Opinion ID: 1646975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Are the activities of the defendants in hiring or appointing counsel to conduct litigation for creditors constitutionally protected.

Text: There remains the constitutional question raised by Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar (1964), 377 U. S. 1, 84 Sup. Ct. 1113, 12 L. Ed. 2d 89, rehearing denied 377 U. S. 960, 84 Sup. Ct. 1625, 12 L. Ed. 2d 505. It is defendants' position that the first and fourteenth amendments, as interpreted in Brotherhood, preclude the State Bar and this court from constitutionally controlling the activities of defendants. In Brotherhood, the United States Supreme Court held that members of the union were asserting rights guaranteed them by the first and fourteenth amendments in the operation of a lawyer referral service. To assist the prosecution of claims by injured railway workers, the Brotherhood maintained both in Virginia and throughout the United States a department of legal counsel, which recommended to its members and families of deceased workers names of lawyers whom the Brotherhood believed to be honest and competent. The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed the injunction granted by the lower court restraining the union from channeling the claims of the workers to lawyers chosen by the legal department. The supreme court reversed. The court recognized the fact that a state has broad powers to regulate the practice of law within its borders provided that such regulation did not trammel the rights of individuals secured by the constitution. The court delineated the right of the Brotherhood members: The right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal organization necessarily includes the right to select a spokesman from their number who could be expected to give the wisest counsel. That is the role played by the members who carry out the legal aid program. And the right of the workers personally or through a special department of their Brotherhood to advise concerning the need for legal assistanceand, most importantly, what lawyer a member could confidently rely on is an inseparable part of this constitutionally guaranteed right to assist and advise each other. (p. 6.) Concluding that these rights were protected by the first amendment, the court stated: In the present case the State again has failed to show any appreciable public interest in preventing the Brotherhood from carrying out its plan to recommend the lawyers it selects to represent injured workers. The Brotherhood's activities fall just as clearly within the protection of the First Amendment. And the Constitution protects the associational rights of the members of the union precisely as it does those of the NAACP. We hold that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right of the members through their Brotherhood to maintain and carry out their plan for advising workers who are injured to obtain legal advice and for recommending specific lawyers. (p. 8.) The failure of the state to establish that the public interest necessitated regulation of the referral plan was critical. The public interest with which the supreme court was concerned is exemplified by the following language: Here what Virginia has sought to halt is not a commercialization of the legal profession which might threaten the moral and ethical fabric of the administration of justice. It is not `ambulance chasing.' The railroad workers, by recommending competent lawyers to each other, obviously are not themselves engaging in the practice of law, nor are they or the lawyers whom they select parties to any soliciting of business. (pp. 6, 7.) The element of commercialization or the profit motive distinguishes Brotherhood from the case at bar. The trainmen's brotherhood received no remuneration for the referral services offered. Clearly, Bonded Collection, Inc., and Norman La Belle participate in the fruits of their collection efforts. The same rationale appears in NAACP v. Button (1963), 371 U. S. 415, 83 Sup. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405, where the supreme court upheld a system whereby that association advised prospective litigants to seek the assistance of particular attorneys: There has been no showing of a serious danger here of professionally reprehensible conflicts of interest which rules against solicitation frequently seek to prevent. This is so partly because no monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no danger that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount interests of his client to enrich himself or an outside sponsor. (pp. 442, 443.) Moreover, in Brotherhood it was apparent that a direct attorney-client relationship existed between the lawyer and the client. Brotherhood acted only as a referral agent, having no control over the litigation. In the instant case the collection agency controls the litigation. Appellants' claim that Button and Brotherhood afford a constitutional shield to their mercenary activities is without merit. By the Court. The order sustaining the respondent's demurrer to the answer and affirmative defense is affirmed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. HANSEN, J., took no part.