Opinion ID: 1387132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Higa propositions

Text: In Higa, supra, the defendant (Higa) appealed his DUI conviction and sentence, inter alia, on the ground that his prior administrative license revocation proceeding barred a subsequent criminal prosecution under the principles of double jeopardy. 79 Hawai`i at 2-3, 897 P.2d at 929-30. Unlike the present matter, Higa's ADLRO proceeding culminated in his license revocation being reversed on the ground that Higa had requested, but had not been given, a blood alcohol test, with the result that there had been insufficient evidence to sustain the initial revocation. Id. at 3 & n. 2, 897 P.2d at 930 & n. 2. See HRS §§ 286-259(e) and (i) (1993). Thus, Higa argued that, inasmuch as his administrative hearing before the ADLRO had ended in his favor, any subsequent criminal prosecution for DUI was constitutionally barred. We disagreed and affirmed Higa's DUI conviction, pursuant to the following analysis: Double jeopardy protects individuals against: (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Lessary, 75 Haw. 446, 454, 865 P.2d 150, 154 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 1897, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989). Here Higa asserts that the first and third protections of double jeopardy have been violated. With respect to the first protection, Higa seemingly argues that, because the ADLRO proceeding ended in his favor, he should not be forced to undergo a second prosecution for the same offense. In other words, Higa implicitly equates ended in his favor with an acquittal, thus implicating the first protection enunciated in Lessary and Halper. However, because we conclude in the following discussion that the ADLRO proceeding does not bar a subsequent criminal prosecution, whether the ADLRO proceeding ended in his favor or resulted in an acquittal is immaterial. We therefore turn to the issue regarding multiple punishments for the same offense. Higa argues that he is being exposed to multiple punishments for the same offense, and that, by permitting the government two chances to revoke his driving privileges via a civil administrative proceeding and a subsequent criminal prosecution, both the letter and the spirit of the protection that the double jeopardy clause was designed to ensure is violated. . . . . Both Higa and the prosecution rely on Halper to bolster their respective positions. We have previously had occasion to examine Halper in Loui v. Board of Medical Examiners, 78 Hawai`i 21, 889 P.2d 705 (1995).... In examining the question of double jeopardy, we stated: we view the Halper decision as applying mainly to prevent instances where the government seeks to extract monetary damages entirely unrelated to the goal of making the government whole in a civil proceeding from an individual who has already been punished in a criminal proceeding. In the instant case, we are not analyzing the constitutionality of any monetary sanction designed to compensate the government for losses it sustained as a result of Loui's criminal actions. We are only looking at the ... suspension of Loui's license to practice medicine. Thus, the Halper test, which requires a comparison between the civil penalty and the government's loss resulting from the defendant's conduct does not apply to the facts of this case. Instead, we must look more broadly at the principles enunciated in Halper to determine whether the ... revocation of Loui's license to practice medicine constitutes a second punishment for purposes of double jeopardy. Loui, 78 Hawai`i at 27, 889 P.2d at 711 (citation omitted). As in Loui, Halper does not apply to the present case because we are not analyzing the constitutionality of any monetary sanctions designed to compensate the government for losses it sustained as a result of [the defendant's] criminal actions. Loui, 78 Hawai`i at 27, 889 P.2d at 711. Therefore, we must examine, as we did in Loui, the broader principles enunciated in Halper to determine whether the civil penalty sought in an ADLRO proceeding constitutes a second punishment violative of double jeopardy. See Halper, 490 U.S. at 448, 109 S.Ct. at 1901, (punishment serves the twin aims of retribution and deterrence). Revocation of an individual's driver's license appears to have a two-fold purpose. First, the procedure protects the public interest by removing potentially threatening drivers from our state's roadways; and, second, between the time offending drivers are cited and their criminal adjudication, the procedure precludes such drivers from continuing to drive. See Kernan [v. Tanaka ], 75 Haw. [1,] 29, 856 P.2d [1207,] 1221, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1070, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994) (In DUI cases, public safety is the main governmental concern.) As the legislature itself has stated: the main benefit of administrative revocation is that it allows the State to remove a drunk driver's license before the culmination of a lengthy prosecution under the criminal statute. Currently, a person charged with driving under the influence must be allowed to continue driving until he or she is found guilty in a court of law. This process takes an average of seven or eight months in Hawai`i, and even longer, and while this process is going on, the dangerous driver, who quite likely is an inveterate repeat offender, remains on the road. Hse.Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 137, in 1990 House Journal at 824[]; Sen. Conf.Comm.Rep. No. 137, in 1990 Senate Journal at 825. Although license revocation may, from Higa's point of view, carry the sting of punishment, Loui 78 Hawai`i at 27, 889 P.2d at 711 (citation omitted), as stated by the Supreme Court in Halper, whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant's perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry `the sting of punishment.' Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. ___, ___ n. 14, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 1945 n. 14, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (citations omitted). Rather, we must examine the purpose actually served by the sanction in question[.] Loui, 78 Hawai`i at 27, 889 P.2d at 711 (citation omitted). The vast majority of cases from other jurisdictions have held that the purpose of the administrative revocation process is not to punish those in Higa's position; it is to safeguard the public and reduce traffic fatalities caused by those driving while under the influence of alcohol. . . . . Based on the foregoing, we hold that Hawa`i's ADLRO proceedings serve legitimate, nonpunitive, and purely remedial functions, and, therefore, the administrative license revocation proceeding based on DUI did not bar Higa's subsequent criminal prosecution on the grounds of double jeopardy principles. Higa, 79 Hawai`i at 5-7, 897 P.2d at 932-34 (footnotes omitted) (some brackets in original). Unlike Higa, Toyomura implicitly claims only the third double jeopardy protection enumerated in Lessary and Halper, namely, the protection against multiple punishments for the same offense. [12] But, as in Higa, Toyomura can derive no benefit from the Halper decision. First, the purely potential [13] costs of substance abuse assessment and treatment that Toyomura may face by virtue of his administrative license revocation, see supra note 11, in no way entail any monetary sanctions designed to compensate the government for losses it sustained as a result of [his] criminal actions. Higa, 79 Hawai`i at 6, 897 P.2d at 933; Loui, 78 Hawai`i at 27, 889 P.2d at 711. Second, the Administrative Revocation Program, including the ADLRO hearing mechanism, is not punitive by its very nature, but rather serve[s] [the] legitimate, nonpunitive, and purely remedial functions of safeguard[ing] the public and reduc[ing] traffic fatalities caused by those driving while under the influence of alcohol. Higa, 79 Hawai`i at 6-7, 897 P.2d at 933-34. [14] And therefore, third, Toyomura's subjective perception of the punitive character of the Administrative Revocation Program is immaterial, inasmuch as even remedial sanctions carry `the sting of punishment.' Id. at 6, 897 P.2d at 933; Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at ___ n. 14, 114 S.Ct. at 1945 n. 14.