Opinion ID: 2630897
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: multiple actsunanimity instruction

Text: Colston first claims that his convictions of rape, aggravated criminal sodomy, and aggravated indecent liberties with a child involved multiple acts which could have sustained each conviction. Because the district court failed to give the jury a unanimity instruction, Colston argues that all three convictions must be reversed. Under Kansas law, a jury verdict in a criminal trial must be unanimous. K.S.A. 22-3421. Normally this requirement is satisfied if the trial court instructs the jury that its verdict must be unanimous on each separate count. However, achieving unanimity can be complicated when the State charges a defendant with a single count based on multiple acts. In a multiple acts case, several acts are alleged and any one of them could constitute the crime charged. State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 115, 61 P.3d 701 (2003). The multiple acts situation is especially common in sex offense cases. In order to ensure jury unanimity as to the specific act for which the defendant is charged, the trial court must either require the State to elect the particular criminal act upon which it will rely for the conviction or instruct the jury that all jurors must agree that the same underlying criminal act has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Voyles, 284 Kan. 239, Syl. ¶ 2, 160 P.3d 794 (2007). In Voyles , this court set out a three-part test to determine when a multiple acts situation has occurred such that the jury must agree on the same underlying criminal act. First, the court must determine if the case truly involves multiple acts, i.e., whether the defendant's conduct was part of one act or represents multiple acts which are separate and distinct from each other. Second, the court must consider whether error occurred, i.e., whether there was a failure by the State to elect an act or a failure by the trial court to instruct. Third, the court must determine whether the error is reversible. 284 Kan. at 252-53, 160 P.3d 794. We will apply these steps to Colston's case.