Opinion ID: 2056520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Consumer Expectation Test

Text: In affirming the jury's verdict, the appellate court held that it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence for the jury to find that the friction-fit device failed to meet Andrina's reasonable expectation that it would function properly. 309 Ill.App.3d at 884, 243 Ill.Dec. 270, 723 N.E.2d 302. Baxter contends that the health-care professional (rather than the patient) should be deemed the consumer for purposes of the consumer expectation test. This approach, Baxter argues, is consistent with the traditional application of the learned intermediary doctrine. Baxter further argues that this is true because, in the case of a prescription medical device, the patient has no more independent ability to assess the product's risks or benefits than to appreciate or assess the warnings as to its use. Thus, under the consumer expectation test, the issue is whether the product is more dangerous than expected by the ordinary learned intermediary. Neither Baxter nor its amicus, the Product Liability Advisory Council, has cited any Illinois authority in support of this argument. Baxter refers us to Shanks v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189 (Alaska 1992). In that case, the court concluded that a prescription drug is defectively designed and imposes strict liability on its manufacturer if it fails to perform as safely as an ordinary doctor would expect, when used by the patient in an intended and reasonably foreseeable manner. Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1195. In a footnote, the court observed: With certain types of prescription drugs, the role of the doctor in the decision to use a specific product is significantly reduced. Examples of such atypical prescription products include contraceptives, where the patient initiates and directs the usage, drugs administered in a clinical setting with little or no physician involvement, or drugs marketed under a strategy designed to appeal directly to the consuming public. These are areas where courts have held that manufacturers have a duty to warn patients directly. In strict liability design cases involving such products, it may be appropriate to apply the `ordinary consumer expectation' test rather than the `ordinary doctor expectation test.' Shanks, 835 P.2d at 1195 n. 7. In the case before us, the evidence showed that the decision to purchase friction-fit connectors was made exclusively by the nursing products committee at Mt. Sinai. The chairperson of that committee testified that the hospital staff relied on the product manufacturer to advise them of the proper uses for the product. The person who actually purchased the friction-fit connectors from Baxter's sales representative was not a physician and did not know that those devices should not be used in central line applications. Since the purchase of the product had little physician involvement, it would appear that the facts in this case are similar to those described in the Shanks footnote. In such cases, the application of the ordinary consumer expectation test, rather than the ordinary physician expectation test, is appropriate. Moreover, in Haudrich v. Howmedica, Inc., 169 Ill.2d 525, 215 Ill.Dec. 108, 662 N.E.2d 1248 (1996), plaintiff sought recovery on a strict liability theory against the manufacturer of a knee prosthesis that failed prematurely, causing personal injuries. The evidence was conflicting as to whether the device failed because of a design defect, a manufacturing defect, or both. In any event, this court held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff was injured by an unreasonably dangerous condition of the knee device. The court stated: sufficient evidence was presented to support a finding that the device failed to perform in a manner reasonably expected in light of its nature and intended function and subjected the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of harm beyond that contemplated by an ordinary person. (Emphasis added.) Haudrich, 169 Ill.2d at 542, 215 Ill.Dec. 108, 662 N.E.2d 1248. Although the Haudrich court was not presented with the argument that the contemplation of the doctors, rather than the patient, should be controlling, that case clearly used the ordinary person standard in applying the consumer expectation test. Andrina, who was conscious after surgery, could have reasonably expected that her IV catheter connection, if properly designed and manufactured, would be safe to use for its intended purpose. She was the person who would be harmed if the device failed. The expert testimony adduced at trial was sufficient to establish that the design of the device was defective and that this defective design caused her injury. Thus, we agree with the appellate court's conclusion that the jury's decision did not contradict the manifest weight of the evidence.