Opinion ID: 2619592
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 161 kv. transmission line index map sub 101 to sub 91 to sub 108

Text: The foregoing specifically shows that the defendant power company intended to condemn an easement for the purpose of constructing a 161,000 volt transmission line or lines, together with necessary distribution lines between two of its substations. The court consistently emphasizes the expression over, under, along and across, as used above in the statement of purpose in the petition, but fails to give due consideration to paragraph 7 appearing in the petition, which reads:  In acquiring said right of way easements for the construction, operation and maintenance of its towers, poles, wires and other facilities for said transmission and distribution lines, in, through, under, and across said tracts and parcels of land described in the preceding paragraph, the rights that the petitioner may exercise and the rights reserved to the owners, tenants, lienholders and easement holders are as follows, to-wit: Petitioner, its successors and assigns, shall have the right of ingress and egress to and from said transmission and distribution line right-of-way to survey, erect, construct, maintain, inspect, patrol, rebuild and repair said lines, together with the right to replace, renew and relocate upon, across, over, under or along said right-of-way steel towers, poles, wires, anchors and appurtenances thereto and the right to remove at any time any or all of said installations or appurtenances, and petitioner may erect, maintain and use gates in all fences which cross or which shall hereafter cross the route of said transmission and distribution lines, and may trim and/or cut and clear away any trees, limbs and brush upon or adjacent to said right-of-way whenever in its judgment the same will interfere with or endanger the construction, operation or maintenance of said lines. In exercising its rights of ingress and egress, petitioner shall, whenever practicable, use existing roads or lanes and shall repair any damage by its use thereof, but if petitioner finds it impractical to use existing roads or lanes during construction or for maintenance or repair of its transmission and distribution lines, petitioner shall have the right to come upon said right-of-way through adjoining lands of the owners, tenants, lienholders and easement holders, petitioner to repair any damage by its use thereof. If the petitioner shall cut or remove trees under the rights hereby taken, if such trees shall be valuable for either timber or wood, they shall continue to be the property of the owners, tenants, lienholders and easement holders, but all tops, limbs and brush shall be burned or removed by the petitioner.  The owners, tenants, lienholders and easement holders, their heirs or assigns, may cultivate and fully use and enjoy the land within said easement or right-of-way, provided the same shall not be used in any way that will interfere with or endanger the construction, operation or maintenance of said transmission and distribution lines and provided that no permanent structures shall be erected or maintained under said transmission or distribution lines. Petitioner, its successors or assigns, agrees to pay for any reasonable permanent damage caused to land, growing crops, fences, livestock, machinery, or other personal property of the owners, tenants, lienholders and easement holders, from the construction, operation or maintenance of said transmission lines. (Emphasis added.) The above portions of paragraph 7 emphasized indicate that the initial clause in paragraph 7 referred only to towers, poles, wires and other facilities. The next clause in the paragraph referred only to steel towers, poles, wires, anchors and appurtenances thereto. There is not the slightest indication anywhere in this paragraph that the petitioner intended to acquire any rights for underground conduits, cables, ducts, mains, pipes, tubes or any similar terms descriptive of any underground transmission facilities. The intermittent use of the preposition under at scattered places in the petition is in itself ambiguous in view of the fact that the erection of steel towers requires a concrete foundation extending beneath the surface of the soil. The next clause in paragraph 7 refers to the right to trim, cut and clear away any trees, limbs and brush which might interfere with the construction, operation or maintenance of said lines. Obviously, this pertains only to overhead transmission lines. There is no mention in the petition of any right to remove roots, stumps, rocks, topsoil, overburden, drainage pipes, culverts, manholes, streets, curbs, retaining walls, or any other possible surface or subsurface obstructions. Likewise, there is no provision giving the defendant power company the right to excavate, dig any ditches or trenches, do any grading, make any cuts or fills, etc. An important subparagraph in paragraph 7 is the one reserving certain rights to the owners of the tracts across which the power company sought to condemn the easement. In this paragraph the said transmission and distribution lines are the 161,000 volt electrical transmission line or lines, together with necessary distribution lines that are the subject of the petition. When the landowners are told in this subparagraph that they can fully use and enjoy the land within the easement or right-of-way provided that no permanent structures shall be erected or maintained under said transmission or distribution lines, they are clearly told in the petition these transmission and distribution lines will be above the surface of the land. On this point it is to be noted there was no limitation or restriction against the erection of a structure over said transmission or distribution lines which would indicate that the petition did not contemplate the construction of an underground conduit for the transmission of electricity. The petition clearly contemplated only the construction of overhead transmission or distribution lines under which the owners' right to erect structures was prohibited. If the defendant