Opinion ID: 1770580
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: what is the constitutionally mandated burden of proof in a forfeiture proceeding?

Text: Spooner argues the state was constitutionally required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each ground for the forfeiture. Specifically, Spooner complains the state's proof with respect to the $1,400 rested entirely on the statute's rebuttable presumption that all monies seized incident to a valid arrest and in close proximity to contraband, paraphernalia or records pertaining thereto, was itself contraband. La.R.S. 32:1500(A)(7)(c). La.R.S. 32:1550 [1] defines the procedure and legal proof necessary for the seizure and forfeiture of contraband, including conveyances or moveable property used to facilitate the transportation of controlled dangerous substances. The state sought forfeiture of Mr. Spooner's automobile and the $1,400.00 found in his pocket pursuant to the following language in the statute: § 1550. Forfeitures A. The following are contraband and shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture, and all property rights in the following are forfeited:       (3) All cash which is used, or intended for use, to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, production, manufacture, compounding, dispensation, concealment, importing, or exporting of [controlled dangerous substances or equipment used in the manufacturing and processing, etc. of controlled dangerous substances].       (5) All conveyances or moveable property, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, manufacture, compounding, dispensation, or concealment of [controlled dangerous substances or equipment used in the manufacturing and processing, etc. of controlled dangerous substances]. The statute also provides the state must prove the value of the contraband was in excess of five hundred dollars or that the contraband was intended for commercial sale. La.R.S. 32:1550(C)(3). Once this burden is satisfied, forfeiture of Spooner's automobile falls easily within La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(5) since Spooner was carrying controlled dangerous substances in the automobile. Proving the $1,400.00 falls under La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(3) was made easier for the state under La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(7)(c) which provides: There shall be a rebuttable presumption that all moneys, coin, and currency seized incident to a valid arrest and found in close proximity to contraband controlled dangerous substances or contraband manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia or records of the illegal importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled dangerous substances, are contraband as defined herein. The burden of proof shall be upon claimants of such property to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Spooner's arguments that the state must prove each ground for forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt rely on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140 (La.1983), and State v. Searle, 339 So.2d 1194 (La.1976). In re Winship is cited for the proposition that due process requires the prosecution to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73. Searle is cited for the proposition that the use of mandatory presumptions in criminal cases will be sustained only if the prosecution can demonstrate that the presumed fact flows, beyond a reasonable doubt, from the proven fact on which it is made to depend. 339 So.2d at 1205. Both are correct statements of the law. See, State v. Lindsey, 491 So.2d 371, 374 (La.1986); State v. Jones, 481 So.2d 598 (La.1986); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-18, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972-73, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-58, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-26, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). However correct and well-settled these principles are, they have applicability only in the context of criminal cases. Consequently, in order to give his arguments any vitality, Spooner must show that the forfeiture statute, found among the Motor Vehicle and Traffic Regulations in the Revised Statutes, is governable by criminal law principles and jurisprudence. To accomplish this and show the necessary connexity, Spooner relies on State v. Manuel, supra . In Manuel, writs were granted to consider the correctness of a district court's ruling which upheld the constitutionality of La.R.S. 32:1550 in the face of the defendant's motion for the release of two cars seized in connection with his arrest on three counts of drug distribution. After a thorough analysis and full written treatment, this Court affirmed. Id. at 148 (Marcus and Watson, JJ., concurring). Manuel classified forfeitures as quasi-criminal and suggested the proceedings were valid only so long as the taking of property ... [is] subject to the same preconditions required for a seizure of criminal evidence. Id. at 143, 146. Manuel also suggested that federal due process analysis might be insufficient because federal review, under the 5th and 14th Amendments, is in some respects less exacting than Louisiana constitutional inspection.... Id. at 146. Accordingly, and pertinent here, Manuel read La.R.S. 32:1550 as requiring: the district attorney to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a hearing instituted by him that: (1) valid grounds exist for forfeiture of the property under the statute which do not conflict with the constitution; (2) the seizure was in conformity with the constitution and the law or was made upon reasonable grounds to believe that it so conformed; (3) the owner of the conveyance was knowingly and intentionally a consenting party or privy to a violation of the controlled dangerous substances statute; (4) the value of the contraband was in excess of five hundred dollars or the contraband was intended for commercial sale. Id. at 147. Manuel was decided January 10, 1983, or some eight months before the amendment which added (A)(7) and its disputed presumption to La.R.S. 32:1550. (Acts 1983, No. 150, § 1, effective August 30, 1983). At issue is whether (A)(7)(c)'s presumption passes constitutional muster under Searle and progeny.
