Opinion ID: 4540350
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Objective Standard of Reasonableness

Text: In order to determine whether appellate counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, we must analyze whether a Rule 32 error even exists. If there was no underlying error, then appellate counsel 5 In Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424 (1962), the Supreme Court held that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to allocution, and therefore cannot collaterally attack his sentence under Rule 32 absent aggravating circumstances. Id. at 428. However, in contrast to the petitioner in Hill, who solely alleged that he had been denied the right to allocution, Scripps alleges that he was denied the right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel under the Sixth Amendment. Thus, although the underlying error concerns a Rule 32 violation, Scripps presents a cognizable claim under § 2255. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 383 (1986) (holding that a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel is cognizable on habeas review where the petitioner alleged that his trial counsel failed to raise a meritorious argument to exclude evidence seized in an unconstitutional search). 10 was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal. See Thomas, 570 F.3d at 121 n.7. Rule 32 protects a defendant’s right to allocution. Specifically, the rule requires that courts “address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has unequivocally instructed courts to “leave no room for doubt that the defendant has been issued a personal invitation to speak prior to sentencing.” Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 305 (1961). Recognizing the long history of the common law right of allocution, the Supreme Court stated in Green that “there can be little doubt that the drafters of Rule 32[] intended that the defendant be personally afforded the opportunity to speak before imposition of 6 sentence.” Id. at 304. We applied this rule in United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2001), holding that Rule 32 is not satisfied if the sentencing judge asks the defendant’s attorney if the defendant wishes to speak, but fails to address the defendant himself. There, the trial judge made clear that the defendant was invited to address the court, telling the defendant’s lawyer, “I want to hear if the remorseful defendant has anything he wants to say.” Id. at 278. After hearing arguments from defense counsel, the 6 The current wording in Rule 32, which requires the court to “address the defendant personally” before imposing its sentence, was adopted in response to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Green. See Fed. R. Crim P. 32, advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; United States v. Adams, 252 F.3d 276, 279 n.2 (3d Cir. 2001). 11 trial judge specifically asked the defendant’s attorney: “Would your client like to exercise his right of allocution?” Id. “After a pause,” the defendant’s lawyer replied, “No.” Id. We noted that while the trial judge was “obviously aware of [the defendant’s] right of allocution,” “the Supreme Court has held that this query, directed towards counsel, does not satisfy the requirement that the district court personally address the defendant himself.” Id. at 279. We therefore held that the district court failed to comply with Rule 32. Id. The Government attempts to distinguish this case as “that rare matter” where, although the sentencing judge did not directly address Scripps, the record reflects that Scripps nonetheless knew he could exercise his right to allocution. Gov’t Br. 23. Both the District Court’s opinion and the Government reason that, unlike in Adams, the trial judge directed Scripps’s attorney to ask Scripps if he wished to speak and, after conferring with his client, Scripps’s attorney confirmed that he did not.7 The Government argues this is the “functional equivalent” of personally addressing Scripps. Gov’t Br. 24. We find this reasoning unpersuasive. As we held in Adams, an invitation to speak directed through defense counsel is not an adequate substitute for a personal invitation to the defendant himself. Our controlling law and the text of Rule 32 make clear that courts must personally address the defendant and that no substitute for such a personal address will be permitted. Accordingly, we find that the trial court erred in failing to personally address Scripps before imposing its sentence. 7 The District Court noted that “[i]n sharp contrast [to Adams], in this case, not only did counsel confer with defendant on the record, but he was directed by the Court to do so.” App. 17. 12 Thus, it is possible that appellate counsel’s failure to raise the Rule 32 error on direct appeal “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. See Goff v. Bagley, 601 F.3d 445, 466 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Failure on the part of [] appellate counsel to raise such an obviously winning claim clearly falls below an objective standard of reasonableness . . . .”). However, without understanding counsel’s reasons for failing to raise this error on appeal, we cannot categorically conclude that appellate counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 115 (3d Cir. 2002) (concluding that the objective standard of reasonableness analysis “needs to be made with an understanding of counsel’s thought process”). This is because we cannot presume that counsel’s failure to raise the Rule 32 error on appeal automatically constitutes deficient performance. Rather, courts must “indulge a strong presumption” that counsel was effective and may only find otherwise if the defendant “overcome[s] the presumption that . . . the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).