Opinion ID: 2593105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Valdez Motel's Directed Verdict on Helfrich's URLTA Retaliation Claims

Text: Helfrich argues that Valdez Motel violated URLTA's anti-retaliation provision and that the superior court therefore erred in granting Valdez Motel's motion for directed verdict on his URLTA retaliation claim. Alaska Statute 34.03.310(a) prohibits a landlord from retaliating against a tenant by increasing rent or decreasing services or by bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession after the tenant has ... (2) sought to enforce rights and remedies granted the tenant under this chapter.  [24] Whether Helfrich's eviction violated the anti-retaliation statute depends on whether his lawyer's May 26, 2005 demand letter was an attempt to enforce rights and remedies granted the tenant under [URLTA]. [25] URLTA requires that landlords maintain fit premises. [26] Maintaining fit premises includes making all repairs and keeping the premises in a fit and habitable condition; [27] keeping common areas clean and safe; [28] keeping the electric, plumbing, heating, and like systems in good and safe working order and condition; [29] providing appropriate trash receptacles; [30] providing essential services such as running water, hot water, and heat; [31] providing locks and keys when requested by the tenant; [32] and providing smoke and carbon monoxide detectors. [33] Tenants' remedies for landlords' noncompliance with AS 34.03.100(a) include terminating the tenancy and suing for damages or injunctive relief. [34] Helfrich essentially argues that his personal injury lawsuit asserts the right to safe common areas granted him by AS 34.03.100(a)(2) through the remedy of damages granted him by AS 34.03.160(b). He contends that either threatening to file or filing a lawsuit is therefore conduct protected from retaliation by AS 34.03.310(a)(2). Valdez Motel appears to respond that the right to be free of the landlord's negligence and the remedy of personal injury damages are granted not by URLTA, but by the state's general tort law, and that because Helfrich was not enforcing rights and remedies granted by URLTA, his conduct was not protected from retaliation by AS 34.03.310(a)(2). We have said that the public policy behind AS 34.03.310 is to encourage tenants to assert their rights under their leases and under the law. [35] But we have not determined the scope of conduct the statute protects. We have emphasized that Alaska's adoption of URLTA accord[ed] tenants previously unrecognized rights by recognizing the contractual nature of the landlord-tenant relationship. [36] URLTA grants the tenant a right to require the landlord to maintain fit premises [37] and provides a remedy for damages if the landlord fails to do so. [38] But URLTA does not expressly grant the tenant a right to be free from the landlord's negligence or a remedy to recover consequential damages for personal injuries resulting from such negligence if fitness and habitability are not in issue. Nor does it do so implicitly. Alaska's tort law, not URLTA, confers this right and this remedy. We conclude that tenants' personal injury claims seeking recovery for injuries resulting from landlords' alleged negligence do not [seek] to enforce rights and remedies granted the tenant under [URLTA]. [39] Alaska Statute 34.03.310(a)(2) therefore does not protect tenants from eviction if they threaten or file personal injury lawsuits. There may be good policy reasons supporting a broader interpretation of subsection.310(a)(2). Tenants who file personal injury lawsuits seek damages for injuries resulting from past conditions, not for ongoing noncompliance with URLTA's duty to maintain premises safe and fit for habitation. Nonetheless, personal injury lawsuits or claims may motivate landlords to comply with URLTAby maintaining safe premises to avoid future litigation or even to mitigate dangerous conditions identified in the claim or lawsuit. Moreover, URLTA's anti-retaliation provision reflects our policy of encouraging tenants to assert their rights under their leases and under the law. [40] Lawsuits under URLTA and lawsuits under state tort law both further that policy. Tenants who have not yet been injured are protected from retaliation if they threaten to sue or sue for rent abatement under AS 34.03.160(b) for landlords' ongoing noncompliance with URLTA's duty to maintain the premises. But tenants who have been injured and who choose to sue under tort law instead of URLTA also assert their rights under their leases and under the law. [41] As a matter of policy, those tenants are no less worthy of protection from retaliation. Despite these considerations, we conclude that a narrower reading is more consistent with the text and structure of AS 34.03.310(a)(2). That subsection's plain text protects from retaliation only a tenant's actions to enforce rights and remedies under URLTA. URLTA's remedy for breach of the landlord's statutory duties under AS 34.03.100(a) and the common law tort remedy for personal injury damages are not the same. Other states have enacted versions of URLTA with broader protections. Oregon's statute prohibits retaliation against any tenant who has performed or expressed intent to perform any other act for the purpose of asserting, protecting or invoking the protection of any right secured