The Third Circuit's close reading of Manuel led it to conclude that Spooner's reliance was misplaced. It conceded the opinion contained language to the effect the state must prove each ground for forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt, but the appellate court considered Manuel of no precedential value because the case involved a pre-trial proceeding, and the precise issue of the burden of proof required of the State ... was not before [the Court]. As a result, the Third Circuit viewed Manuel's statements concerning the burden of proof as dicta, not a firm adjudication of the issue and, thus, not binding on lower courts. With respect to the nature of the proceedings, the Third Circuit had no quarrel with Manuel's assessment that forfeitures were quasi-criminal in character. In the court's view, however, this was not inconsistent with the legislature's designation of forfeiture as in rem proceedings under La.R.S. 32:1551 and with the whole body of federal statutory and jurisprudential law, which recognized forfeitures as civil in rem remedial sanctions, quasi-criminal in nature, which do not require the wide range of constitutional protections required in criminal cases. Spooner, 505 So.2d at 233. The Third Circuit then undertook an exploration of federal jurisprudence interpreting forfeitures under 21 U.S.C. § 881 to determine the precise nature of forfeiture proceedings and the extent of constitutional protections due claimants. Finding this body of law persuasive the court construed La.R.S. 32:1550 as calling for a civil proceeding. It went on to dispose of the core of Spooner's contentions this way: The legislature recognized the difficulty in proving the origin of monies seized in connection with narcotic arrests and in an attempt to diminish the profitability of the illegal drug trade and to help finance the state's effort to fight illicit drug trafficking established the § (A)(7)(c) presumption. That presumption is nothing more than an inference, deduced from facts in evidence, which continues to stand only in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The foregoing leads us to the inescapable conclusion that La.R.S. 32:1550 et seq. establishes a civil remedial proceeding and the presumption created by § (A)(7)(c) is permissive and constitutional. We therefore find this issue without merit. Id. at 237.
The issue of whether the Federal or the Louisiana Constitution requires that the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt in forfeiture proceedings is a question of great importance because of the immense impact which illegal drugs has on society. It is common knowledge, as one judge in New York has noted, that illegal narcotics activity is an insidious vice resulting in human degradation and suffering. Sochemaro v. Rossetti, 6 Misc.2d 23, 161 N.Y.S.2d 454, 458 (1957). The forfeiture provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act were written for the express purpose of creating a weapon in the battle against the illegal drug trade. They permit confiscation of the property used to further illegal activities and thereby deprive drug traffickers of a means of committing subsequent illegal acts. See, e.g. State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So.2d 479, 487 (La.1977) (Summers, J., dissenting); In re Forfeiture of 1983 Wellcraft Scarab, 487 So.2d 306, 309 (Fla.App.1986); State v. S and S Meats, Inc., 92 Wis.2d 64, 284 N.W.2d 712, 715 (App.1979). One often cited reason for the enactment of the provisions is that drug traffic has such a disastrous effect upon society and is so great an evil as to justify the drastic remedy of forfeiture. Vehicle Forfeitures Under South Dakota's Controlled Substances Statute: An Evaluation of the Law in Light of Constitutional Challenges, 21 S.D.L.Rev. 119, 138-9 (1976), citing, Relief to Owner of Motor Vehicle Subject to State Forfeiture For Use in Violation of Narcotic Laws, 50 A.L.R.3d 172, § 2(a) (1973). In light of the immense importance of the constitutional issue to our society's fight against the drug trade, I believe this Court should again carefully examine this issue and the authorities cited in Manuel. It will be seen that the federal jurisprudence and the great weight of authority in other states clearly indicate that the United States Constitution does not mandate proof beyond a reasonable doubt in cases such as this. It therefore will be necessary to consider whether provisions of the Louisiana Constitution provide greater protection against forfeiture than does the United States Constitution.
