Opinion ID: 781405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Walker and Roberts were constructively denied counsel.

Text: 131 Walker and Roberts did not argue to the district court that they were constructively denied counsel. Generally, this Court cannot determine a claim of inadequate representation on direct appeal when the claim has not been raised before the district court. United States v. Freeze, 707 F.2d 132, 138 (5th Cir.1983). Only when the record is sufficiently developed with respect to such a claim, will we determine the merits of the claim. Id. (citing United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1040 (5th Cir.1981)). 132 Walker and Roberts argue that they were constructively denied counsel because their lawyers deferred to Griffin's counsel and thereby represented only Griffin's interests. They also argue that their lawyers failed to subject the government's case to meaningful adversarial testing. Specifically, Walker and Roberts complain that their attorneys did not raise the defense that they were unaware of Griffin's illegal activities because doing so would have been inconsistent with Griffin's defense that she did not own part of BHHI and therefore had done nothing wrong. 133 Additionally, Walker and Roberts argue that their attorneys did not make motions for separate trials. Furthermore, their attorneys did not object when the government elicited testimony that was damaging to them. In particular, the government elicited evidence of the sale of land to Mitchell by BHHI for $15,000.00 an acre, even though BHHI had only paid $2,000.00 an acre for the land. Walker and Roberts argue that this land sale was irrelevant to the charged counts, even though the government argues that the sale showed a concert of action in relation to BHHI and revealed the source of the bribe to Griffin. Walker and Roberts also point out that the district court expressed concern at several points during the trial that Griffin's attorney seemed to be representing everyone, even though Walker and Roberts might have different interests. 134 Notably, Griffin's attorney filed boilerplate objections to Walker's sentencing on his behalf, which were the same as those filed for Griffin and not specific to Walker's interests. The district court, however, refused to allow Griffin's attorney to represent Walker because of his loyalty to Griffin, who had different legal and factual positions. The district court also questioned Roberts' attorney as to whether he truly was comfortable that he has represented Roberts' interests without regard to Griffin. The district court then reiterated that it had told Walker and his counsel in no uncertain terms, that Mr. Walker needed separate counsel, truly separate counsel. 135 In order for an attorney's assistance to be so defective as to require reversal of the conviction, the defendant must make two showings: 136 First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 137 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). However, the defendant need not make a specific showing of prejudice in a limited number of cases. These include: (1) the complete denial of counsel, such as if the accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial; (2) situations in which counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing; and, (3) on some occasions when although counsel is available to assist the accused during trial, the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659-660, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). A constructive denial of counsel occurs in only a very narrow spectrum of cases where the circumstances leading to counsel's ineffectiveness are so egregious that the defendant was in effect denied any meaningful assistance at all. Gochicoa v. Johnson, 238 F.3d 278, 284 (5th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). Walker and Roberts allege that their representation at trial completely failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing and, therefore, they were constructively denied counsel. 138 In Burdine v. Johnson, this Court held that the defendant was denied counsel and was entitled to a presumption of prejudice when his lawyer repeatedly slept as evidence was being introduced against him. 262 F.3d 336, 338 (5th Cir.2001) (en banc). Additionally, 139 [w]e have found constructive denial in cases involving the absence of counsel from the courtroom, conflicts of interest between defense counsel and the defendant, and official interference with the defense; and have stated that constructive denial will be found when counsel fails to subject the prosecution's case to any meaningful adversarial testing. 140 Gochicoa, 238 F.3d at 284. However, 141 we have refused to find a constructive denial where defense counsel investigated only certain issues, where counsel's trial presentation was somewhat casual, where counsel failed to pursue a challenge based on racial bias in jury selection, to object to a variation between the indictment and the jury charge, or to raise a meritorious issue on appeal. Thus, prejudice is presumed, and Washington 's second prong inapplicable, only when the defendant demonstrates that counsel was not merely incompetent but inert, distinguishing shoddy representation from no representation at all. When the defendant complains of errors, omissions, or strategic blunders, prejudice is not presumed; bad lawyering, regardless of how bad, does not support the per se presumption of prejudice. 142 Id. at 284-85 (citations and internal quotations omitted). The attorneys' acts of which Walker and Roberts complain fall in this latter group of cases. The record indicates that there was no complete absence of counsel, no actual conflict between the attorneys and their clients, and no official interference. In addition, Walker's and Roberts' attorneys made opening statements, albeit after the government's case. Both attorneys also questioned some of the witnesses and made closing statements. We find, therefore, that prejudice cannot be presumed in this case. 143 Furthermore, Walker and Roberts have not shown this Court that their counsels' performance was deficient under the first prong of Washington. In other words, they have not shown that their counsels' errors were serious enough to constitute a deficiency, or that they suffered actual prejudice. A decision by co-defendants to proceed with a unified defense is one of trial strategy, and not a basis for an ineffective assistance claim. See United States v. Mooney, 769 F.2d 496, 499-500 (8th Cir.1985). 