Opinion ID: 1166119
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: robert t. kennedy

Text: In the earlier stages of this proceeding Mr. Kennedy was represented by counsel. However, he has represented himself pro se before this court. Mr. Kennedy excepts to findings of fact 3, 9, and 12 through 33. With the exception of findings 18, 19, 22 and 23, to be discussed later, he does not assert that they lack the required support of substantial evidence. In re Wm. H. Simmons, 65 Wn.2d 88, 395 P.2d 1013 (1964); In re Little, 40 Wn.2d 421, 244 P.2d 255 (1952); see also In re Dunham, 124 Wash. 418, 214 P. 628 (1923). Rather, his exceptions are based upon an assertion that the panel's findings of fact include only evidence which justifies the conclusion that he violated CPE 11 and 22. He asserts that his testimony, and that of others, conflicts with that offered by the bar association. He devotes a considerable portion of his brief to rewriting most of the panel's findings of fact to indicate the manner in which he asserts they should have been written, had they contained all of the evidence. Based upon his redrafted findings of fact, he challenges the panel's conclusions of law and submits his own. [2] In disciplinary actions this court will not ordinarily disturb the panel's (formerly the trial committee) findings of fact made upon conflicting evidence. The panel, before which the witnesses appear, is in a much better position to evaluate the testimony than we can possibly be from reading the record, complete though it is. In re Little, supra ; In re Foster, 40 Wn.2d 1, 239 P.2d 1060 (1952); In re Thacker, 35 Wn.2d 605, 618, 214 P.2d 507 (1950). Although a panel's findings of fact do not have the force of formal findings made by a trial judge, they are made by persons chosen to make them according to rules established by this court in carrying out its disciplinary activities. Such findings of fact are entitled to due weight in determining whether they support the conclusions of law and resulting recommendations. In re Foster, supra ; In re Thacker, supra . [3] While the disciplinary rules for attorneys provide that the panel shall prepare findings of fact and conclusions of law, they do not specify the manner in which they shall be prepared. However, since the panel's findings and conclusions serve the same purpose as those entered by a trial court, there is no reason why they should be treated differently. Drawing by analogy upon those cases which govern the preparation of findings of fact by trial courts, we hold it is only necessary to prepare findings of ultimate facts concerning material issues. Whitney v. McKay, 54 Wn.2d 672, 344 P.2d 497 (1959); Wentz v. T.E. Connolly, Inc., 45 Wn.2d 127, 273 P.2d 485 (1954); Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Green, 45 Wn.2d 139, 273 P.2d 513 (1954). Recitals of evidence have no place in findings of fact. Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Green, supra ; Bowman v. Webster, 42 Wn.2d 129, 253 P.2d 934 (1953); Warning v. Warning, 40 Wn.2d 903, 247 P.2d 249 (1952). Thus, there is no need to make findings of fact on every item of evidence introduced in the case. Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Green, supra ; Warning v. Warning, supra ; Williamson v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 12 Wn.2d 171, 120 P.2d 833 (1942). Such a resume of the evidence would merely lead to confusion. 53 Am. Jur. Trial § 1142, p. 796 (1945). The panel's findings of fact are sufficient to enable this court to review the issues, to disclose what questions were decided, and the conclusions reached. Thus, the findings of fact satisfy the requirements in Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men v. Green, supra . We have reviewed Mr. Kennedy's proposed additions to the panel's findings of fact and find that they are not findings of ultimate fact concerning material issues. They are mere recitals, or resumes, of evidence in the case. They are neither a necessary nor a proper part of the findings of fact entered herein. They do, however, require further comment. We would expect that one charged with a violation of CPE 22, governing candor and fairness before the court and with other lawyers, would use great care to insure the accuracy of his brief. At page 29 of Mr. Kennedy's brief, it is said that the purpose of his proposed additions to the panel's findings of fact is: to include the evidence placed in the records that shows a full and fair disclosure and complete candor and fairness plus Findings on additional evidence that will answer questions raised by the Hearing Panel. (Italics ours.) In explanation of the rewritten findings of fact, he states in part, at page 29: (1) In reading the following proposed Findings and Conclusions the underlined portions are those found or concluded by the panel. (2) The parts not underlined are Findings & Conclusions that should have been included. (Italics ours.) From the foregoing explanation it is logical to assume: (1) That unless specifically indicated, the underlined portions of the proposed findings of