Opinion ID: 2301560
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Legislation

Text: [¶ 38] Having concluded that the most recent legislation applies to this matter, we now consider our role in interpreting and applying that legislation as an appellate court. The United States Supreme Court addressed this narrow issue in the early nineteenth century: It is in the general true that the province of an appellate court is only to inquire whether a judgment when rendered was erroneous or not. But if, subsequent to the judgment, and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation is denied. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S.(1 Cranch) 103, 110, 2 L.Ed. 49 (1801). In such circumstances, [i]t is the obligation of the last court in the hierarchy that rules on the case to give effect to [the] latest enactment, even when that has the effect of overturning the judgment of an inferior court, since each court, at every level, must decide according to existing laws. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344, 120 S.Ct. 2246, 147 L.Ed.2d 326 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). [¶ 39] In Schooner Peggy, the Supreme Court vacated a judgment condemning a vessel and then independently interpreted a newly applicable treaty with France to require that the vessel be restored to France. 5 U.S. at 108-10. By contrast, we recently remanded a matter for the trial court to conduct further proceedings based on legislation that took effect after the entry of the trial court's judgment because the newly enacted statute authorized an entire process that had not been afforded to the appellant under the earlier statute. Morrill, 2009 ME 116, ¶¶ 2-3, 6-8, 983 A.2d 1065. Accordingly, when legislation enacted after the entry of a trial court's judgment has been found to be applicable to the dispute, we will resolve any purely legal issues based on our interpretation and application of the law to the facts found by the trial court, see Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. at 110, but if any further factual findings or adjudicatory proceedings are required, we will remand the matter to the trial court, see Miller, 530 U.S. at 344, 120 S.Ct. 2246. [¶ 40] We therefore begin by considering the undisputed factual findings of the Superior Court to determine whether, as a matter of law, each of the counties imposed a reasonable fee of up to $1.50 per page for digital copies in response to MacImage's and Simpson's requests. P.L. 2011, ch. 378, § 3. If any of the counties have failed to meet this requirement, we will remand the matter for appropriate action. [¶ 41] Applying the test set forth by the Legislature, four of the countiesAndroscoggin, Cumberland, Knox, and Yorkoffered a bulk download of digital images for less than $1.50 per page, taking into account the per-page cost of flat fees imposed to cover county costs for technical assistance. Thus, with respect to these four counties, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand for entry of judgment in favor of these counties. [¶ 42] The other two counties that have appealedAroostook and Penobscotoffered access to digital land records on their websites for a cost of less than $1.50 per page [12] but did not offer to provide digital copies of their indexes in response to the MacImage and Simpson requests. Because further proceedings are necessary, we remand those matters to the Superior Court.