Opinion ID: 1168257
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Statutory Standards

Text: It is against this statutory backdrop that the Court of Appeal's holding that defendant failed to establish good cause for discovery must be evaluated. In determining the question of good cause, however, we do not operate in a decisional vacuum. We have previously held that the Legislature, in adopting the statutory scheme in question, not only reaffirmed but expanded the principles of criminal discovery articulated by this court in the landmark case of Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d 531. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 679, fn. 19, 680 [214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446].) These principles were applied in Pitchess to permit the discovery of police personnel records. (1) As we explained, a criminal defendant's right to discovery is based on the fundamental proposition that [an accused] is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information. ( Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 535.) Pitchess made it clear that an accused ... may compel discovery by demonstrating that the requested information will facilitate the ascertainment of the facts and a fair trial. (11 Cal.3d at p. 536.) In contrast to the detailed showing required by some civil discovery statutes (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1985, 2036), the requisite showing in a criminal matter may be satisfied by general allegations which establish some cause for discovery other than a mere desire for all information in the possession of the prosecution. (11 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537.) The information sought must, however, be requested with adequate specificity to preclude the possibility that defendant is engaging in a `fishing expedition.' ( Id. at p. 538.) Pitchess involved an arrestee who asserted self-defense to a charge of battery on a police officer. The defendant sought discovery of records of prior complaints against the officers concerning the officers' propensity for violence. We held that the information was material, noting that the information could be used to cross-examine the officers at trial and was unquestionably relevant and admissible as character evidence of the officers' tendency to engage in violence. (11 Cal.3d at p. 537; see § 1103.) We recently returned to the issue of materiality for discovery of police records in People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d 658. Memro involved an arrestee who alleged that his confession to a murder had been coerced. He sought discovery of records of prior complaints of violence against the interrogating officers. Applying the materiality standard of section 1043 (informed by the principles set forth in Pitchess ), we held that the defendant had demonstrated good cause for the information requested. (38 Cal.3d at p. 684.) Counsel's declaration asserted that the confession had been coerced. ( Id. at p. 682.) Discovery might lead to admissible evidence that the interrogating officers had a habit or custom of obtaining confessions by use of excessive force. ( Id. at p. 681; see § 1105.) Hence, we concluded that counsel's allegations sufficiently `set forth the materiality' of the requested information. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b)(3).) ( Id. at p. 682.) (2) Applying these same principles to the case at bar, we are similarly persuaded that defendant here has sufficiently demonstrated the materiality of the requested records and information. Defendant is charged with resisting arrest. (Pen. Code, § 148.) The police reports make clear that considerable force was used to effect the arrest. Counsel's declaration asserts that the officers used excessive force so as to make said arrest illegal and otherwise improper. The declaration sets forth, on the basis of information and belief, a specific factual scenario to support that assertion. Counsel avers that she seeks the information relating to prior complaints of excessive force against the arresting officers to show a tendency or propensity on the part of the arresting officers[s] herein to engage in the use of unlawful and excessive force in the execution of the arrests. Viewed in conjunction with the police reports, counsel's averments establish a plausible factual foundation for an allegation of excessive force, put the court on notice that the officers' alleged use of excessive force will likely be an issue at trial, and articulate a valid theory as to how the information sought might be admissible. (See §§ 1103, 1105; Pitchess v. Superior Court, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 537; People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 681-682.) Defendant has plainly demonstrated the materiality of the requested information in satisfaction of section 1043, subdivision (b).
