Opinion ID: 776954
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prejudice Resulting from the Suppression of the Impeachment Evidence, Considered Collectively

Text: 68 In determining whether the suppression of impeachment evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to rise to the level of a Brady violation, we analyze the totality of the undisclosed evidence in the context of the entire record. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392; see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375 (opinion of Blackmun, J.). 11 69 Because the withheld impeachment evidence would not simply have been cumulative of the impeachment evidence introduced at trial, but would have created substantial doubt as to Patrick's credibility, it is important to analyze the significance of Patrick's testimony to the prosecution's case. Patrick's testimony was critical because it directly contradicted Benn's evidence that he acted in self-defense and that he did not premeditate the killings. Moreover, it provided the only direct evidence of the aggravating factor of common scheme or plan. Patrick was the only witness to testify to the state's primary theory that Benn killed Dethlefsen and Nelson for threatening to reveal an arson-insurance-fraud scheme. He was also the only witness to suggest that Benn wanted to kill Dethlefsen because Dethlefsen changed his will so as to remove Benn as a beneficiary. Without those theories (and it is difficult to believe that the jury would have accepted the will theory), the only motive the prosecution suggested was that Benn was upset because he thought that Dethlefsen was harassing his ex-girlfriend — a motive that supported the defense's theory (that Benn became upset when he saw a note with his ex-girlfriend's phone number on it in Dethlefsen's house and a spontaneous argument ensued) as much as the prosecution's. 70 Moreover, Patrick's testimony that Benn attempted to hire someone to kill Hartman while in prison undercut Benn's defense, because the jury was more likely to believe that Benn was guilty of premeditating the murders of Dethlefsen and Nelson after being told that he plotted to kill Hartman from prison. 71 The state's failure to disclose to the defense that Patrick was a potential witness prior to the day before trial exacerbated the harm that resulted from its failure to provide impeachment information about him, because the defense did not have sufficient time to investigate Patrick and prepare for cross-examination. 72 The dissenting justices in the Washington Supreme Court's state habeas case stated that the withheld information concerning Patrick was so significant that a new trial was required. See In re Benn, 952 P.2d at 155-56. The district court agreed with the Washington Supreme Court's dissent that [t]he significance of Patrick's testimony cannot be over-stated. Benn v. Wood, 2000 WL 1031361, at  (W.D.Wash.2000). Both statements are correct. 73 Analyzed collectively, the withheld impeachment evidence reveals that Patrick, a critical witness for the state, was completely unreliable, a liar for hire, [and] ready to perjure himself for whatever advantage he could squeeze out of the system. Id. We hold that the suppression of the impeachment evidence undermines confidence in the outcome of Benn's trial and was therefore prejudicial. We further hold that the Washington Supreme Court's decision to the contrary was clearly erroneous and constitutes an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law. 74 C. THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO DISCLOSE EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE THAT THE FIRE AT BENN'S TRAILER WAS ACCIDENTAL AND NOT THE RESULT OF ARSON IS SUFFICIENT, STANDING ALONE, TO CONSTITUTE A BRADY VIOLATION. 75 The prosecution failed to disclose that Deputy Fire Marshal Ted Thompson and Electrical Inspector Walter Erickson both conclusively determined that the fire in Benn's trailer was accidental. The state did disclose its March 30, 1988 report stating on the basis of these experts' investigation that there was no fault or failure of the lead electrical wire and no evidence of tampering with the fuse panel. The report did not state that the deputy fire marshal and electrical inspector had concluded that arson was not the cause of the trailer fire; that the furnace was the same type that Erickson had in his own home; or that there had been a manufacturer's recall of this type of furnace because it tended to cause fires. Rather, the report suggested that Coleman furnaces did not cause fires. 76 The experts' conclusion that the fire was accidental, and the reasons therefor, was material evidence that could have served to rebut the arson-insurance-fraud theory that the prosecution offered to prove motive, premeditation, and the aggravating circumstance of common scheme or plan. We reject the Washington Supreme Court's conclusion that the cause of the fire was not critical to the prosecution's insurance fraud theory because, as the state trial court stated, the arson-insurance-fraud theory evidence was the kind of evidence that the State must and needs to prove if it's going to prove the aggravating factor that is involved in this case.... Without it, the State doesn't have a case for aggravated murder.... The district court reiterated this point when it stated that evidence of the accidental nature of the fire, if presented to the jury, would have gravely undercut[] the fear of police exposure that the prosecution asserted led Benn to kill Dethlefsen and Nelson. Benn v. Wood, 2001 WL 1031361, at 3113  (W.D.Wash.2000). 