Opinion ID: 1127405
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Reporter Immunity Under the California Shield Law

Text: As observed in the statement of facts ( ante, at p. 21), following his arrest, defendant was interviewed by Michael Trihey, a reporter for the Bakersfield Californian. The newspaper published an article based on Trihey's five interviews with defendant. The article, entitled Accused Asks for Own Death, System Says No, was published on April 25, 1988. The article observed that Ted Sanchez says he's a murderer, a triple murderer, and that all three victims were killed for their social security checks. The article also revealed defendant's feelings of guilt: I am not an innocent man. If a man feels guilty he should be allowed to plead guilty, and revealed that he wanted to die in the gas chamber: I want to do the right thing. I should go straight to the gas chamber. I don't need no appeals. I deserve to die. In addition, the article noted that defendant reenacted the crimes for Trihey by raising one arm, covered with the tattoos he got in prison, to show how a fatal knife wound was inflicted. Earlier articles based on the same interviews, including one published on February 12, 1988, reported that defendant did not actually kill either Juan or Juanita but felt he deserves to die because he was present when the slaying happened, because he helped the killers and because he didn't intervene to save the couple, who had been kind to him for years. The same article also quoted defendant as telling Trihey that, `Joey grabbed a knife and started going at his dad' and, `that's when Reyes stepped in' and began clubbing [Juan] Bocanegra. The article also stated that defendant told Trihey they all had been smoking PCP before committing the crimes. Defendant was quoted as admitting that at the time of the Bocanegra murders, `I was scared.... It was just that I felt fear, and I didn't know how to respond to it. It could have been mixed emotions because of the PCP taking me.... I've been through a lot. I have done a lot of bad things. You know, I am no angel. [¶] One thing, I have not murdered nobody. I've done a lot of other things but I haven't went that far yet.' Finally, the article quoted defendant as asserting he didn't want to talk about the Tatman case other than to say, `I'm not guilty of that.' During the guilt phase the prosecution subpoenaed Trihey as a witness to testify as to the events he reported in his April 25, 1988, article. Trihey and the Bakersfield Californian filed a motion to quash the subpoena and for a protective order against the disclosure of unpublished information obtained from defendant, on the ground that the information sought was protected by the California Shield Law (hereafter shield law). (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b); Evid. Code, § 1070.) [2] After the prosecutor assured the court she intended to limit questioning of Trihey to published statements only, the court indicated that it would rule on a question by question basis. When the prosecutor called Trihey to testify, Toton objected. The court allowed Trihey to testify, subject to a motion to strike. Trihey then testified that he interviewed defendant five times, and that defendant told him he was a triple murderer and that all three [victims] were killed for their social security checks. When Toton asked Trihey if he had made any tape recordings of any interviews with defendant, Trihey's counsel objected on the ground that the question violated the shield law. The court then discontinued the cross-examination pending the submission of defense counsel's points and authorities. The next day, defendant argued that application of the shield law to protect unpublished information in Trihey's possession would deny him his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and to the effective assistance of counsel, as well as his statutory right to introduce his entire conversation with Trihey. (Evid. Code, § 356 [when part of act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by one party, the whole may be inquired into by adverse party].) Defense counsel moved the court either to strike Trihey's testimony or to order Trihey to furnish defendant with all unpublished information regarding the interviews. The court made the following ruling: THE COURT: I am going to rule that you haven't gotten over the hurdle of [ Hammarley v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 388 (153 Cal. Rptr. 608)] and [ Hallissy v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 1038 (248 Cal. Rptr. 635)] at this point, and that you may cross-examine Mr. Trihey concerning any of the printed material we have, either this current article or the one before. I am also going to tell you that the court's ruling at this point is without prejudice and that the court does not intend to make a ruling in this case. Thereafter, the court clarified its ruling in the following colloquy: MR. TOTON: Number one, I can cross-examine Mr. Trihey on any published article. THE COURT: Absolutely. MR. TOTON: And the contents of any published article. THE COURT: Absolutely. MR. TOTON: I would be prohibited from inquiring behind the published material? THE COURT: At this point. MR. TOTON: I am not clear as to which [ Hammarley ], [ Hallissy ] prong is lacking. THE COURT: Well, I don't think there is any, right now there is no issue that somehow Mr. Trihey is lying and can be impeached and so forth. That penultimate paragraph [in Hallissy ] that Mr. Werdel called to my attention is pretty strong language. MR. TOTON: That is the one that starts off, [A]rguably? THE COURT: Right. MR. TOTON: So that if I understand, it's the second prong of [the Hammarley test relied on by the Hallissy court] which is lacking; is that correct, your Honor? THE COURT: Right. Defendant now claims the trial court erred in limiting the scope of Trihey's testimony and renews his trial court objections.
