Opinion ID: 796189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Removability of Refugee

Text: 9 Turning to the merits, we note that we are not the first circuit to have addressed this issue. In Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279 (3d Cir.2004), the Third Circuit faced a similar circumstance. The court remanded the case to the BIA in part so that it could decide whether an alien loses refugee status when the refugee becomes a lawful permanent resident. Id. at 297. The BIA, in a published opinion, held that regardless of whether a refugee loses refugee status upon adjusting status to lawful permanent resident—a question that the BIA concluded that it need not reach—the refugee may be removed. In re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. 836, 842 (B.I.A. 2005). The Third Circuit recently upheld that interpretation, affording Chevron deference to the BIA's precedential decision. Romanishyn v. Atty. Gen'l of U.S., 455 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir.2006). 10 We begin, as always, with the text of the statute in question. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. 2778. The relevant passages plainly provide for the possibility that a person classified as a refugee may be removed. The general removal provision states that [ a]ny alien may be removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (emphasis added); see also id. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(i) (alien smuggling provision applies to [ a]ny alien (emphasis added)). Petitioner does not contend that he is not an alien. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (The term `alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States.). Furthermore, Petitioner is unable to point to any provision of the statute that unambiguously bars removal of refugees. 11 Even if the statute were ambiguous because of the benefits afforded those who arrive as refugees, we would have to reach the same conclusion. Under Chevron, we must defer to an agency's reasonable, published interpretation of an ambiguous provision within its area of expertise. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230, 121 S.Ct. 2164, 150 L.Ed.2d 292 (2001) (stating that Chevron deference applies to formal adjudications of agencies). Deference is especially appropriate in the context of immigration law, where national uniformity is paramount. See Ferreira v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 1045, 1050 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that the need for national uniformity is paramount in the immigration context). 12 The BIA's interpretation of the statutory scheme as a whole is reasonable in view of the statutory text allowing removal of any alien. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a). The BIA's interpretation also is reasonable in view of the policy considerations it examined. Refugee status may be terminated only if the Attorney General determines that the alien was not in fact a refugee ... at the time of the alien's admission. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). The BIA observed that it is difficult to imagine that Congress intended validly admitted refugees to be shielded permanently from removal, regardless of the person's acts in the United States. In re Smriko, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 841. 13 In conclusion, whether under our reading of the plain text of the statute or in deferring to the BIA's interpretation in In re Smriko, the outcome is the same. We join the Third Circuit in concluding that an alien who arrives in the United States as a refugee may be removed even if refugee status has never been terminated pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(4). 14 PETITION DENIED.