Opinion ID: 4576552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CIMT Analysis

Text: To determine whether Larios’s alternative is a categorical match, we must first ascertain the elements of the generic offense. There is no statutory definition of a crime involving moral turpitude, so we draw on “long-established BIA principles and decisions of our Court,” Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted), for its elements: (1) an actus reus of “a reprehensible act . . . . that is inherently base, vile, or depraved contrary to the accepted rules of morality and the duties owed to other persons, either individually or to society in general”; and (2) a mens rea of “an appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation,” signifying “a vicious motive or a corrupt mind,” Javier v. Att’y Gen., 826 F.3d 127, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see Francisco-Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 970 F.3d 431, 435 (3d Cir. 2020). With this generic construction in mind, we home in on the elements of Larios’s crime of conviction: an actus reus of “threaten[ing] to commit any crime of violence,” a mens rea of “purpose . . . or [] reckless disregard,” and a causation element of “terroriz[ing] another.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a). We have already settled that “a threat to: [] commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another” is a CIMT. Javier, 826 F.3d at 131 (alteration in original); see also Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 952 (stating that “the intentional transmission of threats is evidence of a vicious motive or a corrupt mind”). The particular alternative offense of which 13 Larios was convicted is the same in all respects, except it requires a mens rea of only recklessness. Our focus, then, is whether the “least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary to sustain a conviction,” Moreno, 887 F.3d at 163, for that alternative offense is turpitudinous. Our precedent provides guidance on when recklessness constitutes a turpitudinous mental state and, conversely, when it does not. We deemed a mens rea of recklessness turpitudinous for both New Jersey’s second-degree aggravated assault offense, Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 623 (3d Cir. 2016), and New York’s reckless endangerment offense, Knapik, 384 F.3d at 93, explaining that there were two “aggravating factors” in the each statute: “serious bodily injury” to another, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1), or “grave risk of death to another person,” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25, and “extreme indifference to the value of human life,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1), or “a depraved indifference to human life,” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 622; Knapik, 384 F.3d at 90. Although these statutes required a mens rea of only recklessness, the two aggravating factors ensured the least culpable conduct encompassed by these statutes was still “inherently base, vile, or depraved.” Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 621; see Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89. In contrast, we concluded recklessness was not turpitudinous in Pennsylvania’s reckless endangerment statute because there was not even one statutory aggravating factor. That statute criminalizes “conduct that may put a person in danger,” Mahn, 767 F.3d at 175, and thus could hypothetically cover “even an individual who drives through a red light on an empty street or speeds down an empty thoroughfare,” id. at 174. Focusing on the “least culpable 14 conduct,” we concluded that traffic offenses “do[] not implicate moral turpitude.” Id. at 172. Here, the BIA did not articulate what, if any, aggravating factors it identified in § 2C:12-3(a), and we perceive none. Whereas the statutes at issue in Baptiste and Knapik targeted conduct that risks death or serious injury to another person, New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute criminalizes threats that merely carry the risk of “convey[ing] menace or fear of a crime of violence” to another person, New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charge, § 2C:12-3(a), at 2; and whereas those statutes required a mental state exhibiting “extreme” and “depraved” indifference to a person’s life, New Jersey defines recklessness to include “heedless[ness],” “foolhardi[ness],” or “scorn for the consequences” of causing fear in another, id. at 3. New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute, therefore, lacks the type of aggravating factors that we have previously recognized would make an offense inherently vile and depraved. The Government contends otherwise, pointing us to two purported statutory aggravating factors. In addition to the required mental state of “purpose” or “reckless disregard,” the Government argues, there must both be a “threat” and “a crime of violence” that is the subject of that threat. Resp’t Br. 25 (internal quotation marks omitted).3 The argument comes up short. 3 As the alternative offense of which Larios was convicted does not concern “serious public inconvenience,” we will not address the Government’s argument that this would also constitute a statutory aggravating factor. See Resp’t Br. 25. 