Opinion ID: 1597492
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the chancellor erred in ordering a decree of divorce in vacation and without the consent of both parties.

Text: ¶ 5. Elizabeth relies on the rule in Mississippi that the power of judges and chancellors to sign decrees and try causes in vacation must be derived from statute or by consent of the parties. Chaffin v. Chaffin, 437 So.2d 384, 385 (Miss.1983); Callicott v. Horn, 137 Miss. 693,137 Miss. 693, 102 So. 850, 851 (1925). A decree entered in vacation that is not in conformity with statute or not authorized by statute is void. Id. According to Elizabeth, Mississippi provides chancellors with the authority to hear and rule on divorce matters as follows: (1) The proceedings to obtain a divorce shall not be heard or considered nor a judgment of divorce entered except in open court. A chancellor may, in his discretion, hear or consider proceedings to obtain a divorce in vacation and make and enter judgments of divorce in the same manner as he may in other cases that may be heard in vacation pursuant to Section 9-5-91. Any judgment made or entered contrary to the provisions of this section shall be null and void. Miss.Code Ann. § 93-5-17(1) (1994). Elizabeth argues that since Miss.Code Ann. § 9-5-91 (referenced above in § 93-5-17) was repealed in 1991, there is no longer a statute that authorizes a chancellor to hear divorce proceedings while in recess or in vacation from its scheduled terms of court. Section 9-5-91 was repealed; however, we do not interpret the repeal of § 9-5-91 to mean that chancellors no longer have the authority to hear divorce matters in vacation. ¶ 6. Elizabeth also contends that Miss. Code Ann. § 9-5-93 did not authorize the chancellor to hear the complaint and render a final decree of divorce. Section 9-5-93 states: Whenever the chancery court or chancellor has lawfully set any matter in vacation for confirmation or decree, and no contest has been timely filed, if an order or decree determining the same or setting another date therefor be not entered upon such date, the chancellor shall have the power to enter an order or decree on any day prior to the adjournment of the next succeeding term, without further process. Provided, that if the matter be one in which contest might have been entered prior to the date set and such contest be filed before the entry of such order or decree, the same shall be disposed of as if such contest had been timely filed. Miss.Code Ann. § 9-5-93 (1991). ¶ 7. Elizabeth argues that since § 93-5-17, quoted above, makes no reference to § 9-5-93 that section does not apply. Furthermore, she argues that there was no order setting the divorce hearing on September 27, 2000. The hearing was originally set for September 12, 2000. The chancery court rescheduled the hearing for a later, undetermined date. ¶ 8. Mark argues that Elizabeth's proposition that chancellors are not authorized to grant judgments of divorce while in vacation is ludicrous. He contends that to hold otherwise would void a large percentage of divorces granted in this state. ¶ 9. Because Elizabeth failed to timely answer the complaint and failed to contest the divorce decree until after the decree was entered, this Court finds that the chancellor did not err in holding the divorce hearing in vacation without her consent. We find that Elizabeth impliedly consented to the hearing in vacation by failing to contest the divorce to make a timely appearance before the chancery court. ¶ 10. Furthermore, the chancellor conducted a hearing on Elizabeth's motion to set aside the divorce decree. Mark admitted that he tried to discuss a proposed settlement agreement with Elizabeth the day before the September 27 hearing and that she would not sign the agreement without letting an attorney review it. However, as the chancellor concluded, Elizabeth was served with the complaint for divorce and failed to answer within 30 days. Mark tried to convince Elizabeth to sign a divorce agreement based on irreconcilable differences. The chancellor found that Mark told Elizabeth that if she did not sign the agreement, he was going to go to the Court, wouldn't have to have her to go ahead and have the divorce. Elizabeth missed her first opportunity to contest the divorce. She was given a second chance to contest the divorce at the hearing on her motion to set aside the divorce decree. The record supports the chancellor's decision to deny the motion to set aside the divorce decree.