Opinion ID: 2779090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: appeal of the rcw 71.09.090 show cause hearing

Text: Under the SVP act, there are two possible statutory ways for a court to determine there is probable cause to proceed to an evidentiary hearing ... (1) by deficiency in the proof submitted by the State, or (2) by sufficiency of proof' by the detainee that he or she no longer suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder or that any mental abnormality or personality disorder would not likely cause the prisoner to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. In re Det. of Petersen, 145 Wn.2d at 798. We review the legal conclusions the trial court drew from that evidence de novo. Id. at 799. Meirhofer contends he succeeds on both grounds. First, Meirhofer contends the State's evidence that he continues to meet the definition of a sexually violent predator was deficient. See RCW 71.09 .090(2)(b ). He stresses that the State's expert did not diagnose him with pedophilia and that an actuarial risk assessment test found his risk of reoffending to be 30% over the next 10 years, among other things. See PRP, App. Gat 10, 12. Considering the experts' conclusions and the reasons recited in the reports, we agree with the courts below that the State has met its statutory prima facie burden. An SVP is any person who has been convicted of ... a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility. RCW 71.09.020(18). It is undisputed that Meirhofer has been convicted of sexually violent crimes. Meirhofer, 2001 WL 1643535. It is also undisputed that Meirhofer has been 9 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 currently diagnosed by licensed forensic psychologists with both mental abnormalities and personality disorders, including paraphilia NOS (nonconsent) and personality disorder NOS with antisocial and borderline features. PRP, App. Gat 10. Meirhofer argues that because the State's experts originally testified he suffered from pedophilia and now the State's expert found insufficient evidence for that diagnosis, the State has not met its burden. His argument is unpersuasive. First, this court has affirmed commitment based on paraphilia NOS nonconsent and antisocial personality disorder, which are essentially Meirhofer's remaining diagnoses. See In re Det. of Stout, 159 Wn.2d 357, 363, 150 P.3d 86 (2007). Second, we rejected a similar challenge to continued civil commitment after an insanity acquittal when the detainee's diagnosis changed in State v. Klein, 15 6 Wn.2d 103, 120-21, 124 P .3d 644 (2005). While we cautioned that ' [d]ue process requires that the nature of the commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed,' we found sufficient connection from the original diagnosis of 'psychoactive substance-induced organic mental disorder' ... and the current diagnosis of polysubstance dependence to justify continued commitment. !d. (first alteration in original) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 79, 112 S. Ct. 1780, 118 L. Ed. 2d 437 (1992)). We observed that the subjective and evolving nature of psychology may lead to different diagnoses that are based on the very same symptoms, yet differ only in the name attached to it. !d. at 120. Similar principles apply here. Without more, the change from a diagnosis of pedophilia to a rule out pedophilia and hebephilia diagnosis is not sufficient to require a new evidentiary proceeding. 10 In re Pers. Restraint ofMeirhofer, No. 89251-2 Meirhofer also argues that hebephilia may not act as a qualifying mental abnormality or personality disorder under the SVP act. He calls our attention to a recent Illinois Court of Appeals case where the court required a Frye 5 hearing before admitting evidence that an SVP respondent suffered from hebephilia, which is not a condition listed in the American Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual ofMental Disorders. In re Det. ofNew, 2013 IL App (1st) 111556, 992 N.E.2d 519, 372 Ill. Dec. 677, 688 (2013), appeal granted, 2 N.E.3d 1045, 377 Ill. Dec. 764 (2013). New had appealed his commitment arguing, among other things, that hebephilia was not a diagnosis generally accepted in the scientific community. The Illinois Court of Appeals reversed his commitment and remanded for a Frye evidentiary hearing, noting that if a respondent in an SVP proceeding does not suffer from an actual mental disorder, then there is nothing to cure, and commitment is pointless. Id. But regardless of whether hebephilia is an accepted diagnosis in the relevant scientific community (a question we need not decide), the State presented sufficient prima facie evidence that Meirhofer has consistently suffered from paraphilia NOS nonconsent and a personality disorder. This is sufficient to show that Meirhofer suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder, RCW 71.09.020(18), as required for continued confinement. 