Opinion ID: 1768435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the execution of the mentally retarded should be prohibited under the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as Article Three, Section 28, of the Mississippi Constitution.

Text: ¶ 15. Goodin's application was filed on April 30, 2002. Goodin argued that the execution of the mentally retarded should be declared unconstitutional. On June 20, 2002, the United States Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 153 L.Ed.2d 335 (2002), that the execution of mentally retarded offenders amounted to cruel and unusual punishment and was, therefore, prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Thus, a large portion of Goodin's argument on what the law should be on this issue may be disregarded. What must be considered is the extent to which, if any, Goodin may be entitled to further proceedings under this issue pursuant to Atkins. ¶ 16. The Supreme Court added in Atkins: To the extent there is serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded offenders, it is in determining which offenders are in fact retarded. In this case, for instance, the Commonwealth of Virginia disputes that Atkins suffers from mental retardation. Not all people who claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus. As was our approach in Ford v. Wainwright, with regard to insanity, we leave to the State[s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of sentences. 477 U.S. 399, 405, 416-417, 106 S.Ct. 2595, 91 L.Ed.2d 335 (1986). Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2250. The Court noted that [t]he statutory definitions of mental retardation are not identical, but generally conform to the clinical definitions set forth in n. 3, supra, as stated below: The American Association of Mental Retardation (AAMR) defines mental retardation as follows: Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present functioning. It is characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure, and work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18. Mental Retardation: Definition, Classification, and Systems of Supports 5 (9th ed.1992). The American Psychiatric Association's definition is similar: The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C). Mental Retardation has many different etiologies and may be seen as a final common pathway of various pathological processes that affect the functioning of the central nervous system. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 41 (4th ed.2000). Mild mental retardation is typically used to describe people with an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70. Id., at 42-43. Atkins, 122 S.Ct. at 2245 n. 3. ¶ 17. Goodin argues that he has met his burden of production, that the issue of whether he meets the definition of retardation must be submitted to a jury, and that the State should bear the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt that he is not mentally retarded. In support of his argument, Goodin cites the recent U.S. Supreme Court cases of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). ¶ 18. After he fired several shots into the home of an African-American family in New Jersey, Apprendi was indicted on numerous state charges of shooting and possession of firearms. He eventually pled guilty to two counts of possession of a firearm for unlawful purpose and one count of possession of an explosive. After the judge accepted the guilty pleas, the prosecutor moved for an enhanced sentence on one of the counts because it was a hate crime. The judge concurred and rendered an enhanced sentence of twelve years on that particular count, with shorter concurrent sentences on the other two counts. ¶ 19. Apprendi argued that he was entitled to have the finding on enhancement decided by a jury. The Supreme Court agreed, stating, Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. However, the Court specifically stated that Apprendi has not here asserted a constitutional claim based on the omission of any reference to sentence enhancement or racial bias in the indictment.... We thus do not address the indictment question separately today. Id. at 477 n. 3, 120 S.Ct. 2348. ¶ 20. The Court found in Apprendi that New Jersey's statutory scheme would allow a jury to convict a defendant of a second degree offense of possession of a prohibited weapon, and then, in a separate subsequent proceeding, allow a judge to impose a punishment usually reserved for first degree crimes made on the judge's finding based on a preponderance of the evidence. The Apprendi Court finally stated that its decision did not apply to capital sentencing cases, even in those cases where it was the judge deciding whether to sentence the defendant to death or some lesser sentence. Id. at 496-97, 120 S.Ct. 2348(citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)) (upholding the Arizona capital sentencing process). ¶ 21. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently decided Ring v. Arizona . Ring addressed the issue of whether the Arizona capital sentencing process, as upheld in 1990 in Walton, that of a jury deciding guilt and a judge making findings on aggravating factors, survived Apprendi. The Supreme Court decided it did not. Despite the efforts in Apprendi to distinguish non-capital enhancement cases from aggravating circumstances in capital cases in this context, the Supreme Court in Ring found that there was no difference: [W]e overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. See 497 U.S., at 647-649, 110 S.Ct. 3047. Because Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, Apprendi, 530 U.S., at 494, n. 19, 120 S.Ct. 2348, the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.    