Opinion ID: 2271426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellant's competency

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial. Specifically, Appellant argues that the competency evaluation and report relied on by the trial court was not current, and that Appellant's erratic behavior should have caused the trial court to sua sponte order an updated evaluation. We disagree. A defendant is competent to stand trial if he has a substantial capacity to comprehend the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him and to participate rationally in his defense. Alley v. Commonwealth, 160 S.W.3d 736, 739 (Ky.2005) (citing Commonwealth v. Strickland, 375 S.W.2d 701 (Ky.1964)). A competency determination is based on the preponderance of the evidence standard. Chapman v. Commonwealth, 265 S.W.3d 156, 174 (Ky.2007). We review a trial court's finding of competency for clear error and will reverse only if it is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. In response to a motion filed by Appellant's trial counsel on March 9, 2007, the trial court ordered a competency evaluation. Appellant was examined by Dr. Stephen Free in July 2007, and his report was submitted in August 2007. Sometime after his evaluation at the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center (KCPC), Appellant was transferred to the custody of the state of Illinois until some point between June 13, 2008 and July 25, 2008. A competency hearing was later set for September 16, 2008. At the competency hearing, Dr. Free was the sole witness called. Dr. Free testified that he spoke to Appellant about his understanding of the legal process and did not find Appellant suffered from any mental condition which would affect or interfere with his ability to comprehend the nature of the proceedings, or interfere with his ability to rationally participate in his defense. Dr. Free believed that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Further, Dr. Free stated that, assuming Appellant had remained drug-free while incarcerated during the time since the evaluation, he would not expect to see any change in Appellant's condition, barring some catastrophic event. No medication for any medical or mental condition was given to Appellant at the time of his evaluation, nor did his treatment while at KCPC include any prescribed medication. Dr. Free ultimately reaffirmed his belief that Appellant was competent to stand trial at the time of the competency hearing. As Appellant offered no evidence to rebut the claims of Dr. Free, we conclude that the trial court's decision was based upon substantial evidence showing that Appellant was competent to stand trial. Appellant, however, maintains that the trial court should have ordered an updated evaluation of his competency. However, before a trial court may sua sponte order a mental health evaluation of a defendant, the reasonable grounds must be called to the attention of the trial court by the defendant or must be so obvious that the trial court cannot fail to be aware of them. Via v. Commonwealth, 522 S.W.2d 848, 849-50 (Ky.1975). Initially, after the competency hearing, there was no suggestion by Appellant's attorney, the Commonwealth, or the trial court, all of whom were in a position to observe Appellant's behavior at the hearings and during the trial, that Appellant was unable to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding of the nature of the proceedings. Appellant appeared in court for every proceeding and the record demonstrates nothing in Appellant's demeanor at these proceedings that should have given the trial court reason to doubt his competency. We fail to see how the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe the defendant [was] incompetent to stand trial in the period of time between the initial determination of competency and the trial. KRS 504.100(1). Additionally, Appellant contends that, because of the filing of multiple, unintelligible pro se pleadings which refer to constitutional provisions and statutes with little or no bearing on the issues in dispute, the trial court had reasonable grounds to conduct another competency evaluation. However, this is only one factor among many to consider. See Mills v. Commonwealth, 996 S.W.2d 473, 486 (Ky. 1999) (Evidence of a defendant's irrational behavior, his demeanor in court, and any prior medical opinion on competence to stand trial are all relevant facts for a court to consider.). These pleadings, by themselves, are simply insufficient to alert the trial court to question Appellant's competency. Pro se pleadings are not held to the same standard as those prepared by an attorney. Case v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 367, 368 (Ky.1971). In addition, Appellant had been observed by this very trial judge for a period of approximately four years, both during the pendency of this case, as well as a prior proceeding in the McCracken Circuit Court in which Appellant was deemed competent to stand trial. [2] Appellant has pointed to no circumstances suggesting a change that would render the accused unable to meet the standards of competence to stand trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975). Simply stated, Appellant has failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that he was not competent to stand trial, nor does he offer any evidence to rebut the conclusions by Dr. Free that he was competent to stand trial. A State may presume that the defendant is competent and require him to shoulder the burden of proving his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 355, 116 S.Ct. 1373, 134 L.Ed.2d 498 (1996) (citing Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 449, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992)). Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court's failure to order another competency evaluation. We, therefore, must also disagree with Appellant's suggestion that he could not validly waive his right to counsel. The standard for determining a defendant's competency to waive counsel is the same standard used to determine if a defendant is competent to stand trial. Chapman, 265 S.W.3d at 166 (citing Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993)). As Appellant was competent to stand trial, so, too, was he competent to waive his right to counsel.