Opinion ID: 170385
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of Involuntarily Disclosed Material

Text: When material is seized pursuant to a search warrant, production is not voluntary. See United States v. de la Jara, 973 F.2d 746, 749 (9th Cir.1992). Although this court has addressed waiver of the work-product doctrine and attorney-client privilege for voluntary or inadvertent disclosures, we have not addressed the issue of waiver when production of the evidence is compelled. [5] Although the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine are distinct, courts have treated them identically when considering involuntary disclosure. See In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d 978, 981 (3d Cir.1998) (relying on attorney-client waiver case law in a work-product protection case). We see no distinction between the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine that would result in different standards of waiver for involuntary disclosure. This court, therefore, applies the same waiver analysis to the privilege and the doctrine. Other courts have examined three main factors in determining whether protection has been waived when material has been involuntarily disclosed: (1) the specificity with which the defendant identifies the material; (2) the expediency by which the defendant informs the government that it seized protected material; and (3) the expediency by which the defendant seeks judicial action to enforce the protection. When the party seeking protection fails to specifically identify the materials protected, courts have uniformly found a waiver. In the context of a discovery request in civil litigation, the Ninth Circuit held that general assertions of privilege or work-product protection are insufficient. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. District Court, 408 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir.2005); see also United States v. White, 970 F.2d 328, 334-35 (7th Cir.1992) (holding failure to timely assert attorney-client privilege for each specific communication or document constitutes waiver); United States v. Neill, 952 F.Supp. 834, 842 (D.D.C.1997) (concluding failure to specifically identify computer files seized by government as protected by the attorney-client privilege constitutes waiver). There is no waiver, however, when the court is provided enough specificity to evaluate whether each document is protected. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe. Ry. Co., 408 F.3d at 1149. Identification of protected material must occur in a timely fashion. Where the party seeking protection fails to pursue all reasonable means of preserving the confidentiality of the privileged matter the protection is waived. See de la Jara, 973 F.2d at 750 (holding defendant waived attorney-client privilege when he made no attempt to assert privilege for six months); Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir.1984) (holding failure to make a timely showing waived work-product protection under Fed. R.Civ.P. 34(b)). Some courts have held that asserting protection solely to the government is insufficient and that invocation of judicial intervention is required. See In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d at 982. For example, in In re Grand Jury (Impounded) the defendant's office was searched and a file containing attorney work-product was seized. Id. at 979-80. Shortly after learning of the seizure, the defendant's attorney notified the United States Attorney and asserted protection under the work-product doctrine. Id. The defense was informed that the government had determined the documents were not protected. Id. at 980. Although the defendant made several additional requests to the government, he waited for another four months before filing a motion to compel the return of the file. Id. at 981. Although the defendant initially made a timely assertion of work-product protection, the court held his subsequent assertions were insufficient once the government informed the defense it would not relinquish the file voluntarily. Id. at 981-82. Judicial enforcement of the privilege was the only remedy that [the defendant] could have obtained which would have foreclosed the United States from further use of the seized file. Id. at 982. The court reasoned that a reasonable person seeking to assert the work-product doctrine would not only inform his adversary, but also seek a judicial determination. Id. Requiring assertions of privilege and work product to be made expeditiously serves the goals underlying the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine. The doctrine and privilege both work to shield confidences from adversaries. Both promote broader public interests by advancing the proper administration of legal claims. See Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389, 101 S.Ct. 677 (attorney-client privilege supports proper administration of justice); Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510, 67 S.Ct. 385 (work-product doctrine supports orderly prosecution and defense of legal claims). The key is that the party seeking protection must treat the document or communication as confidential. When a party delays in asserting protection, however, the adverse party is free to continue to use the material, thereby negating its confidential character. See In re Grand Jury (Impounded), 138 F.3d at 982. The government's investigation may irreparably rely on the protected information, thereby tainting the investigation. Id. By failing to minimize the damage caused by the breach of confidentiality, the defendant is prohibited from using the privilege or doctrine to prohibit the government's use of the information. See de la Jara, 973 F.2d at 750. Thus, in the case of an involuntary disclosure, the party asserting the work-product doctrine or attorney-client privilege must pursue all reasonable means to preserve the confidentiality of the material. Taking into account the circumstances surrounding the disclosure, we will examine the specificity with which Ary identified the material, whether protection was asserted in a timely fashion, and whether additional steps, such as judicial action, were necessary for protection. Examining the above factors, we cannot conclude the district court erred. In his communications with the United States Attorney, Ary never identified the contents of the black plastic box as protected under the work-product doctrine or the attorney-client privilege. Further, Ary did not assert protection in a timely fashion. He waited six weeks to assert protection after the Rule 16 discovery meeting. The district court concluded this delay was sufficient to constitute a waiver. We agree and hold that Ary waived work-product protection and attorney-client privilege. [6] The district court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing does not alter this result. The district court did conduct a non-evidentiary hearing on the defendant's motion to suppress. R. Vol. 19 at 3-62. At this hearing, the court received the documents contained in the black plastic box and conducted an in camera review. Id. at 49-51. Ary had a fair opportunity to present relevant facts and arguments and to counter the government's submissions. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d at 576. Ary argues an evidentiary hearing was required to determine if the government improperly printed copies of protected documents from Ary's computer or copied the files found in the black plastic box. Ary speculates the government reviewed both the computer's electronic files and the black plastic box and therefore knew it was using hard copies of the computer files it agreed were protected. This contention is unsupported by any evidence and fails to account for Ary's failure to inform the government that the contents of the black box may contain privileged information. Once Ary waived protection of the contents of the black plastic box, the government's use of these documents was proper. Under these circumstances, the district court was not obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing.