Opinion ID: 1226957
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: CONCLUSION. Where a controversy between a public employer and a union has been submitted to the Public Employment Relations Commission (PERC) the priority of action rule requires the superior court to decline to decide the controversy in a declaratory judgment action. The second determinative issue in these consolidated cases is which tribunal  the superior court or PERC  had the authority to initially determine the ultimate issue in these cases. Although the procedural history of these cases is somewhat tangled, the jurisdictional issue is fairly forthright. For purposes of clarity, only the suit involving the Fire Fighters will be discussed in this connection. The suit against the Police Officers was consolidated with the City's action against the Fire Fighters. In August 1989, 6 months after PERC was asked to decide the dispute between the parties, the City filed a declaratory judgment action asking the Superior Court for Yakima County to resolve the dispute. That court dismissed the declaratory judgment action, finding that the City had failed to exhaust its administrative remedies and that the priority of action rule required it to decline jurisdiction. The day after the final order was entered by the trial court dismissing the 1989 declaratory judgment action, the City filed another declaratory judgment action against the Fire Fighters. The relief sought was the same as that in the 1989 action. The only difference in the factual basis for the 1990 action was that the Fire Fighters' old collective bargaining contract had expired and negotiations on a new bargaining agreement were underway. The court declined to dismiss the 1990 declaratory judgment action, finding the issue to be different from that raised in the 1989 action, since the old collective bargaining agreement had expired and the question before the court in 1990 was how to interpret the statute with respect to the prospective agreement. [9] PERC unquestionably has authority to rule on unfair labor practice complaints. [40] Indeed, PERC is recognized both by statute, [41] and case law as possessing expertise in the labor relations area. [42] However, this expertise and authority do not divest the superior courts of jurisdiction in all cases to resolve unfair labor practice complaints which involve interpretation of public employee collective bargaining statutes. [43] Both PERC and the court thus had the authority to resolve the question posed in this case. [10] The trial court ruled that the priority of action rule compelled it to decline jurisdiction in the 1989 action but allowed it to retain jurisdiction in the 1990 action. This rule is that the court which first gains jurisdiction of a cause retains the exclusive authority to deal with the action until the controversy is resolved. The reason for the doctrine is that it tends to prevent unseemly, expensive, and dangerous conflicts of jurisdiction and of process.[ [44] ] The priority of action rule applies to administrative agencies and the courts. [45] It generally applies only if the two cases involved are identical as to (1) subject matter; (2) parties; and (3) relief. [46] The identity must be such that a decision of the controversy by one tribunal would, as res judicata, bar further proceedings in the other tribunal. [47] In this case, the 1989 complaint filed with PERC preceded the superior court complaint by about 6 months. The City's complaint for declaratory judgment asked for relief identical to that which it requested in the PERC proceeding. We hold that the trial court properly dismissed the 1989 declaratory judgment action based on the priority of action rule. The trial court refused to decline jurisdiction in the 1990 case, however, finding that the subject matters were not identical with the 1989 complaints because the 1990 issue related to a prospective contract rather than to an existing contract. The issue in controversy in both cases was whether the City had a duty to bargain with the union with respect to matters delegated to the Civil Service Commission. The subject matter of the actions thus was identical. The distinction drawn between the two actions by the trial court was not, in our view, sufficient to support the Superior Court's acceptance of jurisdiction in view of the identity of legal issues and the parties involved, the identity of the remedies requested as well as the fact that the action was filed just 1 day after the City's first effort to have the court resolve the same conflict had failed. [48] Under the priority of action rule, we conclude that the trial court erred in not recognizing that the cause was pending before PERC and it should have declined to accept jurisdiction of the 1990 declaratory judgment action. We hold that PERC had jurisdiction of the controversy and should have been permitted to conclude its process before the court took its turn, in a subsequent appeal, to review the issue. Having decided that PERC had jurisdiction under the priority of action rule, it is unnecessary to address the exhaustion of remedies issue argued by the parties. [11] The City additionally asks us to reverse the trial court's and PERC's refusal to allow the introduction into evidence of an affidavit of a former legislator to show legislative history and intent in enacting the Public Employees' Collective Bargaining Act. The City attempted to introduce an affidavit of a former state legislator into evidence to prove legislative history and legislative intent. Both the trial judge and the PERC hearing examiner correctly declined to consider the affidavit. The legislative history set forth in the affidavit is relevant but is available through the House and Senate Journals. The affiant's statements regarding legislative intent are inadmissible, it being well settled that the Legislature's intent in passing a particular bill cannot be shown by the affidavit of a legislator. [49] In sum, we affirm the trial court's rulings with respect to the 1989 cases and affirm the decision of PERC as to the merits. We reverse the trial court's decision with respect to the 1990 case, and hold that a civil service commission must be similar in scope, structure and authority to the state personnel board before the exemption set forth in the proviso to RCW 41.56.100 relieves a public employer of its duty to collectively bargain. The trial court is reversed and the PERC ruling is affirmed. The case is remanded to PERC for consideration of the Fire Fighters' amended unfair labor practice complaint. DORE, C.J., and UTTER, BRACHTENBACH, DOLLIVER, DURHAM, SMITH, GUY, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur.