Opinion ID: 1277629
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Boards' Powers.

Text: Upon the question of the extent of the boards' powers, the parties are in complete disagreement. The Attorney General contends on behalf of the Commonwealth that the question is to be determined by application of the Dillon Rule of strict construction, viz., that local public bodies may exercise only those powers conferred expressly or by necessary implication. On the other hand, the boards contend that the content of their powers is to be determined not only by application of the Dillon Rule, but also by resort to another rule, viz., that a general grant of power implies the necessary means for carrying into execution the power granted, and, accordingly, where a power is granted expressly but no mode or manner is specified for its execution, the public body, in its discretion, may select any reasonable method of exercising the power. The question whether local governing bodies in Virginia, absent express statutory authority, have the power to bargain collectively with labor organizations is one of first impression for this court. The only Virginia judicial authority we have found on the subject is Teamsters Local Union No. 822 City of Portsmouth, Civil No. 75-184-N, August 11, 1975 (90 LRRM 2145), aff'd, 534 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1976), decided by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, where Judge Kellam stated: {The legislature of Virginia has the right to and has determined not to recognize union representation of public employees . . .. In the absence of legislation a local government has no authority to recognize a labor organization as representative of city employees. It is not a matter of constitutional right, but legislative. 90 LRRM at 2147. Both sides to this controversy have favored us with numerous citations from other jurisdictions supporting their respective views concerning the power of local public bodies to bargain collectively with labor organizations representing public employees. We have read with interest all the authorities cited, and have found them helpful. In the end, however, we must decide ourselves what is the law of Virginia; so no fruitful purpose would be served by repeating the citations here. It suffices to say that the views of both sides are supported by respectable authority. There can be no question that Virginia long has followed, and still adheres to, the Dillon Rule of strict construction concerning the powers of local governing bodies. As recently as June, 1975, in Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County Horne, 216 Va. 113, 117, 215 S.E.2d 453, 455-56, we said: {In Virginia the powers of boards of supervisors are fixed by statute and are limited to those conferred expressly or by necessary implication. Gordon Fairfax County, 207 Va. 827, 832, 153 S.E.2d 270, 274 (1967); Johnson Goochland County, 206 Va. 235, 237, 142 S.E.2d 501, 502 (1965). This rule is a corollary to Dillon's Rule that municipal corporations have only those powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied therefrom, and those that are essential and indispensable. City of Richmond County Board, 199 Va. 679, 684-85, 101 S.E.2d 641, 644-45 (1958). {The Commission on Constitutional Revision recommended inclusion of a provision to reverse Dillon's Rule as to cities and certain counties in order to relax the constraints on local government. Report of the Commission on Constitutional Revision (1969), at 228-231. This recommendation, however, was rejected by the General Assembly, and was not incorporated in the revised Constitution which became effective July 1, 1971. We must conclude, therefore, that, regardless of its fate in other jurisdictions, Dillon's Rule remains in effect in this state . . .. And, with respect to local school boards, in Kellam School Board of the City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 252, 254, 117 S.E.2d 96, 98 (1960), we said: {School boards . . . constitute public quasi corporations that exercise limited powers and functions of a public nature granted to them expressly or by necessary implication, and none other . . .. We have, however, recognized the reasonable selection of method rule, relied upon by the boards, which permits local public bodies to exercise discretionary authority where a grant of power is silent upon its mode or manner of execution. See Kirkham Russell, 76 Va. 956, 961 (1882). At first blush, the reasonable selection of method rule would appear to be at odds with the Dillon Rule of strict construction or, at least, as the boards in the present case suggest, to permit a greater exercise of power than the Dillon Rule. But we do not believe either is the proper view of the two rules. In the authorities we have consulted, the reasonable selection of method rule always is stated in terms that there must be an express grant of power silent upon its mode or manner of execution before the rule comes into play. We perceive no reason, however, that the rule should not apply also, in a proper case, to a power which has been implied from an express grant. Given this application, the reasonable selection of method rule can be made to harmonize with, rather than contradict, the Dillon Rule. Thus, the Dillon Rule is applicable to determine in the first instance, from express words or by implication, whether a power be found, the inquiry is at an be found, the inquiry is at an end. On the other hand, where a power is found to exist but the question is whether it has been exercised properly, then the reasonable selection of method rule may be applicable, and, as we will demonstrate later, the inquiry is directed to whether there may be implied the authority to execute the power in the particular manner chosen. We now note and consider the School Board's special contention that it has constitutional authority to select the mode or manner of carrying out its functions, independent of legislative grant or interference. The Board claims this authority under the mandate of supervision expressed in Article VIII, Section 7 of the Virginia Constitution. This contention, however, is answered not only by Kellam School Board of the City of Norfolk, supra, but also by our decision in DeFebio County School Board of Fairfax County, 199 Va. 511, 100 S.E.2d 760 (1957), appeal dismissed, 357 U.S. 218 (1958). DeFebio involved the validity of an act of the General Assembly placing in the hands of a state pupil placement board the authority to assign pupils to particular schools. In upholding the statute, we said: {The legislature functions under no grant of power. It is the supreme law making body of the Commonwealth, and has the inherent power to enact any law not in conflict with, or prohibited by, the State or federal Constitutions. Section 133 of the Virginia Constitution [now Article VIII, Section 7], while vesting 'supervision' of public schools in local school boards, does not define the powers and duties involved in that supervision. The general power to supervise does not necessarily include the right to designate the individuals over whom supervision is to be exercised. If the legislature deems it advisable to vest the power of enrollment or placement of pupils in an authority other than the local school boards, it may do so without depriving such local school boards of any express or implied constitutional power of supervision. 