Opinion ID: 1034078
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Audio Recordings and Transcripts

Text: Over defendants’ objections, the district court permitted the government to play portions of audio recordings made by two cooperating witnesses, Wanda and Kennon White. The government was also allowed, over defendants’ objections, to provide the jury with transcripts of the recordings. On appeal, defendants argue that the district court erred by admitting the audio recordings, permitting the use of inaccurate transcripts, and excluding defendants’ exculpatory statements from the recordings and transcripts.
Defendants contend that the district court erred in admitting audio recordings of conversations between Wanda and Kennon White and defendants. In particular, defendants argue that the recordings were inadmissible because they were “replete with inaudible portions, barely intelligible portions, and unidentified speakers.” Jones Br. at 21. “The admission at trial of tape recordings rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” United States v. Wilkinson, 53 F.3d 757, 761 (6th Cir. 1995). “That discretion presumes, as a prerequisite to admission, that the tapes be authentic, accurate 28 The better practice, as the government points out, would have been conditionally to admit the evidence at that time or to wait until the government has proffered evidence to make the connection and admit the evidence then. See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988). Neither happened in the present case, however, so we have no reason to consider what might have occurred in assessing whether the district court erred. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 41 5336/ 5337/ 5366 and trustworthy.” United States v. Robinson, 707 F.2d 872, 876 (6th Cir. 1983). Recordings are not admissible “if the unintelligible portions are so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). On appeal, defendants do not challenge the authenticity, accuracy, or trustworthiness of the recordings. Instead, they claim that the unintelligible portions of the recordings rendered the entire recordings untrustworthy and, consequently, inadmissible. Having listened to the recordings, we agree with defendants that the recordings contain portions that are unintelligible. See United States v. Scarborough, 43 F.3d 1021, 1024 (6th Cir. 1994) (reviewing recorded tapes on appeal). We cannot say, however, that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the audio recordings because the unintelligible portions do not “render the recording as a whole untrustworthy.” Robinson, 707 F.2d at 876.
Defendants’ second argument regarding the audio recordings relates to the use of transcripts by the jury. Defendants contend that the district court abandoned this court’s precedent by, in essence, preparing its own transcripts. Defendants also claim that the district court erred in finding the government’s transcripts to be accurate because inaudible portions of the recordings were transcribed and other portions of the recordings were transcribed inaccurately. “We review a district court’s rulings as to a jury’s use of transcripts under an abuse of discretion standard.” United States v. Jacob, 377 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2004). On appeal, defendants must show both error and prejudice. Id.; see Scarborough, 43 F.3d at 1025. “The admission of written transcripts of recorded conversations is not prejudicial error unless an inaccuracy exists.” United States v. King, 272 F.3d 366, 372 (6th Cir. 2001). As outlined in Robinson: The ideal procedure for testing accuracy is to have the prosecution and defense attorneys stipulate to a transcript. If there is a dispute concerning Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 42 5336/ 5337/ 5366 the contents of the [audio recordings], the second best method is for the trial court to make a pretrial determination of accuracy by reading the transcript against the [recordings]. The third and least preferred method is to present two transcripts to the jury, one of which contains the government’s version and the other the defense’s version. Hence, the jury becomes the final arbiter of which version is most accurate. 707 F.2d at 876 (quotation marks and citations omitted). In the present case, defendants allege that the district court abandoned this procedure by taking “the extra step of itself interpreting and transcribing the recording, making edits to the transcript, writing comments, and making admissibility decisions on whole sections of the proffered transcripts deemed not pertinent or relevant absent any adversary process.” Jones Br. at 22–23. The government responds that the district court did not disregard the process described in Robinson but “employed a variation on the second method.” Gov’t Br. at 83. The government explains that “[a]fter reviewing the government’s transcripts against the audio recordings, the court marked off phrases that were unintelligible and also made ‘no[n] substantive changes or additions  just to make the transcripts more complete.’” Id. (quoting R. 721 (12/22/2009 Hr’g Tr. at 27) (Page ID #4798)). This explanation is quite misleading. Looking to the source of the government’s altered quotation, we observe that the district court stated “90 percent of the additions that I’ve made are not substantive changes or additions, it’s just to make the transcripts more complete.” R. 721 (12/22/2009 Hr’g Tr. at 27) (Page ID #4798). This leads us to a simple conclusion: the district court acknowledges that ten percent of its changes or additions are substantive. This court has not explored what types of changes a district court is permitted to make to proposed transcripts. In United States v. Scarborough, we noted that “[t]he District Court reviewed the transcript while listening to the tapes and found that the transcript was accurate with the exception of two words which the court added.” 