Opinion ID: 2326693
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Lewis Case

Text: In the Lewis matter, Respondent first takes exception to Judge Souder's finding that Respondent's lack of competence in the drafting of the complaint itself violated Rule 1.1. We have reviewed the complaint originally filed on February 19, 2008, in the Lewis case, and we sustain Respondent's exception only to the extent that the drafting of the complaint itself does not demonstrate a level of incompetence sufficient to violate MRPC 1.1. The complaint alleges that Rachelle Lewis's son, a minor at the time of the complaint, was injured while in the custody of the Department of Juvenile Services, and the Department and the Juvenile Court had previously been warned about the risk of injury to Respondent, yet no action was taken to prevent such injury. The complaint then asserts claims for negligent entrustment and negligent supervision. To be sure, the complaint contains some technical deficiencies such as no numbering of paragraphs. See Md. Rule 2-303 (Form of pleadings). The complaint, though, contains at least enough by way of facts and claims such that, in and of itself, the complaint does not demonstrate a lack of competence warranting a finding of a violation of MRPC 1.1. Although the complaint itself does not demonstrate incompetence, we accept as not clearly erroneous Judge Souder's finding that Respondent failed to pursue the Lewis claim after filing the complaint, thereby demonstrating incompetence and insufficient diligence in the matter, in violation of MRPC 1.1 and 1.3 respectively. Specifically, Judge Souder found both that Respondent neglected to perform any kind of services or undertake research, to collect documents to support the complaint, and that [t]he complaint was then dismissed when [Respondent] failed to take any action. Respondent filed the complaint on February 19, 2008. The Circuit Court records of the Lewis case were entered into evidence. Those records show that a Notification of Contemplated Dismissal[,] dated April 24, 2009, was sent to all parties, including Respondent. Respondent filed no motion to prevent dismissal, and the case was subsequently dismissed for lack of prosecution. We conclude, based on that evidence, that Respondent violated MRPC 1.1 and 1.3 in that he neither competently nor diligently pursued Lewis's case. Respondent did not take exception to Judge Souder's finding in her written order that he violated MRPC 3.2. That Rule provides: A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client. Judge Souder, although not explicitly casting it in terms of MRPC 3.2, nonetheless found that Respondent failed to expedite [the Lewis] litigation since he undertook no effort to serve process upon either of the Defendants, he undertook no discovery. The record supports that finding. We therefore conclude that Respondent violated MRPC 3.2. Similarly, Respondent does not take exception to Judge Souder's finding that, [w]hen Ms. Lewis demanded a refund of the fee that had been paid, [Respondent] failed to provide a full accounting of the money that he had received and that he had deposited in his trust account and then dispersed to himself. So he violated [MRPC] 1.15(d). [15] Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that Respondent violated MRPC 1.15(d). Respondent next takes exception to Judge Souder's finding that, in the Lewis case, Respondent violate[d] Rule 1.16(d), when he did not take any steps to strike his appearance if, in fact, he understood that he was being terminated. We sustain Respondent's exception only to the extent that Judge Souder's statement is an actual finding of a rule violation. Judge Souder's statement indicates that Respondent violated MRPC 1.16(d) if he believed that his representation of Lewis was terminated. In other words, the finding is conditional. Because Judge Souder did not address whether Respondent, in fact, understood that he was being terminated, the finding does not provide a sufficient basis for us to conclude that Respondent violated MRPC 1.16(d) in the Lewis case. In sum, we have sustained Respondent's exceptions to the MRPC 1.16(d) violation, and one aspect of Respondent's exception concerning the MRPC 1.1 violation. We conclude, upon our independent review of the record, that it supports Respondent's violations of MRPC 1.1, 1.3, 1.15(d), and 3.2, in connection with his mishandling of the Lewis case.