Opinion ID: 2507169
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Individualized Suspicion Justifies Testing

Text: ¶ 77 The United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence holds that the Fourth Amendment, with its unreasonable search protections, allows public schools to randomly drug test student athletes. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 115 S.Ct. 2386, 132 L.Ed.2d 564; Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735. I agree with the majority that the protections of article I, section 7 are greater. I find persuasive a prior case in that Court that required individualized suspicion before the search could take place, thereby articulating a standard more deferential to privacy rights (more analogous to our constitution's). See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). ¶ 78 In my opinion, the T.L.O. deferential standard for suspicion searches could pass Washington's stricter privacy test. As mentioned infra note 3, article I, section 7 and the Fourth Amendment are structurally different and the Washington Constitution protects private affairs and not only against unreasonable searches. Still, the T.L.O. reasoning is persuasive because it balances the privacy rights of minor students and the administrative responsibilities of school officers. ¶ 79 The T.L.O. Court reasoned that searches in a school environment are analogous to those conducted in a similar administrative context, relying on its previous analysis in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967). See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41, 105 S.Ct. 733. The T.L.O. Court held that school teachers and administrators could initiate a search if: (1) there existed reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school; and (2) the search is not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. at 342, 105 S.Ct. 733. The Washington Legislature adopted our current statute governing searches of students and students' possessions that mirrors this reasonable grounds test from T.L.O. RCW 28A.600.230. [9] ¶ 80 In Acton, the majority took issue with the T.L.O. Court's use of individualized suspicion, arguing that requiring individualized suspicion would interfere with the school's drug prevention goals and possibly worsen the situation. See 515 U.S. at 663-64, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (suggesting that teachers and school officials are not trained to detect drug use, teachers might claim any problematic student is using drugs, using individualized suspicion would turn the drug testing process into a badge of shame, and individualized suspicion creates a needless loss of resources in defending against claims of arbitrary imposition). Justice O'Connor in her forceful dissent in Acton, however, addressed the effectiveness of a drug program based on reasonable suspicion: [N]owhere is it less clear that an individualized suspicion requirement would be ineffectual than in the school context. In most schools, the entire pool of potential search targets  students  is under constant supervision by teachers and administrators and coaches, be it in classrooms, hallways, or locker rooms. . . . The great irony of this case is that most (though not all) of the evidence the District introduced to justify its suspicionless drug testing program consisted of first- or second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students acting in ways that plainly gave rise to reasonable suspicion of in-school drug use  and thus that would have justified a drug-related search under our T.L.O. decision. Id. at 678-79, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). ¶ 81 The implementation of a school drug testing program based on individualized suspicion is undoubtedly improved with training of teachers, counselors, and/or staff to detect signs of drug use. Many drugs have easily recognizable physical manifestations: glazed appearance of eyes, dilated pupils, slurred speech, distinct odors on breath, etc. [10] Justice O'Connor observed in her dissent in Acton: Schools already have adversarial, disciplinary schemes that require teachers and administrators in many areas besides drug use to investigate student wrongdoing (often by means of accusatory searches); to make determinations about whether the wrongdoing occurred; and to impose punishment. To such a scheme, suspicion-based drug testing would be only a minor addition. 515 U.S. at 677, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). ¶ 82 Justice O'Connor also emphasized that, The [majority's] fear that a suspicion-based regime will lead to the testing of `troublesome but not drug-likely' students . . . ignores that the required level of suspicion in the school context is objectively reasonable suspicion. Id. at 676-77, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). In State v. McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d 75, 81, 558 P.2d 781 (1977), this court outlined factors relevant to determining whether a school official in fact had reasonable suspicion: the child's age, history, and school record, the prevalence and seriousness of the problem in the school to which the search was directed, the exigency to make the search without delay, and the probative value and reliability of the information used as a justification for the search. ¶ 83 Admittedly, a drug program based only on individualized reasonable suspicion is not without problems, but such a program would result in a greater protection of constitutional rights. [11] Furthermore, a program based on individualized reasonable suspicion might often provide more deterrence to student drug use than a random suspicionless program. Under a random regime, students might take their chances that they will not be one of the very few unlucky students selected for drug testing. But under a reasonable suspicion regime, if students show signs of drug use, there is a higher probability of getting tested. As in Acton, there is a substantial basis for concluding that a vigorous regime of suspicion-based testing . . . would have gone a long way toward solving [the District's] school drug problem while preserving the Fourth Amendment rights of [students]. 515 U.S. at 679-80, 115 S.Ct. 2386 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). ¶ 84 Thus, the United States Supreme Court and prior cases in this court have held that requiring reasonable or individualized suspicion before commencing a search is sufficient to protect a student's right to privacy and still allow school officials to do their job. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733; McKinnon, 88 Wash.2d at 81, 558 P.2d 781 (We hold that the search of a student's person is reasonable and does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, if the school official has reasonable grounds to believe the search is necessary in the aid of maintaining school discipline and order.). While McKinnon was decided before Acton, we have never revisited the case and it remains a correct statement of Washington law. See also State v. Slattery, 56 Wash. App. 820, 823, 787 P.2d 932 (1990) (Under the school search exception, school officials may search students if, under all the circumstances, the search is reasonable.); State v. B.A.S., 103 Wash.App. 549, 554 n. 8, 13 P.3d 244 (2000) (specifically adopting a reasonableness search standard). ¶ 85 Thus, our decisions allow a reasonable search or test using the T.L.O. individualized reasonable suspicion standard. The legislature could further define the factors to be considered by law in a similar fashion as they have previously specified school interests in statute. For example, RCW 28A.600.210 notes the important policy considerations favoring a reasonable search standard and applies that standard to school lockers. [12] ¶ 86 A student may be drug tested if a coach or school administrator can articulate a reasonable suspicion of drug use. In my view, Washington has implicitly accepted this view of private affairs through a special environments exception under article I, section 7.