Opinion ID: 74031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application to Constitutional Claims

Text: We turn now to one final matter. Under the guise of seeking to avoid what they describe as “serious constitutional questions,” the plaintiffs ask us, in effect, to rewrite section 1997e(e) by construing it not to apply to constitutional claims. The panel at least implicitly held that section 1997e(e) does apply to constitutional claims, see Harris, 190 F.3d at 1286, and for three reasons we agree. First, the “avoidance” canon of construction plaintiffs rely upon applies where there is ambiguous statutory language, see Southlake Property Associates, Ltd. v. City of Morrow, Georgia, 112 F.3d 1114, 1119 (11th Cir. 1997), and here there is none. Section 1997e(e) unequivocally states that “No Federal Civil Action may be brought ...,” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (emphasis added), and “no” means no. The 33 clear and broad statutory language does not permit us to except any type of claims, including constitutional claims. See Cassidy v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 199 F.3d 374, 376 (7th Cir. 2000) (rejecting the contention that section 1997e(e) does not apply to constitutional claims, and after quoting the first four words of the provision, explaining that “[i]n light of this plain language, we will not carve out exceptions for which Congress did not provide.”). Courts should not employ the canon of construction that ambiguous statutory language is to be construed to avoid constitutional questions as a pretext for rewriting clear statutory language. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 841, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3251 (1986) (“It is equally true, however, that this canon of construction does not give a court the prerogative to ignore the legislative will in order to avoid constitutional adjudication,” and a court “must not and will not carry this [canon] to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute or judicially rewriting it.”) (internal marks and citation omitted). Second, as we have already discussed, the legislative history of the PLRA clearly shows that its purpose is to substantially reduce the number of prisoner lawsuits. See supra, at 16 - 20. That purpose could never be attained if constitutional claims were not covered by the restrictive provisions, because the overwhelming majority of prison lawsuits raise one or more constitutional claims. 34 Construing section 1997e(e) to be inapplicable to constitutional claims would render it virtually meaningless. Third, the constitutional issues plaintiffs ask us to rewrite the statute to avoid were decided against them by the panel opinion in this case, see Harris, 190 F.3d at 1287-90, and we have reinstated that part of the opinion as the law of this circuit. See also Davis v. District of Columbia, 158 F.3d 1342, 1345-48 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting constitutional challenges to section 1997e(e)).