Opinion ID: 2296226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Nationality Discrimination

Text: Blackman attempted to establish her prima facie case, based on discrimination based on her nationality, by showing that her immediate supervisor, American-born Barnes, was motivated by discriminatory animus as illustrated by her allegedly public statements denigrating foreigners in general and Blackman in particular. See note 2, supra. Barnes's prejudice, Blackman asserts, if not directly communicated to Maurano, was imputed to Maurano during the course of three meetings during which Blackman contends the two discussed the circumstances surrounding Blackman's August leave. Barnes's participation in the decisionmaking process is established principally, according to Blackman, by the fact that Barnes failed to inform Maurano of Blackman's chronic knee problem, that Barnes recommended she visit a doctor to have her knee examined, and that it was Barnes herself who had suggested that Blackman should explore taking sick leave in lieu of annual leave. [5] Blackman relies on Dey v. Colt Const. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1459 (7th Cir.1994), and cases cited therein, for the proposition that summary judgment should not be granted in an employment discrimination case where there is factual information or other input [such as that claimed to have been supplied by Barnes] that may have affected the adverse employment action. We reject Blackman's reliance on Dey, however, because we conclude it is distinguishable, for the reasons discussed below, and because we are persuaded by the reasoning of several other federal cases which hold that the discriminatory animus of an employee's supervisor, who is not involved in the decision to terminate, cannot, as a matter of law, be imputed to the ultimate decisionmaker. The terminated employee in Cram, supra, brought an action against her employer alleging that she was sexually harassed by a company foreman with whom she had an amorous relationship and that her termination resulted from an act of retaliation after she ended the relationship. The foreman had advised the employer that the employee had engaged in job-related misconduct, and the employer's own investigation into the matter confirmed the misconduct which led to the employee's termination. The court found that there was no evidence to support the inference that the employer's decisionmakers were influenced by the foreman's alleged animus, or that the decisionmakers were biased against women. The court concluded that the employee bas[ed] her claim of discriminatory termination on circumstantial evidence that does not directly reflect the alleged discriminatory attitude on the part of the decisionmakers, but is connected to them only through a series of inferences. Id. at 472 (citation and quotations omitted). The Sixth Circuit in Wilson, supra, upheld the grant of summary judgment for the employer in an action brought by a terminated employee who claimed that his termination was the result of his immediate supervisor's racial bias. The immediate supervisor had reported the employee's job-related misconduct to management, but the court was satisfied that it was management's independent investigation confirming the misconduct which led to the employee's termination. The court concluded that there was no evidence showing that management, i.e., the ultimate decisionmaker, was either influenced by the supervisor's racial animus or motivated by considerations of race when it decided to terminate the employee. The court held that [t]he fact that [the supervisor] brought [the employee's] misconduct to [management's] attention, without more, is insufficient to support a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 946. Finally, the court in McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155 (6th Cir.1990), affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the employer in a suit brought by a terminated employee who asserted that his termination was causally related to the age bias of his immediate supervisor who exhibited his bias through several comments about the employee's age. But the court was satisfied that the employee was not qualified for the job and that statements made by an intermediate level management official [are] not indicative of discrimination when the ultimate decision to discharge is made by an upper level official. Moreover, there is no evidence, nor has [the employee] made such an allegation, that [the decisionmaker] was predisposed to age discrimination. Id. at 1160-61 (citations and footnote omitted). Because it concluded that the immediate supervisor did not make the decision to terminate the employee, the court also rejected the employee's assertion that the employer's rationale for terminating his employment, poor job performance, was pretextual for the immediate supervisor's discriminatory statements. [T]he allegedly discriminatory remarks made by [the immediate supervisor] are not attributable to the ... ultimate decision maker. Id. at 1162 (citation omitted). Applying the holdings in Cram, Wilson, and McDonald, supra, to the facts here, Blackman has not established a prima facie case of discrimination based on national origin. Supervisor Barnes, the alleged discriminator, did not participate in the decision to terminate Blackman, and Blackman has offered no evidence showing that decisionmaker Maurano was predisposed to bias based on national origin. Therefore, the fact that Barnes reported Blackman's job-related misconduct to Maurano, is insufficient, without more, to infer a casual relation between Barnes's alleged animus and Maurano's decision to terminate Blackman for gross misconduct. Nor does Dey, supra, the case primarily relied upon by Blackman, support her contention that she had established a prima facie case of discrimination and that summary judgment should not have been granted for VNA. The Dey court reversed the grant of summary judgment for the employer, stating that [s]ummary judgment generally is improper where the plaintiff can show that an employee with discriminatory animus provided factual information or other input that may have affected the adverse employment action. Dey, supra, 28 F.3d at 1459 (citing cases in accord). The court held that, as a matter of law, the employee had established a prima facie case of discrimination that survived summary judgment because the decisionmaker had solicited the view of the employee's immediate supervisor who had provided a negative assessment of the employee's job performance. But the immediate supervisor's recommendation was suspect because the employee's discrimination complaint was based on allegations that she had been sexually harassed by the immediate supervisor, which conduct she complained about to the offending supervisor and to another supervisor who was not involved in the decisionmaker's decision to terminate the employee. The court focused on the immediate supervisor's role in the decisionmaker's decision to terminate the employee and concluded that this circumstantial evidence supported the inference of a causal link between the employee's complaint, the immediate supervisor's animus for the employee and his possible motive to retaliate against her, and the decisionmaker's eventual decision to terminate the employee. The key factor in Dey was the negative recommendation made by the immediate supervisor who held the discriminatory animus against the terminated employee. In contrast, there was no evidence here that Barnes, the asserted discriminating supervisor, participated in the decision making or provided any recommendation to the decision maker regarding the job status of the terminated employee. As the court in Wilson, supra, stated: [t]he determinative question is whether [the employee] has submitted evidence that [the employee with discriminatory] animus was a cause of the termination. Id. at 946. Applying that question to Blackman's complaint against VNA, we find the answer to be no. There is no evidence in this record, other than speculation by Blackman in her deposition testimony, that Barnes was the cause of Blackman's termination. That Barnes attended meetings with Maurano to discuss Blackman's altered medical leave form and the discrepancies surrounding Blackman's August leave, is insufficient, in and of itself, to create a causal link between Barnes's alleged discriminatory animus and Maurano's eventual decision to terminate Blackman. That is especially so where the officer making the decision stated without contradiction, as Maurano did here, that the decision to terminate was hers alone. Blackman's attempt to establish a prima facie case of discrimination fails because her claim of discriminatory termination [is based] on circumstantial evidence that does not directly [or indirectly] reflect the alleged discriminatory attitude on the part of Maurano. Cram, supra, 49 F.3d at 472.