Opinion ID: 2981319
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kentucky Whistleblower Claim

Text: Akers asserted claims under the Kentucky Whistleblower Act against the County of Bell, Judge Brock and Ward in their official and individual capacities, and against the other defendants in their official capacities alone. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the whistleblower claims against: Judge Brock and Ward in their individual capacities with prejudice because the Whistleblower Act does not impose individual civil liability; all defendants in their official capacities with prejudice because Akers failed to show that her whistleblowing activities were a contributing factor in her termination, as required under Kentucky law; and all defendants in their official capacities without prejudice due to the sovereign immunity of the state in federal court under the Whistleblower Act. On appeal, Akers argues that the district court: (1) abused its discretion by retaining jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims; (2) erred in finding that sovereign immunity for all defendants in their official capacity was not waived by the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, Ky. Rev. Stat. § 61.103; (3) erred in applying the federal, rather than the state, summary judgment standard; and (4) erred in applying the incorrect standard of causation to the whistleblower analysis. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion and did not err in its findings on the merits of Akers’s whistleblower claims.
No. 10-5513 Akers v. County of Bell, et al. Page 12 “A district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Exp. Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996). “[S]upplemental jurisdiction does not disappear when the federal claim that gave rise to original jurisdiction in the first place is dismissed. Following such a dismissal, the district court in its discretion may properly choose whether to exercise § 1367(a) jurisdiction over the supplemental state-law claims; however, such a decision is ‘purely discretionary.’” Orton v. Johnny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); see also Musson Theatrical, 89 F.3d at 1254 (“[A] district court ‘may’ (rather than must) decline to exercise jurisdiction if ‘the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3))). Here, the district court acted within its discretion when, after granting summary judgment on Akers’s federal claims, it chose to retain jurisdiction over, and decide, the Kentucky whistleblower claims that Akers raised in her complaint.
We next address Akers’s argument that the defendants—in their official capacities—waived their Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. “[S]tate governments and entities that can be considered arms of the state are immune from suits for money damages under the Eleventh Amendment.” Rodgers, 344 F.3d at 594 (internal quotation marks omitted). One exception to this rule is waiver; that is, “if a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action.” Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985) (abrogated on other grounds). “[I]n order for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, it must specify the State’s intention to No. 10-5513 Akers v. County of Bell, et al. Page 13 subject itself to suit in federal court.” Rose v. Stephens, 291 F.3d 917, 925 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have found that the language of the Kentucky Whistleblower Act, “which specifically waives Kentucky’s sovereign immunity only in its own courts, is insufficient to waive the state’s immunity from suit in federal court.” Id. Alternatively, a state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consenting to the suit. Lawson v. Shelby Cnty., Tennessee, 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2000). “Consent may . . . take the form of a voluntary appearance and defense on the merits in federal court.” Id. Here, defendants did not argue sovereign immunity in the district court, but the district court raised the issue on its own and found, as an alternative reason to dismiss Akers’s claims, that the defendants were immune from federal suit in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment. The Act’s waiver of sovereign immunity applies only in Kentucky state courts and does not waive immunity in federal courts. Rose, 291 F.3d at 925. Akers argues on appeal that the County and the individual defendants in their official capacities consented to her state law whistleblower claims by appearing in federal court and defending the claim on the merits. The defendants appeared in the district court but defended against the state law whistleblower claims only by arguing that the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, a defense that the district court found failed as to the compensatory damages sought by Akers. Although the Kentucky courts have not spoken definitively on whether or not a statute of limitations defense is a defense on the merits, the Kentucky Court of Appeals has held that a “dismissal due to a statute of limitations is in no way dependent on nor reflective of the merits . . . in the underlying action.” Alcorn v. Gordon, 762 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, No. 10-5513 Akers v. County of Bell, et al. Page 14 because the defendants’ statute of limitations argument was not a “defense on the merits in federal court,” they have not waived their sovereign immunity under the Act. We affirm the district court’s finding that the defendants did not waive their sovereign immunity. Because we find that defendants in their official capacities are immune from suit in federal court, and because Akers’s final two arguments on appeal—regarding the summary judgment standard and the causation standard—relate only to her claims against the defendants in their official capacities, we do not reach these final two arguments.