Opinion ID: 3051283
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meaning of “Law” in the 1866, 1922, and 1930

Text: Tariff Acts [3] Section 545 is the latest version of a provision that was first enacted as Section 4 of the Tariff Act of 1866. Section 4 prohibited the fraudulent or knowing importation of merchandise “contrary to law,” as well as the receipt, concealment, or sale of such merchandise or facilitating the 1950 UNITED STATES v. ALGHAZOULI transportation, concealment, or sale knowing the merchandise had been imported “contrary to law.”1 See, e.g., Von Cotzhausen v. Nazro, 107 U.S. 215, 218-19 (1883) (quoting the 1866 version of the statute). [4] In the decades following the 1866 Tariff Act, the Supreme Court made clear in two cases that a criminal conviction for violating a regulation is permissible only if a statute explicitly provides that violation of that regulation is a crime. The first case, United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677 (1892), involved a violation of the Oleomargarine Act of 1885. Section 18 of the Act provided criminal penalties for anyone who “ ‘shall knowingly or willfully omit, neglect, or refuse to do, or cause to be done, any of the things required by law in the carrying on or conducting of his business[.]’ ” Eaton, 144 U.S. at 685 (quoting the Act) (emphasis added). The defendant, a wholesale oleomargarine dealer, was convicted of a crime under Section 18 based on his violation of a bookkeeping regulation promulgated under Section 20 of the Act, which did not specify that the violation of a regulation promulgated thereunder was a crime. The government argued that the word “law” in Section 18 included the bookkeeping regulation. The Court emphatically rejected the government’s argument, writing: 1 The full text of Section 4 provided as follows: That if any person shall fraudulently or knowingly import or bring into the United States, or assist in so doing, any goods, wares, or merchandise, contrary to law, or shall receive, conceal, buy, sell, or in any manner facilitate the transportation, concealment, or sale of such goods, wares, or merchandise, after their importation, knowing the same to have been imported contrary to law, such goods, wares, and merchandise shall be forfeited, and he or she shall, on conviction thereof before any court of competent jurisdiction, be fined in any sum not exceeding five thousand dollars nor less than fifty dollars, or be imprisoned for any time not exceeding two years, or both, . . . An Act Further To Prevent Smuggling and for Other Purposes (Tariff Act), 14 Stat. 178, 179 (1866) (emphases added). UNITED STATES v. ALGHAZOULI 1951 It would be a very dangerous principle to hold that a thing prescribed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, as a needful regulation under the oleomargarine act, for carrying it into effect, could be considered as a thing “required by law” . . . in such manner as to become a criminal offence punishable under § 18 of the act, . . . It is necessary that a sufficient statutory authority should exist for declaring any act or omission a criminal offence; and we do not think that the statutory authority in the present case is sufficient. Id. at 688; see also, e.g., Dimmick v. United States, 121 F. 638, 643 (9th Cir. 1903) (distinguishing its facts from those in Eaton, where “there was no statutory authority for the particular regulation for the violation of which the defendant was indicted”); Van Gesner v. United States, 153 F. 46, 53 (9th Cir. 1907) (citing Eaton for the principle that “[i]t is quite true . . . that no rule or regulation made by the Land Department is a law in the sense that it can make that a crime which is not made a crime by any statute of the United States”). The second case, United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911), involved a regulation promulgated under the Forest Reserve Act. The Act specified that the Secretary of Agriculture “ ‘may make such rules and regulations . . . as will insure the objects of such reservations; . . . and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations of the Secretary shall be punished’ as is provided in § 5388 . . . of the Revised Statutes.’ ” Id. at 515 (quoting the provision) (citations omitted; emphases added). The defendant had violated a regulation promulgated under the Forest Reserve Act. He argued, based on the Court’s decision in Eaton, that he could not be convicted of a crime based on the violation of a regulation. The Court disagreed, pointing out that, unlike in Eaton, “the very thing which was omitted in the oleomargarine act has been distinctly done in the forest reserve act” through the 1952 UNITED STATES v. ALGHAZOULI “ ‘shall be punished’ ” language. Id. at 519; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996) (quoting Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 518, to support the proposition that an agency can be delegated the power to define criminal conduct if “Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations ‘confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute.’ ”) (alteration in Loving); Pappens v. United States, 252 F. 55, 56 (9th Cir. 1918) (applying the Grimaud approach). In 1915, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a conviction under Section 4 of the Tariff Act of 1866, noting that the relevant statute criminalized violations of the regulation at issue. See United States v. Estes, 227 F. 818, 821 (8th Cir. 1915). The defendant had violated regulations promulgated under a statute governing the importation of livestock. The statute specified “ ‘[t]hat any person . . . knowingly violating the provisions of this act or the orders or regulations made in pursuance thereof . . . shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.’ ” Estes, 227 F. at 821 (quoting the statute) (emphases added). The court performed a careful analysis of Eaton and Grimaud, concluding that the defendant’s violations were “contrary to law” within the meaning of Section 4 of the 1866 Act: [A]s these regulations were fully authorized by law, and their violation made punishable by law . . . , it must be held, we think, that it was proper to allege in the indictment that the cattle in question had theretofore been imported and brought into the United States from the republic of Mexico contrary to law, as specified in the indictment, so as to bring the charge within the language [of Section 4 of the 1866 Tariff Act]. Id. at 821-22. UNITED STATES v. ALGHAZOULI 1953 [5] Section 4 of the 1866 Tariff Act was reenacted almost verbatim in the Tariff Act of 1922 and again in the Tariff Act of 1930.2 See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 1994) (describing the reenactment history); Gillespie v. United States, 13 F.2d 736, 738 (2d Cir. 1926) (noting that the 1866 and 1922 provisions are “substantially identical”). Congress thus reenacted the provision that has become § 545 against the background of Eaton, Grimaud, and Estes. That is, Congress reenacted the provision knowing that a criminal prohibition against violating a “law” included a prohibition against violating a regulation when, but only when, a statute specified that a violation of that regulation was a crime.