Opinion ID: 1160878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: unearned wages

Text: Unearned wages are the actual wages a seaman did not earn because of his injury or illness. Berg v. Fourth Shipmor Assocs., 82 F.3d 307, 309 (9th Cir.1996). A shipowner has an obligation to pay a seaman who becomes ill or is injured while working upon a ship full wages for the length of the voyage or employment. See Luksich v. Misetich, 140 F.2d 812, 815 (9th Cir.1944); Berg, 82 F.3d at 309. The Court of Appeals held Lundborg was not entitled to any [unearned] wages when he left the ship [in Portland] after his injury because the ship was at the end of its voyage, and, therefore, it affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Keystone on this issue. Lundborg, 89 Wash.App. at 892, 950 P.2d 1014. Lundborg contends the Court of Appeals erred because the definition of a voyage and the contemplated period of employment are disputed issues of fact for the trier of fact to resolve. Keystone was obligated under the shipping articles to pay Lundborg for one voyage. Clerk's Papers at 486 (stating that [t]he term of employment shall be for one voyage and with agreement of both Master and seaman for successive voyages, but not exceeding twelve months in all). Thus, Lundborg's employment with Keystone was necessarily indefinite beyond one voyage because, as Keystone correctly points out, neither the shipping articles nor the CBA, guaranteed Lundborg employment beyond one voyage. [9] The general rule is, in order for [seamen] to establish that they were entitled to unearned wages beyond the end of a voyage, they [are] required to prove the existence of a definite period of employment that extend[s] beyond the end of each voyage. Blainey v. American S.S. Co., 990 F.2d 885, 891 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 933, 114 S.Ct. 346, 126 L.Ed.2d 311 (1993). The shipping articles plainly contemplated one voyage. As a result, we must determine whether the SS Keystone Rhode Island had finished one voyage when Lundborg suffered his injury. On the day Lundborg was injured, the SS Keystone Rhode Island had finished its voyage from Anacortes to Portland. At the latter city, it docked and discharged its cargo of oil. Keystone contends the ship's voyage was completed at the point the cargo was discharged because under federal statute and established case law, a voyage consists of a trip from one port to the next for cargo operations. Lundborg, as we have noted, asserts the definition of a voyage is a question for the trier of fact. Keystone's contention is correct. 46 U.S.C.A. § 10501(a) (1999) provides, this chapter applies to a vessel ... on a voyage between a port in one State and a port in another State. (Emphasis added.) The statute means a voyage consists of a trip from one port to the next for cargo operations. The case law also supports this proposition. In Vickers v. Tumey, 290 F.2d 426, 434 (5th Cir.1961), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated the end of the voyage for this purpose would be the time and place cargo was discharged, or certainly no later than return to her next loading port. (Emphasis added.) Furthermore, in Blainey, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated it is undisputed that the longstanding custom on the Great Lakes has been to pay unearned wages only to the end of a voyagethat is, a trip from a loading port to an unloading port, or vice versa. Blainey, 990 F.2d at 891. (Emphasis added.) In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in The Velma L. Hamlin, 40 F.2d 852, 853 (4th Cir.1930), that a voyage terminated when the cargo was discharged. Finally, in Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511, 520-21, 69 S.Ct. 707, 93 L.Ed. 850 (1949), the United States Supreme Court noted a voyage terminated at a port of discharge. In summary, 46 U.S.C.A. § 10501(a) (1998) and cases from the United States Supreme Court and Courts of Appeals for the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits confirm the SS Keystone Rhode Island completed its voyage on July 8, 1995, once it docked in Portland and discharged its cargo. Because Lundborg agrees he was fully paid through that date, the Court of Appeals below correctly affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Keystone on the unearned wages issue.