Opinion ID: 546337
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The McNally Instruction

Text: 13 The appellant argues, and the appellee concedes, that the jury was improperly instructed, under the Supreme Court's recent decision in McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987) regarding the elements of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1341-42. The parties are correct, and the appellant's convictions under counts II and III must be reversed. 14 The McNally Court limited the scope of mail fraud to the protection of property rights and held that a defendant could not be convicted of mail fraud for participating in a scheme to defraud citizens of their intangible right to honest government. McNally, 107 S.Ct. at 2882. In the present case the jury was allowed to find the appellant guilty of mail fraud if they concluded that the appellant devised or intended to devise a scheme ... to defraud Cosco ... or Zurn's stockholders of their right to the loyal, faithful, and unbiased services of [the appellant]. McNally was decided after the appellant was convicted, but the McNally rule is fully retroactive and must be applied to this case. See United States v. Mitchell, 867 F.2d 1232 (9th Cir.1989). Accordingly, the appellant's convictions for mail fraud under counts II and III of the indictment are reversed. 15 The appellant further argues that his remaining convictions for Travel Act violations and conspiracy must also be reversed for the same reason. This argument fails. Mail fraud did not support either conviction, nor were these convictions affected by the defective instruction. The jury was specifically instructed that bribery was the underlying offense in counts IV and VI under the Travel Act. On count VII for conspiracy the jury answered a special verdict form in the affirmative when asked whether the object of the conspiracy was the corrupt influencing of Gerald Silverman. Thus, the defective McNally instruction did not affect the Travel Act or conspiracy convictions. 16