Opinion ID: 705922
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Direct Attack on Sentence

Text: 10 Generally speaking, Section 2255 provides relief for a petitioner who can establish that either (1) his sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, (2) the sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, (3) the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or (4) the sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack. See United States v. Faubion, 19 F.3d 226, 232 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Cates, 952 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 962, 112 S.Ct. 2319, 119 L.Ed.2d 238 (1992); and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255. In the present case, Seyfert's arguments in support of his first claim for relief under Section 2255 do not raise either a constitutional or a jurisdictional issue. See Vaughn, 955 F.2d at 368. The issue, then, is whether Seyfert's arguments in support of his first claim for relief provide some other legitimate basis for a collateral attack on his sentence. 11 The district court held that Seyfert's claim could have been raised on direct appeal and was not. Section 2255 does not reach errors not of a constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude that could have been reached by a direct appeal. See United States v. Smith, 32 F.3d 194, 196 (5th Cir.1994); Vaughn, 955 F.2d at 368; and United States v. Stumpf, 900 F.2d 842, 845 (5th Cir.1990). We therefore affirm the district court's holding as to Seyfert's first claim.B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim 12 Seyfert claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to object at sentencing to the lack of proof regarding the quantity of d-methamphetamine contained in the methamphetamine samples used to calculate Seyfert's sentence. 2 To prevail on this claim, Seyfert must prove both elements of the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See also, United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir.1994) (holding that ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserted in a section 2255 motion must meet the Strickland test). Under Strickland, Seyfert must show that his counsel's performance was both deficient (i.e. that counsel did not provide reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms) and prejudicial (i.e. that errors by counsel actually had an adverse effect on the defense). Anderson v. Collins, 18 F.3d 1208, 1215 (5th Cir.1994) (internal quotations omitted). A failure to establish either deficient performance or prejudice defeats an ineffective assistance claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071. 13 1. The district court assumed for the sake of argument that Seyfert's counsel's performance had been deficient but rejected Seyfert's claim because Seyfert had failed to demonstrate the requisite prejudice. The court held that Seyfert could not have been prejudiced by his counsel's failure to raise the d-methamphetamine issue at sentencing because the Government's laboratory report showed that Seyfert's methamphetamine was, in fact, d-methamphetamine. However, the district court's holding was based on a mistaken reading of the laboratory report. The laboratory report summarizes an analysis of three methamphetamine samples. The first contained 3.7 grams of d-methamphetamine, the second contained 5.8 grams of d,l methamphetamine, and the third sample contained 0.261 grams of d,l-methamphetamine. The magistrate judge's findings, adopted by the district court, demonstrate a misunderstanding of the laboratory report; the court interpreted d-l-methamphetamine as d,1-methamphetamine. It then assumed that d,1-methamphetamine was the same as d-methamphetamine and did not reach Seyfert's argument that the samples were at least partially composed of l-methamphetamine. 14 In light of the indication in the laboratory report that two of the three samples of methamphetamine were d,l-methamphetamine, the district court's finding that all three samples were d-methamphetamine was clearly erroneous. However, this Court can resolve Seyfert's claims as a matter of law. 15 2. Seyfert now questions the proper treatment of d,l-methamphetamine under the Sentencing Guidelines. While this is a potentially valid inquiry, we need not reach it today if Seyfert's counsel's performance was objectively reasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. at 2071 (Failure to make the required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats the ineffectiveness claim.). For this portion of our analysis we assume that Seyfert's counsel saw the laboratory report identifying all the methamphetamine samples as either d-methamphetamine or d,l-methamphetamine. 