Opinion ID: 2376581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: counterclaim for monies received by appellee

Text: Appellant is a veteran who, at the time of the marriage, was receiving disability payments from the Veterans Administration. After the birth of the child, appellee wrote a letter, in appellant's name, to the Veterans Administration giving notice of the birth of the child and seeking a dependent's allowance. As a result, the Veterans Administration made an increased payment for the support of appellee and the child. In his counterclaim, appellant included a prayer that the trial judge decree a constructive trust for all the moneys and other benefits received by [appellee] based on her purported marriage to [appellant] and requested an accounting. The trial judge ruled (1) that he did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this prayer and (2) that, even if the court had jurisdiction, he would not consider the claim to be a meritorious one. He also refused to hear any evidence on the merits of appellant's claim. The Domestic Relations Branch of the Court of General Sessions has exclusive jurisdiction over determinations and adjudications of property rights, both real and personal, in any action listed in § 11-1141 D.C.Code, 1967, [4] including actions for annulment of marriages. Williams v. Williams, 120 U.S.App.D.C. 327, 330, 346 F. 2d 808, 811 (1965), and cases cited therein. Appellant's prayer for a constructive trust is an attempt to recover funds belonging to him which came into appellee's possession during the course of their marriage. It is clearly the kind of action over which the Domestic Relations Branch has jurisdiction, and the trial judge should have allowed appellant the opportunity to offer competent evidence in proof thereof. Without hearing the evidence, the trial judge had no basis for rejecting appellant's claim. We do not intimate any opinion as to the merits of this prayer or what monies received by appellee may be subject to a constructive trust and should be accounted for and paid to appellant. We hold only that the trial judge should have received relevant evidence on this issue. We therefore remand this question for consideration and decision after the taking of testimony from both parties. For reasons set forth in this opinion, we order (1) that the judgment of annulment heretofore rendered in favor of appellee, Lucy P. Martin, shall be set aside and awarded instead to appellant, Andrew D. Martin; (2) that such judgment of annulment shall contain no references to the paternity or legitimacy of the minor child; (3) that the award of custody of the minor child shall be vacated; and (4) that the trial judge shall conduct a hearing on the merits of appellant's prayer for a constructive trust over the monies allegedly belonging to appellant and received by appellee, and if the evidence adduced so warrants, the trial judge shall direct appellee to make an accounting and to pay over such monies as may be due appellant.