Opinion ID: 3163110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial: Jury Selection & Deliberations

Text: Jury selection in Spruill’s case took place on July 9, 2013. The focus of our attention on this appeal is Juror 11.3 During voir dire, this juror identified herself as a “clinician in the State of Connecticut . . . do[ing] outreach in the prison systems in Hartford.” App. 51. Juror 11 explained that “it’s not a reason not to serve . . . I’m just thinking like if somebody’s found guilty, I could also see this person in the prison system.” Id.4 In response to a follow‐up question from Judge Chatigny asking whether any jurors had “experiences or connections . . . involving law enforcement,” Juror 11 explained that she worked in the 3 “Juror 11” denotes the juror’s place on the petit jury. During voir dire, this individual was denominated Juror 27. To limit potential confusion, we use the petit jury designation, Juror 11, to refer to this juror throughout our discussion. 4 The district court thereafter explained the difference between the state and federal prison systems to assuage any concern Juror 11 might have had as to the likelihood of future contact with Spruill. 6 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill Connecticut Offender Reentry Program, and that the Program’s mission is to help inmates with mental health issues receive treatment and to “represent them in the prison and [to] work on their . . . life goals.” Id. at 53, 56. Spruill’s counsel initially applied, but then withdrew, a peremptory challenge to Juror 11. The record reflects the following exchange: THE COURT: Mr. Weingast [defense counsel], I’m just interested in why you removed [Juror 11]. MR. WEINGAST: We discussed that very carefully. The fact that she worked in prisons . . . was basically what tipped the scales . . . . THE COURT: What is your concern? MR. WEINGAST: I think with work, she’s a bit jaded. That was a decision by both me and my client. THE COURT: But Mr. Spruill wanted you to remove her? MR. WEINGAST: Yes, Your Honor. Can I just doublecheck? THE COURT: Yes. (Pause) MR. WEINGAST: We’ll keep her instead. THE COURT: I’m sorry? MR. WEINGAST: We’ll keep her. 7 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill . . . . THE COURT: To be clear, Mr. Weingast, I don’t want Mr. Spruill to think that I am here to influence his exercise of peremptories, because I’m not. MR. WEINGAST: No, Your Honor absolutely not. This is . . . one we weighed very carefully, and on balance with what the Court just said, we talked about it some more and my client would like to keep her. THE COURT: Okay. Id. at 116–17. Juror 11 ultimately served on the jury. After the close of evidence, during deliberations, the court received two jury notes in close succession. The first revealed that the jury was divided, apparently 11 to 1, and sought clarification as to the law of constructive possession: Your Honor, we have one juror that at this point that does not agree with the jury. He/she has doubts and at this point is unwilling to change their vote. There is also the law for constructive possession and clarity on the law. We would like you to confirm that we should take what is stated on page 20 as law. The majority of the jurors are unwilling to stop too quickly at the expense of justice. How should we proceed? Do we continue discussing the points? 8 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill Id. at 521. The second note indicated one juror’s concern about a conflict of interest: We have one juror who feels in their gut that they have a conflict of interest. We need to understand how to proceed. Id. Invited to comment on the first note, both the prosecutor and Spruill’s counsel stated that the jury did not appear deadlocked and should be instructed to continue deliberations. As to the second note, counsel agreed that it was not clear whether the “holdout” juror in the first note and the “conflicted” juror in the second note were one and the same. With counsel’s agreement, the court decided to give the jury further instruction. In response to the first note, the court reminded the jurors that “[e]ach of you must decide the case for yourself” and “if after carefully considering all the evidence and the arguments of your fellow jurors you entertain a conscientious view that differs from the others, you are not to yield your conviction simply because you are outnumbered.” Id. at 530–31. This immediately prompted a third note, requesting a definition of “conscientious view.” The court explained, “the term refers to a view of the case based on fair and impartial consideration of 9 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill all the evidence and full and fair discussion of the issues in the case with the other jurors.” Id. at 532. The court then asked counsel whether they agreed with the stated definition, and both responded with approval. Addressing the second note, the district court instructed the jury on “conflict of interest” as follows: Like judges, jurors are required to be impartial and unbiased. A juror is not permitted to have a personal bias for or against any party. A conflict of interest can arise when a juror has a financial interest in a case, knows one of the lawyers or parties or witnesses, or has been personally involved in a situation like the one at issue in the case. A conflict of interest is in the nature of a personal stake or involvement in the case that makes it difficult for the individual to be fair and impartial, to decide the case based solely on the evidence and the applicable law, not on anything else. . . . . [I]f after considering these brief comments it appears that there may be a conflict of interest, then that is something that would need to be disclosed and I would need to address it. Id. at 533–34. When the jury resumed its deliberations, the court confirmed that counsel had no objections to any part of the instruction given: “Not from the government, Your Honor”; and “No, Your Honor, thank you,” from Spruill’s counsel. Id. at 535. 