Opinion ID: 2084834
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Authority of Monroe County DSS to Bring This Child Protective Proceeding

Text: Respondent challenges the authority of DSS to bring this proceeding on the grounds that, as a matter of law, a parent's use of the New York courts and law enforcement authorities to enforce judicially granted rights of temporary or permanent custody cannot constitute neglect within the State ( see , Family Ct Act § 1036 [c]). We disagree. While it is true that respondent has a legal right to seek enforcement of valid court orders, her disregard of her children's special vulnerabilities in attempting to enforce her rights of temporary or permanent custody could nevertheless give rise to a finding of neglect within the meaning of the Family Court Act. As defined in the Family Court Act, `Impairment of emotional health' and `impairment of mental or emotional condition' includes a state of substantially diminished psychological or intellectual functioning    [and] must be clearly attributable to the unwillingness    of the respondent to exercise a minimum degree of care toward the child  (Family Ct Act § 1012 [h] [emphasis supplied]; see also , Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i] [defining a neglected child as one whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of (a) parent    to exercise a minimum degree of care  (emphasis supplied)]). It is settled law that a child's frailties, weaknesses and special needs must be taken into account when they exist. Thus, the minimum standard or degree of care must, of necessity, take into account the special vulnerabilities of the child. For a child with such special vulnerabilities, the minimum standard of care will of necessity be an expansive standard ( see , Matter of Milland , 146 Misc 2d 1, 6; see also , Matter of Hofbauer , 47 N.Y.2d 648 [minimum degree of care cannot be judged in a vacuum free from external influences, but rather each case must be decided on its own particular facts]; Matter of Jose Y. , 177 AD2d 580; Matter of New York City Dept. of Social Servs. [Anna Marie A.] v Elena A. , 194 AD2d 608). A parent fails to exercise a minimum degree of care in not responding to the special needs of a child, even when those needs may not seriously implicate general physical health ( see , Matter of Sampson , 37 AD2d 668, 669, affd 29 N.Y.2d 900; Matter of Ray , 95 Misc 2d 1026, 1029). Parents may not ignore the fact that their conduct is impairing their children's emotional health ( see , Matter of Theresa CC. , 178 AD2d 687, 688-689). Similarly, other State high courts have recognized that the minimum degree of care must take into consideration the special vulnerabilities of the child in question ( see, e.g. , In Interest of L.J. , 436 NW2d 558, 561 [ND] [It can hardly be questioned that some children require more care and attention and skill    than do others. The requisite care and control called for by a minimum standard of parenting must necessarily fluctuate with the kind of children being parented. There is no absolute standard]; People in Interest of D.K. , 245 NW2d 644 [SD]; see also , Matter of Scott G. , 124 AD2d 928 [definition of neglect sufficiently elastic to embrace situations in which a parent allows the child to become impaired]). In the instant case, we find it significant that an independent mental health expert, a child psychologist retained by DSS and not affiliated with either parent, after examining Sayeh and Arash, diagnosed them as suffering from clinical disorders stemming from their earlier trauma and predicted that their mental health might be worsened if respondent succeeded in immediately enforcing her visitation and custodial rights. Specifically, with regard to Sayeh, the child psychologist found that: nothing [could] be more terrifying and traumatic for Sayeh tha[n] to return her to the place where her sister was raped and murdered and where she was raped, physically assaulted and left for dead. His prognosis on the effect of the success of respondent's efforts was: A major depression would probably be one component of her condition if this occurs.    This further suggests that if she experiences a personality disorganization as a result of being confronted with overwhelming life stress, that the disorganization would be massive. Similarly, with respect to Arash, the psychologist found that: Arash also appears to have more anger than has been previously evident, with that anger serving to mask his fear of his mother and her potential actions.    These kinds of feelings [can] provide the psychological base for emotional trauma. As respondent's efforts for temporary or permanent custody in Florida intensified, he wrote: [Arash] is now more    disturbed    [T]he consequences are even more grave. The independent child psychologist's clinical prediction of the effects that enforcement of respondent's visitation and custodial rights would have on the children cannot be ignored. It supports the allegation that, given these exceptional circumstances and special vulnerabilities, the children would be in imminent danger of severe emotional harm as a result of the mother's attempt to force their precipitous return to Florida without benefit of any preliminary ameliorative services ( see , Matter of Milland , supra ; see also , In Interest of L.J. , supra ). Surely, there is evidence to support a claim that respondent's conduct threatens to induce a state of substantially diminished psychological    functioning in the children (Family Ct Act § 1012 [h]). There is also evidence to support the allegation that the threatened impairment of emotional health ( id. ) would be clearly attributable to the unwillingness  ( id. [emphasis supplied]) of respondent to recognize and take into account the special vulnerabilities of her children. Critical is the fact, uncontested in this record, that the children's special vulnerabilities resulted from the unique, devastating trauma they experienced earlier while in their mother's care, and that custody was then transferred upon an assessment of her incapability to provide adequate care for these especially needy children. In this situation, where enforcement of respondent's judicially granted rights to temporary or permanent custody would, in the sound judgment of qualified independently and otherwise retained clinicians, cause severe emotional harm, our child protective laws are not impotent to protect these children through the invocation of an article 10 proceeding. We note also that although respondent unquestionably had a legal right to seek to enforce her Florida visitation rights, she had an obligation to pursue those rights in a responsible way. Given the family's history, a responsible adult would have considered the possibility that an abrupt resumption of visitation with respondent in Florida  and a forced return to the place where the harrowing trauma-producing events occurred  might have a devastating effect on the children's psychological well-being. Yet, respondent chose to insist upon just such a sudden shift of temporary custody instead of taking a gradual approach by initially seeking short, supervised visits, coupled with family counseling for all of the principals, as a means of building a positive relationship and restoring the children's trust to whatever extent was possible. Undoubtedly, had respondent chosen such a gradual course, New York courts and social services agencies would have been willing to provide the necessary support and facilities. Respondent's contrary decision to demand an immediate delivery of the children without regard to their need for preparatory counseling and related services could well be found to represent precisely the kind of failure to exercise a minimum degree of care that our neglect statute contemplates ( see , Family Ct Act § 1012 [f] [i]). Thus, contrary to the dissenters' suggestion that this is merely a case about respondent seeking contact by way of visitation with her children in an environment secure to the children, the instant determination that the allegations of neglect are valid would be predicated more accurately upon respondent's heedless and precipitous efforts to enforce visitation rights in Florida and, when she was unsuccessful, threatening the children with the ultimate sanction of forced immediate relocation to Florida in her sole custody. [2] Surely, on the basis of the potential harm clinically identified in this record, it cannot be said here that the allegations of neglect are insubstantial or that the exercise of child protective jurisdiction is merely a parental device to overturn a custody determination validly made by a court of another State, and we are confident that the New York courts and child protective agencies will be vigilant against any such abuse of our protective laws in the future. In the latter regard, it is especially significant that the Family Court Act does not permit the initiation of article 10 proceedings by anyone other than a child protective agency, except with prior court authorization ( see , Family Ct Act § 1032; see also , Family Ct Act § 1012 [i]; Matter of Weber v Stony Brook Hosp. , 60 N.Y.2d 208, 212, cert denied 464 US 1026).