Opinion ID: 2613162
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kidnapping Instructions

Text: Similar to his indictment argument, defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the trial court's kidnapping instruction did not adequately instruct the jury about the decisions it must reach unanimously before finding [him] guilty of kidnapping.... Absent a finding of fundamental error, defendant has waived this argument on appeal because he failed to raise it in the trial court. See Thomas, 130 Ariz. at 435, 636 P.2d at 1217. We find no error, fundamental or otherwise, in the trial court's kidnapping instruction. The trial court's kidnapping instruction to the jury read as follows: The crime of kidnapping requires proof that the defendant knowingly restrained another person with the intent to: 1. Inflict death or physical injury on the person; or 2. Interfere with the performance of a governmental function; or 3. Place the victim in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury; or 4. Otherwise aid in the commission of a felony. This instruction tracks virtually verbatim Arizona's kidnapping statute. A.R.S. § 13-1304(A)(3), (4) and (5). Pursuant to this instruction, the jury found defendant guilty of kidnapping. The essence of defendant's argument is that he was denied his constitutional right to a unanimous jury verdict as guaranteed by Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 23, because, for example, some of the jurors could have found him guilty of kidnapping by finding that he restrained Deputy Marconnet with the intent to inflict physical injury on him, while the rest of the jurors could have found him guilty of kidnapping by finding that he restrained Deputy Marconnet with the intent to interfere with his governmental function. Thus, defendant would be convicted of kidnapping even though the jury could not unanimously agree on the manner in which he committed the kidnapping. Although this scenario may have occurred, we are not persuaded that defendant was thereby denied any constitutional right. In Arizona, kidnapping is one crime, regardless of whether it occurs as a result of a knowing restraint with the intent to inflict physical injury or with the intent to interfere with the performance of a governmental function. As we stated in State v. Encinas, 132 Ariz. 493, 496-97, 647 P.2d 624, 627-28 (1982), [a]lthough a defendant is entitled to a unanimous jury verdict on whether the criminal act charged has been committed, the defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the precise manner in which the act was committed. See also, e.g., Griffin v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991) (Court affirmed conviction under jury instruction which permitted jury to convict if defendant found to have committed conspiracy in either of two manners); Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991) (jury need not agree on manner in which defendant committed first degree murder); State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 662 P.2d 1007 (1983) (same). We hold that defendant was properly convicted of kidnapping by a unanimous jury verdict.