Opinion ID: 2075202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: denial of defendant's motion for appointment of a psychiatric expert to assist in the preparation of an insanity defense

Text: At a March 25, 1977 pretrial status conference, the trial court ordered psychiatric screening for appellant to determine if appellant was competent to stand trial. A commitment was ordered in accordance with D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(a). [10] That same day, a preliminary report was issued by a forensic psychiatrist working at the Department of Human Resources (DHR). The report, based on observations which disclosed that appellant was showing signs of depression and psychosis, expressed doubts as to appellant's competency to stand trial. The report recommended appellant be admitted for a complete pretrial mental examination. An order to that effect was issued by the court on April 6, 1977, and the case was continued. On May 12, the Chief of the Forensic Psychiatry Division of DHR wrote to the court that there was a serious question about appellant's competency to stand trial, and he requested that appellant remain hospitalized for an additional thirty days and be reevaluated at that time. The request was granted by the court and the status hearing was reset for June 21. On June 15, the staff psychiatrist in charge of appellant's evaluation reported to the court that it was his opinion that appellant was incompetent to stand trial due to appellant's persistent paranoid thinking and auditory hallucinations. Accordingly, at the next status hearing (held on June 22, rather than on June 21), the court found appellant incompetent to stand trial and ordered him recommitted to St. Elizabeths for further evaluation. A new trial date of September 14 was set, to be preceded by a September 7 hearing at which appellant's competency would be redetermined. On July 27, DHR informed the court that appellant was then able to stand trial. In pertinent part, the letter from DHR read: Dr. David L. Shapiro, staff psychologist, recently examined Mr. Dobson, and the following determinations were made at a medical staff conference. He is now competent for trial by virtue of having a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceeding pending against him and being able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. Furthermore, on or about September 23, 1976, the date of the alleged offenses, he was not suffering from a mental disease or defect which substantially impaired his behavioral controls, and the alleged offenses, if committed by him, were not the product of his mental disease or defect. Furthermore, nor as a result of a mental disease or defect did he lack substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. He has been diagnosed as Antisocial Personality with Paranoid features and is currently receiving [medicine]. In the interim between the filing of this letter with the court and the status hearing to be held on September 7, counsel for appellant filed a motion with the court for appointment of a private psychiatrist to examine appellant, and for appropriation of funds to pay for the examination. In a written order dated September 7, 1977, the court denied appellant's request for expert psychiatric services. In addition to reciting the basis for DHR's finding of competence, the order stated: The request for expert psychiatric services, in the view of the Court is not merited. . . . Further psychiatric examination does not appear to be necessary to an adequate defense in this case.       Defendant's history of mental problems is not of major proportions. The chief indication of mental illness in his record is the June 15, 1977, finding by St. Elizabeths Hospital that defendant was incompetent to stand trial at that time. However, after further examination, St. Elizabeth's found him to be competent less than two months later. The balance of defendant's history of mental problems consists of two voluntary hospitalizations, in 1970 and 1972. The diagnosis on both occasions was Adjustment reaction of adolescence, and outpatient therapy was prescribed. Appellant claims that this ruling was error because the recent evidence of mental aberration on appellant's part coupled with his prior history of emotional maladjustment was sufficient to require the grant of the motion. While the question is a close one in this case, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the request. Section 11-2605(a) of the D.C.Code states: Counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate defense may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize counsel to obtain the services. Our application of this statute is controlled by our opinion in Gaither v. United States, supra at 1367 n.4, where we said: Section 11-2605(a) requires that eligibility and need for a defense service be determined in an ex parte proceeding. This requirement affords the defendant an opportunity to present his request to the trial court without prematurely disclosing the merits of his defense to the prosecution. . . . In view of our holding that the trial court erroneously denied appellant's request that a private examination be ordered, we need not decide whether the failure to accord appellant an ex parte hearing constituted reversible error. The court must provide a defendant with expert services under D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 11-2605(a), whenever there has been a showing that the accused is financially unable to obtain the service and the service is necessary to an adequate defense. [11] Gaither v. United States, supra ; Williams v. United States, D.C.App., 310 A.2d 244 (1973). There is no dispute that psychiatric services are covered by the statute, Gaither v. United States, supra, at 1367, or that in the instant case appellant was financially eligible for their provision. [12] Hence, the only issue is whether the services are necessary to an adequate defense. In that regard, this case is governed by Gaither. In Gaither, the trial court denied defendant's timely request for the appointment of an independent psychiatrist because it did not find sufficient evidence of mental disorder to justify the appointment. A similar finding is the basis for the court's denial in this case. We remanded the Gaither case to the trial court with directions to appoint a reputable private psychiatrist to examine the defendant and report to the court and defense counsel whether there is a reasonable basis for pursuing an insanity defense. The reason for our remand was our finding that there was sufficient evidence of mental disorder to support the request for appointment of a private psychiatrist. At the outset of the Gaither opinion, we observed that in evaluating the request for appointment of a psychiatrist under § 11-2605(a) the court is not concerned with the ultimate question of whether or not the defendant was sane at the time of the offense, but rather whether the evidence of mental disorder is such that a reasonable attorney would pursue an insanity defense. Gaither, supra at 1367 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the trial court should tend to rely on the judgment of defense counsel who has the primary duty of providing an adequate defense. Id. at 1368. However, as we noted in Gaither, the court should not act merely as a rubber stamp for defense counsel, but should consider other factors, including the defendant's prior psychological history, reports concerning defendant's mental state, opinions of those who have observed the defendant, and the trial court's own assessment of the defendant's demeanor. Id. When these factors, taken together, fail to establish a basis for a plea of insanity, the court properly may deny the motion. We, therefore, must determine whether or not there was a sufficient evidentiary basis for the defense, such that appellant's motion should have been granted or such that the court should have held a hearing. Admittedly, the record of mental disorder in this case is not as compelling as that which existed in Gaither. There, the accused had been unable to stand trial for several months due to her mental state. She had been consistently diagnosed as paranoid schizophrenic and an excessive drinker. She had murdered her victim, the man with whom she had been living, in a bizarre manner, and her defense counsel thought her the most insane person he had ever observed. Nevertheless, by remanding that case we did not mean to establish a standard whereby only an accused exhibiting the most extreme abnormal behavior would qualify for the appointment of a private psychiatrist. Where, as here, there is a financially eligible defendant who has been recently adjudged incompetent to stand trial by a qualified court-appointed psychiatric staff, who has a history  albeit limited  of psychiatric problems, and defense counsel in good faith asserts that there is a basis for an insanity defense and requests an independent, private psychiatrist, the court should hold a hearing on that request. Had the court held a hearing on the request in this case, a firmer basis for supporting its ruling might have been made to appear, but no hearing was held. In addition to these considerations, a court may also deny a § 11-2605(a) request on the basis that the defendant already had received sufficient psychiatric assistance to prepare his defense. The provision for psychiatric examination under § 24-301(a) is not dispositive of this inquiry. The task of a § 24-301(a) expert essentially is to provide the court, in a neutral and detached manner, with an evaluation of the accused's competency to stand trial or of defendant's sanity at the time of the commission of the offense. In contrast, the § 11-2605(a) expert acts as a consultant to the defendant, not to the court. His main purpose is to help determine whether there is a reasonable basis for an insanity defense. We hold that in this case, as in Gaither, examination of appellant by St. Elizabeth's staff psychiatrists, appointed by, and required to report to, the court in accordance with § 24-301(a), was not provision of sufficient psychiatric assistance so as to obviate the need for the appointment of a private psychiatrist under § 11-2605(a). Since we find no error at trial other than the denial of appellant's motion for a court-appointed psychiatrist, we remand this case under the authority of Gaither v. United States, supra , and direct the trial court to appoint a psychiatric expert under D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 11-2605(a). The jury's disposition of the case shall remain undisturbed by our holding, and appellant's conviction will stand unless the court-appointed private psychiatrist provides defense counsel with a reasonable basis upon which to pursue an insanity defense, and a jury subsequently determines that appellant was insane at the time he committed the acts in question. Affirmed in part and remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. NEWMAN, Chief Judge, concurring: I concur in the opinion of the court with the exception of footnote 9 supra, at p. 365. That footnote is palpable dictum and, in my judgment, merely adds further confusion to the meaning of our now famous footnote 5 in the case of Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 387 A.2d 1084 (1978) (en banc).