Opinion ID: 1442370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis under Tinker of the Ban on Clothing Depicting the Confederate Flag

Text: As an initial matter, we must consider Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that much of the evidence presented by the Board, and relied upon by the district court, was hearsay. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 33-37; Reply Br. at 17-21. As the Board notes, however, Plaintiffs-Appellants do not specify in their brief which evidence they consider to be hearsay; rather, Plaintiffs-Appellants refer us to documents filed at the district court level. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 33 n. 6. Well-established law in this Circuit holds that a party is not allowed to incorporate by reference into its appellate brief the documents and pleadings filed in the district court. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch. v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 459 F.3d 705, 710 (6th Cir.2006) (citing Northland Ins. Co. v. Stewart Title Guar. Co., 327 F.3d 448, 452 (6th Cir.2003)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___ 127 S.Ct. 985, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2007). Therefore, we are left with only Plaintiffs-Appellants' allegation that [m]ost of the defendants' evidence in the case at bar consists of hearsay statements that were [inappropriately] considered `for its[ ] effect upon the listener.' Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 34. Because Plaintiffs-Appellants do not specify to which pieces of evidence they are referring, we have no basis upon which to conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it found that in the record before the Court many of the declarants do, in fact, testify as to occurrences and incidents of which they have personal knowledge as that term would be defined and understood pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence. J.A. 39 (5/24/07 Hr'g Tr. at 96:19-22). See United States v. Khalil, 279 F.3d 358, 363 (6th Cir.2002) (holding that all evidentiary rulings of the district court, including its determination of whether testimony is inadmissible hearsay, are reviewed for abuse of discretion). Plaintiffs-Appellants argue that there is no evidence that the Confederate flag ever caused any disruption at the school, even when worn by students during the ban. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 28. Plaintiffs-Appellants' contention that the Confederate flag itself had to cause disruption in the past for the school to justify the ban, however, misapplies the Tinker standard. Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 591 (6th Cir.2007).  Tinker does not require disruption to have actually occurred. Id. at 593. Rather than evaluating competing claims about whether disruption occurred in the past, we must evaluate the circumstances to determine if [the school's] forecast of substantial disruption was reasonable. Id. The rationale for this standard lies in the fact that requiring evidence of disruption caused by the banned speech would place school officials. . . between the proverbial rock and hard place: either they allow disruption to occur, or they are guilty of a constitutional violation. Id. at 596. Recognizing that the Tinker decision does not require that the banned form of expression itself actually have been the source of past disruptions, subsequent appellate court decisions considering school bans on expression have focused on whether the banned conduct would likely trigger disturbances such as those experienced in the past. Brogdon, 217 Fed.Appx. at 525 (citing Castorina, 246 F.3d at 542; Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 1926, 36 L.Ed.2d 414 (1973)). Our inquiry, then, is whether the school reasonably forecast that the Confederate flag would cause material and substantial disruption to schoolwork and school discipline. Plaintiffs-Appellants further challenge the alleged high level of racial tension at the school, no matter the cause. In particular, Plaintiffs-Appellants allege that [t]he racial graffiti referred to by the defendants as proof of `racial tension' actually caused absolutely no disruptions, implying that racial tension is not as high as claimed. Plaintiffs-Appellants Br. at 29. Were Plaintiffs-Appellants correct and the record showed minimal evidence of prior disruption related to racial tension, then we would likely conclude that the school had little basis for anticipating disruption caused by images of the Confederate flag. But the evidence on the record belies Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument. In deposing Hord, the attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants tried to show that racist graffiti had not specifically caused disruption. When asked if he knew if any classes had been disrupted as a result of the graffiti, Hord stated that [t]he only disruption I think it does have is that just by the fact that a Principal and teachers if they have those kids they are pulling kids out questioning them there, they are trying to get to the bottom of it. So in that sense it is a disruption, but I don't know specifically here is the class, here is the kids, that kind of thing. J.A. at 114 (Hord Dep. at 31:15-21). Hord stated that he did not know whether any fights resulted from the graffiti or hit lists. J.A. at 114 (Hord Dep. at 31:3-12). We are wary of concluding, however, that the racist graffiti had to cause violent disruption to the school for the school reasonably to forecast that images of the Confederate flag