Opinion ID: 66322
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Malice and JMOL (Aikens’ Issue 4)

Text: The Aikens argue that Jordan acted with malice; therefore, the district court erred in granting JMOL in favor of the Appellees. The Aikens correctly point to the definition of malice, as defined by the Mississippi Supreme Court and cited by this Court: “‘maliciousness does not necessarily mean actual malice or ill will, but the intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social justification.’” DIJO, Inc. v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 351 F.3d 679, 684 (5th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). The Aikens argue that because they demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that Jordan committed an intentional act, by changing Chapa’s report without consulting Chapa or conducting a site investigation, the district court erred in granting the Appellees motion for JMOL. The Aikens do demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Jordan committed an intentional act - he reviewed, revised, and changed Chapa’s October 2005 report. Our de novo review of the record as a whole, however, makes clear that the Aikens failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that Jordan committed an intentional, wrongful act. As is stated above, the differences between the October 2005 report and the December 2005 report are not significant. We hold these changes cannot be 7 No. 08-60154 classified as “wrongful acts.” Both reports concluded that “high winds and storm surge/flooding accompanying Hurricane Katrina destroyed the house, boat house and the pump house.” In addition, the March 2006 supplemental report clarifies the likely cause of damage from wind as opposed to storm surge due to USAA’s request for more detailed information. This request provided an adequate justification for Jordan to provide the supplemental report. Thus, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of JMOL with respect to this claim.