In ruling that defendant had failed to meet the second prong of the Hammarley test, the court was referring to Hammarley 's construction of the shield law under Evidence Code section 1070, and its development of a four-pronged test that assisted the court in determining whether the statute should protect a newsperson from having to reveal undisclosed corroborating sources pertaining to the newsperson's interviews with a named individual who was the prosecution's principal witness in a murder case. ( Hammarley v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 392-394 [153 Cal. Rptr. 608] [hereafter Hammarley ].) (16) The Hammarley court reviewed the legislative history and intent of the shield law. The court observed, The `unpublished information' provisions of [Evidence Code] section 1070 were added by amendment in 1974. Prior to that time, the statutory privilege expressly encompassed only source disclosure. ( Hammarley, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d at p. 396, fn. omitted.) The court held that the statutory privilege protecting unpublished information is not limited to material which might lead to the disclosure of a [newsperson's] confidential sources, but encompasses all information acquired by the [newsperson] in the course of his professional activities which he has not disseminated to the public. ( Id., at pp. 397-398.) The Hammarley court then stated its test for determining whether a defendant has met his burden in overcoming the statutory protection. Faced with a claim of privilege, the burden is on the party seeking to avoid the privilege competently to demonstrate not only that the evidence sought is relevant and necessary to his case, but that it is not available from a source less intrusive upon the privilege. Moreover, as with any attempt to discover evidence subject to a claim of privilege, a defendant must show a reasonable possibility that the evidence sought might result in his exoneration. (89 Cal. App.3d at p. 399.) Nine years later, in Hallissy v. Superior Court (1988) 200 Cal. App.3d 1038 [248 Cal. Rptr. 635] (hereafter Hallissy ), the court used the Hammarley test to grant a newsperson immunity from revealing unpublished sources. A brief review of Hallissy 's facts is instructive. A defendant was charged with three counts of first degree murder (§§ 187, 198), and with the multiple-murder and murder-for-financial-gain special circumstances. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(1) & (3).) Prior to the preliminary hearing, the defendant was interviewed by a reporter for the Contra Costa Times. ( Hallissy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at p. 1041.) Information gathered during the interview was published in the paper in an article entitled, I Killed Many for Pay. ( Ibid. ) Following publication of the article, the prosecutor amended the complaint to allege the murder-for-financial-gain special circumstance. ( Ibid. ) The defendant then subpoenaed Hallissy, the reporter, to appear at the preliminary hearing with the unpublished notes of the interview. ( Ibid. ) The trial court granted Hallissy's motion to quash the subpoena on the ground that the unpublished information was protected by the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and by article I, section 2, subdivision (b), of the state Constitution. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeal held that the defendant had failed to meet the second prong of Hammarley. ( Hallissy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at p. 1046.) The court observed, Arguably [defendant] approaches an adequate showing of relevancy: he wishes to attack his own credibility by using inconsistent statements that he may have made to the reporter during the interview. But he has made no attempt to demonstrate that this particular item of evidence, if it exists, is necessary to his case, the second prong of Hammarley.  ( Hallissy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at p. 1046.) During the past five years, we have had the opportunity to review application of the shield law in the context of criminal cases. (See e.g., Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785.) While using the Hammarley and Hallissy cases as a benchmark from which to develop our own test for determining whether the shield law should protect a reporter under the particular facts of a case, we disapproved those cases to the extent they held that a criminal defendant must in every case show the lack of an alternative source regardless of the circumstances. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 813, fn. 29.) We noted, however, that both Hammarley and Hallissy were consistent with the test we adopted in Delaney [a]s to the threshold showing required. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 808, fn. 22.) In fashioning its test for determining whether the shield law should apply to a particular set of facts, the Delaney court held that the law protects a newsperson from being held in contempt of court for refusal to disclose either unpublished information or the source of the reporter's information, whether published or unpublished. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 796-797; cf. People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 820-821 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865] [hereafter Cooper ].) (17a) Nonetheless, the Delaney court recognized that a newsperson's protection under the shield law must yield to a criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial when the newsperson's refusal to disclose information would unduly infringe on that right. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 793.) In order to compel disclosure of information covered by the shield law, the defendant must make a threshold showing of a reasonable possibility that the information will materially assist his defense. The showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation. [Citation.] If the threshold showing is made, the court then balances various factors in determining whether to compel disclosure of the information. [Citation.] ( Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 820, paraphrasing Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 809-813.) The trial court's ruling in this case predated both Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d 785, and Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d 771, but that fact does not bear on our decision. Indeed, defendant concedes Delaney states the applicable standard. Defendant makes several arguments against application of shield law immunity in this case: (1) Trihey's assertion of the privilege was premature because the court had not adjudged him in contempt of court before he invoked immunity; (2) Trihey failed to lay the proper foundation for invoking the immunity; (3) even assuming immunity was properly invoked, defendant met Delaney 's threshold test for defeating a claim for immunity; (4) application of immunity in this case was prejudicial and denied defendant his federal constitutional rights to confrontation and discovery under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments (see, e.g., Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 315 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353, 94 S.Ct. 1105]; Lee v. Illinois (1986) 476 U.S. 530, 540 [90 L.Ed.2d 514, 525-526, 106 S.Ct. 2056] [right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is functional right that promotes reliability in criminal trials]; Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 679 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 683, 106 S.Ct. 1431] [right to confront and cross-examine witnesses includes right to adequate cross-examination]; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 56 [94 L.Ed.2d 40, 56-57, 107 S.Ct. 989] [criminal defendants have right to government's assistance in compelling attendance of favorable witnesses]); and (5) Toton's failure to cross-examine Trihey on alleged inconsistent statements contained in the article deprived defendant of effective assistance of counsel. On this record, we are not persuaded by defendant's contentions. (18) First, with respect to his assertion that the timing of Trihey's claim of immunity should bar application of the shield law, defendant relies on New York Times Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 453 [273 Cal. Rptr. 98, 796 P.2d 811] (hereafter New York Times ), in which we held that a precontempt petition for extraordinary relief under the shield law was prematurely filed. New York Times, however, does not assist defendant, for it was based on the reasoning that precontempt relief would deprive trial courts of the opportunity to decide in the first instance whether the shield law applies to the facts of a case. ( Id. at p. 459.) In New York Times, the court was asked to decide whether, in a products liability action against a car manufacturer for damages arising out of an automobile accident, the manufacturer could subpoena the unpublished photographs of the accident taken by a newspaper reporter. After the publisher invoked the shield law immunity and refused to comply with the manufacturer's subpoena, the trial court ordered the production of the photographs. Before being adjudged in contempt, the publisher petitioned the Court of Appeal for an extraordinary writ and stay of the court's order. (51 Cal.3d at p. 457.) The Court of Appeal issued a writ of mandate ordering the trial court to deny the manufacturer's motion to compel, finding that, unlike application of immunity in a criminal proceeding, in which we have held that the defendant may overcome its application by showing that the immunity would deprive him of a fair trial under the federal constitution, the shield law provides `absolute protection to nonparty journalists in civil litigation from being compelled to disclose unpublished information.' ( Ibid. ) Although we granted the publisher relief in New York Times, we observed that because the shield law provides an immunity from contempt, and not a privilege, the writ petition was premature. (51 Cal.3d at pp. 458-459.) This finding of prematurity was based on the practical concern that precontempt relief would frustrate the trial court's ability to determine whether the immunity should apply in the first instance. ( Id. at p. 459.) We reasoned: Premature interference in trial court proceedings would deprive reviewing courts of adequate factual records for making this determination. Premature relief would also allow newspersons to avoid