(3a) The Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded that counsel's declaration was inadequate to establish good cause for discovery because it was not based on counsel's personal knowledge of the material facts and averments. [5] This conclusion was unwarranted. Section 1043 contains no requirement of personal knowledge on the part of the affiant. (See People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676.) Indeed, an overwhelming majority of the Courts of Appeal have permitted discovery under section 1043, subdivision (b), based on affidavits containing averments on information and belief. (See, e.g., Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal. App.3d at p. 490; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [206 Cal. Rptr. 82]; Arcelona v. Municipal Court (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 523, 527 [169 Cal. Rptr. 877]; see also People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 676 [holding that § 1043, subd. (b) does not require the personal affidavit of the accused].) Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal in the instant matter, relying on its earlier decision in City of Santa Cruz v. Superior Court, supra, 190 Cal. App.3d 1669, held that a showing of materiality under section 1043, subdivision (b) requires the personal knowledge of the affiant. The court's holding was based on the following reasoning: An affidavit, the court noted, is generally presumed to be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant. Accordingly, an affidavit on information and belief is an anomaly, a contradiction in terms. Since section 1043, subdivision (b) expressly requires an affidavit to show that the information sought is material to the pending litigation, it must implicitly require that such a showing be based on personal knowledge. It is a nice but wholly specious syllogism that the Court of Appeal constructs, for it rests on false assumptions. It assumes, incorrectly, that an affidavit cannot contain allegations on the basis of information and belief (or hearsay) and that an affidavit which does has no legal significance. Of course, it is true that an affidavit is normally presumed to state matters personally known to the affiant and lacks evidentiary value, in a variety of civil contexts, when based on information and belief, or hearsay. (See, e.g., Star Motor Imports, Inc. v. Superior Court (1979) 88 Cal. App.3d 201 [151 Cal. Rptr. 721] [an affidavit in support of a petition for writ of mandate must be based on personal knowledge].) It is decidedly not true, however, that an affidavit upon information and belief is an anomaly in the law, bereft of legal significance. On the contrary, as the United States Supreme Court has stated, the value of averments on information and belief in the procedure of the law is recognized. ( Berger v. United States (1921) 255 U.S. 22, 34 [65 L.Ed. 481, 486, 41 S.Ct. 230].) Indeed, there are numerous exceptions to the general rule prohibiting affidavits on information and belief, either where the facts to be established are incapable of positive averment, or where expressly permitted by statute. (See generally 3 DeMeo, Cal. Deposition & Discovery Practice, § 15.01(29), p. 15.01-44; 3 Am.Jur.2d, Affidavits, §§ 22, 23, pp. 482-485.) As this court explained in Brown v. Happy Valley Fruit Growers (1929) 206 Cal. 515, 520-521 [274 P. 977], `Whenever the statute, either in express terms or by implication, requires a person to make a statement which from the very nature of things can only be made on information and belief, an affidavit in that form meets the demands of the statute.' Thus, courts have long held that affidavits on information and belief may be sufficient in a variety of contexts where the facts would otherwise be difficult or impossible to establish. (See, e.g., Berger v. United States, supra, 255 U.S. at pp. 33-34 [65 L.Ed.2d at pp. 485-486] [affidavit on information and belief sufficient to support a motion for disqualification of a trial judge]; Blackman v. MacCoy (1959) 169 Cal. App.2d 873, 879-880 [338 P.2d 234] [affidavit on information and belief sufficient to support disqualification motion pursuant to Code Civ. Proc., § 170]; Brown v. Happy Valley Fruit Growers, supra, 206 Cal. at pp. 520-521; [affidavit on information and belief adequate to support change of venue motion]; Davis-Heller-Pearce Co. v. Ramont (1924) 66 Cal. App. 778, 780 [226 P. 972] [affidavit on information and belief sufficient to support motion to quash service]; People v. Smith (1976) 17 Cal.3d 845, 850 [132 Cal. Rptr. 397, 553 P.2d 557] [police officer's affidavit based on informant's statements sufficient for issuance of search warrant].) Moreover, the Legislature may expressly authorize the use of affidavits on information and belief to support a particular pleading or motion. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 431.30 [affidavit on information and belief adequate for denial of allegations in complaint]; Code Civ. Proc., § 446 [affidavit on information and belief sufficient for verification of pleadings]; Code Civ. Proc., § 482.040 [affidavit on information and belief adequate to support application for writ of attachment].) Of course, the Legislature may also preclude the use of affidavits on information and belief by expressly requiring allegations based on personal knowledge. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (d) [affidavits in support of motion for summary judgment shall be made ... on personal knowledge]; see generally 2 Cal. Civil Procedure Before Trial (Cont.Ed.Bar 1978) § 23.42, p. 36.) (4) Thus, it is simply incorrect to suggest that a statute which requires the filing of an affidavit necessarily implies a requirement of personal knowledge on the part of the affiant. On the contrary, it is a common legislative as well as judicial practice to allow the filing of affidavits on information and belief. Those courts which have granted motions for discovery of police personnel records on the basis of such motions, both before (see In re Valerie E. (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 213, 217-219 [123 Cal. Rptr. 242, 86 A.L.R.3d 1163]; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal. App.3d at p. 828; Hinojosa v. Superior Court (1976) 55 Cal. App.3d 692, 696-697 [127 Cal. Rptr. 664]) and after the enactment of section 1043 (see Jalilie v. Superior Court, supra, 195 Cal. App.3d at p. 490; Larry E. v. Superior Court, supra, 194 Cal. App.3d at pp. 29-31; Pierre C. v. Superior Court, supra, 159 Cal. App.3d at pp. 1122-1123, Arcelona v. Municipal Court, supra, 113 Cal. App.3d at p. 527), have most assuredly not relied on a legal anomaly. Moreover, it is fair to assume that the Legislature was aware of such cases when it enacted section 1043; if its intent was truly to abrogate the use of affidavits on information and belief and to require affidavits based on personal knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that it would have done so explicitly. ( People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 679, fn. 19.) It obviously knew how. