Opinion ID: 891645
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The Deficient Performance Prejudiced Defendant

Text: {41} We turn now to examine whether defense counsel's deficient performance caused Defendant prejudice. To show prejudice, we look to the record to determine whether `there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Patterson v. LeMaster, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 28, 130 N.M. 179, 21 P.3d 1032 (quoting State v. Brazeal, 109 N.M. 752, 757-58, 790 P.2d 1033, 1038-39 (Ct.App.1990)). In this context, a reasonable probability is `a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' Id. (quoting Brazeal, 109 N.M. at 758, 790 P.2d at 1039). {42} In our prior cases, we have demanded more than the self-serving statements of defendants to prove prejudice. Id. ¶ 29. Instead, we look to whether there is a reasonable probability that the accused would have chosen to go to trial rather than pleading guilty if he had received adequate representation. Id. ¶ 28. In making that determination, we have considered (1) the strength of the State's evidence, reasoning that a defendant may be more likely to plead guilty if the evidence against him is strong, Hunter, 2006-NMSC-043, ¶ 26, 140 N.M. 406, 143 P.3d 168 (citing Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 31, 130 N.M. 179, 21 P.3d 1032), and (2) `pre-conviction statements or actions [that] may indicate whether [the defendant] was disposed to plead or go to trial.' Id. {43} With respect to the evidence against Defendant, we conclude that a conviction of intentional child abuse resulting in death was by no means a foregone conclusion. We note that the inquiry is not whether the evidence shows that Defendant would have prevailed at trial; rather, we look to whether there is a reasonable probability that, given the State's evidence against him, Defendant would have chosen to go to trial had he received adequate advice. See Patterson, 2001-NMSC-013, ¶ 31, 130 N.M. 179, 21 P.3d 1032. In previous cases, we have noted a direct relationship between the strength of the case against a defendant and the likelihood that he or she will plead guilty or no contest. As the strength of the evidence increases, so does the likelihood that a defendant will accept a plea offer instead of going to trial. Id. {44} At the plea hearing, the State claimed that it could prove the following at trial: Your honor, the State would show that on or about April 13th and April 14th of 2007, here in San Juan County, New Mexico, that the defendant was helping his girlfriend . . . babysit [the Child], and during the evening of that, when he was babysitting her, he took her into a separate room and actually stomped on her abdomen with such force that he left his shoe impression on her abdomen, and we actually believe there was actually two shoe impressions that were left behind. We would have had somebody from the state lab to come down and testify that the left foot, the left shoe of the Defendant's could not be a source of the impression but that the right shoe would, could not be eliminated as a source of the impression that was left on her abdomen. During the same abuse, she also suffered multiple head injuries, blunt-force trauma to her head, and OMI would testify there were numerous bruises and that actually either injury could have ultimately caused her death. She was basically slipped into a coma and was left in a coma for several hours until she passed away in her sleep and was discovered by [Defendant's girlfriend] sometime in the middle of the morning, no longer breathing. And at that time, they rushed her to a neighbor to call 911, and by that time, it was too late. There was no way they could resuscitate her at that point. {45} Despite this physical evidence proving that Defendant was the cause of the shoe impression on the Child's abdomen, the matter of intent was left far less clear. Defendant's only statement to police, that he guessed he could have stepped on the Child's abdomen when he jumped over her, is at least as consistent with negligent, or even accidental, conduct as it is with an intentional act. Furthermore, there were no eyewitnesses, and Defendant's girlfriend told law enforcement that she did not know how the injuries occurred. She also stated that Defendant had helped her take care of the children before and that he had never hurt them. Additionally, Defendant claimed that his girlfriend had shoes that were identical to his, which would have left the same type of impressions on the Child. [9] {46} Without clear evidence of intentional child abuse, we conclude that, had Defendant been properly advised by defense counsel, there was a reasonable probability that he would have chosen to go to trial rather than plead guilty to the maximum charge of intentional child abuse resulting in deathand its mandatory life sentenceas opposed to negligent child abuse and an 18-year sentence. Cf. United States v. Gigot, 147 F.3d 1193, 1199 (10th Cir.1998) (It is more than possible that [the defendant] might have chosen to take her chances with a jury trial had she thought the worst-case scenario was a five-year prison sentence and a $250,000 fine rather than the thirty years of confinement and $1 million fine she mistakenly believed she faced.). At the very least, we find a reasonable probability that Defendant would have continued to maintain his innocence at trial, rather than pleading guilty to this crime, a crime carrying a life sentence. [10] {47} Defendant may have been prejudiced in still another way. Defense counsel's statements and actions demonstrate that he may have believed that a 30-year sentence could be the only result in this caseregardless of whether Defendant acted intentionally, with criminal negligence, or with no culpability at all. As a result, defense counsel appeared to be unprepared to competently negotiate a plea agreement on Defendant's behalf. Thus, if true, he may have lacked the incentive and knowledge to bargain with the State for a lower sentence based on Defendant's mental state. This may have led defense counsel to advise Defendant to agree to a plea agreement that resulted in a minimum of 30 years in prisonnotwithstanding the fact that even if Defendant had been convicted of negligent child abuse resulting in death and the battery and tampering charges, he would have received only 24 years. {48} The State also argues that Defendant cannot show prejudice in this appeal because of the position that he took in his motion to the trial court to withdraw his plea. There, Defendant claimed that he had agreed to plead guilty because his counsel promised him that he would be sentenced to only two years of probation without prison time. The State therefore contends that [Defendant] seemed to argue that he would have pleaded guilty to any charge contained in the plea agreement because he was relying on his counsel's advice that no matter what the plea agreement stated, he was going to get probation. According to the State, Defendant would have pleaded guilty, regardless of the erroneous information provided by defense counsel raised in this appeal, based on his erroneous understanding that he would be sentenced only to probation. {49} We acknowledge that Defendant's two positions may be inconsistent; however, the root of our inquiry is whether Defendant's decision to enter into his plea agreement was knowing and voluntary. Thus, even if Defendant would have pleaded guilty regardless of the terms of the plea agreement, he still had a right to be accurately informed of the charges against him and the possible sentences that he faced. He had the right to make an informed choice. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. . . .); Rule 5-301(D)(1), (2) NMRA (providing that at the first appearance, the court shall inform the defendant of the offense charged and the penalty provided by law). {50} We therefore conclude that Defendant has met his burden in establishing a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, this case presents the rare circumstance where we will allow Defendant to withdraw his plea without further proceedings. While the record does not contain any testimony from defense counsel, we are more than persuaded that Defendant's plea was not knowing or voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances established by the record. {51} Although we decide this appeal under the framework of ineffective assistance of counsel, we note that defense counsel was not solely to blame for the proceedings below. Indeed, the original source of confusion in this case was the State's ambiguous charge of child abuse resulting in death. No one not the prosecutor, defense counsel, or the trial court itselfseemed to be aware of the subsequent procedural errors that effectively undermined Defendant's ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. Neither the State nor the court clarified for Defendant that intentional and negligent child abuse resulting in death are not both first degree felonies, and that, in fact, they are entirely distinct crimes that carry dramatically different sentences. Similarly, neither the State nor the court corrected defense counsel that Defendant could not be convicted of negligent child abuse resulting in death because he had never been charged with that crime. [11]