Opinion ID: 1301352
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the majority's nuisance analysis is wrong

Text: The majority does not expressly state that it is employing nuisance law, but it does. The majority holds: The trial court went too far in issuing an injunction providing that `defendants are hereby restrained and enjoined from entering upon plaintiff's private property to exercise their expressions of opinion or to gather signatures in the initiative and referendum process without plaintiff's permission or consent.' Clearly they can if they do so reasonably and peaceably. Moreover, plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction to prohibit peaceful solicitation of signatures in the mall or on its walkways that does not substantially interfere with the commercial activity on the premises. The solicitation of signatures of patrons does not in and of itself constitute substantial interference. The public policy behind the signature-gathering process limits equitable enforcement of plaintiff's preferred total exclusion of signature solicitors. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at 1301. (Emphasis added.) The words reasonably and substantially interfere are labels that are used in determining whether a nuisance exists, but they do not apply under trespass law. Although the majority applies nuisance law, the majority provides only a partial statement of this law: In a case in which a very real public interest is at stake    the court should not issue an injunction if it would cause serious injury to the public interest unless without the equitable relief the owner or his equivalent would experience a more serious injury. 307 Or. at 684, 773 P.2d at 1299. The majority should have provided a complete discussion of nuisance law. A private nuisance is an invasion of an individual's interest in the use and enjoyment of land. Raymond v. Southern Pacific Co., 259 Or. 629, 634, 488 P.2d 460 (1971). An interference with the use and enjoyment of land is not actionable unless that interference be both substantial and unreasonable. Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, 184 Or. 336, 348, 198 P.2d 847 (1948) (emphasis added); see also Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., 281 Or. 469, 473, 575 P.2d 164 (1978). A general weighing process is used in determining the existence of a nuisance. See Gronn et ux v. Rogers Construction, Inc., 221 Or. 226, 232-33, 350 P.2d 1086 (1960). Whether a particular use of property constitutes an actionable nuisance cannot be determined by fixed general rules but depends on the individual facts of a particular case. Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 473, 575 P.2d 164. This court, however, has used a number of guidelines in assessing each fact situation. [8] See Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 473, 575 P.2d 164; Gronn et ux v. Rogers Construction, Inc., supra, 221 Or. at 233, 350 P.2d 1086; York v. Stallings, 217 Or. 13, 21-22, 341 P.2d 529 (1959); Amphitheaters, Inc. v. Portland Meadows, supra, 184 Or. at 361, 198 P.2d 847. An injunction does not issue as a matter of absolute or unqualified right once a nuisance has been established. Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 478, 575 P.2d 164. Rather, the court employs a second balancing test to determine whether a defendant's conduct should be enjoined. See Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 478-80, 575 P.2d 164; York v. Stallings, supra, 217 Or. at 22-26, 341 P.2d 529. York refers to this second weighing process as the balancing doctrine. Although York does not clearly define the balancing doctrine, a close reading of the case shows that this doctrine involves two components  the relative injuries to the parties (the comparative injury doctrine, see 217 Or. at 23, 341 P.2d 529) and to the interest of the public. The comparative injury doctrine provides that a court may refuse an injunction in certain cases where the hardship caused to the defendant by the injunction would greatly outweigh the benefit resulting to the plaintiff. York v. Stallings, supra, 217 Or. at 22, 341 P.2d 529 (emphasis added); see also Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 478, 575 P.2d 164. York does not specifically state how the interest of the public factors into the balancing process. The public interest, however, must rise to the level of an important public interest before it will be given significant weight in the balancing process. See Jewett v. Deerhorn Enterprises, Inc., supra, 281 Or. at 479, 575 P.2d 164. Furthermore, the public interest should be protected only from serious inconvenience or loss. See York v. Stallings, supra, 217 Or. at 24, 341 P.2d 529. Accordingly, in this respect, a plaintiff's request for an injunction should be denied only if enjoining a defendant's conduct would amount to a serious public inconvenience or loss. Thus, in York, the court ordered that the case be remanded for further testimony concerning, inter alia, the feasibility of transporting the sawdust to another place for burning or disposal and whether such a program would be so burdensome as to cause a shut-down of the defendants' mill. 217 Or. at 26, 341 P.2d 529. [9] To be sure, a court need not decide whether to grant an injunction if there is no substantial and unreasonable interference with an individual's use and enjoyment of land; that is, if there is no nuisance. The majority, however, needlessly reaches the public interest issue because its nuisance analysis is backwards. A proper nuisance analysis first analyzes whether a nuisance exists, that is, whether there is a substantial and unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of land. Only if a nuisance exists does the analysis continue. The next step in the analysis is application of the comparative injury doctrine. The final step is determining whether there is serious public loss or inconvenience. The majority, however, begins with a discussion of the public interest at issue, [10] and concludes by stating:    Clearly [defendants] can [exercise their expression of opinion or gather petition signatures upon plaintiff's private property without plaintiff's consent] if [defendants] do so reasonably and peaceably. Moreover, plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction to prohibit peaceful solicitation of signatures in the mall or on its walkways that does not substantially interfere with the commercial activity on the premises. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at at 1301. (Emphasis added.) This is just another way of saying that plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction for intrusions that do not constitute a nuisance. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the majority's analysis turns on whether a nuisance exists. Apparently, the majority believes that plaintiff is entitled to an injunction for signature-gathering activity that constitutes a nuisance: The record reveals that some of the signature-gathering activity does temporarily interfere with the commercial activity at the Center. Some gatherers apparently `buttonhole' potential customers and others set up card tables in heavily trafficked areas to facilitate the project at hand. Such obtrusive activity can be enjoined. But not all petition signature-gathering activity on plaintiff's premises can be enjoined. 307 Or. at 687, 773 P.2d at 1301. (Emphasis in original.) Thus, for signature-gathering activity [that] does temporarily interfere with the commercial activity at the Center, the majority holds, without analysis, that (1) such activity constitutes a nuisance; (2) the comparative injury doctrine is decided in plaintiff's favor; and (3) enjoining such activity would cause no serious public loss or inconvenience. At bottom, the majority badly confuses nuisance law. [11] It is, however, clear that the majority's analysis thus turns on the first step of a nuisance analysis  whether a nuisance exists. Accordingly, the majority's discussion of the public interest is entirely unnecessary and irrelevant, and therefore constitutes dicta.