Opinion ID: 3064943
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequate Protection from Air-Based Threats

Text: [3] Petitioners contend that the NRC’s decision to define the scope of the DBT rule on what a private force can reasonably be expected to defend against, which excludes air-based threats, does not ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety. But, the Commission has an “overall statutory mandate to provide adequate protection to nuclear plants,” which is not abdicated by its failure to fully protect against the threat of air-based attacks through an individual regulatory decision. Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Collins, 359 F.3d 156, 169 (2d Cir. 2004). Here, while the NRC determined that air-based threats were beyond the scope of the DBT rule, the Commission provided two primary grounds to support its determination that adequate protection was met: 1) active protection against airborne threats by other Federal agencies, and 2) the ability of mitigative measures to limit the effects of an aircraft strike. 72 Fed. Reg. 12,705, 12,711. In its briefing, the NRC further explained that its judgment was also informed by: “threat analyses, by experience in the enforcement of DBT orders, by knowledge about the robustness of nuclear power plants, by a knowledge that nuclear power plants are better guarded than any other private critical infrastructure, 7 The Commission has issued a final rule to modify the design features of nuclear facilities to better withstand the impact of an air-based attack. See supra n. 5. 9634 PUBLIC CITIZEN v. NRC and the guard forces subject to more oversight than any other civilian industry security force, by new studies of how plants might respond to an air crash, and by a knowledge of actions that other Federal agencies have taken since 2001 to protect against air threat.” Brief for Respondents at p. 46 (internal citations omitted). Though set forth in its briefing, this reasoning is consistent with the reasoning included in the Commission’s final ruling and we accept it as the NRC’s considered views. See Coke, 127 S. Ct. at 2349. Adequate protection may be given content through a case-by-case application of the Commission’s technical judgment, including its knowledge of actions that other Federal agencies have taken since 2001 and its active coordination with many of those agencies. See Concerned Scientists II, 880 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1989).8 [4] It is not implausible for the Commission to determine that most attacks will be prevented in the first instance by the coordinated efforts of multiple Federal agencies. It is also not implausible, based on the evidence before the Commission, for the NRC to conclude that, in the event that an airplane is able to strike a facility, the mitigative and protective measures imposed through the DBT Orders and the revised DBT would likely prevent any serious harm from occurring. The adequate protection standard need not prevent “each and every” potential attack, as advocated by amicus State of California, because the standard “permits the acceptance of some level of risk” and does not require “absolute protection.” Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d 108, 114, 118 (D.C. Cir. 1987). [5] “[T]he NRC’s considered conclusion- right or wrongthat [air-based threats were] being adequately addressed by 8 The extremely broad discretion granted to the Commission to ignore the risks of enemy attacks and sabotage in assessing adequate protection by the Siegel court, see 400 F.2d at 783-784, however, would not apply today given the Commission’s own establishment of DBTs under the adequate protection standard and Congress’s direction in 42 U.S.C. § 2210e. See also Riverkeeper, 359 F.3d at 168 n.14. PUBLIC CITIZEN v. NRC 9635 other agencies of government and its consequent decision to leave the matter to those agencies cannot amount to an ‘abdication’ of its statutory duty under the AEA to insure that the public health and safety is adequately protected. Relying on other governmental bodies to address a risk is not equivalent to ignoring the risk.” Riverkeeper, 359 F.3d at 170;9 see also 42 U.S.C. § 2201(f) (authorizing the Commission to utilize other Federal agencies to perform such functions on its behalf as may appear desirable). Here the Commission is not merely relying on other government bodies, but is an active participant in coordinating for protection of nuclear facilities. See 72 Fed. Reg. 12,705, 12,710. The NRC’s reliance on other government agencies, whose charge is to provide security and defense of the nation against such attacks, is neither inconsistent with its past practices nor an unreasonable interpretation of its statutory obligations. Petitioners’ argument that the NRC’s inclusion of passive measures to protect against vehicle threats in the 1994 revision necessitates the inclusion of passive measures against airborne threats now, is unavailing. In the 1994 DBT rule, the Commission explicitly stated that its decision to include passive barriers against vehicle intrusions and explosions was not based on adequate protection, but as a “matter of prudence” to provide a “substantial increase in protection.” 