Opinion ID: 1733341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority of This Court to Engage in Appellate Review of Sentencing.

Text: The prosecutors in these cases assert that this Court does not have the authority to institute, by case law, appellate review of sentences. As we have noted, and the prosecutors have agreed, some form of review of sentencing already exists. Indeed, the prosecutors rely on the existence of limited review of sentences to demonstrate that a defendant's rights are adequately protected. However, since the authority of this Court has been questioned, it is beneficial to examine the sources of judicial power regarding the sentencing process. Although mindful of the fact that Const 1963, art 6, § 5 gives this Court the power to promulgate and implement rules of practice and procedure for Michigan courts, it is argued that, except where there are constitutional provisions otherwise, the right to an appeal is strictly a matter of legislative prerogative, and it is solely within the Legislature's province to determine in what cases, under what circumstances, and from what courts, appeals may be taken. Moore v Spangler, 401 Mich 360, 368-369; 258 NW2d 34 (1977); Chicago, D & C G T J R Co v Simons, 210 Mich 418, 420; 178 NW 12 (1920). The jurisdiction of a court to entertain an appeal in a certain matter is thus established by the constitution or by statute, and this Court may not, by rule or otherwise, enlarge or diminish such jurisdiction. While it is argued that no constitutional or statutory authority vests this Court with jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of sentencing, the defendants point out that no constitutional or statutory provision exists which limits the review power of this Court or precludes it from passing upon the propriety of sentences imposed by trial courts. In addition, the defendants assert that the constitutional right to an appeal in a criminal case includes the right to sentence review. This Court's general review power is grounded in Const 1963, art 6, § 4, which provides in part: The supreme court shall have general superintending control over all courts; power to issue, hear and determine prerogative and remedial writs; and appellate jurisdiction as provided by rules of the supreme court. The judicial power of this Court has been further defined in MCL 600.212-600.223; MSA 27A.212-27A.223, which, inter alia, grant appellate jurisdiction over any matter or question of law brought before the Court in an authorized manner and grant the Court the power to promulgate and amend general court rules governing the practices and procedures in all courts of record. These rules may include practices and procedures for the method of review of decisions from inferior tribunals. Furthermore, this Court has defined its authority, as permitted by the foregoing constitutional and statutory provisions, to include the power to: Give any judgment and make any order which ought to have been given or made, and make such other and further orders and grant such relief as the case may require. GCR 1963, 865.1(7). Thus, it is clear that this Court has a broad jurisdiction and far-reaching powers in the area of appellate review. Jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals is conferred by statute, although this Court prescribes the rules of practice and procedure in that Court. [17] MCL 600.308; MSA 27A.308 confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Appeals to entertain appeals from, inter alia: [1](a) All final judgments from the circuit court, court of claims, and recorder's court   . [2](d) Such other judgments or interlocutory orders as the supreme court may by rule determine. We conclude that a sentence following a conviction is as much a part of the final judgment of the trial court as is the conviction itself. Since the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments of trial courts, whether the appeal be one to which a defendant is absolutely entitled or one in which a defendant must apply for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear appeals involving a review of a defendant's sentence. We find no sound reason for interpreting the applicable constitutional and statutory provisions as carving out an exception to the right of appeal regarding sentencing matters. None of those relevant provisions limit the particular issues subject to appellate review. We therefore conclude that the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority vest appellate courts with the jurisdiction to review all sentencing issues. The foregoing analysis applies not only to the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, but also to that of the circuit court [18] and of this Court. To the extent that the decision in Cummins, supra, is read to hold that an appellate court does not have the authority to review a convicted defendant's sentence, we disavow such a conclusion. However, an appellate court's authority to consider appeals involving sentencing issues and that court's authority to resentence the defendant on appeal are two separate matters. If the court determines that resentencing is necessary, the case must be remanded to the trial court. The appellate court may direct that the defendant be resentenced by a different judge if the court determines that is warranted by the circumstances. We reach this conclusion for two principal reasons. First, the Legislature has indicated its intention to confer upon the trial courts alone the power to impose criminal sentences. Second, policy considerations dictate that sentencing should remain the responsibility of the trial courts. The jurisdiction to impose a sentence is set forth in MCL 769.1; MSA 28.1072, as follows: A judge of a court having jurisdiction is authorized and empowered to pronounce judgment against and pass sentence upon a person convicted of an offense in a court held by that judge. The sentence shall not be in excess of the sentence prescribed by law. The forerunner to this provision expressly included justices of the Supreme Court and judges having