Opinion ID: 2137995
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ExcessiveSentence Argument

Text: With these principles in mind, we turn now to defendant's contention that his death sentence is excessive. Defendant claims that the death penalty is inappropriate because he acted under an extreme mental disturbance at the time of the murders and he had no significant prior criminal history. Section 9-1(c) of the death penalty statute provides that the trier of fact shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c) (West 2004). Aggravating factors may include, but need not be limited to, those set forth in subsection (b), which include that the defendant murdered a peace officer engaged in his official duties, that the defendant murdered two or more persons and that the defendant murdered someone during the course of a home invasion. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b), (c) (West 2004). Listed among the statutory mitigating factors that the court may consider, along with others not listed, are that (1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity and (2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(1), (c)(2) (West 2004). If the trier of fact determines beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists at the first stage of the sentencing proceeding, the trier of fact shall then consider any aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c) at the second stage, known as the penalty phase of the proceeding. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(f), (h) (West 2004). If the trier of fact determines that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. 720 ILCS 5/9-1(h) (West 2004). The mere existence of mitigating evidence does not preclude imposition of the death penalty. Burton, 184 Ill.2d at 34, 234 Ill.Dec. 437, 703 N.E.2d 49. It is presumed that the circuit court considered any mitigating evidence before it, absent some indication to the contrary other than the sentence itself. Burton, 184 Ill.2d at 34, 234 Ill.Dec. 437, 703 N.E.2d 49. Furthermore, a sentencer may consider, in aggravation, evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct, even though the conduct may not have resulted in prosecution or conviction. People v. Davis, 205 Ill.2d 349, 367, 275 Ill.Dec. 781, 793 N.E.2d 552 (2002). If the aggravation is believed, the trier of fact may find that a defendant's mitigation evidence was insufficient to overcome the aggravating factors. Davis, 205 Ill.2d at 368-69, 275 Ill.Dec. 781, 793 N.E.2d 552. The trial court in the present case considered all of the evidence and its plausibility, the testimony of the witnesses and their credibility, and the law that applies to the decision of whether or not the death penalty should be imposed. Additionally, the court considered the nature and circumstances of the offenses committed, the history, character and condition of defendant, as well as whether or not defendant could be restored to useful citizenship. Specifically, the trial court cited in aggravation the serious crimes that were committed by defendant while armed with a sawed-off shotgun, a weapon that has no legitimate purpose. Additionally, the court noted that defendant had committed past crimes against others, both charged and uncharged, and that he was on criminal probation and in violation of it at the time the offenses were committed on March 22, 2002. The court further noted that defendant had sought to demonstrate that he acted out of a paranoid and delusional fear, or some other mental or psychological ailment. The court found, however, that defendant's acts were not the product of insanity or any kind of mental or psychological malady. Instead, the court found that defendant had acted out of hatred for those who served in the community as law enforcement officers and out of hatred and bitterness for neighbors who crossed his path. Moreover, defendant had continued to hurt, insult, threaten and intimidate others even while incarcerated, and therefore continued to pose a threat to society. The trial court acknowledged the evidence offered in mitigation showing defendant's talents, good deeds, capacity for normal friendships, his childhood, and his concern for his family. The court found, however, that the mitigation was outweighed by the overwhelming evidence in aggravationspecifically, evidence of defendant's criminal intent, violent revenge, hatred of people and authority, threats and intimidation of citizens of [the] community and the apparent belief that [defendant] with a sawed off shotgun in hand has the right to determine that those who sue him or disagree with him or whose duty it is to arrest him shall die. Finally, the court looked for any evidence of remorse, no matter how remote, but was unable to find any. Instead, the court found that defendant's comments, character and attitude suggested that, if given the opportunity, defendant would kill again for whatever unjustified purpose he determined. After careful review, we conclude that the finding that defendant did not act under an extreme mental disturbance at the time of the murders is amply supported by the record. Dr. Kowalkowski testified that defendant did not suffer from any delusional disorder. Rather, defendant suffered from two behavioral disordersparanoid personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder. These were not significant mental disorders. Kowalkowski explained that some of the key ingredients of a paranoid personality disorder included (1) suspecting others of harming, exploiting or deceiving without a sufficient basis to do so, (2) reluctance to confide in others because of unwarranted fear that the information will be maliciously used, (3) persistently bearing grudges and having an intolerance for insults, injuries and slights, and (4) perceiving attacks on one's character that are not apparent to others and being quick to react angrily or counterattack. These indicia were well supported by the testimonial evidence at trial that came from defendant's neighbors and acquaintances, which indicated that defendant held long-standing grudges, did not like to be argued with, and became upset if things did not go his way. Dr. Day, defendant's own expert, also believed that defendant had a paranoid personality disorder. Dr. Kowalkowski did not find any evidence of delusions, noting that defendant's reactions were all based on real events and his reactions were explained by his personality disorders. In contrast to Dr. Kowalkowski, the two defense expertsDrs. Chapman and Daydid believe that defendant had a delusional disorder. Specifically, Chapman testified that defendant shot Deputy Streicher because defendant was in mortal fear for his own life based on a 20-year conspiracy, and that it was as though the Giesenhagens psychologically were standing right behind the officer. However, Chapman testified on cross-examination that he merely assumed these things. Moreover, he was not sure that defendant was actually in fear of the Giesenhagens and he never asked defendant why he initiated the aggressive action toward them. We believe that the suggestion that defendant acted out of a delusional mortal fear is belied by the overwhelming evidence in the record to the contrary. Defendant never stated that he was afraid of the police or the Giesenhagens. Instead, defendant explained that he murdered the Giesenhagens because he had already killed a deputy so why not get them. In other words, defendant was already looking at a life sentence, at a minimum, for killing a police officer, so he felt free to kill two of his neighbors against whom he held a grudge. Defendant himself explained that he killed the Giesenhagens because he wanted to punish them for having filed a lawsuit against him and they had been thumbing their nose at [him] for 15 years. None of this, of course, indicates mortal fear even in defendant's mind. Rather, it shows that defendant was motivated by revenge and hate for neighbors that had crossed him. Defendant's disdain for the police likely stemmed from an incident that occurred many years before when a police officer stopped to ask about his children playing in the front yard and defendant thought the officer was being a smart ass. We find nothing particularly significant about defendant's use of the phrase the powers to be to describe the police. We further note that the evidence showed that defendant knew that Streicher had come to his door because defendant had not paid the small amount of court costs that were assessed on his assault conviction. Defendant's claim that Streicher pulled a weapon on him appears to be a self-serving attempt by defendant to lessen his culpability rather than a product of a delusion. In any event, the claim was contradicted by the eyewitness testimony of James Batey, who testified that the deputy stood outside defendant's door with his hands at his side just before the shooting. Defendant's own actions and words also contradict any notion that he was afraid of police officers or authority. Instead, defendant's actions and comments indicate that he had a disdain for police and authority. On various occasions, defendant actually sought out police to harass them, tailgating and swerving at them in his vehicle. When Chief Deputy Dison came to defendant's house two months before the murders and cordially explained that defendant could post bond on the outstanding warrant against him by simply coming to the station within the next week, defendant replied, You will have to come back and get me. Thereafter, defendant did not pay the $100 bond, but instead armed himself with a sawed-off shotgun, which he kept within easy reach in his living room. After killing the Giesenhagens, defendant drove slowly through town, seeking out other police officers to harm. Defendant's comments to Larry Bantz at the time of their confrontation at the produce stand also show that defendant had no fear of the police department. When Bantz informed defendant that he was going to call the police, defendant responded that it would not make any difference because they had never done anything to him in the past. The evidence further showed that defendant accepted and sought out the aid of police and those in authority when it suited him. Defendant called the Stark County sheriff for assistance with his mother's guardianship. Moreover, defendant asked for and accepted aid from Shane Milroy, working cooperatively with him, even though Milroy was a public official and had been a witness for the Giesenhagens in their dog-bite case. Finally, Lonny