Opinion ID: 6493327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The circuit court abused its discretion in denying Cramer’s motion for substitution of counsel and a continuance of the sentencing hearing

Text: Cramer asserts that pursuant to the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution, he was entitled to privately retained counsel of his choice, and that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for substitution of counsel and a continuance. As explained below, we conclude that Cramer was denied his right to privately retained counsel of his choice under the Hawaii constitution. Article I, section 14 of the Hawaii Constitution provides, in relevant part, “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for the accused’s defense.” We have interpreted this provision to guarantee a criminal defendant’s right to privately retained counsel of his or her choice. Maddagan, 95 Hawai'i at 180, 19 P.3d at 1292 (“On independent state constitutional grounds, we also recognize that the right to counsel in article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution encompasses a right to privately retained counsel of choice.”). In Maddagan, the circuit court denied the defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, made through new counsel, because no motion to withdraw or substitute counsel was filed. Id. at 178, 19 P.3d at 1290. Attached to defendant’s motion was his affidavit that stated that he was authorizing his new counsel, Earle A. Partington, to represent him on the motion. Id. On appeal, this court recognized that article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution “encompasses a right to privately retained counsel of choiee[,]” but that “the right to counsel of choice is qualified, and can be outweighed by countervailing governmental interests.” Id. at 180, 19 P.3d at 1292 (emphasis added and citation omitted). This court determined that the circuit court had discretion to allow the substitution of Part-ington and that the defendant should have been given a hearing to advocate for the substitution. Id. at 182, 19 P.3d at 1294. It is clear from Maddagan that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right under article I, section 14 of the Hawai'i Constitution to privately retained counsel of his or her choice. This right, however, must be balanced against countervailing governmental interests. See Maddagan, 95 Hawai'i at 180, 19 P.3d at 1292 (“[T]he right to counsel of choice is qualified, and can be outweighed by countervailing governmental interests.”) (citation omitted); cf. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 164, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988) (holding that federal courts “must recognize a presumption in favor of petitioner’s counsel of choice, but that presumption may be overcome not only by a demonstration of actual conflict [of interest] but by a showing of a serious potential for conflict. The evaluation of the facts and circumstances of each case under this standard must be left primarily to the informed judgment of the trial court”) (emphasis added). This court has not had occasion to examine the countervailing governmental interests that should be balanced against the right to counsel of choice. However, other jurisdictions have identified several factors that can be relevant in making such a determination. See, e.g., People v. Butcher, 275 Cal.App.2d 63, 79 Cal.Rptr. 618, 621 (1969) (in considering motions to substitute counsel and to continue made on the day of trial, the trial court should have considered: (1) length of the continuance; (2) whether there was a dilatory motive for the continuance; (3) whether the prosecution knew of the motions beforehand and whether the prosecution objected; (4) whether the delay would have inconvenienced the prosecution or its witnesses; (5) whether current court-appointed counsel was prepared to proceed; (6) whether the defendant had already retained private counsel; and (7) whether the continuance would interfere with the efficient administration of justice). In State v. Prineas, 316 Wis.2d 414, 766 N.W.2d 206, 212 (Wis.Ct.App.2009), the defendant in a sexual assault prosecution hired privately retained counsel and filed a motion for his present attorney to withdraw, to substitute counsel, and for a continuance one week before the trial date. 766 N.W.2d at 210. The court held a hearing in which the State argued that the complaining witness and her family wanted the case to “be done so she could get on with her life.” Id. The court stated that it would not grant the request so close to trial unless it was given “some extraordinary reason” other than a desire to change counsel, but none was offered by defense counsel. Id. at 214-15. Accordingly, the court denied the motion. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued, inter alia, that he was denied his right to private counsel of his choice. Id. at 212. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals held that decisions relating to substitution of counsel were within the sound discretion of the trial court, and noted that when making its determination to grant or deny a request for substitution of counsel of choice, the trial court needed to balance the defendant’s request against “the public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Id. The appellate court listed several examples of factors that “assist the court in balancing the relevant interests,” including: the length of the delay requested, whether competent counsel was presently available and prepared to try the case, whether prior continuances have been requested and received by the defendant, the inconvenience to the parties, witnesses and the court, and whether the delay was for legitimate reasons or whether its purpose was dilatory. Id. The appellate court determined that the trial court properly balanced the request against the “public’s interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice.” Id. at 215 (citation omitted). The appellate court determined: Several factors weigh in favor of the court’s exercise of its discretion, for example: [the defendant] did not specify the length of delay that would be required; he did not dispute his current counsel’s ability to try the case; the court considered the inconvenience to the court and the concerns of the victim; and [the defendant] provided no reason for substitution and the accompanying delay. Id. Accordingly, upon consideration of multiple factors, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request for substitution of counsel and a continuance. Id. at 215, 219. In the instant ease, the circuit court merely considered one factor—timeliness of the request—in making its