Opinion ID: 2609043
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Traffic Regulation

Text: It is now well established that violation of an administrative traffic rule which has been adopted by the court as a standard of reasonable behavior constitutes negligence per se in the absence of excuse or justification for the violation. Ferrell v. Baxter, 484 P.2d 250 (Alaska 1971), construing Rogers v. Dubiel, 373 P.2d 295 (Alaska 1962). The trial court's instruction [1] was provided as the applicable law from which the jury would determine whether plaintiff Lester complied with the standard of care in operating his police vehicle as an authorized emergency vehicle. That instruction paraphrased Title 13, § 02.585, of the Alaska Administrative Code [hereinafter cited 13 AAC 02.585]. [2] Appellants, however, contend that the applicable law is contained in § 7-106 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Fairbanks. [3] The state administrative regulation permits the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle, in response to an emergency call, to avoid the use of audible signals and warning lights when ... it can be reasonably shown that the use of either or both would prevent or hamper the apprehension or detection of a violator of a statute, ordinance or regulation. [4] The city ordinance permits the exemption from traffic regulations when audible signals are used ... as may be reasonably necessary ... and provides that police vehicles need not display a warning light visible from the front of the vehicle. [5] Thus the city ordinance requires the use of audible signals at all times and the state code does not. Because the two provisions are in conflict, we must examine the power of the City of Fairbanks to enact and enforce its ordinance. Recently the constitutional basis for denying regulatory authority to home rule municipalities was extensively reviewed and was clarified in Jefferson v. State, 527 P.2d 37 (Alaska 1974), where we stated: A municipal ordinance is not necessarily invalid in Alaska because it is inconsistent or in conflict with a state statute. The question rests on whether the exercise of authority has been prohibited to municipalities. The prohibition must be either by express terms or by implication such as where the statute and ordinance are so substantially irreconcilable that one cannot be given its substantive effect if the other is to be accorded the weight of law. [6] We note that the legislature has granted to the commissioner of public safety authority to promulgate statewide traffic rules and regulations. AS 28.05.030(a)(1). By statutes in force at the time this case arose, the legislature also provided that cities might regulate the use and operation of motor vehicles within their corporate limits, but required that ordinance provisions other than those for penalties must be compatible with provisions of state law relating to motor vehicles and motor vehicle operators within the city... . 1966 SLA, ch. 157, § 1 (repealed 1972). This provision was specifically made applicable to home rule cities. 1966 SLA, ch. 157, § 6 (repealed 1972). By these provisions the legislature expressly prohibited a home rule city, such as the City of Fairbanks, from enacting an ordinance in conflict with the state regulations in regard to the use and operation of motor vehicles. [7] We therefore hold the Fairbanks city ordinance, to the extent it is in conflict with the state traffic regulations, constitutes an exercise of home rule power expressly prohibited by the legislature. The trial court did not err in basing its instruction regarding emergency vehicles upon the state traffic regulations.