Opinion ID: 2278146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: The Graham and Roper Cases

Text: Following Roper, Graham held that a sentence of life without possibility of parole for a juvenile in a nonhomicide case violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment because it violates society's evolving standards of decency. [2] To determine the extent to which society's standards of decency have evolved, three factors are to be considered. First, courts consider objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice to determine whether there is a national consensus against a particular type of sentencing. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Next, courts look at the culpability of offenders in light of their crimes and the characteristics of the offenders  including scientific facts that bear on culpability  along with the severity of punishment. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2026. Finally, the last step is to assess the effectiveness of the sentence in achieving four penological goals  retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation. Id. at 2027-30. The Supreme Court in Graham first considered objective indicia of society's standards, as expressed in legislative enactments and state practice, to determine whether there is a national consensus against a particular type of sentencing. Id. at 2022 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183). Looking at sentencing practice, the Supreme Court held that, given the rarity of imposition of life without parole for nonhomicide offenses, there was a national consensus showing that standards of decency had evolved to prohibit life without parole for nonhomicide offenses. Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2023-26. The Supreme Court then assessed the culpability of offenders  looking at the severity of their crimes and characteristics of the offender. Id. at 2026. Considering the characteristics of juveniles, the Supreme Court held that juveniles, as a class, were less culpable than other offenders. Id. at 2027. The Supreme Court, among other things, looked at the offense and determined nonhomicide offenses were less blameworthy than homicide. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court held that severity of punishment was extreme. Id. at 2027-28. Graham is important for both reaffirming the considerations for determining whether a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment as well as illustrating the Supreme Court's heavy reliance on the unique characteristics of juveniles in determining what juvenile sentences are permissible. Graham also is important for what it does not say. Graham does not hold that a sentence of life without parole for a homicide is constitutional. The Supreme Court distinguished juvenile life without parole for homicide and nonhomicide cases in many parts of its analysis. [3] The sentence at issue in Graham, however, was life without parole for the commission of a nonhomicide crime; therefore, the Supreme Court could not have held that life without parole was permissible for homicide because so holding would have been an advisory opinion in violation of the constitution. [4] The principal opinion interprets Graham to hold that life without parole is permissible for homicides. This is incorrect for two reasons. First, the principal opinion cites Chief Justice Roberts' lone concurring opinion, which is not binding precedent. The portion quoted, when examined in its entirety, merely sets forth Roberts' objection to any categorical ban on life without parole for both homicide and nonhomicide offenses  in contrast to the Supreme Court's majority opinion that imposed a categorical ban. See Graham, 130 S.Ct. at 2041 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). [5] While Graham is useful in determining how a juvenile's unique characteristics interact with Eighth Amendment analysis, Graham does not dictate the outcome in this case. The principal opinion also interprets Roper as expressly recognizing that sentences of life without parole are constitutional for juveniles. The Supreme Court in Roper held that sentencing a juvenile to death was cruel and unusual punishment. See Roper, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005). When discussing the inapplicability of deterrence as a legitimate penological goal, the Supreme Court said, To the extent that the juvenile death penalty might have residual deterrent effect, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person. Id. at 572, 125 S.Ct. 1183. Again, the Supreme Court was not holding that the deterrent effect of life without parole was sufficient justification for its imposition; instead, the Supreme Court merely was using life without parole as an example of alternative punishment. The offender in Roper was not challenging a sentence of life without parole; he simply was trying not to be put to death. The fact that the Supreme Court did not intend to hold life without parole constitutional in Roper is recognized by its holding in Graham that life without parole is unconstitutional for nonhomicide offenses. The principles expressed in Roper and Graham are helpful in this case; they do not foreclose the relief Andrews seeks here. [6]