Opinion ID: 2307582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: statement prior to miranda warning

Text: [¶ 12] Brann argues that his admission that he was the driver should have been suppressed because Officer Niedner had not yet advised him of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Although the trial court made no specific finding that Brann was in custody when questioned, the parties agree that he was. The State thus bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that a Miranda warning was not required. See State v. Leone, 581 A.2d 394, 397 (Me. 1990). [¶ 13] The State argues that the routine booking or administrative question exception to Miranda applies. Although it has never been specifically adopted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court, see Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 601-02, 110 S.Ct. 2638, 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (opinion of Brennan, J., with 3 justices concurring and 3 justices concurring in the result), that exception has long been established in Maine and the First Circuit. See United States v. Shea, 150 F.3d 44, 48 (1st Cir.1998); United States v. Doe, 878 F.2d 1546, 1551 (1st Cir.1989); State v. Rossignol, 627 A.2d 524, 526 (Me.1993); State v. Simoneau, 402 A.2d 870, 873 (Me.1979). Administrative questions, not likely to elicit an incriminating response, include those `routine booking questions' normally attending arrest which seek only `biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services,' such as `name, address, height, weight, eye color, date of birth, and current age ....' Rossignol, 627 A.2d at 526 (quoting Muniz, 496 U.S. at 601, 110 S.Ct. 2638). Even before a plurality of the Supreme Court spoke of biographical data in Muniz, we had called the exception the biographical data exception. State v. Sumabat, 566 A.2d 1081, 1083 (Me.1989) (citing United States v. Downing, 665 F.2d 404, 406 (1st Cir.1981)). [¶ 14] Officer Niedner's question to Brann had nothing to do with biographical data or other information required for booking. I asked Mr. Brann who was driving. He stated he was the driver of the vehicle. In Rossignol, we found that the exception did not apply when a state trooper asked an OUI defendant whose vehicle were you found in? after she was found intoxicated in a car parked in the middle of the road. This question was reasonably likely to elicit a response from Rossignol material to the proof of her operation of that vehicle, an element of the offense of which Rossignol was a suspect. 627 A.2d at 526. The same is true here: Niedner's question went directly to an element of the offense, indeed to the only element that reasonably could be disputed since Brann was plainly under the influence. The routine booking exception is not applicable. [¶ 15] The State also argues that a public policy exception to Miranda is applicable. That argument is without merit. It appears that no court, state or federal, has ever recognized a public policy exception to Miranda. There is a narrow public safety exception which we and the Supreme Court have applied where the safety of officers and the public is so immediately threatened that brief questioning prior to giving warnings must be allowed. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (gun left in supermarket); Leone, 581 A.2d at 397 (gun and possible accomplice in heavily wooded area). No such threat to the safety of the public or the officer was present here, so the public safety exception is inapplicable. [¶ 16] Because no exception to Miranda applies, the trial court erred in refusing to suppress Brann's statement. [7] The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.