Opinion ID: 783260
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Plaintiffs have a right to vote on municipal incorporation

Text: 15 We first address whether Plaintiffs have a constitutionally protected right to vote on municipal incorporation. As Defendants correctly point out, there is no inherent right to vote on municipal incorporation under the federal constitution. However, once a state grants its citizens the right to vote on a particular matter, such as municipal incorporation, that right is protected by the Equal Protection Clause. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n. 78, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (recognizing as implicit in our constitutional system, [a right] to participate in state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an elective process for determining who will represent any segment of the State's population); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) ([T]his Court has made clear that a citizen has a constitutionally protected right to participate in elections on an equal basis with other citizens in the jurisdiction.); see also Hussey, 64 F.3d at 1263 (holding that once citizens are granted the right to vote on municipal annexation, the exercise of that vote becomes protected by the Equal Protection Clause). The initial question, then, is whether Arizona has granted its citizens the right to vote on municipal incorporation. We conclude that it has. 16 We hold, in light of our decision in Hussey, that Arizona's petition procedure for direct incorporation is sufficiently similar to voting to be treated as such for equal protection purposes. In Hussey, also an equal protection case, we considered whether Oregon's double majority procedure for municipal annexation was constitutionally equivalent to voting. 64 F.3d at 1262-65. Under this procedure, a city wishing to annex territory had to obtain the written consent of (1) a majority of all voters registered in the territory to be annexed and (2) owners of a majority of the land in that territory. Or.Rev.Stat. § 199.490(2)(a)(B); see Hussey, 64 F.3d at 1262. Once the city obtained such written consent, it then had to file an annexation resolution with the Oregon Boundary Commission, which retained the ultimate authority to authorize or prohibit the proposed annexation. Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 199.460, 199.490(4)(e). Oregon law also provided for an alternative to the double majority annexation process: a conventional election by a majority of the ballots cast in the affected territory. Or.Rev.Stat. § 222.120(4)(a). 17 We concluded in Hussey that the written consents of voters required under the double majority annexation procedure were the constitutional equivalent of votes: Both [votes and written consents] must be returned by registered voters; both are official expressions of an elector's will; both are required to resolve political issues; and both require a majority for success. Without the consent of a double majority of registered voters and landowners, Portland would have had to conduct an election to annex Mid-County. Hussey, 64 F.3d at 1263. We rejected the defendants' argument that consents are not votes because the ultimate annexing authority is vested in the Oregon Boundary Commission: traditional voting often has no direct, dispositive effect, but rather takes effect only when acted upon by others. For example, voters do not choose the president, the electoral college does.... We decline to hold, therefore, that the annexation proceeding here did not involve voting merely because the Boundary Commission ... would have to approve any boundary changes before they took effect. Id. at 1264. 18 The same reasoning compels us to conclude that signatures on a petition for direct incorporation under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 9-101(A) are the constitutional equivalent of votes. Like a vote on a ballot, a signature on a petition is an expression of a registered voter's will. And like an election, the petition process requires a majority for success, albeit a two-thirds majority. Furthermore, the petition process serves as a substitute for an election. If the direct incorporation route had been unavailable or unsuccessful, the only other way to incorporate Tortolita would have been through an incorporation election under Ariz.Rev.Stat. § 9-101(B). Because the [petition signatures] are analytically like votes, and are a substitute for them, legally they must be treated as votes. Hussey, 64 F.3d at 1265. Consequently, we conclude that Arizona, in providing for direct incorporation under § 9-101(A), has granted qualified voters in unincorporated areas the constitutional equivalent of a right to vote on municipal incorporation. That right is protected by the Equal Protection Clause. 9 19