Opinion ID: 703476
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Burnside's Statement

Text: 31 Hamner contends that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to testify to a statement allegedly made by Burnside to Hamner, in which Burnside admitted to shooting McClellan. 1 The trial court concluded that the statement was inadmissible hearsay; the appellate court affirmed, rejecting Hamner's contention that the statement should have been admitted as a statement against the declarant's penal interest. 32 The admissibility of evidence in a state court proceeding is generally a matter of state, rather than federal, law. Accordingly, an erroneous evidentiary ruling will not generally support a claim for habeas relief. Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384, 389 (7th Cir.1990). In order to constitute a due process violation, and thus justify the granting of a writ of habeas corpus, the alleged error must be 33 ... so 'gross,' 'conspicuously prejudicial,' or otherwise of such magnitude that it fatally infected the trial and failed to afford the petitioner the fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process. 34 Burrus v. Young, 808 F.2d 578, 584 (7th Cir.1986) (quoting Maggitt v. Wyrick, 533 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898 (1977) (citations omitted)). Of course, a prerequisite to Hamner's request for habeas relief on these grounds is that the trial court's ruling was, in fact, in error. 35 Hamner maintained that he should have been able to testify to Burnside's statement notwithstanding the hearsay rule, because of the statement against declarant's penal interest exception to that rule. However, under Illinois law, such testimony, which serves to inculpate the declarant and exculpate the defendant-witness, is only admissible if there are significant indicia of trustworthiness which provide assurance of its reliability. See People v. Bowel, 488 N.E.2d 995, 999 (Ill.1986). As a result, courts have generally required that there be corroborating circumstances which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. See id.; M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence, Sec. 804.7 (4th ed. 1984). Cf. Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) (same requirement under Federal Rules of Evidence). Here, the only evidence which even arguably supported Hamner's claim regarding Burnside's statement was that Collins testified that he may have heard Williams say Call Tony, presumably a reference to Burnside. However, given the uncertainty of Collins' recollection, and the innocuous nature of Williams' statement, it is clear that this scrap of evidence is patently insufficient to lend credence to Hamner's claim. 2 Because we conclude that the trial court's exclusion of the testimony was not error, there is no basis for habeas relief on this claim.