Opinion ID: 2612440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: state privileges and immunities clause

Text: Appellant Ford contends that the attorney's fees and continuing damages provision of RCW 19.118.100(3) violates the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington State Constitution. Ford contends that an analysis of the factors stated in State v. Gunwall [22] indicates that an independent state constitutional analysis is appropriate here. Under Gunwall, the six nonexclusive criteria to be used in determining the scope of protection provided by state constitutional provisions include the following: (1) the language of the state constitution; (2) significant differences in language between parallel provisions of the federal and state constitutions; (3) constitutional history; (4) preexisting state law; (5) structural differences between the federal and state constitutions; and (6) whether the subject matter is of particular state or local concern.[ [23] ] [10] The proper inquiry under Gunwall is not whether state constitutional analysis is necessary, but whether on a given subject the Washington constitutional provision affords greater protection than the minimum protection afforded by the federal constitutional analysis. [24] Despite textual differences, the Washington constitutional privileges and immunities clause, Const. art. 1, § 12, and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are substantially identical and have been considered by this court as the same. [25] However, in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., [26] the court noted that, [w]e have followed this approach because a separate analysis focusing on the language and history of our state constitution has not been urged. The court resolved Sofie on other grounds, reserving an independent state constitutional analysis of Washington's privileges and immunities clause for another case. Under the facts of this case, there is insufficient basis for concluding that greater protection is afforded under our state constitution than under the federal constitution. Even if we were to adopt the state analytical framework proposed by Ford, we would reach the same result because automobile manufacturers do not comprise a suspect class subject to invidious discrimination. Appellant Ford's argument on this issue is not persuasive. Thus, we again reserve any independent analysis of our state's privileges and immunities clause for another case.