Opinion ID: 1285642
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Impeachment of defense witness Stanley Davis

Text: The solicitor was permitted to impeach defense witness Stanley Davis, who testified regarding Kendrick Davis's identification, with a prior conviction for impersonating an officer and his statement to investigators that he knew nothing about appellant's case. Appellant claims this impeachment evidence was improperly allowed. First, appellant contends that impersonating an officer is not a crime of dishonesty and, since it is not punishable by a term in excess of one year, it was not admissible under Rule 609, SCRE. [2] Evidence of a conviction of a crime involving dishonesty is admissible for impeachment regardless of the punishment. Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE. Federal courts applying this rule under the Federal Rules of Evidence have held criminal impersonation is a crime involving dishonesty and therefore admissible. United States v. Moore, 459 F.2d 1360 (D.C.Cir.1972); Brundidge v. City of Buffalo, 79 F.Supp.2d 219 (W.D.N.Y.1999). We agree with the approach taken by the federal courts and hold, since impersonating an officer involves a misrepresentation, it is a crime involving dishonesty and therefore admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) regardless of the punishment it carries. Second, the solicitor sought to impeach Stanley Davis with evidence that Davis told the solicitor's investigator he knew nothing about the case. When asked on cross-examination, Davis simply replied that he did not recall making such a statement. On appeal, appellant mischaracterizes this cross-examination by stating the solicitor was allowed to impeach Davis with his failure to recall an event. Davis's failure to recall was never made an issue. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing this cross-examination of Stanley Davis. See State v. Aleksey, supra (scope of cross-examination within trial judge's discretion).