Opinion ID: 1131632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legislative intent of ors 20.105(1)

Text: In circumstances such as this, the task of this court in interpreting a statute is to discern the intent of the legislature. ORS 174.020. The inquiry begins with an examination of the language of the statute itself. Whipple v. Howser, 291 Or. 475, 479, 632 P.2d 782 (1981). When the language of the statute does not provide sufficient insight into the legislative intent, it is appropriate to consider legislative history. State v. Leathers, 271 Or. 236, 242, 531 P.2d 901 (1975). The term bad faith is not self-explanatory. Accordingly, in determining whether plaintiff's actions were of the type that the legislature intended to address in ORS 20.105(1), we begin with an examination of the legislative history. The legislative committees charged with the task of developing the specific language which was to become ORS 20.105(1) were deliberate about their choices. The statute began in 1983 as House Bill 2253 (sponsored by the Department of Justice), the original language of which would have permitted a court to award attorney fees to the State of Oregon when the state was a prevailing party defendant and when the court found that the opposing party had acted frivolously or in bad faith. The bill was later amended to apply not only to the state but to any prevailing party defendant. Without reference to any specific case law, the Solicitor General testified that the proposed frivolous and bad faith standards both had been construed by the courts in a manner which would not penalize legitimate litigation. He compared those standards with the standard under which the state could be held liable for attorney fees. The latter standardaction by a state agency without a reasonable basis in fact or in law [5] was considered by the Solicitor General to require less serious misconduct than the proposed standards of frivolous and bad faith. That is, a finding of bad faith under House Bill 2253 would have required something more than a lack of a reasonable basis in fact or in law. Although the meanings of the quoted terms were discussed at length by committee members and witnesses, ultimately the committee decided that the terms should remain undefined, allowing the courts to determine their limits. House Bill 2253 eventually was tabled in committee, as was its successor, House Bill 3012. [6] The current language of ORS 20.105(1) emerged from a conference committee [7] as an amendment to House Bill 2364, which previously had not concerned the award of attorney fees for improper litigious conduct. Examination of the conference committee meeting transcripts reveals that the amendment was a resurrection and refinement of the then-defunct House Bill 3012. It was at this time that the language in bad faith, wantonly, or solely for oppressive reasons was suggested. From the minutes, it is clear that the committee's intent was for the specific language chosen to reflect the existing federal bad faith standard referred to in Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Soc., supra , despite some uncertainty about what that standard actually was. In summary, the legislative history of ORS 20.105(1) demonstrates the following: (1) A great deal of discussion and thought preceded the choice of the specific terms used in the statute; (2) there was an intent among those who chose the language to incorporate the federal bad faith standard mentioned in Alyeska; and (3) the committee charged with developing the statute deliberately left to the courts the task of shaping the contours of the somewhat broad language chosen.