Opinion ID: 1145408
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Degree of success

Text: Since Singh's claims were intertwined, we assess the reasonableness of attorney's fees by focus[ing] on the significance of the overall relief obtained by the plaintiff in relation to the hours reasonably expended on the litigation. Id. 461 U.S. at 435, 109 S.Ct. at 1940. In establishing Singh's attorney's fee award, the superior court focused on the following portion of Hensley: [T]he product of hours reasonably expended on the litigation as a whole times a reasonable hourly rate may be an excessive amount. This will be true even where the plaintiff's claims were interrelated, non-frivolous, and raised in good faith... . Again, the most critical factor is the degree of success obtained. Id. at 436, 103 S.Ct. at 1941 (emphasis added). The superior court noted that under Hensley, [a] reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole. Id. The superior court then concluded that Singh's success was limited because of the dismissal of his three state civil rights claims for relief: In this case, plaintiff achieved significant relief in that he settled his defamation and § 1981 claims for the principal amount of $17,501. On the other hand, a substantial portion of the motion for summary judgment and the work that went into litigation of that motion addressed a state civil rights cause of action which was without merit and would have required a court to employ a tortured construction of the clear language of the statute. Thus, plaintiff's success on his civil rights claim was limited in this regard. Upon review of the record and the relevant case law we conclude that the superior court erred in its reduction of Singh's attorney's fees from the lodestar amount for two reasons. First, as we have previously recognized, [f]ull attorney's fees are the norm under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, but such fees must be reasonable. Moseley v. Beirne, 626 P.2d 580, 581 (Alaska 1981). Second, we believe that the superior court erred in its determination that Singh's level of success did not merit a full award of attorney's fees. The degree of success is difficult to measure, particularly in a civil rights case such as this one, where a settlement has precluded a trial on the merits. We note that Singh's financial recovery represented a significant proportion of the damages that he requested. In his initial complaint, Singh requested compensatory and punitive damages in excess of the jurisdictional limits of our district court, or $35,000. See AS 22.15.030. The total of the two settlements Singh obtained exceeded this amount. While it is not possible to quantify Singh's § 1981 damages specifically, since the second settlement aggregated damages for both the defamation and civil rights claims, Singh's total recovery of $17,501 is significant. Additionally, we find that Singh's litigation served a public purpose within the scope of the private attorney general theory of civil rights litigation, as first expressed in City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575, 106 S.Ct. 2686, 2694, 91 L.Ed.2d 466 (1986).