Opinion ID: 388063
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellants' Irrebuttable Presumption Claim

Text: 26 Although indicating that the extremely narrow view of Johnson taken by the Fifth Circuit in Anderson is not acceptable, Ralpho does not dispose of the issue before us. This court has never decided whether Congress intended by section 211(a) to insulate the VA's procedural policies from constitutional review. See Langston v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 915, 916-17 (D.C.Cir.1973). 27 As did the court in Langston, we perceive no reason to resolve this issue in this case. Constitutional questions are not to be decided on hypothetical bases, see Langston, 478 F.2d at 917, and appellants have not supported their complaint that the birth by another presumption is irrebuttable. Rather, the essence of appellants' argument is that there was insufficient evidence to justify the Administrator's conclusion that the separations were attributable in part to the fault of the widows, who therefore did not qualify as surviving spouses under the Act. 28 Guidelines contained in the VA's manual are admittedly binding on the Administration's adjudication officers, who make initial determinations regarding claims for death pension benefits. The birth by another rule does, therefore, create an evidentiary presumption of fault at the first levels of decisionmaking. Accordingly, the adjudication officers in the Carter and Middleton cases referred to the rule as controlling. See App. at 58, 73. The Board of Veterans' Appeals is not required, however, to follow the dictates of such guidelines. See 38 U.S.C. § 4004(c) (1976) (Board is bound only by regulations of the VA, instructions of the Administrator, and precedent opinions of the chief law officer). Under the statutory provision and regulations relevant here, the Board has the responsibility for determining whether, under the facts of the particular case, the spouse intended to abandon the marital relationship or was in any way responsible for continuation of a separation that was initially the fault of the veteran. Claimants are entitled to a hearing before the Board, see 38 U.S.C. § 4004(a) (1976), at which they may present evidence that the separation was in no respect their fault. 29 Appellants were afforded such hearings here, at which they both testified. With respect to Carter, the Board found that the facts in this case do not support a finding that the appellant was without fault in the separation from the veteran. App. at 66. Although conceding that the separation was due initially to the misconduct of the veteran, the Board concluded that Carter's 30 later actions in that she had children by another man would have constituted a stumbling block to any possible reconciliation with the veteran and the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn from her actions is that she had little or no interest in resuming her marital relationship with the veteran. 31 Id. Similarly, in Middleton's case, the Board reasoned that the widow's giving birth to children by another man was inconsistant (sic) with her marital vows and with a posture of holding herself ready, willing and available to resume a husband and wife relationship with the veteran. App. at 82. 32 The Board's opinions, though far from detailed, indicate that in these cases the Board considered birth by another as determinative of appellants' intentions to terminate their marital relationships. We are unable to infer, however, that birth by another will be conclusive in all cases. As did the court in National Ass'n of Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, 489 F.2d 1268, 1270 n. (D.C.Cir.1974), we note that the agency's brief indicates that the guideline is only a tentative interpretation that does not foreclose individual challenges either to the validity of the rule in general or to its application in specific cases. We accept the Administrator's explanation that birth by another does not operate as an irrebuttable presumption, but that in these particular cases the Board was unconvinced by appellants' attempts to prove absence of fault. 5 33 We wish to emphasize, however, that this finding is not made without reservations. The Board's opinions are ambiguous with respect to the weight given the birth by another rule, and it seems to have come close to abdicating its responsibility to make case-by-case determinations of surviving spouses' entitlements to benefits. Obviously, the Administrator is correct in considering birth by another as probative of fault and of an intent to terminate a marriage. But appellants are also right in arguing that it is only some proof and that other evidence may be relevant to determining fault in individual cases, evidence which the Board is bound to consider. We assume that under some circumstances a widow could demonstrate that her having a child by another man was not indicative of her unwillingness to resume her marital relationship. We also trust that the Board would accept such a showing in appropriate cases. 6 34 Because the birth by another presumption is not irrebuttable, appellants' constitutional challenge is merely a claim that the evidence did not support the Board's finding that the widows were at fault. Appellants can dispute the Board's interpretation of the facts of the cases, but this court is foreclosed by section 211(a) from reviewing such sufficiency of the evidence questions. We therefore find that the court below erred in reaching the merits of appellants' constitutional claims. 35