Opinion ID: 2543619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: May a County Regulate the Sale of Firearms on Its Property Located Within the Borders of a City?

Text: In formulating this question, the Ninth Circuit cited several cases that appeared to put the answer in doubt. In Ex parte Pfirrmann (1901) 134 Cal. 143, 66 P. 205, the plaintiff, a resident of the City of Los Angeles, challenged the County's ability to subject him to liquor licensing requirements in addition to the city's requirements. As the court stated, quoting Ex parte Roach (1894) 104 Cal. 272, 277, 37 P. 1044: `It is not to be supposed that it was the intention of the people, through their constitution, to authorize a county to exercise the same power within the territory of the city as the city itself could exercise, or to confer upon the county the right to interfere with or impair the effect of similar legislation by the city itself.'... `... By the organization of a city within the boundaries of a county, the territory thus organized is withdrawn from the legislative control of the county upon the designated subjects, and is placed under the legislative control of its own council; and the principle of local government which pervades the entire instrument is convincive of the intention to withdraw the city from the control of the county, and to deprive the county of any power to annul or supersede the regulations of the city upon the subjects which have been confided to its control' It is claimed upon the part of respondent, that Ex parte Roach, 104 Cal. [at] 277, [37 P. 1044] only goes to the extent of holding that where a conflict arises between the respective regulating ordinances of a county and municipality, that then, in such a case, the ordinance of the municipality within its jurisdiction is controlling.... But ... it has a much broader meaning.... If for no other reason, the unfortunate results which would necessarily follow from a judicial holding that the powers of counties and municipalities derived from the constitution as to the enactment of police and sanitary measures within the municipality were concurrent, justified the conclusion declared in Ex parte Roach, 104 Cal. [at] 277 [37 P. 1044]. ( Ex parte Pfirrmann, supra, 134 Cal. at p. 145, 66 P. 205, italics added.) Similarly, in In re Knight (1921) 55 Cal. App. 511, 203 P. 777, the court struck down a county ordinance enforcing the Volstead Act within the City of Oroville. [W]hen a municipal corporation is organized within the limits of a county, then so much of the territory of such county as is comprehended within the municipal limits of such corporation is, so far as local government is concerned, withdrawn from the county, and any ordinances passed by the latter can have no binding or any force upon the municipality as to any matters or subjects as to which the latter is vested with the power to enact prohibitory or regulatory local laws. ( Id. at p. 518, 203 P. 777, italics omitted.) Pfirrmann and Knight establish the principle that cities and counties generally speaking do not exercise concurrent jurisdiction over regulatory matters. But in this case the County is not seeking to exercise concurrent jurisdiction. As discussed above, Government Code section 23004, subdivision (d), authorizes the County to manage its own property, and that includes deciding how the property may be used, whether that decision is embodied in a contract with a private party, in an ordinance, or in some combination of the two. The City of Pomona does not and may not dictate how the County uses its property. (See Hall v. City of Taft (1956) 47 Cal.2d 177, 302 P.2d 574 [school district need not obtain city building permits for sovereign activities such as the construction and maintenance of its buildings]; County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (1963) 212 Cal.App.2d 160, 167, 28 Cal.Rptr. 32 [applying same principle to counties].) By enacting an ordinance that seeks to regulate the use of its own property, but not the conduct generally of the citizens of Pomona, the County is not exercising regulatory jurisdiction that is coextensive with Pomona. Nor does County law conflict with Pomona law. No Pomona law mandates that the County use its property for gun shows, nor could it. Absent an actual conflict between city and county law, or an exercise in concurrent jurisdiction, the County's legislation concerning the use of its property cannot be regarded as an unlawful extraterritorial act. Amicus curiae Gun Owners of California argues that while the County may be able as a property owner to prohibit firearms sales on its property, it does not have the authority to criminalize activity on its property within the City of Pomona. Thus, amicus curiae argues the County may not, as it has done here, establish ordinances on its extraterritorial property the violation of which constitutes a misdemeanor. This argument misses the mark. When the County acts pursuant to Government Code section 23004, subdivision (d), it is acting for the benefit of its inhabitants. Therefore, although it is acting in some sense as a property owner, it is in another sense acting as a governmental entity. It may regulate property by ordinance as well as by contractual arrangement. (See Air Cal v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 865 F.2d at p. 1117; Santa Monica Airport Assn. v. City of Santa Monica, supra, 659 F.2d at pp. 104-105.) Given that it may draft ordinances governing the use of its property, even extraterritorial use, and given that the violation of a County ordinance is a misdemeanor (Gov.Code, § 25132, subd. (a)), there is no reason why the Ordinance cannot be enforced on the County's extraterritorial property. (See 74 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 211 (1991) [county may enforce ordinance banning smoking in its buildings, with violations punishable as a misdemeanor, although some of the buildings are within the bounds of a city].) In sum, the County has authority to enact the Ordinance, notwithstanding the fact that the Ordinance affects County property within the City of Pomona.