Opinion ID: 901355
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Defendant's refusal to take a urinalysis

Text: [¶ 38.] There is no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to provide non-testimonial, physical evidence for tests such as fingerprints, writing samples, breath samples, and blood-alcohol tests. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564, 103 S.Ct. 916, 923, 74 L.Ed.2d 748, 759 (1983) (holding no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to provide sample for blood-alcohol test when probable cause exists to believe defendant was driving under the influence); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 762-65, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1831-33, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 915-17 (1966) (holding there is no Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when the State seeks to obtain physical evidence from a suspect that does not involve testimonial compulsion or forced communication); State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128, 130 (S.D.1985) (holding no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to perform field sobriety tests when probable cause exists to believe defendant was driving under the influence). A defendant's refusal to perform such non-testimonial tests is admissible at trial, as the refusal is equally non-communicative and non-testimonial in nature. Neville, 459 U.S. at 564, 103 S.Ct. at 923, 74 L.Ed.2d at 759; Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d at 130. [¶ 39.] Defendant cites Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1198 (Alaska 1983), for the proposition that a refusal to consent to a search should not be admitted at trial, as a person who is asked to consent to a search would not know whether he is protecting or prejudicing himself by choosing not to consent. However, in that case the defendant refused to consent to a pat down, a physical search of his body, after being arrested. Id. at 1196. The defendant in that case was under the mistaken belief that he had a Fourth Amendment right to refuse the physical search. The Alaska Supreme Court's rationale for overturning the admission of the refusal was that it would chill others from exercising the right to refuse consent to future searches in violation of Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 1199. However, in a case more fact specific to the instant case, the Alaska Court of Appeals held that there is no Fifth Amendment right to refuse to perform non-testimonial field sobriety tests, and that the government is not precluded from offering evidence of a defendant's refusal to take such non-testimonial tests. McCormick v. Municipality of Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 159 (Alaska Ct.App.2000). [¶ 40.] Defendant also cites several cases to support his proposition that a refusal to take a non-testimonial physical evidence test is not admissible at trial, including People v. Brooks, 334 Ill.App.3d 722, 268 Ill.Dec. 350, 778 N.E.2d 336 (2002); People v. Eickhoff, 129 Ill.App.3d 99, 84 Ill.Dec. 300, 471 N.E.2d 1066 (1984); and State v. Driver, 38 N.J. 255, 183 A.2d 655 (1962). However, each of these cases is distinguishable from the instant case, as those cases dealt with testing mechanisms that are unreliable and therefore not admissible even if a defendant consents to the particular test. Brooks, 778 N.E.2d at 341 (noting that the results of a portable breath test are inadmissible in Illinois as evidence of intoxication); Eickhoff, 84 Ill.Dec. 300, 471 N.E.2d at 1068 (noting that the results of a polygraph test are inadmissible at trial and therefore the refusal to take the polygraph test is also inadmissible); Driver, 183 A.2d at 658 (holding results of a polygraph test are inadmissible at trial, as is the refusal to take the test). [¶ 41.] Defendant next argues that SDCL 32-23-10.1 [4] makes the refusal to submit to chemical analysis of blood, urine, breath, or other bodily substance admissible into evidence at trial, but only with reference to driving under the influence statutes. Defendant argues this narrowly drawn statute should not be extended to automobile passengers who refuse to submit to a urinalysis after an arrest for possession of a controlled substance. [¶ 42.] SDCL 32-23-10 provides that any person operating a vehicle in South Dakota is deemed to have consented to a chemical test of the alcoholic content of his blood if arrested for driving under the influence. The statutory scheme also provides that the refusal to submit to such a test is admissible at trial for driving under the influence. SDCL 32-23-10.1 and SDCL 19-13-28.1. [5] [¶ 43.] In Neville, the United States Supreme Court held that the refusal to take a blood-alcohol test that is safe, painless, and commonplace, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer and is therefore not protected by the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 459 U.S. at 564, 103 S.Ct. at 923, 74 L.Ed.2d at 759. The Supreme Court, however, did not narrowly limit its holding to DUI implied consent laws. If the state may legitimately compel the defendant, against his will, to accede to a physical test, then the State action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. Neville, 459 U.S. at 563, 103 S.Ct. at 922, 74 L.Ed.2d at 759. [¶ 44.] We have previously adopted the Schmerber analysis in the context of alcohol-related offenses. See State v. Nguyen, 1997 SD 47, 10, 563 N.W.2d 120, 122-23; State v. Tucker, 533 N.W.2d 152, 154-55 (S.D.1995); State v. Sickler, 488 N.W.2d 70, 73 (S.D.1992); State v. Lanier, 452 N.W.2d 144, 145-47 (S.D.1990); State v. Heinrich, 449 N.W.2d 25, 26-27 (S.D.1989); State v. Parker, 444 N.W.2d 42, 43-44 (S.D.1989); State v. Ager, 416 N.W.2d 871, 874 (S.D.1987); State v. Hartman, 256 N.W.2d 131, 134 (S.D.1977). We have also adopted the Schmerber analysis for the offense of possession of marijuana under SDCL 22-42-6. Hanson, 1999 SD 9, ¶ 36, 588 N.W.2d at 893. We have stated: Bodily substance samples are not subject to the exclusionary rule under the Fourth Amendment if they are taken (1) incident to a lawful arrest, (2) by a reliable and accepted method of obtaining such sample, (3) in a reasonable, medically approved manner, and (4) where there is probable cause to believe that the evidence sought exists. It is also held that the elimination of alcohol by natural bodily functions presents exigent circumstances which obviate the necessity of obtaining a search warrant. Id. 28, 588 N.W.2d at 891 (quoting Tucker, 533 N.W.2d at 154 (alterations in original) (citing Hartman, 256 N.W.2d at 134 (citation omitted))). [¶ 45.] Therefore, in drug offense cases, just as in alcohol-related offenses, the refusal by a defendant of an officer's legitimate request to take a urinalysis is not protected by the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and such a refusal by a defendant is admissible at trial. This is so even if the defendant is not warned that his refusal will be admissible at trial. See Neville, 459 U.S. at 565-66, 103 S.Ct. at 923-4, 74 L.Ed2d at 760. [¶ 46.] In the instant case, Defendant was asked to submit to a urinalysis after being arrested for possession of a controlled substance. The arrest was based on probable cause to believe Defendant had committed the offense based on the evidence obtained from the search of the vehicle, and the visible track marks on Defendant's arms. [6] The Defendant had no Fifth Amendment right to refuse the non-testimonial testing procedure. Defendant's refusal to submit to the testing procedure is equally non-testimonial in nature and its admission at trial does not offend the Fifth Amendment. The trial court did not err when it allowed the State to admit Defendant's refusal to submit to law enforcement's legitimate request for the urine sample.