Opinion ID: 885762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: hours

Text: ¶13 The District Court found that 151.05 attorney hours expended by Dale L. McGarvey, 3.25 attorney hours expended by John L. Heberling, and 204 paralegal hours expended by Mary K. Johnson were reasonable and necessary. DOT argues that the District Court awarded an excessive number of hours given the fact that the case was settled quickly. DOT observes that the case was settled within nine months of the filing of the complaint and before the exchange of appraisals or the holding of a condemnation commission file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm (4 of 18)1/18/2007 10:05:50 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm hearing. DOT contends that the parties merely exchanged a small number of stock discovery requests and that there were no court hearings. DOT also maintains that the Slacks' claim included attorney and paralegal hours which were duplicative of tasks performed by expert witnesses and also included paralegal time that duplicated attorney tasks. DOT refers us to the testimony of its two expert witnesses, attorneys Dan Sullivan and Gary Christiansen, to demonstrate that McGarvey's fee claim was excessive. ¶14 Mr. Sullivan worked as a lawyer for the Montana Highway Department from 1960 to 1982 and worked in private practice thereafter. Mr. Sullivan testified that he tried 120 condemnation cases to jury. In seven of those cases he represented private landowners. He represented two private landowners against DOT. One of the two cases in which Mr. Sullivan represented a private client against a DOT condemnation action went to a condemnation commission hearing. He was under the impression that eighty attorney hours were billed in that case to the end of the condemnation commission hearing. The other case settled before a hearing. ¶15 While working for the Highway Department, Mr. Sullivan undertook a survey of six or seven lawyers whom he believed were competent, experienced, and had represented private landowners in condemnation actions. Mr. Sullivan testified that according to his survey, a competent practitioner should be able to complete a settlement prior to a condemnation commission hearing in about forty to fifty attorney hours. Based on his experience and the study he performed, Mr. Sullivan believed that a reasonable amount of attorney time in the Slack case would have been about 48 hours. ¶16 Mr. Sullivan's testimony is not sufficient to establish that the District Court's determination of reasonable and necessary attorney hours is clearly erroneous. Mr. Sullivan's conclusion that McGarvey's fee claim was excessive was based on his personal experience and an informal survey he conducted. With regard to his experience, Mr. Sullivan did not have a large amount of experience representing private landowners in condemnation cases against DOT. Rather, he acquired the vast majority of his condemnation experience as an attorney for the State. He had only represented two private landowners in condemnation actions against DOT. With regard to his study, Mr. Sullivan simply conducted an informal survey in the mid-1970's which consisted of calling some attorneys he knew and asking them for ballpark estimates of attorney hours. ¶17 DOT also directs our attention to the testimony of Gary Christiansen, an attorney who has practiced in the Kalispell area for over thirty years. Mr. Christiansen testified that he file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm (5 of 18)1/18/2007 10:05:50 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm had handled four condemnation cases during his practice. Mr. Christiansen reviewed McGarvey's Amended Memorandum of Litigation Expenses and some of the briefing in this case as well as memoranda of litigation expenses in a number of other condemnation cases handled by McGarvey. In Mr. Christiansen's opinion, McGarvey charged an excessive number of hours, charged some hours that were duplicative, and the format of McGarvey's memorandum made it difficult to review because the memorandum contained insufficient detail to allow a comparison of the time spent with the corresponding task accomplished. ¶18 In support of Mr. Christiansen's conclusions, DOT observes that Mr. Christiansen handled a condemnation case for another private property owner on the same highway project which lasted about the same length of time as the Slacks' case and involved some similar issues - referred to as the Jump case. In the Jump case, Mr. Christiansen charged approximately $2,800 in attorney fees. DOT appears to be implying that the Jump case is somehow analogous to the instant case and therefore is evidence that McGarvey's fee claim was excessive. However, we note that Mr. Christiansen also testified that the Jump case was handled through a stipulated appraiser approach in which he and the State agreed on an appraiser and agreed that the condemnation award would be set by the appraisal. Undoubtedly, the stipulated appraiser approach is a simple way to quickly dispose of a condemnation controversy and thus requires less attorney time. The instant case is not analogous; it was not settled through the stipulated appraiser approach. ¶19 DOT notes that Mr. Christiansen testified that there were inconsistencies between the times claimed by McGarvey and his paralegal and the time claimed by expert participants to the same meetings. For instance, DOT observes that McGarvey and his paralegal both charged 6.3 hours for a helicopter flight when the helicopter bill was for 1.1 hours. However, the court's determination that these hours were reasonable and necessary is not clearly erroneous. McGarvey testified that the helicopter flight was necessary to create a video for trial which showed that the Slacks had access to a shop building prior to the highway construction project and would not have access after the project. McGarvey contended that he and his paralegal spent more time than the helicopter service because they had to mark the Slacks' property and access lines before and after DOT's condemnation for purposes of the video. ¶20 DOT notes that Mr. Christiansen testified that McGarvey and his paralegal doublebilled when the paralegal accompanied McGarvey to meetings or when both charged for the same task. Once again, we do not believe that the District Court's determination that file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm (6 of 18)1/18/2007 10:05:50 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm these hours were reasonable and necessary is clearly erroneous. McGarvey testified that it was imperative to resolve this case before the highway construction season started in order for the Slacks to be able to continue operating their logging and trucking business out of their shop building. McGarvey testified that in order to resolve this case quickly, he needed to have a series of joint meetings with various combinations of experts to show that the Slacks could lawfully access their shop before the condemnation and to establish how they would gain access to their shop after the condemnation. McGarvey testified that his paralegal attended these meetings in order to coordinate the experts' activities by establishing task lists and time lines. ¶21 We have previously stated: In the final analysis, the duty of fixing attorney fees in condemnation cases for the prevailing party falls upon the District Court. The purpose of the evidentiary hearing on attorney fees, required since Crncevich v. Georgetown Recreation Corporation (1975), 168 Mont. 113, [120], 541 P.2d 56, 59, is to aid the court in its determination in exercising its discretion to fix reasonable attorney fees. The court, as a jury, is not bound absolutely to the testimony of expert witnesses. It can reduce or increase the figures submitted to it by experts as reasonable attorney fees and as long as its findings are not clearly erroneous, the determination made in its discretion will not be disturbed. State v. Helehan (1980), 189 Mont. 339, 346-47, 615 P.2d 925, 930. We conclude that the District Court's finding that the number of attorney and paralegal hours claimed by the Slacks were reasonable and necessary is not clearly erroneous.