Opinion ID: 4387367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Relation-Back Doctrine

Text: As an initial matter, Defendant County asserts that the claims against the County and John Doe County defendants are time-barred, as they were brought more than three years after the events at issue in this case. See County Brief at 9. Rayfield concedes that the allegations against the County defendants were technically beyond the applicable three-year statute of limitations because they were first filed in January 2018. Rayfield Brief at 36–37. However, Rayfield contends that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), the claims against the County defendants relate back to his original, timely filed, complaint. Id. at 36–45. The district court concluded that the claims against the County defendants did not relate back. R. 39 (Order at 15–19) (Page ID #314– 18). We review de novo a district court’s conclusion that an amended complaint does not relate back to the original complaint. Durand v. Hanover Ins. Grp., Inc., 806 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 2015). Under Rule 15(c)(1)(C) “An amendment to a pleading relates back to the date of the original pleading when: . . . the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits; and (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s identity. 8 No. 18-1927, Weston Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids et al. Rule 15(c)(1)(B), in turn, requires that “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out––or attempted to be set out––in the original pleading.” Although Rayfield does not explicitly articulate this, it is clear to us that any claims against the John Doe City defendants are not time-barred. Specifically, in Rayfield’s original, timely filed complaint, Rayfield identified the John Doe defendants as “one or multiple as-yet-unidentified officers, employees, or affiliates of the City of Grand Rapids and/or the Grand Rapids Police Department who were involved in the detention of Plaintiff from October 1, 2014 through October 3, 2014.” R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 6) (Page ID #2). In his amended complaint, Rayfield describes the John Doe defendants as “one or multiple as-yet-unidentified officers, employees, or affiliates of the City of Grand Rapids and/or the County of Kent who were involved in the detention of Plaintiff from October 1, 2014 through October 3, 2014 or whose actions or failures to act resulted in [the] same.” R. 15 (Am. Compl. ¶ 6) (Page ID #82) (emphasis added). Because both complaints bring claims against some of the same John Doe defendants, i.e., those employed by the City, those claims need not “relate back” to the original complaint. We therefore focus our analysis on the additions of the County and the John Doe County defendants. We conclude that Rule 15(c) does not permit relation back with respect to these claims. First, we have previously held that Rule 15(c) is inapplicable when the plaintiff seeks to add, rather than subtract or change, the named defendants. See Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230, 240 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 821 (1996) (“Sixth Circuit precedent clearly holds that new parties may not be added after the statute of limitations has run, and [ ] such amendments do not satisfy 9 No. 18-1927, Weston Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids et al. the ‘mistaken identity’ requirement of Rule 15(c)(3)(B).” (citing In re Kent Holland Die Casting & Plating, Inc., 928 F.2d 1448, 1449–50 (6th Cir. 1991); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1064 (6th Cir. 1973)); see also Ringrose v. Engelberg Huller Co., 692 F.2d 403, 404–05 (6th Cir. 1982) (apparently concluding that the plaintiff was merely correcting a misnomer when the plaintiff added two successor companies once it became clear that the originally named defendant was no longer in business); cf. Ham v. Sterling Emergency Servs. of the Midwest, Inc., 575 F. App’x 610, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2014) (noting that although the plaintiff added the additional doctor defendant without immediately removing the originally named doctor, because “[t]he amended complaint charged Forte ‘and/or’ Wilson with the same conduct and [the plaintiff] subsequently dropped Forte from the suit[, i]n that sense, [the plaintiff] changed the party against whom he brought his claim and did not add a new party”). Additionally, our case law suggests that the “mistake” at issue in Rayfield’s case––his ignorance of the County’s involvement in his detention––is not the type of “mistake” encompassed by Rule 15. See Brown v. Cuyahoga County, 517 F. App’x 431, 433–34 (6th Cir. 2013) (“We have previously held that an absence of knowledge is not a mistake, as required by Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii).”); Smith v. City of Akron, 476 F. App’x 67, 69 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that the plaintiff was not “mistaken” about the proper defendant to name when “he simply did not know whom to sue or opted not to find out within the limitations period”); Moore v. Tennessee, 267 F. App’x 450, 455 (6th Cir. 2008) (“In this court, a plaintiff’s lack of knowledge pertaining to an intended defendant’s identity does not constitute a mistake concerning the party’s identity within the meaning of Rule 15(c).” (internal quotation marks omitted)); but see Ham, 575 F. App’x at 10 No. 18-1927, Weston Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids et al. 617 (discussing but not deciding whether the plaintiff’s mistake about which doctor was actually in charge of his care would constitute the necessary “mistake” under Rule 15). In response, Rayfield points out that he was unaware of the County’s role in his detention only because the City failed to respond promptly and fully to a Freedom of Information Act request prior to Rayfield’s filing of the original complaint. Rayfield Brief at 39–40. However, while the City’s actions, and Rayfield’s resulting confusion, could well form the basis of an equitable-tolling argument, Rule 15(c) is simply inapplicable to this situation. Indeed, we have previously recognized the distinction between Rule 15(c) and equitable tolling. See Wiggins v. KimberlyClark Corp., 641 F. App’x 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2016); Brown, 517 F. App’x at 433–35 (concluding that although a defendant’s refusal to provide information to the plaintiff may form the basis of an equitable-tolling argument, it does not constitute a “mistake” under Rule 15(c)). Rayfield makes no argument, either before this court or the district court, relating to equitable tolling. For all the reasons set forth above, Rule 15(c) does not save Rayfield’s allegations against the County defendants. Rayfield’s allegations against the County and John Doe County defendants are thus barred by the three-year statute of limitations. We therefore affirm the district court’s dismissal of the County defendants.4 4 Moreover, and as explained further below, because Rayfield has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against all defendants, Rayfield’s allegations also fail on the merits. 11 No. 18-1927, Weston Rayfield v. City of Grand Rapids et al.