Opinion ID: 1714828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Unused Exemplar Ladders as Demonstrative Evidence.

Text: That brings us to Keller's contention that its right to a fair trial was irreparably prejudiced as a result of the receipt into evidence of the unused exemplar ladders. This assignment of error is reviewed under the rule that where the Nebraska Evidence Rules apply, the admissibility of evidence is controlled by the Nebraska Evidence Rules; judicial discretion is involved only when the rules make such discretion a factor in determining admissibility. Koehler v. Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co., 252 Neb. 712, 566 N.W.2d 750 (1997). Benzel contends that the unused exemplar ladders were necessary to supplement his expert witness' spoken description of the design and manufacturing defect in rebuttal to Keller's claim that the broken rivet on Benzel's ladder was caused by misuse and abuse of the ladder. In determining the relevance and admissibility of the demonstrative evidence at issue, our analytical framework is set primarily by the Nebraska Evidence Rules. All relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States or the State of Nebraska, by Act of Congress or of the Legislature of the State of Nebraska, by these rules, or by other rules adopted by the Supreme Court of Nebraska which are not in conflict with laws governing such matters. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-402 (Reissue 1995). Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence, or the evidence tends to establish a fact from which the existence or nonexistence of a fact in issue can be directly inferred. Washa v. Miller, 249 Neb. 941, 546 N.W.2d 813 (1996); Coppi v. West Am. Ins. Co., 247 Neb. 1, 524 N.W.2d 804 (1994). See, also, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-401 (Reissue 1995). However, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-403 (Reissue 1995); Paro v. Farm & Ranch Fertilizer, 243 Neb. 390, 499 N.W.2d 535 (1993); Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 345 N.W.2d 300 (1984). While we have not extensively addressed the standards for admitting demonstrative evidence, several other jurisdictions have concluded that demonstrative exhibits are admissible if they supplement the witness' spoken description of the transpired event, clarify some issue in the case, and are more probative than prejudicial. See, e.g., Cowles v. Sheeline, 259 Mont. 1, 855 P.2d 93 (1993) (summary of other exhibits admitted in evidence; admitted only for demonstrative purposes); Doe v. Johnston, 476 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1991) (21 color slides used by medical expert to explain surgical procedure admitted to demonstrate potential for blood loss from surgery); Hoffman v. Niagra Mach and Tool Works Co., 683 F.Supp. 489 (E.D.Pa.1988) (model of mechanical foot pedal from punch press admitted for limited purpose of demonstrating height to which press operator was required to raise foot to work pedal and activate press); Jenkins v. Snohomish County PUD, 105 Wash.2d 99, 713 P.2d 79 (1986) (defendant's video of child climbing fence admitted for limited purpose of demonstrating physical deterrent aspect of fence with and without barbed wire). Demonstrative exhibits are inadmissible when they do not illustrate or make clearer some issue in the case; that is, where they are irrelevant, or where the exhibit's character is such that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Cowles v. Sheeline, supra . See, also, Roland v. Langlois, 945 F.2d 956 (7th Cir.1991) (no error in trial court's refusal to admit inapplicable safety regulation); Schuller v. Hy-Vee Food Stores, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 328 (Iowa 1982) (no error in trial court's refusal to admit model of merchandise display when plaintiff able to demonstrate theory of accident in alternative ways). We agree and adopt the foregoing principles for determining the admissibility of demonstrative exhibits in civil cases. The admission of demonstrative evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, and a judgment will not be reversed on account of the admission or rejection of such evidence unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. See Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 244 Neb. 822, 509 N.W.2d 603 (1994). In Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., supra , we approved of the use of demonstrative evidence offered to rebut an opponent's claim and not meant to re-create an accident or condition. The defendant in Kudlacek offered into evidence edited videotapes of various performance tests conducted on a Fiat X1/9, the subject vehicle of the litigation, as well as performance tests conducted on other vehicles. The plaintiff objected, but only as to the videotapes showing the other vehicles. We concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence, noting that the videotapes were not meant to re-create the accident, but merely to rebut the plaintiff's contention that the Fiat X1/9 handled differently from other cars in normal maneuvers at a particular speed. With the foregoing in mind, we now examine Keller's final assignment of error. Keller asserts that the exemplar ladders did not contain broken rivets, the defect in the subject ladder claimed to have caused Benzel's accident. Instead, Keller claims that the exemplar ladders contained only minor manufacturing defects which did not affect the structural integrity of the