Opinion ID: 799604
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Advancement of Religion Factor

Text: The plaintiffs also contend that the Kosher Act has the primary effect of both promoting and inhibiting religion by taking sides in a religious matter. The plaintiffs' arguments on the advancement factor fail for many of the same reasons as their arguments on the excessive entanglement part of the Lemon test. The Kosher Act does not endorse a particular religious denomination or sect, but merely requires a seller of kosher products to label those products held out as kosher. Although the plaintiffs argue that the Kosher Act adopts and adheres to Orthodox requirements, unlike in Commack I, there is no preference by [the] government of one interpretation of sacred text over others. Commack I, 294 F.3d at 430. The labeling requirement may be similar to practices under Orthodox Judaism in that it requires all products sold as kosher to be labeled as such; [b]ut a statute primarily having a secular effect does not violate the Establishment Clause merely because it `happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 696, 109 S.Ct. 2136 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961)); see also McGowan, 366 U.S. at 444-45, 81 S.Ct. 1101 (noting that Sunday closing laws further the purpose of providing a uniform day of rest for citizens; the fact that Sunday is a date of particular significance to Christian sects does not bar the State from achieving its secular goals); Curran, 484 F.2d at 1349-50. Here, applying a label to a food product to inform consumers that the product has been deemed kosher by the seller or producer merely happens to coincide with Orthodox Jewish practice and does not evidence a specific endorsement or impairment of any religious practice or viewpoint. The plaintiffs also argue that, because of the inherently religious nature of the observance of kashrut, the State will be perceived as having chosen among the various existing religious views regarding the need for or appropriateness of kosher labeling. This argument too fails. In discussing the second prong of the Lemon test, the Supreme Court has warned that violation of the Establishment Clause can result from perception of endorsement. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief.... Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of N.Y., 650 F.3d 30, 40-41 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). New York, through the Kosher Act, has not explicitly adopted or endorsed one religion or religious group over another, nor has it encouraged particular religious activities. The neutral labeling requirement does not define kosher or any other religious terms and contrasts with prior situations in which this Court has found a perception of endorsement. See Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 839-40 (2d Cir.1991) (noting that the message communicated by direct government funding to foreign sectarian schools may offend the Establishment Clause); Parents' Ass'n of P.S. 16 v. Quinones, 803 F.2d 1235, 1241 (2d Cir.1986) (perception of endorsement when, inter alia, female Hasidic children were taught in classrooms that only they could use and non-Hasidic children could not use, Yiddish was spoken in those classrooms, and a partition was erected to physically separate the Hasidic girls from the remainder of the school population). Therefore, because the amended Kosher Act neither advances nor impedes religion, has a secular purpose, and does not create an excessive entanglement between state and religion, it does not violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.