Opinion ID: 2050973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Roxborough II

Text: a. Bar Docket No. 43-93 8. In November 1991, while in pursuit of another automobile, a District of Columbia police car collided with a third automobile, killing the driver, Tanya Rich, her daughter and her unborn son. BX 9 at 2-3. The driver's mother and sister, Alberta Rich and Melody Rich respectively, were named co-personal representatives of her estate. Id. A third person, William Woodard, who claimed paternity of the driver's two deceased children, was appointed personal representative of the children's estates. Id. at 3. 9. Shortly before the statute of limitations for filing a wrongful-death suit against the District of Columbia was about to expire, Alberta Rich hired Petitioner to represent her. Id. Another lawyer, Patrick Regan, Esquire, was hired to represent Mr. Woodard and Melody Rich. Id. 10. In September 1992, Petitioner filed a wrongful-death action on behalf of Alberta Rich, and Mr. Regan filed similar suits on behalf of Mr. Woodard and Melody Rich. Id. From October 10, 1992 onward, Petitioner knew that Mr. Regan was representing Mr. Woodard. Id. 11. In November 1992, Petitioner sought to remove Mr. Woodard as personal representative of the children's estates and to appoint Alberta Rich in his place. Id. As a basis of removal, Petitioner alleged that Mr. Woodard had abused Tanya Rich and was not the father of the two deceased children. Id. 12. Mr. Regan responded by filing a petition to establish Mr. Woodard's paternity of the children, to declare him Tanya Rich's common-law husband, to remove Petitioner's client as co-personal representative of Tanya Rich's estate, and to appoint Mr. Woodard as the sole personal representative of Tanya Rich's estate. Id. 13. In November 1992, Petitioner hired a private investigator, Richard Ford, to look into the circumstances surrounding the accident. Id. Petitioner failed to warn Mr. Ford of the obligation to avoid contact with other litigants who were represented by counsel. BX 9 at 3-4. 14. Without Petitioner's knowledge or consent, Mr. Ford contacted Mr. Woodard on several occasions. Id. at 4. On January 8, 1993, Mr. Ford informed Petitioner that Mr. Woodard wanted to meet with him, and Petitioner told Mr. Ford to cease his contact with Mr. Woodard. Id. 15. On the same day, Petitioner met Mr. Woodard in Petitioner's office. Id. Petitioner testified that Mr. Woodard informed him that he had fired Mr. Regan. Tr. II 60. Petitioner told Mr. Woodard that he needed something in writing, and he prepared a letter dismissing Mr. Regan, backdated to January 7, 1993, for Mr. Woodard's signature. BX 9 at 4. Although Alberta Rich agreed to Petitioner's dual representation of Mr. Woodard with her, Petitioner failed to discuss with either Alberta Rich or Mr. Woodard the conflict of interest between them. Id. Mr. Woodard signed an agreement retaining Petitioner to represent him in his wrongful-death action. Id. 16. After Mr. Regan learned what had happened, he met with Mr. Woodard and was re-hired as Mr. Woodard's attorney. Id. Mr. Regan then contacted Petitioner, demanding that Petitioner and Mr. Ford cease contacts with Mr. Woodard. Id. Mr. Ford continued to attempt to contact Mr. Woodard. Id. Petitioner testified that Mr. Ford did so without his authority. Tr. II 61-62. 17. Petitioner sent letters to Mr. Regan, contending that he still represented Mr. Woodard. BX 9 at 5. Mr. Regan responded by filing an ethical complaint with Bar Counsel and informing Petitioner that Mr. Woodard wanted to be represented by him. Id. 18. In the spring of 1993, Petitioner filed a complaint on behalf of Alberta Rich against Mr. Woodard, alleging his liability for the deaths of Tanya Rich and her children. Id. Petitioner also filed a motion stating that Mr. Ford's investigation had led to the discovery of Mr. Woodard's responsibility. Id. In October 1993, Petitioner withdrew as counsel for Alberta Rich. Id. The wrongful-death matters later were settled. Id. 19. The Court concluded that Petitioner engaged in the unauthorized communication with an adverse party represented by counsel (Rule 4.2(a)), represented a client with an adverse position, creating an actual conflict of interest (Rule 1.7(a)), misused client confidences (Rule 1.6(a)(2)), and failed to supervise an associate (Rule 5.3(a)), and to mitigate the consequences of the unethical conduct of a nonlegal subordinate subject to his supervision (Rule 5.3(c)). In re Roxborough, 692 A.2d 1379 (D.C.1997)(per curiam)( Roxborough II ). b. Bar Docket No. 377-93 20. In 1992, Arthur Takeall filed a copyright-infringement claim against PepsiCo in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. BX 9 at 8. After he lost a motion for summary judgment, he discharged his lawyer and retained Petitioner to handle his appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Id. 21. After Petitioner was retained, he persuaded Mr. Takeall to rehire his earlier lawyer. Id. While Petitioner was to be lead counsel on the appeal, it was unclear which lawyer had principal responsibility for Mr. Takeall's other matters, including proceedings in the District Court concerning the infringement action. Id. 22. Mr. Takeall believed that Petitioner was solely responsible for all aspects of the infringement action. Petitioner did not share that understanding. Id. 23. Mr. Takeall understood that Petitioner would seek to stay the judgment in the District Court. Id. Petitioner failed to do so or to enter his appearance. The District Court issued a writ of attachment garnishing Mr. Takeall's bank account, which contained his veteran's disability benefits. Id. Mr. Takeall expected Petitioner to seek the release of the benefits, but Petitioner failed to do so. Id. 24. In June 1993, Mr. Takeall fired Petitioner and refused to reconsider his decision. Id. A few days after his termination, Petitioner sent a letter to PepsiCo's attorney, without Mr. Takeall's permission, along with a proposed consent agreement releasing the garnished funds. Id. Mr. Takeall demanded that Petitioner cease to represent him. Id. Petitioner testified that he did not take Mr. Takeall's firing of him seriously because Mr. Takeall had fired him before. Tr. II 64. Petitioner billed Mr. Takeall for expenses, including long-distance telephone calls made after he had been fired. BX 9 at 9. 25. The Court found that Petitioner failed to withdraw after discharge (Rule 1.16(a)(3)). Roxborough II, 692 A.2d 1379. 26. For all of the misconduct found in Roxborough II, the Court imposed a 60 day suspension, nunc pro tunc to the date of the completion of the suspension in Roxborough I, to run consecutively to that 30-day suspension, with a requirement that Petitioner show fitness for reinstatement, citing D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16, and complete a course on the Rules of Professional Conduct. 692 A.2d 1379. Petitioner did not raise Kersey mitigation issues. The Court did not order restitution to any of the clients involved.