Opinion ID: 432214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the hospital's claims

Text: 13 Section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section [7 of the Act]. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(1) (1976). Among the rights protected by this provision are the employees' right to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing .... 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157 (1976). The right of employees to exercise freedom of choice in selecting their collective bargaining representatives is at the very center of our national labor relations policy. Conair, at 1378. When an employer interferes with the exercise of this right by coercing employees to oppose unionization, it violates section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 14 The Board found that Saint Francis committed numerous unfair labor practices which may be grouped into five separate categories: announcement of a wage increase two weeks prior to the Union election; the unlawful promise of benefits; threats to employees for supporting the Union; interrogation of employees as to their support for the Union; and a discriminatory refusal to pay registration fees and grant time off to employees to attend a Union-sponsored seminar in violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3) (1976). Saint Francis petitions for review of the Board's specific findings of unfair labor practices and its imposition of a bargaining order. 15 We hold that there is substantial evidence to support the findings of unfair labor practices by the Board. Although each of these findings is vigorously contested by the [Hospital], it is firmly established that findings of the Board are entitled to judicial deference if supported by substantial evidence. Pedro's Inc. v. NLRB, 652 F.2d 1005, 1007 (D.C.Cir.1981). In holding that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's findings of unlawful threats and interrogations we are mindful of the Supreme Court's admonition in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 1941, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1965) that we take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear. Because the Hospital's claims concerning the wage increase, the promise of benefits, and the seminar policy raise questions about the applicable legal principles, we set forth our reasoning as to those issues in some detail.
16 When a representation election is pending, conferral of benefits for the purpose of inducing employees to vote against the union interferes with the employees' protected right to organize. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409, 84 S.Ct. 457, 459, 11 L.Ed.2d 435 (1964). Section 8(a)(1) prohibits not only intrusive threats and promises but also conduct immediately favorable to employees which is undertaken with the express purpose of impinging upon their freedom of choice for or against unionization and is reasonably calculated to have that effect. Id. 17 An 8(a)(1) violation may occur where the timing of an otherwise legitimate conferral of benefits is too close to an election. If a benefit is granted in the normal course of the business of an employer, without any motive of inducing employees to vote against the union ... no violation occurs. Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1008 (emphasis added). This normal course of business analysis applies to two distinct issues: the decision to confer benefits and the timing of the grant of such benefits. Id. at 1008 n. 9. Thus the timing of the announcement of a wage increase may violate section 8(a)(1), even though the employer's initial decision to raise wages was perfectly legitimate. J.J. Newberry Co. v. NLRB, 645 F.2d 148, 151 (2d Cir.1981). See also NLRB v. Styletek, Division of Pandel-Bradford, Inc., 520 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir.1975). 18 We agree with the ALJ that, under the facts of this case, the timing of the wage increase raised a strong presumption that the Hospital intended to interfere with the employees' section 7 rights. 263 NLRB at 850. See Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1009 and n. 11. In Styletek, the court explained: 19 Wage increases and associated benefits may be well warranted for business reasons; still the Board is under no duty to permit them to be husbanded until right before an election and sprung on the employees in a manner calculated to influence the employees' choice. 20 .... 21 ... [W]hen an employer, without having some fairly rudimentary factual explanation for the timing, announces benefits after the petition for election is filed and two weeks before a representation election, it must take the chance that the Board will ascribe to it improper motives. 22 520 F.2d at 280, 282 (citations omitted). 23 The Board's conclusion that Saint Francis failed to provide an adequate justification for the increase is supported by substantial evidence. The wage increase was announced two weeks prior to the representation election and constituted a change in Saint Francis' policy. Prior to 1979, the Hospital granted pay raises to its employees twice a year. Each employee received an across-the-board increase in January or February and a merit increase on the anniversary of his or her employment with the Hospital. In January, 1979, the Hospital announced its intention to comply with President Carter's wage guidelines. It provided a seven percent annual cost-of-living raise to all staff and announced that it would discontinue its policy of granting additional merit increases during the year. 24 Other hospitals in Milwaukee adopted similar policies, but by early summer, some of them had already deviated from the Carter guidelines. During the summer--while the Union's organizational campaign intensified--the Hospital's Personnel Director, Mr. Smith, made two separate recommendations to the administration concerning wage increases. On July 3, Smith recommended that the Hospital increase the entry rate for nurses so that Saint Francis would be competitive with other area hospitals. No action was taken on that recommendation. On August 22, five days after the Union had obtained a card majority, Smith submitted specific wage increase calculations to Hospital administrators urging them to adopt the wage increases and to announce that decision to the employees within ten days. One day later, the Union filed its election petition with the Board. 