Opinion ID: 1184357
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Registration of shares.

Text: The only instance of breach which the superior court found Ficke capable of asserting was the airline's failure to use its best efforts to secure registration of shares of its stock which were to be paid to Ficke upon construction of the condominiums. Neither Ficke nor the appellees object to this finding, but Ficke contends that it should not be characterized as a minor breach. The stock, escrow and registration arrangement was constructed by the parties to guarantee Ficke that the bonus payment of $280,000 would be available when the condominiums were completed. The airline promised to place 23,333 unregistered shares of its stock in escrow and use its best efforts to secure their registration in order that the shares could be sold and the proceeds, guaranteed by the airline to total $280,000, substituted in the escrow. Ficke argues that the parties' intentions included using the escrowed funds to support financing of the condominiums. In his view, the airline's failure to use its best efforts to register the stock was a material breach of the contract because it prevented him from securing financing with which to begin construction of the condominiums and earn the bonus payment. The superior court rejected Ficke's argument, and there is sufficient support in the record for the finding that we may not disturb it. The written agreement does not anticipate any use of the escrowed stock or substituted funds. [13] However, as in many other issues in this dispute, there was directly contradicting testimony. A witness for the airline testified no mutual consideration had been given to any necessity for registering the shares before construction of the condominiums could begin. [14] Ficke, on the other hand, testified that the airline knew the shares had to be registered in order to secure financing for the condominiums because one of its officers inquired of a bank whether unregistered shares could be put to such a use and related the bank's reply that they were worthless for that purpose. Looking to this contradiction and the silence of the written agreement, we are unable to say that the superior court was clearly mistaken in determining that the parties did not regard the best efforts covenant to be an inducing element of their bargain. Nor do we think that the breach of this covenant should bar specific performance in favor of the appellees. [15] Our review of the evidence has led us to the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court was not inconsistent with the clear weight of the evidence. [16] Accordingly, we affirm its decree.