Opinion ID: 1250550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: good time/disciplinary credits[16]

Text: One of the reasons listed by the sentencing judge to support his departure above the guideline range was the fact that good-time credits may be used to reduce a defendant's sentence. Based on the statute which awards disciplinary credit reductions of 84 days per year, the Defendant would only serve 13 years of incarceration (it is a rare, almost non-existent instance when an inmate does not receive 100% of his good time credit); further, the Emergency Powers Act has come into effect in the last two years six times, each time giving further 90 day reductions. The best estimate that this Judge can make as to the length of time that this 17 year minimum sentence will provide for is 7 years. In light of the age of the Defendant, the court is of the opinion that to protect society he should spend a minimum of 10 years in prison. Because of the uncertainty of the Emergency Powers Act and the slight uncertainty as to Defendant's good time credits, the Court has resolved these differences in favor of the Defendant to result in a probable incarceration of 7 years. [Emphasis added.][ [17] ] Disciplinary credits are provided by statute. MCL 800.33; MSA 28.1403. The disciplinary credits are applied to the judicially imposed minimum sentence to reduce the time a defendant must spend in prison. For instance, the statute provides for five days a month credit for the first and second years of a sentence, i.e., sixty days per year, up to fifteen days' credit per month from and including the twentieth year of a sentence, i.e., six months per year. Disciplinary credits are automatically forfeited during any month in which a prisoner is found guilty of a major misconduct. However, any forfeiture is limited to the month in which the misconduct occurs and these credits may be restored. After December 30, 1982, the statute was amended to allow two more special days a month upon recommendation of the disciplinary credit committee and with the warden's consent. [18] The prosecutor argues that any minimum sentence is subject to good-time reductions without regard to punishment, protection of society, reformation of the offender, or deterrence. He asserts the court's attempts to tailor an individual sentence for each defendant on the basis of the presentence report and the guidelines are frustrated by legislatively imposed sentence reductions that are concerned only with prison overcrowding. No assertion is made, however, nor could one be, that such reductions are constitutionally infirm or not subject to adjustment, revision, or repeal by the Legislature. Yet, it is argued that each judge should be allowed to correct this perversion of sentencing decisions by enhancing a defendant's sentence by the amount the judge estimates it will be decreased by good time. Much of the dissatisfaction with the use of good-time credits reflected in the prosecutor's brief is also apparent in recent Court of Appeals decisions. People v Humble, supra ; People v Lundy, supra . The prosecutor may well be correct in arguing that the system does not operate as it should. However, the failure of the state to create and implement a successful corrections program should not distort the judiciary's sentencing responsibility. It is apparent in the present case that the judge's sentence was based on his guesstimate of time reductions that defendant would receive under the OEPA and good-time statutes. We have found that early release under the OEPA may not be used as a factor in enhancing a defendant's sentence. We find that enhancing a defendant's sentence on the basis of anticipated good-time reductions is also improper. The sentencing guidelines were established to achieve greater uniformity in the sentencing process while preserving judicial discretion. Thus, similar offenders committing similar offenses should not receive dissimilar sentences. [19] The sentencing court must use the guidelines when imposing a sentence for an offense included within the guidelines. Departure from the guidelines is permitted, however, [20] and the judge must give specific explanations for departure where there are special characteristics of the offense or offender necessitating a departure or where the judge believes the recommended ranges are inappropriate. [21] Where the judge finds no special characteristics, he must provide a specific explanation of why the guidelines range does not reflect the sentencing practice of the state's trial judges. [22] This is necessary because the guidelines were developed by an advisory committee to reflect the past sentencing practices of Michigan judges. [23] If the prosecutor is correct in stating that trial judges traditionally factored good time into defendants' sentences, then this practice would be reflected in the presently recommended guidelines sentences. The prosecutor argues that the guidelines are too lenient anyway. The Sentencing Guidelines Advisory Committee recognized that all judges would not concur with the recommended guidelines sentences and provided for departure. However, this Court requires that specific reasons for departure be placed on the record at sentencing as well as on the SIR. Adding good time or disciplinary credits to a defendant's sentence also gives rise to basic unfairness. Similar offenders committing similar offenses may receive dissimilar sentences depending on the judge's decision to add on good time and the accuracy of the computations. In addition, if the present implementation of the good-time statute should be altered  for example, so that loss of good time for minor infractions is the rule rather than the exception  a defendant may be prejudiced. It is clear that there is much concern on the part of the public, prosecutors, and judges over the good-time statute and its implementation by the Department of Corrections. Nonetheless, we again stress that the enactment of the good-time statute, like the OEPA, is not an illegal or extralegal measure designed to frustrate justice, but is within the power granted to the Legislature by the constitution. Const 1963, art 4, § 45. Each of these enactments represents a carefully considered judgment by coequal branches of government. Sentencing judges should not circumvent or nullify the act by taking away good-time credits in advance. [24]