Opinion ID: 6496730
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: conditional new trial order

Text: ¶97 Next, the district court conditionally granted SouthTowne a new trial because it concluded that certain testimony from two of Smith‘s experts—Leiss and Dr. Weaver— should have been excluded, and that without this testimony there was insufficient evidence to support Smith‘s claims. 17 Smith argues this was error because SouthTowne never made the objections that formed the basis of the court‘s ruling (therefore waiving them), the district court was wrong on the merits, and she was not given an opportunity to respond to the court‘s reasons for retroactively excluding the testimony. We find Smith‘s final argument to be persuasive. And because we reverse the __________________________________________________________ 17 The trial court analyzed SouthTowne‘s motion for a new trial under rule 59(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a new trial to be granted for ―insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision.‖ (The court identified the applicable rule as 59(a)(5), possibly due to a typographical error.) However, in its motion, SouthTowne argued it was deprived of a fair trial under rule 59(a)(1), which allows a court to grant a new trial based on ―irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or opposing party, or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which a party was prevented from having a fair trial.‖ UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(a)(1). 29 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court court‘s rulings excluding testimony from Leiss and Dr. Weaver on this basis, we must reverse the court‘s grant of a conditional new trial. ¶98 On cross appeal, SouthTowne argues that the district court should have granted its new trial motion on two other grounds, which the court rejected: (1) that Dr. Weaver should not have been permitted to opine on causation due to alleged reliability defects in his differential diagnosis, and (2) that Dr. Orrison‘s brain scans and opinions should not have been disclosed to the jury because he was a non-testifying witness and Smith did not make the necessary foundational showing of authenticity or reliability. SouthTowne also argues that in the event of a new trial, we should correct these erroneous rulings. But we conclude the court correctly rejected the arguments SouthTowne advances in its cross appeal. So they do not provide an alternative basis for affirming the grant of a conditional new trial. ¶99 Rule 50 requires a court that has granted a motion for judgment as a matter of law to ―also conditionally rule on any motion for a new trial by determining whether a new trial should be granted if the judgment is later vacated or reversed.‖ UTAH R. CIV. P. 50(c)(1). In doing so, ―[t]he court must state the grounds for conditionally granting or denying the motion for a new trial‖ under rule 59. Id. A court may grant a new trial if it determines ―evidence has been erroneously admitted during the course of a trial.‖ Franklin v. Stevenson, 1999 UT 61, ¶ 10, 987 P.2d 22. But ―[n]o error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence . . . is ground for granting a new trial . . . unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice.‖ UTAH R. CIV. P. 61. ¶100 ―Granting a new trial is an extreme remedy.‖ Boyle v. Christensen, 2011 UT 20, ¶ 17, 251 P.3d 810. And while we will not disturb a ruling on a motion for a new trial absent an abuse of discretion, we have made clear that ―[t]he power of a trial judge to order a new trial is to be used in those rare cases when a jury verdict is manifestly against the weight of the evidence.‖ Braithwaite v. W. Valley City Corp., 921 P.2d 997, 1001 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion exists where ―the district court relied on an erroneous conclusion of law,‖ Northgate Vill. Dev., LC v. City of Orem, 2019 UT 59, ¶ 27, 450 P.3d 1117 (citation omitted), or ―where there is no evidentiary basis for the trial 30 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court court‘s ruling.‖ Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 63, 459 P.3d 276 (citation omitted). ¶101 In its new trial ruling, the district court noted that the ―area of most concern‖ to the court was ―the testimony of Mr. Leiss.‖ We therefore begin with Leiss‘s expert testimony.
