Opinion ID: 2995671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sexual Devices

Text: Plaintiffs next contend that Section 125.22, which prohibits the sale of devices designed or marketed primarily for stimulation of human genital organs or for sadomasochistic use or abuse, is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and also violates fundamental rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. We conclude that the district court did not adequately consider these issues, and accordingly, we remand for the district court to consider these claims in the first instance. Plaintiffs contend that Section 125.22 is unconstitutionally vague under Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 358, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983), because it vests complete discretion in the hands of the enforcement agency and fails to provide the minimal guidelines required for due process. Its concerns about arbitrary enforcement are well- taken because at oral argument, Mishawaka asserted that only some types of sexual devices--such as certain vibrators--were banned by Section 125.22, but others were not./5 Moreover, although Mishawaka did not articulate a difference between the allegedly prohibited vibrators and the permissible vibrators, Mishawaka asserted that it would enforce Section 125.22 against plaintiffs but not against other vendors of vibrators. Although such particularized enforcement might be constitutional, the record lacks any evidence addressing this issue./6 In order to determine whether Section 125.22 is unconstitutionally vague, we must remand for a factual development of the record addressing the types of sexual devices banned under Section 125.22 and the types of sexual devices permitted under Section 125.22. Plaintiffs also raise vagueness concerns because although Section 125.22 bans sexual devices designed or marketed primarily for the stimulation of the human genital organs, Section 125.22 does not ban sexual devices designed or marketed primarily for therapeutic use. We take note that stimulation of human genital organs forms part of medically- recognized therapeutic treatment for female sexual dysfunction. See, e.g., John P. Wincze & Michael P. Carey, Sexual Dysfunction: A Guide for Assessment and Treatment 151 (2d ed. 2001) (recommending vibratory stimulation as one of three courses of treatment); Handbook of Sexual Dysfunctions: Assessment and Treatment 269-73 (William O’Donohue & James H. Geer eds., 1993) (Handbook) (listing vibratory use as necessary step to treat certain cases of female anorgasmia). In addition, FDA regulations conclusively establish the therapeutic and medical value of certain sexual devices./7 See 21 C.F.R. sec. 884.5940(a) (2001); 21 C.F.R. sec. 884.5960(a) (2001); 21 C.F.R. sec. 884.5960 (1980); see also Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1292 n.48 (N.D. Al. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001); State v. Hughes, 792 P.2d 1023, 1025 (Kan. 1990) (noting use of dildos and vibrators to treat urinary stress incontinence). Because certain therapeutic treatments for sexual dysfunction often necessarily entail the stimulation of the human genital organs, see, e.g., Handbook at 269-73, Section 125.22 needs to provide standards for determining which of those two uses--stimulation as a part of therapy or merely stimulation--takes priority and thus is a sexual device’s primary use. We must remand for due consideration by the district court because the record does not contain any information of whether it is possible to distinguish a sexual device’s primary use from its auxiliary uses and the prevalence of each type of use, and such information is necessary in order to properly address this claim. We also conclude that the district court did not adequately consider plaintiffs’ fundamental rights challenges. At least two courts have found a ban on similar devices unconstitutional because they intruded upon the fundamental right to privacy, see Hughes, 792 P.2d at 1032; People v. Seven Thirty-Five East Colfax, Inc., 697 P.2d 348, 370 (Colo. 1985), and the Eleventh Circuit has also raised similar questions. See Williams, 240 F.3d at 955-56 (holding that a similar statute was not facially unconstitutional but re manding for as applied analysis); but see Kametches v. State, 251 S.E.2d 232, 234 (Ga. 1978) (finding that a ban on distribution of sexual devices did not invade privacy of adult or married couples); Coberly v. State, 640 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. App. 1982) (concluding that prohibition on promotion of obscene devices did not violate individual right to privacy). In the present case, the district court did not address this issue specifically, and the record is too narrow to permit us to decide whether or to what extent Section 125.22 infringes upon a fundamental right. Accordingly, we must remand. Finally, plaintiffs contend that Section 125.22 is unconstitutionally overbroad because it bans the sale of contraceptives in violation of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485, 85 S. Ct. 1678, 14 L. Ed. 2d 510 (1965). As the district court did not discuss this issue and the record does not contain any pertinent details, we remand plaintiffs’ overbreadth challenge to determine whether Section 125.22 impermissibly intrudes upon the constitutionally permissible sale of prophylactics or is otherwise unconstitutionally overbroad. Mishawaka suggests that Sewell v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 982, 98 S. Ct. 1635, 56 L. Ed. 2d 76 (1978) establishes the constitutionality of Section 125.22. In Sewell, the United States Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from the Georgia Supreme Court for want of a substantial federal question, see id. at 983, a disposition that prevent[s] lower courts from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions as applied to the particular facts involved. Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176, 97 S. Ct. 2238, 53 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1977) (emphases added). The particular facts of the Georgia statute at issue in Sewell are materially different from Section 125.22, see Ga. Ann. Code sec. 2101(c) (1975), and we conclude that Sewell is not controlling./8