Opinion ID: 2322259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jones's initial encounter with police

Text: Jones argues that the police illegally seized him when officers asked the Thunderguards to step outside. Consequently, Jones maintains, the bag of cocaine he discarded, and the evidence found during the ensuing search incident to his arrest, should be suppressed. Jones further contends that he was not subject to administrative seizure under 24 Del. C. § 1324 concerning private security agencies because he was not engaged in activity requiring a license under § 1329. We review the denial of a motion to suppress for abuse of discretion. [2] To the extent the Superior Court judge's decision is based on factual findings, we determine whether the judge abused his discretion by finding sufficient evidence to support his ruling and whether those findings were clearly erroneous. [3] To the extent that we examine the Superior Court judge's legal conclusions, we review them de novo for errors in formulating or applying legal precepts. [4]
In California v. Hodari D., the United States Supreme Court articulated the test for whether an encounter with police constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment to United States Constitution. [5] Under the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs when an officer applies force or, where that is absent, the defendant submits to an officer's show of authority. [6] We considered this test in Jones v. State, but adhered to our own precedents, concluding that the question of whether a seizure occurs under article I, section 6 of the Delaware Constitution requires focusing upon the police officer's actions to determine when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence. [7] Although we declined to adopt the Hodari D. test for interpreting our Constitution, we required that a police officer and a citizen may engage in a consensual encounter that does not amount to a seizure. In Williams v. State , we explained: Even under this more stringent standard, law enforcement officers are permitted to initiate contact with citizens on the street for the purpose of asking questions. This type of interaction is an encounter and, if consensual, neither amounts to a seizure nor implicates the Fourth Amendment. During a consensual encounter, a person has no obligation to answer the officer's inquiry and is free to go about his business. Only when the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that the police officer's actions would cause a reasonable person to believe he was not free to ignore the police presence does a consensual encounter become a seizure. [8] The United States Supreme Court also has distinguished between seizures and consensual encounters. In Muehler v. Mena , the Court explained: We have held repeatedly that mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure. [E]ven when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may generally ask questions of that individual; ask to examine the individual's identification; and request consent to search his or her luggage. [9] Various factors are relevant to an analysis of the totality of the circumstances surrounding a police encounter. The facts of Williams are instructive. In that case, a police officer observed the defendant walking along the median of a road in the early morning hours. The officer pulled his car up and activated his strobe light. The police officer asked the defendant for his name and date of birth. The officer also asked the defendant where he was going and whether he needed a ride. The defendant declined the invitation and continued on his way. We explained that viewing the totality of the circumstances[the officer]'s inquiry, [the defendant]'s voluntary response to questions, and the amicable end to the encountera reasonable person would believe he was free to ignore the police presence. [10] Case law from other jurisdictions also is instructive. Given the necessarily imprecise standard for determining whether an individual has been seized, [11] other courts have developed factors to consider when evaluating whether a police encounter amounts to a seizure. For example, in United States v. Mendenhall , the United States Supreme Court explained that four circumstances might indicate a seizure: (1) the threatening presence of several officers, (2) the display of a weapon by an officer, (3) some physical touching of the person of the citizen, or (4) the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled. [12] In United States v. Scheets , the Seventh Circuit considered the following six factors in its totality-of-the-circumstances analysis: (1) whether the encounter occurred in a public or private place, (2) whether the suspect was informed that he was not under arrest and free to leave, (3) whether the suspect consented or refused to talk to the investigating officers, (4) whether the investigating officers removed the suspect to another area, (5) whether there was physical touching, display of weapons, or other threatening conduct, and (6) whether the suspect eventually departed the area without hindrance. [13] We adopt the Scheets factors here to channel the unavoidable discretion that is part and parcel of our totality of the circumstances inquiry. We also note, however, as did the court in Scheets, that analysis of a police encounter should consider all relevant circumstances, including these six nonexhaustive factors. [14] Courts must not rigidly apply these factors but instead should independently analyze the facts of each case. In applying the totality of the circumstances test, no one factor is legally determinative, dispositive, or paramount. [15] Normally, we do not expect courts to merely count the number of factors weighing on one side of the determination or the other because a factor may be more indicative of a coercive atmosphere in one case than in another. [16] Nevertheless, giving equal weight to each factor and only those factors, provides needed structure to our totality of the circumstances analysis in a close case such as the one before us. Here, we should give great weight [17] to the State's steadfast concession that the police seized Jones. [18] Although the State's confession of error does not require the reversal of [Jones's] convictions, an independent determination [shows] that a reversible error was committed. [19] In Jones's case, two of the Scheets factors favor a determination of a consensual encounter, because Jones was not  removed to another area, and there was [no] physical touching, display of weapons, or other threatening conduct. [20] But, four factors (a majority of the factors identified in Scheets ) favor the determination that a seizure occurred, because the encounter occurred in a ... private place, Jones was [not] informed that he was not under arrest and free to leave, Jones refused to talk to [Dudzinski], and Jones did not eventually depart[ ] the area without hindrance. [21] These factors when combined with the State's concession, lead us to conclude that the police seized Jones shortly before he dropped the bag of cocaine.
