Opinion ID: 2599511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: newsperson's privilege

Text: Boyles, Gallegos, and Jacor each contend that they cannot be compelled to disclose Boyles's sources because, in their view, section 13-90-119 establishes an absolute privilege for newspersons that prohibits compelled disclosure of news information. They argue that the trial court erroneously interpreted the statute by assessing the strength of the evidence presented by Gordon to determine whether Boyles's statements were provable as false before making the three-part inquiry under section 13-90-119(3) to overcome the newsperson's privilege. They also argue that the trial court improperly assessed the factors listed in section 13-90-119(3) when it concluded that the newsperson's privilege did not protect Boyles, Gallegos, and Jacor from having to disclose Boyles's sources. We disagree. With some modifications in terminology and application, we agree with and adopt the trial court's test for assessing a plaintiff's interest in compelling a newsperson defendant in a defamation case to disclose confidential information. The test, which is not directly required by the statute, protects media defendants in defamation cases because the court may not compel disclosure if the evidence presented by both parties fails to convince the court of the probable falsity of the defendant's statements. Hence, pursuant to section 13-90-119, a newsperson will not be compelled to reveal news information or be sanctioned for refusing to do so unless the court is satisfied, based on the evidence produced at the hearing, that the three factors listed in section 13-90-119(3) have been established, including a determination that the evidence available at the time of the allegedly defamatory broadcasts demonstrates the probable falsity of the newsperson defendant's statements.
We begin our analysis with a review of the First Amendment concerns that favor allowing newspersons to withhold confidential news information even though the information is directly relevant to official proceedings. Although he dissented from the Court's holding in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972) Justice Stewart aptly described the importance of promoting an unfettered press as a central component of our democracy: Enlightened choice by an informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised, and a free press is thus indispensable to a free society. Not only does the press enhance personal self-fulfillment by providing people with the widest possible range of fact and opinion, but it also is an incontestable precondition of self-government . . . . As private and public aggregations of power burgeon in size and the pressures for conformity necessarily mount, there is obviously a continuing need for an independent press to disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion through reportage, investigation, and criticism, if we are to preserve our constitutional tradition of maximizing freedom of choice by encouraging diversity of expression. 408 U.S. 665, 726-27, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). Also as Justice Stewart recognized, the ability of the press to gather information by promising to keep the identities of their sources confidential is a crucial tool for the media: No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly compromised. . . . The right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a confidential relationship between a reporter and his source. This proposition follows as a matter of simple logic once three factual predicates are recognized: (1) newsmen require informants to gather news; (2) confidentialitythe promise or understanding that names or certain aspects of communications will be kept off the recordis essential to the creation and maintenance of a news-gathering relationship with informants; and (3) an unbridled subpoena power [to require the disclosure of confidential information] will either deter sources from divulging information or deter reporters from gathering and publishing information. Id. at 728, 92 S.Ct. 2646. Despite Justice Stewart's recognition of the important role of the press in our society and the usefulness of confidential sources in fulfilling that role, the Court majority determined that the First Amendment does not protect members of the press from having to disclose confidential news information at official proceedings. See id. at 690, 92 S.Ct. 2646. Even though the Court determined that there is no First Amendment privilege for newspersons, it noted that Congress and the states are free to fashion such a privilege if they so choose: At the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory newsman's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate. There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits, to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect to relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from responding in their own way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute. Id. at 706, 92 S.Ct. 2646. In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell emphasized that newspersons should be forced to disclose news information only after a court makes a decision based on the particular facts of each case. He suggested that courts should be reluctant to compel disclosure from newspersons, thereby infringing on the operation of the press. Justice Powell stated that before a newsperson should be required to disclose confidential information, a court should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the information is directly relevant and whether the First Amendment interests of the press outweigh the obligation of all citizens to provide relevant testimony in official proceedings. See id. at 710, 92 S.Ct. 2646 (Powell, J., concurring).
