Opinion ID: 1278912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismiss the Petition as Improvidently Granted

Text: The State of Idaho, through the office of the attorney general, petitioned this Court to review the decision of the Court of Appeals which issued on July 12, 1983, State of Idaho v. Nield, 105 Idaho 153, 666 P.2d 1164 (Ct.App. 1983). The Court of Appeals stated the issue before it as being whether the district court adequately stated reasons for the sentence imposed and whether that sentence was excessive. That court concluded that the ten-year sentence was not an abuse of discretion. It further concluded that the district judge's oral statements made on the record, were sufficient to satisfy the Tisdale requirement. State v. Tisdale, 103 Idaho 836, 654 P.2d 1389 (Ct.App. 1982). There was no issue drawn in proceedings below in this case that the reasons for the particular sentence should have been incorporated into separately drawn findings. In fact, the State of Idaho itself relied on State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 650 P.2d 707 (Ct.App. 1982): Finally, the appellant argues that the sentencing court failed to adequately set forth its reasons for imposing sentence. The record reflects, however, that the sentencing judge carefully reviewed appropriate criteria for sentencing and set forth in explicit detail those factors considered in exercising his discretion in imposing sentence. (R., pp. 54-56). The record further indicates that the court took full account of the mitigating evidence presented by the defense, and was fully cognizant of the rehabilitative needs of the appellant. Again, it must be emphasized that for purposes of appellate review, the appropriate measure of the term of confinement for the appellant is three and one third years. Further, in deference to the discretionary authority vested in Idaho trial courts, the court on appeal is not to substitute its view for that of a sentencing judge where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill, supra . In view of the serious nature of the offense committed, the character and background of the appellant, and the court's consideration of the need for rehabilitation, the State submits the resultant sentence in the case at bar is reasonable to the extent it appeared necessary at the time of sentencing to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society, and to achieve the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution applicable to this case. Because no clear abuse of discretion has been demonstrated by the appellant, the sentence imposed by the district court should be affirmed on appeal. Respondent's Brief, pp. 17-18. Nor did the appellant, Nield, raise as an issue any contention that an oral statement of reasons, made on the record, was not a sufficient procedure. As an Issue Presented on Appeal, Nield listed: II. DID THE SENTENCING JUDGE ADEQUATELY SET FORTH ON THE RECORD THE REASONS FOR IMPOSING A TEN-YEAR SENTENCE. The brief went on to argue only that: The Reporter's Transcript contains three and one-half pages of the court's comments concerning the reasons for imposing the ten-year indeterminate term prison sentence. (R. pg. 54-56). The court noted an early `rebellion against authority'. The basis for this conclusion was essentially the testimony of the defendant's father concerning his running away from home at the age of sixteen. The trial court also noted that at age twelve the defendant was seduced by an older woman and then `continued that relationship'. The court noted that the defendant, even prior to his involvement with drugs at age sixteen, had not shown much responsibility, and was therefore an antisocial. In essence, a child's immaturity is the rationale for an adult's sentence. Appellant's Brief, p. 11. The Court of Appeals' opinion was well-reasoned. Nield, the appellant, and the only party aggrieved by the decision affirming the district judge, made no further attempt to obtain any reduction of his sentence. His attorney, faithful to his obligation, had presented his contentions to the Court of Appeals. That court ruled against Nield. That should have been the end of it  both for Nield and his attorney. But, it was not to be the end. The Court of Appeals' opinion mentioned the plurality opinion issued by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Osborn, 104 Idaho 809, 633 P.2d 1111 (1983). [1] The office of the attorney general, apparently extra-sensorily perceiving that this Court would welcome an opportunity to exert itself in that regard petitioned this Court for review  notwithstanding that it had prevailed in the Court of Appeals and notwithstanding that the issue that the attorney general would request this Court to consider had not been raised, and thus preserved. A principle so well-established as to be unneedful of citation is that an appellate court, including (one would like to think) a state's supreme court, will not consider issues in the abstract, and certainly not issues which are attempted to be raised for the very first time. The Petition for Review stated only: This petition is based on the ground that the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance probably not in accord with a governing decision of the Idaho Supreme Court and the State is aggrieved by the erroneous decision of the Court of Appeals, for the reasons to be detailed in the respondent's brief in support of this petition for review, which will be filed pursuant to Rule 118, Idaho Appellate Rules. In due time a supporting brief was filed which delineated the single issue which the attorney general's office desired to lay before this Court: WHETHER THE SUPREME COURT OF IDAHO, IN ITS PLURALITY DECISION IN STATE V. OSBORN , # 14333, OVERRULED STATE V. TISDALE, 103 IDAHO 836, 654 P.2d 1389 (IDAHO APP. 1982). It bears repeating that this was not an issue which had been presented to the Court of Appeals. The Petition for Review should have been summarily denied. However, as the minutes of this Court reflect, three members of this Court saw fit to vote to grant the petition and so this case stayed in the system to the detriment of other cases accordingly set back on the assembly line. The State's brief, authored by the Honorable Lynn E. Thomas, Solicitor-General, suggests the rationale by which the State declares itself a party aggrieved by the Court of Appeals opinion, notwithstanding that the State fully prevailed therein: Although the Court of Appeals upheld the appellant's sentence, the State is aggrieved by the circumstance that the Court of Appeals has announced a rule of procedure probably not in accord with applicable decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court. Rule 118(b)(2), I.A.R.; State v. Osborn, supra . On the face of it, it appears that this court has established one rule respecting the duties of trial judges at sentencing, while the Court of Appeals has set forth a different rule. Trial judges throughout the state, not knowing in advance which cases will be assigned to the Court of Appeals, have no guidance concerning which rule to follow. The potential for confusion in the administration of the criminal law arising from this state of the law is good reason for the court to consider the State an aggrieved party presenting an important question for review. Moreover, the court has supervisory powers reflected in Rule 118(b)(4)[ [2] ] and Rule 120 which authorizes the court to review decisions of the Court of Appeals on its own motion. This power should be exercised in the interest of clarifying an important point of law relating to procedure in the courts. Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8. A majority of this Court departed from acceptable standards of appellate procedure in granting the petition. The State was not a party aggrieved in any manner, and was entirely without any standing to request of this Court that it pass on the sole issue presented, especially where the best of poor reasons advanced is that Trial judges throughout the state, not knowing in advance which cases will be assigned to the Court of Appeals, have no guidance concerning which rule to follow. Justice Huntley has already this day written that Most of our district judges comply with [the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentencing, Section 2.3(c) (1968)] and both the quality and the efficiency of our judicial system would be improved if all the judges conducted their sentencing procedures in conformance with the standards. Believing that Justice Huntley is eminently correct, and fully convinced that the Petition for Review should never have been granted, my first vote is to dismiss it as improvidently granted. No matter what the majority may do or say today, there is little doubt in my mind that our district judges and magistrates will continue to formulate and enunciate their reasons for imposing particular sentences. It will be a shame if today's majority opinion influences even one judge from doing that which in his conscience he or she knows is the right thing to do.