59 Fed. Reg. 38,889, 38,891, 896. Thus, it cannot be said here that the Commission is obligated to find, based on prior decisions, that passive measures are necessary to provide adequate protection.10 And, as discussed above, the Commission was consis- 9 The Riverkeeper court also noted that the “FAA and Department of Defense have acted more than once to protect airspace above nuclear power plants from what were thought to be credible threats against specific sites.” 359 F.3d at 169. 10 It is also reasonable for the Commission to treat the interagency response to air-based threats differently than in land vehicle or waterbased vehicle attacks. There are far fewer airplanes than either trucks or boats, and they are far more regulated. Airspace is monitored by federal agencies in a manner which cannot be duplicated on all of the nation’s roadways and waterways. 9636 PUBLIC CITIZEN v. NRC tent in including within the scope of the DBT rule only those threats a private force can reasonably be expected to defend against. The NRC’s determination that private forces can reasonably defend against vehicle and water-based attacks does not require the Commission to come to the same conclusion regarding airborne threats. Once the Commission determined that adequate protection was met, it was under no obligation to further consider the beamhenge concept outlined in the CBG petition. [6] Petitioners also argue that the Commission improperly considered cost in its assessment. This allegation has no basis in the record. The Commission has consistently stated that its determination of adequate protection was not based on cost. 72 Fed. Reg. 12,705, 12,714. The NRC has provided sufficient explanation of the reasonableness standard to show that it is animated by considerations of practicality, feasability, and the proper division of defense between government agencies rather than cost concerns. For example, Petitioners argue that any reasonableness limitation on the size of a private security force must be driven by cost. This argument ignores potential basic feasability concerns that may arise with maintaining facilities for a private “standing army.” The Commission’s decision to limit the size of private security forces is neither arbitrary nor an abuse of the Commissioner’s discretion. Moreover, because the Commission found that the adequate protection standard was satisfied through mitigation measures and active defense by other federal agencies, any decision to include air-based threats in the DBT could have properly considered costs. When the NRC uses its permissive authority to extend public safety measures beyond those required by “adequate protection,” it may legitimately include costs in its assessment. See Concerned Scientists I, 824 F.2d at 118. C. Compliance with Congress’s Directives in 42 U.S.C. § 2210e [7] Petitioners also contend that the Commission’s final rule is contrary to law because the Commission failed to comPUBLIC CITIZEN v. NRC 9637 ply with Congress’s directive to “consider” “the potential for water-based and air-based threats.” § 2210e(b)(6). This argument is without merit. The Commission thoroughly discussed its assessment of air-based threats in the final rule. The Commission also implemented many mitigative measures to limit the effects of an air-strike and coordinated with other agencies to prevent an airborne attack. The direction to “consider” nonexclusive factors does not necessitate including that factor in the final rule, as Petitioners admit. The NRC’s interpretation of the directive from Congress is reasonable. The statute has no legislative history that could counter the Commission’s interpretation, nor can it be assumed, given the “virtually unique” authority of the NRC to achieve its statutory objectives, see Seigel, 400 F.2d at 783, that Congress intended to interfere with the Commission’s authority any more than is facially clear from the statute. [8] Petitioner’s argument that air-based threats must necessarily be within the scope of the DBT rule simply because they were included as a § 2210e factor is also flawed. The Commission does not argue that it could not have legally chosen to include air-based threats within the scope of the DBT. Section 2210e allowed the Commission the flexibility to determine whether or not to include each individual factor in the final rule. There is no indication that the Commission could not exercise that discretion in determining a factor was beyond the scope of the DBT rule, rather than excluding the factor on any other discretionary basis.11 Petitioners cite no authority to so limit the Commission’s discretion where a factor is not mandated by Congress and we decline to imply any such limitation. Compare Public Citizen v. FMCSA, 374 F.3d 1209, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding agency rule arbitrary 11 Moreover, the first factor listed in § 2210e is “the events of September 11, 2001.” This illustrates that Congress could not have reasonably expected the NRC to treat the factors as a sort of shopping list of threats to include wholesale in the final rule, without further agency analysis and expertise. 