power company intended to exercise its authority to condemn an easement for the underground transmission of electricity, the limitations upon the owner's rights would have been much broader. For example, there was no limitation upon the owners' right to place streets, driveways, curbs or sidewalks across the surface of said easement, or to run sewers, water lines, gas lines, electrical conduits or other underground pipes or tunnels across the right-of-way condemned. None of the surface or subsurface facilities enumerated would be prohibited by the restriction against erecting structures under said transmission or distribution lines. Nevertheless, once the defendant power company constructed an underground system of electrical transmission lines, as it did in 1966, discussed infra, there was no way that anyone could run any such utility or service lines through the concrete conduit forming a barricade. In my opinion the condemnation petition filed in 1956 by the defendant power company was insufficient to acquire the right to construct underground electrical transmission lines as the power company did in 1966 in the right-of-way condemned. Assuming, however, that the word under sporadically used in the 1956 condemnation petition purported to grant such right as held by the court, the entire petition as heretofore analyzed is at least ambiguous as to whether such right was acquired. In this situation the petition must be construed against the defendant power company on the basis of the authorities heretofore cited. Construing the petition then in favor of the landowner, the condemning authority did not allege in its petition that it was taking an easement for the construction of underground electrical transmission or distribution lines. It follows the report of the appraisers, if it be construed to give more than the right to construct, operate and maintain overhead lines, exceeded the authority of the petition and is not controlling on the plaintiffs. The appraisers' report, however, is not subject to such construction. With respect to the electrical transmission lines the appraisers' report refers to them as more particularly described in the petition. What are the facts which the court in this case found to be immaterial on the issue presented? The court was informed on the argument of this case that the defendant power company laid twelve underground electrical transmission conduit lines in concrete; that these lines were placed side by side in two's running parallel on the same horizontal plane approximately one foot apart; and that the pairs were stacked vertically on top of each other six high. These conduit lines were then encased in concrete which measured eighteen inches wide and four feet high, making a solid concrete wall across the plaintiffs' property, the top of which was to be constructed beneath the surface two and one-half feet, thereby making it impossible to install sewer and various utility lines across the easement. It was further related that by negotiation between the contractors the landowners paid $18,005 to have the defendant lower this installation two feet more than had been planned prior to its installation. In the petition herein the plaintiffs request reimbursement of the $18,000 and $100,000 damages for appropriation of an underground easement. This property is located in Johnson County in a rapidly developing area, and the development of the plaintiffs' property for urban purposes was seriously jeopardized. Assuming these facts to be true, were they before the appraisers when the condemnation matter was originally determined, or, if the matter was before a jury to determine just compensation to the landowners, were these facts disclosed so it could properly assess the damages? If the defendant is permitted to construct an underground concrete wall as heretofore related on the right-of-way condemned, there is nothing which would prevent the defendant from constructing a concrete wall two feet wide commencing twenty feet beneath the surface of the land and extending above the surface in such a way as to constitute a Berlin Wall across the premises in question. The court in its opinion circumvents the facts by saying the evidence would have been irrelevant to the issue before us on appeal. (p. 529.) By this the court means the plaintiffs did not raise on appeal an issue as to the reasonable use of the easement condemned. The court fully recognizes authorities which formulate the rule that the use made of an easement must not only be germane to the purposes for which the easement was acquired, but that it must be a reasonable use as well. Therefore, in the opinion of the court, the decision of the trial court in the instant case might well have been reversed had the plaintiffs raised this issue. Actually, the authorities cited by the court for this proposition do not apply to the facts here. In my opinion they do not support the rule espoused by the court. In Aycock v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 175 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1943), the electric company sought to construct a fence along its right-of-way condemned and keep the landowner off or keep him from using the land on the right-of-way. This was held not only to be unreasonable, but that the power company did not acquire the right to fence the easement condemned. The court said companies possessing the right to condemn private property for a public use cannot do what they please with the land condemned, but that they may do what is reasonably needful to carry out the purpose for which the land is taken. In Jenkins v. Depoyster, 299 Ky. 500, 186 S.W.2d 14, the grantee of minerals in land became involved with the owner as to surface rights. The court held the grantee of the minerals by implication of law acquired the right to use so much of the surface as may be reasonably necessary for beneficial and profitable working of the coal mine, including the right of ingress and egress to the extent that it is reasonably necessary for the use of the estate granted. It further held the owner of the servient estate could