Opinion ID: 1822646
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicability of ring v. arizona

Text: This is our second opportunity to address the impact of Ring v. Arizona, supra , on an appeal pending at the time of its decision. The first was State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003), a direct capital appeal in which the defendant had assigned as error the trial court's denial of his motion challenging the constitutionality of Nebraska's capital sentencing statutes as they then existed and requesting a jury determination of sentencing issues. After Gales' appeal was docketed but before it was briefed or argued, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Ring that its prior decisions in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), were irreconcilable and that Walton should therefore be overruled to the extent that it allowed a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. The Court concluded that because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as `the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,' the Sixth Amendment requires that the factors be found by a jury. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra . In State v. Gales, supra , we held that under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987), the new constitutional rule announced in Ring was applicable because Gales had preserved the issue in the trial court and, due to the pending direct appeal, his conviction and sentence were not final when Ring was decided. This case reaches us in a different procedural posture. A criminal conviction is final for purposes of collateral review when the judgment of conviction is rendered, the availability of appeal is exhausted, and the time for petition for certiorari has lapsed. Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 106 S.Ct. 2878, 92 L.Ed.2d 199 (1986); State v. Reeves, 234 Neb. 711, 453 N.W.2d 359 (1990), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Reeves v. Nebraska, 498 U.S. 964, 111 S.Ct. 425, 112 L.Ed.2d 409 (1990). Our decision in Lotter's direct appeal became final in January 1999, and his petition for writ of certiorari was denied on June 7, 1999. State v. Lotter, 255 Neb. 456, 586 N.W.2d 591 (1998), modified on denial of rehearing 255 Neb. 889, 587 N.W.2d 673 (1999), cert. denied 526 U.S. 1162, 119 S.Ct. 2056, 144 L.Ed.2d 222 (1999). Thus, Lotter's convictions were final more than a year before Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra , and more than 3 years before Ring v. Arizona, supra . Thus, assuming without deciding that Lotter properly preserved a Ring Sixth Amendment issue in his trial and direct appeal and in this postconviction proceeding, the disposition of his motion for remand depends upon whether the holding in Ring applies to a conviction and sentence which were final when Ring was decided. The U.S. Supreme Court did not address this retroactivity issue in Ring. Based upon the similarity of the Nebraska statutes under which Lotter was sentenced and the Arizona capital sentencing statutes which were declared unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), Lotter argues that his death sentences were void ab initio and entered without jurisdiction. This argument, however, ignores the existence of Walton v. Arizona, supra , in which the U.S. Supreme Court specifically upheld the constitutionality of the Arizona statutes which it subsequently held unconstitutional in Ring. Walton was the controlling constitutional precedent when Lotter was sentenced and when his convictions became final. By specifically overruling Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty, the Court in Ring announced a new constitutional rule. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. We must now decide whether the new rule applies to Lotter's final judgments. We were presented with a similar issue in State v. Reeves, supra , which, like this case, was a postconviction proceeding in a capital case. Reeves argued that the admission of a victim impact statement during the sentencing phase of his trial violated his Eighth Amendment rights, based upon the holding of Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), overruled, Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991), which was decided after his convictions and sentences became final. In determining whether Booth should be given retroactive application, this court applied the test which was first adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), and later specifically extended to the capital sentencing context in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), abrogated on other grounds, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002). Under this test, a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure will not be applied retroactively to a final judgment on collateral review unless it falls within one of two exceptions. The first exception encompasses new rules which place certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe. Teague v. Lane, supra . The second exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity is for watershed rules of criminal procedure which are `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Lotter contends that the Teague test is inapplicable to this case because the new rule announced in Ring is not procedural, but, rather, substantive in nature. He argues that because Ring treats aggravating circumstances in a capital sentencing statute as the `functional equivalent of an element of greater offense,' Ring redefines the elements of murder as a capital offense. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Arizona Supreme Court recently considered and rejected a similar argument in State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828 (2003). The court noted a distinction between substantive rules which determine the meaning of a criminal statute and address the criminal significance of certain facts or the underlying prohibited conduct and procedural rules which set forth fact-finding procedures to ensure a fair trial. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 390, 64 P.3d at 832, citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998); Curtis v. U.S., 294 F.3d 841 (7th Cir.2002); and U.S. v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir.2001). The Arizona court reasoned that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), did not announce a new substantive rule because it was simply an extension of the procedural rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and changed neither the underlying conduct that the state must prove to establish that a defendant's crime warrants death nor the state's burden of proof; it affected neither the facts necessary to establish Arizona's aggravating factors nor the state's burden to establish the factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, [ Ring ] altered who decides whether any aggravating circumstances exist, thereby altering the fact-finding procedures used in capital sentencing hearings. