Opinion ID: 604665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Issues germane only to Lemke.

Text: 41 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. Lemke asserts that there was insufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to find him guilty. Ordinarily, a sufficiency question is reviewed under the Jackson v. Virginia any rational trier of fact standard--that is, a conviction will be affirmed as supported by sufficient evidence if,  'reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 829 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). Where the defendant has not moved for a judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence, however, a more stringent plain error standard applies. United States v. Mora, 876 F.2d 76, 77 (9th Cir.1989). Lemke moved for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the government's case, but did not renew his motion at the close of evidence. Our review, accordingly, is to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice or for plain error. Id. 42 As described by his attorney, Lemke's story is essentially this. He is 43 a man who fell in love with a woman whose family and friends were beset with drug addiction, many had criminal pasts, they were financially destitute, and they exhibited propensities for violence which [Lemke] clearly distained [sic] and sought to avoid; unfortunately, he reluctantly exposed himself to these individuals, offering his friendship as an auto mechanic or chauffe[u]r, in order to maintain his relationship. As a result of his mere presence amongst Margo's troubled family and friends, he currently finds himself before this court seeking relief from unjust criminal convictions built upon a foundation of speculation. 44 Lemke's Brief at 7. 45 With respect to the 18 U.S.C. § 1958 charges (Counts Two and Four), Lemke argues that there was reasonable doubt that he was involved in a murder-for-hire scheme; it is plausible in many instances, he says, to construe his role as nothing more than a chauffeur or auto mechanic who was employed through friendship, without any knowledge of criminal wrong-doing, to help out financially destitute family members or friends of Margo [Thibault-]Lemke. Id. at 19. 46 A conviction for violation of § 1958 requires proof that Lemke traveled in interstate commerce with the intent that a contract murder be committed. United States v. Ransbottom, 914 F.2d 743, 746 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 439 (1990). The evidence is sufficient to show that Lemke's conviction on Counts Two and Four was not only not plain error, but that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 47 Lemke played an active role in shaping the scheme to kill Richard Thibault. He drove two of the hired killers from Colorado to California, and personally brought the intended murder weapon, a knife. He kept in close contact with Margo; telephone records produced by the government revealed many calls at key times. For example, after Margo learned that a Garden Grove police officer wanted to talk with her about the break-in at Richard's office, Lemke and Margo talked to each other on the phone ten different times that night, with the final conversation lasting approximately ninety minutes. Lamb testified that Lemke interviewed him to see if he was up to the task of killing Richard Thibault--Lemke identified various ways that Richard could be killed, and asked about Lamb's qualifications for undertaking the murder assignment. 48 Lemke also contests the evidentiary sufficiency of his wire fraud convictions (Counts Nine through Eleven). He maintains that there was a dearth of evidence that he intended to defraud any insurance companies or that he personally utilized any interstate communication devices to further the murder-for-hire/insurance fraud scheme. See Bernhardt, 840 F.2d at 1446 (setting forth elements of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 wire fraud). 49 Fraudulent intent need not be proved by direct evidence, but rather can be inferred from statements and conduct. United States v. Cusino, 694 F.2d 185, 187 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983). The jury heard evidence that Lemke was actively involved in the recruitment of the four killers, and that he knew Margo promised payment to them from Richard's life insurance policies. Lemke had no money, and, by the end of December 1987, neither did Margo. As the government summarizes, [a] rational jury could have inferred that [Margo] and Lemke planned to defraud the insurance carriers by concealing from them the true circumstances of Richard's murder. 50 As to the significance of the fact that Lemke did not personally make the telephone calls set forth in Counts Nine through Eleven, case law is clear that a knowing participant in a fraudulent scheme is legally responsible for the improper use of the interstate wires by another scheme participant. See United States v. Dadanian, 818 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir.1987) (analyzing mail fraud), modified on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir.1988). 9 Thus, Lemke's criminal responsibility for telephone calls actually placed by Margo in furtherance of the wire fraud scheme stems from a conceptual framework analogous to conspiracy law. See United States v. Federbush, 625 F.2d 246, 253 (9th Cir.1980) (mail fraud).  'So long as a transaction is within the general scope of a scheme on which all defendants had embarked, a defendant not directly connected with a particular fraudulent act is nonetheless responsible therefor if it was of the kind as to which all parties had agreed.'  Id. at 253-54 (quoting United States v. Amrep Corp., 560 F.2d 539, 545 (2d Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015 (1978)). 51 The government is correct that it need not establish Lemke's direct connection to the telephone calls set forth in Counts Nine through Eleven. No one disputes that the calls were made in furtherance of a scheme to defraud. Lemke's conviction on the wire fraud counts was not plain error. 52 Finally, Lemke disputes the sufficiency of evidence to sustain his 18 U.S.C. § 371 conspiracy conviction (Count Fourteen). His argument is two-fold. He objects to the admission of certain evidence, and to its sufficiency if admissible. He objects to the admission of testimony from government witnesses William McCoy and Anthony Miller, two of the hired killers, who testified that Lemke appeared to be listening to conversations that allegedly detailed the plot to kill Richard Thibault. 10 He contends that the evidence showed, at most, that he was merely present at the time of the alleged conspiratorial conversations, and that, as such, the McCoy and Miller testimony was unduly prejudicial and should have been excluded. 