Opinion ID: 1848477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Original judgment and sentence of appellant-petitioner in Polk County was on July 15, 1968.

Text: Petition for writ of habeas corpus attacking the procedure in Polk County was filed in Jones County September 2, 1968. Section 793.1, Code of Iowa, provides that the mode of review in the supreme court in a criminal case is by appeal. Section 793.2, Code of Iowa, provides for appeal from final judgment within 60 days. When petition for writ of habeas corpus was filed the time for appeal from final judgment had not expired. Why petitioner resorted to habeas corpus rather than appeal does not appear. Habeas corpus is not a substitute for appeal. Farrant v. Bennett, 255 Iowa 704, 706, 123 N.W.2d 888, Hoskins v. Bennett, 256 Iowa 1370, 1377, 131 N.W.2d 510, Ford v. State, 258 Iowa 137, 139, 138 N.W. 2d 116, and Larson v. Bennett, supra, 160 N.W.2d loc. cit. 306. III. While this case might be decided on other grounds, a challenge to due process cannot be brushed aside as immaterial. While the end does not justify the means, the rules should be the vehicle for justice and not an end in themselves. The background in our problem becomes important. From the evidence introduced at the habeas corpus hearing it appears that petitioner, together with three accomplices, was indicted in Polk County for Robbery with Aggravation. He was represented by privately retained and paid counsel. His counsel was experienced and admittedly competent. When employed by petitioner he was also, by previous appointment of court, representing the codefendants. We quote from petitioner's brief: The attorney in this case is certainly not incompetent but was simply placed in such a position by representing all four codefendants that he could not effectively represent the appellant. It is not the purpose of this appellantor his attorney in this appealto criticize anyone. The director of entry at the men's reformatory identified the Mittimus committing petitioner and testified that he was in custody pursuant thereto. It was agreed that there were four defendants in one criminal case, all charged with the same crime and all represented by the same counsel. They were not tried jointly nor were their cases disposed of at the same time. The record does not show that the four cases were disposed of before the same trial judge. George Hobbs, one of the codefendants, pleaded not guilty, was found guilty by a jury of robbery with aggravation and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. Thereafter, petitioner pleaded guilty and received the same sentence. A month later Michael Hobbs and Sharon Hobbs (wife of George), who were apparently accomplices but against whom there was no evidence of any overt act in actual participation of the robbery, having previously pleaded guilty to robbery, were respectively sentenced to not more than 10 years imprisonment. In each case the sentence was suspended and probation granted during good behavior. Each defendant was placed under the supervision of the Bureau of Adult Corrections Services pursuant to the provisions of section 247.20, Code of Iowa. During the habeas corpus hearing petitioner testified: There were other persons arrested with me on that charge of robbery with aggravation. They were George Hobbs, Sharon Hobbs, and Michael Hobbs. I was represented by an attorney on the prosecution of this charge. That attorney was Allen Donielson. Based upon my personal knowledge, the same attorney represented all three of my co-defendants.    Trial was held on behalf of George Hobbs. The attorney for George Hobbs was court appointed, to my personal knowledge. Jury trial was not held for me by Mr. Donielson. From my personal knowledge I know what the sentences were for the other three defendants. George Hobbs got 25 years in the Men's Reformatory, and Sharon and Michael got 10 years with a 2 year bench parole. [Note: This was not in accord with the record]. Mr. Donielson did not at any time during his conversations with me, or conversations with the court, or any other person that I ever heard his conversation with, discuss any conflict of interest representing me or the other three defendants at the same time. He thought he might be able to get Michael and Sharon's charges broken down to a lesser charge. I believe that he told me this sometime in May. Mr. Donielson said that since this was my first offense that he would try to work for, to try to get a bench parole. I was told by my attorney that if I entered a plea of guilty, I would serve less time for being eligible for parole than I would if I was convicted after a trial.    I did have some conversations with my attorney. I talked to Mr. Donielson around five times. I believe it was about 5 or 6. As a matter of fact, Mr. Donielson was employed by me privately. He was the attorney of my choice.    When I alleged in my petition that I entered my plea under duress, I meant that I was told I'd do less time, if pleading guilty, before parole than if I had a jury trial and was convicted. My lawyer told me that.    My attorney did tell me that the policy of the Polk County Court was that in any crime or violence particularly, Robbery with Aggravation, that there was no parole. He told me that more than once. George Hobbs was convicted, to my knowledge, in a jury trial. He received the same sentence that I did. I did not testify at his trial.    He was court appointed, and when I went to talk to him he told me that he wouldn't be able to handle my case unless I hired him on a private basis, which I did.    At the time I retained Mr. Donielson privately, I was aware that any other attorney could be retained.    As our review requires determination of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination, we quote at length. Allen Donielson, who was counsel for petitioner in the Polk County proceedings, testified: Q. Now calling your attention to the Janvrin-Hobbs case, were you appointed initially to represent Mr. Janvrin? A. I was appointed for all four in the beginning. That would be Barry Janvrin, Michael Hobbs, George Hobbs and Sharon Hobbs. Q. All right, Now did you have certain conversations on a number of occasions with the defendant Janvrin? Yes or No. A. I did. Q. Can you tell the Court approximately how many times you had conversations with Mr. Janvrin? A. Would you include phone calls in there, Mr. McKeon? Q. Yes. A. Oh, 7 to 12 times, I would guess, in that vicinity. Q. Now, after talking to Mr. Janvrin did you make an investigation of his case? A. A very complete investigation. Q. All right. Did this also include the facts in the case of George Hobbs and Michael Hobbs and Sharon Hobbs ? A. It did. Q. All right. Now did you try the jury case of State vs. George Hobbs ? A. I did. Q. And who was attorney on the other side ? A. Mr. JimJames McKeon. Q. All right. During the course of that trial, Mr. Donielson, did the facts disclose that two persons entered the grocery store that was robbed?    A. Yes. Q. And were these facts established by three eye witnesses who were in the grocery store? A. Yes. Q. And was George Hobbs identified as one of the two men that went in the store? A. Yes. Q. And was Mr. Janvrin described and identified as the other man that went in the store?    A. Yes. Q. Now did the three eye witnesses testify at the George Hobbs trial as to which defendant held the gun? A. Yes. Q. And would you tell the Court what those witnesses testified to at George Hobbs' trial? A. Well, they testified Mr. Janvrin held the gun, and there's some conflict as to whether or not Mr. Hobbs held a gun, some said yes and some said no. Q. Was there any conflict at the George Hobbs trial as to whether or not Mr. Janvrin had a gun? A. No conflict. Q. And did you hear testimony at the George Hobbs trial as to the apprehension of Mr. Janvrin? A. Yes. Q. And did you hear any testimony at the George Hobbs trial concerning whether or not a weapon was found on the person of Mr. Janvrin? A. Yes.