Opinion ID: 415692
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Closing Argument as Plain Error

Text: 15 Even if Rojas has waived his right to appeal the use of the phrase illegal alien, however, this Court is not precluded from reviewing the use of the phrase at trial. Fed.R.Evid. 103(d) provides: Nothing in this rule [requiring objection to preserve appealability] precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 4 Our authority to review, we note, is limited to plain errors, and the errors must affect substantial rights, We find that allegations unsupported by the record that Rojas was an illegal alien might well have a serious and negative effect on his substantial right to an impartial jury. The only serious issue is whether the allegations rise to the level of plain error. 16 The plain error rule is not a run-of-the-mill remedy. United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d 1291, 1299 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 1369, 67 L.Ed.2d 348 (1981). It is invoked only in exceptional circumstances to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Eaton v. United States, 398 F.2d 485, 486 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 937, 89 S.Ct. 299, 21 L.Ed.2d 273 (1968). The exact delineation of plain error is difficult to articulate. We have defined plain error as error which is both obvious and substantial. United States v. Gerald, 624 F.2d at 1299; Sykes v. United States, 373 F.2d 607, 612 (5th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 977, 87 S.Ct. 1172, 18 L.Ed.2d 138 (1967). But such elegant phraseology yields little guidance. The determination still rests ultimately on the facts of each case. 17 Perhaps the most telling guidelines were laid down by Justice Stone in 1936, when he wrote: 18 In exceptional circumstances, especially in criminal cases, appellate courts, in the public interest, may, of their motion, notice errors to which no exception has been taken, if the errors are obvious, or if they otherwise seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 19 United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936) (emphasis added). Following the clarion call of Justice Stone's words, we must hold that the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings in this case were adversely affected by the closing jury argument of defense counsel. The closing remarks included this paragraph: 20 I hope--I hope--that you don't, because Mr. Rojas is an alien, give him any more benefit than you would any United States citizen who comes in this Court. If the situation were reversed and you or I were in Mexico--were illegal aliens in Mexico--I would hope Mexico would open up their Courts, would open up their job market, would open up their public schools, would open up their State hospitals, as we have in this country for Mr. Rojas. Certainly he is--I'm not saying we shouldn't do those things, but he shouldn't be entitled to any extra benefits because he is an illegal alien in this country than would any other citizen of the United States be entitled. 21 These remarks prejudiced the jury on two counts. First, by introducing irrelevant and unproven allegations that Rojas was an illegal alien, the defense clearly was appealing to the prejudice and bias of members of the jury on the basis of national origin. Although there was justification for presenting Rojas' Mexican citizenship to the jury to establish diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1332(a)(2), his status as an illegal alien was completely irrelevant to the negligence claims the jury was to evaluate. Furthermore, the closing reference to illegal alien could have placed a prejudicial gloss on the many references throughout trial to Rojas as an alien. Having laid a strong foundation through use of the term alien throughout trial, even counsel's single reference to the incendiary, derogatory expression illegal alien is prejudicial. Finally, the allegation that Rojas was in the country illegally is unsupported in the record. 22 Texas courts have found plain error in jury remarks that appeal to racial or ethnic bias. Penate v. Berry, 348 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.), involved remarks to the jury that an alien has no right to come into court and reach your hands into the pockets of an American citizen.... The court reversed and remanded for new trial, despite absence of a timely objection at trial. See also Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n v. Jones, 361 S.W.2d 725 (Tex.Civ.App.--Waco 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (claims to racial or religious prejudice justify new trial). 23 Second, these remarks were an impermissible invocation of the golden rule argument. As we recently explained, 24 What every lawyer should know is that a plea to the jury that they should put themselves in the shoes of the plaintiff and do unto him as they would have done unto them under similar circumstances.... [is] improper because it encourages the jury to depart from neutrality and to decide the case on the basis of personal interest and bias rather than on the evidence. 25 Loose v. Offshore Navigation, Inc., 670 F.2d 493, 496 (5th Cir.1982), quoting Ivy v. Security Barge Lines, Inc., 585 F.2d 732, 741 (5th Cir.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 606 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956, 100 S.Ct. 2927, 64 L.Ed.2d 815 (1980). Accord, Burrage v. Harrell, 537 F.2d 837 (5th Cir.1976); Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.1967). The fact that the statement in this case was an inverse incantation of this golden rule is insufficient to validate the partiality inherent in the argument. Loose, supra. The golden rule argument, while not plain error, is normally ground for new trial. Id. 26 The closing remarks of defense counsel were highly prejudicial and a blatant appeal to jury bias. Although the district court gave a jury instruction emphasizing equal access to justice, even this instruction was ambiguous. The jury was instructed: 27 You are instructed that all persons are equal before the law, and this case should be considered and decided by you as an action between persons of equal standing in the community, of equal worth, and holding the same or similar stations in life. The law is no respector of persons. All persons, including partnerships, and other lawful organizations, stand equal before the law, and are to be dealt with as equals in a Court of Justice. 28 While its wording might have been adequate to indicate that aliens must be treated equally, it was not adequate to tell the jury that illegal aliens are equal before the law. A jury could readily conclude that someone who is illegal is not equal before the law to law abiding citizens and jurors. We are not convinced that the jury instruction could rebuild the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of jury proceedings that Justice Stone admonished us to protect, see Atkinson, 297 U.S. at 160, 56S.Ct. at 392. As we first noted in Dunn v. United States, 307 F.2d 883, 887 (5th Cir.1962), if you throw a skunk into the jury box, you can't instruct the jury not to smell it. Some references are so prejudicial that it is difficult for curative instructions to resuscitate fairness. See, e.g., Pride Transport Co. v. Hughes, 591 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Civ.App.--Eastland 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (disclosure of defendant's insurance coverage can be grounds for mistrial in Texas). Even assuming that a proper jury instruction could have cured prejudice, this instruction did not do so. 29 We hold that the obvious and blatant appeal in this case to racial and ethnic prejudice is plain error. In consideration of this impropriety, combined with an additional golden rule appeal to the jury's partiality, we must reverse the judgment of the district court and order a new trial. 30