Opinion ID: 694580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pinaud's Allegation of an Out-of-Court Conspiracy

Text: 34 On appeal, Pinaud claims that the District Court misunderstood the nature of his claims when it found that the individual defendants were shielded by absolute prosecutorial immunity. Pinaud asserts that his claims against the district attorneys were not based so much on any particular act, but rather on the alleged out-of-court plot among the defendants to violate his civil rights and to imprison him unlawfully. Recognizing that absolute immunity will generally cover a prosecutor for all actions taken in court, Pinaud tries to get around absolute immunity by alleging a conspiracy that was organized outside the courtroom, and he suggests that the individual--perhaps immune--acts of the prosecutors were offered by him in evidence only to substantiate this out-of-court conspiracy. 35 Yet, try as he might, Pinaud's attempt to avoid the defense of absolute prosecutorial immunity by fashioning his claim in terms of a conspiracy based only on actions taken outside the courtroom does not avail. The Supreme Court recently explained in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993), that any claim that absolute immunity is to be confined to conduct occurring in the courtroom was plainly foreclosed by ... Imbler. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2615. Rather, as Imbler first explained and Buckley underscored, absolute immunity extends to those acts, whether in or out of the courtroom, which occur in the course of the [prosecutor's] role as an advocate for the State. Buckley, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2615; see Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. at 996 n. 33 (noting that prosecutorial duties involve actions apart from the courtroom); see also Dory v. Ryan, 25 F.3d 81, 83 (2d Cir.1994) (The application of immunity is not limited to the duties a prosecutor performs in the courtroom.). 36 Moreover, though it may initially seem peculiar to hold that even a conspiracy among prosecutors is shielded by absolute immunity, the fact that such a conspiracy is certainly not something that is properly within the role of a prosecutor is immaterial, because '[t]he immunity attaches to his function, not to the manner in which he performed it.'  Dory, 25 F.3d at 83 (quoting Barrett v. United States, 798 F.2d 565, 573 (2d Cir.1986)). As this Court and others circuits have repeatedly held, since absolute immunity covers virtually all acts, regardless of motivation, associated with [the prosecutor's] function as an advocate, id., when the underlying activity at issue is covered by absolute immunity, the plaintiff derives no benefit from alleging a conspiracy. Hill, 45 F.3d at 659 n. 2. Accord Snelling v. Westhoff, 972 F.2d 199, 200 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 977, 122 L.Ed.2d 132 (1993); Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1077-79 (9th Cir.1986) (Allegations of conspiracy between judge and prosecutor ... are insufficient to overcome [their] immunities.); see also Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 139 (2d Cir.1987) ([S]ince absolute immunity spares the official any scrutiny of his motives, an allegation that an act was done pursuant to a conspiracy has no greater effect than an allegation that it was done in bad faith or with malice, neither of which defeats a claim of absolute immunity.); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1989); Holloway v. Walker, 765 F.2d 517, 522-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1037, 106 S.Ct. 605, 88 L.Ed.2d 583 (1985). 5 37 In the end, then, Pinaud's formulation of his claims in terms of an out-of-court conspiracy does nothing to undercut the District Court's conclusions concerning absolute immunity. 38