Opinion ID: 1036479
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: lee’s batson claim

Text: We left Lee’s Batson claim for last because it requires so much more record review and legal analysis. Specifically, we: (1) must examine Batson and its progeny; (2) review the state trial court record of voir dire, peremptory challenges, and state trial court rulings; (3) outline the state appellate court’s decision on Lee’s Batson claim; (4) discuss whether AEDPA’s deference applies to plain-error decisions by state courts; (5) review Supreme Court and Circuit precedent holding 52 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 53 of 128 that AEDPA applies to state court opinions that are summary adjudications or that contain less than complete discussion of all claims, facts, or arguments; and (6) then analyze whether under AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), the state court’s Batson decision in Lee’s case is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
It is clearly established federal law that, under the Equal Protection Clause, a criminal defendant has a constitutional “right to be tried by a jury whose members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85–86, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 1717 (1986). In Batson, the Supreme Court established a three-step test for evaluating racial discrimination claims in jury selection. In the first step, the defendant must establish a prima facie case by producing evidence sufficient to support the inference that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 169–70, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2416–17 (2005); Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. In determining whether the defendant has made a prima facie case, the court must consider, inter alia: (1) any pattern of strikes against jurors of one race; and (2) “the prosecutor’s questions and statements during voir dire examination” and in exercising peremptory challenges. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723; 53 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 54 of 128 see also United States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1291 (11th Cir. 2007) (“[A] pattern of strikes against all venire members of one race or gender is considered significant” in establishing a prima facie case.). “Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing,” in the second step “the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723. The State may not rebut the defendant’s prima facie case by simply denying a discriminatory motive or “affirm[ing] [his] good faith in making individual selections.” Id. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1723–24 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). The State’s proffered explanation need not be “persuasive, or even plausible . . . . the issue is the facial validity of the prosecutor’s explanation.” Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767–78, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has rejected the contention “that the justification tendered at the second step be not just neutral but also at least minimally persuasive.” Id. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. “It is not until the third step that the persuasiveness of the justification becomes relevant . . . .” Id. In the third and final step, “[t]he trial court . . . will have the duty to determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S. Ct. at 1724. This is “a pure issue of fact, subject to review under 54 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 55 of 128 a deferential standard . . . . [and] ‘peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.’” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 365, 111 S. Ct. 1859, 1869 (1991) (plurality opinion). Further, “[i]n deciding whether the defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S. Ct. at 1723; see also id. at 93, 106 S. Ct. at 1721 (“In deciding if the defendant has carried his burden of persuasion, a court must undertake a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Those relevant circumstances may include the strength of the defendant’s prima facie case at step one. See id. at 97, 106 S. Ct. at 1723 (observing that “a ‘pattern’ of strikes against black jurors . . . might give rise to an inference of discrimination”); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 375, 111 S. Ct. at 1875 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Disproportionate effect may, of course, constitute evidence of intentional discrimination. The trial court may, because of such effect, disbelieve the prosecutor and find that the asserted justification is merely a pretext for intentional race-based discrimination.”). “In the typical peremptory challenge inquiry, the decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365, 111 S. Ct. at 1869 (plurality opinion). “[E]valuation of the prosecutor’s state of mind based on demeanor and credibility 55 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 56 of 128 lies peculiarly within a trial judge’s province.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate court may not “overturn the state trial court’s finding on the issue of discriminatory intent unless convinced that [the trial court’s] determination was clearly erroneous.” Id. at 369, 111 S. Ct. at 1871; see also Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574, 105 S. Ct. 1504, 1511 (1985) (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). The determination “on the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the sort accorded great deference on appeal.” Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 364, 111 S. Ct. at 1868; see also Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208 (2008). Ultimately, the burden of persuasion to show purposeful discrimination “rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768, 115 S. Ct. at 1771. “[A] defendant may rely on ‘all relevant circumstances’ to raise an inference of purposeful discrimination” in the third step. Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 125 S. Ct. 2317, 2325 (2005). As to “side-by-side comparisons,” the Supreme Court has said that “[i]f a prosecutor’s proffered reason for striking a black panelist applies just as well to an otherwise-similar nonblack who is permitted to serve, that is evidence tending to prove purposeful discrimination to be considered at Batson’s third step.” Id. at 241, 125 S. Ct. at 56 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 57 of 128 2325.12 Importantly too, “under Batson, the striking of one black juror for a racial reason violates the Equal Protection Clause, even where other black jurors are seated, and even when valid reasons for the striking of some black jurors are shown.” United States v. David, 803 F.2d 1567, 1571 (11th Cir. 1986); see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478, 128 S. Ct. at 1208 (“Because we find that the trial court committed clear error in overruling petitioner’s Batson objection with respect to [one venire member], we have no need to consider petitioner’s claim regarding [a second venire member].”). With this Supreme Court background, we turn to the jury-selection record.
