Opinion ID: 2634842
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Department's Potential Liability

Text: In Guerrero I we ruled that the Guerreros asserted a potentially viable negligence claim based on their allegations that the department breached its duty to protect pedestrians from unreasonable danger posed by traffic at the intersection of C Street and 22nd Avenue. [40] The Guerreros based this claim largely on allegations of negligent design, construction, and maintenance of the A/C traffic couplet and related pedestrian systems in the vicinity of C Street and 22nd Avenue. [41] After a period of discovery on remand after Guerrero I, the department moved for summary judgment on several grounds, arguing that it had no duty to take the specific actions the Guerreros sought (actions including the placement of warning signs, signals, and/or a crosswalk or pedestrian overpass at C Street and 22nd Avenue); that liability for such actions was barred by discretionary function immunity in any event; and that the undisputed facts of the case simply made some of the Guerreros' specific theories of liability irrelevant. The superior court granted the department's motion summarily, without specifying the grounds for its ruling. The Guerreros challenge the superior court's summary judgment order, insisting that the record raises triable issues of fact to support their claim against the department. In response, the department reasserts the arguments it raised below. When a trial court grants summary judgment without stating its reasons, we presume[] that the court ruled in the movant's favor on all of the grounds stated. Accordingly, the summary judgment should be reversed only if no ground asserted supports the trial court's decision. [42]
The department asserts initially that our decision in Walden v. Department of Transportation [43] compels the conclusion that the department did not owe the Guerreros a duty to install warning signs or markings on C Street. Asserting that Walden embodies the more modern `duty before immunity' analysis, the department urges us to hold that [t]he Guerreros' failure to recognize the priority of duty analysis, and to discuss in any manner the controlling statutes for signing, marking and signaling, is fatal to their signing and marking claims. But the department's duty argument overstates our holding in Walden. Here, as in Guerrero I, [44] it seems appropriate to start by taking stock of our holding in Arctic Tug & Barge, Inc. v. Raleigh, Schwarz & Powell. [45] In Arctic Tug we noted that our cases draw a distinction between questions concerning precisely how far a duty extends and questions concerning the duty's general existence. [46] We noted that a threshold inquiry into duty is reserved for the second category of questions  those concerning the existence of a general duty. [47] We expressly observed that our law disfavors summary adjudication for the first category of questions  those concerning the precise scope of that duty, or of whether particular conduct did or did not breach it. [48] And we emphasized that summary judgment is inappropriate on these narrower duty questions unless the only reasonable inference from the undisputed facts is that one party owed another no duty whatsoever  or owed a duty clearly and vastly narrower in scope than the one that the other party asserts in opposing summary judgment. [49] Viewed in perspective, our decision in Walden simply illustrates Arctic Tug's point concerning the limited circumstances under which narrow duty questions may properly be decided summarily. In Walden, a car slid off the highway on an icy curve, and one of its passengers, a child, was injured; Walden, the child's mother, sued the department, claiming negligence in failing to sand the road properly and in failing to post a warning sign at the curve. [50] She based her warning-sign claim entirely on the theory that the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices ( Traffic Manual ) would have called for a warning sign to be placed at the curve where the accident occurred. But the theory turned out to be unfounded. At the summary judgment hearing, the state's expert applied the Traffic Manual's technical standards for placing warning signs on curves and calculated that they would not have required or recommended a sign at the accident site, but would merely have permitted one. Walden's own expert then performed the same calculations and agreed with the department's conclusion. Walden offered no other factual theory to support her warning-sign negligence claim, so the superior court, seeing nothing left of the claim, granted summary judgment. We affirmed on appeal. As the department correctly observes here, we ruled on the basis of duty, concluding that Walden had failed to establish that the department had a duty to install a warning sign. But in Walden the state's general duty of due care toward the injured child was not contested, and we simply concluded, as did the trial court, that Walden had no factual basis to support her warning-sign claim, so that in those circumstances, the exercise of reasonable care did not impose a duty on the state to post a sign at the accident. In keeping with Arctic Tug, Walden merely recognized that summary judgment was proper as to the specific scope of the duty because the undisputed facts conclusively showed that the plaintiff's sole theory of duty had no factual merit. Nothing in Walden suggests that all warning-sign claims or signage claims pose broad questions concerning the existence of a general duty. As we expressly recognized in Guerrero I, the state does owe a general duty toward pedestrians who cross public roadways, and the existence of that duty here does not turn on the particularized facts of this case. [51] The only duty questions left open by Guerrero I are fact-specific questions relating to scope. At the summary judgment stage, the vastly narrower test set out by Arctic Tug governs such questions. Because this standard overlaps the demanding summary judgment test we usually apply in reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to show possible negligence, [52] we see no need to undertake a preliminary, more modern analysis of the department's general duty toward the pedestrians.
