Opinion ID: 2027925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: waiver and confession

Text: Appellant argues that his waiver and confession were not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made because both were given during a period of extreme emotional distress. He claims that he was in an angry, resentful, and sleep-deprived state when he waived his rights and gave a confession. He also maintains that he did not realize that his statement could be used against him in a court of law. Appellant moved to suppress his written statement and any oral testimony by the police. During the suppression hearing, Officers Taylor, Bradley, and Stevens testified regarding the circumstances surrounding appellant's surrender and confession. At around 11:10 a.m. on October 13, 1982, Officer Taylor was sitting at his desk in the public reception area of the police station. Taylor noticed appellant and another man enter the station, apparently having a disagreement. Appellant approached Taylor and placed his pistol on the counter. Taylor asked appellant what the problem was, to which appellant responded that he was tired of his woman messing him over and he killed her. Taylor then escorted appellant to an interrogation room. Believing Brown to be emotionally distressed, Taylor spent some time trying to calm him. Taylor testified that at this point he would not have advised appellant of his Miranda rights or taken a statement because he believed that appellant's emotional state would have precluded him from using his full range of faculties to understand what he was relinquishing. Appellant appeared to calm down while Taylor was speaking with him and at 11:30 a.m. Taylor left the interrogation room. At 12:30 p.m. Officers Bradley and Stevens interrogated Brown. Appellant appeared calm when Bradley and Stevens first came into contact with him. Bradley began to read Brown his Miranda rights and appellant interrupted, stating that he knew his rights. Despite this acknowledgment, Bradley handed appellant a copy of the Miranda rights and asked him to read along as Bradley read them aloud. The police explained these rights to appellant. Brown responded affirmatively when Bradley questioned whether he understood these rights. After appellant signed the Miranda waiver form Bradley commenced interrogation. Bradley first asked appellant whether he wanted to give a statement and appellant said yes. During the taking of this statement appellant did not appear to be emotionally upset or irrational. Appellant was articulate and his answers were responsive to questions asked. Stevens testified that he would have ceased interrogation had he thought appellant was too emotional to give a statement at that time. The forms used for both the waiver and the statement recite that the statement may be used against appellant at trial. Appellant also told Bradley that he understood his Miranda rights. Appellant read his five page statement and then signed the bottom of each page. When the State cross-examined appellant during the suppression hearing, he testified that the officers read him his Miranda rights and explained these rights to him, that he understood these rights, and that he knew that his statement could be used against him. However, during redirect examination by defense counsel appellant stated he understood his rights but did not fully appreciate them because when he gave his statement he just wanted to get the shooting incident off his chest. The admissibility of a statement or confession is determined from the totality of the circumstances: was the confession given voluntarily and not through inducement, violence, threats, or other improper influences which would have overcome the free will of the accused? Ortiz v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188. The question of voluntariness is one for the trial court. When reviewing a trial court's ruling on the admission of a confession, this Court does not weigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. We must determine whether there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's finding. Washington v. State (1982), Ind., 441 N.E.2d 1355. Where the evidence is conflicting we consider that evidence which supports the trial court's ruling and any uncontroverted evidence presented by appellant. Thomas v. State (1983), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 1197. The degree of impairment of mental faculties at the time of the waiver and statement is of critical importance in determining whether a statement was given voluntarily. Turner v. State (1980), 273 Ind. 627, 407 N.E.2d 235. However, appellant's waiver and statement occurred an hour and a half after Taylor observed appellant in an emotionally upset state. The evidence was such that the trier of fact was entitled to conclude that the impairment of appellant's mental faculties had diminished and that his actions were voluntary and intelligent. Rodgers v. State (1979), 270 Ind. 372, 385 N.E.2d 1136. When the evidence indicates, as here, that appellant was coherent and in control of his faculties at the time of his waiver and statement, then his decision to waive his rights and confess was freely self-determined. Downs v. State (1985), Ind., 482 N.E.2d 716; Ferry v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 207. The evidence also indicates appellant was informed and understood that his statement could be used against him at trial. Judgment affirmed. GIVAN, C.J., and DeBRULER and PIVARNIK, JJ., concur, PRENTICE, J., concurs in result without opinion.