Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Calculation of Mr. Tavares’s Guidelines

Text: Sentencing Range Mr. Tavares correctly points out that the district court never conclusively determined his guidelines sentencing range. It considered both the Government’s calculation and Mr. Tavares’s, but never determined which was correct or stated upon which it relied. This lapse is clearly a significant procedural error. The district court is required to calculate the defendant’s guidelines 27 Id. at 47. -35- sentencing range before exercising its discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (stating that “a district court should begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range”) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-48 (2007)). “[F]ailing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range” is a “significant procedural error.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]he Guidelines provide a framework or starting point . . . for the judge’s exercise of discretion.” Freeman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2685, 2692 (2011). Under the particular circumstances of this case, however, we are convinced that the district court’s failure to calculate definitively the operative guidelines sentencing range was harmless. The record disclosed that the district court understood the position of the parties on the applicable guidelines range. It is also apparent that the court understood that the only point of disagreement between the parties was the applicable criminal history category. There is, moreover, no basis to conclude, and neither party suggests, that the proper guidelines sentencing range was other than one of those suggested and discussed at the sentencing hearing. The court imposed sentencing enhancements, the sole purpose of which is to alter a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range, and considered both resulting guidelines -36- sentencing ranges.28 The record makes equally clear, however, that, having been apprised of these considerations, the district court determined that a sentence within the guidelines range as calculated by either party was not an appropriate sentence. The court stated: “[E]ssentially I will sentence in a way that it will make [the guideline sentencing range calculation] not matter.”29 Therefore, regardless of whether Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range was that calculated by the Government or by Mr. Tavares, the district court was of the view that a sentence of 300 months was warranted. Although the district court’s failure to calculate conclusively Mr. Tavares’s guideline sentencing range is a serious procedural error, such an error does not necessarily require remand for re-sentencing. The Supreme Court held in Williams v. United States that “remand is required only if the sentence was imposed as a result of” the error.30 503 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). If “the district court would have imposed the same sentence” even without the error, it was harmless. 28 R.308 at 5-25. 29 Id. at 17. 30 In United States v. Williams, 503 U.S. 193 (1992), the Court was interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1), which provides, in relevant part, “[i]f the court of appeals determines that the sentence was . . . imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines, the court shall remand the case for further sentencing proceedings.” Section 3742(f)(1) was not changed by United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). -37- Id. We routinely apply Williams’s harmless-error analysis to procedural errors at sentencing.31 Whether the district court’s commission of a significant procedural error, here its failure to calculate Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range, is subject to harmless-error analysis under Williams is a question of first impression in this circuit. Our colleagues in the Sixth Circuit have confronted squarely the issue of whether Williams applies to a failure to calculate definitively the guidelines sentencing range and have held that it does. See, e.g., United States v. Lanesky, 494 F.3d 558, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2007) (performing harmless-error analysis where “the sentencing court did not calculate an applicable guideline range at all”).32 Other circuits, while not confronting precisely this issue, have held that other serious procedural sentencing lapses are subject to Williams and to 31 See, e.g., United States v. McGhee, 651 F.3d 153, 158 (1st Cir. 2011) (performing harmless-error analysis on the district court’s erroneous application of a career offender designation); United States v. Marsh, 561 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2009) (applying harmless-error analysis to the district court’s application of an upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0). 32 The Third and Ninth Circuits also have addressed this issue in unpublished opinions and reached the same conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Swanson, 455 F.App’x 246, 249 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that “the District Court’s failure to calculate explicitly the Guidelines range . . . was harmless error”); United States v. Olibas-Valenzuela, 404 F.App’x 213, 214 (9th Cir. 2010) (applying harmless-error analysis where the district court “did not calculate the advisory Guidelines range[] and neither the parties nor the probation office identified the applicable range”). -38- harmless-error analysis.33 The reasoning of our sister circuits is persuasive. The fact that Gall designated failure to calculate the guidelines sentencing range as serious procedural error does not preclude application of Williams’s harmless-error analysis. As our colleagues on the Eighth Circuit have concluded, “[w]e see nothing in Gall that undermines Williams or makes harmless-error analysis inapplicable to procedural sentencing errors.” United States v. Henson, 550 F.3d 739, 741 (8th Cir. 2008). We note, furthermore, that the Supreme Court in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), noted the continued validity of harmless-error analysis in 33 See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 670 F.3d 883, 886 (8th Cir. 2012) (“A failure to properly calculate the advisory Guidelines range is a significant procedural error, and a non-harmless error in calculating the guidelines range requires a remand for resentencing.” (quoting United States v. Spikes, 543 F.3d 1021, 1023 (8th Cir. 2008))); United States v. Bacon, 617 F.3d 452, 456-57 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying harmless-error analysis where “the district court . . . committed a significant procedural error”); United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Delgado-Martinez, 564 F.3d 750, 752-53 (5th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 666 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying Williams’s harmless-error analysis to “a mistake that is specifically listed as a significant procedural error in Gall [v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007)]”); United States v. Livesay, 525 F.3d 1081, 1092 (11th Cir. 2008) (applying harmless-error analysis where “the district court committed prong one or ‘procedural’ Gall error when it departed 18 levels under § 5K1.1”); United States v. Grissom, 525 F.3d 691, 696 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that remand is necessary only “if the sentence imposed resulted from an incorrect application of the Sentencing Guidelines, and the error was not harmless” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054-55 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that the court “must remand--without reaching the question of reasonableness--unless the error is harmless”). -39- procedural error cases. The Court stated that “in cases not involving a [constitutional] violation, whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be sufficient to review a sentence for reasonableness may depend upon application of the harmless-error doctrine.” Id. at 268. An error is harmless if it “did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed.” Williams, 503 U.S. at 203. However, even if we are satisfied that an error did not affect the district court’s determination of the sentence, we still must review the sentence for substantive reasonableness. See id. (“If the party defending the sentence persuades the court of appeals that the district court would have imposed the same sentence absent the erroneous factor, then a remand is not required . . . and the court of appeals may affirm the sentence as long as it is also satisfied that the departure is reasonable.”); United States v. Marsh, 561 F.3d 81, 86 (1st Cir. 2009) (reviewing the district court’s discussion of § 3553(a) factors after determining that any error in the district court’s sentencing was harmless). With these principles in mind, we first consider whether the district court’s error was harmless. As we noted earlier, the district court clearly stated that it would sentence Mr. Tavares in such a manner as to render the guidelines sentencing range irrelevant. It also engaged in a lengthy colloquy with the parties concerning various enhancements to Mr. Tavares’s sentence. -40- Ultimately, the district court calculated Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range assuming a criminal history category of V and then assuming a criminal history category of VI. Immediately before sentencing Mr. Tavares, the court stated, “I just want to identify again the Sentencing Guideline range which was[,] even accepting the defense’s calculations, the guideline range is 210 to 262 months. I’ve described why, taking the government’s calculations . . . it’s still 235 to 293 at a category 6.”34 With both of these potential guidelines sentencing ranges in mind, the court then stated, “I am going to accept the government’s recommendation here, and here’s why: This is a crime of intentionality. This is a lifestyle crime. This is a choice . . . Mr. Tavares made.”35 This is just the type of harmless error in sentencing envisioned in United States v. Rodriguez, 630 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010). In Rodriguez, we stated: Certainly there are situations in which a judge might make clear that a dispute about a Guidelines calculation did not matter to the sentence. This might be a different case if, for example, the district judge had been faced with an explicit choice between the two sets of Guidelines, and thus understood the magnitude of the difference between them, when he said the choice did not affect 34 R.308 at 42. 35 Id. at 43. -41- the sentence. Id. at 43. Disagreement over Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category separates Mr. Tavares’s calculation from the Government’s. The district court understood this disagreement and chose not to decide between the two proposed guidelines sentencing ranges because the severity and nature of Mr. Tavares’s crimes of conviction made doing so unnecessary. Indeed, in its statement of reasons, the district court wrote that “Criminal History Category is V or VI.”36 The district court therefore did not fail completely to calculate Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range or impose his sentence without any consideration of the Guidelines. Rather, it determined that whether Mr. Tavares’s criminal history category was V or VI did not impact its sentencing decision. The district court clearly understood the options within the possible guidelines calculations and clearly rejected all of them as yielding too lenient a sentence. The district court’s evident intent to sentence Mr. Tavares to 300 months’ imprisonment regardless of whether his criminal history category was V or VI is sufficient to demonstrate that the district court’s failure to determine Mr. Tavares’s guidelines sentencing range did not affect the sentence it imposed. This situation is not materially different from situations that we and our sister circuits have encountered with 36 R.283 at 7. -42- respect to other procedural errors. For example, in Marsh, the district court stated “that it would impose the same sentence as a non-guideline sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” 561 F.3d at 85. We held that the defendant’s claim of procedural error “is not one we need to resolve” because “the district court stated that it would have imposed the same sentence as a non-Guideline sentence.” Id. at 86. This statement was sufficient for us to conclude that “an alleged Guideline error would not have affected the district court’s sentence.” Id.; see also United States v. Ortiz, 636 F.3d 389, 395 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding that “[b]ecause the district court stated that ‘even in the absence of these departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, [the district court] would [have] impose[d] the same sentence,’ any procedural error was harmless as a matter of law” (alterations in original)); United States v. Teague, 469 F.3d 205, 209-10 (1st Cir. 2006) (holding that the district court’s erroneous determination that the defendant was a career offender under the Guidelines was harmless because the district court stated that it found the career offender enhancement “undue or excessive” and so did not rely on the enhancement in sentencing).37 37 This case stands in stark contrast to typical cases where a district court’s failure to calculate a defendant’s guidelines sentencing range has warranted a remand for resentencing. Cases in which reversible error has been found involve far less awareness of the applicable guidelines range than we find here. In United States v. Peebles, 624 F.3d 344, 347 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit remanded the case for resentencing because “the transcript -43- We therefore conclude that the district court’s failure to choose between the two proposed guidelines sentencing ranges and determine definitively which applied is harmless error. We must therefore review the substantive reasonableness of Mr. Tavares’s sentence. See infra II.B.1.f.