Opinion ID: 433508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Act's language.

Text: 35 The Supreme Court has stated: [T]he starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). In this case the statute first provides that the Commission shall at once give notice of [a preliminary permit] application in writing to any State or municipality likely to be interested in or affected by such application[.] 16 U.S.C. Sec. 797(f) (1982). Second, it defines municipality as a city, county, irrigation district, drainage district, or other political subdivision or agency of a State competent under the laws thereof to carry on the business of developing, transmitting, utilizing, or distributing power. Id. Sec. 796(7). 36 The statutory definition of municipality thus expressly includes those entities that FERC now contends it can expressly exclude in interpreting the notice provision. Moreover, although a requirement of written notice is generally understood to mean personal notice, see NLRB v. Vapor Recovery Systems Co., 311 F.2d 782, 785 (9th Cir.1962), FERC argues that certain types of municipalities should have to rely on general public newspaper and Federal Register notices, even though the statute specifically states that they are entitled to notice[s]    in writing. In addition, although the statute is unambiguous and, using the word shall, is written in the language of command[,] Ass'n of American Railroads v. Costle, 562 F.2d 1310, 1312 (D.C.Cir.1977), FERC views itself as free to exercise broad flexibility in deciding what meets its obligation to Congress. 37