Opinion ID: 788549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Schlup to Doe's Proffered New Evidence

Text: 85 We find that Doe presented no new reliable evidence of his factual innocence at the March 2003 evidentiary hearing or in his habeas submissions, as is required by Schlup. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. Because Doe has not presented any new reliable evidence, it is unnecessary to determine whether no reasonable juror would convict in light of Doe's newly proffered evidence. 23 86 The district court's crediting of Doe's and Edwin's testimony, and its consequent finding of actual innocence, resulted in the dilution of Schlup ' s directives. Schlup dictates that the habeas court faced with purported new evidence of a petitioner's actual innocence make its own credibility determinations based on its assessment of the totality of evidence in the record, both old and new. Because Schlup also requires that any new evidence of actual innocence be reliable, the habeas court must analyze not only whether the new evidence throws the pre-existing evidence into doubt, but whether the new evidence itself may be considered reliable in light of the pre-existing evidence. Thus, the habeas court may not merely examine the new evidence and, if it believes the new material credible without regard to the pre-existing record, find that the petitioner is actually innocent. That is how the district court proceeded here, and its disregard for the bulk of the evidence in the record allowed it to circumvent Schlup 's instruction that the proffered new evidence must be reliable. To allow this mode of analysis would eviscerate the Schlup standard. 87 In light of our conclusion that it is not necessary to apply the Schlup no reasonable juror standard because Doe has not presented any new reliable evidence, we need not review the district court's application of that standard. The district court's misstatement of the Schlup standard in its June 2003 order merits comment, however, in order to clarify our standing instruction to district courts faced with actual innocence claims in the context of AEDPA tolling. See Whitley, 317 F.3d at 225-26. The district court stated that Schlup requires only that innocence ... be demonstrated to be more likely than unlikely, thereby substantially reducing the showing that Doe was required to make in order to establish his actual innocence. This statement of the standard essentially allowed the district court to act as a jury, determining in the first instance whether Doe had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that he was innocent. Thus, the court concluded that petitioner has established his innocence by a preponderance of the credible evidence. 88 As discussed above, however, the Schlup standard requires the district court to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no reasonable juror would find the petitioner guilty. The preponderance showing is not in itself a high burden of proof, as the district court noted, but the fact that the showing must establish that no reasonable juror would convict substantially increases that burden. Even if the court, as one reasonable factfinder, would vote to acquit, the court must step back and consider whether the petitioner's evidentiary showing most likely places a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt outside of the range of potential conclusions that any reasonable juror would reach. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 333, 115 S.Ct. 851 (O'Connor, J., concurring). If the court finds that even one juror might reasonably vote to convict, the court must find that the petitioner has failed to establish his actual innocence. 89 The district court also misapprehended our direction in Doe I that the court should decide as a matter of fact whether Doe has presented a credible claim of actual innocence. Doe I, 49 Fed.Appx. at 342. We later extended this instruction to all district courts faced with claims of actual innocence in the context of AEDPA tolling in Whitley, 317 F.3d at 225-26, in which we held that district courts should determine whether a petitioner presents a credible claim of actual innocence before ruling on the legal issue of whether the limitations period could be tolled. The district court understood our reference to a  credible claim of actual innocence to represent a lesser standard than that delineated by Schlup, and noted that, in its view, Doe had satisfied both the higher Schlup standard and the lesser credible claim standard. The reference to a credible claim arises directly from Schlup itself, however, which states that [t]o be credible, [an actual innocence] claim requires petitioner to support his allegations of constitutional error with new reliable evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 324, 115 S.Ct. 851. Thus, our instruction in this case, and our extension of that instruction in Whitley, do not purport to relax the Schlup standard or suggest that the burden of showing of actual innocence is lessened in the equitable tolling context, but simply refer to the fact that any showing of actual innocence must be based on new reliable evidence. 90 The issue in this case is not one of the relative credibility of witnesses but of reliability of new evidence in light of all the evidence. The actual innocence standard is a demanding one. Failing to account for Doe's conduct inconsistent with his claim of actual innocence, our dissenting colleague would have us overturn the weighty presumptions favoring the veracity of a defendant's sworn plea of guilty and the propriety of prosecutorial conduct. While a recanting victim presents a sympathetic scenario for a claim of actual innocence, we must not flinch from our duty to scrutinize all the evidence to assure ourselves of that recantation's reliability. Here, the evidence proffered by Doe fails the strict requirements of Schlup. C. AEDPA Tolling for Actual Innocence 91 In light of our holding, we need not review the district court's conclusion that a credible claim of actual innocence does not toll AEDPA's limitations period. We have previously stated that [i]n a proper case, we will decide whether constitutional considerations require an actual innocence exception to the AEDPA's statute of limitations. Whitley, 317 F.3d at 225. Such a proper case will arise, of course, where a petitioner is able to make a credible showing of actual innocence based on new evidence, thereby demonstrating that equitably tolling the limitations period could prevent a miscarriage of justice. Doe's petition clearly does not present such a case. 92 It is worth noting, moreover, that the Supreme Court has recently counseled lower courts to avoid extending the actual innocence exception to new contexts if there are other grounds for cause to excuse the procedural default. Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1847, 1852, ___ L.Ed.2d ___, ___ (2004). The Court's statement that [b]ecause the various exceptions to the procedural default doctrine are judge-made rules [,] ... courts as their stewards must exercise restraint, adding to or expanding them only when necessary, id. at 1853, counsels restraint in the judge-created area of equitable tolling as well. Thus, in order to avoid the unhappy effect of prolonging the pendency of federal habeas applications, id., district courts confronted with allegations of actual innocence as a ground for tolling the limitations period should first consider any other grounds for tolling, and only after having ruled out any other possible means of tolling, consider petitioner's actual innocence claim. 24