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b).) We decline to redraft the statute to impose such a burdensome requirement where the Legislature has conspicuously failed to do so. We need not speculate, however, as to the Legislature's intentions in this regard. The legislative history of section 1043 reveals that the Legislature expressly considered and rejected a requirement of personal knowledge. As originally introduced in the Senate and later modified in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the initial drafts of section 1043 (Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.)) differed from the final version in one significant respect. The Senate Bill as amended provided as follows: (b) Such motion shall include: [¶] ... (2) A description of the particular records or information sought; and [¶] (3) Affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought, setting forth in full detail and upon personal knowledge the materiality thereof to the issues in litigation, and stating that such governmental agency identified has the records or information from such records if any exist in its custody and control. (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 3, 1978, italics added.) [6] The italicized language was subsequently deleted, however, by the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice and replaced by the language of the current statute, which of course requires only that the affidavit set forth the materiality of the requested records to the subject matter of the litigation. (Assem. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 1978.) A committee staff report accompanying the Assembly amendments explained that the original language was dropped because it required more than the petitioner could likely show at that stage in the proceeding. The purpose of discovery is to find detail. If the petitioner already had the particulars of the records he would not need to use discovery. (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 28, 1978, italics added.) (3b) Thus, the legislative history demonstrates that the notion of requiring a showing of materiality based on personal knowledge and full detail of the relevant facts was considered and expressly rejected by the legislative draftsmen. The legislative history, the case law background, and the statutory language all point to the same conclusion: the materiality component of section 1043, subdivision (b) may be satisfied by affidavits based on information and belief.
(5a) As noted earlier, in addition to a showing of materiality, section 1043, subdivision (b) also requires a description of the type of records or information sought and affidavits stating upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency  has such records or information from such records. (Italics added.) The Court of Appeal construed this provision to hold that the affiant must demonstrate personal knowledge of the particular items sought to be disclosed. Since counsel's declaration stated only a belie[f] that other complaints of excessive force may have been filed, the Court of Appeal concluded that defendant's motion failed to establish good cause for discovery. That conclusion was erroneous. (6) The fundamental objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent. ( Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego (1982) 32 Cal.3d 180, 187 [185 Cal. Rptr. 260, 649 P.2d 902].) In determining such intent we look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving them their usual and ordinary meaning. ( Committee of Seven Thousand v. Superior Court (1988) 45 Cal.3d 491, 501 [247 Cal. Rptr. 362, 754 P.2d 708]; Young v. Haines (1986) 41 Cal.3d 883, 897 [226 Cal. Rptr. 547, 718 P.2d 909].) (5b) The language of section 1043, subdivision (b) is clear and unambiguous. The statute expressly provides that a motion for discovery of peace officer personnel records shall include a description of the type of records or information sought, as well as a statement upon reasonable belief that the governmental agency has such records or information. (§ 1043, subd. (b), italics added.) As previously discussed, it is a common legislative practice to provide for the filing of affidavits on less than personal knowledge. That is precisely what the Legislature chose to do here; we are not at liberty to second-guess that decision. Moreover, it is manifest that a showing of reasonable belief does not require personal knowledge, but may be premised upon a rational inference from known or reasonably assumed facts. Black's Law Dictionary defines reasonable as fair, proper, just, ... rational. (Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 1138.) Black's further defines belief as a [c]onviction of the mind, arising not from actual perception or knowledge, but by way of inference, or from evidence or information derived from others. (Black's Law Dict., supra, at p. 141, italics added.) (7) The words `reasonably believes' ... denote the fact that the actor believes that a given fact or combination of facts exists, and that the circumstances which he knows ... are such as to cause a reasonable man so to believe. (Black's Law Dict., supra, at p. 1138; accord Ballantine's Law Dict. (3d ed. 1969) p. 1060 [A reasonable belief is a belief begotten by attendant circumstances fairly creating it, and honestly entertained.].) (5c) It is equally apparent that the statute, in calling for a description of the type of records sought to be disclosed, does not require the affiant to prove the existence of particular records. The dictionary defines type as a kind, class or group.... (Webster's New World Dict. (2d ed. 1974) p. 1538.) Clearly, an affidavit which describes the information sought as consisting of prior complaints of excessive force by specific officers, as counsel's declaration here alleged, has specified a class, group or type of information within the plain meaning of the statute. Case law lends additional support to this interpretation. Prior to the enactment of section 1043, the Courts of Appeal had overwhelmingly rejected the notion that defendants seeking discovery of police records of citizen complaints must demonstrate knowledge