Opinion ID: 1936270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The general problem next to be resolved is whether trial court's jury instructions as to damages were prejudicially erroneous.

Text: Initially defendants urge the evidence was not sufficiently definite to justify an instruction on impairment of earning capacity. At the outset we find no merit in the position thus taken by defendants. Dr. Robb, attending specialist in orthopedic surgery, testifying for plaintiff, stated she incurred an injury related sprain of the lumbar and cervical spine, described the activity restricting pain experienced by her together with his examination and treatments administered. The doctor also testified: Based on reasonable medical certainty, as regards pain in the future, my opinion is that Mrs. Carradus will continue to have temporary symptoms of pain in both the neck and low back for a period of several months. I think ultimately both areas will heal and she will not have the continuation of these symptoms. The pain which I made reference to which she will experience for some months in the future I think in my opinion it will eventually completely disappear. When I examined her in December of 1970 she had very little restriction of movement of the head from one side to the other. Flexion forward and backward and extension was restricted very, very slightly. She had some soreness in the back of her neck. I think Mrs. Carradus did have some organic damage to the bone or joint, but I don't feel that there is now. I think that's recovered. Based on reasonable medical certainty the cause of the injury and cause of the condition which I found in Mrs. Carradus in my earlier examination and in the examination December, 1970, was the accident that she had incurred in July, 1967; this was the cause of the symptoms for which I had examined her in July of 1967 and subsequently re-examined her in December, 1970. Plaintiff's testimony discloses she secured employment in 1970 at Anamosa with Head Start. This six hour a day job required that she check on small children, take them to the doctor or dentist and deal with their parents. It paid $224 a month, plus ten cents a mile. Plaintiff further testified in part: I did not continue in that work because most of the work was driving a car and sitting at a desk. This was a problem because I would get severe headaches from driving and terrible backaches from sitting in the car for hours at a time. I enjoy working. I hated to give this job up. It was at the hours when my one boy would be in school this winter. He wouldn't even know I was gone. My other boy could go to my mother's. I enjoyed working with people. I enjoyed the three months immensely. I had planned on taking a course at Kirkwood College to prepare for this job so I could get the experience and then later go into a better job, a permanent position. It just didn't work out. I had job offers to me and I have had a job offered to me since I quit then, full time. Dispositive of the loss of earning capacity issue is this statement in Anthes v. Anthes, 258 Iowa 260, 269-270, 139 N.W.2d 201, 208 (1965): There is no fixed rule for the determination of damages for impairment of future earning ability. It cannot be fixed within any prescribed field of certainty and must, of necessity, be left to the sound discretion of the jury. 22 Am.Jur. 2d, Damages, section 93, page 136. The right to damages for impairment of earning capacity may otherwise be classified as impairment of ability to work and earn. It is determinable by the difference between the value of an individual's services, if working, as he would have been but for the injury, and the value of the services of an injured person, if working, in the future. 22 Am. Jur.2d, Damages, section 92, page 134. It is based upon capacity to earn, not on earnings alone. A person may not have worked or may have had no income prior to trial, but still suffer impairment of future earning capacity. Shover v. Iowa Lutheran Hospital, supra [252 Iowa 706, 107 N.W.2d 85 (1961)], and 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, section 100, page 147. Impairment of physical capacity creates an inference of lessened earning ability in the future. Medical testimony is, of course, admissible in support of this element of damage but not always essential. The basic element to be determined in the matter of claimed impairment of future earning capacity is the reduction in value of the power to earn, not the difference in earnings received before and after the injury. 22 Am.Jur. 2d, Damages, section 94, page 136. In considering impairment of earning capacity we are dealing with after injury decreased earning potentiality. This must be determined not alone by earnings before and after, nor by expenditures before and after injury. These are simply elements of proof to aid the jury, if at all, in determining impairment of ability to earn. Actually there may be an allowance of damages for impairment of earning capacity even in the absence of evidence of earnings lost or expenditures made for substitute labor. See also Andrews v. Struble, 178 N.W.2d 391, 403 (Iowa 1970); 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, §§ 313, 315-316; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 40; Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 88. With regard to diminution of plaintiff's services as a wife and mother, this court said in Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 656-657 (Iowa 1969): In Henneman v. McCalla, supra [260 Iowa 60, 78, 148 N.W.2d 447, 458 (1967)], we approved this from Bridenstine v. Iowa City Elec. R. Co., 181 Iowa 1124, 1134, 165 N.W. 435, 439: `The services of a competent wife or mother cannot be weighed in the scales of the money changer. And indeed it would seem almost frivolous to call witnesses to estimate their monetary value. The best that can be done is to prove the facts and circumstances of the woman's life and service in these capacities, her age, health and strength, her expectancy of life, and all that may appear to enlighten the minds and aid the judgment of the jurors, and leave them to assess such recovery within the statutory limit as they find and believe to be just.' We are satisfied a jury issue was adequately generated regarding plaintiff's right to damages for impairment of earning capacity and diminution of services as a wife and mother. III. It is also apparent the record tends to reveal plaintiff, at time of trial, experienced pain with some related restrictions on her ability to engage in normal employment and to perform regular household duties. Therefore a jury instruction as to past and future pain and suffering and related disability was appropriate. See Mabrier v. A. M. Servicing Corporation of Raytown, 161 N.W.2d 180, 183 (Iowa 1968); Rogers v. Jefferson, 226 Iowa 1047, 1051-1052, 285 N.W. 701 (1939). See also Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 10. IV. But defendants argue the instruction given relative to the foregoing was reversibly erroneous because trial court failed to specify a time limitation for any attendant damage award. We do not agree. Defendants would apparently have us arbitrarily convert a fact issue into a question of law. Where, as here, a fact issue is created it must be left to the judgment of the jury on appropriate reasonable probability instructions, subject only to judicial correction for abuse, passion or prejudice. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 344(f)(17); Anthes v. Anthes, supra. See generally 22 Am.Jur.2d, Damages, § 105; 25 C.J.S. Damages § 62. Touching on the subject at hand is this statement in Schmitt v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d at 655: `Courts have recognized a distinction between proof of the fact that damages have been sustained and proof of the amount of those damages. If it is speculative and uncertain whether damages have been sustained, recovery is denied. If the uncertainty lies only in the amount of damages, recovery may be had if there is proof of a reasonable basis for which the amount can be inferred or approximated.    [Citing authorities].' Orkin Exterminating Co. (Arwell Div.) v. Burnett, Iowa, 160 N.W.2d 427, 430. See also 25 C.J.S. Damages § 28. Furthermore, past and future pain and suffering defy any precise measurement. See Stutsman v. Des Moines C. R. Co., 180 Iowa 524, 537-538, 163 N.W. 580 (1917); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 81. The instruction given is substantially in accord with Iowa Uniform Jury Instruction 3.9 and contains the approved qualifying if any you find phraseology. See Miller v. McCoy Truck Lines, Inc., 243 Iowa 483, 490-491, 52 N.W.2d 62 (1952). We now hold fact questions as to plaintiff's pain and suffering, impairment of earning capacity, together with diminution of her services as a wife and mother, were here adequately generated, and the subject instructions were not susceptible to objection regarding time limitations.