¶102 As discussed, at trial Smith offered the opinion testimony of Peter Leiss—an accident reconstruction expert and mechanical engineer with twenty years of experience in the automotive engineering industry, including in quality control for diesel fuel systems. Leiss was called to testify as to whether the diesel fuel spill could have generated carbon monoxide, and if so, whether there was a passageway for the carbon monoxide to travel from the engine compartment into the passenger compartment of Smith‘s car. The district court held that the latter issue was ―well within [Leiss‘s] bailiwick as an automotive engineer,‖ rendering its resolution a ―factual determination for the jury.‖ But the court found fault with Leiss‘s reliance on the test conducted by the lab technician at Robson Forensics, see supra ¶ 18, which the court referred to as the ―fish tank test.‖ ¶103 The district court concluded that it had erred in admitting Leiss‘s testimony ―as it relates to the alleged production of [carbon monoxide] based on the fish tank test . . . because it was unreliable and prejudicial‖ to SouthTowne. In reaching its ruling, the court took particular umbrage at Leiss‘s reliance on an ―unidentified ‗lab technician‘ . . . working at [Leiss‘s] place of employment‖ who performed the test. The court also deemed the test inadmissible because Leiss was not a chemist and therefore was not qualified to assess the reliability of the test himself. The court also noted that during his trial testimony, Leiss was unable to answer a number of questions about the testing methods used. ¶104 The court essentially determined that Leiss‘s reliance on the test did not meet the standards of Utah Rule of Evidence 703, which permits experts to ―base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed.‖ Under this rule, an expert‘s opinion may be based on otherwise inadmissible ―facts or data‖ that the expert has been made aware of, provided that ―experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.‖ UTAH R. EVID. 703. If the proponent of the opinion intends to disclose the underlying ―facts or data‖ to the jury, and the facts or data are otherwise inadmissible (for 31 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court example, because they are hearsay), the proponent may do so ―only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.‖ Id. ¶105 The district court then concluded that because Leiss‘s opinion was based on an unreliable test for which he had provided insufficient foundation, his opinion that carbon monoxide could have been produced under Smith‘s hood was inadmissible under Utah Rule of Evidence 702(b). This rule mandates that any ―[s]cientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge‖ serving as the basis for expert testimony must meet ―a threshold showing that the principles or methods . . . underlying . . . the testimony (1) are reliable, (2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (3) have been reliably applied to the facts.‖ UTAH R. EVID. 702(b). ¶106 Smith first argues that SouthTowne waived this argument because it did not object to the test for the reasons relied upon by the district court either before or during trial or in its post-trial motions, and that, therefore, the district court‘s order should be reversed on this basis. ¶107 SouthTowne does not respond to Smith‘s waiver argument in its appellee brief. And it does not dispute Smith‘s assertion that it did not raise the particular objections relied upon by the district court. ¶108 Our independent review of the record confirms that SouthTowne did not raise these specific objections to Leiss‘s testimony. To be clear, in its pre-trial motion in limine, SouthTowne did object to Leiss testifying that the leaking diesel fuel created carbon monoxide in Smith‘s car. But it objected for a different reason. SouthTowne argued not that the laboratory test was unreliable, that the qualifications or identity of the lab technician were unknown, or that, as a non-chemist, Leiss was unqualified to judge whether the test was reliable or whether the technician was qualified. Rather, SouthTowne argued that Leiss should not be allowed to opine about carbon monoxide production in Smith‘s engine compartment because the test did not replicate the conditions inside the engine compartment of a moving vehicle. In this regard, SouthTowne and its experts took particular issue with the fact that the aquarium test was done in an enclosure and therefore did not account for air flow. In its reply brief in support of its motion in limine in the district court, SouthTowne explained: 32 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court The reliability issue with respect to Mr. Leiss concerns the manner in which he proposes to apply his aquarium test to the facts of this case . . . . There are problems with this detection method . . . . Defendants concede, however, that this particular problem with the test goes to weight and will counter it with [expert] testimony . . . . The Rule 702 problem arises from the way in which Mr. Leiss proposes to extrapolate from his aquarium results to conditions under the hood, and inside the passenger compartment, of the Smith vehicle. ¶109 So, in its motion in limine, SouthTowne did not challenge the admissibility of the test itself, the qualifications of the lab technician, or Leiss‘s reliance on the test. In fact, in criticizing one of the methods the lab technician used, SouthTowne recognized this went only to the weight to be given the evidence rather than the admissibility of the test itself. ¶110 SouthTowne also did not object to the admission of the test results during trial. During Leiss‘s direct examination, Smith offered the laboratory test results as an exhibit. The court asked SouthTowne if it had any objection to the exhibit, to which SouthTowne answered, ―No.