Opinion ID: 38065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disclosure of Evidence under Brady

Text: Next, Infante argues that his conviction should be reversed because the government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose the fact that Castellon had filed a motion requesting a psychiatric evaluation of himself in connection with his own criminal trial for drug trafficking and that the district court had granted the motion and ordered the evaluation. This court reviews allegations of Brady violations de novo. United States v. Hughes, 230 F.3d 815, 819 (5th Cir. 2000). To prevail upon his Brady claim, Infante must establish that: (1) the prosecution did not disclose evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the defense; and (3) the evidence was material--i.e., there is a reasonable probability that if the -13- government had disclosed the evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Lawrence v. Lensing, 42 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 1994). Even if we assume, without deciding, that Infante has established the factors required for a Brady claim, his argument still fails. “Brady rights are not denied where the information was fully available to the defendant and his reason for not obtaining and presenting such information was his lack of reasonable diligence.” United States v. Dean, 722 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1983); accord Wilson v. Whitley, 28 F.3d 433, 435 n.3 (5th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases); Smith v. Black, 904 F.2d 950, 964 (5th Cir. 1990) (noting that Brady “exempts information that the defense could have obtained from other sources by exercising reasonable diligence”), cert. granted and vacated on other grounds, 503 U.S. 930 (1992), reinstated in relevant part on remand, 970 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Fogg, 652 F.2d 551, 559 (5th Cir. 1981). Here, Infante concedes that the motion seeking, and the court order granting, Castellon a psychiatric exam was part of Castellon’s file for the criminal case against him for drug trafficking on June 29, 2000--the same incident that formed part of the conspiracy case against Infante. Infante does not deny that Castellon’s case file was a matter of public record, that he could have obtained the file upon request, and that the psychiatric exam order would have been apparent upon -14- review of the file. Instead, he argues that due diligence does not require a criminal defendant or his attorney to obtain and review the court file on the government’s star witness. We cannot agree, especially when the file pertains to an alleged coconspirator and the charges against the co-conspirator are so closely related to the conspiracy with which the defendant is charged. Under these particular facts, Infante’s Brady argument is without merit. C. Motion for New Trial and Newly Discovered Evidence Infante also argues that the district court erred by not granting his motion for a new trial. Several months after Infante was convicted, the previously discussed psychological evaluation of Castellon was prepared in connection with the criminal case against him. Infante argues that this psychological evaluation, which disclosed that Castellon suffered from memory problems, constitutes newly discovered evidence warranting a new trial. This court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 924 (5th Cir. 1995). “We disfavor these motions and view them with great caution.” Id. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Infante’s motion. To receive a new trial under FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 for newly discovered evidence, Infante “must prove that: (1) the evidence is newly -15- discovered and was unknown to the defendant at the time of trial; (2) failure to detect the evidence was not due to a lack of diligence by the defendant; (3) the evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) the evidence is material; and (5) the evidence introduced at a new trial would probably produce an acquittal.” Jarmillo, 42 F.3d at 924. The district court denied Infante’s motion because it remained unconvinced that the introduction of the psychiatric report probably would have produced an acquittal. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in denying Infante’s motion because, as the district court noted, Castellon admitted on the stand that he had memory problems and that he had to write things down to remember. Thus, the jury had information that Castellon’s memory was imperfect, and the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine him on that point. The jury credited Castellon’s testimony when compared to Infante’s conflicting testimony notwithstanding their knowledge that Castellon had a bad memory. Furthermore, Castellon’s critical testimony that Infante was involved in the alleged conspiracy did not rely heavily on a memory of intricate facts such as the precise order of dates and times, and it was supported by corroborating evidence in the form of phone records. In addition, although the psychiatric evaluation placed Castellon in the below-average range in the area of immediate memory, it -16- placed him well within the average range for working memory. In light of these facts, we cannot say that the introduction of the information contained in the psychiatric evaluation probably would have resulted in an acquittal. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Infante’s motion for a new trial. D. 404(b) Evidence Infante also complains that the district court erred in admitting evidence that he received traffic tickets for driving a Suburban without registration and for failing to change the name on the registration. DEA Agent Mike Hill testified at Infante’s trial that after he found the traffic tickets in Infante’s home, he questioned Infante about them. Infante replied that he had received the tickets in December 2000 (which is after the scope of the conspiracy with which Infante was charged) while he was driving a 1984 Chevy Suburban to Mexico to have it painted.7 The government presented other evidence at trial that the conspirators drove unregistered vehicles to Mexico where they had them painted before using them to transport marijuana back into the United States. Infante argues that this evidence is extrinsic to the crimes with which he was charged and that it is 7 Infante testified that he drove the Suburban to Mexico (a full day’s round trip) to have it painted there because it was considerably less expensive than having it painted in the United States. -17- inadmissible propensity evidence under FED. R. EVID. 404(b).8 Because Infante did not object to the admission of this evidence at trial, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 443 (5th Cir. 2004), pet. for reh’g denied, 2004 WL 1335740 (5th Cir. 2004). Under this standard, Infante “must show clear or obvious error that affects his substantial rights; if he does, this court has discretion to correct a forfeited error that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, but we are not required to do so.” United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866, 874 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Infante’s claim fails under this standard. For admission under Rule 404(b), extrinsic evidence must satisfy two criteria: “(1) it must be relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401 to an issue other than the defendant’s character; and (2) it must have probative value that substantially outweighs its prejudicial impact under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.” United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159, 165 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911-13 (5th Cir. 1978) 8 Rule 404(b) provides that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . . -18- (en banc). Here, the evidence that Infante was caught driving an unregistered Suburban to Mexico where he planned to have the vehicle painted is relevant under Rule 401 to an issue other than Infante’s character because it links Infante to the method used by the drug conspirators for trafficking drugs into the United States. This probative value substantially outweighed any marginal prejudicial impact that might have arisen from the information that Infante received traffic tickets for driving an unregistered vehicle. Other than connecting him to the methods used by the drug conspiracy, the evidence of his receipt of a ticket for failing to register a vehicle did not show that Infante had a propensity to commit crime or had a dishonest or otherwise unlawful character. Regardless, even if the evidence were wrongly admitted, its admission did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Thus, reversal of Infante’s conviction is not warranted on this ground. E. Comment on the Evidence Infante also argues that his conviction should be reversed because the district court improperly commented on the evidence. During its deliberations, the jury wrote a note to the district court asking: “The Suburban that [Infante] was pulled over by the DPS--and rec[ei]ved a ticket for not having registration on it. Is it the same one that was confiscated?” The district court responded in writing: “There is no evidence either way.” Infante -19- claims that this was an incorrect characterization because the evidence showed that the Suburban that Naverette admitted to having used to transport marijuana was a 1995 model, whereas the Suburban that Infante drove when he received his ticket was a 1984 model. He argues that, although he did not object at trial, the comment should be reviewed for abuse of discretion rather than plain error because the record does not show that he had an opportunity to object (i.e., it does not show that he knew the judge had received the note and intended to comment on the evidence). We need not decide the proper standard of review here, however, because Infante’s argument fails under either standard. The government points out that, although the Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”) argued the inference that Navarette (and Belloc) had used the same vehicle as Castellon, the Suburban that was confiscated was the one Castellon was driving when he was arrested on June 29, 2000, and no evidence indicates the year of that Suburban. Thus, no evidence directly linked or refuted a possible link between the confiscated Suburban and the unregistered Suburban that Infante was driving when he received his ticket. Infante also complains that the district court did not instruct the jury that it was not bound by his comment on the evidence. Although the district court did not specifically admonish the jury when it answered this particular question, the -20- court instructed the jury a number of times throughout the trial that the jury, and not the court, is the sole judge of the facts. More important, even if the district court did so err, any such error was harmless because the jury had ample evidence before it to find Infante guilty even if it had been conclusively proven that the Suburbans driven by Castellon and Infante were not the same. See United States v. Mitchell, 166 F.3d 748, 752 (5th Cir. 1999). Thus, the district court’s comment on the evidence was not reversible error. F. Conflict of Interest Infante argues that he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because his attorney labored under a conflict of interest. “Under the Sixth Amendment, if a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel, he also has a corresponding right to representation that is free from any conflict of interest.” United States v. Vaquero, 997 F.2d 78, 89 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981)). Infante’s trial counsel, Anthony Foster (“Attorney Foster” or “Foster”), represented two of the witnesses who testified against Infante, Gallegos-Natera and Rivera-Hernandez, in their own criminal cases. Those cases involved GallegosNatera and Rivera-Hernandez’s transportation of marijuana into the United States on January 29, 2000 and July 14, 2000. Those drug-smuggling incidents were, coincidentally, the same incidents about which the witnesses testified at Infante’s trial in support -21- of the conspiracy charges. Before trial, the government filed a Rule 44 motion to bring Attorney Foster’s potential conflict of interest to the district court’s attention. The district court held a limited hearing on the matter.9 