Initially, the state trial court granted deferrals for hardship and inconvenience. Then outside the venire’s presence, Lee’s trial counsel moved to require the prosecutor to turn over the criminal histories of all venire members.13 The prosecutor replied that he would provide the criminal history of anyone he struck on that basis. 12 We primarily look to Supreme Court holdings extant at the time of Lee’s 2000 trial and 2001-2003 direct appeal. Although Johnson, Miller-El, and Snyder were decided after Lee’s trial and direct appeal, we find their holdings consistent with principles already set forth by the Supreme Court in Batson, Purkett, and Hernandez, which were decided before Lee’s trial and direct appeal. See McGahee v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 560 F.3d 1252, 1261 n.13 (11th Cir. 2009). 13 Lee’s counsel had made a pretrial request for this information too. 57 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 58 of 128 The trial court had each potential juror give his or her name, occupation, marital status, and if married, his or her spouse’s name and occupation. The court asked the venire a series of general questions, after which the attorneys questioned the venire. Given the capital murder charges against Lee, the primary focus of voir dire was the venire members’ views on the death penalty. That afternoon, the state trial court broke the venire into smaller panels, and the court, prosecution, and defense asked questions of each panel regarding the death penalty. The defense moved once again to receive copies of all venire members’ criminal histories, and the prosecution gave them to the defense. The parties then exercised strikes. After cause strikes, there were 53 venire members remaining, consisting of 32 black persons (60.4%) and 21 white persons (39.6%). After peremptory challenges, the final jury consisted of 9 black jurors (75%) and 3 white jurors (25%), with one black alternate and one white alternate. The defense used its 20 peremptory strikes on 18 white and 2 black venire members. The State used all of its 21 peremptory strikes on black venire members. The record indicates that each party’s last strike still sat as an alternate.14 Before the jury was sworn, Lee’s counsel made a Batson motion, stressing 14 We recognize that it is arguably inconsistent to say that a party’s stricken juror still sat as an alternate. But that is what the record shows occurred. And as noted later, the State’s last strike—alternate juror Kevin Stevens—was ultimately seated on the jury at the end of the guilt phase. 58 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 59 of 128 the State’s use of all of its peremptory strikes against black venire members. Lee’s counsel asserted that this district attorney’s office had a “history of racial discrimination in making jury selection[s]” and “many cases overturned with Batson problems.” The trial court asked, “How long have they had that problem? I don’t ever remember [prosecutor Edgar] Greene having one.” Lee’s counsel cited only one case, “Robert Thomas v. State,” and stated that “given the fact that the State [h]as exercised all of their peremptory challenges striking all Blacks,” the defense had made a prima facie case under Batson. The trial court required the State to respond with reasons for its strikes. Prosecutor Greene responded that “[f]irst of all, Judge, there’s no history of racial discrimination in striking the jury either in the District Attorney’s Office or in this Circuit.” Greene added that “[t]here’s been very few cases, if any, overturned on that basis.” Next Greene said, “Secondly, such action has not been done in this case. Most of the strikes the State has made in this case are based on the opposition of jurors to the death penalty, and we’re trying a death penalty case.” Although the State did not make its own Batson motion, Greene did point out that “the defense, most of its strikes, were striking White jurors. In fact, I think all but three or four were exercised to remove White jurors from the panel.” 59 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 60 of 128 Prosecutor Greene then explained his specific race-neutral reasons for each of the State’s 21 peremptory strikes. We quote what Greene said to the trial court because the state appellate court quoted it too, and we review these reasons later on. Prosecutor Greene gave his strike reasons for each venire member: [A]s to strike number 139, Demond Martin, [he] has a general opposition to the death penalty, and does have a bit of an arrest record. The next strike was number 194, Alice Scott who has an arrest record of some note. Number 88 was the next strike, David Gutridge—no, Johnnie Hall, he opposed the death penalty. Didn’t want to answer questions about it, does have an arrest record. Our number 17 [Angela Blythe] was strike number four. .... Mrs. Blythe [was] opposed to the death penalty. Strike number five was number 56, Jerry Edwards. Opposed to the death penalty. Strike number six was juror number 100, Jessica Howard, opposed to the death penalty. Strike number seven was number 23, Mona Brown, opposed to the death penalty. Strike number eight was juror number five, Sherry Baker. Opposed to the death penalty. Strike number nine was Quintin Alexander, juror