Opinion ID: 1819859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether delashmit's counsel was unconstitutionally prevented from making a closing argument regarding reasonable doubt.

Text: ¶ 21. Lastly, Delashmit contends that he suffered irreparable prejudice due to the trial court's limiting his closing arguments. Defense counsel made the following statements during closing arguments to the jury: Now, what is a reasonable doubt? Well, if you're thinking right now, Why would he admit to everything when he was interviewed at the jail by Donna Franks? Why would he say all of this about what happened if he had some sort of intent to take the child off? If you wonder about that, why would he do that, and you're doubting whether that means that he intended to do that, then that is reasonable to you. And that could be a reasonable doubt. A doubt that you have about any of the evidence, about any of the why did this happen or why did this event take that course, if you have a question in your mind about why, that's a doubt. And if you can put a reason on top of that  At this point during defense counsel's closing argument, the following exchange occurred in open court: Mr. Daniels: Objection to trying to define reasonable doubt to the jury, Your Honor. The Court: Yes, sir. You cannot define, that, Counsel. It's for the jury to determine. All right, you may proceed. Mr. Helmert: Your Honor, I  The Court: Go ahead, but you can't tell them what it is. There's no definition to prove as to what reasonable doubt is. Mr. Helmert: Your Honor, I'm not asking the Court to sanction what I'm  I'm not asking the Court to instruct that. I'm asking to argue on behalf of my client. The Court: All right. Go ahead. ¶ 22. After defense counsel stated that he was only asking to argue on behalf of [his] client, the trial court gave him the go-ahead to continue his argument. This Court has held that distinctions between reasonable doubt, all possible doubt, beyond a shadow of a doubt, and the like, while, not properly the subject of jury instructions, are permissible during trial counsel's closing argument. Christmas v. State, 700 So.2d 262, 269 (Miss.1997) (quoting Heidelberg v. State, 584 So.2d 393, 396 (Miss.1991)). In the end, after the above exchange between the trial court and counsel, Delashmit was given this opportunity during closing arguments. However, defense counsel chose, for unknown reasons, to discontinue his argument with regard to reasonable doubt. From the cold record, we can only conclude that this was not trial-court error but rather a choice on the part of defense counsel. Additionally, before the prosecutor objected to defense counsel's closing argument, Delashmit's counsel had several moments to give his opinion of what constituted a reasonable doubt, and the trial court did not instruct the jury to disregard these comments by defense counsel. ¶ 23. Further, even assuming arguendo that the aforementioned trial-court exchange was an impermissible prohibition against defense counsel's reasonable-doubt argument, the error was harmless. The test for harmless error is whether it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Thomas v. State, 711 So.2d 867, 872 (Miss.1998) (quoting Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 392, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 114 L.Ed.2d 432 (1991)). Based on the overwhelming evidence of guilt in the record, this error, if any, had no effect on the ultimate outcome of this case. See Kolberg v. State, 829 So.2d 29, 68 (Miss. 2002) (citing Tanner v. State, 764 So.2d 385, 399-400 (Miss.2000)). ¶ 24. Therefore, we find this issue to be likewise without merit.