Opinion ID: 1163321
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: trial court involvement in plea negotiations

Text: Plea agreements in Washington are governed under RCW 9.94A.080-.100. These statutes provide the prosecutor with authority to amend charges against a defendant, and also permit the prosecutor to recommend a particular sentence as part of a plea arrangement. RCW 9.94A.080 specifically provides that [t]he court shall not participate in any discussions regarding plea negotiations. However, the court may reject a plea bargain in the interests of justice. RCW 9.94A.090(1). The court is not bound by any recommendations contained in the plea agreement, and the defendant must be informed of this prior to pleading guilty. RCW 9.94A.090(2). At all times, the defendant must understand the consequences of pleading guilty. Under Washington's Superior Court Criminal Rules (CrR), the trial court shall not accept a plea of guilty, without first determining that it is made voluntarily, competently and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. CrR 4.2(d). See also State v. Miller, 110 Wash.2d 528, 531, 756 P.2d 122 (1988) (A defendant must understand the sentencing consequences for a guilty plea to be valid.). CrR 4.2(f) provides that a trial court must permit the withdrawal of a guilty plea to correct a manifest injustice. Four nonexclusive criteria exist for determining manifest injustice: (1) denial of effective counsel, (2) plea ... not ratified by the defendant or one authorized [by him] to do so, (3) plea was involuntary, (4) plea agreement was not kept by the prosecution. State v. Saas, 118 Wash.2d 37, 42, 820 P.2d 505 (1991) (quoting State v. Taylor, 83 Wash.2d 594, 597, 521 P.2d 699 (1974)). In the present case, we are concerned primarily with whether the trial court's participation in the plea negotiations affected the voluntariness of Wakefield's plea. The Court of Appeals in State v. Pouncey, 29 Wash.App. 629, 630 P.2d 932, review denied, 96 Wash.2d 1009 (1981) adopted the American Bar Association's standards for judicial participation in plea negotiations. These standards provide that where the prosecutor and defense are unable to reach a plea agreement, they may ask the trial judge to moderate their discussions. 3 American Bar Ass'n, Standards for Criminal Justice, Std. 14-3.3(c) (2d ed. 1980). Moreover, the trial judge may inquire as to the possibility of a plea arrangement if he or she has not been advised of one. Id. at Std. 14-3.3(e). However, these standards emphasize that the judge should never through word or demeanor, either directly or indirectly, communicate to the defendant or defense counsel that a plea agreement should be accepted or that a guilty plea should be entered. Pouncey, 29 Wash.App. at 635, 630 P.2d 932 (quoting 3 American Bar Ass'n, supra Std. 14-3.3(f)). Pouncey, in analyzing the American Bar Association standards, concluded that the appropriate appellate function is to scrutinize the available record carefully to determine whether or not the judge's presence and/or involvement [in the plea negotiations] affected the voluntariness of the defendant's plea. Pouncey, 29 Wash. App. at 637, 630 P.2d 932 (emphasis added). We agree with the reasoning in Pouncey and hold that where a trial court participates in plea negotiations, the critical inquiry is whether such participation resulted in an involuntary plea. Wakefield claims that the trial court improperly participated in the plea negotiations on three different occasions. First, the trial court expressed concern over Wakefield's failure to be receptive to a plea offer that would subject her to much less jeopardy. Report of Proceedings (Dec. 8, 1993) at 26. Second, the trial court urged Wakefield to take the advice of her attorneys. I can not force you to accept their advise [ sic ]. I can simply urge that you should. Report of Proceedings (Dec. 8, 1993) at 27. Finally, the trial court indicated that it would sentence Wakefield within the standard range if she pleaded guilty. Report of Proceedings (Dec. 14, 1993) at 3-5. Wakefield argues her plea was involuntary as a result of the trial court's impromptu comments. Wakefield relies on our decision in State v. Miller, 110 Wash.2d 528, 756 P.2d 122 (1988) to argue that she should be granted specific performance and sentenced within the standard range. In Miller, the prosecutor inadvertently told the defendant that he could receive a sentence of less than 20 years for a first degree murder conviction. Only after Miller pled guilty did he learn that a statute mandated at least a 20-year sentence. He tried to withdraw his guilty plea, but the trial court denied his motion. Since it was undisputed that Miller did not understand the consequences of pleading guilty, we held that Miller could withdraw his plea or have the plea agreement specifically enforced. Miller, 110 Wash.2d at 536-37, 756 P.2d 122. [T]he defendant's choice of remedy controls, unless there are compelling reasons not to allow that remedy. [2] Miller, 110 Wash.2d at 535, 756 P.2d 122. While Wakefield contends she is entitled to specific performance under Miller, that case simply is not analogous. Miller involved prosecutorial breach of a plea agreement. In the present case, the trial court stated that it would sentence Wakefield within the standard range if she accepted a plea agreement. As the Court of Appeals noted, There is no authority ... for the proposition that the court is bound by any misstatement it may make in explaining the plea and sentencing process. Such a requirement would be particularly unwise in a case such as this where the impropriety of the court's statements was not called to the court's attention. State v. Wakefield, No. 34154-5-I, slip op. at 8 (Wn.App. May 8, 1995). Justice Sanders, in his dissent, characterizes a plea agreement as creating a contract between the prosecutor, the defendant, and the trial court. Dissent, at 191. This is wrong. While the State is bound by the plea agreement, the trial court, quite simply, is not. RCW 9.94A.090(2) clearly states that a sentencing judge is not bound by any recommendations contained in an allowed plea agreement. The prosecutor and the defendant are the only parties to a plea agreement. In contrast, the role of the trial court is carefully circumscribed. Wakefield argues that the trial court's impromptu comments regarding a standard range sentence entitled her to specific performance. Nonetheless, a standard range sentence was not part of the plea agreement and thus cannot be specifically enforced. Even so, Wakefield is not without a remedy. A trial court must permit withdrawal of a plea agreement where the defendant entered the plea involuntarily. CrR 4.2(f). The State argues that the doctrine of invited error bars Wakefield's claims because each time the trial court became involved in the plea negotiations, it was in response to a request from defense counsel. The doctrine of invited error prohibits a party from setting up an error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal. State v. Pam, 101 Wash.2d 507, 511, 680 P.2d 762 (1984). See also State v. Boyer, 91 Wash.2d 342, 345, 588 P.2d 1151 (1979) (a defendant cannot propose a jury instruction and then challenge it on appeal). This doctrine is not applicable to the present case. Although defense counsel asked the trial judge to intervene in the plea negotiations, the judge went beyond defense counsel's requests. Defense counsel sought the judge's assurance that Wakefield would be sent to a correctional facility. The judge complied, but then went on to saywithout any prompting from defense counselthat she would sentence Wakefield within the standard range. There appear to be no reported cases from either this jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction in which a trial judge promised a particular sentence before the defendant accepted a plea bargain, and then reneged on that promise at the time of sentencing. We are mindful of the fact that a trial judge's promise of a standard range sentence could easily sway a defendant to plead guilty. In the present case, the trial judge's involvement in the plea negotiations casts significant doubt on the voluntariness of Wakefield's plea. Given these circumstances, we hold that Wakefield may withdraw her plea and remand to the trial court for a hearing to give Wakefield this opportunity. Since Wakefield could decline to withdraw her plea, we must determine whether her sentence violated the real facts doctrine or impermissibly took into account the possibility of good time credits. We turn now to those issues.