Opinion ID: 612189
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral Attack on Prior Convictions at Sentencing

Text: 17 Prior to sentencing, Vea-Gonzales moved for a hearing to collaterally attack his 1985 facilitation conviction on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel, based upon an alleged conflict of interest. 4 The district court denied the motion on the basis of its opinion in United States v. Avery, 773 F.Supp. 1400, 1408 (D.Or.1991), in which it had held that the Sentencing Guidelines' definition of prior sentence allowed the court to rely on facially valid prior judgments for career offender purposes. It had also indicated that it must not consider a judgment which is invalid on its face or which had been invalidated on direct appeal or by a habeas petition. Id. Beyond that, it had decided that a defendant may not attack prior convictions, although it proceeded to consider the defendant's claims. In the case at hand, however, the district court indicated that it has discretion in the matter. Vea-Gonzales argues that he was entitled to attempt to show that his prior conviction was unconstitutional before the court used it to classify him as a career offender. We agree. 5 18 No doubt, the district court must apply the provisions of section 4A1.2 in determining whether a defendant's prior conviction counts towards career offender status. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2, comment. (n. 4) (definitions and instructions for computing criminal history). Section 4A1.2(a)(1) defines a prior sentence generally as any sentence previously imposed upon adjudication of guilt, whether by guilty plea, trial, or plea of nolo contendere, for conduct not part of the instant offense. The definition is limited by Application Note 6, which states in part: [S]entences resulting from convictions that a defendant shows to have been previously ruled constitutionally invalid are not to be counted. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (n. 6) (emphasis added). This version of Note 6 was adopted, effective November 1, 1990, and hence, is applicable to Vea-Gonzales. The earlier, 1987, version stated: Convictions which the defendant shows to have been constitutionally invalid may not be counted in the criminal history score. 6 19 We have interpreted the 1987 version to entitle a defendant to challenge the constitutional validity of a prior conviction at the time of sentencing, if the district court proposed to use the prior conviction to increase defendant's criminal history score. United States v. Guthrie, 931 F.2d 564, 571 (9th Cir.1991). 7 In Guthrie, as here, the collateral attack was based on an alleged conflict of interest that assertedly rendered counsel's representation ineffective under the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 570. 20 Although the defendant in Guthrie was sentenced under the 1987 version, we did note that the 1990 amendment might require a different result. We said that [t]he 'previously ruled' language implies that defendants no longer may challenge prior convictions at the sentencing stage. Id. at 570 n. 4; see also United States v. Carroll, 932 F.2d 823, 825 n. 1 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 312 n. 1 (9th Cir.1991). At the same time, however, we recognized in Guthrie, 931 F.2d at 570 n. 4, that the 1990 Guidelines Background Note, which follows the commentary to section 4A1.2, contains the following statement: The Commission leaves for court determination the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally attack at sentencing a prior conviction. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, comment. (backg'd.) (Nov.1990). We declined to reconcile that background note with the application note. Nevertheless, we did caution that even if the 1990 Note 6 proscribed collateral attacks at sentencing, [t]he Constitution may afford such a right.... Guthrie, 931 F.2d at 571 n. 6. The 1990 provisions on which Guthrie remarked remained intact under the 1991 Guidelines applicable at Vea-Gonzales's sentencing. 21 The Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits 8 have addressed the meaning of the current Note 6 and the Background Note, and have held that those notes combine to give district courts discretion over whether to permit a collateral attack on constitutional grounds. In United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 805 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992), the court explained: 22 while defendants may always present the sentencing court with evidence that another court has ruled their prior convictions invalid and hence unsuitable for consideration as part of the criminal history score at sentencing, the court also retains discretion to determine whether a defendant may mount an initial challenge to the validity of such convictions. 23 See also United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 701 (6th Cir.1992); United States v. Canales, 960 F.2d 1311, 1315 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Cornog, 945 F.2d 1504, 1511 (11th Cir.1991). 24 In general, these courts have not set forth the contours of the discretion thus conferred upon the district courts. The Second Circuit and the Sixth Circuit have simply declared that the sentencing court has discretion. French, 974 F.2d at 701; Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 805. The Eleventh Circuit has opined that the district court should consider the scope of the inquiry, whether the issue is contested, and whether the conviction is invalid on its face. Cornog, 945 F.2d at 1511 n. 16. The Fifth Circuit has come the closest to setting quantifiable standards. It has directed district courts to consider the items mentioned by the Eleventh Circuit, plus comity and whether some other remedy is available. Canales, 960 F.2d at 1316. In short, these courts have treated the issue as one of procedural expediency, as did the district court in Avery, 773 F.Supp. at 1407. 25 On the other hand, in United States v. Hewitt, 942 F.2d 1270, 1276 (8th Cir.1991), the Eighth Circuit held that the 1990 version of Note 6 required the district court to count a prior conviction, unless the defendant could present evidence that the conviction had previously been ruled invalid. Hewitt asserted that the prior conviction was unconstitutional under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), which requires the record to show that a defendant pled guilty knowingly and voluntarily. However, Hewitt did not introduce the record, but only the docket sheet, which merely noted his plea. As the prior conviction was facially valid, the Eighth Circuit ruled that the district court properly counted the prior conviction in Hewitt's criminal history score. 