Opinion ID: 1209917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Of the Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Gang Enhancement Penalties

Text: Briceno also argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to support the enhancements, as there was not sufficient evidence to sustain the conclusion that the robberies were committed with the specific intent to benefit a criminal street gang. We agree. To prevail on an insufficiency of evidence claim, a habeas petitioner must show that upon the record evidence adduced at the trial[,] no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). An additional layer of deference is added to this standard by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which obliges Briceno to demonstrate that the state court's adjudication entailed an unreasonable application of the quoted Jackson standard. See Juan H. v. Allen, 408 F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005). To warrant a gang enhancement, California law requires the prosecutor to prove two things. First, the prosecutor must demonstrate that the defendant committed a felony for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with [a] criminal street gang. Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(b)(1). Second, the prosecutor must show that the defendant committed the crime with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members. Id. We have previously recognized the importance of keeping these two requirements separate, and have emphasized that the second step is not satisfied by evidence of mere membership in a criminal street gang alone. See Garcia v. Carey, 395 F.3d 1099, 1102-03 & n. 5 (9th Cir. 2005). The California Court of Appeal limited its analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the criminal street gang enhancements to the following: Defendants note there was evidence to show the crimes were committed for personal gain (money to buy Christmas gifts) rather than any gang-related purpose. The problem with this argument is that[it] ignores Vi's expert testimony explaining how the commission of these crimes would enhance the reputation not only of the gang itself but of the individual participants as well. Based on this evidence, the jurors could reasonably have found the gang enhancement allegations were true. It was for the jurors to resolve any credibility issues or conflicts in the evidence. We cannot second-guess their decision on appeal. Briceno, 2003 WL 1710927, at . Under our case law, this analysis represents an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard, for several reasons. First, Vi's testimony did not establish Briceno's specific intent in committing the robberies, nor could it. Vi's testimony dealt almost exclusively in hypotheticals; he did not provide any direct or circumstantial evidence of Briceno and Landin's own intent. Even when asked whether he had an opinion as to whether or not [the robberies] ... were committed ... with intent to promote, further and assist criminal conduct by members of the Hard Times gang, Vi did not provide such an opinion. Instead, he responded in generalities, stating that such crimes glorif[ied] the gang and increased the status of the offenders. [1] Although we need not decide whether there was sufficient evidence with regard to the first prong of the gang enhancement, Vi's testimony might have helped to establish the first element of the gang enhancement, i.e., that the crime ultimately benefitted the gang in some way. But it says nothing about Briceno's specific intent in committing the robberies. [2] Second, the California Court of Appeal's analysis runs afoul of this court's decision in Garcia v. Carey . In Garcia, the defendant, a known gang member, robbed the victim in an area known to be in the heart of the gang's `turf.' 395 F.3d at 1103. Although a police expert testified that the defendant's gang was turf-oriented, we held that there was insufficient evidence to warrant an enhanced sentence under § 186.22(b)(1) because there was no evidence, aside from the gang expert's generic testimony, that would support an inference that Garcia robbed [the victim] with the specific intent to facilitate other criminal conduct by the [gang]. Id. Aside from evidence of Garcia's gang membership, the record was singularly silent as to what criminal activity of the gang was... intended to be furthered by the robbery. Id. We concluded that this lack of evidence triggered application of the Jackson standard, as [w]ithout this evidentiary link, it is unreasonable to conclude that a rational jury could find that Garcia committed [this robbery] with the specific intent to facilitate other gang crimes. There was simply a total failure of proof of the requisite specific intent. [3] Id. at 1104. The State urges us to disregard Garcia, citing two California appellate court decisions holding that Garcia misinterpreted California law. See People v. Hill, 142 Cal.App.4th 770, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d 875, 877 (2006); People v. Romero, 140 Cal.App.4th 15, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 862, 865 (2006). Romero and Hill both held that the specific intent element is satisfied if [the defendant] had the specific intent to `promote, further, or