Opinion ID: 2510247
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: defendant adequately preserved the issue for review

Text: {9} The State's primary argument is that Defendant failed to properly preserve this issue for review because his tendered instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. The instruction tendered by the Defendant was for attempt to commit the crime of manslaughter. Thus, the State contends that since attempted manslaughter is not a crime in New Mexico, the tendered instruction was an incorrect statement of the law. Defendant claims that it was clear from the discussions that the attorneys and the judge knew he was asking for an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. The State points out that Defendant also did not tender an instruction defining the elements of attempted voluntary manslaughter. The trial court indicated that aggravated battery was the appropriate instruction and refused the tendered instruction. {10} Generally, to preserve error on a trial court's refusal to give a tendered instruction, the Appellant must tender a legally correct statement of the law. State v. Foster, 1999-NMSC-007, ¶ 54, 126 N.M. 646, 974 P.2d 140. However, if the record reflects that the judge clearly understood the type of instruction the Defendant wanted and understood the tendered instruction needed to be modified to correctly state the law, then the issue is deemed preserved for appellate review. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. The rationale for allowing such flexibility regarding preservation is reinforced by the actual purpose of Rule 5-608(D) NMRA, [3] which is to alert the trial court to the defendant's argument. See Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. {11} The record in this case demonstrates that the judge understood Defendant was asking for an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction. See id. The following discussion took place with respect to Defendant's requested instruction number 10, attempt to commit the crime of manslaughter: Ms. Stevens (State's Attorney): I would strongly object to that. Manslaughter is simplyit's second-degree murder reduced because of provocation. There wouldn't be an attempted manslaughter. Would be an aggravated battery. Which is that he knew his acts created a strong probability of great bodily harm. That's aggravated battery. Mr. Mitchell (Defendant's Attorney): And I think in that instance manslaughter applies. And besides this is a case regarding provocation. Ms. Stevens: If you read the elements of manslaughter, though, there's no way to commit attempted manslaughter. Without it simply being aggravated battery. The Court: [A]ggravated battery ... most accurately covers that situation. Rather than attempt to commit manslaughter a more appropriate (inaudible) would be aggravated battery. Defense requested instruction number 10 will be refused. Because voluntary manslaughter is second-degree murder committed with sufficient provocation, UJI 14-220 NMRA; see also State v. Gaitan, 2002-NMSC-007, ¶ 11, 131 N.M. 758, 42 P.3d 1207, Ms. Stevens' comment that [m]anslaughter is simplyit's second-degree murder reduced because of provocation demonstrates that the State understood the discussion was about voluntary manslaughter. Additionally, Defendant's attorney stated this was a case about provocation. Because the parties were discussing the tendered instruction in the context of the issue of provocation, it is clear the judge understood Defendant was asking for an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter. {12} The fact that Defendant tendered a separate instruction for attempt to commit the crime of involuntary manslaughter is further evidence that the court understood Defendant was also asking for an instruction on attempted voluntary manslaughter. New Mexico recognizes two types of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary. NMSA 1978, § 30-2-3 (1994); State v. Alvarado, 1997-NMCA-027, ¶ 3, 123 N.M. 187, 936 P.2d 869. Because New Mexico only recognizes two types of manslaughter, and in light of the additional instruction for attempted involuntary manslaughter requested by the Defendant, it is only logical that the court and the parties understood that Defendant's requested instruction number 10, attempt to commit the crime of manslaughter, was an instruction for attempted voluntary manslaughter. Defendant's tendered instruction was not refused because Defendant failed to include the word voluntary, but rather because the trial court was persuaded that the appropriate step-down instruction from attempted second-degree murder was aggravated battery. {13} The present case is analogous to Hill, in which the Court of Appeals held the defendant had preserved his argument for a self-defense instruction for appellate review. 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. The defendant in Hill, who was convicted of battery on a police officer, requested a self-defense instruction that was refused by the trial court. Id. ¶ 1. On appeal, the State argued the defendant failed to preserve the issue for review because the instruction he tendered did not accurately state the law with respect to self-defense against a peace officer. Id. ¶ 6. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that the self-defense instruction was flawed on its face. Id. ¶ 7. However, the court was persuaded that the trial court understood the type of instruction the defendant wanted. Because the trial court understood what instruction the defendant sought, the Court of Appeals explained that the trial court should have modified the instruction to correctly state the law. Id.; see Gallegos v. State, 113 N.M. 339, 341, 825 P.2d 1249, 1251 (1992) (concluding that the purpose of the Rule 5-608(D) language is to allow the court an opportunity to decide a question whose dimensions are not open to conjecture or after-the-fact interpretation). The Court of Appeals held that despite the fact the tendered self-defense instruction was flawed on its face, the defendant made a sufficient record to preserve review because the trial court understood what instruction the defendant sought and had the opportunity to modify the instruction to correctly state the law. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, ¶ 7, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139. {14} We also reject the State's argument that Defendant did not preserve the issue when he failed to tender an instruction defining the elements of attempted voluntary manslaughter. It does not seem to us that the trial court was troubled by Defendant's failure to submit such an instruction. During discussions regarding Defendant's requested instruction number 9, attempt to commit second-degree murder, in addition to objecting to the propriety of giving the instruction, the State pointed out that, as written, the instruction did not provide the elements of the crime. Once the trial court agreed to instruct the jury on attempted second-degree murder, the court modified Defendant's instruction to include the elements for attempted second-degree murder. Had the trial court believed it was appropriate to instruct the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter, we are convinced the trial court would have modified the instruction to correctly state the law, by including all of the essential elements for the crime. [4] See UJI 14-2801 NMRA. {15} The record reflects the judge understood Defendant wanted an attempted voluntary manslaughter instruction and had an opportunity to modify the instruction to correctly state the law, but did not give the tendered instruction because he believed aggravated battery to be the correct step-down instruction. Therefore, we hold that Defendant properly preserved the issue for appeal.