Opinion ID: 2038942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Meaning of `Objective Corroboration'

Text: Setting Boclair to one side and assuming, arguendo, that the circuit court may consider a post-conviction petition's compliance with section 122-2 at the summary dismissal stage, rehearing should be granted in this case because the majority opinion overlooks, and thus fails to answer, a very basic question: Why is it that the affidavit submitted by defendant in this case cannot serve two purposes? In other words, Why is it that defendant's affidavit cannot verify the allegations in the post-conviction petition while also substantiating those same allegations? The majority holds that a second affidavit is necessary in this case to show that the verified allegations [in the petition] are capable of objective or independent corroboration. 202 Ill.2d at 67, 270 Ill.Dec. at 6, 782 N.E.2d at 199. But in this case, defendant was a party to the conversation he had with his attorney regarding his appeal. Why then does defendant's sworn statement that his attorney told him he would appeal his case, but then neglected to do so, fail to satisfy the objective corroboration that the majority requires? As far as I can determine, the only way one could conclude that defendant's affidavit in this case does not provide objective corroboration for his claim would be to assume that defendant is not telling the truth. But we are not permitted to make such an assumption at this stage of the proceedings. When the circuit court examines a post-conviction petition at the first stage of review pursuant to section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act, it must accept everything in the petition as true. See People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 380-81, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998). Certainly, if defendant's petition were to advance to an evidentiary hearing, defendant's testimony by itself, if believed by the circuit court, would establish the truth of his factual assertions. Why then is the majority imposing a greater burden of evidentiary corroboration on the pro se defendant at the summary dismissal stage of the proceedings? The phrase objective or independent corroboration (202 Ill.2d at 67, 270 Ill.Dec. at 6, 782 N.E.2d at 199) does not appear in the Act and the majority has offered no authority for its proposition that, under the circumstances presented here, defendant must supply a second affidavit to corroborate his post-conviction claim at the summary dismissal stage. At a minimum, rehearing should be granted to explain why defendant's affidavit fails the majority's corroboration requirement.