Opinion ID: 1521174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appropriateness of an Action for Conversion

Text: Appellants argue that, as remedies were available to appellees for the return of their property, an action for conversion should not have been allowed. The availability of remedies for obtaining a return of property is not, however, a bar to an action for conversion. First, an action for conversion lies as an alternative to, rather than a substitute for, a suit for the replevin of property. The essence of conversion is an interference with another's property that is so substantial as to justify treatment as a forced sale of the property. Horne v. Francis I. duPont & Co., 428 F.Supp. 1271, 1275 (D.D.C.1977). A conversion may occur either where a defendant with rightful possession of plaintiff's property wrongfully refuses to surrender it, id., or where, as here, even the defendant's initial possession of the property is wrongful. See DeKine v. District of Columbia, supra at 986; W. Prosser, supra § 15, at 83-84. Where possession is wrongful ab initio, the conversion is complete when the defendant takes, detains, or disposes of the goods, see DeKine v. District of Columbia, supra at 986, and the tort is complete without any demand for the return of the goods. W. Prosser, supra § 15, at 84 (footnote omitted). Second, money damages, which appellees would not have obtained through an action for the return of their property, constitute a well-established remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. Of course, the Fourth Amendment does not in so many words provide for its enforcement by an award of money damages for the consequences of its violation. But it is ... well settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong done. [ Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 396 [91 S.Ct. at 2004] (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 [66 S.Ct. 773, 777, 90 L.Ed. 939] (1964) (footnote omitted)).] In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that in the absence of an explicit congressional declaration confining them to a particular remedy, petitioners who had been injured by a violation of their Fourth Amendment rights could sue in tort for money damages. Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. at 2005. There is no such statutory limitation on actions for conversion in the District of Columbia. Thus appellees were not required to pursue remedies for the return of their property instead of or prior to bringing this action for conversion.