Opinion ID: 735830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 6 The district court, finding genuine issues of material fact as to whether the plaintiff required a low-sodium diet and whether the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need, twice denied defendants' motions for summary judgment on the merits. The court also denied defendants' second motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds, reasoning that the factual dispute as to deliberate indifference precluded it from granting summary judgment on qualified immunity. We agree. 7 A public official cannot both be deliberately indifferent--i.e., consciously disregard a known, excessive risk to inmate safety, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)--and at the same time reasonably believe that his conduct conforms to clearly established law, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). See Jackson v. McIntosh, 90 F.3d 330, 332 (9th Cir.) (Given the district court's determination that there is a triable issue as to deliberate indifference, the doctors were not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that they could reasonably have believed their conduct did not violate clearly established law.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 584 (1996); Koch v. Rickets, 82 F.3d 317, 319 (9th Cir.1996); Hamilton v. Endell, 981 F.2d 1062, 1066 (9th Cir.1992); Albers v. Whitley, 743 F.2d 1372, 1376 (9th Cir.1984) (deliberate indifference and qualified immunity are mutually exclusive), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 312 (1986). 8 The district court correctly concluded that the existence of a triable issue of fact as to deliberate indifference precluded granting defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. 9 AFFIRMED.