Opinion ID: 1711961
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Dr. Pucci Was an Expert within the Scope of Maday

Text: ¶ 24. The State also argues that Mayday is inapplicable because it did not hire Dr. Pucci as an expert. The State's argument is based primarily on its reading of State v. David J.K., 190 Wis. 2d 726, 528 N.W.2d 434 (Ct. App. 1994). It emphasizes the court of appeals determination in David J.K. that the psychological examination of the complainant authorized in Maday is strictly limited to situations in which the prosecution retains experts in anticipation of trial in order to present Jensen evidence. Id. at 735 (emphasis added). According to the State, it did not retain Dr. Pucci as an expert; rather, she was D.F.'s treating therapist. Because Dr. Pucci was D.F.'s treating therapist, the State contends, it was merely taking the facts and the witness as it found them. In essence, the State's position is that it is shielded from Maday because it was D.F. who retained Dr. Pucci, not the State. ¶ 25. We disagree with the State's characterization of Dr. Pucci as falling outside the intended scope of Maday. By reading too much into David J.K. and interpreting the concept of retain in an overly restrictive manner, the State's position overlooks the core rationale underlying Maday. [4] ¶ 26. The core rationale in Maday was one of basic fairness. If one side is to introduce testimony by a psychological expert who has examined the victim, the other side must also be able to request such an opportunity in order to level the playing field. Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 357. A jury will generally give the opinion of a psychological expert who has examined a party greater weight than the opinion of an expert who has not. The State's position suggests that the key fact in Maday was that its experts were the prototypical hired guns. However, in Maday, the key fact was that the psychological experts had personally interviewed and examined the complainant. ¶ 27. Moreover, the court of appeals in David J.K. did not focus on the distinction between hired gun experts and other experts. Instead, in determining that Maday did not apply, the court in David J.K. contrasted the reason the defendant before it was seeking pretrial psychological examinations with the reason the defendant in Maday sought an examination. David J.K., 190 Wis. 2d at 734. In Maday, the defendant sought a psychological examination in order to rebut the State's Jensen evidence. See id. (citing Maday, 179 Wis. 2d at 352 & n.3). In David J.K., the defendant sought psychological examinations in order to challenge the two victims' competency along with their credibility. Id. The court in David J.K. concluded that the defendant failed to make any showing that the victims lacked mental competency to testify, and therefore, was not entitled to examinations. Id. [5] ¶ 28. We read the court of appeals statement in David J.K. that a Maday determination is limited to situations where the State retains experts in anticipation of trial in order to present Jensen evidence as a reiteration of its holding in Maday. Maday sets forth the correct standard in detail: When the state manifests an intent during its case-in-chief to present testimony of one or more experts, who have personally examined a victim of an alleged sexual assault, and will testify that the victim's behavior is consistent with the behaviors of other victims of sexual assault, a defendant may request a psychological examination of the victim. 179 Wis. 2d at 359-60 (emphasis added). ¶ 29. In State v. Schaller, 199 Wis. 2d 23, 544 N.W.2d 247 (Ct. App. 1995), the court of appeals attempted to distinguish between a State psychological expert who has personally examined a complainant within the meaning of Maday and one who has not. The court explained that Maday involved experts who had conducted psychological examinations or psychological interviews with a complainant. Id. at 34. In upholding the circuit court's denial of the defendant's request for a pretrial psychological examination, the court in Schaller noted that the State's experts did not testify that they had examined the complainant. Id. Similarly, in State v. Mainiero, 189 Wis. 2d 80, 91, 525 N.W.2d 304 (Ct. App. 1994), the court of appeals referred to a Maday expert as one who has personally interviewed the complainant. [6] ¶ 30. We agree with the court of appeals' determination in Schaller that the fact that a Jensen witness has had previous professional interaction with the complainant does not by itself trigger Maday. Given the facts before us, however, we must clarify the distinction between an expert that may trigger Maday and an expert who has only minimal professional interaction with a complainant as contemplated in Schaller. [7] ¶ 31. Although the court in Schaller emphasized that none of the State's experts testified that they had conducted a psychological examination of the complainant, it also noted, somewhat ambiguously, that the State's psychological expert had met with the complainant on one occasion to evaluat[e] . . . her present functioning and . . . her past experiences. 