At that hearing, the AUSA stated that he saw a potential conflict of interest but did not believe an actual conflict existed. The AUSA indicated that Foster represented Gallegos-Natera and Rivera-Hernandez previously in their own criminal cases but that neither witness knew anything about Infante or would directly implicate him in their testimony. Foster explained to the court that he had not gained any confidential information from either Gallegos-Natera or RiveraHernandez about Infante’s case. The court asked whether these two prospective witnesses were former clients of Attorney Foster, and Foster replied that they were former clients in the sense that they had pled guilty and had been sentenced. However, Foster added that if Gallegos-Natera or Rivera-Hernandez did testify against Infante, then he would “pull [his] files and run over to the [g]overnment’s office and ask for a Rule 35 [motion for a reduction in their sentences for substantial assistance in the prosecution of Infante] on [behalf of] the former clients.” Notwithstanding this statement, the district court concluded that 9 Although the district judge presiding over Infante’s trial was Judge W. Royal Furgeson, Jr., visiting Judge Stanwood Duval presided over the hearing relating to Infante’s attorney’s possible conflict of interest. -22- no conflict of interest existed and that there was therefore no need to go into a more extensive Garcia10 hearing. Accordingly, the district court did not question Infante regarding his understanding of the potential conflict of interest, and Infante did not waive his right to conflict-free representation. As noted above, Gallegos-Natera and Rivera-Hernandez both testified against Infante at his trial, but neither one directly implicated him in the alleged conspiracy. Attorney Foster’s cross-examination of these witnesses neither disputed their testimony that their drug transportation efforts were arranged by Sanchez and Salcido nor did it contest their credibility or motive for testifying against Infante (by, for example, delving into the details of their plea agreements or their hopes of receiving a reduction in their sentences for substantial assistance). Instead, Foster limited his cross-examination to 10 United States v. Garcia, 517 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1975). As we explained in United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 519-20 (5th Cir. 2002): After twenty-seven years the requirements of United States v. Garcia are at the hand of every trial judge in the circuit. It commands that the district court “address each defendant personally and forthrightly advise him of the potential dangers of representation by a counsel with a conflict of interest” and detail specifics about potential conflicts that are then foreseeable. The trial court should then seek to elicit a response from each defendant “that he understands the details of his attorney’s possible conflict of interest and the potential perils of such a conflict.” (quoting Garcia, 517 F.2d at 278) (footnotes omitted). -23- eliciting testimony that the witnesses had no knowledge of any involvement in the conspiracy by Infante. Infante argues that these facts demonstrate that he was denied his right to conflictfree counsel. To prevail on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Infante must show that his trial attorney was acting under the influence of an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected his performance at trial. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 781 (5th Cir. 2000). He need not show prejudice in the sense that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different if it were not for his attorney’s conflict of interest.11 Perillo, 205 F.3d at 781-82 (“Assuming the defendant establishes an actual conflict that adversely affected counsel’s performance, prejudice is presumed 11 As we noted in Perillo: The Cuyler standard applicable when a criminal defendant alleges that counsel’s performance was impaired by an actual conflict of interest differs substantially from the Strickland standard generally applicable to Sixth Amendment ineffectiveness claims. Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as well as a showing of prejudice, which is defined as a reasonable probability that counsel’s error changed the result of the proceeding. Cuyler, on the other hand, permits a defendant who raised no objection at trial to recover upon a showing that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected counsel’s performance. 205 F.3d at 781 (internal citations omitted). -24- without any further inquiry into the effect of the actual conflict on the outcome of the defendant’s trial.”). The Cuyler standard applies here because Infante’s claim involves his attorney’s conflict of interest stemming from multiple representation, rather than a conflict of interest springing “from a conflict between the attorney’s personal interest and that of his client.” United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 516 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Beets v. Scott, 65 F.3d 1258, 1265 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc)).12 The determinations whether a conflict existed and whether the conflict had an adverse effect are mixed 12 The Cuyler standard applies to Infante’s claim notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002). In Mickens, the Supreme Court noted that it has never extended Cuyler to cases of successive, as opposed to concurrent, representation, and the Court expressed concern about whether Cuyler or Strickland provides the proper standard for resolving conflict-of-interest claims involving successive representation. See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 174-76. On the facts here, however, we are reluctant to conclude that Mickens’s distinction between concurrent and successive representations resolves Infante’s claim that Foster was laboring under an actual conflict of interest. The representations at issue here were closely related in subject matter (all three defendants were charged with the same conspiracy) and time. See Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing the defendant’s successive-representation claim from the Mickens distinction between concurrent and successive representations because the representations in Hall were close in time and were of closely interrelated subject matter). Furthermore, this case is unique because Attorney Foster indicated that he would actively lobby the government to file a Rule 35 motion on behalf of Gallegos-Natera and Rivera-Hernandez if they testified against his client Infante. Moreover, we continue to be bound by circuit precedent applying Cuyler to cases of successive representation. See, e.g., Perillo, 205 F.3d at 797-99; United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1980). -25- questions of law and fact, which we review de novo. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; Perillo, 205 F.3d at 781. Courts of appeals applying Cuyler traditionally have couched its test in terms of two questions: (1) whether there was an actual conflict of interest, as opposed to a merely potential or hypothetical conflict; and (2) whether the actual conflict adversely affected counsel’s representation. See, e.g., Perillo, 205 F.3d at 782; Hernandez v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 554, 559-61 (5th Cir. 1997). However, in Mickens, the Supreme Court announced that “the Sullivan standard is not properly read as requiring inquiry into actual conflict as something separate and apart from adverse effect. An ‘actual conflict,’ for Sixth Amendment purposes, is a conflict of interest that adversely affects counsel’s performance.” Mickens, 535 U.S. at 172 n.5. Regardless of this clarification of the terminology, the relevant questions remain the same, and we must ask whether Attorney Foster labored under a conflict of interest, which was not merely hypothetical, and whether that conflict adversely affected the representation (i.e., whether it was an actual conflict). See McFarland v. Yukins, 356 F.3d 688, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2004) (noting that Mickens changed the terminology, but not the substance, of the Cuyler test); Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 467 n.23 (6th Cir. 2003).13 13 As the Sixth Circuit explained: -26- The district court concluded that Attorney Foster did not labor under any conflict of interest. We disagree. “A conflict [of interest] exists when defense counsel places himself in a position conducive to divided loyalties.” United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 870 n.1 (1998) (quoting United States v. Carpenter, 769 F.2d 258, 263 (5th Cir. 1985)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Mitchell v. Maggio, 679 F.2d 77, 79 (5th Cir. 1982). This question is highly fact-sensitive. See Perillo, 205 F.3d at 782, 798-99. Whether a conflict of interest exists depends on a number of factors, including, but not limited to, whether the attorney has confidential information that is helpful to one client but harmful to another; whether and how closely the subject matter of the multiple representations is related; how close in time the multiple representations are related; and whether the prior representation has been unambiguously terminated. See id. at 798-99. Although Attorney Foster denied having learned any relevant confidential information from his former clients while In Mickens, the Supreme Court clarified its prior definition of the term “actual conflict of interest” as comprising both requirements of the Sullivan test--a conflict of interest and adverse effect. . . . [I]t appears that the “actual conflict of interest” required in the first prong of the court’s test requires only that the petitioner demonstrate a real or genuine, as opposed to a hypothetical, conflict of interest. Moss, 323 F.3d at 467 n.23 -27- representing them, the subject matter of the representations was nearly identical. Foster represented Gallegos-Natera and RiveraHernandez in their own criminal cases, and the crimes to which they pled guilty in those cases were part of the same alleged conspiracy with which Infante was charged. Gallegos-Natera and Rivera-Hernandez’s testimony at Infante’s trial consisted primarily of recounting the crimes with which they were charged in the cases in which Foster represented them. Moreover, Foster’s representation of the two witnesses had not been unambiguously terminated because he admitted that he would seek a substantial assistance motion from the government for their testimony against his new client Infante. Even if Foster’s representation of the witnesses was actually completed prior to Infante’s trial, the representations were relatively close in time to his representation of Infante. These factors support our conclusion that a conflict of interest did in fact exist. See id. Once Gallegos-Natera and Rivera-Hernandez took the stand to testify against Infante, Foster was put in a position conducive to divided loyalties because he had to choose between vigorously cross-examining his former clients, which might jeopardize their chances of the government filing a Rule 35 motion on their behalf, and not vigorously cross-examining them, which would risk allowing the government to establish through their testimony an essential element of the case against Infante--namely, that a conspiracy existed. Cf. Perillo, 205 F.3d at 801-02 (finding, -28- under the particular facts of the case, that a conflict existed when an attorney cross-examined his own client as an adverse witness); Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 285-87 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that an attorney labored under a conflict of interest when he cross-examined one client as an adverse witness in the related trial of another client); United States v. Martinez, 630 F.2d 361, 362-63 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding a conflict when an attorney previously represented a witness who testified against a current client in a related matter). Thus, Foster labored under a conflict of interest. However, the question remains whether this conflict of interest was an actual conflict in the sense that it adversely affected Attorney Foster’s representation of Infante. “An adverse effect on counsel’s performance may be shown with evidence that counsel’s judgment was actually fettered by