Opinion ID: 775760
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review and Government's Burden of Proof

Text: 104 We review de novo the district court's interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Studley, 47 F.3d 569, 573 (2d Cir. 1995). However, we will reverse a factual finding relevant to a sentencing determination only if it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Ruggiero, 100 F.3d 284, 291 (2d Cir. 1996). And, we must give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v. Molina, 106 F.3d 1118, 1121 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 3742(e)). 105 Preliminarily, defendants argue that due process required the government to prove the facts underlying the attribution of Riddick's murder to them beyond a reasonable doubt or, at a minimum, by clear and convincing evidence. In United States v. Watts, the Supreme Court held that a preponderance standard for proving relevant conduct generally satisfies due process but left open the possibility that the Due Process Clause might require a higher standard of clear and convincing evidence in cases where the tail of relevant conduct wagged the dog of the substantive offense. 519 U.S. 148, 156-57 & n. 2 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). 106 In our most recent case on the burden of proof necessary to establish a sentencing factor, we reconciled dicta in earlier cases by holding that the preponderance standard applied to fact finding at sentencing even when the proposed enhancement would result in a life sentence but that the district court could consider a departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. 5K2.0 where there is a combination of circumstances . . . including (i) an enormous upward adjustment (ii) for uncharged conduct (iii) not proved at trial and (iv) found by only a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Cordoba-Murgas, 233 F.3d 704, 708-09 (2d Cir. 2000). Although the district court's sentencing remarks are not completely free from ambiguity, it appears that it appropriately considered defendants' requests for departure on this basis. The court indicated that it would not depart further downward even if it used a clear and convincing or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Therefore, we discern no error in the district court's analysis of the applicable burden of proof.