Opinion ID: 2363449
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Delegation of Legislative Power

Text: Defendant contends that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 is unconstitutional on grounds of undue delegation of legislative authority. In its view, the provision is faulty because the Legislature has failed to provide adequate standards to guide the Commissioner in exercising his discretionary consent to nonrenewal. We disagree. The principles to be applied in reviewing legislative grants of authority were recently reiterated by Chief Justice Hughes in Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496 (1975). He there stated that there can be no unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority as long as the administrative discretion is hemmed in by standards sufficiently definitive to guide its exercise, such standards not necessarily being stated in express terms if they may be reasonably inferred from the statutory scheme as a whole. [67 N.J. at 553 (emphasis supplied)] See In re Berardi, 23 N.J. 485 (1957); Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117 (1952); Ass'n of N.J. State Col. Fac. v. Bd. of Higher Ed., 112 N.J. Super. 237 (Law Div. 1970). Under this test the instant statute clearly passes constitutional muster. Although N.J.S.A. 39:6A-3 standing alone might appear to give the Commissioner untrammeled discretion in exercising his power to withhold consent, when the Act is considered as a whole, it is clear that his authority is sufficiently circumscribed. Under N.J.S.A. 39:6A-19, the Commissioner is empowered to promulgate only reasonable rules and regulations in order to effectuate the purposes of the No-Fault Act (emphasis supplied). Thus, in deciding whether to withhold his consent, he must act reasonably in light of the policies underlying the Act. Among the factors which the Commissioner may be expected to consider are: unusual risks posed by a particular policyholder or class of policyholders, noncompliance by policyholders with the insurer's reasonable requests, and the public welfare. These standards render the statute immune from constitutional attack. See, e.g., Avant v. Clifford, supra ; Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Work v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court).