Opinion ID: 765927
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Found in under 8 U.S.C. S 1326

Text: 12 With this framework in mind, we turn to the parties' arguments about the proper venue for prosecution in this case. Hernandez argues that venue in the Western District of Washington was unconstitutional because he committed and completed the offense of being found in the United States in Oregon. The government concedes that Hernandez was found in the United States in Oregon, but argues that Hernandez was also found in the United States in Washington because section 1326 is a continuing offense. The government argues that the defendant's presence in a judicial district, for any reason, constitutes a violation of section 1326, permitting the government to prosecute in that venue. Alternatively, the government contends that venue in the Western District of Washington was proper under the venue statute, 8 U.S.C. S 1329, because the government apprehended  Hernandez in Washington. 13 The Supreme Court recently provided guidance on how to determine where a crime was committed for venue purposes: 14 [T]he locus delicti [of the charged offense ] must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it. In per forming this inquiry, a court must initially identify the conduct constituting the offense (the nature of the crime) and then discern the location of the com mission of the criminal acts. 15 United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, _______ U.S. _______, 119 S. Ct. 1239, 1242-43 (1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In identifying the nature of the crime alleged, we look first at the language of the statute under which the defendant was charged. See id. at 1243. Prior to Rodriguez-Moreno, some federal courts looked exclusively at the verbs in the statute in determining the conduct constituting the offense, but in Rodriguez-Moreno the Supreme Court cautioned that [w]hile the `verb test' certainly has value as an interpretive tool, it cannot be applied rigidly, to the exclusion of other relevant statutory language. Id. 16 Following the Supreme Court's direction, we turn to the language of the statute under which Hernandez was charged. Section 1326 provides: 17 (a) In general Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who 18 (1) has been denied admission, excluded, deported, or removed or has departed the United States while an order of exclusion, deportation, or removal is outstanding, and there after 19 (2) enters, attempts to enter, or is at any time found in, the United States . . . shall be fined under Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. 20 (b) Criminal penalties for reentry of certain removed aliens 21 Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any alien described in such subsection 22 (1) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of three or more misdemeanors involving drugs, crimes against the person, or both, or a felony (other than an aggravated felony), such alien shall be fined under Title 18, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; 23 (2) whose removal was subsequent to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined under such Title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both . . . . 24 Hernandez was charged under sections 1326(a), (b)(1), and (b)(2), and convicted under sections 1326(a) and (b)(1). 25 Section 1326 criminalizes three acts by aliens who have been deported: (1) entering the United States; (2) attempting to enter; or (3) being found in the United States, all without permission of the Attorney General. Unlike in Rodriguez Moreno, the verbs in the statute (enters,  attempts to enter, and is found) outline the prohibited conduct. The parties stipulated that Hernandez was deported and the government does not contend that Hernandez entered the United States in Washington, 2 so the only conduct relevant to venue is the act of being found in the United States. Therefore, in this case, the inquiry of where the crime was committed and where Hernandez was found collapses into a single analysis. In order to determine where Hernandez was found, and hence where the crime was committed, we must determine what conduct constitutes the offense of being found in the United States. 26 We have previously had occasion to interpret the found in language. In the context of a challenge to the statute for vagueness, we held that 27 [t]he plain meaning of S 1326 can easily be under stood by a person of ordinary intelligence. It pro hibits a deported alien from re-entering the United States without permission. To avoid being found in the United States, a deported alien can either not re-enter the United States or, if he has already re entered the United States, he can leave. 28 United States v. Ayala, 35 F.3d 423, 425 (9th Cir. 1994). In a further refinement, we stated that the crime of being found in the United States continues until the INS discovers the defendant. United States v. Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d 420, 423 (9th Cir. 1994). 29 Other federal courts agree that a deported alien is found in the United States when the alien is discovered by the authorities. See United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1996) ([A] `found in' violation is a continuing violation until the date the alien is discovered by immigration authorities . . . . ); United States v. Rivera-Ventura, 72 F.3d 277, 282 (2d Cir. 1995) ([T]he offense of being `found in' the United States in violation of S 1326(a) is not complete until the authorities both discover the illegal alien in the United States, and know, or with the exercise of diligence typical of law enforcement authorities could have discovered, the illegality of hispresence.) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Gomez, 38 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 1994) ([A] `found in' violation is a continuing violation that is not complete until the alien is `discovered' by immigration authorities.). The Eighth Circuit recently reiterated its holding in Gomez that the crime of reentry under S 1326 is an ongoing offense that continues until an individual is discovered by authorities . . . . When an individual is `found in' the United States, the date he or she is found is generally considered to be the date he or she violated S 1326.  United States v. Estrada-Quijas, 183 F.3d 758, 761-62(8th Cir. July 2, 1999) (internal citations omitted). 