Opinion ID: 147424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Germain Application

Text: The majority agree[s] with Meihao and the district court that ... the Germain application was material, specifically to inventorship and double-patenting, in the prosecution of the '766 patent. Majority Op. at 1358-59, 1359-62. The district court, however, found that the Germain application was not merely material but was highly material, a significant distinction that the majority does not acknowledge. [2] Summary Judgment Order at 699-700. The district court found the application highly material, because 37 C.F.R. § 10.23(c)(7) required its disclosure and it could have raised concerns regarding inventorship, double-patenting, and the written description requirement. Id. at 694-700. Based on the Germain application's importance to inventorship and double-patenting issues, I would uphold the district court's high materiality finding. As the district court concluded, the Germain application was highly material because it could have conceivably served as the basis of a double patenting rejection of the '766 patent. Dayco Prods., Inc. v. Total Containment, Inc., 329 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed.Cir.2003); Akron Polymer Container Corp. v. Exxel Container, Inc., 148 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed.Cir.1998). The majority properly recognizes that, under MPEP § 804, disclosure of the co-pending, commonly-owned Germain application, with nearly identical claims to the earlier-priority '766 patent application, would have led to an immediate provisional [double-patenting] rejection of each application. See MPEP § 804; Majority Op. at 1361 (emphasis added). Furthermore, the PTO examiner would not have been required to withdraw the rejection as to the earlier-priority '766 patent application, allowing the '766 patent to issue as opposed to the Germain application. See MPEP § 804; Majority Op. at 1361. Instead, the PTO could have rejected the '766 patent for double-patenting. Majority Op. at 1361; see Dayco Prods., 329 F.3d at 1365; Akron Polymer, 148 F.3d at 1382. Under our precedent in Akron Polymer and Dayco Products, which the majority does not mention or distinguish, this potential for a double-patenting rejection is sufficient to make the Germain application highly material. In both cases, we concluded that a withheld later-priority application was highly material to an earlier-priority application claiming similar subject matter because it could have conceivably served as the basis for a double patenting rejection. Dayco Prods., 329 F.3d at 1365; Akron Polymer, 148 F.3d at 1382. Further, under the reasonable examiner standard, our main standard for materiality, information is material when a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1367. Applying this standard, the Germain application's importance to double-patenting would have made it critical to any examiner's evaluation of the '766 patent. Accordingly, I would uphold the district court's determination that, based on its importance to double-patenting concerns, the Germain application was highly material. In addition, the Germain application was highly material to inventorship issues in the prosecution of the '766 patent. As a critical requirement for obtaining a patent, inventorship is material. Perseptive Biosystems, Inc. v. Pharmacia Biotech, Inc., 225 F.3d 1315, 1321 (Fed.Cir.2000). Where information is relevant to inventorship, whether the inventorship of the patents as issued is correct does not determine the materiality of the [information]. Id. at 1322. As such, regardless of whether the inventorship of the '766 patent is correct, the withheld Germain application was highly material. A reasonable examiner evaluating the '766 patent application would have found the co-pending Germain application, which had several nearly identical claims attributed to an entirely different set of inventors, critical in evaluating patentability. The Germain application would have raised serious concerns regarding whether the asserted inventors actually conceived of the invention claimed in the '766 patent. Without the Germain application, however, the examiner had no reason to question the asserted inventorship. Although the majority properly recognizes that disclosure of the Germain application would have raised serious questions regarding inventorship and a substantial inventorship question that would have required additional investigation by the examiner, the majority nonetheless holds that the Germain application was only material. Majority Op. at 1360. In my opinion, given how critical the Germain application would have been to triggering these significant inventorship concerns, it was highly material to inventorship. Thus, in light of the importance of the Germain application to inventorship and double-patenting issues in the prosecution of the '766 patent, I would affirm the district court's finding that the Germain application was highly material.
