Opinion ID: 32033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: danger, bo th of which might have caused the

Text: Jones argues that he had ineffective assis- jury to impose the death sentence. The state tance of counsel at trial because, in question- argues that Jones did not raise this argument ing Dollins, his attorney opened the door to before the district court, that trial counsel’s testimony of a collateral offense. Jones’s performance was not deficient, and that any counsel tried to impeach Dollins’s testimony error was not prejudicial. that Jones had confessed to the murder, using 1 Jones was not related to the victims. 2
We review the district court’s factual find- ture dangerousness sufficient to prejudice the ings for clear error and its determinations of sentencing. law de novo. Evans v. Cockrell, 285 F.3d 370, 374 (5th Cir. 2002). Jones’s petition for The argument Jones now presents is not habeas relief is governed by the heightened properly before us. In his state habeas petistandard of review provided by AEDPA, tion, Jones argued that ineffective cross-examwhich “‘substantially restricts the scope of ination of Dollins “deprived Applicant of a fair federal review of state criminal court proceed- trial in which the jury was to determine his ings.’” Id. (quoting Montoya v. Johnson, 226 guilt or innocence of the offense changed in F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2000)); Wiggins v. the indictment.” Jones now contends that alSmith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2534 (2003). Under though the petition did not address prejudice the Act, as it related to sentencing, it also did not “limit the effect of that error to the guilt phase ver- neither the district court nor this Court dict.” may grant a writ of habeas corpus based solely on a finding of error by a state In his federal habeas petition, Jones again court. Rather, a writ may be granted failed to argue that the prejudice applied to only if a state court arrives at a conclu- sentencing; rather, he asserted that it “undersion opposite to that reached by the Su- mined the guilt phase theory that the state’s preme Court on a question of law or if evidence failed to establish that Mr. Jones the state court decides a case differently killed Sherry Jones.” None of the words that than [sic] the Supreme Court has on a might imply an argument based on a prejudice set of materially indistinguishable facts. to sentencingSSsuch as sentencing, penalty Without such a direct conflict, a writ phase, residual doubt, or future dangerouswill be granted only if the state court nessSSappears in either petition’s discussion of identifies the correct governing legal the Dollins questioning.2 principle from the Supreme Court’s de- cisions but unreasonably applies that Jones’s contention that the issue was raised principle to the facts of the prisoner’s in the district court essentially rests on the nocase. tion that his previous argument did not ex- pressly contradict the argument he now raises. Evans, 285 F.3d at 374-75 (citations and Though this is debatable, we find it beyond punctuation omitted). question that Jones’s petitions before the state
The state contends that Jones has never be- 2 In his response to the state’s motion for sum- fore raised this argument as it relates to the mary judgment, Jones attempted, unconvincingly, penalty phase, but rather has argued only that to recast his argument as relating to “[r]esidual the questioning prejudiced the guilt/innocence doubt, or lack of certainty about whether a person phase. Jones now disclaims any argument that actually killed the victim of a capital murder, the Dollins questioning prejudiced the verdict, [which] is often a powerful basis for a jury to debut does claim that it reduced residual doubt cide not to impose death.” This marked the first appearance of this argument. 3 and district courts did not actually make the Smithey at the sentencing phase prejudiced his argument. We are precluded from considering sentencing and denied him his right to an indithe claim, because Jones did not raise it prop- vidualized sentencing determination required erly before the district court. Beazley v. John- under the Eighth Amendment, as explicated in son, 242 F.3d 248, 271 (5th Cir. 2001) (stat- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). ing that issues not raised in habeas proceedings Smithey testified that a prisoner in another before the district court cannot be considered Texas county, serving a life sentence for a capon appeal).3 ital murder conviction, escaped from a workrelease program. Though the Texas Court of Even were we to find that Jones’s response Criminal Appeals decided that the evidence to summary judgment was sufficient to raise was irrelevant to the sentencing determination the argument in the district court, it was also and should not have been admitted over not raised in state court. A claim is procedur- Jones’s objection, it found the admission ally defaulted if a petitioner has failed to ex- harmless. The district court held the denial of haust all available state remedies, and the state this claim was “neither contrary to, nor an court to which he would be required to peti- unreasonable application of, any clearly estion would now find that the claim is proce- tablished federal law,” see Wiggins, 123 S. Ct. durally defaulted. Bledsoe v. Johnson, 188 at 2534, and granted summary judgment; in F.3d 250, 254 (5th Cir. 1999). The Texas doing so, it addressed Jones’s Eighth AmendCode of Criminal Procedure prohibits the filing ment argument and found it to be without of subsequent or untimely habeas applications, merit. absent a demonstration of cause or actual in- nocence. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art Jones challenges this decision, arguing that 11.071 § 5(a); Ex parte Davis, 947 S.W.2d the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals 216 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc) (up- was objectively unreasonable “because it failed holding the constitutionality of art. 11.071). to take into account the profound effect the Jones does not claim that he meets these ex- prospect of an easy escape would have had on ceptions; we find that he cannot, and therefore the jurors’ assessment of Anzel Jones’s future his claim is procedurally barred. dangerousness.” We disagree that the decision was objectively unreasonable.