Opinion ID: 2518547
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A defendant incurs a penalty at the time of the commission of an offense.

Text: This court has not previously had occasion to define the plain meaning of the term incurred, as employed in the standard savings clause. Nevertheless, courts in other jurisdictions have analyzed the phrase penalties incurred in the context of a savings clause and have concluded that a defendant incurs the penalty at the time of the commission of the offense. [23] See McGranahan, 206 N.W.2d at 91 (`The penalty is imposed by the court after the fact of guilt is legally determined. It is incurred when the act for which the law prescribed the penalty is committed.') (quoting In re Schneck, 78 Kan. 207, 96 P. 43, 44-45 (1908)); State v. Alley, 263 A.2d 66, 69 (Me.1970) (`Punishment, penalty or forfeiture is `incurred' . . . at the time the offence for which punishment is imposed is committed.') (ellipses in original) (quoting Patrick v. Comm'r of Corr., 352 Mass. 666, 227 N.E.2d 348, 351 (1967)); State v. Johnson, 285 Md. 339, 402 A.2d 876, 880 (1979) (holding that a penalty is incurred at the time of the commission of the offense); Commonwealth v. Benoit, 346 Mass. 294, 191 N.E.2d 749, 751-52 (1963) (concluding that Massachusetts jurisprudence had settled since 1869 that a penalty is incurred at the time of the offense, emphasiz[ing] incurrence as resulting from the offender's wrongful act as distinguished from any proceeding by public authority to impose the consequences of the wrongdoing and that `[p]unishment incurred' is not `sentence imposed,' `conviction found' or `judgment entered' and denying application of ameliorative amendments in effect after the date of the commission of the offense but before the issuance of the indictment) (quoting the applicable savings clause); Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 510 ([I]t is clear that the two defendants before this Court have incurred criminal liability for which they may be punished. . . .); Bilbrey, 135 P.2d at 1000 (`hold[ing] . . . that th[e] defendant was subject to any penalty imposed by law for this crime on the date of its commission, and any subsequent statute repealing such penalty can only operate prospectively, and is applicable only to offenses committed after the statute took effect') (emphasis added) (quoting Penn v. State, 13 Okla.Crim. 367, 164 P. 992, 993 (1917)); State v. Moore, 192 Or. 39, 233 P.2d 253, 256-57 (1951) (concluding that an ameliorative amendment was unavailable to the defendant, insofar as he incurred the original penalty before the effective date of the new statute, reasoning that to have `incurred penalties' implies a time past or present as to the act and a future time as to the assessment of the penalty); State v. Petrucelli, 156 Vt. 382, 592 A.2d 365, 366 (1991) (As a result of the saving clause, a criminal irrevocably incurs liability at the time of the offense: not even the repeal of the statute imposing that liability affects that liability.); State v. Senna, 132 Vt. 428, 321 A.2d 5, 6 (1974) (`Criminal liability is incurred when the criminal act is committed.') (quoting Matthews, 310 A.2d at 20); Matthews, 310 A.2d at 21 (Defendant's penalty was `incurred' when he committed the act.). But see State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334, 336 (1971) (concluding that no penalty is incurred until the defendant is convicted, judgment entered and sentence imposed, thereby allowing ameliorative amendments to be applied to a defendant who was tried and convicted, but not sentenced, prior to the effective date of the act). [24] In our view, the reasoning of the foregoing authority is compelling. [25] Accordingly, we hold that a defendant incurs, at the moment he or she commits the offense, liability for the criminal penalty in effect at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. Our construction of proceedings and incurred ensures the consistent application of justice and avoids potential constitutional infirmity. To interpret proceedings to mean any discrete hearing pertaining to sentencing, motions for reconsideration, or appellate review would, in practice, mean that the savings clause would not operate to exclude a defendant's case unless all stages of a prosecution and all appeals were entirely concluded prior to the effective date of an amendment. Such a construction would vitiate the very reason for enacting a savings clause, to wit, (1) to delineate clearly which defendants fall under the new statute, in order to avoid producing inconsistent and unjust outcomes among defendants arising from the vagaries of the scheduling process, and (2) to avoid rendering portions of an act  Act 44 in the present matter  potentially unconstitutional as ex post facto measures. To construe penalties as having been incurred only at the moment of the imposition of sentence would similarly generate risks of inconsistency and constitutional infirmity.
