Opinion ID: 1618117
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the evidence for appellant's first-degree pfo conviction was sufficient, but the jury instruction is a palpable error.

Text: Appellant next argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for being a first-degree persistent felony offender. This argument is unpreserved, and so we will review under our palpable error standard. RCr 10.26. He specifically cites two reasons for the purported insufficiency: (1) one of the prior offenses in the jury instruction was a misdemeanor, and (2) there was no proof of his age. Although the jury instruction was incorrect, the evidence was ample to support a first-degree PFO conviction. The jury instruction as tendered for the first-degree PFO charge instructed the jury that Appellant could be found guilty of being a first-degree PFO if it found beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things: That prior to April 16, 2006, the defendant was convicted of Attempt to Commit Third-degree Arson in case No. 93-CR-00007, by final judgment of the Allen Circuit Court entered on September 10, 1993; and That prior to April 16, 2006, the defendant was convicted of Theft by Unlawful Taking Over $300 in case No. 05-CR-00083, by final judgment of the Allen Circuit Court entered on February 9, 2006. Appellant correctly notes that attempt to commit third-degree arson is a Class A misdemeanor and not a felony. See KRS 506.010(4)(d) (attempt to commit a Class C or D felony like third-degree arson is a Class A misdemeanor). Hence, Appellant reasons that the jury could not convict him of being a first-degree PFO under this jury instruction because, as a matter of law, only one of the offenses identified therein was a felony. To prove the elements of the offense of PFO, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of the Allen Circuit Clerk. The clerk testified to Appellant's prior convictions. In addition to Appellant's more than twenty misdemeanor convictions, the clerk testified to Appellant's five prior felony convictions. Three of those felonies, plus the misdemeanor erroneously placed in the instructions, were contained in separate indictments but resulted in final judgments all entered in September 1993. Thus, for purposes of a PFO charge, those offenses constitute only one prior conviction. KRS 532.080(4). Those three felonies are: (1) third-degree arson (Indictment 92-CR-00052), (2) first-degree bail jumping (Indictment 93-CR-00033), and (3) receiving stolen property over $300 (Indictment 93-CR-00041). The misdemeanor conviction was case number 93-CR-00007. Any of the three felony convictions from September 1993 would qualify as one element of the PFO charge. On October 25, 1995, Appellant was convicted again of receiving stolen property over $300 (Indictment 95-CR-00009). That conviction stands as a second qualifying conviction for the PFO charges. Finally, Appellant was convicted on February 9, 2006, for the felony offense of theft by unlawful taking over $300 (Indictment 05-CR-00083). That conviction stands as a third qualifying conviction. Initially, the jury instructions for the PFO charge contained as elements of that crime only the latter two indictments. To be certain that the Appellant was, in fact, the same Danny Lee Carver named in each felony conviction, the clerk had testified to the birth date and social security number identifying the defendant on each case. All cases showed the same birth date; but one case, Indictment 95-CR-00009, showed a social security number (XXX-X0-XXX0) with two digits different from all the others (XXX-X2-XXX2). With very little discussion and no objection, that felony conviction was removed from the jury instructions; and one of the four convictions from September 1993 was inserted. Although any of the September 1993 felony convictions could have been selected, attempted third-degree arson was chosen. As was later realized, that offense is actually a misdemeanor. Appellant next argues that the first-degree PFO conviction should be overturned because the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior felony offenses were committed when Appellant was over the age of eighteen. At trial, the Commonwealth presented the date of the final convictions for each of the felonies but failed to present any evidence of the date on which the crimes were committed. Evidence was presented, however, that Appellant was born in 1957 and that most of the felony convictions occurred in the 1990s. In Martin v. Commonwealth, 13 S.W.3d 232 (Ky.1999), it was held that a reasonable inference made by the jury on a necessary element satisfies the requirements of the PFO statute. Id. at 235, overruling Hon v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.2d 851 (Ky.1984). A reasonable inference... is a process of reasoning by which a proposition is deduced as a logical consequence from other facts already proven. Id. In this matter, the jury was given the birth date of the Appellant and the dates of the convictions for the felonies. The jury could make a reasonable inference that since Appellant turned eighteen in 1975 that he likely committed at least two of these felonies after that date since the prosecution for the felonies did not occur until the 1990s. There is no error or palpable error here. Although we reject Appellant's argument that there was insufficient evidence to prove his age, we conclude that his first-degree PFO conviction must be reversed because of the erroneous jury instruction that listed a misdemeanor as a qualifying felony conviction. We believe that palpable error occurred because of (1) the improper inclusion of a misdemeanor as a qualifying conviction in the PFO instruction; (2) our presumption that erroneous jury instructions are prejudicial, Harp v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 813, 818 (Ky. 2008); and (3) the fact that Carver was assessed the maximum possible penalty. When a jury is accepted to try a case, it must swear to try the case in accordance with the evidence and the law. The evidence comes from the witness stand; the law comes from the court through the instructions. Here, under the instructions of the trial court, the jury found Appellant guilty of being a persistent felony offender in the first degree under an instruction that establishes the elements only for a persistent felony offender in the second degree. In other words, the jury found beyond a reasonable doubt only that Appellant had one prior misdemeanor and one prior felony. There is no question that Appellant could qualify as a first-degree persistent felony offender. Moreover, there is no doubt that there was ample evidence presented at trial for him to have been convicted accordingly, had the jury been properly instructed. Nevertheless, the jury was instructed on a prior misdemeanor and a prior felony, as opposed to two prior felonies. It was upon this instruction that Appellant was convicted. Facts are stubborn things. No amount of explanation or evidence at trial can change this indisputable truth. A duly selected and properly sworn jury found by unanimous verdict that Appellant had been convicted of attempt to commit third-degree arson, a misdemeanor, and theft by unlawful taking over $300.00, a felony. Such an instruction would permit finding Appellant to be a second-degree persistent felony offender. However, we, as an appellate court, cannot affirm a conviction for a status greater than that which the jury instructions would permit. It is unreasonable for a jury to convict an individual without properly having been instructed as to the elements of the crime. In Harper v. Commonwealth, this Court held that failure to instruct the jury on the element of intent in a charge for complicity was reversible error. 43 S.W.3d 261, 263-64 (Ky.2001). Similarly, in Varble v. Commonwealth, this Court reversed a conviction for manufacturing methamphetamine because the jury had actually been instructed on the lesser offense of possession of drug paraphernalia. 125 S.W.3d 246, 255 (Ky.2004). Other courts have also recognized that a conviction cannot stand if the jury instructions did not include an essential element of the offense. [1] These cases illustrate the necessary recourse when the jury is not instructed fully as to the elements of the crime at handreversal and remand. Accordingly, reversal of the PFO issue is required; and we would remand for a new trial of the PFO only. A retrial on the PFO conviction seems to be a small price to pay to protect the integrity of our jury instructions. Because we now reverse Appellant's PFO conviction and remand for new PFO proceedings and any other proceedings consistent with this opinion, all other arguments regarding the appropriateness of his enhanced sentence are now rendered moot.