Opinion ID: 182629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Mistrial Based on Jury Contact

Text: This Court reviews the district court’s decision not to grant a mistrial for extraneous influence on the jury under an abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Orlando, 281 F.3d 586, 593 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 607 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 533 (6th Cir. 1984).
Defendants contend that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial after Defendant Davis encountered Juror Number 12 and Juror Number 3 in the hallway near the jury room. In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954), the Supreme Court held that “in a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial” requires “notice to and hearing of the defendant, [to establish] that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.” Id. at 230. The Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed the Remmer hearing requirement, stating that it has “long held that the remedy for allegations of juror 5 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.” Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982). In Smith’s wake this Court has held: [f]our principles govern claims of extraneous, prejudicial influences on a jury: (1) when a defendant alleges that an unauthorized contact with a juror has tainted a trial, a hearing must be held; (2) no presumption of prejudice arises from such a contact; (3) the defendant bears the burden of proving actual juror bias; (4) juror testimony at the ‘Remmer hearing’ is not inherently suspect. Orlando, 281 F.3d at 596; see also United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95-96 (6th Cir. 1988). In this case, the district court adhered to these four principles. After Juror Number 12 and Juror Number 3 informed the district court of their contact with Davis, Defendants moved for a mistrial based on prejudicial contact with the jury. The district court initially denied the motions for mistrial, but when Defendants renewed their motions the district court held a Remmer hearing. In counsel’s presence, the district court first questioned the two jurors who encountered Davis, and signed the note to the court. In response to the district court’s questioning, Juror Number 12 stated that she believed Davis knew he was not supposed to be near the jury room, that the encounter was “unnerving,” and made her feel “uncomfortable.” Counsel for Davis and Tellez also had the opportunity to question Juror Number 12. In response to their questions, Juror Number 12 stated that Davis’ proximity to the jury room made her feel intimidated, and that she discussed the encounter with the other jurors. However, Juror Number 12 stated that she would nevertheless be able to decide the case impartially. The court next questioned Juror Number 3 who had also signed the note. Juror Number 3 stated that he thought the language of being “freaked out” used in the jurors’ note was overstated, 6 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 and that Juror Number 12 had convinced herself that Davis had been in the area intentionally. He stated that he did not think much of the encounter with Davis as he thought it was “obvious that [Davis] was lost,” and was not intentionally near the jury room. (Br. of Appellee at 24.) The court also held a hearing to question the remainder of the jurors who heard about the encounter second-hand. Rather than affording counsel opportunity to question each juror, the district court stated that it would ask these jurors questions submitted to the court by parties’ counsel. Neither Davis’ nor Tellez’ attorney objected to this procedure. The district court proceeded to ask the remaining jurors whether they had heard of the encounter with Davis, and whether it would affect their impartiality. Although most of the jurors had heard about the encounter, none stated that it would affect their deliberations. At the close of the hearing the district court dismissed Juror Number 12, and denied Defendants’ motions for mistrial. The district court explained that it was denying Defendants’ motions because the lobby where Davis encountered the jurors is a public area, Davis made no verbal contact with jurors, and Juror Number 12, who the court had dismissed, was the only juror who believed that Davis had done anything wrong. The remainder of the jurors stated in the Remmer hearing that their impartiality was unaffected by anything Juror Number 12 told them about the encounter. As required by this Court, the district court’s Remmer hearing was “unhurried and thorough” and “[d]efense counsel were permitted to question the jurors” to determine whether jurors were prejudiced by the contact. See Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 96; see also Pennell, 737 F.2d at 529 (suggesting that counsel need not themselves ask the questions, when the Remmer hearing was conducted by the 7 Nos. 09-5200, 09-5201 court “[w]ith the concurrence of counsel for both parties”). Defendant bears the burden to show actual prejudice in a Remmer hearing. Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 96. Cases in this Circuit suggest that unless the district court finds that the jury was actually prejudiced it need not grant a mistrial based on non-prejudicial contact with the jury. See, e.g., id. at 93-94 (finding that although a “spectator who appeared to be associated with [defendant]” said to jurors “it would be too bad if the elevator should crash,” as the jurors stated that they “did not believe either side was attempting to influence their verdict, and . . . they could continue as impartial jurors,” the jury was not prejudiced); Pennell, 737 F.2d at 529 (finding no prejudice when five jurors received anonymous telephone calls that they “had better” find the defendant guilty). Based on the Remmer hearing, the district court determined that Juror Number 12, the only juror apprehensive about the encounter, should be dismissed due to possible prejudice. The remainder of the jurors stated that they were unaffected by the encounter. A juror’s ability to gauge their own partiality is not inherently suspect. Orlando, 281 F.3d at 596. Therefore, it was proper for the district court to base its determinations of juror prejudice on the jurors’ statements, and determine that the remainder of the jurors were not prejudiced. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.