Opinion ID: 2514968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Whether Heggland Raised a Good-faith Challenge to His Conviction Under Sinagoga.

Text: Heggland's argument that he properly challenged his conviction under Sinagoga is without merit. As the prosecution correctly points out in its Memorandum in Opposition to Heggland's Application, Heggland's claims of challenge recited in his Application... go toward the applicability of the mandatory minimum statute to him based upon his prior Colorado conviction, rather than whether [Heggland] made a good faith challenge to his prior conviction on the bases permitted by Sinagoga and its progeny. In State v. Afong, 61 Haw. 281, 602 P.2d 927 (1979), this court held that [u]nless conceded by the defendant, the state is required to show, by evidence satisfactory to the court, the fact of the defendant's prior conviction, as well as the fact of his [or her] representation by counsel, or the waiver thereof, at the time of his [or her] prior conviction. Id. at 282, 602 P.2d at 929 (citation omitted and emphasis added). As discussed by the ICA in its summary of the applicable law, In [ Sinagoga ], a majority of [the ICA] established a procedure for determining whether a prior conviction was conceded by the defendant for purposes of applying the holding of Afong. The majority held that in ordinary sentencing situations, which includes mandatory minimum sentencing under HRS § 706-606.5, after the sentencing judge has been informed pursuant to a presentence diagnosis and report or otherwise of a defendant's prior conviction(s), each conviction listed may be used against defendant except those as to which the defendant timely responds with a good faith challenge on the record that the prior criminal conviction was (1) uncounseled, (2) otherwise invalidly entered, and/or (3) not against the defendant. Id. at 445, 918 P.2d at 252. 116 Hawai`i at 383, 173 P.3d at 530. The ICA noted that under step two of the five-step procedure Sinagoga established for trial courts to follow in cases `where ordinary sentencing procedures are applicable and there is a possibility that the court may use the defendant's prior conviction(s) as a basis for the imposition or enhancement of a prison sentence,' id. (quoting Sinagoga, 81 Hawai`i at 447, 918 P.2d at 254), if the defendant contends that one or more of the reported prior criminal convictions was (1) uncounseled, (2) otherwise invalidly entered,[7] and/or (3) not against the defendant, the defendant shall, prior to the sentencing, respond with a good faith challenge on the record stating, as to each challenged conviction, the basis or bases for the challenge. 7 In State v. Veikoso, 102 Hawai`i 219, 74 P.3d 575 (2003), the Hawai`i Supreme Court essentially limited a defendant's ability to collaterally attack a prior conviction to an attack based on a claim that the conviction had been obtained in violation of the right to counsel. Id. at 226-27, 74 P.3d at 582-83. For purposes of its analysis, the court defined collateral attack as a defendant's attempt to impeach a judgment or decree in a proceeding not instituted for the express purpose of annulling, correcting or modifying such judgment or decree. Id. at 223, 74 P.3d at 579. Given the limits it imposed on collateral attacks of prior convictions, the supreme court stated that the language in [ Sinagoga ] permitting a defendant to challenge a prior conviction on the ground that it was otherwise invalidly entered should be disregarded. Veikoso, 102 Hawai`i at 227 n. 8, 74 P.3d at 583 n. 8. Pursuant to Veikoso's modification of the Sinagoga procedure, a defendant is permitted to challenge a prior conviction on the grounds that it was (1) uncounseled and/or (2) not against the defendant. Id. at 383-84, 173 P.3d at 530-31 (emphasis omitted). As found in the ICA opinion, Heggland did not raise a good faith challenge to the validity of his prior Colorado conviction on one of the bases permitted in Sinagoga and Veikoso. Id. at 385, 173 P.3d at 532. On the contrary, he affirmatively stipulated that [a]t the time [Heggland] committed the offenses in the instant case, he had [a] prior felony conviction in Colorado (Department of Corrections No. 110596) for Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Robbery. Id. Heggland's citations to the hearing transcript in his Application do not show otherwise, nor bring forth any statements by defense counsel not covered in the ICA's opinion. At the July 18, 2005 plea hearing, defense counsel stated that we will be opposing any, um, imposition of mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for Mr. Heggland. At the November 2, 2005 hearing, defense counsel summarized its argument to be that Heggland wasn't within the maximum term of imprisonment when he committed this crime. [10] At the December 7, 2005 hearing, Heggland's counsel stipulated to the fact that Heggland had a prior Colorado conviction, and also agreed with the court that the only question left unresolved was the maximum term for this particular offense, which counsel admitted was a matter of law. At the January 17, 2006 hearing cited by Heggland in his Application, the prosecution acknowledged that defense counsel was never agreeing that the mandatory minimum was gonna be imposed. None of these statements indicate that Heggland was raising a good-faith challenge to the validity of his Colorado conviction under Sinagoga. Rather, his argument focused on whether he was within the time frame of maximum term of imprisonment for the Colorado conviction at the time he committed the PDD offense. As such, the ICA did not err in holding that the circuit court erred in denying the State's motion based on the State's alleged failure to prove that Heggland was represented by counsel at the time of his prior conviction or to prove the prior conviction by satisfactory evidence. 116 Hawai`i at 386, 173 P.3d at 533.