Opinion ID: 3010441
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The provision reads in full:

Text: Section 50.1 -- Work Preservation For the purpose of preserving work and job opportunities for the employees covered by this Agreement, the Employer agrees that no operation, work or services of the kind, nature or type covered by, or presently performed or hereafter assigned to the collective bargaining unit by the Employer will be subcontracted, transferred, leased, diverted, assigned or conveyed in full or in part (hereinafter referred to as divert or subcontract), by the Employer to any other plant, business, person, or non-unit employees, or to any other mode of operation, unless specifically provided and permitted in this Agreement. In addition, the Employer agrees that it will not, as hereinafter set forth, subcontract or divert the work presently performed by or hereafter assigned to, its employees to other business entities owned and/or controlled by the Employer, or its parent, subsidiaries or affiliates. 3 out in § 7.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.2 The letter stated: Please consider this letter as a formal grievance under our current collective bargaining agreement regarding waste water loads that were previously handled by the Bensalem, PA terminal and are now handled by your Elkton, MD terminal utilizing a tractor that was transferred from Swedesboro. To the best of my knowledge, these loads originate in Muscatine, Iowa or other parts of the Northern Region and are relayed into New Jersey out of Elkton, MD. We view this as a violation of Article 50 and, as such, request a meeting as scheduled at once to discuss. App. at 41. On August 9, 1994, Lehman met with Michael Lynch, the Bensalem Terminal Manager, in accordance with Step 2 of the grievance procedures to discuss the grievance contained in the letter. At the meeting Lynch informed Lehman that _________________________________________________________________ 2. Section 7.2 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement describes the Grievance Procedures in relevant part: Step 1. All grievances must be made known in writing to the other party within seven (7) working days after the reason for such grievance has occurred. ... Step 2. If the disposition of the matter by the Terminal Manager in charge, or his duly authorized representative, is not satisfactory, the matter must be taken up by the Business Agent, and the Employer's Regional Representative, or other representatives of the Employer with authority to act, within five (5) working days of the written disposition set forth in Step 1. ... Step 3. If the disposition of the matter by the Regional Representative or other representatives of the employer with authority to act, is not satisfactory either party has the right to file its grievance with the Joint Committee. . . . App. at 18. 4 the waste water loads in question were originating from locations in addition to those in Muscatine, Iowa or other parts of the Northern Region. Lehman then made a handwritten amendment to the grievance letter indicating that the grievance was meant to cover all allegedly diverted shipments ever assigned to the Bensalem terminal, not only those suspected to originate from Muscatine, Iowa orother parts of the Northern Region. App. at 41 (Amended -- 8/9/94 -- 9:31 am -- To any waste water that came into and out of this terminal!). Although Lynch refused to sign the amended grievance, he did not object to it, and Lehman noted this fact on the letter. Id. Nothing was resolved at this grievance meeting or at a Joint Committee meeting held on September 12, 1994, in accordance with Step 3 of the grievance procedures. The Company maintained at both grievance proceedings that any shipments coming from Muscatine or elsewhere had never been actually assigned to Bensalem as contemplated by the Work Preservation guarantee of the CBA, but were part of system-wide work which could be dispatched to any terminal location without regard to the jurisdictional restriction in Article 50. The Union's position was that proof of a marked decrease in the number of wastewater shipments from locations such as Muscatine, in the absence of company evidence to the contrary, satisfied the contractually required presumption that work is being diverted to other, non-bargaining units in violation of Article 50. The parties agreed to arbitration and a hearing was held on April 27, 1995 before Arbitrator Charles D. Long. Matlack was represented by J. Carlisle Peet and Local 312 by Mark Muller. There was considerable confusion in the course of the arbitration proceeding. At the outset of the hearing, Matlack's counsel announced that he wanted to raise two procedural defenses not previously mentioned in the prior grievance proceedings: the first, atimeliness objection arguing that the Union's June 1, 1994 grievance letter was filed after the seven day filing requirement set forth in the CBA; the second, an objection that thescope of the grievance contained in the letter was limited to those allegedly improper shipments that originated out of 5 Muscatine, Iowa alone and not those referred to by the clause or other parts of the Northern Region or by the handwritten amendment. Matlack also announced that it was not prepared to address the substantive issue of the grievance, namely whether there was an actual diversion of shipments assigned to Bensalem bargaining unit employees in violation of Article 50. App. at 190-92, 197. After Union counsel objected to Matlack's attempt to focus the hearing only on the procedural aspects of the grievance letter, the arbitrator said to Matlack: You'd better present your arguments as to what the grievance was and the scope of the substance, subject to jurisdiction hearing this, and then proceed on to the substance. So (inaudible) -- so far as it relates to the limited load that the company speaks of. App. at 199. Soon after, Matlack reiterated that it was unprepared to address anything beyond the scope of the grievance, to which the arbitrator replied, I will try and make an effort, in order to determine how we can agree to that -- in effect, as long as we're all here, let's go with the Muscatine part of the substance. App at 201. He continued, I will make . . . a determination on the scope of the issue prior to the holding of a second meeting, because that determination will determine whether or not the second day of hearing is necessary. Id. Later, after confusion about the proper scope of a crossexamination, the arbitrator said, Because everybody is here, I'm