Opinion ID: 498002
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Process Afforded Sheley

Text: 17 The second part of our inquiry entails determining whether the process afforded Sheley satisfied the minimum requirements of the due process clause. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 472, 103 S.Ct. at 871. An inmate facing disciplinary charges for misconduct must be accorded 24 hours' advance written notice of the charges against him, a right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in defense unless so doing would jeopardize institutional safety or correctional goals, the aid of a staff member or inmate in presenting a defense provided the inmate charged with misconduct is illiterate or the issues are complex, an impartial tribunal, and a written statement of the reasons relied upon by the tribunal. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-72, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978-82, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974). In contrast, an inmate facing a transfer to administrative segregation pending completion of an investigation of misconduct charges against him need only be given an informal, nonadversary review. He must merely receive some notice of the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the prison officials charged with deciding whether to transfer him to administrative segregation. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476, 103 S.Ct. at 874 (emphasis added). The decision-maker in such a case must review the charges and then-available evidence against the [inmate]. Id. 18 Sheley was initially placed in CM in March of 1975, and has remained there for the past twelve years. Unlike the inmate in Hewitt, Sheley is not challenging the procedures employed in initially placing him in CM. Rather, he attacks as unconstitutional the procedures used by the Florida Department of Corrections in reviewing his lengthy, uninterrupted, and potentially indefinite 5 segregation in CM. 19 To determine whether Sheley was denied due process, we must apply a three-part balancing test in which we weigh the private interests at stake in a governmental decision, the governmental interests involved, and the value of procedural requirements. Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 473, 103 S.Ct. at 872 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976)). Dicta in Hewitt alludes to the process required in the type of situation involved in this case: 20 Of course, administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of such inmates. This review will not necessarily require that prison officials permit the submission of any additional evidence or statements. The decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk will be based on facts relating to a particular prisoner--which will have been ascertained when determining to confine the inmate to administrative segregation--and on the officials' general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are singularly unsuited for proof in any highly structured manner. 21 Id. 459 U.S. at 477 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. at 874 n. 9. 22 In Mims v. Shapp, 744 F.2d 946 (3d Cir.1984), an inmate who had been kept in administrative confinement 6 for five years alleged that his continued confinement in segregated quarters violated his due process rights. The prison authorities had reviewed the inmate's segregation status every thirty days, and had consistently recommended that the inmate remain in segregation for another thirty days. The prison warden had approved the recommendations every time. Id. at 949, 952. After stating that the language in Hewitt concerning the review of continued administrative confinement was instructive, the Third Circuit applied the three-part Mathews test and held that the monthly reviews had afforded the inmate due process. 7 The court found that the state had a heightened governmental interest in safety given the inmate's two murders, and that the inmate, because of the potentially limitless duration of administrative segregation, had a more significant liberty interest for due process analysis than that attributed to the prisoner in Hewitt. Id. at 951-52. It recognized that determining the adequacy of the periodic review procedures [was] a difficult task, and emphasized the narrowness of its holding by stating that it was strongly influenced by the specific conduct of the inmate ... which heightened the governmental interest in restricting his liberty. Id. at 952. 23 In addition to the Third Circuit, other courts have addressed the adequacy of review procedures for continued administrative confinement. See Toussaint, 801 F.2d at 1101 (annual review of prisoner's administrative confinement status did not satisfy due process); Clark, 776 F.2d at 234 (conducting a hearing every seven days for the first two months of administrative confinement and monthly reviews thereafter satisfied due process). 24 Sheley's situation is unlike that of the inmates in Toussaint, Mims, or Clark. The inmates in Mims and Clark were released from administrative confinement after five years and seven years respectively. See 776 F.2d at 229; 744 F.2d at 948-49. Toussaint involved a class action on behalf of 2,000 prisoners confined in administrative segregation in four California state prisons. See Toussaint v. Yockey, 722 F.2d 1490, 1491 (9th Cir.1984). Sheley is into his twelfth year in CM, and he alleges that since 1977 the reviewing teams have not relied on any new evidence to keep him segregated. This raises the possibility that Sheley is being disciplined for prior conduct. As we have previously stated, we think it self-evident that the State of Florida cannot, by merely attaching the label of administrative segregation to its actions, transform what is in substance disciplinary action subject to due process restrictions into administrative action outside the purview of the due process clause. Parker, 642 F.2d at 875. 