Opinion ID: 1725679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the forfeiture of conrod's property violate constitutional rights?

Text: ¶ 6. Conrod argues that the forfeiture of his property, a 1979 Ford van and two bank accounts, violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and cites Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 113 S.Ct. 2801, 125 L.Ed.2d 488 (1993) in support of his position. In Austin, the defendant, upon his guilty plea, was sentenced to prison for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Subsequently, the United States filed an in rem action in Federal District Court against his mobile home and auto body shop under the federal statutes which provide for the forfeiture of vehicles and real property used or intended to be used to facilitate the commission of certain drug-related crimes. Id. at 604-05, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The United States Supreme Court held that forfeiture under the federal statutes was monetary punishment and thus subject to the Excessive Fines Clause. The Supreme Court ruled that these sections were punitive in nature, even though they may also serve remedial purposes, because Congress provided for an innocent-owner defense within the statutes in addition to requiring that forfeiture be directly tied to the commission of drug offenses. Id. at 619-20, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The Supreme Court concluded that forfeiture under these federal statutes constituted payment for punishment for some offense and was, therefore, subject to the limitations of the Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 622, 113 S.Ct. 2801. The Supreme Court stopped short of indicating exactly what was excessive and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for such a determination. Id. ¶ 7. The United States Supreme Court has not yet prescribed a test for determining whether a forfeiture is an excessive fine. The State argues that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the states. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. 475, 18 L.Ed. 608 (1866); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 78 S.Ct. 1302, 2 L.Ed.2d 1393 (1958). The Mississippi Constitution has its own excessive fines clause, which is identical to the Excessive Fines Clause of the United States Constitution. Miss. Const. art. 3 § 28 (1890). This Court can look to the United States Supreme Court for guidance or we can develop our own application under Miss. Const. art 3 § 28. Other courts have primarily employed two tests when determining whether a forfeiture is excessive. ¶ 8. The Fourth Circuit, in United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir.1994), has adopted the instrumentality test, which requires an analysis of the following three factors, when determining whether forfeiture is excessive: (1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the offense, (2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating the offending property from the remainder. Id. at 365. This test focuses on how closely the property is tied to the crime and whether the property was instrumental to the crime committed. If the above three requirements are met, the forfeiture is considered constitutional. Since the Supreme Court's Austin decision, a number of other courts of appeal have applied the Excessive Fines Clause in the forfeiture context. Only the Chandler court has adopted Justice Scalia's instrumentality approach as the sole inquiry. [2] ¶ 9. At the other end of the spectrum, one circuit has concluded that the appropriate inquiry with respect to the Excessive Fines Clause is, and is only, a proportionality test that compares the value of the property forfeited with the severity of the crime committed. United States v. One Parcel Property Located at 427 & 429 Hall Street, 74 F.3d 1165, 1170 (11th Cir.1996) (rejecting Chandler court's analysis and instrumentality test). Several courts of appeal, meanwhile, have adopted tests that combine instrumentality and proportionality inquiries. See United States v. Premises Known as 6040 Wentworth Avenue South, 123 F.3d 685, 688-89 (8th Cir.1997) (applying gross disproportionality analysis including both proportionality and instrumentality factors); United States v. One Parcel Property, 106 F.3d 336, 338 (10th Cir.1997) (applying instrumentality test first, then proportionality test); United States v. Real Property Located in El Dorado County at 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d 974, 983 (9th Cir.1995) (adopting proportionality test as a check on the instrumentality approach); United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir.1995) (applying multi-factor analysis including both proportionality and instrumentality factors), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1182, 116 S.Ct. 1284, 134 L.Ed.2d 228(1996); United States v. Premises Known as RR #1, Box 224, Dalton, 14 F.3d 864, 876 (3d Cir.1994) (remanding with instructions to apply instrumentality test first, then examine proportionality). The Sixth Circuit has addressed the question but declined to adopt an approach, see United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 11869 Westshore Drive, 70 F.3d 923, 930 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 57, 136 L.Ed.2d 20(1996), while the First, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits apparently have yet to consider the issue. ¶ 10. As a court, we can not view forfeiture cases in a vacuum. The test employed must be one that permits forfeiture of property from those persons who utilize said property in furtherance of their own criminal activity. Yet, the test must also be flexible so as not to permit forfeiture where innocent persons will suffer or where the value of the property is grossly disproportionate to the crime. ¶ 11. Given that the weight of authority among the courts of appeal strongly favors the use of both instrumentality and proportionality review in this context, we decline to employ solely the instrumentality test. One can easily imagine cases in which the freestanding instrumentality approach could lead to results that are excessive fines under the circumstances. ¶ 12. A proportionality analysis is especially appropriate in the civil forfeiture context because it is the sovereign that profits from such forfeitures. See United States v. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d at 983 (adopting proportionality test as a check on the instrumentality approach). Justice Scalia recognized this when he stated: There is good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, will be imposed in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution and deterrence. Imprisonment, corporal punishment and even capital punishment cost a State money; [whereas] fines are a source of revenue ... [I]t makes sense to scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 978 n. 9, 111 S.Ct. 2680 n. 9, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion). All property, such as that which is at issue here, that is forfeited to Mississippi law enforcement agencies is either liquidated, in which case the arresting agency is entitled to a portion of the proceeds, or kept by the arresting law enforcement agency for its own use and benefit. Miss.Code Ann. 41-29-181 (Supp.1997). This incentive enhances the need for close scrutiny of in rem forfeitures. For this reason, the judiciary should be alert to detect constitutionally proscribed injustices imposed on individual wrongdoers. 