would cause disruption within the meaning of Tinker. There is no requirement that disruption under Tinker be violent. Hord presents uncontested testimony that investigation of the graffiti disrupted classes. Furthermore, the racist graffiti was violent in character: the graffiti contained examples of the most demeaning racial slurs, accompanied by threats against the lives of African-Americans generally, an image of a noose next to that of a Confederate flag, and hit lists containing specific students' names. One might plausibly argue that such racist graffiti containing violent threats is inherently disruptive to a school environment. We do not need to reach such a conclusion today, however, because Hord presented evidence that the racist graffiti including the hit lists produced secondary disruptions. There was a lot of school disruption because of the hit lists, parents coming to school, parents calling me, calling the administrator, calling people in the Central office and it was time consuming. J.A. at 114 (Hord Dep. at 30:24-31:2). Hord also gave unrefuted deposition testimony that fear of racial violence caused an increase in absenteeism among African-American students, the epitome of disruption in the educational process. Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the racial tension that existed at the school immediately prior to the clothing ban comes from Plaintiffs-Appellants' own deposition testimony. Barr stated that he felt friction and racially related tension in the school in the spring of 2005. J.A. at 240 (Barr Dep. at 13:11, 13). He said he could feel the intensity as people walk[ed] by. J.A. at 240 (13:8-9). Craig White, another student bringing this suit, conceded in his deposition that his Confederate flag clothing could create disruptive behavior at school if others found his clothing offensive. J.A. at 261 (R. Craig White Dep. at 8:11-14). The instant case can be distinguished from Tinker. In Tinker there were no facts in the record that would reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities, and no disturbances or disorders on the school premises in fact occurred as a result of students wearing black armbands in protest of the Vietnam War. 393 U.S. at 514, 89 S.Ct. 733. The facts in this case, however, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs-Appellants, indicate that school officials could reasonably forecast that permitting students to wear clothing depicting the Confederate flag would cause disruptions to the school environment. In contrast to the dearth of evidence on the record in Tinker, the record in the instant case contains evidence of racial violence, threats, and tensions: a fight between an African-American and a white student on February 22; [6] a complaint filed with OCR alleging that following a racially motivated altercation, the school punished an African-American student more harshly than a white student in the district was punished; racist graffiti containing racial slurs and generalized threats against the lives of African-Americans; hit lists containing student names; unspecified race-related physical fights during the 2004-2005 school year; a fear-motivated increase in absenteeism among African-American students; and a school lockdown in April 2005 that the school implemented because of a breakdown in student discipline and the threat of race-related violence. Notably, a particularly egregious example of racist graffiti depicted the Confederate flag next to a drawing of a noose, just below a general threat to the lives of African-Americans that contained a racial slur. J.A. at 406-09 (Waters Aff. Ex. 2). That graffiti exemplifies how school officials reasonably concluded that the connection between the symbolism of the Confederate flag and racial tensions at the school meant that the Confederate flag would likely have a disruptive effect on the school. Under Tinker, we hold that the school reasonably forecast that clothing bearing images of the Confederate flag would disrupt schoolwork and school discipline. We do not find persuasive Plaintiffs-Appellants' argument that the Board has repeatedly admitted that prevention of disruption is not [its] only motive. Appellant Br. at 27. Hord acknowledges that the disruption he anticipates arising from displays of the Confederate flag directly correlates with the offense the flag poses to some students. Hord stated at deposition: I think when that offense becomes something that you have to deal with day-in and day-out [then] it is disruptive to what our normal process is, yes. J.A. at 115 (Hord Dep. at 34: 6-8). That Hord determined the Confederate flag to be offensive to African-American and other students, however, does not negate his reasonable belief that the flag was also disruptive and would cause substantial and material interference with schoolwork and school discipline. This is not a case in which the school acted upon undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. The school did not merely find the Confederate flag offensive to some students but rather found that in a context of high racial tensions, race-related altercations, and threats of violence, the flag would disrupt the school's educational process. That there exists a relationship between the offensiveness of the Confederate flag, in the eyes of some students, and its disruptive potential does not change our holding. We note that our decision evinces greater sensitivity to the effect of the regulated speech on its student audience than that ordinarily accorded to the targets of speech in our general First Amendment jurisprudence. First