Opinion ID: 1384669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: issues presented for appellate review

Text: A. General It is recognized that this case as a first-impression decision writes our standard for the future; consequently this court should not be unmindful of its constitutional responsibility of Art. 5, §§ 2 and 3, Wyoming Constitution. In our exercise of appellate review and administrative responsibility, grand jury procedural supervision should not be unwittingly excluded. Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge and Undue Influence, 39 U.Chi.L.Rev. 761, 767 (1972), discusses the grand jury as an arm of the court. I cannot justify the whatever goes attitude of criminal-process justification as the limit of judicial responsibility. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118 (1951); Note, Powers of Federal Grand Juries, 39 Cal.L.Rev. 573 (1951). I do not ignore the abrasive protection afforded federal grand juries by the trend of recent United States Supreme Court cases. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397, reh. denied 351 U.S. 904, 76 S.Ct. 692, 100 L.Ed. 1440 (1956); and United States v. Mechanik, supra, 475 U.S. 66, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50. This case, it is to be remembered, involves a state court, and invokes state laws which construe and apply our state Constitution. The United States Congress, administrative agencies such as the Department of Justice, and the federal judiciary, have an emplaced, mandatory grand jury. Federal impediments to an equivalent process by indictment realistically affording equality with the information-charging process do not exist in this state and should not now be created out of whole cloth in contravention of Wyoming constitutional due process and equal protection. B. Recording and Grand Jury Records Despite its extensiveness, the discussion of this subject in the majority opinion appears to be totally academic. Divined from the prosecuting attorney's prior experience in the federal court system grand juries, as well as appearances that a reporter was present, together with a partial but extensive actual record, amplified by the cuteness in brief reference, it would appear that the total session was reported. This scenario, lacking anything to contribute a contrary notion and with Hennigan out of confinement anyway by commuted sentence, adds little as to whether or not the prosecutor in this case only called in the reporter after the first 67 indictments, since there is no transcribed record for these appeals. The terrible danger of the court's discussion is to suggest that a future nonutilization of reporters at grand jury sessions, contrary to universal federal practice and at least by implication contrary to rules and the recently enacted statute of this state, might be acceptable. See § 7-5-206, W.S. 1977, 1987 Replacement. A record is required after refusal to testify for action properly to be taken upon trial court appearance. The statutory provision, If a witness appearing before a grand jury refuses, without just cause shown, will obviously impose a burden if there is no record of earlier events invoking refusal. Furthermore, § 7-5-208, W.S. 1977, 1987 Replacement, obviously contemplates a record: (a) Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror, may be made to the district attorney for use in the performance of his duties. The district attorney may disclose so much of the grand jury's proceeding to law enforcement agencies as he deems essential to the public interest and effective law enforcement. (b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that a particularized need exists for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. Perjury charges cannot be pursued unless a record is made. Selective reporting might afford a usable trial defense if perjury should be charged and prosecuted where the entire sessions have not been reported. Finally, I would question that a prosecutor can obviate discovery rights of Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P. found in subsection (a)(1) or whatever Jencks Act rights are provided in subsection (b), by failing to provide a reporter for the sessions. This court brings unnecessary problems to procedure and due process in its present failure to exercise both adjudicatory responsibility and constitutional supervision in providing, as generally exists for other processes in criminal procedure, that a record will be made and retained for transcription or audio consideration. I would find that the prosecuting attorney, with or without concurrence of the district court, if he did exclude the reporter's participation occasionally or regularly, has deliberately undertaken to avoid due process and equal protection and consequently calls into question the validity of the session. In addition to defending counsel, appellate jurists might have a vicarious interest in the process used and in any construction of the law given to the grand jury by the prosecuting attorney. C. Discovery and Disclosure  Grand Jury Secrecy The sole Wyoming statute in force at this time relating to confidentiality of the grand jury session was derived from § 75, Chapter XIV, Wyoming S.L. 1876: No grand juror shall be allowed to state or testify in any court in what manner he or other members of the grand jury voted on any question before them, or what opinion was expressed by any juror in relation to such question. Section 7-5-213, W.S. 1977. [9] The Wyoming rule on discovery in criminal cases, Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., Discovery and inspection, is comparable with some of the provisions of Rule 16, F.R.Cr.P. and some of the Jencks Act provisions of Rule 26.2, F.R.Cr.P., with substantial differences. Most notable in the resulting provisions is the elimination of Rule 16(c)(3), F.R.Cr.P.: Except as provided in 612(i) and 26(2) and subdivision (a)(1)(a) of this rule, these rules do not relate to the discovery of the grand jury. Countervailing the provisions in regard to production of a statement of witness as derived from Rule 26.2(f), F.R.Cr.P., the definition of the term statement in Rule 18(c)(4), W.R.Cr.P. does not include a statement however taken or recorded or transcription thereof made by the witness to a grand jury. See an analysis of the federal grand jury in Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343. This confusion of Wyoming rule as countervailing the Jencks Act constitutional concern is unexplained and unexplainable. Cf. Jones v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 837 (1977); DeLuna v. State, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1021 (1972). Consequently, the application of federal precedent to the status of Wyoming law, except in the constitutional and due-process purviews, is minimally persuasive in view of the limited requirement of confidentiality afforded by then effective Wyoming statutes. Actually, it appears that the investigating officer was available, apparently identified, but not called to testify before the grand jury. Whatever, if anything, this process did to isolate the investigation reports of Lauck from discovery in the open-file arrangement later professed by the prosecuting attorney cannot be established on this record. The particular document beneficial to the defense if available either in open-file or Jencks Act disclosure would be the undercover agent's investigation report in comparison with trial testimony. See Rule 18(c)(1), W.R.Cr.P. The relevant grand jury issue was whether the hearsay indictment report was consistent with trial testimony. Shaded meaning is not unknown in statement or testimony where the searchlight of knowledgeable cross-examination is extinguished. Capacity to question affords a factor of validity. In discovery activities, following arrest, arraignment on July 5, 1985, and plea entry, a general-case management order was issued and filed July 11, 1985 for each of the persons represented by the Public Defender's office (two local attorneys), providing: 1. All motions under Rules 9, 12, 13, 16B(1), 16(b)(2), 17, 18, 22, 23 [except 23(d)], and 40 and demands under Rules 16.1 and 16.2, W.R.Cr.P. shall be filed and scheduled so as to be heard on or before Aug. 19, 1985. 2. This case will be tried to a jury of 12 commencing on 9th day of September, 1985, at the hour of 9:00 o'clock a.m. (stacked case # 7) in a District Courtroom, Campbell County Courthouse, Gillette, Wyoming. 3. Pursuant to Rule 19, W.R.Cr.P. a pretrial conference will be held on the 19th day of August, 1985 at the hour of 1:30 o'clock P.M., (scheduled for 1 hour) in the office of the undersigned. Thereafter, on August 12, 1985 the State filed a motion for reciprocal discovery, requesting examination, inspection, photocopy, etc.: 1. List of all witnesses that the defendant intends to call at the trial in this matter. 2. Copies of any and all written statements made by witnesses to be called by the defendant (excluding statements of the defendant). 3. Any scientific or medical reports, books, papers, documents, or other tangible objects the defendant expects to produce at trial. 4. Production for viewing of any and all tangible evidence in the possession of the defendant that the defendant expects to introduce at trial. The anomaly of this request, while grand jury records were denied, cannot be unnoticed in unjustified expectancy, if not chutzpah, since on the same day, the Public Defender, through two attorneys, Steven Weerts and Michael Rosenthal, had filed a motion to produce transcript and minutes of the grand jury proceedings and evidence related thereto in behalf of 22 indicted individuals of the grand jury indictees on the 45 cases for which they had then been appointed. On August 16, 1985, the State filed a demand for notice of alibi in the form required by Rule 16.1, W.R.Cr.P. and Rule 12, F.R.Cr.P. The Public Defender, aided through the assistance of the Defender Aid Program at the University of Wyoming, by Professor Gerald M. Gallivan, then moved to dismiss the indictments, with extensive brief support, stating in part: The defendants have no direct knowledge of the course of investigation and prosecution because of the self-serving cloak of secrecy. The minimal information available from court files has been supplemented by press releases and common talk. Any inaccuracies in the following are unintentional and result from the prosecution's choice of secrecy.       5. The Grand Jury proceedings were not recorded, thereby preventing a review of their sufficiency and propriety. See A B A Grand Jury Principle 15. Compare the recording requirements at the preliminary hearing. The prosecuting attorney responded in part: Rule 6(e)(3)(c) Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides the following: (c) Disclosure otherwise prohibited by this rule of matters occurring before the grand jury may also be made (i) when so directed by court preliminary to or in connection with the judicial proceedings; or (ii) when permitted by a court at the request of the defendant, upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. If the court orders disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, the disclosure shall be made in such manner, at such time, and under such conditions as the court may direct.          