Opinion ID: 1140311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Lower Court Erred in Refusing to Grant Defendant's Jury Instruction on Circumstantial Evidence.

Text: In assignment of error number one, McNeal argues that the trial court was in error in not granting a jury instruction on circumstantial evidence. The current rule in this state is that this instruction must only be given where the prosecution can produce neither an eyewitness nor a confession to the offense charged. See Clark v. State, 503 So.2d 277 (Miss. 1987); Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 267 (Miss. 1985). The rule set out in Keys was recently modified to include unwritten verbal admissions made to any lay witness. In Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793, 795 (Miss. 1985), we held: The Reed Court [ Reed v. State, 229 Miss. 440, 91 So.2d 269 (1956)] defined an admission as a statement by the accused  it may be direct or implied  of facts pertinent to the issue and tendings in connection with other facts to prove his guilt [sic.: Mack mis-quotes Reed ].... Direct evidence of the crime is the evidence of an eyewitness that it was committed. This includes in criminal law the confessions and admissions of the accused and dying declarations... . In the case at bar, the trial judge relied heavily on Mack v. State, supra , in his decision not to grant McNeals' circumstantial evidence jury instruction. The trial judge found that Freddie Suttles, a convicted felon, provided direct evidence of McNeal's guilt. As stated in the facts, Suttles testified that McNeal freely admitted killing his wife, Darlene, as well as giving full details of the subsequent coverup. Due to the uncertainty of Freddie Suttles' source for his facts (newspaper or McNeal), we strongly question the reliability of testimony which was given in exchange for a reduced sentence. The testimony of jail-house informants, or snitches, is becoming an increasing problem in this state, as well as throughout the American criminal justice system. The present case is one of many across the nation where the truthfulness of the informant has been called into question. Informants, like Freddie Suttles, are offering evidence against their fellow inmates in exchange for reduced sentences. In the process of reaping their benefit, they are manipulating the system by helping to convict innocent citizens. See Curriden, No Honor Among Thieves, ABA Journal, June 1989, at 51. [2] The trustworthiness of such a witness has been addressed by this Court in the recent past. In Barnes v. State, 460 So.2d 126 (Miss. 1984), the main state witness against Barnes was Arthur Ray Moody. On appeal, Barnes assigned as error that the trial court unduly limited his inquiry into what may have motivated Moody to give testimony against Barnes. The state's case rested primarily on Moody's testimony. Moody believed that in exchange for his testimony, he would be given help. This Court stated: How the jury might regard Moody's credibility upon knowing that he had been promised some help on his case, on the one hand, and how the jury might react if it heard testimony that he had been promised immunity from prosecution altogether, on the other hand, are as a matter of commonsense so substantially different that the State's harmless error point is seen without merit. All of this is particularly true in view of the fact that Moody is the sort of witness whose testimony ought generally be viewed with caution and suspicion even in the absence of any proof of a leniency/immunity agreement. Barnes, 460 So.2d at 132. The point in Barnes is that testimony of a state's witness who has received a reduced sentence to testify should be regarded with caution and suspicion. It is doubtful that such testimony should be considered as direct evidence which would prevent the granting of a circumstantial evidence instruction; however, we do not decide that question here, nor is it necessary, because we find merit and reverse under assignment of error number IV.