Dennison, the Stark County sheriff for 20 years, testified that he had dealings with defendant that went real well, but if things did not go defendant's way, then he would be upset. Dr. Kowalkowski pointed to these incidents of cooperation with law enforcement as an indication that defendant did not have nonbizarre delusions as the defense experts claimed, but was instead tied into reality, always relating real events, albeit interpreting them through his paranoid and antisocial personality disorders. Under the circumstances, we see no reason to disturb the trial court's finding that defendant did not act under a significant mental or psychological impairment at the time of the offenses at issue. We also note that even if defendant did have a significant psychological disorder, we would still find that the sentencing court in this case properly concluded that the mitigation evidence was not sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty when weighed against the aggravating evidence. This court has repeatedly held that evidence of a defendant's mental or psychological impairments may not be inherently mitigating, or may not be mitigating enough to overcome the evidence in aggravation. Ballard, 206 Ill.2d at 190, 276 Ill.Dec. 538, 794 N.E.2d 788 (death penalty affirmed despite evidence that the defendant suffered from a bipolar disorder that is characterized by extremes of mood and sometimes delusions and hallucinations); People v. Macri, 185 Ill.2d 1, 66, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772 (1998) (prosecutor could properly argue in aggravation that the defendant's antisocial personality disorder showed his violent nature); People v. Madej, 177 Ill.2d 116, 139, 226 Ill.Dec. 453, 685 N.E.2d 908 (1997) (the defendant sought to show at a postconviction proceeding that his substance abuse negatively affected his psychological and neurological health, but was ultimately unsuccessful on his petition because mitigation evidence of defendant's mental health does not necessarily preclude a death sentence); People v. Tenner, 175 Ill.2d 372, 382, 222 Ill.Dec. 325, 677 N.E.2d 859 (1997) (defense counsel was not ineffective where he failed to obtain a mental health evaluation because such evidence is not inherently mitigating); see also Taylor, 166 Ill.2d at 432, 211 Ill.Dec. 518, 655 N.E.2d 901 (death penalty was appropriate despite defendant's mental conditionschizo-typal personality disorderwhich resulted in the defendant hearing voices); People v. Christiansen, 116 Ill.2d 96, 129, 107 Ill. Dec. 198, 506 N.E.2d 1253 (1987) (death penalty appropriate despite mitigating evidence of emotional and mental disturbance, alcoholism, drug addiction, poor health, deprived childhood, and remorse); People v. Montgomery, 112 Ill.2d 517, 533, 98 Ill.Dec. 353, 494 N.E.2d 475 (1986) (death penalty appropriate despite an extreme mental or emotional disturbance). A judge or jury considering evidence of this nature at sentencing might view the information as either mitigating or aggravating, depending, of course, on whether the individual hearing the evidence finds that it evokes compassion or demonstrates possible future dangerousness. Ballard, 206 Ill.2d at 190, 276 Ill.Dec. 538, 794 N.E.2d 788; Macri, 185 Ill.2d at 66, 235 Ill.Dec. 589, 705 N.E.2d 772. Furthermore, even if a defendant's psychological and neurological impairments are considered as mitigating factors, such evidence does not preclude imposition of a death sentence when that evidence is outweighed by aggravating evidence. Ballard, 206 Ill.2d at 190, 276 Ill.Dec. 538, 794 N.E.2d 788; Madej, 177 Ill.2d at 139-40, 226 Ill. Dec. 453, 685 N.E.2d 908; Taylor, 166 Ill.2d at 432-33, 211 Ill.Dec. 518, 655 N.E.2d 901. Here, the trial court specifically found that defendant remained a threat to society, and that if given the opportunity, he would continue to be violent. We believe that this conclusion was supported by defendant's shocking lack of remorse, his threats to others in the community and his statements that he regretted not being able to shoot jailhouse employees and that more people were going to get it when he got out. With respect to his lack of remorse, defendant chided 10-year-old Ashley Giesenhagen for not closing her eyes when defendant gunned down her parents in the child's presence. Even though defendant had shot Ashley's mother with a sawed-off shotgun at close range, causing massive injuries, defendant scolded the victim for not knowing how to fashion a tourniquet, adding but the bitch died anyway. Defendant was also rude and insulting to jailhouse staff, and indicated that he would have liked to kill them too. Given that a defendant arrested for a capital crime has every incentive to behave flawlessly while incarcerated because good behavior might cause a sentencing authority to spare his life ( Mertz, 218 Ill.2d at 90, 299 Ill.Dec. 581, 842 N.E.2d 618; Ballard, 206 Ill.2d at 189, 276 Ill.Dec. 538, 794 N.E.2d 788), it is truly remarkable that defendant continued to be abusive and belligerent. It indicates that the trial court justifiably concluded that defendant remained a serious danger to others, even in a prison setting, and that executing him was the only means of eliminating the threat to prison staff or other inmates. See Mertz, 218 Ill.2d at 