Opinion ID: 2973753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of a Previous Bank Robbery

Text: Gibson testified that Sykes and Johnson talked to him on December 9, 2002, about a robbery they had completed on December 7, and defendant objected on the ground that the testimony was not relevant. The district court overruled the objection when the prosecutor responded that it was “a part of the coconspirator statements.” Gibson then reported that Sykes and Johnson told him that the $9,600 that they claimed to have won from a casino on December 8 was actually from a bank robbery they committed on December 7. Defendant renewed his objection, arguing that the evidence was not within the bank robbery conspiracy charged in this case. The government responded that the statements were made in the context of recruiting Gibson to participate in another bank robbery. The Court advised her to end that line of questioning. When Gibson stated that he told Johnson he would participate in the robbery if no gun was used, and the prosecutor asked him if Johnson told him that the December 7 robbery was completed with just a note, defendant objected because the court had prohibited further inquiry into that area. The court sustained the objection. At the end of the day, Johnson moved for a mistrial, arguing that he was prejudiced by the mention of the other bank robbery. The court denied the motion, and the prosecutor suggested instructing the jury about the limited purpose of the evidence of another robbery. The court agreed to give such an instruction but left the decision to defense counsel’s discretion, stating that the court would be available, if needed, the following morning. Johnson never requested or submitted a proposed instruction. Johnson contends that Gibson’s statements were evidence of a past criminal act, which required the government to give Johnson pretrial notice of such evidence and also required No. 04-2371 10 the district court to evaluate several factors before admitting the potentially prejudicial statement.1 See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b); United States v. Merriweather, 78 F.3d 1070 (6th Cir. 1996). We review evidentiary issues for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mack, 258 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 2001). The government argues that the statements were not introduced as 404(b) evidence, but rather as background evidence relating to Johnson’s recruitment of Gibson into the robbery scheme by assuring him that he had successfully robbed a bank a few days before with no firearm. “Proper background evidence has a causal, temporal or spatial connection with the charged offense. Typically, such evidence is a prelude to the charged offense, is directly probative of the charged offense, arises from the same events as the charged offense, forms an integral part of a witness’s testimony, or completes the story of the charged offense.” United States v. Hardy, 228 F.3d 745, 748 (6th Cir. 2000). Gibson’s statement about Johnson’s previous bank robbery was not introduced as “other acts” evidence under Rule 404(b), but was offered as background evidence relative to Johnson’s recruitment of Gibson into the conspiracy to rob the bank. This court has held that similar evidence may be introduced as background evidence. In United States v. Wesley, 417 F.3d 612, 621-22 (6th Cir. 2005), the defendant made a statement to a person he wanted to recruit into a bank robbery conspiracy. On the way to case the bank, the defendant said that after he and another man committed a crime previously, neither testified against the other and 1 We note that although the government has never conceded that the evidence is 404(b) evidence, it did file a motion in limine alerting the defense and the court before trial that it planned on introducing the statements. No. 04-2371 11 they went to prison together. The defendant argued that the statement was improper Rule 404(b) evidence, but this court held that it was properly admitted as background evidence. It was intertwined with the attempted bank robbery offense, we reasoned, because the statement was made on the way to case the bank, was part of the planning of the robbery, and was relevant to establish the defendant’s intent. Id..2 In United States v. Holley, 57 Fed. App’x 639, 641 (6th Cir. 2003) (unpublished decision), the government introduced evidence that the defendant, who was on trial for arson, had told a potential coconspirator about his previous arsons. On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence was improper 404(b) evidence. Id. at 640. We disagreed, holding that the evidence was not introduced to show a propensity to commit arson, but was rather admitted as background evidence that explained how the conspiracy arose, and the statements were made in an attempt to recruit a coconspirator. Id. at 641. Likewise, in this case, Johnson’s statements about a previous bank robbery were not introduced to show Johnson’s propensity to commit crime, but was background evidence that went to show that Johnson recruited a get-away driver as part of his bank-robbery plan. Furthermore, the government offered another valid reason why the statements were relevant. The government knew that Gibson’s credibility would be attacked by the defense 2 The defendant in Wesley also argued that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403 because its probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. This court agreed, holding that it raised a considerable danger of the jury deciding guilt on an impermissible factor, the defendant’s prior incarceration, and that “[t]his is particularly a concern where the evidence presents a close question on the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 622. In this case, Johnson does not make the argument that the evidence should have been excluded under Rule 403, and even if he had, this is a case where the sufficiency of the evidence is not a close question. No. 04-2371 12 because of the plea bargain he reached with the government. The plea bargain dropped the firearm charge, among others, against Gibson. One reason it was dropped was because Gibson said he did not know a firearm would be used in the robbery. Thus, the government maintains that what Gibson knew at the time he joined the conspiracy was relevant to his credibility. Finally, even if we were to conclude that the district court erred by allowing the statements, we would find the error harmless because of the overwhelming, unchallenged evidence indicating Johnson’s guilt.