Opinion ID: 1915237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issues on appeal of convictions

Text: Appellant argues that all the physical evidence found at the scene of the sinkhole where the bodies were recovered, including the bodies of the victims themselves and all information about and descriptions of their condition, should have been excluded from evidence. The law enforcement authorities were able to locate and recover the bodies within a fairly short time after appellant's arrest because he told them where the bodies had been put and directed them to the location. Appellant posits several grounds for ruling that his interrogation was illegal and argues that his statement disclosing and actually leading the sheriff to the location was a direct product of the illegal interrogation. He concludes that the physical evidence therefore should have been suppressed. The grounds of the illegality of the interrogation put forth by the appellant are that it was the product of the unlawful warrantless arrest of appellant by forcible entry at his home on suspicion of cattle theft in violation of the fourth amendment; that it was carried out without a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent and by means of actual threats and coercion in violation of the fifth amendment; and that it was continued by the deceptive and unlawful sequestration of appellant, evading the attempts of legal counsel to reach him in violation of the sixth amendment. Appellant's confession and incriminating statements to the authorities were in fact excluded from evidence at the trial on the ground that they were illegally obtained. The state apparently concedes that the interrogation itself was illegal and the suppression order correct. [2] But the trial court held that the bodies themselves and related physical evidence were admissible on the ground that they were independently obtained. Appellant argues that this was error. A review of the record reveals that the trial judge was in error when he found that the discovery of the bodies by law enforcement authorities was independent, and not a product, of the illegally obtained statements of appellant. Indeed, the police did not know where the bodies were until appellant directed them there and showed them, and this journey to the scene of disposal was an integral part of the continuing interrogation, which the trial court held and the state concedes was illegal for failure to observe constitutional requirements. The foregoing observation does not end the matter, however. For the physical evidence to be admissible it is not necessary that it have been found independently of the confession if there was a reasonable probability that in the normal course of events it would have been found independently. The argument that the physical evidence in question should have been suppressed relies on the court-made exclusionary rule, which forbids the use of evidence in court if it is the product or fruit of a search or seizure or interrogation carried out in violation of constitutional rights. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); United States v. Cruz, 581 F.2d 535 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc). However, the question of whether the evidence in question is in fact the product or fruit of the constitutionally violative conduct depends on whether the connection between the two is a direct connection. If the connection is attenuated rather than direct, the illegality of the conduct does not always mandate application of the exclusionary rule to bar admission of the evidence. Wong Sun v. United States ; Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 60 S.Ct. 266, 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939). One basis for finding that the connection between a constitutional violation and the questioned evidence is severed or attenuated is the fact that the police were able to obtain the same evidence from a separate and independent source not affected by the unlawful police conduct. Closely related to the independent source doctrine is the rule that the exclusionary rule will not be applied where it can be shown that, had the evidence in question not been obtained by the challenged police conduct, it ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). The evidence presented at the suppression hearing in this case was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that, if appellant had not led police to the bodies, they would ultimately have been located very soon thereafter by means of ordinary and routine investigative procedures. There was testimony that the surrounding areas of all sinkholes in the region would have been closely examined as a matter of routine. Also, co-defendant Schmidt had given his lawyer a limited authorization to inform the police that the bodies had been disposed of in deep water. This routine examination of sinkholes would have revealed the drag marks, debris, clothing fibers, and other indicators that were present at Wall Sink where the bodies were found. Wall Sink was the largest and deepest sink in the general area. These indicators, the testimony showed, would inevitably have caused police to concentrate their deep-water searching capabilities at Wall Sink. We therefore conclude that the trial court was correct in admitting the bodies and related evidence, on the ground that although they were in fact found by means of appellant's statements, they would have been found independently even without the statements, by means of normal investigative measures that inevitably would have been set in motion as a matter of routine police procedure. United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1117, 105 S.Ct. 2362, 86 L.Ed.2d 262 (1985); United States v. Brookins, 614 F.2d 1037 (5th Cir.1980). The inevitable discovery doctrine is properly applied regardless of whether the ground of suppression of the statement is violation of the fourth amendment, fifth