Opinion ID: 4181855
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Randolph Issues

Text: The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and provides that a warrant may not be issued without probable cause. U.S. Const. amend. IV. A warrantless search conducted inside a person’s home is presumptively unreasonable and a violation of the Fourth Amendment unless an established exception applies. United States v. Henderson, 536 F.3d 776, 779 (7th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). One established exception is a search of a home that is conducted pursuant to an occupant’s voluntary consent. Fernandez v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1126, 1132 (2014). No. 16-4254 7 With the exception of Jones’ gun safes, there is no dispute that Kelley had the authority to consent to the search of the home. In Randolph, however, the Supreme Court carved out a narrow exception to the consent exception, holding that “a physically present inhabitant’s express refusal of consent to a police search [of his home] is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant.” Randolph, 547 U.S. at 122–23. In dicta, the Court also noted that consent by a resident might not be sufficient if there is “evidence that the police have removed the potentially objecting tenant from the entrance [of their home] for the sake of avoiding a possible objection … .” Id. at 121. Justice Breyer’s concurrence defined the outer limits of the majority opinion, determining that the holding “does not apply where the objector is not present ‘and object[ing].’” Id. at 126 (Breyer, J. concurring); see Henderson, 536 F.3d at 781. The Supreme Court refined Randolph in Fernandez, emphasizing that Randolph’s “holding was limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present.” Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1133. The Court held “that an occupant who is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is absent for any other reason.” Id. at 1134 (emphasis added). As to the Randolph dictum, the Court noted that it “refer[s] to situations in which the removal of the potential objector is not objectively reasonable.” Id. Jones argues that the warrantless search was unconstitutional because the officers removed him for the sake of avoiding a possible objection. Underlying this argument is the dispute of whether Jones was “removed” by the officers as contemplated by Randolph. Jones argues that he was removed 8 No. 16-4254 because, after he voluntarily exited the home, he was removed twenty feet from the entrance to a picnic table on the adjacent property. In response, the government contends that he was not removed because he was only twenty feet away from the entrance of the residence and could see and hear what the searching officers were doing. For our purposes here, we will assume without deciding that Jones was in fact removed, and then the issue becomes whether the removal was objectively reasonable. See Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134. Jones contends that his removal was not objectively reasonable because, unlike the defendant in Fernandez, he was neither under arrest nor read his Miranda rights. Rather, Jones argues that the evidence shows he was detained away from the search on an adjacent property under the guise of “officers’ safety.” We disagree. Prior to the officers conducting the search, Kelley told them that Jones was a convicted felon who had several guns and tendencies of violence and aggression. She also told them that she feared for her life and the lives of her children, one of whom had just reported to those same officers that Jones sexually assaulted her. The officers ran a criminal history check and confirmed Jones’ status as a convicted felon. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Gunning observed knives on a counter near where he initially encountered Jones, who then voluntarily exited the residence. Under these circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to remove him not only for officers’ safety, but also because they had probable cause to arrest him. Moreover, Jones’ attempt to distinguish Fernandez is unavailing. The Fernandez Court held that the Randolph exception does not apply where the defendant’s absence from No. 16-4254 9 the consent colloquy is the result of “lawful detention or arrest.” Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1134. This means that either a lawful detention or arrest may be an objectively reasonable basis for an officer to remove a cotenant. See id. at 1133–34. Even though Jones was neither under arrest nor read his Miranda rights, his removal was objectively reasonable as a lawful detention. See id. Lastly, we note that Jones contends that the district court erred in discrediting his testimony that he objected to the search, and alternatively finding that those alleged objections did not amount to an unequivocal refusal to search under Randolph. See 547 U.S. at 122–23. The outcome of these issues would have no effect—even if Jones expressly refused consent to search—he was no longer “standing at the door and expressly refusing consent” when the officers received Kelley’s consent to search the residence. See id. at 119; Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1133. Instead, Jones was removed due to a lawful detention, and he therefore falls outside the scope of the Randolph exception. See Fernandez, 134 S. Ct. at 1133. As a result, Jones’ objection would have “lost its force.” See Henderson, 536 F.3d at 785. We conclude that Jones’ removal was objectively reasonable, and thus Kelley’s consent was effective to permit the warrantless search of the home.