Opinion ID: 1747577
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: alleged pretrial issues

Text: The Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a change of venue. He avers that murder is an atrocious and heinous crime wherever committed, but it is made even more so when a black male defendant allegedly kills a white female in a predominately white community. He alleges that to try him in Hamblen County violates his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury, which is guaranteed to the Defendant by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, Sections 8 and 9, of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee. The decision of whether to change venue rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this decision will not be reversed on appeal absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Melson, 638 S.W.2d 342, 360 (Tenn. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1137, 103 S.Ct. 770, 74 L.Ed.2d 983 (1983). The Defendant has not established such abuse here. The record does not reveal that this case was given extensive media coverage or publicity in Hamblen County. In order to reverse a conviction for improper denial of a motion to change venue, defendant must demonstrate that the jurors who actually sat were biased or prejudiced against him. State v. Burton, 751 S.W.2d 440 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988). Selection of the jury did not reveal extensive prejudice regarding the case. The few prospective jurors who had formed an opinion as to Evans's guilt or innocence were properly excused for cause. Although most of the potential jurors admitted they had heard or read reports of the murder, each actual juror stated unequivocally that he or she had not prejudged the case and would render a verdict based only upon evidence adduced at trial. Because the Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the actual jury was prejudiced, the issue is without merit.
The Defendant next avers that the trial court erred in denying his motion for an investigator paid by the State as permitted under T.C.A. § 40-14-207(b). Particularly, the Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for appointment of an investigator to assist defense counsel in interviewing witnesses listed on the State's witness list. T.C.A. § 40-14-207(b) provides, in part: (b) In capital cases where the defendant has been found to be indigent by the court of record having jurisdiction of the case, such court in an ex parte hearing may in its discretion determine that investigative or expert services or other similar services are necessary to ensure that the constitutional rights of the defendant are properly protected. This statute provides that it is in the trial court's discretion as to whether investigative services are necessary to protect the constitutional rights of the defendant. State v. O'Guinn, 709 S.W.2d 561, 568 (Tenn. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 244, 93 L.Ed.2d 169 (1986). The courts have uniformly held that the right to assistance of state paid experts exists only upon a showing of a particularized need. The defendant must show that a substantial need exists requiring the assistance of state paid supporting services and that his defense cannot be fully developed without such professional assistance. The Defendant did not request such an investigator until six days before the scheduled start of the trial. Moreover, as conveyed to the trial judge, defense counsel had the names of all potential witnesses at least five weeks before trial, and many of the potential witnesses were listed on the indictment returned six months prior to trial. The trial court ruled: Of course I don't want to put any undue hardship on counsel but you have one retained counsel and two appointed counsels ... with three lawyers and the period of time you should be able to talk to all witnesses. I don't find there's such unusual circumstances are ... are showing of need for appointment of an investigator. I ... I certainly in the capital cases especially would appoint any aide or expert that I feel is ... is needed to give fair representation of the defendant. But I don't feel that that's necessary in this case. The Defendant has made no showing that without the assistance of an investigator he was, in fact, unable to adequately interview potential witnesses. This issue is without merit.
The Defendant challenges the venire composition under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and under Article I, Sections 8, 9, and 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. He alleges that the trial court erred by failing to verify that blacks were proportionately represented in the jury venire and by failing to grant his motion to dismiss the indictment based upon that alleged underrepresentation. In order to establish, in the context of jury selection, a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Defendant must show that (1) he is a member of an excluded, recognizably distinct class; (2) the class to which the Defendant belongs has been underrepresented on venires for a significant period of time; and (3) the selection procedure is susceptible to abuse. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1280, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977) (addressing claim of underrepresentation on grand jury). To establish that the venire violates the Sixth Amendment's right to a jury representing a fair cross-section of the community, a defendant must establish that (1) the excluded group is a distinctive group in the community; (2) representation of the group in the jury pool is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of group members in the community; and (3) underrepresentation of the group is due to systematic exclusion in the jury selection process. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364-66, 99 S.Ct. 664, 668-69, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); see also State v. Thompson, 768 S.W.2d 239, 246 (Tenn. 1989), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3288, 111 L.Ed.2d 796 (1990). The Defendant has failed to establish a prima facie case under either the Fourteenth or Sixth Amendment. Evans introduced no evidence concerning the percentage of blacks in Hamblen county, the percentage of blacks on other venires, the potential for abuse of the selection procedure, or the systematic exclusion of blacks in the jury selection process. The record in this case reveals that the jury panel consisted of 77 individuals, four of whom (5.19 percent) were black. Because blacks constitute only 4.77 percent of the total Hamblen County population, the venire actually had a greater representation of black citizens than the county as a whole. Even though none of the four black members of the venire were selected to sit on the Defendant's jury, such a fact does not establish a constitutional violation in this case. Both defense counsel and the prosecution admitted during the hearing on Evans's motion for a new trial that all four black potential jurors were excused by the court either because they could not consider imposition of the death penalty or because they would never convict solely on circumstantial evidence. The percentage of blacks on the venire in this case exceeded the percentage of blacks in the Hamblen County population. Moreover, none of the black individuals on the venire were removed from the panel by the prosecution. Rather, all four were properly excused for cause by the court. Given these facts and the failure of the Defendant to otherwise establish a prima facie violation of either the state or federal constitution in the selection process, the trial court did not err in failing to verify that blacks were proportionately represented on the venire. Furthermore, the trial court did not err in denying Evans's motion to dismiss the indictment based upon the racial composition of the jury.