Opinion ID: 1822313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dismissal of Lesion Pursuant to Summary Judgment

Text: According to Robert, the law of summary judgment mandates that Anne's lesionary claim be dismissed. He argues that after Anne filed her petition, he filed a motion for summary judgment pointing out lack of factual support for all of Anne's claims. At that point, Robert contends, the burden of proof shifted to Anne who failed to produce factual support sufficient to establish that she would be able to satisfy her evidentiary burden of proof at trial. Therefore, Robert argues, summary judgment was properly granted. The law of summary judgment is set forth in Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966. Subsection C(2) of that statute addresses the burden of proof and reads as follows: The burden of proof remains with the movant. However, if the movant will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the matter that is before the court on the motion for summary judgment, the movant's burden on the motion does not require him to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, action, or defense, but rather to point out to the court that there is an absence of factual support for one or more elements essential to the adverse party's claim, action, or defense. Thereafter, if the adverse party fails to produce factual support sufficient to establish that he will be able to satisfy his evidentiary burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine issue of material fact. (Emphasis provided). Under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 966, Robert is correct. The burden of proving lesion rests with Anne. Thus, Robert, in his motion for summary judgment needed only to point out to the court that there was an absence of factual support for one or more elements of Anne's claim for lesion. Thereafter, the burden would have shifted to Anne to produce factual support sufficient to establish that she will be able to satisfy her evidentiary burden of proof as to the lesion claim at trial. A careful reading of the trial court pleadings, however, reveals that Robert never moved for summary judgment on the lesion claim in the trial court. Robert's motion for summary judgment alleges that there is no genuine issue of fact material to the claims or causes of action alleged in the motion/petition filed by Anne Marie Olivier Hoover. The memorandum in support of the motion, however, requests judgment as a matter of law on only three issues: (1) plaintiffs main demand which is Anne's allegation that the Mizell fee was an unpartitioned community asset; (2) the disclosure/fraud issue which is Anne's alternative argument that Robert fraudulently concealed the Mizell fee; and (3) Robert's affirmative defenses wherein Robert asserts that the doctrines of estoppel and transaction/compromise. Neither the summary judgment motion nor the memorandum attacks Anne's claim of lesion. The overarching language in the motion which states that Robert is challenging the causes of action alleged in the motion/petition coupled with a memorandum that briefs only the main demand, disclosure/fraud issue and Robert's affirmative defenses is insufficient to place Anne on notice that Robert was moving for summary judgment on the issue of lesion. Robert, as movant, failed to adequately place the lesion issue before the court and hence, the trial judge erred in dismissing the claim. The court cannot render a motion for summary judgment dismissing a claim which has not been challenged by the pleading. Because the summary judgment dismissing the lesion claim was in error, the court of appeal also erred in affirming that decision. Anne's remedy of lesion claim remains a viable remedy at this stage of the proceedings and the matter will be remanded to the district court. In conclusion, we find that the lower courts erred in finding that the partition agreement between Anne and Robert Hoover was a transaction or compromise. While the agreement may have had some aspects and qualities of a compromise, it was nonetheless, an extrajudicial partition for which lesion is a remedy under Louisiana Civil Code article 814. Furthermore, Anne's claim for lesion was improperly dismissed on a motion for summary judgment as Robert Hoover's motion did not request disposition of that particular issue. Because the trial court was without authority to dismiss Anne's alternative claim for lesion, it remains a viable remedy at this stage of the proceedings and we remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. REVERSED AND REMANDED.