Having discussed the First Amendment interests implicated when a newsperson is compelled to disclose confidential news information, we turn to Colorado's statutory newsperson's privilege. In 1990, the General Assembly enacted a statute establishing a privilege for newspersons, essentially codifying Justice Powell's balancing test. See ch. 186, sec. 1, § 13-90-119, 1990 Colo. Sess. Laws 1262, 1262-64. [10] Section 13-90-119(2) provides members of the mass media a privilege shielding them from having to provide testimony and from being questioned about news information [11] that the person learned while acting in a newsperson's capacity: [12] Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, no newsperson shall, without such newsperson's express consent, be compelled to disclose, be examined concerning refusal to disclose, be subjected to any legal presumption of any kind, or be cited, held in contempt, punished, or subjected to any sanction in any judicial proceedings for refusal to disclose any news information received, observed, procured, processed, prepared, written, or edited by a newsperson, while acting in the capacity of a newsperson. Thus, consistent with the values of a free press and the usefulness of confidential sources, Colorado's General Assembly established a statutory privilege for newspersons allowing them to withhold news information sought in official proceedings. This privilege, however, is not absolute. Subsection 119(3) explains the conditions under which a newsperson can be compelled to disclose news information. Under this section, a court may compel a newsperson to disclose information if the party seeking the information can demonstrate: (a) That the news information is directly relevant to a substantial issue involved in the proceeding; (b) That the news information cannot be obtained by any other reasonable means; and (c) That a strong interest of the party seeking to subpoena the newsperson outweighs the interests under the First Amendment to the United States constitution of such newsperson in not responding to a subpoena and of the general public in receiving news information. § 13-90-119(3)(a)-(c); [13] see also Henderson v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 393 (Colo.1994) (finding that newsperson's privilege was not overcome because information sought could be obtained through other reasonable means). These conditions on a newsperson's privilege reflect the strong First Amendment interests of the press and the balancing test Justice Powell suggested to weigh the interests of the media against those of the party seeking confidential news information. Thus, under section 13-90-119, a newsperson has a qualified privilege from disclosing news information obtained in her capacity as a newsperson, but that privilege may be overcome if, based on the trial court's determination, the party seeking the information satisfies the three factors listed in subsection 119(3). The first of the three conditions is that the news information sought must be relevant to a substantial issue involved in the proceeding. See § 13-90-119(3)(a). In some cases, the confidential information may be the only evidence of a crucial aspect of the case, while in other situations, the information may be only marginally relevant to a less significant issue. For instance, in a media defamation case the information about the reliability of the declarant's sources may be relevant to the significant issue of the reporter's state of mind about the truth or falsity of his broadcasts. The less credible the sources, the more likely the declarant acted with malice or a reckless disregard of the truth by broadcasting the information they provided. Hence, the identities of these persons and what they said reflects directly on the declarant's state of mind with respect to the truth or falsity about the information he broadcast. See Phillip Morris Cos., 23 Media L. Rptr. at 1438-39. Alternatively, even if there exists sufficient proof of actual malice, the identities of the declarant's sources may be relevant for the plaintiff to prove, for instance, that the statement was false or to overcome the affirmative defense of truth. See Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1341 (Colo. 1988) (recognizing truth as an affirmative defense to an allegation of defamation). In some cases, disclosure of the source may be relevant to prove that the source did not exist. Each case must rest on its own unique facts. When the news information sought bears so directly on substantial elements of a plaintiff's claims, the court may determine that section 13-90-119(3)(a) is satisfied. The second factor that a court must consider before compelling a newsperson to disclose information is whether the information is obtainable through other reasonable means. See § 13-90-119(3)(b). The burden is on the party seeking the information to demonstrate to the court both that no other reasonably available sources of the information exist and that the party has exhausted the reasonably available sources that might provide the information sought. See Bauer v. Gannett Co., 557 N.W.2d 608, 612 (Minn. Ct.App.1997). Further, the party seeking disclosure must demonstrate that it has made substantial efforts to obtain the information from other sources; bald assertions that the information