Opinion ID: 1665278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gulfport's Cross-Appeal

Text: ¶ 25. On cross-appeal, Gulfport complains that, since Miss.Code Ann. § 11-27-5 (Rev.2004) mandates that the petition for condemnation be filed in the jurisdiction where the subject property is situated, venue is jurisdictional, and it was error for the trial judge to grant Dedeaux's motion for change of venue. Gulfport raises this claim for the first time on appeal; therefore it is procedurally barred. Bennett v. Madakasira, 821 So.2d 794, 803 (Miss.2002).
¶ 26. The trial court ordered that Gulfport pay Dedeaux eight percent (8%) per annum compounded interest on the amount of the award from the date of filing of the complaint until the date of entry of the judgment along with simple interest of eight percent (8%) per annum after the entry of the judgment. This order was based upon an interpretation of Miss.Code Ann. §§ 75-17-1 & -7 (Rev. 2000) found in Stovall v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R.R., 722 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1984), a personal injury action. Section 75-17-1(1) states that [t]he legal rate of interest on all notes, accounts and contracts shall be. . . . Section 75-17-7 states [a]ll judgments or decrees founded on any sale or contract shall bear interest . . . The Fifth Circuit made a distinction between pre-judgment interest which it held should be compounded because the section states interest is to be calculated according to the actuarial method, § 75-17-1(1), and post-judgment interest which it held should not be compounded because the statute states interest should be awarded at the legal rate, § 75-17-7. ¶ 27. Eminent domain judgments are not based on notes, accounts, sales or contracts. Because the eminent domain statutory scheme has a specific provision for interest on eminent domain judgments, sections 75-17-1(1) and 75-17-7 do not apply to eminent domain judgments. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-27-19 (Rev.2004) provides as follows: Any judgment finally entered in payment for property to be taken shall provide legal interest on the award of the jury from the date of the filing of the complaint until payment is actually made. . . . Following the Fifth Circuit's interpretation of legal interest, as set out above, legal interest is not compounded, but is, rather, simple interest. Furthermore, there is no distinction between pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest. ¶ 28. Therefore, the trial court erred when it compounded the interest and when it made a distinction between pre-judgment interest and post-judgment interest.