Opinion ID: 1436510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Proper Role of the Judicial Branch

Text: As explained in Section II of this opinion, we have ascertained what the term marriage signified to the legislators who enacted the subject statute; in the words of a leading dictionary of that era, it meant the state of being united to a person of the opposite sex. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 1384 (1961). Having made that determination as to the statute's unambiguous meaning, our role is at an end; we have no constitutional authority to extend the scope of this or any other statute. Citizens for Preservation of Waterman Lake v. Davis, 420 A.2d 53, 57 (R.I.1980) (It is well settled that when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the statute may not be construed or extended but must be applied literally.). Indeed, this Court has in the past pointed to the limited statutory authority of the Family Court, and we have also indicated that it is not our role to supplement or amend a statute. Waldeck v. Piner, 488 A.2d 1218, 1220 (R.I.1985) (noting that the powers of the Family Court are limited to those expressly conferred upon it by statute: its jurisdiction cannot be extended by implication); see also Simeone v. Charron, 762 A.2d 442, 448-49 (R.I.2000) ([T]his Court will not broaden statutory provisions by judicial interpretation unless such interpretation is necessary and appropriate in carrying out the clear intent or defining the terms of the statute.); Sindelar v. Leguia, 750 A.2d 967, 972 (R.I.2000) ([O]ur assigned task is simply to interpret the Act, not to redraft it   .); see generally Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359-60, 125 S.Ct. 2478, 162 L.Ed.2d 343 (2005) (It is for Congress, not this Court, to amend the statute if it believes that [the statutory language leads to undesirable consequences].); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 653, 108 S.Ct. 2063, 100 L.Ed.2d 658 (1988); Pierce v. Pierce, 770 A.2d 867, 872 (R.I.2001); State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 779 (R.I.1996); Rhode Island Federation of Teachers v. Sundlun, 595 A.2d 799, 802 (R.I.1991); State v. Calise, 478 A.2d 198, 201 (R.I.1984); Little v. Conflict of Interest Commission, 121 R.I. 232, 236-37, 397 A.2d 884, 887 (1979); Gomes v. Rhode Island State Board of Elections, 120 R.I. 951, 957, 393 A.2d 1088, 1091 (1978). The role of the judicial branch is not to make policy, but simply to determine the legislative intent as expressed in the statutes enacted by the General Assembly. See, e.g., Little, 121 R.I. at 237, 397 A.2d at 887; State v. Patriarca, 71 R.I. 151, 154, 43 A.2d 54, 55 (1945) ([O]ur duty    is solely to construe the statute   .); see also Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994) (Policy considerations cannot override our interpretation of the text and structure of the Act   .); Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 57 L.Ed.2d 117 (1978); United States v. Great Northern Railway Co., 343 U.S. 562, 575, 72 S.Ct. 985, 96 L.Ed. 1142 (1952) (It is our judicial function to apply statutes on the basis of what Congress has written, not what Congress might have written.); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917) (It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain,    the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.); Civitarese v. Town of Middleborough, 412 Mass. 695, 700, 591 N.E.2d 1091, 1095 (1992) (We will not read into the plain words of a statute a legislative intent that is not expressed by those words.). The case of Pizza Hut of America, Inc. v. Pastore, 519 A.2d 592 (R.I.1987), is especially instructive as to the relatively modest role of the judiciary. After construing a particular liquor control statute as expressing a legislative intent to benefit public and parochial schools, but not other types of schools, this Court stated: We believe that the Legislature intended to exclude private schools from the protection afforded by § 3-7-19. We are aware of the social intent of the legislation, and yet upon the peculiar facts of this case, we do not believe that this interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd result. If the court has not interpreted the statute in a manner consistent with the legislative intent to promote temperance, further societal response is the exclusive prerogative of the Legislature. Id. at 594. In our judgment, when the General Assembly accorded the Family Court the power to grant divorces from the bond of marriage, it had in mind only marriages between people of different sexes. Having said that, we remain mindful of the fact that, unlike a Constitutional Convention, the General Assembly meets every year. That body is free, if it so chooses, to enact divorce legislation that it might possibly deem more appropriate. We have frequently so indicated with respect to numerous statutes. See, e.g., Town of Johnston v. Santilli, 892 A.2d 123, 133 (R.I. 2006) (We recognize that there exists a public policy argument that in the current environment, school committees should have their own legal counsel. That debate, however, should be resolved in the public forum or in the Legislature, not in the courts.); Moretti v. Division of Intoxicating Beverages, 62 R.I. 281, 286, 5 A.2d 288, 290 (1939) (If the matter is called to the attention of the [L]egislature it may be persuaded to make the necessary amendment to the statute  .); see also Comtronics, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Telephone Co., 553 F.2d 701, 707 (1st Cir.1977) (It is for Congress,    and not for this Court, to rewrite the statute to reflect changed circumstances.); Cardi Corp. v. City of Warwick, 122 R.I. 478, 479, 409 A.2d 136, 137 (1979); Malinou v. Board of Elections, 108 R.I. 20, 35, 271 A.2d 798, 805 (1970). As we said years ago with respect to another statute, `the court is to go no faster and no farther than the Legislature has gone.' State v. Goldberg, 61 R.I. 461, 468, 1 A.2d 101, 104 (1938) (quoting Howard v. Howard, 120 Me. 479, 115 A. 259, 260 (1921)); see also Rhode Island Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Burke, 101 R.I. 644, 647, 226 A.2d 420, 422 (1967).