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 391, 64 P.3d at 833. We conclude that this reasoning is both sound and consistent with our holding in State v. Gales, 265 Neb. 598, 658 N.W.2d 604 (2003), that the amendments to Nebraska's capital sentencing statutes enacted in response to Ring constituted a procedural change in the law. In Gales, we reasoned that the amendments did not alter the substantive nature of the aggravating circumstances which must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to establish death eligibility, but only changed the law to require that a jury, rather than a judge, make the determination of the existence of aggravating circumstances in the absence of a jury waiver by the defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the new constitutional rule announced in Ring was procedural, not substantive. Whether that rule affects Lotter's death sentences therefore depends upon whether it fits within either of the two exceptions to the general rule of nonretroactivity established by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). The first Teague exception is inapplicable because the rule announced in Ring clearly does not place any type of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal lawmaking authority to proscribe. In determining whether Ring falls within the second Teague exception, we note that the scope of that exception has been narrowly circumscribed by the U.S. Supreme Court as limited to `a small core of rules,' which not only seriously enhance accuracy but also `requir[e] observance of those procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666, n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001), quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 113 S.Ct. 892, 122 L.Ed.2d 260 (1993). See, also, O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 138 L.Ed.2d 351 (1997). The U.S. Supreme Court emphasized in Tyler that in order to fall within the second Teague exception, [i]nfringement of the rule must `seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction,' and the rule must ``alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements '' essential to the fairness of a proceeding. (Emphasis in original.) Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. at 665, 121 S.Ct. 2478, quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 110 S.Ct. 2822, 111 L.Ed.2d 193 (1990). The Court has noted that its sweeping rule establishing an affirmative right to counsel in all felony cases announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), is an example of the type of watershed rule contemplated by the second Teague exception. O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. at 167, 117 S.Ct. 1969. Accord Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990). In Sawyer v. Smith, supra , the U.S. Supreme Court held that the new rule it announced in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985), that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the imposition of a death sentence by a sentencer that has been led to the false belief that responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the death sentence rests elsewhere, was not retroactively applicable, under Teague, to a final judgment under collateral review in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. In Tyler v. Cain, supra , the Court held that the new rule announced in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), disapproved on other grounds, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991), that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, was not made retroactive by the subsequent holding in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993), that the giving of such an instruction constitutes structural error. The Court in Tyler stated the standard for determining whether an error is structural... is not coextensive with the second Teague exception, and a holding that a particular error is structural does not logically dictate the conclusion that the second Teague exception has been met. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. at 666-67, 121 S.Ct. 2478. The Court further noted its prior observations that it is unlikely that any `watershed' rules which would fall within the second Teague exception have yet emerged. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. at 666, n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 2478 quoting O'Dell v. Netherland, supra . Our research indicates that two other state supreme courts have considered the question of whether the rule announced in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), falls within the second exception to the general rule of nonretroactivity established by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Both courts have concluded that it does not. In State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828 (2003), the Arizona Supreme Court determined that Ring has no effect on the determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence, but, rather, prohibits a validly convicted defendant from being exposed to the death penalty unless a jury finds the existence of certain aggravating circumstances. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 391, 64 P.3d at 833. The court reasoned that this new constitutional rule could not be viewed as enhancing the accuracy of the determination of aggravating circumstances, as required under the second Teague exception, because there was no reason to believe that impartial juries will reach more accurate conclusions regarding the presence of aggravating circumstances than did an impartial judge. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 392, 64 P.3d at 834. Noting that the U.S. Supreme Court in Ring stated that `[t]he Sixth Amendment jury trial right ... does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders,' Towery also concluded that Ring does not involve a procedure so `implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' as to constitute a watershed rule. State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. at 392, 64 P.3d at 834, quoting Ring v. Arizona, supra , and Teague v. Lane, supra . The Nevada Supreme Court employed similar reasoning to reach the same conclusion in Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d 463 (Nev.2002), a postconviction action which was pending when Ring was decided. Adopting a relaxed version of the Teague test which would permit retroactive application of a new constitutional rule if it establish[es] a procedure without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished, the court concluded that the rule established by Ring did not meet this standard because the likelihood of an accurate sentence was not seriously diminished simply because a three-judge panel, rather than a jury, found the aggravating circumstances that supported [the defendant]'s death sentence. Colwell v. State, 59 P.3d at 472, 473. The decision in Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir.2002), further supports the view that Ring does not fall within the second Teague exception. In that case, the court denied an emergency stay of execution and request to file a second federal habeas corpus petition which sought to challenge Oklahoma's capital sentencing statutes under Ring. Prior to Ring, a direct appeal and first habeas corpus petition had been finally resolved against the defendant. The court rejected a claim that Ring announced a new substantive rule which was not subject to a Teague analysis. Based upon its previous holding in U.S. v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2002), that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), announced a new rule of criminal procedure, it concluded that the same was true of Ring because  Ring is simply an extension of Apprendi to the death penalty context. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d at 994. Because, like other courts, we regard Apprendi as the jurisprudential source of the Sixth Amendment principle established by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), we find further guidance from the manner in which other courts have resolved issues regarding the retroactive application of Apprendi. A clear majority of state and federal jurisdictions hold that Apprendi may not be applied retroactively to final judgments on collateral review. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. U.S., 330 F.3d 55 (1st Cir. 2003); Coleman v. U.S., 329 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.2003); U.S. v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304 (5th Cir.2002); Goode v. U.S., 305 F.3d 378 (6th Cir.2002); Dellinger v. Bowen, 301 F.3d 758 (7th Cir.2002); U.S. v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9th Cir.2002); Cannon v. Mullin, supra ; U.S. v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139 (4th Cir.2001); U.S. v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993 (8th Cir.2001); McCoy v. U.S., 266 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir.2001); State v. Sepulveda, 201 Ariz. 158, 32 P.3d 1085 (Ariz.App.2001); People v. Bradbury, 68 P.3d 494 (Colo.App.2002); Figarola v. State, 841 So.2d 576 (Fla.App.2003); People v. Gholston, 332 Ill.App.3d 179, 772 N.E.2d 880, 265 Ill.Dec. 509 (2002); Whisler v. State, 272 Kan. 864, 36 P.3d 290 (2001); Meemken v. State, 662 N.W.2d 146 (Minn.App.2003); State v. Tallard, 816 A.2d 977 (N.H.2003); Teague v. Palmateer, 184 Or.App. 577, 57 P.3d 176 (2002). The small minority of courts initially holding to the contrary have had such decisions reversed. See, U.S. v. Murphy, 109 F.Supp.2d 1059 (D.Minn.2000), reversed 268 F.3d 599 (8th Cir.2001); People v. Carter, 332 Ill.App.3d 576, 773 N.E.2d 1140, 266 Ill.Dec. 70 (2002), abrogated, People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 274 Ill.Dec. 397, 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003). Although the U.S. Supreme Court has not directly addressed the question of whether Apprendi can be applied retroactively under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), its recent decision in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), provides some indication as to whether the Court would regard its holding in Apprendi, and by logical extension its holding in Ring, as watershed rules. Cotton involved a direct appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Following a jury trial in which the defendants were found guilty, the trial judge made a finding as to the amount of cocaine in the defendants' possession, based upon the trial testimony, and pronounced an enhanced sentence dictated by the quantity pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000). Apprendi was decided during the pendency of the direct appeal, and although the defendants did not raise the issue at trial, the appellate court examined the Apprendi issue under the plain-error test of Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b), which required a determination of whether the error affected the substantial rights of the defendants. The Court concluded that it need not resolve that question, because even assuming [the defendants'] substantial rights were affected, the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 632-33, 122 S.Ct. 1781. The Court reasoned that in light of the overwhelming and uncontroverted evidence that [the defendants] were involved in a vast drug conspiracy, a threat to the `fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings' would occur if the defendants were to receive a sentence prescribed for those committing less substantial drug offenses because of an error that was never objected to at trial. 535 U.S. at 634, 122 S.Ct. 1781. As one federal court of appeals has concluded from Cotton: Given that an admitted Apprendi error can be excused if the evidence on the factor is overwhelming, it is difficult for us to conclude that Apprendi can be considered a watershed decision, representing rights fundamental to due process. U.S. v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002). We conclude that Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), announced a new constitutional rule of criminal procedure which does not fall within either of the Teague exceptions to the general rule that such changes in the law do not apply retroactively to final judgments. Therefore, we decline to apply Ring to the final judgments which are before us for collateral review in this postconviction appeal and deny Lotter's motions filed in this court requesting that we vacate his death sentences and remand the causes to the district court with directions to resentence him to life imprisonment.