Opinion ID: 321107
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to submit entrapment issue to jury

Text: 37 On the basis of the evidence presented, the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the issue of entrapment to the jury. 38 Entrapment is a relatively limited defense, not ordinarily constitutional in nature. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366. It consists of two parts: (1) the defendant is induced by government agents to commit the particular acts charged, and (2) the defendant is not predisposed to commit the prohibited acts at any propitious opportunity. United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9 Cir. 1973). 39 When a material question of fact on the issue of entrapment has been presented, the court must submit the issue to the jury. However, whether the elements of the defense have become an issue of fact for the jury is to be determined by the trial judge. Notaro v. United States, 363 F.2d 169, 175 (9 Cir. 1966); United States v. Glassel, 488 F.2d 143, 146 (9 Cir. 1973). 40 Although there is no rigid formula for determining when sufficient evidence has been presented to create a question of fact for the jury on the issue of entrapment, the court in United States v. Christopher, 488 F.2d 849 (9 Cir. 1973), enunciated some guidelines which we find useful in the case at bar. 41 In Christopher, we said that 'The slight testimony which we have held allows the issue of entrapment to go to the jury must still constitute some evidence of inducement or persuasion by the Government.' Id. at 850-851. Further, the court specifically repudiated statements in Notaro, supra, to the effect that any assistance by a government agent in the commission of the crime was sufficient to present the issue of entrapment. 42 The court noted that 'Despite the broad language of the Notaro footnote, the evidence of government intervention which requires a jury instruction on entrapment must tend to show that the crime may have been induced by the Government.' Id. at 851, fn. 1; accord, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366. 43 In Glassel, supra, the court found that the trial judge had a duty to rule on the issue of entrapment because the defendant's actions indisputably demonstrated his predisposition to commit the crime. 44 We have the same situation here. The record indisputably shows that Payseur was predisposed to commit the crime and the court therefore had a duty to rule on the issue of entrapment as a matter of law. Fisher's reference to Payseur as his 'fly boy' implies Payseur's regular participation in Fisher's previous smuggling operations. Payseur's interaction with the other members of the conspiracy reinforces the notion that he was a veteran. He showed no reluctance to commit the crime. Quite to the contrary, he displayed a degree of enthusiasm, expressing confidence in his ability to land an airplane in a tight spot, affirmatively approving certain plans made by Fisher, and even suggesting additional plans himself. The entrapment defense is available to 'unwary innocents' but not 'unwary criminals' like Payseur. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958). 45