Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Admission of Evidence of the Circumstances Underlying Defendant's 1973 Conviction of Voluntary Manslaughter

Text: At the penalty phase of the trial, records of defendant's 1978 conviction of robbery and his 1973 conviction of voluntary manslaughter were received in evidence. Sergeant Charles Dunham of the Oxnard Police Department then testified that approximately 3 p.m. on June 20, 1973, upon arriving at the scene of a crime, he witnessed a body being transported to St. John's Hospital. Dunham described the crime scene, which included an automobile with large amounts of blood on the back seat, and identified photographs of the automobile and the surrounding area. A knife of the type used to harvest lettuce was found inside the vehicle. Dunham described the knife as having a blade approximately six inches long with a sharp curve. Dr. Roy Levin, a physician, testified he specialized in emergency practice at Ventura County General Hospital when, on June 20, 1973, he treated the victim of a knife wound who was in critical condition. He performed emergency surgery, but the patient died. From an examination of the wound, Dr. Levin concluded the murder weapon was a thin-bladed sword or bayonet approximately 12 inches long. Dr. Levin identified an autopsy photograph of the patient he had treated. Mary Romero testified that on June 20, 1973, she was standing in her front yard near the scene of the crime described by Sergeant Dunham when she heard a scream and observed a fight taking place in the back seat of an automobile. She then saw [a] guy running, and a guy screaming, and he just fell to the ground. The person running fled the scene. After the prosecutor had rested his case, defendant moved to strike the testimony of Dr. Levin on [g]rounds of relevance and lack of foundation, because the prosecution allegedly had failed to make any proper connection between the testimony of the physician and the case.... Additionally, defendant moved for a mistrial of the penalty phase. The prosecutor requested, and was granted, permission to reopen his case to present the testimony of Robert Salas. Salas testified that on June 20, 1973, he was a homicide detective in the Oxnard Police Department and was called to the scene of a crime. He examined the victim, who was lying on the sidewalk and appeared to have been stabbed. Salas went to the hospital, where he saw the victim and spoke with Dr. Levin. Salas identified the autopsy photograph previously identified by Dr. Levin as depicting the wound suffered by the victim. At the conclusion of Salas's testimony, the prosecution again rested its case. Defendant renewed his motions to strike the testimony of Dr. Levin and for mistrial, and those motions were denied. Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the circumstances underlying his 1973 conviction of voluntary manslaughter, because that ruling allowed the prosecution to relitigate the circumstances of the crime, violated defendant's constitutional protection against being twice placed in jeopardy, and denied him a speedy trial. We have rejected such claims on several occasions. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 231 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302], and cases cited therein.) (34) Defendant also contends the trial court should have excluded the foregoing evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352, because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value. Defendant did not object on this ground in the trial court and may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 453, 477.) Even had this contention not been waived, it would fail. The short answer to this claim is that the evidence is expressly made admissible by factor (b) of section 190.3. The court is not given discretion under Evidence Code section 352, to exclude this evidence when offered at the penalty phase where ... the question for the jury is not one of fact in determining guilt. [Fn. omitted.] ( People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d 612, 641.) (35) Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to strike the testimony of Dr. Levin, because no evidence was admitted establishing that defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter arose from the stabbing of the victim treated by Dr. Levin. Defendant failed to object on this basis in the trial court, however, and may not raise this issue for the first time on appeal. (Evid. Code, ง 353.) In the trial court, defendant objected only to the testimony of the physician, and solely on the ground that the physician's inability to identify the victim rendered his testimony irrelevant. In response, the prosecutor obtained permission to reopen his case, calling an additional witness who testified that the victim transported from the scene of the crime was the same person treated by the physician. At no time did defendant object on the ground that the crime at issue was not the crime of which defendant subsequently was convicted. Even had the trial court erred, retrial of the penalty phase would not be required, because there is no reasonable possibility the jury would not have imposed the death penalty had the testimony of Dr. Levin been stricken. [8] ( People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) Defendant did not object to the admission of the testimony of the other witnesses concerning the June 20, 1973, stabbing incident. Dr. Levin's testimony added nothing that was likely to affect the jury's penalty determination.