Opinion ID: 2446605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: lrc review of administrative regulations

Text: The General Assembly has in its recent history exercised oversight and review of administrative regulations promulgated by the various executive agencies, boards and commissions. KRS 13.080-13.125. This oversight and review has been achieved through a subcommittee of the LRC known as the Administrative Regulation Review Subcommittee. KRS 13.087. The effect of this LRC subcommittee's actions was recommendatory in nature. KRS 13.087. However, the 1982 General Assembly made several major changes in the nature of this subcommittee's actions which are the subject of this law suit. KRS 13.085(1)(d) and (e) (effective 7-15-82) provide that no regulation made by any administrative body shall become effective until it has been forwarded to the LRC and until it has been reviewed and accepted by the LRC, or it has been placed before and not disapproved by the General Assembly. KRS 13.087(4) requires that the LRC shall submit all regulations to one of its subcommittees to determine . . . if the regulation conforms to the statutory authority under which it was promulgated and if it carries out the legislative intent of the statutory authority under which it was promulgated. (Emphasis added.) The subcommittees' findings are reported to the LRC which then either finds that the regulation conforms to the legislative intent of the statutory authority and accepts the regulation, or attaches a notation of its objection to the regulation and returns it to the promulgating administrative body. KRS 13.087(5) provides that the administrative body may then revise the regulation so as to make it comply with the LRC's determination of the legislative intent or that body may return it unchanged to the LRC. KRS 13.087(6) provides that if the General Assembly is in session when an administrative body returns a regulation, that is objected to by the LRC, then the regulation shall be put before the General Assembly. KRS 13.087(7) requires a monthly reporting to the LRC of all subcommittee actions regarding administrative regulations. KRS 13.087(8) requires that all regulations not accepted by the LRC or one of its subcommittees shall be placed before the General Assembly. KRS 13.087(9) provides that the General Assembly may, during its regular sessions, and by joint resolution, or bill, require regulations submitted to the LRC to be laid before the General Assembly and may void any regulation already in effect. KRS 13.088(1) provides a procedure for the Governor to issue an executive order, in the event of an emergency, to permit applicable regulations to become effective immediately, provided that the emergency regulations are submitted to the LRC for review. KRS 13.088(2) provides that an emergency regulation shall expire when final review action is taken as provided by KRS 13.080 and 13.085. KRS 13.088(3) provides that when the LRC or a subcommittee thereof has an objection to a regulation, such regulation cannot be filed as an emergency regulation. KRS 13.092(1) provides that when the General Assembly is not in session, no administrative regulation, excepting an emergency regulation, shall become effective until accepted by the LRC. KRS 13.092(2) provides that until an administrative regulation is accepted by the LRC, it shall be of no force or effect. KRS 13.092(3) states that if any of the provisions of KRS 13.092 are held to be unconstitutional, no administrative body shall have authority to promulgate any regulations, notwithstanding any other provision of the law. It is clear that if the LRC subcommittee or the LRC itself disapproved of a proposed regulation, the regulation's implementation would be delayed until the next session of the General Assembly. Therefore, KRS 13.085 and KRS 13.087 provide a device whereby the LRC or a subcommittee thereof could block, for a period of nearly twenty-one months, the administrative policy of the executive branch of government. KRS 13.085 and KRS 13.087 have the effect of creating a legislative veto of the administrative policy of the executive branch of government. One of appellants' witnesses testified to this effect when he said: Q. 43. Well, in practical effect it is a legislative veto? A. It's a legislative veto; right. Q. 44. It's a legislative veto. . . A. Yes, sir. Q. 45. . . . of proposed regulations by departments of government? A. Yes, sir. Under pre-existing law, LRC objections to prepared regulations were precatory. The objections did not have the force of law. The changes in KRS 13.085, 13.087 and 13.092 which require LRC approval or LRC subcommittee approval of regulations have the effect of preventing the executive from dealing with emergencies. The power to suspend a regulation's effective date for up to twenty-one months is the power to effectively prevent a regulation from having the force of law. In addition, the legislature has statutorily attempted to deliver this power into the hands of seven members of the General Assembly or into the control of a subcommittee thereof. [12] The trial court held that such constituted a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The judgment stated