6380 Little Canyon Road, 59 F.3d at 984-85. ¶ 13. This Court recognizes the factually intensive nature of forfeiture cases and we elect to apply a test that combines the three prongs of the instrumentality test with a proportionality review. The elements of the test that we elect to employ are as follows: (1) The nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the offense; (2) The role and culpability of the owner; (3) The possibility of separating the offending property from the remainder; and (4) Whether, after a review of all relevant facts, the forfeiture divests the owner of property which has a value that is grossly disproportionate to the crime or grossly disproportionate to the culpability of the owner. ¶ 14. The above test combines the elements of the instrumentality test with a weighing of proportionality on the individual circumstances of each case to determine whether the forfeiture is excessive. It avoids the harsh and unjust results that can be, and will be, produced by the implementation of a bright-line instrumentality test. At the same time, it allows the lower courts, and this Court on review, to consider all relevant factors under a framework that is simple, yet complete. ¶ 15. As outlined in this opinion, the vast majority of federal courts have also elected to temper the instrumentality with a proportionality review. In fact, the Fourth Circuit appears to be the only circuit that strictly follows solely an instrumentality test. United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994). ¶ 16. The analysis under the proportionality test that we employ here is two-part. First, under the instrumentality (or nexus) test, the forfeited property must have a sufficiently close relationship to the illegal activity. Second, under the proportionality test, forfeiture of the property must not impose upon the owner a penalty grossly disproportionate to his offense. ¶ 17. With these enunciated principles in mind, we proceed to determine whether the forfeiture of the 1979 Ford van and the two bank accounts are proper under the test we have set forth above. 1979 Ford van ¶ 18. Conrod pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine and the commission of a drug crime with a firearm which are felonies set forth in 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846. This crime carries a maximum of fifteen years and possibly a $25,000 fine. Conrod drove the van to the site where the terms and details of the drug buy were negotiated. On the night of the actual drug deal, Conrod was driving a Corvette while others with him drove a Maxima. As he is the sole owner of the van, there are no innocent third parties that could be affected. ¶ 19. For forfeiture to be permissible, there must be sufficient nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property's role in the offense. The crime at issue here is not an isolated case of mere possession of a small quantity of illegal drugs. Conrod pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute a large amount of cocaine. In furtherance of this conspiracy, Conrod used the van to facilitate the eventual drug deal, which gives the van a role in the conspiracy. In addition, the van provided a cover for Conrod, as a different vehicle was employed to consummate the sale. The nexus between the property, the van, and the offense, conspiracy to distribute, was sufficiently established and the lower court was not clearly erroneous in its finding that the van should be forfeited. ¶ 20. We now proceed to determine whether the forfeiture of the van was excessive in light of the Eighth Amendment. Our inquiry brings us to the fourth prong of the test that we have set forth above. Specifically, we must determine whether, after a review of all relevant facts, the forfeiture divests the owner of property which has a value that is grossly disproportionate to the crime or grossly disproportionate to the culpability of the owner. ¶ 21. After careful review of the record, we hold that the forfeiture of the van was not grossly disproportionate to the crimes committed or grossly disproportionate to the culpability of Conrod. As noted above, Conrod was engaged in a conspiracy to distribute a large amount of cocaine. When arrested, Conrod had over $90,000 in his possession. In light of the severity of the crime and the amount of drugs and money involved, we can not say that the lower court erred in ordering forfeiture of the 1979 Ford van. The forfeiture of the van is affirmed. The two bank accounts ¶ 22. Conrod argues that there was insufficient evidence to support a judgment of forfeiture of the two bank accounts. The burden of proof the State must meet in forfeiture proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence. Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-179(2) (1993). The State used the testimony of Agent Anderson to tie together the van and the bank accounts with illegal drug transactions. Anderson testified that Conrod told her that his grocery store was not doing well. As to the bank accounts, Anderson testified that she could not point to any drug sale or transaction that contributed proceeds to either the $6,912 or the $6,061.90 account. Conrod's accountant testified that he prepared Conrod's income tax returns in 1988, 1989, and 1990. The testimony indicated that Conrod had excessive amounts of cash in excess of what would normally be expected from the operation of a store or working at a factory. ¶ 23. This Court has held that when a judge sits without a jury, it will not overturn a finding unless the judge was clearly erroneous or applied incorrect legal standards. McClendon v. State, 539 So.2d 1375, 1377 (Miss.1989). In Mullins v. Ratcliff, 515 So.2d 1183, 1189 (Miss.1987), this Court held that it will not reverse a trial court's finding of fact unless it is manifestly wrong. It is not necessary for the government to trace property to a particular drug transaction for property to be forfeited; rather, it is a totality of the circumstances, not a minute accounting of each item of information, that leads to meeting the burden of proof. United States v. 127 Shares of Stock in Paradigm Mfg., Inc., 758 F.Supp. 581 (E.D.Cal.1990). ¶ 24. We find that the trial judge was clearly erroneous in determining that the bank accounts could be forfeited. The State's witness could not tie the monies in the bank accounts with any criminal conduct on behalf of Conrod. Thus, there is no nexus between the bank and the crime committed by Conrod. As to the two bank accounts, we hold that there was insufficient evidence to hold that the relationship of the property was close enough to render the property guilty and thus forfeitable. We reverse and render as to the forfeiture of the two bank accounts.
¶ 25. Conrod asserts that the beginning of forfeiture proceedings after he had entered a plea of guilty violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Conrod did not raise this issue in the lower court. It is established that this Court will not review matters on appeal that were not considered by the lower court. Ditto v. Hinds County, 665 So.2d 878, 880 (Miss. 1995). This issue is procedurally barred.