Opinion ID: 185134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Board's ULP Findings

Text: 26 The Board's holding that Vincent's unilateral actions changing established working conditions constituted ULPs is easily upheld. An employer may not unilaterally impose material changes in terms or conditions of employment that are mandatory subjects of bargaining without first negotiating to impasse. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 198 (1991); Grondorf, Field, Black & Co. v. NLRB, 107 F.3d 882, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1997). There are two exceptions to this general rule: An employer may impose unilateral terms if the union engages in dilatory tactics to delay bargaining. See Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v. NLRB, 86 F.3d 227, 235 (D.C. Cir. 1996). And an employer may act unilaterally if faced with an economic exigency justifying the change. See Visiting Nurse Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 52, 56 (1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 787 (2000); RBE Elecs. of S.D., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 80, 81 (1995). An economic exigency must be a heavy burden and must require prompt implementation. See RBE Elecs., 320 N.L.R.B. at 81. The employer must additionally demonstrate that the exigency was caused by external events, was beyond the employer's control, or was not reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 82 (footnote omitted). 27 Vincent imposed all of the changes save one without presenting a proposal tothe Union during bargaining sessions. Vincent can mount no argument that any of the disputed changes were made due to an economic exigency, although it tries to argue that the changes were not material or that they were waived by the Union. These arguments hold no water: All of the changes involved mandatory subjects of bargaining, they raised material issues, and the Union cannot be held to have waived the right to bargain over an issue that was never proposed during bargaining sessions. There is one change that Vincent did propose before imposing: the change in attendance policy. Vincent urges that the Board's decision on the attendance policy issue should be reversed, first, because the Union waived its right to bargain over this issue, and, second, because the Company had to make the changes in order to meet an economic exigency. Vincent's arguments are meritless. 28 There was no waiver by the Union here. The Union desired to bargain over the attendance policy; it made clear to Vincent that it wanted to negotiate the entire contract, including the attendance policy, as a whole. See Visiting Nurse Servs., 177 F.3d at 59 (rejecting employer's suggestion that a union cannot insist on negotiating an entire contract rather than piecemeal negotiation). In addition, the Union offered counter-proposals to the Company's attendance policy prior to Vincent's imposition of the policy change. See Eighth Negotiation Session Meeting Notes, May 18, 1994, at 3-5, reprinted in Joint Appendix (J.A.) 795-97; Ninth Negotiation Session Meeting Notes, May 24, 1994, at 3-4, reprinted in J.A. 802-03. The Union did not precipitate an impasse by insisting on negotiating a contract as a whole rather than piecemeal. Such a view is mischievous, because it would both permit the employer to remove, one by one, issues from the table and impair the ability to reach an overall agreement through compromise on particular items and undercut the role of the Union as the collective bargaining representative. Visiting Nurse Servs., 177 F.3d at 59. 29 Nor did the Board err in finding a lack of evidence to support Vincent's claim of economic necessity. The Board correctly noted that the exigency asserted by Vincent was hardly extraordinary: The Company could point only to the impending possibility of attendance problems. The Board reasonably found that the Company's alleged problem did not pose a heavy burden necessary to show an economic exigency. See RBE Elecs., 320 N.L.R.B. at 81. In addition, the Board reasonably concluded that Vincent failed to show that the attendance problem was unforeseen, caused by external events outside its control, or that it was new. See id. at 82. 30 The Board's findings that Vincent fired two employees and disciplined another in violation of the Act are also supported by substantial evidence in the record. To establish a causal nexus between adverse employment decisions and an employee's union affiliation, the complaining party must first show that protected activity was a 'motivating factor'  in the adverse employment decision, and then the employer may show that it would have made the adverse decision even had the employee not engaged in protected activity. Wright Line, Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1083, 1089 (1980); see also NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) (approving of Wright Line approach). To establish an employer's discriminatory motive, the NLRB may consider[ ] such factors as the employer's knowledge of the employee's union activities, the employer's hostility toward the union, and the timing of the employer's action. Power Inc. v. NLRB, 40 F.3d 409, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Evidence that an employer has violated S 8(a)(1) of the Act can support an inference of anti-union animus. See Parsippany Hotel Management Co. v. NLRB, 99 F.3d 413, 423-24 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 31 The ALJ found, and the Board affirmed, that Vincent violated the Act in three instanceswhen it took adverse employment actions against its employees on account of their Union affiliation: (1) when Vincent disciplined Gloria Chester;(2) when Vincent terminated Michael Early; and (3) when Vincent terminated Wanda Nantz. With respect to all three findings, there is substantial evidence to support the Board's determination. 