Opinion ID: 2334546
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Gayles' Discovery Violations Argument

Text: Gayles' second argument on appeal is that his convictions should be vacated because he was prejudiced by the government's failure to make timely and complete discovery disclosures under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972). Brady established that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. In Giglio, the Supreme Court refined the Brady standard to include impeachment evidence, specifying that [w]hen the `reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,' nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls [under Brady ]. 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (quoting Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959)); see also Moore v. United States, 846 A.2d 302, 305 n. 4 (D.C.2004) (There is, of course, no `difference between exculpatory and impeachment evidence' when it comes to the prosecutor's duty to disclose evidence favorable to the accused. (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995))). The government must make Brady/Giglio disclosures at such a time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case. Curry v. United States, 658 A.2d 193, 197 (D.C.1995) (quoting Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 970 (D.C.1993)). A conviction may be reversed for failure to provide this evidence where there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of the proceeding would have been different, Edelen, supra, 627 A.2d at 971, which means a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Sykes v. United States, 897 A.2d 769, 777 (D.C.2006) (quoting Ebron v. United States, 838 A.2d 1140, 1155 (D.C.2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 939, 125 S.Ct. 347, 160 L.Ed.2d 247 (2004)); see also Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 ([A] showing of materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal.) (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). [W]here the defendant receives potentially exculpatory information in time to use it effectively at trial, his conviction will be sustained. Edelen, supra, 627 A.2d at 971 (citing Catlett v. United States, 545 A.2d 1202, 1217 (D.C.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1017, 109 S.Ct. 814, 102 L.Ed.2d 803 (1989)). It is clear from the record and the government concedes on appeal that it failed to make proper Brady/Giglio disclosures to defense counsel. The government had given the defense some Brady evidence prior to trial, but it became clear as the proceedings progressed that the disclosures were substantially incomplete. Each of the eyewitnesses had been treated favorably by the government in exchange for their testimony by garnering plea agreements on other charges or being paid with federal witness vouchers, but impeachment evidence on three of the four eyewitnesses was not disclosed before trial and had to be supplemented by the government as the trial progressed. The failures were the most egregious with regards to eyewitness Kevin Perry, who had to be excused twice during his testimony when defense counsel uncovered further evidence of Perry's cooperation with police officers that the government had not disclosed. Finally, the trial court delayed the proceedings for an entire day mid-trial so that the government could supplement their deficient disclosures. The court also denied defense counsel's motion for a mistrial at this time, maintaining that they would have the opportunity to question Mr. Perry about the impeaching evidence. Four days later, Mr. Perry was recalled to the stand, and defense counsel raised the bias evidence on cross-examination. Despite these errors, which the government concedes, we cannot find that there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if the evidence had been properly disclosed. Once defense counsel became aware that there were deficiencies in the government's disclosures, the court delayed the proceedings in order to give the government time to make its required Brady/Giglio disclosures. After the government returned with the evidence, defense counsel was able to make effective use of it in the cross-examination of each eyewitness. Two of the witnesses were recalled for cross-examination based on the evidence, and Mr. Perry's cross-examination occurred at the end of trial, immediately before closing arguments, presumably increasing its prominence in the jurors' minds. [9] Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury not to hold it against any of the parties that the trial had been delayed, thereby minimizing the effect that the untimely evidentiary disclosures had on the outcome of the trial. Gayles, however, argues that because the Brady/Giglio evidence was not disclosed prior to trial, he was particularly prejudiced by not being able to use it in his opening statement. This is unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the fact that some of the impeachment evidence was not available prior to trial, in time for use in the opening statements, did not preclude its otherwise effective use at trial. As discussed above, Gayles took advantage of his ample opportunity to question the eyewitnesses about their biases and to argue it in closing. Second, both the government and Lindsey's counsel argued during their opening statements that there were bias concerns regarding the eyewitnesses, and so the jury was placed on notice from the outset of the case to be aware of credibility issues. Although the government's disclosures under Brady and Giglio were originally deficient and tardily made, the impeaching evidence was provided in sufficient time for Gayles to make effective use of it at trial. Thus, we are not persuaded that there is a reasonable probability that, had the disclosures been made prior to trial, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different and we hold that there was no reversible error on these grounds. [10]