Opinion ID: 195454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sentencing and assignments of error

Text: 9 In July 1993, the trial judge convened a disposition hearing. Apparently fearing potential ex post facto problems, the judge, without objection, consulted the sentencing guidelines that had been in effect at the time the conspiracy wound down, namely, the June 15, 1988 edition. See United States v. Harotunian, 920 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (1st Cir.1990) (explaining that a sentencing court should apply the guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing unless doing so will implicate ex post facto concerns); United States v. Arboleda, 929 F.2d 858, 871 (1st Cir.1991) (stating that, if the guidelines in effect at sentencing are not used, then members of a conspiracy are ordinarily subject to the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of the completion of the conspiracy). 10 Starting with a base offense level of six, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(a), the judge added ten levels on the theory that appellant shared responsibility for inflicting losses of at least $2,000,000 (but less than $5,000,000), see U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(b)(1)(K), and then added two incremental levels for more than minimal planning, see U.S.S.G. Sec. 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). These calculations yielded an adjusted offense level of 18, which, for a first offender, produced a guideline sentencing range (GSR) of 27-33 months. The court imposed an incarcerative sentence at the nadir of the range. 11 This appeal spotlights the court's determination of the aggregate losses properly attributable to LaCroix. Noting that the judge counted transactions handled by his coconspirators as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. Sec. 1B1.3(a)(1), and, therefore, tagged him with the entire loss suffered by the defrauded bank, LaCroix assigns error. He contends that the sentencing court misconceived the applicable test for relevant conduct, mounted too shallow an inquiry into the subject, and, in all events, that the court found the facts in a quixotic manner, thereby misapplying the test. 12 Appellant's first contention poses a question of guideline interpretation, which sparks de novo review. See United States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 7 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that, when an appeal raises a purely legal question involving the proper interpretation of the sentencing guideline, appellate review is plenary); United States v. St. Cyr, 977 F.2d 698, 701 (1st Cir.1992) (similar). Appellant's second contention also poses a pure question of law and is, therefore, to be reviewed under the same standard. Appellant's third contention is cut from different cloth; it hinges on a factbound determination under the applicable guideline, thus evoking clear error review. See United States v. Bradley, 917 F.2d 601, 605 (1st Cir.1990); see also United States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 458 (1st Cir.1994) (holding that valuation of losses for sentencing purposes must be reviewed under the clear error standard), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 16, 1994) (No. 93-9135).