Opinion ID: 1230603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Herrera-Zuniga's Criminal History

Text: Finally, Herrera-Zuniga argues that the district court improperly concluded that his criminal history score did not adequately reflect the full significance of his prior criminal conduct. Although acknowledging that it is within the prerogative of the sentencing judge to deviate from the advisory Guidelines range where the defendant's criminal history category does not adequately represent and account for the defendant's past criminal conduct, U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3; see also Griffin, 530 F.3d at 441; Smith, 474 F.3d at 891, Herrera-Zuniga argues that such a finding is not supported in this case. We disagree. Because defense counsel failed to raise this issue below and failed to object on this ground after sentencing, we review this issue for plain error. Vonner, 516 F.3d at 386. To demonstrate plain error, Herrera-Zuniga must show (1) error (2) that `was obvious or clear,' (3) that `affected defendant's substantial rights' and (4) that `affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.' Id. (quoting United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 459 (6th Cir.2006)). We will find such error only in exceptional circumstances, and only where the error is so plain that the trial judge ... [was] derelict in countenancing it. Gardiner, 463 F.3d at 459. Applying that standard here, we find no reversible error. As an initial matter, although a finding that a defendant's past criminal conduct is extensive and egregious is sufficient to warrant an upward departure, Smith, 474 F.3d at 891, nothing in our case law suggests that such a finding is necessary for a court to depart upwards. On the contrary, because the Guidelines are advisory only, the limitations set forth in § 4A1.3 do not delineate the outer bounds of the sentencing court's authority to impose a sentence above the recommended sentencing range, nor is a sentencing court required to limit its consideration to factors relevant to § 4A1.3. Whereas § 4A1.3(a)(1) permits an upward departure only where the defendant's criminal history category substantially under-represents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court's authority under § 3553(a) more broadly permits consideration of the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need for the sentence imposed ... to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. A district court always can impose an above-Guidelines sentence so long as it is reasonable in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, even if we were to accept Herrera-Zuniga's argument that his criminal history score adequately accounted for the seriousness of his past criminal conduct, that would not have precluded the district court from imposing an above-Guidelines sentence in this case. See United States v. Tate, 516 F.3d 459, 468 (6th Cir.2008) (affirming upward departure under § 4A1.3 where sentencing judge based its departure on a wide range of considerations, some of which were not directly related to defendant's criminal history). The only requirement is that the court determine, in light of all the facts and circumstances of the particular case before it, whether the range in question is appropriate to the case. Brown, 371 F.3d at 860 (internal quotations marks omitted). In any event, after reviewing the record and giving due deference to the sentencing judge's determinations, we are satisfied that the district court's conclusion that a harsher sentence was warranted on this basis was not plain error. In explaining its reasons for imposing a harsher sentence, the district court made clear that it was troubled by Herrera-Zuniga's egregious criminal record, which it reasonably concluded evidenced a high likelihood of recidivism. The court also noted that the PSIR detailed several incidents of prior criminal conduct that did not result in a conviction, or otherwise were not included in the PSIR's criminal history calculation. See PSIR ¶¶ 26, 39, 40. In addition to the number of prior convictions, the court also expressed concern regarding the nature of those offenses, reasoning that Herrera-Zuniga's repeated decision to drive while intoxicated posed a more significant danger to the public than was reflected in his criminal history score. See ROA vol. 2 at 14. Because these findings are adequately supported in the record, the court's conclusion that Herrera-Zuniga's criminal history score did not fully capture the seriousness of his past criminal conduct was not unreasonable, and certainly not plain error. See United States v. Matheny, 450 F.3d 633, 640 (6th Cir.2006). Again though, even if the court's departure cannot be sustained under § 4A1.3, the seriousness of Herrera-Zuniga's criminal history was not the only consideration on which the district court relied in imposing a harsher sentence. The district court also noted several § 3553(a) factors that warranted imposing a harsher sentence. For instance, in discussing the nature and circumstances of Herrera-Zuniga's present offense, the court expressed particular concern that Herrera-Zuniga had illegally reentered the United States only a few months after being deported for the third time. The court concluded that this demonstrated Herrera-Zuniga's utter lack of respect for the law. Under our controlling authority, such considerations provide a reasonable basis for imposing a harsher sentence. See Thomas, 24 F.3d at 833 (Both the criminal history score and the high likelihood of recidivism are valid, legal reasons for an upward departure from the guidelines and satisfy the first prong of our test.); see also Solis-Bermudez, 501 F.3d at 887 (finding that a defendant's history of deportation and illegal reentry, together with his serious criminal record, justified the district court's upward variance).
