Opinion ID: 2067575
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Guilt and Eligibility Phases of Trial

Text: Defendant contends that his post-conviction petition makes a substantial showing that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel at the guilt and eligibility phases of his trial. According to defendant, because counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present evidence of defendant's brain damage and neurological impairments, defendant's sole defense was to imply that the State's two witnesses to the murder, Phyllis Gregson and Elijah Prater, were not believable and were accomplices to the crimes. Defendant observes that no evidence was provided at trial which was probative of defendant's mental state at the time of the murders, and contends that witnesses were available who could have provided testimony concerning what defendant describes in his brief as his bizarre behavior in and around the time of the homicides, defendant's intake of drugs and alcohol that night and morning, and defendant's extreme fear of Kenneth Merkson and William Motley. According to defendant, defense counsel failed to competently present the defense    relied upon, and should have investigated and pursued a mental state defense based upon extreme mental and emotional disturbance, and/or intoxication. Defendant also contends that counsel could have raised self-defense, or could have pursued a voluntary manslaughter claim based upon an unreasonable belief in self-defense, and/or sudden and intense passion. [1] According to defendant, absent these errors, he would not have been found eligible for the death penalty because his eligibility was based upon the statutory provision requiring a finding of intent to kill two or more individuals. Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3). Defendant, in his brief to this court, primarily cites to various passages from the affidavits of Gregson and Prater, including that defendant flipped out the night before the shootings, that defendant snapped in and out of periods of extreme paranoia, that defendant believed devils and demons were after him, and that all four men in the apartment were drinking whisky, smoking marijuana,    snorting cocaine and possibly taking PCP during the time preceding the murders. Defendant also relies upon statements in Prater's affidavit that during the time in the apartment, defendant appeared extremely threatened by [the victims], that Motley made at least five telephone calls throughout the night in which he whispered privately so that no one else could hear, and that defendant stayed awake all night because he believed that Motley and Merkson were going to kill him. Defendant additionally relies upon the affidavit of his girlfriend, Rosemary Thomas, that defendant called her several times from Prater's apartment, that he sounded very strange and that he told her that devils and demons were after him. Finally, defendant cites to the affidavit of his longtime friend, Van J. Ross, who visited defendant at the police station shortly after his arrest for the murders and avers that a police officer in charge of the lockup stated that defendant had been acting crazy and weird. After carefully reviewing the affidavits attached to defendant's petition, and taking all well-pleaded facts as true, we cannot say that defendant has made a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that defendant would not have been convicted of first-degree murder if this testimony had been presented. We find that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial at the guilt-innocence phase would have been different had defense counsel raised the defense of intoxication. While voluntary intoxication is normally not a defense to the commission of a crime, evidence that the intoxication was so extreme as to suspend the power of reason may be used to negate the existence of the mental state which is an element of the crime. Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 6-3(a); People v. Lucas, 132 Ill.2d 399, 435, 139 Ill.Dec. 447, 548 N.E.2d 1003 (1989). In light of the facts of the case at bar, there is no reasonable likelihood that testimony that defendant was intoxicated at the time of the murders would have successfully established the defense of voluntary intoxication or reduced defendant's culpability to provide a basis for a conviction of voluntary manslaughter. Indeed, nowhere in the affidavits relied upon by defendant is there evidence that defendant's purported intoxication was so severe that he could not form the requisite intent to support a first degree murder conviction. Our conclusion is further supported by the fact that although evidence was in the record and presented to the jury that defendant had consumed drugs and alcohol at and around the time of the crimes, this evidence did not alter the jury's finding of culpability. We also reject defendant's contention that he made a substantial showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the result of his trial at the guilt-innocence phase would have been different had counsel investigated and presented evidence that defendant acted in self-defense, in an unreasonable belief in the need for self-defense, or under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. Section 7-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 states: A person is justified in the use of force against another when and to the extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct is necessary to defend himself or another against such other's imminent use of unlawful force. However, he is justified in the use of force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself or another   . Ill. Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 7-1. It is well established that in order to raise a claim of self-defense, a defendant must present evidence supporting each of the following elements which justify the use of force in defense of a person: (1) that force had been threatened against defendant; (2) that defendant was not the aggressor; (3) that the danger of harm was imminent; (4) that the force threatened was unlawful; (5) that defendant actually believed that a danger existed, that the use of force was necessary to avert the danger, and that the kind and amount of force actually used was necessary; and (6) that defendant's beliefs were reasonable. See People v. Jeffries, 164 Ill.2d 104, 127-28, 207 Ill.Dec. 21, 646 N.E.2d 587 (1995). Defendant, relying upon statements in Prater's affidavit that defendant appeared extremely threatened by [the victims] and that defendant believed that Motley and Merkson were going to kill him based upon phone calls that Motley made in which he whispered, contends that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to seek an instruction on self-defense. We disagree. There is no evidence of record that, at the time of the shootings, either Merkson or Motley made any threats of use of unlawful force against defendant that would lead a person to reasonably believe that there was an imminent danger of death or great bodily harm that required the use of deadly force in self-defense. It is undisputed that Motley was shot as he was sitting on the couch making phone calls, and that Merkson was shot in the back of the head after he complied with defendant's instructions to kneel on the floor. Although defendant emphasizes the fact that Motley was armed with a handgun, defendant overlooks the fact that at the time of Motley's murder defendant was also armed with a shotgun. In addition, at the time of Merkson's shooting, Merkson was unarmed and defendant was in possession of the shotgun as well as Motley's handgun. Defendant's argument regarding self-defense is therefore untenable. We also reject defendant's contention that he has made a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to pursue an instruction for voluntary manslaughter. At the time of defendant's trial, the statute provided that an instruction on voluntary manslaughter was available if there was evidence that the person had an actual but unreasonable belief that the circumstances required the use of deadly force as a means of self-defense, or that the killing occurred while he was acting under sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, pars. 9-2(a), (b). [2] An instruction on voluntary manslaughter based upon an unreasonable belief in justification is permissible only if a defendant presents some evidence that unlawful force was used against defendant, and that defendant was not the aggressor. See People v. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d 341, 373, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138 (1993); People v. Sloan, 111 Ill.2d 517, 521, 96 Ill.Dec. 55, 490 N.E.2d 1260 (1986). As discussed above, there is no evidence of record that either victim used unlawful force against defendant. The evidence indicates that defendant was the aggressor. Therefore, we find that defendant suffered no prejudice. We further determine that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that he suffered prejudice at the guilt-innocence phase of his trial due to the failure of defense counsel to request a jury instruction and verdict for voluntary manslaughter on the basis that at the time of the killing defendant was acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation. Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 9-2(a). To constitute serious provocation, it must be established that the provocation fits within certain recognized categories. The categories of serious provocation which have been recognized by this court are `substantial physical injury or assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, and adultery with [defendant's] spouse.' Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 371, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138, quoting People v. Fausz, 95 Ill.2d 535, 539, 70 Ill.Dec. 204, 449 N.E.2d 78 (1983), quoting People v. Crews, 38 Ill.2d 331, 335, 231 N.E.2d 451 (1967). Neither the evidence of record, nor the facts presented in the affidavits, establish that any of the recognized provocations apply in the case at bar. In a related argument, defendant contends that, but for the above-described errors on the part of defense counsel during the guilt-innocence phase of the proceedings, defendant would not have been found eligible for the death penalty because his eligibility was based on a statutory provision requiring a finding of intent to kill. Ill.Rev.Stat.1991, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(3). For the reasons previously stated, we determine that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that he was prejudiced at the eligibility stage of his trial due to defendant's claims of counsel's ineffectiveness during the guilt-innocence stage of the proceedings. Defendant next contends that Levin was distracted from defendant's trial due to outside obligations, resulting in Levin rendering ineffective assistance of counsel. According to defendant, the record indicates that Levin was fully occupied with other matters, both before and during defendant's trial, and his inattentiveness to defendant's case explains counsel's lack of preparation, investigation, and strategic planning. In support of this claim, defendant cites to a comment made by Levin in response to the trial court judge's query whether there was any reason that Levin could not proceed with defendant's case immediately after he completed another criminal trial. Levin informed the judge that although he had been trying two criminal cases simultaneously during the prior three weeks, he could think of no reason why he could not immediately start defendant's trial, save for the burnout factor. Defendant further contends that Levin's preoccupation with other matters did not cease when defendant's trial commenced. According to defendant, because Levin was absent from the courtroom at many critical stages of the trial, defendant was left effectively unrepresented. Although Levin's assistant, attorney Steven Decker, was present in the courtroom on the occasions when Levin was absent, defendant contends that Decker's presence cannot excuse Levin's absences. Additionally, defendant notes that Decker had not filed an appearance on defendant's behalf. The State initially responds that defendant failed to raise this claim on his direct appeal, and thus it is waived. We disagree. The waiver doctrine does not apply where, as here, defendant asserts that the alleged waiver stems from ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. People