Opinion ID: 68570
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Same Course of Conduct

Text: The Guidelines state that [o]ffenses that do not qualify as part of a common scheme or plan may nonetheless qualify as part of the same course of conduct if they are sufficiently connected or related to [the offense of conviction] as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. [20] Factors to consider in making this determination include the degree of similarity of the offenses, the regularity (repetitions) of the offenses, and the time interval between the offenses. [21] A weak showing as to any one of these factors will not preclude a finding of relevant conduct; rather, [w]hen one of the above factors is absent, a stronger presence of at least one of the other factors is required. [22]
To determine whether temporal proximity is present, we begin with the interval between the defendant's purported relevant conduct and the offense of conviction. [23] Because there is no separate statute of limitations beyond which relevant conduct suddenly becomes irrelevant, a defendant's prior conduct w ill not necessarily be placed off limits simply because of a lapse of time. [24] Nevertheless, various courts have found that a period of separation of over one year negated or weighed against [a finding of] temporal proximity. [25] We have generally used a year as the benchmark for determining temporal proximity. [26] For example, in United States v. Miller , we concluded that offenses separated by 21 months were relatively remote in time and held that other factors must be authoritatively present in order to overcome this long gap. [27] Here, at least 17 months separate any participation by Rhine in the Fish Bowl drug-trafficking ring from his offense of conviction. [28] Although not dispositive, a hiatus this large suggests that temporal proximity is lacking. We also find counter-indicative the lack of evidence that Rhine engaged in any intervening criminal activity, the presence of which might link his earlier conduct to the offense of conviction. [29] The government urges us to overlook this shortcoming, insisting that the apparent lack of intervening criminal activity is solely the result of the informants' imprisonment on federal drug convictions  and not Rhine's voluntarily abstention from criminal activity. This argument is unpersuasive, as it suggests that Rhine has the burden of proving the negative fact that he did not engage in any intervening criminal activity, when in fact it is incumbent on the government to show the positive fact of Rhine's continued drug distribution activities. We conclude that temporal proximity is lacking, adding, however, that our conclusion does not necessarily preclude a finding of relevant conduct. [30] Offenses separated by 17 months  or even longer periods of time  might still be considered part of the same course of conduct if supported by a stronger presence of at least one of the other factors. In particular, we recognize that a lapse of time between prior conduct and the offense of conviction does not necessarily indicate that a defendant abandoned a course of conduct. In some cases, a lapse of time might merely mean that the defendant had to put a venture on hold. [31] For example, in United States v. Cedano-Rojas , the Seventh Circuit concluded that a defendant's drug transaction that occurred two years prior to his offense of conviction was not too temporally remote to be considered relevant conduct. [32] The defendant in Cedano-Rojas had completed a large-scale drug transaction shortly before losing his supplier, after which he faced difficulties obtaining cocaine, resulting in a two-year gap between his earlier offense and the offense of conviction. [33] Describing the defendant's earlier offense as relatively stale, the Seventh Circuit warned that courts must remain cautious and exacting in permitting such . . . dealings to be included in the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction. [34] Nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of relevant conduct, basing its holding largely on the overwhelming evidence in support of similarity, as both offenses involved (1) large amounts of cocaine, (2) the same source and supplier, and (3) a nearly identical use of mules to distribute the drugs. [35] Thus, even if, arguendo, we were to adopt the reasoning of Cedano-Rojas and find that Rhine had been forced to put his venture on hold following the Fish Bowl arrests, we would still need to determine whether a stronger presence of either similarity or regularity compensates for the absence of temporal proximity. [36] Therefore, we must now determine whether there is sufficient evidence of similarity or regularity to support a finding that Rhine's earlier conduct and his offense of conviction were part of the same course of conduct, despite the attenuation between the end of the Fish Bowl ring's operations and Rhine's crime of conviction.
