Opinion ID: 1486009
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Diminished Capacity Issue

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court imposed on him the burden of proof of a diminished capacity and thereby violated his due-process right to have the State prove each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, which establishes the defense of diminished capacity, provided at the time of this trial: Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense. In the absence of such evidence, it may be presumed that the defendant had no mental disease or defect which would negate a state of mind which is an element of the offense. Mental disease or defect is an affirmative defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. As we held in State v. Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. 591, 532 A. 2d 199, the statute does not shift the burden of proof to the defendant to disprove an essential element of the case. Rather, the defendant needs to do only what the statute says: to prove the existence of a mental disease or defect. We believed that this was constitutional. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in Humanik v. Beyer, supra, 871 F. 2d 432, ruled that an instruction that a defendant has the burden of proving the existence of a mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence denies him or her due process of law. In its view, the imposition of such a burden on the defendant violates the due-process clause by acting as a filter that may bar the jury's consideration of that evidence when the time comes to decide whether the State has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the criminal state of mind that is an essential element of the crime. Id. at 443. Because certiorari was denied by the United States Supreme Court from the Humanik decision, Chief Justice Wilentz, on behalf of this Court, issued a memorandum on December 8, 1989, instructing all courts to apply the Humanik decision in pending appeals in order to avoid an intolerable conflict between state and federal courts in the circuit. The memorandum provided: Of course, that fact does not require a reversal of every case presenting a diminished capacity issue. Other appellate principles may dictate a different result. See 124 N.J.L.J. 1562 (1989) (summarizing the memorandum). Therefore, we must resolve two issues in this case: (1) whether there is error in the charge, and, if so, (2) whether the error in the charge requires reversal.
The initial charge to the jury on diminished capacity seems clearly to have placed the burden on the defendant to disprove an essential element of the crime. The initial charge follows: The defendant contends that he was suffering from a mental disease or defect which made him incapable of the state of mind required to be proved for a murder, aggravated manslaughter, manslaughter or possession of a weapon. That is, he says that he was not able to act purposely, knowingly or recklessly; that his mental disease or defect prevented him from acting with any of those states of mind. Mental disease or defect which would negate the state of mind which is an element of the defense is never assumed. Indeed, as I told you, indeed, people are capable of forming the requisite intent. When the defendant contends that he does not have the requisite capability, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence, that, (1) that he has the mental disease or defect, and (2) that it was of such a nature that it prevented him from acting purposely, knowingly or recklessly, depending on which state or states of mind are one of the elements of the offense that is under consideration. The State does not have the burden of persuasion on this issue. The burden is on the defendant. And if you have found that the defendant did an act in question, then you must consider his state of mind accompanying the act or acts. If the defendant has proved the mental disease or defect and that it negated his ability to form the state of mind, you must find him not guilty with respect to such crime. [Emphasis added.] It is true that the charge in other respects conveyed to the jury the requirement that the burden of proof to establish each essential element of the crime always remained on the State. Early in its charge, the court instructed the jury that the burden of proof is upon the State to prove the elements of a crime, and it never shifts. It remains on the State throughout the whole trial of the case. In addition, in concluding its charge on the defense of diminished capacity, the court told the jury: All evidence bearing on that, all circumstances, including mental condition, and state of mind, may be considered. In other words, even if a defendant has failed to prove that he was not able to have a particular state of mind by reason of a mental disease or defect, that does not relieve the State of its job to prove that, in fact, at the time in question, the defendant had the requisite mental state when he took the actions which are crimes, if done purposely or knowingly. However, the fact remains that the charge was contradictory. Contradictory and inconsistent charges are inherently inadequate as they create a reasonable likelihood that a juror understood the instructions in an unconstitutional manner   . Humanik v. Beyer, supra, 871 F. 2d at 442 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 323 n. 8, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1975 n. 8, 85 L.Ed. 2d 344, 359 n. 8 (1985)). In responding to a jury request to explain the insanity and diminished-capacity defenses, the court recharged the jury: As a part of his general denial of guilt, the defendant maintains he was not guilty of the crimes charged, either by reason of diminished capacity or lack of capacity, or by reason of legal insanity, or both. Those are separate concepts, but they have certain things in common, and we'll mention again the things in common. First of all, the law entertains no prejudices against the defenses of diminished capacity or insanity. On the contrary, if the defense  if either defense is sufficiently established, the law allows the defendant the benefit of it by an acquittal of all criminal responsibility.    Under our law, all persons are assumed to be sane, and are assumed to be capable of forming the requisite state of mind, and therefore, responsible for their conduct until the contrary is established by them. Insanity and diminished capacity are affirmative defenses, and the burden of proving them or either of them by a preponderance of the evidence is on the defendant who asserts the defense. And later: And therefore, if the evidence were to be in balance with respect to mental disease or defect, or its effect, then the defendant who has the burden of proof with respect thereto has not met the burden. [Emphasis added.] And: When a defendant contends that he does not have the capability, he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence; (1) that he had the mental disease or defect; and (2) that it was of such a nature that it prevented him from acting purposefully, knowingly or recklessly   . The State does not have the burden of persuasion in this issue. The burden is on the defendant, as I've indicated. [Emphasis added.] The combination of those instructions seems clearly to have conveyed to the jury that it was defendant's burden to prove that his mental condition negated the presumed culpability that attended his doing of the act. Although the court reinstructed the jury as well that the defendant's failure to disprove the requisite mental state did not relieve the State of its burden, we cannot say with any degree of confidence which interpretation [the] jury adopted. Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 383, 108 S.Ct. 1860, 1870, 100 L.Ed. 2d 384, 399 (1988).
