Opinion ID: 723914
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Acceptance of Responsibility Finding

Text: 43 The district court apparently relied on two proper grounds for its finding that Nunez had not demonstrated acceptance of responsibility: (i) the six-month delay in entering a guilty plea, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(g)) (timeliness factor), and (ii) the inconsistent stories given by Nunez, see id. (n.1(a)) (truthful-admission factor). 44 In addition, the district court discussed at considerable length Nunez' failure to assist the FBI in identifying his accomplices. See supra Section II.A.1. The court appropriately questioned Nunez' motives for not disclosing the identities of his associates. Its misgivings were prompted by Nunez' inconsistent versions of the carjacking, and were explicitly connected to its finding that Nunez, and by extension, his insistence that he had accepted responsibility, were not credible. Nunez had given uncorroborated and inconsistent explanations for not identifying his accomplices: first, he claimed that he had not known them before the day of the carjacking, and never learned their names; and, second, he was afraid to identify them. See Gonzales, 12 F.3d at 300 (defendant bears burden of proof under § 3E1.1). The district court supportably found that Nunez' true motive was to protect his accomplices, a motive which ---- when coupled with his two pretextual motives for refusing to inform (memory lapse and/or fear) ---- belied a genuine acceptance of responsibility. 45 Nonetheless, other observations by the district court remain open to the plausible understanding that a defendant must always, at least where an offense results in death, inform on his accomplices in order to qualify for a § 3E1.1 adjustment, regardless of any other circumstances in the case: 46 A defendant who accepts responsibility must do more than that when he's involved in a conspiracy and where [ ] human life is involved. He must come forward and identify and help authorities get the other people.... 47 A defendant qualifies for a [§ 3E1.1] reduction when he truthfully admits the conduct comprising the offense of conviction and does not falsely deny or frivolously contest relevant conduct that the Court has determined to be true and also does not keep to himself the identity of other coconspirators. ... 48 [M]y point is that if anyone commits a crime with one or more persons, knowing those persons, does not come forward to the authorities, giving the names of those persons, then you cannot have a full acceptance of responsibility because that entails precisely a catharsis, a full remorse by disclosing the whole thing, being truthful and not concealing any information how to identify ... these defendants. 49 As we have indicated, however, such a per se requirement would prove as inconsistent with the letter and spirit of section 3E1.1 as its counterpart, see, e.g., McKinney, 15 F.3d at 854. Consequently, we are unable to conclude with confidence whether the district court deemed Nunez' failure to identify his criminal associates as sufficient, by itself, to preclude an adjustment under section 3E1.1, without regard to whether Nunez knew the names of his accomplices or feared retaliation. 50 Assuming the district court meant that mitigating considerations are never material under section 3E1.1, it erred. Moreover, insofar as the court envisioned a per se bar to its consideration of mitigating circumstances, the present record precludes reliable harmless error analysis, since we cannot say with any confidence that the court would not have disallowed a section 3E1.1 adjustment solely because Nunez refused to identify his criminal associates. 51 The government points to the district court statement that it was not saying [Nunez] is getting life because of ... [his failure to 'inform']. Yet the literal import of the district court's language is not necessarily equivalent to an assurance that Nunez' life sentence had nothing to do with his refusal to identify his criminal associates. Thus, the quoted statement does not cure the inherent ambiguity created by the categorical remarks the court made earlier. Consequently, on the record as a whole, we cannot say that we are left with the definite and firm conviction that removal of the inappropriate ground would not be likely to alter the district court's view of the sentence rightfully to be imposed. See Diaz, 39 F.3d at 568. These ambiguities counsel a remand for resentencing for clarification, 9 and further factfinding as appropriate. United States v. Berzon, 941 F.2d 8, 20 (1st Cir.1991).