Opinion ID: 1696947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: eligibility for probation

Text: All crimes in Nebraska are statutory in nature. State v. White, 256 Neb. 536, 590 N.W.2d 863 (1999). Sentences imposed upon persons convicted of a crime are also statutory. Id. Thus, in order to resolve the question of whether Hamik was eligible to be sentenced to probation on his Class II felony conviction, it is necessary to examine those Nebraska statutes pertaining to criminal penalties and eligibility for probation. The starting point for our analysis is § 28-105, which provides in pertinent part: (1) For purposes of the Nebraska Criminal Code and any statute passed by the Legislature after the date of passage of the code, felonies are divided into eight classes which are distinguished from one another by the following penalties which are authorized upon conviction: Class I ... Death felony Class IA ... Life imprisonment felony Class IB ... Maximum-life imprisonment felony Minimum-fifty years imprisonment Class IC ... Maximum-fifty years imprisonment felony Mandatory minimum-five years imprisonment Class ID ... Maximum-fifty years imprisonment felony Mandatory minimum-three years imprisonment Class II ... Maximum-fifty years imprisonment felony Minimum-one year imprisonment Class III ... Maximum-twenty years imprisonment, or twenty-five thousand dollars fine, or both felony Minimum-one years imprisonment Class IV ... Maximum-five years imprisonment, or ten thousand dollars fine, felony or both Minimum-none .... (4) A person convicted of a felony for which a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed shall not be eligible for probation. Also pertinent to our analysis is Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2260(2) (Reissue 1995), which provides in part: Whenever a court considers sentence for an offender convicted of either a misdemeanor or a felony for which mandatory or mandatory minimum imprisonment is not specifically required, the court may withhold sentence of imprisonment unless, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the offender, the court finds that imprisonment of the offender is necessary for protection of the public because: (a) The risk is substantial that during the period of probation the offender will engage in additional criminal conduct; (b) The offender is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided most effectively by commitment to a correctional facility[.] The State contends that § 28-105(1) imposes a mandatory minimum term of incarceration for persons convicted of a Class II felony and that Hamik is therefore ineligible for probation under § 28-105(4). This presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which we must resolve in accordance with long-established principles. A fundamental principle of statutory construction requires that penal statutes be strictly construed. State v. Hochstein and Anderson, ante 262 Neb. 311, 632 N.W.2d 273, (2001); State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000). In construing a statute, a court must attempt to give effect to all of its parts, and if it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or meaningless; it is not within the province of the court to read anything plain, direct, and unambiguous out of the statute. State v. Bottolfson, 259 Neb. 470, 610 N.W.2d 378 (2000); State v. Kelley, 249 Neb. 99, 541 N.W.2d 645 (1996). Likewise, it is not for the courts to supply missing words or sentences to a statute to make clear that which is indefinite, or to supply that which is not there. State v. Woods, 255 Neb. 755, 587 N.W.2d 122 (1998). Under principles of statutory construction, the components of a series or collection of statutes pertaining to a certain subject matter may be conjunctively considered and construed to determine the intent of the Legislature so that different provisions of the act are consistent, harmonious, and sensible. State v. Hochstein and Anderson, supra; State v. Seberger, 257 Neb. 747, 601 N.W.2d 229 (1999). As is readily apparent from the plain language of § 28-105(1), the Legislature utilized different language in specifying the lower limit of a term of incarceration for specific felony classifications. For Class IC and Class ID felonies, the statute prescribes a [m]andatory minimum term. For other classifications, including Class IB, Class II, and Class III felonies, the statute prescribes a [m]inimum term of incarceration. Section 28-105(4) provides that a person convicted of a felony for which a mandatory minimum sentence is prescribed shall not be eligible for probation. However, neither this nor any other statute states that a person such as Hamik who is convicted of a felony for which a minimum sentence is prescribed is ineligible for parole. Equating a minimum sentence with a mandatory minimum sentence, as the State urges, would require that we regard the Legislature's use of the word mandatory to be superfluous, contrary to our established principles of statutory construction. The State argues that the statutory structure for classifying penalties for felonies is incongruous if we do not read the term minimum as mandatory minimum, because then, persons convicted of relatively less serious offenses would require a mandatory minimum sentence without the option of probation, while those convicted of more serious offenses could be sentenced to probation without any incarceration. If any such incongruity exists, it is wholly within the province of the Legislature to resolve as a matter of policy. Accordingly, we conclude that the State's first assignment of error is without merit.