Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Evidence Derived from Recording

Text: of Defense Investigator’s Questioning of Witness Early in the murder investigation, LAPD detectives applied for court-authorized wiretaps targeting the residential “hardline” (or landline) telephone and two cell phones used by defendant’s sister, Mary Mercedes, and a residential hardline telephone used by codefendant Jose Moya. A magistrate approved two wiretap applications on August 15, 2008 and August 22, 2008, respectively, and granted one extension on September 13, 2008. 52 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. As statutorily required, authorities provided the court several six-day reports containing summaries of some intercepted calls and updates on the investigation. On August 29, 2008, authorities intercepted a call Moya made from his hardline telephone to defense investigator Glen LaPalme. During the 19-minute telephone conversation, the two went over telephone records detailing calls that Moya had made and received on his cell phone. Moya had previously told detectives he reported the cell phone lost or stolen the day after Pamela’s murder. When Moya admitted to LaPalme he could not remember exactly when he lost the cell phone, LaPalme suggested: “Now if you lost, I mean if you lost the phone, like, over that weekend before all this shit hit the fan then at least we would, maybe it was somebody else that had the phone, you know what I’m saying?” Later in the call, LaPalme told Moya he had “no doubt in my mind that [the LAPD] have the vehicle, the SUV, and they’re probably doing all sorts of forensic examinations for hair, skin, all that crap, and of course there were people who were using it so you’re going to find everybody’s hair and skin there.” Moya replied, “Except for Pam.” When LaPalme indicated he did not hear what Moya had said, Moya told him: “No, except for Pam’s, it wouldn’t be in there, it shouldn’t be in there.” On or about September 10, 2008, Detective Abdul sought a warrant to search Moya’s residence at the Happy Camp Ranch in Moorpark. In the supporting affidavit, Detective Abdul recounted the intercepted call on August 29 and opined that Moya’s statement that evidence of Pam’s skin and hair should not be in the SUV, “[t]his statement in itself proves Moya has knowledge of the murder.” Detective Abdul averred that he “believes evidence will be recovered from Moya’s residence that 53 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. will link him to the murder of Pamela Fayed.” On September 10, a magistrate approved the warrant to search the Happy Camp Ranch. The list of items to be searched included “[u]nknown type sharp objects . . . consistent with the injuries sustained by Pamela Fayed,” cell phones, and Moya’s bank records and deposit slips. During the search, authorities recovered three cell phones, which defendant later described as evidence “crucial to the government’s theory of the case.” Before trial, on October 9, 2009, defendant filed a motion to traverse the affidavit, a motion to suppress the evidence obtained in violation of wiretap provisions, and a motion to dismiss for violation of due process. Defendant argued that the LAPD was well aware that LaPalme was a private investigator working for the defense and yet continued to record the call between him and Moya. Because LaPalme was conducting witness interviews for the defense, defendant argued the conversation between LaPalme and Moya was protected under the work product doctrine. Thus, the affidavit’s failure to disclose that LaPalme was a defense investigator was an egregious omission, one that hindered the “crucial, inferencedrawing powers of the magistrate.” (People v. Kurland (1980) 28 Cal.3d 376, 384.) The trial court denied defendant’s motions. It rejected defendant’s argument that the attorney work product doctrine protected the intercepted conversation between LaPalme and Moya. Moreover, it found “ample probable cause” to support the search warrant even if the challenged information were not included. The court also agreed with the prosecution that there was no material omission in the affidavit to the magistrate. On appeal, defendant raises similar arguments as below. He claims that LaPalme and Moya’s conversation was protected under the 54 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. work product doctrine and that it should be considered excised from the affidavit. Even assuming the intercepted call was privileged and should be deemed omitted from the affidavit, we conclude the affidavit’s remaining contents supported probable cause. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1297 (Bradford).) In general, statements contained in an affidavit of probable cause that are proven to be false or reckless by a preponderance of the evidence, should be considered excised from the affidavit. (Ibid.) As relevant here, “[i]f the remaining contents of the affidavit are insufficient to establish probable cause, the warrant must be voided and any evidence seized pursuant to that warrant must be suppressed. [Citation.] [¶] A defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit containing omissions bears the burden of showing that the omissions were material to the determination of probable cause. [Citations.] ‘Pursuant to [California Constitution, article I,] section 28 [, subdivision] (d), materiality is evaluated by the test of Illinois v. Gates[, supra,] 462 U.S. 213, . . . which looks to the totality of the circumstances in determining whether a warrant affidavit establishes good cause for a search.” (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297.) In this case, even without considering LaPalme and Moya’s conversation, the affidavit’s remaining contents provided probable cause for issuance of the warrant. The affidavit included evidence that Moya had access (both before and after the murder) to the red SUV seen leaving the murder scene, statements from defendant’s employee who told detectives Moya was not at the ranch at the time of Pamela’s death, and statements from another employee that said defendant directed him to give Moya $24,000 sometime in mid55 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. July (several weeks before the murder). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial court properly concluded the affidavit established probable cause to support the search warrant. (Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1297.)