Opinion ID: 1190325
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Instructions on Diminished Capacity

Text: Defendant contends the court's instructions on diminished capacity were insufficient. [3] As in People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 155-157 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587], we disagree for three reasons: (1) there was insufficient evidence to warrant diminished capacity instructions at all, (2) the instructions the court did give were sufficient, and (3) any error was harmless given the actual verdicts. (2) Defendant relied solely on the following testimony of Patricia Pensinger to support the diminished capacity claim. Defendant drank three beers while they talked in the kitchen. Defendant had a funny way of shuffling his feet when he walks when he gets overly tired or when he was drinking. He exhibited that symptom that night. Also his speech was slower, more precise than what his normal speaking voice was. However, he had no trouble walking, and his speech was otherwise fine. He knew what he was talking about, and he could respond. At the time of the stabbing, his reflexes, coordination and balance seemed normal. This evidence does not amount to substantial evidence that defendant lacked the capacity to form the requisite mental states, when we compare this case with others in which we have dismissed evidence of diminished capacity as insubstantial. ( People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1241; see also the cases cited therein.) For example, in People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 762 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113], there was testimony that the defendant had been drinking and had had `a lot' of cocaine, and that he was `under the influence' in that he was `talkative and really hyper.' We found that this testimony lent only minimal and insubstantial support to appellant's theory of diminished capacity from intoxication and therefore was not sufficient to justify the requested instruction. ( Ibid. ) The same is true here. There was no evidence that the three beers affected defendant's ability to think in any way. [D]efendant presented no evidence whatever, expert or otherwise, regarding the intoxicating effect, if any, which his use of ... [the beer] may have had upon his ability to form the necessary intent to commit the crimes. ( People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 156.) Defendant contends that because the trial court did give some instructions on diminished capacity, there must have been evidence to support the theory. We have previously rejected the contention. ( People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1242; People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 157.) (3) Even if there had been sufficient evidence to warrant instructions on diminished capacity, the instructions given were adequate. The court gave modified versions of former CALJIC Nos. 3.35 (Diminished Capacity to Form Specific Mental State), 4.21 (Voluntary Intoxication  When Relevant to Specific Intent), 4.22 (1979 rev.) (Voluntary Intoxication  Defined), and 8.79 (Diminished Capacity to Form Requisite Specific Intent to Commit Underlying Crime in Felony Murder). [4] Defendant also requested former CALJIC No. 8.77 (Diminished Capacity  Ability to Premeditate, Deliberate, Harbor Malice, or Intend to Kill). The court refused the request on the basis that the content was covered by CALJIC No. 3.35. Defendant contends that because the court did not give CALJIC No. 8.77, the jury was only instructed on the diminished capacity defense as it related to appellant's ability to form the specific intent for murder [citation] and his ability to form the specific intent to commit the underlying crime in the felony murder. [Citation.] The jury was never informed that they could also apply the diminished capacity evidence to appellant's ability to premeditate, deliberate or harbor malice. A review of the instructions given belies the contention. The jury was told that it had to determine whether defendant's mental or physical condition prevented him from forming the specific intent or mental state essential to constitute the crime or degree of the crime with which he is charged. The court fully instructed on all the necessary specific intents and mental states for all the offenses, including first degree murder. Thus, the jurors were told in unequivocal language that intoxication could have prevented defendant from forming the requisite specific intent for each of the various crimes charged. ( People v. Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 155, italics in the original.) (4) Finally, any error was harmless. The jury was instructed on two theories of first degree murder: premeditated and felony murder. Defendant does not deny that the court correctly instructed on diminished capacity as it related to the felony-murder rule. The jury found true the rape-murder special circumstance. It thus necessarily found the killing was committed in the course of a rape or attempted rape, a theory upon which the jury was correctly instructed. ( People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 531 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) We thus can determine that the murder verdict rested on at least one correct theory. ( Ibid. )