Opinion ID: 4209433
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Content of the Messages

Text: [¶31] In this case, the nature of Legassie’s conduct and the evidence adduced at trial lead us to the inescapable conclusion that the State sought to prove the content of the messages. Legassie is alleged to have committed the crimes with which he was charged entirely through the words communicated in the messages; it was therefore only by proving the content of the messages that the State could prove that Legassie “[k]nowing or intending that the conduct will be photographed . . . intentionally or knowingly employ[ed], solicit[ed], entice[d], persuade[d], use[d] or compel[led] another person, not that person’s spouse, who is in fact a minor, to engage in sexually explicit conduct.” 17-A M.R.S. § 282(1)(A); cf. Laughner v. State, 769 N.E.2d 1147, 1159 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the best evidence rule applied to messages sent in an internet chat room supporting a charge for attempted child solicitation).9 [¶32] At trial, although the State did not have to prove that Legassie employed any particular legally operative words to prove each element of the 9 Laughner was abrogated on other grounds by Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1206 n.9 (Ind. 2007). Fajardo was itself later superseded by statute, Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5. 19 offenses, the evidence supporting the convictions—the victims’ testimony— derived entirely from the victims’ knowledge and recollection of the content of the messages. Cf. 3 Francis Wharton, Wharton’s Criminal Evidence § 15:4 (illustrating that the best evidence rule does not bar testimony by a witness about facts set forth in a writing if the witness has independent personal knowledge of those facts that is not derived from a review of the writing). In other words, without describing the very content of the messages Legassie sent, the victims would not have been able to testify about what he communicated to them in the messages.