Opinion ID: 2590326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attenuation of Second Statement (Recantation )

Text: Defendant sought to suppress his second statement in the same pretrial motion by which he sought suppression of his first statement. The motion, as it pertained to the second statement, was denied. He now contends the trial court erred when it found the second taped statement (including his recantation) fully admissible on the basis that it was sufficiently attenuated from that portion of his initial statement that was found involuntary. The argument is unavailing. The precise question here is whether the retraction was the tainted product of the portion of defendant's first statement that the trial court excluded, which came after defendant had already confessed to the murders. On October 12, 1995, eight days after defendant confessed to the murders, Kern County Sheriff's Detective John Soliz went to Las Vegas to reinterview defendant at the request of the district attorney who had charged the case. Detective Soliz had had no prior contacts with defendant. During this second interview, defendant recanted much of his earlier statement, now claiming he did not know how the Jordans were killed and asserting he made up the version of events he told to Detective Wahl and Sergeant Johnson to keep my wife from going to jail. Defendant told Detective Soliz, I was scared to death to even talk to them other officers[s] and then when they got me up here that night badgering me, I just made up that story. Defendant went on to tell Detective Soliz his new and purportedly truthful version of events. He claimed that after leaving the Self/Amos residence on the morning of September 11, he realized his mother would not lend him any money so he went to the Jordan residence to ask Shirley for another loan. He and Shirley had coffee, he told her his truck had broken down, and he asked her for a $3,000 loan. Shirley entered her bedroom, closed the door, and returned with $3,000, which she gave to him. Defendant stated he did not tell Detective Wahl and Sergeant Johnson about this loan because he was scared, explaining, I mean just, I don't know why. I'm an ex-con, scared to death. I mean a murder was committed. After Shirley lent him the money, they talked some more and Joey took his picture with a disposable camera. He left the Jordan residence at 1:30 or 2:00 p.m. (6) Previous decisions have acknowledged that whereas a result of improper police conductan accused confesses, and subsequently makes another confession, it may be presumed the subsequent confession is the product of the first because of the psychological or practical disadvantages of having `let the cat out of the bag by confessing.' (See People v. Johnson (1969) 70 Cal.2d 541, 547 [75 Cal.Rptr. 401, 450 P.2d 865]; People v. Spencer (1967) 66 Cal.2d 158, 167 [57 Cal.Rptr. 163, 424 P.2d 715].) Notwithstanding this presumption, `no court has ever gone so far as to hold that making a confession under circumstances which preclude its use, perpetually disables the confessor from making a usable one after those conditions have been removed.' ( Spencer, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 167, citing United States v. Bayer (1947) 331 U.S. 532, 540-541 [91 L.Ed. 1654, 67 S.Ct. 1394]; see United States v. Toral (9th Cir. 1976) 536 F.2d 893, 896; United States v. Knight (2d Cir. 1968) 395 F.2d 971.) Thus, the foregoing presumption is rebuttable, with the prosecution bearing the burden of establishing a break in the causative chain between the first confession and the subsequent confession. ( Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at pp. 547-548; In re Pablo C. (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 984, 990 [181 Cal.Rptr. 468].) A subsequent confession is not the tainted product of the first merely because, `but for' the improper police conduct, the subsequent confession would not have been obtained. ( Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 549.) As the United States Supreme Court has explained: `[N]ot . . . all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' ( Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407]; Johnson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 548.) The degree of attenuation that suffices to dissipate the taint `requires at least an intervening independent act by the defendant or a third party' to break the causal chain in such a way that the second confession is not in fact obtained by exploitation of the illegality. ( People v. Sesslin (1968) 68 Cal.2d 418, 428 [67 Cal.Rptr. 409, 439 P.2d 321]; see People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1081 [248 Cal.Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960].) ( People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 444-445 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992].) (7) Here, of course, defendant's second statement was a recantation, not a second confession, but for purposes of determining its voluntariness we find the same principles of attenuation apply. [13] We agree with the trial court's determination that the second taped statement was sufficiently attenuated from that portion of defendant's first statement that was found involuntary and excludable (which portion itself came after defendant had already confessed to the murders). The sufficient indices of attenuation include: (1) defendant was properly Mirandized at the start of the second interview, as he acknowledges; (2) more than a week transpired between the first and second interviews; [14] (3) the second interview was conducted, not by the same officers who had conducted the first interview, but by Detective Soliz, who had had no prior contacts with defendant and had not reviewed the tape of the first interview before he conducted the second interview; (4) Detective Soliz made no attempt to exploit any information obtained in the first statement, the latter portion of which was later determined to be involuntary. Indeed, when asked by defendant about charges relating to Billie, Detective Soliz told him that, to his knowledge, she was not going to be charged; (5) as the trial court found, defendant's maturity and ability to again handle himself in a fashion that reflects maturity and sophistication and articulation served to cleanse any taint; and (6) defendant's second statement was furnished in an effort to recant his earlier confession, a circumstance we find weighs in favor of a finding that he gave it freely and voluntarily. 