Opinion ID: 774566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aggregation in General

Text: 74 The rule against aggregating the claims of multiple plaintiffs for purposes of determining the amount in controversy dates back at least to 1832. See Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143, 148 (1832). More recently, in 1911, the Supreme Court held that two plaintiffs could not aggregate their claims arising out of distinct promissory notes payable to each plaintiff by the defendant. See Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911). In the Court's words, [w]hen two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the requisite jurisdictional amount. Id. at 40. The Court in Troy Bank also recognized an exception to the anti-aggregation rule that was nearly as old as the rule itself. [W]hen several plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right, in which they have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount. Id . at 40-41 (citing Shields v. Thomas, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 2, 4-5 (1854)). Based on the exception, the Court held in Troy Bank that the two plaintiffs could aggregate their claims based on a vendor's lien that they owned jointly. See Troy Bank, 222 U.S. at 41; see also Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939); Pinel v. Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916). 75 In Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), the Supreme Court rejected an argument that recent amendments to Rule 23 had changed the rule to allow aggregation in class actions. It reiterated that aggregation to meet the amount-in-controversy requirement was permissible only (1) in cases in which a single plaintiff seeks to aggregate two or more of his own claims against a single defendant and (2) in cases in which two or more plaintiffs unite to enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and undivided interest. Id. at 335. It noted that the limitation on aggregation in class actions stemmed not from Rule 23 but from the Court's interpretation of the phrase matter in controversy  in the basic diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332. See id. at 336; see also Zahn, 414 U.S. at 299-301. 76 Our circuit has considered the anti-aggregation rule and the common interest exception in a number of cases. See, e.g., Eagle v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 769 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1984) (allowing aggregation of shareholders' claims for breach of fiduciary duty); Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977) (ban on aggregation applies to injunctive as well as compensatory relief); United States v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 543 F.2d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 1976) (denying aggregation of claims against railroad because rights to exclude trespassers arose from the status of each [plaintiff] as [an] individual); Potrero Hill Cmty. Action Comm. v. Housing Auth., 410 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1969) (refusing to aggregate claims of tenants in a housing project because their claims arose only from the status of each as individual lessee); Handy v. General Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 786, 787 (9th Cir. 1975) (refusing to aggregate actions forexcess depreciation due to automobile manufacturing defects); Skokomish Indian Tribe v. France, 269 F.2d 555, 559 (9th Cir. 1959) (allowing aggregation of quiet title actions by tribe against numerous defendants). 77 The distinction between separate and distinct  claims which cannot be aggregated, and common and undivided claims which can, is not always crystal-clear. See Morrison v. Allstate Indemnity Co., 228 F.3d 1255, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting criticism of distinction as arcane and confusing); 14B Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 3704, at 127 (3d ed. 1998) (describing aggregation rules as being in a very unsatisfactory state); 5 Moore's §§ 23.07[3][b] at 23-40 (calling distinction elusive). But we think it clear in this case that plaintiffs' claims for disgorgement and punitive damages do not implicate a common and undivided interest, and therefore may not be aggregated for purposes of amount in controversy.