Opinion ID: 2487462
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Motion for Mistrial during Voir Dire

Text: Wyatt next contends appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial made during voir dire. In particular, Wyatt claims that the trial court's commentary caused the venire to believe that a penalty-phase proceeding would be inevitable, resulting in error that warranted mistrial. This claim is without merit. When placed in context, Wyatt cites the following commentary made by the trial judge during voir dire as the basis for this claim: THE COURT: ... Again, members of the jury and of the jury panel, upon a finding of guilty in the guilt phase of this case of first-degree murder or of that is premeditated murder or felony murder, we then go into a phase called penalty. It's a separate proceeding in which each side can present testimony, argument, or whatever. At the end of that, I will give you certain criteria that you are to use in determining your recommendation to the Court on whether you should recommend to the Court either the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for twenty-five years. Those include certain aggravating circumstances and certain mitigating circumstances, which I will not go into now. Suffice it to say, will you all agree if we reach that stageI'm not saying that we will, but if we reach that stage, will you all agree that you will be bound by the instructions of this Courton reaching that stage, that you will be bound by the instructions of this Court in determining your recommendation to the Court? Will you all agree to do that? I think that ends it. (Emphasis added.) Immediately thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied. Even if appellate counsel had raised the trial court's denial of Wyatt's motion for mistrial as an issue on direct appeal, it would have been meritless. This Court reviews a trial court's ruling on a motion for mistrial under an abuse of discretion standard. Salazar v. State, 991 So.2d 364, 371 (Fla.2008). In this case, the trial court's statements did not impermissibly lead the potential jury into believing that a penalty phase would be inevitable in light of Wyatt's guilt. Although the trial court mentioned that the trial would proceed to a penalty phase, it prefaced that statement by explaining to the jury that a penalty phase would only be appropriate upon a finding of guilt. The trial court then again emphasized that a penalty phase was not absolute through its use of conditional language such as  if we reach that stage I'm not saying we will, but if we reach that stage. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, the trial court's commentary about penalty-phase procedure was in direct response to, and prompted by, defense counsel questioning a prospective juror about factors the jury should consider in not recommending the death penalty. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Wyatt's motion for mistrial, and appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this meritless issue on appeal.