Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Penalty trial misconduct issues

Text: On August 7, 1992, eight months before the penalty phase began, the People filed their statutory notice of intent to introduce evidence in aggravation (§ 190.3). The notice included defendant's alleged 1982 sexual assault on his 15-year-old niece, Alexandra M. It referred only to a rape of the victim, but warned that the proof would include all acts committed by the defendant whether or not they resulted in a plea or finding of guilty. Also in August 1992, according to defense counsel, the prosecution provided the defense with an offer of proof regarding evidence in aggravation (Offer of Proof). As to the Alexandra M. incident, this document still mentioned only a rape, but it did provide additional details about the circumstances of the assault. It also alleged that as a result of the rape, Alexandra M. became pregnant, had an abortion, and attempted suicide, and that she never reported the crime to the police because she feared the effect on her grandparents if they ever found out. [31] On January 6, 1993, prior to the guilt trial, the trial court ordered a Phillips hearing [32] as to the Alexandra M. incident, to be held if the guilt verdicts made it necessary, in order to allow the defense to cross-examine the complaining witness prior to the penalty trial. The court also instructed the prosecutor to provide the defense with any corroborating evidence he would have in the meantime, including [a]ny other witnesses who may have seen it, any police reports, the extent of any injuries she may have sustained, the hospital where she was treated, and any treatment she received. In mid-April 1993, the prosecutor received, and turned over to the defense, a letter Alexandra M. wrote immediately after the assault, but did not send, to her friend Margaret Yen, in which she said she enjoyed the encounter and mentioned no force or fear. At the Phillips hearing, held on April 29, 1993, Alexandra M. indicated the following: Defendant had gagged her with a bandanna. The assault included sodomy and forcible oral copulation as well as rape. Defendant threatened to kill Alexandra and various members of her family if she revealed the incident. She aborted her pregnancy at Planned Parenthood in New York City. She ultimately revealed the assault to Yen, her parents, her therapist, her godfather, and several other close friends and family members. In 1988, while defendant was a fugitive, she disclosed it to FBI agents who came to her house. At some point, her mother spoke to a Berkeley police detective. In their prior conversations, the prosecutor did not ask for details, and she had provided them fully only that morning, though she had mentioned the gag two weeks earlier. Based on the newly disclosed information, defendant moved in limine to exclude Alexandra M.'s testimony on grounds, among others, that the prosecution had failed to give fair notice and discovery of the aggravating evidence. Alternatively, he sought a continuance to investigate the new information. The motion was heard the day after the Phillips hearing. Defense counsel indicated that I don't think it's controverted ... that up to yesterday, even [the prosecutor] was in possession of only one piece of evidence that had to do with this case i.e., the Margaret Yen letter delivered to the defense two weeks earlier. The prosecutor represented, without objection from defense counsel, that he had provided the defense with information about where the abortion took place as soon as the defense requested it, and that there were no police reports on the incident. The prosecutor confirmed he had not known, prior to the Phillips hearing, of any other witnesses or corroborating evidence. The court agreed to exclude evidence of Alexandra's attempted suicide, but otherwise denied the motion. At the ensuing penalty trial, Alexandra M. testified in basic conformity with her statements at the Phillips hearing. The defense cross-examined her about the unmailed letter to Yen, and pointed out how her trial testimony differed from the facts recited in the Offer of Proof. Alexandra insisted at trial that, in July 1992, she had told the prosecutor of the threats to her familya fact not mentioned in the Offer of Proofbut the parties ultimately stipulated before the jury that she did not disclose either the sodomy and oral copulation, or the threats against her and her family, until the day of the Phillips hearing. On appeal, defendant renews his argument that the prosecutor violated his notice and discovery obligations by failing to provide, prior to the Phillips hearing, the new details Alexandra M. disclosed in the hearingin particular, the sodomy and forcible oral copulation, and the identities of the persons Alexandra had told of the assault. Defendant cites the court's order of January 6, 1993, that the prosecutor turn over all corroborating evidence the prosecutor had, as well as the prosecutor's duty, under Brady, supra, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, and the California criminal discovery statute (§ 1054.1 et seq.), to disclose exculpatory evidence. [33] However, as recounted above, the prosecutor did not know of the additional sex crimes, or of the corroborating witnesses, until Alexandra M. disclosed them at the Phillips hearing. The court's January 1993 discovery order obliged the prosecution only to turn over corroborating evidence it would have between then and the Phillips hearing. Under the California criminal discovery statute, disclosure of covered information should be made within 30 days of trial, but is timely in any event if provided immediately after the prosecution becomes aware of it. (§ 1054.7.) Brady and its progeny do not require disclosure of information before the prosecution actually or constructively possesses it. Defendant suggests the prosecutor had a statutory and constitutional duty to know this information sooner, because Alexandra M. was his intended witness. Not so. Under section 1054.1, evidence is subject to disclosure, if at all, only to the extent it is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or [known by him] to be in the actual