Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Limitation on Cross-examination of Arthur Cox

Text: (16a) As previously discussed, Arthur Cox testified for the prosecution about incriminating statements defendant allegedly made while Cox and defendant were in jail together. Defendant complains that, in twice sustaining prosecution objections to defense counsel's cross-examination of Cox regarding Cox's sources of material support, the trial court violated defendant's due process rights and right of confrontation. Cox was extensively cross-examined by defense counsel. The trial court sustained objections by the prosecution to three lines of defense counsel's questioning. Defendant contends two of the rulings were erroneous. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling sustaining the prosecution's relevancy objection to the question: How do you come up with the money [to pay for your current rent]? Defendant also contends the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecution's relevancy objections to questions about the manner in which Cox supported himself after he was released from jail. (17a) Defendant accurately observes the high court has `recognized that the exposure of a witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination.' ( Delaware v. Van Ardsall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678-679 [106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674], quoting Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 316-317 [94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110-1111, 39 L.Ed.2d 347].) It does not follow, [however], that the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment prevents a trial judge from imposing any limits on defense counsel's inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness. (475 U.S. at p. 679 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1435], citing Delaware v. Fensterer (1985) 474 U.S. 15, 20 [106 S.Ct. 292, 294-295, 88 L.Ed.2d 15].) (16b) Defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine Cox on numerous topics that were relevant to Cox's credibility. Defense counsel was permitted to ask about the particulars of Cox's commitment to the California Youth Authority, his history of gang membership, his arrest for robbery, the favorable disposition of the robbery charges following cooperation with prosecutors and the favorable disposition of his probation violations following such cooperation. Defense counsel also was permitted to cross-examine Cox closely about money he had received from police and prosecutors. Defense counsel asked who was paying for his rent and whether Cox was working. He also asked whether Cox was getting his rent money from the police department or the district attorney's office. Only when defense counsel asked, `How do you come up with the money? did the court sustain a relevancy objection. A moment later, Cox testified, without objection, that he got his rent money from his parents, girlfriend and things like that. We cannot conclude defendant was denied the opportunity to appropriately cross-examine Cox about income or credibility issues. Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of Cox's credibility had defense counsel been permitted to pursue his proposed lines of questioning. ( Delaware v. Van Ardsall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 680 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1435-1436].) In view of the extensive cross-examination of Cox on topics relevant to his credibility, including financial topics, defendant fails to carry that burden. (17b) [T]rial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. ( Delaware v. Van Ardsall, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 679 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1435].) (16c) The trial court apparently was concerned that defense counsel, by repeatedly questioning Cox about his income sources, was unfoundedly creating the impression Cox was generating income illegally. Accordingly, the court limited such questioning to periods of time Cox was housed by the government, and disallowed generalized questioning ranging over longer periods. We discern no error.