Opinion ID: 784434
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Statements Claimed to be Hearsay

Text: 55 The government sought to present testimony by Agent Proenca recounting statements Amaya-Flores made to him asserting that she had not consented to the oral sex with Johnson. Johnson objected to this testimony as hearsay. The district court overruled the objection and allowed the testimony. Although neither Johnson nor the district court referred to any particular rule of evidence, it is obvious that the district court relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which under certain circumstances defines prior consistent statements as nonhearsay. 56 We review de novo a district court's construction of the hearsay rule. United States v. Gilbert, 57 F.3d 709, 711 (9th Cir.1995). We have not previously addressed the standard under which we review a district court's determination of when a person's motive to testify falsely arose within the meaning of Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Although the question of when a motive arose is an issue of fact, ordinarily reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard, United States v. Percy, 250 F.3d 720, 725 (9th Cir.2001), we join our sister circuits and hold that we review a district court's determination of admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Prieto, 232 F.3d 816, 819, 822 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 411 (8th Cir.1998); United States v. Fulford, 980 F.2d 1110, 1114 (7th Cir.1992); see also United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 273 F.3d 1213, 1217 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that the admission of evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule is reviewed for abuse of discretion). 57 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Agent Proenca's testimony that Amaya-Flores told him that she had not consented to the oral sex would ordinarily fall within the scope of Rule 801(c) because Amaya-Flores's out-of-court statement to Agent Proenca was offered for the truth of the matter asserted. Rule 801(d), however, excludes certain statements from the definition of hearsay. Because statements that qualify under Rule 801(d) are defined as nonhearsay, they are admissible as substantive evidence. Rule 801(d)(1)(B) provides: 58 A statement is not hearsay if ... [t]he declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... consistent with the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.... 59 In Tome v. United States, the Supreme Court construed narrowly the exception to the hearsay rule embodied in Rule 801(d)(1)(B), holding that [t]he Rule permits the introduction of a declarant's consistent out-of-court statements to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive only when those statements were made before the charged recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. 513 U.S. 150, 167, 115 S.Ct. 696, 130 L.Ed.2d 574 (1995). Following Tome, we have characterized the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) as follows: 60 (1) the declarant must testify at trial and be subject to cross-examination; (2) there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive of the declarant's testimony; (3) the proponent must offer a prior consistent statement that is consistent with the declarant's challenged in-court testimony; and, (4) the prior consistent statement must be made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose. 61 United States v. Collicott, 92 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir.1996); see also United States v. Frederick, 78 F.3d 1370, 1377 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that prior consistent statements are admissible under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) only if offered to rebut a charge of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive). 62 Johnson contends that Amaya-Flores's statement to Agent Proenca does not meet the fourth requirement of Collicott's Rule 801(d)(1)(B) framework. Johnson's defense at trial was that Amaya-Flores had consented to — indeed, had initiated — the oral sex. As part of that defense, he contended that Amaya-Flores fabricated her story because she wanted to stay in the United States for the duration of the investigation and trial. In support of this contention, he pointed, inter alia, to testimony by Agent William King that the government had arranged for Amaya-Flores to stay with family members in Texas as long as she was needed to assist in the prosecution of Johnson, and had arranged a permit for her to work as a housekeeper or house cleaner during that time. This charge of recent fabrication and improper motive on the part of Amaya-Flores is sufficient to trigger Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 63 Agent Proenca's testimony recounting Amaya-Flores's consistent statements to him can be admitted under the rule only if her statements were made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose. Collicott, 92 F.3d at 979. Amaya-Flores's statements to Agent Proenca were made at about 6:00 a.m., shortly after Amaya-Flores had been kicked back from the Naco border crossing. Johnson contends that Amaya-Flores's motive to falsify arose either when the Mexican official refused to allow her to enter Mexico or, at the latest, when Agent Testa picked her up at the Naco crossing. The district court overruled Johnson's objection to Agent Proenca's testimony without referring to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and without making an explicit finding when Amaya-Flores's motive to falsify arose, if indeed she ever had such a motive. But it is clear from the transcript that the court had Rule 801(d)(1)(B) in mind and understood the rule's requirement that Amaya-Flores's statements have been made before her motive arose. 64 There is ample evidence to support the district court's implicit but clear finding that Amaya-Flores's motive to falsify arose, if it ever arose, after her statements to Agent Proenca. There is no evidence that, at the time she made those statements, Amaya-Flores had been offered any special treatment, or had been told that she could stay in the United States for a sustained period, as a result of her charges against Johnson. There is some evidence that Amaya-Flores was interested in how long the investigation would take, as the following exchange at the end of her questioning by Investigator Madrid shows: Madrid: Okay, then, thank you very much and we will stop here. 65 Amaya-Flores: I just have one question. Are you going to continue with this? 66 Madrid: With the investigation? 67 Amaya-Flores: Yes. 68 Madrid: Of course we are, we are going to continue with this. 69 Amaya-Flores: How long, more or less? 70 Madrid: I don't know. I couldn't tell you that because I don't know. 71 But this exchange is weak evidence, at best, to show that Amaya-Flores's statements to Agent Proenca were post-motive. First, the exchange with Investigator Madrid took place a day after Amaya-Flores's statements to Agent Proenca. Second, the most plausible reading of the exchange is that Amaya-Flores was simply expressing ordinary curiosity about how long the process would take. 72 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Proenca's testimony based on a finding that Amaya-Flores's statements to him were made prior to the time that the supposed motive to falsify arose. Collicott, 92 F.3d at 979.