Opinion ID: 792809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury bias and extraneous influence

Text: 101 Defendants charge that the District Court erred by denying Rule 33 relief without holding an evidentiary hearing on alleged juror misconduct. Defendants claim that evidence indicating that juror Chappell Hartridge gave false voir dire responses justified further inquiry into his ability to be fair and impartial. Bacanovic makes the additional argument that a new trial, or at least an evidentiary hearing, is warranted because post-verdict public statements by Hartridge and other jurors demonstrate that matters outside of the record improperly influenced the verdict of conviction.
102 Post-trial jury scrutiny is disfavored because of its potential to undermine full and frank discussion in the jury room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople. Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120-21, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987). Accordingly, probing jurors for potential instances of bias, misconduct or extraneous influences after they have reached a verdict is justified only when reasonable grounds for investigation exist, in other words, where there is clear, strong, substantial and incontrovertible evidence that a specific, nonspeculative impropriety has occurred which could have prejudiced the trial. United States v. Moon, 718 F.2d 1210, 1234 (2d Cir.1983) (citing King v. United States, 576 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir.1978)). The inquiry should end whenever it becomes apparent to the trial judge that reasonable grounds to suspect prejudicial jury impropriety do not exist. Id. 103 We review for abuse of discretion the District Court's Rule 33 decision regarding the effect on the jury of potentially prejudicial occurrences. Id. at 1235.

104 Reviewing the District Court's denial of Rule 33 relief based on alleged juror bias, we are mindful of the principle that 105 [o]ne touchstone of a fair trial is an impartial trier of fact — a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982). Voir dire examination serves to protect that right by exposing possible biases, both known and unknown, on the part of potential jurors. Demonstrated bias in the responses to questions on voir dire may result in a juror being excused for cause; hints of bias not sufficient to warrant challenge for cause may assist parties in exercising their peremptory challenges. The necessity of truthful answers by prospective jurors if this process is to serve its purpose is obvious. 106 McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554, 104 S.Ct. 845, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). These concerns are reflected in the McDonough standard for analyzing allegations that a juror's false voir dire concealed bias that affected the fairness of the trial: a party alleging unfairness based on undisclosed juror bias must demonstrate first, that the juror's voir dire response was false and second, that the correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. The District Court observed that this Court has never found reason to overturn a verdict on the basis of juror nondisclosure under McDonough and only once, see United States v. Colombo, 869 F.2d 149 (2d Cir.1989), has remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the matter. See United States v. Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d 432, 437 (S.D.N.Y.2004). Our ruling here does not change those statistics. 107 Prompted by the extensive publicity surrounding this case, the District Court undertook a two-step voir dire process. First, prospective jurors completed a questionnaire drafted by the parties. Then, following for-cause challenges based on the questionnaire responses, those persons remaining in the jury pool were questioned individually. The questionnaire probed prospective jurors' prior involvement with the justice system by asking about court appearances and whether the individual or someone close to him or her had filed criminal charges, had been the victim of a crime, had been sued, accused of wrongdoing on a job, or questioned by law enforcement or accused of, charged with, or convicted of any crime. 108 Hartridge's questionnaire reflected that he had appeared in court in connection with a dispute with his landlord, but he gave negative responses to the other questions described above. He returned for individual questioning and was subsequently empaneled. Shortly after the jury's verdict was announced, Hartridge and several other jurors discussed their experience as jurors with the press. According to Defendants, at that time the defense received information calling into question the manner in which Hartridge got on the jury. 109 In their motions for a new trial, Defendants alleged that Hartridge's failure to disclose the following five matters on his questionnaire concealed probable bias: (i) an arrest and arraignment for assault of a former girlfriend; (ii) civil suits against Hartridge and members of his family; (iii) his son's conviction for attempted robbery; (iv) an accusation of embezzlement in his capacity as a Little League volunteer treasurer; and (v) termination for cause from employment with Citibank. As support, Defendants proffered affidavits, only one of which was based on personal knowledge, and court records. The District Court found that the majority of Defendants' allegations did not satisfy the first prong of the McDonough test because they rested on little more than hearsay, speculation, and in one instance, vague allegations made by a person who refused to identify himself. Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d at 438. The District Court also found that certain ambiguities in the voir dire questions developed by the parties made it unclear that Hartridge's responses deliberately concealed the truth. Id. As to those alleged failures to disclose, this was not the type of showing that constitutes reasonable grounds for investigation. Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234. 