Opinion ID: 1039746
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Intimidation Claim

Text: Finally, Holmes challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment on her claim under the North Dakota intimidation statute.2 North Dakota courts have not acknowledged whether a private cause of action exists under this statute. Accordingly, we must determine what the state's highest court would hold if it were called on to decide the issue. Dahl v. ConAgra, Inc., 998 F.2d 619, 621 (8th Cir. 1993). When determining whether a private cause of action exists, North Dakota court's consider three factors: 2 North Dakota Century Code section 34-01-04 reads: Every person who, by any use of force, threats, or intimidation, prevents any person employed by another from continuing or performing the person's work or from accepting any new work or employment, and every person who uses any force, threats, or intimidation to induce such hired person to relinquish the person's work or employment or to return any work the person has in hand before it is finished, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. -9- (1) whether the plaintiff is one of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2) whether there is an indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such remedy or to deny one; and (3) whether it is consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff. Ernst v. Burdick, 687 N.W.2d 473, 477 (N.D. 2004). Assuming that Holmes was a member of the class that the statute was enacted to benefit (i.e., she was an employee), we turn to the second factor. Holmes asserts that, with regard to the second factor, because the language of the statute enumerate[d] a criminal penalty, but does not provide language exclusive to a criminal penalty, the court should imply that a civil remedy may be applied. This reasoning does not persuade us, and as the North Dakota Supreme Court recognized, [t]he legislature's silence in failing to expressly provide a private right of action is a strong indication it did not intend such a remedy. Id. at 478. Because Holmes's argument fails on the second factor, we need not address the third. Accordingly, we conclude the district court correctly granted summary judgment on this claim because there is no private right of action under the intimidation statute. See Humann v. KEM Elec. Coop., Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1015 (D.N.D. 2006) (concluding there is no private cause of action in the intimidation statute).