Opinion ID: 731322
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority for the Section 1404(a) Transfer

Text: 35 The power of a section 1407 transferee court to transfer a case to itself for trial has been recognized, explicitly or implicitly, by the courts that have considered the issue. 3 Patricia D. Howard, the Clerk of the JPML, has stated: 36 Although the Panel's power for the most part is limited to transfer for pretrial only, it is not uncommon for a transferee judge assigned by the Panel to transfer to his own or another district under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a) or 1406 the actions which were previously assigned to him or her by the Panel under Section 1407. 4 37 Permitting the transferee court to transfer a case to itself upon completion of its pretrial work often promotes efficiency in the disposition of the case or cases. 5 The time required for a new judge to become acquainted with the litigation is eliminated, as is the possibility of conflicting or duplicative rulings and proceedings. The above reasons strongly favored trial by the transferee court in this case, where pretrial proceedings left only one claim to be resolved by a trial that was scheduled to begin immediately and conclude in four days. 38 Moreover, the transferee court is empowered to dispose of the cases transferred to it by means of summary judgment or dismissal. 6 Therefore, logic supports its ability to dispose of the case, at least under the circumstances present here, by trial. 39 Despite longstanding practice and the efficiency arguments, Lexecon argues that 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) requires remand for trial. The provision states in relevant part: 40 Each action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall have been previously terminated (emphasis added). 41 Equally specific is JPML R. 14(b), promulgated under the authority granted the JPML by 28 U.S.C. § 1407(f): 42 Each transferred action that has not been terminated in the transferee district court shall be remanded by the Panel to the transferor district for trial, unless ordered transferred by the transferee judge to the transferee or other district under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406. 43 This conflict between statute and rule, while apparent, is not real. 7 Congress in enacting section 1407 in 1968 was concerned with the emerging phenomenon of complex, multidistrict litigation. Its focus was upon creating and defining the functions of the JPML, not on redefining or circumscribing the traditional powers of the district court to which a case has been transferred. This is made reasonably clear by the House Report accompanying the proposed statute; that report stated that the bill affects only the pretrial stages in multidistrict litigation. It would not affect the place of trial in any case or exclude the possibility of transfer under other Federal statutes. H.Rep. No. 1130, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1898, 1900. The report continued, id. at 1901-02: 44 The subsection requires that transferred cases be remanded to the originating district at the close of coordinated pretrial proceedings. The bill does not, therefore, include the trial of cases in the consolidated proceedings. The experience of the Coordinating Committee [for Multiple Litigation of the U.S. District Courts, established by the Judicial Conference of the United States] was limited to pretrial matters, and the committee consequently considers it desirable to keep this legislative proposal within the confines of that experience.... Of course, 28 U.S.C. 1404, providing for changes of venue generally, is available in those instances where transfer of a case for all purposes is desirable. 45 Thus, Congress, because of the nation's limited experience with multidistrict litigation, sought to design only the powers and duties of its new creation, the JPML. Despite some uncertainty about this matter initially, the power of the transferee court to transfer a case to itself for trial has been reinforced by its consistent recognition in practice. Recourse to such sustained practice, particularly when approved by the JPML, is a legitimate aid to statutory interpretation. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 549, 60 S.Ct. 1059, 1067, 84 L.Ed. 1345 (1940). In the case before us, this reading also strongly promotes judicial efficiency, which was a primary purpose of the legislation that created the JPML. See H.Rep. at 2, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1899. 46