Opinion ID: 2815635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Appellant moved for a judgment of acquittal on all counts at the end of the government’s case-in-chief and again at the close of the evidence. The trial judge denied both motions. Appellant claims error, asserting that the government’s witnesses were so inherently incredible, and so thoroughly impeached, that their testimony about his carrying and possession of the Bulldog revolver was legally insufficient to support his convictions for carrying a pistol without a license in a gun-free zone and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. We disagree. A party seeking to exclude a witness’s testimony from consideration based on the doctrine of inherent incredibility must satisfy a “stringent test.” Payne v. 42 United States, 516 A.2d 484, 494 (D.C. 1986). Specifically, the doctrine “can be invoked only when the testimony can be disproved . . . as a matter of logic by the uncontradicted facts or by scientific evidence, or when the person whose testimony is under scrutiny made allegations which seem highly questionable in the light of common experience and knowledge, or behaved in a manner strongly at variance with the way in which we would normally expect a similarly situated person to behave.” In re A.H.B., 491 A.2d 490, 496 n.8 (D.C. 1985) (ellipsis in original) (quotations and citations omitted). “A certain amount of inconsistency in the evidence is almost inevitable in any trial, but it rarely justifies reversal.” Id. at 495. Evidence is not legally insufficient to support a criminal conviction merely because the testimony of the witnesses has been contradictory and the explanations for the inconsistencies difficult to believe. Id. (citing United States v. Jackson, 579 F.2d 553, 558 (10th Cir. 1978)). To the contrary, “a witness may be inaccurate, contradictory and even untruthful in some respects and yet be entirely credible in the essentials of his testimony.” Id. (quoting United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1074 (2d Cir. 1969)). More generally, whenever we consider the legal sufficiency of the evidence presented in support of a criminal conviction, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to 43 determine credibility and to weigh and draw justifiable inferences from the evidence.” Jackson v. United States, 940 A.2d 981, 987 n.3 (D.C. 2008) (citing Rivas v. United States, 783 A.2d 125, 134 (D.C. 2001) (en banc)). Although we are “not a rubber stamp,” Swinton v. United States, 902 A.2d 772, 776 n.6 (D.C. 2006), we “must deem the proof of guilt sufficient if, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, [we conclude that] any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt,’” Rivas, 783 A.2d at 134 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)). We are satisfied that the government’s evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support appellant’s convictions on the weapons charges. Five witnesses testified that appellant had a gun on his person on the night of July 3-4, 2009. Ms. Frazier, her son Antonio, and Mr. Stuckey all told the jury that appellant had a gun in his jacket pocket while he and others shot dice in the basement of the Ord Street house; as discussed above, Mr. Stuckey stated that he had seen the same gun in appellant’s possession three times before and that he recognized it as a .44 caliber Bulldog revolver when it fell out of appellant’s pocket onto the basement floor. Mr. Jones and Mr. Smith testified that appellant later had a chrome revolver in his hand after several shots were fired inside the van. All of this testimony was 44 corroborated by undisputed evidence that two people were shot inside the van and by the testimony of the government’s firearms expert that the bullets recovered from Mr. Brown’s body were fired from either a .44 caliber Charter Arms Bulldog revolver or a .44 caliber U.S. Arms Magnum revolver. Although the government’s witnesses testified inconsistently on some points and were impeached on others, appellant has not established that their testimony was disproved as a matter of fact or logic or otherwise shown to be inherently incredible. The discrepancies in the testimony were properly left for the jury to resolve, and we have no difficulty concluding that a rational trier of fact could have resolved the discrepancies in favor of the government and found the essential elements of each of the weapons offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.