Opinion ID: 3156075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Advice-of-Counsel Instruction

Text: [¶23] Flynn argues that she was entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of “advice of counsel,” see United States v. Powers, 702 F.3d 1, 8-10 (1st Cir. 2012), but that the instruction given improperly shifted to her the burden of proof. We have not had occasion to address an advice-of-counsel defense or instruction. In federal courts, to establish an affirmative defense of advice of 5 M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2) (Tower 2014), applicable when this case was tried, has since been replaced (effective Jan. 1, 2015) with restyled language that does not affect its application in this case. See M.R. Evid. 801(d)(2). 6 M.R. Evid. 801(c) (Tower 2014) has since been replaced (effective Jan. 1, 2015) with restyled language that does not affect its application in this case. See M.R. Evid. 801(c). 11 counsel, the “defendant has a burden of production to establish a prima facie defense of advice of counsel,” and must establish that: (1) before taking action, (2) he in good faith sought the advice of an attorney whom he considered competent, (3) for the purpose of securing advice on the lawfulness of his possible future conduct, (4) and made a full and accurate report to his attorney of all material facts which the defendant knew, (5) and acted strictly in accordance with the advice of his attorney who had been given a full report. United States v. Gorski, 36 F. Supp. 3d 256, 267 (D. Mass. 2014); see also Powers, 702 F.3d at 10 (“In light of the evidence that [the] attorney . . . was not told needed information and was given false information, the instruction was unavailable.”); United States v. Gonzales, 58 F.3d 506, 512 (10th Cir. 1995) (“Reliance upon advice of counsel is a defense that the defendant must establish. Reliance upon advice of a lawyer does not negate willfulness unless the defendant completely disclosed all material fact[s].” (citation omitted)). Once the defendant makes a prima facie case, “[t]he defendant [is] then . . . entitled to the requested instruction, and the [prosecution’s] burden to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, including the necessary mens rea, would encompass the burden to prove that [the] defendant did not reasonably rely on counsel’s advice.” Gorski, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 267. [¶24] An attorney called by Flynn at trial testified that Flynn had consulted with him about holding the funds until the dispute about the money could be resolved. The attorney also testified that (1) he was not aware of who had 12 provided the money that was placed in the Green Tree account; (2) he had not reviewed the agreement or agreements between Dinson and Green Tree; (3) “as far as [he] could see” from what was disclosed to him, the money “was not escrow money”; (4) Flynn had not told him that she had agreed to return the money, with a list of payables, to the investor; and (5) he had not been consulted about transferring funds from the Green Tree account to other accounts under Flynn’s personal control. The attorney also testified that intentionally taking money from the business for personal use without authorization to do so is “a problem.” [¶25] With this record, it is evident that Flynn did not establish that she had “made a full and accurate report to [her] attorney of all material facts [that she] knew . . . and acted strictly in accordance with the advice of [her] attorney who had been given a full report.” Gorski, 36 F. Supp. 3d at 267. Accordingly, the advice-of-counsel defense was not generated, and no instruction regarding advice of counsel should have been given. See id.; Powers, 702 F.3d at 10. [¶26] The question remains as to whether the court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that Flynn had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she “fully disclosed all material facts to her attorney” and “actually relied on counsel’s advice,” but indicated that the ultimate burden of proof rested with the State to prove all elements of theft, including intent, beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Flynn was not entitled to an instruction on the advice-of-counsel 13 defense in the first place, any error in the instruction itself was harmless. See U.C.D.R.P.–Cumberland County 52(a); M.R. Crim. P. 52(a).