Opinion ID: 1415585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Burrows CaseEffect of Waiver

Text: Under the provisions of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31d (1993) (Repl.Vol.2003), underinsured motorist coverage can be waived both directly and indirectly. By statute, insurers are required to offer this optional insurance coverage to any individual who applies for liability coverage. See W.Va.Code § 33-6-31d(a). On a form developed by the state insurance commissioner, an applicant for liability coverage is specifically apprised of the availability of underinsurance coverage [9] and the costs of same based on the coverage limits and whether coverage is sought in connection with a single or multi-car policy. [10] This form, which is required to be delivered either in person at the time of the initial application for insurance or when the initial premium notice is sent to the applicant, contains a designated section where the insured can select the specific amount of underinsured coverage he or she desires. Alternatively, if the applicant does not wish to purchase such optional insurance coverage, there is a box to check and so indicate. [11] Individuals who receive this form offering the optional insurance underinsurance coverage but choose not to return the same to their insurer within the thirty-day period prescribed by statute [12] are subject to the following presumption: Failure of the applicant or a named insured to return the form described in this section [W.Va.Code § 33-6-31d] to the insurer as required by this section within the time periods specified in this section creates a presumption that such person received an effective offer of the optional coverages described in this section and that such person exercised a knowing and intelligent rejection of such offer. Such rejection is binding on all persons insured under the policy. W.Va.Code § 33-6-31d(d). Just as the non-return of the form offering underinsured motorist coverage is binding on all insureds under a particular policy, the completion and transmittal of this form by an individual insured is treated, by legislative design, as binding on all persons insured under the policy. W.Va.Code § 33-6-31d(b). While there is no dispute that Mrs. Chapman twice expressly rejected Nationwide's offer of optional underinsured motorist coverage, the query raised in connection with the issue of coverage available to her daughter is whether the removal of Mrs. Chapman as a named insured from the policy [13] extinguished the statutory reach of that waiver from applying to Ms. Burrows. Presented in another fashion, this Court is being asked to identify the events which statutorily impose upon an insurer the duty to make an offer of optional insurance coverage to its insureds. To begin our analysis of this issue, we look to the statutory language of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31d to identify three events, the separate occurrence of which requires an insurer to make an offer of optional underinsured motorist coverage. [14] Under the terms of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31d, the insurer must make an offer of optional underinsurance coverage concurrent with the initial purchase of liability coverage. In mandatory terms, the statute provides that [o]ptional limits of ... underinsured motor vehicle coverage required by section 31 [§ 33-6-31] of this article shall be made available to the named insured at the time of initial application for liability coverage. W.Va.Code § 33-6-31d(a). The manner in which the form offering the underinsurance coverage is required to be transmitted to the insurance applicant is further set forth by statute. The insurer has the option of either delivering the form to the applicant or mailing the form to the applicant together with the applicant's initial premium notice. W.Va.Code § 33-6-31d(b). In addition to the initial application for liability insurance, the statute provides two other triggers for offering underinsurance to an insured. The statute is clear that upon any request of the named insured, underinsurance has to be made available. W.Va. Code § 33-6-31d(a). Finally, the statute provides that the forms offering the optional underinsured motorist coverage are to be made available to any named insured who requests different coverage limits. W.Va. Code § 33-6-31d(e). As to whether the statute imposes a duty to offer underinsurance upon insurers other than as expressly delineated, the Legislature clearly anticipated this issue and responded statutorily by providing: No insurer is required to make such form available or notify any person of the availability of such optional coverages authorized by this section except as required by this section.  Id. (emphasis supplied) Ms. Burrows argues that any waiver of underinsurance coverage effectuated by her mother was extinguished either when Mrs. Anderson was removed from the policy as a named insured, or alternatively, when she died. [15] To support her position, she looks to the objectives underlying the statutory requirements governing underinsurance, maintaining that she should have been treated as a new policyholder and separately advised of the availability of underinsurance coverage when she became the sole insured under the Nationwide policy. In her attempt to fall within the specified statutory criteria that control underinsured motorist coverage and, specifically, when it is required to be made available, Ms. Burrows also contends she was an applicant for a new policy of insurance at the time she called her agent to have her mother removed as an insured from the policy. Before addressing this issue, however, we first consider whether the objectives of underinsured motorist coverage are being thwarted by Nationwide's denial of such coverage in this case. Citing this Court's recognition in State Automobile Mutual Insurance Company v. Youler, 183 W.Va. 556, 396 S.E.2d 737 (1990), of the public policy of full indemnification or compensation [which] underl[ie] both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage, Ms. Burrows argues that Nationwide contravened this policy by failing to separately offer her underinsurance coverage following her mother's removal from the policy. This objective of full indemnification or compensation, as we explained in Youler was made in reference to obtaining compensation for damages not compensated by a negligent tortfeasor, up to the limits of the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. Id. at 564, 396 S.E.2d at 745. Expounding further on the statutory objectives at issue, we stated in Riffle v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 186 W.Va. 54, 410 S.E.2d 413 (1991), that [t]he purpose of W.Va.Code 33-6-31 [1988] is to provide all insurance buyers with an opportunity to purchase a minimum amount of underinsured motorist coverage. When the buyer is not given this opportunity, the statute provides him with the minimum coverage. The statute and our decision in Bias [ v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 179 W.Va. 125, 365 S.E.2d 789 (1987)] [16] encourage insurance companies to make a real effort to inform customers about the opportunity for underinsured motorist coverage. 