Opinion ID: 75632
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of Reckless Counts

Text: 12 SabreTech argues that the statutory and regulatory history creates a dichotomy between the HMTA and the FAA that cannot support as a crime the reckless violations of the hazardous materials regulations. It contends that the reckless counts are a legal nullity. In these counts, the government alleged that SabreTech should be punished pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 46312 - the criminal penalty provision of the former FAA - for violation of certain hazardous materials regulations. Section 46312(a)(2) makes it a crime to recklessly cause to be transported hazardous material in violation of any regulation or requirement prescribed under the FAA. SabreTech posits that the regulations it was convicted of recklessly violating were not enacted under the FAA. These regulations were promulgated under a different statutory authority - the HMTA. That statute penalizes only willful violations of its regulations. 49 U.S.C. § 5124. Therefore, SabreTech contends that the government improperly charged it with a crime. We agree. 3
13 By way of background, Congress originally enacted 49 U.S.C. § 46312 in 1949 as Section 902(h) of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, as amended. Pub. L. No. 81-186, 63 Stat. 480 (1949). Section 902 was the criminal penalty provision of the Act. The 1949 amendment made it a crime to deliver knowingly, or cause to be delivered for transportation, or cause the transportation of explosives or other dangerous articles in violation of regulations promulgated by the Civil Aeronautics Board under Title VII of the Civil Aeronautics Act. Thus, at that time, the Civil Aeronautics Board was responsible for the regulation and enforcement of the transportation of explosives and dangerous articles by air. 4 14 In 1958, Congress passed the FAA, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958). This Act, among other things, transferred the safety regulatory authority contained in the Civil Aeronautics Act to a newly-created independent aviation safety regulatory agency, the Federal Aviation Agency. The FAA retained the provision (Section 902(h)) making it a crime for a person to deliver knowingly, or cause to be delivered, or to cause the transportation of explosives or other dangerous articles if that transportation was prohibited by any rule, regulation, or requirement prescribed by the Administrator under the FAA. 15 In 1966, Congress created the Department of Transportation to centralize responsibility for the myriad regulatory agencies and cabinet-level departments dealing with transportation. Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80 Stat. 931 (1966). This creation transferred all of the functions of the formerly independent Federal Aviation Agency to the Secretary of Transportation. Moreover, under this new structure, the Federal Aviation Administrator was responsible for the regulation of air safety, including the transportation of hazardous materials by air. See 14 C.F.R. pt. 103 (2001). 16 This statutory scheme remained in effect until 1974 when Congress enacted the Transportation Safety Act, Pub. L. No. 93-633, 88 Stat. 2156 (1974). Title I of this Act was entitled the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act. This Act was a self-contained regulatory and enforcement statute that included its own criminal penalty provision. It established a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of hazardous materials transportation of all modes and gave the Secretary of Transportation responsibility for its regulation. Simultaneously, Congress amended § 902(h) of the FAA to heighten the mens rea necessary for a conviction and increase the penalties for a violation. The amendment made it a crime to deliver willfully for transportation in air commerce or to recklessly cause to be transported in air commerce hazardous materials prohibited by regulations issued pursuant to the FAA. 17 Shortly after the passage of the HMTA, the Secretary of Transportation created the Materials Transportation Bureau (MTB) to implement the new law. The MTB amended and reissued the authority citations for the hazardous materials regulations. The MTB deleted each of the previous authority citations for the hazardous materials regulations and replaced them with references to the regulatory authority for the new HMTA, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1804, 1808. Thus, by January 1977, Congress had eliminated any authority for the regulations which may have existed under the FAA, and placed that authority under the HMTA. 18 The final stage of this evolutionary process occurred in 1994 when Congress codified certain laws related to transportation as Subtitles II, III, and V-X of Title 49 of the U.S. Code. Congress codified the HMTA as Chapter 51, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-27, and made this a part of Subtitle III - General Intermodal Programs, 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-27. Congress codified the FAA as Part A - Air Commerce and Safety, 49 U.S.C. § 40101-46507, and made this a part of Subtitle VII - Aviation Programs, 49 U.S.C. § 40101-49105. Congress codified former Section 902(h) of the FAA within Part A as 49 U.S.C. § 46312. Congress modified this section to read as follows: 19 A person shall be fined under title 18, imprisoned for not more than 5 years, or both, if the person, in violation of a regulation or requirement related to the transportation of hazardous material prescribed by the Secretary of Transportation under this part - 20 (1) willfully delivers, or causes to be delivered, property containing hazardous material to an air carrier or to an operator of a civil aircraft for transportation in air commerce; or 21 (2) recklessly causes the transportation in air commerce of the property. 22 49 U.S.C. § 46312. 23 Thus, at the time of the ValueJet crash, criminal liability existed for willful violations of the hazardous materials regulations promulgated pursuant to the HMTA. Criminal liability also existed for reckless violation of regulations authorized by Part A - Air Commerce and Safety, Subtitle VII, an entirely separate subtitle. The criminal penalties were distinct. Therefore, only regulations adopted under the authority of the FAA in Part A could provide the predicate for prosecuting a reckless violation. See 49 U.S.C. § 46312. However, the government charged SabreTech with recklessly violating regulations promulgated pursuant to the HMTA. That Act contains no criminal liability for recklessly violating the hazardous materials regulations.
24 The Department of Transportation's Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA), the successor agency to the MTB, administered a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of hazardous materials transportation. These hazardous materials regulations are contained in 49 C.F.R. §§ 171-180. At the beginning of each of these parts, the RSPA cites 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127 as the only authority for promulgating each part. The RSPA does not cite any statutory authority found in Part A- Air Commerce and Safety. Thus, during the pertinent time-frame involved here, none of the regulations cited in the reckless counts were issued pursuant to the statutory authority contained in Part A - Air Commerce and Safety. 5 25 The statutory and regulatory history demonstrate that at the time of the crash, the HMTA was the only authority for the hazardous materials regulations under which the government indicted SabreTech. That Act punishes willful violations, not reckless ones. In sum, none of the hazardous materials regulations in existence in May 1996, and relied upon in the indictment, were based upon statutory authority contained within Part A - Air Commerce and Safety. Therefore, the reckless counts are invalid, and the district court erred in denying SabreTech's motion to dismiss them.