number one. He has knowledge of the defendant. Knew his family. Very uncomfortable about it. Strike number 10 was juror number 149, [Ora] Moore. Opposed to the death penalty. Didn’t want to serve. Very uncooperative about the questions I asked. Strike number 11 was 126 Mary Kelley. Opposed to the death penalty. Strike number 12, number 171, Genett Pettway, opposed to the death penalty. Strike number 13 was 191, Vernell Saterfield. [She] was generally opposed to the death penalty. Has been involved in an incident where her spouse was charged with a drug offense and been found not guilty, and she was involved in some type of altercation with somebody. Strike number 14 was 155, Josephine Murry. Opposed to the death penalty. Strike number 15, was number 123, Towanda Jones. Opposed to the death penalty. Strike number 16 was 105, Ethel Hunter. Opposed to the death penalty. Strike number 17 was 246, Johnny Wilmer. Opposed to the death penalty. Strike number 18 was 146, Mary Mitchell. Opposed to 60 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 61 of 128 the death penalty. Strike number 19 was number 86, David Gutridge. Family member involved and convicted of a property crime. Opposed to the death penalty. Very uncooperative about answers. He had to be struck. Number 20 was number 57, [Annie] Ellis. Opposed to the death penalty. Very cooperative [sic] about the answer. Our final strike was number 213, Kevin Stevens. Child support hearing this week. Wanted to be off for that. I only assume we’re prosecuting same. Struck him for that reason. In summary, the prosecutor’s reasons were: (1) 13 venire members were struck because they opposed the death penalty; (2) five venire members were struck for being opposed to the death penalty and other reasons, including because the venire member had an arrest record, was uncooperative in answering questions, had a spouse charged with a drug offense, and/or was involved or had a family member involved in a property crime; (3) one venire member was struck because of a pending child-support prosecution, probably by the same prosecutor’s office; (4) one venire member was struck due to an arrest record; and (5) one venire member was struck because he knew the defendant. After prosecutor Greene’s statement of reasons, the state trial court found, “It appears you have given factually race valid reasons for striking.” The trial court also pointed out the makeup of the impaneled jury, noting that only 30% of the selected jury was white. The record confirms that, after cause and before peremptory challenges, the jury venire was about 40% white and 60% black, and the selected jury with alternates was 30% white and 70% black. 61 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 62 of 128 Without counting the alternates, the 12 member jury was 25% white and 75% black. After the trial court’s comments, Lee’s counsel did not contest, dispute, or otherwise object to any of the prosecutor’s reasons for 20 of the 21 struck venire members. Instead, he challenged only the prosecutor’s child-support prosecution reason for striking Kevin Stevens, venire member 213, as follows: Judge, for the record, and to preserve the record, we’re going to object to the last strike, Kevin Stevens, No. 213. The District Attorney gave the reason being he’s going to be in child support court. There’s no indication that there’s any problem with him being in child support with any animosity towards the District Attorney’s Office or him going to court. The mere fact that he’s appeared in court is no reason why he should be struck from the jury. Even as to Stevens, Lee’s counsel did not dispute the truth of the factual premise of prosecutor Greene’s stated reason that Stevens was going to be in a child-support hearing prosecuted by Greene’s office, but argued only that it was no valid reason to strike that venire member. In response, Greene explained that his office prosecuted child-support cases and “[u]nfortunately that tends to create some difficulty with defendants that come before the Court. They feel somehow we’re prosecuting them for a crime.” The trial court then stated to the defense: “All right, I’m going to overrule your motion.” After closing arguments in the guilt phase and outside the jury’s presence, 62 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 63 of 128 the trial court determined that one juror had not appeared for trial that day, Darrell Minter, a black juror, and therefore, an alternate juror would be used. The two alternate jurors were the last strikes of the State (Kevin Stevens, who is black) and the defense (Melinda Poe, who is white). Without objection, the trial court seated Stevens. Consequently, even with the use of an alternate, Lee’s jury was still 75% black. The trial court observed that “since Kevin Stevens was the only one defense objected to on Batson [grounds], I guess that takes care of that too.” In his direct appeal, Lee raised several new Batson arguments that were not made in the trial court. We focus on the state appellate court’s decision because it is the last reasoned decision of the state courts on Lee’s Batson claim. See Greene v. Upton, 644 F.3d 1145, 1155 (11th Cir. 2011); Sweet v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311, 1317 (11th Cir. 2006).
