Opinion ID: 170165
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Allstate’s Offer

Text: In support of his first argument, Mr. Wobst attempts to distinguish this case from Hill v. Allstate Ins. Co., 479 F.3d 735 (10th Cir. 2007), upon which the district court largely relied in determining that Allstate’s offer was sufficient under Colorado law. Like Mr. Wobst, the plaintiff in Hill complained that Allstate’s explanation of its enhanced PIP options, provided both orally and in writing, was not sufficiently clear to enable the insured to make an informed decision. We rejected this argument, noting that not only had the insured discussed his options in person with an Allstate representative, but that he had also received numerous forms, identical to the forms in this case, reminding him of Allstate’s enhanced PIP coverage. In addition, the insurance policy, like the policy at issue here, contained a detailed explanation of Allstate’s enhanced PIP -6- coverage options. We explained that under Colorado law, “[i]n the final analysis, the sufficiency of the offer must be resolved under the totality of the circumstances.” Hill, 479 F.3d at 742 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Parfrey, 830 P.2d 905, 914 (Colo. 1992)) (quotations omitted). We reiterate that holding here. The No Fault Act did not require insurance companies to exhaustively explain every facet of enhanced PIP coverage and every conceivable scenario under which such coverage might be desirable. It “merely required that the insured be given enough information to advise the insured of the availability of coverage and permit a reasonably informed decision on whether to purchase it.” Id. at 742-43 (quotation omitted). We agree with the district court that the facts of this case mandated summary judgment in favor of Allstate. Mr. Wobst argues repeatedly that his case is different from Hill because there is no conclusive evidence that an Allstate representative met with his mother in person to explain the enhanced PIP options. But we have already held that a face-to-face meeting is not required in order for an offer to be found in compliance with the No Fault Act. See Reid, 499 F.3d at 1165, 1169 (upholding sufficiency of offer where policy was purchased over the telephone and subsequent offer was made in writing); see also Jewett v. Amer. Standard Ins. Co., No. 06CA1523, ___ P.3d ___, 2007 WL 3025286, at  (Colo. Ct. App. Oct. 18, 2007) (upholding sufficiency of enhanced PIP offer even -7- though insurance policy was purchased over the telephone “where [additional] PIP may or may not have been fully discussed”). We also reject Mr. Wobst’s argument attacking the sufficiency of Allstate’s offer based on the four-year time lapse between when his parents last received a copy of their policy and the date of the accident. We fail to see the relevance of this point since the Wobsts conceded (1) that they had in their possession a policy that explained Allstate’s enhanced PIP coverage options; and (2) that they received multiple notices between 1998 and 2002, which reminded them of such coverage and referred them to their policy. Simply put, the mere fact that Allstate last sent a copy of the policy four years before Mr. Wobst’s accident did not constitute a violation of the No Fault Act. B. Inaccuracies in the Alstar Program and Written Materials Mr. Wobst also takes issue with Allstate’s representatives’ use of the Alstar computer program to explain enhanced PIP coverage. He contends that the program itself created a fact issue as to whether Allstate’s offer was sufficient because it was rife with inaccuracies. For example, he contends that it erroneously provided that Allstate’s work-loss benefit under the enhanced PIP options was payable for only 52 weeks when the benefit was actually unlimited in duration. We are not persuaded, however, that the presence of such technical inaccuracies was sufficient to remove Allstate’s offer from the realm of -8- reasonableness required under Colorado law. We reached this identical conclusion in the face of very similar arguments in Hill: While Hill argues there were specific arguably ambiguous phrases and/or wordings in the various documents, it is impossible to conclude that, from all the above information, the [insureds] were unable to make a reasonably informed decision not to purchase the extended PIP coverage. 479 F.3d at 743. Notwithstanding the glitches in the Alstar program utilized in this case or the other ambiguities that Mr. Wobst has identified in the policy itself, we conclude that Allstate’s offer of enhanced PIP satisfied the requirements of Parfrey. C. Effect of Allstate’s Coverage Before Brennan In 1998, the Colorado Court of Appeals held that extended PIP benefits purchased pursuant to § 10-4-710 must include pedestrians among the category of injured persons entitled to coverage. Brennan v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 961 P.2d 550, 552 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998). The court further held that “when . . . an insurer fails to offer the insured optional coverage that satisfies the No-Fault Act, additional coverage in conformity with the offer mandated by statute will be incorporated into the policy.” Id. at 554. After Brennan, Allstate, along with other insurers, reformed its policies to include pedestrians as covered individuals for purposes of enhanced PIP coverage. Allstate conceded in response to Mr. Wobst’s interrogatory requests that “following the decision in Brennan, [it] changed its claims practices to pay appropriate benefits to eligible injured persons -9- as defined in the decision.” Aplt. App. at 570. We recently clarified that reformation under Brennan and the No Fault Act is required when the insurer not only failed to offer the coverage mandated by the Act, but also subsequently denied coverage to which the injured person was clearly entitled. Hill, 479 F.3d at 740-41. Mr. Wobst argues that he is entitled to reformation based on Allstate’s concession that, in violation of the Act, it did not always pay enhanced PIP benefits to injured pedestrians. This argument fails for at least two reasons. First, it is immaterial to Mr. Wobst’s claims whether Allstate violated the No Fault Act with respect to its policies issued before 1998. The policy under which he was insured expressly provided that, in the event of a conflict, coverage in compliance with “the minimum requirements of the law of the state [would] apply.” Aplt. App. at 257. More importantly, his policy was reformed after Brennan to remove any limitations on the recovery of enhanced PIP benefits by pedestrians. Under these circumstances, we have held that reformation is simply unwarranted. Stickley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 1070, 1079-80 (10th Cir. 2007). Second, even if we were to conclude that Mr. Wobst’s policy violated the No Fault Act, as we explained in Stickley, “only the defective portion of the policy [would be] reformed to comply with [the Act].” 505 F.3d at 1080; see also Wilson v. Titan Indem. Co., No. 06-1431, ___F.3d ___, 2007 WL 4171598, at  (10th Cir. Nov. 27, 2007) (rejecting plaintiff’s reformation claim -10- based on Stickley). We would not “wipe the slate clean and give [Mr. Wobst] the fullest amount of benefits available for every category possible.” Stickley, 505 F.3d at 1080. Thus, putting aside the other problems with this argument, reformation of Mr. Wobst’s insurance policy to include the highest possible PIP benefits for pedestrians still would not benefit him, as he is not claiming coverage as a pedestrian. Like the plaintiff in Stickley, “[t]he only defect [Mr. Wobst] can claim is that [his parents] [were] never offered enhanced PIP benefits at all.” Id. We have already rejected this argument, however, having concluded that Allstate’s offer satisfied the requirements of § 10-4-710(2)(a).