Opinion ID: 2283337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: educational fund

Text: Prior to the dissolution decree the defendant had established a custodial savings account for Brian's benefit and had been depositing money to the account at the rate of approximately $1000 per year. The defendant's post-trial financial proposal [5] included a payment of $1000 yearly into an educational fund for Brian with the defendant as custodian. The trial court ordered the defendant to deposit as he had agreed to do $1000 per year into an educational fund. The plaintiff and the defendant are to be joint custodians and joint approval is required for withdrawals. The defendant attacks this order on three grounds: (1) he did not agree to the deposits; (2) it is invalid for lack of a limitation at Brian's eighteenth birthday; and (3) the joint approval provisions are unworkable. The defendant testified that the fund was established and the deposits made by his agreement in early pretrial settlement negotiations following the separation of the parties. The court did not err in concluding that the defendant agreed to make such payments. The legislature of this state has established eighteen years to be the age of majority. General Statutes § 1-1d. Consequently child support orders stemming from a dissolution action may not extend beyond the child's eighteenth birthday. [6] Miller v. Miller, 181 Conn. 610, 613-14, 436 A.2d 279 (1980); Broaca v. Broaca, 181 Conn. 463, 466, 435 A.2d 1016 (1980); Hunter v. Hunter, 177 Conn. 327, 330, 416 A.2d 1201 (1979); Sillman v. Sillman, 168 Conn. 144, 152, 358 A.2d 150 (1975). It is clear that the trial court was conscious of this limitation because, in its unchallenged order to designate Brian as the irrevocable beneficiary of certain life insurance policies, the court ordered the defendant to maintain the policies until Brian is eighteen years old. Neither the periodic child support order nor the educational fund order contain any language terminating payments at age eighteen or continuing payments beyond age eighteen. In order to find error in this order it would be necessary to read into the order language which is not there and which would contravene statutory and case law. This we will not do. With respect to the assertion that the joint approval provision is unworkable, the simple answer is that future cooperation of the parties can only be measured in the future. If the provision proves to be unworkable, the proper approach is to seek modification of the order at that time. General Statutes § 46b-56; Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 100-101, 328 A.2d 691 (1973).