Opinion ID: 2063677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Discovery Procedure

Text: On May 16, 1984, defendant filed a motion to compel production of exculpatory evidence, specifically, a letter allegedly in the possession of a prosecutor in Morgan County. Said letter was allegedly written by a confidential informer and allegedly contained exculpatory information. At a hearing on the motion, the Monroe County deputy prosecutor indicated she was unaware of any such letter, and that she had already provided the defense with everything in her file. It was also revealed defendant had filed a similar motion in Putnam County where he had other forgery charges currently pending. The Putnam County trial court had previously granted defendant's motion, yet defendant had not yet received the letter. The trial court in the instant case limited defendant's discovery request to exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Monroe County prosecutor's office. Defendant now contends the trial court erred by not compelling the Morgan County prosecutor's office to produce the letter. On this appeal, defendant has not only failed to show any prejudice whatsoever as a result of the trial court's ruling, but moreover, has failed to show whether the letter actually existed, or what, if anything, it purported to reveal. We therefore find this argument to be without merit. Defendant also claims error in the trial court's rulings allowing certain evidence to be admitted at trial because the State allegedly failed to timely provide both evidence and pre-trial statements of certain witnesses in contravention to the trial court's discovery orders. A trial judge has the responsibility to direct the trial in a manner which facilitates the ascertainment of truth, insures fairness, and obtains economy of time and effort commensurate with the rights of both society and the criminal defendant. Allen v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 615; State ex rel. Keller v. Criminal Court of Marion County (1974), 262 Ind. 420, 317 N.E.2d 433; Reid v. State (1978), 267 Ind. 555, 372 N.E.2d 1149. Where there has been a failure to comply with discovery procedures, the trial judge is usually in the best position to determine the dictates of fundamental fairness and whether any resulting harm can be eliminated or satisfactorily alleviated. Reid, supra . Where remedial measures are warranted, a continuance is usually the proper remedy, but exclusion of evidence may be appropriate where the discovery non-compliance has been flagrant and deliberate, or so misleading or in such bad faith as to impair the right of fair trial. Wagner v. State (1985), Ind., 474 N.E.2d 476; Crenshaw v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 620. The trial court must be given wide discretionary latitude in discovery matters since it has the duty to promote the discovery of truth and to guide and control the proceedings, and will be granted deference in assessing what constitutes substantial compliance with discovery orders. Allen, supra; Harris v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 112. Absent clear error and resulting prejudice, the trial court's determinations as to violations and sanctions should not be overturned. Wagner, supra; Murray v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1012. The record reveals some instances of late disclosure on the part of the State; however, the deputy prosecutor made adequate explanations for the late revelations since, in most cases, the evidence was not available earlier. The defendant made no motion for a continuance to remedy any harm inflicted by the late disclosures. We perceive no purposeful or deliberate failure to produce discoverable items. There is no clear error, and we are unpersuaded defendant has been prejudiced to an extent warranting reversal.