Opinion ID: 1992017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Tune's Eligibility for a Concealed-Handgun License

Text: We now examine whether the court of appeals correctly determined that Tune is not eligible for a concealed-handgun license. We have jurisdiction to do so because the case requires us to construe the Concealed Handgun Act. [22] Tune contends that the court of appeals erred in concluding that he is convicted within the meaning of the Handgun Act. When Tune applied for a license, the Act defined convicted as: an adjudication of guilt or an order of deferred adjudication entered against a person by a court of competent jurisdiction whether or not: (A) the imposition of the sentence is subsequently probated and the person is discharged from community supervision; or (B) the person is pardoned for the offense, unless the pardon is expressly granted for subsequent proof of innocence. [23] A person is not eligible for a license to carry a concealed handgun if he has been convicted of a felony. [24] Tune argues that because his conviction was set aside and the indictment against him dismissed, he is no longer convicted for Handgun Act purposes, and is therefore eligible for a concealed-handgun license. He points to article 42.12 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which, when his conviction was set aside, required the district court to discharge a defendant who had successfully completed probation. [25] That provision further stated: In case the defendant has been convicted or has entered a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, and the court has discharged the defendant hereunder, such court may set aside the verdict or permit the defendant to withdraw his plea, and shall dismiss the accusation, complaint, information or indictment against such defendant, who shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense or crime of which he been convicted or to which he has pleaded guilty except that proof of his said conviction or plea of guilty shall be made known to the court should the defendant again be convicted of any criminal offense. [26] Relying on the italicized language in this provision, Tune maintains that he is no longer disqualified from obtaining a concealed-handgun license. To determine whether Tune is in fact eligible for a license, we look to the Handgun Act's relevant provisions. We must enforce the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute. [27] If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we need not resort to rules of construction or other extrinsic aid to construe it. [28] Because the Handgun Act's definition of convicted is clear and unambiguous, we follow its plain meaning. The Act considers a person convicted after an adjudication of guilt is entered against him whether or not his sentence is subsequently probated and he is discharged from community supervision. [29] On its face, this language covers Tune. That is: (1) he was adjudicated guilty of a felony by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (2) it doesn't matter that his sentence was subsequently probated and he was discharged from community supervision. The Legislature's use of the phrase whether or not between these two conditions demonstrates its choice that a conviction under the first condition (adjudication of guilt) does not vanish for purposes of the Act when the second condition (completion of probation and discharge from community supervision) occurs. Nothing in the statute suggests any exception for those who successfully complete probation and are discharged and who have the indictment dismissed. Thus, the court of appeals correctly held that Tune is not eligible for a concealed-handgun license. The language Tune cites from article 42.12 of the Code of Criminal Procedure doesn't alter this result. The statutory definition of convicted we examine today applies only to the Concealed Handgun Act. [30] We can see no reason why the Legislature could not provide in article 42.12 that any general penalties and disabilities resulting from a conviction are lifted when a person is discharged from community supervision and the indictment is dismissed, and yet retain certain specific restrictions on those who have previously been convicted of felonies. If the Handgun Act didn't include a specific definition of the term convicted, then the inability to obtain a concealed-handgun license might be one of the penalties and disabilities removed when the district court dismissed Tune's indictment. But the Act does include a specific definition. And for obvious reasons, the Legislature may wish to keep concealed handguns out of the hands of persons who have been convicted of a felony, even if those persons satisfactorily complete community supervision. Tune also complains that the court of appeals erred by failing to consider whether there was any evidence that he had been convicted of a felony. He argues that DPS failed to prove that he was the same person as the Warren Lee Tune who pled guilty in 1972 and thereafter had his conviction set aside and the indictment dismissed. Not only did Tune waive this argument by failing to raise it in the trial court, he foreclosed it by submitting an affidavit to the trial court in which he admitted that in 1972 he was placed on a two-year probation for an alleged theft, and that after he had completed one year and five months of probation, the district court shortened the probation period, dismissed the indictment, and discharged him. Accordingly, we find this complaint without merit.