Opinion ID: 2103388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: evidence concerning the victim's injuries

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecution to admit inflammatory and highly prejudicial evidence that described gruesome details about the victim's injuries. In particular, the defendant objects (1) to Eileen Kampwirth's testimony that after the shooting she tried to give the victim mouth-to-mouth resuscitation but that the victim was bleeding through the mouth, so I turned her head and tried to get the blood out, but I couldn't. It was just blood; (2) to Bill Will's testimony that when he retrieved his coat which had been placed under the victim's head he got blood all over himself and that the coat was drenched with blood; (3) to Will's testimony that a photograph depicting the scene of the crime included napkins    trying to soak up the blood on the pavement; and (4) to the trial court's decision to show the jury a picture of the victim's wounds. The defendant has waived any error in Will's description of the photograph because his counsel failed to make an objection in the trial court to the admission of this evidence. ( People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill.2d 280, 282; People v. Baske (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 590, 600.) Moreover, Will's testimony on this matter was not prejudicial enough to constitute plain error. The defendant's counsel did object to Will's testimony describing the blood on his coat, but the remarks were stricken from the record and the jury was instructed to disregard them. The immediate objection by the defense counsel which was sustained by the trial court and the instructions to the jury cured any error in the prosecution's attempt to admit this testimony. ( People v. Yonder (1969), 44 Ill.2d 376, 392, cert. denied (1970), 397 U.S. 975, 25 L.Ed.2d 270, 90 S.Ct. 1094; People v. Bakutis (1941), 377 Ill. 386, 390.) In some cases, sustaining an objection and appropriate instructions to the jury may not be sufficient to cure an error involving the admission of prejudicial evidence (see, e.g., People v. Hal (1962), 25 Ill.2d 577, 580), but in this case we do not consider Will's testimony so inflammatory or prejudicial that a proper instruction did not cure any error; after all, it should not have been surprising to the jury that a person who received a head wound of the type Quinn did would bleed profusely. The trial court properly admitted, over the defendant's objection, Kampwirth's testimony concerning the victim's injuries. This court held in People v. Speck : `   A party cannot have competent evidence excluded merely because it might arouse feelings of horror and indignation in the jury. Any testimony concerning the details of a murder or other violent crime may have such tendencies, but manifestly this could not suffice to render it incompetent. Of course, where spectacular exhibits having little probative value are offered for the principal purpose of arousing prejudicial emotions they should be promptly excluded. But questions relating to the character of the evidence offered, and the manner and extent of its presentation, are largely within the discretion of the trial judge, and the exercise of that discretion will not be interfered with unless there has been an abuse to the prejudice of the defendant.' ( People v. Speck (1968), 41 Ill.2d 177, 202-03 (quoting People v. Jenko (1951), 410 Ill. 478, 482), rev'd on other grounds (1971), 403 U.S. 946, 29 L.Ed.2d 855, 91 S.Ct. 2279.) Kampwirth's testimony tended to establish the location and nature of the victim's injuries shortly after the wounds were inflicted. These issues were relevant to the proceeding, and we do not regard the trial court's decision to admit this evidence as an abuse of discretion. Likewise, the decision to admit exhibits into the jury room is primarily within the discretion of the trial court, and after viewing the photograph of the victim's injuries and observing that it had some relevance to the question of whether she could have been shot in the head from a passing vehicle, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in submitting it to the jury.