Opinion ID: 1869181
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Heading: Court's Authority To Use Contempt Power to Enforce Judgment For Court-Appointed Attorney Fees and Costs Entered Against an Acquitted Defendant.

Text: A. Rules of Statutory Interpretation. `The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to the intention of the legislature.' State v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Iowa 2000) (quoting State v. Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc., 587 N.W.2d 599, 601 (Iowa 1998)). To ascertain legislative intent, we look to the language of the statute. Casey's Gen. Stores, 587 N.W.2d at 601. We consider not only the commonly understood meaning of the words used in the statute, but also the context within which they appear. Id. We presume that, when the legislature enacts a statute, it intends `[a] just and reasonable result.' Iowa Dist. Ct., 616 N.W.2d at 578 (quoting Iowa Code § 4.4(3)). In addition, we construe statutes that relate to the same or a closely allied subject together so as to produce a harmonious and consistent body of legislation. Casey's Gen. Stores, 587 N.W.2d at 601. If a statute may be construed in more than one way, we adopt the construction that does not violate the constitution. State v. Mitchell, 757 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Iowa 2008). Constitutional questions should be avoided when an appeal can be decided on other grounds. State v. Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Iowa 2005). B. Statutory Basis for Judgment. Under Iowa Code section 815.9, an indigent defendant who was appointed counsel at state expense must reimburse the state for the total fees and costs of legal assistance provided to the person whether the prosecution results in a conviction, acquittal, or dismissal. Iowa Code § 815.9(3). Acquitted defendants must pay all fees and costs to the court within thirty days of their acquittal. Id. § 815.9(4). If the costs are not paid as specified, the court must order payment in reasonable installments, id. § 815.9(7), and if the person is employed, the person must execute a wage assignment and the court must enter an order for assignment of income in a reasonable amount to be determined by the court, id. § 815.9(8). Finally, if fees and costs are not paid, the court is required to enter a judgment against the person for any unpaid amounts. Id. § 815.9(9). This statute does not provide that a defendant's reimbursement obligation is enforceable by contempt. C. Court's Inherent Authority to Use Contempt Power to Enforce Judgment. Although it is not entirely clear whether the State relies on the court's inherent authority to hold persons appearing before them in contempt, we think our decision in LaRue v. Burns, 268 N.W.2d 639 (Iowa 1978), disposes of this contention. In LaRue, a convicted defendant challenged the district court's authority to impose a jail sentence for the defendant's contempt in failing to pay court costs assessed against him in a criminal prosecution. 268 N.W.2d at 641. We held that a judgment for costs against a criminal defendant creates a civil, not a criminal, liability. Id. We noted [a]n exception exists if a statute makes court costs part of the fine to be imposed as penalty for an offense. Id. We concluded that in the absence of such an exception, a judgment for costs is to be enforced by execution. Id. (citing Iowa Code § 626.1 (1975) (Judgments or orders requiring payment of money ... are to be enforced by execution.)). We observed that, [w]hile a court has inherent power to punish for disobedience of its orders, such power is subject to restriction. Id. at 642. Moreover, the contempt power, we said, is to be exercised only to promote fair and impartial administration of the law. Id. We pointed out the State in LaRue had made no attempt to enforce the cost judgment using the execution procedures authorized by section 626.1 prior to invoking the court's contempt power. Id. (discussing Iowa Code section 626.1 (1975)). We held that, [i]n light of the circumstances of this case, the availability of the § 626.1 remedy, and policies underlying the contempt power,... there was no justification for imposition of a jail sentence. [5] Id. We think the same reasoning applies even more powerfully here with respect to an acquitted defendant. Because Sluyter was not convicted of the criminal charges, the cost judgment entered against him could not have been part of the fine to be imposed as penalty for an offense. Id. at 641. Therefore, the judgment created a civil liability. Although a district court has inherent power to punish persons who fail