Opinion ID: 1779062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Morrison Amici

Text: ś 73. We have been presented an excellent amicus curiae brief by The Survivors Network of Those Abused by Priests, and SNAP Mississippi (Morrison Amici). The argument presented is that the United States Supreme Court decisions in Employment Division, Milivojevich, and Kedroff, as well as other lower-court cases, stand only for the proposition that churches have the right to define and govern their theology, their membership, and their own tribunal's ecclesiastical determinations. This case, they say, does not place that right in danger. Additionally, they advance the argument that, [w]hile the Free Exercise Clause protects a Church from persecution for its beliefs, (citing Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye ), it is no defense to a lawsuit brought pursuant to neutral laws of general applicability like those at issue in this case. (citations omitted). (emphasis in original). We agree. ś 74. We are satisfied that the cloak of religion, which does not shield religious institutions from civil responsibility for fraud or breach of contract, surely cannot serve to shield such institutions from civil responsibility for more abhorrent conduct such as sexual molestation of a child. Nor should it shield those who fail in their duty to protect children from it.
ś 75. We turn now to the causes of action alleged by the Morrisons. In its penultimate sentence, the dissent attempts to characterize all of the Morrisons' claims as clergy malpractice. We cannot agree. We find this case to be no more about clergy malpractice that a suit by a client against a lawyer for assault would be about legal malpractice. The term malpractice involves [a]n instance of negligence or incompetence on the part of a professional. Black's Law Dictionary 777 (7th ed.2000). The term legal malpractice involves the failure to render professional services with the skill, prudence, and diligence that an ordinary and reasonable lawyer would use under similar circumstances. Id. This case involves no claim that Broussard was negligent or incompetent in the rendering of religious services or priestly advice. In fact, many of the instances of molestation are alleged to have taken place at the Morrisons' home and lake house, unrelated to any church activity. ś 76. The facts we assume to be true (for our purposes today) are those facts alleged in the Morrisons' well pled complaint, together with the facts alleged in the affidavits of Bishop Houck and Bishop Latino. These affidavits essentially tell us: (1) Subject to the books of the Old and New Testament, from which is derived the whole juridical-legislative tradition of the Church . . ., the Code of Canon Law is the universal law of the Roman Catholic Church. (2) There can never be a circumstance in which a priest's sexual contact with another would constitute activity withing the course or scope of his ministry, his work, or his service to the Church. (3) A Bishop's ministry of governance is led by the Holy Spirit. ś 77. As concerns the question presented, the crux of the affidavits, taken together, is well stated in the affidavit of Bishop Houck: A bishop's decisions regarding ordination, appointments, assignments, re-assignments, discipline, and laicization of priests are likewise made prayerfully and in this full context of striving to imitate the Good Shepherd, as that vocation is understood within the Roman Catholic Church. Accordingly, a bishop's interactions with the priests under his care are only properly understood as part of the bishop's ministry as Christ to the Church. A bishop's conversations with his priests, regardless of whether they take place in the contest of the bishop as spiritual advisor, pastorial counselor, ecclesiastical authority, or brotherly priest, reside within this theological framework. ś 78. Bishop Houck further states that the Diocese of Jackson is under the legislative, executive and judicial control of the Bishop of the Diocese. He further tells us that a bishop is pastor, spiritual adviser, pastoral counselor, spiritual mentor, ecclesiastical authority, father and brother of a priest. He then reminds us that the employment practices of the Catholic Church are not subject to employment laws in the manner that secular employers are subject to employment laws. . . . It may exclude candidates for ordination and assignment based upon gender, age, and disability in a manner that would not be allowed to secular employers. ś 79. Bishop Houck adds, When a bishop assesses whether to discipline or remove a priest from the office assigned to him, he must determine and obey the wisdom and demands of the Scriptures, the teachings of the Church, and the requirements of the Code [of Canon Law]. ś 80. Finally, in explaining the difficulty involved in disciplining a priest who has committed a prior failing, Bishop Houck states: One of the difficulties in ascertaining whether a man has been called as a priest is that, for the Church, a prior failing, while a cause for inquiry and concern, is not necessarily a disqualification for ministry. The Church believes that genuine conversion can occur. Thus, depending upon the circumstances, a prior failing may have taught a spiritual lesson which the individual can share with others in his ministry, as for example in the lives of Moses and King David. See, e.g., Exodus 2:11-15 (Moses' murder of the Egyptian, hiding the body, and fleeing as a fugitive), II Samuel 11:2-12:15 (David's adultery with Bathsheba and coverup by killing her husband), Psalm 51 (David's Miserere psalm of contrition, forgiveness, and grace). ś 81. Because the affidavits are not rebutted in the record, we accept all statements therein as true. We now apply these statements, together with the Morrisons' factual allegations, to the causes of action alleged in the complaint.
