Opinion ID: 852106
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Origin and Application of the Inextricably Intertwined Exception

Text: The Sixth Amendment guarantees that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The purpose of this guarantee is to `protec[t] the unaided layman at critical confrontations' with his `expert adversary,' the government, after `the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified' with respect to a particular alleged crime. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 177-78, 111 S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984)). As such, its protections are offense specific, do not attach until formal commencement of adversarial proceedings, and cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions. Id. at 175, 111 S.Ct. 2204. While the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel is broadly viewed as offense specific, most federal circuits traditionally recognized two exceptions. These were the inextricably intertwined (or closely related) exception and the circumvention of Sixth Amendment right exception, both inferred from the holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court in Brewer v. Williams [5] and Maine v. Moulton. [6] See, e.g., United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1223 (9th Cir.1999), abrogated by Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 1335. The circumvention of the Sixth Amendment right exception applies when the government or state breaches its `affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right to counsel.' Id. at 1223 n. 6 (quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at 171, 106 S.Ct. 477). See also Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477 (Accordingly, the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present in a confrontation between the accused and a state agent.). The crux of this exception is the knowing use of state agents to obtain incriminating statements relevant to pending charges for which a defendant has already obtained counsel. It does not apply to statements obtained by luck or happenstance. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176, 106 S.Ct. 477. A. Federal Appellate Courts. The Ninth Circuit provided probably the best articulation and application of the inextricably intertwined exception. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223-26. In Covarrubias, the defendants allegedly drove eight individualssome of whom were believed to be illegal immigrantsfrom California to Washington. After dropping off seven of the individuals at various locations around Washington, the defendants got in a dispute with the eighth over the amount of payment and refused to let him leave the van. Local police arrested the defendants on charges of kidnapping, and the court appointed counsel at a subsequent arraignment. Id. at 1222. Following their arraignment, a federal agent from Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) visited the defendants in the local jail and interrogated them about both the state kidnapping charge and a potential federal charge for transporting illegal aliens. [7] Id. Though the agent provided Miranda warnings waived by the defendantsthe agent made no attempt to contact the defendants' appointed counsel. Id. at 1222 n. 4. A few months later the state charges were dropped, and the defendants were immediately indicted on federal charges of moving an illegal alien and forfeiture. The federal district court suppressed the statements made to the INS agent, finding support for both exceptions to the offense-specific rule of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, applying only the inextricably intertwined exception. Id. at 1222-26. It noted that the exception has been applied `when the pending charge is so inextricably intertwined with the charge under investigation that the right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense.' Id. at 1223 (quoting United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir.1992)). [T]he inquiry focuses on the nature of the conduct involved rather than on the elements of the offense itself. Id. at 1225. Application of the exception requires examining and comparing all of the facts and circumstances related to the conduct, including the identity of the persons involved (including the victim, if any), and the timing, motive, and location of the crimes. Id. None of those factors is viewed as particularly dispositive, nor do all factors need to tip in favor of the exception for the offenses to be inextricably intertwined. Id. However, [t]he greater the commonality of the factors and the more directly linked the conduct involved, the more likely it is that courts will find the exception to be applicable. Id. The Covarrubias court then examined those factors and found the state crime of kidnapping and the federal crime of transporting illegal aliens to be inextricably intertwined. Id. at 1225-26. The timing of the two crimes overlapped and involved a continuous course of conduct, and the identity of the individuals overlapped as wellthe defendants were perpetrators in both crimes and the kidnapped victim of the state crime was the transported illegal alien in the federal crime. Id. Furthermore, the court found that the situs for both crimes overlapped, to some degree, in Washington; the defendants had an identical motive for both crimes; and both crimes arose from the same set of facts. Id. The court also pointed out that, as a practical matter, the degree of relation between the crimes was easily apparent from the overlap in interrogations between the state and federal officers; it would have been difficult to confine one's questioning to the facts and circumstances of one offense without straying into a discussion of the other. Id. at 1226 n. 8. Other circuits used a similar analytical framework. For example, in United States v. Arnold, the Third Circuit applied the closely related exception where both charged offenses (1) involve the same witness; (2) arise from the same facts and circumstances; (3) are closely related in time; and (4) involve related conduct. 106 F.3d 37, 42 (3d Cir.1997), abrogated by Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 1335. Specifically, the original charge involved precisely the same type of underlying conduct as the superseding indictment. Id. Because the charges were closely related offenses and arose from the same predicate facts, conduct, intent and circumstances, the court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel carried over from the indictment of the first charge to the investigation of the second. Id. Still other cases provide examples in which the inextricably intertwined exception was considered but not satisfied under particular facts. See United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir.1993) (subsequent chargealthough for the same offenseinvolved a different purchaser-informant, occurred at a different time, and took place in a different locationit was factually distinct from, and independent of, the prior charges); [8] United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1992) (federal firearm offense and state burglary offense were not inextricably intertwinedthe only connection between the two crimes was that defendant possessed the firearm at the time he was arrested for the burglary); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991) (federal and state crimes concerned different conduct, even though both prosecutions could use much of the same evidence). [9] B. Texas v. Cobb . As Jewell acknowledges, in Texas v. Cobb the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the inextricably intertwined exception to the offense-specific nature of the Sixth Amendment in favor of a framework based upon the Blockburger test for double jeopardy. 