Opinion ID: 517427
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying State Law.

Text: 81 This is, we believe, an appropriate case. In our judgment, the district court had discretion to act under the state statute and exercised that discretion in an allowable manner. The fact that the district court made no explicit reference to the statute in its award is, we think, immaterial. The court indicated its awareness of Freeman's eligibility for the succor of state law in authorizing the filing of his fee-and-costs application. See Freeman v. PMC, Civ. No. 83-0403-F, memorandum & order (D.Mass. June 29, 1987), at 2 . Plaintiff's ensuing petition invoked the Massachusetts statute and relied upon it as an alternative ground for reimbursement. Defendant's opposing memorandum vetted the point in some detail. Thus, the parties knew the issue belonged in the case and addressed it. Bearing in mind that this suit was originally filed in state court and removed to federal district court by PMC, there is no inequity in calling up the Massachusetts statute. A defendant who chooses to remove a case from a state forum to a federal one is hard put to complain if the federal court follows state practice in regard to state-law claims contained in the complaint. 82 Nor are we materially disadvantaged by the district court's approach. The fact that the judge awarded witness fees under the ADEA, without reaching the state-law question, should not deter us from considering the issue. An appellate court is not wed to a trial court's reasoning: [W]e are free, on appeal, to affirm a judgment on any independently sufficient ground. Polyplastics, Inc. v. Transconex, Inc., 827 F.2d 859, 860-61 (1st Cir.1987); see also Chongris v. Board of Appeals, 811 F.2d 36, 37 n. 1 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 3266, 97 L.Ed.2d 765 (1987); Casagrande v. Agoritsas, 748 F.2d 47, 48 n. 1 (1st Cir.1984) (per curiam). Here, the court considered the appropriate factors and weighed them in an acceptable fashion, easily interchangeable in terms of the state-law/federal-law dichotomy. It referred to its award of the disputed sum as costs--which, in the argot of Chapter 151B, is the proper terminology. Nothing in the record suggests any intention to invoke Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) or any other peculiarly federal rule on court costs. To disallow the award because the trial judge did not specifically advert to the parallel state statute would mindlessly sacrifice substance on the altar of talismanic labelling. 83 Neither the size nor the composition of the award can successfully be questioned. The record reflects that the court below heeded the relevant considerations. Cf. Northern Heel, 851 F.2d at 476-77 (listing factors to be considered under Massachusetts fee-shifting statutes when setting counsel fees). The statements of experts' charges--there were two experts, Dr. Cobb and an actuary, William Massida--were not rebutted in any manner. The statistician's testimony was crucial to Freeman's case and the actuary's figures were important in computing damages. The charges seem modest by any measure; indeed, appellant has not claimed they were excessive. 84 By the same token, the award of experts' fees need not be shrunk to reflect a division of labor between federal and state claims. Theoretical possibilities aside, the sockdolager is this: Freeman's federal and state claims turn upon exactly the same facts and, with a relatively minor exception (emotional distress), involved proof of the same elements. Because the claims were inextricably intertwined, the expert witnesses' time charges need not be prorated. See Wagenmann v. Adams, 829 F.2d 196, 225 (1st Cir.1987) (legal malpractice action was so factually imbricated with the federal civil rights claims as to make separate treatment of the constituent attorney time inappropriate); Aubin v. Fudala, 782 F.2d at 290-92 (if basic relief recovered on state claim, and state claim is factually and legally interconnected with federal civil rights claim, plaintiff would be entitled to attorneys' fees incurred in prosecution of both claims). Since (1) the district court found that the disputed expenditures were fair and reasonable, (2) that determination has not been challenged on appeal, (3) the interrelationship between the federal and state claims is so close-knit as to forestall the need for proration of the charges, and (4) PMC has cited no special circumstances [which] would render such an award [of experts' fees] unjust, Mass.Gen.L. ch. 151B, Sec. 9, 15 reimbursing plaintiff for the expenses was appropriate as a matter of Massachusetts law.