ladders. Further, Keller argues that it never contended that the step-to-side-rail assembly defects identifiedgaps, rivets driven at an angle, rivets struck off center, and margin tearsresulted from misuse and abuse. Rather, Keller contends that just the fractured rivets on the Benzel ladder were caused by misuse and abuse. Thus, Keller claims that testimony concerning the exemplar ladders does not rebut Keller's claim of misuse and abuse, when the exemplar ladders do not contain fractured rivets. In analyzing Keller's argument, it is apparent that Keller either misstates or misunderstands Benzel's theory of causation in this case. At trial, Benzel developed the theory that the manufacturing and design defects of rivets driven at angles, rivets struck off center, and margin tears due to improper placement of rivet holes created excessive gaps between the metal surfaces of the steps and the side rails. The design of the ladder relied on frictional forces created by intimate contact between the steps and the side rails to dissipate the torsional load applied to a rivet when a ladder step is loaded. Thus, at the point of an excessive gap, an excessive load was applied to the rivet. Over time, this excessive load caused the rivet to fail and ultimately resulted in the ladder step, upon use, to suddenly deflect downward at the point of rivet failure. Furthermore, the trial record does not support Keller's argument before this courtthat it only claimed fractured rivets, and not excessive gaps, were caused by misuse. In its answer, Keller does not state that fractured rivets alone were caused by abuse and misuse, but, instead, that its ladder was not defective in any manner and that thus, any defect which may have caused Benzel's accident arose from abuse and misuse of the ladder. Keller's engineering expert testified that the subject ladder had seen a tremendous amount of use over its life span. Keller's expert also testified that the riveting system used by Keller completely fills in that gap and it makes a nice tight connection between the two sections of the ladder. Thus, the obvious inference is that the gaps between the subject ladder's step and side rail resulted from use or misuse. This inference is also consonant with Keller's expert's theory on how the rivets failed. Keller's expert testified that excessive tensional force stretched the rivets until they pulled apart end-to-end. Obviously, tensional loading on a rivet would create a gap between the metal surfaces secured by the rivet. Keller's expert stated that this excessive tensional force resulted from overloading the ladder or from a series of blows to the ladder. Thus, the record establishes that Keller caused to be placed at issue whether the step-to-side-rail gaps, which Benzel contends caused the rivet failure, resulted from abuse or misuse, or whether these gaps were manufacturing defects. Under such circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in receiving into evidence the unused exemplar ladders when Benzel's engineering expert utilized the unused ladders to demonstrate excessive step-to-side-rail gaps. The demonstrative exhibits supplemented the expert's spoken description of the cause of the rivet failure and aided in clarifying a crucial issue at trial. As an integral part of our determination, we reject Keller's contention that the probative value of the demonstrative exhibits is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Most, if not all, items which one party to an action offers in evidence are calculated to be prejudicial to the opposing party; therefore, it is only unfair prejudice with which we are concerned. In the context of § 27-403, such prejudice means a tendency to suggest a decision on an improper basis. Lincoln Grain v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 Neb. 433, 345 N.W.2d 300 (1984). Keller argues that evidence of defects in unused ladders manufactured years after the accident was so prejudicial that there is a high likelihood that the jury's verdict was a result of this evidence. However, the record does not reflect that any evidence was adduced regarding the relative age or date of manufacture with respect to the unused exemplar ladders and the subject ladder. To the contrary, Benzel's expert carefully limited his testimony so as to inform the jury that the exemplar ladders were simply unused, without respect to the relative dates of manufacture. In addition, Keller contends that the exemplar ladders had a bracing system that was different from that of the subject ladder and that this created the specter of substantial prejudice. However, the fact that the bracing differed in some unspecified respects between the unused exemplar ladders and the subject ladder had virtually nothing to do with the issues in the instant case. Keller has failed to demonstrate how this bracing difference was material to an issue in controversy, let alone how it led to an error which rises to the level of unfair prejudice. As such, when viewed in its proper and entire context, the introduction of the unused exemplar ladders into evidence was not unfairly prejudicial so as to outweigh the probative value of the demonstrative exhibits or suggest a decision on an improper basis. Thus, having determined that the demonstrative exhibits aided in clarifying certain issues in the instant case and that the exhibits were more probative than prejudicial, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in receiving into evidence the unused exemplar ladders.