assist' [a fellow gang member] in [any criminal conduct]. Romero, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d at 866; Hill, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d at 877. The State argues that we are bound by this construction of the statute, under which the gang enhancements are warranted so long as Briceno intended to assist Landin in the commission of the crime and knew that Landin was a gang member. Although we are ordinarily bound by a state's highest court's interpretation of its own statute, see Dimidowich v. Bell & Howell, 803 F.2d 1473, 1482 (9th Cir.1986), none of the post- Garcia cases cited by the State were decided by the California Supreme Court, which has yet to address this issue. This panel would therefore normally be bound by the prior panel's decision in Garcia, which expressly rejected the same interpretation of § 186.22(b) advanced by the State in this case. The State argues, however, that intervening case law in the lower state courts, i.e., Romero and Hill, has cast doubt on Garcia. In the absence of a pronouncement by the highest court of a state, the federal courts must follow the decision of the intermediate appellate courts of the state unless there is convincing evidence that the highest court of the state would decide differently. Owen ex rel. Owen v. United States, 713 F.2d 1461, 1464 (9th Cir.1983) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also In re Watts, 298 F.3d 1077, 1082-83 (9th Cir.2002); Dimidowich, 803 F.2d at 1482. Our task is therefore to determine whether, after Romero and Hill, there remain convincing reasons to believe that the California Supreme Court would hold the sentencing enhancements available under § 186.22(b) inapplicable to Briceno's case. To the extent that the California Supreme Court has provided an authoritative interpretation of § 186.22(b), that interpretation suggests that the Court would not adopt the State's understanding of Romero and Hill. In People v. Gardeley, 14 Cal.4th 605, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713 (1997) (as modified), the California Supreme Court noted that the statute does not criminalize mere gang membership; rather, it imposes increased criminal penalties only when the criminal conduct is felonious and committed not only `for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with' a [gang], but also with the `specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members.' Id. at 725. The court further explained that these detailed requirements were designed to ensure that the statute increased punishment only when a defendant committed a felony to aid or abet criminal conduct of a group that has as a primary function the commission of specified criminal acts and whose members have actually committed specified crimes, and who acted with the specific intent to do so. Id. at 725 & n. 10 (emphasis added). In contrast to the State's interpretation of Romero and Hill, Gardeley suggests that merely being a gang member, or committing a crime in association with another gang member, is not enough to trigger the sentencing enhancements of § 186.22(b). Rather, the defendant must commit the crime with the specific intent to aid or abet the criminal conduct of the gang. This is precisely the evidence lacking in Briceno's case. Moreover, as this court previously recognized in Garcia, the California Supreme Court's analysis in Gardeley highlights the type of evidence necessary to sustain gang enhancements under § 186.22(b). In Gardeley, the California Supreme Court found sufficient evidence of gang-related criminal conduct where two gang members severely beat and robbed their victim in full view of neighboring apartment residents. A gang expert testified that such an assault on the gang's own turf, where they had effectively monopolized the drug trade, was committed to intimidate local residents and dissuade them from reporting the gang's activities. Id. at 716-18. The court recognized the assault as a `classic' example of gang-related activity, holding that such testimony allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that the assault was committed with a specific intent to promote, further, or assist in ... criminal conduct by gang members. Id. at 722. This theme also runs throughout the other California cases cited by the State, including Romero and Hill. In each case, a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant committed the crime with the specific intent to benefit the gang, as the defendant either committed the crime to protect gang turf or brandished gang signs or a gang moniker during the attack. See, e.g., People v. Villalobos, 145 Cal. App.4th 310, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 678, 681 (2007) (crime committed on gang turf); Hill, 47 Cal.Rptr.3d at 876 (defendant announced gang membership); Romero, 43 Cal. Rptr.3d at 864-65 (retaliatory shooting on a rival gang's turf). [4] Here, by contrast, such circumstantial evidence of intent is wholly lacking: the individual robberies were not committed in Hard Times gang territory or on the turf of a rival gang, neither Briceno nor Landin made their gang membership known to the robbery victims, and, indeed, there is no evidence whatsoever of any connection between the gang and the