Opinion ID: 2681015
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the delay was unreasonable?

Text: Next, we consider the proper approach for determining what amount of time constitutes an unreasonable and unjustified delay. Although there is no bright-line rule, the doctrine of laches and statutes of limitations have an intertwined relationship that we must consider as a first step in this portion of the analysis. This Court has recognized that, where appropriate, we should look to the General Assembly for guidance in determining what amount of time is reasonable. Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel Cnty., 338 Md. 75, 81, 656 A.2d 751, 754 (1995); see also Frederick Rd., 360 Md. at 117, 756 A.2d at 985 (“When a case involves concurrent legal and equitable remedies, ‘the applicable statute of limitations for the legal remedy is equally applicable to the equitable one.’”) (quoting Schaeffer, 338 Md. at 81, 656 A.2d at 754). We analyzed the principles for analogizing statutes of limitations to the equitable defense of laches in Schaeffer v. Anne Arundel County, 338 Md. 75, 656 A.2d 751 (1995). There, we stated: Choosing the applicable measure of impermissible delay for cases where an equitable remedy is sought is most straightforward in cases when there are concurrent legal and equitable remedies and the applicable statute of limitations for the legal remedy is equally applicable to the equitable one. Schaeffer, 338 Md. at 81, 656 A.2d at 754 (citing Rettaliata v. Sullivan, 208 Md. 617, 621, 119 A.2d 420, 422 (1956); Dugan v. Gittings, 3 Gill 138, 161-62 (1845)). Thus, 149 “[i]n most cases involving an exclusively equitable remedy, we refer to the limitations period for the cause of action at law most analogous to the one in equity.” Id. “The authorities indicate that even when the remedy for a claimed right is only in equity, the period of limitations most nearly apposite at law will be invoked by an equity court, provided there is not present a more compelling equitable reason-such as fraud or other inequitable conduct which would cause injustice if the bar were interposed-why the action should not be barred.” Id. (quoting Stevens v. Bennett, 234 Md. 348, 351, 199 A.2d 221, 223-24 (1964)). “Generally, if there is no action at law directly analogous to the action in equity, the three-year statute of limitations found in Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol., 1994 Cum. Supp.), § 5-101 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article[84] will be used as a guideline.” Schaeffer, 338 Md. at 82, 656 A.2d at 754 (citing Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. C.I. Mitchell & Best Co., 303 Md. 544, 562, 495 A.2d 30, 39 (1985)). For example, in Washington Suburban, a case in which developers brought an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the collection of a “System Expansion Offset Charge” (“SEOC”) imposed by the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (“WSSC”), we held that the proposed analogy was inappropriate. 303 Md. at 563, 495 A.2d at 39. In that case, the developer argued that the WSSC lacked the 84 Section 5-101 provides, A civil action at law shall be filed within three years from the date it accrues unless another provision of the Code provides a different period of time within which an action shall be commenced. Md. Code (1973, 2013 Repl. Vol.), Courts & Judicial Proceedings Art., § 5-101 (emphasis added). 150 authority to impose this new charge and, in the alternative, that even if the WSSC had such authority, the charge was unreasonable and void. The WSSC responded by asserting laches, and proposed “that the analogy be drawn [ ] to the 30 days provided by [Md. Code (1957, 1983 Repl. Vol., 1984 Cum. Supp.), Art. 29,] § 6-110(b),” 85 which provided a process for appealing certain actions of the WSSC to the Maryland Public Service Commission (“PSC”). Id. The Court rejected this proposal: That statute, however, applies to the special statutory remedy before the PSC while the issue now under consideration, WSSC's authority to adopt SEOC, is not subject to that special statutory remedy. Where, as here, the claim under consideration properly invokes the original jurisdiction of the circuit court, the analogy for laches should not be to a time limit for initiating a special statutory administrative remedy applicable to a different theory of the case. Id., 303 Md. at 563, 495 A.2d at 39. In this case, the State Agencies urge an analogy to the timeliness requirements in the Procurement Law’s Regulations. Title 21 of the Code of Maryland Regulations promulgates the State Procurement Regulations. COMAR 21.10.02.03B requires protests relating to the formation of a contract to be filed “no[] later than 7 days after the basis for protest is known or should have been known, whichever is earlier.” COMAR 21.10.02.03B. Before we confront the proffered analogy to the Procurement Law vel non, we conclude that, under the more generous analogy to the three-year statute of limitations, many of Appellees’ claims succumb to laches on that basis. The challenges to the 85 This statute was repealed by Acts 2010, c. 37, § 1, eff. Oct. 1, 2010. 