Opinion ID: 2322590
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act's Express Denial?

Text: The conclusion that C.J. § 12-301 grants a general right to appeal denials of C.P. § 8-301 petitions does not end our inquiry because C.J. § 12-301 precludes appeal where expressly denied by law. We must now consider the State's assertion that the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act (UPPA), codified at C.P. §§ 7-101 through 7-301, strips the right of appeal from actions brought under C.P. § 8-301. Section 7-107(b)(1), the relevant section of the UPPA, provides, in pertinent part: In a case in which a person challenges the validity of confinement under a sentence of . . . imprisonment by seeking the writ of habeas corpus or the writ of coram nobis or by invoking a common law or statutory remedy other than this title, a person may not appeal to the Court of Appeals or the Court of Special Appeals. (emphasis added). The State argues that § 7-107(b)(1) of the UPPA expressly denies the right to appeal a denial under C.P. § 8-301. Appellants respond that the UPPA does not apply to C.P. § 8-301, because claims of newly discovered evidence made pursuant to that statute are not cognizable under the UPPA, and C.P. § 7-107(b) was intended only to deny appeals in matters that could have been heard under the UPPA. We conclude that Appellants have the better part of the argument. The purpose of the UPPA was to streamline into one simple statute all the remedies, beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial and review, which are . . . present[ly] available for challenging the validity of a sentence. State v. Zimmerman, 261 Md. 11, 24, 273 A.2d 156, 163 (1971) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. D'Onofrio, 221 Md. 20, 29, 155 A.2d 643, 647 (1959)). The UPPA does not eliminate alternative remedies, such as habeas corpus, coram nobis, or other common law or statutory remedies, though it restricts the right to appeal orders pursuant to those traditional remedies. Brady v. State, 222 Md. 442, 447, 160 A.2d 912, 915-16 (1960). But where the UPPA does not provide a remedy, the preclusive effects of C.P. § 7-107(b)(1) do not apply. See Gluckstern v. Sutton, 319 Md. 634, 662, 574 A.2d 898, 912 (1990) (explaining that, [i]n situations where the Post Conviction Procedure Act did not provide a remedy, and thus was not a substitute for habeas corpus, the enactment of the new statute provided no reason for restricting appeals in habeas corpus cases). It is settled that questions of guilt or innocence cannot be raised in petitions for postconviction relief. See, e.g., Thornton v. Md. Penitentiary, 241 Md. 715, 717, 216 A.2d 894, 895 (1966) (per curiam) (concluding that no grounds for postconviction relief exist where petitioner claims actual innocence). It is just as well settled that a petition for postconviction relief is not a substitute for a motion for a new trial. Roe v. Patuxent Inst., 240 Md. 717, 719, 214 A.2d 162, 163 (1965) (per curiam). C.P. § 8-301 provides a defendant an opportunity to seek a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that speaks to his or her actual innocence, as evident from the title of the statute itself. Furthermore, the legislative history of C.P. § 8-301 reflects a legislative purpose that the statute extend the right to seek a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence beyond that afforded a convicted defendant under Maryland Rule 4-331(c). The Fiscal and Policy Note that accompanied Senate Bill 486, which became C.P. § 8-301 in 2009, included the statement that the then-current law afforded a defendant relief under Rule 4-331 . . . if newly discovered evidence exist[ed] that could not have been discovered by due diligence in time to move for a new trial within 10 days after the verdict. The Note also stated that defendants had one year within which to file Rule 4-331 motions based on newly discovered evidence. Id. The Note mentioned, too, that Virginia law provided defendants the opportunity to present newly discovered evidence within 21 days after sentencing, which right the Virginia legislature expanded . . . in 2004 to allow felons to submit new evidence other than DNA tests. Id. C.P. § 8-301, as originally enacted, [12] declared, in subsection (a): A convicted person, at any time, may file a petition for writ of actual innocence. . . if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that: (1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and (2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331. 2009 Md. Laws ch. 744. C.P. § 8-301 by its language embodies the apparent intention of the General Assembly to enact in Maryland (similar to the Virginia enactment) a broader claim of actual innocence, based on newly discovered evidence, than that provided under Md. Rule 4-331(c). [13] We are persuaded that the remedy afforded under C.P. § 8-301, like the similar (albeit more restricted) remedy provided by a motion for new trial, see Patuxent Inst., 240 Md. at 719, 214 A.2d at 163, is necessarily part of the usual procedures of trial and review available to a criminal defendant that were not intended to fall within the scope of postconviction relief, see Zimmerman, 261 Md. at 24, 273 A.2d at 163 (The [UPPA] was passed with the intent that there be brought together `into one simple statute all the remedies, beyond those that are incident to the usual procedures of trial and review, which are at present available for challenging the validity of a sentence.' (quoting Brady, 222 Md. at 447, 160 A.2d at 915-16) (emphasis added)). We therefore conclude that the UPPA's appeal preclusion does not apply to claims arising under C.P. § 8-301.