Opinion ID: 3064455
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The “chocolate cake caper”

Text: DeWeaver next challenges the trial judge’s interactions with the jury during deliberations, culminating in his “chocolate cake caper” jury instruction. The instruction was an illustrative hypothetical about his niece, Amy, stealing a piece of chocolate cake. DeWeaver argues that the state appellate court made an unreasonable factual determination when it found no indication of coercion and decided contrary to Supreme Court precedent in holding that the interactions were not coercive. We address each argument in turn.
When deliberations began, the jury requested that the trial judge clarify the definitions of “unambiguous” and “con- scious disregard for human life,” and inquired, “What are [the] options if we are [at] an impasse? We have a juror who is not cooperating.” Before receiving a response, the foreperson sent another note: “I am requesting an immediate audience with the judge, as one juror’s conduct is hindering the progress of this panel . . . .” The judge granted the foreperson an audience during which the foreperson revealed that one juror was not open to the suggestions of the other jurors and was making what the foreperson considered to be snappy retorts and insulting comments. The judge then re-instructed the entire jury regarding the definition of “conscious disregard.” He also admonished the jury: The People and the defendant are entitled to the individual opinion of each juror. Each of you must DEWEAVER v. RUNNELS 2213 consider the evidence for the purpose of reaching a verdict if you can do so. Each of you must decide the case for yourself but should do so only after discussing the evidence and the instructions with the other jurors. Do not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is wrong. However, do not decide any question in a particular way because a majority of the jurors or any of them favor that decision . . . . Remember that you are not partisans or advocates in the matter. You are impartial judges of the facts. The integrity of a trial requires jurors at all times during they’re [sic] deliberations to conduct themselves as required by these instructions. Accordingly, should it occur that any juror refuses to deliberate or expresses an intention to disregard the law or to decide the case based on penalty or punishment or any other improper basis, it is the obligation of the other jurors to immediately advise the court of the situation. The jury returned to deliberate further. The next day, the foreperson asked if the judge would pro- vide a further definition of “jury deliberation” to help convince the juror to deliberate. The judge asked the foreperson to explain what about the juror’s behavior indicated to the foreperson that he was refusing to deliberate. The foreperson described the juror as ignoring the conversation in the rest of the jury and refusing to explain his positions, with which the other jurors disagreed, using specific facts. The foreperson noted that the one juror appeared to disagree with the other jurors’ interpretations of the instructions. When asked, the foreperson was clear that the juror was not basing his opinion on an agenda or personal philosophy. 2214 DEWEAVER v. RUNNELS Because the disagreement seemed to center on the interpretation of certain instructions, the judge asked the foreperson to return to the jury and create a list of terms on which it needed clarification. After the foreperson returned to the deliberation room to create the list, DeWeaver objected to the court giving further definitions of terms, calling them “more items to hit [the holdout juror] over the head with.” The government argued that the holdout juror should be removed for refusing to deliberate. The court said it would not refuse to define terms for the jury and would take a “wait and see” approach to determining if the holdout juror was refusing to deliberate. Over the weekend, the court received another note from the foreperson and a note from the holdout juror. The foreperson’s note asked the court to define “deliberate,” “premeditation,” “reasonable doubt,” “circumstantial evidence,” “intent,” and “intentional.” It also noted that “some jurors are ready to walk if progress does not occur regardless of the consequences.” The holdout juror’s note denied the foreperson’s allegation that the juror was being belligerent or failing to deliberate and stated that other jurors had conducted themselves contrary to the court’s instructions. As a separate issue, the court had to replace a juror who had been in a car accident with an alternate. The court instructed the jury that because an alternate had replaced a juror, it had to start over with its deliberations. The court suggested that the jury consider choosing a new foreperson (while emphasizing that it was not a comment on the current leadership) and asked the jury to reconsider the list of terms it needed defined. At that time the court also discussed the “jurors walking” comment: That type of [ ] planning obviously is rather sharp, it’s rather confrontational, and it sets a tone that obviously gives concern to all of us. It is important that everybody deliberate with an open mind. It’s DEWEAVER v. RUNNELS 2215 also imperative that you keep in mind that you are not advocates, you are not partisans, you are judges of the facts, and with that approach and with that in mind and with all the other instructions that I’ve given you, when — you know, these are difficult issues, we understand that and we appreciate that. And sometimes one’s patience grows short and sometime personalities can get involved in the deliberations and take greater precedent over the issues that are — everybody’s there to deal with. The court adjourned the jury but asked the holdout juror to remain. The holdout juror accused the other jurors of considering improper bases like DeWeaver’s co-defendant’s conviction, personal knowledge of the crime scene, and the