Opinion ID: 1797186
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the lower court erred in adjudging the $15,862.00 loaned armana by griffin for armana's son's education to be a gift from griffin unto armana's son.

Text: Griffin argues that the chancellor erred in finding the payment of $15,862.00 to St. Stephen's School a gift to Armana's son, Henri. This Court has held that it cannot overturn a decree of a chancellor unless it finds, with reasonable certainty, that the decree is manifestly wrong on a question of law or interpretation of facts pertaining to legal questions. In re Enlargement of Boundaries of Yazoo City, 452 So.2d 837 (Miss. 1984). Although there may have been sufficient evidence to support the chancellor's finding that Griffin's payment of the outstanding tuition debt was a gift to Henri, there is conflicting testimony as to whether the money was a loan or a gift to a loved family member. Simply put, it became a question of credibility. However, the chancellor applied an improper legal standard. In requiring a showing of fraud on behalf of Armana regarding the $15,862.00 payment to St. Stephen's School, the chancellor applied the wrong legal standard. In light of the facts in the case sub judice and the chancellor's finding of a confidential relationship, an unrebutted showing of undue influence was all that was necessary. Fraud is too high a standard and not applicable in this case. Therefore, the chancellor erred in finding the $15,862.00 payment to St. Stephen's School a gift. The chancellor found that there was a confidential and fiduciary relationship between Griffin and Armana. Such a finding raises the presumption of undue influence. To rebut this presumption, Armana must show clear and convincing evidence that she did not exert undue influence on Griffin to obtain the funds in question. This Court, in Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 115 So.2d 683 (1959), noted the following: [T]he rule applied in the case of gifts inter vivos, as by deed, [is] that where a confidential relation exists between donor and donee, it is presumptively void and the burden rests on the donee to produce clear and convincing evidence that the gift is free from the taint of undue influence... . Id. 115 So.2d at 687-88. When [a confidential] relation exists, and the parties thereto  `consciously and intentionally deal and negotiate with each other, each knowingly taking a part in the transaction, and there results from their dealing some conveyance or contract or gift,    the principle literally and directly applies. The transaction is not necessarily voidable, it may be valid, but a presumption of its invalidity arises. .. .' 2 Pomeroy Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed.), § 957. Id. 115 So.2d at 687 (quoting Ham v. Ham, 146 Miss. 161, 110 So. 583, 584 (1926)). With a gift inter vivos, there is an automatic presumption of undue influence even without abuse of the confidential relationship. Such gifts are presumptively invalid. Madden v. Rhodes, 626 So.2d 608, 618 (Miss. 1993). The Madden Court continued: The appropriate standard, then, is that no abuse of the confidential relationship must be proved to raise the rebuttable presumption of undue influence accompanying an inter vivos transfer. Nor does this Court require a finding of mental incompetence on the part of the grantor to raise the presumption. When a confidential relationship exists, the presumption arises automatically, to be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence presented by the one who wishes to uphold the validity of the gift. Id. at 619. We may never know exactly what transpired between Armana and Griffin concerning the payment to St. Stephen's School. Although Griffin, Armana and Henri each testified, their testimony is in conflict and therefore not conclusive. It is this problem that this Court's rule regarding the presumption of undue influence seeks to alleviate. As stated in Meek v. Perry, 36 Miss. 190, 246 (1858), if the court does not watch these transactions with a jealousy almost invincible, in a great majority of cases, it will lend its assistance to fraud. Further, this is a policy of the law, founded on the safety and convenience of mankind ... preventing acts of bounty. Id. at 247. Armana argues that the payment was a gift to Henri, in consideration of his doing well in school and helping his uncle around the house and on the farm. However, Henri received expense money from his uncle, a car and gas charge card for his personal use, in addition to a roof over his head and food in his stomach while he resided with his uncle. Armana requested Griffin's assistance with Henri's tuition problem on very short notice. Armana sent a mailgram on January 9, 1989, which reads: A.C. AND HENRY. TRIED TO WRAP UP MONEY SITU. BUT MUSYL APPEALED IN FACT. DON'T WORRY HANDWRITING PROVED FORGERY HEARING TEN JAN. TRYING TO GET TO U.S. END OF MONTH. CAN A.C. TAKE CARE OF ST. STEPHEN'S PAYMENT TO LIBERATE SCHOOL RECORDS BY 15 JAN. WILL CALL WHEN ETA FIRM. LOVE PAM. Griffin testified that he spoke with Armana regarding the debt; that she stated that she expected the case against the estate of her previous husband, Henri Nicolas, Sr., to soon settle; and that she would pay him back. Griffin also testified that Henri assured him that he would be paid back, stating [U]ncle A.C., I appreciate this so much. I will certainly see that you get paid. Griffin paid this debt under the undue influence of Armana. In light of the chancellor's finding that a confidential relationship existed between Armana and Griffin, a presumption of undue influence was raised which Armana failed to rebut with clear and convincing evidence. The chancellor erred in finding that Griffin failed to prove fraud on Armana's part regarding the payment of this money. This was not the proper legal standard applicable to the case sub judice. Accordingly, as to Assignment of Error IV, the ruling of the chancellor is reversed and remanded for a hearing consistent with this opinion.