Opinion ID: 360313
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the mine owners' appeals

Text: 37 The four mine owners appealing in No. 77-1907 are parties to the 1974 National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement, which was negotiated on their behalf by BCOA. Their complaint names the International as the defendant. The Buckeye Coal Company, the appellant in No. 77-1992, is also a mine owner and a party to the 1974 agreement. Its complaint names as defendants both the International and some of its district and local union chapters. 38 In their complaints, the mine owners refer to a series of work stoppages which began in Ohio and West Virginia, and which eventually spread to Pennsylvania. The work stoppages arose out of a provision in the 1974 agreement creating the position of roof bolter's helper. Although the union members had anticipated that this new provision would create a number of new jobs, the provision in practice resulted in a reduction in the work force. Disputes over this issue took the form of grievances over health and safety issues. It is undisputed that all such disputes are subject to the grievance-arbitration procedures under the Settlement of Disputes article of the contract and that work stoppages pending the resolution of these disputes are impermissible under the contract. It is also undisputed that when work stoppages occurred at specific mine locations, numerous § 301 suits seeking Boys Markets relief were brought by the mine owners in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. The mine owners allege that the widespread picketing and shutdowns stemmed from efforts by the International and its members to circumvent the agreed-upon arbitration procedure and to force the mine owners to relinquish their contractual rights. All five mine owners seek both money damages and injunctive relief. 39 The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the mine owners' request for an injunction and, at the end of the submission of plaintiffs' evidence, granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the claim for injunctive relief. 21 In the opinion accompanying its order, the district court observed: 40 While we make no findings in this opinion on the evidence pertaining to the breach of the collective bargaining agreement, we believe that it would be sufficient to sustain findings of repeated breaches of the collective bargaining agreement by many local unions of the defendant and their members, by unauthorized work stoppages, failure to use the grievance and arbitration procedures, widespread cross-picketing and some instances of direct action or failure of action by officers of the defendant International Union, which could impose direct as well as vicarious liability on the defendant International Union. But regardless of these findings we can only conclude that the court has no power to grant the relief prayed for. 41 431 F.Supp. at 789. 42 The relief prayed for by the mine owners was, for all practical purposes, quite similar to that sought by BCOA in its complaint. The mine owners sought to impose on the International (and, in the Buckeye case, on the district and local unions as well) specific, mandatory duties designed to prevent the recurrence of the pattern of illegal picketing and illegal work stoppages. Referring to its simultaneous decision dismissing the BCOA complaint, the court continued: 43 Despite the fact that this present case has provided a full record in support of the allegations of its complaint, for our purposes the result is the same. We are faced with the question of the power of this court to issue a mandatory injunction against the International Union to compel it to take certain action with regard to these breaches of the collateral (sic) bargaining agreement. 44 For the reasons set forth at length in (the BCOA case) we conclude that the relief sought is beyond the power and jurisdiction of this court. 45 431 F.Supp. at 791-92. Thus, the district court concluded that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act barred any prospective injunctive relief and that, even if some prospective relief were proper, no decree could be framed which would comply with the specificity requirements of § 9 of that Act and Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
46 Since the district court, in denying relief to the mine owners, relied on its BCOA opinion, our discussion of the injunctive-remedy aspects of that opinion is relevant in part here. The court's references to the location of some mines in other districts and to the difficulty of drafting appropriate injunctive relief are as misplaced in the mine owners' cases as they were in the BCOA case. In BCOA's appeal in No. 77-1876, we affirm the denial of injunctive relief on the ground that § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act prohibits such relief. But we disagree with the district court's reliance on § 4 in the mine owners' cases. The work stoppages of which the mine owners complained occurred at specific mines, stemmed from underlying disputes which were arbitrable, 22 and thus fell clearly within the Boys Markets exception to § 4. Under these circumstances, § 4 is no absolute bar to an injunction. 47 The more difficult question, however, is the applicability of our decision in United States Steel. In that case, we predicated the availability of prospective injunctive relief upon the power of a federal court, having once adjudicated the scope of a non-strike obligation in a § 301 suit, to protect the parties and itself from the necessity for and burden of repeatedly adjudicating what often may be the identical issue. 534 F.2d at 1077. Recognizing that the Boys Markets accommodation between § 4 and § 301 required an ad hoc adjudication of the alleged contractual violation, we held that this need was satisfied by one such adjudication and by a determination that the continuing pattern of violations involved the same factual and legal findings as those made in that adjudication. The record in the mine owners' cases establishes, we think, that the violations are mere repetitions of those previously adjudicated. Thus § 4, as interpreted in United States Steel, is no bar to prospective relief. 48 In that case, however, we noted that while § 4 might not bar all prospective relief, an accommodation is still required between § 301 and § 9. Just as in United States Steel Corp. v. UMW, 456 F.2d 483 (3d Cir.), Cert. denied, 408 U.S. 923, 92 S.Ct. 2492, 33 L.Ed.2d 334 (1972), we held that § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies in § 301 cases, in the later United States Steel case we held that § 9 of the Act applies in such cases. Section 9 and Rule 65(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that the injunction be limited to the likely recurrence of violations of the same nature as those which had already been adjudicated. In addition, the injunction must specify what steps should be taken to prevent the recurrence of the violations. 534 F.2d at 1077. Writing separately in United Stated Steel, Judge Rosenn would have permitted greater latitude in fashioning a prospective injunction. 534 F.2d at 1081-82. His position did not, however, achieve majority support, and we reaffirm here the narrower approach enunciated in the opinion of the court in United States Steel. 49 Given the legality of some prospective relief, the question in the mine owners' cases is whether on this record the district court could have drafted a decree sufficiently specific to comply with the requirements of § 9 and Rule 65(d). If this appeal were before us on the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction, we might be tempted to defer to the district court's discretion. But here we are reviewing a final order dismissing a complaint for injunctive relief on the ground that no relief of any kind could be ordered. We have no hesitation in holding that this dismissal was error. United States Steel requires that any prospective injunction in a § 301 case be carefully crafted, but it does not permit the court to shy away from that task in appropriate cases. Although the district court may well have been correct in rejecting some of the relief proposed by the mine owners, and although the court still must consider general equitable principles in determining the appropriateness of an injunction, 23 certainly § 9 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar an order designed to prevent the recurrence of identical walkouts at identical locations over issues similar to those previously adjudicated. The court's dismissal of the complaint for injunctive relief at the end of the plaintiffs' case was reversible error.