Opinion ID: 1204963
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues related to the guilt and special circumstance phase

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in permitting Bridget Wilvert and Lorraine Werts [9] to testify at trial. Each witness had been hypnotized during the police investigation following Robin's disappearance. Defendant argues that our decisions in People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18 [181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354] and People v. Guerra (1984) 37 Cal.3d 385 [208 Cal. Rptr. 162, 690 P.2d 635] require reversal. In those decisions, we held that a witness who previously has been hypnotized may not testify concerning matters recalled under hypnosis. (See 31 Cal.3d at pp. 66-67, 70; 37 Cal.3d at p. 390.) As explained below, we conclude that reversal is not warranted.
Prior to trial, defendant moved to exclude the testimony of Bridget Wilvert and Lorraine Werts, based on uncontroverted evidence that police investigators had hypnotized the witnesses in 1979. The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which the parties contested whether our decisions in People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18 and People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d 385 barred introduction of the proffered testimony.
On June 21, 1979, the day following Robin's disappearance, Jim Bogdanoff of the Huntington Beach Police Department interviewed Bridget regarding the events of the preceding day. After the interview, Bridget met with police artist Marilyn Droz for the purpose of creating a composite drawing. No hypnosis of Bridget was attempted on this date. On the basis of Bridget's recollection, the police artist created a composite drawing, which was photographed by the police. On the following day, June 22, Droz's husband and colleague, investigator Arthur Droz, met with Bridget. Investigator Droz had received formal training in hypnosis. He was joined by Marilyn Droz and Sergeant Ron Jenkins, who was supervising the department's investigation of the case. The purpose of this interview was to hypnotize Bridget with the objective of enhancing the June 21 composite drawing. The interview was conducted pursuant to specific department guidelines and was audio tape-recorded. In accordance with Bridget's recollection under hypnosis, the police artist slightly modified the June 21 drawing to show a light moustache and a five-o'clock shadow.
When the police investigators opened the Seattle storage locker in July 1979, they seized hundreds of photographs and slides, five of which showed a girl posing at what appeared to be Sunset Beach, just north of Huntington Beach. At the police investigators' request, Los Angeles and Orange County newspapers published one of the photos with a plea for assistance. Lorraine Werts responded, identifying herself as the girl in the photograph. Police investigators interviewed her regarding the circumstances surrounding her having posed. Lorraine described the photographer but was unable to pinpoint the exact date the photos were taken, except to say she thought they were taken between June 19 and June 23, 1979. In an effort to assist Lorraine in recalling the precise date she was photographed, Grover Payne, a Huntington Beach Police Department captain, hypnotized Lorraine according to department guidelines, in a session that was audio tape-recorded. During this hypnotic session, Lorraine identified the date she was photographed as June 18.
After considering the foregoing facts, the trial court denied defendant's motion to exclude the girls' testimony. The court found all of the information relating to the June 21 composite drawing to have come from Bridget: [T]here's nothing to indicate [that] there is any tainting by law enforcement here to improve her recollection.... Similarly, with respect to Lorraine, the court found the testimony she might offer at trial to be unrelated to the focus of the hypnotic session. The court concluded: I'd be stretching Shirley beyond what it was intended, if I would rule out the proffered testimony.
At trial, Bridget and Lorraine each testified briefly. Bridget recounted the events of June 20, stating that upon leaving Bridget's residence, she and Robin went to the cliffs overlooking the beach, that a man approached to photograph them for a contest and left immediately after Bridget's adult neighbor, Jackelyn Young, arrived, and that Bridget and Robin left the cliffs for Bridget's residence, where Bridget loaned her bicycle to Robin. Bridget also reviewed the events of June 21, explaining that she spoke with police officers and assisted an artist in preparing a composite drawing of the photographer. Bridget was shown a photograph of a composite drawing, which she identified as the one she helped create on June 21. The prosecution did not ask Bridget to testify regarding the hypnotic session of June 22 or to testify regarding any corresponding enhancements that were made to the composite drawing. Nor did the prosecution ask Bridget to identify the person shown in the drawing. In her testimony, Lorraine recounted the events of a date in June 1979 when she and her friend, Patty Elmendorf, were rollerskating at Sunset Beach and were stopped by a man who asked to take their photograph. Patty declined and skated away to a bathroom; the man, explaining that he wanted to enter a contest, took some photographs of Lorraine. The man also asked her personal questions and invited her to have lunch with him at a nearby Jack-in-the-Box, but she declined. Lorraine identified five photographs showing her at Sunset Beach as the ones she believed were taken by the man. When the prosecution asked her to provide a general description of him, Lorraine replied she was unable to do so. The prosecution refrained from asking her to pinpoint the date of the incident. The trial court, however, then asked Lorraine whether she recalled the date the photographer had encountered her and Patty, and Lorraine answered, June 20.
