Opinion ID: 1897412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plain Meaning of Section 1-3003(d)

Text: The District argues that the words not obligated to should be construed to mean that the Mayor may not comply with pre-Act decrees, while Ms. Gallagher contends that those words mean simply that the Mayor is not required to comply with such decrees, though he may do so in his discretion. At first glance, Ms. Gallagher's interpretation seems considerably closer to the plain meaning of the statutory language than does the District's. [5] Ms. Gallagher also maintains that if the Council of the District of Columbia had intended the statute to mean that the Mayor may not comply with pre-Act decrees, it could have used language to that effect. Other parts of the Act clearly show that the Council know how to use mandatory (or prohibitory) language when it so desired. For example, the two subsections immediately preceding subsection (d) both use the word shall to indicate that compliance with divorce decrees in certain circumstances is mandatory. The Mayor retains no discretion when a decree comes within the ambit of one of those two subsections. [6] If the Council had used the words shall not in subsection (d), it could have similarly eliminated any discretion that the Mayor might have with respect to pre-Act decrees. Alternatively, the Council could have used language similar to that found in section 1-3004(d), which states that [o]nly former spouses whose marriages were dissolved after March 16, 1989, through divorce, annulment, or legal separation shall be eligible to enroll in the health benefit plans. The fact that sections 1-3003(d) and 1-3004(d) were simultaneously included in the Act adds weight to Ms. Gallagher's argument that the Council's failure to avail itself of either of these options for drafting section 1-3003(d) in mandatory terms was not accidental, but rather reflects an intent to give the Mayor some discretion with respect to awarding survivor benefits in compliance with pre-Act decrees. When the plain meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, the intent of the legislature is clear, and judicial inquiry need go no further. See, e.g., Burgess v. United States, 681 A.2d 1090, 1095 (D.C.1996); Luck v. District of Columbia, 617 A.2d 509, 512 (D.C.1992); Barry v. Bush, 581 A.2d 308, 314 (D.C.1990). The literal words of a statute, however, are not the sole index to legislative intent, Lange v. United States, 143 U.S.App. D.C. 305, 307, 443 F.2d 720, 722 (1971), but rather are to be read in the light of the purpose of the statute taken as a whole, and are to be given a sensible construction and one that would not work an obvious injustice. Metzler v. Edwards, 53 A.2d 42, 44 (D.C.1947) (footnotes omitted); see also Tillinghast v. Tillinghast, 58 App. D.C. 107, 109, 25 F.2d 531, 533 (1928). The Supreme Court has observed that even when the words of a statute may appear, on superficial examination, to be clear and unambiguous, [w]ords are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history .... Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 479, 63 S.Ct. 361, 87 L.Ed. 407 (1943) (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Citizens Ass'n of Georgetown v. Zoning Comm'n, 392 A.2d 1027, 1033 (D.C.1978) (en banc). The Court has also declared that the plain-meaning rule is `rather an axiom of experience than a rule of law, and does not preclude consideration of persuasive evidence if it exists.' Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 455, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (citations omitted). Upon further examination, we conclude that the meaning of subsection (d) is not as clear and unambiguous as it first appears. While the statute does not explicitly state that the Mayor shall not comply with pre-Act decrees or that former spouses divorced before the effective date of the Act are not eligible for annuities, neither does it say that the Mayor may or may not comply with pre-Act decrees, or that such former spouses shall be eligible to receive annuities, or that the Mayor shall have discretion to award them annuities. In such circumstances, it is our responsibility to examine the legislative history so that we may discern the overall legislative purpose and construe the statute accordingly. See NLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282, 297, 77 S.Ct. 330, 1 L.Ed.2d 331 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in part); Staub v. Office of Personnel Management, 927 F.2d 571, 573 (Fed.Cir.1991).