Opinion ID: 779400
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of Williams's Substantive-Due-Process Claim.

Text: 154 To establish a violation of his right not to be tried and convicted while incompetent, Williams must show that at the time of trial he lacked either sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding, or a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402, 80 S.Ct. 788. In deciding Williams's claim of actual incompetence, we may consider facts and evidence that were not available to the state trial court before and during trial. See Watts, 87 F.3d at 1290; Boag v. Raines, 769 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir.1985). However, we disfavor retrospective determinations of incompetence, and give considerable weight to the lack of contemporaneous evidence of a petitioner's incompetence to stand trial. Moran, 57 F.3d at 696. 155 In evaluating Williams's substantive-due-process claim after the state's motion for summary judgment and again after the evidentiary hearing on Williams's mental state, the district court set forth in its opinions very thorough and detailed descriptions of the evidence that Williams presented in support of his claim. See Williams III, 48 F.Supp.2d at 990-93; Williams IV, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1052-59. We incorporate these descriptions by reference into our opinion. We review the district court's credibility determinations for clear error, Fisher v. Roe, 263 F.3d 906, 912 (9th Cir.2001), and the district court's competency determination de novo. Boag, 769 F.2d at 1343. We agree with the district court that Williams fails to establish his incompetence at the time of trial. 156 We find especially relevant defense counsel's opinion that Williams was competent to stand trial. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 450, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in his defense); Hernandez, 930 F.2d at 718 (the fact that defense counsel considered the defendant competent to stand trial was significant evidence that the defendant was competent). At the evidentiary hearing on Williams's mental state, Joseph Ingber, Williams's trial attorney, testified that Williams fully understood the nature of the proceedings against him and appropriately assisted with and made decisions regarding his defense. For example, Williams contributed to his alibi defense by providing Ingber with the names of the persons that he had been with at the time of the alleged offenses. Williams also indicated that he comprehended the ramifications of his decision not to call witnesses to provide mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. Ingber testified that Williams's response to the proceedings against him was not at all unusual, that Williams exhibited no traits suggestive of mental illness, and that Williams engaged in normal conversations about subjects unrelated to the case that interested him, such as sports and weight-lifting. Ingber roundly rejected the suggestion that Williams was incompetent at trial, stating that there isn't one scintilla of evidence anywhere during the course of this trial that indicates that Stanley Williams was not competent, if he wanted to, to assist in the preparation of this case. 157 Ingber's opinion regarding Williams's competence is consistent with the evidence of Williams's demeanor before the state trial court and the medical evaluations given to that court, which we have already discussed in conjunction with Williams's procedural-due-process claim. Ingber's opinion also corresponds with Dr. Ronald Siegel's 1979 mental-health report provided to defense counsel, which we may properly consider in resolving Williams's claim of actual incompetence. See Boag, 769 F.2d at 1343. Dr. Siegel, as a psychophar-macologist, specialized in the study of how drugs affect the mind. He reviewed the police report, preliminary-hearing transcripts, and evaluations of Drs. Coodley and Coburn, and also conducted a four-hour examination of Williams. Dr. Siegel found that Williams exhibit[ed] none of the characteristic changes in perception and body imagery associated with chronic PCP users, suggesting that his use of this compound has been somewhat exaggerated or involves very low dosages. Dr. Siegel reported no indication of psychotic or schizophrenic thinking and no underlying psychopathology although [Williams] is extremely violent and assaultive. Dr. Siegel concluded that Williams was neither insane, unconscious, nor severely diminished in capacity at the time of the alleged offense. He was capable of knowing and understanding the nature and quality of his acts and the consequences. We accord substantial weight to Dr. Siegel's contemporaneous opinion that Williams did not suffer from a mental defect, and to the other evidence before the state trial court that suggested Williams was competent to stand trial. See Moran, 57 F.3d at 696 (noting that medical reports contemporaneous to the time of the initial hearing greatly increase the chance for an accurate retrospective evaluation of a defendant's competence). 158 We give little weight to the declarations of the mental-health experts that Williams submitted in his habeas corpus proceedings. The district court found that the declarations were not very credible, and this credibility determination is not clearly erroneous. The district court correctly noted that the declarations fail to support sufficiently their retrospective assessments of Williams's mental state by tying them to the facts of the case. See Williams IV, 41 F.Supp.2d at 1059 (Petitioner's experts did not adequately explain the effect of his impairments on his thoughts or actions, and failed to adequately explain how he could appear lucid during the crimes yet be unable to form the intent to kill). The declarations do not describe how Williams's probable mental impairment interfered with his understanding of the proceedings against him or with his ability to assist counsel in presenting a defense. With the exception of the incident at the preliminary hearing where Williams stood mute when questioned by the court, an incident that might simply have been a lapse in attention, the declarations do not point to any manifestation of Williams's incompetence in the trial-court record. The declarations likewise fail to explain Williams's rational responses to police questioning, his sensible decision not to speak with Dr. Coburn about the charged offenses after withdrawing his insanity plea, and his logical requests that the court appoint interim counsel and also continue the proceedings until his attorney was present, requests that reflect an understanding of the judicial proceedings. We agree with the district court that the declarations prepared by the mental-health experts for Williams's habeas corpus proceedings are not entirely credible. 