Opinion ID: 437194
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relationship of Sections 2412(b) and 2412(d)

Text: 55 The majority believes that the mandatory fees assessed by section 2412(d) sufficiently meet the purposes of the EAJA, so that it is unnecessary to allow additional discretionary fees under section 2412(b). See Majority Op. at 11-12. The general statutory exception for fees awards, the majority concludes, was intended to be section 2412(d). Majority Op. at 5-6, 10. 56 These two statutory sections, however, have entirely different aims, although both are consistent with the overall congressional intent to reduce the deterrent impact of litigation cost and the disparity of resources in litigation by individuals against the federal government. See House Report at 5-6, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4984. Prior to adoption of the EAJA, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2412 prohibited awards of attorney's fees against the United States unless a statute specifically authorized such an award. 3 See, e.g., Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 544 (D.C.Cir.1983). The effect was to limit federal exposure to attorney's fees liability in some situations where states or private individuals risked such an award under the common law or statutes that awarded fees. See House Report at 8, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4987. Section 2412(b) was aimed at removing the federal government's unfair advantage: 57 There appears to be no justification for exempting the United States in these situations; the change simply reflects the belief that, at a minimum, the United States should be held to the same standards in litigating as private parties. As such, it is consistent with the history of Sec. 2412 which reflects a strong movement by Congress toward placing the Federal Government and civil litigants on a completely equal footing. 58 House Report at 9, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4987. See Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 726-27. 59 Section 1988 was one of the statutory fee awards Congress had in mind when it adopted section 2412(b). The House Report expressly referred to section 1988 twice, both times in close proximity with discussions of section 2412(b). See House Report at 8, 17, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4987, 4996. As with fee awards assessed under section 1988, awards against the federal government under section 2412(b) are at the discretion of the district court. 60 In contrast with section 2412(b)'s relatively noncontroversial elimination of the federal government's unfair advantage, the fees assessed by section 2412(d) are something of an experiment. See House Report at 13, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4991-92. That section assesses mandatory attorney's fees in all cases where the government's position is not substantially justified, even though a similarly situated private individual, state official or state government would not be liable for fees. Unlike the fees in section 2412(b), the type of liability assessed under 2412(d) is completely novel, and Congress consequently limited section 2412(d) to a three-year trial period. At the end of that time, a sunset provision automatically will repeal section 2412(d) to allow Congress to evaluate the law's impact. See Pub.L. 96-481, Sec. 204(c), 94 Stat. 2327 (1980); House Report at 13, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4992. 61 Section 2412(d), however, does not by itself put the federal government and officials on an equal footing with state counterparts, because the mandatory fees under section 2412(d) are assessed only when the government's position is not substantially justified. A state government, therefore, might be liable for discretionary attorney's fees under section 1988 in situations where the federal government would not be liable for mandatory fees under section 2412(d). It was precisely this sort of inequity that section 2412(b) was intended to eliminate. See House Report at 9, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4987. Congress did not intend that section 2412(d) should replace or supercede any existing fee-shifting statutes such as ... the Civil Rights Act ... in which Congress has indicated a specific intent to encourage vigorous enforcement.... It is intended to apply only to cases ... where fee awards against the government are not already authorized. House Report at 18, 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 4997. 62 The majority suggests that section 2412(b) might swallow section 2412(d) if Lauritzen's interpretation is adopted. Majority Op. at 12. This fear is unwarranted for at least two reasons. First, section 2412(b) grants only discretionary power to the court to award fees, unlike the mandatory assessment under section 2412(d). Although courts may have limited discretion to deny analogous awards under section 1988, see, e.g., Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046, 100 S.Ct. 734, 62 L.Ed.2d 731 (1980) (awards are unavailable where special circumstances render the award unjust), attorney's fees nevertheless are not always awarded under section 1988. See, e.g., Greenside v. Ariyoshi, 526 F.Supp. 1194, 1197 (D.Hawaii 1981) (An award of attorney's fees in a civil rights action must not be such as to encourage the overpressing of marginal claims). The court's discretion would be no more circumscribed under section 2412(b) than under section 1988. 63 Second, attorney's fees under section 1983, and by analogy under section 2412(b), only are available for constitutional or certain statutory violations by the government. As the majority notes, not every statutory violation gives rise to a cause of action under section 1983, although the circuits are in disagreement as to which statutes implicate section 1983 concerns. Majority Op. at 12 and n. 8. It is extremely unlikely, therefore, that section 2412(b) would have the broad effect the majority expects. See Premachandra, 727 F.2d at 730 (section 2412(d) covers many types of suits that would not fall within the rubric of section 1983); cf. United States v. Miscellaneous Pornographic Magazines, 541 F.Supp. 122, 129 n. 7 (N.D.Ill.1982) (questioning whether attorney's fees could be awarded under section 2412(b) where a defendant merely raised a constitutional defense to a forfeiture action). The majority undoubtedly is correct that fees would be available under sections 1983 and 1988 for discharge of a state employee in derogation of protected first amendment activities. Majority Op. at 12. Such fees also should be awarded in analogous situations involving federal employees under section 2412(b). We need not address, however, the scope of constitutional or statutory violations allowing fees awards. There is no question in this case, involving basic first amendment rights, that the fees provision applies. Whether fees are appropriate in other circumstances should be decided on the concrete facts of future cases.