Opinion ID: 2282775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: On September 8, 1981, a Democratic party primary election was held in the city of West Haven. The plaintiff, Donald J. Wrinn, and the named defendant, George Dunleavy, were the candidates for the party's nomination for the office of mayor. In the official count of the votes on September 8, and in a recanvass on September 13, both certified by the head moderator, the named defendant prevailed over the plaintiff by eight votes: 2847 to 2839. On September 11, 1981, the plaintiff initiated the present action pursuant to § 9-329a of the General Statutes. [2] Section 9-329a provides, in relevant part, that any candidate aggrieved by a ruling of an election official in connection with any primary ... or who alleges that there has been a mistake in the count of the votes cast at such primary, may bring his complaint to any judge of the superior court for appropriate action. The plaintiff's amended complaint, which named as defendants George Dunleavy and various election officials, [3] also contained two additional counts not based on § 9-329a, but because of the way this case has been appealed, the trial judge's treatment of those counts is not now before this court. [4] On September 11, 1981, pursuant to § 9-329a, the defendants were ordered by Judge Hadden to appear for a hearing on September 16, 1981. The hearing was conducted by Judge Norcott. At issue was the propriety of the handling of certain absentee ballots. On September 18, 1981, the parties agreed to a stipulation of the facts regarding these absentee ballots. This stipulation, as reported by the trial judge in his memorandum of decision, was as follows: (1) Florence Corradino, a resident of 200 Oak Street, known as `Surfside 200,' an elderly high-rise within the Second Voting District in West Haven, mailed 26 absentee ballots from physically disabled or ill electors residing at that complex. (2) Florence Corradino, upon receipt of the 26 ballots, mailed them by placing them in a mailbox located immediately outside the outer door of Surfside 200. (3) Of the 26 absentee ballots mailed, cast and counted all were votes for the defendant George Dunleavy. [See footnote 5, infra.] (4) At the time of the mailing Mrs. Corradino was not an election official, a physician, nurse, person caring for the health of the persons whose ballots she mailed, nor was she any of the specially designated persons defined in Connecticut General Statutes, § 9-146(b). (5) Florence Corradino held no official capacity in the primary election. [5] Under this stipulation, the principal question below was whether the twenty-six absentee ballots were properly mailed and, thus, were properly counted. The trial judge found that [b]ut for the counting of the aforementioned 26 absentee ballots... the plaintiff would have won the primary election. Section 9-146(b) of the General Statutes expressly deals with the situation where an elector does not personally mail his or her absentee ballot. This section provides: In the case of an elector who cast an absentee ballot because of illness or physical disability, such ballot shall only be mailed by such elector or by any person designated by such elector who consents thereto. Such elector may designate for such purpose only one of the following persons: A licensed physician, registered or practical nurse or any other person who is caring for such elector because of such elector's illness or physical disability, a member of such elector's family or, if no such person consents or is available, then a police officer, registrar of voters or deputy registrar of voters in the municipality in which such elector resides. On September 25, 1981, the trial judge rendered judgment for the defendants. The trial judge held that although there had been deficiencies in complying with § 9-146 by the twenty-six absentee voters, there had been substantial compliance with the requirements for the casting of the absentee ballots. As a result, the trial judge denied the plaintiff's prayers for relief. On September 30, 1981, the plaintiff, pursuant to General Statutes § 9-325, [6] applied to the trial judge for the certification of a question of law for expedited review by this court. The judge certified the plaintiff's question of law on September 30, together with his findings and order, and transmitted the same to the Chief Justice as required by the statute. On October 1, 1981, the judge certified three questions of law raised by the defendants. An expedited briefing schedule was established by this court and oral argument was held on October 16, 1981. On October 5, 1981, the plaintiff filed a separate, direct appeal from the judgment rendered against him, raising certain issues not contained within the certified questions of law. [7] No cross-appeal was filed by the defendants. The plaintiff's direct appeal has not been heard by this court. [8] In view of this court's decision for the plaintiff on the merits as raised by expedited review under § 9-325, the separate appeal of the plaintiff is hereby dismissed as moot.