Opinion ID: 844288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to the Constitutionality of California's Death Penalty Law

Text: Defendant argues that the death penalty in California violates the California Constitution and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because it is imposed arbitrarily and capriciously depending on the county in which the case is prosecuted. We have repeatedly rejected substantially similar claims, concluding over 20 years ago that prosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought does not ... offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual punishment. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 505 [250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081]; see also People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229].) Defendant, however, urges this court to reexamine our decisions in prior cases in light of the United States Supreme Court's voting rights decision in Bush v. Gore (2000) 531 U.S. 98 [148 L.Ed.2d 388, 121 S.Ct. 525], which, he asserts, requires uniformity among California's 58 counties for prosecutorial standards for seeking the death penalty. But as the high court explained, its consideration of the equal protection challenge to Florida's voting recount process was limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities. ( Id. at p. 109, italics added.) That case, therefore, does not warrant our revisiting our prior holdings on the instant issue. ( People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 629, fn. 19 [88 Cal.Rptr.3d 131, 199 P.3d 535].)
Defendant contends the delay in appointing appellate counselfrom the judgment in November 1997 to May 2003violated his constitutional rights. Specifically, defendant claims a violation of his due process right to a speedy appeal and his right to equal protection. We previously have considered and rejected identical claims. ( People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 942 [32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 775-776 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754]; People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 708-709 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213].) In support of his argument, defendant relies on federal authority in noncapital cases, but as we have explained, [n]one of those decisions address the unique demands of appellate representation in capital cases. ( Holt, at p. 709.) Additionally, defendant fails to demonstrate that the delay inherent in the procedures by which California recruits, screens, and appoints attorneys to represent capital defendants on appeal, is not necessary to ensure that competent representation is available for indigent capital appellants. ( Ibid. ) Defendant has identified no persuasive reason to reconsider our prior holdings, and we decline to do so.
Defendant contends that [m]any features of this state's capital sentencing scheme, alone or in combination with each other, violate the United States Constitution. He concedes we have rejected these claims in previous decisions, but argues we should reconsider them. Having found no reason to do so, we reject these claims and list them here to ensure a future court will consider them fully exhausted. Accordingly, we conclude the death penalty law is not unconstitutional:  In assertedly failing to `genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty' generally, or more specifically because the special circumstances are so numerous or so broad ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);  Due to the asserted overbreadth of section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime as an aggravating factor ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);  In failing to require the jury to find the aggravating factors were proved beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, or that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533), nor is this conclusion called into question by the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428] ( People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 214; see also Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270 [166 L.Ed.2d 856, 127 S.Ct. 856]);  In failing to require jury unanimity with respect to aggravating factors ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);  In failing to impose a burden of proof on either party, even if only proof by a preponderance of the evidence, or, alternatively, in failing to instruct the jury on the absence of a burden of proof ( People v. Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 509; People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);  In failing to require the jury to return written findings ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 533);  In failing to require intercase proportionality review ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 534);  In failing to specify which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 534);  In prefacing several factors with the phrase `whether or not' ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 534);  In treating noncapital sentencing differently from capital sentencing ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1067 [`The statutory scheme does not deny capital defendants the equal protection of the laws or any other constitutional right insofar as it does not contain disparate sentence review (i.e., comparative or intercase proportionality review)']; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 590 [36 Cal.Rptr. 3d 340, 123 P.3d 614] [`capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated and therefore may be treated differently without violating constitutional guarantees of equal protection of the laws or due process of law']) ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 534-535);  In failing to comply with `International Norms of Humanity and Decency' ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 535); and  In light of the abolition of capital punishment in Western Europe ( People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 535).
Finally, defendant contends the delay in his executionhe has been on death row for over 13 yearsconstitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the federal and state Constitutions, international law, covenants, treaties and norms. (See, e.g., Lackey v. Texas (1995) 514 U.S. 1045 [131 L.Ed.2d 304, 115 S.Ct. 1421] (mem. of Stevens, J., on denial of cert.).) As explained in People v. Anderson [(2001)] 25 Cal.4th [543,] 606 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347], `we have consistently concluded, both before and since Lackey, that delay inherent in the automatic appeal process is not a basis for concluding that either the death penalty itself, or the process leading to its execution, is cruel and unusual punishment.' ( People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 382, 404 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 624, 93 P.3d 244].) Defendant advances no persuasive reason to reexamine this conclusion. Further, any reliance on international law or extraterritorial decisional law has no bearing on the validity of a death sentence that satisfies federal and state constitutional mandates. ( People v. Brown, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 404.)