As the District of Columbia's highest court has reasoned, in considering the application of ameliorative sentencing amendments to a defendant who committed the charged offense prior to the amendment but was sentenced thereafter, [w]e cannot say that a legislature could not rationally conclude that the best approach would be a purely prospective one, so that all defendants who committed crimes before the statute became effective would be treated equally. Otherwise, sentencings could get caught up in manipulations with unfair results overall. Some convicted felons, for example, might be able to arrange sentencing delays to take advantage of the new sentencing scheme, whereas others could not achieve the same result before less sympathetic judges. But, more fundamentally, we see nothing irrational in a legislative conclusion that individuals should be punished in accordance with the sanctions in effect at the time the offense was committed, a viewpoint encompassed by the savings statutes themselves. Holiday v. United States, 683 A.2d 61, 72 (D.C.1996) (emphasis added). Adopting Reis's contention that proceedings is ambiguous and could be construed to include sentencing hearings as separate and distinct proceedings would invite just such an arbitrary application. The result in Tapp, discussed supra. in section III.B.2 & n. 24, illustrates the danger. In Tapp, the court reviewed precedent regarding when a penalty is incurred, citing, inter alia, State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 P.2d 844 (1970), and Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 230, 479 P.2d 791 (1971). In those related cases, the defendants, Miller and Belt, were each indicted for writing fraudulent checks prior to the effective date of the same ameliorative sentencing amendment reducing the penalty, but one of them, Belt, was convicted and sentenced after the effective date while the other, Miller, was convicted and sentenced before. Miller was subject to a felony with incarceration in State Prison for upwards of 14 years, for doing the same thing, at the same time, under the same statute, with the same penalty, for the same guilt, while Belt was subject to only six months, despite the fact that it was Belt who violated parole and fled the state. Tapp, 490 P.2d at 337-38 (Henriod, J., dissenting) (asserting that the majority's conclusion sanctions such discrimination under the illogical, unreasonable platitude and guise that `time of sentence,'  not guilt . . .  is of the essence). Moreover, the concerns expressed in Holiday have since been borne out in Utah, where the Tapp rule has been extended to allow the application of ameliorative sentencing amendments to defendants even where the defendant's presentence misconduct resulted in the defendant's sentencing being delayed beyond the effective date of the amendments. State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah Ct.App.1997) (citing, inter alia, State v. Yates, 918 P.2d 136, 139 (Utah Ct.App.1996) (noting that the [Utah] supreme court has determined [that the] defendant's actions that delay sentencing are irrelevant to receiving the benefits of the amended sanctions)). [26] Nevertheless, the dissent insists that, by not applying the ameliorative provisions of Act 44, section 11 to Reis's case, it is we who are being arbitrary and unjust and that our decision runs counter to the general trend in other states. Dissenting opinion at ___-___ ___, ___-___, 165 P.3d at 1021-22, 1024-25 (quoting In re Estrada, 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948, 951 (1965)) (citing Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 512; Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 472; Oliver, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d at 203; State v. Macarelli, 118 R.I. 693, 375 A.2d 944, 947 (1977); Holiday, 683 A.2d at 66-68). Again, as discussed supra in section III.B.1.b, the cases upon which the dissent relies implicate only general savings clauses, which, as this court itself has concluded in Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 213, 638 P.2d at 322, and Koch, 107 Hawai`i at 222, 112 P.3d at 76 (quoting Von Geldern ), represent a rule of statutory construction that may yield, and often does, to more express, specific intent regarding retroactive application of ameliorative amendments. See Schultz, 460 N.W.2d at 510 (concluding that the historical and philosophical underpinnings of the state's general savings clause did not support barring retroactive application of ameliorative amendments); Cummings, 386 N.W.2d at 471 (concluding that the applicable general savings clause is but a canon of statutory construction to aid in interpreting statutes to ascertain legislative intent and that [i]t is not an end in itself); Oliver, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367, 134 N.E.2d at 201 (concluding that the general savings clause has been read by this court to provide merely a principle of construction, which governs in the absence of contrary intent) (quotation signals omitted); Estrada, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d at 952 (characterizing the general savings clause as simply embod[ying] the general rule of construction . . . that when there is nothing to indicate a contrary intent in a statute it will be presumed that the Legislature intended the statute to operate prospectively and not retroactively[;] . . . [a] rule of construction, however, [that] is not a straightjacket); Macarelli, 375 A.2d at 947 (relying on the unique wording of the general savings clause directing the courts to look to the record for legislative intent with regard to specific statutes to overcome the presumption against retroactive application). However, a default presumption against retroactive application remains