‖18 ¶111 So Smith is correct that SouthTowne did not challenge Leiss‘s testimony for the reasons relied upon by the district court either before or during trial. And SouthTowne also did not make an argument on this basis in its motion for a new trial. ¶112 Usually, this would be dispositive. See UTAH R. EVID. 103(a)(1) (requiring a party to ―timely object[] or move[] to strike‖ evidence it claims was erroneously admitted, and to ―state[] the specific ground‖ upon which the objection was lodged). But here, it is not the end of the analysis. Under civil rule 59(d), a court may grant a motion for a new trial ―for a reason not stated‖ in a party‘s motion ―[a]fter giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.‖ UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(d). ¶113 In scrutinizing Leiss‘s testimony as it did, the district court was properly observing its role as gatekeeper with respect __________________________________________________________ 18 This may have been because SouthTowne‘s experts relied on similar tests, with variations to account for air flow. See supra ¶¶ 25–27. 33 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court to the admissibility of expert testimony.19 The court raised concerns with Leiss‘s reliance on the aquarium test based on its front-row seat at the trial. And rule 59(d) permitted the court to grant a new trial for a reason not raised by SouthTowne in its new trial motion. So SouthTowne‘s failure to preserve this issue is not dispositive. However, as we will discuss, when a court proceeds under rule 59(d), it must give the non-moving party notice of its concerns and an opportunity to be heard. __________________________________________________________ 19 In its amicus brief, UDLA requests clarification of the proper application of admissibility determinations under rule 702, noting confusion over advisory language in the 2007 amendment. Specifically, UDLA argues that our advisory language ―incorrectly downplays the district court‘s important gatekeeping function,‖ thereby encouraging trial judges to include expert testimony ―so long as it can be said that any basic indication of reliability exists, no matter how far-fetched.‖ UDLA asks us to ―reject any reading of the advisory language that would discourage judges from asserting [their gatekeeping] role.‖ UDLA accurately notes that our advisory language departs from the federal rule by broadening the scope of ―[s]cientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge‖ on which an expert may rely. See UTAH R. EVID. 702 & original advisory committee notes. But this does not suggest that trial judges should abdicate their gatekeeping role. Instead, rule 702 permits judges, as gatekeepers, to err on the side of admission within the confines of rule 702. ―[T]he rigor of [the rule‘s application] ‗will vary depending on the complexity of the particular case.‘‖ State v. Roberts, 2015 UT 24, ¶ 54, 345 P.3d 1226 (quoting Eskelson ex rel. Eskelson v. Davis Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 2010 UT 59, ¶ 15, 242 P.3d 762). Judges are compelled to exclude expert testimony where it is unhelpful, unreliable, unduly prejudicial, or has improperly invaded the province of the jury. See State v. Martin, 2017 UT 63, ¶¶ 30–31, 423 P.3d 1254. But judges may not ―displace the province of the factfinder to weigh . . . evidence.‖ State v. Jones, 2015 UT 19, ¶ 26, 345 P.3d 1195. And although ―the line between assessing reliability and weighing evidence can be elusive‖ under rule 702, ―the factfinder [and not arbiter] bears the ultimate responsibility for evaluating the accuracy, reliability, and weight of the testimony.‖ Id. (quoting Gunn Hill Dairy Props., LLC v. L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power, 2012 UT App 20, ¶ 47, 269 P.3d 980). 34 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court ¶114 Smith next argues that the district court was wrong on the merits. She contends that Leiss did know who performed the lab test and it was reasonable for Leiss to rely on the results of the test. First, Smith proffers Leiss‘s deposition testimony, in which he identifies the technician conducting the lab test as the ―test lab manager, Brett Johnson,‖ and she highlights a portion of Leiss‘s trial testimony in which he states that the technician does this kind of testing ―very often,‖ he is ―knowledgeable‖ and ―well versed‖ in this kind of testing, and experts at Robson Forensics typically rely on the technician. And she argues that she never had the opportunity to offer this response to the district court‘s concerns. ¶115 We ultimately do not resolve whether the district court‘s conclusion that it should have excluded this portion of Leiss‘s testimony was correct. This is because we find Smith‘s related argument—that she was not given the opportunity to respond to the court‘s concerns—to be dispositive. ¶116 While rule 59(d) permits a district court to grant a motion for a new trial for a reason not advanced by the moving party, a court may do this only ―[a]fter giving the parties notice and an opportunity to be heard.‖20 UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(d). See also Salt Lake Legal Def. Ass’n v. Atherton, 2011 UT 58, ¶ 12, 267 P.3d 227 (explaining that due process mandates a party ―be given notice and an opportunity to be heard‖ before a judge ―adjudicate[s] its interests‖). This means that the non-moving party must be given ―timely and adequate notice‖ and an ―opportunity to be heard in a meaningful way.