The department next claims that the Guerreros' action is barred by sovereign immunity. Like the federal government, Alaska has enacted a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity. [53] Although this waiver allows the state to be sued for claims arising in tort, it protects the state from suit when the claim is based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state agency or an employee of the state, whether or not the discretion involved is abused. [54] Not all acts that involve discretion or judgment are immune, for almost any act, even driving a nail, involves some `discretion.' [55] In determining whether an act falls within the discretionary function exception, we distinguish between decisions that involve basic planning or policy and those that are merely operational in the sense that they implement plans or carry out policy. [56] The state retains immunity for the former but not for the latter. [57] Once the state has made a planning-level decision to undertake a project, it does not have discretion to implement that decision negligently. [58] We look to the purposes underlying discretionary function immunity when deciding whether a particular decision is immune. [59] Discretionary function immunity preserve[s] the separation of powers inherent to our form of government by recognizing that it is the function of the state, and not the courts or private citizens, to govern. [60] We have indicated that on basic matters of policy the courts should refrain from second-guessing the legislative and executive branches. [61] Discretionary function immunity also prevents courts from intrud[ing] into realms of policy exceeding their institutional competence. [62] As we have acknowledged, [t]he judicial branch lacks the fact-finding ability of the legislature and the special expertise of the executive departments. [63] Finally, we have recognized that discretionary function immunity protects the public's interest in preventing the enormous and unpredictable liability that would result from judicial reexamination of the decisions of the other branches of government. [64] Our cases have recognized that if decisions require the state to balance the detailed and competing elements of legislative or executive policy, they nearly always deserve protection by discretionary function immunity. [65] Similarly, [d]ecisions about how to allocate scarce resources, will ordinarily be immune from judicial review. [66] On the other hand, we have ruled that if the state has breached a statute or regulation expressly requiring it to act under specific circumstances, its decisions are not protected by discretionary function immunity. [67] And when a statute or regulations are permissive  simply neutral  a decision is more likely protected, especially when the permissiveness suggests a need to balance policy-related considerations. [68] Although the dividing line between planning and operational decisions may often be hard to discern, [69] we have long recognized that, [u]nder the planning/ operational test, `liability is the rule, immunity the exception.' [70] And when the state acts without the protection of discretionary function immunity, the scope of the state's duty should be defined by ordinary negligence principles. [71] By ... applying traditional concepts of tort liability, the administration is not being told that it may not make a particular decision and act pursuant thereto. It is merely being made to pay the entire foreseeable costs of its activities.[ [72] ] Here, the Guerreros argue that once it undertook to build the A/C couplet, the department was required to implement its decision safely. So in the Guerreros' view, the department's design and construction decisions automatically became operational and cannot be treated as immune policy or planning choices. We have no quarrel with the Guerreros' premise that the department's decision to undertake the A/C couplet obliged it to implement the project safely. But the department's undeniable duty to act safely did not automatically shift all of its post-undertaking decisions to the operational side of the planning/operational dichotomy. In Japan Air Lines Co. v. State , for instance, we held that once the state made a basic policy decision to build an airport taxiway for jumbo jets, its ensuing design decisions were operational decisions which merely implemented the basic policy formulation to build a [suitable] taxiway. [73] Yet in summarizing the basis for our decision, we emphasized that it turned on the nature of the design decisions at issue, and did not automatically flow from the state's commitment to undertake the runway project: In summary, the state may be held liable for injuries which result from negligent designs. The issue, as always, is whether the design decision in question involved a basic policy formulation ... or whether the design decision at issue was merely part of the implementation or execution of a basic policy decision, and therefore not immune.[ [74] ] More recently, in Kiokun v. State, Department of Public Safety, we similarly recognized that even though the state's decision to initiate a search-and-rescue operation amounts to a policy decision to take action, not necessarily all[] decisions made after a search and rescue is commenced may be operational. [75] In each case, we recognized, the determination turns on the nature of the specific decision at issue. The Guerreros nonetheless insist that their evidence here reveals various negligent operational design and construction decisions concerning the area of the A/C couplet near C Street and 22nd Avenue. For specific examples, the Guerreros point to the department's decisions not to install an overpass near the intersection, not to install a crosswalk, not to install an overhead lighted crosswalk sign, not to install traffic control devices to prohibit pedestrian crossing, and not to install warning signs, such as an advance pedestrian crossing sign. Under our case law, some of these examples unmistakably belong in the category of immune policy and planning decisions. Our cases have previously recognized that decisions concerning the installation and location of traffic signals require substantial policy considerations and raise significant resource-allocation questions. They therefore qualify as immune under Alaska's planning-operational test of discretionary function immunity. [76] We have reached the same conclusion regarding the construction of pedestrian overpasses [77] and other highway projects requiring the state to allocate scarce traffic-safety resources. [78] To the extent that the Guerreros base their claim on the department's negligence in failing to build a pedestrian overpass near C Street and 22nd Avenue or to install a lighted crosswalk or other comparable traffic control devices, our cases indicate that discretionary function immunity would bar the claim unless the project at issue  here, the A/C traffic couplet  was governed by clearly established standards that mandated their installation. In Jennings v. State , for example, we considered the case of a child killed by a car while she walked across an intersection on her way home from school. The accident site had not been designated as a school zone and fell outside the mandatory school-zone boundaries specified by state regulations. Given these circumstances, we held that the state's failure to designate the intersection as a school zone or take other safety measures, such as building a pedestrian overpass, had rightly been characterized [by the superior court] as planning level decisions, and thus within the ambit of the statutorily created discretionary function exception to the state's tort liability. [79] Yet after noting that a different safety regulation would have applied to a school zone, [80] we went on to observe that we might have reached the opposite conclusion if the state had actually chosen to include the intersection in a school zone: [H]ad the planning level decision been made to delineate this area a school zone and then the state negligently signed the area or negligently constructed a crosswalk, a cause of action might have arisen against the state for these negligently performed operational level acts. [81] In keeping with this cautionary note from Jennings, we later held in Japan Air Lines Co. v. State that immunity did not apply to design decisions made after the state decided to build an airport runway for wide body jets that turned out to be dangerously narrow. [82] Citing Jennings, we held that, because nationwide standards established the minimum width for runways to be used by wide body jets, once the state made the policy decision to build a runway for wide body jets, its ensuing decision to design and build the runway merely implemented its policy choice and amounted to an operational action. [83] Here, the Guerreros have not identified any special standards that became applicable to the intersection of C Street and 22nd Avenue by virtue of the department's decision to build the A/C couplet. And the law and regulations that ordinarily guide the department in deciding when to build pedestrian overpasses and install traffic signals do not appear to call for additional safety measures of this kind. Alaska law distinguishes between traffic control signals on the one hand, and highway signs  or marking and posting  on the other, addressing these categories in two related provisions of the Alaska Statutes. [84] Both provisions, in turn, recognize and incorporate the nationwide standards set out in the 1988 Traffic Manual  the version of the Manual that was in effect at the time of Guerrero's accident. [85] The two statutes expressly require that the department's regulations must correlate with and, as far as possible, conform to the Traffic Manual's recommendations. [86] The Traffic Manual itself sets out a broad array of recommendations for using various kinds of traffic signals, devices, and signs. On the subject of traffic signals, the Traffic Manual lists a set of four criteria, or warrants, to be used in determining whether a traffic signal should be installed at a given location. Evidence in the record, including evidence from the Guerreros' own expert indicates that the intersection of C Street and 22nd Avenue meets none of these warrants: The intersection does not have significant vehicular cross traffic; it is not a designated school crossing; it has not experienced numerous accidents; and it does not meet the minimum requirement for pedestrian volume. [87] Although the Traffic Manual does not categorically prohibit installing a signal when none of these warrants is met, it does expressly recommend against taking such action, advising that in such situations, [t]raffic control signals should not be installed. [88] Because the department had a statutory duty to conform its practices as far as possible with the Traffic Manual's recommendations, it would need a sound, independent policy reason before installing a sign against the Traffic Manual's recommendation. The Guerreros make no showing of any such reason; and even if they did, the department's failure to make a policy-based choice to disregard the Traffic Manual's recommendation would, by definition, amount to an immune policy decision. The department's decision not to place a crosswalk at the intersection is immune for similar reasons. Because a crosswalk would obviously affect traffic movement and could potentially conflict with the department's basic decision to use the A/C couplet to move traffic quickly into and out of downtown Anchorage, determining whether to locate a crosswalk at C Street and 22nd Avenue would require consideration of policies indistinguishable from those that would be involved in deciding whether to place a traffic signal at the intersection  a decision that our cases characterize as an immune policy choice. [89] Moreover, the Traffic Manual points to the same conclusion. Specifically, in the circumstances at issue here, it appears to recommend against placing a crosswalk at C Street and 22nd Avenue. According to the Traffic Manual, crosswalks should be avoided absent a substantial conflict between pedestrians and traffic, and their installation across roads like C Street would not be justified unless supported by a formal study: Crosswalks should be marked at all intersections where there is substantial conflict between vehicle and pedestrian movements.... Crosswalk markings should not be used indiscriminately. An engineering study should be required before they are installed at locations away from traffic signals or STOP signs.[ [90] ] The Guerreros submitted evidence of some conflict between pedestrians and traffic. But they have not shown substantial conflict under the Traffic Manual's criteria, and the department submitted evidence that only one reported injury-accident  Alexander Guerrero's  had occurred since the A/C couplet's completion. Even interpreted in the light most favorable to the Guerreros, the evidence fails to support a reasonable inference that the Traffic Manual would have recommended a crosswalk at 22nd Avenue and C Street. The Guerreros fall even shorter of the mark in suggesting that the department committed operational negligence by failing to erect a pedestrian overpass. The foreseeably high costs of building a pedestrian overpass would inevitably raise concerns over allocating the department's resources, thus raising substantial policy issues. Moreover, the Guerreros do not point out any provision of law, regulation, or the Traffic Manual that would mandate or even recommend that an overpass be installed at the intersection of C Street and 22nd Avenue. And absent any evidence establishing a history of substantial conflict between pedestrian and traffic uses at the intersection there appears to be no reasonable basis to infer that an overpass might be required. By contrast, the Guerreros' remaining theory of operational negligence  that the department failed to post adequate warning signs at the intersection  raises a closer question. As previously noted, both Alaska law and the Traffic Manual draw distinctions between traffic signals and traffic signs. Alaska Statute 19.10.040 unequivocally requires the department to mark highways under its jurisdiction and to implement a uniform system of marking and posting these highways. On three prior occasions we have unmistakably held that these provisions give the department an operational duty to exercise due care in ensuring that roadways have signs and markings that are adequate to protect the public from reasonably foreseeable traffic hazards. In State v. I`Anson , [91] the department failed to stripe and mark a portion of the highway to establish a no-passing zone at a point where the highway joined with an access road. A serious accident occurred when a car attempted to turn onto the access road and was hit from behind by a motorist trying to pass in the highway's left lane. Although the Traffic Manual would have called for a no-passing zone to be marked at the site, the department argued that deciding whether to create a no-passing zone involved planning and policy, and so was protected under the discretionary function immunity exception. But we rejected this argument, holding that functions of this nature do not involve broad basic policy decisions which come within the planning category of decisions which are expressly entrusted to a coordinate branch of government.... [R]esolution of questions such as whether or not the state properly striped or marked a portion of highway as it relates to the state's duty of care to users of the highway presents facts that courts are equipped to evaluate within traditional judicial fact-finding and decision-making processes.