Opinion ID: 1349481
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: People v. Grove

Text: Defendant Richard Grove was charged with committing two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct [1] and one count of second-degree criminal sexual conduct [2] perpetrated on his thirteen-year-old daughter. He pleaded guilty of one count of criminal sexual conduct in the fourth degree. [3] Defendant and the prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain that provided for the prosecution to withdraw the original charges and recommend defendant be sentenced to the county jail. The judge complied with MCR 6.302, established a factual basis for the plea, and took the matter under advisement. After meeting in chambers with all counsel on the date set for sentencing, the trial judge rejected defendant's plea agreement over the objections of both the prosecution and the defense. He acknowledged that the prosecutor had urged him in chambers to accept the agreement because of difficulties in proving the case. [4] The prosecutor also acknowledged on the record that he was prepared to honor the plea and sentence bargain. The defense counsel urged the judge to reconsider and to accept the plea agreement. He objected to the decision not to sentence defendant as scheduled. The judge ruled: Very well. The Court then is ruling as follows: I reject the plea bargain as tendered to the Court. I feel this is a valid exercise of the Court's discretion in this matter. I feel there is too great a disparity between the facts as the victim alleges them to be, versus the Defendant's version as to what happened. I feel that justice would require this matter to be rejected from the fourth degree level which is of a fairly inconsequential nature, if in fact the victim is correct. If in fact the Defendant is correct and the victim has essentially fabricated a great deal of this material that he should be vindicated at trial and the victim be subject to whatever impeachment that may come her way, if she has in fact recanted on this story from time to time. The Court does not feel that it should be involved in this plea bargain effort, that it would give an appearance at least of any quality to all sides, both the Defendant and the victim. Thus the judge substituted his assessment of the people's case for that of the prosecution, functioning as both judge and prosecutor. It was an abuse of his discretion.
The right of a court to refuse a plea bargain is now governed by MCR 6.301, which superseded MCR 6.101(F). It states: Rule 6.301 Available Pleas (A) Possible Pleas. Subject to the rules in this subchapter, a defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, nolo contendere, guilty but mentally ill, or not guilty by reason of insanity. If the defendant refuses to plead or stands mute, or the court, pursuant to the rules, refuses to accept the defendant's plea, the court must enter a not guilty plea on the record. A plea of not guilty places in issue every material allegation in the information and permits the defendant to raise any defense not otherwise waived. (B) Pleas That Require the Court's Consent. A defendant may enter a plea of nolo contendere only with the consent of the court. The staff comment on the rule is illuminating and relevant. [5] MCR 6.301(A) and (B) superseded MCR 6.101(E) and (F), which required that the court consent before a defendant be permitted to plead guilty. The comment reveals the reason for the change: The second sentence of subrule (A) is a modified version of former 6.101(E)(1). It allows a court to refuse to accept a defendant's plea, but only pursuant to the rules. The quoted phrase refers to pleas that can be refused (1) because they require the court's consent (pleas in nolo contendere and the pleas described in subrule [C]) or (2) because they fail to comply with a requirement of the rules in this subchapter. The last sentence of subrule (A) is a stylistically revised version of former 6.101(E)(2). Subrule (B) is a modification of a provision in former 6.101(F). The former rule provided that the court's consent was required before a defendant would be permitted to plead guilty or nolo contendere. Subrule (B) has deleted the requirement for the court's consent to a plea of guilty. The consent provision in the former rule has been construed as giving the trial court the discretion to refuse to accept a guilty plea because of disagreement with the plea bargain agreed to by the prosecutor and the defendant. See People v. Ott, 144 Mich.App. 76 [372 N.W.2d 694] (1985). Accordingly, deletion of the consent provision indicates that the trial court may not refuse to accept a guilty plea based solely on disagreement with the wisdom of the plea, of the charge, or of the plea bargain, unless the bargain is conditioned on the court's agreement to some provision, such as sentence disposition. See 6.302(C)(3). As is noted in subrule (A), however, the court may refuse to accept a plea based on noncompliance with a requirement in these rules. [Emphasis added.] The emphasized portion supports the defendant's contention that the trial court may not refuse to accept a guilty plea solely on the basis of its subjective view of what is just. MCR 6.302(C)(3) lays out the procedure the trial judge must use in accepting or rejecting sentence bargains. As amended, it clarifies the sentence-bargaining procedures announced in Killebrew [6] that prohibit a judge from involvement in the plea-bargaining process. Its effect is to limit the judicial role to accepting or rejecting the bargain. [7] If the court rejects the sentencing recommendation, Killebrew requires it to inform the accused what sentence it would impose and give defendant the option to accept that sentence. Id. at 207, 330 N.W.2d 834; see also MCR 6.302(C)(3). The issue here is whether a trial judge has the authority to block a defendant's plea to a reduced charge absent a determination that the prosecution has abused its discretion. It does not concern the