Opinion ID: 844228
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application in the Asbestos Context

Text: In 2009, the First District Court of Appeal addressed the very question presented here. In Taylor v. Elliott Turbomachinery Co. Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 564, 571-572 [90 Cal.Rptr.3d 414] ( Taylor ), a serviceman developed mesothelioma from his exposure to asbestos on a warship. Like O'Neil, Taylor worked in the ship's engine room. In the course of his duties, Taylor sometimes removed and replaced the internal gaskets, packing, and insulation pads used in pumps and valves. ( Ibid. ) After his death, Taylor's family sued the manufacturers of these pumps and valves. [9] They argued, as plaintiffs do here, that a `manufacturer has a duty to warn of hazards arising from the foreseeable uses of its product, even if that hazard arises from the addition of a product that, although manufactured by another, is used in the normal and intended operation of the defendant's product.' ( Taylor, at pp. 572-573.) The Court of Appeal determined that pump and valve manufacturers could not be held strictly liable for failing to warn about the dangers of asbestos exposure. It gave three reasons for this conclusion. (12) First, California law restricts the duty to warn to entities in the chain of distribution of the defective product. ( Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Based on authorities discussed above, including Peterson v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.4th 1185, and Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th 548, the Taylor court observed that our strict products liability precedents have recognized a bright-line legal distinction imposing liability only on those entities responsible for placing an injury-producing product into the stream of commerce. ( Taylor, at p. 576.) The pump and valve manufacturers could not be strictly liable for failure to warn, the court concluded, because these companies were not part of the `chain of distribution' of the gaskets, packing, discs, and insulation that Mr. Taylor encountered. ( Id. at p. 579.) (13) Second, in a related holding, the Court of Appeal determined that in California, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of defects in products supplied by others and used in conjunction with the manufacturer's product unless the manufacturer's product itself causes or creates the risk of harm. ( Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The court rejected the notion that a manufacturer has a duty to warn whenever the intended use of its product will expose consumers to risks arising from the product of another. ( Id. at p. 580.) (14) Relying on analogous failure to warn cases, the court concluded that, in general, a manufacturer's duty to warn is limited to the dangerous propensities of its own products. ( Id. at pp. 580-583; see Garman v. Magic Chef, Inc., supra, 117 Cal.App.3d 634; Blackwell v. Phelps Dodge Corp., supra, 157 Cal.App.3d 372; Powell v. Standard Brands Paint Co., supra, 166 Cal.App.3d 357; see also In re Deep Vein Thrombosis, supra, 356 F.Supp.2d 1055.) Although a manufacturer may owe a duty to warn when the use of its product in combination with the product of another creates a potential hazard, that duty arises only when the manufacturer's own product causes or creates the risk of harm. ( Taylor, at p. 580.) (15) Third, the Taylor court determined that the component parts doctrine provided an alternate basis for concluding the pump and valve manufacturers owed no duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos. ( Taylor, supra, 171 Cal.App.4th at pp. 584-586.) The component parts doctrine provides that the manufacturer of a component part is not liable for injuries caused by the finished product into which the component has been incorporated unless the component itself was defective and caused harm. ( Jimenez v. Superior Court (2002) 29 Cal.4th 473, 480-481 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 58 P.3d 450]; Rest.3d Torts, Products Liability, § 5, subd. (a); Taylor, at p. 575.) Based on evidence that the pumps and valves were designed to operate as part of a larger `marine steam propulsion system' ( Taylor, at p. 584), the court concluded the manufacturers could be held liable only if defects in these components caused injury or if the manufacturers participated in the integration of their pumps and valves into the ship's propulsion system. ( Id. at p. 585.) Because neither of these requirements was met, the manufacturers could not be held liable for asbestos-induced injuries. ( Ibid. ) [10]
As additional support for its holdings, the Taylor court discussed a pair of asbestos cases from Washington State and a federal case from Ohio. These decisions are instructive. In Simonetta v. Viad Corp. (2008) 165 Wn.2d 341, 345 [197 P.3d 127, 129] ( Simonetta ), the Washington Supreme Court proposed to answer whether under the common law a manufacturer can be held liable for failure to warn of the hazards of another manufacturer's product. When Simonetta served as a fireman and machinist aboard a Navy vessel from 1958 to 1959, he performed maintenance on a seawater evaporator manufactured by the defendant's predecessor. The evaporator was insulated with asbestos mud and cloth, and Simonetta had to remove this insulation to service the machine. ( Id., 197 P.3d at p. 130.) Over 40 years later, Simonetta developed lung cancer and sued. He claimed the evaporator manufacturer had a duty to warn about the dangers of respirable asbestos because it knew or reasonably should have known that asbestos would be used to insulate its product and would have to be removed in the course of normal maintenance and repairs. ( Ibid. ) An intermediate appellate court accepted this argument, holding that `when a product requires the use of another product and the two together cause a release of a hazardous substance, the manufacturer has a duty to warn about the inherent dangers.' ( Ibid. ) Washington's highest court disagreed. It held that the duty to warn, in negligence or strict liability, extends only to those entities in the chain of distribution of a hazardous product. (197 P.3d at pp. 133-134, 138.) Because the hazardous product was the asbestos insulation applied to the evaporator, not the evaporator itself, and because the defendant did not manufacture, sell, or supply this asbestos insulation, the defendant had no duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos exposure. ( Id. at p. 138.) While Simonetta speaks to liability for injuries arising from external insulation, its companion case, Braaten v. Saberhagen Holdings (2008) 165 Wn.2d 373 [198 P.3d 493] ( Braaten ), also addressed the problem of injuries arising from asbestos-containing replacement parts. Braaten, a