Opinion ID: 1776456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: liability of otis

Text: The fountainhead of negligence in Louisiana can be found in two articles in the Louisiana Civil Code. La.Civ.Code art. 2315 provides in part: Every act whatever of man that causes damage to another obliges him by whose fault it happened to repair it. La.Civ.Code art. 2316 states: Every person is responsible for the damage he occasions not merely by his act, but by his negligence, his imprudence, or his want of skill. These articles have spawned the duty-risk analysis. Dixie Drive it Yourself System of New Orleans Co. v. American Beverage Co., 242 La. 471, 137 So.2d 298 (1962). This Court recently reiterated what a plaintiff must establish for liability based on negligence to attach: (1) The conduct in question was a cause in fact of the resultant harm; (2) The defendant owed a duty to plaintiff; (3) The duty owed was breached; and (4) The risk or harm caused was within the scope of the breached duty. Fox v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 576 So.2d 978, 981 (La. 1991). Elevator cases, like escalator cases, add another dimension to the duty-risk analysis. Because parties connected with elevators have been likened to common carriers, the standard of care must be considered in such cases.
We granted this writ, in part, to consider a question pretermitted in Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 843 (La.1989), namely, whether repairers ought to be held to the same high standard of care to which owners are held. It was not necessary for us to resolve the question there because under either standard, the common carrier or the reasonable person, the elevator maintenance firm would be liable. The Rosell elevator was in such a state of disrepair, as testified to by several of the building's employees, that a reasonable repair person should have discovered and remedied the defect. Id. This case is quite different. There were no reports of the elevator having malfunctioned in this way beforehand, nor any after. Therefore, even if we were to hold Otis to a higher standard of care, there is not in the record even the most meager evidence which would tend to show negligence on its part. Otis had a duty, under its contract with Pelican, to inspect and maintain the elevator. By all accounts, Otis did so. Moreover, as noted above, the explanation given by the repairman Mandola indicates that the accident occurred, not as a result of negligence, but rather as a result of the safety interlock's functioning normally. Hence, once again we are constrained to pretermit the question, because, under either standard, the result would be the same: liability on the basis of negligence would not attach to Otis.
The plaintiff contends res ipsa loquitur obtains in this case. Res ipsa is a rule of circumstantial evidence which allows a court to infer negligence on the part of the defendant if the facts indicate the defendant's negligence, more probably than not, caused the injury. Cangelosi v. Our Lady of the Lake Regional Medical Center, 564 So.2d 654, 664 (La.1990), on rehearing; Montgomery v. Opelousas General Hospital, 540 So.2d 312, 319 (La. 1989). Spott argues that the elevator's falling a few feet and stopping constitutes such an unusual occurrence that the inference should be raised. The court of appeal held the doctrine was not applicable because the plaintiff failed to prove the negligence of the defendants, more probably than not, caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur, as a qualification of the general rule that negligence is not to be presumed, must be sparingly applied. Day v. National U.S. Radiator Corp., 241 La. 288, 128 So.2d 660, 665 (1961). Generally, it obtains when three requirements are met: 1) the circumstances surrounding the accident are so unusual that, in the absence of other pertinent evidence, there is an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant; 2) the defendant had exclusive control over the thing causing the injury; and 3) the circumstances are such that the only reasonable and fair conclusion is that the accident was due to a breach of duty on defendant's part. Cf. Wilson v. Hibernia Nat. Bank, 517 So.2d 1206, 1208 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987), writ denied, 520 So.2d 425 (1988) (in which res ipsa loquitur was not applied), citing Boudreaux v. American Ins. Co., 262 La. 721, 264 So.2d 621 (1972), on rehearing. The second requirement, that the defendant have exclusive control over the thing, has not, in our jurisprudence, been strictly applied. Day, supra, 128 So.2d at 664. Indeed, it is satisfied if the circumstances indicate that it is more probable than not that the defendant caused the accident and other plausible explanations do not appear to be the probable cause of the accident. Smith v. State, 523 So.2d 815, 822 (La. 1988). The plaintiff, of course, bears the initial burden of proof. Brown v. Otis Elevator Co., 535 So.2d 525, 527 (La.App. 4th Cir.1988). Although res ipsa may have been properly invoked in this case, its invocation alone does not carry the day because, as noted above, Otis's explanation of the accident sufficiently rebutted any presumption of negligence. [14] Rather, Mandola's hypothesis points to a possibility of a defect in the elevator itself, which brings us to the final theory of recovery urged on appeal, strict liability.
