Opinion ID: 2539725
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Habitual-Offender Status and Prosecutorial Vindictiveness

Text: In his second and third points on appeal, Phavixay contends both that the State engaged in prosecutorial vindictiveness when it amended the information to include a habitual-offender charge and that the circuit court erred in giving the jury the habitual-offender instruction. Phavixay claims that he was essentially punished for exercising his right to appeal, resulting in a violation of his due-process rights. As previously noted, Phavixay pled guilty to eight other felony drug charges during the pendency of the first appeal. After his first case was reversed and remanded, the State used these felony convictions to amend the information, alleging that Phavixay was subject to punishment as a habitual offender, pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501 (Repl. 2006). [2] Phavixay contends that, had he not been serving the thirty-two-year sentence he received after the first trial, he likely would have never pled guilty to the eight felony convictions. While this may be true, Phavixay's second thoughts about his guilty pleas have no bearing on whether the circuit court properly instructed the jury regarding the habitual-offender enhancement. Phavixay further contends that the circuit court erred when it allowed the prosecution to engage in prosecutorial vindictiveness when it pursued sentencing under the habitual-offender statute. He claims that the State amended the information to reflect his felony convictions for the purpose of punishing him for exercising his right to appeal. This court reviews a circuit court's decision regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness for clear error. Gardner v. State, 332 Ark. 33, 963 S.W.2d 590 (1998). There are two methods whereby a criminal defendant may establish a claim for prosecutorial vindictiveness. First, the defendant may establish actual vindictiveness by prov[ing] objectively that the prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do. Gardner, 332 Ark. at 44, 963 S.W.2d at 596 (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 384, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)). This is an extremely difficult burden for the defendant to satisfy, given that it involves proving the prosecutor's state of mind. Gardner, supra . Next, a criminal defendant may contend that there is a presumption of vindictiveness when a prosecutor substitutes a more serious charge for the original one, thus subjecting [the defendant] to a significantly increased potential period for incarceration following the defendant's exercise of his or her right to appeal. See Gardner, 332 Ark. at 45, 963 S.W.2d at 596 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 28, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628 (1974)). We must first determine whether vindictiveness led to the filing of the amended felony information, which subjected Phavixay to the potential for an increased sentence. Phavixay has failed to establish that the State acted with actual vindictiveness when it amended the felony information to allege that he was subjected to punishment as a habitual offender. The State is entitled to amend an information at any time prior to the case being submitted to the jury so long as the amendment does not change the nature or the degree of the offense charged or create unfair surprise. E.g., DeAsis v. State, 360 Ark. 286, 200 S.W.3d 911 (2005). Phavixay does not claim unfair surprise; indeed, he was well aware of the habitual-offender charge prior to trial. Moreover, the fact that an amendment authorizes a more severe penalty does not change the nature or degree of the offense. E.g., Kilgore v. State, 313 Ark. 198, 852 S.W.2d 810 (1993). Phavixay presented no evidence to the circuit court that the prosecutor amended the information to punish Phavixay for exercising his right to appeal. Next, we must consider whether there is a presumption of vindictiveness. Here, Phavixay has established a prima facie due-process violation by showing that the State amended the information so as to expose him to a greater range of punishment following his successful appeal. See Gardner, supra . We must now determine whether the State sufficiently rebutted the presumption of vindictiveness. Our decision in Townsend v. State, 355 Ark. 248, 134 S.W.3d 545 (2003), is instructive. In that case, the State rebutted the appellant's presumption of vindictiveness by showing that the allegations contained in the amended information were not available prior to the appellant's first trial. Specifically, the appellant had not been convicted of aggravated robbery or rape prior to his first trial; those convictions stemmed from a separate, subsequent trial held on separate charges. Those convictions were available for enhancement purposes, however, at the time of the appellant's second trial. We concluded that the State had rebutted the presumption of vindictiveness because it was impossible to proceed on the enhanced-sentencing charge at the time of the first trial. Likewise, in the instant case, the allegations supporting the habitual-offender amendment, the eight subsequent felonies to which Phavixay pled guilty, were not available prior to Phavixay's first trial. Because it was impossible to proceed on the enhanced-sentencing charge at Phavixay's first trial, we conclude that the State has rebutted the presumption of vindictiveness. The circuit court did not clearly err in finding that Phavixay failed to demonstrate prosecutorial vindictiveness. [3] We now consider Phavixay's contention that the circuit court erred in giving the jury the habitual-offender instruction. A defendant who is convicted of a felony and who has previously been convicted of four or more felonies may be sentenced to an extended term of punishment. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-501(b). In this case, after Phavixay was found guilty of felony delivery of methamphetamine, the State presented evidence that Phavixay had been previously convicted of eight felonies. Thus, Phavixay was clearly eligible for an enhanced sentence. We hold that the circuit court did not err in instructing the jury of Phavixay's habitual-offender status.