Opinion ID: 6337651
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: MDOW’s Status as a Victim

Text: Mr. Dodson argues that MDOW does not qualify for restitution because it is not a “victim” under the MVRA. We disagree. The MVRA defines “victim” as “a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense for which restitution may be ordered.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2).2 An insurance company that pays an insured’s claim for a loss is an “identifiable victim” under the MVRA and qualifies for restitution. United States v. 2 “Every circuit court to have considered the issue has . . . rejected [the] . . . contention that the term ‘person’ in the MVRA’s definition of ‘victim’ limits victims to natural persons.” United States v. Zander, 742 F. App’x 358, 362 (10th Cir. 2018) (citing cases). Even “the government can be a ‘victim’ under the MVRA.” United States v. Quarrell, 310 F.3d 664, 677 (10th Cir. 2002). See Catharine M. Goodwin, Federal Criminal Restitution § 5:4 (Aug. 2021 update) (“person” in the MVRA includes non-person entities such as governments and corporations). Mr. Dodson has not argued otherwise. 5 Appellate Case: 21-7046 Document: 010110679525 Date Filed: 05/04/2022 Page: 6 Burks, 678 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 2012) (affirming restitution award for insurance company that paid its insured’s claim for auto theft). Mr. Dodson argues MDOW is not a victim because he did not directly and proximately harm MDOW given “[t]he multiple intervening events in the instant case.” Aplt. Br. at 16. He contends that MDOW lumped the “multiple burglaries that occurred over [ ] an extended period of time” and the “two non-connected arson events” into a “single loss” that it paid to Dr. Miller. Id. But Mr. Dodson overlooks two key points. First, the district court excluded from restitution all personal property losses from any source. Second, the court ordered restitution based solely on the September 16 fire, which damaged the home’s structure and resulted in a total loss. Mr. Dodson admitted setting that fire, and Dr. Miller’s homeowner’s policy required MDOW to pay for the loss.3 We therefore reject Mr. Dodson’s argument that MDOW is not an MVRA victim. 3 We reject any challenge Mr. Dodson may be making regarding the amount of restitution awarded to MDOW. As we said recently, “the court need not calculate the harms with exact precision.” Anthony, 22 F.4th at 950 (brackets and quotations omitted). The government need only “prove the amount of loss by a preponderance.” Id. Here, the district court relied on the home’s replacement value. The amount was listed in an inspection report that was referenced in the PSR. The replacement value was admitted without objection during Mr. Dodson’s sentencing. Courts have held that the replacement cost of a structure damaged by arson can be a valid measure of restitution under the MVRA. See United States v. Howard, 887 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2018) (“[A] district court may, for different types of property, determine that fair market value, replacement cost, foreclosure price, cost to the victim, repair or restoration costs, or another measure of value is most appropriate.”); United States v. Shugart, 176 F.3d 1373, 1375 (11th Cir. 1999) (using replacement cost as the restitution value for a burned-down church). Mr. Dodson offers no cogent argument demonstrating that the district court either (1) legally erred in using replacement cost 6 Appellate Case: 21-7046 Document: 010110679525 Date Filed: 05/04/2022 Page: 7