Opinion ID: 1490004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Clergy Privilege

Text: Lastly, Brown argues that the hearing justice erred because she did not find that John Brown's failure to object to clergy testimony under § 9-17-23 was a basis for her finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. The hearing justice did not make any factual findings or legal conclusions concerning this issue, despite Brown's raising of the statutory argument in both his initial and amended application for postconviction relief and in his questioning of John Brown during the postconviction-relief hearing. The clergy-privilege issue first arose during trial when John Brown cross-examined Janikuak. The following colloquy occurred: JOHN BROWN: And I ask you again, other than what my client Mr. Brown informed you and what you were informed by [Emily], you had no other outside information upon which to draw that assessment, is that correct? Yes or no, Miss Janikuak? JANIKUAK: I can't answer that because of privileged information. JOHN BROWN: Your Honor, could I ask you, may I approach, your Honor? THE COURT: No. Take the jury out, please. Please don't discuss the case among yourselves. You may send one or two of you down to the coffee shop and get something to drink. (WITHOUT JURY) THE COURT: What do you say is the purpose of this? It's your witness. PROSECUTOR: Your Honor, this is news to me. We are all hearing this for the first time. THE COURT: Well, does she have a privilege in your opinion? PROSECUTOR: Well JANIKUAK: It was just something that he shared with me privately. PROSECUTOR: She's a pastor and it was told in a religious context, I'd have to check the rules of evidence, your Honor, under our privileges. I don't have them right in front of me. I believe we recognize priest's penitence. THE COURT: We are not in that area, though, are we? PROSECUTOR: Well, I don't know, your Honor, because all I heard was the word privilege and we have a pastor of a church, this being apparently having asked a question about two members of the congregation, so I don't know where this is going, so I can't answer the question any better than I've just attempted to. JOHN BROWN: My objection, your Honor, would be in light of the charges against my client in weighing any privilege, which I don't believe there is a privilege under our rules of evidence with respect to the clergy in this context, that is without balance. THE COURT: If there is a privilege, your client's privilege, do you waive that privilege? MR. BROWN: I don't understand as to what privilege. THE COURT: Do you waive it? If there is one, do you waive it? JOHN BROWN: I would have to communicate with my client. THE COURT: He's sitting there. JOHN BROWN: Is she stating that this privilege is my client's privilege? THE COURT: Yes. Apparently he told her something, is that correct? JANIKUAK: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Yes. Mr. Brown? JOHN BROWN: Yes, your Honor. THE COURT: Let me, if I can put it in perspective, and correct me if I'm wrong please, the pastor feels that the communication with a member of her Church; to wit, your client, if she gleaned her information from your client, she feels that would be breaching a confidential relationship with your client; therefore, it being your client's privilege. I'm not sure, though, as a matter of law there is a privilege, but assuming there is, would you waive it? JOHN BROWN: I understand the question, your Honor. It's just very difficult without having the information before me. My client indicates to me, Judge, that he's not aware of any such communication or any privilege in existence, or having communicated with her in any manner, so I am basically being asked to make a decision as to what client has informed me he never stated to this individual. THE COURT: You would not be breaching any confidence if you state what he said. All right. Janikuak then testified to something Brown told her about his own background that did not pertain to Emily, and the issue was not pursued further. During the hearing for postconviction relief, Brown, acting pro se, questioned John Brown about the clergy-privilege issue: BROWN: Do you remember at the trial when Pastor [Janikuak] mentioned that she couldn't answer a certain question you asked because she stated it was privileged? JOHN BROWN: Yes. BROWN: And you were not aware of the privilege that day and they sent the jury out and we had a discussion? JOHN BROWN: That's not correct. BROWN: Why is it not correct? JOHN BROWN: Because in my statement to the Judge in the transcript it indicates that as the privilege existing within the particular context, so that's why it's not correct.    BROWN: It's all part of the brief. Were you aware that basically what Pastor [Janikuak] basically told the secret Grand Jury Indictment and at the trial the State violated this privilege which I have a copy of the privilege right here, if you'd like to review it? JOHN BROWN: Could you rephrase the question please, Mr. Brown? BROWN: Were you aware that by having [Janikuak] testify against me at the secret Grand Jury Indictment and at the trial, she basically claimed allegations that I told her things in confidence at the church, did you realize this was violating state law, state statute 9-17-23 at the time? JOHN BROWN: No. No. BROWN: Would you like to review the State statute, Mr. Brown, for the record? Basically, I was lead to believe there was no such privilege from what took place at trial. JOHN BROWN: I've reviewed the document. On appeal, Brown argues that John Brown never identified the privilege as a possible basis for excluding portions of Janikuak's and Dr. Tanguay's testimony concerning their communications with Brown. He argues that even if we conclude that the hearing justice erred when she granted Brown's application for the reasons set forth in her decision, we nonetheless should affirm because of John Brown's failure to object, under § 9-17-23, to certain portions of Janikuak's and Dr. Tanguay's testimony. We disagree. First, after a thorough review of the record, we are of the opinion that the privilege did not apply to Dr. Tanguay. Second, even if John Brown was deficient by not raising the privilege with respect to portions of Janikuak's testimony, we believe that there was ample evidence other than Janikuak's testimony sufficient for a jury to convict Brown. Therefore, Brown has failed to demonstrate how this potential error by his counsel prejudiced his defense.