ś 82. In discussing the principle of fiduciary duty, this Court has held: It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there is confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. The relation and the duties involved in it need not be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal. (If a relation of trust and confidence exists between the parties â that is to say, where confidence is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by the other, or where confidence has been acquired and abused â that is sufficient as a predicate for relief. The origin of the confidence is immaterial.). Glenn v. Macon, 249 Miss. 493, 514, 163 So.2d 239, 249 (1964). Thus, a fiduciary duty exists where one person or institution assumes a trust relationship with another, such that the former, as a matter of choice or legal obligation, assumes the responsibility to act in the best interest of the latter, even to the detriment and peril of the best interests of the former. As stated in another of this Court's decisions, a fiduciary duty may exist when there is a relationship wherein one person is in a position to exercise a dominant influence upon another, arising either from weakness of mind or body, or through trust. Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1191 (Miss. 1987). A confidential relationship such as would impose the duties of a fiduciary does not have to be a legal one, but may be moral, domestic or personal. Id. ś 83. This Court recently examined the suit of a parishioner against her priest and her diocese in Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747 (Miss.2004), wherein the priest was involved in a secretly taped conversation between the parishioner and her husband. We held that a priest may not be held to be in a fiduciary relationship merely based upon his status as a priest.  Id. at 760 (emphasis added). However, we also held, without dissent, that the claim for breach of fiduciary duty [was] not prohibited by the First Amendment. Id. See Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 196 F.3d 409 (2d Cir.1999) (First Amendment no bar to claim of breach of fiduciary duty for sexual abuse by priest); Moses v. Diocese of Colorado, 863 P.2d 310, 314 (Colo.1993) (same); F.G. v. MacDonell, 150 N.J. 550, 696 A.2d 697, 702-03 (1997) (same). ś 84. The Diocese argues that the breach of fiduciary duty claim is no more than an action for clergy malpractice. However, Mabus established that an action for breach of fiduciary duty is distinguishable from an action for clergy malpractice. Whether a fiduciary relationship exists depends on factual circumstances, not upon professional standards of conduct for a reasonable member of the clergy. Mabus, 884 So.2d at 757 (citing Doe v. Hartz, 52 F.Supp.2d 1027, 1062 (N.D.Iowa 1999)). ś 85. Here, the affidavits submitted by the Diocese address almost exclusively the relationship between the Diocese and the priest. We are told little about the relationship between the Diocese and the parishioner. The affidavits do make clear, however, that the Diocese had the power and authority to remove Broussard from his position at the Church. Whether the Diocese had sufficient knowledge and information to obligate it to refuse to hire and/or retain Broussard is a question of fact to be decided at trial. Even if such knowledge and information was possessed by the Diocese, the Morrisons still must bear the burden of proving sufficient facts to establish that the Diocese had a fiduciary duty to act. ś 86. We are not prepared to say that our courts are without jurisdiction over the Morrisons' claim against the Diocese for breach of fiduciary duty. Following the teaching of Mabus, we hold as a matter of law that a fiduciary duty did not exist merely because Broussard was the Morrisons' priest. However, it may have existed for other reasons. That question is not before us today, and we therefore affirm the decision of the trial court in refusing to dismiss the Morrisons' breach of fiduciary claim on jurisdictional grounds.
