Opinion ID: 2448553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of the Initial Search

Text: The State urges us to hold the initial search constitutional based upon the plainview doctrine. We have said in the past that this doctrine may be applied under the following circumstances: 1) the initial intrusion was lawful; 2) the incriminating nature of the items was immediately apparent; and 3) the discovery of the items was inadvertent. Johnson v. State, 291 Ark. 260, 724 S.W.2d 160, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 830, 108 S.Ct. 101, 98 L.Ed.2d 61 (1987). However, the State directs us to a different standard enunciated in the recent United States Supreme Court case of Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). In Horton , the Court held that the plain-view doctrine is applicable if the officer has a lawful right of access to the object and if the incriminating nature of the object is readily apparent. The State contends that Horton dispensed with the inadvertence requirement. We have not had occasion to discuss this aspect of the Horton case. We do not find it necessary to do so now. The incriminating items which were discovered by Officer Norman during the search simply were not in his plain view. The most elemental aspect of the plain-view doctrine has not been met. The rationale behind the plainview doctrine is that the observation of items in plain view is not a search. Johnson v. State, supra . Once an officer's activity crosses the line from observation into a probing quest for evidence, a search has begun, and the realm of the plain-view doctrine is left behind. See generally State v. Risinger, 297 Ark. 405, 762 S.W.2d 787 (1989) (although a container on a table was in plain view, its contents were not; thus the plainview doctrine did not apply to the contents). The incriminating items observed by Officer Norman in this casethe rock on the scale, along with the substance and explicit paraphernalia inside the drawerwere not discovered through mere observation. In moving the bag of cookies and opening the desk drawer, the officer crossed the line into a search. A similar situation arose in Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107 S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). An officer was rightfully inside a residence which he suspected contained stolen stereo equipment. When he observed a Stereo turntable, he moved it to look for a serial number. The Court held that the officer's movement of the equipment to view it further constituted a search. The officer was engaged in a quest for evidence, as opposed to mere observation of an object without disturbing it. The facts show that a warrantless search of the appellants' residence took place. Warrantless searches of a suspect's home are presumptively unreasonable. Guzman v. State, 283 Ark. 112, 672 S.W.2d 656 (1984). The State has the burden of proving such a search is reasonable. Willett v. State, 298 Ark. 588, 769 S.W.2d 744 (1989). That burden is particularly difficult in this case in light of the fact that, just before the search took place, consent to search was denied. As none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement can be shown by the State, we agree with the trial court that the initial search conducted in the appellants' home was unlawful.