Opinion ID: 1887901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the first amendment claim

Text: Bergman's claim that the Act denies him the freedom of speech guaranteed by the First Amendment raises a constitutional issue of considerable moment, for it implicates the core values of a free society. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 595 (D.C.2000). The guarantee of free speech . . . forms the constitutional and philosophical bedrock of our Republic. Id. Indeed, the free flow of ideas and opinions is integral to our democratic form of government. Id. (quoting Ollman v. Evans, 242 U.S.App. D.C. 301, 305, 750 F.2d 970, 974 (1984) (en banc) (plurality opinion), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127, 105 S.Ct. 2662, 86 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985)). However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974); Guilford, 760 A.2d at 596 (quoting Gertz ). The Council is therefore barred from prohibiting the advocacy of an idea or the communication of an opinion because it disagrees with the speaker's message. More than two centuries ago, the French philosopher, Voltaire, anticipatorily articulated the spirit of our First Amendment when he [reportedly] wrote to Helvetius that `I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.' Guilford, 760 A.2d at 595-96. This case, however, is not about the benign democratic ideal of opposing views competing for public acceptance. Rather, it is about practitioners aggressively seeking to secure potentially profitable business. As the Supreme Court stated in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 459, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978), [a] lawyer's procurement of remunerative employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns. It falls within the State's proper sphere of economic and professional regulation. [9] Regulation of commercial speech is reviewed under the intermediate scrutiny standard, which is less rigorous than the strict scrutiny that is applied to restrictions on non-commercial speech. Id. at 456-57, 98 S.Ct. 1912; see also Went For It, 515 U.S. at 623, 115 S.Ct. 2371. Although Bergman depicts the issue in this case as involving a battle of ideas fighting for the accident victim's rights against surrender of the victim's claim by settlement without the benefit of legal advicethe critical and dispositive fact is that we are dealing here with uninvited attempts to secure employment for remunerationa classic example of a business transaction. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 459, 98 S.Ct. 1912. [10] Nevertheless, since the First Amendment is marginally implicated, id., the regulation (i.) must address a substantial interest; (ii.) must directly and materially advance that interest; and (iii.) must be narrowly drawn. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 624, 115 S.Ct. 2371 (quoting Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 564-65, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980)). In our view, the Act satisfies all of these criteria.