Opinion ID: 1525653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdictional claims

Text: We address the defendant's ripeness claim first because it implicates subject matter jurisdiction and, thus, presents a threshold issue. For the same reason, we then address the defendant's jurisdictional challenge to the plaintiff's appeal, which he raised initially in the motion to dismiss filed with the Appellate Court and continues to press in his brief filed in SC 18022. See footnote 1 of this opinion. Thereafter, we will consider the substantive claims raised in the parties' appeals.
The defendant claims that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's claims because, at the time of trial, those claims were not ripe and, therefore, were not justiciable. He argues that the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings against Scalzo, specifically, the bankruptcy trustee's ongoing efforts to recover an asset that Scalzo improperly had transferred prior to declaring bankruptcy, rendered the plaintiff's damages claims speculative and uncertain and, consequently, deprived the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed until the bankruptcy proceedings concluded. We are not persuaded. [22] The defendant questions the justiciability of the plaintiff's claims at the time of trial. [J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter. (Emphasis added.) Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, 271 Conn. 540, 569, 858 A.2d 709 (2004). A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, 245 Conn. 88, 91, 713 A.2d 1267 (1998). [B]ecause an issue regarding justiciability raises a question of law, our appellate review [of the defendant's ripeness claim] is plenary. Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry, supra, at 569, 858 A.2d 709. [T]he rationale behind the ripeness requirement is to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements. . . . (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 570, 858 A.2d 709. Accordingly, in determining whether a case is ripe, a trial court must be satisfied that the case before [it] does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. According to the defendant, the extent of the plaintiff's damages was unknown when the plaintiff commenced this litigation. Specifically, the defendant argues, because the bankruptcy trustee was pursuing a fraudulent transfer claim against Scalzo in connection with Scalzo's transfer of his interest in his personal residence, there remained the possibility that the plaintiff would collect on its debt, the alleged loss of which formed the basis of its claims against the defendant in the present action. The defendant claims that the plaintiff's posttrial, partial recovery of this debt from the bankruptcy trustee in January, 2005, undermined the jury's findings as to compensatory damages and, therefore, demonstrates that the plaintiff brought its claims prematurely. We disagree. Although the exact amount of the plaintiff's damages might have remained uncertain when it commenced this action, it nevertheless was abundantly clear that the plaintiff had sustained some damages and that there was no hope of a full recovery from Scalzo. [23] Pursuant to Connecticut's ripeness jurisprudence, as long as it is clear that a plaintiff has suffered an injury sufficient to give rise to the cause of action alleged, a lack of certainty as to the precise scope of damages will not prevent the claim from being justiciable. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 247 Conn. 196, 211-14, 719 A.2d 465 (1998); Mayer v. Biafore, Florek & O'Neill, supra, 245 Conn. at 90-92, 713 A.2d 1267; Weiner v. Clinton, 100 Conn.App. 753, 757-63, 919 A.2d 1038, cert. denied, 282 Conn. 928, 926 A.2d 669 (2007). In Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, supra, at 198-99, 719 A.2d 465, a plaintiff landowner brought an inverse condemnation action against a municipality, arguing that the municipality's denial of a variance had destroyed the value of the plaintiff's real property and, therefore, that the plaintiff was entitled to just compensation for the regulatory taking of that property. The Appellate Court concluded that the inverse condemnation action had been brought prematurely because the plaintiff's administrative appeal from the denial of its variance request remained pending, and, consequently, the extent of its damages was unknown. Id., at 200, 719 A.2d 465. We disagreed and reversed the decision of the Appellate Court. Id., at 202, 719 A.2d 465. Specifically, we disagreed that the fact that the plaintiff potentially could prevail in the administrative appeal, thereby eliminating its right to damages, rendered the plaintiff's takings claim speculative. Id., at 211-12, 719 A.2d 465. We reasoned that, even if the plaintiff's administrative appeal ultimately was successful, the plaintiff still would be entitled to some compensation for the temporary taking it had suffered during the pendency of that appeal. Id., at 208, 212, 719 A.2d 465. In other words, even though it was unclear at the outset of the inverse condemnation action whether the plaintiff's damages claim was for a temporary or complete taking, the claim nevertheless was ripe and capable of resolution on the merits. Similarly, the Appellate Court recently rejected a claim that a pending appeal from the entry of a default judgment against a plaintiff client rendered premature the plaintiff's malpractice claim against the defendants, an attorney and law firm whose negligence allegedly had caused that default. Weiner v. Clinton, supra, 100 Conn.App. at 755-56, 919 A.2d 1038. Although the trial court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the pendency of the appeal rendered it `impossible' to determine damages; id., at 756, 919 A.2d 1038; the Appellate Court explained that [a] claim's justiciability is wholly separate from its merits. . . . As such, an inability to establish the exact amount of damages is indicative of a defect in a plaintiff's capacity to prove his or her case, not of a deficiency in the court's subject matter jurisdiction. (Citation omitted.) Id., at 760, 919 A.2d 1038; see also Vanderweyst v. Boudreaux, Texas Court of Appeals, First District, Docket No. 01-02-00928-CV, 2003 WL 22255833 (October 2, 2003) (damages claim, though speculative, was fodder for a summary judgment motion, not a dismissal for lack of ripeness in a plea to the [trial court's] jurisdiction). In light of the foregoing authority, we conclude that even though the amount of the plaintiff's injury was not known with certainty, that circumstance did not render its claims against the defendant unripe and nonjusticiable. [24] We note finally that the plaintiff's complaint alleged additional injuries that could not have been remedied by a recovery in the bankruptcy court, namely, the costs of collection expended in pursuance of Scalzo. Consequently, even if the plaintiff could have recovered the entirety of the debt in the bankruptcy proceedings, it had alleged additional actionable injuries stemming from the defendant's conduct such that its causes of action would have remained viable. See Weiner v. Clinton, supra, 100 Conn.App. at 760, 919 A.2d 1038 (plaintiff's claimed injuries included expenses associated with appealing default judgment, which would have remained even if default judgment was reversed, and thus, were by no means hypothetical [internal quotation marks omitted]); see also Knight v. Furlow, 553 A.2d 1232, 1235 (D.C.1989) (legal fees and costs expended as result of attorney's alleged malpractice in drafting will constituted actionable harm, rendering malpractice action ripe, despite fact that case contesting will was still pending). On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we conclude that the plaintiff's claims were justiciable despite the pendency of the bankruptcy proceedings and, therefore, that the court had jurisdiction to consider those claims. Accordingly, the defendant's first jurisdictional challenge must fail.
