Opinion ID: 2317503
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Determination of Penalty

Text: At the punishment phase of the trial, the Commonwealth put on the stand six witnesses who testified over objection concerning appellant's alleged abduction of Mrs. Peugeot and her daughter, and another witness, Agent Dunn of the FBI, who mentioned the pending federal kidnapping indictments against appellant in the Western District of Pennsylvania and in Baltimore, Maryland. Appellant contends that this evidence was inadmissible under the Split Verdict Act. In Commonwealth v. Jones, 355 Pa. 594, 50 A. 2d 342 (1947), which preceded the passage of the Split Verdict Act, we held that [i]t is well-settled that evidence in proper form of prior convictions of crime is admissible in homicide cases, for the sole purpose of aiding the jury in determining the penalty to be inflicted if it finds the accused guilty of murder in the first degree. . . . A similar rule permits the admission in certain types of homicide cases, of statements or confessions in which the accused admitted the actual commission of other crimes to aid the jury in fixing the penalty in a case of murder in the first degree. . . . The appellate courts of this Commonwealth have strictly limited the application of this rule of evidence to certain cases involving either prior convictions or admissions by accused of the actual commission of other crimes and any attempt to extend this principle to include testimony of mere arrests is without foundation in either law or reason. Id. at 597, 50 A. 2d at 344 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). In Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 172 A. 2d 795 (1961), it was firmly established that the passage of the Split Verdict Act in no way affected the type of evidence admissible at the penalty phase: All that can now be shown on the question of the penalty to be imposed upon an adjudicated first degree murderer, concerning his past criminal tendencies, is his prior convictions, confessions or admissions. Id. at 31, 172 A. 2d at 798 (emphasis added); Commonwealth v. Bell, 417 Pa. 291, 295-96, 208 A. 2d 465, 468 (1965), cert. denied 384 U.S. 966, 86 S. Ct. 1599 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Walls v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 290, 295, 205 A. 2d 862, 865 (1965). In McCoy, the appellant was convicted of first degree murder under the felony-murder rule, and at the penalty phase of the trial the Commonwealth placed on the stand the victim of a completely unrelated prior robbery who identified appellant as the perpetrator and related the circumstances of the crime. In holding this evidence improperly admitted we observed that [t]he introduction of such evidence, if approved, would lead to the injection of collateral and diverting issues, and be bound to produce confusion which would deprive an accused of the orderly trial to which he is entitled. 405 Pa. 23, 32, 172 A. 2d 795, 799. Here, the jury heard the testimony of six witnesses which related aspects of the alleged kidnapping, and one witness who informed them of pending federal indictments. The admission of this evidence violated our rule. In a capital case where a man's life is at stake, it is imperative that the death penalty be imposed only on the most reliable evidence. Prior convictions of record, and constitutionally valid admissions and confessions of other crimes meet this standard of reliability; piecemeal testimony about other crimes for which appellant has not yet been tried or convicted can never satisfy this standard. Accordingly, the conviction of murder in the first degree is affirmed, the judgment of sentence of death is vacated, and the record is remanded for further sentencing proceedings in accordance with the Split Verdict Act and consistent with this opinion.