Opinion ID: 2085197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Based on our de novo review, we conclude that plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact and that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The hearing justice said that defendants were essentially bona fide purchasers without knowledge or any information    that Mr. Cataldo was anything other than the full fee owner of the real estate situated at 87 Belfield Drive. The defendants were entitled to rely on the validity of the deed as recorded in the Land Evidence Records. See 27 Williston on Contracts § 70:47 at 343 (Richard A. Lord 4th ed. 2003) (purchasers of real property have a right to rely on recorded public records). The purpose of recording statutes is to provide protection to those diligent enough to conduct a search of the title records. See Domarad v. Fisher & Burke, Inc., 270 Cal.App.2d 543, 76 Cal.Rptr. 529, 536 (1969) (describing purpose of recording statutes as giving notice to prospective purchasers or mortgagees of land of all existing and outstanding estates, titles or interest, whether valid or invalid, that may affect their rights as bona fide purchasers). Rhode Island has long recognized the defense of bona fide purchaser for value and the protections to which such a purchaser is entitled. See, e.g., Coombs v. Aborn, 29 R.I. 40, 68 A. 817 (1908); Babcock v. Wells, 25 R.I. 23, 54 A. 596 (1903); Arnold v. Carpenter, 16 R.I. 560, 18 A. 174 (1889). A bona fide purchaser is a purchaser for value, in good faith, and without any knowledge of adverse claims. [6] See Fleckhamer v. Fleckhamer, 50 R.I. 363, 366-67, 147 A. 886, 888 (1929). The theory behind the rule is to protect innocent purchasers and to allow them to obtain and convey unsullied interests. Sun Valley Land and Minerals, Inc. v. Burt, 123 Idaho 862, 853 P.2d 607, 611 (Ct.App.1993). It is significant to us that plaintiff does not attempt to quibble about defendants' status as innocent bona fide purchasers; instead, his complaint seeks to have the quitclaim deed declared void because when an instrument is wholly void, it cannot be made the foundation of a good title, even under the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase[r]. Trout v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 652, 32 P.2d 968, 970 (1934); see also First Interstate Bank of Sheridan v. First Wyoming Bank, N.A., Sheridan, 762 P.2d 379, 382 (Wyo.1988) (While a void deed cannot pass title even in favor of an innocent purchaser or a bona fide encumbrancer for value,    a deed only voidable can pass title and be relied upon and enforced by a bona fide purchaser.). It is critical to our analysis, that for a deed to be declared void based upon fraud, the grantor must be free from negligence in signing the deed. See 23 Am.Jur.2d Deeds § 167 at 184-85 (2002) ([I]f the grantor's signature to a deed is procured by fraudulently    misrepresenting its character,    and it cannot be said that the signing resulted from the grantor's inattention or negligence in signing something without knowing its contents, the instrument is void at law.); 26A C.J.S. Deeds § 150 at 186 (2001) ([F]raud in the factum renders the deed not merely voidable but absolutely void. Where without negligence chargeable to the grantor there is no effective delivery because of fraud or other cause, the deed will be held void.). Based on this Court's opinion in Dante State Bank, plaintiff argues that if he was not negligent when he signed the quitclaim deed, then defendants, despite their status as innocent bona fide purchasers, cannot prevail. The defendant in Dante State Bank, who did not understand English, executed a power of attorney, written in English, in favor of her husband, who then endorsed to himself certain certificates of deposit that were in her name. Dante State Bank, 56 R.I. at 71-73, 183 A. at 875-76. In reliance on the power of attorney, the bank paid the certificates to the husband. Id. The defendant later admitted that she signed the power of attorney, but said that she did not understand what the document was, and that she would not have signed it if she had. Id. at 71, 183 A. at 875. A Superior Court jury found for the defendant on the grounds that she was unaware that she was executing a power of attorney in favor of her husband when she signed the document. Id. at 73, 183 A. at 876. On appeal, this Court noted that the critical issue in the case was not whether the power of attorney was binding on the defendant as between her and her husband, but whether it was binding on her with regard to the bank if the bank paid out money in reliance on it. Id. at 83, 183 A. at 880. The Court said that innocent third parties are entitled to enforce an instrument even when the party executing the instrument has been misled by the fraud of another into signing it, as long as there was negligence on the part of the signing party. Id. [E]ven when a party to a written instrument has been misled by the fraud of the other party into signing it in the belief that it is something materially different, and this belief is shown by clear and convincing evidence, this fact will not prevent a third party in interest, who is in the position of a bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration, from enforcing the instrument, if the first party was not free from negligence in signing it, however it may be if his freedom from negligence is proved. Id. The Court observed that the plaintiff relied on the power of attorney and that the defendant had not revoked it. Id. Therefore: Even if it was not binding on the defendant, as between her and her husband, because of fraud practiced upon her by him, it would be binding on her, as between her and the plaintiff, if the plaintiff did not, through any officer or other representative, acting within the scope of his employment, participate in such fraud or have notice of it or of a misunderstanding by her of the nature and effect of the power of attorney, but, on the contrary, acted in reliance on it in good faith and she was negligent in signing it as she did. Id. at 83-84, 183 A. at 880-81. Relying on this case, plaintiff now seeks to stretch its holding and contends that whether or not he was negligent when he signed the quitclaim deed is a question for the jury, and that the hearing justice erred when he granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. We disagree. This Court has said that where the facts suggest only one reasonable inference, the trial justice may properly treat the question as a matter of law. Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 119 R.I. 70, 77, 376 A.2d 329, 333 (1977). The plaintiff, unlike the defendant in Dante State Bank, reads and writes English; he acknowledged that he had sufficient time to read the deed, and that he was not rushed into signing it, nor was he prevented from reading it. See Carter v. Carter, 223 Va. 505, 291 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1982) ([f]ailure [of grantor] to read [deed] will not relieve him of obligations entered under it, and will not constitute fraud unless the grantee prevented the grantor's reading or induced the grantor not to read it). [7] Further, the record reveals that plaintiff has owned several properties and has executed deeds in the past. It is clear to us that no reasonable person would have signed this document without reading it first, nor would a reasonable person have signed it in the event that it was blank, as plaintiff contended in his affidavit. We note in this regard that it has long been a settled principle that `a party who signs an instrument manifests his assent to it and cannot later complain that he did not read the instrument or that he did not understand its contents.' Manchester v. Pereira, 926 A.2d 1005, 1012 (R.I.2007) (quoting F.D. McKendall Lumber Co. v. Kalian, 425 A.2d 515, 518 (R.I. 1981)); see also Gorman v. Gorman, 883 A.2d 732, 737 n. 7 (R.I.2005); Fleet National Bank v. 175 Post Road, LLC, 851 A.2d 267, 275 (R.I.2004); Westerly Hospital v. Higgins, 106 R.I. 155, 160, 256 A.2d 506, 509 (1969); Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162, 139 N.E. 226, 228 (1923) (Cardozo, J.) (stating that one who omits to read takes the risk of the omission). It is inescapable that the words Quit-Claim Deed were printed clearly on the top of the document and that it also contained a notary clause. These facts were sufficient to give the plaintiff notice of the document's significance. However, the only question the plaintiff asked of Cataldo was whether his signature required notarization. The plaintiff, based on his apparent trust in his son-in-law, failed to ask for any explanation of the quitclaim deed. Further, he either signed the deed without reading it first, or he signed a blank deed. We conclude that the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact and that he was negligent as a matter of law. Therefore, the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and the hearing justice appropriately granted summary judgment.