Opinion ID: 2216408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Sufficiency of Circumstantial Evidence to Sustain Convictions.

Text: In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, a jury verdict can only be set aside where the evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom fail to sustain a rational theory of guilt. State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1992); State v. Lewandowski, 463 N.W.2d 341 (S.D.1990). In making this evaluation, the Court will accept that evidence, and the most favorable inferences fairly drawn therefrom, which will support the verdict. State v. Banks, 387 N.W.2d 19, 27 (S.D.1986) (citing State v. West, 344 N.W.2d 502 (S.D.1984)). Our function in reviewing the record, forbids our resolving conflicts in testimony, passing on the credibility of witnesses, or weighing evidence. These functions lie solely within the jury's province as ultimate trier of fact. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d at 4; State v. Svihl, 490 N.W.2d 269, 274 (S.D.1992); State v. Huettl, 379 N.W.2d 298, 302 (S.D.1985). The State's case against Hage was purely circumstantial. Circumstantial evidence is equal to and sometimes more reliable than direct evidence ( State v. Best, 232 N.W.2d 447 (S.D.1975)), however The established rule in this state is that to warrant conviction upon circumstantial evidence alone, such facts and circumstances must be shown as are consistent with each other and with guilt of the party charged, and such as cannot by any reasonable theory be true and the party charged be innocent.... This rule does not mean the evidence must be such as to exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence. Rather it requires only the exclusion of reasonable hypothesis of innocence. State v. Esslinger, 357 N.W.2d 525, 530-31 (S.D.1984) (citations omitted). We conclude from our careful review of the record that the State's evidence was more than sufficient to establish arson on each of the five fires. The question then is whether the jury was presented with facts and circumstances consistent with each other and with Hage's guilt, such as cannot by any reasonable theory be true and Hage be innocent? Hage denied starting any fires and no one testified to seeing him start one. Arson is rarely proven through eyewitness testimony. While a conviction may be had, even though there is no evidence that the accused was in a position where he could have ignited the fire, there must be something connecting him in a personal way with the actual burning. 5 AM.JUR.2D Arson and Related Offenses § 55 (1962). By his own admission and eyewitness testimony Hage was on or near the scene of four of the arsons. All fires in this series occurred in Rapid City approximately between 2:15 a.m. and 6:30 a.m. within two miles of each other during a two-month period. The fires had been ignited by a similar method: no accelerants were used, each was fueled with whatever was readily available nearby, such as trash. Hage was unemployed and regularly spent the midnight to dawn hours walking alone around Rapid City. Walking was Hage's typical mode of transit and the fires corresponded with the areas where he walked. Hage gave false and contradictory statements to law enforcement about his movements relating to these fires. At the scene of the bus fire he gave a false name and address. More than once he claimed to have happened upon a fire while traveling home from a nonexistent job. The circumstances surrounding the Livermore and Riss fires definitely tied Hage to these arsons. Hage's possession of pediatric dental tools of the exact type, size and brand Dr. Benusis prefers to use, which could have been taken from one of the trays in his autoclave found empty after the fire, established a tangible link to the dental office arson. Perhaps the most tenuous connection between Hage and a fire was the Midtown Plaza case. But even here the crime fit a clear pattern: trash was used as kindling; fires were started in secluded parts of the building; the building was in the vicinity Hage traveled to go from the bar to Hardees; by an investigator's estimate the fire was started at a time somewhere around 2 to 3 a.m. when by his own admission Hage was walking in the area; and Hage once again was on the scene to witness the blaze. The jury not only had the right to consider Hage's admissions in connection with all the other circumstances in the case, but it also could regard his false statements as themselves tending to evince guilt. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090 (1896). See also Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 112 S.Ct. 2482, 120 L.Ed.2d 225 (1992). We conclude that although the cases against him were wholly circumstantial, viewed cumulatively the evidence was sufficient for the jury to rule out any reasonable hypothesis of innocence and convict Hage on each charge.