Opinion ID: 2095304
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: order granting new trial

Text: Thus, the question still remains whether a new trial is justified on the basis that the verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence. `A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon any of the evidence.' Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 454, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508, quoting Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill.App.3d 1082, 1089, 148 Ill.Dec. 372, 560 N.E.2d 969 (1990). In general, the determination of whether a new trial should be granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose ruling will not be reversed unless it reflects an abuse of that discretion. Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 455, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508. If the trial judge, in the exercise of his discretion, finds that the verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence, he should grant a new trial; on the other hand, where there is sufficient evidence to support the verdict of the jury, it constitutes an abuse of discretion for the trial court to grant a motion for a new trial. Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 456, 177 Ill. Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508. We must begin our consideration of this issue by observing that once a trial court determines that jury verdicts are legally inconsistent, whether to grant a new trial is not up to the trial court's discretion. It is mandatory. Tedeschi, 282 Ill.App.3d at 448, 217 Ill.Dec. 953, 668 N.E.2d 138. In the present case, we are not reviewing an exercise of discretion because it is clear from the trial court's comments that it believed it had no choice but to grant a new trial. Even if we were to treat the trial court's ruling on the motion as an exercise of discretion based on its assessment of the manifest weight of the evidence, we still must reverse. If the trial court had considered Redmond's motion as a motion for a new trial based purely on the state of the evidence, rather than on the state of the verdicts, it would have been required to give substantial deference to the jury. [I]t is the province of the jury to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, and to decide what weight should be given to the witnesses' testimony. Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 452, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508. The trial court, when ruling on a motion for a new trial, may not reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or because the court feels that other results are more reasonable. Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 452, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508. Thus, a trial court may not set aside a verdict merely to achieve more reasonable ( Maple, 151 Ill.2d at 452, 177 Ill.Dec. 438, 603 N.E.2d 508) results. We, therefore, hold that the trial court's order granting a new trial must be reversed because the verdicts are not legally inconsistent and because they were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.