Opinion ID: 2384358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is the other crimes evidence relevant for some purpose other than to prove the criminal disposition of the accused?

Text: During the trial court's hearing on appellant's motion in limine to exclude the testimony of T.C., the prosecutor argued that this evidence was relevant to prove a common plan or scheme. The judge agreed and overruled the motion. In Pendleton, supra at 552, this Court recognized within the category of common plan or scheme, the admissibility of evidence tending to show a pattern of conduct. See also, supra, n. 3. Since then, this Court has devised a test for determining when uncharged acts are relevant to prove a pattern of conduct. When pattern of conduct is the purpose for which evidence is sought to be introduced, the real question is whether the method of the commission of the other crime or crimes is so similar and so unique as to indicate a reasonable probability that the crimes were committed by the same person. Adcock v. Commonwealth, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 440, 443 (1986). Are the similarities between the uncharged crime against T.C. and the November 1989 sodomy for which appellant was tried, so similar and so unique as to meet the Adcock test? They each claim that appellant committed acts of oral sodomy against them. T.C. testified that on the one occasion involving him, appellant said, I will play with you. A.C. testified that on one occasion appellant asked him to play a game. On this similarity, however, the strength of what might be argued is a unique use of language by appellant (i.e., play), is diminished by A.C.'s testimony that no sexual activity took place that day, and that he just figured [appellant] was trying it again. A.C. also stated that appellant had never used the terminology play, before or since that time. What are the dissimilarities? The uncharged conduct alleged by T.C. involves a single occasion on which two acts of oral sodomy took place. This occurred on a camping trip in Lincoln County. A.C. testified to repeated episodes of oral and anal sodomy, all of which occurred inside appellant's home. It was T.C.'s testimony that appellant used alcohol to make him dizzy before approaching him. A.C. testified that appellant never gave alcohol to him. The sodomy alleged by T.C. occurred in October 1991, two years after A.C. alleged abuse. A.C. testified that he was scared of appellant, because appellant told him don't tell nobody. According to T.C., appellant did not admonish him not to tell anyone; but rather, told T.C. if he ever wanted to do it again, to let him know. In sum, the trial record with regard to these separate occurrences demonstrates dissimilarity with respect to the acts, the number of acts, the time, the approach, and the place. These differences convince us that evidence of appellant's alleged crime against T.C., when compared with evidence of appellant's conduct against A.C., fail to establish the striking similarity that in itself would identify appellant as the perpetrator of the acts in question. Lantrip at 816. In this crucial regard, this case is not like Anastasi v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 860 (1988), where the details of the uncharged conduct evidenced a striking similarity indicative of modus operandi relevant to the crime charged in the indictment. The upshot of this inquiry into relevance must weigh in favor of excluding T.C.'s testimony alleging uncharged crimes. B. Probativeness