fact fully and completely set out the panel's findings of fact and do not omit material portions thereof; (2) That the underlined portions are accurate quotations, when taken as a whole; (3) That the underlined portions are not misleading. We have made a word-by-word comparison of the panel's actual findings of fact with those reported by Mr. Kennedy. We find: (1) That in most cases the underlined portions do not fully set forth the panel's findings; (2) That there are major omissions from the panel's findings of fact which were not so indicated in the brief; (3) That some of the purported underlined quotations were inaccurate or entirely changed; and (4) That some of the purported underlined quotations were misleading. A few examples follow. Unless otherwise indicated, the underlining reflects that made by Mr. Kennedy to indicate findings or conclusions made by the panel. Mr. Kennedy's brief omits a material part of the panel's finding 13. It is reported as reading in pertinent part as follows: the court was advised by motion and supporting affidavits and memorandum seeking exclusion of evidence or [ sic ] remarriage. The purported quotation omits material data that followed immediately in the same sentence to explain apparently false answers given in Mrs. Markos' deposition: the court was advised by motion and supporting affidavit and memoranda seeking exclusion of evidence of remarriage, Mrs. Markos explaining her continued financial independence of her new husband and the reason for it. Mr. Kennedy's brief reports the last sentence of the panel's same finding of fact as follows: She requested time over the weekend to think over how to pay the Attorneys for their additional services. The panel's final sentence actually reads: This, Mrs. Markos declined to sign expressing the wish to take it home and show it to her husband. Portions of the panel's finding of fact 14 are omitted, changed and inaccurately reported in Mr. Kennedy's brief. The panel's finding of fact 15 is reported to have read in part as follows: Mrs. Markos then informed Mr. Kennedy that she would agree to pay them 50% of the recovery as a fee for the work ... In fact, the finding of fact actually reads in part: The next morning, September 26, Kennedy says, he told Mrs. Markos that the fee on an hourly basis would be approximately $10,000 plus costs and she then agreed to a 50% fee, saying  maybe 50% ( is ) better.  (Italics ours.) Mr. Kennedy's brief omits most of the panel's finding of fact 16. However, one significant part that purports to be quoted from the panel's finding was never made by the panel. The part wrongly added reads: She acknowledged to the court that this settlement agreement was by her own free will and with full knowledge of all factors. Mr. Kennedy's brief omits a major portion of the panel's finding 20. On the other hand, he purportedly quotes the panel's finding 23 at some length as follows: Mr. Kennedy then telephoned Mr. Sweet and informed him that Mrs. Markos refused to sign the draft and release and for his clients protection it would be best for him to cancel that draft and pay the money directly into the court and counsel would draw it down from the court. Comparison of the foregoing with the panel's actual finding reveals that Mr. Kennedy not only has misquoted it but has omitted entirely a portion that is basic to the charge of violating CPE 22. The omitted portion is italicized below: Mr. Kennedy then telephoned Mr. Sweet and asked him to have payment stopped on the draft of October 20, 1967, and to issue a new draft payable to the court. Mr. Sweet complied having a new draft made out payable to the clerk of the court, reciting that it was in full payment of a stipulated settlement of the case. He sent this draft to Mr. Kennedy. Mr. Kennedy told Mr. Sweet that Mrs. Markos' husband was trying to have Mrs. Markos repudiate the settlement, and for that reason it would be advisable to pay the money through the court. He did not tell Mr. Sweet that there was a dispute over attorneys' fees. Mr. Kennedy purportedly quotes from the panel's finding 30 as follows: ... Mrs. Markos accompanied by Mr. Markos finally came to the office for a conference with Mr. Schroeter and Mr. Kennedy. They were then presented with a statement of what had become of the $7,500 (Exhibit F 11). The finding of fact actually reads: About two weeks before Christmas, 1967, Mr. and Mrs. Markos succeeded in having a conference with Mr. Schroeter and Mr. Kennedy at Mr. Schroeter's office. There, for the first time they were presented with a statement of what had become of the $7,500.00 (Exhibit F.11). It will be noted that the purported quotation completely changes the emphasis of the actual finding of fact. Recitation of other examples will unduly lengthen the opinion. CPE 22 provides in part: The conduct of the lawyer before the court and with other lawyers should be characterized by candor and fairness. It is not candid or fair for the lawyer knowingly to misquote the contents of a paper ... (Italics ours.) Needless to say, the matters reported herein do not conform to the