Opinion ID: 2514493
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other manifestations of legislative intent are inconclusive as to whether the legislature intended RCW 46.55.120 to be the exclusive remedy for unlawful impoundments

Text: ¶ 28 In the absence of statutory language or provisions clearly establishing the exclusivity of a remedy, we may look to other manifestations of legislative intent to determine whether the legislature clearly intended a statute to be an exclusive remedy. Wilmot, 118 Wash.2d at 54, 821 P.2d 18. In Wilmot, we considered, among other things, the comprehensiveness of the remedy provided by the statute, the purpose of the statute, and the origin of the statutory right. Id. at 61-65, 821 P.2d 18. Considering each of these factors in this case, we find there is no clear indication that the legislature intended the redemption procedures of RCW 46.55.120 to be the exclusive remedy for unlawful impoundments. ¶ 29 Remedies. The adequacy or comprehensiveness of a statutory remedy is a factor to consider when determining whether the legislature intended for a statutory remedy to be exclusive. Wilmot, 118 Wash.2d at 61, 821 P.2d 18. In Wilmot, the court found the damages provided under the retaliatory discharge statute were inadequate because the statute did not clearly authorize all damages which would be available in a tort action. Id. The statutory remedy was `all appropriate relief including rehiring or reinstatement of the employee with back pay.' Id. at 55, 821 P.2d 18 (quoting RCW 51.48.025(4)). The court reasoned `all appropriate relief' was ambiguous and, thus, may or may not include emotional distress damages, which would be available under the common law. Id. at 61, 821 P.2d 18. The court also noted the specific damages listed in the statute were equitable in nature, thus adding to the uncertainty as to whether the legislature intended the statutory remedy to be exclusive. Id. ¶ 30 The WSP argues the statute's provisions manifest the legislature's intent to provide an exclusive statutory remedy. However, the fact the legislature provided a statutory remedy does not necessarily evidence a clear intent to create an exclusive remedy. Id. at 53, 821 P.2d 18. RCW 46.55.120 provides some relief when a vehicle is unlawfully impounded. The statutory remedies are limited to fees, costs, and reasonable loss of use damages. RCW 46.55.120(3)(e). The remedy is even more limited in cases, like Potter's, where an improper impoundment arose from a DWLS violation. Where the DWLS impoundment is improper but conducted in good faith reliance on department records, the statute limits WSP's liability to fees and costs. Id.; Honda Accord, 117 Wash.App. at 521, 71 P.3d 226 (loss of use damages unavailable when agency relies in good faith on driving records). Finally, for all impoundments, whether lawful or unlawful, the owner may request the surplus proceeds available after the vehicle is sold at an auction and the tow truck operator's lien is satisfied. RCW 46.55.130(2)(h). ¶ 31 Potter argues the statutory remedies are inadequate and incomprehensive because they do not provide the same damages as a conversion action. Generally, the measure of damages for conversion is the fair market value of the property converted. Merchant, 38 Wash.App. at 858, 690 P.2d 1192. An owner is also entitled to loss of use damages for the period of time during which the owner was wrongfully deprived of the converted property. Dunn v. Guar. Inv. Co., 181 Wash. 245, 248, 42 P.2d 434 (1935). Finally, consequential damages may be available in some circumstances. Dennis v. Southworth, 2 Wash.App. 115, 124, 467 P.2d 330 (1970) (allowing damages for the loss of profits or reasonable rental value of converted property). ¶ 32 The redemption statute does not provide adequate or comprehensive relief for the conversion of a vehicle for a number of reasons. First, while good faith limits the liability of the impounding agency under the statute, RCW 46.55.120(3)(e), good faith is not a defense to conversion, Paris American Corp. v. McCausland, 52 Wash.App. 434, 443, 759 P.2d 1210 (1988). Thus, if a conversion action is brought following a DWLS impoundment, loss of use damages would be available under the common law, but not under the statute, assuming a good faith reliance on driving records. [12] Second, for people who do not attempt to, or are unable to, redeem their vehicles, the remedy is even more inadequate. [13] Once a vehicle is sold at an auction, the owner has the right to claim any surplus proceeds for up to one year. RCW 46.55.130(2)(h). Under conversion, the owner would receive the fair market value of the vehicle. Merchant, 38 Wash.App. at 