Opinion ID: 77334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We Lack Jurisdiction to Review Tan's Application for Asylum.

Text: 21 Tan argues that the Immigration Judge erroneously concluded that she failed to establish extraordinary circumstances to excuse her untimely application for asylum. The government contends that we lack jurisdiction to consider Tan's petition. We agree with the government. 22 Section 1158(a)(2)(B) provides that an alien may apply for asylum if the alien demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien's arrival in the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). An alien may apply for asylum after one year of arrival if the alien demonstrates ... either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application. Id. § 1158(a)(2)(D). No court shall have jurisdiction to review any determination that an application was untimely or failed to establish changed or extraordinary circumstances to excuse the delay. Id. § 1158(a)(3). Because we lack jurisdiction to consider whether the Immigration Judge erroneously concluded that Tan failed to establish extraordinary circumstances, we dismiss her petition for the review of the denial of her application for asylum. 23 B. The Immigration Judge Failed to Make Adequate Findings About Whether Tan Is Entitled to Withholding of Removal. 24 To obtain withholding of removal, an applicant must establish that her life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of [her] race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The alien bears the burden of demonstrating that it is `more likely than not' she will be persecuted or tortured upon being returned to her country. Sepulveda v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1232 (11th Cir.2005) (quoting Fahim v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1218 (11th Cir.2002)). This standard is more stringent than the well-founded fear of future persecution required for asylum. Mazariegos v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1324 n. 2 (11th Cir.2001). 25 An applicant for withholding of removal may satisfy her burden of proof in either of two ways. First, an alien may establish past persecution in [her] country based on a protected ground. Mendoza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir.2003). If the applicant can show that the persecution was, at least in part, motivated by a protected ground, then the applicant can establish eligibility for withholding of removal. Borja v. INS, 175 F.3d 732, 735-36 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc); see Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir.1994) (stating that persecution does not mean persecution solely on account of a statutorily protected ground); see also Sanchez v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 392 F.3d 434, 438 (11th Cir.2004) (citing Grava v. INS, 205 F.3d 1177, 1181 n. 3 (9th Cir.2000), with approval for the proposition that mixed-motive persecution may qualify as persecution based on a protected ground). If an alien establishes past persecution, a rebuttable presumption arises that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution, and the burden then shifts to the Department of Homeland Security to show that the conditions in the country have changed or the alien could avoid a future threat through relocation. Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1287. Second, an alien is entitled to withholding of removal if she establishes that it is more likely than not that [] she would be persecuted on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion upon removal to that country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(2). An alien cannot demonstrate that [she] more-likely-than-not would be persecuted on a protected ground if the [Immigration Judge] finds that the alien could avoid a future threat by relocating to another part of [her] country. Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1287. 26 Tan argues that the Immigration Judge erroneously concluded that she is not entitled to withholding of removal. Tan first argues that she established past persecution through her detailed testimony describing the racial and religious insults used by her attackers. Tan argues alternatively that she established a well-founded fear of future persecution because in the context of current day Indonesia, any reasonable person in [Tan's] situation, as a Christian and an ethnic Chinese, would fear persecution.... 27 The Immigration Judge did not give reasoned consideration to Tan's application or make adequate findings for at least three reasons. Morales, 208 F.3d at 328. First, the Immigration Judge misstated the contents of the record. The Immigration Judge stated, Evidence in this case consists of seven exhibits and the testimony of the lead Respondent [Tan], but failed to include the Country Reports and the newspaper articles that attest to the widespread violence against Chinese and Christians. The Immigration Judge also erroneously stated that Tan's family continues to live in Indonesia without problem[s], although Tan stated in her application that her family business had been totally looted and damaged during [a] recent riot. Because both statements by the Immigration Judge are unsupported by the record, they undermine the conclusion that the Immigration Judge considered all the evidence. Although the Immigration Judge is not required to discuss every piece of evidence presented before him, see Morales, 208 F.3d at 328, the Immigration Judge is required to consider all the evidence submitted by the applicant. See Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. 28 Second, after the Immigration Judge found Tan's account of the sexual assault credible, the Immigration Judge failed to explain why he found that the attack was not based, at least in part, on Tan's race. The Immigration Judge stated that Tan's testimony seems to be consistent with her application for asylum, what she told the interview officer when she had her asylum interview, and I don't see any material inconsistencies in her testimony. The Immigration Judge considered Tan's demeanor while testifying, . . . the rationality, internal consistency, and inherent persuasiveness of her testimony, and the Immigration Judge found that he had no reason to doubt [Tan's] credibility. The Immigration Judge stated, I have no doubt that she was attacked and that there was an attempted rape. The Immigration Judge then found, without logical explanation, that the attack of Tan was not based on her race even though that finding was at odds with Tan's credible testimony. 29 Tan's testimony, if credible, may be sufficient to sustain the burden of proof for asylum or withholding of removal without corroboration. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.13(a), 208.16(b). Tan testified that her attackers were Muslim men, and Muslim men often harass Chinese women. She testified that on the night of the attack the Muslim men singled out only Chinese patrons at the theatre. She also stated, in her application, that the Muslim men called her a Chinese dog and Chinese whore during the attack. Tan testified that Tan offered to give her car to her attackers, but they ignored her offer. The Immigration Judge neglected to reconcile his positive credibility finding and Tan's detailed testimony with the finding that Tan had not been persecuted, at least in part, based on her race. 30 Third, the reasons provided by the Immigration Judge for his findings are unreasonable. Adefemi, 386 F.3d at 1029. The Immigration Judge stated that the chances are about 8 in 10 or 9 in 10 that an attacker would be a Moslem, and explained, the fact that her attackers were Moslem does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that she was singled out because of her ethnicity. This reasoning was unresponsive to any argument reflected in the record. Tan did not contend that the sexual assault was based on her race solely because her attackers were Muslim. 31 The Government reads the findings of the Immigration Judge to mean that the attack on Tan was a random criminal act, but the Immigration Judge did not articulate that finding based on anything in the record. The closest the Immigration Judge came to making that finding was the following statement: I am not convinced that she was attacked based on any of the five protected grounds as opposed to being attached [sic] because she happened to be out at night in a car with another woman. The racial slurs her attackers used, the ethnicity of the other patrons that the Muslim men harassed, and the undisputed documentary and testimonial evidence of discrimination against Chinese and other non-Muslims in Indonesia suggests that Tan was targeted, at least in part, based on her race, but the Immigration Judge provided no response to that inference. 32 The Immigration Judge failed to render a reasoned decision in consideration of Tan's credible testimony and other evidence she submitted. Because the findings of the Immigration Judge are inadequate, we are unable to review the denial of Tan's petition for withholding of removal. It is also unclear whether the Department of Homeland Security could establish that the conditions in Indonesia have changed or Tan could avoid a future threat through relocation, and the Immigration Judge did not address those issues. See Mendoza, 327 F.3d at 1287. We grant Tan's petition for review, vacate the decision of the Immigration Judge, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 33 Because we conclude that the Immigration Judge failed to render a reasoned decision as to whether Tan suffered past persecution on a statutorily protected ground, we do not reach Tan's argument that the Immigration Judge, as affirmed by the BIA, erred when he concluded that Tan failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution.