Opinion ID: 2982675
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sentencing Determination

Text: We review a district court’s sentencing determination for reasonableness under a deferential abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 578 (6th Cir. 2007). This reasonableness review involves two steps: (1) procedural and (2) substantive. Id. In performing this two-step review, “[t]he district court’s interpretation of the advisory Guidelines is reviewed de novo, and its findings of fact are reviewed for clear error.” United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 677 (6th Cir. 2009). This Court evaluates the procedural reasonableness of a sentence to “ensure that the district court did not commit significant procedural error, such as: ‘failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.’” Id. (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007)). When reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, “we must ensure that the district court correctly calculate[d] the applicable Guidelines range” because it is “the starting point and initial benchmark of its sentencing analysis.” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 579 (internal quotation marks omitted). We also assess the substantive reasonableness of the sentence. A sentence is substantively reasonable if it is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the sentencing goals identified by Congress. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also United States v. HerreraZuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 588 (6th Cir. 2009). A sentence will be found substantively unreasonable 9 No. 13-5558 if “the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Corp, 668 F.3d 379, 386 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Defendant was sentenced to 180 months of confinement—the statutory minimum pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). The sentence is fifty-five months below the low-end of the advisory guideline range recommended in the PSR. Neither Defendant nor the government objected to the calculation in the PSR, but Defendant did ask the district court for a downward departure, which was denied. Defendant claims his sentence is “excessive based n [sic] the circumstances.” He does not make clear whether he believes his sentence is procedurally unreasonable, substantively unreasonable, or both. Indeed, he cites to nothing in the record and advances no concrete argument at all as to why his sentence is excessive. We are of the opinion that the sentence imposed by the district court was procedurally reasonable. Neither party asserts that the district court improperly calculated the guidelines range and there is nothing in the record suggesting as much. Additionally, the district court acknowledged that the guidelines were not mandatory and that the court could vary from the calculated range. Before imposing the sentence, the court outlined the facts of the case and the facts of Defendant’s personal and criminal history. None of the facts the court discussed were clearly erroneous. From the sentencing transcript, it is evident that the district court took “everything into account,” including the 3553(a) factors when it determined the sentence. And finally, the court went to great lengths to explain the basis for the sentence imposed, which was a 10 No. 13-5558 significant downward variance from the guidelines range. In sum, the district court did everything that was procedurally required before sentencing Defendant. Similarly, we conclude that Defendant’s sentence was also substantively reasonable. Defendant received a sentence that was the statutory minimum—the lowest sentence the district court could impose. See United States v. Briggs, 431 F. App’x 389, 397 (6th Cir. 2011). The district court explicitly stated that it found the 180-month sentence to be “sufficient but not greater than necessary” to achieve the goals of § 3553(a). Furthermore, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court “select[ed] a sentence arbitrarily, base[d] the sentence on impermissible factors, fail[ed] to consider relevant sentencing factors, or [gave] an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.” United States v. Webb, 616 F.3d 605, 610 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Defendant’s mere allegation that the sentence imposed is greater than necessary to achieve the goals of punishment outlined in § 3553(a) is insufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness given to within-guidelines sentences—a presumption that is even stronger when “the variance results in a sentence even more favorable to the challenging Defendant than a within-Guidelines sentence.” United States v. Curry, 536 F.3d 571, 573 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2006). Since Defendant cannot show any violation of law or abuse of discretion, he cannot establish that the statutorily-prescribed minimum sentence was unreasonable.