Opinion ID: 2509064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ruling on the Modification Application

Text: In addition to the foregoing question of procedure, defendant challenges the modification ruling in substance, contending the court erroneously failed to consider lingering doubt and improperly relied on aggravating evidence not supported by the record. Based on our independent review of the record (see People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 1006-1007, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214), we find no error in the court's determination that the jury's penalty verdict was not contrary to the law or the evidence presented. Regarding lingering doubt, the court indicated it had reviewed the trial transcript, and then recounted the salient circumstances of the killing as they related to aggravation. It next stated, With respect to the offense itself, there is no lingering doubt in this court's mind that the defendant is the killer of Mr. Estell. [¶] The evidence of his guilt is overwhelming and far beyond a reasonable doubt. [¶] The defendant gave inconsistent statements to the detectives regarding the incident. He denied ever being in the house. [¶] But his palm print was found near the yellow toilet paper dispenser, and that, I believe was the paper that was used for the gagging. [¶] The defendant was caught while driving the victim's car four days after the murder. [¶] There was a forged deed of sale. The defendant was also using the false name. The defendant was wearing the victim's gold chain at the preliminary hearing. [¶] In the court's view, there is no doubt as to the defendant being the killer of Mr. Estell. Defendant argues that the omission from this recitation of evidence the defense offered in an attempt to raise a reasonable doubtsuch as the fact that 9 of the 12 latent prints found at the scene were never identified and his sister's testimony that she had purchased the gold chain defendant wore at the preliminary hearingdemonstrates the court did not properly consider lingering doubt. We draw no such inference from the foregoing record. (Cf. People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 625, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854.) In stating there is no lingering doubt, the court plainly did consider that factor. And it was only logical to recite the evidence negating lingering doubt, since that was the court's finding. (See also Babbitt v. Calderon (9th Cir.1998) 151 F.3d 1170, 1179.) Regarding the alleged consideration of aggravating circumstances not supported by the record, defendant cites to the court's statement that it had read the Supreme Court opinion in Lewis I, which contained prejudicial references to criminal conduct beyond the four robbery convictions to which he stipulated at the penalty trial. (See Lewis I, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 279, 286-287, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) From our review of the entire record and consideration of the court's comment in context, it is clear there was no improper consideration. The reference to having reviewed this court's opinion arose in response to defendant's motion for presentencing discovery. In explaining its reason for denying the request, the court quoted from the portion of our discussion limiting the remand to rehearing on the basis of the record certified to this court. ( Id. at p. 287, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) At the hearing on the modification application, the court stated it had considered only the trial transcripts and certain exhibits submitted by the parties as the basis for the ruling; and we discern nothing to indicate otherwise. (Cf. People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 566, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) The trial court's characterization of defendant as a violent and dangerous person prior to murdering Mr. Estell does not alter our conclusion. The court made this statement immediately after referring to defendant's four previous robbery convictions and to the fact that robbery is defined as the taking of property by force or fear. From the context of the remarks, we discern that the court described defendant based on the elements of robbery and not on a consideration of any matters outside the trial record.