Opinion ID: 174796
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Irrational Fear as a Substantial and Unreasonable Interference

Text: Under Colorado law, a plaintiff asserting a nuisance claim must establish an interference with the use and enjoyment of his property that is both substantial and unreasonable. [20] Public Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377, 391 (Colo.2001). The district court instructed the jury that Plaintiffs could meet their burden of establishing an interference with the use and enjoyment of their properties if they proved plutonium contamination from the activities at Rocky Flats exposed them to either some increased risk of health problems or a demonstrable risk of future harm. We agree with the district court that a jury may find the presence of radioactive contamination creates an actual risk to health and thereby interferes with a plaintiff's use or enjoyment of his land if the contamination disturbs the plaintiff's comfort and convenience, including his peace of mind, with respect to his continued use of the land. See Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 273 F.Supp.2d 1175, 1203-04 (D.Colo.2003). But that is not the end of the inquiry. Any interference with a plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property must be both substantial and unreasonable. Under Colorado law, an interference is deemed substantial if it would have been offensive or caused inconvenience or annoyance to a reasonable person in the community. Saint John's Church in Wilderness v. Scott, 194 P.3d 475, 479 (Colo.App.2008). In determining whether an interference is unreasonable, the jury must weigh the gravity of the harm and the utility of the conduct causing that harm. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d at 391. The jury was properly instructed on the elements of a nuisance claim as well as the definitions of substantial and unreasonable. While the resolution of these issues typically involves questions of fact, a scientifically unfounded risk cannot rise to the level of an unreasonable and substantial interference. To the extent Plaintiffs rely on anxiety from an increased risk to their health as an interference with the use and enjoyment of their properties, that anxiety must arise from scientifically verifiable evidence regarding the risk and cannot be wholly irrational. The district court concluded otherwise in light of its review of Restatement (Second) of Torts § 821F, cmt. f, which states: In determining whether the harm would be suffered by a normal member of the community, fears and other mental reactions common to the community are to be taken into account, even though they may be without scientific foundation or other support in fact. Thus the presence of a leprosy sanatarium in the vicinity of a group of private residences may seriously interfere with the use and enjoyment of land because of the normal fear that it creates of possible contagion, even though leprosy is in fact so rarely transmitted through normal contacts that there is no practical possibility of communication of the disease. This court previously cast doubt on whether Colorado would follow this rule, given the potential for anachronistic results. Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 832 n. 13 (10th Cir.1995). Instead, we suggested in Boughton that Colorado courts would require[] some evidence to substantiate the fears. Id. Otherwise, a plaintiff could state a viable nuisance claim any time neighboring property owners contracted a misunderstood disease, whether contagious or not. Such a result would be absurd. Plaintiffs are unable to point to any Colorado case in the fifteen years since Boughton that has endorsed the Restatement's position. More importantly, the Restatement conflicts with Colorado's unreasonableness requirement, which expressly requires the trier of fact to weigh the gravity of the harm and the utility of the conduct causing that harm. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d at 391. No reasonable jury could find that irrational anxiety about a risk that cannot be scientifically verified tips this balance so as to render the interference unreasonable. Accordingly, we now confirm what we previously suggested in Boughton and predict that the Colorado Supreme Court would not permit recovery premised on a finding that an interference, in the form of anxiety or fear of health risks, is substantial and unreasonable unless that anxiety is supported by some scientific evidence. The district court erred in concluding otherwise.