Opinion ID: 2583898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Instruction on Front Pay was Erroneous but Harmless.

Text: The District maintains that the jury instruction on front pay constituted prejudicial error, [3] while Ms. Blaney asserts that there was no error or the error was harmless. Alleged errors of law in jury instructions are reviewed de novo. Keller v. City of Spokane, 104 Wash.App. 545, 551, 17 P.3d 661 (2001), aff'd, 146 Wash.2d 237, 44 P.3d 845 (2002). Jury instructions are proper when they permit the parties to argue their theories of the case, do not mislead the jury, and properly inform the jury of the applicable law. Hue v. Farmboy Spray Co., 127 Wash.2d 67, 92, 896 P.2d 682 (1995). Lords v. Northern Automotive Corp. properly held that [f]ront pay should be awarded `for a reasonably certain period of time that does not exceed the likely duration of the terminated employment.' 75 Wash.App. 589, 605, 881 P.2d 256 (1994). The length of an employee's future employment is a question of fact for the jury, and the duration of future employment may not necessarily extend until retirement. Id. at 607, 881 P.2d 256. The trial court's instruction to the jury to calculate future earnings from today until the time Ms. Blaney may reasonably be expected to retire, CP at 240, was improper because it denied the jury the discretion to determine the duration of Ms. Blaney's future employmenta duration that may not necessarily extend to retirement. Lords, 75 Wash.App. at 605, 881 P.2d 256. Having determined that the front pay jury instruction was erroneous, we next address whether it was harmless. An erroneous jury instruction is harmless if it is not prejudicial to the substantial rights of the part[ies] ..., and in no way affected the final outcome of the case. State v. Britton, 27 Wash.2d 336, 341, 178 P.2d 341 (1947). A prejudicial error, on the other hand, affects or presumptively affects the results of a case, and is prejudicial to a substantial right. Id. When considering erroneous instructions, this court presumes prejudice, subject to a comprehensive examination of the record: When the record discloses an error in an instruction given on behalf of the party in whose favor the verdict was returned, the error is presumed to have been prejudicial, and to furnish ground for reversal, unless it affirmatively appears that it was harmless. However, it becomes our duty, whenever such a question is raised, to scrutinize the entire record in each particular case, and determine whether or not the error was harmless or prejudicial. Id. at 341, 178 P.2d 341 (citation omitted; emphasis added). Scrutiny of the Blaney record reveals that the erroneous front pay jury instruction was harmless because the District suffered no prejudice. See id. Ms. Blaney presented evidence to prove that she would work until retirement. She testified that she would work until age 65. 3 VRP at 398. Dr. Bassett testified that the average retirement age is 62.8. 6 VRP at 965. While Ms. Blaney provided nonspeculative evidence, the District provided none. Instead, during its cross-examination of Dr. Bassett, the District suggested that involuntary removal would preclude Ms. Blaney from working until retirement. For support, the District provided evidence surrounding the at-will nature of the business representative position. [4] However, the District's arguments are unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the removal of a business representative is not entirely at the will of the directing business representative (hereinafter DBR); it requires the approval of the district lodge and the grand lodge. Second, the District has never removed a business representative. [5] 9 VRP at 1580. The District's cross-examination merely speculated that if Ms. Blaney were given the business representative position and if she performed in a way her DBR disapproved, then her DBR might suggest her termination, which the district lodge and grand lodge might approve, and if they did it would be the first termination of a business representative in the history of the District. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeals' holding that [h]ad there been evidence to support a nonspeculative determination that [Ms. Blaney] would have been terminated [prior to retirement], we might view the record differently. But on this record, we see no prejudice by the giving of the erroneous instruction. The error was harmless. Blaney, 114 Wash.App. at 92, 55 P.3d 1208.