Opinion ID: 1706325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Dampier was entitled to a representative jury venire.

Text: ¶ 18. African-Americans compose roughly eighteen percent of Rankin County's population. At trial, Dampier argued that the jury venire lacked fair representation, as there was only one African-American among its thirty-eight members. [20] Specifically, Dampier's argument is not necessarily the process in which they were chosen per se. It is the outcome of that process. . . . Carol Swilley, the Rankin County Circuit Clerk, testified that because of the new State Election Management System program, all 82 counties in the state of Mississippi are using the same jury selection program. . . . [T]he system is set up to follow exactly what the code section says. As such, the 12,000 available names in Rankin County, which in no way identify race, were randomly drawn through the computer into the jury pool. The circuit court concluded that: there has been just no showing of purposeful discrimination. And I believe that the testimony provided by Ms. SwilleyI don't know quite frankly what more that the circuit clerk's office can do in relation to having an impartial venire drawn. So that being the case, I'm going to take your motion as a motion to quash the entire venire, and it will be denied. ¶ 19. On appeal, Dampier argues that the discriminatory effect alone was prejudicial and the case should be reversed. The State initially responds that this issue is procedurally barred because of failure to cite legal authority to support [Dampier's] argument. . . . Next, in addressing the merits, the State argues that Dampier cannot establish a prima facie case that the cross-section requirement was violated as the' testimony of the Rankin County Circuit Clerk which described the process by which potential jurors are randomly selected by computer shows that systematic exclusion of any racial group would be virtually impossible. ¶ 20. This Court finds this issue procedurally barred as the failure to cite authority in support of an argument eliminates our obligation to review the issue. Glasper v. State, 914 So.2d 708, 726 (Miss. 2005) (citing Byrom v. State, 863 So.2d 836, 863 (Miss.2003)). ¶ 21. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this Court also finds that this issue is without merit. Dampier cites. Craft v. State, 380 So.2d 251, 255 (Miss.1980), for the proposition that discriminatory effect will suffice, even, in the absence of discrim inatory intent. A review of Craft reveals no such statement. Craft supports the proposition that a discriminatory effect in the context of persistent absence of under-representation of a race on juries raises a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. (citations omitted). No evidence of such is presented here. ¶ 22. In Haynes v. State, 934 So.2d 983, 986 (Miss.2006), this Court outlined the necessary elements for establishing a violation of the right to, an impartial jury representing a fair cross-section of the community . . . Id. As in Haynes, the venire from which the jury was selected was produced by a computer which randomly selected names from the voter rolls of Rankin County. Id. Furthermore, Dampier objected only to the results of the selection process, not the manner in which the jury was drawn. Id. at 987. As such, Dampier has failed, to make a showing of any of the prima facie elements, and this Court concludes that this argument is without merit. Id.