Opinion ID: 1987576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: False answers during voir dire.

Text: Alternatively, Appellant argues that Juror 64's statement proves that he gave false answers during voir dire and thereby prevented Appellant both from intelligently exercising his peremptory strikes and from challenging Juror 64 for cause. The court extensively questioned Juror 64 with respect to whether he understood the presumption of innocence and the Commonwealth's burden of proof. However, there were only three instances in which the court asked Juror 64 if he would agree to apply those principles. The first occurred when the trial court asked Juror 64 if he agreed that Appellant was presumed to be innocent as he sits here, i.e., before any evidence is presented. Court: Let me state this in another way to you; okay, I'm talking hypothetical right now, if you become charged with a crime, okay? Juror: Uh-huh. Court: And we're talking about you, becomes charged with a crime; okay. At that moment in time, you under our constitution have the presumption of innocence? Juror: Uh-huh. Court: That you're innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; do you understand that? Juror: Yeah, uh-huh, I understand that. Court: Okay, you understand that as this defendant sits here, he is presumed to be innocent? Juror: Uh-huh. I understand that. Court: Okay, do you agree with that and will abide by that? Juror: Yeah, uh-huh. The second occasion occurred when the trial court asked Juror 64 to assume hypothetically that the prosecutor comes in and he announces he has no evidence to introduce in the trial, and asked, in that hypothetical, what would your decision be? Juror 64 responded: Guy'd have to be innocent. Until you've gotif you have a eyewitness or proof, I mean you've got to have eyewitness; you innocent until proven guilty.... If you can't prove it, you innocent. The trial court then asked Juror 64 to assume hypothetically (1) the Commonwealth presented evidence that did not convince him of Appellant's guilt, and (2) Appellant presented no evidence. Again, the juror replied that he would find Appellant: Not guilty, because you still ain't got no evidence, I mean you've thejust take for example, say I committed a crime, or just say that I was a victim, you know what I'm talking about? Say it was a robbery at the bank, out on [highway] 25. And somebody see me walking down the road, so they picked me up, you know at the same time that the crime occurred; and say I was a victim, okay, and they can't prove me guilty until they havethey got to have some kind of evidence in order for me to be guilty. You know what I'm talking about? ... I mean they can't just pick me up and say he's guilty, he's the one robbed the bank. I mean it's still the same case; I mean if you ain't got no eyewitness how can you call a person guilty? Appellant claims Juror 64's statement to the investigators proves that he lied when he made these three statements during voir dire. To obtain a new trial because of juror mendacity, a party must first demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. Adkins v. Commonwealth, Ky., 96 S.W.3d 779, 796 (2003) (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984)). McDonough also noted that expecting jurors to perfectly understand certain terms and concepts is unrealistic because [c]alled as [jurors] are from all walks of life, many may be uncertain as to the meaning of terms which are relatively easily understood by lawyers and judges. 464 U.S. at 555, 104 S.Ct. at 849. Furthermore, [t]he cases in which juror statements have been considered generally have involved deliberate or inadvertent nondisclosure of pertinent historical facts during voir dire; courts have been much more hesitant to consider statements that jurors failed to put personal prejudices aside during deliberations. Brofford v. Marshall, 751 F.2d 845, 853 (6th Cir. 1985). In overruling Appellant's motion for a new trial, the trial court obviously believed that Juror 64's statement to the investigators did not prove that he gave dishonest answers during voir dire ten years before. That finding is supported by a reasonable interpretation of the juror's statements, thus was not clearly erroneous. Commonwealth v. Deloney, Ky., 20 S.W.3d 471, 474 (2000) (The bottom line is that the trial judge's finding that Clemons's comment was inadvertent and did not amount to bad faith, overreaching, or fundamentally unfair conduct was supported by substantial evidence, thus was not clearly erroneous....). What Juror 64 said during voir dire was that he would presume Appellant innocent as he sits here before any evidence is presented; that he would find Appellant not guilty if the Commonwealth presented no evidence; and that he would find him not guilty if the Commonwealth did not prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt even if Appellant presented no evidence. However, he did not say that he would not expect Appellant to present evidence of his innocence if the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence of his guilt to otherwise support a conviction. Juror 64's statement to the investigators is consistent with the latter scenario, thus does not compel a finding that he intentionally lied under oath during voir dire.