Opinion ID: 1922714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Hughes's conviction was based on insufficient evidence or was contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Text: ¶ 10. When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court will reverse and render only if the facts and inferences `point in favor of the defendant on any element of the offense with sufficient force that reasonable men could not have found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty,'. . . . Brown v. State, 965 So.2d 1023, 1030 (Miss.2007) (quoting Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005)). The evidence will be deemed sufficient if `having in mind the beyond a reasonable doubt burden of proof standard, reasonable fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense,'. . . . Brown, 965 So.2d at 1030 (quoting Bush, 895 So.2d at 843). The relevant question is whether `any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Brown, 965 So.2d at 1030 (quoting Bush, 895 So.2d at 843). ¶ 11. This Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Bush, 895 So.2d at 843. The state receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Wilson v. State, 936 So.2d 357, 363 (Miss.2006) (citing Hawthorne v. State, 835 So.2d 14, 22 (Miss.2003)). ¶ 12. Hughes argues that there was insufficient evidence to prove that he aided and abetted the crimes of armed robbery or aggravated assault. Hughes submits that there is no evidence to show that he had prior knowledge of Webster's criminal intent, that he participated in the crimes in any way, or that he otherwise aided and abetted the commission of the crimes. Hughes asserts that he was merely present at the scene and never communicated an intent to aid or encourage Webster's actions. ¶ 13. Hughes points to the testimony of Officer Greg Clark, who stated that there was no evidence of any plan to rob the Warners, or that Hughes knew about Webster's gun. Hughes also contends that Webster's statement, Why did you run? That was our lick, occurred after the fact and provides no evidence that Hughes knew beforehand that Webster had a gun or was going to assault anyone. ¶ 14. One who aids and abets another in the commission of a crime is guilty as a principal. Rubenstein v. State, 941 So.2d 735, 773 n. 18 (Miss.2006) (quoting King v. State, 857 So.2d 702, 739 (Miss. 2003)). To aid and abet the commission of a felony, one must `do something that will incite, encourage, or assist the actual perpetrator in the commission of the crime. . . . [or] participate[ ] in the design of the felony.' Vaughn v. State, 712 So.2d 721, 724 (Miss.1998) (quoting Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 360, 363-64 (Miss.1986)). Criminal law does not recognize guilt by association. Davis v. State, 586 So.2d 817, 821 (Miss.1991) (citing Pryor v. State, 239 So.2d 911, 912 (Miss.1970)). Mere presence, even with the intent of assisting in the crime, is insufficient unless the intention to assist was in some way communicated to [the principal]. Crawford v. State, 133 Miss. 147, 151, 97 So. 534 (1923). Furthermore, [p]roof that one has stood by at the commission of a crime without taking any steps to prevent it does not alone indicate such participation or combination in the wrong done as to show criminal liability, although he approve of the act. Harper v. State, 83 Miss. 402, 415, 35 So. 572, 573 (1903) (quoting McClain on Criminal Law, ch. 15, sec. 194). ¶ 15. Hughes discusses primarily two cases in support of his argument. In U.S. v. James, 528 F.2d 999 (5th Cir.1976), FBI agents and members of the Jackson police force engaged in a shoot-out with members of the Republic of New Africa [RNA], leaving one Jackson police officer dead and wounding another officer and an FBI agent. James, 528 F.2d at 1004. The Fifth Circuit reversed the conviction of Ann Lockhart, the wife of the RNA's vice-president, finding that there was insufficient evidence to show that she had any knowledge of the conspiracy or participation in it. Id. at 1013. Lockhart was a resident of Wisconsin and had planned only a brief stay at the RNA headquarters in Jackson, Mississippi. Id. Even though Lockhart had purchased groceries and prepared meals for RNA members, the Fifth Circuit stated that [m]ere presence at the scene of a crime or mere association with the members of a conspiracy is not enough to prove participation in it. Id. ¶ 16. In Cochran v. State, 191 Miss. 273, 2 So.2d 822 (1941), Cochran was arrested for possession of beer and slot machines inside a dance hall. Cochran, 2 So.2d at 822. This Court held that the arrest was unauthorized because Cochran was not an employee of the dance hall, but was merely staying in the area. Id. at 823. This Court explained that some degree of participation in the criminal act must be shown in order to establish any criminal liability. Id. (quoting Harper, 83 Miss. at 415, 35 So. at 573). ¶ 17. We find the subject case distinguishable from both James and Cochran because there is sufficient evidence of Hughes's participation in the crime. Webster and Hughes had been riding around talking about ways to make money, which included robbing. After parking their truck on a small dirt road late at night, Hughes accompanied Webster some 150 to 200 yards to the Warners' home. ¶ 18. Hughes contends that after Webster returned the phone to Warner, he walked off, believing that Webster had finished his business. In a written statement made later that night, Warner said that Hughes pulled a hood over his head and walked off before any shooting occurred. However, Warner explained at trial that it looked as if both men had turned to walk away. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, and giving the state the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we find that Hughes knew what was about to transpire and acted, along with Webster, as if he were walking away. ¶ 19. Hughes communicated his intent to assist Webster in the commission of the crimes by accompanying Webster some 150 to 200 yards to Warner's home, and acting, along with Webster, as if he were leaving just before Webster began shooting. ¶ 20. Finally, after Webster and Hughes returned to their truck, Webster asked Hughes, Why did you run? That was our lick. While this statement was made after the shootings had occurred, a juror could reasonably infer that a lick or robbery had been their mutual intent beforehand. ¶ 21. Therefore, we find that a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hughes aided and abetted the crimes of armed robbery and aggravated assault.
¶ 22. When reviewing a challenge to the weight of the evidence, this Court will overturn a jury verdict only when it is so contrary to the evidence presented that to let it stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice. Wilson, 936 So.2d at 363 (citing Bush, 895 So.2d at 845). A new trial should be granted on the basis of the weight of the evidence only in exceptional circumstances, when the evidence weighs heavily against the jury's verdict. Wilson, 936 So.2d at 363 (citing Bush, 895 So.2d at 845). ¶ 23. This Court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Bush, 895 So.2d at 844 (citing Herring v. State, 691 So.2d 948, 957 (Miss. 1997)). The state receives the benefit of all favorable inferences that may reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Wilson, 936 So.2d at 363 (citing Hawthorne, 835 So.2d at 22). ¶ 24. Based upon the facts previously discussed, we find that Hughes's guilty verdict is not so contrary to the evidence as to constitute an unconscionable injustice. Furthermore, the evidence does not weigh heavily against the jury's verdict. Accordingly, we find that Hughes's conviction was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.