Opinion ID: 2747138
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Pretrial Motion to Suppress

Text: Before trial, defendant moved to suppress state- ments that she had made to detectives in four interrogations that occurred during the day following Jeanette’s death. Defendant argued that the statements had been obtained in violation of her right to remain silent under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution2 and the Fifth Amendment to 1 We address in detail four assignments of error and one aspect of a fifth assignment of error. We reject without discussion the remaining issues that defendant raises, because those issues are either unpreserved, have already been decided adversely to defendant’s position, or otherwise lack merit. 2 Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution provides, in part, “No person shall    be compelled in any criminal prosecution to testify against himself.” 438 State v. McAnulty the United States Constitution.3 The trial court denied the motion, and defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea to the charges against her. Defendant’s case then proceeded to the penalty phase, and defendant’s statements to detectives were admitted without objection. Defendant first assigns error to the trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress. As a threshold matter, however, the state argues that this court cannot review defendant’s challenge. The state notes that defendant failed, when entering her guilty plea, to make it conditional by reserving “in writing, the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion.” ORS 135.335(3). As a result, the state contends that defendant’s claim that the trial court erred by denying her pretrial motion to suppress is not reviewable under ORS 138.050(3) (limiting issues reviewable on appeal from sentence on plea of guilty or no contest). Whether this court, on automatic and direct review of a sentence of death, may review a defendant’s challenge to a pretrial ruling when the defendant has failed to comply with ORS 135.335(3) is an issue of first impression.4 We examine that issue first, because its resolution controls whether this court may review defendant’s first assignment of error.
It is a “well-settled principle that ‘[a] party does not have an inherent right to appellate court review;’ ” rather, the party must show that the matter from which appeal is taken is appealable under a provision of law. State v. Cloutier, 351 Or 68, 74, 261 P3d 1234 (2011) (alteration in original; quoting Waybrant v. Bernstein, 294 Or 650, 653, 661 P2d 931 (1983)). ORS 138.012(1) provides this court with original jurisdiction in death penalty cases: 3 The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in part, “No person    shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself[.]” 4 This court has previously reviewed a pretrial ruling in a capital case where the defendant had entered an unconditional guilty plea and trial had been limited to the penalty phase. See Acremant, 338 Or at 317. However, the parties in that case did not advance the reviewability argument that the state now raises, and, consequently, the court did not address the issue. Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 439 “The judgment of conviction and sentence of death entered under ORS 163.150(1)(f)[5] is subject to automatic and direct review by the Supreme Court.” See also ORAP 12.10 (specifying rules for automatic review of death sentence cases). The state does not dispute that ORS 138.012 pro- vides this court with original jurisdiction over this appeal. Rather, the state contends that other statutory provisions apply to limit this court’s scope of review. Specifically, the state construes the text of ORS 138.012 as providing only a jurisdictional grant that does not control the permissible range of appellate review. The state points to ORS 138.050 and ORS 138.222, which include provisions that limit appellate review in criminal cases where a defendant has pleaded guilty or no contest without qualification and without invoking ORS 135.335(3). Because defendant entered an unconditional guilty plea and did not comply with the requirements of ORS 135.335(3), the state contends that those limitations apply. The state relies on the following text in ORS 138.050: “(1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 135.335, a defendant who has pleaded guilty or no contest may take an appeal from a judgment or order described in ORS 138.053 only when the defendant makes a colorable showing that the disposition: “(a) Exceeds the maximum allowable by law; or “(b) Is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. “     “(3) On appeal under subsection (1) of this section, the appellate court shall consider only whether the disposition: “(a) Exceeds the maximum allowable by law; or “(b) Is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual.” 5 ORS 163.150(1)(f) requires that, if a jury returns affirmative findings on each of the four questions required to impose the death penalty, the trial court must sentence the defendant to death. See also ORS 163.150(1)(b) (setting out four questions for the jury). 440 State v. McAnulty As applied to this case, the state reads ORS 138.050(3) as limiting appellate review to consideration of only the judgment or order described in ORS 138.053,6 except as otherwise provided in ORS 135.335. The state argues that a judgment or order under ORS 138.053 does not include a disposition on a pretrial ruling and that the exception for ORS 135.335 that would permit a broader scope of review does not apply here because defendant failed to enter a conditional plea. See ORS 135.335(3). The state also relies on the following text of ORS 138.222: “(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS 138.040 and 138.050, a sentence imposed for a judgment of conviction entered for a felony committed on or after November 1, 1989, may be reviewed only as provided by this section. “     “(4) In any appeal, the appellate court may review a claim that: “(a) The sentencing court failed to comply with require- ments of law in imposing or failing to impose a sentence; “     “(7) Either the state or the defendant may appeal a judgment of conviction based on the sentence for a felony committed on or after November 1, 1989, to the Court of Appeals subject to the limitations of chapter 790, Oregon Laws 1989. The defendant may appeal under this subsection only upon showing a colorable claim of error in a proceeding if the appeal is from a proceeding in which: “(a) A sentence was entered subsequent to a plea of guilty or no contest   .” In the state’s view, because defendant’s sentence was entered subsequently to her guilty plea, ORS 138.222(4)(a) limits review to consideration of either the lawfulness of a sentence 6 ORS 138.053 designates five dispositions as subject to the appeal provisions and limitations on review under ORS 138.050. The first two dispositions relate to sentencing, specifically the “[i]mposition of a sentence on conviction,” ORS 138.053(1)(a), and the “[s]uspension of imposition or execution of any part of a sentence,” ORS 138.053(1)(b); the other three relate to probation. See ORS 138.053(1)(c) - (e). Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 441 or whether an error occurred in imposing the sentence. The state contends that those limitations preclude review of the pretrial ruling on defendant’s motion to suppress. The state’s position on review consists of two overlapping propositions. First, because nothing in ORS 138.012(1) purports to prescribe any scope of review, that statute does not supersede or exempt this court in reviewing a death penalty case from the scope of review limitations imposed by ORS 138.050(3) and ORS 138.222(4)(a). Second, the limited review in this case is a direct consequence of defendant’s failure to comply with the conditional plea process outlined in ORS 135.335(3).
