Opinion ID: 426395
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Defendant Vaglica's Contention

Text: 17 The defendant Vaglica raises no issue of erroneous evidentiary ruling, nor does he question the sufficiency of the evidence, if the jury disbelieved his sole defense--i.e., that, as in a 1979 incident, he feigned agreement with the conspiracy to sell his containers, but intended as soon as he received his money to report the incident to law enforcement authorities and to abort it. Vaglica's sole contention on appeal is that this sole defense to the charge against him was severely prejudiced when the prosecutor, in his final closing argument, was erroneously permitted over his counsel's objection, to make a misstatement of law that, further, implied that the government had evidence to refute this defense that only the rules of evidence precluded the government from introducing. 18 During his closing argument, Vaglica's attorney had argued that his client's claim that he did not intend to proceed with the smuggling scheme was credible, in light of Vaglica's testimony, as corroborated by his previous attorney, that he had reported a similar scheme in 1979 after he had collected the payment for the work his shipyard had performed and that he intended to do the same thing in the present case. His trial attorney noted particularly that the government failed to introduce any evidence or present the assistant United States attorney or any other witnesses to refute his client's claim that he had reported the 1979 incident to law enforcement officers after collecting the money for building the containers. 19 In response to this argument, the prosecutor remarked in his closing argument as follows: 20 The reason we didn't bring any evidence in one way or the other following, is because the Federal Rules of Criminal Evidence (sic) prohibit us from bringing in any witness on that particular item. 21 Vaglica's attorney promptly objected to the statement as contrary to law, but the court overruled the objection. Vaglica's attorney again protested that Rule 608 did not bar the admission of such evidence, but to no avail. 3 The prosecutor resumed his argument, remarking thatthe Government was limited to cross examining and taking whatever answer he gave us, but he did come in here and lie to you about a couple of things. 22 The plain import of this prosecution argument was that only because of the rules of evidence was the government unable to refute the testimony of Vaglica and his attorney that in 1979, similarly to Vaglica's lack of criminal intent in the present instance, Vaglica feigned agreement with a conspiracy in order to sell some containers, with the actual intent to inform law enforcement authorities of the conspiracy and to abort it as soon as he had been paid for his containers. Further, the argument implied that the government could have refuted this testimony, if the rules of evidence so permitted. 23 The district judge erred in refusing to sustain the defense objection to this prosecution argument and, by its ruling, agreed with the prosecutor's statement that the government was barred by the rules of evidence from refuting the testimony of the 1979 incident relied upon in Vaglica's defense. In the first place, the prosecutor's statement of the applicable law was erroneous, as the overruled defense objection stated. In the second place, the prosecution's argument impermissibly implied that the government possessed evidence not in the record. 24 The government argues that the prosecutor's statement in closing argument was both accurate and proper because Rule 608(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibited the government from introducing any extrinsic evidence to rebut Vaglica's claim. 4 While it is true that Rule 608(b) excludes extrinsic evidence offered for the purpose of attacking or supporting ... credibility, the extrinsic evidence at issue here would not have served merely to attack Vaglica's credibility, but also would have been relevant merit-testimony to rebut the merit-testimony of the defendant and his attorney as to the 1979 incident, on the material issue of the defendant's intent to join the present conspiracy. 25 The import of the defense testimony about the 1979 incident was to raise an issue about the defendant's present intent by showing his honest behavior in a similar incident. Thus, the 1979 incident became relevant evidence to the defendant's intent. Fed.R.Evid. 401, 402. 5 Nor did the government object to the relevance of either Vaglica's or his prior attorney's testimony about the events surrounding the 1979 incident. Further, even if the 1979-incident testimony were inadmissible, had objection been made, its introduction into evidence by the defendant opened the door as to its actual occurrence, insofar as bearing on the defendant's present intent, and the government was then entitled to produce evidence to rebut the defendant's claims about this earlier incident. McCormick on Evidence, Sec. 57 (2d ed. 1972). 