The State must point out that the above named defendants all have submitted Notices of Discovery to the State and the State has submitted all police reports, chemical testing reports, evidence log-in reports, transcribed telephone conversations and other investigative information contained in the files of the above named defendants.[ [10] ]          The present Motion to Dismiss the indictments against the defendants and the Motions by the above named defendants for discovery and the State's compliance with the discovery motion, mandates that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Indictments in the above captioned matter be denied. At the hearing, appellant's counsel considered the lack of factual knowledge of what record was available. After an extended hearing-time discussion, the order denying motion to dismiss filed September 9, 1985 also considered rights to discovery and provided: 8. There are sufficient methods under the Wyoming Rules of Criminal Procedure for discovery with regard to Grand Jury Indictments to avoid a denial of due process. 9. The lack of a preliminary hearing should not have any substantial effect on discovery by the defendant. Further, there is no constitutional or common law right to a preliminary hearing. The problem with the foregoing is that none of it is centered upon the actual fact that a record may have been made and that a court reporter actually was recording the entire session, which fact was never made known to defendant in court session or otherwise. The first time this court or, as far as is known, the Public Defender became aware of the fact that there was any transcription record of the grand jury session as retained by the prosecuting attorney until after his election defeat and his departure from Wyoming, was by a telephone call. The clerk of the district court telephoned on Friday, April 10, 1987, revealing for the first time that the prosecuting attorney had retained this record without filing it with her until after other records had been certified and sent to the Supreme Court upon appeal. Documents to be included by the Designation of Record dated February 19, 1986, could not, of course, be honored by the clerk of the district court because these records had not been filed by the prosecuting attorney: COMES NOW the Defendant, Joseph M. Hennigan, by and through his Attorney, Michael B. Rosenthal, and hereby designates the entire transcript and all court records as the record on appeal, including without limitation, the peremptory challenges, pleadings, briefs, orders, exhibits, instructions and judgment and sentence. Pursuant to Rule 2.01 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure, as amended, I would like to request that the transcription in the case of The State of Wyoming v. Joseph M. Hennigan, Criminal Action No. 2061, be prepared. Please include all pre-trial proceedings, all trial proceedings, including voir dire, opening and closing statement, post-trial motions and the sentencing hearing. Judge Judson has signed an Order allowing this appeal to proceed in forma pauperis. Therefore, the transcript will be paid by the County, pursuant to Section 7-11-518 of the 1977 Wyoming Statutes. If you have any questions about the composition of this record, please do not hesitate to contact me. Thank you very much for your assistance in this matter. Very truly yours, /s/ Michael B. Rosenthal Assistant Public Defender Following denial by the district court of the motion to quash indictments and dismiss the grand jury, as the result of the hearing on August 29, 1985, the Public Defender, in behalf of 43 named individuals, next filed a proceeding in this court, as the appropriate appellate tribunal, for an order staying proceedings. The issue was reiterated in the memorandum of law accompanying the application which repeated the complaint about the absence of a known record of the grand jury proceedings: Compounding the perfunctory indictment process are the problems that come to light before trial. The secrecy, non-discoverability and non-reviewability of proceedings not only undermines the reliability of the indictment process, but the defendant may well go to trial without the basic knowledge necessary to defend the charges.       The Grand Jury proceedings were not recorded, thereby preventing a review of their sufficiency and propriety. See ABA Grand Jury Principle 15. Compare the recording requirements at the preliminary hearing.       In the present case, the words `A true bill' have been typed at the bottom of each pre-prepared indictment in absolute defiance of the Statute. The significance of this `rush to judgment' increases in the context of a Grand Jury returning 67 indictments and 232 counts in less than 3 days. Taking into consideration the requirement under Section 7-5-206 that no attorney nor any other unauthorized person be present during the expression of Grand Juror's views or the giving of their votes on any matter, one is left with a picture of hurried comings and goings in order to return 20 indictments and 80 counts per day, scarcely time to endorse `A true bill' on each. Attached to the proceeding filed in this court, was a copy of the American Bar Association Grand Jury Policy and Model Act (1982), which included as items of relevance: 15. Principle # 15 would mandate stenographic or electronic recording of all matters before the grand jury  except the deliberations of the grand jury itself. This would represent a logical step forward in grand jury reform, and is not inconsistent with the necessity of maintaining grand jury secrecy. The judge's charge to the grand jury would be recorded, as would the prosecutor's introductory remarks and testimony and questioning of all witnesses. Some 31 states already require recording of all grand jury proceedings other than votes and deliberations, and an additional 6 states permit it, according to a Library of Congress study (printed in 1976 Hearings Record, House Judiciary Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship and International Law, at 714). Since this proposal was adopted by the ABA in 1977, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have been amended to require recordings of all grand jury proceedings. This is a major step forward. Major groups have supported this requirement. The American Law Institute, in its Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, urges that a record be made of all proceedings before the grand jury. The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice on the Prosecution Function [§ 33.5(c)]  already ABA policy  provide that, `The prosecutor's communications and presentations to the grand jury should be on the record.' The accompanying commentary points out that `since grand jury proceedings are generally secret and ex parte, it is particularly desirable that a record be made of the prosecutor's communications and representations to the jury.' The Prosecution Standards of the National District Attorneys Association [§ 14.2(F)] also urge that `all testimony before the grand jury should be recorded.' Recording will aid the prosecution  by insuring that perjured testimony does not go unpunished. Recording would also act as a restraint on the prosecutor not to exercise undue or improper influence on the grand jury. [11] This court was not advised that the assumption of fact was in error and that at least some part of the grand jury session had been reported and partly transcribed. Consequently, not only was the trial judge misled, but this court was also misled. A serious ethical concern is presented. In his brief, appellant related to the absence of the record on the assumptive basis that no record of the grand jury session existed: 5. the failure to record the proceedings and the vote as to each count. In response, the attorney general failed to afford information to this court that a record did exist, and to the contrary stated in summary: Appellant's battery of charges leveled against the grand jury system in Wyoming can be reduced to its simplest terms, he was not accorded discovery in the format he preferred, i.e., through a preliminary hearing. In making this assault Appellant ignores that he has no constitutional right to discovery, that a preliminary hearing is not intended to serve as a discovery device, and that he was afforded the usual discovery provided by our rules of procedure. We should not ignore explicit rules or current authority which, in this case, were hidden by suggestion of the prosecutor that a record did not exist or could not be obtained. I deny avoidance of explicit Wyoming rule and statutory provision by the use of secrecy to hide the fact that a record could be obtained. The importance is recently reemphasized in Jones v. State, 297 Md. 7, 464 A.2d 977 (1983), and Martinez v. State, 309 Md. 124, 522 A.2d 950 (1987), wherein the Maryland court said that once a prosecution witness has testified on direct examination, a defendant is entitled to inspect that witness' grand jury testimony for cross-examination purposes without any further showing of need; here, this would include the suppression hearing, where the appropriateness for disclosure is as compelling as at trial. The court pointed out that suppression hearings are often the most important phase of the prosecution and resemble full trials in many respects. Discussion of discovery within the grand jury indictment scenario becomes something to be pursued between obiter dictum and academic or hypothetical review on this record. In retrospective evaluation, the prosecutor intentionally, deliberately, and effectively misled defense counsel and the court as to what record might exist. As a consequence, the trial court, in its order of September 9, 1985, denied the motion to dismiss (without affording discovery), essentially aproving that which, as far as was known, did not exist  even though it did exist, at least in some still unknown part. The result was no actual right to discovery although authorized pro forma by the court. [12] On September 2, 1986, after primary election defeat and early departure from Wyoming, Murray, as the county prosecuting attorney, filed a motion to seal notes and records: COMES NOW the State of Wyoming by and through the undersigned Campbell County and Prosecuting Attorney and moves this honorable court for an order sealing the notes and records of the Campbell County Grand Jury which met from June, 1985 to January, 1986. As grounds for this motion the State of Wyoming alleges and asserts that: 1. The proceedings of the Campbell County Grand Jury and thus the notes taken during those proceedings are secret and cannot be disclosed absent an order from this court. In addition the Grand Jury maintained records pursuant to the charging order