Opinion ID: 1230428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Evidence to Support the Finding of Fraud.

Text: Sanguinetti contends that the Streckers failed to meet their burden of proof on the claim of fraud. A charge of fraud must be supported by proof of the following elements in an action at law: A false representation made by the defendant, knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is false  or, that he has not a sufficient basis of information to make it, an intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from acting in reliance upon the misrepresentation, justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff in taking action or refraining from it, and damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance... . Lubbe v. Barba, 91 Nev. 596, 599, 540 P.2d 115, 117 (1975). Whether the claim of fraud is made in an action at law or in equity, the appellate court will not disturb the findings of the court or the jury where there is substantial evidence to support the claim. Close v. Flanary, 77 Nev. 87, 360 P.2d 259 (1961). In this case there is ample evidence to support the Streckers' claim, particularly in light of the relationship between the parties. The Streckers claim that they signed a document represented to them by Sanguinetti as a deed of trust. Sanguinetti testified that the title was transferred by prior arrangement ... because we didn't know how we were going to hold title ... We knew that certain commitments had to be made, and I had made a lot of personal commitments, but what the final decision was going to be, whether we were going to, I think, form a partnership, or how we were going to do it at this point, was very uncertain. So, we put the property in the name of First Stockton Title for holding. In light of the relationship between the parties, a finding of false representation by Sanguinetti is supported by reasonable inferences from the testimony of either the Streckers or Sanguinetti himself. Both the Streckers and Sanguinetti testified that they intended to become involved in a joint venture for the development of the property; only the nature or existence of an agreement as to compensation or disposition of the property are disputed. Sanguinetti was a close relative of Mrs. Strecker's. The Streckers had sought and obtained his advice and assistance in financial matters over a number of years. Under such circumstances, the Streckers were entitled to regard the relationship as one of trust and confidence. See Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Nev. 267, 45 P. 1009 (1896) (brothers); Schmidt v. Horton, 52 Nev. 302, 287 P. 274 (1930) (joint venturers); Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 49 Ariz. 34, 64 P.2d 101 (1937), and Fipps v. Stidham, 174 Okl. 473, 50 P.2d 680 (1935) (financial advisors). Under such circumstances, the Streckers were entitled not only to an accurate description of the instrument they were signing, but also to a full disclosure of Sanguinetti's intentions, Dalton v. Dalton, 14 Nev. 419 (1880), and of their rights and the effect and consequences of their acts, Martin v. Dixon, 49 Nev. 161, 241 P. 213 (1925). Sanguinetti's own version of the events fully supports the conclusion that the Streckers were never informed of the effects and consequences of signing an unqualified grant deed to the title company. Furthermore, his description of his own concern at the time of the signing of the deed would support the inference that his unrevealed intention at that time was to take control of the property to protect his own interests. Such evidence would also support the additional inferences that the misrepresentations or concealment of material facts and information involved were made with the knowledge and intention of Sanguinetti to induce the Streckers to sign the grant deed. His assurances to them that he would handle the details of title, permits, and loan arrangements, and his satisfactory handling of loan arrangements in the past, would understandably lull the Streckers into a sense of security regarding the status of their title to the property and justify their reliance upon Sanguinetti's representations until the conversation of January 1973. See Davidson v. Streeter, 68 Nev. 427, 234 P.2d 793 (1951). In short, the finder of fact was entitled to weigh the Streckers' contention that Sanguinetti obtained title to their property by fraud, against Sanguinetti's contention that the Streckers intended to part with all legal claim to their property, retaining only the financial protection that I was going to hold the property for their best interest, for the consideration of prospective financial gain, and to conclude that fraud was indeed the most plausible explanation.