Opinion ID: 2517537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: utah's statutes violate due process if they are interpreted to deprive unwed fathers of children born on weekends and holidays of a postbirth opportunity to preserve paternal rights

Text: ¶25 Under both federal and state law, an unwed biological father has an inchoate interest in a parental relationship with his child that acquires full constitutional protection only when he demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by [coming] forward to participate in the rearing of his child. [13] As explained by the United States Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, [14] The significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. If he fails to do so, the Federal Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best interests lie. [15] ¶26 In Lehr, the United States Supreme Court recognized that individual states may define when an unwed father has grasped that opportunity. It upheld the constitutionality of New York's paternity statute against a challenge by an unwed father of a two-year-old who had failed in the two years since his child's birth to legally claim his paternity by mailing a postcard to the state's registry. [16] ¶27 The United States Supreme Court has not, however, determined the rights of an unwed father of a newborn child or considered whether the United States Constitution places additional restrictions on the laws a state may enact to terminate unwed fathers' opportunities to assert their rights to newborns. Some courts have interpreted Lehr to herald greater protection of the father's opportunity interest in cases involving newborns, reasoning that in those cases the unwed father has not yet had the opportunity to fully demonstrate the level of his commitment to the child. [17] ¶28 In Wells v. Children's Aid Society of Utah, [18] we applied a due process analysis under the Utah Constitution to give greater protection to the rights of unwed fathers of newborns. We described an unwed father's opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his newborn as a provisional right that is itself protected by the due process clause of the Utah Constitution. [19] And we said that [w]e measure the statutory specifications for the termination of that provisional right against the tests of compelling state interest and narrowly tailored means. [20] But because of the state's compelling interest in assuring speedy identification of the newborn's legal parents and the narrow tailoring of the statute, we held that section 78-30-4(3), the predecessor of the adoption statutes at issue in this case, was facially constitutional. [21] ¶29 Under the old Utah Code section 78-30-4(3), [22] an unwed father was required to preserve his rights by registering a notice of claim to paternity with the Department of Health. [23] That section provided that the notice may be registered prior to the birth of the child but must be registered prior to the date the illegitimate child is relinquished or placed with an agency licensed to provide adoption services. [24] The intent of the statute was to facilitate permanent and secure placement of illegitimate children whose unwed mothers wish to give them up for adoption and whose unwed fathers take no steps to officially identify themselves and acknowledge paternity. [25] Specifically, [t]he registration requirement was viewed as a procedure that would protect the putative father's parental rights if he timely claimed his paternity. [26] Thus, the registration statute was intended to strike a balance between two competing interests: the significant state interest in speedily placing infants for adoption and the constitutionally protected rights of putative fathers. [27] ¶30 In Wells, the unwed father challenged the constitutionality of this statute. [28] We held the statute facially valid, stating as follows: [T]he state has a compelling interest in speedily identifying those persons who will assume a parental role over newborn illegitimate children. Speedy identification is important to immediate and continued physical care and it is essential to early and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents. If infants are to be spared the injury and pain of being torn from parents with whom they have begun the process of bonding and if prospective parents are to rely on the process in making themselves available for adoptions, such determinations must also be final and irrevocable. Section 78-30-4(3) is narrowly tailored to achieve the purposes identified above. No infringement of the unwed father's rights not essential to the statute's purposes has been identified. Due process does not require that the father of an illegitimate child be identified and personally notified before his parental right can be terminated. In the common cases of unwed fathers without desires to assume the responsibilities and to claim the rights of parenthood, such a requirement would frustrate the compelling state interest in the speedy determination described above. [29] In subsequent cases, we continued to uphold the constitutionality of the old section 78-30-4 without engaging in additional analysis. [30] ¶31 In Wells, we additionally held that the unwed father's as-applied due process challenge could not succeed because it had been possible for him to register before the birth mother consented to their child's adoption. [31] Wells's biological child was born in Salt Lake City on September 23, 1981. [32] Wells, who lived in Moab, Utah, mailed his registration form to the Department of Health in Salt Lake City on that same day, but the form did not reach the Department of Health until September 30. [33] In the meantime, on September 24, the birth mother consented to the child's adoption. [34] Thus, Wells's registration was seven days late. In rejecting his as-applied challenge, we noted that Wells could not show that it had been impossible for him to file because he had ample advance notice of the expected time of birth and the fact that the mother intended to relinquish the child for adoption, advice of counsel on filing the required form, and a copy of the form provided by a social worker for the department. [35] Wells had signed the form on September 18, but he said that he did not mail it until September 23 because he was waiting to ensure that the baby was his; if it was born any later he would have believed that someone else was the father. [36] ¶32 Our decision in Wells is in many respects relevant to our analysis of the constitutionality of the adoption statutes and their effect in this case. Although the adoption code has been overhauled several times since we decided Wells, [37] the statutory language at issue in that case was very similar to the language in the present statutes that requires unwed fathers to file prior to the mother's consent or relinquishment. But in Wells we did not consider the issue raised herewhether the statute can be constitutional if it completely cuts off postbirth rights of unwed fathers when the child is born on a weekend or holiday. In upholding the old section 78-30-4, we said only that [n]o infringement of the unwed father's rights not essential to the statute's purposes has been identified. [38] ¶33 In this case, we therefore consider whether the infringement upon the unwed father's provisional right caused by interpreting the statutes to make it impossible for unwed fathers of children born on weekends or holidays to preserve their rights postbirth is necessary to achieve the state's compelling interests. While in the past the adoption statutes required only that unwed fathers register with the state before the mother consented to adoption or relinquished the child, the adoption