Opinion ID: 2630898
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Federal Compulsion Argument.

Text: Finally, the City contends the federal equal protection clause (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.) requires the 2003 ordinance as a remedy for the City's own discrimination. Although the superior court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, the court did not meaningfully address the City's federal compulsion argument. The Court of Appeal reversed the superior court's decision to this extent and remanded the case for the limited purpose of adjudicating this issue. Plaintiffs petitioned for review, and we directed the parties to brief the question. [17] We hold the Court of Appeal ruled correctly and affirm its judgment remanding for further proceedings. Plaintiffs assert two procedural objections to remanding for further proceedings. Both lack merit. First, plaintiffs suggest the City failed to carry its burden in the superior court and is merely seeking a second, undeserved chance to do so. Plaintiffs mischaracterize the procedural posture. Because the City raised the federal compulsion theory as an argument against plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the City's burden was to show that triable issues of fact exist. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th 826, 849.) All parties have stipulated that no additional briefing or record submissions are necessary; the City seeks only a hearing in the superior court to determine whether it has carried its burden. Second, plaintiffs contend the City did not properly plead its federal compulsion theory. To the extent the City was required to plead the theory, the City did so by alleging in its answer as an affirmative defense that plaintiff Schram's complaint is barred on the ground that the federal Constitution preempts the application of Proposition 209 [i.e., section 31] to invalidate the Ordinance. Plaintiffs never objected in the lower courts that the City's pleading was insufficient to preserve the issue. Instead, plaintiffs responded on the merits, thus waiving the objection. ( Neverkovec v. Fredericks (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 337, 346, fn. 5 [87 Cal.Rptr.2d 856].) (13) Certainly we have the power to decide the federal compulsion issue in the first instance. We owe the superior court no deference in reviewing its ruling on a motion for summary judgment; the standard of review is de novo. ( Johnson v. City of Loma Linda, supra, 24 Cal.4th 61, 67-68.) Furthermore, [i]t is axiomatic that we review the trial court's rulings and not its reasoning. ( People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 944 [277 Cal.Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950].) Thus, a reviewing court may affirm a trial court's decision granting summary judgment for an erroneous reason. ( D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18-19 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10].) In this case, however, we see no detriment and some benefit in affording the City the hearing in the superior court to which all litigants are entitled as a matter of course. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (a).) Unlike the political structure and federal funding issues, which we may resolve as questions of law, the federal compulsion claim is largely factual and depends on the evidence supporting the Board's decision to adopt race-conscious legislation. When the government seeks to defend actions based on race as remedial, there must be a `strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that remedial action was necessary.' ( Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 500; quoting Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, supra, 476 U.S. 267, 277 (plur. opn. of Powell, J.).) We expect the superior court's assessment of the record will assist the reviewing courts, if necessary, in determining whether a strong basis in the evidence does in fact support the City's decision to adopt the 2003 ordinance. [18] We offer the following comments to assist the superior court in resolving the federal compulsion issue on remand: While the parties have not brought to our attention any decision ordering a governmental entity to adopt race-conscious public contracting policies under the compulsion of the federal equal protection clause, the relevant decisions hold open the possibility that race-conscious measures might be required as a remedy for purposeful discrimination in public contracting. ( Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 568 [Where the state or a political subdivision has intentionally discriminated, use of a race-conscious or race-specific remedy necessarily follows as the only, or at least the most likely, means of rectifying the resulting injury.]; see also Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 509 (plur. opn. of O'Connor, J.) [In the extreme case, some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion.].) (14) All racial classifications, even those contained in ostensibly remedial laws, must survive strict scrutiny. ( Parents Involved, supra, 551 U.S. 701, 720; Adarand, supra, 515 U.S. 200, 226-227.) This is because `racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and classification.' ( Parents Involved, at p. 720, quoting Gratz v. Bollinger (2003) 539 U.S. 244, 270 [156 L.Ed.2d 257, 123 S.Ct. 2411].) Under the strict scrutiny test, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests. ( Adarand, at p. 227.) The only possibly compelling governmental interest implicated by the facts of this case is the interest in providing a remedy for purposeful discrimination. (See Croson, supra, 488 U.S. 469, 500; see also id., at p. 509 (plur. opn. of O'Connor, J.); Hi-Voltage, supra, 24 Cal.4th 537, 568.) [19] (15) In any event, proof of discriminatory purpose or intent is always required to show a violation of the federal equal protection clause ( Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp. (1977) 429 U.S. 252, 265 [50 L.Ed.2d 450, 97 S.Ct. 555]), and remedial action must actually be necessary ( Croson, at p. 500). Accordingly, to defeat plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the City must show that triable issues of fact exist on each of the factual predicates for its federal compulsion claim, namely (1) that the City has purposefully or intentionally discriminated against MBE's and WBE's; (2) that the purpose of the City's 2003 ordinance is to provide a remedy for such discrimination; (3) that the ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose; and (4) that a race- and gender-conscious remedy is necessary as the only, or at least the most likely, means of rectifying the resulting injury. If any of these points can be resolved as a matter of law in plaintiffs' favor, it follows that the City cannot establish federal compulsion and that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment. [20] On remand, the superior court is to consider the federal compulsion issue based on the existing record in accordance with the Stipulation of All Counsel That No Additional Briefing or Record Submissions Are Required for Consolidation (July 9, 2004).