Opinion ID: 2252960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Other-Crimes Evidence

Text: The plurality and the concurring Justice compound their incorrect ruling that Dugan's hearsay statements were properly admitted by finding error with the preclusion of the evidence surrounding Dugan's other crimes. The plurality opines that this preclusion was an abuse of discretion under both modus operandi (for the Ackerman murder) and corroboration (for the other four crimes) theories. The concurring Justice agrees with the three justices in dissent that neither modus operandi nor corroboration principles, as they are presently understood, would suggest error. However, he would find error by retroactively relaxing the standard of admissibility. In cases in which the defendant attempts to use a particular modus operandi as evidence that the crime was committed by another person, a separate offense is found to be relevant and admissible as proof of modus operandi only upon a strong and persuasive showing of similarity. ( People v. Tate (1981), 87 Ill.2d 134, 141, 57 Ill.Dec. 572, 429 N.E.2d 470.) It is not enough that the crime charged and the other crimes have common features or marks of similarity which might be shared by many other crimes committed by other perpetrators. The logical inference that the perpetrator who committed one crime also committed another crime arises only when both crimes share peculiar and distinctive common features so as to earmark both crimes as the handiwork of the defendant. [Citation.] There must be some distinctive features that are not common to most offenses of that type. (Emphasis added.) People v. Kimbrough (1985), 138 Ill. App.3d 481, 486-87, 93 Ill.Dec. 82, 485 N.E.2d 1292. The plurality pays lip service to this stringent standard when it acknowledges that a high degree of identity between the other offense and the charged crime is necessary (162 Ill.2d at 349, 205 Ill.Dec. at 362, 643 N.E.2d at 653) and when it rejects defendant's assertion that [ People v.] Tate [ (1981), 87 Ill.2d 134, 141, 57 Ill.Dec. 572, 429 N.E.2d 470] allows for a relaxed degree of identity between the crimes compared when othercrimes evidence is offered by defendant. 162 Ill.2d at 351, 205 Ill.Dec. at 363, 643 N.E.2d at 654. Unfortunately, the plurality goes on to find modus operandi with the Ackerman murder on the flimsiest of factual similarities. It reasons: In both of Dugan's accounts of the Ackerman and Nicarico murders, he was aimlessly driving around alone in his auto, smoking marijuana, before he encountered the female, Caucasian child-victim. In neither instance was the crime apparently premeditated or planned. In both accounts, Dugan recklessly abducted the victim during daylight hours, in full view, by perhaps placing the victim in the front, passenger-side area of his auto. In both accounts, Dugan attempted to hide or cover the victim with some type of bedding (sleeping bag or sheet). Both accounts also involved anal sex and the tying of the victim's hands. 162 Ill.2d at 351, 205 Ill.Dec. at 363, 643 N.E.2d at 654. I submit that the using of a car to kidnap girls during the day is hardly the earmark of any particular killer. This is not the high degree of similarity that is anticipated by Tate. Were this view to command a majority, and thankfully it does not, any threshold necessary for modus operandi evidence would be largely eradicated. Further, the particulars of the two crimes vary significantly. Like its analysis of the Dugan statements, the plurality hangs its hat on general, loose-fitting facts to show similarities. It necessarily chooses to ignore the details. These details are cogently articulated by Justice McMorrow in her own dissent (162 Ill.2d at 434-35, 205 Ill.Dec. at 400-401, 643 N.E.2d at 691-692), but a brief description of the two accounts is worthwhile at this point. Melissa Ackerman was abducted from a public street by Dugan at a time where he was engaged in no other activity. She was abducted in front of a friend, who was also abducted at the same time but escaped. Jeanine was abducted from her house in a manner that no one could witness (not in full view, as suggested by the plurality), and was abducted during the course of a burglary. Melissa was never blindfolded, while Jeanine was blindfolded from the time of her abduction until her death. While in the car, Dugan told Melissa to sit on the floor so that passers-by would not see her, and he unscrewed the passenger door lock so that she could not unlock the door. Neither precaution was taken in the Nicarico story. The assault on Melissa involved the pair getting out of the car, Dugan taking off all of Melissa's clothes, and Dugan completely removing his pants, shoes and socks. Only anal sex was attempted. Dugan's alleged assault on Jeanine occurred in the car, involved only minimal removal of clothing, and (sometimes, depending on the version) involved oral, vaginal and anal sex. Melissa was killed by drowning. Jeanine was bludgeoned to death. After killing Melissa, Dugan hid her body by putting it in a drainage ditch and covering it with rocks. No such attempt was made to hide Jeanine's body. Melissa's body was naked when Dugan left her. Jeanine's body was found still clothed. In short, the manner of the abductions, the nature of the assaults, the method of the killings, and the methods of body disposal are very different in the Nicarico and Ackerman accounts. To say that the trial court erred when it found that modus operandi was not established makes a mockery of the doctrine. The plurality's remaining analysis fares no better. It concludes that the remaining crimes lacked a sufficient linkage    to support admission    under a theory of modus operandi, [but nevertheless] there was a sufficient degree of similarity to support their entire admission for purposes other than to show modus operandi. 162 Ill.2d at 352, 205 Ill.Dec. at 363, 643 N.E.2d at 654. The purposes other than modus operandi, we later learn, is that the other-crimes evidence corroborate[d] his statements about the Nicarico murder. (162 Ill.2d at 352, 205 Ill.Dec. at 363, 643 N.E.2d at 654.) In support, the plurality cites People v. King (1986), 109 Ill.2d 514, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949, and People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202. It should be noted that, if corroboration of the accuracy of Dugan's confession is the rationale for allowing the other-crimes evidence in, the plurality's analysis of the similarities between the crimes is wholly irrelevant. As argued by defendant, at issue under a corroboration theory is the veracity of the confessor. Defendant argued that the statements were admissible to show that, since Dugan was telling the truth in the other confessions, he must be telling the truth in the Nicarico confession. The merit of this argument is not dependent on the similarities of the crimes. It