144 Additionally, although Walker and Roberts argue that their attorneys were deficient in failing to seek separate trials, the Supreme Court has indicated that a severance of co-defendants' trials should be granted only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). We have found that a defendant did not suffer prejudice from the joinder of his trial with a co-defendant when there was sufficient evidence to convict the defendant. See United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1036-37 (5th Cir.1996). Lastly, Walker and Roberts have not shown prejudice in that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent any alleged errors. We find, therefore, that Walker and Roberts were not constructively denied counsel. 145 J. Whether the district court erred in sentencing the Appellants in its calculations of the benefits to be received from the bribes, the existence of multiple bribes, and the amount of restitution owed to Mitchell. 146 All three Appellants assert that the district court erred in calculating their sentences. In reviewing a sentence imposed by a district court under the federal sentencing guidelines, `we review the trial court's findings of fact for clear error and review purely legal conclusions or interpretations of the meaning of a guideline de novo. ' United States v. Canada, 110 F.3d 260, 262-63 (5th Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 733 (5th Cir.1995)). Clear error exists if this court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Estate of Jameson v. Commissioner, 267 F.3d 366, 370 (5th Cir.2001). 147 As to Griffin's sentence, the district court applied a total offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of I. The district court began with a base offense level of 10 under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, which is applicable to offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). The court then increased the offense level by 2 under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(1) because it found that there was more than one bribe. The court also increased the offense level by an additional 13 under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A) because it found that the value of the benefit to be received from the offenses was $3.1 million. In addition, the court increased the offense level by 2 under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c) for her role in the offense, and by 2 under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice. These increases resulted in a total offense level of 29. Walker's and Roberts' offense levels were similarly increased by two on a finding of more than one bribe, and by 13 on the calculation of approximately a $3.1 million benefit to be received from the offenses. 148 The Appellants argue that there was only one bribe alleged in the indictment, and that it was error to find two bribes. Further, the Appellants contend that the only benefit to be received by BHHI from the Golden Oaks project bribe was the $403,289.00 in profit to BHHI, as stated by Mitchell in a line item in the tax credit application that he prepared. The district court also included in its calculations the $216,000.00 for the 108 acres left over from the land that Smith sold to BHHI, the $61,522.00 salary that Roberts received from One Golden Oaks Ltd., the $400,000.00 developer's fee that Roberts anticipated from completing the project, and the $120,000.00 anticipated profit on the Shadow Wood project. The Appellants argue that the $2.4 million profit calculation is incorrect, and that the additional amounts were not part of the benefit to be received and should not be taken into account. Rather, Appellants argue that $403,289.00, which was the amount listed as the contractor profit on the Golden Oaks project's tax credit application, should have been used. 149 The amount of benefit to be received is a fact finding issue that is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Chmielewski, 196 F.3d 893, 894 (7th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Bankston, 182 F.3d 296, 317 (5th Cir.1999), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Cleveland v. United States, 529 U.S. 1017, 120 S.Ct. 1416, 146 L.Ed.2d 309 (2000). The district court need not determine the value of the benefit with precision. United States v. Landers, 68 F.3d 882, 884 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1995). In fact, in determining the amount of benefit to be received, courts may consider the expected benefits, not only the actual benefits received. See, e.g., Chmielewski, 196 F.3d at 894-95; United States v. Thickstun, 110 F.3d 1394, 1400 (9th Cir.1997). 150 The guideline commentary defines the value of the benefit received or to be received as the net value of such benefit. U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1(b)(2)(A), comment. (n. 2). The commentary provides two examples: 151 (1) A government employee, in return for a $500 bribe, reduces the price of a piece of surplus property offered for sale by the government from $10,000 to $2,000; the value of the benefit received is $8,000. (2) A $150,000 contract on which $20,000 profit was made was awarded in return for a bribe; the value of the benefit received is $20,000. Do not deduct the value of the bribe itself in computing the value of the benefit received or to be received. In the above examples, therefore, the value of the benefit received would be the same regardless of the value of the bribe. 152 U.S.S.G. § 2C1.1, comment. (n. 2). We have stated that these examples make clear that direct costs should be deducted from the gross value of the contract. Landers, 68 F.3d at 884. 153 Applying these principles, we find that the district court clearly erred in calculating the Appellants' sentences. First, we find that the district court clearly erred in determining BHHI's anticipated profit to be $2.4 million, which was the difference between what BHHI allegedly was going to bill One Golden Oaks, Ltd. and what the actual building costs were projected to be. We can find no evidence in the record to indicate BHHI intended to bill One Golden Oaks, Ltd. $7.5 million. We also cannot find any evidence to support the district court's conclusion that building costs were projected to be $5.1 million. There is nothing in the record to support the district court's finding that the profit expected by the Appellants was $2.4 million. Apparently, the district court adopted the figure of $2.4 million as the profit to be made by BHHI, as described in the Appellants' PSRs, which is the major item in the $3.1 million benefits. 