Opinion ID: 1166485
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the huhta survey

Text: Because there was evidence from which the jury could have found that the 1975 Huhta survey met these prerequisites, we do not reach the question of whether the 1972 Meadows survey, the 1970 manufacturer's specifications, or the Love statement that the boat was in A-1 condition could, either standing alone or taken together, also be express warranties. Zeleny v. Karnosh, supra . The Huhta survey concludes that:    the cruiser is an excellently constructed heavy-duty type, where [sic] the best lumber and material selected. The vessel is clean, dry, and well ventilated. Owner has taken excellent care of the cruiser. As far as could be ascertained from hull inspection without taking test bores or opening up of areas ordinarily concealed, the hull appears to be very sound and cruiser should be well suited for its intended purpose. Seller raises several arguments why the Huhta survey does not fall within the express-warranty-by-description provision of ORS 72.3130(1)(b). Seller contends that the Huhta survey cannot constitute an express warranty by description because it was made by someone other than the Seller. Seller misreads the statute. Nothing in ORS 72.3130(1)(b) requires the description to be made by the Seller [1]  the Seller need only introduce it into the bargaining process so that it becomes part of the basis of the bargain. See Antonucci v. Stevens Dodge, 73 Misc.2d 173, 340 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1973) (retail automobile dealer's use of manufacturer's brochure created an express warranty by description). Seller then claims that the description was not a part of the basis of the bargain and thus cannot create an express warranty by description. Seller argues that the description was not part of the basis of the bargain because the sale had already taken place before Mr. Love informed Buyer that he would have a survey made. Seller's contention is that the contract for the sale of the boat was final as of the September 8 meeting at the Thunderbird Motel when the purchase price was agreed upon. Buyer had no knowledge that there would even be a new survey made until the next day, September 9, when Love volunteered to have one made. Seller confuses a bargain with a contract: A `bargain' is not something that occurs at a particular moment in time, and is forever fixed as to its content; instead, it describes the commercial relationship between the parties in regard to this product. The word `bargain' is not encrusted with pre-Code concepts which had attached themselves to contract formation  notions that a contract came into existence at some specific point in time   . The Code's word is `bargain'  a process which can extend beyond the moment in time that the offeree utters the magic words, `I accept'. Nordstrom, Law of Sales, § 67, 206 (1971). In this instance, while the parties had agreed upon the purchase price of the boat, none of the other specifics of the contract had been settled  such as time of payment and transfer of possession. The bargain was still in process. Cf. Phillips v. Johnson, 266 Or. 544, 514 P.2d 1337 (1973). At the time Buyer was first informed of the Huhta survey results, he had not yet taken possession of the boat. While this description did not induce the actual formation of the contract, the jury might have found that it did induce and was intended by the Seller to induce Buyer's satisfaction with the agreement just made, as well as to lessen Buyer's degree of vigilance in inspecting the boat prior to acceptance. Seller additionally argues that the Huhta survey cannot be a part of the basis of the bargain because when Love volunteered to have the survey made, Buyer indicated it would not be necessary. What was once a matter of indifference to the Buyer, Seller argues, cannot retrospectively be transformed into an essential part of the bargain. Seller emphasizes that nothing in the evidence suggests that Buyer bargained for the survey. The basis of the bargain requirement, however, does not mean that a description by the Seller must have been bargained for. Instead, the description must go to the essence of the contract. See Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter. Inc., 39 Ill. App.3d 48, 349 N.E.2d 627 (1976). See also Legislative Counsel Committee, Oregon Uniform Commercial Code, Comment 1, 45 (1962). For the reasons already stated, the jury might properly have found that Love's affirmation of the condition of a $100,000 boat by means of the Huhta survey went to the essence of the contract. Finally, Seller argues that if the survey is found to be part of the basis of the bargain, it would constitute a contract condition rather than a warranty, which was satisfied by the Huhta report. We disagree. Seller points to no evidence, and we have found none, that suggests that the parties intended the making of the survey to be a condition upon which the contract depended. Both logic and the evidence show that it was not the performance of the survey but its content which mattered to the parties. Where there is a conflict in evidence whether an express warranty exists, the question is one for the jury. Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Hydrotex Industries, Inc., 440 F.2d 969 (8th Cir.1971); Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enter. Inc., supra ; Sylvia Coal v. Mercury Coal & Coke Co., 151 W. Va. 818, 156 S.E.2d 1 (1967). And see generally, Annot., 67 A.L.R.2d 619, 626 (1959). Whether the Huhta survey constituted an express warranty for which plaintiff could claim a breach was a proper question for the jury. The judgment is affirmed.