Opinion ID: 1435298
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions Delaware Constitution

Text: Herring's second argument is that the Superior Court improperly commented on the evidence in its initial and supplemental instructions to the jury. Herring argues that both the trial court's initial and supplemental jury instructions violated Article IV, Section Nineteen of the Delaware Constitution. In its initial charge, the Superior Court instructed the jury on elements of both Robbery in the First and Second Degree. The trial judge included language in the Robbery in the Second Degree instruction, over Herring's objection, that Herring could be accountable for the display of a deadly weapon during the commission of a crime if he actively participated in the crime when the weapon was displayed. During its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial judge questioning the use of accomplice liability for determining Herring's accountability for the display of the deadly weapon in the Robbery in the Second Degree instruction. After conferring with counsel, the trial judge delivered supplemental instructions to the jury for their guidance in assessing Herring's culpability as an accomplice for committing either Robbery in the First or Second Degree. The trial judge's complete supplemental instructions to the jury provided: In order to establish Robbery First Degree you must find first Mr. Torres, who is the other individual with the knife, committed the crime of Robbery First Degree. Second, Mr. Herring aided or assisted him in committing that crime. And third, that Mr. Herring was either aware the weapon was to be used, or actively participated in the crime when the weapon was displayed. Article IV, Section Nineteen of the Delaware Constitution states that [j]udges shall not charge juries with respect to matters of fact, but may state the questions of fact in issue and declare the law. Section Nineteen was adopted as a new provision in the 1897 Constitution to ensure that judges confined themselves to making determinations of law and leaving juries to determine the facts. [9] The purpose of the provision was to protect the province of the jury on factual issues. [10] It was not, however, the intention of the framers to impose any restraint on the proper province of the trial judge in either passing upon the legal admissibility of evidence or in instructing the jury on the law. [11] Trial judges may properly combine a statement regarding a fact in issue with a declaration of law. [12] Trial judges may not, however, comment on the facts in their charge to the jury since only juries are entitled to judge the facts. [13] An improper comment or charge as to matters of fact is an expression by the court, directly or indirectly, that conveys to the jury the court's estimation of the truth, falsity or weight of testimony in relation to a matter at issue. [14] It is not entirely improper for a trial judge to explain the legal significance which the law attaches to a particular factual finding. [15] For example, when giving a limiting instruction pursuant to Delaware Rule of Evidence 105, a trial judge must identify the fact at issue and explain the legal prohibition against using certain evidence that is used to establish the contested fact for any other purpose. Similarly, a trial judge may properly state a fact at issue and declare the legal consequences of evidence that is missing in a criminal proceeding. [16] We conclude that the initial and supplemental jury instructions, when viewed as a whole and in context, were not impermissible comments on the evidence. In the initial jury instructions, the trial judge properly charged the jury on the elements of both Robbery in the First and Second Degree. In the supplemental instructions, the trial judge merely clarified the factual elements required to support a conviction for each degree of robbery. The trial judge made an accurate statement of the law and explained the legal significance the law attached to particular facts. The trial judge neither commented on the weight of the evidence nor the credibility of the witnesses. Thus, we hold that the Superior Court's instructions did not violate Article IV, Section Nineteen of the Delaware Constitution. [17]