As the Court of Appeal noted, Manuel was a pre-trial proceeding. Therein, this Court concluded the state had shown probable cause to proceed with a forfeiture action against the vehicles. The defendant had filed a motion for release of the vehicles, the merit of which was before the court. However, noting the quasi-criminal nature of forfeiture, the Court did say at trial of the forfeiture proceedings proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be necessary. Manuel, 426 So.2d at 148. It is apparent a seemingly logical jump was made from the premise that the statute was quasi-criminal to the conclusion that all criminal constitutional protections apply. First, I have no doubt Manuel was correct in saying a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in that it penalizes the claimant, and its penalty can result in even greater punishment than the prosecution. Id. at 143. Obviously, the loss of an automobile and a significant sum of cash can be a great penalty. Nevertheless, upon reflection I would find another statement made in the same paragraph not to be entirely correct. The Manuel court said that the object of a forfeiture proceeding, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense. Id. This statement is only partially true. An object, no doubt, is to penalize. However, an entirely separate object of the forfeiture proceeding exists. The forfeiture of the res used to further the illegal drug trade does more than punish. As I noted above, it also serves to deter further drug trafficking by taking part of the trafficker's means of committing subsequent acts. It is this second purpose which makes the nature of forfeiture quasi-criminal rather than entirely criminal. This Court tacitly recognized this fact in Manuel. A controlled dangerous substances forfeiture statute ... is, the Court said, a reasonable exercise of police power because it fosters the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property and in enforcing criminal sanction. Id. at 146. (emphasis added) This prevention of further drug traffic is an important exercise of the police power of the state and furthers the civil needs of the community. As noted in Schwegmann Bros. v. Louisiana Board of Alcoholic Beverages Control, 216 La. 148, 43 So.2d 248, 255 (1949), the police power allows: such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Consequently, both persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, welfare, and prosperity of the people of the state; everything contrary to the public interest is the subject of the exercise of the power. Two Louisiana cases [2] were cited in Manuel for the proposition that the object of a forfeiture proceeding is to penalize. Manuel, 426 So.2d at 143. They were State v. Billiot, 254 La. 988, 229 So.2d 72 (1969) and Cornman v. Conway, 178 La. 357, 151 So. 620 (1933). The facts of these two cases are entirely consistent with the premise that all penalizations are not entirely criminal in nature, but that some penalties might be considered an exercise of the civil police power. Cornman involved a statute allowing forfeiture of vehicles used to transport malt extract without the tax having been paid. The issue was whether a judicial hearing was needed to seize the property. The court held that it was. It cited E. Freund, The Police Power, §§ 525, 526 (1904), for the proposition that where an unlawful use of property may be punished by forefeiture [s]uch forfeiture is not an exercise of the police power, but of the judicial power; i.e., the taking of the property does not directly subserve the public welfare, but is intended as punishment for an unlawful act. Cornman, 151 So. at 622. The court contrasted the forfeiture statute with a statute which allowed an impoundment fee for towing an illegally parked cara statute which the court did not hold to be punitive, but was found to have been enacted to abate dangers to the public. Two things are interesting to note regarding Cornman. First, the court's example of a fee for towing could be construed as in part a penalty for the act of parking illegally. Admittedly, the penalty was probably not the primary purpose of the state. However, the existence of the penalty aspect did not require a criminal judicial proceeding. Second, the Cornman court views the forfeiture statute as entirely punitive in nature. Freund even suggests that it has no direct subservience of the public welfare. These observations were perhaps correct regarding the state's purpose in enforcing its malt tax requirements, but such suggestions would not be correct as regards the legislative desire to curb the drug trade via La.R.S. 32:1550. Similarly, the Billiot case cannot lend support for the conclusion that the sole object of all forfeitures is to punish the claimant. Billiot involved a criminal statute which made trawling for shrimp during the closed season a misdemeanor. The penalty provisions included (1) a jail sentence, (2) a fine, and (3) the forfeiture of the seines, trawls, tackle, etc. used in the violation. Manuel is correct to cite this case as an example of a forfeiture statute which is intended only as a penalty. This is not, however, the case with the forfeiture provisions in R.S. 32:1550, et seq., which specifically state that it is to be considered an in rem proceeding. La.R.S. 32:1551(A). Moreover, this statute is not a part of the criminal code, but is a provision in the Motor Vehicles section of the revised statutes. Cornman and Billiot are the only Louisiana cases cited in Manuel for the proposition that the object of forfeiture is to penalize for a criminal offense. In State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So.2d 479 (La.1977), however, these same cases were cited (along with Finance Security Co. v. Conway, 176 La. 456, 146 So. 22 (1933); Perry v. Butler, 8 So.2d 95 (La.App.2d Cir.1942); and Armbruster v. Behan, 3 Orl.App. 184 (1906)) for the similar proposition that a forfeiture proceeding, although technically a civil proceeding, is designed as a penalty for violation of a law. It is appropriate to examine these cases to see if they support the premise that the sole object of a forfeiture lays in its design as a penalty. Finance Security Co. involved the same malt tax statute as Cornman. A truck was seized for carrying untaxed malt, but the owner of the truck was in Mississippi and was not aware that the driver, who had possession of the truck only on consignment, was carrying untaxed malt. The court held the forfeiture statute was unconstitutional because it did not afford the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard. The court did not hold that the purpose of the statute was to penalize, but they did cite the same passage in Freund's The Police Power which was cited in Cornman. Perry merely stands for the proposition that, in all penal or summary proceedings for the divestiture of title to property, the law must not only be construed strictly but its substantial requirements must be closely observed as well. Perry, 8 So.2d at 97. