Opinion ID: 2452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Application of Basis-in-Fact Review to This Case

Text: Because I do not think it is appropriate for this court to undertake any basis-in-fact review of Watson's classification challenge in the absence of a proper statement of reasons for the final Army decision, I am reluctant to comment on what valid reasons might be advanced. Nevertheless, because I am far from convinced by Watson's analysis that it would be impossible as a matter of law for the Army to advance any such reasons, I offer a few observations, by no means exhaustive, about basis-in-fact review generally and as applied to this case. First, as already noted, basis-in-fact review is the narrowest standard known to law, see United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d at 810, specifically intended to limit judicial intrusion into military decisionmaking, see United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d at 781. Thus, once a court is satisfied that procedural fairness was afforded, its basis-in fact review is limited to ensuring the rationality of the challenged military decision. As Judge Friendly described the task: a court in effect must determine, as best it can, whether the Local Board or the hearing officer and, ultimately, the Appeal Board were rational and sincere in disbelieving the sincerity of registrant's belief [even] in the absence of conduct inconsistent with the registrant's assertion, and this on a record always cold and often thin. United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d at 814-15 (emphasis added). Second, the fact that a person states a prima facie case for conscientious objection classification does not require military authorities to accept it as sincere. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 381-82, 75 S.Ct. 392, 99 L.Ed. 428 (1955); United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d at 778; United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d at 814. When the hearing officer who interacts directly with the applicant finds him to be sincere, that finding is entitled to great weight. Ferrand v. Seamans, 488 F.2d at 1390. Nevertheless, even in such circumstances, other officers in the review chain may recommend denial of objector classification provided there is objective evidence affording a rational basis for the refusal to accept the validity of the applicant's claims. Lovallo v. Resor, 443 F.2d 1262, 1264 (2d Cir.1971); see also United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d at 778; United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d at 814. On judicial review, such objective evidence need not be preponderant or even substantial to constitute a basis in fact for decision. United States ex rel. Foster v. Schlesinger, 520 F.2d at 755. Indeed, courts conducting basis-in-fact review of objector classification do well to bear in mind Judge Friendly's observation that though the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion, it is a lot less susceptible of objective determination. United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d at 810 (internal quotation marks and internal citation omitted). Moreover, courts must recall that the burden remains always on the applicant clearly and convincingly to prove his claim of conscientious objection. See DOD Instr. 1300.06 § 5.3; AR 600-43, ¶ 1-5c. Third, while objective evidence is more than mere speculation, it does not equate to direct evidence. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. at 383, 75 S.Ct. 392 (observing that it would be pure naivety to expect an outright admission of deception; thus, the most competent evidence will generally be inference[s] drawn from the applicant's testimony and conduct). Nor is it evidence admitting only a single inference. See id. (recognizing Congress's intent to make Selective Service review final in all cases where there was conflicting evidence or where two inferences could be drawn from the same testimony). Indeed, basis-in-fact review does not contemplate any judicial weighing of the evidence. See United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d at 779. Rather, courts must view the record in the light most favorable to the decisionmaker in determining whether a challenged classification was rational. With these principles in mind, I proceed to explain why I cannot agree with Watson's conclusion that it would be impossible for DACORB to point to any basis in fact for its denial decision. It is useful to begin by considering exactly how Watson's professed beliefs conflict with the service commitment the Army asks him to honor. Watson submits that he opposes war because he believes that (1) all human life is sacred, (2) war is a futile means for resolving human disputes, and (3) war inevitably causes a large number of non-combatant casualties. As a result, Watson unequivocally refuses to kill other human beings, and indicates that he would die himself rather than do so. Up to this point, there is no problem. The Army does not ask Watson to serve in a combat role. Quite the contrary, the Army asks Watson to honor his commitment by serving as a non-combatant in a role where his sole responsibility would be to save human lives. Thus, we come to the crux of Watson's objection claim: he refuses to play even the life-saving role of an Army doctor because he deems it immoral to participate in any way in weaponizing human beings. Watson App. at 5. In considering the sincerity of this claim, the Army might reasonably consider that Watson's involvement in any such weaponization would necessarily be indirect. Watson is not, after all, a surgeon, an orthopedist, or a neurologist. He is a radiologist  in short, he reads films  and, as such, would not likely make any final treatment decisions for