Opinion ID: 2070609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The duty to provide a safe place to work.

Text: 2. The duty to provide safe appliances, tools, and equipment for the work. 3. The duty to give warning of dangers of which the employee might reasonably be expected to remain in ignorance. 4. The duty to provide a sufficient number of suitable fellow servants. 5 The duty to promulgate and enforce rules for the conduct of employees which would make the work safe. Id. § 80, at 569 (footnotes omitted). Also, at common law, the rule that an employer was not liable to an employee for injuries inflicted by the negligence of a fellow servant was subject to an exception where the negligence of the fellow servant lay in the performance or failure to perform one of the limited duties owed by the employer. Inasmuch as the employer remained liable for the breach of such a duty which had been delegated to the fellow servant (sometimes called a vice-principal), the duty was said to be nondelegable. See Wood v. Abell, 268 Md. 214, 237-39, 300 A.2d 665, 677-78 (1973); Prosser § 80, at 571-72. Thus, when the Act is superimposed on the common law, those co-employees of the compensation claimant who were charged at common law with performing the nondelegable duties of the employer ordinarily are not persons other than the employer and are not subject to a third-party action. The foregoing analysis is intended only to demonstrate that the reference to nondelegable duties, and liabilities resulting from breach thereof, in the Hastings-Athas rule is a reference to liability for tort damages and not to an obligation imposed under the Act resulting in liability for workers' compensation. Suburban's duty to furnish reasonable medical care for Kirson's work-related injury of August 6 was a delegable duty. It is imposed by the Act and did not exist at common law. Had Suburban simply paid the charges of some other health care provider to treat Kirson's work-related injury, Suburban would have no liability in tort to pay damages for malpractice in that treatment, inasmuch as Suburban could not be a tortfeasor as to the original injury, due to its employer's immunity. Compare Morgan v. Cohen, 309 Md. 304, 310, 523 A.2d 1003, 1005-06 (1987) (tortfeasor liable for aggravation of tortiously inflicted injury caused by negligent medical treatment). Suburban's sole liability for negligent care in the treatment of the August 6 injury was to pay compensation under the Act. See Parts III and IV, supra. Accordingly, because Smith was not performing a nondelegable duty, she does not partake of the employer's immunity under the Hastings-Athas rule. She is subject to suit in tort as a person other than the employer.