Opinion ID: 1124319
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the particularity approach

Text: As noted above, police generally are excused from following the knock-and-announce rule where the destruction of evidence is imminent  a circumstance arising often in drug cases. The State in the present case urges us to expand this exception to embrace the blanket approach adopted by the district courts in Armenteros v. State, 554 So.2d 574 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1989), and State v. Bell, 564 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990), which excuses forcible entry any time a small quantity of drugs is believed to be present in a residence with standard plumbing  regardless of immediacy of destruction. This approach, however, has been rejected by an increasing number of courts in favor of the position articulated by Chief Justice Traynor in People v. Gastelo, 67 Cal.2d 586, 63 Cal. Rptr. 10, 432 P.2d 706 (1967): The Attorney General contends that unannounced forcible entry to execute a search warrant is always reasonable in narcotics cases, on the ground that narcotics violators normally are on the alert to destroy the easily disposable evidence quickly at the first sign of an officer's presence. We do not agree with this contention. Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has held that unannounced forcible entries may be authorized by a blanket rule based on the type of crime or evidence involved... . ... . ... [W]e have excused compliance with the statute in accordance with established common law exceptions to the notice and demand requirements on the basis of the specific facts involved. No such basis exists for nullifying the statute in all narcotics cases, and, by logical extension, in all other cases involving easily disposable evidence. The statute does not contain the seeds of such far-reaching self-destruction. Under the Fourth Amendment, a specific showing must always be made to justify any kind of police action tending to disturb the security of the people in their homes. Unannounced forcible entry is in itself a serious disturbance of that security and cannot be justified on a blanket basis. Otherwise the constitutional test of reasonableness would turn only on practical expediency, and the amendment's primary safeguard  the requirement of particularity  would be lost. Just as the police must have sufficiently particular reason to enter at all, so must they have some particular reason to enter in the manner chosen. Id. 63 Cal. Rptr. at 12, 432 P.2d at 708. See also Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.8(c) (2d ed. 1987). This particularity approach, which requires more than mere possession of drugs within a residence, is consistent with both the plurality and dissenters in Ker, wherein the Court ruled that the officers' unannounced entry was justified under the particular circumstances of this case. Ker, 374 U.S. at 40, 83 S.Ct. at 1634. Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal eschewed the particularity approach in favor of the blanket approach in the key case of State v. Clarke, 242 So.2d 791 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), cert. denied, 246 So.2d 112 (Fla. 1971). There, the district court used a two-step analysis. First, it expanded the four Benefield exceptions noted above to include a fifth, the so-called Clarke exception: The knock-and-announce rule may be dispensed with in situations not just where evidence is being destroyed but where officers reasonably believe it would be destroyed. Second, the court adopted the blanket approach for assessing the reasonableness of the officers' belief: Time and experience have shown us that the small amounts of drugs usually involved in drug law violations may be easily flushed down a toilet or other drain, and that this is frequently done... . Suspects have no constitutional right to destroy or dispose of evidence, and no basic constitutional guaranties are violated because an officer succeeds in getting to a place where he is entitled to be more quickly than he would had he complied with the statute. Where, as here, the evidence sought consists of relatively small amounts of contraband, and where a nearby bathroom or kitchen provides for easy disposal, it is not unreasonable for the officers to conclude that an attempt will be made to dispose of the evidence if they announce their presence to those inside the room and thus frustrate the purpose of the arrest and seizure. Unannounced entry under such circumstances is lawful and does not violate the constitutional rights of any person. Id. at 795. The Florida Supreme Court recognized the Clarke exception, but declined to apply the blanket approach, favoring instead a particularity approach requiring a showing of reasonable grounds for believing that evidence would be immediately destroyed: An appellate court is not justified in concluding there was such an exception as a matter of law when the record is devoid of any testimony by police officers or other competent evidence showing they had reason to fear at time of entry the destruction of evidence... . Essential to such proof in this case is testimony by the arresting officers or other competent evidence that they had reasonable grounds to believe the marijuana within the house would be immediately destroyed if they announced their presence. Absent such evidence, the fruits of any search conducted pursuant to such arrest must be considered illegally obtained. Earman v. State, 265 So.2d 695, 697 (1972). See also State v. Kelly, 287 So.2d 13, 17 (Fla. 1973) ( Clarke exception endorsed and case remanded so trial court could make particularized finding as to whether there existed good reason to fear at time of entry the destruction of evidence.). We reaffirm our conclusion in Earman that police may engage in a no-knock search of a residence where officers have reasonable grounds to believe the [contraband] within the house would be immediately destroyed if they announced their presence. Earman, 265 So.2d at 697. We find the particularity approach applied by this Court in Earman and Kelly and adopted by a majority of courts preferable to Clarke 's blanket approach for assessing the reasonableness of an officer's belief. Accordingly, we hold that an officer's belief in the immediate destruction of evidence must be based on particular circumstances existing at the time of entry and must be grounded on something more than his or her generalized knowledge as a police officer and the presence of a small quantity of disposable contraband in a home with standard plumbing. In short, forcible entry is lawful only under exceptional circumstances, where no reasonable alternative is available.