Opinion ID: 626819
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Testimony's Probative Value was Outweighed by its Prejudicial Effect

Text: Even assuming the relevance of the recognition testimony, evidence admitted under Rule 404(b) must not have its probative value substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Huddleston, 485 U.S. at 691, 108 S.Ct. 1496. This prong of Huddleston is essentially an importation of Rule 403's balancing test, and so we address Scott's Rule 403 argument along with it. See United States v. Gilan, 967 F.2d 776, 780 (2d Cir.1992) (under Huddleston, the evidence must satisfy the probative-prejudice balancing test of Rule 403). Under Rule 403, [a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. We accord great deference to a district court's assessment of this prejudice, Quinones, 511 F.3d at 310, second-guess[ing] a district court only if there is a clear showing that the court abused its discretion or acted arbitrarily or irrationally, United States v. Salameh, 152 F.3d 88, 110 (2d Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). While we have held that a mechanical recitation of the Rule 403 analysis is not required, United States v. Pitre, 960 F.2d 1112, 1120 (2d Cir.1992), [t]o avoid acting arbitrarily, the district court must make a `conscientious assessment' of whether unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value, Salameh, 152 F.3d at 110. Scott argues that the district court did not engage in the analysis required by Rule 403. We are compelled to agree. The district court's only inquiry into prejudice was its suggestion that because the testimony would not lead the jury to conclude Scott had been previously arrested, it was admissible. As an initial matter, as we have discussed supra Part I, Rule 404(b) does not encompass only criminal or wrongful acts incident to arrest, but all other crimes, wrongs, or acts relating to a person's character. Even a juror who did not infer that Scott had been arrested before from the recognition testimony would certainly take from it the implication that he had had substantial contact with the police that was not benign. The district court's view of the evidence as not having a prejudicial effect was thus too narrow. Moreover, outside of this single comment, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court fully engaged in the required analysis, a fact corroborated by its repeated erroneous statements about the limited right of a defendant not to have evidence of his prior bad acts admitted against him. Even the government tries to distance itself from these statements, because they suggest the evidence was admitted precisely for the improper purpose of making it known that Scott had a criminal propensity. We simply find no probative value to this testimony, and what little probative value this testimony may have had was substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The government's main argument on this point appears to be that there were more prejudicial facts they might have tried to raise against Scott at trial. But that other evidence might have been more prejudicial does nothing to support the proposition that the recognition testimony was not. Jurors would have drawn from it the conclusion that Scott had previously had significant contact with the police. Moreover, they were told this contact helped the detectives identify what he was doing, thus implying that they knew what he was likely to be doingin this case dealing drugs. It stretches credulity to think that a jury would assume that the defendant's lengthy and numerous contacts with the police were not, in some sense, related to his bad character and criminal propensity, even if evidence of these contacts did not lead that same jury to conclude that he had been previously arrested. This is the essence of prejudice. In other cases in which identity is actually in dispute, that prejudice may be outweighed by the evidence's probative value, and the evidence may be admissible. But here, given that the only proper purpose for the testimony was an issue not in dispute, we have no trouble concluding that the potential prejudice of this testimony outweighed any conceivable probative value. Scott did not request a limiting instruction. Save for that, all of the Huddleston inquiries fall in his favor. The testimony was either not relevant to a proper purpose or not relevant to an issue sufficiently in dispute. Nor did its probative value remotely approach outweighing the possible prejudicial effect. The district court's admission of the testimony under Rule 404(b) was thus an abuse of discretion, as was its failure to conduct the required Rule 403 analysis.