[ [92] ] We later reached the same conclusion in Johnson v. State , [93] a case concerning the state's failure to post an adequate warning sign. There, a bicyclist was injured in an accident caused by railroad tracks crossing the road at an unmarked spur. The state did not deny its duty to provide and maintain signs warning of foreseeable hazards. It nevertheless argued that, because the railroad spur had been included in the plans for the road before the road was initially built, the decision not to post a warning sign was an original design decision and, as such, was immune. [94] We rejected this argument. Relying on I`Anson, we categorically ruled in Johnson that the decision to sign is operational and hence not immune. [95] And more recently, in Guerrero I, we observed that our cases have placed certain kinds of government actions on the operational side of the operational/planning balance: highway maintenance, painting lane markings on highways, [and] posting highway signage[.] [96] The department nevertheless insists that our most recent case law retreats from these precedents and favors a more modern view that would grant immunity to signing decisions. In support of this argument, the department relies chiefly on Walden v. Department of Transportation. [97] But as we already observed in discussing the department's duty argument, the department misreads Walden. [98] There, Walden claimed that the department's duty of due care required the department to post a specific warning sign at the accident site; to support this claim, Walden relied completely on the allegation that the Traffic Manual recommended posting a sign at that location; but as it turned out, the Manual did not recommend installing the sign. [99] Our decision in Walden simply recognized that under these facts, the department's general duty of due care did not create an actionable duty to install that particular warning sign. The department cites Searles v. Agency of Transportation [100] as additional authority for its argument that signing decisions should be treated as immune. There, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected as barred by immunity a negligent-marking claim alleging that the state had failed to comply with the Traffic Manual's recommendations for marking a no-passing zone. In reaching its decision, the court in Searles described the Traffic Manual as merely a guidebook for the installation of signs and held that decisions concerning highway marking and signs were immune because they involve[] an element of judgment or choice. [101] But in sharp contrast to Searles's reliance on the mere presence of an element of judgment or choice, our own immunity rulings have consistently emphasized that not all acts that involve discretion or judgment are immune, for almost any act, even driving a nail, involves some `discretion.' [102] Furthermore, in holding that failure to properly mark and sign highways amounts to non-immune operational negligence, State v. I`Anson relied largely on Alaska's specific statutory provision directing the department, as far as possible, [to] conform to the recommendations of the [ Traffic Manual ]. [103] Finally, the conflict between Searles and I`Anson simply establishes a disagreement; the mere fact that Vermont disagrees with Alaska's view of immunity cannot by itself justify overturning our settled precedent. [104] The department does not offer any convincing reason to retreat from our holdings in cases like I`Anson and Johnson. [105] As we recognized in those cases, installing appropriate warning signs will generally entail straightforward decisions involving implementation. Given Alaska's statutory directive to follow the Traffic Manual's recommendations when reasonably possible, [106] there is little reason to think that immunity is needed to protect the department from unforeseeable liability. Furthermore, as the Guerreros correctly maintain, installing signs is relatively inexpensive and does not implicate the same resource-allocation concerns raised by the high costs of installing traffic signals, lighted crosswalks, and pedestrian overpasses. Finally, warning signs are less likely than signals and crosswalks to pose serious risks of conflicting with previously established policy choices. We thus find no sound basis for elevating these kinds of decisions to the level of basic policy and planning decisions.
