Opinion ID: 61737
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Strike Jury Panel

Text: At jury selection, the government and Freedman took turns questioning and challenging prospective jurors until a jury of 14 was selected. During its first round of questioning, the government asked the prospective jurors if any of them would give extra weight to the testimony of a police officer. A prospective juror named Raymond Thoennissen responded that, if “[t]he [Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”)] brought this case, [Freedman was] probably guilty.” At the conclusion 1 Freedman also was indicted for importing five kilograms or more of cocaine, also in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2 and 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 960(b)(1), and 963, but the jury found him not guilty of this charge. At sentencing, freedman was held responsible for 7 kilograms of cocaine and sentenced to two concurrent 121-month terms of imprisonment. 2 of the government’s first round of questioning, Freedman requested a sidebar and moved to strike the jury panel, arguing that Thoennissen’s statement “may have sent the message, the idea, across [the] entire panel in [the] room that this defendant is guilty.” The district court denied the motion. During his first round of questioning, Freedman asked the prospective jurors if any of them would have difficulty presuming that he was innocent until proven guilty or holding the government to its burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. None of the prospective jurors responded affirmatively. At the conclusion of the first round of questioning, Thoennissen was dismissed from the jury panel, along with other prospective jurors. During the next four rounds of questioning, the government and Freedman asked many of the new prospective jurors if any of them would give extra weight to the testimony of a police officer. None of the prospective jurors responded affirmatively. Freedman also asked all of the new prospective jurors if any of them would have difficulty presuming his innocence or applying the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. Only one prospective juror expressed difficulty with these standards, and she was dismissed. After the jury was empaneled, the district court instructed the jury that its job would be to decide a verdict based only on the evidence and law that it would 3 hear in the courtroom during the trial. At the beginning of the trial, the district court reminded the jury that it must base its verdict only on evidence presented from “the witness stand in the form of testimony and documents and exhibits received.” The district court instructed the jury that it must apply the appropriate law to this evidence, regardless of whether “[the individual jurors] agree[d] with [the law] or not.” The district court also reminded the jury that Freedman was presumed innocent until proven guilty and that the burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt rested entirely on the government. At the end of the trial, before submitting the case to the jury for its consideration, the district court again reminded the jury that it must make its decision “only on the basis of the testimony and other evidence presented [in the courtroom] during the trial.” The district court also reminded the jury that the government had the burden of proving Freedman’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury “must follow the law as [the district court] explain[ed] it to [the jury] whether [it] agreed with that law or not.” The district court further admonished the jury that the “testimony of police officers or federal agents [was] to be given no more or less weight than the testimony of other witnesses.” We review the district court’s denial of a motion to strike the jury panel for 4 abuse of discretion. See United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 507 (11th Cir. 1983). “The constitutional standard of fairness requires that the criminally accused have a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.” Id. In determining whether this standard has been met, we generally presume that the jury was impartial. See id. at 509. We also generally give deference to the decision of the district court judge who presided over jury selection, as he was in the best position to observe the demeanor of the jurors and determine whether they were impartial. See id. In United States v. Khoury, 901 F.2d 948, 955 (11th Cir. 1990), we held that a party challenging the presumption of impartiality and deferential treatment “must demonstrate that the juror in question exhibited actual bias: That is, either an express admission of bias, or proof of specific facts showing such a close connection to the circumstances of the case that bias must be presumed.” The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to dismiss the entire jury panel after Thoennissen stated that Freedman must be guilty because the DEA had brought a case against him. See Tegzes, 715 F.2d at 507. Freedman has not demonstrated that the jury members were biased, either expressly or because of a close connection to the case. See id. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates the exact opposite. No prospective juror, after Thoennissen, stated that he or she would give extra weight to the testimony of a law enforcement officer. Also, the 5 only prospective juror who expressed difficulty with the presumed-innocent and beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standards was dismissed. Moreover, the district court repeatedly instructed the jury that it could consider only the evidence offered at trial, must follow the law whether its individual members agreed with the law or not, must presume Freedman innocent and could not convict him unless the government proved his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and could not give extra weight to the testimony of a law enforcement officer. Thus, because Freedman has not satisfied the burden set out for him in Khoury, the district court did not abuse its discretion and we affirm Freedman’s convictions and sentences as to this issue. See Tegzes, 715 F.2d at 507; Khoury, 901 F.2d at 955. We note that Freedman argues that Thoennissen’s statements constituted grounds for dismissal because it had to do with Freedman’s guilt or innocence. In making this argument, Freedman cites our language in Khoury that the statement of a prospective juror in a drug-trafficking case that her son had overdosed before he was 18 was not grounds for dismissing the entire panel in part because it did not raise a “spectre of potential prejudice in other jurors” since it “did not constitute an opinion concerning the guilt or innocence of the defendants, nor did it relate to knowledge about the facts, parties, or witnesses involved in this case.” Id. at 956 (citing Tegzes, 715 F.2d at 506-09). We find, however, that Thoennissen’s 6 statement was not the sort of statement we described in Khoury, in that it did not illustrate Freedman’s actual guilt to the other prospective jurors. See Khoury, 901 F.2d at 955. Thoennissen did not state, for instance, that he knew Freedman to be guilty of importing cocaine because he overheard Freedman talk of importing cocaine, saw Freedman with cocaine, or knew one of the co-conspirators. Statements of this sort certainly may have raised the “spectre of potential prejudice” we mentioned in Khoury. See id. Such was not present here.