Opinion ID: 216541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice Claim

Text: First, Herren argues that the district court deprived her of counsel of choice, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, when it refused to grant her motion to continue the suppression hearing. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (describing the Sixth Amendment right of a defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him). Herren bases her argument on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006). In Gonzalez-Lopez, the Supreme Court held that when a court wrongly denies a defendant counsel of choice, the error is structural and, thus, not subject to harmless error analysis. Id. at 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557. As the Government explains, however, Gonzalez-Lopez does not address the particular question that Herren raises whether the district court erred by not granting a continuance so that Bustamante could be admitted pro hac vice to represent her. Concerning that question, this Court has offered previous guidance. In United States v. Flanders, we observed that, in reviewing the district court's denial of a continuance to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel, the court must balanc[e] the defendant's constitutional right to retain counsel of . . . choice against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility, the public's confidence in the integrity of the judicial process and the orderly administration of justice. 491 F.3d 1197, 1216 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In striking that balance, we consider whether: 1) the continuance would inconvenience witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; 2) other continuances have been granted; 3) legitimate reasons warrant a delay; 4) the defendant's actions contributed to the delay; 5) other competent counsel is prepared to try the case; 6) rejecting the request would materially prejudice or substantially harm the defendant's case; 7) the case is complex; and 8) any other case-specific factors necessitate or weigh against further delay. Id. We review the district court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. In Flanders, a defendant filed a fourth motion to continue his trial after receiving funds that would enable him to retain an attorney. Id. at 1215. The district court denied the motion for a continuance because of the age of the case and the substantial likelihood that [the] Defendant would make an eleventh-hour plea for another continuance. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion, this Court explained, Due to the scheduling burdens of the district courts, assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at the same time necessitates that broad discretion . . . be granted [to] trial courts on matters of continuances; only an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay violates the right to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 1216 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Herren's motion for a continuance. First, Herren waited until the day before the suppression hearing to file the motion for continuance. As a result, just as in Flanders, a continuance would have inconvenienced witnesses, the court, counsel, and the parties. Second, Herren failed to establish legitimate reasons that would warrant a delay. While Herren explained that she wanted the continuance in order to retain Bustamante as her attorney, she did not offer a reason for why she waited until a day before the scheduled suppression hearing to ask for the continuance. Three months passed between the time of Herren's arrest and the hearing, during which she could have retained Bustamante instead of waiting until one day before the suppression hearing. Finally, Bustos was prepared to represent Herren at the suppression hearing. Bustos cross-examined the Government's witnesses at the hearing and gave a closing argument. This shows that other competent counsel was available to represent Herren. [3] We cannot conclude that this was an unreasoning and arbitrary insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion, and the denial of Herren's motion to continue the suppression hearing did not violate her Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice. [4]