We first address the scope of review issue before examining the effect of the conditional plea statute in more detail. The state is correct that ORS 138.050 and ORS 138.222 impose significant limitations on the scope of review in criminal cases that fall within their purview. However, the state’s reading of those provisions overlooks significant textual and contextual clues that demonstrate that the legislature intended the appeals undertaken in ORS 138.050 and ORS 138.222 to be distinct from the automatic and direct review process that occurs in death penalty cases. As a result, as explained below, we conclude that the legislature did not intend the scope of review limitations provided under ORS 138.050 and ORS 138.222 to apply to limit a direct death penalty review in this court. We arrive at that conclusion by examining the text and context of the various statutes. See State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-73, 206 P3d 1042 (2009) (describing methodology). We also consider this court’s prior construction of the statutes at issue. Blacknall v. Board of Parole, 348 Or 131, 141-42, 229 P3d 595 (2010). To begin, the text of ORS 138.012(1) contrasts significantly with the text of ORS 138.050 and ORS 138.222. As noted, ORS 138.012(1) provides for “automatic and direct review by the Supreme Court” in all cases in which a jury convicts a defendant of aggravated murder and answers the relevant death penalty questions outlined under ORS 163.150(1)(b) in the affirmative. Under that statute, an appeal to this court occurs as a matter of course after the 442 State v. McAnulty imposition of a death sentence, bypassing any intermediate review that the Court of Appeals would typically conduct. This court has reviewed death sentences in a manner consistent with that textual interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Montez, 309 Or 564, 789 P2d 1352 (1990) (engaging in automatic and direct review; noting that review considered mandatory). See also ORAP 12.10(1) (“Whenever a defendant is sentenced to death, the judgment of conviction and sentence of death are subject to automatic and direct review by the Supreme Court without the defendant filing a notice of appeal.”). In contrast to the automatic and direct review provided under ORS 138.012(1), ORS 138.050 expressly refers to an appeal process that is not mandatory and is not initiated in this court. In Cloutier, 351 Or 68, this court undertook an extensive examination of the meaning and history of ORS 138.050. The court explained that ORS 138.050 must be read with ORS 138.040 and that, taken together, those provisions authorize appeal and review of sentences for criminal offenses. Cloutier, 351 Or at 91. Of particular significance to this case, as the text of those provisions makes clear, an appeal in such criminal cases is at a defendant’s option and goes before the Court of Appeals; there is no right of appeal to or review by this court. ORS 138.040(1) provides a wide scope of review on appeal, but ORS 138.040 does not encompass the process for appeal from a sentence on a plea of guilty or no contest as provided for under ORS 138.050. Similarly, ORS 138.050 states that “a defendant who has pleaded guilty or no contest may take an appeal from a judgment or order” if the defendant makes a colorable showing that the disposition meets either of the two conditions described therein. ORS 138.050(1) (emphasis added). Depending on the court in which the judgment or order originates, ORS 138.050 provides that the appeal be taken either “to the Court of Appeals” or “to the circuit court for the county.” ORS 138.050(2). Thus, the text of ORS 138.050 shows that, for appeals from criminal convictions and sentences, the legislature envisioned a voluntary process that provides for intermediate review in the Court of Appeals. That procedure is distinct from the automatic and direct review provided under ORS 138.012. Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 443 ORS 138.222 authorizes an appeal in the Court of Appeals at defendant’s option. In 1989, the legislature adopted ORS 138.222 as part of a package of new sentencing guidelines legislation. That statute expressly authorizes appeal of convictions from pleas of guilty or no contest, and states that “[e]ither the state or the defendant may appeal” from a judgment of conviction and sentence in such cases. ORS 138.222(7) (emphasis added). Under the terms of the statute, such an appeal is made “to the Court of Appeals.” Id. Thus, as with ORS 138.050, ORS 138.222 contemplates a criminal appeal that is initiated by the defendant filing a notice of appeal in the Court of Appeals. The text of ORS 138.222 provides that, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of ORS 138.040 and 138.050, a sentence imposed for a judgment of conviction entered for a felony committed on or after November 1, 1989, may be reviewed only as provided by this section.” ORS 138.222(1) (emphasis added); see also Cloutier, 351 Or at 91 (noting that ORS 138.222 governs appeal and review of sentences imposed for felonies). ORS 138.222 then sets forth various limitations on the permissible scope of review on appeal, including provisions that apply to sentences of probation, sentences of imprisonment, and sentences that depart from the presumptive sentencing range. ORS 138.222 makes no reference to a sentence of death. Significant distinctions also exist between the remand provisions of ORS 138.222 and ORS 138.012. For example, ORS 138.012 permits review of both the guilt and penalty phases of a death penalty case. If this court determines that prejudicial error occurred in the penalty phase, ORS 138.012(2)(a) provides that a sentence of death may be set aside. It specifies the procedure to occur on remand, which, depending on the course that the state elects, requires the trial court either to sentence a defendant to imprisonment for life pursuant to ORS 163.105(1)(c) or to empanel a jury to determine whether a defendant should again be sentenced to death pursuant to ORS 163.150(1)(f). ORS 138.222 makes no reference to such a process in its remand provisions. See ORS 138.222(5)(a). Those inconsistencies suggest an intention that the two statutes will apply in different settings. 