Opinion ID: 2373626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial violated?

Text: [¶ 7] The appellant argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated because 2,971 days passed from the time a warrant was issued for his arrest until the time of his trial. [1] We have repeatedly stated that we review de novo the constitutional question whether an appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial. Humphrey v. State, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 18, 185 P.3d 1236, 1243 (Wyo. 2008); Strandlien v. State, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 5, 156 P.3d 986, 989-90 (Wyo.2007); Berry v. State, 2004 WY 81, ¶ 17, 93 P.3d 222, 227-28 (Wyo.2004); Warner v. State, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 9, 28 P.3d 21, 26 (Wyo.2001). [2] Furthermore, We review the district court's factual findings for clear error. Humphrey, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 18, 185 P.3d at 1243. [¶ 8] The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. Warner, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d at 26. The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right and is binding on the states through application of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 515, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2184, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 993, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). [T]he protection of the Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has begun and extends only to those persons who have been `accused' in the course of that prosecution. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313, 92 S.Ct. 455, 459, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). Accordingly, the metaphorical clock for speedy trial purposes begins to tick at the time of arrest, information, or indictment, whichever occurs first. Humphrey, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 21, 185 P.3d at 1244; Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 8, 156 P.3d at 990; Campbell v. State, 999 P.2d 649, 655 (Wyo.2000); Wehr v. State, 841 P.2d 104, 112 (Wyo.1992); Harvey v. State, 774 P.2d 87, 94 (Wyo. 1989); see also Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2692, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); United States v. MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 6, 102 S.Ct. 1497, 1501, 71 L.Ed.2d 696 (1982); Marion, 404 U.S. at 320-21, 92 S.Ct. at 463-64. [¶ 9] To determine whether an accused has been denied his right to a speedy trial, we consider four factors: 1) the length of the delay; 2) the reason for the delay; 3) the defendant's assertion of his right; and 4) the prejudice to the defendant. Strandlien, 2007 WY 66, ¶ 6, 156 P.3d at 990; Warner, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d at 26; see also Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. None of these factors are dispositive, rather the factors `must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.' Warner, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d at 26 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193). The ultimate `inquiry is whether the delay in bringing the accused to trial was unreasonable, that is, whether it substantially impaired the right of the accused to a fair trial.' Warner, 2001 WY 67, ¶ 10, 28 P.3d at 26 (quoting Wehr, 841 P.2d at 112). When a speedy trial violation has occurred, the charges must be dismissed. Humphrey, 2008 WY 67, ¶ 20, 185 P.3d at 1244. We will address each of the Barker factors below to determine the validity of the appellant's speedy trial claim.