Opinion ID: 2517801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Instruction regarding defendant's preoffense statement of motive

Text: The trial court gave a standard general instruction (see CALJIC No. 2.51) on motive (motive is not an element and need not be shown, but the presence or absence of motive may tend to establish guilt or innocence; the jury is the exclusive judge of the weight of motive evidence). The court also instructed, in standard form (see CALJIC No. 2.71), on extrajudicial admissions by the defendant (an admission is a statement by defendant which, while not itself an acknowledgment of guilt, tends to prove guilt when considered with other evidence; the jury is the exclusive judge whether defendant made such an admission and, if so, whether it is true in whole or in part; an extrajudicial admission by defendant should be viewed with caution). Over defense objection, the trial court also gave an adapted version of CALJIC No. 2.71.7, stating there was evidence from which the jury might find that an oral statement of motive was made by the defendant before the offense with which he is charged was committed. In standard form, this instruction further advised that the jury was the exclusive judge whether such a statement was made, and that evidence of such an oral statement should be viewed with caution. On appeal, as below, defendant urges that the issue presented by CALJIC No. 2.71.7 was adequately addressed by the general instructions on motive and extrajudicial admissions. As given in his case, defendant contends, CALJIC No. 2.71.7 was an improper pinpoint instruction, cumulative to those described above, which gave undue emphasis to a vital part of the purported evidence. The jury was essentially told as a matter of fact that the accused had motive to commit the homicide in issue. As a result, he argues, he suffered violations of his constitutional rights to due process, a fair trial, and a reliable verdict. However, we have held that both CALJIC Nos. 2.71 and 2.71.7 are standard cautionary instructions, intended for the defendant's benefit, which must be given sua sponte where applicable. (E.g., People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 194, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664; People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1021, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627 ( Lang ).) As the People note, defendant does not argue that CALJIC No. 2.71.7, as given in this case, was unsupported by evidence. [29] We have indicated that CALJIC No. 2.71 is broad enough to cover all out-of-court statements by the defendant offered to prove his guilt. Thus, the defendant suffers no prejudice when CALJIC No. 2.71.7 is not also given. ( Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1021, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) But this is not to say the defendant does suffer error or prejudice when both are given, as justified by the evidence. Defendant's claim that the instruction was biased in form also lacks merit. Far from presenting motive as a predetermined fact, the instruction merely stated that the jury may find the defendant expressed such a motive and must view any such expression with caution. No error occurred. In any event, inclusion of CALJIC No. 2.71.7 in the instructions was harmless by any applicable standard. As noted, the principal effect of the instruction was to reemphasize, on defendant's behalf, that his inculpatory extrajudicial statements, if any, should be viewed with caution. Insofar as the instruction focused on evidence that defendant had motives to commit the charged crimes, that evidence was overwhelming. CALJIC No. 2.71.7 cannot have altered the jury's views on the subject to defendant's prejudice. No basis for reversal appears.