Opinion ID: 1643636
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Next of Kin's Damages

Text: The first assignment of error asserts that the district court erred by rejecting the offer of proof concerning the mental anguish suffered by decedent Nelson's next of kin. We have observed that the right to maintain a wrongful death action does not exist at common law and thus exists solely by virtue of legislative enactment. Smith v. Columbus Community Hosp., 222 Neb. 776, 387 N.W.2d 490 (1986). The Nebraska wrongful death action is found in Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 30-809 and 30-810 (Reissue 1985). The first of these statutes provides in relevant part: Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default, of any person ... and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the person who... would have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony. The second statute reads in relevant part: Every such action, as described in section 30-809, shall be ... brought by and in the name of his personal representatives, for the exclusive benefit of the ... next of kin. The verdict or judgment should be for the amount of damages which the persons in whose behalf the action is brought have sustained. The avails thereof shall be paid to and distributed among the ... next of kin in the proportion that the pecuniary loss suffered by each bears to the total pecuniary loss suffered by all such persons. Thus, the damages recoverable, the disposition of the avails obtained, and the measure of recovery in a wrongful death action are all fixed by statute. Mabe v. Gross, 167 Neb. 593, 94 N.W.2d 12 (1959). See, also, Luckey v. Union P.R. Co., 117 Neb. 85, 219 N.W. 802 (1928). Johnson County v. Carmen, 71 Neb. 682, 99 N.W. 502 (1904), determined that a statute permitting jurors to award such damages, not to exceed $5,000, as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries, resulting from such death, Gen.Stat. ch. 15, § 2 (1873), did not permit the next of kin to recover for bereavement, mental suffering, or solace. The Carmen court ruled that a jury is limited to giving pecuniary compensation resulting to the next of kin on account of the death of the deceased. Carmen at 685, 99 N.W. at 503. A 1919 amendment to the damages language found in the Carmen statute produced the damages language now found in § 30-810. In considering that amendment, this court, in Ensor v. Compton, 110 Neb. 522, 524, 194 N.W. 458, 459 (1923), said: This amendment was made by the legislature after this court had, by a long line of decisions, held that damages in this class of cases were limited under the statute to money loss or its equivalent. This change, while significant, does not provide a wide open door to all sorts of claims for damages. The loss under the statute is still a pecuniary loss. Nothing can be allowed on account of mental suffering or bereavement or as a solace on account of such death. Only such damages can be recovered as are shown by the evidence to have a monetary value. In states having a statute similar to our own, it has generally been construed as permitting recovery of damages for loss of service and companionship under special circumstances where the evidence shows they have a money value. [Citations omitted.] However, recovery for loss of services and companionship by a surviving husband or wife can only be sustained where the evidence shows a reasonable probability that such services and companionship afforded the survivor was of such a character that it would be of advantage to such survivor, and that a disallowance thereof would cause a pecuniary loss to him or her. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis supplied.) In allowing recovery for the economic value of the society, comfort, and companionship lost by the next of kin, the opinion of this court in Selders v. Armentrout, 190 Neb. 275, 207 N.W.2d 686 (1973), noted that the wrongful death damages statute had been interpreted as limiting recovery to pecuniary loss. The Selders opinion then went on to explain that damages for loss of society, comfort, and companionship were recoverable because they constituted services which have a financial value to the next of kin. This court recently reaffirmed the rules announced in Carmen, Ensor, and Selders, and again held that the loss contemplated by the wrongful death statutes is a pecuniary loss, Garvin v. Coover, 202 Neb. 582, 276 N.W.2d 225 (1979), and Maloney v. Kaminski, 220 Neb. 55, 368 N.W.2d 447 (1985), and that damages on account of mental suffering or bereavement or as a solace to the next of kin on account of the death are not recoverable, Garvin v. Coover, supra . The personal representative concedes the current status of the law but invites us to abandon our prior interpretation and permit the next of kin to recover for her or his mental anguish in an action for wrongful death on the ground that a number of other states so permit. See, e.g., Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727 P.2d 1038 (Alaska 1986); Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986); Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249 (Tex.1983); Dawson v. Hill & Hill Truck Lines, 206 Mont. 325, 671 P.2d 589 (1983). See, also, Hopkins v. McBane, 427 N.W.2d 85 (N.D.1988); Nance v. State Board of Education, 277 S.C. 64, 282 S.E.2d 848 (1981). We decline the invitation without undertaking any comparison of the various statutes of other states with our own, for the invitation overlooks the general and dispositive rule that where a statute has been judicially construed and that construction has not evoked an amendment, it will be presumed that the Legislature has acquiesced in the court's determination of its intent. Erspamer Advertising Co. v. Dept. of Labor, 214 Neb. 68, 333 N.W.2d 646 (1983). See, also, Arant v. G.H., Inc., 229 Neb. 729, 428 N.W.2d 631 (1988). That being so, it cannot now be judicially declared that the Legislature meant something else; thus, the personal representative's first assignment of error fails.