Opinion ID: 803994
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allocution Challenge

Text: Frost also claims that the district court violated his allocution rights by sentencing him before he had a chance to address the court.
After conviction and before sentencing, probation services prepared a presentence report and recommended sentence. According to the presentence report, although Frost fell within the most lenient criminal history category under the Sentencing Guidelines, that category significantly under-represented his -32- criminal history because it failed to account for his past convictions in tribal court. The presentence report therefore recommended the court apply a higher criminal history category, yielding a guidelines range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment, and further recommended the court impose a mid-range sentence of 200 months. Frost objected in writing to the recommendation prior to sentencing. Nonetheless, at the beginning of the sentencing proceedings, the court told Frost and his counsel: “I think there is justification for a much higher sentence, but I will abide by the recommendation of Probation and impose a sentence of 200 months.” R., Vol. 3, at 603. The court then asked Frost, “[A]t this time is there anything you’d like to say before I state a sentence?” Id. at 604. Frost answered yes, and read a prepared statement to the court, which covers about three pages of the transcript. His counsel then spoke again, asking the court for a sentence of 188 months. The government responded, asking the court to adopt the presentence report’s recommendation. The district court concluded this segment of the proceeding with an offer to the parties: “This is a proposed sentence, and you may comment on it.” Id. at 612. The court then explained in detail that it had considered the appropriate factors and concluded that 200 months was an appropriate sentence. The court engaged in a formal pronouncement of the sentence, including all the sentencing -33- conditions, and then again asked the parties for comment. Defense counsel’s only request was that a condition on Frost’s computer and internet usage be lifted, to which the court agreed. Finally, the court “ordered that the sentence as I stated it will be the sentence imposed.” Id. at 620.
Because Frost did “not object to the purported violation of his allocution rights at the . . . hearing,” we “review for plain error.” United States v. Rausch, 638 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2011). As a general matter, allocution errors are not subject to harmless-error analysis, because it is difficult for defendants to establish that proper allocution would have resulted in a lower sentence. Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1300–01. But even so, allocution errors are not automatically subject to reversal. They still must meet the fourth requirement of plain error—that they “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1301. Like many trial errors, “denial of the right of allocution is not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.” United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d 1148, 1153 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 32 requires that “before imposing [a] sentence, the court must . . . address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. -34- 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). This rule codifies the common law right of allocution at sentencing. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304 (1961). If a court “definitively” announces a defendant’s sentence before giving him a chance to speak, the court commits reversible error because it “effectively communicate[s] to [the defendant] that his sentence ha[s] already been determined, and that he would not have a meaningful opportunity to influence that sentence through his statements to the court.” United States v. Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d 1260, 1268 (10th Cir. 2010). Such error is generally not cured by “the court’s later remark that it merely ‘intended’ to impose” the sentence it announced. Id.; but see Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d at 1152 (finding no plain error where court announced its intention to sentence defendant within the guidelines range prior to allocution). We find the court below did not commit plain error at sentencing. While the court’s preliminary statement obviously disclosed its favorable view of the recommendations contained in the presentence report, the totality of the hearing shows any error by the court did not “seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings,” Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1301. First of all, the sentencing transcript shows that the court’s statements did not, in fact, inhibit Frost from making a meaningful statement in an attempt to influence his sentence. To the contrary, Frost spoke at length about his upbringing and family circumstances, as well as his perception of unfair treatment -35- at trial and in his past proceedings relating to his prior rape conviction. Frost also proposed “a lesser sentence with the option of probation and early release. And . . . I will succeed in counseling of the probation requirements if I’m allowed to be put on probation as soon and as early as possible.” R., Vol. 3, at 606. Based on these statements and the court’s requests for additional comments, we are satisfied Frost had an opportunity to influence the sentence imposed. Indeed, Frost was undeterred by the court’s preliminary statement and he and his counsel took full advantage of the opportunity to attempt to influence the court’s decision. Where the court personally invites the defendant to present information to mitigate his sentence, and the defendant in fact does so, fairness is not seriously affected, notwithstanding the presumption of prejudice. See Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d at 1153. In addition, Frost “fail[s] to set forth what [else] he would have said to the district court” but for the alleged error. Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1302. These facts differ significantly from the facts in United States v. LanderosLopez, 615 F.3d 1260 (10th Cir. 2010), in which we remanded for resentencing based on the district court’s allocution error. There, after the court announced the intended sentence, the defendant addressed the court “briefly” and apologized for his actions, but did not make an extended argument for leniency. Id. at 1265. Here, in contrast, despite the court’s alleged error, Frost made an extended statement that included an explicit request for a lower sentence. Put differently, -36- even if the court’s statements in theory could have “effectively communicated . . . that his sentence had already been determined,” id. at 1268, Frost’s conduct shows that the court’s statements did not in fact communicate that to him. See Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d at 1153 (finding no serious unfairness where the court did not “conclusively adjudge” the defendant’s sentence before allocution). The present case also differs from Landeros-Lopez in another significant way. In Landeros-Lopez, the defendant was invited to speak only after the court pronounced the sentence in a lengthy and detailed fashion, with all the trappings of a formal sentence, including the defendant’s conditions of confinement and supervised release. See 615 F.3d at 1266; see also United States v. Luepke, 495 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2007). We found that allowing the defendant to speak only after this formal pronouncement would create the impression that the sentence was a “foregone conclusion,” thereby undermining the court’s legitimacy and damaging “the public perception of fairness.” Landeros-Lopez, 615 F.3d at 1267. Here, in contrast, the court did not engage in a lengthy, formal recitation of the defendant’s sentence until after the defendant had made an extended plea for leniency. See Mendoza-Lopez, 669 F.3d at 1152 (distinguishing Landeros-Lopez based on the formality of the court’s pronouncement). In addition, both defense counsel and government counsel spoke after Frost, before the court formally announced a sentence, and offered substantive argument regarding the appropriate -37- sentence. Thus, in light of the proceedings as a whole, a public observer would not be left with the impression that Frost did not have a meaningful opportunity to address the court before it finalized his sentence. Cf. United States v. Griffin, 530 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2008) (no denial of allocution rights where record reflected that court gave defendant’s statements “genuine[]” consideration). And, as noted previously, Frost gives no indication of what else he would say if given another chance to speak. See Rausch, 638 F.3d at 1302. Therefore, even if the court’s preliminary adoption of the presentence report’s recommendation might have been in error, that error did not seriously impair the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.