Opinion ID: 186833
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Judicial Review of the FLRA Order

Text: 16 As emphasized by the district court, the Union did not seek review of the January 31, 2002 FLRA order in the D.C. Circuit, although it was authorized to do so under 38 U.S.C. § 7422(e) and 5 U.S.C. § 7123(a). The reason is simple: petitioning for review of that order would have been to no avail, because the D.C. Circuit lacked the authority to grant the relief sought by the Union. The Under Secretary's decision that a matter arises out of a collective bargaining exclusion may not be reviewed by any other agency. 38 U.S.C. § 7422(d). The Federal Labor Relations Authority and the Department of Veterans Affairs, of course, are separate agencies. The FLRA therefore lacked authority to review the § 7422 Decision, and on review of the FLRA's dismissal this court could not have concluded otherwise. 17 It is true that district courts do not have concurrent jurisdiction over matters within the exclusive purview of the FLRA. AFGE v. Loy, 367 F.3d 932, 935 (D.C.Cir.2004). The district court concluded, under Loy, that the FLRA had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims raised in this lawsuit. Local 446, 404 F.Supp.2d at 21-22. The rule from Loy does not apply in the instant case, however, because the legality of the disputed § 7422 Decision is expressly outside the FLRA's purview. Because the Union is presumptively entitled to judicial review of its claim that the Under Secretary's § 7422 Decision was unlawful, and because the D.C. Circuit could not provide that review on a petition for the review of the FLRA decision dismissing the ULP complaint, Loy does not provide a basis for the district court dismissing this case for lack of jurisdiction.