Opinion ID: 1042586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State Law Claims and the Statute of Limitations

Text: With regard to the state-law claims for conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, which accrued upon the filing of the 2006 and 2007 information returns, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5827, the district court correctly found them time-barred under Michigan’s three-year statute of limitations, see Mich. Comp. Laws § 600.5805(10). Vandenheede does not dispute the filing of the challenged forms more than three years before she filed her complaint in May 2012. (See R. 19-14, 02/19/2007 Letter of Robert L. Litt (alerting plaintiff and defendants to problems with the 2006 form in February 2007).) As the district court correctly noted, the Michigan Supreme Court recently abrogated the “continuing violation” doctrine, finding it “contrary to the language of § 5805.” Garg v. Macomb Cnty. Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 696 N.W.2d 646, 662 (Mich. 2005). Nevertheless, Vandenheede persists with a “continuing violation” argument, and attempts to 2 Without a viable federal claim, we abjure resolving the dependent Supremacy Clause argument concerning Vandenheede’s claims against Doeren Mayhew. We likewise bypass her due process and Seventh Amendment claims as forfeited in the absence of any developed argument. See, e.g., Conlin v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 714 F.3d 355, 360 n.5 (6th Cir. 2013). - 10 - No. 13-1253 Vandenheede v. Vecchio et al. distinguish Garg on the facts. The Michigan Supreme Court did not so limit its holding, and neither may we. That Vandenheede retained counsel and counsel sent cease-and-desist letters to defendants in 2012 does not reset the limitations clock.