Opinion ID: 1449946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Common-law versus Statutory Claims

Text: Auld presents a second constitutional challenge to the cap based on our opinion in Lucas, which stated that, under the open-courts provision of the Texas Constitution, the cap in article 4590i could not be constitutionally applied to a common-law claim for personal injuries resulting from medical negligence. See Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690. Article I, section 13 guarantees that [a]ll courts shall be open, and every person for any injury done him... shall have remedy by due course of law. Tex. Const. art. I, § 13. For this provision to apply, however, the litigant must: (1) have a cognizable common-law cause of action that is being restricted; and (2) show that the restriction is unreasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the statute's purpose. See Lucas, 757 S.W.2d at 690 (quoting Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex.1983)). For Auld's argument to prevail, we must initially determine whether Auld's claim for Hary's personal injuries, although prosecuted under the survival statute, is cognizable as a common-law claim. As we stated in Rose v. Doctors Hospital, 801 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tex.1990), all negligence actions are common-law claims. At common law, however, no personal injury cause of action survived a victim's death. See Diaz v. Westphal, 941 S.W.2d 96, 100 (Tex.1997); Russell v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 841 S.W.2d 343, 344-45 (Tex.1992). The victim's heirs could not sue on behalf of the victim or for their own losses due to the tortious act. See Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 100. Because wrongful-death and survival actions would not exist absent legislative enactment, they are derived not from the common law but from a statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code §§ 71.002, 71.004, 71.021; see also Diaz, 941 S.W.2d at 98, 101 (survival claim); Rose, 801 S.W.2d at 845 (wrongful-death claim). Auld argues that, although her claims may be statutory in nature today, when Hary first filed suit and when the negligence occurred, Hary 's claims were common-law, not statutory, claims; therefore, the common-law rights of those claims did not expire when Hary died. Auld finds support for this position in a recent appellate court opinion involving a survival action in which the court upheld an open-courts challenge to the limitations provision in article 4590i, section 10.01. See Martin v. Catterson, 981 S.W.2d 222 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998), pet. denied, 2 S.W.3d 249 (Tex.1999) (per curiam). Although the Catterson court of appeals admitted that the survival claims were statutory at the time of appeal, the court noted that the claims were still common-law claims when the negligence occurred and when the suit was filed. See id. at 226. Thus, the court concluded that section 10.01 violated the open-courts provision and held that section 10.01 could not bar the plaintiff's survival action. See id. We denied the petition for review in a per curiam opinion, stating that we neither approve nor disapprove of the court of appeals' conclusion that `the claims were cognizable common-law causes of action when filed and at all times before Mr. Martin died[; therefore], we hold that the open courts doctrine applies and these claims are not barred by limitations.' Catterson, 2 S.W.3d at 249 (quoting Martin v. Catterson, 981 S.W.2d at 226). By denying the petition in Catterson, we did not decide whether the court of appeals correctly applied the open-courts provision to a purely statutory claim. Our holding in Bala v. Maxwell , however, answers that question: wrongful-death and survival claimants cannot establish an open-courts violation because they have no common law right to bring either. See Bala v. Maxwell, 909 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex.1995). The court of appeals in Catterson, therefore, misstated the law when it held that a statutory claim can withstand an open-courts challenge. [15] We noted in Bala that a claimant in a common-law personal-injury action loses any right to recover on that claim when he dies. The representative of the decedent's estate may continue prosecuting the claim on the decedent's behalf; however, that right is statutory and not based in the common law. See Bala, 909 S.W.2d at 893 (the plaintiffs sued under both the survival and wrongful-death statutes but could not bring an open-courts challenge to the limitations provision in article 4590i because their claims were purely statutory); cf. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Arredondo, 922 S.W.2d 120, 121-22 (Tex.1996) (first prong of open-courts test was not satisfied by a wrongful-death plaintiff whose suit was based on medical malpractice because the claim was purely statutory). In other words, survival claims exist only because the Legislature provided for them. If the Legislature desires to provide survival claimants with the same rights as common-law claimants, the Legislature has the prerogative to do so. As the law stands now, though, survival claims are not derived from the common law and should not be treated by the courts as if they were. Auld also argues that the survival statute precludes defenses against a survival plaintiff that could not have been asserted against the deceased plaintiff had she survived, citing Vassallo v. Nederl-Amerik Stoomv Maats Holland, 337 S.W.2d 309, 313 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1960), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 162 Tex. 52, 344 S.W.2d 421 (Tex.1961). Based on this premise, Auld asserts that Vassallo prevents Horizon from asserting an affirmative defense against Auld that it could not have asserted in the suit against the decedent, Martha Hary. In Vassallo, a longshoreman was killed while working on a vessel owned by one of the defendants. Although the defense of contributory negligence applied to the heirs' survival claim, the decedent's claim, had he survived, would have fallen under general maritime law and been subject only to comparative negligence, not contributory negligence. See id. at 311-12. The heirs argued that the survival statute provided them the same cause of action available to the decedent had he lived; therefore, the defendants were entitled only to those defenses they could have asserted against the decedent. See id. at 310-11. The court held that the heirs were entitled to recover whatever the decedent could have recovered had he survived; thus, the defendants could assert comparative negligence as a defense but not contributory negligence. See id. at 313. Auld compares her claim to Vassallo and argues that because article 4590i's liability limitation is an affirmative defense that could not have been asserted against Hary, it may not be asserted against Auld. This argument might warrant further discussion had the Legislature not enacted section 11.05 along with the cap in section 11.02. Section 11.05 states that the provisions of this subchapter shall apply notwithstanding the provisions in the wrongful-death and survival statutes. See Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat. art. 4590i, § 11.05. The Legislature clearly intended the cap to apply to statutory survival claims notwithstanding the fact that the survival statute itself preserves the decedent's cause of action and the rights she possessed at the time of her death. Under the plain language of article 4590i, then, the cap can be pleaded and proved against Auld even though she is suing on Hary's behalf.