Opinion ID: 2057494
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: California v. Green

Text: The parties agree that the key issue in the confrontation clause challenge to the Illinois statute is whether the confrontation clause guarantees an accused the right to contemporaneous cross-examination. The State, relying on California v. Green (1970), 399 U.S. 149, 26 L.Ed.2d 489, 90 S.Ct. 1930, contends that contemporaneous cross-examination is not constitutionally required. Before turning to a discussion of Green, we think it appropriate to identify the nature of the videotaped testimony authorized by our statute. Although the legislature appears not to have recognized it as such, the videotape is pure hearsay, since it is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. See Note, The Testimony of Child Victims, 98 Harv. L. Rev. at 813 (noting that the texts of videotape statutes enacted by various States reveal little recognition that videotaped statements are hearsay); see also Long v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), 742 S.W.2d 302, 328 (Teague, J., concurring) (accurately characterizing videotape made pursuant to statute as an out-of-court hearsay videotape interview). Our research reveals no exception to the rule against hearsay recognized by Illinois which would allow the introduction of such hearsay. Similarly, the videotape apparently would not be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. (See Fed. R. Evid. 803 (providing for exceptions to the rule against hearsay even though the declarant is available to testify).) Our legislature, of course, is free to enact exceptions to the hearsay rule, and our only concern is whether such an exception comports with constitutional guarantees. The Supreme Court has made clear that the scope of the confrontation clause is not coextensive with the rules of hearsay and their exceptions. The violation of a long-established hearsay rule does not necessarily mean a constitutional right has been violated, nor does the admission of a statement under an exception preclude a finding of unconstitutionality. ( Green, 399 U.S. at 156, 26 L.Ed.2d at 495-96, 90 S.Ct. at 1934.) However, hearsay rules and the confrontation clause protect similar values. Thus the modification of a State's hearsay rules to create new exceptions for the admission of evidence against a defendant, will often raise questions of compatibility with the defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. ( Green, 399 U.S. at 156, 26 L.Ed.2d at 496, 90 S.Ct. at 1934.) Illinois' videotape statute plainly is a new exception to the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence against a defendant. Similarly, the statute at issue in California v. Green was a new exception to the rule against hearsay adopted in California. The statute provided that the prior inconsistent statement of a witness is admissible at trial as substantive evidence. (Cal. Evid. Code § 1235 (Deering 1966).) The Supreme Court explained that in an earlier decision, People v. Johnson (1968), 68 Cal.2d 646, 441 P.2d 111, 68 Cal. Rptr. 599, the California Supreme Court held that prior statements of a witness that were not subject to cross-examination when originally made could not be introduced under section 1235 to prove the charges against a defendant without violating the defendant's right to confrontation. (399 U.S. at 150, 26 L.Ed.2d at 492, 90 S.Ct. at 1931.) In the Green case, the California Supreme Court applied the same ban to a prior statement of a witness made at a preliminary hearing, under oath and subject to full cross-examination by an adequately counseled defendant. The Court reversed this holding of the California Supreme Court for two reasons, one of which involves rejection of the holding in People v. Johnson.  399 U.S. at 151, 26 L.Ed.2d at 493, 90 S.Ct. at 1931. We find that the holding in Green does not govern the issue raised by the case at bar. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's analysis in Green, rather than supporting the State's position, undermines it. Part II of the Green opinion, in which the Supreme Court explained its basis for rejecting the holding in Johnson, is the only portion of the opinion that is even arguably applicable to the case at bar. In that portion of the opinion, the Court addressed out-of-court statements that were not subject to cross-examination when made. The Court concluded that the admission of the out-of-court statement in the Green case did not violate the confrontation clause. And this would have been true, according to the Court, even if the statement had not been subject to cross-examination at the time it was made, because the declarant was available to testify at trial. Green, 399 U.S. at 158, 26 L.Ed.2d at 497, 90 S.Ct. at 1935. The crucial difference, however, between the out-of-court statement in Green and the out-of-court videotaped statement in the case at bar is that in Green the statement was a prior inconsistent statement. It is clear that the nature of the statement at issue was critical to the Court. In a passage most pertinent to the case at bar, the Court stated: The main danger in substituting subsequent for timely cross-examination seems to lie in the possibility that the witness' `[f]alse testimony is apt to harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by the suggestions of others, whose interest may be, and often is, to maintain falsehood rather than truth.' State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 901 (1939). That danger, however, disappears when the