Opinion ID: 2072259
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to File a Motion to Discharge the Venire

Text: Defendant contends that the pool of potential jurors contained a disproportionately low number of blacks. Of 114 venire persons, defendant alleges that only 16 were black. Defendant claims that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a motion to discharge the venire on this ground. Any objection to the manner in which a jury panel has been selected or drawn shall be raised by a motion to discharge the jury panel prior to the voir dire examination. For good cause shown the court may entertain the motion after voir dire has begun but such motion shall not be heard after a jury has been sworn to hear the cause. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 114-3(a). Defense counsel questioned the number of blacks in the venire at the time of trial, but not until after the jury had been selected and sworn. In response, the trial judge stated: There weren't that many blacks on the venire but the Statethe defense could have brought that up earlier. Maybe we would have worked something out. Defendant contends that the disproportionately low number of blacks on the venire violated the fair-cross-section requirement as enunciated in Taylor v. Louisiana (1975), 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690. Defendant asserts that if defense counsel had raised this issue within the time period prescribed by section 114-3, the trial judge would have ordered a new venire. [T]he American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. ( Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527, 95 S.Ct. at 696, 42 L.Ed.2d at 696.) In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show: (1) the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the under-representation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process. Duren v. Missouri (1979), 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579, 586-87. Defendant has not established a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. Defendant's allegations relate to the composition of an isolated venire of 114 potential jurors. The fair-cross-section requirement deals with the method of selecting jurors from all eligible citizens. Defendant has not shown that the low number of blacks on the venire from which his jury was chosen resulted from anything other than pure chance. This is insufficient to show a violation of the fair-cross-section requirement. Defendant claims that even if the fair-cross-section requirement was not violated, the trial judge's comments show that defense counsel's failure to raise the issue prejudiced defendant. This claim is without merit. As discussed above, defendant has failed to show that the venire from which his jury was chosen was constitutionally deficient. An attorney's conduct does not fall below the range of reasonable professional assistance under Strickland (466 U.S. at 688-89, 104 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694) by failing to make an argument that has no legal basis.