Opinion ID: 654569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence

Text: 75 It is also incomprehensible to me why this court would want to adopt a test that compels plaintiffs to base their pleadings on direct evidence or suffer dismissal--unless the court intends to eliminate all civil rights actions involving unconstitutional motive. As noted in Harlow, the purpose of the qualified immunity defense is to winnow out insubstantial claims before they reach discovery and trial. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-38. But the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is irrelevant to determining the likely merits of a claim. 76 It is indisputable that the probative value of circumstantial evidence is intrinsically no different from testimonial evidence, Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954), and can in some cases be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence. Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330, 81 S.Ct. 6, 11, 5 L.Ed.2d 20 (1960). Circumstantial evidence can be of high probative quality. For example, if one goes to bed and there is no snow on the ground, and one wakes up to find snow on the ground, the snow is powerful evidence--albeit wholly circumstantial--that it snowed while one was asleep. Conversely, direct evidence can consist of something as incredible and unreliable as the testimony of a convicted perjurer who asserts that the defendant confessed his intent and motive to him. If Kimberlin had supported his pleadings with one such affidavit, the majority would now be constrained to [303 U.S.App.D.C. 350] allow him to continue with his suit. I see no reason why this type of direct evidence should suffice to allow a plaintiff to proceed to discovery, when strong circumstantial evidence of a pattern of conduct that overwhelmingly supports an inference that the defendants acted with unconstitutional motive--evidence that Kimberlin has proffered--would not. Redress for violations of the Constitution surely should not rest on such flimsy distinctions. 77 It is also well-recognized that, in almost any claim involving motive, a defendant's state of mind is typically established by circumstantial evidence because of the difficulty in obtaining direct evidence of motive. 11 In criminal cases, for example, where the burden of proof is considerably higher than in a Bivens suit, this court and others have recognized that [i]ntent may, and generally must, be proved circumstantially; normally, the natural probable consequences of an act may satisfactorily evidence the state of mind accompanying it. United States v. Jackson, 513 F.2d 456, 461 (D.C.Cir.1975) (footnotes omitted). 12 Nor does this court distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal case. United States v. Lam Kwong-Wah, 924 F.2d 298, 303 (D.C.Cir.1991) (No distinction is made between direct and circumstantial evidence in evaluating the sufficiency of evidence supporting a guilty verdict.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 287, 121 L.Ed.2d 213 (1992); see also United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362 (6th Cir.1984) (ruling that circumstantial evidence alone can sustain a guilty verdict and that to do so, circumstantial evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except guilt). 78 If circumstantial evidence suffices to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, it should certainly satisfy this court's heightened pleading standard in a civil case. Indeed, to require plaintiffs to plead direct evidence of intent is to require plaintiffs to provide more evidence at the pleading stage than is required to win the case at trial. See Crutcher, 883 F.2d at 504 (rejecting direct evidence requirement because it would require plaintiff to come forth with more evidence than she would have to produce to prevail on the merits); see also American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 411, 70 S.Ct. 674, 690, 94 L.Ed. 925 (1950) (noting that courts and juries every day pass upon knowledge, belief and intent ... having before them no more than evidence of their words and conduct, from which, in ordinary human experience, mental condition may be inferred). 79 Given the recognized difficulty of proving intent by direct evidence, the effect of a direct evidence pleading requirement will be to prevent a plaintiff from overcoming the [303 U.S.App.D.C. 351] qualified immunity defense except in the most extraordinary circumstances. In Hobson, for example, a 15-month intensive investigation by a Select Committee of the United States Senate turned up direct evidence that two of the five Hobson defendants had acted with intent to violate the plaintiffs' civil rights. See SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS, supra note 6, BOOK I, FOREIGN AND MILITARY OPERATIONS at III. If a direct evidence requirement has been applied in Hobson, however, the complaints brought against the other three defendants would have been dismissed for lack of direct evidence of intent. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 80 Justice Marshall recognized this effect in his dissenting opinion in Siegert. Justice Marshall wrote that, [b]ecause evidence of [unconstitutional] intent is peculiarly within the control of the defendant, the 'heightened pleading' rule employed by the Court of Appeals effectively precludes any Bivens action in which the defendant's state of mind is an element of the underlying claim. Siegert, 500 U.S. at ---- - ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1800-01 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Two other circuits have wisely rejected a heightened pleading standard that requires direct evidence for this very reason. Branch, 937 F.2d at 1386-87 (Because evidence of intent is largely within the control of the defendant and often can be obtained only through discovery, we are unwilling to require a plaintiff to present direct evidence of that intent in order to avert dismissal.); Elliott, 937 F.2d at 345 (Requiring 'direct' evidence of intent would be fatal in all but the rare case in which the defendant confessed.); see also Siegert, 895 F.2d at 806 (Wald, C.J., dissenting in part) (The policy of requiring specific, direct evidence of the defendant's unconstitutional intent, when unflinchingly applied to all cases in which a qualified immunity defense is raised, effectively cuts off both bona fide and ill-motivated suits.). 81 A pleading standard that effectively precludes all Bivens actions that involve unconstitutional motive is a cynical perversion of this court's responsibility to strike a balance between the evils inevitable in resolving immunity questions--the evil of shutting out meritorious civil rights claims, and the evil of exposing Government officials to the burdens of litigation and liability. Harlow, 457 U.S. at 813-14, 102 S.Ct. at 2735-36. And, because the direct evidence requirement effectively precludes an entire class of civil rights claims, it stands in flat contradiction with the dictates of Bivens itself, which reaffirmed the notion that  '[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.'  Bivens, 403 U.S. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803)). As both Justice Kennedy and Justice Marshall indicated in Siegert, there is no warrant for ... a [direct evidence] rule as a matter of precedent or common sense. Siegert, 500 U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1801 (Marshall, J., dissenting); id., at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1795 (Kennedy, J. concurring) (Circumstantial evidence may be as probative as testimonial evidence.).