3. Exclusion of Defense Expert Gregory Haussmann's Testimony One defense theory presented below was that Shirley and Joey Jordan died accidentally of carbon monoxide poisoning. Dr. Michael Baden, a forensic pathologist and private defense consultant in this case, testified that the most common cause of multiple deaths, where there is no other obvious cause, is carbon monoxide poisoning. Based on his examination of the photographs of the crime scene and Dr. Walker's autopsy report, Dr. Baden concluded both deaths were the result of asphyxia caused by carbon monoxide poisoning. Billie McWhorter was also called by the defense in support of this defense theory. She testified that when she and defendant moved out of the apartment next to the Jordans, defendant moved a washing machine into a water heater shed adjacent to the Jordans' unit. Billie further recalled that defendant bumped a natural gas valve leading to the water heater, which caused a momentary gas leak until he could shut the valve off and tighten it, and then it was okay. Additionally, the jury saw photographs (including a conventionally enlarged photograph) showing that the bathroom window between the residence and the shed was slightly open. Prior to trial, the defense disclosed to the prosecution a report in which Gregory Haussmann, an engineer with Failure Analysis Associates, a forensic engineering consulting firm in Menlo Park, set forth his conclusion that a lethal concentration of carbon monoxide could have been produced by a water heater attached to the deceased[s'] residence, could have entered the dwelling residence through a `partially opened' window and may have caused the death of two persons therein. The prosecutor filed a pretrial motion to exclude the anticipated testimony on grounds it was based on speculation and conjecture, was unsupported by evidence that could reasonably be relied on by the expert, and was more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. An evidentiary hearing was conducted pursuant to Evidence Code section 402 to determine whether a proper foundation for Haussmann's expert opinion testimony could be laid pursuant to Evidence Code section 801. [15] Haussmann testified at the hearing. At its conclusion, the trial court ruled Haussmann's expert opinion testimony inadmissible. Defendant contends the ruling was an abuse of discretion. We disagree. [T]he value of an expert's opinion depends on the truth of the facts assumed. (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Opinion Evidence, § 28, p. 558.) Where the basis of the opinion is unreliable hearsay, the courts will reject it. ( Id., Unreliable Hearsay, § 36, p. 567; see, e.g., Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 43-44 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641] [rejection of expert opinion testimony based on unreliable hearsay not an abuse of discretion].) It is settled that a trial court has wide discretion to exclude expert testimony, including hearsay testimony, that is unreliable. ( People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1061 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531]; People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 373 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709].) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling Haussmann's testimony inadmissible on grounds that it was unduly speculative, based on unreliable hearsay, and without an adequate foundation. First, Haussmann's conclusionthat it was possible an exhaust vent on top of the water heater had become dislodged several inches when defendant installed the washing machine in the shed adjacent to the Jordans' unit, thereby causing a fatal carbon monoxide leakwas based solely on a defense investigator's hearsay report recounting an interview with Billie McWhorter. Because neither the defense investigator nor Billie was called to testify and authenticate the report at the hearing, it remained unsubstantiated hearsay. [16] Second, hearsay problems aside, the report could not have served as a sufficiently reliable source of information on which Haussmann could base his expert opinion. Haussmann testified his opinion hinged on whether the water heater's exhaust vent had become dislodged. But he conceded at the foundational hearing he had no proof the vent had actually become dislodged, and indicated he would base the entirety of his testimony on inferences to be drawn from the defense investigator's report of the gas valve bumping incident recounted by Billie. The investigator's report, however, made no specific mention of the water heater's exhaust vent, much less that it had become dislodged. Third, the record reflects that a new or different water heater was installed in the Jordans' unit at some point in the ensuing two years between the Jordans' deaths and defendant's trial. The actual water heater and exhaust vent that Haussmann speculated had caused a carbon monoxide leak that killed the Jordans was no longer available for his or anyone else's inspection by the time of trial. Haussmann speculated at the hearing that the replaced water heater must have been old, and thus more susceptible to having its exhaust vent become dislodged. But no facts were known about the model, age, size, or condition of the water heater installed in the shed at the time of Shirley's and Joey's deaths in September 1995. Nor is there any merit to defendant's claim that this asserted error is of constitutional dimension because it violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The defense theory that the victims may have died from carbon monoxide poisoning, weak though it was, was presented to the jury through the testimony of Billie McWhorter, who testified defendant installed the washing machine in the shed before moving out