Opinion ID: 1165060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The validity of the initial encounter.

Text: In State v. Warner, 284 Or. 147, 161, 585 P.2d 681 (1978), this court recognized three kinds of encounters between police and citizens: (1) an arrest, justified only by probable cause; (2) a stop, i.e., a temporary restraint of a person's liberty, ORS 131.605(5), which is justified by reasonable suspicion that the person has committed a crime, ORS 131.615(1); and (3) mere conversation (questioning without restraint of liberty), which needs no justification. Defendant does not contend that he was under arrest in this case. He does contend, however, that his encounter with Officer Johnston constituted a stop and one without reasonable suspicion. The state contends, to the contrary, that the encounter was that of the third kind, a mere conversation, and therefore did not need to be justified by reasonable suspicion. In the alternative, the state contend that even if the encounter was a stop, the drug profile provided the officers with reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Court of Appeals found that Officer Johnston, by identifying himself, displaying his badge and informing defendant that he was suspected of carrying narcotics, had restrained defendant's liberty and thereby made a stop. 45 Or. App. at 915, 609 P.2d 438. The court further found that the characteristics of the drug smuggler's profile upon which the police based their stop of defendant did not provide reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. Id. at 919, 609 P.2d 438. ORS 131.605(5) defines a stop as:    a temporary restraint of a person's liberty by a peace officer lawfully present in any place. In Warner, supra, this court interpreted ORS 131.605(5) to mean that for purposes of determining whether a stop has occurred, it suffices that a person's liberty is restrained by either physical force or by a show of authority. 284 Or. at 162, 585 P.2d 681. Determination of whether a stop has occurred will depend largely upon the particular facts of each case. See 284 Or. at 149, 585 P.2d 681. It is clear, however, that a police officer may approach a citizen, identify himself as an officer and ask some preliminary questions without making a stop. This is consistent with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in which the United States Supreme Court appeared to hold, at least in effect, that such a police-citizen encounter as just described does not amount to a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. [2] Because ORS 131.605(5) is based in part upon Terry ( see Commentary, Proposed Oregon Criminal Code of 1972 at 24 (1972)), that Oregon statute should also be given an interpretation consistent with Terry. It is unnecessary, however, to decide whether the facts of this case and, in particular, the fact that Officer Johnston informed defendant that he was suspected of carrying narcotics, were such as to constitute a stop. It is also unnecessary to decide whether the drug smuggler's profile provided reasonable suspicion to justify a stop of defendant. [3] Assuming, without deciding, that the encounter between defendant and the police officers was a stop that was not justified by reasonable suspicion, we believe that defendant's consent to the search was nevertheless voluntary in light of all the facts, and that as a result of that voluntary consent the evidence found as a result of the search was admissible regardless of whether the stop was unjustified.