Opinion ID: 2801079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third-Party Feres Claims

Text: From its inception, Feres has applied to cases beyond those brought by service members to recover for their own injuries. In fact, Feres itself dealt with two wrongful-death actions brought by the widows of servicemen. But questions lingered regarding the extent to which Feres could uniformly bar recovery for injuries to third parties in circumstances where the genesis of the third-party injury was intimately associated with injuries to service members. Stencel Aero The Supreme Court analyzed those questions in Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). In that case, the Court found that Feres applied equally to a claim against the United States brought by the -13- manufacturer of an ejection seat, the malfunction of which had caused a serviceman’s injuries. The serviceman had sued Stencel, the manufacturer, and the United States for permanent injuries that occurred when the ejection seat in his military plane failed during a midair exercise. Stencel responded by cross-claiming the United States for indemnity, and the United States raised Feres as a jurisdictional bar. The Court sided with the government, finding that “the third-party indemnity action in this case is unavailable for essentially the same reasons that the direct action by [the serviceman] is barred by Feres.” Id. at 673. We have applied this rule to civilian third-party claims beyond a gardenvariety indemnification suit. Thus, for example, we have denied jurisdiction where the civilian wife of a serviceman brought claims against the government on account of her husband’s negligent vasectomy. Harten v. Coons, 502 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1974). Similarly, we have prohibited the daughter of a serviceman from bringing claims for injuries deriving from her father’s military service in Vietnam. See Heffington v. Dep’t of Defense of the U.S., 248 F. App’x 952 (10th Cir. 2007). Other courts have also interpreted Stencel Aero broadly to “preclude[] suits by third parties that derive—directly or indirectly—from injuries to service members incident to military duty.” Brown v. United States, 462 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 2006). In fact, on the heels of Stencel Aero, every other circuit has -14- acknowledged that Feres applies to third-party claims brought by civilians beyond the standard indemnification claim. 5 The analysis in Stencel Aero became what is now known as the “genesis test.” Application of the genesis test sought to provide a reasoned standard for the question common to all third-party Feres claims; namely, to what extent are injuries to civilian third parties that arise out of circumstances concerning the service member’s relationship with the military also barred under the FTCA? To this end, the genesis test asks whether the civilian injury has its origin in an incident-to-service injury to a service member. See, e.g., Ritchie, 733 F.3d at 875. If it does, then Feres applies as a bar to the third-party claim, just as it would to a claim by the service member for his or her injuries. See Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445, 449 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Under this test, if a nonserviceman’s injury finds its ‘genesis’ in the injury suffered by a serviceman incident to service, then the Feres doctrine bars the non-serviceman’s suit.”). 5 See Minns v. United States, 155 F.3d 445 (4th Cir. 1998); Mossow v. United States, 987 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1993); Smith v. United States, 877 F.2d 40 (11th Cir. 1989); Irvin v. United States, 845 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1988); In re Agent Orange Litig., 818 F.2d 201 (2d Cir. 1987); West v. United States, 744 F.2d 1317 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc); Hinkie v. United States, 715 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1983); Gaspard v. United States, 713 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1983); Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981); DeFont v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239 (1st Cir. 1972). -15- The Genesis Test’s Injury Focus Despite the near-universal adoption of the genesis test, our court has yet to apply it to the type of third-party claims we find here. As we explain, in light of our obligation to follow Feres and Stencel Aero, the genesis test is the appropriate mechanism to apply to third-party Feres claims involving derivative third-party injuries, including those occurring in utero. While we recognize that other circuits have not so inclusively utilized the genesis test for every third-party Feres claim, we are convinced that Stencel Aero dictates our decision in this case. In addition, we find it persuasive that courts across the circuits find the genesis test helpful to adjudicate a wide array of third-party Feres claims. First, circuit courts have employed the genesis test when