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that penal statutes be strictly construed. This has never meant, however, that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required. Armbruster involved the taking of $825.00 by the State because the money was used in illegal gambling. The court stated: In this statute, as in all other criminal statutes where the word occurs, forfeiture is synonymous with fine. Armbruster, 3 Orl.App. at 197. (emphasis added) But the court did not hold that all forfeitures are criminal in nature. Rather, the court distinguished between criminal forfeiture and civil forfeiture. For example, they cite Ex Parte Alexander, 39 Mo. App. 108, 109 (1890): The meaning of the word forfeit is to be determined by the connection in which it is used. When used in civil proceedings and in connection with the enforcement of civil rights, it contemplates an ordinary civil judgment which need not even be penal in its character; but when used in a criminal law it denotes a punishment for a statutory crime, the meaning of the word is equivalent to fine. The Armbruster court also cites United States v. 3 Tons of Coal, 6 Biss. 379 (E.D. Wis.1875), where Justice Dwyer discusses in an exceedingly learned opinion the difference between a forfeiture in rem under certain sections of the internal revenue laws, and a forfeiture as a punishment for a personal crime: I think I speak with accuracy when I say that these proceedings (forfeiture in rem under the internal revenue law) ... stand independent of and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam. The forfeiture is not in an apt and legal sense a punishment for crime, even though the crime be committed when the forfeiture is incurred. The true test, I think, lies here. When the judgment of forfeiture necessarily carries with it and as part of it a conviction and judgment against the person for the crime, the case is of criminal character. But where the forfeiture does not necessarily involve personal conviction and judgment for the offense, and such conviction and judgment must be obtained, if at all, in another and independent proceeding, then the remedy, by way of forfeiture, is of a civil and not criminal nature. Armbruster, 3 Orl.App. at 198. The Armbruster court also cited Green v. Briggs, 1 Curtis (U.S.) 317 (1852), where the court stated that a case where [i]t is not possible to separate the proceedings ... against the property, from the proceedings against the person must be distinguished from a forfeiture resulting from particular circumstances attending property imposed sometimes with and sometimes without a conviction of the owner for crime. Armbruster, 3 Orl.App. at 197. Finally, the Armbruster court concluded: In our own State many statutes imposing forfeitures have been the subject of discussion and decision by the Supreme Court, and the line has been clearly drawn between penal statutes wherein forfeitures are imposed, and criminal statutes, where forfeitures are intended as a punishment for crimes. Id. at 203. In summary, the cases cited in Manuel and the cases cited in 1971 Green GMC Van for the same proposition do not fully support the idea that forfeitures (as quasi-criminal statutes in that they do penalize the claimant) are criminal in all aspects and should always be treated as criminal. Rather, as will be seen when I discuss both the federal cases cited in Manuel and their progeny, and the cases treating forfeitures in other states, the use of the phrase quasi-criminal is particularly apt because it recognizes that forfeiture proceedings remain in many respects civil in nature.
Manuel cites, in addition to Cornman and Billiot, three federal cases regarding the quasi-criminal nature of forfeiture. Manuel, 426 So.2d at 143. They are: U.S. v. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 91 S.Ct. 1041, 28 L.Ed.2d 434 (1971); One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965); and Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1885). In Boyd a forfeiture provision was found in a statute making importation of certain property a crime. The Court held that it is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to seize property for forfeiture without a warrant or probable cause. They also held the Fifth Amendment protection against being a witness against oneself was implicated. U.S. Coin and Currency states: [A]s Boyd v. U.S . ... makes clear, proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of the offenses committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in their nature criminal for Fifth Amendment purposes. From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man who forfeits $8,674 because he used the money in illegal gambling activities and a man who pays a criminal fine of $8,674 as a result of the same course of conduct. In both instances, money liability is predicated upon a finding of the owner's wrongful conduct; in both cases, the Fifth Amendment applies with equal force. U.S. Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. at 718, 91 S.Ct. at 1043. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. at 701, 85 S.Ct. at 1251, stated a forfeiture proceeding is quasi-criminal in character. Its object, like a criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law. These cases standing alone would surely lend great support to the defendant's position. However, as noted below, the U.S. Supreme Court has backed away from the statements in Boyd, U.S. Coin and Currency, and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan and has firmly refused to broaden the criminal aspect of forfeiture so as to encompass a wider range of constitutional protections. Spooner, 505 So.2d at 233. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court now clearly recognizes that for many purposes the civil nature of forfeiture dominates the quasi-criminal characteristics; thus, not every criminal constitutional provision protects the forfeiture claimant. For example, in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 94 S.Ct. 2080, 40 L.Ed.2d 452 (1974), the issue involved the forfeiture of a boat which was carrying marijuana for distribution. The Court said: Seizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the property to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby fostering the public interest in preventing continued illegal use of the property and in enforcing criminal sanction. 416 U.S. at 679, 94 S.Ct. at 2089-90. (emphasis added) The Court also cites at page 684 Justice Story's statement in The Palmyra, 12 Wheat 1, 14-15, 6 L.Ed. 531 (1827) that the practice has been, and so this Court understands the law to be, that the whole proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any criminal proceedings in personam. The forfeiture statute serves the underlying laws against the illegal drug trade in two ways. First, it is an economic penalty rendering the illegal behavior unprofitable. Second, it prevents further illegal use of the property. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 686-7, 94 S.Ct. at 2093-4. The Court specifically noted U.S. Coin and Currency was not applicable because that case turned upon the clear intention of Congress to impose a penalty only upon those who were significantly involved in a criminal enterprise. Other statutes which are not intended only to punish criminal offenders do not get the same level of due process protection. Id. at 688, 95 S.Ct. at 2094. Another case where the U.S. Supreme Court retreated from the analysis in Boyd is One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring v. U.S., 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972). Illegally imported jewels were subjected to a forfeiture statute, but the defendant was acquitted of the criminal charges which also resulted from the importation. The defendant asserted that the forfeiture action was (1) barred by the criminal double jeopardy rules because it was an attempt by the state to enact punishment for a crime he was already acquitted of and (2) barred by collateral estoppel. The Court held, first, that: the forfeiture is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment because it involves neither two criminal trials nor two criminal punishments. Congress may impose both a criminal and a civil sanction to the same act or omission.... Id. at 235, 93 S.Ct. at 492. The Court felt the penalty had remedial purposes as well as punitive purposes. Id. at 237, 93 S.Ct. at 493. Regarding the defendant's collateral estoppel argument, the Court stated: Moreover, the difference in the burden of proof in criminal and civil cases precludes application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel. The acquittal of the criminal charges may have only represented an adjudication that the proof was not sufficient to overcome all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 397, 58 S.Ct. 630, 632, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938). As to the issues raised, it does not constitute an adjudication on the preponderance-of-the-evidence burden applicable in civil proceedings. Id. at 235, 93 S.Ct. at 492. The Court added: Forfeiture of goods [is] ... enforcible by civil proceedings.... In spite of their comparative severity, such sanctions have been upheld against the contention that they are essentially criminal and subject to the procedural rules governing criminal prosecutions. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. at 400, 58 S.Ct. at 633. The question of whether a given sanction is civil or criminal is one of statutory construction. Id. at 237, 93 S.Ct. at 493. Calero-Toledo and Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring demonstrate the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to consider forfeitures as criminal for all constitutional purposes. Rather, Boyd, U.S. Coin and Currency, and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan represent the high water mark in extending constitutional criminal protections to a forfeiture claimant. The obvious difficulty presented by this jurisprudence is in deciding when the quasi-criminal nature of forfeiture actions mandates full criminal protection. Why does the U.S. Supreme Court forbid the state to make a warrantless search and seizure without probable cause (Fourth Amendment) and forbid the state to force a claimant to incriminate himself (Fifth Amendment), but not consider forfeiture criminal for double jeopardy purposes (also Fifth Amendment)? The U.S. Supreme Court addressed this question squarely in U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980). It said: This Court has declined ... to give full scope to the reasoning and dicta in Boyd, noting on at least one occasion that several of Boyd's express or implied declarations have not stood the test of time. Fisher v. U.S., 425 U.S. 391, 407 [96 S.Ct. 1569, 1579, 48 L.Ed.2d 39] (1976). In U.S. v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 [34 S.Ct. 213, 58 L.Ed. 494] (1914), for example, we declined to apply Boyd's classification of penalties and forfeitures as criminal in a case where a defendant ... claimed he was entitled to have the Government prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.... [Rather, Boyd ] did not modify or disturb but recognized the general rule that penalties may be recovered by civil actions, although such actions may be so far criminal in their nature that the defendant cannot be compelled to testify against himself in such actions in respect to any matters involving, or that may involve, his being guilty of a criminal offense. Ward, 448 U.S. at 253, 100 S.Ct. at 2643-4. (emphasis added) The Court notes that a case can be criminal enough to trigger the protections of the Fifth or the Fourth amendments, but not so far criminal in its nature to trigger other criminal constitutional guarantees. Id. Further, it notes that the statute in Boyd listed forfeiture along with fine and imprisonment as one possible punishment for customs fraud, a fact of some significance to the Boyd court, but in the case under consideration, the civil remedy and the criminal remedy were in separate statutes. Id. at 254, 100 S.Ct. at 2644. This same rationale was developed in a U.S. Court of Appeal case which dealt with the issue now before this courtwhether proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in a forfeiture proceeding. Bramble v. Richardson, 498 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1974). Bramble