Opinion ID: 1147344
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: STATE v. DUNCAN LEACH

Text: The State of Washington seeks review of a published Court of Appeals decision reversing Duncan Leach's Renton District Court conviction for public indecency and dismissing the charge. The Court of Appeals concluded that the complaint signed by the investigating police officer and the prosecuting attorney did not state necessary elements of the offense charged; and while the complaint cited RCW 9A.88.010, it did not specify which of the two offenses described in that statute was charged. State v. Leach, 53 Wn. App. 322, 766 P.2d 1116 (1989). The State contends the more stringent due process notice requirements of State v. Holt [1] should not apply to misdemeanor complaints or citations filed in courts of limited jurisdiction. On August 8, 1986, Duncan Leach was notified that a complaint had been filed in Renton District Court accusing him of committing RCW 9A.88.010 Public Indecency (see case) [2] on July 8, 1986. The cited statute defines both misdemeanor and gross misdemeanor offenses, but the complaint did not specify which level of crime respondent was being charged with. [3] Further, as the State conceded at trial, the photocopy of the police report received by Mr. Leach and incorporated by reference into the complaint omitted the year of birth of one of the alleged victims. Thus, Mr. Leach was not put on notice that one of his victims was under the age of 14. If that crucial information had been provided him, he would have been able to determine that he was charged with a gross misdemeanor. When Mr. Leach appeared for arraignment on two counts of public indecency, [4] the Honorable Charles J. Delaurenti, II, Renton District Court Judge, informed him he had been charged with two misdemeanors, each of which carried a maximum penalty of 90 days in jail and a $1,000 fine. After respondent pleaded not guilty to both counts, the court realized, and then informed Mr. Leach, that one of the two charges was actually a gross misdemeanor carrying a maximum penalty of 1 year in jail and a $5,000 fine. Duncan Leach later waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated that the court could base its decision on the police report. However, defense counsel advised the court that Mr. Leach had not received appropriate notice of the actual charges. Counsel contended that the State should not be allowed to amend the charge to a gross misdemeanor because Mr. Leach had been charged only with two misdemeanors. The prosecutor requested that the charge based on the July 8, 1986, incident be amended to a gross misdemeanor because one of the alleged victims was under the age of 14, and that the other matter proceed as a simple misdemeanor. The court allowed the amendment after offering defendant Leach a continuance to prepare his defense on the amended charge. Defense counsel neither requested a continuance nor a bill of particulars on the amended charge. After considering the evidence, the court found Mr. Leach guilty of one misdemeanor and one gross misdemeanor. In appealing his conviction to the King County Superior Court, Mr. Leach contended that the complaint charging the July 8, 1986, offense was constitutionally defective because it did not describe the statutory elements of the offense. Judge Lloyd W. Bever ruled in his favor and remanded the matter with directions to dismiss the July 8 charge, basing his decision on State v. Holt, 104 Wn.2d 315, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985). On January 23, 1989, Division One of the Court of Appeals filed its opinion affirming the Superior Court dismissal of Mr. Leach's public indecency conviction because the District Court complaint was constitutionally defective for not stating the statutory elements of the charged offense as required by Holt. State v. Leach, 53 Wn. App. 322, 766 P.2d 1116 (1989). The Justice Court Criminal Rules were in effect on July 8, 1986, [5] the date of the offense of public indecency charged against Duncan Leach under RCW 9A.88.010. [6] Misdemeanor criminal charges were initiated by complaint or by citation and notice under the Justice Court Criminal Rule 2.01(a)(1). A law enforcement officer could initiate charges by citation and notice without prior approval of the prosecutor. JCrR 2.01(b)(4). Both complaints and citations were final charging documents. JCrR 2.01(a)(3), (b)(4). A criminal proceeding initiated by a complaint under the Justice Court Criminal Rules required that the complaint be in writing and that it contain (i) the name of the court; (ii) the title of the action and the name of the offense charged; (iii) the name of the person charged; and (iv) the offense charged, in the language of the statute, together with a statement as to the time, place, person, and property involved to enable the defendant to understand the character of the offense charged. JCrR 2.01(a)(2). In an information or complaint for a statutory offense, it is sufficient to charge in the language of the statute if the statute defines the crime sufficiently to apprise an accused person with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation. State