Opinion ID: 855855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the contempt sanction

Text: In determining whether the contempt sanction in this case was properly imposed, the threshold issue is whether it was civil or criminal in nature. This inquiry is necessary because “[i]t is widely recognized that due process requirements vary in their applicability to contempt cases depending upon the nature of the contempt involved.” State ex rel. Robinson v. Michael, 166 W. Va. 660, 669 n.9, 276 S.E.2d 812, 817 n.9 (1981). In this regard, there are actually four classifications of contempt: direct-criminal, indirect-criminal, direct-civil, and indirect-civil. Id; see also State ex rel. Koppers Co. v. Int’l Union of Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers, 171 W. Va. 290, 292-93, 298 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1982). Direct contempt occurs in the actual physical presence of the court, while indirect contempt occurs entirely or partially outside of the actual physical presence of the court. In this case, it is beyond dispute that the contempt, be it civil or criminal, was indirect. In Robinson, Justice McHugh, writing for the Court, presented a scholarly history and analysis of our precedents, noting at the outset that [t]he law of contempt is frequently a source of confusion. The usual confusion associated with this area of the law arises in classifying the contempt as civil or criminal and in distinguishing the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for the contempt. The history of contempt in West Virginia reflects that confusion. 20 166 W. Va. at 662, 276 S.E.2d at 814. Following this analysis, Justice McHugh established functional tests for distinguishing between civil and criminal contempt. The contempt is civil where the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to compel compliance with a court order by the contemner so as to benefit the party bringing the contempt action by enforcing, protecting, or assuring the right of that party under the order. The appropriate sanction in a civil contempt case is an order that incarcerates a contemner for an indefinite term and that also specifies a reasonable manner in which the contempt may be purged thereby securing the immediate release of the contemner, or an order requiring the payment of a fine in the nature of compensation or damages to the party aggrieved by the failure of the contemner to comply with the order. The contempt is criminal where the purpose to be served by imposing a sanction for contempt is to punish the contemner for an affront to the dignity or authority of the court, or to preserve or restore order in the court or respect for the court. The appropriate sanction in a criminal contempt case is an order sentencing the contemner to a definite term of imprisonment or an order requiring the contemner to pay a fine in a determined amount. Id. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818 (internal citations omitted). Justice McHugh’s analysis was entirely consistent with “principles [that] have been settled at least in their broad outlines for many decades.” Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631 (1988). Of relevance to the instant case, the United States Supreme Court held in 21 Hicks that civil contempt sanctions must be remedial, not punitive, explaining that sanctions are “remedial when [they are] paid to the complainant, and punitive when [they are] paid to the court, though a fine that would be payable to the court is also remedial when the defendant can avoid paying the fine simply by performing the affirmative act required by the court’s order.” Hicks, 485 U.S. at 632. A review of this Court’s precedents post-Robinson leads us to conclude that Justice McHugh’s characterization of contempt as “a source of confusion” remains valid thirty years later. Some of our precedents distinguishing between remedial and punitive sanctions are difficult to reconcile, possibly as a result of the fact-driven inquiry that is at the heart of every contempt case. It is fair to say, at the least, that our precedents do not proceed in linear fashion from Robinson. Of relevance to the instant case, we first examine Gant v. Gant, 174 W. Va. 740, 751, 329 S.E.2d 106, 117-18 (1985), where we held that in a divorce case where the contemner has failed to pay court-ordered support, the only civil contempt sanction that may be imposed is coercive imprisonment, not a per diem fine, despite the fact that either or both types of sanction would serve the remedial purpose of coercing compliance with the support order. In this respect Gant may be seen as completely consistent with Robinson, where Justice McHugh made no mention of a per diem fine but rather stated that 22 “[t]he appropriate sanction in a civil contempt case is an order that incarcerates a contemner for an indefinite term and that also specifies a reasonable manner in which the contempt may be purged thereby securing the immediate release of the contemner[.]” Robinson, 166 W. Va. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818. Thereafter, in Vincent v. Preiser, 175 W. Va. 797, 338 S.E.2d 398 (1986), we reversed the circuit court’s imposition of a per diem fine upon a litigant who had a “tortuous history” of failing to comply with discovery orders, id. at 799, 338 S.E.2d at 399, but not on the ground that a per diem fine is per se impermissible as a civil contempt sanction, as in Gant.16 Rather, this Court first noted that although the circuit court’s initial order, finding appellant Vincent to be in contempt, specified that the $100.00 per day fine was to be paid to appellee Preiser, the court’s final order, reducing the per diem fines to a sum certain, specified that the fine was to be paid to the circuit clerk. Id. at 802, 338 S.E.2d at 403. The Court also reviewed the transcripts of court hearings and concluded that the circuit court’s stated purpose to reimburse the appellee was a collateral purpose; the transcripts, the Court found, “indicate[d] that the predominant purpose of the monetary sanctions imposed by the trial court was to punish the appellant for his disrespect for the 16 In Vincent, a $100.00 per day sanction was imposed for every day of non-compliance with discovery orders (seventy-four days in all), then reduced to a sum certain, $7,400.00, and ordered to be paid to the party aggrieved by the contemner’s conduct. 23 court’s authority.” Id. Taking both of these considerations into account, the Court concluded that “there was ‘an impermissible confusion or combination of purpose on the part of the sanctioning court’ in treating the noncompliance with discovery orders as partially criminal contempt and partially civil contempt.” Id. at 803, 338 S.E.2d at 404 (citing Robinson, 166 W. Va. at 671, 276 S.E.2d at 818); see also Trecost v. Trecost, 202 W. Va. 129, 133, 502 S.E.2d 445, 449 (1998 ) (“[t]hat an act is punished as neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal reflects an impermissible confusion or combination of purpose on the part of the sanctioning court.”). Thereafter, in syllabus point six of State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Company v. Stephens, 188 W. Va. 622, 425 S.E.2d 577 (1992), this Court held that in a civil action where the contemner had failed to provide court-ordered discovery: A civil contempt sanction that sets monetary penalties retroactively before the hearing on contempt for failure to comply with a discovery order cannot be enforced. A monetary per diem penalty is permissible where it is set prospectively from the date of the contempt order as a means of ensuring compliance with the underlying discovery order. We distinguished Vincent, noting that its language to the effect that “a prospective, per diem fine was inappropriate,” was dicta; and further noting that the critical factor in Vincent was “that the trial court attempted to impose a monetary fine upon the plaintiff for conduct which occurred before the plaintiff was found in contempt[.]” State Farm, 188 W. 24 Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587. Citing numerous cases from other jurisdictions that have upheld imposition of a per diem fine as a sanction for civil contempt, we found the following passage from United States v. Westinghouse, 648 F.2d 642, 651 (9 th Cir. 1981), to be consistent with our view of the nature of a civil contempt: [T]he purpose [of the fines] was to compel the companies to comply with the court’s schedule for discovery . . . [T]he companies could have purged themselves of contempt and of any fine through timely compliance. The sanctions were therefore remedial rather than punitive, prospective and for the benefit of the other party to the litigation rather than unconditional, retrospective, or in vindication of the state’s authority . . . . In short, the fines were compulsory in nature, . . . and as such the contempt was civil. That the companies were forced to pay the piper even though they belatedly complied with the orders does not alter the civil nature of the contempt. State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 631-32, 425 S.E.2d at 586-87. Finally, in Trecost, after determining that an award of attorney fees as part of the sanction in a criminal contempt case was error,17 we concluded by “urg[ing] circuit courts to adhere to the precepts of Robinson in fashioning sanctions for civil and criminal cases.” Trecost, 202 W. Va. at 133, 502 S.E.2d at 449. While we affirmed in Trecost that “a fine in the nature of compensation or damages to the party aggrieved . . . is a proper sanction 17 “‘[R]equiring the payment of a fine in the nature of compensation or damages to the party aggrieved by the failure of the contemnor to comply with the order’ is a proper sanction in a civil contempt case, but not in a criminal contempt case.” Trecost, 202 W. Va. at 133, 502 S.E.2d at 449 (quoting Robinson, Syllabus Points 3 & 5). 25 in a civil contempt case . . . ,” id., we did not mention that a prospective per diem fine is also a proper sanction, Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 624, 425 S.E.2d at 579, since this was not necessary to the resolution of the case. With Robinson and its progeny in mind, we turn to the dispositive question presented in this case: whether the penalty imposed on Cordelia Q. was civil, criminal, or a “confusion or combination” of both. In this regard, we note that the penalty was classified in one paragraph of the circuit court’s order as a coercive per diem penalty, and in another paragraph as compensation or damages to the party aggrieved by the contempt. We examine the validity of the penalty under both scenarios.
