Opinion ID: 2633374
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: failure to pay the filing fee within a reasonable time

Text: ¶ 17 We next address McPhie's argument that, even assuming payment of the required filing fee is not a jurisdictional requirement, the court of appeals nevertheless erred by failing to affirm the trial court's dismissal of Dipoma's complaint on the alternative ground that Dipoma did not pay the required filing fee within a reasonable time. Specifically, McPhie argues that Dipoma's eventual payment of the filing fee nine months after it was due was unreasonable as a matter of law. ¶ 18 The court of appeals held, and Dipoma argues on appeal, that we should not reach the issue of whether Dipoma paid the required filing fee within a reasonable time because the issue was not raised before the trial court. However, although we acknowledge that this issue was not presented to the trial court, it is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not considered or passed on by the lower court. Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass'n, 23 Utah 2d 222, 225-26 n. 2, 461 P.2d 290, 293 n. 2 (1969) (emphasis added) (quoting 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error § 1461(1)); see also Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1260 (Utah 1998); Ovard v. Cannon, 600 P.2d 1246, 1247 n. 3 (Utah 1979). Therefore, because the alternate ground for affirmance presented by McPhie is apparent from the record and was briefed and argued by the parties on appeal, we choose to address it. ¶ 19 As an initial matter, we emphasize that although filing fees are not a jurisdictional requirement for commencing an action at the trial level, a litigant may not escape payment of the required filing fee indefinitely. Indeed, the payment of the filing fee is required by Utah law and, as the court of appeals correctly noted, failure to pay the required fee may ultimately result in dismissal of an action. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 21-1-1, 21-1-5(1)(a), 21-7-2 (1998). Accordingly, where, as in the instant case, a litigant receives notice that his or her original payment has been returned for insufficient funds, the litigant must pay the required filing fee within a reasonable time to avoid dismissal of his or her action. See Johnson v. Brown, 803 F.Supp. 1414, 1419 (N.D.Ind.1992) (stating there are limits to the rule enunciated in Rodgers v. Bowen, 790 F.2d 1550, 1552 (11th Cir.1986), that filing fees are not a jurisdictional requirement for the commencement of an action at the trial level, because a plaintiff should not be allowed to wait many months or years between submission of the complaint and compliance with the filing fee requirement); see also Rodgers, 790 F.2d at 1553 (recognizing unreasonable delay in paying filing fees may result in dismissal of action, but holding one-month delay not unreasonable). ¶ 20 In this case, Dipoma demonstrated her knowledge that the filing fee was required by attempting to pay the fee with a personal check, which was returned to the court clerk for insufficient funds on December 29, 1997. Although it is not clear from the record exactly when Dipoma received notice that her check had bounced, it was certainly no later than March 10, 1998, when Dipoma attempted to pay the filing fee a second time with another personal check, which the court clerk again rejected because her first check had been dishonored. At this point, Dipoma was on notice that her original check had bounced, that her personal checks would not be accepted, and that she was required to pay the proper fee with another form [of payment]. However, despite her knowledge of the fee requirement, and her ability to pay the feeas evidenced by the fact that Dipoma did not file an affidavit of impecuniosity demonstrating her inability to pay the fee, see Utah Code Ann. § 21-7-3(2) (1998), or argue, before the trial court or on appeal, that she was unable to pay the fee Dipoma delayed payment of the filing fee for an additional five months, when on August 11, 1998, she paid the filing fee with a certified check. Accordingly, although we establish no bright-line rule for all cases, we hold that under the circumstances of this case, Dipoma's failure to pay the required filing fee for five months after she was notified that her original check had bounced was unreasonable as a matter of law. [7]