determination to deny the motion for substitution and a continuance. The record does not reflect that the circuit court considered, for example, the length of the delay requested, the impact of the delay on the prosecution, witnesses or the court, and whether the delay was for a dilatory purpose. Consideration of those other factors supports the conclusion that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion for substitution and a continuance. The State took no position on the request and there was no apparent prejudice to the State. The record does not establish that the circuit court would have been inconvenienced by the request, particularly given that it subsequently ordered a one-week continuance of the sentencing hearing. The record also does not establish that there were witnesses present at the initial hearing who would be inconvenienced by a continuance. Furthermore, there had been only one prior continuance in the proceeding, which was a stipulated continuance of the trial from September 16, 2010 to November 4, 2010. Under the circumstances, the court’s summary denial of the motion for substitution and a continuance as untimely was an abuse of discretion. Although the ICA relied on Torres in affirming Cramer’s sentence in the instant case, Torres is distinguishable. There, on the day before trial on a burglary charge, Richard Torres asked the court for the appointment of new counsel. 54 Haw. at 502-03, 510 P.2d at 495. The circuit court dismissed the original attorney and appointed Torres’s chosen attorney, Mr. Hall. Id. Both Torres and Hall moved for a continuance so that Hall could prepare for trial. Id. The circuit court denied the motions because the jury was waiting to be impaneled and there had been several continuances leading up to trial. Id. at 503, 510 P.2d at 495-96. Hall went to trial less than twenty-four hours later. Id. at 504, 510 P.2d at 496. On appeal to this court, Torres argued that he was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 503, 510 P.2d at 495. This court held, Generally, any request for continuance is to be disposed of in the discretion of the trial judge. A denial of a continuance is not per se a denial of the constitutional right to counsel, but the appellate court should scrupulously review the record to determine whether, under all the circumstances, there was an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the defendant by amounting to an unconstitutional denial of the right toi [sic] effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 504-05, 510 P.2d at 496. This court determined that Torres was not denied the effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 57, 510 P.2d at 498. This court found no deficiencies in Hall’s performance at trial, Hall had complete access to notes from the prosecution’s and Dwight’s files, and Torres did not request a change of counsel until the very moment of trial and therefore was to blame for the tardiness of the request for new counsel. Id. at 507, 510 P.2d at 497-98. Torres is distinguishable. Torres involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel after the circuit court granted a motion for substitution and after it denied Torres’s motion for a continuance of trial. 54 Haw. at 503, 510 P.2d at 495. Here, the issue is whether the circuit court violated the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel of choice and thus, erred in denying a motion to substitute counsel. Put another way, this court need not analyze this ease for ineffectiveness of counsel because substitute counsel was not appointed. Cramer also asserts that the ICA’s determination that “Cramer provided no reason for the request for new counsel and, on appeal, has not argued he was prejudiced by the court’s denial of a continuance to accommodate appointment of new counsel” was inconsistent with Gonzalez-Lopez. Cramer, 2012 WL 1560671, at . The ICA’s determination is indeed inconsistent with Gonzalez-Lopez. In Gonzalez-Lopez, the defendant, Cuauh-temoc Gonzalez-Lopez, was charged in the Eastern District of Missouri with conspiracy to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana. 548 U.S. at 142, 126 S.Ct. 2557. His family hired an attorney to represent him. Id. Gonzalez-Lopez later called a California attorney, Joseph Low, to represent him. Id. Although the district court initially permitted Low’s provisional entry of appearance, it subsequently revoked the provisional acceptance and did not allow participation or representation by Low, Gonzalez-Lopez’s counsel of choice. Id. On appeal, the issue before the Court was whether a trial court’s erroneous deprivation of a criminal defendant’s choice of counsel entitled him to reversal of his conviction. Id. The prosecution did not dispute that Gonzalez-Lopez was erroneously deprived of his counsel of choice. Id. at 144. The Court determined that the erroneous deprivation of Gonzalez-Lopez’s counsel of choice required reversal of the conviction. Id. at 151-52. The Court determined that no additional showing of prejudice was required when a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice was violated: “[deprivation of the right is ‘complete’ when the defendant is erroneously prevented from being represented by the lawyer he wants, regardless of the quality of the representation he received.” Id. at 148. The Court reaffirmed its holding that the right to counsel of choice was “limit[ed]” and needed to be “balanced]” “against the needs of fairness, and against the demands of [the court’s] calendar,” but concluded that that consideration was not relevant to Gonzalez-Lopez’s case because the prosecution “conceded that the [court] here erred when it denied [Gonzalez-Lopez] his choice of counsel.” Id. at 151-52 (citations omitted). In addition, the Court held that the denial of the right to counsel of choice was a “structural error” not subject to a harmless error analysis. 11 548 U.S. at 150, 126 S.Ct. 2557. Furthermore, the Court determined, “[i]t is impossible to know what different choices the rejected counsel would have made, and then to quantify the impact of those different choices on the outcome of the proceedings.” Id. Similarly, requiring Cram-er to argue that he was “prejudiced” by the denial of the continuance to accommodate the appointment of new counsel would require us to speculate as to how Aluli would have represented Cramer at the sentencing hearing, an inquiry that was rejected in Gonzalez-Lopez. For the same reasons, Cramer is free to argue on remand that he should be sentenced to probation pursuant to Act 44, or any other potentially applicable sentence. Accordingly, the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the motion for substitution and a continuance.