Opinion ID: 1920967
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Glen Sturgis (age 30):

Text: This defendant, along with another, broke into a home intending to burglarize it. While the defendant was inside, the victim returned home. The victim was kidnapped and ultimately shot by each of the intruders. A jury found Sturgis guilty of murder and other offenses. The same jury was elected by the defendant for sentencing and, after they failed to agree on an appropriate sentence, a life sentence was imposed. See Md.Code, Art. 27, § 413(k)(2) (1957). There was evidence of two aggravating circumstances: the victim was taken as a hostage and the murder was committed during the course of a robbery. The trial judge also reported that there was evidence that the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's death, and that the defendant was of youthful age at the time of the crime. Additionally, he had cooperated with the police and assisted in locating the body. An examination of the above cases persuades us that the sentence of death here is not the action of an aberrant jury. Trimble, supra, 300 Md. at 429, 478 A.2d at 1164. Of the eight cases considered in the inventory, four defendants received a life sentence, one of which was as a result of the jury not being able to agree on an appropriate sentence. The remaining defendants received the death penalty. A comparison of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances found indicates to us that in those cases where the sentence was life, generally the sentencing body found more mitigating circumstances than were found in the instant case. This was precisely the case in Mayers' sentencing proceeding, where the sentencing judge found three mitigating factors. At Johnson's proceeding, only one mitigating factor was deemed to exist. The finding of different factors justified the particular sentence in each case; it also convinces us that the sentence received by Johnson was not aberrant. Consequently, having fulfilled our mandated proportionality review function, we hold that the death sentence imposed on the defendant was neither excessive nor disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases in Maryland, considering both the crime and the defendant.
Finally, we are urged to reconsider our decisions in previous death penalty cases such as Colvin, Calhoun, Johnson and Tichnell, all supra, where we upheld the constitutionality of the Maryland death penalty statute. We decline to do so. JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. ELDRIDGE, Judge, concurring: I concur in the judgment affirming the murder conviction and death sentence in this case. I do not agree, however, with the majority's reasoning in Part I of the opinion. Part I of the opinion addresses the first issue raised by Johnson. He challenges the trial court's denial of his pretrial motion requesting that defense witnesses be permitted to testify regarding Johnson's diminished capacity to commit first degree murder. The majority upholds the trial court's ruling by citing Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984), and Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 439 A.2d 542 (1982), which held that evidence of a criminal defendant's mental capability, which tends to negate his ability to form the requisite specific intent, is inadmissible during the guilt or innocence phase of a criminal trial. I continue to adhere to the view, expressed by Judge Cole, Judge Davidson and myself in Johnson, 292 Md. at 446-456, 439 A.2d 542, and in Stebbing, 299 Md. at 380-381, 390, 473 A.2d 903, that such evidence is admissible. In the present case, the record reflects that Johnson's attorney made a pre-trial motion requesting that he be allowed to present testimony from doctors on the question of diminished capacity as it relates to the elements of first degree murder. Counsel merely cited the dissenting opinion in Johnson, supra, 292 Md. at 444, 439 A.2d 542. The trial court, after consideration, denied the motion. Johnson neither renewed his motion at trial, nor made at any time a proffer as to the substance of the testimony which he desired to offer. The record does show, however, that expert testimony was elicited from defense witnesses on direct examination, and from the State's witnesses on cross examination, concerning all aspects of Johnson's mental and emotional state. No relevant evidence relating to his mental capability to form the requisite intent was either objected to or precluded from being admitted. Preliminarily, there is a question as to whether a mere pre-trial motion, with nothing more, would under the circumstances here preserve the point for appeal. Cf., Luce v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 460, 83 L.Ed.2d 443 (1984); Funkhouser v. State, 51 Md. App. 16, 440 A.2d 1114, cert. denied, 293 Md. 331 (1982); Ory v. Libersky, 40 Md. App. 151, 389 A.2d 922, cert. denied, 283 Md. 737 (1978). Nevertheless, assuming that the issue can be preserved by a pre-trial motion, it is settled that whenever one is complaining about a trial court's refusal to admit certain testimony, it is necessary that there be a proffer of what the evidence would have been. Mack v. State, 300 Md. 583, 603, 479 A.2d 1344 (1984); Hooten v. Kenneth B. Mumaw P. & H. Co., 271 Md. 565, 571, 318 A.2d 514 (1974); Keys v. Keys, 251 Md. 247, 250, 247 A.2d 282 (1968). In the present case, at no time either during the making of the pre-trial motion or at trial did Johnson make any proffer, or make any showing on the record, of the nature of the actual testimony which he desired to introduce. Finally, as previously mentioned, whatever evidence which Johnson may have wished to offer regarding his mental condition appears to have been elicited, without objection or exclusion, during the guilt or innocence phase of the trial. For the above reasons, I believe that there is no merit to the first issue raised by Johnson. Judge Cole has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.