Opinion ID: 2113130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The alleged lapse of the assignment.

Text: Ms. Allman argues, in the alternative, that the McGlincheys' assignment to Mr. Bissey lapsed when the McGlincheys moved out of the property, and that Mr. Bissey no longer stands in the shoes of a tenant and therefore has no rights under TOPA. We do not agree. Mr. and Mrs. McGlinchey executed the assignment of their TOPA rights to Mr. Bissey on December 28, 2002. At this time, they were tenants, and they were residing at the Fourth Street property. They executed the assignment in exchange for Mr. Bissey's agreement not to increase their rent in the event that he purchased the property. [6] The McGlincheys were still Mr. Snyder's tenants on March 28, 2003, when Ms. Allman filed this action. It was not until a month later, on April 30, 2003, that they moved to their newly-purchased house. Section 42-3404.06 permits the tenant to exercise, assign, or sell his or her rights at any time in the process provided in this subchapter.... There is nothing in the statute to suggest that, once the assignment has been executed, the validity of the contract between assignor and assignee depends upon, or may be affected by, subsequent events, nor does the Act state or imply that the end of the assignor's tenancy (resulting from his or her departure from the premises) would make the assignment lapse. Further, focusing on the interests of the tenants which TOPA was principally intended to protect, those interests would be substantially impaired if we were to adopt the position urged upon us by Ms. Allman. A prospective purchaser of a tenant's TOPA rights would have little incentive to pay big money (or any money) for these rights if the assignment lapsed as soon as the tenant moved out. Ms. Allman relies on the statutory definition of tenant: A tenant means a tenant, subtenant, lessee, sublessee, or other person entitled to the possession, occupancy or benefits of a rental unit within a housing accommodation. D.C.Code § 42-3401.03(17). She argues as follows: The McGlincheys were no longer tenants when the negotiations were instigated by Seller on September 26, 2003. Certainly a tenant's right to negotiate a purchase contract under TOPA does not continue once he has vacated a rental property and is no longer a tenant. The only tenant to be negotiated with at the point in time that Seller opened negotiations on September 26, 2003 was Elizabeth Allman. The trial judge erred in allowing negotiations to include Mr. Bissey as a tenant. Because, Ms. Allman suggests, an assignee can have no greater rights than an assignor, Mr. Bissey cannot be deemed a tenant. We agree with Mr. Snyder, however, that the statutory definition states only what an entity must be in order to make an assignment in accordance with § 42-3404.06. It says nothing about a tenant having to remain a tenant in order to sustain the validity of the assignment. Mr. Snyder then concludes, and we again agree, that [t]he only fair reading of the statute is that a tenant's assignment of his rights under TOPA is immediate and complete upon the execution of the assignment document. We discern nothing in the statute that suggests, or would countenance, a different result. Because, for purposes of the Act, Mr. Bissey was a tenant, Mr. Snyder had the choice between two offers  Ms. Allman's and Mr. Bissey's  each of which came from a tenant. In this situation, the negotiation period having expired, Mr. Snyder was free to select Mr. Bissey's offer, for the determination as to which offer is more favorable is a judgment which the Act in any case leaves entirely to the owner, Medrano, 885 A.2d at 314, without liability to the other tenants. See D.C.Code § 42-3404.10(2)(C) (2001). Ms. Allman's claim that her offer was more favorable than Mr. Bissey's does not entitle her to relief, for between the two tenants, the choice was Mr. Snyder's to make.