Opinion ID: 1810926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Stutsman Cross-Appeal

Text: Stutsman argues generally that because PVM did not at or before the time of the annual accounting in 1976 and 1977, present to Stutsman a list of its actual expenditures, the court should not have considered taxes for 1975 and 1976. Stutsman apparently does not dispute the amount of those taxes but in effect says that PVM waived its right to any reimbursement by not complying with paragraph VI of the stipulation, which required a list of expenditures each year no later than February 1st. The trial court in findings numbered II, III, IV and V found that PVM did pay real estate taxes for 1975 and 1976 in excess of the agreed base sum and was entitled to credit therefor. There is no finding of fact or conclusion of law that indicates that there was a waiver or any other basis upon which PVM was entitled to this credit. The only statement we find as a basis for findings II, III, IV and V is in the trial court's memorandum decision as follows: No harm can be shown to come to either side, nor is any penalty built into the contract. The requirements in paragraph VI of the stipulation appear clear and unambiguous in requiring annual accountings and an annual listing of expenditures. The fact that there is no harm to anyone that this was not done, alone is not sufficient reason for the courts to, in effect, rewrite that portion of the contract. That is not to say that there may not be a legal and adequate basis under law or equity for not enforcing the accounting requirement under the circumstances of this case. That determination, however, is a trial court function and we remand so that the preparation of an appropriate finding can be made, or a retrial, if deemed necessary by the trial court, in order to provide a basis for the required finding. See Sand v. Red River Nat. Bank & Trust Company, 224 N.W.2d 375, 378 (N.D. 1974). The existence of any doubt as to whether the trial court or the appellate court is the ultimate trier of fact issues is detrimental to the orderly administration of justice, impairs the confidence of litigants and the public, and multiplies unwarranted appeals. Pendergrass v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 181 F.2d 136, 138 (8th Cir. 1950).