Opinion ID: 41388
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Under Brady, “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” 373 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court subsequently extended this principle to impeachment evidence, holding that “[w]hen the ‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within this general rule.” Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 269); see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985) (rejecting any distinction between exculpatory and impeachment evidence for Brady purposes). To establish a Brady -14- violation, Appellants must prove that (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defendant because it was either exculpatory or impeaching; and (3) the evidence was material. United States v. Sipe, 388 F.3d 471, 477 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433-38 (1995). a) Robert Guidry’s Plea Agreement Appellants allege that the government violated Brady with regard to cooperating witness Robert Guidry because (1) in addition to a grant of immunity from state prosecution, Guidry’s plea deal included a secret, unwritten promise of immunity from any future civil suit for damages that the state of Louisiana might bring against him; (2) the deal was confected without Appellants’ knowledge by federal prosecutors, the Baton Rouge district attorney’s office, and Guidry’s defense lawyers and then secretly approved by a federal judge; and (3) the government failed to disclose the deal to Appellants prior to trial, depriving them of valuable impeachment evidence. Our review of the record reveals no factual support for this improbable scenario; instead, the record affirmatively contradicts Appellants’ arguments. To support their theory, Appellants rely primarily on the transcript of a 2003 state court hearing on Guidry’s request for a preliminary injunction of the -15- state lawsuit filed against him. Appellants maintain that the testimony that Guidry’s attorneys elicited from federal and state prosecutors who were parties to the Guidry plea negotiations indicates that there was indeed a hidden promise limiting Guidry’s state financial liability. To the contrary, the record reflects that even Guidry’s attorneys--who Appellants claim negotiated the alleged deal with the state and federal prosecutors--never argued or attempted to insinuate during questioning that Guidry had agreed to a secret deal that included civil immunity. Rather, they merely argued that the state immunity provisions set forth in the Moreau letter should be construed under Louisiana law to include immunity from the state civil suit.5 The theory alleging an unwritten side deal was 5 Guidry’s attorneys did not argue the existence of a hidden deal in their January 31, 2003, Memorandum in Support of Request for Preliminary Injunction: Unquestionably, the State could not prosecute Guidry criminally under the immunity granted to him. The question here is whether the immunity agreement bars the state from prosecuting this so-called civil lawsuit on the basis of his immunized information and testimony. We submit firstly that the State is barred from using the immunized information and testimony under Louisiana immunity law, and alternatively, it is barred because the lawsuit in reality is an attempt to obtain restitution, a criminal penalty, under the guise of a civil claim. Allowing this suit to proceed on the basis of the immunized information and testimony would result in an erroneous interpretation of Louisiana’s immunity law and an improper application of federal and state principles of criminal restitution. Def. § 2255 Exh. tab 11 at 4. Likewise, Guidry’s attorneys did not assert that their client had agreed to such a deal in an affidavit submitted in support of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The most -16- articulated for the very first time in Appellants’ § 2255 motions, six years after Guidry entered into his written plea agreement and more than one year after Guidry’s state court preliminary injunction hearing. Moreover, at least two of the attorneys who allegedly concocted the secret plea agreement--East Baton Rouge Parish District Attorney Doug Moreau and Assistant United States Attorney Fred Harper--testified under oath at the hearing that no mutual understanding or provision limiting Guidry’s state financial liability ever existed. Indeed, at the time that Moreau extended state immunity “for crimes [Guidry] may have committed” in return for Guidry’s cooperation with federal authorities, the state civil lawsuit against Guidry had not been filed, and it is clear from the record that none of the actors involved even contemplated that the state would pursue such a lawsuit. According to Moreau, “I had never even thought about [civil immunity] before this lawsuit. . . . I did not contemplate the use immunity or transactional immunity in regard to civil proceedings. That . . . never crossed my mind. . . . I didn’t even know of such a concept as civil immunity.” Def. § 2255 Exh. they alleged was that Guidry “still refused to enter a plea and cooperate with the government unless he could be assured that the State of Louisiana would defer its interest in the case to the federal government and would agree to limit its financial recovery to the amount specified in the federal proceeding.” Even this statement stops short of alleging the actual existence of an agreement limiting Guidry’s state financial exposure. Def. § 2255 Exh. tab 12 at 2. -17- tab 15 at 