Opinion ID: 2221902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Existence of a Clearly Ascertainable Right

Text: Illinois Power contends that Hartlein failed to establish a clearly ascertained right needful of protection. (See Scraggs, 125 Ill.2d at 388, 126 Ill.Dec. 559, 532 N.E.2d 244.) Illinois Power maintains that Hartlein has not established this factor because he can neither claim a right to continued TTD benefits for lack of jurisdiction, nor a right to continued employment as a matter of law. Hartlein argues, however, that he established this factor by demonstrating that he was discharged in retaliation for exercising his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act. Hartlein cites to Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, as demonstrating that employees, such as himself, possess a clear and certain right not to be retaliatorily discharged for their exercise of rights under the Act. According to Illinois Power, any issue as to Hartlein's right to a continuation of his TTD benefits is within the province of the Illinois Industrial Commission. We would agree. The role of the circuit court in compensation proceedings is appellate only, and is limited by section 19(f) of the Workers' Compensation Act (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.19(f)). (See Gunnels v. Industrial Comm'n (1964), 30 Ill.2d 181, 185, 195 N.E.2d 609 (trial court lacked jurisdiction to restrain a claimant from proceeding with petition before the Industrial Commission seeking a determination of the amount of compensation due and a penalty for delay of payment).) The circuit courts have no original jurisdiction over workers' compensation proceedings, wherein benefits are determined, under the Act. Under section 19(f) of the Act, the circuit courts exercise a special statutory jurisdiction and have only the powers that are conferred by statute. (See Interlake Steel Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n (1975), 60 Ill.2d 255, 326 N.E.2d 744; Ahlers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1977), 54 Ill.App.3d 638, 12 Ill.Dec. 292, 369 N.E.2d 1306; see also Bragado v. Cherry Electrical Products Corp. (1989), 191 Ill.App.3d 136, 138 Ill.Dec. 476, 547 N.E.2d 643 (disallowing recovery of TTD benefits in retaliatory discharge action as determination of such benefits within the province of Industrial Commission).) As this court has previously noted, the Act further provides that the statutory remedies under it shall serve as the employee's exclusive remedy if he sustains a compensable injury. Sharp v. Gallagher (1983), 95 Ill.2d 322, 326, 69 Ill.Dec. 351, 447 N.E.2d 786. The appellate court recognized that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin Illinois Power from discontinuing workers' compensation benefits. Thus, the appellate court narrowly construed the preliminary injunction as enjoining only Hartlein's discharge, a threat of such discharge, or an alteration of his employment status. We believe, however, that the preliminary injunction prohibited Illinois Power from discontinuing Hartlein's workers' compensation benefits as well, despite the limiting language contained in the trial court's order, which pertained to the absence of restraints upon the Industrial Commission. The record reflects that, certainly, Hartlein interpreted the preliminary injunction as restraining Illinois Power from terminating TTD benefits. Thus, to the extent that the order is susceptible to interpretation as enjoining Illinois Power from discontinuing Hartlein's workers' compensation benefits, such an order is beyond the scope of the trial court's authority. Any right Hartlein might have had to continued TTD benefits was not properly protectible by means of the preliminary injunction. We turn to consider Illinois Power's argument that Hartlein can claim no right to continued employment under law and Hartlein's counter argument that he possessed a right not to be retaliatorily discharged in accordance with Kelsay. In Kelsay, 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, this court first recognized a retaliatory discharge cause of action. Such action represents an exception to the general rule that at-will employment is terminable at any time for any or no cause. ( Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. (1981), 85 Ill.2d 124, 128, 52 Ill.Dec. 13, 421 N.E.2d 876.) In Kelsay, an employee was discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim against her employer. After examining the history and purpose of the Act, this court held that a cause of action based on the tort of retaliatory discharge was necessary to insure that the public policy underlying the enactment of the Act was not frustrated. See Kelsay, 74 Ill.2d at 182-85, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353; see also Darnell v. Impact Industries, Inc. (1984), 105 Ill.2d 158, 161, 85 Ill.Dec. 336, 473 N.E.2d 935 (public policy violated by interference with any right under the Act). Despite the revolutionizing effect of Kelsay, the common law doctrine that an employer may discharge an employee-at-will for any reason or for no reason remains the law in Illinois. (See Fellhauer v. City of Geneva (1991), 142 Ill.2d 495, 154 Ill.Dec. 649, 568 N.E.2d 870.) Kelsay only excepts discharges which violate a clearly mandated public policy. (See Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co. (1985), 106 Ill.2d 520, 525, 88 Ill.Dec. 628, 478 N.E.2d 1354.) Thus, Illinois law does not obligate an employer to retain an at-will employee who is medically unable to return to his assigned position (see Horton v. Miller Chemical Co. (7th Cir.1985), 776 F.2d 1351); nor is an employer obligated to reassign such an employee to another position rather than terminate the employment (see LaPorte v. Jostens, Inc. (1991), 213 Ill.App.3d 1089, 157 Ill.Dec. 745, 572 N.E.2d 1209). Similarly, an employer may fire an employee for excess absenteeism, even if the absenteeism is caused by a compensable injury. (See Slover v. Brown (1986), 140 Ill.App.3d 618, 621, 94 Ill.Dec. 856, 488 N.E.2d 1103 (injured employee's lengthy inability to work was considered valid basis for discharge or for employer's failure to rehire).) Simply put, Illinois allows employers to act on the basis of their employee's physical disabilities; it is only the request for benefits that state law puts off limits as a ground of decision. McEwen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. (7th Cir.1990), 919 F.2d 58, 60. A valid claim for retaliatory discharge requires a showing that an employee has been (1) discharged; (2) in retaliation for the employee's activities; and (3) that the discharge violates a clear mandate of public policy. (See Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc. (1988), 119 Ill.2d 526, 529, 116 Ill.Dec. 694, 519 N.E.2d 909.) The element of causation is not met if the employer has a valid basis, which is not pretextual, for discharging the employee. See Slover, 140 Ill.App.3d at 620-21, 94 Ill.Dec. 856, 488 N.E.2d 1103; McEwen, 919 F.2d at 60; Marin v. American Meat Packing Co. (1990), 204 Ill.App.3d 302, 310-11, 149 Ill.Dec. 818, 562 N.E.2d 282; Motsch v. Pine Roofing Co. (1988), 178 Ill.App.3d 169, 174, 127 Ill.Dec. 383, 533 N.E.2d 1. Accepting only for the sake of argument that Kelsay gives rise to a right not to be retaliatorily discharged, the clarity and certainty of such a right must be sufficiently established before a preliminary injunction can be granted. (See Allott v. American Strawboard Co. (1908), 237 Ill. 55, 86 N.E. 685.) An injunction should not be granted where the plaintiff's right is doubtful. ( Bondy v. Samuels (1929), 333 Ill. 535, 165 N.E. 181.) In the present case, Hartlein's right to be free from a retaliatory discharge is doubtful; `a fair question as to the existence of the rights claimed' was not demonstrated. Dixon Association for Retarded Citizens, 91 Ill.2d at 524, 64 Ill.Dec. 565, 440 N.E.2d 117, quoting City of Chicago v. Airline Canteen Service, Inc. (1978), 64 Ill.App.3d 417, 432-33, 20 Ill.Dec. 897, 380 N.E.2d 1106. First, we do not consider evidence that Illinois Power directed Hartlein to engage in a job search sufficient to show the fact or threat of discharge. Quite simply, Hartlein was not discharged by Illinois Power when the company told him to contact other potential employers, nor was evidence offered to rebut Martin's testimony that Illinois Power had no intention of discharging Hartlein. While the proposed job search might have eventually resulted in an end to Hartlein's employment relationship with Illinois Power, either voluntarily or involuntarily, the directive to search, in the context of these facts, does not constitute discharge. Indeed, Hartlein, himself, acknowledged as much, by stating, through his attorney, that he would not accept