Opinion ID: 2055865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Armed Marshals in the Courtroom

Text: The defendant alleges that the trial justice committed prejudicial error in permitting the removal of the jury from the courtroom while the state's witness, John Kelley, was escorted into the courtroom by U.S. marshals and in allowing those marshals to stand nearby during the course of Kelley's testimony. The defendant contends that the marshals' presence created a circus-like atmosphere designed to impress the jury with the importance of this particular witness and the notorious reputation of defendant. In McDonald v. United States, 89 F.2d 128, 136 (8th Cir.1937), the Eighth Circuit established what appears to be a salutary rule to govern situations such as the one presented by these facts. The court said: It is too obvious for argument that hardly any other matter can better be relegated to the discretion of the trial court than that of safeguarding the court, counsel, jury, and spectators, and assuring the continued presence and attendance of the accused at the trial. Absent incontrovertible evidence of hurt, the trial court should be permitted to use such means, to secure the named ends, as the nature of the case, the known criminal record, character, associates in crime, and reputation of the accused shall reasonably call for   . Accord, Leyvas v. United States, 264 F.2d 272, 277 (9th Cir.1958). The transcript indicates that the trial justice was keenly aware of the necessity to balance the need for reasonable security with the rights of defendant to receive a fair trial. At the request of counsel for defendant, he made certain that none of the weapons carried by the marshals were visible to the jury. In view of all of the circumstances, there is no basis for us to conclude that the trial justice abused his discretion in permitting the U.S. marshals to be present during the course of Kelley's testimony. In addition, we believe that the defendant's contention that the statement of Robert E. Sheehan, a special agent of the FBI, that the witness Kelley was under the protection of the United States of America was so prejudicial as to constitute reversible error is without merit. While there is some merit in the contention that such a statement has little relevance within the context of Sheehan's testimony, we are hard pressed to believe that this statement, standing alone, created prejudice in the minds of the jurors sufficient to preclude them from reaching a fair and impartial verdict. These exceptions are without merit. All of the exceptions of the defendant are overruled, the judgment of conviction is sustained, and the case is remitted to the Superior Court. POWERS, J., participated in the decision but retired prior to its announcement. PAOLINO, JOSLIN and DORIS, JJ., did not participate.