Opinion ID: 1155573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pertinent Supreme Court Decisions

Text: In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , the Supreme Court determined for the first time the extent to which the constitutional protections of speech and press limit a state's power to award damages in a libel action brought by a public official against critics of his official conduct. 376 U.S. at 256, 84 S.Ct. at 713. The Court decided that the rules of law applied by the Alabama state courts were constitutionally deficient for failure to provide safeguards for freedom of speech and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by such a public official. Id. at 264, 84 S.Ct. at 717. The Court held that [t]he constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with `actual malice'that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. Id. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 725-26. In Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964), the Court applied the New York Times actual malice standard to state criminal libel statutes that imposed sanctions for criticism of official conduct of public officials. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1966), the Court held that a `public figure' who is not a public official may ... recover [compensatory and punitive] damages for a defamatory falsehood whose substance makes substantial danger to reputation apparent, on a showing of highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers. Id. at 155, 87 S.Ct. at 1991. In holding that the standard had been met by the plaintiff in Butts, but not in the companion case of Associated Press v. Walker (decided in the same opinion), the Court rejected the defendant's contention that it could not be subjected to an assessment of punitive damages. Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, stated: Where a publisher's departure from standards of press responsibility is severe enough to strip from him the constitutional protection our decision acknowledges, we think it entirely proper for the State to act not only for the protection of the individual injured but to safeguard all those similarly situated against like abuse. Id. at 161, 87 S.Ct. at 1994. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968), the Court identified evidence that may be employed to establish New York Times actual malice. The majority, through Justice White, noted that evidence of either deliberate falsification or reckless publication `despite the publisher's awareness of probable falsity' was essential to recovery by public officials in defamation actions. Id. at 731, 88 S.Ct. at 1325. The Court then listed certain acts which show the recklessness aspect of actual malice: intentional fabrication by a defendant of facts or communications; basing an article wholly upon an unverified anonymous telephone call; printing allegations so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would put them in circulation; and publication of an article despite obvious reasons to doubt the truth and veracity of the informant upon whom the article relies for accuracy. Id. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. The Court said that failure to investigate will not in itself establish bad faith, id. at 733, 88 S.Ct. at 1326, but stated that a defendant in a defamation action brought by a public official cannot ... automatically insure a favorable verdict by testifying that he published with a belief that the statements were true. Id. at 732, 88 S.Ct. at 1326. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), a plurality of the Court, through Justice Brennan, extended the New York Times actual malice standard to publications relating to all matters of public or general concern, irrespective of the public or private nature of the plaintiff. In rejecting the suggested distinction between public officials and public figures on the one hand and private individuals on the other, Justice Brennan focused instead on society's interest in learning about issues of public or general concern. Thus, under Rosenbloom, once a trial court determined that the alleged libel involved a matter of public or general concern, the fact finder should then consider whether New York Times malice had been proved, paying no heed to the plaintiff's status. Three years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), the Supreme Court expressly repudiated its holding in Rosenbloom. One commentator states that the Gertz majority sensed the Rosenbloom plurality opinion had nearly destroyed the common law of defamation.... J. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va.L. Rev. 1349, 1409 (1975). In Gertz, a Chicago policeman had shot and killed a youth. Gertz, a reputable attorney, was employed to represent the youth's family in civil litigation against the officer. The defendant published, in its monthly magazine giving the views of the John Birch Society, false statements about Gertz. The publication implied that Gertz had a criminal record and labeled him a Leninist and Communist-fronter. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, articulated several important holdings defining the proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press protected by the First Amendment. 418 U.S. at 325, 94 S.Ct. at 3000. First, the Court reaffirmed its rulings in New York Times and Butts stating that public officials and public figures may recover for defamation only upon clear and convincing proof of New York Times malice. Second, the Court made clear that all persons, public or private, may recover presumed or punitive damages only upon clear and convincing proof of New York Times malice. Third, and most important for purposes of the cases at bar, the Court held that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. Id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. Justice Powell stated that this approach establishes an equitable boundary between the competing interests involved. It recognizes the strength of the legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for wrongful injury to reputation, yet shields the press and broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for defamation. Id. at 348, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. The Court, however, expressly limited the applicability of a fault standard. Such limitation has not been sufficiently emphasized in many of the decisions and comments based on Gertz, but we think recognition of the limitation is essential to an accurate analysis of the decision. The Court said, quoting from Butts, that applicability of a fault standard must be restricted to circumstances where the substance of the defamatory statement `makes substantial danger to reputation apparent.' Id. Continuing, the Court stated: Our inquiry would involve considerations somewhat different from those discussed above if a State purported to condition civil liability on a factual misstatement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor or broadcaster of its defamatory potential. Id.; Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 464-65, 96 S.Ct. 958, 970-71, 47 L.Ed.2d 154 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). In addition, the Court said that the State's interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation extends no further than compensation for actual injury, which may include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, mental anguish and suffering, as well as out-of-pocket loss. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012. Finally, the Court rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's requirement that judges must consider whether publications address issues of general or public interest, stating that such a test for determining the applicability of the New York Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake. Id. at 346, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. In Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979), the Supreme Court rejected a plea that the balance struck in New York Times should now be modified to provide further protections for the press when sued for circulating erroneous information damaging to individual reputation. Id. at 169, 99 S.Ct. at 1645. The Court, through Justice White, noted that the 1964 New York Times decision which was widely perceived as essentially protective of press freedoms, has been repeatedly affirmed in succeeding cases. Id. The Court also pointed out, however, citing Firestone and Gertz, that the Court has reiterated its convictionreflected in the laws of defamation of all of the Statesthat the individual's interest in his reputation is also a basic concern. Id.