Opinion ID: 524999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McKee's Equal Protection Evidence

Text: 92 McKee asserts that the City of Rockwall has a custom, practice, understanding or policy of treating domestic assault cases involving female victims less seriously then assault case involving strangers, thus denying her the equal protection of the law because such a custom or policy is an unconstitutional gender-based form of discrimination. McKee further maintains that the individual officers in this case have demonstrated through their actions similarly unconstitutional discrimination based upon gender. 93 The officers' decision not to arrest Streetman does not facially appear, at first glance, to be based upon considerations of gender. The officers did not state that they do not arrest domestic abuse suspects who beat women. If they had said this, of course, then the nonarrest of Streetman, assuming there was authority to arrest him, would on its face lead to the conclusion that gender discrimination entered into the nonarrest decision. Smoking guns, as I have discussed, are not required. Thus whether a reasonable jury could make factual findings from which one could infer that gender discrimination exists in this case depends on whether the attitudes and decisions of the Rockwall police concerning arrests in domestic violence situations, and in this case in particular, is supported by McKee's summary judgment evidence. 94 McKee presents two pieces of evidence which could permissibly lead to the inference that purposeful gender discrimination entered into the decision not to arrest Streetman: (1) the Chief of Police's statement; and (2) McKee's story of what happened to her. 95
96 The affidavit of McKee's mother states that: Within one or two days of the assault upon my daughter, my husband Roy McKee and I had a conversation with Chief Beaty of the Rockwall Police Department. During that conversation we asked the Chief why Harry Streetman had not been arrested when our daughter first called the police and reported his assault upon her. The Chief responded that his officers did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved either wouldn't file charges or would drop them prior to trial. 97 The Chief's statement explicitly distinguishes between men and women. According to the Chief, it is women who will not file charges, and it is women who will drop the charges prior to trial. The Chief concludes that because women act like this, police officers do not like to arrest their domestic assaulters. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.1988) (reversing district court dismissal of equal protection claim in domestic assault case; remarks of officers strongly suggest ... an animus against abused women); compare Watson v. City of Kansas City, Kansas, 857 F.2d 690, 696-97 (10th Cir.1988) (summary judgment for defendant on equal protection claim reversed with respect to classification scheme of domestic/nondomestic violence, affirmed with respect to gender-based claim because plaintiff presented no evidence of either adverse impact or discriminatory purpose); see also Hynson v. City of Chester, 864 F.2d 1026, 1030 (3rd Cir.1988). 98 The Chief's compacted but crucial statement is central to this case. Under our classification-based equal protection jurisprudence, whether a female plaintiff falls into a class of domestic abuse victims, or female domestic abuse victims, may determine the appropriate level of scrutiny a court conducts for her claim. The police chief's statement (did not like to make arrests in domestic assault cases since the women involved ...) should be enough for McKee to move beyond summary judgment on her gender-based claim. 99 The labels domestic violence or domestic assault tend to hide the gender of the victims in such cases. Numerous scholarly studies have recognized that women are primarily the victims of domestic abuse. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 n. 1 (D.Conn.1984) (quoting Leeds, Family Offense Cases in the Family Court System: in 29 out of every 30 such cases the husband stands accused of abusing his wife); see Comment, Battered Women, 95 Yale L.J. 788 (cited in note 1, supra ). Our equal protection jurisprudence requires evidence of a classification; judicial notice will not do. 100 McKee has offered such evidence. When the Chief states--that women, not men, are the victims in domestic assault cases--the plaintiff hurdles a barrier which is extremely difficult to ascend. This supplies the understanding that domestic assault affects women. A general observation of our society confirms what the Chief easily recognizes, that is that women are the victims in domestic violence situations. 