The guarantees of jury trial in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered.... If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he was to have it. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-156, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968). The right to trial by jury guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be senselessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding necessary to increase a defendant's sentence by two years, but not the factfinding necessary to put him to death. We hold that the Sixth Amendment applies to both. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. at 2443. ¶ 22. The State answers that whether Goodin is mentally retarded is not an aggravating factor necessary for imposition of the death penalty, and Ring has no application to an Atkins determination. The State also asserts that the burden of proof is on Goodin in this matter, citing this state's post-conviction statute, Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-23(7) (no relief shall be granted under this chapter unless the prisoner proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to such). This Court agrees with both arguments of the State. ¶ 23. This Court may find either (1) that Goodin does not meet the standard of mental retardation or (2) that Goodin has met enough of an initial burden to have the matter of mental retardation remanded for a hearing before the trial court. The Legislature adopted the following standard in Miss.Code Ann. § 41-21-61(f) (Rev.2001), dealing with commitments, which states in part: (f) Mentally retarded person means any person (i) who has been diagnosed as having substantial limitations in present functioning, manifested before age eighteen (18), characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work.... ¶ 24. Goodin argues that he is retarded. In his original application he relies on the pretrial evaluation of Dr. Gerald O'Brien, that Goodin had achieved a verbal IQ of 65, a performance IQ of 60, for a full scale IQ of 60 on the Wechsler Test. On another test called the Shipley, Dr. O'Brien found that Goodin had obtained an estimated (WAIS-R) IQ of 50, which also falls within the mildly retarded range. Dr. O'Brien found that Goodin was reading at a second grade level and capable of doing math at a first grade level. Goodin points to Judge Gordon's Report of the trial, where he marked Goodin's intelligence level, as being Low (IQ below 70). ¶ 25. The State rebuts this argument by pointing to the rest of Dr. O'Brien's evaluation, where Dr. O'Brien stated on several occasions that Goodin appeared to be malingering, not trying, or not doing as well as he was capable of, or was feigning a mental disorder. The State points to Dr. O'Brien's finding of no substantial evidence of significant neuropsychological problems, intentional distortion and feigning psychological and emotional difficulties, and his conclusion that Goodin was competent and sane. The State also comments on the remainder of Judge Gordon's trial report, which found that Goodin was attentive, cooperative and polite. The State argues that Goodin's behavior during and after the shooting/robbery showed a level of intelligence, reasoning and planning that was inconsistent with a finding of mental retardation. ¶ 26. Goodin then relies on the following items attached to his rebuttal brief: his school records for grades 1-4 (it appears that Goodin spent three years in third grade); affidavits from relatives stating that Goodin acted strangely at times; several affidavits from OCPCC personnel stating what other people had told them about Goodin's behavior; and an affidavit from Dr. O'Brien. While Dr. O'Brien states that if he had known about Goodin's schizophrenia, he might have made different findings on the issues of IQ and retardation, Dr. O'Brien's original report shows that he was aware of Goodin's claim of hearing voices, of considering suicide, of difficulties in school and of being disabled. ¶ 27. This Court finds that Goodin has produced enough evidence to be granted leave to proceed in the trial court on the issue of his mental retardation. To that end the standard or definition of mental retardation shall be that enunciated by the Supreme Court in Atkins, especially the American Psychiatric Association's definition of mental retardation. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV 39-46 (4th ed.1994). As Presiding Justice Smith recommends in his dissent, we further hold that the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-II (MMPI-II) is to be administered since its associated validity scales make the test best suited to detect malingering. See Id. at 683 (defining malingering as the intentional production of false or grossly exaggerated physical or psychological symptoms, motivated by external incentives such as avoiding military duty, avoiding work, obtaining financial compensation, evading criminal prosecution, or obtaining drugs). See also United States v. Battle, 235 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1307 (N.D.Ga. 2001) (explaining MMPI and its validity scales and stating that [t]he MMPI is generally agreed to be difficult to cheat on without getting caught). Russell v. State, 849 So.2d 95, 148 (¶ 251) (Miss.2003). Goodin must prove that he meets the applicable standard by a preponderance of the evidence pursuant to Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-23(7) (Rev.2000). This issue will be considered and decided by the Newton County Circuit Court without a jury.