Opinion ID: 2320625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Atkins v. State

Text: Atkins was convicted of three counts of second-degree assault stemming from a physical altercation of unexplained origin that culminated eventually in Atkins drawing a foldable-blade pocketknife and wounding three people. Atkins, 421 Md. at 438-39, 26 A.3d at 981. Three days later, police obtained a search warrant for Atkins' home and retrieved a 12-inch-long (6 inch, non-foldable blade), black knife from his bedside table. Atkins, 421 Md. at 439, 26 A.3d at 981. At trial, the State relied heavily on this knife as evidence of the crime, while the defense counsel focused on the lack of physical evidence collected from the knife tying it to the crime through DNA or fingerprints. Atkins, 421 Md. at 440-42, 26 A.3d at 981-83. Moreover, an eyewitness called by the State testified that she saw a silver (not black) knife used by Atkins at the affray. The trial court, over Atkins's objection, delivered the same scientific evidence jury instruction at issue in the present case. Atkins, 421 Md. at 441-42, 26 A.3d at 982-83. The Court of Special Appeals, based on its holding in Evans, 174 Md.App. at 549, 922 A.2d at 620, affirmed the trial court's use of the jury instruction. We reversed, however, finding that the instruction was not proper under the facts of the case, was fairly covered in the instructions actually given, and, rather than solving a problem arising from the circumstances of the case, created a problem that unfairly prejudiced the defendant's case. Atkins, 421 Md. at 447, 26 A.3d at 986. In Atkins, we stated that the most important consideration in evaluating whether a trial judge abused his/her discretion in giving a scientific evidence jury instruction is whether the instruction will run afoul of the prohibition against relieving the State of its burden where . . . its relation [of the instruction] to the reasonable doubt standard [is] unclear. 421 Md. at 451, 26 A.3d at 988 (quoting Evans, 174 Md.App. at 571, 922 A.2d at 633). Further, we evaluated whether there was a need for a curative instruction to clarify the State's burden as it relates to specific investigative techniques or scientific tests. Id. We concluded that defense counsel questioned properly the lack of evidence presented by the State by asking, during cross-examination of police witnesses, whether the police were capable of looking for blood or skin cells on the knife recovered from Atkins's bedroom during a legitimate, brief, and reasonable inquiry. Atkins, 421 Md. at 452-53, 26 A.3d at 989 (relying on Sample v. State, 314 Md. 202, 207, 550 A.2d 661, 663 (1988), where we stated that when the State has failed to utilize a well-known, readily available, and superior method of proof to link the defendant with the criminal activity, the defendant ought to be able to comment on the absence of such evidence). Under the circumstances in Atkins, the jury instruction constituted an improper comment on the weight of the evidence, thus abrogating Atkins's protected right to a fair trial. 421 Md. at 453, 26 A.3d at 989. We found that the instruction directed the jury to ignore the fact that the State had not presented evidence connecting the knife to his crime, implying that the lack of such evidence is not necessary or relevant to the determination of guilt, and to disregard any argument by the defense to the contrary. Id.