Opinion ID: 2211822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: standard of review for competency hearings

Text: [12] ¶ 32. Having addressed the purpose of competency to stand trial, we now turn to the first issue in this case, namely which standard of review an appellate court must employ when reviewing the competency determination of a circuit court. Byrge asks this court to adopt the position of the concurrence in Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 229 (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring), arguing that the issue of competency is a question of constitutional fact, or a mixed question of fact and law, subject at least partially to independent review. The State maintains competency determinations should be reviewed as questions of fact under the clearly erroneous standard endorsed by the majority opinion in Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 223-24. As a threshold matter, we note that whether an issue presents a question of fact or a question of law is in itself a question of law. Crowley v. Knapp, 94 Wis. 2d 421, 429-30, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). ¶ 33. In Garfoot, a majority of this court held that competency to stand trial must be reviewed under the deferential clearly erroneous standard. Garfoot approached competency determinations as functionally factual inquiries. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 223, 225. Findings of fact are not set aside unless they are clearly erroneous, and appellate courts give due regard to a circuit court's opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses. Wis. Stat. § 805.17(2). We reasoned that competency determinations merit this level of deference because the circuit court can balance witness credibility and demeanor: The trial court is in the best position to decide whether the evidence of competence outweighs the evidence of incompetence. Although the court could make precise findings of fact about the skills and abilities the defendant does and does not possess, the court must ultimately determine whether evidence that the defendant is competent is more convincing than the evidence that he or she is not. The trial court is in the best position to make decisions that require conflicting evidence to be weighed. Although the court must ultimately apply a legal test, its determination is functionally a factual one: either the state has convinced the court that the defendant has the skills and abilities to be considered competent, or it has not. The trial court's superior ability to observe the defendant and the other evidence presented requires deference to the trial court's decision that a defendant is or is not competent to stand trial. Only the trial court can judge the credibility of witnesses who testify at the competency hearing. Thus, only the trail court can accurately determine whether the state presented evidence that was sufficiently convincing to meet its burden of proving that the defendant is competent to stand trial. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 222-23. ¶ 34. Chief Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, joined by Justice Ann Walsh Bradley and Justice Janine P. Geske, concurred in Garfoot. Emphasizing the constitutional basis of a competency hearing, the concurrence maintained that a competency determination implicates a question of constitutional fact, a mixed question of fact and law, subject to a two-tier standard of review. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 229, 231-32. (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring). Under this methodology, an appellate court first applies the deferential, clearly erroneous standard in its review of the historical, evidentiary facts. Id. at 234. The reviewing court then independently analyzes the application of constitutional principles to the facts. Id. at 234-35. ¶ 35. Justice William A. Bablitch concurred separately in Garfoot, finding the concurrence authored by Chief Justice Abrahamson fairly persuasive but concluding that the court should await a better briefed case in which the standard of review is actually at issue before rejecting the clearly erroneous standard. Id. at 238 (Bablitch, J., concurring). [13] ¶ 36. The standard of review is at issue in this case, and both parties have briefed the issue thoroughly. We therefore revisit our holding in Garfoot. We begin by considering how the United States Supreme Court treats the standard of review in competency hearings. This court frequently has sought uniformity in the law by following the Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation. See Isiah B. v. State, 176 Wis. 2d 639, 646, 500 N.W.2d 637 (1993). ¶ 37. The Garfoot concurrence pointed to our independent review of many issues characterized as constitutional facts, including the sufficiency of Miranda warnings, voluntariness of confessions, voluntariness of consent to search, and whether the right to silence has been honored. Garfoot, 207 Wis. 2d at 235 n.11. In these areas of inquiry, our constitutional decision making has conformed with the interpretations set forth by the Supreme Court. The Court appraises similar questions independently, recognizing the uniquely legal dimension of those issues. [8] Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1995). ¶ 38. This court's goal of seeking uniformity leads us to consider the manner in which the Supreme Court classifies appellate review of competency determinations. Although the Court certainly categorizes some issues as constitutional facts, it does not treat all constitutional questions identically. The Court's approach reveals that competency falls within a unique sphere of inquiry, a sphere in which the issue turns on more than historical facts but nonetheless requires appellate courts to grant deference to the findings of a trial court. ¶ 39. The difference between constitutional facts, mixed questions of fact and law, and historical facts, or simply questions of fact, is often fuzzy at best. [9] Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983). The Supreme Court itself acknowledges that it has not charted an entirely clear course in the elusive arena of distinguishing between legal and factual questions. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 106 (1985); see also Cooter & Fell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401 (1990). Whether to label an issue a question of law, a question of fact, or a mixed question of law and fact often is more a matter of allocation than analysis, an allocation in which the Court recognizes that one judicial actor is better positioned than another to decide a matter. Miller, 474 U.S. at 113-14. ¶ 40. Initially, the Supreme Court suggested that reviews of competency determinations comprise mixed questions of fact and law. Under that methodology the Court first examined the trial court's findings of historical facts deferentially but then reviewed independently the ultimate question of competency. Because the determination of competency implicates due process protections, the Court suggested that it was appropriate for it to undertake its own independent review of the application of constitutional principles. Drope, 420 U.S. at 175 n.10; Robinson, 383 U.S. at 385-86. ¶ 41. The Supreme Court has retooled its approach and now treats competency determinations more like questions of fact. In Maggio v. Fulford, 462 U.S. 111 (1983) (per curiam), a majority of the Court held that its review of a competency determination must be confined to the clearly erroneous standard. [10] Fulford was the result of a habeas corpus proceeding. A Louisiana trial court refused to order examination by a competency commission after assessing the testimony of a psychiatrist who interviewed the defendant for about one hour the day before the hearing. Id. at 113. In its review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the decision of the trial court was not supported by the record. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the appellate court erroneously substituted its own judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that of the Louisiana courts. Id. In finding that a trial court is better positioned to reach the ultimate competency determination, the Court reasoned: Face to face with living witnesses the original trier of the facts holds a position of advantage from which appellate judges are excluded. In doubtful cases the exercise of his power of observation often proves the most accurate method of ascertaining the truth. . .how can we say the judge is wrong? We never saw the witnesses. . . . Id. at 118 (citations omitted). ¶ 42. Fulford was the product of a divided Court. [11] Since Fulford, however, the Court has not departed from its decision to allocate the ultimate decision of competency to the trial court. Two years after Fulford, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in Miller, concluded that certain trial court findings, including competency to stand trial, should be afforded deference because their resolution hinges on witness credibility, and hence, evaluation of demeanor. 474 U.S. 112-13. Such areas of inquiry offer compelling justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial court. Id. at 114. Subsequently, Justice Ginsburg reiterated this view when she authored the majority opinion in Thompson. She noted that although certain issues, including competency determinations, embody more than basic, historical facts, they nonetheless fall within a genre of decisions that the court classifies as factual issues. 516 U.S. at 111. [12] ¶ 43. Many federal courts follow Fulford, Miller, and Thompson in habeas corpus proceedings, treating competency determinations as factual issues left to the discretion of state trial courts. [13] Deference to trial courts is not, however, limited to federal habeas corpus reviews of state court decisions. A number of state courts apply the Fulford line of cases to appellate review of competency proceedings. [14] These courts implicitly acknowledge that the Fulford methodology is appropriate for competency determinations because of the qualitatively factual nature of the inquiry, not because of the particular posture of a federal habeas corpus proceeding. [15] Like federal courts, these state courts recognize that trial judges are better positioned than appellate judges to observe a defendant's conduct and to gauge the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. [16] ¶ 44. Based on our analysis of the case law since Fulford, we conclude that the Supreme Court classifies competency to stand trial within a discrete category in which the resolution of the legal issue is better left to the trial court. [17] Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111; Miller, 474 U.S. at 112-13. Although more than the what happened types of historical facts arise in a competency determination, the decision pivots on factors only a trial court can appraise. Thompson, 516 U.S. at 111. In a competency proceeding, the ultimate resolution of the legal issue rests on the court's observation of witness credibility and demeanor. [18] An issue does not lose its factual character merely because its resolution is dispositive of the ultimate constitutional challenge. Miller, 474 U.S. at 106. We therefore are persuaded that the circuit court is the judicial actor best positioned to apply a legal standard to the facts of a competency decision. [14] ¶ 45. In the interest of uniformity and consistency in constitutional decision making, we follow the interpretation of the Supreme Court and allocate the application of law to fact to the circuit court in competency proceedings. Because a competency determination depends on the circuit court's ability to appraise witness credibility and demeanor, there are compelling and familiar justifications for leaving the process of applying law to fact to the trial court. Id. at 114. We therefore do not disturb our holding in Garfoot and adhere to the clearly erroneous standard for reviewing circuit court determinations in competency proceedings.