The police could seize Jones only if they had a reasonable articulable suspicion that a civil violation had occurred or was occurring. [22] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause. [23] It depends on `the officer's ability to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.' [24] In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, we look at the totality of the circumstances, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, trained police officer in the same or similar circumstances, combining objective facts with [the] officer's subjective interpretation of those facts. [25] Popp testified that it was believed that the[ ] individuals did not possess a security license to provide or act as a security agency. The record, however, does not reflect specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts support Popp's hunch. [26] In fact, Popp testified, the officers were identifying the persons that night, so that they could later verify whether or not they were indeed licensed to provide security.
Without a reasonable articulable suspicion that Jones violated the private security statute, his seizure was only legal if it was a valid administrative seizure pursuant to New York v. Burger. [27] In this case, Jones' and the Thunderguards conduct did not even come within the law's purview. Under § 1329, No person shall engage in the business of a private ... security guard, [or] guard company ... without first obtaining a license. [28] Consequently, to be subject to a valid administrative search or seizure either the Thunderguards or Jones must be engaged in the business of private security services. That implies a pattern of business activity beyond a mere one time offering. Being engaged in the business of private security requires carrying on a commercial security enterprise for profit. [29] Neither Jones nor the Thunderguards fit this definition. No one paid Jones for his efforts on the evening of March 13, 2009, nor does the record indicate that Cheryl Hollingsworth's potential donation to the local chapter of the Thunderguards actually induced the group to provide security services at the party. In other words, the record does not demonstrate that the Thunderguards offered their services in consideration of a donation from Hollingsworth. The facts actually lean in the opposite direction toward two separate gratuitous transfers rather than one unified contract. As a result, Jones' and the Thunderguards' actions cannot support an administrative search under § 1329. We accordingly need not proceed to apply or analyze the test for a valid administrative search under Burger.
Since the police illegally seized Jones, any evidence gathered as a result of that seizure must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. [30] The traditionally recognized exceptions to this doctrine are limited to attenuation, inevitable discovery, independent source, or some intervening act or event sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal stop. [31] The United States Supreme Court has never held that abandonment of evidence in response to unlawful police action (e.g., an illegal seizure) constitutes an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Nor has this Court specifically addressed whether evidence that was abandoned as a result of an illegal seizure must be suppressed. Courts that have addressed this question have concluded that suppression is required if the abandonment was a direct consequence of the illegal seizure. [32] The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that when the abandonment of property is precipitated by an unlawful seizure, that property also must be excluded. [33] The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has similarly ruled that [w]hile it is true that a criminal defendant's voluntary abandonment of evidence can remove the taint of an illegal stop or arrest, it is equally true that for this to occur, the abandonment must be truly voluntary and not merely the product of police misconduct. [34] Thus, a defendant does not voluntarily abandon property where the abandonment is in response to, because of, or as a direct result of, the unlawful police conduct. [35] Given this authority, the question regarding Jones's first motion to suppress becomes whether his abandonment of the drugs was a result of the unlawful seizure. The United States Supreme Court has set forth several factors that are relevant to determining whether a defendant's behavior was a result of illegal police action. [36] Those factors include: (1) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the defendant's response, (2) the presence or absence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. [37] Put another way, there must be a causal nexus between the unlawful police conduct and [the defendant's] abandonment of his [property]. [38] All three factors point to a conclusion that the illegal seizure provoked Jones' actions. On the first factor, the record reflects that after Detective Dudzinski asked Jones for his identification, Jones refused and immediately began walking away towards the rear where the other members had been gathered outside. [39] Jones dropped the bag of cocaine in the garden while doing so. [40] As for the second factor, no intervening act or event appears that would have severed the causal connection between when Dudzinski seized Jones and when Jones abandoned the drugs. The trial testimony suggests that nothing else occurred in that short interval of time. [41] Thus, this is not a situation where Jones' response to the illegal stop was itself a new, distinct crime that would constitute an intervening act that purged the taint of the unlawful seizure. [42] Finally, nothing in the record suggests that Jones' decision to walk away from Dudzinski and discard the drugs was simply a mere coincidental decision, or caused by anything other than the illegal stop. [43] Thus, the third factor also weighs in favor of concluding that the abandonment was a direct consequence of the illegal seizure. This outcome is consistent with those reached by other courts that have addressed similar facts. [44] Having applied the United States Supreme Court's three factors, we conclude that Jones abandoned the drugs in response to his illegal seizure. The drugs and the fruits of the ensuing arrest should, accordingly, have been suppressed.