Opinion ID: 1057701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: the sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery

Text: Mr. Banks challenges his consecutive twenty-five year sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery on three grounds. First, he asserts that these sentences violate Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) and that he was entitled to a presumptive sentence in the absence of a finding of enhancement factors by the jury. Second, he asserts that each of these sentences was excessive. Third, he asserts that the trial court erred by ordering these sentences to be served consecutively. The Court of Criminal Appeals found each of these claims to be without merit. We agree.
In Blakely v. Washington , the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment required sentences in criminal cases to be based on the facts either admitted by the defendant or found by the jury. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 303-04. Therefore, the Court held that trial courts could not impose a sentence higher than the statutory maximum sentence if their decision was based on facts that were neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. at 304, 124 S.Ct. 2531. However, in the remedial portion of its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245-68, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), the United States concluded that judicial fact-finding in sentencing was permissible so long as sentencing guidelines were advisory rather than mandatory. [33] As they existed prior to 2005, Tennessee criminal sentencing statutes established a sentencing range and a presumptive sentence for each class of felonies other than capital murder. [34] Under the sentencing procedures required by these statutes, a trial court could not increase a defendant's sentence above the presumptive sentence unless it found that enhancement factors existed. If the trial court determined that enhancement factors existed, it then had the authority to increase a defendant's sentence up to the maximum sentence provided for that range. [35] The decision in Blakely v. Washington placed a constitutional cloud over the power of trial courts in Tennessee to sentence defendants beyond the statutory presumptive sentence based on facts not reflected in the jury's verdict. Accordingly, in 2005, [36] the Tennessee General Assembly amended the sentencing statutes to make the statutory sentencing guidelines advisory and to remove the presumptive sentences for each class of felonies other than capital murder. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c) (2006); State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 343. The removal of the presumptive sentences and rendering the guidelines advisory cured the Sixth Amendment defect noted in Blakely v. Washington using the United States v. Booker remedy and enabled Tennessee's trial courts to sentence a defendant to any sentence within the applicable range as long as the length of the sentence is consistent with the purposes and principles of the sentencing statutes. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d). [37] Mr. Banks knowingly exercised his right to be sentenced under the sentencing laws as amended in 2005. [38] As a result of this decision, he did not have the right to a presumptive sentence. [39] Accordingly, Mr. Banks's objections to his sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery based on Blakely v. Washington and his purported right to be sentenced at the presumptive sentence are without merit.
Mr. Banks also takes issue with the length of his sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. He asserts (1) that these sentences are excessive, (2) that the trial court relied on enhancement factors that were not supported by the evidence, (3) that the trial court erred in his treatment of the mitigating factors, and (4) that the trial court violated Blakely v. Washington by considering enhancement factors [that] were not determined by a jury. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the length of these sentences was not excessive. We agree. Mr. Banks has a statutory right to take issue on appeal with the length of his sentences on the ground that they are excessive. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-401(b)(2) (2006). When reviewing a sentence, an appellate court must review the record de novo and must presume that the determinations made by the court from which the appeal is takenin this case the Court of Criminal Appealsare correct. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-401(d). We have interpreted this statutory standard of review to mean that an appellate court is bound by a trial court's decision as to the length of the sentence imposed so long as it is imposed in a manner consistent with the purposes and principles set out in sections -102 and -103 of the Sentencing Act. State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346. Mere disagreement with how the trial court weighed enhancing and mitigating factors is not an adequate basis for reversing a sentence. State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345-46. The twenty-five year sentences imposed on Mr. Banks by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeals are the maximum sentences for convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery. As the Court of Criminal Appeals noted, the trial court's sentencing decision with regard to Mr. Banks's convictions for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery were based on the following six enhancement factors: (1) Mr. Banks had a previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range, [40] (2) Mr. Banks was the leader in the commission of the offense, [41] (3) the personal injuries inflicted upon and the amount of damage to property sustained by or taken from Mr. Atilebawi were particularly great, [42] (4) Mr. Banks failed to comply with the conditions of a sentence involving release into the community, [43] (5) the felony was committed while Mr. Banks