Opinion ID: 2980337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the disputed absences

Text: Coffman first disputes Ford’s reliance on the November and December 16 occurrences on the ground that Ford did not cite them at her final disciplinary hearing as absences that contributed to her termination. In making this argument, however, Coffman fails to mention the undisputed fact that Ford’s progressive discipline policy required three occurrences in a three-month period before an employee would be subject to penalty. Consistent with that requirement, the disciplinary action report completed at the initial hearing mentioned all of these dates as justifying the initial adverse action. Thus, Ford’s current reliance on the November and December 16 occurrences is fully consistent with its earlier treatment of Coffman’s conduct and provides no support for her allegations of pretext. 6 No. 10-3842 Coffman v. Ford Motor Company Coffman’s challenge to the underlying factual bases for the November and December occurrences also fails to raise any material dispute. Coffman neglected to provide Ford with support for her November absences until December 16, rendering the documentation untimely under both the FMLA and the CBA. Coffman’s December absences suffered from a similar deficiency.4 Even if we assume, as Coffman argues, that she did everything possible to return the appropriate forms after her January 21, 2005 disciplinary hearing, that does not change the fact that she again failed to justify her absences within the time period that would have entitled her to leave. Cf. Coulter v. Deloitte Consulting L.L.C., 79 F. App’x 864, 868 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished opinion) (stating that “bare denials” and “subjective beliefs” are “an insufficient basis upon which to vacate summary judgment”).
Coffman’s claim that Ford improperly classified her as AWOL for two periods in March presents a closer question but also ultimately fails. Coffman argues that she timely certified her March absences via two Form 5166s, which she submitted on April 1. Unlike the other absences, the issue here is not timeliness, but instead centers on the validity of the documentation. Coffman submitted her paperwork for the March 16 to 22 absences on two separate forms, each presented within hours of the other, and with one citing “anxiety due to medication adjustment” 4 Coffman’s argument that a nurse in the Plant Hospital found her “unfit for work,” Appellant Br. at 20 (citing R. 35 (Coffman Dep. Ex. 19)), also fails to raise any material dispute, as Coffman failed to show that the designation reflected anything more than her request for leave. That initial request did not eliminate her responsibility to provide timely documentary support for her absences. See R. 38-1 (Lin Supp. Decl. ¶ 4). 7 No. 10-3842 Coffman v. Ford Motor Company and the other citing “EEG & other testing [and] petite mall [sic] seizures” as justification for her leave. R. 35-1 (Coffman Dep. Ex. 32–33). Neither form provided any additional medical facts to support the diagnoses. After reviewing the documents, Dr. Lin, who was responsible for evaluating the sufficiency of medical certifications, made an initial determination that the forms were medically insufficient to justify FMLA leave. His conclusion was based on two observations: (1) the divergent diagnoses for the same period, which left him unable to discern “what medical condition (if any) actually prevented [Coffman] from working from March 16 through March 22,” R. 39-2 (2d Supp. Decl. of Dr. Chun-I John Lin ¶ 10); and (2) the obvious discrepancy between the physician signatures on those certifications and the signatures on previous certifications. Coffman argues that in light of Dr. Lin’s determination, Ford was obligated to request in writing the additional information needed to support her request for medical leave before Ford could issue a blanket denial. Although that obligation exists in most cases, it does not apply here. The 2004 version of the regulations stated that “[t]he employer shall advise an employee whenever the employer finds a certification incomplete, and provide the employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any such deficiency.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(d) (2004) (emphasis added).5 Our cases have consistently enforced this requirement, reaffirming employers’ affirmative duty to seek additional information when they have notice of an employee’s potential need for FMLA leave but are faced with an incomplete medical certification. See, e.g., Novak v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 503 5 Coffman asserts that the notice had to be in writing. Unlike the current regulation, the 2004 version contained no such requirement. 