Opinion ID: 880626
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Garberding was entitled to an evidentiary hearing to challenge alleged misstatements or omissions in the search warrant?

Text: Relying on Franks v. Delaware (1978), 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667, Garberding contends the District Court erred when it denied him an evidentiary hearing to evaluate probable cause based on facts which were allegedly omitted from the search warrant application. He maintains that missing was the critical fact that Sheriff Alexander's failure to reveal the primary informant's criminal background as a felon and that the informant received a cash reward from the sheriff for his information. The State urges that even if intentionally omitted by Alexander, the absence of this information does not affect a probable cause determination because the informant was not presumed reliable and additional facts about his criminal history would not have affected his credibility. The State maintains that the accuracy and detail of the primary informant's tip based on personal observation established the primary informant's reliability, whether or not he was involved in drugs himself. Furthermore, the State points out that Garberding has presented no facts that show that Alexander intentionally or even recklessly omitted any facts from the application, which Franks, 438 U.S. at 155, 98 S.Ct. at 2676, requires before an evidentiary hearing on probable cause is justified. The Franks court held: [W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant's request. Franks, 438 U.S. at 156, 98 S.Ct. at 2676. Sheriff Alexander's failure to reveal the primary informant's criminal background as a felon and that the informant received a cash reward from the Sheriff for his information does not justify a Franks hearing. The fact that the primary informant was a convicted felon and was paid for his tip does not cast doubt on the reliability of his information. In United States v. Harris , the Supreme Court stated that the fact that an informant admitted to his own criminal activity and was paid for his information added credit to his tip. A person of known criminal activity or a person admitting his own criminal activity is not likely to place himself in such a dubious position unless he is telling the truth. Thus, such an omission does not require a Franks hearing. Garberding's arguments of alleged omissions and misstatements do not persuade this Court that a Franks hearing was necessary. The search warrant showed probable cause for believing the occurrence of a crime and the secreting of evidence in specific premises. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. at 584, 91 S.Ct. at 2082. We hold that Garberding was not entitled to a Franks hearing to challenge the search warrant.