Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Rejection of Certain Evidence Offered by Defendant

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in rejecting four items of evidence. First, he proposed to present evidence on exactly how the death penalty is carried out so that the jury could evaluate the physical and psychological suffering of the sentence they were about to impose. For much the same reason, he sought to introduce evidence as to how he would be housed to dispel any notion on the part of the jury that a sentence of life without possibility of parole was somehow a lenient sentence. Third, he sought to introduce evidence that it would not be more costly to maintain defendant on a sentence of life without possibility of parole than to put him to death. And finally he sought to introduce evidence that the death penalty does not deter crime. (32) As we have already discussed, a defendant must be permitted to introduce mitigating evidence on any aspect of his character or record and on any of the circumstances of his offense. ( Skipper v. South Carolina, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 4-5 [90 L.Ed.2d at pp. 6-7]; Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. 104, 110 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 8].) Nor is he limited to mitigating factors particularly listed in the statute. ( Hitchcock v. Dugger, supra, 481 U.S. 393, 398-399 [95 L.Ed.2d 347, 353, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 1824].) That does not mean he is unlimited in what he may introduce and it certainly does not mandate the admission of evidence calculated only to shock the jurors and appeal to their passions and prejudices. (Cf. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1284-1285 [noting applicability of Evid. Code, ง 352 to admission of mitigating evidence].) Evidence of how the death penalty is carried out or what conditions in prison might be for a person serving a sentence of life without possibility of parole was not, as defense counsel candidly admitted, offered as mitigating evidence. It went neither to defendant and his background nor to the nature and circumstances of his crime. We have held that evidence as to how the death penalty is carried out should not be admitted. ( People v. Harris (1981) 28 Cal.3d 935, 962 [171 Cal. Rptr. 679, 623 P.2d 240].) Describing future conditions of confinement for a person serving life without possibility of parole involves speculation as to what future officials in another branch of government will or will not do. (Cf. Ramos, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 156-158.) Defendant's reliance on certain language in section 190.3 does not lead to a contrary conclusion. Reducing section 190.3 to an unfair minimum, defendant quotes it to say he may present evidence as to any matter relevant to ... sentence.... What it says, of course, is: ... In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence including, but not limited to ... a listing of factors, all related to the circumstances of the crime or the defendant and his background. The reference to sentence then would appear to mean no more than that evidence must be relevant to the factors properly considered in imposing one of the sentences available to the jury at this point. It does not expand what those factors may be. (33) Defendant's evidence on how the death penalty would be carried out and how he might be confined in prison were more an attempt to appeal to the passions of the jurors than an offer of evidence relevant to this crime or this defendant's culpability for it. To the extent he had an interest in discussing this area to impress on the jury the gravity of their responsibility in the penalty phase of the trial, it was satisfied by his argument. (See discussion in fn. 29, ante. ) (34) As for evidence of the deterrent value or lack thereof of the death penalty, statistics on that point seem inconclusive. ( Gregg v. Georgia (1976) 428 U.S. 153, 184-185 [49 L.Ed.2d 859, 880-881, 96 S.Ct. 2909].) It remains a proper matter for consideration by the legislative authority, not the jury imposing sentence in a particular case. ( Spaziano v. Florida, supra, 468 U.S. at pp. 461-462 [82 L.Ed.2d at pp. 353-354].) Nor was it relevant here to rebut argument by the prosecutor. The prosecutor continually focused on the nature of this crime and the argument that it justified the death penalty, without clearly choosing a theory such as retribution or deterrence. Finally, as to evidence that costs of imprisonment for life would not necessarily be greater than the costs of carrying out a death sentence, we have already concluded that the jury could properly have been given defendant's requested instruction on this point. However, the fact that some prospective members of the jury during voir dire may have mentioned the question of cost does not mean that by the end of trial this factor entered in any way into their deliberation. (See Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 770.) Neither evidence produced nor the arguments of counsel made cost an issue in this case.