Opinion ID: 1661524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN PERMITTING THE STATE TO EXCLUDE BLACKS FROM THE JURY UNDER BATSON v. KENTUCKY

Text: In the proceedings below, the State exercised five of its peremptory challenges against black veniremen. Their names and reasons given for the challenges were as follows: S-1: Venirewoman # 13, Christine Dobbs. Rebuttal: Venirewoman said her daughter was being represented by Hatten's attorney in an on-going lawsuit. Response: None from Hatten. Ruling: Non-pretextual. Venirewoman excused. S-2: Venireman # 16, Leonard Whitley. Rebuttal: State did not like the appearance of Mr. Whitley, felt that he would not be a good juror to hear this case. Response: Hatten began to respond but was instructed by the trial court that no response was needed. Ruling: Pretextual. Venireman seated on jury. S-3: Venireman # 21, Harry A. Swan. Rebuttal: State had been informed by local law enforcement officers that Venireman # 21 had been arrested for bootlegging in the past. As such, Mr. Swan would probably not be the type of law-abiding citizen in Monroe County that we'd like to see serve as a juror. The State then called a deputy with the Monroe County Sheriff's Department who testified under oath that he apprehended Swan driving into a dry portion of the county with a truckload of liquor. Response: Hatten did not have an opportunity to respond to the officer's testimony. Prior to the deputy's testimony, Hatten objected that the State's contention that Swan was bootlegging was unsubstantiated. Ruling: Non-pretextual. Venireman excused. S-4: Venireman # 22, Lynda Kay Strong. Rebuttal: Strong was inattentive and giggling during voir dire. The State also alleged Strong caused a disturbance with what seemed to be a candy wrapper. The State also asserted: She stood up at one time and tried to explain as to whether or not she knew one of the witnesses; made very little sense. We could not ascertain as to whether or not she did know this person. Response: Hatten stated: As to Lynda Kay Strong, her being allegedly inattentive and giggling, I didn't observe that, Your Honor. And about her answers, the State had the opportunity to question her, and if they couldn't ask the right question or enough questions to get an answer, then that's their fault. Ruling: Non-pretextual. Venirewoman excused. S-5: Venireman # 27, Alonzo Sykes. Rebuttal: Sykes stated during voir dire that he knew Annie McFarland, the alleged getaway driver in the case. Sykes also stated he knew Lee Anna Walker, another individual who might be called as a witness. Response: McFarland and Walker may be called by the State as well as the defense. Also, there were other veniremen who knew potential witnesses who were not struck. Ruling: Non-pretextual. Venireman excused. The trial judge's ruling on the Batson issue was as follows: THE COURT: All right. The Court finds that the State has properly articulated non-racial reasons for using their challenges against juror Christine Dobbs, juror Harry A. Swan, juror Lynda Kay Strong and juror Alonzo Sykes. However, I don't find there was sufficient reasons even though it appeared to be non-racial or could appear to be non-racial. He's black; if they don't like his looks it may be because he is black, and so, therefore, I'm not going to allow the State to challenge juror Leonard McKinley Whitley, Jr. He will be placed on the jury unless the defendant desires to challenge him. On appeal, Hatten challenges the determination of the trial judge regarding the use of peremptory strikes against Venirewoman Linda Kay Strong (# 22) and Venireman Alonzo Sykes (# 27). Hatten claims: The Court made a finding that the State had properly articulated non-racial reasons for the using of peremptory challenges against these two prospective jurors. The Court made no factual determination as to whether the facts as stated by the assistant district attorney were true and correct or not. Hatten concludes the trial court's failure to make factual findings regarding the validity of the reasons given by the State for the use of its challenges requires reversal of this case. The State maintains: All that is necessary is that there exist support in the record for the court's decision, and that there is nothing in the record which would indicate that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1350 (Miss. 1987). At the outset we point out that this area of the law is one in which it is most difficult to make a record. It is important to note that Hatten's attorney, for example, does not deny the State's allegations that Venirewoman Strong was inattentive and giggling, only that he did not observe this demeanor. Calling attention to a such a matter in front of the entire venire would tend to potentially prejudice other veniremen by the comments to the trial judge. Further, by the time a matter is called to the trial judge's attention, it may no longer exist. This type of situation requires a trial judge to constantly scan the trial proceedings with eyes like an eagle. What will we decide when asked to determine whether or not some potential juror gave a glaring look to a defendant or his counsel during voir dire? We point out the difficulties involved in every Batson determination in order to admonish parties that the failure to provide this Court with a complete record for our review only complicates matters. The portion of the jury selection process wherein the State and Hatten peremptorily struck individuals from the venire was not made a part of the record. In Pacee v. State, 306 Ark. 563, 816 S.W.2d 856 (1991), the Supreme Court of Arkansas was confronted with a similar case in which the voir dire proceedings were excluded by the appellant's attorney. The Arkansas Court noted that since it was deprived of the critical part of the record which allowed a consideration of all relevant circumstances, as Batson calls for, the claim must be rejected. This Court has not directly addressed the issue of whether a trial judge is required to make an on-the-record factual determination of race neutral reasons cited by the State for striking veniremen from a panel. The Batson Court declined to provide specific guidelines for handling this issue. This Court has articulated the general law in this state which provides that it is the duty of the trial court to determine whether purposeful discrimination has been shown, by the use of peremptory challenges. Wheeler v. State, 536 So.2d 1347 (Miss. 1988); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1349. In considering this issue, we today decide it necessary that trial courts make an on-the-record, factual determination, of the merits of the reasons cited by the State for its use of peremptory challenges against potential jurors. This requirement is to be prospective in nature. Of course, such a requirement is far from revolutionary, as it has always been the wiser approach for trial courts to follow. Such a procedure, we believe, is in line with the great deference customarily afforded a trial court's determination of such issues. Great deference has been defined in the Batson context as insulating from appellate reversal any trial findings which are not clearly erroneous. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1349-50. Accord Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 672 (Miss. 1991); Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1989); Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 171 (Miss. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797 (1990); Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 630, 633 (Miss. 1988); Johnson v. State, 529 So.2d 577, 583-84 (Miss. 1988) Obviously, where a trial court offers clear factual findings relative to its decision to accept the State's reason[s] for peremptory strikes, the guesswork surrounding the trial court's ruling is eliminated upon appeal of a Batson issue to this Court. Returning to the instant case, it is clear that the trial judge made a sincere, bona fide effort to properly weigh and examine the race-neutral reasons cited by the State. He attempted to determine, on the record, whether each of the State's reasons for striking black jurors was in fact racially neutral. The record indicated the judge undertook an evaluation of each reason given for striking each potential juror. When the State attempted to strike Venireman Leonard Whitley, for instance, because the prosecutor did not like the appearance of Mr. Whitley, the trial judge instantly ruled the proffered reason to be pretextual and promptly seated Mr. Whitley on the jury. The trial judge was certainly sensitive to the possibility that the reasons given for challenging prospective jurors ... may well have served as masks for actual racially discriminatory purposes. Chisolm v. State, 529 So.2d 635, 639 (Miss. 1988). The Alabama court has elaborated on the discretion given to their trial courts in O'Neal v. State, 602 So.2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). In reviewing a Batson hearing where the trial judge's rulings were substantially similar to those by the judge in the case at bar, the Alabama court stated: Based on the foregoing, we find no clear error in the trial court's determination, particularly in light of the court's decision to place [venireman] back on the jury as a result of the prosecutor's ostensibly insufficient race-neutral explanation. The reasons given for striking [two veniremen] were based on considerations other than race, and the trial court correctly so ruled. Id. at 465.