Opinion ID: 2625741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Habeas Corpus Procedure

Text: (2) A petition for writ of habeas corpus initiates judicial proceedings to determine the lawfulness of the petitioner's confinement. ( People v. Romero (1994) 8 Cal.4th 728, 738 [35 Cal.Rptr.2d 270, 883 P.2d 388].) Because such a petition seeks to collaterally attack a presumptively final criminal judgment, the petitioner bears a heavy burden initially to plead sufficient grounds for relief, and then later to prove them. ( People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 259, 886 P.2d 1252].) At the pleading stage, the petition must state a prima facie case for relief. To that end, the petition should both (i) state fully and with particularity the facts on which relief is sought [citations], as well as (ii) include copies of reasonably available documentary evidence supporting the claim, including pertinent portions of trial transcripts and affidavits or declarations. ( Ibid.; see also, e.g., In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 547 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527]; In re Hochberg (1970) 2 Cal.3d 870, 875, fn. 4 [87 Cal.Rptr. 681, 471 P.2d 1].) Next, the petitioner must avoid any procedural bar that would prevent the court from reaching the merits of the claim. (See People v. Romero, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 737; In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 769, fn. 9; see also Clark, pp. 764-765 & fn. 3.) Such rules are necessary both to deter use of the writ to unjustifiably delay implementation of the law, and to avoid the need to set aside final judgments of conviction when retrial would be difficult or impossible. ( Clark, at p. 764.) (3) In this case, the Attorney General contends that the petition is subject to the procedural bar of successiveness. It has long been the rule that absent a change in the applicable law or the facts, the court will not consider repeated applications for habeas corpus presenting claims previously rejected. [Citations.] The court has also refused to consider newly presented grounds for relief which were known to the petitioner at the time of a prior collateral attack on the judgment. [Citations.] This rule was stated clearly in In re Conner [(1940)] 16 Cal.2d 701, 705 [108 P.2d 10]: `In this state a defendant is not permitted to try out his contentions piecemeal by successive proceedings attacking the validity of the judgment against him.' ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 767-768.) (4) This procedural bar is subject to exceptions. For example, where the factual basis for a claim was unknown to the petitioner and he had no reason to believe that the claim might be made, or where the petitioner was unable to present his claim, the court will continue to consider the merits of the claim if asserted as promptly as reasonably possible. ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 775.) Another exception to the general rule that absent justification for the failure to present all known claims in a single, timely petition for writ of habeas corpus, successive and/or untimely petitions will be summarily denied, is petitions which allege facts which, if proven, would establish that a fundamental miscarriage of justice occurred as a result of the proceedings leading to conviction and/or sentence. ( Id. at p. 797.) [A] `fundamental miscarriage of justice' will have occurred in any proceeding in which it can be demonstrated: (1) that error of constitutional magnitude led to a trial that was so fundamentally unfair that absent the error no reasonable judge or jury would have convicted the petitioner; (2) that the petitioner is actually innocent of the crime or crimes of which the petitioner was convicted; (3) that the death penalty was imposed by a sentencing authority which had such a grossly misleading profile of the petitioner before it that absent the trial error or omission no reasonable judge or jury would have imposed a sentence of death; (4) that the petitioner was convicted or sentenced under an invalid statute. These claims will be considered on their merits even though presented for the first time in a successive petition or one in which the delay has not been justified. ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798, fns. omitted.)