26 We must respectfully disagree with each of these decisions. The Guidelines do not compel, or even particularly suggest, the results reached in those cases. More importantly those decisions do not comport with the long-standing law of this circuit. 27 Nothing in the Guidelines indicates that a constitutional attack may never take place at sentencing. On the contrary, that very issue is left to the courts. Thus, we do not agree with the Eighth Circuit's seemingly absolute prohibition. 28 Furthermore, the cases which have decided that the district court has discretion to hear challenges if it wishes to do so have relied upon the Background Note's statement that the issue of whether a defendant may collaterally attack a prior conviction at sentencing is left to court determination and the Note 6 statement that convictions previously ruled unconstitutional cannot be used. Those courts seem to have overlooked the fact that the Background Note's meaning is ambiguous at best. Equally, if not more, likely the Commission intended to leave to the judiciary the entire issue of determining the kinds of collateral attacks (if any) which would be permissible at sentencing, rather than leaving that decision to each district court on a case by case basis. The approach endorsed by the Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits may well promote disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants, a result at odds with the Guidelines' central mission. As this case underscores, a defendant's criminal history score can greatly affect his sentence. The authority given to the sentencing court by a discretionary approach is nearly unlimited. While one sentencing court might find procedural expediency argues against consideration of a collateral attack, another might well find a similar situation sufficiently compelling to require a hearing. That cannot further the goal of uniform and predictable sentences. Thus, we cannot accept that approach. Certainly, the Guidelines do not compel it. 29 Rather, we now answer the question we reserved in Guthrie and hold that the Constitution requires that defendants be given the opportunity to collaterally attack prior convictions which will be used against them at sentencing. 30 In Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), where lack of legal counsel was asserted, the Supreme Court held that a conviction not previously invalidated yet invalid on its face under Gideon v. Wainwright 9 could not be used for penalty enhancement under a state's recidivist statute. In United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449, 92 S.Ct. 589, 593, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972), the Court held that a conviction invalidated under Gideon could not be considered in sentencing a defendant after a subsequent conviction. 10 Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution proscribes the use of prior convictions for sentence enhancement where the defendant was denied counsel under Gideon. See United States v. Custis, 786 F.Supp. 533, 536 (D.Md.1992). 31 In Farrow v. United States, 580 F.2d 1339 (9th Cir.1978) (en banc), our seminal pre-Guidelines case, we held that Tucker requires the district court to undertake a hearing to determine the validity of the challenged prior convictions if the conviction will be used to enhance the defendant's sentence. Id. at 1354. Of course, in Guidelines cases prior sentences are generally so used. 32 Farrow involved a Gideon violation, but we have not limited the availability of collateral attacks to Gideon violations. In Brown v. United States, 610 F.2d 672, 674-75 (9th Cir.1980), Farrow was extended to require a hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Noting that Tucker's scope is uncertain, we stated: it is clear that the right to the assistance of counsel and the right to effective assistance of counsel are constitutional equivalents. Id. at 675. Accordingly, Brown's allegations regarding the adequacy of Iowa counsel could present questions which would require a hearing. Id. 33 Indeed, in other pre-Guidelines decisions we indicated that we would permit collateral attacks premised on any constitutional infirmity. In United States v. Williams, 782 F.2d 1462 (9th Cir.1985), a direct sentencing appeal, we stated that a sentence is subject to review if it has been enhanced in reliance on an unconstitutional conviction, and it must be set aside if the court relied at least in part on misinformation of constitutional magnitude. Id. at 1466 (citation omitted). See also Feldman v. Perrill, where we allowed a federal prisoner to attack his sentence on grounds that an enhancing prior state conviction was unconstitutional because he was incompetent to enter a plea in the state proceeding. 902 F.2d 1445, 1447-49 (9th Cir.1990). 34 Whatever the effects of the 1990 Guidelines amendments might have been, they cannot have limited a defendant's constitutional rights. 11 Even before the Guidelines were enacted, the federal courts had attempted to delineate the bounds of permissible collateral attacks, but the issue remained unresolved. It is to this problem that the Background Note most likely refers. Nevertheless, this circuit had spoken. Therefore, the district court erred by denying Vea-Gonzales an opportunity to challenge the validity of his 1985 and 1989 convictions. 35 We do not ignore, nor are we insensitive to, the potential difficulties this reading may cause. As the district court cogently explained, allowing collateral attacks at sentencing could open up thorny procedural difficulties. Moreover, there is a possibility that sentencing proceedings will sometimes seem like pro tanto equivalents of section 2255 proceedings. First, as the motto of an ancient English house reads, No thorns, no roses. If enforcement of constitutional rights sometimes undermines efficiency, it is the price we all pay for having a constitution. Second, we do not hold that the procedures must or should be different from those used in determining other disputes under the Guidelines. See U.S.S.G. §§ 6A1.1-6A1.3. Finally, we have previously held that a defendant is constitutionally entitled to collaterally attack allegedly unconstitutional prior convictions. The Guidelines cannot have changed that. To reach a different result in this case would require us to ignore our precedent. 12