‖ Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah 1983). We have described this as ―the very heart of procedural fairness.‖ Id. ¶117 Here, Smith was not on notice of the substance of the court‘s concerns prior to the hearing on SouthTowne‘s post-trial motions because SouthTowne had not raised these issues in its new trial motion. We recognize that an issue may become apparent to a court during argument on a post-trial motion, and thus make prior notice impossible. In such a situation, a court can __________________________________________________________ 20 We do not explicate upon the issues a court may properly raise sua sponte when granting a motion for a new trial, except to emphasize that it may do so only after giving the parties fair notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. 35 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court ensure procedural fairness by giving the non-moving party additional time to address the new issue raised by the court. ¶118 In addition to lack of notice, Smith did not have a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the court‘s objections to the lab test. After the hearing, Smith attempted to submit an affidavit from Leiss to respond to the district court‘s concerns, but the court rejected the affidavit as an inappropriate attempt to add substantive evidence to the trial record. However, deposition testimony, affidavits, or other pertinent evidence may be admitted as information relevant to the court‘s legal determination regarding the admissibility of evidence. See UTAH R. EVID. 104(a) (―The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a witness is qualified . . . or evidence is admissible. In so deciding, the court is not bound by evidence rules, except those on privilege.‖); see also State v. Sheehan, 2012 UT App 62, ¶ 28, 273 P.3d 417 (―[T]here are two separate reliability determinations: admissibility, which is a legal determination the court makes, and the weight assigned to the evidence admitted at trial, which is a factual determination made by the fact finder.‖); Goebel v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 215 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th Cir. 2000) (―It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine how to perform its gatekeeping function under Daubert. The most common method for fulfilling this function is a Daubert hearing, although such a process is not specifically mandated. The district court may also satisfy its gatekeeper role when asked to rule on a motion in limine, on an objection during trial, or on a post-trial motion so long as the court has sufficient evidence to perform ‗the task of ensuring that an expert‘s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.‘‖ (second emphasis added) (citations omitted)). ¶119 Where a court is considering granting a new trial based on concerns outside those raised by the moving party, rule 59(d) requires the court to ensure that the non-moving party has adequate notice of the new issues and a meaningful opportunity to address them before granting the motion. Because this did not happen here, we reverse the court‘s new trial ruling excluding the portion of Leiss‘s testimony that relied on the aquarium test.21 __________________________________________________________ 21 However, we note that even if this portion of Leiss‘s testimony were excluded, it would not necessarily render the evidence at trial insufficient to justify the verdict under rule (continued . . .) 36 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court
¶120 Smith next challenges the district court‘s grant of SouthTowne‘s new trial motion based on the court‘s conclusion that it should not have admitted Dr. Weaver‘s testimony. We reverse this ruling as well, because it is based on an issue SouthTowne did not raise in its new trial motion, and Smith did not have notice of or a meaningful opportunity to respond to the court‘s concerns with Dr. Weaver‘s testimony. ¶121 Dr. Weaver opined that Smith had suffered carbon monoxide exposure while driving her Volkswagen to Washington in December 2011. He based this opinion on a review of Smith‘s medical files, on his experience diagnosing carbon monoxide poisoning, on an in-person evaluation of Smith—which included physical and neurological examinations, an interview about Smith‘s medical history, and on a battery of written questionnaires and assessments, and on his elimination of other potential causes. The process of identifying the cause of an injury by eliminating other potential causes—a process referred to as a ―differential diagnosis‖—is generally considered a reliable method supporting expert testimony. See Alder v. Bayer Corp., AGFA Div., 2002 UT 115, ¶ 63, 61 P.3d 1068. ¶122 But although this method is generally accepted, the district court found Dr. Weaver‘s diagnosis problematic because the court believed Dr. Weaver was unaware of ―a second possible source of [carbon monoxide] poisoning‖—a period of time in which Smith became homeless and lived in her car. For this reason, the court ruled that SouthTowne‘s motion for a new trial should be granted because ―Dr. Weaver‘s testimony regarding the source of Plaintiff‘s [carbon monoxide] poisoning was not properly supported by substantial competent evidence.