Opinion ID: 156355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Adequacy of the Punitive Damages Instructions and the Verdict Form

Text: 33 Related to Conoco's argument that Okland failed to present evidence of actual tort damages, is its contention that reversal is required because the jury instructions were deficient in failing to tell the jury to award punitive damages only if it found tort damages and because the general verdict form given to the jury did not permit a determination of how much of the actual damages were for tort and how much were for breach of contract.
34 Conoco alleges that the court's punitive damages instructions were deficient because they failed to accurately inform the jury that it must award actual damages for tort before awarding punitive damages. Instruction No. 39, to which Conoco objects, was given to the jury in the first stage of trial and provided that the jury could award punitive damages in a later stage of trial only [i]f you find in Okland's favor on either of its claims of deceit and/or on its claim of fraud in the inducement and award Okland actual damages. Appellant's App. Vol. I at 177. On appeal, Conoco attacks this first stage instruction by arguing that the court should have given an instruction Conoco requested in the second stage of trial, which would have accurately told the jury that it must award tort damages before awarding punitive damages. We do not find in the record nor does Conoco tell us that it objected to the first or second stage punitive damages instructions on the ground that the language it requested in its proposed instruction was absent. In fact, only in Okland's Supplemental Appendix do we find Conoco's proposed first stage instruction as to punitive damages. See Appellee's Supplemental App. at 8. That proposed instruction, which states that the jury can only award punitive damages later [i]f you find in favor of plaintiff, and grant it actual damages, id., propagates the same error Conoco now alleges the court's instruction contained. Having failed to adequately raise this issue below, we review it for plain error. 35 We initially question whether, in any event, Conoco's proposed second stage instruction would have been enough to cure the error Conoco is alleging. The instruction was to be given only after the jury had already completed the first stage of trial, where the jury either did or did not award actual damages for tort. 36 Moreover, Conoco's proposed second stage instruction did not accurately state the law. The proposed instruction provided as follows: 37 Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, you have found in favor of the plaintiff and granted him/her actual damages for fraud, and you have also found by a separate verdict that the defendant was guilty of reckless disregard of the rights of others. 38 You may now, in addition to actual damages, grant the plaintiff punitive damages in such sum as you reasonably believe will punish defendant and be an example to others. 39 .... 40 In no event should the punitive damages exceed the greater of: $100,000 or the amount of actual damages you have previously awarded. 41 Proposed Instruction No. 30, Appellant's App. Vol. I at 15-16. Unfortunately for Conoco, the jury in the first stage of trial found not only that Conoco had acted recklessly, but also that it had acted intentionally and with malice. Appellant's App. Vol. I at 185. Giving Conoco's proposed instruction on recklessness would have been error because Conoco's conduct fit into the intentional and malicious category of Oklahoma's punitive damages statute, not the recklessness category. See Okla. Stat. tit. 23, § 9.1(B), (C). Conoco does not tell us here whether it requested an instruction within the correct category, and not finding one in the Appellant's Appendix, we assume it did not. The court therefore properly refused to give Conoco's tendered instruction. 42 In addition, looking at the instructions as a whole, we find that they properly informed the jury of its responsibility to find tort damages prior to awarding punitive damages. Each of the instructions on the three tort theories clearly advised the jury that to find Conoco liable on those claims, it must find as one element that Okland had suffered damages as a result of Conoco's actions. 10 Appellant's App. Vol. I at 160, 162, 166. We are to presume that the jury followed those instructions, Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1456 (10th Cir.1997); United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 997 (10th Cir.1993), and found damages. 43 Taken as a whole, the instructions, including the second stage instruction and the verdict form, which contained the same type of language as the first stage instruction, see Appellant's App. Vol. I at 182, 184-85, properly informed the jury that it must award actual damages on at least one tort theory before awarding punitive damages.
44 Conoco also challenges the verdict form given by the court because it does not sufficiently inform the jury that it must have awarded actual tort damages prior to turning to punitive damages and because it does not ask the jury to allocate damages between tort and contract. Although Conoco requested its own verdict form, that form did not do either of these things. See Appellee's Supplemental App. at 1-6. Failure to request the verdict form it now seeks limits our review to plain error. Kloepfer v. Honda Motor Co., 898 F.2d 1452, 1456 (10th Cir.1990). 11 45 The verdict form 12 instructed the jury to answer Parts C and D, which ask the jury to determine the recklessness or maliciousness of Conoco's actions, only if you have found Conoco Inc. liable on the plaintiff's claim for deceit (false representation), deceit (nondisclosure or concealment), and/or fraud in the inducement and awarded actual damages. Appellant's App. Vol. I at 184-85 (emphasis added). Conoco did not object to this language at trial and the language it proffered was even less specific. 13 The verdict form tracks the language of the jury instructions and is sufficient to inform the jury of its responsibility. 46 The verdict form also provided only one space for the jury to award actual damages, which Conoco now argues creates ambiguity as to the nature of those damages. In Mason, 115 F.3d at 1458, we held that where the jury instructions explained the nature and availability of both pecuniary and non-pecuniary compensation, a verdict form requesting only one compensatory damages sum was not error. As discussed above, the instructions given were adequate to inform the jury of its responsibilities here. 47 In addition, Conoco itself opted to request only one space for actual damages and opted not to ask the jury to divide damages between tort and contract on its proposed form, see Appellee's Supplemental App. at 2, possibly because it decided that giving the jury more than one blank to fill in might encourage a higher actual damage award. Conoco also did not object to the verdict form on this basis immediately after it was rendered, nor did it seek a clarification of the allegedly ambiguous verdict before the jury was dismissed. A party who fails to bring to the trial court's attention [such] ambiguities ... may not seek to take advantage of such ambiguities on appeal. Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc., 979 F.2d 1462, 1468 (10th Cir.1992); see Unit Drilling Co. v. Enron Oil & Gas Co., 108 F.3d 1186, 1193 (10th Cir.1997) (holding failure to request clarification of ambiguous verdict before the jury is discharged limits review to plain error). Having chosen the path it did and in light of our conclusion above that the jury awarded actual damages for tort, 14 we do not find plain error in the form of the verdict. 48