Opinion ID: 2520371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Victim-Advocate Privilege

Text: The trial court concluded that the privilege does not protect records of assistance offered by the Alliance. We review the trial court order interpreting the victim-advocate privilege de novo. Generally, privileges are creatures of statute and therefore must be strictly construed. Dist. Court, 719 P.2d at 725; see also 1 McCormick on Evidence § 72, at 298-301 (5th ed. 1999 & Supp.2003) (noting that privileges are strictly construed because all privileges derogate the search for truth). Our task is to ascertain the legislative intent, giving effect to the statute's plain meaning. The victim-advocate privilege was adopted in 1994, see Ch. 327, sec. 7, § 13-90-107, 1994 Colo. Sess. Law, 2031, in furtherance of the policy of the law to encourage confidences and to preserve them inviolate, see section 13-90-107(1)(k)(I). The privilege provides that the victim's advocate shall not be examined as to any communication made to such victim's advocate by a victim of domestic violence ... in person or through the media of written records or reports. The statute provides no exceptions and requires no balancing of competing interests. See DOJ Model Legislation, supra, Appendix 2 (distinguishing among state victim-advocate privileges that are absolute, semi-absolute and qualified, and characterizing Colorado's as absolute). [4] Furthermore, the statute recognizes the victim advocate as a person [w]hose primary function is to render advice, counsel, or assist victims of domestic violence, see section 13-90-107(1)(k)(II)(A). Hence, the language anticipates that any number of services rendered by the advocate may be the subject of the victim's communications. Secure housing, for instance, could become the subject of communications made by a victim seeking to hide from an abuser. Assistance provided by the counselor is necessarily intertwined with information transmitted by the victim to the advocate. The legislative history supports a conclusion that the General Assembly intended a broad construction of communications. Representative DeGette, one of the co-sponsors of the bill explained that the privilege was intended to protect treatment by victim-advocates in the same manner as protections offered treatment by psychologists and psychotherapists. See Hearing on HB 94-1253. More importantly, the clear language of the statute extends the privilege so as to prohibit the disclosure of information contained in records or reports, such that examined is not a restrictive term making the privilege effective only at trial. Cf. Sisneros, 55 P.3d at 800 (holding that once the psychologist-patient privilege attaches, it protects testimonial disclosures as well as pretrial discovery of files or records derived or created in the course of treatment); § 14-12-105, C.R.S. (2004) (creating privilege for communications made, oral or written, from the parties to a domestic relations counselor and extending said privilege to any papers or records of the counselor). [5] Accordingly, the plain language of the statute leads us to conclude that the privilege extends to services or assistance provided by the agency to the victim. The defendant's emphasis on the fact that the subpoena was generic and that the trial court ordered the Alliance to provide a sanitized list of the services rendered to the victim does not negate our conclusion. The mere disclosure that the individual received any services violates confidentiality because it implicitly reveals statements made by the victim to the victim's advocate. Disclosing the victim's identity and the nature and extent of the services compounds the error. The statute's legislative history is consistent with this understanding. Senator Wham, a co-sponsor of the amendment expanding the privilege to include rape crisis organizations, expressed that the assumption of privilege is essential to encouraging victims to seek assistance. Hearing on SB 95-153, supra. Senator Wham explained that it was important for victims to know, even before contacting advocacy centers that their communications would be kept confidential. Id. In total, the victim-advocate privileges reflect the role of [victim advocates] as the last resort from an abusive relationship and underscore the critical importance of anonymity and secrecy in protecting the victim from further abuse. See State ex rel. Hope House, Inc. v. Merrigan, 133 S.W.3d 44, 48 (Mo.2004). Of course, in the face of any privilege, the defendant may still discover records or reports of assistance by demonstrating waiver. At this point in the proceeding, the defendant has made no such showing. At the hearing before the trial court, the defendant argued that the prosecution's endorsement of an expert who would testify about the cycle of domestic violence and about reasons why a victim might recant effectively waived the privilege. The defendant now renews that argument, which the trial court did not address because it held the privilege inapplicable. The party seeking to overcome the privilege bears the burden of demonstrating that the privilege has been waived. Wesp, 33 P.3d at 198; Johnson v. Trujillo, 977 P.2d 152 (Colo.1999); Clark v. District Court, 668 P.2d 3, 8 (Colo.1983). Waiver is a form of consent to disclosure which must be justified by an evidentiary showing of an expressed or implied waiver. Clark, 668 P.2d at 8. It is undisputed that M.P. did not expressly waive the privilege; thus, we must determine from the circumstances of the case whether she waived the victim-advocate privilege by implication. The mere endorsement of a domestic violence expert  even if such expert is affiliated with the Alliance  cannot operate to waive the privilege. The defendant cites no law and makes no evidentiary showing to the contrary. We reject any suggestion that such an endorsement constitutes an implied waiver. [6]