Opinion ID: 206048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prosecutorial misconduct: the were-they-lying questions and comments

Text: Schmitz contends that, during her cross-examination, the Government improperly required her to assess the truthfulness of previous witnesses. On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Schmitz as follows: Q. (by the prosecutor:) [L]et's get a list going of everybody you say is lying, okay? Seth Hammett. He's a liar? A. I said I  what I answered was my answer is different from his. I never called him a liar. Q. Did he tell the truth when he said that you came to him and asked him to put money in the budget to fund your job? A. No, he did not. Q. He lied? A. I never used the word lie. Q. Why not? A. I just don't like the word. Q. So he didn't tell the truth. Does that make you feel better? (Dkt. 202 at 9.) The prosecutor then called out the names of twelve witnesses who had testified in the case and asked Schmitz if they should be added to the list of purported liars. ( Id. at 10-17.) Each time Schmitz attempted to explain the discrepancy in testimony, the prosecutor repeatedly questioned her until he was able to force her to say whether a previous witness was telling the truth or whether the witness should be added to the liar list. ( Id. ) In closing arguments, the prosecutor continued to refer to the list of purported lying witnesses. The prosecutor said: These people are not all making it up, ladies and gentlemen. It's not that the list is now 17 people are lying and the defendant is the one person telling the truth. (Dkt. 199 at 73.) At one point, the prosecutor stated that they were going to have to add some more names . . . to the list of people who were obviously conspiring and lying against the defendant. ( Id. at 129.) Because Schmitz's trial counsel did not object to the were-they-lying questions and related comments, we review the impact of this conduct on the fairness of the trial under the plain error standard of review. Under this standard, Schmitz must show that: (1) an error occurred; (2) the error was plain; (3) it affected [her] substantial rights; and (4) it seriously affected the fairness of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Gresham, 325 F.3d 1262, 1265 (11th Cir.2003) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (articulating four conditions of plain error rule). Only if all four of those showings are made does a court of appeals have any authority to correct an error that was not preserved by a timely objection in the district court. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 741, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-77, 1781. Schmitz has convinced us that there was error, but we do not think there was plain error. We first conclude that there was error in the district court's decision to allow the prosecutor to require Schmitz to say whether other witnesses were lying, and to allow the prosecutor to make comments related to these questions in his closing argument. In evaluating the propriety of the prosecutor's conduct in this case, we analyze separately the questions posed on cross-examination and the comments made during closing arguments. With regard to the questions posed on cross-examination, we begin by noting that most of the federal courts of appeals that have examined the propriety of questions posed to a criminal defendant about the credibility of government witnesses have found that such questions are improper. See United States v. Harris, 471 F.3d 507, 511 (3d Cir.2006); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 846 (7th Cir.2006); United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.2003); United States v. Sanchez, 176 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (9th Cir.1999); United States v. Sullivan, 85 F.3d 743, 749-50 (1st Cir.1996); United States v. Boyd, 54 F.3d 868, 871 (D.C.Cir.1995); United States v. Richter, 826 F.2d 206, 208 (2d Cir.1987); but see United States v. Williamson, 53 F.3d 1500, 1523 (10th Cir. 1995) (characterizing as unpersuasive the reasoning set forth in Richter as to why such questions should not be allowed but declining to decide the issue). Most of these courts have reasoned that such questions are improper because they invade the province of the jury by forcing defendants to assess the credibility of others who have testified. We hold that it is improper to ask a testifying defendant whether another witness is lying. We come to this conclusion for several reasons. First, the Federal Rules of Evidence do not permit such questions. See United States v. Henderson, 409 F.3d 1293, 1299 (11th Cir.2005) (The Federal Rules of Evidence preclude a witness from testifying as to the credibility of another witness.) While Rule 608(a) permits a witness to testify, in the form of opinion or reputation evidence, that another witness has a general character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, that rule does not permit a witness to testify that another witness was truthful or not on a specific occasion. Moreover, the were-they-lying questions have little or no probative value because they seek an answer beyond the personal knowledge of the witness. See Harris, 471 F.3d at 511 (stating that such questions force a witness to testify as to something he cannot know, i.e., whether another is intentionally seeking to mislead the tribunal); Fed. R.Evid. 602 (A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.). The were-they-lying questions are also not relevant because one witness's opinion that another person has or has not lied does not make it more or less likely that the person actually lied. Fed.R.Evid. 401. And, the were-they-lying questions distract the jury from the central task of determining what version of events is accurate in order to determine a defendant's guilt or innocence. Second, the were-they-lying questions invade the province of the jury, as credibility determinations are to be made by the jury, not the testifying witness. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 739 (11th Cir.1998) (Witness credibility is the sole province of the jury.); Thomas, 453 F.3d at 846 (Because the evaluation of witness credibility is the province of the jury, it is improper to ask one witness to comment on the veracity of the testimony of another witness.