Opinion ID: 2570635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Appellees Are Entitled to Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: ¶ 33 There are two ways in which Slusher could have received more money than he did: First, through a unanimous acceptance by the Clients of the offer contained in the Settlement Letter or any subsequent offers; or second, through an individual settlement with State Farm. We agree with the trial court that any damages suffered by Slusher were not as a result of Appellees' actions or omissions.
¶ 34 Prior to the receipt of the Settlement Letter, the Clients had a binding agreement requiring unanimity for the acceptance of any settlement offer. Upon the receipt of the Settlement Letter, Humpherys contacted the Clients and informed them of the offer and conditions contained in the letter. The Ospitals and the Campbells both rejected the offer after Humpherys' explanation, but Slusher argues that their decision was uninformed because the effects of a reversal, the possibility of a reversal, and the vacatur condition were not fully explained and explored by Humpherys. Slusher's argument fails because both the Ospitals and the Campbells in their depositions were adamant that they rejected State Farm's offer because they were more concerned about preserving the October Opinion than they were about the money. Inez in her affidavit stated that, [i]t was as if State Farm was trying to pay us to keep our mouths shut and to hide what we finally uncovered. When asked if she would have accepted the offer if Slusher had spoken with her and explained to her how much the money meant to him, or if Barrett had advised her that there was a fifty-percent chance the U.S. Supreme Court would grant State Farm's Petition for Certiorari, Inez responded that she would not have changed her mind. The Ospitals in their affidavits stated, We did not feel we could accept the condition that the judgment would have to be vacated as part of the settlement. The Ospitals made their decision based on the principle that a vacatur would be unfair. Besides, they already had a judgment for $145 million payable without the requirement of a vacatur. The Ospitals and the Campbells rejected the $150,000,000 settlement offer not because they were a hundred percent sure that they were guaranteed the awards granted by the October Opinion, but because they were opposed to the idea of vacating the October Opinion's substance. ¶ 35 Slusher further argues that in addition to their failure to fully explore the Settlement Letter terms with the Clients, Appellees failed to fully explore the vacatur condition or to negotiate the settlement terms with State Farm. Once again, Slusher's argument does not pass muster. The Settlement Letter was clear on its terms and did not contemplate negotiation, especially regarding the vacatur. [8] Moreover, Appellees had no control over future negotiations with State Farm because, as disclosed by Zimmerman in his deposition, State Farm would not have negotiated any further unless the October Opinion was vacated. There was no possibility of negotiation; State Farm was adamant that the opinion be vacated, and the Campbells, without whom a vacatur request would be impossible, were equally adamant that there would be no vacatur. Therefore, we find that Appellees' conduct was not the reason why the Settlement Letter offer was rejected nor was it the reason why no subsequent negotiations took place.
¶ 36 Slusher argues that Appellees' binding of the Clients to a unanimous consent agreement was improper and deprived the Clients of the opportunity to settle individually. Slusher further contends that but for [Appellees'] breach of [their] duty of loyalty in refusing to follow Slusher's desires ... and [Appellees'] representation of other clients with adverse and conflicting interests ... there is a reasonable probability that Slusher could have settled his interest in the litigation. Also, according to Slusher, Appellees' representation of clients with conflicting and adverse interests is a violation of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct, and is the actual and proximate cause of Slusher's lost settlement opportunity. ¶ 37 A violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct does not itself give rise to causes of action against a lawyer because the rules were not created as a basis for civil liability. Utah Rules of Prof'l Conduct, Scope. The existence of a conflict of interest only shows that Appellees breached an applicable standard of conduct, and does not speak to whether such breach proximately caused damages, and therefore Appellees' alleged representation of clients with conflicting interests is of no moment. The issue of whether appellants were representing clients with adverse and conflicting interests is irrelevant to our decision in this case, and thus we decline to speak to it. ¶ 38 Contrary to his position here, Slusher could not have settled individually with State Farm because the condition for any settlement was a vacatur of the October Opinion. As noted in the previous section, the only clients able to join in requesting a vacatur, the Campbells, were strongly against a vacatur. We note that Slusher was given the option to settle individually with State Farm and to assign his rights to a litigation financing company on at least one occasion prior to the receipt of the Settlement Letter. Humpherys informed the Clients that they had the option of settling with State Farm or selling their rights in the litigation to a litigation financing company in the January Letter. Humpherys also requested that the Clients inform him of their settlement desires in both the January and December Letters. Despite being given these choices, Slusher did not opt to either attempt to settle individually with State Farm or through a litigation financing company, and if he ever desired to settle individually, he neglected to inform Appellees of such desires. Furthermore, the question of what a litigation financing company would have paid for Slusher's interests is one of speculation, and causation cannot be shown through conjecture or speculation. Dunn v. McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (Utah 1978). ¶ 39 The parties touched upon the issue of whether this court would have vacated the October Opinion in their briefs, but we need not address that question because we reject Slusher's arguments on causation. We conclude that absent Appellees' actions, Slusher would not have benefitted and thus affirm the trial court's summary judgment ruling.