Opinion ID: 2979044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: motion for a mistrial (issue 4)

Text: Peatross moved for a mistrial in response to the government’s impeachment of Bertha Gibson (“Ms. Gibson”). On cross examination, the government questioned Ms. Gibson about two prior convictions for forgery and fraudulent use of a credit card. Peatross made no objection at the time, but later moved for a mistrial. Ms. Gibson claimed that admission of the impeachment evidence was improper, as she was not provided the notice required by Fed. R. Evid. 609(b). The district court asked Peatross if she wanted a curative instruction to the jury and, after Peatross declined, the district court denied the motion for mistrial.
This court reviews the denial of a motion for a mistrial for abuse of discretion. Caver, 470 F.3d at 243 (citing Martinez, 430 F.3d at 336); United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1030 (6th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States v. Levy, 904 F.2d 1026, 1030 (6th Cir. 1990)). “The primary concern in ruling upon a motion for a mistrial is a determination of the fairness to the accused.” Id. (citing United States v. Atisha, 804 F.2d 920, 926-927 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Caver, 470 F.3d at 243 (same) (citing United States v. Forrest, 17 F.3d 916, 919 (6th Cir. 1994)). In order to find the lower court abused its discretion, the reviewing court must have a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment. Garner v. Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, 554 F.3d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Berger v. City of Mayfield Heights, 265 F.3d 399, 402 (6th Cir. 2001)). A clear error of judgment occurs when the lower court “relies upon clearly erroneous factual findings, applies the law improperly, or uses an erroneous legal standard.” Id. (quoting Wikol ex rel. Wikol v. Birmingham Pub. Sch. Bd. of Educ., 360 F.3d 604, 611 (6th Cir. 2004)); see also Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action v. Granholm, 501 F.3d 775, 779 (6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 35 (2008) (“A district court abuses its discretion only when we are ‘left with a firm and definite conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors or where the trial court improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous legal standard’”) (quoting Paschal v. FlagStar Bank, 295 F.3d 565, 576 (6th Cir. 2002)). Generally, we review a district court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 611 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 57 (2008). A decision to admit evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(1) is reviewed for abuse of discretion, while a decision to admit evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) is reviewed for plain error. United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 228 (6th Cir. 1992) (en banc). Where, as here, a party fails to object to the admission of evidence at trial, this court reviews the admission of the evidence under the plain error standard. United States v. Stephens, 549 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Cowart, 90 F.3d 154, 157 (6th Cir. 1996)). To establish a plain error, the appellant must establish (1) an error occurred that was (2) obvious and clear, (3) affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 68 (2008) (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir. 2006)). “‘[O]nly in exceptional circumstances’ will