In People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18, the prosecution subjected the key complaining witness, a rape victim, to hypnosis on the eve of trial for the purpose of `filling the gaps' in her story. ( Id., at p. 23.) The trial court denied defendant's motion to exclude the witness's testimony, and at trial the victim testified to several matters that she had been unable to recall prior to being hypnotized. ( Id., at pp. 29-30.) In Shirley, this court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding, inter alia, that the use of hypnosis to restore the memory of a potential witness is not generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community. ( Id., at pp. 66-67.) We held that the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those events, from the time of the hypnotic session forward. ( Ibid. ) Significantly, we noted in Shirley, supra, that our disapproval of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness was not absolute. We set forth several limitations on the rule excluding such testimony. (31 Cal.3d at pp. 67-68.) First, we observed, when the prosecution seeks to question such a witness on a topic wholly unrelated to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session, his [or her] testimony as to that topic would not be rendered inadmissible.... ( Id., at p. 67, original italics.) Second, we recognized a valid purpose in allowing hypnosis by the police for purely investigative purposes, subject to our caveat that any person so hypnotized will not be allowed to testify as a witness to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session. ( Id., at pp. 67-68.) Third, we noted that the improper admission of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness is not reversible per se; its effect is measured under the prejudicial-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]. ( People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 68.) We took no position in Shirley, supra, with respect to the admissibility of testimony from witnesses who had been hypnotized prior to the date our decision was filed, March 11, 1982. (31 Cal.3d at p. 67, fn. 53.) In People v. Guerra, supra , which also involved a hypnotized rape victim, we held the principles set forth in Shirley applied to all cases not yet final on March 11, 1982. (37 Cal.3d at p. 390.) Because defendant's case was on appeal and therefore not final on March 11, 1982, Shirley is applicable to the present appeal. (See also People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1269 [265 Cal. Rptr. 132, 783 P.2d 719] [reaffirming Shirley's retroactivity].) Guerra, supra, foreshadowed our consideration of the question whether prehypnotic evidence, i.e., matters recalled and related by a witness prior to the hypnotic session, is admissible. (37 Cal.3d at pp. 427-429.) In a concurring opinion, Justice Kaus explained why he believed such evidence should be admissible, observing the probable reliability and potential importance of the evidence justifies its admission. ( Id., at p. 431 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.).) Because the issue was unnecessary to the resolution of the Guerra appeal, the majority in Guerra left the question unanswered. ( Id., at p. 429.) We revisited the issue of prehypnotic evidence in People v. Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1260. The defendant in Hayes was charged with murder, rape of the murder victim's spouse, and other offenses occurring in 1979. Marie G., the rape victim, furnished the responding police officer with a description of her assailant and his accomplice. Within hours, the police hypnotized her to assist a police artist in creating a composite sketch of the assailant, and to develop more information regarding the offenses. ( Id., at p. 1262.) Pursuant to decisions in Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18, and Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d 385, this court in Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1260, held that the admission at trial of Marie's post hypnotic testimony, notably her positive identification of defendant as her assailant, required reversal of the convictions. ( Id., at pp. 1262-1263, 1270; see also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 149-151 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561]; People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 982-986 [269 Cal. Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289].) With regard to her pre hypnotic testimony, we held it would be admissible at retrial as to events the trial court found were recalled and related prior to the hypnotic session. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1263, 1270-1273.) In reaching this conclusion, the Hayes opinion agreed with Justice Kaus's view that cases in which the prehypnotic evidence was obtained prior to this court's decision in Shirley, evoked `a special need to ensure that in our zeal to protect the citizenry from the hazards of hypnosis, we do not create a greater injustice by an after-the-fact disqualification of crucial witnesses who have relevant  frequently vital  information that is not tainted by the hypnosis.' ( People v. Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1271, quoting People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 431 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.).) Our holding in Hayes governs the admissibility of all prehypnotic evidence predating January 1, 1985. (49 Cal.3d at p. 1273.) (1a), (2a) With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to defendant's contention that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the testimony of the previously hypnotized witnesses, Bridget Wilvert and Lorraine Werts.
