Opinion ID: 2742439
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The BCPO and Mordaga as “Persons”

Text: We begin with the question of whether Appellees are “persons” amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, §1985, or the NJCRA. In its March 22, 2013 opinion, the District Court held that the BCPO is not a “person” subject to liability under 7 these provisions. In its June 19, 2013 opinion, the District Court concluded that Mordaga is not a “person” subject to suit under the federal civil rights laws. Because the District Court erred in reaching these conclusions, we will vacate the dismissal on this ground.
Section 1983 imposes liability on “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). Section 1985 imposes liability “if two or more persons” conspire to interfere with civil rights in a manner enumerated therein. Id. § 1985 (emphasis added).3 3 We have never explicitly decided whether the term “person” has the same meaning under §§ 1983 and 1985. Nevertheless, the district courts in our Circuit have consistently answered that question in the affirmative. See, e.g., Carabello v. Beard, 468 F. Supp. 2d 720, 723 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 2006); Wright v. Phila. Hous. Auth., No. 94-1601, 1994 WL 597716, at -3 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Rode v. Dellarciprete, 617 F. Supp. 721, 723 n.2 (M.D. Pa. 1985). Here, neither party argues that “person” means something different under § 1985 than under § 1983, and we see no reason why this should be so. We, like our sister Court of Appeals in Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir. 1979), therefore assume that “person” has the same meaning under both §§ 1983 and 1985. 8 The District Court found that the BCPO was an arm of the State of New Jersey, and that Mordaga, as BCPO Chief of Detectives, was a state official. In Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989), the Court held that “neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.” 4 Local governmental bodies and their officials, by contrast, are regarded as “persons” amenable to suit under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep’t of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Because local governmental bodies and their officials are “persons” under §§ 1983 and 1985, and state agencies and their officials acting in their official capacity are not, we must decide initially whether the BCPO is an arm of the State of New Jersey or of Bergen County. If the BCPO is an arm of the State of New Jersey, we must then decide whether Mordaga has been sued exclusively in his official capacity as BCPO Chief of Detectives.5 Our resolution of the first question—whether the BCPO is an arm of the State—is guided by Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491 (3d Cir. 1996). In Coleman, we held that “when [New Jersey] county prosecutors engage in classic law 4 As to officials of the State, the Court in Will explained that “[o]bviously, state officials literally are persons[,] [b]ut a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” 491 U.S. at 71. 5 Of course, a state official sued in his or her personal capacity is amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 31 (1991). 9 enforcement and investigative functions, they act as officers of the State.” Coleman v. Kaye, 87 F.3d 1491, 1505 (3d Cir. 1996). When county prosecutors perform administrative functions “unrelated to the duties involved in criminal prosecution,” however, they act as county officials. Id. at 1505–06. Here, the District Court found that “the BCPO was acting within its classical function of investigating criminal activities and conducting criminal prosecutions with respect to Mr. Lagano.” (App. 13a.) Similarly, the District Court found that Mordaga “was acting as the Chief of Detectives in the BCPO, a state agency,” and that Mordaga was acting “in his official capacity in connection with the allegations made by Lagano’s Estate.” (App. 8a.) Based upon these findings, the District Court concluded that neither the BCPO nor Mordaga were amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985, and dismissed those claims accordingly. It is, of course, true that in some respects the amended complaint avers activity within the BCPO and actions taken by Mordaga that fall within the ambit of “classic law enforcement and investigative functions.” Coleman, 87 F.3d at 1505. But the amended complaint must be read as a whole, and its averments and the inferences reasonably drawn from those averments must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See S.H. ex rel. Durell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 256 (3d. Cir. 2013). In this case, the amended complaint is replete with allegations that Mordaga and others within the BCPO were not performing the classic functions of law enforcement or criminal investigators. For instance, the amended complaint alleged that Lagano and Mordaga “enjoyed a personal and business 10 