to obey its orders, our court made clear in LaRue that section 626.1 limited that power and required the State to enforce a civil cost judgment by execution. Id. That is not to say the court's contempt power can never be called upon in the course of the state's efforts to collect a cost judgment against an acquitted defendant. Chapters 626 and 630 set forth the various procedures for, and auxiliary to, execution on a judgment, as well as the duties of a judgment debtor. See Iowa Code chs. 626, 630. Should the judgment debtor willfully disobey court orders requiring compliance with these obligations, the court's contempt power may be invoked. See id. §§ 626.1 (stating that obedience to orders requiring the performance of any act other than the payment of money is to be coerced by attachment as for a contempt); 630.11 (stating any judgment debtor who fails to appear for examination or who fails to fully answer interrogatories will be guilty of contempt, and may be arrested and imprisoned until the debtor complies). D. Court's Authority Under Section 909.5 To Invoke Contempt Power. We now consider whether the district court had statutory authority to use contempt proceedings to enforce payment of the cost judgment. Cf. id. §§ 252A.6(6) (stating party who willfully fails to comply with support order may be punished for contempt), 598.23(1) (authorizing court to punish for contempt any party who willfully disobeys court's temporary order or final decree in dissolution action). The district court believed, and the State asserts on appeal, that Iowa Code section 909.5 provides that authority. That statute states: A person who is able to pay a fine, court-imposed court costs for a criminal proceeding, or both, or an installment of the fine or the court-imposed court costs, or both, and who refuses to do so, or who fails to make a good faith effort to pay the fine, court costs, or both, or any installment thereof, shall be held in contempt of court. Id. § 909.5. The State argues that, because the statute expressly includes court-imposed court costs for a criminal proceeding, it authorizes the court to use its power of contempt to enforce a chapter 815 cost judgment. Sluyter responds that section 909.5 does not apply to acquitted defendants, and if it does, it violates the debtor clause of the Iowa Constitution. Although section 909.5 does not specifically state whether it applies to convicted defendants, acquitted defendants, or both, its reference to [a] person appears all-encompassing at first blush. On the other hand, this provision appears in the Iowa Corrections Code, which deals with criminal corrections matters such as sentencing procedures, sentences, parole, the department of corrections, correctional programs, the parole board, deferred and suspended sentences and judgments, probation, and fines. See Iowa Code § 901.1 (Chapters 901 to 909 shall be known and may be cited as the ` Iowa Corrections Code. '). See generally id. chs. 901-909. Chapter 815, on the other hand, appears in the Iowa Code of Criminal Procedure, id. § 801.1, which governs the procedure in all criminal proceedings, id. § 801.2. The legislature's decision to place the authority to enforce a cost judgment in the Iowa Corrections Code is relevant to our search for legislative intent. In Iowa District Court, this court concluded the placement of the statute at issue in the Code chapter governing the sentencing of felons rather than in the chapter governing reduction of sentences for good conduct evidenced a legislative intent that the statute operate as a minimum sentence as opposed to a restriction on the power of the parole board. 616 N.W.2d at 579. The legislative history of this statute also indicates a conscious decision by the legislature to restrict the contempt power to criminal liabilities. The predecessor statutes to section 909.5, Iowa Code sections 762.32 and 789.17, both provided that a defendant willfully refusing to pay a judgment for a fine could be punished through contempt. Iowa Code §§ 762.32, 789.17 (1975). Section 762.32 was in the chapter governing trial of nonindictable offenses, and section 789.17 was found in the chapter dealing with judgments. See id. In the 1976 criminal code revision, these statutes were replaced with a new statute stating, Any person who is able to pay a fine, or an installment of a fine, and, and who refuses to do so, or who fails to make a good faith effort to pay his or her fine, or any installment thereof, shall be held in contempt of court. 