Opinion ID: 4406233
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Perceived Impairment

Text: Alternatively, Richardson argues that even if we hold extreme obesity is not itself an impairment, he is still disabled under the ADA because CTA perceived his obesity to be a physical impairment. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). To succeed on this claim, Richardson must show CTA took adverse action against him based on the belief that his condition was an impairment—as the ADA defines that term—not merely based on knowledge of Richardson’s physical characteristic. See Morriss, 817 F.3d at 1113 (“[A]s a threshold matter, [the employee] was required to show that [the employer] perceived his obesity to be a condition that met the definition of ‘physical impairment.’”); Francis, 129 F.3d at 285 (“[T]he plaintiﬀ must allege that the employer believed, however erroneously, 10 Richardson also suggests the fact that he “suﬀered from extreme obesity … alone is suﬃcient … to establish that he meets the definition of ‘disability’ under the ADA.” Cf. Watkins, 463 F.3d at 443–45 & n.1 (Gibbons, J., concurring) (opining that “[i]t is possible that morbid obesity is a disorder that by its very nature has a physiological cause,” but agreeing summary judgment was proper because the plaintiﬀ put forth no evidence to that eﬀect); Cook v. State of R.I., Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1993) (concluding a jury could find that plaintiﬀ’s “morbid obesity” was a “physical impairment” because “she presented expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder involving a dysfunction of both the metabolic system and the neurological appetite-suppressing signal system, capable of causing adverse eﬀects within the musculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular system”). We need not decide whether, on a particular evidentiary showing, extreme obesity alone can be considered a physiological condition because Richardson presented no such evidence. 18 Nos. 17-3508 & 18-2199 that the plaintiﬀ suﬀered from an ‘impairment’ that, if it truly existed, would be covered under the [ADA] ….”). In other words, Richardson must present suﬃcient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to infer that CTA perceived his extreme obesity was caused by an underlying physiological disorder or condition. Richardson did not make this showing. To be sure, Richardson introduced evidence that CTA took adverse action against him based on his excessive weight. For example, CTA transferred Richardson to Area 605 because he exceeded the weight specifications for CTA buses. Additionally, CTA required Richardson to take a special assessment because he weighed over 400 pounds, not because of any violation of CTA standard operating procedures. And in Stewart’s memorandum to Swopes summarizing the results of the special assessment, she highlighted safety concerns directly related to Richardson’s weight: he could not perform hand-over-hand turning, he cross-pedaled, he had diﬃculty getting in and out of the driver’s seat, his body hung oﬀ the seat, his leg was close to the door handle, and he exceeded the 400-pound maximum per CTA bus manufacturer requirements. But there is no evidence Stewart, Swopes, or anyone else at CTA believed Richardson’s excessive weight was caused by a physiological disorder or condition. To the contrary, the evidence suggests CTA perceived Richardson’s weight as a physical characteristic that made it unsafe for him to drive. These facts do not permit a finding that CTA regarded Richardson as disabled for purposes of ADA liability. See Francis, 129 F.3d at 287 (no liability where plaintiﬀ “alleges only that [defendant] regarded him as disabled because it disciplined him for failing to meet a weight standard applied to all of its employees,” and not Nos. 17-3508 & 18-2199 19 “because it perceived him as suﬀering from a physiological weight-related disorder”). Richardson cites to the First Circuit’s opinion in Cook v. State of Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hospitals, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993), and suggests that the court held a jury could find an employer perceived an employee’s extreme obesity as a physical impairment merely because the employer “stated concerns about the plaintiﬀ’s ability to perform her job duties.” Richardson reads Cook too broadly. In Cook, the court aﬃrmed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiﬀ under the identical “perceived disability” provision of the Rehabilitation Act. Id. at 23. The court explained that a jury could have found the defendant treated the plaintiﬀ “as if she had a physical impairment” because the evidence “show[ed] conclusively that [the defendant] treated plaintiﬀ’s obesity as if it actually aﬀected her musculoskeletal and cardiovascular systems.” Id. Critically, the court emphasized that the plaintiﬀ presented “expert testimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder.” Id. Here, by contrast, Richardson presented no such evidence. The district court thus properly held that CTA could not have perceived Richardson as having a physical impairment within the ADA’s definition.