Opinion ID: 1925655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of evidence bearing on actual, reasonable belief

Text: We must bear in mind that as the test of the driver's belief is a subjective one it is not enough that he could reasonably have believed Glenn had authority from Forest City Motor Company to give him permission to drive the carit was necessary that there was testimony from which the fact-finder could find that he actually entertained that belief. (We are still assuming that the cross-claim Defendants had the burden of proof.) There was no direct unequivocal statement by Rodney that he did have such a beliefor that he did not. While a direct affirmative statement by the driver that he believed he had the owner's permission is not required, the Justice's conclusion of fact could not be sustained in its absence unless such an inference could properly be drawn from the testimony. It seems to us that Rodney's state of mind as to his right to operate the automobile could have been one of three possibilities: 1) He could have believed he had consent of Forest City Motor Company through Glenn. 2) He could have believed Glenn had no authority to give such consent. 3) He could have been indifferent as to whether Glenn did or did not have authority to give such consent. The Justice made five specific findings of fact which he held supported his ultimate conclusion that Rodney actually (and reasonably) believed he had the owner's consent, through Glenn: (1) Rodney LaCourse knew that the automobile in question was owned by Forest City Motors and knew that Glenn Porterfield's father was an employee of Forest City Motors. (2) Rodney LaCourse knew that the automobile in question was a demonstrator. (3) Rodney LaCourse had no knowledge of and had no reason to have knowledge of the regulations of Forest City Motors relative to the use of demonstrators or the restrictions placed upon their use by such regulations. (4) Rodney LaCourse requested permission of Glenn Porterfield to operate the motor vehicle and was given that permission. (5) At the time of granting permission to Rodney LaCourse to operate the motor vehicle Glenn Porterfield was in possession of it and said nothing about any restrictions upon its use. We can discern nothing in these findings supported by testimony though they are which indicates Rodney's actual belief. We have only Rodney's testimony before us. We have searched his testimony for additional evidence from which the Justice could have drawn his conclusion that Rodney believed he had the consent of Forest City Motor Company through Glenn. We find it reveals that: Rodney was 19 years old and was either finishing or had recently completed high school. He knew that Glenn, his high school classmate, had just come home on leave from a Navy boot camp. He knew that the automobile was an apparently new Chevrolet Impala. He knew that Glenn had to pick up his mother at a certain time. He knew Glenn did not own the car but that it was owned by Forest City Motor Company and that Glenn was not employed by Forest City Motor Company. He had seen Glenn driving a demonstrator once or twice before but had never ridden in one with Glenn. In addition, we find the following question and answer which prove crucial: Q Well, there wasn't any discussion between you and Mr. Porterfield as to whether or not he had permission to let you use the car? A I asked him if I could drive it, that's all. I asked him and he was driving the car. While the answer was somewhat equivocal the Justice could properly have construed it as intended to be an explanation that the witness believed that Glenn, as the one in possession of the car under those circumstances, was authorized to permit a friend to take a short turn at the wheel. The Justice could properly find that Rodney had such an actual belief. But was the belief a reasonable one under the circumstances? We do not suggest that anyone in possession of another's automobile can reasonably be assumed under all circumstances to be authorized to permit another to drive. The witness here, however, knew that Glenn's father was an employee of Forest City Motor Company; that the father frequently had the company's demonstrator cars at his home; that Glenn had driven these cars on other occasions; that on this occasion Glenn was to use the car to perform a family duty; and he had no information as to any restriction by the owner as to the operation of the demonstrator by others. The Justice observed the witness and was informed as to his age, education and experience and he found as a fact that under those circumstances it was reasonable for that witness to have believed that Glenn was authorized to let a friend enjoy the pleasure of operating the new demonstrator car for a few miles. We cannot say that he was clearly erroneous. The entry will be: Appeal denied.