Opinion ID: 1956793
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether foley's closing argument was improperly restricted.

Text: ¶ 31. Foley also alleges error based on the circuit court's restricting his counsel's closing arguments. Specifically, the circuit court sustained an objection by the State made upon defense counsel's statements that [W]e didn't hear from [G.F.] Nobody knows where he is. His mother testified he was up in Memphis. The objection alleged that defense counsel was, in effect, testifying as to G.F.'s failure to appear at trial as a witness. Foley was attempting to show that G.F., Deborah Houck's son, could have been the perpetrator and cast doubt on the State's evidence that Foley was the one responsible for the acts against K.F. Before he sustained the objection, the circuit judge called counsel for both sides to the bench. The bench conference was not transcribed in the record. After a brief talk, the circuit judge announced that the statement was to be disregarded by the jury. The judge said, [T]hat's not an appropriate argument under the law. They could have gotten him if they wanted to, could have attempted it anyway. [T]he standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice ... so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Eckman, 876 So.2d at 994. ¶ 32. Both Foley and the State focus their arguments on the availability of Houck's son, G.F., and whether it was permissible to comment upon his absence as a witness in closing arguments. Foley points out that there was an attempt to subpoena G.F., but from the judge's comments, it is apparent that the circuit court determined that Foley had not adequately attempted to secure G.F. as a witness. The trial court also made reference to the statements not being appropriate under the law. Indeed, [t]he general principle is that `the failure of either party to examine a witness equally accessible to both is not a proper subject of comment before the jury by either of the parties.' Brown v. State, 27 So.2d at 840 (citing Heafner v. State, 196 Miss. 430, 17 So.2d 806, 808 (1944)). Burke, 576 So.2d at 1241. ¶ 33. Foley fails to show why the witness was unavailable. Simply failing to have a witness under subpoena does not render them unavailable. The circuit judge obviously found evidence that Foley could have obtained G.F.'s presence in court with some amount of reasonable effort but failed to do so. Foley asks us to find that the trial court judge's reasoning was flawed, but did nothing to preserve the judge's objectionable reasoning in the record for appeal. A presumption of equal access to both parties arises when the record provides no proof of the absent witness's accessibility or inaccessibility. Ross v. State, 603 So.2d 857, 864 (Miss. 1992) (citing Madlock v. State, 440 So.2d 315, 318 (Miss.1983)); see also Holmes v. State, 537 So.2d 882 (Miss.1988). We find no reason to disturb the ruling of the circuit judge since we have not been presented with a showing of prejudice to Foley and has not been shown why the circuit court's judgment was incorrect in finding that G.F. could have been found through reasonable effort by Foley. Foley's complaint to the alternative is without merit.