Opinion ID: 159961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellate Jurisdiction and the Scope of Our Review

Text: 20 This case comes before us in an unusual posture. The government contends that we have no jurisdiction to review Gama-Bastidas' claim because he is attacking a sentence that is within the guideline range and he is not challenging the district court's application of the sentencing guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. 3742(a) (delineating grounds upon which sentence can be appealed). Although Gama-Bastidas purports to complain of sentencing error, he is actually attacking the sufficiency of the underlying indictment and, therefore, his conviction. Because we have jurisdiction to review the denial of a challenge to the conviction under 28 U.S.C. 1291, our jurisdiction is not limited to the grounds set forth in 3742(a). Gama-Bastidas' current claim does, however, implicate our earlier decision affirming his conviction. 21 Ordinarily, we will not review in a second direct appeal an issue that underlies a previously affirmed conviction. See United States v. Webb, 98 F.3d 585, 589 (10th Cir. 1996). This general rule is based on two related principles. First, [u]nder the law of the case doctrine, findings made at one point during litigation become law of the case for subsequent stages of that same litigation. Id. at 587. Second, under the mandate rule, the district court should act in conformity with the appellate court's mandate which, in this case, directed the district court only to make findings under a particular sentencing guideline and resentence Gama-Bastidas accordingly. Normally, remand on the sentencing question [will] not reopen for review the underlying convictions. Id. at 589. 22 Neither law of the case nor the mandate rule is jurisdictional, however. We recognize that law of the case is not a jurisdictional rule; rather, it is a rule to be applied at the sound discretion of the court to effectuate the proper administration of justice. United States v. Carson, 793 F.2d 1141, 1147 (10th Cir. 1986). Likewise, the mandate rule, which generally requires trial court conformity with the articulated appellate remand, is a discretion-guiding rule. United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231, 1234 (10th Cir. 1996). Moreover, neither doctrine precludes our review of a non-waivable issue. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Corp. v. Weevil-Cide Co., 897 F.2d 481, 486 n.4 (10th Cir. 1990). 23 The challenge that Gama-Bastidas raises is that the indictment failed factually to charge him with a felony offense under 21 U.S.C. 841. Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(2), a defendant's objection that the indictment fails to charge an offense shall be noticed by the court at any time during the pendency of the proceedings. 3 See also United States v. Bullock, 914 F.2d 1413, 1414 (10th Cir. 1990) ([T]he failure of an indictment to state an offense is a fatal defect that may be raised at any time.) (quotation omitted). Here, Rule 12(b)(2) clearly allows him to raise his current challenge. Accordingly, we may consider Gama-Bastidas' challenge to the sufficiency of his indictment even though he raised it for the first time on remand for resentencing. See United States v. Adesida, 129 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir. 1997) (ruling that defendant could raise challenge that indictment failed to charge an offense for first time on remand for resentencing); United States v. Rosnow, 9 F.3d 728, 730 (8th Cir. 1993) (same). 24 Further, we do not limit our review of Gama-Bastidas' challenge to the narrow scope of clear error under Rule 35(c). Although Gama-Bastidas raised his current challenge through a Rule 35(c) motion, Rule 35(c) was neither a necessary procedural vehicle for his claim nor, as the district court noted, an appropriate one, see United States v. Furman, 112 F.3d 435, 438 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing scope of Rule 35(c)). His claim is one that can be raised at any time during the pendency of the proceedings, and the proceedings were still pendingwith or without his Rule 35(c) motionwhen he raised his claim. Because Gama-Bastidas' claim is functionally and analytically independent of Rule 35(c), our review of his claim is not limited to the narrow scope of that rule. 4