Opinion ID: 2389521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: General Duty Clause

Text: Neither the general duty clause nor any other aspect of VOSHA has been construed by this Court to date. However, several federal circuit courts of appeals have interpreted OSHA and, in particular, OSHA's general duty clause. Although not binding upon us, we find these federal appellate court decisions instructive in light of the genesis of VOSHA and the substantial similarity between the two acts. In order to sustain a general duty clause violation, the Commissioner must establish that the employer (1) failed to render his place of employment free of a hazard that was (2) recognized and (3) causing or likely to cause death or significant physical harm. The hazard under consideration here is the obviously dangerous activity of working with and around high voltage energized electrical wires without adequate protective cover. Since the parties agree that there was inadequate protective cover on the pole for the protection of Bagalio, there is no question that there is a hazard in this case. There is also no dispute that such a hazard is likely to cause death or significant physical harm. Although no injury whatsoever is necessary to establish a causal nexus between the hazard and the likelihood of death or significant physical harm, Bagalio's instantaneous electrocution in this case is demonstrative of the potentiality for serious physical harm while working near energized wires without adequate protective covering. Is this hazard which is likely to cause death or significant physical harm a recognized hazard? The federal courts have given this term various interpretations. It has been held that a hazard is recognized if the employer has actual knowledge of the hazard. Brennan v. OSHRC (Vy Lactos Laboratories, Inc.), 494 F.2d 460, 464 (8th Cir. 1974). It also has been stated that a hazard is recognized if the hazard is known to the industry as a whole, even though the employer is unaware of the activity's potentiality for harm. National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 141, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n. 32 (1973); see Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Division), 502 F.2d 946 (3d Cir. 1974). And the First Circuit has suggested that an appropriate test for establishing a recognized hazard would be whether a reasonably prudent man familiar with the circumstances of the industry would have protected against the hazard. Cape & Vineyard Division v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975). We need not adopt any one interpretation, however, because the evidence here is sufficient to establish a recognized hazard under any construction of the term. The evidence below clearly established that both GMP and the industry in general took the hazard in question seriously enough to formulate a specific safety rule of covering all wires within reach of a working employee. These safety rules certainly show their awareness of the hazard. Cf. Cape & Vineyard Division v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1154 (1st Cir. 1975). Indeed, even though the lower court held that an uncovered energized line is not a `recognized' hazard, GMP does not seem to dispute the Commissioner's contention on appeal that working near energized wires without adequate protective cover is a recognized hazard within the meaning of the general duty clause. The primary issue then is whether GMP furnished its employee a place of employment which was free of the recognized hazard. It is undisputed that GMP has a good over-all safety program. The company's safety policy of covering all wires within reach of a lineman is a reasonable policy and one generally adopted in the industry. But it is also GMP's policy that all safety determinations with regard to protective covering are to be made by the lineman first class, even when he is under the immediate supervision of a foreman. Did GMP make its workplace free of the recognized hazard by issuing adequate safety instructions, or was GMP also under an affirmative duty to see to it that those instructions were implemented? Though a literal reading might suggest otherwise, the general duty clause does not impose an absolute duty on employers to render their workplaces free of recognized hazards. Two factors militate against a standard of absolute liability. First, the preventative and deterrent nature of VOSHA indicates the duty is to be an achievable one. VOSHA is intended to force employers to take action against preventable injuries and deaths. See 21 V.S.A. § 210(a)(4). Compare General Meat Co., 1971-1973 Occ.S. & H.Dec. (CCH) ¶ 15,098 (June 20, 1972) with 21 V.S.A. § 201(c). Its purpose is not to compensate injured employees, and it does not affect workmen's compensation laws in any manner. 