Opinion ID: 2996683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Massaro v. United States

Text: Gomez argues that the recent Supreme Court case, Massaro v. United States, 123 S.Ct. 1960 (2003) removes the procedural bar to his ineffective assistance of counsel claim and thereby allows this Court to review that claim on its merits. In Massaro, the Supreme Court held that a defendant challenging a federal conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 could raise an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a collateral proceeding, even though the defendant could have, but did not, raise the claim on direct appeal. Gomez argues that the Massaro rule should apply with equal force to proceedings challenging a state conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Echoing Massaro’s reasoning, Gomez argues that direct appeal is not the forum best suited to determining the adequacy of representation because guilt or innocence is generally the issue of primary importance. Indeed, Massaro concluded that requiring criminal defendants to bring ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeals of federal convictions does not promote the objectives of the procedural default doctrine, namely conservation of judicial resources and respect for the finality of judgments. While logically these arguments may extend to ineffective assistance claims arising out of state court convictions, the holding of Massaro is not legally binding on states. Massaro was not a constitutional decision. Id. at 1693 (“The procedural default rule is neither a statutory nor a constitutional requirement . . . .”). While Illinois law on waiver may be in conflict with the federal court’s own procedural default rule, it continues to operate as an adequate and independent state ground for barring federal habeas review of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This position was taken in the only appellate decision to date dealing with Massaro’s application to proceedings challenging state convictions. See Perkins v. Lee, 72 Fed. No. 02-4372 7 Appx. 4, 9 n.1 (4th Cir. 2003). As the Fourth Circuit found itself “constrained to respect the contrary view of the North Carolina Supreme Court,” we are constrained by the view of Illinois. Id.