Opinion ID: 2996302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: The evidentiary rulings of the district court are given special deference; we shall not reverse such rulings unless the district court abused its discretion. See United States v. Lea, 249 F.3d 632, 641 (7th Cir. 2001). Under this standard, “we will not find error unless the court’s decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law or the record contains no evidence on which the court rationally could have based its decision or the supposed facts which the court found are clearly erroneous.” Van Stan v. Fancy Colours & Co., 125 F.3d 563, 570 (7th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, even where an error is demonstrated to exist, “[a] jury verdict will stand if the trial court’s evidentiary ruling was harmless error.” Groom v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 62 F.3d 204, 208 (7th Cir. 1995). “A harmful error results only if the error had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence’ on the jury’s verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hanson, 994 F.2d 403, 407 (7th Cir. 1993)); see also Williams v. Pharmacia, 137 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir. 1998); Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 359 (7th Cir. 1993); Datamatic Servs., Inc. v. United States, 909 F.2d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1990). B. Exclusion of Gary Olson’s Letter of Resignation Plaintiffs first submit that the district court committed reversible error when it limited the admissibility of Gary Olson’s February 11, 2000, resignation letter to explaining why a subsequent letter of retraction was written. Plaintiffs contend that the resignation letter should have been admitted as non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 8 No. 02-2381 801(d)(2)(D) as an admission by the agent of a party-opponent. The disputed resignation letter, which Gary Olson addressed and sent to Green’s owner, James Green, provided: I hereby tender my resignation from your company effective immediately. My resignation is based on the following events that transpired during my employment. Approximately 1 ½-2 weeks ago, I was informed by your supervisor to “hide out” a minority worker for the next week and “get rid of him” on the first opportunity. I questioned your supervisor for the reasoning behind this thought process. He informed me “James Green doesn’t like blacks working for him. We already have Lee and that is one too many.” He continued stating, “Lee would never be maintenance supervisor because of his skin color and that Mr. Green would not approve of a black supervisor at the Chateau Town Home complex.” I find this repugnant and a gross violation of State and Federal laws. I refuse to act upon the supervisor’s demands and will leave that decision to one of your other managers. I find it very disturbing that all of the minority workers I hired are only granted an $8.00 per hour wage while our only Caucasian worker be paid $8.50 per hour whom has less experience and is being trained by Lee to do the electrical work. The pay inequities and rent concessions and other benefits given to certain property managers and ordinary maintenance workers reinforce my belief that a serious reevaluation of your management staff is in order. My resignation is due to the illegal acts that have been asked of me to perform. If you have any ques- tions, please contact my attorney, Mr. Bob Perica @ 4621700. No. 02-2381 9 Plaintiffs’ Trial Ex.1. Plaintiffs sought to admit this letter to prove that Green had discriminated against the plaintiffs on account of their race. Because the letter is an out-ofcourt statement and was “offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted,” it constitutes hearsay and, therefore, is inadmissible unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies. Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Rule 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement is not hearsay if “[t]he statement is offered against a party and is . . . a statement by the party’s agent or servant concerning a matter within the scope of the agency or employment, made during the existence of the relationship.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). There is no doubt that Rule 801(d)(2)(D) embodies a broader exception to the hearsay rule than many pre-Rule decisions had permitted. See Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1171-72 (7th Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(D) Advisory Committee Notes). The Rule simply requires that the statement be made by an individual who is an agent, that the statement be made during the period of the agency, and that the matter be within 2 the subject matter of the agency. See id. The district court determined that the letter was not admissible under this provision. We cannot say that, in light of the totality of the circumstances, this ruling was 2 Generally, there is no requirement that the agent have specific authority to make a statement on the subject. However, we have recognized that, in the context of employment discrimination cases, “the declarant must be involved in the decisionmaking process affecting the employment action involved.” Aliotta v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 315 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 2003). That exception does not apply here because Olson had authority to terminate the plaintiffs. 10 No. 02-2381 an abuse of discretion. Olson’s assertions regarding discrimination were not made during the existence of his employment relationship with Green. Olson’s letter of resignation is not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) because the justification for the rule simply is not present in this situation. We agree that there is a fundamental deficiency here that does not permit the admission of the statement. Olson was not speaking as an employee on behalf of Green when he resigned from his employment and accused Green of racial discrimination; to the contrary, in a very overt manner, Olson was acting not only independently of 3 Green but also as its adversary. Because Olson’s out-ofcourt statement was made in the context of terminating his employment (and placing himself in an adversarial relationship with Green), the justification for Rule 801(d)(2)(D) does not exist because Olson no longer was “inhibited by [his] relationship with the principal from making erroneous or underhanded comments which could harm the principal.” Hernandez Escalante v. Municipality of Cayey, 967 F. Supp. 47, 51 (D.P.R. 1997). We also believe that, even if the district court had abused its discretion by refusing to admit the evidence, any error would have been harmless because “it did not have substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Williams, 137 F.3d at 951 (inner quotations omitted). Olson testified fully at trial to all of the 3 Cf. Blackburn v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 97 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that employee’s statement was not admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D) in absence of evidence that employee was speaking for employer on matter within scope of agency or employment). No. 02-2381 11 matters contained in the letter of resignation, see Trial Tr. II 4 at 47-50, and there is no reason to believe that the jury 4 The following exchange took place between the plaintiffs’ attorney and Olson on direct-examination: Q: Would you describe for the jury the conversation with Gerald Clark and tell us where it took place? A: Sure. If I recall we were in the office and Gerald Clark came in and noticed that Glen was around the area. And he asked who that was. And I said, that’s the new guy Glen Mays. And he goes, let me talk to you. He didn’t want to say this in front of the secretary because she was relatively new too. And so we went outside by his truck and that’s when he stated to me that, listen, Gary, you know, we have older folks out here in Green Meadows and we don’t like the impression that we’re hiring these people. We want to keep this a clean place. And these older folks get scared of these black people coming in. And that kind of struck me odd because there’s black people living there. But, anyway, he said, I want you to hide’em and get rid of ‘em. And that just took me back. And I told him, I said, I can’t do that. I can’t get involved in anything like that. I’m not going to be liable and come to this point where they’re sitting. I’m not going to do that. So I went inside and thought about that all day what I was going to do, so. Q: Let me ask you one more, was there any comment made about Leshon during that same conversation? A: About Leshon? Q: Yeah about one too many? A: Yeah. Yeah. I believe I said that, that there was just one too many out here and we don’t need another one. Q: And that one too many he was referring to who? (continued...) 12 No. 02-2381 would have given greater weight to Olson’s unsworn outof-court statement than to his sworn testimony in court. C. Exclusion of EEOC Determinations of Discrimination The plaintiffs next submit that the district court committed reversible error when it excluded from evidence the EEOC determinations of discrimination. In their view, the determinations were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8)(C), the public records and reports exception to the hearsay rule. Green takes the view, however, that the district court properly excluded these determinations from evidence because they were “unreliable, untrustworthy and their probative value was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect.” Appellee’s Br. at 13. As a general proposition, administrative findings regarding claims of discrimination may be admitted under Rule 803(8)(C). See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 864 n.39 (1976); Halloway v. Milwaukee County, 180 F.3d 820, 827 n.9 (7th Cir. 1999); Tulloss v. Near N. Montessori Sch., Inc., 4 (...continued) A: I’m sure—it was my impression he was referring to Leshon. Trial Tr. II at 47-48.