Opinion ID: 389937
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial of Barton in Absentia

Text: 66 On the eve of trial, appellant Barton underwent surgery and was unable to attend the trial. His motion for postponement or severance was denied, and he was tried in absentia. He contends that this constituted an abuse of the trial court's discretion. In view of the facts, we disagree. 67 It is beyond dispute that a defendant has a constitutional right to be present at the trial of charges against him. Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 94 S.Ct. 194, 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973). It is well settled, however, that this right may be waived if the defendant voluntarily and deliberately absents himself from the trial without good cause. E. g., United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063, 93 S.Ct. 554, 34 L.Ed.2d 516 (1972). In the present case, the parties had agreed on November 14, 1979, that the voir dire would begin on January 8, 1980. Barton's attorney stated that Barton had no objection, and thereafter informed Barton of the date on which trial was to begin. Nonetheless, less than one week before trial, Barton elected to undergo spinal surgery. At the hearing on Barton's severance motion Barton's physician testified that, while medically necessary, the operation was not performed on an emergency basis; that he had diagnosed Barton's condition in August 1978, some 17 months earlier, and had several times thereafter unsuccessfully urged Barton to undergo surgery. He stated that Barton's request for surgery in January 1980 came out of the blue. 68 In light of this evidence, we find no error in Judge MacMahon's conclusion that Barton's absence was voluntary. Given this fact and the fact that Barton was alleged to have participated in conspiracies with all of the other defendants except Betti Frassetto, and the additional circumstances that this multi-defendant trial involving more than 100 government witnesses had already been postponed more than once, that a panel of 250 veniremen had already been arranged, and that the trial judge was sitting by designation from another federal district, the trial court ruled that Barton's interest in being present at his trial was outweighed by the burdens that a postponement or severance would impose on the court, the government, the witnesses, the co-defendants, and the public. We find no abuse of discretion in the decision to proceed with trial despite Barton's absence.F. The Conviction of Betti Frassetto 69 Finally, we turn to the claims of appellant Betti Frassetto. Betti was mentioned only in Count Fourteen of the indictment. That count charged her, Frank Frassetto, and Anthony Chirico with endeavoring on or about June 28, 1978, to remove or conceal the Wise Potato Chip truck or its contents in order to obstruct the grand jury's investigation into the possession and use of explosive devices in the underworld power struggle. Betti contends that her conviction must be reversed because her joinder for trial with the other defendants was improper under Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(b), because the evidence was insufficient to convict her, 12 and because her conviction must have resulted from a spillover of the evidence introduced against her codefendants. We find none of these arguments persuasive. 70 Rule 8(b) allows the joinder of a defendant who is not named in all counts of the indictment. United States v. Weisman, 624 F.2d 1118, 1129 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, -- U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 209, 66 L.Ed.2d 91 (1980). The Rule expressly provides that two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment if they are alleged to have participated in the same act or series of acts, and that all defendants need not be charged in each count. This Rule did not require the severance of Betti's case. Count Fourteen was integrally related to Counts Eleven and Twelve, which charged Frank Frassetto, Anthony Chirico, and Celestino with unlawful possession on June 28 of the explosives in the truck that Betti sought to move on that date. Her actions on June 28 were part of a series of actions relating to the unlawful possession and to the attempts by Frank Frassetto and Anthony Chirico to obstruct the grand jury investigation. It was not error to refuse to sever the count against Betti. 71 Betti's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence appears to take two forms. First, she contends that there was inadequate evidence from which the jury could infer that she was the woman who inquired about the truck, and second, she contends that the actions described in the proof are insufficient to constitute an endeavor to obstruct justice within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1503. Viewing the evidence, as we must, in the light most favorable to the government, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), we conclude that the evidence was sufficient. 72 The evidence that Betti was the woman who visited the service station and inquired about the truck, while circumstantial, was compelling. This evidence included testimony (1) that the Arco station owner, upon learning that the government agents were inquiring about the truck, attempted to reach Betti; (2) that Betti's brother-in-law relayed the station owner's telephone number to his wife, who in turn gave it to Betti; (3) that Betti then made a telephone call in which she asked who was inquiring about the truck; (4) that Betti's husband asked her to go to the Arco station and Betti said she would; (5) that Betti shortly thereafter borrowed a green car with a vinyl roof; and (6) that a woman in a green car with a vinyl roof arrived at the Arco station and asked the attendant if he was the person she had spoken to. These facts provided an ample basis for the jury to find that the woman in the green car was Betti. 73 Betti's argument that the acts attributed to her did not amount to an endeavor to obstruct the grand jury investigation presents a somewhat closer question. Section 1503 provides that whoever corruptly endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede, the due administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. The use of the term endeavor( ) in this statute and its predecessor has been interpreted as embodying a concept less technical than that normally associated with an attempt. The Court has construed the word endeavor as describ(ing) any effort or essay to accomplish the evil purpose that the section was enacted to prevent. United States v. Russell, 255 U.S. 138, 143, 41 S.Ct. 260, 261, 65 L.Ed. 553 (1921); Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 333, 87 S.Ct. 429, 434, 17 L.Ed.2d 394 (1966). In Russell, the Supreme Court considered the actions of an attorney who asked the wife of a possible juror to ascertain her husband's attitude toward the lawyer's client, stating that they did not want to pay money to any jurors at the trial unless they knew those jurors would favor acquittal. The attorney argued to the Court that his purpose was to learn the potential juror's attitude only in preparation for a bribe offer, but that his actions did not go so far as to constitute a solicitation, and hence were not an endeavor. The Court rejected this contention, finding that such an experimental approach to the corruption of a juror constituted an endeavor within the meaning of the statute. 74 The evidence established that Betti's actions on June 28 also fit within this construction of the term endeavor. Preliminarily, there is no question that Betti knew there was an ongoing grand jury investigation. On June 19, the day after her husband was arrested, she had gone to the police station and gotten his car, which had attached to its dashboard a search warrant stating that the car had been searched for explosives. A few days later, Betti herself was served with a grand jury subpoena and was informed that the investigation related to recent bombings in Rochester. With this background, on June 28, she (a) telephoned the Arco station, taking care to do so from an untapped telephone, to find out who was asking questions about the potato chip truck, and when told the inquirers were government agents, said I'll be right down; (b) drove to the station and inspected the truck; (c) asked the station attendant again about the men asking questions; (d) said she was looking for the keys to the truck; and (e) said, how am I going to move the truck. 75 We conclude that, taken in the light most favorable to the government, this evidence portrayed an effort or essay to move the truck in which the government was known to be interested. That Betti was unable to move the truck does not detract from her actions, which the jury could fairly infer were an endeavor to obstruct the grand jury's investigations. 76 Finally, we do not believe the trial of Betti with the other defendants was prejudicial to her. While Betti was not alleged to have had any role in the appellants' activities until June 28 13 , the actions attributed to her at trial were not complex. The evidence against her was relatively simple and easy for the jury to consider without any spillover effect from the proof adduced against other defendants. The likelihood of jury confusion seems quite remote.