Opinion ID: 2346472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Degree of Negligence

Text: The trial court instructed the jury that the phrase careless, reckless, or negligent manner found in D.C.Code § 40-713 means to operate the vehicle without the exercise of that degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under the same or similar circumstances.... It is a failure to exercise ordinary care. Appellant contends that negligent homicide requires proof of gross negligence, rather than ordinary negligence, in the operation of a motor vehicle. Relevant case law is to the contrary. In Sanderson v. United States, 125 A.2d 70 (D.C.1956), which was also an appeal from a negligent homicide conviction, this court declared that [c]learly, the judge was justified in finding defendant negligent by ordinary and usual standards of care.  Id. at 74 (emphasis added). Furthermore, appellant's argument contradicts the definition of negligence routinely used in this jurisdiction. See STANDARDIZED CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, No. 5-2 (2002 rev. ed.) (defining negligence as the failure to exercise ordinary care, and defining ordinary care as the attention or skill that a reasonable person would use under similar circumstances). We hold accordingly, in light of Sanderson, that the applicable standard is ordinary negligence, not gross negligence. Moreover, in the trial court, defense counsel not only failed to object, but actually agreed with the prosecutor during the conference on instructions that ordinary negligence was the proper standard of culpability. This court has repeatedly held that a defendant may not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal. Brown v. United States, 627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C.1993) (citing cases). Thus, even if appellant's argument had any legal merit, Brown and the cases on which it is based would preclude us from considering it.