Opinion ID: 1231969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Review of a Trial Court's Findings at a Franks Hearing

Text: In Franks, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to a hearing to challenge a search warrant affidavit when he shows (1) that the affiant knowingly, intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth included a false statement in the affidavit, and (2) the false statement was necessary to the finding of probable cause. 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676. The defendant must establish the first prong of the test by a preponderance of the evidence before the court may set the false material aside and view the affidavit's remaining content to see whether it is sufficient to establish probable cause. Id. at 156, 98 S.Ct. at 2676. If the affidavit is then insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. Id.
This court has followed Franks when considering challenges as to the truthfulness of factual statements in a search warrant affidavit. State v. Carter, 145 Ariz. 101, 108, 700 P.2d 488, 495 (1985); State v. Poland, 132 Ariz. 269, 279, 645 P.2d 784, 794 (1982). In Carter, we also held that where the falsehoods or omissions were deliberate or reckless, the court must redraft the affidavit by deleting the falsehoods and adding the omitted material facts before moving on to the probable cause determination. 145 Ariz. at 109, 700 P.2d at 496. The trial judge in this case clearly redrafted the affidavit in accordance with Franks and Carter, and also, we assume, followed the law in determining that the misstatements and omissions of material fact were made with the requisite state of mind, before finding the remaining facts insufficient to establish probable cause. [5] On appeal, different standards are used to review the trial court's findings as to whether the affiant included a knowing, intentional, or reckless misstatement of fact and whether the redrafted affidavit establishes probable cause. A trial court's finding on whether the affiant deliberately included misstatements of law or excluded material facts is a factual determination, upheld unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Fawole, 785 F.2d 1141, 1145 (4th Cir.1986); United States v. Elliott, 893 F.2d 220, 222 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 268, 112 L.Ed.2d 224 (1990); United States v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701, 705 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 312, 102 L.Ed.2d 331 (1988); United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1079 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 259, 112 L.Ed.2d 216 (1990). This standard is consistent with the general body of law holding review for clear error appropriate where the applicable legal standard provides for a strictly factual test, such as state of mind. See United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1203 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 101, 83 L.Ed.2d 46 (1984). In this case, as Buccini notes, the trial judge was in a unique position to judge Kadous' credibility and determine that he was on notice of material facts that he either misstated or omitted entirely from the affidavit. The Court in Franks stressed that the showing for probable cause must be truthful, in the sense that the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true. 438 U.S. at 165, 98 S.Ct. at 2681. It is clear that Buccini told Kadous of his alibi and named several alibi witnesses. The evidence at the hearing also showed that Kadous knew Buccini was still employed at Canyon Ranch and knew that he had to be at work that day. Therefore, the evidence supports the trial judge's implicit finding that Kadous at least recklessly [6] misstated material facts by swearing under oath that Buccini did not have anyone to substantiate his alibi, and by inferring that Buccini was hurrying Kadous in order to prevent him from discovering further evidence. We cannot conclude, therefore, that the trial judge committed clear error or abused her discretion in making this finding. Cf. State v. Claxton, 122 Ariz. 246, 248, 594 P.2d 112, 114 (Ct.App. 1979) (officer's statement in the affidavit that defendant was in possession of merchandise was found to be knowingly and intentionally false or made with reckless disregard for the truth where officer admitted at hearing that there was, at best, only a possibility that jewelry was back in [defendant's] possession). We conclude that the trial judge was correct in following the first prong of Franks and redrafting the search warrant affidavit to exclude the material misstatements and include the relevant omitted facts. We must now determine whether the redrafted search warrant was sufficient to establish probable cause. [7]
