Opinion ID: 169489
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Right to Self-Government Exception

Text: This brings us to Montana 's second exception. Again, the exception requires that the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within [the] reservation . . . has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566, 101 S.Ct. 1245. When viewed in isolation, the exception appears broad in scope. The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that: Read in isolation, the Montana rule's second exception can be misperceived. Key to its proper application, however, is the Court's preface: Indian tribes retain their inherent power [to punish tribal offenders,] to determine tribal membership, to regulate domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members. . . . But [a tribe's inherent power does not reach] beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations. 450 U.S., at 564, 101 S.Ct. 1245. Neither regulatory nor adjudicatory authority over the state highway accident at issue is needed to preserve the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them. Williams, 358 U.S., at 220, 79 S.Ct. 269. The Montana rule, therefore, and not its exceptions, applies to this case. Strate, 520 U.S. at 459, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (alterations in original). In framing the second exception, the Court also later added: Tribal assertion of regulatory authority over nonmembers must be connected to th[e] right of the Indians to make their own laws and be governed by them. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 361, 121 S.Ct. 2304. The proper question in this case, then, is whether regulatory authority over Defendants' activities, with the exception of those of Mr. Atcitty, is needed to preserve the Navajo Nation's right to make their own laws and be governed by them. In regard to the County defendants, the district court accurately noted that the Navajo district court did not find facts showing conduct on the part of any County defendant that threatened or had some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the Navajo Nation. MacArthur II, 391 F.Supp.2d at 1007. The Navajo district court did not find (and neither do we) that the County defendants  including San Juan County, the San Juan County Commissioners, County Attorney Halls, and County Administrator Bailey  had any role in the complained of activities, other than that they exercised some control over, and provided advice to, SJHSD. Additionally, Mr. Bailey had some role in Plaintiffs' grievance process  he sent grievance decision letters and served as the grievance hearing officer. All of these actions, however, relate exclusively to the governance of SJHSD; they in no way impact the Navajo Nation's ability to make its own laws and be governed by them. SJHSD's activities also do not affect the Navajo Nation's right to self-government. Despite Plaintiffs' attempts to make more of it, this case essentially boils down to an employment dispute between SJHSD and three of its former employees, two of whom happen to be enrolled members of the Navajo Nation. While the Navajo Nation undoubtedly has an interest in regulating employment relationships between its members and non-Indian employers on the reservation, that interest is not so substantial in this case as to affect the Nation's right to make its own laws and be governed by them. This is particularly evident here, when only two members of the Nation were involved and the employment relationships at issue were carried out on non-Indian land. The right at issue in this case is the Navajo Nation's claimed right to make its own laws and have others be governed by them, not the right to self-government. We are therefore left with Ms. Lauren Schafer (SJHSD Personnel Director of Nursing), members of SJHSD's board, and Mr. Wood. Plaintiffs' only complaint about Ms. Schafer is that she failed to do enough to help them in their conflict with SJHSD and Mr. Wood. Moreover, in its orders, the Navajo district court stated only that Ms. Schafer wrote a letter critical of Ms. Singer and that she testified she had discovered only one piece of evidence as to Ms. Singer's intent to commit time card fraud. Failing to help others may violate the golden rule, but it in no way constitutes an affront to the Navajo Nation's self-governance; and Ms. Schafer's actions vis-vis Ms. Singer are irrelevant due to Ms. Singer's lack of membership in the tribe. Next, because the Navajo district court's orders make no mention of the individual members of SJHSD's board and Plaintiffs make no attempt to explain how their activities pose a threat to the tribe's right to make its own laws, it follows that the individual members of the board fall squarely within Montana 's general rule. Finally, as previously detailed, the federal district court held that the Navajo Nation possessed authority over Mr. Wood's alleged defaming of Mr. Riggs. To be sure, that alleged defamation may have had a negative impact on Mr. Riggs individually, but based on the record before us we fail to see how it, or any other of Mr. Wood's actions, negatively affected the tribe as a whole or its ability to self-govern. In sum, with the arguable exception of Mr. Atcitty, the Navajo Nation did not possess regulatory authority over any of Defendants' activities. Because there exists no adjudicatory authority in the absence of regulatory authority, Strate, 520 U.S. at 453, 117 S.Ct. 1404 (As to nonmembers, we hold, a tribe's adjudicative jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.), the Navajo district court did not possess jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' claims unrelated to the activities of Mr. Atcitty.