Opinion ID: 1659535
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Discretion To Impose The Death Penalty

Text: The next issue presented on this appeal is whether the trial court's instructions removed the jury's discretion in deciding whether to impose the death penalty in violation of the defendant's rights under Article I, §§ 8, 16, and 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. The defendant contends that the trial judge made the death penalty mandatory by instructing potential and actual jurors, through both the juror information sheets and the jury instructions, that if aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. We find no merit to this argument. In its instructions, the trial court tracked the language of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(g) (1982), the governing sentencing statute at that time, which provided that: [i]f the jury unanimously determines that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance or several aggravating circumstances have been proved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, and said circumstance or circumstances are not outweighed by any mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death. Therefore, the defendant's challenge to the court's instructions is really an attack upon the sentencing statute. The defendant first argues that the sentence shall be death portion of the statute violates Article I, § 19 of the Tennessee Constitution, which requires that in all indictments for libel, the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, as in other criminal cases. The defendant contends that the shall language of § 39-2-203(g) deprives the jury of its constitutional powers under Article I, § 19, to impose its own decision. We disagree. This argument was recently addressed in State v. Black, 815 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. 1991), where we found that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(g) does not violate Article I, § 19 of the Tennessee Constitution. Accordingly, we hold that the judge's instructions, which merely tracked the language of the statute, did not remove the jury's discretion in violation of Article I, § 19. Along the same lines, the defendant argues that the judge's instructions violated Article I, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution, which provides [t]hat no man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of his peers or the law of the land. Other than just citing the provision, however, counsel for the defendant does not tell us how the instructions or the statute violates Article I, § 8. We can only surmise that counsel for the defendant believes that the shall language of the statute removes the jury's discretion and deprives the defendant of a judgment of his peers. We find the rationale of State v. Black, supra , under Article I, § 19, to be equally applicable to Article I, § 8. Accordingly, we hold that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(g) does not remove the jury's discretion and deprive the defendant of a judgment of his peers in violation of Article I, § 8. The defendant further contends that the jury instructions created a presumption of death, whereby the jury had to automatically impose the death penalty as soon as it found him guilty of kidnapping, a statutory aggravating circumstance under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2-203(i)(7) (1982). As a result, the defendant argues that the presumption created by the instructions improperly shifted the burden of proof from the State to the defendant. Once again, this argument was recently addressed and rejected in State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1990), where we found that the statute clearly outlines where the burden of proof lies and does not impose a presumption of death upon the finding of one aggravating circumstance. Id., 797 S.W.2d at 596. As a result, we hold that the judge's instructions did not create a presumption of death and shift the burden of proof to the defendant.