Opinion ID: 2271648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Standard for Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification

Text: Under Maryland Rule 5-702, Expert testimony may be admitted, in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if the court determines that the testimony will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In making that determination, the court shall determine (1) whether the witness is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, (2) the appropriateness of the expert testimony on the particular subject, and (3) whether a sufficient factual basis exists to support the expert testimony. Although decided before our adoption of Rule 5-702, [2] in Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 512 A.2d 1056 (1986), we applied a substantially similar common law rule, doing so specifically in the context of the admissibility standard for, and the extent of courts' discretion in, allowing or excluding expert testimony on eyewitness identifications. Bloodsworth was convicted of first degree murder and related sexual offenses largely on the strength of eyewitness testimony. Id. at 166-70, 512 A.2d at 1057-59. Similar to Bomar, Bloodsworth argued that the trial court erred in refusing to allow an expert witness to testify about the shortcomings of eyewitness identification. Id. at 177, 512 A.2d at 1062-63. The expert witness in Bloodsworth offered to testify to the following: ... I would only be estimating what the research shows. I don't have a particularly overall general condemnation of eye witnesses at issue.    [E]ye witnesses are really confronted with a difficult situation, and when the circumstances add up to a very difficult challenge to the memory system, these are things that can happen to various parts of their testimony and various parts of their identification, and testing methods ... I see as simply a tool, and the checklist is ... provided to the jury so that they can essentially assess what... the filter of the scientist would say about a given test. Id. at 177-78, 512 A.2d at 1062. The trial judge excluded the expert's testimony stating: I am concerned [about] the possibility [that] admitting the evidence would tend to confuse or mislead the jury. This is not just a matter of usurping the province of the jury, although it is in my judgment most certainly that, it is also that such testimony is of little value in aiding the jury in this case. I'm not persuaded that the testimony will be helpful to the jury in understanding the evidence in this case.    It seems to me that the reliability of the witnesses and the identification witnesses is better tested by the cathartic effect of cross-examination than by the opinion of an expert. Id. at 178, 512 A.2d at 1063. The trial judge also concluded that the proffered testimony failed the Frye-Reed test [3] because the defense failed to present evidence showing that the expert testimony on eyewitness identification has general acceptance in the relevant scientific community. Id. at 179, 512 A.2d at 1063. Finally, the trial judge held: [E]ven if it were a technique generally accepted in the relevant scientific community, the proffer is not sufficient to persuade me first, exactly what is being offered to the jury other than some generalized explanation of the studies that have been made. Nothing that has been proffered suggests that it will be helpful.    [I]t may usurp the jury's province in determining the reliability of the identification in this case.... Id. at 179, 512 A.2d at 1063. We upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude the expert's testimony but remanded the case to the Circuit Court due to Brady violations. [4] Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 171-76, 512 A.2d at 1067. In addition, we held that the Frye-Reed test was not properly applicable to [expert testimony on eyewitness identification.] Id. at 184, 512 A.2d at 1066. In upholding the decision we held that the proper standard for the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is `whether [the expert's] testimony will be of real appreciable help to the trier of fact in deciding the issue presented.' Id., 512 A.2d at 1066 ( quoting Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 165 A.2d 898 (1960)). Further, we held that `[t]he admissibility of expert testimony is a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court, and its action in admitting or excluding such testimony will seldom constitute a ground for reversal.' Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 185, 512 A.2d at 1067 ( quoting Raithel v. State, 280 Md. 291, 372 A.2d 1069 (1977)). Bomar now urges us to reevaluate the standard adopted in Bloodsworth regarding expert testimony on eyewitness identification. He argues that such expert testimony should be presumptively admissible, or at least be favored, especially in cases like this one, where eyewitness testimony forms the foundation of the State's case. For this proposition, he argues that (1) Bloodsworth discouraged the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification; (2) many wrongful convictions are due to eyewitness misidentifications, causing many jurisdictions to favor the admissibility of expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications; and (3) expert testimony on eyewitness identification should be presumptively helpful and under this standard the trial judge erred in not admitting the proffered expert testimony. Before assessing Bomar's arguments, we first look for guidance from other jurisdictions that have grappled with how to handle expert testimony on eyewitness identification. In McMullen v. State, 714 So.2d 368, 370-71 (Fla.1998), the Supreme Court of Florida divided the various jurisdictional approaches on this issue into categories, discretionary and prohibitory. The discretionary approach grants the trial court discretion as to whether to admit such testimony and appears to be the majority view on both the federal [5] and state [6] levels that have considered the question. Id. at 