Opinion ID: 2632541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Propriety of Recognizing the Defense of Entrapment by Estoppel

Text: In a pretrial memorandum, defendant argued, As demonstrated at the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Chacon relied upon the legal advice and actions of the Bell Garden's [ sic ] City Attorney when she entered into that employment contract [as city manager.] At oral argument, defense counsel requested immunity for City Attorney Beltran by making an offer of proof as to what Beltran could say at trial. Defense counsel recounted Beltran's anticipated testimony as follows: ... I was asked whether this waiting period was essential under state law, or whether we could adopt the ordinance that we finally adopted. I ordered my subordinate ... to do a memo on that. I took that memo ... and drafted a statute. I put that statute on the agenda. I had the council vote on it. I was there to explain anything they wanted.... [A]s I drafted the statute and as I said in the statute, the waiting period was not required by state law. [9] And if we got rid of the waiting period, we would be in accordance with state law. I checked with other municipalities. They didn't have a waiting period. I put it on the agenda for a first reading. After it was put on for first reading, we had a waiting period. It was put on for a second reading. There were comments. I spoke to Mrs. Chacon about whether or not this statute was a legal statute, and her actions, if she became city manager or any council member became city manager, whether that would be legal. I authorized that as yes, it would be in compliance with state law. And actions were taken with regard to my advice.  (Italics added.) I, then, on December 7th, I placed on the agenda the appointment of Mrs. Chacon to be ... City Manager. I always do that. I asked Mr. Aceituno to see what she wanted as far as salary. I was in a closed session with the rest of the council members talking about the legality of a city councilman becoming city manager, about the terms and contracts of employment, about what the requirements were for city manager. According to the defense offer of proof, Beltran relayed the council's salary offer and contract terms to defendant and drafted the employment contract. Defense counsel also said Beltran would testify: I urged Mrs. Chacon to become city manager. I thought she would be a good city manager. I thought it would be good for the city of Bell Gardens, and I prevailed upon her to sign the contract and give it a try. I told her that if she became city manager, that was an automatic resignation from the city council, and I never gave any indication that there was anything improper about this entire situation.  (Italics added.) Defense counsel advised the trial court that witnesses other than Beltran could provide some, but not all of this information.
Entrapment by estoppel, based on principles of federal due process, has been recognized by the federal courts and in some sister states. The defense evolved from three United States Supreme Court opinions, although none used the term entrapment by estoppel. The concept was first applied in Raley v. Ohio (1959) 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344. Defendants there were convicted of contempt for refusing to answer questions before Ohio's Un-American Activities Commission. The defendants had invoked their privilege against self-incrimination after being advised of their right to do so by the commission chairman. ( Id. at pp. 424-425, 79 S.Ct. 1257.) The advice, however, was contrary to the Ohio immunity statute, which eliminated the availability of the privilege for persons testifying before legislative committees. ( Id. at p. 431, 79 S.Ct. 1257.) The United States Supreme Court held that the contempt convictions violated due process: After the Commission, speaking for the State, acted as it did, to sustain the Ohio Supreme Court's judgment would be to sanction an indefensible sort of entrapment by the Stateconvicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State had clearly told him was available to him. ( Id. at pp. 425-426, 79 S.Ct. 1257.) In Cox v. Louisiana , the Supreme Court applied Raley to reverse the convictions of protestors arrested for picketing across the street from a courthouse. The leader of the demonstration had been given permission by the police chief to demonstrate at the location. The demonstrators were nevertheless arrested and convicted under a state statute barring certain demonstrations near any courthouse. ( Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at pp. 568-571, 85 S.Ct. 476.) In reversing the convictions, the Supreme Court observed: [T]he highest police officials of the city, in the presence of the Sheriff and Mayor, in effect, told the demonstrators that they could meet where they did... . In effect, appellant was advised that a demonstration at the place it was held would not