Opinion ID: 768583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spath's Disparate Treatment Claim

Text: 17 The ADA makes it unlawful to discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(a). To establish a claim of discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate: '(1) that [he was] disabled within the meaning of the ADA, (2) that [his] work performance met [his] employer's legitimate expectations, (3) that [he] was discharged, and (4) that the circumstances surrounding [his] . . . discharge indicate that it is more likely than not that [his] disability was the reason for these adverse actions.' Patterson v. Chicago Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 725 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Leffel v. Valley Fin. Servs., 113 F.3d 787, 794 (7th Cir. 1997)). 18
19 Initially, Spath argues that Hayes Wheels did not terminate Helblig, 6 a non-disabled employee, who also violated Plant Rule 5 by submitting false information concerning Spath's injury. Spath uses this fact to argue that his employer treated a similarly situated, non- disabled employee better than it treated him, and that we should therefore conclude that his employer terminated him because of his disability. See Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994). 20 It is true that Helblig worked with Spath on the day Spath was injured and told Guenin, at the time of the initial investigation, that Spath was injured when he was sweeping. However, it is also the case that Helblig, unlike Spath, recanted his original story after Desai questioned him a second time; Helblig admitted to Desai that he and Spath were engaged in horseplay and it was that which led to Spath's accident. After Helblig informed Desai that his earlier version of events surrounding Spath's injury was false, Desai prepared a statement, which Helblig signed, in which Helblig again admitted that he had lied to Guenin during the initial investigation of Spath's injury. In contrast, Spath never told any of the investigators of his accident that he was engaged in horseplay until halfway through his termination meeting. 21 Spath's argument that he and Helblig are similarly situated is misplaced. It is fundamental that to make a comparison of a discrimination plaintiff's treatment to that of non-[disabled] employees, the plaintiff must show that the 'comparables' are similarly situated in all respects. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original). 22 In our opinion, when reviewing the respective employee histories of Spath and Helblig, it is obvious that they are not similarly situated employees in all respects. Although both employees initially furnished false information to Guenin, the similarities between them end there. Although Helblig also originally gave a false version of events concerning the accident to Guenin, he later rescinded his false statement both by telling Desai the truth and by signing a statement containing an accurate recitation of the facts concerning the accident. Spath, on the other hand, persisted in giving false statements regarding the cause of the accident and his injury until the zero hour, when he finally admitted he was engaged in horseplay at his termination meeting. Furthermore, Spath, unlike Helblig, on two separate occasions falsified written company documents, the Supervisor's First Report of Injury and the Employee Incident Report. In short, Spath and Helblig did not engage in conduct of comparable seriousness. See id. We hold that Helblig and Spath are not similarly situated employees and, therefore, no discriminatory intent can be inferred from the fact that Hayes Wheels did not terminate Helblig. See Kaniff v. Allstate Ins. Co., 121 F.3d 258, 263 (7th Cir. 1997); Mitchell, 964 F.2d at 583 & n.5. 23
24 Spath next attempts to establish discriminatory intent from his employers' comparatively more lenient investigations of non-disabled employees accused of falsifying company records in violation of Plant Rule 5. Spath argues that the court erred in not allowing discriminatory inferences to be drawn from these investigations which were without purpose, clandestine and scripted for Spath and purposeful and open for non-affected employees. Spath, however, offers no more than bare accusations in his brief that Hayes Wheels engaged in different methods of investigation for disabled and non-disabled employees. As we have repeatedly stated, [i]t is not this court's responsibility to research and construct the parties' arguments. United States v. Lanzotti, 205 F.3d 951, 957 (7th Cir. 2000). Where, as here, a party fails to develop the factual basis of a claim on appeal and, instead, merely draws and relies upon bare conclusions, the argument is deemed waived. See Bonds v. Coca-Cola Company, 806 F.2d 1324, 1328 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Morgan v. South Bend Community School Corp., 797 F.2d 471, 480 (7th Cir. 1986)); see e.g., Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., 77 F.3d 951, 965 (7th Cir. 1996) (failure to cite any factual or legal basis for an argument waives it); Bratton v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 173 n.1 (7th Cir. 1996) (argument that is not developed in any meaningful way is waived); Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, Benefits Review Bd., 957 F.2d 302, 305 (7th Cir. 1992) (there is no obligation to consider an issue that is merely raised [on appeal], but not developed, in a party's brief); United States v. Haddon, 927 F.2d 942, 956 (7th Cir. 1991) (A skeletal 'argument', really nothing more than an assertion, does not preserve a claim [for appellate review].); United States v. Berkowitz, 927 F.2d 1376, 1384 (7th Cir. 1991) (We repeatedly have made clear that perfunctory and undeveloped arguments . . . are waived . . . .). Consequently, we need not address this argument any further. 