Opinion ID: 883222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Misuse Defense

Text: Did the District Court err by submitting the affirmative defense of misuse to the jury? In 1987, the Montana Legislature enacted § 27-1-719, MCA, which established misuse as an affirmative defense in products liability cases. The statute provides that the defense may be asserted if [t]he product was unreasonably misused by the user or consumer and such misuse caused or contributed to the injury. Section 27-1-719(5)(b), MCA. According to National Crane, two types of product misuse exist: 1) use for an improper purpose, such as using a glass bottle for a hammer; or 2) use in an improper manner, such as using a forklift on steep, rather than level, terrain. See Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh (Ariz. 1982), 641 P.2d 258, 262-63; Simpson v. Standard Container Co. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987), 527 A.2d 1337, 1341; see also Harper, James, Jr., and Gray (2d Ed. 1986), The Law of Torts § 26.8 at 364-69. National Crane argues that Lutz used the crane in an improper manner by sideloading, or dragging the load, from beneath the power lines. The 13-foot, 9-inch distance between the tip of the boom and the power line, National Crane asserts, provides uncontroverted proof that Lutz was sideloading. If the load had been directly beneath the boom's tip when the pick began and the cable became taut, then the cable would not have contacted the power line. Comparing the relative positions of the boom tip and the power line with the fact that the cable contacted the power line, National Crane argues, leads to one conclusion: Lutz's misuse of the crane (sideloading) was the sole cause of the accident. The District Court prevented National Crane from introducing certain evidence in support of its misuse defense. For instance, the court restricted opinion testimony by Tom Jones, a Montana Department of Labor employee. National Crane attempted to elicit opinion testimony from Jones  who was not disclosed as an expert  as to misuse, or sideloading, of the crane. Accordingly, the court limited Jones' testimony to include only matters within his personal knowledge. The admission of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Mayes (1992), 251 Mont. 358, 373, 825 P.2d 1196, 1205. The District Court's rulings on evidence offered in support of the defense of misuse were correct; the court did not abuse its discretion. According to National Crane, a manufacturer is not responsible for injuries resulting from abnormal or unintended use of his product if such use was not reasonably foreseeable. Trust Corp. of Mont. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. (D. Mont. 1981), 506 F. Supp. 1093, 1097 (citing 1 Frumer and Friedman, Products Liability, § 15:01). Moreover, National Crane contends, foreseeability includes only what is objectively reasonable to expect, not everything that could conceivably occur. Winnett v. Winnett (Ill. 1974), 310 N.E.2d 1, 5-6. National Crane suggests that sideloading a crane is an abnormal, rather than foreseeable, misuse. Lori argues that Lutz's conduct did not amount to unreasonable, unforeseeable misuse. Rather, according to Lori, the evidence indicates that the crane was being used for its intended purpose: to lift large, heavy drilling pipes and place them on a flat-bed trailer. Lori contends that no evidence exists  either admitted or excluded  that the crane was intentionally misused by sideloading. To the contrary, Lori argues that Lees and Lutz knew the power lines were live and potentially dangerous. Lori further contends the evidence establishes that Lutz and Lees took careful steps to avoid sideloading: Lees situated the crane alongside the road, perpendicular to the power lines, and positioned the crane's boom so that the cable would fall 12 feet short of the power lines; Lees and Lutz selected the pipes which they thought could safely be removed without chancing contact with the power lines; they delineated safe from unsafe pick areas with a two-by-four board; they called in a wrecker to drag pipes which they believed could not safely be removed; and Lutz only hooked up those pipes which he and Lees had selected for removal. At most, Lori argues, the evidence shows ordinary negligence through misperception. The record indicates that Lees or Lutz inadvertently misperceived the distance between the crane cable and the power line. The difficulty of judging the distance to power lines was borne out in eye-witness accounts, scientific articles on visual perception, and expert testimony. Visual misperception of power lines, Lori asserts, may not rise even to the level of contributory negligence, let alone misuse. See Burke v. Illinois Power Co. (Ill. App. 1978), 373 N.E.2d 1354, 1364. Lori contends that while unreasonable misuse is a recognized defense in Montana under § 27-1-719(5)(b), MCA, reasonably foreseeable misuse is not recognized as a defense. See Kuiper v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. (1983), 207 Mont. 37, 63, 673 P.2d 1208, 1222; Trust Corp. of Mont., 506 F. Supp. at 1097. According to Lori, an insulated link, which is readily available, should have been incorporated into the crane's design. These links are the seat belt or air bag of the crane industry. Lori contends that because more than 2,000 people are maimed or injured by crane/power line