Opinion ID: 1985260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: improvident transfer act

Text: [¶ 11] The Improvident Transfer Act, 33 M.R.S.A. §§ 1021-1025, protects elderly individuals against making transfers of property as a result of undue influence. It establishes a statutory presumption of undue influence when an elderly dependent person transfers property to another person in the context of a confidential or fiduciary relationship for less than full consideration. See 33 M.R.S.A. § 1022. [1] [¶ 12] The applicability of the Improvident Transfer Act must be examined, because if its statutory presumption should have been available to Groton, it would have shifted the burden of proof on the undue influence claim. Sylvester could have raised the statutory presumption of undue influence had he brought an improvident transfer action while he was living. [2] The issue is whether Groton, as personal representative of Sylvester's estate, was entitled to bring an improvident transfer claim on behalf of the estate. [¶ 13] Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. Dep't of Human Servs. ex rel. Hampson v. Hager, 2000 ME 140, ¶ 20, 756 A.2d 489, 493. When interpreting a statute we first look at the plain meaning of the statutory language seeking to give effect to the legislative intent. See Stromberg-Carlson Corp. v. State Tax Assessor, 2001 ME 11, ¶ 9, 765 A.2d 566. We consider the whole statutory scheme for which the section at issue forms a part so that a harmonious result, presumably the intent of the Legislature, may be achieved. Id. [¶ 14] Looking at the plain meaning of the Improvident Transfer Act, section 1023 states that [a] civil action may be brought to obtain relief under this chapter by an elderly dependent person or that person's legal representative. Groton contends that the words that person's legal representative includes a representative of the estate. Although legal representative is not defined by the statute, personal representative is generally defined in the Probate Code as including an executor, administrator, successor personal representative, special administrator, and persons who perform substantially the same function under the law governing their status. 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-201 (1998). The use of the term legal representative rather than personal representative suggests that the Legislature intended to permit only legal representatives of living individuals to bring claims under the Improvident Transfer Act. [¶ 15] The legislative history supports this interpretation. The words by an elderly dependent person or that person's legal representative, were added to the law in 1989. Addressing the amendment, the statement of fact indicated who it intended to include and exclude: Title 33, section 1023, subsection 1, clarifies that only an elderly dependent person may bring suit under this law. This change makes it clear that the 3rd parties, such as relatives who stand to inherit from an elderly dependent person, have no standing to sue. It also allows legal representatives of an elderly dependent person, such as a guardian, conservator, guardian ad litem or agent under a power of attorney, to bring suit on behalf of the elderly dependent person. L.D. 745, Statement of Fact (114th Legis.1989). A personal representative can assert causes of action, on behalf of the estate, which accrued during the decedent's lifetime. In contrast, a guardian, conservator, guardian ad litem, or agent under a power of attorney, are all legal representatives acting on behalf of living individuals presently in need of assistance. The statement of fact indicates that the legislative intent was to allow a legal representative to pursue an improvident transfer claim where the elderly person is unable to bring suit on their own because of their dependency. [¶ 16] The statement of fact for the legislation which became the present Improvident Transfer Act describes the harm resulting from improvident transfers which the Act was intended to remedy: At the time the transfer was made, it may have appeared to have been a means of qualifying for Medicaid or satisfying a need for lifelong care. It often turns out that none of these goals are met and that the elderly individual is left without any security with which to face old age. L.D. 2204, Statement of Fact (113th Legis.1987). This statement also reveals that the aim of the statute was to provide for the welfare of the living elderly. Thus, the Probate Court did not err in finding that the Act clearly reflects an intention on the part of the Legislature to provide elderly Maine residents with an immediate legal remedy during their lifetime in the event of an improvident transfer of any of their assets. [¶ 17] The Probate Court's interpretation of the Improvident Transfer Act does not contravene the survivorship statutes, 18-A M.R.S.A. §§ 3-703(c) [3] and 3-817 [4] (1998). Groton claims that she qualifies as a personal representative of a decedent under section 3-703(c). However, a prerequisite for her qualification is that the action survive the death of the decedent. If an Improvident Transfer Act action, with its burden shifting feature, is interpreted to survive death, many perfectly valid transfers of real estate and personal property could be challenged by unhappy heirs, for up to six years after a decedent's death, [5] by a cause of action which the legislative history explicitly stated should be denied to the heirs during the decedent's life. [6] The Legislature could not have intended such a result. A proceeding under the Improvident Transfer Act is not maintainable pursuant to the survivorship statutes. [¶ 18] The improvident transfer statute continues to allow heirs or devisees to seek common law remedies, as noted in 33 M.R.S.A. § 1023. [7] Those who believe that undue influence has been exerted upon a deceased elderly individual may bring a common law claim of undue influence, such as was plead and decided on the merits here. A remedy therefore remains available to such claimants. However, the cause of action under the Improvident Transfer Act expires upon the death of the elderly person. Consequently, the Probate Court did not err in deciding that the improvident transfer statute was inapplicable to the present case.