v. Winsett, 153 Ill.2d 335, 346, 180 Ill.Dec. 109, 606 N.E.2d 1186 (1992). However, we find that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that he suffered prejudice as a result of Levin's courtroom absences. We have repeatedly held that when a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel based upon allegations that counsel was distracted due to personal and professional circumstances, the defendant must establish that, absent these distractions, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant's trial would have been different. See People v. Orange, 168 Ill.2d 138, 162, 213 Ill.Dec. 589, 659 N.E.2d 935 (1995); People v. Titone, 151 Ill.2d 19, 32, 175 Ill.Dec. 702, 600 N.E.2d 1160 (1992). Defendant, citing to a footnote in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2047 n. 25, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 668 n. 25 (1984), contends that the prejudice caused by Levin's absences is a foregone conclusion. Defendant's reliance on Cronic is misplaced. The portion of the Cronic decision on which defendant relies states: The Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel was either totally absent, or prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. at 2047 n. 25, 80 L.Ed.2d at 668 n. 25. The record indicates that Levin and Decker were acting in concert as defendant's counsel, and that defendant was never without representation throughout the course of his trial. Aside from defendant's misplaced citation to Cronic, defendant offers neither argument nor evidence that he was prejudiced by Levin's absences from the courtroom. Therefore, we reject defendant's claim. Defendant next argues that his defense counsel improperly admonished him concerning his right to testify. Defense counsel entered into an agreement with the State not to pursue a motion to suppress statements made by defendant to a detective and assistant State's Attorney after his arrest, in exchange for an agreement by the State that it would not use defendant's statements in its case in chief, but would reserve them only for impeachment purposes in rebuttal if defendant testified. According to defendant, counsel told him, in open court, that this agreement meant that he could not testify in his own behalf. Defendant's claim is waived on two grounds. Defendant failed to present this claim in his original or amended petitions for post-conviction relief. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1994). This claim is additionally waived because defendant failed to raise it on direct appeal. People v. Madej, 177 Ill.2d 116, 127, 226 Ill.Dec. 453, 685 N.E.2d 908 (1997). Defendant next contends that he has made a substantial showing that defense counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to make discovery requests seeking unrecorded exculpatory witness statements taken by the State. According to defendant, had trial counsel requested these statements, counsel would have discovered the statements that Gregson and Prater contend that they made to the police describing the changes in defendant's behavior shortly before the killings and defendant's fear of the victims. Defendant argues that this favorable evidence would have been material to his case to the extent that it would support a mental state defense as well as provide mitigating evidence. We find that defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to specifically request unrecorded exculpatory witness statements. We observe that prior to trial, defense counsel filed a comprehensive motion for discovery and inspection, requesting, inter alia, any material or information within its possession or control which tends to reduce    punishment. The statements of the type defendant now contends should have been turned over were encompassed by the filed motion. However, for the reasons previously stated in this opinion, we do not discern a reasonable probability that the result of defendant's trial would have been different had these alleged unrecorded statements been introduced. As noted above, neither Gregson's nor Prater's observations regarding defendant's behavior at the time of the crimes, nor Prater's belief that defendant generally feared Motley and Merkson, would have been sufficient to support the alleged mental state defenses. In a related argument, defendant contends that the State violated defendant's right to due process by withholding the alleged statements made by Gregson and Prater describing defendant's behavior and mental state. Defendant argues that these statements constituted evidence that the State was required to disclose pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). Defendant argues that, since his trial counsel requested information that would tend to reduce punishment, the State's failure to disclose this evidence is particularly egregious. Defendant contends there is more than a reasonable probability that the exculpatory evidence at issue regarding defendant's mental state would have resulted in a different trial outcome. We determine that defendant's claim lacks merit. In Brady, the United States Supreme Court required disclosure of evidence that is both favorable to the accused and material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 494 (1985). As stated above, on this record defendant has failed to make a substantial showing that there is a reasonable probability that the statements made by Gregson and Prater concerning defendant's behavior at the time of the offenses would have affected the outcome at the guilt-innocence phase of defendant's trial. Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim. Defendant's final contention is that the cumulative effect of counsel's failures at trial denied him his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. However, this claim is waived, as defendant failed to raise it in his amended post-conviction petition. 725 ILCS 5/122-3 (West 1994). In sum, defendant's allegations fail to make a substantial showing of a violation of his right to effective assistance of counsel at the guilt-innocence phase of trial and at death penalty eligibility. Therefore, the dismissal of that portion of his post-conviction petition without an evidentiary hearing was proper. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed as to these issues.