Opinion ID: 1821031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: did the trial court improperly enhance the defendant's punishment for demanding a jury trial?

Text: Gillum alleges that the trial court erred by increasing his sentence in punishment for not entering a guilty plea in violation of his right to trial by jury under U.S. Const. Amend. VI. and Miss. Const. Article 3, Section 26 (1890). He cites Pearson v. State, 428 So.2d 1361 (Miss. 1983); Williamson v. State, 388 So.2d 168 (Miss. 1980); and Fermo v. State, 370 So.2d 930 (Miss. 1979), for the rule that: A criminal defendant may not receive a harsher sentence solely, or even partially, because he refuses to plead guilty and proceeds to require the prosecution to prove his guilt. The rationale behind the principle is that the coercion or the inducement casts a chill over the exercise of guaranteed fundamental constitutional rights. The sentencing court may consider only legitimate factors and cannot base the sentence, either in whole or part, upon the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights to a jury trial. [citations omitted] Fermo, 370 So.2d at 932. We affirmed an enhanced sentence in Fermo because defense counsel directly involved the trial judge in the plea bargain negotiations and, therefore, could not take advantage of an error which he induced the trial court to commit. Id. at 933. In Williamson v. State , the defendant offered to plead guilty for a reduced sentence but the trial judge refused to accept the guilty plea because the defendant gave answers indicating he was offering defenses against the charge. We held that the guilty plea was properly refused and that the imposition of a greater sentence than was offered in exchange for a guilty plea was not reversible error in this case because the defendant had committed an unindicted offense which was unknown to the trial judge when the lighter sentence was proposed. Williamson, 388 So.2d at 170. Finally, in Pearson v. State , a close scrutiny of the trial court's reasons for enhancement of the defendant's sentence from the plea bargain proposal to what was actually imposed made apparent that the basis for the larger sentence was a criminal record dating back 20 years. Pearson, 428 So.2d at 1365. In Pearson, the circuit judge remained aloof from the plea bargain negotiations by refraining from direct involvement as in Fermo v. State, supra . Furthermore, at no time prior to sentencing was the circuit judge informed of Pearson's prior criminal record, as in Williamson v. State, supra . The Pearson Court recommended that trial judges candidly place in the record a statement of factors considered in determining the sentence imposed to assist this Court in the performance of the appellate review function. 428 So.2d at 1365, n. 4. Gillum refers this Court to several statements by the trial judge prior to sentencing in support of his claim that his sentence was enhanced because he demanded a trial by jury. ... But, my attitude is that if, uh, if a fellow wants a trial, he's not going to get the same bargain as the fellow that pleads guilty. Because if I went by that, I mean, I never would get through trying lawsuits, if I adopted that policy, because I've had over a thousand in Harrison County alone. ... . ... And if you gave them all the same bargain if the Jury convicted as you did when they pled guilty, you know, there's got to be some incentive for coming on in and pleading, so they don't get the same bargain when the Jury convicts them as they do when they plead. That may not sound fair, but it's the only way I can move them out. The trial court asked the attorneys for both sides for recommendations, and after adjourning one hour to consider the state's sentencing report, the following exchange took place between counsel for the defendant and the trial court: Uh, another thing I'd like to point out is that I understood the Court was somewhat displeased by the fact that he wanted a trial. BY THE COURT: No, I'm not displeased. BY MR. TUCKER: Well, you know, you thought that should be considered in the sentencing. Well, uh, .... BY THE COURT: (Interposing) Well, I have to do that in order to keep the docket moving. BY MR. TUCKER: Okay. I, I don't think that should be considered and, uh, I can see the consideration if a man gets up there and denies it, you must necessarily think that he's lying and you would think that somewhat contentious and you would hold it against him. BY THE COURT: Well, I just can't give them the same thing as I would if they pled guilty because if I did, I'd have to try every one of them. BY MR. TUCKER: Okay, And... . BY THE COURT: (Interposing) And we'd, uh, this thing would get so out of hand we never would get caught up. In the case sub judice, while there were some intemperate comments by the trial judge indicating displeasure with Gillum's exercise of his right to trial by jury, it is apparent from a review of the record that the basis of the 7-year sentence was the sentencing report submitted by the state which detailed three or four unindicted offenses of breaking and entering committed by Gillum, which were not revealed to the trial court prior to sentencing. See Williamson v. State, supra . We reiterate our holding in Fermo and progeny that it is absolutely impermissible for a trial judge to impose a heavier sentence based in whole or in part upon a defendant's exercise of his constitutionally protected right to trial by jury. However, where, as here, the record reveals without a doubt that the sentence imposed was based solely upon a defendant's prior convictions, or, as here, the presentencing report, we will not disturb the trial court's discretion in sentencing. AFFIRMED. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.