Opinion ID: 1668313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was the grant of a new trial within the court's discretion?

Text: Jerzak urges that the circuit court abused its discretion in granting a new trial for two reasons. First, Jerzak argues that the court improperly granted a new trial when it did so for a reason that Junge did not advance, and that the judge erred when he did not confine himself to the reasons advanced by the parties. Second, Jerzak argues that the error of lawfailure to properly instruct the jurywas not properly preserved by Junge. We disagree on both points. As to Jerzak's first argument, it is our view that the reasons noted by the court for granting the new trial are within the ambit of the grounds for new trial advanced by Junge. Junge urged insufficiency of evidence to support the verdict; the court stated that reasonable people could not differ on whether Jerzak violated SDCL 32-30-20thus implying that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict. Junge also urged that the jury was improperly instructed; the court stated that the jury should have been instructed that Jerzak was negligent as a matter of law. We also disagree with Jerzak's contention that the court must confine itself to the reasons advanced by the parties when considering the propriety of granting a new trial. In fact, the circuit court need not have a new trial motion before it. The parties should take note of SDCL 15-6-59(d) which provides: Not later than ten days after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party. After giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard on the matter, the court may grant a motion for a new trial, timely served, for a reason not stated in the motion. In either case, the court shall specify in the order the grounds therefor. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a court may grant a new trial on its own motion, or for reasons not advanced by the parties. In an early case, this court stated: We are of the view that where the trial court is satisfied there has been a mistrial, or a clear miscarriage of justice, growing out of a failure of the court itself to discharge the duties of its office, the court has inherent power to grant a new trial by reason thereof at any time while the question of a new trial is pending before him, and on this ground he may grant a new trial, without application or motion by either party, wholly upon his own motion. Larsen v. Johnson, 43 S.D. 223, 227, 178 N.W. 876, 877 (1920). [2] More recently, this court stated that, [U]nder SDCL 15-6-59(d), a trial court, on its own initiative, may order a new trial for any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a party. Case v. Murdock, 488 N.W.2d 885, 888 (S.D.1992). This holding comports with the guidelines found in other authority: A trial court has, by virtue of its inherent powers, authority upon its own motion to set aside a verdict and grant a new trial, at least in the absence of any statutory limitation upon its power in this regard.... A trial court may grant a new trial where, by reason of some misapplication of the principles of law, or in consequence of some inadvertence, it is satisfied that a party has not had his or her cause properly presented, even though no exception was taken or attention called to the misapplication or inadvertence. ... Where a party files a motion for a new trial on stated grounds, and the trial court grants a new trial on grounds not stated in the motion, the court in legal contemplation grants a new trial of its own motion. 58 AM.JUR.2D New Trial §§ 33-36 (1989) (emphasis added). We also disagree with Jerzak's contention that Junge failed to properly preserve the error on instruction of the jury. Pertinent language of SDCL 15-6-59(a) provides that an error of law must be based upon an objection[.] As previously detailed, Junge objected to all jury instructions on contributory negligence, and these objections were overruled by the court. See Frey v. Kouf, 484 N.W.2d 864, 866-67 (S.D.1992) (holding that even where counsel failed to propose alternate instructions, the record of error is sufficiently preserved; an objection sufficiently informs the judge of possible error thereby allowing opportunity to make corrections). It would have been fruitless for Junge to request an instruction commanding the jury that Jerzak was negligent as a matter of law, when the court made clear that it intended to instruct on Junge's contributory negligence. We hold that the grant of a new trial was within the sound discretion of the court, and affirm its ruling.