Opinion ID: 2710070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: background: people v gahan

Text: The majority opinion gives little attention and weight to Gahan’s actual analysis. Accordingly, a brief overview of Gahan is necessary. In Gahan, a defendant sold motor vehicles on consignment at his used car lot, repeatedly telling his customers that their cars sold for less than the true amount of the sale and keeping the difference for himself. The defendant perpetrated this scheme on numerous individuals, ultimately leading to the defendant’s conviction of one count of embezzlement regarding a victim who was swindled out of $1,100. Gahan, 456 Mich at 265-267.1 After the defendant was convicted, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report quoting an investigator as saying that the prosecution “ ‘originally had 48 counts against the defendant involving transactions . . . that went on for over a year.’ ” Id. at 268. In order to compensate all known victims, the probation officer recommended that the defendant be ordered to pay restitution in an amount of more than $28,000, which the trial court subsequently adjusted to $25,000 in its order of restitution. Id. at 268-269. The Court of Appeals vacated the order of restitution in a split decision, with the majority concluding that, under the plurality opinion of People v Becker, 349 Mich 476, 1 The defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of embezzlement involving another victim in a separate proceeding. Gahan, 456 Mich at 267 n 3. 2 486; 84 NW2d 833 (1957), “a defendant can be ordered to pay restitution only to the victim(s) of the crime(s) for which he is convicted.” People v Gahan, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued January 16, 1996 (Docket No. 172159), p 5. The Court of Appeals majority reasoned that, although there were similarities between the defendant’s crime and the other acts, the defendant was neither tried for nor convicted of the other acts and, thus, the other acts were related to transactions that were independent from the single transaction that provided the factual basis for the conviction. Stated another way, the majority of the panel held that the other acts were not part of the “course of conduct that gave rise to this conviction.” Id. The Court of Appeals dissent disagreed, explaining that MCL 780.766(2), part of the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, requires that a court order “ ‘that the defendant . . . make restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to a conviction,’ ” with a “victim” defined by MCL 780.766(1) as “ ‘an individual who suffers direct . . . financial . . . harm as a result of the commission of a crime.’ ” Gahan, unpub op at 1 (SMOLENSKI, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). On this basis, the Court of Appeals dissent explained that the victims of uncharged conduct were “also victims of the commission of a crime, i.e., defendant’s other acts of commercial fraud,” and “[t]hese persons were also victims of defendant’s course of conduct, i.e., his commercial fraud, that gave rise to a conviction, i.e., his conviction in this case.” Id. In Gahan, we granted leave to appeal to consider whether MCL 780.766(2) permits a sentencing court to “order a defendant to pay restitution to compensate all the victims who were defrauded by [the defendant’s] criminal course of conduct, even though the specific criminal acts committed against some . . . victims were not the 3 [factual predicate for] the defendant’s conviction.” Gahan, 456 Mich at 265. See, also, id. at 269-270. After full briefing and oral argument, this Court unanimously concluded that it does. Id. at 270. In reaching our conclusion, we stated that the statute applicable at the time was clear that “restitution may be ordered with respect to ‘any’ victim” as defined by the act. Id. at 271 (emphasis added).2 Considering the phrase “course of conduct,” this Court explained that the phrase had acquired a unique meaning at common law before the enactment of the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, MCL 780.751 et seq. Specifically, we explained that the phrase “course of conduct” originated in cases involving the proper scope of restitution ordered under MCL 771.3 as a condition of probation. Under that statute, which provided that a court may require a probationer to “[p]ay restitution to the victim,” defendants generally had argued that restitution was limited to those “losses attributable to the specific charges that resulted in the defendant’s conviction.” Gahan, 456 Mich at 271. We noted, however, that panels of the Court of Appeals had repeatedly rejected this argument. Specifically, the Court of Appeals had held that restitution orders 2 After the defendant’s conviction in Gahan, the Legislature amended the Crime Victim’s Rights Act to “require, rather than permit, that restitution be ordered.” Gahan, 456 Mich at 270 n 6. Specifically, MCL 780.766 now provides, in relevant part: (1) As used in this section only, “victim” means an individual who suffers direct or threatened physical, financial, or emotional harm as a result of the commission of a crime. . . . (2) . . . [W]hen sentencing a defendant convicted of a crime, the court shall order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that the defendant make full restitution to any victim of the defendant’s course of conduct that gives rise to the conviction . . . . 4 requiring a defendant to pay a restitution amount exceeding the losses attributable to the specific charges resulting in the conviction were appropriate because “principles of justice required that the defendant ‘pay back the entire amount obtained by his course of criminal conduct.’ ” Id. at 272, quoting People v Seda-Ruiz, 87 Mich App 100, 103; 273 NW2d 602 (1978). Because the phrase “course of conduct” had developed a unique meaning at common law, this Court held that the common-law meaning of the phrase should be carried over into the Crime Victim’s Rights Act, absent an indication of a contrary legislative intent. Gahan, 456 Mich at 272. Finding no such indication, this Court held that the Legislature did not intend to deviate from prior caselaw holding that a defendant should be required to compensate for all losses attributable to his illegal scheme “culminat[ing] in his conviction,” even if some of the losses did not form the factual basis of the charge resulting in conviction. Id.3 Gahan explained that “totally dissimilar crimes committed at different times may not satisfy the statutory ‘course of conduct’ requirement,” but such facts were not presented in Gahan. Thus, the Court declined to define the exact parameters of that phrase, noting that the defendant’s repeated scheme of defrauding his customers in the same or similar manner clearly fell within the confines of that phrase as developed in previous caselaw. Id. at 273 n 11. 3 This Court also compared the broader statutory language from MCL 780.766(2) with federal caselaw interpreting a federal restitution statute. Gahan, 456 Mich at 271 n 8. Specifically, unlike its federal counterpart, MCL 780.766(2) does not limit restitution to the offense of conviction by providing that, “when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense,” a court “may order . . . that the defendant make restitution to any victim of such offense[.]” 18 USC 3663(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). See, also, Gahan, 456 Mich at 271 n 8. 5 Accordingly, Gahan reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the order of restitution. Id. at 277-278.