Opinion ID: 204991
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial Motions to Suppress

Text: Muhlenbruch argues that the district court erred when it denied his motions to suppress his statements and the evidence obtained during the searches of his apartment and computer. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo. United States v. Aguilera, 625 F.3d 482, 486 (8th Cir.2010).
Muhlenbruch asserts that the district court should have suppressed inculpatory statements he made during his interview with Officer Hansel and Detective Linsenmeyer because Muhlenbruch was not apprised of his Miranda rights before or during the interview. Specifically, Muhlenbruch challenges the district court's conclusion that Miranda warnings were not required because Muhlenbruch was not in custody at the time of the interview. Under the Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings are required when interrogation is `initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' United States v. New, 491 F.3d 369, 373 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602). We review de novo the district court's legal conclusion that Muhlenbruch was not in custody at the time of his interview. Id. To determine whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, we first consider the totality of the circumstances confronting the defendant at the time of the interview, and then we determine whether a reasonable person in his position would consider his freedom of movement restricted to the degree associated with formal arrest. United States v. Flores-Sandoval, 474 F.3d 1142, 1146 (8th Cir.2007) (internal quotation omitted). Our focus during this inquiry is on objective circumstances, not on subjective views of the participants. Id. (quotation omitted). The following non-exclusive factors inform the custody inquiry: (1) whether the suspect was informed that he was free to leave and that answering was voluntary; (2) whether the suspect possessed freedom of movement; (3) whether the suspect initiated contact or voluntarily acquiesced; (4) whether strong arm tactics or strategies were employed; (5) whether the atmosphere was police dominated; or, (6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the end of questioning. Id. at 1146-47. Here, Muhlenbruch was confronted by police at his apartment and, without knowing the reason for their presence, he accompanied the officers to the police station for questioning. Muhlenbruch was told that he was not under arrest and he was placed in the back seat of a patrol car for a short ride to the police station. At the station, Muhlenbruch was not handcuffed and, at the beginning of the interview, Muhlenbruch was informed that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at any time. Muhlenbruch was interviewed by two officers in a small room with the door closed [3] for approximately twenty-two minutes and he confessed to downloading child pornography about seven-and-a-half minutes into the interview. The interviewing officers did not make threats or promises to Muhlenbruch during the interview. At the end of the officers' questioning, Muhlenbruch initially denied consent to seize his computer. The officers explained that Muhlenbruch would need to remain at the police station until they obtained a search warrant to ensure that Muhlenbruch did not hide or destroy the computer. Muhlenbruch eventually consented to the search, acknowledging that the officers had been more than straightforward with him. Muhlenbruch was not arrested at the conclusion of the interview and the officers gave him a ride home. We find the relevant facts of this case virtually indistinguishable from the facts in United States v. LeBrun, 363 F.3d 715, 724 (8th Cir.2004) (en banc), where this court, sitting en banc, determined that the defendant was not in custody for Miranda purposes. There, as here, the defendant accompanied officers to the police station in a patrol car for questioning, the officers told the defendant before questioning that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at any time, and the interview took place in a small, windowless room. Id. at 718. In both cases the defendants confessed after a short period of questioning (the defendant in LeBrun confessed after approximately thirty-three minutes whereas Muhlenbruch confessed after a mere seven-and-a-half minutes), and the officers did not shout or physically threaten the defendants to elicit such confessions. Id. Also, the defendants in both cases were not arrested at the conclusion of their interviews and were driven home by the interviewing officers. Id. at 719. In LeBrun, the court reasoned that the circumstances indicating custody were outweighed by the circumstances indicating non-custody, placing significant emphasis on the fact that the defendant was told before his interview that he was not under arrest and that he was free to leave at any time. See id. at 722-23. Indeed, we have long recognized that [t]he most obvious and effective means of demonstrating that a suspect has not been taken into custody... is for the police to inform the suspect that an arrest is not being made and that the suspect may terminate the interview at will. United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343, 1349 (8th Cir.1990) (internal quotation omitted). To be sure, there are some facts in this case not present in LeBrun that weigh in favor of finding custody. [4] Specifically, when Muhlenbruch initially refused consent to search his apartment, the officers told Muhlenbruch that he would need to wait at the police station until they could secure a search warrant. However, this exchange between Muhlenbruch and the officers took place after questioning had ceased and more than twelve minutes after Muhlenbruch initially confessed to downloading child pornography. This is significant because [o]ur main focus must be on the individual's restraint during the interview.  