Opinion ID: 481712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Distortions

Text: 6 First. The opinion imposes upon the analysis of Judge Schwarzer a new and different framework. The term argument-identification is coined by the opinion and presented as what Judge Schwarzer was seeking. 801 F.2d 1531, 1539-40. A distinction is made between the merits of the case and its manner of presentation by Kirkland, Ellis. Id., p. 1539. The misrepresentations of Kirkland, Ellis are palliated because a brief could have been written without misrepresentations. Id., p. 1535. The opinion so substantially recasts the case that Judge Schwarzer's reasons and action are obscured. 7 The opinion is mistaken in its analysis of the action of the district court. The opinion says that the district judge sanctioned the Kirkland, Ellis brief after the judge had looked not to the merits of the position originally taken by the plaintiff, but to the manner in which the position was advocated. Id., p. 1535. But this account does not do justice to the district judge. The district judge had in front of him a brief which did three things. The brief flatly misrepresented Minnesota law as having definitively decided the issue of forum non conveniens in a way favorable to the defendant. The brief insinuated that federal law on the same issue was definitively established the way the defendant would have liked. The brief set out California law without qualification and without mention of later authority which for purposes of the present opinion is assumed to have been directly contrary. The court sanctioned Kirkland, Ellis for these three statements of law, each of which was not warranted. The truth or falsity of a statement is not merely a matter of the manner in which a position is presented. A false statement presented as a true statement is simply a misstatement. It is not warranted. It should be sanctionable. 8 Second. The opinion substitutes extreme hypotheticals for the case at hand. It imagines close cases where a judge might sanction a lawyer because the judge disagrees with his argument. Id. p. 1540. But close cases exist that test the workability of any rule, civil or criminal. They are not a reason for repealing the rule. Here, on the opinion's own admission, the case was not close. Kirkland, Ellis failed to cite directly contrary authority. 9 Third. The opinion exaggerates the effect of Rule 11 as understood by Judge Schwarzer. The opinion says that according to his decision judges would have to grade accuracy of advocacy in connection with every piece of paper filed in federal court. Id., p. 1540. His decision, the opinion says, imposes upon the district courts the burden of evaluating under ethical standards the accuracy of all lawyers' arguments. Id., p. 1542. What the opinion does not acknowledge is that, as the sanctions of Rule 11 are mandatory, the burden already exists to grade or evaluate every piece of paper filed in federal court. Of course most of the time a judge does so only at the urging of a party; if a party does not object, a judge is not likely to be impelled to act even though Rule 11 is mandatory and the burden of evaluation is present. The difference between the opinion and Judge Schwarzer is not over how often the judge's duty to evaluate will in fact be exercised. The difference is that the opinion would have the judge able to evaluate only the frivolity of a paper; Judge Schwarzer would let the judge also impose sanctions for misrepresentation.