Opinion ID: 3188785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Class Writs.

Text: The Estate argues that the trial court lost jurisdiction of the will contest claim when the court dismissed the claim and then reinstated it without cause. The Estate's argument is essentially that the trial court acted improperly and therefore acted outside its jurisdiction. We have previously held that such an understanding of jurisdiction would effectively gut our procedures for appellate review because, under such an approach, the lower court would be proceeding outside its jurisdiction every time it made an erroneous decision, and so an extraordinary writ would be available for every alleged error. Lee v. George, 369 S.W.3d 29, 33 (Ky. 2012) (emphasis in original). Instead, jurisdiction, when used in the context of extraordinary writs, refers to subject-matter jurisdiction: the authority not simply to hear this case but this kind of case. Davis v. Wingate, 437 S.W.3d 720, 725 (Ky. 2014) (emphasis in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Estate has not and cannot point to any authority which divested the trial court of jurisdiction to hear a case of this kind, i.e. a will contest action. The Circuit Court is a court of general jurisdiction; it has 5 original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not exclusively vested in some other court. Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 23A.010(1). District Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in . . . . [m]atters involving probate, except matters contested in an adversary proceeding. Such adversary proceeding shall be filed in Circuit Court[.] KRS 24A.120(2). Thus, because will contest claims are adversarial probate proceedings, Circuit Courts have original subject-matter jurisdiction. West v. Goldstein, 830 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Ky. 1992). Furthermore, in at least two cases we have held that when a trial court decides whether to set aside a judgment or an order, the court is acting within its jurisdiction, and therefore a first class writ will not be available. See Watson v. Humphrey, 293 Ky. 839, 170 S.W.2d 865 (1943) and Commonwealth v. Eckerle, 470 S.W.3d 712 (Ky. 2015). In Watson, the petitioner argued that the circuit judge was without jurisdiction to set aside an earlier judgment— awarding the petitioner a first and prior lien—in order to address issues raised by a competing judgment involving the same property and entered in the same court. 170 S.W.2d at 865-66. Our predecessor Court denied the writ and held that the judge unquestionably had jurisdiction to decide whether a judgment should be vacated or set aside and to determine its ultimate effect and its conclusiveness as to other parties. He may have acted erroneously but he was not acting beyond his jurisdiction. Id. at 866-67. We relied on Watson's precedent in Eckerle. There, the respondent judge set aside an order denying a motion to dismiss criminal charges on immunity grounds by a senior judge, presiding in her stead. 470 S.W.3d at 715. We 6 ultimately issued a writ because the respondent erred in not first considering the evidence of record as outlined in Rodgers v. Commonwealth, 285 S.W.3d 740 (Ky. 2009). Id. at 727. However, we dismissed the petitioner's first class writ argument, holding that the respondent had the necessary subject-matter jurisdiction to set aside the prior order denying dismissal, just as she has the jurisdiction to revisit other interlocutory orders, when justified by the circumstances. Id. at 721 (citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Bluegrass Powerboats, 424 S.W.3d 902, 909 (Ky. 2014)). Therefore, because the trial court maintained proper subject-matter jurisdiction over the will contest claim at all times and because entry of an interlocutory order does not divest a court of subject-matter jurisdiction, this case does not fall into the first class of writ cases.