Opinion ID: 150167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: To repeat, the single issue before us is whether a private foster care agency can be vicariously liable for a foster parent's act of ordinary negligence. Although this is an issue of first impression under Pennsylvania law, [5] our conclusion is dictated by well-established legal principles.
In Pennsylvania, only a master-servant relationship gives rise to vicarious liability for negligence. Smalich v. Westfall, 440 Pa. 409, 269 A.2d 476, 481 (1970). As a general rule, a master may be held liable for the acts of the servant when those acts are committed during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority. Valles v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 569 Pa. 542, 805 A.2d 1232, 1237 (2002). The rationale for this rule is simple: [B]ecause a master has the right to exercise control over the physical activities of the servant within the time of service, he is vicariously liable for the servant's negligent acts committed within the scope of his employment. Smalich, 269 A.2d at 481 (emphasis in original). In a master-servant relationship, a master not only controls the results of the work but also may direct the manner in which such work shall be done. Id.; see also Universal Am-Can, Ltd. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 563 Pa. 480, 762 A.2d 328, 333 (2000) ([C]ontrol over the work to be completed and the manner in which it is to be performed are the primary factors in determining employee status.). [6] [A] servant, in rendering the agreed services, remains entirely under the control and direction of the master. Smalich, 269 A.2d at 481. When determining whether a master-servant relationship exists, [a]ctual control of the manner of work is not essential; rather, it is the right to control which is determinative. Drexel v. Union Prescription Ctrs., Inc., 582 F.2d 781, 785 (3d Cir.1978). Under this right of control test, [t]he control of the principal does not... include control at every moment; its exercise may be very attenuated and, as where the principal is physically absent, may be ineffective. Smalich, 269 A.2d at 481 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although this passage might suggest a lenient right of control test, the right to exercise day-to-day control remains an important factor in the master-servant inquiry. See, e.g., Smith v. Exxon Corp., 436 Pa.Super. 221, 647 A.2d 577, 583 (1994); Myszkowski v. Penn Stroud Hotel, Inc., 430 Pa.Super. 315, 634 A.2d 622, 626 (1993); Burnatoski v. Butler Ambulance Serv. Co., 130 Pa.Cmwlth. 264, 567 A.2d 1121, 1124 (1989). The party seeking vicarious liability bears the burden of proving a master-servant relationship. See Basile v. H&R Block, Inc., 563 Pa. 359, 761 A.2d 1115, 1120 (2000).
In this context, the dispute between the parties focuses on the scope of control that the Home could exercise over Nortonnot the level of control that the Home actually exercised during I.H.'s placement. I.H. argues that, because Norton was in the act of caring for him at the time of the accident, the Home should be held vicariously liable for any injuries caused by Norton's conduct. Under this far-reaching theory, a private foster care agency's liability would extend to all acts of ordinary negligence committed by a foster parent in the provision of foster care which is defined by relevant regulations as a [t]wenty-four hour commitment. 55 Pa.Code § 3700.4. [7] Such a theory would impose a considerable financial burden on the Pennsylvania foster care system. [8] More importantly, it is also contrary to established Pennsylvania law. In reaching this conclusion, we first consider the terms of the Service Contract between Lehigh County and the Home. From there, we analyze the Placement Agreement between the Home and Norton. Throughout, we consider these agreements in light of the regulatory scheme enacted by the Commonwealth, as well as related Pennsylvania caselaw.
