Opinion ID: 2644038
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Level of Judicial Scrutiny

Text: ¶35 We next turn to the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny that should be used to evaluate Mary F.-R.'s claim. The United States Supreme Court has established two levels of judicial scrutiny that traditionally apply to equal protection challenges.22 See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40 (1985). The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 440. This level of scrutiny is referred to as rational basis. However, the other option, strict scrutiny, will apply when a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin or when state laws impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution. Id. Stated another way, [e]qual protection requires strict scrutiny of a 22 A third level of scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, not discussed here typically applies to discriminatory classifications based on sex or illegitimacy. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). 20 No. 2012AP958 legislative classification only when the classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class. State v. Annala, 168 Wis. 2d 453, 468, 484 N.W.2d 138 (1992)(citing Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976)). In these circumstances, laws must be analyzed using strict scrutiny review and upheld only if narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. City of Cleburn, 473 U.S. at 440. ¶36 Mary F.-R. asks this court to apply strict scrutiny in evaluating her equal protection challenge because she asserts that her fundamental liberty interest is at issue. She contends that the differences in the jury provisions in § 51.20 and Chapter 980 are not narrowly tailored to promote the government interests of protecting the public and treating the committed individual as required under strict scrutiny analysis. In the alternative, if this court determines that rational basis review is appropriate, Mary F.-R. argues that the differences in the jury provisions for initial commitments under § 51.20(11) and Chapter 980 are not rationally related to the governmental interests they serve. ¶37 Milwaukee County, however, argues that rational basis review rather than strict scrutiny should apply. It argues that strict scrutiny analysis cannot apply, because Mary F.-R. does not belong to a suspect class, and because her challenge relates to jury provisions and not to her fundamental liberty interest. 21 No. 2012AP958 ¶38 In evaluating prior challenges based on the differences found in Chapter 51 and Chapter 980, this court has generally refrained from deciding which level of scrutiny should apply. Post, 197 Wis. 2d at 321. However, we agree with Milwaukee County that rational basis analysis is the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny to apply to this case. We disagree with Mary F.-R.'s contention that strict scrutiny applies due to her fundamental liberty interest. While liberty is a fundamental right, Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992), and involuntary civil commitment is a significant deprivation of liberty, Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), Mary F.-R.'s challenge relates only to the jury procedures available for initial commitment hearings under Wis. Stat. § 51.20 and not to the use of involuntary commitments in general. Unlike a situation where protection for a fundamental liberty interest is interfered with impermissibly, having a six-person jury trial is not the equivalent to having no jury trial at all. State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, ¶18, 235 Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. There is no right to a 12-person jury in civil proceedings such as here. Id., ¶¶17-19. In addition, we are satisfied that Mary F.-R. does not belong to a suspect class.23 Since strict 23 Mary F.-R. makes no argument that she belongs to a suspect class. The United States Supreme Court has explained that a suspect class is one 'saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)(citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). The Supreme Court has specifically found 22 No. 2012AP958 scrutiny does not apply to this case, we evaluate Mary F.-R's equal protection argument using rational basis review.