Opinion ID: 2981124
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Demon Statements

Text: Piscopo also asserts his constitutional right to confront witnesses and present a defense was violated by the trial court when it did not admit KB’s statements concerning her asserted rape and threats by demons.7 Piscopo contends that such evidence would have shown the jury that KB misperceived what happened to her during the deliverance ceremony, and that her “delusions” rendered her testimony unreliable. As noted above, the defendant was permitted to make a record of testimony concerning this evidence outside of the presence of the jury. KB confirmed that she wrote on her deliverance questionnaire that she was raped by a demon as a teenager. She explained that she was lying in bed and sensed the presence of a “spirit” without a human form. She also acknowledged writing that evil spirits had tried to kill her and her sister, and she had told people of her fear of the basement stairs because she was afraid that demons would grab her by the ankles. 7 Although Piscopo’s briefs include arguments concerning his constitutional right to present a defense, and the state responds to these arguments, this claim was neither in his habeas petition nor included in the certificate of appealability. In any event, these arguments largely reiterate his Confrontation Clause arguments. To the extent Piscopo’s claim is properly before us, we conclude that the state courts’ exclusion of the questionnaire evidence was not unreasonable under Supreme Court precedent, as Piscopo was given a “meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986). No. 10-2617 10 Piscopo’s argument concerning KB’s experience with demons was mentioned only in passing by the opinion of the Michigan Court of Appeals. On habeas review, the district court then determined that because the state court of appeals decision “provided only a cursory analysis of demon-rape issue,” the appropriate standard of review to apply was that of “modified AEDPA deference.” “This standard of review requires the court to conduct a careful review of the record and applicable law, but nonetheless bars the court from reversing unless the state court’s decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law.” Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 2005). As the state asserts, however, all of the deference afforded by § 2254 applies to our review. This is true whether or not “a state court’s order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011). See also Treesh v. Bagley, 612 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1678 (2011). The Supreme Court’s recent Harrington opinion described the AEDPA’s role as a “part of the basic structure of federal habeas jurisdiction, designed to confirm that state courts are the principal forum for asserting constitutional challenges to state convictions.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 787. A state court order lacking in reasoning or explanation does not have to include citation to, or demonstrate its awareness of, Supreme Court decisions as long as any reasoning that is given, and the result, are not in conflict with Supreme Court precedent. Treesh, 612 F.3d at 430 (citing Williams v. Bagley, 380 F.3d 932, 942 (6th Cir. 2004)). No. 10-2617 11 As with the sexual abuse evidence, the parties also dispute the characterization of this evidence. Piscopo asserts that the evidence would have been used to show that KB misperceived the incident, rather than to attack her credibility. This is asserted by Piscopo to distinguish the case from the facts of Boggs, where we found that “cross-examination as to general credibility is not [constitutionally protected].” 226 F.3d at 737. However, as discussed above, in Vasquez, we held that attacks on general credibility were protected under the Confrontation Clause.8 There is no need to address the tension between the Boggs and Vasquez decisions in deciding this case. Even if Piscopo’s intended use of the evidence was as described, it was not unreasonable for the Michigan courts to conclude that it was a constitutionally permitted limit on cross examination. The jury was presented with the circumstances of the contact between KB and Piscopo. Members of the jury were aware that KB was someone who claimed to be plagued by evil spirits and was in fact at the deliverance ceremony to exorcise them. The jury also heard testimony concerning her attendance at other pastors’ deliverance ceremonies in the past. KB filled out a lengthy form, including a couple of pages briefly describing upsetting experiences in her life, in preparation for deliverance by Piscopo from evil spirits. Piscopo does not argue that these past incidents somehow incapacitated KB, or caused her to be generally unable to distinguish real life events from imagined ones. He 8 Also as with the sexual abuse evidence, the parties dispute whether the trial court properly excluded the evidence under Michigan’s rape shield statute. However, in our habeas review we do not “determine whether the exclusion of the evidence by the trial judge was correct or incorrect under state law, but rather whether such exclusion rendered petitioner’s trial so fundamentally unfair as to constitute a denial of federal constitutional rights.” Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 420 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Logan v. Marshall, 680 F.2d 1121, 1123 (6th Cir. 1982)). No. 10-2617 12 offers no argument as to how one questionnaire answer concerning KB’s perceived teenage demon rape demonstrates that she incorrectly sexualizes situations as an adult.9 The Supreme Court has described the Confrontation Clause’s guarantee as that of “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). Whether or not we would have come to the same conclusion as the trial court on these evidentiary questions is not dispositive of this action. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 699 (2002). As the Supreme Court stated in Harrington, habeas corpus is not a “substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Habeas review employs a deference which “demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 F.3d 668, 676 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Cullen v. Pinholster, __ U.S. __, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L.Ed 2d 557 (2011)). Application of that deference to the state court rulings at issue here demonstrates that Piscopo is not entitled to the relief that he seeks. Because the decision in the Michigan state courts—that excluding this evidence represented a constitutionally permitted limit on Piscopo’s cross-examination of KB—was 9 We find distinguishable the case of Hargrave v. McKee, 248 F. App’x. 718 (6th Cir. 2007), cited by Piscopo. In Hargrave, a woman living out of her car complained of a rape and carjacking by the defendant. The defendant was convicted on the carjacking charges, despite his defense that the complainant had consented to his temporary possession of the car, and was not permitted to cross-examine the complainant in any depth on her psychiatric condition. In that case, we held that the Confrontation Clause guaranteed a defendant the right to additional cross-examination. We came to this determination finding a “strong possibility” that the complaining witness’s mental condition impacted the reliability of testimony concerning her consent to the “very events at issue.” Hargrave, 248 F. App’x at 727. No. 10-2617 13 not an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of the petition.