Opinion ID: 386888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 10 The seventh amendment forbids appellate judges to sit as post-trial assessors and denies them the power to vacate awards because they might, as fact-triers, have decided differently. See Lucas v. American Manufacturing Co., 630 F.2d 291, 293 (5th Cir. 1980) (in light of the seventh amendment an appellate court should proceed cautiously when asked to set aside a jury's verdict). Moreover, the plaintiffs did not move for a directed verdict or a judgment n. o. v. In the absence of a motion for directed verdict, the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's findings is not reviewable on appeal. Liner v. J. B. Talley and Co., 618 F.2d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 1980); Quinn v. Southwest Wood Products, Inc., 597 F.2d 1018, 1024 (5th Cir. 1979); Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290, 297 (5th Cir. 1978); Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir. 1977). See 9 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 2536, at 593 (1971). Our inquiry is, therefore, limited to whether there was any evidence to support the jury's verdict, irrespective of its sufficiency, or whether plain error was committed which, if not noticed, would result in a 'manifest miscarriage of justice.'  Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d at 297; Little v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 426 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1970). 11 The motion for a new trial after entry of judgment does not enlarge the scope of our review. Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d at 297-98; Little v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 426 F.2d at 511. We review the denial of a motion for new trial based on insufficiency of the evidence only to determine whether there was an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict. Fugitt v. Jones, 549 F.2d at 1004; Litherland v. Petrolane Offshore Construction Services, Inc., 546 F.2d 129, 134 (5th Cir. 1977); Urti v. Transport Commercial Corp., 479 F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1973). 12 The evidence was contradictory concerning whether Brasscraft's flexible brass connector was the cause of the fire and, if so, whether it was defective. The plaintiffs attempted to prove that a piece of brass tubing manufactured by Brasscraft was the cause of the fire. There was evidence that the house was put together by the Dunn family from second hand materials. A fire reconstruction expert listed several possible causes of the fire more probable than failure of the tubing. The deposition of the expert witness employed by Amoco contradicted and explained the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict for the defendant under the applicable standard of review. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial. Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d at 298; Litherland v. Petrolane Offshore Construction Services, Inc., 546 F.2d at 134.