Opinion ID: 1613536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether dr. ali and dr. madakasira waived the protections of the mtca by failing to plead the mtca in their answers.

Text: ¶ 27. Neither doctor raised the MTCA as an affirmative defense in their answers, and Bennett argues the trial court erred in permitting the doctors to amend their answers to add the defense. In support of his contention, Bennett cites Bailey v. Georgia Cotton Goods Co., 543 So.2d 180, 182-83 (Miss.1989) (affirmative defenses are waived if not properly pled), and Bell v. First Columbus Nat'l Bank, 493 So.2d 964, 968 (Miss.1986) (affirmative defenses neither pleaded or tried by consent are deemed waived). Though he admits that Miss. R. Civ. P. 15 states amendments should be freely given when justice so requires, Bennett maintains that once an answer has been filed and the affirmative defenses have not been set out, they are waived. ¶ 28. Because Rule 15(b) liberally permits the amendment of pleadings, we find that the trial court did not err in allowing Dr. Ali to amend his answer to include the notice and statute of limitations defenses. ¶ 29. Dr. Madakasira, on the other hand, raised the defenses for the first time in his motion for summary judgment. Citing a federal application of Mississippi law, Theunissen v. GSI Group, 109 F.Supp.2d 505 (N.D.Miss.2000), he contends that raising the statute of limitations defense in a motion for summary judgment prior to trial is permitted if sufficient time to respond is given without prejudice. As indicated in Rule 15, the test for determining whether a party has waived an affirmative defense, according to the Theunissen court, is whether the defendant's timing resulted in unfair surprise and undue prejudice. In Beverly v. Powers, 666 So.2d 806, 809 (Miss.1995), we permitted the Department of Human Services to amend its answer to include the sovereign immunity defense after it failed to do so initially. Though two years had passed since the complaint was filed before the DHS raised the defense in a motion for summary judgment, the trial court judge granted the motion noting that it should be no surprise to plaintiff because the DHS had asserted the defense in an early unaddressed motion. ¶ 30. Bennett argues he was prejudiced by Dr. Madakasira's delay in raising the defense because discovery was complete and he already filed a response to Dr. Ali's motion for summary judgment alleging waiver as a defense. We find that the trial court did not err in allowing Dr. Madakasira to raise the defense. Motions for leave to amend should be liberally allowed. Miss. R. Civ. P. 15(a). We review discretionary determinations by the trial court under an abuse of discretion standard. Unless convinced the trial judge abused his discretion, we are without authority to reverse. Taylor Mach. Works, Inc. v. Great Am. Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 635 So.2d 1357, 1362 (Miss.1994). The record indicates that Bennett was given an opportunity to argue against allowing defenses to be asserted on notice and statute of limitations, but we can find no abuse of discretion by the circuit court. This claim is without merit.