Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Refusal to Redact Asserted Character Evidence from March 22 Statement

Text: During the March 22 interview, before defendant admitted having been intoxicated on the night of the killings, Detective Hash asked him whether he blacked out at any point. The following exchange ensued: Holloway: I knew what I was doing. I wasn't drunk. Usually I can drink a beer and not, you know, really get drunk. As far as hard liquor, I don't really mess with that, because I know, you know, if I do get drunk that's. Just can't handle hard liquor. That's why I only took one shot of Tequila. `Cause I know what I'm capable of doing if I'm drunk, if I'm  Hash: What is that? Holloway: Staggering drunk. Can hurt somebody or whatever. If I was drunk I don't think I could do this. Hash: Do what, exactly? Holloway: Well, killing. Debbie was too close to me. Defendant moved for the redaction of most of this passage, beginning after his statement that he does not really mess with that. Defense counsel argued that defendant's admission he could hurt somebody when very drunk was a reference, in essence, to his prior conviction for assault on Roxie Bianchi, which the guilt phase jury was not to hear about. The prosecutor argued defendant's admission contained no such reference, and the court agreed, stating the remark does not implicate his prior record. On appeal, defendant has shifted ground, claiming not that the remark at issue referred to his prior offense, but rather that it was an opinion about his own character for violence while intoxicated and was inadmissible, under Evidence Code section 1101, to show he acted in accord with that propensity by killing Debbie and Diane while intoxicated on the morning of March 20, 1983. Although prior instances of conduct and opinion of a witness can both serve to show character (Evid.Code, § 1100), defense counsel did not make clear below that the objection was based on use of the statement as character evidence in violation of Evidence Code section 1101. Rather, counsel argued only that introduction of the remark would tend to make the jury think defendant had been violent in the past and to speculate about what exactly happened, you know, was he arrested, did he get in trouble. The court held simply that the remark did not tend to raise the subject of defendant's criminal record, a conclusion defendant does not challenge on appeal. Whether counsel sufficiently stated the specific ground of the objection (Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a)) is thus unclear. Even assuming, however, that defendant did preserve his Evidence Code section 1101 objection and that the challenged statement was inadmissible as an opinion about his character, we cannot conclude its admission caused a miscarriage of justice (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13; Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (b)) or rendered defendant's trial so fundamentally unfair (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182) as to constitute a deprivation of due process. Defendant's remark was in substance a frank admission of his own dangerous tendencies. Defendant's personal evaluation of his own character  unsolicited by the detectives, who had not asked defendant whether he lost control when intoxicated  was far more reliable than typical third party opinion-of-character evidence. The prosecution's use of defendant's freely offered assessment of his own weakness did not offend fundamental notions of fair trial. Nor, given the other strong evidence against defendant, including his earlier attempt at creating a false alibi and his later admissions to being present during the killings, taken with the impeachment of his third party culpability witness, [8] can we conclude a different verdict was reasonably probable ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 835, 299 P.2d 243) had the March 22 statement been redacted to omit defendant's admission he could hurt people when intoxicated.