Opinion ID: 1155733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Challenge to Juror Williams

Text: Defendant asserts the court erred in failing to excuse for cause prospective juror Charles Williams, who indicated during voir dire his belief that persons such as defendant should be given the death penalty. Williams actually served as a juror in the case, despite the fact defendant retained one unused peremptory challenge following jury selection. Juror Williams initially stated on a jury questionnaire that, based on his reading of various news articles, defendant should be executed. When asked to elaborate, Williams stated that if defendant had indeed killed two persons as charged, he should be executed. Williams also stated, however, that he would consider a sentence of life imprisonment without parole if the mitigating circumstances warranted it, that he was capable of listening to the evidence and making my mind up on what is presented, and that he had an open mind regarding this case and could ignore what he had read in the paper about defendant's crimes. Williams also agreed there could be reasons why a premeditated murder would not deserve a death penalty, and that he could think of many types of such premeditated murder. When asked for an example, Williams replied that if a man killed the person who raped or killed his wife or daughter, I see no reason to execute him for that. When asked for other examples, Williams replied, They would be similar. The trial court denied defendant's challenge of Williams for cause on the basis that he had credibly expressed a willingness to consider any mitigating evidence. Defendant first contends the court may have mistakenly applied the automatic vote standard set forth in Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, footnote 21 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 785, 88 S.Ct. 1770], in appraising defendant's challenge to Williams. (9) Defendant contends that the correct test is found not in Witherspoon, supra, but in Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-852, 105 S.Ct. 844]. Under Witt, the juror must be excused if his views [on capital punishment] would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Ibid. ) We have indicated the foregoing test applies to jurors expressing views either opposing or favoring the death penalty. ( People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 764-765 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260].) The United States Supreme Court recently ruled that trial courts must permit specific voir dire inquiry as to whether a juror would automatically impose the death penalty without regard to the particular facts or instructions on law in the case. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. ___, ___ [119 L.Ed.2d 492, 112 S.Ct. 2222].) Citing both Witherspoon and Witt in support of its ruling, the high court indicated that Witt reflects the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror must be excused for cause because of his or her views favoring capital punishment. (504 U.S. at p. ___ [119 L.Ed.2d at p. 502].) In the present case, the court, in conducting its own voir dire, phrased some of its questions in terms of whether the prospective jurors would automatically vote for (or against) the death penalty regardless of the evidence. But the record also indicates the court would have denied defendant's challenge for cause under the Witt standard as well, based on Williams's willingness to consider the mitigating evidence in the case. Defendant argues that Juror Williams's views favoring the death penalty strongly indicated he would be prevented from performing his duties as a juror. The People suggest, however, that Williams's responses could be deemed conflicting or ambiguous, and therefore the trial court's determination regarding his true state of mind should be binding on us. (See, e.g. People v. Mason (1991) 52 Cal.3d 909, 954 [277 Cal. Rptr. 166, 802 P.2d 950], and cases cited.) Several of Williams's responses reflected his ability to weigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence. (10) But in light of the fact defendant failed to use his one remaining peremptory challenge to excuse Juror Williams, we need not resolve whether the court erred in failing to excuse that juror for cause. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 185 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949] [a party's failure to exercise available peremptory challenges indicates relative satisfaction with the unchallenged jurors. Having so indicated in this case, defendant cannot reasonably claim error.]; People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1248 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251]; People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087-1088 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659]; People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 768-770 [defendant must exercise and exhaust his peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who should have been excluded for cause]; but see People v. Box (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 461, 464-466 [199 Cal. Rptr. 532] [where defendant was improperly deprived of 16 peremptory challenges, his tactical reservation of only 1 of his allotted 10 challenges did not bar reversal].) Defendant speculates that trial counsel was reserving his remaining peremptory challenge in the event it became necessary to challenge a prospective juror with even more extreme views than Williams. But the fact remains that counsel expressed satisfaction with the jury selected (We accept the jury as presently constituted), without using his remaining peremptory challenge and without requesting additional challenges. In People v. Box, supra, 152 Cal. App.3d at page 465, relied on by defendant, the court observed that the proper practice is for trial counsel to express a timely on-the-record dissatisfaction with the jury at the time the jury is accepted so the reviewing court knows that in fact this was the situation at trial. ( Id. at p. 465, fn. 3.) Although the present case was tried several years after Box was decided, no such on-the-record statement was made herein. Leaving open the question whether Box correctly reversed the judgment despite the defendant's unexercised peremptory challenge, we conclude that, by expressing his satisfaction with the jury without exhausting such challenges or requesting additional challenges, defendant waived his right to complain about the court's failure to excuse Juror Williams for cause.