Opinion ID: 2518103
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: this court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal

Text: ¶ 11 Del Ozone and Johnson Controls contend this court does not have jurisdiction over this appeal as to them because Ms. Gudmundson did not file a timely notice of appeal naming them as parties. We disagree and hold that Ms. Gudmundson timely appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to all parties. ¶ 12 A party wishing to appeal a final judgment or order of a district court must file a notice of appeal within [thirty] days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. Utah R.App. P. 4(a). An appeal may be taken from a district... court to the appellate court with jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law.... Utah R.App. P. 3(a). The final judgment requirement is jurisdictional; if not met, we lack jurisdiction over the appeal and must dismiss it. Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, ¶ 12, 179 P.3d 799. For an order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case. Id. ¶ 11 (internal quotation marks omitted). The order from which a party appeals is not final if action[s] against other defendants ... remain[] alive. Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979). ¶ 13 Here, the district court granted summary judgment to Del Ozone and Johnson Controls in an order dated March 24, 2008. It did not grant summary judgment to OzoneSolutions, however, because it found OzoneSolutions had not properly filed a separate memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment. In response to the March 24 order, Ms. Gudmundson filed her first notice of appeal on April 2. The notice contained all three defendants as named parties and was given an appellate case number. Because the March 24 order did not include OzoneSolutions, however, it was not final as to all parties and was not appealable under our rules. Accordingly, this court issued an order dismissing Ms. Gudmundson's first notice of appeal without prejudice because it was filed prematurely. ¶ 14 Shortly after the March 24 order, OzoneSolutions filed a separate memorandum in support of summary judgment. The district court granted the motion on May 28, 2008. The court explained that it hereby incorporates by reference its prior analysis as reflected in the Del Ozone summary judgment, and concluded that this Ruling and Order shall constitute the final Order of the Court on this matter. No further Order need be submitted by the parties. ¶ 15 In response, Ms. Gudmundson filed her second notice of appeal on June 4, 2008. The caption included all three defendants. Ms. Gudmundson also stated that she wished to consolidat[e] the second notice of appeal with the first notice of appeal because it stemmed from the same claim, ar[ose] from the same set of facts, and the [second] order... was based on the same legal theories and findings as the [first] order. The body of the appeal, however, stated that Ms. Gudmundson appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the Ruling and Order Granting Defendant OzoneSolutions' Motion for Summary Judgment. On June 27, this court sent a letter with a different case number than the number assigned to the first notice of appeal, advising the parties that the notice of appeal in this case has been filed. [3] ¶ 16 Del Ozone and Johnson Controls argue that this second notice of appeal is not an appeal from the March 24 order granting summary judgment to them. Rather, they claim that because the May 28 summary judgment order named only OzoneSolutions, any reference to Del Ozone or Johnson Controls in the second notice of appeal has no jurisdictional effect. We disagree. ¶ 17 The district court clearly stated that the May 28 summary judgment order operated as the final appealable order of the court. Although the second notice of appeal is not as clear as it could have been, its reference to the first notice of appeal is sufficient to properly subject all three defendants to this court's jurisdiction. Because Ms. Gudmundson filed this second notice of appeal within the required thirty-day period, we conclude Ms. Gudmundson timely appealed as to all parties. Having determined that we have subject-matter jurisdiction over this appeal, we now address whether the district court abused its discretion when it denied Ms. Gudmundson's rule 56(f) motion for additional time to conduct further discovery.