Opinion ID: 3160826
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Obstruction During Trial

Text: 1 We review a district court’s denial of a § 3582(c)(2) motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Brown, 332 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th Cir. 2003). 2 Case: 15-11951 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Page: 3 of 4 Next, Disla argues the district court erred because its finding that he engaged in obstructive conduct during trial is both inconsistent with the original sentencing court’s findings and unsupported by the record. See Hamilton, 715 F.3d at 340 (during a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding, a district court may make new findings supported by the record but it “may not enter any new finding that is inconsistent with a finding . . . made in the original sentence proceeding”). He also asserts that a prisoner’s trial conduct is an impermissible consideration in a § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. However, these arguments are unavailing. First, Disla’s argument that the district court’s “obstruction” conclusion is inconsistent with the sentencing court’s findings is baseless. The sentencing court did not make a determination as to Disla’s trial conduct. In addressing this issue, the court explained, “while I might think that [Disla] committed perjury . . . I am not going to reach that issue . . . because it is not necessary.” Given the sentencing court did not rule on whether Disla obstructed his trial, the district court’s conclusion is not inconsistent with the sentencing court’s findings. Second, the district court’s conclusion is supported by the record; Disla’s Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) includes undisputed statements that Disla committed perjury at trial. See United States v. Davis, 587 F.3d 1300, 1303 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that a court can “make factual findings based on the undisputed statements in the PSI”). Third, Disla’s trial conduct relates to “the 3 Case: 15-11951 Date Filed: 12/08/2015 Page: 4 of 4 history and characteristics of the defendant”—a factor listed in § 3553(a). See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in relying on its conclusion that Disla obstructed his trial. III. Post-Sentencing Rehabilitation and Conduct Finally, Disla asserts the district court abused its discretion by failing to consider his post-sentencing rehabilitation and conduct. This argument is without merit; consideration of post-sentencing rehabilitation and conduct is within the district court’s discretion. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10 cmt. 1(B) (stating that the district court “may” consider the prisoner’s post-sentencing conduct); United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm. 2 AFFIRMED. 2 Following the district court’s denial of his § 3582(c)(2) motion, Disla filed a motion for reconsideration. The district court then denied the motion. Disla also appeals this denial. However, his challenge to this denial is solely based on his assertion that the district court did not properly consider his post-sentencing rehabilitation and conduct. As discussed above, the district court has discretion to consider these factors. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Disla’s motion for reconsideration. 4