Opinion ID: 2633468
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: magistrates' bindover determinations are entitled to some deference

Text: ¶ 26 We next address whether magistrates' bindover determinations are entitled to any deference. We have previously held in a number of cases that the decision to bind a criminal defendant over for trial is a question of law, which we review without deference to the decision below. State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ¶ 8, 44 P.3d 730; State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ¶ 13, 26 P.3d 223; State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 8, 20 P.3d 300; accord State v. Jaeger, 896 P.2d 42, 44 (Utah Ct.App.1995); see also State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 437-39 (Utah 1998) (reviewing evidence with no apparent deference to magistrate); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229-30 (Utah 1995) (same). In those cases, we have set forth this standard of review without fully exploring the issue pursuant to the mixed-question analysis we outlined in State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938-40 (Utah 1994). We take the opportunity to do so here and conclude that, in reviewing a magistrate's bindover decision, an appellate court should afford the decision limited deference. ¶ 27 As we explained in Pena, mixed questions of law and fact require the application of a stated rule of law to a specific fact scenario. See id. at 936. This case presents us with a mixed question because a decision to bind a defendant over for trial includes the application of the appropriate bindover standard to the facts presented in each case. Identifying the issue before us as a mixed question is important because such questions occasionally embod[y] a de facto grant of discretion to lower courts. Id. at 937. This discretion breeds deference. Where lower courts have discretion, appellate courts should grant them commensurate deference. In effect, this discretion allows district courts a measure of freedom to reach one of several possible conclusions about the legal effect of a particular set of facts without risking reversal. Id. at 937. ¶ 28 Thus, to determine the level of deference that we should afford a lower court's decision, we must determine the degree of discretion that the lower court has in making that decision. Because the amount of discretion varies according to the nature of the issue being decided, id., we quantify that discretion by weighing the following factors: (1) whether the facts to which the legal rule is to be applied are so complex and varying that no rule adequately addressing the relevance of all these facts can be spelled out, id. at 939; (2) whether the situation to which the legal principle is to be applied is sufficiently new to the courts that appellate judges are unable to anticipate and articulate definitively what factors should be outcome determinative, id.; (3) whether the trial judge has observed `facts,' such as a witness's appearance and demeanor, relevant to the application of the law that cannot be adequately reflected in the record available to appellate courts, id.; and (4) whether there are policy reasons that weigh for or against granting discretion to district courts, such as when substantial constitutional rights are implicated, see id. at 938-39 (recognizing the interest of having uniform legal rules regarding consent to search, given the substantial Fourth Amendment interests lost as a result of such consents, as a policy reason opposing a grant of discretion to the district court); see also State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15, 103 P.3d 699. ¶ 29 In this case, a consideration of the these factors weighs in favor of granting a limited degree of discretion to magistrates in the context of preliminary hearings. First, while the facts surrounding the myriad cases brought in this context may not all be complex, they are sure to be varying, which makes it difficult to articulate a rule that adequately accounts for all the variations that arise under each fact scenario. Also, a de novo review of fact-sensitive cases could create confusing and inconsistent case law. See Pena, 869 P.2d at 938. Accordingly, the first factor weighs in favor of granting magistrates discretion. ¶ 30 Second, while the preliminary hearing context is not new, applying a probable cause standard in that context arguably is. Yet given the familiarity of the probable cause standard, appellate courts could still anticipate which factors should be outcome determinative. In 2001, we announced that the bindover probable cause standard would be the same as the probable cause standard in the arrest warrant context. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16, 20 P.3d 300. While the application of this standard in the preliminary hearing context was a significant change, the concept of probable cause is a familiar one to magistrates. This weighs in favor of limiting magistrates' discretion. ¶ 31 Third, preliminary hearings are such that magistrates are in a position to observe and assess witness demeanor and credibility. Preliminary hearings are adversarial in nature, [2] and a defendant has the opportunity to attack the prosecution's evidence and to present any affirmative defenses. State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783 (Utah 1980). Although the hearing is not a trial per se, it is not an ex parte proceeding nor one-sided determination of probable cause, and the accused is granted a statutory right to cross-examine the witnesses against him, and the right to subpoena and present witnesses in his defense. Id. (footnotes omitted). Magistrates preside over these proceedings and may decline to bind a defendant over for trial if the prosecution fails to present evidence that would support a reasonable belief that the crime was committed and that the defendant committed it. Clark, 2001 UT 9, ¶ 16, 20 P.3d 300. As discussed above, supra ¶¶ 23-25, making limited credibility determinations is an important part of this decision. State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998). The magistrate's role in observing witness demeanor and credibility is, however, limited to determining whether evidence is wholly incapable of supporting a reasonable belief as to a part of the prosecution's case. See id. at 438. Thus, although magistrates' discretion is restricted because of the limited nature of the credibility determinations they make in this context, their proximity to the facts of the case weighs in favor of granting them some discretion in bindover decisions. ¶ 32 Finally, policy considerations favor giving magistrates some discretion. In State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993), we concluded that affording no deference to a district court's ultimate voluntariness conclusion in a Fourth Amendment consent to search context promoted uniformity throughout the state and more effectively fix[ed] the limits of acceptable police behavior. Id. at 1271; accord Brake, 2004 UT 95, ¶¶ 14-15, 103 P.3d 699 (expanding nondeferential review to all search and seizure cases based on policy considerations). While uniformity and clarity in the law are always worthy goals, granting no deference in the bindover context does not necessarily promote those goals. As we pointed out in Pena, in highly fact-dependant questions, de novo review can sometimes lead to incoherent and unclear statements of the law. 869 P.2d at 938. Furthermore, in Thurman, we were motivated towards uniformity to inform police of the limits of acceptable ... behavior, thereby limiting Fourth Amendment violations. See 846 P.2d at 1271. No similar motive exists in the preliminary hearing context. ¶ 33 As an additional policy consideration, we have noted in the past and we reiterate today that magistrates have an important role in ferreting out groundless prosecutions before they go to trial. State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 783-84 (Utah 1980); supra ¶¶ 20-22. Severely limiting magistrates' discretion could undermine this role because the probable cause standard already favors the prosecution, see Talbot, 972 P.2d at 437-38 (explaining that a magistrate must resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution (internal quotation marks omitted)), and restricting discretion would give magistrates an incentive to be a rubber stamp for the prosecution in order to minimize the possibility of reversal. In other words, because the probable cause standard favors the prosecution, all other factors being equal, reversal of magistrates' decisions is more likely if they decline bindover. As a result, severely limiting magistrates' discretion in applying the probable cause standard may have the unintended consequence of causing them to unjustly bind a defendant over where they would not have otherwise in order to reduce the possibility of reversal. ¶ 34 After balancing these factors, we conclude that magistrates should have some discretion in making their bindover determinations. Because the many potential fact scenarios in the preliminary hearing context make it difficult for appellate courts to make and consistently apply, under de novo review, a rule that adequately accounts for each varied fact scenario, and because of magistrates' proximity to the facts of each case, magistrates should have some discretion to apply the probable cause standard to those facts. This discretion is limited, however, because in the bindover context a magistrate's authority to make credibility determinations is limited. Accordingly, an appellate court should grant commensurate limited deference to a magistrate's application of the bindover standard to the facts of each case.