal.4th 613, 622, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176 ( Lee, ) we observed that Penal Code section 664, subdivision (a) referred three times broadly and generally to `the person guilty of attempted murder, ... not once distinguish[ing] between an attempted murderer who is guilty as a direct perpetrator and an attempted murderer who is guilty as an aider and abettor.... Had the Legislature intended to draw a distinction between direct perpetrators and aiders and abettors, it certainly could have done so expressly. ( Lee, at p. 622, 3 Cal. Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176.) Attempted murder is of course a substantive crime, not an enhancement. For such crimes, it appears the general law of criminal liability, including aider and abettor liability, remains applicable. (See Lee, at p. 626, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176.) Similarly here, when Vehicle Code section 20001(c) refers to committing a violation of ... paragraph (1) ... of subdivision (c) of Section 192 ... of, the Penal Code, or gross vehicular manslaughter, it is referring to a substantive crime. As in Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th 613, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176, when referring to commission of that crime, the Legislature did not expressly draw a distinction between direct perpetrators and aiders and abettors. General principles of criminal liability, including Penal Code section 31, indicate that both aiders and abettors and direct perpetrators can commit[] the substantive crime of gross vehicular manslaughter. Hence both are subject to the Vehicle Code enhancement when they also personally commit the proscribed conduct of fleeing the scene of the crime. Calhoun generally relies on cases such as People v. Piper (1986) 42 Cal.3d 471, 476-477, 229 Cal.Rptr. 125, 722 P.2d 899, and People v. Walker (1976) 18 Cal.3d 232, 241-242, 133 Cal.Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306, which required a defendant to personally engage in proscribed conduct for an enhancement to attach. In these cases, we declined to employ the law of criminal liability to remove the discerned personal conduct requirement for certain enhancements. ( Lee, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 626, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 402, 74 P.3d 176.) Certainly the law of criminal liability remains applicable in determining whether a defendant has committ[ed] an underlying crime within the meaning of an enhancement. Thus, in In re Antonio R. (1990) 226 Cal.App.3d 476, 479, 275 Cal. Rptr. 442, the court concluded the minor defendant was properly punished for his personal use of a firearm even though he was vicariously liable for the murder. Here, aiding and abetting principles establish that Calhoun committ[ed] gross vehicular manslaughter. He then personally fle[d] the scene of the crime after committing manslaughter, thus satisfying both elements of the enhancement. None of the cases Calhoun cites require that in addition to personally engaging in the conduct warranting an enhanced punishment, the person also be a direct perpetrator of the underlying crime. An example from a different context illustrates the point. Two robbers enter a bank. The gunman holds everyone at bay while the other empties the cash drawers. Both are guilty of robbery. Under Calhoun's analysis, however, the gunman would not be subject to a firearm use enhancement because he did not personally take the money, but only aided and abetted the taking. Logic and the law are otherwise. (See People v. Donnell (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 762, 767, 778-779, 125 Cal. Rptr. 310.) Similarly, the Court of Appeal relied in part on the language of Penal Code section 12022, subdivision (a)(1), an enhancement that provides in part, This additional term shall apply to any person who is a principal in the commission of a felony or attempted felony if one or more of the principals is armed with a firearm, whether or not the person is personally armed with a firearm. This provision does nothing more than allow imposition of the enhancement regardless of which principal is personally armed. In this context, the use of the word principal simply describes who can be held liable for the arming. It does not mean that in every other instance when the Legislature uses the words committing or commission of a crime, it must also use the word principal in order to invoke basic principles of criminal liability. The legislative history of section 20001(c) reveals no intent to limit its application to direct perpetrators, of a crime. Calhoun relies on the fact that the bill was enacted in memory of 15-year-old Courtney Cheney, killed by a recidivist drunk driver who fled the scene. (Stats.1996, ch. 654, § 1; Sen. Com. on Crim. Proc, analysis of Assem. Bill No.1985 (1995-1996 Reg. Sess.) as amended July 1, 1996, pp. 3-4.) The Senate committee report pointed out that the enhancement was necessary because when a person who is DUI flees the scene of an accident where a death has occurred and they are not caught immediately, it is hard if not impossible to later prove that they were DUI. This [enhancement] will create an added deterrence to keep people from fleeing accidents where a death may have occurred. ( Id., at p. 5.) However, one can commit gross vehicular manslaughter, the crime for which Calhoun was convicted, without being intoxicated. As the Attorney General notes, [w]hat Calhoun does is take a precipitating event for legislation and use that event to limit the scope of the law. Furthermore, the state has a valid interest in requiring that principals in the commission of serious vehicular crimes remain at the scene.