Because direct evidence of deceptive intent is rarely available, Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366, intent to deceive must generally be inferred from circumstantial evidence, M. Eagles, 439 F.3d at 1341. In other words, `smoking gun' evidence is not required ... to establish an intent to deceive. Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 1189. Nevertheless, the evidence establishing intent must still be clear and convincing, and inferences drawn from lesser evidence cannot satisfy the deceptive intent requirement. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366. Even gross negligence is not sufficient. Kingsdown Med. Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed.Cir.1988). Rather, to justify an inference of deceptive intent, the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive. Astrazeneca Pharms. LP v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 583 F.3d 766, 776 (Fed.Cir.2009). The inference of deceptive intent must not only be based on sufficient evidence and be reasonable in light of that evidence, but it must also be the single most reasonable inference able to be drawn from the evidence to meet the clear and convincing standard. Larson Mfg. Co. of S. Dakota, Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 1340 (Fed.Cir.2009); Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366. Because an inference of deceptive intent is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the facts surrounding Narcisse's withholding of the Germain application, I disagree with the majority's refusal to uphold the district court's finding of intent. At the time he prosecuted the '766 patent, Narcisse was a seasoned patent attorney, having practiced as a patent prosecutor for approximately twelve years. See J.A.1972-76; see also Molins PLC v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed.Cir. 1995) (upholding finding of inequitable conduct where the district court considered the experience of the patent prosecutor). Not surprisingly, Narcisse admitted in his deposition testimony that when he prosecuted the '766 patent, he was aware of his duty of disclosure and his understanding that in cases which are not entirely clear, it is better to disclose the information to the [PTO] and let the [PTO] decide what is material. J.A.2014. More specific to the Germain application, Narcisse acknowledged that he was familiar with the possibility of double-patenting rejections in situations, like the one presented in this case, where commonly-owned applications with different inventive groups claim the same invention. J.A.1991 (Q.... [I]f two different inventive groups tried to submit the same claim in two different applications, but both were owned by Leviton, that could give rise to a double patenting rejection; is that right? ... A. Yes. Q. And you were aware of that when the '766 patent was prosecuted? A. Yes.). Narcisse alone drafted the claims in both the Germain application and the '766 patent application in the course of just six months. J.A.1983-84, 2001. Therefore, he admittedly knew not only that both copending applications existed but also that they had what he described as very similar claims. J.A.1998, 2021. Despite his intimate knowledge of the Germain application and his familiarity with double-patenting rejections, Narcisse did not disclose the Germain application to the PTO. J.A. 1998. The district court properly noted that Leviton had a motive to conceal the Germain application, with a priority date three-and-a-half years later than the '766 patent, during the prosecution of the '766 patent. See Summary Judgment Order at 710. The PTO's awareness of the Germain application, at a minimum, would have delayed the expedited prosecution of the '766 patent application arising out of the Petition to Make Special. At worst, the Germain application could have prevented the '766 patent from issuing. Further, with such an earlier priority date, the '766 patent avoided a significant amount of prior art, including the allegedly infringing product in this case, which was manufactured after the priority date of the '766 patent but before the priority date of the Germain application. See id. It seems to me that the circumstances surrounding Leviton's withholding of the Germain application are as egregious as possible short of an explicit admission of intent to deceive the PTO. An experienced patent prosecutor drafted the claims for two co-pending applications, listing entirely different inventors, within months of one another and thus was intimately familiar with their nearly indistinguishable claims. He was also admittedly aware of his duty of disclosure and the potential for a double-patenting rejection in this situation, yet did not disclose the Germain application. In my view, these facts undoubtedly indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive. Kingsdown, 863 F.2d at 876. As such, I believe Meihao met its burden to prove a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence. Given that Meihao met its threshold burden to prove intent, the district court correctly considered Leviton's purported good faith explanation for withholding the Germain application. The patentee need not offer any good faith explanation unless the [party asserting inequitable conduct] first carries [its] burden to prove a threshold level of intent to deceive by clear and convincing evidence. Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1368. Once the party asserting inequitable conduct meets its threshold burden, however, it is incumbent upon the patentee to rebut the evidence of deceptive intent with a good faith explanation for the alleged misconduct. Id. Throughout Narcisse's deposition, he refused to answer many questions about the prosecution of the '766 patent and his withholding of the Germain application. Nevertheless, Narcisse did put forward two explanations for his failure to disclose the Germain application. First, Narcisse asserted that he did not disclose the Germain application because it was not prior art. Second, Narcisse claimed that he did not believe that 37 C.F.R. § 1.604(b) required disclosure of the Germain application. In considering a patentee's good faith explanation for withholding information from the PTO, merely conclusory statements or completely insupportable, specious, or conflicting explanations or excuses do not raise a genuine issue of material fact for summary judgment purposes. Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1314 (emphasis added); Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 1190 (emphasis added); see Ferring, 437 F.3d at 1193. In other words, to create a genuine issue of material fact, the patentee must put forward a  plausible justification or excuse. Digital Control, 437 F.3d at 1314 (emphasis added); Paragon Podiatry, 984 F.2d at 1191 (emphasis added). Leviton's contention at oral argument that for summary judgment purposes, [the district court] need[ed] to take [Narcisse] at his word [;] ... whether it's a credible explanation or not, it's his explanation, Oral Arg. at 19:45-20:01 available at h ttp://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/mp3/XXXX-XXXX.mp3, squarely contradicts this precedent and is therefore wrong as a matter of law. In my opinion, the district court properly rejected Narcisse's justifications as implausible and therefore insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact. See Summary Judgment Order at 710. First, Narcisse claimed that he did not disclose the Germain application as a result of his belief that the Germain application was not material because it [wa]s not a prior art reference to the '766 [patent] application. J.A.1998-99, 2001, 2021-22; see Oral Arg. at 7:24-29, 19:15-22, 22:25-33 ([Narcisse's] testimony is that he did not believe [the Germain application] was material because ... it was not prior art....), 60:24-59. Our precedent makes clear that [m]ateriality is not limited to prior art but [instead] embraces any information that a reasonable examiner would be substantially likely to consider important in deciding whether to allow an application to issue as a patent. Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1226 (Fed. Cir.2006) (emphasis added); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 326 F.3d 1226, 1234 (Fed.Cir. 2003); GFI, Inc. v. Franklin Corp., 265 F.3d 1268, 1274 (Fed.Cir.2001); see Critikon, 120 F.3d at 1258. Thus, it is indisputable that Narcisse's supposed reasoning is entirely incorrect. More importantly, the district court correctly rejected Narcisse's explanation as implausible. It is implausible that Narcisse, a veteran patent prosecutor and a member of the patent bar for more than a decade, believed that the only material information that must be brought to the PTO's attention is prior art. This purported justification ignores the broad spectrum of information, with which Narcisse was admittedly familiar, that the MPEP and the Code of Federal Regulations require to be disclosed. The most basic patent law treatises, in addition to our case law, explain that materiality is not limited to prior art. See, e.g., 4A-15 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 15.04 (2010) (A patent applicant's duty to disclose is not limited to disclosing prior art. A patent applicant must disclose any material information to the PTO.); Robert A. Matthews, Jr., Annotated Patent Digest § 27:47 (2010) (Just because information may not qualify as prior art does not necessarily mean it is not `material.'); see also 3-7 Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents § 7.05; 4-11 id. § 11.03. The patent bar, an examination Narcisse passed approximately ten years before prosecuting the '766 patent, requires familiarity with the MPEP, which obligates patent applicants to disclose to the PTO information other than prior art. J.A.1976 (I became very familiar with the MPEP, 37 CFR, and old or previous patent bar exams.). In fact, Narcisse admitted his awareness of MPEP provisions that require the disclosure of information that is obviously not prior art, such as MPEP § 2001.06(c), which provides: Where the subject matter for which a patent is being sought is or has been involved in litigation, the existence of such