Opinion ID: 2632413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Confrontation is a fundamental right

Text: ¶ 51 The majority misunderstands confrontation as a mere procedural protection to guard against error. But when a person is threatened with involuntary confinement, he is entitled to the fundamental right of confrontation. See Specht (fundamental language). Justice Harlan joined the Specht majority for the reasons he enunciated previously in Pointer: For me this state judgment must be reversed because a right of confrontation is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, [58 S.Ct. 149, 82 L.Ed. 288 (1937),] reflected in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment independently of the Sixth. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). ¶ 52 The majority mistakes the substantive for procedural when it misapplies Mathews balancing. Mathews dealt with administrative procedures, not fundamental rights. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332, 96 S.Ct. 893 (Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of `liberty' or `property' interests. . . .). [7] In a sense, allowing a potential SVP to confront witnesses against him is a procedure, but one expressly mandated by the Sixth Amendment and Washington Constitution article I, section 22. The majority would not balance away one's right to counsel by inquiring about an erroneous deprivation of that interest through existing procedures, see majority at 93, so why balance away the right to confront your accuser? ¶ 53 Because it claims the SVP proceeding is already fair, the majority argues Stout does not need his constitutional right of confrontation. Majority at 93-94. These basic rights, however, are expressly guaranteed, and this violation cannot be dismissed whenever it is adjudged fair to do so. It is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth in [the Sixth] Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2562, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). Due process commands, not that a trial be fair, but that a particular guarantee of fairness be provided. Id. Specht unequivocally holds the right of confrontation is one particular guaranty of fairness that must be provided. ¶ 54 The majority ignores Specht because it is pre- Mathews. Majority at 94 n. 12. But the United States Supreme Court continues to cite Specht to hold confrontation is a minimal safeguard for any commitment proceeding. [8] See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-94, 100 S.Ct. 1254, 63 L.Ed.2d 552 (1980). [9] The majority claims Vitek relied on Specht only to find `involuntary commitment to a mental hospital is not within the range of conditions of confinement to which a prison sentence subjects an individual.' Majority at 95 n. 13 (quoting Vitek, 445 U.S. at 493, 100 S.Ct. 1254). But the question before the Vitek Court was whether after a conviction for robbery, Jones retained a residuum of liberty that would be infringed by a transfer to a mental hospital without complying with minimum requirements of due process. Vitek, 445 U.S. at 491, 100 S.Ct. 1254. The Court held the transfer of a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital must be accompanied by appropriate procedural protections. Id. And the Court affirmed the lower court holding, which included as one of these appropriate procedural protections, [a]n opportunity at the hearing to present testimony of witnesses by the defense and to confront and cross-examine witnesses called by the state, except upon a finding, not arbitrarily made, of good cause for not permitting such presentation, confrontation, or cross-examination. . . . Id. at 494-95, 100 S.Ct. 1254. ¶ 55 The United States Supreme Court recognizes Specht speaks to fundamental rights, while Mathews applies to nonfundamental procedures. In Parham, another post- Mathews case, both the majority and the dissent cited to Specht for support. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). In his dissent, Justice Brennan explicated Specht's specific holding: [O]ur cases have made clear that commitment to a mental hospital is a deprivation of liberty which the State cannot accomplish without due process of law.. . . . Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 87 S.Ct. 1209, 18 L.Ed.2d 326 (1967) (sex offender commitment following criminal conviction). . . . At such hearings they must be accorded the right to be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against [them], have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of [their] own. Specht v. Patterson, supra, at 610, 87 S.Ct. 1209. Parham, 442 U.S. at 627, 99 S.Ct. 2493 (Brennan, J., dissenting). ¶ 56 The First Circuit has also relied on Specht, even post- Mathews, to hold an inmate must be present at a hearing for involuntary commitment. United States v. Frierson, 208 F.3d 282, 287-88 (1st Cir.2000). Due process requires `[the person] be present with counsel, have an opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own.' Id. at 287 (quoting Specht, 386 U.S. at 610, 87 S.Ct. 1209). The Fourth Circuit has held a commitment hearing could be via videoconference because it did not preclude the respondent from confronting . . . the witnesses. United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 843 (4th Cir. 1995). The Fourth Circuit relied on Vitek and found the right to confront to be a minimum due process safeguard. Id. ( Vitek makes clear that due process entitles the respondent at a commitment hearing to some right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. . . .). Only when it discussed additional procedures, beyond the minimum requirements, did the Court employ Mathews. Id. at 844. ¶ 57 Stout may be imprisoned for life, but today the majority denies him his basic due process right to defend himself by confronting witnesses against him. Both the United States Supreme Court and the Washington State Supreme Court recognize fundamental due process protections for any involuntary commitment proceeding, whether civil or criminal. The right to confront adverse witnesses is a fundamental protection that must be enforced. ¶ 58 And I dissent.