Opinion ID: 1385454
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Error in Giving Certain Jury Instructions

Text: Johnson argues that the trial court erred in giving the following instruction: [32] A railroad track and railroad warning signs may be considered by you as evidence of a warning of danger. While a traveler is not always required to stop before crossing a track, a traveler is required to exercise care commensurate with the danger. Instruction No. 36. The instruction devolves from a line of cases involving collisions between trains and automobiles [33] and thus historically was designed to convey the concept that the track and signs constitute a warning of the danger of a collision. As such, Johnson argues, it was inappropriate, as well as argumentative and misleading. Johnson points out that her main claim of negligence was that the city should have posted a sign alerting bicyclists to the particular hazard presented by the railway crossing's extreme angle. The hazard was that the tracks could throw a bicyclist. The main thrust of the city's defense was that the standard, general purpose signs in place were sufficient to warn all travelers of all hazards associated with the crossing. Thus, Johnson argues, to instruct the jury that the existing signs may be evidence of a warning of danger, and that a traveler is required to exercise care commensurate with that danger, was to effectively determine the outcome of the case against her. We disagree. The instruction merely allowed the jury to consider whether the signs provided a general warning. Just because similar language has been used in some past cases to explain a traveler's duty to avoid collisions does not mean it cannot also be used to explain the traveler's general duty to exercise due care when crossing railroad tracks. The plain words of the instruction say no more. [34] There was no error.
Johnson's final assertion is that the court erred in giving the following proximate cause instruction: A proximate cause of an injury is a cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, produces the injury, and without which the injury would not have occurred. Instruction No. 25. Johnson requested that the following be submitted instead: An act or omission is a proximate cause of an injury if it was more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing about the injury complained of. Johnson argues that her proposed instruction correctly states the law of proximate cause under Sharp v. Fairbanks North Star Borough, 569 P.2d 178 (Alaska 1977), and preceding cases. We agree that the instruction could have conformed more closely to Sharp, but do not find the given instruction to be reversible error. In State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972), we identified the causal element of a negligence cause of action as: A reasonable close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury... . [proximate cause]. (brackets in original). Id. at 725, quoting W. Prosser, The Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971). The principle in Abbott was re-affirmed in Sharp, where we stated: Among the elements adopted by this court as necessary to make out a claim for relief based on negligence is `[a] reasonable close connection between the conduct and the resulting injury ... [proximate cause].' More specifically, negligent conduct may properly be found to be a `legal cause' of a plaintiff's injury if the negligent act `was more likely than not a substantial factor in bringing about the injury.' ... Normally, in order to satisfy the substantial factor test it must be shown both that the accident would not have happened `but for' the defendant's negligence and that the negligent act was so important in bringing about the injury that reasonable men would regard it as a cause and attach responsibility to it. (footnote omitted; emphasis in original). 569 P.2d at 181. We believe the given instruction adequately conveyed these concepts. Johnson argues that the instruction was prejudicial because it omitted the or omission and the substantial factor language endorsed in Sharp. The given instruction was phrased in terms of an act, and the use of in natural and continuous sequence also arguably implies acts. But whatever ambiguity is inferrable from that language is resolved when one considers all of the instructions given. Instruction No. 11 stated that the city is liable for any injury caused by acts or omissions of its employees, and Instruction No. 23 provided that negligence can result from either action or inaction. (emphasis added). Thus the jury was adequately advised that negligence can result from omissions. Johnson's second argument presents a somewhat closer question. The issue reduces itself to whether the instruction indicated that an act or omission must have been the cause of the injury for liability to attach, or whether it need only be a cause. In State v. Guinn, 555 P.2d 530, 538 (Alaska 1976), we stated that to satisfy proximate cause it is not necessary that the actor's conduct be the cause, but rather that [i]t is only necessary that such conduct be `a' legal cause. Again, the given instruction adequately conveyed this concept. The instruction stated that [ a ] proximate cause ... is a cause which ... produces the injury. (emphasis added). This was reinforced by Instruction No. 26 which stated, in part, that [t]here may be more than one proximate cause of an injury. Johnson's claim of error regarding the trial court's proximate cause instruction is rejected.