Opinion ID: 497277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: strict liability and merchantability

Text: 13 We begin with an inquiry into the pertinent substantive law of New Hampshire. The leading New Hampshire products liability case is Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843 (1978). In the course of affirming a jury verdict for the manufacturer of an allegedly defectively designed lawnmower, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire expounded at some length on the law of products liability. It endorsed several general principles, which we summarize as follows. 4 See Thibault, 118 N.H. at 806-14, 395 A.2d at 845-50. 14 1) Products liability actions can be brought under either of two theories: defective manufacture and defective design. Under the former, a plaintiff attempts to show a product defect caused by a mistake or accident in the manufacturing process; under the latter, a plaintiff tries to prove that the product's design itself rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to consumers. 15 2) A court's inquiry into whether a product's design renders it unreasonably dangerous is a multifaceted balancing process involving evaluation of many conflicting factors. Id. at 809, 395 A.2d at 847. One factor is the product's social utility, a consideration that must be weighed against the danger posed by the product. In making this calculation, 16 courts should also consider whether the risk of danger could have been reduced without significant impact on product effectiveness and manufacturing cost. For example, liability may attach if the manufacturer did not take the available and reasonable steps to lessen or eliminate the danger of even a significantly useful and desirable product. 17 Id. at 807, 395 A.2d at 847. 18 3) Another factor in the unreasonable danger calculus is whether the product was accompanied by a warning of any latent dangers. (Under this analysis, an inadequate warning constitutes a design defect.) This duty to warn, however, extends only to dangers that are reasonably foreseeable: Manufacturers cannot foresee and warn of all absurd and dangerous uses of their product. Id. at 808, 395 A.2d at 847. But a suitable warning is not necessarily a conclusive defense in a defective design case, for liability may still attach if the danger could have been eliminated without excessive cost or loss of product efficiency. Id. 19 4) The New Hampshire comparative negligence statute applies to products liability actions. Thus, if the jury finds that a plaintiff's proof is sufficient, it must weigh any plaintiff misconduct, i.e., contributory negligence or assumption of risk, and discount the amount of damages by the percentage of the loss or injury caused by the misconduct. If the plaintiff's misconduct is more than 50 percent responsible, the statute requires a verdict for the defendant. 20 5) New Hampshire explicitly rejects the outer limits of section 402A liability, namely, liability based solely upon a theory of cost redistribution, id. at 806, 395 A.2d at 845, or the theory of liability recognized in cases requiring a manufacturer to warn against even bizarre uses of its product. Id. at 808, 395 A.2d at 847. 21 To sustain the court's direction of a verdict for defendants here, we must determine that the evidence produced at trial, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, would not have permitted a rational jury to reach any conclusion other than that the defendants were not liable. See, e.g., Potterton v. Porter, 810 F.2d 333 (1st Cir.1987). We are unable to make that determination in light of the following evidence. 22 --Testimony that a triple wall pipe installed upside down would inevitably lead to a fire. 23 --Testimony that the pipe's manufacturer, Preway, was aware of the danger of upside down installation. 24 --Testimony by Raymond Duford and his neighbor, who together installed the pipe, that they could not tell, either from the pipe itself or from the installation instructions, which end was up. 25 --Testimony that there was no structural impediment to incorrect installation of the pipe. 26 --Testimony that the addition of small tabs at one end of the pipe, which would have cost only an estimated tenth of a cent per pipe, would have substantially reduced the likelihood of inadvertent upside down installation. 27 --The instruction manual, which had no specific warnings about the danger of installing the pipe upside down. 28 --The indistinct nature of the instructions on the pipe itself. These amounted to faint, embossed arrows and the word up, each approximately one-eighth inch high, at one end. It was also disputed whether these had been rendered more obscure than they originally were by the fire at the Duford home. While the Dufords' expert conceded that an embossed direction would be adequate, he was not shown this particular marking, hence it is not clear that he endorsed an embossed direction of this relatively small size and this character. In any event, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that these markings were necessarily adequate in the circumstances. 29 In light of this evidence it would not have been irrational for the jury, properly instructed on the law according to Thibault, to have found for the plaintiffs. The jury might have based liability solely on the inadequacy of the warnings, viewing the embossing as too small, the directions for proper installation unclear, or the instruction warnings as too general. Alternatively, or perhaps in conjunction with a belief that the warnings were only marginally sufficient, the jury might have found that an available and reasonable alternative design--to wit, a design incorporating the prophylactic tabs--would have substantially reduced the product's dangerousness. 30 We underscore our conclusion that the jury could have found defendants liable pursuant to the evidence we have described and the reasonable inferences therefrom. We of course do not suggest that it was required to do so, nor do we mean to indicate that any such outcome was preferable. We hold only that the issues were not suitable for disposition by the court, as a matter of law. Much of the testimony at trial was confusing and contradictory, and was provided by a cast of interested witnesses--Raymond Duford, his neighbor, and a representative from defendant Preway. Of course, to the extent the resolution of such a dispute turns on the credibility of witnesses, a jury is the accepted vehicle to make this assessment. See C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2527 (1971). The trial was also thrown off balance by confusion as to the presence of markings on the pipe. While normally plaintiff would have to accept the consequences for this, Preway is also to blame, having not only admitted to their absence but agreed to this in a pretrial statement made after its employee had found the markings. Given its misleading concessions, Preway had a duty, which it never discharged, to correct the record upon discovering that markings in fact existed. Had this been done, plaintiff would doubtless have sought to proceed from the beginning on a theory of inadequate warning which, as indicated above, posed a genuine jury issue.
31 For the same reasons outlined in Part IIA, supra, we find that it was error for the district court to have directed a verdict for defendants on the Dufords' claim that Sears breached its warranty of merchantability. The same evidence that would have permitted the jury to find that the chimney pipe was defectively designed under section 402A would also have permitted a conclusion that the pipe was not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, the legal standard under the warranty of merchantability statute, N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. 382-A:2-314(2)(c) (1961). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has stated that when ... any merchant places a defective product in commerce, the plaintiff may plead alternative theories of tort or contract or both. Sheehan v. New Hampshire Liquor Commission, 126 N.H. 473, 476, 493 A.2d 494, 496 (1985) (discussing relation between strict liability in tort and implied warranties under the U.C.C.). And the reasoning of the Thibault court suggests that either a product unaccompanied by an adequate warning or a product designed without a cheap and available safety device are tantamount to a defective product. Accord, e.g., Campos v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 98 N.J. 198, 205, 485 A.2d 305, 309 (1984).