Opinion ID: 2071017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nurraez's Identification Testimony

Text: The defendant's next claim of error is that the trial justice should not have permitted Nunez to testify that he had observed the defendant shooting in the direction of Diaz. The defendant asserts that Nunez did not have sufficient opportunity to view the gunman and that consequently his identification of the defendant as the gunman was incompetent. The defendant also posits in support of that contention that there was not enough light in the doorway of the 97-99 America Street building to illuminate the porch sufficiently from where the defendant allegedly shot Diaz. The defendant also asserts that because there was a high level of stress and excitement stemming from the exchange of gunfire when Nunez allegedly observed the gunman, his ability to identify the gunman was reduced. The defendant attempts to support that assertion by highlighting the fact that Nunez was only able to give a minimal description of the gunman to the police and that he had only seen the defendant briefly in passing prior to the incident in question. [2] In State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710 (R.I.1994), where the victim was brutally attacked by four men at night in the woods, we rejected the argument that the eyewitness testimony of the victim in that case was incompetent because the victim did not have sufficient opportunity to view her assailants because there was diminished lighting and a high level of stress stemming from the presence of weapons. Here there was nothing in the record indicating that the light on the porch was so poor that Nunez could not see the others around him. Certainly, there was more light on the porch than in the woods in Gardiner. [3] In fact, the evidence suggests that Nunez could see the porch clearly because he was able to approach the porch and see the stairs without any difficulty. Furthermore, as in Gardiner, although the level of situation stress was certainly higher, we do not feel that it detracted from Nunez's ability to identify a person he had previously seen on at least one occasion. See State v. Charette, 688 A.2d 1286, 1288 (R.I.1997)(upholding admissibility of eyewitness' nighttime identification of the defendant fleeing from the victim's front doorway based upon a brief observation where witness had known the defendant previously); see also State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165 (R.I.1988)(instruction to jury permitting consideration of whether identification witness had ever seen the defendant before the confrontation was proper). The situation in this case is unlike the one in State v. Ranieri, 586 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I.1991), wherein we held that the victim there did not have sufficient opportunity to view her assailant and as a result could not testify in regard to his identity because she had no previous personal knowledge of him, as required by Rule 602 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. The victim in that case was attacked from behind while in her dark apartment moments after having been awakened by the sounds of an intruder, and she was immediately beaten with a metal rod, which circumstances would obviously have affected her ability to recall the identity of her attacker. Additionally, in Ranieri we found that the victim had in the past made several unwarranted and unfair accusations against Ranieri, whom she later identified as her attacker. It was for all those reasons that we concluded in Ranieri that the victim's identification testimony was not competent. The facts and evidence in that case are completely distinguishable from the facts in the case now before us. In this case setting Nunez was facing the gunman from a distance of some five feet or so as he approached 97-99 America Street and came even closer to him as he scrambled into the apartment through the doorway behind the gunman. The gunman was standing on the porch, brightened by the light emanating from the front door of the apartment. Nunez, in addition, had seen the defendant on at least one prior occasion, and testified that he recognized the gunman on the porch as that person that he had seen previously. Although it is possible that a jury might have found that Nunez was unable to view the defendant adequately, it was in the final analysis a fact finding to be made by the jury and the trial justice certainly did not err in refusing to take that credibility determination away from the jury. As we said in Ranieri, In a situation in which the question of a witness's Rule 602 competency is close (that is, the jury could find that the witness perceived the matter testified to), the judge should admit the testimony since the matter then becomes one of credibility and is properly for the jury. 586 A.2d at 1098. [4] Accordingly, the trial justice did not err in admitting the identification testimony of Nunez.