Opinion ID: 655534
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The willfulness element instruction

Text: 17 The defendant claims that the court's instructions to the jury erroneously stated the law regarding willfulness, the mental state which had to be proven to convict him of filing false tax returns under 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1). He also argues that the instruction amounted to a direction to the jury to convict. 18 Jury instruction 12 is a statement of the standard of culpability required to convict a defendant. 1 The other relevant facts in the case are either undisputed or have been overwhelmingly demonstrated against the defendant. The trial judge rightly described instruction 12 as the heart of the case. 19 During the conference on jury instructions, the defendant objected to the court's proposed instruction 12 and tendered an alternative instruction. He also gave a specific reason for his objection to the court's proposed instruction. 20 The paragraph of instruction 12 to which defendant objected reads as follows: 21 The purpose of the willfulness component is to avoid penalizing taxpayers who make innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of the tax code. A defendant does not act willfully if he believes in good faith that he is acting within the law or that his actions comply with the law. This is so even if the defendant's belief was not objectively reasonable as long as he held the belief in good faith. Nevertheless, you may consider whether the defendant's belief about the tax statutes was actually reasonable as a factor in deciding whether he held that belief in good faith. 22 The defendant argued that the paragraph is irrelevant because this case is not about whether or not the tax code is complex. The defendant clarified this objection by pointing specifically to the language regarding the purpose of the willfulness requirement. He claimed that this language was tantamount [to] directing a verdict for the government. The defendant also argued that willfulness is an element of the crime ... [which] should not be watered down or diminished by a statement of the historical origins of the requirement. 23 The defendant focuses on the language in this paragraph regarding the reasonableness of his belief that he had no duty to pay income taxes. He argues that if he could show that he had such a good-faith belief, then he could not have been acting willfully and hence he should not have been convicted. 24 The instruction given to the jury states that such a belief need not be objectively reasonable to be held in good faith. Defendant's proposed instruction contained virtually identical language. However, the instruction which was actually given contained a further sentence which specifically allowed the jury to consider the reasonableness of defendant's asserted belief that he was not violating the law when determining whether or not it accepts his claim that he held his belief in good faith. 25 Defendant's appeal on this issue is reduced to a claim that the inclusion of any language regarding the objective reasonableness of his belief prejudiced him and is grounds for reversal. 26 Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) held that [w]illfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal tax cases, requires the government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that defendant knew of this duty and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty. 498 U.S. at 201, 111 S.Ct. at 610. To show willfulness, the government must show awareness of a legal duty. 27 Cheek also holds that a claimed good-faith belief does not have to be objectively reasonable if it is to be considered as possibly negating the government's evidence purporting to show a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at issue. 498 U.S. at 203, 111 S.Ct. at 611. Both parties agreed to language in the instruction regarding this holding. 28 Cheek holds further that [o]f course, the more unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings are, the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing more than simple disagreement with known legal duties imposed by the tax laws and will find that the government has carried its burden of proving knowledge. 498 U.S. at 203-04, 111 S.Ct. at 611-12. The instruction regarding the reasonableness of defendant's belief is clearly derivable from this language in Cheek. 29 In United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598 (7th Cir.1991), we held that the reasonableness of a belief is a factor for the jury to consider in determining whether a defendant actually believed and acted on it. The more farfetched a belief is, the less likely it is that a person actually held or would act on that belief. Id. at 614 (citing to Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203-04, 111 S.Ct. at 611-12). 30 In United States v. Becker, 965 F.2d 383 (7th Cir.1992), we analyzed a jury instruction substantially identical to the one complained of here. The instruction in Becker stated that defendant's good faith belief that he complied with the law, even if his belief was objectively unreasonable, defeats the element of willfulness. The instruction in Becker concluded with this sentence: Nevertheless, you may consider whether the defendant's belief about the tax statutes was actually reasonable as a factor in deciding whether he held that belief in good faith. Id. at 388. This sentence mirrors the sentence to which defendant objects in this case. We concluded in Becker that the instruction was a correct statement of the law. Id. 31 Finally, we note that in the recent appeal of the trial-on-remand of United States v. Cheek we ruled on this identical issue. The jury instruction contained the following language: ... [Y]ou may consider whether the defendant's stated belief about the tax statutes was reasonable as a factor in deciding whether he held that belief in good faith. Cheek, 3 F.3d 1057, 1063 (7th Cir.1993). We found that this instruction complied with Becker and with the Supreme Court's ruling in Cheek. 32 In conclusion, defendant was not prejudiced by the court's decision to use the contested paragraph of instruction 12. It is a correct statement of the law. There was no error.