Opinion ID: 388809
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Indicting Grand Jury

Text: 11 The Special November 1975 Grand Jury which returned the indictments in this case began its investigation in November, 1975. Although an ordinary grand jury's term of service is generally 18 months, the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 3331, et seq., 2 extended this time to 36 months for special grand juries in an effort to combat organized crime and to investigate complex criminal schemes. Such special grand juries are otherwise regulated by the same rules and case law as regular grand juries. 18 U.S.C. § 3334. 12 Fed.R. of Crim.P. 6(g) provides for the discharge and excuse of grand jurors: 13 Discharge and Excuse. A grand jury shall serve until discharged by the court but no grand jury may serve more than 18 months. The tenure and powers of a grand jury are not affected by the beginning or expiration of a term of court. At any time for cause shown the court may excuse a juror either temporarily or permanently, and in the latter event the court may impanel another person in place of the juror excused. 14 (emphasis added). 15 Of the original 23 members impaneled on this special grand jury, fifteen members had, from time to time, been lawfully excused and replaced by newly sworn grand jurors by June 17, 1977, the date that indictments were returned against the appellants. Although appellants contend that only 8 of the original 23 grand jurors remained on the panel, the appellants' consolidated abstract and statement of the facts indicates that at least 11 grand jurors heard the entire investigation. On December 1, 1975, three grand jurors had been lawfully replaced, while Lang's case was not first presented to the Special Grand Jury until December, 1975. These first three replacements heard the entire investigation and, therefore, appellants cannot claim any prejudice from their participation on this grand jury. 16 The defendants became aware of these replacements when their motion for discovery of the grand jury proceedings was granted, and based upon this information, they filed a motion to dismiss the indictments, arguing that the grand jury was improperly constituted. The district court refused to dismiss the indictments, and the defendants renew their contentions in this appeal. They contend that only the eight original grand jurors who remained part of the panel from its inception were sufficiently well versed in this particular investigation to vote a true bill. The defendants' theory is that at some point replacements cannot be allowed. Specifically, they suggest two such points. First, that the grand jury was no longer properly constituted when its original membership fell below 16. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(a). In the alternative, the defendants contend that the grand jury cannot be properly constituted when less than 12 of the original members remain on the panel. Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(f). 17 Overall the defendants argue that replacement of grand jurors for good cause on the scale practiced here is unfair and unsatisfactory with respect to Rule 6; and, although their particular theory is not specifically explained, they argue the procedure violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights. 18 We begin our analysis by noting that the grand jury remains a creature of statute, at least in the provisions for its governance. In re Mills, 135 U.S. 263, 267, 10 S.Ct. 762, 763, 34 L.Ed.2d 107 (1890). In the present case, Rule 6 provides the applicable statutory standard. A literal reading of Rule 6 does not lend credence to any limitation upon the number of grand jurors who can be replaced for good cause. The only numerical limitations in the Rule appear in 6(a), (f) and (g). Rule 6(a) states in part: The grand jury shall consist of not less than 16 nor more than 23 members. Rule 6(f) states: An indictment may be found only upon the concurrence of 12 or more jurors. Rule 6(g), supra, provides the process for replacing grand jurors, but places no limitation upon the number of grand jurors who can be replaced. It seems axiomatic that had Congress intended to create limits on the numbers that could be replaced, Rule 6(g) is the logical place to have included such a limitation. For this reason, we hold that Rule 6 is not breached by the grand jury replacements in this case. 19 At least one other circuit court has reached the same conclusion. The dictates of Rule 6 were recently considered in a case which focused upon the attendance required of grand jurors. This case is typical of recurring attempts to have indictments invalidated when the individual grand jurors do not attend every session of the grand jury, although a quorum is present at each meeting. In United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., 478 F.Supp. 799 (C.D.Cal.1979), the district court invalidated indictments when it was shown that only 9 grand jurors had attended all the sessions, and heard all the evidence pertaining to the proposed indictments. By a 2-1 vote the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, stating: 20 This court must give effect to the express terms of Rules 6(a) and (f) unless such an interpretation would frustrate the purpose of the rules (i. e., implementation of the grand jury provision of the Fifth Amendment.) See e. g., Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (98 S.Ct. 2053, 2061, 56 L.Ed.2d 591) (1978); Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563, 571 (85 S.Ct. 1162, 1166, 14 L.Ed.2d 75) (1965). 21 United States v. Leverage Funding System, Inc., 637 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1980). 22 It is clear that the provision of a quorum mechanism in Rule 6 belies any intention to impose the type of perfect attendance rule suggested by the district court in Leverage Funding, or by implication in this case before us. Instead, the integrity of the grand jury's membership is protected by the time limitations on the grand jury's length of service. This term of service, whether it be 18 or 36 months, must be scrupulously adhered to. United States v. Macklin, 523 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1975). 