Opinion ID: 69632
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pecuniary Interest

Text: 22 On appeal, Clay argues that he had a pecuniary interest in Ralph Langkau’s life sufficient to give rise to an insurable interest therein, which arose from contractual dealings pursuant to their land transaction. An individual may have an insurable interest in the life of another person if he “has an expectation of a substantial pecuniary advantage through the continued life . . . of that other person and consequent substantial pecuniary loss by reason of the death . . . of that other person.” Fla. Stat. § 627.404(2)(b)(3). Such a benefit does not arise where there is no present obligation or one certain to arise in the future. See Flynn v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 223 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). Moreover, the arrangement giving rise to the pecuniary interest must be legally valid. See BankAmerica Hous. Services v. Allstate Ins. Co., 771 So.2d 1218, 1220-21 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (discussing insurable interests in property). It is only necessary that the interest exist “at the time [the life insurance] contract was made . . . ; [t]he insurable interest need not exist after the inception date of coverage under the contract.” Fla. Stat. § 627.404(1); see McMullen v. St. Lucie County Bank, 175 So. 721, 722 (Fla. 1937) (“[I]f the insurable interest existed at the time the insurance was secured, the fact that such interest is later cut off or for other reasons ceases to exist is of no consequence.”). Florida courts have held that “a promissory note given for purchase money, 23 in pursuance of the terms of an executory contract for the sale of land, is not without consideration, because the executory contract itself is a sufficient consideration for the promise of the purchaser to pay the purchase price . . . .” Henderson v. Morton, 147 So. 456, 457 (1933); Parker v. Weiss, 404 So.2d 820, 821 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that, in a sale of realty, “the purchaser’s promise to pay in exchange for the vendors’ executory agreement was sufficient to form a binding contract”). Moreover, under Florida law, a deed is not necessary to pass equitable title. See Martinez v. Kennedy Real Estate of Labelle, Inc., Pension Trust, 565 So.2d 399, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). Florida courts have recognized land transactions similar to the transaction at issue here as contracts for deed. For instance, in Bowman v. Saltsman, the parties were deemed to have entered into an agreement for deed where the buyer promised to pay a certain sum for the desired property and, when all the money was paid, the buyer would receive legal title to the property. 736 So.2d 144, 145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Under such an arrangement, “the buyer immediately receives and holds the equitable title and the seller holds the bare legal title only as security for the unpaid purchase price.” White v. Brousseau, 566 So.2d 832, 835 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 24 Although the Mortgage Deed is ambiguous, it appears that Ralph Langkau’s promise to pay as embodied in the Mortgage Note and Clay’s promise to sell Ralph Langkau land subject to a mortgage in the Mortgage Deed constituted valid consideration for each other, such that the parties had entered into a binding contract. Because the parties entered into a valid contract on January 26, 2004, which was not invalidated by Clay’s failure to deliver the deed to Ralph Langkau, it appears that Clay had a pecuniary interest in the life of Ralph Langkau sufficient to give rise to an insurable interest at that time. Accordingly, we reverse the district court’s order finding Langkau, as personal representative of the estate of Ralph Langkau, entitled to the proceeds of decedent Ralph Langkau’s insurance policy and remand to the district court to consider whether and to what extent Clay’s insurable interest in the life of Ralph Langkau entitles him to the insurance proceeds as primary beneficiary. D. Clay’s Entitlement to the Interpleaded Fund as Assignee On appeal, Clay argues that he was entitled to the insurance proceeds as assignee of the policy. Because the district court erred in determining the merits of Clay’s claim to the proceeds as assignee by adhering to the parties’ stipulation, which had no application to assignments, we vacate the district court’s order as to this issue and 25 remand with instructions to consider Clay’s claim to the proceeds as assignee without regard to the stipulation concerning the necessity of an insurable interest. E. Clay’s Entitlement to the Interpleaded Fund as Giftee On appeal, Clay offers no specific argument showing his entitlement to the insurance proceeds as giftee of the policy. Therefore, he abandoned this claim, and we decline to consider any argument in this regard.