Opinion ID: 844220
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of June 1988 Firearm Possession

Text: Defendant contends that the evidence that he possessed a firearm in June 1988 (see, ante, at p. 9) should not have been admitted in aggravation at the penalty phase under section 190.3‟s factor (b) because it was not criminal activity involving actual or threatened force or violence. We conclude the evidence was properly admitted. “A trial court‟s decision to admit, at the penalty phase, evidence of a defendant‟s prior criminal activity is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. [Citation.] Possession of a firearm is not, in every circumstance, an act committed with actual or implied force or violence. [Citation.] The factual circumstances surrounding the possession, however, may indicate an implied threat of violence.” (People v. Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1127.) Here, defendant‟s firearm possession was criminal because former section 12031 made it a crime to carry a loaded firearm in a public place.7 The firearm possession involved a threat of violence because, after Deputy Kuhn told defendant to put his hands on the hood of the patrol car, defendant reached for the pocket containing the gun while saying that he was going to show identification. 7 Effective January 1, 2012, section 12031 was repealed and section 25850, which similarly prohibits carrying a loaded firearm in public, became operative. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, §§ 4, 6.) 66 The jury could reasonably infer, under these circumstances, that defendant‟s intent, when he reached for the pocket containing the gun rather than the pocket containing his identification, was to draw the weapon for use in threatening or perhaps even shooting Deputy Kuhn. C. Prosecutor’s Comment on Defendant’s Lack of Remorse During penalty phase argument to the jury, the prosecutor made these statements: “But the bottom line is a lot of victims came up and testified. And these were people, some of them, there was no question but that the defendant had shot them, had done things to them. And he sat there the whole time as he sits there now, and he doesn‟t care. He isn‟t remorseful in the slightest.” Defense counsel objected without stating the basis of the objection. The trial court responded: “I think that‟s very much on the border. I would avoid that if I were you.” Defendant contends the prosecutor‟s quoted remark was an improper comment on defendant‟s failure to testify. We reject the claim because the prosecutor‟s statements were not improper. “Although the prosecution may not refer to the defendant‟s failure to testify, it may comment upon the defendant‟s lack of remorse.” (People v. Castaneda (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1292, 1346.) The jury here would have understood the prosecutor to be referring to defendant‟s courtroom demeanor, which is a proper subject for comment during penalty phase argument (People v. Valencia (2008) 43 Cal.4th 268, 307-308; People v. Haskett (1990) 52 Cal.3d 210, 247) or to “the absence of evidence of remorse, which might have been presented by friends or relatives who believed he was remorseful” (People v. Castaneda, at p. 1346; see also People v. Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th 547, 585 [“If defendant had appeared sorry in front of another person, performed an act of contrition, apologized to any of his victims, or otherwise 67 demonstrated any remorse, a witness other than he could have testified about such acts or statements, but none did.”]). The prosecutor here did not improperly comment on defendant‟s failure to testify. D. Defendant’s Courtroom Behavior We have already considered defendant‟s claim of being prejudiced at the guilt phase by the trial court‟s response to the incident when he threw apples at the trial court and the jurors. (See, ante, at pp. 58-61.) Here, we consider defendant‟s related claims concerning the penalty phase. After the jury reported that it had reached guilt phase verdicts, defendant expressly waived his right to dress in civilian clothing, and during all later proceedings in the jury‟s presence he wore jail clothing. Also during the penalty phase, against the advice of counsel, defendant began wearing eyeglasses that were similar to those described by witnesses as having been worn by the person who robbed and killed Patrick Rooney. Defendant argues that these actions provided further evidence that he was mentally incompetent to stand trial, and therefore the trial court erred in not suspending criminal proceedings to hold a competency hearing. We disagree. As we have stated in the past, the test for mental competency to stand trial is whether the defendant understands the proceedings rationally and factually and is able to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding. (People v. Ary, supra, 51 Cal.4th 510, 517.) Here, defendant‟s decisions to wear jail clothing and eyeglasses after the jury had returned the guilt phase verdicts do not call his mental competence into question. At most, they reveal his correct understanding that his guilt was no longer at issue during the penalty phase. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by arguing to the jury that defendant‟s courtroom misbehavior during the apple- 68 throwing incident could be considered in determining penalty. The argument was entirely proper. A defendant‟s courtroom demeanor and behavior are proper subjects for comment during penalty phase argument to the jury. (People v. Valencia, supra, 43 Cal.4th 268, 307-308; People v. Haskett, supra, 52 Cal.3d 210, 247.) Moreover, even were we to assume for the sake of argument that a juror might have construed the prosecutor‟s remarks as a comment on defendant‟s failure to testify, defendant‟s claim would still fail because those remarks were the sort of indirect, brief, and mild comment that we have consistently found harmless. (See People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 455-456.) E. Instructions and Argument on Victim Impact Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly referred to facts outside the record during penalty phase argument to the jury regarding the impact of armored car guard Patrick Rooney‟s murder on his family, and that the resulting harm was exacerbated by an incorrect jury instruction. We disagree. Defendant‟s penalty phase occurred in March 1992, not long after the United States Supreme Court‟s decision in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, and this court‟s decision in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, both concluding that victim impact testimony may appropriately be considered when determining penalty in a capital case. At the outset of the penalty phase, defense counsel stated that the defense had just received notice of the prosecution‟s intent to present victim impact evidence. Defense counsel said that if the court was going to allow this, the defense would request a continuance to investigate the evidence. The prosecutor said the only victim impact witness would be the wife of murder victim Patrick Rooney. The next day, the trial court and counsel discussed the matter again. The court said that it seemed the prosecution was “entitled to argue victim impact as a 69 factor regardless of whether they call any witness or not,” and it questioned what the prosecution would “gain by putting this poor woman on and having her break into tears and put her through the emotional travail of trying to describe the depth of her loss, when you can certainly comment on it as much as you please in your argument without having any supporting testimony.” The court also questioned whether victim impact evidence should be limited to facts that were foreseeable by the defendant at the time of the capital murder. The court then ruled “that the defense objection is well taken as to calling the witness.” The parties stipulated that a woman who was present in the courtroom was the wife of murder victim Patrick Rooney. The prosecutor‟s argument to the jury concerning victim impact was limited to these statements: “We have Patrick Rooney who is now dead. He leaves his wife. She‟ll never be able to talk to him again. She and his family will never be able to talk to him, to share their plans, to do anything because the defendant didn‟t care. [¶] And he didn‟t have to. He didn‟t have to do it. He didn‟t have to kill — even if he wanted the money, he didn‟t have to. But he didn‟t care. He didn‟t care about what this was going to do to these other people, to Mrs. Rooney and to the family. He didn‟t care because he doesn‟t care about anything but himself and what‟s easy for him. [¶] So that, I guess, is what we have been talking about, the circumstances of the crime, the circumstances in aggravation.” Although insisting that the prosecutor‟s argument referred to facts outside the record, defendant does not identify a single such fact. From the parties‟ stipulation, the jury learned that Patrick Rooney was married and had a surviving wife. No evidence was needed to establish that Rooney‟s death would prevent his wife from ever again talking to him. Although no evidence was presented that Rooney was survived by family members other than his wife, it was reasonable to 70 infer the existence of additional family, and in any event reference to surviving family was harmless under any standard. In substance, defendant argues that without actual testimony describing specific effects of the capital crime on surviving family members, any argument to the jury regarding victim impact is improper. This court has rejected that position, stating instead that a prosecutor‟s victim impact argument to the jury “need not be based upon specific testimony of the victim‟s family members describing their emotions; the prosecutor can urge the jury to draw reasonable inferences concerning the probable impact of the crime on . . . the victim‟s family.” (People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1017; accord, People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 550.) Regarding victim impact, the trial court gave the jury this instruction: “A factor you may consider in this phase of the trial is the specific harm caused by the defendant, including the impact on the family of Patrick Rooney. [¶] You may assess the harm caused by the defendant as a result of the murder of Patrick Rooney as a factor to be considered in determining the appropriate punishment.” Defendant argues that the instruction was improper for two reasons. Because no victim impact testimony was admitted, defendant argues that no victim impact instruction should have been given. In the alternative, he argues that the instruction was incorrect because it encouraged the jurors to speculate about victim impact rather than limiting their consideration to facts supported by testimony or other evidence. We find no error in the instruction. As we have explained in the past, the jury may draw reasonable inferences about the likely impact of a capital murder on the victim‟s family. (People v. Sanders, supra, 11 Cal.4th 475, 550; People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th 988, 1017.) 71 F. Failure to Instruct on Costs of Imprisonment The defense requested this penalty phase instruction: “In deciding whether death or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is the appropriate sentence you may not consider for any reason whatsoever the deterrent or nondeterrent effect of the death penalty or the monetary cost to the state of execution or maintaining a life prisoner.” Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to give this instruction. We disagree. Although the instruction was legally correct, the trial court was not required to give it if neither party raised the issue of cost or deterrence at trial. (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 371; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 807.) Here, the trial court cautioned the prospective jurors during voir dire that cost was not a factor to consider in determining penalty (see, ante, at pp. 19-21), no evidence on the subject was introduced during the penalty phase, neither side mentioned cost during argument to the jury, and cost was not among the factors the jury was instructed to consider in making the penalty determination. The prosecutor‟s questions to a defense penalty witness about life prisoners‟ access to television, libraries, recreational facilities, and conjugal visits did not raise the cost issue. (See People v. Zamudio, supra, at p. 371.) Because the issue of cost was not raised at trial, the proposed jury instruction was unnecessary, and the trial court did not err in refusing it. G. Self-representation Defendant contends the trial court erred by granting his motion for selfrepresentation without first advising him of the perils of self-representation and determining his competence to represent himself. The claim lacks merit. Defendant was originally charged in May 1990 with armored car guard Patrick Rooney‟s murder, and counsel was appointed to represent him. In March 1991, the trial court granted defendant‟s motion for self-representation. Ten days later, at defendant‟s request, counsel was again appointed. Eventually, the trial 72 court granted the prosecution‟s motion to dismiss the charges, which the prosecution then refiled in a different district of the Los Angeles Superior Court. After the refiling of the charges, defendant was continuously represented by counsel until the jury returned its penalty verdict. At that point, on April 22, 1992, defendant again moved for self-representation, giving this explanation: “The reason why I want to do [this] is because my counsel have no more trust — I have no trust in them. They gave me nothing but false promises and led me down a path full of lies. They have shown me ineffective assistance of counsel.” After saying that defendant‟s attorneys “conducted themselves throughout this case in a very professional, thorough manner and did everything that could possibly be done under the circumstances in the face of overwhelming odds,” the court acknowledged that defendant had the right to proceed with the sentencing without counsel. The court advised defendant that “it‟s an unwise decision for anyone to go pro. per.” Asked by the trial court whether defendant understood the issues sufficiently to represent himself, Defense Counsel Ramirez said: “Well, in my discussions with him, he has always been rational and seems to understand everything that‟s going on. I have no reason to doubt that.” The trial court ruled: “So I am going to make a finding, based on my observation and the representations of counsel, and taking judicial notice of the fact that another judicial officer on a previous occasion made a finding that he was able to represent himself, that he is — that he will be allowed to represent himself in pro. per.” The trial court granted the prosecutor‟s request to incorporate into the record the questionnaire that defendant had filled out when he previously requested and was granted self-representation. The United States Supreme Court has construed the federal Constitution‟s Sixth Amendment, which guarantees “the assistance of counsel” to an accused in a criminal prosecution, to also guarantee a right of self-representation. (Faretta v. 73 California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 834.) The right applies in both capital and noncapital prosecutions. (People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th 850, 865-866.) To exercise the right, a defendant must make a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 824; People v. Burgener (2009) 46 Cal.4th 231, 240-241.) “On appeal, we independently examine the entire record to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.” (People v. Burgener, at p. 241.) Here, the record shows that defendant chose self-representation with an understanding of the risks involved, the nature and seriousness of the crimes for which he would be sentenced, and his right to continue being represented by counsel. Having previously experienced both self-representation and representation by counsel, defendant necessarily understood what each form of representation involved as well as his right to continue with the attorneys who had represented him throughout the trial. His attorney affirmed that defendant had always seemed able to understand the courtroom proceedings, a view that was consistent with the trial court‟s own observations of defendant throughout the proceedings. The trial court advised the defendant that his choice of selfrepresentation was unwise and that preparation and submission of a motion for a new trial might be necessary to preserve certain issues for appellate review. The trial court also appointed advisory counsel for defendant and arranged for her to meet with defendant well in advance of the sentencing hearing, to ensure that defendant understood what needed to be done to prepare for that hearing. Given defendant‟s familiarity with trial proceedings, and with both self-representation and representation by counsel, further advisements regarding the perils of selfrepresentation were not required. (See People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1070 [“No particular form of words is required in admonishing a defendant who 74 seeks to waive counsel and elect self-representation . . . .”]; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 928-929.) We conclude that defendant‟s waiver of the right to counsel was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. As explained earlier (see, ante, at pp. 60-61), the trial court did not err in failing to suspend criminal proceedings to determine defendant‟s competence to stand trial. We likewise conclude that the trial court properly found defendant competent to represent himself at sentencing without counsel. (See People v. Taylor, supra, 47 Cal.4th 850, 879 [at time of defendant‟s trial, under state law, competence to defend oneself and competence to stand trial were determined by the same standard].) Although defendant‟s apple-throwing incident (see, ante, at p. 58) showed that he sometimes had difficulty controlling his anger and frustration, the record contains no indication of serious mental deficiency or illness. H. Constitutionality of Death Penalty Law Defendant contends that California‟s death penalty law violates the federal Constitution in various ways. As discussed below, we have repeatedly considered and rejected each of these constitutional challenges. We do so again here. California‟s death penalty law, which permits capital punishment for many first degree murders, including unintentional felony murders, is not overly broad. (People v. Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1129; People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 483.) Section 190.3, factor (a), which allows the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime, does not result in the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. (People v. Moore (2011) 51 Cal.4th 386, 415; People v. Kennedy (2005) 36 Cal.4th 595, 641.) 75 The death penalty law is not rendered unconstitutional by the absence of a requirement that the jurors unanimously agree on aggravating circumstances, or by the absence of a requirement that aggravating circumstances be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Moore, supra, 51 Cal.4th 386, 415.) The United States Supreme Court‟s decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2003) 530 U.S. 466 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 do not alter that conclusion. (People v. Moore, supra, at pp. 415-416; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 534.) The jury‟s consideration of the defendant‟s unadjudicated criminal activity as an aggravating circumstance is constitutionally permissible, and the jury need not agree unanimously that the defendant committed the unadjudicated crimes. (People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141, 196; People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691, 756.) The federal Constitution does not require “that the trial court instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating circumstances exist, that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, or that death is the appropriate penalty.” (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 533; accord, People v. Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1129.) A jury‟s death verdict need not be based on written findings regarding aggravating factors. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 533-534.) “The absence of intercase proportionality review does not violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (People v. Bacon, supra, 50 Cal.4th 1082, 1129.) The use of the restrictive adjectives “extreme” and “substantial” in section 190.3‟s list of potential mitigating factors does not unconstitutionally inhibit the jury‟s consideration of mitigating evidence or make the factors impermissibly vague. (People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141, 197; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 532.) 76 The trial court is not constitutionally required to instruct the jury that certain sentencing factors can only be mitigating. (People v. Booker, supra, 51 Cal.4th 141, 197.) The standard instruction given in this case telling the jury how it is to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence (CALJIC No. 8.88) accurately and adequately describes the jury‟s sentencing discretion and the deliberative process for determining the penalty verdict. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 533534.) California‟s death penalty law does not violate the federal Constitution‟s equal protection guarantee by denying capital defendants procedural safeguards that are available to defendants charged with noncapital crimes. (People v. Loker, supra, 44 Cal.4th 691, 756.) The federal Constitution does not require that the trial court instruct the jury that life imprisonment without possibility of parole is presumed to be the appropriate penalty unless the prosecution proves to the contrary. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th 415, 534.)