Opinion ID: 1188554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: statutes creating and limiting new rights

Text: 12. In the preceding discussion we were dealing with the suspension by war of ordinary statutes of limitation which affect the remedy rather than the right. Evans v. Finley et al, 166 Or 227, 111 P2d 833. We next consider the bearing of the rules of international law upon cases in which a statute has created a right and has fixed the time within which action upon that right must be brought. Such statutes generally contain no express provision for the suspension of the running of the limitation, and the common law rule is that the writ must affirmatively show that the action was brought within the statutory period. State ex rel v. Olson, 175 Or 98, 151 P2d 723; Rosell v. State Ind. Acc. Com., 164 Or 173, 95 P2d 726. Nevertheless, in the light of the principles of international law as above set forth, the courts have, as a matter of statutory construction, held that it was not the legislative intent to restrict the time within which an action may be brought, to the period limited in the statute when the law which authorizes suit within a given period of time also prohibits the bringing of such suit by reason of the intervention of war. In Frabutt v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis R. Co., 84 F Supp 460, action was brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. A state of war existed between the United States and Italy from 11 December 1941 to 6 September 1947. On 31 December 1942 the workman suffered an industrial accident from which he died. The administrator sued for the benefit of the Italian widow on 12 July 1948. The statutory period within which suit could be brought was three years. The defendant moved for summary judgment upon the following grounds: 1. That the Complaint fails to state a claim against defendant upon which relief can be granted. 2. There is no allegation in the pleadings that this action was commenced within three years from the date the cause of action accrued. Thus the objection was based, not only upon the lapse of the statutory period, but also upon the ground of a failure to plead that the action had been commenced within the required time. The court said: It appears by a firmly established principle of international law that the existence of a state of war between two countries or powers is effective to suspend the running of statutes of limitations as between the citizens of such countries or powers at war, or, as it has been otherwise stated, war suspends the statute of limitations against alien enemies resident in enemy territory. On the restoration of peace all rights suspended during hostilities, or which remain dormant, are revived, and the statute of limitations again becomes operative. The rule suspending the running of limitations during war is one of international law which the courts attach to, or read into, statutes of limitations, though it is not expressed in them; and it is applicable irrespective of whether the limitation in the particular statute of limitations is considered to be a limitation of the right or liability, or of the remedy.    The reason for this modern rule lies in the fact that during the war the courts of either belligerent country are necessarily closed to the citizens of the other, since the law of nations forbids any intercourse between citizens of belligerent powers. Accordingly taking into consideration that statutes of limitations, in fixing a definite period for the bringing of suits, proceed upon the principle that the courts where the person to be prosecuted resides, or the property to be reached is situated, are open during the prescribed period to the suitor, and in view of the fact that the law of nations which closed the courts to alien enemies renders compliance with the statute impossible, it is only fair and just that the operation of statutes of limitations should be suspended; an alien enemy's right to sue being suspended by circumstances beyond his control, which, in fact, create a positive duty on his part to refrain from pursuing his right of action. 137 A.L.R. page 1454 et seq.; The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 3 Cir., 246 F. 786, L.R.A. 1918 C 795.    War can only end by treaty of peace between the belligerent countries, and while war continues the courts of each belligerent are closed to nationals of the other country. Statute of limitations will not be permitted to run against an alien enemy. First National Bank of Pittsburgh v. Anglo-Oesterreichische Bank, supra; Siplyak v. Davis, 276 Pa. 49, 119 A. 745; Zeliznik v. Lytle Coal Co., 82 Pa. Super. 489; Borovitz v. American Hard Rubber Co., D.C. 287 F. 368.    The suspension of the remedy during war is so absolute that the courts could not have granted permission or authority to take testimony in the Republic of Italy which would have been an absolute necessity in order for the widow and her children to prosecute their right to recover. It, therefore, appears to me that when the reason for the suspension ceases, the right to prosecute revives and the fact that the right had been suspended in the war between United States and Italy should not constitute a disability or deprive the widow and children to recover if such right exists. To hold otherwise, the principles of the Constitution of the United States would be destroyed. It would be basically unsound and work a disallowance of the equal protection of the laws of this country to all persons, regardless of their previous condition of servitude or alienage. All statutes of limitations are based on the assumption that one with a good cause of action will not delay bringing it for an unreasonable period of time; but, when a plaintiff has been denied access to the courts, the basis of the assumption becomes destroyed. In Siplyak v. Davis, 276 Pa 49, 119 A 745, the Austrian widow of a workman who was killed in an industrial accident brought a claim under the Pennsylvania Compensation Act. The statutory limit upon the right to sue was one year. A claim was filed after the expiration of one year. The court held that the statute limiting the right was tolled during the period of the war between the United States and Austria. The court said: A further principle, however, is recognized by the courts, which is applicable to the present proceeding. In case of the existence of an emergency, such as the declaration of war, and the statute makes no provision for such emergency, it may be reasonably implied that, if the Legislature had had in mind such contingency, it would have made provision to meet it. This implied suspension of the statute may be justified on the ground of public necessity due to the fact, for example, that during the existence of war a total inability exists on the part of the citizens of the belligerent countries to carry on business intercourse with each other, and necessarily an absolute suspension of all rights and a prohibition to exercise them exists during that time, and, as this state of facts was brought about by circumstances over which the individual had no control, it is only fair that on termination of hostilities and the declaration of peace both the right and the remedy therefor should be returned to the parties.    We find nothing in the recent federal legislation known as the Trading with the Enemy Act of October 6, 1917, 40 State. 411 (U.S. Comp. St. 1918, U.S. Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, §§ 3115 1/2 a-3115 1/2 ff, 3115 1/2 g-3115 1/2 j), which in any way indicates an intention of Congress to change the existing law applicable to dealings between citizens of the United States and those countries with which we were at war. On the contrary, section 8 of that act (section 3115 1/2 dd), dealing with contracts with the enemy and providing for the suspension of the statute of limitations between parties neither of whom was an enemy, or an ally of an enemy, contains the express provision that  `Nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the suspension of the running of the statute of limitations in all    cases where such suspension would occur under existing law.' Here is an express recognition of the fact that under existing laws the statute is suspended as between American citizens and the citizens of other countries, who were neither an enemy, nor an ally of an enemy, but against or in favor of whom the existence of war naturally made it difficult to enforce contractual or other obligations. Other cases supporting the same rule are as follows: Borovitz v. American Hard Rubber Co., 287 F 368; Colorado Fuel & Iron Co. v. Industrial Commission, 73 Colo 579, 216 P 706; Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Rotar, supra, 124 Ohio St 418, 179 NE 135; and see The Kaiser Wilhelm II, 246 F 786, CCA 3d (1917).