Opinion ID: 2625939
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Heading: Does the Ex Post Facto Clause Prohibit Resentencing Under Arizona's Amended Capital Sentencing Procedure?

Text: ¶ 15 The defendants argue that resentencing under A.R.S. sections 13-703 and 13-703.01 (Supp.2002) (the new sentencing statutes) would constitute an ex post facto violation under the United States Constitution, Article I, Section 10, Clause 1, and the Arizona Constitution, Article II, Section 25. We disagree. [4] ¶ 16 The ex post facto doctrine prohibits a state from retroactively alter[ing] the definition of crimes or increas[ing] the punishment for criminal acts. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). In Dobbert v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that ex post facto prohibitions reach only those legislative enactments that affect substantive criminal law. 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). Likewise, we recently held that, under the United States and Arizona Constitutions, [a]n ex post facto law is one that increases the punishment or aggravates any crime previously committed. Zuther v. State, 199 Ariz. 104, 111 ¶ 26, 14 P.3d 295, 302 (2000) (holding legislative amendment changing statutory computation of prisoner gate money not an ex post facto law because legislative purpose was not punitive). ¶ 17 In Dobbert, the Supreme Court restated the categories of laws constituting substantive changes to criminal law: [A]ny statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto. 432 U.S. at 292, 97 S.Ct. at 2298 (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)). Thus, a legislative act affecting changes in criminal procedure, including procedural changes that disadvantage a defendant, generally does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Collins, 497 U.S. at 45, 110 S.Ct. at 2720 ([Procedural] refers to changes in the procedures by which a criminal case is adjudicated, as opposed to changes in the substantive law of crimes.); State v. Mendoza, 170 Ariz. 184, 193, 823 P.2d 51, 60 (1992) (A defendant has no vested right in any particular mode of procedure.). ¶ 18 The question before us, then, is whether Arizona's new sentencing statutes worked a substantive or procedural change in the law as it existed when these murders took place. We regard three decisions as particularly instructive. ¶ 19 In Dobbert, the defendant argued that his death sentence violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Dobbert killed his children in 1972. At that time, Florida mandated a death sentence for capital felony convictions unless the jury, in its discretion, recommended mercy to the judge. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 287, 97 S.Ct. at 2295. Shortly after Dobbert murdered his children, the Supreme Court decided Furman v. Georgia, striking down the Georgia death sentencing statute as unconstitutional. Id. at 288, 97 S.Ct. at 2296. A month later, in Donaldson v. Sack, the Florida Supreme Court held the Florida death sentencing statute unconstitutional under Furman. 265 So.2d 499, 501 (Fla.1972). Later that year, the Florida Legislature amended the state's capital sentencing procedure to comply with Furman and Donaldson. Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 288, 97 S.Ct. at 2296. Dobbert was then tried and sentenced to death under the state's new law. Id. at 284, 97 S.Ct. at 2294. ¶ 20 Dobbert failed to persuade the Supreme Court that sentencing him under the amended procedures violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The Court first limited ex post facto violations to those occurring when a statute makes criminal a previously innocent act, aggravates a crime previously committed, provides greater punishment, or changes the quantum of proof needed to convict a defendant. Id. at 292, 97 S.Ct. at 2298 (quoting Beazell, 269 U.S. at 169-70, 46 S.Ct. at 68). None of those categories applied to the Florida statute. Instead, the Court concluded, the statutory change between the two sentencing methods was clearly procedural, and [t]he new statute simply altered the methods employed in determining whether the death penalty was to be imposed; there was no change in the quantum of punishment attached to the crime. Id. at 293-94, 97 S.Ct. at 2298. ¶ 21 The Supreme Court also rejected an Ex Post Facto Clause challenge in Collins v. Youngblood , a non-death penalty case. The jury had imposed a prison sentence and a fine, the latter not authorized by law. 497 U.S. at 39, 110 S.Ct. at 2717. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reformed the sentence under a statute enacted after the defendant's criminal act took place. Id. at 40, 110 S.Ct. at 2718. The Supreme Court held that applying the sentence reform statute in the defendant's case did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because although the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial is substantial, it is not a right that has anything to do with the definition of crimes, defenses, or punishments. Id. at 51-52, 110 S.Ct. at 2724 (overruling Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898)). ¶ 22 In State v. Correll, in contrast, we found a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. 148 Ariz. 468, 482, 715 P.2d 721, 735 (1986), rev'd in part on other grounds by Correll v. Stewart, 137 F.3d 1404 (9th Cir.1998). A jury convicted the defendant of three counts of first degree murder. After the murders, but before sentencing, the legislature amended A.R.S. section 13-703.F to add multiple homicide convictions as an aggravating circumstance. We held that retroactively applying the new aggravating circumstance constituted a substantive change to capital murder and disadvantaged the defendant. Id. This change affected the substantive nature of the crime and sentencing by adding a new element that, if present, permitted the defendant to receive a more severe punishment than that available at the time of the crime. [5] ¶ 23 These cases clearly indicate not only that ex post facto principles generally do not bar applying procedural changes to criminal proceedings, but also that the general framework of a state's statutory capital sentencing scheme is procedural in nature. As Collins established, rights secured by the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, the right at issue here, are inherently procedural. 497 U.S. at 51, 110 S.Ct. at 2724. Under the holding of Dobbert, Arizona's change in the statutory method for imposing capital punishment is clearly procedural: The new sentencing statutes alter the method used to determine whether the death penalty will be imposed but make no change to the punishment attached to first degree murder. The new sentencing statutes added no new element, or functional equivalent of an element, to first degree murder. [6] Correll, 148 Ariz. at 481-82, 715 P.2d at 734-35. Hence, the changes to the state's capital sentencing procedures do not resemble the type of after-the-fact legislative evil contemplated by contemporary understandings of the ex post facto doctrine. ¶ 24 Even a procedural change amounts to an ex post facto violation, however, when it affects matters of substance, by depriving a defendant of substantial protections with which the existing law surrounds the person accused of crime, or arbitrarily infringing upon substantial personal rights. Collins, 497 U.S. at 45, 110 S.Ct. at 2720 (quoting Beazell, 269 U.S. at 171, 46 S.Ct. at 69; Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183, 35 S.Ct. 507, 508, 59 L.Ed. 905 (1915); and Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382-83, 14 S.Ct. 570, 572, 38 L.Ed. 485 (1894)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The change involved here does not affect the substantive matters of the defendants' prosecutions. See id. Under the new sentencing statutes, to obtain a death sentence, the state must prove the same aggravating circumstances required by the former statute and must prove them beyond a reasonable doubt. The only difference is that a jury, rather than a judge, decides whether the state has proved its case. The new sentencing statutes do not place the defendants in jeopardy of any greater punishment than that already imposed under the superseded statutes. Accordingly, applying the new sentencing statutes does not violate the federal or state Ex Post Facto Clause.