Opinion ID: 2089638
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Joint-Venture Service

Text: Ryan and GMH urge us to adopt the lower courts' conclusions that Ryan properly served JAG through its joint venture partner, JDC. Ryan argues that its service on JDC within the one-year time limit should be effective as to JAG because JDC and JAG are engaged in a joint venture. We have not decided whether service on one joint-venture member satisfies service as to another joint-venture member, and no rule expressly permits such service. Both lower courts assumed, without analysis, that a joint venture exists between JAG and JDC. JAG protests the lower courts' decisions because they are based on joint-venture theory of service that Ryan never argued to the district court. GMH did make reference to a joint venture between JDC and JAG, but did not offer it as a theory of service. Rather, GMH argued that, because a joint venture existed between JDC and JAG, JDC had a property interest in the Fairway Hills property and therefore GMH's lien should attach against JDC. JAG does not concede that a joint venture exists. Although the question of whether a joint venture exists is an unresolved factual issue, for the following reasons it is not a factual question material to the resolution of this case. See, e.g., O'Malley v. Ulland Bros., 549 N.W.2d 889, 892 (Minn.1996) (A fact is material if its resolution will affect the outcome of a case.). Neither the mechanics' lien statutes nor the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure expressly permit joint-venture-based service. In the absence of a statute expressly permitting such service in the context of mechanics' liens, this court will not presume that one exists. See State v. Moseng, 254 Minn. 263, 269, 95 N.W.2d 6, 11-12 (1959) (Where failure of expression rather than ambiguity of expression concerning the elements of the statutory standard is the vice of the enactment, courts are not free to substitute amendment for construction and thereby supply the omissions of the legislature.). Ryan's arguments also do not persuade us to construe the Rules of Civil Procedure to allow service on a party through service on its joint-venture partner. Moreover, [w]e have not treated service of process as a mere technicality, as it serves the important function of actual, formal notice to the defendant of the action. Patterson, 608 N.W.2d at 867. Recognizing the important function that service of process fulfills, and recognizing the due process implications involved, we have always required parties to adhere strictly to the service requirements. See, e.g., Tullis v. Federated Mut. Ins. Co., 570 N.W.2d 309, 311 (Minn.1997) (Service of process in a manner not authorized by the rule is ineffective service.); Berryhill v. Sepp, 106 Minn. 458, 459, 119 N.W. 404, 404 (1909) ([S]ervice must accord strictly with statutory requirements.). Accordingly, we decline to adopt a joint-venture service rule and therefore need not consider whether Ryan satisfied such a rule. The court of appeals also supported its decision by stating that JAG was not prejudiced by Ryan's improper service because JAG had actual notice of the suit. We have recognized, however, that actual notice of the lawsuit will not subject defendants to personal jurisdiction without substantial compliance with the rules of service. Tullis, 570 N.W.2d at 311. Ryan made no effort to comply with service requirements because it did not attempt to serve JAG within the one-year time limit imposed by Minn.Stat. § 514.12, subd. 3. Accordingly, we conclude that JAG's actual notice of the lien action, without more, is insufficient to subject JAG to personal jurisdiction.