6 The State has also met its prima facie burden of showing Meirhofer is likely to reoffend if not confined. RCW 71.09.090(2)(b). Meirhofer is correct that the actuarial 5Frye v. United States, 54 App. D.C. 46,293 F. 1013 (1923). 6 For similar reasons, we find Meirhofer's contention that he is entitled to a jury trial on whether he suffers from hebephilia unavailing based on the facts of this case. We recognize that the dissent finds the change in professional terminology from pedophilia to hebephilia significant. Given that Meirhofer has two other qualifying conditions, we do not find this an appropriate case to explore the issue. 11 In re Pers. Restraint ofMeirhofer, No. 89251-2 instmments the State's expert used suggest his risk ofreoffense is 30% in the next 10 years. However, the SVP act does not limit experts to the results of actuarial tests and there is no requirement that the SVP will reoffend in the foreseeable future. In re Det. ofMoore, 167 Wn.2d 113, 125,216 P.3d 1015 (2009). While Meirhofer is correct that we observed in a case considering the admissibly of actuarial instmments in SVP proceedings that the State asserts [they] are more reliable than clinical judgment, we never found that they were better evidence than clinical judgment. In re Det. of Thorell, 149 Wn.2d 724, 757, 72 P.3d 708 (2003). Based on static and dynamic risk factors and his own clinical judgment, the State's expert opined that there has been no apparent change in [Meirhofer' s] mental condition that would indicate a lowered risk for sexual re-offense. PRP, App. Gat 14. This is amply supported by the evidence reviewed in Dr. Saari's report. The State has met its prima facie burden under RCW 71.09.090(2)(b). Second, Meirhofer contends that he has shown probable cause that his condition has so changed that he no longer meets the criteria for a sexually violent predator. See In re Det. ofPetersen, 145 Wn.2d at 798; RCW 71.09.090(2)(c). Again, Meirhofer suggests that the change in diagnosis from pedophilia to hebephilia is significant. Whether or not it might be significant if it were the only diagnosis, even Meirhofer' s own expert found that he suffered from a personality disorder with antisocial traits. PRP, App. D at 20. Moreover, under the statutory standards, only a change in the person's mental condition brought about through positive response to continuing participation in treatment is sufficient under the act. RCW 71.09.090(4)(b)(ii). Any change in Meirhofer's condition was not driven by any 12 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirho.fer, No. 89251-2 positive response to continuing participation in treatment as Meirhofer has refused to participate in treatment. Instead, it appears to be driven by dispute within the psychiatric establishment and refinement in the relevant diagnostic criteria. See PRP, App. J, Ex. A (Allen Frances & Michael B. First, Hebephilia Is Not a Mental Disorder in DSM-JV-TR and Should Not Become One in DSM-5, 39 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 78, 84 (2011)). Perhaps sensitive to the ongoing legal conflict, Meirhofer' s expert couched his conclusion that Meirhofer had so changed as to justify further proceedings in very limited terms: Mr. Meirhofer was found to be an SVP based on the diagnoses of pedophilia. The most recent annual review by Dr. Saari questions this diagnoses and feels there is a need to rule it out. He has supplemented that diagnoses with paraphilia NOS, hebephilia which as previously mentioned is questionable whether it exists as a mental abnormality as opposed to a descriptor of behavior. I have been asked to address whether Mr. Meirhofer's mental abnormality has so changed as to whether he continues to meet the statutory definition of an SVP. As mentioned, recently the Washington State Supreme Court has ruled that the amendments of 2005 which restricted the definition of so changed should be reversed to pre-2005 standards. Therefore, it is my opinion that Mr. Meirhofer no longer meets the criteria of sexual violent predator based on the lack of evidence of a current paraphilic disorder[?] as well as the low risk found on the actuarial instruments utilized. PRP, App. D at 29. Given Dr. Rosell's reliance on Meirhofer's age in determining his risk of recidivism, given the fact that Meirhofer has not undergone treatment, and given the fact no expert has suggested that Meirhofer meets the current statutory 7 Dr. Rosell does not explain why he rejected the paraphilia NOS nonconsent diagnosis. 13 In re Pers. Restraint of Meirhofer, No. 89251-2 requirements for an evidentiary proceeding, the trial court did not err in declining to order one. 8