Opinion ID: 1295082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Americamps' Claim for Negligent Interference with Contractual Relations

Text: Americamps operated a campground within 400 feet of ELI, and the partnership claims damages against all defendants for interference with the operation of the facility. This damage claim arose because Americamps was ordered to evacuate the campers because of the potential danger of the pentaborane gas Kachur negligently released. There was no evidence that any of the pentaborane gas actually invaded the campground. Americamps concedes that there was no physical entry or damage to the campground and that, under ordinary circumstances, such losses are not recoverable. Describing the negligent release of pentaborane as creating problems of uniqueness and magnitude and an unnecessary, extraordinary and inherently dangerous hazard, Americamps urges us to create an exception to the rule expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766 (1977) that [o]ne is not liable to another for pecuniary harm not derived from physical harm to the other, if that harm results from the actor's negligently ... interfering with the other's performance of his contract... Although a number of persons were substantially affected by the negligent handling of a supertoxic chemical, the uniqueness of the incident provides no justification for abandoning the requirement of physical harm from negligent interference with contract. We refuse to create any such exception. Americamps also asserts two alternate theories of liability, strict liability in tort and nuisance. Neither has merit. We have applied strict liability in a blasting case where property was damaged by dirt and debris from the blast. M.W. Worley Construction Co. v. Hungerford, Inc., 215 Va. 377, 210 S.E.2d 161 (1974). In Laughon & Johnson, Inc. v. Burch, 222 Va. 200, 278 S.E.2d 856 (1981), we extended the rule to allow recovery for property damage caused by concussion and vibration from blasting. Both cases, however, were based upon the intrinsically dangerous and ultrahazardous activity [of blasting] since it is impossible to predict, with certainty, the extent of severity of a blast. Worley, 215 Va. at 379, 210 S.E.2d at 163. Implicit in these holdings is the fact that injuries may result from blasting, despite every reasonable precaution. Americamps relies on the criteria stated in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520(c) (1965) for determining whether an activity is ultra-hazardous. One criterion is an inability to eliminate the risk by exercise of reasonable care. Id. That criterion is not met here because Texaco, Philip Morris and A-Line all had the ability to eliminate the risk of injury by exercising reasonable care. Americamps also urges the doctrine of liability for maintenance of a nuisance as a means of recovery for damages. In all the cases Americamps cites, the smoke, odors, and water entered the premises of the plaintiff; no such thing happened in this case. The object of Americamps' action is to recover damages for negligent conduct. Americamps pled both negligence and nuisance as a basis for liability, but the nuisance allegedly was the result of negligent conduct. We will look to the object of the action, rather than its form, to determine the extent of liability of the defendants. In Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960), the plaintiff, a minor alleged to have been intoxicated, sought to avoid the defense of contributory negligence by invoking the doctrine of nuisance in his action for personal injuries arising out of the sale of intoxicating liquor to him. Even though the prior indiscriminate sale of liquor to minors was said to be a nuisance, the court applied the defense of contributory negligence to the plaintiff, saying: Merely attaching the label `nuisance' to an action for personal injuries does not alter the nature of the action. Where the acts or omissions constituting negligence are the identical acts which it is asserted give rise to a cause of action for nuisance, the rules applicable to negligence will be applied. 258 Minn. at 86, 103 N.W.2d at 135. Similarly, Americamps may not recover damages for the negligent conduct alleged merely by characterizing the results of the conduct as a nuisance. We conclude that Americamps has no basis for a claim for damages. Accordingly, we will reverse the judgments entered in its favor against all three defendants.