Opinion ID: 1887865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Whether the lower court acted improperly by sentencing appellant to a mandatory sixty-six years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections?

Text: ¶ 39. Jones' final argument is that the trial judge erred by sentencing him as an habitual offender, with enhanced punishment, to sixty years in prison on Count I and six years in prison on Count II. The record reflects that Jones was sentenced to thirty years on Count I and three years on Count II (pursuant to the sentences outlined in Miss Code Ann. § 41-29-139). Those sentences were then doubled (pursuant to Miss.Code Ann § 41-29-147, which allows for such enhancement for repeat offenders). Finally, as an habitual offender under Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-81, Jones is ineligible for parole. That is, Jones' total sentence is sixty-six years in prison, without parole. Jones argues that this sentence is cruel and unusual punishment, and is in violation of the Eighth Amendment. ¶ 40. Traditionally, [t]his Court has found that sentencing, `is within the discretion of the trial court, and this Court will not review the sentence, if it is within the limits prescribed by statute.' Berry v. State, 722 So.2d 706, 707 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Reynolds v. State, 585 So.2d 753, 756 (Miss.1991)). As a general rule, a sentence will not disturbed on appeal so long as it does not exceed the maximum term allowed by statute. Wallace v. State, 607 So.2d 1184, 1188 (Miss.1992); Fleming v. State, 604 So.2d 280, 302 (Miss.1992); Reed v. State, 536 So.2d 1336, 1339 (Miss.1988); Corley v. State, 536 So.2d 1314, 1319 (Miss.1988). However, where a sentence is grossly disproportionate to the crime committed, the sentence is subject to attack on the grounds that it violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. Wallace, 607 So.2d at 1188; Fleming, 604 So.2d at 302. In Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983), the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a three-prong test for evaluating proportionality. The elements include: (1) The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) Comparison of the sentence with sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) Comparison of sentences imposed in other jurisdictions for commission of the same crime with the sentence imposed in this case. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292, 103 S.Ct. at 3011. Stromas v. State, 618 So.2d 116, 122-23 (Miss.1993). ¶ 41. Jones was convicted of delivering a large quantity of cocaine (forty-five rocks) and of possession of a small amount of residue. There is nothing in the record regarding the other two factors of the Solem test. Nonetheless, given the gravity of Jones' crimes alone, the sentence is not considered grossly disproportionate. See Stromas, 618 So.2d at 123 (Declaring a sentence violative of the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution carries a heavy burden and only in rare cases should this Court make such a finding.) ¶ 42. In support of his argument, Jones cites Davis v. State , in which this Court considered the mandatory sixty-year sentence of a young mother, who was convicted of selling two rocks of cocaine within 1,500 feet of a church building. See Davis v. State, 724 So.2d 342, 343-46 (Miss.1998). This Court remanded the case for reconsideration of the sentence, and noted that: (a) there was little in the record to explain the sentence; (b) the defendant was not being tried as an habitual offender; (c) the trial judge gave no explanation for imposing the maximum sentence; and, (d) the trial judge did not have the benefit of a pre-sentencing investigation. Id. at 345 (Even as to those circumstances for which the statutes provide mandatory sentences, the punishment must be weighed against the prohibition imposed in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment.). ¶ 43. The case sub judice is easily distinguished from Davis. Jones was convicted of delivery of a large quantity of cocaine (forty-five rocks), and he received a separate sentencing hearing. In addition, Jones was charged as an habitual offender, and the trial judge was well aware of Jones' criminal history. For these reasons, the sentence was proper. See Stromas, 618 So.2d at 123 (where defendant was convicted of selling a small amount of cocaine received sixty-year sentence as a repeat offender, this Court held that the sentence was not grossly disproportionate.).