and bumped a natural gas valve in the process; through photographic evidence of the bathroom window between the residence and through the adjacent shed, depicting the window slightly open or ajar; and the testimony of defense expert Dr. Baden, a forensic pathologist who furnished his opinion that the Jordans likely died of asphyxia from carbon monoxide poisoning. Although Haussmann's expert opinionthat a dislodged water heater exhaust vent could have caused the release of carbon monoxide fumes and the fatal poisoning of the Jordans was properly excluded as speculative and lacking adequate foundation, defendant was not otherwise precluded from presenting this defense through admissible testimony and evidence. [17] 4. Exclusion of Defense Expert Norman Perle's Testimony Defendant next claims the trial court abused its discretion when it ruled that the foundational requirements for admission of the opinion testimony of Norman Perle, defendant's forensic image-enhancement expert, had not been met, and excluded Perle's testimony. We find no abuse of discretion. In support of the defense theory that the Jordans died of carbon monoxide poisoning, the defense relied on photographs of the bathroom window between the residence and its adjacent water heater shed depicting the window slightly open or ajar. Prior to trial, the prosecution moved to exclude the proffered opinion testimony of defense expert Norman Perle, an expert in the field of electronic processing of visual and audio recorded data. The motion sought to exclude a forensic image enhancement Perle had created from a picture of the bathroom window furnished by the prosecution as discovery, as well as his expert opinion testimony regarding the image he created. The defense desired to introduce the enhanced image, and Perle's testimony explaining it, for the purpose of assisting the jury in seeing that the window was indeed slightly open or ajar. (8) The prosecutor argued in opposition to the motion that the enhanced image and Perle's opinion testimony were inadmissible unless a proper foundation could be laid for the image-enhancing technique he used pursuant to People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24 [130 Cal.Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240] ( Kelly ) (see also Frye v. U.S. (D.C. Cir. 1923) 293 F. 1013). Under the Kelly standard, evidence based upon application of a new scientific technique may be admitted only after the reliability of the method has been foundationally established, usually by the testimony of an expert witness who first has been properly qualified. The proponent of the evidence must also demonstrate that correct scientific procedures were used ( Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30), and that the scientific technique concerning which the evidence is being offered has gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs. ( People v. Leahy (1994) 8 Cal.4th 587, 594 [34 Cal.Rptr.2d 663, 882 P.2d 321] ( Leahy ); People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 242 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107].) The prosecutor argued further that the enhanced image and Perle's expert opinion testimony were unnecessary because the jurors could look at the conventional photographs themselves and determine whether or not the window was open, and that the enhanced image should be excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. In his written opposition to the motion, defendant argued that reasonable jurors could differ in their perception of whether the window was open or closed when viewing the conventional photograph, although defense counsel himself stated plainly, The window appears partially open to me. It was further argued that [t]he methods used to enhance the image, referred to as electronic embossing, employ products generally available to the public which are produced by software companies listed on the national security exchanges. However, the actual software program utilized by Perle to create the enhanced image was not identified. The defense took the position that [e]lectronic image and sound processing is a field which has thoroughly established its presence and general reliability in our 1997 society; that the Kelly foundational requirements rightfully require a foundational showing in situations where there is a conceptually new procedure or technology, but that [t]he questions involved here are qualitatively different from those issues. The opposition to the motion to exclude Perle's testimony concluded that [a]n Evidence Code Section 402 hearing is inappropriate and would be a waste of court time. A lengthy foundational hearing was conducted on the matter at which Perle, and prosecution expert Jim Ray, who was employed by the Kern County District Attorney's Office as an evidence technician in charge of digital imaging and video/audio services, each testified. Perle was the owner and director of the National Audio Video Forensic Laboratory; had worked with various aspects of recorded evidence, both audio and video; and had provided services related to recorded evidence such as enhancements, authenticity analysis, imaging for detail and identification, voice identification, and other forensic media services. He was certified by an organization known as the American Board of Recorded Evidence and was a member of the American College of Forensic Examiners. Perle's credentials notwithstanding, it will suffice to observe that he could not identify the computer program he used to enhance or electronically emboss the image in question, nor could he satisfactorily explain the full nature of the process he used to create it. When the prosecutor, in cross-examining Perle, observed that the photographic image from which he created his enhanced image was in color, whereas the enhanced image was in black and white, Perle could not recall whether he converted the image from color to black and white. Nor could Perle recall whether he had increased or decreased the contrast of the image. When asked on cross-examination how the embossing feature of the unidentified software program he used works, Perle answered, Really carefully. I