25 The Hospital did not take any immediate action on either of Smith's recommendations. Then, on October 12--two weeks prior to the Union election--David Rose, the new Administrator, announced three new wage policies for the Hospital: an across-the-board increase of ten percent which would go into effect on November 4; the reinstitution of merit pay increases beginning on January 1, 1980; and the Hospital's intention to consider further wage increases in July, 1980. 26 Saint Francis contends that there was a legitimate business justification for the pay increase. Because other hospitals in Milwaukee were raising wages in violation of President Carter's voluntary guidelines, Saint Francis argues that it needed to raise its wages to remain competitive. Assuming arguendo that the size of the wage increase was justified, Saint Francis has failed to provide an adequate business justification for timing the announcement of the increase two weeks prior to the election. 27 The Hospital justifies the timing of the announcement on the ground that it was in an unresolvable dilemma. Personnel Director Smith recommended specific wage increases in August. Thus the Hospital had been considering wage increases long before the October announcement and had avoided granting an increase while the Union's election petition was pending before the Board. Furthermore, when it announced adherence to President Carter's guidelines in January, the Hospital said it would consider a further increase if money became available later in the year. The Hospital argues that, combined with the timing of Smith's specific recommendations in August, the nurses' expectations of a wage hike placed it in a no-win situation. If it granted a benefit, it might be charged with committing an unfair labor practice. Yet the withholding of benefits during a union campaign that are customarily granted to employees also violates the Act. See Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1008 n. 8. One court aptly described this dilemma as damned if you do, damned if you don't. J.J. Newberry, 645 F.2d at 151. According to Saint Francis, Administrator Rose carefully avoided mentioning a wage increase to employees until he received clearance from the Hospital's legal counsel. 28 The dilemma analysis urged by Saint Francis does not apply to the facts of this case. The wage increase was a change in the Hospital's policy, not a benefit customarily granted to employees. Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1008 n. 8. Although granting a wage increase in late August, while the election petition was pending, might have constituted an unfair labor practice, so was granting that increase two weeks prior to the Union election. The fact that Hospital management scrupulously avoided promising a wage increase until their legal staff gave the go-ahead indicates only that they received dubious legal advice, not that the announcement was lawful. Two of the three wage policies announced by Rose were not scheduled to go into effect until the following year. Having waited nearly two months to announce a wage hike, Saint Francis failed to explain why it could not have waited an additional two weeks. 29 Nor does the case relied upon by the Hospital support its dilemma argument. In J.J. Newberry, 645 F.2d 148, the court found an 8(a)(1) violation where the employer announced a wage increase prior to an election. The court concluded, however, that the withholding of that increase earlier in the campaign did not violate the Act because the employer had been in an unresolvable dilemma at that time. Id. at 151-52. J.J. Newberry supports the argument that the Hospital's failure to grant an increase in August was lawful; it does not support the Hospital's contention that the October announcement was also lawful. 30 Saint Francis further argues that the wage increase was not designed to influence the election because it applied across-the-board and was not limited to those employees who would be voting in the election. But in the cases relied upon by the Hospital to support this argument, only a small percentage of employees who received the increase were in the affected bargaining unit. See e.g., MGM Grand Hotel-Reno, Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.1981) (where only 49 of the 1200 employees who received the increase were in the affected bargaining unit); Delchamps, Inc. v. NLRB, 588 F.2d 476 (5th Cir.1979) (where the wage increase affected 44 stores, only 15 of which were involved in unionization). In contrast, Saint Francis has not cited any statistics to show what percentage of staff employees receiving the wage increase were in the affected bargaining unit. Moreover, the Board asserts--and Saint Francis has not denied--that employees other than those in the nurses' bargaining unit were engaged in organizing activities at Saint Francis in 1979. Thus the wage increase might have been reasonably calculated to discourage union activities throughout the Hospital. We conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that the announcement of the wage increase two weeks before the election constituted an unfair labor practice.
