Opinion ID: 2446605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the separation of powers doctrine

Text: President George Washington, in his farewell address, described the problem which is addressed by the separation of powers doctrine when he said: The spirit of encroachment [of one branch of government into the functions of another] tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. XIII, Writings of George Washington, 277, 306 (Ford ed., N.Y., 1892). Montesquieu, the father of the doctrine of separation of powers, articulated the concept by writing: Here then is the fundamental constitution of the government we are treating of. The legislative body being composed of two parts, they check one another by the mutual privilege of rejecting. They are both restrained by the executive power, as the executive is by the legislative. 1 Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws, Book XI, Chapter VI, 159 (1823). The extent to which a country can successfully resolve the conflict among the three branches of government is, to a very great extent, the measure of that nation's capacity to self-govern. The framers of Kentucky's four constitutions obviously were cognizant of the need for the separation of powers. Unlike the federal constitution, the framers of Kentucky's constitution included an express separation of powers provision. They were undoubtedly familiar with the potential damage to the interests of the citizenry if the powers of government were usurped by one or more branches of that government. Our present constitution contains explicit provisions which, on the one hand, mandate separation among the three branches of government, and on the other hand, specifically prohibit incursion of one branch of government into the powers and functions of the others. Thus, our constitution has a double-barreled, positive-negative approach: Section 27 The powers of the government of the Commonwealth of Kentucky shall be divided into three distinct departments, and each of them be confined to a separate body of magistracy, to wit: Those which are legislative, to one; those which are executive, to another; and those which are judicial, to another. (Emphasis added.) Section 28 No person or collection of persons, being of one of those departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances hereinafter expressly directed or permitted. Subsequent provisions of the Constitution proceed logically and consistently with the policy established in Sections 27 and 28 that grant powers to the three branches of government. Section 29 vests the legislative power in the General Assembly, Section 69 vests the executive power in the Governor and finally, Section 109, as amended by the people in 1975, establishes the judicial power in the Court of Justice. [9] A motivating factor that led to the drafting and eventual adoption of our present constitution was a strong desire on the part of the people to curb the power of the General Assembly. Convention delegate John D. Carroll from Henry County exemplified that spirit when he stated, It is a well known fact that one of the prime causes for the calling of this convention was the abuses practiced by the legislative department of this state. . . . 1 Debates of Constitutional Convention of 1890, p. 1482. According to delegate J.F. Askew, there was a great necessity to reform the legislative department. . . . Id. at 3821. A noted Kentucky constitutional historian, Dr. Robert Ireland, clearly established in his testimony before the trial court that the desire to curb the power of the General Assembly was the primary motivation for calling the 1891 Constitutional Convention. Even a cursory reading of Kentucky history reveals the factual basis for the conclusions of delegates Carroll and Askew and the opinion of Dr. Ireland. The then General Assembly was dominated by a few, powerful special interests who wielded that power for their own benefit. This situation obviously does not exist today; however, constitutions are operative until and unless changed by the people. A case which was contemporaneously decided with the adoption of our present constitution, Pratt v. Breckinridge, 23 Ky.Law Rep. 1858, 112 Ky. 1, 65 S.W. 136 (1901) stated: From this it seems clear that the makers of the constitution intended the legislature to discuss and enact laws, and to do nothing else. 65 S.W. at 140. (Emphasis added.) Moreover, it has been our view, in interpreting Sections 27 and 28, that the separation of powers doctrine is fundamental to Kentucky's tripartite system of government and must be strictly construed. Arnett v. Meredith, Ky., 275 Ky. 223, 121 S.W.2d 36, 38 (1938). In Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455 (1922), we expounded at some length on the history and the purposes of Sections 27 and 28: Perhaps no state forming a part of the national government of the United States has a Constitution whose language more emphatically separates and perpetuates what might be termed the American tripod form of government than does our Constitution, which history tells us came from the pen of the great declaimer of American independence, Thomas Jefferson.. . . 246 S.W. at 457. . . . We conceive it to be the duty of the courts to adopt the construction most conducive. . . [to prevent] . . . the destruction of the edifice as contemplated.  