Opinion ID: 52875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Caselaw on kidnapping as an enumerated offense

Text: In Gonzalez-Ramirez, this court addressed whether a conviction under section XX-XX-XXX of the Tennessee Code qualifies as a conviction for the enumerated offense of kidnapping. 477 F.3d at 314. Section 39-13-303 defines kidnapping as false imprisonment . . . (1)[u]nder circumstances exposing the other person to substantial risk of bodily injury; or (2)[w]here the confinement of another is in a condition of involuntary servitude. Id. (quoting TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-303 (2003)). False imprisonment, in turn, is defined as knowingly remov[ing] or confin[ing] another unlawfully so as to interfere substantially with the other's liberty. Id. (quoting TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-302 (2003)). The Tennessee Code defines unlawfully as follows: Unlawful means, with respect to removal or confinement, one that is accomplished by force, threat or fraud, or, in the case of a person who is under the age of thirteen (13) or incompetent, accomplished without the consent of a parent, guardian or other person responsible for the general supervision of the minor's or incompetent's welfare. TENN.CODE ANN. § 39-13-301(2). Thus, under Tennessee law, kidnapping entails the following: knowing removal or confinement; accomplished by force, threat, or fraud (or, for incompetents or minors, without consent of a guardian); in a manner that interferes substantially with the other's liberty; and (1) under circumstances exposing the other person to substantial risk of bodily injury, or (2) where the confinement of another is in a condition of involuntary servitude. The Gonzalez-Ramirez court looked to the MPC definition of kidnapping and explained that kidnapping does not occur under the Model Penal Code absent one of the specifically enumerated purposes. 477 F.3d at 316. [6] The court further noted, however, that a majority of states have rejected a specified purpose requirement for kidnapping crimes. Id. at 318. The court therefore decided that it [could not] conclude that a specified purpose or intent is required for a state kidnapping conviction to constitute a crime of violence under section 2L1.2 [of the U.S.S.G.] Id. After restating the elements of Tennessee Code section 39-13-303, the court explained, Tennessee's kidnapping statute is in line with a majority of other states with regard to victims who are children or legally incompetent, and it is at least as restrictive, if not more restrictive, than a majority of state kidnapping statutes as to competent adults. In this latter regard, it is significant that Tennessee requires the use of force, threat or fraud along with the additional aggravating elements of substantial risk of injury or confinement as a condition of involuntary servitude. Id. at 319. The court therefore concluded that Tennessee's statute does not sweep more broadly than the generic, contemporary meaning of the term `kidnapping.' Id. at 320. We held that [b]ecause Tennessee's statutory definition of kidnapping falls within the generic, contemporary meaning of `kidnapping,' an enumerated offense in the commentary to section 2L1.2, the district court did not err in applying a crime-of-violence enhancement in this case. Id. at 311. This court relied heavily on Gonzalez-Ramirez in its recent decision in Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d 790, which addressed whether a conviction under New York's second-degree kidnapping statute, New York Penal Law § 135.20, qualifies as a conviction for the enumerated offense of kidnapping. New York Penal Law § 135.20 states that [a] person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree when he abducts another person. 485 F.3d at 791. The New York code defines abduct as to restrain a person with intent to prevent his liberation by either (a) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly physical force. Id.; see NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 135.00(2). Restrain means to restrict a person's movements intentionally and unlawfully in such manner as to interfere substantially with his liberty by moving him from one place to another, or by confining him either in the place where the restriction commences or in a place to which he has been moved, without consent and with knowledge that the restriction is unlawful. A person is so moved or confined without consent when such is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation or deception, or (b) any means whatever, including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and the parent, guardian or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced in the movement or confinement. 485 F.3d at 791; see NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 135.00(1). The Iniguez-Barba court first noted that in Gonzalez-Ramirez, we rejected the argument that because the MPC requires a specific purpose for an act to be `kidnapping' (such as a desire for ransom, an intent to facilitate another felony or flight, etc.), the generic, contemporary meaning of kidnapping includes such a purpose. 485 F.3d at 791. Consequently, the court concluded that NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 135.20 can be a kidnapping statute even though it doesn't require such a purpose. Id. The court then noted that the Tennessee statute held in Gonzalez-Ramirez to constitute the enumerated offense of kidnapping included the following elements: (1) knowing removal or confinement; (2) substantial interference with the victim's liberty; (3) (a) force, threat, or fraud, or (b) if the victim is incompetent or under age thirteen, lack of consent from the person responsible for the general supervision of the victim's welfare; and (4) (a) circumstances exposing the victim to substantial risk of bodily injury, or (b) confinement as a condition of involuntary servitude, meaning the condition of a person who is compelled by force, coercion or imprisonment and against the person's will to labor for another, whether paid or not. Id. at 791-92 (citing Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d at 318). The court noted that NEW YORK PENAL LAW § 135.20 includes the first three of those four elements; it does not include the last. Id. at 792. We held that the first three [elements] are sufficient to render an offense the equivalent of the enumerated offense of kidnapping. Id. The court explained that in Gonzalez-Ramirez we held that the Tennessee statute in question was at least as restrictive, if not more restrictive, than a majority of state kidnapping statutes as to competent adults. Id. (quoting Gonzalez-Ramirez, 477 F.3d at 319). The court also pointed out that, as we noted in Gonzalez-Ramirez, the elements of force, threat, or fraud or, for children or incompetents, lack of valid consent, are elements of MPC kidnapping not included in lesser MPC offenses. Id. The court further noted that the Black's Law Dictionary definition of kidnapping did not require a potential for injury or involuntary servitude. Id. at 793. Finally, the court acknowledged that in United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 168 Fed.Appx. 564, this court held that Texas's kidnapping statute, Texas Penal Code § 20.03, which is almost identical to New York's and doesn't require a risk of injury or involuntary servitude qualified as a crime of violence. Iniguez-Barba, 485 F.3d at 793. The court noted that although [ Garcia-Gonzalez ] isn't controlling, it's consistent with our holding today. Id. In Garcia-Gonzalez, an unpublished decision, this court held that a conviction under Texas's kidnapping statute qualifies as a conviction for the enumerated offense of kidnapping. 168 Fed.Appx. at 565. Under Texas Penal Code § 20.03(a), a person commits the offense of kidnapping if he intentionally or knowingly abducts another person. Id. [7] In a very brief analysis, this court explained that the elements of the Texas kidnapping offense are consistent with the ordinary, contemporary, and common understanding of the term as defined by Black's Law Dictionary. Id.