199 Wis. 2d at 34. While we do not purport to set forth a bright line rule that will prove definitive in every case, the distinction between a psychological expert that triggers Maday and one that does not will depend in part on the extent and nature of the contact between the expert and the complainant. [8] ¶ 32. We must not lose sight of the fundamental fairness principle that drives the Maday decision. If the State is to introduce Jensen evidence through a psychological expert who has become familiar with the complainant through ongoing treatment, or through an intensive interview or examination focused on the alleged sexual assault, the defendant must have the opportunity to show a need to meet that evidence through a psychological expert of its own. As the Maday court explained in support of its holding, a definitive opinion requires an extensive interview plus review of material on the victim's life and behaviors. 179 Wis. 2d at 357. [9] ¶ 33. With these principles in mind, we conclude that it would strain logic and ignore fairness to determine that a psychological expert such as Dr. Pucci does not trigger Maday. Dr. Pucci was not just any professional who briefly encountered D.F. after a reported sexual assault. Dr. Pucci was a clinical psychologist who had an extensive, ongoing relationship with D.F. She interviewed, examined, and diagnosed D.F. Moreover, Dr. Pucci testified that the bulk of her treatment of D.F. in 1997 was directed at the sexual assault. In short, the extent and nature of Dr. Pucci's contacts with D.F. bring her within the ambit of Maday. ¶ 34. In addition, we agree with Rizzo and the court of appeals that the State retained Dr. Pucci in the sense meant by David J.K. Although there is no assertion by Rizzo that Dr. Pucci received a specific witness fee, the State admitted that it paid three times for Dr. Pucci's flights, hotel, rental cars, and meals in order to bring her from Tennessee, where she had relocated since treating D.F. [10, 11] ¶ 35. More to the point, however, we determine that even if the State had not compensated or reimbursed Dr. Pucci, she would still have been a Maday expert. A determination of whether the State retains an expert for purposes of Maday cannot stand or fall on whether or how it has compensated its expert. Such a determination would thwart the fundamental principle underlying Maday and would allow the State to subvert Maday by, for example, obtaining an expert willing to volunteer her time. For the same reasons, we conclude that an expert's status as the complainant's treating therapist does not preclude that expert from being retained by the State for purposes of Maday. ¶ 36. In sum, given the nature of Dr. Pucci's interactions with D.F., she was an expert within the scope of Maday. Her testimony contained Jensen evidence because she made a comparison between D.F.'s behavior and the behaviors of sexual assault victims generally. [12] ¶ 37. It is important to emphasize that our decision does not tie the State's hands in presenting expert witnesses in sexual assault trials. It does not require that a defendant receive a determination under Maday whenever the State calls a complainant's treating psychologist as a witness. Here, the State would have been free to elicit factual and opinion testimony from Dr. Pucci without triggering Maday if it had called a different witness in order to introduce Jensen evidence. Indeed, before trial, this is precisely the course the State represented that it would follow if it determined that Jensen evidence was necessary. ¶ 38. In addition, Maday' s own balancing test prevents a defendant from receiving a pretrial psychological examination in every case where the State wishes to call a psychological expert who has examined the victim to give Jensen testimony. A conclusion that a defendant is entitled to a Maday determination is not equivalent to a conclusion that the defendant is entitled to a psychological examination. For that, the defendant must show a compelling need for the examination under Maday. [13] ¶ 39. We are mindful of the need to protect the privacy interests of sexual assault victims and to ensure that they are not re-victimized by the intrusiveness of a defense psychological examination unless necessary to preserve the competing constitutional rights of the defendant. Sexual assault complainants should not be caught needlessly between their privacy interests and the vigorous prosecution of the alleged perpetrators. However, as we have indicated, it is only when the State seeks to admit Jensen evidence through a Maday expert that a complainant will face the possibility of a defense psychological examination. In many cases, the experts involved will not fall within the confines of Maday. [14] ¶ 40. Likewise, we stress that the very purpose of the Maday test is to account for the privacy interests of the victim in the face of the defendant's competing constitutional rights. See 179 Wis. 2d at 359-60. The factors under Maday represent substantial hurdles that a defendant seeking a psychological examination must clear. They ensure that the privacy interests of victims are properly protected, and they preclude defense psychological examinations that amount to nothing more than fishing expeditions. These factors, together with the obstacles that the defendant faces in asserting that the State's witness is an expert within the meaning of Maday, constitute a carefully crafted system of procedural and substantive safeguards that ensure the protection of the victim's privacy interests. [6]