Opinion ID: 7347067
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Count 1(H): McGee

Text: Michael McGee is Judge Stanford’s son-in-law; he is married to the judge’s daughter Laurie. In March 2010, McGee received a ticket for running a red light. McGee believed he had entered the intersection on a yellow light. He talked to his wife about getting Judge Stanford’s advice about whether he should fight the ticket. Laurie told McGee she would talk to her father or ask her mother to talk to her father. Laurie either left the ticket for her mother with a note or gave it to her mother. Laurie never spoke directly with her father about the ticket. Sometime later, McGee and Judge Stanford had a conversation about the ticket. They discussed McGee’s options of either contesting the ticket or attending traffic school. At some point, Judge Stanford told McGee that he would process the ticket, but he would not be able to help him with future tickets. McGee does not remember the exact words used, but recalled the judge saying he would let McGee know if there was anything else McGee needed to do. A courtesy notice was sent on April 12, indicating a total bail amount of $456, and a bail-plus-traffic-school-fee amount of $496. On May 3, Judge Stanford provided written directions for his clerk, Gonzales, to enter a disposition for traffic school with all fines suspended except for the county traffic school fee. When Gonzales recognized the defendant as the judge’s son-in-law, she went to the judge’s chambers and told him she could not enter minutes for someone she knew. She asked Judge Stanford whether he would like her to give it to her supervisor to assign to someone else to enter the minutes and the judge responded “yes.” Gonzales gave the written disposition to her supervisor and explained that she could not enter it into the system because she knew the defendant. The supervisor asked another clerk to enter the disposition. The supervisor also reported the matter to the deputy court operations manager who determined the clerk should not enter the disposition. Meanwhile, the clerk had independently declined to enter the disposition upon learning that McGee was the judge’s son-in-law and reported the interactions to the deputy court operations manager. At this point, the matter was referred to Judge Stanford’s superiors. Meeting with Presiding Judge and Subsequent Handling of the McGee Ticket When Presiding Judge Kim Dunning learned that Judge Stanford had attempted to enter a disposition in his son-in-law’s traffic matter, she arranged a meeting with him for the following morning. Prior to the meeting, Judge Dunning was provided with a list of traffic infractions handled by Judge Stanford, which included the dispositions at issue in this case. Some of the tickets where fines and fees had been waived were highlighted by staff, but the list was not accompanied by minutes or other information detailing the dispositions. The meeting which took place in Judge Stanford’s chambers was attended by Judge Dunning, Assistant Presiding Judge Thomas B orris, and Judge Stanford. Judge Dunning told Judge Stanford “you can’t do this,” and explained the need for disqualification and the appearance of impropriety created by the judge’s conduct. Judge Stanford explained that he did not think it was unusual for a traffic defendant who came to court to have fines and fees reduced or eliminated. Judge Dunning responded that you “can’t handle cases for family members,” and further explained that traffic tickets are not as simple as they used to be, and that fiscal issues in 2010 have impacted the collection of fines and fees. During the meeting, Judge Stanford was “receptive and cooperative.” He was not defensive or argumentative, but appeared embarrassed and humiliated. It was Judge Dunning’s impression that Judge Stanford “missed the issue,” and that “a light bulb went on” during the meeting. Judge Stanford admitted his actions in the McGee matter and volunteered that he had taken similar actions in the past. Because of this admission, Judge Dunning did not show Judge Stanford the list of other traffic matters he had handled nor ask him about any of the cases on the list. Judge Stanford did not disclose that he had handled a ticket for his courtroom clerk, nor did he offer specifics about his assistance to other friends. Judge Dunning informed Judge Stanford that she expected McGee’s ticket to be paid in full. Judge Dunning did not articulate how the matter should be resolved other than that there must be an immediate payment of the full fines and fees. She recalls Judge Stanford saying that he would write the check. After the meeting, Judge Stanford gave Barbara Bums, the deputy court operations manager, a personal check for $456, the total bail amount of McGee’s ticket, and the “Court Information Sheet” (CIS) for the ticket. Despite having been counseled about the impropriety of entering a disposition in his son-in-law’s case, Judge Stanford crossed out the earlier disposition on the CIS and wrote instead: “T.S. Fines & fees pd Today $456, sign & pay TS fee by 5/28/10. RWS.” He asked Bums to enter the new disposition. A traffic clerk subsequently entered the payment and the indicated extension of time to pay the traffic school fee. Bums gave Judge Stanford a receipt and a document which reflected the extension. The judge did not inform McGee of the disposition of his ticket or of the May 28 deadline to pay the county traffic school fee. Judge Dunning testified that she did not expect Judge Stanford to order a disposition in his son-in-law’s matter after their meeting. She decided at the meeting that the ticket had to be handled by someone else. However, she went on to state, “I have to take responsibility for this because I didn’t articulate [how the matter was to be handled].” Judge Stanford’s State of Mind 1. Did Judge Stanford know his conduct was wrong at the time he acted? Judge Stanford testified that when he was adjudicating the tickets of friends and family it did not occur to him that his actions were improper, that he simply “missed” the conflicts and appearance issues, and had a “blind spot” which prevented him from thinking about the impropriety of his actions. Consciousness of wrongdoing is not charged in the Notice and is not an element of willful misconduct in the context of this case. Nevertheless, the judge urged the masters to find that he did not realize his actions were unethical until he was confronted by the presiding judge. While recognizing “[t]hat a seasoned judge would miss the issue does seem implausible,” the masters were “not persuaded that he [(Judge Stanford)] could not have failed to recognize the conflict of interest and the appearance of impropriety it created. Many who have known Judge Stanford for years have testified that, yes, he could have—and did—miss the issue. We cannot simply disregard this mass of evidence as ‘wishful thinking’ and conclude it was not possible.” (Original italics.) We respectfully decline to adopt this finding and, instead, find that Judge Stanford recognized the impropriety of his conduct when he provided preferential treatment to friends and his son-in-law in traffic matters. As the masters note, numerous fellow jurists testified and submitted letters attesting to Judge Stanford’s integrity and opining that he would not have handled the tickets of friends and family if he had known it was wrong. During her meeting with Judge Stanford, Judge Dunning was of the impression that the judge had “missed” the issue, and that “a light bulb” had gone on when confronted with the impropriety of his conduct. It is not surprising that those who know and respect Judge Stanford would have difficulty reconciling their view of the judge’s integrity with his having knowingly engaged in unethical conduct. However, even if the judge’s misconduct was an aberration or motivated by his proclivity to help others, we find it implausible that Judge Stanford was entirely unconscious of the impropriety of his actions when he handled the traffic tickets of family and friends. Judge Stanford’s 26 years on the bench, long career as a prosecutor, and reputation as a “by-the-book” judge who does not “cut corners” and is knowledgeable, diligent and follows the law negates any possibility that he missed the issue. Fellow judges to whom the question was posed on cross-examination acknowledged that they would not have missed the issue. Many of those who submitted letters and testified as to the judge’s good character acknowledged the apparent impropriety and gravity of the judge’s conduct (“disturbing,” “serious breach of ethical duties,” “shocks and disappoints me,” “indefensible”). Significantly, Gina Gonzales, the judge’s clerk, did not “miss the issue” when asked to enter the disposition for Judge Stanford’s son-in-law. She knew immediately that she could not handle a case involving someone she knew and told the judge so. Yet, according to Judge Stanford, even this did not alert him to the impropriety of handling his son-in-law’s ticket. Members of the public know instinctively that a judge should not handle traffic tickets of family and friends. We have previously noted that common experience and common sense indicate that “ ‘ticket fixing is a quintessential bad act of a judge. It is an abuse of power that citizens unquestionably understand and are suspicious about.’ ” (Inquiry Concerning Platt (2002) 48 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 227, 233 (Platt).) Judge Platt was charged with instructing his clerk in four cases to transfer to his court a speeding ticket issued to a friend or relative of a friend or acquaintance, and then dismissing the ticket without an appearance. The judge testified that, although he later realized that dismissing the tickets was wrong, he did not perceive any legal or ethical problem at the time he handled the tickets. The masters concluded that Judge Platt’s explanation for dismissing the ticket and his claim that he did not realize at the time his action was wrong were “ ‘after-the-fact rationalizations which lack credibility.’ ” Citing Judge Platt’s reputation as a careful decision maker with a good knowledge of the law, the commission concurred with the masters’ finding that “ ‘it is inconceivable he did not know the obvious, that ticket fixing was wrong ....’” (Ibid.) Judge Platt was removed from office. The impropriety of adjudicating the traffic tickets of friends and family is no less transparent when fines and fees are waived than when the ticket is dismissed. (Inquiry Concerning Wasilenko (2005) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 26, 49-50, 51 (Wasilenko).) As we stated in Wasilenko, the vice in a two-track system of justice does not turn on whether there was a classic ticket “fix” in the sense of a dismissal of a ticket, “but rather, in the damage to the reputation of the judiciary from the double standard.” (Id. at p. 49.) We are mindful that the masters found Judge Stanford to be a credible witness and that the factual findings of the masters are entitled to special weight. However, this commission retains the authority to override the factual findings of the special masters, even on matters of credibility. (See, e.g., Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1090.) In this case, commission members had the opportunity to question Judge Stanford extensively concerning his state of mind and observe his demeanor at his appearance before the commission. The judge acknowledged that he has attended judicial ethics education programs and has looked at summaries of cases involving ticket fixing. Yet, he was unable to offer any introspection as to how he could have missed the obvious. When asked why he handled tickets for friends and family, he responded, “In an effort to help people that I knew in situations that, at the time, seemed like an appropriate thing to do, to help the individuals.” We simply do not believe that Judge Stanford failed to recognize the impropriety of using the power of his judicial office to help his son-in-law and his friends. When asked if he would have recused if his son-in-law had a case assigned to his courtroom, Judge Stanford stated that the issue would have been obvious in open court with “people standing in front of you.” We believe the issue was just as obvious to Judge Stanford in the cases before us, but that his failure to recuse was easier to conceal when people were not standing in front of him. While insisting that he was oblivious to the impropriety of his actions, Judge Stanford acknowledged that he agreed with his character witnesses who testified that the issue was so obvious they did not see how anybody would miss it. Judge Stanford did not miss the issue, he ignored the issue. 