ś 87. The Morrisons allege that the Diocese acted to fraudulently conceal their knowledge of illegal sexual abuse of children. In Mabus, this Court held that the plaintiff could proceed with her fraudulent concealment claim against her priest, but held that she could not proceed with her vicarious liability claim against the Diocese because neither the Church nor the Diocese authorized or ratified the Priest's actions of fraudulent concealment. Id. at 763. We are not prepared today to say the same is true here. ś 88. The Affidavits do not address the specific facts surrounding the alleged sexual abuse of the Morrison children. We do not know whether the Diocese authorized or ratified Broussard's actions, nor do we know whether it took action to cover it up. Those questions are simply not before us today. We have been asked only to review the jurisdictional issue. ś 89. In Mabus, we did not hold that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, and we do not so hold today. As the Supreme Court stated in Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, freedom to believe is absolute, but freedom to act cannot be. A church may not hide behind the first amendment when perpetrating fraud upon the public or its members. As stated in General Council, 439 U.S. at 1373, 99 S.Ct. 35, (in resolving intrachurch disputes the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies . . . [however] [s]uch considerations are not applicable to purely secular disputes between third parties and a particular defendant, albeit a religious affiliated organization, in which fraud, breach of contract, and statutory violations are alleged.) (emphasis added). [T]he right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes conduct that his religion prescribes. Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Furthermore, Laws . . . are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices. Id. ś 90. We hold that the doors of the circuit court are not jurisdictionally locked to the Morrisons' claims of fraud, fraudulent concealment and conspiracy.
ś 91. In Mabus, we upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment on several negligence causes of action. Mabus was a review of a trial court's grant of summary judgment, rather than (as here) a challenge to subject matter jurisdiction. However, had Mabus been framed in terms of a jurisdictional challenge, it would have been a factual rather than facial challenge. ś 92. We held in Mabus that allowing the case to go forward would excessively entangle this Court into the investigation and evaluation of religious tenets. Id. at 764. That determination was made based upon the record of facts before us, rather than a blanket determination that our circuit court lacked jurisdiction. Our holding on the negligence claims in Mabus was limited to its facts. This Court has never held that, as a jurisdictional matter, religious institutions may not ever be held liable in our civil courts for their active negligence. Our decision in Mabus was motivated by the record presented to us, not by an absence of subject matter jurisdiction. ś 93. By contrast, we are here concerned with the duty imposed by the common law to protect against the foreseeable harm to children caused by sexual molestation. Regardless of what policies or practices may have been adopted by the Diocese, it may be held liable for negligence if the Morrisons can establish: (1) the Diocese â because of specific knowledge or information available to it â knew (or should have known) that the Morrison children were in danger of sexual molestation by Broussard; (2) the Diocese had the power and authority to prevent the sexual molestation of the children, but did not do so; (3) a reasonable, prudent person would have prevented the sexual molestation; and (4) as a proximate result, the Morrisons suffered damage. ś 94. This Court held in Summers ex rel. Dawson v. St. Andrew's Episcopal School, Inc., 759 So.2d 1203, 1213 (Miss. 2000), that, [t]he school is not an insurer of the safety of pupils, but has the duty of exercising ordinary care, of reasonable prudence, or of acting as a reasonable person would act under similar circumstances. This court also stated that, schools have the responsibility to use ordinary care and to take reasonable steps to minimize foreseeable risks to students, thereby providing a safe school environment. Id. ś 95. In Mabus, we observed, with the exception of the claim for negligent supervision and retention, [the plaintiff] seeks to impose vicarious liability on the Church and Diocese for the actions of [the priest]. Id. at 756. We continue to state that our holding in Mabus is sound. Churches and religious institutions are not traditional employers such that vicarious liability, through the doctrine of respondeat superior, exists as a matter of law, in all cases. The relationship between a religious organization and its leader â such as pastor, preacher, rabbi or priest â is not the same for every religion. While on the one hand, the authorities in the centralized associations (e.g. the Southern Baptist Convention) may have no power or authority over its autonomous local congregations, [19] the Pope, Cardinals and diocese may have considerable power and influence over a local Catholic congregation. Such relationships come in many varieties, church to church, and are by definition of a religious nature, determined primarily by the religious beliefs and ecclesiastical doctrine of the particular religious group. ś 96. Nevertheless, as discussed supra, under certain factual circumstance, churches and religious institutions may be held vicariously liable for the actions of pastors and other employees. These determinations require a factual analysis and are not decided on jurisdictional grounds. ś 97. We will not today pass on the legitimacy of the Morrisons' vicarious or direct negligence claims. But we do hold that they are not jurisdictionally barred. To hold otherwise, that is, to hold that the Diocese is immune and completely insulated from claims that it committed negligent acts which caused damage to third parties, would be contrary to the holdings in Lemon v. Kurtzman ; Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah ; Bowen v. Roy , Cantwell v. Connecticut ; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America; Employment Division Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith ; and Watson v. Jones . ś 98. We accept that our civil courts should not take jurisdiction over matters which foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 613, 91 S.Ct. 2135 (citation omitted). For instance, our civil courts may not resolve disputes of scriptural interpretation or denial of membership in a particular congregation. [20] But we reject the notion that the First Amendment provides, or was intended to provide, blanket civil immunity to churches for violation of recognized standards of conduct which results in reasonably foreseeable harm. ś 99. We further state that our holding today is not to be blindly applied, allowing in all cases the exercise of jurisdiction over a particular cause of action. Rather, each cause of action asserted against a religious organization claiming First Amendment protection, must be evaluated according to its particular facts. For instance, with respect to a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, a religious organization might enjoy First Amendment protection from claims of failure to provide a certain quantity or quality of religious instruction in exchange for tithes and offerings, but might not enjoy such protection from claims that it solicited and accepted funds to be held in trust for a specific, stated purpose, but spent the funds for an unauthorized purpose. ś 100. We hold that the Morrisons are not jurisdictionally barred from presenting their negligence claims in circuit court.