possession of the investigating agencies. Under the federal Constitution, evidence is subject to disclosure, if at all, only to the extent actually possessed by the prosecution team, i.e., those government agencies assisting in the criminal investigation, such as the police. ( Steele, supra, 32 Cal.4th 682, 697, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 85 P.3d 444; see Kyles, supra, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490.) The prosecution `has no general duty to seek out, obtain, and disclose all evidence that might be beneficial to the defense.' [Citation.] ( People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 460, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790 ( Panah ).) Thus, it need not extract all possible information from a private citizen who is a potential prosecution witness in order to disclose it to the defense. [34] Defendant also fails to demonstrate, for purposes of Brady and the criminal discovery statute (§ 1054.1, subd. (e)), that the prosecution failed to disclose exculpatory evidence. The prosecution did turn over, as soon as it received, the only arguably exculpatory evidence in the record, Alexandra's unmailed letter to Margaret Yen. Alexandra M.'s disclosure, at the Phillips hearing, of the additional forcible sex acts committed by defendant was certainly not exculpatory. And the record contains no evidence that persons whom Alexandra revealed she told about the assaultother than Yen, who did testify for the defensewould have provided information to impeach Alexandra or otherwise undermine the prosecution's case. Insofar as the court's January 1993 discovery order required the prosecutor to turn over corroborating evidence, it is difficult to see how any omission was prejudicial. At trial, the People presented no corroborating witnesses or evidence. In sum, no misconduct or prejudice occurred. [35]
Jiro Enomoto, a former Director of the Department of Corrections, testified for the defense that, based on defendant's pretrial jail records, he would not pose a safety risk to prison staff or inmates if sentenced to life without parole. On cross-examination, the prosecutor elicited the witness's admissions that he frequently testified for criminal defendants on prison-adjustment issues, and had done so perhaps three or four times in the past year. The prosecutor then asked, In fact, a few weeks ago you testified across the hall in the case of the gentleman that was convicted of four separate murders and six attempted murders that he would adjust well to prison life also; is that correct? The witness responded, That's correct; yes. Defendant did not object. Defendant now insists the prosecutor's question unfairly impugned the witness's credibility, and thus compromised a reliable penalty determination in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The absence of a trial objection, where an admonition would have cured any harm, forfeits the claim. The contention lacks merit in any event. [A]n expert's testimony in prior cases involving similar issues is a legitimate subject of cross-examination. ( Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th 324, 457, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) Despite arguable differences in the facts of the two cases, they involved similar issues of the expert's views on prison adjustment. The prosecutor was entitled to expose bias in the witness by showing his propensity to advocate for criminal defendants even in extreme cases. No misconduct occurred.
As noted above, Alexandra M. testified at trial, as at the Phillips hearing, that defendant's sexual assault included sodomy and oral copulation as well as rape, that he gagged her with a bandanna, and that he threatened to kill members of her family, and then her, if she told anyone about the incident. She acknowledged the unsent letter to Margaret Yen, in which she wrote that she enjoyed the sex and mentioned no force or threats. Smudges on the letter, she said, were from my crying. She admitted she did not disclose the incident to anybody other than [her] mother and some people close to [her], friends, and did not report it to any law enforcement officer until 1988, when she mentioned it to an FBI agent. As in the Phillips hearing, defense counsel cross-examined Alexandra at some length about details of her trial testimony that were not included in the Offer of Proof. Counsel particularly sought to determine what details she had told the prosecutor, and when. She indicated she spoke to the prosecutor by phone in July 1992 and several times thereafter, that he just asked ... what had basically happened, and that she told him the basic facts corresponding to her testimony. She agreed the Offer of Proof capture[d] the essence of what she told the prosecutor, though she insisted she did tell him, in July 1992, of defendant's threats against her and her family. She also agreed she had told the prosecutor like two weeks ago about the bandanna used as a gag. As a defense witness, Yen testified to her conversation with Alexandra M. shortly after the assault. In this conversation, Yen recounted, Alexandra did not seem upset, characterized the encounter as consensual, and described it as the seduction of a young girl by an older man. In a stipulation later read to the jury, the parties agreed as follows: The prosecutor first spoke to Alexandra M. in July 1992. Then, and in subsequent conversations, she mentioned only a rape, not sodomy or oral copulation. Only on April 29, 1993 (the day of the Phillips hearing) did she mention threats by defendant against herself and her family. The prosecutor did not believe he asked her any questions beyond whether she was raped, as was his practice in sexual assault cases. In his closing penalty argument, the prosecutor anticipated defense comments about the discrepancies between the Offer of Proof and Alexandra M.'s trial testimony. He asked the jury not to be concerned about the legal document I'm sure [defense] counsel will talk about in which the [Alexandra M.] sexual assault was described [only] as a rape. When I spoke with her on the phone, I didn't go into detail with her and ask her questions about each individual