43 F.3d at 1024. We failed to state, however, what words were added by the district court and what their effect was on the transcript. In United States v. Hogan, we noted that “the magistrate judge’s diligence in approving the transcripts for the jury’s use safeguarded Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 43 5336/ 5337/ 5366 Defendant from being prejudiced by the jury’s use of the transcripts” where the magistrate judge had “underlined the portions of the transcript corresponding to audible parts of the recording, and ordered that the inaudible portions that were not underlined be excised from the transcript, and referred to as ‘unintelligible.’” 402 F. App’x 54, 61 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, in United States v. Segines, we cautioned that a district court abuses its discretion when it allows its “best guess as to [a recording’s] contents to be placed into the transcript.” 17 F.3d 847, 855 (6th Cir. 1994). These precedents provide the following guide for what changes a district court can make permissibly to a proposed transcript: A district court has the discretion to mark portions of the proposed transcript that it finds to be inaudible or unintelligible and order that those portions be removed from the transcript and marked accordingly. It also has the discretion to add words to enhance the completeness of the transcript. A district court cannot, however, make substantive changes—those that affect the meaning of the transcript—that are unprompted by either party. Here, the district court estimated that it made one-thousand changes to the government’s proposed transcripts. R. 721 (12/22/2009 Hr’g Tr. at 27) (Page ID #4798); see Appellants Appendix (“A.A.”) at 566–773. As noted earlier, the district court acknowledged that some of these changes were substantive. Defendants highlight one example of the district court’s substantive changes. The transcript provided to the jury included this statement by Thompson: “I think I’m in trouble.” The government did not include this inculpatory statement in its proposed transcript; rather, the district court added the statement to the government’s proposed transcript after the court reviewed the audio recordings. See R. 615 (Thompson Notice of Substantive Errors at 2) (Page ID #4037) (“In previous transcripts submitted by the Government, this passage was deemed unintelligible. . . . This statement is highly prejudicial, was not heard by either party during their original efforts to make a transcript, and is not sufficiently intelligible to be included in the transcript.”); see also R. 644 (01/14/2010 D. Ct. Op. at 3) (Page ID #4115). This is a substantive change by the district court because it adds an inculpatory Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 44 5336/ 5337/ 5366 statement that previously was not contained in the government’s proposed transcript.29 This and other substantive changes made by the district court were an abuse of its discretion. Defendants also contend that portions of the government’s transcript approved by the district court were inaccurate. For example, defendants point to a statement allegedly made by Maricle that is included in the transcript: “I’ll take care of it.” Reviewing the recordings ourselves, we agree with defendants that this statement is inaudible and therefore the transcript is inaccurate. Also inaccurate is this exchange contained in the transcript: Maricle: Last year . . . not been around him. His big problem was a conspiracy charge . . . . Kennon: Right. Conspiracy charges, they could hit him on that, too? A.A. at 14. At trial, Maricle testified that this transcription was incorrect because the exchange was really: Maricle: Last year, I don’t remember ever being around him, his big problem was in the state. Kennon: Stephen Charles represented him on that one too. R. 883 (03/12/2010 Trial Tr. at 33) (Page ID #9983). In our review of the audio recordings, we agree with Maricle that the transcript is inaccurate; however, we cannot say with certainty that Maricle’s interpretation is exactly accurate.30 Thus, the district court erred in permitting the use of an inaccurate transcript. 29 We acknowledge that the district court, of course, did not have the benefit of this opinion at that time. We recognize also that the district court went to great lengths to ensure that the transcripts were accurate and commend it on that effort. 30 We realize that without hearing the recording, readers may wonder just how these two seemingly different interpretations stem from the same portion of the recording. With the benefit of the recording, we too are unsure as to how, but the fact remains that both appear to be accurate when read while listening to the recording. This highlights the district court’s error: when there are two very plausible interpretations, the portion is better left as “unintelligible” on the transcript, so that the jury will reach its own conclusion when listening to the recording. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 45 5336/ 5337/ 5366 The district court did instruct the jury throughout trial and in its final charge to the jury that the jury should rely on what they heard in the recordings, not what they read on the transcripts. Although this instruction helps to minimize the prejudice to defendants, “[w]here, as here, there are inaudible portions of the tape, the court should direct the deletion of the unreliable portion of the transcript.” King, 272 F.3d at 374. The reason is that “[w]hen tapes are unintelligible . . . a transcript intended as an aid to the jury inevitably becomes, in the minds of the jurors, the evidence itself.” Segines, 17 F.3d at 854. Therefore, we hold that district court erred in failing to delete portions of the transcript that were unintelligible or inaudible as well as in making substantive changes to the transcript.
