Opinion ID: 197760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the challenged conspiracy conviction

Text: Conspiracy Count. 1 Two of the overt acts charged that in the spring of 1991 Henry, after receiving laboratory data showing contamination of the soils, either by cadmium or iron, caused the soils to be transported to Beede. One shipment of 243 tons came from a site in Lawrence, Massachusetts and the other shipment of 250 tons came from the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine. -4- The conspiracy count, charged under 18 U.S.C. 371, alleged that Henry and LaFlamme conspired knowingly to transport and cause to be transported hazardous waste to a facility that did not have interim status and a permit to accept hazardous waste in violation of 42 U.S.C. 6928 (d)(l).2 The indictment defined hazardous waste by reference to the substances and materials listed or identified in Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 261 and further alleged that under the regulation, any waste containing concentrations of lead in excess of 5 parts per million or cadmium in excess of l part per million using appropriate test methods is a hazardous waste. The jury instructions relative to the conspiracy charge defined the offense of causing hazardous wastes to be transported to an unpermitted facility as requiring the following elements: 2 Section 6928(d)(l) provides: (d) Criminal penalties (d) Criminal penalties Any person who-- (1) knowingly transports or causes to be transported any hazardous waste identified or listed under this subchapter to a facility which does not have a permit under this subchapter, . . . . . . . shall, upon conviction, be subject to a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation, or imprisonment not to exceed two years (five years in the case of a violation of paragraph (1) or (2)), or both. . . . -5- First, that the defendant transported or caused to be transported hazardous waste to a facility that was not authorized to receive such waste; and Second, that the defendant knew that the material transported was hazardous and that the facility that received the waste was not authorized to receive such waste. Then, over the defendant's timely objection, the court defined hazardous waste as follows: Solid waste qualifies as hazardous waste if using the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure, TCLP, extract from a representative sample of the solid waste contains lead in concentrations greater than five parts per million or cadmium in concentrations greater than one part per million. (Emphasis added). The appellant couples the challenge to the definition of hazardous waste with the claim that the trial court improperly participated in the direct examination of the government witness Michael Wimsatt, a regulatory inspector with NHDES in the hazardous waste program. First, we observe that the court's definitional instruction as to what constitutes hazardous waste was correct as a matter of law. The government bears the burden of establishing that the defendant knew that the materials transported constituted hazardous waste. The Congress has delegated to the Administrator of the EPA the responsibility for listing the types and characteristics of substances considered to be hazardous wastes. 42 U.S.C. 6921(b). The ensuing regulation, found at 40 C.F.R. 261.3, provides that soil is a hazardous waste if it -6- exhibits any of the characteristics of hazardous waste identified in Subpart C. Subpart C includes the characteristic of toxicity. 40 C.F.R. 261.24 introduces the Toxicity Characteristic Leaching Procedure (TCLP) as a means of testing for toxicity and provides that when this testing procedure shows that the waste contains any of the contaminants listed in table l at a concentration equal to or greater than the respective value given in the table, then the waste, by definition, constitutes hazardous waste. The table located at 40 C.F.R. 261.24(a) dictates that the regulatory limit for lead is 5 mg/L (or 5 parts per million) and the corresponding regulatory limit for cadmium is l mg/L (or l part per million). In the conference conducted by the district court prior to finalizing the jury instructions, counsel for the defendant argued that it should be left for the jury to determine if soils shipped contained hazardous waste without the benefit of the challenged definition. Defendant's counsel also disputed the delegation by the Congress to the EPA Director to promulgate regulations defining hazardous wastes and argued that because there had been changes in those regulations as to what constituted levels of toxicity, that an individual such as the defendant should not suffer criminal liability in such a setting. Defendant's argument is grounded in the nondelegation doctrine, which provides that Congress may not delegate its legislative power to another branch of the government. See U.S. Const. art. -7- I, 1 (All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States.). The district court responded to the improper delegation argument by reliance on Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 165 (1991), for the proposition that the delegation of legislative power to another branch of the government is permissible as long as Congress sets forth an intelligible principle to which the executive or judicial branch must conform. In Touby, the Supreme Court upheld Congress' delegation of the power to define criminal conduct to the Attorney General as constitutionally permissible. The Court held that Congress does not violate the Constitution merely because it legislates in broad terms, leaving a certain degree of discretion to executive or judicial actors. So long as Congress 'lay[s] down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.' Touby, supra, at 165, quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409, 48 S. Ct. 38, 352, 72 L.Ed. 624 (1928). The Touby Court then upheld the Controlled Substances Act at issue in that case on the ground that Congress had in fact set forth an intelligible principle which meaningfully constrained the Attorney General's discretion to define criminal conduct. The Court discussed several factors that rendered the statute constitutional: (1) requiring the Attorney General to determine that the expedited procedure is necessary to avoid an -8- imminent hazard to the public safety, (2) specifying the factors that the Attorney General must consider in making such a determination; and (3) requiring publication of a 30-day notice of the proposed scheduling and consideration of any comments from the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Touby, supra, at 166. We approve the district court's reliance on Touby in the instant case, and hold that the delegation by Congress to the EPA of the legislative authority to define hazardous waste was permissible given the fact that there existed several constraints upon the EPA's exercise of this authority that are similar to the constraints found to be determinative of constitutionality in Touby. First of all, we note that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act sets forth a detailed procedure with which the EPA must comply before it may exercise this legislative power and list the types and characteristics of hazardous waste. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. 