Opinion ID: 2708354
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fees from Inception

Text: Lightspeed’s suit against the ISPs was premised on the notion that because the ISPs challenged appellants’ subpoe‐ na of the personally identifiable information of Smith’s 6,600 “co‐conspirators,” they somehow became part of a purport‐ ed plot to steal Lightspeed’s content. If there was any con‐ ceivable merit in that theory, then perhaps fees would have been inappropriate. But there was not. 16 Nos. 13‐3801 & 14‐1682 Count I alleged that the ISPs violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1030 and 1030(g), by failing to prevent hacking. The only alleged assistance to hackers, however, was the challenge to the subpoena. As ex‐ pansive as the CFAA is, see Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1563–65 (2010), this is a frivolous charge. Court II alleged that the ISPs were unjustly enriched be‐ cause they collected subscriber fees from people who used the internet to gain illegal access to Lightspeed’s website. To this day, the appellants have provided no support for the idea that every time an internet user does something unlaw‐ ful online, the user’s ISP is unjustly enriched because it con‐ tinues receiving subscriber fees from the malefactor. The law in fact is to the contrary. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (a “service provider shall not be liable … for infringement of copyright by reason of the provider’s transmitting, routing, or provid‐ ing connections for” material distributed by others on its network). Count III alleges that the ISPs were members of a civil conspiracy to hack and steal from Lightspeed because the ISPs supposedly knew of the alleged hacking and yet pro‐ tected the John Does by challenging the subpoena. Count III also throws in an accusation that the ISP corporate repre‐ sentatives were co‐conspirators. These assertions are utterly without legal merit. The complaint lacks even the most ru‐ dimentary allegation of agreement that would satisfy federal pleading standards. In addition, a service provider does not risk becoming a co‐conspirator every time it challenges a subpoena. To argue that challenging a subpoena makes the ISPs co‐conspirators in a fictional copyright infringement Nos. 13‐3801 & 14‐1682 17 ring is frivolous. Appellants’ theory is all the more outra‐ geous given the fact that the Illinois Supreme Court quashed a functionally identical abusive subpoena. Count IV alleges that the ISPs violated the Illinois Con‐ sumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILCS § 505/2, by engaging in the deceptive practice of allowing illegal access to plaintiff’s online content. More than this, however, is needed to state a claim under the Illinois statute: it requires “(1) a deceptive act or practice by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intent that the plaintiff rely on the decep‐ tion; and (3) the occurrence of the deception during a course of conduct involving trade or commerce.” Robinson v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 775 N.E.2d 951, 960 (Ill. 2002). The Act al‐ so covers unfair conduct. Id. Lightspeed’s complaint fails to place the defendants on notice of how they may have violat‐ ed this statute. Counts V and VI are similarly meritless. They allege that the ISPs aided and abetted Smith and the thousands of John Does by fighting the subpoenas. They also assert, somewhat contradictorily, that the ISP corporate representatives acted outside the scope of their employment when they helped with that aiding and abetting. These claims are baseless. The district court similarly did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees to Smith from the inception of the suit. Lightspeed raised baseless claims and pressed for a meritless “emergency” discovery hearing. The district court found that the litigation “smacked of bully pretense.” At the November 13, 2013, hearing on fees, the court could not have been more clear: it stated that appellants were engaged in “abusive litigation … simply filing a lawsuit to do discovery to find out if you can sue somebody. That’s just utter non‐ 18 Nos. 13‐3801 & 14‐1682 sense.” We see no need to belabor the point. The record am‐ ply supports the district court’s conclusions, as our discus‐ sion of the case thus far demonstrates. There was no abuse of discretion in the court’s decision to grant either the ISPs or Smith fees for the entire case.