Opinion ID: 338425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Charge on Unreasonably Dangerous

Text: 53 The appellant, relying once again heavily on Berkebile II, urges that the trial Judge erred when he charged the jury that they had to find the VW had a defect which was unreasonably dangerous, as well. We cannot agree, for two reasons. We find that Greiner waived on this issue under Rule 51, FRCP; and, in the alternative, hold, that, even if there had been no waiver under the confused law of this case, Greiner does not have a meritorious argument. We feel compelled to include this latter finding to expedite a new trial, if the Judge finds one is necessary on remand. 13 54 On the waiver issue, Greiner did before trial submit a proposed interrogatory suggesting that the jury merely had to find a defect dangerous, not unreasonably dangerous. And Greiner's counsel did file a suggested interrogatory at the end of trial with the latter language and, as far as we are able to ascertain, never took exception to the District Court's charge. The language of Rule 51 requires such exception. Under it, Greiner clearly waived. Bair, supra; Harkins v. Ford Motor Co., 437 F.2d 276, 278 (3d Cir. 1970). 55 On the merits, the Restatement literally applies to a product sold in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. Comments i and j indicate that unreasonably dangerous is to be defined by asking the question whether the user or consumer ordinarily would know of the product's dangerous or unsafe propensities. See 14 Duques.L.Rev., supra, at 48-49. 56 Following Berkebile II, the appellant would have us hold that the phrase unreasonably dangerous is redundant with the words defective condition. To charge the jury or permit argument concerning the reasonableness of a consumer's or seller's actions and knowledge, even if merely to define 'defective condition' undermines the policy considerations that have led us to hold . . . that the manufacturer is effectively the guaranter (sic) of his product's safety. Berkebile II, supra, 462 Pa. at 97, 337 A.2d at 900. (citation omitted). 57 An alternative position, which we accept, is that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its adoption of section 402A and willingness to refer to its comments for guidance has never read the unreasonably dangerous language out of the section. As noted above, Berkebile II cannot be read as the majority view in Pennsylvania. See Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853 (1966); Bair, supra; Eshbach v. W. T. Grant's Co., 481 F.2d 940, 942 (3d Cir. 1973); Beron, supra, 402 F.Supp. at 1273-76. 58 Judge Huyett in his well-reasoned opinion in Beron notes that even under Berkebile II's ambiguous language a carefully-tailored charge on the meaning of unreasonably dangerous might be permissible. Id. at 1273. The trial Judge's charge, Appendix, infra, at 31, is carefully drawn to respect comments i and j and could be construed as proper under Berkebile II. 59 However, even if Berkebile II is inconsistent with the Judge's charge on this point, its weak precedential value does not permit us to find an unequivocal rejection of the unreasonably dangerous concept in Pennsylvania. Bair, supra; Beron, supra, 402 F.Supp. at 1273. This is especially true given the phrase's important place as a limitation on liability in the American Law Institute's deliberations when it drafted section 402A. 14 Duques.L.Rev., supra, at 46.