Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to appoint a second attorney

Text: Section 987, subdivision (d), provides trial courts with discretion to appoint at public expense a second attorney in a capital case upon a written request of the first attorney appointed. Implicitly acknowledging that defense counsel did not make a request for the appointment of cocounsel, defendant contends that the court's failure, on its own motion, to appoint a second attorney to represent him violated his various rights under the state  and federal Constitutions. We reject defendant's assertion that to protect those constitutional rights, the court had a duty to appoint cocounsel. Our decisions have long emphasized that [t]he appointment of a second counsel in a capital case is not an absolute right protected by either the state or the federal Constitution. ( People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950 , 997, fn. 22, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689 , 857 P.2d 1099 ; accord, People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609 , 667, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 ; People v. Lancaster (2007) 41 Cal.4th 50 , 71, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 608 , 158 P.3d 157 .) From this it follows that the failure to appoint a second attorney does not, in itself, implicate any constitutional guarantees. Defendant asserts nonetheless that the constitutional requirements of effective representation, heightened reliability, and an individualized determination  of guilt and penalty require capital defendants to be represented by two attorneys. For support, he points to the recommendation in the 1989 American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (1989) (ABA Guidelines) that two qualified trial attorneys should be assigned to represent the defendant. (ABA Guidelines, guideline 2.1.) According to the commentary to this guideline, the responsibilities of trial counsel in a capital case are sufficiently onerous to require the appointment of two attorneys in order to ensure that the capital defendant receives the best possible representation. ( Id ., comm. foll. guideline 2.1.) As defendant acknowledges, this court has long recognized that the appointment of a second attorney to represent a capital defendant is a decision left to the trial court's discretion, based on a proper showing by the defendant that an additional attorney is necessary. ( Keenan v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 243 , 430, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 640 P.2d 108 ( Keenan ); People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264 , 287, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603 , 618 P.2d 149 .) We decline defendant's invitation to overrule these decisions and to hold instead that representation of a capital defendant by a single attorney, because it violates ABA Guidelines, amounts to constitutionally inadequate performance as a matter of law. Defendant is correct that the United States Supreme Court has recognized the ABA Guidelines as useful 'guides'  for assessing the reasonableness of counsel's performance in connection with a defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. ( Bobby v. Van Hook (2009) 558 U.S. 4 , 7, 130 S.Ct. 13 , 175 L.Ed.2d 255 ; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 .) But the high court has also indicated that the ABA Guidelines are not controlling. ( Bobby v. Van Hook, at p. 8, 130 S.Ct. 13 .) This court likewise has observed that the ABA Guidelines are far from binding  precedent. ( People v. Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86 , 113, 172 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 326 P.3d 188 .) Aside from his quotation of guideline 2.1 and its accompanying commentary, defendant fails to offer any persuasive basis on which to conclude that representation by a single attorney amounts to ineffective assistance in every capital case. Nor does defendant provide any support for his contention that the constitutional requirement of heightened reliability in a capital case is undermined when the judgment of only one attorney is involved. We note that Keenan emphasized Sixth Amendment concerns when explaining how a trial court should exercise its discretion under section 987, subdivision (d). For example, recognizing that death is a different kind of punishment from any other, both in terms of severity and finality,  Keenan directed trial courts to be particularly sensitive to insure that every safeguard designed to guarantee defendant a full defense be observed. ( Keenan, supra , 31 Cal.3d at p. 430, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 640 P.2d 108 .) But Keenan also made clear that the decision to appoint a second attorney in  a capital case is one left to the trial court's sound discretion, based on a showing that the additional attorney is necessary. ( Ibid . ) Defendant's claim that representation by a single attorney denied him equal protection under the law is likewise without merit. Section 987, subdivision (d), authorizes the appointment of a second attorney at public expense in a capital case. But not all capital defendants are similarly situated because not all capital cases present a genuine need for a second attorney to lend important assistance in preparing for trial or presenting the case. ( Keenan, supra , 31 Cal.3d at p. 434, 180 Cal.Rptr. 489 , 640 P.2d 108 .) We have expressly rejected in another case a capital defendant's claim that the trial court's failure to appoint, on its own motion, a second attorney to represent him infringed his federal constitutional rights under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments. ( People v. Cunningham, supra , 61 Cal.4th at p. 667, 189 Cal.Rptr.3d 737 , 352 P.3d 318 .) Defendant has presented no persuasive grounds for disturbing that prior conclusion.