Opinion ID: 1239033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: juror affidavit

Text: It has long been the rule in this state that a juror's testimony is not admissible in order to prove either his own misconduct or that of fellow jurors. State v. Thomas, 268 S.C. 343, 234 S.E.2d 16 (1977); Barsh v. Chrysler Corp., 262 S.C. 129, 203 S.E.2d 107 (1974). Recently, however, this Court has moved away from the traditional rule, holding juror testimony regarding internal jury misconduct may be admissible if necessary to ensure fundamental fairness. State v. Hunter, 320 S.C. 85, 463 S.E.2d 314 (1995). [1] See also McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 35 S.Ct. 783, 59 L.Ed. 1300 (1915). [2] The question here is whether the misconduct in this case, i.e., premature jury deliberations, involves a matter of fundamental fairness. We hold that it does, and accordingly, we affirm the Court of Appeals' holding on this issue. We have routinely held instructions which invite jurors to engage in premature deliberations constitute reversible error. See State v. Thomas, 307 S.C. 278, 414 S.E.2d 783 (1992); Gallman v. State, 307 S.C. 273, 414 S.E.2d 780 (1992) State v. Pierce, 289 S.C. 430, 346 S.E.2d 707 (1986); State v. Joyner, 289 S.C. 436, 346 S.E.2d 711 (1986); State v. McGuire, 272 S.C. 547, 253 S.E.2d 103 (1979); State v. Gill, 273 S.C. 190, 192, 255 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1979). The rationale for prohibiting premature jury deliberations was set forth in McGuire, supra, in which we stated: [A] jury should not begin discussing a case, nor deciding the issues, until all of the evidence, the argument of counsel, and the charge of the law is completed.... The reason for the rule is apparent. The human mind is constituted such that when a juror declares himself, touching any controversy, he is apt to stand by his utterances to the other jurors in defiance of evidence. A fair trial is more likely if each juror keeps his own counsel until the appropriate time for deliberation. Similarly, other courts have recognized premature deliberations may affect the fundamental fairness of a trial. See United States v. Resko, 3 F.3d 684 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1205, 114 S.Ct. 1326, 127 L.Ed.2d 674 (1994)(prohibition against premature deliberations protects defendant's right to a fair trial as well as his or her due process right to place burden on the government to prove its case). Accordingly, we hold premature jury deliberations may affect fundamental fairness of a trial such that the trial court may inquire into such allegations and may consider affidavits in support of such allegations. However, under the circumstances of this case, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to conduct further inquiry. We have routinely held that a party must object at the first opportunity to preserve an issue for review. State v. Sullivan, 310 S.C. 311, 426 S.E.2d 766 (1993); State v. Williams, 303 S.C. 410, 401 S.E.2d 168 (1991). A contemporaneous objection is required to preserve an issue for appellate review. Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 479 S.E.2d 35 (1996). Here, prior to the jury's verdict, counsel for Aldret, in talking to Juror Laskey, discovered the jury's allegedly premature deliberations. Although Aldret's brief indicates this information was made known to the trial judge and the state prior to the verdict, there is no indication on the record that the trial judge was made aware of this fact, or that the trial court was asked, prior to the verdict, to question the jurors regarding any premature deliberations. Had such a request been timely made, the court could have voir dired the jury prior to its verdict to determine if, in fact, there had been premature deliberations, and whether Aldret had been prejudiced thereby. See United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, n. 5 (3d Cir.1994). In light of Aldret's failure to call the alleged juror misconduct to the trial court's attention at his first opportunity to do so, we hold he is procedurally barred from raising the issue. Cf United States v. Nance, 502 F.2d 615 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied 420 U.S. 926, 95 S.Ct. 1123, 43 L.Ed.2d 396 (1975) (where counsel discovered during jury's deliberations that it had prematurely deliberated, but counsel waited until after jury's verdict to raise issue of premature deliberations, court held he was barred from raising issue on motion for new trial). Accordingly, although we affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that a trial judge may consider affidavits when inquiring into allegations of premature jury deliberations, we reverse its holding that the trial judge in this case committed error in failing to do so.