Opinion ID: 763558
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Constitutional Violation

Text: 16 In support of his claims, Smith invokes his long established constitutional right to be free from arrest ... in the absence of probable cause. Ricciuti v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 124 F.3d 123, 128 (2d Cir.1997). For present purposes, this right can be particularized as the right to be free from an arrest based on a warrant that would not have been issued if the officer seeking the warrant had disclosed to the issuing magistrate information within the officer's knowledge that negated probable cause. Brown v. D'Amico, 35 F.3d 97, 99 (2d Cir.1994). A plaintiff can demonstrate that this right was violated where the officer ... 'knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made a false statement ...' or omitted material information, and where such false or omitted information was 'necessary to the finding of probable cause.'  Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d 917, 920 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted); see also Martinez v. City of Schenectady, 115 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting Soares ). 17 Here, Smith claims that Edwards was guilty not of a false statement, but of a material omission, i.e., he never alerted the magistrate judge as to the outcome of the Superior Court proceedings. The first step in assessing the materiality of such an omission is to correct the allegedly defective affidavit by inserting the information withheld from the magistrate judge. Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841, 845 (2d Cir.1992); see also Soares, 8 F.3d at 920. The second step is for the court to then determine whether as a matter of law [the corrected affidavit] did or did not support probable cause. Cartier, 955 F.2d at 845. If probable cause remains, no constitutional violation of the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights has occurred. Soares, 8 F.3d at 920; see also Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.1995) (There can be no federal civil rights claim for false arrest where the arresting officer had probable cause.); Weyant v. Okst, 101 F.3d 845, 852 (2d Cir.1996) (The existence of probable cause to arrest constitutes justification and 'is a complete defense to an action for false arrest.' ) (quoting Bernard v. United States, 25 F.3d 98, 102 (2d Cir.1994)). In such a case, any disputed factual issues cannot be deemed material, and summary judgment is warranted. 5 18 Probable cause to arrest exists under federal law when the authorities have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by the person to be arrested. Golino, 950 F.2d at 870 (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 n. 9, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979)). Similarly, under Connecticut state law, probable cause comprises such facts 'as would reasonably persuade an impartial and reasonable mind not merely to suspect or conjecture, but to believe' that criminal activity has occurred. State v. Barton, 219 Conn. 529, 594 A.2d 917, 928 (Conn.1991) (quoting Stone v. Stevens, 12 Conn. 219, 230 (1837)); see also State v. Heinz, 193 Conn. 612, 480 A.2d 452, 456 (Conn.1984) (defining probable cause as a standard less demanding than that which attends an inquiry into whether there has been a prima facie showing of criminal activity. Instead, all that is required is that the affidavit, read in a common-sense manner, give objective evidence of a fair probability that proscribed activity has occurred.) (citations omitted). We conclude that under federal law (as under Connecticut law for that matter), defendants' alleged failure to alert the magistrate judge to the outcome of the Superior Court proceedings was not material because there would have been probable cause to arrest Smith even if Edwards had included the omitted information. 19 In the affidavit that he actually presented to the magistrate judge, Edwards described the graphic statements that Jane made to her mother and to various social workers and nurses. Although Smith suggests that Mary's pending divorce rendered her own account of Jane's statements suspect, Mary provided that account under oath and her statement was largely corroborated by Warshaw's independent interviews with Jane. In addition, Edwards's affidavit described the contents of two separately compiled reports, one by Warshaw and one by Murphy, which indicated that Jane had physical abnormalities and exhibited behavior consistent with sexual abuse. Although one of the two cited reports was expressly labeled interim, the two taken together certainly contained reasonably trustworthy information corroborating Jane and her mother's accounts. All of these considerations, taken together, would have left a magistrate judge with ample support for the conclusion that there was a fair probability of criminal conduct by Smith. 20 Moreover, had Edwards' affidavit been corrected in the manner plaintiff now proposes, we see nothing in the outcome of the Superior Court proceedings that would have negated probable cause. As an initial matter, Judge Bassick did not explain his reasons for ruling that Sally had failed to sustain her burden of proof that permanent protective orders were warranted. It would not have been clear to Edwards or a magistrate judge--and it is not now clear to us--that those reasons implicated considerations that would be relevant to a probable cause determination in a criminal setting. It is significant that the standard of proof necessary to secure a protective order in a civil hearing in Connecticut is higher than the standard necessary to obtain an arrest warrant. See State v. Munoz, 233 Conn. 106, 659 A.2d 683, 697 (Conn.1995) ([P]roof of probable cause requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence.); cf. Heinz, 480 A.2d at 456 (holding that less is required to establish probable cause to arrest than to make a prima facie showing of criminal activity). Smith's success in state court therefore had little bearing upon whether there was probable cause to support his arrest. Lastly, in order to secure a protective order, Sally needed to demonstrate a continuous threat of present physical pain or physical injury, Conn.Gen.Stat. § 46b-15 (1993), and there was no comparable element in any of the criminal offenses with which Smith was charged. In light of these considerations, there is simply no basis to conclude that it would have been critical to the evaluation of probable cause for Edwards to have alerted the magistrate judge to the state court ruling. Brown, 35 F.3d at 99. Edwards was therefore entitled to summary judgment and the action against him should have been dismissed.