Opinion ID: 2053657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Testimony About Prior Misconduct

Text: During Greenlee's criminal trial, the deputy prosecutor asked Evansville Police Officer Brian Underwood if he was familiar with Timothy Greenlee? Officer Underwood replied, Yes, I had arrested him in the past. (R. at 156.) Greenlee's attorney immediately objected to Officer Underwood's statement and moved for a mistrial. He argued Underwood's testimony prejudiced the jurors. The trial court denied the motion and directed the jury to disregard the testimony about Greenlee's prior arrest. The trial court similarly directed the jury to disregard certain testimony from Jones, who had testified that after the altercation between Greenlee and Kinsey Ledford, he heard that Greenlee had taken a stick and busted a windshield on a car. Greenlee's attorney objected to the hearsay testimony and the trial court ordered the jury to disregard the testimony about the windshield. Greenlee asserts his right to a fair trial was denied when the trial court denied his motion for a mistrial after Officer Underwood testified he had arrested Greenlee once in the past. Granting a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Duke v. State (1968), 249 Ind. 466, 233 N.E.2d 159. Absent an abuse of that discretion, this Court will not disturb a trial court's ruling. Love v. State (1977), 267 Ind. 302, 369 N.E.2d 1073. Even if evidence of uncharged misconduct is heard by the jury, a prompt admonishment to the jury to disregard the improper testimony is usually enough to support a denial of a motion for mistrial. Schlomer v. State (1991), Ind., 580 N.E.2d 950. Generally, [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. Ind.Evidence Rule 404(b). To determine if testimony of prior uncharged misconduct should warrant a new trial, however, the circumstances must be analyzed as to whether the evidence was intentionally injected or came in inadvertently and as to what degree the defendant was subjected to improper speculation by the jury. Davis v. State (1989), Ind., 539 N.E.2d 929, 931 (citing Henson v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1064). In Davis, defendant Danny W. Davis was being tried for burglary. The burglary victims gave police the license plate number to a car that matched the description of the vehicle they saw leaving their home after the burglary. Id. at 930. Testifying for the State, a police officer said that after police traced the license plate number to Davis, he found an outstanding warrant for Davis's arrest. Davis's trial attorney immediately objected to the officer's statement. The trial court admonished the jury to disregard the remark. While noting such admissions tend to prejudice a jury because it may infer the defendant had a criminal record, the Davis Court found no error in admitting the remark. Id. at 931. This Court decided the officer's remark, while unfortunate, was stated in such an offhand manner in the middle of a lengthy interrogation without any specific reference to a crime. Id. Similarly, Officer Underwood's statement about the earlier arrest came at the beginning of his testimony and also never included a specific reference to the crime. Greenlee offers support for his claim that Officer Underwood's remark unfairly prejudiced him by citing White v. State (1971), 257 Ind. 64, 272 N.E.2d 312. In White, however, the Court found a police officer's testimony about prior uncharged conduct warranted a new trial largely because the officer's testimony constituted an evidential harpoon. Id. at 76, 272 N.E.2d at 319. The Court noted that the officer's only contribution to the trial was his knowledge that the armed robbery defendant had been a suspect in another robbery: He knew nothing concerning the defendant's involvement, if any, with the crime for which he was standing trial . . . We think it apparent that the sole purpose of calling the witness was to wield the evidential harpoon, deliberately calculated by counsel to prejudice the jury against the defendant and his defense. Id. Despite a limiting instruction from the trial court, this Court found the jury was improperly influenced by the officer's statement. Id. Greenlee's case can be distinguished. Unlike the officer who carried the evidentiary harpoon in White, Officer Underwood knew substantially more about the defendant's connection to the crimes at issue. Officer Underwood was one of the first police officers to arrive after the disturbance was reported and interviewed the defendant. His testimony had relevance in the trial well beyond his mere knowledge of Greenlee's earlier arrest. The opinion in Burdine v. State (1985), Ind, 477 N.E.2d 544, also helps determine if a remark about uncharged conduct prejudiced the defendant. The question we must ask is whether, absent the improper comment, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty. Id. at 546 (citing United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 510, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1981, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983)). In light of the trial testimony against Greenlee from an eyewitness, it is likely the jury would have returned a verdict of guilty even without the improper testimony. Given the strong testimony against Greenlee and the absence of any evidence in the record of a deliberate attempt to inject Officer Underwood's testimony into trial [1] , the trial court acted within its discretion to deny Greenlee's motion for a mistrial. Schlomer, 580 N.E.2d 950. As for Jones's comment that Greenlee busted a windshield, we note that Greenlee's objection at trial was based on hearsay, and the trial court sustained his objection and admonished the jury. The court gave what Greenlee requested and there is no error for review on appeal.