Opinion ID: 784606
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Understanding

Text: 42 Henderson's first argument for cause is based on his alleged lack of a sufficient understanding of the actual claims contained in the Rule 32 petition he dismissed. Henderson argues that because of this failure, his dismissal was not a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his legal rights. Henderson argues that under prevailing law, his waiver is ineffective unless it was an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, and, according to Henderson, his was not. Thus, he argues that this Court should find cause and excuse the procedural default created by the premature dismissal of his Rule 32 claims. 43 Henderson's argument that he lacked a sufficient understanding of the claims set forth in the Rule 32 petition that he dismissed is more specifically confined to the knowing and intelligent prongs of the knowing, voluntary, and intelligent standard that he sets forth. With respect to his lack of understanding argument for cause, the argument Henderson presents is not one of lack of voluntariness. 19 Rather, the argument focuses specifically on whether Henderson's alleged lack of understanding of the legal claims set forth in his Rule 32 petition rendered his decision to dismiss the petition not sufficiently knowing and intelligent to be deemed legally valid. We now turn to this question, while fully recognizing the AEDPA-mandated deference owed to the prior determination of the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals as to this same issue in Henderson v. State, 733 So.2d 484 (Ala. Crim.App.1998). 20 44 Language from the Supreme Court's decision in Rees v. Peyton, 384 U.S. 312, 86 S.Ct. 1505, 16 L.Ed.2d 583 (1966), has consistently been cited as setting forth the controlling legal standard for assessing the validity of a death row inmate's choice to forego post-conviction review. In Lonchar v. Zant, 978 F.2d 637, 641 (11th Cir.1992), this Circuit addressed the question of whether Lonchar was competent to waive his right to collaterally challenge his conviction and death sentence. Quoting from Rees, this Court phrased the test as follows: 45 Competency to forego further legal proceedings depends on whether the person whose competency is in question has capacity to appreciate his position and make a rational choice with respect to continuing or abandoning further litigation or on the other hand whether he is suffering from a mental disease, disorder, or defect which may substantially affect his capacity in the premises. 46 Lonchar, 978 F.2d at 641 ( Rees, 384 U.S. at 314, 86 S.Ct. at 1506). Applying this Rees test in Lonchar, this Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the condemned person could forego further review of his conviction and sentence. Id. at 642. This Court noted that the district court had found that Lonchar was able to understand his legal position and the options available to him and the consequences of not pursuing review of his conviction. Id. It concluded that Lonchar could make a rational choice among his options, and according to testimony from a psychiatrist, after considering his options and the quality of life in prison, [Lonchar] had decided not to oppose his conviction. Id. 47 Then, in Ford v. Haley, 195 F.3d 603, 605 (11th Cir.1999), our Circuit considered another case where a death row inmate sought to dismiss his counsel and forego all further collateral challenges to his conviction and sentence. The district court found the inmate competent to forego further collateral relief. In so concluding, [t]he district court held that under Lonchar, Ford need not understand the particulars of each legal issue framed in the petition or the likelihood of prevailing on any or all of them, as his counsel argues. Id. at 615. Rather, Ford needed to exhibit a basic understanding of the habeas proceedings and understand that without further proceedings he would be executed. Id. He needed to understand the `bottom line' of his legal situation — that he must continue to engage in the review process or be executed — [in order to be] able to make a rational choice among these options. Id. Upon review, this Circuit upheld the decision of the district court. In so doing, this Circuit stated that [t]he district court applied the Rees test in the precise manner instructed in Lonchar.  Id. at 617. 48 In Hauser ex. rel. Crawford v. Moore, 223 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir.2000), a death row inmate filed a waiver of all collateral and/or post-conviction relief proceedings. Id. at 1319. The state court appointed an attorney to represent the inmate. Id. The inmate filed a motion to dismiss the counsel and for permission to proceed pro se. Id. Despite the inmate's desire to proceed pro se and waive all rights to collaterally challenge his death sentence, attorneys from the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel (CCRC) and Hauser's biological mother, purporting to act on Hauser's behalf, attempted to challenge the conviction and sentence in both state and federal court. Id. at 1319-20. On appeal from a § 2254 petition filed by CCRC, this Circuit concluded that the inmate was competent to dismiss the § 2254 petition. Id. at 1322-23. 49 Relying on the Circuit's prior precedent in Ford and Lonchar to articulate the proper test, the panel in Hauser addressed whether the inmate understood the `bottom line' of his legal situation — that he must continue to engage in the review process or be executed — and that he was able to make a rational choice among these options. Id. at 1323 (emphasis added). Then, the court acknowledged that the state court had previously concluded that the inmate has the capacity to appreciate the allegations against him, has an appreciation for the range and nature of these proceedings and the appellate process, and has the ability to disclose facts pertinent to those proceedings. Id. The panel then noted that these findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness that can only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the inmate is incompetent. The court easily found such evidence lacking and vacated the stay consistent with the inmate's expressed wishes. Id. 50 Applying the standard derived from the foregoing cases, we readily conclude that the state court's determination, see Henderson v. State, 733 So.2d 484 (Ala. Crim.App.1998), in this case was not contrary to, or [did not] involve an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Nor did the state court's determination result in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The record in this case, including the extensive colloquy conducted by the Rule 32 court prior to its granting of Henderson's motion to dismiss, see supra at [M/S 4-7], makes clear that Henderson understood the bottom line of his legal situation, that he had to continue to engage in the collateral review process or be executed, and that he was able to make a rational choice among these options. The colloquy also makes it clear that Henderson had a basic understanding of the purpose of the Rule 32 proceedings which he was deciding to abort, namely an effort to get a new trial. Thus, the district court correctly concluded that this lack of understanding argument for cause is without merit. 21