Opinion ID: 2584893
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Challenges to the Constitutionality of California's Death Penalty Statute

Text: Defendant reiterates various constitutional challenges to California's death penalty law that we have repeatedly rejected. Defendant provides no persuasive reason why we should reexamine our prior decisions. California homicide law and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.... ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229].) Section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime, is neither impermissibly vague nor overbroad, and it does not result in an arbitrary and capricious penalty determination. ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545]; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 574 [26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182]; People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 439 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1].) The statute is not invalid for failing to require (1) written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors, (2) proof of all aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt, (3) findings that aggravation outweighs mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or (4) findings that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126.) Except regarding prior violent crimes and prior felony convictions under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c), the court need not instruct regarding a burden of proof, or instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase. ( People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1216 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130]; Carpenter, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 417-418.) The decisions in Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428] and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348] do not affect California's death penalty law. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642 [134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302].) Moreover, `[b]ecause the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative [citation], and therefore different in kind from the determination of guilt,' the federal Constitution does not require the prosecution to bear the burden of proof or burden of persuasion at the penalty phase. [Citations.] ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 317 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433] ( Sapp ).) There is no requirement that the trial court or this court engage in intercase proportionality review when examining a death verdict. ( Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 317.) Because capital defendants are not similarly situated to noncapital defendants, California's death penalty law does not violate equal protection by denying capital defendants certain procedural rights given to noncapital defendants. ( People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1242-1243 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1287 [232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].) Accordingly, the jury may consider unadjudicated offenses under section 190.3, factor (b), as aggravating factors without violating a defendant's rights to trial, confrontation, an impartial and unanimous jury, due process and a reliable penalty determination. ( Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 316; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 566 [127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931].) `International law does not prohibit a sentence of death rendered in accordance with state and federal constitutional and statutory requirements.' [Citation.] Defendant's claim that the death penalty is imposed regularly as a form of punishment in this state `is a variation on the familiar argument that California's death penalty law does not sufficiently narrow the class of death-eligible defendants to limit that class to the most serious offenders, a contention we have rejected in numerous decisions.' [Citations.] ( People v. Carey (2007) 41 Cal.4th 109, 135 [59 Cal.Rptr.3d 172, 158 P.3d 743].)