‖ ¶123 Smith argues that SouthTowne waived this objection. She is correct. SouthTowne‘s argument at trial and in its motion for a new trial was that Dr. Weaver‘s differential diagnosis was unreliable because Smith had an upper respiratory infection when she drove to Washington, and Dr. Weaver failed to reliably rule 59(a)(6). As discussed above, see supra ¶¶ 58–70, the lab test results and Leiss‘s corresponding testimony were not the only evidence from which the jury could have reasonably inferred that the diesel fuel leaking onto Smith‘s engine compartment produced carbon monoxide. 37 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court out the respiratory infection as the cause of Smith‘s symptoms. And that is a substantively different argument than the court‘s concern that Dr. Weaver had not ruled out the period when Smith lived in her car. ¶124 But again, waiver is not dispositive here. See supra ¶ 112. The court had the authority under rule 59(d) to grant a new trial for reasons not raised by SouthTowne in its new trial motion. ¶125 Smith also challenges the merits of the court‘s ruling. She asserts that the court‘s objection to Dr. Weaver‘s differential diagnosis was factually incorrect because Dr. Weaver did consider that Smith lived in her car for a period of time and ruled it out as a possible cause of her carbon monoxide poisoning. Smith proffers evidence in support of her argument, and again protests that she was not given the opportunity to respond to the court‘s concern. ¶126 As with Leiss, we do not resolve this issue on the merits. Rather, we again find dispositive Smith‘s argument that she did not have an adequate opportunity to be heard on this issue. Because SouthTowne did not raise this issue in its post-trial motion, the court was required to give Smith ―notice and an opportunity to be heard‖ before granting the motion for this reason. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 59(d). But since SouthTowne did not ask for a new trial on this basis, Smith did not have notice prior to the hearing that this would be an issue. And although she stated at the hearing that the issue had not been briefed and she was learning of it for the first time, she was not given any additional time to respond to it. Accordingly, we conclude that the requirements of rule 59(d) were not met. And we reverse the court‘s new trial ruling excluding Dr. Weaver‘s testimony. ¶127 The court‘s grant of a new trial was based on its exclusion of testimony from Leiss and Dr. Weaver. Because we have reversed these underlying rulings, we reverse the conditional grant of a new trial in favor of SouthTowne.

¶128 On cross appeal, SouthTowne argues that the district court should have excluded Dr. Weaver‘s testimony because he failed to reliably apply the methodology of a differential diagnosis to account for Smith‘s other illnesses and symptoms around the same time she allegedly suffered carbon monoxide poisoning. SouthTowne made this argument in its motion for a new trial, and the district court rejected it. 38 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court ¶129 Under Utah Rule of Evidence 702(b)(2), a court may exclude expert testimony if that testimony is not based on sufficient facts or data. As such, expert testimony must rest on a reliable foundation. See Patey v. Lainhart, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 23, 977 P.2d 1193. Speaking specifically about the foundation necessary to opine on the issue of causation, in Patey, we explained that a ―declaration about causation is inadmissible ‗where an expert witness has not testified to sufficient facts on which to base his opinion.‘‖ Id. (citation omitted). In other words, under rule 702, ―[t]he expertise of the witness, his degree of familiarity with the necessary facts, and the logical nexus between his opinion and the facts adduced must be established.‖ Id. (citation omitted). ¶130 A differential diagnosis is a presumptively admissible diagnostic technique. See Alder, 2002 UT 115, ¶¶ 62–64 (―[D]ifferential diagnosis is one of the oldest and most widely used and recognized of all [diagnostic] methods.‖). And here, Dr. Weaver‘s expert testimony, ―based on accepted and standard methods and techniques‖ alongside sufficient facts and data to underpin those techniques, does not run afoul of rule 702. See id. ¶ 66. ¶131 SouthTowne is correct that simple temporal proximity is insufficient support for a differential diagnosis.22 See Taylor v. Univ. of Utah, 2020 UT 21, ¶ 56, 466 P.3d 124. But as the district court accurately observed, Dr. Weaver considered more than the timing of Smith‘s alleged exposure and her reported symptoms— including by conducting an extensive review of Smith‘s medical history and preexisting conditions. The court of appeals has found such testimony admissible under rule 702 where it is based on __________________________________________________________ 22 PLAC also asserts that temporal proximity is an insufficient basis for determining causation. But Dr. Weaver considered information and data that went beyond the temporal connection between Smith‘s alleged carbon monoxide exposure and the onset of her symptoms when forming his causation opinion. See supra ¶ 121. We are not holding that a causation opinion is per se admissible simply because an expert employs a differential diagnosis methodology. That methodology must be grounded in sufficient facts and data. The district court found that this was the case here. And we cannot conclude that it abused its discretion in so holding. 39 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court patient statements, temporal proximity, physical examination, and imaging studies. See Majors v. Owens, 2015 UT App 306, ¶ 20, 365 P.3d 165. Similarly here, Dr. Weaver relied on Smith‘s statements and recorded medical history, related imaging studies, the temporal proximity of her alleged carbon monoxide exposure to her constellation of symptoms, and his own physical and neurological examination of Smith to conclude that Smith had suffered carbon monoxide poisoning during her drive to Washington. Based on these facts, we do not disturb the district court‘s assessment that it ―cannot conclude that the manner in which [Dr. Weaver] conducted his differential medical diagnosis was so inappropriate or prejudicial as to require a new trial.‖
