Opinion ID: 3159270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sophisticated User Jury Instruction

Text: The Lawings argue that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision to charge the sophisticated user defense to the jury. We agree. An appellate court will not reverse the trial court's decision regarding jury instructions unless the trial court committed an abuse of discretion. Cole v. Raut, 378 S.C. 398, 404, 663 S.E.2d 30, 33 (2008) (citing Clark v. Cantrell, 339 S.C. 369, 389, 529 S.E.2d 528, 539 (2000)). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is based on an error of law or is not supported by the evidence. Id. Suppliers and manufacturers of dangerous products are generally under a duty to warn the ultimate user of the dangers associated with the use of the product. See Livingston v. Noland Corp., 293 S.C. 521, 525, 362 S.E.2d 16, 18 (1987) (citing Gardner v. Q.H.S., Inc., 448 F.2d 238, 242 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding that the duty to warn arises when the user may not realize the potential danger of a product)). However, the sophisticated user doctrine, which arose from comment n to section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,13 recognizes that a supplier 13 Section 388 provides that one who supplies a chattel directly or through a third may rely on an intermediary to provide warnings to the ultimate user if the reliance is reasonable under the circumstances. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 cmt. n. The sophisticated user doctrine is typically applied as a defense to relieve the supplier of liability for failure to warn where it is difficult or even impossible for the supplier to meet its duty to warn the end user of the dangers associated with the use of a product, and the supplier therefore relies on the intermediary or employer to warn the end user. See id. In arguing that the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's decision to charge the jury on the sophisticated user defense, the Lawings contend that the sophisticated user defense is not the law of South Carolina. We agree that prior to the court of appeals' opinion in this case, neither this Court, nor the court of appeals, had explicitly adopted the defense.14 However, we need not formally person a chattel for another to use is subject to liability for physical harm caused by the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied, if the supplier: (a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for which it is supplied; (b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388 (1965). 14 The court of appeals stated in its opinion that when it affirmed a trial court's decision to charge the jury on the sophisticated user defense in Bragg v. HiRanger, Inc., 319 S.C. 531, 462 S.E.2d 321 (1995), the court recognized that the sophisticated user doctrine is part of the products liability law of South Carolina. Lawing, 406 S.C. at 23, 749 S.E.2d at 131. In affirming the jury charge in Bragg, however, the court of appeals referenced section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts—upon which the sophisticated user doctrine is based—but did not state whether South Carolina courts had adopted that section. Bragg, 319 S.C. at 550, 462 S.E.2d at 332 (The sophisticated user defense outlined in section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts has been adopted by numerous jurisdictions.). We note that the only mention of section 388 from this Court—albeit not in the context of whether the sophisticated user defense is a viable one—was in a dissent in Claytor v. General Motors Corporation, 277 S.C. 259, 267, 286 S.E.2d 129, 133 (1982) (Lewis, C.J., dissenting). Further, although the court in Bragg found that the jury's charge was an accurate recitation of the sophisticated user doctrine as adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, it did not provide that the sophisticated adopt the doctrine at this time because as discussed, infra, the facts of this case do not implicate the sophisticated user defense.15 When instructing the jury, the trial court is required to charge only principles of law that apply to the issues raised in the pleadings and developed by the evidence in support of those issues. Clark, 339 S.C. at 390, 529 S.E.2d at 539 (citing Tucker v. Reynolds, 268 S.C. 330, 335, 233 S.E.2d 402, 404 (1977)). Accordingly, the threshold question in determining whether the trial judge erred in charging the sophisticated user defense to the jury is whether the law was implicated by the evidence in this case. We find that it was not, and therefore hold that the trial court erred in charging the sophisticated user defense. Trinity and Matrix—similar to the court of appeals—center their argument around Engelhard's knowledge of the nature and use of sodium bromate, an unsurprising approach given that the sophisticated user defense revolves around an intermediary's knowledge and awareness of the danger associated with the use of a particular product. See Lawing, 406 S.C. at 30–32, 749 S.E.2d at 135–36. Indeed, based on the testimony in this case, there is no doubt that Engelhard was very familiar with sodium bromate and understood its dangerous nature. However, a sophisticated user has a responsibility separate and apart from the responsibility to adequately label a dangerous product. Under the specific factual circumstances in this case, the proper focus is the labeling on the sodium bromate shipped to Engelhard, not the use of sodium bromate in Engelhard's plant. Engelhard's knowledge of the dangers of sodium bromate does not affect the user defense was in fact the law of South Carolina. See Bragg, 319 S.C. at 550–51, 462 S.E.2d at 332. 15 Likewise, to the extent that the Lawings contest the correctness of the trial court's sophisticated user defense jury charge—which took a common law approach to the doctrine, as opposed to the Restatement approach—we do not address that issue. See Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) (holding that the Court need not address remaining issues when resolution of a prior issue is dispositive). suppliers' duty to properly label sodium bromate as a hazardous and flammable product, because the knowledge of sodium bromate's inherent qualities are useless to a person who comes into contact with the chemical but cannot identify it.16 In other words, there is a critical distinction between an intermediary's knowledge of the dangerous qualities and nature of a product, and the ability of the third party user to identify and recognize that product on its face. When considering only Engelhard's use of sodium bromate in its manufacturing process, it follows that Engelhard is a sophisticated user. However, when, as here, labeling is the underlying issue, the adequacy of the labeling on the sodium bromate does not require a sophisticated user analysis. If we conflate the two analyses—as the dissent would have us do—we would absolutely absolve suppliers of their responsibility to label dangerous products during shipment and upon delivery. The fact that a sophisticated user of a particular product ultimately receives the product does not permit the supplier to decide whether or not to adequately label the dangerous product as such. Black testified that employees like himself utilized labeling on products as their first line of defense within the plant. Because maintenance workers, including Lawing, received training to familiarize themselves with hazard labels, i.e., the oxidizer symbol, with no visible hazard label, these employees who encountered the shrink-wrapped pallets of sodium bromate were unable to identify it as a dangerous product. Under these facts, Engelhard's knowledge regarding the properties of sodium bromate and its transfer of that information to its employees is insignificant. Therefore, we find that the evidence does not support a jury charge on the sophisticated user defense because the evidence in this case that does support that charge—i.e., Engelhard's experience with sodium bromate, the fact that it employed chemical engineers, and the MSDSs which were available—is merely a distraction from the real issue: the visibility of the labels indicating danger on the pallets of sodium bromate. Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in charging the sophisticated user defense to the jury, and we reverse the court of appeals' decision on this issue. 16 The trial court apparently had a similar concern while hearing pre-trial motions, as it asked counsel, How is a sophisticated user like Engelhard and their employees going to know the stuff is what it is unless it is properly labeled?