Opinion ID: 592851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant City of Tucson

Text: 6 Johnson asserts liability against the City of Tucson on a theory of respondeat superior for the actions of its employees. As the district court correctly noted, however, respondeat superior cannot serve as a basis for imposing section 1983 liability on a municipality unless it is alleged that the action inflicting injury flowed either from an explicitly adopted or tacitly authorized municipal policy. See Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978); Harris v. City of Roseburg, 664 F.2d 1121, 1130 (9th Cir.1981). Johnson has failed to allege that any municipal policy sanctioned the actions which allegedly caused the deprivation of his constitutional rights. Accordingly, the district court did not err by granting without prejudice the City of Tucson's motion to dismiss. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. 2 II. Defendant Judge Harry Gin 7 Johnson alleges that Judge Gin is liable under section 1983 for his actions during Johnson's state court trial, including the directed verdict in that trial. Johnson also alleges that Judge Gin conspired with the other defendants to deprive him of his constitutional rights. 8 It is well established that judges have absolute immunity from suit for their judicial actions taken within the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir.1986). Here, because Johnson does not allege facts indicating that Judge Gin either acted in the clear absence of all jurisdiction, or perform[ed] an act that [was] not judicial in nature, id. at 1075, immunity applies. Furthermore, Johnson's vague and conclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to withstand Judge Gin's motion to dismiss. See Ivey, 673 F.2d at 266.