Opinion ID: 2323462
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Prohibition on Prior Bad Acts Evidence to Prove Propensity

Text: The principles of law that govern this appeal are well settled. It is fundamental that evidence of prior bad acts independent of the crimes charged is inadmissible to show the defendant's disposition or propensity to commit the charged offenses, from which the jury improperly could infer the defendant actually did commit them. [10] Leading jurors to draw such an improper propensity inference is presumptively prejudicial. [11] Evidence of prior bad acts may be admissible, though, if offered for a substantial, legitimate purpose, rather than to show the defendant's propensity. [12] One such legitimate purposethe one on which the government relies in this appealis to establish that the defendant had a motive to commit the charged offense. [13] In principle, [w]hen the accused denies committing the crime,. . . the prosecutor is permitted, as part of his effort to prove that the . . . accused did commit the act, to prove that the accused had a motive for perpetrating the crime against the victim. [14] The prosecutor has the burden of demonstrating that the evidence is being introduced for a substantial and legitimate purpose. [15] Assuming the proffer passes muster, and there is clear and convincing evidence that the prior bad acts occurred, the trial court must additionally consider the relative probative value of the evidence and the danger of unfair prejudice that it poses. [16] The trial court should exclude the evidence if the danger of unfair prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value. [17] The government suggests, in passing, that Harrison's comments to T.D., J.M., and A.G. were not technically `other-crimes' evidence because they did not rise to the level of crimes. [18] Perhaps so, but the government is wise not to press the point. The basic rule, which we have recognized as consistent with District of Columbia law, [19] is embodied in the first sentence of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith (emphasis added). Harrison's sexually suggestive remarks to students other than the complainant were far from innocuous; as the trial court observed, they portrayed him as an unsavory character who took advantage of a position of trust to hit on teenage girls. [20] The bar against propensity evidence therefore must apply here, for the law generally disfavors the admission of evidence of a person's character in order to prove conduct in conformity with that character. [21] Thus, the government correctly agrees that it must demonstrate that Harrison's remarks to the other girls were admitted for a substantial, legitimate purpose other than showing his disposition or propensity to commit the charged offenses.