Opinion ID: 1829631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exclusion of Evidence Concerning Haynes's Receipt of Railroad Retirement Benefits

Text: The railroad sought to introduce evidence through cross-examination of Haynes concerning his receipt of Railroad Retirement Board disability and sickness benefits after Haynes testified that he had insufficient financial resources to attend a trade or vocational school. Haynes testified that he was unable to return to work because of the extent of his injuries and that he could not afford to go to school. The trial court excluded any questions concerning the receipt of railroad disability and sickness benefits, based on the collateral source rule. The railroad contends that Haynes's receipt of these disability and sickness benefits should have been presented to and considered by the jury. The railroad asks this Court to abandon the collateral source rule as applied to Railroad Retirement Board disability benefits. The railroad argues many reasons why this rule is dated, and why we should carve out an exception to the collateral source rule in this case. We cannot agree with the argument, as this Court abides by the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R., 375 U.S. 253, 254, 84 S.Ct. 316, 317, 11 L.Ed.2d 307 (1963). In Eichel, the Supreme Court held that evidence of disability payments was not admissible for the purpose of impeaching the testimony of petitioner as to his motive for not returning to work and as to the permanency of his injuries. Eichel, 375 U.S. at 254-55, 84 S.Ct. at 317. The Court stated: `[T]he benefits received under [the Railroad Retirement Act] are not directly attributable to the contributions of the employer, so they cannot be considered in mitigation of the damages caused by the employer.' Id. at 254, 84 S.Ct. at 317, citing New York, N.H. & H.R.R. v. Leary, 204 F.2d 461, 468, (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 346 U.S. 856, 74 S.Ct. 71, 98 L.Ed. 370 (1953). Our case law shows that this Court has strictly adhered to the collateral source rule and that under the rule any showing that the plaintiff received payments from a source wholly independent of the wrongdoer, such as workmen's compensation or disability payments, constitutes reversible error. [3] See Jones v. Crawford, 361 So.2d 518 (Ala.1978); Gribble v. Cox, 349 So.2d 1141, 1143 (Ala.1977) (this Court is committed to the rule of exclusion of collateral source payments); Vest v. Gay, 275 Ala. 286, 154 So.2d 297 (1963); see also Southern v. Plumb Tools, A Division of O'Ames Corp., 696 F.2d 1321 (11th Cir.1983). The Eichel rationale was recognized by this Court in Jones v. Crawford, 361 So.2d 518, 521 (Ala.1978), when the Court stated that courts have held that any showing that the plaintiff has received insurance benefits for his injuries is prejudicial to his case and should not be admitted. (Emphasis added.) The reason underlying the exclusion of evidence regarding collateral source payments is that, based upon a weighing of the prejudice it causes to the plaintiff against its value to the defendant, its exclusion is warranted by the availability of less prejudicial evidence on the issue. See Gribble, 349 So.2d at 1143. We refuse to change the collateral source rule in Alabama in FELA actions. The railroad further argues that even if the collateral source rule applies, the evidence of the disability and sickness payments should be introduced, because, it says, Haynes opened the door to that evidence when he testified on direct examination that he did not have the money to go to school. The railroad cites Lange v. Missouri Pacific R.R., 703 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1983), and Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480 (3rd Cir.1967), to support this proposition. In Lange, the plaintiff testified that he had to return to work immediately after undergoing surgery for a back injury because he had to support his family and had no savings or disability income to fall back upon. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit allowed the defendant to introduce evidence that the plaintiff did indeed receive disability payments, because under the applicable Arkansas law, such payments are relevant when the plaintiff's direct testimony is misleading concerning some issue in the case and cross-examination is necessary to rebut the testimony. Lange, 703 F.2d at 324. In Gladden, the plaintiff testified, on direct examination, that he returned to work and did not revisit his physician because of strained financial circumstances. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit allowed the defendant to introduce evidence of collateral source payments, focusing on the fact that the defendant did not ask the plaintiff about workman's compensation benefits, but instead asked only if he had received any financial assistance. The court stated that the [d]efendant was not required to leave [the plaintiff's] testimony unchallenged and had the right to ask plaintiff on cross-examination whether he had received financial assistance, as affecting the credibility of his assertion. Gladden, 385 F.2d at 483. Alabama does not allow the introduction of collateral source payments for any reason other than those laid out by the legislature in Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-522 and § 6-5-545, dealing with product liability and medical malpractice cases. Furthermore, we find that Haynes did not refer to any collateral source payments on direct examination. He merely stated that he could not afford to go to school. The railroad additionally argues that the railroad disability benefits attributable to Illinois Central's contributions should be deducted from the plaintiff's damages. [4] Section 5 of the FELA, 45 U.S.C. § 55, renders void any contract, rule, regulation or device whose purpose or intent is to enable a railroad to exempt itself from any liability created by the FELA. Notwithstanding this general proposition, a railroad may set off in any FELA suit any sum it has contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee ... on account of the injury or death for which said action was brought. 45 U.S.C. § 55. A similar issue was decided by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in Hetrick v. Reading Co., 39 F.Supp. 22 (D.N.J.1941), and the district court's holding was recognized by the United States Supreme Court in a footnote in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 99 S.Ct. 802, 59 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978). [5] We adopt the reasoning of the district court in Hetrick. In that case, the defendant in his answer asked the court to offset any damages the plaintiff might receive under 45 U.S.C. § 51 by deducting the present value of payments that would be received under the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937. 45 U.S.C. § 228b (amended to § 228a et seq.). The court denied the defendant's request, after examining the legislative intent and considering the wording within the four corners of the Retirement Act. Hetrick, 39 F.Supp. at 25. The district court in Hetrick noted that the right to receive benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act was an inherent right of the employee that becomes crystallized upon the occurrence of the designated prerequisites. Id. The defendant in Hetrick, like the railroad in this case, argued that the FELA and the Railroad Retirement Act should be viewed together, on the ground that the receipt of damages for injuries under the FELA, as well as payments under the Railroad Retirement Act, were in effect a dual recovery based on the same injuries. Id. However, the [Railroad Retirement] fund is created by equal contributions from the employee and employer. For that reason it cannot be said that the defendant will be paying twice ... for the same injury. Furthermore, we do not think that an annuity based upon total and permanent disability, etc., was ever intended as compensation, because the right to the fund does not depend upon the ordinary rules of evidence. In short, the occurrence of the disability in such a case is simply the event upon which the right to the annuity accrues. Hetrick, 39 F.Supp. at 25. Furthermore, the defendant in Hetrick, as well as the defendant in this case, wished to offset any sum it contributed or paid to any insurance, relief benefit, or indemnity that may have been paid to the injured employee ... on account of the injury ... for which said action was brought. Id. In Hetrick, the plaintiff had not yet received any payments from the Railroad Retirement Fund, whereas, in the present case the defendant has received such payments. However, the district court found this point irrelevant, saying it was the court's understanding that Congress by the passage of the Retirement Act undertook to create a certain amount of economic security for employees of a railroad who engage in a work fraught with daily exposure to the hazard of injury, but peculiarly essential to the public. Id. The district court denied the offset, noting: The objects of the two pieces of legislation are entirely foreign to each other, and we are of the view that there never was a legislative intent that a jury ... was to draw into its calculations the annuities provided for by the Retirement Act so that payments made by the employer under the latter legislation would be returned to it.... [W]e do not feel that the annuity was ever intended to restore injured employees to a theoretical status quo, but on the contrary was intended to make secure in society those employees suffering injury after thirty years of service, or perhaps because of thirty years of service. Recovery under [the FELA] is beside the point, because that is an attempted restorative alone. Id. Because this Court adopts the reasoning of the District Court for the District of New Jersey, we deny the railroad the right to offset payments from the Railroad Retirement Board against any damages owed by the defendant.