Opinion ID: 2518531
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Interpretation of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3).

Text: The defendant argues the Court of Appeals violated several rules of statutory construction by interpreting K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3) as mandating the use of his prior DUI convictions to enhance his current DUI offense. The interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this court has unlimited review. State v. Williams, 277 Kan. 338, 346, 85 P.3d 697 (2004). K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-1567(k)(3) provided in relevant part: (k) For the purpose of determining whether a conviction is a first, second, third or subsequent conviction in sentencing under this section: (1) `Conviction' includes being convicted of a violation of this section or entering into a diversion agreement in lieu of further criminal proceedings on a complaint alleging a violation of this section; . . . . (3) only convictions occurring in the immediately preceding five years, including prior to the effective date of this act, shall be taken into account, but the court may consider other prior convictions in determining the sentence to be imposed within the limits provided for a first, second, third or subsequent offender, whichever is applicable. (Emphasis added.) Subsection (k)(3) of K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-1567 is referred to as a decay provision. See City of Norton v. Hurt, 275 Kan. 521, 522, 66 P.3d 870 (2003). The statute was amended in 2001, and the decay provision was removed. L. 2001, ch. 200, sec. 14. The amended statute contains identical provisions to K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-1567(k)(1) in subsection (1)(1); however subsection (1)(3) was amended to read any convictions occurring during a person's life-time shall be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed for a first, second, third, fourth or subsequent offender. See K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3); K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 8-1567(m)(3). In a well-reasoned opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's use of the defendant's prior conviction and diversion agreement occurring during the defendant's lifetime under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3), reasoning: Under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3), `any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime' shall be used in calculating the sentence to be imposed for a third offender. The statute does not limit a person's convictions to those that occur after July 1, 2001. To read such a requirement into the statute would be contrary to the plain language of the statute that a person's lifetime convictions shall be taken into account. As stated by our Supreme Court in GT, Kansas, L.L.C. v. Riley County Register of Deeds, 271 Kan. 311, 316, 22 P.3d 600 (2001): `Ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning, and a statute should not be so read as to add that which is not readily found therein or to read out what as a matter of ordinary English language is in it. [Citation omitted.]' Here, the statute plainly reads that a person's lifetime convictions shall be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed and does not merely apply to those convictions that occur after July 1, 2001. If we were to construe K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3) as applying to only those convictions that occur after the effective date of the amendment, such interpretation would produce an unreasonable result that would contravene the clear language of the statute. If we were to adopt Sedillos' interpretation, those prior DUI convictions occurring before July 2001 would not be counted for sentencing purposes. Thus, the result would contradict the language of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3) indicating that a person's lifetime prior convictions are to be taken into account for sentencing purposes. 'As a general rule, statutes are construed to avoid unreasonable results. There is a presumption that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. [Citation omitted.]' In re M.R., 272 Kan. 1335, 1342, 38 P.3d 694 (2002). Although the previous version of K.S.A. 8-1567 included the phrase `prior to the effective date of this act,' this wording appeared to be unnecessary given what was already stated in the provision, that is, that convictions occurring in the immediately preceding 5 years would be taken into account. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-1567(k)(3). Moreover, such wording is unnecessary for the amended version of 8-1567 where any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime are taken into account for sentencing purposes. K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3). As a result, we find that the trial court properly used Sedillos' prior DUI convictions to enhance his current DUI offense to a felony. 33 Kan. App. 2d at 146-47. The resolution of the issue we are called upon to decide depends upon the following rules of statutory construction: The fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained, and when a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court must give effect to the intention of the legislature as expressed rather than determine what the law should or should not be. Where the face of the statute leaves its construction uncertain, the court may look to the historical background of the enactment, the circumstances attending its passage, the purpose to be accomplished, and the effect the statute may have under the various constructions suggested. The legislative intent is to be determined from a general consideration of the entire act, and effect must be given, if possible, to the entire act and every part thereof, and it is the duty of the court, as far as practicable, to reconcile the different provisions so as to make them consistent, harmonious, and sensible. State v. Van Hoet, 277 Kan. 815, Syl. ¶ 2, 89 P.3d 606 (2004). When the legislature revises an existing law, it is presumed that the legislature intended to change the law from how it existed prior to the amendment, and it is presumed that the legislature does not intend to enact useless or meaningless legislation. [Citations omitted.] The court should avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that part of it becomes surplusage. [Citation omitted.] 