Opinion ID: 3050155
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: TCA Remedies

Text: “[I]t is . . . well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done.” Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946). The Court has subsequently explained that “the federal courts have the power to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to KAY v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 12917 a federal statute,” Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 71 (1992), and that “denial of a remedy [is] the exception rather than the rule,” id. At the same time, it is critical that when deciding which remedies are appropriate in a given situation, we attempt to “infer how . . . Congress would have addressed the issue” if it had done so at the time the law was passed. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998) (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 178 (1994)). In Franklin, the Court examined a district court’s dismissal of a Title IX damages action for failure to state a claim, 503 U.S. at 64, and remanded after holding that a damages remedy was appropriate and consistent with the intent of Title IX, id. at 71-76. The Court narrowed this broad rule in Gebser, again examining the purpose and intent behind Title IX, and limiting the circumstances under which damages were an appropriate remedy. 524 U.S. at 292-93. To determine whether damages are appropriate here, we examine Congress’s intent and the structure of § 332. 1. Stated Intent [8] As in Franklin, we first examine whether Congress intended to limit the remedies available for violations of § 332. 503 U.S. at 71. We have no statement of congressional intent on the question of remedies in the legislative history. See Abrams, 544 U.S. at 130 (Stevens, J., concurring). However, unlike the implied Title IX cause of action in Franklin and Gebser, here we have some legislative history discussing the remedial structure created by the statute. Section 332(c)(7), captioned “[p]reservation of local zoning authority,” was intended to minimize federal interference with State and local land use decisions. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104458, at 207-08 (1996) (hereinafter “Conference Report”) (“The conference agreement . . . preserves the authority of State and local governments over zoning and land use matters except in the limited circumstances set forth in the conference agreement.”). 12918 KAY v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES [9] Because TCA plaintiffs are often large telecommunications companies, it is likely that the damages attributed by them to adverse zoning or permitting decisions will be substantial, particularly from the viewpoint of a municipality. See Abrams, 544 U.S. at 123. This potential for large damages claims, even if they are not ultimately awarded, suggests that Congress did not intend to create a damages remedy. Just like the attorney’s fees addressed by the Court in Abrams, there is a real danger here that a damages remedy “would have a particularly severe impact in the § 332(c)(7) context, making local governments liable for the (often substantial) [damages] of large commercial interests for the misapplication of a complex and novel statutory scheme.” Id. The specter of large damages claims, and the expensive litigation recognized in Abrams, could easily intimidate local authorities into effectively abdicating their zoning and permitting powers when confronted with an application from a wireless service provider.9 Nor do we find that the requirement that courts “hear and decide such action on an expedited basis,” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v), cuts against this view, as the Nextel Partners court mused in passing. 286 F.3d at 695 (“For defendants, assuming for the sake of argument that damages may be recovered under the TCA itself, quick review may diminish the amount that may be recovered.”) (footnote omitted). In the Central District of California, where Kay filed his action, the median time from the filing of a complaint to disposition of the case after a trial is 23.9 months. Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics tbl. C-5 (March 31, 2006). Partially due to the intervening Abrams decision, the City took almost a year to decide Kay’s permit application, and the district court took another two years to hold a bench trial and rule on the merits of the permit issue. This kind of schedule for the resolution of a civil case, 9 As discussed in the context of Kay’s state damages claim, local zoning and permitting authorities are normally immune from damages under state law. KAY v. CITY OF RANCHO PALOS VERDES 12919 even on an expedited basis, is typical. It is unrealistic to expect any case involving administrative review to wend its way through our district courts, let alone the appellate process, in a manner that is speedy enough to meaningfully stave off the accumulation of damages. [10] Congress sought to preserve local authority while also providing a federal forum for the review of certain zoning and permitting decisions without further need to exhaust “any independent State court remedy otherwise required.” Conference Report at 209. A damages remedy does not further that purpose, and could potentially frustrate it. 2. Administrative Nature of Review Several features of section § 332(c)(7) are borrowed from state zoning and administrative review laws. Zoning and permitting decisions are made by municipalities like the City or other regional authorities. Every state provides for review of such agency decisions through an appeal or writ of certiorari to the state courts, and most provide a short time frame in which to file an appeal; thirty-two of those states have a thirty-day appeal period.10 The TCA adopts a similar thirtyday appeal period. 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(v). The language used by Congress closely mirrors many of those same state laws, allowing “[a]ny person adversely affected by any final action or failure to act” to seek aid from the courts. Id. The TCA also requires that zoning decisions by state and local authorities be “in writing and supported by substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(7)(B)(iii). Congress explained that it used this phrase to reflect “the traditional standard used for judicial review of agency actions.” Conference Report at 208. Most states also apply a similarly deferential standard of review to appeals from local zoning and permitting agency decisions. See 10 Thirty days is the mode, but some states give as few as ten days or as