Opinion ID: 4995635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Webster’s motions for default judgment

Text: Webster argues that the magistrate judge “overlooked” his filing of a summons and complaint as well as the fact that the Commissioner “had no response” and then filed an answer after the deadline. We disagree. A default occurs when the defendant fails to plead or otherwise respond to the complaint within the time required. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 84 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 1996). When a plaintiff fails to properly serve process on a defendant, the district court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant and any default judgment would be void. See Rogers v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 167 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1999). Here, the district court denied Webster’s first motion for default judgment because Webster had not effected service on the Commissioner. The district court denied Webster’s second motion for default judgment because it was filed before the expiration of the Commissioner’s sixty-day deadline for filing an answer. On July 17, 2020, as permitted under Federal 5 Case: 21-50455 Document: 00516034329 Page: 6 Date Filed: 09/29/2021 No. 21-50455 Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b), the district court granted the Commissioner’s motion for extension of time to file his answer, setting a new deadline of September 15, 2020. In the meantime, Webster filed two motions for recusal, which the district court denied. The Commissioner filed his answer on September 2, 2020. Webster subsequently filed three motions for default judgment, all of which were denied because no default occurred. The district court properly denied Webster’s motions for default judgment because the Commissioner filed his answer within the time required. Further, under these circumstances, Webster would likely not have been entitled to a default judgment even if default had occurred. See Ganther v. Ingle, 75 F.3d 207, 212 (5th Cir. 1996) (“A party is not entitled to a default judgment as a matter of right . . . .”). For these reasons, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Webster’s motions for default judgment.