Opinion ID: 656960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Greene's negligence claims.

Text: 11 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA, or Act), 28 U.S.C. Secs. 1346(b), 2671-2680, provides in part: The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674. Since a claim brought under the FTCA is governed by the law of the place where the act or omission occurred, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b), this negligence claim is controlled by the substantive law of Illinois. See, e.g., Campbell v. United States, 904 F.2d 1188, 1191 (7th Cir.1990). Furthermore, the duty of care owed to federal prisoners is established by federal statute, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4042, independent of any inconsistent state rule governing the duty of care owed by state correctional officials to state prisoners. 1 United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 164-65 (1963). 12 Under Illinois law, to recover in negligence the plaintiff must set out sufficient facts establishing the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and an injury proximately resulting from the breach. Vesey v. Chicago Housing Authority, 145 Ill.2d 404, 411, 583 N.E.2d 538, 541 (1991); see Ward v. K Mart Corp., 136 Ill.2d 132, 140, 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (1990). Courts have held that under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 4042, federal prison officials have a duty to exercise ordinary diligence to keep prisoners safe and free from harm. Cowart v. United States, 617 F.2d 112, 116 (5th Cir.) (quoting Jones v. United States, 534 F.2d 53, 54 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978 (1976)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 903 (1980). Under this standard, the government is not an insurer of a prisoner's safety. See id. Correctional officials are thus expected to use ordinary care to protect prisoners from unreasonable risks, not to provide them with a risk-free environment. 2 See id.; Fleishour v. United States, 365 F.2d 126, 128-29 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 987 (1966); see also Flechsig v. United States, 786 F.Supp. 646, 650 (E.D.Ky.1991), aff'd, 991 F.2d 300 (6th Cir.1993); Turner v. Miller, 679 F.Supp. 441, 443 (M.D.Pa.1987); Artis v. Petrovsky, 638 F.Supp. 51, 53 (W.D.Mo.1986). Moreover, in cases where one inmate is assaulted by another, a breach of the duty of ordinary care usually requires a showing that correctional officials knew of a potential problem between the two inmates prior to the assault. 3 See Jones, 534 F.2d at 54; see also Turner, 679 F.Supp. at 443-44; Artis, 638 F.Supp. at 53-54. 13 Greene's own testimony undermines his claims that correctional officials breached their duty of ordinary care in failing to prevent either of the two assaults. On cross-examination, Greene admitted that he had never had any difficulties with Fernandez-Santana, that he had never indicated to correctional officials that he feared Fernandez-Santana, and that he had never requested protective status within the prison or protection from any particular inmate. (Trial Tr. at 17-18, 24, 26). Greene likewise admitted that he had never informed correctional officials that he feared an attack by McCoy. (Trial Tr. at 27). Greene stated that he was surprised by both attacks, having had no particular reason to anticipate either of them. (Trial Tr. at 20, 24, 26-27). Greene failed to bring forward any evidence suggesting heightened tensions within the prison, or a pattern of behavior on the part of either Fernandez-Santana or McCoy that would indicate to prison officials that special vigilance was necessary to prevent the attacks that occurred. 4 The magistrate judge was therefore correct in concluding that Greene had failed to show that correctional officials breached their duty of ordinary care in connection with either of the assaults. 5 See Jones, 534 F.2d at 54; Turner, 679 F.Supp. at 443-44; Artis, 638 F.Supp. at 53-54. 14 Under Illinois law, where a plaintiff has failed to establish that the defendant was negligent, in that the defendant breached a duty he owed to that particular plaintiff, the issue of proof of damages does not arise. Cf. Fisher v. Patel, 93 Ill.App.3d 694, 697, 417 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Ill.App.Ct.1981) (after liability is established, actual damages must be proved); Jeffrey v. Chicago Transit Authority, 37 Ill.App.2d 327, 335-36, 185 N.E.2d 384, 388-89 (Ill.App.Ct.1962) (same). Accordingly, we will not address this issue except to note that the record fully supports the magistrate judge's determination that Greene did not suffer damages as a result of either the water-throwing incident or the altercation in the prison law library. (Exhs. 1 and 3; Trial Tr. at 60-61, 65, 87-90).