going to let the union proceed, even though the case may extend beyond Muscatine. If, after the hearing today, I determine that the issue is broader than just Muscatine, we'll have to reconvene for the company to deal with these other issues. And if it means recalling these particular witnesses so you can reopen cross- examination, I'll certainly permit you to do that. App. at 216. Again, after more controversy over the scope of the day's hearing, the arbitrator said: 6 I am more concerned that, in resolving this problem, it is resolved on a full factual record and, therefore, if, in fact, the issue is determined to go beyond the scope of Muscatine, Iowa, I'll permit the company to address it at a subsequent time. App. at 232-33. Thus, the arbitrator appears to have concluded that he would permit broad questioning of the witnesses on all the issues -- procedural and substantive -- in order to create a full factual record, but that he would permit Matlack to address the merits of the Article 50 argument at a later date. Again at the close of the day's hearing, the arbitrator appeared to signal to the parties that he would only decide the procedural issues presented that day and that Matlack could address and brief the merits of the dispute at a later date. The following colloquy occurred: Mr. Peet [counsel for Matlack]: I would like to brief the issue of the grievance. And I think trying to brief the other issue (inaudible) we may want to come back, depending upon your points on the grievance issue. Based upon your ruling (inaudible), I'd like to brief the case, depending on how you rule and how we see the grievance issue. ... Arbitrator: I have no objection. As a matter of fact, I was just going to say, Mr. Lehman [Local 312's president], its a little unusual to have a proceeding and then -- and then and my only question really -- my only comment (inaudible) what Mr. Peet had suggested was going to be (inaudible) need not brief it, which is go ahead and issue a ruling on the -- on the scope of the issue. If there was (inaudible) the broader issue for a second day of hearing, I would then go ahead and address the whole shooting 7 match and then brief everything or close orally. I have no problem if Mr. Peet wants to address the scope of the issue individually, and whether you do it orally or brief form is up to you. If you want to brief it (inaudible) I would just ask not to take too long because of the day of submitting (inaudible). Mr. Peet: I would like to brief. Mr. Muller [counsel for Local 312]: I am going to brief the whole thing, the whole ball of wax. ... Arbitrator: You understand, Mr. Muller, you're going to exchange briefs and you'll have the benefit of your brief on that. App. at 325-327. Based upon its understanding of the arbitrator's intentions, Matlack submitted a post-hearing brief that only addressed the timeliness of the Union's letter of June 1, 1994 and whether the letter's scope extended beyond the Muscatine loads. Matlack stated in its brief its understanding that, In the event the Arbitrator ruled that the alleged amendment to the grievance was valid, the Company would have the right to reopen the hearing for the purposes of further cross-examining the witnesses the Union presented at the April 27th Hearing, and presenting new evidence. App. at 49. In the Union's post-hearing brief, the Union answered all the procedural objections made by Matlack, and argued that the merits of the dispute rendered Matlack in violation of Article 50 and also that no additional hearing was necessary as Matlack never provided any evidence to rebut the established presumption of diversion and would thus be estopped from presenting such evidence in future proceeding. App. at 62-72. 8 On June 13, 1995, Arbitrator Long sent both parties an award that clearly purported to render judgment in favor of the Union on the procedural objections regarding the scope and timeliness of the grievance letter as well as on the merits of the grievance. See App. at 89-99 (opinion, decision, and remedy of Arbitrator Long).3 He decided that the grievance letter was timely filed, that the handwritten amendment to the amendment extended the scope of the grievance to those loads originating in areas other than Muscatine, Iowa, and that Matlack violated Article 50 by diverting Muscatine loads from the Bensalem terminal. He awarded the Union back pay and remanded the matter to the Step 2 grievance procedure for disposition of those disputed shipments other than those from Muscatine. On June 14, 1995 Matlack wrote to the arbitrator and expressed great shock that the arbitrator had rendered a decision on the merits of the grievance since all parties to the hearing had understood that Matlack would have another opportunity to present evidence on that substantive issue. App. at 101. What followed was aflurry of correspondence between Matlack and the Union about the propriety of the scope of the judgment and, ultimately, Arbitrator Long's decision to withdraw as arbitrator. On July 17, 1995, Arbitrator Long sent the parties a letter confirming his withdrawal. Again both parties sent letters disputing what was actually adjudged by the arbitrator and what remained to be decided. _________________________________________________________________ 3. In his written award, the arbitrator announced that he would be addressing the following issues: 1. Is the grievance of June 1, 1994, timely filed pursuant to Article 7, section 7.2, of the collective bargaining agreement? 2. Is the amendment of August 9, 1994, timely and, otherwise, valid? 3. If not, is the grievance filed on June 1, 1994, limited solely to the loads of waste water originating in Muscatine, Iowa? 4. If it is determined that the grievance is timelyfiled, has there been a violation of Article 50 of the collective bargaining agreement, as alleged? App. at 81. 9 Arbitrator Long responded on July 31, 1995 in an attempt to clarify where he believed the case currently stood: My decision to withdraw from this matter concerned a misunderstanding concerning the procedure to be followed prior to a decision resolving the substantive portion of the issue which is separate and unrelated to that portion of the issue concerning the scope of the grievance. Consistent with the record at the close of the hearing on April 27, 1995, it was my intent to leave the matter in the following posture: 1. a binding decision dated June 13th, 1995 extending the scope of the underlying substantive issue to include the grievance of June 1, 1995 as amended during the step 2 grievance meeting on August 9, 1995.