Opinion ID: 2585539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arguments For and Against a Narrow Interpretation of the Pollution Exclusion Clause.

Text: One of the primary arguments for a narrow interpretation of the pollution exclusion is based on the history reviewed above. As Kolums stated: Our review of the history of the pollution exclusion amply demonstrates that the predominate [sic] motivation in drafting an exclusion for pollution-related injuries was the avoidance of the `enormous expense and exposure resulting from the explosion of environmental litigation.' [Citations.] Similarly, the 1986 amendment to the exclusion was wrought, not to broaden the provision's scope beyond its original purpose of excluding coverage for environmental pollution, but rather to remove the `sudden and accidental' exception to coverage which, as noted above, resulted in a costly onslaught of litigation. We would be remiss, therefore, if we were to simply look to the bare words of the exclusion, ignore its raison d'etre, and apply it to situations which do not remotely resemble traditional env ironmental contamination. The pollution exclusion has been, and should continue to be, the appropriate means of avoiding 'the yawning extent of potential liability arising from the gradual or repeated discharge of hazardous substances into the environment. ` (Emphasis in original.) [Citations.] We think it improper to extend the exclusion beyond that arena. ( Koloms, supra, 227 Ill.Dec. 149, 687 N.E.2d at p. 81; accord, Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., supra, 774 So.2d at pp. 126-128; Sullins v. Allstate Insurance Co., supra, 340 Md. 503, 667 A.2d 617, 622-623; Andersen v. Highland House Co., supra, 757 N.E.2d at p. 334; Gainsco Ins. Co. v. Amoco Production Co., supra, 53 P.3d at p. 1066; see also Stempel, supra, 34 Tort & Ins. L.J. at pp. 35-40.) Courts adopting a narrower interpretation of the exclusion have also maintained that an interpretation of pollutant as applying literally to any contaminant or irritant would have absurd or otherwise unacceptable results. [T]here is virtually no substance or chemical in existence that would not irritate or damage some person or property. ( Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, Kans. (D.Kan.1991) 768 F.Supp. 1463, 1470 (City of Pittsburg, Kans.), affd. sub nom. Pennsylvania Nat Mut. Cos. Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, Kan. (10th Cir.1993) 987 F.2d 1516; see also Nautilus Ins. Co. v. Jabar (1st Cir. 1999) 188 F.3d 27, 30-31 [interpreting Maine law]; Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund v. Westchester Fire Insurance Co. (7th Cir.1993) 976 F.2d 1037,1043 (Pipefitters) ; Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. RSJ, Inc. (Ky.Ct.App.1996) 926 S.W.2d 679, 682 [437 Ky.L. Summary 4] (RSJ, Inc.).) Another argument for this camp focuses on the common meaning of the term discharge, dispersal, release or escape, as implying expulsion of the pollutant over a considerable area rather than a localized toxic accident occurring in the vicinity of intended use. ( Lumbermens Mutual Casualty v. S-W Industries, Inc. (6th Cir. 1994) 39 F.3d 1324, 1336 (Lumbermens) ; accord, Meridian Mutual Ins. Co. v. Kellman (6th Cir.1999) 197 F.3d 1178, 1185 (Kellman) ; Center for Creative Studies v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co. (E.D.Mich. 1994) 871 F.Supp. 941-946 (Center for Creative Studies); Steely, supra, 785 A.2d at p. 982.) Other courts have viewed these words as terms of art describing environmental pollution. ( West American Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring (1991) 104 N.C.App. 312, 409 S.E.2d 692, 699-700 (Tufco Flooring ), disapproved on other grounds in Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co. v. Northfield Ins. Co. (2000) 351 N.C. 293, 524 S.E.2d 558; accord, Sphere Drake Ins. Co. v. Y.L. Realty Co. (S.D.N.Y.1997) 990 F.Supp. 240, 244; RSJ, Inc., supra, 926 S.W.2d at p. 681; Gill, supra, 686 N.E.2d at p. 999; Continental Casualty Co. v. Rapid-American Corp. (N.Y.1993) 80 N.Y.2d 640, 654, 593 N.Y.S.2d 966, 609 N.E.2d 506 [asbestos-related injury not excluded].) On the other hand, many courts have taken a position that the current pollution exclusion is not ambiguous in encompassing acts of negligence involving toxic substancesacts that are outside the scope of traditional environmental pollution. These courts tend to find the meaning of the key words, as defined in a dictionary, to unequivocally cover forms of contamination other than traditional environmental pollution. This approach is exemplified by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Peace, supra, 596 N.W.2d 429, in which the court determined, after extensive analysis of the dictionary definitions of the various terms, that a tenant's action against the landlord for lead paint ingestion was excluded. As the court stated: The words `discharge,' 'dispersal,' `release,' and `escape' are not defined in the policy, but they appear to describe the entire range of actions by which something moves from a contained condition to an uncontained condition. (Id. at p. 438.) The court therefore concluded that ingestion of chipped lead paint was covered We believe the plain language of the policy covers the release of paint containing lead from a wall or ceiling into the air or onto the floor. `Common sense tells us that lead paint that never leaves a wall or ceiling does not cause harm.' (Id. at pp. 438-439, fn. omitted.) The Peace court also rejected the argument that the terms discharge, dispersal, release or escape are environmental law terms of art because they appear in environmental statutes: A quick check of the Wisconsin Statutes shows that these terms are used in many situations completely unrelated to the environment, including criminal law. Citing a multitude of criminal justice statutes that use these common terms would not transform the terms into criminal justice terms of art. (Peace, supra, 596 N.W.2d at p. 446.) The court also disagreed that the term pollutant is ambiguous. The key term in the clause'pollutants'is specifically defined in the policy; the definition cannot be undone by different notions of `pollution' outside the policy, unrelated to the policy language, unless such a `reading' produced absurd results. In the text here, the words are not fairly susceptible to more than one construction. The pollution exclusion clause does not become ambiguous merely because the parties disagree about its meaning [citation], or because they can point to conflicting interpretations of the clause by different courts. (Peace, supra, 596 N.W.2d at p. 442; accord, Deni Assocs., supra, 711 So.2d at p. 1139.) As for the intended purpose of the pollution exclusion, courts finding a lack of ambiguity in the language of the policy dismiss such history as irrelevant. [U]nless we conclude that the policy language is ambiguous, it would be inappropriate for us to consider the arguments pertaining to the drafting history of the pollution exclusion clause. [Citation.] ( Deni Assocs., supra, 711 So.2d at p. 1139.)