Opinion ID: 2361257
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: TV Estoppel

Text: Appellants argue for their next point that Foxglen Associates and Hart knew that the southernmost patio home lot was being sold, and they said nothing about their intention to resume use of the Southern Drive. The appellants assert that this silence estops Foxglen Associates and Hart from breaking their silence at such a late date, after the patio home had been sold to Riley and residence in the home has been established. Equitable estoppel requires that an innocent person be misled to his or her detriment, so that it would be inequitable to permit the person estopped to change an original position. Exchange Bank & Trust Co. v. Gibbons, 228 Ark. 454, 307 S.W.2d 877 (1957). In order to prove estoppel, the party asserting the defense must prove the following elements: (1) the party to be estopped knew the facts; (2) the party to be estopped intended that the conduct be acted on; (3) the party asserting the estoppel was ignorant of the facts; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel relied on the other's conduct and was injured by that reliance. Bedford v. Fox, 333 Ark. 509, 970 S.W.2d 251 (1998); Foote's Dixie Dandy Inc. v. McHenry, 270 Ark. 816, 607 S.W.2d 323 (1980). See also Parker v. Parker, 75 Ark.App. 90, 55 S.W.3d 773 (2001). The conduct of the party to be estopped may consist of declarations or admissions, or failure to act or speak. American Cas. Co. v. Hambleton, 233 Ark. 942, 349 S.W.2d 664 (1961). The second element of estoppel has been alternatively stated as follows: The person to be estopped must intend that his conduct shall be acted on or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it is so intended. Foote's Dixie Dandy Inc. v. McHenry, supra . The chancery court determined that equitable estoppel would not pertain in this case because Foxglen Associates and Hart were strangers to the transaction for the sale of the patio home that occurred between Riley on the one hand and Bradley and Lile on the other. The chancery court is correct. Foxglen Associates and Hart were not parties to the sale of the patio home to Riley. Yet, the appellants argue that the second element was met because Foxglen Associates and Hart intended by their silence to induce Riley to buy the patio home. This argument requires this court to speculate unduly. There is nothing in the record to show that the appellees (1) knew of the specific pending transaction between Riley and Bradley and Lile, (2) deliberately held their tongues as to the past use of the Southern Drive, and (3) did so with the intent of inducing Riley to buy the patio home property from Bradley and Lile. Were we to subscribe to the appellants' theory that Foxglen Associates and Hart intended reliance on their silence, we would be engaging in rank conjecture. We decline to extend the doctrine of equitable estoppel to the facts of this case.