Opinion ID: 795103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clearly Established Law on Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 94 The Supreme Court first articulated the now familiar two part test for determining whether counsel is ineffective in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and [i]t is past question that the rule set forth in Strickland qualifies as `clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.' Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Under Strickland, a defendant seeking to establish that his counsel's assistance was ineffective must show: (1) that his counsel's performance was deficient, in other words, that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) that the defense was prejudiced by the attorney's deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In establishing prejudice, a defendant need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome of the case, but only, that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 95 In Strickland, the Court dealt specifically with a claim that counsel's failure to investigate and present mitigation evidence constituted deficient performance. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Court explained that while strategic choices made after a through investigation are virtually unchallengeable; . . . strategic choices made after a less than complete investigation are reasonably precise to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigation or to make a reasonable decision that a particular investigation is unnecessary. Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, it follows that any decision to forgo mitigation evidence is unreasonable if not made after a reasonable decision not to investigate further. See id. 96 The Supreme Court has now applied Strickland in the AEDPA context at least three times to hold that a defense attorney's failure to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (June 20, 2005); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003); Williams, 529 U.S. at 390, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In these cases, the Court has reiterated that trial counsel has an obligation to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background in death penalty cases. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (citing ABA guidelines advising attorneys to conduct thorough investigations); Williams, 529 U.S. at 396, 120 S.Ct. 1495. In this context, the Court has warned against a tendency to invoke strategy as a  post-hoc rationalization of counsel's conduct [rather] than an accurate description of their deliberations prior to sentencing to explain counsel's decisions. Id. at 527, 123 S.Ct. 2527. 97 E. The Ohio Courts' Decisions Were Contrary to and an Unreasonable Application of Clearly Established Federal Law 98 The Ohio courts' denial of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim was both contrary to and an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law as articulated by the Supreme Court in Strickland. Under Strickland, counsel's failure to present any mitigation evidence without first conducting an investigation is considered deficient performance. 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Thus, the Ohio courts' holding that Petitioner's counsel made a strategic decision not to present mitigation evidence despite his unreasonable failure to conduct any investigation is contrary to Strickland. Similarly, the Ohio courts' determination that counsel's submission of the presentence report and Dr. Schonberg's evaluation was reasonable trial strategy constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland. Because the overwhelming majority of the reports contained information that was prejudicial as opposed to beneficial, counsel's decision fell below an objective standard of reasonableness as evidenced by prevailing professional norms. Together, these errors prejudiced Petitioner because there is a reasonable probability that but for the errors one juror might have decided to sentence Petitioner to life, not death.
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100 Counsel's complete failure to investigate before deciding not to present mitigating evidence at sentencing is deficient performance as a matter of law under Supreme Court case law, and thus, the Ohio courts' determination that counsel did not err is contrary to Federal law as articulated in Strickland. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The Ohio courts all determined that counsel's failure to present mitigation evidence was strategic. They reasoned that presenting mitigation evidence was incompatible with a claim of innocence. Putting aside the dubious proposition that mitigation and innocence are inconsistent, the Ohio courts' reasoning must be rejected because counsel's strategic decision not to present mitigation evidence is only protected under Strickland to the extent the decision followed a reasonable investigation. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. It is uncontested in this case that Mr. Banks conducted absolutely no investigation. Therefore, his decision not to present mitigation evidence constituted deficient performance. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 101
102 Counsel's decision to submit the psychological and pre-sentence reports fell far below the standard of attorney conduct articulated in Strickland: reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Thus, the Ohio court's holding to the contrary constitutes an unreasonable application of Strickland. 103 According to ABA guidelines, counsel in death penalty cases have an obligation to consider the strategic implications of requesting a pre-sentence report where such reports are optional. ABA Guidelines, Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 10.12(A)(1); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (stating that ABA standards are guides to prevailing professional norms); see also Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The commentary following Guideline 10.12 expressly notes that requesting such a report in Ohio may amount to ineffective assistance of counsel because it allows the prosecution to present a defendant's prior record and victim impact evidence, where such information would otherwise be inadmissible. ABA Guideline 10.12 and accompanying commentary; Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.03(D) (stating that only a defendant may request reports). Additionally, Guideline 10.12 states that counsel should . . . provide to the report preparer information favorable to the client [and] . . . take appropriate steps to ensure that improper, incorrect or misleading information that may harm the client is deleted from the report. 