Opinion ID: 1826501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standards of decision

Text: The present guardianship law mandates that the trial court find incapacity, lack of an alternative resource plan, and necessity of guardianship supervision, all by clear and convincing evidence, then select the least restrictive form of intervention. NDCC 30.1-28-04(2)(b). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is induced by an erroneous view of the law, if there is no evidence to support it, or if, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court, on the entire evidence, is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Boehm v. Backes, 493 N.W.2d 671, 674 (N.D.1992). Whether a determination is a finding of fact or a conclusion of law is decided by the reviewing court, and labels applied by the trial court are not conclusive. In Interest of Kupperion, 331 N.W.2d 22, 27 (N.D.1983). Accordingly, we will not disturb a trial court's findings on guardianship unless the findings are clearly erroneous. Treatment, services, and habilitation for developmentally disabled persons must be provided in the least restrictive appropriate setting. NDCC 25-01.2-02. [E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960). See also Mullins v. North Dakota Dept. of Human Services, 483 N.W.2d 160 (N.D. 1992). For guardianships, these precepts have been aptly restated: Guardianship ... has been considered a benevolent act by society to protect less fortunate individuals. Protection is afforded through deprivation of the ward's basic human liberties. Therefore, guardianship is a drastic measure which should only be taken if no other alternatives exist. Handbook for Guardians ad Litem, 66 N.D.L.Rev. 45, 57 (1990). See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322-24, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2462, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (mentally retarded person, committed to state institution, has constitutionally protected right of reasonable care and safety, reasonably nonrestrictive confinement, and reasonable training to ensure his safety and to facilitate his ability to function free from bodily restraints). The trial court's evidentiary standard for determining the need for a guardianship and this court's standard for appellate review of that determination are interrelated. Our precedents on the related subject of the care, treatment, and commitment of mentally ill persons, identify the conflicts between the needs for protection and liberty in imposing involuntary controls. See In Interest of R.N., 492 N.W.2d 582, 584 n. 2 (N.D.1992). The intrusion upon individual liberty by the involuntary imposition of a guardianship upon an incapacitated ward sufficiently resembles the involuntary commitment of a mental health patient to call for similar careful standards of decisionmaking. See In Interest of Gust, 392 N.W.2d 824 (N.D.1986); Kottke v. U.A.M., 446 N.W.2d 23 (N.D.1989); In Interest of T.A., 472 N.W.2d 226 (N.D. 1991). To balance the competing interests of protection and liberty in these situations, our decisions expect trial courts to use a clear and convincing evidentiary standard, while our appellate review under NDRCivP 52(a) uses a more probing clearly erroneous standard.