Opinion ID: 2598459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: exclusion of prior inconsistent statement testimony

Text: [¶ 36] Appellant asserts that the district court abused its discretion in excluding testimony offered to impeach the victim's mother with a prior inconsistent statement. During the cross-examination of Barbee, appellant's trial counsel elicited the following testimony: Q.... You moved out of your family's house because you had troubles with your father; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And he's actually your stepfather; is that right? A. Yes. ... Q. Okay. And you had explained to Matt [the victim's father] and the family that it was because of your father; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. And you also shared with Matt and his, his family that he had abused you; is that correct? A. Me and him had gotten into a fist fight once, and that's the only time he has abused me. Q. Okay. Did you ever tell Mike Seward that you had been abused by him? A. No. Q. Did you ever tell him that you had been sexually abused by him? A. No. Appellant's trial counsel called appellant's son, Mike Seward, as a witness, and the following transpired during direct examination: Q. Have you had conversations with [Barbee] concerning her past? A. Yes, I have. Q. Okay, and specifically with her grandfather, about her grandfather on her side? A. Well, her father on her side, yes. Q. Father. Excuse me. What transpired in those conversations? The prosecutor objected as to relevance. Appellant's trial counsel responded that the witness' testimony would rebut Barbee's testimony. The district court sustained the prosecutor's objection. Appellant's trial counsel provided the district court an offer of proof regarding the witness' proposed testimony that he and Barbee were watching television, and something came on the TV about [a] child molester, or it was something along those lines, and Barbee stated that she couldn't stand her father either because he used to do the same thing to her. The district court stated that the testimony was collateral to the issues in the case and 404(b) evidence called against a person who is not charged and isn't here.... [¶ 37] Should this issue arise on remand, we note that, while the district court retains its discretion regarding the admissibility of evidence, we have recently stated the following with respect to such testimony when offered for impeachment purposes: Prior inconsistent statements are admissible under W.R.E. 613(b) to impeach by contradiction a witness' trial testimony. W.R.E. 613(b) provides: Extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement by a witness is not admissible unless the witness is afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the same and the opposite party is afforded an opportunity to interrogate him thereon, or the interests of justice otherwise require. This rule applies when two statementsone made at trial and one made previouslyare irreconcilably at odds. In such an event, counsel is permitted to show the discrepancy by extrinsic evidence, if necessary. United States v. Winchenbach, 197 F.3d 548, 558 (1st Cir. 1999). The purpose of this type of impeachment evidence is to show a witness to be generally capable of making errors in his testimony. 3A John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1017 (Chadbourn rev.1970). In doing so, counsel can resort to the witness' own prior statements in which that witness has given a contrary version. Id. Prior statements made by a witness are not hearsay if the declarant testifies at the trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statements. W.R.E. 801(d)(1). The use of a prior inconsistent statement is not inadmissible hearsay because it is not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rather, it is used as a tool to compare both statements and conclude that the declarant has erred in making one or the other without determining which statement is erroneous. 3A John Henry Wigmore, Evidence § 1018 (Chadbourn rev.1970). Willis v. State, 2002 WY 79, ¶¶ 18-19, 46 P.3d 890, 896 (Wyo.2002). However, the jury should ultimately consider such testimony in accordance with the limited purpose for which it is offered. See, for example, Medrano v. State, 914 P.2d 804, 810 (Wyo.1996) and Channel v. State, 592 P.2d 1145, 1149-50 (Wyo.1979). [¶ 38] In evaluating whether the proffered testimony was indeed collateral, the district court might consider whether such testimony was relevant to some issue in the case other than credibility.... Daniel v. State, 923 P.2d 728, 739 (Wyo.1996) (emphasis in original). Barbee's credibility certainly was at issue, and one of appellant's theories was that Barbee had a motive to influence the victim based on Barbee's desire that the victim's father relinquish his parental rights. Appellant also advanced a theory that the victim's maternal grandfather was the perpetrator. Appellant, and several witnesses from appellant's family, testified that the victim referred to her maternal grandfather perpetrating the acts alleged. Bilkie also testified that he checked the maternal grandfather's history and found one incident, and that Barbee denied that the maternal grandfather perpetrated any acts against her. We make no comment as to whether the proffered testimony was probative of that, or some other issue in the case, but merely state that the district court should consider any such issues in deciding on remand whether the proposed brief testimony is collateral and would unduly confuse the issues at trial. [¶ 39] We reverse.