of this court which reflect the business conducted by the Grand Jury. 2. The records and notes have been consolidated into two boxes which have been sealed pending disposition by the court. WHEREFORE the State of Wyoming moves this court to direct the Clerk of the District Court to take custody of the records and seal them pending further order of the court. The resulting order, dated September 2, 1986, stated: The State of Wyoming's `Motion to Seal Notes and Records of the Campbell County Grand Jury' having come before the court, the court hav[ing] reviewed the motion, and being otherwise advised in the premises; IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Clerk of the District Court shall take custody of the notes and records of the Campbell County Grand Jury which are presently in two sealed boxes, seal and keep same until further order of the court. In review of this record, after current discovery that some records did exist, this court addressed a request of counsel by reference to the district court for consideration, to which an order was issued: The above-entitled cases having come before the Court for the purpose of considering appellants' motion to supplement the record on appeal with the transcripts and other records of the proceedings of the grand jury, and the Court finding no good reason why the record should not be so supplemented, it is ORDERED that all transcripts and records of the proceedings of the grand jury be transmitted to the Supreme Court of Wyoming. The point in academic consideration of this constitutional discovery issue is informative about what was furnished: transcript of hearing of motion to dismiss August 29, 1985; two files containing order convening, jury list, jury summons and returns, precipes, subpoenas, returns, motion and order to unseal grand jury records; 30 volumes of grand jury testimony, involving interviews of two dozen persons taken in the period between July and December, 1986; plus notification that the testimony of 16 witnesses also taken in the same period was not transcribed. In casual review, we find what was not included: no exhibit of any kind, leading one to wonder whether 94 indictments were obtained without a single exhibit (including samples of controlled substances), and specifically no undercover agents' investigative reports; no notes or records of the grand jury referenced in the motion to seal; no transcript of the initial charging session; no record of advice furnished to the session generally as to the process; and no record of witness appearances before the district court to record testimony or grant immunity, except Volume IIIA as to one witness. It takes less suspicion than this experienced practitioner can afford to deny suggestion that the absence of candor and exercise of fair-minded prosecutorial responsibility is less than discernible in evaluation of this bobtail record said to be all transcripts and records of the proceedings of the grand jury. Simplistically, the majority apprehend to this arrogant display a presumption of regularity. The lack of candor of the prosecutor leaves circumstantial justification to question that unsupported assumption. We also make note of an apparent misunderstanding of the record where the court says: There is also an inconsistency in Hennigan's position. He claims that the failure to make a record of the grand jury proceedings has deprived him of the right to discovery in almost the same breath in which he claims that the indictment was based wholly on hearsay. Both could not be true. Certainly the acceptance of the assumption that this indictment was based upon hearsay testimony makes clear the proposition that no prejudice could attach with respect to the failure to report the proceedings as there would have been no statement available of a witness who testified at the trial. Majority opinion at 370. We know what we do from admissions by brief of the State clearly stating how the initial 67 indictments were factually founded: The grand jury heard evidence received through testimony of the supervising officers of the undercover agent, containing information about the contacts and buys of controlled substances from the above named defendants. This is determined sufficient for the grand jury to find probable cause. Discovery in a material sense invoking the perjury inquiry, related to a comparison of what was provided the grand jury with what was said at trial, is the first obvious concern. Assuming, rationally, that Deputy Hamilton summarized and discussed investigative reports of Lauck to the grand jury, trial counsel would be finitely interested in those reports for comparison with trial testimony as well as procedural aspects involving instructions given by the court and legal instruction provided by the prosecutor. From what is more than a somewhat academic inquiry, it is fruitful to wonder what Murray actually did during the grand jury discussion and voting, including method of use of the pre-typed indictments. Logically, then, to further regurgitate the Gillette scenario in behalf of Hennigan, who after all has secured a commutation of his sentence, we are called to analyze standards for the future in event of recurrence in the context of the pre-May 22, 1987 Wyoming law, the federal law from which precedence is announced, and then the present Wyoming statutes and rules. Perhaps more so than in any subject on grand jury law, availability of information for defense counsel provides the only meaningful protection against abuse, misuse, and totalitarianism in the system operation. In adoption of the rules of criminal procedure, this court provided for discovery in Rule 18, W.R.Cr.P., similar to Rule 16, F.R. Cr.P. and the exclusion of rule of evidence, Rule 1101(b)(2), F.R.Cr.P. [13] By statute, included in the 1876 territorial code as Ch. LXI, Compiled Laws of Wyoming 1876, and now found in § 1-27-125, W.S. 1977, the use of habeas corpus is defined: Habeas corpus is not permissible to question the correctness of the action of a grand jury in finding a bill of indictment, or a petit jury in the trial of a cause nor of a court or judge when acting within their jurisdiction and in a lawful manner. Since the Wyoming rule provision for discovery accords rights similar to the federal process, I would apply the comment of extensive authorities found in Federal Criminal Code and Rules, p. 70 (West 1986 ed.), as referenced to a dozen law journal articles and extensive case law. State v. Moffa, 36 N.J. 219, 176 A.2d 1 (1961). Summarized accurately: The extent to which pretrial discovery should be permitted in criminal cases is a complex and controversial issue. The problems have been explored in detail in recent legal literature, most of which has been in favor of increasing the range of permissible discovery. Federal Criminal Code and Rules, supra, Notes, p. 70. The newly enacted statute now provides, with reference to secrecy and discovery: (a) After the grand jury is impaneled and sworn, the district judge shall charge the jurors as to their duties particularly to the obligation of secrecy which their oaths impose, and give them any information the court deems proper concerning any offenses known to the court and likely to come before the grand jury. Section 7-5-202, W.S. 1977, 1987 Replacement. (a) Disclosure of matters occurring before the grand jury, other than its deliberations and the vote of any juror, may be made to the district attorney for use in the performance of his duties. The district attorney may disclose so much of the grand jury's proceeding to law enforcement agencies as he deems essential to the public interest and effective law enforcement. (b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, a juror, attorney, interpreter, stenographer, operator of a recording device or any typist who transcribes recorded testimony may disclose matters occurring before the grand jury only when so directed by the court preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding or when permitted by the court at the request of the defendant upon a showing that a particularized need exists for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. (c) No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this section and W.S. 7-5-207. Section 7-5-208, W.S. 1977, 1987 Replacement. Consequently, the legislature adopted the particularized need criteria for support of a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand jury. [14] As with all other problematic aspects of grand jury operation, the issue of availability of information has usually been considered in the context of secrecy, disclosure and discovery. There remain, therefore, on principle, no cases in which, after the grand jury's functions are at an end, the privilege of witnesses to have their testimony blanketed in secrecy should be deemed to continue. This is, in effect, the law as it is generally accepted today, but it is not usually stated so sweepingly. By statute or decision the rule of absolute secrecy has been abolished, and the common expression of the rule now is that disclosure may be required `whenever it becomes necessary in the course of justice.' Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is the statutory basis for disclosure in the federal courts and it provides for inspection of grand jury minutes both by the prosecution and defense within the discretion of the court. Similar provisions are in effect throughout most of the states. Comment, The Impact of Jencks v. United States and Subsequent Legislation on the Secrecy of Grand Jury Minutes, 27 Fordham L.Rev. 244, 245 (1958). Comment, Disclosure of Federal Grand Jury Material, 68 J.Crim.Law & Criminology 399 (1977); Comment, Discovery By a Criminal Defendant of His Own Grand-Jury Testimony, 68 Colum.L.Rev. 311 (1968); Note, Lifting the Bridled Veil: Disclosure of Grand Jury Proceedings Under Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 3 Am.J. of Trial Advocacy 459 (1980); Seltzer, Pre-trial Discovery of Grand Jury Testimony in Criminal Cases, 66 Dick.L.Rev. 379 (1962). In addition to the direct issue of discovery and disclosure, the general subject of secrecy has occasioned frequent, critical and comprehensive review. See 2 Beale & Bryson, Grand Jury Law & Practice; Comment, Secrecy in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal For a New Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 38 Fordham L.Rev. 307 (1969); Note, A Reexamination of the Rule of Secrecy of Grand Jury Minutes in the Federal Courts, 34 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 606 (1959); Kennedy and Briggs, Historical and Legal Aspects of the California Grand Jury System, 43 Cal.L.Rev. 251 (1955); Note, Grand Jury Minutes and the Rule of Secrecy in Federal Litigation, 55 Nw.U.L.Rev. 482 (1960). In one of the more significant early reviews on the subject, Professor Sherry made these comprehensive remarks:    In the light of this experience, and since it is self-evident that disclosure is far more compatible with a just, fair and equitable administration