32 The ALJ, with whom the Board agreed, relied on Ms. Chester's position as a Union supporter, the fact that she received discipline at a time when Vincent had taken several unlawful unilateral actions, and the significant aberrant circumstances surrounding issuance of the warning to conclude that the discipline would not have occurred but for Ms. Chester's Union involvement. Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at . There is substantial evidence to support this conclusion, especially given our deference to the Board's findings regarding discriminatory motive. See Laro Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 56 F.3d 224, 229 (D.C. Cir. 1995).Vincent cites to testimony in which the employer asserted that other employees had been disciplined for similar behavior, but the ALJ and Board rejected this testimony for lack of documentary or other corroborating evidence. The Board's judgment on this point was reasonable. Cf. Synergy Gas Corp. v. NLRB, 19 F.3d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (reversing finding of discrimination where company introduced personnel records to demonstrate that other employees had been terminated for actions similar to that of the complaining employee). 33 The ALJ and the Board relied on similar factors to conclude that the Company discharged Mr. Early in violation of the Act. First, the ALJ found that a prima facie case of discrimination was established in light of the other unlawful conduct engaged in by Vincent and the Company's response to Mr. Early's request for accommodation. See Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at . The ALJ found Vincent's explanation for refusing to participate in the work release program to be cryptic and nothing other than inartful pretext. Id. (noting that Mr. Domsic stated both that Vincent did not want to take responsibility for Mr. Early's program and that Vincent did not know what it would have been required to do). The Board agreed and we cannot second-guess that judgment. In upholding the Board on this point, we do not suggest that all employers must grant all requests similar to Mr. Early's lest they be accused of discriminating against bargaining unit employees. A company that consistently applies neutral policies, for example, usually is on safe ground. See TIC-The Indus. Co. Southeast, Inc. v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 334, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1997). In this case, there is no evidence that the Company had any policy at all to apply to Mr. Early. Therefore, it cannot be said that the ALJ was unreasonable in finding that Mr. Early's status as Union President influenced Vincent's decision to refuse to accommodate his particular needs as a result of his arrest, especially considering the ALJ's conclusion, supported by substantial evidence, that Mr. Early was a long-term skilled press operator and that there is not a scintilla of evidence that alcohol ever affected his job performance or that he posed any threat to others at the plant.Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at . 34 Vincent argues that the ALJ erroneously found violations of the Act for the discharge of Ms. Nantz on two grounds: (1) the ALJ erroneously concluded that Vincent knew of Ms. Nantz's Union affiliation; and (2) the discipline meted out to Ms. Nantz was consistent with Vincent's past practice. The first challenge is easily dismissed. Ms. Nantz had been a pro-Union advocate during the election, the shop steward, and the Treasurer of the Local, and she had refused to sign the decertification petition. Under these circumstances, there was substantial evidence for the ALJ to conclude that Vincent was aware of Ms. Nantz's affiliation with the Union. 35 With respect to Vincent's justification for disciplining Ms. Nantz, the ALJ found that, for the five months that the hourly shot count requirement was in place, there was no evidence that any employees were disciplined even though employees other than Ms. Nantz had made mistakes. Vincent proffered evidence that prior to the institution of the new policy, employees were warned for failure to fill out production logs correctly; but there are no such warnings in evidence (apart from Ms. Nantz's discharge) for the period during which the new policy was in place. Under these circumstances, there was substantial evidence for the ALJ and Board to conclude that Vincent's purported reason for disciplining Ms. Nantz was pretextual. 