Opinion ID: 4534699
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Retain a Fire Expert

Text: The district court also found that Stermer’s trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a fire expert. Stermer v. Warren, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 660–69. Because AEDPA deference applies and the claim is being assessed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), we cannot rely on the evidence introduced in the district court or any findings of fact it made from the federal evidentiary hearing. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181. For the reasons discussed below, we forego deciding the merits of this claim, since Stermer is already entitled to a new trial and the question of prejudice would raise several complicated issues of law that were never addressed in the district court. That said, the record clearly establishes that Stermer’s trial counsel was deficient in refusing to call a fire expert, and but for Stermer’s failure to present certain evidence in her state habeas petition, the record would show that she clearly was prejudiced by this error as well. We explain each of these points here.
“Criminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and available defense strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert evidence, whether pretrial, at trial, or both.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 106; accord Hinton v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 263, 273 (2014) (per curiam). This is one such case. In order to convict Stermer, the state had to prove the fire was an arson and that Stermer was the culprit. Save perhaps for testimony from one of the jailhouse informants, the only evidence supporting a finding of arson was the state’s fire expert. In her state habeas petition, Stermer noted that her attorney failed to even consult with a fire expert, No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 41 despite her and her family begging him to do so and despite counsel obtaining the state expert’s report and hearing his testimony at the preliminary hearing. In defending trial counsel’s actions, the state argues that presenting evidence that the fire could have been an accident would undercut the defense’s strategy of blaming Todd for the fire, and so “would effectively put all the defense eggs in the basket of an accidental fire.” (Resp’t’s Br. at 57.) This assessment both ignores defense counsel’s actual strategy on this point and takes an extremely narrow view of a defendant’s options in demonstrating reasonable doubt. At trial, defense counsel argued that the state failed to prove the fire was intentionally set, but even if it had shown arson, it also failed to prove it was Linda Stermer who set the fire (as opposed to Todd). Thus, whatever credibility hit defense counsel could have taken by arguing both the accidental-fire and arsonist-Todd theories was already a necessary consequence of his strategy. The state’s argument wrongly suggests that Stermer’s counsel did better by presenting these theories without expert testimony to support them, and indeed, without even knowing what such an expert might have said. Furthermore, it is a legitimate strategy to present evidence that says the fire could have been either accidental or intentional (thus injecting reasonable doubt on one front), and that assuming it was intentional, Todd was most likely the source (injecting further reasonable doubt on another front). While it might also be a fair strategy to focus on only one of these theories given the weight of the evidence, this is not a circumstance where it was a reasonable choice of counsel to make this decision without even consulting a potential expert and investigating possible evidence that the fire was accidental. And finally, the state’s argument ignores the fact that an expert witness might have supported Stermer’s case even if she only presented the arsonist-Todd theory. Under Strickland, “counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” 466 U.S. at 691; accord, e.g., Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521–22. In a previous arson case, this Court noted that the “most egregious type” of failure to investigate is where “lawyers altogether fail to hire [a fire] expert.” Richey v. Bradshaw, 498 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691); see No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 42 also id. at 362–63 (finding trial counsel ineffective for failing to monitor his own arson expert, since “it is inconceivable that a reasonably competent attorney would have failed to know what his expert was doing to test the State’s arson conclusion”). So too here. And this is not a case like Richter, where “[t]here were many factual differences between prosecution and defense versions of the events” and thus “any number of hypothetical experts” who might testify, meaning it would be reasonable to focus on other issues instead of any one particular expert. 562 U.S. at 107. At Stermer’s trial, the question of who (if anyone) started the fire was the central issue. And the only physical evidence supporting the state’s felony murder charge was presented through the expert’s assessment of the fire. While different circumstances might dictate a different result, in this case, there was no reasonable basis for trial counsel not to have consulted a fire expert. As noted above, counsel already decided to argue that the fire could have been an accident, but then rested on the prosecution’s expert, who specifically opined it was not an accident. In a duel, it might be a reasonable choice to elect a swordfight over pistols, but once you choose the latter, it makes no sense to show up without any bullets. Where the defendant’s guilt turns on a fire being arson, the state’s evidence of arson is expert testimony, and the defense in fact argues (at least in part) that the fire was accidental, it is ineffective for counsel not to retain someone to help respond to the state’s expert testimony. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690–91; Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521–22. To buy the state’s contrary arguments here would amount to an unreasonable application of Strickland.