of justice than the policy of secrecy, it seems plain that there is no rational basis for the opinion that complete grand jury secrecy is indispensable. Liberal as some courts may be in permitting inspection of the minutes for the purpose of impeachment or in the case of `particularized need,' the prevailing, traditional policy of secrecy is an anachronism that has long outlived any real necessity. Comment, Grand Jury Minutes: The Unreasonable Rule of Secrecy, 48 Va.L.Rev. 668, 684 (1962). See Maldonado v. State, 93 N.M. 670, 604 P.2d 363 (1979); and Comment, Criminal Procedure  Grand Jury  Inadmissible Evidence, Due Process, 11 N.M.L.Rev. 451 (1981). A demonstration of the trend and delineation of the reasons is found in Connecticut, where by recent constitutional amendment the indicting function of the grand jury was replaced by information in serious-crime cases, as described by the Connecticut Supreme Court in State v. Rollinson, 203 Conn. 641, 526 A.2d 1283, 1288 (1987): The changes    represent the collective judgment of the legislature and of the voters that indicting grand juries did not provide adequate safeguards for those accused of having committed serious crimes. As we noted in State v. Mitchell, 200 Conn. 323, 326-27, 512 A.2d 140 (1986), `[a]lthough originally conceived as a shielding device to protect individuals from unfounded prosecutions [citation] the grand jury system came to be widely criticized for its secret operation and its ex parte nature. [Citations.]' The grand jury system precluded the accused person from effective participation in its processes and precluded judicial review of the evidentiary basis of any indictment that the grand jury might return. Further support for a modernized or enlightened view is found in approval by the American Bar House of Delegates, Grand Jury Principle No. 32 (1987), which provides for the release of all grand jury materials to the defendant after indictment unless, upon a showing of good cause, a court decides that a protective order is appropriate. 56 U.S.L.W. at 2095. D. Hearsay It is not the burden of my dissent to exclude all hearsay from indictment and preliminary-hearing processes, although legalistic justification for a requirement of real, knowledgeable evidence can be found in logic and precedent. In due-process terms, we should not justify second-hand evidence when the real thing, namely the actual witness, is available. I do not accord Wyoming justice to cases such as State v. Higgins, 201 Conn. 462, 518 A.2d 631 (1986) (before that state constitutionally abandoned the grand jury process), in adopting United States v. Mechanik, supra, by rote. Better evidence when readily available but not used should justify indictment dismissal. The practice  as in the instant case  of relying on hearsay rather than upon the testimony of eye-witnesses is pernicious for two reasons. First, it habituates the grand jury to rely upon `evidence' which appears smooth, well integrated and consistent in all respects. Particularly because neither cross-examinations nor defense witnesses are available to them, grand jurors do not hear cases with the rough edges that result from the often halting, inconsistent and incomplete testimony of honest observers of events. Thus, they are unable to distinguish between prosecutions which are strong and those which are relatively weak. All cases are presented in an equally homogenized form. A grand jury so conditioned is unable to adequately serve its function as a screening agency. It cannot exercise its judgment in refusing to indict in weak cases where, technically, a prima facie case may have been made out. It is, moreover, unlikely to demand additional evidence. The second reason the practice is undesirable is that it prevents the defendant from utilizing grand jury testimony in cross-examining witnesses who will testify at the trial. Since no witness the government intends to use is called before the grand jury, it avails a defendant little to have the grand jury testimony furnished to him at the trial. United States v. Arcuri, 282 F. Supp. 347, 349 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 913, 89 S.Ct. 1760, 23 L.Ed.2d 227 (1969). Probably the most controversial and criticized penumbras of the grand jury denominated inquiries is the use of hearsay evidence. Standards utilized in various jurisdictions move from complete acceptance as existent here to the further removed reform status where normal rules of trial admissibility are applied. Addressing the subject in consonance of a rule of reason, if the total grand jury system justifies retention, the moderate view is clearly indicated by justice, due process, and rational use. [15] The rule followed is generally a principle of necessity that a total hearsay prosecution is unacceptable, but the use of some hearsay is not a basis for successful attack on the grand jury indictment if the live witness is not reasonably available to testify. Directly, this means that Lauck, and not the completely uninformed supervisor, should have provided actual rather than second- or even third-hand hearsay testimony as was apparently presented in the original indictments in these cases. This rule accords with the general practice of modern-view states, and is not inapposite to the federal court practice by manual direction of the Department of Justice now utilized. In addressing indictments based on hearsay, the New York courts have said:    [A]s a matter of public policy, the courts, in an effort to deter baseless prosecutions, have established that criminal prosecutions be underpinned by the sanctity of an oath which would subject the complaint to the penalty of perjury if it is willfully false   . People v. Bishop, 64 Misc.2d 147, 314 N.Y.S.2d 419, 420 (1970). Unabashed hearsay does not necessarily meet this New York test. In like rationale, in a concurring opinion in State v. Parks, Alaska, 437 P.2d 642, 645-646, 37 A.L.R.3d 605 (1968), Justice Rabinowitz, one of the premier justices of current time, discerned: In State v. Shelton [Alaska, 368 P.2d 817, 818-819 (1962)] this court said that one of the purposes of grand juries, as provided for in article I, section 8 of the Alaska constitution, is to carry out the vital function of protection of the innocent against oppression and unjust prosecution. Unless this court is prepared to change its evaluation of the role that grand juries actually play, or should play, in our society, rejection of the Supreme Court of the United States' construction of the fifth amendment, announced in Costello v. United States, is indicated. If the institution of the grand jury is viewed as an anachronism, then Costello has appeal, for there the Supreme Court held that an indictment proper on its face returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury is sufficient to require a trial on the merits. The Supreme Court in Costello also emphasized the likelihood of interminable delays and abuses of criminal practice which would result if indictments were held subject to attack on grounds of the inadequacy, or incompetency, of the evidence which was presented to the grand jury. Admittedly, these are factors which must be considered in the shaping of any system for the administration of criminal justice. Yet it seems to me that our system of criminal laws must include procedures whereby cases in which there is an absence of reliable evidence can be detected and filtered out prior to the trial stage. Before an individual suffers any of the serious inconveniences which are apt to ensue upon the return of a felony indictment (arrest, loss of job, humiliation, etc.), there should be a reliable determination made as to the probability of his guilt. See in accord, State v. Gieffels, Alaska, 554 P.2d 460, 465 (1976), subsequently retried and affirmed in Gieffels v. State, Alaska, 590 P.2d 55 (1979): In restricting the type of testimony which may be introduced to the grand jury, it is not our intention to turn this stage of the proceedings into a mini-trial. However, the rationale for limiting hearsay testimony appears evident; before the accused suffers any of the grave inconveniences which are apt to ensue upon the return of a felony indictment, there should be a reliable determination made as to the probability of his guilt. This can best be guaranteed when witnesses against the accused appear in person before the grand jury so that the panel can view their demeanor and subject them to cross-examination. In our view hearsay evidence, if unchecked, would erode the protective value of the grand jury so as to make it nothing more than an administrative arm of the district attorney's office. If the grand jury indictment process is to fulfill its intended functions, this must not be allowed to happen. The struggle of the federal courts, commencing with some recognition of the philosophy of Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), came to United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668 (2d Cir.1955), reargument denied 232 F.2d 958 (2d Cir.1956), in which even Judge Hand recognized that cases should exist where `   the finding of a grand jury is based upon such utterly insufficient evidence, or such palpably incompetent evidence as to indicate that the indictment resulted from prejudice, or was found in wilful disregard of the rights of the accused.' Id. at 679, quoting from United States v. Farrington, 5 F. 343, 348 (D.C.N.Y. 1881). Assessing the symptom as a cure for the disease, the United States Supreme Court in Costello v. United States, supra, birthed the rule that even if all the evidence presented to the grand jury was hearsay, no basis to quash the indictment existed. Neither the historical assumptions manifested by the opinion nor the perspicacity to recognize future problems as reflected by later cases was evidenced. It was apparent that Justice Burton in concurrence had more clearly understood:    I agree with Judge Learned Hand that `if it appeared that no evidence had been offered that rationally established the facts, the indictment ought to be quashed; because then the grand jury would have in substance abdicated.' [ United States v. Costello, ] 221 F.2d 668, 677. Accordingly, I concur in this judgment, but do so for the reasons stated in the opinion of the Court of Appeals and subject to the limitations there expressed. See also Notes, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 111; 65 Yale L.J. 390. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. at 365 [76 S.Ct. at 409], Burton, J., concurring. Editorial writers have reflected:    However negligible may be the impact of the Costello rule in practice, it undoubtedly will provide an opportunity for renewed discussion of the validity of the grand jury today. Note, Indictment Upheld Even Though Founded Solely on Hearsay Evidence, 104 U.Pa. L.Rev. 429, 435 (1955). The pathway of persuasion in Second Circuit progression is found in seven succeeding cases. Judge Friendly, in United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 391 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965), said: If [the witness] had testified before the grand jury, the defendants would have been entitled to have the judge inspect the minutes and turn over any parts useful for cross-examination. [Citations.] The Government ought not be allowed, by having its principal witness speak to the grand jury through the voice of another, to deprive a defendant of this right to impeach by contradiction. It is true that inconsistencies found in the grand jury testimony of such a surrogate are less susceptible of effective use than if the witness himself had testified; when the witness is confronted with what appears to be an inconsistency, he may deny having made the contradictory statement to the agent and counsel's only recourse would be to call the agent and endeavor to have him prove the contrary. In United States v. Payton, 363 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 993, 87 S.Ct. 606, 17 L.Ed.2d 453 (1966), Judge Feinberg wrote the majority, and Judge Friendly, in dissent, again stated: The course followed by the Government in this case makes a mockery of the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that `No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.' What compromises this indictment is not that the grand jury heard only hearsay testimony as in Costello, [supra,] but that, in sharp contrast to that case, it had no way of knowing that the testimony which was all it was hearing was hearsay. Despite the lame apology offered at trial by Agent Ward, his statements to the grand jury, recorded in the transcript annexed to this opinion, were the words of a man who had seen or heard whereof he spoke and were plainly meant to be taken as such; the Government does not contend anything was said to the grand jury before Ward was sworn that would have apprised it of his limited knowledge.    If, in these narcotics peddling cases, the Government insists on pressing Costello to the point of offering a grand jury only hearsay testimony by a surveilling agent when there is no apparent reason save a transparently unworthy one for not producing the agent with firsthand knowledge, it must make clear to the jurors the shoddy merchandise they are getting so they can seek something better if they wish; thus pressing the prosecutor for more reliable evidence  particularly important in these narcotics prosecutions where there is often a problem of the reliability of an agent's identification  is the grand jury's historic function. Next addressed in United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 730 (2d Cir.1966), cert. dismissed 389 U.S. 80, 88 S.Ct. 253, 19 L.Ed.2d 255 (1967), the standard was established: While we are not condemning the procedure used here before the grand jury, we think it not amiss for us to state that excessive use of hearsay in the presentation of government cases to grand juries tends to destroy the historical function of grand juries in assessing the likelihood of prosecutorial success and tends to destroy the protection from unwarranted prosecutions that grand juries are supposed to afford to the innocent. Hearsay evidence should only be used when direct testimony is unavailable or when it is demonstrably inconvenient to summon witnesses able to testify to facts from personal knowledge. In United States v. Beltram, 388 F.2d 449 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Colon v. United States, 390 U.S. 955, 88 S.Ct. 1860, 20 L.Ed.2d 869 (1968), the majority denied attempt to mislead the grand jury, and Judge Medina dissented: I dissent. But I do not dispute the fact that there is no constitutional obstacle to the presentment of a case to the grand jury by means of hearsay evidence. Such a view is foreclosed by Costello v. United States, [supra]. My point has a double aspect. As the grand jury may and often does refuse to indict, it seems to me that it is only just and fair to require the prosecutor at least to warn the grand jury that most or all of the proofs presented are at second hand. Of even greater significance, in my opinion, is the evil practice, especially in narcotics cases, of using before the grand jury only a peripheral witness, who recites in more or less narrative fashion what other narcotics agents have seen, heard or done. 388 F.2d at 451. Next arising as an issue in United States v. Catino, 403 F.2d 491 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 1003, 89 S.Ct. 1598, 22 L.Ed.2d 780 (1969), the court adhered to the Umans standard, but defined that because of the indictment being less than a week after that case, it would be unduly harsh exercise of supervisory power to impose sanctions upon the government for failing to achieve compliance. Judge Friendly, in writing the opinion in United States v. Arcuri, 405 F.2d 691 (2d Cir.1968), cert. denied 395 U.S. 913, 89 S.Ct. 1760, 23 L.Ed.2d 227 (1969), accepted the trial court analysis of the short time occurring after the Umans and Beltram cases, and found absolute requirement for dismissal on the basis of hearsay use for indictment. Morality and fairness finally survived, and despite the misguided posture earlier pontificated in Supreme Court decision in finding that enough was enough in United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1136-1137 (2d Cir.1972), a conviction was dismissed by virtue of the hearsay usage in indictment. Judge Friendly spoke for the court:    When the framers of the Bill of Rights directed in the Fifth Amendment that `No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury,' they were not engaging in a mere verbal exercise. The importance of avoiding undue reliance upon hearsay before a grand jury is heightened by this circuit's view that an indictment constitutes a finding of probable cause and avoids the need for a preliminary hearing under F.R.Cr.P. 5(c).          The many opinions in which we have affirmed convictions despite the Government's needless reliance on hearsay before the grand jury show how loathe we have been to open up a new road for attacking convictions on grounds unrelated to the merits. We have been willing to allow ample, many doubtless think too ample, latitude in the needless use of hearsay, subject to only two provisos  that the prosecutor does not deceive grand jurors as to `the shoddy merchandise they are getting so they can seek something better if the wish'   .    We cannot, with proper respect for the discharge of our duties, content ourselves with yet another admonition; a reversal with instructions to dismiss the indictment may help to translate the assurances of the United States Attorneys into consistent performance by their assistants. It was found that procedural rules of the Justice Department failed, and that only reversal could remove the evil of uncontrolled hearsay usage. Not dissimilar in substance to the use of factually uninforming hearsay is the subject of prosecutorial abuse derived from perjured or knowingly false testimony. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781 (9th Cir.1974); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610 (N.D.Okla. 1977); State v. Reese, 91 N.M. 76, 570 P.2d 614 (1977); Note, Quashing Federal Indictments Returned Upon Incompetent Evidence, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 111 (1948); Comment, The Prosecutor's Unnecessary Use of Hearsay Evidence Before the Grand Jury, 61 U.Wash.L.Q. 191 (1983); Comment, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence From Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72 Yale L.J. 590 (1963); Westling, Use of Hearsay Testimony Before Oregon Grand Juries, 62 Or.L.Rev. 505 (1983). As court processes sometimes tend to bury reason in ritual and rationalization, it is fairly observed that the practical basis for hearsay exclusion is ignored. It is simply unreliable. The error factor in repeated conversation is exponentially extended. In current literature, Bergman, Ambiguity: The Hidden Hearsay Danger Almost Nobody Talks About, 75 Ken.L.J. 841 (1987), essays the thought-provoking function of ambiguity. We need only evaluate his thesis and included topics to recognize that as in the saga of Campbell County, unbridled use of hearsay for any purpose defeats the basic interest of the justice system of search for truth and validity. In analyzing the ambiguity of ambiguity, the author reminds us of the language features of abstraction, polarity, unconventional meanings, form versus function, chronology, filling, and conclusion, all of which directly challenge the factual validity of hearsay, not to disregard faulty memory, diminished perception, and insincerity. In rejecting uncontrolled hearsay usage for indictment or for preliminary hearing for that matter, I abjure reexecution of Sir Walter Raleigh: A few centuries ago, Sir Walter Raleigh was executed in the Tower of London after being convicted of treason. The conviction rested in part on the hearsay testimony of a fisherman, who testified that `a Portuguese gentleman' had told him that Raleigh intended to murder the King. One would think that the possibility that the fisherman's testimony would be admissible today had been safely put to rest. Yet, if a federal judge believed that the Portuguese gentleman's statement was made under conditions suggesting its trustworthiness, Sir Walter might fare no better today than he did under Elizabeth. Id. at 883. Uncontrolled and unnecessary hearsay as a basis for factually charging may actually be as discerned by Justice Burton: to be `no evidence.' [16] Costello v. United States, supra, 350 U.S. at 365, 76 S.Ct. at 409. Paraphrased to the Not wrong, don't fix it rule, we should reasonably say, If it isn't any good, don't use it. E. Due Process The conduct of the initial grand jury session accords most interest in only conjecture since undocumented by available record. [17] Critically, we have a due-process question where the equivalently valid result would have been achieved if either the undercover investigating officer or the prosecuting attorney simplistically and procedurally, without additional ceremony, had signed the indictments by endorsement of a true bill, in counterpoint to any execution by the grand jury foreman. It is passing strange that all efforts undertaken to date have produced neither a testimony transcript of the deputy sheriff, or copies of whatever reports were used in conjunction with the oral testimony of the supervising deputy sheriff, Steve Hamilton, for informational delivery to the grand jury membership. A minimum effort to afford compliance with due process would require that the undercover agent, as well as his reports and summarization, should have been presented in order to afford evidence first-hand as would actually inform the grand jury. It is fair from what is decided in this case to say that the contention of deprivation of due process was answered factually that no due process was afforded in the indictment methodology; none was denied, since none was offered or provided. With that status established, I then consider whether