Opinion ID: 216585
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: General Remands

Text: Pepper held that a general remand leaves the district court free to sentence de novo. As the Eighth Circuit did in Pepper, we issue a general remand. “A criminal sentence is a package of sanctions that the district court utilizes to effectuate its sentencing intent.” Pepper, 131 S. Ct. at 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he delicate balancing that occurs in the sentencing process in light of the complexity of the Sentencing Guidelines leads this court to believe that limited remands are less likely to be desirable or effective when multiple issues require reconsideration.” United States v. Campbell, 168 F.3d 263, 268 (6th Cir. 1999). The multiple, interrelated issues in this case make a general remand appropriate. The two-level reduction that the district court already granted for substantial assistance is closely intertwined with any yet-to-be-assessed additional reduction for substantial assistance. Similarly, the amount by which the original district court judge 2 Even though Gapinski did not argue for a downward variance based on post-sentencing rehabilitation in the current appeal, Gapinski has not waived that argument. “Waiver under Rule 28(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure occurs when a party omits an available argument.” Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 964 (emphasis added). The argument for a downward variance based on post-sentencing rehabilitation was not available to Gapinski in the present appeal because he raised it in his second appeal. Prior to the change in law that Pepper brought about, “law of the case doctrine barred the defendant[] from raising the issue again.” Id. Waiver, therefore, does not apply. 12 No. 09-2267 United States v. Gapinski varied downward is not “fixed independently” of a downward variance for post-sentencing rehabilitation or diminished capacity. Id. Therefore, we issue a general remand. C. Reassignment to a Different District Court Judge At oral argument, Gapinski requested that we reassign his case to a different district court judge in the event that we remand his case for resentencing. To determine whether reassignment is necessary, we consider (1) whether the original judge would reasonably be expected to have substantial difficulty in putting out of his or her mind previously expressed views or findings; (2) whether reassignment is advisable to preserve the appearance of justice; and (3) whether reassignment would entail waste and duplication out of proportion to any gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. Solomon v. United States, 467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006). All three factors support reassignment here. First, the original judge had substantial difficulty setting aside his previously expressed views about the substantial-assistance departure. “Having reimposed an identical sentence after [one] remand, the district judge may reasonably be expected to have substantial difficulty ignoring his previous views during [the next] sentencing proceeding.” United States v. DeMott, 513 F.3d 55, 59 (2d Cir. 2008). The district court judge who sentenced Gapinski voiced that type of problem, saying, “Okay. I’ve reviewed it, I’ve reconsidered it, and I’m not going to change.” R. 218 (3d Sent. Tr. at 3). Moreover, a judge who has “questioned the wisdom of the substantive law” that he or she must apply is less likely to be able to overcome prior views. United States v. Torkington, 874 F.2d 1441, 1447 (11th Cir. 1989). Here, the district court judge refused to follow our prior instructions because he believed that the instructions would force the district court to engage in activity that “just isn’t 13 No. 09-2267 United States v. Gapinski good jurisprudence.” R. 218 (3d Sent. Tr. at 22). He also stated that, “contrary to what I think I see in this Court of Appeals hint, this Court doesn’t have the ability to go back and say, Well, you know, I think . . . I made a mistake the first time . . . .” Id. Because the district court judge was reluctant to follow our prior remand instructions, we have little reason to think that another remand would cause the judge to disavow his previously expressed views about this case. Second, reassignment will preserve the appearance of justice. This criterion is satisfied because “[t]he district judge’s previously expressed views appear too entrenched to allow for the appearance of fairness on remand.” United States v. Ressam, 629 F.3d 793, 840 (9th Cir. 2010). In addition, reassignment will ensure that Gapinski’s sentence is the product of a reasoned procedure. The original district court judge “want[ed] the record to reflect [that] . . . the whole reason we’re back here on [this case] is the length of the sentence. I don’t see any other reason for that. Clear. It’s clear that once you strip away the verbiage in the Court of Appeals, that’s what they’re concerned with too.” Id. at 15. To the contrary, our opinion held that procedural defects marred Gapinski’s second sentencing hearing. Reassignment will protect the appearance and actuality of procedural justice. Finally, any lost efficiency is not out of proportion to the gain in preserving the appearance of fairness. This case is not a large-scale controversy with a “complex factual record.” Hamad v. Woodcrest Condominium Ass’n, 328 F.3d 224, 239 (6th Cir. 2003). In addition, when issues have already been remanded once to no avail, “reassignment provides an opportunity to reduce waste and move the case toward definitive resolution.” John B. v. Goetz, 626 F.3d 356, 365 (6th Cir. 2010). 14 No. 09-2267 United States v. Gapinski Because the issue of post-sentencing rehabilitation is not one that the original judge has had the occasion to consider, no efficiency is lost or gained on that issue. We acknowledge that reassignment is “an extraordinary power” that we should exercise “infrequently and with the greatest reluctance.” Solomon, 467 F.3d at 935. This case, however, represents an extraordinary circumstance in which reassignment is appropriate. D. Remaining Issues We leave the questions of codefendent disparities and funds for psychiatric evaluation to the district court judge who will be assigned to this case.3 First, the district court sentenced Gapinski and codefendant Vinson to the same term of imprisonment even though Gapinski has fewer criminal-history points and a lower adjusted offense level. The unwarranted-disparities factor in § 3553(a)(6) relates to “national disparities between defendants with similar criminal histories convicted of similar criminal conduct—not disparities between codefendants.” United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 521 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, Marlowe v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 450 (2008). “A district judge, however, may exercise his or her discretion and determine a defendant’s sentence in light of a co-defendant’s sentence.” United States v. Simmons, 501 F.3d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 2007). On remand, the district court may choose whether to exercise its discretion in this fashion. 3 Because we are remanding for resentencing, it is unnecessary for us to decide the issue raised by Gapinski that the district court erred by evaluating whether Gapinski’s sentence was “reasonable,” which is the appellate standard of review. See United States v. Bolden, 479 F.3d 455, 467 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 872 (2007). 15 No. 09-2267 United States v. Gapinski Second, our opinion in Gapinski II instructed the district court to “consider Gapinski’s arguments for a lower sentence based upon alleged diminished capacity due to ADHD.” Gapinski II, 561 F.3d at 478. “[A]n indigent defendant may obtain authorization for investigative, expert, or other services under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) upon a demonstration that (1) such services are necessary to mount a plausible defense, and (2) without such authorization, the defendant’s case would be prejudiced.” United States v. Howard, 621 F.3d 433, 447 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 3006A(e)(1) applies in the sentencing context. United States v. Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 389–90 (1st Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Clark, 385 F.3d 609, 617–18 (6th Cir. 2004). Gapinski admits that he has no basis for a departure due to diminished capacity because he can “absorb information in the usual way and . . . exercise the power of reason.” United States v. Osoba, 213 F.3d 913, 916 (6th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, at least one district court has varied downward on account of untreated ADHD. United States v. Patzer, 548 F. Supp. 2d 612, 617–18 (N.D. Ill. 2008). We leave to the district court on remand the decision whether to allocate funds for a psychiatric evaluation.