Opinion ID: 537726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timing of Ownership

Text: 219 Defendants first contend that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that, before forfeiting an asset on the ground that it provided a source of influence under Sec. 1963(a)(2), the jury had to find initially that the defendant owned the property at issue at the time of indictment. The government responds that its interest in forfeitable property vests at the time of the unlawful activity and cannot be extinguished by a subsequent transfer of the property prior to the indictment. 220 The government's position clearly is the accepted view with respect to forfeitures under Sec. 1963(a)(1). Courts that have considered RICO forfeitures in this context have held that RICO forfeiture, unlike forfeiture under other statutes, is a sanction against the individual rather than a judgment against the property itself. United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d 798, 801 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1011, 106 S.Ct. 1186, 89 L.Ed.2d 302 (1986); see also United States v. Robilotto, 828 F.2d 940, 948-49 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1011, 108 S.Ct. 711, 98 L.Ed.2d 662 (1988). Because RICO forfeiture is an in personam action, rather than an in rem action, it has been held that the government's interest in the forfeitable property vests at the time of the unlawful activity and cannot be defeated by the defendants' subsequent transfer of the property. See Ginsburg, 773 F.2d at 801; see also United States v. Navarro-Ordas, 770 F.2d 959, 969-70 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016, 106 S.Ct. 1200, 89 L.Ed.2d 313 (1986). 221 Defendants acknowledge the holdings of these cases but argue that (a)(2) forfeiture should be treated differently from (a)(1) forfeiture. They, however, have cited nothing in the legislative history of RICO or anywhere else to support the proposition that RICO forfeiture under Sec. 1963(a)(2) should be treated as an in rem action, in contrast to forfeiture under (a)(1), which is universally treated as an in personam action. The cases that we have reviewed in the (a)(1) context make no mention of such a distinction, and do not suggest that their in personam reasoning is limited only to (a)(1) forfeiture. Rather, they state that RICO forfeiture, presumably in general, is an in personam sanction. See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 576 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 821, 106 S.Ct. 72, 88 L.Ed.2d 59 (1985); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1349 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005, 104 S.Ct. 996, 79 L.Ed.2d 229 (1984). 222 We, therefore, reject defendants' contention that (a)(2) forfeiture can only occur when the property was owned at the time of the indictment. Due to the in personam nature of RICO forfeiture, we find that under (a)(2) as well as under (a)(1), the government's interest in the forfeitable property vests at the time of the unlawful activity and cannot be defeated by the defendants' subsequent transfer of the property. 24 4]