Opinion ID: 78403
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of the Complaint

Text: The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to disclose the existence of the Complaint. The Judicial Council Rules have strict confidentiality requirements. Judicial Council Rule 16 requires that complaints, records of investigations and proceedings relating to allegations of judicial misconduct or disability shall be maintained as confidential matters, and shall not be disclosed to the public. Judicial Council Rule 15(f) does allow disclosure of a complaint upon the written consent of both the complained-of judge and the Chief Judge, but in our view the strict confidentiality requirements indicate the generally secretive nature of judicial complaints. This preference for confidentiality maintains public confidence in the judiciary. Keeping the existence of the Complaint confidential kept the Complaint from affecting the public's confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the judicial process. Davis, 506 F.3d at 1332 n. 12 (internal citations omitted). It defies logic for Ginsberg to file a motion asserting harm to public confidence in the judiciary when his own actions in filing the Motion and attempting to make the Complaint public are creating such harm. Surely if he was so concerned, Ginsberg could have inquired about the Complaint out of the public eye. Yet, the first time Judge Briskman was asked to disclose information about the Complaint was in full public view. Indeed, Ginsberg was relentless in his attempts to force Judge Briskman to testify about the Complaint and make it public. First, Ginsberg listed Judge Briskman as a witness in the pretrial disclosures for the recusal hearing. When Judge Briskman entered an order excluding himself as a witness, Ginsberg sought to compel Judge Briskman to testify. After postponing his rebuttal case during the Recusal Motion hearing, Ginsberg wrote a letter to Judge Briskman again requesting he make disclosures about the Complaint. Later, on August 8, 2007, Ginsberg filed another Motion Requesting the Honorable Arthur Briskman Make Certain Disclosures on the Record (Disclosure Motion) and before Judge Briskman ruled on the Disclosure Motion, at the commencement of the sanctions hearing, Ginsberg made an additional ore tenus motion to have Judge Briskman disclose his knowledge of the Complaint on the record. In addition to the Judicial Council Rules' preference for confidentiality, Federal Rule of Evidence 605 also states that a judge cannot testify at a trial in which he is presiding. F.R.E. Rule 605. Moreover, a judge is not required to recuse himself so that he can testify. See, e.g., Cheeves v. So. Clays, Inc., 797 F.Supp. 1570, 1582-83 (M.D.Ga.1992) (having a judge testify is manipulated harassment, as it would cause an unjustified voluntary disqualification of the presiding judge or endless delays in the litigation); Sensley v. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591, 599 (5th Cir.2004) (a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which is equally as strong as its duty to not sit where disqualified) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837, 93 S.Ct. 7, 34 L.Ed.2d 50 (1972)). As Judge Briskman presided over both the recusal hearing and the sanctions hearing, he could not testify at either. Ginsberg argued that Judge Briskman should have recused himself from both hearings, but Section 455(a) places the burden to decide recusal on the judge who is the subject of the Motion. Section 455(a) states that any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself.  28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (emphasis added). Further, judges routinely preside over motions for their own recusal. For example, Justice Scalia presided over a motion to recuse him in a case before the United States Supreme Court. Cheney, 541 U.S. at 913, 124 S.Ct. 1391. The Fifth Circuit also held in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation that [i]t is for the judge who is the object of the affidavit (of bias) to pass on its sufficiency. 614 F.2d 958, 963 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting 13 Wright, Miller & Cooper § 3551 at 375). [22] In the event that Judge Briskman erred in some rulings, Ginsberg should have waited to deal with these issues on appeal. In re Walker, 532 F.3d at 1311 (Adverse rulings are grounds for appeal but rarely are grounds for recusal ...). The district court here (through Judge Antoon) advised Ginsberg as much in the denial of Ginsberg's Third Petition for Writ of Mandamus, explaining that Ginsberg should wait until Judge Briskman issued a ruling on the Recusal Motion and then appeal it, but Ginsberg simply ignored this instruction. Further, Ginsberg's dogged pursuit of Judge Briskman's testimony supports the bankruptcy court's finding of bad faith. See Indus. Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1448 (11th Cir.1998) (Improper purpose may be shown by excessive persistence in pursuing a claim or defense in the face of repeated adverse rulings.). For all of these reasons we find that the bankruptcy court was not clearly erroneous in its fact finding and applied correct legal standards.