Opinion ID: 2999760
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Fair Housing Amendments Act

Text: The duty to accommodate imposed by the FHAA, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq., mirrors in large part the modification obligations under the Rehabilitation Act. Enacted in 1988, No. 04-1966 19 the FHAA extended the scope of other federal housing laws to cover persons with disabilities. Under these amendments, disabled individuals may not be prevented from buying or renting private housing because of their disabilities. See id. § 3604. They also must be provided reasonable “accommodation in rules, policies, practices, or services when such accommodation may be necessary to afford [them] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.” Id. § 3604(f)(3)(B).4 Although the plain language of the FHAA provides little guidance concerning the reach of its accommodation requirement, the contours of the obligation have been given substantial elaboration by this court and other courts of appeals. The basic elements of an FHAA accommodation claim are well-settled. First, the requested accommodation must be reasonable, which, as we have stated, is a “highly fact-specific inquiry and requires balancing the needs of the parties. An accommodation is reasonable if it is both efficacious and proportional to the costs to implement it.” Oconomowoc Residential Programs, 300 F.3d at 784 (internal citations omitted). In the zoning context, a municipality may 4 The legislative history of the Fair Housing Amendments Act explains: The Committee intends that the prohibition against discrimination against those with handicaps apply to zoning decisions and practices. The Act is intended to prohibit the application of special requirements through land-use regulations, restrictive covenants, and conditional or special use permits that have the effect of limiting the ability of such individuals to live in the residence of their choice in the community. H.R. Rep. No. 100-711, at 24 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2185. 20 No. 04-1966 show that a modification to its policy is “unreasonable if it is so at odds with the purpose behind the rule that it would be a fundamental and unreasonable change.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, the requested accommodation must be “necessary,” meaning that, without the accommodation, the plaintiff will be denied an equal opportunity to obtain the housing of her choice. See id. at 784; see also Giebeler v. M & B Assocs., 343 F.3d 1143, 1155 (9th Cir. 2003); Smith & Lee Assocs., Inc. v. City of Taylor, 102 F.3d 781, 795 (6th Cir. 1996). This has been described by courts essentially as a causation inquiry. See, e.g., Lapid-Laurel, L.L.C. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Scotch Plains, 284 F.3d 442, 460 (3d Cir. 2002) (“This requirement has attributes of a causation requirement. And if the proposed accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a disability’s effect, it cannot be said to be necessary.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). In addition, the FHAA links the term “necessary” to the goal of “equal opportunity.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B). The “equal opportunity” element limits the accommodation duty so that not every rule that creates a general inconvenience or expense to the disabled needs to be modified. Instead, the statute requires only accommodations necessary to ameliorate the effect of the plaintiff’s disability so that she may compete equally with the non-disabled in the housing market. We have enforced this limitation by asking whether the rule in question, if left unmodified, hurts “handicapped people by reason of their handicap, rather than . . . by virtue of what they have in common with other people, such as a limited amount of money to spend on housing.” See Hemisphere Bldg. Co. v. Vill. of Richton Park, 171 F.3d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis in original). No. 04-1966 21 Most recently, we considered the “equal opportunity” limitation in deciding an FHAA claim brought by a group home challenging a city’s ad hoc decision to shut off the water supply to the group home’s land. See Good Shepherd Manor Found., Inc. v. City of Momence, 323 F.3d 557, 561-64 (7th Cir. 2003). Rejecting the group home’s claim that the city had to modify its decision because shutting off its water harmed its disabled residents by preventing them from living in group homes, we stated that “[c]utting off the water prevents anyone from living in a dwelling, not just handicapped people.” Id. at 562. Put differently, the plaintiff’s accommodation claim failed because the disability suffered by the group home’s residents did not deny them an equal opportunity to obtain housing.5 5 Other circuits similarly have adopted the view that the FHAA’s accommodation requirement is limited only to lowering barriers to housing that are created by the disability itself. See, e.g., Forest City Daly Housing v. Town of N. Hempstead, 175 F.3d 144, 151-53 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the decision of a zoning board to prevent a developer of an assisted living facility to relocate to a business zone and agreeing with the district court that “reasonable accommodations were not necessary to afford prospective residents an equal housing opportunity, because persons without disabilities do not have opportunities analogous to those being sought here”); Bryant Woods Inn, Inc. v. Howard County, 124 F.3d 597, 604 (4th Cir. 1997) (“The ‘necessary’ element—the FHA provision mandating reasonable accommodations which are necessary to afford an equal opportunity—requires the demonstration of a direct linkage between the proposed accommodation and the ‘equal opportunity’ to be provided to the handicapped person. This requirement has attributes of a causation requirement. And if the proposed accommodation provides no direct amelioration of a disability’s effect, it cannot be said to be (continued...) 22 No. 04-1966