American soldiers, much less would he be likely to provide that treatment. [13] Nevertheless, Watson insists that it would be immoral to play even a tangential role in providing any medical care for American soldiers. The Army might reasonably identify an inconsistency between this opposition and Watson's professed belief in the inviolable sanctity of every human life, the core of his personal moral code. Watson submits that there is no inconsistency because he is not suggesting that wounded American soldiers should be left to die; he is simply refusing himself to play any part in their treatment. He expects that other doctors  presumably with less refined moral codes  would provide the treatment necessary to save soldiers' lives. It would hardly be irrational for DACORB to reject this tortured reasoning. If a person sincerely believes an act is immoral, then the person might reasonably be expected to believe that the act is immoral no matter who commits it. I am hardly suggesting that Watson should believe it immoral for any doctor to treat wounded American soldiers, a position that necessarily leads to the breathtaking conclusion that it is morally preferable for such wounded Americans to die for lack of medical care than for any doctor to play a part in their weaponization. I am noting simply that Watson's effort to have it both ways, refusing to treat wounded soldiers himself but not opposing treatment by others  thereby denying the possibility of, and avoiding responsibility for, the loss of soldiers' lives  exposes the shallow moral foundation of his claim to conscientious objector status. DACORB could reach the same determination from the stated facts and rationally conclude that Watson had not clearly and convincingly established that his moral opposition to providing any medical care for American soldiers is a belief held with the strength and devotion of traditional religious conviction. AR 600-43, Glossary. [14] Indeed, the shallowness of Watson's moral opposition to treating soldiers is further revealed by another objective fact: his failure to take any steps in his civilian medical practice to ensure that he did not treat, and thereby weaponize, any United States military personnel, for example, reservists or persons on leave from active duty. Watson apparently failed even to consider such action. [15] The oversight is noteworthy because the likelihood of Watson's encountering some reservists, and even active duty soldiers, as a hospital resident was hardly remote, and the very essence of his claim is a moral objection to playing any role, however tangential, in weaponizing soldiers. [16] Moreover, DOD Instr. § 5.2.2 specifically states that [s]incerity is to be determined by an impartial evaluation of the applicant's thinking and living in its totality, past and present, and § 5.2.2.1 requires careful examination of an applicant's outward manifestation of the beliefs asserted. [17] In addition to troubling facts inherent in Watson's claim, there is the objective chronological fact that Watson did not file for conscientious objector classification until 2006, the same year his service deferment was scheduled to expire. Watson notes that Army regulations preclude belated or coincidental filing from being the sole reason for denying conscientious objector classification. See Watson v. Geren, 569 F.3d at 132. True enough, see AR 600-43, ¶ 1-5a(5)(c) (stating that timing of an application alone . . . is never enough to furnish a basis in fact to support a disapproval), but the same regulation specifically recognizes that coincidental timing may indicate that further inquiry as to the person's sincerity is warranted, id. The reason is grounded in common sense. While [s]udden accessions of belief may be utterly sincere, as the memorable one on the Damascus road, United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d at 812, [a]ny parent whose child claims to be sick on the morning of the final exam knows better than to take such a claim at face value, Hanna v. Sec'y of the Army, 513 F.3d at 18 (Boudin, J., dissenting). Thus, the Army is not foreclosed from relying on timing together with other facts in providing a rational explanation for its denial decision. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. at 383, 75 S.Ct. 392 (recognizing that facts possibly insignificant standing alone may in context of totality of circumstances help support the finding of insincerity); Lobis v. Sec'y of the U.S. Air Force, 519 F.2d 304, 307 (1st Cir.1975) (observing that timing might warrant substantial weight where reinforced by other evidence). The Army might identify further objective facts relevant to its denial decision in the findings in Col. O'Neill's investigation report. To explain, it is useful to begin by listing the subjects expected to be addressed in such a report: (a) The underlying basis of the person's professed conscientious objection (what applicant believes, and why). (b) The time period (being as specific as possible) in which the person's belief became fixed. (c) Whether the belief constitutes conscientious objection (1-0 or 1-A-0) under this regulation. (d) The sincerity of the person, including reasons for such conclusions. AR 600-43, ¶ 2-5k(5). In response to the first inquiry, the investigation report states simply that Watson no longer believes in serving in the military in any capacity and he feels very strongly that treating wounded soldiers and sending them back to fight results `in the functional equivalent of weaponizing human beings.' Investigation Report, July 12, 2006, at 1. It is hardly apparent that these views, particularly the first one, equate to the required opposition to all war, a point that might reasonably inform DACORB's consideration of other aspects of the report. In response to the second inquiry, the report