be one `near' the courthouse within the terms of the statute. ( Id, at p. 571, 85 S.Ct. 476.) The Due Process Clause does not permit convictions to be obtained under such circumstances. ( Ibid. ) In United. States v. Pennsylvania Chem. Corp. (1973) 411 U.S. 655, 93 S.Ct. 1804, 36 L.Ed.2d 567, the court considered the defense in a regulatory setting involving a corporate defendant found to have discharged refuse into navigable waters. The Supreme Court, relying on Raley and Cox, held the defendant should have been allowed to present a defense that it had been misled by administrative regulations which appeared to permit the defendant's actions. ( Id. at pp. 670-675, 93 S.Ct. 1804.) Federal cases applying the entrapment by estoppel defense, while varying slightly in their formulation, rest on the premise that the government may not actively provide assurances that conduct is lawful, then prosecute those who act in reasonable reliance on those assurances. [10] Under these limited circumstances, fundamental fairness supports the defense, even when the prosecution can prove each element of the crime. Courts have cautioned that the defense is narrowly circumscribed. (See e.g., U.S. v. Spires (5th Cir.1996) 79 F.3d 464, 466.) [The defense is a narrow exception to the general rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse....]; U.S. v. Corso (2nd Cir.1994) 20 F.3d 521, 528 [Judicial decisions indicate great caution should be exercised when it comes to the application of the defense]; U.S. v. Howell (7th Cir.1994) 37 F.3d 1197, 1204 [Entrapment by estoppel ... is a defense that is rarely available]; U.S. v. Smith (1st Cir.1991) 940 F.2d 710, 714 [entrapment by estoppel is recognized as applicable under certain, relatively narrow, circumstances].)
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial court's recognition of the entrapment by estoppel defense and its concomitant refusal to exclude supporting evidence was not tentative. Under the court's ruling, of course, defendant was then required to present sufficient evidence to support the defense she was allowed to interpose. [11] Regardless of whether she succeeded in this effort, however, the trial court had made a final legal ruling that the defense was available and, therefore, evidence of Beltran's advice was admissible. We assume, as do the parties, that defendant would have produced evidence consistent with the offer of proof described above. Under these facts, the defense of entrapment by estoppel is not available as a matter of law. We also assume, but do not decide, that defendant's conduct would fall within the proscription of Government Code section 1090. (See ante, 53 Cal. Rptr.3d p. 878, fn. 1, 150 P.3d p. 756. fn. 1) A contract made in violation of that section may be voided by any party except the financially interested official. (Gov.Code, § 1092.) To incur criminal liability, an official must act both willfully and knowingly. (Govt.Code, § 1097; People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 289, 333-336, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 555.) An official who purposefully makes the prohibited contract acts wilfully. ( Honig at p. 334, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 555.) To act knowingly the official must be aware there is a reasonable likelihood that the contract may result in a personal financial benefit to him. ( Id. at p. 338, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 555.) An official is not required to know that his conduct is unlawful. ( Id. at pp. 336-337, 55 Cal. Rptr.2d 555.) Therefore, reliance on advice of counsel as to the lawfulness of the conduct is irrelevant. Nevertheless, defendant argues that she is entitled to assert the defense of entrapment by estoppel because City Attorney Beltran is a government lawyer, authorized to advise the city council on legal matters. [12] Defendant's attempt to rely on existing authority fails. Unlike those charged in Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 559, 85 S.Ct. 476, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 and Raley v. Ohio, supra, 360 U.S. 423, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344, defendant was not an ordinary citizen confronting the power of the state. Defendant was a member of the executive branch of government. A public office is a position held for the benefit of the people; defendant was obligated to discharge her responsibilities with integrity and fidelity. ( City of Imperial Beach v. Bailey (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 191, 197, 162 Cal.Rptr. 663.) The law in question regulates the very manner in which defendant was empowered to exercise her governmental authority. For over a hundred years our courts have consistently held that that our conflict-of-interest statute, now embodied in [Government Code] section 1090, is intended to enforce the government's right to the absolute, undivided, uncompromised allegiance of public