Opinion ID: 1127349
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's request for telephone privileges.

Text: (14) Defendant contends the trial court improperly denied his request for telephone access for the purpose of contacting potential defense witnesses, in violation of his rights to a fair trial, to effective assistance of counsel, and to assist in his own defense, among other rights guaranteed under the federal and state Constitutions. The appellate record, however, fails to establish that defendant was denied telephone access or otherwise was precluded from assisting counsel in contacting potential defense witnesses. On January 18, 1985, at the conclusion of the Marsden hearing, defendant requested access to a telephone for one hour each day throughout the trial, in order to enable him to contact witnesses. In response to the court's comment that defense counsel had retained investigators for that purpose, defendant explained that the investigators could not go to the places that [he] must send them. At this point, Newton interjected that, for this very reason, defendant should provide defense counsel with the names and addresses of potential defense witnesses to enable counsel to attempt to locate them and, if such efforts proved unsuccessful, counsel could report back to the court and seek another solution. The court finally indicated to defendant that [i]f you will provide the names and addresses of any witness you want your attorneys to contact, I'll have no objection in ordering that you may be permitted to phone call, but explained that defendant first must permit counsel to contact witnesses in an orderly manner through their investigators. Although current regulations provide that a prisoner should be afforded reasonable telephone access while incarcerated (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 1067), the record fails to indicate that defendant was denied the same reasonable access that was afforded other prisoners. The trial court simply refused to grant unconditionally the special telephone privileges that were sought by defendant but not by his counsel. Defendant maintains that his right to an effective defense included the right to assist his counsel in contacting witnesses. Appointed counsel were in control of preparing the defense, however, and they did not seek special privileges for their client and never indicated to the court that special telephone access was necessary for the preparation of an adequate defense. Moreover, the court did not deny absolutely such privileges, but simply conditioned the privilege of special access upon defendant's cooperation with defense counsel. The court's condition was reasonable under the circumstances where defendant had not asserted a timely, unequivocal right to self-representation and was represented by counsel. In imposing the condition, the court properly sought to enable appointed counsel to fulfill their duties and to prevent defendant from impeding the preparation and implementation of the defense. Thus, the court's ruling reflected an appropriate concern that defendant would use telephone privileges to circumvent the efforts of his counsel. Where appointed counsel were in control of the defense, neither the court nor counsel were compelled to manage the case according to defendant's whims (see People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 281 [247 Cal. Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052]). We find no abuse of discretion.