Opinion ID: 1227345
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion by Giles and Brown to Dismiss Count II

Text: Count II alleged that Giles and Brown had used, carried, possessed, and discharged a firearm on or about October 3, 2005the date Monte Williams was shot. Giles and Brown claim that the government's evidence focused instead on the shootout with Clarence Dennis on October 11, and that as a result the jury might have convicted them based on the latter incident which was not the offense alleged in Count II. Giles and Brown moved before trial to dismiss Count II based on their anticipation that Dennis would testify about October 11, and they raised the issue again in a motion for judgment of acquittal. The district court denied both motions, and our review is de novo. United States v. Howell, 531 F.3d 621, 622 (8th Cir.2008) (motion to dismiss indictment); United States v. Garcia-Hernandez, 530 F.3d 657, 661 (8th Cir.2008) (motion for judgment of acquittal). In their briefs Giles and Brown allege their convictions on Count II amounted to a variance and a constructive amendment of the grand jury's indictment; at oral argument they focused exclusively on a constructive amendment theory. A constructive amendment implicates the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to be charged by a grand jury. It occurs when the essential elements of the offense set forth in the indictment are in effect altered by the prosecutor or the court, such as when the jury instructions or evidence presented allow the jury to convict the defendant of an offense other than the one alleged in the indictment. United States v. Gill, 513 F.3d 836, 849 (8th Cir.2008) (citations omitted). Count II alleged that on or about October 3, 2005, Giles and Brown used, carried, possessed, and discharged a firearm during and in connection with the drug conspiracy. In her opening statement, the prosecutor said that Count II charged defendants with the possession, use, carrying, and discharge of a firearm in connection with the Williams and ... Dennis shootings. Appellants claim that this implied that the charged offense encompassed both the October 3 and October 11 shootings. The jury instructions and prosecutor's closing argument referred only to the October 3 shooting, however. The government presented evidence about the later shooting in order to establish that Monte Williams was shot during and in relation to the drug trafficking conspiracy. The government's eyewitness to the Williams shooting, Cyrinthia Williams, knew nothing about the conspiracy, and Monte Williams died before trial in an unrelated shooting. The government therefore produced Clarence Dennis to testify that he and Williams had stolen marijuana from Giles and Brown to show that the shootings on October 3 and 11 were in retaliation for that robbery. Neither defendant objected to this evidence on grounds of relevance or unfair prejudice, and Brown's counsel brought out additional evidence from Dennis about the October 11 shooting. Neither defendant requested an instruction for the jury to consider the October 11 events only for the purpose of establishing the motive for the October 3 shooting. After a careful review of the record, we conclude that there is not a substantial likelihood that the jury convicted Giles and Brown of using or carrying a firearm on October 11 instead of October 3 and that there was no constructive amendment. The evidence of the later shooting was presented to establish the motive for the attack on Monte Williams on October 3 and to tie it to the drug conspiracy. Moreover, the jury instructions clearly stated that Count II pertained to conduct on October 3. We conclude that the district court did not err by denying the motions to dismiss and for judgment of acquittal.