Opinion ID: 1814310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Counsel's Failure to Present Mitigation Evidence

Text: Next, Williams asserts that the trial court erred in denying his claim that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to present a mental health expert's report, despite the fact that the report outlined substantial evidence of mitigation which would have legally prevented an override of the jury's life recommendation regardless of the trial judge's personal inclinations. Williams asserts on appeal that his counsel was ineffective in failing to present the mitigating evidence of Dr. James D. Larson, despite the fact that, long before sentencing, defense counsel had this mental health expert's evaluation and detailed report. Among other findings, Dr. Larson concluded that Williams had an IQ of 75 and was in the borderline range for mental retardation. Dr. Larson further calculated that due to his mental deficits, Williams had a personality disorder and functioned emotionally and mentally at the age level of a thirteen or fourteen-year-old. The report reflects that the defendant had an impoverished and abusive childhood, an erratic school record, was frequently beaten, sometimes with an extension cord, and his parents were alcoholics who frequently drank to the point of intoxication. Williams himself also had a lengthy drug abuse history. These circumstances eventually caused Williams to leave school at age sixteen and to enter the drug culture that thrived in his ghetto neighborhood in Miami. Further, due to the mental deficits Dr. Larson found, he concluded that Williams would not even be recommended for employability. The trial judge denied this claim, finding that Williams failed to demonstrate prejudice. The trial judge held that because trial counsel was successful in securing a life recommendation from the jury, the only relevant question was whether this mitigating evidence would have made a difference to him since he was also the sentencing judge in the case. He then found that the evidence contained in the report would not have made a difference to his decision to override the jury's life recommendation. Hence, the trial judge concluded that Williams was not prejudiced by the failure of counsel to utilize the report because its presentation would not have changed the judge's mind to override the jury's recommendation. As an initial matter, we find that the trial judge applied an erroneous standard to his prejudice analysis. The personal and subjective analysis applied by the trial judge is legally flawed. As this Court has held: It is of no significance that the trial judge stated that he would have imposed the death penalty in any event. The proper standard is whether a jury recommending life imprisonment would have a reasonable basis for that recommendation. If so, the trial judge could not override the jury's recommendation.... Hall v. State, 541 So.2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 1989). In other words, the proper standard for prejudice is whether the omitted evidence would have provided a reasonable basis for a life recommendation and sentence. In turning to the merits of the claim, Williams raises two issues: whether his counsel was ineffective in failing to present this evidence to the jury; and whether counsel was ineffective in failing to present this report to the judge at the Spencer [3] hearing. Williams acknowledges that the jury returned a life recommendation, and hence he cannot demonstrate prejudice for his counsel's decision to fail to present this evidence to the jury. We agree. However, we reach a different conclusion as it relates to Williams' claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to present this evidence to the trial judge during the Spencer hearing conducted after the jury returned a life recommendation. To prove a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate an act of ineffectiveness by counsel and prejudice resulting from that act. We conclude that the circumstances of this case present a classic case of ineffectiveness and prejudice. Under Florida law, defense counsel in a capital proceeding has a fundamental obligation to both diligently investigate and present evidence of mitigation in the penalty phase of the proceedings. In this case, the record demonstrates that a defense lawyer who is presumed to know the law utterly failed to present to the sentencing court mitigation evidence that defense counsel literally had in his hand. Further, in this case, as we have noted in our discussion on the recusal issue, Williams' defense lawyer was aware that the presiding trial judge had already failed to follow life recommendations by other juries in the cases of Williams' codefendants. In fact, his client had repeatedly expressed this concern to him. Defense counsel also knew that this same trial judge had failed to follow jury recommendations for life in other unrelated capital cases. In other words, defense counsel was well aware, at the time of Williams' sentencing, that he needed to ensure that there was sufficient mitigating evidence in the record to support a jury's recommendation of life due to this trial judge's practice of overriding jury life recommendations. Yet, in the face of a very high risk, if not virtual certainty, that this trial judge would not follow the jury's life recommendation for Williams, defense counsel failed to present the significant mitigation evidence contained in Dr. Larson's report. Defense counsel gave conflicting testimony on this issue. He first asserted that he thought he had alluded to this evidence at the Spencer hearing before the trial judge. When he was asked about Dr. Larson's report, defense counsel asserted that he thought he referred to it, but he did not believe that he presented the report itself during the Spencer hearing and did not discuss it in the sentencing memorandum because he did not think it was necessary. He also asserted that he did not believe that Williams was mentally retarded, although the report itself did not find retardation, only mental impairment and low mental age. [4] It appears counsel's decision to withhold Dr. Larson's evidence was based upon counsel's overconfidence that a life sentence would be imposed and his erroneous belief that it was not necessary since his research seemed to show that this Court generally did not approve of overrides. However, counsel clearly missed the mark in overlooking our extensive case law that consistently requires some reasonable evidentiary basis for a life sentence in order to bar an override. Under Florida law, a trial judge is prohibited from rejecting a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment if there is competent evidence of mitigation supporting a life recommendation at the time of sentencing. Stevens v. State, 552 So.2d 1082, 1085 (Fla. 1989); Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908, 910 (Fla.1975). This Court has previously considered circumstances similar to those involved herein and found that counsel was ineffective because counsel failed to present evidence of mitigation to the judge which would have provided a reasonable basis for the jury's life recommendation. For example, in Stevens, after a jury returned a life recommendation for the defendant, the trial judge informed counsel that he intended to override this recommendation. 