Amendment standards applicable to student speech in public schools, however, are unique, and courts accord more weight in the school setting to the educational authority of the school in attending to all students' psychological and developmental needs. Unlike in Tinker, Plaintiffs-Appellants' free-speech rights colli[de] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. The fact of this collision would almost certainly not be enough to justify government regulation of the speech, if the parties in this case were adults in a public forum. If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989) (holding that prosecution of defendant for burning an American flag during a protest rally violated the defendant's right to free expression under the First Amendment). We caution, however, that our decision today does not establish a precedent justifying a school's ban on student speech merely because other students find that speech offensive: we simply hold that the school's dress code as applied to ban the Confederate flag is constitutional because of the disruptive potential of the flag in a school where racial tension is high and serious racially motivated incidents, such as physical altercations or threats of violence, have occurred. Our holding that the school in the circumstances of this case reasonably forecast the disruptive effect of the Confederate flag accords with precedent in our circuit as well as our sister circuits. In Melton v. Young, 465 F.2d 1332 (6th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 951, 93 S.Ct. 1926, 36 L.Ed.2d 414 (1973), we held that the suspension of a student for violating a high-school code of conduct banning displays of the Confederate flag and the Confederate soldier, as well as the song Dixie, did not violate the student's rights under the First or Fourteenth Amendments. Evidence on the record showed that during the 1969-1970 academic year, the school that implemented the ban had become racially polarized as a result of continuing controversy over the use of the Confederate flag and the song Dixie at various school functions. Id. at 1333. Racial tension in the school disrupted classes and led school authorities to call for police assistance amid several confrontations and also to close the school for the purpose of restoring order and calming tensions. Id. The evidence in Melton supporting the school's rationale for the ban is, in two respects, stronger than that in the instant case: past disruptive conflict in the school had centered on the Confederate flag and disruption had led authorities not only to lockdown the school but to actually close it. Nevertheless, as we noted above,  Tinker does not require school officials to wait until the horse has left the barn before closing the door. Lowery, 497 F.3d at 591-92. In another sense, despite the fact that the displays of the Confederate flag did not themselves apparently instigate racial conflict, the evidence supporting the ban in the instant case is stronger than in Melton because racial tension had produced physical confrontations and threats against students' lives. In sum, the holding in Melton supports our decision that a school may reasonably forecast that the Confederate flag would cause substantial and material disruption of a school when the school had recently experienced intense racial conflict. Furthermore, the record in the instant case closely parallels that in West v. Derby Unified School District No. 260, 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir.2000). In West, a middle-school assistant principal had suspended a student who had drawn a Confederate flag on a sheet of paper during a class, in violation of a school's racial-harassment policy that prohibited students from possessing written material that is racially divisive or creates ill will or hatred. Id. at 1361. The policy listed the Confederate flag as an example of the banned material. Id. In the three years prior to the incident, the school at issue had experienced verbal confrontations . . . between black and white students; white students wearing clothing depicting the Confederate flag and black students wearing clothing invoking the ideology of Malcolm X; the circulation of racist materials among students by non-student members of the Aryan Nation and Ku Klux Klan; graffiti stating such things as `KKK' (Ku Klux Klan), `KKKK' (Ku Klux Klan Killer), and `Die Nigger'; reports of racial incidents on school buses and at football games; and [a]t least one fight . . . as a result of a student wearing a Confederate flag headband. Id. at 1362. The Tenth Circuit concluded that [t]he evidence . . . reveals that based upon recent events, [the school district] officials had reason to believe that a student's display of the Confederate flag might cause disruption and interfere with the rights of other students to be secure and let alone. Id. at 1366. Just as in West, in the instant case the school based its clothing ban on the existence of racial tension, threatening graffiti, reports of racially motivated confrontations, and at least one fight. The only potentially significant difference between the records in the two cases is that the February 22, 2005 fight in the instant case did not involve an image of the Confederate flag. Given binding precedent in the Sixth Circuit interpreting Tinker, however, we do not think any difference between the record in the instant case and that in West is significant enough to distinguish West. Indeed, we find West consistent with our decision in Melton and, therefore, consider West to constitute persuasive precedent. [7]