don't know exactly what the algorithms are or how to explain this to you, but you can take a two dimensional process image and you can emboss or deboss, which means you can make the surface of what you're viewing appear to have greater detail or you can have the background appear to have greater detail. That would be debossing. And the emboss process is one that's called into play to give a viewer a different perspective, one that would, one that would have a perception of depth. That is the best I can explain this. As noted, in his written opposition to the motion, defense counsel had taken the position that a Kelly foundational hearing would be inappropriate and a waste of court time. Now, upon commencing his argument at the conclusion of testimony at the hearing, defense counsel appeared to switch horses, acknowledging the prosecution's objection to Perle's testimony on Kelly grounds, and further acknowledging that reliability and acceptance of procedure is relevant in any scientifically based opinion, expert opinion. As the arguments continued, however, defense counsel made a number of noteworthy concessions. He agreed Perle had not adequately described how the embossing process he used works. In response to the court's comment that it never could quite figure out what he accomplished, particularly with the embossing and sharpening aspect of the process he described, defense counsel responded, I recognize in the description by Mr. Perle of the exact mechanisms by which these programs accomplish that which they do that I was not able to find a clear statement, myself, of the mechanism by which these computer programs actually perform the task which they are ascribed to have done. Acknowledging further that Perle did not know what imaging software he had used in this case or precisely how it worked, defense counsel added, He doesn't know the exact mechanical process by which the computer does that which it does. That's something that is outside of his field of expertise. At one point defense counsel tried to salvage Perle's testimony by seemingly abandoning his argument that the testimony satisfied the Kelly foundational requirements and arguing instead that Perle's process was a tool. Counsel suggested that although Perle might not know how the program did what it did, he is an expert in the use of these tools and is an expert in the interpretation of the images and the products that these tools provide. [18] Finally, when the court asked defense counsel whether he agreed that the enhanced image showed something that was not apparent in the original image, counsel disagreed, observing that the enlarged photograph made by conventional photographic means also showed the window to be slightly open. He added, [Y]ou know, honestly, Judge, if I, if I see a weakness in the admissibility of this evidence, opinion of Mr. Perle, it's that maybe it's not necessary because of the [conventional] photographic enlargement shows the same thing that Mr. Perle's enhanced image via the video disc shows. A trial court's finding that the Kelly foundational requirements have not been met is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 805 [38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938]; People v. Venegas (1998) 18 Cal.4th 47, 93 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 262, 954 P.2d 525].) We conclude on this record that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Perle's expert opinion testimony. Assuming for sake of argument that the ruling was error, it was clearly harmless given that defense counsel, and Perle himself, conceded the conventional photographic image and Perle's enhanced or embossed image showed the same thingthat the window was slightly open. [19] 5. Exclusion of Third Party Culpability Evidence Defendant argues the trial court erroneously precluded him from introducing evidence that a third party, Glenn Jordan, one of Shirley's ex-husbands and Joey's father, committed the murders. The claim must be rejected. (9) We repeatedly have indicated that, to be admissible, evidence of the culpability of a third party offered by a defendant to demonstrate that a reasonable doubt exists concerning his or her guilt, must link the third person either directly or circumstantially to the actual perpetration of the crime. In assessing an offer of proof relating to such evidence, the court must decide whether the evidence could raise a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt and whether it is substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. (See People v. Davis [(1995)] 10 Cal.4th 463, 501 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119]; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 609 [25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635]; People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 792-793 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192]; People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 685 [276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278]; People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1017-1018 [254 Cal.Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1].) ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1325 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259].) In People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 [226 Cal.Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99], we held that the third-party evidence need not show `substantial proof of a probability' that the third person committed the act; it need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. ( Id. at p. 833.) Our holding [in Hall ] did not, however, require the indiscriminate admission of any evidence offered to prove third-party culpability. The evidence must meet minimum standards of relevance: `evidence of mere motive or opportunity to commit the crime in another person, without more, will not suffice to raise a reasonable doubt about a defendant's guilt: there must be direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime.' ( Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 833.) We also reaffirmed that such evidence is subject to exclusion under Evidence Code section 352. [Citation.] ( People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d 983, 1017.) Prior to trial, the prosecution filed a motion to exclude evidence of third party culpability. The prosecutor indicated in the motion that he had been provided with discovery by the defense relating to third party culpability consisting of a taped conversation between defendant's trial counsel, a defense investigator, and witness Cynthia Durham, a friend and former neighbor of Shirley Jordan, as well as documents reflecting that in 1994 and again in 1996, Glenn Jordan, one of Shirley's ex-husbands and the father of Joey Jordan, had been convicted of misdemeanor infliction of corporal injury upon a spouse or cohabitant (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). In the taped interview, Durham stated that in January of 1995, eight months before the murders, Shirley saw Glenn Jordan parked outside the apartment complex where she was then living (prior to moving to the Wilson Avenue apartment in which she and Joey were killed). During the interview Durham also told the defense investigator, with some measure of prompting according to the prosecutor, that when Shirley saw her ex-husband parked outside her home she got a panic stricken look on her face. The prosecutor argued in support of his motion that the information presented was too speculative to be admissible, and further, that it was excludable under Evidence Code section 352 as more prejudicial than probative. Defense counsel filed an opposition to the prosecutor's motion. He reported that according to published accounts of the murders (supposedly based on information furnished by the police investigating the case), the Jordans' bodies were discovered on September 18, 1995; that their deaths were thought to have occurred three to five days earlier; and that defendant had been in Las Vegas during this timeframe. The opposition indicated further that one week after the murders, Chris Barton, Joey's 13-year-old friend, reported to detectives she had heard a television set in the Jordans' residence on the afternoon of September 12 when she went to look for Joey; that she did not hear the television when she returned a few days later; and that she knew Joey was afraid of his father, Glenn Jordan, and feared he would come back and beat him up. Defense counsel went on to relate in the opposition to the motion that Cynthia Durham had told him that in January 1995 (eight months before the murders), Shirley told her she was afraid of her ex-husband, who had parked in front of her former residence on Wilson Avenue and stared through the window for several minutes. Counsel reported that Durham told him Shirley was panic stricken as a result of this incident, and further, that Shirley's car had been parked in front of the apartment complex at the time. The opposition to the motion next reported that, according to police reports, in June 1994 (16 months prior to the murders), Glenn Jordan had struck Emily McCoy, his common law wife, in the head, forcing her face to strike a wall, and had again struck McCoy on April 24, 1996 (eight months after the murders), causing her to strike the back of her head on an object, causing a gash. As a result of each incident, Glenn Jordan pleaded guilty to one misdemeanor count of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant. Defense counsel pointed out that the murder investigation had revealed a dent in a wall in the Jordans' kitchen, which he stated the People assert was caused by the head of Shirley Jordan. The opposition next reported that a series of phone calls had been made by Emily McCoyone to another of Shirley's ex-husbands, Lewis Smith; [20] another to a former wife of Glenn Jordan's, Mary Frye, shortly after the murders. Frye allegedly confirmed for McCoy that Glenn Jordan had beaten her during their marriage; told her Shirley was afraid of Glenn; and told her Shirley would not let Frye's daughter Jennifer see Joey if Jennifer disclosed to Glenn the location or phone number of Shirley and Joey. The opposition also related that McCoy had told defense counsel that Frye had told her that daughter Jennifer had stated that she had never seen her father Glenn, with anything other than cowboy boots on his feet. Defense counsel pointed out that prosecution Criminalist Laskowski had identified a shoe print or impression on the carpet near Shirley's body as a cowboy boot print. Defense counsel also reported in his opposition to the motion that Glenn Jordan had called the sheriff's department the day after the murders to state he did not kill his ex-wife and son, telling police the last time he had seen Joey was on a chance meeting at a bank in 1992. Counsel indicated he believed Glenn Jordan's source of income was from Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and that the Kern County District Attorney's Office deducted child support payments from Glenn's SSI payments for Joey. Defense counsel then summarized the defense theory of third party culpability in the opposition as follows: Investigation is continuing. However, at this time, there is corroborated evidence of propensity for violence against [Glenn's] wives and children over an extended period of time before and after the discovery of decedents. There is an on going and immediately recent expression of fear of Glenn by decedents Shirley Jordan and Joseph Jordan. There is an act of apparent stalking of Shirley where Glenn observes the car in front of the apartment. There is motive in the ongoing child support payments. There is circumstantial evidence of his commission of the offense by the dent in the wall showing identity of modus operandi and the cowboy boot print next to the body. Richard McWhorter was not wearing cowboy boots on September 11, 1995. At the hearing on the motion to exclude the defense evidence, defense counsel added that Shirley's close friend Angelica Herrera was also claiming that after moving from 1319 Wilson Avenue to 1016 Wilson Avenue, Shirley increased her vigilance and acted as though she was regularly in fear of someone or something. The trial court observed that