identifies the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the United States' pre-emptive strikes in Afghanistan and especially Iraq as the events prompting Watson to study various writers and philosophies addressing violence, the causes of violence and alternatives to violence. Id. The report makes no express finding, however, that this study in fact expanded Watson's opposition from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to wars generally, nor does it indicate when any of Watson's views became fixed. Id. The silence is significant. DACORB  which has much more experience than this court in reviewing such reports  might conclude therefrom that the four reviewing officers, each of whom determined that Watson had convincingly demonstrated opposition only to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and not to all wars, were not rejecting a specific finding by the investigation officer but, rather, identifying a concern not addressed by that officer. The Army review process relies heavily on the considered opinions of a number of officers in addition to those who serve on the DACORB. Aguayo v. Harvey, 476 F.3d 971, 979 (D.C.Cir.2007). When they are all in agreement that conscientious objector classification should be granted, see, e.g., Hanna v. Sec'y of the Army, 513 F.3d at 11, DACORB confronts a greater challenge in identifying a basis in fact for a denial decision. But where, as here, the investigation officer's recommendation to grant conscientious objector classification is rejected by all four reviewing officers on a ground not specifically addressed in the investigation report, surely a court should proceed cautiously in concluding that these reviewing officers all acted irrationally and without a basis in fact, and that DACORB would necessarily do likewise if it were asked to provide a fuller explanation of its reasons for denial. Indeed, such caution is further signaled by the investigation report's response to the third inquiry, which states at the outset that Watson presently fits somewhere in the middle ground of the definition of a conscientious objector. Investigation Report, July 12, 2006, at 1. While the report does not explain this characterization, context suggests that it is not meant to signal that Watson fit squarely within the definition but, rather, that the evidence did not all point in one direction on the issue. The report states that Watson has deeply held moral and ethical beliefs that fit in with the definition of a conscientious objector, noting particularly that [h]e is against the U.S. Army and all Armies, and would not care for injured service members. Id. At the same time, it notes that Watson is not a strict pacifist because he is willing to use force as necessary to defend his loved ones and himself, but not to inflict harm or exact retribution. Id. Observing that these circumstances required a judgment call on where this soldier fits in the definition of a conscientious objector, the investigation report recommends 1-0 classification because of Watson's strong anti war bias, and refusal to treat combatant Soldiers. Id. at 1-2. In response to the fourth inquiry, the report states that Watson's views are sincerely held and not likely to change. See id. In considering these responses to the last two inquiries, one is struck by the finding that what Watson's beliefs prompted was opposition to all Armies, a curious formulation for the investigation officer to employ given his undoubted awareness that the regulatory requirement is opposition to all wars. See DOD Instr. 1300.06 § 3.5.1; AR 600-43, Glossary, Section II; see also Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 443, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971). To the extent the report indicates that Watson has a strong anti war bias, it makes no specific finding as to whether this bias is directed at all wars or at the wars presently being fought by the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, in which Watson might be expected to serve. Thus, even if one were to assume that this reference was to all wars, the failure of explanation, particularly on the point of concern noted by four reviewing officers, is itself an objective fact that DACORB might reasonably consider in making its own final decision. The reviewing officers' concern  and possibly DACORB's  on this point is further reasonably informed by Watson's own testimony at the investigation hearing. While this testimony was not formally transcribed, the investigation officer prepared a memorandum of the questions asked and answers given that is usefully contrasted to Watson's statements in his counseled written submissions. [18] Three questions and answers suffice to make the point: Q: What exactly are your beliefs? A: Basically being as concise as I can be concerning my beliefs they are that human life is a gift and we are charged with the responsibility of honoring that gift. And to do so we must make every effort to ensure we save, protect, and uphold human life. Q: What basic values besides objecting to violence do you have? A: My basic values are complex. Human beings are rational[] and should be able to decipher between good and bad and this is a core value. In addition, our gift is to think and reason and we have an obligation to do so. To shirk this responsibility is to deny who we are. I believe in the humanistic view point. I believe in the goodness of us as a species animal, and respect we are basically an animal, but we have the ability to reason and can deny any animalistic instincts, and be more responsible and reach gracious conclusions. Dealing on a day-to-day basis, I honor each individual as an individual with their own understanding of the world. I help them with decisions concerning their health and well being to the best of my ability