Opinion ID: 1495428
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spector's Case.

Text: We pass now to a consideration of the case of Spector. Most of the contentions urged in his behalf are the same as those advanced by Manton and have already been answered. The only remaining question which we find it necessary to consider is whether the evidence was sufficient to warrant the trial court in submitting the case to the jury. First. The theory of the indictment and of the prosecution at the trial is that Spector, although not one of the original conspirators or connected with its consummation generally, knowingly joined the general conspiracy and participated in the execution of its purposes in so far as they related to the Schick case. It is not required that each of the conspirators shall participate in, or have knowledge of, all its operations. He may join at any point in its progress and be held responsible for all that may be or has been done. Allen v. United States, 7 Cir., 4 F.2d 688, 692; Baker v. United States, 4 Cir., 21 F.2d 903, 905; Rudner v. United States, 6 Cir., 281 F. 516, 519; Commonwealth v. Anderson, 64 Pa.Super. 427. The evidence warrants a finding that Andrews was a party to the general conspiracy. His special interest was of course in the Schick case; and he had joined with Fallon and Renkoff in the effort to secure Manton's corrupt action in that case. Renkoff having dropped out, Andrews sought and obtained the assistance of Spector in the further prosecution of this criminal enterprise. As already appears, Andrews made many payments of money to Spector aggregating a very large sum. On one occasion a payment of $7,500 made to Spector was first designated as a 90-day loan to him. Spector, after some hesitation, agreed to give his note for the amount. He failed to do so and the amount, having first been entered as prepaid insurance, was later entered in the suspense account and finally charged to Andrews personally. We have already discussed the way in which Spector lent himself as an intermediary between Andrews and Manton to transfer from the former to the latter the large sums of money which were loaned. And it is quite evident that the purpose of such action was to conceal the true character of the transactions. In that connection a significant item of evidence may be cited. Spector had received from Andrews $5,000. Instead of transferring the sum by one check to Manton's secretary, he first drew a check for $2,437.60 and a day or two later another check for $2,562.40, the two aggregating $5,000, the proceeds of both finding their way into the hands of a Manton corporation. On another occasion the sum of $5,000 was divided into two checks, one for $2,615.66 and the other for $2,384.34. Both checks bear the same date and the proceeds followed the same course as in the preceding instance. Taken in connection with other evidence, it is hard to explain these devices upon any other theory than that they were adopted to conceal the real facts and to aid in the consummation of the criminal conspiracy. Certainly they are not the accompaniments of honest business. The circumstances of secrecy, intrigue and deviousness, and the attempts to conceal the real nature of the transactions, which the evidence discloses, are hallmarks of fraud and dishonesty, justifying the jury's conclusion that a criminal conspiracy existed to influence and obstruct the administration of justice and defraud the United States of its right to the conscientious action of the defendant Manton free from corruption; and that Spector knowingly became a party to that conspiracy. Spector may have thought the conspiracy did not go beyond the Schick case, but that is immaterial. In a case like this, it is enough that a convicted defendant knew he had connected himself with a criminal conspiracy, even though he was unaware of its full extent. A charge of engaging in a far-reaching conspiracy cannot be avoided by showing that what the accused conceived to be a limited conspiracy turned out to be a conspiracy of wider range, of which the supposed smaller one, in fact, was but a segment. The conclusion of the jury as to Spector's connection with the conspiracy is greatly fortified by statements in the nature of a confession which were made by him after the final termination of the Schick case. The decision of the court in Andrews' favor was handed down April 12, 1937, and in June of the same year Spector had a conversation with one Chaperau. Spector told Chaperau that he was going to Europe to dispose of some foreign rights in an electric razor. Spector showed him a letter of introduction from Judge Manton to someone in England. Chaperau gave Spector a letter to a London solicitor and Spector inquired with respect to the possibilities of raising capital and was informed by Chaperau that patents were not regarded favorably on the other side because of the fear that someone would infringe on them. Spector replied that there was nothing to worry about; that the Dictograph Company had secured the reversal by the Circuit Court of Appeals of an adverse decision in a lower federal court for which he, Spector, was responsible. Spector said: I put the G____ d____ deal over all by myself. No one can infringe on us and the patent situation is an excellent one and if anyone were to go into the business, they could put them out of business. In the light of the foregoing, there can be no doubt that the case was properly submitted to the jury. Second. But the conclusion would not be otherwise even if we reject the view that Spector was criminally connected with the general conspiracy and assume that the verdict cannot be sustained unless upon the theory that Spector was involved in a distinct and separate conspiracy; for the position which Spector takes on the basis of that assumption, to the effect that a fatal variance would then result between the allegations and the proof, is without merit. The trial judge was careful to tell the jury that they must confine themselves, in passing upon the question of Spector's guilt or innocence, to the evidence which related to him, without reference to that which related only to the defendant Manton; and that they were to limit their consideration to the facts of the Schick case with which the testimony connected Spector. Thus the attention of the jury was pointedly directed and confined to the specific facts relating to Spector. If, then, the view be adopted that Spector was not a party to the general conspiracy alleged, the effect of the evidence would be to split the conspiracy, so far as Spector alone is concerned, into two: one, the general conspiracy; and the other, a smaller one, confined to the Schick case. Some of the circuit courts of appeals have held that this would constitute a fatal variance, but the Supreme Court in Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 81, 55 S.Ct. 629, 630, 79 L.Ed. 1314, rejected that concept, holding that it ignored the question of materiality and should be so qualified as to make the result of the variance depend upon whether it has substantially injured the defendant. In reality, the attack made upon the verdict is not that the evidence does not prove the smaller conspiracy but that it proves more. In the Berger case it was pointed out that the general rule in criminal cases in respect of variances is based upon the requirements (1) that the accused shall be informed of the charge against him so that he may not be taken by surprise and (2) that he may be protected against another prosecution for the same offence. The true inquiry, therefore, the Court said, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to `affect the substantial rights' of the accused. Certainly there has been no such variance in respect of Spector in the present case. The indictment is explicit in its allegations. It alleges in a separate paragraph the pendency of the appeal in the Schick case and that it was a part of the conspiracy alleged in the indictment that the co-conspirator Andrews would pay and cause to be paid, directly and indirectly, to the defendant George M. Spector, certain sums of money    and that the defendant George M. Spector would turn over said sums of money    to the defendant Martin T. Manton, directly and indirectly, and for his use and benefit through his interest in the Manton corporations as aforesaid,    The proof at the trial corresponds with these allegations, so that the case is controlled by the language used by the Supreme Court in the Berger case: The proof here in respect of the conspiracy with which Berger [Spector] was not connected may, as to him, be regarded as incompetent; but we are unable to find anything in the facts    or in the record from which it reasonably can be said that the proof operated to prejudice his case, or that it came as a surprise; and certainly the fact that the proof disclosed two conspiracies instead of one, each within the words of the indictment, cannot prejudice his defense of former acquittal of the one or former conviction of the other, if he should again be prosecuted. (295 U.S. page 83, 55 S.Ct. page 631, 79 L.Ed. 1314.) We have not been unmindful of other contentions made by both appellants; but we do not discuss them because either they have been sufficiently covered by what we have already said or they are so clearly without substance as to make a review of them unnecessary. After a careful consideration of the entire record, we find nothing to warrant a reversal of the judgments of the trial court and, accordingly, they are affirmed.