alive and well both in our jurisprudence and in the foreign jurisdictions that the dissent cites. See e.g., Taniguchi v. Assoc. of Apt. Owners of King Manor, 114 Hawai`i 37, 48, 155 P.3d 1138, 1149 (2007) ([I]t is well settled that `all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.') (quoting Robinson v. Bailey, 28 Haw. 462, 464 (1925)); Kramer v. Ellett, 108 Hawai`i 426, 432, 121 P.3d 406, 412 (2005) (quoting Gap v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 106 Hawai`i 325, 333, 104 P.3d 912, 920 (2004) (`Hawai`i statutory and case law discourage retroactive application of laws and rules in the absence of language showing that such operation was intended.')); Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 215-16, 638 P.2d at 323 (clarifying that we are not suggesting, as other courts have, see, e.g., . . . Estrada ; . . . Oliver, that whenever an amendatory statute is enacted . . ., it must be presumed that the legislature intended for it to apply in every case where it could constitutionally apply and reemphasizing that [w]here the intention of the legislature with respect to retroactivity is incapable of ascertainment, the provisions of HRS § 1-3 will determine the statute's interpretation); Evangelatos v. Super. Court, 44 Cal.3d 1188, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 642, 753 P.2d 585 (1988) (rejecting the characterization that Estrada eroded the strong presumption against retroactivity and asserting that absen[t] . . . an express retroactivity provision, a statute will not be applied retroactively unless it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature . . . must have intended a retroactive application.). Therefore, insofar as the presumption remains against retroactive application, the inclusion of a specific savings clause within an amendment  the polar opposite of an express retroactivity provision  must operate as clear evidence of the legislature's intention that the act in question should apply prospectively only. Indeed, where a specific savings clause has been included in amendatory legislation, the general trend among the states nationally is, in fact, not to apply the amendments retroactively, even when they are ameliorative. In People v. Floyd, 31 Cal.4th 179, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 885, 72 P.3d 820 (2003), the California Supreme Court refused to apply ameliorative amendments requiring probation and treatment for certain drug offenders where the amendments took effect before the defendant's conviction was final, relying on the language of a savings clause included as part of the amending statute. [27] 1 Cal.Rptr.3d at 886-87, 72 P.3d 820. It concluded that the rule of Estrada allowing retroactive application for ameliorative amendments did not apply when the amendments in question contained a specific savings clause, adding that [w]e cannot embrace an interpretation that makes [the specific savings clause] mere surplusage. Id. at 887, 889, 72 P.3d 820. [28] Similarly, in State v. Parker, 871 So.2d 317 (La.2004), the lower appellate court attempted to apply to the defendant's case ameliorative amendments to the state's habitual offender statute  despite a specific savings clause that provided that the provisions of this Act shall only have prospective effect  by relying on the fact that the hearing in which the lower court found that the defendant was an habitual offender occurred after the amendment's effective date. 871 So.2d at 324. The Louisiana Supreme Court (1) refused to apply the ameliorative sentencing amendments (a) in light of the existence of a specific savings clause and (b) because it sought to prevent manipulation of the court schedule for the benefit of individual defendants and (2) noted that, had the legislature intended the more lenient sentencing provisions to be immediately effective, it could have signified that intent in the Act. Id. at 322-23 (citing State v. Sugasti, 820 So.2d 518, 520-21 (La.2002); State v. Dreaux, 205 La. 387, 17 So.2d 559, 560 (1944)). The Washington Supreme Court reached the same conclusion in State v. Ross, 152 Wash.2d 220, 95 P.3d 1225 (2004), wherein it rejected the defendant's argument that state precedent required that ameliorative amendments apply retroactively. Id. at 1232, 1234. The court instead concluded that, by including a specific savings clause that provided that the amendments in question apply to crimes committed on or after July 1, 2002, the state legislature had expressed the opposite intent, i.e., that the ameliorative amendments applied only prospectively. Id. at 1234. Indeed, a number of other jurisdictions have refused to apply ameliorative amendments retroactively, even when only general savings clauses were implicated. See, e.g., State v. Vineyard, 96 Ariz. 76, 392 P.2d 30 (1964); State v. Ismaaeel, 840 A.2d 644, 655 (Del.Super.Ct.2004) (citing Holiday, 683 A.2d at 78-79, for its concern that to conclude otherwise would bestow a windfall on defendants whose sentencing proceedings had been delayed and concluding that [j]ust as the State will not surprise a defendant with greater punishment in an ex post facto fashion, neither should a defendant feign surprise about the penalties that accompanied his [or her] conduct at the time); Castle v. State, 330 So.2d 10 (Fla.1976); Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938 (1968); Pollard v. State, 521 P.2d 400 (Okla.Crim.App.1974); State v. Kane, 101 Wash.App. 607, 5 P.3d 741 (2000). Our decision today is not, therefore, out of step with the jurisprudence of other states, nor is our analysis of specific versus general savings clauses, despite the dissent's disparagement of the distinction, dissenting opinion at ___ n. 51, 165 P.3d at 1021 n. 51 (discussing the so-called specific savings clause in Section 29).
