Opinion ID: 1779062
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church

Text: ś 43. In Elvig, the pastor of a Presbyterian Church sexually harassed the associate pastor, Monica Elvig, who complained of the inappropriate conduct by her superior to church authorities, who did nothing. Thereafter, the pastor retaliated against her, prompting her to file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Church officials then terminated Elvig from her employment at the Church and prevented her from seeking employment as a pastor in other Presbyterian churches. ś 44. Applying the ministerial exception to Title VII, the Ninth Circuit refused to allow Elvig to seek damages for either the termination of her employment or her inability to become employed as a pastor at other churches. However, the court refused to apply the exception to her claim for emotional distress and harm to her reputation caused by the harassment. The court denied rehearing and rehearing en banc. Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 397 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.2005). Four judges explained their reasons for refusing to grant rehearing: We declined to allow damages to Elvig for having been terminated, or for having been prevented from seeking ministerial employment at other churches. We held that those actions came within the ministerial exception to Title VII, and that damages for these actions would have constituted an unconstitutional intrusion into the ministerial relationship. On the other hand, following Bollard, we allowed Elvig to seek damages for the sexual harassment and retaliation to which she was subjected: [T]he termination of Elvig's ministry and her inability to find other pastoral employment are consequences of protected employment decisions. Consequently, a damage award based on lost or reduced pay Elvig may have suffered from those employment decisions would necessarily trench on the Church's protected ministerial decisions. The same would be true of emotional distress or reputational damages attributable to those decisions. On the other hand, Elvig may recover for emotional distress and reputational harm caused by the sexual harassment itself â or by retaliatory harassment â because such harassment implicates . . . decisions the ministerial exception does not protect. Elvig, 397 F.3d at 791 (W. Fletcher, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc). ś 45. The plaintiffs' claim of negligent hiring, retention and supervision of Broussard is simply a negligence claim, requiring a finding of duty, breach of duty, causation and damage. The Diocese, as far as we can tell from the record and briefs before us, does not really contest these traditional elements but, rather, claims they cannot be asserted in a court of law. For this Court to agree with the Diocese would require us to conclude that ecclesiastical principles could reasonably impose or suggest different requirements for the protection of children from sexual molestation, than the requirements generally imposed by society. This we cannot do. The Establishment Clause does not per se prevent civil courts from exercising jurisdiction over such claims. ś 46. Applying the Lemon analysis to the question presented, and finding no persuasive authority to the contrary, we hold that prosecution of the Morrisons' claims will not excessively entangle the court in ecclesiastical matters. A civil trial may require some inquiry into the relationship between the Diocese and Broussard to learn its nature and extent. However, the court's inquiry will end at learning whether the Diocese had the authority and power over Broussard to do that which our common law says should have been done, given the extent of knowledge and information available to it. If it indeed had such power and authority, its requirement to protect children from sexual abuse is not different from other institutions to which the common law applies; no more, no less. ś 47. We emphasize, however, that our holding today does not imply that any of the four requirements for a negligence cause of action have, or have not, been established. We hold only that, if they can be established, they may be pursued in our courts. 2. Free Exercise Clause ś 48. It was historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance for religious beliefs and practices, that gave birth to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2226, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993); citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2154, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (other citations omitted). In discussing the Free Exercise Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1148, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953). Church of the Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 532, 113 S.Ct. at 2226 (emphasis added).