Opinion ID: 152605
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The transfer as an adverse employment action

Text: An adverse employment action has been defined as a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of [a plaintiff's] employment. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc) (citation omitted). A bruised ego or a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities is not sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. Id. at 797. Adverse employment actions are typically marked by a significant change in employment status, including hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits. Id. at 798 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998)). Reassignments and position transfers can qualify as adverse employment actions, particularly where they are accompanied by salary or work hour changes. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 885-86 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a job transfer was not an adverse employment action because the plaintiff enjoyed the same ... rate of pay and benefits, and her duties were not materially modified). And even if a reassignment is not paired with a salary or work-hour change, it can nonetheless be considered an adverse employment action where there is evidence that the employee received a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation. Id. at 886 (citation omitted). Upon learning that Spees was pregnant, JMI transferred her from a daytime welding position to a daytime position in the tool room, where she worked for approximately one week before being transferred to a nighttime shift in order to keep her job. Some evidence indicates that the transfer was not a materially adverse change in her employment. For instance, Spees received the same salary while working in the tool room and did not lose any of her benefits. And, as JMI points out in its brief, the working conditions in the tool room were in some ways better than those while welding. JMI contends, for example, that the summer heat was more tolerable in the tool room because Spees could wear two fewer pieces of gear than when welding, and JMI provided a small fan for Spees's personal use. Spees was also not subject to the toxic fumes from welding while working in the tool room. But the record contains other evidence to suggest that Spees's transfer was a materially adverse change. In many ways, the tool-room transfer can be seen as a demotion. Spees was required to complete a 30-day training course to become a welder, but there is no evidence that a tool-room position required any specific training or skill. In addition, Spees appears to have felt unchallenged by her tool-room position, testifying that she found it to be more boring than welding. This contrast weighs in favor of finding the change in job assignments to be materially adverse. See White v. Burlington N., 364 F.3d at 803 (concluding that an employee's transfer from a forklift operator to a standard railroad track laborer job was an adverse employment action because, in part, the forklift operator position required more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige). Moreover, Spees was soon assigned to the night shift, which adversely affected her ability to raise her daughter as a single mother. An inconvenience resulting from a less favorable schedule can render an employment action `adverse' even if the employee's responsibilities and wages are left unchanged. Ginger v. District of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1344 (D.C.Cir.2008) (holding that switching police officers to a rotating morning/afternoon/night shift from a permanent night shift was an adverse employment action because it severely affected their sleep schedules and made it more difficult for them to work overtime and part-time day jobs). Although Spees did not describe in detail how the schedule change affected her, she did state that she wasn't happy about transferring to nights because she was a single mother. And the fact that Spees requested the night-shift position does not diminish JMI's responsibility for the schedule change because Spees was constructively forced to work nights. Both Milam and Spees testified that Milam told her to pursue the night-shift because it was the only option available that would allow her to retain her employment with JMI. This evidence supports the conclusion that she suffered an adverse employment action. Nor does the evidence conclusively indicate that the tool-room position was a more pleasant working environment. Spees testified that working in the tool room was just as hot and as physically demanding as welding, the only difference being that she did not need to do any overhead handling of the welding equipment. And although Spees was not exposed to toxic fumes while working in the tool room, she could have avoided such fumes by wearing a respirator while welding, as first recommended by Dr. Cardenas. On balance, Spees's transfer to the tool room resulted in her working a more inconvenient shift in a position that was less challenging and that required fewer qualifications. Viewing this evidence collectively in Spees's favor, a reasonable jury could find that her transfer to the tool room constituted an adverse employment action.