8 No. 10-3842 Coffman v. Ford Motor Company F.3d 572, 579 (6th Cir. 2007); Sorrell v. Rinker Materials Corp., 395 F.3d 332, 337 (6th Cir. 2005); Hoffman v. Prof’l Med Team, 394 F.3d 414, 418 (6th Cir. 2005). But incomplete certifications are distinguishable from invalid ones. See Verkade v. U.S. Postal Serv., 378 F. App’x 567, 574 (6th Cir. 2010) (unpublished opinion). A valid certification “must show that the employee’s serious health condition makes her unable to perform job functions.” Hoffman, 394 F.3d at 419. Although certifications that contain all required information6 are presumptively valid, an employer can rebut the presumption of sufficiency by demonstrating that a certification is invalid, contradictory, or of an otherwise suspicious nature. Novak, 503 F.3d at 578. If the certification is invalid on its face, that in some cases may be enough for an employer to deny FMLA leave without engaging in further inquiry. Verkade, 378 F. App’x at 574. Here, when faced with contradictory, questionable certifications, Dr. Lin sought clarification by asking Coffman to sign a document requesting that her physician provide any medical records pertaining to the dates in question. In response to the request, Coffman’s physician provided a single document, which indicated only a March 17, 2005 date of service, a chief complaint of depression (not seizures), and a list of medications that actually did not support Coffman’s assertion that her prescriptions had recently changed. Thus, rather than supporting the forms Coffman had already submitted, the new information only created new contradictions. Under these circumstances, we do not think Ford had any further duty to seek information to support Coffman’s leave request. See 6 At a minimum, this includes “(1) the date on which the serious health condition commenced; (2) the probable duration of the condition; [and] (3) the appropriate medical facts within the knowledge of the health care provider regarding the condition.” 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b). 9 No. 10-3842 Coffman v. Ford Motor Company Novak, 503 F.3d at 578; see also Culpepper v. BlueCross BlueShield of Tenn., Inc., 321 F. App’x 491, 496–97 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished opinion) (concluding that a document “of questionable reliability”—e.g., lacking a date, devoid of detailed medical explanations, and containing only the signature of a staff member in the physician’s office—“[did] not constitute an acceptable form of certification of a serious health condition under the FMLA”).7
Coffman’s final argument is that her June absences should have been considered intermittent FMLA leave because a jury could conclude those absences were based on the same illness—her newly diagnosed sleep apnea—as the March and April absences. As a result, Coffman argues, Ford incorrectly determined that she had not worked enough hours to be eligible for FMLA leave because the eligibility determination should have been made in March rather than June. Coffman, however, provided no evidence to support any request for intermittent leave, let alone evidence suggesting Ford granted it. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b)(1) (“Leave . . . shall not be taken by an employee intermittently . . . unless the employee and the employer of the employee agree otherwise.”). 7 This is not to say that employers can generally avoid liability by deeming employees’ medical certifications to be facially invalid. Employers facing questionable certifications have two preferable options: they can require the employee to obtain a second opinion from a different provider at the employer’s expense or, after granting the employee an opportunity to correct any shortcomings, they can obtain the employee’s permission to clarify or authenticate a questionable certification with the original health-care provider. 29 C.F.R. § 825.307(a)–(b) (2010); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2613(c). Although these measures are discretionary, see Sorrell, 395 F.3d at 337, utilizing them would avoid the factual disputes and questions of reasonableness that conceivably arise from an employer’s decision to classify an FMLA request as facially invalid without first working with the employee to resolve any discrepancies. 10 No. 10-3842 Coffman v. Ford Motor Company Coffman’s eligibility for FMLA leave in March therefore had no bearing on her later eligibility, and, because the evidence is clear that Coffman was ineligible for FMLA leave in June due to insufficient hours, these absences do not support her retaliation claim. See Staunch, 511 F.3d at 631 (holding that because the evidence was clear that the plaintiff had not worked the 1,250 hours required to be an “eligible employee,” her FMLA claims failed as a matter of law).