Opinion ID: 2599716
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial courts possess discretion to limit the scope of closing argument; however, undue limitations may infringe upon defendants' Sixth Amendment and due process rights

Text: ¶ 12 It is well established that trial courts possess broad discretionary powers over the scope of counsel's closing arguments. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975); Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wash.2d at 474-75, 6 P.3d 1160; City of Seattle v. Erickson, 55 Wash. 675, 677, 104 P. 1128 (1909). As explained by this court: The presiding judge must be and is given great latitude in controlling the duration and limiting the scope of closing summations. . . . He may ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial. In all these respects he must have broad discretion. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wash.2d at 474-75, 6 P.3d 1160 (quoting Herring, 422 U.S. at 862, 95 S.Ct. 2550). This court has emphasized that the trial court should `in all cases . . . restrict the argument of counsel to the facts in evidence.' Id. at 475, 6 P.3d 1160 (alteration in original) (quoting Sears v. Seattle C.S.R. Co., 6 Wash. 227, 233, 33 P. 389, 33 P. 1081 (1893)). Counsel's statements also must be confined to the law as set forth in the instructions to the jury. Id. ¶ 13 However, despite their broad discretion, trial courts cannot compel counsel to reason logically or draw only those inferences from the given facts which the court believes to be logical. City of Seattle v. Arensmeyer, 6 Wash.App. 116, 121, 491 P.2d 1305 (1971). Moreover, it is generally permissible for defendants to argue inconsistent defenses so long as they are supported by the evidence. See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63, 108 S.Ct. 883, 99 L.Ed.2d 54 (1988); State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wash.2d 448, 458-60, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000); State v. Conklin, 79 Wash.2d 805, 807, 489 P.2d 1130 (1971). Where a trial court goes too far in limiting the scope of closing argument, a defendant's constitutional rights may be implicated. ¶ 14 For instance, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel encompasses the delivery of a closing argument. Herring, 422 U.S. at 858, 95 S.Ct. 2550. The Court explained: There can be no doubt that closing argument for the defense is the basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial. Accordingly, it has universally been held that counsel for the defense has a right to make a closing summation to the jury, no matter how strong the case for the prosecution may appear to the presiding judge. Id. This court has also held that the constitutional right to be represented by counsel includes the right of counsel to argue the case to the jury. See Erickson, 55 Wash. at 677, 104 P. 1128; State v. Mayo, 42 Wash. 540, 548-49, 85 P. 251 (1906). Likewise, this court has recognized the particular importance of closing argument to the effective exercise of this right. Perez-Cervantes, 141 Wash.2d at 474, 6 P.3d 1160. Thus, where a trial court unduly limits the scope of defense counsel's closing argument, it may infringe upon a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. ¶ 15 Improper limitation of closing argument may also infringe upon a defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights as set forth in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Due process requires that the State prove every fact necessary to constitute a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.; State v. McHenry, 88 Wash.2d 211, 214, 558 P.2d 188 (1977). Where a trial court limits argument as to any fact necessary to constitute a charged offense, the trial court may lessen the State's constitutionally required burden, thus, implicating a defendant's due process rights. See Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734, 739 (9th Cir.1999) (concluding that trial court's action in limiting scope of argument as to element of crime relieved the prosecution of its burden to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt).