Opinion ID: 625342
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hostile Work Environment Claim under the Rehabilitation Act

Text: Pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, `[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 705(20) of this title, shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, . . . be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity . . . conducted by . . . the United States Postal Service.' Rolland v. Potter, 492 F.3d 45, 47 (1st Cir.2007) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794(a)). McDonough argues that she was subjected to a hostile work environment due to her disability. [8] In order to succeed on her hostile work environment claim McDonough must show the following: (1) she was disabled as defined under the Rehabilitation Act, (2) she was subjected to uninvited harassment, (3) her employer's conduct was based on her disability, (4) the conduct was so severe or pervasive that it altered the conditions of her work and created an abusive work environment, and (5) the harassment was objectively and subjectively offensive. [9] See Prescott, 538 F.3d at 42; see also Ríos-Jiménez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31, 43 (1st Cir.2008). Based on the record before us, we find that McDonough has failed to clear the first hurdle. [A]n `individual with a disability' [is defined] as `any person who . . . has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities' or `has a record of such impairment' or `is regarded as having such an impairment.' [10] Rolland, 492 F.3d at 47 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)). To qualify as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act's first disability definition, [w]e apply a three-part analysis. Ramos-Echevarría v. Pichis, Inc., 659 F.3d 182, 187-188 (1st Cir.2011). First, the plaintiff must establish that she suffers from an impairment. Next, the plaintiff must show that the impairment affects a major life activity, and third, that the impairment substantially limits the major life activity [11] . Id.; see also Rolland, 492 F.3d at 48 (same). The phrases `substantially limits' and `major life activities' must be strictly interpreted `to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.' Rolland, 492 F.3d at 47 (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg. Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197, 122 S.Ct. 681, 151 L.Ed.2d 615 (2002)) (emphasis in original). In order to qualify, an individual must have a permanent or long term impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people's daily lives. Id. at 47-48 (internal quotation marks omitted). The determination of disability is made on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 48. McDonough argues that she actually has an impairmentback and neck painthat substantially limits five major life activities: working, walking, standing, sitting, and lifting. We think the record before us is devoid of any evidence supporting this contention. First, McDonough has not pointed us to any evidence to establish that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of working. Working can be considered a major life activity. Ramos-Echevarría, 659 F.3d at 188. Nonetheless, despite her back and neck pain, McDonough was able to do her job satisfactorily with the accommodations provided by the Postal Service, specifically, a four-hour work day, a stool to rest her knee on while she sorted the mail, and a cart instead of a satchel to help her deliver the mail. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Mac-Gray, Inc., 345 F.3d 44, 46 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that plaintiff could not show that he was disabled because he conceded that he could do his job despite his impairment); see also Mays v. Principi, 301 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir.2002) (The number of Americans restricted by back problems to light work is legion. They are not disabled.). Likewise, McDonough has failed to produce evidence to show that she was substantially limited in the major life activity of walking. Walking is considered a major life activity. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2011). However, it is undisputed that McDonough could walk continuously for one hour a day and intermittently for four hours a day. Moreover, McDonough spent two hours a day delivering mail, walking fifteen to twenty minutes non-stop. She also walked up and down the stairs in her home. For exercise, she would walk to a nearby lake and she even went to the gym a couple of times each week to take part in a water walking therapy class. As a matter of law, this evidence does not support McDonough's disability claim. See, e.g., Neal v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 379 Fed.Appx. 632, 634 (9th Cir.2010) (holding that evidence that plaintiff could walk only four hours a day was insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that she was disabled); see also Turner v. The Saloon, Ltd., 595 F.3d 679, 689 (7th Cir.2010) (stating that walking with difficulty is not a significant restriction on walking). Neither has McDonough produced evidence to support her contention that she was substantially limited in her ability to stand. [12] It is undisputed that she could stand for one hour a day and intermittently for four hours a day. She was also able to perform all of the following activities, each of which involves standing: vacuuming, doing laundry, putting dishes in the dishwasher, mowing, baking, and gardening. Consequently, we cannot agree with McDonough's claim that she was substantially limited in her ability to stand and therefore, disabled. See, e.g., Neal, 379 Fed.Appx. at 634 (holding that plaintiff's inability to stand more than two hours was insufficient, as a matter of law, to prove that she was disabled); see also Dupre v. Charter Behavioral Health Sys. of Lafayette Inc., 242 F.3d 610, 614 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that plaintiff's inability to stand for more than one hour did not render her disabled). Likewise, though McDonough claims that she was substantially limited in her ability to sit, the record suggests otherwise. [13] Indeed, McDonough sat in her car for one and a half hours every weekday, driving forty-five minutes each way to and from work. She was also able to crochet and gardenactivities which undoubtedly require some form of sitting. Accordingly, the record does not support McDonough's claim that she was substantially limited in her ability to sit. This brings us to the final major life activity that McDonough claims to be substantially limited inlifting. Unfortunately for McDonough, this final argument fares no better than the other four. According to her own doctor's restrictions, McDonough could lift ten pounds continuously and twenty pounds intermittently. In addition, she concedes that even with this lifting restriction she never really thought about how much she could lift. This court has specifically addressed the issue of lifting limitations and held that limitations on lifting, without more, are not a substantial limitation on a major life activity. Prescott, 538 F.3d at 44 (citing Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 22 (1st Cir.2002) ([I]f a restriction on heavy lifting were considered a substantial limitation on a major life activity, then the ranks of the disabled would swell to include infants, the elderly, the weak, and the out-of-shape.)). In sum, and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to McDonough, she has not proven disability in that she has failed to show that her impairment caused her to be substantially limited in any major life activity. Alternatively, McDonough claims disability alleging that her employer regarded her as disabled. The regarded as prong of the [Rehabilitation Act] exists to cover those cases in which myths, fears, and stereotypes affect the employer's treatment of an individual. Ruiz Rivera v. Phizer Pharm., LLC, 521 F.3d 76, 82 (1st Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff claiming that [s]he is `regarded' as disabled cannot merely show that h[er] employer perceived h[er] as somehow disabled; rather, [s]he must prove that the employer regarded h[er] as disabled within the meaning of the [Rehabilitation Act].  Bailey v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 306 F.3d 1162, 1169 (1st Cir.2002). In other words, McDonough must show that the Postal Service thought her neck and back impairment substantially limited one or more of her major life activities. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). Moreover, [w]hen `working' is the major life activity at issue, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that the employer thought that [s]he was impaired in [her] ability to do the job that [s]he held, but also that the employer regarded [her] as substantially impaired in either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared with the average person having comparable training, skills, and abilities. Ruiz Rivera, 521 F.3d at 83 (internal quotation marks omitted). McDonough argues that the Postal Service regarded her as disabled because she received worker's compensation benefits and worked four-hour days. [14] We disagree. Pursuant to the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193, a federal worker's compensation program is available for employees who suffer from a disability stemming from an on-the-job injury. Under FECA, disability is defined as incapacity, because of an employment injury, to earn the wages the employee was receiving at the time of the injury. 20 C.F.R. § 10.5(f). We have acknowledged that this definition of disabilityfor worker's compensation benefits purposesis much less exacting than the definition of disability under the Rehabilitation Act. See Rolland, 492 F.3d at 47-8. Thus, the fact alone that McDonough was receiving worker's compensation benefits does not prove that her employer regarded her as disabled. Similarly, McDonough's four-hour work day fails to prove that the Postal Service regarded her as disabled. Instead, it supports the conclusion that the Postal Service found that despite her neck and back impairment, McDonough could do her job with the accommodations providedreduced work day, a stool to rest her knee while sorting the mail, and a cart to carry her mail, instead of a satchel. In fact, the record indicates that the Postal Service thought McDonough could do more, (i.e., work up to five hours a day), not less, despite her impairment. When all is said and done, the record before us establishes that McDonough was able to do her job; she was merely limited in her ability to do it full-time. Consequently, McDonough has failed to show that the Postal Service regarded her as disabled. This brings us to the end of our discussion. Because the first step in any claim under the Rehabilitation Act is establishing a disability covered by the Act and McDonough has failed to show that she was disabled, her hostile work environment claim must fail. See Tardie v. Rehab. Hosp. of R.I., 168 F.3d 538, 542 (1st Cir.1999) (In any claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the plaintiff must first establish that she has a disability covered by the Act.). There was no error.