Opinion ID: 614115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Clarett's Convictions

Text: The district court entered a ruling in limine that two of Clarett's criminal convictionsfor misdemeanor retail theft and obstructing a police officercould be admitted at trial. [1] The judge held that her retail-theft conviction was admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence as a crime involving an act of dishonesty. The judge held that her obstruction conviction was also admissible, though he did not specify the grounds. It appears that the judge admitted this convictionor perhaps bothfor purposes of impeachment since Clarett had denied in her deposition that she had ever been convicted of a crime. These rulings may have been problematic. Admission of a criminal conviction under Rule 609(a)(2) is limited to crimes for which it readily can be determined that establishing the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness. FED.R.EVID. 609(a)(2). The Advisory Committee Notes explain that this rule is generally limited to perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretenses, and similar crimes. Retail theft lacks an element of an act of dishonesty that is common to crimes of this type. As such, [t]his circuit generally does not count retail theft as a crime of dishonesty for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2). Kunz v. DeFelice, 538 F.3d 667, 675 (7th Cir.2008). The authority to admit evidence for impeachment purposes is implicit in Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 27 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR JAMES GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 6096, at 655 (2d ed.2007). To the extent that the court gave a green light to the introduction of either of Clarett's convictions to attack her truthfulness, their admission was governed by Rule 608(b), which provides that specific instances of conduct bearing on a witness's character for truthfulness other than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. FED. R.EVID. 608(b). Neither conviction was admissible under Rule 609. [2] So the defendants could not make affirmative use of this evidence or prove it up by way of extrinsic evidence. Moreover, it is generally improper to rely on extrinsic evidence to impeach a witness about a collateral matter. Young v. James Green Mgmt., Inc., 327 F.3d 616, 627 (7th Cir.2003); United States v. Bonner, 302 F.3d 776, 785 (7th Cir.2002) ([O]ne may not contradict for the sake of contradiction; the evidence must have an independent purpose and an independent ground for admission. (quotation marks omitted)). A matter is collateral if it could not have been introduced into evidence for any purpose other than contradiction. United States v. Williamson, 202 F.3d 974, 979 (7th Cir.2000) (quotation marks omitted). The only remaining evidentiary option available to the officers was inquiry on cross-examination. Under Rule 608(b) specific instances of conduct bearing upon truthfulness may ... be inquired into on cross-examination in the discretion of the court. Perhaps this is what the court and the officers had in mind. As things unfolded at trial, however, and apparently based on the court's pretrial ruling, the first mention of the convictions came during Clarett's case-in-chief, when her counsel questioned her about them on direct examination. By introducing the convictions herself, Clarett waived the right to challenge their admission on appeal. The Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants who introduce evidence of their own prior convictions in an effort to remove the sting forgo the right to appeal the trial court's decision to admit those convictions into evidence. Ohler v. United States, 529 U.S. 753, 758, 120 S.Ct. 1851, 146 L.Ed.2d 826 (2000). The Court held that by introducing the evidence first, the defendant adopts a concerted trial strategy to minimize the prejudicial effect of the evidence and in so doing waives the right to appeal the court's ruling that the evidence may be admitted at trial. Id.; see also United States v. Saunders, 359 F.3d 874, 877-78 (7th Cir.2004). We have never addressed whether the Ohler principle applies in civil cases. Clarett argues against applying Ohler in the civil context, noting that criminal defendants have the right not to testify in their defense, while civil plaintiffs generally must do so in order to prove their claim. This distinction is immaterial in light of Ohler 's reasoning. The Court noted that even after a criminal defendant chooses to take the stand, she has a further choice to make.... The defendant must choose whether to introduce the conviction on direct examination and remove the sting or to take her chances with the prosecutor's possible elicitation of the conviction on cross-examination. Ohler, 529 U.S. at 757-58, 120 S.Ct. 1851. The same choice is present in civil cases. Similarly, in the criminal context, the government must also make a tactical decision: If the defendant testifies, [the government] must choose whether or not to impeach her by use of her prior conviction. Here the trial judge had indicated he would allow its use, but the Government still had to consider whether its use might be deemed reversible error on appeal. This choice is often based on the Government's appraisal of the apparent effect of the defendant's testimony. If she has offered a plausible, innocent explanation of the evidence against her, it will be inclined to use the prior conviction; if not, it may decide not to risk possible reversal on appeal from its use. Id. at 758, 120 S.Ct. 1851 (footnote omitted). The Court noted in Ohler that when the defendant decides to introduce the conviction evidence herself, she denies the government its usual right to decide, after she testifies, whether or not to use her prior conviction against her. Id. The logic of Ohler applies with equal force in both criminal and civil cases. The tactical nature of each party's decisions is the same; indeed, the stakes are higher in a criminal case, and still the Supreme Court found waiver. We note that every circuit to have addressed the question has applied Ohler in civil cases. See, e.g., Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 621 F.3d 1116, 1130 (9th Cir.2010); Estate of Smith v. City of Wilmington, 317 Fed.Appx. 237, 239 n. 1 (3d Cir.2009); Canny v. Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Bottling Grp., Inc., 439 F.3d 894, 904 (8th Cir.2006); Ludwig v. Norfolk So. Ry. Co., 50 Fed.Appx. 743, 751 (6th Cir.2002). In Canny the Eighth Circuit observed that a civil litigant should not be allowed to avoid the consequence of its own trial tactic by arguing it was forced to introduce the evidence ... to diminish the prejudice. 439 F.3d at 904. We agree. Because Clarett introduced the evidence of her retail theft and obstruction convictions herself, she is precluded from challenging their admissibility on appeal.