Opinion ID: 889885
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Parole Board

Text: ¶ 55 Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, could be construed broadly to grant sentencing judges authority over parole eligibility, doing so would undermine the Legislature's delegation of this matter to the parole board. ¶ 56 It would be one thing if parole was not covered elsewhere in the Montana Code Annotated. In that situation, one might argue for an expansive construction of § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA. But the reality is that the Legislature has created a Board of Pardons and Parole, § 2-15-2302, MCA, and has enacted a statutory scheme defining that agency's powers, duties, and responsibilities (Title 46, chapter 23, parts 1, 2, 3, 10, MCA). The Legislature has specifically delegated to the parole board the authority to decide matters relating to parole, § 46-23-104(1), MCA (The board of pardons and parole is responsible for ... parole as provided in this chapter.), and that includes parole eligibility, § 46-23-218(1), MCA (The board may adopt any rules that it considers proper or necessary with respect to the eligibility of prisoners for parole. . . .). ¶ 57 Indeed, the members of the parole boardnot sentencing judgesare charged with determining whether, when, and under what conditions an offender is eligible for parole. Parole is defined as the release to the community of a prisoner by the decision of the board prior to the expiration of the prisoner's term. Section 46-23-1001(3), MCA (emphasis added). Release on non-medical parole is authorized when the board believes that the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations of a law-abiding citizen and when in its opinion [i.e., the board's opinion] there is reasonable probability that the prisoner can be released without detriment to the prisoner or to the community. Section 46-23-201(1), (5), MCA (emphases added). There are express limitations on the board's discretion to grant parole. See § 46-23-201(2)-(4), MCA. [4] But one, and only one, of those limitations may be imposed by a sentencing judgenamely, that the offender is outright ineligible for parole while serving the term of imprisonment. Section 46-23-201(2), MCA (cross-referencing § 46-18-202(2), MCA). The decision to grant nonmedical parole is otherwise left entirely to the parole board's discretion. ¶ 58 Similarly, [t]he board is authorized to release on medical parole a prisoner who has a qualifying medical condition, who is not under a sentence of death or life imprisonment without possibility of release, and who is unlikely to pose a detriment to himself or herself, the victim, or the community. Section 46-23-210(1), MCA. As with nonmedical parole, the statute governing medical parole recognizes one, and only one, situation where a sentencing judge may interfere with the board's otherwise exclusive decision-making power: where the sentencing judge designates the offender totally ineligible for parole under § 46-18-202(2), MCA. In that situation, the prisoner must obtain approval of the sentencing judge before being eligible for medical parole. Section 46-23-210(2), MCA. But the statute does not reference or even contemplate the possibility of there being any other restrictions placed on parole eligibility by a sentencing judge. Aside from the one restriction authorized by § 46-18-202(2), MCA, the determination whether a prisoner is eligible for medical parole is entirely within the parole board's discretion. ¶ 59 In creating the Board of Pardons and Parole and making that agency responsible for ... parole (§ 46-23-104(1), MCA), including the eligibility of prisoners for parole (§ 46-23-218(1), MCA), it is clear that the Legislature intended for parole matters to be handled and decided by the board, not sentencing judges. Significantly, there is no provision in any of the sentencing statutes (Title 46, chapter 18, MCA) explicitly granting sentencing judges a general authority to impose conditions on parole or parole eligibility. Rather, the Legislature has been quite specific about the few instances in which a judge may intrude upon parole matters. ¶ 60 For example, a judge sentencing a sexual or violent offender shall, as a condition to probation, parole, or deferment or suspension of sentence, impose upon the defendant reasonable employment or occupational prohibitions and restrictions designed to protect the class or classes of persons containing the likely victims of further offenses by the defendant. Section 46-18-255(1), MCA (emphasis added). When sentencing a Level 3 sexual offender, the judge also shall, as a condition of probation, parole, conditional release, or deferment or suspension of sentence, require the offender to participate in the program for the continuous satellite-based monitoring of sexual offenders. Section 46-18-206, MCA (emphasis