444 State v. McAnulty This court’s case law also suggests that the auto- matic and direct review provided under ORS 138.012(1) is unique. The court has recognized that a death sentence is different both in the legislative enactments that control how it is enforced and in the overall significance of the penalty. In State v. Haugen, 349 Or 174, 243 P3d 31 (2010), this court declined to apply ORS 137.123—which governs consecutive sentences—to a sentence of death, because it determined that that statute was inconsistent with the more specific statutes permitting a death sentence for aggravated murder. The court explained that “[t]he statutes providing for the imposition of a sentence of death are a more specific expression of legislative intent when compared with a sentence of incarceration, because a sentence of death is exceptional. For that reason,    the legislature has enacted a number of specific statutes to regulate the manner in which a death sentence moves toward the issuance of a death warrant and the date of execution.” Id. at 203-04; see also State v. Guzek, 322 Or 245, 264, 906 P2d 272 (1995) (Guzek II) (“Capital cases require our most vigilant and deliberative review. We agree    that ‘[d]eath is a punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree’ so that ‘there is a difference in the need for reliability in the determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case.’ ” (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 US 280, 303-05, 96 S Ct 2978, 49 L Ed 2d 944 (1976)). In sum, we conclude that the legislature did not intend the scope of review limitations contained in ORS 138.050 and ORS 138.222 to apply to this court’s automatic and direct review of a conviction and sentence of death under ORS 138.012(1). Further, nothing in ORS 138.012(1) purports to limit this court’s ability to review defendant’s assignment of error. Consequently, we may review defendant’s challenge under ORS 138.012(1). That conclusion, however, does not directly answer what effects, if any, flow from defendant’s failure to enter a conditional plea pursuant to ORS 135.335(3). We therefore turn to that issue. Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 445
ORS 135.335 was originally enacted in 1973 to per- mit pleas of guilty, not guilty, and no contest. See Or Laws 1973, ch 836, § 159. The statute was amended in 1999 to add a further provision permitting a defendant to enter a conditional guilty plea. See Or Laws 1999, ch 134, § 1. The statute now provides, in part: “With the consent of the court and the state, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty or no contest reserving, in writing, the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a review of an adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. A defendant who finally prevails on appeal may withdraw the plea.” ORS 135.335(3). The 1999 enactment of subsection (3) of ORS 135.335 has two primary effects. First, for criminal defendants who plead guilty or no contest, it gives them a statutorily recognized path to obtain appellate review of a pretrial ruling. See Or Laws 1999, ch 134, § 1. Previously, a defendant who had pleaded guilty or no contest to a criminal charge had no procedural way to challenge a trial court’s ruling on a pretrial motion. As this court observed in State v. Dinsmore, 342 Or 1, 6-7, 147 P3d 1146 (2006), before 1999, a defendant who, for example, was unsuccessful in pretrial efforts to suppress evidence was typically required to enter a plea of not guilty and proceed to trial—often a trial on stipulated facts—to preserve the ability to contest the adverse pretrial ruling on that motion. Second, the enactment of ORS 135.335(3) provides a statutory mechanism for a criminal defendant to later withdraw a guilty plea if that defendant prevails in challenging the pretrial ruling reserved for review. As the last sentence of that subsection states, a defendant who is successful on appeal may withdraw his or her plea and enter a new plea of guilty, not guilty, or no contest. If a defendant withdraws the plea and enters a plea of not guilty, then that defendant may proceed to trial with the benefit of a successful challenge to an earlier pretrial ruling. See also Dinsmore, 342 Or at 7 (“[W]hen a conditional plea is entered 446 State v. McAnulty as an expediency under ORS 135.335(3), the parties begin anew on the charges subject to the plea if the defendant’s appeal is successful and the defendant opts to withdraw the conditional plea.”). But, by providing a mechanism to obtain review on a pretrial ruling and later withdraw a guilty or no contest plea, the text of ORS 135.335(3) carries with it an implicit limitation. Specifically, if a criminal defendant does not enter a conditional plea, the provisions of subsection (3) do not apply. Thus, a defendant does not have the benefit of a statutorily recognized path for appellate review. Even if a separate provision of law nonetheless permits appellate review, the defendant would have no statutorily recognized right to later withdraw her guilty or no contest plea on the basis that a particular pretrial ruling constituted reversible error. Thus, the plea would remain intact, effectuate a waiver of the right to trial, and result in a conviction of the offense for which the plea was entered. See also ORS 135.345 (regarding effect of no contest plea). Here, in entering her guilty plea, defendant did not attempt to reserve in writing her ability to challenge the trial court’s adverse determination on any specified pretrial ruling. Although this court may review defendant’s assignment of error pursuant to ORS 138.012(1), defendant’s failure to comply with ORS 135.335(3) precludes a withdrawal of her plea. Defendant’s conviction therefore remains intact, effectuates a waiver of the right to trial, and results in a conviction on the charged offenses. The state, however, advances a further effect of ORS 135.335(3) in relation to defendant’s claim of error. In the state’s view, defendant’s unconditional guilty plea amounted to a complete waiver of any claims relating to the adverse pretrial rulings. Because defendant did not renew her objection to the admission of the evidence during the penalty trial, the state maintains that defendant cannot now challenge the admission of those statements during the penalty phase. We disagree. Although the functional effect of defendant’s unconditional plea precludes her from obtaining a reversal of her conviction through a challenge to the trial court’s pretrial ruling on her motion to suppress, Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 447 we find nothing in the text or context of ORS 135.335(3) that prevents her from challenging, on automatic and direct review, the ruling as it relates to the imposition of her death sentence.7 Moreover, ORS 163.150(1)(a) prohibits the admission, during penalty proceedings, of “any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Oregon.” In other words, the merits of the arguments made in defendant’s pretrial motion also apply to the penalty-phase