Opinion ID: 158868
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conceding Appropriateness of Death Penalty

Text: 25 Petitioner argues defense counsel, during his first-stage closing argument, conceded that this crime was cruel, thus admitting the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance, and that the crime warranted the death penalty. Representative of the remarks petitioner challenges, defense counsel told jurors not to kid yourselves, ladies and gentlemen. If you find that [petitioner] . . . brutally murdered [the victim] . . ., the penalty you're going to impose is going to be the very severe one. Trial tr. at 767. Defense counsel also suggested the murderer was an animal and he emphasized the gruesomeness of the crime scene. The uncontroverted evidence, however, including a number of gruesome photographs of the crime scene and the victim's body, established that the victim was brutally murdered. Defense counsel could not have argued otherwise credibly. 26 From the tenor of his entire argument, defense counsel made these remarks for two reasons supporting his contention that petitioner was innocent. First, counsel argued that, if petitioner had wanted to rob the victim, he would not have needed to kill him, in light of the victim's intoxicated state at the time of death. Further, even if the robber thought murdering the victim was necessary, there was no need to have committed such a brutal murder. This supported defense counsel's argument to the jury that robbery was not a sufficient explanation for such a brutal slaying and that there must have been something more going on than the purported robbery--perhaps the murderer was someone other than petitioner who had a score to settle with the victim or to whom the victim owed drug money. 27 Secondly, defense counsel emphasized the bloodiness of the crime scene, both in his cross-examination and closing argument, to support his contention that the murderer would have had to have had blood all over him after the killing. Only Hickman testified that petitioner had what appeared to be blood on him after returning from the victim's apartment, and that was only a single spot one to two inches in diameter. 28 Petitioner argues both that trial counsel's argument was per se ineffective and, alternatively, was deficient performance prejudicial to petitioner under Strickland. Considering the whole of his argument, however, counsel did not abandon[] his duty of loyalty to his client and effectively join[] the state in an effort to attain a conviction or death sentence such that counsel's performance could be deemed per se ineffective. Davis v. Executive Dir. of Dep't of Corrections, 100 F.3d 750, 756-57, & 757 n.3 (10th Cir. 1996) (further quotation omitted); see also Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 625-26, 629 (10th Cir. 1988). Rather, he made these challenged references in support of his argument to the jury, based upon the circumstantial nature of the evidence, that petitioner did not commit this crime. He, thus, remained petitioner's advocate. See United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1511-12 (10th Cir. 1995). 29 Further, counsel's performance was not deficient under Strickland. These remarks were reasonable trial strategy in light of the circumstantial nature of the evidence against petitioner. See Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 1999). [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. 30 Petitioner also challenges defense counsel's second-stage closing argument, asserting counsel continued to argue in this same vein, targeting any residual doubt the jurors might have had concerning petitioner's guilt. But residual doubt has been recognized as an extremely effective argument for defendants in capital cases. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 181 (1986) (further quotation omitted). Such strategy was reasonable under these circumstances. See, e.g., Tarver v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 710, 715-16, 715 n.7 (11th Cir. 1999); Felker v. Thomas, 52 F.3d 907, 912 (11th Cir.), opinion supplemented on denial of reh'g on other grounds, 62 F.3d 342 (11th Cir. 1995). 31