Opinion ID: 2616594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial Evaluation of Aggravating Circumstances

Text: The State argues that allowing the district court to test the sufficiency of evidence to support aggravating circumstances before trial improperly interferes with the State's prosecutorial charging discretion and usurps the jury's function in postconviction death-penalty sentencing. Despite the State's contentions, we endorse pretrial evaluation of aggravating circumstances by the district court upon the defendant's motion to dismiss aggravating circumstances. Our view that it is important to curtail unwarranted death-penalty prosecutions stems from the fact that they are qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from other criminal proceedings. [T]he qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3452, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983); State v. Henderson, 109 N.M. 655, 659, 789 P.2d 603, 607 (1990). Allegations of aggravating circumstances will affect and pervade every stage of the prosecution for murder, Ghent v. Superior Court, 90 Cal. App.3d 944, 153 Cal.Rptr. 720, 727 n. 10 (Ct.App.1979), engender[ing] tremendous costs in terms of time, expense, energy, and motion, State v. Matulewicz, 115 N.J. 191, 557 A.2d 1001, 1008 (1989) (Handler, J., concurring). Capital felony prosecutions and sentencing command extra judicial resources, including an additional, separate sentencing proceeding to evaluate aggravating and mitigating circumstances with direct appeal of a death sentence to the New Mexico Supreme Court. NMSA 1978, §§ 31-20A-1 to -6 (Repl.Pamp.1990 & Cum.Supp.1993) (Capital Felony Sentencing Act); see N.M. Const. art. VI, § 2 (permitting direct appeal to New Mexico Supreme Court following death penalty conviction). In addition, the state in capital prosecutions is entitled to a death-qualified jury. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); State v. Trujillo, 99 N.M. 251, 252, 657 P.2d 107, 108 (1982). Whether or not death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone or give the state a strategic advantage, see Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167-73, 106 S.Ct. at 1761-65; Trujillo, 99 N.M. at 252, 657 P.2d at 108, they clearly absorb more judicial resources in voir dire. Other aspects of capital prosecutions make them uniquely complex and demanding. More skilled and experienced prosecutors and defenders are required; extensive investigation into the defendant's background for proof of mitigating circumstances must be done, State v. McCrary, 97 N.J. 132, 478 A.2d 339, 344 (1984); and there will be a proliferation of pretrial motions, applications, and hearings, consuming significantly more judicial resources than noncapital prosecutions, see Matulewicz, 557 A.2d at 1008, (Handler, J., concurring). We have the inherent authority to establish a pretrial procedure for evaluating aggravating circumstances under our power of superintending control over lower state courts. N.M. Const. art. VI, § 3; Hudson v. State, 89 N.M. 759, 760, 557 P.2d 1108, 1109 (1976) (stating that our superintending control includes the power to regulate and to promulgate rules regarding pleadings, practice, and procedure affecting the judicial branch of government), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 924, 97 S.Ct. 2198, 53 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977). This new procedure will conserve judicial resources and ensure fairer trials for capital defendants. [4] The district court properly conducted pretrial review of the murder of a peace officer aggravating circumstance. Pursuant to our superintending authority, we authorize district courts to perform pretrial review of death-penalty aggravating circumstances as explicated herein. District courts have the power to do so under their inherent authority to conduct felony trials. See N.M. Const. art. VI, § 13; State v. Garcia, 93 N.M. 51, 53, 596 P.2d 264, 266 (1979). A defendant who has been notified that the State will seek the death penalty may move to dismiss an aggravating circumstance before trial. Pretrial rulings on the support of aggravating circumstances can present questions of fact, law, or mixed fact and law, and this will affect the standard of review. When the applicability of an aggravating circumstance presents a question of law capable of determination without trial (like the peace officer aggravating circumstances in this case), SCRA 1986, 5-601 (Repl.Pamp.1992) applies and the district court should rule on the motion consistent therewith. [5] A motion to dismiss an aggravating circumstance that presents a purely legal question should be granted when the district court finds that the aggravating circumstance does not apply as a matter of law. The issue of whether a Farmington CSO qualifies as a peace officer under the aggravating circumstance statute is a purely legal question. As an objection that was capable of determination without trial on the merits, Ogden appropriately moved to dismiss this aggravating circumstance before trial pursuant to SCRA 5-601. When the applicability of an aggravating circumstance raises a question of fact or a mixed question of fact and law, the district court should grant the defendant's motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstance only when it finds that there is not probable cause to support the aggravating circumstance. The burden of proof is on the State; the State will