As noted, defendant contends that under this court's decisions in Shirley and Guerra, it was error for the trial court to permit Bridget and Lorraine to testify and that the admission of their testimony requires reversal of the judgment. We disagree. (1b) Bridget's testimony regarding the composite sketch she helped create prior to her June 22 hypnotic session was properly admitted under the principles set forth in our decision in People v. Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1260. The police investigators preserved her prehypnotic recollection by photographing the June 21 composite drawing of the suspect, which clearly established that Bridget's testimony pertained to matters that she had both recalled and related to other persons prior to undergoing hypnosis, thus meeting the test of admissibility set forth in Hayes. (49 Cal.3d at pp. 1272-1273; compare People v. Miller, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 983-984 [ Hayes prehypnotic evidence rule held inapplicable where all copies of prehypnotic composite drawing were lost prior to trial and witness testified the drawing was inaccurate].) The prosecution confined its questioning concerning the composite sketch to prehypnotic evidence. Similarly, Bridget's testimony regarding the events of June 20, with the exception of a single response, was admissible under Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1260. The exception is as follows. The prosecution asked Bridget at trial whether defendant touched Robin when he had her pose for the photographs taken on the cliffs above Huntington Beach. Bridget replied affirmatively, recalling that defendant had touched Robin's leg. The defense did not interpose an objection to this testimony. Several days after Bridget had testified, however, defendant requested that her response be stricken on the ground that, because she had not mentioned prior to her June 22 hypnotic session that defendant had touched Robin, Bridget's testimony on this particular point was the product of a posthypnotic recollection and was therefore inadmissible. The trial court viewed the request as untimely but nevertheless admonished the jury to disregard Bridget's testimony that defendant had touched Robin when they were on the cliffs. In light of the trial court's admonition, and the relative insignificance of the challenged testimony, any error committed by the trial court in admitting Bridget's response to this single question was harmless. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) (2b) Lorraine's testimony, with two exceptions, was confined to matters that she had both recalled and related to other persons prior to her hypnosis, and thus was properly admitted under Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1260. The exceptions are as follows. First, Lorraine's response to the question posed by the trial court  that she identify the date she was photographed  was inadmissible under Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18, because the inquiry involved a matter identical to the subject of her hypnosis. Nonetheless, under the applicable Watson standard, the court's error in eliciting this testimony was not prejudicial. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) At trial, in addition to presenting the testimony of Lorraine, the prosecution called as a witness Patty Elmendorf, the friend of Lorraine's who was rollerskating with her when the two were approached by defendant. Patty testified that the date on which the incident occurred was June 20, 1979, the same date related by Lorraine in her testimony. Patty was certain of the date in light of an entry in her diary, and the diary itself was received in evidence. Patty further identified defendant as the photographer who had confronted the two girls on that date. In view of Patty's testimony, it is not reasonably probable that the trial court's erroneous elicitation of Lorraine's reference to June 20 affected the jury's verdict. Second, several days after the conclusion of Lorraine's testimony, defendant requested that the portion of her testimony relating the photographer's request that she accompany him to lunch and provide him with her address be stricken as posthypnotic recollections. The trial court granted the request, admonishing the jury to disregard this testimony. In light of the court's admonition and the marginal relevance of the testimony in question, any error in admitting this evidence was harmless. ( Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.) (3) Our decision in Hayes, supra, also disposes of defendant's additional contention that the testimony of the hypnotized witnesses should have been excluded because the hypnotic sessions did not conform to the procedures set forth in Evidence Code section 795. [10] In Hayes, supra, we concluded that Evidence Code section 795 properly should be interpreted to apply only to hypnotic sessions conducted on or after January 1, 1985, the effective date of the statute. (49 Cal.3d at pp. 1273-1274.) We also explained that our holding in Hayes regarding prehypnotic evidence shall govern the admissibility of all prehypnotic evidence predating January 1, 1985  regardless of when such evidence was or may in the future be offered at trial. ( Id., at p. 1274.) Thus, defendant's reliance on Evidence Code section 795 is misplaced. In sum, we find no prejudicial error in the admission of the challenged testimony. ( People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 68; see also People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1048, fn. 4 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680] [ Watson test applicable to erroneous admission of testimony by previously hypnotized witness]; People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836.)
Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in declaring Dana Crappa unavailable as a witness pursuant to Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(3), [11] and in permitting transcripts of her testimony at defendant's first trial to be read to the jury pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a)(2). [12] Defendant also argues the court's rulings denied him his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine the only witness who tied him to the scene of Robin's murder. For the reasons set forth below, we find these contentions to be without merit.