31 An employer's promise of benefits during a union campaign violates the Act if the promise is reasonably calculated to induce employees to vote against the union. See Exchange Parts, 395 U.S. at 409, 84 S.Ct. at 459; International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers of America v. NLRB, 392 F.2d 801, 806 (D.C.Cir.1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906, 88 S.Ct. 2058, 20 L.Ed.2d 1364 (1968). Here, the Board found that the Hospital made an implied promise that it would grant employees benefits if they voted against the Union. According to the ALJ, [a]lthough the promised benefits are not specifically stated, the message was obvious (especially after the October 12 wage increase and other promises) that management would improve conditions if the nurses rejected the Union. 263 NLRB at 841 n. 5. 32 The Board has cited numerous examples of statements which, it asserts, collectively constitute an unlawful implied promise of future benefits. Most of the statements were made by supervisory staff urging nurses not to vote for the Union because, e.g., there was going to be a new administrator, the new Administrator should be given one year, problems would be taken care of if you just give us one year and if you give the new administrator a chance. Some of the statements were more direct. For instance, the Assistant Nursing Director told one of the nurses that they could get things a lot faster by working with the new administration, give them one year and [you] will get what [you] want. Another supervisor said to one of the nurses: What is it you girls are really unhappy about? You have your ten percent raise. What else could you possibly want? 263 NLRB at 841. 33 Saint Francis argues that these statements are lawful in light of the fact that Hospital officials consistently refused to make specific promises of benefits during the election campaign. But an explicit promise of benefits is not required for the Board to find a violation of section 8(a)(1). As the First Circuit recently stated: His [the supervisor's] refusal to give a specific promise did not demonstrate the absence of an implied, general promise. NLRB v. Cable Vision, Inc., 660 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.1981) (emphasis in original). See also Peavey Company v. NLRB, 648 F.2d 460, 462 (7th Cir.1981); Hubbard Regional Hospital v. NLRB, 579 F.2d 1251, 1256-57 (1st Cir.1978). 34 We are mindful of Saint Francis' concern that the Board not transform the isolated, innocuous statements of an employer into unlawful conduct. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(c) (1976) (The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion ... shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.). But the conduct here consisted of repeated statements made in the context of numerous acts of objectionable conduct [by the employer] during the critical period. Royal Petroleum Company, 243 NLRB 508 n. 2 (1979). Particularly in the context of the pre-election announcement of wage increases in November and further possible increases the following year, the give us a year pleas by the administration took on greater significance. Compare Waterbury Community Antenna, Inc., 233 NLRB 1312, 1317-19, 1322 (1977), aff'd in part on other grounds, 587 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.1978) (in the context of a free-wheeling debate over unionization, a supervisor's single statement that the company should be given a fair chance for another year did not violate the Act). Nor does the fact that David Rose was a new administrator insulate Saint Francis from the Board's findings that the Hospital's implied promises of benefits to its employees violated the Act.
