Opinion ID: 218016
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive Due Process Challenge

Text: We review acts of Congress with considerable deference. Lawrence, 951 F.2d at 754. The penalty scheme at issue does not encroach on a fundamental right, see Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 464-65, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 114 L.Ed.2d 524 (1991), and therefore we apply a rational basis standard of review, Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 467 (7th Cir. 2003). The pertinent inquiry is whether the crack-powder disparity bears a reasonable relation to any proper legislative purpose. As the Supreme Court explained in Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 95, 128 S.Ct. 558, 169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), Congress adopted the 100-to-1 ratio based on its belief that crack was significantly more dangerous than powder cocaine. That belief was based on evidence indicating that (1) crack was highly addictive; (2) crack users and dealers were more likely to be violent than users and dealers of other drugs; (3) crack was more harmful to users than powder, particularly for children who had been exposed by their mothers' drug use during pregnancy; (4) crack use was especially prevalent among teenagers; and (5) crack's potency and low cost were making it increasingly popular. Id. at 95-96, 128 S.Ct. 558. This Court, and others, similarly relied on that evidence in upholding the sentencing scheme, reasoning that punishing crack offenses more severely than powder cocaine offenses is rationally related to the government's legitimate interest in protecting the public from the dangers of crack cocaine. See Lawrence, 951 F.2d at 755 (based on the risks associated with crack, including its highly addictive nature. . ., its growing availability, and [its] relatively low cost, concluding that the 100-to-1 ratio was rationally related to Congress's purpose of combating the drug's effects); United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 97 (2d Cir.1994) (the greater accessibility and addictiveness of crack provides a rational basis for the crack-powder disparity); United States v. Bynum, 3 F.3d 769, 774 (4th Cir.1993) (the 100-to-1 ratio . . . is rationally related to a legitimate government end, because crack is a greater threat to society than is powder cocaine); United States v. Pickett, 941 F.2d 411, 418 (6th Cir.1991) (concluding that the problems caused by the special qualities of crack provided a rational basis for the disproportionate sentencing scheme); United States v. Buckner, 894 F.2d 975, 978-80 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that the crack-powder disparity is rationally related to Congress's objective of protecting the public welfare, in light of Congress's belief that crack is more dangerous to society than cocaine); United States v. Catchings, 922 F.2d 777, 780 n. 3 (11th Cir.1991) (per curiam) ([T]he difference in penalties between crack and other forms of cocaine demonstrated that Congress considered crack to be a more powerful and dangerous drug.). Moore contends that data amassed by the Sentencing Commission and others over the past twenty years demonstrates that Congress relied on flawed evidence in concluding that crack is more dangerous than powder cocaine, and in arriving at the 100-to-1 differential. It is true that where a statute [is] predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts (as the instant statute is based on the belief that crack is more dangerous than powder cocaine), its constitutionality may be challenged by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). However, such a challenge will fail where it is even debatable that the classification is rational, because, where that is the case, the decision is one for Congress. Id. at 154, 58 S.Ct. 778. To succeed, therefore, Moore must demonstrate that Congress has no reasonable basis for believing that crack is more dangerous than powder cocaine. Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979). Moore fails to make that formidable showing. He relies on a series Sentencing Commission reports advocating the abandonment of the 100-to-1 ratio. As the Kimbrough Court noted, for the past decade and a half, the Commission has consistently recommended that Congress alter the ratio, calling for a 1-to-1 ratio in 1995, a 5-to-1 ratio in 1997, and lowering the ratio at least to 20-to-1 in 2002. 552 U.S. at 99, 128 S.Ct. 558. The Commission also has reported that some of the specific evidence of crack's dangerousness on which Congress relied was incorrect. For example, in 2002, the Commission reported that, contrary to the 1986 Congress's understanding, prenatal exposure to crack cocaine produces identical effects as prenatal exposure to powder cocaine and is far less devastating than previously reported. The Commission further reported that crack is associated with significantly less trafficking-related violence . . . than previously assumed, and that the epidemic of crack cocaine use by youth never materialized to the extent feared. Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 98, 128 S.Ct. 558 (citations omitted). There can be no dispute that this evidence undermines some of the assumptions on which the 100-to-1 ratio originally was based. However, the Sentencing Commission reports also contain findings indicating that crack is at least somewhat more dangerous than powder cocaine. For example, in 2002, the Sentencing Commission reported that crack is more addictive than powder, crack offenses are more likely to involve weapons or bodily injury, and crack distribution is associated with higher levels of crime. Id. Similarly, the Commission's 2007 report states that while weapon involvement . . . is present in only a minority of both powder cocaine and crack cocaine offenses[,] . . . crack cocaine offenses continue to involve this conduct more often than powder cocaine offenses. The 2007 report further notes that violence is more prevalent in crack cocaine cases than in powder cocaine cases, and that the risk of addiction and personal deterioration may be greater for crack cocaine than for powder cocaine because of their different methods of usual administration (typically crack cocaine is smoked whereas powder cocaine typically is snorted). Thus, the Sentencing Commission reports on which Moore relies demonstrate a rational basis for punishing crack offenses more harshly than powder cocaine offenses. Moore's primary position is that the 100-to-1 ratio is too high. But that argument relates to the wisdom of the approach Congress selected to address the problems associated with crack cocaine, something we have no authority to second-guess. FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993). As such, whether we believe another approach to the issuesuch as a lower crack-to-powder ratiowould be preferable is irrelevant to our analysis. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993). Because Moore has not demonstrated that the crack-powder disparity rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of [Congress's] objective, it survives rational-basis review. Id. at 324, 113 S.Ct. 2637 (internal quotation omitted).