proceedings. As the state points out, during the penalty phase, defendant did not object to the admission of defendant’s statements that were the subject of defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress. On review, however, we find applicable the rule of preservation that permits a reviewing court to consider issues previously litigated and decided notwithstanding a lack of relitigation at trial. See State v. Foster, 296 Or 174, 183-84, 674 P2d 587 (1983) (concluding that pretrial motion preserved issue notwithstanding lack of relitigation at trial because a sufficient offer of proof was made “to permit the court to rule intelligently” and “the judge gave a final ruling”); see also State v. Pitt, 352 Or 566, 574-75, 293 P3d 1002 (2012) (same); Acremant, 338 Or 302 (death penalty case where defendant pleaded guilty and the court considered the defendant’s challenge to an adverse pretrial ruling when defendant had made no objection at the penalty trial and scope of review was not contested). Defendant argued in her pretrial motion to suppress that her statements were inadmissible because they were obtained in violation of her constitutional rights. The trial court held a hearing on the issue, considered the evidence, and made findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, 7 Aggravated murder trials are typically divided into two proceedings: the guilt phase and the penalty phase. State v. Pratt, 309 Or 205, 210, 785 P2d 350 (1990). In most cases, guilt and penalty proceedings “are merely separate phases of the same trial in which the same jury decides, first, whether the defendant is guilty and, second—if the defendant is guilty—whether the defendant should receive the death penalty.” State ex rel Carlile v. Frost, 326 Or 607, 613, 956 P2d 202 (1998) (citing State v. Montez, 324 Or 343, 348-49, 927 P2d 64 (1996), cert den, 520 US 1233 (1997)). If a defendant pleads guilty, a jury is impaneled and sworn for only a penalty-phase proceeding. ORS 163.150(1)(a) (“If the defendant has pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose.”); see also ORS 138.012(2) (regarding procedure for penalty phase when on remand for resentencing). 448 State v. McAnulty defendant alerted the trial court to the purported error, and the court considered the merits of defendant’s motion and ruled on it. After defendant entered her plea, the trial court empanelled a jury for a penalty-phase trial. At the time the evidence was admitted during the penalty phase, the trial court was on notice of defendant’s position regarding that evidence. See Foster, 296 Or at 183-84; Pitt, 352 Or at 574. See also ORS 163.150(1)(a) (prohibiting the admission of “any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the State of Oregon”). We therefore conclude that we may consider defen- dant’s first assignment of error on automatic and direct review under ORS 138.012(1).8 However, as a result of defendant’s unconditional plea, she cannot now withdraw her plea, and her conviction remains intact. Accordingly, we examine her challenge to the trial court’s ruling on her pretrial motion to suppress only as it relates to the penalty phase of her trial. We now turn to the merits of defendant’s suppression argument.
Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment to the United Stated Constitution both protect against compelled self-incrimination. Pursuant to those provisions, a criminal defendant’s admissions will ordinarily be suppressed if they are obtained in violation 8 The approach that we take in this case does not necessarily extend to other types of cases or other types of evidence that may be admitted during penaltyphase proceedings. As this court has explained: “[E]ven if a trial judge has denied a pretrial motion to exclude evidence, the moving party (and other parties) are well advised to consider making the same or other objections, if warranted, when a party offers the evidence during trial. An objection during trial allows a judge to reevaluate the issue of admissibility in light of what has occurred at trial, including whether the anticipated evidence or the parties’ arguments have changed since the court denied the motion in limine. An objection at trial to the admission of certain evidence also may help refine the evidentiary issues for appellate review.” Pitt, 352 Or at 574. It bears mentioning that relitigation may, in some instances, be required to preserve a claim of error in penalty proceedings, particularly in cases where the evidence relates to a purpose not previously relevant or considered. See ORS 163.150(1)(a) (permitting admission in penalty phase of evidence “as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence,” which includes victim impact evidence or proof of aggravating or mitigating circumstances). Such an instance is not present here. Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 449 of the right to remain silent or are the product of coercion. See, e.g., State v. Vondehn, 348 Or 462, 474-75, 236 P3d 691 (2010); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385, 397-98, 98 S Ct 2408, 57 L Ed 2d 290 (1978). Defendant contends that the trial court should have suppressed statements that she made to detectives in four interrogations following Jeanette’s death.9 Defendant points to three invocations of her right to remain silent that occurred during the first interrogation. She argues that detectives persisted in questioning her after each of those invocations and that, as a result, the statements that followed were obtained in violation of her rights. She further contends that those violations created a coercive environment that carried forward through the subsequent interrogations and created the impression that the continued assertion of her rights would be meaningless. As a result, defendant submits that all statements that followed her invocations—even those occurring in subsequent interrogations—must be suppressed. We review defendant’s challenge for errors of law. See State v. James, 339 Or 476, 481, 123 P3d 251 (2005). In doing so, we are “bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if evidence in the record supports them.” Id. (citing Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487-88, 443 P2d 621 (1968)). As we will explain, we conclude that defendant’s right to remain silent was violated when detectives continued questioning her after her second and third invocations that occurred during her first interrogation. We further conclude, however, that her statements in subsequent interrogations were voluntary and that any error in admitting the statements from the first interrogation was harmless.