The state appellate court’s analysis of Lee’s Batson claim proceeded in the following way. The court correctly identified Batson as the applicable test, and stated that “[a]fter the appellant makes a timely Batson motion and establishes a prima facie showing of discrimination [step one], the burden shifts to the state to provide a race-neutral reason for each strike of a minority veniremember [step two].” Lee I, 898 So. 2d at 813. Consistent with Batson’s step three, the state appellate court observed that it would “reverse the circuit court’s ruling on the 63 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 64 of 128 Batson motion only if it is ‘clearly erroneous.’” Id. After reviewing these Batson principles, the state appellate court implicitly turned to Batson’s first step and stated that Lee’s trial counsel objected on Batson grounds “after the State used all of its peremptory strikes against black veniremembers.” Id. at 812. The court recounted the manner in which Lee’s Batson objection was raised and evaluated in the trial court. It noted that after the jury was struck, but before it was sworn, Lee’s trial counsel had made a Batson motion, and the trial court had required the prosecutor to state his reasons for exercising the State’s peremptory strikes. Id. The appellate court also noted that the prosecutor had first observed that most of the State’s strikes were made based on potential jurors’ opposition to the death penalty. Id. But then the prosecutor had provided specific reasons for each of the State’s 21 peremptory strikes. Id. at 812–13. Despite the fact that at trial Lee had specifically objected to only the raceneutral reason given for striking venire member 213, Kevin Stevens, the state appellate court still evaluated in great detail all of the prosecutor’s strike reasons to determine whether each was race-neutral. The court even reproduced in full the prosecutor’s statement of the race-neutral reasons, given venire member-by-venire member, for each of the State’s 21 peremptory strikes. Id. at 812–13. Consistent with step two of Batson, the state appellate court then assessed 64 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 65 of 128 whether the prosecutor’s proffered reasons were race-neutral. See id. at 813–15. To begin with, it observed that opposition to or even reservation about the death penalty is a “reasonable explanation” for the exercise of a peremptory strike. Id. at 813. Therefore, according to the state appellate court, the reason stated for striking venire members 17 (Angela Blythe), 56 (Jerry Edwards), 100 (Jessica Howard), 23 (Mona Brown), 5 (Sherry Baker), 126 (Mary Kelley), 171 (Genett Pettway), 155 (Josephine Murry), 123 (Towanda Jones), 105 (Ethel Hunter), 246 (Johnny Wilmer), 146 (Mary Mitchell), and 57 (Annie Ellis), which was their opposition to the death penalty, was a valid race-neutral reason. Id. at 813–14. As noted earlier, Lee’s trial counsel did not dispute that these 13 venire members’ voir dire answers indicated that they were opposed to the death penalty.15 Further, it is not surprising that the State focused particularly on the venire members’ views of the death penalty, because the overwhelming evidence of Lee’s guilt meant the main fight would be about the sentence. The state appellate court then addressed Lee’s challenge to the strike of venire member 194, Alice Scott, on the basis of her arrest record. The court agreed that an arrest record is a valid race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory 15 In his direct appeal and before this Court, Lee does not dispute that the state trial court record showed that during voir dire these 13 black venire members answered at least one question by stating that they were opposed to the death penalty. Rather, as discussed later, Lee before this Court primarily challenges the State’s reasons for striking two other black venire members: David Gutridge and Demond Martin. 65 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 66 of 128 strike. Id. at 814. The court next turned to the strikes of venire members 139 (Demond Martin), 86 (David Gutridge), 88 (Johnnie Hall), 149 (Ora Moore), and 191 (Vernell Saterfield). See id. The prosecutor had stated that he struck: (1) Demond Martin because of his opposition to the death penalty and his arrest record; (2) Johnnie Hall because of his opposition to the death penalty, his unwillingness to answer questions about it, and his arrest record; (3) Ora Moore because she was opposed to the death penalty, she did not want to serve, and she was uncooperative in answering questions; (4) Vernell Saterfield because she generally opposed the death penalty, her husband had been charged with a crime and found not guilty, and she herself had been in an altercation; and (5) David Gutridge because he had a family member who was convicted of a property crime, he was opposed to the death penalty, and he was uncooperative in answering questions. The court concluded that all those reasons were valid race-neutral reasons. Id. at 813–14. Turning