277 Kan. at 826-27. Criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. Any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone subjected to the criminal statute. The rule of strict construction, however, is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent. [Citation omitted.] State v. Brown, 272 Kan. 843, 847, 35 P.3d 910 (2001). The defendant argues the Court of Appeals erroneously interpreted earlier versions of the statute in such a way as to render the language prior to the effective date of this act as meaningless and surplusage. He contends the legislature's removal of this language from the amended version of K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3) expressed its intent that convictions should only be counted from the effective date of the act. Thus, according to the defendant, the Court of Appeals read or judicially resupplied the omitted prior to the effective date of this act language back into the amended statute. The defendant fails to consider whether the language of the amended statute is plain and unambiguous on its face, the first step in statutory construction. If the statute is plain and unambiguous, the appellate courts will not speculate as to the legislative intent behind it and will not read the statute so as to add something not readily found in it. State v. Gordon, 275 Kan. 393, Syl. ¶ 2, 66 P.3d 903 (2003). K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3) provides that any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime shall be taken into account when determining the sentence to be imposed for a third offender. The plain language of the statute contains no reference to the effective date of the act. Rather, it uses the words any and lifetime, which are common words that convey a definite meaning. See GT, Kansas, L.L.C. v. Riley County Register of Deeds, 271 Kan. 311, 316, 22 P.3d 600 (2001) (Ordinary words are to be given their ordinary meaning, and a statute should not be so read as to add that which is not readily found therein or to read out what as a matter of ordinary English language is in it.). Thus, the plain language of the statute provides that any of a person's lifetime convictions shall be taken into account when determining the enhanced sentence to be imposed and does not merely apply to those convictions that occur after July 1, 2001. The defendant's interpretation of the statute is contrary to the plain and unambiguous language of the statute and leads to an unreasonable result because not all convictions having occurred during a person's lifetime would be counted. Although the defendant claims the Court of Appeals effectively reads the prior to the effective date of this act language back into the amended statute, the defendant is asking this court to read into the statute a start date for lifetime convictions which does not appear in the plain language of the statute. The conclusion that all lifetime convictions shall be counted does not result from the judicial construction of omitted language, but from the plain language of the amended statute itself which essentially contains a retroactive provision by using the term lifetime. Although courts should avoid interpreting a statute in such a way that part of it becomes meaningless, useless, or surplusage, the defendant correctly points out that the Court of Appeals interpreted the phrase prior to the effective date of this act as being unnecessary in the earlier version of the statute because the statute provided that all convictions occurring in the immediately preceding 5 years would be taken into account. See K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-1567(k)(3). However, the defendant's interpretation of the amended statute would likewise render the amended statutory language any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime unreasonable and meaningless by excluding any lifetime convictions committed prior to the enactment date, contrary to the clear legislative intent expressed by the plain and unambiguous meaning of the term lifetime. Thus under either interpretation, some portion of either the prior version of the statute or the amended statute would be rendered superfluous or meaningless, a result sought to be avoided by the rules or statutory construction. A reading of the plain language of both versions of the statute solves this problem. We believe that the prior version of the statute, K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 8-1567(k)(3), included the language prior to the effective date of this act in order to specify the parameters of the 5-year time period. The amended version, K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(1)(3), no longer requires such parameters because the plain language includes any convictions occurring during a person's lifetime. This interpretation effectively gives meaning to the statutory language used in both versions of the statute. It explains the legislature's use of the prior to the effective date of this act language in the earlier version of the statute while recognizing that the amended statute did not need this language because it now refers to any convictions during a person's lifetime. Thus, although we disagree with the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the prior to the effective date of this act language in the earlier statute was surplusage, we may uphold its decision on other grounds. See Drake v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 272 Kan. 231, 239, 32 P.3d 705 (2001) (The reason given by the district court for its decision is immaterial if the result is correct for any reason.). Additionally, we note that the interpretation suggested by the defendant would not be in line with the apparent legislative intent when passing the 2001 amendment to impose harsher penalties upon those convicted of drinking and driving: I vote yes on SB 67. [L. 2001, ch. 200] This comprehensive legislation significantly enhances public safety by imposing harsher penalties on drunk drivers. Many Kansans' lives have been tragically affected by the act of a drunk driver. My vote in favor of this legislation is offered in tribute to the innocent victims of this crime and their families  lives torn apart by the dangerous and senseless act of driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs. This bill says loud and clear that those who drink and drive in our state will face strong penalties. Those who commit this crime more than once will also be dealt with as the serious criminals they are.  (Emphasis added.) Sen. J. 2001, p. 1063. (Explanation of Vote by Senator David Adkins). Drunk driving is a continuing problem in the State of Kansas. Statistics clearly show that enhanced penalties reduce the incidents of drunk driving. This is a simple issue of public safety. This bill will enhance penalties and save lives. We strongly favor SB 67. (Emphasis added.) House J. 2001, p. 558. (Explanation of Vote by House Representatives Dean Newton and Daniel Williams.) Interpreting the amended statute to include only convictions committed after July 1, 2001, for enhancement purposes suggests more lenient rather than enhanced penalties for repeat DUI offenders. Consistent with the above expressed intent, the replacement of the immediately preceding 5-year provision with a lifetime provision must be construed to include all convictions during a person's lifetime, not just those committed after the effective date of the act. The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that all prior convictions, even those occurring before the enactment date, should be considered under K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 8-1567(l)(3).