Opinion ID: 1694090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: LAW Authority of Forrest County Chancery Court

Text: Insofar as two utilities were concerned, Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-5 is applicable. The pertinent portions state: ... The public service commission shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over the intrastate business and property of public utilities. On the date the Forrest County Chancery Court action was begun, August 6, 1982, Mississippi Power's 1980 rate case had been heard and decided by the Commission, reviewed on appeal by the Hinds County Chancery Court, and a 16-volume record was on appeal before this Court. Also, on this date the Mississippi Public Service Commission had assumed original jurisdiction of the other two rate cases, and they were in progress, being heard and considered by the Commission. The consumer objectors, representing the same class which Mrs. Goudy is supposed to represent in the Forrest County action, indeed, in one case she appeared herself, did very well before the Commission. The Commission denied the utilities any relief in both cases. By the time the Chancery Court of Forrest County considered the merits of the motion to dismiss, both these 1982 rate cases had been heard and considered by the Commission, and were before the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County on appeal, the only court authorized by statute to hear the appeal, Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-67. Under this section the Chancery Court of Hinds County upon appeal is specifically authorized to vacate the Commission's order if it violates constitutional rights. [2] Some eyebrows might be raised at the intrepidity of the Legal Services Coalition, while fighting a battle in one forum, simultaneously trotting 100 miles down the road and trying another facet of the same case in another forum. This may appear an unnecessary drain upon the already taxed and burdened case loads of our court system. The question of the Chancery Court's jurisdiction in Forrest County should have been bluntly and vigorously contested at the threshold  the front door of the Forrest County action. In fairness to the chancellor the following should be noted: While defense counsel raised the issue of jurisdiction in their answers and motions to dismiss, in their amalgamated wisdom they did not choose to press the matter in the trial court. Their presentation at most was tepid. The discombobulated gentlemen have seen fit to repair this defect in assiduity in their brief on appeal. The issue is now clearly before this Court. It is also clear the Forrest County Chancery Court should never have heard this case. The constitutional issue in the Forrest County Chancery Court suit should have been first addressed to the Commission, and it should have been addressed to the Hinds County Chancery Court, and finally to this Court considering these rate cases on appeal from the Hinds County Chancery Court. It was the function and responsibility of the Hinds County Chancery Court to hear the very constitutional questions raised in the Forrest County Chancery Court action. The same class of individuals were before the Hinds County Chancery Court. Long ago, the United States Supreme Court stated in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Illinois Central Railroad Company, 215 U.S. 452, 470, 30 S.Ct. 155, 160, 54 L.Ed. 280, 288: Beyond controversy, in determining whether an order of the Commission shall be suspended or set aside, we must consider (a) all relevant questions of constitutional power or right. ..... Aside from the specific statutory mandate of Miss. Code Ann. § 77-3-67, this Court also stated long ago in Dixie Lines v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 190 Miss. 704, 713, 200 So. 579, 580: That a court of competent jurisdiction has the power to review any order made by an administrative commission whether it ... violates some statutory or constitutional right of an interested party, is so well settled as not to be open to any doubt. Before foolishly permitting this skipping around and fighting the same battle (or different features of the same battle) in disparate forums, we might consider that two can tango. This time it was the consumer and her exemplary counsel. The next time it might be the utility company. Indeed, this same thing was tried, the shoe was in fact on the other foot, and we did not permit it. In Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 220 Miss. 439, 71 So.2d 176 (1954), the railroad desired to terminate passenger service on its lines, and after a hearing, the Commission ordered the railroad to continue its service. No appeal from the Commission order was taken. Instead, the railroad tried without success in the Chancery Courts of Harrison and Hinds counties to get a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the Commission's order. While getting temporary injunctions in both courts, they were later dissolved, the railroad was denied any permanent relief in the Chancery Courts. An appeal was taken from the decree of the Hinds County Chancery Court dissolving the temporary injunction and denying any relief. Upon appeal to this Court, one of the Assignments of Error of the railroad was that the order of the Commission amounted to taking the railroad's property without due process of law in violation of the United States and our state constitutions. In affirming we stated the following at p. 445 of the 220 Mississippi Reports, p. 177 of 71 Southern Second: We have given the case long and thorough consideration and have concluded the Railroad did have a plain, adequate and complete remedy by appeal from the order of the Commission, to which resort was not had, and for that reason the present bill was not maintainable. P. 448-49, 71 So.2d p. 179 In other words, the