21 V.S.A. § 222(a)(2). The penalties that may be imposed under the Act, which are collected by the state, exist to deter violations of the Act and to compel abatement or correction of hazardous conditions or activities. A hazard consisting of unforeseen employee misconduct cannot be completely eliminated. A demented, suicidal, or willfully reckless employee may on occasion circumvent the best conceived and most vigorously enforced safety regime. National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 133, 142, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (1973); see Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Division), 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1974) (no strict liability for the results of idiosyncratic, demented, or perhaps suicidal self-exposure of employees to recognized hazards). When such a hazard is unpreventable the employer, of course, cannot correct or abate it. It follows, we think, that the Act does not make an employer the guarantor of employee compliance with the Act's provisions. Secondly, the avowed legislative occupational policies underlying VOSHA do not accord with a finding of an absolute duty. The declared policies of the state are twofold: (1) that insofar as practicable no employee shall suffer diminished health, functional capacity or life expectancy as a result of his work experience, and (2) that practices and procedures prescribed by an employer for performance of work or duties by his employees shall not be insofar as practicable, dangerous to the life, body or well being of the employees. 21 V.S.A. § 201(a)-(b) (emphasis added); see 21 V.S.A. § 202. Compare 21 V.S.A. § 201(c)(3) with 29 U.S.C. § 651(b). The proviso insofar as practicable evinces a legislative intent that the duty imposed by the general duty clause be an achievable one; a standard of absolute liability is not contemplated. See National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, supra, 489 F.2d at 1266 n. 35; accord, Horne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 570-71 (5th Cir. 1976); Cape & Vineyard Division v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC (Alsea Lumber Co.), 511 F.2d 1139, 1144-45 (9th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Division), 502 F.2d 946, 951 (3d Cir. 1974); REA Express, Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 826 (2d Cir. 1974). Nothing in VOSHA, on the other hand, is intended to relieve the employer of his general responsibility of obtaining employee compliance with the Act's requirements. Primary responsibility for achieving a safe and healthful workplace rests with the employer under the Act. The general duty clause imposes upon the employer a statutory duty to attempt to prevent and suppress hazardous conduct by employees, and this duty is not qualified by the doctrines of assumption of risk, contributory negligence, comparative negligence, or the fellow servant rule. Many, if not most, occupational injuries arise from varying degrees of employee negligencethis is why primary responsibility for compliance with the requirements of the Act remains with the employer. National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, supra, 489 F.2d at 1266 n. 36. A recognized hazard is preventable if demonstrably feasible measures taken by the employer would materially reduce the likelihood of the existence of the hazard. National Realty & Construction Co. v. OSHRC, supra, 489 F.2d at 1267; see Horne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, supra, 528 F.2d at 569; Brennan v. OSHRC (Hanovia Lamp Division), supra, 502 F.2d at 952. Where the employer could not have taken additional feasible steps to avoid noncompliance with the Act's requirements by his employee, there is no basis for imposing liability under the Act. Under the particular facts of this case, we hold that GMP did not discharge its statutory obligation by simply issuing adequate safety instructions and holding safety meetings. Delegating the responsibility of implementing the company's safety policies to rank and file employees, while under the immediate supervision of managerial personnel, does not comport with either the letter or the spirit of VOSHA. To hold otherwise would mean that once an employer provides its employees with safety equipment and issues orders or instructions regarding the safe use of that equipment, the employer is free to disregard the employee's actual compliance with those instructions. To say the company invokes disciplinary measures for noncompliance with its safety rules is not enough. Although such after-the-fact measures are within the intendment of the Act, actual supervision during the performance of a job, where feasible, also is intended. We do not hold that the employer must provide constant over-the-shoulder or one-to-one supervision for his employees. Such a duty would be impracticable, unfeasible, and unreasonable. Where, however, as here, a supervisor is present on the job site, has knowledge of the job, and is aware of a particular hazard that poses a high likelihood of serious injury in the absence of precautionary measures, an employer cannot rely on a company policy that provides that the employee should make his own determination of the need for protective cover. Such a policy may, of course, meet the mandate of VOSHA in certain situations, such as where a lineman first class must, by necessity, work alone. This is not the case here, however. Nor are we faced with the factual situation where an employee disobeys a direct order. The foreman, who was aware of the fact that there was inadequate protective cover around Pole No. 3, could easily have directed Bagalio to install additional protective cover. The judgment of the Chittenden Superior Court is reversed and vacated, and the determination of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Board is reinstated.