1976 Iowa Acts ch. 1245, § 905 (codified at Iowa Code § 909.5 (1979)). Although one of the predecessor statutes was located in a chapter governing criminal procedure, the legislature chose to place the new statute in the Iowa Corrections Code. Later, when the legislature decided to make a failure to pay court-imposed court costs in a criminal proceeding subject to contempt, it amended section 909.5 in the Iowa Corrections Code to accomplish that goal. 1985 Iowa Acts ch. 52, § 1 (codified at Iowa Code § 909.5 (1985)). Significantly, at the time of this amendment, an indigent, acquitted defendant had no obligation to reimburse the state for the cost of legal assistance provided to him. See Iowa Code §§ 910.1(4) (1985) (defining restitution to include court-appointed attorney's fees or the expense of a public defender), 910.2 (requiring the sentencing court to order that restitution be made by each offender ... to the county where conviction was rendered for court costs, court-appointed attorney's fees or the expense of a public defender when applicable) (1985). It was not until 1999 that the legislature imposed an obligation on acquitted defendants to pay court-appointed counsel fees and defense costs. 1999 Iowa Acts. ch. 135, § 27 (codified at Iowa Code § 815.9 (1999)). This legislative history shows the legislature did not have civil cost judgments against acquitted defendants in mind when it amended section 909.5 in 1985, so it certainly had no intent at that time to apply the statute to acquitted defendants. Secondly, when civil cost judgments were authorized in 1999, the legislature took no action to expand the reach of section 909.5 beyond its criminal corrections context, as it could have easily done by expressly incorporating a contempt remedy in section 815.9 or by making a cross-reference to section 909.5. Yet, it did neither. In summary, the legislature's failure to expand the reach of section 909.5 to acquitted defendants suggests a legislative intent that the remedies permitted by section 909.5 apply only to cost judgments entered as part of the penalty for a criminal offense. As a final matter, we consider the possible constitutional infirmities of a statute that denies indigent acquitted defendants the protective exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors whose debt must be enforced through execution. In James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128, 92 S.Ct. 2027, 32 L.Ed.2d 600 (1972), the United States Supreme Court held that a Kansas recoupment statute violated the equal protection rights of indigent defendants. 407 U.S. at 142, 92 S.Ct. at 2035, 32 L.Ed.2d at 611. The Kansas statute required the entry of a judgment against indigent defendants for any expenditures made on their behalf to defend against criminal charges. Id. at 130, 92 S.Ct. at 2029, 32 L.Ed.2d at 604-05. Although the judgment could be enforced like any other civil judgment, indigent defendants were denied the exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors. Id. at 135, 92 S.Ct. at 2031-32, 32 L.Ed.2d at 607. The Court held the State could not impose unduly harsh or discriminatory terms merely because the obligation is to the public treasury rather than to a private creditor. Id. at 138, 92 S.Ct. at 2033, 32 L.Ed.2d at 608-09; accord Alexander v. Johnson, 742 F.2d 117, 124 (4th Cir.1984) (stating one basic feature[ ] of a constitutionally acceptable attorney's fees reimbursement program is that the defendant accepting court-appointed counsel cannot be exposed to more severe collection practices than the ordinary civil debtor). The remedy for which the State advocates in the present case suffers from the same deficiency as the remedy at issue in James. Enforcement of the cost judgment by contempt allows the State to bypass all the protections enjoyed by civil judgment debtors under our execution and related statutes and send Sluyter directly to jail. This potential constitutional infirmity may explain why the legislature did not include a contempt remedy in chapter 815. See generally State v. Haines, 360 N.W.2d 791, 795 (Iowa 1985) (upholding statute requiring convicted defendant to repay court-appointed attorney's fees against equal-protection claim, noting this sanction was designed to instill responsibility in criminal offenders and was based on a legitimate concern of the legislature, rehabilitation of the criminal defendant (emphasis added)). In view of the legislative history of the relevant statutes, the location of section 909.5 in the Iowa Corrections Code, and the constitutional problems raised in circumventing civil judgment collection protections, we conclude section 909.5 does not authorize the power of contempt to enforce a civil cost judgment such as the one entered against Sluyter.