Opinion ID: 1121458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Patrol Car Statement

Text: Defendant offers several reasons why his Patrol Car Statement should be deemed inadmissible under Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436. We find no merit in defendant's claims. (4a) Defendant first contends that Gall's response to his inquiry regarding possible penalties for something like this constituted interrogation in violation of Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 484-485 [68 L.Ed.2d 378, 385-387, 101 S.Ct. 1880] (hereafter Edwards ). In that case, the Supreme Court announced the following prophylactic rule: Once a custodial suspect invokes his right to an attorney, he is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ( Ibid. ) The trial court specifically found that Gall's statement did not constitute interrogation. We review the trial court's finding regarding whether interrogation occurred for substantial evidence or clear error. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 678 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705]; People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 649 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84].) We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding. (5) Interrogation has a specific meaning as used in Miranda and Edwards. Interrogation refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. ( Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301 [64 L.Ed.2d 297, 308, 100 S.Ct. 1682], fns. omitted; accord, People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 679.) The Supreme Court has also recognized that [i]n deciding whether particular police conduct is interrogation, we must remember the purpose behind our decisions in Miranda and Edwards : preventing government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment. ( Arizona v. Mauro (1987) 481 U.S. 520, 529-530 [95 L.Ed.2d 458, 468-469, 107 S.Ct. 1931].) Where government actions do not implicate this purpose, interrogation is not present. ( Ibid. ) Clearly, not all conversation between an officer and a suspect constitutes interrogation. The police may speak to a suspect in custody as long as the speech would not reasonably be construed as calling for an incriminating response. (See People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 645, 651 [no interrogation found when police responded to defendant's question regarding the burial of his victims and the defendant subsequently lost his composure and made incriminating statements]; cf. Rhode Island v. Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at pp. 300-303 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 319-321].) (4b) In this case, substantial evidence supports the conclusion that there was no reason for Gall to have known that his casual estimate of possible penalties would produce an incriminating response from this defendant. Defendant phrased his question in abstract terms and the officer responded in the same terms. The response contained no suggestion that if defendant confessed he would receive more favorable treatment, or that if he did not confess the penalties would be more harsh. Defendant was in effect told that the officer thought it was likely that the person who committed the crime, whoever that may be, would serve substantial prison time, albeit less than 30 years, whether or not the person confessed. [8] The record does not establish that defendant was subject to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning. ( Arizona v. Mauro, supra, 481 U.S. at p. 529 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 468].) Rather, the record demonstrates defendant's desire to unburden himself by confessing the murder. Defendant's expression of guilt was volunteered and was not the result of impermissible police interrogation. ( Ibid. ) [9] (6a) Next, defendant contends that his waiver of his Miranda rights in the patrol car was neither knowing, intelligent nor voluntary. (See Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 444 [16 L.Ed.2d at pp. 706-707]; accord, Colorado v. Spring (1987) 479 U.S. 564, 566, 572 [93 L.Ed.2d 954, 960-961, 107 S.Ct. 851]; Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412, 421 [89 L.Ed.2d 410, 420-421, 106 S.Ct. 1135].) According to the Supreme Court, this inquiry has two distinct dimensions. ( Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 421 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 420-421].) (7) First, the relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. Only if the `totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveals both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension may a court properly conclude that the Miranda rights have been waived. [Citations.] ( Ibid., quoting Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 442 U.S. 707, 725 [61 L.Ed.2d 197, 212-213, 99 S.Ct. 2560].) [10] (6b) Defendant argues that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent, because he was deceived by Gall's statement as to possible punishment and it was not voluntary because Gall's statement induced him to waive his rights and confess. He also asserts that his background and mental state rendered him especially vulnerable to inducements or promises of leniency. The trial court found that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing, intelligent and voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. After independent review of the record ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 649), we agree with the trial court's findings. Although defendant contends that the waiver of his constitutional rights was not knowing and intelligent, he never contends that he did not understand the rights that were read to him and which he effectively invoked to terminate his Sergeant's Room Statement. (8)(See fn. 11.) Rather, he contends that he was misled regarding the penalties that he faced and for that reason his assessment regarding whether he should waive his rights was not knowing and intelligent. [11] (6c) Defendant misunderstands the nature of the waiver required by Miranda. All that is required is that the defendant comprehend all of the information that the police are required to convey by Miranda. ( Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 427 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 424-425].) Once it is determined that a suspect's decision not to rely on his rights was uncoerced, that he at all times knew he could stand mute and request a lawyer, and that he was aware of the State's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, the analysis is complete and the waiver is valid as a matter of law. ( Id. at pp. 422-423 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 421-422], fn. omitted.) The record demonstrates that defendant was aware of and understood these rights. (9)(See fn. 12.) We conclude that defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights in the patrol car was knowing and intelligent, whatever the applicable standard of proof. [12] (6d) Defendant also contends that his Patrol Car Statement was not voluntary within the meaning of Miranda. He argues that his inexperience with the legal system and the level of his mental functioning at the time of the Patrol Car Statement rendered him particularly susceptible to responding to false representations and influences. An involuntary waiver of Miranda rights, however, is a product of government coercion. ( Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 170 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 486-487].) Taking into account the totality of the circumstances in this case, such coercion is absent. (10)(See fn. 13.) We find that, under any standard, the content of Gall's statement and the circumstances under which it was made were not such as to force or compel a confession from the defendant. [13] Furthermore, this court has repeatedly rejected claims of incapacity or incompetence to waive Miranda rights premised upon voluntary intoxication or ingestion of drugs, where, as in this case, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant did not understand his rights and the questions posed to him. (E.g., People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 301 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585].)
(11) Defendant also contends that his Patrol Car Statement was involuntary within the meaning of the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. A statement is involuntary and, thus, inadmissible if it is obtained by threats or promises of leniency, whether express or implied. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 778-782; People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166-170 [266 Cal. Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857]; People v. Hogan (1982) 31 Cal.3d 815, 838 [183 Cal. Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93]; cf. Moran v. Burbine, supra, 475 U.S. at p. 421 [89 L.Ed.2d at pp. 420-421].) A finding of coercive police activity is a prerequisite for a finding that a confession was involuntary under the due process clauses of the federal or state Constitution. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 778; Colorado v. Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 167 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 484-485].) After reviewing the record, we do not find the requisite coercion. Even though Gall's statement was not accurate, the circumstances surrounding it demonstrate none of the indicia of coercion. (See People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 167; see also, ante, at pp. 985-986, 988.) Gall's statement, whether considered objectively or subjectively (see People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 780), was not a promise of leniency or an inducement. [14] Viewed objectively, Gall's statement merely offered his opinion that the person who committed a crime like the one for which defendant was under arrest would serve substantial time in prison, but probably less than 30 years. There was no mention of the effect of cooperation upon the time to be served. There was no threat, promise, psychological trickery or physical violence used to prompt a confession. Nothing in the exchange between the officer and the defendant gives rise to the inference that an implied message was being conveyed. Viewed subjectively, Gall's statement was not shown to be a promise or an inducement. During the Taped Statement that followed, defendant stated that no promises or threats had been made to him by the police. Although Dr. Mayland testified that defendant was more susceptible than the average person to a suggestion that he would get a lighter punishment in return for a confession, it is clear that defendant did not view the exchange between himself and Gall as containing a promise of leniency. In light of all of the circumstances, we conclude that defendant's Patrol Car Statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt. [15]