defeat the motion if it proves that there is probable cause to believe an aggravating circumstance is present. Pretrial review of aggravating circumstances is intended to screen out only those cases in which the State does not have any significant factual or legal basis for pursuing the death penalty, and the probable cause standard of review should reflect this objective. [6] The district court may conduct a limited evidentiary hearing on a pretrial motion to dismiss aggravating circumstances when necessary. Such a hearing should be summary in nature; we have no intention of allowing a trial within a trial on a pretrial challenge to aggravating circumstances. Testimony may be presented, but it usually should not be necessary. See McCrary, 478 A.2d at 345. Formal rules of evidence should be relaxed, and hearsay will be admissible. See id. at 346 (endorsing use of hearsay in pretrial hearing on motion to dismiss aggravating circumstances while noting that hearsay and other informal proofs are permissible in determining issues that implicate important rights); see also Zamora v. Creamland Dairies, Inc., 106 N.M. 628, 632, 747 P.2d 923, 927 (Ct.App.1987) ([H]earsay evidence may be used to establish probable cause.) (citing State v. Deltenre, 77 N.M. 497, 501, 424 P.2d 782, 785 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 976, 87 S.Ct. 1171, 18 L.Ed.2d 136 (1967)). These hearings can be abbreviated because the district court's task is limited to determining if the State has demonstrated that the aggravating circumstance is supported by probable cause. The district court must not weigh the evidence or consider evidence of mitigating circumstances. [7] Any pretrial determination by a district court that (1) there is not probable cause to support an aggravating circumstance, or (2) an aggravating circumstance applies or does not apply as a matter of law will ordinarily be an order or decision involving a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion, and an immediate appeal from such an order or decision may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Thus, the district court will ordinarily certify such pretrial orders for interlocutory appeal pursuant to SCRA 1986, 12-203 (Repl. Pamp.1992). Whether we decide to accept the interlocutory appeal is, of course, within our discretion. State v. Hernandez, 95 N.M. 125, 126, 619 P.2d 570, 571 (Ct.App.1980). On appeal, we will review questions of law de novo, and we will review questions of fact to see whether the district court correctly evaluated probable cause to support the aggravating circumstance. Pretrial dismissal of aggravating circumstances unsupported by probable cause will not improperly interfere with prosecutorial charging discretion. While prosecutorial discretion in charging is quite broad, it is ordinarily limited by the requirement that the state must demonstrate probable cause that the defendant committed a particular crime. In Wayte v. United States , the Supreme Court stated, [S]o long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668-69, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978)). Pretrial review of aggravating circumstances for support by probable cause does not disturb this standard. Further, in New Mexico, an aggravating circumstance is not an element of the crime of capital murder, State v. Compton, 104 N.M. 683, 693, 726 P.2d 837, 847, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 890, 107 S.Ct. 291, 93 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), and aggravating circumstances are not required to be formally charged in an indictment or ruled on by the grand jury for the existence of probable cause. State v. Morton, 107 N.M. 478, 479-81, 760 P.2d 170, 171-73 (Ct.App.1988). [8] The pretrial procedure for evaluating aggravating circumstances that we endorse today is currently the only screening mechanism applicable to an allegation of aggravating circumstances, and it imposes no more of a restriction upon prosecutorial charging discretion than is present when a typical crime is charged. Still, district courts should be aware of the potential for impeding prosecutorial charging discretion, and they should confine their review as we have instructed to prevent this. The limited nature of pretrial evaluation of aggravating circumstances should also preclude elaborate or duplicative pretrial litigation or usurpation of the jury's function in capital sentencing. We are aware that Pennsylvania courts prohibit pretrial judicial classification of a trial as capital or non-capital to prevent infringement of the jury's statutory role in evaluating capital sentencing aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tomoney, 488 Pa. 324, 412 A.2d 531, 533-34 (1980). The Pennsylvania case establishing this view, however, is distinguishable; the district court in that case did not employ a limited standard of review like the one we prescribe today, and it engaged in actual weighing of mitigating circumstances. See Commonwealth ex rel. Fitzpatrick v. Bullock, 471 Pa. 292, 370 A.2d 309, 313 (1977). Our circumscribed procedure of screening for probable cause simply will not allow the type of pretrial review which concerned the courts of Pennsylvania, and under our procedure, the sentencing judge or jury will still fully perform its statutory task of assessing and weighing aggravating and mitigating circumstances consistent with our capital sentencing statute, NMSA 1978, § 31-20A-2 (Repl. Pamp.1990). [9]