Opinion ID: 1954827
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Indictment Challenge Untimely

Text: Brown's first claim of error is that the indictment was fatally defective in that it failed to specify a specific overt act in each conspiracy count. An indictment performs two functions: to put the accused on full notice of what he is being called upon to defend; and to effectively preclude subsequent prosecution for the same offense. Malloy v. State, Del.Supr., 462 A.2d 1088, 1092 (1983). These functions are fulfilled if the indictment contains a plain statement of the elements or essential facts of the crime. Id.; Super.Ct.Crim.R. 7(c). A motion based upon a defect in the indictment must be raised prior to trial. Super.Ct.Crim.R. 12(b)(2). Like the defendant in Malloy, however, Brown challenged the indictment in a motion for judgment of acquittal under Superior Court Criminal Rule 29(a) rather than a pre-trial application. `Such a long delay in raising the issue suggests a purely tactical motivation of incorporating a convenient ground of appeal in the event the jury verdict went against the [defendant].' Id., quoting United States v. Pheaster, 9th Cir., 544 F.2d 353, 361 (1976). We have concluded that because Brown failed to raise this contention in a pre-trial motion, it was not properly preserved for appeal and thus was waived. Malloy v. State, 462 A.2d at 1092.