Opinion ID: 1734307
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether mmha has standing to appeal the city's zoning decision.

Text: ¶ 7. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (Rev. 2002) states any person aggrieved by a judgment of ... municipal authorities ... may appeal within ten (10) days from the date of adjournment at which session the board of supervisors or municipal authorities rendered such judgment. ¶ 8. Mississippi's standing requirements are more relaxed than the stringent case or controversy requirements for standing in federal courts under Art. III, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Burgess, 814 So.2d at 152-53. In Mississippi, parties have standing to sue when they assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experience an adverse affect from the defendant's conduct. Id. ¶ 9. In Belhaven Improvement Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 507 So.2d 41 (Miss. 1987), we addressed the issue of whether a neighborhood improvement association had standing to appeal a city's zoning decision on behalf of members of the neighborhood. The circuit court dismissed the appeal, finding that the society was not an aggrieved party because it did not own any property or have an interest in any property that would be affected by zoning. We noted that jurisdictions throughout the country were divided. ¶ 10. Some jurisdictions have adopted the New York rule, which requires a court to consider four factors: (1) the capacity of the organization to assume an adversary position, (2) the size and composition of the organization as reflecting a position fairly representative of the community or interest which it seeks to protect, (3) the adverse effect of the decision sought to be reviewed on the group represented by the organization as within the zone of interests sought to be protected, and (4) the availability of full participating membership in the organization to all residents and property owners in the relevant neighborhood. See Douglaston Civic Ass'n v. Galvin, 36 N.Y.2d 1, 364 N.Y.S.2d 830, 324 N.E.2d 317 (1974). ¶ 11. Other jurisdictions have adopted the federal rule. [2] An association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when (1) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, (2) the interest it seeks are germane to the organization's purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383, 394 (1977). ¶ 12. In Belhaven, we set out our requirements for standing: For standing, the person(s) aggrieved, or members of the association, whether one or more, should allege an adverse effect different from that of the general public. Also, they should show the fact of a representative capacity, particularly of those adversely affected. An association should not be permitted to close out minority members, cutting off their views entirely, particularly where the effect on some individuals would be greater than effect on the majority. Membership in the association should be limited to residents and property owners. 507 So.2d at 47. The Court then vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to determine the question of standing. Id. In Tallahatchie Valley Electric Power Ass'n v. Miss. Propane Gas Ass'n, 812 So.2d 912 (Miss. 2002), citing Belhaven, we applied the federal test in finding that an association had standing to sue on behalf of one of its members. There, we found that MPGA, a non-profit association representing propane companies, had standing to bring suit when one of its members had been adversely affected by TVEPA, a non-profit association incorporated under the Mississippi Electric Power Association Law. TVEPA began investing in the propane business in efforts to keep its rates down and purchased DeSoto Gas. MPGA filed a complaint for injunctive relief and declaratory judgment against TVEPA. The trial court enjoined TVEPA from owning or operating DeSoto Gas. ¶ 13. One of the numerous issues on appeal was whether MPGA had standing to challenge TVEPA's ownership of DeSoto Gas. MPGA argued that it had standing inasmuch as one of its members, Dowdle Butane Gas Co., had standing to sue TVEPA because it was a member-owner of TVEPA and could challenge any ultra vires act of TVEPA. ¶ 14. Applying the federal test to determine whether MPGA had standing, we found that MPGA had standing due to its representation of Dowdle Butane Gas Co., which was a member of MPGA and of TVEPA. Since Dowdle Butane could challenge TVEPA's actions, MPGA could also. MPGA asserted interests relevant to its purpose because Dowdle Butane had been adversely affected by TVEPA's actions. Id. at 922. ¶ 15. Applying the three-pronged federal test to the present case, we find that MMHA has standing to challenge the city's zoning decision:
¶ 16. The issue under the first prong of the federal test is whether a member of MMHA would have standing to challenge the City's zoning decision. MMHA asserts that one of its members owns property and manages a retail manufacturing housing center in the City of Canton. [3] ¶ 17. Other jurisdictions have found associational standing in similar circumstances. In Colorado Manufactured Housing Ass'n v. Pueblo County, 857 P.2d 507 (Colo.Ct.App.1993), the plaintiffs, a manufactured housing association, dealers, and builders brought suit challenging a county's zoning restrictions on manufactured housing. The plaintiffs had contracted with a buyer to purchase a mobile home. In accordance with the local zoning resolution, the county denied the buyer's application for a permit to install the manufactured home on his property. The buyer then rescinded the contract with the manufactured home dealer. The plaintiffs alleged actual and threatened injury; specifically, that they suffered injury by the loss of the sale to the buyer and that their future sales would be adversely affected. The trial court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiffs did not have standing. Id. at 510. On appeal the court found that the plaintiffs had standing, stating that the plaintiff's allegations of threatened injury were sufficient for purposes of standing. Id. at 511. The plaintiffs had already lost one sale and would lose more in the future. ¶ 18. Here, the first federal test factor is satisfied. Members of MMHA have standing under Mississippi's liberal standing requirements to challenge the City's zoning decision. Members of MMHA will experience an adverse effect from the City's zoning decision that restricts the area where manufactured homes can be placed. The zoning decision will no doubt have a direct negative economic impact on any member of MMHA that sells manufactured homes in the City because their buyer's market would be diminished.
¶ 19. There is no doubt that MMHA's challenge to the City's zoning restrictions is of importance to MMHA's members. MMHA is seeking to have a zoning ordinance struck down that will likely diminish business for its members. MMHA stated in its position statement presented to the Mayor and Board of Aldermen that, Development, zoning and planning issues concerning manufactured housing issues are of critical importance to MMHA.
¶ 20. This prong has been interpreted as follows: [W]hether an association has standing to invoke the court's remedial powers on behalf of its members depends in substantial measure on the nature of the relief sought. If in a proper case the association seeks a declaration, injunction, or some other form of prospective relief, it can reasonably be supported that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 343, 97 S.Ct. at 2441. ¶ 21. When an association seeks only prospective relief and raises only issues of law, it need not prove the individual circumstances of its members to obtain that relief. The third element of associational standing is met. Tex. State Employees Union/CWA Local 6184 v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 16 S.W.3d 61, 69 (Tex.App.2000). ¶ 22. Adopting the federal test to determine whether an association has standing to sue on behalf of its members, we find that MMHA has standing to challenge Canton's zoning decision. Thus, the circuit court erred in dismissing MMHA's bill of exceptions for lack of standing by MMHA.