Opinion ID: 49389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pinson’s Title VII Claims

Text: On appeal, Pinson asserts that the district court erred and committed manifest injustice by concluding that his employment records were not maintained in the state of Georgia. He notes, for the first time on appeal, that one document within his employment records was forwarded to a Georgia address, which shows that his files were maintained in Georgia. Moreover, he alleges, even if the district 11 court was not the proper forum for his Title VII claim, his constitutional and civil rights claims should not be preempted by Title VII venue concerns. He also maintains that venue can be established in Georgia under 28 U.S.C. § 1391, the general federal venue statute. We review the dismissal of a lawsuit for improper venue for abuse of discretion. Home Ins. Co. v. Thomas Indus., Inc., 896 F.2d 1352, 1355 (11th Cir. 1990). Title VII’s venue provision states, in relevant part, that the appropriate venue for Title VII claims is: any judicial district in the State in which the unlawful employment practice is alleged to have been committed, in the judicial district in which the employment records relevant to such practice are maintained and administered, or in the judicial district in which the aggrieved person would have worked but for the alleged unlawful employment practice, but if the respondent is not found within any such district, such an action may be brought within the judicial district in which the respondent has his principal office. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3). The venue provisions of § 2000e-5(f)(3) were intended to be the exclusive venue provisions for Title VII employment discrimination actions and that the more general provisions of § 1391 are not controlling in such cases. Stebbins v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 413 F.2d 1100, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam). The plaintiff has the burden of showing that venue in the forum is proper. See Home Ins. Co., 896 F.2d at 1355. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that 12 Pinson’s claims were filed in an improper venue. Pinson did not introduce any evidence demonstrating, and, thus, did not meet his burden to establish, that the Northern District of Georgia was the location where his personnel records were maintained by an official custodian, where the alleged adverse employment actions occurred, or where he would have worked, but for an unlawful employment practice. Although Pinson argues that he maintained his personnel records in Georgia, Pinson’s records are not officially administered here, for purposes of Title VII’s venue provisions, § 2000e-5(f)(3). Moreover, because Title VII claims are governed by § 2000e-5(f)(3), and these venue provisions set forth the exclusive venues for Title VII claims, the proper venue for Pinson’s other claims is irrelevant to this inquiry.
Pinson argues on appeal that he did not waive his right to pursue his Title VII claims in the district court by appealing the MSPB’s decision to the Federal Circuit. He alleges that he did not check the section of the “Statement Concerning Discrimination” indicating that he waived his discrimination claims. He contends that the MSPB expressly waived its jurisdiction to hear his discrimination claims, and, thus, he could not have waived the claims by appealing the MSPB’s decision. Pinson maintains that not all Title VII claims related to security clearance 13 revocation are non-justiciable. He also argues that, because the Federal Circuit did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to hear his discrimination claims, he should be permitted to bring his suit before the district court and that he did not intend to waive his discrimination claims by indicating on his “Statement Concerning Discrimination” that he had no such claims. “[T]he decision whether to transfer a case is left to the sound discretion of the district court and is reviewable only for an abuse of that discretion.” Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. La Quinta Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 985 (11th Cir. 1982). Under § 1406(a), “[t]he district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong . . . district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district . . . in which it could have been brought.” 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a). We have found such transfers required only in the limited situation when a party was directed by a government official to file in the incorrect court and the case was time-barred by the time it was dismissed. ITT Base Servs. v. Hickson, 155 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 1998); Slatick v. Director, OWCP, U.S. Dept. of Labor, 698 F.2d 433, 434 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam). Generally, a federal employee seeking review of certain specified adverse employment actions, or those employment actions in conjunction with his discrimination claims, must proceed under the rules and regulations enacted 14 pursuant to the CSRA. See Doyal v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1526, 1535-36 (11th Cir. 1985); McAdams v. Reno, 64 F.3d 1137, 1141-42 (8th Cir. 1995); 5 U.S.C. §§ 7701(a), 7702(a)(1). The CSRA provides for the creation of the MSPB, an “independent, quasi-judicial federal administrative agency established to review civil service decisions.” McAdams, 64 F.3d at 1141; see 5 U.S.C. § 1204. The MSPB has jurisdiction to entertain specific adverse employment actions affecting federal employees, including demotions, suspensions, and terminations. See Chappell v. Chao, 388 F.3d 1373, 1375 (11th Cir. 2004) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 7512). A federal employee who is terminated and also alleges discrimination in violation of Title VII presents a “mixed case” that may be appealed directly to the MSPB. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 7702(a)(1)(A) and (B)(i). “Although the MSPB does not have jurisdiction over discrimination claims that are not related to adverse actions, it can entertain appeals in ‘mixed cases,’ where an employee alleges a Title VII violation in relation to one of the specified adverse employment actions.” Chappell, 388 F.3d at 1375. Once the MSPB enters its final order with respect to a mixed case, the federal employee is advised that he can (1) waive the discrimination claims and file a petition for review of the adverse employment action in the Federal Circuit; (2) obtain additional administrative review of his discrimination claims in the EEOC; 15 or (3) file a complaint in an appropriate district court raising both his discrimination and adverse employment claims. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7702(a)(3), 7703(a) and (b). If the employee elects to file a petition for review in the Federal Circuit, he must complete a “Statement Concerning Discrimination,” pursuant to Fed. Cir. Loc. R. 15(c). Local Rule 15(c) sets forth the contents of the form that the petitioner must complete, including an acknowledgment that he either abandons any claims of discrimination or that such claims are not among those for which he is seeking review. Fed. Cir. Loc. R. 15(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii); see R1-19 at 8, Exh. A. In Chappel, we explained that a federal employee who wants to preserve both discrimination and non-discrimination claims after a final order from the MSPB must do so by bringing all his related claims in federal district court. . . . [A]n employee who chooses to appeal an adverse action to the Federal Circuit waives his right to pursue not only any discrimination claims he waived before the MSPB, but also any other discrimination claims arising out of the same facts. 388 F.3d at 1378. In this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), that the interests of justice did not warrant the transfer of Pinson’s claims to another judicial district. It is undisputed that Pinson appealed the MSPB’s adverse decision to the Federal Circuit. By electing to appeal the decision to the Federal Circuit, Pinson waived his ability to pursue the 16 discrimination claims he raised before the MSPB and any other discrimination claims arising from the same facts to any federal district court. See Chappell, 388 F.3d at 1378. Because there is no federal district court in which Pinson could bring his Title VII claims, the district court did not err in determining that the interests of justice did not warrant a transfer of the suit to another judicial district.