Opinion ID: 2073745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Judgment n.o.v. on Impala's Claim.

Text: The grant of a judgment n.o.v. is dependent upon the denial of a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence. Maryland Rules 563 a 1, a 2 and 552 a. A motion for judgment n.o.v. cannot be considered, much less acted upon, unless the record discloses the denial of a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence. Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 356, 283 A.2d 392 (1971); Glover v. Saunders, 252 Md. 102, 105, 249 A.2d 156 (1969); Hajewski v. Baltimore County, 184 Md. 161, 165, 40 A.2d 316 (1944). The record here, as reflected in the joint record extract, does not show the denial of a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence. The court, however, granted Impala's motion for summary judgment. Maryland Rule 610. Summary judgment procedure under this Rule is not a substitute for trial, but rather is a determination of whether there are disputed issues of fact that should be tried. Merchants Mortgage Co. v. Lubow, 275 Md. 208, 217, 339 A.2d 664 (1975); Greenwell v. American Guaranty, 262 Md. 102, 109, 277 A.2d 70 (1971). Kirsner v. Fleischmann, 261 Md. 164, 169, 274 A.2d 339, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 856 (1971). The purpose of a hearing on a motion for summary judgment at the trial level is not to try the case on its merits, but rather to decide whether any real dispute as to material facts exists. Shatzer v. Kenilworth Warehouses, 261 Md. 88, 94-95, 274 A.2d 95 (1971); Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 254-255, 272 A.2d 42 (1971). Properly granted summary judgments do not usurp any jury function. Dietz v. Moore, 277 Md. 1, 4, 351 A.2d 428 (1976). The court does not attempt to decide any issue of fact or credibility, but only whether such issues exist. Wolfe v. Lamar & Wallace, Inc., 261 Md. 174, 177-178, 274 A.2d 121 (1971). See Washington Homes v. Inter. Land Dev., 281 Md. 712, 715-718, 382 A.2d 555 (1978). On the other hand, a motion for a directed verdict or for a motion n.o.v. tests the legal sufficiency of the evidence. See Beahm v. Shortall, 279 Md. 321, 341-342, 368 A.2d 1005 (1977); Levine v. Rendler, 272 Md. 1, 12, 320 A.2d 258 (1974); Katz v. Holsinger, 264 Md. 307, 311, 286 A.2d 115 (1972) and discussion infra. Instead of granting or denying the motion for a directed verdict, the court may submit the case to the jury and reserve its decision on the motion until after the verdict or discharge of the jury, but for the purpose of appeal such reservation constitutes a denial of the motion, unless judgment is rendered for the moving party pursuant to Rule 563 (Judgment N.O.V.). Rule 552 c. In contrast, a summary judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 610 d 1. It is readily apparent, therefore, that summary judgment procedure is so clearly distinguishable from a motion for a directed verdict, that the grant of summary judgment cannot serve as the basis for a judgment n.o.v. Here, the trial court had no authority to enter the judgment n.o.v. upon grant of the motion for summary judgment, absent a denial of a motion for a directed verdict, and we reverse the judgment n.o.v. We note that the grant of a motion for summary judgment does not of itself constitute the entry of final judgment from which an appeal may be made. Felger v. Nichols, 30 Md. App. 278, 279, 352 A.2d 330 (1976). In any event, we believe that the grant of the motion for summary judgment was improper. We find that the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file showed that a genuine dispute as to material facts existed regarding the monies claimed by Impala to be due it by Sales. Furthermore, even if the grant of the motion for summary judgment be deemed to be compliance with the denial of a directed verdict requirement of Rule 563 a 1 as the basis for a judgment n.o.v., we think that the trial court erred in granting the judgment n.o.v. The general rule by which the sufficiency of the evidence is to be tested on appellate review is the same for a judgment n.o.v. and a directed verdict. The evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from it are to be considered in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Wesko v. G.E.M., Inc., 272 Md. 192, 200, 321 A.2d 529 (1974); Gill v. Computer Equip. Corp., 266 Md. 170, 173, 292 A.2d 54 (1972); Wheeler v. Katzoff, 242 Md. 431, 435, 219 A.2d 250 (1966); Safeway Stores v. Bolton, 229 Md. 321, 326, 182 A.2d 828 (1962). A party is not entitled to judgment n.o.v. unless the facts and circumstances so considered are such as to permit of only one inference with regard to the issue presented. Here, the evidence and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom were sufficient to lead to conclusions from which reasonable minds could differ, so that the issue was not one of law for the court but was one of fact for the jury with the weight and value of such evidence left to the jury. See discussion of directed verdict infra.