Opinion ID: 1309759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: pattern of racketeering activity

Text: Defendant contends that because the State failed to convict him on at least two of the eight indictments which charged him with distribution of a controlled substance, it failed to prove that he engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity necessary to convict under section 76-10-1603. Pattern of racketeering activity is defined by section 76-10-1602(4) [2] as engaging in at least two episodes of racketeering conduct which have the same or similar objectives, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Acts constituting racketeering under section 76-10-1602(1) do not need to be charged or indicted, and under subsection (w) they include soliciting, requesting, commanding, encouraging, or intentionally aiding another in commission of any of the illegal activities listed in section 76-10-1602. We are cognizant of federal cases that reverse convictions under the Racketeer Influences and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962-1968 (RICO), after the same court has reversed the conviction of a predicate crime upon which the jury may have relied in reaching the RICO conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 583 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 909, 99 S.Ct. 1217, 59 L.Ed.2d 456, reh'g denied, 441 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 2019, 60 L.Ed.2d 389 (1979); United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831, 105 S.Ct. 118, 83 L.Ed.2d 60 (1984). However, those cases have no application here since none of the predicate acts which support the racketeering charge have been invalidated. It is true that in the instant case, the jury acquitted defendant on seven indictments for distributing a controlled substance. The eighth indictment charging him with that crime was amended to an attempt to distribute, and he was convicted of that charge. However, we are unable to subscribe to defendant's argument that the jury's verdict indicates that the State did not prove two episodes of racketeering conduct but only one. The indictment for racketeering charges defendant with racketeering between February 15 and July 15, 1983, in Weber County, but does not refer to the eight alleged sales which formed the basis for the eight indictments for distribution. The instruction given to the jury on racketeering (No. 8) did not limit the jury's deliberations to the eight incidents charged in the indictments for distribution which allegedly occurred on specific dates ranging from May 15 to July 15, 1983. Instead, instruction No. 8 was much broader. It permitted the jury to consider any two occasions between February 15 and July 15, 1983, when defendant intentionally supplied cocaine to Marcus. In contrast, the instruction on distribution for value (No. 6) required the jury to find that Marcus (not defendant) made sales of cocaine to the person alleged in the indictment in question on the date alleged; that defendant was a principal in that sale because he was a wholesaler of the cocaine intentionally supplied to Marcus; that defendant intended that it was reasonably certain that Mr. Marcus would further wholesale the cocaine to individuals such as Mr. Hastie or others, who would eventually retail it; that defendant, as an individual wholesaler, knew in general the type of sales that would be made; that defendant intended that Mr. Marcus would make illegal sales of the general type that would occur on opportunity; and that the total of the evidence must be that it is reasonable to conclude that each are legally responsible for the intentional furtherance of the crime of reselling all or part of said inventory, and guilty thereof. The instruction cautioned, however, that the mere fact, if it is a fact, that Mr. McGrath with reasonable certainty delivered, or attempted to deliver, or helped arrange for Mr. Marcus to have cocaine available for sale, would not alone be sufficient. In summary, conviction of defendant on the indictments for distribution required proof of many elements that were not required in instruction No. 8 on racketeering which simply required proof that on at least two occasions, defendant sold cocaine to Marcus. Counsel for defendant recognizes, in his brief, the stringent requirements of proving defendant guilty of distribution. There, he explains the acquittals: Seven of the indictments were based upon sales made by Eric Marcus, of which the Defendant had no knowledge... . [D]efendant ... did [not] know the person to whom the sales were made. It is therefore entirely consistent that the jury could acquit defendant on some or all of the indictments for distribution and yet find him guilty of supplying cocaine to Marcus on any two occasions during a five-month period. In arguing his posttrial motion for arrest of judgment, defendant's counsel conceded that the jury could have reasonably found from the evidence that there were at least two episodes of racketeering conduct. The main ground for the motion was that the evidence was insufficient to prove the existence of an enterprise. Counsel stated in his argument: There was evidence adduced at trial, I will concede, that the jury could reasonably infer therefrom that there was at least a couple of transactions that went on, two episodes, two predicate crimes. ... . Your Honor, that is my main concern that expressed in U.S. v. Anderson is that what was adduced at trial was only a showing that the defendant engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, that he distributed controlled substances, that he received from them  he received for them something of value. I submit to the court that there was no evidence that there was any organization or association, the words the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court used in defining enterprise in the Turkette case. There was no evidence of proof of sharing or splitting. ... . I don't believe there is any interpretation in the evidence that can show anything more than that the predicate crimes occurred, and that there was no evidence that there was an enterprise within the requisite meaning of that word that we have to have to satisfy the fifth amendment. ... . All I'm saying is, is then the proof that was adduced in this case it was shown pretty clearly that the defendant exercised in a pattern of racketeering activity; that's what those 74 things are. The 74 incidents are a pattern of racketeering activity. The seventy-four incidents referred to by counsel for defendant are the seventy-four transactions between defendant and Marcus which were entered in a ledger book kept by Marcus (see section VI infra ). No objection was made to the giving of instructions No. 6 or 8 by defendant. While we recognize that a criminal defendant is entitled to notice of the charges against him so that he can adequately defend against them, no objection was raised in the trial court by defendant as to lack of notice, nor was any surprise claimed. On this appeal, defendant does not complain of lack of notice or surprise. As heretofore pointed out, section 76-10-1602(1) provides that the acts constituting racketeering do not need to be charged or indicted. Since jury instruction No. 8 on racketeering did not limit the jury to a consideration of the eight charges of distribution or attempted distribution, the jury's verdict does not indicate that the State did not prove two episodes of racketeering conduct.