Opinion ID: 1265952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inherent Powers Doctrine

Text: In Pena v. District Court, 681 P.2d 953 (Colo.1984), we affirmed the basic principles underlying the inherent powers doctrine. The inherent powers which courts possess consist of: [A]ll powers reasonably required to enable a court to perform efficiently its judicial functions, to protect its dignity, independence, and integrity, and to make its lawful actions effective. These powers are inherent in the sense that they exist because the court exists; the court is, therefore it has the powers reasonably required to act as an efficient court. Id. at 956 (quoting Jim R. Carrigan, Inherent Powers and Finance, Trial, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 22, 22). The separation of powers doctrine provides the basis for the inherent powers of the courts. [4] Previously, we stated: In their responsibilities and duties, the courts must have complete independence. It is not only axiomatic, it is the genius of our government that the courts must be independent, unfettered, and free from directives, influence, or interference from any extraneous source. It is abhorrent to the principles of our legal system and to our form of government that courts, being a coordinate department of government, should be compelled to depend upon the vagaries of an extrinsic will. Such would interfere with the operation of the courts, impinge upon their power and thwart the effective administration of justice. These principles, concepts, and doctrines are so thoroughly embedded in our legal system that they have become bone and sinew of our state and national polity. Smith v. Miller, 153 Colo. 35, 40-41, 384 P.2d 738, 741 (1963); see also Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, and F, 589 So.2d 260, 264 (Fla.1991) ([N]o branch [of government] may encroach upon the powers of another.); In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 405 S.E.2d 125, 129 (1991) (A court's inherent power is that belonging to it by virtue of its being one of three separate, coordinate branches of the government.); In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wash.2d 232, 552 P.2d 163, 171 (1976) ([C]ourts possess inherent power, that is, authority not expressly provided for in the constitution but which is derived from the creation of a separate branch of government and which may be exercised by the branch to protect itself in the performance of its constitutional duties.). However, a court's inherent power is not unlimited and may be exercised only in certain situations. A court's inherent authority is generally limited to matters that are reasonably necessary for the proper functioning of the judiciary. See In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d at 129; In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 552 P.2d at 173; see also Smith, 153 Colo. at 41, 384 P.2d at 741 (stating that those who control the purse should not pay expenses only where the amounts are so unreasonable as to affirmatively indicate arbitrary and capricious acts). While the separation of powers doctrine prevents another branch of government from encroaching upon the judiciary, the same principle bars a court from intruding into the affairs of the legislative or executive branches. See Kort v. Hufnagel, 729 P.2d 370, 373 (Colo.1986) (The doctrine of separation of powers imposes upon the judiciary a proscription against interfering with the executive or legislative branches and operates to prohibit the judiciary from preempting an executive agency from exercising powers properly within its own sphere.); In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d at 133 (The inherent power of the court must be exercised with as much concern for its potential to usurp the powers of another branch as for the usurpation it is intended to correct.). An appropriate use of the inherent powers doctrine recognizes the subtle balancing of the three branches of government, which is necessary to further the public interest of a cooperative and harmonious governmental structure. See Kort, 729 P.2d at 373. Applying these principles to the present case, the Chief Judge properly ordered security to ensure the continuing viability of the courts. Without security the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial system is threatened. The proper administration of justice requires that courts operate in a safe and secure environment. When society views the security of the court system with skepticism, the authority of the judicial branch is diminished. A weak judicial branch prevents a proper functioning of the tripartite scheme of government. The Chief Judge properly ordered security so the courts may continue to fulfill their constitutional mandate and administer justice in an orderly and dignified atmosphere. A court's inherent authority terminates when its ability to carry out its constitutional duty to administer justice is no longer threatened. The Chief Judge's order that the Sheriff's recommendation for security in the Courthouse be complied with was proper. However, the order directing the Board to pay for the security measures is not supported by the record. We recognize that when the action of another branch of government threatens fiscally to undermine the integrity of the judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is reasonably necessary for `the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.' In re Alamance County Court Facilities, 405 S.E.2d at 132 (quoting Beard v. North Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 357 S.E.2d 694, 696 (1987)); see also Ridenour v. Schwartz, 179 Ariz. 1, 4, 875 P.2d 1306, 1309 (1994) ([T]he legislative or executive branches cannot, through lack of proper planning, budgeting or funding, require the judicial branch to take cost-cutting measures so severe that the operation of the judicial system cannot be carried out in a constitutional manner.). By ordering security for the proper administration of justice, the Chief Judge legitimately used his inherent authority. If the Board fails to provide financial support to the Sheriff's implementation of the Chief Judge's order, the Chief Judge may determine that further orders are required to provide security for the Courthouse.
Although ordering specific fiscal action by another branch of government is outside the judiciary's inherent authority, the use of a court's contempt power is not. The United States Supreme Court stated: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power. Ex Parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510, 22 L.Ed. 205 (1873); see also In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508, 511 (Colo. 1991) (The judiciary's authority to punish for contempt of court has long been recognized as an inherent power essential to the effective administration of justice.); I ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Special Functions of the Trial Judge, Standard 6-4.1 (2d ed. 1980 & 1986 Supp.) (discussing the inherent power of the court to punish for contempt). To shield judicial power from legislative control under the separation of powers doctrine, the Chief Judge had his contempt power to force the Sheriff to provide security. See In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d at 512. A court's main concern is its own continuing viability. A court may exercise its inherent authority to further this goal. The Chief Judge ordered security to maintain the court's existence. If the Sheriff failed to provide security, the Chief Judge had his contempt power, another facet of a court's inherent authority, to enforce his order to the Sheriff to provide security for the Courthouse. By following this procedure a court confines itself to judicial matters and does not stray into territory properly administered by another branch of government. Based on these principles, we find that the Chief Judge properly ordered the Sheriff to provide Courthouse security. However, the Chief Judge exceeded his authority under the record before us in ordering the Board to pay the expense of the security measures.