Opinion ID: 2765929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Credibility Decision

Text: The Estate also argues that the district court erred in finding that Sanchez made a permissible and sincere credibility determination in believing Iams; it contends that there was insufficient evidence supporting Iams’s credibility. 3 The Estate targets the District’s allegedly inadequate investigation and the 3 The Estate confuses Sanchez’s own credibility determination with the district court’s finding that this determination was not a pretext for his actions. In its opening brief, the Estate declares that “[t]he court made a credibility determination that it believed Sanchez and accepts his proffered reason for firing Bassatt.” Appellant’s Br. at 48. But it is mistaken. In the next sentence, it states: “The court wrote that ‘Principal Sanchez made a credibility determination as to Iams’ statements and concluded that any doubt should be resolved against Bassatt.’” Id. This latter sentence shows that the district court did not make a credibility determination. Based on the evidence, it rightly concluded that the Estate did not raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. - 13 - discrepancies in Iams’ report to demonstrate that Sanchez did not have enough information in front of him to credibly determine that Iams had seen Bassatt masturbating in the parking lot. First, the Estate asserts that Sanchez inadequately investigated the incident. It offers four reasons why the investigation was inadequate: (1) after Bassatt had returned to his student teaching responsibilities, Muller told Sanchez that additional investigation was needed, but nothing else occurred except the additional meeting with Bassatt and his wife; (2) the District did not produce documentation of an independent investigation, which is against normal practice; (3) Sanchez’s investigation was so suspect that he could not have credibly believed Iams’s allegation; and (4) neither Sanchez nor Muller considered Bassett’s record or background before terminating his student teacher placement. The failure to conduct a fair investigation can raise an inference of pretext. Smothers v. Solvay Chems., Inc., 740 F.3d 530, 542 (10th Cir. 2014). While the Estate relies on Smothers for this proposition, there the employer never heard the plaintiff’s side of the story before firing him. Id. That is not the case here. Sanchez heard both Iams’s and Bassatt’s accounts of what happened and had to make a decision. As the principal, he had to weigh numerous competing interests, including the safety of his students. Sanchez’s decision to believe Iams over Bassatt, when there was no direct evidence either way, is not evidence of pretext. - 14 - The Estate also relies on Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 2008), for the same proposition, but this case too provides little support. In Trujillo, the court stated that “[a]lthough the couple together [had] served PacifiCorp for 28 years, they were never given the benefit of the doubt during the investigation. Rather, the company seemingly relied only on evidence to the detriment of the [plaintiffs] and failed to interview key witnesses.” Id. at 1160. Conversely, Bassatt had not worked at West for even a month before the incident occurred. And, while the District’s investigation conceivably could have been more thorough, Sanchez and Muller did interview the key witnesses—Iams, Damian, and Bassatt himself. Again, nothing about the District’s investigation suggests deficiencies from which we could infer pretext. The Estate further argues that the discrepancies in Iams’s report created a genuine issue of material fact on pretext. It points out that Iams could not identify Bassatt as the man in the Ford Focus and that her description of the man’s clothing did not match what Bassatt was wearing in the surveillance video. 4 While discrepancies exist, Bassatt admitted that he was the person reclined in the driver’s seat of the Ford Focus. 4 We note, however, that Dean Trujillo identified the man walking to the Ford Focus as Bassatt in the surveillance video, and that the man was wearing a dark polo shirt in that video. - 15 - Regardless, the Estate focuses on the wrong question. The proper inquiry is not whether the inadequacy of the investigation foreclosed Sanchez from the possibility of believing Bassatt. Rather, the relevant inquiry is whether Sanchez subjectively, but honestly, believed that Bassatt had engaged in the misconduct. See Rivera v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924–25 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, we infer from Bassatt’s testimony before the ALJ that Bassatt believed that Sanchez honestly believed that Bassatt had engaged in the misconduct. 5 Finally, the Estate argues on appeal that Sanchez’s first email to Bassatt, inviting him back to work, is evidence that Sanchez did not truly believe Bassatt had engaged in the misconduct. But this argument fails in light of the Colorado Court of Appeals’ decision, which specifically reviewed and rejected this position. That decision affirmed the ALJ’s finding that the e-mail “does not provide evidence of discriminatory intent or an ulterior motive.” J.A. vol. III at 1281. Additionally, we believe that Sanchez only sent the email because he believed that the District Attorney’s decision not to pursue charges bound him from acting against Bassett based on Iams’s allegations. Once he determined he was not bound by the District Attorney’s decision, he reconsidered his options. 5 See infra note 6 and accompanying text. In addition, Sanchez knew that Muller also believed that Bassatt had engaged in the wrongdoing. Damian also believed that Bassatt had committed the misconduct. - 16 - We agree with the district court that the Estate fell short of establishing pretext. It provided no evidence to the district court that Sanchez was motivated to take action based on anything other than Bassatt’s alleged misconduct. In fact, as we read the record, Bassatt acknowledged that Sanchez genuinely believed Iams’s allegations. 6 Further, Sanchez is Latino, and we conclude that this undermines any suggestion of pretext. See Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1471 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that plaintiff failed to show pretext in part because decision makers were in the same protected class as plaintiff). Sanchez is even a founding member of a group that advocates for Latinos in education. Thus, we cannot agree with the Estate that Sanchez had insufficient information in front of him to make a credibility determination regarding Bassatt’s behavior. 6 During his hearing before the ALJ, Bassatt said: And Mr. Muller kept asking me, well, why would she be making those allegations if it’s not true? And that’s when I told Mr. Muller, You know what, you’re very discriminating against me because you already have your mind made up that I did it based on your conversation and what you’re saying, all right. That just because I’m a Hispanic male, you already believe that I did it? That’s discrimination against me. So Mr. Sanchez turned around and told me, Carlos, that is not helping, so don’t do that. That’s when I said, Sir, but it’s the truth, okay. He presented himself the whole time as I was – you know, as I did it. J.A. vol. II at 617. Bassatt’s lawyer told the court that during the meeting between Bassatt and Sanchez, Bassatt said to Sanchez, “Look, you’re taking the word of this woman over mine without doing an investigation.” J.A. vol. IV at 1760. - 17 -