Opinion ID: 2176458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Other Acts Evidence.

Text: The general rule is that other acts evidence is not admissible to prove that a defendant acted in conformity with his past conduct. State v. Steele, 510 N.W.2d 661, 667 (S.D.1994) (citing State v. Chapin, 460 N.W.2d 420, 421 (S.D.1990)). The admission of other acts testimony is governed by SDCL 19-12-5, which provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. Under SDCL 19-12-5, admissibility of other acts evidence is determined by a two-step process: 1) Whether the intended purpose for offering the other acts evidence is relevant to some material issue in the case, and 2) Whether the probative value of the evidence substantially is outweighed by its prejudicial effect? Steele, 510 N.W.2d at 667. Although McGill's conduct under South Dakota law did not constitute criminal stalking prior to July 1, 1993, the trial court admitted it to prove a course of conduct for McGill's subsequent illegal acts. In State v. Werner, 482 N.W.2d 286, 289 (S.D.1992), this court held that the list of exceptions in SDCL 19-12-5, for which other acts evidence is properly admissible, is not exhaustive. The statutory language, such as, indicates that other acts evidence may be admissible for purposes not specifically stated in the statute. Id. Besides a course of conduct, the trial court alternatively admitted the evidence to show proof of intent and absence of mistake. South Dakota's stalking law, SDCL 22-19A-1, provides in part: Any person who willfully, maliciously, and repeatedly follows or harasses another person or who makes a credible threat to another person with the intent to place that person in reasonable fear of death or great bodily injury is guilty of the crime of stalking. SDCL 22-19A-4 provides: For the purposes of this chapter `harasses' means a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person which seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the person, and which serves no legitimate purpose. Course of conduct is defined in SDCL 22-19A-5 as: A pattern of conduct composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of `course of conduct.' In reviewing the admissibility of this type of evidence, we consider its relevancy, probative value and prejudicial effect.
This court has previously stated that `[a]ny fact that tends to connect an accused with the commission of a crime is relevant and has probative value.' State v. Goodroad, 442 N.W.2d 246, 250 (S.D.1989) (quoting State v. Sieler, 397 N.W.2d 89, 92 (S.D. 1986)); State v. Iron Shell, 336 N.W.2d 372, 374 (S.D.1983). The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 439 Pa.Super. 227, 235, 653 A.2d 706, 710 (1995), stated that a course of conduct by its very nature requires a showing of a repetitive pattern of behavior. The court held where evidence of prior bad acts is necessary to establish the pattern, the evidence is admissible. Id.; see also People v. Payton, 161 Misc.2d 170, 175-77, 612 N.Y.S.2d 815, 819 (1994) (holding uncharged incidents were facially sufficient to support a course of conduct for one count of menacing (stalking)). Here, the trial court found McGill's prior actions relevant for the purpose of showing a course of conduct, which was a contested issue in the case.
This step to admissibility requires the trial court to weigh the probative value of McGill's prior acts with any undue prejudicial effect. SDCL 19-12-3, South Dakota's version of the Federal Rule of Evidence 403, provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.] This court has held: Other acts evidence has a prejudicial effect if it has the capacity to persuade by illegitimate means which results in the state's having an unfair advantage. Such evidence is not prejudicial merely because its legitimate probative force damages the defendant's case. Goodroad, 442 N.W.2d at 250 (citing State v. Lowther, 434 N.W.2d 747, 753 (S.D.1989); State v. Kerkhove, 423 N.W.2d 160, 163 (S.D.1988)). Besides undue prejudice, McGill argues that admitting this evidence was an ex post facto violation of his rights under the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. We find this claim to be completely without merit. In a recent case, Cal. Dept. of Corrections v. Morales, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 1601, 131 L.Ed.2d 588, 594 (1995), the United States Supreme Court held that the ex post facto clause is aimed at laws that retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. Id. (citations omitted.) In this case, we are considering the admissibility of other acts evidence, not the retroactive alteration of a defined crime or an increase in punishment. Id. In Delano v. Petteys, 520 N.W.2d 606, 608 (S.D.1994), this court stated: The ex post facto prohibition forbids the Congress and the States to enact any law `which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time it was committed, or imposes additional punishment to that then prescribed ... [O]ur decisions prescribe that two critical elements must be present for a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto; it must be retrospective, that is it must apply to events occurring [before] its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. (Citations omitted.) McGill's pre-July 1, 1993, acts were not charged or punished. The sole issue is whether they were admissible to provide the jury with evidence to determine McGill's intent and course of conduct which led to the letters Victim received on July 12, 1993. A review of the record shows the trial court weighed, as required, the probative value of McGill's prior acts against its prejudicial effect. It held that testimony regarding McGill's telephone calls, letters and physical tracking of Victim and her family before July 1, 1993, was not unduly prejudicial, yet relevant to establish McGill's course of conduct and intent. [2] We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this other acts evidence, nor was the admissibility of evidence a violation of the ex post facto clause.