Opinion ID: 32624
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Present Insanity Claim and Proceedings

Text: 1. Petitioner is currently insane so that to execute him would violate the Eighth Amendment by inflicting upon him cruel and unusual punishment; 2. To execute petitioner would violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by denying him the right to due process of law, because: a. The State’s procedure for determining his competence to be executed was inadequate; b. Medicating petitioner in preparation for the state court hearing on his claim of present insanity, without his consent or notice to his counsel or the court, violated his due process rights and directly affected his presentation to the state court trier of fact; - 3 - In reviewing Billiot’s petition, the district court first addressed Billiot’s claim that his death sentence should be vacated because the “cruel, heinous, and atrocious” aggravating circumstance, as given, was constitutionally infirm. The district court agreed and, relying on Wiley v. Puckett, 969 3. The Mississippi Supreme Court’s finding of waiver is not based on an independent and adequate state procedural ground; 4, The evidence presented at the insanity hearing was evaluated under incorrect legal standards: a. The trial court erred in applying a legal presumption that petitioner is competent to be executed; b. The state court’s interpretation of present insanity is constitutionally flawed; 5. De novo review of the finding of present insanity is essential to protect the constitutional issue at stake; 6. The evidence does not support the finding that the petitioner is competent to be executed; 7. Petitioner’s mental state has further deteriorated since the 1988 hearing and he should be given a hearing on his present insanity claim; B. The Claims Relating to Petitioner’s Trial and Sentencing 1. Petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, in that his counsel: a. Failed to reasonably investigate or discover the existence of mitigating evidence, and failed to present mitigating evidence; b. Failed to object to Jury Instruction C-01 at the guilt/innocence phase, and failed during the sentencing phase to object to erroneous jury instructions relating to mitigating factors or to offer additional instructions on mitigating circumstances; c. Failed to offer evidence in support of the post-trial motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence; 2. Petitioner’s due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated by: a. The jury’s finding of the “especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel” aggravating circumstance; b. Prosecutorial misconduct during the closing argument on the guilt/innocence phase; c. The use, as an “aggravating circumstance,” that the murder was committed during the commission of a felony, to justify the imposition of the death sentence, was itself a necessary element of the underlying crime of capital murder. d. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(e) (Rev. Ed. 1994) was improperly applied because the state never proved the petitioner’s intent to commit robbery; e. The statute and instruction at the sentencing phase shifted the burden of proof to petitioner and contained no standards for weighing; f. The prosecution’s use of statements made by petitioner during a court-ordered psychiatric examination on the issue of his competence to stand trial, where petitioner was not first advised by the psychiatrist of his right to remain silent; 3. The Mississippi Supreme Court misunderstood the psychological testimony in enunciating its decision relative to a “majority report” and “minority report”; 4. Petitioner was subjected to double jeopardy in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment for the felony and robbery underlying his capital conviction; 5. The trial court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for a change of venue abridged his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to an impartial jury; 6. Petitioner was denied his right to a fair and impartial trial because: a. His request for individual voir dire of potential jurors was denied and his voir dire of potential jurors was limited; b. The court refused to excuse certain jurors for cause and denied petitioner additional peremptory challenges; and c. The court refused to provide special venire. - 4 - F.2d 86, 94 (5th Cir. 1992), held that “the writ is due to be issued unless the State of Mississippi initiates the appropriate proceedings in state court within a reasonable time after the issuance of this opinion.” In the alternative, the district court held that Billiot was entitled to relief on this ground even if Wiley did not apply because the error was not harmless under either Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967), or Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993). Recognizing “the strong possibility that the Mississippi Supreme Court [would] remand petitioner’s cause for resentencing,” see Wilcher v. State, 635 So.2d 789, 791 (Miss. 1993) (remanding for resentencing after noting that, as a matter of state law, it lacked the authority to either reweigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances or conduct harmless error analysis),3 the district court declined to reach Billiot’s other claims relating to the sentencing phase of his trial.4 The district court did, however, address the claims relating to the guilt phase of Billiot’s trial, all of which were denied. Because Billiot has not appealed the district court’s denial of his claims relating to the guilt phase, the sole issue before this court is whether the district court properly concluded that Billiot was entitled to habeas relief because the “cruel, heinous, and atrocious” aggravating circumstance was constitutionally infirm.