Opinion ID: 891659
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Legislative History of the Amenability Hearing

Text: {25} To further inform ourselves regarding legislative intent, we look to the history of the Children's Code and to the Code as a whole. See N.M. Dep't of Health v. Compton, 2001-NMSC-032, ¶ 18, 131 N.M. 204, 34 P.3d 593. The Legislature adopted New Mexico's first Juvenile Code in 1917, entitled An Act Defining Juvenile Delinquents, Providing for Their Reformation or Punishment and Providing for the Punishment of Those Who Contribute to Such Delinquency. See 1917 N.M. Laws, ch. 4. Prior to that date, a juvenile charged with a criminal offense was treated no differently than an adult. Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 723, 437 P.2d 716, 722 (1968). The Code established a juvenile court in each county and vested it with exclusive original jurisdiction, over juvenile delinquents. 1917 N.M. Laws, ch. 4, § 2; see also 1921 N.M. Laws, ch. 87, § 1 (amending 1917 N.M. Laws, ch. 4, § 2). The Code defined a juvenile delinquent as a child under the age of 16 who violates any laws of this state or any ordinance of any city, town or village within this state, or who is incorrigible, or who knowingly associates with thieves, vicious or immoral persons, or who is growing up in idleness or crime, or who knowingly visits or enters a house of prostitution, or who knowingly visits any saloon or dram-shop where intoxicating liquors are sold, or who wanders about the streets in the night-time without being on any lawful business or occupation, or who patronizes or visits any public pool-hall, or who habitually wanders in the railroad yards or tracks or habitually jumps or hooks onto any moving train or habitually enters any car or engine without lawful authority, or who habitually uses vile, obscene, vulgar, profane or indecent language in public places, or is guilty of immoral conduct in any public place or about any school house, or who having no responsible parent or guardian, shall habitually violate the provisions of the law with reference to attendance on public schools. 1917 N.M. Laws, ch. 4, § 1. The Code further specified that a child found delinquent would be adjudged a ward of the juvenile court, and that such an adjudication could not be deemed to be a conviction of crime. Id. § 5. Interestingly, nothing in the Code allowed a juvenile delinquent to be tried or sentenced as an adult. But see In re Santillanes, 47 N.M. 140, 159-60, 138 P.2d 503, 515-16 (1943) (holding that once a child fits the definition of incorrigible, he must be tried criminally for subsequent delinquent acts). With the exception of raising the age of a juvenile from 16 to 18, see 1929 N.M. Laws, ch. 74, § 1, the Code remained largely unchanged for several decades. {26} The Legislature first addressed whether a child could be tried and sentenced as an adult when it enacted the 1943 amendments to the Code: [N]othing in this Act shall be construed to prevent any person of whatever age from being charged with the commission of a felony under the laws of this state and prosecuted therefor in the District Courts of this state, and upon conviction may be sentenced to the State Penitentiary in conformity with the criminal laws of this state in the same manner as any person. 1943 N.M. Laws, ch. 40, § 4 (emphasis omitted). Thus, the act of charging a juvenile of any age with a felony was enough to try the child as an adult and impose an adult sentence upon conviction. {27} This expansive approach to the criminal treatment of juveniles was tempered by the 1955 amendments to the Code. That version of the Code restricted adult treatment to juvenile[s] over the age of fourteen years. 1955 N.M. Laws, ch. 205, § 9. The Legislature further limited the range of children who could be treated as adults to those who are not proper subject[s] for reformation or rehabilitation. Id. The amendment did not specify how the juvenile court was to determine whether a child was a proper subject for reformation or rehabilitation. The inclusion of this language signaled the inception of the amenability inquiry that is the focus of this Opinion. {28} In 1972, the Legislature revamped New Mexico's juvenile justice system when it enacted the Children's Code. See 1972 N.M. Laws, ch. 97. The change was likely prompted by a trio of contemporary United States Supreme Court decisions that expanded constitutional protections for juveniles. See Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 553, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966) (holding that a juvenile court may not waive its jurisdiction and transfer a juvenile offender to a criminal court without a hearing, effective assistance of counsel, and a statement of reasons); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) (holding that juveniles are entitled to certain constitutional protections in adjudication proceedings, including the right to counsel); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (holding that a juvenile is entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt in an adjudication proceeding). The new Code, based on a model statute created by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, provided a comprehensive approach to the adjudication and disposition of alleged delinquent children. See 1972 N.M. Laws, ch. 97, § 4(C); see also Theodore E. Lauer, The New Mexico Children's Code: Some Remaining Problems, 10 N.M. L.Rev. 341, 344 (1980) (The model statute was written to strengthen the rights of children in the juvenile court; it retained the traditional juvenile court framework in large part, but embodied what was then the most advanced thinking in terms of children's rights and procedural safeguards.). The Code also made reference to the Supreme Court adopting rules of procedure for the newly established children's court division of the district courts. See 1972 N.M. Laws, ch. 97, § 4. {29} The 1972 Children's Code included a further refinement of the court's