Opinion ID: 3012794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Religion-based Challenge

Text: In addressing the Batson challenge, the District Court assumed that “the categorical striking of a juror based 6. DeJesus argues that the government struck Pressey only in order to lend credibility to its earlier-stated reasons for striking Bates and McBride. DeJesus argues in a similar vein that the government did not strike the remaining minority jurors in order to avoid an appearance of racial prejudice since it had already used its first two strikes against African Americans. These points were not pressed in the trial court and, in any case, we find them to be without merit. 15 upon denomination affiliation . . . would be constitutionally offensive to the guarantee of free religious affiliation.” (App. at 29). The District Court found, however, that “[t]he reasons stated by the government in this case point to the prosecution’s concerns about inclinations of these potential jurors manifested by their unusual degree of involvement in church activities and religious readings, but not directly associated with a specific religion, that may affect the jurors’ judgment of others.” Id. at 33. DeJesus argues that the District Court correctly assumed that a strike based on a juror’s religious affiliation would be unconstitutional.7 DeJesus maintains that the stricken 7. Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ruled on this issue. See Davis v. Minnesota, 511 U.S. 1115 (1994) (denying certiorari to appeal from Minnesota Supreme Court decision declining to extend Batson to religion); United States v. Clemmons, 892 F.2d 1153, 1158 n. 6 (3d Cir. 1990) (declining to consider claim of religious discrimination in exercise of peremptory strike because issue raised for the first time on appeal). There is no clear consensus among the other Circuits on this issue. See e.g. United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating in dicta that “[i]t would be improper and perhaps unconstitutional to strike a juror on the basis of his being a Catholic, a Jew, a Muslim, etc.”, but holding that because “status of peremptory challenges based on religion is unsettled,” allowing strike based on religion was not plain error); United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 120 (2d Cir. 2000) (declining to decide whether Batson extends to strikes based on religious affiliation because prosecutor provided a reason for the strike based on something other than juror’s membership in a protected class). The state courts are not uniform in their approach to this issue either. Compare State v. Fuller, 356 N.J. Super. 266, 279, 812 A.2d 389, 397 (N.J. App. Div. 2002) (finding that exclusion of jurors based on religious affiliation would violate the state constitution’s Equal Protection Clause); State v. Purcell, 199 Ariz. 319, 326, 18 P.3d 113, 120 (Ct. App. Ariz. 2001) (holding that Batson encompasses peremptory strikes based upon religious affiliation or membership); Thorson v. State, 721 So.2d 590, 594 (Miss. 1998) (holding that state constitutional and statutory law prohibit the exercise of peremptory challenges based solely on a person’s religion); with Casarez v. State, 913 S.W.2d 468, 496 (Ct. Crim. App. Texas 1994) (en banc) (holding that “interests served by the system of peremptory challenges in Texas are sufficiently great to justify State implementation of choices made by litigants to exclude persons from service on juries . . . on the basis of their religious affiliation.”); State v. Davis, 504 N.W.2d 767, 771 (Minn. 1993) (declining to extend Batson to strikes on the basis of religious affiliation). 16 jurors’ religious affiliations were made apparent by their responses to the questionnaires, in which they mentioned “key symbols of Christianity” such as the bible and bible literature, Sunday school, and the church choir. (DeJesus’ Opening Brief at 32). In response, the government insists that neither the Court nor the lawyers were aware of the religious affiliations of Bates or McBride during voir dire. (Government’s Brief at 39-40). The government argues that the strikes were based only on the jurors’ beliefs and that strikes based on beliefs, even if religiously-inspired, are permissible. Id. at 40-41 n.15. The government also directs our attention to Rico v. Leftridge-Byrd, 340 F.3d 178, 183 (3d Circ. 2003), for the proposition that Batson protection should not be extended to a group unless the group had been singled out for disparate treatment in the past and had been disparately represented on juries. Because we affirm the District Court’s finding that the government’s strikes were based on the jurors’ heightened religious involvement rather than their religious affiliation, we need not reach the issue of whether a peremptory strike based solely on religious affiliation would be unconstitutional. Bates and McBride did not state their religious affiliations during voir dire. Of course, it is certainly fair to infer, as DeJesus has done on appeal, that the jurors are Christian based on their questionnaire responses. But the government did not refer to the religious affiliation of either juror in articulating its reasons for striking Bates and McBride. Instead, the government said that their unusual amount of religious activity suggested strong religious beliefs, which could prevent them from convicting the defendant. The District Court agreed, stating that: “faced with a prospective juror whose answers to neutral questions regarding hobbies, pastimes, reading materials, television programs and the like reveal a rather consuming propensity to experience the world through a prism of religious beliefs, it is rational for a prosecutor to act upon the concern about the reluctance to convict.” (App. at 30-31). Even assuming that the exercise of a peremptory strike on the basis of religious affiliation is unconstitutional, the exercise of a strike based on religious beliefs is not. 17 Addressing the precise issue presented in this case, the Seventh Circuit held that “[i]t is necessary to distinguish among religious affiliation, a religion’s general tenets, and a specific religious belief. . . . . It would be proper to strike [a juror] on the basis of a belief that would prevent him from basing his decision on the evidence and instructions, even if the belief had a religious backing . . . .” Stafford, 136 F.3d at 1114. Several state courts have made a similar distinction between strikes based on beliefs and membership in a protected class. See, e.g., Fuller, 356 N.J. Super. at 2279-80, 812 A.2d at 397 (finding permissible a peremptory strike based on prosecutor’s inference from juror’s traditional Muslim clothing that juror was religiously devout and therefore likely to be defense-oriented); Purcell, 199 Ariz. at 328, 18 P.3d at 122 (holding strike constitutional because it was based on juror’s personal beliefs rather than religious affiliation); Card v. United States, 776 A.2d 581, 594-95 (D.C. Ct. App. 2001) (finding strike based upon inferred allegiance to Louis Farrakhan related to a “genuine race-neutral concern regarding the potential juror’s desire to hamstring any possible conviction.”). The distinction drawn by the District Court between a strike motivated by religious beliefs and one motivated by religious affiliation is valid and proper. The District Court’s finding that the government struck jurors Bates and McBride out of concern that their heightened religiosity would render them unable or unwilling to convict was not erroneous.