Opinion ID: 169881
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial M isconduct

Text: Belden first claims that the trial court impermissibly influenced him “to drop a line of questioning intended to show the jury that [Smith’s estranged husband] was a viable suspect.” A plt. Opening Br. at 16. Specifically, Belden’s attorneys sought to elicit from Smith that (1) her husband wanted to continue a sexual relationship he had had with Smith and Lane; (2) Lane was not interested; and (3) he had a history of sexual assault and violence toward women. The trial -4- judge asked defense counsel in camera how the jury would view the proposed testimony, given that he viewed it “as being totally nonsense and illogical.” ROA, Vol. 7 at 696. He then stated, I see this as more damaging to the [d]efense than it is helpful. . . . You know, I want you and your client to insist-particularly your client, to insist that this kind of testimony be received. . . . Now, I don’t want to block the [d]efense, but I don’t want in my record any allegations of ineffective assistance of [c]ounsel. Id. at 697. Belden expressly indicated that he wanted to proceed as outlined by his attorneys. But after an ensuing off-the-record discussion with his attorneys, Belden changed his mind. His attorneys indicated that, while they would ask Smith about her husband’s desire for Lane, Belden did not want them to pursue whether the husband had violent propensities. Belden assured the judge that his decision was not influenced by the judge’s comments. The judge commented on Belden’s change of mind, stating that it was a wise decision and that he would allow Belden’s attorneys to proceed with their limited line of questioning. The W yoming Supreme Court concluded that the trial judge’s comments were inappropriate and threatened to “involve the judge in the unique attorney- client relationship.” Belden, 73 P.3d at 1056 (quotation omitted). Nevertheless, it held that Belden was not prejudiced because the trial judge did not comment on the appropriateness of the defense strategy before Belden decided to abandon the strategy. Rather, it believed that the trial judge’s comments “up to that point had -5- been an attempt to determine exactly where the defense was going with its questioning of the witness.” Id. Belden contends that the W yoming Supreme Court’s holding is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, United States Supreme Court decisions stressing the importance of a criminal defendant receiving the “guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings,” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932); see also Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972). W e disagree. A decision is “contrary to” federal law only if the state court (1) reaches a conclusion opposite of that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law; or (2) decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts. Young, 486 F.3d at 662-63 (quotation omitted). First, the W yoming Supreme Court did not reach a legal conclusion in opposition to Powell and its progeny, as the court clearly recognized the importance of defense counsel’s guidance when it discussed whether the trial judge had encroached on the attorney-client relationship. Second, Belden does not claim that the trial judge’s comments are controlled by a factually indistinguishable United States Supreme Court case, and we have found none. Consequently, Belden cannot prevail under AEDPA ’s “contrary to” clause. As for AEDPA ’s “unreasonable application” clause, Belden must show that the W yoming Supreme Court unreasonably applied the governing legal principle to the facts of the case. See Young, 486 F.3d at 663. In other words, he must -6- show that the W yoming Supreme Court’s decision is “at such tension with governing U.S. Supreme Court precedents, or so inadequately supported by the record, or so arbitrary as to be unreasonable.” M aynard v. Boone, 468 F.3d 665, 671 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1819 (2007). “It is not enough that the decision is clearly wrong or that [we] would have reached a contrary decision.” Id. W e conclude that it was not unreasonable for the W yoming Supreme Court to decide that Belden was not prejudiced by the trial judge’s comments. W hile we question the court’s view that the judge did not comment on the appropriateness of Belden’s proposed line of questioning before Belden changed his mind, it is clear that the trial judge’s comments did not influence Belden’s change of mind, given Belden’s express assurance that he was not influenced by the judge. M oreover, the judge allowed Belden’s attorneys to pursue Smith’s husband as a possible suspect by offering the jury evidence of the husband’s sexual desire for Lane. Consequently, it was reasonable for the W yoming Supreme Court to decide that Belden was not prejudiced by the judge’s comments.
