Opinion ID: 127916
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I begin with the text of the statute:

Text: The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. § 1226(e) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that after respondent's release from prison in 1999, the Attorney General detained him under this section, i. e., under § 1226. And, the action of which respondent complains is one regarding the detention or release of a[n] alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole. § 1226(e). In my view, the only plausible reading of § 1226(e) is that Congress intended to prohibit federal courts from set[ting] aside the Attorney General's decision to deem a criminal alien such as respondent ineligible for release during the limited duration of his or her removal proceedings. I recognize both the strong presumption in favor of judicial review of administrative action and our longstanding rule requiring a clear statement of congressional intent to repeal habeas jurisdiction. INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U. S. 289, 298 (2001). I also acknowledge that Congress will not be deemed to have repealed habeas jurisdiction in the absence of a specific and unambiguous statutory directive to that effect. See id., at 312-313; Ex parte Yerger, 8 Wall. 85, 105 (1869). Here, however, the signal sent by Congress in enacting § 1226(e) could not be clearer:  No court may set aside any action or decision ... regarding the detention or release of any alien. (Emphasis added.) There is simply no reasonable way to read this language other than as precluding all review, including habeas review, of the Attorney General's actions or decisions to detain criminal aliens pursuant to § 1226(c). In St. Cyr, the Court held that certain provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) do not strip federal courts of their jurisdiction to review an alien's habeas claim that he or she is eligible for a waiver of deportation. 533 U. S., at 312. I dissented in that case, and continue to believe it was wrongly decided. Nothing in St. Cyr, however, requires that we ignore the plain language and clear meaning of § 1226(e). In St. Cyr, the Court stressed the significance of Congress' use of the term judicial review in each of the jurisdictional-limiting provisions at issue. In concluding that Congress had not intended to limit habeas jurisdiction by limiting judicial review, the Court reasoned as follows: The term `judicial review' or `jurisdiction to review' is the focus of each of these three provisions. In the immigration context, `judicial review' and `habeas corpus' have historically distinct meanings. See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U. S. 229 (1953). In Heikkila, the Court concluded that the finality provisions at issue `preclud[ed] judicial review' to the maximum extent possible under the Constitution, and thus concluded that the [Administrative Procedure Act] was inapplicable. Id., at 235. Nevertheless, the Court reaffirmed the right to habeas corpus. Ibid. Noting that the limited role played by the courts in habeas corpus proceedings was far narrower than the judicial review authorized by the APA, the Court concluded that `it is the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that differentiates' habeas review from `judicial review.' Id., at 311-312. In this case, however, § 1226(e) does not mention any limitations on judicial review. To be sure, the first sentence of § 1226(e) precludes review of the Attorney General's discretionary judgment[s] to detain aliens under § 1226(c). But the second sentence is not so limited, and states unequivocally that [n]o court may set aside any action or decision to detain an alien under § 1226(c). It cannot seriously be maintained that the second sentence employs a term of art such that no court does not really mean no court, or that a decision of the Attorney General may not be set aside in actions filed under the Immigration and Naturalization Act but may be set aside on habeas review. Congress' use of the term Judicial review as the title of § 1226(e) does not compel a different conclusion. As the Court stated in St. Cyr, a title alone is not controlling, id., at 308, because the title of a statute has no power to give what the text of the statute takes away. Where as here the statutory text is clear, `the title of a statute ... cannot limit the plain meaning of the text.' Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U. S. 206, 212 (1998) (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 331 U. S. 519, 528-529 (1947)). The Court also focused in St. Cyr on the absence of any language in the relevant statutory provisions making explicit reference to habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 533 U.S., at 313, n. 36. This statutory silence spoke volumes, the Court reasoned, in light of the historic use of § 2241 jurisdiction as a means of reviewing deportation and exclusion orders, ibid. In contrast, there is no analogous history of routine reliance on habeas jurisdiction to challenge the detention of aliens without bail pending the conclusion of removal proceedings. We have entertained such challenges only twice, and neither was successful on the merits. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). See also Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 961, 1067, n. 120 (1998) (distinguishing detention pursuant to a final order of removal from the interlocutory detention at issue here). Congress' failure to mention § 2241 in this context therefore lacks the significance that the Court accorded Congress' silence on the issue in St. Cyr. In sum, nothing in St. Cyr requires us to interpret 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) to mean anything other than what its plain language says. I recognize that the two Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue have held that § 1226(e) does not preclude habeas claims such as respondent's. See Patel v. Zemski, 275 F. 3d 299 (CA3 2001); Parra v. Perryman, 172 F. 3d 954 (CA7 1999). In Parra, the Seventh Circuit held that § 1226(e) does not bar challenges to § 1226(c) itself, as opposed to decisions implementing that subsection. Id., at 957. Though the Court's opinion today relies heavily on this distinction, I see no basis for importing it into the plain language of the statute. The Seventh Circuit sought support from our decision in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1999) (AADC), but our holding there supports my reading of § 1226(e). In AADC, the Court construed a statute that sharply limits review of claims arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this [Act]. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (1994 ed., Supp. III). The Court concluded that this provision imposes jurisdictional limits only on claims addressing one of the three `decision[s] or action[s]' specifically enumerated in the statute. AADC, supra, at 482. Nowhere in AADC did the Court suggest, however, that the statute's jurisdictional limits might not apply depending on the particular grounds raised by an alien for challenging the Attorney General's decisions or actions in these three areas. AADC therefore provides no support for imposing artificial limitations on the broad scope of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).