Opinion ID: 2590571
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Inman's statement to upper management

Text: As for Inman's statements to upper management, it appears that the district court improperly relied on our decision in M & R Investment Co. v. Mandarino [38] for the proposition that intracorporate communications cannot constitute publication. In M & R, we held that a statement between two employees of a casino was not a publication for the purposes of a defamation action. [39] In Simpson v. Mars Inc., [40] however, we revisited the issue of intracorporate communications and concluded that while certain intracorporate communications are privileged, any privileges are defenses and not part of the prima facie case. [41] As a result, defendant corporations bear the burden of alleging and proving the privilege's existence. [42] We noted in Simpson that [t]he circumstances of the communication of the allegedly defamatory material are uniquely within the knowledge of the corporation and its agents. [43] Because an intracorporate communication is only privileged if the communication occurs in the regular course of the corporation's business, we held that it would be unfair to place the burden on the plaintiff to plead and prove facts which are peculiarly within the knowledge of the corporate defendant, such as the circumstances of intracorporate communications. [44] Accordingly, under Simpson, Motel 6 had the burden of alleging and proving the existence of the privilege. Because Juanita alleged that Inman made defamatory statements to upper management and supported her allegations with a third-party affidavit, which acknowledged that the allegedly defamatory statement was made, Motel 6 had the burden of demonstrating that the statement was privileged. Motel 6 neglected to do so, and thus summary judgment was erroneous. Accordingly, we reverse on this narrow issue.