Opinion ID: 75485
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: lucas' ada retaliation claim

Text: The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of Grainger on Lucas' ADA retaliation claim. The ADA provides that [n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge .... 8 Lucas also contends that the ADA required Grainger to restructure his Will-Call Service Representative job as a reasonable accommodation. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (listing job restructuring as a possible reasonable accommodation). He maintains that Grainger could have restructured that job by, for example, instituting reasonable physical lifting restrictions. However, performing physical labor in Grainger's warehouse was an essential—indeed the core—function of the Will-Call job, and Lucas either could not or would not perform that function. Lucas told Stewart that he would never work in the warehouse again, even if he became physically able to do so, because he did not want to risk further injuring his back. When asked in his deposition whether there was anything Grainger could have done after he injured his back to help him perform his warehouse duties, Lucas answered no. Lucas either could not or would not perform the essential functions of the Will-Call Service Representative job and, therefore, he was not otherwise qualified to do it. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). under [the ADA]. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a). In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Lucas must show that: (1) he engaged in a statutorily protected expression; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a causal link between the adverse action and his protected expression. See Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1336 (11th Cir.1999); Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1287. Lucas claims that he engaged in a statutorily protected expression on June 26, 1996, when he asked Stewart for an accommodation in the form of desk work and, again, on January 8, 1997, when he filed a charge with the EEOC. Moving straight to the second element of a prima facie case of retaliation, we conclude that Lucas has failed to produce sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that Grainger took an adverse employment action against him. Lucas maintains that Grainger took an adverse action against him when Stewart actively solicited negative performance memoranda from several of ... Lucas' co-workers. In August of 1996, after Grainger had placed Lucas on workers' compensation leave, Stewart and two other members of Grainger's management at the Marietta Boulevard facility submitted evaluations to Lucas' employee file that were critical of his customer service skills. An employment action is considered adverse only if it results in some tangible, negative effect on the plaintiff's employment. Here, the negative performance evaluations did not result in any effect on Lucas' employment with Grainger. Grainger did not rely on the evaluations to make any employment decisions regarding Lucas. Indeed, Lucas concedes in his brief to us that Stewart did not use [the evaluations]; he merely placed them in [my] file. And Stewart testified in his deposition that he simply wanted something in the file to support his position that Lucas was not qualified to be a Customer Service Representative. Negative performance evaluations, standing alone, do not constitute adverse employment action sufficient to satisfy the second element of a prima facie case of retaliation under the ADA.9 See Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 802-03 (7th Cir.1999) (concluding that the plaintiff's ADA retaliation claim fails because he provided no evidence that any injury or adverse employment action resulted from the allegedly lower ratings [in his performance evaluations].); Cossette v. Minn. Power & Light., 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th Cir.1999) ([T]he negative evaluation does not by itself constitute an adverse employment action within the ADA's contemplation.); see generally Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir.2001) ([C]ourts 9 Lucas also contends that Stewart took an adverse employment action against him by harassing him and by threatening his job. However, he does not point to any evidence in support of that contention. are wisely reluctant to treat job performance memoranda as actionable under Title VII where they do not trigger any more tangible form of adverse action such as a loss in benefits, ineligibility for promotional opportunities, or more formal discipline.). Lucas also contends that Grainger took adverse action against him by failing to reasonably accommodate him, by refusing to maintain him on light duty work, and by failing to engage him in an interactive process. But this contention merely reclothes Lucas' ADA discrimination claim, which we have already rejected, and it fares no better in this garb. See Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1288 ([T]he acts Stewart describes relate directly to her 'reasonable accommodation' discrimination claim, not her retaliation claim, and accordingly provide no basis for denying summary judgment on this issue.). AFFIRMED.