detail of the incident. I didn't think it was necessary; and I didn't think it was proper to do that to a woman who was traumatized the way she had, to make her discuss those details on the phone to a stranger. [¶] It is common for women to refer to a rape to cover all the incidents of a sexual assault. If you want to blame someone for the lack of details in that document, blame me. Don't blame Alexandra. The prosecutor also hypothesized why Alexandra M. wrote that she enjoyed the sex, told Yen it was consensual, and did not report the incident to the authorities sooner. Citing both Alexandra's tearstained airplane letter and her later statement, in a second conversation with Yen, that defendant took advantage of her because she was worthless, the prosecutor said, It's very common for a woman or a girl in this case to have feelings of guilt and shame even though she's done nothing wrong. ... [¶] And it may very well be that Alexandra was so traumatized by what happened to her that she couldn't admit at first what happened, so it took her time to be able to say, to admit and realize what her uncle had done to her. Defendant raised no objection. On appeal, defendant contends this argument constituted improper vouching for Alexandra M.'s credibility. The prosecutor, defendant claims, wrongly bolstered her testimony with his personal knowledge and assurances when he alluded to his telephone contact with Alexandra, stated why he did or did not discuss certain things with her, and asked the jury to blame him, not her, for any discrepancies. Furthermore, defendant insists, the prosecutor gave unqualified expert opinion, not supported by trial evidence, about the common effects of rape trauma on the victim's ability to understand, accept, and report what happened to her. As a result, defendant urges, he suffered violations of his federal constitutional rights to due process, confrontation, fair trial, impartial jury, adequate legal representation, and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) At the outset, defendant's failure to raise a vouching objection at trial forfeits the claim on appeal. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 970, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183 ( Frye ); People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 756-757, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2 ( Medina ).) The claim also fails on the merits. Impermissible vouching occurs where the prosecutor places the prestige of the government behind a witness through personal assurances of the witness's veracity or suggests that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony. ( People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 211, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302 ( Fierro ).) But so long as a prosecutor's assurances ... are based on the `facts of [the] record and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom, rather than any purported personal knowledge or belief,' [his] comments cannot be characterized as improper vouching. ( Frye, supra, 18 Cal.4th 894, 971, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183; see also Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th 694, 757, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Such is the case here. The prosecutor's references to his telephone contact with Alexandra M., and his stated reasons for not questioning her about the details of the assault, are amply supported either directly, or by reasonable inference, from the trial evidence. The stipulation read to the jury indicated that the prosecutor first spoke to Alexandra in July 1992, one month before filing the Offer of Proof, that in this and subsequent conversations she mentioned only a rape, and that it was his practice not to subject sexual assault victims to detailed questioning. Alexandra confirmed that she first spoke with the prosecutor on the phone in July 1992, and told him the basic facts of the incident at that time. Jurors could readily infer that the prosecutor's restrained questioning practice in sex assault cases stemmed from his sensitivity to the victim's traumatized state. Nor was the prosecutor obliged to present a rape trauma expert before suggesting that feelings of confusion and unwarranted shame might have caused Alexandra M. to be uncertain about whether the sexual encounter with defendant was consensual, and to delay reporting the incident. There was substantial evidence that she was confused and ashamed as a result of the assault. She testified she was hysterically crying immediately after the incident, even though defendant told her she had enjoyed the experience, and she knew no better. Alexandra further testified that she remained hysterical as she boarded the plane home, and that she cried during the flight as she drafted a letter about the episode to Margaret Yen. In this letter, which was admitted in evidence, Alexandra said she enjoyed the sex, but also that she hate[d] [her]self, that Yen would probably want nothing more to do with her now that I have shamed myself and my family, and that I can never look at my aunt or my cousins again. According to Alexandra, she was a basket case during the three months between the assault and the discovery of her pregnancy. Only then did she tell her mother, without go[ing] into detail, and she still kept the matter secret from other family members. Yen, testifying as a defense witness, recounted Alexandra's statement, months after the incident, that it must have been caused by her own worthlessness. Yen could tell from the conversation that Alexandra was feeling some shame. Six years after the assault, when the FBI contacted her family in connection with defendant's fugitive status, Alexandra still had told only close family and friends. Alexandra stated that, even recently, she was reluctant to testify about the assault because of the effect it would have on her grandfather, who was ill. This evidence readily permitted an inference that Alexandra M. was traumatized, confused, and unjustifiably ashamed about defendant's assault, and that this might have influenced her reluctance to report the matter. No improper vouching occurred. [36]