of prior complaints. (See, e.g., Caldwell v. Municipal Court (1976) 58 Cal. App.3d 377, 380 [129 Cal. Rptr. 834] [Even though the defense has not been able to point to specific prior acts of violence, the official records desired to be examined were identified with reasonable particularity and the pertinence to the defense of the requested information was demonstrated.]; accord In re Valerie E., supra, 50 Cal. App.3d at pp. 217-219; Kelvin L. v. Superior Court, supra, 62 Cal. App.3d at p. 828; Hinojosa v. Superior Court, supra, 55 Cal. App.3d at pp. 696-697.) Caldwell, supra, 58 Cal. App.3d 377, relied principally on In re Valerie E., supra, 50 Cal. App.3d 213. In the latter case the defendant  charged with battery against two police officers  moved for the production of all records involving complaints against the officers for unnecessary and excessive acts of violence or racial prejudice. Counsel's declaration in support of the motion stated in part that he was informed and believes that unspecified persons had ... made [such] complaints. ( Id. at p. 217.) The trial court denied the motion because defense counsel could not state with any certainty that there had in fact been any prior complaints. ( Ibid. ) On appeal, the defendant claimed that although she could not identify the specific  content of the material sought, her motion for discovery was not a mere `fishing expedition' since she could identify the type of material desired. ( Ibid., original italics.) The Court of Appeal agreed. Its reasoning is particularly pertinent to the question before us and bears full recitation: In the present case, defendant did not have the names of any prior citizen complainants and was not aware of any complaints made against the police officers involved herein. However, proof of the existence of the sought material is not a prerequisite to the granting of a discovery motion. ( Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.3d 812, 817 [112 Cal. Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353]; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 75-76 [346 P.2d 407].) A requirement of such proof would, in many cases, deny the accused the benefit of relevant and material evidence. Defendant should not be required to produce the names of specific citizen complainants. Ordinarily, an accused would never be in a position to know what complaints, if any, had been filed against certain police officers in the community. To make such a showing a condition precedent to production would make an accused's rights `dependent upon the highly fortuitous circumstance' (see People v. Chapman, 52 Cal.2d 95, 98 [338 P.2d 428]) of the accused's detailed knowledge as to the contents of the police officers' personnel files. [¶] In the present case defendant showed more than a `mere desire for the benefit of all information'; she clearly specified the exact material sought, i.e. all information regarding citizen complaints for excessive force against the two police officers involved in her arrest. This was sufficient to justify discovery. ( In re Valerie E., supra, 50 Cal. App.3d at pp. 218-219.) It is fair to assume that the Legislature was cognizant of the courts' holdings in Valerie E. and its progeny that the defendant need prove only the  type of material desired, not the  existence of the sought material. ( In re Valerie E., supra, 50 Cal. App.3d at pp. 217, 219, second italics added; People v. Memro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 679, fn. 19.) In expressly requiring a description of only the type of information requested rather than the particular records, it would appear that the Legislature intended to codify the preexisting case law. (§ 1043, subd. (b).) We need not infer the Legislature's intentions in this regard, however. As was the case with respect to the materiality component of good cause, the legislative history of section 1043 demonstrates rather conclusively that the statute means precisely what it says. As noted earlier, one of the early drafts of the bill required (2) A description of the particular records or information sought. (Sen. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Apr. 3, 1978, italics added.) This requirement was deleted in the Assembly, however, and replaced by the current provision requiring only a description of the type of information sought. (Assem. Amend. to Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 30, 1978.) A committee staff report explained the purpose of the amendment as follows: If the petitioner already had the particulars of the records he would not need to use discovery. (Assem. Com. on Crim. Justice, analysis of Sen. Bill No. 1436 (1977-1978 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 28, 1978, italics added.) [7] Thus, both the legislative history and the decisional background of section 1043, subdivision (b) support the interpretation which we adopt and which is otherwise clear from the statutory language. In requiring only a reasonable belief that the governmental agency has the type of information sought, the statute says what it means and means precisely what it says. [8] (8) It is readily apparent, moreover, that defendant has met his burden in this regard. Counsel's statement of belief that the City may have other complaints of excessive force against the officers in question constitutes a rational inference from the facts of the pending litigation. [9] The police reports state that one of the arresting officers struck defendant with a closed fist and that both officers subsequently wrestled him to the ground. Counsel's affidavit avers that the officers continued to apply unnecessary and excessive force even after defendant was handcuffed and subdued. While the recited facts do not, of course, establish that the force used was in fact excessive, it is altogether fair and rational, on the basis of such facts and averments, to entertain a reasonable belief or inference that the same officers may have been accused of the use of excessive force in the past, and that such information may be found in their personnel records. As noted above, a reasonable belief is simply a conviction of mind ... arising by way of inference (Black's Law Dict., supra, at p. 141, italics added), a belief begotten by attendant circumstances, fairly creating it, and honestly entertained.  (Ballantine's Law Dict., supra, at p. 1060, italics added.) Defendant's substantive allegations plainly meet this standard. Defendant, in short, has satisfied the criteria for discovery under section 1043, subdivision (b), and is entitled to a determination of relevance pursuant to the provisions of section 1045.