litigation and any other material information arising therefrom must be brought to the attention of the [PTO]. Examples of such material information, include evidence of possible prior public use or sales, questions of inventor-ship, prior art, allegations of `fraud,' `inequitable conduct,' and `violation of duty of disclosure.' Another example of such material information is any assertion that is made during litigation which is contradictory to assertions made to the examiner. MPEP § 2001.06(c) (emphases added); J.A.2008 (Q. Could you look at 2001.06(c).... Were you aware of that rule or provision at the time you prosecuted the '766 [P]atent [A]pplication? A. Yes I was.). Not only does this provision require disclosure of the existence of ... litigation involving the subject matter of a patent application, information that clearly falls outside the realm of prior art, but also the listed examples of material information show that materiality is not limited to prior art. Rather, prior art is but one example in the list of examples of such material information. See MPEP § 2001.06(c). Narcisse's rationale for failing to disclose the Germain application is thus inconsistent with MPEP provisions that he admits he was familiar with at the time he prosecuted the '766 patent. This specific inconsistency, together with the fact that it is inconceivable that a patent prosecutor with more than a decade of experience would equate materiality solely with prior art, leads me to firmly agree with the district court's conclusion that Narcisse's purported justification is entirely implausible and insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. In my view, in light of our case law holding that specious and implausible explanations for withholding material information do not raise a genuine issue of material fact, there is no basis in our precedent for the majority's refusal to allow the district court to reject Narcisse's explanation as unreasonable and implausible and therefore insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact on summary judgment. See Majority Op. at 1363-64. Narcisse's second explanation for his failure to disclose the Germain application is based on a technical reading of the language of another in 37 C.F.R. § 1.604(b). 37 C.F.R. § 1.604(b) provides that [w]hen an applicant presents a claim known to the applicant to define the same patentable invention claimed in a pending application of another, the applicant shall identify that pending application.... 37 C.F.R. § 1.604(b) (emphasis added). In his deposition testimony, Narcisse admitted that he was familiar with the provision at the time he prosecuted the '766 patent but claimed that he didn't think, d[id]n't know, and was not sure whether the provision would have applied to applications owned by the same entity. J.A. 2013-14. Yet he never discussed his understanding of the provision with anyone. J.A.2014. Even if, as the majority holds, Narcisse was correct that 37 C.F.R. § 1.604(b) did not mandate disclosure of the Germain application, this is a technical argument about a specific disclosure provision. See Majority Op. at 1359-60. This purported explanation does not affect the other obvious reasons why the Germain application should have been disclosed to the PTO during the prosecution of the '766 patent. As previously discussed, the Germain application would have been critical to the prosecution of the '766 patent, raising substantial inventorship and double-patenting issues. Any patent practitioner, never mind one with Narcisse's level of experience, would realize that the co-pending Germain application and the '766 patent application, claiming the same invention but attributing it to different people, could not both issue as patents. It is obvious that the PTO would want to be made aware of the co-pending applications to investigate inventorship issues and avoid double-patenting. Narcisse did not provide any rationale for believing these concerns to be inapplicable to his prosecution of the '766 patent. Instead, he admitted that he was aware that the situation that the commonly-owned Germain application and '766 patent application presented could give rise to a double [-] patenting rejection. J.A.1991. Leviton's proposed inference that Narcisse did not disclose the Germain application because he did not believe it was material prior art and did not think 37 C.F.R. § 1.604(b) required its disclosure is simply unreasonable. Instead, given the obvious reasons the application would have been highly important to the prosecution of the '766 patent, as well as Narcisse's awareness of the substantially similar claims and that such a situation could lead to a double-patenting rejection, the overwhelming circumstantial evidence suggests that Narcisse purposefully withheld the Germain application. In light of these glaring facts, an inference of deceptive intent is the only reasonable inference to be drawn from Narcisse's withholding of the Germain application. See Star Scientific, 537 F.3d at 1366. I would therefore uphold the district court's inference of deceptive intent on summary judgment. [3]