was caught transporting marijuana in his automobile, which was seized pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881, a federal forfeiture statute. The criminal charges against Bramble were dismissed; nevertheless, the government proceeded with its forfeiture action. Under 21 U.S.C. § 881 the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove that his vehicle is not forfeitable as contraband. All the government need show is that there is probable cause to believe that it is contraband. Bramble challenged § 881 as unconstitutional, saying that the forfeiture proceeding is in reality a criminal action and that to take his car without establishing beyond a reasonable doubt that a criminal violation has occurred violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 970. The Court of Appeal, meeting Bramble's contentions, noted that Boyd did say forfeiture is quasi-criminal, but they also noted that One Lot Emerald Cut Stones and One Ring demonstrates the U.S. Supreme Court does not equate forfeiture with a criminal action for all constitutional purposes. The difficult question, they say, is under what circumstances will the quasi-criminal statute be considered criminal and when civil? Many situations, of course, exist outside forfeiture where civil fines are allowed. The Court of Appeal answered the question by focusing on whether the reason for the constitutional provision is being sidestepped. They stated: In holding that the forfeiture proceeding was invalid the Court [in U.S. Coin and Currency ] was essentially stating only that the civil penalty could not be imposed in a manner inconsistent with the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. We therefore do not read U.S. Coin and Currency as signaling an end to the characterization of forfeiture actions as essentially civil proceedings.... What Coffey, Boyd, One Plymouth Sedan, and U.S. Coin and Currency do indicate is that the civil nature of forfeiture proceedings will not be permitted to provide an avenue through which the fundamental rights of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and self-incrimination can be frustrated. A close reading of those cases simply does not justify the inference that they were intended to transform forfeiture proceedings into criminal actions for all procedural purposes. The absence of the reasonable doubt standard in the challenged forfeiture process does not result in a denial of due process. Id. at 973. The current federal test for determining when a penal statute (i.e., one that is quasi-criminal in nature because it penalizes the defendant) is to be considered as civil is outlined in U.S. v. Ward, supra ; Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 58 S.Ct. 630, 82 L.Ed.2d 917, (1938); and Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S.Ct. 554, 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963). First the Court considers whether the legislative branch, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or another. Ward, 448 U.S. at 246-7, 100 S.Ct. at 2640. Second, where the legislative branch has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty, we have inquired further whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. In regard to this latter inquiry, we have noted that only the clearest proof could suffice to establish the unconstitutionality of a statute on such ground. Id. Regarding the controlled dangerous substances contraband forfeiture statute, it is evident the Louisiana Legislature considered the action to be a civil in rem action. La.R.S. 32:1551(A). Recognizing that forfeiture can be punitive, this Court has not been afforded proof of any unreasonableness of this penalty. Rather, as seen already, forfeiture aids in preventing those who deal in drugs from doing so again. A more recent case by the U.S. Supreme Court is on point. In U.S. v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984), a man was tried for illegally dealing in firearms but was acquitted. The government nevertheless instituted forfeiture proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 924(d). The defendant claimed the forfeiture proceeding was criminal in nature, not civil. The Court said: Finally, the forfeiture provision of § 924(d) furthers broad remedial aims. Section 924(d) was enacted as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and later retained without alteration in the Gun Control Act of 1968. In enacting the 1968 gun control legislation, Congress was concerned with the widespread traffic in firearms and with their general availability to those whose possession thereof was contrary to the public interest. Accordingly, Congress sought to control the indiscriminate flow of firearms.... Keeping potentially dangerous weapons out of the hands of unlicensed dealers is a goal plainly more remedial than punitive. Accordingly, we hold that Congress viewed § 924(d) forfeiture as a remedial civil sanction rather than as criminal punishment. (citations omitted) Id. at 364, 104 S.Ct. at 1105-6. Thus, said the Court, the forfeiture is not an additional penalty so punitive under the second part of the Ward/Mitchell test as to override Congress's labeling it as a civil statute. The analogy between La.R.S. 32:1550 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(d) is obvious.
It is apparent from the analysis above that the federal courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, do not consider the U.S. Constitution to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in forfeiture cases. Rather, the language in Boyd, U.S. Coin and Currency, and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan which was relied on in Manuel has been limited and clarified in subsequent cases. It has been seen that the Louisiana jurisprudence cited in Manuel, along with Boyd, U.S. Coin and Currency, and One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, cannot be said to justify the full sweep of the conclusion reached in Manuel that all criminal constitutional protections apply. It is also appropriate to note that the overwhelming majority of states follow the federal lead. [3] The following statutory provisions and court decisions make express references to the burden of proof not being beyond a reasonable doubt in forfeiture actions. Ala.Code § 20-2-93 (1975) (The standard of proof required under this section is reasonable satisfaction); State v. Blair, 435 So.2d 124 (Ala.Civ.App.1983); Tucker v. State, 445 So.2d 311 (Ala.Civ.App.1984); Pickron v. State, 443 So.2d 905 (Ala.1983); Woods v. State, 247 Ala. 155, 22 So.2d 901 (1945); Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 13-4311 (Supp.1986), (Civil in rem action); Ark. Stat.Ann. § 82-2629 (Supp.1985); Reding v. State, 277 Ark. 288, 641 S.W.2d 24 (1982) (preponderance); Reddin v. State, 15 Ark. App. 399, 695 S.W.2d 394 (1985) (in rem civil proceeding, independent of the criminal charge and to be decided by a preponderance of the evidence); Fla.Stat. §§ 932.701-704 (1985); In Re Forfeiture of 1974 Ford Pickup Truck, 462 So.2d 1127 (Fla.App.1984) (Forfeiture is a civil remedy and the law does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt to sustain the petitioner's case. Marks v. State, 416 So.2d 872 (Fla.App.1982); Tallahassee v. The Forfeiture of One Yellow 1979 Fiat, 414 So.2d 1100 (Fla.App.1982)); In re Forfeiture of 1983 Wellcraft Scarab, 487 So. 2d 306 (Fla.App.1986) (State need only show probable cause that the res is subject to forfeiture); Morgan v. State, 172 Ga. App. 375, 323 S.E.2d 620 (1984) (preponderance); Idaho Code § 37-2744 (Supp.1987) (Forfeiture proceedings shall be civil actions against the property subject to forfeiture and the standard of proof shall be preponderance of the evidence. § 37-2744(d)); Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 56½, § 1505 (Supp.1987); People v. LeShoure, 97 Ill.Dec. 880, 143 Ill.App.3d 839, 493 N.E. 2d 687 (1986) (preponderance); Ind.Code § 16-6-8.5-5.1 (1983); Iowa Code §§ 809.11 (Supp.1987) (Forfeiture is a civil proceeding. At the hearing the burden is on the state to prove by a preponderance ...); Miss.Code Ann. § 41-29-153 (Supp.1986) (preponderance); Reed v. State, 460 So.2d 115 (Miss.1984) (preponderance); Ervin v. State, 434 So.2d 1324 (Miss.1938) (preponderance); N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 318-B:17-b (Supp.1987) (shall be deemed a civil suit in equity in which the state shall have the burden of proving all material facts by a preponderance of the evidence....); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 34-20B-70 et seq. (1986) (Forfeiture proceedings shall be civil actions against the property seized and the standard of proof shall be preponderance of the evidence.); Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 4476-15 § 5.07(b) (Vern.Supp. 1987) (preponderance); Valles v. State, 646 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.App.1983) (preponderance); Sochemaro v. Rossetti, 6 Misc.2d 23, 161 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1957) (forfeiture is civil); Lettner v. Plummer, 559 S.W.2d 785 (Tenn.1977) (preponderance); Commonwealth v. 1978 Toyota, 468 A.2d 1125 (Pa. Super.1983) (despite quasi-criminal nature, preponderance is enough); State v. S and S Meats, Inc., 92 Wis.2d 64, 284 N.W.2d 712 (App.1979) (greater weight of the credible evidence).
The foregoing makes it abundantly clear that courts in other jurisdictions, and particularly the U.S. Supreme Court, do not find that forfeiture proceedings are mandated by due process to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Also, the cases cited in Manuel for the proposition that forfeiture is penal do not support the idea that forfeiture proceedings should be treated as criminal for all purposes. This being so, one must look to the Louisiana Constitution to see whether it mandates a higher burden of proof. This inquiry is particularly necessary in light of this Court's reference in Manuel to the more detailed safeguards for property rights contained in our state charter. Manuel, 426 So.2d at 147. Two provisions of the Louisiana Constitution are relevant to this discussion. La. Const. Art. I, § 2 reads: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law. La. Const. Art. I, § 4 reads: Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect, and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power. Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit. Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity authorized by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question. In every expropriation, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine compensation, and the owner shall be compensated to the full extent of his loss. No business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the purpose of operating that enterprise or halting competition with a government enterprise. However, a municipality may expropriate a utility within its jurisdiction. Personal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken. This Section shall not apply to appropriation of property necessary for levee and levee drainage purposes.
It is difficult to conclude Section Two of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights affords greater due process protection than does the due process clause in the Federal Constitution. The language of the two provisions is almost identical. The U.S. Fourteenth amendment provides that no State shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Not only is the language almost identical, but a co-author of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights believes that Section Two continues the standard of `fundamental fairness' used to determine whether governmental action violates those `principles of justice which lie at the base of all of our civil and political institutions.' Louis Woody Jenkins, The Declaration of Rights, 21 Loyola L.Rev. 9, 16 (1975). This standard does not differ from the federal standard. As recited above, the federal and state constitutions both provide that no person shall be deprived of property without due process of law, but balanced against this substantial due process right, however, is the police power of governing authorities to protect the health, safety, morals and general welfare of the people. Theriot v. Terrebonne Parish Police Jury, 436 So.2d 515, 519-20 (La.1983). Moreover, in regard to the taking of property, the federal and state due process guarantees requires only that the legislature have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 520; City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 96 S.Ct. 2513, 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955); Harry's Hardware, Inc. v. Parsons, 410 So.2d 735 (La.1982). Clearly the State has a legitimate interest in curbing the illegal drug trade, and the means chosen by forfeiture rationally serves that end by preventing drug dealers from using their property to engage in further illegal acts.
