Opinion ID: 1711452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: bergquist

Text: Wishnatsky asserts the court erred in dismissing his claims against Bergquist because his affidavit raised genuine issues of material fact about Bergquist's role in the arrest. Wishnatsky's theory of the case is that Bergquist instigated his arrest by providing false information to the police that resulted in his arrest. Wishnatsky asserts that [a] private citizen is responsible for instigating a false arrest if he either directs that the arrest be made or provides false information that is material in the arrest occurring. This is a correct statement of the general rule. See, e.g., Johnson v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 207 Neb. 521, 300 N.W.2d 10, 13 (1980); Harrison v. Southland Corp., 544 S.W.2d 692, 693 (Tex.Civ.App.1976); 3 Lee & Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 41.02 (rev. ed.1990); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 45A cmt. c (1965); Landis, Annotation, False Imprisonment: Liability of Private Citizen, Calling on Police for Assistance after Disturbance or Trespass, for False Arrest by Officer, 98 A.L.R.3d 542 § 2 (1980). However, where a private citizen merely summons the police for assistance or to report an offense, and does not specifically request that the person be arrested nor supply false information, no liability for false arrest arises. See Harrison, 544 S.W.2d at 693; Landis, 98 A.L.R.3d at § 2; 32 Am. Jur.2d False Imprisonment § 41 (1995). And there is no liability where a private citizen merely provides information to the police and leaves the decision whether to arrest to the officer's judgment and discretion. E.g., Johnson, 300 N.W.2d at 13; 3 Lee & Lindahl, at § 41.02; Prosser & Keeton, Torts § 11 (5th ed.1984); Restatement (Second) of Torts, at § 45A cmt. c; see also Larson v. Baer, 418 N.W.2d 282, 287 (N.D. 1988) (there is no liability for malicious prosecution if a private citizen merely gives authorities information he believes to be true and leaves the decision to prosecute to the officer's discretion). Wishnatsky claims that his affidavit, when viewed in the light most favorable to him, raises genuine issues of material fact whether Bergquist provided false information to the police. The only evidence in Wishnatsky's affidavit directly on this point is Wishnatsky's version of the officers' questioning: Why are you questioning me about this? I asked. Thinking it over later I realized that Mr. Bergquist must have painted a rather lurid and over-imaginative picture of what had happened in the Spectrum office during our visit. Knowing his excitable tendencies I could understand why the officers were acting so peculiar, but I thought it rather naive of them to take his statements at face value. Wishnatsky's assertions are rank speculation and conjecture and, lacking personal knowledge about Bergquist's statements to the officers, have no function in an affidavit for summary judgment. As Wishnatsky himself cogently pointed out in challenging Lee's affidavit, an affidavit under NDRCivP 56(e) must be made upon personal knowledge. Statements may not be made upon information and belief, and certainly not upon speculation or conjecture. Wishnatsky also asserts, however, that he had personal knowledge of Bergquist's first telephone call to police because he was still present in the Spectrum offices when Bergquist placed the call. He asserts that Bergquist's call constituted false information because he had no reason to make the call. The evidence in the record, including Wishnatsky's affidavit, shows only that Bergquist called the campus police and requested assistance with a person who refused to leave. Wishnatsky concedes that he refused to leave the office after being asked to do so. There is no support for Wishnatsky's assertion that Bergquist's call constituted false information because Bergquist had no reason to call. Part of NDCC 12.1-22-03(4) declares: A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that person remains upon the property of another after being requested to leave the property by a duly authorized person. Bergquist was justified in calling campus police for assistance with a person who refused to leave the office, and his actions did not give false information. [4] Although not relied upon by Wishnatsky for his argument on this issue, we note his affidavit suggests that the officers mentioned Bergquist's involvement. In describing the questioning by the officers, Wishnatsky's affidavit states that the officers asked if he had legitimate business on campus; he replied by asking why they were asking him rather than other people in the SOTA lounge; Willoughby purportedly responded, on request that Mr. Bergquist asked me to. Without considering the hearsay problems in relying upon that statement as proof that Bergquist asked the officers to question Wishnatsky, it does not evidence that Bergquist instigated or demanded Wishnatsky's arrest. The record before the trial court showed, at most, that Bergquist called the police for assistance with a person who refused to leave the Spectrum offices. There is no evidence that Bergquist demanded that Wishnatsky be arrested, or that he conveyed any false information to the police. It was incumbent upon Wishnatsky to supply that evidence and, because he failed to do so, we must assume no such evidence exists. See Soentgen, 467 N.W.2d at 77. Dismissal of the claims against Bergquist was appropriate.