Opinion ID: 1312837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Petition for Rehearing Properly Filed?

Text: Simms also seeks to toll the AEDPA limitations period for the period during which his petition for rehearing was pending at the Illinois Supreme Court. Of course, his petition was never really pending; it was returned three weeks later by the clerk's office, which informed Simms that it was unable to file the petition. Remember that Simms needs only one day of tolling to save his case; if we toll the period for the three weeks the clerk had the petition, his federal habeas corpus claim is timely. Remember also that we explained above that the clerk's acceptance of a petition is not sufficient to render the petition properly filed. To prevail, Simms must succeed where he failed regarding his initial Illinois habeas petition discussed above; he must show that the clerk of the Illinois Supreme Court erred when she returned his petition. Both parties assume that the clerk was unable to file the petition because it was mislabeled a petition for rehearing. (The clerk's actual letter to Simms is more ambiguous, but since neither party teased out an alternative ground for rejection of the petition from the letter, neither will we). Simms argues that the clerk misinterpreted Illinois law which, Simms claims, allows for petitions for rehearing after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal. Simms argues that the denial of the petition for leave to appeal (PLA) is a judgment and as such, is a proper subject for a petition for rehearing. See Illinois Supreme Court Rule 367(a) (A petition for rehearing may be filed within 21 days after the filing of the judgment....). The respondent disagrees. In a case like Simms's where there is no appeal as of right to the Illinois Supreme Court, leave to appeal to that court is entrusted to the sound judicial discretion of the court. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a). Because of this discretion, the Illinois Supreme Court has refused to invoke res judicata based on its previous denial of a PLA at an earlier stage in the proceeding. For res judicata to apply, there must have been a final judgment on the merits of the case. Denials of petitions for leave to appeal are not decisions on the merits. In re Leona W., 228 Ill.2d 439, 320 Ill.Dec. 855, 888 N.E.2d 72, 81 (2008); see also People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill.2d 236, 256 Ill.Dec. 530, 752 N.E.2d 410, 424 (2001) (It is well settled that our denials of leave to appeal are not decisions on the merits of the case. They carry no connotation of approval or disapproval of the appellate court action, and signify only that four members of this court, for reasons satisfactory to them, have not voted to grant leave. (quotation omitted)). Illinois law is, therefore, clear that the denial of the PLA is not a final judgment. And, accordingly, a petition for rehearing is not a proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a PLA. The fact that, as Simms points out, we have mistakenly assumed, in dicta, that a petition for rehearing is the proper vehicle to challenge the denial of a PLA, see Jones v. Hulick, 449 F.3d 784, 789 (7th Cir.2006); Wilson v. Battles, 302 F.3d 745, 747 (7th Cir.2002), does not alter our responsibility to interpret the law of Illinois as the Illinois courts have. As the clerk noted when it rejected Simms's petition for rehearing, a motion for reconsideration is available to a petitioner whose PLA was denied. See, e.g., People v. Thivel, 234 Ill.2d 546, 334 Ill.Dec. 130, 916 N.E.2d 545 (2009). Simms filed no such petition here, and we have repeatedly held that in Illinois, the time period during which a petition for reconsideration can be filed after the denial of a petition for leave to appeal is not tolled for purposes of AEDPA. See Jones, 449 F.3d at 789; Wilson, 302 F.3d at 747-48. At least one Illinois court of appeals has also made the same error of nomenclature that we made in Jones and Wilson, see Butts v. City of Peoria, 152 Ill.App.3d 382, 105 Ill.Dec. 444, 504 N.E.2d 544, 545 (1987), but Simms does not argue that Illinois courts ordinarily treat the two separate motions identically and that he was prejudiced by the clerk's decision to choose not to in his case. Instead, he rests his claim on the fact that the denial of a PLA is a judgment. As noted above, it is not, and the Illinois statute is clearrehearing is only available when there has been a judgment. Therefore, a petition for rehearing was an improper filing after the denial of Simms's leave to appeal. Accordingly, AEDPA's limitations period was not tolled by the filing.