Opinion ID: 1957798
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Heading: Minnesota's Postconviction Remedy

Text: We begin our analysis with an overview of the postconviction remedy. The substance of Minnesota's postconviction remedy has been fashioned over the last four decades by judicial decisions that express our understanding of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 85 S.Ct. 1486, 14 L.Ed.2d 422 (1965), and interpret the Minnesota Postconviction Remedy Act. In the 1960's, when federal courts were experiencing dramatic increases in habeas filings, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to provide state prisoners with some adequate corrective process for the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional guarantees. Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. at 337, 85 S.Ct. 1486; Christopher Flood, Closing the Circle: Case v. Nebraska and the Future of Habeas Reform, 27 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 633, 634 (2001-02). But the Court never issued a decision on the issue for which it granted certiorari because, in the intervening months, the Nebraska legislature enacted a statute providing a state postconviction remedy. Case, 381 U.S. at 337, 85 S.Ct. 1486. The Court remanded the matter to the Nebraska Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the newly enacted statute. Id. Because of the procedural posture of that decision, and because subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not revisited the issue directly, it is not clear whether the federal constitution requires states to provide state prisoners with some judicial review processes for claimed violations of the federal constitution. Lacking clear direction from the Supreme Court, the Minnesota legislature nevertheless enacted the Postconviction Remedy Act in 1967. As originally enacted, this statute provided: Except at a time when direct appellate relief is available, a person convicted of a crime, who claims that the conviction was obtained, or that the sentence or other disposition made violated his rights under the constitution or laws of the United States or of the state, may commence a proceeding to secure relief therefrom   . Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 1 (1967). Nine years later, we noted that the Postconviction Remedy Act was enacted as a legislative response to the United States Supreme Court's pronouncement in Case v. Nebraska .  State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 251, 243 N.W.2d 737, 740 (1976). We said that the implication of Case v. Nebraska was that a convicted defendant is entitled to at least one state corrective process to determine a claim of violation of Federal constitutional rights. Id. We also observed that the Postconviction Remedy Act provides broader grounds for relief than is required by Case v. Nebraska because the Postconviction Remedy Act provides relief from state law violations in addition to federal and state constitutional violations. Id. We concluded that [t]he salient feature of Minn. St. c. 590 in coordination with Case v. Nebraska, supra , is that a convicted defendant is entitled to at least one right of review by an appellate or postconviction court. Id. at 251, 243 N.W.2d 737, 243 N.W.2d at 740-41. In Knaffla, we considered the scope of postconviction relief available in Minnesota in two circumstances: where the petitioner did pursue a direct appeal and where the petitioner did not pursue a direct appeal. Where a postconviction petitioner has first taken a direct appeal, we held that all claims raisedor known but not raisedare barred from further consideration in a postconviction action. Id. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. Two exceptions to the Knaffla rule allow for postconviction relief despite the fact that the claims could have been raised on direct appeal: (1) where a novel legal issue is presented; or (2) where the interests of fairness and justice require relief. To justify a hearing on a novel legal issue, the claim must be so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably available to counsel at the time the direct appeal was taken. Powers v. State, 688 N.W.2d 559, 561 (Minn.2004) (internal citations omitted). Claims decided in the interests of justice require that the claims have substantive merit, id., and that the defendant did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal, Fox v. State, 474 N.W.2d 821, 825 (Minn.1991). Because these exceptions are quite narrow, the grounds for postconviction relief are substantially limited once a direct appeal has been taken. But where a postconviction petitioner did not take a direct appeal from the conviction, but seeks review of a claimed violation of the United States or Minnesota Constitutions or of state law for the first time by a postconviction petition (hereinafter referred to as a first review by postconviction proceeding), we held that a postconviction petitioner is entitled to raise nearly the same breadth of claims that could have been brought in a direct appeal, so long as the postconviction claims are in compliance with the procedural requirements of the Postconviction Remedy Act. Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. There are no specific limitations in the Postconviction Remedy Act for first review by postconviction proceeding. See Minn.Stat. § 590.01-.04 (2004). Thus, a first review by postconviction proceeding is substantially similar in scope to a direct appeal. Postconviction remedies in other jurisdictions appear to be more limited. In contrast to Minnesota's broad right of review in a first review by postconviction proceeding, in federal postconviction proceedings (section 2255 actions) and in many states' postconviction proceedings, the failure to pursue a direct appeal bars all claims that were known and should have been raised on direct appeal, absent cause for failing to raise the issue previously and resulting prejudice. E.g., United States v. Pipitone, 67 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that failure to take a direct appeal bars claims in a section 2255 proceeding that could have been raised on direct appeal); Worthen v. Meachum, 842 F.2d 1179, 1181 (10th Cir.1988) (Under Oklahoma law, post-conviction relief is not available to a defendant who has not perfected a timely direct appeal unless he articulates special circumstances showing `sufficient reason' for his failure.), overruled on other grounds by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Coplen v. State, 298 Ark. 272, 766 S.W.2d 612, 613 (1989) (holding that when petitioner did not pursue a timely direct appeal, no relief was available because the postconviction remedy is not meant to be a substitute for direct appeal and is not designed for review of a mere error that occurred at trial); Thomas v. State, 316 N.W.2d 182, 184 (Iowa App.1981) ([F]ailure to appeal bars relief in a postconviction action as to factual and legal contentions which were known at the time of the original trial court proceeding but which petitioner inexcusably failed to pursue on appeal.); State v. Osborne, 329 Mont. 95, 124 P.3d 1085, 1088 (2005) (holding that when petitioner did not pursue direct appeal, postconviction claim was barred because [t]he plain language of these provisions establishes that the courts lack any authority to consider    or decide    legal and factual issues that could reasonably have been raised on direct appeal if an adequate remedy of appeal was available to the petitioner); State v. Perry, 268 Neb. 179, 681 N.W.2d 729, 735 (2004) (holding that when petitioner's direct appeal was dismissed for failure to meet a procedural deadline, [a] motion for postconviction relief cannot be used to secure review of issues which were or could have been litigated on direct appeal). [4] Deegan suggests that Minnesota's provision of broad review in a first review by postconviction proceeding derives from the right to at least one review of a criminal conviction that is guaranteed by the Minnesota Constitution. Whatever the federal constitutional requirements may be for postconviction remedies, they do not appear to be as broad as the grounds for relief available in Minnesota for a first review by postconviction proceeding. We infer this conclusion from the longstanding lack of such grounds for relief in federal postconviction proceedings and similar proceedings in other states, and the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Finley that [s]tates have no obligation to provide [postconviction] relief. Finley, 481 U.S. at 557, 107 S.Ct. 1990. It is true that state constitutions are a font of individual liberties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court's interpretation of federal law. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 Harv. L.Rev. 489, 491 (1977). As a general rule we favor uniformity with the federal constitution, but our state constitution may in some narrow circumstances provide greater protection for individual rights based on language, concerns, and traditions unique to Minnesota. Kahn v. Griffin, 701 N.W.2d 815, 825 (Minn.2005) (citing State v. Harris, 590 N.W.2d 90, 97-98 (Minn. 1999)). Because a first review by postconviction proceeding in Minnesota is substantially similar to a direct appeal, and appears to differ from first review by postconviction proceedings in other jurisdictions, it may well be that the right to one reviewthrough either direct appeal or postconviction proceedingis a tradition unique to Minnesota. And because traditions unique to Minnesota may reflect a guarantee in the Minnesota Constitution, the right to one review of a criminal conviction may arguably be grounded in the Minnesota Constitution. But, because the resolution of that question is not necessary to our ultimate holding in this case, we defer until another day the question of whether the right to one review of a criminal conviction, which is recognized in Knaffla, is derived from the Minnesota Constitution. [5]