Opinion ID: 1407450
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the amendment during trial

Text: In his complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he sustained fractures of his lumbar spine requiring surgical fusing   . At trial, over defendant's objection, the plaintiff offered evidence of a herniated intervertebral disc. [5] The defendant assigns this error: The trial court erred in permitting plaintiff to change the claim of injury which made his surgery necessary, from one of fractures of the lumbar spine to one of a herniated intervertebral disc; and the court erred in permitting a doctor to testify with respect to a herniated disc, when there was no claim for such injury; and the court erred in permitting the doctor to make his own decision concerning what was within the pleadings. The issue arose during the testimony of an orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Cherry: Q Doctor, you mentioned that he had a laminectomy, what is the purpose of the laminectomy? A A laminectomy, the word itself means that a lamina is removed or the lamina is partially removed in the back. If you go in after a disc  MR. COSGRAVE: Well, now, Your Honor. I object to that. There's no claim in this case with respect to discs and it  it's not in the case at all. (Pause) THE COURT: Well, there is discussion of surgical fusion. MR. COSGRAVE: Yes, only with the fusion but no claim of any herniation of the disc. MR. ZAKOVICS: I might have to amend the pleadings. It's certainly no surprise to anyone. THE COURT: You may proceed with the doctor, if he's of the opinion that's encompassed in the allegations you can proceed on that basis. Q (By Mr. Zakovics:) Continue, please. A You might want to repeat the question. Q What is the purpose of a laminectomy? A The purpose of a laminectomy is to make an exposure to operate on the discus. Two questions arise from the foregoing record. First, did the court err in permitting the witness to make his own decision concerning what was within the pleadings? Second, did the court err in receiving evidence respecting a herniated disc and permitting an amendment consistent with such evidence? It is the responsibility of the trial judge to rule on questions relating to the admissibility of evidence. A judge abdicates that responsibility if such determination is left to a witness. The defendant claims that the trial judge effectively delegated his responsibility to the witness when he said, [Y]ou may proceed with the doctor, if he's of the opinion that's encompassed in the allegations. Even in the most complex and technical case, the responsibility for determining whether evidence is admissible is always a judicial function. If the trial judge is unsure whether the evidence is within the pleadings, the preferred course is to make appropriate inquiry, outside the presence of the jury, and then rule. Admissibility should never be determined by the witness. A witness's explanation of the meaning of a technical term may well determine its admissibility and relevance to the issues in the case  indeed, it may be conclusive on the question of the admissibility of the evidence  but the threshold decision of admissibility remains a judicial one. Therefore, if the trial judge permitted the witness to determine whether a claim of a herniated disc was encompassed in the allegations, the trial court erred. But we are unpersuaded that prejudicial error resulted from the receipt of the evidence, for the record clearly shows that long before trial the defendant was on notice of possible herniation of the plaintiff's disc, the disc claim is arguably included within the allegation that a fusion was required, and the trial court, in a real sense, was merely postponing the ruling on the evidence. ORS 16.390 (1977), which was in effect at the time of the trial of this case, [6] provided: The court may, at any time before trial, in furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, allow any pleading or proceeding to be amended by adding the name of a party, or other allegation material to the cause; and in like manner and for like reasons may, at any time before the cause is submitted, allow such pleading or proceeding to be amended, by striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party or a mistake in any other respect, or when the amendment does not substantially change the cause of action or defense, by conforming the pleading or proceeding to the facts proved. The defendant relies on Wood v. Southern Pacific Co., 216 Or. 61, 337 P.2d 779 (1959). There we reversed a judgment for the plaintiff when the trial court permitted evidence to be received of a claimed arm injury which had not been pleaded and of which, prior to trial, the defendant was unaware. We stated:    There is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant or its counsel had any advance notice whatever that any such amendment would be requested at the trial, or that such a claim would be made, nor does plaintiff's counsel seriously contend otherwise. It thus appears that a material amendment was allowed as to a new element of damage. Plaintiff argues that even so, the amendment was allowable as conforming to the proof. We believe that the record otherwise discloses. Counsel, as soon as he became aware of what was happening, made prompt objection, and continued to do so at every opportunity accorded to him. Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that the amendment was proper during trial, by virtue of ORS 16.390. This statute provides that the court in furtherance of justice and upon such terms as may be proper, may, at any time before the cause is submitted, allow a pleading to be amended by conforming a pleading to the facts proved `when the amendment does not substantially change the cause of action or defense.   '   . Having held that the defendant properly objected to the evidence relating to the amendment thereof, and since the plaintiff by his said amendment interjected an entire new element of damage, substantial in its nature, without any advance notice whatsoever to his adversary, we hold that the trial court committed prejudicial error permitting the same.    216 Or. at 72-73, 337 P.2d at 784. In the case at bar the defendant was on notice that two of the plaintiff's doctors were of the opinion that the plaintiff had a herniated disc and the disc was located in the same area as the plaintiff's fusion. The plaintiff's complaint contained an allegation of a twisting, tearing and wrenching of the nerves, muscles, ligaments of his lumbar spine; plaintiff sustained fractures of his lumbar spine requiring surgical fusing. Nearly two years before trial the plaintiff's treating physician made a report to the defendant which referred to the plaintiff's degenerative disc disease with herniation. Also, the deposition of a Dr. Johnson was taken prior to trial. Dr. Johnson testified to the plaintiff's degenerative disc disease with nerve root impingement and that a myelogram revealed a question of a disc protrusion. The final diagnosis, on the first page of the hospital chart, which was also in evidence without objection, was herniated L4-5 disc. We cannot say that the herniated disc claim was necessarily an entire new element of damage. See italicized language from Wood, supra . After Dr. Cherry left the stand, the trial judge stated: THE COURT: You had moved to remove the testimony relative to the herniated disc, I think in the doctor's testimony it is inextricably woven with the fusion as described.  (Emphasis added.) There is ample evidence from the medical reports, the operative record, and the hospital records, to support the trial court's finding that the testimony relative to the herniated disc    is inextricably woven with the fusion   , and therefore did not substantially change the cause of action and inject an entire new element of damage. By contrast, in Wood the complaint alleged injuries to the abdomen, ribs, back and shoulders; the amendment pertained to an injury to a different body area, the left arm. [7]