370. Other jurisdictions embrace a discretionary approach generally, but either require or favor the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification when the prosecution's case relies solely on eyewitness testimony. [7] Some jurisdictions appear to generally disfavor expert testimony on eyewitness identification, but favor it when the State has no substantial corroborating evidence. [8] Finally, there is a prohibitory approach which excludes all expert testimony on eyewitness identification. To our knowledge, only three jurisdictions have retained this per se exclusion. [9] Id. at 371. Bomar argues that Bloodsworth discourages the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification because the opinion advances all the arguments against the admissibility of expert testimony, and provides no countervailing observations which would educate trial judges as to circumstances in which expert testimony on eyewitness reliability would be helpful. To support his argument, Bomar draws attention to our observation in Bloodsworth that, [t]he vast majority of courts have rejected [expert testimony on eyewitness identification,] id. at 181, 512 A.2d at 1064, and the Court's reliance on United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973), and State v. Porraro, 121 R.I. 882, 404 A.2d 465 (1979), two cases that upheld the exclusion of such evidence. We quoted Amaral for the proposition that `[o]ur legal system places primary reliance for the ascertainment of truth on the test of cross-examination' and that `[i]t is the responsibility of counsel during cross-examination to inquire into the witness' [sic] opportunity for observation, his capacity for observation, his attention and interest and his distraction or division of attention.' Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 182, 512 A.2d at 1065 ( quoting Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1153) (citations omitted). We also referenced Porraro, in which the Supreme Court of Rhode Island upheld the trial judge's exclusion of a psychology professor's testimony on eyewitness identification because of a fear `it would effectively invade the province of the jury' and that `admitting this testimony would open a floodgate whereby experts would testify on every conceivable aspect of a witness' [sic] credibility.' Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 183, 512 A.2d at 1065 ( quoting Porraro, 404 A.2d at 471). We then quoted the following holding in Porraro, which was similar to the decision in Amaral: We are persuaded that the subject matter of the proffered testimony in this case, the trustworthiness in general of eyewitness observations, was not beyond the ken of the jurors and therefore the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence. Through cross-examination, defense counsel was able to probe into the witness' [sic] capacity and opportunity for observation, her attention, interest and distraction. The jury was perfectly capable of assessing the witness' [sic] credibility by weighing the inconsistencies and deficiencies elicited in cross-examination. Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 183, 512 A.2d at 1065 ( quoting Porraro, 404 A.2d at 465). We agree with Bomar that the Bloodsworth opinion strikes a negative tone with respect to expert testimony on eyewitness identification. But this does not mean that Bloodsworth was wrongly decided or that we should depart from the real appreciable help to the jury standard for admission that was applied in that case. We will be sure, though, to carefully examine the record here to ascertain whether that negative tone influenced the trial court's ruling excluding Dr. Schretlen's testimony. First we consider Bomar's thesis that such expert testimony should be presumptively admissible. Quoting an article published in an American Bar Association journal, Richard S. Schmechel, et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors' Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 177, 184, Bomar defends his presumptively admissible theory by arguing that the standard of review for trial judges' decisions on expert testimony is `vacuous[,]' makes a lower court's decision `de facto final' or grants the lower court unfettered discretion, and insulates the decision not to allow such experts within an extremely deferential standard of review. Bomar points out that the trial judge in Bloodsworth, on remand, again precluded the expert testimony he sought to introduce and again a jury convicted Bloodsworth of murder primarily on the basis of eyewitness identification. See Bloodsworth v. State, 76 Md.App. 23, 33, 543 A.2d 382, 387 (1988). He observes, moreover, that DNA testing in 1993 exonerated Bloodsworth of this crime. See The Innocence Project, Know the Cases: Kirk Bloodsworth, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ Content/54.php (last visited Jan. 04, 2010). Bomar's second contention is that the volume of wrongful convictions based on eyewitness misidentifications impels this Court to encourage the admission of expert testimony on eyewitness identification. Bomar predicates his argument on studies showing that a substantial number of individuals who were convicted of a crime, but later exonerated by DNA evidence, were mistakenly identified by at least one eyewitness. For example, the Third Circuit in United States v. Brownlee reviewed literature on eyewitness reliability and observed: The recent availability of post-conviction DNA tests demonstrate that there have been an overwhelming number of false convictions stemming from uninformed reliance on eyewitness misidentifications. In 209 out of 328 cases (64%) of wrongful convictions identified by a recent exoneration study, at least one eyewitness misidentified the defendant. In fact, mistaken eyewitness identifications are responsible for more wrongful convictions than all other causes combined. 