Opinion ID: 2227403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The History of Assignability

Text: Because a legal malpractice claim is a chose in action, we begin by reviewing the law generally controlling the assignment of chose in action. [1] Under ancient common law, hardly any chose in action was assignable. 3 S. Williston, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts § 405, at 7 (3d ed. 1960) [hereinafter Williston on Contracts ]. Scholars have postulated various reasons for this rule. Both Lord Coke and Blackstone argued that assignment constituted champerty and maintenance, which were discouraged by the `wisdom and policy of the sages and founders of our law.' 3 Williston on Contracts § 404, at 7 (citing Lampet's Case (Eng.) 10 Coke, 46a, 48a). See also Draper v. Zebec (1941), 219 Ind. 362, 372, 37 N.E.2d 952, 956 (In Blackstone's time it was thought that many, for the furtherance of pretended rights, conveyed some interest therein to great men in order to gain their support and influence over the courts in the interests of their cause... .). [2] Discounting the fear of maintenance, others argued that assignment was barred by the doctrine of privity. Ames, The Disseisin of Chattels: The Inalienability of Choses in Action, 3 Harv. L.Rev. 337, 339 & n. 2 (1890) (noting that the rule barring assignments predated laws against maintenance and was justified in other European countries on grounds that such personal rights were non-transferrable). The intangible nature of a chose in action and the lack of commercial necessity are also credited as contributing to the non-assignment rule. 4 Corbin on Contracts § 856, at 403. Whatever the reason for this rule, over the centuries a variety of forces combined to work its slow reversal. The chose in action based on contract was the first to become assignable, primarily out of economic necessity. Competition between courts of equity and law, and assignees' creative use of the power of attorney also contributed. Id., at 404-08. The assignment of choses in action based on tort gained judicial acceptance more slowly. With the de-emphasis of privity, the passage of English statutes, and the demise of laws against champerty, choses in action for torts against personal property slowly gained the power of assignment. The assignment of tort suits growing out of an injury to the person, however, or for wrongs done to the person, reputation, or feelings of the injured party, continued to be held unassignable. Today, the non-assignability of a chose in action has become so restricted that it is now the exception to the rule of free assignment. Essex v. Ryan (1983), Ind. App., 446 N.E.2d 368, 374. Contract-based choses in action have been deemed assignable, except for contracts which are purely personal in nature (like marriage contracts). Id. at 374 n. 3. Tort-based choses in action are assignable if they arise out of injuries to personal property; torts for personal injuries and for wrongs done to the person, reputation, or feelings of the injured party remain unassignable. Annotation, Assignability of Claim in Tort for Damages to Personal Property, 57 A.L.R.2d 603, 606 (1958) (few legal principles are as well settled ... as the rule that the common law does not permit assignments of causes of action to recover for personal injuries); Annotation, Assignability of Claim for Personal Injury or Death, 40 A.L.R.2d 500, 502 (1955); 4 Corbin on Contracts § 857, at 411; Methodist Hospital v. Town & Country Mut. Ins. Co. (1964), 136 Ind. App. 184, 192, 197 N.E.2d 773, 776-77. The common law in most states today, including Indiana, teaches that any chose in action that survives the death of the assignor may be assigned. `[A]ny cause or right of action may be assigned that, in accordance with the rules relating to the survivability of causes of action ... would, on the death of the assignor, survive to his legal representative.' Armstrong v. Illinois Bankers Life Ass'n (1940), 217 Ind. 601, 619, 29 N.E.2d 415, 422 (quoting 6 C.J.S. § 30, at 1079). An English statute on the survival of actions enacted in 1330 is responsible for this connection between survival and assignment. [3] The interpretation of this statute over the centuries eventually led courts to view assignment and survival as convertible propositions. Zabriskie v. Smith, 13 N.Y. 322, 334 (1855). As one might expect, this rule derived from an English statute enacted more than a century before the invention of movable type is not tightly enforced. Some state courts, like the Illinois Supreme Court, have expressly stated that although survival is the usual test for assignability, it is not the only test. North Chicago St. R.R. v. Ackley, 171 Ill. 100, 49 N.E. 222 (1897).