To determine whether a defendant's earlier conduct is sufficiently similar to the offense of conviction, we inquire whether there are distinctive similarities between the offense of conviction and the remote conduct that signal that they are part of a course of conduct rather than isolated, unrelated events that happen only to be similar in kind. [37] As we have previously cautioned, however, courts must not conduct this analysis at such a level of generality as to render it meaningless. [38] For example, in Wall, we concluded that two offenses were not sufficiently similar because (1) there was no evidence that the marijuana involved in each of the offenses shared a common source, supplier or destination, (2) there were no common accomplices, and (3) one of the offenses involved large loads of marijuana secreted in the wheels and gas tank[s] of two pick-up trucks driven across the border, whereas the other offense involved only a much smaller . . . load hidden [somewhere] in [the defendant's car]. [39] Likewise, there are several material differences between Rhine's alleged participation in the Fish Bowl drug-trafficking ring and his offense of conviction. Rhine's instant offense involved possession of a very small quantity (1.89 grams) of crack cocaine with intent to sell some lesser portion of it to an individual buyer for five dollars; the sale took place in a vehicle; and Buchanan, the individual purchaser for her personal consumption, had just learned about Rhine from some unnamed source at a service station. In contrast, Rhine's alleged participation in the Fish Bowl drug-trafficking ring was said to have involved his acting as a large-scale manufacturer, distributor, and supplier of kilogram quantities of crack cocaine to numerous mid-level dealers. There are not even any allegations that Rhine sold to individual users during the Fish Bowl drug trafficking. Neither is there any suggestion that the two incidents involved any common participants or accomplices. We conclude that similarity is lacking, as the differences between these offenses are significant. The quantities, methods of distribution, participants, and nature of the transactions  as well as the defendant's role in them  all vary substantially. Further, there is no evidence that the cocaine forming the basis for Rhine's offense of conviction shared a common source, supplier, or destination with the cocaine involved in the Fish Bowl activities. [40] Although the offenses both involve the distribution of crack cocaine, the mere fact that two separate offenses involve the same type of drug is generally not sufficient to support a finding of similarity. [41] To hold that these offenses are similar would be, in the words of the Fourth Circuit, to describe the defendant's conduct at such a level of generality as to eviscerate the evaluation of whether uncharged activity is part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction. With a brushstroke that broad, almost any uncharged criminal activity can be painted as similar in at least one respect to the charged criminal conduct. [42] Having satisfied ourselves that both temporal proximity and similarity are lacking, we must now determine whether there is a sufficiently strong presence of regularity to support a finding of relevant conduct. [43]
To determine whether regularity is present, we inquire whether there is evidence of a regular, i.e., repeated, pattern of similar unlawful conduct directly linking the purported relevant conduct and the offense of conviction. [44] For example, in Culverhouse, we held that two dissimilar offenses separated by almost three years lacked regularity because there was no evidence of unlawful conduct occurring between the [defendant's] prior transaction . . . and [his] later manufacturing. [45] In Culverhouse, the government had insisted that regularity was present because the defendant had been involved in several prior drug transactions, all of which had taken place before the offense the government sought to characterize as relevant conduct. [46] But, as we explained, [t]he sentencing judge could not have relied on this evidence to establish the regularity required by § 1B1.3, primarily because the temporally remote offenses had not occurred between the earlier conduct and the offense of conviction. [47] We then concluded that, even if we were to consider the earlier offenses, our case law established that five offenses over the course of fifteen years, separated as they are by time and circumstances, cannot be considered repetitious or regular conduct to a degree significant enough to constitute sufficient connection under the [G]uidelines. [48] After reviewing the instant record, we conclude that regularity is lacking, as there is no evidence that Rhine engaged in any intervening criminal activity  much less drug distribution  between the Fish Bowl drug-trafficking ring and his offense of conviction. Without even a scintilla of evidence that Rhine sold drugs in the interim, the government nevertheless seeks to shift the burden to Rhine, insisting that he must prove the negative fact that he did not engage in a series of similar drug transactions. But we decline to adopt the government's assertion that regularity is present merely because of Rhine's inability to disprove an assertion that already finds no support in the record, and conclude instead that there is no evidence of intervening or repetitious criminal behavior that might link the two incidents together. The government also insists that Rhine's three prior convictions for marijuana possession and cocaine distribution support a finding of regularity, even though the convictions all took place well before Rhine's alleged participation in the Fish Bowl drug-trafficking ring. Rhine counters that, under our precedent, a district court may not base a finding of regularity on a defendant's prior convictions or activity that did not take place between the purported relevant conduct and the offense of conviction. It bears emphasizing that the overall purpose of this analysis is simply to determine whether the offense at issue is part of the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction, or, more specifically, whether the two are sufficiently connected or related . . . as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses. [49] Consequently, we decline to adopt Rhine's suggestion that a district court may never consider a defendant's prior convictions or activities simply because they did not occur in the interval between the purported relevant conduct and the offense of conviction. Rhine's contention misstates our holding in Culverhouse, in which we concluded not only that the defendant's several prior transactions had preceded his purported relevant conduct, thus rendering their persuasive value questionable, but also that, even on the merits, those activities did not demonstrate sufficient regularity to overcome the absence of both temporal proximity and similarity. Indeed, there may be the rare case in which a prior conviction or prior activity informs this analysis by establishing a direct link, i.e., a pattern of regularity or repetition, between the purported relevant conduct and the offense of conviction (e.g., if a specific course of conduct began before the relevant conduct and continued through to the offense of conviction). But this, like Culverhouse, is not such a case. We are satisfied that Rhine's old, pre-Fish Bowl convictions do not establish a direct link or pattern of regularity between the two disparate and temporally remote incidents at issue, viz., Rhine's alleged 2006 participation in a large-scale drug trafficking ring and his 2007 conviction for a relatively small, street-level drug deal. In sum, Rhine's alleged participation in the Fish Bowl activities cannot be considered part of the same course of conduct as his instant offense, as temporal proximity, similarity, and regularity are all lacking.