Opinion ID: 321107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Other Assignments of Error

Text: 57 The following contentions of the defendant are without merit: 58 a. Denial of a motion for continuance of the trial date. Payseur and four co-defendants first appeared for arraignment on August 27, 1971. Fisher and Talla were then fugitives. Idom later entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced. Upon motion of the five defendants, the arraignment was continued to September 7, 1971. On this date Payseur had not retained counsel and Ronald Bain was appointed to represent him. At Payseur's request, trial was set for November 9, 1971, two months away. 59 On the date set for trial, Godfrey Isaac appeared and moved to be substituted as attorney for Payseur and for a continuance of the trial date. In reply to the court's questions he stated, 'in the event that the motion for a continuance is denied, which appears likely, nevertheless we will be prepared to proceed.' 60 Contrary to Payseur's contention, there was no claim by Isaac that he was 'utterly unprepared.' The record does not reveal when Isaac was retained or when he began work on the case. After the jury was selected the court, on its own motion, continued the trial from November 9 to November 11. There was no abuse of the court's discretion. 61 b. Alleged denial of access to Pendley, the government's informer-witness. On September 7, 1971, the trial court sua sponte ordered the government to disclose whether an informer was expected to testify, but not his identity or his expected testimony. The government complied, and the disagreement of counsel as to whether there should be disclosure of the identity and address was entered in the discovery statement filed with the court. 62 A defendant is not entitled as a matter of right to the name and address of any witness. Rosenzweig v. United States (9 Cir. 1969) 412 F.2d 844, except as provided in 18 U.S.C. 3432 for capital cases. 63 In any event, the defendant is ordinarily required to file a motion and make a sufficient pretrial showing of need before the government must comply with a request for the name or address of a witness. United States v. Richter (9 Cir. 1973) 488 F.2d 170, 175. At no time did counsel for the defendants ask for a hearing on the matter or file a motion for discovery under Rule 16, F.R.Crim.P. 64 Moreover, counsel for the defendants were provided prior to trial with a statement that the witness Pendley had made to customs agents. Following Pendley's testimony on direct examination there was no claim by defendant Payseur of surprise or unpreparedness for cross-examination nor any request for a continuance. Pendley's direct testimony ended on a Friday afternoon and the trial did not start again until Monday afternoon. 65 c. Hearsay declarations were properly admitted. The acts and declarations of Payseur's co-conspirators subsequent to his arrest, but prior to arrest of the others, were admitted in evidence against Payseur. His arrest terminated his participation in the conspiracy 'in the sense that his acts and declarations following his arrest do not bind, and may not be introduced against, other co-conspirators . . .. But the converse is not true. An unarrested co-conspirator still operating in furtherance of the conspiracy may say and do things which may be introduced against the arrested one if the conspiracy is still in operation.' United States v. Wentz (9 Cir. 1972) 456 F.2d 634, 637. 66 Accordingly, the delivery of the marijuana to Pendley by Nelson and Reynolds, their subsequent arrest, the conversations of Pendley, Rosenblatt and Idom, Idom's samples of the marijuana and payment of $14,000 for it, and Idom's driving away with the marijuana-loaded van and his subsequent arrest, were all properly presented in evidence, since the conspiracy was still in existence. 67 Also, '. . . evidence of acts of co-conspirators which occurred after the entire conspiracy had ended and was complete may be introduced against all of the co-conspirators if the evidence tends to prove the existence of the conspiracy.' Wentz, supra, at 637. Here the questioned evidence did exactly that. 68 Payseur complains of three instances where Pendley was permitted to testify to statements made by Fisher, which Payseur characterizes as recitals of past events. (E.g., 'Why (lately I have been) smuggling, of course.') Assuming they were not made in furtherance of the conspiracy, any error in admitting them into evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969). None of the statements referred to defendant Payseur nor in any way connected him to the conspiracy. The evidence against him concerned events occurring within the period of the conspiracy, as alleged in the indictment, including events in which he participated. 69 d. The motion to suppress the evidence obtained by the seizure and search of Payseur's flight bag was properly denied. The record shows that the agents involved had probable cause to arrest Payseur and seize the flight bag. In addition, exigent circumstances existed which justified the immediate seizure of the bag. Co-conspirators were at large. The bag might have been taken or lost by third parties through inadvertence. Since probable cause and exigent circumstances existed, the government was not required to secure a search warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51-52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970); Hernandez v. United States (9 Cir. 1965) 353 F.2d 624, 627; United States v. Mehciz (9 Cir. 1971) 437 F.2d 145, 147, cert. denied402 U.S. 974, 91 S.Ct. 1663, 29 L.Ed.2d 139 (1971); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974). 70 Even if the search was improper and the exhibits from the bag improperly admitted, the error was harmless. Harrington v. California,supra. The maps and charts from the bag related only to whether the defendant had flown to Mexico. There was overwhelming evidence to this same fact based in part on surveillance by government agents and in part on the readings of the Hobbs meter in defendant's plane. 71 e. Admission of documentary evidence. There was no error in the admission of the evidence as to (1) the records of Aer-O-West Aviation; (2) a certain note written by witness Pendley, and (3) a certain note written by co-defendant Fisher. 72 f. There was no error in procedures in selecting the jury. The record shows that the only motion made regarding jury selection was that the government supply defendants with the names of jurors to which the government would exercise peremptory challenges. The motion was correctly denied. Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 412, 14 S.Ct. 410, 38 L.Ed. 208 (1894). 73 Defendant argues about the use of a 'jury book' by the U.S. Attorney. There was no showing such a book existed and no offer of proof of such a fact was made. 74 In any event, federal courts have consistently held that lack of access by the defense to the greater range of government information about potential jurors is not a ground for reversal. United States v. Costello (2 Cir. 1958) 255 F.2d 876, 883-884, cert. denied 357 U.S. 937, 78 S.Ct. 1385, 2 L.Ed.2d 1551 (1958); Best v. United States (1 Cir. 1950) 184 F.2d 131, 141, cert. denied 340 U.S. 939, 71 S.Ct. 480, 95 L.Ed. 677 (1951); Christoffel v. United States (1948), 84 U.S.App.D.C. 132, 171 F.2d 1004, 1006, rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 84, 69 S.Ct. 1447, 93 L.Ed. 1826 (1949); Hamer v. United States (9 Cir. 1958) 259 F.2d 274, cert. denied359 U.S. 916, 79 S.Ct. 592, 3 L.Ed.2d 577 (1959) (no error merely in use of jury book to which prosecution has exclusive access). 75 The judgment is affirmed.