Opinion ID: 76984
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Georgia Public Policy

Text: 72 The district court applied Georgia law because it concluded that the result under Michigan law would be to allow insurers (Allstate and Auto Club) that accepted premiums from McGow to escape liability, and that this result would contravene Georgia's public policy. First, as established above, Allstate, along with St. Paul, bears primary liability under Michigan law, and only Auto Club escapes liability under its exclusion. Second, and more importantly, this result under Michigan law does not contravene Georgia's public policy. 73 We acknowledge that Georgia has a strong interest in ensuring that its drivers who have UM coverage are compensated for damages caused by uninsured drivers. The application of Michigan law will not deprive Plaintiff McGow of compensation for his injuries; it will simply affect which insurance company pays McGow. We recognize that Georgia courts have devised rules applicable to competing other-insurance clauses that they think will best provide UM coverage. Nonetheless, that choice is better described as a rule than as a public policy that is contravened by applying Michigan's different rules for reconciling competing insurance clauses. 74 Indeed, Georgia courts have repeatedly held that another state's law can be enforced to give effect to a provision of a UM policy even though the provision would not be enforceable under Georgia law. See, e.g., Dacosta v. Allstate Ins. Co., 188 Ga. App. 10, 372 S.E.2d 7, 8 (1988) (applying Tennessee law to allow Allstate to offset workers' compensation benefits received by the insured against the amount of uninsured-motorist benefits otherwise due, even though Georgia law did not provide for such offset); Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Parnham, 182 Ga.App. 823, 357 S.E.2d 139, 142 (1987) (discerning no prejudice to the public interest in Georgia in applying Texas law to enforce self-insurer-exclusion provision in Texas insurance policy, even assuming such an exclusion would be disfavored under Georgia law); Terry v. Mays, 161 Ga.App. 328, 329, 291 S.E.2d 44, 45 (1982) (applying South Carolina law to enforce exclusion of coverage for settlement without the consent of the insurer, even though such an exclusion has been held repugnant to the Georgia uninsured motorist statute). In so holding, the Georgia Court of Appeals has repeatedly stated the following with regard to the refusal to enforce a provision of an insurance policy as contrary to public policy: 75 Enforcement of a contract or a contract provision which is valid by the law governing the contract will not be denied on the ground of public policy, unless a strong case for such action is presented; mere dissimilarity of law is not sufficient for application of the public policy doctrine. A contract is not necessarily contrary to the public policy of a state merely because it could not validly have been made there, notwithstanding the making of such contracts in the place of the forum is expressly prohibited by statute. 76 Terry, 161 Ga.App. at 329, 291 S.E.2d at 45 (quotation marks and citation omitted). Under this standard, the application of Michigan law here would not contravene Georgia's public policy. 11 77 The district court concluded, and St. Paul argues, that Georgia has a strong interest in forcing insurers, such as Auto Club, who received premiums for providing UM coverage to the insured to provide such coverage. That argument ignores the fact that part of the bargained-for contract included an unambiguous escape clause regarding Auto Club's liability if the insured, McGow, was occupying a motor vehicle that had the same or similar coverage. At the time of the accident, McGow was not in his own vehicle but was a passenger in the Expedition insured by St. Paul. We find nothing in Georgia's public policy that is contravened when McGow is covered by the UM insurance on the vehicle in which he was a passenger. 78 Furthermore, St. Paul's argument might be more compelling with regard to insurers providing insurance pursuant to Georgia contracts. However, Allstate and Auto Club issued and delivered policies in Michigan with an expectation that Michigan law would be applied to enforce the terms of those contracts. Accordingly, to apply Georgia law instead would effectively require Allstate and Auto Club to provide insurance other than what they contracted for, not simply require them to provide the insurance for which they received premiums. Given that McGow was a passenger in a vehicle insured by St. Paul and that McGow is clearly covered under St. Paul's policy, Georgia has no compelling interest in requiring insurers in Auto Club's position to provide insurance beyond the terms of their policies, which are valid under the Michigan law governing them. The district court thus erred in applying Georgia law. 12