another job, by means of such a search, unless it was comparable to the job he had at Illinois Power. Furthermore, with regard to the fact of discharge, we decline to expand the tort to encompass a retaliatory discharge process as alleged by Hartlein. The instant case is factually distinguishable from Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, Inc. (1988), 119 Ill.2d 526, 116 Ill. Dec. 694, 519 N.E.2d 909, relied upon by the appellate court to demonstrate that directing an employee to apply for work with other employers effectively discharges the employee. In Hinthorn, the plaintiff was instructed to meet with the company's vice-president on the same day she suffered a work-related injury and sought medical attention. The officer told her that she should seek other employment as she had been `getting hurt too muchcosting the company too much money.' ( Hinthorn, 119 Ill.2d at 528, 116 Ill.Dec. 694, 519 N.E.2d 909.) He then directed her to sign a Voluntary Resignation form, which she signed because she understood she would lose her job if she did not. Hinthorn, 119 Ill.2d at 528-29, 116 Ill.Dec. 694, 519 N.E.2d 909. Hartlein, by contrast, was not threatened with a loss of employment if he failed to apply for other positions; he was not working at the time of Illinois Power's directive and had been collecting TTD benefits for over one year. While Hartlein attempted to characterize the threatened loss of TTD as a loss of employment, nonetheless, it is not. Nor was Illinois Power's directive accompanied by conduct or statements which indicated a prohibited discriminatory intent on the part of Illinois Power. Rather, Hartlein was advised that the proposed work search was considered to be governed by workers' compensation law. Furthermore, it is undisputed that a similar directive to Hartlein to begin a work search had been communicated by Illinois Power in early 1989, with no consequence to plaintiff's employment status. No evidence was offered that, 16 months later, any such consequence would flow from that same or a similar directive. Requiring Hartlein to look for a job elsewhere may be, as stated by the appellate court, patently inconsistent with his continued employment at Illinois Power. (209 Ill.App.3d 948, 954, 154 Ill.Dec. 520, 568 N.E.2d 520.) Nonetheless, a directive to start a job search, particularly, as part of a program of vocational rehabilitation, is not the equivalent of involuntary discharge. In order to receive TTD benefits, a workers' compensation claimant must establish not only that he did not work, but that he was unable to work ( Arbuckle v. Industrial Comm'n (1965), 32 Ill.2d 581, 207 N.E.2d 456), and that one is temporarily totally disabled when he cannot perform any services except those for which no reasonably stable labor market exists ( Zenith Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1982), 91 Ill.2d 278, 62 Ill.Dec. 940, 437 N.E.2d 628). Furthermore, where rehabilitation of the injured employee is ordered, there are boundaries which reasonably confine the employer's responsibility, including the requirement that a claimant make a good-faith effort to cooperate in the rehabilitation effort. ( Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1990), 138 Ill.2d 107, 115-16, 149 Ill.Dec. 253, 561 N.E.2d 623; citing National Tea Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1983), 97 Ill.2d 424, 433, 73 Ill. Dec. 575, 454 N.E.2d 672.) A request that Hartlein demonstrate that he was unable to work or that he cooperate with rehabilitation efforts, without more, is not to be equated with a discharge from Illinois Power. We further decline to expand the tort of retaliatory discharge, on these facts, to encompass the concept of constructive discharge. (See Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill.2d at 525, 88 Ill.Dec. 628, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (finding that this court does not strongly support the expansion of the tort); see also Grey v. First National Bank (1988), 169 Ill.App.3d 936, 942-43, 120 Ill.Dec. 227, 523 N.E.2d 1138; Scheller v. Health Care Service Corp. (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 219, 224-25, 92 Ill.Dec. 471, 485 N.E.2d 26 (interpreting Barr as disallowing the recognition of constructive discharge concept).) That Illinois Power could conceivably utilize the threat of a termination of TTD benefits to force Hartlein to make bona fide