On December 9, after Jeanette was pronounced dead, defendant voluntarily accompanied investigators to the sheriff’s station from the hospital. Defendant rode uncuffed in the front seat of an unmarked patrol car, and Richard followed in a separate patrol car. At the station, defendant remained in a room for approximately one hour while detectives interviewed Richard in another room. A detective was 9 During the pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion to suppress, the parties agreed that four separate interviews occurred. We follow that framework. 450 State v. McAnulty either in the room with defendant or was standing outside the room during that time. At about 1:00 a.m. on December 10, Detectives Fenley and Hoberg moved defendant to an interview room and began her first interrogation. The detectives read defendant her Miranda rights. Defendant said that she understood her rights and signed a form to that effect. Defendant was not handcuffed or placed under arrest, and the detectives told her that the interview was optional and would be recorded. The first interrogation lasted approximately one hour and 45 minutes. Fenley and Hoberg took turns asking questions. Defendant initially told detectives that only Richard had “spanked” Jeanette and had put her on timeouts. She blamed many of Jeanette’s injuries on Jeanette’s own clumsiness and her “picking” at her scabs. Defendant provided various explanations for Jeanette’s low weight, but generally maintained that Jeanette ate “a lot.” Defendant also explained that she had turned the water off under the sinks to prevent Jeanette from drinking at night. Defendant eventually admitted to personally “spanking” Jeanette, but claimed she had done so only three times. She also admitted to using a belt during the “spankings” and to giving Jeanette a “pat on the butt” with a stick. Defendant stated that some blood evidence in the home was the result of a belt causing Jeanette’s scabs to break open. She also admitted that she had cleaned up some of the evidence of Jeanette’s physical injuries. After about an hour, defendant asked “Can I see my husband?,” to which Fenley responded, “I can’t promise you that.” Defendant then asked, “Can I please go out of here?,” to which Fenley responded, “I think we’re close to being done, then you can go out of here.” The following exchange then occurred: “DEFENDANT: I want to go see my husband, please, let me go see my husband.    [P]lease let me go see him, please. “HOBERG: Well, the reason, you know, obviously we— “DEFENDANT: Is it because he doesn’t want to see me? Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 451 [FIRST INVOCATION] “HOBERG: No, the reason that we keep you separated is because we have to get your story and his story, if we get them combined— “DEFENDANT: I’m done, I don’t want to talk anymore.” (Emphasis added). The interrogation continued for a short period of time with defendant making statements, asking questions, and occasionally asking to see Richard. Detectives generally did not attempt to solicit additional information at that time, but did ask some clarifying questions in response to defendant’s statements and questions. Then the following exchange occurred: “HOBERG: Well, if you don’t want to talk, the[n] I’m going to (inaudible). “DEFENDANT: I don’t know what else to say.    “HOBERG: Well, I mean, I’m not going to ask you any questions because you said you didn’t want to talk to me anymore. “DEFENDANT: No, I was just letting you know that I did tell you everything— “HOBERG: Yeah. “DEFENDANT: —and you said to be honest with you, and I was honest with you. “HOBERG: Well, I had some more questions, as far as like, I mean, you don’t have to answer these (inaudible). “DEFENDANT: Are these more questions on what I did? “HOBERG: It’s about, like you said you went to church and stuff, I had some questions about that, but you don’t have to answer them, you said you didn’t want to talk anymore, so, I don’t want to, I’m not making you talk more. “DEFENDANT: I know. [SECOND INVOCATION] “HOBERG: Do you not want to answer those? 452 State v. McAnulty “DEFENDANT: I don’t want to talk no more. I’m sorry. I just— “HOBERG: That’s fine.” (Emphases added). Hoberg left defendant alone in the room. After a one minute pause, Hoberg reentered the room and asked: “HOBERG: Another quick thing[;]    [Y]ou said you take her to    Winco or church or whatever.    [W]ho was the last    person outside the home to see her? “DEFENDANT: At Winco? “HOBERG: Or anywhere   . “     “We just want to talk to somebody that’s seen her. “DEFENDANT: No, I don’t want to, I’m sorry. “HOBERG: You don’t want us to talk to anybody that’s seen her? “DEFENDANT: Well, I don’t want them to think that I didn’t, think I killed her. You know.” The interrogation continued for some time with Hoberg asking additional questions and defendant providing responses. Fenley then reentered the room and asked about Jeanette’s injuries: [THIRD INVOCATION] “FENLEY:    I know you don’t want to look at, at “DEFENDANT: I don’t want to, please don’t make me. “FENLEY: No, no, no, don’t. Let me finish please. I’m not going to ask you to do that. But I am going to ask you about them just real quick, ok? “DEFENDANT: I don’t want to no more, please, I don’t want to.” “FENLEY: No, there’s something I have to    know. Um, when you were treating the wounds    you saw the ones that went clear down to the bone, right? Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 453 “DEFENDANT: Yes. “FENLEY: Ok, was that    from one of the lashings with the belt? “DEFENDANT: It was from the belt, you’re right.” (Emphases added.) The interrogation then continued with defendant providing some limited incriminating admissions, such as explaining that she attempted to treat Jeanette’s injuries herself.