It is well established that where a coercive civil contempt sanction is imposed, the contemner must have the opportunity to purge himself or herself of contempt by complying with the relevant court order. Robinson, 166 W. Va. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818; Westinghouse, 648 F.2d at 651; see also Slauenwhite v. Slauenwhite, 679 A.2d 93, 94 (Me. 1996); Ohio Dept. Of Taxation v. Kunkle, 903 N.E.2d 692, 696 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). It is often said, somewhat literally in the case of imprisonment and metaphorically in the case of a monetary sanction, that the contemner “has the keys to the cell in his or her own hands.” In re Marriage of Tatham, 688 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); see also 26 Varley v. Varley, 934 S.W.2d 659, 664 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996) (to same effect). Petitioner claims that her contempt cannot be classified as civil in nature because the nunc pro tunc imposition of a $50.00 per diem sanction did not allow her to purge herself of the contempt, since the time for purging had already elapsed at the time the sanction was imposed. See State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587 (“a civil contempt sanction that sets monetary penalties retroactively before the hearing on contempt for failure to comply with a discovery order cannot be enforced.”). We agree, although only with respect to that portion of the fine that imposed daily penalties from October 28, 2008, the date on which the mental hygiene commissioner orally recommended that the petitioner be held in contempt, to August 25, 2010, the date on which the circuit court entered its order of contempt and set the $50.00 per day penalty. The whole purpose of a prospective fine is to coerce obedience to a lawful order of the circuit court, by giving the contemner the “power to avoid any penalty” by complying with the order. Penfield Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947). In this case, the circuit court retroactively imposed a prospective fine, meaning that it was not prospective at all for the period beginning October 28, 2008, and ending on August 25, 2010. The retroactive fine was not a “coercive sanction[] to compel the contemnor to do what the law made it [her] duty to do . . . ,” and was therefore not remedial; it was punitive. Id.; see also 27 State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587 (“impos[ition of] a monetary fine for conduct which occurred before the plaintiff was found in contempt of the court’s discovery order, [is] a sanction which smacks of a criminal penalty, rather than a coercive civil penalty which can be purged upon compliance with the discovery order.”).18 It is not clear from the petitioner’s brief whether she is contesting the fine insofar as it actually did operate prospectively, i.e., from August 25, 2010, to June 11, 2011, the date on which Frieda died. However, there can be no serious question that from August 25, 2010, forward, the fine was civil in nature and entirely proper as a sanction pursuant to this Court’s decision in State Farm: it operated to coerce Cordelia’s compliance with the circuit court’s orders, and Cordelia could have avoided it completely by promptly turning over the accounting of Frieda’s assets, Frieda’s physical property, and Frieda’s will. “A monetary per diem penalty is permissible where it is set prospectively from the date of the contempt order as a means of ensuring compliance with the underlying discovery order.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587. In light of the foregoing, we reaffirm the continuing vitality of the law enunciated 18 It is of no moment that the mental hygiene commissioner had orally found Cordelia to be in contempt two years before the circuit court entered its contempt order. The commissioner did not have contempt power; rather, she had the power to make findings and recommendations, which could then be accepted or rejected by the court. 28 in State Farm, which held that a per diem penalty is a permissible civil contempt sanction in a case where a litigant has refused to obey an order of the court, where the fine is set prospectively from the date of the order of contempt, and where the contemner has the ability to purge himself or herself by complying with the order. However, “[a] civil contempt sanction that sets monetary penalties retroactively before the hearing on contempt for failure to comply with a discovery order cannot be enforced.” Syl. Pt. 6, in part, State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587. Applying these principles to the case at bar, that portion of the per diem penalty covering the period of time from October 28, 2008, to August 25, 2010, the date of entry of the circuit court’s order of contempt, was impermissible as it “smacks of a criminal penalty, rather than a coercive civil penalty which can be purged upon compliance[.]” State Farm, 188 W. Va. at 632, 425 S.E.2d at 587. That portion of the per diem penalty which was prospective from August 25, 2010, to June 11, 2011, the date of Frieda’s death, was a permissible civil contempt penalty, as the contemner could have purged herself at any time after August 25, 2010, and thus avoided the penalty.
