Opinion ID: 2976721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Miranda-in-the-Middle Interrogations

Text: Midway through the interrogation, the police officers read Lopez his Miranda rights in Spanish. Immediately thereafter, they asked him whether he had brought cocaine with him from Mexico, to which he responded in the affirmative. The district court ruled that this statement should be admitted because it found that the earlier line of questioning did not constitute an interrogation. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 (2004) (administering Miranda warning before a suspect makes a custodial confession admissible so long as there was proper waiver). Because this conclusion was incorrect, and the earlier statements must be suppressed, the question then becomes whether Lopez’s later, post-Miranda statement should similarly be suppressed or whether it is 7 We did extend the reasoning in Avery to a location outside of the police station in an unpublished opinion, United States v. Garcia-Torres, 1 Fed. Appx. 294 (6th Cir. 2001). In Garcia-Torres, the defendant produced a fake identification card after the officer requested identification pursuant to a valid Terry stop. The Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress this evidence, holding that because the officer had no reason to suspect that the defendant possessed a fake ID card, the request was “not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Id. at 299. No. 07-5408 United States v. Pacheco-Lopez Page 5 admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief. The Supreme Court’s two principal cases addressing midstream Miranda warnings both compel our conclusion that Lopez’s post-warning statements must be suppressed. Compare Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12 (focusing on whether the midstream warning was “effective”) (plurality opinion), with Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310 (analyzing whether the latter statement was voluntary, an inquiry based on whether the taint of the earlier compelled statements dissipated through the passing of time or changed circumstances). In Seibert, the Supreme Court addressed an interrogation technique wherein the police first purposefully interrogated an unwarned suspect, then apprised her of her Miranda rights, and finally asked similar questions again.8 Specifically, the defendant mother, whose 12-year-old son suffered from cerebral palsy and died in his sleep, feared prosecution and chose to conceal the death by burning the family’s mobile home and incinerating the body. To avoid the appearance that the son had been left unattended, the defendant arranged for Donald Rector, a mentally ill teenager living with the family, to stay in the house. Donald then died in the fire. Five days later, the police questioned Seibert at a hospital. On specific instructions from headquarters, the investigating police officer refrained from giving Miranda warnings when he first interrogated Seibert. After more than 30 minutes of questioning, during which time the officer repeatedly referenced Donald’s death, Seibert admitted that she knew that Donald would die in the fire. Seibert then received a 20 minute coffee break. Upon her return, the officer read her Miranda warning, turned on a tape recorder, and then proceeded to ask the same questions. Seibert ultimately confessed to Donald’s death. Five justices agreed to suppress both the pre- and post-Miranda statements, while four dissenting justices thought both statements were permissible under the Court’s earlier, voluntariness test espoused in Oregon v. Elstad. Of the five justices who reached the same result, a plurality of four framed the underlying issue as follows: the “threshold question in [such a] situation is whether it would be reasonable to find that the warnings could function ‘effectively’ as Miranda requires.” Seibert, 542 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added). The effectiveness inquiry focused, in turn, on whether the suspect “had a real choice about giving an admissible statement at that juncture.” Id. “For unless the warnings could place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to make such an informed choice, there is no practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as compliance with Miranda, or for treating the second stage of the interrogation as distinct from the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.” Id. (emphasis added). The plurality believed that the warnings in Seibert’s case did not operate effectively and identified five factors, discussed infra, that must be analyzed to ensure that such9 a warning is effective in every situation where police administer Miranda mid-interrogation. Id. at 615. In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy similarly disproved of the two-step process at issue in the case, noting that it would “allow police to undermine [the Miranda rule’s] meaning and effect,” but rejected the plurality’s test and instead limited his critique to two-step situations where the “technique is used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning.” Id. at 622 (Kennedy, J., concurring). According to Justice Kennedy, any statements resulting from an intentional ask first, question later technique must be suppressed.10 In all other cases, Elstad – with its focus on the voluntariness of both the pre- and post-Miranda statements – would continue to control the analysis. Id. The four dissenting justices in Seibert rejected application of a new test 8 As the Fourth Circuit explained, an initial statement preceding the Miranda warning is “presumed involuntary.” Consequently, the issue is “whether those initial, unwarned statements rendered involuntary the statements [] made after receiving and waiving Miranda rights. United States v. Mashburn, 406 F.3d 303, 306 (4th Cir. 2005). 