We must also interpret the language of the savings clause to preserve, if possible, the constitutionality of the statute. Kamal, 88 Hawai`i at 294, 966 P.2d at 606. Interpreting the savings clause such that any hearing conducted after the effective date could be considered a separate proceeding or that the defendant has not incurred the penalties set forth in Act 44 until the date sentence is imposed could expose some provisions of Act 44 to constitutional challenges. This court has stated that [t]he ex post facto clause of the United States Constitution[,] U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1[,] prohibits states from enacting retrospective penal legislation. In Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990), the United States Supreme Court was presented with the question whether the application of a Texas statute, which was passed after respondent's crime and which allowed the reformation of an improper jury verdict in respondent's case, violate[d] the Ex Post Facto Clause. . . . Id. at 39 [110 S.Ct. 2715]. In summarizing the meaning of the ex post facto clause, the Court stated: It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute [(1)] which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done[,(2)] which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or [(3)] which deprives one charged with [a] crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.  Id. at 42 [110 S.Ct. 2715] (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). The Beazell formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts.  Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Von Geldern, 64 Haw. 210, 212, 638 P.2d 319, 321 (1981) (no new punitive measure may be applied to a crime already consummated. . . . Such legislation would be [an] ex post facto law[.]). State v. Nakata, 76 Hawai`i at 375, 878 P.2d at 714 (emphasis in original) (footnote and some citations omitted) (some brackets added and some in original) (some underlining omitted in original). By its plain language, the savings clause set forth in section 29 applies to the entirety of Act 44. [29] See supra note 1. Act 44, section 3 provides for enhanced penalties for exposing children to the process of manufacturing or distributing methamphetamine, as well as new penalties for injuries to others arising out of the manufacture or distribution of the drug. See 2004 Haw. Sess. L. Act 44, § 3 at 206-08. If proceedings and incurred are interpreted to allow application of Act 44 to a defendant charged before July 1, 2004 but sentenced thereafter, the provisions of Act 44, section 3, as an example, if properly pled and proven, could be susceptible to challenge as unconstitutional ex post facto measures because, at sentencing, they would (1) punish[] as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done[, or (2)] . . . make[] more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, Collins, 497 U.S. at 42, 110 S.Ct. 2715. 4. The legislature unambiguously intended that the provisions of Act 44 would not be available to defendants whose criminal prosecutions commenced prior to July 1, 2004. The language of Act 44, section 29 does not present us with a situation [w]here the intention of the legislature . . . is incapable of ascertainment, Von Geldern, 64 Haw. at 215, 638 P.2d at 323. Rather, we must presume that the legislature knows the law when enacting statutes, Agustin v. Dan Ostrow Constr. Co., 64 Haw. 80, 83, 636 P.2d 1348, 1351 (1981) (the legislature is presumed to know the law when enacting statutes, including this court's interpretations of statutory language), and, hence, we must presume that the legislature, in enacting Act 44, was aware (1) of this court's interpretation, in Van den Berg, 101 Hawai`i at 191, 65 P.3d at 138, of the term proceedings as being synonymous with the initiation of a prosecution through the issuance of criminal charges and (2) of the crucial analytical role the absence of a savings clause played in Koch and Von Geldern; yet the legislature nevertheless chose to include a savings clause that plainly states that its provisions do not apply to proceedings begun prior to July 1, 2004. [30] The preceding analysis, in sum, leads to the conclusion (1) that proceedings, absent ambiguity arising from subject matter peculiar to the legislation, means criminal prosecutions of which sentencing hearings are an inseparable component [31] and (2) that the legislature did not intend to allow the sentencing provisions of Act 44, section 11 to apply prospectively to a sentencing hearing conducted after July 1, 2004, which resulted from a criminal prosecution initiated prior to that date. Therefore, we hold that the term proceedings, as employed in Act 44, section 29, unambiguously means the initiation of a criminal prosecution against a defendant through a charging instrument and subsumes within its scope hearings and other procedural events that arise as a direct result of the initial charging instrument. Hence, because Reis was charged on January 5 and April 13, 2004, prior to Act 44's effective date of July 1, 2004, the circuit court erred in applying Act 44's ameliorative amendments to her sentence by failing to observe the statutory command of Act 44, section 29, Aplaca, 96 Hawai`i at 22, 25 P.3d at 797. Furthermore, in keeping with this court's holdings in Smith, 103 Hawai`i at 234, 81 P.3d at 414, and Walker, 106 Hawai`i at 10, 100 P.3d at 604, and insofar as Reis conceded that she qualified as a repeat offender under HRS § 706-606.5 in light of a prior conviction of unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle, the circuit court could not sentence Reis to probation pursuant to HRS § 706-622.5 (Supp.2002), the first-time drug offender statute in effect at the time of the commission of her offenses. Rather, the circuit court was required to apply HRS § 706-606.5 to sentence her to a mandatory minimum sentence of one year and eight months.