8 25 Even if his segregation is not punitive in nature, Sheley's due process claim must be evaluated on its own facts. The requirements of due process are flexible and variable dependent upon the particular situation being examined. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 12, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2105, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). 26 Unfortunately, on the basis of the record before us, we cannot address Sheley's procedural due process claims. Because the state decided to provide only a representative sample of the review of Sheley's confinement in CM, see Response to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Record, Vol. 2 at Tab 12, the record is not sufficiently complete or specific with regard to the review that Sheley received. In its present form, the record indicates that Sheley's status was reviewed thirty-three times in a ten-year period, that Sheley was interviewed by somebody on twenty-two of those occasions, that the classification team recommended on five occasions that Sheley be returned to the general prison population, and that all five of those recommendations were denied. Record, Vol. 1, Tab 12 at A112-A146. Although the record does not indicate that monthly reviews took place, a report dated January 23, 1984 states that Sheley's case has been reviewed on a monthly basis. If monthly reviews have taken place, however, it is unclear when they began. A reclassification and progress report dated May 15, 1975 states that Sheley's next review was scheduled for November of 1975, six months later, and a report dated June 14, 1976 states that Sheley's next review was scheduled for May of 1977, eleven months later. Record, Vol. 2, Tab 12 at A117-A120. In any event, Sheley alleges that he was not present at the reviews and did not receive notice of them, that he did not have an opportunity to present arguments on his behalf, and that the assignment team denied the recommendations that he be removed from CM without holding a hearing or explaining its reasons. Petitioner's Brief at 8-12, 17. The latest correspondence between Sheley and prison officials indicates that Sheley was told in May of 1986 that the assignment team would review his CM status in September of 1986. Although Sheley was kept in CM, it is unclear from the correspondence whether Sheley saw any of the assignment team members when his case was reviewed at that time. Supp. Record, Vol. 1 at 4. Given the possibility that Sheley may remain in CM for the rest of his prison sentence, we cannot adjudge his procedural due process claim on the incomplete and apparently conflicting record before us. 27 We therefore remand the case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing. See Demps v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 1426, 1433 (11th Cir.1986) (a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing to a habeas petitioner if the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved at the state hearing, the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole, or the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing). Now that Sheley has appointed counsel who can undertake discovery, the district court can provide the parties with a meaningful evidentiary hearing if the case cannot be disposed of through summary judgment. 9 28 C. Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection 29 Sheley alleges that the arbitrary actions of the prison officials in keeping him in CM violated his substantive due process rights. He also claims that he was denied equal protection because other prisoners with worse disciplinary records had been released from CM after much shorter periods of confinement. Because these two claims appear to be intertwined with the procedural due process claim, the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing on the procedural due process claim will be relevant to them. We therefore do not address the substantive due process and equal protection claims at this time. D. Cruel and Unusual Punishment 1. Sheley's Allegations 30 Sheley contends that his continuous confinement in CM status for twelve years constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. He asserts that CM is essentially punitive, that the length of his confinement in CM is entirely disproportionate to any offense he may have committed, and that the conditions of confinement in CM inflict unnecessary pain and suffering. He alleges that he is completely idle in CM, and that this isolation has resulted in mental and physical deterioration. Sheley asserts that CM inmates are confined to their cells, which are approximately six feet by eight feet, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week except for a five-minute shower three times a week, limited out-side exercise, if any, and an occasional call out. He claims that it is difficult to get needed medical attention, that access to legal material is minimal, that visits are severely restricted, and that he cannot have a job or participate in vocational programs. He also claims that his canteen and money-withdrawal privileges are restricted, that he is not permitted to have a radio or television, and that he is ineligible for parole. 31 The state does not challenge Sheley's factual assertions. In fact, the pertinent Florida administrative rules indicate that Sheley's claims about the conditions of confinement in CM are fairly accurate, except that the rules provide for daily access to medical care, access to legal materials, and out-of-cell exercise for two hours per week. See Fla.Admin.Code Ann. Sec. 33-3.0083 (Supp.1985). 