this accords constitutionally required rights. I will not concur with the court in its essential conclusion that the charging process where the grand jury is used can be illusory so that it becomes a contrived excursion of the will of the prosecuting attorney, as a clerical accomplishment. In effect, this court seems to conclude that constitutional protection need only be provided in the trial itself, and the distinction of the erosion of the individual's liberty interest to enjoy due-process rights does not arise at the earlier accusatory or investigatory stages. The distinction cannot be discerned from Wyoming Constitution terminology that the grand jury in indictment delivery would eschew a validating criminal-charge characteristic and instead afford a rubber-stamp prosecutorial fiat by ministerial result: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Article 1, § 6, Wyoming Constitution. It is established in historical activity, differentiated from factually unsupported repetition in some opinion writing, that the grand jury essentially never was utilized to protect the individual. Reason abounds why the vast majority of nonfederal criminal proceedings in all but a few states now proceed by information and preliminary hearing processes as being less expensive, dispositively faster, and most particularly preferable in affording desired protection to the individual from the misguided, mistaken or promiscuous prosecutorial process empowered to the prosecuting attorney. The distinction must be clearly understood between the grand jury which constitutes a conduit to initiate a criminal charge, constituting only an indictment function, and the investigatory grand jury, which does serve to be informed, advised, and intrinsically decisional. We need not travel backward in moralistic regression to debate the due-process advantage which incubated and nurtured the prosecutorial disuse of the grand jury in favor of the information-preliminary hearing. Wyoming in essence since statehood has normally utilized the information in recognizing the reason for pre-trial protection of the individual from conflagration by the prosecutorial process. See National Lawyers Guild, Representation of Witnesses Before Federal Grand Juries, Ch. 12, Abuse of the Grand Jury Process, and Ch. 13, Prosecutorial Misconduct (1979). Note also is required that less than ten percent of all criminal complaints are ever considered in jury trial. Consequently, the only due process which would ever be accorded 90 percent of the time is at issue before a plea is entered. Within its territorial imperative, the prosecutorial function exhibits more discretional aura over the life, liberty, and conduct of individuals than exists in any other character of officialdom within the democratic society. Rational persuasion is critically de minimis to expand that territory by determination that due process only arrives when the petit jury convenes. I cannot accommodate to an analysis that in the absence of statute no preliminary hearing is required, since the statute now exists and any repeal would undoubtedly engender serious procedural and due-process constitutional inquiry. [18] A view is expressed that the baby should be saved even if the bath water is discharged: All of these values will be fostered if we require the prosecutor to present the federal grand jury with a prima facie case of legal guilt, strengthen the grand jury's capacity to make a reliable ex parte adjudication of guilt, and provide greater judicial safeguards against prosecutorial misconduct before the indicting grand jury. Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 Mich.L. Rev. 463, 579 (1980). Nearly every authority similarly analyzes societal requests to either eliminate or renovate. I reject the see no evil, hear no evil posture of the majority, and would accrue to the institution's operative protections to justly present retribution for a civilized society, or if not done, then foresee that the legislature should follow England and eliminate. In the absence of the elimination of the grand jury as presently constituted, I would find a due-process requirement that its function as an actual evaluative entity requires real evidence and proper procedure, or contrarily that a preliminary hearing can be required as a matter of right by the indicted party. In due-process terms, the process should afford reasonable reliability as to be compared as a reflection of the prosecutor's beliefs, however well intended, and his prosecutorial desires, however motivated. In constitutional terms, it is this requirement of reasonable determinate reliability that becomes the responsibility of this court in exercise of its supervisory responsibility. The collective acceptance of oppressive conduct in the name of criminal justice effectuates a denial of due process. F. Equal Protection Because of prosecutorial immunity, this court is denied effectuation of the general ideal stated by Justice Scalia in Anderson v. Creighton, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3038, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), when he said that if    government officials abuse their offices, `action[s] for damages may offer the only remedial avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees,' Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. [800,] 814, 102 S.Ct. [2727,] 2736, [72 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)], even though, as he continues in the opinion, the Supreme Court of the United States has never suggested that the precise contours of official immunity can and should be slavishly derived from the often arcane rules of the common law. 107 S.Ct. at 3041. With prosecutorial immunity granted in Wyoming by Blake v. Rupe, Wyo., 651 P.2d 1096 (1982), cert. denied 459 U.S. 1208, 103 S.Ct. 1199, 75 L.Ed.2d 442 (1983), misconduct can only be addressed by challenges to the process aberrations by judicial supervision and rejection. Prosecutorial abuse that is not repaired by damage responsibility must certainly be circumscribed by judicial supervision. With the recently enacted grand jury statute in Wyoming, and the complete absence of any realistic authority from the previous law, it is now the province of this court to determine the fairness and viability of the grand jury system as acceptable to the electorate and the political system. My premise in dissent is accommodated by the view that the legislature has determined that the grand jury system as an adjunct in criminal-law enforcement serves a purpose, and that this court then has its primary obligation to assure a proper functioning in constitutional perspective, fairness and justice. In my opinion, the reasoned start of the United States Supreme Court in recognizing protective requirements for prosecutorial processes as found in Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 4 S.Ct. 111, 28 L.Ed. 232 (1884), with Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975), now fails to achieve accommodation under the Constitution of the State of Wyoming, in abject yielding to the diminished justice guarantees afforded by United States v. Calandra, supra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561; Costello v. United States, supra, 350 U.S. 359, 76 S.Ct. 406, 100 L.Ed. 397; and now most recently United States v. Mechanik, supra, 475 U.S. 66, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 93 S.Ct. 1602, 36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973). In according the effect of this decision not just to Hennigan but to a 1987 world and a new statute, we do not deal in construction or reapplication of intent of the legislature except that a process be available. We are concerned with the fundamental factors of the justice-delivery system in execution of a process created or diminished by judicial supervision and constitutional application. I find no basis in our constitutional heritage for the use of the grand jury as a prosecutorial tool, with little differentiation from the filing of an information except for additional investigatory support by secretly subpoenaed witnesses. Consequently, the basic intent that pretrial appearances to test probable cause should not be differently available in either of the prosecutorial methods which may be employed in the courts of this state is recognized in simple application of the terms of our Constitution itself. This court cannot have it both ways and hide any disingenuous activities of the prosecutor behind secrecy, and then say that the individual is afforded due process when a right for an impartial magistrate is ignored or denied. I would simply say today that such a right is required by the Constitution of our state. [19] It cannot be ignored that the English nation, the birthplace of our system of justice, found that the operational grand jury lacked societal justification in its total elimination now more than 55 years ago. Furthermore, in Wyoming, it cannot be denied that in preservation of due-process and liberty interests, indictment is not equal to charging by information, and cannot, in procedural terms, be academically characterized as fair. Attacking as it does that liberty interest which invokes the strict-scrutiny standard, I cannot relate unfairness and inequality to reach acceptance within constitutional guarantees. Neither equality nor fair protection is accorded to the individual by the uncontrolled grand jury encroaching upon rights reserved to him by explicit constitutional guarantee. In assessing that the denial of a right must be vindicated by an effective remedy, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Hobby v. United States, supra, 468 U.S. 339, 104 S.Ct. 3093, 82 L.Ed.2d 260, equal protection must not be denied. G. Burden of Cases This court adjusts to the 67 indictments and the approximately 237-count, three-day session in remarking that:    [T]he grand jury might have relied upon the same evidence in addressing cases involving several defendants. Given these circumstances we cannot say that the grand jury did not properly perform their assigned tasks in the time available; we will presume that they did. Majority opinion at 373. My power to presume is comparably limited in absence of an actual record to determine real events. Hopefully, these events will not be repeated while the foresight of man doth run not to the contrary; cross-assumption in argumentative opinions does little to establish a standard for future conduct of these criminally charging processes. Pragmatically, I cannot presume more than extensive trial experience and analysis would permit me to conclude in application of Frankfurter's criteria of ignoring as judge what we know as man. First, no real evidence by a knowledgeable witness was presented in that three-day session; second, in following his anticipation, all indictments were pre-prepared by the prosecutor; and third, the grand jury had no conception of proof or process in the actual indictment production. My real concern about the Campbell County grand jury episode is the fundamental overwhelming of the Public Defender's office in post-indictment process and subsequent trial, where individual rights to justice became enfolded or ensnared in the grab-bag, mass-produced factory for conviction. Inadequate records and unprovided discovery occurred. The statutory compliance and constitutionally provided rights of the preliminary hearing process were demonstratively denied in the proscription of a fair and adequate justice-delivery system. Not to be either Chicken Little or Cassandra, uncontrolled totalitarianism of the criminal process can happen here if constitutional guarantees are ignored when first denied to someone else. H. Prosecutorial Misadventure And Legally Impermissible Conduct 1. Interspousal privilege and denied witness privilege In his examination of a male subpoenaed witness who was not granted immunity, Murray engaged in a colloquy under the reconstructible probability in prosecutorial approach that the witness was probably a target, as was his wife: Q.    