neither the written nor oral offers of proof tendered by defense counsel were in the form of reliable sworn declarations. The prosecutor stated he would accept defense counsel's offer of proof (although not the validity of the facts averred) [f]or expediency [ sic ] sake. Defense counsel proceeded to argue that the prosecutor's motion to exclude the defense evidence of third party culpability should be denied, outlining the anticipated evidence he had reported in his opposition to the motion. The prosecutor in turn argued that the evidence of Glenn Jordan's misdemeanor convictions of inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant would not be admissible to show modus operandi because the defense suggestion that Glenn's abuse of his current wife was consistent with the murder of Shirley Jordan was a huge stretch. He further represented to the court that the defense investigator had told him Emily McCoy was never interviewed by the defense because they haven't found [her], and argued the information about the incidents, to the extent gleaned from police reports, was inadmissible hearsay that should not be admissible at trial. The prosecutor also argued that the opinions of friends or neighbors, to the extent they claimed to know or had observed Shirley to be fearful of someone or something (i.e., Angelica Herrera's claim), did not establish that Shirley specifically feared her ex-husband Glenn. He argued the evidence of the dent in the kitchen wall and the shoe print or impression on the carpet near Shirley's body was inconclusive, noting it seem[ed] rather ironic defense counsel would include it because questions had been raised in the case (presumably by the defense) about whether prosecution Criminalist Laskowski should even be permitted to furnish an opinion about the source of the print. [21] The prosecutor stated that although defense counsel may have felt he knew the actual source of the print (counsel had stated in the opposition that Glenn Jordan always wore cowboy boots, and that defendant was not wearing cowboy boots on Sept. 11), he did not believe that had been resolved as a matter of fact in the case. The prosecutor argued counsel's suggestion that Glenn was stalking Shirley by parking in front of her former residence eight months prior to the murders was purely speculation on the defense part, suggesting it was just as possible Glenn might have parked there simply to get a glimpse of his son whom he had not seen or perhaps was not allowed to see. He further argued the suggestion that Glenn could locate Shirley's new residence by searching for her car, or type of car, on the streets of the neighborhood was at best a speculative inference. The prosecutor also represented he had received no discovery from the defense concerning whether Shirley was receiving child support payments from Glenn Jordan directly through the district attorney's office, stating, I don't know that that is a fact. He surmised that if such payments had been ordered they would likely have been ongoing for some time, and found it rather extreme for the defense to infer that the desire to avoid those payments would suddenly become a motive for murdering Shirley and Joey. He argued, Who knows. Maybe [Glenn Jordan] felt it was the right thing that he was giving support to his son. I don't know. Defense doesn't know. The prosecutor concluded by summarizing his position on the defense offer of proof as follows: What we're left with, as I said before, is a person who's afraid of this third party, which is not enough under Hall. Additional to which you have very, very attenuated potential motive to end the payments, I guess. And the possibility, although I think evidentiary-wise it's never coming in, the possibility that he was violent towards another woman. That's just simply not enough under Hall.  The court proceeded to rule on and grant the prosecutor's motion to exclude the third party culpability evidence. It found the possible motive of ending child support payments by killing one's former wife and son very attenuated. It found the proffered evidence that Mr. Jordan is a habitual wearer of cowboy boots insufficiently probative of identity without further evidence of a brand or size of boot that in a logical chain would link the print impression found at the crime scene to Glenn Jordan. It found the defense theory regarding the proffered evidence of Glenn's past or future acts of violence against women to be largely propensity evidence that, without more, would not likely be admissible in a trial for murder according to the rules of evidence. We conclude the record supports the trial court's ruling. The motive defense counsel ascribed to Glenn Jordan for the murdersthat of killing one's former wife and son in order to end child support paymentswas entirely speculative. So too was the attempt to establish identity by linking him to the crime scene based on hearsay evidence that his daughter had never seen her father Glenn, with anything other than cowboy boots on his feet; defense counsel's own personal attestation that Richard McWhorter was not wearing cowboy boots on September 11, 1995; and counsel's further suggestion that Glenn Jordan's modus operandi was to beat his wives in a manner resulting in their heads banging against walls and leaving dents in those walls. (10) We agree with the trial court that much of defendant's offer of proof consisted of mere evidence of a propensity for violence to prove identity that would not have been admissible in a trial for murder or, even if it was, would not itself have established identity. As we explained in People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th 463:  Hall did not abrogate Evidence Code section 1101 as applied to such evidence. Subsequently, in People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888 [254 Cal.Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940], we specifically addressed the application of Evidence Code section 1101 to proposed evidence regarding prior criminal conduct of a third party alleged to have committed the charged offense. The defendant in Farmer offered evidence of a third party's history of violent crime, on the theory that it tended to identify him as the perpetrator. We noted that under Hall, evidence linking a third person to the actual perpetration of the crime should be treated like any other evidence. ( Id. at p. 921.) We went on to hold, however, that the proffered evidence was properly excluded under Evidence Code section 1101, because it was offered not to show a fact other than the third party's criminal disposition, such as motive or intent, but merely to show that the third party was the more likely perpetrator because he had a history of violence. (47 Cal.3d at p. 921.) Such evidence does not amount to direct or circumstantial evidence linking the third person to the actual perpetration of the crime. ( Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 501.) 6. Trial Court's Neutrality Defendant next claims the trial court failed to maintain an atmosphere of neutrality and was unduly harsh to his trial counsel, undermining his right to an unbiased jury and prejudicing his guilt and penalty verdicts. The claim is unavailing. (11) Although the trial court has both the duty and the discretion to control the conduct of the trial ( People v. Fudge [(1994)] 7 Cal.4th [1075,] 1108 [31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36]), the court `commits misconduct if it persistently makes discourteous and disparaging remarks to defense counsel so as to discredit the defense or create the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution' ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708]). Nevertheless, `[i]t is well within [a trial court's] discretion to rebuke an attorney, sometimes harshly, when that attorney asks inappropriate questions, ignores the court's instructions, or otherwise engages in improper or delaying behavior.' ( United States v. Donato (D.C. Cir. 1996) [321 U.S. App.D.C. 287] [99 F.3d 426, 434].) Indeed, `[o]ur role . . . is not to determine whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid. Rather, we must determine whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to a perfect, trial.' ( United States v. Pisani (2d Cir. 1985) 773 F.2d 397, 402.) ( People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 78 [132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749] ( Snow ).) First, because defendant raised no objection below on the grounds asserted in this claim, and did not seek a jury admonition regarding any of the alleged instances of judicial intemperance, he has failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. ( Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 78; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 459 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391]; People v. Fudge, supra, 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1108.) Even if the issue were properly before us, we would find no judicial misconduct. Defendant points to various comments by the trial judge during voir dire that, he asserts, prevented defense counsel from exploring areas with potential jurors that could lead to challenges for cause, and did so in ways that attacked the integrity of counsel and painted him as someone willing to bend the rules in order to achieve his ends. We have reviewed each comment or remark in the record of which defendant complains, and are satisfied there was no error, much less error rising to the level of judicial misconduct. In many instances the trial judge simply used the word unfair somewhat indiscriminately when suggesting, for example, that counsel had posed an unfair hypothetical to a prospective juror. In those instances, the court's remarks could not in reason have been understood as disparaging defense counsel for being unfair to anyone; rather, the court appears to have used the term broadly to refer to inartfully worded inquiries to the jurors. In one instance, defendant claims the court prevented counsel from probing a prospective juror (Mr. F.) about his views on the death penalty. We have reviewed the complained-of passage and find the court was merely clarifying several of counsel's questions put to the prospective juror, and in no way sought to preclude counsel from conducting a thorough voir dire. In other instances, despite defendant's assertion here that comments by the court had disparaged counsel in the eyes of the jurors, counsel ultimately thanked the court for its guidance, or conceded that the question perturbing the court was indeed confusing or unclear. Defendant also claims the court's bias against the defense in general was apparent from the fact that it ruled against him on several of the pretrial issues discussed above, including the exclusion of the proffered opinion testimony of defense experts Gregory Haussmann and Norman Perle, and the exclusion of third party culpability evidence concerning Glenn Jordan. Since we have in each instance found the proffered testimony or evidence properly excluded, this aspect of defendant's claim of judicial bias also must fail. 7. Spousal Privilege Against Testifying Defendant next argues the trial court erred when it refused to inform Billie McWhorter of the statutory privilege of one spouse not to be forced to testify against the other. (Evid. Code, §§ 970-971, 973.) The claim has no merit. (12) The spousal privilege is personal to the spouse seeking to avoid testifying, and because Billie, and not defendant, was the holder of the privilege, defendant does not have standing to raise the claim. (Evid. Code, § 918; see People v. Lucas (1995) 12 Cal.4th 415, 490 [48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373]; Jurcoane v. Superior Court (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 886, 896 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 483].) Defense counsel himself acknowledged this below. Moreover, it has been expressly recognized that a trial court does not have a duty to advise a witness of the spousal privilege. ( People v. Resendez (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 98, 106-108 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 575].) As explained in Resendez, nothing precluded defense counsel from directly informing Billie of the privilege himself. ( Id. at p. 109, fn. 6.) Defense counsel acknowledged this below as well. Finally, counsel waited until after the prosecutor had begun his direct examination of Billie to request the court to advise her of the spousal privilege. Billie was the holder of the privilege, and once she decided to testify at any point in defendant's criminal proceedings, the privilege was waived for the entirety of the proceedings. (See Evid. Code, § 973, subd. (a).) 