Opinion ID: 2499737
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: This case is controlled by our precedent in Webb.

Text: Mickelsen's appeal primarily relies on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 364 as establishing Wendy's duty of care. We have not previously recognized the section 364 standard as controlling and no Alaska case has previously cited it. It is unnecessary for us to adopt the Restatement in this case because our decision in Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka [36] provides controlling precedent. Where existing Alaska case law provides adequate grounds for deciding an issue, judicial economy argues in favor of relying on those grounds rather than adopting a new rule in order to reach the same result. Webb established that [a] landowner or owner of other property must act as a reasonable person in maintaining his property in a reasonably safe condition in view of all of the circumstances, including the likelihood of injury to others, the seriousness of the injury, and the burden on the respective parties of avoiding the risk. [37] According to Mickelsen's complaint, [t]he use of the 5th Avenue exit as a short-cut entry ... is a[n] ... artificial condition that posed an unreasonable risk of harm to west-bound traffic on 5th Avenue, and Wendy's failed to take action to make this dangerous condition safe. As a result of Wendy's alleged creation of this short-cut entry route and its alleged failure to take reasonable steps to prevent the use of that route, Wendy's customers regularly drove across two lanes of oncoming traffic in order to reach the restaurant. In terms of the Webb factors, the alleged dangerous condition was likely to result in traffic accidents and resulting injury; a collision between a customer's vehicle and oncoming traffic was likely to be gravely serious; and Wendy's was in a much stronger position to bear the burden of avoiding the risk than drivers in the west-bound lanes such as Mickelsen. Such drivers were effectively powerless to prevent third parties such as Hayward from taking the short-cut. Wendy's, if nothing else, might have altered the design of the Fifth Avenue exit or posted more effective warnings. Whether Wendy's failure to take such steps was unreasonable, and whether it breached its duty, are not questions before us at this stage of the case. In sum, Wendy's had a duty under Webb to maintain its property in a reasonably safe manner in view of all relevant circumstances. This duty applied to those entering and exiting Wendy's and to those who might be affected by those entering and exiting Wendy's, pedestrian or otherwise. [38] It may yet be proper for the superior court to dismiss Mickelsen's claim on summary judgment, or it may be that the case must go to trial. But Mickelsen's claim cannot be dismissed as a matter of law based on Wendy's owing no duty of care to passing motorists allegedly endangered by the artificial conditions on Wendy's property. [39] Finally, having concluded that Webb provides controlling precedent in the present case, it is unnecessary for us to determine whether the public policy factors enumerated in D.S.W. v. Fairbanks North Star Borough School District [40] support the imposition of a duty of care.