Opinion ID: 2977301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Thompkins’s Fifth Amendment Claim

Text: Thompkins argues that the introduction at his trial of the statements that he made near the end of the three-hour long interrogation session conducted by Detective Helgert violated the Fifth Amendment. Thompkins contends that he had effectively invoked his right to remain silent by being—in the words that Helgert used at the hearing on Thompkins’s Motion to Suppress—“so uncommunicative,” J.A. at 217 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 82), “not verbally communicative,” J.A. at 227 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 92), and by “[l]argely . . . remain[ing] silent,” J.A. at 229 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 94). Further, when Thompkins’s attorney asked Helgert whether Thompkins “had consistently exercised his right to remain substantively silent for at least two hours and forty-five (45) minutes,” Helgert replied “Yes, that’s right.” J.A. at 232 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 97). The district court denied Thompkins’s Fifth Amendment claim because it found that the Michigan state court—which held that Thompkins did not “assert[] his right to remain silent” because “he continued to talk with the officer, albeit sporadically” such that Thompkins “voluntarily waived his right to remain silent,” J.A. at 163-64 (Mich. Ct. App. Op. at 1-2)—did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court or base its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. J.A. 202-03 (Op. at 29-30). Noting that “[t]he prosecution has the burden of establishing a knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights,” Thompkins argues that “[t]he prosecution did not meet its heavy burden in proving a valid waiver of the right” to remain silent given Detective Helgert’s repeated descriptions of Thompkins as silent and uncommunicative and Helgert’s inability to identify answers to specific questions that Thompkins made in the first two hours and forty-five minutes of the interview. Pet’r Br. at 15, 22, 21. Thompkins thus contends that the state court’s decision involved both an “unreasonable application of clearly established federal law” and “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings.” Pet’r Br. at 22 (citing § 2254(d)(2)). We agree with Thompkins and reverse the district court’s denial of his petition because the state-court’s decision involved both “an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law” and “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). 1. Clearly Established Federal Law Regarding Waiver and Invocation of a Suspect’s Right to Remain Silent In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966), the Supreme Court held that “a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination.” The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he critical safeguard” provided by the Miranda warnings is the knowledge of “a person’s ‘right to cut off questioning.’” Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474). Therefore, “the admissibility of statements obtained after the person in custody has decided to remain silent depends under Miranda on whether his ‘right to cut off questioning’ was ‘scrupulously honored.’” Id. at 103-04 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474, 479). No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 8 In determining whether a suspect has waived her Miranda rights, the Supreme Court has held that that “[t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great.” North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (emphases added). Further, “a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. In Butler, the Supreme Court re-affirmed its holding in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (1962), that “[p]resuming waiver from a silent record is impermissible,” but the Court did state in Butler that “in at least some cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated.” Butler, 441 U.S. at 373 & n.4. The Court in Butler quoted two crucial passages from its opinion in Miranda, observing that in Miranda this Court said: “If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against selfincrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel.” The Court’s opinion went on to say: “An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Thus, the Court held that an express statement can constitute a waiver, and that silence alone after such warnings cannot do so. But the Court did not hold that such an express statement is indispensable to a finding of waiver. Butler, 441 U.S. at 372-73 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475) (internal citations omitted) (emphases added). The Court’s Miranda opinion emphasized that “[t]he requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is [] fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods of interrogation.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. Finally, the Supreme Court has cautioned that “[i]nvocation and waiver are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them together.” Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984). In terms of a suspect’s invocation of her right to remain silent, in Miranda the Supreme Court held that “[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (emphasis added). Although the Supreme Court has not addressed what conduct or statements suffice to “indicate[] in any manner” one’s intent to invoke the right to remain silent, the Supreme Court has explained the standard governing the invocation of one’s right to counsel. In Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 455 (1994), the Supreme Court noted that the suspect “waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing.” Approximately an hour and a half into the interview, the suspect stated that “‘[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.’” Id. at 455. After the investigating agents sought clarification as to whether the suspect wanted a lawyer, the suspect said “‘No, I don’t want a lawyer.’” Id. Rejecting the defendant’s argument that his statement that “[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer” effectively invoked his right to counsel such that the interrogation should have ceased and his statements been suppressed, the Supreme Court held that to invoke one’s right to counsel “the suspect must unambiguously request counsel” because the Court’s “precedents do not require the cessation of questioning” “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal.” Id. at 