Opinion ID: 2090042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Waiver

Text: Defendant next argues that his waiver of his right to silence and to counsel rights was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Specifically, defendant argues that the court did not conduct a probing inquiry to determine whether defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights, as is required to protect the rights of persons with diminished mental capacity or lower intelligence. State v. Cleary, 161 Vt. 403, 413, 641 A.2d 102, 108 (1994). Again, however, defendant did not raise these issues at trial; thus, we review only for plain error. See V.R.Cr.P. 52(b). Defendant did not put the court on notice that he had a serious mental impairment that interfered with his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his rights. The record shows that defendant made only limited references to his mental impairment with regard to waiver, despite the fact that he put on substantial evidence of his diminished capacity to control his rage in the attack, including the testimony of an expert on defendant's stunted frontal lobe development. Defense counsel never argued that defendant could not make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights. Although the issue was not raised below, the court entered substantial findings on defendant's capacity to waive his rights: Officer Danforth took Bruce and Jason into the interrogation room where she read the Miranda rights and Public Defender Forms. After each question, she received a positive response from each Mears and noted each on the form. . . . . When advising them that they could stop the questioning at any time, she read the passage twice and each acknowledged that they understood, and the acknowledgment was recorded. . . . . The Miranda and Public Defender rights were properly read and explained to both Mears. Both understood Jason's rights and Jason, with the advice and guidance of his father and his approval, voluntarily waived those rights. . . . . Jason, though technically a minor, was less than a year away from majority. He had been questioned by police on at least two other occasions, understood his criminal rights and indeed, without advice, exercised his right against a warrantless search just hours before. [3] He had already spent almost two hours discussing his predicament with his father. His waiver was voluntary, as were the statements he made to Detective Danforth up until his father invoked his right to have questioning cease. Thus, the court inquired and then found that defendant was capable of waiving his rights. Moreover, the court personally addressed defendant to ascertain his reasons for changing his plea to not guilty and to ensure that he understood the consequences of his withdrawal. In response to the court's inquiry of why defendant was changing his plea, defendant answered that he had not completely understood his original plea and had felt pressured into entering it. As the court questioned him further, defendant indicated a similar degree of understanding sufficient to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver. If there was any error here, it certainly did not rise to the level of plain error. See State v. Forant, 168 Vt. 217, 220, 719 A.2d 399, 401 (1998) (Plain error exists only in extraordinary situations where it is `obvious and strikes at the heart of defendant's constitutional rights or results in a miscarriage of justice.') (quoting State v. Streich, 163 Vt. 331, 353, 658 A.2d 38, 53 (1995)).