¶132 Lastly, on cross appeal, SouthTowne argues that the district court should not have permitted Smith to rely on the scans and related opinions of Dr. Orrison, who ordered an MRI of Smith in November 2013 but was unable to testify at trial because he passed away prior to its start. Specifically, SouthTowne asks us to hold that the district court abused its discretion in (1) failing to apply rule 703‘s balancing test when it denied SouthTowne‘s motion in limine seeking to exclude Dr. Orrison‘s scans, and (2) failing to grant SouthTowne a new trial based on the improper introduction of evidence of Dr. Orrison‘s assessment. ¶133 But the district court‘s ruling was correct. As SouthTowne notes in its brief, ―[a]s a general principle, medical experts often rely on data provided by specialists from other fields, treating providers, or data obtained from imaging scans or diagnostic tests.‖ And, as mentioned, under rule 703, expert opinion may be based on otherwise inadmissible ―facts or data‖ that the expert has been made aware of provided that other ―experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject.‖ UTAH. R. EVID. 703. In fact, ―[m]uch of what experts rely upon in formulating opinions is inadmissible evidence.‖ Patey, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 33; see also State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, ¶ 23, 1 P.3d 546 (noting that we have held expert testimony based on psychological and medical records not performed by the testifying expert to be admissible). And while rule 703 cannot be used to circumvent other rules of evidence, ―experts may recite hearsay evidence in order to lay a foundation for the opinions they give to the jury,‖ Patey, 1999 UT 31, ¶ 33, provided the ―probative value in helping 40 Cite as: 2022 UT 29 Opinion of the Court the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs [any] prejudicial effect.‖ UTAH R. EVID. 703. ¶134 SouthTowne does not contest that Dr. Orrison was qualified to order and interpret the results of Smith‘s brain imaging. Nor does it dispute that MRI reports are reasonably relied on by experts in the field as part of the diagnostic process. As the district court aptly pointed out, SouthTowne‘s own medical expert relied on the records and opinions of other non-testifying experts in this case—including that of Dr. Orrison. And while the ―opposing party may challenge the suitability or reliability of such materials on cross-examination, [any] such challenge goes to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility.‖ Green v. Louder, 2001 UT 62, ¶ 28, 29 P.3d 638 (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). ¶135 Importantly, SouthTowne overstates the extent to which Smith‘s medical experts relied on the findings of Dr. Orrison. Neither the scans Dr. Orrison ordered, nor his report of the scan findings were entered into evidence. As noted, Dr. Weaver provided medical testimony about the magnitude of Smith‘s injuries and opined on the cause of those injuries. See supra ¶ 121. But although Dr. Weaver based his conclusions in part on the report created by Dr. Orrison, he also interpreted Smith‘s imaging himself;23 conducted his own interview with and physical examination of Smith; and, coupled with his extensive personal experience in the field, relied on his knowledge of the events surrounding Smith‘s alleged carbon monoxide poisoning in forming his opinion. ¶136 The district court found that because ―[Dr.] Weaver used the report in forming [his own] opinions regarding [Smith], and because such evidence is the type that is reasonably relied on by experts in the field,‖ any potential prejudice to SouthTowne ―was outweighed by the probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the opinions at issue.‖ We review legal standards applied by the district court for correctness. State v. Bess, 2019 UT 70, ¶ 17, 473 P.3d 157. And here, the district court was correct in its application of rule 703 to its admissibility __________________________________________________________ 23 Indeed, in its motion for a new trial, SouthTowne argued that Dr. Weaver lacked sufficient qualifications to opine on Smith‘s brain imaging. The district court correctly held this argument specious. 41 SMITH v. VOLKSWAGEN SOUTHTOWNE, INC. Opinion of the Court determination regarding Dr. Orrison‘s reports and scans. Accordingly, we affirm the district court‘s evidentiary rulings with respect to Dr. Orrison. ¶137 In sum, we reverse the underlying bases for the district court‘s conditional grant of a new trial, and therefore we reverse the district court‘s conditional new trial order. Further, we affirm the district court‘s rejection of SouthTowne‘s alternative arguments for a new trial with respect to Dr. Weaver and Dr. Orrison‘s scans and opinions. Accordingly, SouthTowne‘s request that we correct these evidentiary rulings in the event of a new trial is moot. And as we have explained, those arguments would nevertheless fail on the merits.