Opinion ID: 6497989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Search and Arrest

Text: Our conclusion that Sergeant López-Maysonet lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the initial seizure of SierraAyala does not end the inquiry. The government argues that an intervening voluntary act -- Sierra-Ayala's display of the contents of the bag to Sergeant López-Maysonet -- provided independent probable cause to arrest Sierra-Ayala, rendering any lack of reasonable suspicion prior to the voluntary act irrelevant to suppression.11 Appellant offers two arguments in response. First, appellant contends that the district court clearly erred in concluding that he spontaneously and voluntarily displayed the contents of the bag to Sergeant López-Maysonet, thereby obviating 11The government also argues that we need not reach the merits of Sierra-Ayala's suppression arguments because Sierra-Ayala lacks standing to challenge the search of the bag. We do not address the standing issue. Unlike Article III standing, Fourth Amendment standing is not jurisdictional, and courts may address whether a seizure or search was adequately supported -- by reasonable suspicion or probable cause and exigent circumstances -- before resolving whether a defendant has standing to challenge the search or seizure. Byrd, 138 S. Ct. at 1530-31. The district court's written order concluded that Sierra-Ayala lacked standing to challenge the discovery of the drugs, and denied the motion to suppress on that basis. Subsequently, the district court also made the factual finding that Sierra-Ayala acted voluntarily in displaying the contents of the bag to Sergeant López-Maysonet. - 24 - the need for probable cause for a search. Second, appellant argues that even if the district court properly concluded that he acted voluntarily, suppression of the drugs and the firearm is nevertheless appropriate under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. We consider these arguments in turn.
At the suppression hearings, the parties presented opposing testimony on the issue of voluntariness. Sierra-Ayala testified that Sergeant López-Maysonet observed the contents of the bag only because he ordered Sierra-Ayala to turn the bag over. Sierra-Ayala argued then, and argues again on appeal, that Sergeant López-Maysonet's coercive inspection of the bag was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to which Sierra-Ayala did not consent. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 497 ([W]ithout a warrant to search Royer's luggage and in the absence of probable cause and exigent circumstances, the validity of the search depended on Royer's purported consent.). The government, on the other hand, argues that Sierra-Ayala voluntarily showed Sergeant LópezMaysonet the contents of the bag, such that López-Maysonet's observation of the bag's contents was not an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. Where the government defends the validity of a search based on an individual's consent, the government has the burden of proving that the necessary consent was obtained and that it was - 25 - freely and voluntarily given, a burden that is not satisfied by showing a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority. Royer, 460 U.S. at 497. Sergeant López-Maysonet testified that SierraAyala freely and voluntarily showed him the bag, without any prompting. After hearing Sierra-Ayala's competing testimony, the magistrate judge made the factual finding that Sierra-Ayala voluntarily displayed the bag's contents to Sergeant LópezMaysonet. The Report and Recommendation identified several factors supporting the magistrate judge's determination that López-Maysonet's testimony on this point was credible.12 The district court adopted this factual finding in a written order, after a de novo suppression hearing and subsequent status conference that addressed the voluntariness issue. Although appellant offers several arguments for why the lower court's credibility assessment of the competing testimony on voluntariness was wrong,13 he does not identify objective evidence 12 These factors include López-Maysonet's tone and demeanor and the logic and plausibility of his version of the events, as compared to the inconsistencies and implausibilities of SierraAyala's version of events. The magistrate judge specifically found implausible Sierra-Ayala's testimony regarding the prices of the goods he sought to purchase and the story . . . that he was literally caught holding the bag. 13Specifically, Sierra-Ayala argues that the district court overlooked the generally implausible nature of Sergeant LópezMaysonet's testimony, the nonsensical logic of Sierra-Ayala's supposedly voluntary action, Sergeant López-Maysonet's evasiveness during testimony, and Sergeant López-Maysonet's disciplinary history. - 26 - that contradicts [Sergeant López-Maysonet's] story. GuzmánBatista, 783 F.3d at 937. Nor was Sergeant López-Maysonet's testimony so internally inconsistent or implausible that no reasonable factfinder would credit it. Id. Because appellant's evidentiary