Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Definition of Rape

Text: The trial court instructed the jury on first degree felony murder, as follows: The unlawful killing of a human being, whether intentional, unintentional or accidental, which occurs during the attempted commission of the crime of rape is murder of the first degree when the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit such crime. The specific intent to commit rape and the attempted commission of such crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As used in this instruction, the word `rape' means engaging in an act of sexual intercourse with a female person, who is not the spouse of the perpetrator, accomplished against such person's will by means of force, violence, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury to such person. (Former CALJIC 8.21.) Defendant contends the definition of rape included in this instruction was deficient because it failed to define sexual intercourse. We disagree. As a preliminary matter, the People argue defendant has forfeited this claim because he failed to request a clarifying instruction at trial. Generally, a claim of instructional error is not cognizable on appeal if the instruction is correct in law and the defendant fails to request a clarification instruction. (See e.g., People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 149, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357.) Here, however, because the asserted error consists of a failure to instruct on an essential element of the offense of rape as included in the felony-murder charge and affects his substantial rights, his failure to object does not preclude our review of this issue. (See e.g., People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 482, fn. 7, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 180, 957 P.2d 869.) Contrary to defendant's assertion, sexual intercourse is not a technical term with various meanings that might be mis-understood when used to define rape. (See People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 676, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213 [In the context of rape, sexual intercourse requires penetration of the victim's vaginal genitalia by the male sex organ].) In Holt, we rejected defendant's argument that the trial court erred by failing to define sexual intercourse in the context of rape. The term sexual intercourse was placed in proper context by other instructions given in that case and by the arguments of counsel. ( Ibid. ) Defendant asserts there was no similar clarification in this case, but we disagree. It was undisputed that the offense was attempted rape, not rape, and required no penetration. ( People v. Ray (1960) 187 Cal.App.2d 182, 189, 9 Cal.Rptr. 678 [Rape requires penetration, however slight.].) Defense counsel argued the lack of evidence of attempted rape, as follows: There was no ... tearing or attempted removal of ... Powell's clothes. No penetration or attempted penetration of the vaginal area. No evidence of any words or acts that would indicate an intent to take a woman by force or against her will. We agree with the People that there is no possibility that the jury misunderstood the term sexual intercourse in the context of the definition of rape.