Opinion ID: 200762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instruction on Seatbelt Evidence

Text: 27 Hyundai's second challenge concerns the district court's instruction limiting the jury's consideration of the evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident. While the court permitted Hyundai to introduce evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt, it instructed the jury that its consideration of [e]vidence of whether or not Eduardo was seatbelted is ... for the limited purpose of deciding whether or not [Hyundai] has proved the superseding cause defense. 7 28 Hyundai asserts that the district court committed two errors in so limiting the jury's consideration of this evidence. First, it claims that the court should have instructed the jury that it could consider this evidence for the purpose of evaluating whether the Sonata's airbag system was negligently designed. 8 Second, it claims that the court should have instructed the jury that it could consider this evidence for the purpose of determining whether the negligently designed airbag system was a proximate cause of Eduardo's injuries. 9 29 The appropriate use of seatbelt evidence in crashworthiness cases has been a source of much controversy. See Gen. Motors Corp. v. Wolhar, 686 A.2d 170, 173 (Del. 1996). For a long period, many courts refused to permit the introduction of evidence that a victim was not wearing a seatbelt in a product liability action. See 2 Madden & Owen, Prod. Liab., § 21:7 (3d ed.2000). Courts provided several reasons for this resistance: there is no duty to mitigate damages prior to sustaining an injury; a defendant must take the plaintiff as it finds him or her; there is no common law duty to wear a seatbelt; and seatbelt evidence leads to excessive speculation by experts (and thus protracted litigation). See Swajian v. Gen. Motors Corp., 559 A.2d 1041, 1043 (R.I.1989). 30 State legislatures, in enacting mandatory seat belt laws, further complicated this issue by including limitations on the introduction of seatbelt evidence in civil trials. For example, New Hampshire's seatbelt law contains such a limitation. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 265:107-a IV. The statute requires minors to wear seatbelts but prohibits a defendant from proving comparative negligence through evidence that the plaintiff was not wearing his or her seatbelt. 10 Id. (stating that a violation of [the child passenger restraint law] shall not be used as evidence of contributory negligence in any civil action.); see Forsberg v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 769 F.Supp. 33, 36 (D.N.H.1990). 31 More recently, some courts have relaxed their skepticism to the introduction of seatbelt evidence in product liability actions. See, e.g., Jimenez v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 269 F.3d 439, 457 (4th Cir.2001); Wolhar, 686 A.2d at 176-77. However, in deciding whether to admit seatbelt evidence, courts carefully adhere to the limitations placed on the use of this evidence by state legislatures. See, e.g., Rougeau v. Hyundai Motor Am., 805 So.2d 147, 157 (La.2002); Ulm v. Ford Motor Co., 170 Vt. 281, 750 A.2d 981, 987-88 (2000). 32 As discussed above, the New Hampshire seatbelt law prohibits the introduction of seatbelt evidence for the purpose of establishing the comparative negligence of the plaintiff. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 265:107-a. It does not, however, prevent the admission of seatbelt evidence for other purposes. See id. Here, the district court permitted the jury to consider evidence that the Cabreras' Sonata was equipped with seatbelts in assessing the overall design of the airbag system. The court concluded, however, that whether Eduardo was actually wearing his seatbelt at the time of the accident was not relevant to the safety of the design. Thus, the court instructed the jury to ignore evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt for the purpose of deciding whether the Sonata's airbag system was negligently designed. 33 The district court's analysis was correct. To find a negligent design, the jury had to conclude that Hyundai failed to exercise reasonable care in designing a vehicle for those uses which could be reasonably foreseen in order to avoid an unreasonable risk of injury to the occupant. In assessing Hyundai's care in designing the airbag system, the jury could consider the Sonata's overall airbag system design and not merely the design of the airbag which struck Eduardo. See, e.g., Jimenez, 269 F.3d at 459; Wolhar, 686 A.2d at 175; Lowe v. Estate Motors Ltd., 428 Mich. 439, 410 N.W.2d 706, 719-20 (1987). Thus, as the district court concluded, the presence of safety devices in addition to the airbags ( e.g., seatbelts) could be relevant to the jury's determination of whether the Sonata's airbag system was negligently designed. Id. 34 But while the presence of seatbelts in the Sonata was potentially relevant to the negligent design issue, whether Eduardo actually was wearing his seatbelt during the accident was not. The point at which the jury was to determine whether Hyundai negligently designed the airbag system was the date when Hyundai sold the Sonata to the Cabreras in the summer of 1995. See Trull, 761 A.2d at 481; Chellman v. Saab-Scania AB, 138 N.H. 73, 637 A.2d 148, 150 (1993). Obviously, Eduardo's conduct on the day of the accident, over a year after the Cabreras bought the Sonata, was irrelevant to this determination. In short, Eduardo's conduct and its causal relation to [his] injuries [was] not relevant to the issue of the vehicle's design. Lowe, 410 N.W.2d at 720; see DePaepe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 33 F.3d 737, 746 (7th Cir.1994) (On retrial the district court should again permit [General Motors] to show that [plaintiff's car] was equipped with a functional restraint system and should again instruct the jury of the limited purpose of that evidence.); Hermann v. Gen. Motors Corp., 720 F.2d 414, 415 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that jury was properly instructed that it could consider the availability of seat belts in assessing dangerousness of car); LaHue v. Gen. Motors Corp., 716 F.Supp. 407, 418 (W.D.Mo.1989)(the defendants ... should be permitted to introduce evidence concerning whether seat belts were available and operable); Jordan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 624 F.Supp. 72, 75 (E.D.La.1985) (holding that plaintiff may introduce evidence on the availability of seat belts in determining whether the car, as designed, was unreasonably dangerous); Wolhar, 686 A.2d at 176 (concluding that presence of seatbelts is relevant to showing the vehicle's over-all safety design); Whitehead v. Am. Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 928 (Utah 1990) (concluding that presence of seatbelts in vehicle was relevant in assessing design). 35 Hyundai also argues that the district court's limiting instruction was erroneous because the jury could have relied on evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt to conclude that the negligent design was not the proximate cause of Eduardo's injuries. 11 Hyundai failed to properly preserve this argument. 36 Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 51, a party wishing to object to an instruction must raise the objection before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds of the objection. Our interpretation of Rule 51 is quite strict. See Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 134 (1st Cir.2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1001, 123 S.Ct. 485, 154 L.Ed.2d 397 (2002). It is well-settled in this Circuit that [e]ven if the initial request for an instruction is made in detail, the requesting party must object again after the instructions are given but before the jury retires for deliberations. Foley v. Commonwealth Elec. Co., 312 F.3d 517, 521 (1st Cir.2002); see Gray, 289 F.3d at 134; Smith v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 877 F.2d 1106, 1109 (1st Cir.1989). It is also well-settled that an objection on one ground does not preserve appellate review of a different ground. Negron v. Caleb Brett U.S.A., Inc., 212 F.3d 666, 672 (1st Cir.2000); see Cambridge Plating Co. v. Napco, Inc., 85 F.3d 752, 766 (1st Cir.1996). 37 Prior to trial, Hyundai requested an instruction informing the jury, inter alia, that it could consider the evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt [i]n deciding whether the allegedly defective airbag was the proximate cause of [his] death. The district court refused to give this instruction and instead instructed the jury that it could only consider the evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt on the issue of superseding cause. After the court instructed the jury and before the jury retired to deliberate, Hyundai objected to this instruction. However, at that time, Hyundai objected only on the ground that the jury should have been instructed that evidence of Eduardo's failure to wear his seatbelt could be considered in deciding if the Sonata's design was crashworthy. 12 This was not sufficient. 13 38 When an objection to a jury instruction is forfeited, we apply the plain error standard. See Gray, 289 F.3d at 134. To obtain relief under this standard, the party claiming error must show (1) an error, (2) that is plain ( i.e., obvious and clear under current law) (3) that is likely to alter the outcome, and (4) that is sufficiently fundamental to threaten the fairness or integrity or public reputation of the judicial process. See Babcock, 299 F.3d at 65. Plain error is reserved for only the most egregious circumstances. See Moore v. Murphy, 47 F.3d 8, 11 (1st Cir.1995). Such egregious circumstances do not exist here. 39 Hyundai has a plausible argument that the district court should have instructed the jury to consider the evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt on the issue of proximate cause. Indeed, some courts have so held. See MacDonald v. Gen. Motors Corp., 784 F.Supp. 486, 499 (M.D.Tenn.1992); LaHue, 716 F.Supp. at 416; Wolhar, 686 A.2d at 176-77. However, there is also substantial contrary authority. 14 See Milbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 105 F.Supp.2d 601, 606 (E.D.Tex.2000); Rougeau, 805 So.2d at 157; Swajian, 559 A.2d at 1046; Lowe, 410 N.W.2d at 720-21; Horn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 17 Cal.3d 359, 131 Cal.Rptr. 78, 551 P.2d 398, 404 (Ca.1976). As one treatise recently stated, the appropriateness of evidence of seat belt non-use (as opposed to availability) raises difficult issues apart from the defectiveness vel non of a vehicle's design, and the propriety of such evidence is not so clear. 2 Madden & Owen at § 21:7 (emphasis and parenthesis in original). In a similar vein, one court observed: 40 Enough has been written about the seatbelt defense to show the body of law related to it is split, fragmented and changing. It varies in time, place, rationale, effect and implementation. No doubt the law varies so much because the theory does not fit neatly into traditional tort doctrines of negligence (including duty, breach of duty and causation), strict liability, contributory negligence, mitigation of damages, avoidance of consequences, and comparative fault. 41 LaHue, 716 F.Supp. at 410 (internal citations omitted) (parenthesis in original). As should be evident, the most that can be said on this issue is that the law is unsettled. See United States v. Marino, 277 F.3d 11, 32 (1st Cir.2002) (concluding that there cannot be plain error where the law is unsettled), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 948, 122 S.Ct. 2639, 153 L.Ed.2d 819 (2002). Thus, to the extent that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury to consider evidence that Eduardo was not wearing his seatbelt on the proximate cause issue, the error was not so obvious or clear under current law that it can be considered a plain error. Babcock, 299 F.3d at 65.