Opinion ID: 807691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Javell’s Jury Instruction Claim

Text: Next, Javell argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury to only consider Arroyo’s postarrest statements with respect to Arroyo; that they should not be imputed to Javell. At trial, Javell never objected to the district court’s jury instructions, nor did he request that the judge give a specific, clarifying instruction. As such, we review for plain error. See United States v. Courtright, 632 F.3d 363, 371 (7th Cir. 2011). “To establish plain error, [Javell] must show that there was an actual error, that the error was plain, that the error affected [his] substantial rights, and that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Courtright, 632 F.3d at 371 (citing United States v. Canady, 578 F.3d 665, 670 (7th Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted)). To be considered plain, an error must be “so obvious, crucial, and egregious, that we may and 12 No. 11-3044 should correct it even if no objection was made below.” Courtright, 632 F.3d at 371 (quoting Backwater, Inc. v. PennAmerican Ins. Co., 448 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2006)). Furthermore, “[p]lain error review of jury instructions is particularly light handed, and we will reverse only if the error was of such a great magnitude that it probably changed the outcome of the trial.” Courtright, 632 F.3d at 371 (citing United States v. Moore, 115 F.3d 1348, 1362 (7th Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted)). At the Bruton hearing prior to trial, the district court summarized Bruton and its progeny and noted the need for proper limiting instructions. At trial, when Agent Secor testified as to Arroyo’s post-arrest statements, the district court instructed the jury “to accept the last answer made by Agent Secor regarding the seasoned bank account only insofar as it bears on the issues in this case regarding Ms. Arroyo.” Later, prior to jury deliberations, the district court instructed the jury as to Seventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction 3.02: You have received evidence of a statement said to be made by Defendant Aysha Arroyo to law en- forcement officers. You must decide whether the defendant did in fact make the statement. Notably, and as Javell ardently calls to our attention, the district court omitted the last line of the instruction, which reads, “[y]ou may not consider this statement as evidence against any defendant other than the one who made it.” It is possible that by singling out only one of the statements made by Agent Secor the district court inad- No. 11-3044 13 vertently communicated to the jury that the remainder of Agent Secor’s testimony could be properly imputed to Javell and it is unclear why the district court chose to omit the last sentence of 3.02. Nevertheless, both the instruction regarding Agent Secor’s testimony and the omission of 3.02’s last sentence are of little consequence. “In reviewing the sufficiency of jury instructions, we look to the instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury was misled in any way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duty to determine those issues.” United States v. Johnson, 584 F.3d 731, 739 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing United States v. Berndt, 530 F.3d 553, 555 (7th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted)). “We would only reverse if the instructions viewed in their entirety, mislead the jurors to [Javell]’s prejudice.” Johnson, 584 F.3d at 739 (citing United States v. Smith, 223 F.3d 554, 556 (7th Cir. 2000) (internal quotations omitted)). Though juries often benefit from hearing concrete instructions that specify exactly which evidence and testimony should be considered with respect to each co-defendant, neither party found it necessary to request such definition at trial, and nor did we, upon review of the instructions and record as a whole, find that the jury was misled or misinformed as to their responsibilities. Furthermore, the omission did not result in such prejudice to Javell that would require us to reverse for a finding of injustice. As we previously mentioned, plenty of evidence was properly introduced at trial, in- dependent of Arroyo’s post-arrest statements, which implicated Javell. 14 No. 11-3044 Javell has not met his burden. Finding no plain error by the district court, we conclude that not only were Javell’s substantial rights unharmed, but that the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of these judicial proceedings are intact.