Opinion ID: 2260979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Reinstatement should be denied because of the lack of respondent's good moral character.

Text: ¶ 20 The majority opinion in Stewart's reinstatement request makes it clear that the fact of filing of the bankruptcy is not, in and of itself, the reason for denying reinstatement. It provides in pertinent part at ¶¶ 24-28: ¶ 24 The dissent would allow reinstatement based on the premise that a failure to allow Stewart to return to the practice of law based solely on her failure to meet her federal tax obligations violates concepts of federal constitutional principles. It is significant to note that the constitutional argument is raised sua sponte and was not relied upon by the attorney as a basis for her reinstatement petition. Furthermore, the dissent's analysis oversimplifies the decision to deny reinstatement. ¶ 25 Reinstatement is denied on the basis of Stewart's failure to present clear and convincing evidence that, if readmitted, her conduct would conform to the high standards required of a member of the Bar Association. [14] Stewart's omission in meeting her monetary obligations to the federal government is a reflection upon her character in that it demonstrates her failure to understand that the general public, the judiciary, and this Court must be able to rely upon her representations. ¶ 26 In Stewart I, the attorney argued that her misconduct called for either a public censure or, at most, a six month suspension. At that time Stewart had been suspended or disbarred in six jurisdictions: the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Texas, the United States District Courts for the Eastern District, the Northern District, and the Southern District of Texas, and from the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Stewart had also been convicted for contempt for violating the United States Code involving the overcharging of clients for fees and the failure to report the collection of such fees to the respective bankruptcy courts. She admitted failing to pay her tax obligations for at least two years. Most instructive is the fact that one factor this Court considered in imposing a four-year suspension rather than disbarring the attorney was the fact that Stewart had an agreement with the Internal Revenue Service to pay her tax debt. The same agreement for repayment was a condition of the attorney's probation. ¶ 27 The decision that the attorney does not possess the character necessary for reinstatement is not based merely on the failure to repay her debt. It encompasses a character flaw related to her promise to pay. If Stewart cannot be relied upon to meet her contractual duties to the federal government, this Court has no assurance that she will carry out promises entered in with regard to her clients, other attorneys, or the courts in which she might appear. ¶ 28 Another factor which causes this Court pause in allowing reinstatement is the attorney's failure to realize that her prior conduct is relevant to a determination of her current good character. Before the trial panel, the attorney testified that she did not believe that the reinstatement proceedings should encompass a retrial of the original conduct. [15] In her reply brief, filed on March 11, 2008, the attorney argued that due to claim preclusion (res judicata) it is inappropriate to re-litigate the original offense in this case. Stewart makes this argument despite a long line of Oklahoma jurisprudence making it clear that the seriousness of the original misconduct is one factor to be considered in any reinstatement proceeding. [Footnotes omitted. Emphasis in original.]