459. The Court specifically restated its holding as establishing “that, after a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” Id. at 461 (emphases added). In terms of our review of the distinct waiver and invocation inquiries, “[a]lthough the ultimate question of whether [the suspect’s] waiver was knowing and intelligent is subject to review No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 9 under the standards set forth in section 2254(d), any subsidiary factual findings made by the state court are entitled to a presumption of correctness under section 2254(e).” Valdez v. Ward, 219 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted); see also Williams v. Jones, 117 F. App’x 406, 412 (6th Cir. 2004) (unpublished) (citing Valdez); United States v. Rodriguez, 518 F.3d 1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 2008) (“This court reviews a trial court’s legal conclusions on Miranda waivers de novo, and findings of fact underlying those conclusions for clear error.”); United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 534 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We review a district court’s determination regarding the constitutionality of a Miranda waiver de novo and a district court’s underlying factual findings for clear error.”). In the invocation “context, we review the district court’s factual findings concerning the words a defendant used to invoke his Miranda rights for clear error and whether the words actually invoked those rights de novo.” Rodriguez, 518 F.3d at 1076. In denying Thompkins’s petition, the district court quoted a First Circuit case that “‘concluded that Davis applies to both components of Miranda: the right to counsel and the right to remain silent’” and accordingly analyzed the record to determine whether Thompkins “clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent after Helgert advised him of his Miranda4 rights.” J.A. at 201-02 (Op. at 28-29) (quoting Bui v. DiPaola, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999)). 2. The Michigan State Courts’ Adjudication of Thompkins’s Fifth Amendment Claim In denying Thompkins’s motion to suppress, the Michigan trial court rejected Thompkins’s argument that his silence and general uncooperativeness during the three-hour long interview were “repeated implicit invocations of his right to silence” and instead found that “[t]he defendant never invoked his right to remain silent.” J.A. at 151-52 (Order Denying Mot. to Suppress at 3-4). As to the initial issue of whether Thompkins waived his rights, the trial court observed that the officers advised Thompkins of his rights, but that he refused to sign the form. The trial court concluded that Thompkins “knowingly and intelligently waived his rights” because he “never invoked his right to remain silent, and participated in the interview by making eye contact, nodding, and answering questions with, ‘I don’t know.’” Id. at 152. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, and the entirety of its analysis regarding Thompkins’s Fifth Amendment claim is quoted below: Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police. Defendant asserts that the police improperly continued to interrogate him after he “implicitly” invoked his right to remain silent by failing to answer the officers’ questions. We disagree. The record discloses that defendant was advised of his Miranda rights and, according to the interrogating officer, verbally acknowledged that he understood those rights. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the record does not demonstrate that defendant asserted his right to remain silent. Although defendant refused to sign the advice of rights form, he continued to talk with the officer, albeit sporadically. He answered questions with brief responses, or by nodding his head, but never said he did not want to talk or that he was not going to say anything. “When a defendant speaks after receiving Miranda warnings, a momentary pause or even a failure to answer a question will not be construed as an affirmative invocation by the defendant 4 Thompkins contends that lower courts are in conflict regarding whether the Davis “unambiguous request” standard for invoking the right to counsel affects the analysis of whether an individual has invoked the right to remain silent. Pet’r Br. at 18-22. Because the resolution of this issue is not critical to the outcome in this case—that is, we conclude that the prosecution failed to meet its “heavy burden” in first showing that Thompkins waived his Miranda rights—we need not address Thompkins’s arguments that the Davis standard does not apply to invoking the right to remain silent. No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 10 of a right to remain silent.” The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that defendant voluntarily waived his right to remain silent and that he did not subsequently invoke his right to silence. Defendant’s statements were properly admitted into evidence. J.A. 163-64 (Mich. Ct. App. Op. at 1-2) (footnote and citations to Michigan case law omitted). The state court’s adjudication of Thompkins’s Fifth Amendment claim both involved an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented and also unreasonably applied clearly established federal law. That is, the state court’s analysis failed to pay proper heed to the Supreme Court’s holding that “[t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great.” Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (“[A] heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination.”). Furthermore, the record contradicts the finding that Thompkins “continued to talk with the officer, albeit sporadically.” We consider the factual determination first, as it underlies the legal determinations. The Michigan Court of Appeals’s finding that Thompkins “continued to talk with the officer, albeit sporadically” lacks support in the record. Certainly, Helgert at one point testified that Thompkins “talk[ed] with us very sporadically,” J.A. at 216 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 81), but Helgert identified essentially no specific statements that Thompkins made. At the suppression hearing, Helgert testified that during the first two hours and forty-five minutes of the interrogation Helgert was “just repeating that theme [and b]eing really quite repetitious in the monologue, ‘This is your opportunity to talk. What do you think is going to happen? Who is going to speak up for you if you don’t speak up for yourself?’” J.A. 233 