Opinion ID: 1936466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Schafersman-Daubert Framework

Text: Under rule 702, it is not enough that a witness is qualified as an expert. The trial court must also act as a gatekeeper to ensure the evidentiary relevance and reliability of the expert's opinion. Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 631 N.W.2d 862 (2001). In Schafersman, we rejected the general acceptance test for determining the admissibility of an expert's testimony. In its place, we adopted the standards set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), and its progeny, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), and General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997). Specifically, we held: [I]n those limited situations in which a court is faced with a decision regarding the admissibility of expert opinion evidence, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Neb. Evid. R. 702, whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This entails a preliminary assessment whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is valid and whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. at 232, 631 N.W.2d at 876-77. We further explained: In determining the admissibility of an expert's testimony, a trial judge may consider several more specific factors that Daubert said might bear on a judge's gatekeeping determination. See [ Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, supra ]. These factors include whether a theory or technique can be (and has been) tested; whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; whether, in respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or potential rate of error; whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation; and whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. See id. These factors are, however, neither exclusive nor binding; different factors may prove more significant in different cases, and additional factors may prove relevant under particular circumstances. See, e.g., Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136 (3d Cir.2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 921, 121 S.Ct. 1357, 149 L.Ed.2d 287 (2001) (setting forth additional factors to be considered). Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. at 233, 631 N.W.2d at 877. There is, however, an ambiguity in Schafersman. At one point, we drew a distinction between a methodology and the application of a methodology. We stated that once the validity of the expert's reasoning or methodology has been satisfactorily established, any remaining questions regarding the manner in which that methodology was applied in a particular case will generally go to the weight of such evidence. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 232, 631 N.W.2d at 877. Since Schafersman, we have repeated, but not applied, this dictum twice more. See, Perry Lumber Co. v. Durable Servs., 266 Neb. 517, 667 N.W.2d 194 (2003); State v. Leibhart, 266 Neb. 133, 662 N.W.2d 618 (2003). But other language in Schafersman casts doubt upon the distinction between a methodology and its application. We said, In evaluating expert opinion testimony under Daubert, when such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question, the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the relevant discipline. (Emphasis supplied.) Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 262 Neb. 215, 233, 631 N.W.2d 862, 877 (2001). Thus, we find it necessary to clarify whether a court, having determined that a methodology is reliable at a general level, must also decide if the expert seeking to testify reliably applied the methodology. Following Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), there was some debate in the federal courts over whether an expert's deviation from an otherwise reliable methodology went to admissibility or weight. See Christopher B. Mueller, Daubert Asks the Right Questions: Now Appellate Courts Should Help Find the Right Answers, 33 Seton Hall L.Rev. 987 (2003). Some courts held (or at least suggested) that if the methodology the expert claimed to be using was generally reliable, the expert's opinion was reliable enough to be admissible under Daubert; any misapplications in the methodology were for the fact finder to sort out. See, e.g., U.S. v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir.1994). See, also, State v. Porter, 241 Conn. 57, 698 A.2d 739 (1997). But it soon became apparent to most courts that the distinction between methodology and application was unworkable. As one often-cited opinion explained: [I]t is extremely elusive to attempt to ascertain which of an expert's steps constitute parts of a basic methodology and which constitute changes from that methodology. If a laboratory consistently fails to use certain quality controls so that its results are rendered unreliable, attempting to ascertain whether the lack of quality controls constitutes a failure of a methodology or a failure of application of methodology may be an exercise in metaphysics. Moreover, any misapplication of a methodology that is significant enough to render it unreliable is likely to also be significant enough to skew the methodology. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir.1994). See, also, Cavallo v. Star Enterprise, 892 F.Supp. 756 (E.D.Va.1995), affirmed in part 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir.1996). For the federal courts, the confusion was cleared up with the 2000 amendments to Fed.R.Evid. 702. The 2000 amendments were meant to codify Daubert and its progeny. The revised rule explicitly requires courts to determine if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.  (Emphasis supplied.) 29 Charles Alan Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure 19 (Supp.2002). The advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendment explains that the amendment specifically provides that the trial court must scrutinize not only the principles and methods used by the expert, but also whether those principles and methods have been properly applied to the facts of the case. Id. at 21-22. See, also, Mueller, supra (noting that amendment to rule 702 settled debate in federal courts). We agree with the approach that has become prevalent in the federal courts. We are skeptical that there is a meaningful distinction between a methodology and the application of that methodology. When a step in an otherwise valid methodology is performed incorrectly, we fail to see how the expert's results can be any more reliable than if the methodology itself had been wholly invalid. Accordingly, we hold that it is not enough for the trial court to determine that an expert's methodology is valid in the abstract. The trial court must also determine if the witness has applied the methodology in a reliable manner. With this framework in mind, we turn to the question whether Einspahr's expert testimony was reliable.