Opinion ID: 1609315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: testimony of sandy hull

Text: Shipps argues that the trial court erred in denying his motions for mistrial and for new trial based on the State's production of inflammatory, prejudicial, and irrelevant testimony from Sandy Hull in violation of U.S. Const. amend. XIV and Neb. Const. art. I, § 3. Hull was called as a witness on behalf of the State. Shipps' defense was based, at least in part, on a claim that he had been injured and did not have full use of his right hand at the time of the alleged incident. Hull, a friend of Shipps, testified that during the week of June 20, 2001, Shipps could not help move a couch because of his injury. Hull had earlier told a police officer that Shipps was able to help move the couch. Hull said that Shipps could use his right arm, but not his right hand. Hull added that he had seen Shipps move a small dresser with his left hand and right arm, but Hull never saw Shipps grasp anything with his right hand. Hull also testified that for 2 years prior to the alleged crime, Shipps and Hull played pool together several times a week. Shipps stopped playing pool with his right hand after his work accident because he could not hold a pool cue in that hand. He subsequently tried to play pool with his left hand. Hull saw Shipps playing pool left handed approximately 1 week before June 20, 2001. Shipps objected when the State questioned Hull as follows: Q[.] You were a very good friend of [Shipps], is that correct? A[.] Yes. Q[.] Okay. In fact, during 2001 you would perform a favor for [Shipps], if women stopped by your house.... Defense counsel interposed an objection to the question as leading and irrelevant. Arguments on the objection were held in camera, with both parties waiving the presence of a court reporter. The objection was overruled. The State proceeded with its questioning: If a woman stopped by your place... and asked for [Shipps], what would you tell [her]? Defense counsel again objected, on grounds of foundation and that the form of the question was hypothetical, and the objection was overruled. Hull stated that he would tell the woman that Shipps was living there but was not home at the time. Hull admitted that Shipps was not in fact living there and that he had lied for Shipps. On recross-examination, Hull stated that he did not know where Shipps was when he was not at Hull's house, but that Shipps could have been at D.H.'s house. At trial, Shipps first objected as to the relevance of the question about Hull's performing a favor for him. Shipps' second objection was based on foundation and the form of the question. In his brief, Shipps also objects to the use of Hull's testimony as impeachment. Shipps argues that this testimony, on collateral matters, was used to impeach at a time when he had not decided whether he was going to testify at trial, and that thus, he was forced to modify his trial strategy in order to address the impeachment. The record shows that Shipps' complaints concerning whether this testimony constituted improper impeachment were not raised before the trial court. On appeal, a defendant may not assert a different ground for his objection to the admission of evidence than was offered to the trier of fact. State v. Timmens, 263 Neb. 622, 641 N.W.2d 383 (2002). An objection, based on a specific ground and properly overruled, does not preserve a question for appellate review on any other ground. Id. Thus, Shipps has waived any objection that might have been made to Hull's testimony on the basis of impeachment. It appears that the State's questions were intended to demonstrate that as a friend of Shipps, Hull was willing to be less than truthful. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-607 (Reissue 1995) provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him. See, also, State v. Marco, 220 Neb. 96, 368 N.W.2d 470 (1985). The relationship between Hull and Shipps could be seen as close enough that Hull was willing to show bias in his testimony. The State was attempting to demonstrate this bias, and its questioning was not improper. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to grant a mistrial or new trial on the basis of Hull's testimony.