Opinion ID: 2973585
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Missing Transcript

Text: First, Jackson claims that he was denied his due process right to a meaningful appeal because the trial court’s instructions to the jury were never transcribed. He claims prejudice as a result. While Jackson was preparing for his first appeal as of right to the Michigan Court of Appeals, he discovered that his jury instructions were not included in the trial transcript. The Michigan Court of Appeals held his appeal in abeyance and remanded. Upon concluding the transcript was unavailable, the court held an evidentiary hearing to settle the record. The trial court on remand (a different judge, Judge Timothy M. Kenny) found that the content of the jury 2 instructions given in Jackson’s case was identical to the instructions given in co-defendant Holston’s case. The trial court therefore ordered that the transcribed jury instructions for co-defendant Holston would serve as the settled record of jury instructions applicable to Jackson. The Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that this ruling was clearly erroneous “because the jury instructions could not have been identical” since the charges against both defendants were not identical, and, whereas Holston testified, Jackson did not. Jackson, 2001 WL 1134709, at . Further, upon review of the trial record and the record of the evidentiary hearing, the appeals court found that prior to closing arguments, the trial judge, Judge Kim Worthy, cited the instructions she intended to read in regard to each defendant. Id. at  (quoting trial judge’s recitation of instructions to be given). The appeals court further noted that the prosecutor who had been assigned to Judge Worthy’s courtroom for two years and was present during the instructions testified it was customary for Worthy to always give the instructions she cites on the record. Id. at . The Michigan Court of Appeals therefore held “as a matter of law that Judge Worthy charged the jury as she indicated she would in the trial record. No evidence contradicts or places doubt on this conclusion.” Id. As an initial matter we note that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ factual finding that Judge Worthy instructed the jury as she indicated she would is presumed correct pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). Jackson claims that without a transcript of the actual instructions he cannot raise meritorious issues regarding trial counsel’s possible failure to request a cautionary instruction involving Robinson’s hearsay testimony. As noted, prior to closing arguments, Judge Worthy stated the exact instructions she intended to read to the jury, and she did not include a cautionary instruction 3 regarding Robinson’s 804(b)(3) testimony. See Jackson, 2001 WL 1134709, at . Trial counsel could have objected then, but did not. Moreover, had counsel requested such an instruction, the request would not have been reflected in the jury instructions themselves but rather in the record during the discussion regarding instructions that took place before closing argument. Thus, Jackson did not need the actual transcript of the jury instructions to raise a claim of constitutional error. Jackson simply failed to present such a claim to the Michigan Court of Appeals despite the record’s clear indication that Judge Worthy did not give that instruction. Jackson therefore could have raised his ineffective assistance of counsel claim based upon the record as it existed, without the actual transcription of the instructions. Jackson also contends that he was prejudiced because he does not know the content of the trial court’s modified instruction regarding Jackson’s false exculpatory statement. That is, he claims that since he cannot determine whether the instruction was appropriate, he is entitled to a reversal. The Michigan Court of Appeals rejected this argument, noting that “defendant has not set forth any substantive argument in regard to this issue.” Jackson, 2001 WL 1134709, at  (citations omitted). The Michigan Court of Appeals ruling is not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Although the Supreme Court has held that the due process clause is violated if an indigent defendant is denied a transcript, Griffin v. Illinois, 351U.S. 12 (1956) (plurality opinion), that a state may not block an indigent petty offender’s access to an appeal afforded others, Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971), and that a new courtappointed attorney who represents an indigent attorney on appeal (but not at trial) is entitled to the entire trial transcript at public expense, Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, 279-80 (1964), it has 4 never held that the absence of a portion of a trial transcript automatically entitles the defendant to a retrial. In fact, in Mayer, the Supreme Court acknowledged that a “complete” record did not necessarily require a verbatim transcript, so long as the state found another means of providing an adequate record. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 194. In other words, “Mayer does not stand for the proposition, implicit in [Jackson’s] argument, that where a portion of a trial transcript is missing and unobtainable, and where a defendant makes a claim that could possibly implicate that portion of the transcript, a retrial is always necessary.” Scott v. Elo, 302 F.3d 598, 604 (6th Cir. 2002) (rejecting that the failure to transcribe a significant portion of the closing argument denied the petitioner due process). This Court has held that federal habeas relief based on a missing transcript will only be granted where the petitioner can show prejudice. Bransford v. Brown, 806 F.2d 83, 86 (6th Cir. 1986). In Bransford, as in this case, this Court considered whether the unavailability of transcripts of jury instructions was a per se violation of due process. The trial court in that case had determined that the transcript of the instructions was irretrievable. The petitioner made no specific allegation of error, however. This Court held that there was no per se violation of prejudice, and stated that a petitioner “must show prejudice resulting from the missing transcripts.” Id. at 86. The Court added that “[a]lthough this court recognizes the inherent difficulty in demonstrating prejudice where the transcripts are missing, petitioner must present something more than gross speculation that the transcripts were requisite to a fair appeal.” Id. In short, Jackson has not shown that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. Furthermore, Jackson’s claim would also fail under 5 the less deferential de novo standard of review articulated in Bransford because his claim is nothing more than gross speculation.