36 The Board's finding that Vincent supervisor Mark Coomes violated the Act by coercively interrogating Robert Ferguson is less easily upheld. The interrogation of employees by an employer is evaluated under a five-factor totality of the circumstances test in order to determine whether the questioning is coercive and therefore violates S 8(a)(1). These factors are: (1) the history of the employer's hostility and discrimination against unions; (2) whether the information sought is of a type that could be used to take action against individual employees; (3) the rank of the questioner; (4) where the questioning occurred; and (5) the truthfulness of the reply. See Perdue Farms, Inc., 144 F.3d at 835. Here the ALJ relied on the following facts to conclude that Mr. Coomes compromised Mr. Ferguson's right to keep private his sentiments as to the Union and his knowledge of its affairs: Mr. Coomes pulled Mr. Ferguson away from his work area to initiate questioning; and Mr. Ferguson had not previously identified with the Union. Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at . The ALJ inferred that Mr. Coomes' purpose, to test the strength of the Union, was clear. Given the substantial evidence in the record, we cannot say that this conclusion is unreasonable. 37 Vincent relies on Certainteed Corp., 282 N.L.R.B. 1101 (1987), for the proposition that there is nothing coercive about an employer inquiring about the possibility of a strike. In Certainteed, the ALJ found that the employer did not violate the Act by asking an employee about the possibility of a strike, because the employer had a reasonable basis to fear an imminent strike and had an interest in determining whether it would be able to keep its business open. 282 N.L.R.B. at 1107. Here, while Mr. Coomes had just heard from Mr. Early about the possibility of a strike vote, Mr. Coomes had no legitimate reason for inquiring of Mr. Ferguson; Mr. Early's offhand comment about the possibility of a strike vote sometime in the future could hardly be relied upon to support a reasonable basis to fear an imminent strike. Certainteed does not compel reversal of the Board. 38 The Board's findings that several unremedied ULPs tainted the decertification petition is unassailable. For the first year after a successful certification election, a union enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority support, after which the employer may withdraw recognition if it has a good faith, reasonable basis to doubt majority support for the union. See Peoples Gas Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 1980). When a majority of unit employees signs a petition in support of decertification, an employer may reasonably doubt that there exists majority support for the union. See Sullivan Indus. v. NLRB, 957 F.2d 890, 898 (D.C. Cir. 1992).Nonetheless, if the Board determines that unremedied ULPs contributed to the erosion of support for the union, the employer may commit an unfair labor practice by withdrawing its recognition of the union. See, e.g., Lee Lumber & Bldg. Material Corp. v. NLRB, 117 F.3d 1454, 1458-60 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (examining whether ULPs contributed to lack of support for union). 39 The Board's traditional four-factor test for determining whether there is a causalconnection between unremedied ULPs and a petition for decertification consists of the following elements: (1) [t]he length of time between the unfair labor practices and the withdrawal of recognition; (2) the nature of the illegal acts, including the possibility of their detrimental or lasting effect on employees; (3) any possible tendency to cause employee disaffection from the union; and (4) the effect of the unlawful conduct on employee morale, organizational activities, and membership in the union.Master Slack Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. at 84. Vincent argues that the explanation offered by the Board does not satisfy the Master Slack requirements. We reject this contention. 40 The Board adequately explained its decision on the basis of all four Master Slack factors, in more than conclusory language. The Board noted the close temporal link between the unremedied ULPs and the decertification petition. See Vincent Indus., 1999 WL 282397, at . The Board additionally explained that the unilateral implementation of changes in working conditions has the tendency to undermine confidence in the employees' chosen collective-bargaining agent. See id.The Board finally reasonably concluded that the discipline and termination of public supporters of the Union convey to employees the notion that any support for the Union may jeopardize their employment. Id. The Board's conclusion that Vincent's practices contributed to the decertification petition are reasonably justified and supported by substantial evidence. See NLRB v. Williams Enters., Inc., 50 F.3d 1280, 1288-89 (4th Cir. 1995) (upholding finding of causation where four months passed between company's anti-union statements and decertification petition); Columbia Portland Cement Co., 303 N.L.R.B. 880, 882 (1991), enf'd, 979 F.2d 460, 464-65 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding Board's finding of causation where justification offered by Board was simply that the unremedied ULPs are likely to have undermined the Union's authority generally and influenced [the Union's] employees to reject the Union as their bargaining representative) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).