Opinion ID: 484637
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction over statutory challenges

Text: 16 The district court's decision below, and plaintiffs' defense of that decision on appeal, reads Sec. 8128(b) as applying only to individual compensation decisions, and not to policies enunciated in Program Memoranda. Plaintiffs do not deny that Congress has the power, through a clear command of the statute, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 167, 90 S.Ct. 832, 838, 25 L.Ed.2d 192 (1970), to preclude review of policy decisions; however, they deny that the command is clear in this case. Plaintiffs read the phrase in Sec. 8128(b), the action of the Secretary ... in allowing or denying a payment, to refer to individual adjudications, alone. 17 This reading, however, distorts the statute. It would create the absurd result of permitting a court to strike down a policy statement of the Secretary, notwithstanding the court's inability to review any subsequent individual adjudications for conformance with its policy decision. As recently stated by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, it is individual determinations that have traditionally been accorded more rather than less judicial protection against agency error than generally applicable rules. Compare Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 [36 S.Ct. 141, 60 L.Ed. 372] (1915) with Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 [28 S.Ct. 708, 52 L.Ed. 1103] (1908). Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902, 915 (D.C.Cir.1985) (Scalia, J.) vacated and reh'g granted, 791 F.2d 172, remanded with instructions to dismiss as moot, 791 F.2d 172 (D.C.Cir.1985). 3 Yet plaintiffs suggest that Congress intended the reverse when enacting Sec. 8128(b). This suggestion makes no sense, because the Secretary would be free, in individual adjudications, to ignore anything we say, and because it conflicts with one of the major purposes of Sec. 8128(b): that the Secretary should be free to make the policy choices associated with disability decisions. Rodrigues v. Donovan, 769 F.2d 1344, 1348 (9th Cir.1985). Issuing an FECA Program Memorandum is simply a wholesale action ... in allowing or denying a payment. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8128(b). Federal employees have no right to appeal compensation decisions on FECA statutory grounds, whether these decisions are made individually or through broad-impact changes in policy. Congress gave the Secretary of Labor the unequivocal power to interpret and apply the FECA without review by another official of the United States or by a court, id., as long, of course, as that power is not used in an unconstitutional manner. See ante. 18 The district court's reliance on decisions extending Johnson v. Robison, supra, to permit judicial review of veterans benefit decisions on statutory grounds is misplaced. See, e.g., Wayne State University v. Cleland, 590 F.2d 627, 631-32 (6th Cir.1978). We find the recent contrary decisions of the Second and the Federal Circuits more persuasive. See Roberts v. Walters, 792 F.2d 1109 (Fed.Cir.1986); Traynor v. Walters, 791 F.2d 226 (2d Cir.1986). As the Supreme Court recently noted, both 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8128(b) and 38 U.S.C. Sec. 211(a) are examples of unambiguous and comprehensive language showing that Congress intends to bar judicial review altogether. Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 1627 & n. 13, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985).