United States v. Wallace, 323 F.3d 1109, 1113 (8th Cir.2003) (emphasis in original). We also find that there are facts present in this case that make a finding of non-custody even more compelling than the facts present in LeBrun. Specifically, Muhlenbruch confessed a mere seven-and-a-half minutes into his interview whereas the defendant in LeBrun confessed after thirty-three minutes. We also note that Muhlenbruch was friendly and cooperative during the interview. In fact, on several occasions, Muhlenbruch volunteered information to the officers without a question being posed. See United States v. Axsom, 289 F.3d 496, 502 (8th Cir.2002) (finding non-custody based, in part, on the fact that the defendant was extremely friendly and cooperative during the interview). Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that Muhlenbruch was not in custody at the time of his interview and Miranda warnings were, therefore, not required. Given that Muhlenbruch was not in custody at the time of the interview, his right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment is not implicated and we need not address Muhlenbruch's additional argument that the officers denied his allegedly unambiguous request for counsel during the interview. See United States v. Fitterer, 710 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir.1983) ([Defendant] was not in custody ... and therefore the [F]ifth [A]mendment right to counsel is not implicated.). Muhlenbruch argues that even if he was not in custody at the time of the interview, the district court should have suppressed his statements because they were involuntary. A conviction based on an involuntary confession, obtained through police coercion, violates the Due Process Clause. United States v. Carroll, 207 F.3d 465, 472 (8th Cir.2000). A statement is involuntary when it was extracted by threats, violence, or express or implied promises sufficient to overbear the defendant's will and critically impair his capacity for self-determination. LeBrun, 363 F.3d at 724 (quotation omitted). To determine whether a confession is voluntary, we consider the totality of the circumstances and look at the conduct of the officers and the characteristics of the accused. Id. (internal quotation omitted). The government bears the burden of proving the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. After considering the totality of the circumstances surrounding Muhlenbruch's interview, we conclude that Muhlenbruch's confession was voluntary. As discussed above, Muhlenbruch was not in custody at the time of his confession, and he was interviewed for a mere twenty-two minutes, albeit at the police station. See id. at 726 (We place substantial weight on the fact that [the defendant] confessed after a mere thirty-three minutes.). The record reflects that Muhlenbruch is a relatively intelligent individual who was in his late thirties at the time of the interview and had been arrested on at least two prior occasions. See United States v. Gallardo-Marquez, 253 F.3d 1121, 1123 (8th Cir.2001) (finding confession was voluntary where defendant was of average intelligence and had prior experience with law enforcement). We also note that the officers did not raise their voices or make promises or physical threats. The officers merely emphasized the importance of telling the truth and told Muhlenbruch that he was free to leave at any time. Muhlenbruch argues that his confession was not voluntary because he was sleep-deprived at the time of the interview and he drank alcohol earlier that day. However, the DVD of the interview reveals that Muhlenbruch was alert and responsive during the interview and there is no indication that Muhlenbruch was intoxicated or otherwise impaired. Muhlenbruch also emphasizes that the officers told him he could not leave the police station until they obtained a search warrant. However, as discussed above, the officers told Muhlenbruch he would need to wait at the police station after he had already confessed and after questioning had ceased. Moreover, the officers explained to Muhlenbruch that they needed him to wait at the station to ensure that Muhlenbruch would not destroy evidence in his apartment. This was certainly not a threat used to extract Muhlenbruch's already-obtained confession. Because Muhlenbruch's statements were voluntarily made in a non-custodial setting, we hold that the district court did not err when it denied Muhlenbruch's motion to suppress the statements.
