Opinion ID: 2515085
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bulgo is limited in its applicability to this case.

Text: Bulgo is distinguishable from this case in two significant ways. First, Act 47 conferred a power to each county in the State unless a county had adopted a charter that provided an alternate process for addressing the situation described in Act 47. Act 47, ง 2 at 35. At least two other counties existed when Act 47 was enacted, and they also received the power conferred by the Act at the time of its enactment. See id. at 59, 430 P.2d at 327. In this case, only one member of the class created by Act 2 existed at the time of its enactment. Section 2 of Act 2 provides the following definitions: Large capacity ferry vessel means any inter-island ferry vessel that transports, is designed to transport, or is intended to transport per voyage at least five hundred passengers, two hundred motor vehicles, and cargo between the islands of the state. Large capacity ferry vessel company means any company that owns or operates a large capacity ferry vessel. Act 2, ง 2 at 7. Unlike Bulgo, in this case there is no evidence in the record that any company, other than Superferry, met the definition provided by section 2 when Act 2 was enacted. Secondly, the Bulgo court did not contemplate a statute that was subject to automatic repeal on a particular date or upon the happening of a one-time event. Compare Act 47 at 34-35 with Act 2, ง 18 at 20-21. Section 18 of Act 2 mandates such a repeal. Section 18 provides: This Act shall take effect upon its approval; provided that this Act shall be repealed on the earlier of: (1) The forty-fifth day, excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, following adjournment sine die of the regular session of 2009; or (2) Upon acceptance of the final environmental impact statement as provided in this Act; and provided further that: (1) The final environmental impact statement by the department of transportation that is accepted by the office of environmental quality control under this Act shall be and remain effective for all purposes under the laws of this state, notwithstanding the repeal of this Act; and (2) Section 16 of this Act shall not be repealed when this Act is repealed. [9] Act 2, ง 18 at 20-21 (emphasis added). In contrast, the Bulgo court considered an Act that was unlimited in duration. As such, it was possible that future circumstances would require another county to exercise the power conferred by Act 47. Such a possibility is highly unlikely, if not impossible, in this case. The rights and privileges conferred to a large capacity ferry vessel company by Act 2 exist for a limited period of time (less than twenty-one months) and the possibility that a company other than Superferry would be able to exercise those same rights before they are extinguished is beyond remote. See infra Part IV.A.2.c.ii. Thus, while Bulgo informs our approach to distinguishing between general and special laws, it is limited in its application, as the Bulgo court did not consider a statute that created a class with only one member nor did it consider a statute that was limited in duration. Therefore, we look to the case law of other jurisdictions. After reviewing other approaches to distinguishing between special and general laws, we believe that guidance on this issue is best found in the Colorado Supreme Court's approach in People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380 (Colo.2005). The Nebraska Supreme Court and Arizona Supreme Court provide further guidance in analyzing the future applicability of a class. See Haman v. Marsh, 237 Neb. 699, 467 N.W.2d 836, 848-49 (1991); Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 800 P.2d 1251, 1258-59 (1990).