Opinion ID: 1749674
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the trial court err in refusing to admit into evidence the complete hospital records of appellee?

Text: Appellant's first proposition revolves around certain hospital records concerning an injury to appellee which occurred on December 23, 1978, just prior to the fishing expedition when appellee injured his knee. From the Singing River Hospital records, it is apparent appellee was admitted to the emergency room, apparently intoxicated, after having been found passed out, with a contusion to the lateral parietal area and to the superior portion of the left ear. He was admitted for observation for a possible cerebral concussion. However, he left the hospital before being seen by a doctor, against medical advice. Laboratory studies showed a blood alcohol content of .4%. Final diagnosis was listed as acute alcohol intoxication, probable cerebral concussion syndrome, mild. Although there is really no dispute that this fall had anything to do with appellee's knee injury, appellant offered this evidence to show that appellee was more prone to fall following a cerebral concussion. Also, the evidence would have served for some impeachment value because appellee denied he was injured or hospitalized on this date. An objection to the admission of the records was sustained on medical privilege grounds as well as being irrelevant and immaterial to the lawsuit. Communications between a patient and physician are privileged by Mississippi Code Annotated section 13-1-21 (Supp. 1981). A waiver may occur at the instance of the patient or his personal representative following his death. A waiver of the privilege also occurs where a plaintiff in a personal injury suit voluntarily exhibits the injured portions of his body to the jury for inspection. In Teche Lines, Inc. v. Bounds, 182 Miss. 638, 179 So. 747 (1938), this Court stated: Appellee says, however, that the court was in error in ordering the examination and that the testimony of the specialist should, therefore, be disregarded; that the order is not sustained by the holding of this court in Dixie Greyhound Lines, Inc., v. Matthews, 177 Miss. 103, 170 So. 686. In that case, at page 115 of 177 Miss., 170 So. 686, 688, the court quoted, with approval, as follows: An examination of the cases will show that the courts have uniformly held that, where a plaintiff in a personal injury suit voluntarily exhibits the injured part of his body to the jury for inspection, the portion of his body so exhibited becomes an exhibit in the case, like any other object or thing introduced in evidence, and the opposite party has the right to make such inspection of it as will enable him to explain, criticize, or impeach its value as evidence, and to that end have it examined by experts. The other approved quotations in the opinion are to the same effect. That opinion was prepared after a long and most thorough consideration by the entire court, and we will not take it to pieces by technical refinement of argument in subsequent cases. (183 Miss. at 647-48, 179 So. at 749) See also Dennis v. Prisock, 254 Miss. 574, 181 So.2d 125 (1965); and Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Matthews, 177 Miss. 103, 170 So. 686 (1936). By exhibiting his knee to the jury, appellee waived any medical privilege as to that portion of his body. However, no such waiver occurred as to any treatment appellee may have received to other portions of his body. When the records were proffered and Dr. Enger was questioned by the court, the following colloquy transpired: BY THE COURT: I am asking him, though, can he testify as to the probability that the head injury on December 23rd had anything to do with the subsequent fall or alleged fall and injury on the 30th. Is there any way you could testify to that? BY THE WITNESS: I could not give it in a real percentage ... to make it a real possibility. (emphasis added.) Any connection between the two incidents was very speculative. Therefore, the admission of the records would have been more prejudicial than probative in value. Furthermore, appellee was not examined by a physician on December 23, 1978, but left the hospital before being treated, against medical advice. The hospital records concerning the December 23, 1978, injury were, therefore, properly excluded.