Opinion ID: 2318253
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remedies of Back Pay, Front Pay, and Reinstatement

Text: [¶ 33] Walsh argues that the court erred when it reduced the amount of back pay it awarded when it found that Walsh no longer made reasonable efforts to locate suitable employment because she unduly limited the scope of her search. Walsh further contends that the court inappropriately shifted the burden of proof for damage mitigation to her, rather than to the Town. [¶ 34] We have held that back pay awarded as relief for unlawful employment discrimination is to be reduced by actual earnings on another job during the pertinent period, or by whatever amount [the victim] could with reasonable diligence have earned during that time. Maine Human Rights Comm'n v. Dep't of Corrections, 474 A.2d 860, 869 (Me.1984). The employer has the burden to prove that the employee could have mitigated her damages by finding other employment. LeBlond v. Sentinel Serv., 635 A.2d 943, 945 (Me.1993). We will uphold an award of back pay or a limitation on the amount of back pay absent clear error by the grant of the award or an abuse of discretion in the amount awarded. Id. [¶ 35] In the present case, the Town demonstrated that after Walsh moved to Lincoln in 2007, she did not apply for similar recreation-related positions in the Bangor area that were advertised in the Bangor Daily News. The trial court found that, in 2008, she no longer made reasonable efforts to locate suitable employment because she unduly limited the scope of her search, which impaired her ability to apply for reasonable employment opportunities, and accordingly concluded that she failed to mitigate her damages. The court differentiated Walsh's situation from the situation presented in Maine Human Rights Commission v. Dep't of Corrections, 474 A.2d at 869, because, it reasoned, there is a huge difference between expecting a person from Springvale to accept employment in Skowhegan [a commute or move of nearly two-and-one-half hours] and expecting a person from Lincoln to pursue employment in greater Bangor [a commute or move of approximately one hour]. Considering our deferential standard of review, the trial court's findings on the back pay issue are supported by the record and are not clearly erroneous. [¶ 36] Walsh argues that because reinstatement, when possible, is the preferred remedy in the context of employment discrimination, the trial court erred when it did not order her reinstatement to the position of recreation director. Walsh offers that her reinstatement is not impossible, as ongoing hostility between her and the Town was not proven and that the two-year contract that effectively removed her from her position expired in July 2009, which would have allowed her to retake her position with the Town. [¶ 37] We review a trial court's determination concerning the feasibility of reinstatement for clear error to the extent that the determination relies on findings of fact and for an abuse of discretion to the extent that the determination relies on evaluative factors and choices. See Wells v. Powers, 2005 ME 62, ¶ 2, 873 A.2d 361 (explaining clear error review); Pettinelli v. Yost, 2007 ME 121, ¶ 11, 930 A.2d 1074 (explaining abuse of discretion review). [¶ 38] The trial court found that after Walsh's position was eliminated in July 2005, it has not existed. Instead, the Town entered into an outsourcing contract with the Town of East Millinocket that has remained in effect to consolidate recreation services between the towns. In addition to the court's finding that the position no longer exists, the trial court determined that it would not order reinstatement because it is predictable that the employer-employee relationship in this small workplace will remain hostile. [¶ 39] The trial court did not clearly err or abuse its discretion when it determined that reinstatement would be impractical or infeasible. Similar to the situation in Mercier v. Town of Fairfield, 628 A.2d 1053, 1056 (Me.1993), the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to order that Walsh be reinstated to a position that no longer exists. [¶ 40] Walsh finally contends that, should reinstatement be impossible, she is entitled to front pay, which the trial court did not award to her. Walsh suggests that because front pay is the closest approximation to reinstatement a court can award in a discrimination case, front pay should have been awarded to her in this case. [¶ 41] We review the trial court's decision to reward front pay or not for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 1056. In the employment context, ... reinstatement or, if reinstatement is not feasible, front pay, is a proper remedy for a deprivation of procedural due process unless it is shown that the discharge was otherwise justified. Id. [¶ 42] In its order, the trial court did not make a front pay award [b]ecause the Court's findings with regard to mitigation also apply to front pay. This decision was not an abuse of discretion and will be affirmed. The entry is: Judgement affirmed.