relationship,” (App. 29a ¶ 11), which included “vacation[ing], visit[ing,] . . . socializ[ing,]” and “multiple business ventures.” (Id. ¶ 12, 14.) The amended complaint also alleged that Mordaga met with Lagano after Lagano’s home was searched, provided him with the name of a specific attorney, and assured Lagano that, if he retained this attorney, “90% of [his] problems would go away.” (Id. 30a ¶ 20.) After Lagano failed to retain the recommended attorney, the amended complaint averred that Mordaga attended a “dinner meeting,” during which Mordaga advised Lagano that “half his money would be returned and guaranteed that [Lagano] would serve no prison time if [he] hired the attorney Mordaga recommended.” (Id. 31a ¶ 27.) As to the disclosure of Lagano’s identity as a confidential informant, the amended complaint alleged that “[BCPO] personnel thereafter disclosed to alleged members of traditional Organized Crime families arrested in raids on December 1, 2004 that [Lagano] had been an informant.” (Id. 32a ¶ 32.) The amended complaint clearly alleges that Mordaga’s relationship with Lagano extended beyond Mordaga’s official role as BCPO Chief of Detectives during the BCPO investigation of Lagano. It can also reasonably be inferred from the allegations that Mordaga was not performing classic investigatory and prosecutorial functions when he urged Lagano to retain a specific attorney on the assurance that this attorney could make Lagano’s problems disappear. It can also be inferred from the amended complaint that the alleged disclosure of Lagano’s status as a confidential informant was unrelated to any lawful investigative or prosecutorial 11 function.6 These allegations support a reasonable inference that neither Mordaga nor the BCPO acted within their classic investigatory and prosecutorial functions with respect to the state-created danger claim advanced by the Estate. Accordingly, the District Court erred in holding that the amended complaint alleged that the BCPO and Mordaga acted exclusively in classic law enforcement and investigative functions so as to make them part of the State and thus not amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985. Even if the amended complaint could not be viewed as alleging conduct outside classic law enforcement and investigative functions, the dismissal as to Mordaga was incorrect for an additional reason. Mordaga is sued not only in his official capacity, but also in his personal capacity. (See Estate Br. 31.) Accordingly, he most certainly is amenable to suit as a “person” under §§ 1983 and 1985. See Hafer, 502 U.S. at 27. In Hafer, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the theory that “state officials may not be held liable in their personal capacity for actions they take in their official capacity.” Id. Thus, under Hafer, the District Court erred in 6 Lagano’s complaint intermittently describes this disclosure in language that suggests it was intentional (see, e.g., App. 32a ¶ 32 (“[BCPO] personnel thereafter disclosed . . .”)), and in language that suggests it may have been inadvertent (see, e.g., id. ¶ 36 (“By failing to protect from disclosure . . . .”)). The District Court is free to consider, therefore, whether the complaint sufficiently pled the requisite affirmative act on the part of the BCPO or Mordaga that is required to state a claim under the state-created danger theory. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008). 12 dismissing the amended complaint against Mordaga in his personal capacity.
In addition to bringing suit under the federal civil rights statutes, the Estate raised a claim under the NJCRA, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-1 to -2. Like 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the NJCRA “premise[s] liability on the conduct of a ‘person.’” Lopez-Siguenza v. Roddy, No. 13-2005 (JBS/JS), 2014 WL 1298300, at  (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2014). New Jersey district courts have interpreted the NJCRA as having incorporated the Supreme Court’s decision in Will that, for purposes of § 1983, states and state officials acting in their official capacity are not amenable to suit. See id. at ; Didiano v. Balicki, Civ. No. 10-4483 (RBK/AMD), 2011 WL 1466131, at  (D.N.J. Apr. 18, 2011); Slinger v. New Jersey, Civ. No. 07-5561 (DMC), 2008 WL 4126181, at –8 (D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2008), rev’d in part, 366 F. App’x 357 (3d Cir. 2010). Because the District Court erred in concluding at this stage that neither the BCPO nor Mordaga were “persons” amenable to suit under §§ 1983 and 1985, it likewise erred in concluding that they are not “persons” under the NJCRA. 7 Accordingly, we will vacate the dismissal of Count 2 on that ground as well. 7 The District Court and the parties cite N.J. Stat. Ann. § 1:1-2, which defines “person” for purposes of New Jersey law as: corporations, companies, associations, societies, firms, partnerships and joint stock companies as well as individuals, 13