Opinion ID: 2828001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Aggravated Furnishing of Scheduled Drugs

Text: [¶21] The charge of aggravated furnishing of scheduled drugs arose from evidence that Gagnier provided her prescription medication to B.G.5 Gagnier argues that she was entitled to a duress instruction based on evidence that when she provided her medication to B.G., she acted under duress because Michael would 4 Gagnier did not offer expert testimony. Because there is no evidence that any threat posed by Michael was an imminent one, this case is not an occasion for us to consider the extent to which expert testimony, such as that offered in State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 893-94 (Me. 1981), may be necessary for a defendant to make a factual argument about the psychological effects of domestic abuse. 5 Pursuant to 17-A M.R.S. § 1105-C(1)(A)(4) (2014), “[a] person is guilty of aggravated furnishing of a scheduled drug if the person violates section 1106 and . . . furnishes a scheduled drug to a child who is in fact less than 18 years of age and the drug is . . . [a] schedule Z drug.” The drug at issue here, azithromycin, is a schedule Z drug because it is a prescription drug not included in schedules W, X, or Y. See 17-A M.R.S. § 1102(4)(A) (2014). 12 not allow Gagnier to take B.G. to obtain medical treatment and that she therefore chose to provide B.G. with her own prescription drug. A detective testified differently, stating that Gagnier had told him that Michael instructed her to furnish the medication to B.G.6 Neither account is accompanied by the report of a threat of imminent harm conveyed by Michael, and therefore, on this record, there is no factual basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Michael’s conduct compelled Gagnier to furnish the prescribed drug to B.G. Therefore, the evidence could not support an argument that Gagnier’s conduct resulted from duress within the meaning of section 103-A. [¶22] Additionally, the evidence could not support a claim that Gagnier had no option but to give her medication to B.G. Because of Michael’s employment, Gagnier had the opportunity to take B.G. to the hospital while Michael was working, to notify the school nurse about B.G.’s medical condition, or to tell B.G. to consult with the nurse. Even though Gagnier knew that B.G. might need medical treatment, the evidence established that she had reasonable options other than giving B.G. unprescribed medications. The evidence therefore did not generate a claim based on the provisions of section 103-A that a reasonable person 6 The detective’s testimony is actually more favorable to Gagnier’s claim that she acted under duress because it attributes Gagnier’s decision to Michael. Evidence that bears on a defendant’s burden of production to generate a defense may come from any source, see State v. Millett, 273 A.2d 504, 508 (Me. 1971), and is viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, State v. Tomah, 1999 ME 109, ¶ 18, 736 A.2d 1047. Consequently, Gagnier is not limited to her own testimony on this point. 13 in Gagnier’s position would have been unable to resist Michael’s influence and exercise independent judgment. See Larrivee, 479 A.2d at 350-51. Thus, without addressing the availability of other defenses such as competing harms, 17-A M.R.S. § 103 (2014), we conclude that Gagnier was not entitled to a jury instruction on the law of duress for the charge of furnishing scheduled drugs.