Opinion ID: 1750565
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff offered in evidence copies of both letters claimed to have been forwarded by Thompson to Griffith but objections made were sustained by the trial court.

Text: Under the circumstances we find the exclusion of these exhibits was proper. In the case of Roshek Realty Co. v. Roshek Bros. Co., 249 Iowa 349, 356, 87 N.W.2d 8, this court said: Proof of mailing a statement or letter properly addressed and otherwise conforming to postal laws and regulations concerning postage raises a presumption of fact it was received. The different things which must be shown to give rise to the presumption are listed in Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, 205 Iowa 742, 746, 218 N.W. 580, 582, and Forrest v. Sovereign Camp, W.O.W., 220 Iowa 478, 480, 261 N.W. 802. See also Gregory v. Kirkman Consol. Ind. Sch. Dist., 186 Iowa 914, 921, 922, 173 N.W. 243, 246 (`   it must be clearly shown that the facts upon which the presumption rests actually exist.')   . (Emphasis supplied) Turning now to Central Trust Co. v. City of Des Moines, supra, we find the elements necessary to create a presumption of delivery of a communication through the mail are: (1) The necessary evidence of the contents and execution of the paper; (2) that it was inclosed in a wrapper, or otherwise prepared for transmission through the mail; (3) there must be evidence of the correct post office address of the person to be charged with receiving it; (4) evidence that the package containing the document was properly addressed; (5) that postage was prepaid; and (6) that it was deposited in the mail for transmission. It is apparent plaintiff failed, either in whole or in part, to satisfactorily establish elements 2 through 6 relative to each letter claimed to have been sent by Thompson to Griffith. And where as here the necessary foundation is lacking no presumption of delivery can be indulged. In support hereof see also Seevers v. The Cleveland Coal Co., 158 Iowa 574, 594-596, 138 N.W. 793; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 136, page 287; and 29 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, sections 195-196, pages 249-250. II. Defendant State Auto, in moving for a directed verdict, contended the evidence was insufficient to support any alleged agreement by it to contribute half the amount paid Petchulat in settlement. While the record leaves much to be desired it still remains we must resolve all doubts in favor of submission of the case to the trier of the facts. Bunn v. Standard Oil Co., 251 Iowa 7, 9, 99 N.W.2d 436; Clark v. Umbarger, 247 Iowa 938, 942, 75 N.W.2d 243; 89 C.J.S. Trial § 595d, page 396; and 53 Am.Jur., Trial, sections 394-395, pages 316-317. Furthermore the truth of the testimony presented by the plaintiff stands admitted as against a motion to direct. Crouch v. Pauley, 254 Iowa 14, 15-16, 116 N.W.2d 486. And in Erwin v. Erwin, 251 Iowa 1344, 1348, 105 N.W.2d 489, this court said: It is unnecessary that the proof of the oral contract be undisputed or be established as an absolute certainty. Reasonable certainty is sufficient. See also Schofield v. Schofield, Iowa, 149 N.W.2d 810 (1967). Plaintiff's testimony, presented and standing without objection or motion to strike, discloses Thompson, acting on behalf of plaintiff-insurer, talked with Griffith representing defendant-insurer, and that in the course of this conversation these parties discussed 50% contribution on the part of both companies in obtaining settlement, which was agreed. Despite any possible susceptibility of this testimony to a proper and timely objection it must, for the purpose of the moment, be deemed admitted. We conclude the trial court erred in directing a verdict for defendant State Automobile Casualty and Underwriters. III. Defendant Johnson, in moving for a directed verdict, contended as follows: (1) the evidence failed to disclose plaintiff's insured, Northcott, was negligent, and (2) plaintiff neither pleaded nor proved John Richard Petchulat was free from contributory negligence. The points here raised are traceable to our landmark case of Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23, 60 A.L.R.2d 1354. See also Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., Iowa, 144 N.W.2d 303; Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co. v. Lowe Constr. Co., 251 Iowa 27, 99 N.W.2d 421; Allied Mutual Casualty Co. v. Long, 252 Iowa 829, 107 N.W.2d 682; and Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 280 F.2d 110.