Opinion ID: 2620459
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: State Consumer-Protection Claims

Text: Moore brought two claims under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 47-18-101 et. seq. First, he alleged that in connection with the marketing and advertising of the Movie, Genius Products’ DVDs and Concord’s Soundtrack “intentionally and - 12 - No. 12-5715 Moore v. Weinstein Co. willfully caused a likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding” regarding whether Sam Moore sponsored the Movie and Soundtrack. (R. 146, Am. Compl. ¶ 138.) Though Moore does not identify the precise subsection of the Tennessee Code, we review his claim under the most analogous section, § 47-18-104(b)(2) (“Causing likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship, approval or certification of goods or services.”). Moore argues that the district court should have applied Tennessee law, rather than “summarily dismiss” his claim for his failure to brief the choice-of-law issue. (Appellant Br. at 59; see R. 375, Op. & Order at 62.) But as appellees note, even if Moore had responded to defendants’ choice-of-law argument and his preferred Tennessee law did apply, “[t]he same analysis that applies to the federal Lanham Act claims also applies to the state claims of unfair competition under . . . the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.” (McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 816 (M.D. Tenn. 2000). In response to this argument, we adopt the district court’s reasoning that under Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989), the First Amendment limits Moore’s protectable interests in his purported marks. And we adopt its decision that Moore’s “competing titles” claim established no likelihood of confusion. (See R. 375, Op. & Order at 64–67, 70–78.) These determinations, paired with Moore’s decision not to appeal the district court’s no-likelihood-ofconfusion holding and his failure to cite to evidence establishing confusion, foreclose his TCPA likelihood-of-confusion claim. - 13 - No. 12-5715 Moore v. Weinstein Co. Moore’s pleadings doom his second TCPA claim as well. He alleges that the Genius DVDs and the Concord Soundtrack “intentionally and willfully made, published, disseminated, circulated, and placed before the purchasing public advertisements containing false, deceptive and misleading statements about Sam Moore’s affiliation, connection or association with the Movie.” (R. 146, Am. Compl. ¶ 137.) Again, Moore fails to identify the precise TCPA violation, but we nevertheless analyze his claim under Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-18-104(b)(5) (barring “[r]epresenting that goods or services have sponsorship [or] approval . . . that they do not have”). When defendants argued that Arizona’s consumer-protection law should apply instead of Tennessee’s, Moore offered only a footnote explaining that his right-of-publicity choice-of-law argument “applies equally” to the consumer-protection choice-of-law challenge. (R. 340, Pl.’s Resp. Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 16 n.25.) As the district court noted, however, Moore’s right-of-publicity claim and his consumer-protection claims are “substantively distinct.” (R. 375, Op. & Order at 56 n.28.) Accordingly, left with no argument on why Arizona law should not apply to Moore’s consumer-protection claims, and instructed by Moore to rely on his publicity choice-of-law argument, the district court found that Arizona law should apply. (Id. at 62.) Having been instructed by Moore to rely on his publicity choice-of-law analysis, the district court understandably declined to survey Arizona law for a corresponding Arizona consumer-protection provision and pursue its own conflict-of-laws analysis. - 14 - No. 12-5715 Moore v. Weinstein Co. Moreover, even applying Tennessee law, Moore’s district court pleadings never responded to defendants’ merits-based attacks on his Tennessee consumer-protection claim. At summary judgment, defendants challenged both the choice of Tennessee law and the merits of his Tennessee claim, pointing to Tennessee cases explaining that the TCPA protects “consumers and legitimate business enterprises from those who engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices . . . in part or wholly within this state.” Bennett v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 198 S.W.3d 747, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Tenn. Code. Ann. § 47-18-102). Missing from Moore’s claim, defendants argued, was any “admissible evidence that [the] Defendants’ actions deceived or injured Tennessee consumers.” (R. 306, Def.’s Mot. Summ. J. at 13.) Moore never responded to defendants’ merits-based attack on his TCPA claim, offering only the choice-of-law footnote, leaving defendants’ merits-based attack unrefuted. Moore compounds this error on appeal. His opening brief disputes only the district court’s choice-of-law dismissal, asking us to reinstate his TCPA claim so Moore can “proceed to enforce [his] claim[].” (Appellant Br. at 58–59.) But faced with summary judgment, Moore needed to show that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding this TCPA claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1) (obliging “[a] party asserting that a fact . . . is genuinely disputed [to] support the assertion by . . . citing to particular parts of materials in the record . . . or . . . showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute”); Horton v. Potter, 369 F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and - 15 - No. 12-5715 Moore v. Weinstein Co. admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Tucker v. Tennessee, 539 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 2008) (explaining that the court “no longer has the duty to search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact” (citation omitted)). With Moore’s failure to brief and argue the choice-of-law issue at the district court, his failure to respond to defendants’ merits challenge at summary judgment or on appeal, we find no error in the district court’s dismissal of his second consumer-protection claim.