9 By applying the test in every instance, the plurality opinion in Seibert limits the Elstad holding to its facts. 10 Resolution of whether the police purposefully sought to evade Miranda is unnecessary, as Lopez’s statements are inadmissible even if the police didn’t purposefully implement a question first-warn later strategy. No. 07-5408 United States v. Pacheco-Lopez Page 6 and simply applied Elstad, finding that the later statements were sufficiently voluntary. We believe that Lopez’s statements must be excluded under both Seibert and Elstad.11 According to the Seibert plurality, the relevant factors for determining whether a midstream Miranda warning could be effective are: (1) the completeness and detail involved in the first round of questioning; (2) the overlapping content of the statements made before and after the warning; (3) the timing and setting of the interrogation; (4) the continuity of police personnel during the interrogations; and (5) the degree to which the interrogator’s questions treated the second round as continuous with the first. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615. The results of the effectiveness inquiry inform the subsequent analysis: “If yes [to the question of effective warning], a court can take up the standard issue of voluntary waiver and voluntary statement; if no, the subsequent statement is inadmissible for want of adequate Miranda warnings, because the earlier and later statements are realistically seen as parts of a single, unwarned sequence of questioning.” Id. at 612 (emphasis added). An analysis of the sequence of events surrounding Lopez’s interrogation compel our conclusion that the warning was ineffective, and that his statements were thus the result of a single, unwarned sequence of questioning. The third, fourth and fifth factors, in particular, inform our determination that the warning in this case was ineffective, as the same officers conducted the interrogation in the same location without any break between the two sets of questions. The interrogation was continuous – the break only lasted for the amount of time it took the investigators to read Lopez the Miranda warning. In such a situation, administration of the Miranda warning could not lead a suspect to a meaningful understanding that he could cease answering the questions at that point in time. Lopez’s interrogation thus implicates the exact problem described by the Supreme Court Seibert: “Unless the warnings could place a suspect who has just been interrogated in a position to make [] an informed choice, there is no practical justification for accepting the formal warnings as compliance with Miranda, or for treating the second stage of interrogation as distinct from the first, unwarned and inadmissible segment.” 542 U.S. at 612 (emphasis added). There was no break in the questioning or any effort by the police to ensure that Lopez understood that his prior statements could not be used against him; consequently, we believe that any suspect in Lopez’s situation would have viewed the two series of questions as part of one sequence. The first and second factors of the plurality’s test also support our finding that the warning was ineffective. While the exact questions did not overlap, the post-Miranda question resulted from the knowledge gleaned during the initial questioning – that Lopez had driven from Mexico to Kentucky (i.e. from a country serving as a cocaine conduit to a state where no cocaine is produced), via pickup truck, during the preceding week. That is, the question regarding the transportation of cocaine was not anomalous, which might support a finding that the warning was effective, but was the next logical question based on the earlier statements. All five factors – and particularly factors three, four and five – demonstrate that the Miranda warning was ineffective. As a result, Lopez’s admission must be suppressed under Seibert’s effectiveness test. Our dissenting colleague suggests that Lopez’s decision to stop talking after his confession revealed that the warning was effective: “by invoking his right to silence” the defendant conveyed 11 Because the Supreme Court divided 4-1-4 in Seibert, there has been some confusion about whether the plurality or concurring opinion controls. Most circuits have assumed that Justice Kennedy’s concurrence operates as the controlling precedent, though others have raised doubts about whether his concurrence actually represents the narrowest grounds for decision. See United States v. Carrizales-Toledo, 454 F.3d 1142, 1151 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing the problem with adopting Justice Kennedy's approach); United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1139-42 (9th Cir. 2005) (Berzon, J., dissenting) (describing how a court should not adopt Justice Kennedy's opinion and might instead choose to apply the plurality's test). We do not need to resolve this issue because regardless of the applicable framework Lopez’s statement must be suppressed. No. 07-5408 United States v. Pacheco-Lopez Page 7 his understanding of his Miranda rights in the “clearest, most unequivocal way possible.” Dis. Op. at 2. As noted supra, the record is ambivalent as to whether the defendant specifically invoked his right to silence as an exercise of his Miranda rights or merely indicated that he did not want to speak further to investigators.12 It is not difficult to imagine reasons for why Lopez ceased talking after he was taken to the bedroom, none of which relate to the effectiveness of the Miranda warning with regards to the earlier statement. Perhaps, as Officer LaGrange stated at the suppression hearing, Lopez