potential penalty. He further stated that the other jurors had commented that the defense had failed to prove its case. The holdout juror stated that he had told the rest of the jurors that what they were doing was improper and for the most part it stopped. The court then asked the juror to return to the jury and send down the foreperson. The foreperson confirmed that some impermissible bases had come up in the conversation, but that once he had noted the improprieties the jury had moved on without further considering such improper bases. At the end of his discussion with the foreperson, the court explained that it would define the requested terms for a jury in a presentation the next day. In defining the terms, the court used an expanded version of the “chocolate cake caper” hypothetical to illustrate the terms. The story, which fills 20-pages of transcript, was well summarized by the state appellate court: In [the] original version, the court had recounted the story of a dinner at which his young niece Amy repeatedly insisted on having some chocolate cake 2216 DEWEAVER v. RUNNELS right away but was told by her mother she would have to wait until after dinner. When the mother subsequently went into the kitchen to check on dinner, she discovered a chair had been pulled from the kitchen table to the counter where the cake was and that there was an irregular hole in the cake. The court discussed these facts, as well as cake crumbs and frosting found on Amy’s face, as circumstantial evidence that she had taken and eaten some of the cake. The court also explained that if the mother saw Amy standing on the chair, eating the cake, her testimony about her observations would be direct evi- dence. Addressing intent, the court explained that intent could be determined by statements made at or near the time of the incident and the circumstances surrounding the act. Returning to Amy, the court noted her intent could be inferred from her statement that she “wanted cake and wanted it now,” from the chair having been moved, and from a child-sized gouge in the cake. During deliberations, the court presented an expanded version of this hypothetical. Again the court explained how Amy’s intent could be inferred from statements and circumstances surrounding the act. The court hypothesized that the cake theft required premeditation and deliberation, which, it observed, were shown by Amy’s statement that she wanted the cake now and by her having moved and climbed on a chair to reach it. The court similarly related its hypothetical to the reasonableness of two possible explanations for the cake on Amy’s face and hands. Suppose, the court hypothesized, Amy said she had moved the chair and climbed up to sim- ply look at the cake, and then lost her balance and fell on the cake. Relating the child’s explanation to the [form] instruction (CALJIC 2.02) involving two reasonable interpretations of circumstantial eviDEWEAVER v. RUNNELS 2217 dence, the court stated that Amy’s interpretation was unreasonable in light of the evidence: Amy’s earlier demand for cake, the hole gouged in it, the cake on her face and hands, and that she was chewing when discovered. Turning to the jury’s request for clarification of “unambiguous intent” in the context of attempted murder, the court defined unambiguous as “clear, definite, susceptible of but one meaning, to unequivocally show an intent to kill.” Again referring to the Amy story, the court added to the hypothetical that Amy (1) enlisted her little sister to help “get some cake”; and (2) was caught red-handed just as she started to grab it. The court stated: “[Y]ou look at her conduct, you can consider her statements before or at the time of the act itself. That shows her intent. You look at the means that are utilized, the manner in which the act is done, and the totality of the circumstance[s]. That shows a clear intent to do the one thing that logically makes sense. [¶] I mean, one could say, well, maybe she was just trying to see how close her finger could get. That doesn’t make sense.” People v. DeWeaver, No. A091078, 2001 WL 1515830, at  (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 2001). After giving this expanded illustration, the trial judge admonished the jury to consider his story in the light of the other instructions and reminded the jurors of their duties. Specifically, he said: Please do not construe my explanation to be a com- ment by me on the evidence or a suggestion on what you should find to be the facts. Please remember that you are the exclusive judges of the facts and you 2218 DEWEAVER v. RUNNELS may disregard any or all of my comments if they do not coincide with your views of the evidence. Finally the judge reminded the jury: “Do not hesitate to change an opinion if you are convinced it is wrong. However, do not decide any question in a particular way because a majority of the jurors or any of them favor that decision.” Without further interaction with the judge, the jury returned its guilty verdict later that day. On direct appeal, the state appellate court determined: “[T]he record of the court’s inquiries into the questions and problems reported by the jurors reveals a prudent, reasonable and balanced course of action. We search the record in vain for any indication of coercion, express or implicit . . . .” DeWeaver, 2001 WL 1515830, at  n.7. However, because the hypothetical presented only situations in which Amy was guilty, the court concluded that it had a prosecutorial slant. Id. at . In deciding that any such error was harmless, it considered whether the instruction denied DeWeaver a fair trial. Id. The appellate court emphasized that the jury instruction correctly stated the law, the trial judge advised the jury not to use the instruction as a comment on the evidence, the facts of the hypothetical were very different from the facts of the shootings, the timing of the verdict did not indicate it was induced, and guilt or innocence was not a close factual issue. Id. at -11.
