Opinion ID: 2519770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Probability of Prevailing

Text: As noted, no cause of action qualifies as a SLAPP merely because the defendant's actions conceptually fall within the ambit of the statute's initial prong. Despite the fact Sletten has made a threshold showing that plaintiffs' action is one arising from statutorily protected activity, plaintiffs may defeat the anti-SLAPP motion by establishing a probability of prevailing on their claim. (See generally Equilon, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 63, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 507, 52 P.3d 685.) [11] The trial court denied Sletten's anti-SLAPP motion in a minute order stating simply that the motion was denied, issuing no other statement of decision. In affirming, the Court of Appeal opined that the complaint is not subject to section 425.16 and expressly refrained from reaching the question whether plaintiffs had demonstrated a probability of prevailing. However, because plaintiffs' action arises from statutorily protected activity, the complaint is potentially subject to section 425.16. Accordingly, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal. But because the Court of Appeal did not consider whether plaintiffs have established a probability of prevailing (§ 425.16, subd. (b)), we shall remand the cause to permit the court to address that question in the first instance. On reconsideration, therefore, the Court of Appeal should consider whether plaintiffs' fraud and contract claims have the minimal merit required to survive an anti-SLAPP motion.