Opinion ID: 3210008
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balancing The Rights During Frisbee’s Trial

Text: [¶25] In the matter before us, the court made specific findings regarding the nature and extent of the distraction presented by the spectator, and the potential for significant distraction should the spectator remain in the courtroom. Acknowledging the different interests at stake, the court made an effort to balance those interests and engaged in an escalating series of responses to the distraction. The court considered alternatives to exclusion of the spectator, such as moving the spectator to a different spot in the courtroom and having him go through security screening before entering the courtroom. After learning more information regarding the seriousness of the potential distraction for defense counsel and juror 116, however, the court concluded that those alternatives would not be sufficient to protect the right to effective assistance of counsel and to trial before a adversary witness’s testimony because the court believed that the family members were intimidating the witness); Boyd v. United States, No. 00-612-ML, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16690, at -6 (D.R.I. 2009) (reaffirming the validity of a trial court’s restrictions on courtroom ingress and egress by spectators during a criminal trial based on security considerations and efforts to “limit interruptions and minimize distraction”); New York v. Jones, 750 N.E.2d 524, 530 (N.Y. 2001). 16 nondistracted jury, and the court appropriately excluded the individual. Cf. DeLuca, 137 F.3d at 35. [¶26] Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate the nature and effect of a distraction in the courtroom, the court has broad discretion to fashion a remedy when the court has determined that a spectator is disruptive or distracting during any aspect of a trial. The process employed here, including the entry of specific findings regarding the nature and significance of the distraction, the attempts at less restrictive alternatives to exclusion, the consultation with counsel, the voir dire of the jurors, and the additional security screening, demonstrates that substantial interests were at stake and that the court used “special care” in balancing those interests. The court acted well within its authority when it ultimately excluded the spectator from any further proceedings and did not violate the United States or Maine Constitutions in selecting this remedy.