Opinion ID: 677313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: bifurcated jury trial

Text: 65 Bland argues that the district court's bifurcation of the trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury because the jury had already decided the guilt of his co-defendants for the same conspiracy before hearing his case. See Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Bland relies primarily on the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. McIver, 688 F.2d 726 (11th Cir.1982), which also involved a bifurcated trial. In McIver, the jury heard the government's case against the three co-defendants, two of the defendants presented their defense, and the jury deliberated, returning a guilty verdict against both defendants. The same jury then heard the third defendant's case and found him guilty as well. In refusing to uphold the bifurcated trial and reversing the third defendant's conviction, the Eleventh Circuit stated: 66 A bifurcated trial like the one here and in [United States v.] Stratton [649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir.1981) ] violates the Sixth Amendment because the jury might consider, even if inadvertently, the guilt of the defendant before it has heard the defendant's case. Here the three defendants were all charged with the same crimes. The government's evidence presented during the McIvers' phase of the trial pertained to all three defendants. It is unlikely in such a situation that the jury could convict two of the three defendants without forming an opinion regarding the third defendant. Such a jury cannot be impartial; rather, it is 'predisposed to find guilt.' Stratton, supra, 649 F.2d at 1082. 67 688 F.2d at 729 (footnote omitted). 68 Unlike the present case, the bifurcation procedure in McIver was proposed by the district court and implemented over the objection of the third defendant's attorney. McIver, 688 F.2d at 728. In this case, Bland's own lawyer requested that the trial be bifurcated, and Bland himself expressly consented to the bifurcation procedure before the district court. 4 During the government's case-in-chief, it became apparent that Bland intended to call as a defense witness a police officer who would testify that Bland implicated Nancy, Michael Nietupski, Battles, and Hunter in the charged conspiracy. Nancy Nietupski's lawyer was concerned that admitting the officer's testimony would violate the Confrontation Clause if Bland did not testify. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). To meet this concern, Bland's counsel suggested bifurcating the trial: 69 MR. NOLL [Bland's attorney]: Based upon a variety of possibilities in this case we could, and we've discussed this with the prosecutor, and I have not discussed this specifically with my client, and that would be a situation, Judge, where basically for some really strong tactical reasons I would like this jury to hear Mr. Bland's defense. I can appreciate we do not want to flirt with a mistrial in this case. We would consider, and at a break talk the prosecution as follows: Number one, all the defendants put on their case. Mr. Bland has an opportunity to cross all their witnesses and so forth. Then we bifurcate the case, allow the jury to go out, make their findings as to all these Defendants. Seal the verdict. The jury comes back, sits down in this courtroom, we present our defense. They go back out, decide Mr. Bland's faith [sic]. Come back, open up the jury's verdicts as to all these Defendants. Open it up as to us. We would bifurcate the findings. Everybody participate. Their guilt or innocence is done and we be allowed to present our defense to the jury, if you will separately, almost as an individual trial. 70 THE COURT: After the jury has returned a verdict as to the other eight defendants? 71 MR. NOLL: Yes, sir.THE COURT: Then you present your defense? 72 MR. NOLL: Yes, sir, and I would sit here as all the other Defendants present their defense, the jury walks out and makes all their findings for eight of the Defendants. I don't know if they found them guilty or not guilty, but I just feel that tactically, and I've discussed this with my client, it is to his advantage to go to trial with these Defendants under these conditions. Tactically that's a decision we have made and that's why he's willing to solve the problem. We bifurcate the case, then all these witnesses wouldn't testify in any way involving these people. They would only testify in my case. 73 The district court allowed the parties time to consider the procedure suggested by Bland's counsel. Later the same day, the court inquired of the parties' positions regarding the procedure. No one had any objection to bifurcation. The court then personally addressed Bland: 74 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Bland, you've heard Mr. Risley's [the Assistant United States Attorney] statements and what Mr. Noll advised the Court. He said he talked to you and he talked to you again over the noon hour, and did he indeed? 75 BLAND: Yes, sir. 76 THE COURT: And have you discussed this with him? 77 BLAND: Yes, sir. 78 THE COURT: Are you ready to tell me on the record whether or not you agree to go along with that? 79 BLAND: I agree. 80 THE COURT: So you would like to have everybody else's case determined first and then pick up-- 81 BLAND: Yes, sir. 82 THE COURT: With the same jury and continue with your defense; is that right? 83 BLAND: Yes, sir. 84 THE COURT: All right, fine, thank you very much. 85 (Tr. 3127). 86 The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, like any constitutional right, may be waived. See United States v. Cirrincione, 780 F.2d 620, 624 (7th Cir.1985). A waiver must be knowing and voluntary. Id. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1468-69, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970)). Based on the colloquy between Bland and the district court, it is clear that Bland knowingly and voluntarily waived his claim that the bifurcated trial violated his Sixth Amendment right by personally consenting to the procedure. As counsel acknowledged, moreover, the bifurcation offered Bland a potential tactical advantage, for if the jury found Bland's co-defendants guilty, Bland could conceivably capitalize on that finding to bolster his defense that he was cooperating with the police. See United States v. Joshi, 896 F.2d 1303 (11th Cir.) (the defendants waived their Sixth Amendment challenge to trial bifurcation by virtue of their counsel's tactical decision to consent to such a procedure), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 986, 111 S.Ct. 523, 112 L.Ed.2d 534 (1990).