In the midst of his lengthy penalty phase argument, the prosecutor admonished the jury that the statutory aggravating factors were the only ones the jury could consider, but said he want[ed] to speak briefly about the subject of religion in case there is anybody who may have a problem or may feel an impediment principled by that. While quotes from the Bible could not be used in aggravation, he cautioned, he offered them only ... to show that the death penalty has from the beginning of time been repeatedly considered a just and proper punishment for murderers. Quoting Genesis 9:6 (whoever sheds the blood of man, by man shall his blood be shed, for in [H]is image did God make man), the prosecutor said this stood for two concepts: The first is that capital punishment for murderers is necessary to preserve the sanctity of human life, and second being it is man's obligation to do it. The sanctity of life, the prosecutor continued, does not forbid, but demands, the death penalty for murder, because a lesser penalty means that the taking of life is not that serious an offense. The prosecutor followed with other biblically attributed quotes on a similar theme: He who fatally strikes a man shall be put to death; You shall not make reparations for the soul of a murderer who deserves to die, and he shall be put to death; Vengeance is mine, I will repay, saith the Lord; The ruler bears not the sword in vain for he is a minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil. That's all I want to say on that subject, [l]adies and [g]entlemen, he concluded. Defendant did not object. Defendant responded with his own religious references. Counsel noted that when Cain slew Abel, God did not kill Cain, but banished him with a mark. Counsel urged that although he was not a particularly religious person, he believed jurors who imposed death might one day face memory's accusing voice asking, did I do the wrong thing? He also suggested that [e]very philosophical tenet of faith that I'm familiar with, Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism, almost says the same thing. To err is human, to forgive divine. Man without mercy is not man at all. Defendant now insists the prosecutor's invocation of the Bible as religious authority for the death penalty undermined the jurors' sense of penalty responsibility, and discouraged them from giving individualized consideration to mitigating factors. As a result, he urges, he was denied his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination. At the outset, defendant's failure to object at trial forfeits the claim on appeal. (E.g., Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264, 298, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1209, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262 ( Slaughter ); People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 100, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506 ( Ervin ).) In any event, even if the prosecutor's argument overstepped proper bounds, defendant fails to show the remarks at issue warrant reversal of the penalty judgment. A prosecutor may not cite the Bible or religion as a basis to impose the death penalty. (E.g., Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 100, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Roybal (1998) 19 Cal.4th 481, 519-521, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 487, 966 P.2d 521; People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 260-261, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107 ( Wash ).) On the other hand, we have suggested it is not impermissible to argue, for the benefit of religious jurors who might fear otherwise, that application of the death penalty according to secular law does not contravene biblical doctrine (e.g., Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th 1005, 1063, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544; Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 180, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1223, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068 ( Davenport )), or that the Bible shows society's historical acceptance of capital punishment ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1325, 248 Cal.Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221). This prosecutor sought to cast his remarks accordingly. However, he did not strictly confine himself to these themes. Though he insisted he sought only to allay religious misgivings about the propriety of the death penalty, he did not simply argue that jurors could impose capital punishment without offending the Bible's teachings. Instead, he asserted that the Bible, and particularly Genesis 9:6, makes it man's duty to impose that penalty to preserve the sanctity of human life. He urged that the Bible not only permits such action, but demands it. We recently have suggested or assumed that prosecutorial arguments substantially similar to the one at issue here are improper. ( Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264, 297-298, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1208-1210, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) But even if we similarly assume this prosecutor's comments went too far, we find, as in Vieira and Slaughter , that defendant suffered no prejudice. In this regard, we note that the prosecutor's biblical comments were part of a longer argument that properly focused upon the factors in aggravation and mitigation. ( Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1210, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) Hence, there is no likelihood his biblical references diminished the jury's sense of responsibility or displaced the court's standard penalty instructions. ( Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264, 297, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th 215, 251, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.) That defendant himself invoked religious principles is further evidence he suffered no unfair damage at the prosecutor's hands. ( Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th 48, 100, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) Hence, reversal of the penalty judgment is not warranted.