110 The District Court credited Defendants with raising serious questions concerning deliberate concealment of two matters that Hartridge did not disclose, namely, the conviction of Hartridge's son for attempted robbery in 2000 and a civil judgment against Hartridge and his wife in 1997, both of which were supported by objective evidence. Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d at 441-42. But the District Court found that none of the alleged omissions satisfied the second part of the McDonough test, which requires the party seeking a new trial to demonstrate that the correct answer at jury selection would have provided a valid basis to challenge the prospective juror for cause. McDonough, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. 845. To do so, the district court must determine if it would have granted the hypothetical challenge. United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir.2002). Its determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion and, in that regard, we have noted that `[t]here are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to disturb a trial judge's exercise of discretion, absent clear abuse, than in ruling on challenges for cause in the empanelling of a jury.' Id. at 172 (quoting United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118 n. 4 (2d Cir.1972)). 111 Defendants contend that the juror's multiple failures to disclose background information indicate a suspicious pattern sufficient to raise doubts about his impartiality which justifies further inquiry in a hearing. For this proposition, Defendants cite a decision in which the Ninth Circuit observed that certain false statements that might be harmless in isolation may present a much more sinister picture when viewed as a whole. Green v. White, 232 F.3d 671, 678 n. 10 (9th Cir.2000). The assertion that Hartridge engaged in a pattern of lies ignores the District Court's finding, which is not clearly erroneous, that only two of the alleged intentional omissions were supported with the type of evidence that justifies further inquiry. In Green, the Ninth Circuit found error in the trial court's finding of no bias where the juror not only lied twice about his background but gave misleading and false explanations when confronted with the lies and also made comments ( i.e., that he knew the defendant was guilty on first sight) that left little doubt as to his inability to render a fair verdict. Id. at 677-78. In this case, the allegations form a pattern that might create destructive uncertainties about Hartridge's indifference if they were proved, id. at 676 (quoting Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 983 (9th Cir.1998) (in banc)), but the Defendants' proffer is insufficient as to all but two of those allegations. 7 The significant factor, however, is that the District Court found that even if it were established that Hartridge's responses were false as alleged, none of the correct answers would have supported an inference that he was biased or prejudiced against Stewart and Bacanovic or had prejudged the evidence. See Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d at 443. 112 Nor is Colombo to the contrary. In Colombo, a district court's decision to refuse Rule 33 relief on the basis of alleged false voir dire responses was vacated and the case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Colombo, 869 F.2d at 150. The alleged false responses asserted by Stewart and Bacanovic differ distinctly from the ones at issue in Colombo. There, the defendant's Rule 33 motion was supported by an alternate juror's affidavit, which stated that one of the jurors (i) confided that she failed to disclose that her brother was a government attorney because she feared the relationship would make her ineligible to serve on the jury and (ii) asserted familiarity with one of the conspirators' meeting places as a hang out for gangsters. Id. In Colombo, it was not simply that the lies in question were deliberate, but that the deliberateness of the particular lies evidenced partiality.  Greer, 285 F.3d at 172-73 (discussing Colombo ). Thus, where the Colombo affiant specifically asserted that the juror admitted not only concealment, but concealment of facts from which specific bias could be inferred, the alleged lies, if established, would demonstrate both dishonesty and partiality and would satisfy both prongs of the McDonough test. Id. That is not the case here. 113 Defendants note that all of the jury bias cases cited by the District Court involved post-trial hearings. See Greer, 285 F.3d at 166; United States v. Shaoul, 41 F.3d 811, 814-15 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 67 (2d Cir.1993). In the present case, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to conduct a hearing because it found that even if all of the allegations were established by competent evidence, none would provide valid grounds to challenge for cause Hartridge's membership on the jury. While an evidentiary hearing is not held to afford a convicted defendant the opportunity to `conduct a fishing expedition,' Moon, 718 F.2d at 1234 (quoting United States v. Moten, 582 F.2d 654, 667 (2d Cir.1978)), it is possible, even plausible, that a district court's decision to hold a hearing under these circumstances would not have licensed such an expedition. We therefore caution district courts that, if any significant doubt as to a juror's impartiality remains in the wake of objective evidence of false voir dire responses, an evidentiary hearing generally should be held. Cf. United States v. Boney, 977 F.2d 624, 634 (D.C.Cir.1992) (recommending that an evidentiary hearing be held under most circumstances, including a juror's lying about his felony status, but declining to hold that any false statement or deliberate concealment by a juror necessitates an evidentiary hearing). Such a hearing is often the most reliable way for discerning the true motivations behind a juror's false replies. See Smith, 455 U.S. at 215, 102 S.Ct. 940 ([T]he remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.). Here, however, although we might have ruled differently on the hearing request in the first instance, we cannot say that the District Court's decision was an abuse of discretion. See Moon, 718 F.2d at 1235.
