Opinion ID: 1742506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: evidence of habit and custom

Text: Whitted testified that he did not have a specific recollection of informing either Harry Borley or Maxine Borley of the need to file a continuation statement within 5 years of filing the original financing statement. Over an objection that he lacked personal knowledge, Whitted was permitted to testify as to his habit and custom in advising parties in seller-financed transactions. Borley Storage contends that the district court erred in receiving this testimony over its objection. The issue presented by this assignment of error is governed by § 27-406, which provides: (1) Evidence of the habit of a person or of the routine practice of an organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or routine practice. (2) Habit or routine practice may be proved by testimony in the form of an opinion or by specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit existed or that the practice was routine. Although this court has not interpreted or applied this rule, the Nebraska Court of Appeals did so in Hoffart v. Hodge, 9 Neb.App. 161, 609 N.W.2d 397 (2000). In that case, the Court of Appeals examined whether a medical doctor offered sufficient foundation to support his testimony in a malpractice action as to his regular practice and routine. At the outset, the court noted that its analysis was limited to situations where a party attempts to prove habit by way of opinion rather than by specific instances of conduct, because there was no record made of the doctor's habit based on specific conduct in specific similar situations. Id. at 167, 609 N.W.2d at 403. The court further noted the precise contours of how frequently and consistently a behavior must occur to rise to the level of habit cannot be easily defined or formulated, and thus concluded that admissibility depends on the trial judge's evaluation of the particular facts of the case. Id. Thus, the trial court's decision to admit habit evidence based on opinion will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. In Hoffart, the doctor testified that he regularly saw 140 patients per week for 15 years. He stated that during the relevant time period, he had a policy of advising his patients of mammogram failure rates and he generally told them a mammogram would be `10 to 15 percent not accurate.' Id. at 169, 609 N.W.2d at 404. Although the doctor could not specifically remember advising the patient at issue of the mammogram failure rates, it was his opinion that he would have informed her because it was his regular practice to do so. The Court of Appeals concluded that although the foundation for this opinion was not thoroughly or artfully presented, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding it to be admissible. Id. at 170, 609 N.W.2d at 405. The court noted that [t]he lack of detail concerning regularity (which involves frequency and consistency), specificity, and involuntary response, which are the hallmarks of proof of habit by specific instances rather than by opinion, does not render the opinion evidence inadmissible. Id. Rather, the court found that the absence of detail went to the weight which the fact finder would place on such evidence. In the instant case, Whitted testified that he drafted all of the documents for the sale of Borley Storage. He stated that he had a procedure or checklist he followed in seller-financed transactions like that in which he represented Borley Storage. He stated that the documents involved in such transactions are generally the same. In addition, Whitted testified: Generally in a seller-financed transaction I would go through the documents with the client. And in going through the documents with the client, I would tell them of the effect of the document. For example, I would tell them that the stock pledge entitled to [sic] them to basically enforce the stock pledge and irrevocable stock power and take back the stock. I would have told them whatthat the security interest in the personal property entitled them to repossess the personal property or to sell the personal property for satisfaction of the debt. I would tell them that it was perfected by virtue of filing with the Secretary of State, and I would tell them that the financing statement was good for a period of time and subject to later continuation. Whitted stated that with respect to the Borley Storage sale, he would have advised that the financing statement needed to be continued after 5 years because that was his standard operating procedure. We agree with the analytical principles applied by the Court of Appeals in Hoffart v. Hodge, 9 Neb.App. 161, 609 N.W.2d 397 (2000), and conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting this testimony. As in Hoffart, this case focuses on a professional service rendered years prior to testimony in a malpractice action. In Hoffart, the court recognized the practical reality that a doctor cannot be expected to specifically recall the advice or explanation he or she gives to each and every patient he or she sees or treats and that thus, evidence of habit may be the only vehicle available for a doctor to prove that he or she acted in a particular way on a particular occasion and is therefore highly relevant. 9 Neb. App. at 168, 609 N.W.2d at 404. The same reality exists with respect to advice which is routinely given by a lawyer to a client in particular circumstances. Whitted testified that he has practiced law in Nebraska since 1974, focusing his practice on real estate and corporate transactional law, including the sale of businesses of all sizes. Although Borley Storage argues that Whitted did not provide a specific number of transactions in which he had been professionally involved or the details of any specific transaction, we conclude that this goes to the weight to be given to his testimony and not to its admissibility.