15 As to the first factor, the Government reads into the lone word “threat” an “additional, intentional ‘layer’ to the mens rea requirement” because it “suggests that the perpetrator must initially commit a purposeful act.” Resp’t Br. 32–33. But we already rejected that argument when reviewing Pennsylvania’s terroristic-threats statute in Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 2002). There, we held a “threat[] to commit a crime of violence” was simply the actus reus, id. at 170 (alteration in original) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706), and did not carry its own implicit mens rea, independent of that specified in the statute. We reaffirm that holding here: Where a statute specifies the mens rea, courts ordinarily interpret it as applying throughout the statute, see Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2196 (2019), and here, nothing in the text, New Jersey law, or our precedent suggests we should stray from that ordinary construction.4 4 In support of its construction, the Government cites Javier, where we held one alternative of Pennsylvania’s terroristic-threats statute is a CIMT, in part, because of “the psychological distress that follows from [a threat’s] invasion of another’s sense of personal security.” 826 F.3d at 131 (quoting Commw. v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)). But the Government places too much weight on Javier, as our analysis there relied on Pennsylvania law, and we did not find the threat alone to be a CIMT, but rather emphasized the match hinged on “the communication of the threat and its requisite scienter”—namely, “a specific ‘intent to terrorize.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1)). The New Jersey alternative of which Larios was convicted is missing half the equation because, as we have explained, the least culpable conduct is only a reckless threat. 16 The Government’s second factor fares no better. Although we agree that the term “crime of violence” does not encompass simple assault under New Jersey law, it does encompass other crimes lacking in the vileness and depravity required for a statutory aggravating factor. See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 621. Neither New Jersey law nor the Model Penal Code defines “crime of violence,” but we draw on the federal definition of that term, as we did in Bovkun: “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another.” Bovkun, 283 F.3d at 169 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)). So the least culpable conduct under § 2C:12-3(a) would be a threat to commit an offense involving the use of physical force against a person’s property in reckless disregard of the risk of terrorizing that person—conduct the Government contends is necessarily vile and depraved. Yet New Jersey’s criminal code demonstrates otherwise: The offense of criminal mischief, for example, involves “tamper[ing] with tangible property of another so as to endanger person or property” and causing “pecuniary loss of $500 or more,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:17-3(a)(2), so a threat to commit that particular “crime of violence” would include a threat to “chip[] away at the patio bricks around the porch of [a neighbor’s] property,” State in Interest of A.H., 697 A.2d 964, 965 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997). No doubt, threats to engage in this type of conduct would be unwelcome and un-neighborly, but they do not rise to the level of depraved or extreme indifference to the risk of causing serious bodily injury or death.5 See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 622; Knapik, 384 F.3d at 5 Given that “crime of violence” encompasses property crimes, it falls short even of “conduct that may put a person in 17 90; see, e.g., Matter of C.P.M., 223 A.3d 616, 620 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019) (damaging property); State in Interest of D.P., 556 A.2d 335, 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (same); State v. Clarke, 486 A.2d 935, 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) (same). The Government also doubles down on the BIA’s reasoning that it “ha[d] not identified any case resulting in a conviction under this statute for far less serious conduct than” a prototypical terroristic threat, such as “yelling ‘bomb’ in a sporting arena or a crowded movie theater, or a student declaring that he is going to open fire in a school.” A.R. 7. In support, it cites a slew of New Jersey cases signifying that prosecutions under § 2C:12-3(a) are generally limited to such egregious conduct. But that is neither here nor there: We have held that this “realistic probability” analysis is inapplicable when assessing crimes of moral turpitude under the categorical (or modified categorical) approaches.6 See JeanLouis, 582 F.3d at 471–73. Cf. Cabeda v. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 165, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2020) (declining to apply realisticprobability analysis in the absence of a categorical match between elements). Instead, we have treated “the possibility of danger,” which we rejected as a statutory aggravating factor in Mahn, 767 F.3d at 175 (emphasis altered). 6 We do not defer to the BIA’s recent opinion classifying Minnesota’s terroristic-threats statute, also based on the Model Penal Code, as a CIMT because it focuses on “the minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being prosecuted under the statute,” In re Salad, 27 I. & N. 733, 734 (BIA 2020), and we rejected that approach in Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471–73. 18 conviction for non-turpitudinous conduct, however remote,” as sufficient to render the alternative overbroad.7 Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 471. In sum, Larios’s crime of conviction has a minimum mens rea of recklessness but lacks any statutory aggravating factors, so the least culpable conduct is a reckless threat to commit a violent property crime, which under Baptiste, Knapik, and Mahn, is not turpitudinous. Larios’s offense of conviction therefore does not qualify as a CIMT under the modified categorical approach. See Javier, 826 F.3d at 130–31; Hillocks, 934 F.3d at 339.