erect and maintain gates across the passageway to the property provided they are located and erected not to interfere unreasonably with the right of passage. Here the court is not confronted with an easement created by contract which has been termed a vested expansible easement, wherein the expansion should be limited to what would be considered reasonable in amount or distance. In Waggle v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 17 Pa. D. & C.2d 550 (1958), the court held the right in such easement ceased to be transitory when the original installation was completed. For the rule where a blanket form of easement to erect an electric transmission line by contract is granted, see Jackson Electric & c. Corp. v. Echols, 84 Ga. App. 610, 66 S.E.2d 770. In my opinion on the facts in this case there is no distinction between an unreasonable use of the easement acquired by the defendant power company by condemnation and an unauthorized use of the easement. If it was unreasonable to construct an underground concrete barrier along the right-of-way it was unauthorized, and on this basis the decision of the trial court should have been reversed. The basis of my dissent herein, however, is more fundamental. It is based upon the petition filed in the instant case which is the jurisdictional instrument upon which the condemnation proceeding was conducted. As heretofore stated, the petition authorized only the taking of an easement for the construction, operation and maintenance of overhead transmission and distribution lines. The overhead line was constructed, operated and maintained for ten years before the defendant power company began construction of the underground lines here in controversy. Nowhere in the record is it disclosed that the underground lines installed in the year 1958 were known to be in existence on the right-of-way condemned when the present plaintiffs acquired the property in question, and it cannot be said they were bound by the existence of these underground transmission lines by notice of the original condemnation proceedings on file in the office of the clerk of the district court. It is time the Kansas Supreme Court spell out with some certainty what is required in a condemnation petition. Other jurisdictions have been confronted by similar situations and require the purposes for which an easement is taken for the transmission of electricity to be specifically described in detail. For example, in the case of In Matter of Long Island Lighting Co. (Wicks), 272 App. Div. 915, 71 N.Y.S.2d 12, a property owner challenged the sufficiency of a petition, and the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York reversed an order granting an easement and right-of-way in, over and across lands owned by the plaintiffs, stating: ... Appellant is entitled to know with reasonable certainty from an examination of the petition the height and size of the poles to be installed, their approximate location on the property, the number, location and size of the cross arms, and the extent to which they will be used for the purposes designated in the petition, the extent to which overhead and underground facilities will be employed, and such other information as will permit an accurate admeasurement of damages and control the future use of the property. ( Suffolk County Telephone Co. v. Gammon, 113 App. Div. 764; Bell Telephone Co. v. Parker, 187 N.Y. 299.) ... (p. 915.) In Power Co. v. Shackelford, 137 W. Va. 441, 73 S.E.2d 809, an easement for the construction and operation of an electric transmission line was condemned, and the award of the commissioners was reversed and set aside, the court saying: `In condemnation proceedings where land is sought to be taken, the plaintiff must describe it with accuracy and certainty. See 29 C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 259, pages 1228 et seq. And this is the purport of subsection 5 of section 8220, supra. We cannot see why the same certainty and accuracy are not essential where an easement rather than the land itself is sought in the proceedings. And the authorities so hold. The reasons for this requirement of certainty and accuracy are not far to seek. They are essential so that both the owner of the easement and the owner of the property subjected to it may know exactly what their rights are with respect to their different interests. And certainty is just as essential in order to determine the value of the interests taken and the damage done by its taking to that portion of the property not subject to the easement. See, C.J.S., Eminent Domain, § 259, pages 1230, et seq.' ... (p. 448.) In Bell Telephone Co. v. Parker, 187 N.Y. 299, 79 N.E. 1008, the court said: I think the description of the property sought to be condemned in this proceeding complies with the requirements of the statute in all respects save one; but that it is not sufficiently specific in stating the extent of the right which the petitioner desires to acquire `to trim such trees as may be necessary to protect said line from interference.' (p. 303.) The landowners of this state and companies authorized to condemn private property to acquire an easement or right-of-way for the transmission of electric power are entitled to a statement of the law from this court as to what shall definitely be stated in a condemnation petition. It should require the petition to state in definite and certain language that which is taken and the uses to which the property taken will be put, both at the time of condemnation and in the future, so that no question may arise, as here, concerning the extent of the condemner's rights and the rights retained by the landowners in accordance with the authorities cited from other jurisdictions for the reasons stated therein. In the instant case the defendant shortly after acquiring its easement by condemnation erected overhead transmission and distribution lines on high poles so that the lines were far above the surface of the land. This was pursuant to the stated purpose for which it acquired the easement at the time of condemnation. This is consistent with my construction of the petition