Opinion ID: 1833631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: should mississippi or arkansas substantive law be applied in this case?

Text: ¶ 11. The children argue that the chancery court erred by applying Arkansas law because Mississippi has the most substantial contacts with the parties and subject matter of this action. Further, the children argue that Mississippi's interest in the decedents, their estates, and the expectations of their rights undoubtably outweighs any interest of Arkansas. ¶ 12. Whether Mississippi or Arkansas substantive law applies is critical to this case because the wrongful death statutes of Mississippi and Arkansas contemplate different beneficiaries. Mississippi's wrongful death statute distributes the proceeds as follows: Damages for the injury and death of a married man shall be equally distributed to his wife and children, and if he has no children all shall go to his wife; damages for the injury and death of a married woman shall be equally distributed to the husband and children, and if she has no children all shall go to the husband; and if the deceased has no husband or wife, the damages shall be equally distributed to the children. ... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-7-13 (Supp.2001)(emphasis added). In contrast, Arkansas' beneficiary pool is expanded as follows: (d) The beneficiaries of the action created in this section are: (1) The surviving spouse, children, father, mother, brothers, and sisters of the deceased person; (2) Persons, regardless of age, standing in loco parentis to the deceased person; and (3) Persons, regardless of age, to whom the deceased stood in loco parentis at any time during the life of the deceased. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-62-102(d) (Michie Supp.2001)(emphasis added). In effect, under Arkansas law the siblings and the children are all potential beneficiaries. Under Mississippi law only the children acquire that status. ¶ 13. In Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968), this Court modified the traditional rule that the governing law is the law where the accident occurred. In Mitchell, the administratrix of the estate of a Mississippi resident, killed in a car accident in Louisiana, brought a wrongful death suit in Mississippi. This Court stated: The traditional rule, that the governing law is the law of the place where the injury occurred, has been discarded as a rule of invariable application in recent years by most of the courts which have examined it. It requires disregarding the facts in many cases and the governmental interests of the forum state. Unless the judicial function is abdicated, it should not be an unvarying guide to choice-of-law or conflict-of-law decisions in all tort cases. The only merits of that mechanical doctrine are certainty and predictability. Thus in many cases it bears little relationship to any relevant considerations for choosing one law against another in a particular tort case. The facts of the instant case illustrate this observation. Louisiana's sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the collision happened there. Id. at 512-13 (emphasis added). ¶ 14. Just as in Mitchell, Arkansas' sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious circumstance that the accident happened there. Bryce's children correctly argue that Mississippi clearly has the most substantial contacts in the present case. In Mitchell, this Court further held: This case involves a choice-of-law or conflict-of-law problem in an action for wrongful death resulting from an automobile accident, in which plaintiff's decedent and defendant's decedent were in separate cars. Both decedents were domiciled in Mississippi, their estates are being administered here, and whatever expectations they might have had were centered in Mississippi.... We modify the previously existing rule in this jurisdiction, which applied invariably the law of the place of injury, and hold that under the factual situation existing in this case, the most substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum require application of Mississippi law, in accordance with the principles summarized in the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law sections 175, 145, 164 and 6.... Mitchell, 211 So.2d at 509 (emphasis added). [3] ¶ 15. Applying the rule of Mitchell, it is clear that Mississippi substantive law must be applied to the case sub judice. First, Bryce and Juanita were domiciled in Mississippi. All of Bryce's brothers and sisters are domiciled in Mississippi. Tim is domiciled in Mississippi (Tonita lives in California). In fact, both decedents and six of the seven parties to this suit are domiciled in Mississippi, none are domiciled in Arkansas. Second, Bryce's estate is being administered in Mississippi. Third, whatever expectations Bryce might have had were centered in Mississippi. Bryce's last will and testament was drafted and witnessed in Hinds County, Mississippi. In his will, Bryce directed that if he and his wife died, he wanted the balance of his estate to be distributed equally among their five children. Nowhere does Bryce make provision for part of his estate to be distributed to his siblings. It would be fair to say that Bryce's justified expectations were that, upon his death, his estate would be distributed equally to his children, not half to his children and half to his siblings. Mississippi law would provide for that outcome; Arkansas law would not. As in Mitchell, under the factual situation existing in this case, the most substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum require application of Mississippi law.
¶ 16. The siblings do not dispute the children's choice of law argument; instead, they argue that judicial estoppel operates to prohibit the children from now changing their position in order to secure a more advantageous position. They further argue that if the children are allowed to apply Mississippi law to determine the beneficiary class, they would be entitled to claim all of the net settlement proceeds, to the exclusion of the siblings, even though they had used the siblings to enhance the number of beneficiaries and increase the potential exposure to the entities that caused the deaths. [4] They further note that Tonita, in her capacity as co-executrix, had twice petitioned the court to apply Arkansas law in this matter. Further, Tim did not disagree with applying Arkansas law in the affidavit he submitted to the court. ¶ 17. In Mauck v. Columbus Hotel Co., 741 So.2d 259 (Miss.1999), this Court explained the doctrine of judicial estoppel as follows: the doctrine is based on expedition of litigation between the same parties by requiring orderliness and regularity in pleadings. [J]udicial estoppel will be applied in civil cases where there is multiple litigation between the same parties and one party knowingly `assert(s) a position inconsistent with the position in the prior' litigation. However, ... where the first position asserted was taken as a result of mistake, judicial estoppel should not be invoked. Id. at 264-65 (citations omitted). Further, in Thomas v. Bailey, 375 So.2d 1049, 1051 (Miss.1979), we stated, the doctrine is inapplicable unless the parties were adverse in the original proceedings. ¶ 18. The children correctly respond that by denying Arkansas law is controlling, they have not taken a position inconsistent with a previously asserted position. While it is true that Tim did not take a position as to which law applied in his affidavit, he filed a timely answer to the petitions where he denied that Arkansas law was controlling. And while it is true that Tonita was a signatory on both the petitions and the answer, the former was in her capacity as co-executrix, the latter was in her capacity as beneficiary. Also, there is a question as to whether Tonita knowingly asserted Arkansas law was controlling in her petitions, or whether it was merely the result of mistake. Further, the parties have not been involved in multiple litigations; this is the only proceeding in which the children and the siblings have been in an adversarial position. Therefore, judicial estoppel is not applicable to this case. Because the resolution of this issue is dispositive of the case, we need not address the children's remaining assignments of error.