90, 299 Ill.Dec. 581, 842 N.E.2d 618, citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 165 n. 5, 114 S.Ct. at 2194 n. 5, 129 L.Ed.2d at 143 n. 5. Defendant contends that his prior criminal history was minor and should be considered a mitigating factor. We agree that this is an appropriate mitigating factor to consider. However, it is presumed that the trial court considered any mitigating evidence before it, absent some indication to the contrary other than the sentence itself. Burton, 184 Ill.2d at 34, 234 Ill.Dec. 437, 703 N.E.2d 49. Furthermore, the sentencing authority in a capital case may consider, in aggravation, evidence of a defendant's prior misconduct, even though the conduct may not have resulted in prosecution or conviction. Davis, 205 Ill.2d at 367, 275 Ill.Dec. 781, 793 N.E.2d 552, quoting People v. Smith, 176 Ill.2d 217, 255, 223 Ill.Dec. 558, 680 N.E.2d 291 (1997). If the aggravation is believed, the trier of fact may find that a defendant's mitigation evidence was insufficient to overcome the aggravating factors. Davis, 205 Ill.2d at 368-69, 275 Ill.Dec. 781, 793 N.E.2d 552, quoting People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 296, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992). Here, the trial court considered defendant's prior misconduct, both charged and uncharged, and concluded that it, along with all of the other aggravating evidence, outweighed the mitigating evidence. This was proper under Davis, 205 Ill.2d at 365-71, 275 Ill. Dec. 781, 793 N.E.2d 552. Specifically, the court had before it evidence that aside from the violent crimes of March 22, 2002, defendant threatened Jason Rice with a club, threatened Joseph Tracey with a hammer, later verbally assaulted Tracey in the grocery store, blocked intersections around Toulon, tailgated police, threatened to kill Jerry Abbed and leave his body in place where no one would find him, and stole produce from Bantz's farm stand and then threatened Bantz's family. The court also heard testimony that defendant had a number of physically violent outbursts from 1967 through 1998, in which he attacked various neighbors, a car dealer and a sibling. Defendant further argues that his positive life accomplishmentssome good deeds, hard work, concern for his family, helping his children through school and normal friendshipsshould be considered as some evidence in mitigation to tip the scale in his favor. The trial court, however, carefully considered all of this evidence and concluded that it was outweighed by the aggravating circumstances mentioned above, which included the nature of the crimes committed on March 22, 2002, taken together with defendant's long-standing history of threats and intimidation against citizens of the community and his unrepentant belief that he has a right to shoot people with a sawed-off shotgun who disagree with him or sue him. Under the circumstances, we find that the trial court's conclusion that the mitigating evidence was insufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty in light of the aggravating evidence was amply supported by the record. Defendant cites People v. Carlson, 79 Ill.2d 564, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980), People v. Buggs, 112 Ill.2d 284, 97 Ill.Dec. 669, 493 N.E.2d 332 (1986), People v. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d 253, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118 (1989), and People v. Leger, 149 Ill.2d 355, 173 Ill.Dec. 612, 597 N.E.2d 586 (1992), cases in which the death penalty was vacated as excessive, and argues that there is no basis on which those cases may be distinguished from the present one. Defendant quotes People v. Thomas, 178 Ill.2d 215, 249-50, 227 Ill.Dec. 410, 687 N.E.2d 892 (1997), as distilling from the foregoing line of cases the factors this court considers most significant in considering whether a death sentence is excessive: the circumstances surrounding the murder generally involved the defendant acting under an extreme mental or emotional disturbance. [Citations.] In addition, the defendants in those cases generally led blameless lives with little contact with the criminal justice system. The State argues that the cases cited by defendant are distinguishable. First, in all four cases the murders were accompanied by sudden, explosive outbursts. Here, defendant's conduct was an amplification of a violent, mean and confrontational attitude for which defendant was well-known in the community. Second, Buggs and Carlson rested on the crucial fact that there were two statutory mitigating factors in play for defendants: they acted under extreme mental or emotional disturbances and they had no significant prior criminal history. Here, defendant had a behavioral disorder, not a mental disorder, and had not led a blameless life. Third, in Buggs and Carlson, defendants found themselves at the center of unique and tragic events which were not likely to be repeated in the future: each defendant was experiencing unique and complicated marital problems. In contrast, defendant here was not confronted with tragic events; rather, defendant was confronted with routine, even mundane events in that he was served with a warrant that he could have satisfied by paying $100 and he had been a defendant in a dog-bite