Opinion ID: 1224156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: The dispositive question before the Court is whether plaintiff is barred as a matter of law from asserting a claim for punitive damages against defendant in his capacity as the administrator of decedent's estate. See Newberne v. Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 359 N.C. 782, 784, 618 S.E.2d 201, 203 (2005) (A motion to dismiss under N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) `is the usual and proper method of testing the legal sufficiency of the complaint.' (quoting Sutton v. Duke, 277 N.C. 94, 98, 176 S.E.2d 161, 163 (1970))). As the Court stated in Newberne, our task in reviewing the trial court's order dismissing this claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to inquire whether, as a matter of law, the allegations of the complaint, treated as true, are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under some legal theory. Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiff contends that N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 sets forth the controlling legal theory upon which his claim for punitive damages may rest. This statute provides: Punitive damages may be awarded, in an appropriate case and subject to the provisions of this Chapter, to punish a defendant for egregiously wrongful acts and to deter the defendant and others from committing similar wrongful acts. N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 (2005) (emphasis added). Plaintiff asserts that punitive damages may be awarded to deter others from similar wrongful acts, even though it is obvious that decedent could neither be punished for any wrongdoing nor deterred from committing similar wrongful acts in the future. It is axiomatic that [w]hen the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity, it is the duty of this Court to give effect to the plain meaning of the statute, and judicial construction of legislative intent is not required. See Diaz v. Div. of Soc. Servs., 360 N.C. 384, 387, 628 S.E.2d 1, 3 (2006) (citation omitted). This Court has also stated that [o]rdinarily, when the conjunctive `and' connects words, phrases or clauses of a statutory sentence, they are to be considered jointly. Lithium Corp. of Am. v. Town of Bessemer City, 261 N.C. 532, 535, 135 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1964) (citation omitted). In Sale v. Johnson, this Court recognized a limited number of circumstances in which the conjunctive and and the disjunctive or could be interchanged by a court when applying a statute, one of which is  to effectuate the obvious intention of the legislature.  258 N.C. 749, 755-56, 129 S.E.2d 465, 469 (1963) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Contrary to plaintiff's assertions, we can discern no obvious legislative intent to treat the purposes of punishment and deterrence disjunctively in N.C.G.S. § 1D-1. The same must be said for the purpose of deterring a defendant and that of deterring others. As this Court has clearly stated, Chapter 1D reinforces the common-law purpose behind punitive damages. Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 167, 594 S.E.2d 1, 7 (2004) (citing N.C.G.S. § 1D-1). Plaintiff cites no authority preceding the enactment of Chapter 1D in 1995 in which this Court held that the purpose of deterring others, standing alone, was sufficient to support an award of punitive damages. In fact, when this Court has identified the purpose of deterring others, that purpose has consistently been coupled with the purpose of punishing a wrongdoer. See, e.g., Newton v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 291 N.C. 105, 113, 229 S.E.2d 297, 302 (1976) (North Carolina has consistently allowed punitive damages solely on the basis of its policy to punish intentional wrongdoing and to deter others from similar behavior. (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); Oestreicher v. Am. Nat'l Stores, Inc., 290 N.C. 118, 134, 225 S.E.2d 797, 807 (1976) (stating that punitive damages are usually allowed to punish defendant and deter others (emphasis added)). Nor has this Court interpreted N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 as abrogating the pre-existing common law. See, e.g., Rhyne, 358 N.C. at 176, 594 S.E.2d at 12 (A plaintiff's recovery of punitive damages is fortuitous, as such damages are assessed solely as a means to punish the willful and wanton actions of defendants and, unlike compensatory damages, do not vest in a plaintiff upon injury. (citation omitted)). Plaintiff contends this obvious legislative intent to have courts read and as a disjunctive or in N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 is found in N.C.G.S. § 1D-26. This statute exempts from the statutory cap on punitive damages claims established by N.C.G.S. § 1D-25 any punitive damages sought for injury or harm arising from a defendant's operation of a motor vehicle if the actions of the defendant in operating the motor vehicle would give rise to an offense of driving while impaired under G.S. 20-138.1 [impaired driving generally], 20-138.2 [impaired driving while operating a commercial vehicle], or 20-138.5 [habitual impaired driving]. N.C.G.S. § 1D-26 (2005). We certainly acknowledge the General Assembly's intent in section 1D-26 to punish individuals more severely for driving while impaired than for other tortious conduct by exempting such claims from section 1D-25(b). However, we cannot infer from section 1D-26 an obvious intent to have courts read and as a disjunctive in section 1D-1, which governs all punitive damages claims. Because we discern no obvious legislative intent to the contrary, we are constrained to apply the plain meaning of N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 to plaintiff's claim for punitive damages. Plaintiff concedes that decedent can no longer be punished or deterred for whatever egregiously wrongful acts he may have committed before his death. As a consequence, plaintiff is precluded as a matter of law from asserting his claim for punitive damages under N.C.G.S. § 1D-1.
Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-1 allows any claims he may have asserted against decedent to survive against defendant as the administrator of decedent's estate, including his claim for punitive damages. This statute provides: (a) Upon the death of any person, all demands whatsoever, and rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding, existing in favor of or against such person, except as provided in subsection (b) hereof, shall survive to and against the personal representative or collector of his estate. (b) The following rights of action in favor of a decedent do not survive: (1) Causes of action for libel and for slander, except slander of title; (2) Causes of action for false imprisonment; (3) Causes of action where the relief sought could not be enjoyed, or granting it would be nugatory after death. N.C.G.S. § 28A-18-1 (2005). Although punitive damages claims are not expressly excepted by this statute, the General Assembly has mandated that Chapter 1D prevails over any other law to the contrary with respect to such claims. N.C.G.S. § 1D-10 (2005). Thus, since N.C.G.S. § 1D-1 precludes plaintiff from asserting a claim for punitive damages against defendant, plaintiff cannot rely upon the survival statute to procure a different result.