Opinion ID: 1245546
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Heading: Statutory and regulatory duty.

Text: As mentioned, the Kolbes rely on Iowa Code section 321.177(7) and Iowa Administrative Code rule 761600.4(2). Iowa Code section 321.177(7) provides that the IDOT shall not issue a motor vehicle license ... [t]o any person when the director [of the IDOT] has good cause to believe the person by reason of physical or mental disability would not be able to operate a motor vehicle safely. Iowa Code § 321.177(7). Iowa Administrative Code rule 761600.4(2) similarly provides: The [IDOT] shall not knowingly license any person who is unable to operate a motor vehicle safely because of physical or mental disability until that person has submitted a medical report stating that the person is physically and mentally capable of operating a motor vehicle. Iowa Admin. Code r. 761600.4(2). This rule appears intended to implement Iowa Code section 321.177(7). See Iowa Admin. Code r. 761600.4. Without conceding it breached the duty imposed under Iowa Code section 321.177(7) as implemented by Iowa Administrative Code rule 761600.4(2), the State argues that even if it had, such breach does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action. We agree. See Seeman v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 322 N.W.2d 35, 37-38 (Iowa 1982) (holding that a private cause of action does not arise solely from the violation of a statutory duty). A violation of a statutory duty gives rise to a tort claim only when the statute, explicitly or implicitly, provides for such a cause of action. Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 371. Absent such a provision, the violation of a statutory duty does not give rise to a private cause of action. See Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 288-89. There is no provision expressly providing a cause of action for violation of Iowa Code section 321.177(7) or Iowa Administrative Code rule 761600.4(2). We therefore must employ the following four-factor test to determine whether a private cause of action against the State may be implied from the statute: (1) Is the plaintiff a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted? (2) Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to either create or deny such a remedy? (3) Would allowing such a cause of action be consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislation? (4) Would the private cause of action intrude into an area over which the federal government or a state administrative agency holds exclusive jurisdiction? Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 288; accord Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 371. If any one of these factors is not satisfied, there is no implied cause of action. See Sanford, 601 N.W.2d at 372; Marcus, 538 N.W.2d at 288-89; Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 316. Additionally, [i]f we do not imply a cause of action for statutory violations, we likewise refuse to imply a tort from the violation of a rule enacted to carry out statutory directives. Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 316. To resolve the issue, we address only the second factor, which is the most relevant inquiry here: Is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to either create or deny such a remedy? As mentioned, there is no express indication of legislative intent to create a remedy, i.e., recovery of money damages for violation of Iowa Code section 321.177(7). In determining whether there is any indication of legislative intent to implicitly create a cause of action, we have previously considered the purpose for which the statute was created. See Unertl v. Bezanson, 414 N.W.2d 321, 325-26 (Iowa 1987); Seeman, 322 N.W.2d at 42. The subsection of Iowa Code chapter 321 in which section 321.177(7) is located clearly deals with regulatory matters pertaining to motor vehicle licenses. For example, the subsection covers (1) who is and who is not eligible for motor vehicle licenses, (2) driver education courses, (3) instruction permits, (4) driver's permits, (5) driver's license applicant examinations, (6) the types of licenses which may be issued and their contents, (7) fees for licenses, and (8) expiration and renewal of licenses. See Iowa Code §§ 321.174-.200. These provisions clearly suggest that Iowa Code section 321.177(7) was intended to be a regulatory measure designed to do nothing more than simply limit the driving privileges of those who are incapable of operating a motor vehicle safely. It is devoid of any suggestion of a private remedy. See Unertl, 414 N.W.2d at 326 (holding that provisions intended as regulatory measures did not create cause of action). Because we do not imply a cause of action for a violation of Iowa Code section 321.177(7), we likewise refuse to imply such an action for the violation of rule 761600.4(2) implemented to carry out this statutory provision. See Engstrom, 461 N.W.2d at 316. This is consistent with the clearly established law that administrative rules cannot go further than the law permits. Iowa Nat'l Indus. Loan Co. v. Iowa State Dep't of Revenue, 224 N.W.2d 437, 441 (Iowa 1974). We conclude Iowa Code section 321.177(7) and rule 761600.4(2) provide the Kolbes with no right of action against the State. This still leaves for our consideration, however, their contention that they have a common law claim against the State.