12 The prosecutor also stressed the importance of the arson-fraud-insurance theory to the jury. In his closing argument, he stated: And aggravating circumstances exist ... the common scheme or plan, the single act.... [H]e indeed wanted both men dead. He told the persons he confided in about the fact that Mike was threatening over the fire insurance money as well as Jack. 13 77 The state argues that its failure to disclose this exculpatory information did not constitute a Brady violation because Benn was aware of the February 12, 1988 report in which the deputy fire marshal tentatively concluded that the fire was accidental. The February report's tentative conclusion, however, was displaced by the conclusions in the later March 30, 1988 report. The March report suggested that, after further investigation, the experts had reached a different conclusion. Specifically, the report stated that Al Pearson, a furnace technician, said that he could find and think of no situation in which a furnace [such as a Coleman] had caused a fire in a mobile home. 78 The state, relying on United States v. Marashi, 913 F.2d 724 (9th Cir.1990), and United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1991), asserts that there was no Brady violation because Benn could have discovered the experts' conclusions by interviewing them. Marashi does not support the state's position. There, we simply held that the prosecution's failure to disclose an IRS agent's notes revealing the identity of a private detective was not prejudicial to the defense because the defendant's own conduct showed that the evidence was not material. We relied in part on the fact that the defendant had access to and chose not to interview the individual who hired the private detective as support for that holding. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 733-34. Here, contrary to Marashi, there is no doubt of the materiality of the suppressed evidence. 79 Aichele involved the obligation of a United States Attorney to turn over California State Department of Corrections files that were under the exclusive control of California officials. We held that because the United States Attorney had no control over the state's files there was no Brady violation. See also United States v. Santiago, 46 F.3d 885, 894 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that the federal government did have an obligation to turn over information in the possession of the Bureau of Prisons and limiting the principle in Aichele to federal prosecutions in which material is held exclusively by a state agency). The Aichele court then added, by way of dictum, that if a defendant can ascertain the material on his own, there is no suppression. Certainly, that observation is overbroad, at the very least. We need not consider, however, whether the dictum in Aichele accurately states the law, particularly after Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995), or what the limitations on that dictum might be. For whatever its merit, and we express no view, the Aichele dictum would not apply in circumstances such as those present here. 80 In Paradis v. Arave, 130 F.3d 385 (9th Cir.1997), a post- Aichele case, our Brady analysis was not affected by the defendant's knowledge of and ability to interview the prosecution's expert and obtain the undisclosed material. There, the medical expert testified at trial that the victim was killed in a creek where her body was found. That testimony contradicted the defense theory that the victim was killed by others at Paradis' house when Paradis was not home and that Paradis then just helped dump the body in the creek. After the trial, defense counsel discovered that the prosecutor had written notes of the briefing conducted by the medical expert shortly after he performed the autopsy. The written notes showed that at that time the medical expert had expressed the opinion that the victim did not die in the creek. The prosecution did not disclose this fact. We held that the undisclosed material constituted impeachment evidence, although the defendant obviously knew of the expert's existence and could have obtained the suppressed information from him. Paradis, 130 F.3d at 392. 81 The facts in Benn are similar. Benn, like Paradis, knew of the experts' existence but had been supplied with evidence by the state that the experts' view supported the state's theory. A defendant furnished with such inculpatory evidence by the state is not required to assume that the state has concealed material information and has thereby obligated him to ascertain the Brady material on his own. In the case before us, moreover, the state not only failed to disclose the crucial information about the accidental nature of the fire, but it actually misled the defense by disclosing a part of the experts' findings that, read alone, would lead to a conclusion directly opposite to the one they reached. 82 Evidence that the fire in Benn's trailer was not caused by arson and had been determined by fire officials to be accidental would have substantially undermined the state's principal theory of motive and its main support for the aggravating factor of common scheme or plan, as well as its contention that the killings were premeditated. Thus, we hold that the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence about the nature of the fire constitutes a Brady violation, independent of the Brady violation that resulted from the state's suppression of impeachment evidence. We also hold that the state court ruling regarding the exculpatory evidence was clearly erroneous and thus constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent.