Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Presence of Unauthorized Individuals at Grand Jury Proceedings

Text: Present at some part of the grand jury proceedings that returned the indictment against defendant were several deputy district attorneys who were apparently observing the proceeding for training purposes. Subsequently, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment under section 995 alleging, as one ground of the motion, that the presence of these prosecutors violated section 939. Section 939 provides in pertinent part: No person other than those specified in Article 3 (commencing with Section 934), and in Sections 939.1, 939.11, and 939.21, and the officer having custody of a prisoner witness while the prisoner is testifying, is permitted to be present during the criminal sessions of the grand jury except the members and witnesses actually under examination. Although the district attorney is allowed to be present at grand jury proceedings to serve particular functions in aid of the proceedings (§ 935), the trial court agreed with defendant that the presence of deputy district attorneys who are not fulfilling this function was a violation of section 939. Nonetheless, the trial court concluded that defendant had failed to establish prejudice arising from the violation and dismissal of the indictment was not required. On appeal, defendant contends the violation of section 939 amounted to a violation of his state and federal due process rights as well as the requirement in article I, section 14 of the state Constitution that felonies be prosecuted either by indictment or information and the Eighth Amendment's requirement of heightened scrutiny in capital cases. He further asserts that these violations constituted a structural error in the grand jury proceedings that requires reversal without reference to prejudice. We reject the argument. Although section 939 does not preclude the presence of deputy district attorneys actively involved in assisting the district attorney in fulfilling his or her statutory function in grand jury proceedings (see Stern v. Superior Court (1947) 78 Cal.App.2d 9, 13, 177 P.2d 308), in this case, evidently, the deputy district attorneys were not rendering such assistance. We assume, therefore, that the trial court correctly concluded their presence was a technical violation of section 939. (See People v. Superior Court (Mouchaourab) (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403, 415, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 829 [Apart from necessary and authorized appearances, as specified by statute, no person is permitted to be present during criminal sessions of the grand jury except the members of the jury and witnesses actually under examination].) Where, as here, irregularities in the grand jury proceedings are challenged on appeal, a showing of actual prejudice is required. ( People v. Towler (1982) 31 Cal.3d 105, 123, 181 Cal.Rptr. 391, 641 P.2d 1253.) Thus, defendant must show the alleged errors before the grand jury deprived him of a fair trial or otherwise resulted in any actual prejudice relating to his conviction before reversal on the ground of such irregularity is warranted. ( Ibid. ) Defendant asserts that the unauthorized presence of the deputy district attorneys had an inherent tendency to be coercive and to compromise the grand jury's independence. This assertion, unsupported by any reference to the record, is purely speculative and fails to comport with Towler's actual prejudice requirement. Undeterred, defendant argues that he is not required to show prejudice. In support of this claim, defendant relies on Vasquez v. Hillery (1986) 474 U.S. 254, 106 S.Ct. 617, 88 L.Ed.2d 598. Under federal law, as under state law, irregularities in grand jury proceedings are generally subject to analysis for prejudice. ( Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States (1988) 487 U.S. 250, 254-257, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228.) Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that there are isolated exceptions to the harmless error rule involving cases where the error is of constitutional magnitude and the structural protections of the grand jury have been so compromised as to render the proceedings fundamentally unfair, allowing the presumption of prejudice. ( Id. at pp. 256-257, 108 S.Ct. 2369.) In Vasquez, racial discrimination in the composition of the jury that indicted the defendant led the court to reverse his conviction without reference to prejudice. ( Vasquez v. Hillery, supra, 474 U.S. at pp. 263-264, 106 S.Ct. 617.) As the court subsequently explained, Vasquez exemplified the rare case where [t]he nature of the violation allowed a presumption that the defendant was prejudiced, and any inquiry into harmless error would have required unguided speculation. ( Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 257, 108 S.Ct. 2369; United States v. Mechanik (1986) 475 U.S. 66, 70-71, fn. 1, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 [noting that the grounds for reversal in Vasquez have little force outside the context of racial discrimination in the composition of the grand jury].) Vasquez is inapposite. The presence of unauthorized individuals at grand jury proceedings does not have a structural impact on those proceedings comparable to that of discriminatory selection of grand jurors, nor is such error insusceptible of review for actual prejudice such that prejudice must be presumed. (Cf. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, supra, 487 U.S. at pp. 257-260, 108 S.Ct. 2369 [unauthorized presence of two IRS agents at grand jury proceeding was not prejudicial and did not warrant dismissal of indictment]; United States v. Plesinski (9th Cir. 1990) 912 F.2d 1033, 1038-1039 [presence of unauthorized special prosecutor was not prejudicial].) Accordingly, we reject defendant's claim that violation of section 939 resulted in any constitutional error, much less that automatic reversal of his conviction is warranted.