case 15 years earlier. Fourth, each case is distinguishable from the present case on any one of a number of salient pointslike military service, a show of remorse, a relatively blameless life, or severe marital difficulties. Defendant urges a comparison of this case with the facts of Carlson, Buggs, Johnson and Leger, but we note that comparative proportionality review in death penalty cases is not required by the United States Constitution, [2] and it is not a feature of the capital sentencing process under the Illinois Constitution ( Williams, 192 Ill.2d at 576, 249 Ill.Dec. 563, 736 N.E.2d 1001; People v. Cole, 172 Ill.2d 85, 115, 216 Ill.Dec. 718, 665 N.E.2d 1275 (1996); People v. Palmer, 162 Ill.2d 465, 491, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797 (1994)). Nonetheless, on a number of occasions this court has indicated that the principles enunciated in these cases may be helpful in determining whether the death penalty is appropriate, while emphasizing that each case must ultimately be evaluated on its own facts. See, e.g., People v. Heard, 187 Ill.2d 36, 85-86, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58 (1999); Palmer, 162 Ill.2d at 491, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797; Johnson, 128 Ill.2d at 280, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118. Under the circumstances presented here, we do not believe that the Carlson line of cases requires that the trier of fact's decision be overturned and defendant's death sentence be vacated. In Carlson, the defendant had led a crime-free life up to the date that he shot and killed his ex-wife, which was three months after they divorced. They had planned to remarry, but the ex-wife told the defendant that she had a new boyfriend. When police tried to arrest the defendant at a bar several hours after the shooting, the defendant shot and killed an officer. The defendant later claimed that he had been attempting suicide when the officer was shot. The defendant had been suffering from severe mental and emotional problems before the shootings. He had also had two heart attacks and was undergoing a slow grieving process related to the loss of affection of his wife. Shortly after he shot his wife, the defendant sought to make provisions for his son. This court found that these circumstances do not bespeak a man with a malignant heart who must be permanently eliminated from society. Carlson, 79 Ill.2d at 590, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233. In Buggs, the defendant and his wife had been arguing about her infidelity, when the wife told the defendant that he was not the father of their two sons. At that point, the defendant poured gasoline on his wife and lit the house on fire. The defendant's wife and son were killed in the blaze. The court noted that the defendant had no prior criminal history (though there was evidence presented that the defendant had previously stabbed someone and had fired a shot between his son's legs during an argument with his wife), he had served his country honorably in the military for 21 years, and it was the marital disharmony that had triggered the tragic sequence of events. This court vacated the defendant's death sentence under the authority of Carlson. Buggs, 112 Ill.2d at 293-95, 97 Ill.Dec. 669, 493 N.E.2d 332. In Johnson, the defendant was unjustly fired from a job and returned to his former place of employment for a final paycheck only to be told that there was no paycheck for him. The defendant shot and killed one former coworker and wounded two others. On the day of the offenses, the defendant had used alcohol, cocaine, and marijuana laced with PCP. This court found that the deterrent purposes of the death penalty would not be served by putting the defendant to death because he had led a relatively blameless life before the murder, he was not known to be violent or untruthful, the crime was an aberration not likely to be repeated, he had only one misdemeanor conviction for which he successfully completed supervision, he had expressed remorse to the victims and their families, and had acted under a good deal of stress, which in his mind may have been equal to that suffered by the defendants in Buggs and Carlson. Johnson, 128 Ill.2d at 278-81, 131 Ill.Dec. 562, 538 N.E.2d 1118. In Leger, the defendant shot and killed his estranged wife five days before their divorce became final. Later that same night, the defendant shot his former wife and her new husband. The defendant had suffered from a chronic and painful injury. On the date of the offenses, the defendant was taking 10 different medications, had a drinking problem and had a history of blackouts. Moreover, the defendant had expressed remorse for his crimes, his prior convictions were related to his marriage problems, he got along well with people in the community and did not display any violence toward them, and had honorably served in the armed forces for 3½ years. Based on all the circumstances and the fact that the violent acts were triggered by the defendant's emotional disturbance over his marital problems, the court reduced the sentence to natural life. Leger, 149 Ill.2d at 412-14, 173 Ill.Dec. 612, 597 N.E.2d 586. The foregoing cases can be easily distinguished from the present one. The criminal conduct of the