Opinion ID: 1164429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the scope of the kidnapping statute

Text: Crump's first point in this appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal based on the canon of statutory construction ejusdem generis [1] as applied to Alaska's former kidnapping statute, AS 11.15.260. The statute read as follows: Kidnapping. A person who knowingly and without lawful reason kidnaps, abducts or carries away and holds for ransom, reward or other unlawful reason another person, except in the case of a minor by his parent, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of years or for life. [emphasis added] Crump's argument is that the general words other unlawful reason, following the specific words ransom or reward, mean that the statute is confined to conduct having some pecuniary motive or interest, such as bribery or blackmail. Crump also argues that the term unlawful should be confined to crimes against the person, or that, in the alternative, there was no unlawful conduct under any Alaska statute. This court has never given unlawful the narrow interpretation that an offender must hold a kidnapping victim for some pecuniary benefit. Convictions for kidnapping have been affirmed where the unlawful reason[s] have included assault with a dangerous weapon, rape, attempted rape, and murder. [2] Ejusdem generis is not a rule of law, but rather an aid to the interpretation of statutes that are ambiguous or that leave unclear the legislative intent. [3] Here ejusdem generis is not appropriate because the statute is not ambiguous. The legislature almost certainly intended to include in the crime of kidnapping cases where a victim is held for any unlawful reason. It is also instructive to examine court interpretations of the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201, which is very similar in its wording to former AS 11.15.260. The federal statute, although it has been amended several times, has always included a provision that the victim be held for ransom or reward or otherwise. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a) (West 1966 & Supp. 1980). In Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124, 56 S.Ct. 395, 80 L.Ed. 522 (1936), the United States Supreme Court considered an argument identical to the one Crump has raised here. To avoid arrest, Gooch and a partner kidnapped two police officers and drove them from Texas into Oklahoma, where the officers were released. On appeal, Gooch argued that ejusdem generis prevented the language or otherwise from being applied to situations where a victim was held for purposes not related in some way to ransom and reward. The Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting first that Congress intended the words or otherwise to broaden the applicability of the statute to include other crimes besides those in which a victim was held for pecuniary benefit. The Court explained: The rule of ejusdem generis, while firmly established, is only an instrumentality for ascertaining the correct meaning of words when there is uncertainty. Ordinarily, it limits general terms which follow specific ones to matters similar to those specified; but it may not be used to defeat the obvious purpose of legislation. And while penal statutes are narrowly construed, this does not require rejection of that sense of the words which best harmonizes with the context and the end in view. 297 U.S. at 128, 56 S.Ct. at 397, 80 L.Ed. at 526. Like the Gooch court, we believe ejusdem generis should not be applied to Alaska's kidnapping statute. We hold that a motive of pecuniary benefit is not required to sustain kidnapping convictions. Gooch has been widely followed in situations where victims have been held for a variety of different reasons. The federal courts would undoubtedly apply the federal statute to one in Crump's position. In United States v. Atchison, 524 F.2d 367, 368 (7th Cir.1975), a defendant's conviction for kidnapping a five-year-old child was sustained where the victim was held only out of concern for the child's well-being and a belief that she was being mistreated by her parents. The language or otherwise in the federal statute is, however, broader than the language unlawful in the former Alaska statute. In United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75, 84 S.Ct. 553, 11 L.Ed.2d 527 (1964), the United States Supreme Court concluded that, under the federal statute, a victim could be held for any purpose even if that purpose was not in itself illegal. The Court concluded that Congress intended to punish kidnapping per se, regardless of the ultimate purpose of the kidnapping. [4] Regardless of the rejection of the argument of ejusdem generis, it is necessary under Alaska's statute for the victim to be held for some unlawful purpose. Here there was evidence from which the jury could find an unlawful purpose. On July 18, 1978, the superior court awarded temporary custody of S.L. to the Department of Health and Social Services until August 10, 1978. A further custody hearing was to be held on August 3, 1978. Crump was certainly aware of the superior court's orders. [5] Removing S.L. from Hospitality House and holding her was unlawful because it violated the superior court's order and amounted to contempt of court, in violation of AS 09.50.010, [6] and obstruction of justice, in violation of former AS 11.30.320. [7] There is no merit in Crump's argument that S.L. would have to have been under a court subpoena before these statutes would come into play, or that the court would actually have to adjudge Crump in contempt. S.L.'s abduction was a flagrant and obvious interference with the court's order granting the state temporary custody of S.L. until a final resolution of the custody issue, and constituted an obstruction to the due administration of justice. There was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that S.L. was abducted for an unlawful reason.