Opinion ID: 3134767
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or

Text: (5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of a statement has been unable to procure the declarant’s attendance (or in the case of a hearsay exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant’s attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means. A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.” While this court has not adopted Rule 804(a) as an exhaustive definition of “unavailability” under Illinois law, this court has embraced the general principles reflected theren: “The general thrust of the rule makes clear that ‘unavailability’ is a narrow concept, subject to a rigorous standard. The reasons for unavailability which are acceptable under Federal Rule 804–privilege, persistent contemptuous refusal to testify, failure of memory, death or illness, etc.–are substantial and therefore legally cognizable.” People v. Johnson , 118 Ill. 2d 501, 509 (1987). A witness’ exercise of a privilege satisfies the requirement of unavailability. Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(1). Accordingly, a declarant who asserts his or her fifth amendment right not to testify is not available for cross-examination in the context of the fourth Chambers factor. People v. Swaggirt , 282 Ill. App. 3d 692, 703 (1996) (collecting cases); People v. Carter , 174 Ill. App. 3d 369, 374 (1988); see People v. Rice , 166 Ill. 2d 35, 44 (1995). Defendant argues that Iacullo was available for cross-examination, even though she had invoked her fifth amendment rights, because the State could have granted her immunity. In People v. Rivera , 260 Ill. App. 3d 984, 992 (1994), the appellate court accepted this argument in finding that the fourth Chambers factor was established in that case: “In People v. Ireland (1976), 38 Ill. App. 3d 616, 621-22, 348 N.E.2d 277, 281-82, this court ruled that the State had effectively prevented itself from cross-examing a declarant who invoked the fifth amendment by refusing to grant the declarant immunity and that the declarant therefore could not have been held to have been unavailable. The precedent in Ireland is applicable to the present case. The State in effect made [the witness] unavailable by refusing to grant him immunity.” However, a defendant does not have a constitutional right to compel the State to confer immunity upon a witness who has exercised his or her privilege against self-incrimination. Carter , 174 Ill. App. 3d at 375, citing United States v. Ramsey , 503 F.2d 524, 532 (7th Cir. 1974); People v. Cunningham , 130 Ill. App. 3d 254, 264-65 (1984). To the extent that Rivera and Ireland hold to the contrary, those cases are overruled. We find that the fourth Chambers factor has not been met. Defendant has failed to establish three of the four Chambers factors. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding Iacullo’s hearsay statements because they lacked sufficient indicia of reliability.