Opinion ID: 2058658
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Identity or Privity of Relevant Parties

Text: Of course, in addition to the identity of claims, there must generally be some identity of the parties for claim preclusion to apply. [6] Kaspar Wire Works, supra note 3, 575 F.2d at 535-36. A comparison of the case on appeal with the Maryland litigation reveals a complicated roster of plaintiffs and defendants, counterclaimants, successors in interest, nonlitigant participants in the underlying transactions, and one unserved named defendant. The Maryland plaintiffs and the District of Columbia defendants, upon whom service has been effected, are the same. With the exception of appellant Augmentation, the plaintiffs herein are distinct from the defendant-counterclaimants in Maryland. Again excepting Augmentation, there is no evidence in the record that appellants herein were owners, subsidiaries, agents or affiliates of any of the plaintiffs in the Maryland suit. Nevertheless, claim preclusion will bar relitigation of the claims if the parties to the second suit were in privity with the parties to the first. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); Lawlor, supra, 349 U.S. at 326, 75 S.Ct. at 867. A privy is one so identified in interest with a party to the former litigation that he or she represents precisely the same legal right in respect to the subject matter of the case. Jefferson School of Social Science v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 118 U.S. App.D.C. 2, 9, 331 F.2d 76, 83 (1963). The orthodox categories of privies are those who control an action although not parties to it [7] ...; those whose interests are represented by a party to the action ...; [and] successors in interest. Lawlor, supra, 349 U.S. at 329 n. 19, 75 S.Ct. at 869 n. 19 and accompanying text (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF JUDGMENTS § 83, Comment a (1942)) (text omitted in original). An examination of the identity and status of appellants herein indicates that Augmentation, Hewes and Smith were all either parties or privies to the Maryland action. As we have already observed, appellant Augmentation was a direct party to both actions. It is immaterial that the relevant claim was adjudicated as a counterclaim in Maryland and is raised as the basis of a plaintiff suit here; Augmentation has interposed it against the same parties in both actions, and it has been formerly adjudicated in a sister jurisdiction. Nor is it material that Augmentation participated in the Maryland action as general partner and successor to the interests of the Johnsons and Ocean Holiday, and sues here as an original limited partner. It is a fundamental purpose of claim preclusion to prevent the relitigation of claims that plaintiffs have already had a full and fair opportunity to litigate, thereby protecting adversaries from expensive and vexatious multiple lawsuits, conserving judicial resources, and minimizing the likelihood of inconsistent outcomes. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 153-54, 99 S.Ct. at 973-74; cf. Roach v. Teamsters Local Union No. 688, 595 F.2d 446, 448-49 (8th Cir.1979) (en banc). Irrespective of the capacity in which Augmentation participated in the Maryland suit, it had a full and fair opportunity there to litigate an identical claim agains the same adversaries. [8] Accordingly, Augmentation's current claim is barred by the rule of claim preclusion. Appellants Hewes and Smith, although they were apparently not parties to the Maryland litigation, were nevertheless in privity with the parties to that action. Hewes and Smith were among the original limited partners in Herring Landing, and Hewes has remained a limited partner throughout the relevant time period. As a lead attorney in both actions, Hewes did maintain control of the Maryland litigation as well as the matter on appeal. While neither Hewes nor Smith is a successor in interest to any of the parties that participated in the Maryland action, their interests were represented byand represent the claims of the parties to the former suit. Hewes' control of the Maryland litigation is the inescapable consequence of his legal representation of the defendant-counterclaimants in that action. As the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra, § 39, Comment c, explains: To have control of litigation requires that a person have effective choice as to the legal theories and proofs to be advanced in behalf of the party to the action. He must also have control over the opportunity to obtain review.... It is sufficient that the choices were in the hands of counsel responsible to the controlling person; moreover, the requisite opportunity may exist even when it is shared with other persons. It is quite clear that as an attorney in both actions, regardless of his personal stake in either of them, Hewes did have at least some share in exercising the effective choice of legal theories and proofs to be advanced in behalf of his clients, as well as at least partial control over any decision to appeal. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed, [O]ne who prosecutes or defends a suit in the name of another to establish or protect his own right, or who assists in the prosecution or defense of an action in aid of some interest of his own... is as much bound ... as he would be if he had been a party to the record. Montana v. United States, supra, 440 U.S. at 154, 99 S.Ct. at 974 quoting Souffront v. Compagnie des Sucreries, 217 U.S. 475, 486-87, 30 S.Ct. 608, 612, 54 L.Ed. 846 (1910); see also Schnell v. Peter Eckrich & Sons, 365 U.S. 260, 262 n. 4, 81 S.Ct. 557, 559 n. 4, 5 L.Ed.2d 546 (1961); cf. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 111, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1570, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969). Thus, to the extent Hewes undertook in Maryland to represent interests substantially the same as his own, his participation in the current matter as a party must be barred by the rule of claim preclusion just as if he had been a named party in Maryland. Moreover, even if Hewes' activities as an attorney in the Maryland case were not determinative, his interest in the case, as well as Smith's, were fully represented by the litigation of the identical claim in Maryland. Appellant Augmentation, as a defendant and counterclaimant, and in its capacity as the Herring Landing successor general partner in the Maryland suit, interposed this claim unsuccessfully on behalf of the partnership. While the Maryland Court of Special Appeals questioned the procedural propriety of this representation, because of the failure of appellees therein, Jenkins and Esham, to challenge this procedure, the court proceeded to treat the claims of the partnership as if they had been presented in a more appropriate manner. Ocean Holiday Investments, Inc. v. Esham, No. 1019, slip op. at 11 (Md.Ct. Spec.App. Apr. 5, 1988) (per curiam). The claim is thus res judicata and the interests of the partnershipand thus those of the partnerswere fully represented in the action. Finally, appellants contend that appellant Smith could not be in privity with the litigants in the Maryland action, because at the time of its filing, trial, and judgment, he was no longer a partner in Herring Landing. Nevertheless, Smith attempts, on the basis of his partnership in Herring Landing at the time of the alleged fraudulent activities, to assert a claim identical to that unsuccessfully asserted in Maryland when he was no longer a limited partner. However, we find it unnecessary even to reach whether Smith was privy to the litigation to dispose of this argument: if his interest continued to exist at the time of the Maryland action, it was identical with that of the Herring Landing partners and was therefore represented by the partners who interposed the counterclaim in Maryland. If his interest no longer continued at that time, it no longer exists today. In short, if at the time of the Maryland action, Smith was in the partnership, he is bound; if not, he has no interest to defend. Thus, Smith is either barred from proceeding before this court with the claim on appeal, or lacks standing to do so.