Opinion ID: 1743864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: statement of the case and material facts

Text: ¶ 1. Roger Heigle (Roger) and Jo Ann Heigle (Jo Ann) were granted a divorce on December 1, 1992. Roger appealed the chancellor's order to this Court on December 28, 1992. This Court vacated the judgment on both the appeal and cross-appeal and remanded with instructions to the lower court that all issues, other than the issue of the granting of the divorce, should be stayed until the conclusion of the bankruptcy proceedings. Heigle v. Heigle, 654 So.2d 895, 898 (Miss.1995)( Heigle I ). ¶ 2. Jo Ann moved for summary judgment on October 6, 1997. The trial court partially granted Jo Ann's motion, ruling that as a matter of law and fact, Jo Ann was entitled to equitable distribution of the marital assets. ¶ 3. In January, 1998, Jo Ann filed a motion with the trial court, asking that an expert be appointed to appraise the marital estate as of 1992. Roger opposed the motion and stated that his counsel could not be present for the hearing on the matter. Regardless, the court heard the motion without the presence of Roger's counsel. At the hearing, the court appointed an expert, a local accountant, to value the marital estate. ¶ 4. The expert failed to have the required report ready for court until December of 1998. Roger's counsel repeatedly tried to contact the expert to obtain a copy of his report, only to be told by the expert that he would have to talk to the chancellor before giving Roger's counsel any information. ¶ 5. Trial on this matter was held on December 17, 1998. At this time, the bankruptcy regarding Heigle Farms had been settled. The chancellor issued a bench ruling where he valued Heigle Farms at $900,000, of which $225,000 constituted Roger's interest. The chancellor then placed a $14,000 value on a life insurance policy owned by Roger and valued the marital residence at $48,150. Jo Ann was awarded 40% of the marital estate or $114,860. The chancellor went through a series of credits and debits to arrive at a final figure of $115,060. Roger was ordered to pay $10,000 of Jo Ann's attorney's fees as well as $3,000 in expert fees. ¶ 6. The chancellor set a supersedeas appeal bond for three times the judgment amount, in direct contravention to M.R.A.P. 8, which calls for a supersedeas appeal bond of 125% of the judgment. Roger filed a motion with this Court to reverse the chancellor's order requiring the exorbitant bond. Such order was granted by this Court. On remand, the chancellor then set the bond at 125%. Roger then appealed the final judgment to this Court. STATEMENT OF ISSUES I. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JO ANN'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AND RULING JO ANN WAS ENTITLED TO EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION PRIOR TO THE TRIAL OF THE MATTER. II. WHETHER THE RULING ISSUED BY THE LOWER COURT HAS SUFFICIENT FACTUAL SUPPORT AND DEVELOPMENT TO ALLOW THIS COURT TO CONDUCT A MEANINGFUL APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE BASIS FOR THE LOWER COURT'S RULING IN LIGHT OF THE LOWER COURT'S FAILURE TO DISCUSS THE FERGUSON FACTORS. III. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPOINTING A COURT APPOINTED EXPERT TO PREPARE VALUATIONS IN THIS MATTER. IV. WHETHER THE COURT ERRED IN VALUING THE MARITAL ESTATE AS OF 1998 INSTEAD OF THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE IN 1992. V. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING PARTNERSHIP LIABILITIES ON NOTES SIGNED BOTH BY THE PARTNERSHIP AND ROGER IN DETERMINING THE VALUE OF THE PARTNERSHIP AND ROGER'S LIABILITIES. VI. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN THE WAY IT HANDLED ALL THE ISSUES INVOLVING THE HOUSE THE PARTIES LIVED IN DURING THEIR MARRIAGE. VII. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAKING ROGER PAY PART OF JO ANN'S ATTORNEYS FEES AS WELL AS THE EXPERT FEES. VIII. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE ATTORNEY FOR ROGER TO TESTIFY AS A WITNESS FOR JO ANN. IX. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RELYING UPON ITS OWN PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND MATTERS NOT IN THE RECORD IN ITS RULING. X. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT'S TREATMENT OF ROGER EVIDENCES BIAS AND PREJUDICE. XI. WHETHER THE AWARD MADE BY THE LOWER COURT IS EQUITABLE AND JUST GIVEN THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE, INCLUDING ROGER'S FINANCIAL CONDITION. XII. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ROGER'S INABILITY TO PAY IN MAKING THE RULING OF DECEMBER 17, 1998, THAT FORMED THE BASIS FOR THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM AND WHETHER THE EVIDENTIARY BASIS FOR THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION ORDERED WAS PROVED BY THE PLAINTIFF. XIII. WHETHER THE LOWER COURT WAS CONSISTENT IN THE APPLICATION OF ITS CREDITS AND DEBITS TO THE MARITAL ESTATE IN COMING UP WITH THE FINAL FIGURE AWARDED TO JO ANN.