Opinion ID: 2071448
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: lad claim

Text: I agree with the majority that the standards established in Lehmann v. Toys `R' Us, Inc., 132 N.J. 587, 626 A. 2d 445 (1993), apply to racial discrimination cases, that a single incident of racial harassment may be severe enough to produce a hostile work environment, and that the fact the single remark here was made by the Sheriff is a factor to be considered. However, I believe, as did the trial court and the Appellate Division, that despite the defendant's deplorable use of a racial slur, `the workplace, objectively viewed, [was] not hostile.' Although a single incident of racial harassment can result in a hostile work environment, it will be a rare and extreme case in which a single incident will be so severe that it would ... make the working environment hostile. Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 606-07, 626 A. 2d 445. As the majority properly recognizes, usually repeated racial slurs must form the basis for finding that a hostile work environment has been created. Ante at 500, 706 A. 2d at 690 (citations omitted); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F. 2d 872 (9th Cir.1991) (Although a single act can be enough, ... generally repeated incidents create a stronger claim of hostile environment, with the strength of the claim depending on the number of incidents and the intensity of each incident.) (quoting King v. Board of Regents, 898 F. 2d 533, 537 (7th Cir.1990)). It is the harasser's conduct, not the plaintiff's injury, that must be severe or pervasive. Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 610, 626 A. 2d 445. Because the Sheriff, plaintiff's supervisor, made the remark, its severity is exacerbated. Nonetheless, while the Sheriff's remark was extremely offensive, demeaning and humiliating, he used the racial epithet only once. Moreover, although he was reluctant to apologize, the Sheriff promptly offered a written apology that plaintiff refused. Furthermore, plaintiff, who has worked in the Sheriff's office since 1972, never alleged any other incident of discrimination by the Sheriff or by any other member of the Sheriff's office. Indeed, plaintiff received commendations from the Sheriff for her work. As the Appellate Division properly concluded, plaintiff experienced no adverse consequences in the terms of her employment. There was no change in plaintiff's employment status. Her working conditions were not altered. There was no interference with her work performance. She remained a sheriff's officer, continued her assigned duties, and lost no time from her work. Furthermore, there was no reduction in salary and plaintiff lost no wages as a result of the incident. The majority attempts to excuse plaintiff's failure to prove a change in her working conditions by changing the Lehmann standard and asserting that [t]he test of severity adopted by this Court in Lehmann does not in all cases require evidence of an actual change in working conditions. Ante at 505, 706 A. 2d at 692. I disagree. The majority fails to recognize that the hostile work environment is the legally recognized harm. Lehmann, supra, 132 N.J. at 610, 626 A. 2d 445. Plaintiff has failed to show that her working conditions were affected by the harassment to the point at which a reasonable woman would consider the working environment hostile. Ibid. That she has not proven a change in conditions is not surprising since plaintiff's major contention is that, in a racial discrimination case under LAD, it is not necessary to establish a hostile work environment. Hence, she has presented little evidence of such an environment. In her complaint, plaintiff merely alleges that she suffered an emotional insult to her sense of well-being. By holding that a single racial slur that does not result in any actual change in working conditions, ante at 505, 706 A. 2d at 692, is severe enough to create a hostile work environment resulting in a LAD violation, the Court has substantially changed the Lehmann standard and enlarged the scope of LAD. It also reflects a departure from the United States Supreme Court's treatment of single racial slurs. The Supreme Court has observed that under Title VII, a single racial epithet, although extremely offensive to an employee, does not affect the terms, conditions or privileges of employment. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed. 2d 49, 60 (1986) (`mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee' would not affect the conditions of employment to [a] sufficiently significant degree [so as] to violate Title VII)) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972)); see also Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F. 2d 897, 904 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting same). The majority also adopts a different view of a single racial slur than is found in the law of defamation. Recognizing the chilling effect such a holding would cast over a person's freedom of expression, most courts do not find words of bigotry or racism to constitute actionable defamation, thus protecting the freedom to express even unpopular, ugly and hateful, political, religious, and social opinions. Ward v. Zelikovsky, 136 N.J. 516, 533, 536, 643 A. 2d 972 (1994). Although the Sheriff's remark was morally repugnant and reprehensible, I believe that it was not severe enough to result in a LAD violation. The Court has come perilously close to punishing the Sheriff not for creating a hostile work environment under LAD, but solely for his speech. I conclude that the record fails to support the majority's conclusion that the Sheriff's single remark was severe enough to constitute a LAD violation. I would affirm the order of summary judgment for defendant on the LAD claim.