Opinion ID: 3063602
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Analysis - Minimum Contacts

Text: Brennan next relies upon Licciardello to argue for personal jurisdiction over his intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud claims because (1) the diocese committed an intentional tort; (2) the intentional tort was aimed at Brennan, a Florida resident; and (3) Brennan felt the effects of the intentional tort in Florida. Brennan relies upon Cronin to argue that the Due Process Clause would not be violated if the diocese was subject to personal jurisdiction for his breach of contract claim. Specifically, Brennan argues that he has established that the district court had jurisdiction over the diocese based on the diocese’s breach of its oral agreement to pay for (1) his healthcare related expenses not covered by his 7 insurance; and (2) all necessary psychological and therapeutic care. Even though a long-arm statute may permit a state to assert jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution protects an individual’s liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful “contacts, ties, or relations.” International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, Office of Unemployment Comp. and Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S. Ct. 154, 160, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945). Where a forum seeks to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, due process requires that the defendant have “fair warning” that a particular activity may subject him to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). “This ‘fair warning’ requirement is satisfied if the defendant has ‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that ‘arise out of or relate to’ those activities.” Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1284 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984), and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984)). In this way, the defendant could have reasonably anticipated being sued in the forum’s courts in connection with his activities there. 8 Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 474, 105 S. Ct. at 2183. “Jurisdiction is proper where the defendant’s contacts with the forum proximately result from actions by the defendant himself that create a ‘substantial connection’ with the forum state.” Madara, 916 F.2d at 1516. In Cronin, we held in the oral contract context that the allegation that an agent of a noncitizen insurance company orally offered to obtain insurance for a Florida resident was sufficient to conclude that said agent had purposely availed himself of the benefits of Florida law, so that the agent could reasonably expect to be sued in Florida. 980 F.2d at 670. Moreover, so long as the purposeful conduct creates a “substantial connection” with the forum, even a single act can support jurisdiction. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 475, 105 S. Ct. at 2184. Intentional torts are such acts and may support the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant who has no other contacts with the forum. Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1285. In Licciardello, we held that the commission of an intentional tort by a nonresident expressly aimed at a resident, the effects of which were suffered by the resident in the forum, satisfied the “effects” test established in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789-90, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1486-87, 79 L. Ed. 2d 804 (1984). 544 F.3d at 1288. The “effects” test provides that due process is satisfied when the plaintiff brings suit in the forum where the “effects” or “brunt of the 9 harm” caused by the defendant’s intentional tortious activity was suffered. Licciardello, 544 F.3d 1285-87. Therefore, personal jurisdiction is proper over a defendant who commits an intentional and allegedly tortious act expressly aimed at the plaintiff in the forum state. Id. at 1288. Taking Brennan’s allegations as true, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that the diocese did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Florida for purposes of Brennan’s breach of contract and tort claims because the diocese orally offered to pay for his treatment in Florida and he felt all of his harm from the intentional torts directed at him by the diocese in Florida. C. Due Process Analysis - Fair Play and Substantial Justice Brennan contends that he met the fair play and substantial justice standard in the intentional tort context because: (1) he was injured by the intentional misconduct of the diocese; (2) the intentional tort was expressly aimed at him in Florida; and (3) Florida has a strong interest in affording its residents a forum to obtain relief from intentional misconduct of nonresidents causing injury in Florida. Further, Brennan contends that, in the oral contract context, he met the fair play and substantial justice standard articulated in Cronin. Even where a defendant has purposefully established constitutionally significant contacts within the forum state, jurisdiction must also be evaluated in 10 light of several other factors to determine whether its exercise would comport with “fair play and substantial justice.” International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320, 66 S. Ct. 154. These factors include the burden on the defendant of litigating in the forum, the forum’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, and the judicial system’s interest in efficiently resolving the dispute. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S. Ct. 559, 564, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980). “Where these factors do not militate against otherwise permitted jurisdiction, the Constitution is not offended by its exercise.” Licciardello, 544 F.3d at 1284 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292, 100 S. Ct. at 564)). In Licciardello, we held that litigation in Florida comported with fair play and substantial justice because the defendant knowingly caused a tort injury in Florida, and “Florida has a very strong interest in affording its residents a forum to obtain relief from intentional misconduct of nonresidents causing injury in Florida.” 544 F.3d at 1288. In Cronin, we held that: Florida’s interest in resolving a dispute over a contract pursuant to which insurance benefits would be provided to a patient in a Florida hospital is substantial, as is Cronin’s interest in obtaining relief. The inconvenience caused to [the defendant], while not insignificant, does not outweigh the factors that mitigate in favor of the district court’s exertion of personal jurisdiction over him. Thus, personal jurisdiction 11 over the contract claim was proper. 980 F.2d at 671. We conclude from the record that the exercise of jurisdiction over the diocese comports with fair play and substantial justice because Brennan was injured by the alleged intentional misconduct of the diocese in Florida, and Florida has a very strong interest in affording him a forum to obtain relief. Further, in the breach of contract context, Florida has a substantial interest in resolving a dispute over a contract when the benefits would be provided in Florida. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.