246 S.W. at 458. (Emphasis added.) Appellants urge this court to adopt a so-called liberal construction of the separation of powers doctrine and argue that the General Assembly is the dominant branch of government. In support of this argument, they claim that in Brown v. Barkley, Ky., 628 S.W.2d 616 (1982), we denigrated the power of the Governor and gave the General Assembly a dominant role in the tripod, by allegedly giving to the General Assembly all residual powers. We do not agree and we do not so interpret Barkley . In Barkley , following a lengthy discussion of the inherent or implied powers of the Governor, we said: The extent that the Governor has any implied or inherent powers in addition to those the Constitution expressly gives him, it seems clear that such unexpressed executive power is subservient to the overriding authority of the legislature.. . . 628 S.W.2d at 621. Practically speaking, except for those conferred upon him specifically by the Constitution, his powers like those of the executive officers created by Const. Sec. 91, are only what the General Assembly chooses to give him. 628 S.W.2d at 623. These words, plus the following, are seized upon by appellants in their argument as proof that somehow, this Court has sawed off one of the legs of the tripod, viz., that of the executive, and that we have made that branch of government less than equal to the other two branches. Appellants remind us that we also said in Barkley : It is axiomatic that under our Constitution the General Assembly has all powers not denied to it or vested elsewhere by the Constitution. (Emphasis added.) and: Whereas the judicial branch must be and is largely independent of intrusion by the legislative branch, the executive branch exists principally to do its [the legislature's] bidding. 628 S.W.2d at 623. The inference appellants draw from this language is that the General Assembly possesses all powers and authority to act which are not specifically denied it by the Constitution and has the authority to act in exercising those powers. It is argued that all powers, residual in nature, belong to the legislative branch. We do not agree. To place this interpretation on that language would be tantamount to saying that we were repealing Sections 27 and 28 of the Kentucky Constitution. We would in effect be eliminating the separation of powers doctrine. We would reach a result which would fly in the face of history and the legal precedents of this Commonwealth. Our review of that doctrine's history and our description of its language most assuredly confirm this. Nothing in Barkley can be construed to deny the existence of the doctrine of separation of powers and the equality of the three coparceners in government. Implicit in Barkley is that the General Assembly as the legislative branch, has all powers which are solely and exclusively legislative in nature. To argue that any other power is given to the General Assembly simply won't wash. The power referred to in Barkley is legislative power and legislative power only. In summation, our view is best expressed in Sibert v. Garrett, 197 Ky. 17, 246 S.W. 455 (1922), which we reaffirm. There we stated: But a deeper probing into and investigation of the subject will reveal the truth that the rule so generally stated means, not that the Legislature has all powers not withheld by the Constitution, but that it may pass any acts that are not expressly or by necessary implication inhibited by their own Constitutions or by the Federal Constitution. In other words, the Legislature may perform all legislative acts not expressly or by necessary implication withheld from it, but it may not perform or undertake to perform executive or judicial acts, except in such instances as may be expressly or by necessary implication directed or permitted by the constitution of the particular state. To adopt the latitudinous construction that the Legislature may do anything not expressly or impliedly prohibited by the Constitution would, to our minds, at once destroy the separation of the powers of government into the three great departments. 246 S.W. at 457 (Emphasis added.) Nearly every one of our sister state courts have similarly resisted any weakening of the doctrine of the separation of powers. See, e.g., In re Opinion of the Justices, N.C.App., 295 S.E.2d 589 (1982), and State ex rel. McLeod v. McInnis, 278 S.C. 307, 295 S.E.2d 633 (1982). In like manner, the United States Supreme Court, in striking down a federal statute, has spoken to the issue. The Court ruled that an attempt by Congress to vest veto authority in itself over executive action violated the separation of powers doctrine of the United States Constitution. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, Et al., ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983). There the court said: The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted. 103 S.Ct. at 2784. We should not abandon the philosophical principles that were incorporated by the framers of our present constitution. The purpose of the separation of powers doctrine is uncontroverted. The precedents established by this court have been uniform in retaining the goals set out by the framers. The separation of powers doctrine is set in the concrete of history and legal precedent. We will not overrule those cases and we will not, by the fiat of judicial legislation, change the clear and imperative meaning of our constitution. Such action is within the sole province of the voters of this Commonwealth. We conclude that any statute subject to the scrutiny of Sections 27-28 of the Kentucky Constitution should be judged by a strict construction of those time-tested provisions.