Opinion ID: 1172226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: All of Manes's Challenges to Jury Instructions Lack Merit.

Text: Jury instructions to which a timely objection is made are subject to de novo review. See Conam Alaska v. Bell Lavalin, 842 P.2d 148, 153 n. 9 (Alaska 1992) (challenges to jury instructions present questions of law to which the court applies its independent judgment). However, [n]o party may assign as error the giving or failure to give an instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict. Alaska R. Civ. P. 51(a). In the absence of an objection, jury instructions are reviewed only for plain error, which occurs if a correct instruction would have likely altered the result. Conam Alaska, 842 P.2d at 153 (citations omitted).
Jury Instruction 27 provides that Defendants Bradshaw and Hutchison are not the special agents of plaintiff.... Manes failed to object to this instruction. Moreover, the instruction was appropriate since it merely effectuates the court's grant of summary judgment on that issue. As a result, the use of this instruction did not constitute reversible error.
While Manes properly objected to the omission of Proposed Instructions 50 and 51, [4] her challenge to these omissions fails. Proposed Instruction 50 provides that Bradshaw and Hutchinson [sic] are under a duty to exercise ordinary care in the inspection of the premises ... [and] failure to fulfill this duty ... would be negligence. The superior court correctly concluded that the grant of partial summary judgment negated the existence of a duty of inspection. An instruction which declared that the defendants were under such a duty was therefore improper, and the court did not err in rejecting that instruction. For its part, Proposed Instruction 51 contains no actual instructions for the jury. It neither outlines the findings the jury must make to accept Manes's claim nor sets forth any legal directives to the jury. Instead, it merely outlines Manes's argument that One Call voluntarily undertook a duty of inspection. Failure to include a summary of a party's arguments in the jury instructions does not constitute reversible error.
Manes argues that as a result of the court's refusal to use her proposed special verdict form, [5] the jury was precluded from finding that the conduct of two or more defendants was indistinguishable. This contention lacks merit. A trier of fact is permitted to treat separate parties as indistinguishable only if the separate act or omission of each person cannot be distinguished. AS 09.17.080(b). In this case, no duty was common to all defendants. Peggy Coats was liable as a property owner and as an innkeeper, while Richard Coats was liable only as a property owner. The conduct which exposed each of them to liability was not identical. While a jury could conclude that their conduct as landowners was indistinguishable, Richard could not be subject to liability as an innkeeper. Manes's form only allowed the jury to find that the conduct of two or more defendants was indistinguishable in its entirety, without regard for any distinction between each party's responsibility. The court properly refused to use such a form. Manes's claims regarding the indistinguishability of the One Call employees' conduct with each other or with the Coats defendants also fail. As noted, the jury absolved Bradshaw and Hutchison of liability. As a result, while their interests were coextensive, any error concerning the indistinguishability of their conduct from each other was harmless. Similarly, Manes cannot argue that the non-culpable conduct of One Call was indistinguishable from the culpable conduct of the Coats.