the responsibility of choosing between disclosing information or being held in contempt. A newsperson would have no incentive to make that choice until after a decision by a reviewing court. The result would be an increased burden on reviewing courts. ( Id., at pp. 459-460.) The above reasoning, while clearly based on practical grounds, does not foreclose a claim of immunity in the trial court by the nonparty witness during cross-examination. By invoking immunity while on the witness stand, the newsperson is making the choice, discussed in New York Times, between disclosing the information he or she believes falls under the ambit of the shield law, or being held in contempt. (51 Cal.3d at p. 460.) That was the choice properly made by Trihey and the Bakersfield Californian when raising shield law immunity during cross-examination. Defendant's claim that Trihey failed to lay a proper foundation for raising the shield law is equally unavailing. First, defendant failed to object on this ground. Accordingly, he has waived the claim on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a).) Had he made the proper objection, however, his claim would fail on the merits. We held in Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 805, that under article I, section 2, subdivision (b) of the state Constitution, a newsperson claiming shield law protection must show that he is one of the types of persons enumerated in the law, that the information was `obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public,' and that the information has not been `disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure is sought.' ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 805, fn. 17, quoting Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (b).) Once that showing is made, the burden shifts to the party opposing the immunity to show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his defense. (50 Cal.3d at p. 808, italics in original.) Trihey met his foundational requirements. In support of his motion to quash the People's subpoena, he filed a declaration stating that he was a news reporter employed by the Bakersfield Californian Newspaper, that his sources for the February 12, 1988, and April 25, 1988, articles on defendant [were] the source or sources of some information, procured while so connected or employed, for publication in the newspaper. Trihey also declared that the information gathered for the stories [was] unpublished and [had] not been disseminated to the public... except for the specific information published in said news article, and that [a]ll such unpublished information was obtained or prepared in the gathering, receiving or processing of information for communication to the public. Defendant has provided no evidence that would contradict Trihey's declaration and, in fact, concedes the subject notes and tapes were unpublished information within the meaning of the shield law. [3] (19a) Once Trihey met the shield law requirements, defendant was required to show that nondisclosure would deprive him of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 805.) As observed, ante, this page, in order to meet this burden, defendant had to make a threshold showing that it was reasonably possible the unpublished information he sought was necessary to his defense. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 808.) (17b) Although Delaney did not and could not specify what evidence would meet its threshold test, the court did observe that the defendant need not prove evidence he sought to discover would lead to his exoneration and that the defendant's showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation. ( Delaney, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 809.) Some examples the court provided are instructive: [E]vidence may establish an `imperfect defense,' a lesser included offense, a lesser related offense, or a lesser degree of the same crime; impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness; or, as in capital cases, establish mitigating circumstances relevant to the penalty determination. A criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial includes these aspects of his defense. ( Ibid., fn. omitted.) (19b) In attempting to meet his burden, defendant attacks his own credibility by claiming he made inconsistent statements during the course of the interviews that would have exposed his confused state of mind at the time the interviews took place. He asserts his alleged unpublished statements also could have been used to impeach Trihey's testimony that defendant had told him he was a triple murderer and that all three were killed for their social security checks. But defendant never shows how the information he sought would materially assist his defense, or how it differed in content from the testimony and published information available for cross-examination, including defendant's statements that he was scared, that he had taken phencyclidine (PCP), and that he had not murdered anyone. Defendant simply asserts that he needed discovery of, and cross-examination about, the unpublished records of the interviews to impeach Trihey's testimony. Unlike other statements attributed to [defendant] in the April 25th article, Trihey's `triple murderer' assertion was