159 We also accord little weight to the competency assessments of Williams's habeas corpus experts because they are based not upon medical reports contemporaneous to the time of the preliminary hearings or trial, but upon declarations submitted by Williams's friends and family and neuropsychological testing conducted more than ten years after trial. We have previously held that retrospective competency determinations, although disfavored, are permissible when it is possible to make an accurate retrospective evaluation, for example, by consulting contemporaneous medical reports. See Moran, 57 F.3d at 696. Without the benefit of such contemporaneous reports, the passage of time and the difficulties inherent in evaluating the defendant's competence from a written record reduce the likelihood of an accurate retrospective determination. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 387, 86 S.Ct. 836 (concluding that no meaningful retrospective competency determination could be made six years after trial). Because we doubt the accuracy of the retrospective competency determinations of Williams's habeas corpus experts, we conclude that the determinations are not especially probative of whether Williams actually was incompetent at the time of his trial. 160 Given the significant contemporaneous evidence of Williams's competence at trial, supported by defense counsel's firm belief that Williams was competent, and the absence of persuasive evidence to the contrary, Williams fails to establish a violation of his right not to be tried and convicted while incompetent. We affirm the district court's denial of both Williams's procedural-due-process and substantive-due-process claims. 161 F. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. (Claim D) 162 Williams argues that the district court erred in denying on summary judgment his claim that defense counsel was ineffective at the guilt phase of trial. See Williams III, 48 F.Supp.2d at 1000. To prevail on his claim, Williams must first show that defense counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Williams faults Ingber for insufficient investigation of a mental-state defense and for his decision not to pursue the defense at the guilt phase. [C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. Id. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. Id. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. In assessing the reasonableness of Ingber's representation, we must be highly deferential, avoid the distorting effects of hindsight, and indulge a strong presumption that [his] conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 163 In a declaration submitted in the state habeas corpus proceedings, Ingber explained that he did not present a mentalstate defense because he had no credible evidence of mental disability or brain damage to support such a defense. When Ingber inherited Williams's case from prior counsel, three mental-health experts had already interviewed Williams and reviewed the police report and preliminary-hearing transcripts. As already discussed in the context of Williams's competency claims, Dr. Siegel provided his considered opinion that Williams was neither insane, unconscious, nor severely diminished in capacity at the time of the alleged offense. Dr. Coburn's preliminary impressions based on the materials at hand and [his] examination of[Williams did] not indicate any support for [a] defense position of insanity or diminished capacity, unless virtually all of the witness statements regarding both [Williams's] behavior and his post-offense statements [were] discounted completely. Dr. Coburn reported that [t]here [was] really nothing in the data itself to support the likelihood that [Williams's] behavior or thought patterns were materially affected by any PCP usage. Dr. Coodley concluded that Williams was sane, but noted the possib[ility] that [his] mental capacity to form the specific intent to kill, rob and kidnap at the time of the commission of the alleged offenses was diminished because of PCP (angel dust) use. However, Dr. Coodley stated that he did not have sufficient tangible evidence to support that conclusion [of diminished mental capacity]. 164 In general, an attorney is entitled to rely on the opinions of mental health experts in deciding whether to pursue an insanity or diminished capacity defense. Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir.1995); see also Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1525 (9th Cir.1990) (It is certainly within the `wide range of professionally competent assistance' for an attorney to rely on properly selected experts.). We have previously held that defense counsel reasonably declined to pursue a mental-state defense when two experts opined that the defendant was neither insane nor diminished in mental capacity, and a third expert could not reach a conclusion. Morgan v. Bunnell, 24 F.3d 49, 52 (9th Cir.1994); see also Hendricks, 70 F.3d at 1038 (defense counsel was not deficient in deciding not to present a mental-state defense when two mental-health experts had found no evidence that the defendant was insane or diminished in mental capacity). Moreover, it is acceptable trial strategy to choose not to call psychiatrists to testify when they can be subjected to cross-examination based on equally persuasive psychiatric opinions that reach a different conclusion. Harris, 949 F.2d at 1525. Given that the mental-health experts' evaluations of Williams did not support a mental-state defense, Ingber's decision not to investigate further or ultimately