Opinion ID: 2516473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Same Actor Inference

Text: In attempting to establish pretext in the final step of the McDonnell Douglas framework, many federal circuit courts of appeal have required plaintiffs to overcome the same actor inference. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 847 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1018, 114 S.Ct. 1398, 128 L.Ed.2d 72 (1994); Buhrmaster v. Overnite Transp. Co., 61 F.3d 461, 463 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1078, 116 S.Ct. 785, 133 L.Ed.2d 736 (1996); Rand v. CF Indus., Inc., 42 F.3d 1139, 1147 (7th Cir.1994); Lowe v. J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 963 F.2d 173, 174-75 (8th Cir.1992); Bradley v. Harcourt, Brace & Co., 104 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir.1996). [W]here the same actor is responsible for both the hiring and firing of a discrimination plaintiff, and both actions occur within a short period of time, a strong inference arises that there was no discriminatory motive. Bradley, 104 F.3d at 270-71. In Proud v. Stone, 945 F.2d 796 (4th Cir.1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit became the first court to recognize the same actor inference defense. Id. at 797. In adopting the inference, the Fourth Circuit concluded that a strong supposition exists that discrimination could not have been a determining factor for adverse employment action taken by the employer in cases where an employee is terminated by the hiring individual within a relatively short time after being hired. Id. The plaintiff in Proud was hired on the basis of a written application sent to a United States Army Division in Germany. Id. at 796. The hiring official selected Proud over six younger applicants for the position of chief accountant. Proud's date of birth, indicating that he was sixty-nine years old, was noted on his employment application. When Proud arrived in Germany, he agreed to assume temporarily the responsibilities of an accounting technician who had recently resigned. Id. The hiring official's stated reason for terminating Proud related largely to dissatisfaction with Proud's performance of the accounting technician duties. Id. at 797. At trial, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted the Army's motion for dismissal at the close of the plaintiff's case. Id. The district court found that Proud had failed to present a prima facie case of discriminatory termination under the McDonnell Douglas analysis because his performance at the time of discharge did not meet the employer's legitimate expectations. In addition, the district court found no evidence of discrimination, noting, among other evidence, that Proud's age was the same at hiring and firing. Id. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the hirer-firer relationship was significant. In affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit reasoned: One is quickly drawn to the realization that [c]laims that employer animus exists in termination but not in hiring seem irrational. From the standpoint of the putative discriminator, [i]t hardly makes sense to hire workers from a group one dislikes (thereby incurring the psychological costs of associating with them), only to fire them once they are on the job. Id. (citing John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L .Rev. 983, 1017 (1991)). Based upon this principle, the Fourth Circuit held that in cases where the hirer and the firer are the same individual and the termination of employment occurs within a relatively short time span following the hiring, a strong inference exists that discrimination was not a determining factor for the adverse action taken by the employer. Id. The court noted that the hirer-firer inference would be appropriate at the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework. [5] Id. at 798. Although we adopt the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Proud, we decline to extend the parameters of the same actor inference beyond that applied in Proud. [6] Theoretically, the hirer-firer relationship could be invoked to discredit a plaintiff's discrimination claims in virtually every hire-fire situation. We therefore hold that the same actor inference is merely a permissive inference supplemental to other evidentiary or policy considerations.