Opinion ID: 585697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 3 Marsh argues that the government failed to establish that his presence in the United States on August 15, 1989, when he was transferred from the custody of the California authorities to the INS, was voluntary. He contends that a conviction cannot be sustained under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) unless the defendant's presence in the country was voluntary. Marsh argues that his presence in the country on August 15, 1989 was not voluntary because he was being released from the California State Prison system where, of course, he had been held against his will. However, he was formally deported in 1980, and the court could reasonably infer that he was voluntarily in the country when he committed the offense for which he was convicted on September 5, 1985. It could hardly be otherwise. Certainly, he was here when convicted and while serving his sentence. That his presence in prison was not voluntary, or that he wished he was not in the United States on August 15, 1989 is immaterial. 4 Marsh's argument suggests that had he been indicted for his illegal presence in the country on a date prior to his arrest on state charges, his presence would have been voluntary, but that any voluntariness was terminated upon his incarceration on the state charges. The district court, nevertheless, could reasonably infer that while Marsh was not voluntarily in prison, he was still voluntarily in this country. On the basis of the evidence presented to the district court a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Marsh violated section 1326. United States v. Adler, 879 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir.1988). Accordingly, we affirm his conviction.