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Third, the were-they-lying questions ignore other possible explanations for inconsistent testimony. Testimony can conflict for many reasons that do not involve a deliberate intent to deceive. There may be lapses in memory, differences in perception, or a genuine misunderstanding. The were-they-lying questions ignore all of these innocent explanations, and put the testifying defendant in a no-win situation: The defendant must either accuse another witness of lying or undermine his or her own version of events. See Harris, 471 F.3d at 511 (stating that such questions unfairly force defendants into choosing to either undermine their own testimony or essentially accuse another witness of being a liar); Liggett v. People, 135 P.3d 725, 731-32 (Colo.2006) (citing State v. Graves, 668 N.W.2d 860, 872 (Iowa 2003)) (describing the no-win situation that results when were-they-lying questions are posed). Fourth, the were-they-lying questions are argumentative, and often their primary purpose is to make the defendant appear accusatory. See Liggett, 135 P.3d at 732 (citing Burgess v. State, 329 S.C. 88, 495 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1998)) (describing were-they-lying questions as argumentative). The very structure of the question is designed to pit the testifying witness against every other adverse witness, suggesting to the jury that someone is deliberately deceiving the court and the jury must choose the culprit. While the jury must make credibility assessments in determining guilt or innocence, the were-they-lying questions do not serve this function but prejudicially force the testifying defendant to accuse or not. Even worse, the defendant's answer often does not matter because the predominate purpose of such questions is to make the defendant look bad. Graves, 668 N.W.2d at 872. Today's holding will not hamper the prosecution's ability to cross-examine a criminal defendant. We recognize that [i]t is essential . . . to the proper functioning of the adversary system that when a defendant takes the stand, the government be permitted proper and effective cross-examination in an attempt to elicit the truth. Harris, 471 F.3d at 512 (quoting United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-27, 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916, 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980)). We agree that it is often necessary on cross-examination to focus a witness on the differences and similarities between his testimony and that of another witness. This is permissible provided he is not asked to testify as to the veracity of the other witness. Harris, 471 F.3d at 512. We also recognize that were-they-lying questions might be proper if a defendant opened the door by testifying on direct that another witness was lying. Harris, 471 F.3d at 512; see also Boyd, 54 F.3d at 871 n.  (explaining that had the defendant testified on his own that the officers were lying, such questions might be proper). Thus, while we hold today that asking a criminal defendant whether another witness is lying is improper, we do not foreclose the possibility that, in the circumstances of a particular case, a question about the truthfulness of another witness may in some cases be appropriate. The Government contends that Schmitz opened the door to such questions in this case by testifying on direct examination as to the truthfulness of another witness. On direct examination, Schmitz testified that Speaker Hammett was not truthful when he testified that Schmitz asked him to adjust the budget to support her CITY Program employment. According to the Government, this testimony opened the door to the prosecutor's later questions about the truthfulness of other witnesses. We recognize that were-they-lying questions may be proper if a defendant opens the door by testifying on direct that another witness was lying. But Schmitz opened no such door in this case. First, Schmitz did not testify on direct that Hammett was a liar. Second, even if Schmitz's direct testimony could be construed as calling Hammett a liar, the prosecutor did not cross-examine Schmitz only as to Hammett's testimony. Instead, the prosecutor cross-examined Schmitz as to the testimony of eleven other witnesses and forced her to testify whether they were lying. Even if Schmitz opened the door as to Hammett's testimony, eleven other doors remained closed. With respect to the prosecutor's comments made during closing argument, an attorney's statements that indicate his opinion or knowledge of the case as theretofore presented before the court and jury are permissible if the attorney makes it clear that the conclusions he is urging are conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. United States v. Johns, 734 F.2d 657, 663 (11th Cir.1984) (quotation omitted). In light of this principle, the propriety of the prosecutor's closing-argument comments presents a closer question than the propriety of the cross-examination questions. We have no doubt that there are some cases where a prosecutor is justified in arguing during closing arguments that a particular witness is lying, if that is an inference supported by the evidence at trial. See, e.g., Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 914 (11th Cir.2001) (finding that prosecutor's comment during closing argument that witness was liar was accurate statement because witness had told four different stories regarding defendant's whereabouts during crucial time). We must nonetheless conclude that the prosecutor's comments in this particular case were not justified. The problem with the prosecutor's comments in this case is that they were a clear continuation of the improper questions posed previously during Schmitz's cross-examination. In particular, the prosecutor continued during closing arguments to hammer home the idea of a liar list, which was a metaphor improperly developed during Schmitz's cross-examination. Thus, we hold that the comments in closing argument were improper because the cross-examination was improper. Having concluded that allowing the prosecutor's cross-examination questions and closing-argument comments constituted error, we must decide whether those errors were plain. Before an error is subject to correction under the plain error rule, it must be plain under controlling precedent or in view of the unequivocally clear words of a statute or rule[.] United States v. Lett, 483 F.3d 782, 790 (11th Cir.2007) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-37, 113 S.Ct. at 1776-79); see also United States v. Castro, 455 F.3d 1249, 1253 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. Lejarde-Rada, 319 F.3d 1288, 1291 (11th Cir.2003)) (When `the explicit language of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme Court or this Court directly resolving it.'). The Supreme Court has never ruled on the propriety of questions and comments of the kind at issue in this case, and, until now, neither has the Eleventh Circuit. As a result, although Schmitz has shown errors in allowing the prosecutor's questions and comments, she cannot show that such errors were plain, and thus her challenge must fail. [14]