Opinion ID: 2390222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Other Similar Incidents

Text: In Whaley v. CSX Transportation Inc., this Court recognized that similar accidents are admissible if they tend[ ] to prove or disprove some fact in dispute. 362 S.C. 456, 483, 609 S.E.2d 286, 300 (2005). The Court also recognized that this type of evidence has the potential to be highly prejudicial. [19] Id. at 483, 609 S.E.2d at 300. Accordingly, it set forth a stringent standard for admissibility: `[A] plaintiff must present a factual foundation for the court to determine that the other accidents were substantially similar to the accident at issue.' Id. at 483, 609 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting Buckman v. Bombardier Corp., 893 F.Supp. 547, 552 (E.D.N.C.1995)); see also Atkinson v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 361 S.C. 156, 604 S.E.2d 385 (2004) (recognizing that unless Orkin's past conduct is `similar' to the conduct directed at the [plaintiffs], it is inadmissible). Before addressing the substantially similar test, we resolve Ford's twin challenge to the post-manufacture evidence of supposed similar incidents. Even assuming a plaintiff satisfies the Whaley substantially similar test, such evidence must not run afoul of the rule in products liability cases that prohibits post-distribution evidence to establish liability. Whaley is instructive in this regard. Whaley was employed by CSX Transportation. Whaley became ill, allegedly due to work conditions, with heat-related symptoms first reported on May 24, 2000. Whaley introduced evidence that between 1984 and 2000, CSX had received ninety-seven employee complaints about heat. In addition, the trial judge permitted Whaley to introduce evidence that, between 1993 and 2000, eighteen CSX employees had suffered heat stroke. Whaley, 362 S.C. at 483, 609 S.E.2d at 300. Because Whaley did not establish that the reported complaints and injuries stemmed from the same or similar circumstances as his injuries[,] it was error to admit the evidence. Id. at 483-84, 609 S.E.2d at 300. Yet Whaley never attempted to introduce evidence of other incidents that occurred after the 2000 injury date. On the issue of liability, Branham presented voluminous evidence of post-manufacture rollover data. The post-manufacture evidence of purported similar incidents was error, even if the substantially similar threshold was met. [20] Post-manufacture evidence of similar incidents is not admissible to prove liability. This Court recently revisited Whaley in a products liability setting, Watson v. Ford Motor Co., 389 S.C. 434, 699 S.E.2d 169 (2010) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 10 at 37). In Watson, we repeated that [e]vidence of similar accidents, transactions, or happenings is admissible in South Carolina where there is some special relation between the accidents tending to prove or disprove some fact in dispute. Id. at 50. In imposing a burden on plaintiffs to demonstrate that the other accidents were substantially similar to the accident at issue[,] the Court set forth factors to support a claim that the present accident was caused by the same defect: (1) the products are similar; (2) the alleged defect is similar; (3) causation related to the defect in the other incidents; and (4) exclusion of all reasonable secondary explanations for the cause of the other accidents. Id. at 51 (citing Buckman v. Bombardier, 893 F.Supp. at 552). We turn now to the evidence of pre-manufacture rollover data. Branham introduced evidence of rollover accidents involving the Bronco II and other vehicles in the same class that was known at or prior to the 1986 manufacture of Hale's Bronco II. Ford claims the pre-manufacture comparative evidence of rollover accidents violates the Whaley-Watson substantially similar test because there was no showing that the cause of the other accidents was similar to the cause of the rollover accident at issue. In commenting on this evidentiary dispute, we must be careful not to foreclose the discretion of the trial court in ruling on objections during the course of the retrial. This is especially true with other similar incidents evidence because of its potential to be highly prejudicial, thereby implicating Rule 403, SCRE. Our discussion, therefore, is intended as a general guideline, as we recognize a host of factors can arise during the course of a trial that impact a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence. With that caveat, on the record before us, we disagree with Ford. Admittedly, a showing of comparative rollover accident rates does not establish the manner in which any particular accident occurred. But Ford misconstrues the essence of Branham's design defect claim. To the extent Branham is able to establish (at or prior to the manufacture date of the subject vehicle) the rate or number of rollover accidents of the Bronco II was greater as compared to other vehicles in its class, such evidence may well be relevant on whether the Bronco II was unreasonably dangerous. We do agree with Ford that if the cause of an accident is known and the cause is not substantially similar to the accident at issue, evidence of the other accident should be excluded. Yet, where the precise cause of an accident is not known, Bronco II rollover accident data has relevance when compared to rollover accident data of other vehicles in class. This relevance is linked directly to Branham's claim that the design of the Bronco II caused it to have an unreasonably dangerous tendency to rollover. Like the trial court, we are persuaded by neither Ford's general argument that many accidents may be attributable to inexperienced or impaired drivers, nor its specific reference to Hale's inattention as the cause of the June 17, 2001 accident. First, as referenced in a Ford document (Plaintiff's exhibit 168), Ford recognized the tendency of the Bronco II to roll over, describing it as driving sensitivity which is aggravated by the fact [that] most operators in rollover accidents are either inexperienced drivers, under the influence of alcohol or both. Assuming a number of rollover accidents are caused by inexperienced or impaired drivers, there is no suggestion in this record that inexperienced or impaired drivers disproportionately favored the Bronco II, thus skewing the comparative rollover accident data. It is inferable that rollover accidents caused by inexperienced or impaired drivers are shared by all vehicles in the class, not just the Bronco II. While Ford's position may have appeal as a jury argument, it is of little moment on the admissibility question in the record before us. Second, there may be little or no doubt as to Hale's negligence, but that misses the point in terms of the admissibility of comparative rollover accident data. A car manufacturer must design and produce vehicles that are not in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user. Cars are designed with utility and safety in mind, and careless driving is a foreseeable reality. The general nature of the alleged negligent driving on the part of Hale was (or should have been) part of the evaluative process that culminated in the ultimate decision of Ford to design, manufacture and market the Bronco II to the driving public. Ford had a duty to design and manufacture the Bronco II as a reasonably safe vehicle. We believe our consideration of the admissibility of the pre-manufacture rollover accident data necessarily flows from the risk-utility test for products liability design defect cases.