Opinion ID: 2999882
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exculpatory Material

Text: Barker next claims that his right to a fair trial was prejudiced because the government failed to timely disclose Agent Skender’s report containing exculpatory information. Barker also asserts that he was further prejudiced by his inability to impeach Diers with the statement. In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. However, “evidence for Brady purposes is deemed ‘suppressed’ if (1) the prosecution failed to disclose the evidence before it was too late for the defendant to make use of the evidence, and (2) the evidence was not otherwise available to the defendant through the exercise of reasonable diligence.” United States v. O’Hara, 301 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2002). We review claims under Brady raised for the first time on appeal for plain error. United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890, 900 (7th Cir. 2001). We find that there was no plain error. Though discovered at trial, the defense had sufficient time to make use of Agent Skender’s report. Gevers had time to find Diers, interview her, and call her as a witness. In fact, Gevers used both the report and Diers’ testimony in support of his defense. Gevers even recalled Agent Skender as a witness to question him on his failure to disclose the 8 No. 05-2861 report. Therefore, the government’s failure to disclose Agent Skender’s report earlier did not rise to the level of a Brady violation because it was not too late for the defense to make use of the evidence.