199 Va. at 512-13, 100 S.E.2d at 762. This rationale applies here. The general power of school boards to supervise does not necessarily include the right to deal with the labor relations of employees in any manner the boards might choose, unfettered by legislative restriction. Indeed, to say that the constitutional power to supervise includes authority to bargain collectively with labor organizations is to say, at the same time, that the General Assembly could not prohibit school boards from so bargaining; this would be not only unrealistic but also a subversion of the powers of the General Assembly. Inapposite are several Virginia cases relied upon by the School Board to support its claim of constitutional autonomy. Typical are Howard County School Board of Alleghany County, 203 Va. 55, 122 S.E.2d 891 (1961), which involved a state statute requiring sale of school property if the disposition was favored by a majority of voters in a public referendum, and Harrison Day, 200 Va. 439, 106 S.E.2d 636 (1959), which involved state statutes divesting local school boards of their power and control over public schools, upon the occurrence of a particular event, and placing the control in the hands of the governor. In these cases, the statutes involved were invalidated because they were found to have the effect of removing from local school boards and transferring to others functions indispensable to the boards' constitutional duty to supervise public schools. Here, no legitimate claim can be made that the power to enter into collective bargaining agreements is indispensable to the discharge of the functions of the School Board. Neither does this case involve the involuntary transfer to others of any function of the School Board. So the cases relied upon by the School Board do not aid its cause. We hold, therefore, that whether the School Board had the power to act as it did in this case is to be determined by the same rules applicable to the County Board. And whether the powers of both boards are determined by the Dillon Rule of strict construction or the reasonable selection of method rule, the result, in the view we take of the case, is the same. It is agreed that no statute expressly confers upon the boards the power to bargain collectively with labor organizations. We are concerned, therefore, with a question of implied power, and this is the question even when we consider the reasonable selection of method rule. Indeed, this rule is premised upon the proposition that, because a grant of power is general in its terms, the necessary means for carrying into execution the power granted must be implied before the authority may be exercised. The real difference between the Dillon Rule and the reasonable selection of method rule is that, under the former, any doubt is resolved against the existence of the power while, under the latter, the doubt is resolved in favor of the method selected to exercise the power. Specifically, we are concerned in this case with the question whether, from the power conferred upon the boards in general language to enter into contracts and to hire employees and fix the terms and conditions of their employment, there may be implied the further power to bargain collectively with labor organizations. In questions of implied power, the answer is to be found in legislative intent. To imply a particular power from a power expressly granted, it must be found that the legislature intended that the grant of the express also would confer the implied. In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where a power is conferred and the mode of its execution is specified, no other method may be selected; any other means would be contrary to legislative intent and, therefore, unreasonable. See Page Belvin, 88 Va. 985, 990, 14 S.E. 843, 845 (1892). A necessary corollary is that where a grant of power is silent upon its mode of execution, a method of exercise clearly contrary to legislative intent, or inappropriate to the ends sought to be accomplished by the grant, also would be unreasonable. See Groner City of Portsmouth, 77 Va. 488, 490 (1883); Kirkham Russell, supra, 76 Va. at 966-67. Consistent with the necessity to uphold legislative intent, the doctrine of implied powers should never be applied to create a power that does not exist or to expand an existing power beyond rational limits. Always, the test in application of the doctrine is reasonableness, in which concern for what is necessary to promote the public interest is a key element. See National Linen Service City of Norfolk, 196 Va. 277, 281, 83 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1954). In determining the issue at hand, we emphasize the history in the General Assembly of Virginia, previously recited, of the concept of public employee collective bargaining. Aside from the question of public policy, which we do not reach, we believe this history is important because it not only furnishes a clear and unambiguous indication of legislative intent but it also magnifies the situation in which this court finds itself, where it is asked to imply a power the General Assembly consistently has refused to confer expressly. For this court to imply the power here sought, we would be required to find that because local governmental boards possess the power to enter into contracts and to hire employees and fix the terms and conditions of their employment, the boards also possess the authority to bargain collectively with labor organizations. But if the power cannot be found in this source, the boards in the