Opinion ID: 2996093
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legitimate Prosecutorial Conduct

Text: Also important to the Supreme Court’s analysis in Rumery was the fact that “the prosecutor had an independent, legitimate reason to make this [release-dismissal] agreement directly related to his prosecutorial responsibilities.” Rumery, 480 U.S. at 398. Such a legitimate reason ensures that the prosecutor acts consistent with his 14 No. 02-1514 duties to uniformly enforce the criminal law, rather than as the agent for the private interests of potential § 1983 defendants. In this case, we believe that the prosecutor did not engage in any improper conduct inconsistent with his role as prosecutor, nor were his efforts in securing the releases from Gonzalez and Holland the result of any prosecutorial overreaching. First, the prosecutor did not act improperly when he pursued the charges against Gonzalez and Holland. The appellants go to great lengths to argue that the pursuit of charges against them was wholly unjustified. In disputing the disorderly conduct charge, they admit that Gonzalez was yelling, but argue that it was not “at the top of top of [sic] his lungs.” In challenging the charges of resisting law enforcement, they admit that they offered some resistance during the arrest attempt, but that their resistance was not “forcible.” They also point to inconsistent accounts given by Officers Kokot and Dixon in their depositions as evidence of misconduct and apparent complicity by the prosecutor in ignoring the inconsistencies. But as the Sixth Circuit has noted, “the existence of discrepancies among the accounts of prosecution witnesses does not amount to ‘substantial evidence’ of police misconduct such that an inference of prosecutorial misconduct” arises. Burke, 167 F.3d at 286. Even accepting Gonzalez’s and Holland’s characterization of the charges, we believe that there was enough evidence to send the criminal case to the trier of fact. The charges brought against Gonzalez and Holland were certainly not “unfounded criminal charges used as bargaining chips to cover up police misconduct.” Id. (quotations omitted). Second, the prosecutor did not abandon his responsibilities in securing the releases from Gonzalez and Holland. Prosecutors may legitimately consider the strength of the defendants’ § 1983 claims when considering whether to enter into a release-dismissal agreement. See Rumery, 480 No. 02-1514 15 U.S. at 396 (plurality opinion) (“To the extent releasedismissal agreements protect public officials from the burdens of defending such unjust [§ 1983] claims, they further this important public interest.”); id. at 399 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[T]here are substantial policy reasons for permitting release-dismissal bargains to be struck in appropriate cases. Certainly some § 1983 litigation is meritless, and the inconvenience and distraction of public officials caused by such suits is not inconsiderable.”). We cannot say that it would have been inappropriate for Prosecutor Kray (as well as Gonzalez and Holland themselves) to have considered the strength of the § 1983 case in deciding whether or not to enter into a releasedismissal agreement. In addition, the plurality opinion in Rumery noted that “[p]rosecutorial charging decisions are rarely simple.” Id. at 396 (plurality opinion). Prosecutors must consider the strength and importance of a particular case, government enforcement priorities, and the appropriate allocation of scarce prosecutorial resources. Id. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Rumery notes that “[s]paring the local community the expense of litigation associated with some minor crimes for which there is little or no public interest in prosecution may be a legitimate objective of a release-dismissal agreement.” Id. at 399-400 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). In this case, prosecutor Kray testified in his deposition that “[t]his was a very minor case that got out of hand.” (Kray Dep. at 10.) Avoiding a potentially costly and lengthy trial over relatively minor matters, with a settlement that was acceptable to both sides, was certainly a legitimate goal related to Kray’s duties as a prosecutor.