Opinion ID: 785013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Issues Raised by Crayton

Text: 53 We also find no merit in the remaining issues raised by Crayton.
54 The statements made by the prosecutor during his direct examination of Beamus did not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, Beamus testified that she picked up several people including Crayton at the airport and took them to her house because her cousin wanted to talk with Crayton. Crayton contends that the prosecutor then improperly asked Beamus if her cousin had been involved with the distribution of cocaine?, to which Beamus replied, Yes, sir, I think so. J.A. at 703. At this point, the defense objected, and Beamus's answer was stricken. 55 In order for a prosecutorial misconduct claim to succeed, statements by the prosecutor must first be deemed to have been improper. Tarwater, 308 F.3d at 511. If the statements were improper, the court then look[s] to see if they were flagrant and warrant reversal. Id. To determine flagrancy, the court considers 56 1) whether the statements tended to mislead the jury or prejudice the defendant; 2) whether the statements were isolated or among a series of improper statements; 3) whether the statements were deliberately or accidentally before the jury; and 4) the total strength of the evidence against the accused. 57 Id. The government's theory of the case was that Crayton came to Louisville to distribute cocaine and not just to visit Louisville for the Kentucky Derby festivities. Thus, the question the prosecutor asked was relevant to the theory of the case and not flagrantly improper. 58 To warrant a new trial, however, prosecutorial misconduct must be so pronounced and persistent that it permeates the entire atmosphere of the trial. United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1177 (6th Cir.1986) (internal quotes omitted). Crayton's counsel properly objected to the answer, and his objection was sustained. The statement was removed from the record. This one question, made at the end of the trial and removed from the record, hardly permeated the entire trial. It is the only incident Crayton points to of the prosecution's intentionally misleading the jury. Since the defendant has not shown that the prosecution's question was improper, much less that it rose to the level of flagrant misconduct, prosecutorial misconduct does not warrant reversal in this case.
59 Finally, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to convict Crayton of conspiracy. In his supplemental pro se brief, Crayton argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiracy with the intent to distribute. [W]hen the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, the standard of review is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' United States v. Swidan, 888 F.2d 1076, 1080 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original)). 60 Crayton argues that the government failed to prove that he conspired with anyone to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. We have summarized what evidence is needed to establish a conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846 — the same section Crayton was charged under — by stating: 61 To establish a drug conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove `that a conspiracy existed, that the accused knew of the conspiracy, and that he knowingly and voluntarily joined it.' United States v. Barrett, 933 F.2d 355, 359 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir.1986)). The essence of conspiracy, of course, is agreement, but proof of a formal agreement is not necessary; a tacit or material understanding among the parties will suffice. United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir. 1990).... `A conspiracy may be inferred from circumstantial evidence that can reasonably be interpreted as participation in the common plan.' United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001, 1010 (6th Cir.1991) (quoting United States v. Bavers, 787 F.2d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1985)).... The government need not show that a defendant participated in all aspects of the conspiracy; it need only prove that the defendant was a party to the general conspiratorial agreement. Further, the connection between the defendant and the conspiracy need only be slight. Id. 62 United States v. Ledezma, 26 F.3d 636, 640 (6th Cir.1994). The essential elements of conspiracy that violate 21 U.S.C. § 846 are an agreement between two or more individuals, with the intent to commit an offense in violation of the Controlled Substance Act. United States. v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1093, 1098 (7th Cir.1990). Circumstantial evidence may be the sole support of a conviction under § 846. Id. 63 The jury heard testimony from various police officers detailing (1) a tip from the Los Angeles Police Detective, (2) a description of the box addressed to Alex Winters, which had several earmarks of a package containing narcotics, including a phony return address and being sent overnight mail from a source city, (3) the K-9 unit's indication that the box contained narcotics, (4) the officers' removal of the cocaine and resealing the package, (5) Crayton's pretending to be Alex Winters to pick up the box at a vacant address at the exact time of delivery, (6) Crayton's driving away and then stopping the car for five minutes on the side of the highway, in what the police described as a countersurveillance technique to see if the car was being followed, (7) the box being thrown out the window when it was opened, and (8) an ensuing chase. These facts alone could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that Crayton conspired with the person who sent the package. In addition, Beamus's testimony may have indicated that her cousins were also involved in cocaine distribution. Thus, the jury could have concluded that the cousins were also co-conspirators. In sum, a rational trier of fact could easily conclude that Crayton conspired with the intent to distribute cocaine.