Opinion ID: 454309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Imprisonment for Debt

Text: 20 The threshold question in this case is whether the contempt judgment violated the prohibition against imprisonment for debt of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2007(a) and Tex. Const. art. I, Sec. 18. The federal statute is to be read in conjunction with the law of the state, i.e., section 2007(a) prohibits imprisonment for debt based on any process issued from a federal court in Texas to the extent that Texas law prohibits imprisonment for debt. 5 In determining whether contempt sanctions were properly used by the district court to enforce the consent order, we will first discuss whether the consent order was a money judgment or debt under federal law, then whether the use of contempt sanctions constituted imprisonment under federal law, and finally whether Texas law permits contempt sanctions for noncompliance with the consent order. 6
21 For section 2007(a) to apply in this case, the consent order must be a money judgment or debt. 7 The Secretary contends that imprisonment for failure to make court-ordered payments is not imprisonment for debt within the meaning of section 2007(a). The two cases cited in support of this argument do not resolve the status of the present consent order. See In re Cordova Gonzalez, 726 F.2d 16, 21 n. 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984); Usery v. Fisher, 565 F.2d 137, 139 (10th Cir.1977). In Cordova Gonzalez, the alleged debt was actually a fine imposed as a sanction on an attorney who withdrew shortly before trial. The fine was based on the costs incurred by opposing counsel in preparing for trial and was imposed under the inherent power of a court to assess expenses against counsel who wilfully abuse judicial processes. Id. at 20 (citation omitted). In Fisher, the Tenth Circuit found the prohibitions against imprisonment for debt inapplicable because the consent order was equitable in nature rather than being a money judgment. Id. at 139. 22 Although the consent order in Fisher bears some resemblance to that in the present case, the court's construction of the Fisher order as equitable appears to have been based on its implementation of the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 201 et seq. Specifically, the order in Fisher enjoined Fisher from further violations of the Act and restrained him from continuing to withhold the sum of $2,500 in unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation due his employees. Id. at 138. The order also provided that the amounts due be paid to the Secretary of Labor in monthly installments for distribution to the employees by the Secretary. Id. After Fisher ceased making the monthly payments, the Secretary instituted civil contempt proceedings against him. The district court denied the Secretary's petition, finding the consent order to be a money judgment, and therefore under section 2007(a) and Colo. Const. art. II, Sec. 12, not enforceable by a contempt judgment. 23 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court's analysis to the extent that it found the consent order not to be a money judgment but rather to be equitable in nature. Id. The court focused on the terms of the order enjoining Fisher from continuing to withhold the money due his employees, citing a Fifth Circuit case for the proposition that the purpose of an injunction under the Fair Labor Standards Act to restrain the withholding of wages due is not to collect a debt ... but [is] to correct a continuing offense against the public interest. Id. (quoting Wirtz v. Jones, 340 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.1965)) (emphasis added). Fisher also cites a Seventh Circuit case for the proposition that the payment of money for past violations of the Act is not a money judgment but a judgment designed to ensure compliance with the Act. Id. (citing Fleming v. Warshawsky & Co., 123 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.1941)). We distinguish the Fisher decision as restricted to the enforcement of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 24 Thus, neither Cordova Gonzalez nor Fisher provides a basis for our finding that the consent order in the present case requiring the payment of money not to be a money judgment or debt within the meaning of section 2007(a). Similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act violation involved in Fisher is a recent case involving the Employee Retirement Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1001-1381, in which the court relied on Fisher and the other Fair Labor Standards Act cases cited therein to justify the imposition of a contempt judgment. See Robbins v. Labor Transportation Corp., 599 F.Supp. 705, 708 (N.D.Ill.1984). The court in Robbins noted the similarity as follows: In either case, what is at stake is the economic well-being of ... employees who are entitled to minimum wages and to the pension and health benefits that have been promised them. Id. (emphasis in original). In holding that contempt proceedings would be proper, the court further referred to the importance of the public policy embodied in the Employment Retirement Income Security Program, i.e., the continued well-being and security of employees ... [with] appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the federal courts. Id. Robbins, too, would not provide a basis for our finding that the consent order in the present case is not a money judgment for the purposes of section 2007(a). 25 Thus, we find that the consent order in the present case is a money judgment and as such is subject to the prohibition against imprisonment for debt of section 2007(a). It does not fit any of the exceptions previously carved out by the federal courts concerning judgments involving money that are not subject to section 2007(a). Further, no compelling public policy argument has been advanced by the Secretary nor do we sua sponte find the present money judgment to be exempt from the section 2007(a) prohibition.
26 The Secretary argues that the Kirks have not been imprisoned or threatened with imprisonment. We find, however, that the contempt judgment in this case carried with it an imminent threat of imprisonment for failure to comply with its terms. We note that nonpayment of civil contempt fines that have not been imposed for a failure to pay a money judgment but for refusal to obey a court order may lead to imprisonment which would not be prohibited under section 2007(a). See Chapman v. United States, 139 F.2d 327, 331 (8th Cir.1943); Diversified Growth Corp., 595 F.Supp. at 1171. Accordingly, the consent order, being a money judgment, is not properly enforceable by a contempt judgment if not otherwise exempted from the prohibition against imprisonment for debt under Texas law. Cf. Fisher, 565 F.2d at 139 (district court held that any adjudication of civil contempt inapplicable to a money judgment because of the implicit power to punish by imprisonment; issue not reached on appeal). Finding the contempt sanctions for noncompliance with the terms of the consent order to be governed by the prohibition against imprisonment for debt of section 2007(a), we turn to Texas state law to determine whether the order may properly be enforced by civil contempt sanctions.
27 The Secretary contends that under Texas law imprisonment is an appropriate contempt sanction for failing to make payments in accordance with a court order unless the contemner demonstrates inability to pay. The two cases cited in support of this argument, see Ex parte Dustman, 538 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.1976); Ex parte Raymer, 44 S.W.2d 889 (Tex.App.--Amarillo 1982, no writ), exemplify a line of cases exempting money judgments in domestic relations cases from the full prohibition against imprisonment for debt in Tex. Const. art. I, Sec. 18. See supra note 5. 28 In Raymer, the court held that a criminal contempt penalty was valid if the contemner failed to carry the burden of proof of establishing that he was unable to make each child support payment as it came due. Id. at 890. It held further that to invalidate a civil contempt judgment, the contemner must establish impossibility of performance at the time of commitment to jail. Id. The contemner must present not only conclusive proof that he lacks the financial resources to pay the delinquency, but also that he knows of no source from which the sum might be obtained. Id. (citation omitted). The latter may be shown by proof that the contemner (1) does not have property that can be sold or mortgaged in order to obtain the necessary amount; (2) has unsuccessfully attempted to borrow the necessary amount from financial institutions; and (3) knows of no other source, including relatives, from which the necessary amount can be obtained. Id. at 890-91 (citation omitted). In Dustman, the Texas Supreme Court ordered the contemner discharged in view of his established inability to pay the arrearage due in child support payments ordered in his divorce judgment. 29 Numerous other Texas cases have both permitted and imposed certain restrictions on imprisonment as a civil sanction in domestic relations cases. See, e.g., Ex parte Preston, 162 Tex. 379, 347 S.W.2d 938, 942 (1961) (quoting Decker v. Decker, 52 Wash.2d 456, 326 P.2d 332, 333 (1958), for the proposition that [p]roblems of domestic relations involving alimony, support payments, property settlements, together with court orders in connection therewith, do not normally fall into the debtor-creditor category.); Ex parte Jackson, 590 S.W.2d 775, 776 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1979, no writ) (holding that a divorce judgment ordering a husband to pay $5000 in past community debts could not be enforced by a contempt judgment because it concerned money to be earned in the future). 30 Were we to find that the Texas law exemption from the prohibition against imprisonment for debt for domestic relations cases, see Tex. Const. art. I, Sec. 18, interp. commentary (Vernon 1984), supra note 5, applies to this case, Raymer would dictate that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing prior to issuing a contempt order to provide an opportunity for the Kirks to demonstrate their inability to pay at that time. However, we find that the Texas domestic relations cases are exceptions to the general prohibition against imprisonment for debt, and therefore are inapplicable to the present case. See also infra part B. 31 Accordingly, the civil contempt judgment imposed by the district court, carrying with it the threat of imprisonment, is prohibited by section 2007(a) and Tex.Const. art. I, Sec. 18, to enforce the consent order, and must be vacated.