Opinion ID: 183473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Sanchez’s Testimony

Text: Because Cortes and Brown did not object when Gonzalez asked Sanchez whether the defendants had committed a criminal act, we are reviewing that portion of Sanchez’s testimony only for plain error. See United States v. Habel, 613 F.2d 1321, 1326-27 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying the plain-error standard where the prosecutor, but not the defendant alleging error on appeal, objected to a codefendant’s proposed line of cross-examination). Under the plain-error standard, the defendant must show “(1) error, (2) that is plain and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation omitted). If all three of those conditions are met, we have discretion to correct an error that “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation omitted). To demonstrate that an error affected his substantial rights, a defendant must show that it had a significant influence on the outcome of the case. Id. We will not reverse an evidentiary ruling under the plain-error standard if the other 23 evidence of the defendant’s guilt was overwhelming. See id. at 1278-80 (concluding that the district court’s error in admitting testimony did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights because there was overwhelming independent evidence that the defendant was part of the charged conspiracy). Also, when a party chooses not to object to evidence for tactical reasons, we generally will not conclude that the admission of that evidence was plain error. See Habel, 613 F.2d at 1327-28 (“When a lawyer, for strategic reasons, chooses to by-pass the appropriate procedures for informing the trial court of contemporaneous errors, he will not be heard to complain when his strategy backfires.”). Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness may testify concerning an ultimate issue of fact, but may not “tell the jury what result to reach.” See Montgomery v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 898 F.2d 1537, 1541 (11th Cir. 1990) (addressing the permissible scope of expert testimony under Fed.R.Evid. 704). “A witness also may not testify to the legal implications of conduct; the court must be the jury’s only source of law.” Id. Thus, a government witness may not offer an opinion as to whether the defendant committed the offenses with which he is charged. Cf. United States v. Gutierrez-Farias, 294 F.3d 657, 662-63 (5th Cir. 2002) (agent’s testimony that, in most cases, individuals who transport drugs know that the drugs are in the vehicle crossed the line between a permissible expert 24 opinion and an improper legal conclusion); United States v. Scop, 846 F.2d 135, 138-43 (2d Cir. 1988) (investigator’s testimony that a scheme to defraud existed and that the defendants were active participants in the scheme was an improper legal conclusion concerning the defendants’ guilt). In this case, neither Cortes nor Brown objected when Gonzalez’s counsel asked Detective Sanchez whether Gonzalez had committed a criminal act before May 13. Because the record shows that Cortes’s and Brown’s counsel were attentive throughout trial, it appears that they chose not to object to this line of questioning for tactical reasons. See Habel, 613 F.2d at 1327 (concluding that, where counsel had been attentive throughout trial, counsel’s failure to object was for strategic reasons). Presumably, they believed that the line of questioning would be helpful to their defense. Having made an affirmative decision not to object, Cortes and Brown cannot argue that the admission of this testimony was plain error. See id. Even if Cortes and Brown had not waived this issue by failing to object, any error did not affect the defendants’ substantial rights because the government introduced considerable independent evidence of their guilt. See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1278-80. In particular, the government established that Cortes and Brown repeatedly stated that they wished to go forward with the robbery scheme. Also, at 25 the time of their arrest, Cortes and Brown were at Sanchez’s office preparing to follow him to the purported stash house, and they were in possession of an air pistol and black t-shirts that Brown planned to use as a mask. Given this evidence, the outcome of the trial would not have changed had the district court excluded Sanchez’s testimony that the defendants entered into a conspiracy.