Opinion ID: 2675408
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Free-Speech Retaliation

Text: Fields argues that the district court should have allowed him to amend his complaint to include a claim that Defendants retaliated against him for filing this lawsuit, in violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. We disagree. 21 Ordinarily, “[t]he First Amendment prohibits the government from punishing a person for exercising the right to free speech.”1 Deutsch v. Jordan, 618 F.3d 1093, 1097 (10th Cir. 2010). “When the government is [a] person’s employer, however, the right to free speech is limited in ways that would otherwise be unconstitutional.” Id. “Speech, for example, can be insubordinate, disruptive, or demoralizing; and government employers are not required to let such misconduct pass.” Merrifield, 654 F.3d at 1079. “‘Government employers, like private employers, need a significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions; without it, there would be little chance for the efficient provision of public services.’” Id. (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). To balance the public employee’s right to speak as a citizen on matters of public concern against the government employer’s interests in ensuring efficient public service, we use a five-step approach derived from Garcetti and Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See id. We consider: (1) whether the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s official duties; (2) whether the speech was on a matter of public concern; (3) whether the government’s interests, as employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public service are sufficient to outweigh the plaintiff’s free speech interests; (4) whether the protected speech was a motivating factor in the adverse 1 Perhaps Fields could have framed his claim as a violation of his right to petition. See Borough of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488, 2491 (2011). But our analysis would be the same. See id. at 2494‒95 (retaliation claims by public employees are subject to the same test regardless of whether they are under the Free Speech or Petition clauses of the First Amendment). 22 employment action; and (5) whether the defendant would have reached the same employment decision in the absence of the protected conduct. Leverington v. City of Colo. Springs, 643 F.3d 719, 724 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The first three inquiries are ordinarily matters of law for the court to decide, while the last two are for the factfinder. See Deutsch, 618 F.3d at 1098. Under this analysis, a public employee’s speech is unprotected if it was made pursuant to official duties, if it was not on a matter of public concern, or if the balance of interests favors the employer. See id. at 1097–98. The district court rejected Fields’s retaliation claim on the ground that the subject matter of his lawsuit was not a matter of public concern because Fields “allege[d] only an employment dispute that resulted from an alleged violation of his own personal rights; not any corruption, impropriety, or malfeasance on the part of officials in the [TPD],” Aplt. App., Vol. I at 129, and he had “offered no case law for the proposition that filing a lawsuit turns a dispute over the violation of personal rights into a public concern,” id. at 129–30. But we need not address the public-concern issue. Regardless of whether the lawsuit was on a matter of public concern, Fields’s claim cannot survive the balancing of interests at the third step of the Garcetti/Pickering analysis. “In balancing the employee’s interest in expression against the government’s interest in efficiency, a court must consider ‘the manner, time, and place of the employee’s expression,’ as well as the events leading up to it.” Lytle v. City of Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 863–64 (10th Cir. 1998) 23 (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987)). Relevant considerations include “whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among coworkers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker’s duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise.” Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388. “These considerations . . . make apparent that the state interest element of the test focuses on the effective functioning of the public employer’s enterprise. Interference with work, personnel relationships, or the speaker’s job performance can detract from the public employer’s function; avoiding such interference can be a strong state interest.” Id. “[T]he State’s burden in justifying a particular [employment action] varies depending upon the nature of the employee’s expression.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983). “[T]he employer’s burden to justify its restriction on speech increases in proportion to the value of that speech in the public debate.” Curtis v. Okla. City Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 147 F.3d 1200, 1213 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, “‘[t]he burden of caution employees bear with respect to the words they speak will vary with the extent of authority and public accountability the employee’s role entails.’” Id. (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390). “The employee’s burden of caution is greater when the employee serves in a ‘confidential, policymaking, or public contact role,’ rather than, for example, a clerical role, because of the higher likelihood the employee’s speech will cause disruption to the agency’s successful functioning.” Id. (quoting Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390–91). 24 We begin with Fields’s interests. He contends that he filed his lawsuit “seeking vindication of fundamental constitutional rights,” Aplt. Reply Br. at 17, and that allowing a government employer to punish an employee for filing a civil-rights lawsuit will chill civil-rights litigation. To be sure, we have recognized that “[s]peech which discloses any evidence of corruption, impropriety, or other malfeasance on the part of city officials, in terms of content, clearly concerns matters of public import,” and that “an employee’s First Amendment interest is entitled to greater weight where he is acting as a whistle blower in exposing government corruption.” Lytle, 138 F.3d at 865 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, as we have already explained, Fields’s free-exercise claim was based on an unreasonable construction of the Attendance Order, his Establishment Clause claim failed because no informed, reasonable observer would have perceived that TPD was endorsing Islam, and there was also no merit to his other claims. “[A] government employee’s interest in whistleblowing is entitled to little weight if a reasonable person in his shoes would not have believed that there was government corruption or wrongdoing.” Id. at 866. His claims are therefore “less important and less valuable to the public than is the speech often at issue in public employee speech cases.” Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 933 (10th Cir. 1995). TPD’s interests, on the other hand, are compelling. We have long recognized that law-enforcement agencies have a “heightened interest . . . in maintaining discipline . . . among employees.” Lytle, 138 F.3d at 867 (internal quotation marks omitted). Fields was a commanding officer. His challenge to a superior’s order, by disobedience or by 25 litigation, sets a powerful example. It would likely undermine not just his superiors’ confidence in his loyalty and willingness to implement orders, but also his own authority as a commander. In addition, TPD must maintain public confidence that “police protection will be available to the public . . . and that the police will deal impartially with all.” Horstkoetter v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 159 F.3d 1265, 1274 (10th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks omitted) (police officers could be prohibited from allowing political signs in the yards of their homes, in part because of the government’s interest in prohibiting the appearance of partisanship in law enforcement). In particular, the inclusion in the complaint of numerous largely irrelevant paragraphs attacking “shariah-adherent” Islam, Aplt. App., Vol. I at 17, would inevitably create the perception of hostility to a component of the community. Cf. Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d 159, 178‒79 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Police officers . . . are quintessentially public servants. As such, part of their job is to safeguard the public’s opinion of them, particularly with regard to a community’s view of the respect that police officers . . . accord the members of that community.”). Fields contends that Defendants “never explain how any of their interests are legitimately advanced by punishing Plaintiff for filing this civil rights lawsuit.” Aplt. Reply Br. at 20. But “[w]e have long said that we may affirm on any basis supported by the record, even if it requires ruling on arguments not reached by the district court or even presented to us on appeal.” Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130 26 (10th Cir. 2011). In our view, permitting Fields to amend his complaint to add this retaliation claim would have been futile.