Opinion ID: 1179552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Remaining Evidentiary Issues

Text: Our conclusion that the judgment must be reversed on account of the failure to grant a change of venue renders it unnecessary to pass on defendant's remaining arguments. For the guidance of the trial court in the event of a retrial, however, we shall address defendant's several contentions concerning the admissibility of evidence. 1. The Admission of Fingerprint Evidence A. Factual Background Defendant contends that certain fingerprint evidence admitted at trial did not meet the chain-of-custody requirements set forth in People v. Riser (1956) 47 Cal.2d 566 [305 P.2d 1], overruled on other grounds in People v. Morse (1964) 60 Cal.2d 631, 649 [36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 33, 12 A.L.R.3d 810] for two reasons: (1) the police investigators were negligent in the collection, processing and comparison of the evidence and later committed perjury to cover up their mistakes, and (2) the trial court misapplied the law in ruling on the custody question. [17] There is no doubt that the evidence in question was mishandled. Prior to trial, the prosecution informed defense counsel that it had not identified defendant's fingerprints on any items in the Graham house. Trial commenced in July 1981. By the trial recess in August, the prosecution had introduced evidence which showed that defendant possessed items stolen from the Graham residence. The only evidence that actually placed defendant at the scene of the murder, however, was McGruder's testimony that he thought he heard defendant's voice in the Graham house  and that testimony had been effectively impeached. The situation changed dramatically when the prosecutor disclosed during the August recess that a fingerprint of the defendant had been identified on a Stoney Ridge business card found in the Graham residence during the initial investigation in June 1980, 14 months earlier. Trial counsel objected to the card's admission on the grounds that it appeared to have been suppressed for over a year and might have been tampered with. Defense counsel also claimed that he had relied to his prejudice on the prosecutor's representation that none of the items in the house contained defendant's fingerprints. After an extended hearing, the trial court admitted the evidence. Four employees of the Sacramento County sheriff's department and a fingerprint analyst for the Justice Department were called by the prosecution to testify at the hearing. Dennis Hill, a sheriff's department fingerprint analyst, testified that he found the card on the kitchen floor of the Graham residence and placed it in a bag along with other items seized from that location. Hill stated several times that he had a distinct recollection of having retrieved the card from the kitchen floor. Following Hill's testimony, however, the prosecution apparently discovered a photograph of the crime scene which showed the Stoney Ridge card lying on a bed in the Graham residence. Thereafter, Hill was recalled to the stand and totally changed his testimony. He stated that earlier he had merely assumed he found the card in the kitchen because it was in the bag with the other items seized from that location. His new position was that he could not specifically recall finding the card in the kitchen or anywhere else in the house. Michael Kidwell, another employee of the sheriff's department, processed the evidence taken from the Graham residence for fingerprints. Kidwell testified that he took a photograph of the latent fingerprint on the Stoney Ridge business card. He conceded that it was possible he had inadvertently commingled the contents of the separate bags containing evidence from the bedroom and the kitchen. To have done so, however, would have been contrary to his standard practice, and Kidwell stated that he had no independent recollection of having commingled the contents of the bags. Photographs of all of the latent fingerprints in the case were forwarded to John Allen, another analyst, for comparison with exemplars from defendant, his brother Kenneth Williams, and others who may have been in the Graham residence. The photographs were sent in seven separate envelopes. The Stoney Ridge business card was contained in the seventh envelope. Allen stated that he completed the comparison of the photographs in the first six envelopes in June 1980. He received the seventh envelope sometime later, but was then unable to locate the exemplars to do the comparisons. Although Allen eventually compared the photographs in the seventh envelope with exemplars from Rod Zeller and Jeff Kearney in October 1980, and with exemplars from Bruce Pfeiffer, Fred and Bettie Graham and the victim in February 1981, for some inexplicable reason he never compared the photograph of the print on the card with exemplars of defendant's fingerprints. Allen further stated that he did not realize his mistake until he reviewed the evidence during the trial recess in August 1981. He then made the comparison and discovered that the print in the photograph of the business card matched defendant's exemplar. Angelo Rienti, a fingerprint analyst for the