Opinion ID: 2979005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tyson’s Motion for a New Trial

Text: Tyson first contends that it is entitled to a new trial because, subsequent to the district court’s decision on the spoliation of evidence jury instruction and denial of Tyson’s motion for a new trial, this Circuit overruled prior Sixth Circuit precedent governing the standard to apply when considering remedies for the spoliation of evidence. - 16 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. The propriety of jury instructions is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. Williams v. Paint Valley Local Sch. Dist., 400 F.3d 360, 365 (6th Cir. 2005). On February 4, 2009, this Court, sitting en banc, decided Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc). That decision liberated the federal district courts in the Sixth Circuit from adhering to state-law spoliation rules, allowing them “broad discretion in crafting a proper sanction for spoliation.” Adkins, 554 F.3d at 652 (internal citations omitted). This change in the law provides no basis for relief in the instant case. The jury instruction the district court gave here was merely a permissive one, allowing, but not requiring, the jury to draw a negative inference, if it concluded such an inference was warranted. Thus, the instruction was simply a formalization of what the jurors would be entitled to do even in the absence of a specific instruction. Therefore, even if the district court had not given the instruction under Adkins, the jury’s discretion would not have been affected in any way, and thus no relief is warranted. B. Evidence of post-constructive discharge interview and investigation Tyson next claims it is entitled to a new trial because the district court erred in admitting evidence regarding West’s exit interview with Guizar and the investigation Tyson conducted after receiving the complaint from the EEOC, in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 403. Tyson asserts admission of the evidence confused the jury (1) into believing that Guizar’s failure to investigate West’s claims was evidence supporting West’s claims of sexual harassment and constructive discharge, and (2) “into believing that Tyson’s liability for sexual harassment attached at this point, when there would be knowledge of the egregious sexual harassment that had not been reported before hand [sic].” Tyson further argues that even if the evidence was correctly admitted on the issue of punitive - 17 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. damages, it was entitled to a limiting instruction under Fed. R. Evid. 105, which the trial court failed to give. In the district court, Tyson filed a motion in limine to exclude this evidence, which the court denied. After the jury returned its verdict, Tyson moved for a new trial based in part on the admission of evidence regarding Guizar’s exit interview and Tyson’s post-EEOC charge investigation. The district court denied that motion, stating that “[a]t a minimum, West’s interview with Guizar was admissible to rebut Tyson’s assertion of ‘good faith’ compliance with Title VII for purposes of punitive damages.” A district court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Barnes v. Cincinnati, 401 F.3d 729, 741 (6th Cir. 2005). “This standard is highly deferential to the determination of the district court, and an abuse of discretion is found only when we are firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.” Early v. Toyota Motor Corp., 277 F. App’x 581, 585 (6th Cir. 2008). “We accord the district court ‘[b]road discretion . . . in determinations of admissibility based on considerations of relevance and prejudice,’ and we do not ‘lightly overrule’ those decisions.” United States v. Penney, 576 F.3d 297, 315 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. White, 563 F.3d 184, 191 (6th Cir. 2009)). Whether an action, or lack thereof, by the employer manifests an “attitude of permissiveness” is relevant to whether an employer failed to take prompt and appropriate corrective action leading up to the constructive discharge and therefore is liable for constructive discharge. However, because the asserted constructive discharge here had already occurred by the time of Guizar’s exit interview—West decided not to return to work on February 10, 2005 and did not have the interview - 18 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. with Guizar until February 18—Tyson’s failure to conduct an investigation after the interview could not, on a purely chronological basis, be relevant to the constructive discharge claim itself. Although the evidence relating to West’s exit interview and Tyson’s post-EEOC charge investigation was not relevant to the claim of constructive discharge, the evidence was relevant to the jury’s consideration of punitive damages. A plaintiff may collect punitive damages under Title VII if the plaintiff establishes that (1) the employer acted with knowledge that its actions may have violated federal law, and (2) the employees who discriminated against her are managerial agents acting within the scope of their employment. However, an employer may avoid liability nonetheless if it shows that it engaged in good-faith efforts to implement an anti-discrimination policy. Parker v. Gen. Extrusions, Inc., 491 F.3d 596, 602-03 (6th Cir. 2007). In assessing an employer’s good faith, it is appropriate to consider not only whether “the defendant employer had a written sexual harassment policy” but also “whether the employer effectively publicized and enforced its policy.” Id. Evidence of the actions that Guizar took, or the lack thereof, following the exit interview, and Tyson’s eventual investigation and response to the EEOC, go directly to whether Tyson attempted to enforce its policy in good faith. See Lampley v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 340 F.3d 478, 483 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Because a jury could have found that [the employer] engaged in a cover-up rather than a good faith investigation of [the employee]'s retaliatory discharge claim, we find that the punitive damages issue was properly before the jury.”). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence relevant. Tyson also argues that the admission of evidence concerning West’s exit interview confused the jury “into believing that Tyson’s liability of sexual harassment attached at this point, when there - 19 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. would be knowledge of the egregious sexual harassment that had not been reported before hand [sic].” Tyson has not met its high burden of showing abuse of discretion on this claim. When assessing evidence as to whether its prejudicial impact outweighs its probative value, the district court is required to “look at the evidence in a light most favorable to its proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its prejudicial effect.” United States v. Perry, 438 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 2006). Here, the prejudicial impact was minimal in light of the substantial evidence, apart from the exit interview, supporting that Tyson knew or should have known of the harassment; the probative value was considerable when evaluating West’s claim for punitive damages. Tyson further complains that it was prejudiced because it was never given an opportunity to request a limiting instruction under Fed. R. Evid. 105, because it was not until the court ruled on Tyson’s motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict that the court held that the posttermination evidence was relevant “[a]t a minimum” to the punitive damages claim. But nothing in the district court’s response to Tyson’s prior motion in limine regarding the post-termination investigation evidence, which stated that the evidence was relevant to gauging Tyson’s indifference or unreasonableness in response to the harassment, precluded Tyson from seeking a limiting instruction, even if it thought it was unlikely to succeed. Indeed, the clear language of Rule 105 states that such an instruction will only be given if requested. Where a party fails to request a limiting instruction, this Court reviews for plain error. Rush v. Ill. Cent. Ry., 399 F.3d 705, 721 (6th Cir. 2005). Plain error is an egregious error, one that leads to a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Busacca, 863 F.2d 433, 435 (6th Cir. 1988); see also EEOC v. Allen Petroleum Co. of East Tenn., Inc., 89 F.3d 833, at  (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished - 20 - No. 08-6516 West v. Tyson Foods, Inc. decision) (plain error only where evidence admitted without instruction is “extremely damaging, the need for instruction is obvious, and the failure to give it so prejudicial as to affect the substantial rights of the accused.” (quoting United States v. Sisto, 534 F.2d 616, 623 (5th Cir. 1976)). Here, because there was ample evidence supporting the jury’s finding of sexual harassment and constructive discharge, even absent Guizar’s failure to conduct an investigation after the exit interview, Tyson has not shown plain error warranting reversal. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of Tyson’s motion for a new trial.