Opinion ID: 2633305
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Because CCO 12.08.030 is unconstitutionally overbroad, we grant Silvar's petition

Text: In addition to violating the vagueness requirements of the Constitution, CCO 12.08.030 also fails the Constitution's test for overbreadth. The overbreadth doctrine invalidates laws, such as this ordinance, that infringe upon First Amendment rights. For example, this court held in City of Las Vegas v. District Court that the overbreadth doctrine provides that a law is void on its face if it `sweeps within its ambit other activities that in ordinary circumstances constitute an exercise of' protective First Amendment rights, such as the right to free expression or association. [27] Even minor intrusions on First Amendment rights will trigger the overbreadth doctrine. As the Supreme Court of Florida stated in Wyche, the `First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive, [so] government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity.' [28] Because an overbroad law will have a chilling effect on free expression and thus impact the breathing space of First Amendment rights, an overbroad law is unconstitutional. However, the overbreadth doctrine has its limits. The Virginia Court of Appeals in Coleman recognized that [t]he Supreme Court [cautioned that] the overbreadth doctrine is `strong medicine' and that a statute should not be void unless it is substantially overbroad in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep. [29] Therefore, this case hangs in the balance between the legitimate needs, on the one hand, to enforce prostitution laws and, on the other, to protect the First Amendment rights of all citizens to approach others on the street and in their cars. In this case, Silvar argues that CCO 12.08.030 is substantially overbroad because it criminalizes conduct  for example, beckoning to or waving at another  that merely indicates prostitution loitering. For two reasons, Silvar's argument has merit. First, the conduct the ordinance criminalizes is constitutionally protected. Because CCO 12.08.030 chills this conduct, the ordinance is substantially overbroad in relation to its legitimate sweep. The ordinance's provision for an opportunity to explain one's conduct does not mitigate this chilling effect. Second, the ordinance contains no specific intent element; therefore, it cannot make constitutionally protected conduct criminal. Because the ordinance's substantial overbreadth is unconstitutional, we grant Silvar's petition.
CCO 12.08.030 chills constitutionally protected conduct because it substantially envelops ordinary activities that may only be mere indicators of prostitution loitering. The ordinance suggests that repeatedly beckoning to, stopping, attempting to stop, or engaging passersby in conversation, or repeatedly stopping or attempting to stop operators of motor vehicles by hailing, waving of arms, or any other bodily gesture are circumstances indicative of prostitution loitering. However, these actions, in and of themselves, are constitutionally protected activities that may be performed without any regard to prostitution whatsoever. [30] A person performing these actions may simply be hailing a cab or a friend, chatting on a public street, or strolling aimlessly about. [31] CCO 12.08.030 chills this constitutionally protected conduct because people would otherwise risk arrest. Providing the opportunity to explain one's conduct does nothing to stave off this chilling effect. An arresting officer need not accept the explanation or give it any weight. [32] And even if a trial court should believe the explanation and acquit the arrestee, it would be too late because the person's First Amendment rights would have already been chilled by the arrest. [33] Thus, we conclude that CCO 12.08.030 chills constitutionally protected conduct.
CCO 12.08.030 also lacks a specific intent element. Although other jurisdictions have prostitution loitering ordinances that clearly require specific intent, Clark County's ordinance does not. Rather than criminalizing loitering with a specific intent to commit an act of prostitution, CCO 12.08.030 criminalizes loitering in a manner and under circumstances manifesting the purpose to engage in prostitution. In Rowland, the Supreme Court of Ohio failed to find a specific intent element in a drug loitering ordinance that used language identical to that in CCO 12.08.030 and further determined that such an element was irreconcilable with the ordinance's goal: [S]pecific intent ... cannot be found in the language of the ordinance. More significant, a specific intent requirement is irreconcilable with the goal of the ordinance, which is to permit arrest and conviction when an individual is acting under circumstances manifesting the purpose to commit a drug crime. [But a]cting under circumstances manifesting a purpose to do something is a far cry from specifically intending to do something. For example, a carpenter carrying a tool belt and ladder down a dark street late at night may well be manifesting the purpose to burglarize a home. This evidence, however, certainly does not show that he or she specifically intends to commit burglary. [34] Similarly, under CCO 12.08.030, high school cheerleaders flagging down cars for a car-wash fundraiser or celebratory tourists reveling with passersby during a public holiday may also be manifesting the purpose of inducing, enticing, soliciting for or procuring another to commit an act of prostitution. However, that evidence does not show that they are specifically intending to engage in prostitution. In contrast to CCO 12.08.030, most of the prostitution loitering ordinances that have been upheld clearly require a specific intent element. Those ordinances criminalized loitering with the intent to commit prostitution; [35] for the purpose of engaging in soliciting or procuring sexual activity for hire; [36] when a person intentionally solicits, induces, entices, or procures another to commit prostitution; [37] or variations thereof. One prostitution loitering ordinance that contained the circuitous under circumstances manifesting the purpose of intent language of CCO 12.08.030 was upheld because it subsequently and specifically stated that the violator's conduct `must ... demonstrate a specific intent to induce, entice, solicit or procure another to commit an act of prostitution.' [38] CCO 12.08.030 contains no such circumscribing language. Accordingly, we conclude that CCO 12.08.030 lacks a specific intent element. Because CCO 12.08.030 chills constitutionally protected conduct and lacks a specific intent element, the prostitution loitering ordinance is unconstitutionally overbroad.