532 U.S. at 168, 173, 121 S.Ct. 1335. While this forecloses the federal constitutional matter here, [10] the rationale behind the decision bears on our analysis of whether the exception exists under Article 1, Section 13, of the Indiana Constitution. In Cobb, the defendant's neighbor's home was burglarized and the neighbor's wife and daughter were reported missing. Id. at 164-65, 121 S.Ct. 1335. An anonymous tip led police to believe the defendant was involved in the burglary; after questioning, he confessed to the burglary but denied any knowledge about the missing individuals. Id. at 165, 121 S.Ct. 1335. The defendant was arrested and charged with burglary and appointed counsel in due course. Believing the defendant was involved in the disappearances, the police contacted his attorney and asked to interview the defendant. The attorney agreedthis process repeated itself several times. Id. Released on bond for the burglary, the defendant moved in with his father. A short time later, the father contacted the police to report that the defendant had confessed to murdering the missing woman and daughter. The police arrested the defendant for murder and administered Miranda warnings; the defendant waived his Miranda rights and confessed to killing the mother and daughter during the burglary. Id. He was subsequently found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reversed, on grounds there had been a violation of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel with respect to the murder charge. Id. at 166-67, 121 S.Ct. 1335. The Texas court applied its version of the inextricably intertwined exception and found that the defendant's assertion of the right to counsel in the burglary case carried over to the murder investigation and charge. Id. at 167, 121 S.Ct. 1335. The Cobb Court reversed, holding that when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test. Id. at 173, 121 S.Ct. 1335. It acknowledged the trend in the federal circuits (and some state courts) to apply some variation of the inextricably intertwined exception, but explicitly rejected it. Id. at 168, 121 S.Ct. 1335. Instead, the Court focused on two critical considerations: the importance of Miranda warnings before the police conduct any custodial interrogations and society's interest in the ability of police to talk to witnesses and suspects, even those who have been charged with other offenses. Id. at 171-72, 121 S.Ct. 1335. Additionally, the Court believed the inextricably intertwined exception was flawed in that it would presuppose that officers will possess complete knowledge of the circumstances surrounding an incident, such that the officers will be able to tailor their investigation to avoid addressing factually related offenses. Id. at 173, 121 S.Ct. 1335. The reality, the Court said, is that determining the factual circumstances surrounding an alleged crime is the very purpose for the police investigation in the first place, and the possibility of violating the Sixth Amendment under a more nebulous inextricably intertwined exception might deter legitimate investigation altogether. Id. at 173-74, 121 S.Ct. 1335. Justice Breyer, however, challenged the majority's presumption about the clarity of the Blockburger test, saying that it has been described as `a veritable Sargasso Sea which could not fail to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator.' Id. at 185, 121 S.Ct. 1335 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981)). If it is challenging to trained legal professionals, Justice Breyer opined, it will likely be more so for officers in the field. Id. at 185-86, 121 S.Ct. 1335. The inextricably intertwined exception while less a bright line and still imperfect is more reasonable to apply by defining offense based upon the conduct constituting the crime and closely related criminal acts. Id. at 186, 121 S.Ct. 1335. Furthermore, despite its nebulous nature, the federal circuits had no trouble applyingor refusing to applythe exception. Id. C. The Inextricably Intertwined Exception in State Courts. A survey of cases from other states reveals that several have used the inextricably intertwined exception. See, e.g., Taylor v. State, 726 So.2d 841 (Fla.Ct.App.1999); People v. Clankie, 124 Ill.2d 456, 125 Ill.Dec. 290, 530 N.E.2d 448 (1988); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 665 A.2d 223 (1995); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 425 Mass. 540, 681 N.E.2d 1218 (1997), abrogated by Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 1335; State v. Tucker, 137 N.J. 259, 645 A.2d 111 (1994); In re Pack, 420 Pa.Super. 347, 616 A.2d 1006 (1992), abrogated by Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 n. 1, 121 S.Ct. 1335. But almost all these cases rely on the Sixth Amendment, not the state constitutions, and all of the Sixth Amendment cases pre-date Cobb. An exception is Chenoweth v. State, which both post-dates Cobb and examined the right to counsel and the inextricably intertwined concept under the Georgia constitution. 281 Ga. 7, 635 S.E.2d 730 (2006). The Chenoweth court declined to decide, however, whether the majority or minority holding of Cobb best expressed the right to counsel under the Georgia constitution because it found the defendant's right was not violated under either standard. [11] Id. at 733-34. Oregon appears to recognize some version of the inextricably intertwined exception under its constitution, but not in those express terms. See State v. Sparklin, 296 Or. 85, 672 P.2d 1182, 1187 (1983) (under Oregon's right-to-counsel provision there can be no interrogation of a defendant concerning the events surrounding the crime charged unless the attorney representing the defendant on that charge is notified and afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend. . . . The prohibitions placed on the state's contact with a represented defendant do not extend to the investigation of factually unrelated criminal episodes (emphasis added)); [12] cf. State v. Hill, 142 Or.App. 189, 921 P.2d 969, 972 (1996) ( Sparklin means that a defendant cannot be interrogated on matters that are `factually related' to the charges on which he or she is represented unless defense counsel is notified of the interrogation and given a reasonable opportunity to attend). Many of the state law cases cited by the Sparklin courtin which state courts applied a factually related/factually unrelated distinctionpre-date the U.S. Supreme Court's first articulation of the offense specific nature of the Sixth Amendment in McNeil. Still, the principle remains valid under Oregon law. See, e.g., State v. Gilmore, 350 Or. 380, 256 P.3d 95 (2011).