Opinion ID: 1796621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: direct examination continuing by ms. bridges:

Text: BY THE COURT: You may proceed, Ms. Bridges. Q. Agent Quill, I believe I had asked you if your work in this particular case, your match in this particular case, had been reviewed by other scientists? A. Yes, it has. Q. What is the procedure for reporting out your work, your findings, in your DNA analysis? A. Upon completion of all my work, it has to be reviewed by another DNA Profiler in the Unit. All of my work, all of my statistical interpretations, all of my visual interpretations are reviewed by another. That individual has to sign and date that he reviewed my work and that he agrees and confirms the matches that I had made in  for example, in this particular case. I put together the package with my dictation. I get the report typed. All of my results and work, notes, then go to the Unit Chief of the DNA Analysis Unit, who then reviews my report once again, looks over my data, and then he will sign off if he feels that everything is right and correct. Then, it is mailed back to the contributor and that is my final work product is my report that goes out and returns to a particular contributor. Q. Who were the two people  who were the  I believe you said the head of the agency  A. The head of the DNA Analysis Unit is David Bigbee, the Unit Chief of DNA Analysis Unit. Q. Who is the other scientist who reviewed your work at the FBI Laboratory? A. Harold Deadman. Q. What is his title? A. He is a supervisor, Special Agent, like myself. He also has his Ph.D. Q. Has your work been reviewed by other scientists? A. Yes, it has. Q. This particular case? A. Yes, it has. Q. As to the match quality  excuse me  as to the factor of the match, who were the other people who have reviewed it? A. The other people that have reviewed it was a Dr. Acton, Dr. Martin Tracy, and Dr. Lavette. Q. Who is Dr. Acton? BY MR. JONES: Your Honor, I object on the grounds of hearsay unless he can show by personal knowledge. BY MS. BRIDGES: He was here, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: I think he can probably show by personal knowledge who Dr. Acton is. The objection will be overruled. A. Dr. Acton is from the University of Alabama and he uses the FBI protocol and procedures in his own testing. He uses the same biological scissors that the FBI uses. He produces pieces of X ray film very similar to what the FBI produces. He reviewed my work and he offered testimony in a prior hearing. BY MS. BRIDGES: ... prior hearing. BY MR. DYER: Your Honor, if Ms. Bridges wants to testify, that will be fine. I think he can testify on his own. BY THE COURT: Sustained. A... . in a prior hearing here back in March of '91  actually, March, '92. It was last year. Almost a year ago. He agreed with my match at that time. His concerns were in the area of the population genetics which are not an issue in this particular case. Q. Did he agree with the match that you found of the DNA as to the defendant himself? A. Yes, he did in his review of my pieces of X ray film. The defense first argues that Agent Quill's testimony that other FBI personnel reviewed his work and agreed a match existed is hearsay and denied him his right to confront those witnesses against him. Hull agrees that experts are allowed to rely on hearsay evidence as long as it is relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions. Miss.R.Evid. 703. He notes, however, that Agent Quill did not testify that he regularly relied on these experts nor did he use their knowledge to form his own opinion. Hull relies predominately on Kim v. Nazarian, 216 Ill. App.3d 818, 159 Ill.Dec. 758, 576 N.E.2d 427 (1991), where the court stated: Rule 703 allows an expert to base his opinion on the opinions of others which are not in evidence so long as experts in the field ordinarily rely on such opinions in forming their own opinions. For example, a psychiatric expert may rely on the reports of a patient's psychiatric history in arriving at his diagnosis. In such circumstances, the opinion of the nontestifying expert would serve simply as a premise supporting the testifying expert's opinion on a broader issue. In the instant case, however, the opinions of the nontestifying experts do not serve as merely a narrow premise upon which the testifying experts' opinions are based. Instead, the nontestifying experts offered corroborating opinions on the same issue as that addressed by the testifying experts. Accepting for the moment, arguendo, defendants' contention that their experts reasonably relied on their consultation with other experts in forming their opinions, we believe that neither Wilson [v. Clark, 84 Ill.2d 186, 49 Ill.Dec. 308, 417 N.E.2d 1322 (1981)] nor Rule 703 allows an expert's testimony to simply parrot the corroborative opinions solicited from nontestifying colleagues. 159 Ill.Dec. at 764-65, 576 N.E.2d at 433-34. We agree with the State that this testimony only related to standard FBI procedures and controls and did not introduce the expert opinions of other personnel. Thus, the statements are not hearsay as they were not offered to prove that a match, in fact, existed, but rather were offered to show whether proper testing procedures were followed. This is not to say that such evidence might be used improperly to bolster a witness's testimony by showing that other experts were in complete agreement that the DNA samples matched in a manner which constitutes hearsay and impermissibly bolsters the State's witness. While it would be better to question the expert on the efficacy of the procedures used by a given laboratory prior to the time of his delivering the opinion, in this case the State did not use Quill's testimony as hearsay. As to the confrontation clause question, Hull cites Hall v. State, 611 So.2d 915 (Miss. 1992), and Barnette v. State, 481 So.2d 788 (Miss. 1985), to argue he was denied his right of confrontation. It is true that Hall notes the vital correlation between the rule prohibiting the admission of hearsay evidence and the right of a defendant to confront those witnesses against him. 611 So.2d 915, 922 (Miss. 1992). However, Hall offers no support here. Hall was concerned with the right of a defendant to face his accuser. Id. In the present case, Hull had the opportunity to cross-examine the victim. Hull's other citation, while more analogous, also misses the point. In Barnette v. State , this Court reversed, holding a defendant's confrontation clause rights were violated where the analyst who performed certain tests was not available to testify. 481 So.2d at 791. Here, Hull faced the scientist who actually performed the tests, i.e., Agent Quill. Although the State may not impermissibly bolster an expert's conclusion through irrelevant repetitions of corroborative opinions solicited of nontestifying colleagues, the value of face-to-face confrontation in this scenario is low, and this Court declines to create a mechanical confrontation rule in the expert opinion arena. This line of questioning appears to have come closer to the line than was necessary. However, even though it would be preferable to review the methodology of a lab without reference to the testifying expert's conclusions concerning a piece of evidence, the testimony here was adequately linked to the testing methodology of the DNA analysis unit.