Opinion ID: 2997347
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim Against Port Byron

Text: Although the mayor is entitled to judicial immunity, we must independently analyze plaintiff’s claim against Port Byron. This is so because a municipality may not assert the judicial immunity enjoyed by its official. Reed, 704 F.2d at 953; Devito v. Chi. Park Dist., 83 F.3d 878, 881 (7th Cir. 1996) (“The only immunities available in an official capacity suit are those that may be asserted by the governmental entity itself (e.g., Eleventh Amendment immunity or sovereign immunity).”). Port Byron may be liable for the mayor’s actions under § 1983 only if a municipal policy caused the constitutional violation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). A plaintiff may demonstrate the existence of an official policy in one of three ways: “proof of an express policy causing the loss, a widespread practice constituting custom or usage that caused the loss, or causation of the loss by a person with final policymaking authority.” Kujawski v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 183 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir. 1999). Killinger does not contend that an express policy or widespread custom caused his injury. He argues only that Chief Rathburn held final policymaking authority, and that the chief ratified Mayor Johnson’s decision to close G’s. Killinger has failed to establish, however, that either Chief Rathburn or Mayor Johnson held final policymaking authority with respect to the challenged actions. “In order to have final policymaking authority, an official must possess ‘[r]esponsibility for making law or setting policy,’ that is, ‘authority to adopt rules for the conduct of government.’ ” Rasche v. Village of Beecher, 336 F.3d 588, 599 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397, 401 (7th Cir. 1992)). The mere authority to implement pre-existing rules is not the authority to set policy. Id. at 601; Auriemma, 957 F.2d at 401; Eversole v. Steele, 59 F.3d 710, 717 (7th Cir. 1995). “A person’s status as a final 10 No. 04-1492 policymaker under § 1983 is a question of state or local law.” Kujawski, 183 F.3d at 737. Courts identify those officials with final policymaking authority by “[r]eviewing the relevant legal materials, including state and local positive law, as well as ‘custom or usage having the force of law.’ ” Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 737 (1989) (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnick, 485 U.S. 112, 124 n.1 (1988)) (internal quotations omitted). A municipality may also be liable for the actions of an employee who lacks final policymaking authority if that employee’s actions were “ratified” by the municipality. Baskin v. City of Des Plaines, 138 F.3d 701, 705 (7th Cir. 1998). “[A] plaintiff seeking to establish a § 1983 claim against a municipality based on a ‘ratification’ theory must allege that a municipal official with final policymaking authority approved the subordinate’s decision and the basis for it.” Id. Plaintiff’s municipal liability theory fails because he has not identified any state or local positive law, or custom having the force of law, that grants either the chief or the mayor authority to adopt rules that are relevant to this case. See Kujawski, 183 F.3d at 738 (“our task is to determine whether the official in question was a final policymaker for the local government ‘in a particular area, or on a particular issue’ ”) (quoting McMillian v. Monroe County, 520 U.S. 781, 785 (1997)). The only arguable “policy” instituted by the chief was his decision to require that adults of drinking age wear wristbands during Tug Fest. We fail to see how the use of wristbands to police underage drinking could cause a constitutional violation. Rather, the thrust of plaintiff’s claim is that the mayor violated his due process rights by failing to observe the procedures mandated by the Liquor Act. The very nature of this allegation, however, shows that plaintiff’s claim lacks merit. The Illinois General Assembly, not the mayor, established the procedures applicable to temporary closings, suspensions, and fines under the Act. If the mayor violated these procedures, No. 04-1492 11 he was acting contrary to—not setting—the policy of the State. Because the mayor does not hold final policymaking authority to establish procedural rules, Port Byron is not liable for his actions.