present case then would have us find that, nonetheless, they possess the power to bargain collectively because they have discretionary authority to select any reasonable method of exercising a power expressly granted but silent upon its mode or manner of execution. We cannot make either finding. To imply the contended for authority would constitute the creation of a power that does not exist or, at least, the expansion of an existing power beyond rational limits. To sanction the method of exercising authority which the boards have selected in this case, even giving the selection the benefit of any doubt, would result in an unreasonable and strained application of the doctrine of implied powers. To approve the actions taken in this case would ignore the lack of any support for the proposition that collective bargaining by the boards is necessary to promote the public interest. And, finally but not least important, to imply the power asserted by the boards would be contrary to legislative intent. The powers vested in local boards to enter into contracts and to hire employees and fix the terms and conditions of their employment are of ancient origin, conferred at a time when the concept of collective bargaining in the public sector had not emerged as a debatable issue. While this fact is not controlling, because changing conditions may warrant different considerations of the extent of power, the record Virginia history of public employee collective bargaining is persuasive, if not conclusive, that the General Assembly, the source of legislative intent, has never conferred upon local boards, by implication or otherwise, the power to bargain collectively and that express statutory authority, so far withheld, is necessary to confer the power. And when legislative intent is plain, our duty is to respect it and give it effect. Before concluding the question, however, we must consider two matters stressed by the boards in their assertion that already they possess legislatively conferred authority to bargain collectively with labor organizations. First, the boards say that the various opinions of the Attorney General, previously mentioned herein, support the proposition that the general powers conferred by the legislature upon local governmental bodies authorize the boards to bargain collectively. An examination of those opinions, however, discloses that our view of this case is not inconsistent with, but is supported by, the expressions of the Attorney General. While, in some of the opinions, the Attorney General has approved certain proposed practices in the public employer-employee area, consistently he has indicated disapproval of the notion that local governmental bodies are authorized to bargain collectively with labor organizations. Each of the opinions we will refer to is relied upon by the boards. Yet, in his opinion of July 30, 1962, [24] the then Attorney General stated that it was the policy of the State to be against negotiating with any labor union or its agents with respect to any matter relating to [public employees] or their employment or service. In his opinion of February 16, 1970, [25] the present Attorney General stated that if a unit of government undertook to negotiate a collective bargaining contract it would be necessary to imply the power to so do in the absence of legislative authorization, and that the better practice would be to enact legislation authorizing such negotiations, together with any desirable limitations thereon. In his opinion of February 18, 1970, [26] the Attorney General stated that a collective bargaining agreement entered into by a school board would be of doubtful enforceability, and that the authority of political subdivisions to enter into collective bargaining agreements should be founded on a specific grant of authority rather than implied from the existing powers of political subdivisions. In his opinion of October 7, 1974, [27] the Attorney General stated that the authority of counties, cities, and towns to collectively bargain cannot be implied from general powers granted localities but must be specifically granted to the localities by the General Assembly. Finally, in his opinion of April 8, 1975, [28] the Attorney General reviewed a proposed agreement between the School Board of the City of Hampton and the Hampton Education Association. The Attorney General stated: }To the extent that the proposed agreement may be intended or construed to confer exclusive recognition on the association . . . it would be unlawful since the General Assembly has not authorized school boards to grant exclusive recognition to any group or association. Of further interest is an article of the proposed Hampton agreement which would have provided that all terms and conditions of employment presently in existence shall remain in existence throughout the term of the proposed agreement unless they are changed by future agreement. Concerning this proposed provision, the Attorney General stated that it would have the effect of binding the School Board to past decisions in perpetuity, and that since the provision destroys the right of the School Board to alter present policies, it cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. [29] Second, the boards say that the two legislative enactments, [30] previously noted, relating to collective bargaining rights of employees of transportation districts, support the proposition that the boards presently possess the power to bargain collectively. We disagree. Approval of the concept of collective bargaining in this narrow and select public field is not an indication of legislative intent to embrace the concept generally. Indeed, the contemporaneous disapproval of the various proposals to confer general collective bargaining authority is another indication that legislative intent is to the contrary. We are faced in this case with overwhelming indications of legislative intent concerning the concept of collective bargaining in the public sector. For this court to declare that the boards have the power to bargain collectively, when even the wisdom of incorporating the concept into the general law of the Commonwealth is the subject of controversial public and political debate, would constitute judicial legislation, with all the adverse connotations that term generates. Conscious of the respective roles of the General Assembly and the judiciary, we decline to intrude upon what the Attorney General succinctly describes as a singularly political question.