v. Grant, 89 Wn.2d 678, 686, 575 P.2d 210 (1978) (citing State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 403 P.2d 838 (1965)). See also RCW 10.37.050. However, it is not necessary to use the exact words of the statute if other words are used which equivalently or more extensively signify the words in the statute. State v. Knowlton, 11 Wash. 512, 39 P. 966 (1895). In Holt, the court dismissed a complaint which omitted two statutory elements of the crime of child pornography. Further, the court concluded that [t]he omission of any statutory element of a crime in the charging document is a constitutional defect which may result in dismissal of the criminal charges. Holt, 104 Wn.2d at 320 (citing State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1, 16, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983)). The court further cited Bonds for distinction between a constitutionally defective information and one merely deficient for vagueness. A constitutionally defective information is subject to dismissal for failure to state an offense on the face of the charging document by omitting allegations of essential elements constituting the offense charged. Holt, 104 Wn.2d at 320-21; In re Richard, 75 Wn.2d 208, 211, 449 P.2d 809 (1969). However, a charging document which states the statutory elements of a crime, but is vague as to some other significant matter, may be corrected under a bill of particulars. A defendant may not challenge a charging document for vagueness on appeal if no bill of particulars was requested at trial. Holt, 104 Wn.2d at 320; Bonds, 98 Wn.2d at 17. [1] In holding that a charging document which omits a statutory element of the crime charged violates a defendant's constitutional rights, the court in Holt did not distinguish between misdemeanors and felonies, nor between complaints and citations. In applying the Holt rule, there is no logical reason to distinguish between complaints and citations or felonies and misdemeanors. If a misdemeanor citation or complaint omits a statutory element of the charged offense, the document is constitutionally defective for failure to state an offense and is subject to dismissal. However, in order more fully to understand the import of the Holt rule, it is necessary to examine the origins of the rule in the case law of this state. The line of cases culminating in the Holt decision includes: State v. Bonds, 98 Wn.2d 1, 653 P.2d 1024 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 831 (1983); State v. Ashker, 11 Wn. App. 423, 523 P.2d 949 (1974), overruled on other grounds in State v. Braithwaite, 92 Wn.2d 624, 600 P.2d 1260 (1979); State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952); State v. Unosawa, 29 Wn.2d 578, 188 P.2d 104 (1948). In Unosawa, without citation to further authority, the rule is stated: [W]e must first determine whether or not the information charges all of the statutory elements of the particular crime involved.... To state the proposition in another way, ... it [must be] determined that the information itself does charge a crime. The facts stated in count No. 2 of the information, as amended, do not charge the crime... (Italics ours.) State v. Unosawa, 29 Wn.2d 578, 589, 188 P.2d 104 (1948). This does not support the proposition suggested by the language in Holt that a charging document must list every element of a crime. Rather, the charging document must allege sufficient facts to support every element of the crime charged. This formulation of the rule is supported by other authority. The Court of Appeals in this case relied in part upon Blanton v. State, 1 Wash. 265, 24 P. 439 (1890) and Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 7 P. 872 (1885) for the proposition that the essential elements rule has always been the law in this state. State v. Leach, 53 Wn. App. 322, 326, 766 P.2d 1116 (1989). In Leonard, for example, the rule was stated: Under our laws an indictment must be direct and certain, both as regards the crime charged and as regards the particular circumstances thereof, when they are necessary to constitute a complete crime. Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 392, 7 P. 872 (1885) (remanding the case for a new trial because of insufficiency of the charging document). However, the court in that case was considering whether [g]uilt of murder in the first or second degree cannot ... be gathered from the facts set forth as constituting the crime. (Italics ours.) Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 389, 7 P. 872 (1885). In Leonard, the indictment omitted a factual allegation that the killing was purposed, deliberate, premeditated and malicious and therefore did not charge the crime conformably to the definition of the statute. Leonard v. Territory, 2 Wash. Terr. 381, 391, 7 P. 872 (1885). Because statutory language may not necessarily define a charge sufficiently to apprise an accused with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation against that person, to the end that the accused may prepare a defense and plead the judgment as a bar to any subsequent prosecution for the same offense, mere recitation of the statutory language in the charging document may be inadequate. See State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 403 P.2d 838 (1965); see also State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729 (1892). Moreover, an information need not state the statutory elements of an offense in the precise language of the statute, but may instead use words conveying the same meaning and import as the statutory language. State v. Nieblas-Duarte, 55 Wn. App. 376, 380, 777 P.2d 583 (1989) (citing State v. Jeske, 87 Wn.2d 760, 765, 558 P.2d 162 (1976); State v. Moser, 41 Wn.2d 29, 31, 246 P.2d 1101 (1952)). But: [T]he information must state the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language, not the name of the offense, but the statement of the acts constituting the offense is just as important and essential as the other requirements of the information, such as the title of the action and the names of the parties. State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 557, 403 P.2d 838 (1965). It may be concluded from these authorities that the essential elements rule requires that a charging document allege facts supporting every element of the offense, in addition to adequately identifying the crime charged. This is not quite the same as a requirement to state every statutory element of the crime charged, as suggested in State v. Holt, 104 Wn.2d 315, 320, 704 P.2d 1189 (1985). However, any imprecision in delineating the essential elements rule in Holt does not alter our conclusions in the two cases we now decide. The Holt decision is not in conflict with this court's holding in Grant in which it was held that a misdemeanor citation containing a statutory reference RCW 9.69.060 and the description obstructing a police officer in the performance of his duty was constitutionally sufficient. This court concluded that the citation met the requirement that defendants be apprised with reasonable certainty of the nature of accusations against them so they may prepare an adequate defense. Grant, 89 Wn.2d at 686. The complaint against Duncan Leach is constitutionally defective because it does not include the offense charged, in the language of the statute, together with a statement as to the time, place, person, and property involved to enable the defendant to understand the character of the offense charged as required by JCrR 2.01(a)(2). The complaint merely stated RCW 9A.88.010/PUBLIC INDECENCY and incorporated an attached police report describing the general facts of the July 8, 1986, offense. However, the complaint did not specify whether a misdemeanor or a gross misdemeanor was charged. It further omitted an essential elemental fact of the gross misdemeanor offense. Specifically, it did not include, either on its face or in the accompanying photocopy of the police report, the fact that one of the alleged victims was under the age of 14. This omission violated JCrR 2.01(a)(2)(iv) and Mr. Leach's due process right to be properly informed of the charge against him as required by the state and federal constitutions. Const. art. 1, §§ 3, 22 (amend. 10); U.S. Const. amends. 5, 6, 14. The State is not excused by JCrR 2.04(a) from providing Duncan Leach with adequate notice of the nature of the charge against him. JCrR 2.04(a) provided that a misdemeanor complaint shall not be considered insufficient if it does not contain any matter not necessary to a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the specific offense or offenses with which the defendant is charged ... JCrR 2.04(a). The State's failure to include in the charging document the essential elemental fact that one of the victims to the July 8, 1986, incident was younger than 14 years of age and its failure to charge the offense in the language of the statute were indeed omissions of matters necessary to a plain, concise and definite statement of the essential facts constituting the specific gross misdemeanor offense of public indecency. Those omissions constituted a failure to state an offense in violation of Mr. Leach's due process right to be apprised with reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusations against him. [2] The State contends that a defendant charged with a misdemeanor in a court of limited jurisdiction, whether by complaint or by citation and notice, forfeits the right to challenge a constitutionally defective charging instrument by not raising the issue at trial. This is not correct. An appellant may at any time claim an error which was not raised in the trial court if the error affects a constitutional right. See RAP 2.5(a). See also Holt, 104 Wn.2d at 320-21 (a criminal defendant can raise objections at any time to an information which completely fails to state an offense). Thus, because it involves a question of constitutional due process, Mr. Leach's challenge to the sufficiency of his misdemeanor citation is reviewable even though raised for the first time on appeal. We affirm the Court of Appeals and uphold superior court dismissal of Respondent Duncan Leach's public indecency conviction. The Superior Court and Court of Appeals properly based their decisions on Holt which requires that a criminal complaint allege all statutory elements of the offense charged.