amendment, or sixth amendment. See Nix v. Williams . We therefore find no reversible error in the admission into evidence of the physical items in question, testimony about the location and condition of the bodies of the victims, and related physical evidence. Next appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the state to present evidence of collateral crimes, that is, testimony and evidence showing that appellant and Schmidt had been stealing cattle from the ranch. Appellant was not charged with any crimes based on this conduct. He argues that therefore the evidence pertaining to the stealing was not relevant to any material issues, served only to prejudice the jury against him, and should have been excluded. This argument ignores the fact that the background information concerning appellant's employment as ranch manager and the continuous pattern of thievery was relevant to establish his motives and to provide the jury with the entire factual context in which the charged crimes arose. In a criminal trial, it is generally improper to admit evidence tending to show that the accused committed crimes other than those of which he stands accused. This rule is but a specific application of the more general principle that all evidence must be relevant to a material issue. But collateral crime evidence is given special treatment because of the danger of prejudicing the jury against the accused either by depicting him as a person of bad character or by influencing the jury to believe that because he committed the other crime or crimes, he probably committed the crime charged. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 110 So.2d 654 (Fla.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847, 80 S.Ct. 102, 4 L.Ed.2d 86 (1959); Winstead v. State, 91 So.2d 809 (Fla. 1956); Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479 (1925). A verdict of guilt on a criminal charge should be based on evidence pertaining specifically to the crime. The jury's attention should always be focused on guilt or innocence of the crime charged and should not be diverted by information about unrelated matters. We find that the evidence of appellant's thefts of cattle on several occasions was relevant to show his motive for killing Eubanks and Farmer. Williams v. State . The cattle thefts were not wholly independent of the murders but rather were an integral part of the entire factual context in which the charged crimes took place. Smith v. State, 365 So.2d 704 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 885, 100 S.Ct. 177, 62 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). While evidence of motive is not necessary to a conviction, when it is available and would help the jury to understand the other evidence presented, it should not be kept from them merely because it reveals the commission of crimes not charged. The test for admissibility is not the necessity of evidence, but rather its relevancy. Hall v. State, 403 So.2d 1321 (Fla. 1981); Ruffin v. State, 397 So.2d 277 (Fla.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882, 102 S.Ct. 368, 70 L.Ed.2d 194 (1981). We therefore hold that the evidence about the cattle thefts was relevant and was properly admitted. Appellant makes the same relevancy argument with regard to some testimony that indicated that he spent some of the money he gained from the unauthorized cattle sales on illicit drugs. Appellant argues that this had the effect of depicting him as a person of bad character. In contrast to our finding regarding the evidence of thievery as discussed above, we do not believe that the testimony about illegal drug use was relevant to any material issue in the case or to reasonably related factual background. Appellant's objection to it should have been sustained. We do not agree, however, that the matter compelled a mistrial or that reversal is required now. The basis for the prohibition on evidence of collateral crimes should be kept in mind: Evidence that the defendant has committed a similar crime, or one equally heinous, will frequently prompt a more ready belief by the jury that he might have committed the one with which he is charged, thereby predisposing the mind of the juror to believe the prisoner guilty. Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. at 685, 106 So. at 488 (emphasis supplied). While all irrelevant evidence should be excluded or stricken on motion or objection, we are not persuaded that any prejudice flowed from the evidence of illegal drug use when there was ample direct evidence of appellant's guilt on two counts of first-degree murder. We therefore find that the error was harmless. Appellant's next argument is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial made during the prosecutor's closing argument to the jury in the guilt phase of the trial. Appellant presents numerous contentions that various features of the argument were unduly emotional, inflammatory, and prejudicial to his right to a fair trial. While certain of the arguments appellant makes refer to prosecutorial comments to which the defense objected below, with the issues having been preserved for review by motion for mistrial at some point during closing argument or, at the latest, at the conclusion of the prosecutor's closing argument, State v. Cumbie, 380 So.2d 1031, 1033 (Fla. 1980), most of the challenges now made were not raised by timely objection in the trial court. A motion for mistrial based on certain grounds cannot operate to preserve for appellate review other issues not raised by specific objection at trial. Thus defense counsel's attempt, when he objected on the ground of repeated references to the defendant as having lied in his testimony, to have his motion apply to the whole argument thus preserving for review objections not specifically made to the trial court, must fail with the result that most of the objections argued are being raised for the first time on appeal. Therefore, all