Opinion ID: 1732178
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Threshold Showings

Text: The affidavit filed by Reindel stated, in toto: 1. I have been employed by [Gen Re] in Stamford, Connecticut[,] since 1983. 2. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated in this Affidavit and am competent to testify to the same. 3. I live and work in Fairfield County, Connecticut. I have never resided, or maintained a place of employment, in Alabama. 4. I do not conduct business in Alabama. In particular, I:  do not maintain, and have never had, an office in Alabama;  do not own or possess, and have never owned or possessed, any real property or hold any mortgages or liens in Alabama;  do not have, and have never had, any bank accounts in Alabama;  do not have, and have never had, any telephone listings in Alabama;  do not have, and have never had, any employees or authorized agents in Alabama;  have never been a litigant in the courts of Alabama or availed myself of the courts of Alabama;  have not incurred or paid taxes in Alabama; and,  have not derived any income from business in Alabama. 5. In the last ten years, I have not visited Alabama for any reason. 6. I had no dealings with the Plaintiffs of any kind relating to their decision to pursue the business combinations and capital calls referred to in the Complaint in the above-captioned action. In particular, I was in no way involved in negotiating or promoting the `Acquisition of Assets and Assumption of Liabilities Agreement' between AHAT and ROA referred to in ¶ 3 of the Complaint. I was also in no way involved in negotiating, soliciting or promoting the voluntary capital contributions of June 2002 referred to in ¶ 4 of the Complaint. 7. I have never contracted to supply or obtain services or goods to or from Alabama. 8. Given my lack of contacts with the State of Alabama, I have never expected that I could properly be sued therein. Kellogg's affidavit was identically worded, except to say that he had worked for Gen Re in Greenwich, Connecticut, from 1968 to May 2001, and had not visited Alabama in the last seven years. Seeger's affidavit was also identically worded, except for paragraphs 1, 3, and 5, which stated: 1. I am employed by General Star (`GenStar') in Stamford, Connecticut. I have been employed with GenStar since February 2002. From October 1986 through January 2002, I was employed by [Gen Re] in Stamford, Connecticut. . . . . 3. I live and work in Stamford, Connecticut. I have never resided, or maintained a place of employment, in Alabama. . . . . 5. I have traveled to Alabama only once. The trip did not involve meeting with, or communicating with, the Plaintiffs. None of these affidavits deny the existence of a conspiracy, or the affiant's participation therein. The affidavits are addressed, instead, to more conventional bases of jurisdiction, such as those embodied in the laundry-list provisions of Rule 4.2 before its 2004 amendment. However, the fact that a jurisdictional basis is not found within the laundry list does not prevent a threshold finding of jurisdiction under the conspiracy theory, pursuant to Rule 4.2(b). McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F.Supp. 513, 532 (D.Md.1977). The petitioners concede, as they must, that the defendant must make[ ] a prima facie evidentiary showing that the court has no personal jurisdiction [before] `the plaintiff is . . . required to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof.' Petition, at 12-13 (emphasis added). Our cases say as much. See Ex parte United Ins. Cos., 936 So.2d at 1053 (`[I]f the defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary showing that the Court has no personal jurisdiction, `the plaintiff is then required to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof. . . .''); Bufkin, 936 So.2d at 1045 (`However, if the defendant makes a prima facie evidentiary showing that the Court has no personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff is then required to substantiate the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint by affidavits or other competent proof. . . . '). To be sure, the conspiracy averments in the complaint must exceed bald speculation and mere conclusory assertions. Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d at 806-07. However, this burden is not heavy, especially [w]hen determination of the jurisdictional facts is intertwined with and may be dispositive of questions of ultimate liability. McLaughlin v. Copeland, 435 F.Supp. at 530. This is so, because [t]o require a more substantial showing in a case alleging a civil conspiracy would be . . . `harsh, if not impossible' in view of the difficulties of pleading and proving a conspiracy. Id. (quoting Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F.Supp. 692, 696 (D.D.C.1973)). Moreover, until controverted by the defendant's affidavits,  the plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations must be considered as true. Wenger Tree Serv. v. Royal Truck & Equip., Inc., 853 So.2d 888, 894 (Ala.2002)(emphasis added). Thus, where the complaint alleges conspiracy-based jurisdiction with particularity, failure to deny by affidavit or deposition the existence of, or participation in, a conspiracy will result in a denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See McLaughlin, supra; Mandelkorn, supra. AHAT's complaint meets the specificity threshold. As illustrated previously in this opinion, AHAT alleges facts purporting to show that the petitioners, in the financial-reporting-fraud phase, conspired with Patterson, Hudgins, Crews, and others to conceal and to misrepresent the progressively precarious financial condition of ROA by, among other things, (1) underreporting the liabilities of ROA, and (2) inflating the surplus of ROA, in order to avoid intervention by various state insurance departments, and, ultimately, to present ROA to AHAT and BHS in a posture conducive to investment through the investment-fraud conspiracy. Relative to the investment fraud, the complaint alleges that the petitioners  in the historical context of Gen Re's relationships with, and reinsurance of, AHAT  knew and approved of the negotiations with AHAT for its investments in ROA, which were conducted by and through their alleged co-conspirators, Patterson, Crews, and Hudgins. It further alleges that some of these negotiations occurred in Alabama. Without doubt, the petitioners were required to controvert by affidavit or deposition these specific allegations. However, their affidavits did not do so. They reveal nothing material to the conspiracy theory on which jurisdiction purports to stand. Defendants contesting in personam jurisdiction cannot meet their prima facie evidentiary burdens with affidavits having nothing to do with the relevant issues. At this stage in the litigation, therefore, it is not unfair or unreasonable to require the petitioners to answer here for their roles in the alleged course of events. Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F.Supp. at 696-97 (Assuming as true the unchallenged allegations of conspiracy, . . . [there is] no injustice in requiring . . . the New York and Florida Defendants to submit to suit [in the District of Columbia].). In that connection, it must be remembered that [a] denial of a . . . motion to dismiss for want of personal jurisdiction is interlocutory and preliminary only. Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d at 798. After such a denial, the continuation of personal jurisdiction over a defendant who appropriately persists in challenging it in [an] answer to the complaint and by motion for summary judgment or at trial depends on the introduction of substantial evidence to prove the . . . jurisdictional allegations in the . . . complaint. Id.