Opinion ID: 791972
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Remainder of the Plain Error Inquiry

Text: 33 Having decided that there was error that was plain, to complete our inquiry, we must determine whether the error affect[ed] [the] substantial rights of the defendant, and whether it seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For analytical purposes, we address these issues in reverse order. 34
35 Though a sentencing judge retains discretion ... he must demonstrate that he has thoughtfully discharged his statutory obligation [under § 3553(c)], with a degree of care appropriate to the severity of the punishment ultimately selected. United States v. Chartier, 933 F.2d 111, 117 (2d Cir.1991). In thus enabl[ing] the public to learn why [the] defendant received a particular sentence, United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 206 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Molina, 356 F.3d at 277), section 3553(c) has implications beyond the immediate rights of criminal defendants or the government, or the effective conduct of particular criminal proceedings. It tends to instill understanding of, trust in, and respect for the court and its proceedings on the part both of those who are themselves parties to the proceeding and those who are not. To paraphrase Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 572, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980), people in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions, but it is difficult for them to accept what they have insufficient information to understand. When a statement of reasons is given, there is at least an opportunity for understanding both the system in general and its workings in the particular case. We have held, for similar reasons, that the public has a presumptive right of access to sentencing proceedings. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 196. The requirement that a statement of reasons be given is hardly, as the government would have it, a mere formalism. See Gov't Br. at 15-16 n. 36 We conclude, then, that a sentencing court's failure to comply with § 3553(c)(2) affects the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings. 37
38 The third prong of the plain error test is whether the asserted error affected substantial rights. In addressing the issue, we begin by noting the concrete purposes for requiring sentencing courts to make statements of reasons under rule 3553(c). By informing the defendant of the basis for the sentence, he or she may well become better able effectively to pursue an appeal asserting that the sentence is unreasonable. By similarly informing the Court of Appeals as to the reasons for the sentence, we may well become better able to hear and determine the appeal effectively. See Molina, 356 F.3d at 277 (noting that one of the goals of enacting § 3553(c) was to permit meaningful appellate review); accord Cervantes, 878 F.2d at 54. 4 Section 3553(c) bestows on defendants the right to argue more effectively that — and enables us to decide more effectively whether — a sentence is reasonable. This right seems to us clearly to be substantial. 5 39 We recognize, though, that as the Supreme Court observed in United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), the phrase affected substantial rights, 40 usually means that the [plain] error must have affected the outcome of the district court proceedings. Olano, [507 U.S.] at 734, 113 S.Ct. at 1777. Respondents argue that an indictment error falls within the limited class of structural errors, Johnson, [520 U.S.] at 468-469, 117 S.Ct. at 1549-50, that can be corrected regardless of their effect on the outcome, Olano, [507 U.S.] at 735, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. 41 Id. at 632, 122 S.Ct. 1781. 6 But we do not think that this appeal — whether couched as dealing with structural error or otherwise — falls within the category of the usual case. The substantial rights affected by a court's failure to comply with section 3553(c) are of a somewhat different nature from those with which we typically deal. 42 First, as we suggested in Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 196-99, the First Amendment guarantees of a public trial extend to defendants' sentencing proceedings. A violation of section 3553(c) is thus at least akin to the deprivation of the defendant's right to a public trial, which the Supreme Court has enumerated as one of the limited class of structural errors for purposes of plain error analysis. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (citing Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49, n. 9, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (discussing Sixth Amendment right to public trial)). 7 43 Second, in the sentencing context there are circumstances that permit us to relax the otherwise rigorous standards of plain error review to correct sentencing errors. Sofsky, 287 F.3d at 125. Because noticing unobjected to errors that occur at trial precipitates an entire new trial that could have been avoided by a timely objection, whereas correcting a sentencing error results in, at most, only a remand for resentencing, id., we need not be concerned that a generous reading of the statements of reasons requirement at sentencing will adversely interfere with trial proceedings or affect their finality. 44 And third, it seems unlikely that a court's failure to state its reasons for imposing a particular sentence would except in the rarest of cases affect the sentence imposed, in the sense that a court would impose a materially different sentence if required to state its reasons. 8 Therefore, if an error affecting substantial rights in the sentencing context is understood only as an error that materially affected the sentence that was imposed, the error of failure to comply with the requirements of section 3553(c) would virtually never be plain. Even if preserved, such an error would be left uncorrected on appeal because the error would appear virtually always to be harmless (ignoring for the moment that the burden of proof is then on the government rather than the defendant). See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) (stating that [a]ny error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded). We therefore think that treatment of section 3553(c) error as plain error which may be corrected on appeal will help maintain the provisions of section 3553(c) as truly mandatory, as they are apparently intended to be. 9