authority of the trial judge to reject a plea because of disagreement with the prosecutor's sentence recommendation. In the present case, the judge invaded the province of the prosecutor, essentially dismissing the people's new information and placing the original charges back on the trial docket. His actions violated the plea-taking procedures adopted by the new court rules and enunciated by this Court in Killebrew and its progeny. The lead opinion suggests that I have failed to acknowledge that the language of the rule authorizes the judge's conduct in this case. I believe that it does not. The rule specifies that the judge's choices are to accept a plea, reject it, or take it under advisement. In this case, the judge took it under advisement. The lead opinion glosses over the procedures that the rule requires a judge follow after making that decision. The last paragraph of MCR 6.302(C)(3) states: If the court accepts the agreement without having considered the presentence report or takes the plea agreement under advisement, it must explain to the defendant that the court is not bound to follow the sentence disposition or recommendation agreed to by the prosecutor, and that if the court chooses not to follow it, the defendant will be allowed to withdraw from the plea agreement. This language is taken from Killebrew. In it, agreement refers to the sentence agreement rather than to the underlying plea bargain. A defendant is entitled either to accept the sentence that the court would impose under the plea agreement or to withdraw from the plea agreement entirely. [8] The judge must follow the rules. When a plea is taken under advisement, the court is obliged to explain to the defendant that it is not bound to follow the sentence recommendation and allow defendant to withdraw the plea. In this case, the judge failed to follow that rule, and instead trumped the prosecution's charging power. While the court rule indicates that a trial court's consent is required with respect to the sentence, it does not confer authority on the court to interfere with the prosecutor's charging power. In Genesee Prosecutor v. Genesee Circuit Judge, [9] where we held that the trial judge acted without authority in amending the information over the objection of the prosecutor, we observed: Acting as prosecutor, judge and jury is a common description of an unfair and unlawful operation. However innocently and mistakenly, this is what happened in this case. The trial judge assumed the right over the objection of the prosecutor to determine under which of two applicable statutes a prosecution will be instituted. As already indicated such determination is an executive function and a part of the duties of the prosecutor. For the judiciary to claim power to control the institution and conduct of prosecutions would be an intrusion on the power of the executive branch of government and a violation of the constitutional separation of powers. Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2. It also violates our fundamental sense of fair play. We again addressed whether a circuit judge can exercise supervisory authority over a prosecutor in Genesee Prosecutor II, [10] stating: A circuit judge does not enjoy supervisory power over a prosecuting attorney. He may reverse a magistrate's decision only for abuse of discretion. He may not properly substitute his judgment for that of the magistrate or prosecuting attorney as if he were reviewing the magistrate's decision de novo or acting in a supervisory capacity with respect to the prosecuting attorney. He may reverse or revise their decisions only if it appears on the record that they have abused the power confided to them. Without question, a prosecutor has broad discretion in determining which charges to bring against a defendant. A circuit judge may not usurp authority vested in the prosecutor to determine what charges are brought against a defendant, except as explicitly provided by law. [11] People v. Williams, 186 Mich.App. 606, 465 N.W.2d 376 (1990); People v. Monroe, 127 Mich.App. 817, 339 N.W.2d 260 (1983). Judicial modification of prosecutorial decisions is appropriate only if the decisions are unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, or an abuse of prosecutorial authority. Genesee Prosecutor I and II, supra 386 Mich. at 683, 194 N.W.2d 693, 391 Mich. at 121, 215 N.W.2d 145. In the case at hand, there was no finding that the prosecutor exceeded his authority or abused his discretion. Both the prosecution and the defense evaluated the likelihood of success at trial and concluded that their respective interests would best be served by a compromise plea agreement. The judge disagreed, rejected the entire agreement, and reinstated the original charges because of his assessment of the case. [12] This is disallowed by the court rules and the case law. Because both parties were willing to abide by their agreement, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals, remanding for further proceedings pursuant to Killebrew, supra . If the trial judge rejects the sentence bargain, then he should state what sentence he would impose and defendant should be given the option to accept or reject it. In the alternative, defendant would have the option to withdraw his plea. Killebrew, supra at 210, 330 N.W.2d 834. I agree with the lead opinion that the trial judge considered the sentencing implication of the prosecutor's recommendation. However, after reaching the conclusion that the plea agreement resulted in a miscarriage of justice, he was bound to follow the court rule and give defendant the above-stated options. He violated the court rule when he failed to do so. Therefore, I would hold that the trial judge did not have the authority to refuse to accept the guilty plea. To rule otherwise allows the judge to act, not only as judge, but as jury and prosecutor as well, a practice condemned by this Court. Genesee Prosecutor I and II, supra 386 Mich. at 683, 194 N.W.2d 693, 391 Mich. at 121, 215 N.W.2d 145.