Opinion ID: 1162168
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: INAPPLICABILITY OF Saling TO ADMISSIONS HEREIN

Text: (2) No remotely comparable independent evidence of the existence of a continuing conspiracy to effect payment to Leach at the time of his admissions, much less at the time of the Kramers' admissions, can be found in the record of this case. Although the trial court correctly observed that independent evidence of a continuing conspiracy was required by Saling, [11] such evidence is simply not to be found in this case. This is not to say that the trial court was incorrect in its finding that there had been a conspiracy to murder Howard Kramer (see ante, fn. 11); the circumstances of the murder and the evidence found on Leach at the time of his arrest were surely sufficient to make out a prima facie showing of a conspiracy. It is even arguable  although we do not decide this point  that this evidence of a conspiracy, in conjunction with the lack of any other apparent motive for Leach's participation, is sufficient to make out a prima facie showing that this was a murder-for-hire conspiracy involving some member of the Kramer household. But what Saling requires, and what is totally lacking in this case, is independent evidence that the conspiracy between Leach and the Kramers was still operative at the time of their respective admissions, notwithstanding the accomplishment of the primary objective of the conspiracy with the death of Howard Kramer. Despite an intimation to the contrary by the trial court (see ante, fn. 11), we find no support in the record for the proposition that the conspiracy between Leach and the Kramers had as a primary objective not only the murder of Howard Kramer but also the collection of insurance proceeds as a result of his death, and hence that the conspiracy was prolonged past the death of Howard Kramer not only for so long as Leach remained unpaid but also for so long as the insurance proceeds remained uncollected. Other than portions of the admissions of the Kramers and Leach, the only evidence in the record arguably relating to such an insurance conspiracy (see People v. Saling, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 854) consists of the pretrial testimony of the trust fund administrator for Howard Kramer's union listing the sums paid by his office to Edith Kramer upon Howard Kramer's death, and a more inclusive stipulation at trial itemizing by amount all monies in the nature of insurance received by Edith Kramer following her husband's death. We have heretofore held in Saling that the mere fact that the principal in a murder-for-hire plot was the beneficiary of insurance on the life of the victim falls short of establishing prima facie the existence of an insurance conspiracy concurrently with the murder conspiracy. Indeed, we held in Saling that even the fact that such insurance was fraudulently obtained through the beneficiary's forgery of the insured's application does not transform the fact that such insurance was in force at the time of the insured's murder into prima facie proof of an insurance conspiracy. (7 Cal.3d at pp. 854-855.) It necessarily follows from the reasoning of Saling that the same result must obtain when the record reflects in addition nothing more than that the insurance in force was in due course actually collected by the murderous beneficiary. To hold otherwise would have the artificial effect of making virtually every inter-spousal murder conspiracy a prima facie insurance conspiracy as well, since many spouses have some sort of reciprocal life insurance in force, if only as an incident of employment in the form of private pensions or social security benefits. A murderer playing the part of a bereaved spouse is hardly likely to refuse to accept the payment of such insurance notwithstanding that the collection of insurance proceeds may in no way have been the motive or objective of the murder conspiracy. Of course, as to the admissiblity against Leach of evidence of the declarations of the Kramers, and vice versa, the declarations of Leach and the Kramers respectively may also be considered in determining whether there is prima facie proof by independent evidence of an insurance conspiracy such as would bring the declarations within the coconspirator exception. The Kramers' admissions, however, discount entirely the idea of an insurance conspiracy. At one point, in fact, Lorraine Kramer was asked by the undercover agent: Did they pay double on it? She replied: No  well, see, we didn't do it for the money. That's the thing.... He was a psychopath, but he wasn't insane enough to commit him, and if we did, uh, if we did, he can get out in six months and shoot us all. She and her mother then elaborated on their mutual fear of their victim's violent nature. On Leach's part, his only mention of insurance to Hagler was confined to his description of his bargain with the Kramers as anticipating his being paid off in installments once the Kramers had collected their insurance proceeds. (See ante, p. 425.) This consciousness of the existence of the insurance and expectation of being paid out of its proceeds falls short of establishing, even prima facie, that the conspiracy between Leach and the Kramers was directed towards the successful collection of the insurance. The objective of the conspiracy was to kill Howard Kramer, not to collect insurance, and Leach cared not a whit whence his remuneration came, be it by insurance fraud, bank robbery, or dope peddling. We note that here no special statutes are involved, such as those making it a crime to