Opinion ID: 4519774
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to file a suppression motion

Text: Mr. Waldron argues that his counsel should have moved to suppress the evidence because it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Claim 11). The district court held there was no ineffective assistance. It explained: Mr. Waldron signed an agreement in connection with his parole in which he expressly consented to searches by parole officers of his person, property, residence, or personal effects with or without cause. (1:19-cv-82, Dkt. No. 5, Ex. A.) The evidence which Mr. Waldron would seek to suppress was all discovered in the course of a lawful search, consistent with that agreement. ROA, Vol. II at 369. Mr. Waldron’s parole agreement with the Utah State Board of Pardons and Parole included the following: I know that I am subject to, and I will allow at any time, the search or seizure of my person, property, personal effects, place of residence, or vehicle by AP&P or a law enforcement officer. I understand that such a search may be with or without a warrant and with or without cause. Id. at 319. This court has previously determined that the Utah law governing parole searches complies with the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 11 1193, 1199 (10th Cir. 2002); United States v. Lewis, 71 F.3d 358, 362 (10th Cir. 1995). “Generally, a condition of parole that permits warrantless searches provides officers with the limited authority to enter and search a house where the parolee resides, even if others also reside there.” Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. King, 687 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2012). Mr. Waldron argues on appeal that law enforcement officers exceeded the scope of the search authorized in the parole agreement because they looked at his Codefendant’s belongings, including women’s clothing, before they found the evidence used against him. But the parole agreement authorized a search of his residence, and that is what the officers did. The trial transcript shows that officers searched in areas of the home subject to Mr. Waldron’s sole or common control. See Dist. Ct. Docs. 177, 178; United States v. Cantley, 130 F.3d 1371, 1377 (10th Cir. 1997) (upholding parole search that was limited to “the common areas of the residence and the one bedroom [the defendant] had previously identified as his”). And the parties stipulated at trial that the search was “legal and lawful.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 177 at 125. Any objection to a search of the Codefendant’s personal effects must come from her. As the district court explained, Mr. Waldron lacked standing to make that objection. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978). Failure to Address Statutes Mr. Waldron presented several arguments in his § 2255 motion on his actual innocence claim, including challenges to his convictions under 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 931. In his brief here, he does not seek a COA to appeal the denial of his actual 12 innocence claim. But in his discussion of his claim that counsel failed to research certain statutes (Claims 9 and 10), he contends the district court erred in “failing to make findings” regarding §§ 924(c)(1)(A) and 931. Although the district court did not specifically address these statutes when it denied his actual innocence claim, we deny a COA on this assertion of error because his arguments are so lacking in merit that no reasonable jurist could debate the district court’s denial of his ineffective assistance and his actual innocence claims. a. Section 924(c)(1)(A) The jury convicted Mr. Waldron of Count 5 of the superseding indictment, which charged him under § 924(c)(1)(A). That provision states: Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime (including a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime that provides for an enhanced punishment if committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon or device) for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States, uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime— . . . . The statute goes on to list different mandatory minimum sentences depending on the type of firearm used, the manner of the firearm’s involvement, and whether the conviction involves a single, first-time offense. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A), (B), and (C). In his § 2255 motion, Mr. Waldron argued that his § 924(c)(1)(A) charge should be dismissed under the “except” clause of the statute because “a greater 13 minimum sentence was provided by all of the other included counts, which provided a minimum sentence of 144 months for counts 1, 3, 4, and 7.” ROA, Vol. II at 57. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8, 13 (2010): We hold, in accord with the courts below, and in line with the majority of the Courts of Appeals, that a defendant is subject to a mandatory, consecutive sentence for a § 924(c) conviction, and is not spared from that sentence by virtue of receiving a higher mandatory minimum on a different count of conviction. Under the “except” clause as we comprehend it, a § 924(c) offender is not subject to stacked sentences for violating § 924(c). If he possessed, brandished, and discharged a gun, the mandatory penalty would be 10 years, not 22. He is, however, subject to the highest mandatory minimum specified for his conduct in § 924(c), unless another provision of law directed to conduct proscribed by § 924(c) imposes an even greater mandatory minimum. In United States v. Villa, 589 F.3d 1334, 1343 (10th Cir. 2009), we held similarly: “Today we join the majority of those courts and hold that the prefatory clause to § 924(c) refers only to a minimum sentence provided by § 924(c) or any other statutory provision that proscribes the conduct set forth in § 924(c).” Mr. Waldron’s challenge plainly fails and does not deserve a COA. 3 3 He alternatively argued in his § 2255 motion that “this count must be dismissed because [he] is actually innocent of this charge” because his Codefendant confessed to sole knowledge and possession of the contraband under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and because there was no evidence he knew of the contraband other than his Codefendant’s perjured statement. ROA, Vol. II at 57-58. But in rejecting his actual innocence claim, the district court said “he ha[d] not provided the court with any new evidence that was not presented at trial, as required by” United States v. Cervini, 379 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 2004). Id. at 370. Moreover, as noted above, Mr. Waldron does not argue actual innocence in his brief to this court. 14 b. Section 931 The jury convicted Mr. Waldron of Count 7 of the superseding indictment, which charged him under 18 U.S.C. § 931. The statute makes it “unlawful for a person to purchase, own, or possess body armor, if that person has been convicted of a felony that is a crime of violence (as defined in section 16).” 18 U.S.C. § 931(a)(1). Section 16 defines a crime of violence as: (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another, or (b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. Id. § 16. Mr. Waldron asserted in his § 2255 motion that “[t]he Supreme Court recently struck down 18 U.S.C. § 16 as unconstitutionally vague in Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018).” ROA, Vol. II at 59. But the Supreme Court invalidated § 16(b), the residual clause, leaving § 16(a) intact. See United States v. Salas, 889 F.3d 681, 684 (10th Cir. 2018). And the presentence report listed Mr. Waldron’s prior convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated assault, which he did not contest as satisfying the “crime of violence” element under 18 U.S.C. §§ 931 and 16(a). Mr. Waldron’s argument again lacks any merit and does not warrant a COA. 4 4 Mr. Waldron also argued in district court that he is actually innocent of violating § 931. This argument fails here for the same reasons stated above as to § 924(c)(1)(A). 15 Evidentiary Hearing Mr. Waldron argues that he should have received an evidentiary hearing in district court. “We review the district court’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing for an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Moya, 676 F.3d 1211, 1214 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotations omitted). In his § 2255 motion, Mr. Waldron posited that “[a]n evidentiary hearing is requested as being necessary to ascertain whether counsel should have requested a copy of the alleged anonymous tip to assert its actual existance [sic] and specification to support the required reasonable suspicion to warrant a full scale raid of Mrs. Moores [sic] home.” ROA, Vol. II at 23. Mr. Waldron has not argued for a COA on the issue of whether his counsel was ineffective for failure to investigate the anonymous tip. In that regard, his request for an evidentiary hearing is moot. To the extent he is making a broader request for an evidentiary hearing in his appellate brief, he did not preserve the issue in district court, and his only argument is that “[s]ome of these claims involve ultimate facts requiring an evidentiary hearing to get to the heart of the matter.” Aplt. Br. at 12. He does not identify which claims merit an evidentiary hearing, and he does not explain how any of his claims would benefit from one. We see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s not conducting an evidentiary hearing. 16