Opinion ID: 1823719
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: deborah a. marzula

Text: Crowell alleges that Marzula was negligent in the operation of her vehicle and in shouting to Crowell. The standard of conduct required of persons in Louisiana in their relationships with one another as a basis of delictual liability is set forth in La.Civ.Code arts. 2315 and 2316. Article 2315 provides in pertinent part: Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. Article 2316 provides that: Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill. Accordingly, under these articles, the elements of a cause of action are fault, causation, and damage. The conduct of which the plaintiff complains must be a cause-in-fact of the harm. After determining causation, the court must also determine what was the duty imposed on the defendant, and whether the risk which caused the accident was within the scope of the duty. A breach of a duty on the part of the defendant which was imposed to protect against the risk involved makes the offender negligent under the above articles. Morris v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 553 So.2d 427 (La.1989). In the instant case, Crowell testified that she heard someone yelling as she was driving down Hill Street. She turned her head to the left to see Marzula beside her. The next thing Crowell heard was a loud noise at the front of the car. Marzula testified that she did not yell to Crowell and that she did not invade Crowell's lane. Further, she said that she had completed her passing maneuver and was one-half block ahead of Crowell when the accident occurred. Through her rearview mirror, she saw Crowell's car go off to the right and hit the drainage culvert. No evidence was offered to prove that Marzula was speeding or that she passed in a no-passing zone. The investigating officer testified that he knew of no prohibitive passing indicators on Hill Street. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Crowell failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Marzula's conduct was a cause-in-fact of the accident. Hence, the trial judge was correct in granting Marzula's motion for involuntary dismissal. The court of appeal properly affirmed. Therefore, further inquiry into the negligence of Marzula and the claim for exemplary damages is not necessary.