Let me tell you that you have a right to exercise a privilege as I ask you questions which is called the marital privilege, and that is to say, you do not have to testify about anything of a communicative nature between you and your wife. If I were to ask you some questions, did your wife tell you this or that, you do not have to answer those questions unless you choose to do so. That's called a marital privilege. However, my understanding of the privilege is it does not exist as to those things that you have observed her do. A. Okay. Q. I tell you that not because I intend to get into a large amount of questions concerning what you have observed your wife doing. Rather, we're going to discuss other people. But I believe you have a right to know about the marital privilege, and that you will be able to exercise the same privilege. Okay. Do you have any questions in that regard concerning the privilege? A. No, sir. Q. I'll try to alert you to the fact if I'm going to ask you questions that you have a right not to answer, if you choose not to do so. In the examination of Julie Jean Stahnke, whose husband was obviously a target, was later indicted, entered a plea, and was sentenced, and where the interspousal privilege was not even mentioned, Murray's introductory comment was: I must advise you that your responses that you give to the grand jury should in fact be truthful, because if you knowingly or intentionally made a statement in here which you knew not to be the truth, then you will have committed a crime called perjury, which is a felony punishable by five years in the Women's Correction Center down at Lusk. Do you understand that? He later further commented: Q. I have to honestly tell you that I don't think that's the truth, and I am placing you on notice that I think you are committing perjury at this particular point in time.       Q. Have you ever seen  strike that. Has your husband ever discussed the sale of methamphetamine or crank with you in the last three years?       Q. When was the last time you saw your husband consume methamphetamine? A. I would say the last time I saw him was when I did. Apparently Murray lacked familiarity with §§ 1-12-101 and 1-12-104, W.S. 1977, as well as the not unknown cases of Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 332, 71 S.Ct. 301, 95 L.Ed. 306 (1951), and Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 53, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980), where, in conclusion, even Justice Burger said:    Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. This modification  vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse  furthers the important public policy in marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs. 2. Immunity Pervasive in the conduct of the grand jury sessions was the attitude of the prosecutor that he was vested with the power to grant immunity and consequently forced testimony when Fifth Amendment rights were asserted. The relationship of the district court to the process is generally not recorded by available transcript, since it is revealed that on one occasion, after a witness refused to testify and was then taken to the district court for instruction, the session before the court was not transcribed by the prosecuting attorney's direction. The relationship of the so-called informal immunity to subsequent perjury charges affords some interesting academic review which does not occasion our instant comment since apparently none of the individuals subject to perjury is presently before this court on appeal. Lacking authority in common law or by statute for prosecutorial right to afford immunity, Murray apparently relied on what is characterized as informal immunity. See United States v. Anderson, 577 F. Supp. 223 (D.Wyo. 1983), rev'd by 778 F.2d 602 (10th Cir.1985), wherein in the latter case the right against self-incrimination was not considered on a lack of standing of a defendant to assert, by citation of United States v. Skolek, 474 F.2d 582 (10th Cir.1973). See more recently United States v. Kilpatrick, supra, 821 F.2d 1456. Immunity under the federal system requires a court order granted upon formal application. 2 Beale & Bryson, Grand Jury Law & Practice, supra, § 9.06, p. 20. Actually, the United States Attorney cannot act alone in seeking the order, but requires approval of certain ranking officers in the Department of Justice. Wyoming is classified generally as a state with no general-immunity statute. Id., § 9.09, p. 28. This text recites that the general statutory scheme is that immunity is granted by the court and not asserted by the prosecutor alone, and as to the Wyoming constitutional and statutory structure, only Art. 1, § 11 provides: No person shall be compelled to testify against himself in any criminal case, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. If a jury disagree, or if the judgment be arrested after a verdict, or if the judgment be reversed for error in law, the accused shall not be deemed to have been in jeopardy, and no other provision for immunity or requirement is provided that testimony can be elicited involuntarily when the right is invoked, except in separate statutory provision relating to controlled substance: All duly authorized peace officers including any special agents or other personnel appointed by the commissioner [attorney general], while investigating violations of this act [§§ 35-7-1001 to XX-X-XXXX] in performance of their official duties, shall be immune from prosecution under this act. Any person working under the immediate direction, supervision or instruction of a duly authorized peace officer, special agent or other person appointed by the commissioner, may be granted immunity from prosecution under this act by the commissioner. In addition to the foregoing persons, such immunity may also be granted to any person whose testimony is necessary to secure a conviction under this act with the consent of district judge in the district wherein prosecution is to take place. Any person granted immunity under this section shall not be excused from testifying or producing evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture. Any person who except for the provisions of this act, would have been privileged to withhold the testimony given or the evidence produced by him shall not be prosecuted, subjected to any penalty, forfeiture, for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, by reason of said immunity, he gave testimony and produced evidence; and no such testimony given or evidence produced shall be received against him in any criminal proceeding. Provided, no person given immunity under this section shall be exempt from prosecution for perjury or contempt committed while giving testimony or producing evidence under compulsion as provided in this section. Section 35-7-1043, W.S. 1977. [20] See, however, Miskimmins v. Shaver, 8 Wyo. 392, 58 P. 411, 49 L.R.A. 831 (1899); Richmond v. State, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1217 (1976), reh. denied 558 P.2d 509 (1977). Cf. Haselhuhn v. State, Wyo., 740 P.2d 387 (1987), Thomas, J., specially concurring. Although three of the witnesses, as determinable through the record, were taken before the district court, the only recorded appearance available involved Jayme Sue Fristam, who incidentally was later subjected to a perjury charge for which she undoubtedly inopportunely entered a guilty plea following a November, 1985 indictment. That initial exchange, in the absence of counsel, although her legal representation status was noted, is most curious: THE COURT: Court is in session in the matter of the Campbell County Grand Jury. Present in chambers is the official court reporter, Mr. Murray, the Campbell County and Prosecuting Attorney, and someone else that I do not know. Would you please identify yourself. MISS FRISTAM: I'm Jayme Sue Fristam. THE COURT: Jayme what? MISS FRISTAM: Fristam. THE COURT: All right. MR. MURRAY: Your Honor, Miss Fristam was subpoenaed before the Campbell County grand jury and went into testify in front of the grand jury at  approximately 10 minutes ago. She was properly sworn and then began to give testimony, and specifically in regards to a person by the name of James Charles McFarlane. I placed Miss Fristam on notice that I believed she was in the process of either committing or about to commit perjury, and explained perjury to her concerning the testimony that she was rendering, and then asked a question as to whether or not she'd ever been present at the time Mr. McFarlane had ever sold a controlled substance. At that time, and for purposes of this hearing, she then invoked her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, not as artfully, perhaps, as the Fifth Amendment may state, but essentially she wanted to remain silent and exercise her constitutional rights. I recognized that and at that time I told her that I was conferring upon her use and derivative use immunity and explained to her that her, her testimony and the fruits of her testimony could not be used against her in any court proceeding today or in the future. At that time she indicated she was still not going to answer the question and wanted to see her attorney. I enquired as to who her attorney was. She said that the attorney's name was Steve Johnson. I might note for the record, and I think the court's aware, that Mr. Johnson has entered an appearance on behalf of Mr. McFarlane. So I don't believe he can represent Miss Fristam. I asked her if she had been in contact with Mr. Johnson. She explained no, that his telephone was not working, and that she was unable to make contact with him. I then asked her whether or not she was going to answer my questions. She informed me that she was not going to answer my questions. And then I informed her that we would then come down before the judge for the purposes of the state moving for her to show cause why she should not be held in contempt of court. That is the reason that we're in front of you now. THE COURT: Thank you. Is that