Opinion ID: 413377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Electronic Surveillance Procedures

Text: 11 Appellant's contention is that the government failed to follow several statutory requirements for obtaining and using the electronic listening device. He argues that these failures to follow proper procedures necessitate suppression of all electronically obtained evidence since the communications were unlawfully intercepted within the meaning of both 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(10)(a)(i) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) 3 and 23 D.C.Code Sec. 551(b)(1) (1981). 4 To evaluate these arguments, we must first set forth the standards governing suppression. 5 12 The Supreme Court has made clear that not every failure to comply fully with any requirement provided in Title III would render the interception of wire or oral communications 'unlawful.'  United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 574-575, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 1855-1856, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974). The suppression remedy would be warranted only when the government fail[s] to satisfy any of those statutory requirements that directly and substantially implement the congressional intention to limit the use of intercept procedures to those situations clearly calling for the employment of this extraordinary investigative device. United States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413, 433-434, 97 S.Ct. 658, 671, 50 L.Ed.2d 652 (1977) (quoting United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 527, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1832, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974)). 13 This court has recently addressed itself to these Supreme Court opinions in United States v. Johnson, 696 F.2d 115 (D.C.Cir.1982). We held that in evaluating the need for suppression of electronically obtained evidence, we shall be guided by the principle implicit in the above opinions--that violations of even these central [statutory] requirements do not mandate suppression if the Government demonstrates to the court's satisfaction that the statutory purpose has been achieved despite the violation. 696 F.2d at 121 (footnote omitted). We will therefore focus on these considerations in evaluating appellant's claims that the conversations in the Royal Carpet were unlawfully intercepted and that all evidence derived therefrom must be suppressed.
14 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. Secs. 2510-2520 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) prescribes the procedures for obtaining the necessary judicial approval of electronic surveillance. The statute provides in pertinent part: 15 The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for    an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications    [.] 6 16 Assistant Attorney General Litvack had been specially designated on January 19, 1981 by Attorney General Civiletti. Mr. Litvack authorized the application in this case on February 19, 1981. However, on January 22 Attorney General Civiletti had been succeeded by William French Smith. The issue before the court is whether the special designation of Mr. Litvack by Attorney General Civiletti satisfies the requirements of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1) for an electronic surveillance application that was made only after Mr. Civiletti had left office. 17 The government argues that the statutory requirement was satisfied by the January 19, 1981 special designation and that no new designation was required. 7 For support, the government relies on the general proposition that orders and decisions of one Attorney General must continue in effect until changed by a successor to the office; to require express revalidation of all grants of authority would throw into chaos the ongoing operations of the Department of Justice. See, e.g., In re Weir, 520 F.2d 662, 667 (9th Cir.1975) (authorization of grant of immunity continues under successor); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 216 F.Supp. 250, 256 (D.Minn.1962) (authority of Justice Department attorneys to appear before grand jury continues), aff'd, 382 U.S. 44, 86 S.Ct. 181, 15 L.Ed.2d 36 (1963). 18 However, arguments about the need for administrative continuity miss the mark in this case. The power to authorize electronic surveillance applications is uniquely circumscribed by statute. Congress has identified a very limited category of officials who may legally wield this power. Section 2516's restrictions thereby ensure that decisionmaking is centralize[d] in a publicly responsible official subject to the political process. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1968). Furthermore, should abuses occur, the statute guarantees that the lines of responsibility lead to an identifiable person. Id. 19 There is no doubt that Section 2516 is one of those central safeguards in the statute which, if violated, warrants suppression. 8 However, despite appellant's arguments to the contrary, the authorization by Assistant Attorney General Litvack adequately satisfies the purposes of the statutory provision. Mr. Litvack had been specially designated by Attorney General Civiletti within the literal meaning of Section 2516(1). He was a clearly identifiable and politically accountable person within the Justice Department. 9 20 Still, the court is concerned about the lack of diligence and forethought that characterize the actions of the Justice Department in this case. Questions about the legality of relying on outdated special designations have arisen before 10 and should have encouraged this Administration to revalidate special designations more promptly. However, since the delay in revalidation was relatively brief and since the purposes of the statutory requirements were adequately served, we will not overturn the District Court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress.
21 Appellant also argues that the affidavit supporting the government's application for the listening device failed to provide the required full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous[.] 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(1)(c) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 11 This requirement ensures that wiretapping is not resorted to in situations where traditional investigative techniques would suffice to expose the crime. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 153 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 977, 983 n. 12, 39 L.Ed.2d 225 (1974). 22 We find the application more than adequate to fulfill the statutory requirement. While appellant terms the affidavit conclusory, in fact it is remarkably detailed. It provides a thorough explanation of the need for the listening device--the need to determine the scope of the illegal fencing operation, the identities of the parties, the methods of operation, the possibility of police involvement, and, perhaps most critically, the need to gather evidence to prove knowledge on the part of Martin and his co-conspirators. It is clear that fences are more difficult to prosecute because superficially they do run legitimate businesses and can merely assert their lack of knowledge as to whether the goods they bought were in fact stolen. And yet we must be careful not to permit the government merely to characterize a case as a drug conspiracy or a fencing conspiracy that is therefore inherently difficult to investigate. The affidavit must show with specificity why in this particular investigation ordinary means of investigation will fail. See United States v. Johnson, supra, 696 F.2d at 124; United States v. Williams, 580 F.2d 578, 588 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 832, 99 S.Ct. 112, 58 L.Ed.2d 127 (1978). The government here provided detailed information about two confidential sources that were reluctant to testify, the various means that had already been tried (including pen registers, seizures of trash, and undercover operations), and why these techniques failed to provide adequate evidence. In our judgment, the government has clearly carried its burden of showing that the listening device was necessary as other procedures, while somewhat successful, had been inadequate.
23 Appellant also argues that the evidence obtained from the listening device should be suppressed because the government did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay of four days in arranging for judicial sealing under the requirements of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(8)(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and 23 D.C.Code Sec. 549(a) (1981). 12 We find this argument similarly unpersuasive. In United States v. Johnson, supra, 696 F.2d at 125, we held that in most cases, evidence from which the court can infer that the tapes were held in such a condition as to ensure that they could not be tampered with will be an important component of the Government's 'satisfactory explanation.'  24 Here, the record indicates that the government's explanation for the four-day delay is barely sufficient. The delay was attributed to: (1) the need to duplicate the tapes before sealing in order to provide a working copy for the prosecutor; and (2) the simultaneous, time-consuming efforts of the prosecutor and case agents to prepare another application for a wire intercept to replace the expired oral intercept at the Royal Carpet. Given the brevity of the delay, we are inclined to accept this explanation as sufficient. It should be clear, however, that any delay is not in keeping with the required strict adherence to the statute and that this court's toleration of such deficiencies has its limits.