Opinion ID: 1852244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: evidentiary hearing/ineffective assistance of counsel

Text: This Court has indicated on numerous occasions that a defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his initial postconviction motion unless (1) the motion, files and records in the case conclusively show that the defendant is not entitled to any relief, or (2) the motion or a particular claim is legally insufficient. See Maharaj v. State, 684 So.2d 726 (Fla.1996); Holland v. State, 503 So.2d 1250 (Fla. 1987). The defendant in a postconviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case based upon a legally valid claim. Mere conclusory allegations are not sufficient to meet this burden. See Kennedy v. State, 547 So.2d 912 (Fla.1989). This Court, however, in determining whether or not an evidentiary hearing on a claim is warranted must accept the defendant's factual allegations to the extent they are not refuted by the record. See Peede v. State, 748 So.2d 253 (Fla.1999). Where ineffective assistance of counsel is alleged, the defendant must establish a prima facie case that there was deficient performance by counsel and that there is a reasonable probability that the deficient performance affected the outcome of the proceeding. Because the record in this case does not conclusively refute Cook's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, the trial court must conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine if counsel failed to investigate Cook's family history and possible mental health mitigators, and whether there is a reasonable possibility that such failure, if any, affected the outcome of the penalty proceeding. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The record indicates that only one mitigating factor and two aggravating factors were found by the trial court. [2] On direct appeal Cook argued the trial court erred in failing to find the two statutory mitigators of extreme mental or emotional disturbance and diminished capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Cook now alleges counsel failed to properly investigate the mental mitigators and Cook's family and personal background. In addition, Cook argues counsel waited until the day before the penalty phase hearing to seek the assistance of a mental health expert. While counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Haber, [3] a clinical psychiatrist, at the penalty phase hearing, Dr. Haber's evaluation of Cook was done the morning of the penalty phase hearing. Furthermore, Cook alleges the opinions rendered by the expert were based on this brief evaluation and Cook's self-reporting. Thus, Cook argues Dr. Haber, without being given family and other background information, was unable to support her testimony with other evidence. The record also indicates that some general information concerning Cook's nonviolent past, [4] religion, [5] rehabilitation, [6] and others' evaluations of Cook as slow was presented at the penalty hearing. However, Cook complains that had counsel fully investigated his family and background, he would have been able to better cross-examine the witnesses that were presented. Counsel would have also discovered additional mitigating evidence including a long history of drug use, abuse as a child, racial threats and attacks upon moving to Florida, the death of a close sibling at an early age, a learning disability, and growing up in an atmosphere of chaos and instability. Given the scarce mitigating evidence presented at the penalty phase, Cook is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of counsel's effectiveness at that stage of the proceeding. See Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509 (Fla.1999); Rose v. State, 675 So.2d 567 (Fla.1996). Although Cook raises other claims which he alleges entitle him to an evidentiary hearing, such as ineffective assistance of counsel at guilt and resentencing, [7] an Ake claim, and a Brady claim, we find no error in the trial court's summary disposition of these issues. More specifically Cook argues counsel was ineffective for laboring under a conflict of interest, conceding Cook's guilt, failing to pursue an intoxication defense, failing to secure a forensic expert, failing to object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to excuse black prospective jurors, failing to object to the written resentencing order, and failing to request a new penalty phase jury and the opportunity to present new evidence. The issue concerning a conflict of interest is not properly before this court since it was raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing from the denial of 3.850 relief. See Preston v. State, 528 So.2d 896 (Fla.1988). Additionally, Cook has not sufficiently pled information demonstrating that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel's representation. Cook's argument that trial counsel was ineffective because he conceded Cook's guilt is refuted by the record. Cook does not point to any instance where counsel conceded his guilt before the jury; rather, he has outlined a portion of the record where counsel summarizes what the State says it will prove. Cook has failed to sufficiently plead his claim that counsel should have based his defense on voluntary intoxication. He has not advanced any factual allegations to demonstrate intoxication at the time of the offense. Additionally, Cook has not demonstrated ineffectiveness in counsel's failure to engage the services of an independent expert on bullet trajectories. Cook admitted to shooting the victim while she was on her knees. He simply makes a conclusory statement that an expert's testimony would have exonerated him. As a final allegation of ineffectiveness of counsel at the guilt phase, Cook argues counsel should have challenged the State's use of peremptory challenges on two black jurors. The mere fact that the jurors are black does not mean they were not subject to challenge, and Cook has not alleged that the challenges were in fact racially motivated. To the extent Cook argues he was entitled to the assistance of a psychological expert pursuant to Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), he had such assistance in the form of Dr. Haber, who testified at the penalty phase. Moreover, to the extent Cook is arguing the expert assistance was inadequate, this issue is subsumed under the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase and relief is being granted on that claim. Cook's claim that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), is premised on his allegation that the State did not disclose a letter received from codefendant Melvin Nairn offering additional assistance. However, it should be noted that Nairn was not called as a witness by the State; he was in fact called as a defense witness. Even assuming the letter was withheld, Cook does not allege how this fact demonstrates a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995).