added). If a victim has sustained pecuniary loss, the judge shall, as part of the sentence, require [the] offender to make full restitution, which is to be a condition of any probation or parole. Section 46-18-241(1), MCA (emphasis added). And when an offender is sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, the judge may also impose the restriction that the offender is ineligible for parole . . . while serving that term. Section 46-18-202(2), MCA. As this last statute demonstrates, the Legislature knows how to grant a sentencing judge authority to impose restrictions relating to parole eligibility. It simply says soexpressly. ¶ 61 So, to summarize, the Legislature created the Board of Pardons and Parole. The Legislature granted that agency authority over parole. And the Legislature provided for a very few specific and explicit exceptions where a sentencing judge may intrude upon the parole board's otherwise exclusive authority over parole matters. In these circumstances, it would be absurd to conclude that the Legislature intended § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, to be construed as a broad grant of authority to sentencing judges to decide the conditions under which a prisoner will be eligible for parole. We rejected the notion of overlapping authority in Burch, ¶¶ 21, 29; and such an approach would, in any event, undermine the Legislature's clear mandate that parole decisions be made by the parole board, not sentencing judges. It would likewise undermine the Governor's constitutional power to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons by allowing sentencing judges to impose conditions on an offender's eligibility for executive clemencyeven though that too is a matter expressly delegated to the board and the Governor, not judges. See Mont. Const. art. VI, § 12 (The governor may grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, restore citizenship, and suspend and remit fines and forfeitures subject to procedures provided by law.); § 46-23-104(1), MCA (The board of pardons and parole is responsible for executive clemency and parole as provided in this chapter.). ¶ 62 In the construction of a statute, the intention of the legislature is to be pursued if possible. Section 1-2-102, MCA. We interpret a statute to give effect to its purpose and to avoid absurd results. In re Marriage of McMichael, 2006 MT 237, ¶ 14, 333 Mont. 517, 143 P.3d 439. But the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained [in the statute], not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. Finally, a specific legislative directive controls over a general legislative directive to the extent of any inconsistency between the two. Section 1-2-102, MCA; Mosley v. Am. Express Fin. Advisors, Inc., 2010 MT 78, ¶ 20, 356 Mont. 27, 230 P.3d 479. ¶ 63 Here, §§ 46-18-201(3)(a)(iii) and -202(1)(f), MCA, read together, are a general grant of authority to sentencing judges to impose on an offender's term of incarceration any restrictions or conditions that the judge considers necessary to obtain the objectives of rehabilitation and the protection of the victim and society. However, this authority is necessarily circumscribed by the Legislature's specific directive that parole matters are to be decided by the parole board. That specific intent is reflected in the Legislature's allocation of responsibility for parole to the parole board and by the fact that the Legislature has provided for only a few limited situations in which a sentencing judge may impose restrictions or conditions relating to parole. In essence, the Legislature took the pie represented by § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, carved out the piece relating to parole, and handed all but a few morsels of it to the parole board. ¶ 64 Under the statutory scheme, a sentencing judge has express authority to say that an inmate will never be parole eligible. Section 46-18-202(2), MCA. But that is the extent of the judge's authority. If the judge does not impose that restriction, then the decision as to whether, when, and under what conditions an inmate becomes eligible for parole is exclusively the prerogative of the parole board. Thus, when a sentencing judge imposes conditions on parole eligibility, she or he is interfering with the authority and discretion that the Legislature specifically delegated to the parole board. Indeed, the judge effectively deprives the parole board of its ability to exercise its legislatively conferred powers until the judge's imposed conditions are met. ¶ 65 In sum, a construction of § 46-18-202(1)(f), MCA, as granting sentencing judges authority to decide when a prisoner will be eligible for parole would be contrary to the statutory scheme, counter to the Legislature's intent, and violative of our canons of statutory construction. The exercise of that power is plainly with the board, not judges.