Opinion ID: 222925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of the Postjudgment Motion

Text: Williams also argues that the district court erred by denying the postjudgment motion. We review the district court's denial of a postjudgment motion for leave to replead for abuse of discretion. See In re Assicurazioni Generali, S.P.A., 592 F.3d 113, 120 (2d Cir.2010); Ruotolo v. City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir.2008). A district court abuses its discretion when its ruling rests on an error of law or cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2001). In reviewing the district court's denial of this motion, we are mindful of the nature of the relief that Williams sought: namely, leave to amend her complaint. In the ordinary course, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that courts should freely give leave to amend a complaint when justice so requires. Fed. R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2). This permissive standard is consistent with our strong preference for resolving disputes on the merits. New York v. Green, 420 F.3d 99, 104 (2d Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, however, a party does not seek leave to file an amended complaint until after judgment is entered, Rule 15's liberality must be tempered by considerations of finality. As a procedural matter, [a] party seeking to file an amended complaint postjudgment must first have the judgment vacated or set aside pursuant to [Rules] 59(e) or 60(b). Ruotolo, 514 F.3d at 191; see also Nat'l Petrochem. Co. of Iran v. M/T Stolt Sheaf, 930 F.2d 240, 245 (2d Cir.1991) (Unless there is a valid basis to vacate the previously entered judgment, it would be contradictory to entertain a motion to amend the complaint.). [T]o hold otherwise would enable the liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a) to be employed in a way that is contrary to the philosophy favoring finality of judgments and the expeditious termination of litigation. Nat'l Petrochem., 930 F.2d at 245 (quoting 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1489 (2d ed.1990)). The standards we have developed for evaluating postjudgment motions generally place significant emphasis on the value of finality and repose. In re Frigitemp Corp., 781 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir.1986). Our precedents make clear, however, that considerations of finality do not always foreclose the possibility of amendment, even when leave to replead is not sought until after the entry of judgment. Thus, we have stated that in view of the provision in rule 15(a) that `leave [to amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires,' it might be appropriate in a proper case to take into account the nature of the proposed amendment in deciding whether to vacate the previously entered judgment. Ruotolo, 514 F.3d at 191 (alteration in original) (quoting earlier version of Rule 15) (other internal quotation marks omitted); see also State Trading Corp. of India, Ltd. v. Assuranceforeningen Skuld, 921 F.2d 409, 418 (2d Cir.1990) (When the moving party has had an opportunity to assert the amendment earlier, but has waited until after judgment before requesting leave, a court may exercise its discretion [to grant leave to amend] more exactingly.). Under these formulations, postjudgment motions for leave to replead must be evaluated with due regard to both the value of finality and the policies embodied in Rule 15. Particularly instructive in this respect is the Supreme Court's decision in Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962). Foman involved an action to enforce an alleged oral agreement regarding the amount that the plaintiff stood to inherit from her father's estate. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on the ground that the alleged oral agreement was unenforceable under the statute of frauds. The day after judgment was entered, the plaintiff moved to vacate the judgment and to amend her complaint to seek recovery in quantum meruit. The district court denied that motion. Id. at 179, 83 S.Ct. 227. The Supreme Court reversed, construing the motion to vacate as filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) and holding that the district court abused its discretion in denying leave: Rule 15(a) declares that leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so requires; this mandate is to be heeded. If the underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded an opportunity to test his claim on the merits. In the absence of any apparent or declared reasonsuch as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely given. Of course, the grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the District Court, but outright refusal to grant the leave without any justifying reason appearing for the denial is not an exercise of discretion; it is merely abuse of that discretion and inconsistent with the spirit of the Federal Rules. Id. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227 (citation omitted). Against this background, we turn to the district court's stated reason for denying the postjudgment motion for leave to replead. The district court wrote in explanation, Plaintiff ... does not explain why she should be granted leave to replead at this stage when she failed to request an opportunity to replead in the first instance. App. 44. We conclude that the denial of the motion for this reason was not a proper exercise of the district court's discretion, as the district court applied a standard that cannot be reconciled with the Supreme Court's holding in Foman. The district court apparently believed that a motion for leave to replead is not timely unless made in the first instance. The court did not explain precisely what it meant by in the first instance. In the circumstances of this case, however, it can only have meant one of two things: that the plaintiff was under obligation to seek leave to replead either immediately upon answering the motion to dismiss the complaint (without yet knowing whether the court will grant the motion, or, if so, on what ground), or immediately upon receipt of the court's ruling granting the motion and prior to the entry of judgment thereupon. Regardless which of the two the court had in mind, Foman makes unmistakably clear there is no such rule. The plaintiff in Foman did not seek leave to replead either together with her response to the motion to dismiss, or indeed prior to the district court's entry of judgment. The motion was made postjudgment. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court, identifying undue delay as an appropriate reason that might be given for denial of such a motion, ruled that the district court abused its discretion and violated the liberal spirit of Rule 15 by denying the motion. The Foman holding cannot be reconciled with the proposition that the liberal spirit of Rule 15 necessarily dissolves as soon as final judgment is entered. Citigroup also argues that the denial of the postjudgment motion was justified on the ground that the proposed amendments would not remedy the deficiencies in Williams's claims. It is well established that [l]eave to amend need not be granted ... where the proposed amendment would be `futil[e].' Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 18 (2d Cir.1997) (second alteration in original) (quoting Foman, 371 U.S. at 182, 83 S.Ct. 227). Therefore, on remand, the district court should address whether the proposed amendments would be futile. See, e.g., Ronzani v. Sanofi S.A., 899 F.2d 195, 198-99 (2d Cir.1990). [3]