42-44. Likewise, Harper testified that side agreements outside the scope of the written plea agreement would have been prohibited and that no one involved had anticipated that the state of Louisiana would subsequently bring a civil suit against Guidry: [N]ever, in my experience, have I ever had a situation where unbeknownst to me at the time this plea agreement was entered into, and I believe at the time Mr. Guidry pled guilty, . . . the state of Louisiana, or anybody else for that matter, sued a cooperating defendant in a criminal case. . . . Never, in any case in the 28 years I’ve been doing this, have I ever seen the state sue a cooperating defendant civilly. . . . [T]he thought of a civil action brought by the state of Louisiana against this cooperating defendant never entered anybody’s mind. Id. at 67-68.6 Finally, Appellants contend that a federal judge colluded with the federal prosecutors and Guidry’s attorneys to approve the alleged civil immunity agreement at Guidry’s arraignment in an in camera, “secret proceeding.” Appellants offer no support for this serious allegation other than pointing to a short, offthe-record chambers conference between the judge and the attorneys that happened during Guidry’s arraignment and speculating that something illicit occurred during the recess. 6 Resting its decision on this testimony, the state court ultimately denied Guidry’s motion for a preliminary injunction, stating, “[c]onsidering the testimony of the witnesses at the hearing, it is clear that there was simply no meeting of the minds regarding any civil liability of Mr. Guidry. . . . The court reads [the Moreau letter’s] granting of immunity to apply to criminal culpability only and not to any civil matters.” Def. § 2255 Exh. tab 16 at 5. -18- This contention is wholly without merit, particularly because this same judge later rejected the argument that the federal plea agreement necessarily limited Guidry’s financial liability to the state during the restitution portion of Guidry’s sentencing. See Def. § 2255 Exh. tab 10 at 18-19. Our review of the record leaves us with the firm conviction that there was no clandestine, collateral plea agreement protecting Guidry from state financial liability. Appellants’ contentions are speculative and find no support in Guidry’s plea agreement, the Moreau immunity letter, the transcripts of proceedings from the state’s lawsuit against Guidry, or the record on appeal.7 Because “[t]he prosecution has no duty to turn over to the defense evidence that does not exist,” we reject Appellants’ Brady claims with respect to Robert Guidry.8 Brogdon v. Blackburn, 790 F.2d 1164, 1168 (5th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); 7 For the same reasons, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Appellants’ request for an evidentiary hearing. Appellants have failed to provide “independent indicia” of the likely merits of their allegations and instead rely on speculation based on a misreading of the record, which is insufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Cervantes, 132 F.3d at 1110; Auten, 632 F.2d at 480 (“[C]onclusory assertions do not support the request for an evidentiary hearing.”). 8 Accordingly, we need not address the materiality vel non of the allegedly suppressed evidence. Likewise, because the record reveals neither that a civil immunity agreement concerning Guidry existed, nor that the government was aware that Guidry might have believed that such a deal existed, we need not address Appellants’ related claim that the government violated their due process rights in violation of Napue, 360 U.S. 264, by failing to correct Guidry’s allegedly false testimony. -19- see also United States v. Rivera Rangel, 396 F.3d 476, 486 n.11 (1st Cir. 2005) (reversing the district court’s grant of a new trial based on an alleged Brady violation resulting from the suppression of a cooperating witness’s plea agreement, noting that “the district court’s finding that [the witness] entered into a plea agreement was entirely at odds with the only evidence--which was in the form of sworn statements--that had been offered on the subject, and as a result, it was unjustified”); Todd v. Schomig, 283 F.3d 842, 849 (7th Cir. 2002) (addressing a prisoner’s claim that the government suppressed the existence of a cooperating witness’s plea agreement and holding, “Todd cannot prove an agreement existed. . . . Without an agreement, no evidence was suppressed, and the state’s conduct, not disclosing something it did not have, cannot be considered a Brady violation”). b) John Brotherton’s Book Deal The Edwardses also contend that the government violated their Brady rights by failing to disclose: (1) that cooperating witness John Brotherton was writing a book during their trial; (2) Brotherton’s allegation in the book that the government secretly recorded a meeting between Brotherton and government informant Patrick Graham, which the government subsequently failed to disclose to the Edwardses; and (3) a fabricated memorandum that Brotherton claims he prepared at one point to -20- secure a job with a tribal casino, which he also discusses in his book. Even if the government had known that Brotherton was writing a book and had failed to provide the Edwardses with this information--and it is unclear from the record whether this was even the case9--the Edwardses’ claim fails because the evidence was not material for Brady purposes. “‘[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’” Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 562 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (1985)). Specifically, we must determine whether the allegedly suppressed evidence, considered collectively and in light of all of the evidence at trial, could reasonably be taken to put the entire case in a different light so as to “‘undermine[] confidence in the outcome of the trial.’” