Opinion ID: 895280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Presumption Against Preemption

Text: Before discussing whether preemption applies here, we must first address MCI's argument that the court of appeals improperly applied a presumption against preemption. MCI contends that Geier rejected any special burden beyond the application of ordinary preemption principles. The Plaintiffs counter that the presumption is rooted in federalism, not in Geier 's analysis of the interplay between the Safety Act's preemption and saving clauses. We agree in principal with the Plaintiffs while recognizing that the exact contours of the presumption are far from clear. See Robert N. Weiner, The Height of Presumption: Preemption and the Role of Courts, 32 HAMLINE L.REV. 727, 727 (2009) (Few aspects of Supreme Court jurisprudence are as contradictory and convoluted as the so-called `presumption against preemption.'). The United State Supreme Court noted a presumption against preemption in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., grounding it in the states' police power to regulate for the good of their citizens: [W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) ([B]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.). The presumption is particularly strong when Congress legislates in [a] field which the States have traditionally occupied. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146; see also Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449, 125 S.Ct. 1788, 161 L.Ed.2d 687 (2005) (In areas of traditional state regulation, we assume that a federal statute has not supplanted state law unless Congress has made such an intention clear and manifest. (quotation marks omitted)). Citizens' health and safety are `primarily and historically, ... matter[s] of local concern,' and thus states have `great latitude' to protect `the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.' Lohr, 518 U.S. at 475, 116 S.Ct. 2240 (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985) and Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756, 105 S.Ct. 2380, 85 L.Ed.2d 728 (1985)) (alterations in original). Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court in Geier analyzed whether the Safety Act and FMVSS 208 preempted a common-law tort action in which the plaintiff claimed the automobile manufacturer was liable for failing to install airbags in a 1987 vehicle. 529 U.S. at 865, 120 S.Ct. 1913. The Court first addressed the Safety Act's express preemption clause [11] and limited its application to state legislative and regulatory enactments, concluding that the Act's saving clause [12] exempted common-law tort actions from the preemption clause's scope. Id. at 867-68, 120 S.Ct. 1913. The Court then rejected the argument that the saving clause foreclosed the operation of ordinary implied preemption principles, including obstacle preemption. Id. at 869, 120 S.Ct. 1913. Further, the majority disagreed with the dissent's suggestion that the two clauses together created a special burden disfavoring preemption. Compare id. at 870-74, 120 S.Ct. 1913, with id. at 898-99, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Instead, the majority considered the language, purpose, and administrative workability of the statutes and concluded that no reading of the two clauses favored jury-imposed safety standards over federal safety standards with which they actually conflict. Id. at 872-73, 120 S.Ct. 1913. In such a case, the operation of ordinary preemption principles dictates that the state-law standard must give way. We do not read Geier 's special-burden discussion to undermine the presumption against preemption. The former is rooted in two statutory provisions of the Safety Act, the latter in principles of federalism. Merely because the Safety Act's saving clause does not create a special burden disfavoring preemption does not eliminate the respective spheres of state and federal sovereignty, and the presumption simply affords deference to the states' long-standing rights to protect their citizens absent a clear directive from Congress. In the end, what the majority said in Geier does not negate the presumption against preemption. What the majority did not say is another matter. MCI correctly notes the Geier majority's silence regarding the presumption. The Geier dissent noticed as well and decried the majority's refusal to apply what the dissent considered to be an `ordinary experience-proved principle[] of conflict pre-emption.' Id. at 906-07, 120 S.Ct. 1913 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 874, 120 S.Ct. 1913); see also Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 129 S.Ct. 538, 558, 172 L.Ed.2d 398 (2008) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting in a discussion of Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 128 S.Ct. 999, 169 L.Ed.2d 892 (2008), which involved express preemption, the effect of the majority's refusal to invoke the presumption: Given the dissent's clear call for the use of the presumption against pre-emption, the Court's decision not to invoke it was necessarily a rejection of any role for the presumption in construing the statute.). Commentators likewise concluded that the Geier majority upended the normal presumption against preemption. [13] In view of the Supreme Court's recent statements on the issue, however, we cannot agree. In Wyeth v. Levine , the Court considered whether federal law preempted, under the actual conflict theory, a Vermont jury's finding that the manufacturer of the drug Phenergan failed to adequately warn of the risks associated with directly injecting the drug into a patient's vein. 129 S.Ct. at 1190-91. The Court, relying on Lohr, stated the classic formulation of the presumption against preemption and rejected the dissent's contention that the presumption should not apply to claims of implied conflict preemption. Id. at 1194-95 & n. 3 (citing Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240 and Rice, 331 U.S. at 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146). According to the dissent, the Court had neverprior to Wyeth definitively applied the presumption in the actual-conflict context. Id. at 1228-29 & n. 14 (Alito, J., dissenting). From the majority's language in Wyeth, we fail to see how the presumption does not apply to all preemption cases, including implied conflict cases. Id. at 1194-95 & n. 3 (For its part, the dissent argues that the presumption against pre-emption should not apply to claims of implied conflict pre-emption at all, but this Court has long held to the contrary. (citation omitted)); see also Altria Group, 129 S.Ct. at 543 (When addressing questions of express or implied pre-emption, we begin our analysis with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress. (quotation marks omitted; alteration in original)). That Geier addressed the Safety Act and Wyeth a different statute is, contrary to MCI's position, irrelevant. [14] Accordingly, we apply the presumption that Congress did not intend to preempt contrary state law absent evidence that such a result was Congress's clear and manifest purpose.