commit arson with the intent to defraud an insurer (Pen. Code, §§ 450a, 548), and that the existence of a conspiracy is urged not for the purpose of imposing substantive liability but merely as a vehicle for using otherwise inadmissible hearsay evidence against a defendant. In such circumstances we see no basis for further breach of the general rule against the admission of hearsay evidence ( People v. Saling, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 853). We accordingly decline to treat a conspiracy to commit a particular criminal offense as necessarily entailing a second conspiracy to collect the insurance proceeds which will be paid as a matter of course upon the successful commission of the contemplated offense. [T]he looseness and pliability of the doctrine [of conspiracy] present inherent dangers which should be in the background of judicial thought wherever it is sought to extend the doctrine to meet the exigencies of a particular case. ( Krulewitch v. United States, supra, 336 U.S. 440, 449 [93 L.Ed. 790, 797] [concurring opn. of Jackson, J.]; cf. People v. Saling, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 853.) It should also be noted that even if the independent evidence heretofore discussed were sufficient to establish that the Kramers and Leach were party to an insurance conspiracy, that evidence would not suffice to admit, solely under the auspices of such insurance conspiracy, any proffered evidence of the extrajudicial declarations which occurred after the death of Howard Kramer. Although evidence was adduced below that the Kramers had received insurance proceeds, there was no evidence whatsoever as to when those proceeds had been received. The mere establishment of the existence of a conspiracy at some time prior to an extrajudicial declaration does not meet Evidence Code section 1223's requirement of prima facie proof by independent evidence that that conspiracy was still in existence at the time of the declaration of which evidence is proffered pursuant to the coconspirator exception. (See ante, fn. 10.) The putative insurance conspiracy would normally have terminated upon the receipt of the insurance proceeds, which may well have been months before Leach's admissions to Hagler. Thus even under the insurance conspiracy theory there would still be a need under Saling for independent evidence sufficient to establish, prima facie, the existence at the time of the declarations of continuing efforts by the conspirators qua conspirators  still acting in concert towards the common objective of carrying out their agreement as to payment, notwithstanding the prior attainment of their primary objective of killing Howard Kramer or collecting the proceeds of insurance on Howard Kramer's life. In light of the inconsistency between the record in this case and the ruling below that there was independent evidence that the conspiracy was still continuing when Leach began confiding in Hagler some six months after the murder, it appears that the trial court erroneously read Saling as holding that once there is independent evidence that one conspirator was induced to enter the conspiracy by a promise of payment, then as a matter of law the conspiracy is to be deemed continuing until such time as other evidence indicates payment has been received. Such a presumption that conspirators who stand in an unenforceable debtor-creditor relationship are going to be motivated by a continuing common desire to make a full and satisfactory accounting, and are going to act in concert towards this objective in continuation of their conspiracy to commit the crime for which payment was promised, belies common sense and adds but another layer of tarnish to the already dull finish of conspiracy doctrine. Save where efforts at a payoff are necessary to preserve the debtor's personal safety or to insure that the creditor does not bring about the detection of the conspiracy and the apprehension of the defaulting conspirators, it is commonplace for conspirators to forsake each other once the original substantive object of the conspiracy is achieved or abandoned. Such seems to have been the case with the Kramers and Leach. It is hardly surprising that there was no independent evidence that the conspiracy remained operative because of the continuing collective intention of the conspirators to effect payment, [12] since the evidence of the admissions themselves tends to establish that the conspiracy had terminated and that Leach was being left, in the timeless fashion of forsaken former conspirators, to twist slowly, slowly in the wind. [13] Hagler's testimony shows Leach to be of the opinion that he was being burnt, and therefore desperate enough to employ Hagler to coerce from his silent partners some compensation for his crime. The tape recordings of the Kramers' admissions confirm what was powerfully implicit in their lack of action to benefit Leach in the preceding 15 months: that they were far from anxious to implicate themselves by seeking to pay him off, and were seemingly content to abandon him altogether for as long as he remained incarcerated and unable to resort to extortion. In view of the lack of independent evidence, or indeed of any evidence, of the continuing nature of the conspiracy herein, there is a tangible factual distinction which removes the instant case from the ambit of Saling. Evidence of the admissions of Leach and the Kramers was accordingly not admissible under the aegis of the coconspirator exception. Whether it was admissible under another exception to the hearsay rule is a separate question to which we now turn.