Opinion ID: 699226
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disentitlement of Mr. Prevot to Access to the District Court

Text: 29 Ms. Prevot presented to the court her contention that pursuant to its equitable powers it should deny Mr. Prevot access to the court. At the first district court hearing counsel for Ms. Prevot told the court that one of her defenses was that a fugitive seeking relief from the court must be in compliance with the laws of this country. Tr. II, p. 47. Her trial brief set out that Mr. Prevot moved her and the children to France for the purpose of circumventing the jurisdiction of the courts, because of his failure to abide by his conditions of probation, and because of his fear of having to serve ten years in a Texas prison for violating probation. Her proposed findings submitted to the court reiterated her position. Her contentions referred to the rubric of unclean hands, but they sufficiently brought to the court's attention the issue of whether Mr. Prevot's status and conduct barred him from access to the court. The court considered the matter and held: 30 Mrs. Prevot also argues that the equitable doctrine of unclean hands should preclude the relief sought by the [sic] Mr. Prevot. Mrs. Prevot contends that her husband, who is a fleeing felon from Texas, should not be allowed to use a court system from which he fled to obtain the return of his children. Mr. Prevot seeks relief, however, under a treaty (the Hague Convention) and the International Child Abduction [Remedies] Act passed by Congress to implement it. The relief provided by the Act is simply not subject to traditional equitable defenses. Moreover, one requirement of the defense of unclean hands is that the alleged wrongful conduct be directly related to the matter in litigation. Mr. Prevot's initial flight from the United States and violation of the terms of his probation is simply unrelated to his request that the children be returned to the country of their habitual residence as provided by the Act. In any event, Mrs. Prevot aided her husband in his initial flight from the United States. She cannot now attempt to use the activity in which she voluntarily participated to disqualify her husband. 31 855 F.Supp. at 922 (emphasis added; citation omitted). 32 The finding that Mr. Prevot's flight is unrelated to this case was fundamental error. His status, and actions, as fugitive are central to the case. Once their significance is recognized it is apparent that the district court abused its discretion in declining to invoke its equitable power to hold Mr. Prevot disentitled to assert his claim in a United States district court. 33
34 The fugitive disentitlement doctrine limits access to courts in the United States by a fugitive who has fled a criminal conviction in a court in the United States. The doctrine is long-established in the federal and state courts, trial and appellate. 35 The power of an American court to disentitle a fugitive from access to its power and authority is an equitable one. U.S. v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 681 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573 n. 2, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 1080, 1098 (1st Cir.1992); U.S. v. Van Cauwenberghe, 934 F.2d 1048, 1054-55 (9th Cir.1991); U.S. v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 136 (2d Cir.1988); Brinlee v. U.S., 483 F.2d 925, 926 (8th Cir.1973). See also Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587, 590 (9th Cir.1982), stay denied, 459 U.S. 1309, 103 S.Ct. 663, 74 L.Ed.2d 588 (1983). 6 36
37 The doctrine was first applied in the federal courts by the Supreme Court's denial of its processes for a fugitive's appeal to the Court from his conviction in Washington Territory. Smith v. U.S., 94 U.S. 97, 24 L.Ed. 32 (1876). The Court drew upon earlier state cases. Smith was followed by Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 8 S.Ct. 1390, 31 L.Ed. 854 (1887), a similar case. Soon after Smith and Bonahan, the Court considered the constitutionality of disentitlement when invoked by a state court. The Supreme Court of Georgia had dismissed an appeal to it by a fugitive from a death penalty conviction. Over due process objections the Supreme Court affirmed. Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138, 17 S.Ct. 525, 41 L.Ed. 949 (1897). Accord, Brinlee v. Crisp, 608 F.2d 839, 857 (10th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1047, 100 S.Ct. 737, 62 L.Ed.2d 733 (1980). 38 In Eisler v. U.S., 338 U.S. 189, 69 S.Ct. 1453, 93 L.Ed. 1897, cert. dismissed, 338 U.S. 883, 70 S.Ct. 181, 94 L.Ed. 542 (1949), the litigant appealed from a contempt of Congress conviction. After submission of his case to the Court on the merits he fled the country, and the Court, applying Smith and Bonahan, struck his case from the docket. 