Opinion ID: 727854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sentencing Enhancements for Leadership and Obstruction

Text: 49 The district court enhanced Cha's sentence four levels for exercising a leadership role, and two levels for obstruction of justice. Cha argues that both of the enhancements are based on insufficient findings.
50 The district court found that Cha was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity involving five or more persons under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Whether Cha was an organizer or leader justifying enhancement under § 3B1.1 is a question of fact reviewed for clear error. United States v. Mares-Molina, 913 F.2d 770, 773 (9th Cir.1990). 51 Cha argues that the court failed to make its factual basis for the enhancement clear on the record. The court adopted the findings of the PSR, however, which states that Cha served as the leader or organizer of a criminal activity including thirteen named individuals. This finding is sufficient. 52 Cha also argues that the enhancement was improper because the people that Cha organized were customers and thus cannot be counted as participants for a leadership enhancement. Because Cha did not make this objection to the district court, it is waived. United States v. Visman, 919 F.2d 1390, 1394 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 969 (1991). 53 Even if the objection had not been waived, it would not be successful. Although status as distributor does not warrant the leadership enhancement, Mares-Molina, 913 F.2d at 773 (9th Cir.1990) (finding leadership enhancement improper when there was no evidence defendant exercised control or was otherwise responsible for organizing, supervising, or managing others in the commission of the offense), Cha was more than a mere distributor. To determine whether defendant is a leader, the district court considers: 54 [T]he exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. 55 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 application note 4. The evidence at trial established that Cha exercised decision making authority in importing and purchasing ice; he recruited accomplices; and that he claimed a right to a large share of the proceeds. The conspiracy was large in scope, involving 819 or more kilograms of ice and profits of more than $18 million. Cha exercised control over others, for example, by ordering Yong Chang Yi to kidnap Sang Jin Cha to obtain repayment of $300,000 in stolen drug money. The district court did not err in finding that Cha exercised a leadership role.
56 The district court applied a two level enhancement for obstruction of justice based on the court's finding that Cha testified untruthfully under oath. An enhancement for obstruction of justice is appropriate if the court finds that a defendant committed perjury. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 application note 3(b). 57 Cha argues that the district court's findings were inadequate to support the enhancement because the court failed to make findings to support all the elements of a perjury violation. The independent findings necessary to establish perjury are that the witness gave false testimony under oath concerning a material matter, with the willful intent to provide false testimony. United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 94-95 (1993). 58 The district court stated: The testimony--I find that [Cha's] testimony was not truthful. I can't imagine any better way of obstructing justice than being untruthful under oath. The district court also adopted the findings of the PSR which states that during his testimony at trial, Cha denied conducting drug transactions with several named defendants and lied about material information. Together, these findings establish all of the elements necessary to support the enhancement. See Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95. The district court does not have to make findings as to the specific portions of defendant's testimony believed to be false. United States v. Arias-Villanueva, 998 F.2d 1491, 1512 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 937, and cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1001 (1993).