10 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill Shortly thereafter, the court received a fourth note, this time from Juror 11, which stated as follows: I had concerns during jury selection about being in a position where I have involvement with similar cases when working with individuals with similar charges. After hearing deliberations, I’m finding my “gut feeling” is potentially creating a bias. If possible, it may make sense to be replaced at this time by another juror. Id. at 536. The court shared the note with counsel and solicited guidance on how to proceed. Agreeing with the Government, Spruill’s counsel urged further inquiry: I think the Court would need to inquire of her whether she can set aside the bias and deliberate, and I suppose also the nature of the bias so that we know if it’s something that is truly a bias in terms of jury deliberations. . . . I think the court needs to inquire of her individually. Id. at 537–38. In discussing how to conduct such an inquiry without intruding on jury deliberations, see id. at 538–39 (observing, “I don’t want to intrude on the jury’s deliberations, I don’t want to know about the jury deliberation, but I need to 11 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill respond intelligently to this note”),5 the district court posited two scenarios: “either [1] Juror 11 has a conscientious view that differs from everybody else or [2] she’s having difficulty deliberating as she would wish to do because of what might be thought of as sympathy for Mr. Spruill,” id. at 539. With counsels’ consent, the court then called Juror 11 into the courtroom. Before making any inquiry, Judge Chatigny cautioned the juror: [I]t’s important that you not reveal to me anything about the jury deliberations. . . . That’s a matter for the jury alone and we need to respect the confidentiality of the jury’s work and the secrecy of the jury’s deliberations. But with regard to your own personal situation as a juror, we can talk about whatever problem is causing you concern. Id. at 541. Juror 11 explained that her employment experience was the source of her concern: I think when we had the jury selection . . . I had mentioned [that] I work in the prison system and I work with inmates all the time. And I feel . . . like that was sort of a conflict in the beginning. . . . But 5 The record consistently demonstrates Judge Chatigny’s commendable caution in identifying the concerns presented by the court’s inquiry of a deliberating juror regarding a potential conflict, and in further consulting with counsel before every action taken. 12 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill I said, okay, well, maybe there isn’t a problem, because I presented it to you as a judge and you continued to let me stay in there, so I figured it probably wasn’t a problem. . . . I’m trying to do my best . . . to make the best unbiased decisions, but I also am feeling like my work and my involvement with people in that matter and the things that I’ve heard from other inmates in cases, similar cases that they have like this—you know, I work with people that have had drug convictions and things like that—and things that they say to me . . . [are] somewhat clouding my views. I’m trying not to. . . . I’m trying to look at the evidence and trying to make a decision on all that, and I feel like in some ways I kind of am. But somebody mentioned—I can’t bring up the deliberations, but it just kind of made me think about it and it’s just been difficult. And they were asking me all this stuff and I was, look, I don’t know, you know. So I’m just trying to be honest about it. I’m trying to do my best . . . . Id. at 542–43. The court then asked, “So in a very real sense, you have clients who are similarly situated to Mr. Spruill?” id. at 543, to which Juror 11 replied: Yes. I’ve had experience with that. . . . . And a lot of [my clients] have mentioned things to me that makes me think about the system and things—I don’t know what’s truth and what’s not—to create some cloudiness in my head about certain things. Id. at 543–44. 13 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill The court then presented Juror 11 with the two possible scenarios discussed previously with counsel, and she replied: I’m trying to be as fair as I can be and I feel like I’ve been trying to listen to all the evidence and I feel like I was coming to a fair decision, but I feel like other members also felt maybe I didn’t, you know. So I don’t know where I feel like if I can even—I don’t know. I mean, for [the] interest of the Court and everybody’s time, it might just make sense to have somebody else. I just don’t know. Id. at 546. The court made no decision at that time as to whether Juror 11 could continue to serve or should be dismissed. Instead, it suggested to Juror 11 that she take time to consider whether she could “fairly and impartially judge the case based solely on the evidence.” Id. It directed her not to “be concerned about time or imposing on other people,” and “simply [to] focus on whether you are able to be a fair and impartial judge of the case or whether it’s really not a suitable case for you given the work that you do.” Id. at 547. After the juror departed the courtroom, the court asked counsel whether they had “[a]ny objection to anything that happened just now,” to which both responded, “No, Your Honor.” Id. at 548. The court again solicited guidance on how to proceed, whereupon Spruill’s attorney stated, “I think we just need to give her a few minutes . . . . We just have to recess and . . . be nearby . . . .” Id. 14 13‐4069‐cr United States v. Spruill A short time later, the court received a fifth note. Therein, Juror 11 asked to be dismissed, stating that she was having “some difficulty in making a decision on a verdict based on feelings of sensitivity toward individuals who have similar cases to Mr. Spruill.” Id. at 549. When Judge Chatigny invited comment, the prosecutor stated that Juror 11 “should be excused at this point.” Id. at 550. Asked whether he agreed, Spruill’s counsel responded, “Yes, Your Honor.” Id. The court then dismissed Juror 11, replacing her with an alternate. The jury began its deliberations anew, and soon thereafter returned a guilty verdict on all counts.