pursue the defense was a reasonable strategic choice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 165 Ingber's conclusion that an alibi defense was both viable and preferable to a mental-state defense also cannot be criticized. In response to questioning by the police, Williams had insisted that he was not present at either of the two robbery-shootings, and had disputed the statements of the government informants that he had admitted responsibility for the crimes. Williams had similarly denied involvement in the crimes during his mental-health consultations with Drs. Coodley and Siegel. In an interview with the police, Holiwell, Williams's stepfather, had stated that he saw Williams at a bar right before the Brookhaven Motel crimes occurred, thereby indicating that Williams could not have been the perpetrator. Williams provided Ingber with the names of other witnesses, like Beverly McGowan and Eugene Riley, who were able to substantiate Williams's alibi defense by testifying that he was with them at the time of the alleged offenses. The credibility of the prosecution's witnesses that placed Williams at the crime scenes was suspect because they each had inducements to testify. Ingber could through cross-examination bring out their motivations to lie. Given this factual support for the alibi defense, [i]t was clearly within the `wide range of professionally competent assistance' for [Ingber] to choose not to present a psychiatric defense theory that could conflict with [the] alibi defense .... Harris, 949 F.2d at 1525. 166 Having reasonably selected an alibi defense as the primary defense theory, Ingber no longer had a duty to investigate a conflicting mental-state defense. See Bean v. Calderon, 163 F.3d 1073, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1998) (counsel's reasonable choice of an alibi defense ended counsel's duty to investigate a conflicting defense of diminished mental capacity); Turk v. White, 116 F.3d 1264, 1266-67 (9th Cir.1997) (defense counsel's reasonable selection of a self-defense theory obviated counsel's need to investigate a conflicting defense of incompetency); Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404, 1411 (9th Cir.1998) (defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to present psychiatric evidence that would have contradicted the primary defense theory of misidentification); Fritchie v. McCarthy, 664 F.2d 208, 215 (9th Cir.1981) (same). 167 Williams argues that Ingber's decision to pursue an alibi rather than a mental-state defense was not a considered choice, and that Ingber simply tossed out whatever came to hand, irrespective of merit. to support this inference, Williams points to aspects of Ingber's pre-trial representation, for example, that Ingber informed the prosecutor of his intention to present an alibi defense only the day before trial began; that Ingber denied on the record that Holiwell, Williams's stepfather, definitively would be a defense witness when later he was the first alibi witness called for the defense; and that Ingber refused, in advance of trial, to request or reject jury instructions on diminished mental capacity, and then failed to inform the prosecutor whether this refusal was inadvertence or trial tactics. 168 Our review of the record reveals that the inference that Williams argues — that Ingber's reticence to disclose information about the defense strategy evidences Ingber's lack of preparation and ill-considered choice of defense strategy — is not supportable. Ingber informed the prosecutor on the day before trial of his intent to present an alibi defense only to comply with California Penal Code § 1051 (1981), which Ingber understood to require such notice and to allow the prosecutor to seek a continuance if the state did not receive the necessary notice. Ingber did divulge the names of some defense witnesses before trial in order to allow the court to rule on the admissibility of the witnesses' prior convictions. Ingber also revealed the identity of some defense witnesses prior to trial when he made arrangements to have various inmates released from custody so that they could testify in court. When the prosecutor sought the names of all the witnesses that the defense planned to call, Ingber refused, arguing to the trial court: [I]f I were to reveal the names of alibi witnesses, I would be subject [to sanctions] for inadequacy of counsel and incompetency and possibly malpractice. When Ingber declined to express a preference regarding jury instructions on diminished mental capacity in advance of trial, the prosecutor attributed this conduct to trial tactics, not inadvertence. Referring to an award recently presented to Ingber for his outstanding work as a trial attorney, the prosecutor said: I would assume that the record should reflect that that is being done as a means of trial tactics by what is certainly known in this area as a very prestigious and competent attorney, Mr. Joseph Ingber, the recipient of the Jerry Geisler Award by the Criminal Courts Bar Association. In light of this record, we conclude that the inference that Williams asserts, namely that Ingber arbitrarily chose a defense strategy without regard to merit, is not a reasonable one. The conduct that Williams highlights suggests only that Ingber was being cagey about disclosing his defense strategy to the prosecution. 169 Because Ingber made a reasonable strategic decision to present an alibi defense and not a mental-state defense, Williams fails to establish that Ingber's representation was deficient. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on the basis that defense counsel was effective at the guilt phase of trial. 17 170 G. Cumulative Error. 171 Although no single alleged error may warrant habeas corpus relief, the cumulative effect of errors may deprive a petitioner of the due process right to a fair trial. Karis, 283 F.3d at 1132. That is not the case here. Williams has not shown that the cumulative prejudicial effect of the alleged errors at his trial puts the case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in its outcome. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-35, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). 172