Opinion ID: 2148851
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Introduction of Gang Affiliation Evidence

Text: Defendant next claims that he was denied his due process right to a fair sentencing hearing and his first amendment right of freedom of association where the State introduced evidence of his gang affiliation. Relying on Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 117 L.Ed.2d 309, 112 S.Ct. 1093 (1992), defendant alleges that his death sentence should be vacated since this evidence was not relevant to any issue at sentencing. Initially, the State counters that defendant has waived this argument on appeal by failing to properly object to its introduction at trial. During the State's examination of Benjamin Lieu, who shared a cell with defendant while they were incarcerated in the Cook County jail, the following colloquy occurred: Q. Mr. Lieu, could you please tell the court whether or not you ever talked about any gang affiliation with defendant? A. Like can you be more specific, like talk about a gang activity in the cell or MR. CHERONIS: Objection to that. A. O [ sic ] over over. THE COURT: Overruled. MR. GOEBEL: Q. Did you know whether or not he belonged to a gang? A. Yes, he does. Q. How do you know that? A. Because he has a tattoo on his back. Q. What kind of tattoo? A. A crown. Q. Do you know what that symbolizes? A. Yes. Q. What [is] that? A. A particular gang. Q. What gang? A. Gaylord. Q. Did he claim he had any rank in the Gaylord Gang? A. Yes. (Emphasis added.) The State maintains that defense counsel only objected to the introduction of gang activity evidence and not to the introduction of gang affiliation evidence. Although defense counsel's objection lacked specificity, we will assume, arguendo, that defense counsel's objection went to the State's introduction of gang affiliation testimony in general, not merely the introduction of gang activity testimony, and that defendant properly preserved his objection. In Dawson, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's first amendment right to freely associate is violated when the State introduces evidence during a death penalty hearing regarding a defendant's gang affiliation, when it is irrelevant to proving any aggravating circumstances. The Dawson court further held, however, that the erroneous introduction of such gang affiliation evidence is subject to a harmless error analysis. Dawson, 503 U.S. at 168-69, 117 L.Ed.2d at 319, 112 S.Ct. at 1099. We conclude that, if error occurred, the State's introduction of the gang affiliation evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Ward, 154 Ill.2d 272, 181 Ill.Dec. 884, 609 N.E.2d 252 (1992). The sentencing judge considered numerous aggravating factors in the instant case, including the defendant's principal role in the acts which culminated in the victim's death; the premeditated nature of the murder; the fact that the defendant set the victim on fire; the defendant's criminal history; and the defendant's lack of remorse after the crime. The contrary mitigating evidence was minimal, consisting of testimony that defendant felt unloved as a child, began experimenting with drugs at an early age, and that, prior to his arrest, was gainfully employed and had treated his current girlfriend well. Moreover, the testimony concerning defendant's gang affiliation was brief and isolated, and the sentencing judge did not even mention it during his sentencing summation. Therefore, we conclude that the introduction of defendant's gang affiliation evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.