Opinion ID: 1366472
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the trial and jury verdict

Text: Ross's complaint against Coast and Coleman alleged that the defendants carelessly and negligently designed, constructed, manufactured, tested, certified, sold and delivered a certain boat known as a `Hobie Cat 16' ..., which was involved in the accident. That defendants ... had knowledge of the negligent and defective design and manufacture of the Hobie Cat boat and mast by virtue of various notices received by these defendants concerning prior accidents... . Said defect consisted of improper design of the boat and mast such that upon contact with a known danger, to wit, electrical wires of any sort, the electricity would enter the boat and cause grave injury or death to those on board. That defendants having full knowledge of this condition of the boat, failed to correct the condition and failed to supply warnings of the dangers to users of the boat, wholly disregarding the likelihood of serious harm to others, all of which proximately resulted in the electrocution of Katherine Kristin Sateren, a passenger on the boat, and the serious and grave injuries to Michael Ross as herein described. The plaintiff's evidence of negligence against the defendant Coast was primarily that Coast negligently designed the Hobie Cat 16 sailboat with a mast and a substantial portion of the boat being made primarily of metal which conducted electricity and which could injure those on board. The major thrust of plaintiff's claim against the defendant Coleman was that Coleman, after acquiring the controlling stock interest in Coast in 1976, became aware of the defects in the boat, nevertheless marketed the boat and did not take the necessary steps to compel its subsidiary, Coast, to redesign the boat. The major thrust of the defendants Coast and Coleman's evidence was to show that the primary cause of the accident was the negligence of Idaho Power in not elevating its low-hanging power lines, and also the negligence of plaintiff Ross who, knowing that the mast would conduct electricity, nevertheless attempted to sail his boat under the low-hanging power lines at a time when his faculties were impaired from drinking alcohol. The jury, after hearing all of the conflicting evidence, resolved the conflicts in favor of the defendants, returning a verdict which found that the Hobie Cat 16 was not defectively designed; rejected plaintiff's claim to punitive damages; and held that Ross's negligence was greater than Coleman's, and equal to Coast's, thus precluding Ross from obtaining any judgment against either Coast or Coleman. As a preliminary matter, we must consider whether the jury's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. If they are, then both the trial court and this Court are bound by the jury's verdict. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 727 P.2d 1187 (1986); Dinneen v. Finch, 100 Idaho 620, 603 P.2d 575 (1979). When reviewing a jury verdict the evidence adduced at trial must be construed in a light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the jury's verdict. Nelson v. Northern Leasing Co., 104 Idaho 185, 188, 657 P.2d 482, 485 (1983) (Here the evidence viewed from the most favorable standpoint in support of the jury's verdict can be held to demonstrate substantial negligence on the part of the Nelsons.); Mann v. Gonzales, 100 Idaho 769, 605 P.2d 947 (1980). Viewing the evidence most favorably to support the jury's verdict, the record demonstrates that in June of 1984 Ross caused his Hobie Cat 16 sailboat, which was designed and manufactured by defendant Coast, to make contact with a power line owned and operated by Idaho Power Company, which was located approximately 26 feet above the water, 14 feet below Idaho Power's 40-foot standard for power lines crossing bodies of water in which sailing boats operate. Idaho Power knew of the substandard line, but took no action to remedy the defect. There was evidence that Michael Ross had previously sailed into the cove over which the power lines were located, that he had prior knowledge of their existence, and that he had been drinking. A fisherman who observed the boat sail into the cove testified that the boat had stopped for several minutes before he spotted smoke from the accident. Further evidence indicated that the boat had been partially de-rigged (sails had been taken down) and there was expert testimony that from the position of Sateren's body and the position of burn marks on the boat, that neither of the victims had been on the trampoline upon which the crew rides that is strung between the two hulls of the Hobie Cat 16. Furthermore, expert testimony was presented from which a jury could reasonably have inferred that one or both of the passengers debarked and were attempting to push the boat away from the power lines when the accident occurred. [3] Thus, the jury could reasonably have concluded that even after Ross became aware that his mast had become entangled in the power lines, he knowingly and negligently attempted to remove it without having the power in the line deactivated, thus causing his own injuries. The evidence further demonstrated that at the time of the accident Coast was a wholly owned subsidiary of Coleman. Coleman had bought the stock of Coast in 1976. The Hobie Cat 16 had been designed in 1968 and had been manufactured continually since that time by Coast, many years prior to Coleman's acquiring Coast's stock. After acquiring Coast's stock in 1976, both companies became aware of the danger of the Hobie Cat 16 sailboat contacting electrical power lines. Coast had actively attempted to solve the dangers presented by contact between the Hobie Cat 16's 26-foot aluminum mast and power lines. Warning notices had been sent to owners, and warning labels advising sailors of the extreme hazard presented by the overhead power lines were attached to the mast. Ross had installed a new 26-foot mast on his