Opinion ID: 1314502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admissibility of state and federal regulations

Text: Gypsum next asserts it is entitled to a new trial because the trial court improperly allowed Kershaw to admit into evidence a DHEC regulation promulgated in 1982 and a NESHAP [2] regulation first promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1973. Gypsum also asserts error in the admission of testimony concerning these regulations as well as testimony concerning AHERA [3] regulations promulgated in 1987. The DHEC regulation was offered by Kershaw to show that asbestos is unreasonably dangerous and that Kershaw therefore acted appropriately in removing the material. Specifically, Gypsum objects to a statement contained in the preamble to the DHEC regulation that the presence in school buildings of asbestos creates a hazard to the health of exposed school children and employees. The NESHAP regulation to which Gypsum objects requires that certain procedures be followed if a building with friable asbestos-containing products is renovated or demolished. These procedures include notice to the EPA of the intention to renovate or demolish and compliance with certain procedures to prevent emissions of particular asbestos material to the outside air. The AHERA regulations were promulgated after the asbestos removal in this case and describe certain precautionary procedures to be implemented by school authorities if friable asbestos-containing surfacing materials are present in their buildings. On appeal Gypsum argues that these regulations were hearsay and irrelevant and unfairly prejudiced the jury. Kershaw asserts the admission of the regulations and related testimony was not error since such were admitted for the limited purpose of showing the information on which the school board relied and why it pursued the course of action it did. Kershaw further asserts that the regulations were not hearsay because they were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted but to show what Kershaw relied upon in deciding to remove the asbestos. Kershaw also argues that the trial court gave a limiting instruction to the jury. Finally, Kershaw notes that the substance of these regulations was admitted through other sources and therefore, any error was harmless. We agree with Kershaw on all points. First, the regulations were not used by Kershaw to establish liability on the part of Gypsum. The findings in the DHEC preamble were only discussed outside the presence of the jury and were not argued to the jury. Kershaw offered these regulations to show its reliance on the regulations and the inevitability of the necessity of removal and accordingly the inevitability of damages. Further, portions of the regulations Gypsum finds objectionable came in through other testimony. For example, an expert witness testified that friable asbestos material in a school environment would pose a threat and that school buildings are of special concern because of the presence of children. Although Gypsum cites a number of cases for the proposition that these regulations should not have been admitted, none of its cited authority is controlling under the facts of this case. For example, many of the cases Gypsum cites concern the admissibility of reports, not regulations. See, e.g., Sandel v. State , 126 S.C. 1, 119 S.E. 776 (1923); Stack Prudential Insurance Company , 173 S.C. 81, 174 S.E. 911 (1934); Peagler v. Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co. , 234 S.C. 140, 107 S.E. (2d) 15 (1959). Additional cases cited by Gypsum are inapplicable because they involve reports or regulations offered to prove negligence, which was not the purpose here; other cases address reports found to be unreliable. We are not persuaded by these authorities as all are distinguishable from the facts of this case. We hold that admission of the regulations and related testimony in this case did not constitute reversible error.