Opinion ID: 772585
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Allegations Under sec. 1962(d)

Text: 53 We have long recognized that sec. 1962(d)'s target, like that of all provisions prohibiting conspiracies, is the agreement to violate RICO's substantive provisions, not the actual violations themselves. See Schiffels v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 978 F.2d 344, 348 (7th Cir. 1992). 12 Accordingly, it is the well-established law of this Circuit that an individual can be charged under sec. 1962(d) even if he personally does not agree to commit two predicate acts of racketeering. See Goren, 156 F.3d at 731. [T]he touchstone of liability under sec. 1962(d) is an agreement to participate in an endeavor which, if completed, would constitute a violation of the substantive statute. Id. at 732. Hence, in order to state a viable claim for conspiracy under sec. 1962(d), a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant agreed to maintain an interest in or control of an enterprise or to participate in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and (2) the defendant further agreed that someone would commit at least two predicate acts to accomplish those goals. Lachmund, 191 F.3d at 784. 54 Slaney's complaint did not allege a violation of the RICO conspiracy statute. Nonetheless, the district court was correct to address whether there had been a violation of that section of RICO. The fact that a complaint does not reference 1962(d) is no obstacle to our consideration of whether Slaney's complaint states a claim under sec. 1962(d) because under the notice pleading regime of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, plaintiffs are not required to plead legal theories. See Goren, 156 F.3d at 730 n.8. Instead of asking whether the complaint points to the appropriate statute, a court should ask whether relief is possible under any set of facts that could be established consistent with the allegations. Bartholet v. Reishauser A.G. (Zurich), 953 F.2d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992). 55 Slaney's complaint is wanting for any allegation that the USOC agreed to violate RICO. As the district court noted, the closest the complaint comes to alleging any sort of agreement is in the statement that the USOC ordered the UCLA laboratory not to hand over to Slaney any information regarding the laboratory's analysis of her specimen. Yet, as the court noted, there is not even a hint that this command by the USOC was given with any motivation to participate in the fraudulent affairs of the Olympic Movement or an agreement to commit two predicate acts. Thus, Slaney results to bolstering her 1962(d) claim by introducing new evidence and drawing inferences from those materials that the USOC is engaging in a conspiracy to violate RICO. We have consistently frowned upon such essays to cure pleading deficiencies by means of introducing new factual support in appellate briefs. Put simply, the pleading itself must state the essential elements of the RICO action or it is worthy of dismissal. Richmond v. Nationwide Cassel L.P., 52 F.3d 640, 646 (1995). As a result, we find that Slaney has failed to sufficiently allege a RICO conspiracy.