boat just hours before the accident. At that time, he had removed the warning labels from the mast. Research was being conducted by Coast into attaching a non-conducting comp tip to the upper portions of the mast. Although there was other conflicting evidence, the foregoing was substantial competent evidence to support the jury's verdict that (1) Idaho Power's 75% negligence was the primary cause of the accident, and (2) that Michael Ross's negligence was at least equal to or greater than that of either Coast or Coleman. The jury's findings in the special verdict are supported by substantial competent evidence, and thus they are unassailable. Quick v. Crane, supra ; Nelson v. Northern Leasing Co., supra . In Instruction No. 34, the court expressly instructed the jury of the consequences of finding Ross's negligence equal to or greater than that of Coast or Coleman, as provided in our decision in Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho 186, 579 P.2d 683 (1978). The jury was expressly told that by finding Ross 10% negligent, Coast 10% negligent, and Coleman 5% negligent, Ross would recover nothing from either Coast or Coleman. Thus, knowing the consequences of the verdict which they rendered, the jury must have concluded, from their own lay sense of justice, that the defendants should not have to pay for the plaintiff's injuries. Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho at 193, 579 P.2d at 690. The Special Verdict Form, which was given to the jury, required the jury to make several findings regarding the various claims of the plaintiff and the several defenses raised by the defendants. Section 1 of the Special Verdict Form (Questions 1 through 4) dealt with the plaintiff's claim of strict liability in tort. The jury, in response to Question No. 1, determined that the Hobie Cat 16 was not defectively designed and unreasonably dangerous to person or property, thus eliminating plaintiff's claim based on strict liability in tort. In another section of the Special Verdict the jury ruled against plaintiff Ross's claim that the defendants' conduct was such as to warrant punitive damages, thus eliminating punitive damages from the case. In Section Two of the Special Verdict dealing with negligence and proximate cause, the jury was asked, by individual interrogatories, to evaluate separately the conduct of each actor โ Idaho Power, plaintiff Ross, defendant Coast, and defendant Coleman โ to determine which if any of those actors were individually guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the accident. The jury separately found each actor negligent. [4] The jury was then asked, in Questions 13 and 14, to evaluate the business relationship of defendants Coast and Coleman jointly to determine if they were jointly, rather than separately, negligent. Question No. 13, which was part of the special verdict form submitted by the plaintiff, [5] was answered as follows:  Question No. 13: Do you find that Coast Catamaran Corporation and Coleman Company, Inc., under these instructions, are equally at fault by reason of their business relationship which was a proximate cause of the injuries to Michael Ross? Answer: Yes ____ No 12  The court then, in the next section of the Special Verdict, by Question No. 14, told the jury that they were to assign percentages of causal negligence to each of the entities for which the jury had determined negligence in the previous Questions 5-13. The jury's findings were as follows: SECTION THREE You are now to compare the extent to which the conduct of Michael Ross, Idaho Power Company, Coast Catamaran Corporation, and Coleman Company, Inc., caused the accident.  Question No. 14: We find the parties contributed to the cause of the accident in the following percentages: a. Michael Ross 10 % b. Idaho Power Company 75 % c. Unknown or Unnamed party 0 % d. By reason of a yes answer to Question No. 13: Coast Catamaran Company, and Coleman Company, Inc. 0 % e. By reason of a no answer to Question No. 13: (1) Coast Catamaran Company 10 % (2) Coleman Company, Inc. 5 % TOTAL 100 % ... . In answering Question No. 14, use subparagraph d if you answered yes to Question No. 13; but use subparagraph e if you answered no to Question No. 13. (Emphasis supplied.) In answering Question No. 14, the percentages of causation you find attributable to each party, whether you use subparagraphs a, b, c and d; or you use subparagraphs a, b, c and e; must total 100% for all parties. The foregoing directions at the end of Question 14 were particularly instructive. By those instructions, the jury was told that if they answered yes to Question No. 13 [finding Coast and Coleman equally at fault by reason of their business relationship], that Coast's and Coleman's negligence should be determined jointly and not separately. [Parts a, b, c and d must total 100%.] However, if the jury answered no to Question No. 13, then the instructions in Question 14 directed that the jury evaluate Coast's and Coleman's negligence separately, not jointly. [Parts a, b, c and e must total 100%.] Thus, by Questions 13 and 14 (which had been submitted by the plaintiff and approved at the instruction conference), the jury was instructed to determine the negligence of Coast and Coleman either jointly, Question 14(d), or separately, Question 14(e), based upon their answers to Question 13, and the directions in Question No. 14. Those directions told the jury that in answering Question No. 14, the percentages of causation you find attributable to each party, whether you use subparagraphs (a), (b), (c), and (d) [joint liability]; or you use subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) [separate liability]; must total 100% for all parties. When the jury rendered its verdict, it unanimously answered Question No. 13 no and entered a 0 in Question 14(d), and thus, pursuant to the court's instruction in Question No. 14, found no joint negligence or joint liability on behalf of Coast and Coleman.