statutes now require an unwed father to both register notice and file a paternity petition before the child is relinquished. In addition, if the unwed father of a newborn desires to establish a right to withhold consent to his child's adoption (rather than simply to receive notice of the adoption and an opportunity to present evidence regarding the child's best interests), [39] he must file in the paternity action a sworn affidavit stating that he is fully able and willing to have full custody of the child[,]. . . setting forth his plans for care of the child[,] and . . . agreeing to a court order of child support and the payment of expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth. [40] He must also have offered to pay and paid a fair and reasonable amount of the expenses incurred in connection with the mother's pregnancy and the child's birth, in accordance with his financial ability. [41] These actions must all be taken before the mother consents to adoption or relinquishes the child. [42] ¶34 As we previously held in Wells, it is beyond dispute that the state must . . . have legal means to ascertain within a very short time of birth whether the biological parents (or either of them) are going to assert their constitutional rights and fulfill their corresponding responsibilities, or whether adoptive parents must be substituted. [43] The state also has compelling interests in promoting early and uninterrupted bonding between child and parents and in facilitating final and irrevocable adoptions. [44] ¶35 Yet we are persuaded that as interpreted by the district court in this case, the statute's effect of cutting off postbirth weekend and holiday filing opportunities for unwed fathers is not necessary to achieve the state's compelling interests, nor is such an interpretation a narrowly tailored means of achieving those interests. Under the adoption statutes as interpreted by the district court, the unwed father whose child is born on a weekend or holiday would have no opportunity to assert his paternity after the birth of the child. Accordingly, no unwed father could be certain of when he must file a paternity action and register with the Department of Health in order to preserve his rights. He could not be certain that he will have time after the birth of his child to file because his child may be born on a weekend or holiday. ¶36 The lack of certainty presents particular problems for unwed fathers because they must not only register by filing a simple form with the state, but also file a paternity action in which they profess a willingness to take custody of the child, set[] forth . . . plans for care of the child, and pay for birth expenses, all before the mother signs her consent and relinquishment. [45] On one hand, because an unwed father could not be assured of even a minimal amount of time to file after the child's birth under the district court's interpretation of the statute, there would be an incentive for the unwed father to commence an action and file early to preserve his rights. But on the other hand, the Legislature may have intended under the adoption statutes for the unwed father to reach a certain maturity in the decision-making process regarding the care of the child after birth before filing a paternity action. Therefore, the unwed father also has an incentive to wait until he is ready to finally decide what is best for the child before taking the actions required by the adoption statutes. ¶37 This is not a problem that we previously contemplated in Wells because in that case we were not presented with a situation where the father's rights were effectively cut off as of the time of the child's birth, leaving the father no postbirth opportunity to assert his rights. Wells was aware of his baby's birth that same day and presumably could have filed before the mother relinquished the baby the next day. In this case, although Thurnwald had the rightand opportunityto assert his paternal rights prior to the birth of the child, the district court's interpretation of the statute has the effect of eliminating Thurnwald's postbirth opportunity altogether, essentially requiring him to have asserted his rights prebirth. ¶38 Neither this state nor any other state that we know of has held it constitutionally permissible to cut off a father's right to assert his paternity interest at a time before the child's birth. [46] When the court of appeals was presented with a similar problem under the old section 78-30-4 in In re K.B.E., [47] it held the statute unconstitutional as applied, stating that the statute was `not created to encourage a race for placement to cut off the rights of fathers who are identified and present.' [48] In that case, the unwed father registered on the afternoon of the same day of his child's birth, but his registration was preempted by the actions of the mother who filed an adoption petition that morning. [49] The court explained that [t]o deprive both [the unwed father] and [the child] of the possible benefits of their relationship simply because [the unwed father] filed his notice just a few hours after [the mother] filed [her] petition for adoption . . . [flies] in the face of fundamental fairness and due process. [50] ¶39 In short, the lack of a guaranteed filing period after the child's birth under the district court's interpretation of the adoption statutes would create great uncertainty for unwed fathers and a risk of a sudden and unintentional loss of the opportunity to file that is unnecessary to the state's compelling interests. The statute already explicitly provides that the Legislature's concern for the mother's relationship with the child is important enough to require her to wait twenty-four hours before the relinquishment. In most instances when the mother relinquishes the child after the twenty-four-hour waiting period expires, the parties to the adoption will not know for certain if the father has filed an adequate legal claim until they consult the state registry. In the meantime, the child usually goes home with a prospective adoptive family. Further, in cases involving a relinquishment on a holiday or weekend, the parties to an adoption already have to wait until the next business day to be certain that the father did not file an appropriate paternity petition and register his claim. In this case, L.D.S. Family Services contacted the registry the Tuesday after Labor Day weekend. Given these practical realities, the addition of a single business day in which the father may file does not unduly burden the state's compelling interest in prompt resolution of parental rights. ¶40 Additionally, the uncertain filing period that the statute would provide to unwed fathers under the district court's interpretation actually works against, rather than promotes, the state's compelling interest in permanent adoptions. If the rights of unwed fathers are well defined, it will be more difficult for fathers to mount as-applied constitutional challenges to the deprivation of their rights. As we said in Sanchez v. L.D.S. Social Services, [51] a firm cutoff date is reasonable, if not essential. [52] That firm cutoff date benefits all parties if it is tied to a certain time period after the child's birth rather than being left to the uncertainty of nature. In at least one case involving an as-applied challenge to the statute, we have expressed significant concern over an unwed father's unexpected loss of the opportunity to assert paternity where the child was born prematurely. [53] Such cases would be less troubling under an interpretation of Utah law that allows unwed fathers a guaranteed window after the child's birth to assert paternity without risk that the mother's actions will deprive him of that right.