In the midst of his argument that no mitigating factors applied, the prosecutor discussed factor (h) (§ 190.3, factor (h)), i.e., whether the defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect, or the [e]ffects of intoxication. In that regard, he told the jury you have heard not one shred of evidence from a psychologist or psychiatrist or family member or anybody of any mental impairment on the part of the defendant. You heard no evidence of any mental disease or effect of intoxication, not from the defendant, not from anybody. Defendant did not object. Later, when discussing factor (k) (§ 190.3, factor (k)), i.e., whether there was [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, the prosecutor remarked, No evidence of unhappy childhood. No evidence of drug or alcohol problems. No evidence of any mental problems.  (Italics added.) Again, defendant raised no objection. Defendant claims the prosecutor thus willfully misled the jury, because he knew there was evidence of defendant's mental illnessthe born insane letter he had received from defendant's sister Terri Zambrano. (See discussion, ante. ) The prosecutor's misconduct, defendant asserts, violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair penalty determination, effective assistance of counsel, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, due process, and equal protection of the law. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) The claim must be rejected. Once again, defendant's failure to object at trial to the remarks now challenged forfeits the claim on appeal. (E.g., People v. Hinton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 839, 903, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981 ( Hinton ).) In any event, the prosecutor committed no misconduct. He merely observed, accurately, that the jury had heard no evidence on this subject. While the prosecutor may not misstate the record, [i]n general, ... [he] may comment on the record as it actually stands. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 509, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081 ( Keenan ).) Defendant had obtained a copy of the letter before the end of the guilt trial, but did not attempt to introduce it, or any related mental evidence, at the penalty trial. The record contains no explanation for the omission. (See Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 509, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) Defendant now suggests the prosecutor's delay in turning it over prevented him from conducting a timely investigation of the allegations it contained, and the letter's author had, in any event, since died. But defendant had the letter no later than April 12, 1993, when he moved for a mistrial on Brady grounds, citing the prosecutor's failure to disclose it. The defense did not begin to present its penalty case until May 4, 1993, almost three weeks later. When it denied a guilt mistrial, the court specifically said defendant was free to submit the letter to a psychiatrist for whatever help it might be at the penalty phase. And, despite Terri Zambrano's death, there were indications that other members of defendant's family were still available to provide information about his mental health. Yet counsel sought no continuance to pursue the matter. The record thus provides no ground to conclude the prosecutor's comment was unfair. Moreover, the trial court gave a standard instruction that statements by attorneys are not evidence. Under the circumstances, we find no misconduct of the sort defendant suggests. ( Keenan, supra, 46 Cal.3d 478, 510, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081, fn. omitted.)
At a point in his closing penalty argument, the prosecutor addressed the issue whether the defendant acted under extreme duress or the substantial domination of another (§ 190.3, factor (f)). The prosecutor argued, without objection, that there was no evidence of either because defendant acted on his own and did what he did for his own evil reasons. Later, the prosecutor urged that defendant deserved no leniency as one who never before did anything wrong, or killed from an internal breakdown or human weakness. Defendant, said the prosecutor, was just the opposite; he killed to suit his purposes, as a way of solving his problems, even to the point of carrying out, in cold blood, the murder and dismemberment of his friend. Thus, the prosecutor argued, this man is especially evil, and this man is especially deserving of the death penalty. [¶] This is not human weakness, ladies and gentlemen. This is evil. This defendant is much more like the other end of the spectrum, the hit man, the hired killer, except he does it himself. Still later, the prosecutor stressed that [t]his defendant was not forced into evil because of some environmental factor. This defendant had everything going for him. He chose evil, [l]adies and [g]entlemen. Finally, the prosecutor said, All you heard from the defendant are lies, [l]adies and [g]entlemen. He has not changed one bit over the years. He is still the same dangerous sociopath he has always been. Defendant now urges that the prosecutor committed misconduct, and injected his personal opinions into the case, by branding defendant as evil, a liar, and a sociopath. As a result, he insists, he was denied his constitutional right to a fair and reliable penalty determination. Defendant failed to object to any of these comments, though a prompt admonition would have cured any harm. He has therefore forfeited the claim on appeal. (E.g., People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 665-666, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 101 P.3d 509.) His claim lacks merit in any event. There is a wide range of permissible argument at the penalty phase. (E.g., People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 463, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442 ( Ochoa ).) Argument may include opprobrious epithets warranted by the evidence. ( Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th 155, 180, 14 Cal. Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) Where they are so supported, we have condoned a wide range of epithets to describe the egregious nature of the defendant's conduct. (E.g., Farnam, supra, 28 Cal.4th 107, 168, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988 [defendant is monstrous, cold-blooded, vicious, and a predator; evidence is horrifying and more horrifying than your worst nightmare]; People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 537, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101 ( Thomas ) [defendant is mass murderer, rapist, perverted murderous cancer, and walking depraved cancer]; Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1249, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163 [based on facts of crime, defendant is human monster and mutation].) Defendant brutally assaulted the Mishells because he believed they had exposed his extramarital affair. After admitting this to his friend Reyna, he murdered Reyna to prevent Reyna from testifying to the admission. Defendant then dismembered and scattered Reyna's body to hamper its identification. The prosecutor could properly characterize these acts as evil, and could brand defendant as evil for committing them. And, considering that defendant was a successful contractor and public official whose life began its downward spiral when he decided to commit adultery, the prosecutor was not amiss for suggesting that he chose his evil course. Nor did the prosecutor mischaracterize the evidence by saying that defendant told nothing but lies, and was a sociopath. When a defendant's testimony contradicts the strong evidence of his guilt, it is not improper to call him a liar. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1030, 254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1 [snake in the jungle, slick, tricky, a pathological liar, and one of the greatest liars in the history of Fresno County]; People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 505, 116 Cal. Rptr. 217, 526 P.2d 225.) And the label of sociopathsomeone who acts without conscience or remorsecertainly fit defendant, based on the facts of his crimes. No misconduct occurred.
As mitigating character witnesses, defendant called persons who knew him in his adult life as a contractor, computer enthusiast, community activist, and parent. No family members were presented. There was evidence that his parents were deceased, and that he wished to spare his children any involvement in the trial, but that he had a living brother and sister. In his closing argument, the prosecutor noted defendant's omission to call family and childhood witnesses, remarking, I ask you, who really knows someone, acquaintances or family, friends, brothers and sisters, the people you grew up with in your youth? [¶] They really know you; and they were not called, [l]adies and [g]entlemen. You did not hear from them. You have to ask yourself what that means and why that was. The defense raised no objection. On appeal, defendant urges the prosecutor's argument unfairly placed pressure on him to produce a certain kind of mitigating evidence. The failure to object, where an admonition would have cured any harm, forfeits the point. The argument is meritless in any event. The prosecutor never suggested defendant had a legal burden to present family members in mitigation. He merely commented, as is permitted, on defendant's failure to call logical witnesses. (E.g., Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th 468, 549, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035; Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th 215, 262-263, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.) The prosecutor also argued there was no evidence defendant felt remorse for his crimes. The prosecutor said, There is something else you can consider to see if the defendant deserves sympathy, and that's remorse? [¶] Is there any evidence that the defendant has repented or has expressed remorse? [¶] I submit, [l]adies and [g]entlemen, there has been none, no evidence at all that he has ever repented, ever expressed remorse for what he did to Luis Reyna in the desecration of his body, no evidence that he ever admitted the truth of what he did to Luis Reyna or has ever accepted responsibility for it. Defendant did not object. On appeal, defendant first claims these remarks constituted comment on his failure to testify at the penalty phase, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. ( Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 ( Griffin ); see Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 462, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 [5th Amend. privilege applies at sentencing phase of capital trial].) The claim was not forfeited by his failure to object, he urges, because an admonition could not have cured the harm. Even if so (but see Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th 809, 854, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152), his Griffin claim fails on the merits. The prosecutor did not comment that defendant had failed to take the stand to express remorse; he simply said there was no evidence that defendant had ever expressed remorse. We have consistently found such penalty phase argument permissible under Griffin , even where it faults the defendant for failing to confess guilt and express remorse during his guilt phase testimony. (E.g., People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 455, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391 ( Boyette ); Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th 809, 854-855, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 691, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213 ( Holt ); People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 724, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; People v. Taylor (1990) 52 Cal.3d 719, 744, 276 Cal.Rptr. 391, 801 P.2d 1142.) We do so again. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor's argument improperly implied he deserved pity or sympathy only if he had expressed remorse. The claim is forfeited for failure to object on that ground at trial. In any event, it lacks merit. The prosecutor only said that something else  (italics added) the jury could consider sympatheticallyan expression of remorsewas absent. He never stated or implied the jury could not or should not decide defendant deserved sympathy unless it found he had expressed remorse. Finally, defendant contends the prosecutor argued that the absence of sympathetic evidence was an aggravating factor. Again the claim is forfeited for failure to object, and is also meritless. The prosecutor did not state or imply that defendant's failure to express or show remorse in the wake of his crimes was a factor in aggravation. He urged only that remorse was absent as a possible mitigating factor. Such argument is permissible. ( Cook, supra, 39 Cal.4th 566, 611, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 22, 139 P.3d 492; Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th 72, 141, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400; Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th 130, 187, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) No misconduct occurred.
