Opinion ID: 557354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendant's post-arrest statements

Text: 20 Crucial evidence for Gomez's conviction of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in violation of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 841 arose out of his statement to the police after his arrest. Initially Gomez was taken to the office of the DEA, informed of his Miranda rights, and asked if he wished to cooperate with the investigation. He indicated that he wished to speak with his attorney. Agent Henley testified at trial that after Gomez requested counsel Henley told Gomez that he was in serious trouble but that the agents understood that Gomez was a minor player and that they were really after other people in the conspiracy. He then told Gomez that he need not say anything now, but that he might want to discuss with his attorney the possibility of cooperating. Cooperating would be good for Gomez, Henley stated, because he faced a possible life sentence and a minimum of ten years, and that the only chance he had to reduce the sentence was through cooperation with the government. Gomez then left the room, asked agent Hastings what he was charged with, received the incorrect information that he had possessed ten kilos, and immediately expressed his desire to cooperate. The time between Henley's statements and Gomez's cooperation was no more than a few minutes, according to agent Henley. Gomez was again informed of his Miranda rights and proceeded to admit that he had gone to Tampa to pick up cocaine and not cash, although he at that time stated that someone named Papi had sent him. 21 Appellant argues that the DEA agents did not properly respect his request for counsel, and that the district court should have granted his motion to suppress. He insists that once he asserted his desire to see an attorney the agents should not have impressed upon him the severity of the possible sentence or the advantages of cooperating, and that agent Hastings' incorrect statement that ten kilos were involved, rather than the actual six, impermissibly elicited Gomez's desire to make a statement. In essence, Gomez contends that the agents' statements after he asserted his right to counsel amounted to further interrogation in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). 22 Edwards established the principle that once an accused has invoked his right to counsel 23 a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. ... [A]n accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. 24 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (footnote omitted). Gomez contends that the agents' discussion of possible sentences constituted further interrogation after he requested counsel. He also presents a related question of whether the agents' statements, combined with agent Hastings' mention of the incorrect amount of cocaine, 6 could constitute an impermissible badgering [of] a defendant into waiving his previously asserted rights which Edwards sought to prevent. Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 1180, 108 L.Ed.2d 293 (1990); Minnick v. Mississippi, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 486, 489, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990). 25 In United States v. Johnson, 812 F.2d 1329 (11th Cir.1986), we considered a similar incident in which, after the accused requested counsel, the officers asked him if he wanted the justice system explained and proceeded to inform him about federal hearings, bond, and appointment of counsel. After this explanation the accused made an incriminating statement. This court reversed the conviction because the question and discussion following the counsel request violated the bright-line rule that interrogation must end upon invocation of the right to counsel. Id. at 1331. We have also stated, however, that where the accused initiates a conversation after a request for counsel, an officer's explanation of the investigation and the possibility of cooperation did not violate Edwards. United States v. Valdez, 880 F.2d 1230, 1233-34 (11th Cir.1989). In that case the accused requested counsel upon arrest. Hours later, as he was being driven to jail, he asked the officers where he was going. The officers told him and proceeded to explain the justice system and to mention that he might want to cooperate. 26 The government naturally argues that Gomez's initiation of the conversation with Hastings on the way to his cell constituted a waiver under Edwards and Valdez. Unlike Valdez, however, the agents here continued to talk to Gomez after he requested counsel, stressing the importance of cooperating. In addition, Gomez's initiation of a conversation with Henley occurred almost immediately after the interrogation, not several hours later. The government responds that they did not ask Gomez any questions after he requested counsel but only made statements about sentencing. Johnson, it contends, relied on the fact that the agents questioned the accused. Absent such questioning, the government insists, there was no further interrogation and Gomez's question to Henley constituted waiver by initiation under Edwards. 27 Neither our circuit nor the Supreme Court has created an artificial distinction between questioning and statements. The issue under Edwards is whether the police engaged in further interrogation, not questioning. Indeed, prior to Edwards the Supreme Court established that Miranda and its progeny focus on the interrogation environment and not simply questioning. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 298-99, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1688-89, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The Court noted in Innis that many techniques of persuasion which are not questioning fell under the interrogation rubric, including conversations between police officers in the presence of the accused. 