Opinion ID: 531302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Grant of Plaintiff's Directed Verdict Motion

Text: 36 A local government is liable under Sec. 1983 when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.... Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2037-38, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). See also Geter v. Wille, 846 F.2d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 870, 102 L.Ed.2d 994 (1989). Section 1983 liability may not be premised solely upon a respondeat superior theory--i.e., a county may not be held liable solely by virtue of the employment relationship linking it to the offending employee. Rather, only deprivations undertaken pursuant to governmental custom or policy may lead to the imposition of governmental liability. [R]ecovery from a municipality is limited to acts that are, properly speaking, acts 'of the municipality'--that is, acts which the municipality has officially sanctioned or ordered. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1298, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). See City of Canton v. Harris, --- U.S. ----, ----, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 1203, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989) (a municipality can be found liable under Sec. 1983 only where the municipality itself causes the constitutional violation at issue) (emphasis in original). 37 The County contends that the district court erred in directing a verdict at the close of all the evidence because there was insufficient evidence to establish the existence of a custom or policy which caused the deliberate indifference. According to the County, there was only one incident in the record to support the existence of a governmental policy or custom--Hatfield's deliberate indifference and Chairman Kelson's statement to Mandel's father that he would not intervene. Relying on City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985), the County argues that a single act cannot establish governmental policy or custom for purposes of Sec. 1983, unless the policy itself is unconstitutional. Here, the County asserts, its policy was to provide medical attention to the inmates of the road prison by stationing a duly licensed physician's assistant at the road camp to work under the supervision of a licensed medical doctor. Brief of Appellant 31. Such a policy can hardly be deemed unconstitutional. Accordingly, the County argues, the one act of Chairman Kelson is insufficient to establish governmental liability. 38 The County's sole argument at trial and on appeal was premised upon the Supreme Court's decision in City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, in which a plurality of the Supreme Court held that, in cases involving unconstitutional acts of low-level municipal employees, the plaintiff may prove custom or policy by showing a pattern of unconstitutional acts. The instant case, however, concerns altogether different methods of proving custom or policy: the delegation of final policymaking authority from one official to another and the ratification of a subordinate's actions by a final policymaker. See Tuttle, 471 U.S. at 834, 105 S.Ct. at 2441 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (there may be many ways of proving the existence of a municipal policy or custom that can cause a deprivation of a constitutional right). 14 Recent Supreme Court decisions have traced the contours of these alternative theories of addressing when a local government may be held liable under Sec. 1983 for a single decision by a government policymaker. 39 In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), the Court upheld a finding of municipal liability for the violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights where deputy sheriffs unlawfully entered plaintiff's office on the express instructions of the county prosecutor. Because the county prosecutor was acting as the final decisionmaker for the county at the time he ordered the deputy sheriffs to enter the office, the Court concluded the county could be held liable under Sec. 1983. 475 U.S. at 484-85, 106 S.Ct. at 1301. Thus, Pembaur stands for the proposition that, under certain circumstances, municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by a municipal policymaker. 15 475 U.S. at 480, 106 S.Ct. at 1298. 40 In City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988), the Court sought to clarify the question of when a decision on a single occasion may be enough to establish an unconstitutional municipal policy. 485 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. at 924 (plurality opinion). The Court in Praprotnik held that a municipality could not be held liable for the unconstitutional transfer of a city employee where the officials who arranged for the transfer did not possess final policymaking authority with respect to employment decisions and had not been delegated such authority. Praprotnik reaffirmed that the authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make final policy. 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original). The Court concluded that the mere delegation of authority to a subordinate to exercise discretion is not sufficient to give the subordinate policymaking authority. Rather, the delegation must be such that the subordinate's discretionary decisions are not constrained by official policies and are not subject to review. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 125-28, 108 S.Ct. at 925-26. 41 Furthermore, the Praprotnik plurality made clear that the question of whether an official has final policymaking authority is a question of state law. 485 U.S. at 124, 108 S.Ct. at 924 (plurality opinion). Most important for this case, the Praprotnik plurality stated that final policymaking authority could be delegated, and that the delegation issue was a question of state law: 42 'Authority to make municipal policy may be granted directly by a legislative enactment or may be delegated by an official who possesses such authority, and of course, whether such official had final policymaking authority is a question of state law.' 43 Id. at 124, 108 S.Ct. at 924 (quoting Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. at 483, 106 S.Ct. at 1300 (plurality opinion)). 16 44 Just this last term, in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989), a majority of the Supreme Court adopted the Praprotnik plurality's view that identification of the official or final policymaker is a question of state law, to be determined by the trial judge and not by the jury: 45 [T]he identification of those officials whose decisions represent the official policy of the local governmental unit is itself a legal question to be resolved by the trial judge before the case is submitted to the jury. Reviewing the relevant legal materials, including state and local positive law, as well [as] 'custom or usage', having the force of law, the trial judge must identify those officials or governmental bodies who speak with final policymaking authority for the local governmental actor concerning the action alleged to have caused the particular constitutional or statutory violation at issue. Once those officials who have the power to make official policy on a particular issue have been identified, it is for the jury to determine whether their decisions have caused the deprivation of rights at issue.... 