herein. It must be conceded the defendant herein, having the power of eminent domain, has the right to condemn property for future uses as well as uses contemplated at the time of condemnation, but if such future uses are to go beyond the present needs of the condemning authority to construct, operate and maintain its transmission and distribution lines, such future use to which the property will be put must also be specifically stated and described in the condemnation petition. It is respectfully submitted the judgment of the lower court should be reversed. FROMME, J., joins in the foregoing dissent. FATZER, J., dissenting: In my opinion, this case should be reversed with directions to proceed to trial upon the plaintiffs' petition for damages. There was no statutory authority by which the defendant could acquire any right of eminent domain to construct an underground conduit. The court correctly observes the statute (K.S.A. 17-618) is ambiguous, but its language authorizes an electric company to exercise the power of eminent domain only to the extent that its  wires may be laid, carried or stretched on, through or over any land or lot ... as may be needed ... (Emphasis supplied.) The court construes the statute and virtually, in one short sentence disposes of the case. In construing the statute, it states [t]he term `through' in our opinion, is used in the sense of and equivalent to `under,' and, therefore, holds the defendant acquired the right to construct a conduit under the surface of the plaintiffs' land. No authority is cited in support of that sweeping conclusion. My research discloses there is no authority to support the statement and the decided cases on the point are contrary to the court's holding. The power of eminent domain can be exerted only by virtue of legislation expressly authorizing its exercise, and there is nothing in the statute which indicates an intention to authorize an electric company to condemn a right of way to lay, carry or stretch its wires in an underground conduit. The words on and over, as used in the statute, clearly do not authorize the acquiring of any such right. The word on can only refer to the surface of land. The word over was used in its ordinary sense to mean above the surface of the land. Thus, the only other empowering word remaining in the statute for consideration is the word through. The word through is defined in Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, as: Extending or passing from one end or surface to another ... admitting free or continuous passage .. . not interrupted or obstructed ... affording right of way ... Like many words in the English language, the word through has various meanings and its significance in a particular case is dependent on the thought with which it is used and the context in which it is employed. (86 C.J.S., Through, p. 813.) The word is a very common preposition and its primary and ordinary meaning is from end to end; from side to side; from one surface or limit to the other surface or limit, and as meaning onward from point to point, or into or out of at the opposite, or at another point. As employed as an adjective and when used with respect to transportation, it means extending or going from point of departure to destination, and has been held to merely describe the line or direction of the route. When used as an adverb, it may be employed as meaning throughout; from beginning to end; to the ultimate purpose. (62 C.J., Through, p. 949.) As used in 17-618, the word through should be construed to be synonymous with in, over and across as merely describing the line or direction by which an easement passes through land or lots. The phrase over and through has been held not to include under, below or beneath. In Commonwealth v. Warwick, 185 Pa. 623, 40 A. 93, a telephone company contended it had the right to lay its lines in underground conduits pursuant to an ordinance by which it was authorized to run and maintain its wires over and through the streets of the city of Philadelphia for the purpose of establishing telephonic communication between its patrons and between its exchange office and the subscribers thereto ... It was held the company acquired no such right, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said: The grant however of authority to run and maintain wires `over and through' the streets, did not include permission to lay them under, below or beneath. Over and through are equivalent to across and along, not only by the natural meaning of the words in this connection, but by the practical construction given to them at the time of the acts of the parties. The claims of the realtor in this respect are too broad and cannot be sustained. (l.c. 637.) (Emphasis supplied.) The foregoing construction of the statute is sustained in Strain v. Cities Service Gas Co., 148 Kan. 393, 83 P.2d 124. There, the gas company sought to take by condemnation subterranean sands of the plaintiffs' land for a gas storage reservoir. This court said no statutory authority existed to condemn subterranean earth to store natural gas. The words of the statute empowering the exercise of eminent domain of on, through or over any land were expressly considered in the opinion, and in denying the right, the court said: ... If the rights contended for by appellant are to be given to gas pipeline companies, it is a matter for the consideration of the legislature. To stretch the statute to cover the case here presented would be little short of judicial legislation. (l.c. 397.) It is well settled that an easement taken by condemnation cannot be extended by implication or intendiment. Any ambiguity in the scope of the easement taken by the defendant in 1956 must be resolved against it. To permit the construction of 161,000 volt electric transmission line or lines by the use of a Berlin Wall under the plaintiffs' land by which they were compelled to pay the sum of $18,000 to have the construction company lower the wall so they might use their land to construct sewage lines without interference, is to grant a right the legislature never contemplated. I would reverse the judgment.