Opinion ID: 202875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Promise of an Official Act

Text: D'Amico next challenges the district court's denial of his Fed.R.Crim.P. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. He contends that the government failed to prove, as it must, that he accepted the $2,500 payment from Gostoves in exchange for a promise to perform an official act. We review D'Amico's sufficiency of the evidence claim de novo. See United States v. Hall, 434 F.3d 42, 49 (1st Cir.2006). In so doing, we must decide, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict of guilt, whether a reasonable factfinder could find the defendant guilty of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Boulanger, 444 F.3d 76, 89 (1st Cir.2006). In relevant part, the Hobbs Act defines extortion as the obtaining of property from another with his consent, induced . . . under color of official right. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2). To establish guilt for extortion under color official right, the [government] must show . . . that the defendant, a public official, has received an emolument that he was not entitled to receive, with knowledge that the emolument was tendered in exchange for some official act. United States v. Cruz-Arroyo, 461 F.3d 69, 73 (1st Cir.2006). Additionally, where the payment was treated as a campaign contribution, the government must demonstrate that the payment was in return for an explicit promise or undertaking by the official to perform or not to perform an official act. McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257, 273, 111 S.Ct. 1807, 114 L.Ed.2d 307 (1991). In other words, where the payment takes the form of a campaign contribution, the government must prove a specific quid pro quo  between the public official and the payor. United States v. Cruzado-Laureano, 404 F.3d 470, 482 (1st Cir.2005). This last requirement is rooted in the recognition that candidates for political office must raise money to fund their campaigns and that, to do so effectively, they often must make promises concerning their plans if elected. As the Supreme Court explained: Money is constantly being solicited on behalf of candidates, who run on platforms and who claim support on the basis of their views and what they intend to do or have done. Whatever ethical considerations and appearances may indicate, to hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents . . . shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from the beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain property from another, with his consent, `under color of official right.' To hold otherwise would open to prosecution not only conduct that has long been thought to be well within the law but also conduct that in a very real sense is unavoidable so long as election campaigns are financed by private contributions or expenditures, as they have been from the beginning of the Nation. McCormick, 500 U.S. at 272, 111 S.Ct. 1807. The government contends that the quid pro quo requirement does not apply in this case because there was evidence from which a jury could conclude that Gostoves' payment to D'Amico was not a campaign contribution. But, whatever inference the evidence may have permitted, the district court instructed the jury that to find D'Amico guilty, it had to conclude that the payment was made in return for an agreement or a promise by [D'Amico] to perform some official act. . . . The quid pro quo is a promise to use the office for the benefit of the payor. This instruction, unobjected to by the government, is the law of the case and supplies the standard by which we measure the sufficiency of the evidence. See United States v. Zanghi, 189 F.3d 71, 79 (1st Cir.1999). [6] Thus, for the conviction to stand, there must be adequate evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that D'Amico promised to perform an official act in exchange for the payoff from Gostoves. D'Amico contends that, by the time Gostoves paid him, the plan to widen the road in front of Gostoves' Dunkin' Donuts had already been approved by the city council. This undisputed fact, D'Amico contends, compels the conclusion that there was no quid pro quo. We disagree. A reasonable jury could have found the following facts. In August 2001, the Quincy City Council considered issuing a permit to allow Home Depot, Inc. to construct a new building on the same street as Gostoves' Dunkin' Donuts. At the Council meeting where this permit was considered, D'Amico told the Quincy traffic engineer, Jack Gillon, that he would oppose the permit unless Home Depot was required to pay for widening the road in front of the Dunkin' Donuts. As a result of D'Amico's demand, Home Depot agreed to pay for the road-widening project as part of the permit requirements. On October 15, 2001, approximately two months after Home Depot agreed to pay to widen the road, Gostoves and D'Amico met at 10:30 p.m. in the parking lot of Gostoves' Dunkin' Donuts to execute the payoff. [7] Gostoves made clear that he was paying D'Amico for the road improvement and because he needed a friend . . . to make sure that this is going to happen and happen the right way. D'Amico assured Gostoves that the widening project would proceed but also promised that he would meet periodically with the traffic department just to keep it going. Promising to meet with the traffic department was not an empty gesture because there was a further approval process for the project, even after the Home Depot permit issued. In fact, D'Amico, as promised, contacted the traffic engineer shortly after receiving the payoff to make sure that the project remained on track. A reasonable jury thus could have concluded that D'Amico explicitly promised Gostoves that, in exchange for the $2,500 payment, he would use his influence as a city councillor to pressure the traffic department to pursue the road-widening project. This conclusion is sufficient to ground a conviction. Until the project was completed, Gostoves had an interest in having an influential public official advocating for the project, and D'Amico willingly agreed to serve as that advocate.