Opinion ID: 2060114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compliance with the Uniform Detainer Act.

Text: In his original petition, Garner alleged several instances of noncompliance with the Uniform Detainer Act. A fact-finding hearing was ordered to determine whether such allegations were true. [18] In lieu of a factfinding hearing the parties have entered into a stipulation of facts pertinent to the allegations of noncompliance and have filed such stipulation with this court. In the stipulation petitioner has abandoned several of his original charges of error. The stipulation reveals only one instance of noncompliance of any moment. Petitioner originally asserted the detainer lodged against him was filed by the Chicago police department rather than the correct party, the Cook county state's attorney (or his assistants). The parties have stipulated that this is truethe Chicago police department rather than the Cook county state's attorney lodged the detainer against the petitioner. The Uniform Detainer Act's relevant section does not clearly designate who is entitled or required to lodge the detainer against the prisoner of another state. Art. IV (a) of the act merely provides: The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction... shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer... made available in accordance with article V (a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody.... (Emphasis supplied.) [19] Other sections of the act make it clear that the prosecuting officer of the county wherein outstanding complaints, warrants or indictments exist is the appropriate officer within the meaning of art. IV (a). [20] This is also verified by the Committee of State Officials on Suggested State Legislation, wherein it is stated: In Article IV the prosecutor initiates the proceeding. [21] Thus, despite the lack of clarity in art. IV (a), the appropriate officer referred to would be, in this situation, the Cook county, Illinois, state's attorney. The Chicago police department in the instant case was not the appropriate authority to file a detainer against the petitioner. This failure to follow the dictates of the Detainer Act merits discussion. Several authors have noted the adverse effects upon a prisoner resulting from a detainer being lodged against him. [22] Thus, for example, he may be held under maximum security, he may be denied transfer to a minimum security area or prison, he may be denied the privilege of becoming a trustee or a job which involves a degree of trust. Further, and of great importance to the prisoner, he may be denied parole because of a detainer filed against him. [23] Because of the seriousness of these conceivable ramifications of a detainer being lodged against a prisoner, there must be strict adherence to the provisions of the Uniform Detainer Act. Thus, where the act suggests the proper party to lodge a detainer is the local prosecutor, compliance with such provision should be required. This is true for other provisions of the Detainer Act also. This particular procedural error did not prejudice any of petitioner's fundamental rights and is, therefore, not fatal to the efforts by the Illinois authorities to obtain the return of petitioner. By the Court. Petition denied.