Opinion ID: 543590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cable Association

Text: 40 The district court held that because the Cable Association alleged no injury to itself caused by the defendants, it did not have standing to sue on its own behalf. 698 F.Supp. at 413-14. This ruling is not challenged on appeal. The court did hold, however, that the Cable Association had standing to sue on behalf of its members. Id. at 414. 41 The parties and the district court agreed that the relevant test was stated in Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n: 42 [A]n association has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. 43 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 2441, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977). Applying this test, Judge Pieras decided, first, that the record before the Court, including the stipulations of the parties, reveals that any member of [the Cable Association] could have brought this action and would have alleged a particularized harm sufficient to give that member standing. 698 F.Supp. at 414. He next found that the organizational purposes of the Association had been sufficiently pled, and that these avowed purposes are consonant with the relief requested and the interest sought to be protected in the suit. Id. Third, he decided that [t]he claim asserted and the relief requested, at this stage of the litigation, do not require the participation of the individual [Association] members, and that the relief requested here runs to all [Association] members equally: protection from local prosecution. No individualized evidence is required. Id. The defendants challenge the district court's determination on all three elements of the Hunt test. 44 First, the defendants note that this suit no longer contains a challenge to the constitutionality of Puerto Rico's obscenity statute; only the statutory preemption claim remains. The defendants then argue that Teleponce is the only member of the Cable Association claiming to have designated a channel for commercial use under Sec. 532, so it is the only member which can assert an immunity from prosecution based on Sec. 558. Without disputing that Teleponce itself would have had standing to sue, they argue that the prospective standing of a single member cannot support standing for the Cable Association to sue on behalf of its members. 45 We think the defendants' assertion that, because other members have not yet designated a leased access channel they lack standing, confuses merits and standing. Certainly, the members of the Association who have dropped transmission of the Playboy Channel on account of threats of prosecution have suffered an injury directly traceable to the defendants' actions, see Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982); whether or not they are entitled to the protection from prosecution offered by Sec. 558 is part of the merits of their claim, not their standing to sue. In any event, the Supreme Court has never required that every member of an association have standing before it can sue on behalf of its members. The association must allege that its members, or any one of them, are suffering immediate or threatened injury as a result of the challenged action of the sort that would make out a justiciable case had the members themselves brought suit. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2212, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975) (emphasis added) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734-35, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 1366, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), which held that the Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge the U.S. Forest Service's approval of development in the Mineral King Valley because the Club didn't allege that any of its members use the area for recreation). In Automobile Workers v. Brock, the Court held that the first element of the Hunt test was met when the plaintiff association showed that at least some of its members would have had standing to sue on their own. 477 U.S. 274, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2523, 2530, 91 L.Ed.2d 228 (1986). Teleponce's prospective standing is enough to satisfy the first element of Hunt. 46 Next, the defendants claim that in reality, the Cable Association is just an empty husk of an association with no public identity which is controlled by PEI for its own interests, not the interests of the members. The record does not support this accusation. 47 The record evidence shows that the Cable Association was organized prior to the filing of this suit, and for different reasons, Appellants' Appendix (AA) at 57; that the members of the Association twice unanimously consented to the Association's participation in the suit (one member later demurring), Id. at 58; and that PEI does not own or control the Cable Association, or any of its members. SA at 72. The defendants point out that PEI is bearing the expense of this litigation, but this doesn't show that the Association is a pawn of PEI or that it is not representing its members' true interest. If the members felt their interests were not being served by this suit, they could vote to end the Association's involvement. 48 A more difficult question is posed by the third prerequisite for an association to sue on behalf of its members: that neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit. The defendants argue that because this lawsuit requires the participation of Teleponce, the Association lacks standing. 49 We can easily find that the plaintiffs' request for declaratory relief--that the Cable Act prevents local prosecution of cable operators for programing transmitted over leased access channels--does not require any individual member's participation as a party. Such declaratory relief turns on a question of law which is not particular to each member of the Association, and because the declaration applies equally to all members of the Association, there is no need for individual proof or participation. Brock, 477 U.S. at 287, 106 S.Ct. at 2531 (no need for members' participation when suit raises a pure question of law not individual to members, even though later proceedings might require individualized consideration). The same is true for injunctive relief which parallels the declaration. Although not every member may derive any immediate benefit from the injunction, no individual findings are necessary, and it can reasonably be supposed that the remedy, if granted, will inure to the benefit of those members of the association actually injured. Warth, 422 U.S. at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213. See Camel Hair and Cashmere v. Associated Dry Goods, 799 F.2d 6, 12 (1st Cir.1986). 50 A different part of the claim asserted does depend upon proof which may vary from member to member, however. The complaint asked the district court to enjoin the defendant from prosecuting or threatening to prosecute cable operators generally. This claim is now solely based upon the immunity from prosecution found in Sec. 558. The district court made an individualized determination when it declared that Teleponce carries the Playboy Channel pursuant to Sec. 532. 698 F.Supp. at 419. This declaration was based upon the court's review of communications between PEI and Teleponce, evidence which could not have established whether any other member of the Association had similarly designated a channel for leased access. Id. at 416-18. 51 But just because a claim may require proof specific to individual members of an association does not mean the members are required to participate as parties in the lawsuit. In Warth, the Supreme Court held that an association had no standing to sue on behalf of its members, when seeking monetary relief to compensate its members' injuries. The Court said 52 whatever injury may have been suffered is peculiar to the individual member concerned, and both the fact and extent of injury would require individualized proof. Thus, to obtain relief in damages, each member of Home Builders [Association] who claims injury as a result of respondents' practices must be a party to the suit, and Home Builders has no standing to claim damages on his behalf. 53 422 U.S. at 515-16, 95 S.Ct. at 2213-14. The crucial reason for requiring the members' participation as parties must have been so that the members could recover their own damages, should they prevail. The Home Builders Association, having alleged no injury to itself nor any assignment of damage claims by its members, was not entitled to be compensated for the various injuries suffered by its members. Id. at 515, 95 S.Ct. at 2213. The members' participation as parties was necessary so that judgment could be entered in their favor, not in order to prove individual damages. The members could still have been called to testify as to their damages, and could have been deposed and subjected to subpoenas duces tecum by the defendants without being parties to the suit. Fed.R.Civ.P. 30 & 45. 54 We see no reason why the claim for injunctive relief in this case requires the participation of any Cable Association member, or how Teleponce's participation as a party would make any significant difference. No monetary judgment was granted, either on behalf of the Cable Association or its members. 10 The defendants do not claim that because Teleponce is not a plaintiff, they have been unable to gain access to evidence concerning the single individual issue, whether or not Teleponce has designated for commercial use the channel over which it transmits the Playboy Channel. The defendants, in fact, agreed to submit the case for decision on summary judgment without claiming there was a genuine issue of fact, only contesting the evidence the court could consider in resolving this issue. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that Cable Association has standing to bring this suit on behalf of its members.