considering whether children can recover for genetic injuries stemming from alleged government negligence in exposing their service-member fathers to radiation or chemical weapons. See Minns, 155 F.3d at 449; Hinkie, 715 F.2d at 98; Laswell v. Brown, 683 F.2d 261, 269 (8th Cir. 1982); Monaco v. United States, 661 F.2d 129, 133 (9th Cir. 1981). In Minns, for example, the Fourth Circuit explained why Feres precluded the claims of the wives and children of servicemen for genetic birth defects resulting from the military’s negligent inoculation of the servicemen in an effort to immunize them from possible biological or chemical attacks during the Persian Gulf War. The court said that the government’s conduct toward the servicemen “was the ‘genesis’ and the ‘but for’ cause of the -16- injuries to the wives and children.” Minns, 155 F.3d at 450. Relying on Feres’s military-discipline rationale, the court found that “[i]f allowed to proceed, their suits would place the courts in exactly the position that the Feres doctrine was designed to avoid.” Id. Other genetic-defect cases have likewise relied on this rationale as the reason for extending Feres to bar the third-party claims. See, e.g., Monaco, 661 F.2d at 134 (dismissing third-party claims where “the court still must examine the Government’s activity in relation to military personnel on active duty”). Second, an even more clear-cut application of the genesis test occurs when the relative of a service member sues for loss of consortium or mental anguish when the government negligently causes the service member’s death or injury. See Kendrick v. United States, 877 F.2d 1201, 1206–07 (4th Cir. 1989); De Font v. United States, 453 F.2d 1239, 1240 (1st Cir. 1972). By their very legal nature, these claims are “ancillary or derivative to an injury to a serviceman incident to military service” and thus cannot proceed under Feres. Lombard v. United States, 690 F.2d 215, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). But courts have inconsistently described the threshold or starting point for scrutiny of a civilian plaintiff’s claims under the genesis test—sometimes underscoring the government’s negligent conduct and other times the service -17- member’s injury. 6 While the courts are not united, we appreciate that only the latter approach conforms with Feres and Stencel Aero. Indeed, this injury-focused approach asks first whether there was an incident-to-service injury to the service member, Feres, 340 U.S. at 144, and second whether the injury to the third party was derivative of that injury, Stencel Aero, 431 U.S. at 673–74. A negative answer to either question permits a complaint to survive dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Feres. We thus apply the injury-focused approach, finding that it is more faithful to Feres and Stencel Aero, the precedential cases binding on this court. By the same 6 In Minns, for instance, the Fourth Circuit focused on the target of the government’s negligent conduct as the key consideration. According to that court, where the negligent act or behavior was directed at the service person, then any injuries that had their genesis in that negligence, even those to third parties, were barred by Feres. See Minns, 155 F.3d at 450 (“This negligence in implementing and administrating the program to the servicemen thus was the “genesis” and the “but for” cause of the injuries to the wives and children.”); see also Matthew v. United States, 452 F. Supp. 2d 433, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The relevant inquiry is not, therefore, who is injured and when the injury becomes manifest, but rather the time and nature of the negligent act alleged.”). But in Lombard, the D.C. Circuit focused instead on whether there was an actual injury to the serviceman that, based on typical causation principles, ultimately generated an injury to the third party. There, the plaintiffs claimed that government negligence during its oversight of the “Manhattan Project” in New Mexico allowed Mr. Lombard, a member of the Army, to handle radioactive substances, which negatively altered his genetic makeup. As a result, his children were born with physical defects. Relying on Stencel Aero, the court found that “Feres has also been held to bar cases brought by third parties . . . where the claim originates with or derives from an injury to a serviceman incident to military service.” Lombard, 690 F.2d at 219 (emphasis added); see also Adkins v. United States, 869 F.2d 593, at  (4th Cir. 1989) (unpublished table decision). -18- token, we reject the object of the negligence or the target of the medical treatment as linchpins in analyzing third-party Feres claims. 7 Our task in this case would be difficult enough if we simply had to navigate the conflicting interpretations of Feres and the genesis test. But an additional (and significant) variable requires further explanation: the fact that I.O.’s injuries were suffered in utero. With that in mind, we next discuss the nature of the in utero cases.