Opinion ID: 181698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Caldwell's Holding in Light of Burton

Text: The Supreme Court in Burton putatively called the analysis of Caldwell into question by emphasizing that, for purposes of the AEDPA, the term judgment includes both the conviction and the sentence. This arguably blocks our deeming a deferred-adjudication order to be a judgment. Because Burton only addressed claims relating to a conviction and sentence, however, its analysis is logically limited to such claims. The Burton Court was asked specifically whether a habeas claim that challenges a conviction and another habeas claim that challenges a sentence involve two different judgments for AEDPA purposes. The Court answered no. In contrast, the question we are asked in the instant case is whether a habeas claim that challenges a deferred-adjudication order and another habeas claim that challenges a conviction and sentence involve two different judgments for AEDPA purposes. Ours is an entirely different question, to whichconsistent with our holding in Caldwell we answer yes. It follows, then, that in dealing with two entirely separate and distinct judgmentsone a deferred-adjudication order and the other a judgment of conviction and sentencewe are dealing with two separate and distinct limitation periods under the AEDPA. After the state trial court entered Tharpe's deferred-adjudication order on June 26, 2006, he was in custody pursuant to a state judgmentviz. that deferred-adjudication ordertriggering our federal habeas jurisdiction under § 2254. Then, when the appeal of his deferred-adjudication order was dismissed by the State's highest court on January 11, 2007, that order, i.e., that judgment, became final, triggering the AEDPA's one-year limitations period within which Tharpe could challenge his deferred-adjudication order. With the inclusion of the time tolled for exhaustion of state remedies, Tharpe theoretically had until January 11, 2008 to file a federal habeas application challenging the June 26, 2006 deferred-adjudication order. Thus, whenon January 31, 2008 Tharpe first began his efforts to exhaust state habeas remedies on his deferred-adjudication claims, his one-year federal limitations period had already run. Consequently, those claims were appropriately found to be time-barred by the district court following the filing of Tharpe's federal habeas application on June 2, 2008; and we so hold. Moreover, our holding here is wholly reconcilable with Burton. Inasmuch as Tharpe's deferred-adjudication order was a separate judgment from his subsequent judgment of conviction and sentence, that subsequent judgment also constituted a final judgment per Burton and was thus unaffected, for purposes of the AEDPA's statute of limitations, by the earlier finality of his deferred-adjudication order. Like the petitioner in Burton, who was in custodyfirst pursuant to his 1994 judgment, then pursuant to his 1996 judgment, and then pursuant to his 1998 judgment Tharpe was in custody first pursuant to the deferred-adjudication order and then pursuant to his January 10, 2007 judgment of conviction and sentence. [23] Therefore, Tharpe's habeas claims challenging the deferred-adjudication order were untimely because the AEDPA's statute of limitations had already run for those claims. [24]