Opinion ID: 168329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The M CPD’s motion to dismiss

Text: The district court granted the M CPD’s motion to dismiss because M r. Johnson had identified no municipal policy or custom the execution of which caused his injury, a requirement for claims against municipalities under M onell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). M r. Johnson does not challenge this ruling on appeal, which we affirm without discussion. Instead, he argues that the district court misconstrued his complaint as being against all -4- police officers of the M CPD whereas his claim is really against only “those who [did] w rong.” Aplt. O pening Br. at 5 (page numbered “4”). Although M r. Johnson’s inartful pleadings and other filings rendered the district court’s job difficult, we agree with this claim of error. In his complaint, M r. Johnson states that he was “taken to Jail S.L. County by police two . . . of midval utah” [sic generally]. R., Doc. 3 at 4. In its initial consideration of this claim, the district court stated that M r. Johnson had “accuse[d] un-named M idvale City Police officers of false arrest” but construed it as a claim against Chief M aughn. Id., Doc. 8 at 2 n.2. In a letter responding to the M CPD’s motion to dismiss, M r. Johnson stated that two officers, one of whom he unclearly identified by name, arrested him after his father had falsely reported that M r. Johnson had assaulted him and that the officers knew it w as a false report. See id., Doc. 24 at 1. In its dismissal order, it appears the district court reinterpreted the claim as one against the M CPD, dropping Chief M aughn. See id., Doc. 31 at 2 n.3 (explaining that the complaint referred to the M CPD , not Chief M aughn, and that the M CPD had filed the motion to dismiss). Despite M r. Johnson’s attempts to identify the unnamed officers and the district court’s recognition that he accused unnamed M CPD officers of false arrest, the district court construed this claim as one against only the M CPD . By not construing this claim also as one against the unnamed officers, the district court erred. -5- The M CPD contends that even if the false arrest claim is construed as a claim against the one officer M r. Johnson refers to in his appellate brief, whom the M CPD identifies as Ken Yurgelon, the claim fails because M r. Johnson has alleged no facts showing that there was a lack of probable cause for his warrantless arrest. Although we may affirm a district court’s judgment on any basis supported by the record provided that the parties have had an adequate chance to respond, Ross v. United States M arshal, 168 F.3d 1190, 1194 n.2 (10th Cir. 1999), we decline to do so here. The M CPD is not asking us to affirm a judgment against it on other grounds but to affirm a judgment the district court did not enter, one against Officer Yurgelon. W hether or not M r. Johnson has stated a claim against Officer Yurgelon or any other M CPD officers is better left to the district court’s consideration upon a proper motion filed by the appropriate defendant(s). Accordingly, we remand for further proceedings on M r. Johnson’s claim of false arrest against the appropriate M CPD officers. W e express no opinion on the merits of this claim. On remand, M r. Johnson should be given an appropriate opportunity to amend his complaint to name the proper defendants. See Farrell v. J.E. Ham ilton Corr. Ctr., 12 F. App’x 788, 792 (10th Cir. 2001) (unpublished) 1 (quoting Dayse v. Schuldt, 894 F.2d 170, 174 (5th Cir. 1990), for 1 Under 10th Cir. R. 36.3(B), we cite an unpublished decision only if it has persuasive value with respect to a material issue that has not been addressed by us in a published opinion and it assists in our disposition. Both requirements are met with regard to this case. -6- the proposition that, “[w]hen a pro se plaintiff’s suit raises a constitutional claim, but he has inadvertently sued the wrong parties, he should [be] given leave to amend to sue the appropriate party or parties”).