Opinion ID: 1912119
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Superior Right of Possession

Text: Finally, Simion argues that PLI's right to possess the seat was not superior to his and that this element therefore was not satisfied. The element at issue requires Simion to have taken property out of the possession of a pledgee or other person having a superior right of possession. Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(2). Simion relies on our decision in State v. Cohen, 196 Minn. 39, 263 N.W. 922 (1935), to support his argument that the evidence failed to prove that PLI had a superior right of possession to the seat. Advisory committee comments to the theft statute, Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(2), indicate that the Cohen decision was the impetus for the enactment of that section. [7] Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.52, subd. 2(2), advisory committee cmt. (West 2003). While the statute plainly covers the situation at issue in Cohen through its use of the word pledgee, it is not, as the court of appeals noted, limited to only those situations presenting the same facts as in Cohen. Simion, 2007 WL 1412764, at . The statute makes this plain because it provides that theft can be committed against some other person in addition to a pledgee. Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(2). Here, PLI bought the seat and had an ownership interest in it, pursuant to the parties' agreement, until Simion reimbursed PLI for its seat-related expenses. Because Simion had only repaid PLI a small portion of his total debt when he took the seat, we hold that the evidence supports the conclusion that PLI's right to the seat was superior to Simion's right for the purpose of Minn.Stat. § 609.52, subd. 2(2). We therefore hold that the district court did not err in denying Simion's motion for judgment of acquittal on the charge of theft from a person with a superior right of possession.