25 3. Hayes Wheels' Refusal to Allow Spath to Return to Work and Its Reduction of Spath's Overtime Hours 26 Finally, Spath attempts to establish discriminatory intent from, what he argues are, changes in Hayes Wheels' medical release policy. First, Spath contends that although Hayes Wheels had routinely allowed Spath to return to work after his seizures during his first nine years with the company with a release from any physician, it ceased doing so after his seizure on August 7, 1996. After this seizure, Hayes Wheels refused to accept a release from either the emergency room physician on duty when Spath appeared for treatment 7 or from Spath's regular physician, Dr. Matthew. Instead, Hayes Wheels told Spath that he could not return to work until he got a release from his neurologist, Dr. Stevens. Spath argues that this conduct was contrary to Hayes Wheels' medical release practice because, according to him, other employees on medical leave, who do not have a seizure disorder, were uniformly allowed to return to work upon presenting a release from any physician. 27 Second, Spath argues that in a separate departure from its medical release policy, Hayes Wheels reduced Spath's overtime after his seizure on December 5, 1996, despite the fact that it had not imposed work restrictions, which were not physician-approved, on him in the past. 28 Spath's allegations that Hayes Wheels' changes in its medical release policy should constitute evidence of discriminatory intent are unconvincing because the undisputed evidence in this case established that Hayes Wheels had a nine-year history of accommodating Spath's epileptic condition and his repeated seizures. It is apparent that his employer was concerned with Spath's safety and wanted to make sure that Spath was fit to return to work after his August 1996 seizure. In order to ensure this, Hayes Wheels, on this occasion, requested that Spath submit a medical release from a neurological specialist, specially qualified to evaluate epileptic disorders, rather than from a general practice physician. Furthermore, although Spath was unable to schedule an appointment with his neurologist for several weeks, Hayes Wheels again accommodated Spath and allowed him to return to work in the interim. In an internal memorandum Hayes Wheels explained its decision to allow Spath to return to work without a release from a neurologist: Rodney has been set up to see a specialist. A neurologist on Sept. 15th. He has pleaded with us to be able to come back to work. We have agreed to let him return but on day shift and on special projects where we can keep a close eye on him . . . until he can return to your shift with a clean bill of health. Consistent with its internal memorandum, Hayes Wheels allowed Spath to return to work full time, even changing his shift schedule, after the neurologist examined Spath and recommended that he only work first shift. We are of the opinion that the decision to require a release from a neurologist was justified, especially in this litigious society where Spath and/or other employees may have been injured as a result of one of Spath's seizures after his return to work. Furthermore, Hayes Wheels had, as even Spath concedes, accommodated Spath's seizures for over nine years. Consequently, we refuse to infer any discriminatory intent from Hayes Wheels' decision to request additional medical testing. Cf. Porter v. United States Alumoweld Co., 125 F.3d 243, 245-46 (4th Cir. 1997). 29 Similarly, Hayes Wheels' restriction of Spath's overtime was justified because Spath's supervisors observed that most of Spath's seizures occurred when he was working overtime. Thus, it was logical to believe that restricting Spath's overtime would, in all probability, reduce his fatigue factor and thus the number of seizures, as well as better ensure Spath's safety and the safety of his fellow employees. When combined with Hayes Wheels' long history of accommodating Spath, we refuse to hold that the restriction of his overtime evinces any discriminatory intent. Cf. Howard v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 904 F. Supp. 922, 930-31 (E.D. Wis. 1995), aff'd, 107 F.3d 13 (7th Cir. 1997). 30 Moreover, Spath has failed to demonstrate how the decisions to require a release from a neurologist or restrict his overtime are causally related to his termination, which occurred months later. See Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1014 (7th Cir. 1997) (requiring that a plaintiff making a claim of discrimination establish 'that the protected activity and the adverse action were not wholly unrelated.') (quoting Simmons v. Camden County Bd. of Educ., 757 F.2d 1187, 1189 (11th Cir. 1985)). Because Spath has failed to present any evidence of discriminatory intent, we hold that he has failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.