concern over the effect of certain trial decisions on other clients.” Perillo, 205 F.3d at 807 (internal quotation marks omitted). [W]hen a [defendant’s] claim is premised solely upon what a conflicted lawyer failed to do on his or her behalf, the [defendant] must generally establish adverse effect by demonstrating that there was some plausible alternative defense strategy that could have been pursued, but was not, because of the actual conflict. Id. Infante argues that Foster should have pursued a strategy at trial designed to show that no drug conspiracy existed at all (which would negate an essential element of the conspiracy charges) but that he neglected to do so because of his -29- conflicting duty to his other clients to request that the government file a substantial assistance motion for their testimony against Infante. The government argues that the strategy that Foster pursued, i.e., questioning the witnesses only enough to show that they had no knowledge of Infante, was effective, as evidenced by the jury’s finding that Infante was guilty of conspiracy only as to the June 29 load. Although we are satisfied that the record demonstrates that a conflict on interest existed, we are not prepared to say that the record is sufficiently developed to allow us to determine whether Attorney Foster’s conflict of interest adversely affected his performance. Therefore, it is necessary to vacate Infante’s conviction and remand to the district court for a determination on the question whether Foster’s conflict of interest adversely affected his representation of Infante. See United States v. Salado, 339 F.3d 285, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2003) (remanding to the district court on direct appeal for a determination of whether an actual conflict of interest existed and, if so, whether the conflict adversely affected the attorney’s performance). G. Sentencing 1. Application of Obstruction of Justice Enhancement Infante argues that the district court erred in determining that his sentence should be enhanced for obstruction of justice under the Guidelines. We review the district court’s factual determination that Infante obstructed justice for clear error. -30- United States v. Huerta, 182 F.3d 361, 364 (5th Cir. 1999).14 “As long as a factual finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole, it is not clearly erroneous.” Huerta, 182 F.3d at 364. We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the Guidelines de novo. Id.; see also United States v. Villegas, No. 03-21220 (5th Cir. Mar. 17, 2005). As discussed previously, the PSR recommended the addition of two levels to Infante’s offense level because Infante had become a fugitive from justice after he was convicted but before he was sentenced. At sentencing, the probation officer further informed the court that he had made a number of attempts to contact Infante in connection with preparing the PSR but was unable to find him. The district court asked whether Infante’s absence was involuntary. Infante’s attorney replied: “No, it was just a temporary thing. He was at the point he felt he shouldn’t have to do any time because he was not guilty so he kind of wishy washed around and then finally came in.” The court responded: “Well, he didn’t come in when he was supposed to come in.” Accordingly, the court assessed the two additional levels under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, which provides that an obstruction enhancement is proper when a defendant “escape[s] or attempt[s] to escape from custody before trial or sentencing; or willfully fail[s] to 14 Both parties agree that we review the judge’s factual findings for clear error. Accordingly, we assume without deciding that clear error is the proper standard post-Booker. -31- appear, as ordered, for a judicial proceeding.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 cmt. 4(e). The court’s finding that Infante’s failure to appear constituted obstruction of justice is plausible in light of the record as a whole and therefore is not clearly erroneous. Furthermore, its application of the Guidelines to enhance Infante’s sentence because of that conduct was proper. Therefore, Infante is not entitled to relief on this ground. 2. Booker Error Infante also avers that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated under United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), and its progeny because the district court enhanced his sentence for obstruction of justice under the mandatory sentencing regime after finding facts not admitted by the defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Infante did not raise this claim in the district court below, our review is for plain error. E.g., United States v. Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at  (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005). We find plain error when: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37 (1993); Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at . “If all three conditions are met an appellate court may then exercise its discretion to notice a forfeited error but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at  (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)). -32- Infante satisfies the first two prongs of the plain-error test because the district court committed Sixth Amendment Booker error and because that error is now plain after Booker. See Mares, 2005 WL 503715, at . However, he has not satisfied the third prong of the plain-error test because he cannot show that the error in question affected his substantial rights. Infante has not shown, with a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome, that if the judge had sentenced him under an advisory sentencing regime rather than a mandatory one, he would have received a lesser sentence. See id. (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004)). The judge imposed a sentence in the middle of the properly determined Guidelines range, and there is no indication in the record from the judge’s remarks or otherwise that the judge would have reached a different conclusion in an advisory regime. See id. at . Having failed to meet his burden, Infante is not entitled to resentencing on this ground.