2. Eighth Amendment Standards 32 The Eighth Amendment prescribes punishment that shocks the conscience, offends society's evolving notions of decency or is grossly disproportionate to the offense. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2570-71, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). It also forbids inflictions of pain which are  'totally without penological justification.'  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). 33 It is clear that administrative segregation and solitary confinement do not, in and of themselves, constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686, 98 S.Ct. at 2571. Because Sheley apparently has adequate food, clothing, and sanitation, the conditions of his confinement in CM do not on their face violate the Eighth Amendment. See Dorrough v. Hogan, 563 F.2d 1259 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 850, 99 S.Ct. 153, 58 L.Ed.2d 153 (1978); cf. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283, 291 (5th Cir.1977) (state's obligations under Eighth Amendment end if it furnishes its prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 57 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978) (per curiam). 34 The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding whether the confinement meets constitutional standards. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 686, 98 S.Ct. at 2571. 10 In reviewing the Eighth Amendment claims of prisoners confined in segregation, federal courts of appeals have recognized that the length of time in isolation is a factor which must be considered. See, e.g., Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 614 (7th Cir.1980); Sweet v. South Carolina Dept. of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861 (4th Cir.1975) (en banc); O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941, 944 (1st Cir.1974). As the First Circuit recently stated, 35 Although depression, hopelessness, frustration, and other such psychological states may well prove to be inevitable by products of lifelong incarceration, the threat of substantial serious and possibly irreversible if not critical psychological illness together with prolonged or indefinite segregated confinement would increase the burden on prison authorities to explore feasible alternative custodial arrangements. 36 Jackson v. Meachum, 699 F.2d 578, 584-85 (1st Cir.1983). Similar concerns were voiced by the Ninth Circuit: 37 The deprivations associated with an institutional lock-up, including twenty-four hour confinement, and curtailment of all association, exercise and normal vocational and educational activity, may constitute a due process violation, as well as a violation of the Eighth Amendment, if they persist too long. 38 Pepperling v. Crist, 678 F.2d 787, 789 (9th Cir.1982); see also Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416-17 (7th Cir.1987) (it is more troubling to extend a holding that prisoners in administrative confinement do not have the same right of access to vocational, academic, and rehabilitation programs as regular prisoners do to an inmate who is required to serve a thirty-five year sentence in segregation); Sweet, 529 F.2d at 866 (restriction of two one-hour exercise periods each week for prisoners in segregation may transgress the Eighth Amendment if the restriction has extended over a period of years [three and a half] and is likely to extend indefinitely for the balance of plaintiff's confinement). 39 Sheley's case is unique because of his long period of segregation. While we have been hesitant in the past to apply the Eighth Amendment to claims of physical and mental deterioration by prisoners in the general prison population, see Newman, 559 F.2d at 291, Sheley's twelve-year confinement in CM raises serious constitutional questions. In addition to the mental and physical deterioration he alleges, Sheley's Eighth Amendment claim is supported, at this stage of the litigation, by his contention that his confinement in CM is punitive in nature. If the segregation is punitive, it should be determined whether it shocks the conscience, is grossly disproportionate to the offense, or is totally without penological justification. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346, 101 S.Ct. at 2399; Hutto, 437 U.S. at 685, 98 S.Ct. at 2570-71. 40 As with Sheley's other claims, however, we cannot decide the Eighth Amendment issue at this time. Because no evidence on the Eighth Amendment claim has been presented, we remand to the district court for an evidentiary hearing at which both sides may present evidence on the reasons for Sheley's segregation, the conditions in CM, the effects of long-term confinement in CM, the psychological evaluations (if any) that Sheley has received, and the possibility of feasible alternatives. 11 See Demps, 805 F.2d at 1433; see also Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 417 (it was premature for the district court to dismiss the Eighth Amendment claims of an inmate facing prolonged confinement in segregation without ascertaining the actual conditions of [the inmate's] confinement and the existence of any feasible alternatives); cf. Sweet, 529 F.2d at 866 (We accordingly feel constrained because of the extended period of time of plaintiff's confinement in maximum security to remand the case to the district court in order that it may take additional testimony and consider in greater detail whether the health of the plaintiff may be adversely affected by the restricted exercise rights accorded him.).