Opinion ID: 170350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lack of Scienter and Vagueness/Overbreadth

Text: Fields contends that aggravators relating to the infliction of anguish or other special suffering on the part of a victim are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad unless narrowed by a scienter tied to the suffering caused. Fields's reference to vagueness here involves a confusion of constitutional concepts. As we have seen, the vagueness principle has to do with whether an aggravator `has some commonsense core of meaning . . . that criminal juries should be capable of understanding.' Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630 (quotation marks omitted). This core of meaning is lacking if an aggravator leave[s] the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining [its] presence or absence. McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1110 (internal quotation marks omitted). Fields is not claiming that mental anguish lacks a commonsense core of meaning, leaving it too vague to apply. Rather, his objection is that this concept has too large a range of application, i.e., that it is overbroad and must be narrowed by the addition of a scienter requirement. We therefore construe Fields' objection as one of overbreadth only. Fields cites Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), and Wade v. Calderon, 29 F.3d 1312 (9th Cir.1994), to support his objection. These cases are inapposite. Both involved overbreadth challenges to aggravators that under the operative capital schemes were prerequisites in the eligibility determination. [11] At the eligibility stage, aggravators have a distinct constitutional function: narrowing the range of conduct for which the death penalty may even be considered. See Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998) (contrasting eligibility and selection stages of sentencing); Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 971-75, 114 S.Ct. 2630 (same). Obviously, this narrowing function is inherently related to overbreadth concerns, as Walton and Wade reflect. In contrast, non-statutory aggravators play no role in the eligibility determination under the FDPA, but are relevant only in the weighing process at the ensuing sentence-selection stage. There, the critical constitutional imperative is no longer narrowing the range of potential defendants eligible for the death penalty but, rather, ensuring that the jury focuses on the particular case before it and makes an individualized determination whether the death-eligible defendant should in fact receive that sentence . . . on the basis of [his] character . . . and the circumstances of the crime. Tuilaepa, 512 U.S. at 972, 114 S.Ct. 2630 (internal quotation marks omitted). We do have relevant guidance from the Supreme Court, however. In Jones v. United. States, 527 U.S. 373, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999), the Court expressly considered the overbreadth of non-statutory aggravators under the FDPAand aggravators (vulnerable victim and victim impact) that focused on the victim rather than the defendant and thus had no scienter requirement. Indeed, the Court remarked that this was the first time it had specifically considered what it means for a factor to be overbroad when it is important only for selection purposes and especially when it sets forth victim vulnerability or victim impact evidence. Id. at 401, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). While the selection stage does' not involve the narrowing function that is of primary importance at the eligibility stage, the Court identified another function relevant to both: protection against bias or caprice in the sentencing decision through the use of factors that direct the jury to the individualized circumstances of the case. Id. at 402, 119 S.Ct. 2090 (internal quotation marks omitted). This is, of course, consistent with Tuilaepa 's characterization of the selection stage, noted above, which Jones quoted. Id. Based on this functional understanding of non-statutory aggravators, the Court upheld the victim-centered (and scienter-less) aggravators against the overbreadth challenge not because they narrowed the category of cases in which the death penalty applied, but [b]ecause [they] directed the jury to the evidence specific to this case and for that reason were not overbroad in a way that offended the Constitution. Id. at 402 (emphasis added). Under Jones, the mental-anguish aggravator in the present case was not overbroad. Regardless of its lack of a scienter requirement, it clearly directed the jury to focus on evidence specific to the particular victim and crime in this case, thereby satisfying the overarching function of a nonstatutory aggravator.