The defendant also claims that the plaintiff's appeal should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. According to the defendant, the May 31, 2005 order from which the plaintiff has appealed, did not reflect an opening and alteration of the judgment, but rather, merely reduced the earlier attachment order. Consequently, the defendant argues, the plaintiff's appeal from the May 31, 2005 order was not brought from a final judgment. We disagree with the defendant's characterization of the court's order and, therefore, reject his jurisdictional claim. [25] Because [t]he construction of a judgment is a question of law for the court; Lashgari v. Lashgari, 197 Conn. 189, 196, 496 A.2d 491 (1985); our review of the defendant's claim is plenary. As a general rule, judgments are to be construed in the same fashion as other written instruments. . . . The determinative factor is the intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the judgment. . . . The interpretation of a judgment may involve the circumstances surrounding the making of the judgment. . . . Effect must be given to that which is clearly implied as well as to that which is expressed. . . . The judgment should admit of a consistent construction as a whole. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 196-97, 496 A.2d 491. We reiterate the order at issue for clarity of analysis. The order stated: [T]he jury verdict [of $55,500] is offset by $15,283.91. Accordingly, the judgment is recalculated as follows: Verdict: $40,216.09; § 37-3a Interest: $12,000; Exemplary Damages: $17,231.31; § 52-192a Interest: $0; Total: $69,447.40. Accordingly, the attachment is reduced to $70,000. The defendant focuses on the concluding sentence of the court's order and certain of the surrounding circumstances, namely, that the court issued the order following a hearing that purportedly was held only to address the defendant's motion for a reduction of the attachment, and argues that they show that the order constitutes only a reduction of the attachment. He notes further that at a subsequent hearing, the court heard argument on, and then expressly denied, his motion to open, which would have been unnecessary and inconsistent had the court already decided the motion previously, at least partly in his favor. The defendant argues finally that the order does not state explicitly that it is opening the judgment and, if the plaintiff wished to pursue claims related to the order on appeal, it was obligated to seek an articulation as to the nature of the order, but failed to do so. We are not persuaded. Although we agree that the trial court did not indicate at the hearing preceding the order that it was considering opening and modifying the judgment, the order, read as a whole, clearly indicates that the court did just that. In addition to its closing phrase, the order also states [t]hat the jury verdict is offset by $15,283.91 and that  the judgment is recalculated as follows; (emphasis added); before setting out and totaling the various components of the damages award, three of which are altered as a result of the specified offset. Our jurisprudence has established that when a trial court enters an order that substantively modifies a judgment, it necessarily has opened the judgment, regardless of whether that opening explicitly is acknowledged in the order. See Commissioner of Transportation v. Rocky Mountain, LLC, 277 Conn. 696, 705-707, 894 A.2d 259 (2006) (citing cases). Moreover, there would be no reason for the court to reduce the attachment in the absence of a corresponding reduction in the judgment that the attachment was intended to secure. See Atlas Garage & Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hurley, 167 Conn. 248, 251, 355 A.2d 286 (1974) ([a]n attachment of property on mesne process is a mode of obtaining security for the satisfaction of any judgment which the plaintiff may finally recover [internal quotation marks omitted]). The fact that the court subsequently heard, and denied, the defendant's pending motion to open does not compel a different result. Rather, a more plausible explanation for the subsequent denial is that the court, because it already had opened the judgment, sua sponte, and had ordered some of the relief sought, i.e., a reduction of the judgment, considered moot the portion of the defendant's motion requesting that relief and denied the motion as to the remaining relief sought, i.e., a complete set aside of the judgment. On the basis of the foregoing analysis, we reject the defendant's claim that we lack jurisdiction over the plaintiff's appeal. We now turn to the substantive claims raised by the defendant in his three appeals.