Opinion ID: 701738
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Court's Decision to Allow Evidence of Buckley's Death

Text: 47 Birbal contends, secondly, that he was denied a fair trial by Judge Billings's in limine ruling permitting the prosecutor to elicit allegedly prejudicial testimony concerning Peter Buckley's death of a heroin overdose. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the in limine ruling. 48 Before trial, Birbal moved to preclude the government from introducing any evidence relating to Buckley's death. He argued that Buckley's death was relevant only to sentencing and not to the issue before the jury, namely, whether he and Wright had distributed drugs to Buckley. Even if it were relevant to that issue, he argued, such evidence should be excluded, pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, as substantially more prejudicial than probative. 49 The district court denied Birbal's motion from the bench, concluding that although Buckley's death was not an element of the crime charged, it was, however, inexorably intertwined with the issue of whether Birbal and Wright distributed narcotics to him. Transcript of Proceedings of Oct. 20, 1993, at 5. Accordingly, the court concluded, evidence of Buckley's death doesn't come under [Rule] 403, and the motion was denied. Id. The court, however, invited Birbal's counsel to make a request for a limiting instruction at the conclusion of trial, instructing the jury that they should consider testimony regarding Buckley's death only insofar as it served to prove the crime charged, i.e., narcotics distribution. At trial, the government elicited substantial testimony concerning the details of Buckley's death, to which Birbal's counsel made no objection. After trial, Birbal's counsel made no request for a limiting instruction. 50 We review the court's in limine ruling for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brady, 26 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 246, 130 L.Ed.2d 168 (1994). We note first that the district court erred in concluding that evidence of Buckley's death doesn't come under [Rule] 403. Rule 403, by its terms, makes no exception for intertwined or background evidence, but applies to all evidence. Nevertheless, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Birbal's motion, as some evidence of Buckley's death was clearly relevant to whether the defendants distributed narcotics, and was not substantially more prejudicial than probative. As we have previously noted: 51 The trial court may admit evidence that does not directly establish an element of the offense charged, in order to provide background for the events alleged in the indictment. Background evidence may be admitted to show, for example, the circumstances surrounding the events or to furnish an explanation of the understanding or intent with which certain acts were performed. 52 United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1561 (2d Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Daly, 842 F.2d 1380, 1388 (2d Cir.1988)), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 941, 112 S.Ct. 1486, 117 L.Ed.2d 628 (1992); see also Brady, 26 F.3d at 287 (finding evidence of uncharged murders admissible, as probative of existence of the charged conspiracy); United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir.) (evidence of acts that arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense is admissible if it is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or if it is necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial) (quoting United States v. Weeks, 716 F.2d 830, 832 (11th Cir.1983)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1101, 109 S.Ct. 2456, 104 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1989). 53 Here, testimony concerning the circumstances of Buckley's death, even if prejudicial to defendants, was properly admitted to show that Birbal and Wright had distributed heroin to Buckley shortly before his death. In particular, Peter Buckley's daughter, Leah, testified that Birbal and Wright visited the Buckley home on the afternoon before Buckley's death; that defendants spent a few minutes with Buckley and then drove off; that, shortly after the two defendants left the home, her father began to experience severe physical discomfort, which manifested itself in staggering, vomiting, and calling out that he was in pain; and that she discovered her father dead in his bedroom the next morning. Certainly, this evidence--which was corroborated by the medical examiner's testimony--was crucial to the government in demonstrating that Birbal and Wright sold heroin to Buckley. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying Birbal's in limine motion to exclude all testimony regarding Buckley's death. 54 In addition to challenging the court's in limine ruling, Birbal challenges the court's failure to restrict ... the extremely prejudicial evidence that the government presented relating to Peter Buckley's death. Brief for Appellant Birbal, at 22. He notes that almost every government witness discussed Buckley's death, often in graphic detail, and the government referred to it repeatedly in its opening and closing arguments. Particularly inflammatory, he notes, was the emotional testimony of twelve-year-old Leah about how, when she went upstairs to wake up her father on Sunday morning, she found him dead in his bed. We address Birbal's contention in order to provide guidance to the district court on retrial. 55 Having moved in limine to exclude all evidence relating to Buckley's death, Birbal failed to raise an objection at trial to any of the testimony of which he now complains. He contends that, by moving in limine to exclude any evidence of Buckley's death, he preserved his right to appeal the admission of all such evidence. It was apparent to [counsel] from the judge's pretrial ruling on this issue, he contends, that any such objection [at trial] would be fruitless. Reply Brief for Appellant Birbal, at 5. 56 We cannot agree. Rule 103, Fed.R.Evid., requires that, in order to preserve an evidentiary claim for appeal, a party must make a timely objection at trial. While circumstances exist in which a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve an evidentiary issue for appeal without a contemporaneous objection to the evidence at trial, see United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121 (2d Cir.1995), this is not the case with regard to Rule 403 objections, which must be made at trial. Id. at 1120. Because an appellate court cannot review a trial court's balancing of probative value and prejudice without reference to the witness's actual testimony, a defendant must both confront and challenge an adverse evidentiary decision at trial to raise and preserve for review the correctness of this ruling. Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted). When the district court denied Birbal's in limine motion to exclude all evidence of Buckley's death, it did not thereby relieve Birbal's counsel of the obligation to object whenever specific inflammatory statements were made at trial. Thus, while we affirm the court's blanket in limine ruling, Birbal may still object at retrial to any specific testimony regarding Buckley's death which he considers unduly prejudicial, and indeed he must do so in order not to forfeit his right to appeal on this ground.