39 The most familiar federal case is Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), in which the Court, citing Smith, Bonahan, Allen v. Georgia, and Eisler, applied disentitlement to the appeal of a fugitive from a state court conviction. 40 No persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the conviction. While such an escape does not strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his claims. In the absence of specific provision to the contrary in the statute under which Molinaro appeals, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1257(2), we conclude, in light of the Smith and Bonahan decisions, that the Court has the authority to dismiss the appeal on this ground. 41 Id. at 366, 90 S.Ct. at 498-99. In 1975 the Court confirmed the history and vitality of the doctrine.This Court itself has long followed the practice of declining to review the convictions of escaped criminal defendants ...[,] a long-standing and established principle of American law. 42 Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537, 95 S.Ct. 1173, 1175, 43 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975). 43 Since Molinaro was handed down in 1970, in what we estimate to be more than 100 cases, all or substantially all federal circuit courts have invoked Molinaro and its predecessors and successors to disentitle appellants, criminal and civil, from the appellate processes of the court. In some cases the court has dismissed the appeal unconditionally, in others with conditions upon the fugitive's returning to custody within some fixed period. Other decisions have refused to reinstate appeals that have been summarily dismissed. Still other cases have been concerned with the effect of the fugitive's voluntary return to custody before fugitivity has been made an issue. 7 44 Disentitlement of access to appellate court applies to appeals in civil cases as well as to criminal appeals: Broadway v. City of Montgomery, 530 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.1976) (dismissing the appeal in a Sec. 1983 action of a fugitive from a state conviction); Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir.1982) (dismissing the appeal of a civil tax assessment against appellant, a fugitive from a federal tax conviction, and stating, [T]he rule [of disentitlement] should apply with greater force in civil cases where an individual's liberty is not at stake.), stay denied, 459 U.S. 1309, 103 S.Ct. 663, 74 L.Ed.2d 588 (1983); Stern v. U.S., 249 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1957) (dismissing the appeal by fugitives from fines and costs for contempt in failing to obey a grand jury subpoena), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 919, 78 S.Ct. 1360, 2 L.Ed.2d 1364 (1958). 45 Numerous cases have denied appellate access to appellants seeking review of denials of habeas corpus relief. Johnson v. Laird, 432 F.2d 77 (9th Cir.1970) (district court dismissed petition for habeas corpus, litigant went AWOL pending his appeal, appeal dismissed); Arana v. U.S. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 673 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.1982) (dismissing the appeal of the denial of a habeas corpus petition of litigant who had been declared deportable and had hidden his whereabouts from authorities); Gonzales v. Stover, 575 F.2d 827 (10th Cir.1978) (habeas petition by fugitive dismissed, certificate of probable cause denied by circuit court); U.S. v. Glomb, 877 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1989) (affirming the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition on the ground that fugitivity was a voluntary by-pass where, after pleading guilty with the right to appeal a constitutional issue, defendant escaped and his direct appeal was dismissed); Lopez v. Malley, 552 F.2d 682 (10th Cir.1977) (petition for habeas denied, petitioner fled pending appeal, appeal dismissed). 46 In Van Blaricom v. Forscht, 490 F.2d 461 (5th Cir.1974) (en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 915, 96 S.Ct. 222, 46 L.Ed.2d 144 (1975), disentitlement was retroactively applied in a civil case by an en banc decision of the Court of Appeals, which vacated the decision of a panel that had not known appellant was a fugitive. In a civil case the Third Circuit applied disentitlement prospectively in Ali v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954 (3d Cir.1986), to deny a fugitive future access to the district court for a new trial. Damages were awarded to plaintiff. Plaintiff and defendants appealed, and plaintiff fled, hijacking a plane and endangering passengers. The court reversed the judgment for plaintiff but, applying Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 and 41 and Molinaro, held plaintiff was not entitled to a new trial. 