46 Jett, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2723 (emphasis in original) (quotation and citation omitted). 47 Although identification of the policymaker may often involve fact-sensitive inquiries, the Supreme Court has determined as a matter of policy that courts, and not juries, are to make this decision. Municipalities cannot be expected to predict how courts or juries will assess their 'actual power structures,' and this uncertainty could easily lead to results that would be hard in practice to distinguish from the results of a regime governed by the doctrine of respondeat superior. It is one thing to charge a municipality with responsibility for the decisions of officials invested by law, or by a 'custom or usage' having the force of law, with policymaking authority. It would be something else, and something inevitably more capricious, to hold a municipality responsible for every decision that is perceived as 'final' through the lens of a particular factfinder's evaluation of the city's 'actual power structure.'  Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124 n. 1, 108 S.Ct. at 924 n. 1. 48 For these reasons, every circuit court of appeals, including this court, that has addressed this issue since Praprotnik, has concluded that the identification of the final policymaker is a question of state law for the trial judge, not for the jury. See Owens v. Fulton County, 877 F.2d 947, 950-51 (11th Cir.1989); Parker v. Williams, 862 F.2d 1471, 1478-81 (11th Cir.1989). See also Arnold v. Bd. of Educ. of Escambia County, 880 F.2d 305, 316 (11th Cir.1989). Accord Worsham v. City of Pasadena, 881 F.2d 1336, 1340 (5th Cir.1989); Praprotnik v. City of St. Louis, 879 F.2d 1573, 1574 (8th Cir.1989); Starrett v. Wadley, 876 F.2d 808, 818-19 (10th Cir.1989); Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887, 894-95 (7th Cir.1989). 49 As the above discussions of Jett, Praprotnik, and Pembaur make clear, municipal liability may attach to a single decision made by a municipal official if that municipal official is the final policymaker for the municipality with respect to the subject matter in question. Under this theory of municipal liability, the first step of the inquiry is to identify those individuals whose decisions represent the official policy of the local governmental unit. Jett, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2723. As already discussed, this is a question of law to be resolved by the trial court judge. Id. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 924. In making this determination, the court should examine not only the relevant positive law, including ordinances, rules and regulations, but also the relevant customs and practices having the force of law. Jett, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2723. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 485, 106 S.Ct. at 1301 (county prosecutor found to be final policymaker based in part on relevant operational practices). See also Williams v. Butler, 863 F.2d 1398, 1403 (8th Cir.1988) (in banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3215, 106 L.Ed.2d 565 (1989). The court must also ensure that the municipal official possesses the authority and responsibility for establishing final policy with respect to the issue in question. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127, 108 S.Ct. at 926; Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1300. Only after this determination is made is the second step of the inquiry relevant: Did the challenged decision or act of the official cause the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights? The answer to this question is, of course, for the jury. See Jett, --- U.S. at ----, 109 S.Ct. at 2723. 50 In this case, the district court clearly understood the delegation theory of governmental liability at issue as outlined in Pembaur, Praprotnik and Jett when it held that final policymaking authority with respect to medical decisions at the road prison had been delegated to Hatfield. 17 As noted above, this issue of whether final policymaking authority was delegated to Hatfield is a question of state law to be decided by the district court, and not to be submitted to the jury. Accordingly, our standard of review is not premised upon whether a reasonable jury could find otherwise; rather, we must independently review the district court's decision on this matter of state law. 51 We agree with the district court's conclusion that Hatfield was acting as the final policymaker for the County with respect to the medical affairs at the road prison. The County had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding with the health department and had established a policy that medical care for inmates at the road prison would be provided by a physician's assistant. Hatfield was that physician's assistant. Although it was initially contemplated that the physician's assistant would be supervised by a medical doctor, the evidence revealed that a custom and practice developed so that the policy was that Hatfield was authorized to function without any supervision or review at all. The policy was that Hatfield's medical decisions were subject to no supervision or review, except to the extent that Hatfield himself, in his sole and unsupervised discretion, deemed appropriate. We agree with the district court that Hatfield was the sole and final policymaker with respect to medical affairs at the road prison. 18 52 Of course, we properly accord some deference to the evaluation of the district judge who is familiar with local law, see National Fire Insurance Co. v. Housing Development Co., 827 F.2d 1475, 1480 (11th Cir.1987), and who had before him all of the evidence adduced as to the structure of this local government with respect to medical policymaking at the road prison. 19 Our independent review of this issue of state law leads us to agree with the district court that the County did delegate to Hatfield final policymaking authority with respect to medical affairs at the road prison. 20 Because Hatfield had been delegated the final policymaking authority with respect to medical affairs at the prison, his acts of deliberate indifference can be attributed to the County so as to establish municipal liability. See Pembaur, 475 U.S. at 483-84, 106 S.Ct. at 1292 (municipality may be liable under Sec. 1983 where a deliberate choice is made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible for establishing final policy with respect to subject matter in question.). 53