Commission is vested with extensive administrative and judicial powers in the adoption and enforcement of its administrative orders, and in the ajudication of its judicial functions, it necessarily has power to pass upon judicial questions, and the vested legal and constitutional rights of the parties, such as are involved in the case at bar  that is to say the extent of its power to require the operation of the two trains here involved, whether its orders deny the carrier the due process of law under the facts of the case, and whether public convenience and necessity require appellant to make available such passenger service. And on appeal to the Circuit Court that tribunal has the power to view the findings and actions of the Commission, affirm, reverse, amend or change them, and from this action an appeal may be taken to this Court, where the actions, findings, and proceedings of both the Commission and the trial judge may be reviewed, affirmed, altered, remanded and changed, and from which action, where a Federal question is involved, appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States for such review by that Court. From this it is seen, we think, that the remedy of appellant, thus set out, is adequate and complete. [Emphasis added] P. 451, 71 So.2d p. 180 However, every question presented in this proceeding could have been raised and passed upon had the procedure by appeal prescribed by the statute been followed ... It is our opinion that the statutory method of appeal, theretofore set out, afforded appellant a plain, adequate, speedy, and complete remedy for a judicial determination of all the rights of appellant and all of the questions here involved. See also: West Brothers, Inc. v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 186 So.2d 202 (Miss. 1966); Everitt v. Lovitt, 192 So.2d 422 (Miss. 1966). In the case of Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. v. Lankford, 278 Ark. 595, 648 S.W.2d 65 (1983), the Arkansas Supreme Court faced the same question on jurisdiction as in this case. The electric company, following a hearing before the Arkansas Public Service Commission had a rate increase approved in part. The consumer respondents did not seek to intervene or request a hearing before the public service commission in Arkansas, but later filed an original complaint in Circuit Court. This was a class action suit for a declaratory judgment filed by the respondents as customers and rate payers of the electric company. The electric company filed a motion to dismiss, denied by the trial court, and the electric company then sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Arkansas against the Circuit Court exercising jurisdiction in this case. The Arkansas Supreme Court held there was no concurrent jurisdiction in the Circuit Court to exercise jurisdiction with the public service commission when there was a complete and adequate remedy by an application to the public service commission. The court stated, p. 66: Here, ... respondents had a full, adequate, and complete remedy by intervention in the proceedings before the PSC. At that time the PSC could have ruled on the constitutionality of Arkansas Statutes Annotated § 73-217 and the other issues which respondents are now raising. The PSC, in exercising its exclusive jurisdiction over rate setting, can also pass upon questions of law that are germane and incidental to its legislative acts. This case is really worse than the Arkansas case, because Mrs. Goudy's interest was represented by the same consumer class in the Bell rate increase, and she personally appeared in the power company rate increase case. Her counsel did not, either before the Commission, or on appeal to the Hinds County Chancery Court, seek to avail themselves of this constitutional protection sought in the Chancery Court of Forrest County. The above holdings are not simply abstract principles of law, but have compelling reasons to support them. The cost of operating the three-member Mississippi Public Service Commission for the past fiscal year was $3,099,855.00 (Chapter 157, Laws of 1982). [3] It is also common knowledge that the overwhelming portion of the time, effort and energy of the Commission and its personnel is spent on rate cases such as these three. They are complex, exhaustive, and as noted, cost the taxpayers of this state millions annually. It is the height of waste of time and money for the Commission to be engaged in one of these cases, hear and determine it, spending hundreds of thousands of taxpayer dollars, and while the case is on appeal, have one of the parties go into a separate forum and seek to litigate a key question which should have first been presented to the Commission, and then to the Chancery Court of Hinds County exercising appellate jurisdiction. Illustrative of this very observation is the monstrous anomaly we would create in affirming this case. On March 18, 1983, the Forrest County Chancery Court entered a judgment that Mississippi Power would have to repay all the increased rates it had charged since November 20, 1980. On appeal we decided on March 23, 1983, that 47.35% of the rate increase requested, or $18,611,256.00 annually would be approved. The Chancery Court of Forrest County, ignoring the fact this case was pending before us, entered judgment that any payments made violated state constitution, and should be refunded, and no further rate increase charged. This Court, unaware, of any such proceeding in the Forrest County Chancery Court, approved almost half the proposed rate increase. How can these two judgments possibly be reconciled? Again, why should this Court be called upon to straighten out this kind of mess, as to conflicting judgments, when the entire matter could have been avoided by presenting the constitutional issue before the Commission, and before the Hinds County Chancery Court, and then this Court?