Opinion ID: 1908176
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extrinsic Versus Intrinsic Fraud in Marital Dissolution Proceedings

Text: The Fourth District's essential reasoning and conclusion in Parker reflects this Court's precedent regarding the distinctions between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in the context of marital dissolution proceedings. As a threshold matter, the Fourth District considered the petitioner's action as a motion to vacate the final judgment dissolving the marriage and establishing paternity under rule 1.540(b) in keeping with this Court's precedent in D.F. v. Dep't of Revenue ex rel. L.F., 823 So.2d 97 (Fla.2002). In D.F., this Court recognized that because a determination of child support in a final dissolution of marriage order is deemed a final determination of paternity, relitigation of paternity is barred by res judicata, and a party seeking relief from child support obligations established during the dissolution of marriage proceedings must proceed under rule 1.540. See id. at 100; see also Parker, 916 So.2d at 929 (quoting portion of holding in D.F. ). Under rule 1.540(b), relief from a judgment based on intrinsic fraud must be sought by motion within one year of its entry. However, this one-year limit does not apply to extrinsic fraud, because extrinsic fraud is considered fraud on the court. See DeClaire v. Yohanan, 453 So.2d 375, 377 (Fla.1984), and discussion infra. Rule 1.540(b) specifically provides that [t]his rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, decree, order, or proceeding or to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud upon the court. See DeClaire, 453 So.2d at 378 ([Rule 1.540(b)] clearly preserves the equitable remedy of an independent action where extrinsic fraud is established.). After determining that the petitioner's action would be treated as a motion under rule 1.540(b), the Fourth District revisited this Court's explanation of the substantive distinctions between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in DeClaire v. Yohanan . In DeClaire, this Court considered whether a husband's presentation of false financial affidavits during a dissolution of marriage proceeding constituted extrinsic or intrinsic fraud. This Court detailed the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud in DeClaire as follows: Extrinsic fraud involves conduct which is collateral to the issues tried in a case. . . . [T]his Court has defined extrinsic fraud as the prevention of an unsuccessful party [from] presenting his case, by fraud or deception practiced by his adversary; keeping the opponent away from court; falsely promising a compromise; ignorance of the adversary about the existence of the suit or the acts of the plaintiff; fraudulent representation of a party without his consent and connivance in his defeat; and so on. Fair v. Tampa Electric Co., 158 Fla. 15, 18, 27 So.2d 514, 515 (1946). See Black's Law Dictionary 595 (rev. 5th ed.1979). In other words, extrinsic fraud occurs where a defendant has somehow been prevented from participating in a cause. Intrinsic fraud, on the other hand, applies to fraudulent conduct that arises within a proceeding and pertains to the issues in the case that have been tried or could have been tried. This Court . . . has expressly held that false testimony given in a proceeding is intrinsic fraud. We have stated that [i]f a judgment was obtained upon false testimony or a fraudulent instrument and the parties were heard, the evidence submitted to and received consideration by the court, then it may be said that the matter has been actually tried, or was so in issue that it might have been tried and the parties are estopped to set up an intrinsic or direct fraud to vitiate the judgment, because the judgment is the highest evidence and cannot be contradicted by the parties to it. Johnson v. Wells, 72 Fla. 290, 299, 73 So. 188, 191 (1916) (citation omitted). DeClaire, 453 So.2d at 377 (emphasis added). In essence, extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from trying an issue before the court, and the prevention itself becomes a collateral issue to the cause; whereas intrinsic fraud is the presentation of misleading information on an issue before the court that was tried or could have been tried. Id. In DeClaire, this Court also explained the procedural significance of the substantive distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud. As this Court explained, The concept of fraud on the court has historically been limited in its application to ensure the finality of judgments and to avoid frequent attacks against final judgments. Prior to the adoption of Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.540(b), only what was defined as extrinsic fraud could, in reality, form the basis for relief from a judgment. Johnson v. Wells ; Fair v. Tampa Electric Co . Further, such relief could be obtained only by an independent action in equity. There was no practical basis for relief from a judgment obtained by intrinsic fraud. . . . . . . . Where relief from a judgment is sought by motion [under rule 1.540(b)], [t]he motion is filed in the action in which the judgment was rendered.  Trawick, Florida Practice and Procedure § 26.8 (1982). Where relief is sought by independent action, however, [t]he action is not a continuation of the action in which the judgment . . . under attack was entered. A new complaint is filed, service of process is made and the new action follows the same procedure as other civil actions. Id. . . . It should be clearly understood that rule 1.540(b) broadened the grounds upon which a final judgment could be attacked, but created a one-year limitations period within which such an attack must be made. The rule does not change the existing definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic fraud or change the type of conduct which constitutes fraud on the court. DeClaire, 453 So.2d at 378-79 (emphasis added). Thus, where fraud is extrinsic, it is deemed independent of the action and, therefore, must be attacked independent of the action. However, where fraud is intrinsic, it is deemed to have occurred in the current action and must be attacked by a rule 1.540(b) motion directed at the current action. And because rule 1.540(b) seeks to achieve finality, the motion must be filed within one year of the final judgment.