Opinion ID: 3036748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Simpson’s Civil Rights Were Restored

Text: [2] At the time of Simpson’s arrest, A.R.S. § 13-904(A) provided that A conviction for a felony suspends the following civil rights of the person sentenced:
2. The right to hold public office of trust or profit. 3. The right to serve as a juror. 4. During any period of imprisonment any other civil rights the suspension of which is reason- ably necessary for the security of the institution in which the person sentenced is confined or for the reasonable protection of the public. Accordingly, as of 1989, Arizona law did not suspend Simpson’s right to possess a firearm.4 In addition to having some rights automatically suspended under § 13-904(A), Simpson was subject to several standard restrictive terms and regulastate of a felony or who has been adjudicated delinquent and whose civil right to possess or carry a gun or firearm has not been restored.” A.S.C. § 13-3101(6)(b). 4 In 1994, A.R.S. § 13-904 was amended to add a fifth suspension item: “The right to possess a gun or firearm.” Because Simpson was convicted in 1989 and discharged from probation in 1991, this amendment is not applicable to him. UNITED STATES v. SIMPSON 3295 tions during the course of his two-year probation. Standard Term 11 provided that Simpson could not “possess, control, or own any firearms, ammunition, explosives, deadly weapons, or prohibited weapons as defined by A.R.S. § 13-3101.” [3] The record also demonstrates Simpson satisfactorily completed his two-year probation, and was released from its restrictive terms. Upon completion of his probation, Simpson’s rights that had been suspended under § 13-904(A) were automatically restored to him. A.R.S. § 13-912(A) (1991) provides, in relevant part, that Upon completion of the term of probation . . . any person who has not previously been convicted of any other felony shall automatically be restored any civil rights which were lost or suspended by the convic- tion. The record indicates that Simpson had not been convicted of any other felony. Thus, upon completion of his probationary period in 1991, all of Simpson’s civil rights that had been suspended or restricted because of his 1989 conviction were restored to him by operation of law. B. Whether Arizona Expressly Prohibited Simpson From Possessing A Firearm Having determined that Simpson’s civil rights were restored following the conclusion of his probation, we turn to the second question: has Arizona law otherwise expressly prohibited Simpson from possessing a firearm? Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d at 1128. The answer is a straight-forward “no.” In 1989, A.R.S. § 13-904(A) suspended only Simpson’s rights to vote, hold public office, and serve as a juror, and those rights were restored by operation of law under § 13-912(A). The probation-term restriction against possessing a firearm expired—as did all of the other terms of Simpson’s probation —at the conclusion of his probationary term. Accordingly, 3296 UNITED STATES v. SIMPSON Arizona law did not expressly prohibit Simpson from possessing a firearm following the end of his probation. The government argues that the restrictive term prohibiting Simpson from possessing a firearm during his two-year probation survived the end of that probation, and that Simpson failed to take the steps necessary to restore his right to possess a firearm. This claim is erroneous. The government points out that in 1991, A.R.S. § 13-912(B) provided that § 13-912(A) “does not apply to a person’s right to possess weapons as defined in § 13-301 unless he applies to a court pursuant to the procedures of § 13-906.” However, Simpson’s right to possess a firearm was never formally and indefinitely suspended in the same manner as were his rights to vote, hold office, and serve as a juror. Rather, the restrictions placed on Simpson’s right to possess a firearm—as well as those placed on his right to be free of search and seizure absent probable cause—are more aptly described as special conditions imposed by the court which applied only for the period of probation (i.e., two years) and no longer. Thus, § 13-912(B)’s limitation is inapposite. [4] Moreover, even if we were to countenance the government’s assertion that the probation-period restrictions on Simpson’s right to possess a firearm somehow survived the end of his probation, Arizona law certainly did not expressly provide that Simpson could not possess a firearm following his probation, as it must where his civil rights have been restored. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).5 Our conclusion is in harmony with our decision in Meza-Corrales, 183 F.3d at 112930. In that case, the government sought to bring felon-inpossession charges against a former Arizona prisoner, a first- 5 While §§ 13-904(A) and 13-3101(5)(b) were amended in 1994 and now expressly provide that a felon may not possess a firearm even after his probationary term is ended, we of course may not apply this law retroactively to those, like Simpson, whose civil rights had already been restored prior to the 1994 amendments. UNITED STATES v. SIMPSON 3297 time felon whose rights were restored to him under § 13912(A) following his detention. We held that § 13-904(A) did not suspend the former prisoner’s right to possess a firearm, and that § 13-912(A) restored to him all of his civil rights. The former prisoner’s right to possess a firearm was undoubtedly restricted during his incarceration; yet we concluded that there were no express restrictions on the former prisoner’s right to possess a firearm following his release and that, in the absence of some express restriction, § 13-912(B) was inapposite: [A]lthough it is true . . . that A.R.S. § 13-912(B) expressly provided that A.R.S. § 13-912(A) did not apply to past felons so far as the automatic restoration of their rights to possess firearms was con- cerned, that provision had no relevance for step (2) of the analysis . . . . [A.R.S. § 13-912(B)] did expressly provide that it would not restore a past felon’s right to possess a firearm, but it did not expressly provide that he was prohibited from doing so if he had not lost the right previously (i.e., Arizona’s restoration law did not give back anything that was formerly taken away, but at the same time, it did not take away anything that was not formerly taken away). Id. (internal citations omitted)). Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in Arizona law expressly prohibited Simpson from possessing a firearm following the end of his probation.