Opinion ID: 566003
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Substantive Challenge to the Sec. 5K2.4 Departure

Text: 33 In challenging the merits of the district court's decision to depart on the basis of the Sarantopoulos kidnaping and assault, Uccio does not contest the findings that these events occurred and that they were acts in furtherance of the offense of which Uccio was convicted. Rather, he contends principally that no upward departure pursuant to Sec. 5K2.4 was permissible because, not being acts against persons specially protected by federal law, see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. Secs. 111, 351 (1988) (punishing assault or kidnaping of certain federal officials), and not having an interstate character, see id. Sec. 1201 (1988) (punishing kidnaping where abductee is transported in interstate or foreign commerce), the misconduct on which the departure was premised could not have been prosecuted as a federal offense. Again, we disagree. 34 A sentencing court may elect to depart from the imprisonment range specified by the Guidelines if it finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b) (1988). Under Chapter 5, Part K, of the Guidelines, the court may depart upwardly if it finds that circumstances relating to the manner, effect, or other characteristics of the offense aggravate or mitigate the offense conduct in a way not adequately taken into consideration by existing Guidelines provisions. See Secs. 5K2.0-5K2.15; see generally United States v. Colon, 905 F.2d at 585; United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir.1990). 35 Fraudulent schemes do not typically involve violent conduct, and the Guidelines sections dealing with fraud offenses do not make provision for adjustments on account of kidnapings or assaults occurring in the course of the fraud. In identifying grounds for departure, however, Sec. 5K2.4 of the Guidelines, as a Policy Statement, provides specifically for an upward departure when the offense of conviction is not kidnaping but has entailed a kidnaping. That section reads as follows: 36 If a person was abducted, taken hostage, or unlawfully restrained to facilitate commission of the offense or to facilitate the escape from the scene of the crime, the court may increase the sentence above the authorized guideline range. 37 Section 5K2.4 does not by its terms require that the abduction or unlawful restraint constitute an independent federal offense in order to authorize a departure, and we see no reason to read in such a requirement, for the enhanced punishment is not directed toward separately indictable criminal conduct but rather toward conduct aggravating the offense of conviction. We conclude that where the violent misconduct, though not itself violating federal law, was undertaken in furtherance of the federal offense, the district court is permitted to depart on the basis of that misconduct. Cf. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1105 n. 26 (3d Cir.1990). 38 In arguing for the contrary result, Uccio places principal reliance on United States v. Kim, 896 F.2d 678. In Kim, noting that Chapter 5, Part K departures apply only to acts of misconduct not resulting in conviction, we directed sentencing judges to measure the extent of those departures by reference to the penalties that would have been provided by the Guidelines if the misconduct at issue had resulted in a federal conviction, in order that an act that need be proven only by a preponderance of evidence, ... [not] result in more punishment than would be called for if the act had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and had resulted in conviction, 896 F.2d at 684. Accord United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1112; United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d at 1062-63. Uccio's reliance on Kim is misplaced for two reasons. First, we were confronted there with misconduct that could have grounded a federal conviction, not with misconduct that arguably did not violate federal law, and hence we had no occasion to consider the latter. Second, we dealt not with whether the ground of departure was authorized but only with whether the extent of the departure was reasonable, see 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(e)(3) (1988) (imposition of a sentence outside of the applicable Guidelines range must not be unreasonable); United States v. Palta, 880 F.2d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1989) (extent of an authorized departure must be reasonable). Thus, Kim did not purport to deal with the question presented here, i.e., whether, as to misconduct that could not have grounded a federal conviction, there can be any departure at all. 39 Finally, we note that it is not clear from Uccio's brief on appeal whether he continues to pursue the main argument he made in the district court both in the pre-Uccio I proceedings and on remand, i.e., that Sec. 5K2.4 does not apply to acts of violence against coparticipants in the crime. In any event, we reject this proposition. Though most often the victim of the kidnaping would be a target of the crime or an innocent bystander, the scope of this section is not so limited. There is no language indicating that the person abducted cannot be a coconspirator. As the district court reasoned on remand, to ignore an abduction carried out in furtherance of the underlying offense simply because the abductee was a member of the conspiracy would be to conclude that anything that goes on between coconspirators is, in essence, their own business. (Dec. Tr. at 6.) No such policy is to be found in the law or in the Guidelines, and we agree with the district court's post-Uccio I view that Sec. 5K2.4 encompasses abduction, unlawful restraints, and other violence against coconspirators. 40 In sum, given the facts found by the district court, the departure pursuant to Sec. 5K2.4 on the basis of the kidnaping and assault of coconspirator Sarantopoulos was authorized.