47 [T]he principles of Molinaro intersect with the principles underlying Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 & 41, which render a party's misconduct a basis for the dismissal of his case. See supra pp. 957-958. Indeed, the cases involving dismissals under the Federal Rules generally entail conduct far less egregious than a flight from justice. Thus, the jurisprudence upholding such sanctions as necessary and proper in an era of court backlogs dovetails with the Molinaro doctrine. Cf. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.1985) (in banc ) (it is within the inherent powers of the court to take such actions as are necessary for the effective administration of the judicial system). 48 In sum, the concerns that animate Molinaro as well as the principles that undergird Rule 37 and Rule 41 sanctions, dictate that Ali, whose contempt for justice was manifest in the egregious act of skyjacking a plane and endangering innocent lives in a flight from justice, not be awarded a new trial. 49 Id. at 959. 50
51 Disentitlement applies to federal trial courts in civil cases as well as to appellate courts. 8 52 Civil litigation, in general: Schuster v. U.S., 765 F.2d 1047 (11th Cir.1985) (affirming the dismissal of a petition by a fugitive for review of a tax assessment); Doyle v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C.Cir.1981) (affirming the dismissal of an FOIA suit by a fugitive seeking records), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002, 102 S.Ct. 1636, 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982); Dawkins v. Mitchell, 437 F.2d 646 (D.C.Cir.1970) (affirming the dismissal of a civil suit by a fugitive to enjoin enforcement of a warrant). 53 Section 1983 cases: Seibert v. Johnston, 381 F.Supp. 277 (E.D.Okla.1974) (dismissed for fugitivity); Beckett v. Cuyler, 523 F.Supp. 104 (E.D.Pa.1981) (Sec. 1983 case alleging unconstitutional conditions of confinement, case closed when petitioner escaped; Rule 60(b) motion to reopen denied based on Molinaro ). 9 54 Habeas corpus cases: Bailey v. U.S. Commanding Officer, 496 F.2d 324 (1st Cir.1974) (affirming the dismissal of a petition for habeas corpus by person AWOL from the Army); Clark v. Dalsheim, 663 F.Supp. 1095 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (fugitive from state conviction and from arrest warrants on other charges; petition for habeas dismissed); U.S. v. Collins, 651 F.Supp. 1177 (S.D.Fla.1987) (28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255 petition granted by court without knowledge that petitioner had just escaped; court sua sponte reinstated conviction and sentence and vacated relief granted); Potter v. Davis, 519 F.Supp. 621 (E.D.Tenn.1981) (state criminal appeal dismissed for fugitivity; federal habeas denied because decision proper under state law and federal law), aff'd, 701 F.2d 180 (6th Cir.1982) (table); Lewis v. Delaware State Hosp., 490 F.Supp. 177 (D.Del.1980) (petitioner fugitive from confinement in state mental hospital pursuant to finding of not guilty by reason of insanity). 55 Civil forfeiture cases: U.S. v. Timbers Preserve, 999 F.2d 452 (10th Cir.1993) (affirming the forfeiture of real estate in a default judgment against claimant for fugitivity); U.S. v. Eng, 951 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.1991) (affirming the default judgment against a fugitive in a forfeiture case); U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Estate, 868 F.2d 1214 (11th Cir.1989) (affirming the denial to a fugitive of access to trial of an in rem forfeiture action); U.S. v. $129,374 in U.S. Currency, 769 F.2d 583 (9th Cir.1985) (affirming the denial of a petition by a conservator of a fugitive's estate to intervene in a civil forfeiture case), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1086, 106 S.Ct. 863, 88 L.Ed.2d 901 (1986); U.S. v. $45,940 in U.S. Currency, 739 F.2d 792 (2d Cir.1984) (affirming judgment on the pleadings for the government against a fugitive seeking remission of forfeited funds); U.S. v. Real Property Located at Incline Village, 47 F.3d 1511 (9th Cir.1995) (affirming order striking opposition to forfeiture of drug-related realty, filed by defendant who had fled to Switzerland from indictment on drug charges); U.S. v. One Parcel of Real Property, 776 F.Supp. 482 (W.D.Mo.1991) (opposition to forfeiture barred when filed by petitioner avoiding service of an outstanding warrant), aff'd, 982 F.2d 526 (8th Cir.1992) (table); U.S. v. $182,980 in U.S. Currency, 727 F.Supp. 1387 (D.Colo.1990) (default judgment against claimant for fugitivity). 