Opinion ID: 754566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidentiary Record for Resolving Motion to Terminate

Text: 72 Michigan further contends that under the statute a motion for immediate termination of a consent decree must be considered on the record existing at the time the motion was filed, disallowing the district judge to engage in supplemental fact-finding. The state supports its argument by § 3626(b)(3)'s directive that [p]rospective relief shall not terminate if the court makes written findings based on the record  (emphasis added) that relief remains necessary and narrowly drawn. That language, the inmates respond, does not mean simply the existing record at the time the motion was filed. Rather, the statute necessarily enables a district judge to examine current conditions at the prisons which become part of the judicial record, since the very task before the judge is to ascertain the existence of a current or ongoing violation of a federal right. As the state would have it, the district court would be forbidden from supplementing the past record in a case to determine whether a current constitutional violation exists. The Second Circuit recently adopted the prisoners' interpretation, finding it the most sensible construction of § 3626(b) [g]iven that the pre-existing record will rarely contain information on the 'current' state of affairs. Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162, 179 (2nd Cir.1997); see also Thompson v. Gomez, 993 F.Supp. 749, 755-56 (N.D.Cal.1997) (If the existing record is not adequate to determine present circumstances, subsection (3) gives the court the power to supplement the record by taking further evidence.); Ruiz v. Scott, 1996 WL 932104,  8 n. 6 (S.D.Tex. Sept. 25, 1996) (Th[e] 'record' is not necessarily limited to the record that existed prior to the filing of a motion to terminate under Section 3626(b). Rather, ... the record may include supplemental information that is presented to the court.). We note that other courts have also allowed the record to be supplemented with information on current conditions when considering a motion under § 3626(b)(2). See, e.g., Jensen v. County of Lake, 958 F.Supp. 397, 406-07 (N.D.Ind.1997) (declining to terminate consent decree until after a hearing is held to determine whether ongoing constitutional violations exist); Carty v. Farrelly, 957 F.Supp. 727, 733 (D.Vi.1997) (relying on evidence introduced at a hearing following defendants' motion to modify or terminate consent decrees under the PLRA). 73 We believe this debate is premature at this juncture and should await appellate review of the lower courts' actual rulings on the termination motions. The proper evidentiary methods and materials that a district court may utilize in deciding a § 3626(b)(2) motion is a question more aptly considered when this court has before it a concrete example of how a district court actually proceeded in ruling upon a motion under § 3626(b)(2). Since we hold the automatic stay provision constitutional in light of the inherent equity powers of the courts to stay the stay if necessary, this debate does not touch upon any issue before this court at this time.