Opinion ID: 2166974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Juror Bias Issue

Text: Graham contends that the trial court should have declared a mistrial because juror number 292 failed to disclose during the voir dire that he knew Williams. The jury began deliberations on the morning of Friday, June 17, 1994. On Monday, June 20, 1994, juror number 292 called the trial court to report that his car had been stolen, and that he was stranded in Richmond, Virginia and unable to return to the District of Columbia. He had several conversations with court personnel, including the trial judge, regarding ways in which he could get back to the District that day. However, he never made it to court that Monday. When he arrived in court on Tuesday, June 21, 1994, the juror reported suddenly remembering that he knew government witness Williams. The trial judge decided to reopen the voir dire to question the juror. The court questioned the witness and offered the prosecutor and defense counsel an opportunity to inquire, but neither had any questions. The juror told the court that he knew Everett Williams through [his] daughter, but did not recognize him until he saw his address on one of the trial exhibits given to the jury at the time deliberations commenced. [3] Williams and the juror's daughter were classmates when they were teenagers, but did not date. However, Williams had visited the juror's house on approximately two occasions about three to five years before Graham's trial. The juror stated that he really didn't know [Williams] that well, . . . or even [try] to get to know him that well. When the trial judge asked the juror: [d]o you think that the fact that he came by your house a few times and that he was a friend of your daughter's, would that affect you in weighing the believability or the unbelievability of his testimony[,] the juror replied: I don't really think so. It's just that I thought I would mention it, . . . that I had been in his company a few times. The trial court asked government and defense counsel whether they wished to pose any questions to the juror. Both responded in the negative. However, defense counsel pressed for a mistrial, saying, inter alia: given who the witness isand I remain somewhat taken aback by the lateness of the disclosurethat Mr. Graham's position remains the same that the Court strike the juror and declare a mistrial. Defense counsel also maintained that had the juror's knowledge of Williams been disclosed during the voir dire, defense counsel would have exercised a peremptory strike if he was not successful in prevailing upon the Court to have this juror removed for cause. Based upon the trial court's conversations with the juror while he was in Richmond regarding his efforts to get back to the District, the trial judge described the juror as extremely conscientious and credited his testimony. The trial judge stated, in part: [I] know he's a conscientious person, he's not trying to get out of this jury or else he wouldn't have appeared here this morning and he wouldn't have been so cooperative yesterday. Certainly, I too am taken aback that he didn't recognize Mr. Williams. And I recognize Mr. Williams's central role in this trial. Pretty hard not to. It's not surprising to me that he didn't recognize him by name. That is a very common name. [I] think when you are the parent of a teenager who is probably bringing a whole slew of young men and women into and out of the house and the teenager doesn't have a notably bad or good relationship with one of many other teenagers, it is not incredible to me that he wouldn't recognize that young man as just another 17 or 19-year-old who was coming by the house. He obviously didn't have a serious relationship with his daughter and he obviously didn't have a negative relationship with his daughter or the juror would have focused on that. I think he was very clear, when I asked him the question, that his acquaintanceship with that young manI'm not sure it even rises to the level of an acquaintanceshipwould not affect him. Based on all of these ... facts that I know about this juror, I don't think he has been tainted and I think he has demonstrated both by his conduct yesterday and by bringing this information to my attention that he would be candid with the Court.... The trial judge denied the request for a mistrial and instructed the juror not to reveal or discuss in any way that you had this brief acquaintanceship with Mr. Williams at [your] home.... We have said previously that [t]he right to trial by an impartial judge or jury is fundamental and deeply embedded in American jurisprudence. Hughes v. United States, 689 A.2d 1206, 1207 (D.C.1997). Whenever a juror's impartiality is questioned, the trial judge is obligated, at least, to reopen the voir dire to determine whether actual bias existed. Id. at 1210; see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 944-45, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982); Young v. United States, 694 A.2d 891, 894 (D.C.1997). A hearing to determine whether the juror is biased is essential because [t]he seating of an actually biased juror is a structural error not subject to the harmless error rule. Id. (citing Hughes, supra, 689 A.2d at 1210). The burden is on the complaining party to demonstrate that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire, and then [to] further show that a correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556, 104 S.Ct. 845, 850, 78 L.Ed.2d 663 (1984). Only reasons for concealing information which affect a juror's impartiality will be considered to affect the fairness of the trial. Id. Furthermore, `following a proper hearing, the determination of juror bias or prejudice lies particularly within the discretion of the trial court, reversible only for a clear abuse of discretion, and the findings of fact underlying that determination are entitled to great deference.' Young, supra, 694 A.2d at 894 (quoting Hill v. United States, 622 A.2d 680, 683-84 (D.C.1993)). Here, upon learning that juror number 292 suddenly remembered that he knew Williams, the trial court immediately called the juror for questioning. From the juror's responses to the trial judge's questions, it is clear there was no significant relationship between the juror and the witness. Indeed, the record contains no facts to support a finding of actual bias. [4] The juror had last seen the witness Williams three to five years before Graham's trial. When asked why he did not recognize Williams, the juror said: It's been so long since I had seen him. Williams was a classmate of the juror's then teenage daughter, but the juror remembered seeing him at his house only a couple of times and really didn't know [him] that well, ... or even [try] to get to know him that well. Significantly, when the trial judge inquired whether the juror's prior contact with Williams would affect [him] in weighing the believability or the unbelievability of his testimony, the juror stated: I don't really think so. The trial court credited the juror's responses, characterized him as conscientious, found no serious or negative relationship between the juror's daughter and Williams, and concluded that he has [not] been tainted as a juror. `Our review is deferential because the question of prejudice turns substantially on the judge's appraisal of the juror's demeanor....' Young, supra, 694 A.2d at 894 (quoting Hill, supra, 622 A.2d at 684). On the record before us, we cannot conclude that the juror, who had previously seen Williams only a couple of times, who had no significant conversations with him, and who had not seen him in three to five years, failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire. [5] McDonough, supra, 464 U.S. at 556, 104 S.Ct. at 850. Thus, we see no reason to disturb the trial court's findings. Accordingly, we conclude that Graham has not sustained his burden to prove actual bias. [6]