151 selection of the Developers were justiciable by no later than 21 March 2006. Laches bars those claims because Appellees did not file their Original Complaint until 17 December 2010. The State was open and transparent with the entire “unique” procurement process. The local newspapers covered the matter extensively. If the announced process was illegal, Appellees could have—and should have—brought their complaints on that score to court sooner than they did. In regards to the second group (those claims arising from events or actions envisioned in either the RFQ or MDA and made actual in the MDA) and third group (those claims arising from events or actions that represented allegedly “material changes” from the MDA to the First Amendment), we consider whether the less generous analogy to COMAR 21.10.02.03B makes sense in the context of this case. We note first that a strict timeliness requirement is reasonable generally for protests of alleged procurement infractions, as the COMAR section makes evident. Procurements are issued for services or goods that the government needs. Once a submission is awarded for the project or the order for goods, both the awardee and the government proceed (presumably promptly) to expend time and resources on the completion of the procurement’s goal. Allowing an extended period for protests to be brought forth would hinder the government’s ability to obtain the needed item or service (and would increase costs for developers and contractors interested in government contracts). The question in this case, though, is whether the seven day statutory limit, which is appropriate for bid protests to the Appeals Board, is appropriate for importation by analogy here where the complainants are not entitled to protest the action in any administrative avenue. 152 In light of Washington Suburban, which held that the statutory limitation for an administrative remedy was not appropriate for a claim for which a circuit court had original jurisdiction, we decline here to adopt the direct analogy to the COMAR provision. Rather, adhering to the flexible nature of the laches doctrine, we conclude nonetheless that, at least in this case involving time-sensitive procurement issues, 86 the delay until 17 December 2010 to file suit was unreasonable and unjustified for both of the latter groups of claims. Such a conclusion fits comfortably within our taxpayer standing doctrine jurisprudence. Although the motive of a taxpayer bringing suit is immaterial to whether the complainant has standing, the motive is not immaterial as to the relief sought in taxpayer standing suits. As the Court stated in Konig v. City of Baltimore, 128 Md. 465, 97 A. 837 (1916): While under the decisions a Court of Equity may grant relief to a taxpayer even if it is not satisfied that he is acting in good faith, or is influenced by proper motives, yet when it is called upon to determine what relief it will grant the plaintiff, there is no reason why the court should be compelled to shut its eyes and not see what the real facts are. This court refused to grant to Kelly, Piet & Co. any relief, although they were taxpayers as well as bidders, because it was really a controversy between 86 We recognize that some federal courts have adopted a per se rule with respect to the application of laches to claims arising out of time-sensitive issues involving elections, for example. See Ross v. State Bd. of Elections, 387 Md. 649, 671, 876 A.2d 692, 705 (2005) (citing Fulani v. Hogsett, 917 F.2d 1028, 1031 (7th Cir. 1990); Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1980); MacGovern v. Connolly, 637 F. Supp. 111, 115 (D. Mass. 1986); Barthelmes v. Morris, 342 F. Supp. 153, 160–61 (D. Md. 1972)). Similar to our conclusion in Ross, however, we need not decide here whether any per se rule should apply because the doctrine of laches is a flexible doctrine and, moreover, “[t]here may be situations in which such a rule would be inappropriate.” Id. 153 rival tradesmen for the custom of the city. [Kelly v. Mayor of Baltimore, 53 Md. 134 (1880).] Notwithstanding what we have said, the appellant claims to appear in this court for the purpose of protecting himself and other taxpayers from loss, but no other taxpayer has within the two years since the bill was filed asked to be made a party. The board of awards cannot be censured for endeavoring to save the city money in awarding the contract, if they believed they were complying with the charter. No other motive is suggested, and, when we remember of whom the board is composed, no improper motive will be presumed. Every principle of justice would prohibit an individual or a private corporation from profiting by such a mistake affecting an honest contractor, by keeping the fruits of the mistake without paying for them, and, while the rules of law applicable to officers of municipal corporations are different from those governing private corporations, it would not be regarded by the public, for whose benefit such rules have been adopted, as just to deprive a contractor of all compensation for work done and accepted by the city under such circumstances as exist in this case. 128 Md. at 478, 97 A. at 841 (emphasis added). Similarly, in this case, when analyzing what constitutes an unreasonable delay, we note that significant motivations of Appellees appear to be a “desire to stave off competition.” Their initial objections to the Project stemmed from the selection of the Master Developer, which was announced publicly by Governor Ehrlich on 21 March 2006, more than three years prior to Appellees’ filing of the Original Complaint. That they alleged additional violations should not save their complaint for equitable relief based on taxpayer standing. If the First Amendment’s “material” changes, which were approved and executed in September 2010, were the first stage of the alleged violations, we might be more likely to find reasonable the short time period between September 2010 and December 2010. Equity is not limited, however, to such a tunneled vision of 154 the circumstances. Instead, we are permitted to weigh all the facts. In doing so, the motivations of the parties matter and indicate that Appellees’ delay in bringing their claims was unreasonable and unjustified.