The court of appeals apparently reviewed the trial court's probable cause determination under an abuse of discretion standard. Buccini, 165 Ariz. at 110, 796 P.2d at 912. Although this court has never expressly considered this issue, we believe that de novo review is the proper standard to review a trial court's finding as to whether a redrafted search warrant affidavit is sufficient to establish probable cause. See, e.g., Elliott, 893 F.2d at 222; Dozier, 844 F.2d at 705; United States v. Grandstaff, 813 F.2d 1353, 1355 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. United States, 484 U.S. 837, 108 S.Ct. 119, 98 L.Ed.2d 78 (1987); see also McConney, 728 F.2d at 1203 (noting that the United States Supreme Court has held that the mixed question of probable cause is treated as a question of law and reviewed de novo). Although in most instances a magistrate's finding that sufficient probable cause exists to issue a search warrant will not be overturned unless it is clearly erroneous, this rule does not apply when a trial court reviews an affidavit that was submitted to the magistrate and later found to have been supported by false statements. Elliott, 893 F.2d at 222. Under these circumstances, the trial court must undertake an independent review of the effect of the false statements on probable cause because the question turns on the consequences of a fraud on the issuing magistrate which that magistrate was not in a position to evaluate. Id. Because the magistrate's discretion was vitiated by fraud, the question turns on the legal effect of the correct facts. De novo review of the trial court's finding as to the existence of probable cause is therefore appropriate. Id. Moreover, as the McConney court noted, de novo review is proper when a mixed question of law and fact implicates constitutional rights. 728 F.2d at 1203. Clearly, when we are required to apply the legal standard for probable cause, we must go beyond the facts of the case and consider the abstract legal principles that inform constitutional jurisprudence. Id. Other state courts follow the rule of de novo review as well. See, e.g., State v. Rubio, 115 Idaho 873, 771 P.2d 537 (App.), rev. denied, 117 Idaho 509, 788 P.2d 1332 (1989); People v. Caserta, 123 Ill. App.3d 608, 79 Ill.Dec. 52, 463 N.E.2d 190 (1984); see also People v. Loewen, 35 Cal.3d 117, 196 Cal. Rptr. 846, 850, 672 P.2d 436, 440 (1983) (whether search was reasonable within the meaning of the constitution is a question of law, and appellate court must exercise its independent judgment, measuring the facts, as found by the trier, against the constitutional standard of reasonableness).
In undertaking de novo review of the probable cause determination under the redrafted affidavit, we must apply the standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Under Gates, probable cause exists if given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. In Carter, we applied the Gates standard using the following test: An officer has probable cause to conduct a search if a reasonably prudent person, based upon the facts known by the officer, would be justified in concluding that the items sought are connected with the criminal activity and that they would be found at the place to be searched. 145 Ariz. at 110, 700 P.2d at 497 (citations omitted). The redrafted affidavit indicates that Kadous knew the following facts at the time he applied for the search warrant: first, Moore, the victim of the bombing, had been involved in a minor traffic accident with Buccini several weeks before the bombing; second, a note reading drop it was found on the victim's vehicle; third, Buccini could account for his whereabouts on the night in question and had named several witnesses who could verify his presence at the bar and at his parents' residence before, during, and after the bombing, which occurred at 11:56 p.m.; [8] and finally, Buccini apparently had lawfully experimented with explosives and had gunpowder and fuse in his home. In this case, the property to be seized constituted items that could be used to make an explosive device. Buccini never denied that he had worked in an ammunition supply store and that he kept such items in connection with his reloading hobby. We have no quarrel, then, with the court of appeals' statement that there was probable cause to believe that such items would be found in the search. Buccini, 165 Ariz. at 110, 796 P.2d at 912. However, justification for a search requires more. The inquiry is not whether these items could be found in Buccini's house; the critical question is whether such items were connected with the particular criminal activity of which he was suspected. [9] Gates, 462 U.S. at 2388, 103 S.Ct. at 2322; Carter, 145 Ariz. at 110, 700 P.2d at 497. Any other result would justify search of any premises connected with the use, distribution, or sale of guns or explosive materials. The items to be seized were not contraband, nor are the materials or equipment in question inherently criminal. Thus, the strength of the inference that the items were connected with criminal activity depends upon the strength of the evidence indicating that Buccini was responsible for the bombing. The affidavit recounts the fact that Buccini and Moore were involved in a traffic accident. There was no evidence that the encounter was hostile or that Buccini later evinced any threatening behavior toward Moore. Further, there was no evidence that the note reading drop it was tied in any way to Buccini. It is not alleged in the affidavit or otherwise that Moore or his insurer had instituted any type of proceedings against Buccini or that Buccini was aware of any threat