Opinion ID: 2058758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: contract choice of law

Text: The plaintiff, citing Morin v. Lemieux, 179 Conn. 501, 427 A.2d 397 (1980), contends that this court should apply the law of Connecticut, the place where the employment contract was made, to determine whether the court erred in denying her motion to strike the special defense. Although the contract choice of law rule is a certain one, easily applied, this approach would present several problems in determining whether an employee can properly avail herself of supplemental workers' compensation remedies such as the tort action against a third party provided by General Statutes § 31-293. First, such a rule would serve to preclude the successive incremental awards sanctioned by Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 100 S. Ct. 2647, 65 L. Ed. 2d 757 (1980); Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622, 67 S. Ct. 886, 91 L. Ed. 1140 (1947); Restatement (Second), 1 Conflict of Laws § 182, comment b; [3] Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 403; [4] 4 Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 85.60, pp. XX-XX-XX-XX; because the employment contract is typically made in only one jurisdiction. Where the contract was not made in Connecticut, remedies provided by the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act would not apply. Were all or even a substantial number of jurisdictions to adopt this approach, an employee's effort to maximize her compensation benefits and remedies would be frustrated because relief would be limited to that provided by the jurisdiction where the contract was made. A second problem encountered by this approach is the possibility that an employer can avoid the full extent of potential liability imposed by the Connecticut Workers' Compensation Act simply by making the contract elsewhere, even though all other incidents of employment, such as the place of performance, the employee's residence and the employer's place of business, are in Connecticut. In addition, jurisdictions which have adhered to the contract choice of law rule have become immersed in disputes over contract law to determine where the employment contract was made, disputes which bear no relationship to the purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act. As Professor Larson has stated: Probably the ultimate blame for these rather artificial arguments [to determine where the employment contract was made] and attempted evasions [to avoid the sometimes harsh results of the rule's application to the injured employee] rests on the unrealistic character of the place-of-contract test when construed to depend upon the sheer formality of being physically present in a particular geographical subdivision when a signature is scrawled or a word spoken into a telephone mouthpiece. There is nothing in this technicality of relevance to the choice of an appropriate statute for practical compensation purposes. 4 Larson, supra, § 87.39, pp. XX-XX-XX-XX. The contract choice of law approach is particularly inappropriate in an action such as this where there is no contract between the parties who are fellow employees.