Opinion ID: 2827459
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Opportunity and Necessity

Text: The first two elements are closely related. The first asks “whether the requested accommodation would afford the disabled resident an equal opportunity to enjoy the property.” Hollis, 760 F.3d at 541. The FHAA “links the term ‘necessary’ to the goal of equal opportunity. Plaintiffs must show that, but for the accommodation, they likely will be denied an equal opportunity to enjoy the housing of their choice.” Smith & Lee Assocs., 102 F.3d at 795 (citations omitted). “The necessity element is, in other words, a causation inquiry that examines whether the requested accommodation or modification would redress injuries that otherwise would prevent a disabled resident from receiving the same enjoyment from the property as a non-disabled person would receive.” Hollis, 760 F.3d at 541. No. 14-3754 Anderson, et al. v. City of Blue Ash Page 24 Equal use and enjoyment of a dwelling are achieved when an accommodation ameliorates the effects of the disability such that the disabled individual can use and enjoy his or her residence as a non-disabled person could. See id.; see also Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass’n, 765 F.3d 1277, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 2014) (finding that an emotional support dog was necessary for a plaintiff’s equal use and enjoyment of his dwelling where it “alleviate[d] the effects of a disability” so that he could work from his house as a non-disabled person could, and that “without the dog, [the plaintiff’s] social interactions would be so overwhelming that he would be unable to perform work of any kind” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here the plaintiffs contend that C.A.’s horse allows her to play independently in her backyard as a nondisabled child can, and so having the horse at her house is necessary for her equal use and enjoyment of her dwelling. The district court found that permitting Anderson to keep a horse at her house was unnecessary because C.A. could obtain therapy with a horse by traveling to a local farm or stable. On appeal, the City similarly argues that C.A. did not need therapy with a horse at her house, and that the accommodation was also unnecessary because “C.A. can ambulate and otherwise function without the horse,” and continue to live in her house without it. (Appellee Br. 47–48.) Anderson contends that the accommodation was necessary for C.A. to play independently in her backyard as a non-disabled child could, and that therapy with a horse at a farm is no substitute for therapy at her house, citing to Dr. Levin’s letter in which he stated that “[C.A.] fatigues easily, and just a drive across town to receive therapy can wipe her out leaving no energy to enjoy this therapeutic and recreational activity.” (Levin Letter, November 3, 2010, R. 10-5, PageID 717.) Regarding the assertion that C.A. can obtain therapy with a horse at a local farm or stable, Dr. Levin’s letter is evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find that C.A. cannot obtain the benefit of therapy after traveling from her house, so the district court’s conclusion to the contrary on summary judgment, where it was required to draw all reasonable inferences in Anderson’s favor, was in error. More to the point, the availability of an alternative treatment away from the plaintiff’s dwelling is irrelevant to the FHAA, which requires reasonable accommodations necessary for a disabled individual to receive the “same enjoyment No. 14-3754 Anderson, et al. v. City of Blue Ash Page 25 from the property as a non-disabled person would receive,” Hollis, 760 F.3d at 541 (emphasis added), not merely those accommodations that the disabled individual cannot function without or for which no alternative is available away from the dwelling. For the same reason, the City’s argument that “C.A. can ambulate and otherwise function without the horse” is likewise irrelevant because the FHAA requires accommodations that are necessary to achieve housing equality, not just those accommodations that are absolutely necessary for the disabled individual’s treatment or basic ability to function. The City’s argument that the accommodation was not necessary because C.A. can continue to live in her house without it is also inapposite. The City relies on our decision in Howard, in which we rejected a plaintiff’s claim that a privacy fence was a necessary accommodation for him to continue to live in his dwelling in part because the plaintiff had lived there without the fence for years. See 276 F.3d at 806. The City points out that, like the plaintiff in Howard, C.A. can continue to live in her house without the presence of a horse. But, unlike the plaintiff in Howard, the plaintiffs here do not contend that the accommodation is necessary for C.A. to continue to reside in her dwelling, but rather that the accommodation is necessary for her to have an equal opportunity to enjoy a particular use of her house—independent recreation and exercise in her backyard. Because the FHAA requires accommodations that are necessary for the same enjoyment of a dwelling that a non-disabled person would receive, not just those that are necessary to remain in the dwelling at all, the City’s reliance on Howard is misplaced. See Bhogaita, 765 F.3d at 1289 (finding that the FHAA required an accommodation for a puppy that was necessary for the plaintiff to work from his house, even though the plaintiff could continue to live in the house without it). Anderson testified that Ellie allows C.A. to play independently and exercise in her backyard and that, without the horse, C.A. cannot do so for any significant length of time, and would effectively be denied the equal opportunity to play in her own backyard as non-disabled children can. This evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the requested accommodation of keeping the miniature horse at her house is necessary for C.A.’s equal use and enjoyment of her dwelling. No. 14-3754 Anderson, et al. v. City of Blue Ash Page 26