Opinion ID: 2576153
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted denial of access to ancillary defense resources

Text: Defendant claims a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws, his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and a fair trial, due to the trial court's alleged denial of reasonable ancillary defense resources such as investigators, experts, and legal materials.
At defendant's first appearance in the superior court on October 21, 1986, he requested $2,500 for an investigator and for travel and supplies. Judge Munoz denied that request but ordered that defendant be provided with the normal indigent funds and supplies. The court also agreed to appoint an investigator from the superior court panel, but defendant did not select an investigator at that time. At defendant's November 4, 1986, arraignment, Judge Munoz appointed Donna Brooks as defendant's legal runner  that is, an individual designated to make deliveries to and from the court on defendant's behalf. The court also ordered $40 in in propria persona funds placed in defendant's inmate account, as well as $50 for his runner at $5 per visit. In late January 1987 defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, asserting that Detective Jackson's search of defendant's briefcase and wallet in 1984 was unreasonable. The hearing on this motion was continued numerous times until it was finally heard in April 1989. In the meantime, on March 4, 1987, Judge Roger Boren, to whom the case had been assigned, ordered a reporter's transcript of the attempted murder trial delivered to defendant for his use in preparing for the hearing on the motion to suppress. At an ex parte hearing held in early April, Judge Boren ordered certain legal and medical books and articles provided to defendant. On April 24, 1987, defendant's advisory counsel, Newman, stated that defendant was having difficulty accessing his in propria persona and investigation funds. Judge Boren issued an order clarifying that defendant was to receive a total of $40 for telephone and stamps, payable at $10 per week, as well as those supplies regularly and normally ... provided without cost to other persons who are in propria persona. The order allowed defendant to direct any request for additional funds or supplies to the court. On May 4, 1987, defendant advised Judge Nelson, to whom the case recently had been transferred, that he recently had received the transcript of the attempted murder trial. When defendant complained a few days later in the master calendar court about the $40 limit on in propria persona funds, Judge Munoz explained that the $40 was intended only to cover incidental expenses, and stated: [i]f you need experts, you will get experts, pay them just like we do with other attorneys. On June 10, 1987, on defendant's motion, Judge Munoz appointed Robert Sabel as defendant's investigator and issued an order authorizing payment not to exceed $3,000 without further order of court. Between July 1987 and February 1988, the case was continued several times and was reassigned to Judge Candace Cooper. During that period, defendant moved for an order to preserve tissue samples taken from Green's organs after her death, for examination by a defense pathologist. The prosecutor agreed to have the samples sent from Michigan, where Green had died, to the coroner's office in Los Angeles. Upon defendant's request, the court ordered the reporter's transcript of the May 31, 1985, proceedings in the attempted murder trial prepared and filed. The court denied, however, defendant's request for additional legal books and other materials. At a hearing held on March 11, 1988, Judge Cooper at defendant's request appointed Dr. Irving Root as the defense expert pathologist. The court later signed an order authorizing payment of up to $3,000 for Dr. Root's services. The court also promised to look into the matter of the May 31, 1985, transcript, which had not been prepared as ordered. In June 1988 the parties agreed to continue the trial until January 1989, in part because Dr. Root had not yet examined Green's tissue samples. On July 8, 1988, the parties appeared before Judge Cooper for a hearing on defendant's discovery motion. Defendant asked for a copy of any fingerprint analysis conducted by the prosecution on the gin bottle and the box it came in, and asked that the bottle and box be released to a defense fingerprint expert. Defendant also complained that a page was missing from the defense copy of the murder book (the district attorney's collection of relevant police reports), which had been turned over to defendant in March of 1987. The missing page documented the death of Michelle Dubois, the woman Rhoda Miller had visited on the day of the poisoning. Defendant suggested that the district attorney or his agents might have taken the page from his cell during a search. Judge Cooper declined to inquire into the legality of any searches of defendant's cell, but stated she would order the prosecutor to deliver to the defense a new copy of the page involving Dubois, as well as any prosecution fingerprint analysis of the gin bottle and box. After another continuance, on March 16, 1989, the court set this matter for trial the next day. Because Judge Cooper was unavailable, the case was reassigned to Judge Krieger. On March 17, 1989, before Judge Krieger, the prosecutor agreed to arrange for the defense expert, Dell Freeman, to examine the gin bottle, the box it came in, and other relevant items. When defendant complained that he had not received the missing page from the murder book, the court stated that Judge Cooper's order regarding the page was still in effect, and that the prosecutor would turn it over to defendant if and when it was found. Jury selection began on March 22, 1989. Later that day, Judge Krieger appointed Malcolm Everest as defendant's replacement investigator after defendant explained that his previous investigator, Robert Sabel, had resigned. The court's order provided funds of up to $1,500 for Everest's services. During jury selection on March 30, Judge Krieger formalized the appointment of Dell Freeman as defendant's fingerprint expert. The prosecutor stated that the gin box and bottle would be available for Freeman to examine at the Los Angeles Police Department. At defendant's request, on April 6, 1989, Judge Krieger relieved Everest as defendant's replacement investigator and appointed Malcolm Richards in his place. The funding limit remained $1,500. On April 7 and 10, 1989, during jury selection, Lucas informed the court that he had been unable to contact Richards. Judge Krieger heard and denied defendant's suppression motion on April 17, 1989. The parties presented opening statements and the prosecution began its case in chief that same day. The next day, defendant again complained that the defense had been unable to contact his replacement investigator, Richards. The court ordered Richards to appear in court on April 20 to meet with defendant. The prosecution rested its case-in-chief on April 24, 1989. Dell Freeman testified for defendant the following day. Ultimately, defendant declined to call Dr. Root, but the prosecution called him on April 28, 1989, in its rebuttal case. Dr. Root testified that Green died from cyanide poisoning. Between October 1987 and July 1988, defendant's initial investigator, Robert Sabel, submitted four fee statements seeking reimbursement for a total of $4,426.57 for 177 hours worked, plus expenses. On each statement, defendant acknowledged that he had requested all of the services performed. Neither of defendant's subsequent two defense investigators (Everest or Richards) submitted billing statements.