114 During the course of a televised interview shortly after the verdict was returned, jurors were asked what they thought about the testimony of Stewart's friend, Mariana Pasternak. Their responses give rise to Bacanovic's argument that the jury impermissibly considered matters outside the record in reaching the verdict as to him. 115 During direct examination by the Government, Pasternak testified that while vacationing with Stewart at the end of December 2001, she recall[ed] Martha saying that [Sam Waksal's] stock is going down, or went down, and I sold mine. When asked whether she recollected speaking with Stewart about brokers during the vacation, Pasternak replied, I remember one brief statement, which was: `Isn't it nice to have brokers who tell you those things.' Pasternak was then asked if she knew who Stewart's broker was and she replied I know that Peter Bacanovic was Martha's broker. The District Court instructed the jury that the testimony could be considered only in connection with the charges against Stewart. On cross-examination, Pasternak stated that she could not remember with certainty whether the statements she attributed to Stewart were actually made by Stewart or whether they were Pasternak's own thoughts. Bacanovic's motion for a mistrial was denied, and prior to cross-examination of Pasternak, the District Court instructed the jury as follows: 116 Testimony about what Martha Stewart told Ms. Pasternak is received in evidence only with respect to Martha Stewart. None of the statements of Martha Stewart to Ms. Pasternak that you heard yesterday afternoon are received in evidence against Peter Bacanovic, and it is not evidence against Peter Bacanovic. So that remember I told you at the beginning of the trial that guilt is personal, that you must separately consider each defendant and each charge. In considering the charges against Peter Bacanovic, you may not consider the testimony about those statements of Martha Stewart to Ms. Pasternak in any respect. They have no bearing as to Peter Bacanovic. 117 The jury received similar limiting instructions in the jury charge at the close of evidence. 118 Bacanovic now contends that certain public remarks by Hartridge and other jurors reveal that the jury did consider Pasternak's testimony in connection with the charges against him. In the interview, jurors were asked the following questions about the portion of Pasternak's testimony quoted above: What did you think when she said that? and But you found that pretty incriminating? Hartridge replied, Oh, very. Yeah. It took down two people with one shot because she mentioned Peter's name. `It's good to have a broker to tell you things.' Other jurors seemed to agree. Bacanovic asserts that these remarks indicate that his conviction was improperly influenced by extra-record prejudicial material, and that the District Court erred by denying his motion for a new trial and his request for an evidentiary hearing in holding, in part, that Hartridge's statement was inadmissible under Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). See United States v. Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d 426, 431-32 (S.D.N.Y.2004). 119 Fed.R.Evid. 606(b) precludes a juror from testifying about deliberations and jurors' mental processes in the course thereof, but allows testimony regarding extraneous prejudicial information that came to the jury's attention. Bacanovic argues that the juror's statement regarding Pasternak's testimony falls within the exception to Rule 606(b) because (i) it was outside the record, as the record pertained to him and (ii) was highly prejudicial because it was the only evidence corroborating Faneuil's testimony that Bacanovic was involved with telling Stewart that Waksal was attempting to sell his stock. 120 According to Bacanovic, a ruling against him on this point would have the effect of barring, under Rule 606(b), testimony that the jury improperly considered evidence extraneous to one defendant in a multi-defendant trial, where Rule 606(b) would permit such testimony from a juror regarding the same extraneous evidence if the defendant was tried alone. We do not agree with that articulation of the issue. In fact, a ruling in Bacanovic's favor would enable an end-run around the well-settled proposition that jurors are presumed to follow instructions, see, e.g. United States v. Downing, 297 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir.2002), by permitting inquiry into a matter at the core of jury deliberations protected by Rule 606(b), see United States Football League v. Nat'l Football League, 842 F.2d 1335, 1371 n. 24 (2d Cir.1988) (rejecting, under Rule 606(b), claim that jurors were improperly influenced by information not in evidence despite district court's limiting instruction). 121 In so deciding, we agree with the Eighth Circuit's decision to reject an argument, similar to Bacanovic's, that Rule 606(b) did not prohibit the trial court from inquiring about jurors' alleged discussion of the defendant's failure to testify. See United States v. Rodriguez, 116 F.3d 1225 (8th Cir.1997). Like Bacanovic, the Rodriguez defendant argued that his failure to testify was not evidence and should not have been considered, it should be considered an `outside influence' about which the jurors should be allowed to testify. Id. at 1226-27. The Eighth Circuit responded, 122 That [defendant] did not testify is not a fact the jurors learned through outside contact, communication, or publicity. It did not enter the jury room through an external, prohibited route. It was part of the trial, and was part of the information each juror collected. It should not have been discussed by the jury, and indeed was the subject of a jury instruction to that effect. But it was not extraneous information, and therefore does not fall within the exception outlined in Rule 606(b). 123 Id. at 1227. We reach the same conclusion, for the same reasons. 124 Here, as in Rodriguez, the alleged impermissible influence was not the result of information the jurors learned through outside contact, communication, or publicity or that enter[ed] the jury room through an external, prohibited route. Id. Rather, Pasternak's testimony came `from the witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial protection of the defendant's right of confrontation, of cross-examination, and of counsel.' Loliscio v. Goord, 263 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 472-73, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424 (1965)). As such, the testimony cannot be considered extraneous information. 8 Accordingly, in considering whether Bacanovic's Sixth Amendment rights were implicated by an improperly influenced jury, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order a new trial or an evidentiary hearing that was clearly proscribed by Rule 606(b). 125