Opinion ID: 2054217
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Smith's Damages Between Date of Breach and Trial

Text: Hood explained her calculation of accrued damages with the help of a large chart. For the period of October 1991 through September 1992, the chart summed CUIC's rent, taxes, operating expenses, utility charges, and late feesall payable by CUIC under the lease. Because CUIC remained in possession without paying rent during the six months between October 1991 and March 1992, Smith could not have relet the premises during that period. During the next six months after CUIC had left, three of CUIC's subtenants remained, and Hood credited CUIC for subtenant rent that Smith had received in CUIC's absence. Hood testified as to the basis for most of the numbers on the chart and also explained to the jury why some of the expenses changed from month to month. The chart reflected that CUIC owed Smith a total of $2,150,386.55 in damages for the period from the date of the breach to the time of trial. This figure reflected neither a discount to the date of breach nor interest to compensate for delay between breach and judgment. In testifying about damages to date, Hood did not refer specifically to the difference between the rent reserved under this Lease on the date of breach or to the fair market value of the Lease on the date of breach, the language used in § 12.4 of the lease. See supra note 12. But Smith correctly argues that, for the period between the breach and the trial, Hood in effect addressed the difference between the rent reserved and the fair market value during that portion of the lease term. She took CUIC's rental obligation over that period (rent reserved) and deducted the amounts Smith actually received as rent for CUIC's space after the breach. Hood, of course, in calculating the difference between the rent reserved for that year and the rents actually received, had to make a credible showing that the rents Smith actually collected reflected fair market value, i.e., all the rent that Smith reasonably could have expected to receive under the circumstances. CUIC does not claim that she failed to do so; CUIC presented no rebuttal evidence that the rents Smith received were lower than what Smith could have obtained through reasonable efforts to mitigate damages by reletting the premises during the period before trial. Furthermoreand this is crucialCUIC offered no evidence to rebut Smith's prima facie case by showing that the real estate market dropped off during this pretrial period, such that the actual damages demonstrated by Hood would have exceeded the damages calculable for that period, prospectively, as of the date of the breach pursuant to § 12.4 of the lease. [21] In sum, we agree with Smith that, under § 12.4 of the lease, fair market value for a period that has already elapsed can be ascertained not only (1) by calculating that value wholly prospectively, as of the time of the breach, by reference to rental values of comparable property (increased by interest to compensate for the period before judgment), but also (2) by calculating actual damages for that period, as Smith has demonstrated in this case. The actual damage calculation would have been subject to rebuttal by a showing that an unforeseeable downturn in the real estate market made the actual damages too high for that period, because the lease requires calculation of damages based on estimated market value as of the date of breach. But CUIC offered no rebuttal. [22] See supra note 21. We therefore concludecontrary to CUIC's contention that Hood sufficiently accounted for fair market value of the Lease on the date of breach by deducting from her rent reserved calculation the amounts Smith actually received as rent during the period about which she testified.