552 So.2d at 1085. Counsel then chose not to make any arguments or present additional mitigating evidence to the judge in support of the life recommendation. Id. Similar to this case, four relevant aggravators applied, including HAC, and there was little to no mitigation. Id. at 1085 & n. 6. During the postconviction proceedings, trial counsel defended his actions, asserting that he did not believe that he could have persuaded the trial judge to impose a life sentence and, at any rate, believed a life recommendation from the jury was a guarantee that this Court would overturn the death sentence, if imposed. Id. at 1085. This Court held that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence, including evidence that would have shown that Stevens spent his childhood raised in severe poverty and neglect, was physically abused by both of his parents, and still became a responsible family man until the time of his arrest. Id. at 1085-88. See also Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So.2d 1321, 1325-26 (Fla.1994) (holding that counsel was ineffective in failing to discover and present evidence that a coperpetrator received disparate treatment, the defendant grew up in abject poverty, the defendant was a good child, and the defendant supported his family after his father died  evidence which could have supported the jury's life recommendation); Heiney v. State, 620 So.2d 171, 174 (Fla.1993) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence at sentencing where mitigating factors could have established reasonable basis to uphold jury's life recommendation so as to make jury override by court improper). All of these cases involved defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence similar to that alluded to in the mental health expert's report involved herein. Under these circumstances, we conclude Williams has demonstrated deficient performance. As our case law has consistently emphasized, defense counsel has an obligation to investigate and present evidence of mitigation even in ordinary circumstances. However, in this case, because of the known and substantial risk of an override, defense counsel's responsibility was heightened. In addition, it is apparent that defense counsel simply had nothing to lose in presenting this evidence at the Spencer hearing, thereby ensuring that such evidence would be in the record on appellate review. Instead, on appellate review this Court concluded there was only de minimis mitigation evidence in the record and not enough to provide a reasonable basis for a life recommendation and sentence, even though this Court struck two of the aggravators found by the trial court. Of course, under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland, Williams must also show that he was prejudiced by his counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to present the mitigating evidence in Dr. Larson's detailed report. This issue turns on an evaluation of the impact that the presentation of the mitigation evidence would have, i.e., whether a jury's recommendation for life could properly have been set aside by the trial judge if the evidence had been presented. We have already discussed and found error with the trial judge's application of a subjective evaluation of this issue. In asserting his claim of prejudice, Williams first correctly asserts that because this is a jury override case, the trial court would essentially be precluded from overriding the jury's life recommendation unless the court could state that the facts suggesting a sentence of death [were] so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable person could differ. Tedder, 322 So.2d at 910. In other words, to show prejudice in this type of case, Williams must show that his counsel failed to present evidence which would support a life sentence and constitute a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's [life] recommendation. Stevens, 552 So.2d at 1085 (If there is a reasonable basis in the record to support the jury's recommendation, an override is improper.). As discussed above, it is apparent that the omitted mental health report would have provided additional mitigation relating to at least three significant categories of mitigation: (1) evidence concerning Williams' childhood, including information that he was raised in an impoverished and abusive home, where his mother would beat him with an extension cord when the belt didn't do no good; (2) he had a lengthy drug and substance abuse history; and (3) the mental health expert's opinion that Williams' IQ was 75 and that he operates on the mental level of a thirteen-and-a-half-year-old male. Our case law has consistently recognized the importance and significance of this kind of mitigation evidence. See, e.g., Torres-Arboleda; Heiney; Stevens. Further, as in these prior cases, we conclude that the important mitigation evidence that was available but was not presented by defense counsel would have provided an objective and reasonable basis for the jury's recommendation and a sentence of life. Under our case law, it is the existence of such evidence of mitigation in the record that operates to provide a basis for a life recommendation and, hence, preclude a trial judge's override of the jury's decision. In fact, in the initial appeal of this case, this Court noted, in dismissing the case for mitigation and approving the override of the jury's life recommendation, that the evidence of mitigation was virtually nonexistent. Williams, 622 So.2d at 464. Because of this absence of mitigation, we approved the trial judge's override of the jury's findings even while holding that the trial judge had erroneously found two aggravators. Id. In the absence of any significant evidence of mitigation we concluded these erroneous findings were harmless. Id. That sparse record of mitigation contrasts sharply with the substantial evidence of mitigation we now know existed but was not placed before the court. Accordingly, because we know that significant mitigation evidence existed here and that only defense counsel's neglect prevented its introduction, we conclude that defendant has sufficiently demonstrated both prongs of Strickland, and, hence, the trial court erred in denying relief.