cannot be obtained through alternative sources cannot sustain a court's order requiring disclosure by a newsperson asserting the privilege. See id. ; see also Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 714 & n. 50 (D.C.Cir.1981) (noting that in some circumstances a court may require a party to depose as many as sixty people before concluding that the party has exhausted reasonably available alternative sources of confidential information). In cases where the information itself is the subject of the plaintiff's inquiry, a court must consider whether the plaintiff has exhausted available avenues from which the information could be obtained. For example, in Henderson, we held that the newsperson's privilege protected the newsperson from compelled disclosure because the plaintiff had not sought information about a helicopter's flight path from public aviation authorities and because other witnesses had provided the information sought. See 879 P.2d at 393. In other situations, however, there may be no reasonable alternative means of obtaining the information sought. For instance, the identities of and information revealed by confidential sources often cannot be obtained by means other than disclosure by the newsperson because the plaintiffs cannot find anyone who both knows and is willing to disclose information about the confidential sources. See Phillip Morris Cos., 23 Media L. Rptr. at 1439. Thus, before compelling disclosure of confidential news information, a court must determine that no other sources of specific information directly relevant to an official proceeding exist. In cases where a party seeks news information related indirectly to an issue in the case and the specific information sought is not itself central, the court should consider whether there are other sources of the information being sought. For example, a plaintiff in a defamation case may be able to establish the actual malice of the declarant with information other than the identity of source on which the declarant relied, such as testimonial or documentary evidence of the declarant's state of mind. In other words, even though the specific information sought may not be available through other means (e.g., the names of and information revealed by confidential sources), the information that is truly relevant to the defendant's claims (e.g., the actual malice of the newsperson) may be available through other evidence. See Dangerfield v. Star Editorial, Inc., 817 F.Supp. 833, 838 (C.D.Cal.1993). In such instances, the court will not compel disclosure. As the third consideration for compelling disclosure under section 13-90-119(3), the court must weigh the interests of the party seeking the information against the First Amendment interests of the newsperson in withholding it and the public's interest in promoting the gathering and reporting of news. This balancing test requires the court to consider the First Amendment values Justice Stewart eloquently set forth in Branzburg. The newsperson's privilege should give way only under circumstances where the party seeking the information has a truly significant interest at stake, such as the interest that defamation plaintiffs have in protecting their reputations. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169, 99 S.Ct. 1635 (recognizing that a person's reputation is a basic concern). As part of the balancing test required under section 13-90-119(3)(c), the court must consider the nature of the claim at issue. For example, [w]hen the journalist is a party, and successful assertion of the privilege will effectively shield him from liability, the equities weigh somewhat more heavily in favor of disclosure. Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 714. On the other hand, when the newsperson is not a party and is merely a source of information for one party in a lawsuit, the newsperson's state of mind is not at issue in the case and the equities weigh in favor of respecting the privilege. In addition to its exposition of these three factors under section 13-90-119(3), the district court considered the evidence presented by both parties to determine whether Gordon had shown that Boyles's statements were provable as false. Essentially, the court asked whether Gordon presented sufficient evidence to conclude that Boyles's statements were more likely than not false. The court made this assessment because false speech does not contribute to the values protected by the First Amendment and thus receives minimal protection. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340, 94 S.Ct. 2997 ([T]here is no constitutional value in false statements of fact). The reasoning of the trial court was that if, based on the evidence presented it appeared that Boyles's comments were probably false, then the First Amendment interests in protecting Boyles's sources were substantially less than if it appeared at least somewhat likely that Boyles's statements were true. As part of its analysis, the court took into account the fact that no eyewitnesses placed Gordon at the nightclub when Thomas was stabbed or claimed that Gordon stabbed Thomas. Further, the court found that Boyles presented no evidence that Gordon was even present at the scene when Thomas was stabbed and that Boyles relied upon no evidence other than unsupported hearsay statements