requirements of that canon. Next, we shall consider Mr. Kennedy's exceptions to specific findings of fact. It is urged that findings of fact 18 and 20 are contrary to the evidence. We have reviewed the record and are convinced that each finding is supported by substantial evidence thus complying with the requirements in In re Wm. H. Simmons, 65 Wn.2d 88, 96, 395 P.2d 1013 (1964); and In re Little, 40 Wn.2d 421, 244 P.2d 255 (1952). [4] Finding of fact 19 is challenged as contrary to the evidence and because the last sentence is said to be a conclusion of law. The record indicates that the first part of the finding of fact is adequately supported. The last portion is, however, a conclusion of law. It reads: Under the circumstances, it must be concluded that the respondents could not show the fair and full disclosure and lack of undue influence necessary to a change of contract during the existence of the attorney-client relationship Kennedy v. Clausing 74 Wn 2d 483, 445 P.2d 637 (1968) (to which respondent Kennedy was a party). Nevertheless, since other findings of fact support this conclusion of law, it may stand. Miller Lumber Co. v. Holden, 45 Wn.2d 237, 273 P.2d 786 (1954), see also Freeman v. Stemm Bros., Inc., 44 Wn.2d 189, 265 P.2d 1055 (1954). Mr. Kennedy's proposed conclusions of law are not relevant. They are either unnecessary to a decision of this case or are supported only by his proposed, but rejected, findings of fact. Mr. Kennedy states that his case was heard at the end of 8 days of hearings which involved matters unrelated to the instant action. He suggests that the panel, being pressed for time, limited him to a showing of how the client's money was handled. He objects to having been prevented from establishing that the revised fee ( i.e., 50 per cent of the gross recovery) was reasonable and justified. The panel committed no error. The members acknowledged that Messrs. Kennedy and Schroeter had done considerable work. However, the panel was not concerned with the justification of a fee ( i.e., CPE 12). The issue was whether the two lawyers had dealt properly with their client's funds ( i.e., CPE 11). Thus, testimony or exhibits relating to the subject of fixing the amount of the fee ( i.e., CPE 12) were not relevant to any issue before the panel. It is equally irrelevant to any issue before this court on review. [5, 6] Mr. Kennedy has challenged finding of fact 23. However, it is adequately supported by the statement of facts. His original brief has furnished us with no reason for the exception. Again, drawing by analogy from the rules on appeal, we have uniformly refused to consider an assignment of error for which no argument has been made. Sepich v. Department of Labor & Indus., 75 Wn.2d 312, 450 P.2d 940 (1969); Valente v. Bailey, 74 Wn.2d 857, 477 P.2d 589 (1968); see also ROA I-43. Logic requires us to apply the same rule to a review of this nature. Mr. Kennedy's reply brief suggests that finding of fact 23 is based upon incorrect or erroneous testimony and thus is in error. His assertion is based upon an affidavit of one who did not appear as a witness before the panel. The affidavit was submitted for the first time as an attachment to the reply brief. There are two answers to his contention. (1) The argument was made for the first time in the reply brief. Points not argued and discussed in the opening brief are deemed abandoned and are not open to consideration on their merits. Dickson v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 77 Wn.2d 785, 466 P.2d 515 (1970); Fosbre v. State, 70 Wn.2d 578, 424 P.2d 901 (1967). (2) The disciplinary rules for attorneys provide for the use of affidavits at only one stage of the proceedings. An affidavit is required when one attempts to obtain a new hearing, particularly when based on newly discovered evidence. Otherwise, the rule is silent. We held in In re Thacker, 35 Wn.2d 605, 619, 214 P.2d 507 (1950), a case in which an affidavit was submitted under surprisingly similar circumstances: We have no disposition to establish a precedent that would invite appellants or respondents, in cases pending in this court, to file affidavits merely to impeach witnesses who testified in the cause during the trial thereof in the court below. We did not consider the affidavits in Thacker and we have been given no reason to depart from our prior rule. Mr. Kennedy suggests that much of what he did was to prevent Mrs. Markos from profiting by her lack of truthfulness. He attempts to justify his action as some kind of punishment for an avaricious client. [7] While we do not condone a client's untruthfulness with either court or counsel, that issue is not before us. A lawyer's knowledge of his client's misconduct does not given him license to violate the canons of ethics either with regard to his handling of that client's funds or by failing to make a proper or timely accounting. The client's punishment is a matter for the courts or for criminal prosecution. It is sufficient to say that the panel's findings of fact fully support the conclusion of law that Mr. Kennedy violated CPE 11 and 22.