that delegation of legislative powers to the LRC when the General Assembly was in adjournment was improper and declared that neither the General Assembly nor its designee could legislate when the General Assembly was not in session. The adoption of administrative regulations necessary to implement and carry out the purpose of legislative enactments is executive in nature and is ordinarily within the constitutional purview of the executive branch of government. Ky. Const. Secs. 27-28, 42, 88 and 89. Brown v. Barkley, Ky., 628 S.W.2d 616 (1982). We conclude that KRS 13.085(1)(d) and (e); KRS 13.087(4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (9); KRS 13.088(2)(3); and KRS 13.092(1) and (2) which set out the plan and the rules for providing legislative or LRC review of proposed regulations as those statutes are presently written are violative of Ky. Const. Secs. 27-28 and are a legislative encroachment into the power of the executive branch. [13] It will also be recalled that the review of the regulations was for the stated legislative purpose of determining if they comported with statutory authority and if they carried out the legislative intent. It requires no citation of authority to state unequivocally that such a determination is a judicial matter and is within the purview of the judiciary, the Court of Justice. [14] For this reason, we also conclude that the statutory scheme discussed above violates the separation of powers doctrine. See, Butler v. United Cerebral Palsy of Northern Kentucky, Inc., Ky., 352 S.W.2d 203 (1961). One further question remains. Appellants argue that KRS 13.092(3), a non-severability clause, is applicable. The statute, in essence, provides that if the LRC or its subcommittee cannot constitutionally veto proposed regulations, then the executive department cannot issue any more regulations. The trial court declared KRS 13.092(3) to be void as being in contravention of the Governor's constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws of the Commonwealth under Sections 69 and 81 of the Kentucky Constitution. Under Kentucky's Constitution, the executive powers and responsibilities of the Commonwealth lie within the province of the Governor. Ky. Const. Sec. 69. Under Section 81 the Governor has the positive duty to go forward and take care that the laws be faithfully executed. Ky. Const. Sec. 81. In Brown v. Barkley, Ky., 628 S.W.2d 616 (1982), we reaffirmed this executive duty when we said: We do not doubt that if the General Assembly should pass a law that requires implementation, and appropriate funds for that purpose but omit specifying the manner in which it is to be carried out, the chief executive would be required to carry it out and have the right to choose the means by which to do it. 628 S.W.2d at 623. (Emphasis added.) This right, this duty, exists because of the specific constitutional duties conferred on the Governor. The non-severability clause that appears in KRS 13.092(3) has the effect of throwing the baby out with the bath water. The adoption and use of administrative regulations are important tools in the operation of modern government, at all levels. The purpose is to enable the Governor to successfully carry out the constitutionally mandated executive and administrative duties bestowed upon that office: General Assembly v. Byrne, 90 N.J. 376, 448 A.2d 438 (1982); Burton v. Mayer, 274 Ky. 245, 118 S.W.2d 161 (1938). There is no constitutional authority, however, whereby the governor can add, directly or indirectly, to the content of a statute by means of an administrative regulation and, a fortiori, no administrative regulation can be adopted unless it is necessary and is related to the content of the legislative act and to its effective administration. The statute in question not only impliedly reorganizes the executive duties of the Governor, but also attempts to usurp these powers. Having failed at the first part, it further attempts to restrict the ability of the Governor to carry out his sworn duties. The General Assembly, by enacting the clause, has restricted the power of the Governor to carry out his duties. In Kenton Water Company v. City of Covington, 156 Ky. 569, 161 S.W. 988 (1913), we said: [W]here the Constitution has by express provision denied the Legislature the right to require a particular thing to be done, or to legislate upon a particular subject or in a particular way, then the Legislature cannot by indirection require it to be done by attaching it as a condition to the exercise of some power which it has granted and which is essential to the public welfare that it be exercised. To do this would be to permit the constitutional provision to be indirectly violated and render it a nullity. . . . 161 S.W. at 992. The restriction placed on the executive by KRS 13.092(3) effectively and unconstitutionally limits and interferes with the governor's mandated duties. It should also be noted that the General Assembly, through its enactment of KRS 446.090 clearly established the necessity of being able to sever a constitutionally infirm section of any statute from the sound portion thereof. We, therefore, conclude that Section 3 of KRS 13.092 is void and we affirm the trial court.