23 Since their contentions regarding Rule 6 are without merit, the defendants can succeed in having this indictment dismissed only if the replacement procedure, as utilized here, frustrates the historic purposes of the grand jury, and hence the Fifth Amendment, or impinges on the defendants' Fifth Amendment due process rights. The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in pertinent part: No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury .... Rule 6 is merely the congressional implementation of this constitutional requirement. Generally, the Fifth Amendment requirements are satisfied when an independent and informed grand jury votes an indictment. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 1373, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962). The question presented is whether this grand jury was sufficiently informed. 24 The extent of procedural protections generally required in the grand jury proceedings 3 was addressed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), which summarized the role of the grand jury in the criminal law system: 25 Because the grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial. 26 Id. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 620. 27 Calandra held that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings. The test to decide whether a procedural protection was warranted was also stated: 28 ... we must weigh the potential injury to the historic role and functions of the grand jury against the potential benefits of the rule (exclusionary rule) as applied in this context. 29 Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. at 349, 94 S.Ct. at 620. 30 Our case impacts upon the investigatory function of the grand jury, the importance and scope of which has been discussed at length by the Supreme Court in Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 618: 31 The grand jury's investigative power must be broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be discharged. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, (408 U.S.) at 700 (92 S.Ct. at 2666): Costello v. United States, supra, (350 U.S.) at 364 (76 S.Ct. at 409). 32 In Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the importance of the grand jury's role: 33 (T)he investigation of crime by the grand jury implements a fundamental governmental role of securing the safety of the person and property of the citizen.... 408 U.S., at 700 (92 S.Ct., at 2666). 34 The role of the grand jury as an important instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily includes an investigatory function with respect to determining whether a crime has been committed and who committed it.... 'When the grand jury is performing its investigatory function into a general problem area ... society's interest is best served by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 392 (82 S.Ct. 1364, 1374, 8 L.Ed.2d 569) (1962). A grand jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every proper way to find if a crime has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970) ... It is only after the grand jury has examined the evidence that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an indictment can be made.... Id., at 701-702 (92 S.Ct., at 2666-2668.) 35 Id., 414 U.S. at 344, 94 S.Ct. at 618. 36 Balanced against this historic purpose, the defendants contend that a rule limiting replacements will insure that each grand juror hears, or has access to, the evidence that is presented. Their theory is that this will insure that the grand jurors find probable cause to indict based on all the testimony presented. 4 37 The leading case to weigh the potential benefit and burden of such a rule as the defendants have proposed is Judge Learned Hand's opinion in United States ex rel. McCann v. Thompson, 144 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 790, 65 S.Ct. 313, 89 L.Ed. 630 (1944). This case is expressly followed by United States v. Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., supra, (9th Cir.); United States v. Colasurdo, 453 F.2d 585, 596 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917, 88 S.Ct. 1834, 20 L.Ed.2d 875 (1972); Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951, 88 S.Ct. 1042, 19 L.Ed.2d 1142 (1968); United States v. Pastor, 419 F.Supp. 1318 (S.D.N.Y.1975). In McCann, the attendance of grand jurors was being challenged. Although at least 12 unchallenged and otherwise qualified grand jurors heard the evidence as it was presented at every session of the grand jury, their attendance had fluctuated, so that the same 12 members were not present at each session. The McCann court rejected the defendant's claim that less than perfect attendance by twelve grand jurors invalidated the indictments. Judge Hand's reasoning is equally applicable to a replacement situation such as this. McCann states 144 F.2d at 607: 38 On principle the objection seems to us not well taken. Since all the evidence adduced before a grand jury certainly when the accused does not appear is aimed at proving guilt, the absence of some jurors during some part of the hearings will ordinarily merely weaken the prosecution's case. If what the absentees actually hear is enough to satisfy them, there would seem to be no reason why they should not vote. Against this we can think of nothing except the possibility that some of the evidence adduced by the prosecution might conceivably turn out to be favorable to the accused; and that, if the absentees had heard it, they might have refused to vote a true bill. No one can be entirely sure that this can never occur; but it appears to us so remote a chance that it should be left to those instances in which it can be made to appear that the evidence not heard was of that character, in spite of the extreme difficulty of ever proving what was the evidence before a grand jury. 39 (emphasis added). 