The plaintiff contends both defendants are strictly liable under La.Civ.Code art. 2317, which provides in part: We are responsible, not only for the damage occasioned by our own act, but for that which is caused by the act of persons for whom we are answerable, or of the things which we have in our custody. To recover under this article a plaintiff must prove he was injured by a thing, the thing was in the defendant's custody, there was a vice or defect creating an unreasonable risk of harm in the thing, and the injured person's damage arose from such a defect. Ross v. La Coste de Monterville, 502 So.2d 1026, 1028 (La.1987). Spott has proven he was injured by a thing, the elevator. Hence, he must next prove the defendant had custody or garde of the thing. Otis strongly rejects the notion that it, as repairer, has garde. This Court has defined garde as: the obligation imposed by law on the proprietor of a thing, or on one who avails himself of it, to prevent it from causing damage to others. The things in one's care are those things to which one bears such a relationship as to have the right of direction and control over them, and to draw some kind of benefit from them. Loescher v. Parr, [324 So.2d 441, 449 (La.1975)] (quoting Verlander, We Are Responsible ... 2 Tulane Civil Law Forum, No. 2, p. 64 (1974)). King v. Louviere, 543 So.2d 1327, 1329 (La.1989). On the question of Otis's garde, the plaintiff suggests we follow Coleman v. Otis Elevator Co., 582 So.2d 341 (La. App. 4th Cir.1991), in which the court held Otis had garde. Spott relies on Doughty v. Insured Lloyds Ins. Co., 576 So.2d 461 (La.1991), which held the owner's presumed garde may be rebutted. The plaintiff asserts Otis had control over the elevator to the exclusion of Pelican and, therefore, had garde. The plaintiff's contention is without merit in this case. Pelican is the primary party benefitting from the elevators on its premises. Moreover, the facts in Coleman are distinguishable. In Coleman, Otis hired an employee to work forty hours a week at Charity Hospital to upgrade and to maintain the hospital's forty-eight elevators. Hence, Otis had garde of the elevators, the Otis employee being physically on the premises full time. Consequently, on the peculiar facts of Coleman, the court of appeal's determination that Otis had garde was sound. In this case, however, an Otis employee visited Pelican only weekly for a brief period of time. Moreover, a service contract by itself does not create garde. Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So.2d 585, 589 (La.1980) (construing a service contract provision with language identical to that in this case, we found the store owner was the sole custodian of the escalator); see also Brown, supra, 535 So.2d at 527. The service contract in this case, in fact, specifically provides that Pelican retains control of the elevator. Because we find Otis did not have garde of the elevator, Otis cannot be found strictly liable.
Finally, Spott's petition alleges, inter alia, that Otis is liable because the elevator was defectively designed and bore no warnings. However, the plaintiff offered no proof of any kind relative to a products liability claim. [15] Thus, while we might entertain any patent products claim, we give the theory short shrift in light of the lack of evidence. The elevator in this case was manufactured by Otis. Therefore, Otis could be liable if the elevator, when it left the manufacturer's hands, was unreasonably dangerous to normal use. Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So.2d 839, 843 (La. 1987); Brown v. Sears, 514 So.2d 439, 444 (La.1987); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110 (La.1986); Hunt, supra . This case is distinguishable, however, from those cases in which children's hands and feet were caught in escalators. The design defect in escalators was a nationally recognized problem in the 1970's. Indeed, it was referred to as the tennis shoe phenomenon. [16] It is also distinguishable from McCoy v. Otis Elevator Co., 546 So.2d 229 (La.App. 2d Cir.1989) (convenience for loading of elevator without inside doors is not outweighed by the significant risk of severe injury.) Defects are not presumed to be present by the mere happening of an accident. Broussard v. Pennsylvania Millers Mutual Ins. Co., 406 So.2d 574, 576 (La. 1981). No evidence whatsoever was presented in this case with respect to any design, installation, or operational defects. Accordingly, we hold Otis is not liable as a manufacturer. Davis v. D.H. Holmes, Ltd., 359 So.2d 743 (La.App. 4th Cir.1978). Indeed, at oral argument plaintiff's counsel conceded they were not suing on the basis of products liability.