454 F.3d 131, 141-42 (3d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Copeland, 226 S.W.3d 287, 299-300 (Tenn.2007) (reviewing literature addressing limitations of eyewitness identification evidence); The Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment, Final Report to the General Assembly 64, Dec. 12, 2008 (citing the prevalence of erroneous eyewitness identifications and subsequent wrongful convictions as a reason to abolish the death penalty in Maryland); The Innocence Project, Fact Sheet on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/news/Fact-Sheets.php (finding that Eyewitness [m]isidentification [t]estimony was a factor in 74 percent of post-conviction DNA exoneration cases in the U.S.) (last visited Jan. 04, 2010). Bomar maintains that because of the apparently frequent convictions based on eyewitnesses' misidentifications, [o]ther jurisdictions have tempered the judicial hostility towards admitting ... expert testimony on eyewitness reliability in vogue when Bloodsworth was decided, and the decisive trend now recognizes that expert testimony on eyewitness reliability is a necessary safeguard against wrongful conviction. He argues that the majority of cases treat expert testimony on eyewitness reliability as presumptively helpful to the jury when the State's case is based primarily on eyewitness testimony. In support of this trend, Bomar offers United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); Johnson v. State, 272 Ga. 254, 526 S.E.2d 549 (2000); and Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 301. In Smithers, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to allow an expert on eyewitness identification. In examining the means by which courts consider such testimony, the court appraised the development of expert testimony on eyewitness reliability as follows: Courts' treatments of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification has experienced a dramatic transformation in the past twenty years and is still in a state of flux. Beginning in the early 1970's, defense attorneys began to bring expert testimony into the courtroom. Then, courts were uniformly skeptical about admitting such testimony, elaborating a host of reasons why eyewitness experts should not be allowed to testify.    This trend shifted with a series of decisions in the 1980's, with the emerging view that expert testimony may be offered, in certain circumstances, on the subject of the psychological factors which influence the memory process.... This jurisprudential trend is not surprising in light of modern scientific studies which show that, while juries rely heavily on eyewitness testimony, it can be untrustworthy under certain circumstances. Recognizing the dichotomy between eyewitness errors and jurors' reliance on eyewitness testimony, this Circuit has held that expert testimony on the subject of eyewitness identification is admissible. 212 F.3d at 311-12 (citations and footnote omitted). The Smithers court held that the district court improperly excluded the proffered expert testimony because (1) the district judge excluded the expert's testimony because it makes it a more interesting case and (2) the district court failed to follow established guidelines for admitting such evidence. [10] Id. at 314-15. The Sixth Circuit also held that expert testimony should be admitted in the precise situation presented to the trial court in this case-that is, when there is no other inculpatory evidence presented against the Defendant with the exception of a small number of eyewitness identifications. Id. at 317. Bomar maintains that the reliability of eyewitness testimony is beyond the ken of jurors, citing Smithers, 212 F.3d at 312 n. 1, 316, which states that [t]oday, there is no question that many aspects of perception and memory are not within the common experience of most jurors, and in fact, many factors that affect memory are counter-intuitive and that [j]urors tend to overestimate the accuracy of eyewitness identifications because they often do not know the factors they should consider when analyzing this testimony. Bomar reiterates, citing Copeland, that expert testimony is needed to sensitize jurors to eyewitness errors: [R]esearch over the past thirty years has shown that expert testimony on memory and eyewitness identification is the only legal safeguard that is effective in sensitizing jurors to eyewitness errors. Studies have shown that erroneous identification accounted for as much as eighty-five percent of the convictions of those individuals later exonerated by DNA testing.    Further, the research also indicates that neither cross-examination nor jury instructions on the issue are sufficient to educate the jury on the problems with eyewitness identification.... Copeland, 226 S.W.3d at 299-300 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Brownlee, 454 F.3d at 141-42 (reviewing literature and stating that `jurors seldom enter a courtroom with the knowledge that eyewitness identifications are unreliable') (citations omitted). Bomar's third argument calls for us to consider expert testimony on eyewitness identification presumptively helpful in cases where there is no other evidence to corroborate the eyewitness identification. For this proposition, Bomar relies on two cases: Johnson, 526 S.E.2d at 549, and State v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374 (2007). According to Bomar, in Johnson, the Supreme Court of Georgia adopted a presumptive admissibility standard for expert opinion on eyewitness testimony where a state's case against a defendant rests primarily on the eyewitness identification, in holding: Where eyewitness identification of the defendant is a key element of the State's case and there is no substantial corroboration of that identification by other evidence, trial courts may not exclude expert testimony without carefully weighing whether the evidence would assist the jury in assessing the reliability of eyewitness testimony and whether expert eyewitness testimony is the only effective way to reveal any weakness in an eyewitness identification. However, the admission or exclusion of this evidence lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear abuse of discretion. 526 S.E.2d at 552-53 (quotation marks and citations and omitted). Similarly in LeGrand, the Court of Appeals of New York held: [W]here the case turns on the accuracy of eyewitness identifications and there is little or no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the crime, it is an abuse of discretion for a trial court to exclude expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identifications if that testimony is (1) relevant to the witness's identification of defendant, (2) based on principles that are generally accepted within the relevant scientific community, (3) proffered by a qualified expert and (4) on a topic beyond the ken of the average juror.... [T]rial courts generally have the power to limit the amount and scope of evidence presented.... 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d at 375-76. Bomar believes a standard where expert testimony is presumptively helpful to a jury will strike the proper balance between the trial judge's traditional discretion in evaluating the admissibility of evidence and providing a proper safeguard against wrongful conviction. Under Bomar's proposed standard, [t]rial judges would still have discretion to exclude the testimony, but only if the party seeking to exclude the expert demonstrates that the opinions are not helpful because they do not pertain to the situation at hand. Bomar also argues this standard would be consistent with Bloodsworth, though the end result would differ, and with Maryland Rule 5-401, which defines relevant testimony. [11] We agree with Bomar that jurisdictions have trended toward the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness reliability and we recognize that scientific advances since Bloodsworth may assist juries in evaluating eyewitness testimony. We appreciate that scientific advances have revealed (and may continue to reveal) a novel or greater understanding of the mechanics of memory that may not be intuitive to a layperson. Thus, it is time to make clear that trial courts should recognize these scientific advances in exercising their discretion whether to admit such expert testimony in a particular case. Nonetheless, some of the factors of eyewitness identification are not beyond the ken of jurors. For example, the effects of stress or time are generally known to exacerbate memory loss and, barring a specific set of facts, do not require expert testimony for the layperson to understand them in the context of eyewitness testimony. In recognition of this, we believe, consistent with our past holdings, that a flexible standard that can properly gauge the state of the scientific art in relation to the specific facts of the case is best. Accordingly, notwithstanding the negative tone of the Bloodsworth decision, the substantive standard for admissibility set forth was not wrong, and indeed is consonant with the current majority view. Thus, we reiterate the following test for the admissibility of expert testimony on eyewitness identification: `whether his [or her] testimony will be of real appreciable help to the trier of fact in deciding the issue presented[;]' the application of this test is `a matter largely within the discretion of the trial court[.]' Bloodsworth, 307 Md. at 184, 185, 512 A.2d at 1066, 1067 (citations omitted). This standard comports with the general rule on expert testimony set forth in Rule 5-702. [12] The trial court's discretion is sufficiently circumscribed by Maryland Rule 5-702, which outlines specific criteria to determine whether to admit the proffered expert testimony. We decline Bomar's proposed standard because we do not want to hamper the trial court's ability to evaluate proffered expert testimony on a case-by-case basis. Despite the increased acceptance of such evidence, most jurisdictions have not embraced a presumption of admissibility. Rather, the trend has largely been one of jurisdictions abandoning blanket exclusion of such expert testimony. [13] A trial judge must have the ability to determine whether proffered testimony has a credible foundation and is relevant to the facts of a given case. Rule 5-702 entrusts the trial court with the task of determining whether an expert is qualified to give testimony about an issue, whether there is a foundation for the expert's proffered testimony, and the relevance of the proffered testimony. We see no reason to shift the burden of demonstrating the Rule 5-702 elements away from the one who presents the expert to the court. Expert testimony is not the only means to educate juries about the vagaries of eyewitness testimonies and safeguard against wrongful convictions based on misidentifications. In some cases, other trial components such as cross-examination, closing arguments, and jury instructions, can provide the jury with sufficient information to evaluate the reliability of eyewitness identifications. Indeed, it might be an appropriate time for the Maryland Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Committee to evaluate whether its current rule on witnesses (MPJICr 3:10) should be modified in light of the studies about eyewitness testimony, and the scientific advances in this area. [14] A presumptively helpful standard in cases relying on eyewitness identification could unnecessarily complicate a case by encouraging a battle of the experts. Dueling experts could interject differing interpretations of statistics and scientific studies on identification, leaving the jury more confused than aided by the expert opinions. Further, we do not want to force experts upon a court where, as here, the expert's testimony would not have been helpful to a jury. Thus, we reject holding expert testimony on eyewitness reliability to any other standard other than the abuse of discretion standard. Whether the prosecution's case rests solely on eyewitness identification or not, the probative value of expert testimony on eyewitness identification and how much such testimony can actually help the jury in the case before it must be carefully weighed by the court on a case-by-case basis.