Opinion ID: 883180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: blood alcohol report

Text: Barrack argues that defense counsel was relying on a long-standing course of conduct with the State when it failed to subpoena records of Sue's blood alcohol content for use during the trial. He asserts that his error in failing to discover her blood test is excusable because in the past, the State routinely provided law enforcement reports, including blood test results, upon request by the defense attorneys. Barrack's attorney had requested results from the State and the Sheriff's Office but did not receive them so he was led to believe that there were no test results. The attorney did not realize there were blood test results until he subpoenaed them on August 4, 1992, in preparation for sentencing. The State contends that Barrack wanted the State to conduct his own discovery for him. It also states that it did not subpoena the blood alcohol records at any time nor did it use any information regarding the blood alcohol content of the victim at trial. A hearing was held on the issue of the blood alcohol results on December 16, 1992, in which defense counsel testified that he had asked Lt. Brannin and Mr. Van Valkenburg, a deputy county attorney, for blood alcohol reports. Counsel stated that Lt. Brannin told him he did not think that there was a blood alcohol test because she was a Jehovah's Witness. Further, counsel stated that although available from St. Patrick's Hospital, he did not receive a copy of the blood alcohol results until he subpoenaed them for sentencing purposes. He argued at the hearing that if he had known that he was not going to get them through the sheriff's office, he would have gotten them on his own, but he was led to believe that none existed because he had never had a problem in getting anything from the sheriff's department or county attorney's office in the past, and I think it was just a mistake that they missed it.... When Brannin testified, he stated that he remembered that the fact that Sue was a Jehovah's Witness was a factor in the case, but that he did not remember any specific request for blood alcohol results. Brannin also testified that he never received a blood alcohol test for Sue, although Brannin did know she had been drinking that evening because she did acknowledge the fact during a police interview. Moreover, Brannin had prepared a memorandum to the deputy county attorney stating that there was certainly no specific request for this information, referring to the blood alcohol results. The Deputy County Attorney stated at the hearing that when the defense attorney interviewed Sue, she did tell counsel that she had had either two or three glasses of wine mixed with 7-Up, or something of that nature, prior to the incident that night. Moreover, the county attorney asserted, she also told Brannin that she had been drinking when she made her statement to the police officer and that statement was made available to the defense but defense counsel never cross-examined Sue on that issue at trial. The District Court, in its order of December 17, 1992, stated the following: Hearing on Defendant's petition was had on December 16, 1992 with defense counsel testifying that he asked State's counsel for blood alcohol results on the victim and was referred to the sheriff's office. Defense counsel further testified that the investigative officer in the Sheriff's office said he did not think there was one because the victim was a Jehovah's witness. The officer testified at hearing that he does not recall the conversation and that his files do not contain blood alcohol results for the victim. Defense counsel subpoenaed the hospital records following trial for sentencing purposes and those records contained blood alcohol results of the victim. The Court would grant Defendant a new trial if the State had exculpatory evidence in its possession which was not available to Defendant and did not turn over the evidence to defense counsel. However, it does not appear the State had the blood alcohol results on the victim in its possession. The hospital records were equally available to both parties by subpoena and therefore the evidence is not newly discovered evidence which was unavailable for trial and a new trial is not warranted in this case. We agree with the District Court that it does not appear that the State had blood alcohol results on Sue in its possession. Moreover, the hospital records were available to both parties by subpoena. Defense counsel had information that she had been drinking and if counsel thought that jury knowledge of her drinking may have changed the outcome of the trial, it was counsel's responsibility to request the information from the sheriff's office or county attorney's office in a formal manner if informal requests were of no avail. A written request for the necessary information addressed to the county attorney's office or a request to the District Court for an order requesting that the information be made available to the defendant could have been employed to obtain the blood alcohol results, pursuant to § 46-15-322, MCA. The problem of the prosecution failing to reveal evidence necessary for a defendant's case is not present here. Lt. Brannin stated that they did not have any reports on Sue's blood alcohol level on the night of the incident and never requested such reports. Police officers may not frustrate or hamper a defendant's right to obtain exculpatory evidence but they have no affirmative duty to gather such evidence absent express statutory mandate. State, City of Bozeman v. Heth (1988), 230 Mont. 268, 272, 750 P.2d 103, 105. We recently clarified the State's obligation of disclosure under § 46-15-322, MCA, in State v. Licht (1994), ___ Mont. ___, ___, 879 P.2d 670, 673, 51 St.Rep. 686. While, as we pointed out in that case, subsections (1)(a) through (d) and subsections (2)(a) through (c) of that statute require the prosecution to disclose all material and information described, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, and while subsection (1)(e) requires disclosure of all exculpatory or mitigating material or information, there is no obligation under the statute for the State to disclose material or information which it does not have in its possession. Here, neither the prosecution nor the police had the blood alcohol results and they had no affirmative duty to obtain them. Therefore, the District Court did not err when it denied the motion for a new trial (petition for post-conviction relief) based on Barrack's argument that his failure to discover Sue's blood test results was an excusable mistake. AFFIRMED. TURNAGE, C.J., and GRAY and WEBER, JJ., concur.