Opinion ID: 2066494
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Pending

Text: We turn to the second question how long does the suspension last? If the District Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over pendent Statelaw claims and there is an appeal, does the 30-day grace period commence upon the dismissal of the claims by the District Court or upon the conclusion of the appellate process? So far as we can tell, that issue has been considered in only two cases, both in California. In Kendrick v. City of Eureka, 82 Cal.App.4th 364, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 153 (2000), the plaintiffs filed suit in U.S. District Court in February, 1995, based on events that occurred a month earlier. In June, 1997, the court, having granted summary judgment on the Federal claims, declined to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent State-law claims and dismissed them. The U.S. Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal in June, 1998. The plaintiffs then sought certiorari in the Supreme Court, which was denied in February, 1999. A month later, they filed a complaint in State court, which was dismissed on limitations grounds. The California appellate court affirmed the dismissal. Noting the absence of any decisions construing the word pending, as used in § 1367(d), but relying on judicial construction of the term in other contexts, the court determined that there was a consensus view that a matter remains `pending' in the federal court system, at least arguably through appeal to the Courts of Appeals afforded as a matter of statutory right, but that there was no consensus with respect to the effect of the certiorari procedure on the federal tolling statute. Id. at 370, 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 153. The court concluded that, because appeals to the U.S. Supreme Court were not afforded as of right, but were discretionary, and because the filing of a petition for certiorari does not affect the finality of the judgment or stay the mandate of the appellate court, that proceeding did not continue to toll the running of the State statute of limitations. In light of the fact that the petition for certiorari was denied, the court did not need to address whether a different result would obtain if the petition had been granted. Because the plaintiff did not file the State action within 30 days after issuance of the U.S. Court of Appeals mandate, the action was untimely. Although, in light of the facts and the actual result, the conclusions expressed by the Kendrick court with respect to the continued tolling of limitations pending an appeal of right were dicta, that dicta was adopted by the court as a holding in Okoro v. City of Oakland, 142 Cal.App.4th 306, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 (2006). Citing Burnett v. New York Central R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 85 S.Ct. 1050, 13 L.Ed.2d 941 (1965) and two lower Federal court cases, the Okoro court concluded that [t]he notion that a matter remains pending through the appellate process finds support elsewhere. Id. at 312, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 260. Section 1367(d) is hardly a model of clarity in this regard. The only court called upon to construe the meaning of pending, as used in that statute, had to rely on interpretations given to the word in other contexts. In part, that may be because the structure of the statute itself creates some ambiguity. In contrast to the more general language of Art. III, § 1 of the Federal Constitution, which extends the judicial power of the United States to the Supreme Court and such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish, which would include, of course, the U.S. Courts of Appeal, all of the other parts of § 1367 focus specifically on proceedings in the District Court. Subsection (a) confers supplemental jurisdiction on the District Courts, not Federal courts generally; subsection (b) creates exceptions to the supplemental jurisdiction of the District Courts; and subsection (c) specifies when the District Courts may decline to exercise their supplemental jurisdiction. Subsection (d), although providing that limitations remains tolled while the claim is pending, ends the tolling 30 days after the claim is dismissed, without accounting for appeals from the dismissal. That omission, of course, is what creates the ambiguity. A strict and literal reading of subsection (d), in the context of the rest of the statute, could well lead to a conclusion that the tolling does indeed end 30 days after dismissal by the District Courtthat the specific provision for when the tolling ends trumps any uncertainty over the meaning of pending. Such a literal reading, however, would be at odds with the purpose of the statute, as recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court and as revealed in the statute's legislative history, and it is therefore not the only, or, as we shall conclude, the preferred interpretation. The legislative history of § 1367 well documents the purpose of the statute, which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Jinks v. Richland County, supra, 538 U.S. 456, 123 S.Ct. 1667, 155 L.Ed.2d 631the case sustaining its Constitutionality. It was intended to eliminate[] a serious impediment to access to the Federal courts on the part of plaintiffs pursuing federal and state law claims that `derive from a common nucleus of operative facts.' Id. at 463-64, 123 S.Ct. at 1671-72, 155 L.Ed.2d at 640, quoting in part from Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218, 228 (1966). Justice Scalia explained: Prior to enactment of § 1367(d), [plaintiffs] had the following unattractive options: (1) they could file a single federal-court action, which would run the risk that the federal court would dismiss the state-law claims after the limitations period had expired; (2) they could file a single state-law action, which would abandon their right to a federal forum; (3) they could file separate, timely actions in federal and state court and ask that the state-court litigation be stayed pending resolution of the federal case, which would increase litigation costs with no guarantee that the state court would oblige. Section 1367(d) replaces this selection of inadequate choices with the assurance that state-law claims asserted under § 1367(a) will not become time-barred while pending in federal court.  (Emphasis added). Statutes of limitations vary from State to State, depending, in part, on the nature of the action. Mostly, they range between two and six years, although there are some wider variations. If an action is filed relatively promptly and the U.S. District Court acts expeditiously, it may well be that the need for a tolling under § 1367(d) would exist only in the event of an appeal. Even where that is not the case, if an appeal is taken by either party and § 1367(d) does not continue the tolling during the appellate process, the plaintiff will necessarily be faced with at least the third inadequate choice noted by Justice Scalia, of filing a new action in State court and hoping that the State court will stay proceedings while the plaintiff pursues (or defends) the appeal. Two types of appeals can be taken from District Court decisions under § 1367. As in this case, if the court has dismissed the State-law claims only because it dismissed all of the Federal claims, the appeal is likely to be focused on the dismissal of the Federal claims. The State-law claims remain very much in play, however, for, if the dismissal of the Federal claims is reversed, the District Court's supplemental jurisdiction over those pendent claims will remain and likely will be exercised. Apart from any complaint about the dismissal of the Federal claims, appeals may also challenge more directly the decision to exercise or not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendant State-law claims. See Regan v. Starcraft Marine, LLC, 524 F.3d 627 (5th Cir.2008); Novak v. MetroHealth Medical Center, 503 F.3d 572 (6th Cir. 2007); Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904 (7th Cir.2007) (Decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over State-law claims is reviewable for abuse of discretion); Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 48 F.3d 1260 (D.C.Cir.1995) (Decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, rather than dismiss or remand the State-law claims to State court, is also reviewable for abuse of discretion). In either situation, the plaintiff, having chosen the Federal forum, must necessarily await the appellate ruling before knowing whether that forum is viable. As noted, if the tolling ends 30 days after dismissal of the pendant claims by the District Court, the plaintiff will be forced to file a protective action in State court and hope that the court will agree to stay proceedings until the Federal appeal is concluded. The State court, possibly faced with judicially or legislatively imposed time standards for disposing of cases, may be reluctant to do thatto keep an open case on its docket for an indeterminate period of time with no activity on itthereby forcing both parties to litigate in both systems, with the troublesome prospect of inconsistent decisions. The Congressional intent was to avoid that dilemma, and the full implementation of that intent can be realized only by construing § 1367(d) to continue the tolling throughout the appellate process. There is, indeed, some support for that construction in the legislative history of the statute. The ultimate origin of § 1367 was the Federal Courts Study Act (102 Stat. 4644), being Title I of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (P.L.No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642), which established, within the Judicial Conference of the United States, a Federal Court Study Committee. That Committee, to be appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States, was to examine the problems then facing the Federal courts and to develop a long-range plan for the future of those courts, including the types of disputes resolved by them. The Committee was appointed in December, 1988, and made its final Report in April, 1990. [9] Among the broad range of recommendations ultimately made by the Committee was that Congress expressly authorize federal courts to assert pendent jurisdiction over parties without an independent federal jurisdictional base. Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee, Part I at 47. In order to minimize friction between the State and Federal courts, the Committee recommended that Congress direct federal courts to dismiss state claims if these claims predominate or if they present novel or complex questions of state law, or if dismissal is warranted in the particular case by considerations of fairness or economy. Id. at 47-48. On the heels of that Report, two law professors from the Western New England Law School took it upon themselves to draft a statute to implement that supplemental jurisdiction recommendation and to forward the draft to Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, who then chaired the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary. [10] With some modifications, that draft was included as § 120 of the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990, H.R. 5381, and became § 1367. One of the changes made from Professor Wolf's draft dealt with the issue at hand. Wolf's draft of subsection (d) provided that the period of limitations for any non-federal claim shall be tolled while the claim is pending in the district court and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed under subsection (c) unless state law provides for a longer tolling period. (Emphasis added). Although the text of Wolf's draft specifically referenced pendency in the District Court, in an explanatory statement, he characterized that provision as a tolling of limitations while the non-federal claim is pending in the federal court and for 30 days after its dismissal. Supra at 695, n. 10. (Emphasis added). Kastenmeier and his co-sponsor, Congressman Carlos J. Moorhead, opted for the more general reference, and, as a result, H.R. 5381 provided, in proposed new § 1367(d), that the period of limitations shall be tolled while the claim is pending in Federal court and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed under subsection (c) unless State law provides for a longer tolling period. (Emphasis added). See Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice, supra at n. 10, at 30. During deliberations on H.R. 5381 in the House of Representatives, subsection (d) was amended to delete the words in Federal Court. As passed by the House, the subsection provided that limitations shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless state law provides for a longer tolling period. House of Representatives, 101st Congress 2nd Sess. H.R. REP. No. 101-734 at 11. In the Senate, that part of H.R. 5381 was incorporated into H.R. 5316, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, and was enacted and signed into law without further change to § 1367(d). What emerges from this history is a rejection of language that would have clearly tied the tolling to pendency of the State-law claim in the District Court and a decision to have the tolling continue while the claim is pending in the Federal courts generally. At the very least, that gives credence to giving the word its more general meaning and thereby more completely implementing the purpose of the law. Upon this analysis, we conclude that § 1367(d) serves to suspend the running of a State statute of limitations from the time the State-law claim is filed in U.S. District Court until 30 days after (1) a final judgment is entered by the U.S. District Court dismissing the pendant State-law claims, or (2) if an appeal is noted from that judgment, issuance of an order of the U.S. Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal or a mandate affirming the dismissal of those claims by the District Court. Because the issue is not presented here, we need not consider whether the tolling would continue in the event a petition for certiorari is filed with the Supreme Court. Upon entry of the District Court judgment or issuance of the appellate order or mandate, the plaintiff will have whatever time that remained when the claims were filed with the District Court plus 30 days in which to file the State court action. The action now before us was filed well within that period.