Opinion ID: 616832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction to review denial of registry decisions

Text: Amicus argues that we have jurisdiction to review the entirety of the IJ's decision regarding Gutierrez's denial of registry. Specifically, Amicus argues that the IJ based his decision on a statutory per se category rather than his discretionary authority and therefore this panel need not reach the issue of jurisdiction over discretionary decisions. In the alternative, Amicus argues that we retain jurisdiction to review statutory determinations regarding good moral character. We agree with the latter argument. In addition, we retain jurisdiction to decide issues of law, including constitutional claims. [3] 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). [4] Since the Real ID Act of 2005, we have not determined whether we have jurisdiction over decisions of the Attorney General denying registry. The applicable provision states that: [N]o court shall have jurisdiction to review... (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title, or (ii) any other decision or action of the Attorney General ... the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General..... Id. § 1252(a)(2)(B). According to 8 U.S.C. § 1259, the statute under which Gutierrez was denied registry, the IJ may grant registry if the alien establishes certain facts, including that he is of good moral character. Id. § 1259 (registry may, in the discretion of the Attorney General ..., be made in the case of any alien). Although registry under Section 1259 is not expressly listed as a section for which judicial review is barred, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), we do not have jurisdiction to review any other decision or action of the Attorney General ... the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, id. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added). [5] Section 1259 explicitly states that registry is in the discretion of the Attorney General. Id. § 1259. Thus, to the extent the challenged decision was a legally permissible exercise of that discretion, we lack jurisdiction to review it. Here, in denying Gutierrez's application for registry, the IJ noted that [registry] is a relief in the discretion of [the IJ], and that he did not believe that the respondent has demonstrated good moral character and believes that in its discretion, it is inappropriate for [the IJ] to grant the respondent registry. Although Section 1101(f) lists nine circumstances that, if true in a particular alien's case, preclude a finding of good moral character, the IJ did not rely on any of the items listed therein. [6] Rather, the IJ based his conclusion on Gutierrez's numerous criminal convictions for driving under the influence ... from 197[8] to 2001, [7] as well as the fact that Gutierrez was currently driving on a suspended license. The BIA concurred, stating that [w]e agree with the Immigration Judge that the respondent failed to establish the requisite good moral character for the requested forms of relief. Because the IJ made no mention of per se good moral character except to restate the Government's argument and instead relied on actions falling outside Section 1101(f), the IJ made a general finding of lack of good moral character, a statutory requirement for registry. [8] We have jurisdiction to review this determination. As we made clear in Singh v. Holder, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not preclude from review factual decisions unless the language of the statute in question ... provide[s] the discretionary authority for the Attorney General's action. Singh v. Holder, 591 F.3d 1190, 1194 (9th Cir.2010) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Spencer Enters., Inc. v. United States, 345 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir.2003)). In Singh, we addressed the statutory requirements for eligibility for hardship waiver of the requirements for permanent residence status, holding that by stating [t]he Attorney General, in the Attorney General's discretion, may grant relief, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4), the ultimate decision was specified to be in the Attorney General's discretion. [9] Singh, 591 F.3d at 1194. Singh also concluded that the phrase, [t]he determination of what evidence is credible and the weight to be given that evidence shall be within the sole discretion of the Attorney General,  8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4) (emphasis added), sufficed to commit such decisions to the Attorney General's discretion. Singh, 591 F.3d at 1195. In contrast, the language providing that the Attorney General could grant relief if the alien demonstrate[d] that certain criteria were met did not commit[ ] to the Attorney General's discretion the question whether those criteria were satisfied. Id. at 1194-95 (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the establishes language in Section 1259 is akin to the demonstrates language of Section 1186a(c)(4). Just as Singh held that the IJ's and BIA's underlying factual determinations were not specified to be in the discretion of the Attorney General, nothing in sections 1252 or 1259 specifies that the good moral character decision is committed to the discretion of the Attorney General. As a result, Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) does not strip us of jurisdiction over the IJ's decision regarding Gutierrez's moral character. [10] Thus, we turn to Gutierrez's claims regarding, 1) the extent to which an assessment of good moral character can be based only on the immediate present and whether there was substantial evidence supporting the finding of lack of good moral character for purposes of registry, 2) procedural due process, and 3) the Fifth Amendment.