Opinion ID: 2520047
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Instruct on First Degree Premeditated Murder and Second Degree Murder

Text: The trial court instructed the jury on first degree felony murder [15] and on the definition of murder. [16] Defendant contends the trial court's failure also to instruct, sua sponte, on first degree premeditated murder and second degree murder as lesser included offenses of felony murder deprived him of his Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. [17] DEFENDANT ARGUES THat failure to give these instructions violated his constitutional rights because the jury was left with an `unwarranted all-or-nothing choice' ( People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 352, 216 Cal.Rptr. 455, 702 P.2d 613), making it likely that it resolved any doubts in favor of conviction ( Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 634, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 ( Beck )). `[A] defendant has a constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. [Citations.]' ( Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1007, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519, quoting People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 645, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392.) Accordingly, `[i]t is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case. [Citation.] That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present [citation], but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. [Citations.]' ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Although defense counsel advised the court that after consulting with defendant he did not want the jury instructed on lesser included offenses, the obligation to instruct on [such] offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 154, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) The Attorney General contends that under the invited error doctrine, defendant may not now complain on appeal that such instructions were not given because defense counsel informed the trial court that, after consulting with defendant, they did not want to request any lessers. Invited error, however, will only be found if counsel expresses a deliberate tactical purpose in resisting or acceding to the complained-of instruction. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 830, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865; People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 332, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) The record in this case is ambiguous as to whether defense counsel was referring solely to voluntary and involuntary manslaughter instructions, which had been raised as possible jury instructions in previous discussions between the court, defense counsel, and the prosecutor, or whether defense counsel considered and rejected instructions on all potential lesser included offenses. Therefore, we do not find invited error with respect to the lack of an instruction on second degree murder. We conclude, nonetheless, that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on second degree murder because `[s]peculation is an insufficient basis upon which to require the giving of an instruction on a lesser included offense.' ( People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 620, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152; People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 941, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212 ( Wilson ).) [T]he existence of ` any evidence, no matter how weak' will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense.... ( People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Rather, substantial evidence must exist to allow a reasonable jury to find that the defendant is guilty of a lesser but not the greater offense. ( Ibid. ) `Substantial evidence is evidence sufficient to `deserve consideration by the jury,' that is, evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive.' ( Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1008, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) [18] There was no substantial evidence introduced at defendant's trial that the killing was other than robbery murder. [19] And on appeal defendant does not advance a theory that would support a second degree murder instruction, but merely points to evidence that there may have been a struggle in the house and that the victim was shot at close range. [20] This is insufficient to support the murder instruction defendant claims should have been given to the jury sua sponte. (See, e.g., People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 424, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000 [`Defendant advances no theory consistent with the evidence that would have allowed the jury to convict him of second degree murder']; People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 211, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949, overruled on another point in People v. Stansbury (1995) 9 Cal.4th 824, 830, fn. 1, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 394, 889 P.2d 588.) At most, defendant raises the issue of sufficiency of the evidence relating to the robbery, and from that would have us hold that he acted with malice in killing defendant and he could, therefore, have been found guilty of second degree murder, and even first degree premeditated murder. But [a]ll the evidence points to robbery as the motive for the killing [ ] ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 970, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131), and contrary to defendant's assertion, the evidence relating to the robbery was not weak or virtually nonexistent (see ante, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 300-302, 82 P.3d at pp. 321-322). [21] Indeed, in his argument on appeal, defendant accepts the prosecution evidence and theory that he did not have a gun while at the victim's house and that he did not go to the victim's house with the intention of killing him. Based on this, a jury finding of second degree murder, and especially first degree premeditated murder, would have been based on pure speculation. The defendant concedes as much when he argues to this court that he may have killed [the victim] in self defense, in anger, or for any reason ranging from first degree murder to justifiable homicide. He speculates further that a gunfight may have ensued between himself and the victim or that the victim may have shot at defendant, causing the defendant to retaliate. He states: There is no way of telling when or in what order any of this transpired. We rejected a similar argument in Wilson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 926, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212. The victim in Wilson was discovered in his automobile with his left pants pocket turned inside out, and a $20 bill in his rear pocket. ( Id. at p. 931, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) Similar to defendant's contention in this case, the defendant in Wilson argued that a second degree murder instruction was warranted because the circumstantial evidence did not conclusively prove that the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. As in this case, the defendant in Wilson also maintained that the evidence was not inconsistent with the theory that [he] shot and killed the victim ... and then fled, and that another person then came upon the victim's body and removed the wallet, or that the victim was not carrying a wallet or cash at the time he was shot. ( Id. at p. 940, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 838 P.2d 1212.) We held the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on second degree murder because the defendant's argument rested on mere speculation. [22] Because there was no substantial evidence supporting an instruction on second degree murder, the high court's decision in Beck is not implicated. As defendant acknowledges, even under Beck, instructions on lesser included offenses are not constitutionally required in the absence of evidence warranting those instructions. In Beck, the state conceded that, but for the prohibition on giving instructions on lesser included offenses in capital cases, the defendant's testimony would have entitled him to an instruction on a lesser included offense. ( Beck, supra, 447 U.S. at p. 630, 100 S.Ct. 2382.) [23] Moreover, as the Supreme Court clarified, the constitutional infirmity of the law invalidated in Beck was partly the result of the artificial barrier erected in capital cases prohibiting instructions on any lesser included offenses, even though such instructions were available in noncapital cases. (See Hopkins v. Reeves, supra, 524 U.S. at pp. 97-98, 118 S.Ct. 1895.) But as we have previously explained, California does not preclude a trial court from giving instructions on lesser included offenses in capital cases. (See People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 736, fn. 15, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) We also explained in People v. Waidla that the Beck rule [was] not implicated in its purpose in that case because the jury was not forced into an all-or-nothing choice between a conviction of murder that would legally compel it to fix the penalty at death, on the one side, and innocence, on the other: Even if it found [the defendant] guilty of [felony murder under the special circumstance allegations], it was not legally compelled to fix the penalty at death, but could fix it instead at a term of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. ( Ibid., italics added.) The same is true in this case.