Opinion ID: 712131
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of Janice Compton

Text: 18 Roulette contends that the district court erred when it allowed the testimony of Janice Compton, a government rebuttal witness, to impeach the testimony of Charles Harrison, Jr., a defense witness who was charged as Roulette's co-conspirator in the same indictment as Roulette and who had already pled guilty. 19 The government offered the testimony of Janice Compton to impeach Harrison's testimony at trial with prior inconsistent statements he made to Compton during an earlier interview. Compton served as Harrison's probation officer and conducted the interview while she was preparing his presentence report. On direct examination, Harrison stated that he had no contact with Roulette during 1990. Defense counsel then asked Harrison if he had ever asked Roulette to sell crack cocaine on his behalf during 1989 or 1990; Harrison responded that he had not. Defense counsel also asked Harrison if he had seen Roulette in 1987 and 1988. Harrison replied that he had seen Roulette in 1987 and 1988 on only a few occasions, and that on such occasions he and Roulette had gone to the movies or gone out together socially. 20 On cross examination, the government asked Harrison how many times he had been present when Cedric Roulette had sold drugs. Harrison responded that he had never been present when Roulette sold drugs. The government then asked Roulette if he had not stated to Compton in an earlier interview that he had been with Roulette on two or three occasions when Roulette had sold cocaine while Harrison had remained in a car without participating in the sales. Harrison responded that he had told Compton that he had seen Roulette with cocaine or drugs in 1988, but he had never seen Roulette sell drugs in exchange for money. 21 The government later called Compton to testify as a rebuttal witness to impeach Harrison's trial testimony with his prior inconsistent statement. Roulette objected to Compton's testimony as impeachment by extrinsic evidence on a collateral issue. Roulette argued that the government was bound by Harrison's answers under cross examination concerning his prior inconsistent statements and could not use extrinsic evidence to further impeach him. The government contended that it was offering Compton's testimony to impeach Harrison's testimony that he had not told Compton that he had witnessed Roulette selling drugs. The trial judge allowed Compton to testify that Harrison had told her that he was with Roulette on two or three occasions when Roulette would go up to the house and sell the cocaine. 22 A trial court's determination of the admissibility of evidence will not be overturned except for a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Houston, 892 F.2d 696, 705 (8th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 1265, 1267 (8th Cir.1982)). At trial, the government contended that Compton's testimony was offered to impeach Harrison's testimony with prior inconsistent statements. Extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements may not be used to impeach a witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 613(b) unless the witness is given the opportunity to explain or deny the statements. United States v. White, 11 F.3d 1446, 1448 (8th Cir.1993). Harrison was given such an opportunity and both denied and explained the prior inconsistent statement. However, under 613(b) a witness may not be impeached on a collateral matter by use of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements. United States v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 428 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 873 (8th Cir.1985). Contradiction of a witness by prior inconsistent statements may be shown only on a matter material to the substantive issues of the trial. Grooms, 978 F.2d at 429; McCrady, 774 F.2d at 873. A prior inconsistent statement contains collateral matter and is therefore inadmissible if the facts referred to in the statement could not be shown in evidence for any purpose independent of the contradiction. McCrady, 774 F.2d at 873 (quoting United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1306 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 934, 97 S.Ct. 1558, 51 L.Ed.2d 779 (1977)). 23 Harrison's statement to Compton involved matters which were material to the charges against Roulette and could have been offered in evidence independent of the contradiction. The substance of Harrison's statement is admissible evidence because it relates to multiple drug transactions involving both Harrison and Roulette. Such activities tend to prove the existence of the charged drug conspiracy and add weight to the government's evidence that Roulette later dealt drugs repeatedly on behalf of Harrison. 24 In addition, Compton's testimony is admissible to contradict Harrison's testimony on direct examination that his infrequent contact with Roulette from 1987 to 1990 involved only innocent activities, such as going to movies. Once the defendant elicited such evidence from Harrison, the government was free to rebut Harrison's testimony with the statement he had made to Compton describing drug activity. See Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1078 (8th Cir.1995); United States v. Valencia, 61 F.3d 616, 619 (8th Cir.1995). The trial court did not err in admitting Compton's testimony. 25