Department of Justice, testified that because of fading it was not possible to determine whether the actual latent fingerprint on the business card matched defendant's exemplar, but confirmed that the print in the photograph of the card was identical to defendant's. Rienti stated that it is possible under ideal conditions to use a person's fingerprint exemplar to place a print on another surface, but it did not appear to him that such tampering had occurred in this case. The trial court ruled that a sufficient prima facie showing of relevancy and chain of custody had been made to admit the fingerprint evidence. At defense counsel's suggestion, however, the court instructed the jurors that they could consider the evidence only if they found (1) that the business card which contained the fingerprint had been found and seized at the Graham residence, (2) that the fingerprint on the card was defendant's, and (3) that even if the prosecution has failed to establish a continual chain of possession of the item from the time of its initial seizure to presentation in court, the prosecution has nevertheless shown beyond a reasonable doubt and to a moral certainty that there was no alteration of offered evidence. B. Discussion Defendant contends that in view of these facts the prosecution failed to establish a continuous chain of custody, a necessary foundation for the admission of demonstrative evidence. (7) The rules for establishing chain of custody were set forth in the seminal case of People v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d 566: The burden on the party offering the evidence is to show to the satisfaction of the trial court that, taking all the circumstances into account including the ease or difficulty with which the particular evidence could have been altered, it is reasonably certain that there was no alteration. [¶] The requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when some vital link in the chain of possession is not accounted for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence analyzed was not the evidence originally received. Left to such speculation the court must exclude the evidence. [Citations.] Conversely, when it is the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight. ( Id. at pp. 580-581.) (8) In the present case the prosecution was unable to explain satisfactorily two anomalies in the facts and circumstances of the handling of the fingerprint evidence in question. First, the evidence concerning the card's location in the Graham residence was inconsistent: the photograph placed it in the bedroom, yet the evidence bag in which it was contained came from the kitchen. Dennis Hill's inconsistent testimony made the circumstances seem even more suspicious. Nevertheless, defendant adduced no evidence that the card itself had been tampered with or that another card had been substituted in its place. As the trial court observed, whether originally seized from the bedroom or the kitchen, the evidence showed that the card was from the house, that's the overwhelming significance in this case. The second anomaly surrounding the evidence was the prosecution's inexplicable failure, until midtrial, to compare the latent fingerprint on the card with defendant's exemplar. There was no evidence, however, of prosecutorial bad faith or suppression of the evidence. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the belated disclosure resulted in the denial of a fair trial. ( People v. Ruthford (1975) 14 Cal.3d 399, 406-407 [121 Cal. Rptr. 261, 534 P.2d 1341, A.L.R.4th 3132].) We conclude that the evidence was properly admitted. Defendant also contends that the trial court applied an erroneous standard in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence and in permitting the jury to determine its relevance. The contentions are without merit. [W]hen it is the barest speculation that there was tampering, it is proper to admit the evidence and let what doubt remains go to its weight. ( People v. Riser, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 581.) Notwithstanding the prosecution's errors in the handling of the evidence, the trial court properly concluded that the prosecution had made at least a prima facie showing that the evidence had not been tampered with. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence, permitting the jury to hear all of the facts and circumstances surrounding its discovery and disclosure, and requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the card had not been tampered with before considering it. 2. Inspector Smith's Opinion Testimony on Rape Defendant contends that the trial court erred in permitting Inspector Smith to give expert opinion testimony on certain aspects of rape. During the prosecution's case-in-chief and during the defense case, the defense established that there were no marks on defendant's body following the commission of the rape and homicide. During the People's rebuttal, the trial court permitted Inspector Smith to testify, over objection, that during his 17 years of experience with the police he had investigated approximately 100 rape cases and that in his opinion there [was] really nothing unusual about the