Opinion ID: 1309573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Closing Argument of State and Charge to Jury.

Text: The punishment of an accused person who is found guilty of murder is determined in a separate sentencing procedure (the second stage of the bifurcated trial). The sentencing proceeding is normally conducted by the same trial judge and before the same jury as the first phase. During this second phase the parties may introduce additional admissible evidence in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of punishment. After the introduction of any such evidence, both the State and the defense are entitled to make a closing argument in favor of or against imposition of the death penalty. Following arguments, the judge must charge the jury to consider any mitigating circumstances otherwise authorized or allowed by law and any of the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances that are supported by the evidence. If the jury finds at least one aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, it may recommend the death penalty. The recommendation must be unanimous, and the jury must designate in writing the aggravating circumstance(s). The jury may recommend a sentence of life imprisonment even if it finds a statutory aggravating circumstance. Where a recommendation of death is made, the trial judge must impose the death penalty if he affirmatively finds that it is warranted under the attending evidence and that it is not a result of prejudice, passion, or other arbitrary factor. We have interpreted this State's Death Penalty Statute to require the trial judge instruct the jury that it could effectively impose life imprisonment instead of death even if it found one or more statutory aggravating circumstance(s). Failure to so charge may require a death penalty sentence to be vacated. State v. Tyner , 273 S.C. 646, 258 S.E. (2d) 559 (1979); State v. Goolsby , S.C. 268 S.E. (2d) 31 (1980). The required charge was not given. The State argues, however, that the jury had been thoroughly indoctrinated with the applicable law by way of counsel's questioning on voir dire and closing arguments. This position cannot be sustained. No principle of law is more firmly established than the solemn duty of the court to determine the law of the case and declare it to the jury. That jury is bound by, and must accept and be governed by, the instructions of the court. 75 Am. Jur. (2d) Trial § 574. Even assuming, arguendo, that the statements of law by counsel during the course of a trial were legally correct, the adversarial nature of our trial system mandates that the jury have a complete statement of the law from the trial judge. Arguments of counsel simply cannot substitute for instructions by the court. Taylor v. Kentucky , 436 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed. (2d) 468 (1978). This court has also found reversible error where counsel argues to the jury that its decision for life or death is not necessarily binding and is subject to higher review. State v. Gilbert , 273 S.C. 690, 258 S.E. (2d) 890 (1979). The following appears in the record: [Closing argument of the State] What then? Does it end there? No, it doesn't and we've explained this to you. Mr. Dunn has explained it to you. What happens then? His Honor, before he can impose the death penalty based on your recommendation, he must make some affirmative findings, and  [Defense attorney]: Your Honor, we have a matter, please. [W]e are objecting at this point to any reference made in the record that the jury recommends the death sentence, the imposition of the death sentence, and that it's then up to Your Honor to impose. We feel like this takes the burden off of the jury in their minds;... [Counsel for the State]: May I, Your Honor, say that Your Honor must make some affirmative findings, and then if you make those findings that you must, upon their recommendation, make  The Court: It's mandatory that I impose the death penalty. The Court: Well, again, I think the jury should assume that upon imposition of the death sentence, that it will be in fact imposed. I just don't think it would be proper for you to leave anything in the minds of the jury that even though they might recommend it, there's a chance that his life might be spared. That interference should be left with the jury. [Closing argument of the State later continued]: Now, what is His Honor's role? Ladies and gentlemen, I think you should clearly understand that if you make a recommendation for the death penalty that you should expect that that should be carried out. I'm not trying to spread your responsibility thin. I say to you I made the decision to seek it. As solicitor, that's my function. Your function as a juror is to recommend, and His Honor's function is to impose it. But, he can only do that  he cannot, he shall not, he must not, and I submit, will not follow your recommendation for a death penalty in this case until he has found, he having heard the same evidence from this witness stand, that the State  that your recommendation is supported by substantiated by the evidence, that it is warranted by the evidence. And he must, as his duty as the trial judge in this case, make that finding affirmatively on the record. Next, he must find that it was not done arbitrarily. Next, that it was not done with prejudice, not done capriciously, with prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, but that it was warranted under the evidence. Despite the ruling of the trial judge, it is apparent that the prosecutor later returned to his attempt to minimize the solemn responsibility of the jurors. In Gilbert , where the State's closing argument was in a similar vein, this court said: These comments by the solicitor suggested to the jury that its responsibility for deciding appellants' fate was lessened. Under our judicial system, the jury is given the heavy responsibility of determining whether a convicted murderer will live or die. It was erroneous and extremely prejudicial for the solicitor to imply to the jury that its burden could be passed on to a higher court. Whether the reference be to further review before the immediate trial judge or to a higher court, the effect on the jury is the same: its responsibility is lessened through the inferences that ultimate outcome is determined by the court. The imposition of the death penalty must be set aside because of the insufficient jury charge and the improper closing argument of the State. We have treated those issues argued by counsel for Woomer. Several exceptions are enumerated in the transcript but not pursued in counsel's brief. Under our rules, such are deemed abandoned. However, inasmuch as this is a capital punishment case, all of them have been considered and found without merit. In addition, we have examined the entire record and find no error prejudicial to Woomer. Such examination of the record has been made in addition to those issues argued and/or enumerated in the exceptions. We affirm the conviction, but vacate the death penalty and remand for resentencing pursuant to § 16-3-25 (E) (1) and (2) Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976). as amended (Supp. 1980). Affirmed in part; Reversed in part and Remanded. LEWIS, C.J., and GREGORY, J., and WILLIAM L. RHODES, JR., Acting Associate Justice, concur. NESS, J., dissents. HARWELL, J., not participating.