Opinion ID: 2241961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Corroborate Diminished Capacity Defense

Text: Defendant next maintains that even if this court were to disagree with him concerning counsel's decision to have him testify, the record nevertheless demonstrates that his attorney provided ineffective representation throughout the remainder of the trial. For example, defendant contends that once the decision was made to have [him] testify it was imperative that his testimony be corroborated and that independent lay and expert testimony supporting a defense of diminished capacity be presented. In support of this argument, defendant suggests that his attorney should have questioned a second waitress from the Golden Flame restaurant, Jane Sparks, concerning a statement she made to the police. In the statement, Sparks indicated that defendant and the victim appear[e]d to be high on something. Defendant further argues that his attorney erred by not having his brother and three acquaintances take the stand on defendant's behalf. According to defendant, these witnesses could have testified as to defendant's history of drug and alcohol abuse. Defendant also submits that his attorney should have called Dr. O'Donnell as an expert witness. Defendant believes that testimony from Dr. O'Donnell would have confirmed that Barbara had ingested either heroin, morphine or codeine shortly before her death. Finally, defendant points out that a police inventory sheet disclosed that a bag containing crushed green plant had been confiscated at the scene of the crime, but was later misplaced by the police. Defendant believes that his attorney should have offered the inventory sheet into evidence to corroborate his story that drugs did indeed play a part in Barbara's murder. According to defendant, his attorney's failure to present the foregoing corroborative evidence resulted in the denial of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. We find this argument unpersuasive. It is well established that decisions concerning which witnesses to call at trial and what evidence to present on defendant's behalf ultimately rest with trial counsel. People v. Ramey, 152 Ill.2d 41, 53-55, 178 Ill.Dec. 19, 604 N.E.2d 275 (1992). Such decisions have long been viewed as matters of trial strategy ( People v. Haywood, 82 Ill.2d 540, 543-44, 45 Ill.Dec. 932, 413 N.E.2d 410 (1980)), which are generally immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel ( People v. Guest, 166 Ill.2d 381, 394, 211 Ill.Dec. 490, 655 N.E.2d 873 (1995); see also People v. Gosier, 165 Ill.2d 16, 22, 208 Ill. Dec. 308, 649 N.E.2d 364 (1995) (noting that strategic choices are virtually unchallengeable); People v. Palmer, 162 Ill.2d 465, 476, 205 Ill.Dec. 506, 643 N.E.2d 797 (1994) (same)). This general rule is predicated upon our recognition that the right to effective assistance of counsel refers to competent, not perfect representation. People v. Stewart, 104 Ill.2d 463, 492, 85 Ill.Dec. 422, 473 N.E.2d 1227 (1984). Hence, `[m]istakes in trial strategy or tactics or in judgment do not of themselves render the representation incompetent.' People v. Hillenbrand, 121 Ill.2d 537, 548, 118 Ill.Dec. 423, 521 N.E.2d 900 (1988). The only exception to this rule is when counsel's chosen trial strategy is so unsound that counsel entirely fails to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. Guest, 166 Ill.2d at 394, 211 Ill.Dec. 490, 655 N.E.2d 873, citing People v. Hattery, 109 Ill.2d 449, 464, 94 Ill.Dec. 514, 488 N.E.2d 513 (1985), citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2045, 80 L.Ed.2d 657, 666 (1984). In our view, the above principles have particular resonance when applied to the case at bar. Contrary to defendant's position, our review of the record reveals that counsel's trial strategy cannot be viewed as so unsound as to lead us to believe that he did not fulfill his obligation to provide a meaningful adversarial testing of the State's case. In fact, defendant's attorney presented ample evidence in support of his theory that defendant suffered from a diminished mental capacity. James Bunker testified that he and defendant began drinking beer at approximately 9 o'clock on the morning in question. He and defendant then went to a party at a local forest preserve, where they continued to drink alcohol until early afternoon. The two men eventually drove to a friend's house later in the afternoon to have a few more beers. When asked by defense counsel whether defendant was intoxicated, Bunker replied, Yes, more or less. He had a few. Defense counsel later utilized Bunker's testimony