efforts to seek other employment is, therefore, irrelevant to the fact of discharge. The second, more fundamental problem concerning the evidence in support of a retaliatory discharge here lies with the element of causation. Concerning the element of causation, the ultimate issue to be decided is the employer's motive in discharging the employee. See Marin v. American Meat Packing Co., 204 Ill. App.3d at 310-11, 149 Ill.Dec. 818, 562 N.E.2d 282; Austin v. St. Joseph Hospital (1989), 187 Ill.App.3d 891, 897, 135 Ill.Dec. 364, 543 N.E.2d 932. In the present case, there can be no dispute that Hartlein was unable to perform as an apprentice lineman or even as a meter reader by December 1988. Furthermore, Martin testified, and indeed, additional evidence supported that Illinois Power considered Hartlein unable to perform his former job. Martin also reportedly told Cueto that that was the reason Hartlein would have to find another job. Martin also testified that Illinois Power had no available positions which Hartlein was capable of performing, and McKee stated that fact in correspondence to Hartlein. Martin further testified that Illinois Power, in directing Hartlein to start a job search and contact other employers, believed that Hartlein was obligated to cooperate with such a directive in accordance with the Act. The evidence also showed that by July 1988, Hartlein had been evaluated by two physicians as unable to resume his former position as an apprentice lineman. Specifically, Dr. Wayne opined that it did not appear that Hartlein could be rehabilitated to his former position. Additional evidence also showed that, at the time of Illinois Power's directive, Hartlein had been continuously receiving TTD benefits for approximately 16 months; and that while he had been released for work under certain restrictions, he was, nonetheless, unable to perform a second job assignment which had appeared to be within his physical limitations. As such, Illinois Power presented sufficient evidence of a valid basis for directing Hartlein to apply for other jobs. Hartlein in turn alleged that Illinois Power was forcing him to quit his job because the company had tired of paying him TTD benefits. He further alleged that Cole's physical rehabilitation program was a sham, as it was not designed to rehabilitate him to resume his former position. Hartlein presented evidence that he had proposed assignment to several alternate positions within Illinois Power; Illinois Power had not responded to that proposal; he was ordered by Illinois Power to engage in the company's vocational placement efforts; Illinois Power wanted him to search for other employment, directed him to prepare resumes, start a job search, contact prospective employers; told him not to mention his foot injury to prospective employers; considered him to be temporarily totally disabled, yet intended to terminate his TTD benefits, without the benefit of a recent medical examination, if he did not make a bona fide effort to seek other employment. An employer may legitimately seek to vocationally rehabilitate an injured employee when the employee is unable to perform the job he held when injured. ( Cf. National Tea Co., 97 Ill.2d 424, 73 Ill.Dec. 575, 454 N.E.2d 672 (employer failed to assume its responsibility to rehabilitate injured employee who could no longer perform assigned job).) Under the Act, an employer is obligated to provide for the physical, mental and vocational rehabilitation of the injured employee, including the costs and expense of maintenance. (See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 48, par. 138.8(a).) Indeed, the Industrial Commission has adopted a rehabilitation rule (the 120-day rehab rule) which provides: The employer or his representative, in consultation with the injured employee and, if represented, with [the employee's] representative, shall prepare a written assessment of the course of medical care, and, if appropriate, rehabilitation required to return the injured worker to employment when it can be reasonably determined that the injured worker will, as a result of the injury, be unable to resume the regular duties in which he was engaged at the time of injury, or when the period of total incapacity for work exceeds 120 continuous days, whichever first occurs. (50 Ill.Adm. Code § 7110.10 (1992).) Such rehabilitative efforts may be taken even though the issue of the extent of