Opinion ID: 1060409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: status of surviving children as beneficiaries to a wrongful death action

Text: Having concluded that trial courts may generally apply the common fund doctrine in this context, the second issue we must resolve, then, is whether the children in this action, who hired separate counsel to represent their interests, should nevertheless be required to pay a fee to the appellant's attorney. The children's attorneys argue that they contributed to procuring the final settlement, and a majority of the Court of Appeals believed that the record failed to support the trial court's conclusion that their efforts were not needed to settle the case. However, we need not address whether the evidence supports the findings of the trial court in this regard, because we conclude that the children must be considered, as a matter of law, to be passive beneficiaries of the wrongful death proceeds. The parties do not dispute that the statutes permitting an action for the wrongful death of another create no right of action exist[ing] independently of that which the deceased would have had, had [he or she] survived. See Rogers v. Donelson-Hermitage Chamber of Commerce, 807 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tenn.Ct.App.1990); Memphis St. Ry. Co. v. Cooper, 203 Tenn. 425, 431, 313 S.W.2d 444, 447 (1958). Although the living beneficiaries of the action may seek a limited recovery for their own losses in addition to those of the decedent, see Hill v. City of Germantown, 31 S.W.3d 234, 239 (Tenn.2000); Jordan v. Baptist Three Rivers Hosp., 984 S.W.2d 593, 598 (Tenn.1999), the right of action itself remains one that is single, entire[,] and indivisible. See Wheeler v. Burley, No. 01A01-9701-CV-00006 (Tenn. Ct.App. filed at Nashville, Aug. 27, 1997), perm. to appeal denied, Apr. 13, 1998. In point of fact, therefore, [t]here can be but one cause of action for the wrongful death of another. Matthews v. Mitchell, 705 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Tenn.Ct.App.1985). Because multiple actions may not be brought to resolve a single wrongful death claim, the statutes carefully prescribe the priority of those who may assert the action on behalf of the decedent and any other beneficiaries. In a dispute between the surviving spouse and the children of the decedent as to who may maintain the action, the surviving spouse clearly has the prior and superior right above all others.... Foster v. Jeffers, 813 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tenn.Ct.App.1991); see also Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-107 (1994); Busby v. Massey, 686 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn.1984). In fact, the children of the deceased may maintain an action only if the decedent is not survived by a spouse or if the surviving spouse has waived his or her right of priority. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-107; Foster, 813 S.W.2d at 453. Consequently, once the surviving spouse has asserted his or her right or priority, the statutes give to the surviving spouse complete control over the right of action until he or she waives that right. Estate of Baker ex rel. Baker v. Maples, 995 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). As part of this right of control over the action, the surviving spouse is entitled to control the litigation and to hire the attorney or attorneys needed to prosecute the action. More importantly, however, the surviving spouse also has the discretion either to litigate the claim or to settle it in a manner that is binding upon the children. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 20-5-110(b). Therefore, absent proof of bad faith or lack of diligence in representing their interests, see Busby, 686 S.W.2d at 63, the children of a decedent simply have no right to representation under these circumstances except through the surviving spouse. Although the surviving spouse may consent to other assistance in litigating or settling the wrongful death claim, he or she is under no statutory obligation to do so. Upon considering the procedural character of the wrongful death statutes in Tennessee, we conclude that the children in this case possessed no privilege to employ separate counsel to protect their interests in receiving a share of the wrongful death proceeds. As such, the wrongful death statutes place them in precisely the same situation as the typical passive beneficiary who does not hire separate counsel or whose separate counsel makes no meaningful contribution to the common fund itself. Cf. Gilpin, 188 Tenn. at 90, 216 S.W.2d at 737. Just as the common fund doctrine applies against typical passive beneficiaries to permit the original or lead counsel to seek additional fees from the fund itself, so must it also apply here. As the Court of Appeals noted in its decision below, the trial court in this case essentially permitted the children to intervene in the appellant's action to establish their own damages for loss of consortium. Clearly, a claim for loss of consortium does not, in any way, represent a claim for damages separate from the wrongful death action itself. Rather, a claim for consortium merely embodies one component of the decedent's pecuniary value of life. See Hancock v. Chattanooga-Hamilton County Hosp. Auth., 54 S.W.3d 234, 237 (Tenn.2001); Hill, 31 S.W.3d at 239; Jordan, 984 S.W.2d at 601. Consequently, to avoid situations similar to this in future cases, trial courts should dismiss in toto any other pending wrongful death actions upon the proper filing of an action by the surviving spouse. See Swanson v. Peterson, No. M1999-00241-COA-R3-CV (Tenn.Ct.App. Jan.21, 2000) (citing Dockery v. Dockery, 559 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn.Ct.App.1977) (stating that a properly filed suit should be dismissed when it loses its essential character before adjudication)). Accordingly, we hold that the trial court may employ the common fund doctrine to award the appellant's attorney an additional fee from the children's portion of the wrongful death settlement.