Opinion ID: 1908530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the application of carl ii to the present record

Text: We now turn to the question whether the order granting summary judgment in favor of Guest Services can continue to stand if we apply the en banc court's subsequent decision in Carl II. We conclude that it cannot. Linda Carl alleged in her complaint that Children's Hospital had discharged her from her position as a nurse because, inter alia, she had testified before the Council of the District of Columbia in opposition to tort reform legislation. The trial court dismissed her complaint on the ground that her allegations were insufficient to bring her case within what was then the sole declared public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, as articulated in Adams. A division of this court affirmed. Carl v. Children's Hosp., 657 A.2d 286 (D.C.1995) ( Carl I ). The full court granted Ms. Carl's petition for rehearing en banc. In support of her claim of wrongful termination, Ms. Carl placed her principal reliance on D.C.Code § 1-224 (1992). Section 1-224 makes it a criminal offense corruptly or by threat of force, or by any threatening letter or communication, [to] endeavor[ ] to influence, intimidate or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before the Council.... Ms. Carl did not allege that Children's Hospital had threatened her or had otherwise violated the proscriptions of § 1-224, nor did she claim that the statute created a private right of action. Rather, Ms. Carl argued that her termination for testifying before the Council contravened a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, and that it was therefore actionable. A majority of the en banc court held that Ms. Carl's complaint stated a claim upon which relief could be granted because it fell within a public policy solidly based on, or firmly anchored in, Section 1-224. Carl II, supra, 702 A.2d at 163-64 & n. 6 (Terry, J., concurring). Our disposition of Carl II mandates reversal of the summary judgment in the present case. The health and food regulations which we have cited in footnote 1, supra, are expressions of a clear public policy proscribing, in the interest of public health, the preparation, service or sale of adulterated or contaminated food. Conduct that imperils the health and safety of the elderly residents of a retirement home, who, as a group, are particularly vulnerable to the kind of practice here alleged, is obviously contrary to the public policy of this jurisdiction, and Guest Services has not seriously argued the contrary. Ms. Washington has alleged, under oath, that she was discharged for attempting to persuade her fellow worker (and, ultimately, her employer) not to violate this officially declared public policy and for protesting an alleged unsafe and unlawful practice. To permit an employee to be fired for such actions would undermine the purposes of the food and health regulations and would frustrate the public policy of which these regulations are an expression. If a cook who attempts to prevent the contamination of the food that she is preparing can lose her job for insubordination, then similarly situated employees are likely to be coerced into silence, and the safety of the food will be compromised. Indeed, in the present case, the supervisor's intervention, if it occurred as Ms. Washington claims, had the immediate potential consequence of permitting Tyrica Martin to continue to spray the residents' food with a poisonous cleaning fluid. [17] The relationship between Ms. Washington's discharge and the applicable public policy was thus closer in time and more palpable than in Carl II. It may be, of course, that Ms. Washington's allegations will not be sustained at trial. On Guest Services' motion for summary judgment, however, we view the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Washington, and we must treat her sworn affidavit and deposition testimony as true. See, e.g., Graff v. Malawer, 592 A.2d 1038, 1040 (D.C.1991). [18] If the events occurred as Ms. Washington has alleged, then an impartial trier of fact could reasonably conclude that Ms. Washington was discharged for conduct protected by a public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine, and that her termination was therefore wrongful.