Opinion ID: 2165690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court's Failure to Direct a Verdict for Defendants

Text: In reviewing defendants' contentions as to the denial by the trial court of their motions for a directed verdict, we have viewed the evidence produced by plaintiff in a light most favorable to his cause. We find no merit in defendants' arguments that the trial justice committed error in permitting the jury to consider plaintiff's counts for false imprisonment, assault and battery. In Barth v. Flad, 99 R.I. 446, 208 A.2d 533, this court pointed out that the essence of an action for false imprisonment is the restraint of another without legal justification. The tort involves an imposition of unlawful restraint upon another's freedom of movement. This restraint need only continue for no more than a brief time. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 35. If a person is unlawfully detained by another and is fearful that physical force will be used unless he submits to the detention, his submission thereto will not bar his cause of action. See Zayre, Inc. v. Gowdy, 207 Va. 47, 147 S.E.2d 710. While the racetrack admits that a false imprisonment action goes to the question of an illegal restraint, it takes solace in Webbier's statement that he had no fear of Tempest as he was being brought from the vending stand to the bureau's office. It claims that he consented to be interviewed by the bureau's agent. The defendants, however, overlook the events that took place after Webbier had reached the office. The plaintiff testified that Tempest remained in his company for the duration of his detention in the outer office. When he asked the detective if he could leave, he was told that he could not. As of that moment, plaintiff's freedom of locomotion was clearly infringed upon. It was not necessary for plaintiff, a man of slight proportions, to brave the consequence of resistance in the face of his physical disadvantage. A man in such a position need not risk bodily injury as a means of perfecting his right of recovery. The plaintiff acted with prudence in declining such a course of action. Considering the evidence as it bears upon plaintiff's claim for assault, we do not dispute the racetrack's recitation of the familiar principle that words alone do not give rise to a cause of action. The defendants argue that the facts put forward by plaintiff show nothing more than a situation in which harsh words were directed at him by Wickman and Tempest. For this reason, they allege that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict upon plaintiff's count for assault. We feel that defendants' contention involves a considerable understatement. Most simply stated, an assault is a physical act of a threatening nature which puts an individual in fear of immediate bodily harm. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 21. It is the complainant's apprehension of injury which renders the defendant's act compensable. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97, 24 L.R.A.,N.S. 991. Words alone are never a sufficient basis for a finding for assault. See Kaufman v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 144 Kan. 283, 58 P.2d 1055; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 31. However, words can give character to subsequent physical acts. See Hulse v. Tollman, 49 Ill. App. 490; Keep v. Quallman, 68 Wis. 451, 32 N.W. 233. In the present case, Mr. Webbier's testimony reveals that his refusal to manifest the contents of his pockets was met with words of ominous connotation from both Wickman and Tempest. Both individuals said they would Take care of plaintiff. Wickman then told Tempest to take Webbier and Throw him out of the place. Tempest took plaintiff by the arm. While no statement is found on the record confirming the fact that Webbier was put in fear as Tempest approached him to carry out the command, we feel that the testimony regarding this occurrence must be read in its entirety. When we do this, we are convinced that there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the count for assault. Immediately after plaintiff indicated that Tempest had taken him by the arm, the following testimony was elicited from him by his attorney: Q What did Mr. Tempest do next? A He said, `Come on, let's get out of here.' And he took me by the arm, and dragged me out. Q What did he do next? A As I was walking down the stairs, I was scared of him because I started to get nervous. (italics ours) We feel that plaintiff's statement that he was scared as he was being dragged out must be read in the light of his previous testimony as to the detective's remarks and his perception of Tempest approaching him and seizing him by the arm. We feel that a jury considering this testimony as a whole could properly infer that plaintiff was also put in fear as Tempest moved toward him. In short, we have no difficulty in agreeing with the trial court that plaintiff's assault count was a matter for the jury. In pressing its motion for a directed verdict, the bureau classifies plaintiff's testimony as being inherently improbable and incapable of belief citing the case of Gaudette v. Carter, 100 R.I. 259, 262, 214 A.2d 197, 199. However, we have carefully studied the record in this case and we cannot describe plaintiff's testimony as inherently improbable or unworthy of belief. Much of his testimony finds corroboration in the records of the state police and the veterans administration. While there is a conflict in the evidence as to the occurrences at Lincoln Downs on the day in question, this conflict exists in credible evidence adduced from both sides. The jury selected the evidence which it felt to be the most credible and we will not now disturb their finding.