robberies. [5] Finally, even if we were to defer to the post- Garcia decisions of the California Courts of Appeal, not all of those decisions have adopted the expansive reading of § 186.22(b) advanced by the State. In In re Frank S., for example, the State sought gang enhancements based solely on an expert witness's testimony that the defendant was a gang member and that his criminal conduct would benefit the gang. 46 Cal.Rptr.3d at 841. The Court of Appeal held this evidence insufficient, explaining that while a trier of fact may rely on expert testimony about gang culture and habits to reach a finding on a gang allegation, such testimony is insufficient to establish that a specific individual possessed a specific intent. [6] Id. at 842; see also Killebrew, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d at 886-87. In Briceno's case, of course, the testimony of a gang expert was all that the State presented to establish specific intent. Thus, even if we were to defer to the state courts' post- Garcia interpretation of § 186.22(b), it is not at all clear that a gang enhancement could be sustained in this case. We conclude that on the facts of this case, the California Supreme Court would not hold that there was sufficient evidence to establish a specific intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct by gang members, as required by statute. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(b)(1). According to the dissent, however, the California Supreme Court has already considered and implicitly rejected Briceno's argument regarding insufficiency of the evidence[.] Diss. Op. at 1086. We disagree. In the state proceedings, both the State and Briceno filed petitions for review with the California Supreme Court. The California Supreme Court granted only the State's petition for review. That petition related to a separate legal question concerning California's Three Strikes law. See People v. Briceno, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 77 P.3d 3 (Cal.2003); Petition for Review, No. S117641, available at 2003 WL 23015606, at  (filed July 28, 2003). None of the justices voted to grant Briceno's petition for review as to the question of whether the commission of a crime with a fellow gang member, without more, [is] sufficient to prove the crimes were gang related.... See Briceno, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 32, 77 P.3d at 3; Petition for Review, No. S117641, available at 2003 WL 23015605, at . The briefing in the case further demonstrates that the gang enhancements were not before the California Supreme Court, as the parties addressed only the Three Strikes issue. Concluding its opinion on that issue, the court wrote: In all other respects, the judgment [of Briceno's conviction] is affirmed. Briceno, 20 Cal.Rptr.3d 418, 99 P.3d at 1015. Contrary to the reasoning of the dissent, it is unlikely that the California Supreme Court, in a single boilerplate sentence at the end of its opinion on an issue that it decided to review at the behest of one party, intended to express an authoritative view on an issue presented by another party that it had in fact expressly decided not to review. See In re KF Dairies, Inc. & Affiliates, 224 F.3d 922, 925 n. 3 (9th Cir.2000); cf. Trope v. Katz, 11 Cal.4th 274, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 902 P.2d 259, 268 n. 1 (1995) (It is well established that our refusal to grant a hearing in a particular case is to be given no weight insofar as it might be deemed that we have acquiesced in the law as enunciated in a published opinion of a Court of Appeal when such opinion is in conflict with the law stated by this [C]ourt. (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original)). We think that the portion of the gang enhancement statute requiring specific intent has a plain meaning, that our interpretation is consistent with Garcia and Gardeley, and that the California Supreme Court is likely to conclude that the mere fact that Briceno committed the robberies with another gang member is insufficient to support a gang enhancement under § 186.22(b). We emphasize that Garcia does not displace the Jackson standard as the proper lens with which we review state-court decisions. This court's decision in Garcia remains persuasive because it analyzed the only California Supreme Court decision addressing § 186.22(b), i.e., Gardeley, 14 Cal.4th 605, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713, to guide this court's interpretation of the elements of § 186.22(b). See Garcia, 395 F.3d at 1103-04. Moreover, Garcia interpreted the substantive elements of § 186.22(b) based on legal considerations that remain valid in this appeal, namely, the California Supreme Court's decision in Gardeley, and the specific-intent language in § 186.22(b), which has not been amended since Gardeley. See Garcia, 395 F.3d at 1103-04. Indeed, the California Supreme Court has not, to date, invalidated this court's interpretation of § 186.22(b) or otherwise disagreed with Garcia in any decision. We therefore hold that the appellate court's conclusion in this case represents an unreasonable application of the Jackson standard, and we grant Briceno's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as to the sufficiency of the evidence.