Opinion ID: 1858107
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gubernatorial Commutation and Pardon Powers/Assignment of Error 1

Text: Defendant argues the trial court committed reversible error when it advised various jury panels during voir dire on the commutation and pardon powers of the governor. The record reveals the trial judge referred to the governor's commutation and pardon powers during voir dire of various sub-panels on seven occasions. First, in response to a question by a potential juror as to the certainty that a defendant sentenced to life in prison would actually remain in prison for that length of time, the trial judge responded: Judge: Yes, ma'am. I'm glad you asked that question. I usually remember to tell you all and I forgot. In Louisiana, when a person is sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, that's basically what it means. No probation, no parole, the sentence can't be suspended. You don't get good time, if you've ever heard of that. You do life imprisonment unless the governor were to pardon you or commute your sentence. I don't know how often that happens. I can't give you numbers, but in my life time, since I've been doing this, I don't remember it happening very often, if at all in a first degree murder case. So, yes, in effect, if somebody is sentenced to life imprisonment in Louisiana, it's not like a lot of states where life means that you are eligible for parole after a certain number of years and that kind of thing. It's not like that. Basically, you would probably die in prison. Jurors Rauschkolb and Robin were the only members of the panel which heard this comment who were ultimately seated. The second comment came as the judge was instructing a sub-panel: Judge: Now, life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, basically, means that in Louisiana. A lot of states, a lot of places you read where you see somebody is sentenced to twenty-five to life or they are sentenced to a life imprisonment and then you'll read in some little writing down there under it that says that means that they will be eligible for parole in twenty-five years or fifteen years, or something like that. That doesn't happen in Louisiana. If you are sentenced to life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, then that's what it means. You don't get to be put on probation. You don't get a chance to be put on parole. You don't get a chance to have your sentence suspended. You don't even getif you're familiar with ityou don't even get good time, which means you douhfor every one day in prison you do, they knock off a day. You don't get anything like that if you're convicted and sentenced under that statute. The only way that you could get out of jail before you were to die in prison would be if the governor were to pardon you or commute your sentence to a certain number of years, which would then make you eligible to be put on probationuhI mean, parole at some point. Juror Sanders was the only member of the panel which heard this comment who was ultimately seated. The third reference by the trial judge to the governor's power to pardon or commute a life sentence was made in response to a request by defense counsel: Def.: Okay, now does anybody have a problem with what, I don't, I don't, with what a life sentence means? That is at some point you've got to balance. You've got two things out there. One of `em is death and we know what that is, assuming that it's imposed and we had better assume that it's imposed; the other one is a life sentence. Uhwe asked you all these questions on a form about life sentence, becauseuh Def.: I'm going to ask the judge. Didn't you talk to this group, judge? Court: I don't know whether I told this group or not, but I think I did. Def.: You did. Court: What life imprisonment means is life imprisonment and there isn't any way to get out. There's only one way and that's if the governor were to pardon you or commute your sentence. And I will also sayuhfor Mr. Perez's [defense counsel] benefit, but I don't know that I've ever seen that happen, since I've been doing this, on a first degree murder case. Def.: All right, now, for you see we have to know. If we think we're balancing death on one hand against five years on the other hand, you know, then that's going to be one decision to make. On the other hand, death against a real serious life in prison sentence is another whole different story. Do you agree with that? Juror: (Mr. Howard nodded his head.) Def.: Because I don't want anyonewhat I don't want anyone doing is going into the jury room and voting death because they think a person is going to get a lenient sentence because of publicity on the way things used to be done before we had a bad crime problem or maybe the way they're done in another state, huh? That, that's why we asked the judge to talk to you all about what's happening now in Louisiana, okay? Juror: (Mr. Howard nodded his head.) Juror Tabor was the only member of the panel which heard this comment who was ultimately seated. The fourth instance was also precipitated by defense counsel: Def.: And while I'm on that, if you noticed on the forms that we had you fill out, we asked what was your guess about what life imprisonment was. And the reason why we did that was that people have uhsome misperceptions about what life imprisonment is today in Louisiana, as opposed to even what used to be in Louisiana, twenty years ago before our crime problem got as bad as it is and, and the laws started getting tougher and tougher. Or what it is, is, maybe, in California and so the judgeuhI'm going to ask the judge to explain it to you because what we don't want is to have a person going into the jury room balancing these two, you know, you have to choose between one or the other. You know what one is if you give it. But if you think the other one is five years, then you know, you are not going to let the person walk out of the room with five years, huh? And so I don't want someone on just a misapprehension of what the penalty isthe real impact of the penalty is to give a person death and then any of us find out after the trial that it was a really serious penalty. So I'm going to ask the judge to go into that with you for a moment, huh? Court: Ladies and gentlemen, in the uhfirst degree murder statute it says one of the verdicts that can be returned is life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. And, basically, that means just that. In Louisiana, you don't get good; you don't get a shortened sentence for uha life in prison sentence. If you are sentenced to life imprisonment, basically, it means you'll be there the rest of your life unless the governor pardons you or commutes your sentence. And as long as I've been doing this, for fifteen years or so, I don't think I've ever seen the governor pardon a first degree murderer. So, basically, what I'm telling you is I think that a person would die in prison or get so sick at some point, you know, seventy or eighty years old or whatever, they may let him out somehow at that point. But it would mean, basically, a life imprisonment sentence. It doesn't mean that there is some way for him to get out in a short period of time. Some states have short sentences, like twenty-five to life and they're eligible for parole after a certain amount of time. We don't do that in Louisiana on a life sentence. ... Def.: This is, this is what I wanted you all to know. Because ityou can't go in there with a misperception of the balancingin, inwhen you're in the jury room on these two sentences. Alternate juror Arceneaux was the only member of the panel which heard this comment who was ultimately seated. In addition to the above four instances, there were three other times the issue of the governor's commutation power arose; however, no juror who was ultimately seated heard any of the following discussions. We include them, however, to further illustrate the defense counsel's desire that the issue be raised by the trial judge with the prospective jurors. At one point, a prospective juror asked the judge whether life in prison meant exactly that, to which the judge responded, Well, there is one way to get out, and that's the governor's pardon. But there is not any other way, like good time or parole or something like that. In another instance, defense counsel was questioning a prospective juror about why she believed a life sentence would result in a defendant's serving only 7 years. Defense counsel was concerned the prospective juror would be balancing life againstdeath against seven years in deliberating the death penalty. The woman was confused, and the prosecutor asked the court for an instruction that life means life. The judge then gave a short instruction, similar to the ones quoted above, regarding the nature of a life sentence. Finally, the judge gave a similar instruction to another sub-panel, because Mr. Perez is so apt to point [it] out, and the judge wanted to go ahead and take the burden away from him. Initially, we note the record reveals defense counsel solicited many of these instructions. Additionally, when defense counsel did not request the instruction, he indicated his acquiescence in it by failing to object. Indeed, because defendant conceded guilt, a primary defense strategy during voir dire was to insure the jurors understood a life sentence in this case (1) would place defendant in prison for life subject only to the very limited exception of the governor's pardon power and (2) would adequately serve to protect society. Unlike the typical case, where a judge's or prosecutor's remarks emphasize the possibility of a reduction of a life sentence, perhaps leading the jurors to believe only the death penalty would sufficiently protect society from defendant, the comments of the judge in the instant case only served to help the defense's voir dire strategy. The defense decided to precipitate discussion about the meaning of a sentence of life imprisonment in order to assure prospective jurors life meant life. [3] Thus, in defense counsel's words, when the jurors went to balance the two penalties, they would be given their proper meaning and weight. Defense counsel continued this line of questioning throughout voir dire. The tactic was clearly designed to convince jurors a life verdict would be a measured response, assuring the safety of society while punishing defendant with the harshest penalty short of death. The trial judge's remarks were of inestimable value to defendant. Further, to the extent defendant raised the issue with the desire that the judge convey to the jury the virtual certainty that defendant would serve out a life sentence without referring to the governor's power to pardon or commute, this would have constituted an erroneous statement of law, and the judge was not required to so restrict his definition of a life sentence. Additionally, only four of the jurors ultimately seated, and one alternate who did not participate in deliberations, heard any one of the complained-of comments by the trial judge in voir dire. The governor's power to commute a sentence or pardon a prisoner was not discussed at all by the State or the trial court during the guilt or penalty phases of this trial. Rather, the court instructed the jurors their decision was to now determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. In State v. Lindsey, 404 So.2d 466 (La. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 908, 104 S.Ct. 261, 78 L.Ed.2d 246 (1983), the defendant alleged it was error for the judge to give the jury an instruction on the governor's pardon power during jury deliberations. This court remanded for a new sentencing hearing, holding that conditions under which a person sentenced to life imprisonment without the benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence can be released at some time in the future are not a proper consideration for a capital sentencing jury and should not be discussed in the jury's presence. Lindsey, 404 So.2d at 487. We noted, however, it was possible for cases to arise in which this Court can conclude that a death penalty imposed after future remedial measures are discussed at the sentencing hearing is not reversible. Id. [4] That references made during the penalty phase to the possibility of a gubernatorial pardon, although impermissible, would not always require reversal came to pass in State v. Glass, 455 So.2d 659 (La.