Opinion ID: 431115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Immigration and the Authority of the Political Branches

Text: 12 Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the country.... What it owes to itself, the care of its own safety, gives it this right; and, in virtue of its natural liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge whether its circumstances will or will not justify the admission of the foreigner. 13 Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations (1758). 14 For centuries, it has been an accepted maxim of international law that the power to control the admission of foreigners is an inherent attribute of national sovereignty. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707-11, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 1019-21, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659, 12 S.Ct. 336, 338, 35 L.Ed. 1146 (1892). 4 Although the Constitution contains no direct mandate relating to immigration matters, the Supreme Court has long recognized that the political branches of the federal government have plenary authority to establish and implement substantive and procedural rules governing the admission of aliens to this country. Id.; Chae Chan Ping v. United States [The Chinese Exclusion Case], 130 U.S. 581, 609, 9 S.Ct. 623, 631, 32 L.Ed. 1068 (1889). It is worth emphasizing that while the Court could have implied the power to regulate immigration from constitutional grants of legislative powers such as the right to declare war, to approve treaties, to regulate foreign commerce, to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and to enact all necessary and proper laws, the Court instead declared that the control of immigration [is] an implied power arising out of national sovereignty and existing without regard to any constitutional grant. 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, Immigration Law and Procedure Sec. 2.2a (rev. 1982); cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318, 57 S.Ct. 216, 220, 81 L.Ed. 255 (1936) ([T]he investment of the federal government with the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants of the Constitution.). 5 15 The political branches of the federal government therefore possess concurrent authority over immigration matters. See Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713, 13 S.Ct. at 1022; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659, 12 S.Ct. at 338. Congress may exercise its implied powers in the immigration field through its legislative powers, while the Executive has two sources of authority in this area: (1) power delegated by Congress through statutes such as the INA and (2) its inherent power, arising out of the Executive's plenary authority over foreign relations. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542, 70 S.Ct. 309, 312, 94 L.Ed. 317 (1950). Theoretically, the President has an independent source of power concerning immigration policy, at least with regard to matters that are not the subject of either a statutory mandate or an express prohibition. 6 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-37, 72 S.Ct. 863, 870-71, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d 204, 226 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 980, 101 S.Ct. 1513, 67 L.Ed.2d 814 (1981). In practice, however, the comprehensive character of the INA vastly restricts the area of potential executive freedom of action, and the courts have repeatedly emphasized that the responsibility for regulating the admission of aliens resides in the first instance with Congress. See, e.g., Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543, 70 S.Ct. at 312; Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 713, 13 S.Ct. at 1022; Nishimura Ekiu, 142 U.S. at 659, 12 S.Ct. at 338; Palma v. Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100, 103 (4th Cir.1982). The courts have instead tended to view the President's inherent powers as a justification for permitting Congress to make remarkably broad delegations of its authority in the immigration field. As Justice Minton explained in Knauff, [n]ormally Congress supplies the conditions of the privilege of entry into the United States. But because the power of exclusion of aliens is also inherent in the executive department of the sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the executive to exercise the power without raising delegation concerns. 338 U.S. at 543, 70 S.Ct. at 313; cf. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17, 85 S.Ct. 1271, 1281, 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320, 57 S.Ct. at 221 (when dealing with foreign affairs Congress may delegate a degree of discretion that would not be permissible if domestic policy alone were involved). 16 The sweeping delegations of congressional authority contained in the INA demonstrate that Congress has taken full advantage of the Supreme Court's invitation. The principal responsibility for immigration matters in the Executive branch resides with the Attorney General, who is the beneficiary of broad grants of discretion under the statute. The most important of these is set forth at 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1103(a), which provides that: 17 The Attorney General shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens, except insofar as [power is delegated to other executive officials].... He shall establish such regulations; ... issue such instructions; and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority under the provisions of this chapter.... He shall have the power and duty to control and guard the boundaries and borders of the United States against the illegal entry of aliens.... 18 The INA also provides that determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all questions of law [under the statute] shall be controlling, id., and it grants the Attorney General the authority to delegate his powers under the INA to employees of the INS or other Justice Department officials. Id. 7 Other provisions of the INA grant broad discretionary powers to the Attorney General or his delegate with regard to the parole power, the underlying predicate of this action. 8 The Attorney General may ... in his discretion parole into the United States temporarily under such conditions as he may prescribe for emergent reasons or for reasons deemed strictly in the public interest any alien applying for admission to the United States.... Id. Sec. 1182(d)(5)(A). 19 The Attorney General may be permitted the greatest degree of discretion under the INA, but other executive officials also benefit from extremely broad delegations. In the event of war or some other national emergency, the President, upon a finding that additional restrictions beyond those supplied in the statute are necessary, may issue a proclamation making it unlawful for any alien to depart from or enter ... the United States except under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions as the President may prescribe.... Id. Sec. 1185(a)(1). 9 Section 1182(f) of the INA goes even further. It empowers the President, upon a finding that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, to suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens ... or to impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate for as long as he considers necessary. Id. Sec. 1182(f). 10 20 Despite these broad grants of authority, executive officials function as agents of Congress in enforcing the law.... If such officers depart from the zone of authority charted in the statute they act illegally and their actions can be corrected in the courts. 1 C. Gordon & H. Rosenfield, supra, at Sec. 2.2b; see also, e.g., Lloyd Sabaudo Societa Anonima Per Azioni v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 335, 53 S.Ct. 167, 170, 77 L.Ed. 341 (1932) (courts may review executive action in immigration field to ensure compliance with grant of statutory authority); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44, 44 S.Ct. 283, 288, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924) (warrants of deportation could not issue until executive officials made individualized findings that aliens were undesirable residents); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9, 36 S.Ct. 2, 3, 60 L.Ed. 114 (1915) ([W]hen the record shows that a commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power, the alien may demand his release upon habeas corpus.). 11 In practice, however, the vague and sweeping language employed by Congress in these provisions permits wide flexibility in decision-making on the part of the executive officials involved, and the courts are generally reluctant to interfere. See Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S. 65, 74, 95 S.Ct. 272, 278, 42 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974); Knauff, 338 U.S. at 543-44, 70 S.Ct. at 312-13. 21 Thus, as a result of the existence of inherent executive power over immigration and the broad delegations of discretionary authority in the INA, the separation-of-powers doctrine places few restrictions on executive officials in dealing with aliens who come to this country in search of admission or asylum. The authority of a companion branch, however, is not the only source of restraint upon executive action. We must also consider whether the Haitian plaintiffs in this case have any rights under the Constitution that can permit them to challenge the Executive's refusal to grant them parole. 22