correct, Miss Fristam? MISS FRISTAM: Fristam. Yes. THE COURT: I'm sorry. Did Mr. Murray explain to you what he means by use immunity, that is, what you say cannot be used against you? That, of course, does not mean it cannot be used against other people, but it cannot be used against you. In addition, what he calls the fruits of that statement cannot be used against you. If what you say to the grand jury leads to the discovery of other evidence against you, that is called the fruits of your statement, and that cannot be used against you also. Do you understand that? MISS FRISTAM: Yes. THE COURT: By giving you that immunity you no longer are placed in jeopardy. And what the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides is that you are not required to give statements that can be used against you in criminal prosecutions. By being offered immunity they can no longer be used against you. So you no longer have a reason not to answer. Do you understand that? MISS FRISTAM: Yes. THE COURT: If you fail to answer the questions, the statutes dealing with the grand jury provide that if the court  and that's me  determines that the witness is bound to answer, and he persists in his refusal, he should be brought before the court and shall proceed in the same  who shall proceed in the same manner as if the witness had been interrogated and refused to answer in open court, which means we apply Rule 41(e) of our Rules of Criminal Procedure, and that's the rule dealing with criminal contempt. And that provides that a criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt, and that it was committed in the actual presence of the court. And, as you see, that statute says that if you refuse to answer the grand jury, it is to be treated as if it was done in front of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts, shall be signed by the judge, and entered on the record, and I may then place you in the county jail for a period of up to six months. In the alternative, if Mr. Murray should wish to proceed by way of filing a criminal contempt against you for criminal contempt, he may do that. A jury trial may be had. And if you are convicted you would face a possible penalty much in excess of six months. I believe that it is probably Mr. Murray's desire not to do that at this point, but I must tell you that if you refuse to answer the questions you will go to jail. I need to know now. Do you wish to answer the questions or not? Apparently the district court did not recognize that only he and not the prosecutor could grant immunity pursuant to the only applicable statute, § 35-7-1043, W.S. 1977. Derivation of any common-law immunity which otherwise was considered to be within the authorization of the prosecutor cannot be additionally justified or explained in the record then made. In the context that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely, I see this uncontrolled and irresponsible grand jury session as an unusually clear demonstration of that historical adage. It is also noteworthy that the immunity statute affords a transactional immunity contrary to the posture adopted by the prosecutor. The differentiation is described in 2 Beale & Bryson, Grand Jury Law & Practice, supra, § 9.03, p. 9: The two principal types of immunity are referred to as `transactional immunity' and `use and derivative use immunity.' Transactional immunity is broader. A witness who is given transactional immunity is protected against prosecution for any matter about which he testifies under the grant of immunity. Use and derivative use immunity gives the witness protection only against the use of his immunized testimony and the use of any evidence obtained by exploiting his testimony. Thus, while a witness with transactional immunity cannot be prosecuted at all for the offenses about which he testifies, a witness with use and derivative use immunity does not have that guarantee. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212, reh. denied 408 U.S. 931, 92 S.Ct. 2478, 33 L.Ed.2d 345 (1972); Foreword, Symposium: `The Granting of Witness Immunity', 67 J.Crim.Law & Criminology 129 (1976); and particularly Wolfson, Immunity  How it Works in Real Life, 67 J.Crim.Law & Criminology 167 (1976). Nothing is found in the opinions of the United States Supreme Court considering grants of immunity that suppose any common-law derivation conclusion. Kastigar v. United States, supra; Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 76 S.Ct. 497, 100 L.Ed. 511, 53 A.L.R.2d 1008, reh. denied 351 U.S. 928, 76 S.Ct. 777, 100 L.Ed. 1457 (1956); Hoffman v. United States, supra, 341 U.S. 479, 71 S.Ct. 814, 95 L.Ed. 1118; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 S.Ct. 644, 40 L.Ed. 819 (1896). Any basis for the prosecutor to accord to himself the power to grant immunity is certainly not justified by Wyoming case law, statute, or constitution. As a matter of fact, under the present circumstances, the right where no statute exists to waive prosecution by a grant of immunity and require testimony, lacks determinate validity. Attention by the legislature or by this court by rule, or both, would not be inappropriate. 3. Requirement that witnesses not discuss their grand jury testimony Simplistically stated, this absurd but generally used command of the prosecutor not only lacks legal validity, but under rule and statute is now directly contrary to express Wyoming statutory provisions. Perhaps the witnesses would like to have been accorded the same function as jurors, but, lacking statutory responsibilities, they could not be obligated by the same secrecy accountability. More expressively stated, although generally occurring in all cases except where for some reason the ending grand jury session contact with the witness went off the record, we find a female witness-prosecutor exchange illustrative: However, you are not at liberty to discuss it with any other members of the hospital staff, or with other members of the community unless you receive permission from a district court judge. [THE WITNESS]: District court judge? This is all  I have been in court 30 years ago when I divorced. May I explain that, sir? MR. MURRAY: We're not interested in the divorce. [THE WITNESS]: No, I know you are not.    I would just like you all to know that, if I, if something slips and I slip and say something. Tell me what I do? MR. MURRAY: Don't slip. [THE WITNESS]: Don't slip. Okay. MR. MURRAY: It's real simple. [THE WITNESS]: That's what I need to know. MR. MURRAY: Don't talk about what went on here today with anybody except your attorney and you won't have a problem. [THE WITNESS]: Okay. MR. MURRAY: And if you want to talk about it with somebody else, you contact your attorney; he'll apply to the court for permission, which will routinely be denied. [THE WITNESS]: Okay. Thank you. MR. MURRAY: But that's  the proceedings are secret. [THE WITNESS]: Okay. (Emphasis added.) This requirement asserted by the prosecutor compares with the secrecy criteria for only jurors and officers of court in prior law and present statutory provisions making clear in § 7-5-208(c), W.S. 1977, 1987 Replacement, that the obligation of secrecy is restricted.  No obligation of secrecy may be imposed upon any person except in accordance with this section [basically court personnel] and W.S. 7-5-207 [secrecy of indictments until a warrant issues]. (Emphasis added.) Synthesized in the silence demand and explicitly communicated threat of the prosecutor is the behavioral principle that it is OK if you can get by with it, in that in secrecy no one knows how the rules are written. Reference to the philosophical review found in Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 82 S.Ct. 1364, 8 L.Ed.2d 569 (1962) is helpful. 4. Jury term The Wyoming statute in force when these events occurred [21] contained no provision for length of term. One of the nine appeals, Kortz v. State, 746 P.2d 435, supra, invokes this specific question, together with other issues. The term of the District Court for Campbell County began on the first Monday of February and ended before the second Monday in September. Without regard for the argument otherwise pursued about completed investigations of individuals, Kortz v. State, supra, the county attorney continued without regard for the general rule that where not otherwise stated, grand jury terms end with the term of court for petit juries. At common law, the grand jury's term expired at the end of the term of the court during which the grand jury was convened. Many states continue to adhere to this common law rule; others have altered the common law rule by enacting statutes or rules governing the length of the grand jury's term. In the federal system, a regular grand jury sits for up to 18 months, although the court can discharge the grand jury before the end of the 18 month period. A special grand jury also sits for 18 months, unless discharged earlier by the court, but the court may extend the term of the special grand jury for periods of up to six months for each extension, if the court determines that the grand jury's business is not completed. The total term of the special grand jury, however, cannot exceed 36 months. A grand jury whose term has expired is no longer considered a grand jury; it loses the power to indict, to subpoena witnesses, and to engage in any of the other actions that a grand jury is otherwise entitled to perform. Because of the difference in their maximum potential terms, it is important to know whether a particular federal grand jury was convened as a regular grand jury or as a special grand jury. In most cases, the application and the order convening the grand jury will make this clear, but occasionally it will not be clear whether the grand jury was intended to be a regular or a special grand jury. In those cases, the reviewing court must consider factors such as the identity of the requesting authority, the language of the application, and the court's charge to the grand jurors in order to determine whether the grand jury is governed by the rules applicable to regular grand juries or by those applicable to special grand juries. The terms of state grand juries vary widely, from a minimum of 10 days to a maximum of 18 months, with extensions ordinarily available if authorized by the court. Typically, the extensions are authorized only to complete investigations or presentations that were already begun during the grand jury's regular statutory term. 1 Beale & Bryson, § 5.09, pp. 37-38. The issue is relevant as to this appeal only as the indicated attitude of the prosecuting attorney and further reason why this Supreme Court should not have so precipitously denied the writ for mandamus and prohibition on September 5, 1985, without hearing, all of which justifies the extent and detail of present consideration on this first completed and denied appeal. These events of misuse and erroneous advice are demonstrations of the absolutely compelling principle that secrecy and denied justice are joint passengers in this criminal-process vehicle.