Opinion ID: 759696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Petitioner Suffer Prejudice From Counsel's Assertedly

Text: 39 Deficient Performance? 40 A defendant cannot succeed on an ineffective assistance claim unless he can show that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the result of his proceeding would have been different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In other words, the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt. Id. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 41 But we will presume prejudice when a jury instruction on reasonable doubt is found to be constitutionally deficient. See Birbal, 62 F.3d at 461. Harmless error analysis is inappropriate in such circumstances because [t]here being no jury verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt, the question whether the same verdict of guilty-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt would have been rendered absent the constitutional error is utterly meaningless. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). While the Sullivan analysis originates in cases directly reviewing jury instructions, rather than in ineffective assistance cases based on a failure to object to defective jury instructions, the force of its reasoning and its conclusion apply equally here. 42 Although the government concedes that the jury charge given at Bloomer's trial contains the same language with which we found fault in Birbal, it argues that Bloomer was not prejudiced because the error was ameliorated by the numerous times (at least 17) where the original district judge gave proper reasonable doubt instructions. For that reason, the government continues, any reasonable probability that the jury convicted petitioner using the wrong standard was eliminated. We rejected a similar argument in Birbal, where we stated that the erroneous instruction was only partially ameliorated by the court's correct [reasonable doubt] instruction several sentences earlier. 62 F.3d at 460. Because the conflicting instructions must have left the jury uncertain of the standard it was charged with applying, we held that such a jury was insufficiently prepared to carry out its constitutional mandate to resolve all reasonable doubts before adjudging the defendants guilty. Id. Significantly, none of the district court's correct reasonable doubt instructions in the instant case was styled as a curative instruction that would alert the jurors that they should disregard the incorrect instruction. Accordingly, we do not find that the correct instructions--however numerous they may be--suffice to overcome the damage done by the district court's conflicting, incorrect instruction. 43 Finding that the reasonable doubt instructions given at petitioner's trial were infected with the same constitutional deficiencies as those identified in Birbal, we conclude Bloomer suffered prejudice from his counsel's failure to object to these instructions or to challenge them on appeal regardless of the strength and quantity of evidence against him. As a consequence, if on remand the district court concludes that Bloomer's previous counsel's performance was deficient, Bloomer will succeed on his ineffective assistance claim.