Opinion ID: 2378741
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Authority from other states

Text: Goodyear argues that authority in other jurisdictions supports the proposition that striking an answer as to liability only is an ultimate sanction that requires heightened due processwhich Goodyear equates to requiring the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing before an answer can be stricken as to liability only. Nevada law, of course, controls in this case and, as discussed above, Bahena I is in accordance with Nevada precedent and meets due process requirements. However, we also disagree that the state cases cited by Goodyear can be interpreted so broadly; consistent with Nevada law, none of them mandate that an evidentiary hearing be held in all cases before a trial court can strike a defendant's answer as to liability only. In some of the cases discussed by Goodyear, the appellate court affirmed the striking of a defendant's answer or a plaintiffs complaint even when there was no evidentiary hearing on the motion to strike. See State Farm v. Health Horizons, 264 Ga.App. 443, 590 S.E.2d 798 (2003); Sims v. Fitzpatrick, 288 S.W.3d 93 (Tex.Ct.App.2009) (affirming the trial court's imposition of death penalty sanctions as to liability only after it conducted a nonevidentiary hearing because it has the inherent power to impose sanctions that are not covered by a specific court rule for the conduct of the appellants of purposefully delaying the case and because it made specific findings of fact in support of its sanctions; the court of appeals further held that the appellants were entitled to a jury trial upon the issue of damages). Also, in Burton v. Sparler, 272 Ark. 254, 613 S.W.2d 394 (1981), the court affirmed the trial court's order dismissing plaintiffs complaint and entering a default against the plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim, which was entered without an evidentiary hearing being held. In the cases cited by Goodyear and the amici in which the striking of an answer was reversed, evidentiary hearings were required based upon the specific facts of those cases not because such hearings are always required. [3] See Robinson v. Higuera, 157 Ariz. 622, 760 P.2d 622, 624 (App.1988) (reversing the trial court's decision to strike an answer without a hearing and to enter a default judgment as to both liability and damages for violation of a discovery order, but noting that [d]ue process does not require that a hearing be held in every case prior to imposition of Rule 37(b)(2) sanctions of dismissal or entry of default judgment); Roberts v. Roberts, 32 Conn.App. 465, 629 A.2d 1160 (1993) (holding that an evidentiary hearing was needed based on the specific facts in the case requiring a determination as to whether a sale by auction of marital property was the best way to effectuate the original judgment when one of the parties objected to selling the property this way). The Illinois case cited by Goodyear and the amici concluded that evidentiary hearings may be necessary before imposing discovery sanctions when a unique factual situation is presented. Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill.2d 112, 229 Ill.Dec. 513, 692 N.E.2d 286 (1998) (concluding the hearing was necessary because the plaintiff had conducted destructive testing on the General Motors vehicle prior to filing the products liability claim and the trial court needed to consider the degree of destructive testing done to determine the prejudice to General Motors). Goodyear cites to a Texas case in which the Texas Supreme Court instructed the district court to impose less stringent discovery sanctions; however, the Texas Supreme Court made the instruction because of the specific facts present in that case. Trans-American Natural Gas v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.1991) (reasoning that the district court did not indicate that it had considered less severe sanctions before striking the defendant's answer and that the violation was that the parties could not mutually agree to a new deposition date for the president of TransAmerican). In the other Texas cases cited by Goodyear, the Texas appellate courts reversed the trial courts' sanctions because Rule 215 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that sanctions must be proportionate to the violation. Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon, 841 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1992) (also concluding that trial courts are not required to make written findings for discovery sanctions); In re Carnival Corp., 193 S.W.3d 229 (Tex.Ct.App.2006). Goodyear cites to Georgia cases in which the appellate courts have remanded cases to the trial courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing on discovery sanctions to determine willfulness of the discovery violation; however, in these cases, the courts have stated that while the hearing was necessary under the present facts, the trial courts need not conduct a hearing to determine willfulness in every case based upon a party's failure to comply with discovery. McConnell v. Wright, 281 Ga. 868, 644 S.E.2d 111 (2007) (concluding the hearing was necessary to determine if the plaintiffs willfully failed to attend their depositions); General Motors Corp. v. Conkle, 226 Ga.App. 34, 486 S.E.2d 180 (1997) (concluding the hearing was necessary because the trial court had not set forth the statutory basis for the discovery sanctions and it had not made specific findings of willfulness and bad faith when General Motors had partially complied with the discovery order and was continuing to attempt to comply with the discovery order). In other cases discussed by Goodyear, whether or not there was an evidentiary hearing before an answer was stricken for violating a discovery order, the courts speak to the trial courts' broad authority to impose severe sanctions when the circumstances warrant it. See State Farm, 590 S.E.2d at 800 (concluding that an order to compel does not have to be completely violated before the trial court can grant a motion to strike, that the trial court has broad discretion to control litigation, and that an appellate court will affirm a trial court's finding of willful refusal to comply with discovery if any evidence supports the trial court's findings); Schultz v. Sykes, 248 Wis.2d 746, 638 N.W.2d 604 (App.2001) (holding that the trial court has the inherent authority to investigate the facts of the case, so it has the discretion and authority to set an evidentiary hearing to conduct its investigation when it sees fit). Goodyear and the amici argue that Pinkstaff v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 211 P.3d 698, 704 (Colo.2009), is applicable here because the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the imposition of discovery sanctions finding that they were unduly harsh and not commensurate with the harm done. [4] In reaching this decision, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the district court did not put on the record or enter a written order that it had considered the full range of lesser sanctions before striking Black & Decker's answer as to liability and that all the discovery documents were produced within 30 days after the court-ordered deadline expired. [5] Id. While the Colorado Supreme Court recognizes that striking an answer as to liability represents the harshest of all sanctions, [6] the majority stated that a trial court does not abuse its discretion when it imposes severe sanctions based upon extensive nondisclosure or wholesale failure to prosecute a case. Id. at 703-04. Ultimately, Colorado law does not require an evidentiary hearing before a district court may strike a defendant's answer as to liability, but does require that sanctions be proportional to the violation. See Pinkstaff, 211 P.3d at 703-04; Kwik Way Stores, Inc. v. Caldwell, 745 P.2d 672 (Colo.1987).