4 A Texas statute is a good example of the observation that women particularly suffer from violence in the home. The assault statute, Tex.Penal Code Sec. 22.01 was amended in 1979 to include the underscored words: A person commits an offense if he: (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including his spouse.... The Texas legislature felt it was necessary to make it explicit that husbands cannot beat their wives. Presumably, before the Texas legislature made this clear, some people thought, and probably still think, that it is acceptable for husbands and boyfriends to beat their wives and girlfriends. 5 See Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F.Supp. 1521, 1528 (D.Conn.1984) (quoting from scholarly writings which set forth that at common law, husbands were permitted to beat their wives, within limits). 101 Women in their homes are vulnerable to the men with whom they live. Women's vulnerability is heightened by a police officer's hesitancy and sometimes refusal to invade the space of privacy which surrounds the family or unit of people living together. The Texas legislature has attempted to address and refute the historical belief that the curtilage of a man's home is sacrosanct. A man's home is his castle indeed. The officers' dislike affects women. 102 The Chief voices the sentiments and purposes of the officers he commands by stating that his officers did not like to make arrests.... The buried feeling among his officers, according to the Chief's statement, which we must take as true, is that women are responsible for the officers' disinclination to make arrests in domestic assault situations. This blaming of the victim operates to deprive women of the protection of the police from assault based upon their status as women. The majority states that a dislike is not a policy, and one officer's dislike [is not] binding on another. The majority's construction of the evidence against nonmovant is inappropriate. A trial may demonstrate that a dislike and a de facto policy are one and the same. The Chief is certainly competent to discuss whether a particular action or response in a given situation is a custom or de facto policy of the officers he commands. The Chief's statement creates an issue of fact concerning the discriminatory treatment of women in domestic assault situations. This evidence should be enough for plaintiff to survive summary judgment concerning the viability of her equal protection claim. 103
104 The officers' interaction with McKee constitutes evidence that, when coupled with the Chief's statement, would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of McKee's equal protection claim. Again, because this is case is presented in the posture of defendants' motions for summary judgment, we must treat plaintiff's evidence as true. 105 In her affidavit, quoted above, McKee informed the officers that Streetman had beat her, and that she feared that he would do so again because he had threatened her. McKee states: The officers present refused to drive me to my parents' home and refused to arrest Mr. Streetman. Instead, they said that I was exaggerating the threat Mr. Streetman posed to me and suggested that I talk matters out with him.    They also indicated that after I had calmed down I probably would not want to file a complaint. At this time, Mr. Streetman threatened to burn my belongings if I went to the station [to file a complaint]. The police did not respond. (emphasis added). 106 The treatment McKee received calls to mind the archaic and stereotypical usage of the word hysteria. The Oxford English Dictionary, finally published in 1933 after 70 years of compilation, defines hysteria as follows: 1. Path[ological] A functional disturbance of the nervous system, characterized by such disorders as anaesthesia, hyperaesthesia, convulsions, etc., and usually attended with emotional disturbances and enfeeblement or perversion of the moral and intellectual faculties. The OED goes on to state: Women being much more liable than men to this disorder, it was originally thought to be due to a disturbance of the uterus and its functions. The officers' accusation that McKee was exaggerating the threat, and their suggestion that after she calmed down, she would not want to file a complaint, remind me of the mores of the century preceding even my birth. 107 In the linguistic history of our society, it is common to find women referred to as hysterical; it is uncommon to find references to hysterical men. Two thousand years of Western Civilization's stereotypes are not easy to undo from the hearts of its people. McKee probably was upset. Such a response is extremely rational and understandable if Streetman had beat her and threatened her physical safety to the point of death, and the police stood by and did nothing to protect her. 6 There is nothing hysterical about such a response. In contrast, Streetman threatened in the officers' presence to burn her belongings. The officers, who are all male, treated McKee's expressions in a condescending manner, while not responding to Streetman's threat. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 855 F.2d 1421, 1427 (9th Cir.1988) (officer's comment that he did not blame plaintiff's husband for hitting her because of the way she was 'carrying on'  suggests an animus against women). 108