Opinion ID: 834755
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of waiver analysis

Text: Because the Court of Appeals determined in AOCE I that ERB had erred in its waiver analysis, the court did not reach DOC’s alternative argument that, even if ERB were correct in its use of that analysis, ERB erred in concluding that the contract terms on which DOC relied did not establish a clear and unmistakable waiver of AOCE’s statutory right to bargain about changes to employees’ scheduled days off and their shift stop and start times. We address that argument now. For the following reasons, we hold that ERB did not err in its interpretation of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement. As noted, DOC invokes Article 3 of the CBA, which provides: “The Association agrees that the Employer retains all inherent rights of management and hereby recognizes the sole and exclusive right of the State of Oregon, as the Employer, to operate and manage its affairs in accordance with its responsibilities to maintain efﬁcient governmental operations. The Employer retains all rights to direct the work of its employees, including, but not limited to, the right to hire, promote, assign, transfer, demote, suspend, or discharge employees for proper cause; to schedule work; determine the processes for accomplishing work; to relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; to take action as necessary to carry out the missions of the State; or determine the methods, 186 Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp. v. State of Oregon means, and personnel by which operations are to be carried on, except as modiﬁed or circumscribed by the terms of this Agreement. The retention of these rights does not preclude any employee from ﬁling a grievance, pursuant to Article 44, Grievance and Arbitration Procedure, or seeking a review of the exercise of these rights, when it is alleged such exercise violates provisions of this agreement.” (Emphasis added.) In its 2005 decision, which was at issue in AOCE I, ERB recognized that the legislature had distinguished between scheduling services to the public and scheduling employee work hours. Ass’n of Oregon Corr. Employees, 20 PECBR at 897-98. The latter was a mandatory subject of bargaining, the former was not.13 ERB explained that, in Article 3, the parties could have been referring to either subject: “It is unclear    whether the language applies to scheduling services to the public, or instead to individual employee work hours. The language might also apply to the employer’s decision about when during the day to schedule a particular task, rather than to the hours a particular employee works.” Id. at 900. “One point is clear,” ERB concluded: “[T]he provision does not expressly give DOC the right to unilaterally change the start/stop times and days off of employees. Such ambiguity and lack of speciﬁcity preclude us from ﬁnding a ‘clear and unmistakable’ waiver of bargaining over these subjects.” Id. When ERB reconsidered its decision in 2009 after remand by the Court of Appeals in AOCE I, ERB described the phrase “inherent rights of management” in Article 3 as one that is “commonly used in labor law” and stated that it had “repeatedly used the phrase to refer to subjects that are permissive for bargaining.” Ass’n of Oregon Corr. Employees, 23 PECBR at 237. ERB concluded that the phrase “is a term of art in labor-management relations, and the parties used the phrase as it is commonly understood in 13 Under ORS 243.650(7)(a), “employment relations” about which a public employer must bargain in good faith, includes “matters concerning    hours[.]” Under ORS 243.650(7)(g), “employment relations” does not include “scheduling of services provided to the public.” Cite as 353 Or 170 (2013) 187 the labor-management community. Use of the phrase indicates that the parties intended the management rights clause to apply only to permissive subjects for bargaining. If so, the clause would not apply to work hours issues such as employee start-stop times and days off because they concern mandatory subjects for bargaining.” Id. at 238. That interpretation was bolstered, ERB noted, by the use of the word “retain” in Article. A party cannot retain, ERB reasoned, something that it never had in the ﬁrst place. Thus, one plausible reading of Article 3 was that it authorized DOC to keep only those rights that it had prior to negotiating that provision (i.e., the right to schedule services to the public); it did not grant DOC rights that it did not have (i.e., the right to schedule employee work hours unilaterally). Prior to negotiating Article 3, DOC did not have the right unilaterally to change employee work hours, a mandatory subject for bargaining, and, ERB concluded, Article 3 did not unambiguously bestow that right. In AOCE I, DOC argued to the Court of Appeals that the CBA granted DOC the broad right to “schedule work” and that, in the exercise of that right, DOC necessarily had to determine when such work would start and stop and on what days the work would occur. The fact that DOC’s right to schedule might also encompass the scheduling of tasks did not mean that the provision was “ambiguous”; rather, DOC argued, it was merely an indication that DOC’s scheduling powers were broad. DOC renews its argument in this court. Citing UFORMA/Shelby Business Forms, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 111 F3d 1284, 1290 (6th Cir 1997), DOC contends that a broadly worded management rights clause operates as a clear and unmistakable waiver of a union’s right to bargain with respect to subjects covered by that clause. We are not convinced. As ERB explained, there is a question in this case about the subject matter that is covered by Article 3. In theory, Article 3 could cover scheduling employee work hours. However, given ERB’s prior interpretation of the term of art included in that Article and the parties’ use of the word “retain,” ERB did not err in concluding that the meaning of the term “to schedule work” in Article 3 also could be limited to directing 188 Assn. of Oregon Corrections Emp. v. State of Oregon the work of employees and scheduling the services that they provide to the public. Consequently, ERB also did not err in concluding that Article 3 did not clearly and unmistakably waive its statutory right to bargain over changes to employees’ scheduled days off and their shift stop and start times.14