Opinion ID: 1778765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: the failure to give a circumstantial evidence instruction at the first phase of the trial violated manning's rights.

Text: ś 172. Manning contends that a circumstantial evidence instruction should have been given in this case. The court denied the proposed instruction because it found that Earl Jordan's testimony (that Manning had confessed to him) removed the case from the wholly circumstantial category. ś 173. Manning's argument must fail because the testimony of Jordan was enough to eliminate the need for a circumstantial evidence instruction. Our decision in Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1324 (Miss.1989), stands for the proposition that where there is direct evidence, a circumstantial evidence instruction is not a necessity. Additionally, in Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743, 750 (Miss. 1991), we said that a confession which constitutes direct evidence is not limited to a confession to a law enforcement officer but also includes a confession to another person. ś 174. The rule in Mississippi is that a circumstantial evidence instruction should be given only when the prosecution can produce neither eyewitnesses or a confession to the offense charged. Stringfellow v. State, 595 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Miss.1992). A confession takes the case out of a circumstantial context such that  a circumstantial evidence instruction [is] inapplicable. Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 1246, 1270 (Miss.1996). ś 175. This case was not wholly circumstantial. Manning's confession to Jordan removed this case from the circumstantial realm, and as such the trial judge's denial of the circumstantial evidence instruction was proper. This assignment of error is meritless.