7 Interrogation thus means any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Innis, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90 (footnotes omitted). The Court defined incriminating response as any response--whether inculpatory or exculpatory--that the prosecution may seek to introduce at trial, id. at 1690 n. 5 (emphasis original), and the Court stressed that to limit the definition of interrogation to questioning would place a premium on the ingenuity of the police to devise methods of indirect interrogation, id. at 1689 n. 3 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 445 Pa. 292, 297, 285 A.2d 172, 175 (1971)). 28 This review helps crystallize the issue before us: whether the agents should have known that agent Henley's statements to Gomez regarding possible sentencing and the benefits of cooperation were reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response. In light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Innis and our holding in Johnson, these statements clearly constituted further interrogation. As we stated in Johnson, explanations of possible sentences and of the criminal justice system, though seemingly innocent, are 29 often designed to inform the accused that cooperation may be beneficial when a judicial officer considers such matters at bail. This type of helpfulness is often used to indicate to the accused that the law enforcement officers will be good if the accused will be good, or infer Why don't you be good and tell us about it? 30 No interest would be served by attempting to list matters that may or may not be discussed by law enforcement officers with an accused in custody after the accused has indicated that a lawyer is desired before further interrogation. It best serves all interests, especially law enforcement, to remain close to the bright line: interrogation must cease when the accused in custody requests the presence of a lawyer before further interrogation. 31 Johnson, 812 F.2d at 1331. The mere fact that agent Henley told Gomez that he need not respond does not alleviate his duty to cease interrogation; that would place the officer's artifice in interrogation over our concern with the interrogatory environment. Once Gomez requested an attorney, agent Henley should have respected that request. Any information he had regarding cooperation and sentencing could be addressed to the attorney. Indeed, the attorney would likely request it himself. An officer should know that he can tell the attorney any information regarding sentencing, and that emphasizing to the accused the possible harsh sentences and the benefits of cooperation will likely be interpreted by the accused as pressure to respond and come clean. This is precisely the type of psychological ploy Innis and Miranda sought to prevent. Innis, 100 S.Ct. at 1689; Miranda, 86 S.Ct. at 1615. 32 Nor does Valdez salvage this situation. In that case the defendant initiated further conversation prior to the officer's discussion of cooperation. 880 F.2d at 1234. In addition, the court in Valdez admitted that the issue was close, and observed that even were the interrogation impermissible, the error was harmless in light of other evidence at trial. Id. Finally, to the extent that the government reads Valdez to require questioning by the officer in order for there to be interrogation, Innis clearly rejects such formalism. 33 The fact that Gomez began the conversation with agent Hastings does not cure the infection of the further interrogation. Although Edwards permits further interrogation if the accused initiates the conversation, Edwards, 101 S.Ct. at 1885, the validity of this waiver logically depends on the accused being free from further interrogation. In other words, the initiation must come prior to the further interrogation; initiation only becomes an issue if the agents follow Edwards and cease interrogation upon a request for counsel. Once the agents have, as here, violated Edwards, no claim that the accused initiated more conversation will be heard. 8 Indeed, Edwards would be rendered meaningless if agents were permitted to continue interrogation after the request for counsel, and then claim that the consequent response by the accused represented initiation and permitted a waiver of the asserted counsel right. 9 34 The law in this area is clear: once an accused requests counsel, the officer cannot ask questions, discuss the case, or present the accused with possible sentences and the benefits of cooperation. Innis, 100 S.Ct. at 1689; Johnson, 812 F.2d at 1331. Any information or discussion regarding the case should be addressed to the accused's attorney. Only if the accused, after requesting counsel, voluntarily initiates further communication can the agents pursue more information and interrogation. Edwards, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. Agent Henley's statements constituted further interrogation and occurred immediately prior to Gomez's request to cooperate, rendering suspect the voluntariness of Gomez's initiation of the conversation and his desire to cooperate. The subsequent inculpatory statements by Gomez were therefore inadmissible at trial. 35 As we stated at the outset, the inculpatory remarks made by Gomez were crucial to the prosecution's case. His defense at trial was that he did not know that he was to pick up cocaine; his statement to the DEA asserted the opposite. Such an error cannot be considered harmless unless, absent the so-determined unconstitutional effect, the evidence remains not only sufficient to support the verdict but so overwhelming as to establish guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 540 (11th Cir.1988). Although the government had other evidence to support its case, including the testimony of Jorge Restrepo and the evidence from the arrest, it is quite possible that the jury's evaluation of this other evidence could have been heavily affected by its awareness of the inadmissible statements. The other evidence was not so overwhelming that it rendered harmless the admission of the coerced statements. At a new trial the government will have an opportunity to present its evidence without the pall of an unconstitutionally obtained statement.