Opinion ID: 2353935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims of Perjured Testimony and Obstruction of the Right to Appeal

Text: Appellant claims that the chief detective of Montgomery County, Charles G. Moody, committed perjury with either actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the prosecution when Moody described the events surrounding appellant's interrogation and the contents of appellant's statements. This claim rests upon an alleged discrepancy between Moody's testimony at appellant's pretrial habeas corpus hearing and that given at trial. It is well settled that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S. Ct. 1173, 1177 (1959). (Emphasis supplied.) Assuming arguendo that all the elements of perjury are present, see Commonwealth v. Billingsley, 357 Pa. 378, 54 A. 2d 705, affirming on the opinion of Superior Court, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 140, 50 A. 2d 703 (1947), we fail to see in what manner Detective Moody's perjury could have contributed to appellant's conviction. The trial testimony was, by appellant's own admission, accurate and the pretrial testimony was not admitted at trial. Hence, any perjury committed by Chief Moody could not have contributed to appellant's conviction and thus cannot form the basis of a due process denial. The Napue court further noted that even if the false testimony did not affect directly the issue of guilt, but rather only the credibility of a witness, its use would still constitute a denial of due process. Appellant insists that this rule should apply in reverse, i.e., if a witness has in the past given false testimony, then any conviction obtained on the basis of accurate testimony by this witness is tainted. [11] We disagree. Appellant's contention overlooks the crucial distinction that Napue referred to false testimony given at trial which, when the true version was disclosed, could then be employed to destroy the witness' credibility. Chief Moody's trial testimony, according to appellant, accurately portrays the interrogation and statements; Moody's alleged perjury could thus in no manner have been a contributing factor to Snyder's conviction. A second example of alleged perjury involves testimony of Dr. M. Harold Book, a pathologist who performed the post-homicide autopsy. Dr. Book estimated that the deceased weighed 145 pounds and was five feet, nine inches tall; the deceased's half-brother asserted at trial that the proper statistics were 170 pounds and five feet, eleven inches. To term Dr. Book's testimony perjurious, as does appellant, is to equate any conflict in matters over which disagreement is possible with the proposition that one of the witnesses of necessity has committed perjury  an equation we find clearly illogical. The importance of any discrepancy between Dr. Book's testimony and that of decedent's half-brother was for the jury. See Commonwealth ex rel. LaRue v. Rundle, 417 Pa. 383, 207 A. 2d 829 (1965). [12] Appellant launches a massive attack on what he styles as a campaign by trial judge ROBERT W. HONEYMAN to deprive him of due process. [13] This attack centers upon allegedly false statements in both Judge HONEYMAN'S opinion denying motions for new trial and his summation of the evidence contained in the charge to the jury. The false statements in the new trial opinion, appellant asserts, misled this Court as to the facts of the case, resulted in an unjustifiable affirmance of appellant's conviction and thus obstructed his right to appeal. The trial court opinion does contain two misstatements, the first of which involves the admission into evidence of a photograph employed to demonstrate the location of the entry wound. Defense counsel objected to admission, insisting that the pathologist's testimony alone as to the entry wound furnished an adequate description. Mr. Waters, the prosecuting attorney, suggested that the photograph could be admitted without fear of inflaming the jury if that portion of the photograph showing the decedent's head were deleted  a suggestion accepted by the court. However, the opinion states that the suggestion to decapitate the photograph came from the court rather than the prosecution. The second misstatement concerns the display before the jury of a vial of decedent's blood. Several times during trial the prosecution offered the vial into evidence and each time was rebuffed by the court below on the theory that the prosecution had yet to demonstrate its relevancy. Finally, at defense counsel's insistence, the vial of blood was removed from jury view. The record is unclear as to the length of time of the display, though it is arguable that the trial court opinion gives the impression that the time span of display was quite brief. We fail to see how these statements obstructed appellant's right to appeal. On appeal, defense counsel forcefully pressed his belief that admission of the photograph, albeit decapitated was error. Judge HONEYMAN'S statement that he suggested that the photographic head be removed was not in the remotest stretch of the imagination crucial to the admissibility of the photograph. It played no role in our decision and thus could not have obstructed appellant's appeal. An identical issue is posed by the display of the vial of blood. The defense insisted, as disclosed by Mr. Justice EAGEN'S opinion, [14] that mere display of the vial inflamed the jurors. In this posture, any distortion by the trial judge of the period of display could not have affected our disposition of appellant's appeal. Appellant's reliance upon Commonwealth v. New, 354 Pa. 188, 47 A. 2d 450 (1946) is clearly misplaced. New, during his murder trial, insisted that he was never in the presence of the deceased and that he did not attempt to flee to another jurisdiction. The trial judge's opinion denying new trial motions, however, placed New at the scene of the crime and stressed his purported flight. Classifying this statement as a disclosure of fundamental error, this Court granted a new trial. [15] Judge HONEYMAN'S two statements, given their irrelevancy to the issues raised on appeal, are not a revelation of fundamental error. The second prong of appellant's attack focuses upon the trial judge's summation of the evidence. Trial testimony discloses that Chief Moody and Jay Cochran, Jr., an F.B.I. ballistics expert, disagreed as to the manner in which appellant's gun was loaded and that Mr. Cochran stated that he received the gun from another federal agent. The summation indicated to the jury that Chief Moody and Agent Cochran were in agreement as to the condition of the gun and that Agent Cochran received the weapon from an Officer Bach. [16] Where defense counsel does not object, [17] defendant cannot later complain of alleged misstatements in the trial judge's evidentiary summation without showing that these misstatements contributed prejudicially to the verdict. Compare Commonwealth v. Becker, 326 Pa. 105, 191 Atl. 351 (1937) with Commonwealth v. Young, 418 Pa. 359, 211 A. 2d 440 (1965) and Commonwealth v. Chambers, 367 Pa. 159, 79 A. 2d 201 (1951). In both Young and Chambers the trial judge's misstatements were held sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal and a new trial. A comparison of those two decisions with the instant case easily yields the conclusion that Snyder was not harmed by the trial judge's evidentiary summation. Young was convicted of first degree murder after a jury charge which included the following admonition: My comment, members of the jury, and I have good reason for making it, is that I think the defendant is guilty, and that it would be a miscarriage of justice to find him not guilty. (Emphasis supplied.) Whatever may be the impact of judicial commentary on the accused's guilt, [18] we held the jury could easily have believed on the basis of the italicized phrase that the judge was in possession of facts, not disclosed by the evidence, which were damaging to the accused. Chambers was also convicted of first degree murder. Chambers insisted at trial that he was merely the lookout for the two others  Phillips and Bryant  who had administered the fatal beating; Phillips, on the other hand, asserted that he took no part in the robbery-beating. The trial judge treated Phillips' version as true, thus usurping the function of the jury to resolve contested factual issues, and, as this Court found, contributed to the sentence of death rather than life imprisonment. Judge HONEYMAN'S mistake as to the individual who actually delivered the gun to Agent Cochran could have played no part in the jury's deliberations since, throughout the trial, it was never disputed that Snyder fired the weapon. Cochran testified as a ballistics expert and was employed by the Commonwealth primarily to describe the distance at which the gun was fired. Had there been in any way a factual dispute as to whether the gun examined by Cochran was actually Snyder's gun, then perhaps this statement could be said to have played a part in the jury's verdict. [19] Though there was some dispute as to the load of appellant's gun, we fail to see how the trial court's inadvertent minimization of this dispute operated to appellant's prejudice given the fact that he never disputed having fired his weapon. [20]