Opinion ID: 76726
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Continuing Nuisance

Text: 59 The defendants contend that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to have found that there was a continuing nuisance. Georgia broadly defines nuisance as anything that causes hurt, inconvenience, or damages to another. Ga. Code Ann. § 41-1-1. The defendants argue that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find that there was continuing migration of materials onto the Parker property. See Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales and Servs., 29 F.Supp.2d 1372, 1378 (M.D.Ga.1998) (noting that [a] cause of action for continuing nuisance is limited to situations where the contamination has continued to spread). The Parkers respond that there was evidence of many materials entering the Parker property, including solid waste, hazardous waste, and storm-water runoff. At the outset, we note that this court is without power to consider the merits of the defendants' contention because the defendants did not move for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Dietz v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 643 F.2d 1088, 1095 (5th Cir.1981). 28 The defendants, however, would fare no better if we did consider the evidence. As shown in the discussion above, the record shows many instances of materials entering the Parker property from the SMP facility, and the jury's decision on the issue of whether there was a continuing nuisance must stand. 29 See Goble v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 187 Ga. 243, 200 S.E. 259, 263 (1938) ([E]very continuance of a nuisance which is not permanent, and which could and should be abated, is a fresh nuisance for which a new action will lie.); Smith v. Branch, 226 Ga.App. 626, 487 S.E.2d 35, 38 (1997) (same).