Opinion ID: 174941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dr. Carlini's Testimony is Admissible under Daubert

Text: The path charting the judiciary's standards for admitting or excluding expert testimonyfrom the early Frye standard to Kumho's clarification of Daubert has been a movement towards granting district judges greater discretion in making expert testimony determinations. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993); Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). Today, that discretion is flexible and very broad. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167. Daubert's role of `ensur[ing] that the courtroom door remains closed to junk science,' Amorgianos v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2002), is not served by excluding [medical expert] testimony ... that is supported by extensive relevant experience. Such exclusion is rarely justified in cases involving medical experts as opposed to supposed experts in the area of product liability. See generally Daniel W. Shuman, Expertise in Law, Medicine, and Health Care, 26 J. Health Pol. Pol'y & L. 267 (2001) (characterizing the effect of the Daubert and Kumho Tire cases on claims of medical expertise as `[m]uch ado about little,' while noting that these cases have had a significant effect on toxic tort and products liability litigation). Dickenson v. Cardiac and Thoracic Surgery of E. Tenn., 388 F.3d 976, 982 (6th Cir.2004). As `gatekeeper,' the trial judge is imbued with discretion in determining whether or not a proposed expert's testimony is admissible, based on whether it is both relevant and reliable. Johnson, 484 F.3d at 429 (quoting Kumho, 526 U.S. at 147, 119 S.Ct. 1167). It is for the district court to determine whether expert testimony is essentially junk science rather than testimony falling within the range where experts might reasonably differ. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167. One way in which a court may make this determination is by examining the expert's testimony in relation to the factors laid out by the Supreme Court. These factors include: (1) whether a theory or technique ... can be (and has been) tested; (2) whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and publication; (3) whether, with respect to a particular technique, there is a high known or potential rate of error and whether there are standards controlling the technique's operation; and (4) whether the theory or technique enjoys general acceptance within a relevant scientific community. Johnson, 484 F.3d at 430 (internal quotations omitted). Six years after issuing Daubert, the Supreme Court clarified that the factors listed [in Daubert] do not constitute a `definitive checklist or test.' Id. at 429-30 (quoting Kumho, 526 U.S. at 150, 119 S.Ct. 1167). Our Court has recognized that the Daubert factors `are not dispositive in every case' and should be applied only `where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony.' In re Scrap Metal, 527 F.3d at 529 (quoting Gross v. Comm'r, 272 F.3d 333, 339 (6th Cir.2001)). Rather, the gatekeeping inquiry must be tied to the facts of a particular case, depending on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony. Id. While Dr. Carlini testified that he was not able to point to a specific study showing that manganese exposure caused Parkinson's Disease, his testimony was supported by his own general experience and knowledge (corrected J.A. at 615, Tr. Testimony of Walter Carlini, Sept. 13, 2007), and theoretical medical writing that explored the connection between manganese exposure and Parkinson's Disease. [2] ( Id. at 599, Tr. Testimony of Walter Carlini, Sept. 11, 2007). When asked what publications substantiated his claim, Dr. Carlini clarified that [t]here is a lot of literature out there about the potentialand it's all theoreticalabout the potential causes for sporadic parkinsonism. And a lot of literature discusses the combination of environmental factors together with genetic predispositions. ( Id. ) He further stated that there is a large likelihood that what we now know as sporadic Parkinson's disease, which is not understood very well, is due to a combination of environmental factors together with an underlying genetic predisposition. That's the way the field is moving. ( Id. ) He additionally testified that, there is [sic] a lot of studies or a lot of thinking out there ... which conceptualizes sporadic Parkinson's disease as being... a combination of environmental factors and genetic predisposition which is how I conceive of manganese-triggered parkinsonism that falls under that rubric. ( Id. at 600.) He further stated that there is quite a bit of writing about patients theoretical writing about patients developing Parkinson's disease due to a combination of genetic and environmental factors. ( Id. at 621, Tr. Testimony of Walter Carlini, Sept. 13, 2007). Thus, the connection between manganese and Parkinson's disease, though not agreed upon by every member of the scientific community, was certainly the subject of valid scientific debate and publication at the time of Dr. Carlini's testimony. [3] The district court succinctly explained its decision not to exclude Dr. Carlini's evidence, focusing on his methodology: I see nothing about [Dr. Carlini's] methodology that is either flawed or inconsistent with the very diagnostic methods that other experts in this case ... have used and have described as appropriate diagnostic methods. ( Id. at 170-173, Tr. of Proceedings, Nov. 1, 2007). While Dr. Carlini's testimony may not have satisfied every Daubert factor, it is not necessary that it do so. Johnson, 484 F.3d at 429-30 (holding that the factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test); see also In re Scrap Metal, 527 F.3d at 529 (holding that the Daubert factors are not dispositive in every case and should be applied only where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony. (internal quotations omitted)). Dr. Carlini's testimony easily satisfied at least one Daubert factor because the manganese-Parkinson's Disease theory was the subject of peer review and publication at the time of Dr. Carlini's testimony. See infra, n. 2. Furthermore, to the extent that the connection between manganese and Parkinson's Disease could be tested at the time, the then-ongoing studies of individuals exposed to manganese, who later developed Parkinson's Disease, constitutes testing sufficient to satisfy Daubert. Therefore, Dr. Carlini's testimony appears to meet one, if not several, Daubert requirements. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting it, and the majority errs in so holding.