The prosecutor devoted substantial portions of his argument to the premise that the jury should not show defendant sympathy or mercy. Aside from the no remorse remarks detailed above, the prosecutor argued that [t]here was no basis for mitigation or to show sympathy or mercy based upon the evidence presented to you in this trial. At another point, he noted that defendant had asked for sympathy under section (k) of the death penalty statute (§ 190.3, factor (k); see CALJIC No. 8.85) because there was nothing else in mitigation. Then he asked, What kinds of things could you consider under [factor] (k) as we've seen because there is nothing else there. In this regard, he urged that sympathy might be appropriate for someone who had been born in a ghetto, or had suffered a broken home or childhood abuse, but the opposite was true of defendant, who grew up in an intact family in a beautiful home in Long Beach. Thus, the prosecutor insisted, defendant had absolutely no excuse for what he's done. And he has no right to ask you for sympathy for what he's done. The prosecutor asked rhetorically what evidence defendant offered to show he deserved sympathy or mercy, answered sarcastically by alluding to defendant's interest[] in old buildings, and asked [h]ow many buildings equal a human life. He asks for sympathy, said the prosecutor, but look at the viciousness of his attack on Robert and Barbara Mishell. In summation, the prosecutor asserted: The defendant asks you for sympathy and mercy. I ask you to tell him no. He has no right. The crimes he has committed go far beyond the pale, are too horrible. He's not entitled to sympathy or mercy. [¶] I will tell you as the prosecutor representing the People of the State of California, if you show him the same sympathy and mercy that he showed to Alexandra [M.], the same sympathy and mercy that he showed to Robert and to Barbara Mishell, the same sympathy that he showed to Luis Reyna, then I will be satisfied and justice will be done. If this defendant deserves sympathy, then they all do; and we become defenseless against predators among us, and they devour us. Defendant urges this argument violated his Eighth Amendment right to the jury's sympathetic consideration to all character and background evidence proffered in support of a penalty less than death. (E.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 114-117, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1.) The gravamen of the claim appears to be that the prosecutor improperly told the jury that sympathy evidence was irrelevant, and that defendant was not legally entitled to sympathy or mercy. [37] The prosecutor made no such assertion. On the contrary, he acknowledged that sympathy and mercy were factors the jury could consider in deciding the appropriate punishment, and he indicated that sympathetic evidence, if any, must be weighed against the evidence of aggravating factors. However, he urged, when weighed against all the aggravating evidence, the evidence in mitigation was nothing, and [t]here was no basis for mitigation or to show mercy or sympathy to this defendant based upon the evidence presented to you in this trial.  (Italics added.) All the excerpts cited by defendant pursued the same theme, i.e., that this defendant did not deserve sympathy or mercy on the basis of the evidence actually presented. The prosecutor's rhetorical assertions that defendant had no right to ask the jury for sympathy or mercy in light of his terrible crimes and the lack of sympathetic evidence would not reasonably be understood to mean that consideration of sympathy and mercy was legally foreclosed, or that sympathetic evidence was irrelevant. Instead, they suggested only that defendant had not presented a case deserving of consideration on the issue. We have often upheld such arguments. (E.g., Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th 264, 296, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990; Ochoa, supra, 19 Cal.4th 353, 464-465, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442; People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 184-185, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960; Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 176-177, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) We do so again. As noted above, the prosecutor said in his final summation that, as the People's representative, he would be satisfied if the jury showed defendant the same sympathy and mercy defendant showed his victims. Defendant contends this was misconduct, in that the prosecutor used his official position to vouch personally for the appropriateness of the verdict he was urging. (See People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 288, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193 ( Ayala ); People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 795, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330 ( Benson ).) The claim is forfeited for failure to object at trial. It also lacks merit. Here, as in Ayala and Benson , no improper vouching occurred. The prosecutor simply stated `what was obvious and altogether unobjectionablei.e., that it was the People's position that defendant's crimes called for the ultimate sanction.' [Citation.] ( Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th 243, 288, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193, quoting Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d 754, 795, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) No misconduct occurred.
