Opinion ID: 1201276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for New Trial and Request for Evidentiary Hearing

Text: We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion for a new trial and the denial of an evidentiary hearing on a motion for a new trial. United States v. Begnaud, 848 F.2d 111, 113 (8th Cir.1988). We have held that a district court may rule on a motion for a new trial based only on affidavits and that an evidentiary hearing may not be necessary if the judge who ruled on the post-trial motion also presided at trial and, therefore, had a prior opportunity to consider the veracity of the purportedly recanting witness. See, e.g., id. (The necessity for a hearing is lessened in cases involving challenged testimony where the trial judge has had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and weigh the credibility of the witness at trial.); United States v. Baker, 479 F.3d 574, 579 (8th Cir.2007) (affirming a denial of an evidentiary hearing and relying, in part, on the fact that motion judge had been trial judge); United States v. Provost, 969 F.2d 617, 619 (8th Cir.1992) (same). We have not held, however, that the presence of the motion judge at trial should be our sole consideration. Rather, [t]here may be exceptional circumstances in which an oral hearing should be granted. United States v. Ward, 544 F.2d 975, 976 (8th Cir.1976) (per curiam). When reviewing district courts' decisions as to the necessity of evidentiary hearings on motions for new trials, we have relied upon a number of factors. Some of these factors include: the importance of the purportedly recanting witness in obtaining the conviction; the existence of evidence corroborating either the conviction or the recantation; the potential trauma to an abused minor of having to re-testify; the temporal proximity of the trial testimony and the purported recantation; the consistency of the recantation with the witness's comments and behavior before, during, and after trial; and the existence of evidence of outside influence suggesting either coerced testimony or coerced recantation. See, e.g., Baker, 479 F.3d at 579 (finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of an evidentiary hearing where a witness recanted between trial and sentencing, but the witness's trial testimony was relatively unimportant to the defendant's conviction); United States v. Gayles, 1 F.3d 735, 737-38 (8th Cir.1993) (finding no abuse of discretion in the denial of a hearing in a kidnaping case where the recanting victim-witness married the defendant after the trial, the victim's testimony was not crucial to the conviction, and the victim's recantation was contrary to the testimony of eyewitnesses who had seen the defendant beat the victim-witness and force her into his car); Provost, 969 F.2d at 619 (finding no abuse of discretion where the trial judge had observed a victim-witness who purportedly recanted four years after trial and who had continued to talk of her abuse throughout those four years such that her post-trial statements largely buttressed, rather than detracted from, her trial testimony). Here, we believe a hearing was necessary. Defendant's conviction for the sexual assault of A.P. rested solely on A.P.'s testimony, which the AUSA elicited largely through the use of leading questions. Further, no physical evidence corroborated A.P.'s trial testimony. Although we sustain this evidence as sufficient to support the conviction, there can be little dispute that this evidence was only minimally sufficient. It is difficult to imagine a case where the testimony of a purportedly recanting witness could have factored more largely into a defendant's underlying conviction. We note also that A.P.'s purported recantation occurred mere days after trial, and defense counsel as well as the AUSA claim to have heard A.P.'s recantation and the mother's report of the recantation on separate occasions. Further, while A.P.'s trial testimony was consistent with her pre-trial statements to counselors, there is no indication that she maintained her version of the facts following trial. This is not a case like Provost, where years passed between trial and recantation and where the witness maintained her version of the facts following trial. The government asserts that no hearing was required because this is a clear case of improper influence by Defendant over A.P. and her mother. Cf., United States v. Rouse, 410 F.3d 1005, 1009 (8th Cir.2005) (finding victim-witnesses' recantations noncredible following a four-day evidentiary hearing based on the fact that medical evidence corroborated the victims' trial testimony and based on the fact that relatives who disbelieved the victims' testimony had custody of the victims between trial and prior to the recantations and exerted influence over the victims during that time). In particular, the government asserts that Defendant held sway over A.P.'s mother during the time period following trial, called A.P.'s home over seventy times from the jail, and bribed A.P.'s mother with the purchase of a vehicle. Such behavior, if demonstrated, would be relevant to the veracity of, and motivations for, the purported recantation. The evidence cited by the government, however, was not before the district court when the court ruled on the motion. While an evidentiary hearing may well prove the government correct in its assertion that Defendant exerted improper influence by over A.P. and her mother, we do not believe attorney representations as to this issue are a sufficient grounds for denying a hearing. Here, the post-trial record consisted solely of attorney representations regarding the purported recantation. These representations paint a confusing and inconsistent picture, yet the district court accepted each attorney's representations in ruling on the motion. Given the factors cited above, in particular, the importance of A.P.'s testimony to the conviction and the absence of corroborating evidence, we believe an evidentiary hearing was required. [1] The judgment of the district court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings as discussed herein.