Opinion ID: 1951964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Other-Crime Evidence and Reference to Mug Shot

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court improperly admitted testimony from two witnesses. Specifically, defendant challenges Gloria Dunn's testimony that defendant offered to kill Anthony Boone, the father of one of her children, and the testimony of Edward Borm, an employee of the Trenton Club, that he identified defendant out of a mug shot photo array. We find no material prejudice to defendant from the testimony. Prior to trial the State indicated that it did not intend to present other-crime evidence under N.J.R.E. 404(b). The trial court accepted this representation. At the beginning of Dunn's testimony, the State sought to establish how Dunn and defendant came to be acquainted. Dunn testified that she met defendant in September 1992 at the Trenton Welfare Office. Dunn approached defendant because a friend mistook defendant for defendant's brother whom she knew. Defendant asked Dunn for her name, address and phone number presumably so that his brother, who was incarcerated at that time, could call Dunn. Dunn said that defendant called her later in the day and began to ask her a variety of personal questions about her children and whether she was married or had a boyfriend. During this conversation, Dunn told defendant that her children were not living with her because she was having domestic problems with Boone. The prosecutor asked Dunn what else she and defendant talked about during that conversation. The following colloquy ensued: A. That we was having problems, that [Boone] busted my windows out of my apartment and stuff. And [defendant] asked me did [Boone] hurt me, and what I wanted to be done about him doing that to me, because I should have my kids with me. And I told him nothing. He kept asking me. He said when was the last time I seen them and stuff. And I told him that I seen them. And he asked me did I want [defendant] to take care of [Boone] for me, and I told him no. Q. Did [the defendant] tell you what he meant when he asked you if you wanted him to take care of Anthony Boone for you? A. He asked me did I want [defendant] to pop [Boone]. Q. What does that mean to you? A. To hurt him or kill him. Q. Did you want that to happen to Anthony Boone? A. No, no. I didn't want [defendant] to hurt [Boone]. I never asked him until he kept talking about it. Defendant did not object to this testimony nor did he request a limiting instruction. Defense counsel did raise the issue on cross, noting that in all of her statements given to the police, Dunn had never mentioned this conversation. Defendant now argues that this testimony portrayed him as a killing machine, thus eliminating the possibility that he would receive a fair trial. N.J.R.E. 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts for the purpose of showing that a criminal defendant is predisposed to commit a crime. State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 605 A. 2d 230 (1992); State v. Stevens, 115 N.J. 289, 558 A. 2d 833 (1989); State v. Weeks, 107 N.J. 396, 526 A. 2d 1077 (1987). However, such evidence may be admitted for limited purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute. N.J.R.E. 404(b). The State seeks to justify admission of the evidence to show why Dunn was rightfully afraid of defendant during Huggins' abduction. Had the State proffered to the trial court that basis for admission of the evidence, it is highly unlikely that the trial court would have sustained the State's position. See Part IV, Sec. C hereof, post at 176, 716 A.2d at 485, discussing balance of probative value versus prejudicial effects of 404(b) evidence. Dunn's fear of defendant was not a material issue at that stage of the case. Dunn was testifying without challenge on direct examination. Dunn's testimony sought to explain that her fear of defendant prevented her from helping Huggins when she had the chance and from immediately notifying the police of the crime. The probative value relevant to that issue was slight compared to the prejudicial effect. Moreover, Dunn's failure to assist Huggins did little to establish whether defendant committed the crimes with which he was charged. Although the evidence may not be admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b), it did not turn the jury against defendant. The State never referred to this testimony again in its direct case, rebuttal or summation. The admission of this evidence was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result warranting reversal. Next, defendant argues that Borm's testimony regarding defendant's mug shot impaired his ability to receive a fair trial. During the course of his testimony, Borm relayed the manner in which the Trenton Police came into contact with him. The prosecutor continued: Q. Were you ever asked to view photographs? A. Yes. Q. Where did you do that for the first time? A. At the police station. Q. And tell us the kind and number of photographs that you were asked to view. A. I was looking at pictures of mug shots, mostly black and white pictures. There were a few color, and they were a couple of file cabinet drawers filled to the top that I had to go through. Borm stated that this photo identification took place in January 1993. Defendant did not object to this testimony nor did he request a curative instruction. Reference to mug shots constitutes an impermissible reference to a defendant's criminal record. State v. Cribb, 281 N.J.Super. 156, 161-62, 656 A. 2d 1279 (App.Div.1995). Although references to mug shots have been found to be error, solitary, fleeting references will generally not constitute reversible error. See State v. Porambo, 226 N.J.Super. 416, 425-26, 544 A. 2d 870 (App.Div.1988); State v. Miller, 159 N.J.Super. 552, 562, 388 A. 2d 993 (App.Div.1978). The reference to the mug shot was fleeting and came after testimony that defendant had been arrested in December 1992. Therefore, the jury was aware that mug shots of defendant existed. Despite the lack of a court instruction to the jury regarding Borm's statement, there was no harm.