Opinion ID: 203028
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Courtroom Seating

Text: Throughout the trial, the defendants were seated in the first two rows of the courtroom rather than at the defense table with their attorneys. On the second day of trial, González-Valero submitted an emergency motion stating that he could not communicate effectively with his attorney and requesting that he be seated beside counsel so that he could interact and communicate regarding the evidence presented to fully exercise his rights to effectively confront and cross-examine testimony presented against him. The next day, González-Valero's counsel asked the court if another table could be obtained because [i]t is difficult to communicate. The judge responded that he already had spoken with the marshals and that another table would not fit. The court then said: Counsel, you can communicate. González-Valero contends that his distance from his attorney deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel, and he argues that the district court abused its discretion in failing to either probe his claim of inadequate communication or make alternative arrangements. See United States v. Balsam, 203 F.3d 72, 82 (1st Cir.2000) (noting that courtroom seating arrangements for defendants and counsel are reviewed for abuse of discretion). We previously have concluded that seating five co-defendants in the first row of a courtroom's spectator section because of limited space in the courtroom did not significantly impede the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to consult with counsel. Id. ; see also United States v. Larson, 460 F.3d 1200, 1216 (9th Cir.2006) [39] ; United States v. Sorrentino, 726 F.2d 876, 887 (1st Cir.1984) (Where special circumstances, such as the number of defendants, make it impractical for defendants to sit at the counsel table, `as is ordinarily the case,' the seating arrangement is necessarily `a matter best left to the discretion of the trial court.' (quoting United States v. Turkette, 656 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir.1981))). Although we noted in Balsam that the court had assured the defendants that they could consult freely with their attorneys as they wished, either by walking the short distance to the defense table, or passing written notes, 203 F.3d at 82, defendant does not complain that he was prevented from using such techniques here. He identifies no particular instance in which he was unable to communicate effectively with counsel. With nine defendants and nine separate counsel, and in the absence of any indication of actual prejudice, we cannot conclude that the court abused its discretion in seating the defendants immediately behind, rather than beside, their attorneys.