Defendants’ final argument with regard to the audio recordings and related transcripts is that the district court erred in excluding defendants’ exculpatory statements. Defendants argue that such statements were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 106. “The ‘rule of completeness’ allows a party to correct a misleading impression created by the introduction of part of a writing or conversation by introducing additional parts of it necessary to put the admitted portions in proper context.” United States v. Holden, 557 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2009). The common-law doctrine of completeness is partially codified in Rule 106: “If a party introduces all or part of a writing or recorded statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other writing or recorded statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” FED. R. EVID. 106; see Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 171–72 (1988). We have determined previously that Rule 106 “covers an order of proof problem; it is not designed to make something admissible that should be excluded.” United States v. Costner, 684 F.2d 370, 373 (6th Cir. 1982).31 Right or 31 Recognizing “that one panel of this court cannot overturn a decision of another panel,” United States v. Lanier, 201 F.3d 842, 846 (6th Cir. 2000), we note that should this court sitting en banc address whether Rule 106 requires that the other evidence be otherwise admissible, it might consider: Stephen A. Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 46 5336/ 5337/ 5366 wrong, this court has acknowledged that under Costner “[e]xculpatory hearsay may not come in solely on the basis of completeness.” United States v. Shaver, 89 F. App’x 529, 533 (6th Cir. 2004); see Holden, 557 F.3d at 706 (rejecting defendant’s Rule 106 argument because “his statements are inadmissible hearsay and were properly excluded”). Defendants point to numerous instances where the purposes of Rule 106 would have been served by admitting their exculpatory statements. For example, cooperating witness Kennon White was directed by the government to tell Maricle about the questions that were asked when Kennon testified before the grand jury. In the present case, the jury heard: Kennon: [D]id you use Cletus Maricle’s influence as circuit judge to get people to vote for Phillip Mobley? . . . Maricle: Did you promise anybody I’d do anything for them? Kennon: Only one was that Downy boy; Bobby Downy’s brother . . . . A.A. at 769–70. The government was permitted to omit Maricle’s response: “That’s one thing I did very seldom, promised to do, I never promised anybody that I would help somebody in a Court case . . . UI . . . the simple reason is . . . UI . . . I don’t believe having cases held over head forever for some political thing.” Id. at 770. In a later recording when Kennon brought up the “Downy boy” again, Maricle stated “I don’t Saltzburg et al., 1-106 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 106.02 (“We believe that these rulings are misguided and contrary to the completeness principle embodied in Rule 106. A party should not be able to admit an incomplete statement that gives an unfair impression, and then object on hearsay grounds to completing statements that would rectify the unfairness.”); Charles Alan Wright et al., 21A Federal Practice and Procedure § 5078.1 (2d ed. 2012) (“Even were Rule 106 ambiguous on this point, Rule 102 requires that it ‘be construed to secure fairness in administration . . . to the end that the truth be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.’ No one has ever explained how these standards would be met by a construction that would allow a party to present evidence out of context so as to mislead the jury, then assert an exclusionary rule to keep the other side from exposing his deception.”); Dale A. Nance, A Theory of Verbal Completeness, 80 IOWA L. REV. 825 (1995); United States v. Sutton, 801 F.2d 1346, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“The structure of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates that Rule 106 is concerned with more than merely the order of proof. . . . Rule 106 can adequately fulfill its function only by permitting the admission of some otherwise inadmissible evidence when the court finds in fairness that the proffered evidence should be considered contemporaneously. A contrary construction raises the specter of distorted and misleading trials, and creates difficulties for both litigants and the trial court.”). Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 47 5336/ 5337/ 5366 know a thing about that no Downy boy.” Id. at 730. The district court excluded this statement too. Wanda White, the government’s other cooperating witness, was given the same instructions as her husband, Kennon. In one instance, the jury heard: Wanda: He asked me, um, oh, how I become an election officer over again. Did you appoint me to election officer. Maricle: Did I appoint you? (Laugh) Wanda: Yeah. Id. at 291. The district court excluded Maricle’s response: “I don’t really have any authority to appoint anybody.” Id. at 660. Defendants claim that “by severely cropping the transcripts, the government significantly altered the meaning of what [defendants] actually said.” Maricle Br. at 35. Although we agree that these examples highlight the government’s unfair presentation of the evidence, this court’s bar against admitting hearsay under Rule 106 leaves defendants without redress. Maricle responds that if his exculpatory statements were not admissible under Rule 106 during the government’s case-in-chief, such statements became admissible when he testified during his defense. The district court rejected this argument because “[a]n exculpatory statement made outside the presence of the jury is still an exculpatory statement that’s inadmissible under [Rule] 801.” R. 883 (03/12/2010 Trial Tr. at 30) (Page ID #9980). On appeal, Maricle relies solely on United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005). Paladino does not, however, address the issue of whether hearsay is admissible under Rule 106, and Maricle fails to assert that his exculpatory Nos. 11-5291/ 5308/ 5311/ 5312/ 5313/ United States v. Adams et al. Page 48 5336/ 5337/ 5366 statements fall within a valid hearsay exception.32 Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding defendants’ exculpatory statements.