53 The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the McCoy and Miller testimony. Lemke apparently was listening at the meetings held to discuss the murder plot because his role was discussed and he undertook to perform that role as discussed. Miller, for example, testified that he met with Margo and Lemke prior to traveling to California. At that meeting, Margo explained to Miller that Lemke would drive Miller to California. Lemke did, in fact, do so, and supplied the intended murder weapon. Lemke drove Miller to the airport for a second attempt, and told Miller that Margo would meet him in California and give him a knife and some gloves. The testimony offered by McCoy and Miller, in short, was relevant and not unduly prejudicial. The district court judge's decision to admit it was not an abuse of discretion. 54 As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Lemke acknowledges that [o]nce the government establishes that a conspiracy exists, evidence of only a slight connection to the conspiracy is necessary to convict a defendant of knowing participation in it. United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108, 1116 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094 (1987). The evidence discussed supra in reference to the § 1958 counts connects Lemke to the conspiracy to murder Richard Thibault in order to collect insurance proceeds. 55 2. Admission of the bankruptcy petition. Lemke contends that the trial judge erred in admitting government exhibit 70, Lemke's bankruptcy petition. As noted previously, we ordinarily review evidentiary decisions of this sort for abuse of discretion. Kessi, 868 F.2d at 1107. The government urges only plain error review in light of Lemke's failure to object at trial (there, only a relevance objection) upon the same basis argued on appeal (here, a Rule 403 objection). United States v. Gomez-Norena, 908 F.2d 497, 500 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 363 (1990). 56 Whatever the standard, evidence that Lemke was experiencing significant financial difficulty is probative of motive to commit a money crime. Jackson, 882 F.2d at 1449 (permissible to admit testimony that defendant was short on funds, having financial difficulty, and couldn't pay for things he needed to have done); Feldman, 788 F.2d at 557 (permissible to introduce evidence through bank custodian that defendant's bank account overdrawn by more than $8,000); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 907 (2d Cir.1981) (defendant's belief that he is in financial difficulty is admissible to show motive, and not unduly prejudicial; letter from bank, found in defendant's desk, advising defendant that he was eight months behind in his mortgage payments admissible). 57 Lemke argues that admission of the bankruptcy petition itself, however, is more prejudicial than permitting oral testimony of financial difficulty. See United States v. Reed, 700 F.2d 638, 642-43 (11th Cir.1983). The connection between a bankruptcy filing and motive to commit crime for financial gain may be illusory; an individual enters bankruptcy for the purpose of having his debts discharged and thereby relieving the pressure which might compel him or her to commit a criminal act. Id. at 642. The admission of the petition in this case, however, does not seem unfairly prejudicial. 58 Here, the government presented evidence that, prior to filing his bankruptcy petition, Lemke was not able to pay his telephone and credit card bills, or for repairs on his truck. Margo covered him with about $2,000 worth of checks drawn on the joint checking account she held with Richard Thibault. By early January 1988, that account was overdrawn by some $13,000. On January 8, 1988, during the second of the monitored telephone calls between Margo and David Jan Lamb, Margo told Lamb that she was running out of money and couldn't afford to send him a plane ticket. We find no error. 59 3. Three-level enhancement for manager or supervisor role. Lemke contends that he did not deserve a three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 for being a manager or supervisor in the murder-for-hire scheme. A trial judge's findings under § 3B1.1 are reviewed for clear error. United States v. Sanchez, 908 F.2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir.1990). 60 Lemke reiterates the broad outlines of his story as support for his argument, claiming that he was merely Margo's boyfriend, that he mistakenly provided certain services at the wrong time to the wrong people, but that he was not involved in, or for that matter even cognizant of, a high degree of planning, intent, and participation in a scheme to kill Richard Thibault. 61 In distinguishing leaders and organizers (who are given a four-level enhancement under § 3B1.1) from managers and supervisors, application note 3 advises the sentencing judge to consider 62 the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. 63 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment (n. 3) (Oct. 1987). 64 The district court gave this issue serious consideration. At Lemke's sentencing hearing, his attorney discussed the three-level enhancement at some length, as did the prosecutor. The district court determined that while Lemke was [c]learly ... less culpable than Margo, 11 it could not in good conscience say that he does not have the role in the offense indicated in the tentative ruling. 65 Issued about a week prior to the sentencing hearing, the trial judge's tentative ruling on legal matters raised in the context of Lemke's sentencing sets forth her view of the evidence presented at trial: 66 [Lemke] contends that he rarely, if ever, participated in alleged conversations, and when present was always in the background. However, the evidence demonstrates otherwise. [Lemke] worked closely with [Margo] Thibault[-Lemke] to plan and organize the offense. He met with and helped recruit the would be killers. He was responsible for providing transportation to them. He suggested methods by which the intended victim could be killed. Moreover, [Lemke] was not a hired killer: as a result of his intimate relationship with [Margo] he stood to share equally in the profit with her if the crime was successfully completed. Under these circumstances, a three level enhancement for defendant's role in the offense is appropriate. 67 Given the obvious attention the district court judge accorded this issue, and the fact that her application of the facts to the Guidelines provisions would not seem to be clearly erroneous, we uphold Lemke's three-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1.