Opinion ID: 2482936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Joinder under CPL 200.20 (2) (c)

Text: CPL 195.20 states that the offenses for which indictment may be waived include any offense for which the defendant was held for action of a grand jury and any offense or offenses properly joinable therewith pursuant to [CPL] 200.20 and 200.40. CPL 200.15, the statute defining a superior court information, contains the same language, with the added limitation that an information may not include a charge not listed in defendant's written waiver of indictment. An information is therefore governed by the same joinder rules as an indictment, in keeping with the legislative directive that [a] superior court information has the same force and effect as an indictment and all procedures and provisions of law applicable to indictments are also applicable to superior court informations (CPL 200.15). In fact, the term indictment encompasses superior court informations and they are treated identically everywhere in the CPL except in article 190 where the operations of the grand jury are addressed ( see CPL 200.10). CPL 200.20 and 200.40 are the general joinder provisions that determine, in all contexts, whether offenses are properly included in the same indictment or, if there are multiple indictments, whether they may be consolidated for a single trial. Joinder of charges involving a single defendant is addressed in CPL 200.20 (2). Paragraph (a) of that subdivision authorizes joinder of multiple charges if they are based on the same criminal transaction. Paragraph (b) permits joinder of charges arising from different criminal transactions if proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief in the trial of the second offense. In this case, the People relied on paragraph (c) of the subdivision which authorizes joinder when, [e]ven though based upon different criminal transactions, and even though not joinable pursuant to paragraph (b), such offenses are defined by the same or similar statutory provisions and consequently are the same or similar in law (CPL 200.20 [2] [c]). This is the broadest of the three categories and, for this reason, where counts are joined under CPL 200.20 (2) (c), the trial court has the discretion to grant an application for severance if it determines that the offenses should be tried separately to avoid undue prejudice to the defense (CPL 200.20 [3]; see e.g. People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747 [1980]). Of course, no severance application was made in this case since defendant agreed to the joinder of the two offenses in the written waiver of indictment and SCI, and he then pleaded guilty. The issue here is whether the criminal possession of stolen property count that was not charged in the superior court felony complaint was the same or similar in law to the grand larceny offense so that its inclusion in the SCI on a joinder theory complied with the requirements of CPL 195.20. CPL 200.20 (2) (c) is typically relied on when a person is alleged to have violated the same Penal Law provision on two or more occasions ( see e.g. People v Jenkins, 50 NY2d 981 [1980] [two separate robberies were properly joined in a single indictment]) or has been charged with comparable criminal conduct in discrete incidents, such as multiple sexual assaults ( see Shapiro, supra [sexual assault counts were properly joined but defendant's application for discretionary severance should have been granted because defendant would be unduly prejudiced by a joint trial of the charges]; People v Hunt, 39 AD3d 961 [3d Dept 2007], lv denied 9 NY3d 845 [2007] [sexual assault counts were properly joined and court did not abuse its discretion in denying severance application]; People v Clark, 24 AD3d 1225 [4th Dept 2005], lv denied 6 NY3d 832 [2006] [rape and sodomy charges were properly joined]). Offenses will not be deemed sufficiently similar to support joinder under CPL 200.20 (2) (c) if the offenses do not share any elements and the criminal conduct at the heart of each crime is not comparable ( see e.g. People v Dabbs, 192 AD2d 932 [3d Dept 1993], lv denied 82 NY2d 707 [1993] [kidnapping and coercion charges were not sufficiently similar to support joinder]). A comparison of the two charges that were joined in this case reveals little, if any, commonality. The stolen property offense stemmed from the police discovering defendant in possession of a car that had previously been reported stolen. A person is guilty of criminal possession of stolen property in the third degree when he knowingly possesses stolen property, with intent to benefit himself or a person other than an owner thereof or to impede the recovery by an owner thereof, and when the value of the property exceeds three thousand dollars (Penal Law § 165.50). The grand larceny charge arose from an incident in which defendant allegedly obtained a bank card by false pretenses and then withdrew funds from the victim's account without authorization. A person is guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree when he steals property and when ... [t]he value of the property exceeds one thousand dollars (Penal Law § 155.30 [1]). Viewed in the broadest sense, both offenses involve misappropriated property  but that is where any similarity ends. The crimes do not have comparable elements and the essential nature of the criminal conduct is quite distinct, as is evident from the underlying allegations. We therefore conclude that the third degree criminal possession of stolen property charge was not sufficiently similar in law to be properly included in the waiver of indictment and SCI on the theory that it was joinable with the grand larceny offense. As we have previously determined, the improper inclusion of an offense in a waiver of indictment and SCI is a jurisdictional defect that, when raised on direct appeal, requires reversal of the conviction and dismissal of the SCI.