Opinion ID: 2262565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Stalking by Following

Text: ¶ 68 Notwithstanding the need to reverse because insufficient evidence exists to support stalking by harassment, I would also reverse because insufficient evidence exists to convict on the alternative means of stalking by following. ¶ 69 Stalking by following requires a repeated following, among other factors. RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a). Follows is defined as deliberately maintaining visual or physical proximity to a specific person over a period of time. A finding that the alleged stalker repeatedly and deliberately appears at the person's home, school, place of employment, business, or any other location to maintain visual or physical proximity to the person is sufficient to find that the alleged stalker follows the person. It is not necessary to establish that the alleged stalker follows the person while in transit from one location to another. RCW 9A.46.110(6)(b). Following, then, does not explicitly require a course of conduct similar to stalking by harassment, but it does implicitly require something similar. Logically, one cannot follow another without committing a series of acts. [10] Maintaining visual or physical proximity requires multiple actions on the part of the would-be stalker. This series of acts equates to a single episode of following. That single episode of following, in turn, must be repeated on at least two occasions. RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a). [11] ¶ 70 In both the Westfall and Gudaz incidents, Kintz's acts amount to a single episode of following. RCW 9A.46.110(6)(b) describes a series of acts that would constitute a single episode of follow[ing]. [12] Kintz repeatedly and deliberately appeared at ... any other location to maintain visual or physical proximity to the person. RCW 9A.46.110(6)(b). These actions are sufficient to find that the alleged stalker follows the person. Id. (emphasis added). The statute does not say the actions are sufficient to find the alleged stalker repeatedly follows the person. The statute articulates a single incident of following. Accordingly Kintz followed Westfall and Gudaz once because, over a period of time, Kintz endeavored to maintain his physical proximity to the women by repeatedly and deliberately appearing where he thought they would be. But he did not follow the women repeatedly, as required by RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a). ¶ 71 The majority, instead, slices the Westfall incident into four distinct episodes. Majority at 479. [13] It asserts that each episode constitutes a separate occasion of following under RCW 9A.46.110(6)(b) because Kintz `deliberately maintain[ed] visual and physical proximity.' Id. (quoting RCW 9A.46.110(6)(b)). This argument has no legs. The majority goes astray by conflating the definition of follows with the definition of, for example, encounters. [14] If I encounter a person on the street, then encounter them again at a different location, I could arguably be accused of following that person once. But I could not, despite the majority's reading, be accused of following that person twice. ¶ 72 Such a drastic broadening of the definition of follows also has imprudent policy ramifications. If, hypothetically, Kintz had maintained complete visual or physical proximity to both Westfall and Gudaz (i.e., hovered closely around them without any lapse in time or distance), his hovering would have constituted only one episode of following. He would not be guilty of stalking. But because Kintz briefly lost visual contact and had to regain immediate proximity to the womenin effect having less contact with the individuals over the course of conductunder the majority's reasoning he is guilty of stalking. This makes no sense. ¶ 73 I would hold in both the Westfall and Gudaz incidents that Kintz's acts comprised only a single occasion of following. There can be little doubt the interactions frustrated, angered, and upset both women. Kintz's conduct, and perhaps his demeanor, fell outside the norm exercised by most people. But because there was no repeated following, as required by RCW 9A.46.110(1)(a), there is insufficient evidence to convict Kintz of stalking by following. ¶ 74 I dissent. CHAMBERS, J. (concurrence in dissent). ¶ 75 I agree with Justice Sanders that RCW 9A.46.110 is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation and that the rule of lenity requires that we find for the defendant. Therefore, I would reverse.