not a direct quotation. Rather, it was a conclusion drawn by Trihey. Trihey's unpublished material might have shown that his `triple murder' testimony was his own interpretation of [defendant's] account, not an actual admission. Moreover, discovery and cross-examination might have proven that Trihey's conclusion was not supported by the interviews. The tapes might have shown that [defendant] never said he was a `triple murderer' or a `triple killer'; that he did not hit either Juan or Juanita; that he did nothing to aid or abet Joey; that he did not intend that either Juan or Juanita be killed; that he tried to stop Joey from killing his parents; or that he feels guilty because he failed to prevent the homicides. Any of these possibilities would have bolstered [defendant's] insufficiency of the evidence argument. The alleged evidence defendant claims would have materially assisted his defense consists of nothing more than self-serving statements that a court could reasonably conclude were either too speculative to assist defendant or would harm, rather than materially assist, the defense. Indeed, this case is similar to Hallisy, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d at page 1041, in which the court rejected the defendant's attempt to attack his own credibility by subpoenaing a reporter's unpublished interview notes. Based on this record, and under the more recent Delaney threshold test, we find that defendant has failed to make the threshold showing that publication of alleged unpublished interview information possessed by Trihey would have materially assisted the defense and defeated Trihey's claim of immunity under the shield law. [4] In addition, for the same reasons noted above, we reject defendant's claim that he was denied his right to confront and cross-examine Trihey and to discover and present evidence under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. The record shows the court rejected Trihey's statements as proof that defendant killed the victims for their Social Security checks. Moreover, the court found untrue the special circumstance allegations that the murders of Juan and Juanita Bocanegra were committed during a robbery and found defendant not guilty of the robbery in connection with that crime. Thus, it appears the court afforded little weight to Trihey's testimony, and defendant was not denied his federal constitutional right to a fair trial simply because the court allowed the testimony to be introduced. (20) In a related argument based on independent state grounds, defendant claims that application of the shield law denied him his right to the complete statements he made to Trihey. Defendant asserts the unpublished statements should have been provided the defense under Evidence Code section 356, allowing him to inquire into the entire conversation with Trihey. Defendant fails to acknowledge, however, that section 356 evidence is subject to the immunity provided under the shield law. (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Circumstantial Evidence, § 319, p. 292, and cases cited.) In addition, defendant fails to show how the unpublished statements he alleged he made to Trihey would have placed Trihey's testimony in its proper context, or that the information sought had some connection with Trihey's testimony. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704]; see also People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1174 [259 Cal. Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730].) (21) Finally, we reject defendant's assertion that counsel's failure to cross-examine Trihey before closing argument denied him the effective assistance of counsel under article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, and the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. In order to succeed in his claim, defendant must show (1) deficient performance under an objective standard of professional reasonableness and (2) prejudice under a test of reasonable probability of an adverse effect on the outcome. ( People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1081 [25 Cal. Rptr.2d 867, 864 P.2d 40] [hereafter Berryman ]; cf. People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215-218 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839] [discussing state and federal right to effective assistance of counsel].) Defendant does not satisfy either prong of the foregoing test. As discussed, Toton convinced the court during his closing argument that Trihey's testimony should not be given substantial weight; his decision not to cross-examine Trihey as to the contents of the published material was sound strategy, given the nature of defendant's alleged contradictory statements. Defendant does not establish that cross-examination would have revealed any new information, or that any additional information about the interviews would have influenced the court's judgment. Hence, we cannot find counsel's failure to cross-examination Trihey to be deficient. In any event, given the fact that the court dismissed the robbery charges against defendant, and found not true the robbery-murder special-circumstance allegation, we discern no prejudice to defendant based on counsel's performance. ( Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1082.)