Opinion ID: 3049781
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: attorney general’s authority to promulgate 8

Text: C.F.R. § 212.7(d) [1] The first question we consider is whether the Attorney General exceeded his statutory authority in adopting 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d), the regulation that establishes a heightened burden under § 212(h) for individuals who have committed violent or dangerous crimes. Section 212(h)(1) states that the Attorney General may, “in his discretion” waive the inadmissibility of certain criminal aliens if “it is established to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that the alien’s denial of admission would result in extreme hardship to the United States citizen or lawfully resident spouse, parent, son, or daughter of such alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B). This waiver may be granted if “the Attorney General, in his discretion, and pursuant to such terms, conditions and procedures as he may by regulations prescribe, has consented to the alien’s applying or reapplying for a visa, for admission to the United States, or adjustment of status.” Id. § 1182(h)(2). [2] In 2003, the Attorney General adopted 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d), which states: The Attorney General, in general, will not favorably exercise discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the 5 In his brief on appeal, Mejia does not discuss the arguments in his appeal to the BIA as distinct from those in his motion to reopen. To the extent that those issues overlap, we discuss them below. To the extent that the motion to reopen discusses separate issues, any challenge to those issues is waived. See Devereaux v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1079 (9th Cir. 2001). 10498 MEJIA v. GONZALES [Immigration and Nationality] Act (8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(2)) to consent to an application or reapplication for a visa, or admission to the United States, or adjustment of status, with respect to immigrant aliens who are inadmissible under section 212(a)(2) of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act in cases involving violent or dangerous crimes, except in extraordinary circumstances, such as . . . cases in which an alien clearly demonstrates that the denial of [relief] would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship. Moreover, depending on the gravity of the alien’s underlying criminal offense, a showing of extraordinary circumstances might still be insufficient to warrant a favorable exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the Act. In issuing the regulation, the Attorney General emphasized that “8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) governs only the exercise of discretion under section 212(h)(2) of the Act, after the alien has met the threshold requirement of section 212(h)(1) of the Act.” 67 Fed. Reg. at 78,677. Mejia argues that there is a disconnect between the language of the statute—“extreme hardship”—and the burden imposed by the regulation—an “exceptional and extremely unusual” hardship. His suggestion that the regulation exceeds the bounds of the Attorney General’s authority misconceives the statute as a whole and the discretion Congress has entrusted to the Attorney General in this arena. We apply the “familiar Chevron two-step approach” to determine whether 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) is valid. See MoralesIzquierdo v. Gonzales, 486 F.3d 484, 489 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (applying Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), to determine whether an immigration regulation was ultra vires). In the first step of the Chevron inquiry, we ask “whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842—here, MEJIA v. GONZALES 10499 whether Congress has established the standard that the Attorney General may use in exercising his discretion to grant § 212(h) relief. In fact, Congress has not spoken on this issue as the statute does not address any standard for exercise of his discretion under § 212(h)(2). Therefore, we assess “whether the agency’s [regulation] is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; see also Morales-Izquierdo, 486 F.3d at 492. “[T]he agency construction [need not be] the only one it permissibly could have adopted . . . , or even the reading the court would have reached if the question initially had arisen in a judicial proceeding.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11. The regulation speaks only to the exercise of discretion under § 212(h)(2), not to the threshold determination of eligibility under § 212(h)(1). The Attorney General has not changed or altered the statutory “extreme hardship” standard. Instead, he has promulgated a regulation to guide IJs in the way they exercise their relatively unfettered grant of discretion after the statutory requirements are met. Cf. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) (insulating from judicial review discretionary determinations under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)). [3] The regulation does not alter or supercede the “extreme hardship” standard. Rather, the regulation supplements and gives definition to the standard to be applied in the cases of individuals who have committed violent or dangerous crimes. The Attorney General, in the exercise of his discretion, suggests that the equities disfavor, although do not preclude, relief in this circumstance. Given Congress’s broad grant of discretion, this approach is not inconsistent with the statute or the Attorney General’s authority. As we noted in Ayala-Chavez v. INS, “[C]ourts have always interpreted broadly the discretionary authority of the Attorney General to grant or deny waiver of deportation. . . . Inherent in this discretion is the authority of the Attorney 10500 MEJIA v. GONZALES General and his subordinates to establish general standards that govern the exercise of such discretion, as long as these standards are rationally related to the statutory scheme.” 