Opinion ID: 2338704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The juror's disregard of instructions.

Text: We agree with the appellants that if Harn's testimony is believedand the trial judge, for sound reasons, expressly credited itthen there can be no doubt that Juror No. 9 violated the court's instructions by discussing the case with Harn. Indeed, the remarks which the juror made, early in the proceedings, within the hearing of the deputy clerk, were also improper. It is well established, however, that standing alone, a juror's unauthorized comments about a pending case will not require his disqualification in the absence of a showing of prejudice. See, e.g., ( Woodrow J.) Wilson v. United States, 663 A.2d 558, 562-63 (D.C.1995) (where a juror had telephoned a prosecutor friend and posed questions regarding procedures in drug cases, but prosecutor terminated conversation, the trial judge did not abuse her discretion by declining to order a new trial). We agree in this regard with the following statement by the court in United States v. Boylan, 698 F.Supp. 376, 391 (D.Mass.1988), aff'd, 898 F.2d 230 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 849, 111 S.Ct. 139, 112 L.Ed.2d 106 (1990), and with the authorities cited by the court: Jurors may make statements about the case yet keep their minds open to the remaining evidence and give the defendant a fair trial. See, e.g., Grooms v. Wainwright, 610 F.2d 344 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 953 [100 S.Ct. 1605, 63 L.Ed.2d 789] ... (1980) (Trial judge did not err in refusing to interrogate jurors about one juror's statement from what I heard he's already guilty made after close of the prosecution's case because statement did not reflect serious prejudice but only objective evaluation of evidence to date); United States v. Chiantese, 582 F.2d 974 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 922 [99 S.Ct. 2030, 60 L.Ed.2d 395]... (1979) (court did not err in refusing to hold a hearing when after a particular cross examination a juror remarked to other jurors about the attorney Stupid. Stupid. Stupid. He's a pain in the ___ because the remark did not indicate partiality); United States v. Klee, 494 F.2d 394 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 835 [95 S.Ct. 62, 42 L.Ed.2d 61] ... (1974) (no mistrial warranted when one juror states by affidavit that nine of the jurors expressed opinions as to guilt before the close of the case, given jury's impartiality evidenced by their request for re-reading of court's instructions on sole issue in the case). The important thing is not that jurors keep silent about the case but that each juror keeps an open mind until the case has been submitted to the jury. Klee, 494 F.2d at 396. In Boylan, and in the cases there cited, the comments made by various jurors in violation of the judge's instructions were directed to other jurors. In the present case, there is no evidence that any juror heard any improper comment by Juror No. 9, a circumstance which further weakens appellants' position. On this record, Juror No. 9's unfortunate failure to follow the judge's directions was not sufficient to disqualify him. [F]ew trials would pass constitutional muster if a new trial [were] required each time that a juror was discovered in a potentially compromising situation. Boylan, supra, 698 F.Supp. at 385 (citing Smith, supra, 455 U.S. at 217, 102 S.Ct. at 946). Juror No. 9 undoubtedly missed at least two golden opportunities to remain silent. Nevertheless, although the mouth[] of [one] of the jurors may have been too open, [his] mind [was] not [necessarily] shut. Commonwealth v. Scanlan, 9 Mass.App.Ct. 173, 400 N.E.2d 1265, 1272 (1980).