Opinion ID: 901911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Were the Security Guards Government Actors?

Text: [¶21.] Given that the exclusionary rule applies to the Indian Civil Rights Act, we next must determine whether the Tribe was engaged in exercising powers of self government as it pertains to Long Crow and the security guards when they conducted the search of Madsen's hotel suite. In the alternative, Madsen argues that Long Crow and his security guards were agents of local law enforcement. If the answer to either of these inquires is yes, then we must reverse and remand the matter to the trial court. [¶22.] Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity. Indian Gaming Regulation, 25 USC § 2701(5) (1988). For purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulation, Indian lands are defined as (A) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation; and (B) any lands title to which is either held in trust by the United States for the benefit of any Indian tribe or individual or held by any Indian tribe or individual subject to restriction by the United States against alienation and over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power. 25 USC § 2703(4). [¶23.] According to the record below, the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe operates its casino under the provisions of the Indian Gaming Regulation on trust land. The State's supplemental materials provided after oral arguments included a Gaming Compact between the Tribe and the State of South Dakota that substantiates that fact. As such, it is the Tribe's responsibility to conduct its gaming operations in compliance with Indian Gaming Regulation, which requires, among other things, adequate security measures and personnel. Indian Gaming Regulation, 25 USC § 2710(b)(E)  (F). The Flandreau Santee Sioux Gaming Commission's internal regulations detail the functions of its security department: 1. The Security people are responsible for the safety and protection of casino transactions giving support to the employees and ensuring guests of fair play. (See [Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribal Gaming Commission] (FSSTGC) Regulations, Section 1300, General 1300.15). 2. The Security Director shall employ and engage such Security personnel as may be reasonably necessary to insure the reasonable safety and security of the casino/Motel Complex and its guests and employees and of the monies incident to managing and operating the same at all times. 3. Protection from and elimination of any element or agent which jeopardizes the welfare and security of the casino's property, patrons and employees. [¶24.] The Casino has implemented policies and procedures to assist security guards with maintaining compliance with the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribal Gaming Commission's internal regulations, and ensuring casino operations are conducted fairly, cash accounted for accurately, and removing any agent from the property who presents a security risk. In addition to duties pertaining to casino operations, security guards also provides safety and security services at the Tribe's adjacent hotel property. The Casino's policies and procedures state that security guards are not permitted to search a casino guest or a guest's hotel room, or to conduct an arrest. Instead, security guards may detain guests suspected of criminal conduct and contact local law enforcement officers who will determine and conduct any arrest or search that may be necessary. Based on these facts, regulations, policies and procedures, we conclude that the security guards were employed by the Tribe in its exercise of powers of self government as it relates to its lawful operation of its gaming operation under Indian Gaming Regulation, 25 USC § 2701 et al. [4] [¶25.] The State argues that the security guards were acting as private citizens rather than agents of the Tribe in carrying out their duties. The State cites to Ramirez, 148 CalApp4th at 1471 n8, in support of its argument that the exclusionary rule cannot apply to Long Crow and the security guards because they were not tribal officers, but rather were employed as private security guards at the casino. The holding in Ramirez is not as narrow as the State suggests in its brief. Ramirez does not stand for the proposition that the exclusionary rule applies only to violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act by tribal officers, or as the State contends specifically to violations by tribal law enforcement officers. Ramirez stands for the proposition that the exclusionary rule applies to violations of the Indian Civil Rights Act by tribal governments. The Ramirez court also specifically rejected the very argument advanced by the State in the instant case: we reject the People's argument that `with respect to non-Indians, tribal officers have essentially the same status as security guards who patrol their employers' premises.' Ramirez, 148 CalApp4th at 1471 n8. [¶26.] Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures has never been limited exclusively to the conduct of law enforcement officers. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 US 67, 767-7, 121 SCt 1281, 1287-88, 149 LEd2d 205 (2001) (holding that employees of a state run hospital were government actors subject to the strictures of the Fourth Amendment when conducting urine screenings for cocaine use on pregnant mothers without informed consent for purposes of criminal prosecution); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 US 325, 335-37, 105 SCt 733, 739-40, 83 LEd2d 720 (1985) (holding searches of student lockers by public school officials was government action subject to Fourth Amendment reasonableness standards). The reasonableness restraint is imposed on `government action' that is, `upon the activities of sovereign authority.' T.L.O., 469 US at 335, 105 SCt at 739, 83 LEd2d 720 (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 US 465, 475, 41 SCt 574, 576, 65 LEd 1048 (1921)). Hence, the Fourth Amendment is applicable to the activities of both civil and criminal authorities. Id. (holding public school officials subject to Fourth Amendment limits) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 US 523, 528, 87 SCt 1727, 1730, 18 LEd2d 930 (1967) (holding building inspectors subject to the Fourth Amendment standards); Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 US 307, 312-13, 98 SCt 1816, 1820, 56 LEd2d 305 (1978) (holding Occupational Safety and Health Act inspectors subject to Fourth Amendment standards); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 US 499, 506, 98 SCt 1942, 1948, 56 LEd2d 486 (1978) (firemen entering privately owned premises to battle fire subject to Fourth Amendment standards)). [¶27.] Like the hospital staff of the state run hospital in Ferguson, and the public school officials in T.L.O., Long Crow and the security guards were Tribal government actors