ś 101. Having found that our courts are not jurisdictionally barred from hearing the Morrisons' negligence claims, we hold the same reasoning applies, even more so, to claims of intentional torts. Therefore, the Morrisons are not barred from presenting their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in circuit court. See Gibson v. Brewer, 952 S.W.2d 239, 249 (Mo.1997) (liability for intentional torts can be imposed without excessively delving into religious doctrine, polity, and practice). Furthermore, [r]eligious conduct intended or certain to cause harm need not be tolerated under the First Amendment. Id. at 248 (citing Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 308, 60 S.Ct. 900.)
ś 102. Dorothy Morrison, the mother of the three Morrison children who allege they were sexually molested by Broussard, makes a claim for loss of consortium. Her claim is challenged only on jurisdictional grounds, and we hold her claim is not jurisdictionally barred. Any claim challenging the cause of action on other grounds will be reviewed by this Court only after the challenge has been presented to the trial court for determination.
ś 103. We turn now to the second issue raised by the Diocese concerning discovery disputes. The Morrisons served discovery upon the Diocese, including the following: Interrogatories Identify every attorney consulted since 1965 relating to any allegations of inappropriate conduct by a priest toward a minor; itemize any and all reports or complaints made to the Diocese, at any time, which alleged any inappropriate conduct by Broussard towards any minor child; identify when you first received any information concerning any allegations involving Broussard and alleged inappropriate behavior towards minor children; identify any and all persons with whom the Diocese or its representatives have negotiated any kind of settlement arrangement or agreement or other arrangement or agreement as a result of allegations of abuse by Broussard; identify every document of which you know, or about which you have information, which relates in any way to any allegation of abuse by Broussard of any minor; identify any and all priests about whom allegations of sexual abuse have been made known to any church officials in the Jackson Diocese. Requests for Production of Documents Any and all documents or things received by you from any individual or on behalf of any individual who has ever made any allegations of inappropriate behavior by any priest relating to any minor (including plaintiffs); all confidential files relating to allegations of child abuse by any priest ever employed in Mississippi; produce all documentation in your possession or control relating to allegations of inappropriate conduct towards children by Broussard. ś 104. In response to these requests, the Diocese raised numerous objections and privileges. The initial response to each of the nine requests for which the trial court ordered supplemental answers, includes some portion or variation of the following language: Objection on grounds that the request is overly broad, unduly burdensome, and beyond the scope of MRCP 26(b). The request seeks information of a highly sensitive private and personal nature which Defendant objects to disclosing without the consent of the person(s) involved and/or entry of an appropriate protective order. The request may encompass materials protected against disclosure by Defendant for work product, attorney-client privilege, priest-penitent privilege, and/or sacramental seal of confession of Catholic Church. Further, results of the Diocese's Fitness Review Administrator and/or Investigating Committee are confidential. ś 105. The Diocese also claims that various privileges apply to the requested responses and documents, including Physician/Psychotherapist-Patient, Self-Critical Analysis, Priest-Penitent, Attorney-Client, Work Product, and First Amendment. Also, the Diocese claims it is privileged from violation of privacy rights arising from Canon law. ś 106. We will analyze each of the asserted privileges. Each of the requested documents and interrogatory answers falls into one of three categories: (1) it is discoverable, without restriction; (2) it is discoverable, but requires protection from unnecessary disclosure; or (3) it is protected by a privilege and, thus, not discoverable.