Opinion ID: 3152015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Logan’s investigation violated PCA-like

Text: restrictions. PCA-like restrictions prohibit direct military involvement in civilian law enforcement activities, but they permit some indirect assistance, such as involvement that arises “during the normal course of military operations or other actions that ‘do not subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory.’” Hitchcock, 286 F.3d at 1069 (alterations omitted) (quoting DoDD 5525.5 § E4.1.7.2). Permissible indirect assistance “must not ‘constitute the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory military power,’ must not ‘amount to direct active involvement in the execution of the laws,’ and must not ‘pervade the activities of civilian authorities.’” United States v. Khan, 35 F.3d 426, 431 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1991)). “If any one of these tests is met, the assistance is not indirect.” Id. The Government argues that NCIS’s involvement in the Washington investigation constituted permissible indirect assistance because NCIS merely transferred information to civilian law enforcement. Not so. In contrast to cases where military personnel offered only subsidiary support, Logan’s investigation in this case pervaded the actions of civilian law enforcement. Cf. United States v. Klimavicius-Viloria, 144 UNITED STATES V. DREYER 17 F.3d 1249, 1259 (9th Cir. 1998) (no violation where the Navy merely supplied equipment, logistical support, and backup security); Khan, 35 F.3d at 431–32 (same). Logan testified that he and two other NCIS agents initiated an operation to search for individuals sharing child pornography online. His report on the Washington investigation formed the basis of the state warrant to search Dreyer’s home, and execution of that warrant yielded the evidence that led to the charges against Dreyer. Logan testified that he was not engaged in “surveillance,” which he described as “watching.” He explained that he was instead conducting an “investigation,” an activity he described as “active.” This conduct is expressly prohibited as direct assistance. See DoDD 5525.5 § E4.1.3.4 (identifying under “[r]estrictions on [d]irect [a]ssistance” the “[u]se of military personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators”); see also United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 925 (D.S.D. 1975) (“Activities which constitute an active role in direct law enforcement [include] investigation of a crime . . . .”). We have recognized that PCA-like restrictions allow “an exception to the general prohibition on direct involvement where the military participation is undertaken ‘for the primary purpose of furthering a military or foreign affairs function of the United States, regardless of incidental benefits to civilian authorities.’” Hitchcock, 286 F.3d at 1069 (quoting DoDD 5525.5 § E4.1.2.1). This exception includes, for example, “investigations and other actions related to enforcement of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” Id. at 1070 (alteration omitted) (quoting DoDD 5525.5 § E4.1.2.1.1). Courts have regularly construed that code to prohibit members of the armed forces from possessing child pornography. See, e.g., United States v. Stoltz, 720 F.3d 18 UNITED STATES V. DREYER 1127, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brown, 529 F.3d 1260, 1262 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. Allen, 53 M.J. 402, 407 (C.A.A.F. 2000). Properly executed, investigations of possession or distribution of child pornography by military personnel could be excepted from PCA-like restrictions. Logan did not undertake such an investigation. Instead, he used RoundUp to conduct a statewide audit of all computers engaged in file sharing. Logan represented to the FBI that he sought an administrative subpoena “in [an] area of large DOD and USN saturation indicating likelihood of USN/DOD suspect” (emphasis added), but the computer query employed in this case was in no way limited to members of the military. See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (identifying persons subject to the UCMJ). To the contrary, Logan later testified that he had been “monitoring any computer IP address within a specific geographic location . . . not specific to US military only, or US government computers,” and that it was his “standard practice[] to monitor all computers in a geographic area.” Here, Logan set RoundUp to cast a net across the entire state of Washington, knowing the sweep would include countless devices that had no ties to the military and thus did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The investigation in this case was not reasonably tied to military bases, military facilities, military personnel, or military equipment. Cf. