Opinion ID: 2594774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: source of allocution right under federal law

Text: When adopted in 1944, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (FRCP) 32(a) provided in part: Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment. [23] In Green v. United States , petitioner claim[ed] that the failure of the judge to inquire of the defendant if he had anything to say on his own behalf prior to sentencing rendered the subsequent sentence illegal under Federal Criminal Rule 32(a). [24] In interpreting Rule 32(a), the United States Supreme Court noted: [I]ts legal provenance was the common-law right of allocution. As early as 1689, it was recognized that the court's failure to ask the defendant if he had anything to say before sentence was imposed required reversal. See Anonymous, 3 Mod. 265, 266, 87 Eng. Rep. 175 (K.B.). Taken in the context of its history, there can be little doubt that the drafters of Rule 32(a) intended that the defendant be personally afforded the opportunity to speak before imposition of sentence. We are not unmindful of the relevant major changes that have evolved in criminal procedure since the seventeenth centurythe sharp decrease in the number of crimes which were punishable by death, the right of the defendant to testify on his own behalf, and the right to counsel. But we see no reason why a procedural rule should be limited to the circumstances under which it arose if reasons for the right it protects remain. None of these modern innovations lessens the need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. [25] After recognizing the importance of the right of allocution in Green v. United States , the United States Supreme Court concluded in Hill v. United States that failure of a trial court to ask a defendant represented by an attorney whether he has anything to say before sentence is imposed is not of itself an error of the character or magnitude cognizable under a writ of habeas corpus. [26] Petitioner in Hill filed a motion to vacate sentence because the trial court did not ask him whether he wished to make a statement on his own behalf before imposition of sentence. [27] He nonetheless was not entitled to collateral relief because the trial court's oversight, although a violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, was not an error of constitutional dimension. [28] Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Hill stated It [was] an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional. It [was] not a fundamental defect which inherently result[ed] in a complete miscarriage of justice, nor an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure. [29] As noted in Green v. United States , a defendant's right of allocution is derived from the common law and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Petitioner in this case claims there is also a constitutional source for this right because the United States Supreme Court in Hill v. United States left the door open to the proposition that under exceptional circumstances the denial of the right may be a due process violation.... [30] In McGautha v. California, the United States Supreme Court reserved for consideration the issue whether due process is denied when a defendant makes an unequivocal request to exercise the right of allocution and the trial court denies the request. [31] This case, however, does not involve that problem. During the sentencing hearing, Judge Brown was presiding when Petitioner's counsel asked him on direct examination whether he had anything to say to the court. Petitioner then immediately addressed the court at length without interruption. Citing Hill v. United States, the Court of Appeals in this case correctly concluded Petitioner's right of allocution is nonconstitutional in nature. It also correctly concluded that Petitioner has not presented ... any evidence of how [denial of this right] resulted in a `complete miscarriage of justice'.... [32] Like the trial court in Hill, the Superior Court for Benton and Franklin Counties in this case did not specifically ask Petitioner whether he wished to make a statement in his own behalf before imposition of sentence. However, the record indicates Petitioner did indeed make an extensive allocutive statement to the court in his testimony during his sentencing hearing on June 18, 1996 after his counsel asked him on direct examination whether he had anything to say to the court.