fact that a defendant would not have any marks upon his body following a sexual assault or a rape of a female victim. Smith went on to testify, over objection, that he base[d] his opinion in part on the emotional make-up of the female victim, and how the woman herself feels she should react under given circumstances.... (9) Defendant contends that Inspector Smith's background and experience were insufficient to permit him to testify, as an expert on rape, that in his opinion it was not unusual for a rapist's body to be unmarked. The contention lacks merit. We are required to uphold the trial judge's ruling on the question of an expert's qualifications absent an abuse of discretion. [Citation.] Such abuse of discretion will be found only where `the evidence shows that a witness clearly lacks qualification as an expert.' ( People v. Chavez (1985) 39 Cal.3d 823, 828 [218 Cal. Rptr. 49, 705 P.2d 372], original italics.) In view of Inspector Smith's unchallenged experience in investigating approximately 100 rape cases, the trial court's ruling that Inspector Smith was qualified to testify that it is not unusual for a rapist to be unmarked after the offense, was not an abuse of discretion. Defendant also contends that the trial court erred in permitting Inspector Smith to testify that the emotional make-up of the victim is a factor which may affect whether the rapist will have any marks on his body. The contention has merit. (10) `The competency of an expert is relative to the topic and fields of knowledge about which the person is asked to make a statement. In considering whether a person qualifies as an expert, the field of expertise must be carefully distinguished and limited.' ( People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24, 39 [130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1240], quoting People v. King (1968) 266 Cal. App.2d 437, 445 [72 Cal. Rptr. 478].) Even assuming that expert testimony was admissible to show that rape victims react in a certain way based upon their emotional make-up (cf. People v. Guthreau (1980) 102 Cal. App.3d 436 [162 Cal. Rptr. 376] and People v. Clark (1980) 109 Cal. App.3d 88 [167 Cal. Rptr. 51]), there was no evidence that Inspector Smith had the requisite psychiatric training and experience to testify on such matters. 3. Motion to Suppress Evidence Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his section 1538.5 motion to suppress evidence, based on his claim that the arrest was unlawful and therefore that all of the evidence seized at the time should be suppressed. He charges illegality on two theories. First, he contends that his arrest on a Sacramento County burglary arrest warrant was invalid because it was allegedly obtained as a pretext to obtain evidence pertinent to the homicide, because the affidavit in support of the arrest warrant failed to establish probable cause, and because the affiant made false and misleading statements. Alternatively, defendant contends that the police lacked independent probable cause to arrest for the homicide. The trial court ruled that the arrest was legal, both because the burglary warrant was valid and because there was probable cause to arrest for the homicide. A. The Facts The record of the section 1538.5 hearing reveals that Inspector Smith inspected the body of the victim shortly after it was discovered in the early morning hours of June 12, 1980. He observed a spent slug and bullet fragments at the scene and concluded that the victim had been shot at that location, possibly by a .38-caliber handgun. Relatives of the victim were contacted who informed Smith that she had been house-sitting for her aunt and uncle, the Grahams, in Sacramento. Officers questioned neighbors of the Grahams, including Kevin McGruder, that day as well as the next, June 13, 1980. From McGruder the police learned that defendant might have known the Grahams were on vacation, that McGruder had driven defendant's brother to the vicinity of the Graham residence, had heard defendant's voice inside the house within hours of the murder, and had called the police to report a disturbance. On the evening of June 12, Inspector Smith learned from Fred Graham, who had just returned from holiday, that a .38-caliber revolver was among the items stolen from the residence. The following morning, June 13, 1980, Inspector Smith learned that the victim's car had been located in Marysville. Field questioning continued through the afternoon, including a follow-up interview with McGruder. About 5:30 p.m., Inspector Smith attempted to contact defendant, who lived with his parents about three-tenths of a mile from the Graham residence. Smith was then told by defendant's mother that she had not seen defendant since midnight of June 11, just hours before the murder. Mrs. Williams directed Smith to another residence where defendant had stayed in the past. The individuals at this location informed Smith that defendant had a girlfriend in Marysville, Tammy French. Smith then went to Marysville on the evening of June 13 and learned that the victim's car was parked within one to two blocks of French's residence. In Marysville, Smith rendezvoused with officers from the Sacramento County