Opinion ID: 2977297
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defect in the Removal Proceedings

Text: It is well-settled that “[a]n IJ . . . shall administer oaths, present and receive evidence, interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien or witnesses.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b). However, this court has recognized that: Though “[t]he IJ is afforded broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth,” Mikhailevitch, [146 F.3d 384, 391 (6th Cir. 1998)] (internal quotation omitted), we have recognized that “[a] neutral judge is one of the most basic due process protections.” Reyes-Melendez v. INS, 342 F.3d 1001, 1006 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation omitted); see also Ahmed v. Gonzales, 398 F.3d 722, 725 (6th Cir. 2005) (“It is undisputed that petitioners in such proceedings are entitled to an unbiased arbiter who has not prejudged their claims.”). Vasha, 410 F.3d at 873. In Vasha, the court held that the IJ “crossed the line from impartial arbiter to government advocate” when, in reaching her decision, the IJ relied on evidence that she obtained from an off-the-record conversation with the court’s clerk that was not produced by the parties at the hearing. Conversely, in Mikhailevitch v. INS, 146 F.3d at 391, the court rejected the petitioner’s claim that he was denied due process because the IJ allegedly questioned him in an intimidating manner and prevented him from fully explaining instances of past persecution that he suffered in Belarus. Instead, the court found that the IJ’s questions “were apparently intended to clarify a time frame and focus more directly upon [petitioner’s] situation, not to intimidate him or prevent him from presenting relevant evidence on his own behalf.” See also Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Although the [IJ] may have been ‘brusque,’ and perhaps could have achieved his objective in a more courteous manner, it is difficult to say on the cold record that his approach warrants criticism; 11 certainly, he did not deny a fair trial.”). Here, as in Mikhailevitch, the IJ’s hypothetical to Dr. Kamoo does not constitute evidence of bias. Rather, the hypothetical appears to have been an attempt to clarify Dr. Kamoo’s testimony about Antar’s mental health symptoms. Similarly, as in Mikhailevitch, the IJ’s questions to Antar regarding his testimony with respect to his role as a human shield and how he obtained his passport or birth certificates appear designed to elicit relevant testimony from Antar and resolve any inconsistencies, not to intimidate him. As in Iliev, while the IJ may have been brusque and perhaps his objective could have been achieved in a more courteous manner, it does not constitute a defect in the removal proceedings. Moreover, the court finds that the IJ’s decision to deny Antar a continuance to incorporate the FDL results of Antar’s birth certificate does not constitute a due process violation because a decision to grant a continuance is completely discretionary.