16 The Sentencing Guidelines do not explicitly address the issue of how d,l-methamphetamine should be treated for purposes of calculating a defendant's base offense level for a narcotics offense. Section 2D1.1(a)(3) provides that the base offense level for offenses involving drugs is to be calculated by reference to the Drug Equivalency Table in Section 2D1.1(c). See United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, Secs. 2D1.1(a)(3), 2D1.1(c) (Nov. 1991). With respect to methamphetamine, the Drug Quantity Table refers only to Methamphetamine and Methamphetamine(actual). This distinction is explained in a footnote to the table:The terms PCP(actual) and Methamphetamine(actual) refer to the weight of the controlled substance, itself, contained in the mixture or substance. For example, a mixture weighing 10 grams containing PCP at 50% purity contains 5 grams of PCP(actual). In the case of a mixture or substance containing PCP or methamphetamine, use the offense level determined by the entire weight of the mixture or substance, or the offense level determined by the weight of the PCP(actual) or methamphetamine(actual), whichever is greater. 17 U.S.S.G. Sec. 2D1.1 n. The Drug Quantity Table weights Methamphetamine(actual) ten times more heavily than Methamphetamine for purposes of calculating a defendant's base offense level under Section 2D1.1. 18 The commentary to Section 2D1.1 contains Drug Equivalency Tables which can be used as a means of combining different controlled substances to obtain a single offense level. The Drug Equivalency Tables provide that one gram of Methamphetamine is equivalent to one kilogram of marijuana while one gram of Methamphetamine(actual) is equivalent to 10 kilograms of marijuana. 19 The Drug Equivalency Tables also contain an explicit reference to L-methamphetamine and Levo-methamphetamine. One gram of L-methamphetamine is equivalent to 40 grams of marijuana. Consequently, a defendant must have distributed 250 times as much l-methamphetamine as d-methamphetamine(actual) to receive the same sentence. 20 At the time of Seyfert's sentencing, no court had addressed the specific question Seyfert raises of whether d,l-methamphetamine is the same as d-methamphetamine for purposes of measuring Methamphetamine(actual) under Section 2D1.1, or whether the Government must prove the quantity of d-methamphetamine in a sample of d,l-methamphetamine to sustain its burden regarding the proper quantity. Since that time, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that d,l-methamphetamine should be treated like d-methamphetamine for purposes of Section 2D1.1. United States v. Decker, 55 F.3d 1509 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Carroll, 6 F.3d 735 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1234, 127 L.Ed.2d 577 (1994). The Third Circuit has disagreed with what it perceives to be the Eleventh Circuit's reasoning on the issue. United States v. Bogusz, 43 F.3d 82 (3rd Cir.1994), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1812, 131 L.Ed.2d 736 (1995). 21 The Sentencing Guidelines explicitly refer to l-methamphetamine and treat it significantly less harshly, and a creative lawyer could have made the leap in reasoning from l-methamphetamine to the l-methamphetamine component of d,l-methamphetamine. However, considering the absence of any reference to d,l-methamphetamine in the Sentencing Guidelines and the total lack of case law on the subject, we find, as a matter of law, that it was not objectively unreasonable for Seyfert's attorney to fail to raise this innovative sentencing issue. C.f. United States v. Acklen, 47 F.3d 739, 742-43 (5th Cir.1995) (declining to hold as a matter of law that counsel's performance was not deficient where section 2255 movant alleged that counsel was ineffective for failing to object at sentencing to the assumption that the methamphetamine involved ... was d-methamphetamine and not l-methamphetamine since the Sentencing Guidelines explicitly referred to l-methamphetamine and the issue had been addressed in an Eighth Circuit case). 22 3. If the record had reflected that Seyfert's counsel had actually seen the Government's laboratory report, our inquiry would be complete. We note, however, that the record before us does not so reflect. If, in fact, counsel had not seen the report and had failed to request such a report, we would be prepared to find that his performance was deficient. See Acklen, 47 F.3d at 742-43. However, Seyfert's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would still fail because he cannot demonstrate the level of prejudice required to succeed on this claim. 23 To satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland test in the context of a non-capital sentencing proceeding, a defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, but for the deficient performance of counsel, his sentence would have been significantly less harsh. See Acklen, 47 F.3d at 742; United States v. Segler, 37 F.3d 1131, 1136 (5th Cir.1994). To find that Seyfert had established this prejudice, we would have to find that, had Seyfert's counsel requested the laboratory report, he would have gone beyond what we are today prepared to find reasonable and would have raised this novel sentencing issue regarding the amount of d-methamphetamine found in the d,l-methamphetamine samples. Then, despite the absence of case law on the subject, the sentencing judge would have had to accept counsel's argument. We do not find that such a tenuous likelihood rises to the level of reasonable probability.