Opinion ID: 1802064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Church showed it was in peaceable possession of the cemetery property

Text: The trial court has jurisdiction over quiet-title actions in which the plaintiff shows that he or she is in peaceable, rather than scrambling, possession of the property. Orso v. Cater, 272 Ala. 657, 661, 133 So.2d 864, 868 (1961) (It is true that the [plaintiff] cannot recover under the statute unless his proof shows his peaceable possession, as contradistinguished from a contested, disputed or scrambling possession.); Hinds v. Federal Land Bank, 237 Ala. 218, 219, 186 So. 153, 154 (1939) (a scrambling, disputed, or contested possession will not support [a quiet-title] action); and Buchmann Abstract & Inv. Co. v. Roberts, 213 Ala. 520, 521, 105 So. 675, 676 (1925) (we are constrained to hold that the possessory acts herein indicated on the part of respondent were sufficient as a contest of complainant's possession so as to destroy the peaceable character thereof and constitute it a disputed, contested or scrambling one. . . . This conclusion destroys the jurisdiction of the court over the cause at its very threshold, and renders unnecessary a consideration of the questions which constitute any of the issues as to the contest of title.). The plaintiff in a quiet-title action must present evidence to support a peaceable possession in the [plaintiff] as contradistinguished from a contested, disputed or scrambling possession. Price v. Robinson, 242 Ala. 626, 627, 7 So.2d 568, 569 (1942) (citing Randle v. Daughdrill, 142 Ala. 490, 39 So. 162 (1905), and George E. Wood Lumber Co. v. Williams, 157 Ala. 73, 47 So. 202 (1908)); see also Cobb v. MacMillan Bloedel, Inc., 604 So.2d 344, 345 (Ala.1992) (In an action to quiet title to real property, the plaintiff must prove that he was in actual or constructive possession of the property and that his possession was peaceable, as distinguished from scrambling or disputed; furthermore, there must be no suit pending at the time the suit is commenced testing the defendants' claims. (citing Denson v. Gibson, 392 So.2d 523 (Ala.1980))). Whether a plaintiff is in peaceable possession is a question of fact, Price v. Robinson, 242 Ala. at 627, 7 So.2d at 569, that is evaluated as of the date the action is commenced. Davidson v. Blackwood, 250 Ala. 263, 34 So.2d 205 (1948). [O]ne is in peaceable possession as opposed to scrambling possession when at the time of the suit no other party is denying the fact of complainant's possession. If both parties claim actual possession or are scrambling for it, then the possession is not peaceable. Denson, 392 So.2d at 524-25. The distinction between peaceable possession and scrambling possession is that `in the former, an adverse party may be denying the [plaintiff's] right to possession, but in the latter there is a denial of the fact of his actual possession.' Cullman Wholesale, 592 So.2d at 1034 (quoting Adams v. Bethany Church, 380 So.2d 788, 791 (Ala.1980)). [8] The Church demonstrated that it was in peaceable, as opposed to scrambling, possession. Although the trial court did not make an express finding of fact regarding whether the Church was in peaceable possession of the cemetery property, [w]here a trial court does not make specific findings of fact concerning an issue, we will assume that the trial court made those findings necessary to support its judgment, unless such findings are clearly erroneous. Sundance Marina, Inc. v. Reach, 567 So.2d 1322, 1324 (Ala. 1990) (citing Robinson v. Hamilton, 496 So.2d 8 (Ala.1986)). The trial court had to conclude that the Church's possession was peaceable and not scrambling; otherwise, it could not have proceeded with the Church's quiet-title action. The Association alleged that the Church was not in peaceable possession of the cemetery property, and at best had only `scrambling possession' which is insufficient to maintain the [quiet-title] action. Association's brief, p. 14. However, the Association did not provide facts in support of that allegation. This Court has held that [m]erely going on the property which is at the time in the actual possession of someone else, and claiming title to it and warning others off it does not constitute a challenge to the other's peaceable possession so as to render it scrambling and prohibit the other from bringing an action to quiet title. Adams, 380 So.2d at 791. In this case, the Association's actions did not go even that far. It did not claim title to the cemetery property, nor did it warn others off the property. Thus, the Association's only action going onto the cemetery property in the fall of 2001 to clean the groundswas insufficient to render the Church's possession of the cemetery property scrambling rather than peaceable. [9] Nor does the Association's petition in the probate court for a boundary determination render the Church's possession scrambling rather than peaceable. When the Church filed its action to quiet title, the Association had petitioned the probate court to appoint a commission to locate and mark the boundary of the cemetery pursuant to § 11-17-1, Ala.Code 1975. However, the Association's petition in the probate court does not deny the Church's peaceable possession of the cemetery property. Cullman Wholesale, 592 So.2d at 1034. Section 11-17-1, Ala.Code 1975, provides that [f]ive or more citizens may petition the judge of probate for the appointment of such a commission. A petition brought under this statute is not a challenge to the fact of another party's peaceable possession of property; it is merely an action to establish the boundaries of a burial ground, and such an action can be brought by any five individuals, regardless of whether they have an ownership claim or interest in the property at issue. § 11-17-1, Ala.Code 1975. The Association also requested that the probate court designate the property on said map indicated as Cemetery . . . as belonging to Woodland Grove Community Cemetery Association. However, the Association's challenge at most denies the Church's right to possession, not the fact of the Church's peaceable possession, and is, therefore, not sufficient to defeat the Church's claim of peaceable possession. See Cullman Wholesale, 592 So.2d at 1034. Moreover, even if we considered the Association's petition for a boundary commission as an action challenging the fact of the Church's peaceable possession, merely maintaining an action challenging title to the property, without more, is insufficient to defeat the Church's claim of peaceable possession. As this Court has explained: `But the statute requires that such possession shall be peaceable. So the question arises, what is peaceable possession? It cannot mean that it is peaceable unless there be some legal proceeding in progress to test the title or right to the possession; for the object of the statute is to allow the party who is in possession, and who cannot force the adversary claimant to institute any proceeding, to bring said party into court in order to determine whether he has any just claim to the property. The word peaceable, then, refers to the character of his possession. So long as his possession is so clear that no one is denying the fact of his actual or constructive possession, it is peaceable, although some other person may be denying his right to possession.' Chestang v. Tensaw Land & Timber Co., 273 Ala. 8, 11, 134 So.2d 159, 161 (1961) (quoting George E. Wood Lumber Co., 157 Ala. at 76-78, 47 So. at 203). Thus, the Church was in peaceable possession of the cemetery property when it initiated the current action to quiet title. Because the Church was in peaceable possession of the cemetery property, the Church established a prima facie case that entitled it to relief. Wiggins, 282 Ala. at 257, 210 So.2d at 816-17.