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d at 1070 (applying exception where NCIS agent investigated the use and distribution of LSD on a military base); Chon, 210 F.3d at 994 (applying exception where NCIS agents investigated theft of military equipment from a naval facility). Logan and the NCIS agents who worked with him spearheaded a law enforcement investigation that would UNITED STATES V. DREYER 19 inevitably encompass mostly civilian-owned computers. We cannot conclude that the investigation had a legitimate independent military purpose because the methodology NCIS employed so clearly violated DoD and naval policy, as well as the boundary Congress imposed through the PCA and § 375. B. The violations in this case likely resulted from institutional error. Logan’s testimony illustrates that the violations in this case likely resulted from institutional confusion about the scope and contours of the PCA and PCA-like restrictions. On the incomplete record available, we cannot tell whether Logan’s practices were as widespread as Dreyer argues they were, but it is certain that the NCIS activity in this case was not an isolated incident. Logan and two other NCIS agents initiated their child pornography investigative operation in 2010. The operation involved at least three agents and had been underway for 19 months at the time of the trial in this case. Logan testified in another federal proceeding that “th[e] operation was cleared all the way through NCIS headquarters back in 2010.” See Transcript of Supplemental Motion to Suppress Evidence (Transcript) at 75, United States v. Gentles, No. 1:12-cr-120 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 2014), ECF No. 112; see also Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, 753 F.3d 890, 894 (9th Cir. 2014) (“It is well established that we may take judicial notice of judicial proceedings in other courts.”). Logan also testified that his duties as an NCIS agent were “[t]o investigate any federal, U.S. federal crimes, or crimes against the Uniform Code of Military Justice.” He also claimed he had authority to investigate “[p]ossession and distribution of child pornography across the [I]nternet” 20 UNITED STATES V. DREYER because it is “a federal crime” and NCIS agents “are credentialed U.S. federal agents.” Notably, at one point Logan specifically disavowed that his investigative authority was limited: Q. . . . [Y]ou are limited in the areas that you can investigate, wouldn’t that be correct? A. No, sir, that would not be correct. Contrary to the suggestion in one of the concurrences, Logan at no point testified that he limited his investigations to military personnel, and the foregoing testimony indicates that he did not believe his authority to be limited to military personnel. Indeed, Logan explained that he had a standard practice of “monitor[ing] all computers in a [certain] geographic area” without regard to military status. Yet RoundUp’s geographic accuracy is limited to “a 25- to 30-mile radius.” We recognize that because some military bases are in remote areas, it might be possible to fashion a targeted RoundUp inquiry that would encompass only an insignificant number of civilian-owned computers. The record does not tell us whether the scope of the other NCIS investigations Logan described went beyond geographic areas that legitimately could be expected to include high concentrations of military personnel. What is clear is that the investigation in Dreyer’s case resulted from an investigative technique that NCIS did not consider to be out of bounds. To the contrary, Logan testified that after the three-judge panel of this court issued its opinion unanimously finding that his conduct violated PCAlike restrictions, NCIS put “[a]bsolutely no[]” restrictions on him. See Transcript at 75, Gentles, No. 1:12-cr-120 (E.D. UNITED STATES V. DREYER 21 Mo. Oct. 16, 2014), ECF No. 112. NCIS’s misunderstanding about the contours of the PCA and PCA-like restrictions is further evident in the Government’s emphatic assertion before the district court and the three-judge panel that Logan’s actions were permissible. At best, the record demonstrates a poor understanding of the restrictions imposed on NCIS’s involvement in civilian law enforcement. Authorization of the program described in Logan’s testimony was apparently based on an entirely incorrect understanding of the PCA-like restrictions that apply to NCIS. III. Although this case presents troubling violations, we do not order suppression. A. We exercise our discretion to reach the issue of suppression. The Government argues in its supplemental brief that suppression is never warranted for PCA violations that do not implicate constitutional violations. Dreyer strenuously counters that the Government waived this argument by failing to raise it before filing its petition for panel rehearing. Dreyer is correct that the Government did not raise this argument in the district court, or even when the case was originally briefed and argued on appeal. The three-judge panel that originally heard this case unanimously held that PCA-like restrictions apply to NCIS and that the conduct in this case violated those restrictions. Dreyer, 767 F.3d at 829–35, 838–39. One member of the panel concluded exclusion was not warranted. Id. at 838–42 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 22 UNITED STATES V. DREYER Generally, an appellee waives any argument it fails to raise in its answering brief. See Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177, 1182 (9th Cir. 2009). But “the rule of waiver is a discretionary one,” Ruiz v. Affinity Logistics Corp., 667 F.3d 1318, 1322 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ackerman v. W. Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517 (9th Cir. 1988)), and we can “make an exception to waiver . . . in the exceptional case in which review is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to preserve the integrity of the judicial process,” id. (quoting Bolker v. C.I.R., 760 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 1985)). Here, we exercise our discretion to consider whether suppression is warranted because, under the unique facts of this case, doing so best serves the integrity of the judicial process.5 Our decision to do so is informed in part by our conclusion that the important issues in this case will reoccur until they are addressed by the court.