Opinion ID: 1491821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing and timeliness issues.

Text: Intervenor suggests that DHS, as a non-party below, lacks the requisite standing to appeal from the September 30 order without having intervened below or initiated an original action in the trial court. Alternatively, intervenor argues that DHS's notice of appeal from the September 30 order was untimely under the timeliness provisions of Ark. R. Civ. P. 59 and 60 and Ark. R.App. P.Civ. 4. We reject these arguments and hold that DHS possesses the requisite standing to appeal, and that its notice of appeal was timely filed. The matter is resolved by Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Crunkleton, 303 Ark. 21, 791 S.W.2d 704 (1990), and Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs. v. Bailey, 318 Ark. 374, 885 S.W.2d 677 (1994), where this court laid down the path for DHS to take when appealing matters in similar circumstances. In Crunkleton DHS attempted to appeal from a judgment awarded against it for disbursements made to it for a child-support arrearage. While we suggested that the award violated principles of sovereign immunity, we dismissed the appeal since DHS was not a party to the litigation below. We held that DHS must first attempt to obtain relief in the trial court. But see In the Matter of Allen, 304 Ark. 222, 800 S.W.2d 715 (1990) (stating that the Crunkleton court failed to follow the long recognized exception that a person pecuniarily affected by a judgment but not a party may nonetheless bring a direct appeal where the action has been taken without notice to the one complaining). Crunkleton was followed by Bailey , where this court once again held that DHS was precluded from bringing a direct appeal from an order requiring it to pay for treatment in a FINS case which it had not initiated and was not a party to. While there DHS argued that the case was distinguishable from Crunkleton in that it had filed a Rule 60 motion to set aside, we noted that DHS has not appealed the denial of its motion to set aside the judgment which would have been the proper procedure. Bailey, supra . In the present case, DHS has followed the proper procedure prescribed by this court in Bailey . It first sought relief from the trial court by filing a motion to set aside following the September 30 order. While intervenor suggests that this motion should have otherwise been governed by the timeliness provisions of Rule 59 and 60, the fact remains that DHS was never a party to the underlying action for purposes of those rules. Pursuant to Bailey , it had no final judgment to appeal from until the trial court entered an order denying its motion to set aside. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that DHS has standing and has filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court's order denying its motion to set aside the September 30 order.