In addition to his procedural challenges, Herrera-Zuniga also argues that the length of his sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to accomplish the sentencing goals identified by Congress in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Although a sentence that falls within the Guidelines range warrants a presumption of reasonableness in this circuit, there is no presumption against a sentence that falls outside of this range. See Smith, 474 F.3d at 892. Rather, [t]his court has applied a form of proportionality review to sentences outside the Guidelines range, so that `the greater the variance from the range, the more compelling the justification for variance must be.' Tate, 516 F.3d at 470 (quoting Smith, 474 F.3d at 892). Nevertheless, while the extent of the difference between a particular sentence and the recommended Guidelines range is surely relevant, courts of appeals must review all sentenceswhether inside, just outside, or significantly outside the Guidelines rangeunder a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall, 128 S.Ct. at 591. Applying that standard, and in light of our upward departure case law, we are satisfied that the sentence imposed by the district court, although certainly harsh, is not unreasonable. See Griffin, 530 F.3d at 440-41; Tate, 516 F.3d at 468-70; Brown, 371 F.3d at 859-60; Smith, 474 F.3d at 892; Thomas, 24 F.3d at 833-35. Regardless of whether we would have imposed the same sentence, we must afford due deference to the district court's decision to determine the appropriate length of the defendant's sentence, so long as it is justified in light of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. See Kimbrough, 128 S.Ct. at 576 (Giving due respect to the District Court's reasoned appraisal, a reviewing court could not rationally conclude that the 4.5-year sentence reduction Kimbrough received qualified as an abuse of discretion.); Vonner, 516 F.3d at 392 (Our affirmance in today's case respects the central lesson from these decisionsthat district courts have considerable discretion in this area and thus deserve the benefit of the doubt when we review their sentences and the reasons given for them.). As our discussion of the factual record makes clear, a host of factors support the sentencing judge's conclusion that a particularly harsh sentence was warranted in this case, including Herrera-Zuniga's significant criminal history, his repeated recidivism, the seriousness of his offenses, the nature and circumstances of his latest offense, his repeated failure to complete substance abuse programs, and the need to protect the public from his inability to refrain from driving while intoxicated.
Although we have resolved all of the issues raised by the parties, we feel the need to discuss one additional issue. As explained in detail above, the Assistant Federal Public Defender assigned to Herrera-Zuniga's case chose to submit to the court a letter written to Herrera-Zuniga in lieu of a likely useless discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. At a minimum, that strategy was highly questionable. Not only was the tone of the letter highly unprofessional, but many of the statements made therein cast Herrera-Zuniga's conduct in a particularly unfavorable light, seemingly supporting the court's inclination to depart upward. We thus are concerned that defense counsel's chosen strategy constitutes professional malfeasance and, potentially, constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel. As a general rule, we do not consider on direct appeal whether defense counsel's performance constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance, primarily because there has not been an opportunity to develop and include in the record evidence bearing on the merits of that issue. United States v. Wunder, 919 F.2d 34, 37 (6th Cir.1990). We have recognized an exception to that rule, however, where the record is adequate to assess the issue. Id. In this case, the record is clear that Stroba failed to raise any § 3553(a) factors in response to the court's Notice of Intent to Upward Depart, despite the fact that the PSIR identified several potentially relevant considerations, including Herrera-Zuniga's decision to return to the United States to support his sick daughter. According to Stroba, he chose not to engage in a likely useless review of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors because [t]here is not one thing about [Herrera-Zuniga's] situation that lends itself to a positive thought. ROA vol. 1 at 16, 19. Such statements raise serious concerns that Stroba failed to fulfill his duty to advocate on his client's behalf. See Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 696 (6th Cir.1974) (noting that defense counsel must conscientiously protect his client's interest by asserting all apparently substantial defenses available to the defendant ... in a proper and timely manner). Moreover, Stroba's letter actually went beyond that and expounded on and emphasized the seriousness of his client's misdeeds. In fact, the sentencing memorandum and the letter Stroba attached to it read more like a prosecutor's argument in favor of a harsher sentence. For instance, Stroba's letter belittles Herrera-Zuniga as being at the bottom of society's hierarchy, and exclaims that it is only a matter of time before Herrrera-Zuniga kill[s], maim[s], or injure[s] some innocent driver or passenger in another vehicle or a bystander. ROA vol. 1 at 20. From the record before us, we do not understand how a federal public defender could in good faith make such statements to the sentencing court about his client. At oral argument before this Court, Stroba suggested that he submitted this letter to the court in an effort to convince the court that his client understood the seriousness of his offenses, thus hopefully dissuading the court from imposing an overly harsh sentence. Perhaps that explanation would be more plausible had Stroba made at least one statement to that effect before the district court. The sentencing memorandum and the transcript from the sentencing hearing, however, are entirely bereft of any comments suggesting that Herrera-Zuniga appreciates the seriousness of his offenses or that he was repentant in any way. It seems much more likely that Stroba simply washed his hands of the matter and abdicated his responsibility to advocate on behalf of his client: I am truly at a loss to figure out how to explain to Chief Judge Bell that somehow or in some manner, he should not treat you most severely.... I am sorry to be so blunt, but I have to honest with you, your case has left me without an expressible empathy. For this I am sorry because it leaves me almost unable to advocate on your behalf. ROA vol. 1 at 20. In light of such statements, we are concerned that Stroba may have rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel entitles an accused to be assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that the trial is fair). In fact, because Stroba's letter essentially argued against his client's interests, Stroba's conduct may have been so likely to prejudice the accused that any ineffective assistance concerns should be evaluated under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). See Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 128 S.Ct. 743, 746 n. 1, 169 L.Ed.2d 583 (2008) (per curiam) (recognizing that Cronic 's presumption of prejudice applies when `there [is] a breakdown in the adversarial process,' such that `counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing' (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039)). Nevertheless, given that further evidence may be relevant to evaluating the validity of Stroba's explanation, we decline to resolve this issue at this stage. [12] However, we order that Stroba provide a translated copy of this opinion to his client so that Herrera-Zuniga can evaluate his options for seeking habeas relief on this basis.