Opinion ID: 2752607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Jury Instructions Were Erroneous

Text: El-Shaddai raises two arguments against the challenged jury instruction.4 First, he contends that, although the district 4 We reject the officers’ argument that the jury instructions should be reviewed for plain error because, the officers claim, El-Shaddai failed to properly object to the instruction. El-Shaddai, who was without counsel, did object at other points in the proceedings that Heck v. Humphrey did not bar his claim because it would not affect his sentence. Also, the officers’ own counsel’s contemporaneous objection to the instruction, 12 WILKERSON V. WHEELER court thought the instruction was required by Heck v. Humphrey, that case does not apply where, as here, the duration of an inmate’s sentence is not at stake. Second, he contends that the instruction “had the effect of barring relevant testimony in violation of Simpson v. Thomas, 528 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 2008),” because it contradicted ElShaddai’s testimony that he had not resisted the prison guards. As to El-Shaddai’s first contention, we conclude that Heck did not require the jury instruction given here. In Heck, the Supreme Court ruled that an inmate may not seek damages in a § 1983 claim when establishing the basis for the claim necessarily involves demonstrating that the conviction, sentence, or length of incarceration is invalid. 512 U.S. at 480–82; see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643–47 (1997) (extending Heck rule to § 1983 claims that, if successful, would imply the invalidity of deprivations of good-time credits provided for by prison disciplinary proceedings). But the Supreme Court has clarified that Heck does not bar a § 1983 claim that “threatens no consequence for [an inmate’s] conviction or the duration of [his or her sentence.]” Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 751 (2004). We have also held that application of Heck “turns solely on whether a successful § 1983 action would necessarily render invalid a conviction, sentence, or administrative sanction that affected the length of the prisoner’s confinement.” Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 856 (9th Cir. 2003). Here, El-Shaddai is serving an indefinite life sentence. Any loss of good-time credits could not extend his potential arguing that it would violate Simpson v. Thomas, put the district court on notice of potential error. WILKERSON V. WHEELER 13 term, which is life in prison. Further, as the California Attorney General’s office argued in El-Shaddai’s habeas corpus proceedings challenging the prison disciplinary action, the loss of good-time credits for a prisoner, such as ElShaddai, whose date at which he is initially eligible for parole has already passed, does not affect the length of sentence. We conclude that Heck v. Humphrey did not require the challenged jury instruction. Of course, even if Heck did not require the district court to give the instruction, it would not be error for the district court to do so unless the instruction contained some other error of fact or law. So long as an instruction correctly states the law and is not misleading or inadequate, a district court’s decision to give an instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Oglesby v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 6 F.3d 603, 606 (9th Cir. 1993). But the instruction here was misleading, and defendants have not carried their burden to show that any error was harmless. In Simpson v. Thomas, we reversed a district court’s exclusion of a § 1983 plaintiff’s testimony. 528 F.3d at 696. The district court had held that, because Heck barred the use of § 1983 suits to collaterally attack prison disciplinary proceedings, and a disciplinary proceeding had found inmate Simpson responsible for instigating the use of force challenged in the § 1983 suit, Simpson was not permitted to testify that a guard had punched him first. Id. at 688–89. However, we held that Heck is not an evidentiary bar, but a claims bar, and so long as the § 1983 suit did not impact the disciplinary proceedings, the plaintiff was “entitled to tell the jury the entire story.” Id. at 696. 14 WILKERSON V. WHEELER Here, the district court’s instruction, though it did not directly exclude any testimony, was in tension with ElShaddai’s trial testimony in a way that likely confused the jury. El-Shaddai testified: “I didn’t refuse to comply with him. I just told him I’m getting my legal stuff first. I never said that I was—I’m not leaving the law library. I just said let me—I’m not leaving without my material.” Even if, as defendants contend, El-Shaddai’s statements that he did not immediately obey the officer constitute resistance under the relevant California penal regulations, the instruction that ElShaddai did resist and was disciplined for that resistance, without clarifying for the jury that resistance need not be physical, posed a severe risk of prejudice. In light of the instruction, the jurors may well have understood that they were to disbelieve El-Shaddai’s testimony in whole or in part. Even if such an instruction did not actually bar testimony within the meaning of Simpson, we conclude that it was misleading and therefore error. We conclude that El-Shaddai was prejudiced by the instruction that he had resisted the officers. Because his own testimony was the central component of El-Shaddai’s case, the likelihood of prejudice here is difficult to overcome. ElShaddai testified that he was handcuffed and in waist restraints in the library. There was no evidence that ElShaddai tried to assault any of the officers or posed a similar physical threat. The jury, without the instruction that ElShadai resisted the officers, or even with that instruction if it had been adequately clarified on the nature of his “resistance,” might well have decided that the force used against El-Shaddai was excessive. WILKERSON V. WHEELER 15 The crux of this appeal is this: The district court gave a general instruction on excessive force telling the jury to consider: the need to use force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, whether defendants applied the force in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, any threat reasonably perceived by the defendants, any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response, and the extent of the injury suffered. In considering these factors, you should give deference to prison officials in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve discipline and to maintain internal security in a prison. Being told that El-Shaddai had resisted the officers without more clarification would probably lead a reasonable jury to think that his resistance had a physical component, and that in turn would justify the use of physical force by the officers to restrain him. But if in fact, as he testified, his only resistance was briefly to delay complying with a command to come back to his cell and to say that he would await his legal papers from the copier, a jury would not necessarily have determined that physical force used against him was not excessive. The instruction that El-Shaddai had resisted the officers, as determined in a prison discipline proceeding that wasn’t appealed, was likely to lead the jury to conclude that he had used physical force in resisting, rendering use of physical force against him not excessive. Yet, if El-Shaddai’s testimony was credited by a jury, the jurors might have concluded that the officers did use excessive force, as El16 WILKERSON V. WHEELER Shaddai had not physically resisted. To level the playing field in a fair way required either not giving the instruction that he had resisted the officers, or giving an adequate explanation of the nature of his resistance consistent with his testimony. We hold that the challenged instruction was misleading and that there was resulting prejudice. Because we vacate the district court’s judgment and remand for a new trial on the basis of the flawed jury instructions, we do not address ElShaddai’s arguments about his first request for appointed counsel or the evidentiary issues. We note, however, that at oral argument, El-Shaddai’s pro bono attorneys indicated that they would continue to represent him on remand.