to venire member 1, Quintin Alexander, the prosecutor had stated the reason for that strike was that Alexander knew Lee and his family and Alexander was uncomfortable about it. The court agreed this was a valid raceneutral reason. Id. at 814. After confirming that each of the prosecutor’s reasons for the State’s peremptory strikes was race-neutral, the appellate court turned to other arguments 66 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 67 of 128 Lee raised for the first time on direct appeal: that those race-neutral reasons were actually pretexts for racial discrimination. Id. at 815. Proceeding to the Batson step three inquiry, the court addressed Lee’s arguments concerning each venire member for whom Lee, on direct appeal, claimed the State’s specific race-neutral reasons were pretextual. In his direct appeal, Lee’s brief argued that all of the State’s 21 peremptory strikes were pretextual. As examples of that pretext, Lee’s brief primarily discussed the State’s strikes of seven venire members: Kevin Stevens, Josephine Murry, Johnnie Hall, Ora Moore, David Gutridge, Alice Scott, and Demond Martin. The court first considered Lee’s pretext argument concerning Kevin Stevens, which was the only pretext argument actually made before the state trial court. Since Stevens was later put on the jury, the court found Lee’s argument moot. Id. Because Lee had not raised his other pretext arguments before the trial court, the appellate court evaluated the rest of Lee’s pretext challenges for plain error under Alabama Rule of Appellate Procedure 45A. Id. Although issues not raised in trial courts are usually waived, Alabama’s Rule 45A requires the state appellate court in death penalty cases to review such issues for plain error.16 16 Alabama Rule 45A provides: In all cases in which the death penalty has been imposed, the Court of Criminal Appeals shall notice any plain error or defect in the proceedings under review, whether or not brought to the attention of the trial court, and take appropriate 67 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 68 of 128 The state appellate court then evaluated the plausibility of each of the prosecutor’s contested reasons in light of the trial record. Lee I, 898 So. 2d at 815–17. The court concluded that the record did not support Lee’s contentions that the prosecutor’s strike reasons were false and did not demonstrate disparate treatment between black and white venire members. See id. First, the court considered Lee’s argument that the State did not strike white venire member Melinda Poe even though she was previously challenged for cause based on her opposition to the death penalty. The state trial court had denied the State’s challenge of Poe for cause on this basis, stating, “I didn’t have that” she could not impose the death penalty. Id. at 815. Lee contrasted Poe with the State’s strikes against black venire members Josephine Murry and David Gutridge, who were struck by the State based on opposition to the death penalty despite the fact that their opposition was also disputed in the record. Id. The appellate court noted the places in the voir dire transcript in which Murry wavered on the issue of whether she supported or opposed the death penalty. At various points, Murry said the death penalty was “a proper thing,” she could “weigh the evidence and make a decision based on the evidence,” but also stated she was “realizing [she] wasn’t in favor of the death penalty because people appellate action by reason thereof, whenever such error has or probably has adversely affected the substantial right of the appellant. Ala. R. App. P. 45A (emphasis added). 68 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 69 of 128 were innocent” and “the reason [she] would say not the death penalty is because if [Lee] was innocent and he [was] killed . . . it wouldn’t do any good to kill him.” Id. The court concluded that Murry was not similarly situated to white venire member Poe, and thus Poe could not serve as a comparator for purposes of Lee’s pretext argument as to the strike of Murry. Id. Considering the other alleged comparator to Poe, black venire member Gutridge, the court agreed that the prosecutor was mistaken in stating that Gutridge opposed the death penalty. Gutridge had indicated that he could listen to the evidence and consider life imprisonment. Id. But the court noted that the prosecutor could exercise a peremptory strike based on a mistake, so long as it was an honest and race-neutral mistake. Id. “The record does not indicate that the prosecutor’s reason was not based on an honest belief,” and moreover, the prosecutor had an additional reason for the strike: Gutridge had a family member convicted of a property crime. Id. at 816. Thus, the court concluded that Gutridge and Poe were also not similarly situated. Id. In sum, the court found no disparate treatment with respect to Poe, Murry, and Gutridge, and therefore no plain error.17 17 At the time of Lee’s direct appeal, “[i]n considering what constitutes plain error in a capital case,” Alabama appellate courts followed “the interpretation given that term by the federal courts.” See Hardy v. State, 804 So. 2d 247, 276 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); Bush v. State, 695 So. 2d 70, 87 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); see also Davis v. State, 740 So. 2d 1115, 1118 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998) (“The Alabama Supreme Court has adopted federal case law defining plain error . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 69 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 70 of 128 Id. Next, the court addressed Lee’s argument that the prosecutor’s reason for striking several black venire members (Scott, Hall, and Martin) due to their arrest records was not supported by the record. Id. The court rejected this argument, observing that the prosecutor had documentation regarding the venire members’ criminal histories and, before the parties made challenges for cause, the State provided the defense with “a copy of the criminal history on the venire.” Id. The court also pointed out that the state trial court had assured defense counsel that it would allow the defense time to review the records before striking the jury. Therefore, the court concluded, Lee’s argument that this arrest reason was pretextual was not supported by the record, and the court found no plain error. Id. The court next addressed the prosecutor’s strikes against Johnnie Hall, Ora Moore, and David Gutridge based on demeanor. The court noted that: (1) demeanor and reluctance to answer questions were race-neutral reasons for exercising strikes; (2) Lee did not dispute the prosecutor’s assertions regarding Ex Parte Womack, 435 So. 2d 766, 769 (Ala. 1983)). Under Alabama law, these four factors identified in United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S. Ct. 1770 (1993), are the test for plain error: (1) whether there is error; (2) whether the error is plain; (3) whether the error affects substantial rights; and (4) if the first three factors are present, whether, in the court’s discretion, correcting the error is appropriate because the error seriously affects “the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” See Thomas v. State, 824 So. 2d 1, 12–13 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted), overruled on other grounds by Ex parte Carter, 889 So. 2d 528, 533 (Ala. 2004). 70 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 71 of 128 these venire members’ demeanor at trial; and (3) the prosecutor offered additional, race-neutral reasons for each of these strikes. Id. The court could not “find that there was any plain error in this regard.” Id. The court next addressed Lee’s argument that the State engaged in disparate treatment of black and white venire members with similar feelings regarding the death penalty when the State did not strike Melissa Speigner, a white venire member, but struck Murry, a black venire member. Id. The state appellate court noted that during voir dire, Speigner initially indicated she opposed the death penalty, but later said that she would be able to listen to the evidence and recommend either death or life imprisonment based on the evidence. Id. As noted above, Murry similarly wavered on the appropriateness of the death penalty, but later added that she had subsequently realized she was not in favor of the death penalty and that “it wouldn’t do any good to kill [Lee].” Id. The court concluded that Speigner and Murry were not similarly situated. Id. at 816–17. Speigner ultimately said that she would consider the death penalty and would vote based on the evidence presented. In contrast, Murry ultimately stated that although she could weigh the evidence and make a decision based on that evidence, she probably would not impose the death penalty. Id. at 817. Thus, because the two venire members were not similarly situated, the court concluded that Lee had shown no plain error in the State’s strike of Murry and its retention of 71 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 72 of 128 Speigner. Id. Next, the state appellate court reviewed Lee’s argument that the State had discriminated in its treatment of black venire members who had been accused of or charged with a property crime or who had family members or friends who had. Specifically, Lee asserted that the State did not strike white venire member Edwin Ember, who had indicated that he or a family member had been accused of or charged with a property crime, but it struck black venire member Gutridge who indicated the same. Id. The court observed that Lee’s trial counsel used his own 12th peremptory strike against Ember, and the State used its 19th peremptory strike against Gutridge. “Because the defense had long since struck veniremember [Ember] when the State struck veniremember [Gutridge], we do not find that there was any plain error in this regard.” Id. Having reviewed the state appellate court’s Batson decision, we turn to AEDPA’s highly deferential standard for evaluating that state court ruling.