sheriff's office, who had simultaneously been putting together an affidavit for an arrest warrant based upon defendant's alleged involvement in two Sacramento burglaries a month earlier. The officers then went to French's residence, knocked on the front door which was a common door to three apartments, and were permitted entry by a young child into a common foyer. They immediately observed defendant peer over a balcony from upstairs and run into an apartment. The officers gave chase, located defendant in the dining room and placed him under arrest. Smith then asked Ms. French if they could speak in private. She led him into the bedroom, where he observed a CB radio on the floor and the other stolen property which defendant had left there the day before. B. Discussion (11) As a general matter, `[a] peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony.' [Citations.] However, ... article I, section 13, of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment of the federal Constitution prohibit warrantless arrests within the home, even upon probable cause, in the absence of exigent circumstances. ( People v. Campa (1984) 36 Cal.3d 870, 878 [206 Cal. Rptr. 114, 686 P.2d 634]; see also People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 270-277 [127 Cal. Rptr. 629, 545 P.2d 1333]; Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 589-590 [63 L.Ed.2d 639, 652-653, 100 S.Ct. 1371].) The same constitutional protection extends to individuals sought to be arrested in someone else's private dwelling. ( People v. Tillery (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 975, 978-979 [160 Cal. Rptr. 650].) (12) `[E]xigent circumstances' means an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence. There is no ready litmus test for determining whether such circumstances exist, and in each case the claim of an extraordinary situation must be measured by the facts known to the officers. ( People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 276.) Although the United States Supreme Court has not fully delineated the scope of the exigent circumstances exception, it has recognized the seminal case of Dorman v. United States (D.C. Cir.1970) 435 F.2d 385 [140 App.D.C. 313] as a leading federal case defining exigent circumstances ... in a warrantless arrest situation. ( Welsh v. Wisconsin (1984) 466 U.S. 740, 751 [80 L.Ed.2d 732, 744, 104 S.Ct. 2091]; see People v. Lanfrey (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 491, 508 [251 Cal. Rptr. 189].) (13) Dorman found the following factors relevant to a determination of exigent circumstances: First, that a grave offense is involved, particularly one that is a crime of violence... [¶] Second, ... that the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed. Delay in arrest of an armed felon may well increase danger to the community ... [¶] Third, that there exists ... a clear showing of probable cause ... [¶] Fourth, strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered. [¶] Fifth, a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended. [¶] Sixth, the circumstance that the entry, though not consented, is made peaceably. (435 F.2d at pp. 392-393; accord People v. Lanfrey, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d at p. 508; United States v. Crespo (2d Cir.1987) 834 F.2d 267, 270; United States v. Davis (8th Cir.1986) 785 F.2d 610, 615.) Both federal and California cases have found exigency where there was a threat that delay would result in the destruction of evidence. ( People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 276; People v. Lanfrey, supra, 204 Cal. App.3d at p. 508; People v. Keltie (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 773, 779-780 [196 Cal. Rptr. 243]; United States v. Davis, supra, 785 F.2d at p. 615.) (14) All of the foregoing factors justified, indeed compelled, the warrantless arrest in this case. The crimes were vicious and violent. The suspect was quite clearly armed. The police had obtained trustworthy information pointing to defendant as one of the perpetrators. The proximity of the victim's car clearly suggested defendant's presence in the apartment, and also made flight a realistic possibility. The entry was peaceable. Moreover, the possibility that defendant might have learned from friends or family that the police were looking for him and might, as a result, dispose of any blood-stained clothing, stolen property or the murder weapon made arrest all the more urgent. There was no unjustified delay by the investigating officers during which time an arrest warrant for the homicide could have been obtained. Inspector Smith's field investigation had been progressing steadily from the morning of the murder, on June 12, to the early evening of the 13th. At that point, as Inspector Smith testified, everything [was] starting to ... come together. Viewed as a whole, the circumstances confronting the officers were more than sufficiently urgent to justify a warrantless arrest of defendant in his girlfriend's apartment for the rape, robbery and homicide. In view of the foregoing conclusion, we need not address defendant's alternative contention concerning the validity of the burglary arrest warrant.