Opinion ID: 2912047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Density Limitation

Text: [¶13] Campbell next argues that the building permit was improperly issued because the proposed permitted development on Loring’s lot will violate the density limitations prescribed in section 27-534 of the City’s ordinance. [¶14] Section 27-304(a) of the City’s ordinance authorizes the issuance of a permit for construction on a lot—such as Loring’s, because of the 1973 variance— that has as little as 5,000 square feet and fifty feet of street frontage, only if the lot “conform[s] to the space and bulk regulations for the zoning district in which it is located except for the minimum lot area and minimum street frontage requirements . . . .” South Portland, Me., Code § 27-304(a). For the zoning district in which Loring’s lot is located, the “[m]aximum net residential density” is “[f]our (4) dwelling units per net residential acre.” South Portland, Me., Code § 27-534. Campbell argues that it is impossible for Loring’s lot to be developed without violating that density restriction. [¶15] We do not reach the merits of this contention, however, because Campbell did not properly present this challenge to the Board and therefore has not preserved it for judicial review. The City’s ordinance itself establishes the notice requirement that an appellant must meet in order to pursue a particular argument before the Board. That local legislation provides that a notice of appeal to the Board “shall be filed with the Department of Planning and Development on forms 10 approved by the Board of Appeals, and the aggrieved person shall specifically set forth on said form the grounds for said appeal.” South Portland, Me., Code § 27-154(a) (emphasis added). Here, as part of her notice of appeal to the Board, Campbell submitted a written list of twelve specific challenges to the building permit issued to Loring. The density issue was not included among those challenges. Consequently, Campbell did not satisfy the notice requirement created in section 27-154(a), which was the necessary predicate for her to pursue a challenge based on the density criteria. Several times during her oral presentation to the Board, Campbell noted that development on Loring’s lot would violate the applicable density requirements. These oral references, however, did not cure her initial failure to comply with the written notice requirement in section 27-154(a), which foreclosed her opportunity to pursue the issue before the Board. [¶16] By requiring an appellant to expressly identify those issues that she seeks to present to the Board, section 27-154(a) establishes an organizational structure for the administrative proceeding. Additionally, section 27-154(a) further provides the Board and other interested parties with reasonable notice and an opportunity to address those issues that may warrant the presentation of evidence and argument at the proceeding. The requirement of notice also ensures that the Board will be attentive to matters relating to those issues that are properly raised. 11 [¶17] Given this procedural requirement, it is telling that in its decision affirming the issuance of the building permit, the Board did not address the density issue that Campbell raised orally, in contrast to the Board’s methodical consideration of each of the twelve issues enumerated in Campbell’s written addendum. Under section 27-154(a), the Board was not required to determine whether the density requirement precluded issuance of the permit, because it was not one of the grounds that Campbell “specifically set forth” in the notice of appeal filed with the Board. Instead, when the Board addressed each of the twelve arguments that Campbell properly raised in the notice of appeal, it ruled on those issues that were in order for decision. The Board was not required to do more. [¶18] Therefore, despite the clear requirements of the ordinance, Campbell failed to assert a proper and timely challenge to the issuance of the permit based on density. As a result, that issue was not in order for decision by the Board, and Campbell may not raise the issue collaterally for judicial review. See, e.g., Wells v. Portland Yacht Club, 2001 ME 20, ¶ 5, 771 A.2d 371. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 12 On the briefs: John S. Campbell, Esq., Campbell & Associates, P.A., Portland, for appellants Mary E. Campbell and Maureen and Edward Conroy Gene R. Libby, Esq., and Tyler J. Smith, Esq., Libby O’Brien Kingsley & Champion, LLC, Kennebunk, for appellee Kay Loring Daniel L. Cummings, Esq., Norman Hanson & DeTroy, LLC, Portland, for appellee City of South Portland Cumberland County Superior Court docket number AP-2014-12 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY