Opinion ID: 2425406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jurisdiction Over The Damages Claims

Text: We have appellate jurisdiction over non-final orders of the district courts' granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). A prior panel concluded that appellate jurisdiction should be exercised over appellants' injunctive claims because the district court's denial of that relief might have serious, perhaps irreparable consequence and can be effectually challenged only by direct appeal prior to the entry of final judgment. See Amador, No. 08-2079-pr (2d Cir. June 25, 2008) (quoting Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465, 467 (2d Cir.2007)). Appellants ask that we exercise pendent jurisdiction to review the interlocutory orders dismissing some of their individual claims for damages. They argue that our review of the district court decision dismissing the injunctive claims entails resolution of the same issue as the dismissed damages claims: whether appellants satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion requirements. See, e.g., Lamar Adver. of Pa., LLC v. Town of Orchard Park, 356 F.3d 365, 371-72 (2d Cir.2004); Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Celanese AG, 430 F.3d 567, 576 (2d Cir.2005). [W]here our jurisdiction is properly founded upon the district court's ruling on a preliminary injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), our review extends to all matters inextricably bound up with the preliminary injunction. Lamar Adver. of Pa., LLC, 356 F.3d at 371 (internal quotations omitted and modifications incorporated). Section 1292(a)(1), however, provides only a narrowly tailored exception to the final judgment rule and its policy against piecemeal appellate review. Cuomo v. Barr, 7 F.3d 17, 19 (2d Cir.1993). To be inextricably intertwined requires, for example, that review of the otherwise unappealable issue is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the appealable one. Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264, 273 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). No such necessity exists here. Although prisoners seeking injunctive relief and those seeking damages are each required by the PLRA to exhaust internal grievance procedures, see generally Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001), the overlap in legal issues is at a very high level of generality. A resolution of the dispute over exhaustion of the damages claims would not necessarily overlap with the resolution concerning exhaustion with regard to injunctive relief. There is, therefore, an insufficient basis for us to justify the application of an exception to an exception, i.e., the exercise of jurisdiction over claims pendent to a claim reviewable only as an exception to the final order rule. Under these circumstances, a measure of self-restraint is desirable, particularly because appellants' proffered justification for pendent jurisdiction does not distinguish them from most litigants seeking both injunctive relief and damages.