Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Standard Instructions on Circumstantial Evidence

Text: Defendant attacks four standard instructions given in his case, CALJIC Nos. 2.01, 2.02, 8.83, and 8.83.1, each of which contains language advising the jury that if faced with two possible interpretations of the evidence, one reasonable and one unreasonable, you must accept the reasonable interpretation and reject the unreasonable. According to defendant each of these was constitutionally flawed because each sanctioned a permissive inference or factual finding against [defendant] even if it was less than more likely than not to be true. [18] We rejected this precise contention in People v. Bradford (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1054, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544, and rejected closely related claims in People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1200, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969, People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 144, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, and other decisions. Defendant's citation of federal decisions involving the constitutionality of permissive presumptions in criminal cases ( Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 166, fn. 28, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 60 L.Ed.2d 777; Schwendeman v. Wallenstein (9th Cir.1992) 971 F.2d 313, 316) adds no merit to his contention. The challenged CALJIC instructions do not create a presumption, permissive or mandatory, as they do not permit or require any particular ultimate fact to be inferred from any particular predicate fact; they simply direct the jury, in general, to choose a reasonable conclusion over an unreasonable one in evaluating circumstantial evidence. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130,181, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Moreover, even if we viewed the instructions as creating permissive presumptions, we would find they met the more likely than not standard of Ulster County Court v. Allen, supra, 442 U.S. at page 166, footnote 28, 99 S.Ct. 2213. When only one inference may reasonably be made from circumstantial evidence, that inference is indeed more likely than not to be true. The instructions did not deprive defendant of due process or a fair and reliable penalty determination.