Opinion ID: 2195379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of the Tuckers' Claims by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and Their Reinstatement by the Superior Court

Text: On March 19, 1999, in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas (trial court), Appellant-newspapers filed Preliminary Objections to the Complaint of the Tuckers. Appellant-newspapers argued to the trial court that the Complaint should be dismissed because: (1) the [newspapers'] Article[s] and the statements contained therein, are not capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law; (2) [the Tuckers] have failed to satisfy the pleading standard of actual malice to support their claim for defamation or their prayer for punitive damages; and (3) the Article[s], even if defamatory, [are] protected by the media's long-standing privilege to publish fair and accurate accounts of judicial proceedings. (R.R. 117a-118a.) The trial court sustained the Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Complaint. First, the court agreed with the argument of the Appellant-newspapers that the articles are not capable of a defamatory meaning. The court explained: Based on the information set forth in the complaint and relevant case law, Tucker has failed to state a cause of action for defamation. She has not presented evidence that her reputation was actually damaged, only that she feels ridiculed when people ask her about the Shakur case. She does not contend that people have stopped asking her to speak at public engagements or provide other indicators that her position in the community has diminished. The only harm that Tucker alleges is that people question her about the lawsuit. Her embarrassment from the questions does not rise to the level of harming her reputation or deterring third parties from associating with her. Because Tucker's complaint failed to show any defamation resulted from the publication of their articles, the Defendants' Preliminary Objections are properly sustained. Tucker v. Legal Communications, Ltd., No. 3644, slip op. at 6 (C.P. Phila. Co. filed June 16, 1999) (footnote omitted). The trial court also accepted the argument of Appellant-newspapers that the Tuckers had failed to prove actual malice because they provided no evidence that the authors had knowledge that their statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for the truth. Id. at 7. Indeed, the court found that the statements were not false because the definition of consortium includes sexual relations. Id. at 7-8. The trial court also agreed with the argument of Appellant-newspapers that, because the articles, taken as a whole, were fair and accurate and were not published for the sole purpose of causing harm to the Tuckers, the report was protected by the fair reporting privilege. Id. at 8-9. The Superior Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. It determined that: (1) the articles were capable of a defamatory meaning; (2) the Tuckers were not required to prove actual malice at the pleading stage; and (3) the issue of whether the fair reporting privilege was abused was an issue for a jury to decide. [14] Tucker v. Philadelphia Newspapers, 757 A.2d 938 (Pa.Super.2000). The Superior Court believed that the implication of the articlesthat the Tuckers, who hold themselves out as moral people, are overly concerned with sexual matters [] could be capable of a defamatory meaning. Id. at 944. Also, the Superior Court agreed with the Tuckers' argument that Appellant-newspapers' emphasis ... on the one possible component of a loss of consortium claim, to the exclusion of the other ingredients, creates an impression that will expose the Tuckers to public hatred and ridicule. Id. at 943. The court also accepted the contention of the Tuckers that because of their advanced age and their reputation as people of strong morals, the suggestion in the newspaper articles that the Tuckers are overly concerned with sexual matters could be capable of defamatory meaning. Id. at 943-44. The Superior Court ultimately held that determining whether the articles were published with knowledge of their falsity or reckless disregard for the truth requires an analysis of the state of mind of the authors and publishers, which the Superior Court agreed should not occur at the pleading stage. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for further proceedings. Appellant-newspapers filed a petition for allowance of leave to appeal, which we granted. Appellant-newspapers formulated the issues as follows: 1. Is the statement that [the Tuckers] filed a lawsuit[,] which asserts, inter alia, a claim for loss of consortium, including damage to their sex life, capable of a defamatory meaning? 2. Can [the Tuckers] recover for defamation for publication of true information about a lawsuit, when the United States Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly held that, under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, in order for a statement to be actionable in defamation, it must be false? We address those issues seriatim.