should also be noted that both King and Kokoraleis are inapposite. In King, the defendant was on trial for murder and armed robbery, to which he had confessed. In that confession, he also confessed to a previous armed robbery. The State was allowed to present evidence of the previous armed robbery to show the accuracy of the confession. Dugan's Nicarico statements, on the other hand, did not include anything concerning the other five crimes. Those statements were entirely separate. Thus, the existence of those crimes does nothing to demonstrate the accuracy of the Nicarico story. Further, the confessions to the other five crimes were given in a quid pro quo context, where defendant gave the details in exchange for the waiver of the death penalty. He therefore had reason to be accurate. Since he received nothing for giving the Nicarico statements, he had no similar reason to remain truthful. In Kokoraleis, defendant was on trial for the murder of Lori Borowski. Evidence of two other murders were allowed into evidence under a modus operandi theory. The State was also allowed to present evidence that he had voluntary confessed to those two other murders, to support the reliability and accuracy of the voluntariness of his confession to the Borowski confession, which defendant later claimed was coerced. There is nothing remotely similar to the Kokoraleis facts in the instant case. Were the plurality's suggestion that the other-crimes evidence tends to support the veracity of Dugan's Nicarico story to command a majority, the new state of the law would be that prior truthful statements are admissible to demonstrate the truthfulness of any contested statement. This is not the law, nor should it be. Besides corroboration, the plurality offers no other purpose other than modus operandi in support of allowing the other crimes evidence into evidence. As already noted, a corroboration theory of admissibility would not require a finding that the crimes were similar factually. Nevertheless, for whatever reason the plurality offers a description of the similarities between Dugan's other crimes and the Nicarico murder. Thus, a demonstration that these crimes were in fact very different is appropriate. The plurality notes: In each murder, Dugan tied the victim's hands at some point. In all of the murders, Dugan availed himself of whatever physical material (water, tire iron, tree branch) was immediately at hand for use as a murder weapon. Several of the crimes, like the Nicarico murder, involved sexual assaults in an auto, blindfolding, tire irons, blows to the head, and the use of bedding materials. Two of the three murders involved blunt trauma, and two of the three involved drowning. Every crime involved the use of an auto to abduct the victim, and every crime involved the abduction of a young, Caucasian female. Although each crime does not bear the same similar feature, various similar features are repeated. The crimes appear unpremeditated, highly spontaneous, and reckless in their regard to possible apprehension. The greatest similarity between the crimes, however, lies not in discrete and observable facts, but in the character of the assaults as a whole. 162 Ill.2d at 352, 205 Ill.Dec. at 363, 643 N.E.2d at 654. To begin, we should not take refuge in amorphous suggestions that a requisite similarity is most easily found not in discrete and observable facts but in some undefined character of the assaults taken together. This is especially true when, as in this case, an examination of the discrete and observable facts demonstrate that the crimes at issue are indeed very different. It should also be noted that most of the similarities cited are those that Dugan's other crimes share with each other. It is certainly true that Dugan's other crimes share similar features. They all involved Dugan coming upon females along the road while he was driving, at which time he would abduct them and sexually assault them. These crimes occurred within a short amount of time from each other (four within a month, less than a year after the first, in a time period not proximate to the Nicarico murder). However, the crimes are very different from the Nicarico account. The plurality's analysis is a little like saying that the Rose Bowl, the Orange Bowl, the Sugar Bowl and the World Series are similar because they all involve either football or baseball. In suggesting their similarities, the plurality necessarily plays fast and loose with the facts. For instance, the plurality states in all of the murders, Dugan availed himself of whatever physical material (water, tire iron, tree branch) was immediately at hand. This is a convenient lumping together of water (the shared method of killing in the Ackerman and Schnorr murders) and a tire iron and tree branch (the purported weapon in the Nicarico murder) which fails to explain their similarity to each other and which ignores the fact that the water used in the Ackerman and Schnorr murders was not immediately at hand. Rather, Dugan had to drive toward the water, get out of the car and then walk with his victims to get to the water, where he killed them. The plurality also reports that several of the assaults involved blindfolding. In fact, Dugan blindfolded only one of his five othercrimes victims. The plurality reports that several of the assaults involved tire irons. However, a tire iron was mentioned in only one of the other crimes, and there it was not used as a weapon. The plurality reports that several of the assaults involved blows to the head. However, only one of the other crimes involved blunt trauma to the head, the Donna Schnorr murder. The source of this trauma is unclear, but Dugan did not claim to have struck her in the head. The trauma may have occurred when he pushed her in the water. The plurality reports that several of the assaults involved the use of bedding materials. Depending on how broadly one defines bedding materials, either none, one or, at most, two of the other crimes involved them; the Ackerman murder involved a sleeping bag, and the rape of C.W. involved a green blanket. The plurality reports that two of the three murders involved blunt trauma, and two of the three murders involved drowning. The blunt trauma that Schnorr suffered appears to have been coincidental to the murder; it certainly was not the cause of death or the method of killing. Mere coincidences can hardly be deemed corroborative. As far as the drowning, this goes again to show that the Nicarico murder was different from the rest of the crimes, since no drowning occurred in the Nicarico murder. Finally, the plurality reports that the crimes all involved young, Caucasian females. However, only one of the five other victims was a child. In sum, the plurality's finding of reversible error in the trial court's refusal to allow evidence of other crimes which were very different from the Nicarico crime is entirely insupportable.