858, 690 P.2d 1192. The auction value of a car, after satisfaction of a tow truck operator's lien, is an inadequate remedy when compared to the fair market value of the vehicle. In short, the inadequacy of the remedy provided by the redemption statute is evidence that the legislature did not intend the statute to be the exclusive remedy for an unlawful impoundment. ¶ 33 Purpose. When determining whether a statute is exclusive, the court should strive to uphold the purpose of the statute. Wash. Water Power Co., 112 Wash.2d at 855, 774 P.2d 1199; Wilmot, 118 Wash.2d at 66, 821 P.2d 18. The legislative history of the challenged statute should be reviewed to determine whether allowing a common law action to proceed would frustrate the legislative purpose of the statute. Wash. Water Power Co., 112 Wash.2d at 854, 774 P.2d 1199; Wilmot, 118 Wash.2d at 63-64, 821 P.2d 18. ¶ 34 In Washington Water Power Co., we determined the Washington product liability act (WPLA), chapter 7.72 RCW, is the exclusive remedy for product liability claims. 112 Wash.2d at 853, 774 P.2d 1199. Although WPLA did not contain an express preemption clause, the court determined, [c]lear statutory language and corroborative legislative history leave no doubt about the WPLA's preemptive purpose. Id. The scope of WPLA is broadly defined so as to include `any claim or action brought for harm caused by the ... product.' Id. (quoting RCW 7.72.010(4)). Furthermore, the legislative history indicated the purpose of the statute was to eliminate common law remedies and provide a single cause of action. Id. at 854, 774 P.2d 1199. The court reasoned that allowing common law claims would defeat the purpose of WPLA and, essentially, render[] the statute a nullity. Id. at 856, 774 P.2d 1199. ¶ 35 Unlike Washington Water Power Co., allowing a common law cause of action for conversion does not defeat the purpose of the statute in this case. WSP asserts the purpose of RCW 46.55.120 was to limit the government's liability for unlawful impoundments. However, while language in the statute addresses the extent of the government's liability, there is no evidence in the legislative history of the statute suggesting the redemption statute was intended to limit the government's liability. ¶ 36 RCW 46.55.120 was first adopted in 1985. LAWS OF 1985, ch. 377, § 12. RCW 46.55.120 was based, in part, on previous statutes dealing with the redemption of abandoned vehicles (LAWS OF 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 178, § 4) and vehicles impounded on private property (LAWS OF 1983, ch. 274, § 4). The predecessors of RCW 46.55.120 were passed to satisfy due process concerns. 1979 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 46th Wash. Leg., 1st Ex.Sess., at 72; 1983 FINAL LEGISLATIVE REPORT, 48th Wash. Leg., at 298-99. ¶ 37 In 1998, language was added to RCW 46.55.120 regarding impoundments for DWLS violations. Laws of 1998, ch. 203, § 5. The new requirements for DWLS impoundments were added to protect public safety due to the increased risk of accidents posed by people driving with suspended licenses. LAWS OF 1998, ch. 203, § 1. Additionally, the legislature determined, [e]xisting sanctions are not sufficient to deter or prevent persons with a suspended or revoked license from driving. Id. The statute was intended to provide an immediate consequence which will increase deterrence and reduce unlawful driving by preventing a suspended driver access to that vehicle. Id. In light of this legislative history, it appears the purpose of RCW 46.55.120 is, in relevant part, to protect the public, deter DWLS violations, and provide due process when a vehicle is impounded. Allowing a common law action in conversion for the unlawful impoundment of a vehicle does not interfere with protecting the public, deterring DWLS violations, and providing due process. ¶ 38 Origin of the statutory right. In determining whether a statute is exclusive, the court also considers whether the statute creates a new right or whether the right preexisted the statute at common law. Wilmot, 118 Wash.2d at 62, 821 P.2d 18. Where the common law remedy predates the statutory remedy, the court infers the statutory remedy is cumulative, not exclusive. Id. at 63, 821 P.2d 18. In this case, the modern law of conversion was first recognized in 1841. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A cmt. a (1965). The statutory vehicle redemption procedures, in their earliest form, were passed in 1979. LAWS OF 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 178, § 4. Consequently, the common law remedy of conversion predated the statutory redemption procedures, which suggests the impound statute is not exclusive.