Opinion ID: 2639471
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Debbie

Text: Joanna testified on direct examination that several days before Debbie's disappearance, Darlene and Debbie had an argument about defendant and defendant said to Debbie, I'm going to get you. Joanna also testified that in the month after Denise died, Debbie appeared to be afraid of defendant. Defendant did not object to this testimony. Shawn Philpott testified regarding three instances in which Debbie hid from defendant. In the defense case, however, testimony was elicited that Joanna and Larry Wright told Sergeant Scholtz that Debbie would get into a car with a stranger. Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error to admit Philpott's testimony that Debbie hid from defendant because the evidence was not material to any disputed issue in the case and was thus irrelevant. The prosecutor's theory of admissibility was that, because Debbie's fear of defendant would prevent her from voluntarily getting into his car, it was a permissible inference that he used a weapon, such as a gun, to get Debbie into his car. The evidence was properly admitted. Circumstantial evidence showing that the victim feared the defendant may be admissible if the acts or conduct of the victim prior to the crime are at issue. ( People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 779, 69 Cal.Rptr. 102, 441 P.2d 942; People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 586, 209 Cal.Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243 [evidence that the victim feared the defendant is admissible when the victim's conduct in conformity with that fear is in dispute]; cf. People v. Ruiz (1988) 44 Cal.3d 589, 608, 244 Cal.Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854 [victims' expressions of fear of the defendant were inadmissible where neither the states of mind of these victims prior to their deaths ... nor their acts or conduct ... were an issue in the case which might have been resolved or assisted by the challenged evidence].) In the present case, the prosecutor's theory was that defendant drove Debbie to the murder scene in his vehicle. The circumstances surrounding Debbie's entry into defendant's carwhether she would enter the car voluntarily or whether defendant may have overcome any resistance by forcewere at issue. In People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 628-629, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152, we stated that evidence that the murder victim feared the defendant was admissible to show that she would not have voluntarily given him any of her personal property and thus it could be inferred the property was obtained by force. Here, evidence that Debbie had acted as though she feared defendant was admissible to show that she would not have voluntarily entered defendant's car and thus he may have forced her into his vehicle the night she disappeared. Even assuming Philpott's testimony was admitted in error, such error would be harmless. Joanna had previously testified, without objection, that Debbie was afraid of defendant. As we stated in Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at page 27, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, where evidence of fear is admitted in error but is cumulative of other properly admitted evidence to the same effect, such error is not prejudicial. It is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have occurred in the absence of Philpott's testimony. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.)