Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Compelling State Interest Analysis

Text: The majority carefully avoids deciding whether strict scrutiny would be required under the California Constitution. Other states with very similar constitutional liberty of conscience clauses have found that infringement requires strict scrutiny. (See, e.g., Humphrey v. Lane (2000) 89 Ohio St.3d 62, 728 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 [holding that under the Ohio Constitution, the standard for reviewing a generally applicable, religion-neutral state regulation that allegedly violates a person's right to free exercise of religion is whether the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest and finding the regulation at bar not the least restrictive]; State v. Hershberger (Minn.1990) 462 N.W.2d 393 [under the Minnesota Constitution, neutral motor vehicle statute, which burdened Amish religious exercise, failed compelling state interest test since state failed to show lack of reasonable alternative means]; First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle (1992) 120 Wash.2d 203, 840 P.2d 174, 187 [statute that burdened free exercise failed state compelling interest test under Washington Constitution since the state's interest was not of sufficient magnitude to outweigh free exercise of religion].) At the very least, the constitutional weight of the state's interest must be affected by the size and severity of the problem the state is attempting to solve. To authorize the state to use a howitzer to smite a gnat should be no part of our constitutional jurisprudence. Where strict scrutiny applies, the state may abridge religious practices only upon a demonstration that some compelling state interest outweighs the defendants' interests in religious freedom. ( People v. Woody (1964) 61 Cal.2d 716, 718, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813 ( Woody ).) It may also be true that [s]ection 4 has not played an independent role in free exercise claims (Grodin et al., The Cal. State Constitution: A Reference Guide (1993) p. 44), but does that mean it should remain dormant? In Woody, the court relied on the First Amendment rather than the California provision, but in doing so, the court applied strict scrutiny and insisted on a searching inquiry. Under California law  at least up to now  the compelling state interest test had bite and required the court to weigh[ ] the competing values represented ... on the symbolic scale of constitutionality. ( Woody, supra, 61 Cal.2d at p. 727, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813.) Untested assertions of a possible deleterious effect on a statutory scheme were not sufficient. ( Id. at p. 724, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813.) In Woody, the court concluded that uniform enforcement of neutral criminal drug laws (similar to the laws at issue in Smith ) was not a compelling reason to intrude upon sincere religious practices. In explaining why the interest in drug enforcement  while undeniably important  was not compelling enough, the court said: In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity, the protection of self-expression, however unique, of the individual and the group becomes ever more important. The varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. ( Woody, at p. 727, 40 Cal.Rptr. 69, 394 P.2d 813.) These concerns should be heightened when the government seeks to redefine the core theology of religious organizations. Under the standard enunciated in Woody, the state has actually failed to meet its burden. The whole debate ensues because the state found that approximately 10 percent of commercially insured Californians do not have coverage for prescription contraceptives. (Maj. opn., ante, 10 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 291, 85 P.3d at p. 74.) Presumably that 10 percent includes both men and women. Still, it means that 90 percent of Californians who are commercially insured do have such coverage! The insurance gap itself is not large, and Catholic Church employers can constitute only a small percentage of that small percentage. Moreover, even if we assume the interests at issue here are both compelling and of equal weight, the Legislature's refusal to grant a broader exemption  one which would not embroil the government in the unseemly task of deciding what is religious  is inexplicable. The state has produced no substantial evidence that the exemption of Catholic Charities from this particular mandate would render the whole scheme ineffective or would be so administratively burdensome as to preclude enforcement. As petitioner poses the question: [I]f closing the Catholic gap [was] not the problem, how can `granting an exemption to Catholic employers' ... `defeat the purpose of the bill'? There has been no showing that the interests served by the WCEA  which focuses on a modest 10 percent gap in coverage  cannot be achieved by less restrictive means.