Opinion ID: 1364765
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plea Agreement of Codefendant

Text: Thornton next argues the Government improperly questioned his codefendant, Nirvana Martin, about the details of Martin's plea agreement. Defendant did not object at trial to this line of questioning, so we review the admission of such testimony for plain error. See United States v. Zidell, 323 F.3d 412, 425 (6th Cir.2003). On direct examination, the Government questioned Martin about the charge to which he pled guilty, the statutory penalties and sentencing guideline range he confronted, the reason for his agreement to testify at trial, and the charges which the Government had agreed to dismiss as a result of his cooperation. The Government then questioned Martin directly about his relationship with Thornton. Several pages of Martin's plea agreement were published to the jury during the Government's direct examination. However, the district court did not admit the agreement itself as evidence. Defense counsel did not object to the Government's questioning or publication of the plea agreement, nor did defense counsel request a limiting instruction on the permissible use of the plea agreement. Defense counsel's sole objection was to a question asking whether Martin had an understanding where the guidelines placed him in the permissible statutory range of ten years to life. On cross-examination, defense counsel also questioned Martin regarding the plea agreement, including his potential sentence. During closing argument, the Government never mentioned the plea agreement, and defense counsel mentioned it only briefly in an attempt to impugn Martin's credibility. The district court instructed the jury that [e]vidence of . . . prior convictions was brought to your attention only as one way of helping you decide how believable [the witnesses'] testimony was. Do not use the evidence of the prior convictions for any other purpose. Thornton claims two forms of prejudice from the prosecutor's questioning of Martin. First, he argues the jury might have used Martin's guilty pleaan admission of guilt already accepted by the District Courtas direct evidence of Thornton's own guilt. Second, Thornton argues that Martin's testimony about his own sentence may have confused the jury about the sentence Thornton was facing. These arguments are foreclosed by circuit precedent. We have previously ruled that a guilty plea of a codefendant may not be received as substantive evidence of a codefendant's guilt, but may properly be considered as evidence of a witness' credibility. United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 214 (6th Cir.1986) (citing United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir.1981)). Moreover, under proper instruction, evidence of a guilty plea may be elicited by the prosecutor on direct examination so that the jury may assess the credibility of the witnesses the government asks them to believe. Id. We have explained that a plea agreement could be interpreted as either bolstering or hurting a witness' credibility, so that introduction of the entire agreement is appropriate to permit the jury to consider fully the possible conflicting motivations underlying the witness' testimony. United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 416 (6th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 163 (6th Cir.1986)). In addition, [t]he prosecutor may . . . wish to place the plea before the jury so as to blunt defense efforts at impeachment and dispel the suggestion that the government or its witness has something to hide. Christian, 786 F.2d at 214. Here, the Government relies on this last rationale in defending its use of the plea agreement during direct examination, and the legitimacy of this strategy was validated by defense counsel's efforts to undermine Martin's credibility on cross-examination. Moreover, although [a] guilty plea entered by a codefendant can be especially prejudicial if the plea is made in connection with a conspiracy to which the remaining defendants are charged, . . . much of this potential for prejudice is negated when the pleading codefendant . . . testifies regarding the specific facts underlying the crimes in issue. Christian, 786 F.2d at 214 (citing United States v. DeLucca, 630 F.2d 294, 298 (5th Cir.1980)). In this case, Martin testified directly about his relationship with Thornton and the drug-related acts in question. Thus, under the rationale of Christian, the potential prejudice of the conspiracy plea was negated. As to the risk of potential confusion about the sentence Thornton was facing, some discussion of a codefendant's potential sentence is inevitable if the Government is allowed to explore a codefendant's motivation for testifying. Furthermore, in this case, defense counsel also inquired into Martin's potential sentence, so Thornton cannot legitimately claim this information prejudiced him. In sum, Martin's testimony about his plea agreement was permissible in order to allow the jury to fully assess his credibility. The Government did not cite the plea agreement for any improper purpose during closing argument. See United States v. Carson, 560 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir.2009). The court gave the jury a cautionary instruction on the use of prior convictions. Under these circumstances, allowing testimony about the details of Martin's plea agreement was not error.