stopped speaking because Bernal-Bajo “was giving him the look” and trying to intimidate him. JA 74. The facts of this case are distinguishable from the two cases – both of which discuss the issue of waiver and not effectiveness13 – upon which the dissent relies for the proposition that the invocation of the right to silence necessarily indicates that the defendant understood those rights. See United States v. Allen, 247 F.3d 741, 766 (8th Cir. 2001); Pickens v. Gibbons, 206 F.3d 988, 995 (10th Cir. 2000). In finding a voluntary waiver, the Eight Circuit in Allen noted that the defendant “initiated the request to speak” with the officer, had been warned of his rights four times, and had specifically “indicated that he understood [his rights]” prior to confessing. Id. The case is hardly analogous to the present situation. In the instant case, Lopez received the warning only once and did not initiate any of the interactions with the investigators; moreover, the record is ambivalent as to whether he even understood those rights. The dissent’s use of retrospection to find an effective warning is also directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s admonition that courts should “presume that a defendant did not waive his rights [and that] the prosecution’s burden is great” to demonstrate such a waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). In Pickens, the Tenth Circuit emphasized that the defendant had, prior to his confession, demonstrated that he understood his rights: “[the defendant’s] initial refusal to make a statement and his request for an attorney indicate he understood . . . both the nature and consequences of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.” Pickens, 206 F.3d at 996 (internal quotations omitted). In the instant case, Lopez’s confession occurred before the interaction in which the defendant purportedly indicated his understanding of his rights. Equally important, looking at the defendant’s decision to stop speaking (which he conveyed in the bedroom rather than the kitchen – i.e. under different circumstances) presents an issue that is not before us. That is, the thrust of the effectiveness inquiry focuses on whether the defendant had a choice “at [the] juncture” of the statement, Seibert, 542 U.S. at 611-12, not on whether the defendant’s later behavior casts retrospective insight into his state of mind at the time of the statement. Had Lopez confessed in the bedroom or specifically invoked his right to silence after further explanation by police, then perhaps the effectiveness issue would be a slightly closer call. See id. at 615 (“In Elstad, it was not unreasonable to see the occasion for questioning at the station house as presenting a markedly different experience . . . [and] the Miranda warnings could have made sense as presenting a genuine choice whether to follow up on the earlier admission.”). But in this case, the Miranda warning was given literally in the middle of questioning, a situation that is “likely to mislead and ‘deprive a defendant of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.’” Id. at 613-14 (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986)). To hold otherwise elevates form over substance by treating “two spates of integrated and proximately conducted questioning as independent interrogations subject to independent evaluation simply because Miranda warnings formally punctuate them in the middle.” Id. at 614. Additionally, adopting the dissent’s position risks undermining important 12 Officer Slaughter, whose testimony the district court found most reliable, stated simply that “Mr. Lopez stated that he did not wish to say anything to investigators” and that he “basically said he didn’t want to say anything.” JA 60-61. Testimony by Officer LaGrange, on the other hand, indicated that the “basic was he [Lopez] just said, no, he wanted to consult with an attorney.” JA 74. 13 As discussed supra, the Seibert plurality explained that where a warning is ineffective, the defendant cannot waive his rights. Hence, the issue of voluntariness does not arise. See 542 U.S. at 612 (describing how voluntariness issues are only addressed where the warning was effective). No. 07-5408 United States v. Pacheco-Lopez Page 8 constitutional rights through retrospective inferences, a result the Supreme Court has previously rejected in the context of Miranda. Cf. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984). Lopez’s statement must similarly be suppressed under the Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in Oregon v. Elstad.14 As the dissenting justices in Seibert explained, Elstad requires that “if [a suspect’s] first statement is shown to have been involuntary, the court must examine whether the taint dissipated through the passing of time or a change in circumstances.” Seibert 542 U.S. at 665 (citing Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310) (emphasis added). Elstad thus requires that “[w]hen a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310. When reviewing Lopez’s confession, all three of these factors suggest a finding that the coercion has carried over. As discussed supra, there was no change in the time or place of the interrogation, or the identity of the interrogators. Further, when determining voluntariness, “the finder of fact must examine the surrounding circumstances and the entire course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of his statements.” Id. at 318. Here, there is insufficient evidence in the record that Lopez was aware that his earlier confession would not be admissible against him, nor do the circumstances suggest that the second confession was separate from the first confession in any way.15 Accordingly, Lopez’s post-Miranda statements must be suppressed.