Two alternative summary judgment grounds remain for us to consider: negligence and causation. The Guerreros claim that the department acted negligently in failing to provide two different kinds of warning signs: signs warning pedestrians against crossing C Street at 22nd Avenue and signs warning approaching motorists on C Street that pedestrians might be crossing the roadway at 22nd Avenue. They assert that this negligence caused Alexander's injuries. As the moving party, the department had the entire burden of proving its right to summary judgment; unless the department advanced prima facie evidence of non-negligence or lack of causation, the Guerreros had no duty to submit evidence supporting their allegations on these points. [107] On appeal, the department has not expressly argued that it established a prima facie case of non-negligence or lack of causation. But it indirectly raises these issues. A claim of non-negligence seems implicit in its argument that it had no duty to post signs at the accident site; and the department presented evidence on this point with its motion for summary judgment: state traffic safety expert Ron Martindale submitted an affidavit suggesting that there was no need for warning signs at the intersection. The department similarly raises an implied claim of lack of causation; it argues that the Guerreros' warning-sign claims are not factually related to Alexander Guerrero's accident, specifically contending that a No Pedestrian Crossing sign would have been useless because Alexander did not know how to read and that an advance School Crossing sign would have been futile because Alexander was not a student and the accident occurred outside the usual hours of school. For purposes of considering these points, we assume that the department made a prima facie showing of non-negligence and lack of causation; our inquiry thus centers on determining whether the Guerreros presented any rebuttal evidence raising genuine issues of material fact on negligence and causation.
The Guerreros rely partly on the Traffic Manual as evidence supporting their claim that the department acted negligently in failing to post warning signs. The Manual establishes three levels of recommendation for warning signs: shall, should, and may. It defines them as follows: 1. SHALL  a mandatory condition. Where certain requirements in the design or application of the device are described with the shall stipulation, it is mandatory when an installation is made that these requirements be met. 2. SHOULD  an advisory condition. Where the word should is used, it is considered to be advisable usage, recommended but not mandatory. 3. MAY  a permissive condition. No requirement for design or application is intended.[ [108] ] Although the Manual emphasizes that these recommendations are not legal requirements, [109] they nonetheless provide useful and authoritative guidance concerning the level of care that would generally be necessary to meet the department's operational duty to post adequate traffic signs. In a case where the Traffic Manual merely suggests that a sign may be posted, it simply describes a permissive condition. [110] This designation recognizes that installing a sign is generally an acceptable option under the specified conditions, but it gives no specific advice as to what choice the department should actually make. A may recommendation thus creates no inference that failing to install a sign amounts to negligence in any particular case. By contrast, the Manual does affirmatively give advice when it says that a sign should be installed, specifically declaring that, under the stated conditions, installing a sign is considered to be advisable usage. [111] This amounts to a qualified recommendation: it advises that due care would generally call for installing a sign, but also recognizes considerable leeway for individual exceptions. [112] The Manual's advice grows even stronger when it says that a sign shall be installed: by defining shall as a mandatory condition, the Manual unequivocally advises that when the specified conditions are met, due care requires installing a sign in all but extraordinary cases. [113] As applied to the two types of warning signs at issue here  No Pedestrian Crossing signs and Advance Crossing signs (that is, signs giving motorists advance warning that pedestrians may be crossing the roadway), the Traffic Manual produces different recommendations. As to no-crossing signs, the Manual takes the neutral position that posting may be appropriate: Pedestrian Crossing signs may be used selectively to aid in limiting pedestrian crossing to safe places.... The No Pedestrian Crossing sign may be used to prohibit pedestrians from crossing a roadway at a point which is considered to be hazardous, especially in front of a school or other public building where a crossing is not designated.