Opinion ID: 2648894
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Separate Judgment Requirement

Text: Hawai#i Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 641-1(a) (Supp. 2012) authorizes appeals in civil cases from final judgments, orders, or decrees. Such appeals “shall be taken in the manner . . . provided by the rules of court.” HRS § 641-1(c)) (1993). Consistent with HRS § 641-1(c)’s directive, HRCP Rule 58 was promulgated and specifically requires that “[e]very judgment shall be set forth on a separate document.” Based on this requirement, the supreme court has held that “[a]n appeal may be taken . . . only after the order[] ha[s] been reduced to a judgment and the judgment has been entered in favor of and against the appropriate parties pursuant to HRCP [Rule] 58[.]” Jenkins v. Cades Schutte Fleming & Wright, 76 Hawai#i 115, 119, 869 P.2d 1334, 1338 (1994). The separate judgment must “either resolve all claims against all parties or contain the finding necessary for certification under HRCP [Rule] 54(b).” Jenkins, 76 Hawai#i at 119, 869 P.2d at 1338. “An appeal from an order that is not reduced to a judgment in favor or against the party by the time the record [on appeal] is filed in the supreme court will be dismissed.” Id. at 120, 869 P.2d at 1339 (footnote omitted). B. The Forgay Doctrine Exception to the Separate Judgment Requirement There are several exceptions to the separate judgment 9 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER requirement.8 One recognized exception is the Forgay doctrine. This doctrine, which is sometimes referred to as the hardship and irreparable injury exception to the final judgment requirement, was established by the United States Supreme Court in Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201 (1848),9 and adopted by this court in dictum in Ciesla.10 Although narrow in scope and limited in use, the Forgay doctrine permits a direct appeal from a non-final, interlocutory order or decree that commands the immediate transfer of property, where the losing party will be subjected to undue hardship and irreparable injury if appellate review must wait until the final outcome of the litigation. See Ciesla, 78 Hawai#i at 20, 889 P.2d at 704; Bank of Hawai#i v. Davis Radio Sales & Serv., Inc., 6 Haw. App. 469, 475 n.10, 727 P.2d 419, 424 n.10 (1986); Penn v. Transportation Lease Hawai#i, Ltd., 2 Haw. 8 Exceptions to the separate, final judgment requirement include the Forgay doctrine, the collateral order doctrine, and HRS § 641–1(b) (1993). See Ciesla v. Reddish, 78 Hawai#i 18, 20, 889 P.2d 702, 704 (1995) (discussing the two requirements for appealability under the Forgay doctrine); Abrams v. Cades, Schutte, Fleming & Wright, 88 Hawai#i 319, 322, 966 P.2d 631, 634 (1998) (discussing the three requirements for appealability under the collateral order doctrine); HRS § 641–1(b) (setting forth the requirements for an appeal from an interlocutory order). 9 In Forgay, the United States Supreme Court held that an order providing for the immediate delivery to an assignee in bankruptcy of property that had previously been conveyed to the bankrupt was appealable even though the underlying case was to continue for an accounting. The court held that the order was appealable because it directed the immediate delivery of property and threatened irreparable hardship to the appellant. The order was found final, in itself, even though the case was not fully resolved. 10 In Ciesla, the court dismissed the appeal as untimely but went on in dictum to note that the judgment for possession being appealed, which was accompanied by a writ of possession, would have been immediately appealable under the Forgay doctrine. 10 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER App. 272, 630 P.2d 646 (1981). The Forgay doctrine is therefore an appropriate exception to the final judgment requirement in light of the consequences of an order or decree requiring an immediate change in the ownership or possession of real property. C. The October 25, 2012 Confirmation Order is Appealable Under the Forgay Doctrine We now turn to our original inquiry -- Whether the October 25, 2012 Confirmation Order is appealable as a final order in the absence of Rule 54(b) certification? Foreclosure decrees, writs of possession, and orders for the sale of specific property are examples of orders and decrees that this Court has held to be appealable under the Forgay doctrine. See, e.g., Waimanalo Village Residents’ Corp. v. Young, 87 Hawai#i 353, 363 n.7, 956 P.2d 1285, 1295 n.7 (1998) (judgment for possession, accompanied by writ of possession, was appealable under Forgay doctrine); International Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Woods, 69 Haw. 11, 16, 731 P.2d 151, 154-55 (1987) (decree foreclosing mortgage and ordering sale of property was appealable under the Forgay doctrine because the appellants would be subjected to irreparable injury if their condominium apartment was sold before the foreclosure decree could be reviewed). This court, therefore, has traditionally permitted appeals of nonfinal, interlocutory orders that command the immediate transfer of property. Thus, a partition confirmation order that effectively terminates property rights is similarly appealable 11 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER under the Forgay doctrine. We recognize, however, that no Hawai#i case law has specifically addressed the applicability of the Forgay doctrine to an order confirming a partition sale and directing distribution of the sale proceeds -- like the order at issue in this appeal.11 We, therefore, look to cases from other jurisdictions for guidance. See Sierra Club v. Department of Transp., State of Hawai#i, 120 Hawai#i 181, 200-03, 202 P.3d 1226, 1245-48 (2009) (the court can look to other jurisdictions for assistance); County of Hawai#i v. C & J Coupe Family Ltd. P’ship, 119 Hawai#i 352, 369, 198 P.3d 615, 632 (2008) (opinions on an issue from other jurisdictions were useful where no Hawai#i case addressed the issue). There are a number of jurisdictions that have addressed the appealability of a partition decree or confirmation order in the absence of a final judgment, but the holdings in those cases are based upon the statute or case law of the specific jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit’s analysis and application of the Forgay doctrine to a partition decree in Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 575 F.2d 239 (9th Cir. 1978), however, is helpful to our present jurisdictional query and supports this court’s conclusion that an order confirming a partition sale is 11 Hawai#i’s case law has established that an order appointing a commissioner and directing a partition sale (e.g., a partition decree) is an interlocutory order that is not appealable unless allowed by the trial judge. See Cooke Trust Co., Ltd. v. Ho, 43 Haw. 243 (Terr. 1959). 12 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER appealable under the Forgay doctrine. There, the Ninth Circuit inquired as to whether it had jurisdiction to review an appeal of a partition judgment, which ordered a partition sale that would effectively transfer separate possession from one party to another and use of lands previously held jointly. Sekaquaptewa, 575 F.2d at 241-42. Recognizing the pragmatic construction given to the finality requirement, the court addressed the narrow relaxation of the finality rule for orders transferring property announced in Forgay v. Conrad and concluded that even though the partition judgment did not direct the immediate delivery of property, the order had the effect of depriving one group of property owners of property they previously occupied and, therefore, the hardship of relocation would be exacerbated by a refusal to undertake immediate review. Id. at 243. The court determined that the partition judgment was sufficiently “final” to be appealable. Id. Here, the October 25, 2012 Confirmation Order meets the requirements of appealability under the Forgay doctrine. Although the October 25, 2012 Confirmation Order does not command the immediate execution of the property to Trustee Lambert, the order confirms the sale to Trustee Lambert, directs the commissioner to convey the property to Trustee Lambert, and orders the Teisinas to surrender the property within 30 days of the conveyance. The Confirmation Order effectively terminates 13 FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER the Teisinas’ rights to the property and they will suffer irreparable injury if appellate review is postponed until final judgment.