Opinion ID: 867184
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Sorf May Have Had a Reasonable

Text: Mistaken Belief Under Rule 60(b)(1) ¶15 Rule 60(b)(1) provides that a “court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding [because of] . . . mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1). Mr. Sorf argues that he did not know that the complaint had actually been filed against him or that he had an obligation to file a responsive pleading. And he argues that he was surprised by the entry of the default judgment because of the District’s representations that they were interested in reaching an amicable resolution through settlement. He contends that he qualified for relief under rule 60(b) and that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment. We agree that Mr. Sorf may have qualified for relief under rule 60(b) and remand to the district court for factual findings as to this issue. ¶16 In the hearing denying Mr. Sorf’s motion to set aside the default judgment, the district court first stated, “[w]hat’s been offered here as excusable neglect . . . is fairly characterized as Mr. Sorf was not aware of the complaint.” However, the district court then ruled that “the law is fairly clear that [when the rule for perfecting service is complied with, that] is not excusable neglect.” This conflated the concept of proper service of process with the concept of mistake. Specifically, the district court conflated the provisions of rule 60(b)(1), which refers to instances of “mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect” with the provisions of rule 60(b)(4), which refers to instances where a judgment is void for a failure of service of process. See, e.g., UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1), (4); Garcia v. Garcia, 712 P.2d 288, 290–91 (Utah 1986) (recognizing that an allegation that a default judgment is void for failure of service of process is pled under rule 60(b)(4)). ¶17 Service of process was adequate in this case because the process server left the complaint with an adult of reasonable age and discretion who resided at Mr. Sorf’s residence.7 But the fact that 7 Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that personal service may be made “[u]pon any individual . . . by delivering a (continued...) 6 Cite as: 2013 UT 27 Opinion of the Court service of process was proper does not end the inquiry because Mr. Sorf could have still been mistaken about whether he had been served or was obligated to file an answer. ¶18 As we have previously held, “if default is issued when a party genuinely is mistaken to a point where, absent such mistake, default would not have occurred, the equity side of the court would grant relief.” May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam). This is in accordance with the intent of rule 60(b) to ensure that parties are afforded “a full opportunity to present their evidence and contentions as to disputed issues so [that cases] may be disposed of on substantial rather than upon technical grounds.” McKean v. Mountain View Mem’l Estates, Inc., 411 P.2d 129, 130 (Utah 1966). ¶19 Here, the district court refused to set aside the default judgment based on its conclusion that Mr. Sorf had been properly served with process. But the district court did not make any factual findings with respect to Mr. Sorf’s claim under rule 60(b)(1) that the default was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect, and Mr. Sorf’s claim in this regard was sufficient to raise a factual dispute as to the reason he failed to file a timely response to the complaint. ¶20 When the process server arrived at Mr. Sorf’s home, a woman who represented herself as Mr. Sorf’s wife answered the door and told the process server that Mr. Sorf was not home. The process server announced that he was serving her on behalf of Mr. 7 (...continued) copy of the summons and the complaint to the individual personally, or by leaving a copy at the individual’s dwelling house or usual place of abode with some person of suitable age and discretion there residing.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1)(A). And “[i]f the person to be served refuses to accept a copy of the process, service shall be sufficient if the [process server] shall state the name of the process and offer to deliver a copy thereof.” UTAH R. CIV. P. 4(d)(1). At the motion hearing, the district court determined that the woman served by the process server was a person of suitable age and discretion residing at Mr. Sorf’s home. Therefore, the process server provided proper service of process by explaining that he was serving the woman who answered the door with the summons and complaint on behalf of Mr. Sorf and by leaving a copy of the complaint and summons. 7 METROPOLITAN WATER v. SORF Opinion of the Court Sorf and attempted to hand her the summons and complaint, but she refused to accept the papers. When the woman refused to take the complaint, the process server left the papers on the floor inside the door of Mr. Sorf’s home and walked away. According to the process server’s signed affidavit, the woman slammed the door, reopened it, picked up the papers and threw the summons and complaint at him. The papers landed in the driveway. Mr. Sorf was not at home when the complaint was served, and when he arrived home the complaint was no longer there. ¶21 Shortly after the District’s attempt to serve Mr. Sorf at his residence, Mr. Sorf received a letter from the District dated October 28, 2010. The letter stated Dear Mr. Sorf: Please find enclosed a Summons and Complaint in the above-referenced matter. While we have commenced this lawsuit, [the District] remains willing to discuss this matter with you in hopes of an amicable resolution. Please contact the undersigned if you wish. [Counsel for the District] Mr. Sorf’s affidavit states that this “letter led [him] to believe that [the District] would not file a lawsuit against [him] if [they] were able to reach an amicable resolution to the dispute.” And while the letter referenced a filed summons and complaint, Mr. Sorf asserts that nothing was attached to the letter. Thus, while the letter asserts that the District had commenced the lawsuit, the fact that no complaint or summons was attached was consistent with Mr. Sorf’s mistaken belief that, even if the District had attempted to initiate a lawsuit, litigation could not have actually commenced since he had not been personally served. ¶22 The letter and Mr. Sorf’s subsequent conversation with counsel for the District suggested that the District was willing to work out a settlement even though a complaint had been filed. After receiving the letter, Mr. Sorf called counsel for the District. During this phone call, the District’s attorney suggested that Mr. Sorf call the District directly in an attempt to work out a settlement. The District’s attorney made this invitation even though the twenty-day period to file an answer had already expired.8 8 The District’s attorney also asserts that he informed Mr. Sorf (continued...) 8 Cite as: 2013 UT 27 Opinion of the Court ¶23 These claims are certainly sufficient to raise the possibility that Mr. Sorf’s failure to timely respond to the complaint was the result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Because the district court did not make any factual findings regarding these issues, it erred. We therefore vacate the district court’s order refusing to set aside the default judgment and remand this matter to the district court for a factual determination on this issue.