35 Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discourage membership in any labor organization through discrimination with regard to ... any term or condition of employment. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(a)(3) (1976). Prior to the organizational campaign in 1979, the Hospital had always granted registration fees and time off for nurses to attend education seminars, including those sponsored by unions. After the election, however, the Hospital refused to send two nurses to a Union-sponsored seminar. One of the nurses was a Union supporter; the other nurse was not. 36 The ALJ found that the denial of the nurses' requests to attend the seminar was unlawful. Even with regard to the nonunion supporter, the ALJ concluded that the Hospital violated Section 8(a)(3) because [the denial of her request] amounts to an employer discriminating against a group of employees in order to reach the pro-union employees. 263 NLRB at 846. The Board upheld this decision, explaining: 37 [W]e rely on the fact that the Hospital's refusal was admittedly motivated by the fact that the seminar was sponsored by a union. Even though the Hospital had allowed employees to attend union-sponsored seminars in past years when there was no union activity among its employees, it refused to allow employees to attend such seminars when its employees were actively involved in union activities. Thus, regardless of whether the employees who applied to attend the seminar were prounion or anti-union, the Hospital's motivation was the same, i.e., to take away a benefit because of its employees' exercise of their Sec[tion] 7 rights .... 38 Id. at 834 n. 2. 39 Saint Francis contends that there was no discriminatory treatment of employees within the meaning of section 8(a)(3) because the prounion and antiunion nurses were treated similarly. Yet the Hospital's policy toward seminar attendance changed because of Union activity among the nurses at Saint Francis. The critical factor here is not the union sympathies of the two nurses, but the fact that the seminar was sponsored by the Union. By discouraging employee participation in a Union-sponsored activity, the Hospital sought to diminish employee participation in a legitimate Union activity, thus discouraging membership in the Union. A practice applied uniformly to all employees may be discriminatory and violate the Act .... Conduct by an employer which discourages a union activity protected by Sec. 7 may also discourage and discriminate against membership in a labor organization. Allied Industrial Workers, AFL-CIO, Local 289 v. NLRB, 476 F.2d 868, 877 (D.C.Cir.1973) (footnote omitted). 40 The Hospital also claims that the new Administrator, David Rose, had no knowledge of the Hospital's preexisting policy of permitting attendance at Union seminars or of the Union sympathies of the nurses who requested to attend the seminar. Yet the Hospital concedes that the new policy was motivated by Rose's philosophical opposition to Union sponsored seminars. Even where discriminatory conduct has only a comparatively slight effect on employee rights, the burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legitimate objectives since proof of motivation is most accessible to him. NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 34, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 1798, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967). See Allied Industrial Workers, 476 F.2d at 877. Because philosophical opposition to Union sponsored seminars is hardly a legitimation of the Hospital's change in policy, the Board's finding of a section 8(a)(3) violation must be upheld.
41 As previously explained, the Board has a great deal of discretion in devising remedies that will best serve the purposes of the Act and its choice of remedies is entitled to considerable deference by a reviewing court. In this case we are asked to review a type two bargaining order approved by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 89 S.Ct. 1918, 23 L.Ed.2d 547 (1965). Where the Union once has exhibited majority support, the Board may issue a bargaining order in cases marked by practices that have the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election processes. Id. at 614, 89 S.Ct. at 1940. In fashioning such a remedy, the Board may properly consider the extensiveness of an employer's unfair practices in terms of their past effect on election conditions and the likelihood of their recurrence in the future. Id. (emphasis added). In Gissel, [t]he Court made clear that it was the Board's responsibility to ascertain on a case-by-case basis whether in fact conditions were not conducive to a 'fair and reliable election.'  Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers International Union v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 237, 247 (D.C.Cir.1971) (quoting Gissel, 395 U.S. at 614, 89 S.Ct. at 1940), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1039, 92 S.Ct. 713, 30 L.Ed.2d 730 (1972). In making that determination, the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its own. Gissel, 395 U.S. at 612 n. 32, 89 S.Ct. at 1939 n. 32. 42 We recently outlined the three prerequisites for issuance of a type-two Gissel bargaining order. See Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. NLRB, 681 F.2d 11, 22 (D.C.Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1178, 103 S.Ct. 831, 74 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1983). First, the Union, at some time, must have had majority support within the bargaining unit. Second, the employer's unfair labor practices must have had the tendency to undermine majority strength and impede the election process. Finally, the Board must determine that the possibility of erasing the effects of past practices and of ensuring a fair rerun election by the use of traditional remedies is slight and that employee sentiment once expressed in favor of the Union would be better protected by a bargaining order. In this case, the first two prerequisites clearly have been met: a majority of the nurses signed Union authorization cards and there is substantial evidence that the Hospital's unfair labor practices tended to undermine majority strength and impede the election process. See Pedro's, 652 F.2d at 1011. 43 The Hospital contends that the third prerequisite has not been met. Under the third prerequisite, the issue is whether the bargaining order better protects employees' expressed Union preference than any other available remedy. See Road Sprinklers, 681 F.2d at 24. Assessing the appropriateness of the bargaining order remedy is a determination largely within the special competence of the Board. Id. 44 Many recent court decisions have imposed a requirement that the Board give detailed, specific reasons explaining its decision to issue a bargaining order. See, e.g., NLRB v. Apple Tree Chevrolet, Inc., 671 F.2d 838, 840-41 (4th Cir.1982); Red Oaks Nursing Home, Inc. v. NLRB, 633 F.2d 503, 508-09 (7th Cir.1980); NLRB v. Jamaica Towing, Inc., 602 F.2d 1100, 1103 (2d Cir.1979); First Lakewood Associates v. NLRB, 582 F.2d 416 (7th Cir.1978). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, recently explained that the purpose of requiring specificity in the Board's findings and reasoning ... is to facilitate an informed review. NLRB v. Maidsville Coal Company, 718 F.2d 658 (4th Cir.1983) (en banc). The specificity requirement enables a reviewing court to determine whether the Board applied the Gissel standards to a particular set of facts. To facilitate review under those standards, the Board must support a Gissel order by a statement of reasons stating what unfair labor practices the order is intended to redress and indicating in general why traditional remedies are inadequate in the circumstances. Id. at 660 (quoting Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Carpet Yarn Division, Inc. v. NLRB, 691 F.2d 1133, 1144 (4th Cir.1982), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 1772, 76 L.Ed.2d 345 (1983)). 45 We agree with the Fourth Circuit that the Board should state clearly its reasons for issuing a bargaining order and we conclude that the Board here has met this obligation. The Board emphasized the pervasiveness of the Hospital's unlawful conduct when it explained why a bargaining order would better protect employee sentiment previously expressed through authorization cards: From the very day that the Union filed its election petition ... the Hospital embarked on a course of retaliatory unfair labor practices .... This unlawful activity was committed by at least eight different supervisors and involved numerous employees. 263 NLRB at 836. The Board placed particular emphasis on the unlawful wage increase because it affected all employees, but it also relied upon the whole litany of unfair labor practices that characterized the Hospital's anti-Union campaign--interrogations, threats, and promises of benefits--in deciding that a bargaining order was appropriate. The Board explained: 46 [W]e find that the Hospital's unfair labor practices are serious and pervasive in their impact--the unlawful wage increase in particular having touched all unit employees. Such conduct can reasonably be expected to have a lingering effect on employees, by signalling to them the Hospital's displeasure at union activity and the lengths to which it would go to stifle the employees' right to self-organization.... [W]e find that simply requiring the Hospital to refrain from repeating such conduct, the traditional remedy, will not erase the effects of this unlawful conduct, and will not enable the employees to participate in a free and uncoerced rerun election. 47 Id. at 837. Furthermore, the Board found that the decision not to allow nurses to attend a Union-sponsored seminar after the election emphasized to employees that the Hospital would continue to punish them for their union activities even after the election, and thus served to remind them, lest they forgot, that their support for the Union, or activities on its behalf, would not be tolerated. Id. We find this to be an adequate explanation of the Board's decision to issue a bargaining order and cannot say that this is a patent attempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act. Virginia Electric, 319 U.S. at 540, 63 S.Ct. at 1218. 48 The Hospital argues that events which occurred subsequent to the election render a bargaining order inappropriate. Some courts indeed have imposed a duty on the Board to inquire into subsequent developments before issuing a bargaining order. See, e.g., NLRB v. Heads & Threads Co., 724 F.2d 282 at 289 (2d Cir.1983) (the Board may issue a bargaining order only after it has taken evidence and made appropriate findings as to the need for the bargaining order at the time it is issued, not at some earlier date). On occasion, this court has directed the Board to consider specific significant events which occurred after an election. See, e.g., Peoples Gas System, Inc. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 48 (D.C.Cir.1980) (where there was both an extraordinary delay between the initial refusal to bargain and the ultimate formulation of the remedy ... [and] a clear, uncoerced expression in the interim by the employees that they do not desire the Union to represent them) (emphasis added); NLRB v. Ship Shape Maintenance Co., 474 F.2d 434, 443 (D.C.Cir.1972) (where there was an extraordinary rate of turnover in the affected unit). 49 We have never, however, imposed a blanket requirement on the Board that it consider subsequent events before issuing a bargaining order and we refuse to do so today. The lapse of time alone is insufficient grounds for overturning a bargaining order because holding a rerun election simply because of the passage of time rewards employer recalcitrance and offers no deterrence to future unfair labor practices. Peoples Gas, 629 F.2d at 47-48. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 748 n. 16, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 1114 n. 16, 8 L.Ed.2d 230 (1962). Nor does normal employee turnover justify displacing the Board's determination that a bargaining order is appropriate. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704-05, 64 S.Ct. 817, 818-19, 88 L.Ed. 1020 (1944). Imposition of a requirement that the Board consider subsequent events would reward an employer's efforts to postpone enforcement of a remedy by adding further delay to the proceedings. As the Ninth Circuit has explained: 50 [Delay] is an unfortunate but inevitable result of the process of hearing, decision and review prescribed in the Act. And to deny enforcement, with or without remand for reconsideration on the basis of facts occurring after the Board's decision, is to put a premium upon continued litigation by the employer; it can hope that the resulting delay will produce a new set of facts, as to which the Board must then readjudicate. Suppose that the Board does so, and again finds against the employer. There can then be a petition to this court, a decision by it, and a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. By that time there will almost surely be another new set of facts. When is the process to stop? 51 NLRB v. L.B. Foster Co., 418 F.2d 1, 4 (9th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990, 90 S.Ct. 1124, 25 L.Ed.2d 398 (1970). 52 The subsequent events cited by Saint Francis are not significant enough to justify a remand to the Board. Passage of time, changes in three supervisory personnel, and the posting of a notice and distribution of a handbook apprising all Hospital employees of their rights under the Act are not noteworthy events that are likely to undermine the Board's ability to infer from circumstances which existed at the time of the violations whether a bargaining order is warranted. 53 The ALJ concluded that [s]ince September 22, 1979, the Union has represented a majority of the employees in the ... appropriate bargaining unit, and since that date the Union has been the exclusive bargaining representative of said employees. 263 NLRB at 852. The Hospital has expressed concern that this finding could be construed as making the bargaining order retroactive to September 22, 1979. The Board's decision contains no conclusion or order that Saint Francis bargain with the Union as to matters arising on or after that date, and the Board asserts that retroactive application of the bargaining order--if relevant at all--is a matter for subsequent compliance proceedings. We express no opinion on the propriety of issuing a retroactive bargaining order in this case. See Road Sprinkler, 681 F.2d at 24-25 & n. 18 (discussing the appropriateness of making a bargaining order retroactive). 54 The delay which would result if we overturned the Board and ordered a rerun election makes us particularly reluctant to disturb the Board's finding that a bargaining order was appropriate. Delay alone is often the goal of an employer reluctant to bargain with the employees' chosen representative. In rejecting the claim that employee turnover justifies overturning a Board bargaining order, the Supreme Court discussed the employer's interest in encouraging further delay: 55 The Board might well think that were it not to adopt this type of remedy, but instead order elections upon every claim that a shift in union membership had occurred during proceedings occasioned by an employer's wrongful refusal to bargain, recalcitrant employers might be able by continued opposition to union membership indefinitely to postpone performance of their statutory obligation. In the Board's view, procedural delays necessary fairly to determine charges of unfair labor practices might in this way be made the occasion for further procedural delays in connection with repeated requests for elections, thus providing employers a chance to profit from a stubborn refusal to abide by the law. 56 Franks Bros., 321 U.S. at 705, 64 S.Ct. at 819. See Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV.L.REV. 1769, 1777 & n. 24 (1983) (analyzing data indicating that delay before an election serves the employer's interest in discouraging employee support for the union). 57 We choose not to second-guess the Board's judgment and further postpone the Hospital's performance of its statutory obligations. Saint Francis Hospital is not entitled to use the processes of this court to seek further delay or benefit from the consequences of the unfair labor practices which it committed during the election campaign four years ago. The Board has explained its reasoning and applied its expertise in choosing a remedy that can best effectuate the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. We therefore enforce the Board's bargaining order.