Opinion ID: 765760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sua sponte application of the Teague defense

Text: 78 Although the Teague defense was not properly preserved by the state, we may exercise our discretion to raise the defense sua sponte. See Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 389 (1994) ([A] federal court may, but need not, decline to apply Teague if the State does not argue it.). In making the determination of whether to apply the Teague principle sua sponte, we should primarily focus on the fundamental policies underlying Teague. The Supreme Court has held that, with two narrow exceptions, a criminal defendant may not benefit from a new rule of constitutional law after direct review of his or her case. See Teague, 489 U.S. 288, 305-10 (1989). This ruling is based upon the interests of comity and finality. Id. at 308. The habeas corpus process should protect the finality of state court judgments and ensure comity between the federal and state court systems. Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 850-51 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 305 (5th Cir. 1999) (In the interests of finality and judicial economy, we choose to exercise our discretion and consider whether [petitioner's] claim is barred.). In light of these fundamental principles, I believe that a federal court should presumptively apply the Teague analysis sua sponte whenever a defendant tries to raise a new constitutional rule for the first time on collateral review. 79 This presumption, however, is not irrebutable, and a federal court must consider whether the concerns of finality, federalism, and comity support Teague's application on a case-by-case basis. For instance, a federal appellate court should be particularly vigilant to any indication that the state intentionally neglected to raise the Teague defense at the district court level in the hope of getting a favorable determination on the merits, with the idea that it could then raise the issue for the first time at the appellate level if the ruling on the merits was adverse to its interests. Permitting such a practice would allow the state to sandbag the appellate court and benefit from its own strategic pleading. In the present case, however, there is no indication that the state is sandbagging this court. 80 Although Judge Moore agrees that courts may raise the Teague defense sua sponte, she argues that courts should not invoke the defense sua sponte unless there are particularly strong reasons to overlook the state's neglect. In support of her position, she cites various cases in which this court has declined to raise the defense in the face of the state's waiver. See Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 337 n.1, 339 n.3 (6th Cir. 1998), petition for cert. filed, No. 98-9606 (May 24, 1999); Sinistaj v. Burt, 66 F.3d 804, 805 n.1 (6th Cir. 1995); Kordenbrock v. Scroggy, 919 F.2d 1091, 1104 n.4 (6th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 970 (1991). These cases, however, fail to provide any analysis or reasoning for thecourt's decision not to raise the Teague defense sua sponte, and thus provide us with little guidance. 81 Furthermore, I disagree with the implication in Judge Moore's dissent that courts rarely if ever raise the defense sua sponte. The Teague rule itself was not briefed by the parties and yet was fashioned by the Supreme Court sua sponte. Moreover, the defense has been raised by courts sua sponte in subsequent cases, including Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), Fisher v. Texas, 169 F.3d 295, 305 (5th Cir. 1999), and Spaziano v. Singletary, 36 F.3d 1028, 1041-42 (11th Cir. 1994). See James S. Liebman, More than Slightly Retro: The Rehnquist Court's Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 537, 635 n.247 (1990-91). 82 Judge Moore further argues that it is particularly unfair for the court of appeals to apply Teague once another federal court has declared that a constitutional violation has occurred. I respectfully disagree for two reasons. First, the entire thrust of Teague is to limit the issues that can be raised on habeas review, irrespective of the fairness of the outcome. Second, Congress expressed a policy choice in enacting AEDPA, as partially codified in 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1), to have the public interest in finality outweigh a criminal defendant's interest in gaining the benefit of a new constitutional rule. See 2 JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 30.2c, at 1240-41 (3d ed. 1998) (In this way, section 2254(d)(1) . . . makes the state court 'decision,' and not the petitioner's 'independent' complaint, the focus of the federal court review . . . [S]ection 2254(d)(1) unqualifiedly limits federal review to legal rules that actually were in effect when the state court decided the case . . .) (emphasis in original); see also Zuern v. Tate, 938 F. Supp. 468, 475-76 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (Congress intended by [ 2254(d)(1)] to shield convictions which complied with federal law when entered from reversal by later habeas courts applying 'new' law.). 83 To the extent that the Supreme Court considered fairness in its Teague decision, such concern was encapsulated in the analysis itself that allows a habeas corpus defendant to gain the benefit of a new constitutional rule if the rule either (1) places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe or (2) is one of the 'watershed rules of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 494-95 (citing Teague, 489 U.S. at 311). 84 For these reasons, I believe that the presumption in favor of the sua sponte application of Teague should apply in the instant case. Once raised, I concur with Judge Clay's conclusion in Part II.B. that retroactive application of the new constitutional rule Lyons proposes is barred by Teague. Notes: 1 Because Judge Moore concurs in the analysis set forth in Part I below, this reflects the panel's majority opinion as to the issue there discussed. DISSENT 85