Opinion ID: 2273504
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Hearsay Exception for Statements Against Penal Interest

Text: The hearsay rule ... is premised on the theory that out-of-court statements are subject to particular hazards. The declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived the events [that] he relates; he might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or taken out of context by the listener. And the ways in which these dangers are minimized for in-court statements  the oath, the witness' awareness of the gravity of the proceedings, the jury's ability to observe the witness' demeanor, and, most importantly, the right of the opponent to cross-examine  are generally absent for things said out of court. Nonetheless, the ... [r]ules of [e]vidence also recognize that some kinds of out-of-court statements are less subject to these hearsay dangers, and therefore except them from the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible. One such category covers statements that are against the declarant's [penal] interest.... Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 598-99, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994). (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 146, 728 A.2d 466, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862, 120 S.Ct. 152, 145 L.Ed.2d 129 (1999). Our present rule allowing the admission of trustworthy third party statements against penal interest has its genesis in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); (internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Lopez, 239 Conn. 56, 71, 681 A.2d 950 (1996); which held that an accused's constitutional right to a fair trial prevented the exclusion of such statements. See Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, at 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Chambers, [f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.... In the exercise of this right, the accused, as is required of the [s]tate, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to [en]sure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Although perhaps no rule of evidence has been more respected or more frequently applied in jury trials than that applicable to the exclusion of hearsay, exceptions tailored to allow the introduction of evidence which in fact is likely to be trustworthy have long existed. (Citations omitted.) Id., at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Thus, when a statement against penal interest bears significant assurances of trustworthiness and is crucial to the defendant's theory of defense, the due process clause bars exclusion of the statement. See id., at 285, 302-303, 93 S.Ct. 1038. In other words, as the court in Chambers explained, [i]n [such] circumstances, [in which] constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Id., at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Before Chambers, however, in this state, such third party statements were per se inadmissible as hearsay.... In State v. DeFreitas, [179 Conn. 431, 449, 426 A.2d 799 (1980)], we interpreted Chambers as forbidding ... application of the hearsay rule to exclude all third party statements against penal interest exculpatory of an accused. We [nevertheless] concluded ... that Chambers did not mandate the admission of every such statement but required the admission only of those statements that, after a careful examination, were determined in the sound discretion of the trial court to be trustworthy. State v. DeFreitas, supra, at 451-52, 426 A.2d 799. (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, supra, 239 Conn. at 71, 681 A.2d 950. As we explained in DeFreitas, courts have recognized that the unrestricted admission of declarations against penal interest would be to invite perjury of a kind that is most difficult to ascertain. To circumscribe fabrication and [to] ensure the reliability of declarations against penal interest, there must exist circumstances... [that] clearly tend to support the facts asserted in the declarations. State v. DeFreitas, supra, at 452 n. 9, 426 A.2d 799. Thus, under our case law and § 8-6(4) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, [26] which represents a codification of that case law, a statement against penal interest by an unavailable declarant is admissible only if the statement is trustworthy and, at the time of its making, so far tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. [27] Conn.Code Evid. § 8-6(4); see also, e.g., State v. Lopez, 254 Conn. 309, 315, 757 A.2d 542 (2000). In allowing this exception to the hearsay rule, we are primarily concerned that under the particular circumstances, the statement is trustworthy, that is, that safeguards reasonably equivalent to the oath and the test of cross-examination exist. (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, supra, 254 Conn. at 316, 757 A.2d 542. The court must consider three primary factors in determining whether the statement is sufficiently trustworthy to render it admissible: (1) the time the statement was made and the person or persons to whom the statement was made; (2) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case; and (3) the extent to which the statement was against the penal interest of the declarant. Conn.Code Evid. § 8-6(4); see also State v. Lopez, supra, 254 Conn. at 316, 757 A.2d 542. We previously have emphasized, however, that no single factor in the test ... for determining the trustworthiness of third party declarations against penal interest is necessarily conclusive.... Thus, it is not necessary that the trial court find that all of the factors support the trustworthiness of the statement. The trial court should consider all of the factors and determine whether the totality of the circumstances supports the trustworthiness of the