Opinion ID: 778631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Key Limitations of Claims 11 and 14 in the Prior Art

Text: 50 As noted above, claim 11 differs from claim 1 in that claim 11 adds grammar-creation capability features including a means for extracting a grammar from a hypermedia source; a means for modifying the grammar; a means for dynamically producing the grammar; and a means for processing the grammar to produce a reference to a specific hypermedia source. In the August 1996 Office Action, the examiner summarily rejected claim 11's grammar-creation capability limitations, stating that [t]he use of grammar is old and well known in the art of speech recognition as a means of optimization which is highly desirable. Aug. 7, 1996 Office Action at 5. The examiner's final Office Action generally affirmed his initial conclusion as to obviousness, without specifically discussing the grammar features. Mar. 27, 1997 Final Office Action at 2. The Board subsequently affirmed the examiner's decision to reject claim 11, noting that the examiner set forth sufficient reasoning for asserting the obviousness or inherent nature of each of the claimed features, and therefore, the Examiner's reasoning is sufficient to shift the burden to Appellants to come forward with evidence and/or arguments to rebut the Examiner's position. Decision on Appeal at 9; accord Decision on Request for Rehearing at 6. 51 Appellants urge that this rejection was improper because there is no evidence in the record to prove that the following limitations of claim 11 would be obvious: 52 d. a means for extracting a grammar from a hypermedia source on said information resource for future reference to said source; 53 e. a means for modifying said grammar; 54 .... 55 g. a means for processing said grammar to produce a reference to said hypermedia source. 56 Even if all of the limitations of claim 11 were present in the prior art, appellants urge that there is no teaching or suggestion supporting the combination of these references. 57 We agree with appellants that the Board's ground of rejection is simply inadequate on its face. The Board sustained the examiner's very general and broad conclusion of obviousness based on his finding that [t]he use of grammar is old and well known in the art of speech recognition as a means of optimization which is highly desirable. Aug. 7, 1996 Office Action at 5; accord Decision on Request for Rehearing at 6. Although this statement is likely true, it fails to address the grammar-creation capability limitations of claim 11. While the examiner's statement generally addresses the use of grammar, it does not discuss the unique limitations of extracting, modifying, or processing the grammar to interact with hypermedia sources. The Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because the cited references do not support each limitation of claim 11. See In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488, 493, 20 USPQ2d 1438, 1443 (Fed. Cir.1991). 58 The Patent Office (PTO) on appeal does not even defend the Board's rejection of claim 11 on the merits. Rather, it urges that appellants did not properly raise the grounds for sustaining the patent before the Board. The PTO's argument seems weak at best because appellants' brief to the Board specifically discusses the alleged failure of the Schmandt and Stefanopoulos references to teach the claimed invention of claim 11. Despite language in the Board's reconsideration decision faulting appellants for failure to raise issues before the Board, 1 we do not read the Board's decisions on appeal or reconsideration as resting on this ground. Rather, the Board sustained the examiner's rejection on the merits. 59 In SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947), the Supreme Court held that 60 a reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. 61 Here the Chenery rule is implicated because the Board failed to provide an adequate ground for sustaining the rejection of claim 11 in either its decision on appeal or its decision on request for rehearing. See also SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed.Cir.2001). 62 Therefore, because the Board did not hold that appellants' arguments were untimely and did reach the merits of claim 11 but failed to provide an adequate basis for rejecting this claim, we vacate and remand for further proceedings before the Board as to independent claim 11 and dependent claims 12 and 13.
63 Since the limitations of claims 11 and 14 are very similar, the examiner rejected claim 14 on the same grounds as he rejected claim 11. Appellants urge that there was also insufficient evidence in the record to support the examiner's and Board's conclusions regarding obviousness because the cited references do not support all of the limitations of claim 14. We agree that the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Again, in its brief to this court, the PTO attempts to sustain the actions of the Board on grounds not articulated in the Board's decision, relying on Schmandt to defend the rejection of claim 14. The PTO claims that Schmandt's Xspeak II system discloses the grammar limitation of claim 14: a means for producing a grammar from textual representation of links to said information resource. The PTO further contends that Schmandt provides the motivation to combine a speech user agent such as Xspeak II with the information resource described in Stefanopoulos because Xspeak II provides the benefits of decreased manual input and improved recognition rates. 64 Whatever merit there is to the PTO's defense of the rejection of claim 14 raised in its brief submitted to this court, that ground does not appear in the Board's decision and may not be the basis for affirmance. See Chenery, 332 U.S. at 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575; In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 n. 7, 222 USPQ 191, 196 n. 7 (Fed.Cir.1984) ([T]he Solicitor cannot raise a new ground of rejection or apply a new rationale to support a rejection in appeals from decisions of the board.). We vacate and remand for further proceedings as to independent claims 14 and dependent claims 15-19.