Opinion ID: 169079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Amoco Receipts in Cross's Hotel Room Are Material Under Brady.

Text: 23 In the usual case, a defendant seeking habeas relief for an alleged Brady violation must show that: (1) the prosecution suppressed evidence; (2) the evidence was favorable to the accused; and (3) the evidence was material to the defense. Snow v. Sirmons, 474 F.3d 693, 711 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). This case, however, turns on Brady's third element — materiality — because the State has conceded the first two elements. Appellee's Br. 15. 24 The standard for determining Brady materiality is well established. The touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result, which exists when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)). This inquiry does not permit piecemeal evaluation of suppressed evidence; instead, courts must 25 review the cumulative impact of the withheld evidence; its utility to the defense as well as its potentially damaging impact on the prosecution's case. Furthermore, . . . [courts should] evaluate the materiality of withheld evidence in light of the entire record in order to determine if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. What might be considered insignificant evidence in a strong case might suffice to disturb an already questionable verdict. 26 Snow, 474 F.3d at 711 (quoting Banks v. Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1518 (10th Cir. 1995)). 27 The district court, 2006 WL 2228953, held that the Amoco receipts were not material because they do[] not cast any doubt on the eyewitness identifications, and the evidence discovered in Cross's motel room is consistent with [Mr. Trammell's] testimony that Cross stole items from him. Op. 16. 3 We think this is too narrow a conception of the role that the suppressed evidence would have played. Defense counsel would not have used it solely to impeach the eyewitnesses or buttress his claim that Cross broke into Trammell's house. The receipts directly link Cross to the stolen truck, and defense counsel could have used the evidence to support his theory of the case — that Cross is the one who stole the tow truck, which is how the box of tow truck receipts got into his motel room. This evidence could also have been used to cast doubt on police officers' decision to focus their attention (including the photo arrays) on Trammell rather than Cross. 28 The potential importance of this evidence is underscored by closing arguments. Almost at the beginning of his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor told the jury: There is virtually no evidence to suggest or to corroborate what Mr. Trammell wants you to believe, that Scott Cross set him up. Trial Tr. vol. I, 327. But if the government had disclosed the Amoco receipts, as required under Brady, the jury would have known that the physical evidence in the case connected Cross with the crime: the tow truck was found in the parking lot of Cross's motel and receipts from the tow truck were found in a box in Cross's motel room. Only after being confronted with that evidence did Cross finger Trammell. The prosecutor's rebuttal statement appeared accurate only because the government failed to disclose the Amoco receipts. In a trial with all the exculpatory physical evidence in play the government would not be able to pursue the line of argument that there was virtually no evidence corroborating the theory of the defense. 29 In finding that the evidence against Mr. Trammell was so strong that the withheld evidence was not material, the district court relied heavily on the fact that three eyewitnesses at trial identified Trammell as the perpetrator. Op. 12-14 (citing Trammell, 92 P.3d at 1106, 1109). But this evidence may be less powerful than it at first appears. There was evidence that Trammell and Cross were similar in appearance. Trial Tr. vol. I, 64. Yet neither in the photo arrays nor in court were the prosecution witnesses enabled to compare the two men. The photo arrays shown to the prosecution witnesses contained Trammell's picture, but not Cross's. And by the time the trial started, two of the eyewitnesses already had read newspaper articles naming Mr. Trammell as the suspect. Tr. Hr'g Mot. to Suppress Identification, 14-16. The articles may have stated, falsely, that Trammell's fingerprints were found on the tow truck. Id. at 16; Trial Tr. vol. I, 95, 174. At a preliminary hearing, the prosecution witnesses already knew that Mr. Trammell was the defendant, and they saw him in an orange jumpsuit; they then identified him as the perpetrator. Tr. Hr'g Mot. to Suppress Identification, 5, 39. The witnesses never saw Mr. Cross, or even his picture. Trial Tr. vol. I, 63, 140-41. Cross did not testify at the preliminary hearing or at trial. In light of these suggestive circumstances, the reliability of their in-court identification is less than ironclad. Moreover, the only eyewitness who was given a photo array with Mr. Cross's picture identified him as the perpetrator. Id. at 246-47. Based on these facts, we do not think that the eyewitness identifications carry as much weight as the district court assigned to them. 30 This is a close case. The eyewitness identifications, though occurring under seemingly questionable circumstances, were nonetheless consistent despite thorough cross-examination. We are not certain that timely disclosure of the Amoco receipts would have resulted in a different result. But that is not the standard. We need to be convinced only that the government's evidentiary suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (internal quotation marks omitted). Of this we are persuaded. Exercising de novo review, we hold that the Amoco receipts were material under Brady and that the government violated Mr. Trammell's due process rights by failing to disclose this evidence before trial.