Opinion ID: 2258873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Witness' Plea Agreements

Text: Smith argues that the trial court erred in permitting the government to introduce, over objection, plea agreements with two of its witnesses. He contends that the agreements improperly vouched for and bolstered the credibility of the government's key witnesses and contained information having a prejudicial effect outweighing any probative value. The government argues that, where a defendant brings out that the witness is testifying pursuant to a plea agreement with the government, the prosecutor is permitted to elicit the contents of the agreement during its direct examination of the witness. It also contends that provisions of the agreement requiring truthful testimony from the witness have not been held not to amount to vouching for the witness' credibility when placed before the jury. The government also challenges Smith's claim of undue prejudice. This court has not addressed specifically whether the government may introduce evidence on direct examination concerning its witness' plea agreement with the government or whether the agreement may be introduced in its entirety. The majority of the circuits, including the D.C. Circuit, have held that the prosecutor may introduce on direct examination its witness' plea agreement in its entirety. United States v. Spriggs, 996 F.2d 320, 324 (D.C.Cir.1993) (citations omitted); United States v. Lord, 907 F.2d 1028, 1029 (10th Cir.1990). The argument against introduction, during the direct examination of the witness, of the entire agreement which requires the witness to provide truthful testimony is that it allows the government to bolster the witness' testimony before it is attacked. United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46, 56 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Edwards, 631 F.2d 1049, 1052 (2d Cir.1980). The case law in the Second Circuit precludes the introduction of such evidence prior to a challenge to the witness' credibility. Borello, 766 F.2d at 56. Recognizing that such agreements have the effect of both bolstering and discrediting, the Second Circuit created an exception which allows the government to introduce circumstances concerning the witness' motivation to testify for the government during its direct examination of the witness in order to keep the jury from inferring that the government is attempting to hide evidence of the witness' bias which is later brought out by the defense. Id. at 57. Although at least two circuits prohibit introduction of those portions of the agreement which require truthfulness until the witness' credibility is challenged, the difficulties attendent to making such redactions during trial have caused other courts to opt in favor of introduction of the entire agreement. See Lord, 907 F.2d at 1030 (citing United States v. Cosentino, 844 F.2d 30, 32-35 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923, 109 S.Ct. 303, 102 L.Ed.2d 322 (1988) and United States v. Cruz, 805 F.2d 1464, 1479-80 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1631, 95 L.Ed.2d 204 (1987)). The D.C. Circuit has adopted the position of the majority of the circuits which hold that the agreement may be admitted in its entirety during the direct examination of the witness by the government. Spriggs, supra, 996 F.2d at 324. The court reasoned that the provision of the agreement providing that the witness can be prosecuted for perjury for false testimony referenced no new law or incentive which would suggest to the jury that special credence should be attached to the witness' testimony. Id. Moreover, the court observed, there was nothing in the agreement which enhanced the government's ability to detect that the witness was lying or suggested that the government had special knowledge of the witness' veracity. [10] Id. (citing United States v. Henderson, 717 F.2d 135, 138 (4th Cir.1983) cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1009, 104 S.Ct. 1006, 79 L.Ed.2d 238 (1984)). Evidence of a plea bargain can be both favorable and unfavorable to the government. On the one hand, it may impeach the witness' credibility by showing the witness' incentive for providing testimony favorable to the government solely for the witness' own personal gain. Henderson, supra, 717 F.2d at 137. On the other hand, such evidence may tend to suggest to the jury that the witness has relevant and truthful information, the disclosure of which the prosecutor forces through the terms of the agreement. Id. (citing United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 536 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942, 101 S.Ct. 3088, 69 L.Ed.2d 957 (1981)). However, introduction of the entire plea agreement permits the jury to consider fully the possible conflicting motivations underlying the witness' testimony and, thus, enables the jury to assess more accurately the witness' credibility. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir.1986). Given this two-sided nature of the issues raised by such agreements, which must be resolved ultimately by the jury, admission of the agreements specifying the consequences of perjury are not considered impermissible bolstering of the witness' testimony. See United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir.1989) (citing United States v. Martino, 648 F.2d 367, 389 (5th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949, 102 S.Ct. 2020, 72 L.Ed.2d 474 (1982)). In this case, defense counsel mentioned in opening statement to the jury that the testimony of the government's witnesses, Leo Spriggs and Michael Allison, could not be relied upon because they would receive favorable treatment in their own criminal cases in exchange for their testimony. During Allison's direct testimony, the prosecutor read provisions of Allison's plea agreement with the government, which explained the charges and that the government would seek a lesser sentence for him if it determined that he had provided substantial assistance in a case involving another person. The prosecutor also read, over defense objection, the provision which forbade perjury. In a bench conference which preceded this testimony, defense counsel objected to the inquiry generally on the ground that the government would be vouching improperly for its own witness, and specifically to the perjury provision. When Leo Spriggs testified, the prosecutor elicited similar information concerning his plea agreement with the government by asking that he acknowledge various terms as his agreement. Defense counsel did not object, but when the government moved the complete agreements into evidence at the close of its case, the defense objected to their admission. Defense counsel cross-examined both Allison and Spriggs about the agreement with the government and its advantages to them. We are persuaded by the reasoning of the majority of the circuits which have held that elicitation during direct examination of a plea agreement containing a promise to testify truthfully does not constitute impermissible bolstering of the witness' credibility. Townsend, supra, 796 F.2d at 163 (citations omitted); Spriggs, supra, 996 F.2d at 325. Indeed, we have held that disclosure of a witness plea agreement, including the requirement therein that he testify truthfully, [does] not constitute improper prosecutorial vouching for [the witness'] veracity. Ford v. United States, 616 A.2d 1245, 1254 n. 21 (D.C.1992) (citing Felder v. United States, 595 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C.1991)). We stated that we have considerable difficulty with the proposition that such supposed vouching would have substantially swayed an impartial jury where the witness in question had already been introduced by the prosecutor and had sworn in the presence of the jury to tell the truth. Id. (citation omitted). The opinion in Ford does not state at what point portions of the plea agreement were mentioned to the jury. However, that makes no difference to the outcome of this case. Here, defense counsel raised the issue of the two witnesses' motivations not to tell the truth in opening statement. This previewed the challenge that would be made to their testimony based upon the plea agreements. Prior to the admission of the agreements in their entirety, defense counsel cross-examined the witnesses concerning the agreements, thereby making the nature of the agreements an issue in the case. See Edelman, supra, 873 F.2d at 795. Under such circumstances, we find no error in their admission. See id. Smith argues for the first time on appeal the prejudicial nature of two other specific provisions of the agreement, i.e., the willingness of the witnesses to take a polygraph examination and the witness protection provisions. Smith contends that the polygraph provision vouched for the witness' credibility and that the witness protection provision suggested that he must be a dangerous person. We review Smith's claim for plain error. [11] See Harris v. United States, 602 A.2d 154, 159-60 (D.C.1992) (en banc) (error must be readily apparent and so prejudicial as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial to warrant reversal). We are not persuaded that the court's failure to exclude the evidence on these grounds amounted to plain error. The provisions pertaining to the polygraph commitment were not commented upon by the prosecutor or the witnesses, and they were but one of many provisions of the lengthy agreements, which were but two items of evidence in the trial. See United States v. Rosa, 891 F.2d 1063, 1068 (3d Cir.1989) (low profile and marginal significance of a polygraph commitment not prejudicial error where government's case is strong); United States v. Herrera, 832 F.2d 833, 835 (4th Cir.1987) (references to polygraph in plea agreement harmless error); Porter, supra, 821 F.2d at 974 (references in plea agreement to witness' polygraph commitment harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where not used to bolster credibility of crucial witnesses). In addition, there was no evidence that either witness ever took a polygraph test. See Herrera, 832 F.2d at 835. Under the circumstances we find no plain error in the admission of this evidence. Similarly, we reject Smith's argument that the admission of the witness protection provisions of the agreements was unduly prejudicial or amounted to plain error. This provision was not highlighted. Moreover, the defense cross-examined Allison extensively about the reason for his failure to come forward voluntarily, and Allison explained what happens to people in his neighborhood who help the police. Such evidence is not inadmissible. See Carpenter v. United States, 635 A.2d 1289, 1294 (D.C.1993) (witness' testimony about what happens in general to snitches relevant and admissible to explain fear of going to the police). The need for a witness protection provision is explained to some extent by Allison's testimony in this regard. Therefore, we are not persuaded that such a provision as one of many terms in the plea agreement, which was not highlighted during the trial, was plain error. Since the circumstances concerning what happens to snitches generally were already in evidence with respect to Allison, we see no undue prejudice in the introduction of Spriggs' agreement containing the same term. Accordingly, we find no plain error. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from hereby is Affirmed. SCHWELB, Associate Judge, concurring: I adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d 735 (D.C.1996), with respect to what I regard as unnecessary language in Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331 (D.C. 1994) and Foreman v. United States, 633 A.2d 792 (D.C.1993). In all other respects, I join the opinion of the court. FARRELL, Associate Judge, concurring. I join the opinion of the court, and have only a few observations concerning the reasonable-doubt instruction given in this case. The departure here from the Redbook instruction is, of course, further reason why the court en banc should revisit the issue of what instruction is necessary on reasonable doubt. See Proctor v. United States, 685 A.2d at 740-42 (D.C.1996) (separate remarks of Associate Judge FARRELL). I am not of the view, apparently shared by two or more federal appellate courts, that the jury should receive no explanation of that concept. Given the vital role which it plays in our scheme of criminal procedure, Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. at 39-40, 111 S.Ct. at 329, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970)), juries should not be left without some elaboration of what reasonable doubt means. Butler v. United States, 646 A.2d 331, 337 (D.C.1994). The issue in the present case arises only from the appearance of two words (real possibility) in the federal pattern instruction which the judge gave and which I believe provides a model for this court to adopt and mandate in future cases. Proctor, 685 A.2d at 741-42, (separate remarks of Associate Judge FARRELL). Appellant argues that real possibility could be taken by the jury to mean a serious or substantial possibility  on the order of substantial evidence in the civil administrative context  which is more than reasonable doubt requires. But the court explains convincingly why, taken as a whole, the instructions here do not realistically allow of that possibility. For future purposes, however, the arguable ambiguity in these words can be remedied easily by the addition of a few words, i.e., a real possibility as distinct from an imaginary or fanciful one. With that minor supplementation, the federal pattern instruction remains a strong improvement over the Redbook explanation of reasonable doubt.