Opinion ID: 2605280
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearsay Testimony of Davis

Text: (9a) Defendant objects to the admission into evidence of Davis' testimony as to numerous statements made to him by Westmoreland that implicated defendant. Davis testified that when he and Smith first approached Westmoreland, Westmoreland told them, I'll get Elbert to do it [the killing]. Later, when Davis told Westmoreland that Penka wanted to postpone the killing, Westmoreland replied that it was too late because Elbert is already here. After the homicides, Westmoreland told Davis, Elbert is at the Snow White Drive-In eating a hamburger and he wants his money, and also said, Elbert took care of her [Sigrid Junghans] too. He argues that two of the statements were inadmissible hearsay, outside the scope of the coconspirator's exception to the hearsay rule (Evid. Code, § 1223) because they were made after the killings and thus after the termination of the conspiracy. He also contends that the introduction of the statements violated his constitutional right to confrontation, under the holding of Dutton v. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74 [27 L.Ed.2d 213, 91 S.Ct. 210]. The Attorney General correctly notes that there was no objection to the introduction of the hearsay statements at trial. (2b) Issues relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be considered on appeal absent a timely objection in the trial court. ( People v. Rogers, supra, 21 Cal.3d 542, 548.) (9b) In addition, defendant's claims are without merit. First, defendant errs in assuming that the conspiracy ended with the deaths of Reiner and his wife. Where payment of money is a crucial objective of a conspiracy, and a coconspirator's statement is made shortly after the substantive crime is committed but before the money is paid, the coconspirator's statements may be admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Saling (1972) 7 Cal.3d 844, 852 [103 Cal. Rptr. 698, 500 P.2d 610]; People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 428-432 [124 Cal. Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296].) Independent evidence of the continuing nature of the conspiracy is necessary. ( Id., at p. 432.) Here, there was ample independent evidence that the conspiracy continued until defendant received his share of the payment for the homicides. Westmoreland's statements to Davis after the killings but before defendant was paid clearly were made in furtherance of the conspiracy and therefore fall within the coconspirator's exception. Defendant's second claim equally lacks merit. Although the admission of some hearsay may violate the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution ( Bruton v. United States (1968) 391 U.S. 123, 126 [20 L.Ed.2d 476, 479, 88 S.Ct. 1620]), the right to confrontation does not bar the use of all hearsay ( Dutton v. Evans, supra, 400 U.S. at p. 80 [27 L.Ed.2d at p. 222]). The United States Supreme Court has expressly declared that the rule of Bruton and Dutton is violated only where the out-of-court hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for `full and effective' cross-examination. ( Nelson v. O'Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622, 627 [29 L.Ed.2d 222, 227, 91 S.Ct. 1723], italics in original; see also People v. Steger (1976) 16 Cal.3d 539, 551 [128 Cal. Rptr. 161, 546 P.2d 665, 83 A.L.R.3d 1206]; In re Rosoto (1974) 10 Cal.3d 939, 951-952 [42 L.Ed.2d 141, 95 S.Ct. 177]; People v. Brown (1978) 79 Cal. App.3d 649, 656-657 [145 Cal. Rptr. 130].) Here, Westmoreland testified at trial and was cross-examined at length about his statements. Defendant's right of confrontation was not violated.