Opinion ID: 820615
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Capers

Text: Mr. Capers argues that the evidence presented against him was legally insufficient to establish he was part of the conspiracy, or to sustain his convictions for possession with intent to distribute crack as alleged in the substantive counts. He also argues that the District Court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial.
At the end of the government’s case-in-chief, Mr. Capers moved for a Rule 29 Judgment of Acquittal. The District Court denied the motion.
Conviction Mr. Capers was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1). To be convicted of conspiracy to distribute narcotics, “the Government must establish beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the existence of an agreement among two or more persons; 2) that the defendant knew of the general purpose of the agreement; and 3) that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily participated in the agreement.” United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1298 (11th Cir. 2000). Mr. Capers’s theory of defense was that he was a retail purchaser of crack cocaine and therefore did not knowingly and willfully conspire to possess and distribute the drugs he purchased from different people in Coconut Grove. 17 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 18 of 41 Consistent with his theory at trial, Mr. Capers argues here that the “[t]he testimony of the[] accomplice witnesses did not establish [his] involvement in the distribution of the crack cocaine he bought” because “[e]ven if credence is given to the Government’s contention that he resold the cocaine elsewhere, that inference did not make him part of the conspiracy.” Essentially, Mr. Capers argues that his conspiracy conviction must be overturned because the government failed to prove that “[he] was part of the distribution chain flowing from Frederick through Burke.” In evaluating Mr. Capers’s argument, we have concluded that even if we credit his assertions that the drugs purchased directly from Ronald Burke were entirely for personal use, there remains substantial evidence that he was aware of and knew the general purpose of the drug ring headed by Mr. Frederick and Mr. Burke, and that he was a knowing and voluntary participant in the objectives of that ring. See Simpson, 228 F.3d at 1298. The jury heard testimony to the effect that Mr. Capers regularly made purchases of crack and cocaine in amounts consistent with redistribution. Included in the wiretap evidence were two conversations between Mr. Capers and Mr. Burke about the possibility of purchasing distribution level amounts of cocaine and crack. Specifically, Mr. Capers asked about purchasing a $50–75 bag of powder cocaine and about purchasing an “eight-ball” (3.4 grams) of crack. On each occasion, Mr. Burke 18 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 19 of 41 referred Mr. Capers to Mr. Frederick. There was no evidence that Mr. Capers completed either of these particular purchases, but the jury heard from a number of witnesses that he dealt directly with Mr. Frederick as often as three to four times per week. Jimmy Tucker, another cooperating witness, testified that Mr. Capers was familiar with Mr. Frederick’s price for wholesale amounts of powder cocaine, and that he was frustrated that the price had risen from $800 to $900/ounce. Mr. Tucker also testified that Mr. Capers’s drug dealing activity was at a level above that of a “petty juggler”; the implication being that Mr. Capers purchased larger amounts of crack for redistribution, similar to Mr. Tucker. Finally, the jury heard evidence of conversations between Mr. Capers and Mr. Burke in which Capers warned Burke about police activity in the area around Coconut Grove, indicating Capers’s interest in the continued operation of the drug ring. Based on this evidence, it was not unreasonable for the jury to determine that Mr. Capers knew of the existence of an agreement between Mr. Burke and Mr. Frederick to distribute drugs in Coconut Grove; that he knew of the general purpose of the agreement; and that he knowingly and voluntarily participated in the objectives of that agreement. See Simpson, 228 F.3d at 1298. This being the case, 19 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 20 of 41 the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied his motion for judgment of acquittal on the conspiracy count. 8 ii. Evidence Supporting the Possession with Intent to Distribute Convictions Mr. Capers was also convicted of four counts of possession with intent to distribute “detectable” amounts of crack in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), as alleged in Counts 16, 17, 18, and 20. As we have set out above, in order to prove that a defendant possessed narcotics with an intent to distribute, the government must show that the defendant had knowing possession of the drugs and intent to distribute them. Cochran, 683 F.3d at 1322. Each of Mr. Capers’s possession and distribution convictions involved purchases of crack from Ronald Burke. Mr. Capers argues that the evidence was not sufficient to sustain these convictions because (1) “the government failed to prove the . . . offenses occurred on [the dates alleged]” insofar as it established only that he was invited to go to Burke’s apartment to purchase crack cocaine, not 8 Mr. Capers suggests that the juggling he engaged in was limited to the “common practice” by