DeWeaver argues that the state court ignored material evidence in determining that the record contained no indication of coercion. He argues that, as a result, the state court’s factfinding process was defective and its decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. In Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2001), on which DeWeaver relies, this court cautioned that “before we can determine that the state-court fact-finding process is defective in some mateDEWEAVER v. RUNNELS 2219 rial way . . . , we must be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be unreasonable in holding that the . . . fact-finding process was adequate.” In Taylor, this court determined that no reasonable appellate tribunal would ignore the testimony of a witness that corroborated the petitioner’s version of challenged events. Because the state court had blatantly ignored such probative evidence, this court set aside its findings as unreasonable. Id. at 100507. In contrast, DeWeaver disagrees with the state court’s interpretation of the record but does not point to any material fact that the court failed to consider. The state appellate court accurately recounted the trial court’s interactions with the jury; nothing in the record indicates that its fact-finding process was unreasonable. Insofar as DeWeaver argues that the state appellate court failed to properly weigh the evidence, we consider this further in analyzing whether the court’s legal conclusion regarding coerciveness was contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.
[9] DeWeaver argues that the “chocolate cake caper” instruction was so coercive that it constituted directing a verdict. “Any criminal defendant . . . being tried by a jury is entitled to the uncoerced verdict of that body.” Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241 (1988). Thus, an instruction is unconstitutionally coercive if it denies a defendant the due process right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. See id. That right is not violated when the judge gives a so-called Allen charge, named for Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 50102 (1896), which encourages a dissenting juror to give weight to the views of the majority. To determine whether an instruction is coercive, the Court “consider[s] the supplemental charge given by the trial court in its context and under all the circumstances.’ ” Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237 (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965) (per curiam)). 2220 DEWEAVER v. RUNNELS In a case similar to this one, Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3 (2002), the Supreme Court reversed a grant of habeas, determining that the California court had reasonably concluded an instruction was not coercive. In that case, the jury deliberated for 28 hours before one juror asked to be removed from the jury. The foreperson accused that juror of failing to deliberate in a note that said, “nearly all my fellow jurors questio[n] her ability to understand the rules and her ability to reason.” Id. at 4. The court read that note aloud to the entire jury, instructed it that the one juror had the right to disagree with the rest of the jurors, inquired as to the latest vote count, and admonished the jury to consider the law as instructed and the facts as they found them. The next day, the one juror again asked to be removed, but the court insisted she continue trying to deliberate. The jury returned a guilty verdict after two more days of deliberation. Id. at 4-6. The Supreme Court upheld the state appellate court’s determination that no coercion had occurred, concluding that it was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 11. In many ways, the facts of this case are not sufficiently distinguishable from those in Early to warrant a different result. Although DeWeaver argues that the state court ignored how the trial court singled out the holdout juror and inquired into the deliberative process, the trial court in this case did no more in that regard than the court in Early. The only distinction between the two cases is the forty-five minute “chocolate cake caper” instruction, which the state appellate court concluded was prosecutorially slanted because it only presented hypothetical situations in which the suspect was guilty.4 The 4 DeWeaver also argues that the state court improperly applied harmless error analysis to this instruction, alleging that the error was structural. DeWeaver does not argue that a prosecutorial slant alone is structural error but that a coercive jury instruction would be structural error. Because we conclude that the state court reasonably determined that the instruction was not coercive, we do not reach the question of whether a coercive instruction would be structural error. DEWEAVER v. RUNNELS 2221 state appellate court considered the instruction an attempt to respond to the jury’s concerns and questions about the law, lauding its goal of explaining the law in an understandable manner while warning that such explanations must be evenly balanced. The court concluded that the instruction properly stated the law and, most importantly, that it did not deprive DeWeaver of his right to a fair trial. DeWeaver, 2001 WL 1515830, at -11. [10] Although the state court performed its fair-trial analysis in the context of harmless error, its analysis was consistent with Lowenfield, in which the Court describes an unconstitutionally coercive jury instruction as one that deprives a defendant of due process. 484 U.S. at 241. The state appellate court properly considered the totality of the circumstances surrounding the trial judge’s interactions with the jury, empha- sizing that the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the law, advised the jury not to use the instruction as a comment on the evidence, and employed hypothetical facts very different from the facts of the shootings. DeWeaver, 2001 WL 1515830, at . Neither the court’s reasoning nor result were contrary to Supreme Court precedent; therefore, we must let the state court’s decision stand. See Early, 537 U.S. at 8.