Opinion ID: 2976568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: petitioner as a victim of past persecution

Text: The Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to a “refugee,” Perkovic v. I.N.S., 33 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 1994), which is defined as an alien who “is unable or unwilling to return to” 6 their home country “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The alien bears the burden of establishing that they are a refugee “either because he has suffered actual past persecution or because he has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” Koliada v. I.N.S., 259 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)-(b) (2001)). An alien who establishes that he suffered from past persecution on a protected ground is “presumed to have a well-founded fear of persecution.” Id. To rebut this presumption, the government must demonstrate either that changed conditions in the alien’s home nation obviate the threat of future persecution, or that it would be reasonable to expect the alien to relocate to another part of his home nation where the threat of future persecution does not exist. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i). An alien qualifies for withholding of removal, and therefore cannot be removed to their home county, if “the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). To qualify for such relief, however, the alien must demonstrate that it is “more likely than not” that he would be subject to persecution. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 424 (1984). Nevertheless, an alien who can demonstrate that he suffered past persecution on a protected ground enjoys the same presumption in the withholding of removal context as he does in the asylum context. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(1)(i). The IJ determined that, although Petitioner was detained, tortured, and hunted within his own country, such treatment did not constitute past persecution. Accordingly, Petitioner was not afforded a presumption of eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal. For the reasons that follow, this decision was incorrect as a matter of law. 7
To benefit from the presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution, Petitioner must establish both that he suffered past persecution and that this persecution was on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. Koliada, 259 F.3d at 487. The BIA determined, and the government does not contest, that Petitioner’s decision not to fire on political demonstrators was itself a statement of political opinion. Accordingly, the question of whether Petitioner is entitled to a presumption of eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal hinges upon whether his detention, torture and subsequent flight from the Albanian police falls within the definition of past “persecution.” The Immigration and Nationalization Act (“INA”) provides no definition of “persecution,” and thus far this Court has declined to articulate one. See Mikhailevitch v. I.N.S., 146 F.3d 384, 389 (6th Cir. 1998). Rather than laying out a bright-line rule or even a multi-factor test establishing the scope of the word “persecution,” this Court has preferred to engage in case-by-case discussions of the circumstances of individual parties, occasionally providing hints as to what “persecution” may encompass. Thus, precedent teaches that persecution “requires more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, unaccompanied by any physical punishment, infliction of harm, or significant deprivation of liberty,” id. at 390, but also that “[a] single incident may be sufficient to constitute persecution.” Mohammed v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 369, 371 (6th Cir. 2007). It teaches that persecution “embodies punishment or the infliction of suffering or harm,” Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389; however, it “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Lumaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 574, 577 (6th Cir. 2006). 8 This lack of clarity in regard to the meaning of the word “persecution” may be by Congressional design. In 1978, Congress enacted the Holtzman Amendment to the INA, which prohibits asylum from being extended to persons who themselves engaged in persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B). In enacting this Amendment, Congress considered providing a specific definition of the word “persecution,” but ultimately decided instead to “require [an] individual determination based on the facts in each case.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-1452, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4700, 4706. Nevertheless, the Holtzman Amendment’s legislative history does provide a helpful window into Congress’ understanding of what constitutes persecution. The Amendment’s legislative history embraces previous case law that described persecution “as the infliction of suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive (e.g. race, religion, political opinion, etc.), in a manner condemned by civilized governments.” Id. at 5. It would be inconsistent with Congress’ intent to treat this description of persecution as providing a rigid, bright-line rule that necessarily excludes oppression which does not fall within its scope. See id. at 7 (“It is the intention of the committee that determinations be made on a case-by-case basis in accordance with the case law . . . as well as international material on the subject such as the opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunals.”) Nevertheless, when a member of a protected class suffers officially sanctioned harm which is of the severity widely condemned by the international community, such harm falls within the INA’s definition of the word “persecution.” See id. at 5. In the instant case, Petitioner testified that he was detained and tortured because of his politically motivated decision not to fire on civilians, and the IJ found that Petitioner’s testimony accurately described what happened to him. Similarly, Petitioner experienced the harm at the hands 9 of Albanian police officers, thus lending official sanction to his suffering. Accordingly, inasmuch as the ill-treatment which Petitioner experienced was of the severity that is condemned by civilized governments, that treatment amounted to persecution.
Torture is an activity which is almost universally condemned by civilized governments. Under the Convention Against Torture no signatory nation may engage in the practice of torture, and indeed such nations must take affirmative action to prevent torture from occurring within their jurisdiction. Dec. 10, 1984, art. 2, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027, 1028. This prohibition is absolute. “No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.” Id. Under the Convention, torture is defined as: [A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. Id., art. 1. The Convention Against Torture has over 140 signatory nations including the United States, and though a handful of nations, such as Iran, Iraq and North Korea, have declined to join this prohibition on torture, it is safe to say that the overwhelming majority of “civilized governments” join the Convention’s condemnation of officially sanctioned torture. See Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterIV/treaty14.asp. Moreover, 10 applying the Convention’s definition of torture to the instant facts demonstrates that the harm inflicted on Petitioner is exactly the sort of “severe pain or suffering” which the Convention and its signatory nations condemn. Petitioner was detained, tied up and beaten repeatedly by police officers wearing masks, suffering injuries that left him unable to move one arm. Moreover, the BIA found that this officially sanctioned harm was inflicted as punishment for Petitioner’s refusal to fire upon defenseless political protestors, and appears to have occurred for the purpose of intimidating other police officers against following Petitioner’s example. Such maltreatment at the hands of government officials is at least as severe as maltreatment that we have previously stated may amount to torture. See Ali v. Reno, 237 F.3d 591, 593, 598 (6th Cir. 2001) (a person who was kicked, beaten and threatened with a gun experienced sufficiently severe treatment to constitute “torture,” even though no lasting injuries were inflicted). Accordingly, we hold that Petitioner was a victim of torture, an activity which is condemned by civilized governments. Convention Against Torture, art. 1. Moreover, as we defer to the BIA’s findings that Petitioner was tortured by government officials as punishment for his politically motivated actions, we hold that Petitioner experienced “the infliction of suffering or harm, under government sanction, upon persons who differ in a way regarded as offensive (e.g. race, religion, political opinion, etc.), in a manner condemned by civilized governments.” H.R.Rep. No. 95-1452, at 7.
Because Petitioner experienced torture, a practice condemned by civilized governments, and because we differ to the BIA’s finding that he was tortured by government officials in retaliation for his political activity, we hold that he suffered past persecution for the purposes of his petition for 11 asylum and withholding of removal, and thus is entitled to a presumption that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.13(b)(1)(i) & 1208.16(b)(1)(i).