Opinion ID: 2599941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Identification of defendant in photographic lineup

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly admitted hearsay testimony that the victim Flores picked defendant's picture out of a photographic lineup. [17] After a pretrial hearing on the issue, the trial court ruled that evidence of the identification was relevant for a nonhearsay purposeto establish that defendant's motive for killing Flores was to eliminate him as a witness. The identification that was made provided evidence of a motive, regardless of whether it was accurate. The trial court also concluded that the probative value of the evidence was not outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The court instructed the jury that this evidence was offered to show a motive for the murder and was not to be considered for its truth, that is, to prove that defendant committed the robbery. It was alleged as a special circumstance that the victim was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony in any criminal proceeding. (Former § 190.2, subd. (c)(2).) It is the accused's subjective intent that is crucial to establish the witness-killing special circumstance. ( People v. Weidert (1985) 39 Cal.3d 836, 854, 218 Cal.Rptr. 57, 705 P.2d 380.) In People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 171, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629, we held that evidence establishing that the deceased victim had identified the defendant as the person who had raped her was admissible to prove a witness-killing special circumstance. In Heishman, the defendant actually had been charged with the rape at the time of the capital crime. Although the defendant's knowledge of the pending charges provided some evidence that he killed the victim to prevent her from testifying, we concluded that evidence demonstrating that she actually had identified him nevertheless was relevant to prove the special circumstance allegation. The defendant would not likely believe it was necessary to kill his accuser unless he knew or believed she had identified him to the police and was prepared to identify him at trial. ( Id. at p. 172, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) [18] Defendant contends that the victim Flores's identification of defendant's photograph nevertheless should have been excluded as more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352 because of the risk that the jury would use it for an improper purpose, that is, to prove the charge that defendant robbed Flores. Defendant also contends the probative value of the actual identification was minimal, because there was other evidence from which the jury could conclude that defendant believed he had been identified namely, that the police had told Jesse Perez that a witness had identified defendant, and Jona Cardona testified that defendant knew he had been identified. We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's decision that the evidence was admissible under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 134, 14 Cal.Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164.) Other witnesses testified that defendant's motive in killing the victim was that he had identified defendant, but that did not render proof of the actual identification superfluous as to motive. Jona Cardona testified that, before the killing, defendant told her he had committed a robbery at a gas station and wanted to obtain revenge on the victim because he had picked out defendant from a photograph and had his motorcycle license number. Shirley Chavez testified that defendant admitted he killed the victim because he had identified him. Evidence of the identification tended to corroborate the testimony of these other witnesseswitnesses whose credibility the defense vigorously challenged at trial. Furthermore, the risk that the jury would rely on the identification as proof of defendant's guilt of the robbery was low, because several other witnesses testified that defendant had admitted committing the robbery. The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Defendant also contends the actual photo display from which the victim Flores made the identification was irrelevant and should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. Defendant argues the photo display was prejudicial because the jury could have interpreted defendant's photograph as a mug shot and could have concluded he had been previously arrested and had a criminal history. The trial court rejected that argument, ruling there was nothing about the photograph that would identify it as a mug shot. Having reviewed the photograph at issue, we agree.