was released on probation, [44] and (6) Mr. Banks abused a position of private trust. [45] State v. Banks, 2007 WL 1966039, at -46. The trial court also considered Mr. Banks's apparent lack of remorse and his dangerousness. Before the Court of Criminal Appeals, Mr. Banks took issue with the trial court's reliance on the three enhancement factors in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(2), (6), (14). He also asserted that the trial court had erred by disregarding all his mitigating factors solely because of his lack of remorse. The State conceded that the evidence did not support the trial court's reliance on the enhancement factors in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(6), (14) [46] but insisted that the evidence fully supported the trial court's reliance on the enhancement factor in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(2) and that the trial court had not improperly disregarded Mr. Banks's mitigating factors. The trial court focused its analysis on the nature and characteristics of Mr. Banks's criminal conduct in this case, the weight of the evidence supporting the enhancement factors, and the relative lack of weight of Mr. Banks's mitigation evidence. The trial court considered all of the criteria set out in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b) and then imposed a sentence within the applicable range. The trial court explained its reasons for imposing the sentences, and most of the trial court's relevant findings are adequately supported by the record. See State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 346. The trial court's sentencing discretion was broadened when the Tennessee General Assembly enacted the 2005 amendments to the sentencing statutes. State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 345. We have conducted a detailed, de novo review of the record with regard to the twenty-five year sentences Mr. Banks received for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery, and we have determined that the evidence supports the trial court's finding of the enhancement factors in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1), (2), (8), and (13)(c). Accordingly, despite the trial court's reliance on two inapplicable enhancement factors, we, like the Court of Criminal Appeals, have concluded that the trial court considered and weighed all the matters that Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210 required it to consider and that the four remaining enhancement factors more than adequately support the trial court's discretionary decision to impose twenty-five year sentences for these two crimes.
In his final challenge to his non-capital sentences, Mr. Banks argues that the trial court erred by ordering these sentences to be served consecutively. Specifically, he insists that his criminal history after he became eighteen years old was not extensive enough to influence whether he should serve his non-capital sentences concurrently or consecutively. The Tennessee General Assembly has provided the courts with the factors to consider when determining whether sentences should be served concurrently or consecutively. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b) (2006). A trial court may order multiple sentences to be served consecutively upon finding that any one of the seven factors contained in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b) apply. However, if the trial court bases its decision to require sentences to be served consecutively on its finding that the defendant is a dangerous offender, it must make additional findings regarding the severity of the crimes committed and the necessity to protect the public from further criminal acts by the defendant. State v. Allen, 259 S.W.3d 671, 689 (Tenn.2008); State v. Robinson, 146 S.W.3d at 524 (appendix); State v. Lane, 3 S.W.3d 456, 460-61 (Tenn.1999). Although it is only necessary for the trial court to find one of the factors in Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b) in order to require Mr. Banks to serve his non-capital sentences consecutively, the trial court found that three factors were applicable. In accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2), the trial court found that Mr. Banks's record of criminal activity was extensive, particularly for someone so young. The trial court also found, in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4), that Mr. Banks was a dangerous offender. Finally, the trial court had already determined that Mr. Banks had committed his crimes while on probation. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(6). Mr. Banks argues that the trial court should not have considered his juvenile record and that he did not have a particularly extensive criminal record after his eighteenth birthday. Neither the law nor the facts support this argument. When determining whether sentences should run consecutively or concurrently, trial courts are not limited to considering the defendant's criminal activity or conduct that occurred after the defendant's eighteenth birthday. State v. Stockton, 733 S.W.2d 111, 112 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 37-1-133(b) (2005) (authorizing the use of juvenile records in the preparation of pre-sentence reports). Mr. Banks's presentence report and other evidence in this case provides ample evidence of his extensive criminal record and of his dangerousness. He has prior convictions on two counts of assault, one of which involved bodily harm. He has been convicted of aggravated burglary. His criminal conduct in this case demonstrates a lack of regard for human life and a lack of hesitation to resort to violence to commit crimes that create a high risk to human life. Based on our de novo review of the record, we have concluded, like the Court of Criminal Appeals, that the trial court, in accordance with Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-115, did not err by ordering Mr. Banks to serve his sentences for attempted first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery consecutively.