Notwithstanding the defect in the charge, the State argues that any error in the charge is harmless. The argument has support in a recent decision of the Appellate Division, State v. Carroll, 242 N.J. Super. 549, 577 A. 2d 862 (1990), certif. denied, ___ N.J. ___ (1991). In that tragically similar factual circumstance, a stormy love relationship between a couple disintegrated, culminating in the crushing and stabbing murder of the thirteen-year-old daughter of the defendant's estranged wife. The Appellate Division found the jury instruction in Carroll to be defective because it erroneously placed the burden of proving the existence of a diminished capacity on the defendant, contrary to Humanik. However, the error was harmless as the defendant had failed to present evidence of the kind of mental disease or defect which would negate the mental state required to convict him of murder. State v. Carroll, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 557, 577 A. 2d 862. The Appellate Division relied on this Court's opinions in State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 562 A. 2d 1320 (1989), and State v. Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. 591, 532 A. 2d 199. In State v. Pitts , the Court concluded that the psychiatric testimony presented by the defendant, which characterized the defendant's behavior as a loss of emotional control (rage reaction) rather than a loss of cognitive faculties, was not the kind of evidence that required the diminished-capacity instruction to be submitted to the jury. 116 N.J. at 592, 562 A. 2d 1320. In State v. Breakiron , we ruled that in order to qualify for the defense of diminished capacity, at a minimum the evidence must be shown to be capable of negating a mental element of the crime charged or otherwise to impair cognition. 108 N.J. at 619, 532 A. 2d 199. Based on these two opinions, the Carroll court distinguished between a case presenting evidence of a mental disease or defect that impairs the cognitive state required to act knowingly or purposely and a case in which the evidence presented concerns a mental disease or defect which produces an emotive reaction such as rage or impassioned impulse   . State v. Carroll, supra, 242 N.J. Super. at 558, 577 A. 2d 862. The former case requires the submission of the diminished-capacity defense to the jury whereas in the latter case the defense need not be submitted. Reviewing the testimony, the Carroll court determined that the defendant had failed to present evidence that his mental condition so impaired his cognitive faculties as to prevent him from acting purposely or knowingly. While stating in conclusory terms that Carroll's mental condition at the time of the homicide prevented him from acting purposely or knowingly, one medical expert asserted that a combination of mental diseases (atypical psychosis, organic brain syndrome, and borderline or mixed personality disorder) and the consumption of alcohol (chronic substance abuse) caused Carroll to become enraged and to lose control of his impulses. The court continued: However, [the doctor] never stated that defendant suffered from an impairment of his faculties which prevented him from being cognizant of the fact that he was hitting his stepdaughter over the head with a scale and stabbing her in the throat with a knife and that it was practically certain his actions would cause death or serious bodily injury to the child. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3a(2). Therefore, [the doctor's] testimony did not mandate a jury instruction as to the defense of diminished capacity. [ Id. at 560-61, 577 A. 2d 862.] Another defense expert, a neurologist, concluded that Carroll had acted recklessly, not purposely or knowingly. He based his conclusion on the impression that a person who is indifferent to the consequences of his or her actions, one who does not care whether the victim lives or dies, cannot be found to have acted knowingly or purposely. The neurologist believed that Carroll's intellectual impairment and consumption of alcohol caused him to lose impulse control and that he was acting in a fury, in a rage when he committed the murder. Id. at 561, 577 A. 2d 862. The Appellate Division found that that testimony was not the kind of evidence that required the submission of a diminished-capacity defense to the jury. Because the only possible consequence of the court's    instruction to the jury regarding the defense of diminished capacity would have been to improve defendant's chances of securing an acquittal, the Appellate Division found that the erroneous instruction had not prejudiced Carroll, and that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 563, 577 A. 2d 862. We are unable to agree, however, that the evidence in this case can be analyzed in the same way as the psychiatric testimony in the Carroll case. In this case the psychiatric witness testified that the fact defendant killed Kory in the course of killing Melva indicates even more so and underscores the fact that he was not aware of what he was doing or not in control of what he was doing, because he certainly felt the opposite toward Kory [than he felt toward Melva]. And later when asked specifically by the prosecutor about the striking of Kory, But [he] knew what he was doing? Answer: I think not. But there is always a continuum. He could have been subconsciously aware, minimally aware. As thin as the evidence was, it contained a diagnosis of a brief reactive psychosis that defendant suffered at the time of the murder as the result of stress. In later cross-examination the prosecutor questioned whether defendant's consciousness of guilt, as shown by his concealment of the evidence, clearly established that he had consciously killed: Q. Someone who knows they were guilty would get rid of the evidence, wouldn't they? A. Shouldn't [one] who knows that he has killed two people, for whatever reasons. Guilty sounds like he did something deliberate, and my point is he has not. Q. You don't think he deliberately killed? A. That's right. Another defense witness placed defendant's conduct closely into the rage pattern. He said that he interpreted this type of a homicide to be a rage reaction, out of control, emotionally murder  or homicide, excuse me. I'm sorry. To which the prosecutor replied: I take it one of those emotions of the assailant could be hate as well, couldn't it, doctor? That kind of testimony indeed would not qualify for the diminished-capacity charge. It might be a mitigating factor in a capital-sentencing proceeding, but surely would not qualify for the diminished-capacity charge. Nonetheless, the admissible testimony of at least one of defendant's expert witnesses purported to establish the presence of a mental disease in the form of a stress-induced psychosis that grew out of the borderline personality disorder, which was described in some detail in the evidence. According to defendant's expert psychiatric witness, that disease or defect affected Moore's cognitive faculties. Given the qualitative difference between the evidence in this case and that in Pitts and Carroll, we are unable to agree that any error in the charge can be regarded as harmless. Defendant presented evidence from which a jury could have concluded that the State had failed to prove the requisite state of mind beyond a reasonable doubt.