Opinion ID: 3040111
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comments on Fahy’s credibility

Text: Fahy argues that the prosecutor repeatedly expressed her personal opinion that Fahy had testified falsely. He raised this claim in PCRA #3 and it was rejected. 35 Despite this, the 35 The PCRA court concluded that: [Defense] counsel argued in closing that the 73 District Court concluded that there was no “adjudication on the defendant told the truth on the stand in denying his guilt and that the Commonwealth witnesses, particularly the police officers who recorded defendant’s confession, had lied. The prosecutor could respond to trial counsel’s argument about the credibility of his client, especially where she told the jury that she was not expressing her personal opinions, but was commenting on the evidence. The PCRA court’s opinion spent a page discussing the claim and indicated how it reached the decision: The prosecutor did not commit misconduct in commenting on the credibility of the defendant. Pennsylvania courts have allowed prosecutors great leeway in presenting argument based on the evidence of record concerning the credibility of defense witnesses, especially where, as here, the defendant makes credibility an issue. . . . Here trial counsel argued in closing that defendant told the truth on the stand in denying his guilt and that the Commonwealth witnesses, particularly the police officers who recorded defendant’s confession, had lied. The prosecutor could respond to trial counsel’s argument about the credibility of his client, especially where she told the jury that she was not expressing her personal opinion. 74 merits” under Chadwick v. Jenecka, 312 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2002), and therefore, it is not entitled to deference. We disagree with the District Court and conclude that the state court decision is entitled to § 2254(d) deference. In Chadwick, this Court noted that “the Supreme Court clearly held that the § 2254(d) standards apply when a state supreme court rejects a claim without giving any indication of how it reached its decision.” Id. (citing Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 237 (2000) (affirming state supreme court’s rejection of a claim without explanation, concluding that the adjudication was neither “contrary to,” nor involved an “unreasonable application of,” any of its decisions)).36 At all events, we agree with the District Court with regard to the merits of the claim. The first allegedly improper statement occurred while the prosecutor was cross-examining Fahy: Q: Didn’t you just say that you were seeing her? A: I was seeing—I said I used to. I was seeing no one at the time. I was with Cookie. I went with Cookie for 36 While we realize that the state supreme court never reached the merits of Fahy’s third petition because of his waiver, we believe that deference still applies to the PCRA court’s decision. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . .”) (emphases added)). 75 good, so if you want to try to get a few things into my mind and get them twisted, you know, it’s up to you. Q: Why don’t you just answer questions? A: I’m trying to answer the question as best I can. You want me to tell you what you want. Q: All I want from you, Mr. Fahy, is the truth, if you know what that is. Defense counsel objected to this last statement and asked for a mistrial. The trial court denied the request but instructed the jury to disregard the remark. Defense counsel later objected to statements made during the prosecution’s closing argument. The prosecutor, in discussing Fahy’s testimony and credibility, stated: [Defense counsel] said that there is a scenario that was presented. Well, from the evidence in this case, the scenario that was the defendant’s version of what happened was a well-orchestrated scenario. Mr. Fahy would have you believe that he only talked to his lawyer about his testimony once or twice. Is that believeable? The way [defense counsel] prepared this case, that he only talked to his client once or twice? Mr. Fahy took the stand and went through an entire day, minute by minute, practically. He told you exactly where he placed battery cables 76 and what he did. But, when it came to cross- examination, he couldn’t remember the lies he told on direct examination. And all of a sudden, he gives a completely different answer from the morning to the afternoon session. He couldn’t remember which lies he was supposed to tell. Defense counsel objected to the use of the word “lies” and the trial court instructed the prosecutor to rephrase her statement. The prosecutor then pointed to a specific instance of Fahy’s inconsistent testimony. Fahy argues that the prosecutor’s comments in the above instances were improper statements of her personal belief about his credibility and thereby prejudiced the jury. If a defendant testifies on his own behalf, as occurred here, a prosecutor may attack his credibility to the same extent as any other witness. See Fitzpatrick v. United States, 178 U.S. 304, 315 (1900). This does not mean, however, that a prosecutor may express his personal belief in the credibility of a witness or the guilt of a defendant. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). When the claim is that a prosecutor’s remark at trial so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process, we must examine the comment in light of the entire proceedings. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. at 643. We do not think that the state court’s decision here is an unreasonable application of this law. See supra note 35. Here, the prosecutor explained to the jury at the beginning of her closing argument that she could not give her personal opinion of Fahy’s guilt. She then proceeded during her 77 closing to point out the inconsistencies in Fahy’s testimony. Her comments on Fahy’s preparation for his testimony served as a suggestion that the jury consider the detailed nature of his testimony in contrast to his claims that he had discussed it only “once or twice” with his counsel. The record supports this argument, in that Fahy’s testimony regarding his whereabouts on the day of the murder was given in considerable detail. While the prosecutor’s conclusory use of the word “lies” was unfortunate, it did not infect the proceedings with unfairness. Fahy attempts to argue that while the record supported the assertion that he made inconsistent statements, it did not support an inference that both statements were lies. This is sophistry. Either Fahy signed his Miranda warnings or he did not; only one statement could be true. Because the prosecutor made it clear that she was not expressing her personal opinion but was relying on the facts in the case, we do not believe that her use of the word “lies” or her comment about Fahy’s credibility made the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Therefore, we reject Fahy’s claim.