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1080, 105 S.Ct. 2159, 85 L.Ed.2d 514 (1985). Therein, the defendant called a former Director of Jails and Prisons to testify during the penalty phase as to how many defendants sentenced to life for murder had been pardoned. The prosecutor cross-examined the witness on whether it was the governor who had the final decision to pardon a defendant. This court held the references by the State did not require reversal under Lindsey because (1) the problematic comments occurred during cross-examination in the penalty phase and not in the closing argument; (2) the references came during cross-examination of a defense witness in response to questioning by defense counsel; (3) the defense opened the door on the subject and further pursued the topic; (4) defense counsel did not ask the court to caution the jurors and did not object; and (5) the information given the jury members fell far short of the damaging comments made in Lindsey. Glass, 455 So.2d at 668-69. Likewise, in State v. Williams, 490 So.2d 255 (La.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033, 107 S.Ct. 3277, 97 L.Ed.2d 780 (1987), the defendant objected to the district attorney's statements in his closing argument in the penalty phase which implied that perhaps the law could change and murderers sentenced to life would some day be released for work furloughs. This court found the reference did not constitute reversible error. [T]he fact that the possibility of release is discussed in the jury's presence does not mandate that the case be remanded for resentencing. A case should be remanded only when the discussion presents a genuine risk that the jury's attention will be deflected from the ultimate significance and finality of the penalty recommendation or misguide the jury's sentencing discretion by the introduction of inappropriate considerations. Williams, 490 So.2d at 263. In Williams, because the district attorney's comments were made in response to a statement by the defense that the defendant would not be eligible for furlough if sentenced to life in prison, it was the defendant who opened the door for the discussion of the topic by first referring to it in his closing argument. Id. Defendant relies on State v. Jones, 94-0459 (La.7/5/94), 639 So.2d 1144, and State v. Cousan, 94-2503 (La.11/25/96), 684 So.2d 382, to support his argument the trial court's references during voir dire to the gubernatorial pardon power constitute reversible error. In Jones, this court held unconstitutional an amendment to La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 which had mandated that trial courts charge capital jurors during the penalty phase relative to the governor's power to reprieve, pardon or commute punishment: The possible prejudicial effect of the instruction perniciously undermines the reliability of the capital sentencing hearing and the soundness of the process by which a jury arrives at the recommendation of death. It purposefully injects an irrelevant, arbitrary factor into the sentencing hearing risking speculation and chancing the recommendation of the death [penalty] from a capital jury lacking confidence in [the] governor's ability to wisely use the clemency power ... Injecting this arbitrary factor into the capital sentencing process undermines the fundamental fairness requisite for the capital hearing, a hearing which requires a greater degree of scrutiny due to the qualitative difference between the death penalty from other statutory punishments. Jones, 94-0459 at p. 13, 639 So.2d at 1153 (citation omitted). On November 18, 1995, however, the people of Louisiana voted to amend the Louisiana Constitution to allow for the enactment of a statute that would require trial courts to inform the jury of the governor's clemency power during the sentencing hearing. Defendant's trial herein was held May 8-15, 1995, and thus, at the time of trial, Jones, prohibiting the mandatory charge in the penalty phase, was still in effect. Consequently, the trial court was not required by statute to, and did not, charge the jury at the penalty phase on the governor's power to pardon, reprieve or commute. Even assuming the constitutional amendment allowing for a statute mandating such an instruction would not apply in a case where the trial took place prior to its enactment but the opinion on direct appeal was issued well after the passage of the amendment, see, e.g., Cousan, supra, we find Jones, and Lindsey for that matter, factually distinguishable from and inapplicable to the instant case. Unlike Jones and Lindsey, the objected-to comments were made during voir dire, many days before jury deliberations, and not during the penalty phase. They were made by the judge in response to prospective juror inquiries, to help clarify prospective jurors' positions at the request of the attorneys, and, in many cases, in response to defendant's requests for assistance. The defense did not object to or request different instructions. The comments were phrased not to emphasize the governor's power to pardon or the likelihood of an early release, but, instead, to impress upon the jury panels the improbability defendant would ever be released from prison if he received a life sentence. The judge's instructions could only have been of great benefit to the defense which was concerned the jury would be balancing death on the one hand against five years on the other hand. Indeed, the defense focused all of its resources on the penalty phase, given defendant's concession of guilt and the brutal, vicious, senseless nature of the crime. Its strategy, in order to protect defendant from the death penalty, was to emphasize to the jury in voir dire the improbability of defendant's release under a life sentence, i.e., that the only way a first degree murderer sentenced to life could be released would be by gubernatorial pardon or commutation, something which rarely occurred. Thus, in the context of the entire voir dire, the judge's comments did not deflect the jury's attention from the ultimate significance and finality of the penalty recommendation, did not prejudice defendant, and did not misguide the jury's sentencing discretion by the introduction of inappropriate considerations. This assignment of error lacks merit. In a sub-argument, defendant asserts the trial court erred when it instructed the jury defendant would be released from a life sentence without parole because of illness. However, only the alternate juror heard this comment. Any presumption of prejudice regarding this comment would be speculative at best, considering the alternate did not participate in any deliberations. This assignment also lacks merit.