Opinion ID: 4486921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Delayed Disposition

Text: ¶ 24. Parents next assert that the delays “created by the State” deprived them of their rights without due process and prejudiced the outcome of the case by mooting their objections to the case plan and their requests to return the children to their care. They argue that the State was not allowed to keep the children in custody pursuant to a temporary-care order for the length of time at issue here, and that the case therefore must be dismissed. Mother further asserts that parents were prejudiced by the court’s failure to adopt a case plan in a timely fashion. ¶ 25. We conclude that the court’s failure to enter a disposition order for two-and-a-half years after its merits order was error, but that in the specific circumstances of this case, the error was harmless. ¶ 26. As to the error, periodic status conferences are no substitute for the process provided for in our juvenile statutes, pursuant to which a merits determination is ordinarily followed by a disposition order, then regular post-disposition reviews by the court. Normative “convene and continue” events do not serve to advance the meaningful process contemplated by statute.4 Although, at any given juncture, further delay of the disposition hearing may have made sense under the circumstances, the collective effect of those incremental delays was a gap of two- 3 Undoubtedly, given the significance of the rights at issue and the provisions of 33 V.S.A. § 5315a(b)(2), the court must engage in meaningful colloquy to make sure that parents are aware of procedural rights that they are giving up as a result of a merits stipulation. However, because we conclude that the trial court’s acceptance of the parents’ CHINS stipulation was not plain error in the circumstances of this case, we decline to articulate a general rule establishing specific elements of a colloquy that the court must engage in or specific disclosures the court must make in considering a CHINS stipulation beyond the general statutory requirements. 4 Stated simply, chronic, “normative” continuances serve to compound delays in meaningful disposition in CHINS cases. See V.R.F.P. 2(b)(3) (“A hearing on the merits of a petition, or a disposition hearing, shall be continued only for good cause shown and found by the court.”). 10 and-a-half years between the trial court’s merits determination and its disposition order. Throughout that period, although the parties did have the benefit of a full panoply of supports and services, they did not have the benefit of a court-reviewed disposition plan. Whether these delays were manufactured by the State—and we reject parents’ contention that they were—or caused by the court, or just the result of well-intended decisions by the parties along the way, the potential prejudice to the parents’ and children’s ability to reunify is the same. The delay in this case was well beyond the pale, and we conclude that it amounted to error. ¶ 27. But we decline to reverse because we conclude the error was harmless. Specifically, we reject parents’ jurisdictional argument, and we conclude that parents in this case did not suffer prejudice as a result of the delays. The deficits parents needed to overcome were identified throughout the process and they had comprehensive services and supports throughout the period. We do not find a reasonable probability that the court would have returned conditional custody to parents had it issued a disposition order given that the deficits that led to removal of the children, and ultimately termination, persisted with little change throughout the duration of the case. ¶ 28. Parents’ assertion that the court lacked jurisdiction to maintain the children in DCF custody pursuant to the TCO through the course of these proceedings is inconsistent with our case law. “It is settled that juvenile proceedings should be resolved as quickly as is reasonably possible, but the time limits established by the governing statutes . . . are directory and not jurisdictional.” In re M.B., 158 Vt. 63, 67, 605 A.2d 515, 517 (1992) (quotation and citations omitted); see also In re D.D., 2013 VT 79, ¶ 24, 194 Vt. 508, 82 A.3d 1143 (noting that disposition “timeline is not mandatory”). ¶ 29. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that in this case, parents suffered no prejudice as a result of the delay in completing the disposition hearing and issuing a disposition order. First, the absence of an approved case plan through the course of this case did not create 11 notice issues for parents. The court’s termination order here was not based on any failure by parents to satisfy the expectations DCF laid out in the never-approved case plan; it was based on the court’s conclusion, among others, that the parents would not likely be able to resume parenting responsibilities in a reasonable time because of their failure to improve over the course of more than two years despite extensive DCF supports. See, e.g., In re G.L.C., No. 2018-091, 2018 WL 3913133, at  (Vt. Aug. 6, 2018) (unpub. mem.), https://www.vermontjudiciary.org/opinionsdecisions [https://perma.cc/XW9L-AERG] (noting that trial court’s analysis did not turn on mother’s failure to comply with any purported requirements imposed by DCF in not-yet-approved case plan but, rather, turned on mother’s failure to mitigate underlying problems that led to CHINS determination and child’s removal in the first place). Parents were on notice from the outset of— and throughout—this case of the parenting deficits that gave rise to state intervention. DCF’s case plan, the temporary-care order, and discussions at court conferences throughout this case made plain the parenting deficits the parents needed to address. The court’s termination decision did not introduce new, unanticipated considerations into the mix. ¶ 30. In addition, there is no credible claim here that, had the court issued a disposition order sooner, it would have called for services or supports for the parents that they did not have the opportunity to access. In fact, even in the temporary-care order, the court noted that DCF had been involved with the family for five years and had provided the parties with extensive support, including Family Time coaching, Nurturing Parents group, financial support, daycare, early education, counseling and regular treatment-team meetings. In terms of custody, the court found it difficult to determine what additional services DCF could provide to parents to keep the children in the home. ¶ 31. Nor do we accept parents’ argument that had the court held a timely disposition hearing it would have placed the children with parents pursuant to a CCO, thereby changing the course of this case. We are mindful of the trial court’s TCO findings, which led to removal of the 12 children in the first place. Not long after the CHINS merits hearing, following an unsupervised overnight visit with parents at their home, H.T. was found to have suspicious bruising on his body that was determined to be caused by abuse, with the perpetrator unknown. DCF suspended the unsupervised overnight visits, which never resumed. Several months later, mother obtained a temporary relief-from-abuse order against father based on allegations of domestic violence (at a time when the children were not present). The order was later vacated at mother’s request. In May 2018, mother gave birth to another child, greatly exacerbating the household chaos and parenting deficits that gave rise to state intervention. It is clear from the trial court’s analysis that the deficits that led the court to ultimately terminate parents’ rights existed throughout the case— from the time of the TCO through TPR. We cannot conclude on the basis of the court’s analysis and the record that, had the court completed a disposition hearing sooner, there is a reasonable probability it would have placed the children in parents’ care. ¶ 32. We further reject parents’ assertion that they were prejudiced by the delays because the court’s ultimate decision was based on the amount of time that had passed. In fact, as explained above, the court found that the delay gave parents additional time to show improvement. Despite being provided with such time, parents nonetheless failed to show “sustained, significant benefit from the education and support that they ha[d] been offered in how to parent the children.” While they received parent coaching for a very long time, for example, they still could not make sustained changes. The court described chronic problems that had continued without any significant abatement since 2014, including: chronic mess, clutter, dirt, insects, and unpleasant smells in the residence; parents’ yelling or talking very loudly both to one another and the children; their failure to provide a clear, consistent routine for visits; their inability to control M.L.’s, and later H.T.’s, tantrums; their failure to follow consistent rules and expectations for the children; their inability to effectively discipline the children; father’s apathetic and uninvolved attitude toward parenting and household chores; and parents’ attitude and practice of blaming and deflecting responsibility 13 onto others. The court also found that parents had never accepted full responsibility for having failed to provide proper parental care to the children at the time DCF first became involved with their family. It added that, among other things, parents also failed to effectively address the very disturbing allegations of family violence and controlling behavior by father that mother had made, under oath, in her June 2017 relief-from-abuse complaint. The court’s decision did not rest on the passage of time alone, but rather, the passage of time without progress.5