Opinion ID: 1447783
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Gross-Negligence Claim

Text: The Estate also argues that the district court erred in dismissing its gross-negligence claim pursuant to FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Nixon v. Wilmington Trust Co., 543 F.3d 354, 356 (6th Cir.2008). The district court noted that in Jennings v. Southwood, 446 Mich. 125, 521 N.W.2d 230, 232-34 (1994), the Michigan Supreme Court barred all claims of common-law gross negligence under Michigan law except in certain contexts in which Michigan law exculpates actors for mere negligent conduct. Concluding that this limited exception did not apply in this case, the district court dismissed the Estate's gross-negligence claim. Prior to its adoption of a pure comparative-negligence scheme in Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. 638, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979), Michigan adhered to the doctrine of contributory negligence under which a plaintiff found to be even slightly at fault was completely barred from recovery. Jennings, 521 N.W.2d at 233. Michigan courts recognized gross negligence as an exception to the contributory-negligence doctrine in order to mitigate the often harsh consequences of that doctrine to plaintiffs. Id. Although gross negligence typically implies a higher degree of negligence, in Michigan it was merely an alternative label used to describe the doctrine of last clear chance and allowed a plaintiff to recover when the defendant's negligence (even ordinary negligence) occurred after the plaintiff's negligent conduct. Id. In Jennings, the Michigan Supreme Court repudiated the common-law concept of gross negligence, reasoning that when it abandoned the contributory-negligence doctrine in Placek the concept of gross negligence was no longer needed. Id. However, the Jennings court recognized that a different concept of gross negligence survived in certain Michigan statutesincluding the Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA) which was at issue in Jennings in which certain actors are immune from liability for ordinary negligence but may be liable for conduct reaching a grossly negligent level. Id. at 235. In this context, gross negligence means `conduct so reckless as to demonstrate a substantial lack of concern for whether an injury results.' Id. (quoting Government Tort Liability Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1407(7)(a)). As the district court observed, the Estate does not argue that any such statutes are applicable in this case. Furthermore, the two unpublished Michigan Court of Appeals cases cited by the Estate are readily distinguishable. Each involved situations analogous to Jennings in which a defendant could not be held liable for ordinary negligence but could be held liable for heightened or gross negligence. See Hawkins v. Ranch Rudolph, Inc., No. 254771, 2005 WL 2372008, at -4 (Mich. Ct.App. Sept.27, 2005) (unpublished) (reversing dismissal of gross-negligence claim where plaintiff signed a release waiving liability for ordinary negligence but waiver did not cover gross negligence under Michigan law); Thomas v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 208311, 1999 WL 33432173, at -3 (Mich.Ct.App. Nov.2, 1999) (unpublished) (reversing dismissal of gross-negligence claim in premises-liability action where the plaintiff-trespasser could recover only by showing either active negligence or gross negligence). Unlike Hawkins and Thomas, in which the defendants could not be held liable for mere negligence, there is no such obstacle in the instant case. The Estate need not show that Dailey's conduct rose to the level of gross negligence or recklessness. Instead, Dailey (and Quickway by imputation) may be held liable upon a showing of ordinary negligence. Accordingly, the district court did not err in ruling that under Michigan law a gross-negligence claim is not cognizable in this case.