Opinion ID: 67611
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merker’s Ability to Present a Defense

Text: Merker contends that the district court’s evidentiary rulings and trial “manner” violated his right to present a defense and denied him a fair trial.4 4 Citing his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights and his “right to present a defense, the right to present [his] version of the facts,” see Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1967), Merker argues that the district court improperly restricted his defense by constantly interrupting him and excluding relevant testimony. The government responds that Merker’s claim should be treated as one implicating the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of due process and it points out that a passage in Washington v. Texas cited by Merker suggests as much. See 388 U.S. at 19, 87 S. Ct. at 1923 (“The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law.”). Whether it is styled as a Fourteenth Amendment claim or one arising out some amalgam of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, Merker's argument is that the district court prevented him from adequately defending himself. 19 First, Merker argues that the district court improperly restricted Achterberg and Aguilar’s testimony about general procedures at the Airport. The government had an opportunity to paint a picture of how things normally worked. And it argued that Merker’s behavior was inconsistent with normal CBP protocol. Merker claims he was denied the opportunity to counter that image. Had he been able to offer more evidence of CBP procedure, his behavior would have appeared innocuous and innocent. Second, Merker claims that the district court’s constant interruptions, “derogatory tone, and “implicit disapproval” of Merker’ arguments denied him a fair trial. We reject Merker’s arguments for a number of reasons.5 First, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain testimony that was untethered to the time frame of the conspiracy and irrelevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 401, 403. For example, defense witnesses did not know whether the fingerprint 5 We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508, 1515 (11th Cir. 1989). Even if the district court committed constitutional error, we will not reverse errors that are harmless. See United States v. Candelario, 240 F.3d 1300, 1307 (11th Cir. 2001). “Under the harmless-error standard articulated in Chapman and its progeny, a conviction may be affirmed only if the reviewing court conclude[s] that, on the whole record, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.] Put differently, the reviewing court must consider whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” LaMarca v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corrs., — F.3d —, 2009 WL 1377235, at  (11th Cir. May 19, 2009) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A] non-constitutional error is harmless if, viewing the proceedings in their entirety, a court determines that the error did not affect the verdict, or had but very slight effect.” United States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2005). 20 machines were malfunctioning on the dates listed in the indictment. At one point, Achterberg offered testimony about pre-September 11, 2001 procedures, even though the conspiracy began in 2005. Such testimony was properly excluded. That the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such testimony undermines Merker’s argument that he was denied the right to present a defense. Defendants do not have “an unfettered right” to offer irrelevant testimony. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S. Ct. 646, 653 (1988). Second, Merker was given ample opportunity to present a robust defense. For starters, the district court allowed him to present evidence of CBP procedures (that inspectors were forced to process a large volume of individuals quickly, that they had discretion over when to send individuals to secondary, that Merker was an experienced inspector, that the adulterated passports were not obvious forgeries, etc.).6 Aguilar and Achterberg provided much of that information. Admittedly, portions of their testimony were punctured by a number of objections, but this was not true for all of their testimony. For example, the district court overruled the government’s objection and allowed Aguilar to testify that in some cases an 6 Merker outlines four things that his witnesses were unable to prove as a result of the district court’s interruptions: (1) Merker was an experienced, senior inspector; (2) Merker was not required to send passengers with ADIT stamps to secondary; (3) Merker was permitted to perform secondary work in his booth; and (4) manpower shortages forced inspectors to process people quickly. But Aguilar and other witnesses testified as to all of these facts. Defense counsel relied on many of these arguments during closing. 21 inspector does not have to refer an individual to secondary. The jury also heard that Merker was experienced and had the discretion to perform secondary inspections at his booth. Defense counsel had the opportunity to build on this evidence of CBP procedures to counter the government’s depiction of how the CBP worked. Indeed, defense counsel relied on this evidence during closing argument. Furthermore, the record does not support the suggestion that the district court impermissibly commented on the quality of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, or displayed a bias against Merker such that it impeded his ability to present a defense. See United States v. Verbitskaya, 406 F.3d 1324, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[I]n order to amount to reversible error, a judge’s remarks must demonstrate such pervasive bias and unfairness that they prejudice one of the parties in the case.”(alteration in original)) (quotation marks and citation omitted). To the extent that the district court “constantly” interrupted defense counsel, such interruptions were prompted by defense counsel’s desire to consistently run afoul of the district court’s evidentiary rulings. Third, the sheer volume of record evidence showing Merker’s guilt persuades us that any error was “harmless.” The government presented a vast array of testimony and documentary evidence showing that Merker was guilty 22 beyond any reasonable doubt. We recounted the evidence above in great detail. In short, the government presented evidence about Merker’s active involvement in the conspiracy on the critical dates in question. We are persuaded that there is no reasonable possibility that the alleged errors might have contributed to the convictions. Lastly, Merker had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and to challenge the evidence against him. In short, the district court committed no reversible error.