Opinion ID: 1186734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: 2. Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 provides for both an independent judgment and a substantial evidence review of administrative decisions.

Text: Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides the basic framework by which an aggrieved party to an administrative proceeding may seek judicial review of any final order or decision rendered by a state or local [2] agency. Section 1094.5, subdivision (c), does not establish any single standard for judicial review of the evidentiary basis for agency determinations, but simply states: Where it is claimed that the findings are not supported by the evidence, in cases in which the court is authorized by law to exercise its independent judgment on the evidence, abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by the weight of the evidence; and in all other cases abuse of discretion is established if the court determines that the findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record. (Italics added). [3] (2) The Legislature originally enacted section 1094.5 as a codification of the then current approach to the judicial review of administrative decisions by writ of mandamus. ( Temescal Water Co. v. Department of Public Works (1955) 44 Cal.2d 90, 105 [280 P.2d 1].) In tracing the origin of section 1094.5, we note that prior to 1936 all administrative decisions were reviewable on writ of certiorari under Code of Civil Procedure section 1068. In Standard Oil v. State Board of Equalization (1936) 6 Cal.2d 557, 562-565 [59 P.2d 119], however, this court unanimously held that certiorari would not lie to review the decisions of statewide agencies which were not constitutionally authorized to exercise judicial functions. In Whitten v. California State Board of Optometry (1937) 8 Cal.2d 444 [65 P.2d 1296, 115 A.L.R. 1], we held unanimously that prohibition also would not lie to review statewide agencies empowered to exercise judicial functions. Then, in 1939, undertaking a new approach to the problem, the court unanimously held that the decisions of statewide agencies which lacked constitutional authority to exercise judicial functions could be reviewed by means of a writ of mandamus. ( Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors (1939) 13 Cal.2d 75, 82-85 [87 P.2d 848].) In Drummey, two duly licensed embalmers were charged with unprofessional conduct; the State Board of Funeral Directors accepted evidence on these charges and suspended the embalmers' licenses. The Drummey court reasoned, Legislative agencies, with varying qualifications, work in a field peculiarly exposed to political demands. Some may be expert and impartial, others subservient. It is not difficult for them to observe the requirements of law in giving a hearing and receiving evidence. But to say that their findings of fact may be made conclusive where constitutional rights of liberty and property are involved, although the evidence clearly establishes that the findings are wrong and constitutional rights have been invaded, is to place those rights at the mercy of administrative officials and seriously to impair the security inherent in our judicial safeguards. That prospect, with our multiplication of administrative agencies, is not one to be lightly regarded. ( Drummey v. State Board of Funeral Directors, supra, 13 Cal.2d 75, 85 (quoting from St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U.S. 38, 52 [80 L.Ed. 1033, 1041, 56 S.Ct. 720]).) [4] The Drummey court accordingly concluded, In view of these principles, it necessarily follows that the court to which the application for mandate is made to secure the restoration of a professional license must exercise an independent judgment on the facts.... [I]n weighing the evidence the courts can and should be assisted by the findings of the board. The findings of the board come before the court with a strong presumption of their correctness, and the burden rests on the complaining party to convince the court that the board's decision is contrary to the weight of the evidence. (13 Cal.2d at p. 85; italics added.) The later case of McDonough v. Goodcell (1939) 13 Cal.2d 741, 753 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205], drew a line between the review of an agency decision affecting the restoration of a license and the attempted acquisition of such a right. In McDonough, in reviewing the agency decision denying the application for the bail bond license, we held that the court should use the test of substantial evidence, not an independent review of the agency decision. Since the attempt to obtain a license did not involve a fundamental, vested right we distinguished Drummey, a case in which the aggrieved party already possessed such a right  a license to practice his profession. Accordingly, in Laisne v. Cal. St. Bd. of Optometry (1942) 19 Cal.2d 831, 840 [123 P.2d 457], this court followed Drummey in requiring an independent judgment review of an agency decision to revoke an optometrist's vested right to practice his profession. Similarly, in Dare v. Bd. of Medical Examiners (1943) 21 Cal.2d 790, 799-801 [136 P.2d 304], we upheld the trial court's exercise of an independent judgment review in a license revocation case. Following this historic approach to the judicial review of administrative decisions, [5] the Legislature in 1945 adopted the above principles in Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 to authorize the reviewing court to exercise its independent judgment in those cases in which it deemed that it was authorized by law to exercise such judgment. (3) Thus, section 1094.5 empowers this court to establish standards for determining which cases require such independent judgment review and which call for only a substantial evidence review of the entire record. ( Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 914-915 [80 Cal. Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33].) In view of this judicial history, the court would now assert a doubtful prerogative if it were to rule that no cases at all require an independent judgment review and that the Legislature created an empty category in section 1094.5. [6]