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 98). When the prosecution asked Helgert how Thompkins responded to this monologue, Helgert offered vague testimony that “sometimes [Thompkins’s response] would be eye-contact, sometimes it would be a nod of the head, sometimes, I know the words, ‘I don’t know’ was quite prevalent,” while also admitting that Thompkins “sat there and listened to our speech, if you will, most of the time.” J.A. at 233, 234 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 98, 99). Helgert never identified any specific question or questions to which Thompkins made his “responses” of eye-contact, head nods, or use of the phrase “I don’t know.” Indeed, Helgert even admitted that when he tried his “spiritual tac[k]” near the end of the interrogation, Thompkins then “made eye-contact with me for one of the few times that he did for the interview.” J.A. at 218 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 83) (emphasis added). Helgert’s testimony thus demonstrates that Thompkins rarely even made eye contact with the officers. At trial, Helgert stated that “I remember two things that he did say, he said ‘He didn’t want a peppermint’ that my partner offered him and ‘the chair that he was sitting in was hard.’” J.A. at 364 (Trial Tr. 5/16/2002 at 109). Given that the above constituted the total of Thompkins’s responses to the first two hours and forty-five minutes of the interrogation, the Michigan Court of Appeals’s finding that Thompkins “talk[ed] with the officer, albeit sporadically” simply misrepresents the record. Rather, Helgert’s testimony demonstrates that the interrogation was “very, very one-sided,” J.A. at 217 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 82), “nearly a monologue,” J.A. at 227 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 92), and that Thompkins was “uncommunicative,” J.A. at 217 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 82), and “not verbally communicative,” J.A. at 227 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 92). Most revealingly, three times Thompkins’s counsel asked Helgert variations of a question regarding whether Thompkins remained silent during the first two-plus hours of the interrogation, and each time Helgert confirmed that Thompkins had done so. See J.A. at 229, 231, 232 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 94, 96, 97).5 Contrary to the state court’s statement, the evidence 5 Specifically, the first question asked Helgert whether “consistently . . . for two hours and fifteen (15) minutes every time you gave [Thompkins] an opportunity to participate meaningfully in the conversation he exercised his right to remain silent,” and Helgert replied that “[l]argely he remained silent, that’s correct.” J.A. at 229 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 94). The second question asked Helgert whether Thompkins “exercised [his right to remain silent] continuously for two No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 11 demonstrates that Thompkins was silent for two hours and forty-five minutes. Indeed, the only evidence of Thompkins’s participation consists of his declining a peppermint, complaining about his chair, and occasionally nodding his head or responding “I don’t know” to unidentified questions, and these actions do not amount even to “sporadic” conversation with the officers. To disregard a state court’s factual determination, “the state court’s factual determination must be ‘objectively unreasonable’ in light of the evidence presented during the state proceedings,” and this is such a case. Dennis v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 511, 518 (6th Cir. 2003). The state court also unreasonably applied clearly established federal law insofar as the court viewed such scant evidence of Thompkins’s participation during the interrogation as demonstrating that Thompkins voluntarily waived his right to remain silent given the Supreme Court’s command that “[t]he courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights; the prosecution’s burden is great.” Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (stating that a “heavy burden rests on the government” to prove waiver). Helgert’s vague testimony regarding Thompkins’s “responses” during the interrogation—responses consisting of eye contact, head nods, declining a peppermint, complaining about his chair, and occasional statements of “I don’t know”—does not suffice to meet the state’s “great” burden of showing that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Miranda specifically addressed this precise issue: “[A] valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Waiver can never occur through ‘mere silence,’ as the Miranda warnings themselves indicate.”) (citing Butler, 441 U.S. at 373). In addition, Thompkins refused to sign even the advice of rights form, which purports only to show a suspect’s acknowledgment that officers had read the rights and not that the suspect was waiving the rights. The Supreme Court’s opinion in Butler clearly permits implied waivers of Miranda rights, but a suspect’s uncooperativeness or refusal to sign even an advice of rights form certainly has relevance to determining whether Thompkins waived his rights. Butler, 441 U.S. at 374 (“[T]he question of waiver must be determined on ‘the particular facts and circumstances surrounding th[e] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.’”) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Had Helgert identified any particular exchange involving an instance of eye contact or a head nod, the issue of whether the prosecution had satisfied its “heavy burden” of showing “a course of conduct indicating waiver” would be entirely different. Helgert described his questioning as similar to a “monologue” propounding on the “theme” that this was Thompkins’s opportunity to tell his side of the story. Crucially, Helgert described Thompkins’s conduct throughout the first two and half hours of the interview as generally “shar[ing] very limited verbal responses with us,” J.A. at 217 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 82), as “remain[ing] silent,” J.A. at 229 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 94), and as “not very cooperative or responding,” J.A. at 228 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 93). Helgert described Thompkins’s “limited” conduct of making a “nod of the head” or a “‘yeah,’ or a ‘no,’ or ‘I don’t know’” without providing any context. J.A. at 236-37 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 101-02). Had Helgert testified that