Opinion ID: 2584893
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Assertedly Inadequate Faretta Advisement

Text: Defendant represented himself at the preliminary hearing and throughout the trial. [8] He now claims on appeal that his conviction and sentence should be reversed because he never knowingly and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. Defendant contends that the two colloquies conducted by the municipal and superior court judges concerning the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation were inadequate under the United States Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 [45 L.Ed.2d 562, 95 S.Ct. 2525] ( Faretta ) because the trial court did not mention to him the factors that are unique to a death penalty case. We are not persuaded.
On January 22, 1992, defendant was arraigned on the charges, and the Riverside County Public Defender's Office was appointed to represent him. Just under seven weeks later, during a pretrial hearing on March 10, 1992, defendant made his first request to represent himself. Resolution of defendant's request was deferred at that time because the trial courtat the request of defendant's attorneyordered a competency evaluation pursuant to section 1368. After defendant was found to be competent, a preliminary hearing was scheduled for April 21, 1992. At the start of the scheduled preliminary hearing, defendant's attorney stated that defendant was not ready to proceed because defendant wished to make a motion to relieve counsel and represent himself. Defendant confirmed this, stating, I feel that no one can conduct a better trial than I would for myself. I have just one life to give and I would like to exercise my right to counsel of my choice and I choose myself. The trial court then conducted a lengthy colloquy with defendant concerning his familiarity with the charges, his experiences with the legal system, his educational background, and the disadvantages of self-representation. At one point in the discussion, the prosecutor listed each area of inquiry suggested in People v. Lopez (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 568, 572-574 [138 Cal.Rptr. 36] ( Lopez ), and the trial court further discussed those areas it had not already covered. Throughout the entire colloquy defendant reiterated that he understood the implications of his decision to represent himself and wanted to do so. Indeed, he at one point stated, I've had three months to think about this, your honor, and it's not a snap decision. I feel it is a rational decision. The trial court ultimately found that there was no reason at this point to deny [defendant] his right to represent himself. He is clearly intelligent, articulate, appears to understand the difficulty that he's facing representing himself and is willing to shoulder that responsibility at his peril. The trial court granted defendant's motion to represent himself and relieved the public defender. After the preliminary hearing, at which defendant represented himself, defendant was held to answer in the superior court. At the arraignment on the information on May 21, 1992, the trial court inquired concerning defendant's desire for appointed counsel. Defendant again stated that he did not want counsel appointed to represent him. In response to the trial court's inquiry concerning whether defendant's decision to represent himself merely reflected his desire to choose his own attorney, defendant made clear that he wanted to represent himself: [Defendant]: Your honor, I'm very serious about representing myself. I have no doubts about that whatsoever, but I am serious about myself. I know it's my life. I only have one. [¶] ... [¶] The Court: But what I meant to say was ... you would like to have a lawyer but you don't want the ones you think are available; is that right? [Defendant]: No, your honor. That's not right. [¶] I said if I had a second choice besides myself, it would be a lawyer that I would pick. [¶] Other than that, I do want to represent myself, period. [¶] And I'm standing on that. I haven't changed one bit, your honor. [9] At this hearing the trial court again discussed at length with defendant the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, and the prosecutor again mentioned the areas of inquiry set forth in Lopez, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d 568. When ultimately asked whether he understood the pitfalls and dangers of self-representation, defendant responded affirmatively. The trial court found that defendant had waived his right to the assistance of counsel and allowed him to continue to represent himself.
On appeal, defendant acknowledges that the record here establishes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel at any other sort of trial. He contends, however, that the advisements in this case were insufficient because in neither colloquy, at the preliminary hearing or at the superior court arraignment, did the trial court explain to defendant the particular factors that are unique to a death penalty case. Defendant argues the trial court should have advised him (1) that defenses offered in the guilt phase must be carefully considered because they may conflict with potential penalty phase defenses; (2) that there are different burdens of proof in the guilt and penalty phases; (3) that evidence that would not be admissible at the guilt phase might be admissible at a penalty phase; and (4) that if defendant were convicted at the guilt phase, there would be a separate penalty phase of the trial. Defendant contends the failure to do so renders his conviction and sentence unconstitutional. Defendant is mistaken. (1) The United States Supreme Court recognized a criminal defendant's right to self-representation in Faretta, but the court stressed that any waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary: A defendant seeking self-representation `should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open.' ( People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1224-1225 [259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698], quoting Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) As we stated in Bloom, supra, 48 Cal.3d at page 1225, however, [t]he test of a valid waiver of counsel is not whether specific warnings or advisements were given but whether the record as a whole demonstrates that the defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case. The asserted shortcomings in the colloquies in the present case do not undermine the trial court's finding that defendant understood the disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case. First, defendant is incorrect in claiming that the record does not establish that he was aware of the fact that if convicted in the guilt phase, he would then face a penalty phase of the trial. To the contrary, when taking defendant's pleas to the charges in the informationbefore the trial court made its ultimate finding that defendant had waived his right to counselthe trial court told defendant, It is also alleged by the District Attorney that a special circumstance [applies] which if found true would trigger a penalty phase in the trial in that the homicide in this case was committed during the perpetration of a robbery.... When asked whether he understood that allegation, defendant stated he did. The trial court then again asked defendant whether he understood if at the jury trial, the jury finds that beyond a reasonable doubt that the homicide occurred during the commission of the robbery, that that would trigger the penalty phase in which the possible punishment is life without the possibility of parole or the gas chamber. Defendant again answeredwithout any hesitation or uncertainty noted in the recordthat he understood. Accordingly, even assuming that such an advisement was required (but see People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 710 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145] ( Blair )), the record shows that defendant was in fact aware of the possibility of a penalty phase of the trial at the time he waived his right to counsel. As to the other advisements defendant claims should have been given, we find that they were not necessary here. The fact that guilt and penalty phase defenses might in some cases be in conflict, that the burden of proof differs between the two phases of a capital trial, and that some evidence might be admissible at the penalty phase that would not be admissible at the guilt phase are each aspects of the substantive law of a capital case, not dangers and disadvantages arising from a decision to represent oneself in a capital trial. Those and a multitude of other legal aspects of trying a capital case are at issue regardless of whether the defendant opts for self-representation or is represented by counsel. The trial court is not required to ensure that the defendant is aware of legal concepts such as the various burdens of proof, the rules of evidence, or the fact that the pursuit of one avenue of defense might foreclose another before the trial court can determine that a defendant has been made aware of the pitfalls of self-representation, such that he or she can make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to waive the right to counsel. [10] The lengthy advisements given twice in this case warned defendant that defending against capital charges is a complex process involving extremely high stakes and technical rules defendant would be expected to follow despite his likely unfamiliarity with them, and that defendant's ability to defend himself might be hampered by his incarceration and lack of training. Moreover, the record shows defendant understood the possibility of a penalty phase of the trial that might result in a sentence of death. Accordingly, we conclude defendant adequately was made aware of the `disadvantages of self-representation, including the risks and complexities of the particular case,' and that he made his choice to waive counsel with `eyes open.' (See Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 708; see also People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 140-142 [115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461].) His right to the assistance of counsel, therefore, was not violated.