Opinion ID: 221275
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kinsel's Due Process Claim

Text: Beyond our limited review of his habeas claims under the AEDPA and apart from his assertion of actual innocence, Kinsel contends that the Louisiana appellate court violated his due process rights during his state postconviction proceedings. He asserts that the Louisiana Fifth Circuit deprived him of due process by refusing to give deference to the trial court's credibility determinations and by denying him the opportunity to present A.M.'s recantation to a jury. The dissenting Louisiana Fifth Circuit judge aptly summed up the constitutional error allegedly made by the majority: In the instant case, the trial judge found that the recanted testimony would materially affect the jury verdict. The trial judge evaluated the credibility of the recanting witness and struggled to determine which testimony, the trial testimony or the testimony during the Motion for New Trial, was truthful. In ruling the trial judge stated, I'm not sure I believe her about whether it happened or not . . . concluding, I find that in no way can one convict absent her testimony. Given the vast discretion afforded the trial court in evaluating evidence and ascertaining whether a new trial is warranted, I find in this case, where the victim of the crime, upon whose testimony the guilty verdict rests, recants that testimony, the trial court has a valid legal basis to grant a new trial. [27] Undeniably, the trial court (along with the dissenting judge) and the appellate court hold Kinsel's postconviction petition to different standards: The trial court granted Kinsel a new trial based on its determination that A.M.'s recantation undermined her trial testimony without which no reasonable juror could have convicted Kinsel. The appellate court, in contrast, focused on the fact that Kinsel did not establish[] a due process violation so as to make his post-conviction claim cognizable under [the Louisiana postconviction statute]. The differing approaches could stem from the fact that the trial court and the dissenting appellate judge treat Kinsel's postconviction petition as a motion for a new trial, [28] for which Louisiana law only requires the movant to show that if the evidence had been introduced at the trial[,] it would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty. [29] If this standard were applicable to Kinsel's postconviction petition requesting a new trial, then the Louisiana Fifth Circuit might well have erred in reversing the trial court's decision. [30] But, if the Louisiana Fifth Circuit were correct that Kinsel must first show that his conviction was obtained in violation of the constitution of the United States or the state of Louisiana [31] regardless of his request for a new trial in the alternative to exonerationthen that court did not err in concluding that Kinsel failed to establish that a constitutional violation occurred at his trial. The bottom line is that the proper court to review whether the Louisiana Fifth Circuit deprived Kinsel of due process during his postconviction proceedings was either the Louisiana Supreme Court, which dismissed Kinsel's direct appeal of the decision, or the U.S. Supreme Court, to which Kinsel never petitioned for certiorari review of his state postconviction proceedings. We, as a federal appeals court entertaining a federal habeas corpus application, are without jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of Kinsel's state postconviction proceedings. Indeed, we are barred from doing so by our no state habeas infirmities rule. [32] It is beyond regrettable that a possibly innocent man will not receive a new trial in the face of the preposterously unreliable testimony of the victim and sole eyewitness to the crime for which he was convicted. But, our hands are tied by the AEDPA, preventing our review of Kinsel's attack on his Louisiana postconviction proceedings, so we dutifully dismiss his claim.