Opinion ID: 1101396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: MTCA Statute of Limitations

Text: ¶ 18. The Legislature passed into law the MTCA in 1993 to carve out a limited waiver of immunity for the State and its political subunits. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-1 et seq. (Supp.1998). The immunity is limited to specific claims confined to a certain period of time with significant limits on the measure of damages that can be recovered. Id. ¶ 19. The MTCA contains a mandatory notice provision and a one (1) year statute of limitations in § 11-46-11 which reads in relevant part: (1) After all procedures within a governmental entity have been exhausted, any person having a claim for injury arising under the provisions of this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee shall proceed as he might in any action at law or in equity; provided, however, that ninety (90) days prior to maintaining an action thereon, such person shall file a notice of claim with the chief executive officer of the governmental entity.... (2) The notice of claim required by subsection (1) of this section shall be in writing, delivered in person or by registered or certified United States mail ... (3) All actions brought under the provisions of this chapter shall be commenced within one (1) year next after the date of the tortious, wrongful or otherwise actionable conduct on which the liability phase of the action is based, and not after; provided, however, that the filing of a notice of claim as required by subsection (1) of this section shall serve to toll the statute of limitations for a period of ninety-five (95) days. The limitations period provided herein shall control and shall be exclusive in all actions subject to and brought under provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the nature of the claim, the label or other characterization the claimant may use to describe it, or the provisions of any other statute of limitations which would otherwise govern the type of claim or legal theory if it were not subject to or brought under the provisions of this chapter. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-46-11 (Supp.1998) (emphasis added). ¶ 20. In City of Jackson v. Lumpkin , we held that: [t]he Legislature elected to waive sovereign immunity to a large extent in the Tort Claims Act statutes, but it saw fit to qualify this waiver with a number of procedural requirements which, it is logical to conclude, must be complied with for this waiver to take effect. City of Jackson v. Lumpkin, 697 So.2d 1179, 1181 (Miss.1997). ¶ 21. In the present case, Merrill argues that the discovery rule exception we applied to the general libel statute of limitations in Staheli, should be applied to the statute of limitations in the MTCA as well. We disagree. ¶ 22. First, unlike the general defamation statute of limitations found in § 15-1-35 which hinges on the time that cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations contained in § 11-46-11 of the MTCA sets its accrual on the date of the occurrence. ¶ 23. The letter was posted at the School on October 2, 1995. Merrill discovered the letter on October 8, 1995. According to the language in § 11-46-11, Merrill's cause of action accrued on the date of the tortious, wrongful, or other actionable conduct. The statute does not use the language accrued as does § 15-1-35. The use of different wording in § 11-46-11 and § 15-1-35 indicates the Legislature's desire to exclude the application of the discovery rule to defamation actions arising under the MTCA. ¶ 24. Second, the unambiguous wording of § 11-46-11's statute of limitations provision represents the Legislature's clear resolve to strictly limit the State's waiver of sovereign immunity. Section 11-46-11 expressly mandates that the limitations period contained therein shall be exclusive in all actions subject to and brought under the provisions of this chapter .... (emphasis added). In light of such a mandate, it is obvious the Legislature did not intend for the limitations provision in the MTCA to be subordinate to other statutes of limitations or legal doctrines of this State. ¶ 25. Third, the determination of this issue involves the weighing of two (2) competing policy interests: the right of plaintiffs to recover for injuries suffered and the State's need to limit its damages by the imposition of various procedural strictures. In balancing these policy considerations, the Legislature enacted the MTCA to provide plaintiffs with an opportunity for recovery against the State that previously did not exist. However, the Legislature has limited that recovery in the MTCA by instituting a limit on damages and the notice of claim and one (1) year statute of limitations. These requirements allow the State to budget for its contingencies and limit an otherwise endless scope of liability, while affording plaintiffs a narrow passage through the previously impenetrable wall of sovereign immunity. ¶ 26. Preventing the discovery rule's application to defamation claims arising under the MTCA will not be unduly burdensome to the rights of plaintiffs. The class of defamation cases involving the State, in which the undiscoverable nature of the libel is unknown to the plaintiff, or with reasonable effort could not have been discovered, will likely to be an extremely limited one. However, unlike Staheli, applying the discovery rule to defamation actions under § 11-46-11, even with a small class of plaintiffs, could thwart the purpose of the statute. Conversely, the ability of the State to limit the scope of its liability and budget for the contingency of anticipated litigation will be preserved if the discovery rule is excluded in this instance. Therefore, this Court holds that the discovery rule does not apply to defamation actions arising the MTCA. ¶ 27. However, it appears from the record that the trial judge, the State and perhaps even Merrill miscalculated the timing of events. ¶ 28. The letter at issue was posted on October 2, 1995. Merrill filed a proper notice of her claim on October 1, 1996, which was within one (1) year after the date of the actionable conduct. Therefore, the complaint was required to be filed by January 4, 1997, which was 95 days after the filing of the notice. However, as January 4 was a Saturday, Miss. R. Civ. P. 6(a), requires that the final day of the 95-day period be the following Monday. The following Monday was January 6, 1997, the date on which the complaint was filed. Since the letter was posted on October 2, 1995, and the notice of claim was filed October 1, 1996, the complaint was timely filed on January 6, 1997. ¶ 29. The trial judge and the State miscalculated the timing of the statute of limitations. Thus, this Court holds that Merrill's notice and complaint were timely filed on October 1, 1996, and January 6, 1997, respectively.