I.H. stakes much of his argument on a single passage from the Independent Contractor provision of the Service Contract. In relevant part, this provision states that the Home is deemed an Independent Contractor and shall not during the term of this contract assign, subcontract, transfer, or otherwise delegate all or part of its obligations or responsibilities without prior written approval of [Lehigh County]. From this, I.H. argues that the Home had a non-delegable duty to exercise all control necessary to ensure his safety. On this reading, the Home committed itself to providing more than initial placement and ongoing monitoring of established goals; it also must exercise additional control over the manner of its foster parents' care (on a daily basis, if necessary). According to I.H., it is thus no argument that the Home did not exercise this control, including when supervising I.H.'s care by the Nortons. The Home had the duty to exercise whatever level of control was necessary to keep I.H. safe. [9] Scattered provisions of the Service Contract strengthen this reading. For instance, the Purpose of [the] Contract between the Home and Lehigh County was defined (quite broadly) as Residential/Foster Care, while the Home elsewhere agreed to provide Foster Care ... Services. Furthermore, the Home promised to promote [each] child's growth and development by providing the physical care, nurturance[,] and opportunity [necessary] for individual, social, emotional[,] and intellectual development. Finally, the Home agreed to accomplish these goals by: 1) provid[ing] a temporary living environment in the form of foster family care; 2) retain[ing] responsibility of [I.H.'s] physical custody throughout his placement; and 3) actively participat[ing] in the delivery of [related foster care] services. Given these provisions, I.H. concludes that the Home was charged with running a foster care program, with non-delegable responsibilities that extended beyond mere placement and supervision to additional control over the manner in which the Nortons cared for I.H. on a daily basis. These textual arguments, simple and supportive, nonetheless fall short. First, I.H. reads too much into the Independent Contractor provision. Recourse to it merely begs the key question on appeal. It provides that the Home shall not ... delegate all or part of its obligations or responsibilities without prior written approval. This provision says little about what those obligations and responsibilities are. As the Illinois Supreme Court recently noted in a similar context, whatever duty there is to provide placement, to institute procedures, or even to exercise general authority over foster children[,] is not the same as a continuing, nondelegable duty to provide for the care of children placed in foster homes. Nichol v. Stass, 192 Ill.2d 233, 248 Ill.Dec. 931, 735 N.E.2d 582, 589 (2000). Furthermore, many of the provisions that I.H. cites apply equally to a Service Contract providing for foster care placement and ongoing monitoring rather than one including additional responsibilities for directing the manner of care the foster parents need to provide on a daily basis. For instance, the Home's purported duty to provide a temporary living environment in the form of foster family care can be met through placement services. The same is true of the Home's obligation to promote a child's growth and development by providing the physical care, nurturance[,] and opportunity [necessary] for individual, social, emotional, and intellectual development. And while the Home agreed to actively participate in the delivery of services, this need not extend to all (or even most) of the Nortons' day-to-day parenting decisions. Indeed, this passage itself is part of a larger paragraph on the role of caseworkers in monitor[ing] foster families. The Home's level of control is further clarified by the following passage, which was part of a program description incorporated into the Service Contract by the parties: The Lutheran Home strives to provide the most stable and caring environment for children. Proper recruitment and training of foster parents, careful matching of children and families, and viable accessible supports for foster parents and foster children are in place in order to avoid multiple placements. J.A. 517 (emphasis added). In this passage, the Home defined its key duties as foster family recruitment, foster child placement, and ongoing supervision. Other passages in the program description also aid this account of the Home's responsibilities. Among them, the Home pledged to provide supportive services to [its] foster families, which were intended to under-gird the foster parents' effectiveness in providing a stable, nurturing environment for the foster children in their care. In addition, the Home put in place a referral procedure for processing requests from Lehigh County: A referral for foster care placement can be made by the county by contacting the foster care supervisor. A verbal description of [a] child's [characteristics] ... [is] necessary in order to provide the most appropriate foster family setting. Importantly, [a]cceptance of the referral is contingent upon whether a suitable match can be made between the child and a foster family and the availability of an opening. Therefore, if a suitable match with a family were not made, the Home would not accept a referral from Lehigh County. [10] Moreover, within the Home's program approved foster families agree to provide room/board, basic physical care, health care, and supervision, as well as