Opinion ID: 2454387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Pre-Trial Ineffective Assistance

Text: Storey asserts that the motion court erred in denying post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. To prove ineffective assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care, and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney, and that the defendant was thereby prejudiced. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Wise, 879 S.W.2d 494, 524 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied,  U.S.___, 115 S.Ct. 757, 130 L.Ed.2d 656 (1995). To prove prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 468 (Mo. banc 1993), cert. denied,  U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 118, 130 L.Ed.2d 64 (1994). Trial strategy is not a ground for ineffective assistance. Id. The motion court found that trial counsel was not ineffective, so review is to determine if the motion court clearly erred. Rule 29.15(j); Wise, 879 S.W.2d at 524. Findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous only if, after a review of the entire record, the appellate court is left with the definite impression that a mistake has been made. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d at 468-69.
Storey contends that trial counsel should have moved to strike jurors Duly and Doerrer. Duly, after the prosecutor asked if any of the venire were crime victims, approached the bench and said: I was involved in a child molestation case involving me as a young girl, so I feel very prejudiced against any sexual-related things. I just have a lot of past, you know, memories from anything like that, so when rape is involved or any sexual assault, I tend not to be fair. The prosecutor conceded there might be some sexual assault evidence. The court then questioned Duly: THE COURT: If you think that anything comes out, you think that would prejudice you? DULY: I would just tend toit just depends. It's hard to say, but I just tend to have really bad feelings in that area. THE COURT: Okay. You understand that each case is on its own DULY: Yes, sir, I do. THE COURT: and is guided by its own evidence? DULY: Yes, sir, I do. THE COURT: And you should be guided by the evidence that's presented in this case from the witness stand and exhibits DULY: Yes, sir, I do understand that. THE COURT: and follow the Court's instructions, and you thinkyou think you could do that? DULY: I think I could give a fairI've accepted it and, yes, I do think that. I just want it to be known. THE COURT: Fair to the Defendant and fair to the State? DULY: Yes, sir On this record, trial counsel was not ineffective for not moving to excuse Duly. The critical question in a bias challenge is whether the venireperson unequivocally indicated an ability to evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially. State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 919 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1827, 131 L.Ed.2d 748 (1995). Duly did. Since there was no legal basis to excuse Duly for cause, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to seek removal. See Antwine v. State, 791 S.W.2d 403, 411 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055, 111 S.Ct. 769, 112 L.Ed.2d 789 (1991). Juror Doerrer said her brother was murdered four years earlier, but indicated that the incident would not impair her ability to be fair and impartial and that she could put the incident aside and be fair to both sides. Doerrer thus unequivocally showed she could evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially. There was no basis to move to excuse her, and no ineffective assistance in not doing so. Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 919; Antwine, 791 S.W.2d at 411.
Storey argues counsel was ineffective for failing to move for a change of venue and for conducting insufficient voir dire on pretrial publicity issues. During voir dire, the trial judge noted the publicity the case had received, identified the site of the crime, then asked if anyone had personal knowledge of the incident from media, friends, or law enforcement officers. Eight venirepersons said yes; all were questioned by the judge at the bench (with counsel present). Five of the eight were excused for cause. Three said they had not prejudged the case, could put aside their knowledge, and could be fair. Two of those ultimately served on the jury. Exposure to pretrial publicity is not inherently prejudicial, and a juror who can set aside an opinion previously formed may serve. State v. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d 392, 402 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1047, 108 S.Ct. 786, 98 L.Ed.2d 871 (1988). Whether a venireperson is biased is often a question of demeanor for the trial judge. Id. at 403. On the record here, trial counsel was not ineffective in handling publicity issues. First, there is no merit to the claim that trial counsel should have sought additional voir dire. Control of voir dire is within the discretion of the trial judge; only abuse of discretion and likely injury justify reversal. State v. Bannister, 680 S.W.2d 141, 145 (Mo. banc 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1009, 105 S.Ct. 1879, 85 L.Ed.2d 170 (1985). Contrary to Storey's assertion in his brief that the only information about [venirepersons'] exposure to publicity came from Judge Dalton's one question, the trial judge extensively questioned those who knew about the case. The trial court complied with constitutional standards by retaining only those venirepersons who unequivocally stated that they had not prejudged the case and could be fair and impartial. State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 919 (Mo. banc 1994), cert. denied, ___U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1827, 131 L.Ed.2d 748 (1995). This voir dire was no abuse of discretion, and trial counsel was not ineffective in choosing not to request more. Second, counsel was not ineffective for opting not to seek change of venue. In Schneider, this Court upheld denial of a change-of-venue motion in a death-penalty case where less than half the venire had heard of the case; those who had were individually questioned; those who could not be fair were excused; and two jurors served who had heard of the case but could put aside any previous impression and evaluate the case fairly. Schneider, 736 S.W.2d at 403. Those facts are virtually identical to these facts. Point denied.