Opinion ID: 1689141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the admission of evidence of whitten's alleged statement containing the word nigger, and denying whitten's motion for a new trial.

Text: ¶ 26. A motion for a new trial falls within a lower standard of review than does that of a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a directed verdict. A motion for a new trial simply challenges the weight of the evidence. `The Supreme Court will reverse the lower court's denial of a motion for a new trial only if, by doing so, the court abused its discretion.' `We will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice.' Sheffield v. State, 749 So.2d 123, 127 (Miss.1999) (citations omitted). ¶ 27. The standard of review regarding admission [or exclusion] of evidence is abuse of discretion. Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court `will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party.' Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113 (Miss.1999) (citations omitted). ¶ 28. Prior to voir dire, Whitten made a motion in limine requesting that the trial court exclude any comment and evidence as to the contention that Whitten said at some point during the detention of the plaintiffs, that nigger judge in Sumner will not be able to help you. Whitten argued first that the statement was not relevant and second that its probative value would be substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Whitten also informed the trial court that he denied ever making such a statement. Whitten stated that he had no objection to the plaintiffs testifying to their recollection of the statement, but without using that highly inflammatory word before the jury. Whitten claimed that the injection of the word nigger into the trial would corrupt the jury. The trial court denied the motion in limine, finding that the alleged statement was relevant under M.R.E. 401, and that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under M.R.E. 403. Specifically, the trial judge found as follows: THE COURT: Well, this is certainly a troubling evidentiary matter but I just have to go with my gut feeling on it. And considering the law and the evidence, knowing it's discretionary, subject to abuse of discretion on appeal when the Supreme Court looks at it, but I really believe it's admissible. I think it's relevant. I think the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. I recognize that certainly there will be blacks on the jury, but all things considered, I think the jury is entitled to hear the entire events as far as what took place supposedly. I know that statement evidently is denied by the defendant Whitten but I think the jury is entitled to hear all the evidence as to what happened out there and make a decision. So considering Rule 401, it is relevant. Under 403 the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. ¶ 29. The first mention of the word nigger was during direct examination of Cox, where the following discourse took place between Cox and his attorney: Q. Just tell the jury your conversation between you and John Whitten A. Okay, John Whitten saidOkay, he said that I could go ahead and pursue a legal matter for this. He said you can even put it in front of that nigger judge right there in Sumner  Q. Those were his words? A. That was his words, not mine. But wouldn't nothing happen to him but be damn sure something would come of it, that I wouldn't get anything or anything good would come of it. ¶ 30. On cross-examination, Spinosa testified as follows regarding what Whitten said: [I]f you decide you want to pursue this, he said, if you think it will do you any good, he said we can do something about it. We can go see that black nigger judge in Sumner if you think it will help you any. Spinosa interpreted the statement as meaning, Telling us, as far as the way I saw it, you know, from knowing the man and the power he had, saying that we could try to do what we wanted to; as far as if we didn't come to a decision with him nothing would be done about it. ¶ 31. While being called as an adverse witness, Whitten testified that he did not say the word nigger, and that it was Cox, not he, who said it. Specifically, Whitten testified that when he told Cox he was going to recommend to the Sheriff that Cox be jailed for trespassing, Cox said That black nigger judge ain't going to put me in jail. It is of note that Whitten sought to exclude all reference to the word nigger from the jury, yet during his own testimony he brought up the very same word and attributed it to Cox. Thus, Whitten not only denied using the slur, but placed additional emphasis on it by attempting to turn it against Cox. This appears inconsistent with his claiming unfair prejudice as a result of admitting the slur into evidence. [3] ¶ 32. Whitten argues that the verdicts reached by the jury on the intentional tort claims, as well as the damages they awarded, were influenced by the animus created between an all African-American jury and Whitten by the injection of the word nigger into evidence, which Whitten claims is inflammatory and irrelevant. Whitten cites Gaston v. State, 239 Miss. 420, 123 So.2d 546 (1960), where this Court found reversible error in admitting the word negro into evidence when it was wholly irrelevant in pertaining to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Whitten also cites GMAC v. Baymon, 732 So.2d 262 (Miss. 1999), where an expert testified that during his years of selling collateral insurance protection in another state, the insurance was placed disproportionately upon racial minorities. This Court held this evidence irrelevant to the suit being brought by the borrower, which was to determine whether the lender committed breach of contract or fraud, and reversed because the borrowers counsel had played the race card for no justifiable reason. Id. at 271-72. ¶ 33. M.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as follows: Relevant Evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. ¶ 34. M.R.E. 403 states: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. ¶ 35. The threshold for admissibility of relevant evidence is not great. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to prove a consequential fact. In both of the cases cited by Whitten, the issue of race was wholly irrelevant to the claims asserted or to the damages claimed. The comment in the current case is relevant to a full understanding of all the facts. In this case the purpose of the evidence offered by the plaintiffs was to show their sense of helplessness, which is relevant to whether they felt free to leave and therefore relevant to their claim for false imprisonment. The evidence was also relevant to the plaintiffs' contention that Whitten sought to convince them that they would have no potential remedies available to them to redress his actions that afternoon. The admission of the evidence therefore meets the threshold requirement of relevance, unlike the cases relied on by Whitten. ¶ 36. Was the probative value of the relevant evidence substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice? The jury in this case was not unanimous, the verdict was 9-3 in favor of awarding compensatory damages for the intentional torts and associated emotional distress suffered by the plaintiffs. The jury declined to award punitive damages. The plaintiffs offered two theories of why the evidence was relevant. Given the disparity of power between Whitten, a municipal judge with a gun, and the plaintiffs, any words on his part that emphasize this disparity of power, particularly in the context of discussing the plaintiffs' potential remedies, would appear highly relevant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony into evidence. The verdict is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice.