Opinion ID: 867372
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pandeli knew right from wrong

Text: ¶ 34 In Eddings v. Oklahoma, the Supreme Court of the United States held that [j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating evidence. 455 U.S. 104, 113-14, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982). Thus, the State may not tell jurors that they cannot consider relevant mitigating evidence. ¶ 35 Pandeli asserts that the State did just that when it argued in its closing that Pandeli knew the difference between right and wrong and that the jurors should put Pandeli's background and actions in perspective. The State, however, did not direct the jurors to disregard the mitigation evidence; it simply suggested that jurors should assign less weight to the mental health mitigation presented by Pandeli's expert witnesses. Such argument is proper. See Anderson II, 210 Ariz. at 350, ¶ 97, 111 P.3d at 392; cf. State v. Johnson, 212 Ariz. 425, 440, ¶ 65, 133 P.3d 735, 750 (affording evidence of defendant's mental impairment minimal value because defendant knew right from wrong), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 559, 166 L.Ed.2d 415 (2006). ¶ 36 Moreover, any potential error was remedied by the jury instructions. See Roque, 213 Ariz. at 223-24, ¶ 126, 141 P.3d at 398-99. The penalty phase jury instructions stated that [i]n order to prove the existence of a mitigating circumstance, the defendant does not need to prove that he did not understand the nature of his actions, was unable to control his actions, or did not know his actions were wrong. The court also instructed the jury that [m]itigating circumstances are not a defense, excuse or justification for the offense. Consequently, the trial court did not err when it allowed the State to argue that Pandeli knew the difference between right and wrong. ¶ 37 Pandeli also claims that the State's argument that Pandeli knew right from wrong was irrelevant. We have previously held, however, that a defendant's knowledge of right and wrong decreases the weight given to mental health mitigation. Johnson, 212 Ariz. at 440, ¶ 65, 133 P.3d at 750. Thus, the State's argument was relevant to the jury's assessment of the value of Pandeli's mental health mitigation.