Opinion ID: 1060373
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 31

Heading: Propriety of Court's Refusal to Impose Life Sentence Due to Twenty-year Delay

Text: The Appellant asserts that the twenty plus years delay in imposing the death penalty has eviscerated any justification for carrying out the sentence of death; therefore, execution of this sentence at this point would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of the Tennessee Constitution. The United States Supreme Court declined to review a similar issue in Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995), petition for reh'g denied, 520 U.S. 1183, 117 S.Ct. 1465, 137 L.Ed.2d 568 (1997) (whether executing a prisoner who has already spent seventeen years on death row violates the Eight Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment). Notwithstanding, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, filed a memorandum, emphasizing that a denial of certiorari was not a ruling on its merits and noting his belief that this concern should be further explored. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. at 1045, 115 S.Ct. at 1421. Specifically, Justice Stevens recognized that the delay in the execution of judgments imposing the death penalty frustrates the two principal social purposes of the penalty, i.e., retribution and deterrence. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045, 115 S.Ct. at 1421 (Stevens, J., respecting denial of certiorari). In so stating, Justice Stevens invited the state and federal courts to serve as laboratories in which the issue [may] receive further study before it is addressed by this Court. Id. at 1045, 115 S.Ct. at 1421 (citing McCray v. New York, 461 U.S. 961, 963, 103 S.Ct. 2438, 2439, 77 L.Ed.2d 1322 (1983)). The issue was again presented to the Court in Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 120 S.Ct. 459, 145 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999). Justice Thomas, writing separately in the court's denial of certiorari, opined: . . . I am unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or in this Court's precedent for the proposition that a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed. Consistency would seem to demand that those who accept our death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary consequence. . . . It is incongruous to arm capital defendants with an arsenal of constitutional claims with which they may delay their executions, and simultaneously to complain when executions are inevitably delayed. . . . Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. at 990-92, 120 S.Ct. at 459-60 (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (citations omitted). Justice Thomas, notably, revisited Justice Stevens previous invitation for the lower courts to serve as laboratories in which the viability of this claim could receive further study. He emphasized that, since Justice Stevens' invitation, the lower courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless. Id. at 461, 120 S.Ct. at 461 (citing People v. Frye, 18 Cal.4th 894, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183, 262 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1023, 119 S.Ct. 1262, 143 L.Ed.2d 358 (1999); People v. Massie, 19 Cal.4th 550, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29, 44-45 (1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113, 119 S.Ct. 1759, 143 L.Ed.2d 790 (1999); Ex parte Bush, 695 So.2d 138, 140 (Ala.1997); State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 947 P.2d 315, 336 (1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 862, 119 S.Ct. 149, 142 L.Ed.2d 122 (1998); Bell v. State, 938 S.W.2d 35, 53 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 827, 118 S.Ct. 90, 139 L.Ed.2d 46 (1997); State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272, 1287-88 (1996), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 965, 118 S.Ct. 410, 139 L.Ed.2d 314 (1997); White v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 432, 439-40 (C.A.5), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 911, 117 S.Ct. 275, 136 L.Ed.2d 198 (1996); Stafford v. Ward, 59 F.3d 1025, 1028 (C.A.10 1995)). A panel of this court similarly dismissed the claim without review. See State v. Charles Eddie Hartman , No. M1998-00803-CCA-R3-DD, 2000 WL 631400 (Tenn.Crim.App. at Nashville, May 17, 2000). After consideration of the Appellant's claim, we perceive no constitutional violation under either the federal or the Tennessee constitution. We remain unconvinced that neither this state's capital sentencing law nor the accompanying subsequent appellate review of a capital conviction was enacted with a purpose to prolong incarceration in order to torture inmates prior to their execution. As in most cases, the delay in the instant case was caused in large part by numerous appeals and collateral attacks lodged by the Appellant. This issue is without merit.