Opinion ID: 1389650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: use of defendant's statements made during police investigation and at the first trial

Text: The trial court refused to suppress statements defendant made to police detectives on June 16 without the benefit of Miranda warnings. Defendant claims that he was interrogated while in custody and, thus, Miranda warnings were required. See, e.g., State v. Hawkins, 27 Wn. App. 78, 615 P.2d 1327 (1980). [9] A case-by-case approach is generally used to determine what constitutes custodial arrest under Miranda, when formal arrest has not been made. See generally 2 W. Ringel, Searches & Seizures, Arrests and Confessions § 27.3 (1983). Both subjective and objective tests have been developed, using the following combination of factors: (1) was there probable cause to arrest at the time of questioning? (2) did the officers intend to hold the suspect if he refused to cooperate? (3) did the defendant have a reasonable, subjective belief that he was in custody? (4) was the investigation focused on the defendant at the time of questioning? See, e.g., United States v. Warren, 578 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 956 (1980); LaPoint v. State, 650 S.W.2d 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). This court has held that mere suspicion before the facts are reasonably developed is not enough to turn routine investigatorial questioning of a witness into a custodial interrogation for the purposes of requiring Miranda warnings. State v. Green, 91 Wn.2d 431, 436, 588 P.2d 1370 (1979), rev'd on rehearing on other grounds, 94 Wn.2d 216, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). Once the police have probable cause to arrest a suspect, however, delay in making the arrest cannot serve as an excuse for conducting interviews without Miranda warnings. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 32 Wn. App. 13, 645 P.2d 722 (1982). In this case, defendant was questioned by the police 2 weeks after the killings. He was met by the officers on the street and agreed to accompany them to their headquarters interrogation offices. The investigating officers testified that Dictado was one of as many as 20 suspects and that they did not have probable cause to arrest him. They were routinely questioning all suspects or potential witnesses who might help verify unsubstantiated leads. They also testified that the questioning was friendly and that they could not have restrained defendant had he refused to cooperate. We do not find it dispositive that probable cause to arrest did not exist at the time of questioning. However, the circumstances of the questioning indicate that it was part of a routine general investigation with which defendant voluntarily cooperated. The trial court properly admitted these statements. Defendant also argues that suppression of his testimony as a material witness at the Ramil-Guloy trial was required because the trial court failed to give him Miranda warnings before he testified. Defendant was brought to court to testify under a material witness warrant procured by the State. The detective executing the warrant gave Dictado verbal Miranda warnings, which Dictado acknowledged he understood. At the material witness hearing, outside of the presence of the jury, defendant was informed that he would be required to remain available as a witness that day, and, if not called, would be subject to subpoena. He was then called by the State, although the defense had endorsed him as a possible witness prior to trial. The trial judge did not give him Miranda warnings, nor inform him of his right to refuse to answer questions when incriminating responses were possible. Defendant testified about the Tulisan, admitting his own membership and naming other members of the Tulisan, but denying that Ramil and Guloy were members. He acknowledged meeting socially with Baruso 2 days before the killings, but failed to recall an argument with one victim. He admitted that he had visited Ramil in jail, including the night prior to his testimony, and presented alibi testimony for both Ramil and Guloy. He was allowed to leave the courtroom at the conclusion of his testimony. [10] We cannot agree with defendant's assertion that Miranda requires suppression of this testimony in his own trial. Miranda warnings were developed to protect a defendant's right not to be compelled to make extrajudicial incriminating confessions or admissions at the behest of police interrogators while in the coercive environment of police custody. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 48 L.Ed.2d 212, 96 S.Ct. 1768 (1976); Labbe v. Berman, 621 F.2d 26 (1st Cir.1980); Davidson v. State, 54 Md. App. 323, 458 A.2d 875 (1983). None of the circumstances under which Dictado testified fit the Miranda scenario: Defendant was not charged with or indicted for any crime at the time he was brought to court. He was informed by the trial court that he was required to remain in the courtroom for testimony purposes only, under a subpoena served at the hearing. He testified in open court in the presence of his counsel with whom he had previously discussed his testimony. Indeed, the Miranda warnings are inapt to this testimonial situation. A witness does not have an absolute right to remain silent when called to testify, as does a defendant in custody or on trial. See United States v. Mandujano, supra ; State v. Parker, 79 Wn.2d 326, 331, 485 P.2d 60 (1971). We are thus reluctant to extend the requirement of Miranda warnings to a nondefendant witness's testimony in open court. Accord, Labbe v. Berman, supra ; United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir.1979); United States v. Plesons, 560 F.2d 890 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (1977); Davidson v. State, supra ; State v. Williams, 59 N.J. 493, 284 A.2d 172 (1971); State v. Harge, 94 N.M. 11, 606 P.2d 1105 (Ct. App. 1979). Defendant suggests that without suppression under Miranda, his own prior testimony will have been unconstitutionally used to incriminate him. The constitution does not forbid self-incrimination. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 52 L.Ed.2d 238, 97 S.Ct. 1814 (1977). It does forbid, however, the use of involuntary statements against a defendant. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 98 S.Ct. 2408 (1978); Mead Sch. Dist. 354 v. Mead Educ. Ass'n, 85 Wn.2d 278, 534 P.2d 561 (1975). One giving testimony may protect against compelled disclosures by claiming a privilege against incriminating responses. United States v. Mandujano, supra ; Andino v. State, 645 S.W.2d 615 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Parker, supra . But one who voluntarily chooses to testify, forgoing the right not to provide answers when they might tend to incriminate, cannot later claim that the Fifth Amendment privilege was violated. United States v. Washington, supra . The proper test to be applied in this setting is whether, in light of all the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne. United States v. Washington, supra . We note that although defendant was brought to court to testify for the State, he had, on several occasions prior to trial, discussed his potential testimony with defense attorneys. He had indicated willingness to testify on behalf of Ramil and Guloy and was endorsed as a potential defense witness prior to trial. Defendant regarded Ramil's attorney as his own, and was represented by him prior to and during the testimony. Verbal Miranda warnings were given to defendant before he was brought to the courtroom, which warnings he indicated he understood. At one point during questioning, he asked the trial judge if he was required to answer a particular question, showing an understanding that he could refuse to answer. The trial court found that defendant's testimony was voluntary. Defendant assigns no error to this finding. We also find no basis for a claim that his Fifth Amendment privilege was violated. Defendant raises one further argument. Acknowledging that his counsel at the time he testified at the Ramil-Guloy trial was also defense counsel for Ramil, he points to a potential conflict of interest in the simultaneous representation. This conflict, he claims, deprived him of his right to effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment at a critical stage of the proceedings against him. See, e.g., In re Richardson, 100 Wn.2d 669, 675 P.2d 209 (1983). [11] We have recently reaffirmed that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only when formal judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated against a defendant. State ex rel. Juckett v. Evergreen Dist. Court, 100 Wn.2d 824, 675 P.2d 599 (1984). Defendant was present at the Ramil-Guloy trial only as a material witness. He was not arrested and charged in connection with the killings until 2 weeks after he testified. No Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached at the time of the Ramil-Guloy trial which could have been infringed by the asserted conflict of interest.