to do so. Thus, the phrase drop it seems to have little relevance when related to an incident that occurred weeks earlier. In short, the affidavit does not show that, so far as Buccini knew, Moore had anything to drop. The facts relating to Buccini's alibi, then, were critical to the probable cause determination. If Buccini had a firm alibi for the time of the bombing, there would be no basis to believe that the items in his home were connected to the bombing, and therefore no probable cause. Absent facts indicating that the alibi was untrue, we cannot say that a reasonably prudent person would be justified in concluding that the items sought were connected with criminal activity. To the contrary, the officer's deliberate or reckless omission and misstatement of material facts indicates that he was acting mainly upon a suspicion or hunch that Buccini was responsible for the bombing. An officer's mere suspicion that a search will reveal items connected to criminal activity is not sufficient to establish probable cause. United States v. Kandlis, 432 F.2d 132 (9th Cir.1970); State v. Hutton, 110 Ariz. 339, 341, 519 P.2d 38, 40 (1974). To the contrary, as the United States Supreme Court pointed out in Johnson v. United States: The point of the Fourth Amendment, which is often not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. 333 U.S. 10, 13-14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). We conclude, therefore, that the redrafted affidavit does not provide probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant. The redrafted affidavit fails to show probable cause connecting Buccini or Buccini's home with the crime. While it shows that he possessed property of the type that might be connected with the crime, it also shows that this possession is explained and is not refuted by any facts cited in the affidavit. Further, the redrafted affidavit shows an alibi for the crime, and, again, the affidavit provides no facts indicating the alibi to be untrue or possibly untrue. Because the materiality of false statements or omissions is reviewed de novo, we need not accord any special deference to the trial judge's findings in this regard. See Grandstaff, 813 F.2d at 1355. However, in this case, given the importance of the alibi to the probable cause determination, we are compelled to agree with the trial judge's conclusion that had Kadous truthfully revealed the fact that Buccini had an alibi and witnesses, the magistrate would have been prompted to inquire whether Kadous had attempted to verify the alibi. Thus, the omission was material in that it rendered the affidavit substantially misleading and was also necessary to the finding of probable cause. See People v. Aston, 39 Cal.3d 481, 216 Cal. Rptr. 771, 780, 703 P.2d 111, 120 (1985) (citing People v. Kurland, 28 Cal.3d 376, 168 Cal. Rptr. 667, 618 P.2d 213 (1980)) (omissions are material where there is a substantial possibility that the omitted facts would have altered a reasonable magistrate's probable cause determination). [10] We realize that probable cause is a somewhat fluid concept that turns on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts. Gates, 462 U.S. at 232, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. We also agree that [r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause.... United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). However, even if this were a close case on the probable cause finding, policy considerations militate in favor of resolving this probable cause determination in the defendant's favor. The rule in non- Franks cases considers the general presumption of validity of a search warrant and the deference given to a magistrate's determination of probable cause in concluding that in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fail. See 2 W. LA FAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE § 4.4 at 199 (2d ed. 1987) (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). The same rule, however, does not apply to a Franks case. To the contrary: [W]hen it has been established that the earlier finding of probable cause was based upon a broader set of facts, some of which are now shown to be false, there is no longer any reason to give deference to that earlier finding. Thus, when a court reassesses a search warrant affidavit with the false allegations excised, a doubtful or marginal case should be resolved in the defendant's favor. That is, in such circumstances the probable cause determination should be made as it would upon a motion to suppress evidence obtained without a warrant. Id. The policy underlying Franks seeks to mitigate the dangers of the ex parte procedure used to obtain a search warrant, and to deter over-zealous officers from supplying false information in their efforts to obtain access to the constitutionally protected privacy of one's home or car. See Franks, 438 U.S. at 168-169, 98 S.Ct. at 2682-83. We firmly adhere to these policies and believe that where the officer has deliberately or recklessly made material misstatements and omissions in the original affidavit, it is appropriate to resolve marginal probable cause determinations in such a manner as will best uphold the integrity of the fourth amendment.