[ [114] ] As noted above, because this recommendation is merely permissive it does not imply the existence of negligence or non-negligence in any particular case. As to Advance Crossing signs, the Manual takes a stronger position, recommending that Advance Crossing signs should be used to alert vehicle operators to unexpected entries into the roadway by pedestrians, trucks, bicyclists, animals, and other potential conflicts. [115] Because should affirmatively advises installing a sign in specified situations, this recommendation alone, if shown to apply to the disputed intersection, would raise a triable question of fact on the issue of negligence. [116] Here, the required showing was made. The Guerreros submitted an affidavit signed by their own traffic expert, Edward M. Stevens, who concluded that crossing C Street at 22nd Avenue on foot in times of heavy traffic would be inherently unsafe, especially for young children. According to Stevens, [w]arning signs, such as an advance pedestrian crossing sign, a pedestrian crossing sign, or a no pedestrian crossing sign, were appropriate with the intersection of 22nd avenue and C street. Stevens based his opinion on gap and traffic-volume studies of the specific intersection. These studies reveal that: (1) [t]he location nearly meets gap warrant criteria for a grade-separated pedestrian over-crossing; and (2) [t]here were several 15 minute periods when no acceptable [time delays sufficient for a pedestrian to cross] were recorded. Stevens's expert opinion could support a reasonable inference that conditions at the intersection triggered the Manual's recommendation that advance warning signs should be installed. Therefore, Stevens's affidavit, coupled with the Manual's recommendation, raises a triable issue of fact as to the department's negligence in failing to install an advance-warning sign. To be sure, as already mentioned, the department offered opposing evidence from its own traffic safety expert, Martindale, who emphasized that unnecessary use of warning signs can be counterproductive because it breeds disrespect for all signs. [117] Yet the general proposition that signs should not be overused fails to address the specific conditions at the intersection of 22nd Avenue and C Street. The Guerreros presented evidence showing that a heavily used footpath led from the Loussac Manor housing complex to C Street and 22nd Avenue and that this intersection, in turn, provided the most direct route to a nearby elementary school on the far side of C Street. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Guerreros, this evidence would tend to refute Martindale's implied assertion that the intersection at C Street and 22nd Avenue was no more dangerous than other unmarked intersections along the A/C couplet, so a genuine dispute of material fact exists as to the need for an advance-warning sign. The Guerreros' evidence similarly raises a genuine issue of fact concerning potential negligence in failing to install a No Pedestrian Crossing sign. Stevens's affidavit could support a finding that the department violated its duty of due care in failing to install a No Pedestrian Crossing sign; this evidence thus independently tends to show negligent conduct, despite the Manual's neutral may recommendation as to the general advisability of posting No Pedestrian Crossing signs. The conflicting evidence in the record concerning these points thus precludes the department from claiming that it was entitled to summary judgment because of unrebutted evidence showing that it acted non-negligently in failing to post warning signs.
The record similarly contains conflicting evidence precluding the department from prevailing on the alternative theory that its failure to post warning signs could not have caused Alexander's injury. As already mentioned, the department reasons that a sign prohibiting pedestrians from crossing C Street would have been futile because Alexander was too young to know how to read, and that a sign warning motorists that the intersection was a school crossing would have been useless because Alexander was not a student and the accident occurred outside the usual hours of school. These arguments mistakenly assume that the Guerreros limited their claim to the department's failure to post signs warning motorists to beware of students crossing C Street or signs warning in writing that pedestrians should not cross the street. The Guerreros' negligent signing claim and their supporting evidence asserted broader positions. Because the criteria specified in the Traffic Manual for Advance Crossing signs broadly include all potential conflicts between pedestrians and motorists [118]  not just conflicts between student pedestrians and motorists  we see no basis for assuming that the department would only have needed to post advance-warning signs that alerted motorists to the danger of students crossing C Street during normal school hours. Neither the Guerreros' negligent warning sign claim nor their expert's affidavit was confined to this narrow theory. Furthermore, insofar as the Guerreros asserted that the department was negligent in failing to install No Pedestrian Crossing signs, we find little reason to assume that Alexander's inability to read would necessarily rule out causation. The sample No Pedestrian Crossing sign set out in the Traffic Manual consists of a non-textual warning: it uses no words and simply depicts the figure of a pedestrian in the middle of a red circle with a diagonal slash drawn through the figure. [119] The Manual expressly points out that either this pictorial warning or a word message sign may be used when a No Pedestrian Crossing sign is installed. [120] Neither Alexander's illiteracy nor his parents' prior warnings would necessarily preclude a finding that he might have understood and heeded a simple, clear, and immediate picture warning like the one in the Manual. Since the state failed to produce any evidence establishing that a pictorial sign could not have been posted or that Alexander could not have understood and heeded such a sign, we conclude that the record fails to reveal undisputed evidence demonstrating that it was entitled to summary judgment based on lack of causation.