Opinion ID: 900409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Acquittal of CodefendantOpening the Door

Text: [¶ 8.] New argues that Molstad first failed to properly object to the admission of evidence of White Horse's acquittal and then opened the door to allow it in. He asserts that Molstad correctly moved to exclude this evidence, but his reasons for seeking exclusion were flawed and unresearched. Molstad's argument was that evidence of White Horse's acquittal could bolster his credibility with the jury and unduly prejudice New. Molstad did not cite authority to the trial court to support the motion. New argues that this was ineffective assistance of counsel because any reasonably competent defense attorney would have searched for authority to buttress his position on this crucial issue. Had Molstad completed even minimal research, claims New, he would have discovered precedent stating that an acquittal of a codefendant or an accessory is inadmissible hearsay pursuant to SDCL 19-16-4. [2] Further, New notes that on five separate occasions, Molstad failed to object to the evidence of White Horse's acquittal as inadmissible hearsay. According to New, these deficiencies combined to prevent him from getting a fair trial based on the evidence against him, rather than on a process of elimination. The habeas court found that Molstad's decisions were reasonably related to sound trial strategy and did not fall below the standard of reasonableness. [¶ 9.] We must gauge whether, under the Strickland standard, Molstad's representation on this point was deficient. Scrutinizing the situation facing Molstad at the time of trial, we cannot say his representation fell outside reasonable professional competence. Molstad moved to exclude evidence of the acquittal. The court granted the motion, but advised: If it comes up on cross-examination, then, of course, it's wide open. On the State's motion for reconsideration, the trial court abided by its original ruling, though it was unsure whether the evidence might somehow later become admissible. While Molstad may not have advanced every possible objection to admitting the evidence, the reasons he gave the court, undue prejudice and improper bolstering of White Horse's credibility, were legally correct. See SDCL 19-12-3 (Rule 403). [3] An attorney is not expected to advance every possible basis to support an evidentiary objection, especially after a court grants counsel's motion, relying on one of the reasons counsel gave. Would it be reasonable or efficient to expect an attorney to go back and research a previous argument successfully made? Perhaps Molstad could have proceeded differently or based his objection on the acquittal rule; however, he did have a legal basis for the objection he raised. [4] Moreover, he lodged a standing objection to the admission of White Horse's acquittal. [¶ 10.] In any event, the evidence of White Horse's acquittal was admitted, not due to failure to raise proper legal grounds for an objection, but because the trial court ruled Molstad broached the issue during his opening statement. See New, 536 N.W.2d at 718 (acquittal admitted after references made by New's attorney in opening statement that White Horse was involved in Mousseaux's death.). A diligent advocate could hardly have done otherwise. In finding a workable trial strategy, Molstad was faced with a thorny problem. White Horse had been acquitted, yet Molstad wanted to show that White Horse and Black Bear were the true murderers. This was certainly a reasonable approach, as it appeared to Molstad that White Horse's acquittal was the product of perjury. There were two murder weapons but three people at the scene, suggesting that one may have been a bystander. Molstad also sought to impeach White Horse by showing that he had pleaded guilty to being an accessory. Even if Molstad had found additional legal grounds to preclude admission of White Horse's acquittal, it may not have dissuaded the trial court from admitting it. Failed trial strategy is not equivalent to ineffective assistance. See generally Hofer, 1998 SD 58, 578 N.W.2d 583. [¶ 11.] In certain instances, this Court has found an attorney's performance deficient. In Jones, trial counsel, outside the defendant's presence, was warned by the trial judge that counsel's conduct was close to contempt of court, that his strategy was about to open the door to evidence which was irrelevant and prejudicial to his client, and that he was on `very dangerous grounds.' 353 N.W.2d at 783. We found that Jones did not have the advice of effective legal counsel; therefore, we reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial. Id. at 786. [¶ 12.] In Wayrynen v. Class, 1998 SD 111, 586 N.W.2d 499, we examined the conviction of defendant Wayrynen on thirteen counts of arson and two counts of attempted arson. Id. ¶ 6, 586 N.W.2d 499. Wayrynen was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison. Id. ¶ 7, 586 N.W.2d 499. We found counsel was deficient when he failed to warn Wayrynen of the 140 year maximum sentence she could face, never discussed with Wayrynen the possibility of withholding her identity from law enforcement while he negotiated a plea agreement with the State, and made no attempt to limit the number of charges brought against her. Id. ¶ 20, 586 N.W.2d 499. This was especially egregious because the attorney knew of the unavailability of a sentencing cap in the circuit. Id. [¶ 13.] Most recently, in Sund v. Weber, 1998 SD 123, 588 N.W.2d 223, we found ineffective assistance when counsel failed to inquire of known witnesses, and did not call important witnesses at trial. Id. ¶ 30, 588 N.W.2d 223. Also, until the day before trial, counsel had spent only thirty minutes preparing. Id. ¶ 19 n. 3, 588 N.W.2d 223. We found that counsel's actions prejudiced the defendant and remanded for a new trial. Id. ¶¶ 30, 31, 588 N.W.2d 223. [¶ 14.] The facts here are not comparable to these cases. Molstad made timely, proper objections. He called relevant witnesses and adequately prepared for trial. When he could not keep it out, he attempted to use the acquittal to impeach White Horse's credibility, and did get White Horse to admit that he lied at his trial. Molstad also brought out the conspiracy between Black Bear and White Horse to frame New for Mousseaux's murder. Molstad offered an adequate defense, probably the only one reasonably presented by the facts. In the end, Molstad convinced the jury to hand down a second-degree murder conviction, rather than a first-degree murder verdict. New was also acquitted of kidnapping. Faced with convoluted facts and difficult witnesses who were not averse to perjuring themselves, Molstad presented a coherent defense. His actions did not fall below the Strickland standard. [¶ 15.] Even if Molstad's representation was deficient in some manner, New also must show that he was prejudiced by Molstad's ineffective assistance. New fails to meet this burden. First, New has not shown that, had hearsay been raised as the legal rationale for excluding the acquittal evidence, the trial court would have not allowed it in either on rebuttal or under some exception to the hearsay rule. Second, even if Molstad's opening statement and cross-examination would not have led to the admission of White Horse's acquittal, New has not established that the trial would have had a different outcome. The other evidence against New was quite persuasive; the jury could have relied on it alone to arrive at its verdict. Specifically, Rita Reber testified that New and Mousseaux had an argument at her home before the murder. She told the jury that New, White Horse, and Black Bear later returned to her house without the victim and that New tried to call his father to say good-bye. Also, Rodney Young, New's cellmate at the Pennington County Jail, testified that New admitted getting into an argument with Mousseaux at Reber's home, and hitting Mousseaux with a hammer. Based on the foregoing, even if Molstad's actions were deficient, it cannot be said that New's conviction resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. The outcome probably would have been the same.