Belden next argues that the trial judge became an adversary by suggesting a “motive to silence” theory under which the two prior rape accusations against Belden were ultimately admitted. W hen arguing the issue on direct appeal to the W yoming Supreme Court, Belden contended that the trial judge suggested the -7- theory during trial on October 11, 2000. But in the habeas proceedings in the federal district court and this court, he contends that the trial judge suggested the theory in an August 29, 2000 letter to the parties’ counsel. The federal district court considered Belden’s argument only in the context in which it was presented to the state court, apparently finding it unexhausted insofar as it involved the judge’s letter. See Hawkins v. M ullin, 291 F.3d 658, 670 (10th Cir. 2002) (“W hile a habeas petitioner might still be able to present to a federal habeas court bits of evidence not previously presented in state court, he cannot first present evidence in a federal habeas proceeding that places the claims in a significantly different legal posture without first presenting that evidence in state court.” (quotations omitted)). Even if we assume that the legal posture of Belden’s argument remains the same w hether the motive theory was advanced during trial or in the August 29 pre-trial letter, habeas relief is still unavailable. The W yoming Supreme Court concluded that the prosecution, rather than the trial judge, suggested the theory of admissibility. To support its conclusion, the court cited various portions of the record, including the transcript of an August 28 hearing on the prior rape accusations. After reviewing that transcript, we are convinced that the W yoming Supreme Court did not unreasonably attribute a “motive to silence” theory to the prosecution. Specifically, we note that at the hearing, the prosecutor theorized that “[m]otive also would go to the murder charge, your Honor, because the -8- motive in that case would be the sexual assault.” ROA, Vol. 2, Doc. 24, App. 6 at 17. In response, the trial judge criticized the theory, questioning how a motive to silence Lane was connected to the purported past rapes. The prosecutor acknowledged the court’s criticism and quickly moved on to another area. W e conclude that it is sufficiently clear from the record that the “motive to silence” theory originated with the prosecution, before the trial judge’s A ugust 29 letter.
Belden challenges the W yoming Supreme Court’s decision that he was not prejudiced when the trial judge scolded both parties’ counsel in front of the jury. The incident occurred in the context of the prosecutor’s attempts to elicit from a witness the value of Belden’s motorcycle, which Belden had abandoned fifteen years earlier. W hen the prosecutor asked the witness whether he (the w itness) would have abandoned such a motorcycle, defense counsel objected and requested a mistrial. After further argument from the prosecutor and voir dire by the defense counsel, the judge ended the matter: The Court: Fellows, enough’s enough. Enough’s enough from both of you. You’re treating the Jury and me like we’re a bunch of dummies. [D efense Counsel]: I’m not trying to, your Honor. The Court: Ladies and Gentlemen, you know what this is all about, don’t you? Is there anybody confused about what’s going on about the motorcycle? If so, raise your hands? No hands have been raised. Now, the motion for mistrial is denied. M r. Anderson [the prosecutor], I won’t reprimand you for anything other than wasting our time over this issue of the motorcycle. -9- Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, it’s time for the noon recess and w e’ll take it now . ROA, Vol. 6 at 498. Immediately after the recess, the judge instructed the jurors to disregard any impressions they might have developed about his view of the motorcycle evidence. He explained: I do not want you to think that any of the comments that I made to you at the end of the morning session were a comment on any of the evidence. Anything that I said at the end of the morning recess was not a comment on the evidence. It was a comment on the actions of the attorneys and that’s what I intended it to be. Id. at 511-12. The W yoming Supreme Court found the judge’s remarks “unsettling.” Belden, 73 P.3d at 1065. But it rejected Belden’s claim that he was prejudiced by those remarks, reasoning that (1) the judge focused his ire on the prosecutor, (2) the evidence regarding the “motorcycle w as, at most, peripheral to the ultimate question of Belden’s guilt,” and (3) “any prejudicial effects of the court’s comm ents were mitigated by the timely instruction given to the jury.” Belden, 73 P.3d at 1065. Belden challenges the state court’s decision with minimal analysis and by citing a variety of United States Supreme Court decisions, several of which are of questionable relevance. Roughly on point, however, is Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (holding that judicial rulings and remarks during trial that are disapproving or even hostile to counsel, the parties, or their cases do not support a claim of bias or partiality unless they reveal “such a high -10- degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible”). W e conclude that the W yoming Supreme Court’s determination was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, Litekey. W hile the trial judge did address his overall comments to both counsel, he limited his reprimand to the prosecutor, seemingly disparaging the motorcycle’s evidentiary importance to the state. And none of the comments, while indeed unsettling, were so highly favorable to the prosecution or antagonistic to the defense as to preclude a fair trial, especially considering the trial judge’s cautionary instruction. Habeas relief on this matter is not warranted. 2