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434 (quoting 9 The Edwardses’ assertions that the government even knew of Brotherton’s book deal are largely speculative. The Edwardses cite the book’s preface, in which Brotherton congratulates the government on its successful prosecution of Governor Edwards, for the proposition that “the prosecutors were apparently aware of” both the existence and the contents of Brotherton’s book. Edwards Br. at 46 (emphasis added). Moreover, to support their claim, the Edwardses merely assert that “the government has not denied” knowledge of this evidence. Id. at 50. This argument ignores that the Edwardses, as the parties alleging a Brady violation, have the burden of establishing all three prongs of the Brady test. See, e.g., Sipe, 388 F.3d at 477 (“To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must make three showings . . . .”) (emphasis added). -21- Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678); see also Duncan v. Cain, 278 F.3d 537, 539 (5th Cir. 2002). The Edwardses speculate that the fact that Brotherton was writing a book and the book’s contents would have been sufficiently impeaching to undermine confidence in the jury verdict; however, taken in context, this evidence would have had at best only a marginal impact on the government’s case against the Edwardses. Brotherton was not the only witness to testify against the Edwardses regarding the “Players Scheme,” nor was he the most important. The trial record reflects that Richard Shetler, another Players employee and long-time Edwards family friend, provided extensive, damning testimony about the Edwardses’ dealings with the casino. The government further bolstered this testimonial evidence with copious exhibit evidence and inculpatory taped conversations. Given the amount of incriminating evidence other than Brotherton’s testimony that the government presented, the allegedly suppressed impeachment evidence is simply too insignificant to undermine confidence in the jury’s verdict. See Kopcynski v. Scott, 64 F.3d 223, 226-27 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting a habeas petitioner’s Brady claim where the suppressed impeachment evidence was immaterial in light of the other, corroborated testimony and physical evidence supporting petitioner’s conviction); see also Pippin v. Dretke, 434 F.3d 782, 789 n.7 (5th Cir. 2005) (“A claim that is largely -22- speculative with respect to the effect of the allegedly exculpatory evidence on the jury’s ultimate determination of guilt or innocence cannot support a Brady violation.”). We thus reject the Edwardses’ Brady claim with respect to John Brotherton.10
Finally, Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying their motions for leave to amend their § 2255 motions in light of Booker, 543 U.S. 220, and Blakely, 542 U.S. 296. Although they acknowledge that they did not challenge the constitutionality of their sentences on direct appeal or in their initial § 2255 motions, Appellants argue that, in the wake of 10 Although, in the alternative, the Edwardses urge us to grant an evidentiary hearing to explore their theory further, we decline to do so. Due to the speculative and conclusory nature of the Edwardses’ allegations with respect to both the suppression and materiality Brady prongs, such a hearing would serve as nothing more than a fishing expedition. See Cervantes, 132 F.3d at 1110 (noting that an evidentiary hearing is warranted only “[i]f the [Appellants] produce[] independent indicia of the likely merit of [their] allegations”); Auten, 632 F.2d at 480 (denying an evidentiary hearing because the conclusory allegations set forth were not sufficient to support a request for an evidentiary hearing). We have also denied evidentiary hearings to explore similarly unsupported claims in state habeas proceedings under § 2254, applying the same standard. See Hughes v. Johnson, 191 F.3d 607, 629 (5th Cir. 1999) (denying an evidentiary hearing to investigate a “purely speculative” Brady claim); Johnson v. Scott, 68 F.3d 106, 112 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The [habeas] petitioner must set forth specific allegations of fact, not mere conclusory allegations.”); Ellis v. Lynaugh, 873 F.2d 830, 840 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The court need not blindly accept speculative and inconcrete claims as the basis upon which to order a hearing.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). -23- Booker and Blakely, they should now be allowed to amend their § 2255 motions to add a collateral constitutional challenge to their sentences. This argument is foreclosed before this court by United States v. Gentry, 432 F.3d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 2005), and In re Elwood, 408 F.3d 211, 212-13 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam), both of which hold that the Blakely/Booker line of cases does not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Appellants correctly conceded in oral argument that this precedent forecloses relief before this court. They raise this issue only to preserve it for possible Supreme Court review, and we decline to consider it further.