Opinion ID: 1189662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The imperfect self-defense doctrine

Text: The development of the imperfect self-defense doctrine was fully traced in Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of second degree murder after shooting to death a man with whom he had previously argued and fought. The evidence indicated that the defendant believed his victim had a knife and was prepared to attack him with it. Defendant relied on a self-defense theory. The court instructed on that theory, as well as on the subjects of first and second degree murder, malice, manslaughter, and intoxication as it bore on intent to commit murder. The court failed to instruct sua sponte on imperfect self-defense. On appeal, we explained that an honest but unreasonable belief that it is necessary to defend oneself from immediate peril to life or great bodily injury (i.e., imperfect self-defense) will negate malice aforethought and reduce the offense from murder to manslaughter. (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 674-680.) We held, however, that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte on imperfect self-defense because, when the case was tried, the doctrine could not be considered a general principle of law requiring such instruction. ( Id. at pp. 680-683.) For future cases, we indicated that sua sponte instructions on the doctrine would be required where appropriate. ( Id. at p. 683.) In the course of our discussion, we traced the development of the imperfect self-defense doctrine as follows: In People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53], the defendant had been charged with the capital offense of assault on a police officer. We noted that an honest though unreasonable fear of bodily harm would not constitute a complete defense to the assault but would negate the element of malice required for that offense. ( Id. at p. 345.) A subsequent decision ( People v. Lewis (1960) 186 Cal. App.2d 585, 598 [9 Cal. Rptr. 263]) applied the foregoing theory in a homicide context. Dictum in People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 715, 718 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913], confirmed that instructions on the effect of an unreasonable belief that deadly force was necessary in defense of self would be appropriate in a murder case when the evidence shows the defendant believed he was acting in self-defense. (See Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 674-677.) The People had argued in Flannel that malice could be negated only by sudden quarrel or heat of passion on reasonable provocation (Pen. Code, § 192; further statutory references are to this code unless otherwise indicated) or by diminished capacity caused by voluntary intoxication, mental disease or mental defect (e.g., People v. Conley (1966) 64 Cal.2d 310 [49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911] [hereafter Conley ]). According to the People, the doctrine of unreasonable belief is necessarily bound up with or limited by the concepts of either heat of passion or diminished capacity. ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 677.) We disagreed, noting that [t]o hold that an honest but unreasonable belief in the need to defend mitigates to manslaughter only if accompanied by the heat of passion-type terror expected of a reasonable man renders superfluous the unreasonable belief doctrine expressed in prior cases. ( Id. at p. 678.) Flannel explained that [t]he nature of malice is central here for `[m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought' (Pen. Code, § 187; `[m]anslaughter is the unlawful killing ..., without malice.' (Pen. Code, § 192.) ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 679.) Relying on Conley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at page 322, we noted that if one is aware of his societal duty to act within the law, and nonetheless does an act likely to cause serious injury or death to another, he thereby exhibits a wanton disregard for human life or antisocial motivation that is equivalent to malice aforethought. ( Flannel, supra, at p. 679.) Flannel concluded its analysis by rejecting the People's claim that an honest belief, though unreasonably held, can be consistent with malice. As we stated, [n]o matter how the mistaken assessment is made, an individual cannot genuinely perceive the need to repel imminent peril or bodily injury and simultaneously be aware that society expects conformity to a different standard. Where the awareness of society's disapproval begins, an honest belief ends. It is the honest belief of imminent peril that negates malice in a case of complete self-defense; the reasonableness of the belief simply goes to the justification for the killing. ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d at p. 679.) In sum, although Flannel rejected the People's contention that imperfect self-defense is bound up or limited by the diminished capacity doctrine, we stressed that imperfect self-defense operates to negate malice because it represents an unawareness of one's legal and societal obligations, a state of mind necessarily inconsistent with malice. In the present case, we must decide whether, by reason of post- Flannel statutory amendments redefining the concept of malice, the doctrine of imperfect self-defense has been abrogated.