Opinion ID: 196651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Historical Application of the Statute

Text: D. Historical Application of the Statute Actions speak louder than words. In this case this old adage is not simply poetic expression, for the interpretation of 21 U.S.C. 952(a) promoted by the government is most certainly at odds with the government's past enforcement practices under this statute throughout its long life. It is difficult to accept that Congress intended the government's reading of 952(a), considering that this reading of the statute has somehow lain lifeless for 25 years until given breath in this case by the prosecution. The government would have us believe that throughout the life of this statute, which has been on the books in practically the same form since 1970, in every direct flight, commercial or private, between, say, the Mainland and Puerto Rico, or the Mainland and Hawaii or Alaska, or vice versa, or even between Miami and New York, or Nantucket, Massachusetts and Boston, etc., all of whom at some point (or, in fact, throughout most of their passage) fly within international airspace before returning to domestic territory, the occupants have always been subject to being charged under this hitherto overlooked definition of importation. The government's novelty seems all the more striking in this Circuit, where notwithstanding the hundreds (perhaps thousands) of such daily Spanish, and that one of the passengers had a map of Mexico, as well as a match box from a Mexico motel, was not sufficient to establish that the marihuana had been imported from Mexico! -28- flights, the government has somehow throughout these many years never pressed such a theory of importation. Is this attributable to prosecutorial benevolence or incompetence? Certainly not. What we have is the tacit recognition that such acts could not reasonably be considered importation within 952(a). Whatever other statutes defendants may have violated, they did not violate this one. Maravilla, 907 F.2d at 223 (Breyer, C.J.) (holding that custom agents who murdered a Dominican citizen who was temporarily in the United States did not violate civil rights statute because the victim was not an inhabitant). We have a similar situation with water-borne traffic. There are literally thousands of vessels of all sizes and with all kinds of purposes that daily pass through international waters as they move between domestic areas which, without picking up contraband in international waters or visiting foreign jurisdictions, would be subject to this expanded interpretation of 952(a). Not only is there the obvious marine traffic between the Mainland and its outlying domestic areas (Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, etc.), and the considerable coastwise traffic in the Atlantic, Pacific, Gulf and Great Lakes waters which as a matter of course continuously exits and reenters international waters. There are also hundreds of thousands of commercial fishermen, as well as those who fish for sport, who on a daily basis leave domestic waters, enter international waters, and return to domestic waters, again without acquiring contraband in international waters or entering -29- foreign jurisdictions, who would be subject to the contested interpretation of 952(a). However, contrary to the government's assertions at oral argument, it does not stop here. For example, a passenger on a commercial whale-watching vessel who left Provincetown, Massachusetts, went thirteen miles offshore into international waters to watch these behemoths, and then reentered domestic waters would be subject to a charge of importation if he or she had drugs when he or she originally left Provincetown. A maritime worker traveling to and from an oil rig on international waters in the Gulf of Mexico off Louisiana, or on George's Bank off New England, would be equally exposed. A sailboat tacking up the coast would engage in an act of importation every time it reentered domestic territory, if it had contraband aboard when it tacked out of domestic territory. The height of absurdity,12 however, is that according to the government's interpretation as expressed at oral argument, the act of leaving domestic territory would in turn also be considered an illegal exportation subject to charge under 952(a)'s companion provision, 953(a), even though there was no intention or act of visiting a foreign territory or offloading the exported contraband onto a vessel in international waters. Thus, under this scenario, a sailboat tacking twenty times up the East Coast of the United States from Miami to New York, which had aboard illegal substances acquired in Miami, 12 See In re Trans Alaska Pipeline Rate Cases, 436 U.S. 631, 643 (1978) (holding that an absurd result militates against a proposed statutory interpretation). -30- would be subject to being charged with twenty violations of exportation under 953(a), and twenty violations of importation under 952(a), one for each time it tacked out to and from international waters. As if the above scenarios were not ludicrous enough, at oral argument, the government also informed us that in the above situations, since international borders were crossed, border crossing rules are applicable, with all of the consequent diminished Fourth Amendment implications such circumstances bring into play. See United States v. Ram rez, 431 U.S. 606, 616-19 (1976) (holding that government's right to search all persons and their belongings who cross its borders is plenary and is reasonable per se within the Fourth Amendment); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153-54 (1925) (stating that border searches require no probable cause); see also United States v. Montoya de Hern ndez, 473 U.S. 531, 537-38 (1986) (Routine searches of persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant . . .).13 Clearly, the implications of the government's proposed interpretation go far beyond the mere crossing of a stretch of water between two points in the same municipality in Puerto Rico. Cf. Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474 (1978) (concluding no international border exists 13 Indeed, the Fourth Amendment issues here may be more troubling than in the land border cases, given the relative lack of notice upon entering the United States by water versus by land, since land borders are often marked. -31- between Puerto Rico and continental United States). A passenger and his or her belongings on a Boston to Nantucket flight, which is partially over international waters and airspace, can be subjected hereafter to a border search upon arrival in Nantucket, as well as to another such intrusion upon returning to Boston. In light of these possibilities and in light of the fact that drug possession statutes already exist to address domestic conduct,14 we cannot accept the government's reading of 952(a). By its interpretation of 952(a), the government has chosen to ignore a basic rule of statutory interpretation, one firmly imbedded in the jurisprudence of this Circuit: [U]nreasonableness of the result produced by one among alternative possible interpretations of a statute is [a valid] reason for rejecting that interpretation in favor of another which would produce a reasonable result. United States v. Bayko, 774 F.2d 516, 522 (1st Cir. 1985) (quoting Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 45.12 (4th Ed. 1984)). Furthermore, the undeniable fact is that section 952(a) has not been used at all in the fashion now promoted by the prosecution. On this point, there should be no need to engage in 14 These real possibilities are not merely lurking Fourth Amendment problems to be resolved in future cases. Although obviously they are not at issue in this case, particularly in view of the Government's assertions at oral argument, they fall within the realm of consequences that will follow from the government's proposed interpretation of section 952(a), and are valid factors to be considered in determining whether Congress in enacting that statute intended the result espoused by the government. Needless to say, the mere possibility is extremely worrisome as nothing of this sort has ever occurred in the Nation's history. -32- speculation regarding whether or not there are other uncited or unreported prosecutions demonstrative of the government's view of 952(a). At oral argument, the government was specifically asked to produce evidence of such a prosecution. Nevertheless, the government has failed to cite even one case in this circuit, at any level, reported or otherwise, in which a defendant was even charged, much less convicted, in the manner now claimed, nor has our own search revealed the existence of such a case. Considering the possibility that the government may not have prosecuted small quantities of drugs transported over international space from a prior United States connection as importation under 952(a), but that similarly transported large amounts have been considered violations of that provision, we conducted our own search of reported cases. The inquiry revealed that such a distinction simply does not exist. See, e.g., United States v. Marcel, 1995 WL 732747,  (2d Cir. 1995) (discussing convictions of two co-conspirators who participated in the transportation of 48 kilograms of cocaine from Puerto Rico to New York, but who apparently faced no charge or conviction for importation); United States v. P rez, 1994 WL 702058, -2 (discussing suppression motion of two co-conspirators arrested with approximately 30 kilograms of cocaine shortly after arriving at John F. Kennedy International Airport aboard a flight from San Juan; the two defendants faced a two-count indictment that did not include an importation charge). This court can take judicial notice of the substantial traffic in narcotics between Puerto -33- Rico and the mainland United States involving large amounts of contraband. See P rez, at  (describing San Juan, Puerto Rico as a location known to [Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force] agents to be an active departure point for narcotics smuggling activities into New York). Yet, we are unaware of any case in which the government has in fact charged that transporting the contraband from Puerto Rico to the mainland (or vice versa) constituted an importation violation under 952(a). Nor is the possibility of such forbearance by the government from prosecuting such cases in the future very reassuring. Cf. Donovan v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 873 (1994) (in light of Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994), vacating and remanding First Circuit case that tried to uphold the prosecution of defendant pursuant to the money laundering statute even though defendant's structuring was merely an attempt to hide money from his wife in a divorce proceeding), vacating United States v. Aversa, 984 F.2d 493 (1st Cir. 1993). Although prosecutors should perhaps not be faulted for seeking to expand the limits of the law, courts cannot allow themselves to be caught up in this euphoria. Rather, they are duty bound to contain the government within established limits. The government's actions in not prosecuting such cases up to now are powerful evidence that Congress did not intend the interpretation now promoted by the government. Such lengthy non-action should not be glibly overlooked. -34- The government also claims that the interpretation set forth here would inordinately burden prosecutors by adding to their burden the obligation of identifying and proving the point of origin of drugs in smuggling operations. However, when a drug-laden ship coming from an unknown point of origin is shown to have traversed international waters and brought drugs into the United States, a jury could presume, without more, that importation from a place outside the United States has occurred - - although the precise place from which the drugs emanated is not established. Cf. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 (1970) (approving statutory permissive inference that a person in possession of heroin is in knowing possession of an imported narcotic because of the high probability that the heroin originated in a foreign country); see also Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156-57 (1979); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46-47 (1969). In other words, the government can make out a prima facie case of importation, within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 952(a), merely by showing that a ship carrying drugs from parts unknown has cruised international waters before entering the United States. Similar inferences would apply to the case of drugs off-loaded into this country from a mother ship located within international waters. We therefore hold only that a defendant can defeat an importation charge by demonstrating affirmatively by competent evidence that the drugs came into the United States directly from another place that is also within the United States. That is the case before us. The charge in the -35- present case, and the undisputed evidence presented by the government is that the drugs were picked up in Mona Island (i.e., domestic U.S. territory) and brought to another place within U.S. domestic territory. The government never made out a prima facie case that the drugs came from a place outside the United States, as the statutory language requires.