After the first interrogation concluded, Hoberg and Fenley began to leave the room. Defendant then began talking to them as they were leaving. Hoberg returned to the room, and the second interrogation followed with defendant and Hoberg present. In the second interrogation, Hoberg was more confrontational in his tone. He requested additional details about Jeanette’s injuries and further asked defendant about her mental state during the abusive acts. Again, defendant generally admitted only to spanking Jeanette. The second interrogation lasted about 10 minutes. Afterwards, detectives walked defendant back to the first room where she waited for them. Detectives then interviewed Richard for approximately one hour.
The third interrogation occurred sometime after Hoberg had made the decision to arrest defendant; however, Hoberg had not informed defendant that she was under arrest. The interrogation lasted about 20 to 30 minutes, with Hoberg and Lieutenant Smith present. It was prompted by defendant’s request to speak with Hoberg and Smith, indicating that she had something to tell them. In her statements, defendant discussed certain aspects of her abusive behavior. For example, defendant stated that she had lied about striking Jeanette only three times on the buttocks. Defendant then admitted to whipping Jeanette over her back and sides with belts, a sewing yardstick, and sticks from the yard; punching and scratching Jeanette’s face; and kicking her “over and over.” Defendant was then arrested and transported to the county jail. 454 State v. McAnulty
The fourth interrogation occurred about six hours after the third interrogation. It lasted about 10 to 20 minutes, with Hoberg and Smith present. At the beginning of the interrogation, defendant was again read her Miranda rights. She stated that she understood her rights and had no questions. Like the third interrogation, defendant provided additional incriminating statements about certain aspects of the abuse. For example, she told detectives that she had also whipped Jeanette’s chest, legs, feet, and hands; and she had hit Jeanette hard with her hand, which caused Jeanette to fall back into a door and seriously injure her head.
In ruling on the admissibility of the evidence, the trial court heard testimony from Hoberg, watched video recordings and reviewed transcripts of the first and second interrogations, and reviewed police reports recounting the third and fourth interrogations. The court concluded, as a matter of law, that defendant was adequately advised of her Miranda rights “at all times.” It then determined that defendant was under compelling circumstances when she first indicated that she was “done,” because, at that point, the tone and content of the conversation had shifted and defendant had unsuccessfully requested to see Richard. The trial court concluded that the conversation had turned from “an informational conversation to one of interrogation.” The court further determined that defendant’s statements “to the effect that she was done” were equivocal; however, it concluded that defendant continually reinitiated the conversation with detectives and made additional statements without inducement by threats, promises, or coercion. It concluded that all of defendant’s statements in the interrogations were voluntary and, thus, admissible at trial.
To protect the right against self-incrimination secured by Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment, police are required to give Miranda warnings to persons in custody or otherwise compelling circumstances. Vondehn, 348 Or at 474; State v. Roble-Baker, 340 Or 631, 638, 136 P3d 22 (2006); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436, 473-74, 86 Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 455 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).10 If a person unequivocally invokes her right to remain silent during a custodial interrogation, police must honor that request and stop questioning. See State v. Davis, 350 Or 440, 459, 256 P3d 1075 (2011) (“[I]f there is a right to remain silent that is guaranteed by Article I, section 12, it is a right to insist that the police refrain from interrogation after a person who is in custody or otherwise in compelling circumstances has invoked the right to remain silent.”); Miranda, 384 US at 473-74 (“If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”). However, a person may still waive the right as long as that waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances. See State v. Meade, 327 Or 335, 339-41, 963 P2d 656 (1998) (waiver under Article I, section 12); State v. Kell, 303 Or 89, 734 P2d 334 (1987) (same); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 US 477, 482, 101 S Ct 1880, 68 L Ed 2d 378 (1981) (waiver under Fifth Amendment). We begin our analysis with defendant’s claim under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. See Sterling v. Cupp, 290 Or 611, 614, 625 P2d 123 (1981) (so holding). As mentioned, the trial court concluded that defendant equivocally had invoked her right to remain silent three times during the first interrogation, but that she then continually waived that right by reinitiating the conversation with detectives. Defendant contends that she did not reinitiate the conversation with detectives. The state responds that the trial court was correct that defendant reinitiated the conversations and, alternatively, claims that defendant’s invocations were equivocal such that the detectives were permitted to continue the conversation to clarify whether defendant was exercising her Miranda rights. 10 The parties do not dispute that defendant was adequately advised of her Miranda rights or that she validly waived those rights at the commencement of the interrogation. Nor do the parties contest that defendant was under compelling circumstances at the time of the invocations highlighted above. We agree with the trial court’s legal conclusion that defendant was properly advised of her rights, waived those rights initially, and was under compelling circumstances when she first indicated that she was “done.” See, e.g., Vondehn, 348 Or at 474 (regarding Miranda requirement and ability to waive right to remain silent); Roble-Baker, 340 Or at 640-41 (citing nonexclusive list of factors establishing when circumstances are compelling such that Miranda warnings are required). 