Thompkins nodded his head in response to a question asking whether Thompkins wanted his side of the story to be known, such testimony would obviously be powerful evidence of waiver; a head nod in response to a question asking whether Thompkins was comfortable declining to exercise his opportunity to tell his side of the story (or a “no” to a question about whether Thompkins wished to tell his story) would present an entirely different situation. Without the context of Thompkins’s occasional eye contact or head nods, we cannot say that Thompkins’s conduct indicated a waiver hours and forty-five (45) minutes in terms of substantive responses to your attempts to elicit statements regarding his offense, is that fair to say?,” and Helgert responded “[m]uch of the time. Most of the time, yes.” J.A. at 231 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 96). Finally, the third question inquired whether Thompkins’s statements responding to Helgert’s “spiritual tac[k]” of questioning came “after [Thompkins] had consistently exercised his right to remain substantively silent for at least two hours and forty-five (45) minutes?,” and Helgert answered “Yes, that’s right.” J.A. at 232 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 97). No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 12 of his rights; to the contrary, refusing to sign even an advice of rights form, being “so uncommunicative,” J.A. at 217 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 82), “remain[ing] silent,” J.A. at 229 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 94), and “spen[ding] a lot of his time sitting . . . simply holding his head looking down,” J.A. at 364 (Trial Tr. 5/16/2002 at 109), form a course of conduct that powerfully suggests Thompkins did not waive his rights. Thompkins’s conduct also contrasts markedly to the behavior of defendants in cases where courts have found implied waivers. For instance, in United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 399 (7th Cir. 2008), the Seventh Circuit found that the defendant “impliedly waived his Miranda rights before he confessed” even though “he did not sign an acknowledgment form” because the defendant “freely talk[ed] about the allegations against him, admitting they were true but attempting to strike a deal.” The Seventh Circuit also stated that “[w]aiver can never occur through ‘mere silence,’ as the Miranda warnings themselves indicate.” Id. Similarly, in United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1186 (9th Cir. 2005), the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding of “an implied waiver . . . based on evidence that after Officer Hall advised defendant of his Miranda rights but before questioning him, defendant made a spontaneous statement and responded to further questioning without reference to counsel.” In Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 198 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit denied a certificate of appealability in a case in which the Virginia Supreme Court found an implied waiver given that the defendant “initiated a conversation” with the detective and “stated that he understood his rights and wanted to talk to” the detective. The case presenting perhaps the starkest contrast is Bui v. DiPaola, 170 F.3d 232, 239 (1st Cir. 1999), the First Circuit case that the district court cited. In Bui, the First Circuit observed that courts “routinely” conclude that defendants have impliedly waived their rights in cases in which the “incriminating statements were made either as part of a ‘steady stream’ of speech or as part of a back-and-forth conversation with the police.” Bui, 170 F.3d at 240 (internal citations omitted). The First Circuit concluded that the petitioner’s interview “fit the implied waiver profile” because the record showed “a fairly standard two-way conversation with the authorities” in which the petitioner’s conduct even included a “continuation of the conversation,” asking the officers “‘who said I did this’” when the officers inquired “whether he had something to say about the reasons for his arrest” in response to the petitioner’s “boast[] that the police had nothing” on him. Id. at 240-41. The account of Helgert’s interview with Thompkins bears no resemblance to the clear evidence in Bui of a back-and-forth conversation between the petitioner and the authorities, which included specific questions and answers. Indeed, the evidence in Bui demonstrated that the petitioner even asked questions; in contrast, as Helgert testified at trial, Thompkins “spent a lot of his time sitting . . . simply holding his head looking down,” J.A. at 364 (Trial Tr. 5/16/2002 at 109). Helgert described the interview as “nearly a monologue,” J.A. at 227 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 92), and as “very, very one-sided,” J.A. at 217 (Supp. Hr’g Tr. at 82), an account that clearly establishes the interview was not “a fairly standard two-way conversation.” Bui, 170 F.3d at 241. As a result, we conclude that Thompkins did not waive his rights, and the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law, namely Miranda itself and Butler, in concluding otherwise. The state failed to satisfy its “heavy burden” of showing that Thompkins’s “course of conduct indicat[ed] waiver.” Butler, 441 U.S. at 373. Indeed, Thompkins’s persistent silence for nearly three hours in response to questioning and repeated invitations to tell his side of the story offered a clear and unequivocal message to the officers: Thompkins did not wish to waive his rights. See United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the defendant “did not waive her rights” when, “[i]n the face of repeated questioning by Agent Brehm, Wallace maintained her silence for several minutes and, perhaps, as many as ten minutes.”). In sum, we hold that the district court erred in denying Thompkins’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the Michigan Court of Appeals’s rejection of his Fifth Amendment claim “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence” and “involved No. 06-2435 Thompkins v. Berghuis Page 13 an unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law.” § 2254(d). Because we conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in determining that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent, we do not need to resolve whether the state court further unreasonably applied clearly established federal law in determining that Thompkins failed to invoke his right to remain silent by in fact remaining substantively silent for nearly three hours.