Opinion ID: 6729
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inexcusability

Text: The magistrate judge found, and the district court agreed, that Plaintiffs' delay in bringing suit was not excused. The magistrate judge based his determination as to inexcusability on the following undisputed facts: (1) Plaintiffs have been represented by counsel continuously since conciliation efforts were terminated in 1980; (2) the plaintiff union (and its predecessor), whose expertise in employment matters is presumed, was actively involved in the case from the time charges were filed with the EEOC in 1977; (3) Plaintiffs failed to take advantage of their right under the statute (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5) to demand right to sue letters at any time after 180 days following filing of the EEOC charges; (4) Plaintiffs did not at any time from 1980 to 1989 make any inquiry with the Department of Justice or the EEOC as to the status of their claims; and (5) Plaintiffs' then attorney called a press conference in 1984, accusing the EEOC of failure to act and promising to file suit within six weeks, yet Plaintiffs did nothing at that time nor for five years thereafter to bring this suit. Plaintiffs attack the inexcusability determination, advancing two interrelated arguments. First, they argue that their delay in filing suit was not inexcusable because they were relying on the administrative process. Second, Plaintiffs contend, in effect, 18 that they should not be faulted for the laxity of their various attorneys in pursuing this suit. Neither of these contentions has merit. Plaintiffs contend that, as legally unsophisticated parties with few English skills, they cannot be assumed to be familiar with the administrative complexities of Title VII litigation.15 This argument fails to explain why Plaintiffs' counsel did not pursue this litigation, or why Plaintiffs should not be charged with their counsels' neglect. Under our system of representative litigation, each party is deemed bound by the acts of his lawyer-agent and is considered to have notice of all facts, notice of which can be charged upon the attorney. Irwin v. Veterans Administration, 111 S.Ct. 453, 456 (1990) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). That an attorney's conduct of the suit is inadequate may be grounds for a malpractice action against the attorney, but it is certainly no basis for requiring the defendant to pay the price of opposing counsel's dereliction. See Link v. Wabash Railroad, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1390 n.10 (1962). Plaintiffs' assertion that one of their attorneys died and another was suspended from practice are wholly unavailing. As to the former, the record contains no indication of when the attorney died, but it does show that while he was representing Plaintiffs they were also represented by other counsel. As to the latter, the 15 We are puzzled by Plaintiffs' contention in their reply brief that they did not know that conciliation efforts had failed until 1989. Letters sent to Plaintiffs in 1980 from the EEOC clearly state that conciliation had failed and was terminated and that the matter was being referred to the Department of Justice. 19 record merely indicates that the attorney was eventually suspended from the practice of law (emphasis added); it does not indicate when the suspension occurred, and so far as the record shows the suspension could have come well after (or only shortly before) the time when other counsel had succeeded to the representation of Plaintiffs.16 Also significant in this respect is the ongoing and direct involvement of the union, which purports to represent Plaintiffs' interests in this suit. A labor union is assumed to have some degree of expertise in equal employment opportunity matters. See Cleveland Newspaper Guild v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 839 F.2d 1147, 1154 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S.Ct. 234 (1988). Plaintiffs have not argued that the union did not know of its right to request right to sue letters nor explained why the union failed to take any action to pursue the Title VII claims after conciliation failed.17 In sum, we are unable to fault the conclusion of the magistrate judge and the district court that under the undisputed facts of record the delay in this case was inexcusable.