Opinion ID: 6357898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factual and procedural history of this case

Text: Turning to the present controversy, T.S. and E.S. were born to Appellant T.H.-H. (Mother) in June 2013 and August 2014, respectively. The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and Families (CYF) became familiar with Mother shortly after E.S.'s birth. Mother admitted to using marijuana while pregnant with E.S., and she tested positive for THC (a cannabinoid) shortly after giving birth. CYF did not initially file a dependency petition, opting instead to provide services to help Mother implement her goals. However, Mother was not substantially compliant with treatment and failed to discontinue her drug use. Also, she admitted to smoking marijuana in the presence of the children, exhibited minimal parenting skills - often leaving Children in a bedroom unattended with the television blaring, and failing to undertake basic parenting tasks such as feeding the children or changing their diapers - and did not follow through with E.S.'s medical appointments. See N.T., Feb. 3, 2017, at 8, 13-14. 4 Beginning in January 2015, home visits were conducted by a caseworker from an independent social services agency, who helped Mother with various aspects of parenting and budgeting. On one visit, the caseworker developed concerns for the safety of the children when she observed an open oven being used to heat the residence, the presence of a cigarette lighter and a large knife where T.S. could access them, and a used condom on the floor which she believed could constitute a choking hazard. See N.T., Feb. 3, 2017, at 52-53. Although she discussed these matters with Mother, Mother downplayed their significance and generally did not appear to appreciate that they could compromise the children's safety. In July 2015, a CYF caseworker made an unannounced visit and noticed that the home smelled of marijuana and Mother was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Because CYF believed it could no longer ensure the safety of the children in Mother's care, it sought an emergency custody authorization and the children were removed that day. They were adjudicated dependent and placed with foster parents. For the placement and permanency review period that followed, the court appointed KidsVoice (a child-advocacy organization in  Pittsburgh) to represent the children's best interests and legal interests in compliance with Section 6311 of the Juvenile Code. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311 ; Pa.R.J.C.P. 1154. After the foster care placement, Mother's court-ordered goals were, inter alia , to participate in drug and alcohol treatment (which included random urine screens), mental health treatment, and parenting classes, and to visit her children and maintain contact and cooperation with CYF. The court appointed Beth Bliss, Psy.D., a licensed forensic psychologist, to conduct evaluations. Dr. Bliss evaluated Mother individually and performed interactional evaluations between the children and Mother, and between the children and their foster parents. 5 In late 2016, CYF filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, which Mother contested. 6 The court held a hearing on the petition on February 3, 2017. At the hearing, CYF was represented by Melaniesha Abernathy, Esq.; Mother was represented by Kiersten Frankowski, Esq., of the Allegheny County Bar Foundation's Juvenile Court Project; and, as reflected on the hearing transcript and the TPR docket sheet, the children were represented by Cynthia J. Moore, Esq., from KidsVoice. The orders appointing KidsVoice to represent the children in the dependency proceedings stated it was to represent their legal and best interests, and it is undisputed that this dual function carried over into the termination proceedings. Thus, the children had continuity of representation between the dependency and TPR proceedings. However, no independent counsel represented solely the children's legal interests in the latter proceedings. The CYF caseworker, the ACHIEVA employee, and Dr. Bliss were among the witnesses called by CYF. According to their testimony, Mother was inconsistent or non-compliant with most of the treatment programs to which CYF referred her - including dual-diagnosis ( i.e. , mental health and substance abuse) treatment - and had difficulty providing clean urine screens, see N.T., Feb. 3, 2017, at 10-11; she was unable to understand or manage the needs of both children simultaneously during supervised visits, including their safety needs, see id. at 13, 31, 36, 39, 64; see generally id. at 37 (reflecting the ACHIEVA worker's assessment that Mother would need 24/7 supports if she were alone with the children); and she only minimally complied with the court's permanency plan, see id. at 31. More generally, the conditions leading to the children's removal had not been remedied, nor were they likely to be within a reasonable timeframe. See, e.g. , id. at 24. In foster care, moreover, T.S.'s speech and overall behaviors improved greatly, and E.S.'s feeding problems resolved. Id. at 21. The CYF caseworker expressed that it would be best for the children to remain with the foster parents and ultimately to be adopted by them. See id. at 24. Dr. Bliss testified that Mother did not prioritize being a parent, as she missed numerous visits with the children because she had other things she had to do, id. at 72, and she continued to use drugs although she was aware such conduct would negatively impact the likelihood of reunification. Dr. Bliss also expressed that,  whereas the children were indifferent to Mother's presence in the visiting room and did not seem bonded with her, they appeared emotionally bonded with their foster parents. In this respect, Dr. Bliss stated that T.S. repeatedly sought attention from his foster mother, referred to the latter as Mommy, and showed her physical affection. Further, according to Dr. Bliss, the foster parents were effective in attending to the children's needs, providing them with affection, and promoting developmentally appropriate skills. 7 Dr. Bliss opined to a reasonable degree of psychological certainty that the children would not suffer any harm from not seeing Mother again, and she recommended that the current foster placement continue. See id. at 78-79. Later that day, the court granted the petition, finding that CYF had established by clear and convincing evidence grounds for termination under paragraphs (2), (5), and (8) of Section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act, see 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), 8 and that termination would serve the children's needs and welfare. See id. § 2511(b) (providing that, in terminating parental rights, the court shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child). While Mother's appeal to the Superior Court was pending, this Court decided L.B.M. on March 28, 2017. 9 Accordingly, in her appellate brief Mother claimed for the first time that the children should have been represented by appointed counsel separate from the GAL at the termination proceeding. 10 Mother argued that the trial court's failure to appoint such counsel constituted  structural error, thereby entitling her to a new TPR proceeding. Mother also maintained that her failure to raise the issue previously should be excused because this Court had not yet ruled in L.B.M. at the time of the February 3, 2017, hearing. In a supplemental brief, the GAL argued that, under the Superior Court's interpretation of L.B.M . in In re D.L.B. , 166 A.3d 322 (Pa. Super. 2017), a guardian ad litem may serve as legal counsel for a child in an involuntary TPR proceeding as long as the child's legal interests and best interests are not in conflict. 11 The GAL asserted that no such conflict had been identified here. In response, Mother did not contend that the children's best interests and legal interests were in conflict. Rather, she argued that the D.L.B . panel had misapprehended L.B.M. , which, she argued, requires the appointment of independent legal counsel for children in every involuntary TPR proceeding. A three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed in an unpublished decision. The panel observed that, regardless of Mother's suggestion that D.L.B. was wrongly decided, D.L.B. represented binding precedent which the panel was not at liberty to overrule. See In re T.S. , Nos. 364 & 365 WDA 2017, slip op. at 5, 2017 WL 3669504 , at  (Pa. Super. Aug. 25, 2017). The court noted that, per D.L.B. 's analysis, L.B.M. does not require appointment of independent legal counsel for a child in a contested TPR proceeding unless the child's legal and best interests conflict. See id. (citing D.L.B. , 166 A.3d at 329 ). The court ultimately concluded that a remand was unnecessary as Mother did not argue that the children's legal and best interests were in conflict and, in the court's view, the record did not indicate that any such conflict existed. See id. 12 We granted further review to determine whether the common pleas court erred in failing to appoint separate counsel to represent the children's legal interests pursuant to Section 2313(a), 23 Pa.C.S. See In re T.S. , --- Pa. ----, 173 A.3d 266 (2017) ( per curiam ).