Opinion ID: 775760
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Scope of the Agreement and Reasonable Foreseeability

Text: 114 Under the relevant conduct principles of subsection 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), all reasonably foreseeable acts . . . of others in furtherance of [a] conspiracy may be taken into account to determine a defendant's sentence. Molina, 106 F.3d at 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the district court must make two particularized findings. First, it must determine the scope of the criminal activity agreed upon by the defendant. Studley, 47 F.3d at 574. Second - and only if it finds that the scope of the activity to which the defendant agreed was sufficiently broad to include the conduct in question -- the court must make a particularized finding as to whether the activity was foreseeable to the defendant. Id. In Studley, we identified several principles and factors relevant to determining the scope of jointly undertaken criminal activity. Mere knowledge of another participant's criminal acts or of the scope of the overall operation will not make a defendant criminally responsible for his co-defendants' acts. Id. at 575. Also, it is more likely that an activity has been jointly undertaken if the participants pool their profits and resources and do not work independently. Id. Another sign of a joint undertaking is the defendant['s] assistance in designing and executing the illegal scheme. Id. 115 The government agrees that the district court may not have made sufficiently particularized findings on the scope of the individual defendants' agreements and consents to a remand for this purpose but argues that the scope of each defendant's agreement was broad enough to cover Riddick's murder. To support its argument, the government relies principally on the assistance that coalition members rendered each other and Johnson and McCall's roles as supervisors of Mulder. 116 There is evidence in the record that both McCall and Johnson entered into a joint agreement with Mulder to eliminate Callie Harris' gang as a threat at HHM's Queens work site. A recording demonstrates that Mulder informed Johnson of his intent to kill someone at that site. And, the court could choose to believe Mulder's testimony that Johnson's later attempt to disassociate himself from any such plan was a sham. Mulder also testified that he viewed McCall as his supervisor, that McCall frequently visited the site, that McCall introduced him to Harvey Lyons as the new coordinator of the Queens site, and that Mulder told McCall about his problem with Callie Harris' coalition. From Johnson's and McCall's conversations with Mulder, the district court reasonably could find that they jointly planned methods to take control of the Queens site, albeit not specifically the murder of Riddick. Because a reasonable fact finder could find, but would not be required to find, that McCall and Johnson entered into a joint agreement with Mulder to maintain control of the Queens work site, we vacate their sentences and remand to allow the district court to make particularized findings with respect to each on the scope of their agreement. 117 We find no evidence, direct or circumstantial, that Hunter's agreement with other BFB members extended to the Queens work site. Therefore, we vacate Hunter's sentence and remand for resentencing at an offense level that does not take into account Riddick's murder. 118 The only evidence that associates Carnes with the Queens site is his promise to Mulder to check with members of BFB to see whether Mulder would be acceptable as the site's coordinator and his attendance at meetings with Mulder that members of Harris' coalition also attended. As a matter of law, this conduct is not sufficient to indicate that Carnes agreed to help control the Queens work site. See Studley, 47 F.3d at 576. Therefore, we vacate Carnes' sentence and remand for resentencing without consideration of Riddick's murder. 119 If the district court finds on remand that the scope of Johnson's or McCall's agreement was broad enough to encompass Riddick's killing, that defendant or those defendants will have the burden of demonstrating Mulder's conduct was not foreseeable to them. United States v. Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d 662, 677 (2d Cir. 1998). Because we are remanding, we add that the district court's original basis for finding foreseeability - the use of violence by coalition members in other circumstances - was inadequate. Our cases contemplate a closer link. See United States v. Franklyn, 157 F.3d 90, 98 (2d Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's conclusion that co-defendant's possession of a machine gun was foreseeable to sentenced defendant where he carried the ammunition for the gun in question); Martinez-Rios, 143 F.3d at 674-78 (upholding scheme's mastermind's responsibility for a substantial portion of his co-conspirators' tax losses where he had direct personal involvement in the evasion of taxes by [his co-defendants] and also upholding less culpable defendants' offense level reflecting co-defendants' losses because they shared specific tax evasion mechanisms and pooled resources) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Medina, 74 F.3d 413, 417 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding relevant conduct adjustment for use of firearms where defendant knew co-conspirator intended to carry a gun and defendant masterminded the robbery); United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 743 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant's involvement in cocaine transaction was not sufficient to hold him liable for proposed heroin transaction where only evidence was co-conspirator's alleged ambiguous statement to government agent indicating that defendant also would be the buyer in the heroin transaction and even this statement was contradicted by other portions of agent's testimony). On remand, the district court may not find that Riddick's murder was foreseeable to McCall or Johnson solely because BFB members committed other violent acts.