Opinion ID: 3031870
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Should” Indict if Probable Cause Is Found

Text: Navarro-Vargas and Leon-Jasso also claim that the following passage misinstructs the grand jury: [Y]our task is to determine whether the govern- ment’s evidence as presented to you is sufficient to cause you to conclude that there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged. To put it another way, you should vote to indict where the evidence presented to you is sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable person’s 5548 UNITED STATES v. NAVARRO-VARGAS believing that the accused is probably guilty of the offense with which the accused is charged. Appellants claim that this passage is unconstitutional because it instructs grand jurors that they “should” indict if they find probable cause, but does not explain that they can refuse to indict even if they find probable cause. Further, Appellants argue that the instructions use the singular terms “purpose”26 and “task” in advising the grand jurors that their sole responsibility is to make probable cause determinations. Even though the instructions indicate that the jurors “should” indict if they find probable cause, Appellants believe that the model charge reasonably read, imposes upon the grand jury a duty to indict if they find probable cause. Appellants argue that this improper instruction deprives them of the “traditional functioning of the institution that the Fifth Amendment demands.” Br. of Appellants at 18 (citing Williams, 504 U.S. at 51). [6] This instruction does not violate the grand jury’s independence. The language of the model charge does not state that the jury “must” or “shall” indict, but merely that it “should” indict if it finds probable cause. As a matter of pure semantics, it does not “eliminate discretion on the part of the grand jurors,” leaving room for the grand jury to dismiss even if it finds probable cause. Marcucci, 299 F.3d at 1159.27 26 The singular term “purpose,” referred to by Appellants, is used earlier in the model charge: The purpose of a Grand Jury is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a formal accusation against a person. If law enforcement officials were not required to submit to an impartial Grand Jury proof of guilt as to a proposed charge against a person suspected of having committed a crime, they would be free to arrest and bring to trial a suspect no matter how little evidence existed to support the charge. 27 The first model grand jury charge approved by the Judicial Conference left even less room for the grand jury to exercise its discretion. It instructed the grand jury: “It is your duty to see to it that indictments are returned against those who you find probable cause to believe are guilty and not against the innocent.” Model Charge to Grand Juries, Report of the Committee on the Operation of the Jury System 3 (September 1978). UNITED STATES v. NAVARRO-VARGAS 5549 [7] Even assuming that the grand jury should exercise something akin to prosecutorial discretion, the instruction does not infringe upon that discretion. The analogy that the Court recognized between the grand jury and the prosecutor is useful for understanding the source of both the grand jury’s and prosecutor’s discretion. See Economou, 438 U.S. at 510. Under Article II, § 3, the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” That duty can be delegated to subordinates, including the attorney general and the U.S. attorneys serving in each judicial district. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163-64 (1926) (“[A]rticle 2 grants to the President the executive power of the government — i.e., the general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the power of appointment and removal of executive officers — a conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed[.]”); Ponzi v. Fassenden, 258 U.S. 254, 262 (1922). U.S. attorneys, operating with limited resources, are literally incapable of seeing that each and every federal law is executed. Allocating their resources, they decide whether those resources are better put to prosecuting narcotraficantes, 21 U.S.C. § 1906; government fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1031, and public corruption, 18 U.S.C. § 666; or to pursuing unlawful transportation of dentures, 18 U.S.C. § 1821; disruption of zoos, circuses, and rodeos, 18 U.S.C. § 43; or parking violations committed on federal lands, 36 C.F.R. § 4.13. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (The government relies on “[s]uch factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s enforcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforcement plan” in determining which cases to prosecute.); LAFAVE, ET AL., supra, § 13.2(d) (pointing out that with the great assortment of crimes and limited government resources often prosecutors are choosing who “will” be prosecuted rather than who will not be prosecuted). It is also possible that an attorney general might decide not to enforce, or at least to underenforce, politically controversial laws or laws that, in the attorney general’s view, are unconstitutional. In effect, a decision 5550 UNITED STATES v. NAVARRO-VARGAS not to prosecute someone who would likely be indicted and could be convicted is a form of prosecutorial nullification. See Cox, 342 F.2d at 169-70 (Attorney General instructed U.S. Attorney not to seek indictment even though the grand jury voted to indict and the district court placed him under civil contempt of court for refusing to indict.). Notwithstanding Article II’s instruction to take care that the laws are faithfully executed, the president and those who represent him have broad independence in their prosecutorial decisions. The president’s independence arises not out of any constitutional direction to exercise prosecutorial discretion, prosecutorial nullification, or substantive constitutional review, but out of the lack of any check on the president’s ability to do so. The president operates virtually without check on decisions not to charge violations. There are, of course, long-term checks on the president. Congress has broad powers of inquiry and may, if necessary, impeach a president for his decisions. In extreme cases, courts may make judgments about selective prosecutions that violate the promise of due process or equal protection of the laws. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (The equal protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits selective prosecutions based on “race, religion, or other arbitrary classification[.]”); United States v. Olvis, 97 F.3d 739, 743 (4th Cir. 1996). The people have a check by bringing political pressure on the president and, if the president seeks a second term, to offer a referendum vote at the ballot box on the president’s judgment in enforcing the laws. In this respect, the grand jury has even greater powers of nonprosecution than the executive because there is, literally, no check on a grand jury’s decision not to return an indictment. The grand jury has no accountability at the ballot box, before Congress, the President, or the courts. The grand jury’s duty to follow the Constitution is no less than the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed. It is the grand jury’s position in the constitutional scheme that gives UNITED STATES v. NAVARRO-VARGAS 5551 it its independence, not any instructions that a court might offer. [8] Even though the terms “purpose” and “task” are singular, conveying that the grand jury has one purpose, these instructions do not undermine the grand jury’s purpose and function. The instructions remind the grand jury that it has “extensive powers” and in “a very real sense stand[s] between the government and the accused.” Admittedly, the instructions do not explain to the grand jury what its “extensive powers” are or have been in the past, including its power to refuse to indict even when a conviction can be obtained. However, the instructions remind the grand jury of its independence from the federal government and leave room for it to refuse to indict. Consequently, we conclude that this instruction is not inconsistent with the Fifth Amendment.