Opinion ID: 1955158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Last Opportunity to Repair

Text: The main issue in this case is whether the Board must dismiss the proceeding where the manufacturer's final opportunity to repair pursuant to 9 V.S.A. § 4173(d) brings about an apparent repair although the car-owner is not satisfied. We hold that it does not and affirm the Board on its conclusion that the satisfaction standard under the statute is essentially subjective. Although we find the legal question to be fairly close, we have a number of reasons for our conclusion. Our first reason is that the Board's interpretation appears to comport best with our rules of statutory construction. In construing a statute, our primary mission is to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. In re Spencer, 152 Vt. ___, ___, 566 A.2d 959, 962 (1989). Where the language of the statute is clear, we must ascertain the intent from the wording of the statute using the plain, ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. Remedial statutes, like the lemon law, are entitled to a liberal construction in favor of those who are intended to benefit from the legislation. See Caledonian Record Publishing Co. v. Department of Employment & Training, 151 Vt. 256, 261, 559 A.2d 678, 681 (1989). We cannot say that the language used here is unambiguous. [8] There is an unresolved tension between the consumer's right to relief after a reasonable number of attempts fail to repair the vehicle and the manufacturer's right to attempt a last repair. Cf. Kletzien v. Ford Motor Co., 668 F.Supp. 1225, 1228 (E.D.Wis.1987) (statutory provisions of Wisconsin lemon law do not fit squarely). Nevertheless, the choice of wording is more consistent with a subjective standard than an objective one. This Court has interpreted a similar use of the term satisfied in the early case of McClure Bros. v. Briggs, 58 Vt. 82, 2 A. 583 (1886). In McClure Bros., the defendant agreed to purchase an organ from plaintiff if, on trying it, he was satisfied with it. Although an expert determined that the tone of the organ was good, defendant was dissatisfied with the tone of the organ. In plaintiff's suit for the price of the organ, the Court found for defendant, rejecting plaintiff's claim that defendant should be liable because he had no reasonable grounds for dissatisfaction: But it is said that he was bound to be satisfied, as he had no ground to be dissatisfied. He was bound to act honestly, and to give the instrument a fair trial, and such as the seller had a right, in the circumstances, to expect he would give it, and therein to exercise such judgment and capacity as he had, for by the contract he was the one to be satisfied, and not another for him. If he did this and was still dissatisfied, and that dissatisfaction was real and not feigned, honest and not pretended, it is enough, and plaintiffs have not fulfilled their contract.... Id. at 87, 2 A. at 584 (emphasis in original). We see no reason to construe the word satisfied in the lemon law differently from the way it is construed in McClure Bros. [9] Since there is no claim that appellees' dissatisfaction in this case is feigned or dishonest, and the trial court found it to be honest and in good faith, the McClure Bros. construction supports the Board's conclusion in this case. We also note that the Legislature has considered and rejected amendments to 9 V.S.A. § 4173(d) to clearly adopt the meaning advanced by GM in this case. Both the House and Senate voted down such an amendment in 1986. 1986 House J. 364-65; 1986 Senate J. 784-85. These amendments would have been unnecessary if the section had the meaning urged by GM. Second, we believe the Board's construction is most consistent with legislative intent. That intent is specifically stated in 9 V.S.A. § 4170 and includes a declaration that manufacturers, distributors and importers of new motor vehicles should be obligated to provide speedy and less costly resolution of automobile warranty problems. GM's repair in this case was the sixth one attempted. GM asserts that the vehicle is repaired, but it is likely that a similar assertion was made in good faith after each of the five other attempts. The only way the issue can be resolved is by expert evaluations or by operation of the vehicle over time. Neither of these methods are consistent with the legislative intent. If the consumer must hire an expert to evaluate the vehicle, the remedy will be more costly, not less costly as intended by the Legislature. The dismissal sought by GM makes test operation of the vehicle over time impossible; even if possible, it would delay any remedy. In effect, GM's position leads to a treadmill of repair attempts without end, not the speedy and less costly resolution of automobile warranty problems contemplated by the Legislature. Third, we believe that liberal construction consistent with the remedial purpose favors the Board's conclusion here. As the New Hampshire Supreme Court emphasized in Asciolla v. Manter Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc., 117 N.H. 85, 89-90, 370 A.2d 270, 274 (1977), the purchaser of a new car expects to receive a vehicle upon whose dependability and safety he could comfortably rely. Thus, the vehicle is more than the sum of its components. It must be reliable and operate well, day after day. What the lemon law really protects against is the insecurity of ownership of a vehicle that is perceived to be undependable. We share the sentiment of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals that giving the manufacturer further attempts to repair, after the failure within the reasonable number, can act to eviscerate the lemon law. Hartlaub v. Coachmen Industries, Inc., 143 Wis.2d 791, 802, 422 N.W.2d 869, 873 (Ct.App.1988); see also Vultaggio v. General Motors Corp., 145 Wis.2d 874, 886, 429 N.W.2d 93, 97 (Ct.App.1988) (follows Hartlaub ). The subjective satisfaction standard of § 4173(d) protects against that evisceration and fairly responds to insecurity caused by past operation failures. [10] Finally, we reiterate that we have a limited review standard here. At best, we are choosing between two arguable constructions of the Act. We believe that in such a case the Legislature intended that the Board's construction would prevail and would not be second-guessed in this Court.