arguments do not leave us with a definite and firm conviction that the district court erred in crediting Sergeant López-Maysonet's testimony, Jones, 187 F.3d at 214 (quoting Rostoff, 164 F.3d at 71), the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Sierra-Ayala displayed the drugs to Sergeant López-Maysonet without prompting from the sergeant. See United States v. Casellas-Toro, 807 F.3d 380, 390 (1st Cir. 2015) (noting that the voluntariness of a consent search is a factual determination for the district court); accord United States v. Coraine, 198 F.3d 306, 308 (1st. Cir. 1999). Upon observing the drugs in the bag due to this voluntary act, Sergeant López-Maysonet acquired probable cause to arrest Sierra-Ayala and to conduct a search of him incident to arrest. Ordinarily, this conclusion would end our inquiry and warrant affirmance of the district court's order denying SierraAyala's motion to suppress. But because appellant also argues that his voluntary act is inextricably linked to the initial unconstitutional seizure that precipitated his display of the bag, we next address whether suppression is warranted under the fruitof-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. - 27 -
The fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine is an extension of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule that requires indirect fruits recovered after an initial Fourth Amendment violation to be suppressed if they bear a sufficiently close relationship to the underlying illegality. Camacho, 661 F.3d at 729 (quoting New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19 (1990)). Because the exclusionary rule is a 'prudential' doctrine whose sole purpose . . . is to deter future Fourth Amendment violations, Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236-37 (2011) (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)),14 suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree is not appropriate where the connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery and seizure of the evidence is 'so attenuated as to dissipate the taint,' Camacho, 661 F.3d at 729 (quoting Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 805 (1984)). The notion of the 'dissipation of the taint' attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost. United States v. Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d 64, 75 (1st Cir. 2015) 14As the Court emphasized in Davis, [e]xclusion is 'not a personal constitutional right,' nor is it designed to 'redress the injury' occasioned by an unconstitutional search. 564 U.S. at 236 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976)). - 28 - (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring)). In the context of a voluntary confession after an illegal arrest, to which appellant analogizes his situation, courts examine [t]he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct to determine whether suppression of the statements is warranted under the fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04 (citations and footnote omitted). And, of closer relevance to the situation here, we have held that the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine may be implicated where an individual's voluntary consent to a search of his belongings followed an initial Fourth Amendment violation that significantly influenced his decision to consent. United States v. NavedoColón, 996 F.2d 1337, 1339 (1st Cir. 1993).15 The key inquiry is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint. Cordero- 15Whether the initial illegality play[ed] a significant role in obtaining appellant's consent is a factual question for the district court. Navedo-Colón, 996 F.2d at 1339; see also CorderoRosario, 786 F.3d at 73, 78 (remanding for the district court to make the factual finding after reversing the holding that the searches . . . did not violate the Fourth Amendment). - 29 - Rosario, 786 F.3d at 75-76 (emphasis added) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)); accord United States v. Delgado-Pérez, 867 F.3d 244, 257-58 (1st Cir. 2017).16 Applying these principles, we conclude that the circumstances of this case do not warrant suppression of the evidence recovered from Sierra-Ayala as fruits of the poisonous tree. To start, we recognize that this case differs from the consented-to search at issue in Navedo-Colón, where the district court assumed without deciding that the initial alleged illegality (an illegal x-ray) was unlawful. 