officials by proscribing any personal interest. ( People v. Honig, supra, 48 Cal.App.4th at pp. 324-325, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 555.) In our society, people of ordinary sensibility should recognize, without the intervention of a criminal proscription, that a public official is a trustee and that it is wrong for such a trustee to engage in self-dealing, including the contingent feathering of one's own nest. ( Id. at p. 338, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 555, italics added.) For these reasons, we are reluctant to extend the defense to public officials who seek to defend conflict of interest accusations by claiming reliance on the advice of public attorneys charged with counseling them and advocating on their behalf. Recognizing entrapment by estoppel in such circumstances is antithetical to the strong public policy of strict enforcement of conflict of interest statutes and the attendant personal responsibility demanded of our officials. The defense is particularly inappropriate here. Bell Gardens is a general law city, in which the city attorney is a subordinate officer of the city council, appointed by and serving at its pleasure. [13] An official cannot escape liability for conflict of interest violations by claiming to have been misinformed by an employee serving at her pleasure. If permitted to rely on the defense of entrapment by estoppel, such an official could insulate herself from prosecution by influencing an appointee to provide the advice she seeks. The appointee would be forced to choose between two masters: the official in whose hands his continued employment rests and the public that both are sworn to serve. Obviously, this circumstance is not in the public interest. [14] Additional policy considerations also support our conclusion. City Attorney Beltran is authorized to give legal advice to the city council on matters related to city business. He is not similarly situated to those public officials whose actions have been found to bind the state. In Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. at page 568, 85 S.Ct. 476 the police chief was charged with administering and enforcing the statute at issue, and in United States v. Pennsylvania Chem. Corp., supra, 411 U.S. at page 674, 93 S.Ct. 1804 the Army Corp of Engineers was the administrative agency promulgating regulations as to the meaning and requirements of the statute. In Raley v. Ohio, supra, 360 U.S. at page 437, 79 S.Ct. 1257 the commission chairman conducting the hearing clearly appeared to be the agent of the State. Legal advice regarding the application of a statute must be distinguished from the authority to bind the government. Any lawyer may be asked to provide an opinion as to the meaning of a statute. However, only certain government authorities are empowered to administer or enforce particular statutes. Officials like the police chief or the commission chairman are designated to apply and implement the law in question. This specific authority is quite different from the general role of any lawyer to provide a client with a legal interpretation. The city attorney offering an interpretation of Government Code section 1090 to councilmembers in the course of his daily responsibilities acts simply as a lawyer advising a client. Government Code section 1090 applies statewide to [m]embers of the Legislature, state, county, district, judicial district, and city officers or employees. City Attorney Beltran's clients are the officials of Bell Gardens. Section 1090 is one of the myriad of state statutes he and other city attorneys must advise upon in the course of their daily responsibilities. Beltran is not authorized to criminally enforce or administer this law. [15] Private attorneys interpret and advise their clients on the application of statutes under all kinds of circumstances. Yet the average citizen cannot rely on a private lawyer's erroneous advice as a defense to a general intent crime. (See People v. Vineberg (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 127, 137, 177 Cal.Rptr. 819; People v. Aresen (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 26, 35, 204 P.2d 389; People v. McCalla (1923) 63 Cal.App. 783, 793, 220 P. 436.) The defense of action taken in good faith, in reliance upon the advice of a reputable attorney that it was lawful, has long been rejected. The theory is that this would place the advice of counsel above the law and would place a premium on counsel's ignorance or indifference to the law. (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, § 38, p. 369, and cases cited therein.) Defendant cannot evade that rule by asserting the attorney who mistakenly advised her happened to hold a governmental position. We express no view as to whether defendant's conduct violated Government Code section 1090. We hold only that the defense of entrapment by estoppel is not available under the offer of proof contained in this record.