8. Shackling During Trial Defendant argues that although alerted to the fact that he was shackled while in the courtroom, the trial court failed to fulfill its duty to forbid physical restraints unless their use was manifestly necessary. ( People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 841 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673].) The claim, too, is devoid of merit. (13) Before the first jury panel entered the courtroom, defense counsel requested that defendant be unshackled. [22] In response, the trial court ordered defendant's waist chains removed (and inferentially, the handcuffs to which they were attached) but did not order his leg restraints removed because defendant was seated at counsel table and thus the leg restraints could not be observed by others in the courtroom. There is no evidence in the record that any prospective juror observed defendant in the leg restraints on this single occasion. We have consistently found any unjustified or unadmonished shackling harmless where there was no evidence it was seen by the jury. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 583-584 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142].) Moreover, although defense counsel made the request that defendant be unshackled, he thereafter acquiesced in the remedy selected by the trial courtremoval of the visible waist chainsand made no further objection, thereby waiving any claim on appeal with respect to the absence of further inquiry into the manifest need for the concealed leg restraints. ( People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 95 [270 Cal.Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23]; People v. Walker (1988) 47 Cal.3d 605, 629 [253 Cal.Rptr. 863, 765 P.2d 70].) Nor do we find any merit to defendant's further claim that the trial court highlighted the fact that he was in concealed leg restraints by forcing [him] to sit when introduced. There is no evidence that anyone in the courtroom was aware defendant was in leg restraints when he remained seated at counsel table as counsel stood up to be introduced to the prospective jury panel. Finally, as there is no evidence in the record that the two prospective jurors in the first panel who were ultimately seated on defendant's jury could see the leg restraints, there is no merit to defendant's further claim that the trial court committed reversible error by failing sua sponte to instruct the jury to disregard [defendant's] physical restraints. 9. Flight Instruction Defendant next contends the trial court erred when, over his objection, it instructed the jury with CALJIC No. 2.52 (flight after crime), because the evidence showed without contradiction that [defendant] lived out of state and because the only evidence of flight was the fact that [defendant] did not remain in the area. The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 2.52, which informed it that if it found defendant fled, his flight was a circumstance it could consider when determining guilt. [23] (14) At the threshold, we disagree with defendant's contention that he lived out of state at the time of the murders and, for that reason, the flight instruction was improperly given. At most, defendant traveled to Las Vegas and stayed with Billie's son, Eric Roesler, for several days before hitchhiking back to Bakersfield on Sunday, September 10, the day before Shirley and Joey were murdered. Defendant and Billie had not yet purchased the van in which they were later living in Las Vegas; it was purchased two days after the murders, on September 13. In any event, nothing in the standard flight instruction requires that it be proved a defendant lived in the area where his or her crimes were committed before an inference of guilt may properly be drawn from facts evidencing flight. A flight instruction is proper where the evidence shows a defendant departed the crime scene under circumstances suggesting his movement was motivated by a consciousness of guilt. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 982 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171]; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 60 [5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388].) Within hours after the murders defendant announced to his family members at the Self/Amos residence in Oildale, which was in the vicinity of the Jordans' apartment, and to which he returned directly after killing Shirley and Joey, that he and Billie would be leaving for Las Vegas that same evening. Billie washed his clothes, defendant changed into clean clothes, and they took the 7:00 p.m. bus to Las Vegas. We conclude on this factual record that defendant's objection was correctly overruled and the flight instruction properly given. Defendant also contends the flight instruction (CALJIC No. 2.52), as well as CALJIC No. 2.03, the instruction on consciousness of guilt, are both impermissibly argumentative pinpoint instructions that allow juries to draw improper inferences of guilt. The claim has been repeatedly rejected. (See, e.g., People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 555 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182] [CALJIC No. 2.03]; People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 848-849 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820] [CALJIC Nos. 2.05, 2.52].) He further argues the flight instruction improperly allows permissive inferences, i.e., authorizes the jury to draw an irrational inference of consciousness of guilt from flight. This claim too has previously been considered and rejected. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 179-180 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150].)