Opinion ID: 2996713
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Heading: T.D.’s Status as a Prevailing Party Under

Text: Buckhannon As noted above, Buckhannon held that to be a “prevailing party” a litigant must have obtained a judgment on the merits, a consent decree, or some similar form of judicially sanctioned relief. 532 U.S. at 603-04. In Buckhannon, the Court specifically noted that “[p]rivate settlement agreements do not entail the judicial approval and oversight involved in consent decrees. And federal jurisdiction to enforce a private contractual settlement will often be lacking unless the terms of the agreement are incorporated into the 3 (...continued) District of Illinois, it has been held that Buckhannon applies to the IDEA. See, e.g., Koswenda v. Flossmoor Sch. Dist. No. 161, 227 F. Supp. 2d 979, 989 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Jose Luis R. v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist., No. 01 C 4798, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20916, at -10 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 14, 2002). Likewise, numerous other district courts have concluded that Buckhannon applies to the IDEA. See, e.g., Jane Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 264 F. Supp. 2d 65 (D. Mass. 2003); Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331, 1341-42 (N.D. Ga. 2003); Adams v. Dist. of Columbia, 231 F. Supp. 2d 52, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2002); Ostby v. Oxnard Union High, 209 F. Supp. 2d 1035 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 16 No. 02-3928 order of dismissal.” 532 U.S. at 604 n.7. Therefore, the Court left the clear impression that private settlements do not involve sufficient judicial sanction to confer “prevailing party” status. See Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003); Smyth, 282 F.3d at 279. The merits of this case were ultimately resolved through a settlement between the parties. We agree with the Fourth Circuit’s recent conclusion that some settlement agreements, even though not explicitly labeled as a “consent decree” may confer “prevailing party” status, if they are sufficiently analogous to a consent decree. Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281. For instance, “[w]here a settlement agreement is embodied in a court order such that the obligation to comply with its terms is court-ordered, the court’s approval and the attendant judicial oversight (in the form of continuing jurisdiction to enforce the agreement) may be . . . functionally a consent decree.” Id; see also John T., 318 F.3d at 558 (stating that “a stipulated settlement could confer prevailing party status . . . . where it (1) contained mandatory language, (2) was entitled ‘Order,’ (3) bore the signature of the District Court judge, not the parties’ counsel, and (4) provided for judicial enforcement”) (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). The settlement agreement in this case does not bear any of the marks of a consent decree. It is not embodied in a court order or judgment, it does not bear the district court judge’s signature, and the district court has no continuing jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Rather, it was merely a private settlement agreement between the parties. T.D. argues that because the district court was actively involved in the settlement negotiations, having conducted a settlement conference in his chambers and made certain settlement suggestions, that we should find that there was sufficient “judicial imprimatur” on the settlement to confer “prevailing party” status. No. 02-3928 17 Mere involvement in the settlement, however, is not enough. There must be some official judicial approval of the settlement and some level of continuing judicial oversight. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 604 n.7; Smyth, 282 F.3d at 281. Therefore, we find that the settlement agreement reached in this case did not confer “prevailing party” status upon T.D. T.D. asserts that even if he cannot be said to have prevailed via the settlement, that he was the “prevailing party” in the due process hearing and therefore should be compensated at least for that success. The parties do not dispute that the IDEA’s fee-shifting provision allows courts to grant attorney’s fees to parents who prevail in an administrative hearing. Indeed, we held in Brown v. Griggsville Comm. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 4, that the IDEA does allow fees to the prevailing party in administrative hearings. 12 F.3d 681, 683-84 (7th Cir. 1993). While we recognize that this opinion was issued before Buckhannon, we do not perceive that Buckhannon requires a different conclusion. The IDEA’s fee-shifting provision allows attorney’s fees to the party that prevails “[i]n any action or proceeding” brought under the IDEA. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). As other courts have noted, the word “proceeding” as used in other parts of the statute refers to administrative or due process hearings. See, e.g., id. § 1415(d)(2)(F) & (k)(7)(C)(I) (“due process proceedings”); Id. § 1415(i)(2)(B)(I) & (i)(3) (D)(ii) (“administrative proceedings”); L.C. v. Warterbury Bd. of Educ., No. 3:00 CV 580, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6079, at - 8 (D. Conn. Mar. 21, 2002). And the Court in Buckhannon gave no indication that it intended to overturn its decision in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980). That case held that the fee-shifting provision in Title VII, which also referred to “action or proceeding,” allowed courts to award attorney’s fees to the prevailing party in administrative hearings. Id. at 61. 18 No. 02-3928 The school district does not dispute that to the extent that T.D.’s parents prevailed at the due process hearing, they are eligible for fees for that success. The school district disputes only whether T.D. prevailed at the due process hearing at all. The Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff may be considered a “prevailing party” if “they succeed on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433 (noting that this is a “generous formulation”). We find that while T.D. did not succeed on every issue at the due process hearing, he did prevail on certain significant issues and achieved at least some of the benefit he sought. In his hearing request, T.D. sought to have the school district conduct a case-study evaluation to determine his eligibility for benefits under the IDEA. And he sought reimbursement for various costs incurred in attending the private day school, including tuition, a one-on-one aide, and transportation. The hearing officer granted T.D.’s request for an evaluation by the school district, ordering the school to conduct the evaluation on November 20, 1997. Significantly, the hearing officer placed blame on the school district for not requesting written consent to conduct the evaluation, even though they had notice that T.D. might have been eligible for IDEA benefits. The case-study evaluation and IEP conference that followed, determined that T.D. was in fact eligible for IDEA benefits and proposed placement of T.D. at public school in a regulareducation classroom, with supplemental special-education services to address T.D.’s needs. This determination represented some success for T.D. because prior to his request for the due process hearing the school had not acknowledged that T.D. was even eligible for IDEA benefits. The hearing officer partially granted T.D.’s requests for reimbursement for the costs of attending the private school, awarding reimbursement for the cost of the one-on-one aide No. 02-3928 19 and for transportation, but refusing to grant reimbursement for the cost of tuition. The hearing officer characterized this partial relief as an equitable award. He found that the private day school was not providing T.D. with an appropriate education; therefore, he did not award T.D. reimbursement for the cost of the tuition. The hearing officer, however, found that the school district was at least partly to blame for T.D.’s inappropriate placement at the private school since the school district failed to conduct an evaluation of T.D. and failed to offer T.D. any formal placement proposal before the November 20, 1997 evaluation and conference. Considering these failures, the hearing officer ordered the school district to reimburse T.D. for the cost of the one-on-one aid from the time she was hired until T.D. could be enrolled in the public school. And the cost of transportation to the private school was also ordered to be reimbursed. T.D. succeeded in obtaining the case-study evaluation that the school previously had not conducted and that ultimately led to the determination that he was eligible for benefits under the IDEA. This success coupled with the reimbursement he received for the cost of the one-on-one aid and transportation to the private school (which together added up to nearly $1200 a month) rendered T.D. a “prevailing party” in the administrative hearing. Therefore, we find that T.D. is entitled to attorney’s fees for prevailing at the administrative hearing.