that Gordon stabbed Thomas. Thus, because false speech receives little First Amendment protection, and because evidence available at the time of the broadcasts indicated that Boyles's radio broadcast statements were probably false, the court concluded that Gordon's interests in obtaining the information outweighed the First Amendment interests at stake. Although we do not adopt the trial court's terminology, we agree with its approach to assessing the interests of both parties under section 13-90-119(3)(c). We hold that, as part of the balancing test required by that section, the trial court must weigh the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing to determine whether the newsperson's statements were probably false. [14] If a newsperson defendant in a defamation case can provide evidence that a confidential source's information was at least probably truthful, then the court should favor non-disclosure. For example, in Southwell v. Southern Poverty Law Center, 949 F.Supp. 1303 (W.D.Mich. 1996) the court refused to compel disclosure of confidential sources because it was convinced that the defendant provided sufficient evidence to support a reasonable reliance on the confidential source. 949 F.Supp. 1303, 1307-08 (W.D.Mich.1996). The defendant in Southwell produced notes from a conversation with the source that included specific details, such as the names of persons present at a meeting being described by the source, the license plate number of a car driven by one of those present at the meeting, and the nature of the conversation at the meeting. See id. Because the defendant produced sufficient evidence of the reliability and probable truthfulness of the source's information, the court did not compel disclosure. See id. at 1307. We note, as did the court in Southwell, that a court should weigh the evidence known to the defendant about his source's information at the time that the defendant published the defamatory statement. See id. at 1309. That is, proving that a source's information was false after publication does not establish that the defendant knew or should have known the information was false. See id. If the newsperson defendant can demonstrate that there was a reasonable basis to believe that a source's information was true at the time it was reported, then the court should favor protecting the source. By doing so, the court will not dissuade reporters from relying on sources they believe are reliable because such discouragement would run counter to the interests protected by the First Amendment. By contrast, when a defendant produces little or no evidence to support his reliance on the source and the plaintiff demonstrates that the source's information was probably false, the court should favor compelling disclosure. In such instances, the First Amendment interests at stake are probably minimal because false statements of fact receive little protection and the First Amendment was not designed to foster the reporting and dissemination of false facts. Thus, if the trial court is convinced that a newsperson had only an insubstantial basis (or no basis at all) to believe in the truthfulness of the source's information, then the First Amendment interests at stake are probably minimal and compelling disclosure may be appropriate. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 171, 99 S.Ct. 1635; Cervantes, 464 F.2d at 994. By weighing the relative strength of the evidence presented as to the likely falsity of the defendant's statements, the trial court ensures that newspersons will not be forced to disclose confidential sources based on unsubstantiated claims of injury resulting from alleged falsehoods. See Dallas Morning News Co. v. Garcia, 822 S.W.2d 675, 681 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1991), writ conditionally granted. The court does not have to be convinced that the statement is actually false; rather, the court must believe that, based on the evidence presented at the pretrial hearing, the statement is probably false. [15] Thus, if the plaintiff fails to convince a court of the probable falsity of allegedly defamatory remarks, or the newsperson defendant in a defamation action produces sufficient evidence to persuade the court that the statements were true, then the court will not compel disclosure. In sum, the General Assembly adopted section 13-90-119 in order to protect the First Amendment interests of newspersons who rely on confidential sources of information to gather and report news about public affairs. However, the privilege is qualified, not absolute. A court must carefully weigh each of the three factors listed in section 13-90-119(3)(a)-(c) before compelling disclosure. As part of the balancing test required under section 13-90-119(3)(c) to weigh the First Amendment interests of a newsperson defendant in resisting compelled disclosure of confidential sources and the plaintiff's interest in the information, the trial court must make a preliminary determination about the probable falsity of the defendant's statements. While in some instances disclosure may be the best option, we emphasize that when deciding whether to compel a newsperson to disclose confidential information, a trial court should compel disclosure only as a last resort when necessary to promote the effective administration of justice.