provide for the child's developmental needs. In this role, foster parents must participate in the development of the [child's] [i]ndividual [s]ervice [p]lan and facilitate many of the objectives outlined in the plan. Related regulations provide further support for this account. Pennsylvania law defines a foster family care agency as [a] public or private agency which recruits, approves, supervises[,] and places children with foster families. See 55 Pa. Code § 3700.4. In this capacity, it is a stand-in for the county, which would typically be responsible for these tasks. At the same time, a foster family is defined as [t]he living unit, including the foster family residence and foster parent, approved by a foster family care agency to provide foster family care to children. Id. Similarly, a foster parent is defined as [a]n individual responsible for providing foster family care to children placed by a[] [foster family care agency]. Id. Within this scheme, foster families are tasked with [p]rovid[ing] temporary, substitute care for each child in need. Id. at § 3130.5. In addition, the Service Contract itself suggests that it should be read in light of these regulatory goals, as the Contract's Interpretation provision provides that it is the intention of the [parties] that the public health, safety[,] and welfare be protected and furthered by the [C]ontract. Therefore, this [C]ontract is to be interpreted in such manner as to favor such public interest as opposed to any private interest. As the Home's counsel explained at oral argument, The [service] contracts are written in light of [related] code provisions. Oral Arg. Tr. 24. Analyzing the Service Contract in light of related regulations, the Home argues that its duty is to provide foster care indirectly through a foster family and assist the county in placing children in foster families. Id. at 25, 26. The Pennsylvania Children and Youth Administrators Association (PCYAA) similarly explained, Private foster care agencies cannot and do not supervise and control the day-to-day... care that a foster parent provides a foster child. Foster care agencies do not have the power or authority to exercise this type of control over foster parents. PCYAA's Br. 10-11. These accounts are consistent with the role of a foster family care agency as defined by Pennsylvania's regulatory scheme. Taken together, these passages suggest that the Home's duties extended only to initial placement and ongoing supervision of established goals, not to the manner in which the Nortons chose to achieve each of these goals. Therefore, the Service Contract, standing alone, is insufficient to establish a master-servant relationship. Yet this does not end the master-servant inquiry. It is still possible that the Home's related supervisory responsibilities give rise to a master-servant relationship. To that end, we turn to the Placement Agreement and accompanying Handbook.
Under the Placement Agreement and the Handbook, the Home had the right to control many facets of I.H.'s care. Under the Agreement, Norton was assigned a Topton foster care caseworker. [11] In addition, Norton agreed that [f]requent contacts between the caseworker ... and the foster parents [we]re necessary [so] both c[ould] discuss observations, difficulties, general development, and future plans regarding [I.H.]. To that end, the Agreement provided for biweekly visits by the caseworker to the foster home for the first two months of placement and monthly visits thereafter (at the discretion of the caseworker and supervisor). Apart from these ongoing visits, the Home also set various standards for I.H.'s care. In its Handbook, the Home detail[ed] foster care practices, foster parent/Topton roles and responsibilities, and current foster care regulations. As new foster parents, the Nortons were required to participate in an orientation, which outlined Topton philosophy, practices, foster parent and Topton's roles and responsibilities, and applicable regulations for foster care. These practices and regulations included rules dealing with a foster child's money, clothing, medical and dental treatment, education, employment, transportation, recreation, religious practices, tobacco use, and vacations. They also included standards that governed its foster parents on everything from disciplinary practices to the frequency of photograph-taking. The Home even reserve[d] the right to question the adequacy of meals, clothing, recreational opportunities, or other needs being provided by the foster family. In addition to these paper provisions, the level of control that the Home actually exercised during I.H.'s placement further suggests the limited scope of foster parent autonomy within the Home's foster care programwith the Home's frequent phone calls and visits (to say nothing of their direct interventions involving the Nortons and I.H.). While true that the relationship between Norton and I.H. was not that of a biological parent and his children, [12] this does not settle the master-servant question. The test is not whether Norton retained as much control over I.H. as a biological parent; it is whether the Home had sufficient control over Norton to result in a master-servant relationship. We hold that it did not. First, in the Placement Agreement, Norton agreed to be responsible for meeting the physical, social[,] and emotional needs of [I.H.] on an ongoing basis, leaving the Home with the related responsibility of assisting Norton in achieving these goals. This passage alone suggests a division of labor inconsistent with a master-servant