6921(a) requires the EPA to first provide notice and the opportunity for public hearing on the issue of what precisely are the characteristics of hazardous waste, and further requires the EPA to consult with appropriate Federal and State agencies on this definitional issue. See Touby, supra, at 166 (delegation of legislative power to executive constitutional in part due to requirement that executive consider comments from other authorities). Secondly, in addition to requiring the EPA to comply with these procedural steps, the statute specifies certain factors that the EPA must consider in developing the criteria: -9- the Administrator shall. . . develop and promulgate criteria for identifying the characteristics of hazardous waste, . . . taking into account toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous characteristics. 42 U.S.C. 6921(a). See Touby, supra, at 166 (holding specification of three factors that the executive is required to consider constrains executive's legislative power and renders delegation constitutional). Furthermore, besides this detailed process for establishing the criteria to be used in identifying hazardous waste, the statute also constrains the EPA's discretion by listing specific characteristics which the statute directs shall be subject to the provisions of this subchapter solely because of the presence in such wastes of certain constituents (such as identified carcinogens, mutagens, or teratagens) at levels in excess of levels which endanger human health. 42 U.S.C. 6921(b)(1). In sum, we find no fault with the challenged definition. In fact, the district court in this case was sensitive to the knowledge component of the government's proof and the defendant's contention that he believed the soils in question did not constitute hazardous waste, and therefore instructed the jury on a good faith defense.3 3 The jury was instructed as to the defense of good faith with respect to the conspiracy count as follows: -10- B. The Questioning of Wimsatt by the District Court. The defendant combined his objection to the definition with an objection to the court's questioning of Michael Wimsatt, a regulatory inspector with the NHDES in its hazardous waste program. The court engaged in the following colloquy with Wimsatt that featured the toxicity characteristic leaching procedure: THE COURT: And the TCLP test uses water as the [leachate], right? WIMSATT: It's a water solution. It has some acid in it, obviously, and it has whatever contaminants, but it's still relatively dilute and it's essentially a water solution, that's right. THE COURT: Is it fair to say, then, with a TCLP test, something expressed as five milligrams per liter, could also be expressed as five parts per million? WIMSATT: Yes, that's correct, that's right. So we have a limit set under TCLP that says when you get an extract from our sample, it can't have more than five parts per million of lead in it, and if it does, it's going to be considered a hazardous waste. If the defendant had a good faith belief that Beede was authorized to transport the waste to its facility, he is not guilty of the crime of conspiracy even if it turns out that that belief was wrong. The burden of proving good faith does not rest with the defendant because the defendant does not have an obligation to prove anything in this case. It is the government's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of conspiracy. -11- The defendant's counsel first objected to the above questioning of Wimsatt during the jury charge conference, and when asked by the court what remedy did counsel propose, the response was to delete the hazardous waste definitional paragraph from the jury charge. The district judge declined, properly we hold, and observed that he had the authority pursuant to Evidence Rule 614 (b)4 to question witnesses and had done so to assist the jurors. Specifically, the district court opined: THE COURT: All right. I decline to do that for the reasons that I've outlined. Let me just note I think this issue of questioning of witnesses by the Court is a very important and - important matter that has to be handled carefully by the Court. Clearly, Rule 614(b) allows the Court to question witnesses. In a trial like this where I think much of the evidence has been confusing and concerns technical matters, terms that involve jargon, I think it is important where counsel does not ask questions clearly for the Court to clarify undefined terms, and therefore I have asked questions during the trial to that end. I think it's also important for me since - in order to protect the defendant's rights, that I understand the import of something that is being testified to. The jury has to make findings of fact here ultimately in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence, but I have to pass on motions that deal with evidentiary sufficiency; such as, Rule 29 motions. If I don't understand a particular point of testimony, I can't do my job with respect to a Rule 29 motion. So I feel it's important for me to ask questions when I don't understand some testimony and when the jury may potentially not understand testimony. I 4 This rule states that [t]he court may interrogate witnesses, whether called by itself or by a party. Fed. R. Evid. 614(b). -12- try to do it as little as possible, and I try my best not in any way to indicate in any sense that I'm taking sides. I also have in my jury instructions an instruction to the jury that they should not give any greater weight to the testimony of a witness in answer to my questions simply because the questions have come from me, and I have reiterated for the jury the fact that I am neutral, impartial and doesn't - don't have a stake in this case, and I don't believe that I've in any way adversely affected the defendant's right to a fair trial here by my questions. So I think the premise of your request is flawed, and I decline to grant the instruction that you propose. Transcript of Day 8 at p. 41. We agree with the district court that his questioning in this case was permissible. Initially, we note that the First Circuit recognizes the well-settled rule that the trial judge has a perfect right to participate in the trial and to question witnesses. United States v. Gonz lez-Soberal, 109 F.2d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 1997). The limitations placed on this right are that the judge's questioning must be balanced; he cannot become an advocate or otherwise use his judicial powers to advantage or disadvantage a party unfairly. Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir. 1997). An inquiry into the judge's conduct of the trial necessarily turns on the question of whether the complaining party can show serious prejudice. Id. In the instant case, our review of the transcript reveals that the judge's questioning of Wimsatt was nothing more that the sort of occasional efforts to clarify testimony that -13- falls squarely within the scope of the district judge's right and responsibility to manage the progress of the trial. See Logue, supra, at 1045. Furthermore, we hold that any possible risk of prejudice to Henry as a result of the judge's questions was abated by the clear instruction to the jury that it should ignore any impression that his questions might have made on them. In conclusion, the trial transcript clearly demonstrates that the key issue on the conspiracy count was whether the defendant knew the soils constituted hazardous waste and his good faith defense was anchored in his assertion that he did not believe the soils constituted hazardous waste. We further hold that the district court's decision to define hazardous waste in the context of the indictment and the C.F.R. regulations, rather than offer no assistance to the jury on the question of what constitutes hazardous waste, as suggested by defendant's counsel, was proper, and in any event, in the setting of this case, clearly not prejudicial to the defendant.