Opinion ID: 773009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restrictions on Computer Use and Internet Access

Text: 14 In our view, the broad restrictions on Peterson's computer ownership and Internet access are not reasonably related, 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b), to the nature and circumstances of the offense or Peterson's history and characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Nor are they reasonably necessary to the broad sentencing purposes indicated in § 3553(a)(2). See 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b). The government does not argue that the computer and Internet restrictions were related to the offense of conviction. Rather, the government contends, and the district court found, that these restrictions were reasonably related to Peterson's prior incest conviction. We do not deny that a relationship exists, but we find that the condition is neither reasonably related to that conviction nor reasonably necessary to the sentencing objectives. 15 We believe the breadth of the restrictions on computer and Internet use made those restrictions excessive. The computer/Internet restrictions prohibit the defendant outright from possessing or using a computer that includes either a modem, an Internet account, a mass storage device, or a writable or re-writable CD Rom. Computers and Internet access have become virtually indispensable in the modern world of communications and information gathering. The fact that a computer with Internet access offers the possibility of abusive use for illegitimate purposes does not, at least in this case, justify so broad a prohibition. See United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir.2001) (computer restriction which would bar [defendant] from using a computer at a library to do any research, get a weather forecast, or read a newspaper online was excessively broad). Although a defendant might use the telephone to commit fraud, this would not justify a condition of probation that includes an absolute bar on the use of telephones. Nor would defendant's proclivity toward pornography justify a ban on all books, magazines, and newspapers. We believe this restriction was overbroad and therefore was not reasonably related to Peterson's offense or his history and characteristics. 16 Nor is the ban on computer or Internet use reasonably necessary to protect the public or Peterson's family from future crimes, or to any of the numerous broad sentencing grounds set forth in § 3553(a)(2). There is no indication that Peterson's past incest offense had any connection to computers or to the Internet. Cf. United States v. Crandon, 173 F.3d 122, 127-128 (3d Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's condition of supervised release restricting Internet access where the defendant met a fourteen-year old girl over the Internet and used her in the creation of child pornography). 17 Our conclusion is further reinforced by the Sentencing Guidelines provision that permits a district court to impose an occupational restriction-a restriction prohibiting the defendant from engaging in a specified occupation, business, or profession, or limiting the terms on which the defendant may do so-as a condition of probation only if it determines that: (1) a reasonably direct relationship existed between the defendant's occupation... and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and (2) imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted. U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3563(b)(5). Cf. Doe, 79 F.3d at 1319 ([W]e carefully scrutinize unusual and severe conditions, such as one requiring the defendant to give up a lawful livelihood. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 18 Here, the special condition of probation imposed by the District Court constituted an occupational restriction. In addition to the broad prohibition on possession or use of computer equipment, the condition prohibits Peterson from using commercial computer systems/services for employment purposes without a probation officer's permission. The categorically banned items include technology that Peterson would likely need to hold any computer-related job (i.e., a modem; Internet account; writable or re-writable CD Rom; tape backup or removable mass storage device; device/appliance that can be used to connect to the Internet; digital camera; [and] CDs (other than original manufacturer's software distribution)). Ante at 81-82 2 . Peterson has consistently worked in computer-related jobs and, beginning in May 1997, operated his own computer business. Nothing in the record suggests that the Internet and computer restrictions are reasonably necessary, U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5(a)(2), to protect the public or to deter Peterson from continuing to engage in the conduct for which he was convicted, i.e., bank larceny based on payments made with bad checks. See Doe, 79 F.3d at 1322 (holding that the district court erred in imposing an occupational restriction because the record had not established that there [was] reason to believe that, without such a restriction, the defendant [would] continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which he was convicted, and that such a restriction [was], therefore, reasonably necessary to protect the public). We conclude that the special condition related to Peterson's use of computer equipment was unreasonably broad and categorical. In our view it cannot be sustained in such broad form.