Opinion ID: 657206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 33 Next, Climpson claims that her money laundering conviction is not supported by constitutionally adequate evidence. This claim will be reviewed only for a manifest miscarriage of justice because Climpson did not renew her motion for a judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence. See United States v. Faymore, 736 F.2d 328, 334 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868, 105 S.Ct. 213, 83 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984). Moreover, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government. Id. 34 The elements of the money laundering offense with which Climpson was charged are: (1) use of funds that are proceeds of unlawful activity; (2) knowledge that the funds are proceeds of unlawful activity; and (3) conduct or attempt to conduct a financial transaction, knowing that the transaction is designed in whole or in part to disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds. See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Recently, this court addressed the quantum of proof necessary to support a money laundering conviction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1956 in United States v. McDougald, 990 F.2d 259 (6th Cir.1993). In that case, the court vacated defendant's money laundering conviction noting that the government did not prove: (1) that the money in question was drug money; or (2) that the defendant knew that the money was drug money. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 261-64. Certainly, a money laundering conviction is supported by constitutionally adequate evidence only where the record contains sufficient evidence to convince a reasonable juror beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] knowingly laundered drug money. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 261. Further, the court noted that defendant's mere association with a drug dealer is not constitutionally adequate evidence that laundering of drug money was knowingly undertaken. McDougald, 990 F.2d at 262. While the instant case is similar to McDougald in some respects, it is concluded that no manifest miscarriage of justice occurred here. 35 In this case, Climpson does not contest the fact that the money she used to procure the cashier's check used at the closing was drug money. However, Climpson maintains that she did not knowingly launder the money in question. The evidence showed that Richardson left to attend the closing with Climpson in possession of his green money bag containing over $10,000 in cash. Richardson told Hines that he was going to make a down payment on a house. Hines testified that Richardson kept only money obtained from his marijuana sales in the green bag. Prior to the closing, Climpson purchased a cashier's check in the amount of $9,400.02 using 32 $100 bills and other smaller bills. Upon Richardson's return, the green money bag was empty. 36 Moreover, Hines testified that Climpson smoked marijuana with Richardson and that Richardson sold marijuana to Climpson. Hines testified that she accompanied Richardson in his car as he delivered 1/4 to 1 pound quantities to Climpson's house following telephone conversations between Climpson and Richardson. Richardson told Hines that he would occasionally leave his green money bag at Climpson's house. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, evidence exists of record such that no manifest miscarriage of justice occurred.