Opinion ID: 1805410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: incompleteness of record

Text: However, inasmuch as the collision occurred, and thus Sanwick's cause of action accrued, prior to February 8, 1992, this case is controlled by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,185 (Reissue 1989). See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-21,185 (Cum.Supp.1992). In pertinent part, § 25-21,185 provides that in an action for injuries caused by another's negligence, the fact that the plaintiff may have been guilty of contributory negligence shall not bar a recovery when the contributory negligence of the plaintiff was slight and the negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict liability in tort of the defendant was gross in comparison, but the contributory negligence of the plaintiff shall be considered by the jury in the mitigation of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence attributable to the plaintiff; and all questions of negligence or act or omission giving rise to strict liability in tort and contributory negligence shall be for the jury. It was therefore the jury's responsibility in awarding damages to comparatively measure the amount of negligence on Jenson's part to the contributory negligence, if any, on Sanwick's part by considering all the evidence presented on the issue. C.C. Natvig's Sons, Inc. v. Summers, 198 Neb. 741, 255 N.W.2d 272 (1977); Niemeyer v. Tichota, 190 Neb. 775, 212 N.W.2d 557 (1973); Gross v. Johnson, 174 Neb. 273, 117 N.W.2d 534 (1962); Cullinane v. Milder Oil Co., supra . In analyzing the jury's award of damages, an appellate court must examine the particular facts and circumstances of the case in light of the applicable damages rules. See Cooper v. Hastert, supra . While the pertinent rule of practice requires the court reporter to include in the bill of exceptions only those portions of the evidence specified in the request for preparation of the bill, it also provides that if the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the bill of exceptions must include all evidence relevant to the finding or conclusion. Neb. Ct.R. of Prac. 5A(2) (rev. 1992). It was therefore Sanwick's responsibility as appellant to present a record which supports the error he assigned. See, GFH Financial Serv. Corp. v. Kirk, 231 Neb. 557, 437 N.W.2d 453 (1989); Behm v. Northwestern, Bell Tel. Co., 241 Neb. 838, 491 N.W.2d 334 (1992); Abboud v. Cutler, 238 Neb. 177, 469 N.W.2d 763 (1991); In re Interest of R.R., 239 Neb. 250, 475 N.W.2d 518 (1991). In Ward v. Ward, 220 Neb. 799, 373 N.W.2d 389 (1985), we held that given a bill of exceptions which contained only the respondent's testimony and the trial exhibits, we could not make the required de novo review to determine the validity of the respondent's claim that the trial court had erred in dividing the property of the parties. We thus affirmed the trial court's denial of the respondent's motion for new trial. In like fashion, the condition of the record presented here prevents us from knowing the entirety of the evidence presented to the jury on the manner in which the collision occurred and thus deprives us of the ability to determine whether there was a basis for the jury to mitigate Sanwick's damages by virtue of his own contributory negligence.