Opinion ID: 78361
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Tonya Flynn

Text: Lamarca argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to impeach Tonya Flynn with the lack of evidence supporting her allegations of sexual battery and evidence contradicting her testimony about Lamarca breaking into his father's house in Hudson. Lamarca originally presented this ground for relief as claim 3 in his 3.851 motion for post-conviction relief, in which he asserted his trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine Tonya Flynn regarding the alleged sexual battery. At trial, Lamarca was represented by Ron Eide and Nora McClure; Eide, a 20-year veteran of the Public Defender's Office at the time of trial, handled the guilt phase, while McClure, a 16-year veteran at the time of trial, was responsible for the penalty phase. During the five-day state evidentiary hearing, Eide provided extensive testimony regarding his trial preparation and strategy, including his decisions regarding the cross-examination of Tonya Flynn. Based on this testimony, the state trial court concluded Lamarca's claim failed under Strickland. In its order denying the claim, the court first addressed Lamarca's contention that trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine Tonya Flynn concerning her account of the sexual battery. The court noted Eide testified he deliberately limited his cross-examination of Tonya to avoid opening a door for the State to introduce additional incriminating evidence regarding the sexual battery, including Tonya's S.A.V.E. examination and DNA evidence reflecting Lamarca was a possible donor to saliva found on Tonya's breast, [6] and to permit [Lamarca] a meaningful opportunity to tell his own story, a story that was credible and not completely at odds with the other testimony offered in the case. The court also reviewed the trial transcript and noted Lamarca's counsel extensively argued the lack of DNA evidence surrounding the sexual battery during closing arguments. Finding trial counsel was not inattentive to this issue, and was indeed fully aware of the significance of the sexual battery, the court determined the tactical decision to limit cross-examination of Tonya ... was sound and well within the range of prevailing professional standards. The trial court then turned to a number of alleged inconsistent statements Lamarca claimed his trial counsel should have used to impeach Tonya's testimony. It concluded none of the statements provided a basis for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Specifically, with respect to evidence in a police report allegedly contradicting Tonya's claim that Lamarca had kicked in the door to his father's home, the state trial court found cross-examination would not have been proper as the alleged inconsistency would not have undermined Tonya's credibility, and [Lamarca] failed to adduce evidence at the evidentiary hearing to develop the significance of the alleged inconsistency. Concluding its discussion of this claim, the court stated, as [Lamarca] has failed to demonstrate deficient performance or that [he] suffered prejudice, this claim fails under Strickland and is therefore denied. On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's determination with respect to this claim. Lamarca II, 931 So.2d at 850. After setting out the test for demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland, id. at 846-47, the court noted Eide's testimony regarding his strategic decision to limit his cross-examination of Tonya Flynn to avoid opening the door to potentially incriminating information that would not otherwise have been admissible, recognized such decisions are virtually unchallengeable, and accordingly rejected the claim, id. at 850. In his § 2254 petition, Lamarca challenged the state courts' conclusions that his trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to impeach Tonya Flynn and present evidence demonstrating the inconsistencies in her testimony. The district court denied this claim on the merits, concluding Lamarca had not met his burden of showing that the state courts' decisions were contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland, or that the state decisions' were based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Jurists of reason would not debate the correctness of the district court's ruling. First, Lamarca does not explain, in neither his § 2254 petition nor his application for a COA with this Court, how the state courts' decisions were contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. In fact, Lamarca does not even discuss the state courts' legal conclusions in his § 2254 petition. Second, Lamarca has failed to establish the state courts made an unreasonable determination of the facts. Lamarca has not put forth any evidence, much less clear and convincing evidence, to rebut the state courts' determinations that Eide made a strategic decision to limit his cross-examination of Tonya Flynn and that the statements from the police report would not have undermined Tonya's credibility. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ([A] determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.); Provenzano v. Singletary, 148 F.3d 1327, 1330 (11th Cir.1998) (The question of whether an attorney's actions were actually the product of a tactical or strategic decision is an issue of fact, and a state court's decision concerning that issue is presumptively correct.). Accordingly, no jurist of reason would find the district court's denial of this claim debatable, see Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, 120 S.Ct. at 1604, and Lamarca is not entitled to a COA with respect to it.