jurisdiction over criminal cases among those possessing authority to impose a sentence. [19] We read MCL 769.1; MSA 28.1072 now to exclude other courts from possessing jurisdiction to impose a sentence where one court has already exercised jurisdiction to convict and sentence a defendant. In addition, the policy of this state favors individualized sentencing for every convicted defendant. The sentence must be tailored to fit the particular circumstances of the case and the defendant. People v McFarlin, 389 Mich 557, 574; 208 NW2d 504 (1973). As we stated recently in People v Pulley, 411 Mich 523, 529-530; 309 NW2d 170 (1981): To so tailor the sentence, the judge must gather complete and detailed information about the offender. The judge must assess the reliability of the information received, assure that it is reasonably up-to-date, determine its competency as a sentencing consideration, and resolve challenges to its accuracy. This process entails the need for a certain amount of factfinding which is best discharged by the trial court. Appellate courts were not established to engage in any significant factfinding functions, and, were they to resentence a defendant, such a function would become necessary, lest they have only a skeletal picture from which to determine the propriety of a given sentence. Furthermore, a defendant's right to allocution prior to sentencing might have to be extended to a defendant being resentenced at the appellate level, especially when a significant amount of time has passed between the original sentencing in the trial court and the resentencing in the appellate court. Such a requirement would further burden the appellate process, and thus we conclude that imposing the duty to resentence a defendant on the appellate courts is both unnecessary and unwise. It is also argued that if this Court were to adopt and implement a procedure to expand the appellate review of sentences, it would encroach upon the duties and responsibilities of the legislative and executive branches of this state. Our attention is directed to this Court's decision in In re Callahan, 348 Mich 77, 80; 81 NW2d 669 (1957), in which we held that the Legislature has the exclusive authority to determine the appropriate length of imprisonment for a felony and that a court, in imposing a sentence, has only limited discretion to act within the parameters set forth in the statute. We continue to adhere to this view. See Brinson v Genesee Circuit Judge, 403 Mich 676, 681; 272 NW2d 513 (1978). We believe that the people of this state, through their elected legislative representatives, are the appropriate ones to determine what specific punishment a defendant should receive for the conviction of a given crime. However, instead of adopting a scheme of presumptive sentencing, which would specify a definite term of punishment for each act declared to be a crime, the Legislature chose to adopt a scheme of indeterminate sentencing, which directs courts to sentence certain defendants to a minimum and maximum term of punishment. [20] In order to ensure that the purpose of indeterminate sentencing could not be undermined by a sentencing court, this Court held in Tanner, supra, that any sentence which provides for a minimum term which exceeds 2/3 of the maximum is improper because it fails to comply with the indeterminate sentence act. We reached this conclusion on the ground that too short an interval between the minimum and maximum sentence given by the trial court prevented the sentence from being indeterminate. Indeterminate sentencing, by its very nature, requires the trial court to exercise a certain degree of discretion in the imposition of a sentence. This does not amount to an encroachment by the judiciary into the legislative prerogative of establishing punishment for crimes. As we stated in In re Southard, 298 Mich 75, 82; 298 NW 457 (1941): The policy expressed by the people, in providing by constitutional amendment for an indeterminate sentence law, directed the legislature to adopt a flexible law and the courts to fit the punishment in the exercise of their discretion to the needs of the particular case. In no other way could the will of the people be carried into effect. A discretion must be exercised in order to have indeterminate sentences. The judicial power to exercise discretion in the imposition of sentences is thus an integral part of the legislative scheme of indeterminate sentencing, and it will always remain that unless removed or curtailed by the Legislature. Southard, p 81. It is this exercise of discretion that we intend to now subject to a limited appellate review, and any such review will in no way interfere with the Legislature's ability to maintain or change the method of sentencing in this state. In addition, we are not persuaded that an expanded appellate review of sentencing will infringe upon the exclusive power of the Governor to modify or reduce sentences. See Const 1963, art 5, § 14. Although we have faithfully guarded the Governor's prerogative under the foregoing constitutional provision, [21] we have also held that a court clearly has the authority to set aside a previously imposed invalid sentence and impose a new one without infringing upon any power granted to the Governor. People v Whalen, 412 Mich 166, 169; 312 NW2d 638 (1981). As previously discussed, this Court has already established certain circumstances in which a sentence will be held invalid. See also Whalen, pp 169-170. All we do today is add to the list another set of circumstances in which a sentence may be declared invalid. In such a situation, it is the responsibility of the courts to correct error and resentence the defendant to a valid sentence. As we stated in People v Murray, 72 Mich 10, 17; 40 NW 29 (1888): It will not do to say the executive may apply the remedy in such a case [in which a sentence within the statutory limits was held to be clearly excessive]. We do not know what the executive may do, and it is but a poor commentary upon the judiciary when it becomes necessary for the executive to regulate the humanity of the bench.