Opinion ID: 1508751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Firearm Charge

Text: On appeal from the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, we must determine, de novo, whether any rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [4] On appeal, as he did at trial, Childress argues that the evidence against him was insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He bases his argument on the geography of the searched premises. Childress points out that, while the alleged drug sales took place outdoors near the spot of his apprehension, the firearm was well out of reach in his second-story bedroom. This spatial separation of the firearm from the underlying crime, he claims, precludes a finding that he possessed the firearm during the commission of the felony. The Superior Court correctly denied Childress' motion for judgment of acquittal. This Court has previously ruled that a defendant can be held to possess a firearm even if it is not found on his person. [5] The law does not look to actual, physical control, but rather to accessibility. A felon is in `possession' of a deadly weapon ... when it is physically available or accessible to him during the commission of the crime. [6] More discretely, we hold that, considering the instant factual scenario, this case is controlled by our prior jurisprudence. We have held that, where the underlying felony involves the sale of drugs, a jury may find that the defendant possessed the firearm during the commission of a felony, so long as the drugs and firearm are found in close proximity to each other, even if neither is in close proximity to the defendant at the time of his apprehension. [7] The rationale is that a drug-sale operation is a continuing felony the locus of which is wherever the defendant keeps his contraband. [8] Necessarily, a drug dealer must draw on his inventory prior to a sale. Therefore, where (as here) the police discover a firearm next to a quantity of drugs sufficient to constitute a felony, the law permits the jury to infer that the gun was accessible to defendant at some point during the transaction for purposes of 11 Del.C. § 1447A. Childress relies primarily on Barnett v. State, [9] wherein this Court overturned a conviction for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Barnett, however, is readily distinguishable on its facts. In Barnett, the police discovered the drugs in a backpack the defendant was carrying when apprehended on the street. They later found the firearm in a locked box inside defendant's apartment in a location not primarily under his control. The police found no drugs in Barnett's apartment. Even if the State could prove that the locus of Barnett's criminal enterprise was his apartment, the evidence was insufficient to establish the physical accessibility and availability of the firearm during the commission of any predicate drug felony. [10] Unlike Childress, Barnett did not have ready access to his firearm. Here, a rational fact finder could conclude that Childress kept the firearm in such close proximity to his drug inventory that it was in his possession during the commission of the felony of drug trafficking. There was thus ample evidence to support the jury's determination that Childress had immediate access to the firearm during the continuing felony of his drug-dealing operation, and it is irrelevant that the firearm was unloaded when it was found in the search.