Opinion ID: 167739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asylum Claim B ased On Chinese Ethnicity.

Text: Congress has imposed a one-year limitations period on the filing of applications for asylum. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The one-year filing period comm ences either on the date of the alien’s last arrival in the United States or on April 1, 1997, whichever is later. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii). An asylum application that is filed outside of the one-year limitations period may, nevertheless, be considered if the applicant shows “changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Under the asylum statute, however, we “do not have ‘jurisdiction to review any determination’ on whether the alien filed his application within a year of entry or whether ‘changed circumstances’ exist ‘which materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum.’” Tsevegmid v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(a)(3) and (a)(2)(D)). 1 The IJ also denied M r. Bastian’s applications for: (1) restriction on removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3); and (2) withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture, see 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c). M r. Bastian has not made any arguments in this appeal challenging the IJ’s rulings with regard to these applications. As a result, he has waived all issues relating to them. See Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1280 (10th Cir. 2002). -2- It is undisputed that M r. Bastian is of Chinese ethnicity, and he claims that “[a]s an ethnic Chinese Indonesian, . . . he was often mistreated and discriminated against” during the time that he lived in Indonesia. Pet. Br. at 5. M r. Bastian also claims that he has a well-founded fear of future persecution in Indonesia based on his Chinese ethnicity should he be forced to return there. The threshold question here, however, is whether the IJ determined that M r. Bastian’s asylum claim is barred by the one-year limitations period in § 1158(a)(2)(B) to the extent that it is based on his Chinese ethnicity. Because it is undisputed that M r. Bastian arrived in the United States prior to April 1, 1997, M r. Bastian was required to file his asylum application by April 1, 1998. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii). M r. Bastian did not file his asylum application until September 30, 2003, however, and his application was therefore untimely unless there existed “changed circumstances which materially affect[ed his] eligibility for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). Although the IJ’s decision is somewhat difficult to follow due to the fact that the IJ also addressed the merits of M r. Bastian’s ethnicity claim, see Admin. R. at 37-38, we conclude that the IJ determined that M r. Bastian’s asylum claim was barred by the one-year limitations period to the extent that it is based on his Chinese ethnicity, id. at 38 (stating that M r. Bastian “fail[ed] to timely pursue” his ethnicity claim). In addition, we note that, in contrast to his religion claim, there is no indication in the administrative record that M r. Bastian has ever -3- claimed that there existed changed circumstances which affected his eligibility for asylum based on his Chinese ethnicity. Finally, the IJ’s determination of the timeliness issue was not affected by the B IA’s per curiam order adopting and affirming the IJ’s decision, as the BIA stated that its conclusions “coincide with those which the [IJ] articulated in his . . . decision.” Id. at 2 (quoting M atter of Burbano, 20 I& N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994)). Accordingly, because the BIA affirmed the IJ’s determination that M r. Bastian’s ethnicity claim was time-barred, we have no jurisdiction to review that aspect of his asylum claim, and that part of M r. Bastian’s petition for review must be dismissed. 2 2 On M ay 11, 2005, the REAL ID Act of 2005 took effect. Among its other provisions, the REAL ID Act provides that “[n]othing in . . . any . . . provision of this A ct (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review , shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). This case raises an issue as to whether the REAL ID Act’s grant of jurisdiction to review “questions of law” has any impact on the jurisdictional bar in 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3). Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that it does not, as we are dealing here with factual determinations, and we recently held that the term “questions of law” as used in § 1252(a)(2)(D) refers only to a narrow category of issues regarding statutory construction. See Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1282 (10th Cir. 2006). -4-