154 The Golden Oaks project's tax credit application is the best indicator in the record as to what the expected costs and profits were. Mitchell specifically noted in the tax credit application that BHHI's expected profit was $403,289.00, which we conclude is the best available evidence of what BHHI's expected profit was. 155 Second, we agree with the Appellants' argument that the benefit received should not have included the $216,000.00 that BHHI earned from the land sale to One Golden Oaks, Ltd. This sale had nothing to do with any bribe concerning Griffin's vote for the Golden Oaks project's tax credit application. Mitchell hired Roberts to obtain land for the project, which he did. As a sophisticated businessman, Mitchell knew or should have known the potential costs of purchasing land in the location intended for the project. Roberts' act of making a profit off of his own business partner may be unethical and possibly actionable in a civil lawsuit; but it was not a crime and we do not believe it can be included within the scope of the bribe in this case. 156 Third, we do not believe that the benefit received should have included Roberts' salary amounting to $61,522 6 or his anticipated $400,000 expected bonus. Both the salary and bonus were negotiated with Mitchell before any bribery scheme came into being. And, Roberts would have received these amounts regardless of any bribes had the project been completed. Again, these amounts were negotiated with Mitchell, a sophisticated businessman, who clearly viewed the salary and bonus as part of the cost of doing business. These amounts cannot be included in the scope of the bribery scheme. 157 Fourth, we conclude that the $120,000 expected profit from the Shadow Wood project should not have been considered as part of the benefit received. The record includes very little testimony concerning this potential project. Regardless, the record clearly indicates that Griffin never voted on this project, nor was there any evidence that she intended to so. Furthermore, the indictment does not even include a charge that refers to this project or a bribe for Griffin's vote. Therefore, the $120,000 should not have been included in the calculations. 158 We conclude that the expected benefit to the Appellants should have been the $403,289.00, which is stated in the tax credit application; and it was clear error for the district court to include the other amounts discussed above. As a result, the Appellants' sentences must be recalculated to account for this change. 159 Similarly, we conclude that the district court erred in applying a two level increase as a result of concluding that there were two bribes in this case. Our reading of the indictment is that there was only one bribe charged — the bribe for Griffin's vote on the Golden Oaks project. As noted above, though there was some testimony concerning other intended projects such as Shadow Wood, they had nothing to do with the bribe charged in this case. Therefore, this two level increase should not have been applied. 160 Lastly, we question the district court's determination that Mitchell is owed $783,455.00 in restitution, which was based on the amount of restitution recommended in the Appellants' PSRs. There are two puzzling aspects of this determination in the PSRs. First, the PSRs suggest that Mitchell is qualified to receive restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) because he is a proximate victim, who suffered financial harm resulting from the Appellants' criminal conduct. Secondly, the PSRs indicate the amount of restitution owed to Mitchell by adding the $61,529.94 7 in salary that he paid to Roberts; the $328,133.87 for the land purchased for the Golden Oaks project; credit card charges totaling $2,570.22; and $391,221.05 for development costs including appliances, application fees and lumber. 161 We are not convinced that the amount of restitution suggested by the PSRs and ordered by the district court is justified. We cannot speak to the credit card charges incurred by Mitchell because the record does not indicate what they were for and when they were incurred. However, as we noted above, Roberts' salary and the land purchase occurred before the fruition of the bribery scheme and were part of what Mitchell clearly viewed as acceptable costs of putting the project together. Therefore, these amounts should not be included in any restitution figure. 162 Further, the development costs noted in the PSRs also should not be included for restitution. These costs had nothing to do with the bribery scheme, and would have been incurred had there never been a bribery scheme. Again, Mitchell agreed to these costs as part of doing business. 163 We note that this Court has expressly held that a victim who is directly and proximately harmed in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 3663A may be entitled to restitution. See United States v. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341, 343 (5th Cir.1999) (citing United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998)). However, we also have restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense. Id. Our reading of the record indicates that any losses incurred by Mitchell resulted from the Golden Oaks project collapsing because of BHHI's or LCCM's inability to obtain interim financing and performance bonds. This collapse had nothing to do with the bribery scheme for which the Appellants were charged. Rather, Mitchell was a sophisticated businessman who should have been able to evaluate whether a construction company was capable of performing a particular project. 164 The record does not indicate that there was a separate hearing detailing whether Mitchell qualifies for restitution as a proximate victim and what amount he should receive if he does qualify. Therefore, on remand, the district court should conduct a hearing to determine Mitchell's status as a direct and proximate victim, and the amount of restitution that is attributable to the specific conduct supporting the offense of conviction. Hughey, 147 F.3d at 437.