Opinion ID: 845997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: aftermath

Text: State courts, consistently with Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker, have held that that the Sixth Amendment bars the use of judicially ascertained facts to increase a defendant's sentence only when that sentence is increased beyond the statutory maximum. For example, the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in State v. Abdullah, 184 N.J. 497, 878 A.2d 746 (2005), that the applicability of Blakely hinges on the question whether the trial court uses judicially ascertained facts to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum. In Abdullah, the defendant was convicted of murder and two counts of second-degree burglary. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a 30-year parole disqualifier on the murder conviction and to a consecutive ten-year prison term with a five-year parole disqualifier on the burglary convictions. Under New Jersey law, a defendant convicted of burglary is entitled to a presumptive sentence of seven years. Id. at 503, 878 A.2d 746. Because the defendant was entitled to no more than the seven-year sentence for burglary on the basis of the jury's verdict alone, imposition of the ten-year sentence on the basis of judicially ascertained facts was incompatible with the holdings in [ Apprendi, Blakely, and Booker ]. Id. at 505, 878 A.2d 746 (citation omitted). On the other hand, the court noted that there is no presumptive term for murder. Id. at 504, 878 A.2d 746. [B]ecause the crime of murder has no presumptive term, defendant, like every murderer, knows he is risking life in prison. Id. at 508, 878 A.2d 746 (citation omitted). Thus, the upper sentencing limit based on the jury's verdict alone was life imprisonment. Accordingly, the murder sentence was not in derogation of the Sixth Amendment. See also State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 931, 104 P.3d 969 (2005) (stating that [t]he Blakely Court recognized that an indeterminate sentencing system does not violate the Sixth Amendment); State v. Rivera, 106 Hawai`i 146, 157, 102 P.3d 1044 (2004) (noting that the Blakely majority's declaration that indeterminate sentencing does not abrogate the jury's traditional factfinding function effectively excises indeterminate sentencing schemes such as Hawaii's from the decision's sixth amendment analysis); Commonwealth v. Junta, 62 Mass.App.Ct. 120, 129 n. 11, 815 N.E.2d 254 (2004) (finding that [t]he recent United States Supreme Court decision in [ Blakely ] has no application here, as the Massachusetts sentencing scheme provides for indeterminate sentences). The courts in Pennsylvania, a state with a sentencing scheme bearing a strong resemblance to Michigan's, have also held that the use of judicially ascertained facts to increase a defendant's minimum sentence is permitted by the Sixth Amendment. The Pennsylvania Superior Court addressed the implications of Blakely on its sentencing scheme in Commonwealth v. Smith, 863 A.2d 1172 (Pa.Super., 2004). In Smith, the defendant claimed that Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme violated Blakely, because it allowed a trial court to use judicially ascertained facts to increase the defendant's minimum sentence. The court rejected this claim, noting that Pennsylvania utilizes an indeterminate sentencing scheme with presumptive sentencing guidelines which limit the judge's discretion only concerning the minimum sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721; 204 Pa.Code § 303.9(h). The United States Supreme Court has previously determined that this system does not violate the Sixth Amendment so long as the enhanced minimum sentence is not beyond that authorized by the jury verdict. [ Harris, supra ]. Because of the link with the maximum sentence, enhanced minimum sentences, when enhanced by factors in the guidelines, are not beyond sentences authorized by the jury verdict. [ McMillan, supra ]. Blakely is only implicated in Pennsylvania to the extent that an enhanced minimum term leads to a longer period of incarceration by extending the date at which the defendant is eligible to be released. Yet, because there is no limit, other than the statutory maximum, on the maximum term a judge may set, and due to the discretion vested in the parole board, the Pennsylvania sentencing scheme and guidelines evade even these Blakely concerns. The Blakely Court, itself, noted that indeterminate guidelines do not increase judicial discretion at the expense of the jury's function of finding the facts essential to a lawful imposition of penalty, and judicial (or parole board) factfinding does not infringe on a defendant's legal right to a lesser sentence. Blakely [ supra at 309, 124 S.Ct. 2531]. Here, the trial court did not employ an enhancement provision based on a judicially determined fact, but instead, imposed its sentence pursuant to the discretion provided it under the sentencing code and the sentencing guidelines. The sentence was proper under the code and the guidelines, and the guidelines, themselves, are constitutional under Blakely. [ Smith, supra at 1178-1179.]