Opinion ID: 1058326
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Quantum Meruit and Express Contract

Text: The Executors point out that for a court to award a quantum meruit recovery, the court must conclude that there is no enforceable express contract between the parties covering the same subject matter. In such a case, the court will imply a contract between the parties to prevent inequity; when such an express contract exists, however, there is no need to imply one because the parties have already negotiated an agreement. Nedrich v. Jones, 245 Va. 465, 477, 429 S.E.2d 201, 207 (1993). The Executors correctly state the rule, but the rule, according to its terms, applies only when there is an express, enforceable contract between the parties covering the services for which quantum meruit recovery is claimed. Id.; Royer v. Board of Supervisors, 176 Va. 268, 280, 10 S.E.2d 876, 881 (1940). Implicit in the circuit court's holding is the finding that Woods and Paul Dove had an unwritten agreement, beginning in 1985, that Woods would work between 35 and 40 hours per week for the Doves. In return for that labor, he was to be paid a salary as agreed between them annually, plus bonuses from the sales of chickens. That contract was fully performed and Woods makes no claim for its breach. Also implicit in the court's holding is that when the first haying season began after the relationship was created, Woods' workload nearly doubled, and remained far in excess of 40 hours per week until the end of the relationship. There was, in 1985, no express contract covering Woods' compensation for the additional work except for the vague promise that the Doves, being unable to fully compensate him, would take care of [him]. Later, Paul Dove made a more specific promise as described above, but that promise was held by the circuit court not to constitute an enforceable contract. That holding was not appealed and is therefore the law of the case. Thus, the rule cited by the Executors has no application to Woods' additional, uncompensated work. We will defer to the circuit court's determination of the facts unless unsupported by evidence or plainly wrong because an appellate court lacks the fact-finder's ability to hear and see the witnesses and assess their credibility. Patterson v. Patterson, 257 Va. 558, 564, 515 S.E.2d 113, 116 (1999). The record contains ample evidence to support the circuit court's conclusion that no express, enforceable agreement existed between the parties as to Woods' compensation for his work in excess of 40 hours per week. We cannot say that the circuit court's conclusion from the evidence, that an implied contract was necessary to prevent injustice to Woods, was plainly wrong.