Opinion ID: 1465695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: findings of reasonable articulable suspicion

Text: Even aside from the resolution of the issues in sections A and B, the facts before the trial court supported a reasonable articulable suspicion that a drug transaction was about to occur. In arriving at its conclusion, the Court of Appeals failed to consider the different levels of reliability between tips from a confidential informant or anonymous tipster versus that of a citizen, who personally approaches an officer to give information about ongoing criminal activity. [T]ips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. One simple rule will not cover every situation. Some tips, completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no police response, or require further investigation, before a forcible stop of a suspect would be authorized. But in some situations  for example, when a victim of a street crime seeks immediate police aid and gives a description of his assailant, or when a credible informant warns of a specific pending crime  the subtleties of the hearsay rule should not thwart an appropriate police response. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). One who personally comes forward to give information that was immediately verifiable at the scene may carry sufficient indicia of reliability to justify a stop and would be a much stronger case than an anonymous phone tip. Id. at 146, 147, 92 S.Ct. 1921. See also, United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1098, 121 S.Ct. 830, 148 L.Ed.2d 712 (2001). (Held that tipster, who failed to give her name, but gave the police her home address, was not an anonymous tipster and that face-to-face informants are generally more reliable than anonymous telephone tipsters). In its analysis of the trial court's finding that the circumstances related by Officer Koenig in the case at hand did not articulate a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, the Court of Appeals relied on Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 120 S.Ct., 1375, 146 L.Ed.2d 254 (2000). In J.L., the tip came through a phone call made from an unknown location by an unknown caller. Unlike a tip from a known informant whose reputation can be assessed and who can be held responsible if their allegations turn out to be fabricated, an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informant's basis of knowledge or veracity.... Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); J.L. at 270, 120 S.Ct. 1375. However, [a] face-to-face encounter provides police officers the opportunity to perceive and evaluate personally an informant's mannerisms, expressions, and tone of voice (and thus, to assess the informant's veracity more readily than can be done from a purely anonymous telephone tip). In person communications also tend to be more reliable because, having revealed one's physical appearance and location, the informant knows that she can be tracked down and held accountable, if her assertions prove inaccurate. Finally, a face-to-face encounter often provides a window into an informant's represented basis of knowledge; for example, his physical presence at or near the scene of the reported events can confirm that she acquired her information through first-hand observation. United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 73-74 (1st Cir.2004)(internal citations omitted). In Romain , the call came into the 911 emergency operator from a woman who explained she was visiting with her friend and that someone had come in with a gun. When the operator inquired whether the woman was placing the call surreptitiously, the woman asked that the call be traced. The police then responded, whereat, the woman again covertly indicated to the officers that another person was inside the apartment and armed. Her identity, however, was unknown until after the search of the person indicated turned up the weapon complained of. In concluding the search was valid, the court stated [h]ere, the officers had in-person contacts ..., and those contacts, although limited, allowed them to gauge her veracity and to make some informed assessment of the reliability of the tip.... Romain at 73-74. The informant here was not `anonymous' as the J.L. Court had employed that term and the information was not, as in J.L., a tip that had no discernable basis. Id. at 74. In United States v. Sierra-Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir.1978), a border patrol agent was approached by a man, described in the record only as wearing farmer's overalls and a baseball cap and driving a late-model brown Mercedes Benz. The man then pointed to a black pickup truck proceeding parallel on a road about 100 yards away and told the officer the black pickup truck had just loaded with weed at the canebreak. Without asking the unidentified man for his name, or for any other information, the agent immediately radioed for assistance and followed the black pickup, stopped it and discovered the marijuana. In commenting upon the identity of the person giving the information, the court acknowledged [m]oreover, although the informant did not identify himself by name, he would have been available for further questioning if the agent had judged the procedure appropriate. Unlike a person who makes an anonymous telephone call, this informant confronted the agent directly. By thus presenting himself to the agent, and doing so while driving a car from which his identity might easily be traced, the informant was in a position to be held accountable for his intervention. The reliability of the information was thus increased. Sierra-Hernandez at 763. The court also noted the timely nature of the information, required the agent to immediately leave the informant's presence, radio for assistance and set off in pursuit. Id. In United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141 (4th Cir.2000), the intoxicated woman approached officers who were then in her neighborhood, gave them her residence address, but not her name, and told them you need to come and deal with the drugs and the guns that those guys have on the porch two doors down from me. Id. at 143. Reacting to the information given, the officers approached the individuals indicated, did a pat-down search and found weapons. After the arrest, a more thorough search revealed a large amount of crack cocaine and marijuana. In upholding the search, the court noted, unlike the anonymous tipster, a witness who directly approaches a police officer can also be held accountable for false statements. As the Supreme Court has observed, citizens who personally report crimes to the police thereby make themselves