Opinion ID: 848805
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: our approach to the residual exception

Text: We agree with the majority of the federal courts and conclude that a hearsay statement is specifically covered by another exception for purposes of MRE 803(24) only when it is admissible under that exception. Therefore, we decline to adopt the near-miss theory as part of our method for determining when hearsay statements may be admissible under MRE 803(24). In our view, the arguments in favor of the near-miss theory are unpersuasive and do not conform to the language of the rule. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1995) defines cover as 8. to deal with or provide for; address: The rules cover working conditions.  (Emphasis in original.) Therefore, a rule concerning the same subject matter as a piece of evidence, or from a similar source, arguably could be said to cover that evidence. If the rule applied to all evidence not covered by other exceptions, the near-miss theory would be more persuasive. [6] However, the rule modifies the term covered with the adjective specifically. Hence, more than simple coverage is required. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.) defines specific as 1. Of, relating to, or designating a particular or defined thing; explicit.... 2. Of or relating to a particular named thing.... 3. Conformable to specific requirements .... (Emphasis added.) Reading the words specifically covered together and giving each its normally understood meaning, we conclude that to be specifically covered requires more than to be covered. Since specific can mean conformable to specific requirements and cover can mean addressing or dealing with, we understand that a statement is only specifically covered by a categorical exception when it is conformable to all the requirements of that categorical exception. [7] To hold otherwise would read specifically out of the rule. [8] We also disagree with the Zenith court that interpreting the residual exceptions in this manner will nullify the categorical exceptions. Indeed, by their own language the residual exceptions cannot apply to statements admissible under the other exceptions. Moreover, the requirements of the exceptions are stringent and will rarely be met, alleviating concerns that the residual exceptions will swallow the categorical exceptions through overuse. We stress that this interpretation of the residual exceptions does not subvert the purpose of the hearsay rules. Each of the categorical exceptions requires a quantum of trustworthiness and each reflects instances in which courts have historically recognized that the required trustworthiness is present. [9] The residual exceptions require equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. Thus, if a near-miss statement is deficient in one or more requirements of a categorical exception, those deficiencies must be made up by alternate indicia of trustworthiness. To be admitted, residual hearsay must reach the same quantum of reliability as categorical hearsay; simply, it must do so in different ways. [10] Thus, we affirm that the residual exceptions may be used to admit statements that are similar to, but not admissible under, the categorical hearsay exceptions. Next, we turn our attention to the requirements of the residual exceptions themselves. We focus on MRE 803(24), the applicable exception in this case. The language of MRE 803(24) provides substantial guidance in determining the proper method of analysis. As we noted above, the rule contains four elements. To be admitted under MRE 803(24), a hearsay statement must: (1) demonstrate circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the categorical exceptions, (2) be relevant to a material fact, (3) be the most probative evidence of that fact reasonably available, and (4) serve the interests of justice by its admission. The first and most important requirement is that the proffered statement have circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those of the categorical hearsay exceptions. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit noted in Clarke, the inquiry into trustworthiness aligns with the inquiry demanded by the Confrontation Clause, which requires courts to examine the `totality of the circumstances that surround the making of the statement' for `particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Clarke, supra at 84. Thus, courts should consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding each statement to determine whether equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness exist. There is no complete list of factors that establish whether a statement has equivalent guarantees of trustworthiness. [11] However, the Confrontation Clause forbids the use of corroborative evidence to determine the trustworthiness of statements offered under the residual exception in criminal cases if the declarant does not testify at trial. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 823, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). [12] Beyond this limitation, courts should consider all factors that add to or detract from the statement's reliability. The second requirement is self-explanatory. To be admissible under the residual exceptions, the proffered statements must be directly relevant to a material fact in the case. A material fact is [a] fact that is significant or essential to the issue or matter at hand. Black's Law Dictionary (7th ed.). The third requirement is that the proffered statement be the most probative evidence reasonably available to prove its point. It essentially creates a `best evidence' requirement. Larez, supra at 644. This is a high bar and will effectively limit use of the residual exception to exceptional circumstances. For instance, nonhearsay evidence on a material fact will nearly always have more probative value than hearsay statements, because nonhearsay derives from firsthand knowledge. Thus, the residual exception normally will not be available if there is nonhearsay evidence on point. The final requirement is that admission of the proffered statement conforms to the rules [of evidence] and serve the interests of justice. Accordingly, a court may refuse to admit a statement into evidence, even though the first three requirements of the exception have been met. This may occur if the court determines that the purpose of the rules and the interests of justice will not be well served by the statement's admission. [13] Finally, we note that the facts of each case determine the answers to questions about the admissibility of evidence. Here, the trial court did an exemplary job of making clear and concise findings on the record. In order to facilitate review in the future, we ask that courts faced with MRE 803(24) questions of the type presented here make similarly explicit supportive findings on the record.