186 W.Va. at 56, 410 S.E.2d at 415 (footnote added). In Cox v. Amick, 195 W.Va. 608, 466 S.E.2d 459 (1995), we reversed the trial court's ruling that each individual insured under one insurance policy had to be offered the opportunity to purchase or reject underinsured motorist coverage. Mr. Cox, the named insured on the Nationwide policy at issue, had expressly waived underinsurance coverage when he added his wife's vehicle to a policy he had owned prior to his marriage. In discussing whether each insured under an automobile insurance policy to be offered the optional insurance coverage mandated by West Virginia Code § 33-6-31b, we observed, as a practical matter, it would be very time consuming and unreasonable to expect an insurer to offer every person who would be an insured under the policy the optional coverage and then ascertain whether the optional coverage was rejected. 195 W.Va. at 615, 466 S.E.2d at 466. After determining that West Virginia Code §§ 33-6-31(b) and -31d were required to be read in pari materia given their common subject matter, we applied the clear and unambiguous statutory language to hold that [u]nder W.Va.Code, 33-6-31d [1993] a knowing and intelligent rejection of optional uninsured and underinsured motorists coverages by any named insured under an insurance policy creates a presumption that all named insureds under the policy received an effective offer of the optional coverages and that such person exercised a knowing and intelligent rejection of such offer. The named insured's rejection is binding on all persons insured under the policy. Cox, 195 W.Va. at 610, 466 S.E.2d at 461, syl. pt. 13. This case presents a related, but previously unaddressed, issue of whether a waiver of underinsurance that is statutorily binding on all the insureds under one policy continues to be binding when the named insured is no longer an insured under the policy. The statute is silent as to this issue. However, the statute is unmistakably clear with regard to identifying which events trigger an insurer's duty to make an offer of underinsured motorist coverage and that those statutorily defined events are the only circumstances which trigger an insurer's statutory duty to offer such optional insurance. See W.Va. Code § 33-6-31d. Even if this Court viewed the position advocated by Ms. Burrows as wise from a public policy standpoint, [17] our duty is not to retool the statute but merely to apply its provisions where the language at issue is unambiguous. [18] As we recognized in syllabus point five of State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137, 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959) [w]hen a statute is clear and unambiguous and the legislative intent is plain, the statute should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute. Another rule of statutory construction that must be considered provides that [i]n the interpretation of statutory provisions the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterus, the express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another, applies. Syl. Pt. 3, Manchin v. Dunfee, 174 W.Va. 532, 327 S.E.2d 710 (1984). Application of this principle requires the conclusion that had the Legislature deemed the removal of a named insured an event significant to trigger the requirement that optional underinsured motorist coverage be made available to existing insureds, the statute would have expressly directed insurers to distribute the above-discussed insurance form to the remaining insured(s) upon the occurrence of such event. There can be no dispute that it is the Legislature's sole prerogative to designate the circumstances upon which an insurer's statutory duty to offer optional insurance coverage such as underinsurance is triggered. The provisions of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31d are free from ambiguity as to what events trigger the requirement that insurers make available the optional insurance coverages required by West Virginia Code § 33-6-31(b). As discussed above, those three events specified by statute for offering such insurance do not include either the death of a named insured or the removal of a named insured from the policy. Accordingly, we conclude that the removal of a named insured as a policyholder on an automobile liability policy who directly or constructively executed a waiver of underinsured motorist coverage does not, standing alone, invalidate the statutory effect of the waiver that was implemented pursuant to the provisions of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31d. To conclude otherwise would be an act of judicial policy making. We prefer to leave for the Legislature the decision to amend this statute, should it so desire, rather than to improperly effect such an amendment through an opinion of this Court. We are not persuaded by Ms. Burrows' contention that denial of underinsurance under the facts presented in her case contravenes the public policy sought to be achieved through the enactment of our insurance laws. As we explained in Riffle, it is the offering of such coveragethe opportunity to purchase such coveragethat is mandated by statute. 186 W.Va. at 56, 410 S.E.2d at 415. Insureds are free to reject this optional coverage and many insureds decidedly opt not to carry this additional coverage. While the Legislature's objective in mandating the offering of optional underinsurance coverage was certainly to provide a mechanism that would encourage or enable full compensation up to the limits of the ... underinsured motorist coverage, there is no law which requires that underinsurance must be purchased. In those situations when underinsurance was not purchased after it was properly offered, this Court cannot, solely based on the laudatory ideals of encouraging full compensation, conclude that the insurer is obligated to provide such coverage. [19] Youler, 183 W.Va. at 564, 396 S.E.2d at 745. Arguing that she was a new applicant for insurance when she notified her insurer of her mother's removal as an insured under the policy, Ms. Burrows argues that Nationwide was required to make an offer of underinsured motorist coverage under the terms of West Virginia Code § 33-6-31d. Although the terms of the Nationwide policy clearly allow any insured to request the issuance of a new policy at any time, we cannot equate the removal of a named insured from a policy with an actual request that a new policy be issued. Moreover, there are specific monetary and contractual reasons why it is preferable for insureds in many situations to continue their insurance coverage under an existing policy rather than to apply for a new policy. These factors include premium discounts and a policy of first-time accident forgiveness that are extended to long-term insureds, as well as a prohibition against cancellation and nonrenewal. [20] Consequently, in many circumstances it may not be prudent for a policy holder to request or come under the terms of a separate policy. On the record presented in this case, we find no basis for concluding that Ms. Burrows was seeking the issuance of a new policy from Nationwide when she contacted her agent to have her mother removed from the policy. Simply put, the policy change requested by Ms. Burrows was not the equivalent of requesting or applying for a separate and new policy of insurance.