permanent disability cannot be determined. (See Hunter Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n (1981), 86 Ill.2d 489, 501, 56 Ill. Dec. 701, 427 N.E.2d 1247.) Although the parties have not raised the point, it would seem that Illinois Power's directive to Hartlein falls within the parameters of this rehab rule. As such, we would not consider the directive, in the context of these facts, to violate the principles established by Kelsay. Furthermore, it is widely accepted that [t]he primary goal of rehabilitation is to return the injured employee to work. (See T.W. Gifford, K. Gurber, W.D. Leahy & F.J. Wiedner, Worker's Compensation in Illinois 68 (1989); see also Gianforte, Industrial Rehabilitation in IllinoisAn Evolving Process, 71 Ill. B.J. 668 (1983).) TTD benefits were not designed to continue indefinitely. (See Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Industrial Comm'n (1990), 138 Ill.2d 107, 118, 149 Ill.Dec. 253, 561 N.E.2d 623 (once an injured employee's physical condition stabilizes, he is no longer eligible for TTD benefits, although he may be entitled to permanent partial or permanent total disability compensation).) While it may be that one of the by-products of undertaking rehabilitation is an eventual cessation of TTD benefits, that in no way makes such efforts on the employer's part discriminatory as defined by Kelsay. Additionally, even assuming, arguendo, that Illinois Power had no authority to order Hartlein to engage in its vocational rehabilitation program, a plaintiff does not establish a claim for retaliatory discharge if all he can show is that his employer refused to grant him the rights and remedies that he was entitled to under the Act. ( Horton, 776 F.2d at 1356.) Thus, no improper motive on Illinois Power's part was shown by its directive to Hartlein to engage in a job search as part of the company's rehabilitative program. Neither is improper motive revealed by Illinois Power's conditioning the payment of TTD benefits on Hartlein's efforts to apply for other jobs. Kelsay, 74 Ill.2d 172, 23 Ill.Dec. 559, 384 N.E.2d 353, holds that the employer may not present the employee with a choice between his job and his legal entitlement to compensation. Kelsay thereby prohibits an employer from utilizing an employee's job as leverage to condition his exercise of rights under the Act; Kelsay does not, however, prohibit the leveraging of benefits under the Act to condition the exercise of employment rights. Furthermore, a determination of the propriety of that form of activity lies with the Industrial Commission. See Hayden v. Industrial Comm'n (1991), 214 Ill. App.3d 749, 158 Ill.Dec. 305, 574 N.E.2d 99 (TTD justifiably terminated by the employer, under the Act, when the injured employee was unwilling to cooperate with vocational placement efforts); see also 2 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation § 61.24, at 10-1027 (The incentive applied by compensation law to undertake rehabilitation may take the form of the stick as well as of the carrot. Most unsubtle of all is simply to refuse benefits to a claimant who refuses rehabilitation), § 57.66(c), at 10-492.75 (the usual holding as to the effect of a refusal of suitable work is that it results in a suspension of benefits for the period of refusal) (1992). In sum, we conclude that Hartlein's argument and supporting proofs did not show that Illinois Power's directive to Hartlein resulted from a prohibited, discriminatory intent to abridge his workers' compensation rights. The evidence does not reveal that Hartlein was retaliatorily discharged. Manifestly, the evidence was insufficient to establish the existence of a clear and ascertainable right in need of protection. We need not consider whether the evidence sufficiently supported the existence of the three remaining factors necessary to preliminary injunctive relief, extent of harm, appropriateness of remedy and the likelihood of success on the merits. (See In re Adoption of Scruggs, 125 Ill.2d at 388, 126 Ill.Dec. 559, 532 N.E.2d 244.) The insufficiency of the evidence to support a clear right obviates such a consideration. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the appellate court, which affirmed the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction, and reverse the judgment of the circuit court. Judgments reversed. CUNNINGHAM, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.