while remaining non-judgmental and practical, but using a meaningful approach. Q: When did these beliefs become fixed in your mind, and you realized you were a CO? A: Sometime in late 2004 my beliefs became fixed when our efforts in Fallujah came to light and I had an increasing concern that our approach in Iraq and Afghanistan was unfounded. I remember the picture of a soldier shooting an unarmed Iraqi at close range crying out. This really shook me and prompted me to investigate what we were doing and what got us into this situation and quest. My personal awakening of this and future missions peculated [sic] in early 2005, which led to on-line organizations that made more sense to me. Sometime in the late or early summer of 2005, I was uncomfortable with our part in the current situation. I discussed this with friends who were supportive and family members who were unhappy with this decision. My friends suggested fraudulent approaches such as using homosexuality or using my position as a physician to process a disability to get out of the Army. That made no sense. I broke out my contract specifically Section 21 concerning resignation as a CO. I also went on-line and connected with the Organization Center for the Counsel of COs which was most helpful to me. Investigation Hearing Memorandum, July 12, 2006, at 2-3. Notably absent from Watson's responses to the first two inquiries is any mention of his opposition to all wars. Rather, the answers express general beliefs of good will likely held by large numbers of people, including many presently serving in this country's armed forces. Even more noteworthy is the lack of any mention in Watson's third response of his purported rigorous study of thinkers and philosophies that (according to his written submissions) was the critical factor in expanding and fixing his beliefs from opposition to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars to opposition to all wars. Watson does not testify to any such expansion of his views. Quite the contrary, he says that in the summer of 2005 his discomfort with the current situation prompted him to break out his service agreement with the Army to see how he could get out of it. The investigation officer, the reviewing officers, and DACORB itself are, of course, obliged to review the record in its entirety. That record, as Watson notes, contains numerous written submissions asserting that Watson's opposition to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars was simply the first step on a road that brought him to his present opposition to all war. See Watson v. Geren, 569 F.3d at 132. [19] But the investigation officer never made an explicit credibility finding on this point, and neither the reviewing officers nor DACORB were required to credit those submissions, particularly in light of the objective fact of Watson's hearing testimony indicating that it was the current situation, i.e., the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, that in the summer of 2005 prompted him to start reading not philosophy but his service agreement and to contact conscientious objector groups to see what would get him out of his commitment. Whether or not this testimony might somehow be reconciled with Watson's claim of conscientious objection is not the point. It is objective evidence from which DACORB could rationally draw an inference that Watson's real opposition is to the specific wars in which he would be required to serve, not to all war. See Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. at 383, 75 S.Ct. 392 (holding that, where Selective Service picks between conflicting evidence or competing inferences, its decision has a basis in fact); United States v. Corliss, 280 F.2d at 815-16 (observing that, when confronted with competing statements of applicant's basis for his conscientious objection to military service, Appeal Board was free to accept or reject last statement most favorable to applicant). [20] Still other objective facts in the record could provide rational support for a DACORB determination that Watson failed clearly and convincingly to prove his opposition to all wars. For example, Watson professes to view all war as an entirely shameful human endeavor. Watson App. at 6. The particular war actions that he references are ones subject to easy condemnation or, at least, to present debate. See id. at 10 (citing the Crusades to the atrocities of the Third Reich, the Turks in Armenia, the Iraq-Iran conflict, Stalin's murderous regime, the Japanese campaign in the Pacific, to include the rape of Nanking, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Sudan, the American conquest of the Native peoples). But this begs the difficult question critical to Watson's demonstration of conscientious objection to all wars, i.e, whether he also views as shameful those war actions generally recognized for their liberating effects. Lexington and Bunker Hill, Omaha Beach and Iwo Jima are notably missing from Watson's list of shame, as are the Civil War campaign that led to Lincoln's pronouncement of the Emancipation Proclamation and the Allied offensive in World War II that led to the liberation of Auschwitz and Buchenwald. [21] Yet this must be Watson's view if his refusal to save a life, if the life belongs to an American soldier, is to be understood as a sincere opposition to all war. This discussion is not meant to exhaust the objective facts that might be relied on by DACORB on remand to explain its denial decision, but only to illustrate why I cannot agree with Watson 's conclusion that no explanation with a basis in fact could be given on remand. For that reason, but more specifically because I do not think the futility doctrine is properly applied in this case as an exception to the remand rule, I respectfully dissent from the denial of en banc review.