944 F.2d 638, 641 (9th Cir. 1991). In that case, we held that where Congress had not specified any standards with respect to the discretionary determination of eligibility for relief under former INA § 212(c), the Attorney General did not exceed his statutory authority by requiring a showing of “outstanding equities” from those individuals who had been convicted of serious drug offenses. See id. [4] The heightened standard is rationally related to the national immigration policy of not admitting aliens who could be a danger to society. Our sister circuits are in accord. See Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462, 466-67 (7th Cir. 2006) (affirming the BIA’s use of the §212.7(d) standard before it was formally codified); Jean v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 392, 396-98 (5th Cir. 2006) (same); compare Succar v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding, under a different section of the INA, that categorically eliminating a certain type of relief exceeds the Attorney General’s discretion). The regulation, which neither precludes relief for the class of aliens who commit violent crimes nor instructs the IJ to ignore the statutory considerations, is within the Attorney General’s authority. II. RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) Mejia, whose convictions were entered long before the regulation was enacted, next contends that the BIA violated constitutional prohibitions on retroactivity by applying 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d) to him. As a preliminary matter, we reject the government’s claim that Mejia waived this argument by failing to exhaust his administrative remedies. Although ordinarily we do not hear an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review, we excuse the lack of exhaustion where a petitioner raises a challenge to the constitutionality of the statutes and regulations the BIA administers. See Padilla-Padilla v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 972, 976-77 (9th Cir. 2006); see also MEJIA v. GONZALES 10501 Garcia-Ramirez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 935, 938 (9th Cir. 2005) (applying this principle to a retroactivity challenge). [5] Turning to the merits, we hold that § 212.7(d) may be applied retroactively. Determining whether a regulation or statute may be applied retroactively requires a two-step analysis under Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244 (1994). First, we determine whether the statute or regulation clearly expresses that the law is to be applied retroactively, id. at 280, which is not the case here. The regulation makes no mention of the timing of the convictions it affects. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.7(d). [6] In the absence of clear direction, we must consider whether application of the regulation would have a retroactive effect. Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280. “The inquiry into whether a statute [or regulation] operates retroactively demands a commonsense, functional judgment about whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 321 (2001) (internal quotations omitted). A regulation has retroactive effect “when it takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” See id. (internal quotations omitted). A judgment bearing on retroactivity should be guided by “fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Relying principally on St. Cyr, Mejia argues that the regulation “attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past.” See id. (internal quotations omitted). St. Cyr addressed an individual’s continuing eligibility for relief under former INA § 212(c). The Supreme Court held that the INS could not retroactively apply the repeal of § 212(c) to individuals whose plea-based convictions were entered before Congress enacted the Illegal Immigration 10502 MEJIA v. GONZALES Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”). Id. at 321. The Court reasoned that IIRIRA’s elimination of any possibility of § 212(c) relief for people who entered into plea agreements with the expectation that they would be eligible for such relief clearly attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past. . . . There can be little doubt that, as a general matter, alien defendants . . . are acutely aware of the immigration consequences of their convictions. . . . Given the frequency with which § 212(c) relief was granted in the years leading up to [the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] and IIRIRA, preserving the possibility of such relief would have been one of the principal benefits sought by defendants deciding whether to accept a plea offer or instead to proceed to trial. Id. at 321-23 (internal quotations and citations omitted). [7] Mejia argues that like St. Cyr, he pleaded guilty to his offenses with the expectation that the standard for § 212(h) relief would be “extreme hardship,” rather than “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” He analogizes to St. Cyr’s expectation that § 212(c) relief would be available. The question, then, is whether the Attorney General’s articulation of an enhanced standard “attaches a new disability” to Mejia’s conviction. See id. at 321. [8] Although Mejia’s argument has some analytical appeal, his situation differs from St. Cyr’s in one significant way: In St. Cyr, the repeal of the statute deprived would-be immigrants from seeking any relief under the statute. Id. Here, the challenged regulation does not completely foreclose the possibility of relief as did the repeal of § 212(c) in St. Cyr. Both before and after the adoption of § 212.7(d), Mejia had the ability to seek relief under INA § 212(h). Before and after the MEJIA v. GONZALES 10503 regulation took effect, Mejia would have been subject to the Attorney General’s discretion, provided that he met the threshold statutory requirements at INA § 212(h)(1). And, both before and after the regulation took effect, we may presume Mejia knew that the IJ would weigh the equities of his case and make a decision. As the Supreme Court observed in St. Cyr, “[t]here is a clear difference, for the purposes of retroactivity analysis, between facing possible deportation and facing certain deportation.” Id. at 325. Both before and after the adoption of the regulation, Mejia faced only possible deportation. [9] Nor could Mejia reasonably rely on the “extreme hardship” standard applying to the discretionary (rather than statutory eligibility) aspect of the Attorney General’s analysis because Congress never suggested that the “extreme hardship” standard applied to the Attorney General’s exercise of discretion. Applying the regulatory “exceptional and extremely unusual” standard to Mejia does not have an impermissibly retroactive effect because it neither attaches a new disability to past conduct nor upsets settled expectations.