The issues are more complicated when we get to prejudice. The district court found prejudice largely based on what Stermer’s post-conviction fire expert said at the federal evidentiary hearing. Stermer v. Warren, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 667. But under Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 181, we cannot rely on that evidence, and instead must assess prejudice based on the record before the state habeas court. On appeal, the state argues that Stermer failed to establish prejudice “even assuming that, if counsel did consult with a fire expert, he would have presented that expert’s testimony and that No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 43 testimony would have been that the fire was accidental.” (Resp’t’s Br. at 60.) The state never argued that Stermer failed to show, in the state court record, that an expert would have testified that the fire could have been an accident. If we held the state to this assumption, we would find that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland by denying Stermer’s ineffective assistance claim. Given the weaknesses of the state’s case, introducing expert testimony that the fire could have been accidental (or that, if the fire was not accidental, that it was more likely for Todd to have been the arsonist) might easily have swayed the jury to find a reasonable doubt. The state’s expert testimony that the fire was arson was fundamental to its case, see Richey, 498 F.3d at 362, and so undercutting this evidence would have substantially increased Stermer’s chances of acquittal, see Hinton, 571 U.S. at 275–76 (finding prejudice from the failure to present an effective expert witness and noting that the “threat [of wrongful conviction] is minimized when the defense retains a competent expert to counter the testimony of the prosecution’s expert witnesses”). Viewing the evidence as a whole, there is a considerable probability that, with expert testimony suggesting the fire was accidental, Stermer’s trial might have ended differently. This amounts to prejudice under Strickland, see 466 U.S. at 694, even after applying AEDPA deference. If, however, we look past the state’s assumption and turn to the state court record itself, this issue becomes significantly complicated. In the state habeas proceeding, Stermer alleged that her trial counsel refused to retain an expert, pointed out several problems with the state expert’s testimony, and noted that by retaining an expert, her lawyer could have rebutted the state’s expert at trial. Given these allegations, if the court denied Stermer’s petition without allowing her to obtain or present evidence as to what an expert would have said on the stand, the only logical assumption would be that the state court decided Stermer loses even if an expert would have provided rebuttal testimony against the state’s evidence. See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 205 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“For example, if the state-court rejection assumed the habeas petitioner’s facts (deciding that, even if those facts were true, federal law was not violated), then (after finding the state court wrong on a [§ 2254](d) ground) [a federal habeas] hearing might be needed to determine whether the facts alleged were indeed true.”). So, if the state habeas court took Stermer’s allegations as true, our analysis would be the No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 44 same as it was above when operating under the state’s assumption (namely, that Stermer’s expert would have said the fire might have been an accident). But the state habeas court did not deny Stermer’s petition outright. Instead, after its initial review of the case, the state court appointed post-conviction counsel for Stermer. This lawyer never supplemented the record or filed any papers with the court. See Mich. Ct. R. 6.505(B) (“If the court appoints counsel to represent the defendant, it shall afford counsel 56 days to amend or supplement the motion.”). After the lawyer’s failure to file anything, but without specifically relying on that failure, the state habeas court denied Stermer’s petition. While in several cases, the Supreme Court has found that a state-habeas attorney’s failure to file can constitute cause for excusing a procedural default, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 17 (2012); Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 289 (2012), the Court has not addressed how this principle relates to state habeas counsel’s failure to present evidence or to supplement the petitioner’s pro se filings once appointed when that does not result in a procedural default. And even more complicated is the question of whether the state court’s rejection was based on Stermer’s initial allegations alone or whether the merits decision rests on the lack of expert evidence presented in support of her case. Cf. Babick v. Berghuis, 620 F.3d 571, 577 (6th Cir. 2010) (noting that federal habeas counsel failed to produce a fire expert and inferring that this is because no expert would support the defendant’s version of events). Rather than wade into this AEDPA-created confusion, we decline to address the question of prejudice on Stermer’s fire-expert claim, since she is already entitled to a new trial based on the prosecutor’s misconduct and her counsel’s failure to object. But from the district court’s erroneous evidentiary hearing, we know what Stermer’s expert would have said, and so the only reason she might not prevail on this claim is a further mistake of counsel and the state habeas court’s failure to address that mistake. Cf. Robinson, 663 F.3d at 823 n.2 (noting that a state court decision might not be “on the merits” if it was decided without the key records establishing the basis for the claim). No. 19-1075 Stermer v. Warren Page 45