to tenants under any federal, state or local law. [42] The Alaska legislature could have adopted a similar protection but did not. We will not second guess that determination. Our analysis is confirmed by our review of statutory schemes elsewhere. Several other states adopting URLTA have also adopted provisions similar to AS 34.03.310(a)(2). [43] But none appears to have decided whether seeking compensation for personal injuries sustained as a result of a prior dangerous condition on the premises is protected conduct under the retaliatory eviction provision. New York's anti-retaliation statute, which is not based on URLTA, resembles AS 34.03.310 in specifying that tenant actions must vindicate legal rights protected by landlord-tenant laws to be protected from retaliation. [44] A New York municipal court has held that this statute protects from retaliation only conduct related to tenants' contract actions to enforce rights related to the warranty of habitability, not tort actions seeking compensation for personal injury. [45] New York's landlord-tenant law requires the landlord to keep the premises safe and fit for human habitation and entitles the tenant to damages for breach of this duty. [46] In Pezzolanella v. Galloway , a tenant threatened to sue in tort for damages after her child was injured when her kitchen ceiling collapsed. [47] The tenant alleged that her landlord breached his duty under the landlord-tenant law to keep the premises safe and fit for human habitation. [48] The landlord subsequently commenced a summary eviction proceeding in which the tenant raised retaliation as an affirmative defense. [49] The court rejected the tenant's argument that the lawsuit was an action to secure her rights under housing laws. [50] It therefore held that threatening to file the lawsuit was not conduct protected from retaliation and that the landlord did not violate the statute by evicting the tenant. [51] Helfrich's purported eviction occurred after he requested compensation for personal injuries allegedly suffered as a result of Valdez Motel's negligence. Because we have held that claims for compensation for personal injuries are not protected by URLTA's anti-retaliation statute, we must next determine whether Helfrich's pre-eviction demands asserted any other rights and remedies granted by URLTA. [52] On appeal Helfrich alleges that Valdez Motel failed to comply with the requirement that it keep all common areas of the premises in a clean and safe condition. [53] But the demand letter Helfrich's attorney sent did not explicitly or implicitly threaten to sue for noncompliance with the requirements contained in AS 34.03.100(a). The letter did refer to common law tort duties by stating that liability in this case is fairly straightforward. An innkeeper has a clear duty under Alaska law to maintain safe conditions for their lodgers. The letter also urged Valdez Motel to seek coverage for Helfrich's expenses and damages from its insurance provider, and Helfrich's subsequent complaint referred to the request for reimburse[ment] for damages from Valdez Motel's insurance carrier. In context the demand letter refers to a liability insurer covering tort claims for negligently caused damages. Likewise, the letter refers to typical personal injury remedies for an on-premises slip and fall: out-of-pocket medical expenses plus unspecified damages. The demand letter did not explicitly refer to or implicitly invoke any statutory URLTA remedy. Its exclusive focus was on recovery of what would be considered common law tort damages. A tenant may sue under URLTA to recover damages and obtain injunctive relief for any noncompliance by the landlord with ... AS 34.03.100.... But remedies for a landlord's noncompliance with URLTA generally relate to habitability or fitness disputes. URLTA damages compensate tenants who live with conditions that render a dwelling unfit, uninhabitable, or unsafe, or who are constructively evicted by those conditions. [54] Fault is irrelevant to such URLTA claims. [55] Common law tort remedies compensate plaintiffs for consequential damages resulting from personal injury, including medical expenses, loss of employment or lack of income, and pain and suffering. Helfrich's attorney's demand letter did not seek any URLTA-specific remedies, such as rent abatement or injunctive relief. Instead it requested compensation for Helfrich's medical expenses and damages, noting that as a result of the accident Helfrich was unable to work and continued to suffer pain and interference with normal activities. Likewise, it asserted that Helfrich fell on an icy pathway that was clearly dangerous. It therefore made out a claim of fault, implying that the landlord was negligent. Helfrich could have threatened to sue under both tort law and URLTA, but only invoked rights granted by Alaska's tort law and only sought typical common law tort remedies. Helfrich's attorney's demand letter did not, in the words of AS 34.03.310(a)(2), seek to enforce rights and remedies granted under URLTA. [56] We conclude that subsection.310(a)(2) is inapplicable as a matter of law, and that no reasonable juror could find any facts that would support a verdict for Helfrich on his retaliation claim. [57] We therefore hold that the superior court did not err in granting Valdez Motel's motion for directed verdict on Helfrich's URLTA claims. [58]