Opinion ID: 1404383
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of CEQ's Alternative Arrangements for NEPA Compliance

Text: On January 15, 2008 CEQ purported to approve alternative arrangements for the Navy to continue its use of MFA sonar while complying with NEPA, reasoning that emergency circumstances prevented normal compliance. CEQ's authority to grant such relief derives from 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11, which provides in full: Where emergency circumstances make it necessary to take an action with significant environmental impact without observing the provisions of these regulations, the Federal agency taking the action should consult with the Council about alternative arrangements. Agencies and the Council will limit such arrangements to actions necessary to control the immediate impacts of the emergency. Other actions remain subject to NEPA review. 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11. CEQ's letter of explanation to the Navy stated that the district court's modified injunction imposes training restrictions . . . that continue to create a significant and unreasonable risk that Strike Groups will not be able to train and be certified as fully mission capable. CEQ Letter to Donald C. Winter at 3. CEQ also stated that the inability to train effectively with MFA sonar puts the lives of thousands of Americans directly at risk. . . . Therefore, there are urgent national security reasons for providing alternative arrangements under the CEQ regulations. Id. at 3-4. The Navy then petitioned this court to vacate the district court's preliminary injunction, arguing that CEQ's approval of alternative arrangements deprived NRDC of the likelihood of success on the merits of its NEPA claims, thus eliminating the legal basis for the injunction. We remanded to the district court to allow it to consider in the first instance whether this legal development merited vacatur or a partial stay of the injunction. On remand, the Navy maintained that the CEQ's emergency circumstances determination relieved it of the requirement to prepare an EIS prior to commencing the remaining SOCAL exercises. NRDC argued that CEQ's action was beyond the scope of the regulation and otherwise invalid, and that the preliminary injunction should remain in place. The district court considered these arguments and concluded that its preliminary injunction was not affected by [CEQ's] approval of emergency alternative arrangements because there is no emergency. Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 1219-1220. Accordingly, it held that CEQ's action is beyond the scope of the regulation and is invalid[ ] and that [t]he Navy is not, therefore exempted from compliance with NEPA and the preliminary injunction. Id. The district court found that CEQ's interpretation of emergency circumstances to include a court order entered in the course of pending litigation was not authorized by 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11, because it was contrary to both the plain meaning of emergency circumstances and the drafters' original intent. It also found that CEQ's action was contrary to the governing statute, NEPA. [38] The Navy makes two basic arguments as to why the district court erred by failing to vacate the preliminary injunction in light of CEQ's approval of alternative arrangements. First, the Navy argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review CEQ's approval of alternative arrangements because such approval constitutes a superseding agency action that removes as moot any basis for an injunction predicated on plaintiffs' original claims concerning the Navy's EA. Second, the Navy argues that, even if the district court could review CEQ's action, the court erred by not deferring to CEQ's and the Navy's assessment that emergency circumstances exist within the meaning of 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11. We address the Navy's arguments in turn.
The Navy argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the validity of CEQ's action because that action allegedly moots the plaintiffs' original claims. Specifically, the Navy contends that the adoption of CEQ's alternative arrangements in a superseding Decision Memorandum constitutes a new administrative action, which can only be challenged by a new claim on the merits. See Rattlesnake Coalition v. EPA, 509 F.3d 1095, 1103-04 (holding that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over new final agency action). [39] The district court implicitly rejected this argument by continuing to exercise jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' NEPA claim. Its decision to do so is firmly grounded in the familiar principle that only a valid subsequent action can render a legal claim moot. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Slater, 528 U.S. 216, 222-23, 120 S.Ct. 722, 145 L.Ed.2d 650 (2000); United States v. Larson, 302 F.3d 1016, 1020 (9th Cir.2002) (The stipulation moots [plaintiff's] challenge to the suppression ruling only if it is valid.). Accordingly, the district court did not rely on an erroneous legal premise or abuse its discretion in concluding that it had jurisdiction to assess the validity of the new action in order to determine whether plaintiffs' original claims could survive. See Adarand, 528 U.S. at 222-23, 120 S.Ct. 722. Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by leaving in place the preliminary injunction after determining that CEQ's action did not require its vacatur. The Navy's contention that the district court issued an entirely new injunction . . . based on new, ancillary claims mischaracterizes the posture of this case. The Navy challenged the injunction based on CEQ's action; NRDC argued only that CEQ's action did not change the merits of its NEPA claims. Thus, the district court here did not [g]rant[ ] a preliminary injunction based on a showing that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in establishing a violation of an ancillary court order, rather than a showing that they were likely to succeed on the merits of any of their claims. Alabama v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 424 F.3d 1117, 1135 (11th Cir. 2005).
The district court concluded that CEQ's interpretation of 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11 is not entitled to deference. It reasoned that under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. ง 551 et seq., the courts traditionally afford deference to (1) an agency's reasonable interpretation of a statute it administers if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue . . ., citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), and (2) an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless an alternative reading is compelled by the regulation's plain language or by other indications of the [agency's] intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation, citing Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 114 S.Ct. 2381, 129 L.Ed.2d 405 (1994), and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 89 L.Ed. 1700 (1945). See Feb. 4, 2008 Dist. Ct. Order at 1226-1227. NRDC challenged neither the propriety of CEQ's original promulgation of 40 C.F.R. ง 1506.11 nor the fact that ง 1506.11 allows alternative arrangements for compliance with NEPA under genuine emergency circumstances. Instead, NRDC limited its challenge to CEQ's application of the regulation to the facts of this case. Accordingly, the district court considered whether the term emergency circumstances could be afforded so broad an interpretation as to encompass the Navy's need to continue its long-planned, routine sonar training exercises without the mitigation measures imposed by the district court. The district court concluded that the plain language of the regulation and the limited indicia of the agency's original intent compelled a narrower interpretation of emergency circumstances than the one afforded it by CEQ. Accordingly, the district court concluded that it did not owe deference to CEQ's interpretation of ง 1506.11 under Thomas Jefferson and Seminole Rock. We review that conclusion to determine whether in so doing it relied on an erroneous legal premise or abused its discretion; we conclude that it did neither. The district court followed established Supreme Court precedent in finding that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is not entitled to deference when it is inconsistent with the regulation itself, conflicts with agency intent at the time of promulgation, and reaches beyond the limits imposed by the statute, NEPA. See Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461-63, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 (1997). Next, the district court, after concluding that the meaning of emergency circumstances was clear, applied the appropriate legal principles that an agency's interpretation of its own regulation is entitled to deference only when the language of the regulation is ambiguous. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined not to give deference to CEQ's overly broad interpretation of emergency circumstances. [40]