Opinion ID: 2000436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Verdict Was Supported by Substantial Evidence and Was in Accord with Iowa Law.

Text: The district court may grant an aggrieved party a new trial when the jury awards excessive or inadequate damages, or when the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, or is contrary to law. Iowa R. Civ. P. 244(d), (f). The district court has considerable discretion in ruling upon a motion for new trial based upon the ground that the verdict was inadequate. Householder v. Town of Clayton, 221 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1974). Whether damages are so inadequate to warrant a new trial is for the district court to decide. Id. And we will not ordinarily disturb its discretion to grant or deny the motion unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Id. We are slower to interfere with the grant of a new trial than with its denial. Iowa R.App. P. 14(f)(4). Whether damages in a given case are adequate depends on the particular facts of the case. Witte v. Vogt, 443 N.W.2d 715, 716 (Iowa 1989). The test is whether the verdict fairly and reasonably compensates the party for the injury sustained. Id. In Cowan v. Flannery, we observed that [w]e have not adopted an inflexible rule that every verdict awarding only damages for medical expenses in a personal injury action is inadequate as a matter of law. 461 N.W.2d 155, 159 (Iowa 1990). Our survey of the cases showed that [w]e have affirmed the court's granting of a new trial where the evidence material to the damage award is undisputed and the damage award was approximately equal or less than the special damages. We have reversed the court's denial of a new trial where evidence material to the damage award is undisputed and the award was nearly equal or less than the special damages. We have affirmed the trial court's denial of a new trial where the evidence of the cause or extent of injury was disputed. We have also reversed the granting of a new trial based on inadequate damages where the evidence as to the nature, extent and severity of the injuries were disputed. Id. (citations omitted). We think the facts here fit the first scenario. As we shall discuss, there was undisputed evidence that Fisher sustained a neck injury in the collision, and she had pain and suffering as a result of that injury. In addition, the damage award was equal to the medical expenses for the neck injury with nothing for the pain and suffering. The district court was therefore well within its discretion to rule that Fisher was entitled to a new trial. Fisher testified about the pain to her neck that she had shortly after the collision. Fisher saw Pattee the day following the collision. Pattee testified about her complaints of neck pain to him and that he treated her for those complaints with anti-inflammatory medication, muscle relaxers, pain medication, and osteopathic manipulation therapy. He also testified he treated her sporadically for her neck injury until July 1994. Although Wirtz minimized Fisher's neck injury, he did confirm that the rear-end type of collision Fisher experienced would result in a soft tissue injury to the neck of Grade I strain. He also confirmed that Fisher would be expected to (1) have some symptoms of pain from the neck injury for a period of time, (2) require medication for her neck injury, and (3) be restricted in her activities. He further testified that the injury should respond to treatment over a short period of timetwo to four to six weeks. In a similar type rear-end collision, this court reversed a district court ruling that denied the plaintiff's motion for new trial based on inadequacy of the verdict. The jury had only awarded the plaintiff his medical expenses of $25 and property damage to his vehicle in the amount of $84.71. See Shewry v. Heuer, 255 Iowa 147, 150, 121 N.W.2d 529, 531 (1963). In that case, as here, there was undisputed evidence that the plaintiff had suffered a neck injury and pain as a result of the injury. In Shewry, the court noted that the district court had instructed the jury (1) to determine whether the plaintiff had established he endured past and future pain and suffering, and (2) that it could only allow the doctor bill if it found the services for which the bill was rendered were necessary. Id. at 152, 121 N.W.2d at 532. Given these instructions, the court reasoned that it could find no logical ground on which the jury could award plaintiff the cost of medical services made necessary by his pain and suffering and yet allow him nothing for the pain and suffering. There is no basis for finding that anything other than the pain and suffering resulting from the accident necessitated the medical services for which allowance was made. Id. Here, the district court had similarly instructed the jury. The jury allowed the medical expenses made necessary by the neck injury and the resulting pain and suffering but nevertheless declined to award Fisher anything for her pain and suffering. We conclude it was illogical for the jury to award Fisher medical expenses to treat her neck injury and pain and then allow nothing for her pain and suffering. As mentioned, the district court concluded that the jury's failure to award damages for pain and suffering was unreasonable and internally inconsistent with the jury's finding that Fisher had sustained a neck injury in the collision that necessitated medical treatment. Such a finding leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial on the following three stated grounds in rule 244: (1) inadequate damages, rule 244(d); (2) verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, rule 244(f); and (3) verdict is contrary to law, rule 244(g). We observe that, in some of our cases on inadequate damages, this court, like the district court here, has used language that the verdict was inconsistent with the evidence. See, e.g., Shewry, 255 Iowa at 153, 121 N.W.2d at 533. We have traced this language back to Tathwell v. City of Cedar Rapids, 122 Iowa 50, 54, 97 N.W. 96, 97 (1903). At the time this court decided Tathwell, there was no statute that expressly authorized trial courts in personal injury cases to grant a new trial on the grounds the verdict was inadequate. Common law, however, allowed trial courts to grant a new trial in case of an inadequate verdict on the ground that the verdict was inconsistent with the evidence. In addition, a statute allowed trial courts to grant a new trial when the evidence did not sustain the verdict. See Iowa Code § 3755(6) (1897). The court in Tathwell relied on the common law inconsistency rule and the statute regarding sufficiency of the evidence as authority for the trial courts to grant a new trial for inadequate verdicts in personal injury cases. Now, we have a rule of civil procedure that expressly authorizes trial courts to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was inadequate. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 244(d). Additionally, our rule authorizes the trial courts to grant a new trial on the grounds the verdict was not supported by sufficient evidence and was contrary to law. See Iowa R. Civ. P. 244(f). There is, therefore, no need to rely on the common law inconsistency rule. In the future, a party seeking a new trial on the ground that the verdict was inadequate should use the grounds in rule 244 rather than the common law inconsistency rule. That brings us to the next issue.