Opinion ID: 2022208
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Claims of Sentencing Error

Text: A sentencing court shall make a record of the hearing, including ... if the court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances, a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the sentence that it imposes. I.C. § 35-38-1-3 (1993). The statement of reasons should contain three elements: 1) identification of all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances found, 2) specific facts and reasons which lead the court to find the existence of each such circumstance, and 3) articulation demonstrating that the mitigating and aggravating circumstances have been evaluated and balanced in determination of the sentence. Scheckel v. State, 620 N.E.2d 681, 685 (Ind. 1993). We have previously addressed the issue of the standard of appellate review of a sentencing statement which rests in part on impermissible grounds. A sentence supported by permissible grounds sufficient to persuade the reviewing court that the original sentencing decision would have been the same had the trial court not relied on the impermissible factor should be affirmed. When the appellate court cannot reach that conclusion with confidence, it should remand for a new sentencing or revise the sentence on appeal. Day v. State, 560 N.E.2d 641, 642 (Ind.1990). Judge Barney's sentencing statement, while detailed, is not completely clear. In discussing the aggravators, he states that the crime was a killing of a person who was asleep ... with no defense. (R. at 2137.) He also describes the crime as motivated by either insurance money or marital difficulty. These factors were properly considered under the statutory aggravator, the nature and circumstances of the crime. I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(2) (1993). While a material element of a crime may not also constitute an aggravating circumstance to support an enhanced sentence, the court may look to the particularized circumstances of the criminal act. Smith v. State, 675 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. 1996). Judge Barney also discussed the effect of the murder on the families of defendant and Cheryl. Defendant did not object to the admission of this evidence. The sentencing judge could consider this victim impact evidence. See Edgecomb v. State, 673 N.E.2d 1185, 1199 (Ind.1996); Loveless v. State, 642 N.E.2d 974, 978 (Ind.1994). It is unclear whether Judge Barney intended the other aggravators mentioned as statutory or non-statutory aggravators. He states, An aggravating circumstance, by statute is, victim's mental or physical infirmness, and I guess when you're asleep, which is not what the statute means, but at least at that point, a person is absolutely defenseless. Therefore, the shooting and killing of Cheryl Angleton was a cold-blooded and a calculated act. [10] (R. at 2138-39.) It is unclear whether Judge Barney used this as an aggravator under the statutory aggravator that the victim was mentally or physically infirm, I.C. § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(6), or whether he intended it as further description of the nature and circumstance of the crime. Judge Barney had already, at the start of his statement, noted the state of sleep when describing the nature and circumstances of the crime. And, as he states, a state of sleep would not properly fall under the statutory aggravator that the victim was mentally or physically infirm. See Jenkins v. State, 492 N.E.2d 666 (Ind.1986) (using statutory aggravator because victim crippled); Page v. State, 442 N.E.2d 977 (Ind.1982) (using aggravator where victim was epileptic 12-year-old child with cerebral palsy and mental age of 5); Dellenbach v. State, 508 N.E.2d 1309 (Ind.Ct. App.1987) (using statutory aggravator because victims were aged and infirm). It was, thus, erroneous for Judge Barney to imply state of sleep was used as an aggravator separate and distinct from the nature and circumstances of the crime. Judge Barney also states in his sentencing statement, I don't know why Cheryl Angleton didn't know that Brad Angleton was in financial difficulties at the time of their marriage; I don't know why a husband doesn't assist in funeral expenses for his wife. I don't know why a husband doesn't check from time-to-time to ascertain the progress of an investigation into the murder of his wife, or the burglary of his apartment, if any there was; ... I don't know why those things were not done, but certainly in the aggregate, it would be a person of greater naivete, ... would not in the aggregate consider those to be aggravating circumstances. I just don't understand why those things would not happen. Unfortunately, the conclusion is that Mr. Angleton knew what happened, and it was just a question of whether or not the Indianapolis Police Department could eventually put it together, as to what happened. Neither side touched upon the fact that the evidence was clear that Mrs. Angleton is, missing, so Mr. Angleton went and checked in a hotel. You know, all of those things went into the Jury's conclusions, I'm sure. But, if your wife is missing, you ought to be somewhere where you can be found, or do what you can, you know. (R. at 2141-43.) It is unclear whether Judge Barney used this evidence of defendant's lack of actions as an aggravator separate and distinct from the aggravator of the nature and circumstances of the crime. If so, he did not adequately state what type of separate non-statutory aggravator he considered the evidence to be. [11] Judge Barney could properly rely on defendant's lack of actions, which would be expected by someone whose wife has died (whether or not he is maintaining his innocence), as evidence of the nature and circumstances of the crime. These actions include not disclosing financial difficulties, not investigating the burglary, and not helping with funeral expenses. It is improper, however, to rely on a defendant's maintaining his innocence as an aggravator. See Linger v. State, 508 N.E.2d 56, 64 (Ind.Ct.App.1987) (The trial court, however, may not consider Linger's denial of guilt as an aggravating factor and the trial court erred in doing so here.). A defendant's Constitutional privilege against self-incrimination protects him from having to confess to the police. United States v. Lemon, 723 F.2d 922, 937 (D.C.Cir. 1983). (Thus, a defendant may not be given a higher sentence in retaliation for invoking the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.) To the degree Judge Barney relied on the conclusion that Mr. Angleton knew what happened, and it was just a question of whether or not the Indianapolis Police Department could eventually put it together, as to what happened, as an aggravating circumstance, he erred. Judge Barney also listed in his sentencing statement two mitigating factors. He found that defendant is unlikely to commit another crime and is using his education as a participant in a literacy program for other prisoners. He gave weight to the second mitigator, as many prisoners may benefit from learning to read from defendant. Judge Barney properly considered the evidence argued in support of mitigation and found the two listed mitigators. [12] We conclude that at least one proper aggravator was used by the court. The court also found two proper mitigators. Because we cannot say with confidence that the sentencing judge would weigh this aggravator against these two mitigators in the same manner as he weighed the three aggravators, two of which were improper, against the two mitigators, we remand for a new sentencing hearing. Day, 560 N.E.2d at 642. [13]