Defendant contends that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution demands parity between the ancillary services provided to an indigent defendant who represents himself or herself and an indigent defendant represented by counsel. Defendant contends that parity was denied to him and that his Fourteenth Amendment rights therefore were violated. Defendant asserts that even if parity is not required, the alleged denial of ancillary services violated his Sixth Amendment right to represent himself and his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of law and a fair trial. Our analysis begins with a discussion of the constitutional and statutory bases of a criminal defendant's right to ancillary defense services. [T]he right to counsel guaranteed by both the federal and state Constitutions includes, and indeed presumes, the right to effective counsel [citations], and thus also includes the right to reasonably necessary defense services. [Citations.] ( Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319-320, 204 Cal.Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360.) Section 987.9 codifies this right in capital cases. ( County of Los Angeles v. Commission on State Mandates (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 805, 815, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 304.) At the relevant time (1987 through 1989), that statute provided, as it does today, in pertinent part: In the trial of a capital case ... the indigent defendant, through the defendant's counsel, may request the court for funds for the specific payment of investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense. The application for funds shall be by affidavit and shall specify that the funds are reasonably necessary for the preparation or presentation of the defense. (Former § 987.9, now § 987.9, subd. (a).) As section 987.9 makes clear, the right to ancillary services arises only when a defendant demonstrates such funds are reasonably necessary for his or her defense by reference to the general lines of inquiry that he or she wishes to pursue. ( Corenevsky v. Superior Court, supra, 36 Cal.3d at p. 320, 204 Cal.Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360.) This requirement applies both to indigent defendants represented by counsel and to those who choose to represent themselves. (See People v. Faxel (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 327, 330-331, 154 Cal.Rptr. 132 [interpreting the analogous provision for noncapital cases, section 987.2].) The court held in Faxel that the necessary parity between the indigent defendant and others required by the equal protection clause is to be achieved not by permitting the indigent to spend public funds at his whim but rather by administration of the reasonable necessity requirement. ( Id. at p. 331, 154 Cal.Rptr. 132.) Assuming the equal protection clause also demands parity between the services provided to indigent defendants represented by counsel and those provided to individuals representing themselves, such parity is to be achieved in the same manner. As for the Sixth Amendment, we have recognized that depriving a self-represented defendant of all means of presenting a defense violates the right of self-representation. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1040, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044, citing Milton v. Morris (9th Cir.1985) 767 F.2d 1443, 1445-1446.) Thus, a defendant who is representing himself or herself may not be placed in the position of presenting a defense without access to a telephone, law library, runner, investigator, advisory counsel, or any other means of developing a defense. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1040, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Yet, as we have observed, [i]nstitutional and security concerns of pretrial detention facilities may be considered in determining what means will be accorded to the defendant to prepare his or her defense. [Citations.] When the defendant has a lawyer acting as advisory counsel, his or her rights are adequately protected. [Citations.] ( Ibid. ) In the final analysis, the Sixth Amendment requires only that a self-represented defendant's access to the resources necessary to present a defense be reasonable under all the circumstances. (See People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1040-1041, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Thus, the crucial question underlying all of defendant's constitutional claims is whether he had reasonable access to the ancillary services that were reasonably necessary for his defense. A review of the record reveals that he did. Defendant had advisory counsel Newman and Lucas acting on his behalf, so his Sixth Amendment rights were adequately protected. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1040, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Moreover, defendant received the services of several investigators, a runner, a pathologist, and a fingerprint expert. Although defendant complains that the services provided were not used effectively, any failure to utilize those resources better is attributable to defendant who, as his own counsel, controlled the litigation. Defendant cannot premise a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on his own shortcomings. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) As discussed below, none of defendant's specific claims regarding the resources provided to him has merit. Defendant first complains that he was restricted to a total of $40 for legal resources pursuant to a Los Angeles County Superior Court policy. But as noted above, the trial court explained that sum was intended only for incidental expenses such as telephone calls and stamps, and defendant was free to ask for additional funding for such expenses if he needed it. Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the budget of $50 for a runner at $5 per visit. He makes no showing, however, that this budget was inadequate. Further, although defendant complained occasionally concerning his inability to access the funds in his inmate account, he makes no showing that the funds were not ultimately made available, or that he suffered prejudice from any temporary lack of access. Defendant also asserts he was denied reasonable access to an investigator. He is incorrect. Although the court initially denied defendant's October 21, 1986, request for $2,500 for an investigator and other expenses, it informed defendant at the time that an investigator would be appointed from the approved panel as soon as defendant sought one. Defendant did not formally request appointment of an investigator until June 10, 1987, at which time the court immediately appointed Robert Sabel. [17] Sabel worked a total of 177 hours on defendant's case and apparently resigned some time after July 1988, but defendant did not request appointment of a replacement investigator until March 22, 1989, at which time the court appointed Malcolm Everest and, thereafter, Malcolm Richards. Although defendant complains of difficulty in contacting Richards during the trial, as noted above the record reflects that when defendant brought this matter to the court's attention, the court ordered Richards to appear in court to meet with defendant. There is no indication in the record that this order was not complied with. Defendant further asserts that Sabel interviewed only one witness during the entire time he worked for defendant and spent most of his time preparing and filing writ petitions. This, however, apparently was how defendant chose to use his investigator. Defendant acknowledged requesting all of the services performed by Sabel. He cannot premise a claim of error upon his own failings as counsel. ( Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 834-835, fn. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525.) Defendant next complains he was denied access to expert witnesses. Again, he is mistaken. The court appointed Dr. Irving Root as defendant's expert pathologist immediately upon defendant's formal request. The prosecution made Green's tissue samples available for Dr. Root to examine. That Dr. Root's conclusions were not favorable to the defense, and that he ultimately did not testify on defendant's behalf, is immaterial; defendant was given access to and funding for the expert he chose, which is all that the law requires. The court also appointed Dell Freeman as defendant's fingerprint expert, and the prosecution made the gin bottle, box, and wrapping available for Freeman to examine. Freeman subsequently testified favorably for the defense. Although Freeman may not have been appointed as expeditiously as defendant would have liked, defendant has not established prejudice from any delay. Defendant next contends that his access to documents and discovery materials was inadequate. He observes that it took more than a year for the transcript of the attempted murder trial to be delivered to him. Defendant first requested the transcript on March 4, 1987. The bulk of the transcript was delivered by May 1987. Although the record does not reflect the precise date on which defendant received the final portion of the transcript  that portion reporting the May 31, 1985, proceedings  it is reasonable to assume that he received that material shortly after his last request for it on March 11, 1988, well before the start of jury selection in March 1989 and the suppression hearing the following month. No prejudice appears from any delay in the completion and delivery of the transcript. Defendant also contends he never received the missing page from the murder book involving Michelle Dubois. The court did indicate it would order a copy of that page delivered to defendant, but it apparently never issued a formal order, and the prosecution later disputed that any order existed. Even assuming the prosecution should have supplied defendant with a copy of the missing page, defendant was not prejudiced. The page apparently documented the fact that Dubois had died, something the prosecution brought out at trial. We fail to see how such information would have assisted the defense. Defendant further asserts he was denied access to the courts. Defendant complained on occasion that he was unable to send or receive legal mail. The court resolved this problem in part, however, by having defendant's mail delivered through the court or through defendant's advisory counsel. The record does not support defendant's further contention that he was unable to file writ petitions with the appellate courts. Defendant finally asserts he was denied access to legal resources such as books and periodicals. The record belies this assertion. On at least one occasion, the court ordered certain legal and medical books and articles that were not available in the prison law library delivered to defendant. The court denied defendant's request for additional materials, because defendant had access to the law library, advisory counsel, and a runner who could make copies for defendant of materials that were unavailable in the prison law library. Defendant thus makes no showing he was denied any reasonably necessary legal resources. In sum, defendant had access not only to advisory counsel Newman and Lucas, but also to investigators, experts, a runner, and library and other resources. To the extent defendant may have been denied access to any resources, the denial was minimal and defendant has failed to demonstrate any resulting prejudice. Defendant thus has not established any violation of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation or his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. [18]