Opinion ID: 221339
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Weight of Criminal History

Text: Erwin’s PSR identified 19 prior adult convictions and 16 additional arrests and prosecutions. Seven of these convictions were counted toward Erwin’s criminal history for the purposes of sentencing in this offense; the remaining twelve were not counted because they were too dated. The scored convictions were: transporting, possessing and selling narcotics (3 points); transporting and selling narcotics (3 points); burglary (1 point); receiving stolen property (1 point); obtaining and possessing a credit card without cardholder’s consent (1 point); possessing or selling personal information to establish false status or identity (1 point); and driving under the influence of alcohol (1 point). At sentencing, the district court identified Erwin’s “repeated convictions for a whole bevy of offenses including drug crimes, including lesser crimes for sure, but then including a series of fraud crimes.” (Erwin Sent. Tr. at 70.) It further highlighted the trend in Erwin’s history of receiving “progressively increasing punishments,” which had “done nothing to deter the law-breaking conduct.” (Id.) Lastly, it noted that Erwin’s PSR reflected “a history of basically 25 years of law-breaking and no history of law-abiding activity.” (Id.) Having reviewed these considerations, the district court “conclude[d] that the criminal history calculation substantially underrepresents either the seriousness of [Erwin’s] criminal history or the likelihood of recidivism.” (Id. at 67-68.) 9 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 Erwin now argues that the three points that he was assessed for a conviction for transporting, possessing and selling narcotics, for which he served a sentence between 1991 and 1994, was “obviously considered far too strongly by the court” in reaching its sentencing determination. (Erwin Br. at 12.) This is because, while that offense conduct “barely made it in” to the 15-year criminal conduct window mandated by U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(e), it accounted for three of the 12 criminal history points that Erwin was assessed, which he argues is imbalanced with its relative importance. (Id. at 7-8.) Erwin argues that in imposing sentence without re-weighing the relative importance of his prior convictions, the district court erred in not recognizing its “wide latitude in imposing sentence and the fact that sentences must be tailored to defendants and do not depend on the Guidelines for ultimate support.” (Id. at 13.) The government responds that “the record thoroughly supports its finding that Defendant had been breaking the law since he was 18, had shown no sign of changing his ways, and had proven impervious to the deterrent of increasingly longer sentences.” (Pl.’s Br. at 18-19.) Therefore, the government contends, “the district court could, and did, correctly conclude that [Criminal History Category] V did not reflect the likelihood of Defendant’s recidivism, and that the need to protect the public warranted treating him as a [Criminal History Category] VI instead of a [Criminal History Category] V.” (Id.) An upward departure may be taken under the following circumstance: If reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, an upward departure may be warranted. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)(1) 10 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 An upward departure under this section does not represent a deviation from the guidance provided by the Guidelines; instead this Court has held that “a departure is expressly encouraged under § 4A1.3 where the recommended sentencing range does not adequately account for the defendant’s past criminal conduct.” Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d at 583 (internal quotations omitted). As an initial matter, it should be noted that the district court clearly considered Erwin’s criminal history and made an individually tailored decision about the relative weight to give to his prior offenses. That the district court recognized its “wide latitude in imposing sentence” is proven by the fact that it determined that a departure based on Erwin’s criminal history was warranted—albeit it an upward departure. Because the scored offenses underlying the calculation of a Criminal History Category V for Erwin only extended back 15 years, they did not clearly reflect the fact that Erwin had never had a significant period of time elapse during his adult life when he was free from crime. The limited scored offenses also failed to illustrate Erwin’s propensity to commit the same kinds of crimes—involving stolen property, stolen identities, and drug offenses—over and over again. This pattern directly implicates the probability of Erwin reoffending, which the district court addressed. (Erwin Sent. Tr. at 70.) Finally, the extent of Erwin’s criminal history, and the seeming failure of previous punishment to deter him from committing further crimes, also supports the district court’s conclusion that upward departure was warranted. Having reviewed Erwin’s record, it is clear that the district court reasonably determined, “in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it, whether the range in question 11 Nos. 10-1103, 10-1843 [was] appropriate to the case.” United States v. Brown, 371 F.3d 854, 860 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal quotations omitted). This Court will not disturb that determination.