Opinion ID: 2110976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is subsection (3) unconstitutional on its face?

Text: Appellant argues subsection (3) of the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face. Specifically, Appellant argues the provision is unconstitutionally vague. We agree. In determining whether a statute is vague, the Court has held: The concept of vagueness or indefiniteness rests on the constitutional principle that procedural due process requires fair notice and proper standards for adjudication. The primary issues involved are whether the provisions of a penal statute are sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct to those who wish to avoid its penalties and to apprise Judge and jury of standards for the determination of guilt. If the statute is so obscure that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its applicability, it is unconstitutional. City of Beaufort v. Baker, 315 S.C. 146, 152, 432 S.E.2d 470, 473-74 (1993) (quoting State v. Albert, 257 S.C. 131, 134, 184 S.E.2d 605, 606 (1971)). The Fourteenth Amendment does not permit a State to make criminal the peaceful expression of unpopular views. Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237, 83 S.Ct. 680, 684, 9 L.Ed.2d 697 (1963). In Edwards, a group of African Americans were convicted of breach of peace after they marched peacefully on a sidewalk around the State House grounds to publicize their dissatisfaction with discriminatory actions against African Americans. The United States Supreme Court found the arrest, conviction, and punishment of the defendants infringed their constitutionally protected right of free speech. Id. at 236, 83 S.Ct. at 684. The Court found the defendants were convicted of an offense so generalized as to be not susceptible of exact definition. Id. The Court stated: [W]e do not review in this case criminal convictions resulting from the evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute evincing a legislative judgment that certain specific conduct be limited or proscribed. If, for example, the petitioners had been convicted upon evidence that they had violated a law regulating traffic, or had disobeyed a law reasonably limiting the periods during which the State House grounds were open to the public, this would be a different case. Id. We find subsection (3) is unconstitutionally vague because the words humiliate, insult, and scare are not sufficiently definite to give reasonable notice of the prohibited conduct. This provision is subjective because the words that humiliate, insult, or scare one person may not have the same effect on another person. Therefore, people of common intelligence may be forced to guess at the provision's meaning and may differ as to its applicability. Subsection (3), like the statute in Edwards, is not precisely written in a way that would notify a person of the certain specific conduct that is prohibited. Accordingly, we find subsection (3) is unconstitutional because it is facially vague.