Opinion ID: 2804395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Missouri Constitutional Claim

Text: Trinity Church’s fifth cause of action alleged that the DNR’s grant denial violated the second clause of Article I, § 7, which forbids “any discrimination made against any church,” and that granting the application would not have violated the first clause because it would not have been “in aid of any church.” Though pleaded last, this was the only claim argued at length by Trinity Church at the hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss, and it was the lead argument in its brief on appeal (seemingly an implicit acknowledgment the federal constitutional claims are weak). This inversion of the theories pleaded distracted the district court from a very serious issue -- after dismissing the federal claims, should the court have declined to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim that is based on an important provision of the Missouri Constitution and turns on the proper interpretation of rather ambiguous Supreme Court of Missouri precedents? We think that question should have been answered affirmatively, but we will nonetheless review the district court’s dismissal of this claim on the merits. Under Missouri law, the district court had jurisdiction to decide the state law claim pleaded in the initial Complaint because whether Article I, § 7, permits DNR to deny Scrap Tire Program grants to all church applicants is an issue of law. See Premium Std. Farm, Inc. v. Lincoln Twp., 946 S.W.2d 234, 237-38 (Mo. banc 1997) (exhaustion of administrative remedies is a jurisdictional issue); Motor Control Specialties, Inc. v. Petelik, 258 S.W.3d 482, 485-86 (Mo. App. 2008). Turning to the merits, we agree with the district court that the two clauses of Article I, § 7, must be interpreted in harmony. See Union Elec. Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 425 S.W.3d 118, 122 (Mo. banc 2014); Wring v. City of Jefferson, 413 S.W.2d 292, 300 (Mo. banc 1967). Therefore, if granting Trinity Church’s application would have constituted “aid” to a church prohibited by the first clause of Article I, § 7, then denying the grant was not a discriminatory action prohibited by the second clause. So the district court properly focused on Trinity Church’s contention that a Scrap Tire Program grant is -10- not “aid” within the meaning of the first clause of Article I, § 7, because it involves a quid pro quo, with the applicant undertaking obligations under the Scrap Tire Program in exchange for the granted funds. On appeal, Trinity Church argues the court erred in rejecting this interpretation of state law. Trinity Church bases its contention on the reasoning in two Supreme Court of Missouri decisions, Kintzele v. City of St. Louis, 347 S.W.2d 695 (Mo. banc 1961), which Trinity Church did not cite to the district court, and Americans United v. Rogers, 538 S.W.2d 711 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976), which the district court described as “grossly misrepresented” by Trinity Church. Concluding that the quid pro quo exception to Article I, § 7’s, prohibition was not supported by any Missouri case, the court instead relied on the many Supreme Court of Missouri decisions that “strictly interpreted [Article I] Section 7 to prohibit public funding of religious institutions” in order to maintain “the higher wall of separation between church and state present in the Missouri Constitution.” See Paster, 512 S.W.2d at 104-105 (invalidating statute requiring public school boards to provide textbooks to private school students); Bereghorn v. Reorg. Sch. Dist. No. 8, 260 S.W.2d 573, 58283 (Mo. 1953); McVey v. Hawkins, 258 S.W.2d 927, 933-34 (Mo. 1953) (enjoining use of public school buses to transport students to religious schools); Harfst v. Hoegen, 163 S.W.2d 609, 613-14 (Mo. 1941) (enjoining use of public school funds for the teaching of religion and faith at a parochial school that was taken into the public school system); accord Luetkemeyer, 364 F. Supp. at 383-84 (upholding the State’s refusal to provide transportation to church-sponsored schools); Brusca, 332 F. Supp. at 279-80 (the State may deny funds to sectarian schools for religious instruction). Based on these decisions, the district court concluded that Trinity Church’s state law claim under the Missouri Constitution must be dismissed because its “own pleadings demonstrate that funds from [DNR] in the form of the Scrap Tire Program would aid the Church and its Ministry Learning Center within the meaning of -11- Missouri law.” We agree with this assessment of how the Supreme Court of Missouri would decide this claim. In Kintzele, plaintiffs alleged that a subsidized sale of land by the State to St. Louis University constituted an unconstitutional use of public funds in aid of a private sectarian school. The Court declined to invalidate the sale, concluding that, because Missouri law authorized “sale by negotiation at fair value,” and the State tried competitive bidding and thereafter sold the land to SLU at nearly twice the highest bid, “plaintiffs’ contention of illegal . . . subsidy from public funds cannot be sustained.” 347 S.W.2d at 700-701. This decision in no way supports Trinity Church’s claim that a Scrap Tire Program grant is not “aid.” In Americans United, the Supreme Court of Missouri upheld a statute providing tuition grants to students at approved public and private colleges. The statute was invalidated by the trial court, applying Article I, § 7, and Article IX, § 8. The State appealed. Noting that “[a]n act of the legislature is presumed to be valid and will not be declared unconstitutional unless it clearly and undoubtedly contravenes some constitutional provision,” 538 S.W.2d at 716, the Court concluded it could not “with confidence declare that the statutory program” clearly contravened these constitutional provisions because “the parochial school cases with which the court has dealt in the past involved completely different types of educational entities than the colleges and universities herein involved.” Id at 721-22. The defendants’ quid pro quo argument was noted but not adopted. Id. at 721. Americans United demonstrates that Article I, § 7, will be difficult to apply in some cases, particularly when an expenditure authorized by state statute is challenged as beyond the State’s constitutional authority. But that decision does not support Trinity Church’s claim to affirmative relief in this case. In upholding the challenged program, the Court reaffirmed that the Missouri Constitution is “more restrictive than the First Amendment to the United States Constitution in prohibiting the expenditures of public funds in a manner tending to erode the absolute separation of church and state,” and it noted that the program was “designed and implemented for the benefits -12- of the students, not of the institutions, and that the awards are made to the students, not to the institutions. The legislative purpose in no wise includes supporting aiding or sustaining either public or private educational institutions.” Id. at 720. We affirm the district court’s dismissal of the state law claim under the Missouri Constitution in Trinity Church’s original Complaint.