Opinion ID: 1379489
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: instruction on alibi

Text: A final instructional error alleged by the appellant is that his instruction number 1, as amended favorably to him without objection, was confusing as given and should have been corrected by the court so that the jury would not have been misled as to the burden of proof in this case. [11] There is no merit to this assignment of error. In syllabus point 1 of State v. Dozier, 163 W.Va. 192, 255 S.E.2d 552 (1979), the Court held: A defendant may challenge, on appeal, the propriety of instructions tendered by him and given by the court if the challenge is based on a violation of due process. In syllabus point 2 of Dozier the Court held: When given, instructions to a jury are the court's instructions and, irrespective of who requests them, the court must see to it that all instructions conform to constitutional requirements. See also syl., State v. Lambert, ___ W.Va. ___, 312 S.E.2d 31 (1984). On the other hand, a limiting factor to the application of these principles is that the erroneous instruction must substantially impair the truth-finding process in order to be noticed as plain error: Although this Court may, under Rule 30 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, notice plain error in the giving of an erroneous instruction (in the absence of a proper and timely objection at trial), this Court will not ordinarily recognize plain error under such circumstances, even of constitutional magnitude, where the giving of the erroneous instruction did not substantially impair the truth-finding function of the trial. Syl. pt. 2, State v. Hutchinson, ___ W.Va. ___, 342 S.E.2d 138 (1986). In Hutchinson this Court declined to notice plain error of constitutional magnitude in the giving of the defendant's instruction expressly placing the burden of proof of an alibi defense upon the defendant. We concluded that such instruction did not substantially impair the truth-finding function of the trial. In the present case the appellant argues that a part of his instruction number 1, as amended, impliedly placed the burden of proof upon the State to prove commission of the offense by the appellant beyond a reasonable doubt solely because the appellant had raised an alibi defense. The remainder of this instruction dispels this purported implication: If you believe ... that the evidence does not prove the identity of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, then you shall find him not guilty. Other parts of the court's charge and State's instruction number 1, given as amended, also indicate in unmistakable terms that the State, with or without an alibi defense, had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the offense charged: The presumption of innocence stays with the defendant throughout the trial and prevails at its close unless overcome by evidence which satisfies you of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence. The burden of proving the defendant guilty of every element of the crime charged is upon the State.... .... If ... you believe that the evidence does not show the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the State has failed to prove any one or more elements of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the evidence is consistent with a reasonable theory of innocence, then you shall find the defendant not guilty. In any event, any error in giving appellant's instruction number 1, as amended, did not substantially impair the truth-finding function of the trial, and, under Hutchinson, any such error was not preserved for review.