10 56 Two forfeiture cases have emphasized the unwillingness of a fugitive to return to the United States to process a claim that he is himself asserting. In U.S. v. Eng, 951 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.1991), the litigant had fled to Hong Kong from a U.S. indictment charging RICO and narcotics violations. The district court denied his claim to property which was the subject of a civil forfeiture proceeding. In affirming, the Court of Appeals noted that he--like Mr. Prevot--was unwilling to return voluntarily to the United States to face criminal charges and would not agree to return to contest the forfeiture. Id. at 464-65. The Ninth Circuit, in Real Property Located at Incline Village, commented upon the petitioner's status as fugitive from an indictment: 57 At [the time of the district court's order] he was apparently free to return to the United States to contest the forfeiture action, but chose not to do so, presumably to avoid arrest on the criminal charges. Under these circumstances, Brian was a fugitive. See $129,374, 769 F.2d at 587-88 (It is important to recognize that Lewis has complete control over the protection of his property interests in this forfeiture proceeding; if he finds his interests are sufficiently worth defending, he can terminate his fugitive status and present his own defense.).... 58 Id. at 1516. 59
60 Disentitlement is consistent with the inherent power of a court to manage its own affairs. See Ali, 788 F.2d at 959; Doyle v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 494 F.Supp. 842, 845 (D.D.C.1980), aff'd, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C.Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1002, 102 S.Ct. 1636, 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982). Inherent powers do not derive from statute but are powers vested in the courts upon their creation. Eash v. Riggins, 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir.1985) (en banc). See also U.S. v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34, 3 L.Ed. 259 (1812) (Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice from the nature of their institution.). The inherent powers of the federal court have been described as: 61 rooted in the notion that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a Chancery Court (subject, of course, to congressional limitation) to process litigation to a just and equitable conclusion. ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir.1978); cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5, 93 S.Ct. 1943, 1946, 36 L.Ed.2d 702 (1973) (courts possess inherent equitable power); Johnston v. Marsh, 227 F.2d 528, 531 (3d Cir.1955) (Our Federal judiciary has consistently recognized that at common law this inherent power existed.). 62 Eash, 757 F.2d at 563. 63 [A]t least in the absence of contrary legislation, courts under their inherent powers have developed a wide range of tools to promote efficiency in their courtrooms and to achieve justice in their results. 64 Id. at 564. Inherent powers include contempt power, sentences for abuse of the judicial process, id. at 561, dismissal for failure to prosecute, and disciplinary power over attorneys. The power to dismiss exists in many situations. The district court has the inherent power to dismiss sua sponte for want of jurisdiction. The power to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) recognizes a power of ancient origin in law and equity. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962). Under some circumstances a court may dismiss under the ancient doctrine of forum non conveniens. 15 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 3828 (2d ed. 1986). A court has the inherent power to manage its docket, subject of course to statutes requiring special treatment for specified types of cases. 65 The district court limited its consideration of equity powers to unclean hands, and rejected that rubric as a traditional equity defense to which the Act was not subject. 855 F.Supp. at 922. This case does not involve balancing individual equities between the parties. Pretermitting whether unclean hands can ever be asserted as a defense or exception in an ICARA case by the party opposing the claim for return, disentitlement is an issue between the claimant and the court, arising from conduct by the claimant that triggers the institutional, and inherent, equitable power of the court itself to respond to that conduct. We find nothing in the Convention or the Act that purports to strip an American court of the powers inherent to it as a court. Because of the unique facts, the core of this case is not custody, or competing interests of parents, but fundamental concerns of how the United States operates its courts and how those courts may react to abuses of American criminal process, to defiance of judicially-imposed obligations owed to victims of crime, and to flights from financial responsibilities to our government. 66 For the same reasons it is not relevant to the disentitlement issue that Ms. Prevot accompanied her husband to France. Mr. Prevot went to France with his wife and children in tow, but he is no less a fugitive, no less disdainful of his responsibilities to United States courts and obligations.