996 F.2d at 1338. Here, in contrast, the district court concluded that Sierra-Ayala was not seized, and thus it did not consider the fruit-of-the-poisonoustree issue. Nevertheless, the district court made factual findings that give us sufficient information to determine whether SierraAyala's display of the bag was obtained by exploitation of the underlying illegality. See Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d at 78 (remanding where we lack[ed] sufficient information to determine whether [the] consent was obtained by exploitation of the underlying illegality); Navedo-Colón, 996 F.2d at 1338-39 16 Although [h]ow appellant's mind worked at the time -- whether or not the [initial illegality] significantly influenced his action -- is a factual determination for the district court that we review for clear error, Navedo-Colón, 996 F.2d at 1339, [i]n determining the outcome under the attenuation doctrine, the court of appeals does not defer to the district court. United States v. Paradis, 351 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir. 2003). In other words, our review is de novo. - 30 - (holding that although the district court did not explicitly deny a causal connection between the x-ray and appellant's consent, a [f]air[] read[ing] of its opinion indicates that the court asked, and answered, the correct causal question in deciding whether to suppress evidence of consent). Even assuming a causal connection between the voluntary display of the bag and the initial illegal seizure effected by the arriving officers' show of authority due to their temporal proximity, the facts found by the district court do not support the conclusion that the causal link . . . is so tight that the evidence acquired pursuant to that [voluntary act] must be suppressed. Delgado-Pérez, 867 F.3d at 257 (quoting CorderoRosario, 786 F.3d at 76); see also United States v. SerranoAcevedo, 892 F.3d 454, 460 (1st Cir. 2018) (indicating that suppression is not warranted where the causal link between an initial illegality and subsequent consent is sufficiently attenuated). Nothing about the behavior of the officers at the scene generally, or Sergeant López-Maysonet's particular actions towards Sierra-Ayala, can be read as exploit[ing] the primary illegality, Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d at 78, to induce SierraAyala to display the contents of the bag. See United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2019) ('[T]he purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct' . . . 'is the most important part of the analysis because it is tied directly to the rationale - 31 - underlying the exclusionary rule, deterrence of police misconduct.' (first quoting Cordero-Rosario, 786 F.3d at 76; and then quoting United States v. Stark, 499 F.3d 72, 77 (1st Cir. 2007))). According to Sergeant López-Maysonet's testimony, which the district court credited, Officers Lopez Garcia and Garcia Nieves, upon arriving at the site, exiting their vehicle, and announcing themselves as law enforcement, chased several individuals into the woods as other officers arrived. Sergeant López-Maysonet was behind Officer [Garcia Nieves] when [he] noticed an individual that remained sitting down on a plastic chair, so [Sergeant López-Maysonet] turned and . . . identified [him]self as a police officer and the individual stood up facing [him], . . . turned to the right and . . . opened [the bag he was holding] and showed [López-Maysonet] the contents. To be sure, the officers' cumulative show of force as they pursued the fleeing individuals contributed to the seizure of Sierra-Ayala. But chasing other fleeing individuals cannot be interpreted as exploiting the illegal seizure to induce the seized individual to surrender evidence. Cf. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (unprovoked flight may provide reasonable suspicion to investigate fleeing individuals). Nor was turning towards Sierra-Ayala and identifying himself as a police officer while the other officers pursued those in flight flagrant misconduct by Sergeant López- - 32 - Maysonet. See Smith, 919 F.3d at 12 (distinguishing the professional and polite interactions at issue from the extreme tactics the Supreme Court [has] deemed coercive). Any number of scenarios could have followed Sergeant López-Maysonet's identification of himself as law enforcement, including an order from the sergeant to hand over the bag -- which likely would have been deemed to exploit the initial seizure -- but also a notification that Sierra-Ayala was free to go -- which clearly would not. But, as the district court found, nothing exploitative happened: Sergeant López-Maysonet just identified himself, and [Sierra-Ayala] gave him the bag. These facts render this case quite unlike Camacho, where we suppressed evidence under the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine after police officers engaged in aggressive questioning of Camacho after an illegal stop and [t]he only intervening action by Camacho between the illegal stop and the frisk [that precipitated the discovery of evidence] was removing his hands from his pockets at [an officer]'s direction. 661 F.3d at 729-30. Sierra-Ayala's intervening volitional act, in the absence of exploitative behavior by LópezMaysonet, renders the discovery of the drugs sufficiently attenuated so as to dissipate the taint of the initial unlawful seizure. Hence, we affirm the district court's denial of SierraAyala's motion to suppress. See United States v. Rivera, 825 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2016) ([B]ecause of the de novo component to our - 33 - review, we can affirm on any ground appearing in the record . . . .).