accountable for lodging false complaints. Id. at 144, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233-234, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 & n. 2, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972). In United States v. Heard, 367 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir.2004), the officer responded to a location where a fight was in progress. As the officer responded, he observed a woman yelling at the defendant and demanding fifty dollars. At the officer's suggestion, the defendant paid the woman the fifty dollars. However, just as the woman, whose name and address was unknown, was leaving the scene, she told the officers the defendant was carrying a gun. She then jumped on an arriving train and left the scene anonymously. Nevertheless, to protect his own safety and the safety of the train station patrons, the officer placed the defendant in handcuffs and did a Terry frisk. During the pat-down, a weapon was discovered and the defendant was later indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In upholding the reasonableness of the search, the court noted [a] face-to-face anonymous tip is presumed to be inherently more reliable than an anonymous telephone tip because the officers receiving the information have an opportunity to observe the demeanor and perceived credibility of the informant. Heard at 1279, citing United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350, 354 (3rd Cir.2000). In United States v. Hopes, 286 F.3d 788, 789-790 (5th Cir.2002), the court noted in the instant case the tip was not anonymous but, rather, was given by Robinson, an individual who had operated the halfway house for many years and was well known to the officers who had dealt reliably with her many times. Unlike the unknown, unaccountable tipster in Florida v. J.L ., Robinson personally summoned and met the police officers face-to-face, and could be held accountable if the tip proved to be fabricated. Hopes at 789-790. Courts are not required to sever the relationships that the citizens and local police forces have forged to protect their communities from crime. [Appellee] argues for a rule that comes close to disqualifying face-to-face discussions with residents as a basis for a Terry stop and frisk. To rule out such conversations as a basis for reasonable suspicion would be a serious step. A community might quickly succumb to a sense of helplessness if police were constitutionally prevented from responding to the face-to-face pleas of neighborhood residents for assistance. Officers are entitled to investigate such reports without jeopardizing their personal safety. Any other constitutional rule would destroy the basis for effective community police work. Christmas at 145. In this instance, officer Koenig was stopped and flagged down on the street by a citizen and given information that a narcotics transaction was occurring, right then, in the K-Mart parking lot several minutes away. The officer was given an accurate description of the dealer and his vehicle and told they were there as they spoke. The alleged site of the drug transaction being several minutes away, one would have to concede that the failure to get the name and address of the citizen was understandable, given the timely nature of the information along with the common knowledge that it doesn't take long to conduct a drug transaction. Next, and even viewing the evidence as argued by Appellee, officer Koenig arrived on the scene and immediately spotted the person and vehicle described just moments before. As the vehicle was then exiting the K-Mart parking lot, according to Appellee's version (where the transaction was supposed to have taken place), he followed and blue-lighted the Appellee. After activating the blue lights, but before approaching the vehicle, he noticed the apparent frantic activity of the Appellee inside his vehicle indicating concealment activity. Indeed, a brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity, or to maintain the status quo momentarily, while obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light of the facts known to the officer at the time. Williams at 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921. And, [r]easonable suspicion, while dependant upon the `totality of the circumstances,' including both the content of the information and its reliability, `can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.' Heard at 1278. (Internal citations omitted). Even viewing the evidence as argued by the Appellee, we believe Officer Koenig's stop of the Appellee was based upon reasonable and articuable suspicions that criminal activity was afoot. Officer Koenig was flagged down on the street and approached by a citizen who gave him the information, including the necessity of responding quickly. It was under circumstances where Officer Koenig could assess the demeanor of the person giving the information and make his own judgment, as to that person's credibility. Additionally, the person giving the information undertook the risk that the officer, having spoken with her, could recognize her and identify her at a later time thus, subjecting her to various penalties, should the information been proven to be untrue. See KRS 519.040(1)(2nd), Falsely Reporting an Incident. Once the response of the officer validated the description of the Appellee and the vehicle, this added credibility to the information, as well as the fact that it was at the location suggested. Thus, even limiting the evidence as argued by the Appellee, he was then leaving the vicinity of the parking lot where it was reported the alleged criminal activity would have occurred. Then, factoring this into an officer's knowledge that it doesn't take a long time to do a drug deal, this had been consistent with the fact that by the time he responded from the location where he was notified of the activity, to its actual location, the deal might have been completed and the Appellee would be leaving the transaction area. Finally, once stopped, the Appellee's vehicle was not approached; nor was the Appellee asked to exit the vehicle, until after Officer Koenig had also witnessed the frantic activity of the Appellee in his vehicle, suggesting he was then hiding something. A court inquiring into the validity of a Terry stop must use a wide lens and survey the totality of the circumstances. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8, 109 S.Ct. 1581. Thus, considering the totality of the circumstances, we believe Officer Koenig had reasonable and articuable suspicion of criminal activities afoot, sufficient to justify his search in this instance, even limiting the evidence as argued by Appellee.