Next, Muhlenbruch argues that the district court erred in several respects when it denied his motion to suppress physical evidence obtained during the searches of his apartment and his computer's hard drive. First, Muhlenbruch asserts that Klaas's private search of Muhlenbruch's apartment violated his Fourth Amendment rights and that all evidence stemming from that search should have been suppressed. We disagree. A search by a private citizen is not subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment unless that private citizen is acting as a government agent. United States v. Smith, 383 F.3d 700, 705 (8th Cir.2004). To determine whether a private citizen is acting as a government agent, we consider (1) whether the government had knowledge of and acquiesced in the search; (2) whether the citizen intended to assist law enforcement agents or to further his own purposes; and (3) whether the citizen acted at the government's request. Id. Here, Tatiana, not the government, directed Klaas to enter Muhlenbruch's apartment, and the officers did not know about Klaas's search until after it occurred. See United States v. Malbrough, 922 F.2d 458, 462 (8th Cir.1990). Because Klaas was not acting as a government agent, Muhlenbruch's Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated by Klaas's search. Next, Muhlenbruch argues that evidence obtained during the search of his apartmenti.e., his computer and the files contained thereinshould have been suppressed because he did not voluntarily consent to the search. The Fourth Amendment prohibition against warrantless entry of a person's home does not apply to situations in which voluntary consent has been obtained ... from the individual whose property is searched. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). We determine whether consent is voluntary based on the totality of the circumstances, and the government bears the burden of proving voluntary consent by a preponderance of the evidence and must show that the defendant behaved in such a manner that the officer reasonably believed that the search was consensual. United States v. Esquivias, 416 F.3d 696, 700 (8th Cir.2005). Factors relevant to this analysis include: (1) the individual's age and mental ability; (2) whether the individual was intoxicated or under the influence of drugs; (3) whether the individual was informed of [his] Miranda rights; and (4) whether the individual was aware, through prior experience, of the protections that the legal system provides for suspected criminals. It is also important to consider the environment in which an individual's consent is obtained, including (1) the length of the detention; (2) whether the police used threats, physical intimidation, or punishment to extract consent; (3) whether the police made promises or misrepresentations; (4) whether the individual was in custody or under arrest when consent was given; (5) whether the consent was given in public or in a secluded location; and (6) whether the individual stood by silently or objected to the search. United States v. Golinveaux, 611 F.3d 956, 959 (8th Cir.2010) (quotation omitted). The voluntariness of a consent to search is a factual question that is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Johnson, 619 F.3d 910, 918 (8th Cir.2010) (quotation omitted). Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that the district court did not commit clear error when it found that Muhlenbruch voluntarily consented to the search. As discussed above, Muhlenbruch is a relatively intelligent adult who was in his late thirties at the time of the interview and had been arrested on at least two prior occasions. Although Muhlenbruch consented in a police-dominated atmosphere, he was not in custody, he gave consent after a mere twenty-two minute interview, and there is no indication that he was intoxicated or otherwise inhibited at that time. The officers did not make promises or threats but rather informed Muhlenbruch that giving consent was his choice and they explained to Muhlenbruch that he would not be placed under arrest if he refused to sign the consent form. After Muhlenbruch initially refused consent and requested to speak to an attorney, the officers explained that they would need Muhlenbruch to remain at the police station until they could obtain a search warrant to ensure that Muhlenbruch did not destroy evidence. This was not a threat but merely a truthful explanation of the process the officers would take to protect evidence. Muhlenbruch gave consent after the officers explained that he would get his computer back and Muhlenbruch acknowledged that the officers had been more than straightforward with him. He then rode with the officers to his apartment in the front seat of a patrol car, led the officers to his computer, and even helped unhook the computer to aid in its seizure. Finally, Muhlenbruch asserts that the district court should have suppressed evidence obtained during the forensic search of his computer's hard drive because the application for the warrant permitting the forensic search included deliberate or reckless falsehoods and omissions and, therefore, violated his Fourth Amendment rights. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). Muhlenbruch emphasizes that Officer Hansel's application for the warrant erroneously stated that Muhlenbruch confessed under Miranda  that he had child pornography on his computer, and did not mention Muhlenbruch's references to counsel, the officers' statement that Muhlenbruch would remain at the station until they obtained a search warrant, or the officers' statement that they would be able to seize Muhlenbruch's computer even if he refused consent. Even assuming that such falsehoods/omissions were deliberately or recklessly included in or excluded from the warrant application, the Fourth Amendment is not violated if the [application] would still show probable cause after such falsehood[s] or omission[s] [are] redacted or corrected. Technical Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244 F.3d 641, 647 (8th Cir.2001). As discussed above, Muhlenbruch was not entitled to Miranda warnings or the presence of an attorney during his interview, and his confession and consent to search his apartment were voluntary. Thus, even if we reconstructed the warrant application to exclude the falsehoods and include the omissions emphasized by Muhlenbruch, the warrant is still supported by probable cause based on Muhlenbruch's confession. Accordingly, Muhlenbruch's Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by the search of his computer's hard drive. Muhlenbruch has failed to show that the searches in question violated his Fourth Amendment rights and we, therefore, affirm the district court's denial of Muhlenbruch's motion to suppress evidence obtained during the searches.