Opinion ID: 1166996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the constitutionality of section 78-3 under the equal protection clause.

Text: Appellant contends that section 78-3 infringes upon a fundamental right to work and, therefore, that this court should review the statute under a standard of review more rigorous than the rational basis test. He cites York v. State of Hawaii, 53 Haw. 557, 498 P.2d 644 (1972), and Nelson v. Miwa, 56 Haw. 601, 546 P.2d 1005 (1976), for the proposition that a statute which affects an individual's freedom to work must have a fair and substantial relationship to important governmental interests. Based on these cases, appellant would have us strike down section 78-3 as unconstitutional because it fails to satisfy the fair and substantial relationship test. In light of our recent decision in Nagle v. Board of Education, 629 P.2d 109 (Haw. 1981), which followed the York, supra, and Nelson, supra, cases, we reject the appellant's arguments. Instead, based on Nagle, we hold that section 78-3 does not infringe upon a fundamental right to work and, therefore, need only satisfy the rational basis test under the equal protection clause. In Nagle, appellant, a public intermediate school teacher, argued that HRS § 297-15 (1976) which mandated the retirement of public school teachers at age 65, [2] violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the Hawaii Constitution. This court upheld the constitutionality of the statute under the rational basis test because we concluded that mandatory retirement provisions do not infringe upon any fundamental right to work. This court stated in Nagle, at 116: While it is true that a statute must withstand the strict scrutiny test where a fundamental right is involved, San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 [93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16] (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 [89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600] (1969), this court has already held that the right to work is not fundamental and that, therefore, only the rational basis test applies. Maeda v. Amemiya, 60 Haw. 662, 594 P.2d 136 (1979). Moreover, we pointed out that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard in age discrimination cases given prevailing trends in federal law. [3] Since the rational basis test is the proper standard of review over section 78-3, our inquiry concerning the constitutionality of the statute is whether it has a reasonable relationship to legitimate state interests. Nagle, at 112, 113. As we emphasized in Nagle, at 114, judicial review over a statute under the rational basis test is a very limited one. Instead of engaging in a rigorous examination of the objectives behind the legislative enactment, the court will only seek to determine whether any reasonable set of facts can be conceived to uphold the challenged statute. Id., at 112, 114; State v. Cotton, 55 Haw. 148, 516 P.2d 715 (1973); State v. Johnston, 51 Haw. 195, 456 P.2d 805 (1969). Under the rational basis test, appellee hypothesizes in the instant case several state objectives to support section 78-3. It argues that section 78-3 furthers a state interest in creating employment opportunities for young people by mandating the retirement of 70-year-old employees. In addition, appellee points out that the statute advances a state interest in maintaining an efficient government work force through the retirement of public employees whose physical and intellectual skills generally decline with age. Finally, it contends that section 78-3 supports a state interest in administrative convenience. On the other hand, appellant argues that the reasons offered by the appellee for retiring public employees at age 70 are untenable even under the rational basis standard. He challenges the appellee's assertion that section 78-3 has a rational relationship to the goal of improving employment and promotion opportunities for young people. Appellant points out that the forced retirement of elderly workers has made little impact on the employment market since the number of job positions already held by employees age 70 and older are relatively small. [4] Moreover, appellant argues that mandatory retirement is an unfair method for creating additional employment positions for young workers because such a policy merely saddles one age group with unemployment to relieve the unemployment problems of another age group. He asserts that the creation of a few jobs for young teachers does not justify the economic hardship which older instructors will experience through mandatory retirement. Finally, appellant contends that section 78-3 does not further a state objective in insuring the competency of the work force. Appellant points out that an employee's physical and intellectual condition is largely an individual matter in that he and others like him remain fit to work despite the fact that they have attained the age of 70. Cognizant of the fact that judicial review under the rational basis test is a limited one, we hold that the appellee's arguments rationally support the constitutionality of section 78-3. First of all, we agree with the appellee that section 78-3 has a rational relationship to increasing work opportunities for young employees. It is reasonable to assume that mandatory retirement has made at least a few jobs available for young employees. These employment positions would necessarily be withheld from young job applicants if the State allowed older employees to retain the limited number of public sector jobs. Moreover, we disagree with the appellant that section 78-3 is unconstitutional simply because the effect of the statute is to open up only a relatively small number of jobs for young employees. As this court recognized in Nagle, at 114, the constitutionality of a statute under the rational basis test does not depend upon whether it provides a perfect solution to a problem. If a statute furthers a state objective even to the slightest degree, this court will affirm its validity. See also Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970). Therefore, the fact that section 78-3 has produced any turnover in employment for young job applicants is enough to satisfy the rational basis test. In addition, this court does not share the appellant's position that we overturn section 78-3 if we conclude that the statute operates unfairly against the elderly. As we stated in Nagle, at 112-113, this court will not interpose its judgment for that of the legislature's in assessing the fairness of a mandatory retirement statute to the elderly under the rational basis test. Regardless of the hardships to elderly workers, we are satisfied that section 78-3 is constitutional to the extent that it furthers a state interest in improving job prospects for young employees. This court also agrees with the appellee that section 78-3 advances a state interest in preserving the competency of the public work force. We recognized in Nagle, at 114-115, the common sense proposition that the physical and mental skills of individuals generally decline with age. Because a quality public work force depends upon the involvement of able-bodied, mentally alert individuals, mandatory retirement statutes serve a legitimate state interest by retiring employees at an age when their physical or mental abilities are declining in general. Moreover, the fact that appellant Daoang and other employees like himself may be physically and mentally fit to work does not affect the constitutionality of section 78-3 under the rational basis test. Since there is at least a reasonable, although not a precise, relationship between advanced age and declining physical and mental skills, we conclude that the goal of retiring employees whose competency may be impaired by advancing years is a valid state interest. Finally, this court agrees with the appellee that section 78-3 supports a state interest in administrative convenience. As this court recognized in Nagle, at 115, the requirement of mandatory retirement for all 70-year-old employees obviates the necessity for time-consuming hearings in which the competency of each job applicant would be reviewed on an individualized basis. To the extent that mandatory retirement relieves the State of additional personnel and paperwork involved in case-by-case hearings, section 78-3 furthers a state interest in administrative convenience. Because section 78-3 has a reasonable relationship to legitimate state objectives, we hold that the statute is not violative of the equal protection clause of the Hawaii Constitution.