Opinion ID: 2595269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Theta Lester's Letter

Text: [¶ 14] As set out more fully above, husband's grandmother made gifts of real property to the parties. At trial, husband offered as evidence a letter purportedly written by Theta Lester. The letter is not dated and reads as follows: I Theta H. Lester gifted and deeded land to my grandson Michael D. Odegard and his wife Brenda K. Odegard with the intention that it would not be sold or divided. It was also my intention that Brenda would not get any of the land in case of divorce. Her name was added as an estate planning tool to allow for a larger gift. The district court declined to admit the letter as evidence. It is agreed by both parties that the letter constitutes hearsay evidence and is in the nature of parol evidence. The admission of evidence, including the admission of hearsay, is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb evidentiary rulings unless a clear abuse of discretion is demonstrated. Young v. HAC, LLC, 2001 WY 50, ¶ 6, 24 P.3d 1142, ¶ 6 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 15] Husband contends that the letter was admissible because it met the requirements of W.R.E. 804(b)(6) (also see W.R.E 803(24)): Rule 804. Hearsay exceptions; declarant unavailable. .... (b) Hearsay Exceptions.The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: .... (6) Other Exceptions.A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. Although the letter may have had some marginal utility as evidence of a material fact, the deeds signed by Lester were unequivocal and were the most probative evidence on point. Moreover, the letter lacked the requisite circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. In addition to the fact that the letter was not dated, husband conceded that he wrote the body of the letter, and his grandmother signed it. The record bears out the district court's conclusion that Lester knew what she was doing, and the consequences of those gifts and the deeds should be taken at face value, i.e., that the gifts were marital property. See Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1086 (Wyo.1999) (extrinsic evidence not admissible to contradict plain meaning of terms used). The district court did not err in disallowing the letter as evidence contradicting Theta Lester's gifts. Failure to Consider Condition in Which the Parties Will be Left by the Divorce [¶ 16] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 20-2-114 requires that the district court consider the condition in which the parties will be left by the divorce. The district court made a specific finding in this regard, noting that husband would continue to have a substantially higher income than wife, who works as a bank employee. In 2000, the parties enjoyed an adjusted gross income of over $300,000.00, most of which will continue to go to husband. [¶ 17] Husband contends that the Recluse Place is an integral part of the family ranching operation and will work a hardship on him. Perhaps more to the point, because no hardship to husband is evident in the record, he contends that, [i]n one devastating blow, the District Court ended a tradition in the Odegard family ranch being passed down to the boys. Giving [wife] the Recluse place effectively took out 3,735 acres of ranching land out of the family. The ruling may have ruined her son[s'] chances at becoming ... rancher[s] as well. As we have noted above, the property division was equitable in all respects, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in fashioning a division that provided some security for wife in the form of the Recluse Place. However, it is significant that husband ignores that wife specifically testified that she intended to pass on the ranch to the boys, who were her sons too, and the likelihood of them continuing in the ranch business does not appear any less likely with the ranch in wife's hands, than it was when in husband's hands.