Opinion ID: 2221881
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Heading: Shell's Cross-Appeal.

Text: On cross-appeal Shell claims the Tank Fund Act applies only to owners or operators of underground storage tanks who are subject to the proof of financial responsibility requirements under the Tank Fund Act, and it was never subject to such requirements. [1] It also claims the Tank Fund Act cannot apply retroactively. Thus, Shell claims it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Tank Fund Act does not apply to all underground storage tanks. See Iowa Code § 455G.1(2)(a), (b), (c). Instead, it applies to petroleum underground storage tanks for which an owner or operator is required to maintain proof of financial responsibility under federal or state law. . . . Id. § 455G.1(2); see also id. §§ 455G.1(2)(b), .2(19). Federal law first required proof of financial responsibility in 1988, and our state law first required proof of financial responsibility in 1989. See 53 Fed.Reg. 43322, 43370-72 (Oct. 26, 1988) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 280.90-.93 (1999)); Iowa Admin. Code r. 567-136.2 (1989). Even though the particular underground tank at issue in this case was in operation prior to the requirement that the owner or operator maintain responsibility, that fact does not exclude the tank from the Tank Fund Act. The Tank Fund Act describes the tanks within its scope as those which require the owner or operator to maintain proof of financial responsibility. See Iowa Code § 455G.1(2). The effective date of the proof of responsibility requirements do not exclude tanks which predate the requirements, but simply designate those tanks subject to the Tank Fund Act whether they existed before or after the requirement. If the tank, regardless of when it was placed in the ground, is a type for which the owner or operator is required to maintain proof of responsibility, it is covered under the Tank Fund Act.
Absent an expressed indication to the contrary, statutes are generally presumed to apply prospectively. Iowa Code § 4.5. However, this statutory rule was not intended to apply to remedial or procedural statutes. State ex rel. Buechler v. Vinsand, 318 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Iowa 1982). We recognize remedial and procedural statutes are exceptions to section 4.5, and may be applied retroactively. Schuler v. Rodberg, 516 N.W.2d 902, 904 (Iowa 1994). Shell argues chapter 455G is substantive and should be construed prospectively because it creates and regulates new rights, obligations, and duties. See Walker State Bank v. Chipokas, 228 N.W.2d 49, 51 (Iowa 1975). The Board asserts this is a remedial statute and susceptible to retroactive application consistent with the legislature's intent. We have previously found legislation which regulates conduct for the public good is remedial. See McCracken v. Iowa Dep't of Human Serv., 595 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Iowa 1999); Hornby v. State, 559 N.W.2d 23, 25 (Iowa 1997). A remedial statute is not always applied retroactively. See Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 587 N.W.2d 781, 789 (Iowa 1998). Instead, we follow a three-part test to determine whether the legislature intended retrospective or prospective application. Emmet County State Bank v. Reutter, 439 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Iowa 1989). First, we look to the language of the new legislation; second, we consider the evil to be remedied; and third, we consider whether there was any previously existing statute governing or limiting the mischief which the new legislation was intended to remedy. Emmet County State Bank, 439 N.W.2d at 654 (citations omitted); see also State ex rel. Turner v. Limbrecht, 246 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Iowa 1976) (applying same rule), overruled on other grounds by, State ex rel. Miller v. Hydro Mag, Ltd., 436 N.W.2d 617, 622 (Iowa 1989). In applying the first part of this test, the language of the Tank Fund Act, especially legislative findings and legislative intent, clearly indicates retroactive application. Specific legislative findings include: 1. Maintenance of Iowa's petroleum distribution network, particularly in rural Iowa, is dependent upon the provision of moneys to clean up existing petroleum releases and the availability [of funds] ... for petroleum underground storage tank improvements. . . . . . . . 3. It is necessary to provide a reasonable means to share the cost of clean up of past and existing petroleum leaks to make [Iowa's underground storage tanks] insurable and environmentally safe, and to protect groundwater safety.. . . . 1989 Iowa Acts ch. 131, § 1(1), (3) (emphasis added). Additionally, the legislative intent was to protect and improve the environment by correcting existing petroleum releases. Id. § 2. The fund was established as an interim measure to address short-term unavailability of funds for these clean up measures of past releases. Id. The goal was to phase out the fund as assurance mechanisms were established within the private market. Id. We believe this approach clearly revealed an intent for the act to apply retroactively. Secondly, the legislative findings clearly indicate a purpose of the Tank Fund Act was to establish mechanisms, financial and regulatory, to handle the environmental issues created by existing petroleum leaks, as well as implement means to prevent future leaks. The environmental damage was the evil to be remedied, and financial support for clean up was the means to accomplish that end. Finally, prior to the Tank Fund Act, Iowa had no comprehensive statutory scheme for petroleum contamination. Thus, the retroactive reach of the Tank Fund Act was not previously governed by a prior statute. The Tank Fund Act fits squarely within the Emmet County State Bank test for retroactivity. It also fits into the types of situations in which we have found a statute to be retroactive. See Board of Trustees of Mun. Fire & Police Retirement Sys. v. City of West Des Moines, 587 N.W.2d 227, 230 & n. 4 (Iowa 1998) (remedial, curative, or emergency legislation given retroactive application). We also recognize other jurisdictions have applied their underground storage tank statutes retroactively. See Medical Clinic Bd. v. Alabama Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt., 679 So.2d 1142, 1144 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996); Shell Oil Co. v. Meyer, 705 N.E.2d 962, 977 (Ind.1998); State ex rel. Dep't of Envtl. Protection v. Arky's Auto Sales, 224 N.J.Super. 200, 539 A.2d 1280, 1283 (App.Div.1988); Leone v. Leewood Serv. Station, Inc., 212 A.D.2d 669, 624 N.Y.S.2d 610, 612 (1995); Weston v. Northwest Pump & Equip. Co., 150 Or.App. 562, 946 P.2d 691, 696 (1997); Dash Point Village Assocs. v. Exxon Corp., 86 Wash.App. 596, 937 P.2d 1148, 1152 (1997). Those jurisdictions which have declined to apply their statutes retroactively have failed to find clear legislative intent to do so. These states apply their Tank Fund Acts prospectively by relying upon either express prospective language, or particular statutory language which evidences a complete lack of retroactive intent. See Wilson v. Triangle Oil Co., 566 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Del.Super.Ct.1989) (lack of retroactive language, thus no clear legislative intent); Memphis Publ'g Co. v. Tennessee Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Board, 975 S.W.2d 303, 304 (Tenn.1998) (language specifically negated retroactive application). We find our Tank Fund Act was designed to address past and future petroleum leaks, and that our legislature intended its retroactive application. Our legislature made specific findings of an existing problem and made repeated reference to the need to address past contamination. We affirm the district court's denial of Shell's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.