Opinion ID: 1180798
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Administrative Hearing

Text: First, we turn to whether the scope of the administrative hearing included a determination of the validity of respondent's arrest. By valid arrest we mean an arrest supported by probable cause. Under former ORS 487.805(1), [4] a person operating a motor vehicle on the state's highways was deemed to consent to a chemical breath test if arrested for driving while under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). If the person failed the test and had his or her driving privileges suspended, he or she could ask for an administrative hearing. Former ORS 482.541(2). [5] The scope of the hearing was limited to determining whether the requirements for a valid suspension under former ORS 487.805 had been met. Former ORS 482.541(4). Among those requirements was whether [t]he person, at the time the person was requested to submit to a test under ORS 487.805, was under arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicants. Former ORS 482.541(4)(a). (Emphasis added.) In State v. Ratliff, 304 Or. 254, 256 n. 2, 744 P.2d 247 (1987), we left open the question of whether hearings officers might consider the validity of arrests in suspension hearings. Here, the state contends that the scope of the hearing was limited to determining whether respondent simply was under arrest when asked to take the breath test. The state argues that to allow inquiry into the validity of the arrest would unduly complicate the hearing, tax the adjudicative skills of the hearings officer, and implicate the collateral estoppel concerns at the heart of State v. Ratliff, supra . According to the state, the determination that respondent was under arrest, validly or not, ends the inquiry because respondent then could be requested to take the chemical breath test. The position of the state is unpersuasive. In an earlier case, this court concluded that the guideline of a legal arrest was a control over a police officer's discretion in requesting a chemical breath test. Heer v. Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 252 Or. 455, 450 P.2d 533 (1969). Implicit was the idea that an illegal arrest would not place suitable controls over the officer's discretion and thus that the request might run afoul of separation-of-powers provisions in the state constitution. See 252 Or. at 463-64, 450 P.2d 533. The Heer court apparently assumed that the breath test request only would be made after a legal arrest. Id. Similarly, the Court of Appeals concluded eight years ago that a valid arrest was prerequisite to a lawful request to take a chemical breath test. Brinkley v. Motor Vehicles Division, 47 Or. App. 25, 29, 613 P.2d 1071 (1980). Again, there was an idea implicit in that conclusion: That a valid arrest is required to suspend for failing the test. Together, the Heer and Brinkley decisions favor the view that the arrest which is prerequisite to a lawful suspension under the implied consent law must be a valid arrest. Without a valid arrest, there can be no request to take a breath test which may lead to a lawful suspension. Other considerations bolster this view. Although former ORS 482.541 does not, on its face, address the issue, we conclude that the legislature must have intended a valid arrest when it used the term under arrest in that statute. Were that not so, police officers would be free to stop drivers at random, without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, hoping to identify the occasional DUII driver. Such random activities by the police would be unconstitutional. See State v. Boyanovsky, 304 Or. 131, 743 P.2d 711 (1987); State v. Anderson, 304 Or. 139, 743 P.2d 715 (1987). Because we do not attribute to the legislature the intent to sanction unconstitutional procedures, see Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or. 290, 299, 744 P.2d 992 (1987), we conclude that the term under arrest in former ORS 482.541 meant a valid arrest. If the arrest must be valid, it follows that the scope of the administrative hearing before the hearings officer included the question of the validity of the arrest. Upon respondent's request, the hearings officer was required under former ORS 482.541 to determine whether respondent validly was under arrest for DUII when asked to take the chemical breath test. In so concluding, we recognize the added burden placed upon the hearings officer. That burden, however, is not significantly more far-reaching than that already borne in these administrative proceedings. See Leabo v. SER/Motor Vehicles Division, 46 Or. App. 55, 610 P.2d 317 (1980) (whether police officer had reasonable grounds to believe driver was DUII included within scope of suspension hearing). Moreover, we note that the state has misapprehended the rationale of our opinion in State v. Ratliff, supra . Although we stated in that opinion that license suspension proceedings were intended to be expeditious and informal, we did not purport to exclude from those proceedings matters which are properly before the hearings officer. See 304 Or. at 259-60, 744 P.2d 247. The validity of the arrest for DUII is such a matter.