Opinion ID: 1930327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Division of Marital Estate

Text: [9] Upon further review from a judgment of the Court of Appeals, the Nebraska Supreme Court will not reverse a judgment which it deems to be correct merely because it may disagree with the reasoning employed by the Court of Appeals. Newman v. Rehr, 263 Neb. 111, 638 N.W.2d 863 (2002). While the Court of Appeals should not have summarily affirmed the judgment of the district court based on the acceptance of benefits rule, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dividing the marital estate. Gail's argument, as we understand it, is that Lonnie's $21,000 lottery winnings should have been considered part of the marital estate. However, there is no indication from the court's order that the lottery winnings were set aside, or otherwise credited to Lonnie. The only asset of the marital estate for which the court set a value certain was Gail's retirement account, valued at $62,111.53 and awarded to Gail. The court awarded the house, motorcycle, and trailer to Lonnie without making specific findings as to their value or equity. The court also awarded Lonnie the truck and mower, and Gail the car, without specific findings as to their value. Nor did the court include any findings or calculations with respect to the overall value of the property awarded to the parties. In Gail's appellate brief, she narrows the claims she advanced at trial about the valuation of the property in the marital estate. Gail concedes that the trailer had an equity of $1,155 and the motorcycle had a debt of $461. She also concedes that the house did not have $100,000 in equity, instead accepting Lonnie's figures for the equity in the house, except for the setoff of the lottery proceeds. Thus, Gail's appellate argument is limited to a contention that the house should have been found to have equity of $74,046, instead of the figure of $53,046 advanced by Lonnie. As noted above, in their proposals to the court, Gail sought a payment of $22,444.50 to equalize what she believed to be the difference in the value of the property to be awarded, while Lonnie, apparently relying on a setoff of the lottery proceeds, argued against such a payment. But since the court made no specific finding, we do not know what value, if any, the court established for the equity in the house. The only findings we have before us are those awarding the various items in the marital estate to the parties. It would have been helpful had the court made more specific findings about the value of the property, especially after the parties contested that issue at trial. Of course, it might also have been helpful to the court had the parties provided it with a more substantial basis for making such findings than the he said, she said evidence they adduced. Gail seems to be assuming that because the court did not order an equalization payment, the court must have adopted Lonnie's valuation of the house. The record, however, does not support that assumption. Instead, the question presented to us given the state of the record is whether, in the context of the property division as a whole, the court's award of the house without an equalization payment was an abuse of judicial discretion. See Gangwish v. Gangwish, 267 Neb. 901, 678 N.W.2d 503 (2004). Gail's own calculations, as stated in her appellate brief, would have us conclude that [Lonnie] was awarded property with a value of $82,940, while [Gail] was only awarded $64,011.53. Brief for appellant at 9. Although the division of property is not subject to a precise mathematical formula, the general rule is to award a spouse one-third to one-half of the marital estate, the polestar being fairness and reasonableness as determined by the facts of each case. Gress v. Gress, 271 Neb. 122, 710 N.W.2d 318 (2006). Here, by her own calculations, Gail was awarded approximately 44 percent of the marital estate. Gail also received alimony of $5,400. Although alimony and distribution of property have different purposes in marriage dissolution proceedings, they are closely related and circumstances may require that they be considered together. Pendleton v. Pendleton, 242 Neb. 675, 496 N.W.2d 499 (1993). Having reviewed the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's division of the marital estate. Thus, although our reasoning differs from that of the Court of Appeals, we reject Gail's assignment of error.