witness has changed his testimony so that, far from `hardening,' his prior statement has softened to the point where he now repudiates it. 399 U.S. at 159, 26 L.Ed.2d at 497-98, 90 S.Ct. at 1935-36. The danger identified by the Supreme Court is precisely the danger presented by the delayed cross-examination authorized by the challenged statute. It is quite possible that the videotaping and the trial will take place months apart. During that time, the child undoubtedly will have contact with the prosecutor and relatives who, consciously or unconsciously, may influence the child. We are convinced that the statute, by prohibiting contemporaneous cross-examination, unnecessarily and impermissibly infringes on an accused's right of confrontation. See also Long v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), 742 S.W.2d 302 (holding unconstitutional the then-applicable Texas videotape statute, upon which the Illinois statute was patterned, on similar grounds); Comment, The New Illinois Videotape Statute in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: Reconciling the Defendant's Constitutional Rights with the State's Interest in Prosecuting Offenders, 22 J. Marshall L. Rev. 331, 352-53 (and accompanying notes) (1988) (relying on the quoted portion of Green to conclude that the Illinois statute violates the right of confrontation). Other decisions of the Supreme Court, while not directly on point, support our conclusion that the statute impermissibly infringes on respondent's right to cross-examination. In United States v. Inadi (1986), 475 U.S. 387, 89 L.Ed.2d 390, 106 S.Ct. 1121, the Court addressed the right to cross-examination in the context of co-conspirator statements. The Court contrasted cases involving former testimony with cases involving co-conspirator statements. (475 U.S. at 394, 89 L.Ed.2d at 398, 106 S.Ct. at 1126.) The Court concluded that a showing that the witness is unavailable is not required for the admissibility of co-conspirator statements. In reaching this conclusion, the Court explained the rationale for the unavailability rule in former testimony cases, by stating that former testimony: is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is available and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evidence. 475 U.S. at 394, 89 L.Ed.2d at 398, 106 S.Ct. at 1126. We think the same rationale applies to the case at bar. Under the terms of the statute, the child witness must be available to testify and to submit to cross-examination at trial; thus, there is little justification for relying on the weaker version  the videotaped statement. And this is particularly true where the statute, although its permissive language indicates that the trial court has discretion in allowing use of the videotape procedure, does not expressly require the State to demonstrate any necessity for the procedure. In Perry v. Leeke (1989), 488 U.S. 272, 102 L.Ed.2d 624, 109 S.Ct. 594, the Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel was not violated by a trial court's order, entered after defendant's direct testimony and before cross-examination, directing the defendant not to consult with his attorney during a 15-minute recess. In reaching its holding, the Court observed that the truth-seeking function may be impeded by permitting a witness to consult with his attorney under these circumstances, because this gives the witness an opportunity to regroup and regain his poise. Cross-examination often depends for its effectiveness on the ability of counsel to punch holes in a witness' testimony at just the right time, in just the right way.    [C]ross-examination of a witness who is uncounseled between direct examination and cross-examination is more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-examination of a witness who is given time to pause and consult with his attorney. (488 U.S. at ___, 102 L.Ed.2d at 635, 109 S.Ct. at 601.) We think that the challenged statute frustrates the truth-seeking function of the confrontation clause for much the same reasons articulated by the Court in Inadi. Moreover, we are troubled by the fact, which the State conceded at oral argument, that if this statute passes constitutional muster, there is no reason why the videotape procedure it authorizes may not be used for other witnesses  for example, the elderly or handicapped. The highest court of Massachusetts, striking down a statute authorizing testimony outside the physical presence of the defendant in child sexual abuse cases, recognized this problem. ( Commonwealth v. Bergstrom (1988), 402 Mass. 534, 524 N.E.2d 366.) The court rejected the view that special rules can be developed for certain classes of crimes or certain classes of witnesses. It pointed out that for constitutional purposes, no principled distinction can be drawn between child witnesses and any other class that the legislature might think is in need of special protection. The Massachusetts statute, it concluded, created a rule of witness protection that was too broad to withstand constitutional scrutiny. 402 Mass. at ___ & nn. 13, 14, 524 N.E.2d at 374 & nn. 13, 14. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that section 106A-2 of the Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure violates respondent's right to confrontation guaranteed by the United States and Illinois Constitutions. In light of this disposition, we need not address respondent's contention that the statute also violates his constitutional right to due process. The State's motion for supervisory order is denied. Supervisory order denied.