during closing arguments when he reminded the court that defendant had starting drinking-starting doing drugs as early as about 9:00 o'clock that Saturday morning. The record also contains the testimony of Jacque Garceau, the bartender at the Garage Inn tavern, and George Moraitis, one of its patrons. Although both of these witnesses testified on behalf of the State, defense counsel did, during cross-examination, elicit evidence which was highly relevant to defendant's diminished capacity defense. Garceau, for example, acknowledged that at one point in the evening defendant had fallen asleep on his bar stool while drinking. Moraitis, meanwhile, agreed with defense counsel that defendant appeared to be high on some kind of drug or whatever. In fact, Moraitis described defendant as a maniac: Well, the defendant was-he was walking around, was very hypersensitive, spaced out or something, and he was going by the telephone and was trying to call somebody up and he put the telephone back up there, up on the dial, on the hook and he was infuriated or something. He started shaking the telephone off the wall. He was very hypersensitive, he was very-like a maniac. It is unbelievable. Thus, the record amply demonstrates that counsel, in furtherance of his theory of diminished capacity, elicited testimony from witnesses who directly observed defendant's drinking and behavior during the immediate hours preceding Barbara's murder. In contrast to this evidence, defendant now insists that his attorney should have questioned another waitress from the Golden Flame restaurant concerning her statement to police, i.e., that defendant and Barbara appeared to be high. However, even if this witness had been called to the stand, and further assuming that she testified consistent with her prior out-of-court statement, her testimony would have been merely cumulative of the in-court testimony offered by Bunker, Garceau and Moraitis. Moreover, the statement itself is equivocal on its face because it, at most, indicates that defendant and the victim  appeared to be high. Consequently, counsel's decision not to question the waitress about her prior statement to the police can hardly be viewed as a grave error in trial strategy. Similarly, having defendant's brother and his three friends take the stand would not, in our view, have made a significant impact on the diminished-capacity defense. Their testimony, the substance of which has been presented to this court pursuant to an offer of proof, pertains only to defendant's use of drugs and alcohol on other occasions. Notably, none of these witnesses were with defendant during the critical hours leading up to Barbara's murder. As a result, they could not have testified as to defendant's drug and alcohol consumption at that time. As noted above, Bunker, Garceau and Moraitis all observed defendant on the day in question. Their testimony, therefore, was far more probative on the issue of whether defendant's mental capacity was diminished at the time he killed Barbara than was the testimony of defendant's brother and his friends. As to defendant's assertion that his attorney erred by not presenting any expert witnesses, we seriously doubt whether Dr. O'Donnell's proffered testimony would have had an impact on the outcome of this case. First, any testimony regarding Barbara's consumption of drugs and alcohol would have had little, if any, relevance in determining whether defendant himself suffered from a diminished mental capacity. Second, even if Dr. O'Donnell had been called as a witness, his testimony would have been limited to the findings presented in the toxicologist's report. Although that report itself has not been made a part of the record for this appeal, it was admitted into evidence by way of stipulation. The record reflects that the report included a specific finding of 14.6 micrograms per millimeter of morphine in Barbara's bile. Consequently, defense counsel had no reason to call Dr. O'Donnell. Indeed, the toxicology report itself already corroborated defendant's claim regarding Barbara's consumption of drugs and alcohol. Finally, we consider any alleged error on counsel's part for failing to introduce the police inventory sheet referring to a bag containing crushed green plant barred by the doctrine of res judicata, that issue having been previously litigated on direct appeal. See Madej, 106 Ill.2d at 214, 88 Ill.Dec. 77, 478 N.E.2d 392. For the foregoing reasons, we reject defendant's contention that his attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to present additional evidence supporting his claim of diminished mental capacity.