Opinion ID: 1226554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Constitutionality of. Crim.P. 41.1

Text: Since the issue of the admissibility of the defendant's handwriting exemplars is likely to be raised upon retrial, we elect to address his contention relating to Crim.P. 41.1. The defendant does not question the sufficiency of the affidavit upon which the nontestimonial identification order was issued. Rather, he argues that the rule is facially unconstitutional because it permits an investigatory detention on less than probable cause in contravention of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. At the outset we put to rest the People's claim that the defendant was not seized and therefore lacks standing to challenge the rule. Crim.P. 41.1 requires the judge to issue an order directed to any peace officer to take the person named in the affidavit into custody to obtain nontestimonial identification. (Emphasis added) Such an intrusion clearly is within the scope of the search and seizure clause of the Fourth Amendment and its Colorado counterpart and the defendant's constitutional interest in privacy has been adversely affected by the intrusion. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1969); Stone v. People, 174 Colo. 504, 485 P.2d 495 (1971). The critical question is whether the intrusion can be constitutionally justified. Crim.P. 41.1 was an outgrowth of dicta in Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969), suggesting that limited intrusions based on less than probable cause might be constitutionally permissible under narrowly defined circumstances. Subsequent cases of the United States Supreme Court have addressed the propriety of such intrusions in various contexts. See, e.g., Michigan v. Summers, ___ U.S. ___, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972); Terry v. Ohio, supra . These cases suggest that limited intrusions into privacy on less than probable cause are reconcilable with Fourth Amendment guarantees when the following conditions exist. First, there must be an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting criminal activity at the outset. Second, the intrusion must be limited in scope, purpose and duration. Third, the intrusion must be justified by substantial law enforcement interests. Last, there must be an opportunity at some point to subject the intrusion to the neutral and detached scrutiny of a judicial officer before the evidence obtained therefrom may be admitted in a criminal proceeding against the accused. The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a particular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances. And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard.... Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction. Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d at 906. Judged by these standards we are satisfied that Crim.P. 41.1 passes constitutional scrutiny. Crim.P. 41.1(c)(1) and (2) require that an order for nontestimonial identification evidence be supported by articulable and specific facts in the form of an affidavit establishing: (1) probable cause to believe a crime has been committed; and (2) reasonable grounds, not amounting to probable cause to arrest, to suspect the person described in the affidavit committed the offense. The rule is limited to nontestimonial identification evidence only and does not authorize the acquisition of testimonial communications protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979). Crim.P. 41.1(h)(2) provides: `Nontestimonial identification' includes, but is not limited to, identification by fingerprints, palm prints, footprints, measurements, blood specimens, urine specimens, saliva samples, hair samples, specimens of material under fingernails, or other reasonable physical or medical examination, handwriting exemplars, voice samples, photographs, appearing in lineups, and trying on articles of clothing. The order itself must designate the specific identification procedure to be conducted, Crim.P. 41(e), and upon completion the person must be released or charged with an offense, Crim.P. 41(d). Also, Crim.P. 41(c)(3) requires that before issuance of any order the judge be satisfied, by affidavit, that the results of the identification procedures will be of material aid in determining whether the person committed the offense. In this respect the rule insures, to the extent practicable, that the requested procedures be demonstrably related to the apprehension of a suspected offender for a specific crime, certainly a substantial law enforcement interest. Finally, the rule requires prior judicial approval for the order and imposes conditions of execution calculated to adequately safeguard the constitutional interests of the person affected. Not only must the judge direct that the designated procedure be conducted expeditiously, Crim.P. 41.1(d), but also Crim.P. 41.1(f) further provides that: (1) No person who appears under an order of appearance issued pursuant to this section (f) shall be detained longer than is reasonably necessary to conduct the specified nontestimonial identification procedures unless he is arrested for an offense. (2) The order may be executed and returned only within ten days after its date. (3) The order shall be executed in the daytime unless the issuing judge shall endorse thereupon that it may be served at any time, because it appears that the suspect may flee the jurisdiction if the order is not served forthwith. (4) The officer executing the order shall give a copy of the order to the person upon which it is served. (5) No search of the person who is to give nontestimonial identification may be made, except a protective search for weapons, unless a separate search warrant has been issued. (6) A return shall be made to the issuing judge showing whether the person named has been: (I) Detained for such nontestimonial identification; (II) Released or arrested. (7) If, at the time of such return, probable cause does not exist to believe that such person has committed the offense named in the affidavit or any other offense, the person named in the affidavit shall be entitled to move that the judge issue an order directing that the products of the nontestimonial identification procedures, and all copies thereof, be destroyed. Such motion shall, except for good cause shown, be granted. Our evaluation of Crim.P. 41.1 leads us to conclude that it does not violate either the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article II, Section 7, of the Colorado Constitution. See State v. Grijalva, 111 Ariz. 476, 533 P.2d 533 (1975); In re Fingerprinting of M.B., 125 N.J.Super. 115, 309 A.2d 3 (1973). We therefore reject the defendant's claim of facial unconstitutionality.