Opinion ID: 394126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Contempt Judgment

Text: 24 As the Supreme Court stated in Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450, 31 S.Ct. 492, 501, 55 L.Ed. 797 (1911), the power of courts to punish for contempts is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, supra, 447 U.S. at 764, 100 S.Ct. at 2463. A party commits contempt when he violates a definite and specific order of the court requiring him to perform or refrain from performing a particular act or acts with knowledge of the court's order. See Jim Walter Resources, Inc. v. International Union, UMW, 609 F.2d 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1980); In re Baum, 606 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1980). In this case, the district court's judgment was an adjudication of civil contempt. The purpose of this order was to compel appellants to comply with the court's previous orders requiring them to submit to discovery by the SEC rather than to vindicate the court's authority without regard for the contemnor's future compliance with the court's orders. See Smith v. Sullivan, 611 F.2d 1050, 1053 (5th Cir. 1980). The order itself stated that appellants could purge their contempt, presumably by following the district court's prior orders, and we conclude that the contempt judgment entered by the district court was civil in nature. Consequently, we must examine the validity of the district court's order underlying its contempt judgment because a judgment of civil contempt can not stand if the basis for the judgment is erroneous. ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1356 (5th Cir. 1978). 25 Appellants contend that the district court's contempt judgment should be reversed because the district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous and the district court abused its discretion in holding them in contempt. Finally, appellants argue that their refusal to submit to discovery was based upon a valid claim of privilege and the advice of counsel. We can not accept these contentions. 26 While the district court entered separate findings of fact in connection with its contempt judgment, 6 appellants' argument here is the same as that in regard to the default judgment that there is nothing in the record to support the finding that appellants received notice of the different depositions and hearings they were required to attend. We have already rejected that argument in connection with our discussion of the default judgment and, for the reasons stated above, we also reject it here. The district court also did not abuse its discretion. Appellants' persistent refusal to comply with the district court's orders throughout this litigation justified the district court's imposition of this sanction. For the reasons stated above, we also reject appellants' argument that they validly invoked their fifth amendment privilege before the district court. Finally, we reject appellants' contention that reliance upon the advice of counsel constitutes an excuse for their refusal to obey a valid court order. Reliance upon advice of counsel may be considered in mitigation of the sanction but does not constitute a defense to contempt of court. United States v. Seavers, 472 F.2d 607, 611 (6th Cir. 1973); In re Door, 195 F.2d 766, 770 & n. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1952); United States v. Goldfarb, 167 F.2d 735, 735 (2d Cir. 1948) (per curiam); Eustace v. Lynch, 80 F.2d 652, 656 (9th Cir. 1935); Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 384 F.Supp. 846, 849-50 (C.D.Cal.1974), vacated as moot, 537 F.2d 1031 (9th Cir. 1976); id. (cases cited); Theriault v. Carlson, 353 F.Supp. 1061, 1066 n. 2 (N.D.Ga.1973), rev'd on other grounds, 495 F.2d 390 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003, 95 S.Ct. 323, 42 L.Ed.2d 279 (1974). The judgments of the district court are 27 AFFIRMED.