Opinion ID: 1805260
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Heading: Multiple Enhancement Penalties Under Iowa Code Section 902.7.

Text: The district court imposed two mandatory minimum sentences under Iowa Code section 902.7 which pertinently provides: if the trier of fact finds ... that the person... was armed with a firearm while participating in the forcible felony the convicted person shall serve a minimum of five years of the sentence imposed by law. Section 902.7 is an enhancement provision rather than a criminal offense. Jose contends the imposition of the two mandatory minimum sentences violated his right against double jeopardy even though the underlying felonies may not have been the same offense. In support of his contention, Jose argues that the legislature did not intend multiple penalties for (1) a single assault (2) committed against a single victim (3) while the defendant was armed with a firearm. The enhancement penalties here merely mean that as to each offense Jose must serve a minimum of five years of the sentence imposed. Logically, if multiple punishments for the two offenses of which Jose was convicted do not offend double jeopardy, we fail to see how enhancement as to both offenses does. Contrary to Jose's argument, we see nothing in section 902.7 which indicates a contrary intent. The obvious purpose of section 902.7 is to deter the use of firearms by imposition of mandatory minimum penalties. State v. Powers, 278 N.W.2d 26, 28 (Iowa 1979). Imposing the mandatory minimum penalties as the district court did in Jose's case promotes that purpose. For that reason and because there is nothing in section 902.7 to the contrary, we can safely say the legislature intended exactly what was done here: imposing multiple enhancement penalties. What Jose is really espousing is the continuous offense doctrine. Under a double jeopardy claim, the continuous offense doctrine prohibits multiple convictions of a defendant who commits only one, continuous offense. Frink v. Iowa, 968 F.2d 734, 737 (8th Cir.1992). The test for determining whether the continuous offense doctrine applies is whether the individual acts are prohibited, or the course of action which they constitute. If the former, then each act is punishable separately.... If the latter, there can be but one penalty. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 302, 52 S.Ct. at 181, 76 L.Ed. at 308. In Frink, the defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of second-degree kidnapping and two counts of second-degree sexual abuse involving two victims. Each offense carried a maximum sentence of twenty-five years. The Iowa district court sentenced Frink to four consecutive twenty-five year prison terms. The court also ordered Frink to serve a minimum of five years of each term because he had used a firearm in participating in the crimes against the two victims. Frink unsuccessfully challenged the convictions in habeas corpus proceedings in federal district court. On appeal he contended that his trial counsel was ineffective because counsel did not challenge the Iowa district court's application of section 902.7 to each of the four counts. The appellate court rejected Frink's contentionsimilar to the one made herethat because he had only one firearm throughout the commission of the crimes, the sentencing court should have applied section 902.7 only once. In rejecting this contention, the appellate court in Frink explained: This is not a case, however, to which [the continuous offense doctrine] applies; Frink pleaded guilty to four separate feloniestwo each of kidnapping and sexual assault. He was not convicted of four counts of firearm possession, but received the statutorily mandated minimum confinement for each of the four offenses of which he was convicted. The only question before the sentencing court was whether Frink should serve his sentences consecutively or concurrently, and as we have noted, under the plea agreement the government would recommend consecutive sentences. Id. at 737. Similarly, here, Jose was found guilty of two separate feloniesassault while participating in the felony of going armed with intent causing serious injury and willful injury. Jose was not convicted of two counts of firearm possession. Rather, he received the mandatory minimum penalty for each of the two offenses of which he was convicted.