Opinion ID: 1596844
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wantonness Claim

Text: As mentioned above, Dolgencorp argues, among other things, that the trial court erred by denying its motions for a JML on the wantonness claim against it because the cases of merchandise were an open and obvious hazard and, thus, it says, it had no duty to eliminate the hazard or to warn Taylor of the hazard. See Sessions, 842 So.2d at 652. Dolgencorp correctly notes that this Court previously has defined wantonness `as the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty, while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.' Bozeman v. Central Bank of the South, 646 So.2d 601, 603 (Ala.1994) (quoting Stone v. Southland Nat'l Ins. Corp., 589 So.2d 1289, 1292 (Ala. 1991), quoting in turn McDougle v. Shaddrix, 534 So.2d 228 (Ala.1988) (emphasis added)); in her brief on appeal, Taylor expressly adopts Dolgencorp's general statement of the law regarding wantonness. Taylor primarily relies on the following factual assertions in contending that Dolgencorp's conduct rises to the level of wantonness. Taylor contends that cases of merchandise had been stored in the aisles of the store for several years before her accident because, she says, the stockroom was overcrowded with Christmas merchandise and could not hold any additional merchandise. Taylor also contends that, although store employees had made numerous requests of their district manager for assistance regarding the overcrowded stockroom since 1999, their requests had gone unheeded. Taylor further contends that Dolgencorp's wanton conduct is evidenced by the fact that, in October 2001, another store customer had fallen over some excess merchandise stored in the aisle, but, despite being aware of that accident, Dolgencorp made no effort to remedy the hazardous condition. Moreover, Taylor contends that Dolgencorp acted with reckless disregard for the safety of its customers because, Taylor says, the cases of merchandise were stored in the aisles in violation of store policy. Taylor contends that the testimony of certain store employees also evidences the wanton nature of Dolgencorp's conduct. Taylor notes that a former store employee, Vicki Brown, testified that the store was an accident ready to happen on the day Taylor fell because, according to Brown, our stockroom was full and we had a floor full of boxes. Taylor also notes that another former store employee, James Bettis, testified that the store was a wreck, a mess, and so cluttered that [y]ou couldn't hardly get through on the day Taylor fell. Regarding Taylor's negligence claim, we concluded that the cases of merchandise that caused Taylor to fall were an open and obvious hazard and, accordingly, that Dolgencorp owed Taylor no duty to eliminate the hazard or to warn her of the hazard. Because Dolgencorp owed no duty to Taylor, her wantonness claim must also fail as a matter of law; thus, the trial court erred by denying Dolgencorp's motions for a JML on the wantonness claim. See Sessions, supra ; see also Lilya v. Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., 855 So.2d 1049, 1056 (Ala.2003) (concluding in a case in which Lilya was injured when he fell from a mechanical bull ride while attending a fair on the premises owned by Greater Gulf State Fair, Inc., that the condition that caused Lilya's injuries was an open and obvious hazard, that the premises owner thus owed no duty to warn Lilya of the possible danger, that  [w]ithout the existence of a duty, Lilya's negligence and wantonness claims fail as a matter of law, and that the trial court's summary judgment as to those claims was appropriate (emphasis added)). Because Taylor's negligence and wantonness claims fail as a matter of law, we reverse the trial court's judgment and render a judgment for Dolgencorp. REVERSED AND JUDGMENT RENDERED. WOODALL, STUART, BOLIN, PARKER, MURDOCK, and SHAW, JJ., concur. COBB, C.J., dissents.