The trial court's written order, requiring Jacor and Gallegos to disclose Boyles's sources, thoroughly addressed each of the statutory factors that section 13-90-119(3) lists as considerations for requiring a newsperson to divulge confidential information. Additionally, the court's provable as false test, which we adopt in modified form as a probably false standard today, provides another level of protection for newspersons asserting the privilege. However, because the trial court failed to make adequate findings under section 13-90-119(3) concerning Boyles's claim of privilege at the time it ordered disclosure of the identities of Boyles's sources, we are unable to affirm the contempt sanction imposed on Boyles for his refusal to follow the trial court's disclosure order. The thorough written order of the trial court concerning the newsperson's statutory privilege was issued after it ordered Boyles to disclose his sources and after it held Boyles in contempt for failing to do so. [16] This written order was directed to defendant Jacor and non-party witness Gallegos, but not to Boyles. If, on remand, the court issues appropriate findings with regard to Boyles's assertion of the privilege and the court, consistent with this opinion, determines that section 13-90-119(2) does not shield Boyles from having to disclose the sources, it may then order disclosure. If Boyles continues to defy the court, the court may then consider appropriate sanctions. Although the trial court did not make findings concerning the factors enumerated under section 13-90-119(3) before ordering Boyles to disclose his sources, the court did make adequate findings in its order compelling Gallegos to disclose his knowledge of Boyles's sources and their identities. However, because we instruct the trial court to reconsider its order compelling Boyles to disclose the information and because Gallegos is a non-party to Gordon's defamation suit, the trial court must reassess its order compelling Gallegos to reveal the news information about Boyles's confidential sources. First, the trial court must reconsider its order compelling Gallegos to reveal the news information only after it completely reevaluates Boyles's assertion of the newsperson's privilege in light of our opinion today. If, after reviewing our opinion, the trial court issues an order requiring disclosure based on findings applicable to Boyles and Boyles reveals the information, then the trial court may determine that it is not necessary to compel the same information from Gallegos. See § 13-90-119(3)(b). On the other hand, if Boyles persists in his refusal to divulge information, then the court may determine that Gallegos represents the only reasonable means by which Gordon may obtain relevant and necessary information about Boyles's sources. Second, in addition to requiring that the trial court refrain from compelling Gallegos to disclose the information about Boyles's sources until after making the proper findings about Boyles's assertion of the newsperson's privilege and allowing Boyles an opportunity to respond, the trial court should only require Gallegos to disclose the information after taking into consideration Gallegos's position as a non-party in this case. Unlike Boyles, Gallegos did not broadcast any reports about Gordon based on information from the confidential sources and therefore did not risk defaming Gordon or place his own state of mind at issue for purposes of a defamation suit. See Zerilli, 656 F.2d at 714. For these reasons, we vacate the trial court's order compelling Gallegos to disclose the news information he learned about Boyles's sources and instruct the trial court to reconsider any order to Gallegos in light of our discussion in this opinion. Although we vacate the trial court's order requiring Gallegos to disclose the identities of Boyles's sources, we recognize that circumstances may arise that we have neither considered nor mentioned in this opinion that would support an order compelling Gallegos to divulge the identities of and any information he learned about Boyles's sources. In contrast to both Boyles and Gallegos, Jacor cannot assert the newsperson's privilege in this case. Section 13-90-119(2) only provides the privilege to those parties who possess news information received, observed, procured, processed, prepared, written, or edited by a newsperson while acting in the capacity of a newsperson.  (Emphasis added). As Jacor itself asserts, Larsen and Olinger learned information about Boyles's sources only in meetings with Boyles and Jacor's and Boyles's joint attorney to discuss legal strategy in response to Gordon's contemplated lawsuit. Jacor did not learn about Boyles's sources while gathering news information for dissemination to the public through the mass media. § 13-90-119(1)(c). For this reason, Jacor cannot rely on section 13-90-119(2) to shield it from having to disclose Boyles's sources.