Opinion ID: 2520161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did CLC Receive Effective Assistance of Counsel

Text: [¶ 10] To the extent CLC contends that his counsel was ineffective in the proceedings prior to the filing of the application for conditional discharge, we cannot consider that issue because a timely appeal was not taken from the district court's earlier order. W.R.A.P. 1.03. [¶ 11] To the extent CLC contends that his counsel was ineffective leading up to and during the hearing on WSH's application for conditional discharge, we employ the following standard of review: In reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, our paramount consideration is whether, in light of all the circumstances, trial counsels' acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Gleason v. State, 2002 WY 161, ¶ 44, 57 P.3d 332, ¶ 44 (Wyo.2002). An appellant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must demonstrate on the record that counsel's performance was deficient. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Ordinarily, he must also demonstrate that prejudice resulted. Under this test, the inquiry is whether or not counsel rendered the assistance a reasonably competent attorney would have offered and, if not, whether his failure to do so prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. This two-part test, the Strickland test, is the test we normally apply in reviewing ineffectiveness claims, and it is this test that applies to Mr. Sincock's first claim of ineffectiveness. We examine the conduct of defense counsel in light of all the circumstances in determining whether the identified acts or omissions fall outside the ambit of professionally competent assistance, bearing in mind the function of counsel is to make the adversarial testing process work in every case. Dickeson v. State, 843 P.2d 606, 609 (Wyo.1992). The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon as having produced a just result. Gleason, 2002 WY 161, 57 P.3d 332. We do not evaluate the efforts of counsel from a perspective of hindsight but endeavor to reconstruct the circumstances surrounding the challenged conduct and evaluate the professional efforts from the perspective of counsel at the time. Dickeson, 843 P.2d at 609. We invoke a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate and reasonable assistance making all decisions within the bounds of reasonable professional judgment. Id. The burden is on the defendant to overcome this presumption that, in light of the circumstances, the challenged action or failure of the attorney might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶¶ 34-35, 76 P.3d 323, ¶¶ 34-35 (Wyo.2003). [¶ 12] We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal, and we conclude CLC's counsel was not ineffective. Did the District Court Err in Denying the Application for Conditional Discharge [¶ 13] It is apparent that WSH decided to withdraw, or at least modify, its application for conditional discharge. Its papers make clear that it still considered CLC to be a danger to himself or others. CLC presented no evidence to the contrary. For these reasons we are compelled to conclude that the district court's order denying the motion for conditional discharge was not contrary to the evidence presented to it and was not otherwise an abuse of discretion.