Opinion ID: 1784225
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue # 3: Whether Discovery Was Properly Stayed?

Text: McQueen filed his complaint on April 18, 1988. Approximately six months later, the Sheriff filed his motion for a protective order on December 14, 1988, alleging immunity from suit which potentially would be dispositive of the entire cause of action. Additionally, the Sheriff asserted that the control of discovery was clearly a function of the Court and that the claimed immunities protect from the burden and expense of discovery as well as trial. Allowance of discovery procedures to plaintiff, under these facts, would violate the spirit and content of the Court's rules, create potential waste, subject defendant to undue interference, expense and burden, and be inequitable under the circumstances. McQueen responded reasserting the alleged facts of the complaint, but recognizing that this motion was clearly within the Court's discretion and the authority of the Court pursuant to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986); and Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) and their progeny. Those cases specifically state that the official's immunity is an immunity from judgment, trial and discovery, as same is necessary to protect officials from vexatious lawsuits. On January 10, 1989, the judge granted the Sheriff's motion, issued the protective order, and stayed all discovery until disposition of the immunity issue during summary judgment proceedings. Dissatisfied with this order, McQueen filed an affidavit averring that the facts material to plaintiffs' cause of action concerning the liability of defendant were known only to hostile witnesses and witnesses identified and in close association with the defendant, and that the plaintiffs were therefore unable to procure affidavits to oppose defendant's affidavits. McQueen filed the affidavit pursuant to Miss.R.Civ.P. 56(f). [4] Notwithstanding McQueen's affidavit, the judge granted the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment. In his Opinion on Motion for Summary Judgment, the judge explained his decision to stay discovery: This Court granted the Defendant's Motion to Stay Discovery under Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 [, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396] (1982) which stated that a defendant is entitled to a stay of discovery pending the determination of whether qualified immunity is applicable. Harlow has been followed in numerous other cases namely, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 [, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411] (1985), Anderson v. Creighton, [483 U.S. 635] 107 S.Ct. 3034 [, 97 L.Ed.2d 523] (1987); Ellilot v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472 (5th Cir.1985). McQueen now contends that the judge erred; that is, issuance of the protective order was inappropriate because he was precluded from discovering any evidence which may have helped him to pierce the Sheriff's immunity and defeat the motion for summary judgment. The Sheriff counters that McQueen was provided ample opportunity to complete discovery; that is, eight months transpired from the time McQueen filed his original complaint to the time the Sheriff filed his motion for a protective order. Moreover, the Sheriff contends that McQueen's Rule 56(f) affidavit was insufficient to overcome his motion for summary judgment: [I]n resisting summary judgment[, a party] must present specific facts stating why he cannot oppose the motion and must specifically demonstrate how postponement of a ruling on the motion will enable him, by discovery or other means, to rebut the movant's showing of the absence of a genuine issue of fact. The party opposing the motion for summary judgment may not, as was done in Plaintiff's Rule 56(f) affidavit, rely on vague assertions that discovery will produce needed, but unspecified, facts particularly where there was ample time and opportunity for discovery.
The Sheriff is correct; McQueen did have eight months to complete discovery prior to the judge's issuance of the protective order. This Court holds that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that eight months was a sufficient amount of time for McQueen to complete discovery. A recently-decided case  Malone v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.  provides some guidance on this point: On October 1, 1986, the wrongful-death beneficiaries of Cala Malone sued Aetna Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna) seeking uninsured-motorist benefits. Months later, Aetna filed a motion for summary judgment, and the beneficiaries responded that the motion had been filed prematurely because pre-trial discovery had not been completed. The beneficiaries then filed a MOTION TO COMPEL ... AETNA TO RESPOND TO DISCOVERY. The trial judge held a hearing and granted Aetna's motion. The beneficiaries appealed. ... . A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time upon expiration of thirty days from the date the suit was filed. MISS.R.CIV.P. 56(a). Thus, Aetna filed its motion in a timely manner. This notwithstanding, the record supports the beneficiaries' claim that discovery had not been completed by the time the hearing on the summary-judgment motion had commenced. The beneficiaries should have been provided reasonably sufficient time to develop their theory of liability. This conclusion is consistent with this Court's holdings in other factually-analogous cases. For example, in Hudson v. Parvin, the defendant had filed a motion for summary judgment, and the plaintiff had requested additional time to gather critical evidence and present it in opposition to the motion. 511 So.2d 499, 499-500 (Miss. 1987). The trial judge refused the plaintiff's request, and this Court reversed on the basis that fairness required a continuance of limited duration to afford this plaintiff the opportunity to go forward, if possible, with her case. Id. at 500 (citing cases). The prudence of providing a party with reasonably sufficient time to develop his or her case may be gleaned from this State's rules of civil procedure and case law. For example, in Cunnigham v. Lanier, this Court concluded: Justice is served when a fair opportunity to oppose a motion is provided  because consideration of a motion for summary judgment requires a careful review by the trial court of all pertinent evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmovant. 555 So.2d 685, 687 (Miss. 1989) (emphasis in original) (citing Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358 (Miss. 1983)); cf. MISS.R.CIV.P. 12(c) (When a Rule 12 motion is treated as a Rule 56 motion, all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.). ... . In sum, the trial judge prematurely ruled on Aetna's motion for summary judgment. See Hudson, 511 So.2d at 500 (The [C]ourt is of the opinion that the motion for summary judgment was hastily granted in favor of [the defendant].). The beneficiaries' request for additional time to complete discovery seems reasonable; indeed, no evidence evinces the converse. Therefore, this case is reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. 583 So.2d 186 at 187 (Miss. 1991). Thus, Malone's Motion to Compel ... Aetna to Respond indicated to this Court that Aetna may not have been completely forthright with all of Malone's discovery requests. In view of this fact, this Court concluded that the judge should have provided Malone with more time to complete discovery before considering the motion for summary judgment. In the case sub judice, McQueen waited until December 27, 1988, before attempting to uncover evidence to oppose the Sheriff's motion for summary judgment. On that date, McQueen filed notices that he planned to depose Minnick, Dyess, and J.C. Denham (the Sheriff's deputy). McQueen filed these notices eight months after he filed the original complaint and after the Sheriff filed his motion for a protective order. The belatedness of these notices is wholly unexplained. In this regard, the United States Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth stated: [This Court has] refashioned the qualified immunity doctrine in such a way as to permit the resolution of many insubstantial claims on summary judgment and to avoid subject[ing] government officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad-reaching discovery in cases where the legal norms the officials are alleged to have violated were not clearly established at the time... . [I]f the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts. Harlow thus recognized an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, conditioned on the resolution of the essentially legal question whether the conduct of which the plaintiff complains violated clearly established law. 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411, 425 (1985) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 817-18, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2737-38, 73 L.Ed.2d 396, 409-10 (1982)). Under the circumstances, eight months would be a sufficient amount of time for McQueen to uncover any existing evidence of significant and probative value which would show that the Sheriff may have greatly or substantially exceeded his statutory authority. See Palmer, 564 So.2d at 1355. In Mitchell and Harlow, the United States Supreme Court stated that discovery should not be allowed until the threshold immunity question is resolved  but only if the plaintiff's allegations [fail to] state a claim of violation of clearly established law. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d at 425; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d at 411. In sum, McQueen's allegations, if true, are insufficient to pierce the Sheriff's qualified immunity; therefore, discovery should have been stayed. This Court affirms on all issues. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., and HAWKINS, P.J., and ROBERTSON, PITTMAN and BANKS, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., and McRAE and SULLIVAN, JJ., dissent by separate written opinion.