Opinion ID: 1695332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: has medical expert testimony established causal connection in this case?

Text: In our de novo review, this Court looks to see if the moving party has demonstrated that no genuine issue of fact exists. Daniels v. GNB, Inc., 629 So.2d 595, 599 (Miss. 1993). A motion for summary judgment should be overruled unless the trial court finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the plaintiff would be unable to prove any facts to support his claim. Id. at 599 (citing McFadden v. State, 580 So.2d 1210 (Miss. 1991)). The lower court is prohibited from trying the issues; it may only determine whether there are issues to be tried. Id. (citing Brown v. Credit Center, Inc., 444 So.2d 358, 362 (Miss. 1983)). The non-moving party, in this case the Palmers, has the burden of providing `supportive evidence of significant and probative value' in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Daniels, 629 So.2d at 600 (citing Palmer, 564 So.2d at 1355). There is no magic form to which a plaintiff's supporting expert opinion must conform, so long as its import is apparent. Kelley v. Frederic, 573 So.2d 1385, 1389 (Miss. 1990). We find the import of Dr. Timmcke's testimony to be readily apparent. In fact, in the case sub judice, the lower court assumed that the Plaintiff ha[d] provided significant probative evidence demonstrating a breach of duty on the part of the Defendant hospital in failing to have two surgeons in the operating suite at the time of Plaintiff's surgery because such procedure constituted an unusual hazard to life. The Palmers presented only one expert's testimony. When asked if the injury would have been prevented if there had been another surgeon present during Sonny's first surgery, Dr. Timmcke replied, I don't think I can answer that question, either. It would depend on the experience and expertise of that surgeon.... It is clear to us that the physician tried to answer the question honestly, that without further information, Dr. Timmcke was unable to give a definite opinion. This in our mind establishes that there was sufficient testimony to create a jury question regarding the causal connection between the absence of a second surgeon and the injuries sustained by Palmer. Furthermore, it is illogical to us that the lower court could have denied the summary judgment of the doctor and granted the summary judgment of the hospital where the Palmers alleged (1) that the hospital failed to insure that Dr. Anderson was competent and qualified to perform the surgery that was needed and (2) that the Hospital failed to enforce their rules requiring the presence of a second physician. Summary judgment is not a substitute for trial regarding disputed issues of fact. Barner v. Gorman, 605 So.2d 805, 808 (Miss. 1992). Once a witness is qualified as an expert to render expert testimony, then it is within the province of the trier of fact to give weight and credibility to the testimony. We reverse the lower court's summary judgment on the issue of negligence. We find that the evidence sufficiently supported the Palmers' allegations against the hospital to avoid summary judgment. The trial court should have allowed the jury to decide if the facts supported the Palmers' suit against Anderson Hospital.