Opinion ID: 175946
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Finding Disclosure Proved by Preponderance of the Evidence

Text: We review the sufficiency of the district court's findings of fact for clear error, and we may not reverse a district court's account of the evidence [that] is plausible in light of the entire record . . . even if convinced that, had [we] been sitting as trier of fact, [we] would have weighed the evidence differently. Harlamert v. World Finer Foods, Inc., 489 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). We cannot deem the factfinder's choice between two permissible views of the evidence clearly erroneous. Id. [W]hen a trial judge's finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504. We must liberally construe[ ] findings in support of the district court's judgment, even if the findings are not as explicit or detailed as we might desire. Truform, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 80 Fed.Appx. 968, 973 (6th Cir.2003) (unpublished opinion) (citing Grover Hill Grain Co. v. Baughman-Oster, Inc., 728 F.2d 784, 793 (6th Cir.1984)). [T]he failure to even make an express finding of a particular fact does not require reversal if a complete understanding of the issues may be had without the aid of separate findings. Grover Hill, 728 F.2d at 793; Truform, 80 Fed.Appx. at 973. Contrary to the Defendants' contentions, the district court here did not rely on legally insufficient circumstantial evidence and credibility determinations in finding proof of disclosure by a preponderance. Although the district court did not explicitly state that it was crediting the Plaintiffs' proffer of inmate testimony respecting other inmates' access to the folder and use of the information over the Defendants' proffered testimony regarding the appearance of the folder, the court did explicitly state it was discrediting all of the Defendants' testimony. See Beaven, 2007 WL 1032301, at . We conclude that, when viewed in context, the findings in the remainder of the opinion confirm that the district court accepted the inmates' testimony of disclosure. See id. at -3. These findings support the district court's judgment and permit us to have a clear understanding of the reasoning behind the district court's decision. Grover Hill, 728 F.2d at 793 (If, from the facts found, other facts may be inferred which will support the judgment, such inferences should be deemed to have been drawn by the District Court.). We therefore affirm the district court's judgment that a disclosure occurred. Because we have affirmed the district court's judgment that a Privacy Act disclosure occurred in violation of § 552a(g)(1)(D) and that the agency acted in a manner that was intentional or willful, we conclude that the district court properly determined that the Plaintiffs were entitled to damages under § 552a(g)(4) of the Privacy Act. The Defendants do not challenge the district court's damages award on appeal, but our conclusion does require us to address one of the Plaintiffs' cross-appeal contentions.