Opinion ID: 883705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: McKenzie argues that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to reset the execution date because the law in effect at the time he was sentenced had no provision for the resetting of the execution after the statutory time for execution had passed. The law in effect at the time McKenzie was originally sentenced provided that: [i]n pronouncing the sentence of death, the court shall set the date of execution which must not be less than thirty (30) days nor more than sixty (60) days from the date the sentence is pronounced. Section 95-2303(b), RCM (1947), as amended (later recodified as § 46-19-103, MCA). Therefore, according to McKenzie, at the time he was sentenced, an execution had to be conducted within the sixty-day time frame, and the court had no power to reset the execution date if the sixty days elapsed. However, in 1981, § 46-19-103(1), MCA, was amended to provide that a court shall set a new execution date upon dissolution of a stay of execution. According to § 46-19-103(1), MCA, the District Court has a mandatory duty to set a new execution date, and has no discretion to do otherwise. Because we have previously concluded that the order resetting the execution date was merely a procedural or ministerial act and, thus, McKenzie's substantial rights were not thereby affected, the controlling law is that law in effect at the time of the court's resetting the execution date. See, State v. Coleman (1979), 185 Mont. 299, 605 P.2d 1000. Therefore the District Court acted correctly in setting the execution date pursuant to § 46-19-103(1), MCA. In addition, we find no merit to McKenzie's argument that once the initial execution date has passed, the District Court has no authority to reset the date. Other courts have recognized that the failure to execute a death warrant on the original date fixed does not result in the discharge of a prisoner sentenced to die, but requires the court to fix a new date for the execution. Joubert, 518 N.W.2d at 891. As stated by the Kansas Supreme Court in Miller, 217 P.2d at 290, the authorities uniformly hold that failure to execute a death warrant on the date fixed does not result in immunity to or discharge of a person sentenced to die, but requires the fixing of a new date for his execution. McKenzie also claims that the District Court did not have jurisdiction to reset the execution date pursuant to § 3-1-804(1)(b), MCA, which provides in part: [t]he first district judge who has been substituted or disqualified for cause shall have the duty of calling in all subsequent district judges. McKenzie argues that Judge McKittrick did not have jurisdiction because the original presiding judge or his successor, did not enter an order conferring jurisdiction on Judge McKittrick. McKenzie also points to this Court's order of March 14, 1976, as authority for the proposition that McKittrick lacked jurisdiction to reset the execution date. McKenzie's argument is based on the following procedural background. This case arose in Pondera County, in the Ninth Judicial District before Judge R.D. McPhillips. McKenzie subsequently disqualified McPhillips by substitution. McPhillips called in Judge Robert J. Nelson of the Eighth Judicial District Court to assume jurisdiction of the case, and Judge Nelson moved the cause to Cascade County for the purposes of trial. Thereafter McKenzie was found guilty of deliberate homicide and aggravated kidnapping, and Judge Nelson imposed the death penalty. The execution date was set for April 30, 1975, however it was stayed pending appeal to this Court. After remittitur, Judge Nelson's term had expired and Judge William H. Coder succeeded Judge Nelson as a judge in the Eighth Judicial District Court. Coder issued an order resetting the execution date on the basis of the sentence previously pronounced by Judge Nelson. In our March 14, 1976 order we concluded that Judge Coder did not have jurisdiction to reset the execution date. We held that before a district court judge could reset the execution date, the cause had to be returned to the original presiding judge in Pondera County. That judge was required to call in another district judge to continue with jurisdiction of the case. At the time we issued that order, however, § 46-19-103(1), MCA (1993), was not in effect. The relevant portion of that statute, which controls here, provides that the court in which the defendant was previously sentenced shall, upon dissolution of the stay, set a new date of execution ... McKenzie was properly sentenced by Judge Nelson, a judge in the Eighth Judicial District Court. Judge McKittrick is a judge in the Eighth Judicial District Court, the court in which the defendant was previously sentenced. Accordingly, Judge McKittrick has the statutory authority under § 46-19-103(1) and (4), MCA, without more, (as would any other district judge in that District) to perform the ministerial act of setting an execution date and signing the death warrant. Moreover, we conclude that § 3-1-804, MCA, which controls the substitution of district court judges, is not applicable. Rather, § 46-19-103(1) and (4), MCA, governs, and it reposes the act of setting the execution date and signing the death warrant in the court in which the defendant was sentenced  here the Eighth Judicial District Court. Therefore, our order indicating the original presiding judge in Pondera County must appoint another district court judge before the court may set a new execution date is not controlling.