Opinion ID: 3061872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Goodlow’s Motion to Supress

Text: Goodlow argues that the district court erred when it denied her motion to suppress evidence found in her trailer because the government failed to demonstrate probable cause to search her trailer.6 She asserts a lack of probable cause because: (1) the search warrant affidavit did not state a connection between Willingham’s drug activities and her trailer; (2) the affidavit did not contain specific enough information concerning her involvement; (3) the warrant did not include her trailer because it was issued for 5136 County Road, and her trailer is properly at 5138 County Road; and (4) the affidavit failed to articulate with specificity what the government expected to find in the trailer. We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed standard of review, examining findings of fact for clear error and the application of law to those facts de novo. United States v. King, 509 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). As noted above, however, where the defendant has failed to raise an issue below, we review for plain error. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1298. 6 Goodlow also argues that the United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S. Ct. 3405 (1984), good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule cannot apply to allow admission of the seized evidence because the error in identification of the address and the lack of particularity in the affidavit were made by the affiant, not the magistrate who issued the warrant. In light of our determination that the search warrant was valid, we do not address this argument. 18 “A warrant which fails to sufficiently particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized is unconstitutionally over broad.” United States v. Travers, 233 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). However, “[w]hen evaluating a warrant, it is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended.” United States v. Ellis, 971 F.2d 701, 703 (11th Cir. 1992) (alteration omitted) (quotation omitted). “More specifically, a warrant’s description of the place to be searched is not required to meet technical requirements or have the specificity sought by conveyancers. The warrant need only describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity to direct the searcher, to confine his examination to the place described, and to advise those being searched of his authority.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quotation omitted). “Probable cause to search a residence exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.” United States v. Jenkins, 901 F.2d 1075, 1080 (11th Cir. 1990) (quotation omitted). “Where a warrant to search a residence is sought, the affidavit must supply the authorizing magistrate with a reasonable basis for concluding that Defendant might keep evidence of his crimes at his home, i.e., a ‘safe yet accessible place.’” United 19 States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1310 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1315 (2010). The district court did not err by denying the suppression motion because the search warrant identified Goodlow’s home with sufficient particularity. The warrant incorporated by reference the affidavit and other attachments, which explicitly stated that the area to be searched included the mobile home, and that the mobile home sometimes used the 5138 address. Additionally, the district court did not plainly err by denying her motion to suppress for lack of probable cause because, based on information in the affidavit, there existed fair probability that contraband would be found in the mobile home. Upon a thorough review of the entire record on appeal, and after consideration of the parties’ appellate briefs, we affirm Evans’s and Goodlow’s convictions, and Evans’s sentence. AFFIRMED. 20