As regards Section Four of the Declaration of Rights it has been stated [t]he right to own and control private property is recognized and given far-reaching new protection in another entirely new Section entitled `Right to Property.' Certainly, no other state constitution places such extensive limitations on the power and authority of government to regulate or expropriate private property. Jenkins, supra, at 19. This statement is undoubtedly correct, and if a greater protection from forfeiture is to be found in our Constitution, then it must lie in Section Four rather than Section Two. The language of Section Four is, indeed, not entirely found in the Federal Constitution. Despite the great reach of Section Four in the protection of property, it is apparent the reach does not extend to requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in forfeiture proceedings. The language and the history of this provision make this clear. At the Constitutional Convention hearings Mr. Jenkins was asked by Mr. Henry to explain the section. XII Constitutional Convention of 1974, Verbatim Transcripts, p. 6 (Aug. 30, 1973). Mr. Jenkins began by saying that property rights are as important as liberty rights because in Socialist countries where the government owns the means of production, even though liberty is guaranteed, liberty is less possible. For example, free press is less free because government owns so much of the business enterprises which advertise. Id. at 6-7. The first sentence of Section Four, explained Mr. Jenkins, means simply this. It does not mean that a person has a right with regard to any given piece of property; to dispose of it, or own it, or enjoy it. But that he has a general right, that the right, say, to own property cannot be a right which is taken away from him. Id. at 7. Regarding the second sentence: There are basically two ways in which government limits property rights. One, by the police power, that is the regulatory power of the state, the authority of the state to do virtually anything in furtherance of the common welfare in the nature of regulation of property, so long as property rights are not denied entirely. That is what we refer to here when we talk about the police power. Id. Mr. Jenkins further explained the first two sentences of Section Four as follows: The first sentence of the Section spells out various attributes of the right to property. This right is then limited by the two exceptions listed in the second sentence. This has the effect of making respect for property rights the rule and  reasonable statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power the exception. Unlike present law, this does not mean that a statutory restriction or an exercise of the police power is constitutional merely because it does not amount to a taking of property. The first two sentences would have been meaningless if that had been the intent, because the remainder of the Section protects citizens when their property is actually taken. On the contrary, the purpose of this language is to limit the authority of the Legislature and to limit the exercise of the police power to a standard of reasonableness. Moreover, since the rule is protection of property rights and the exception is regulation of those rights, the burden of proof must shift from the owner of property to its regulator. In other words, it is not the duty of the property owner to demonstrate that a given regulatory scheme is wholly arbitrary; instead, it is the responsibility of the state to show its reasonableness. This is not to say that any manner of regulatory activity is necessarily invalid. Price fixing, licensing laws, land-use laws, zoning, fire code, building restrictions and countless other measures are all constitutionally permissible, provided they meet the standard of reasonableness and do not violate other constitutional safeguards, such as due process and equal protection. Moreover, even restrictions which do meet the standard of reasonableness on their face must still be administered in a reasonable manner. Even without language such as that in the second sentence, a number of other states use the due process clause in their own constitutions to scrutinize legislation with greater care than the federal courts and to invalidate laws with greater frequency. However, the new standard established in the second sentence of the Section provides an additional basis for the courts to inquire into the question of whether state action affecting property rights has a rational basis. Id. at 20-21. (Emphasis added) It is readily apparent that regulation of property need only be reasonablealthough the state must show it is reasonable rather than relying on a presumption of reasonableness as is done in Fourteenth Amendment cases. Further, the transcript statements by Mr. Jenkins show that the concern addressed by the section was that of Socialism or excessive regulation or ownership of property by the government. Delegates also believed that both public and private entities authorized by law to expropriate have abused that power. Finally, delegates expressed the fear that there were few constitutional safeguards against the expropriation or nationalization and business concerns which has occurred in other countries. Id. at 19. The last two paragraphs of Section Four deal with expropriation in contrast to the first paragraph's concern with regulation. See, Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 L.L.R. 1, 13 (1974). It is in the subject matter of expropriation that the Louisiana Constitution gives far-reaching new protections. Protections regarding expropriations cannot be said to limit the government's reasonable regulation of contraband. It is true that Section Four provides that personal effects, other than contraband, shall never be taken [expropriated]. Forfeiture is not expropriation, however. Neither is the taking of contraband prohibited. Professor Hargrave correctly understood the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section Four as regards the forfeiture or taking of contraband when he noted: The government's power to classify items as contraband and to take them without compensation is of course limited by the provision that the right to own property is subject to reasonable restrictions and that property cannot be taken without due process. Id. at 20. As we've already seen, the taking of contraband under La.R.S. 32:1550 is both reasonable and comports with due process. No right, therefore, to have proof beyond a reasonable doubt in forfeiture proceedings can be gleaned from La. Const. Art. I, § 4. Rather, the burden of proof in a forfeiture proceeding is the civil standard of preponderance of the evidence. Insofar as Manuel required proof beyond a reasonable doubt in forfeiture proceedings, I would expressly overrule that case.