456 State v. McAnulty We conclude that defendant unequivocally invoked her right to remain silent during the first interrogation. See Meade, 327 Or at 339 (“When a suspect in police custody makes an unequivocal request to talk to a lawyer, all police questioning must cease.”); State v. Charboneau, 323 Or 38, 54, 913 P2d 308 (1996) (same). Defendant’s first and second invocations unambiguously communicated that she no longer desired to talk with detectives. Defendant’s third invocation, when viewed in the context in which it was made, effectively communicated her intent to stop the conversation.11 We agree with the trial court’s conclusion that defendant then reinitiated the conversation with authorities after her first invocation, thus waiving her right to remain silent. See State v. Singleton, 288 Or 89, 104, 602 P2d 1059 (1979) (“[T]he question of waiver is not simply a question of historical fact, but one which requires the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.”). After communicating to detectives that she no longer wanted to talk, defendant continued the conversation without prompting from the detectives. Defendant made repeated references to her abuse of her daughter and asked the detectives about their view of the case. Defendant thereby expressed a willingness to continue a discussion about the investigation. See Meade, 327 Or at 341 (concluding that the defendant initiated further conversation that evinced a willingness and desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation). Defendant was advised of her Miranda rights at the beginning of the first interrogation, indicated that she understood her rights, and waived them. Defendant’s first invocation came approximately one hour later. As defendant continued talking, the detectives repeatedly sought to clarify whether defendant wanted to stop speaking with them. See Montez, 309 Or at 572-73 (noting that officers’ “neutral questions, intended only to clarify” whether the 11 The state maintains that defendant, in her third invocation, merely expressed a desire not to look at a photograph of Jeanette. The state is mistaken. Before defendant’s invocation, Fenley acknowledged that he was aware that defendant did not want to look at anything and assured defendant that he was “not going to ask [her] to do that.” He instead told defendant that he still needed to ask her about Jeanette’s injuries. When defendant then stated, “I don’t want to no more, please, I don’t want to,” she was communicating that she did not want to talk with Fenley about Jeanette’s injuries. Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 457 defendant had invoked his right to counsel “did not probe beyond [the] limited and permissible inquiry”). The detectives did not ask investigative questions at that time and offered limited responses to questions that defendant posed to them. Thus, we conclude that defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to remain silent after her first invocation. See Meade, 327 Or at 341-42 (concluding that the statements following the defendant’s invocation were “the result of free, unconstrained, and informed choice” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That reasoning, however, does not apply to defen- dant’s subsequent invocations. After defendant’s second invocation, Hoberg understood that defendant was exercising her right to remain silent. He therefore stopped the interrogation and left the room. Hoberg waited only one minute before reentering the room and asking the same question that preceded defendant’s second invocation. Similarly, defendant’s third invocation occurred in response to Fenley’s question regarding Jeanette’s injuries. Rather than stop the interview, Fenley persisted in questioning defendant about Jeanette’s injuries. Thus, we conclude that the statements defendant made after her second and third invocations were not obtained through defendant’s knowing and voluntarily waiver of her right to remain silent, under Article I, section 12, of the Oregon Constitution. We conclude that defendant unequivocally invoked her right to remain silent under Article I, section 12, and the detectives violated defendant’s rights when they persisted in questioning her after her second and third invocations. As a result, defendant’s statements from the first interrogation that occurred after her second invocation should have been suppressed pretrial and were improperly admitted during the penalty-phase proceeding. We now consider whether defendant’s statements in her subsequent interrogations were obtained in violation of her right to remain silent under either the state or federal constitution. In State v. Jarnagin, 351 Or 703, 716-17, 277 P3d 535 (2012), we examined whether a defendant’s later decision to speak to officers was a product of an earlier Miranda violation. We explained that relevant factors 458 State v. McAnulty to consider include the nature of the initial violation, the amount of time between the violation and the defendant’s later statements, whether the defendant remained in custody between the violation and the later statements, and whether there was a change in time and circumstances. Id. Turning to the evidence, we note that defendant’s second interrogation occurred immediately after the statements that were obtained during the first interrogation. There was no significant temporal break, and the same parties were present in the same room. There was also no significant difference in the quality of the statements elicited. Based on those circumstances, we conclude that defendant’s statements in her second interrogation were an extension of the statements illegally obtained during her first interrogation and that they also should have been suppressed pretrial and were improperly admitted during the penalty-phase proceeding. However, we conclude that the statements defen- dant made during the third and fourth interrogations were not a product of the earlier illegality. As noted, the detectives stopped questioning defendant for a period of one hour after the second interrogation. Defendant then initiated the third interrogation by stating that she had something to tell Hoberg and Smith. See Meade, 327 Or at 340-42; Edwards, 451 US at 484-85. She requested to speak with them privately and provided additional admissions about certain aspects of her abusive acts against Jeanette. Many of those statements were qualitatively different from the more limited admissions that she had made previously. See Jarnagin, 351 Or at 722 (noting that the defendant had not previously admitted to specific criminal conduct in unwarned interview, so subsequent interview was not a repeat of earlier violation); Missouri v. Seibert, 542 US 600, 616-17, 124 S Ct 2601, 159 L Ed 2d 643 (2004) (analyzing same considerations under the federal constitution). Defendant likewise waived her rights at the initiation of the fourth interrogation. When a person invokes her right to remain silent, police may reinitiate contact after a reasonable time, provide new Miranda warnings, and obtain a valid waiver. See State v. Stilling, 285 Or 293, 302-03, 590 Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 459 P2d 1223, cert den, 444 US 880 (1979) (so holding); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 US 96, 104-06, 96 S Ct 321, 46 L Ed 2d 313 (1975) (same). In this case, the fourth interrogation occurred approximately six hours after the third and after defendant had initiated a discussion in the third interrogation. At that point, Hoberg and Smith again advised defendant of her Miranda rights. Defendant acknowledged that she understood them and signed a form to that effect. She answered the detectives’ questions and did not again invoke her right to remain silent. Thus, we conclude the statements elicited in the third and fourth interrogations were not obtained in violation of defendant’s constitutional rights. Defendant also claims that the detectives’ unconstitutional conduct during the first interrogation created a coercive environment that rendered her subsequent statements involuntary. Under both Article I, section 12, and the Fifth Amendment, a person’s statements are voluntary if, under the totality of the circumstances, the person’s “ ‘will was not overborne and his capacity for self-determination was not critically impaired.’ ” Acremant, 338 Or at 324 (quoting State v. Vu, 307 Or 419, 425, 770 P2d 577 (1989)); see also Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218, 225-26, 93 S Ct 2041, 36 L Ed 2d 854 (1973). We review the voluntariness of defendant’s statements for errors of law and are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if supported by the record. State v. Terry, 333 Or 163, 171, 37 P3d 157 (2001), cert den, 536 US 910 (2002). Applying that standard, we reject defendant’s contention that the detectives used coercive tactics that rendered defendant’s subsequent statements involuntary. The trial court found that defendant’s statements were not obtained by threats or promises, and that finding is supported by the record. Additionally, as previously discussed, defendant was given Miranda warnings before any statements were obtained, she initiated the third interrogation, and she was given Miranda warnings before the fourth interrogation. Her statements in the third and fourth interrogations were also qualitatively different from those that had preceded. Thus, the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant’s statements were voluntary. 460 State v. McAnulty The remaining question is whether the admission during the penalty phase of the statements improperly obtained during the first and second interrogations was harmless. We begin with the state constitutional standard. Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution governs whether an appellate court must affirm a conviction even though a legal error occurred during the trial. State v. Davis, 336 Or 19, 28, 77 P3d 1111 (2003). That provision provides, in part: “If the supreme court shall be of opinion, after consideration of all the matters thus submitted, that the judgment of the court appealed from was such as should have been rendered in the case, such judgment shall be affirmed, notwithstanding any error committed during the trial[.]” Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3. In determining whether to affirm a judgment under that constitutional provision, this court reviews the record to decide whether there was “little likelihood” that the error affected the jury’s verdict. Davis, 336 Or at 32; see also State v. Lopez-Minjarez, 350 Or 576, 587, 260 P3d 439 (2011) (concluding “that the erroneous instruction had no significant likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict”). The focus of that inquiry “is on the possible influence of the error on the verdict rendered, not whether this court, sitting as a factfinder, would regard the evidence of guilt as substantial and compelling.” Davis, 336 Or at 32. In Davis, this court concluded that the erroneous exclusion of evidence was harmful. Davis, 336 Or at 33-35. The court reasoned that the evidence excluded was integral to the defendant’s case and influential because it substantiated the defendant’s version of events. Id. at 34. The court further reasoned that the evidence was not “duplicative or unhelpful” to the jury and was not cumulative, because the excluded evidence was “qualitatively different than the evidence that the jury heard.” Id. at 33-34. Applying those harmless error principles, we conclude, on the particular facts of this case, that the trial court’s error in admitting the statements illegally obtained during defendant’s first and second interrogations was harmless. As noted, the illegally obtained statements were more limited in Cite as 356 Or 432 (2014) 461 nature than those obtained from the third and fourth interrogations. The illegally obtained statements included only admissions that defendant had “spanked” Jeanette three times with either a belt or stick, had controlled and limited Jeanette’s water supply, had cleaned up some evidence of abuse, had caused an injury that had exposed Jeanette’s bone, and had attempted to treat Jeanette’s injuries herself. Defendant otherwise maintained that Jeanette’s additional injuries were caused by Richard or by Jeanette falling down. In contrast, defendant provided more substantial admissions of certain aspects of the abuse in the third and fourth interrogations. She admitted to repeatedly whipping, hitting, and kicking Jeanette all over her body; and hitting Jeanette so hard that Jeanette fell and seriously injured her head. Those admissions were properly admitted at trial. Moreover, as noted, defendant pleaded guilty before she proceeded to sentencing. In her plea petition, defendant admitted to the “intentional maiming and torturing” of Jeanette. That admission was properly before the jury in its deliberations on whether defendant should receive the death penalty. In considering the effect of the improperly admitted evidence in light of the admissions that were properly admitted and the guilty plea, we conclude that the jury would have regarded the improperly admitted evidence as duplicative or unhelpful. See Davis, 336 Or at 33-34 (relying on the same considerations); see also State v. Randant, 341 Or 64, 74, 136 P3d 1113 (2006), cert den, 549 US 1227 (2007) (any error in admitting some statements harmless in light of more detailed and prejudicial statements). The evidence did not have a tendency to affect the jury’s verdict, and its erroneous admission was harmless. The same result follows under the Fifth Amendment. Once a person exercises her Fifth Amendment “right to cut off questioning,” police must “scrupulously honor” that request and cease the interrogation. Mosley, 423 US at 104. A person may knowingly and voluntarily waive the right. Edwards, 451 US at 482. However, without a waiver, police violate a person’s right if they fail to “honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by persisting 462 State v. McAnulty in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance and make him change his mind.” Mosley, 423 US at 105-06. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that the detectives’ conduct after defendant’s second and third invocations violated defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. Under the Fifth Amendment, “before a federal con- stitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman v. California, 386 US 18, 24, 87 S Ct 824, 828, 17 L Ed 2d 705 (1967); see also Delaware v. Van Ardsdall, 475 US 673, 684, 106 S Ct 1431, 89 L Ed 2d 674 (1986) (reviewing court must consider the importance of the improperly admitted testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting testimony, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case). Under the federal standard, we conclude that admission of the statements in question was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.