authority to try and sentence an alleged juvenile offender as an adult. Under NMSA 1953, Section 13-14-27(A)(1) (Vol. 3, Repl., Part 1), the children's court could waive its jurisdiction and transfer the matter for prosecution in the district court, provided the child was 16 years of age and charged with a felony. As a condition to transfer, the court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing, similar to the amenability proceeding in today's Delinquency Act, to determine if it was appropriate to try and sentence the child as an adult. Section 13-14-27(A)(2). To justify transferring the child to the district court, (4) the court [had to find] upon the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that: (a) the child committed the delinquent act alleged; and (b) the child is not amenable to treatment or rehabilitation as a child through available facilities; and (c) the child is not committable to an institution for the mentally retarded or mentally ill; and (d) the interests of the community require that the child be placed under legal restraint or discipline. Section 13-14-27(A)(4)(a)-(d) (emphasis added). Upon transfer, the child was both tried and sentenced as an adult. {30} In 1975, the Legislature added a provision that lowered the threshold for transfer to district court for certain serious offenses. See Lauer, supra, at 370 (noting that the amendment was passed in reaction to the contention that the recited safeguards were too stringent in cases of serious crimes and that the age requirement was too limiting, particularly in murder cases). The amendment allowed the discretionary transfer to criminal court of matters where the juvenile was at least 15 years old and accused of murder, or at least 16 years old and accused of a felony enumerated in the statute. See 1975 N.M. Laws, ch. 320, § 4(A)(1) (including assault with intent to commit a violent felony, kidnaping, aggravated battery, dangerous use of explosives, aggravated burglary, and aggravated arson). When the court's discretion to transfer was invoked, it only had to hold a hearing and consider the child's amenability to treatment and make a finding that it had reasonable grounds to believe that the child committed the alleged delinquent act. Id. § 4(A)(5); see also State v. Doe, 100 N.M. 649, 650, 674 P.2d 1109, 1110 (1983) (holding that the statute only requires consideration of child's amenability  not a specific finding). These relaxed requirements made it easier to transfer a proceeding to the district court for an adult trial and sentencing when the juvenile was accused of a serious felony. They foreshadowed the youthful offender and serious youthful offender categories we have today. {31} In 1993, our Legislature again changed its tack, creating a unique approach to delinquency matters. See Daniel M. Vannella, Note, Let the Jury Do the Waive: How Apprendi v. New Jersey Applies to Juvenile Transfer Proceedings, 48 Wm. & Mary L.Rev. 723, 753 (2006); see also Kelly K. Waterfall, Note, State v. Muniz: Authorizing Adult Sentencing of Juveniles Absent a Conviction that Authorizes an Adult Sentence, 35 N.M. L.Rev. 229, 231 (2005) (noting that New Mexico joined a nationwide movement to crack down on juvenile crime, and generally . . . expand[] eligibility for criminal court processing and adult correctional sentencing). By enacting the Delinquency Act, which is still in force today, the Legislature established the now-familiar juvenile offender trichotomy described in the first section of this Opinion. As previously discussed, the Act provides that only serious youthful offenders charged with first-degree murder can be tried in district court and automatically sentenced as adults if convicted. All others remain in the juvenile system until after adjudication and may be sentenced as adults only after an amenability hearing. {32} Thus, on the one hand, the Delinquency Act made it easier to prosecute a child charged with first-degree murder as an adult  a transfer hearing is no longer necessary. On the other hand, the Act extended the protections of the juvenile system to all other alleged juvenile offenders by treating them as children throughout the adjudication process [2]  effectively eliminating the trial court's ability to waive or transfer a juvenile proceeding. We interpret this legislative history as evidence of an evolving concern that children be treated as children so long as they can benefit from the treatment and rehabilitation provided for in the Delinquency Act. {33} With this most recent version of the Children's Code, the Legislature moved away from an approach that had previously afforded wide latitude to the courts in sentencing children as adults. It is no longer the case that a child accused of any felony potentially can be tried and sentenced as an adult. Compare NMSA 1953, § 13-14-27 (1972, as amended through 1975) with § 32A-2-3(J) (2009) (listing offenses that expose a child to adult sanctions). Similarly, with the exception of a serious youthful offender, the Legislature no longer allows a child to be sentenced as an adult without the court first finding that the child is not amenable to treatment. Compare NMSA 1953, § 13-14-27.1 (1975) with § 32A-2-20(B)(1) (2009). {34} Taken as a whole, this history demonstrates a carefully calibrated grant of judicial authority to sentence children as adults. In light of the relatively long lineage of the amenability proceeding, its continued presence in the Delinquency Act cannot be ignored or tacitly diminished. We are persuaded that the Legislature intended to make an amenability determination a necessary predicate to the court's exercise of adult sentencing authority. Cf. Kent, 383 U.S. at 560-61, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (holding that a transfer hearing is a critically important proceeding because, under a juvenile statutory scheme, non-criminal treatment is to be the rule  and the adult criminal treatment, the exception (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).