by virtue of their status as employees of the Tribal casino operation, a distinctly Tribal governmental operation by virtue of Indian Gaming Regulation, 25 USC § 2701(5). While it is undisputed that Long Crow and the security guards were not employed by the Tribe as law enforcement officers, they were employed in a civil capacity to provide safety and security services for the gaming operation on Tribal land. As such, their actions when conducting searches and seizures were subject to the constraints of the Fourth Amendment, including the exclusionary rule, as embodied in the Indian Civil Rights Act , 25 USC § 1302(2). [¶28.] This becomes even clearer under the holding in Becerra-Garcia, 397 F3d 1167. In that case, tribal officials with the title of tribal rangers were charged with the task of patrolling reservation land for trespassers. Id. at 1169. The tribal rangers lacked authority to stop suspicious vehicles, were not cross deputized by local law enforcement, and were without authority to conduct searches on the reservation. Id. at 1169-70. The only authority the tribal rangers had was to identify suspicious vehicles and make reports to tribal law enforcement officers, as trespassing was a significant problem on the reservation. Id. Tribal rangers spotted Becerra-Garcia's van on a remote dirt road on the reservation within a few weeks of reports of suspicious vehicles in the area. Id. at 1170. The tribal rangers approached Becerra-Garcia's van from the rear, and engaged their hazard lights. Id. Becerra-Garcia stopped his vehicle and after failing to communicate with the tribal rangers in either English or Spanish, Becerra-Garcia motioned the rangers toward the van. Id. Upon approaching the van, the tribal rangers saw twenty individuals who appeared to be illegal aliens in the back of the van. Id. The tribal rangers held Becerra-Garcia until tribal law enforcement arrived and conducted an arrest. Id. At the trial court level, Becerra-Garcia's motion to suppress all evidence discovered as a result of the stop was denied. Becerra-Garcia appealed. Id. [¶29.] On appeal, Becerra-Garcia argued that the tribal rangers were acting in the capacity of private citizens and not as government actors due to their lack of authority to stop cars on the reservation. Id. at 1171. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held the argument while creative, misses the mark. Id. at 1172. The test was not whether the tribal rangers were without law enforcement authority. Id. Rather, the test was whether the tribal rangers were government actors under the three-part test in United States v. Reed, 15 F3d 928, 931 (9thCir 1994). Id. The test was (1) whether the government, in this case the tribal government represented by tribal law enforcement, knew of and acquiesced in the tribal rangers' activities, (2) whether the tribal rangers intended to assist tribal government, and (3) whether the tribal rangers acted to further the ends of tribal government rather than the tribal rangers' own ends. Id. (citing Reed, 15 F3d at 931 (citing United States v. Miller, 688 F2d 652, 657 (9thCir 1982))). That court concluded that the function of the tribal rangers was to assist the tribal police department and the United States Border Patrol by monitoring remote areas of the reservation, and that both government agencies were aware of the tribal rangers' purpose and activities. Id. Furthermore, the tribal rangers stopped Becerra-Garcia to enforce the criminal trespass laws of the tribal nation, not for their own personal benefit. Id. Thus, that court held the tribal rangers were government actors and subject to the constraints of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Id. [¶30.] The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also noted that the tribal rangers exceeded the scope of their authority, as testified to by the tribal rangers involved in the stop, when they initiated the stop of Becerra-Garcia's van. Id. at 1173. Despite that fact, that court also held the constraints of the Indian Civil Rights Act applied, as the rangers' authority under tribal law [was] not the linchpin for determining the admissibility of the evidence obtained as a result of the stop. Id. at 1173. Despite lacking Tribal authority to make the traffic stop, that court held that the stop was reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment because the rangers had reasonable articulable suspicion to investigate Becerra-Garcia for criminal trespass. [5] Id. at 1174-75. That court declined to adopt Becerra-Garcia's argument that a bright-line rule should be adopted for determining reasonableness: that a stop is automatically unreasonable if the officers lacked authority to conduct the seizure. Id. at 1175. Instead, that court adhered to the rule that reasonableness must be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than by a bright-line rule. Id. (citing Terry, 392 US at 17, 20-21, 88 SCt 1868, 20 LEd2d 889 (rejecting a `rigid all-or-nothing model of justification and regulation under the [Fourth] Amendment' in favor of a flexible model that considers the scope of the intrusion and its justification); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States , 282 US 344, 357, 51 SCt 153, 75 LEd 374 (1931) (`There is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances')). [¶31.] Thus, in the instant case, the issue is not determined by whether Long Crow and the security guards exceeded the boundaries of their authority to conduct searches under the Flandreau Santee Sioux Gaming Commission's rules and regulations. Instead, we are guided by the legal conclusion that Long Crow and the security guards were government actors charged by the Tribe with the safety and security of the casino and hotel operation. The Tribe, through the Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribal Gaming Commission, knew of the security guards' policies and procedures. Furthermore, Long Crow testified he conducted the search in order to protect casino and hotel property, and not for his own purposes. The security guards, therefore, were Tribal government agents whose conduct was limited by the constraints of the Indian Civil Rights Act. [¶32.] Because we hold that the security guards were Tribal government actors, we do not need to address Madsen's alternative argument that Long Crow and the security guards were also agents of local law enforcement. However, the circuit court never addressed the reasonableness of the search and whether the consent given by Carter to Long Crow to enter and search the hotel suite was valid. [¶33.] We remand the matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The circuit court is directed to use Fourth Amendment case law for guidance as to whether the search by Long Crow and the security guards was reasonable under the circumstances. Reversed and remanded. [¶34.] KONENKAMP, ZINTER, and MEIERHENRY, Justices, and SABERS, Retired Justice, concur.