Shortly before Crappa was scheduled to testify at trial, the prosecutor informed the court, outside the presence of the jury, that Crappa is not going to testify because she doesn't have any recollection about the events in this case.... The prosecutor moved that the trial court declare Crappa unavailable as a witness (Evid. Code, § 240, subd. (a)(3)), and permit Crappa's testimony from defendant's first trial to be read to the jury pursuant to the prior-testimony exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1291, subd. (a)(2).) Before ruling on the motion, the trial court requested that Crappa testify at a foundational hearing held pursuant to Evidence Code section 402. [13] A hearing was conducted outside the presence of the jury, during which Crappa testified she had no recollection of her activity at Chantry Flats or, more specifically, of the events to which she testified at defendant's first trial. The trial court made a preliminary determination that Crappa was unavailable to testify within the meaning of the [Evidence Code] statutes at this time. The court determined, however, that the jury should be allowed to evaluate her demeanor and hear why she was unable to testify. Proceedings were resumed in the presence of the jury. As she had at the foundational hearing, Crappa testified to a complete loss of memory with regard to the events that related to this case. She testified she could not recall appearing in court to testify at defendant's first trial. She acknowledged having consulted a psychiatrist or psychologist regarding her memory lapse. [14] Thereafter, the trial court excused the jury. The court informed the parties that Crappa probably has a preexisting mental infirmity so as not to recall her testimony.... And it seems to me that infirmity is such as to permit the introduction of her former testimony. And I don't think she's refusing by her own choice. The court observed that the prosecution had the burden of proving unavailability and, prior to issuing its final ruling, gave the parties five days to prepare the necessary arguments for a full evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution presented testimony of Dr. Anthony Staiti, a psychiatrist who had examined Crappa on three occasions in 1985, one year prior to defendant's second trial. Staiti testified Crappa had been referred to him by another psychiatrist for a determination whether she would be capable of working as a police dispatcher. He testified Crappa complained of memory lapses that impeded her efficiency. Staiti affirmed that she had described to him periods of waking up suddenly screaming and shaking, totally panicked without knowing why. Crappa told him that after awakening in a frightened state, she usually could not return to sleep but would, instead, remain awake, waiting for the time to go to work. Staiti diagnosed Crappa as suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder chronic delayed, one of the symptoms of which is memory impairment arising at least six months following the initial trauma. Based on his consultations with Crappa in 1985, he opined her memory lapse with respect to events in 1979 had something to do with a murder.... Following the prosecution's direct examination of Dr. Staiti, defense counsel informed the court that the defense had yet to complete its review of the psychiatric reports that Dr. Staiti had brought to court, which consisted of between 20 and 30 pages. The defense requested an opportunity to review this material before cross-examining Dr. Staiti. The prosecutor argued that approximately one-half of the material appeared to be comprised of an M.M.P.I. (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) examination, which Staiti testified he had not considered. The court recessed to allow the defense to review Dr. Staiti's reports, after which defense counsel proceeded with cross-examination, without requesting any further continuance in order to prepare. At the conclusion of the cross-examination, defense counsel reiterated a request (set forth in moving papers opposing a finding that Crappa was unavailable) that the trial court order an independent psychiatric examination of Crappa to assist the court in ascertaining the validity of Crappa's memory loss. The court denied the request. Defendant called as a witness, at the hearing, Judge Philip E. Schwab, who presided over defendant's first trial. Judge Schwab testified that during Crappa's testimony at the first trial, there were substantial delays between the question and an answer, sometimes running perhaps close to a minute, perhaps even longer. After hearing the testimony presented at the hearing, the trial court indicated it was adhering to its preliminary determination that Crappa was unavailable as a witness within the meaning of Evidence Code section 240, subdivision (a)(3). [15]
On appeal, defendant's challenge to the trial court's ruling admitting testimony from the first trial is based on three distinct arguments. First, defendant contends the trial court's conclusion that Crappa was unavailable within the meaning of the statute was not supported by substantial evidence. Second, defendant contends his interest and motive in cross-examining Crappa at the first trial were not the same as at the second trial, and therefore, the trial court erred in admitting the prior testimony pursuant to Evidence Code section 1291, subdivision (a). Third, defendant contends the admission of Crappa's prior testimony violated his constitutional right to confrontation. We shall address each of defendant's contentions in turn.