26 The government's reliance upon Rule 608(b) as barring the introduction of such evidence is misplaced. The rule does not bar the admission of evidence introduced to contradict, and which the jury might find disproves, a witness's testimony as to a material issue of the case. United States v. Opager, 589 F.2d 799, 803 (5th Cir.1979). The rule is addressed against the use of specific incidents to prove a witness's capacity to lie. Id., 589 F.2d at 811. Writing for this court in Opager, (then Chief) Judge Brown stated: 27 We consider Rule 608(b) to be inapplicable in determining the admissibility of relevant evidence introduced to contradict a witness's testimony as to a material issue. So long as otherwise competent, such evidence is admissible. 28 Id., 589 F.2d at 802. 29 Since the defense testimony about the 1979 incident was relevant to a material issue in the case, the government would have been entitled to rebut the claim with any extrinsic evidence it may have had available to do so. Insofar as the prosecutor's closing remark suggests otherwise, it misstates the proper scope and application of Rule 608(b). 30 Moreover, Fed.R.Evid. 404(b) allows the admission of other extrinsic crimes, wrongs or acts when offered for the purpose of showing motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident. Vaglica testified about his conduct in the 1979 smuggling incident to raise a question before the jury as to his motive and intent in the present conspiracy. When intent and motive are thus challenged in a conspiracy case, the government may be entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence of prior acts, such as the 1979 incident, to overcome the defendant's denial of criminal intent. See United States v. Roberts, 619 F.2d 379, 381-84 (5th Cir.1980). Thus, had the government offered witnesses who would testify as to Vaglica's conduct in the 1979 incident for the purpose of establishing motive or intent rather than to attack Vaglica's credibility, the trial court would likely have been within its discretion in allowing the testimony. 31 As this analysis suggests, closing arguments about facts that have been omitted because of the rules of evidence present the trial judge with a serious dilemma. If an objection is raised that the statement is contrary to law, the trial court must engage in a speculative inquiry on the question of whether certain hypothetical evidence, which may not have even been proffered to the court, would have been admissible. Given the ephemeral nature of such an inquiry, it is difficult for a trial court to properly assess whether or not the evidence would have been inadmissible, especially where, as in the case here, the evidence may have been inadmissible for one purpose and admissible for another. 32 Another danger inherent in this style of closing argument is that such statements imply to the jury that evidence supporting the attorney's position exists but has not been introduced at trial. United States v. Morris, 568 F.2d 396, 401 (5th Cir.1978). As we stated in Morris, an attorney may not state that he could have called additional witnesses whose testimony would have supported his version of the case. Id., 568 F.2d at 401. 33 A similar situation was posed to this court in United States v. Diaz, 662 F.2d 713 (5th Cir.1981). In Diaz, the prosecutor stated in closing argument that the failure to discuss certain issues may very well be the result of the rules of evidence. Id., 662 F.2d at 717. After the defendant objected, the court promptly gave the jury a cautionary instruction not to consider the statement as evidence. We stated that in light of Morris, it appears that the prosecutor's comment, although merely responsive to the prior comment of defense counsel, may have been erroneous, id. at 717, although we ultimately found the error to be harmless under the circumstances present in the Diaz case. 34 In the present case, unlike Diaz, we cannot find the prosecutor's statement to be harmless error. Vaglica's defense centered upon his claim that he never intended to go through with the conspiracy. The primary evidence in support of his defense was his own testimony that he had aborted a similar conspiracy in 1979. The prosecutor's statement clearly suggested to the jury that the government had evidence to rebut or refute Vaglica's testimony about reporting a similar conspiracy in 1979, but that the Federal Rules of Evidence prevented the government from introducing that evidence. Even if the remark had been an accurate statement of the law, it encouraged the jury to assume that inadmissible evidence existed that would negate the thrust of Vaglica's defense. Thus, the jury was invited by the prosecutor's argument to infer that, but for the rules of evidence, the primary evidence in support of Vaglica's defense would have been discredited. Unlike Diaz, no cautionary instruction was given to the jury to attempt to cure the impact of the remark. 35 In summary, a prosecutorial argument that suggests to the jury that facts or witnesses could have been presented but for the rules of evidence requires the trial court to make a speculative determination about the admissibility of hypothetical evidence in the time-pressured atmosphere of closing arguments. Aside from the dangers of such speculative evidentiary rulings, such remarks--even if correct statements of the law--may improperly suggest to the jury that inadmissible evidence exists that bears against the defendant's case.