Opinion ID: 2344873
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We have explained:

Text: Pursuant to the New Jersey Rules of Evidence, scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge by a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may be admissible in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the expert testimony will assist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. [ State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 490, 897 A. 2d 316 (2006) (quoting N.J.R.E. 702).] We further have noted that the rule sets forth three basic requirements for the admission of expert testimony: (1) the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average juror; (2) the field testified to must be at a state of the art that an expert's testimony could be sufficiently reliable; and (3) the witness must have sufficient expertise to offer the intended testimony. [ State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 567-68, 874 A. 2d 1084 (2005) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).] It is the first requirement for the admissibility of expert testimonythat the intended testimony must concern a subject matter that is beyond the ken of the average jurorthat is squarely implicated by the issue posed in this appeal. Plaintiff asserts that, in an automobile accident, there is no correlation between the amount of vehicle damage and the infliction of injuries on the occupants or the extent thereof and, hence, expert testimony is needed in order to link them. We do not accept that proposition because, in most cases, there is a relationship between the force of impact and the resultant injury, and the extent of that relationship remains in the province of the factfinder. We acknowledge those instances where slight force causes grave injury-a simple misstep off a sidewalk curb resulting in a compound, complex fracture of the legas well as those where great force results in little or no injurythe child who miraculously survives a fall out of a high-rise window, or the driver who walks away unscathed from a hideous car crash. Those instances inhabit, however, the margins of common knowledge. Juries are entitled to infer that which resides squarely in the center of everyday knowledge: the certainty of proportion, and the resulting recognition that slight force most often results in slight injury, and great force most often is accompanied by great injury. Thus, although [i]t must be conceded that the force of the impact, when two automobiles collide, does not necessarily justify an inference that the occupants of the vehicles sustained serious physical injuries[,] Gambrell v. Zengel, 110 N.J.Super. 377, 380, 265 A. 2d 823 (App.Div.1970), [a]t the same time it is a generally accepted rule that evidence of the speed at which the colliding cars were traveling, the severity of the physical impact and the manner of the happening of the accident is admissible where there is an issue as to the seriousness of plaintiff's injuries. And this, too, despite admitted liability. [ Ibid. ] But see Suanez v. Egeland, 353 N.J.Super. 191, 201-03, 801 A. 2d 1186 (App.Div.2002) (holding that defendant failed to establish a reliable scientific foundation for [the] purported expert opinion on the basis of [the expert]'s own research work, authoritative scientific literature or persuasive judicial decisions and that there is no reliable scientific foundation in bio-mechanical studies for an expert opinion that a low-impact automobile accident cannot cause a . . . serious injury). In the end, the standard is clear: in the absence of competent proofs to the contrary, the aggregate of everyday knowledge and experience fairly entitles a jury to infer that there is a proportional relationship between the amount of force applied and the injuries resulting therefrom. In a similar and more recent setting, the Appellate Division addressed both the admission of photographs showing damage to a vehicle involved in a collision and counsel's argument based thereon. Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J.Super. 573, 630 A. 2d 355 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 567, 636 A. 2d 524 (1993). The panel summarily dispatched the argument that the photographs should not be admitted into evidence; it referred solely to the standard for admission of a photograph, and concluded that [t]he photographs, as explained, fairly and accurately depicted the condition of the automobile immediately following the accident, and thus, were properly admitted into evidence. Id. at 590, 630 A. 2d 355. Significantly, in respect of the argument made by counsel based on the photographs, the Appellate Division explained that [i]t is fundamental that counsel may argue from the evidence any conclusion which a jury is free to arrive at. Ibid. We too have embraced that rule. We have held that, [a]s a general matter, counsel is allowed broad latitude in summation[.] Bender v. Adelson, 187 N.J. 411, 431, 901 A. 2d 907 (2006) (citations, internal quotation, and editing marks omitted). We have emphasized that [s]ummation commentary, however, must be based in truth, and counsel may not misstate the evidence nor distort the factual picture. Ibid. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The potential peril incurred by a transgressor is clear: When summation commentary transgresses the boundaries of the broad latitude otherwise afforded to counsel, a trial court must grant a party's motion for a new trial if the comments are so prejudicial that `it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a miscarriage of justice under the law.' Ibid. (quoting R. 4:49-1(a)). On the whole, that analysis leads us to conclude that the trial court did not palpably abuse its discretion when it permitted the admission of photographs that fairly and accurately depicted the condition of the rear of plaintiff's carthe place where her car was struck by defendant's carand allowed defendant's counsel to argue that neither the cause nor the extent of plaintiff's injuries could have been the proximate result of the impact. We commend and therefore repeat the analysis applied by the trial court: if evidence is relevant, it is to be admitted unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by its undue prejudicial effect and, once admitted, counsel is permitted to argue to the jury based on that evidence.