Opinion ID: 166964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecutor Remarks During Closing Arguments

Text: 53 Finally, Eva Atencio renews her objection to the prosecutor's statement during closing arguments that Eva Atencio was in jail. That remark, according to Mrs. Atencio, marked her as a criminal in the eyes of the jury and undermined her constitutionally protected presumption of innocence. The Supreme Court in Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 504, 96 S.Ct. 1691, 48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976), held that the Constitution forbids states from compelling the accused in a criminal trial from appearing before the jury, at all times, in prison clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption [of innocence] so basic to the adversary system. The Court in Estelle emphasized that the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable attire exerted a continuing influence throughout the trial. Id. at 504-05, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Requiring a defendant to wear prison clothes therefore created an unacceptable risk that the jury might base its decision on impermissible factors. Id. at 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691. 54 The rule of Estelle does not apply, however, to every mere utterance of the words [jail, prison, or arrest], without reference to context or circumstances. United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051, 1058 (11th Cir.1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). In United States v. Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568, 570-71 (10th Cir. 1991), this Court held that a prosecutor's single question at trial about the defendant's prior incarceration did not constitute plain error. Unlike the constant and continuing influence of the prison attire in Estelle, the effect of the lone, isolated reference to the defendant's prior jail time in Lonedog did not meaningfully impair the presumption of innocence. See id. Similarly, other federal appellate courts have distinguished Estelle in cases involving isolated, brief, or fleeting references to the defendant's incarceration. See Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d at 1058 (finding a defense witness's remarks during cross-examination, which revealed the defendant's prior incarceration, unlikely to prejudice the jury sufficiently to rise to the level of a due process violation in part because the comments were quite brief and added nothing to the government's case); cf. Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 482-83 (9th Cir.1994) (finding that the judge's isolated comment about reluctant jurors during voir dire did not undermine the presumption of innocence); United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517, 527 n. 9 (8th Cir.1977) (finding no constitutional violation where a juror's vision of a defendant in jail uniform is fleeting and outside the courtroom). 55 For several reasons, the prosecutor's comment that Eva Atencio was in jail did not impair the presumption of innocence. First, as in Lonedog, the comment was an isolated, not a `continuing,' occurrence, making the case very different from Estelle. Lonedog, 929 F.2d at 571. The comment not only represented a single, passing reference at the close of a full jury trial, but in context it apparently referred to ordinary pretrial detention, not to the fact of a prior conviction as in Lonedog or to continuing detention as in Estelle. 4 Second, the trial court issued standard instructions admonishing the jury to base its verdict solely upon the evidence, and emphasizing that any statements, objections, or arguments made by the lawyers are not evidence. R. Vol. III, pp. 935-36. Such instructions help to mitigate any risk that the jury will give weight to this kind of minor, offhand remark. Third, the government has offered a benign explanation for the reference: the defense made Edward Atencio's decision not to flee the country an important part of closing arguments, when in fact Eva Atencio's imprisonment might have limited his options. Because the prosecutor's comment did not rise to the level of an unconstitutional impairment of the presumption of innocence, we affirm the decision of the district court denying her request for a mistrial.