Opinion ID: 1759252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Louisiana Civil Code article 495

Text: In his primary assignment of error, Unkel alleges the district court erred in applying La. C.C. art. 495 to this matter and awarding Smith the value of his improvements pursuant to this article. La. C.C. art. 495 provides: One who incorporates in, or attaches to, the immovable of another, with his consent, things that become component parts of the immovable under Articles 465 and 466, may, in the absence of other provisions of law or juridical acts, remove them subject to his obligation of restoring the property to its former condition. If he does not remove them after demand, the owner of the immovable may have them removed at the expense of the person who made them or elect to keep them and pay, at his option, the current value of the materials and of the workmanship or the enhanced value of the immovable. La. C.C. art. 495 affords a lessee the right to remove improvements or attachments made to the immovable of another with his consent. If the lessee fails to remove the improvements after demand, the owner must compensate the lessee for the improvements upon his election to keep said improvements. Id. However, Unkel asserts that La. C.C. art. 495 does not apply because it is a supplementary remedy that applies only in in the absence of other provisions of law or juridical acts. He urges the applicable provision in this matter is La. C.C. art. 2697, which pertains specifically to a lessee's right to damages in the case of expropriation. At the time of the events in question, Article 2697 provided: If, during the lease, the thing the [sic] totally destroyed by an unforseen [sic] event, or it be taken for a purpose of public utility, the lease is at an end. If it be only destroyed in part, the lessee may either demand a diminution of the price, or a revocation of the lease. In neither case has he any claim of damages. Applying the provisions of this article, Unkel claims that Smith has no recourse against him for the value of the improvements, but rather must seek his compensation from the expropriating body, DOTD. Article 2697 does provide that when a lease is terminated by the taking or expropriation of the leased property, the lessee has no claim for damages against the lessor, only against the expropriator. La. C.C. art. 2697; State Through Dept. of Highways v. Holmes, 253 La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811 (1969)(J. Sanders dissenting). Even if the expropriator's compensation to the landowner included the cost of the lessee's improvements, the lessee can still seek reimbursement for the improvements from the expropriator, but not from the landowner. DOTD v. Wahlder, 94-791 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/7/94), 647 So.2d 481, 486. A clear and unambiguous reading of this article, however, indicates that it does not apply to the current issue and the particular facts of this case. First, the lease between Unkel and Smith had already terminated prior to Unkel's sale to DOTD, thus, the event in question did not happen during the lease. Furthermore, the property was not taken by DOTD, but rather sold to the state, albeit under the threat of expropriation. Louisiana statutory law and jurisprudence does not recognize sales under the threat of expropriation to be analogous with actual expropriation proceedings or takings pursuant to the law. Thus, Article 2697 does not apply to protect Unkel from Smith's claims for reimbursement of his improvements. Therefore, in the absence of other provisions we must address whether the lower courts properly applied the provisions of Article 495 to the instant matter and awarded Smith the value of his improvements. A close examination of the language of Article 495 indicates that it does not provide for Smith's recovery under the particular facts of this case. Paragraph one of the article allows a person to remove those improvements, designated as component parts, which were made to the immovable of another with the owner's consent subject to the obligation to restore the property to its former condition after removal. La. C.C. art. 495. The second paragraph provides for the owner of the immovable to demand the removal of the items. Id. If the improver fails to remove the improvements after demand, the owner has the choice to remove the items at the cost of the improver, or elect to keep the improvements and pay the improver the value of the improvements. Id. However, no provision of Article 495 allows a lessee to seek compensation from the lessor for his improvements without an election by the lessor to retain them. Whether or not a lessor has elected to keep said improvements is a factual determination made upon the individual circumstances of the case. Annina v. Eschette, 00-1892 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/21/01), 814 So.2d 13, writ denied, 01-3375 (La.3/8/02), 811 So.2d 880; Taylor Lumber Co. v. Fuller, 292 So.2d 878 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 294 So.2d 839 (La.1974). Furthermore, a literal reading of this article indicates that an election to keep the improvements requiring compensation to the improver must first be preceded by a demand. A review of the record indicates Unkel never made a demand upon Smith to remove the improvements; therefore, the remedies and procedural requirements of Article 495 were never triggered. Furthermore, Smith's own testimony proves that he never attempted to remove any of the improvements for which he is now seeking compensation from Unkel. Specifically, when asked by defense counsel if he ever had any intention of removing any of the improvements from the