Most of the prosecutor's closing penalty argument, covering some 33 pages in the reporter's transcript, was an attempt to persuade the jury that the balance of aggravating and mitigating evidence warranted the death penalty. At the conclusion of his argument, however, the prosecutor said he wanted to talk for a few minutes about the philosophy of capital punishment. In this regard, the prosecutor indicated that the purpose of the death penalty is collective vengeance, defined simply as punishment or retribution for a wrong. He urged that such vengeance is a vital expression of the community's outrage, and that the vigor of society's values is nourished by use of the criminal justice system to impose punishments that reflect the community's controlled indignation. He asserted that a society incapable of imposing such punishment where warranted is decadent and emasculated, and that the jury serves as the community's conscience in implementing this sanction. The prosecutor also invoked John Locke's concept of the social contract, whereby each individual surrenders the personal right of vengeance in favor of state-controlled retribution. The jury's failure to implement the death penalty, he argued, would violate this contract, for if society were unable or unwilling to impose even the most drastic punishment in appropriate cases, individuals, having lost faith in state justice and protection, might return to vigilantism and personal vengeance. Defendant did not object at trial. However, he now claims the prosecutor's plea that the jurors act as the community's conscience and avenger, and that they apply collective and societal values rather than focusing on a case-specific determination of the appropriate punishment, diminished their personal sense of sentencing responsibility, and deprived him of an independent, individualized, and constitutionally reliable penalty determination, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Because an admonition would have cured any harm, defendant's failure to object below forfeits the argument on appeal. In any event, it lacks merit. The prosecutor never invited the jurors to abrogate their personal responsibility to determine the appropriate punishment. Nor did he not commit misconduct merely by describing the jurors, accurately ( Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. 510, 519-520, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776), as the conscience of the community ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 734, 97 Cal. Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248 ( Lucero ); People v. Jones, supra, 15 Cal.4th 119, 185-186, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 386, 931 P.2d 960; see also Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1041, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627) or by noting the jury's important role in the criminal justice system ( Lang, supra, at p. 1041, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627; Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th 173, 248, 249, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302). Furthermore, the prosecutor did not err by devoting some remarks to a reasoned argument that the death penalty, where imposed in deserving cases, is a valid form of community retribution or vengeance i.e., punishmentexacted by the state, under controlled circumstances, and on behalf of all its members, in lieu of the right of personal retaliation. Retribution on behalf of the community is an important purpose of all society's punishments, including the death penalty. (E.g., Spaziano v. Florida (1984) 468 U.S. 447, 462, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 82 L.Ed.2d 340; see also § 1170, subd. (a)(1) [the purpose of imprisonment for crime is punishment].) And the prosecutor was entitled to direct some argument, as he clearly intended, against the possibility that one or more jurors harbored lingering reservations about capital punishment as equivalent to the State murdering. Our modern cases have suggested that prosecutorial references to community vengeance, while potentially inflammatory, are not misconduct if they are brief and isolated, and do not form the principal basis for advocating the death penalty. (E.g., Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th 839, 907, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 149, 126 P.3d 981; Davenport, supra, 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1222, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 800, 906 P.2d 1068; Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th 215, 262, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107; People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) Concern about extended comment on this issue appears traceable to People v. Floyd (1970) 1 Cal.3d 694, 83 Cal.Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64 ( Floyd ). There we noted that [a]lthough this court has never held that it is improper for a prosecutor in closing argument in a penalty trial to ask the jury to impose the death penalty for reasons of retribution or vengeance, we have stated in other contexts that `There is no place in the [sentencing] scheme for punishment for its own sake, the product simply of vengeance or retribution.' [Citation.] ( Id. at pp. 721-722, 83 Cal.Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64.) Floyd also pointed to another earlier statement of this court, i.e., that `[w]hatever may have been the fact historically, retribution is no longer considered the primary objective of the criminal law [citation] and is thought by many not even to be a proper consideration [citations].' ( Floyd, supra, 1 Cal.3d 694, 722, 83 Cal. Rptr. 608, 464 P.2d 64.) Intervening changes in penal philosophy (see discussion, ante ) make these statements suspect, and thus ameliorate concerns about the inflammatory irrelevance of such prosecutorial argument. Here, the prosecutor's comments were not brief or isolated, but neither did they form the principal basis of his argument. Moreover, his remarks were not inflammatory. They did not seek to invoke untethered passions, or to dissuade jurors from making individual decisions, but only to assert that the community, acting on behalf of those injured, has the right to express its values by imposing the severest punishment for the most aggravated crimes. This case, the prosecutor was at pains to suggest, was one of those that deserved such severe punishment. No misconduct occurred.