Opinion ID: 1389408
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: limited-purpose public figure

Text: 3. In New York Times v. Sullivan , the Court held that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press prohibited a public official from recovering damages for defamatory criticism of his conduct unless the official proves the statement was made with actual malice. [13] This standard requires the public official to prove that the defendant had knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was true or false. [14] Three years later in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, [15] a majority of the Court applied the New York Times rule on actual malice to criticism of public figures, defined as individuals who are intimately involved in the resolution of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of concern to society at large. [16] The Court found that Wally Butts, the University of Georgia athletic director, had attained his status as a public figure by his position alone; the second plaintiff, a retired army officer, had achieved public figure status by his purposeful activity amounting to a thrusting of his personality into the `vortex' of an important public controversy, the racial integration of the University of Mississippi. [17] The rationale for extending the constitutional privilege to protect criticism of public figures was the increasingly blurred distinctions between the governmental and private sectors: In many situations, policy determinations which traditionally were channeled through formal political institutions are now originated and implemented through a complex array of boards, committees, commissions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely connected with the Government. [18] Later declining to apply the New York Times standard of fault in cases involving private-figure plaintiffs, the Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc . explored the difference between public figures and private persons in defamation cases involving statements of public concern. [19] The Court explained that some persons may hold positions with such pervasive fame or power that they are deemed public figures for all purposes, [20] but more often an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. [21] Whether a person is a public figure is a question of law that requires the court to review the nature and extent of the individual's participation in the specific controversy that gave rise to the defamation. [22] The court of appeals has adopted a three-part analysis used in federal cases to determine whether an individual is a limited-purpose public figure. [23] Under this analysis, a court must isolate the public controversy, examine the plaintiff's involvement in the controversy, and determine whether the alleged defamation was germane to the plaintiff's participation in the controversy. [24] Applying this analysis, we conclude that Cannon is a limited-purpose public figure in the controversy surrounding the recycling facility and landfill in Crisp County. The public controversy concerns the Solid Waste Management Authority of Crisp County's financially unsuccessful operation of its solid waste recovery facility and resulting strain on the county's resources and its taxpayers. After 18 months of operation, the plant was not able to process the solid waste or produce the recyclable materials and commercial compost as projected. As a result, a large amount of solid waste that was collected from other locations for processing at the authority's plant was instead being diverted to the county landfill. The county commission voted to raise property taxes to deal with the costs related to disposing of the county's own waste and expand the county-owned landfill to accommodate the additional solid waste that TransWaste was bringing into the county under its contract with the authority. In reviewing Cannon's role, we find that he was involved in the public controversy in Crisp County in at least three ways. First, he was a crucial actor in helping the authority obtain the commitments from other county and city governments in south Georgia to provide solid waste for the authority's facility. Without these early commitments, the authority would not have been able to obtain the construction loans necessary to go forward with the project. Second, Cannon represented the authority in a variety of ways that far exceeded the terms of TransWaste's contract to collect and haul solid waste to Crisp County. As he explained in his deposition, the authority in 1996 was still just a shell of an authority developing a concept, with no funding, lines of credit, or buildings. TransWaste would step in to try to help the Authority in whatever way they could, and there are many, many instances of that. Although he described his position as an independent contractor who functioned as the garbage man of the deal, it is difficult to distinguish between his efforts on behalf of the public authority and his efforts on behalf of his private company. Using his personal contacts with city and county officials developed from selling them heavy-duty equipment, Cannon solicited business for the authority; this solicitation helped generate business for TransWaste as the authority's exclusive hauler. He negotiated the authority's contracts with local governments who provided waste; borrowed money through TransWaste and wrote a check directly to the City of Warner Robins for equipment that the authority had agreed to purchase; wrote and signed correspondence on authority letterhead in his capacity as its solid waste hauler; and participated in some of the authority's executive sessions. Third, Cannon precipitated the financial crisis in November 1999 by filing a lawsuit against the authority and then temporarily halting deliveries to the solid waste recovery plant. TransWaste's actions in stopping deliveries forced the authority to address its financial and legal problems. Moreover, Cannon knew, or should have known, that suing the authority for payment for services rendered would affect the county as the other major participant in the project. Based on Cannon's role in developing the project, representing the authority, and accelerating the crisis, we conclude that he voluntarily injected himself into the controversy or, at a minimum, became drawn into the public controversy over the operation of the authority's facility and county's landfill. Contrary to the dissent's analysis, it is not the global nature of the public's interest that defines a dispute as a public controversy, but rather whether the issue generates discussion, debate, and dissent in the relevant community, which in this case happens to be a county. Having blurred the distinction between his work for his private business and his more public efforts in helping develop the quasigovernmental project, he should not be able to erect a barrier to public criticism of his role once the project failed to perform as planned. Finally, we determine that the Mathis's statements were germane to Cannon's participation in the controversy. Mathis posted his message on the Internet bulletin board of Waste Industries, Inc., TransWaste's parent company, three days after the Crisp County grand jury issued its report on the authority. In his messages, he attacked wwin and its chief executive officer; told Cannon to stop the trash flow because our county [is] not a dumping ground; questioned why Cannon and the lieutenant governor, whose family owned a minority interest in TransWaste, think that crisp county needs to be dumping ground of the south? ? ?; and urged others to stay out of the county and we thank u for it. Although the messages accused Cannon of being a crook and a thief and asked why he had been fired from a specific company, these accusations were made as part of the ongoing debate about the garbage disposal dispute in Crisp County. Moreover, any person reading the postings on the message board written entirely in lower case replete with question marks, exclamation points, misspellings, abbreviations, and dashescould not reasonably interpret the incoherent messages as stating actual facts about Cannon, but would interpret them as the late night rhetorical outbursts of an angry and frustrated person opposed to the company's hauling of other people's garbage into the county. [25] In sum, we conclude that the nature and extent of Cannon's participation in the local controversy concerning solid waste disposal has made him a limited-purpose public figure. This conclusion means that he must meet the standard of fault established in the New York Times v. Sullivan case. Under that standard, Cannon must show by clear and convincing evidence that Mathis published false and defamatory statements knowing that they were false or acting in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity. [26] Because the trial court and the court of appeals did not apply this standard of fault, Cannon was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of liability.