statement. [28] (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, supra, 254 Conn. at 316, 757 A.2d 542. With respect to the timeliness element of the first prong of the trustworthiness test, [w]e afford the trial court broad discretion in deciding whether the timeliness of a statement indicates that it is trustworthy. In general, declarations made soon after the crime suggest more reliability than those made after a lapse of time [during which] a declarant has a more ample opportunity for reflection and contrivance.... A statement's timeliness, however, is not necessarily dispositive of the trustworthiness determination. (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 317, 757 A.2d 542. Thus, this court has upheld the admission of third party statements against penal interest even though the timing of those statements afforded the declarant abundant opportunity for contrivance. See, e.g., State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 370-71, 844 A.2d 191 (2004) (statement against penal interest made within five months of commission of crime deemed sufficiently trustworthy to be admissible); State v. Gold, 180 Conn. 619, 634, 431 A.2d 501 (statement made within three months of crime deemed sufficiently trustworthy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 320, 66 L.Ed.2d 148 (1980). We also have upheld the exclusion of a statement against penal interest as untrustworthy when the statement was made so soon after the crime that the declarant had little or no time for reflection or fabrication. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, supra, 254 Conn. at 317-21, 757 A.2d 542 (statement made one and one-half days after crime was nevertheless untrustworthy because it was not sufficiently corroborated); State v. Hernandez, 204 Conn. 377, 392-93, 528 A.2d 794 (1987) (statement made one day after crime was nevertheless untrustworthy because, inter alia, it was not sufficiently corroborated). Indeed, in certain circumstances, statements against penal interest have been deemed to be particularly reliable because a significant amount of time had elapsed from the date of the crime to the date of the declaration. See, e.g., Stevens v. People, 29 P.3d 305, 316 (Colo.2001) (statement against penal interest more reliable when two years had passed since events at issue and investigation of declarant appeared to be inactive), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 975, 122 S.Ct. 1448, 152 L.Ed.2d 390 (2002). It therefore may be said that the passage of time makes a statement more reliable in one case and less reliable in another. State v. Mizenko, 330 Mont. 299, 375, 127 P.3d 458 (Warner, J., concurring), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 810, 127 S.Ct. 43, 166 L.Ed.2d 19 (2006). As for the second part of the first prong of the trustworthiness test, we require that the witness testifying [about] the statement must be one in whom the declarant would naturally confide. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, supra, 254 Conn. at 317-18, 757 A.2d 542. Thus, the relationship between the declarant and the person in whom the declarant confided must be close and confidential. State v. Rivera, 221 Conn. 58, 70, 602 A.2d 571(1992). [T]he focus on the party to whom the statement was made is consistent with the requirement that the declarant be aware of the disserving quality of the statement. Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 201 n. 15 (D.C.1979). With respect to the second trustworthiness factor, namely, the existence of corroborating circumstances, this court repeatedly has emphasized that [t]he corroboration requirement for the admission of a third party statement against penal interest is significant and goes beyond minimal corroboration.  (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lopez, supra, 254 Conn. at 319, 757 A.2d 542; accord State v. Rivera, supra, 221 Conn. at 71, 602 A.2d 571. Therefore, the statement must be accompanied by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the statement's trustworthiness. (Emphasis in original.) State v. Lopez, supra, 254 Conn. at 319, 757 A.2d 542. In determining whether a statement is corroborated, all evidence bearing on the trustworthiness of the underlying statement may be considered.... No one criterion [is] determinative, but the [trial] court [should] consider a wide variety of facts and circumstances in making the ultimate determination of admissibility. (Citations omitted.) State v. Paredes, 775 N.W.2d 554, 567 (Iowa 2009). Finally, the statement also must be against the declarant's penal interest. In determining whether a statement satisfies this requirement, this court has rejected a narrow and inflexible definition of a statement against penal interest in favor of a definition [that] includes not only confessions ... but other remarks [that] would tend to incriminate the declarant were he or she the individual charged with the crime. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 695, 523 A.2d 451 (1987). Thus, [t]he against interest exception is not limited to a defendant's direct confession of guilt.... It applies as well to statements that tend to subject the speaker to criminal liability.... [Consequently, the] rule encompasses disserving statements [made] by a declarant that would have probative value in a trial against the declarant.... [Our rule therefore] reaches ... remarks that strengthen the impression that the declarant had an insider's knowledge of the crimes.... As to what is against penal interest, quite obviously the essential characteristic is exposure to risk of punishment for a crime.... Moreover, it is not the fact that the declaration is against interest but the awareness of that fact by the declarant [that] gives the statement significance. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 695-96, 523 A.2d 451.