Opinion ID: 1180985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Enhanced Penalty.

Text: Appellant contends that when one deadly weapon is used in the commission of a crime, only the principal possessing it may be found guilty of violating a weapon enhancement statute. Here, the robbery occurred in an automobile; appellant was unarmed, and only his accomplice actually held a gun on the victim. Although several states have considered this issue, there is far from a unanimity in the rulings. For example, Arizona has held that for armed clauses to be fully effective, when one deadly weapon is involved in the commission of a crime more than one principal may be subject to a weapon enhancement penalty. State v. Church, 109 Ariz. 39, 504 P.2d 940, 944-45 (1973). Cf. Key v. State, 563 S.W.2d 184 (Tenn. 1978) (enhancement applies only to statute not requiring a firearm to be in defendant's possession and only if unarmed defendant knows his accomplice had firearm in his possession); Jenkins v. State, 509 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974) (knowing aider and abettor subject to same punishment as principal). Contra, People v. Walker, 18 Cal.3d 232, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d 306 (Cal. 1976) (enhancement penalty limited in its application only to persons convicted of felonies who are personally armed); People v. Hicks, 94 Cal. Rptr. 393, 484 P.2d 65 (Cal. 1971) (same). The state contends that the participation of a defendant not actually in possession of the weapon by aiding and abetting the actual user in the unlawful use of the weapon, makes the former equally subject to the added penalty inflicted upon defendants who commit crimes through the use of deadly weapons. We agree. Certainly, it is settled that penal statutes should be strictly construed and resolved in favor of the defendant when the applicability of such statute is uncertain. Sheriff v. Hanks, 91 Nev. 57, 60, 530 P.2d 1191, 1193 (1975); Smith v. District Court, 75 Nev. 526, 528, 347 P.2d 526, 527 (1959). Further, under strict rules of construction, criminal statutes may not be enlarged by implication or intendment beyond the fair meaning of the language used, and will not be held to include other offenses and persons than those which are clearly described and provided for... . Richmond v. State, 171 Tenn. 1, 100 S.W.2d 1, 2 (1937). See Sardis v. District Court, 85 Nev. 585, 460 P.2d 163 (1969); In re Laiolo, 83 Nev. 186, 426 P.2d 726 (1967). Nevertheless, we believe that the legislature intended the enhancement statute to apply under this set of facts. Although the armed clause does not apply where the use of a firearm or other deadly weapon is a necessary element of the crime, NRS 193.165(3), there is no indication that the additional punishment may not properly be imposed upon an offender whose criminal acts were accomplished with the aid of a firearm or other deadly weapon which was held, as here, by an accomplice and equally culpable principal. The enhancement statute demonstrates generally the legislature's concern regarding the increased use of deadly weapons in the commission of crimes and its belief that such proscription will serve to deter persons from using weapons during the perpetration of certain crimes, in the hope that the possibility of death and injury will be reduced. See Key v. State, 463 S.W.2d at 186-87. When one of two robbers holds a victim at bay with a gun and the other relieves the victim of his properties, or, as in the instant case, the unarmed assailant has knowledge of the use of the gun and by his actual presence participates in the robbery, the unarmed offender benefits from the use of the other robber's weapon, adopting derivatively its lethal potential. See People v. Bush, 50 Cal. App.3d 168, 123 Cal. Rptr. 576, 582 (Ct.App. 1975), expressly disapproved, People v. Walker, 18 Cal.3d 232, 133 Cal. Rptr. 520, 555 P.2d at 310. This conclusion is consistent with our holdings involving interpretations of the term possession. See Glispey v. Sheriff, 89 Nev. 221, 510 P.2d 623 (1973); cf. Alsup v. State, 87 Nev. 500, 489 P.2d 679 (1971) (circumstantial evidence sufficient to connect murder weapon with defendant). Those cases do not require actual or physical possession, but rather control. Therefore, in our view, the possession necessary to justify statutory enhancement may be actual or constructive; it may be exclusive or joint. Constructive or joint possession may occur only where the unarmed participant has knowledge of the other offender's being armed, and where the unarmed offender has, as here, the ability to exercise control over the firearm. It is noteworthy that during the change of plea proceedings, appellant acknowledged that the firearm was used to rob the victim. Cf. Key v. State, 563 S.W.2d at 186 (defendant apparently did not know his accomplice had a firearm). Giving the statute this construction complements the public policy which underlies it. We affirm the conviction, judgment and sentences. MOWBRAY, C.J., and THOMPSON, GUNDERSON and BATJER, JJ., concur.