electrocutions every year, the danger has long been known, and should be eminently foreseeable to the manufacturer. In light of that eminent foreseeability, Lori urges this Court to determine, as a matter of law, that the affirmative defense of misuse should never have been submitted to the jury. In deciding whether the defense of misuse should have been submitted to the jury, we turn to our recent decision in Hart-Albin Company v. McLees (1994), 264 Mont. 1, 870 P.2d 51. In Hart-Albin, when ruling on the term unreasonably misused as set forth in § 27-1-719(5)(b), MCA, this Court stated: [A] manufacturer is not responsible for injuries resulting from abnormal or unintended use of a product if such use was not reasonably foreseeable. Generally, the defense of misuse refers to a use not foreseen by the manufacturer of the product. Most cases have indicated that the key issue involved in a determination whether a product has been misused is foreseeability. The definition of misuse, then, incorporates the concept of abnormal or unintended use, but emphasizes unforeseeability. The defense of misuse is not available if the misuse of the product was reasonably foreseeable. 870 P.2d at 53-54 (citations omitted). In Hart-Albin, respondent Leviton manufactured an electrical extension cord connector which overheated and started a fire that caused extensive damage to a Hart-Albin department store in Billings. Among other things, the jury found that Hart-Albin misused the cord connector and that the misuse was a proximate cause of the damages. In responding to a written interrogatory concerning misassembly or foreseeable misuse of the cord connector, Leviton agreed that the connector could be abused or misassembled. During trial, a Leviton representative stated that he was aware that it was possible to misassemble the cord connector. In reversing on the misuse issue, this Court concluded that Leviton admitted it was foreseeable that the Catalog No. 67 cord connector could be misused through misassembly. Hart-Albin, 870 P.2d at 54. In applying the misuse defense of § 27-1-719(5)(b), MCA, to the facts of this case it is necessary to understand what the phrase  un reasonable misuse means in the context of the statute. In using the term unreasonable misuse, the plain language of the statute requires that if a misuse is reasonable, then the defense is not available. Our statute clearly contemplates that manufacturers must expect, or, stated another way, must reasonably foresee, that their products will not always be used in precisely the manner for which they were designed or constructed  hence, the Legislature's use of the phrase  un reasonable misuse. In the instant case, there is really no factual disagreement that cranes are often operated in close proximity to live electrical lines and that, as the evidence here indicates, sideloading is a not an uncommon, albeit improper, practice of crane operators and groundcrews. Were that not the case, insulated links would not be as readily available and as commonly used as they are and there would not be the high number of deaths and injuries from crane/power line contacts that there are. Clearly, if, as here, the manufacturer expects or, stated another way, reasonably foresees, that its product is or will be subject to misuse in a certain fashion, then the fact that the user of the product actually does use  or, in the words of the statute, misuse  the product in that fashion can hardly be said to be unreasonable. In short, reasonably foreseeable misuse is reasonable misuse. Furthermore, if the manufacturer reasonably foresees that its product can be misused in a certain fashion  i.e., that the offending misuse is reasonable  then the manufacturer does not have the benefit of a defense which exonerates or mitigates its breach of duty and its wrongful conduct in failing to design out or guard against the defect. To hold otherwise simply shifts the consequences of the manufacturer's breach of duty to the innocent, or perhaps, even negligent, user and, in violation of the statute, injects contributory negligence into the law of strict liability. While reasonableness is generally a question of fact to be determined by the jury, see Dean v. Austin Mutual Ins. Co. (1994), 263 Mont. 386, 869 P.2d 256, 258, where, as in Hart-Albin and here, the party asserting the unreasonable misuse defense acknowledges the foreseeability of the misuse, then, as a matter of law, it is improper for the district court to submit that issue for determination to the trier of fact. National Crane admits that the cranes which it manufactures can be misused through sideloading. National Crane also knows that if sideloading occurs in the vicinity of power lines, the possibility exists that its crane cables might contact power lines. It is undisputed that a crane/power line contact was foreseeable to National Crane. In fact, the record establishes that there are 2,300 crane/power line contacts in the United States each year and crane/power line electrocutions are the fifth leading cause of work-related deaths in the United States. It being admitted that the alleged misuse of the crane through sideloading was reasonably foreseeable to National Crane, we hold that, as a matter of law, the affirmative defense of unreasonable misuse is unavailable to National Crane. Therefore, we need not review whether the District Court correctly instructed the jury on misuse.