Opinion ID: 770823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Collateral Order Exception

Text: 31 In general, we may review only final judgments of a district court on appeal. See Midland Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 798 (1989)(internal quotations omitted). Under the collateral order doctrine, however, we have jurisdiction to review a limited class of prejudgment orders. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The collateral order doctrine permits an appeal from a non-final judgment if three criteria are met: the order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed questions, (2) resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and (3) be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Midland, 489 U.S. at 799. The Supreme Court has emphasized that the conditions for collateral order appeal are to be stringently applied to ensure that this narrow exception never be allowed to swallow the general rule  requiring a judgment to be final prior to appeal. Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 868 (1994). We therefore determine the applicability of the collateral order doctrine without regard to the chance that the litigation at hand might be speeded, or a particular injustic[e] averted by a prompt appellate court decision. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
32 We have jurisdiction to review a district court's order denying summary judgment on a qualified immunity defense under the collateral order doctrine. See Armendariz v. Penman, 75 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1996). However, our jurisdiction is limited to purely legal issues. Watkins v. City of Oakland, 145 F.3d 1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 1998).
33 We need not address whether the Heck issue meets the first and second prongs of the test outlined above because it is effectively reviewable on appeal. Appellate courts can effectively review a district court's ruling on a Heck issue because, unlike immunity rights where the right is lost if the case goes to trial, an appellate court can reverse the district court after entry of a final judgment without departing from the holding or purpose of Heck.
34 The rule announced in Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), that individual defendants can appeal from the denial of a motion for summary judgment to obtain review of the merits of their qualified immunity defense does not empower a federal court to consider the denial of a municipality's motion for summary judgment in a section 1983 action. See Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42-43 (1995).