Opinion ID: 1774411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: History of LSA-R.S. 14:143

Text: The problem this statute is designed to address arises as a consequence of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 90 S.Ct. 1184, 25 L.Ed.2d 435 (1970). In Waller, the Court held that for double jeopardy purposes, a municipality and a state constitute the same sovereign, and therefore a conviction or acquittal entered as a result of the violation of a municipal ordinance bars a later prosecution by a state's attorney under a state statute proscribing the same offense. The difficulties that Waller created for those state jurisdictions, like Louisiana, which allow different tiers of government to define and prosecute criminal violations was well-stated by the California Supreme Court in Kellett v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 63 Cal.2d 822, 48 Cal.Rptr. 366, 409 P.2d 206, 209 (1966) ( In Bank ): We recognize that in many places felonies and misdemeanors are usually prosecuted by different public law offices and that there is a risk that those in charge of misdemeanor prosecutions may proceed without adequately assessing the seriousness of a defendant's conduct or considering whether a felony prosecution should be undertaken. When the responsibility for the prosecution for the higher offense lies with a different public law office there is also the risk that a well advised defendant may plead guilty to a misdemeanor to foreclose a subsequent felony prosecution the misdemeanor prosecutor may be unaware of or may choose to ignore. Cases may also arise in which the district attorney is reasonably unaware of the felonies when the misdemeanors are prosecuted. In such situations ... a defendant guilty of a felony may escape proper punishment. Compare Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980); People v. Stefan, 146 Ill.2d 324, 166 Ill.Dec. 910, 586 N.E.2d 1239 (1992); People v. Morgan, 785 P.2d 1294 (Col.1990) ( En Banc ); State v. Weide, 775 S.W.2d 255 (Mo.App.1989). This Court first confronted in State v. Suire, 319 So.2d 347 (La.1975), the dilemma presented by a subsequent state prosecution of an offense for which a municipality had already obtained a conviction. In Suire, the defendant was convicted in the Mayor's Court of Lake Arthur for the municipal offenses of disturbing the peace and aggravated battery. When the local district attorney later prosecuted Suire under the state aggravated battery statute, LSA-R.S. 14:34, Suire filed a motion to quash the prosecution on double jeopardy grounds. The district court granted the motion and quashed the prosecution, and the State appealed. The basis of the State's appeal was that the mayor's court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because Lake Arthur's ordinance penalizing aggravated battery, a state felony offense, was inconsistent with ... state law and therefore preempted. Suire, supra, 319 So.2d at 349. See also LSA-C.Cr.P. Art. 595(1). [4] A unanimous Court rejected the State's argument, finding that the ordinance was a legitimate exercise of the Parish's delegated police power and that it was not inconsistent with or in conflict with any state statutes. Id, at 350. The Court specifically noted that, given the absence of any contrary legislative expression, it is immaterial that the same conduct is punished by both state and municipality in the concurrent exercise of police power. Id. Justice Tate, the author of the Court's opinion, also authored a special concurrence. In his concurrence Justice Tate stressed that the Court had declined to decide whether Article VI, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 [5] was intended to exempt from local regulation any conduct which the state legislation punishes as a felony. Suire, supra, 319 So.2d at 351 ( Tate, J., concurring ). In addition, Justice Tate speculated that the legislature might soon enact clarifying legislation, and that if such legislation were to statutorily deny local governments the power to enact police regulations punishing conduct which the state punishes as a felony there would be no need to reach the underlying constitutional question. Id. Justice Tate concluded by reiterating the need for legislative attention to the problem of concurrent state and local police regulation under the 1974 Constitution. Id. Despite Justice Tate's entreaties, no legislative action was immediately forthcoming, and six years later this Court revisited the issue in State v. Foy, 401 So.2d 948 (La.1981). In Foy, the defendants pleaded guilty in the Mayor's Court of Tallulah to the violation of a city ordinance defining the crime of burglary and specifying it as a misdemeanor. Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 949. The local district attorney later prosecuted the defendants in district court under the State felony burglary statute, LSA-R.S. 14:62. Id. The district court quashed the State prosecution on double jeopardy grounds, and the State appealed. Id. As in Suire, the basis of the State's appeal was that the mayor's court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense, and that therefore jeopardy had never attached in the initial prosecution. Foy, 401 So.2d at 949. See Note 4, supra. The Court in Foy began by noting that LSA-R.S. 33:441 granted the mayor's court jurisdiction over all violations of municipal ordinances. Id. The Court then found that under Suire the State had no standing to challenge any constitutional infirmity in the statute establishing the jurisdiction of the mayor's court, and therefore affirmed the district court's judgment. [6] Id., at 950. Justice Dennis, although concurring in the majority's decision in the case, wrote separately to address the State's argument that Article VI, § 9(A)(1) of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, see Note 5, supra, in and of itself preempted the city court's subject matter jurisdiction. [7] After pursuing an extensive examination of the transcripts of the constitutional convention debates dealing with Article VI, § 9(A)(1), Justice Dennis concluded that the constitutional intent was merely to limit the power of municipalities to the imposition of punishment without hard labor for a violation of a municipal regulation and not to also limit what conduct those regulations might address. Foy, supra, 401 So.2d at 951 ( on rehearing ) ( Dennis, J., concurring ). However, Justice Dennis, hearkening back to the sentiments expressed in Justice Tate's special concurrence in Suire, also remarked that the abuses referred to in the state's application for rehearing and oral argument on rehearing indicate a possible need for legislative attention to the problem of concurrent state and local jurisdiction of criminal prosecutions based on felonious conduct. Id., at 951. In 1983, the legislature responded to the suggestions of Justice Tate in Suire and Justice Dennis in Foy with LSA-R.S. 14:143. 1983 La.Acts, No. 531, § 1. The minutes of the House committee which considered it reveal that the statute is designed to alleviate a person pleading guilty to a municipal offense of something like burglary and then it is impossible for the district attorney to prosecute as a state offense (which is a felony). Committee Meeting Minutes, House Comm. on Admin. of Criminal Justice, House Bill No. 275, Pp. 4-5 (April 21, 1983). The factual scenario discussed in committee was identical to that in Foy, indicating a legislative awareness of this Court's decision in Foy and a legislative desire to resolve the concurrent jurisdiction problem in the favor of the State. [8] In construing LSA-R.S. 14:143, therefore, we must examine the terminology employed in the statute in light of its purpose as revealed by this history. That purpose is to prevent local governments from passing criminal ordinances defining as a misdemeanor the same offense (as that term is understood in the double jeopardy context) proscribed by a State felony statute.