2. Was it reasonable to believe that suspension of all fees and fines was a common practice in traffic court? 3 Judge Stanford testified he believed that waiving or suspending all fees and fines was a regular practice in traffic court. His understanding was based on his own experience in occasionally covering traffic court and night court 15 to 20 years ago. He testified he also based his belief about standard traffic dispositions on occasional conversations with traffic commissioners; however, he could not provide any specifics about those conversations. The judge admitted he did not make inquiries about the current practices in traffic court at the time he was adjudicating the tickets at issue. The masters found “that the judge’s belief he was acting within the mainstream of traffic citation outcomes, while falling below professional standards—possibly, a violation of Canon 3B(2)—was not unreasonable.” We reach a different conclusion based on our independent review of the record. In fact, during the period of the subject tickets, waiver or suspension of all fines and fees was an unusually lenient disposition in traffic court. Orange County Superior Court judges who were familiar with traffic court testified that a judge or commissioner would commonly reduce fees and fines in traffic court, but a complete waiver of fines and fees was not common and was “the exception to the rule.” Presiding Judge Dunning testified that traffic fees are not as simple as they used to be and that fiscal issues in recent years have impacted collection of fees and fines. 4 Further, she testified that Judge Stanford “was not really current on what the traffic ticket situation was.” The examiner introduced a random sample of two weeks of traffic dispositions in 2009 and 2010 for the same violations as those handled by the judge in this case (with the exception of impeding traffic). None of the dispositions included a full waiver of fees and fines. 5 The director of criminal operations in Orange County Superior Court testified that in her experience as a traffic court clerk she frequently saw fines and fees reduced but infrequently, less than a few times per month, saw a waiver of all fines and fees except for the traffic school fee. Other traffic department clerks made similar observations [(full waiver other than traffic school fee was “extremely rare and out of the ordinary,” saw similar dispositions “never” or “every once in a while”)]. Based on this evidence, we conclude Judge Stanford had no reasonable basis for believing his family and friends would have received the same outcome had they appeared in traffic court. Having handled criminal courts for years, Judge Stanford knows that sentences and fees and fines change over time, yet he never bothered to inquire whether sentencing practices in traffic court had changed in the last 15 to 20 years. Moreover, it has never been proper to waive fees and fines in traffic court for no reason or to benefit friends and family. As noted by the masters, “judges should not issue orders in any cases where they are unfamiliar with the legal standards (Canon 3B(2)).” Wearing blinders may have provided Judge Stanford with a rationalization for his conduct, but it did not render his unfounded belief that he was acting within the mainstream of traffic citation dispositions reasonable. The Judge’s Contributions to the Judiciary and His Community Much of the evidence Judge Stanford presented at the hearing before the masters related to his reputation within the judicial and legal community and his significant charitable contributions outside of court. Judge Stanford understands that mitigating evidence is not relevant in determining if he acted in bad faith, and thus engaged in willful misconduct, but may be taken into account in determining the totality of the circumstances as pertinent to determining the appropriate discipline. (Inquiry Concerning MacEachern (2008) 49 Cal.4th CJP Supp. 289, 312 (MacEachern); Broadman, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 1112.) Fellow judges, lawyers, friends, relatives, members of the community, and law enforcement associations testified or submitted letters on Judge Stanford’s behalf. The masters state, “By far the greatest outpouring of support for Judge Stanford relates to his 26 years of ethical, fair and honorable service on the bench and the value of his contributions to the Orange County Superior Court.” Judge Stanford is described as “zealously fair,” well prepared, honorable, “rock solid” and humble. He is known to be one of the hardest working judges on the Orange County bench. Based on this evidence, the masters found that Judge Stanford is a widely respected jurist. We adopt this finding. The masters also found “that both the nature and quantity of Judge Stanford’s community service is extraordinary.” We agree. He is an active member in the First Free Evangelical Church, where he serves as an elder. Judge Stanford volunteers at the church’s program for the homeless, the Good Samaritan Center, five days a week. As the administrator of the center, he spends 300 hours per year personally managing the program. In addition to donating his time to the center and other charitable organizations, the judge assists a woman, who was blinded by battery acid in a vicious attack, by driving her to church on Sundays, bringing her food, and helping her with home maintenance. The judge and his wife spend one week of their vacation every year at a camp for foster children.