Opinion ID: 220781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Felony Menacing

Text: According to Colorado law, [a] person commits the crime of menacing if, by any threat or physical action, he or she knowingly places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-206. Menacing is a felony if it is accomplished by the use or threatened use of a deadly weapon. Id. Colorado defines the term deadly weapon broadly to include not only guns, knives, and bludgeons, but also [a]ny other weapon, device, instrument, material, or substance, whether animate or inanimate. Id. § 18-1-901(e). As Armijo recognizes, this court previously concluded Colorado felony menacing is categorically a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA). [3] United States v. Herron, 432 F.3d 1127, 1138 (10th Cir.2005). Herron recognized that the use-of-force element of Colorado felony menacing is symmetrical with the ACCA's use-of-force requirement: [The defendant's felony menacing] convictions were undoubtedly for violent felonies. He knowingly place[d] or attempt[ed] to place another person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury... by the use of a deadly weapon. [Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-206]. This conduct easily satisfies the requirement of the threatened use of physical force against the person of another, under the ACCA. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Knowingly placing someone in fear ... by the use of a deadly weapon certainly constitutes threatening someone. [The defendant] argues that menacing cannot be a violent felony because under Colorado law the term deadly weapon is defined so broadly as to include a fist, foot, or whiskey bottle, so that menacing includes conduct such as telling someone over the telephone that one intends to punch or kick them the next day, or within the next few hours, depending on the interpretation of the phrase `imminent.' But this observation is beside the point. A threat to kick or strike someone comes within the ACCA definition regardless of whether a foot or bottle is a deadly weapon. Id. (citation omitted). Armijo argues, however, that Herron does not control the outcome of this appeal because it failed to recognize felony menacing could be committed through the use of a material or substance such as poison or pathogen. See Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-1-901(e) (defining deadly weapon to include, inter alia, a material[] or substance, whether animate or inanimate); People v. Shawn, 107 P.3d 1033, 1036 (Colo.App.2004) (holding that HIV is a deadly weapon for purposes of the Colorado felony menacing statute). In particular, Armijo asserts this court's post- Herron decision in United States v. Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir.2008), makes clear that injury effected by chemical action on the body (as in poisoning or exposure to hazardous chemicals) should not be described as caused by physical force.  We conclude Armijo's reliance on Rodriguez-Enriquez is unavailing. Given that this court has concluded analysis under the ACCA applies equally to § 4B1.2(a), Charles, 576 F.3d at 1068 n. 2, we specifically adopt the reasoning in Herron to hold Colorado felony menacing is categorically a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1). This is true despite the inclusion of poisons and pathogens in Colorado's definition of deadly weapon. In so holding, this court joins the Eighth and Ninth Circuits in rejecting arguments regarding Colorado felony menacing identical to those raised by Armijo on appeal. United States v. Melchor-Meceno, 620 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir.2010) (One cannot knowingly place another in fear of being poisoned [under Colorado law] without threatening to force the poison on the victim.); United States v. Forrest, 611 F.3d 908, 910-11 (8th Cir.2010) (A threat that creates a fear `of imminent serious bodily injury' is a threat of physical force.). Armijo asserts the Colorado Court of Appeals decision in Shawn stands for the broad proposition that poisons or pathogens always satisfy the use-of-a-deadly-weapon element of Colorado felony menacing, no matter how the poison or pathogen is used or threatened to be used. He also asserts this court's decision in Rodriguez-Enriquez stands for the broad proposition that use, or threatened use, of a poison or pathogen can never satisfy the physical force requirement of § 4B1.2(a)(1). Thus, according to Armijo, Colorado felony menacing is categorically not a crime of violence. Armijo's descriptions of the holdings of these cases are less than accurate. This court in Rodriguez-Enriquez was tasked with deciding whether the Colorado crime of assault two (drugging a victim) is a crime of violence for purposes of U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). [4] 518 F.3d at 1192. A person commits the crime of assault two (drugging a victim) if [f]or a purpose other than lawful medical or therapeutic treatment, he intentionally causes stupor, unconsciousness, or other physical or mental impairment or injury to another person by administering to him, without his consent, a drug, substance, or preparation capable of producing the intended harm. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 18-3-203(1)(e). Importantly, there is no requirement that a drug or poison be delivered to the victim through the use of physical force; instead, the surreptitious administration of the substance through drink or food satisfies the elements of Colorado assault two (drugging a victim). Rodriguez-Enriquez, 518 F.3d at 1194-95. Accordingly, Rodriguez-Enriquez held as follows: Turning to the statute at issue in this case, Colo.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 18-3-203(1)(e), it criminalizes harm caused by the nonconsensual administration of a drug, substance, or preparation. The harm is caused by chemical action on the victim's body. Although there is no doubt that one could use physical force to drug someone, as by forcing a drink down the victim's throat, drugging by surreptitious means does not involve the use of physical force. Therefore, we hold that assault two (drugging a victim) is not a crime of violence under § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii). Id. at 1195. Unlike the statute at issue in Rodriguez-Enriquez, Colorado felony menacing requires as an element the use or threatened use of physical force. Colo. Stat. Ann. § 18-3-206. This is true even if the deadly weapon in question is a poison or pathogen. In Shawn, the Colorado Court of Appeals determined that HIV is a deadly weapon. 107 P.3d at 1036. It began by noting that any object or substance can be a deadly weapon within the meaning of [Colorado law] if it is used in a manner capable of producing death or serious bodily injury. Id. at 1035. Nevertheless, the object or substance must be used or intended to be used as a weapon. Id. Shawn next noted that the dangers of HIV are widely known and the virus is capable of causing injury or harm to another person. Id. at 1036. Finally, the Colorado Court of Appeals concluded a reasonable jury could find the defendant's statement that he was HIV positive during the course of a physical altercation was a threat of imminent serious bodily injury through the use of a deadly weapon. Id. at 1035-36. In reaching that conclusion, however, the court emphasize[d] that defendant made his menacing statement indicating an intent to harm during a physical altercation. Id. at 1036; see also id. at 1035 (The victim ... testified that defendant scratched and pinched the victim on both arms with his fingernails; defendant broke the skin on the victim's right arm; defendant stated, `I'm HIV positive, let go of me, let go of me'; and defendant repeated the assertion that he was HIV positive.). Thus, an examination of Rodriguez-Enriquez and Shawn refutes Armijo's broad assertion that this court can no longer consider Colorado felony menacing as categorically a crime of violence because poisons and pathogens qualify as deadly weapons under Colorado law. Instead, Rodriguez-Enriquez stands for the limited proposition that a Colorado provision criminalizing the surreptitious drugging of a victim does not involve the use of physical force. 318 F.3d at 1195. Shawn stands for the limited proposition that a threat to infect the victim with a potentially deadly virus during the course of a physical attack satisfies the elements of Colorado felony menacing. Neither of these cases casts any doubt on this court's reasoning in Herron that led to the conclusion Colorado felony menacing is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. 432 F.3d at 1138. Because this court looks to interpretations of the ACCA to guide our interpretation of § 4B1.2(a), Charles, 576 F.3d at 1068 n. 2, we thus conclude Herron compels the determination Colorado felony menacing is a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2(a)(1). Accordingly, the district court correctly resolved that Armijo's Colorado felony menacing conviction is categorically a crime of violence. [5]