Opinion ID: 844235
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Testimony of a Crime Scene Reconstructionist

Text: (13) Section 190.3, factor (a) permits the jury, in determining the penalty, to take into account the circumstances of the crime[s] of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. Crime scene reconstruction expert Rod Englert appeared at the penalty phase as the prosecution's first witness. Defendant contends his crime scene reconstruction testimony was inadmissible factor (a) evidence, violated the heightened requirement of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and was more prejudicial than probative within the meaning of Evidence Code section 352 and the due process clause of [the] Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As we explain, defendant's claim has no merit. Evidence depicting the `circumstances of the crime' generally is admissible at the penalty phase. ( People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 755 [80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 188 P.3d 580]; see Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1164.) The trial court's discretion to exclude such evidence at the penalty phase is more circumscribed than it is in the guilt phase. ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1201 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130].) Defendant concedes that, [h]ad Englert's testimony been confined to bullet trajectories, etc., it may have been marginally relevant and therefore admissible. However, she complains that, in addition to such relevant testimony, Englert provided unduly inflammatory evidence by editorializing about [defendant] pausing to reload the gun while the boys cowered in fear and by making speculative comments about the sequence of the shootings and the boys' state of mind. After holding an extensive Evidence Code section 402 hearing on the admissibility of the challenged crime scene reconstruction evidence, the trial court determined the expert would provide some helpful information regarding the sequence of the shots fired, how the errant bullets entered into the equation, and regarding the other bullets that were fired in the bedroom of the three boys. The court added that the expert would shed some light on other areas that were not covered by the medical examiners' testimony and going directly to the circumstances of the crime, which is obviously relevant at the penalty phase. After expressly weighing the probative value of the proposed testimony against its potential for prejudice, the trial court found the evidence admissible. We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Defendant's claim that Englert's testimony before the jury was unduly inflammatory is belied by the record. For example, defendant claims Englert testified that, while defendant reloaded her gun, Brigham and Matthew cowered on the lower bunk. However, while Englert used the word cowering out of the presence of the jury during the Evidence Code section 402 hearing regarding the admissibility of the proffered reconstruction evidence, he did not use that word during his actual testimony. Similarly, during his penalty phase testimony before the jury, Englert did not use the word huddling, as defendant suggests. Instead, he testified that, based on the physical evidence of the crime scene, Brigham and Matthew were very close together when they were shot. Again, despite defendant's claim to the contrary, Englert did not testify before the jury that Matthew scramble[d] to the other end of the bed; Englert simply stated that, once Brigham had been shot but Matthew had not been hit, Matthew move[d] to the opposite end of the bed and bent over. [16] Similarly, there was no testimony that Brandon was slumped over, as defendant claims. Instead, Englert testified Brandon was shot in the left temple, he went down and onto the floor, and that the second shot was fired into the back of [his] neck. Similarly, the expert's testimony that Austin was in a defensive posture when shot was not unduly inflammatory or unduly chilling, as defendant claims; Englert gave his straightforward expert opinion that Austin had pulled his knee up and close to [his] head in a defensive posture, putting a barrier between himself and the shots that were being fired at him with the knee up because stippling could not get on his knee with his knee in a flat position. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidence provided by Englert was not based on speculation. Based on his extensive training and experience, as well as on an examination of the premises and a thorough review of the police and medical reports in this case, Englert presented testimony regarding bullet trajectories, stippling, and the relative positions of the multiple victims and the shooter that was sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. (Evid. Code, § 801.) That evidence was relevant, probative, and not unduly prejudicial. (See, e.g., People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 643-644 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363] [deputy medical examiner's penalty phase testimony regarding relative positions of the victims and the shooter was admissible].) Englert's testimony that defendant fired at the height of Austin's head three times, that one shot missed to the right of Austin, one missed to the left, and one struck him in the face, provided the jury with probative evidence regarding defendant's determination to shoot Austin in the head and provided the jury with one basis to consider whether the death penalty was appropriate in this case. Evidence that defendant reloaded her gun in the boys' bedroom was similarly probative on the issue of penalty. Finally, nothing in the record of the expert's testimony supports defendant's claim that the reconstruction evidence did not meet the heightened reliability requirement of the Eighth Amendment. At trial the defense left unchallenged Englert's testimony that, based on the disciplines on which he relied and the facts of this case, his expert opinion is within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty as what occurred in that residence and the sequence it occurred in. The testimony was presented in a dispassionately objective manner and did not create an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome.' ( People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 724.) Accordingly, we find no violation of the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert crime scene reconstruction testimony at the penalty phase to show the circumstances of the crime under factor (a) of section 190.3.