Opinion ID: 2486429
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Limitation on McCRAY's Narrative Testimony

Text: Next, McCRAY argues that the trial court's limitation of his guilt-phase testimony denied him the fundamental right to testify on his own behalf and to present evidence in defense. In response, the State concedes that the introductory portion of McCRAY's testimony was relevant, specifically referencing McCRAY's discussion of an alibi, the reason he chose to cut his hair, why he decided to leave town and travel to Tallahassee, and that he did not, in fact, run from the police when he was arrested. The State asserts, however, that the remainder of McCRAY's testimony, which was largely argumentative in nature, was inappropriate, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in terminating McCRAY's continued commentary. We agree. [T]he right to present evidence on one's own behalf is a fundamental right basic to our adversary system of criminal justice, and is a part of the `due process of law' that is guaranteed to defendants in state criminal courts by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. Masaka v. State, 4 So.3d 1274, 1284 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009) (quoting Gardner v. State, 530 So.2d 404, 405 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988)). That right includes, of course, McCRAY's right to testify on his own behalf. See Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51-52, 107 S.Ct. 2704, 97 L.Ed.2d 37 (1987). This Court has embraced the principle that [a] criminal defendant's right to testify is a fundamental right under both the Florida and United States Constitutions. Morris v. State, 931 So.2d 821, 833 (Fla.2006). While this right is necessarily of constitutional magnitude, it is not absolute and may only be exercised within certain bounds: [T]he right `may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.' Bowden v. State, 588 So.2d 225, 230 (Fla.1991) (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 55, 107 S.Ct. 2704). One area in which the right to testify may be circumscribed is where a defendant chooses to disregard the rules of evidence. See Rock, 483 U.S. at 56 n. 11, 107 S.Ct. 2704; Booker v. State, 397 So.2d 910, 914 (Fla.1981) (A defendant who takes the stand as a witness in his own behalf occupies the same status as any other witness, and all the rules applicable to other witnesses are likewise applicable to him.); see also Wilson v. State, 12 So.3d 292, 297 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (The right to testify includes the right to testify fully, without perjury, to matters not precluded by a rule of evidence.). Nevertheless, a procedural or evidentiary rule may not be applied in a manner so as to arbitrarily exclude material portions of a defendant's testimony. Bowden, 588 So.2d at 230-31 (citing Rock, 483 U.S. at 55, 107 S.Ct. 2704). A criminal defendant's right to testify overlaps with the trial court's discretionary role in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. The trial court's authority to impose restrictions on the presentation of evidence is recognized by Florida statute, which permits a trial court to exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of the interrogation of witnesses and the presentation in order to [f]acilitate, through effective interrogation and presentation, the discovery of the truth and [a]void needless consumption of time. § 90.612(1)(a)-(b), Fla. Stat. (2008). Further, a trial court has discretion to limit the presentation of evidence that is either irrelevant or outside the scope of a witness's knowledge. See §§ 90.403, 90.604, Fla. Stat. (2008). However, the court's discretion on evidentiary matters such as these must be constrained by a criminal defendant's constitutional right to testify. See McDuffie v. State, 970 So.2d 312, 324 (Fla.2007) (A trial court's discretion [in the limitation on cross-examination of witnesses], however, is constrained by the rules of evidence and by recognition of a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. (citation omitted)). When discussing the interplay between the two concepts, this Court has employed an abuse of discretion standard of review. See England v. State, 940 So.2d 389, 404-05 (Fla. 2006). In the present case, it is quite apparent from the record that McCRAY was permitted to testify for at least fifty minutes. Not only did McCRAY testify, but his narrative commentary continued at length with only minor interruption. The trial court authorized McCRAY to testify in the narrative because he refused to inform defense counsel about the substance of his testimony. Of McCRAY's twenty-four-page commentary, it appears that only the first three pages were of any relevance or within the bounds of permissible testimony. Yet following this brief presentation of relevant information, McCRAY's statements quickly turned from testimony to a lengthy argument regarding the weight of the evidence, the improper procedures in which the trial court engaged, why several State witnesses were unreliable, and how DNA evidence was stolen and did not prove the State's casesome of which would be more appropriately raised during closing argument by defense counsel. See Merck v. State, 975 So.2d 1054, 1061 (Fla. 2007) (Closing argument is an opportunity for counsel to review the evidence and to explicate those inferences which may reasonably be drawn from the evidence.). After the State objected to the relevancy of McCRAY's testimony, the trial court ordered McCRAY to move on. However, McCRAY ignored that order and returned to his irrelevant and argumentative commentary. Following a brief recess, the court informed McCRAY that it would only allow him to proceed if questioned by counsel, thereby placing a limitation on McCRAY's continued testimony. The trial judge explained that his reason for doing so was to prevent McCRAY from simply making arguments. When McCRAY returned to the witness stand, the State made a standing objection as to relevance, which the trial court again acknowledged. After defense counsel informed the court that he would not question the defendant, McCRAY insisted on continuing his discussion of testimony offered by the State's witnesses. The State acknowledged that it had cross-examination questions, but McCRAY repeatedly stated that his testimony had not ended, explaining that it was his job to end [his] testimony. As McCRAY began to discuss another eyewitness, defense counsel told McCRAY that it was time for the State to ask him questions. The court then repeated defense counsel's explanation but McCRAY again exclaimed, Not yet. No. It's not time for the state.... The defendant's testimony has not been finished yet at this time. When the State informed the court that it was ready to proceed, McCRAY objected, telling the prosecutor to have a seat so the jury could return to the courtroom to listen to the duration of his testimony. Consequently, the court had McCRAY removed from the courtroom and made assurances that the television and sound were on in the holding cell; the jury was not present during this outburst. Based on the above, we conclude that the trial court was well within its discretion to control the mode and presentation of McCRAY's testimony, especially in light of the fact that a large portion of McCRAY's exhortation was completely irrelevant, outside the scope of his knowledge, or constituted impermissible argument. [9] Further, when confronted by the court about the propriety of his testimony, McCRAY provided no reasonable indication that he would end his irrelevant narrative and resume testifying about relevant matters. See United States v. Carter, 410 F.3d 942, 951 (7th Cir.2005) (Simply stated, a criminal defendant does not have an absolute, unrestrainable right to spew irrelevantand thus inadmissibletestimony from the witness stand.). Moreover, the record demonstrates that the trial court's decision to terminate McCRAY's testimony was not exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable fashion, see Bowden, 588 So.2d at 230-31, and McCRAY does not direct this Court to relevant facts about which he would have testified had the trial court allowed him to proceed. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting McCRAY's testimony, nor did the trial court encroach upon McCRAY's right to testify and present a defense. [10]