Opinion ID: 4116429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Supreme Court Precedents

Text: Finally, although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on the validity of EPAʹs ʺunitary watersʺ theory, it has expressed serious reservations. In South Florida Water Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 1537 (2004), the Court strongly suggested that the theory is not reasonable. First, the Court remanded for fact‐finding on whether the two water bodies at issue phrase ʹaddition . . . to navigable watersʹ unambiguously referred to a collection of individual ʹnavigable waters.ʹʺ (internal citations and quotations omitted)). It is not possible, however, to define ʺadditionʺ without defining the object to which the addition is made, as the concepts are inexorably linked. It is clear from our reasoning in Catskill I and II, that we considered the entire phrase in reaching our conclusion. Thus, when we stated ʺthat the discharge of water containing pollutants from one distinct water body to another is an ʹaddition of [a] pollutantʹ under the CWA,ʺ we could only have meant that the discharge of water containing pollutants constitutes ʺan ʹadditionʹ of [a] pollutantʺ to navigable waters. Catskill II, 451 F.3d at 80. 29 were ʺmeaningfully distinct water bodies.ʺ 541 U.S. at 112. That disposition follows from Judge Walkerʹs soup ladle analogy in Catskill I: ʺIf one takes a ladle of soup from a pot, lifts it above the pot, and pours it back into the pot, one has not ʹaddedʹ soup or anything else to the pot (beyond, perhaps, a de minimis quantity of airborne dust that fell into the ladle).ʺ 273 F.3d at 492. In Catskill II, we noted that such a transfer would be an intrabasin transfer, from one water body back into the same water body, and we then applied the analogy to the facts of this case: ʺThe Tunnelʹs discharge . . . was like scooping soup from one pot and depositing it in another pot, thereby adding soup to the second pot, an interbasin transfer.ʺ 451 F.3d at 81. In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court cited the ʺsoup ladleʺ analogy with approval, and remanded the case to the district court to determine whether the water bodies in question were ʺtwo pots of soup, not one.ʺ 541 U.S. at 109‐10; see also id. at 112. If the ʺunitary watersʺ theory were valid, however, there would have been no need to resolve this factual question. If all the navigable waters of the United States were deemed one collective national body, there would be no need to consider whether individual water bodies were distinct ‐‐ there would be no need to determine whether there were two pots of soup or one. 30 Second, as previously discussed, the Court observed that ʺseveral NPDES provisions might be read to suggest a view contrary to the unitary waters approach.ʺ Id. at 107. The Court noted that under the Act, states ʺmay set individualized ambient water quality standards by taking into consideration ʹthe designated uses of the navigable waters involved,ʺ thereby affecting local NPDES permits. Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A)). ʺThis approach,ʺ the Court wrote, ʺsuggests that the Act protects individual water bodies as well as the ʹwaters of the United Statesʹ as a whole.ʺ Id.10 Subsequent Supreme Court decisions support this reading of Miccosukee. In Los Angeles County Flood Control District v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Supreme Court held that a water transfer between one portion of a river through a concrete channel to a lower portion of the same river did not trigger a NPDES permit requirement. 133 S. Ct. 710 (2013). The Court observed that ʺ[w]e held [in Miccosukee] that th[e] water transfer would count as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA only if the canal and the reservoir were ʹmeaningfully distinct water bodies.ʹʺ Id. at 713 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In holding that ʺthe flow of water from an improved portion of a 10 In Catskill II, we concluded that ʺ[o]ur rejection of [the unitary waters] theory in Catskill I . . . is supported by Miccosukee, not undermined by it.ʺ 451 F.3d at 83. 31 navigable waterway into an unimproved portion of the very same waterway does not qualify as a discharge of pollutants under the CWA,ʺ id., the Court again suggested that it would be a discharge of pollutants if the transfer were between two different water bodies. In Miccosukee, the Supreme Court acknowledged the concerns that have been raised about the burdens of permitting, but also observed that ʺit may be that such permitting authority is necessary to protect water quality, and that the States or EPA could control regulatory costs by issuing general permits to point sources associated with water distribution programs.ʺ 541 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added). Indeed, recognizing the importance of safeguarding drinking water, Congress created an extensive system to protect this precious resource, a system that would be undermined by exempting interbasin water transfers. Hence, the Supreme Courtʹs decisions in Miccosukee and Los Angeles County support the conclusion that water transfers between two distinct water bodies are not exempt from the Act.