pipefitter on Navy ships, was exposed to asbestos from 1967 until the early 1980's. Braaten performed regular maintenance on steam pumps and valves, which required him to remove and replace asbestos-containing external insulation, gaskets, and packing. ( Id., 198 P.3d at p. 496.) He developed mesothelioma in 2003 and sued several pump and valve manufacturers, arguing they had a duty to warn him about the dangers of exposure to asbestos in external insulation and in replacement packing and gaskets. Although the defendants' products had originally included asbestos-containing packing and gaskets, these parts had been replaced several times before Braaten encountered the pumps and valves. The defendants did not manufacture or sell these replacement parts. ( Id. at pp. 495-496.) The Washington Supreme Court concluded that the holding in Simonetta applied equally to internal asbestos-containing components made by others: [T]he general rule that there is no duty under common law products liability or negligence principles to warn of the dangers of exposure to asbestos in other manufacturers' products applies with regard to replacement packing and gaskets. The defendants did not sell or supply the replacement packing or gaskets or otherwise place them in the stream of commerce, did not specify asbestos-containing packing and gaskets for use with their valves and pumps, and other types of materials could have been used. ( Braaten, at pp. 495-496.) Accordingly, the court held that pump and valve makers had no duty to warn about the risks of exposure to asbestos, either from thermal insulation applied to their products by the Navy or from replacement gaskets and packing materials. ( Id. at p. 503.) The Simonetta and Braaten decisions both discussed Lindstrom v. A-C Product Liability Trust (6th Cir. 2005) 424 F.3d 488 ( Lindstrom ), a case involving very similar facts. Lindstrom, a merchant seaman, developed mesothelioma after years of working in the engine rooms of numerous ships. ( Id. at p. 491.) After the federal district court dismissed his claims against certain pump and valve manufacturers, Lindstrom appealed. As in the Washington cases, and here, Lindstrom alleged he was exposed to asbestos-containing gaskets and packing materials when he worked on pumps and valves, but the evidence established that all of this exposure was to replacement parts manufactured by other companies. The gaskets and packing originally supplied with the pumps and valves had been replaced several times before Lindstrom worked on the defendants' products. ( Id. at pp. 494-497.) The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit upheld dismissal of the pump and valve manufacturers, ruling insufficient evidence connected Lindstrom with asbestos released from the defendants' products. Lindstrom almost certainly could not have handled the original packing or gasket material, and this fact compels the conclusion that any asbestos that he may have been exposed to in connection with [the defendant's] product would be attributable to some other manufacturer. ( Id. at p. 495.) The court did not consider whether a duty to warn could ever extend to replacement parts, but rejected Lindstrom's claims as simply lacking in causation. It reasoned that a manufacturer cannot be held responsible for material `attached or connected' to its product ( ibid. ) or otherwise incorporated into its product post-manufacture. ( Id. at p. 497; see also Stark v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (6th Cir. 2001) 21 Fed.Appx. 371, 378, 381.) The issue of liability for replacement parts has also arisen in other types of asbestos cases. In Ford Motor v. Wood (1998) 119 Md.App. 1, 33 [703 A.2d 1315, 1330], family members of mechanics who died of mesothelioma sued an auto manufacturer for failing to warn about the dangers involved in replacing asbestos-containing brakes and clutches on its vehicles. It was undisputed that the mechanics were exposed to asbestos from replacement parts and not from the original brakes and clutches shipped in Ford vehicles. ( Ibid. ) A Maryland appellate court refused to hold Ford strictly liable and rejected the plaintiffs' belatedly raised failure to warn theory, concluding Ford had no duty to warn about the dangers of a product it did not place into the stream of commerce. (703 A.2d at p. 1332.) [11] Similarly, a federal court in Illinois refused to hold an aircraft manufacturer liable for injuries caused by a repairman's exposure to asbestos-containing replacement parts. ( Niemann v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (S.D.Ill. 1989) 721 F.Supp. 1019.) The district court found it of no moment that the defendant had originally installed asbestos chafing strips on its airplanes because these strips had been replaced many times before the repairman's exposure, and the defendant did not supply the replacement strips. ( Id. at pp. 1029-1030.) Reliance on the adjacent products theory of liability was stretched perhaps the farthest in Macias v. Mine Safety Appliances Co. (2010) 158 Wn.App. 931 [244 P.3d 978]. Macias, a tool keeper, used respirators made by different companies to mitigate exposure to asbestos and other toxic dust and fumes. ( Id., 244 P.3d at p. 979.) When Macias developed mesothelioma, he sued the respirator makers for failing to warn him about the dangers of exposure to asbestos dust. On discretionary review from a denial of summary judgment, the Washington appellate court observed that the connection between the defendants' products and the plaintiff's asbestos exposure was even more remote than in Simonetta and Braaten. ( Macias, 244 P.3d at p. 982.) Because the respirator manufacturers did not manufacture, sell, or supply the asbestos that harmed Macias, and thus were not in the chain of distribution of a harmful product, the court held they had no duty to warn about the dangers of asbestos. (244 P.3d at p. 983.) The court stressed that a duty to warn arises when the manufacturer is in a harmful product's chain of distribution. It declined to extend that duty when the purpose of the defendant's product is to prevent exposure to a hazardous substance. The foreseeability that customers will have such exposure is not enough to establish a duty to warn: The respirator manufacturers' ability to foresee that their products would be used in tandem with hazardous substances like asbestos, and that cleaning and maintaining their respirators might expose workers to asbestos, does not give rise to a duty to warn under [Reststatement Second of Torts,] section 388 where the respirator manufacturers were not involved in manufacturing, supplying, or distributing the asbestos. ( Ibid.; see also Simonetta, supra, 197 P.3d at p. 131, fn. 4 [`Foreseeability does not create a duty but sets limits once a duty is established.'].)