Opinion ID: 3064918
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Officer Nguyen

Text: [14] To this point, we have discussed the conduct of Officer Buelow and Officer Bonvicino, but not the conduct of Officer Nguyen, who remained outside with Talib while his colleagues broke into Hopkins home. The district court granted Officer Nguyen’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Hopkins’ claim of excessive force, but denied the motion with respect to the unlawful entry claim. Hopkins argues that Officer Nguyen should not enjoy qualified immunity on the warrantless-entry claim because Nguyen was an “integral participant” in the search. This argument, however, misunderstands our circuit precedent. In Chuman v. Wright, 76 F.3d 292 (9th Cir. 1996), we rejected “the ‘team effort’ standard [that] allows the jury to lump all the defendants together, rather than require it to base each individual’s liabilHOPKINS v. BONVICINO 9047 ity on his own conduct.” 76 F.3d at 295. In that case, we held that a police officer’s “[b]eing a mere bystander [to his colleagues’ conduct] was insufficient” to support § 1983 liability. Id. at 294. [15] Hopkins seeks to distinguish Chuman by relying on the “integral participant” rule, which, as its name suggests, extends liability to those actors who were integral participants in the constitutional violation, even if they did not directly engage in the unconstitutional conduct themselves. However, this rule requires more participation and support on the part of a particular defendant than the undisputed facts in this case show Officer Nguyen to have provided. Under the integral participant rule, “an officer who does not enter an apartment, but stands at the door, armed with his gun, while other officers conduct the search, can . . . be a ‘full, active participant’ in the search” and therefore can be subject to § 1983 liability. Boyd v. Benton County, 374 F.3d 773, 780 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). Each of the cases cited in Boyd in which the “integral participant” rule was deemed satisfied involved officers who “provided armed backup during an unconstitutional search.” Id. While the “integral participant” rule may extend liability beyond simply those officers who provide “armed backup,” it is clear that an officer who waits in the front yard interviewing a witness and does not participate in the unconstitutional search in any fashion cannot be held liable under Chuman. [16] Hopkins argues that Officer Nguyen is not entitled to qualified immunity because he was part of a conversation in which the three officers formed a “plan of action” to enter the house. However, the undisputed facts show that the decision to enter Hopkins’ home was not made or discussed during that conversation, but rather was made in a separate conversation between Officers Buelow and Bonvicino at the side entrance to Hopkins’ house.11 Accordingly, Officer Nguyen partici11 We also note that there is no allegation that Officer Nguyen either ordered the unconstitutional search or directed it from afar. To the con9048 HOPKINS v. BONVICINO pated in neither the planning nor the execution of the unlawful search. We therefore reverse the district court with respect to Officer Nguyen’s liability and hold that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the unlawful search claim.