Opinion ID: 702975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Molina's Motions to Sever

Text: 22 Molina argues that he was prejudiced by the district court's refusal to sever the counts as well as defendants for trial. The appellant claims that the gun charges and drug charges were so dissimilar as to warrant severance of the counts; in fact, only his codefendant was charged with the use of a weapon. Molina also asserts that the government's introduction of prior bad acts against codefendant Simpson was so prejudicial to him as to warrant severance of the trials. 23 The government argues that Molina has not met the heavy burden required on this issue, quoting us in United States v. Kaplan, 895 F.2d 618, 621 (9th Cir. 1990): 24 A denial of severance will be upheld absent a showing that joinder was so manifestly prejudicial that it outweighed the dominant concern with judicial economy and compelled exercise of the court's discretion to sever. U.S. v. Whitworth, 856 F.2d 1269, 1277 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 109 S.Ct. 1541, 103 L.Ed.2d 846 (1989); U.S. v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980). [J]oinder is the rule rather than the exception. Whitworth, 856 F.2d at 1277. 25 Id. We find no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever charges of drug dealing from the charge involving the weapon.