defendants in those cases was triggered by provocative events related to stressful marital or employment situations that led to sudden, explosive outbursts. In the present case, defendant erupted over a routine event only because he was filled with hate and disdain for authority and because he held a grudge against his neighbors who had sued him some 15 years earlier. Moreover, although the present murders were uniquely extreme in terms of defendant's past conduct, defendant had a history of violent and threatening behavior toward others in the community, unlike the defendants in the above-mentioned cases. The instant crimes are also distinguishable from the ones mentioned above in terms of severity. Defendant killed three persons, who were wholly unrelated to him and who had not provoked him in any way near the date of the offenses. He was also convicted of the attempted murder of two more persons. The Giesenhagens' only dealings with the defendant appear to be limited to a dogbite incident that occurred some 15 years earlier. Additionally, the fact that defendant kept a sawed-off shotgun within easy reach in his living room after telling police they would have to come back and get [him] indicates some level of forethought. But perhaps of greatest significance in distinguishing the Carlson line of cases is the shocking lack of remorse and rehabilitative potential of defendant. As previously mentioned, defendant was only sorry that he had not killed more peace officers. There is also no indication that he has ever relented from his belief that he has a right to shoot people at close range with a sawed-off shotgun if they shit on [him] first. In contrast to Carlson and its progeny, where the murders were the result of tragic, one-time events that were not likely to be repeated because of the remorse of the offenders and their general character, defendant had a long history of threats and violence against others in the community. The trial court specifically found that if given an opportunity, defendant would continue right where he left off. Additionally, defendant cannot be ruled out as a future threat to society even while incarcerated. Defendant's lack of remorse and future dangerousness clearly sets him apart from the offenders in Carlson and subsequent cases that have followed its lead. Instead, we find that the facts of the present case are closer to those in People v. Heard, 187 Ill.2d 36, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58 (1999), and People v. Cole, 172 Ill.2d 85, 216 Ill.Dec. 718, 665 N.E.2d 1275 (1996), where death sentences were affirmed over excessive-sentencing challenges. In Heard, the defendant shot three persons to deathhis ex-girlfriend, her boyfriend and another person at the scene. The murders were the result of an obsession the defendant had with his ex-girlfriend that resulted in a pattern of harassment and stalking. The defendant maintained that he had been operating under an emotional disturbance at the time of the murders, and he presented extensive evidence in mitigation showing that he was a hardworking, caring and nonviolent person, who had helped others during financial and emotional crises. The defendant also had no significant criminal history. Heard distinguished the Carlson line of cases by noting that the murders in the case before it were the culmination of an escalating history of violence by defendant against the victims, not a spontaneous reaction to information such as the infidelity of a spouse. Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 88, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58. Heard found unpersuasive the defendant's claim that murdering someone because of an obsession should be considered mitigating. Heard, 187 Ill.2d at 88-89, 240 Ill.Dec. 577, 718 N.E.2d 58. In Cole, the defendant killed the mother and brother of his ex-girlfriend with a shotgun. The shootings were triggered by the defendant's obsession with his ex-girlfriend after she moved out of their shared residence and obtained an order of protection against the defendant. This court concluded that the defendant's conduct was more akin to stalking than to the sudden, explosive outbursts found in Carlson, Buggs, Johnson, and Leger. Cole, 172 Ill.2d at 111, 216 Ill.Dec. 718, 665 N.E.2d 1275. Similarly, we find that defendant's conduct was the culmination of an escalating pattern of violence against citizens in the community of Toulon, and not the result of a spontaneous reaction to information such as the infidelity of a spouse. The trial court's assessment that defendant did not suffer from a psychological malady was also well supported by the record, as was the determination that defendant posed a continuing threat to society. Additionally, even if defendant had established the mitigating circumstance that he acted under an extreme mental disturbance, we would not view it as sufficient to overcome the aggravating circumstances in this case. Accordingly, we reject the contention that the cases cited by defendant require that his death sentence be vacated. After careful review of the circumstances of the crimes in this case and the character of defendant, we conclude that the death penalty is the appropriate penalty in this case and that its imposition was not fundamentally unjust.