40 In United States v. Pastor, supra, 419 F.Supp. at 1329, the same McCann language on grand juror responsibilities was cited, along with this commentary: 41 The argument of McCann is, thus, a practical one. It does not assume that the grand jury is merely to be a mechanism of the prosecutor. To the contrary, it merely presumes that the individual grand jurors are honest and conscientious in their voting, fully cognizant of their oath, but nevertheless sometimes able to find a prima facie case on less than all the evidence presented. 42 (emphasis added). Indeed, the raison d'etre of a grand jury is the belief that an independent review by a body of citizens is the best protection from ill-advised and malicious prosecutions. Wood v. Georgia, supra, 370 U.S. at 390, 82 S.Ct. at 1373; Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 686-88, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 2659-60, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972). The required deference to the grand jury was restated in Leverage Funding Systems, Inc., supra, by the Ninth Circuit: 43 The Fifth Amendment bestows upon grand jurors a heavy responsibility, but lacking evidence to the contrary, courts must presume that grand jurors have properly performed their duties. See Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553-54 (2d Cir. 1977). Courts must also presume that a grand juror who votes to indict an individual on a particular count has heard sufficient evidence to believe that a trial on that count is warranted. Id. Leverage Funding has cited no authority, and we have found none, which even suggests that the Fifth Amendment requires the abandonment of this presumption unless a grand juror has heard all the evidence presented by the prosecution. 44 In addition, this is the typical grand jury case Judge Hand discussed in McCann. The appellants never appeared before the grand jury, raising a logical inference that none of the testimony presented was exculpatory in nature. Rather, if the grand jurors missed some of the testimony in this case that fact can be presumed to have been inculpatory in nature. The fact that some replacement grand jurors missed some of the testimony in this case would inure to the benefit, not the detriment of the appellants. 45 To the importance of the grand jury's investigative functions, and Judge Hand's reasoning in McCann, we can add other reasons why the balance in this case does not mandate a judicially created prophylactic rule limiting grand juror replacements. Such a judicially created limit could frustrate the explicit congressional intent of extending the length of grand jury service. This extension was found necessary to respond to the increasingly complex crimes federal prosecutors must police. Such a limit could mandate the discharge of an investigative grand jury at the very point they are ready to vote indictments. The first effect of such a discharge would be an inefficient use of prosecutorial resources. The prosecutor would be left with the business of recreating the investigation for a new body of citizens. The possible fallout of such a delay would be a resulting reduction in witness memory and reliability, a condition as harmful to defendants as it is to society as a whole. 46 Furthermore, there is no constitutional requirement that primary evidence be presented to the grand jury. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397 (1956). In this case, the jurors heard a summary witness, the government agent who conducted the investigation, before they voted to indict. This in itself could have provided sufficient evidence to allow the indictment to be voted. For this reason, the prejudice to appellants, if any, was further minimized. 47 Nor do we seek to encourage a routine inquiry into grand jury attendance and voting records. Disclosure of grand jury testimony and voting records is required when defendants show a particularized need for the information before the grand jury secrecy privileges in Rule 6(c) are to be violated. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400, 79 S.Ct. 1237, 1241, 3 L.Ed.2d 1323 (1959); State of Wisconsin v. Schaffer, 565 F.2d 961 (7th Cir. 1977). In an effort to avoid the creation of a routine disclosure requirement of voting and attendance records, other courts have refused to find the absence of grand jurors to be a problem. United States v. Pastor, supra, 419 F.Supp. at 1328-29. United States v. Colasurdo, supra, 453 F.2d at 596. Were we to grant appellants the rule they seek, inevitably the inquiry into grand jury attendance will grow into a routine inquiry as to how the individual grand jurors voted. For example, in United States v. Colasurdo, supra, the appellants contended that where 11 defendants were indicted on 45 counts, 12 or more grand jurors had to be present to hear the evidence that supports the 233 decisions involved. While Judge Oakes called this suggestion ingenious, he based his refusal on the McCann holding. In any event, a rule such as the appellants envision would only result in a windfall unrelated to prejudice or the evidence presented. 48 No blanket rule regarding the extent of grand juror replacement can be made from this case. Prosecutors can insure that the perception of fairness, as well as its substance, are maintained by giving replacement and absent grand jurors the opportunity to review transcripts or summaries of missed sessions. That should go a long way to ameliorate the concerns raised here. 49 In conclusion, the speculative benefit of a broad judicial limit on the number of grand jury replacements may serve a minimal public interest in preserving the purity of the grand jury proceedings. However, it would disserve other public interests of a weightier nature. The replacement procedure does not violate either Rule 6 or the applicable constitutional guarantees. 50 In light of our resolution of this issue, the appellants' request to unseal the grand jury transcripts and records pertaining to this case is also denied.