Opinion ID: 1303239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: interstate implications

Text: But our review is not yet completed, for there remains the question as to whether, notwithstanding all of the foregoing, the fact that Heath engages in interstate commerce precludes enforcement of the Nebraska act. It is clear that some applications of state antitrust statutes are not permissible. See, Connell Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters, 421 U.S. 616, 95 S.Ct. 1830, 44 L.Ed.2d 418 (1975) (state antitrust laws used to regulate union activities aiding union organization clearly preempted by federal labor laws); Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.1971), affd on other grounds, 407 U.S. 258, 92 S.Ct. 2099, 32 L.Ed.2d 728 (1972) (state's interest in antitrust regulation, when compared with its interest in health and safety regulation, not of particular urgency); Robertson v. National Basketball Association, 389 F.Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y.1975) (New York antitrust law inapplicable to professional basketball league); Partee v. San Diego Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal.3d 378, 668 P.2d 674, 194 Cal.Rptr. 367 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904, 104 S.Ct. 1678, 80 L.Ed.2d 153 (1984) (California Cartwright Act generally concurrent with federal antitrust laws, but inapplicable to National Football League due to burden on interstate commerce of nonuniform state policies); State v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc., 31 Wis.2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1 (1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990, 87 S.Ct. 598, 17 L.Ed.2d 451 (state antitrust law preempted as to national baseball league); HMC Management v. New Orleans Basketball Club, 375 So.2d 700 (La.App.1979), cert. denied, 379 So.2d 11 (La.1980) (undue burden on league bars application of Louisiana antitrust law). However, those cases concern state regulation of national organizations already subject to federal legislation or national governing bodies. The present case concerns private enterprise conducting business within Nebraska. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not explicitly held that state antitrust statutes may apply to matters involving both intrastate and interstate commerce, it has upheld application of state antitrust laws in cases in which those laws clearly affected interstate commerce. See, California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 109 S.Ct. 1661, 104 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989); U.S. v. Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533, 64 S.Ct. 1162, 88 L.Ed. 1440 (1944); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387, 61 S.Ct. 962, 85 L.Ed. 1416 (1941). Moreover, several lower federal courts have expressly determined that the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution does not necessarily preclude the application of state antitrust laws to interstate commerce. Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, 587 F.2d 34 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 947, 99 S.Ct. 1425, 59 L.Ed.2d 635 (1979); Woods Exploration & Pro. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Amer., 438 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047, 92 S.Ct. 701, 30 L.Ed.2d 736 (1972); Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73 (6th Cir. 1943). Indeed, several state courts have reasoned that neither federal antitrust legislation nor the Commerce Clause precludes application of state antitrust laws to all interstate commerce. Younger v. Jensen, 26 Cal.3d 397, 605 P.2d 813, 161 Cal.Rptr. 905 (1980); State v. Sterling Theatres Co., 64 Wash.2d 761, 394 P.2d 226 (1964); State v. Southeast Tex. Chap. of Nat. Elec. Con. Ass'n, 358 S.W.2d 711 (Tex.Civ.App.1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 969, 83 S.Ct. 1094, 10 L.Ed.2d 131 (1963); Peoples Savings Bank v. Stoddard, 359 Mich. 297, 102 N.W.2d 777 (1960); State v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., 9 Wis.2d 290, 101 N.W.2d 133 (1960); Commonwealth v. McHugh, 326 Mass. 249, 93 N.E.2d 751 (1950); C. Bennett Bldg. Supplies v. Jenn Air, 759 S.W.2d 883 (Mo.App.1988); State v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Southwest, 697 S.W.2d 677 (Tex.App.1985), appeal dismissed, 478 U.S. 1029, 107 S.Ct. 9, 92 L.Ed.2d 764 (1986). State courts upholding the application of state antitrust law as applied to interstate commerce have reviewed the issue with regard to the test promulgated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 90 S.Ct. 844, 25 L.Ed.2d 174 (1970). `Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits....' Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Southwest, 697 S.W.2d at 681-82. Accord Pike, supra . In State v. Allied Chemical & Dye Corp., supra , the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the fact that the Federal Trade Commission had filed a complaint against defendants who neither owned, operated, nor maintained any manufacturing plant, sales, or other office within the state did not preclude the State of Wisconsin from seeking an injunction against those corporations under the state antitrust statutes. In rejecting the defendants' contention that the Federal Trade Commission having taken jurisdiction over the business practices in question, the state was precluded from enforcing the state statutes, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reasoned: The Wisconsin statutes were enacted in the exercise of the police powers of the state. The public interest and welfare of the people of Wisconsin are substantially affected if prices of a product are fixed or supplies thereof are restricted as the result of an illegal combination or conspiracy. The people of Wisconsin are entitled to the advantages that flow from free competition in the purchase of calcium chloride and other products, and if the state is able to prove the allegations made in its complaint it is apparent that the acts of the defendants deny to them those advantages. 9 Wis.2d at 295, 101 N.W.2d at 135. Inasmuch as the Nebraska act is consistent with federal law and there are ultimate inferences that the tying arrangement and monopolization had an impact upon local residents, the burden on interstate commerce cannot, at least at this point, be said to outweigh the interest of this state.