Opinion ID: 2709585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requirements for Proof of a Conspiracy

Text: To convict a defendant on a conspiracy charge, the government must prove that (1) two or more people agreed to commit an unlawful act, and (2) the defendant knowingly and intentionally joined in the agreement. United States v. Rollins, 544 F.3d 820, 835 (7th Cir. 2008). Specifically, a drug-distribution conspiracy charged under 21 U.S.C. §846 “requires proof that the defendant knowingly agreed—either implicitly or explicitly—with someone else to distribute drugs.” United States v. Johnson, 592 F.3d 749, 754 (7th Cir. 2010). This court has repeatedly explained that a conspiracy does not exist where a drug purchaser resells to his own customers drugs he obtained from a supplier. Id.; United States v. Colon, 549 F.3d 565, 567 (7th Cir. 2008). Instead, a conspiracy “requires evidence that the buyer and seller entered into an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself.” Johnson, 592 F.3d at 754 (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 Because certain characteristics inherent in a buyerseller relationship may also suggest the existence of a conspiracy, we have recognized that it is difficult to determine what evidence is sufficient to establish an agreement to distribute drugs. Id. For example, the sale of large quantities of drugs, standardized transactions, and a sustained relationship between the parties may demonstrate either a buyer-seller relationship or a conspiracy to distribute. Id. at 754-55. Consequently, we require the government to “offer evidence establishing an agreement to distribute drugs that is distinct from evidence of the agreement to complete the underlying drug deals.” Id. at 755. For example, the government may prove the conspiratorial agreement through evidence of sales on credit or consignment, an agreement to seek out additional customers, commission payments, one party providing advice for the other’s business, or an agreement to warn of potential threats to each other’s business. United States v. Villasenor, 664 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2011); see also Colon, 549 F.3d at 568-70. To be sure, “not all credit sales can support an inference that there was an agreement to distribute.” United States v. Vallar, 635 F.3d 271, 287 (7th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But when a credit sale is combined “with certain characteristics inherent in an ongoing wholesale buyer-seller relationship—i.e., large quantities of drugs, repeat purchases or some other enduring arrangement—the credit sale becomes sufficient evidence to distinguish a conspiracy from a nonconspiratorial buyer-seller relationship.” Id. Nos. 12-1835 & 12-1947 21