Opinion ID: 150664
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Investigate or Present Tonia McClain

Text: Allen claims that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate or present Tonia McClain as a witness at the guilt stage. She allegedly would have testified that she saw two cars parked at Cribbs' house on both the evening before and the morning of the murder and that she saw a young, thin man with dirty blond hair on Cribbs' porch on the morning of the murder. The failure to investigate part of this claim is procedurally barred. Allen never presented this part of the claim or made this argument to the Florida courts. See Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1258 n. 4; Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 38-39. He cannot raise it for the first time here. See supra at 749-50. In any event, trial counsel did not insufficiently investigate what McClain would say. In fact, he took her deposition before trial. The failure to present part of the claim concerning McClain does not fare much better. Trial counsel did not call her as a witness because he decided based on her deposition that she would not make a good witness. The Florida courts denied this claim based on Strickland 's performance element, Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 38-39, as well as its prejudice element, Allen II, 854 So.2d at 1258 n. 5. As to the performance element, the state collateral trial court determined that, [g]iven the nature of the testimony [McClain] had to offer, Counsel can hardly be deemed ineffective for failure to call her. Florida v. Allen, No. 92-30056-CF, slip op. at 39. Allen argues that conclusion deserves no deference because [n]o one knows what the court meant by the `nature of the testimony.' To the contrary, the state collateral trial court explained what it meant: [U]nder oath at her deposition, [McClain] testified that she lived across the canal from the Victim; that she saw two persons on the Victim's porch when she went out to check on her fishing pole; that she didn't wear her glasses when she went out to check her fishing pole; that without her glasses she see[s] people but I don't see; that she could not identify the Victim if she saw her; that she would not recognize the Defendant if she saw him; and that perhaps the second car she saw was a neighbor's car. Id. (third alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). At her deposition, McClain also testified that she was nervous and in shock when she first spoke with the police. Post-conviction Record at 1211. She admitted that she would not be able to recognize the man from Cribbs' porch if she saw him again. She said that [t]he only thing I remember is tall and skinny, id. at 1210, which is not inconsistent with Allen's appearance at the time of the murder. This Court has emphasized that [w]hich witnesses, if any, to call, and when to call them, is the epitome of a strategic decision, and it is one that we will seldom, if ever, second guess. Waters v. Thomas, 46 F.3d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir.1995) (en banc); see also Rhode v. Hall, 582 F.3d 1273, 1284 (11th Cir.2009) (per curiam). Given the obvious problems with McClain's potential testimony that were revealed at her deposition, Allen cannot show that no competent counsel would have taken the action that his counsel did take. Chandler, 218 F.3d at 1315; Stewart, 476 F.3d at 1209; see also Dorsey v. Chapman, 262 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir.2001) ([T]rial counsel's decision to not call the [ ] witness was not so patently unreasonable a strategic decision that no competent attorney would have chosen this strategy.). The decision of the Florida courts was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strickland. [10]