Opinion ID: 1683460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: scope of review on appeal

Text: What is the scope of review on appeal from a finding by the trial judge that the state has given a satisfactory neutral explanation? This, too, is a question of first impression. In Batson, the Court stated that [w]e have confidence that trial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. In Batson, the Court, in footnotes 20 and 21, discussed how it had handled similar cases involving claims of discrimination, and the weight to be given court findings: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit observed in McCray v. Abrams, 750 F.2d [1113] at 1132 [(2d Cir.1984)], that `[t]here are any number of bases' on which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a juror who is not excusable for cause. As we explained in another context, however, the prosecutor must give a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1096, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). In a recent Title VII sex discrimination case, we stated that `a finding of intentional discrimination is a finding of fact' entitled to appropriate deference by a reviewing court. Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985). Since the trial judge's findings in the context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference. Id., at 573, 105 S.Ct. at 1511. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1723, 1724. In Jackson, this Court said that the trial court must use its discretion in determining whether the prosecutor's reasons are adequate. In view of the statements made both in Batson and Jackson, we believe that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly held that [w]e may only reverse the trial judge's determination that the prosecution's peremptory challenges were not motivated by intentional discrimination if that determination is clearly erroneous, citing United States v. Mathews, 803 F.2d 325, 330 (7th Cir.1986). The Court of Criminal Appeals, applying this standard of review, concluded: We find that the trial court's treatment of Branch's motions and its ruling were proper, for the prosecution's explanations for its strikes were neutral, clear and reasonably specific, legitimate, and related to the outcome of the case. After considering all the relevant circumstances, as the trial court did, we also conclude that Branch failed to carry his ultimate burden of proving discriminatory selection of the petit jury; thus, we cannot say that the court's ruling was `clearly erroneous.' After reviewing the same record as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, we do not come to the same conclusion, at this time. [13]