but two of appellant's thirteen asserted instances of prosecutorial misconduct are not properly before the court on appeal and will not be considered. Appellant argues that the prosecutor made improper and erroneous statements about the law of principals as it related to the evidence of the relative culpability of appellant and the accomplice, Schmidt. This and other remarks of the prosecutor concerning the relative roles of the two perpetrators in committing the two murders were in response to defense arguments and suggestions designed to attack the credibility of Schmidt as a witness. In a criminal trial, whenever the evidence shows that more than one perpetrator participated in a crime, defense counsel can be expected to raise questions about the relative roles and culpability of the other perpetrators and will attack the credibility and motives of any accomplice testifying for the state. Such challenges to the state's evidence are quite proper and that is what happened here. The prosecutor's argument was merely in response to such arguments and suggestions by defense counsel and was equally proper. To the extent that the prosecutor misstated the law, we note that the judge cautioned the jury that the court would instruct them on the law and that they should follow the instructions of the court. This adequately remedied any impropriety. Appellant argues that the prosecutor improperly made repeated references to defendant's testimony as being untruthful and to the defendant himself as a liar. It may be true that the prosecutor used language that was somewhat intemperate but we do not believe he exceeded the bounds of proper argument in view of the evidence. When counsel refers to a witness or a defendant as being a liar, and it is understood from the context that the charge is made with reference to testimony given by the person thus characterized, the prosecutor is merely submitting to the jury a conclusion that he is arguing can be drawn from the evidence. It was for the jury to decide what evidence and testimony was worthy of belief and the prosecutor was merely submitting his view of the evidence to them for consideration. There was no impropriety. We have reviewed the entire closing argument of the prosecutor at the guilt phase of the trial in light of appellant's other contentions of impropriety and conclude that nothing was said or done that deprived appellant of a fair trial. Next appellant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the minimum and maximum penalties prescribed by law for not only the crimes charged but for all lesser included offenses of the crimes charged. We agree that this action of the trial court was error but reject appellant's further contention that the error entitles him to a new trial. At the time of appellant's trial, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.390(a) provided as follows: The presiding judge shall charge the jury only upon the law of the case at the conclusion of argument of counsel and upon request of either the State or the defendant the judge shall include in said charge the maximum and minimum sentences which may be imposed (including probation) for the offense for which the accused is then on trial. Pursuant to this rule, defense counsel requested that the court instruct the jury on the maximum and minimum sentences that could be imposed for the offenses charged. Appellant was on trial on two counts of first-degree murder. With regard to each of the offenses charged, the possible penalties were limited to either a sentence of death or life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for twenty-five years. §§ 782.04, 921.141, Fla. Stat. (1981). Defense counsel did not ask for instructions on the possible penalties for all the lesser included offenses of first-degree murder, nor did the rule cited or any other rule provide for or authorize such instructions. Appellant argues that the instructions on minimum and maximum penalties for all lesser included offenses improperly impaired his due process right to have the jury impartially consider returning verdicts of guilt of lesser included offenses on one or both of the counts of the indictment. Appellant points out that the minimum penalties for some of the lesser degrees of homicide appear quite lenient compared with the possible penalties for first-degree murder. He contends that this procedure prejudiced the jury against the possibility of considering a lesser verdict on either of the charges. While defense counsel only requested penalty instructions on the charged offenses of first-degree murder, the charge conference transcript shows that he did not make the specific objection, stating grounds, and the argument of prejudice that appellant makes now. Because objections to instructions and the legal grounds therefor must be specifically stated before the jury retires in order for the objection to be reviewable on appeal, we find that the trial court's error has not been preserved and is not properly before us. Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.390(d). Moreover, even if the issue of the erroneous instruction were properly before us on appellate review, we would find the error to be non-reversible on the ground that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant relies on Murray v. State, 403 So.2d 417 (Fla. 1981), and Tascano v. State, 393 So.2d 540 (Fla. 1980), as support for the proposition that rule 3.390 is mandatory and that its violation is presumed harmful. Tascano and Murray are inapposite. They concerned the error committed when courts refused to instruct on possible penalties for the crime charged after being asked to do so by the defendant. No such error occurred here. In view of the overwhelming evidence of guilt of two counts of first-degree murder, we conclude that the instructions on possible penalties for all the lesser degrees of homicide cannot have affected the jury's deliberations or the verdicts.