Opinion ID: 1355634
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mandatory Sentencing Statute

Text: Defendant observes that the jury was instructed in the unadorned statutory language that If you conclude that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you shall impose the sentence of death. (10) He suggests that these instructions were inadequate to inform the jury that it should find the appropriate penalty for defendant regardless of the number or weight of the applicable aggravating and mitigating factors. (See People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1035-1041 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]; People v. Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1276-1277; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 541 [114 Cal. Rptr. 426, 523 P.2d 226].) Defendant also observes that, in response to a juror's inquiry regarding the meaning of the term mitigating, the trial court indicated that mitigation means good things about defendant, and that a life imprisonment without parole sentence should be imposed if the good things outweighed the bad. Defendant suggests that this simplistic response may have prejudiced him if the jury confined itself to merely good or positive aspects about him, rather than attempting to find an appropriate penalty based on a consideration of all factors which might militate in favor of a lesser penalty, including such negative factors as his troubled childhood and family history, his drug use and his marital problems. Our review of the record indicates the jury was not misled concerning the scope of its sentencing responsibilities. First, the jury was given a modified section 190.3 factor (k) instruction which advised it to consider any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, including sympathy. Thus, the instructions made it clear that the jury was to weigh and consider all mitigating evidence in the case (see People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813]). In addition, the court gave a further modified instruction which explained that if the weight of the mitigating circumstances equals or exceeds the weight of the aggravating ones, the jury must return a verdict of life without parole, and that in determining whether or not mitigating circumstances outweigh aggravating ones, you are not bound by the number of circumstances on each side. One circumstance in either mitigation or aggravation might outweigh all the contrary circumstances. The prosecutor made certain comments indicating that a mere count of the various applicable sentencing factors would be determinative of penalty, but he later explained that mere count was insufficient. Thus, the prosecutor at one point urged the jury to add up all the factors. Are the factors in favor of the defendant? Are the factors against the defendant? If the factors against the defendant outweigh the factors for the defendant, then your duty is to impose the death penalty. But later in his argument, the prosecutor reviewed the various sentencing factors, applied them to the evidence, and explained an important caveat set forth in the court's instructions: [I]n determining whether or not circumstances in aggravation outweigh those in mitigation ... you are not bound by the number of circumstances on each side. One circumstance in either mitigation or aggravation might outweigh all the contrary circumstances. The prosecutor stated that if the jury would follow the law, it would reach the inevitable conclusion that defendant justly deserves the death penalty, and admonished the jury to apply the law no matter which way it cuts. But nothing in the prosecutor's argument stressed the mandatory language of the sentencing statute. Defense counsel explained to the jury that it was faced with only one issue, namely, whether defendant should live or die. Counsel observed that death is reserved for the most despicable criminals who are virtually without any redeeming worth, and he emphasized aspects of defendant's character and background that mitigated his offense. Counsel listed several sentencing factors that he deemed mitigating, including the absence of any prior conviction, defendant's emotional stress arising from his troubled background and family life, his intoxication at or around the time of the offense, and his age (21) at that time. Counsel reiterated that in weighing the various factors, [i]t is not a matter of numbers. It is not saying `There are five here and three here,' it is how strong each one is. [¶] Either way, one can outweigh all of the rest.... [¶] In other words, it is what is in your heart. As we stated in People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 655 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836], [w]e see no impropriety in a prosecutor urging that the jurors `follow the law' and base their penalty decision on a weighing of the applicable factors, so long as it is understood that inherent in the weighing process itself is the determination of `appropriateness'.... As previously noted, the jury in the present case fully understood that it could assign whatever weight it deemed appropriate to the various aggravating and mitigating factors, and that its penalty decision should be based on all the evidence in the case. As in Hendricks, we conclude that, by reason of the court's modifications of the standard sentencing instructions, and the jury arguments themselves, the jury in the instant case fully understood its sentencing responsibilities. The jury knew that it should consider all the mitigating evidence in the case, and knew that it could assign whatever weight it chose to the various applicable sentencing factors. It is inconceivable that a jury armed with such understanding would fail to appreciate its responsibility to find an appropriate penalty for defendant. The prosecutor urged the jury to return the verdict defendant deserves, that is, the appropriate verdict under the circumstances. We find it significant that the jury, appreciating the seriousness of its task, deliberated for several days before rendering its verdict of death. In a related argument, defendant contends that because the jury was never told to determine whether death was an appropriate punishment, the California statutory scheme is unconstitutional as applied to defendant. As we have explained, we cannot accept defendant's initial premise that the jury was inadequately informed regarding its appropriateness determination.