30 The precise issue in these cases was when a defendant completed the offense of being found in the United States, for purposes of the statute of limitations or the Sentencing Guidelines, as opposed to where a defendant committed the offense of being found for venue purposes. The government argues, therefore, that neither the reasoning nor the holdings of these cases is applicable to the venue question. We disagree. By articulating the act that triggers when as 1326 violation is committed--the alien's discovery by the immigration authorities--these cases also provide a limit on where venue may lie. Under the continuing offense venue statute relied upon by the government, venue is proper where a crime began, continued, or was completed. See 18 U.S.C. S 3237. Neither the Constitution nor section 3237 permits venue in a location in which the defendant happens to be after the crime was completed, unless the defendant began, continued or completed his crime in that venue. Once the when is determined, the where follows as a matter of fact and logic. 31 The government even concedes that Hernandez was found in the United States in Oregon, stating in its brief that [t]he Government does not contest the defendant's assertion that he was first `found' as defined by Gomez , in Portland when [the INS agent] concluded that he was prosecutable under Section 1326. The district court agreed that Hernandez was found in Oregon: The Court holds that defendant was `found' as used in 8 U.S.C. S 1326 when the INS first concluded that he had likely violated section 1326, thus while he was in Oregon. 32 Although conceding that Hernandez was found in Oregon, the government argues that a defendant can be found in more than one judicial district, even if the defendant is present in a district because the government moved him there. In support, the government cites Guzman-Bruno, 27 F.3d at 422. 3 To understand Guzman-Bruno, it is necessary to lay out what occurred. Guzman-Bruno argued that his crime of being found in was committed not when he was discovered by INS agents in 1992 but when he re-entered the United States in 1990 and reported to his state parole officer under an alias. Id. Because a more lenient version of the Sentencing Guidelines was in effect in 1990, Guzman-Bruno claimed that use of the Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing violates the ex post facto clause. Id. Against this backdrop we stated that [a] violation of 8 U.S.C. S 1326 for being found in the United States after a prior deportation is a continuing offense which continues so long as the alien remains in the country. Id. at 422-23. The government relies on this sentence. The very next sentence, however, goes on to say Guzman Bruno continued to violate the statute until 1992 when the INS arrested him. Id. at 423. Read together, these two sentences mean that it is a crime for a deported alien to remain in the United States until he is found by the authorities. The INS's act of discovering or finding the defendant completes the offense. In the case of Guzman-Bruno, his discovery and arrest were contemporaneous. 33 The government's argument that venue lies in Washington because section 1326 is a continuing offense begs the question of whether the crime had been completed when Hernandez entered the State of Washington. To say that section 1326 is a continuing offense does not mean that venue is proper wherever the government moves an alien allegedly in violation of section 1326, because even continuing offenses are completed at some point. Although the violation continues up to that point--at any time that the alien is discovered and identified--the continuing nature does not mean that the deported alien can be successively found at some later time. 34 The offense of being found in the United States ends when an alien is discovered and identified by the immigration authorities. We conclude that the crime is completed at that point not only for statute of limitations and Sentencing Guidelines purposes, but also for venue. To hold otherwise would produce unfair and absurd results. For example, venue would become the government's choice rather than a constitutional guarantee. Under the government's scenario, a defendant could be found again and again. Or a deported alien who was moved around the country to various penal institutions could be prosecuted, at the government's option, in any of the districts where the alien set foot. 35 The government's position regarding the meaning of found in the United States is unsupported by a single published decision. Although the government contends that the district court's decision in United States v. Mancebo Santiago, 886 F. Supp. 372, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd, 112 F.3d 506 (2d Cir. 1996) (unpublished decision), supports its argument, the defendant in that case did not argue that he was found in any district other than the Southern District of New York. Instead he claimed that there was insufficient evidence to establish venue. 886 F. Supp. at 373. Mancebo Santiago held that the government introduced sufficient evidence that the defendant violated S 1326 within the Southern District of New York because of evidence that the defendant was present in that district when he was taken into federal custody. Id. at 375-76. United States v. Cores, 356 U.S. 405, 409 (1958), cited by the government, also upheld a prosecution in the venue in which the defendant was discovered. 36 These cases do not address the government's contention that a defendant may be found, over and over again, until the INS physically arrests or deports the defendant. If Congress wanted to criminalize the conduct of remaining in the United States, it could have used the same wording as in 8 U.S.C. S 1282(c), which punishes any alien crewman who willfully remains in the United States in excess of the number of days allowed. See Cores, 356 U.S. at 409 (Given the element of willfulness, we believe an alien `remains,' in the contemplation of the statute, until he physically leaves the United States. The crime achieves no finality until such time.). The government has provided no evidence from the legislative history of section 1326 that Congress meant willfully remains when it said found. We cannot rewrite the statute to substitute willfully remains for being found in  the United States. 37