Opinion ID: 681588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The $1 Million Fine

Text: 99 The district court fined Anderson $1,000,000. Anderson argues that the court's determination that the fine was appropriate is contrary to the evidence and in contravention of Sec. 5E1.2(d)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines, which requires that the district court relate any fine to the defendant's ability to pay. As Anderson concedes, the Sentencing Guidelines do not require, and we have specifically declined to require, that the trial judge make findings of fact regarding a defendant's ability to pay the fine imposed. So long as the sentencing judge in fact considers ability to pay, he is in compliance with the guideline's mandates. United States v. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d 905, 906 (D.C.Cir.1991). We review the finding of ability necessarily implied by such consideration looking only for clear error. Id. at 906-07. 100 The government argues that the district court in fact consider[ed Anderson's] ability to pay, that the fine imposed was well within the statutory and guideline ranges, and therefore that we must affirm it. Here is what the district court had to say about Anderson's ability to pay: 101 Now, the probation department has recommended that I not impose a fine in this case because they seem to believe that Mr. Anderson doesn't have any money. I'm not certain of that. I know that there are going to be a lot of asset forfeitures of property here in the United States, but Panama may be opening up, and I don't know whether Mr. Anderson has a lot of money in Panama or not. I have reason to believe that money was coming from Panama for some purpose after his arrest. So I don't know whether he has any money in Panama or not. If he does have money in Panama, I am going to fine him one million dollars on counts 1 and 2. 102 Counsel for Anderson then objected that Anderson doesn't have a million dollars, to which the district court replied, He may not. 103 While it is clear that the district judge did consider Anderson's ability to pay a $1,000,000 fine, her implicit determination that he had the ability to pay it is at war with her explicit acknowledgment that he may not, and is therefore clearly erroneous. We recognize, of course, that a fine is meant to be punitive; that it causes hardship does not mean that it is erroneously imposed, Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 907, but quite the opposite. Nothing in the present record, however, even remotely suggests that Anderson could ever pay a $1,000,000 fine. 104 Anderson's presentence report indicates that at sentencing he had a net worth of $96,000 (most of it the equity in his home) and that the government had instituted civil forfeiture proceedings against his property. Anderson was sentenced to 645 months (53 years, nine months) in prison; once he is released from prison he will not only be rather old to work off so large a fine; he will also be subject to deportation, and presumably will be deported, because he is an illegal alien. Thus, all the evidence suggests that Anderson will not be able to obtain employment and pay the fines over time. Mastropierro, 931 F.2d at 907. 105 The government argues that the district court's cognizance of the significant wealth Anderson enjoyed as a drug dealer--his extravagant spending habits, his ownership of a home and several apartments and of expensive cars and jewelry--supports the court's conclusion that the amount of the fine was appropriate to reflect the seriousness of the offense (including the gain to the defendant), to promote respect for the law, to provide just punishment and to afford adequate deterrence. Perhaps so, but the government's rationale does not override the district court's duty under the Guidelines to consider the defendant's ability to pay. 106 Unable to point to any evidence suggesting that Anderson in fact has assets in Panama, the government argues that it is Anderson's burden to prove that he has no such assets and thus cannot pay the fine. Nothing in the Guidelines, the case law, or indeed common sense, supports that position. The government cites two cases. In one of them the court held that where the government alleges that a defendant owns a specific asset that could be used or liquidated to pay a fine, the defendant seeking to avoid the fine must prove that the asset is not his or that it would not cover the fine assessed. United States v. Preston, 910 F.2d 81, 89-90 (3d Cir.1990). In the other case the court found that the defendant had actively hindered the government's efforts to determine his ability to pay by refus[ing] to provide any information regarding his financial status. Moreover, $80,000 had been withdrawn from the defendant's bank account shortly before his arrest. United States v. Rafferty, 911 F.2d 227, 232 (9th Cir.1990). 107 While it makes good sense to burden a defendant who has apparently concealed assets, here the government has made no such showing; nor has the government offered anything to substantiate its suspicion that Anderson has assets in Panama. In such a case the burden does not shift to Anderson to prove that he does not have assets in Panama. Upon remand, therefore, the district court should also reconsider the fine to be imposed upon Anderson in light of the record evidence regarding his ability to pay. 108