drug addicts of “buy[ing] a ‘dime’, and cut[ting] it into two ‘nickels’ . . . then consum[ing] one and sell[ing] the other.” Mr. Capers argues that such petty juggling, intended merely to finance a drug users’ habit, is insufficient “[a]s a matter of law . . . [to] make him a member of the conspiracy.” We need not decide whether this type of juggling alone would be insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a conspiracy conviction, however, because the evidence at trial was sufficient for a jury to conclude that Mr. Capers operated at a level above that of a “petty juggl[er].” Jimmy Tucker testified to the effect that Mr. Capers regularly purchased large amounts of crack from Mr. Frederick, and that he broke those larger units down for resale outside the Grove which, Mr. Capers concedes, is enough to prove involvement in a conspiracy to distribute narcotics. 20 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 21 of 41 that he did; and (2) he purchased crack cocaine in unit sizes “consistent [only] with personal use and not consistent with redistribution.” In other words, Mr. Capers contends that the government failed to prove that he possessed the drugs in question and, in any event, failed to prove he had the intent to distribute the drugs he did possess. 1) Proof of Possession “[Possession] can be proven by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” United States v. Poole, 878 F.2d 1389, 1391–92 (11th Cir. 1989). The government never got drugs directly from Capers. Instead, as proof that Capers possessed the “detectable” amounts of crack at issue in Counts 16, 17, 18, and 20 it offered circumstantial evidence, consisting of recordings of phone conversations between Mr. Burke and Mr. Capers arranging for purchases of crack cocaine on the dates charged, as well as Burke’s testimony that he completed these transactions with Capers on those dates. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, a jury could reasonably conclude that Capers possessed the drugs at issue in these counts. 2) Proof of Intent to Distribute The intent to distribute element of § 841(a)(1) can also be proved through circumstantial evidence. Poole, 878 F.2d at 1391–92. “Intent to distribute can be proven circumstantially from, among other things, the quantity of cocaine and the 21 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 22 of 41 existence of implements such as scales commonly used in connection with the distribution of cocaine.” Id. at 1392. As stated, the government did not recover narcotics of any amount from Mr. Capers. Neither did it recover any illicit implements. Instead, as circumstantial proof that Mr. Capers intended to redistribute the drugs that he purchased from Mr. Burke, the government relies on “testimony from co-conspirators regarding Capers’ juggling activities.” As stated, Mr. Capers purchased the drugs underlying Counts 16, 17, 18 and 20 from Ronald Burke. Mr. Burke testified that Capers was a “friend” and a “customer,” “mostly a [crack] smoker,” and a “drug addict.” Mr. Burke also testified that he did not know what Mr. Capers did with the crack once he sold it to him, but that “[a]s far as [he was] concerned,” Capers smoked it. Without more, there would have been little basis to conclude that Mr. Capers intended to distribute the drugs that he purchased from Mr. Burke. But the jury also heard testimony from two other co-conspirators—Jimmy Tucker and Otis Walker—that Mr. Capers resold the crack he purchased in Coconut Grove. The jury received evidence that Mr. Burke tended to sell Mr. Capers ten or eleven dime bags of crack at a time, and that Burke sold these quantities to Capers on the dates alleged in Counts 16, 17, 18, and 20. Based on this evidence, and viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the jury 22 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 23 of 41 could reasonably infer that Mr. Capers intended to redistribute at least some of the crack he purchased from Mr. Burke. Therefore, Mr. Capers’s convictions for counts 16, 17, 18, and 20 are affirmed.
Following the jury’s verdict, Mr. Capers filed a timely motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 33. The District court denied the motion. On appeal, Mr. Capers argues this was an abuse of discretion because there was insufficient evidence to support his conspiracy conviction; it was “manifest injustice” for the government to base its conspiracy case against him on his juggling activities; and it was prosecutorial misconduct for the assistant United States attorney (AUSA) to comment on Mr. Capers’s juggling in her closing argument. Our examination leads us to conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Mr. Capers’s conspiracy conviction. Further, there is simply no authority for Mr. Capers’s claim that it was “manifest injustice” for the government to prosecute him for conspiracy on a theory that he juggled cocaine where, as here, witnesses testified that Mr. Capers purchased distribution-level amounts of crack from Mr. Frederick and sold it for higher prices in other locations. Finally, insofar as Jimmy Tucker and Otis Walker each testified to the effect that Mr. Capers operated at a level above that of a “petty juggl[er],” it was permissible for the 23 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 24 of 41 AUSA to argue in closing that he engaged in such behavior. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Capers’s motion for a new trial.