9638 PUBLIC CITIZEN v. NRC and capricious where the “agency neglected to consider a statutorily mandated factor” under its organic statute). D. Reliance on Non-Public Information Petitioners next argue that the Commission improperly relied on non-public information when engaging in the DBT rulemaking. The cases relied upon by Petitioners, however, involve cases where an agency relies on general factual information not provided to the public, and do not govern this case. See, e.g., Kern County Farm Bur. v. Allen, 450 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2006). Here, the AEA specifically allows the Commission to maintain “safeguards information” that is not available to the public. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2167, 2201(i); see also 10 C.F.R. § 73.21. The APA also exempts from the general rule information it is specifically authorized to withhold from public scrutiny. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). The Commission cannot be required to reveal classified information about nuclear facilities, nor would it be able to do so while fulfilling its duty to maintain the common defense and security of classified information. See also Siegel, 400 F.2d at 786 (“When, as here, a statute does not require that a particular kind of rule making be on a record made after a public hearing, the Commission is not confined to evidence presented in some formal manner. It may act not only on the basis of the comments received in response to its notice of rule making, but also upon the basis of information available in its own files, and upon the knowledge and expertise of the agency.”) (citing Pacific Coast European Conference v. United States, 350 F.2d 197, 205 (9th Cir. 1965)). [9] We hold the Commission acted neither arbitrarily or capriciously in excluding the threat of air-based attacks from the scope of the DBT rule, nor contrary to law in finding that adequate protection was satisfied without incorporating passive protective measures against air-based attacks in the DBT rule. PUBLIC CITIZEN v. NRC 9639 E. NEPA Analysis Petitioners also challenge the sufficiency of the EA provided by the Commission, arguing that the NRC should have analyzed its decision to exclude air-based threats from the DBT rule and included that environmental analysis in the alternative action portion of the EA. They argue that the decision to exclude air-based threats is an agency action that “increases the risk of a successful terrorist attack,” and that that decision produces its own adverse environmental affects. Petitioners rely on this court’s decisions in Center for Biological Diversity v. NHTSA, 538 F.3d 1172, 1216 (9th Cir. 2008), and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC (Mothers for Peace), 449 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2006). [10] “An EA shall include brief discussions of the need for the proposal and the environmental impacts of the proposed action and alternatives.” Center for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1215 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9(b)) (internal citations and alterations omitted). Because the Commission acted within its discretion in concluding that air-based threats were beyond the scope of the DBT rule, however, it was unnecessary for the Commission to consider that decision as an alternative course within the scope of the rule. The Commission’s determination that air-based threats were outside the scope of the DBT rule distinguishes this case from a case like Center for Biological Diversity, where we held an agency must consider a broad range of alternative actions within the scope of the rule at issue, beyond those alternatives the agency seriously considered. We decline to extend that holding to create a rule that ignores reasonable boundaries in the scope of an EA alternative action analysis. The Commission did not merely select among a range of options, but instead determined air-based threats were not properly addressed by the DBT rule. As noted above, this decision was within the Commission’s discretion and it need not include an analysis of airbased threats within the EA alternative action section. 9640 PUBLIC CITIZEN v. NRC [11] By only highlighting one potential deficiency in the EA that could impact the environment, petitioners implicitly agree with the Commission’s argument that the rule was otherwise only beneficial to the environment, because it reduced the threat of a terrorist attack. Therefore, we do not address whether the NRC violated this court’s holding in Mothers for Peace, or whether the effects of an air-based attack (rather than the possibility of a terrorist attack) were too speculative to necessitate their inclusion in the EA. See Mothers for Peace, 449 F.3d at 1033-1034. Because Petitioners have identified no effect of the revised DBT rule that “may cause significant degradation of some human environmental factor,” no EIS was necessary. Center for Biological Diversity, 538 F.3d at 1219 (quoting Idaho Sporting Cong. v. Thomas, 137 F.3d 1146, 1149 (9th Cir. 1998)); see also Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A]n EA or an EIS is not necessary for federal actions that conserve the environment.”). PETITION DENIED.