Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Refusal of pinpoint voluntary manslaughter instruction

Text: The trial court gave the standard instructions on voluntary manslaughter and the requisite provocation necessary to reduce murder to manslaughter. Defendant argues the court erred in refusing to additionally give three pinpoint manslaughter instructions proposed by the defense. The first, entitled Manslaughter, would have told the jury, When the charge is intentional murder (as distinguished from felony murder), evidence that the defendant committed the homicide in a heat of passion, or evidence that by reason of mental disease, mental defect or intoxication he lacked capacity to harbor malice, may form the basis for a voluntary manslaughter verdict. The second, entitled Manslaughter: Heat of Passion Defined, would have told the jury, The term `passion' as used in the phrase `heat of passion' need not mean rage or anger, but may be any violent, intense, high-wrought, or enthusiastic emotion, other than a passion for revenge, and includes a `passion' which might be induced by a victim's long-continued provocating [ sic ] conduct which causes a `long smoldering resentment' on the part of the defendant towards the victim. The third, entitled Manslaughter: Verbal Provocation, would have told the jury, To satisfy the objective or `reasonable person' element of voluntary manslaughter, the accused's heat of passion must be due to sufficient provocation. Verbal provocation may be sufficient. The first instruction was, of course, properly rejected insofar as it misstated the law by invoking the defense of diminished capacity, which had been abolished by the Legislature. ( People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1013-1014, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1114, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) [8] The court refused the remaining two requested instructions, finding the standard instructions on voluntary manslaughter fully and adequately advised the jury on provocation and heat of passion. A criminal defendant is entitled, on request, to instructions that pinpoint the theory of the defense case. ( People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588; People v. Wright (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1126, 1137, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049; People v. Sears (1970) 2 Cal.3d 180,190, 84 Cal.Rptr. 711, 465 P.2d 847.) Here, defendant's second requested instruction, entitled Manslaughter: Heat of Passion Defined, appears to be derived from language in our past decisions. (See, e.g., People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515, 134 Cal. Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777; People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 329, 325 P.2d 97; see also People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1251-1254, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225 ( Steele ) [rejecting claim that similar pinpoint instruction should have been given because evidence failed to support giving of any heat of passion instruction].) Some Courts of Appeal have concluded a trial court should not give such an instruction on request; others have determined such an instruction can and should be given if requested. (See, e.g., People v. Rupe (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1537, 1540-1542, 256 Cal.Rptr. 126 [instruction should not be given even if requested]; cf. People v. Thompkins (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 244, 256-257, 240 Cal.Rptr. 516 [instruction permitted]; see Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1252, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) In People v. Wharton (1991) 53 Cal.3d 522, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290, this court found it error to refuse a requested pinpoint manslaughter instruction, explaining that legally adequate provocation could occur over a considerable period of time, although in Wharton the error was found harmless. ( Id. at pp. 571-572, 280 Cal. Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) As explained in Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pages 1252-1253, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225, however: Since its adoption in 1872, section 192, subdivision (a), has described voluntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing `upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.' ... Also since its adoption in 1872, section 188 has stated that malice is implied `when no considerable provocation appears.' (See People v. Williams (1969) 71 Cal.2d 614, 623-624 [79 Cal.Rptr. 65, 456 P.2d 633].) Under this language, `[e]vidence of adequate provocation overcomes the presumption of malice.' ( Id. at p. 624 [79 Cal.Rptr. 65, 456 P.2d 633].) Accordingly, for voluntary manslaughter, `provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated.' ( People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 719 [112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913]; see also People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 163 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094].) The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both an objective and a subjective component. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 326-327 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) The defendant must actually, subjectively, kill under the heat of passion. ( Id. at p. 327 [185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) But the circumstances giving rise to the heat of passion are also viewed objectively. As we explained long ago in interpreting the same language of section 192, `this heat of passion must be such a passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person under the given facts and circumstances,' because `no defendant may set up his own standard of conduct and justify or excuse himself because in fact his passions were aroused, unless further the jury believe that the facts and circumstances were sufficient to arouse the passions of the ordinarily reasonable man.' ( People v. Logan (1917) 175 Cal. 45, 49 [164 P. 1121].) ( Steele, supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 1252-1253, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) To satisfy the objective or `reasonable person' element of this form of voluntary manslaughter, the accused's heat of passion must be due to `sufficient provocation.'  ( People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 326, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) Although the trial court in this case instructed the jury on heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, it clearly did so out of an abundance of caution, as the evidence, in our view, arguably could not satisfy the requirement of provocation. Defendant planned the trip to Hesperia and outfitted himself with the weapons and items he would need to surprise his victims and ensure their demise. He calmly waited in Jones's van in the vicinity of Rose V.'s residence until Rose V. and Stopher returned home. He gained entry to the home by ruse, quickly subdued his second wife, proceeded directly to the master bathroom, broke down the locked door, and fatally shot Stopher, who was in the shower, with several shotgun blasts. If anything, defendant appears to have acted out of a passion for revenge, which will not serve to reduce murder to manslaughter. Although the defense evidence was probative of whether defendant subjectively killed in the heat of passion, from an objective standpoint, the evidence arguably did not establish the requisite provocation necessary for conviction of voluntary manslaughter, rather than murder. Since defendant was given the benefit of the doubt and standard manslaughter instructions were given, the court did not have to give yet additional instructions on the point. ( People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129-1130, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159.) Beyond that, the standard manslaughter instructions given adequately covered the valid points in the proposed pinpoint manslaughter instructions. (See CALJIC Nos. 8.40 [voluntary manslaughter defined], 8.42 [sudden quarrel or heat of passion and provocation defined], 8.43 [defining cooling-off period], 8.44 [no one specific emotion alone constitutes heat of passion], and 8.50 [distinguishing murder from manslaughter].) Most importantly, even were we to conclude on this record that a pinpoint instruction should have been given explaining that legally adequate provocation can occur over a considerable period of time, the error would be harmless, as nothing in [the standard instructions given] precluded the jury from finding adequate provocation resulting from conduct occurring over a considerable period of time, and counsel's argument to the jury fully explicated the defense theme of long-standing provocation in connection with the Stopher murder charge. ( People v. Wharton, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 572, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290.) For the same reasons, it was not error to refuse to specially instruct the jury that words themselves can constitute sufficient provocationthe essence of defendant's third requested and rejected pinpoint instruction.