Opinion ID: 776696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the Conflict

Text: 24 Notwithstanding Caban's satisfaction of the first prong of both the Cuyler and Strickland tests, we hold he would fail under the second prong of either. The district court, in its order, and the Government, in its brief, provide numerous reasons why McGlennen's refusal to call Clemons as a witness did not prejudice the outcome of Caban's case. First, assuming Clemons could have testified at trial, his credibility would have been challenged by cross-examination regarding his prior ethical improprieties. Persuasive evidence indicated that the bill of sale was created after the fact and Jegede signed it when Clemons visited him in jail on the conspiracy charges, as well as while Clemons was practicing under his own conflict of interest between Caban and Jegede. Moreover, McGlennen's testimony indicates that Clemons' knowledge likely was second hand. This would have made his testimony inadmissible hearsay at trial. 25 Furthermore, the bill of sale was of doubtful validity. It was difficult to read, unsigned by Caban, and appeared to have been altered. Thus, even at best, Clemons only would have been able to establish the genuineness of the seller's signature on a document otherwise irregular on its face. 6 26 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, even if the bill of sale were admissible evidence, it contradicted Caban's testimony about the circumstances of the sale of the boat. Caban testified he owed $9000 on the boat in December and he was referring to that amount in the recorded telephone call. The bill of sale, however, appeared to record a $5000 down payment in August with $5000 owing, to be paid in $250 monthly installments. 27 We are convinced upon the evidence presented that the outcome of the trial would have been the same regardless whether McGlennen operated under a conflict of interest. Caban's inability to show any adverse effect on the outcome of the trial arising from McGlennen's conflict persuades us that the outcome of Caban's trial was reliable. Therefore, Caban could not prove actual prejudice as required by Strickland for post-conviction relief. 28 Likewise, we believe McGlennen's conflict did not adversely affect his representation of Caban as required for relief under Cuyler. Stated alternatively, McGlennen's conflict made no difference to his trial strategy or otherwise to the quality of his performance as Caban's attorney. See Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372, 378 (8th Cir.1990) ([The defendant] must show, in addition, that this dual representation made some difference, and that this difference was adverse to his defense.). The evidence showing an absence of actual prejudice also shows that a reasonable attorney in McGlennen's position would not have called Clemons or introduced the bill of sale. Indeed, the district court expressly stated that a reasonable attorney would not have called Clemons at all. We agree with this conclusion and believe that if a reasonable attorney would have adopted the same trial strategy absent a conflict, Caban cannot show McGlennen's performance was adversely affected by that conflict. Consequently, Caban would fail under Cuyler 's second requirement were that test applied. 29 Under the circumstances, it is difficult to believe Clemons' testimony would have provided any actual benefit to Caban's defense. Even McGlennen's testimony indicates only a hypothetical benefit. The remote likelihood that the testimony at issue would have made a difference in Caban's defense falls short of satisfying defendant's burden to show actual prejudice under Strickland. The same evidence demonstrates that the quality of McGlennen's performance was not objectively undermined by the conflict; thus Caban cannot show adverse impact as required by Cuyler. Therefore, we hold the outcome of Caban's trial was reliable, and consequently, he falls short of showing ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment as required for success on his § 2255 motion. Relief is denied and the district court's order is AFFIRMED.