relationship, with Norton responsible for daily parenting decisions and the Home merely responsible for setting goals and providing additional support (as needed). Under Pennsylvania law, that the Home set[] certain standards in order to maintain a uniform quality of ... service only addresse[d] the result of the work and not the manner in which it [wa]s conducted. Myszkowski, 634 A.2d at 627 (emphases in original). This is insufficient to establish a master-servant relationship. Second, in the specific context of transportation, the Home's responsibilities under the Service Contract were narrow, and its control over Norton attenuated: the Home simply agreed to guarantee[] all drivers hold a valid, appropriate driver's license. The Placement Agreement is not in tension with this. Rather than exerting continuous control over Norton's manner of driving, the Home stipulated that anyone driving I.H. had to have a driver's license and adequate insurance coverage subject to certain common-sense (and state-imposed) safety guidelines. [13] Indeed, the Home even permitted other adults to drive I.H., at the discretion of Norton, subject only to the expectation that Norton knows the driver, the destination, and is able to validate that the driver has a current motor vehicle driver's license and adequate insurance coverage. Taken together, these requirements fulfilled the Home's obligations under the Service Contract and established less extensive control over Norton's transportation responsibilities than in other areas. Finally, the source of many of the more invasive requirements within the Placement Agreement was the Commonwealth itselfeither through statute or regulationnot the Home. Under Pennsylvania law, these requirements alone do not result in a master-servant relationship. In Universal Am-Can, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an agreement between a hauling company and the owner-operator of a tractor-trailer did not establish a master-servant relationship. On examining the agreement between the parties, the Court observed that its provisions were for the most part governed by federal regulations, including requirements for mandatory inspections, for observing speed limits, and for covering loads with tarps. Universal Am-Can, 762 A.2d at 334, 335. It added: Factors which demonstrate compliance with government regulations do not assist in the application of the [right-of-control] test. The existence of the regulations precludes [the parties] from negotiating any terms subject to the regulations. Neither party has bargaining power, or the ability to control the work to be done, when dealing with matters subject to regulation. Id. at 334-35. As a result, the Court concluded that the regulations were not probative of the master-servant issue, as they reflect the control of the government, not the motor carrier. Id. at 336. Because federal and state regulations controlled the essential elements of the trucker's work, the Court concluded that other features of the Agreement (which were not dictated by government regulations) also fell short of establishing a master-servant relationship. These additional features included requirements to communicate with the dispatcher every 12 or 24 hours, submit fuel and toll receipts, and take a mandatory one-hour stop for meals. See id. at 337-38 (Cappy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). [14] The Home argues that the same is true here. And, indeed, the Placement Agreement and Handbook do overlap with state regulations in many key areas. For instance, the Pennsylvania Administrative Code reads: The county agency shall provide an opportunity for a child placed in a foster home or child care facility which it administers to participate in religious activities, services[,] and counseling, taking into account the choices specified by the parents or guardian or the child. 55 Pa. Code § 3130.86. The Placement Agreement largely tracks the Code's language, providing that [a]ll children are to be given reasonable opportunities for religious expression within the broad religious preferences of their choice or that of their parents. This is only one of several examples of how the Placement Agreement and the Handbook track state regulations. Others include the regulation of a foster child's money, [15] education, [16] safety, [17] medical and dental care, [18] residence, [19] grievance procedures, [20] transportation requirements, [21] and constraints on parental autonomy (including methods of discipline [22] and training [23] requirements). I.H. counters that not every provision in the Placement Agreement and Handbook was a product of state regulations. For instance, the Home included certain disciplinary practices beyond those enumerated under Pennsylvania law. The Home also exercised final authority over whether a child could partake in certain childhood rights-of-passage, including holding a summer job and driving a car. Finally, foster parents were prohibited from sign[ing] any papers or documents other than school absence excuses, report cards[,] or items of a routine nature. I.H. contends that, even if Universal Am-Can applied, these additional provisions, among many others, would be enough to establish a master-servant relationship. We disagree. Universal Am-Can does not mean that all requirements within an agreement must be the product of government regulations. Instead, in this case we must consider the foster care agency-foster parent relationship in light of related state regulations, as well as the provisions imposed by the Home itself.