Opinion ID: 3040457
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Status Conference with the Parties

Text: On the morning of August 29, 2003, after the jury had deliberated for three-and-a-half days, the district court held a status conference with all parties and their respective attorneys. The court hoped to discuss some of the jurors’ conflicting schedules, that appeared to limit the number of days available for deliberation. The court believed that some of these requests for days off might be related to “the issue of stress and responsibility on the part of the jury.” The court suggested that it might be helpful to engage in an informal discussion with jurors on the record but outside the presence of the parties and their attorneys. The court explained its proposal: I think this is the time when the jurors need under- standing and patience. This is the time when we do what we can to lead them not to make a rush to judg- ment and emotional unfair verdicts, chaos within the jury room and eventually a verdict of hung jury. If there had been any suggestions about an Allen instruction I want the record to indicate that I do not believe in the Allen instruction, I will not give it, never have given it. My suggestion was to communicate with the jurors quietly and personally, to convey to the jury, of course, an understanding of their problems. It’s not an easy task for the jurors to listen to two months of legal arguments, for them to have a clear head to the 716 UNITED STATES v. BERGER point where they could return what we would call a reasonable judgment. My effort to communicate, wish to communicate was to add a positive energy to the deliberations, and not to impose ridiculous time tables. And this communication technique has been used, with the con- sent of the parties of course, on dozens of occasions and used when I have been on the bench. It has saved many jury verdicts and of course, the goodwill of the judicial system. My philosophy there is not to encourage them to do anything more than to diligently study the evidence, to relieve the tension and to redefine their responsibility. Defense counsel expressed concern that the need for the judge to address the jurors was not yet necessary. After fur- ther discussion, however, counsel for Berger and Metz indicated that “doing it informally” might be acceptable. Berger’s counsel agreed with the prosecutor that it would be more productive for the court to indicate what it intended to say, and then the parties “could come to an agreement pretty quickly.” The court explained: This is what I was planning to do. I was planning to address the issue, first of all, regarding the jury request for days off. And in the process of doing so I was going to suggest to them that your fellow jurors are going to be, I suppose there will be, contrary to their particular private plans, but then we also recognize the fact that if you have to take off we could certainly understand that. And I want to make certain that I can convey to them the thought that a rush to judgment is probably the UNITED STATES v. BERGER 717 worst form of verdict you could receive. I feel very strong about that. Other than that, nothing magical about what I want to say except that in the past anyway, it’s been very effective when I could get down to the jury room, chat with them, let them know that they’re not doing wrong. And a lot of times there’s little clashes within the jury room and I try to resolve those. It’s not a question of emotions, it’s a question of determining what the truth is. Write your script and I will cer- tainly diligently — Counsel for defendants declined the court’s invitation to write a “script.” Metz’s counsel stated that Metz would be willing to have the court informally address the jury “without counsel being present,” because the court’s “vague outline” of what it intended to say “does not sound to us like it will in any way pressure the jury to rush to judgment,” but “will do just the opposite.” Berger’s counsel agreed, stating that he had conferred with Metz’s counsel and agreed “with everything he said.” Berger’s counsel’s agreement was qualified only by his request that, “in discussing search for justice,” the jurors “be reminded that the government bears the burden of proof and guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Based on this representation from counsel, the court accepted Berger’s personal waiver of his right to be present for the court’s meeting with the jury. Berger waived his “right to be present for the particular communication that [the court] anticipate[d] having with the jury.” The court found Berger’s and Metz’s waivers to be free and voluntary.