Respondents contend that notwithstanding the analysis above, the contempt was civil in nature because the circuit court specified that “[t]he fifty dollar per day sanction was properly ordered to be paid to Frieda [Q.], through her conservator, the KCSD, as a 29 form of compensation or damages, inasmuch as Frieda [Q.] was the party aggrieved by the contemptuous conduct.” It was established in Robertson and affirmed in all of our cases thereafter with the exception of Gant, discussed infra, that a sanction for civil contempt may take the form of “an order requiring the payment of a fine in the nature of compensation or damages to the party aggrieved by the failure of the contemner to comply with the [underlying] order.” Robertson, 166 W. Va. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818. In this case, however, notwithstanding the circuit court’s dutiful recitation of the words “compensation or damages,” the sanction was not related in any way to actual injury or harm caused to the respondents.19 Rather, the amount was calculated by multiplying the per diem fine, $50.00, by the number of days that had elapsed since the date on which the mental hygiene commissioner orally found Cordelia to be in contempt. In short, the “compensation or damages” award was simply the per diem fine, thinly disguised. Thus, as was the situation in Vincent, our review of the appendix record demonstrates that “the predominant purpose of the monetary sanctions imposed by the trial court was to punish the appellant for [her] disrespect for the court’s authority . . . ,” and the 19 If there was any evidence presented to the circuit court as to injury or harm, it is not included in the appendix record and, therefore, cannot be considered by this Court on appeal. 30 contempt was therefore criminal at least in part. Vincent, 175 W. Va. at 802, 338 S.E.2d at 403. The petitioner contends, in cursory fashion, that imposition of the sanction under these facts and circumstances violated her right to due process of law. We note at the outset that both West Virginia’s contempt statute and this Court’s precedents have been limited to a consideration of certain procedural due process rights which are not at issue in this case. “No court shall impose a fine for contempt, unless the defendant be present in court, or shall have been served with a rule of the court to show cause, on some certain day, and shall have failed to appear and show cause.” W. Va. Code § 61-5-26 (2010). Although a jury trial is not required in a civil contempt case, “certain procedural safeguards must be present. The accused must have notice, the right to counsel, and the right to present evidence and argue his case.” Lawyer Disciplinary Counsel v. Cunningham, 200 W. Va. 339, 341 & n.4, 489 S.E.2d 496, 498 & n.4 (1997) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Faerber, 179 W. Va. 73, 76 n.3, 365 S.E.2d 353, 356 n.3 (1986)). Cordelia Q. enjoyed all of these procedural protections during the course of the contempt proceedings below. Nonetheless, we find that the monetary sanction imposed upon Cordelia violated her due process rights under the West Virginia Constitution, article III, section 10, because the sanction was neither a prospective per diem fine nor “compensation or damages” for the party aggrieved. Rather, it was arbitrarily imposed and was punitive in nature. 31 In all of our precedents, the monetary sanctions imposed for contempt have ranged from nominal ($10.00) to modest, albeit attention-getting ($500.00). In contrast, the monetary sanction imposed on Cordelia was $47,800.00, with post-judgment interest until paid. Under the facts of this case, this extraordinary sanction cannot be upheld. Although designated as “compensation or damages” for Frieda, it bore no relationship whatsoever to any injury or harm sustained by Frieda (or her conservator acting on her behalf); no evidence was presented from which an award of “compensation and damages” could have been rationally determined. Rather, as noted earlier, the circuit court simply multiplied the per diem fine, $50.00, by the number of days that had elapsed from October 28, 2008, the date on which the mental hygiene commissioner recommended that Cordelia be held in contempt, to July 11, 1011, the date on which Frieda died. The court then labeled the result “compensation or damages” in an apparent attempt to bring the fine within the language of Robinson and its progeny. While we are sympathetic to the circuit court’s understandable frustration with Cordelia, who shamefully neglected her aged mother, systematically converted her assets, and then stonewalled any attempts to require an accounting, the words of Robinson at issue here, “compensation or damages,” have meaning. Robinson, 166 W. Va. at 670, 276 S.E.2d at 818. In this regard, we hold that a monetary civil contempt sanction for 32 compensation or damages must be based upon competent evidence of actual injury or harm to the aggrieved party resulting from the contemner’s refusal to follow an order of the circuit court. The sanction must be remedial, not punitive. See N.L.R.B. v. Monfort, Inc., 29 F.3d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1994) (“The sanction of civil contempt serves two remedial purposes: (1) to enforce compliance with an order of the court, and (2) to compensate for losses caused by the noncompliance. The sanctions imposed are to be remedial or coercive, but not penal[.]”) (emphasis supplied and internal citations omitted); Broadview Chem. Corp. v. Loctite Corp., 311 F. Supp. 447, 449 (D. Conn. 1970) (“While the court has wide latitude in the assessment of damages, damages cannot be arrived at by conjecture.”) (internal citations omitted); Nelson v. Progressive Realty Corp., 104 A.2d 241, 243 (R.I. 1954) (contempt sanctions must be based upon competent evidence, as sanctions are “remedial and designed to reimburse complainants for the wrong done as a result of the noncompliance with a valid order of the court[.]”). In this case, where the appendix record contains no evidence showing the actual harm, if any, resulting from Cordelia’s contumacious conduct – and where the indisputable fact is that the amount of the sanction was based on a per diem fine, not on any injury or harm to the respondents – the sanction imposed by the circuit court cannot stand. 33