Opinion ID: 808399
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Michigan’s Long-Arm Statute

Text: The district court found that Michigan’s long-arm statute was satisfied because it allows personal jurisdiction over a corporation that is involved in “the transaction of any business in the state.”2 Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.715(1); see Sifers v. Horen, 188 N.W.2d 623, 624 n.2 (Mich. 1971) (explaining that “[t]he word ‘any’ means just 1 Generally, long-arm statutes that confer jurisdiction to the extent of due process only require a one-step consideration of due process. Green v. Wilson, 565 N.W.2d 813, 816 (Mich. 1997). Some Michigan courts have interpreted Michigan’s long-arm statute to be coextensive with due process in certain respects, but we still must consider both factors since the language of the statute enumerates specific instances where jurisdiction may be exercised. Id. 2 Later in the opinion, however, the district court said that the long-arm statute was only “likely” satisfied. It appears from the opinion that the district court did, in fact, find personal jurisdiction under Michigan Compiled Laws § 600.715(1). No. 11-1751 Miller v. AXA Winterthur Ins. Page 5 what it says. It includes ‘each’ and ‘every.’”). Furthermore, the “slightest act of business in Michigan” is a sufficient business transaction for purposes of the statute. Neogen Corp. v. Neo Gen Screening, Inc., 282 F.3d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 2002); see Oberlies v. Searchmont Resort, Inc., 633 N.W.2d 408, 413 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001). Although no financial transaction occurred, we assume, without deciding, that the district court was correct in holding that the letter sent from Winterthur to Miller was a nominal business transaction that satisfied the Michigan long-arm statute.