building, Smith replied: No ... I wanted to be paid for. He also testified that he never made any request to Mr. Unkel to remove any of the items in the building. Evidence presented at trial indicated that Smith moved out of the property in question during mid-November 1999. However, when Unkel attempted to retrieve Smith's key to the building on December 10, 1999, Smith requested more time to remove additional items from the building. Unkel agreed to give Smith until the end of the month to remove his belongings and improvements, provided Smith pay rent for the month, which he agreed to do. Again, on December 31st when Unkel attempted to retrieve the key, Smith requested an additional day to remove those items he wanted to keep. On January 1, 2000, Smith returned the key to Unkel's wife, Adele Unkel. At that time, Ms. Unkel asked if Smith was able to get everything out of the building he desired, to which Smith replied yes. Smith had ample time to remove those improvements he desired to keep, and it appears no person restrained him from doing so. However, on February 28, 2000, one month after the sale to the state was completed, Smith's attorney issued a formal demand letter to Unkel notifying him of Smith's request for the value of his improvements. Unkel refused Smith's demand by formal letter on March 29, 2000. By the time Smith made his formal demand for his improvements, Unkel no longer owned, nor had access to the building and its improvements and could not return the actual improvements to Smith. Further, Unkel testified that by that time, the building had been stripped of most items; however, no conclusive evidence was presented as to who actually removed the improvements from the building. Smith suggested Unkel and his workmen removed the items in question, but Unkel denied this claim. Nevertheless, Unkel did admit to removing one air conditioner from the building for use in a camp, but did not do so until one month after the completion of the sale and only after Smith indicated he did not desire any of the items left in the building. Moreover, Article 495 requires the improver to restore the immovable to its original condition after removal of component parts. Smith testified that he made no attempt to restore the building to its original condition. Based on the aforementioned facts, the elements of La. C.C. art. 495 are not satisfied in these particular circumstances, and therefore, this article does not allow Smith to recover the value of his improvements. Article 495 provides a mechanism for a person to retain those items of value he incorporates or attaches to the property of another. Further, the article provides a mechanism for the landowner to have those improvements removed from his property, if he so desires, by demanding their removal. Id. If upon demand the improver fails to remove, the owner may remove the items or elect to keep them and then pay the value of the items to the improver. Id. However, Article 495 does not appear to contemplate a situation where the improver abandons his improvements, then makes a demands to be compensated for their value. See Riggs v. Lawton, 231 La. 1019, 93 So.2d 543 (1957) (applying the pre-revision La. C.C. art. 2726 [4] regarding lessor-lessee obligations relating to improvements). Thus, Article 495 does not require a lessor to pay for improvements to a lessee if the lessee abandons the improvements upon the termination of the lease. Pylate v. Inabnet, 458 So.2d 1378, 1391(La.App. 2 Cir.1984) (citing Riggs v. Lawton, supra). Furthermore, use of one's property, and other acts of ownership, which necessarily result in the use of improvements placed upon the premises by a lessee who does not remove the improvements upon termination of the lease, but rather abandons them, does not constitute an election within the contemplation of Article 495. See id. However, denying a lessor the right to remove improvements upon termination of the lease could be construed as an election, as required by Article 495. See Annina at p. 6, 814 So.2d at 17. Smith did not attempt to remove the improvements upon termination of the lease, but rather abandoned the improvements and requested compensation from Unkel upon his sale of the building. Unkel's sale of the building, including the improvements, was an act of ownership which necessarily resulted in the use of the improvements. Yet, this act was not an election to keep said improvements. It would be illogical to have required Unkel to strip the building of Smith's improvements prior to the sale to DOTD when the building was going to be destroyed. Furthermore, we do not find Unkel's removal of one air conditioner after the completed sale an election to keep all of the improvements. Since Smith abandoned the improvements without demand or any attempt of removal, he cannot seek compensation under Article 495 after he notified Unkel of such abandonment. Furthermore, Smith did not make his demand to Unkel for his improvements until the sale was complete. At this time, Unkel was no longer in a position in which he could follow the procedural requirements of Article 495 and demand the removal of the improvements by Smith himself or return the improvements to Smith. Therefore, those requirements necessary for the recovery of the value of one's improvements under Article 495 were not satisfied in this particular case. Thus, the trial court's reliance upon Article 495 to compensate Smith for the value of his improvements to Unkel's building was in error and a misapplication of the law. We therefore, reverse the court of appeal's decision affirming the district court's judgment finding Unkel liable to Smith in the amount of $38,384.12 for the value of his improvements.