Opinion ID: 1786702
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State's definition and examples of premeditation

Text: Finally, Williams claims that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's improper definition and examples of premeditation. Williams complains about the following comments made by the State during closing argument: Anytime anybody takes a gun, a .38 caliber gun and shoots another person in the head, that is premeditated. That is intent to kill.... Mr. Jones can argue to you until he is blue in the face, but shooting somebody in the head is about as solid and convincing evidence of intent to kill as there can be. Later in the argument, however, the prosecutor also stated: Now, this premeditation we are talking about is the intent to kill. That is all it is, a conscious intent or decision to do so. There is no instruction that will tell you that it is a fixed period of time on which this must occur. It just says there must be a reflection. That is all it is, a moment. At the close of the arguments, the trial court read the following instruction to the jury regarding premeditation: Killing with premeditation is killing after consciously deciding to do so. The decision must be present in the mind at the time of the killing. The law does not fix the exact period of time that must pass between the formation of the premeditated intent to kill and the killing. The period of time must be long enough to allow reflection by the defendant. The premeditated intent to kill must be formed before the killing. To support his position on this issue, Williams relies on Waters v. State, 486 So.2d 614 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). During the voir dire in Waters, the prosecutor defined premeditation as killing after consciously deciding to do so and operation of the mind. Id. at 615. The prosecutor's definition failed to include any reference to reflection, the integral second requirement for premeditation. Id. The district court held that the trial court erred by allowing the prosecutor to follow this line of questioning over defense counsel's objection and permitted an improper definition of premeditation to form in the jury's mind. Id. We find that the present case is distinguishable from Waters. First, as pointed out above, the State did refer to the element of reflection in its closing argument. Second, the trial court properly instructed the jury on the definition of premeditation. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in denying Williams an evidentiary hearing on this issue, as the motion, files, and record in the case conclusively show that Williams was entitled to no relief. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in this opinion, we hold that the trial court did not err in summarily denying Williams' claim of ineffective assistance of guiltphase counsel. We affirm the trial court's order in its entirety. It is so ordered. SHAW. HARDING, and QUINCE, JJ., concur. WELLS, C.J., concurs with an opinion. LEWIS, J., concurs in result only. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with an opinion, in which PARIENTE, J., concurs. WELLS, C.J., concurring. I concur in the majority's opinion. I write to quote a portion of Judge Cohen's order, which I believe needs to be broadly published: On December 29, 1986, Defendant filed a postconviction motion pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 which was subsequently amended. An order was entered on March 8, 1996 on Defendant's amended motion. That order granted an evidentiary hearing on claims II, III, and IV in which Defendant raised allegations of ineffective assistance of penalty phase counsel. Those claims will be addressed seriatim herein. As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that the inordinate and unacceptable passage of time between Defendant's conviction and issuance of this Order. In particular, the file shows a seven year span from May 1989 to March 1996 during which apparently nothing was done to resolve this matter. The problem of undue delay is not novel to this case. It is virtually endemic in death penalty cases. Even now, Defendants are raising claims that extended confinement on death row constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Thus far those challenges have been rejected. As a result of the backlog of death penalty cases, the Florida Supreme Court has taken steps to closely monitor postconviction death penalty cases with tight time constraints. As trial judges, we are resistant and even resentful of orders that require us to drop everything else we are doing and respond to a Supreme Court mandated hearing. This case demonstrates why it has become necessary for the Supreme Court to take this approach. Justice Wells has written that such an extended time frame as seen in this case to finally rule on a postconviction motion is totally unacceptable and is this Court's and the State's prime responsibility to correct. Knight v. State, 746 So.2d 423 (Fla.1998) (Wells, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). While it is not this Court's intention to place blame, it is apparent that defense counsel, the prosecution, and the court each bear responsibility. Certainly, Defendant himself has little motivation to expedite his own execution. Nevertheless, it is both defense counsel's and the prosecution's professional duty honestly and ably to assist the courts in securing the efficient administration of justice. In re the Florida Bar, 316 So.2d 45, 48 (Fla.1975). Therefore, once it became apparent that no action, for whatever reason, was being taken on Defendant's postconviction motion, each attorney involved in this case, whether defense or prosecution, was obligated at the very least to inquire about the motion's status. Clearly this was not done. Still, it is perhaps the court which was most at fault. Florida courts are quick to admonish defendants who stymie the efficient procession of cases through our courts by the invidious filing of frivolous, meritless, and impermissibly successive postconviction motions. These admonishments become hypocrisy when, as in this case, we contribute to the morass of capital cases by our own hand through neglect. Such dereliction undermines public confidence in our system of justice, risks prejudicing defendants, and reduces our capital punishment system to one that seems unable to function except as a parody of swift or even timely justice. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 669, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). This case serves as an example of why it is incumbent upon our courts to remain vigilant in the administration of swift justice, and for judges to be particularly mindful of our ethical responsibility to dispose of all judicial matters promptly, efficiently, and fairly. Fla. Code Jud. Conduct, Canon 3B(8). State v. Williams, No. CR80-5117, Div. 10, order at 2-3 (Fla. 9th Cir. Ct. order filed Feb. 1, 1999) (emphasis added). I commend Judge Cohen for addressing frankly this problem. All involved in the further processing of this casethe courts, the prosecutors, the defense counselneed to make this case a priority. This case was tried in October 1981, which means that in more than nineteen years this case has not even been processed through its penalty phase. There can be no satisfactory explanation or excuse for the passage of that period of time. We can only work steadfastly and with due focus toward completing the processing of this case and to be vigilant against this occurring in other cases. ANSTEAD, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. I cannot agree that the appellant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim of the ineffectiveness of counsel during the guilt phase since it is apparent that a facially valid claim has been stated and the record does not conclusively refute the claim. [1] We often forget that this is the test for entitlement to a hearing that we have explicitly set out in rules 3.850 and 3.851. As the majority notes, Williams asserts three instances of counsel error within his ineffective assistance of guilt-phase counsel claim: (1) defense counsel's failure to investigate evidence of a defense of voluntary intoxication and to request a voluntary intoxication instruction; (2) defense counsel's confusing and ineffective presentation to the jury by his rejection of Williams' claims of innocence before the jury, as well as counsel's failure to present a viable alternative defense; and (3) defense counsel's failure to object to the State's use of improper definitions and examples of premeditation to the jury.