104 In this case, Mr. Banks conduct fell well below the standards set forth in ABA Guideline 10.12. In the first place, considering the information contained in the reports, it is highly unlikely that Mr. Banks considered the strategic implications of placing the reports before the jury. No reasonable defense attorney could actually read these reports and determine that there was anything to be gained by submitting them as evidence at the mitigation stage. As discussed above, the reports contained pages documenting Petitioner's prior record, impact on the victims and their families, evidence implicating Petitioner, erroneous statements about Petitioner's background and childhood, and a psychologist's conclusion that no mitigating factors existed. In contrast, the report contained one sentence on Petitioner's version of the events. Additionally, Dr. Schonberg's report stated that Petitioner was not depressed, which a jury could easily interpret as evidence of lack of remorse. Finally, Dr. Schonberg also made the outrageous statement that no mitigating factors existed. This is exactly what the jury, not Dr. Schonberg, was convened to determine. No reasonable attorney could conclude that the mitigating value of the report outweighed the introduction of the prejudicial evidence simply because the report also contained a handful of positive sentences about the Petitioner. 105 The Ohio courts' determination to the contrary is an unreasonable application of Strickland. The Ohio courts found that the decision of counsel to submit the reports was strategic. Strickland, however, warns courts not to accept post-hoc rationalizations for counsel's conduct. The Ohio courts' justification of counsel's conduct is just such a rationalization. There is absolutely no support in the record evidencing that Mr. Banks considered the implications of submitting the reports. Moreover, as explained above, counsel's decision, to the extent it was even a conscious decision, was not a reasonable strategy. 106 Next, there is no evidence that Mr. Banks made any effort to provide favorable information to the probation officer who prepared the pre-sentence report. As will be discussed more thoroughly in the section below on prejudice, post-conviction counsel discovered relevant mitigation evidence that should have been presented at trial. Mr. Banks failed to have this information included in the pre-sentence report. Thus, the jury never heard the evidence. 107 Finally, Mr. Banks made no effort to insure that the information contained in the report was accurate. Again, as will be discussed below, the reports submitted to the jury contained information that conflicted with information discovered by the post-conviction counsel. Because of counsel's failure to correct the erroneous information, the jury received inaccurate and prejudicial information about Petitioner's life.
108 Counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence and his submission of the psychological and presentence reports prejudiced Petitioner. To demonstrate prejudice under Strickland, Petitioner must show that but for counsel's errors there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Under Ohio law, a jury verdict sentencing a defendant to death must be unanimous. State v. Robb, 88 Ohio St.3d 59, 723 N.E.2d 1019, 1044 (2000). Thus, to demonstrate prejudice in this case, Petitioner need only show that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability that one juror would have voted differently. 109 In this case, there is a reasonable probability that one juror would have spared Petitioner's life if the jury had not received Petitioner's prior record or the victim impact evidence contained in the reports and instead received mitigation evidence. Under Ohio law, neither a defendant's prior record nor victim impact evidence is admissible to prove aggravation. See Ohio Rev.Code § 2929.04; State v. Jackson, 92 Ohio St.3d 436, 751 N.E.2d 946, 957 (2001) (limiting aggravating factors to statutory aggravating factors that have been charged and proved beyond a reasonable doubt). Thus, but for counsel's submission of the reports, the jury would not have had access to Petitioner's record of the victims' trauma. See ABA Guideline 10.12 and accompanying commentary. Furthermore, the jury clearly considered Petitioner's prior record in its deliberations. The jury's prejudicial consideration of Petitioner's prior record is evidenced by a question the jury submitted to the court during its sentencing deliberations. The jury asked the court to verify the dates of Petitioner's imprisonment for a prior robbery. Petitioner's prior record very clearly affected the jury's deliberations, and thus, there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's submission of the reports, one juror would have voted to recommend sentencing Petitioner to life imprisonment instead of death. 110 Had defense counsel acted as competent counsel, the jury would have heard mitigating evidence concerning Petitioner in place of the victim impact evidence and Petitioner's prior record. The jury would have known and been able to consider the information obtained by post-conviction counsel, namely, that Petitioner's mother was an alcoholic who drank during her pregnancies; that Social Services determined that Petitioner's mother neglected him and placed him with his grandparents; that Petitioner's grandfather abused at least one of Petitioner's half-siblings and probably abused the other children, presumably including Petitioner; 1 and that Petitioner's custodial grandmother was a convicted murderer. See Rompilla, 125 S.Ct. at 2468-69 (finding prejudice where evidence that Petitioner was abused and that his mother was an alcoholic was not presented at the mitigation hearing). 111 The majority's assertion that the mitigation evidence duplicated information already submitted to the jury through the reports is simply incorrect. First, Dr. Schonberg's report states that Petitioner's family had no history of alcoholism. In fact, Petitioner's mother admits that she was an alcoholic who drank while she was pregnant. Additionally, there is substantial evidence of drug abuse in Petitioner's family. Second, the reports do not state that Ohio Social Services found that Petitioner's mother was not fit to care for him. Instead, the pre-sentence report states, [Petitioner] was raised by his grandfather . . . due to the fact that his mother was too young. This statement implies that Petitioner's mother voluntarily relinquished him to her parents and not that Social Services had to come and take him away. 2 Finally, Dr. Schonberg's report states that Petitioner was not abused. While it is not clearly established that Petitioner was abused, there is evidence suggesting abuse. This evidence could have been further developed if the post-conviction trial court had allowed post-conviction counsel to present evidence at a hearing. 112 In light of counsel's submission of extremely prejudicial evidence and counsel's failure to submit mitigation evidence, there is certainly a reasonable probability that but for counsel's errors one juror would have chosen to sentence Petitioner to life and not death.