Opinion ID: 2617586
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: an instrument's meaning and effect depend upon its content and substance rather than upon its form or title [5]

Text: Judgments, [6] orders [7] and minutes [8] are facially distinguishable instruments. Recognizable by their content, appearance and substance, each of these writings has a distinct legal identity and objective. [9] Before October 1, 1993, judgment was secured by the filing of a memorial that met the 12 O.S. 1991 § 24 [10] recordation criteria (the judge's full signature and a clear indication of the relief afforded). After October 1, 1993, a judgment, to be recordable, must substantially meet not only the § 24 criteria but also the requirements of 12 O.S.Supp. 1993 § 696.3. [11] The filing of a recordable memorial triggers the 12 O.S. 1991 § 990A [12] countdown for commencing an appeal. [13] The substance of the March 31 entry is that of a judgment and not that of a minute. [14] If the four corners had yielded no more than an unsigned or initialed memorandum of the courtroom events, my conclusion would be different. Because the earlier court-prepared (March 31) memorial precludes all further inquiry into the breach-of-contract issues joined by the pleadings, [15] the March 31 entry, and not the later April 7 memorial, is the filed judgment in this case. [16] The former may not be transmuted into a minute either by its preprinted court minute label or by the judge's directive that plaintiff's counsel prepare a journal entry. The later April 7 journal entry simply does not extend appeal time. Although Manning holds that the law will not tolerate more than one record entry of the same appealable event, [17] we there saved from dismissal a tardy appeal to protect the appellant from a confusing instruction from a trial judge who told counsel for the prevailing party to prepare a second memorial of the same judgment. While I agree that Wright's appeal is untimely, I do so for a different reason. It is my view that the appeal was brought more than thirty days from April 19  the day Wright first acquired notice of the earlier (March 31) record entry's filing.