Opinion ID: 2615004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Stacey Ashford

Text: Ashford, a neighbor, testified that he heard what he characterized as an argument between defendant and Diana, who were about 100 to 200 feet away. He could not understand the words because they spoke Spanish, which he does not understand. He saw the two fighting. Defendant hit her numerous times, arguing at her, yelling at her, and knocking her on the ground. Ashford then heard shots, and saw defendant flee with a handgun. Based on this record, the Court of Appeal found the evidence of lying in wait deficient in three respects. First, it found no evidence of watching and waiting. Second, it found no evidence of a plan or concealed purpose to take the victim by surprise, or, stated slightly differently, to attack Diana unawares. On this point, the court stated: Although Diana answered the door when appellant arrived at the house, he did not immediately assault her. Rather, they spent some time talking. Diana then reentered the house and returned with their son, whereupon the three of them visited together for a while. It was only after their meeting escalated into an argument and a physical confrontation and Ortega directed disparaging remarks to appellant, that the shooting occurred. The evidence is more suggestive that the killing was a product of appellant's `hot anger of the moment and was executed without reflection' rather than the result of any plan, secrecy or concealment. [Citation.] Third, the court found no evidence that defendant attacked the victim from a position of advantage or seclusion. It reasoned that [a]ppellant had no more advantage over Diana at the time he actually fired the fatal shot than he had at any time during and after they first met at the front door. To the contrary, the fact that appellant shot Diana in Ortega's presence during an argument, rather than while seated alone with her, suggests the killing resulted from anger and provocation rather than from a planned, surprise attack. (5a) We disagree that the evidence was insufficient to warrant instructions on lying in wait. Although the Court of Appeal has stated one possible interpretation of the evidence, the jury, which was the finder of fact, could reasonably have interpreted the evidence quite differently. Viewing the record, as we must, favorably to the jury's verdict, we find sufficient evidence, that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value, to support each element of lying in wait. There was evidence of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act. Defendant parked his father's pickup truck next to the house hours before he came to the door. It was not until an outsider, Bruce, came to speak with people in the house, and possibly provide a distraction, that defendant actually asked to see Diana. Moreover, the jury could infer that he waited and watched until his victim was alone with him in the relative isolation of the front yard before he struck. We also disagree with the second and third perceived evidentiary deficiencies. In essence, the Court of Appeal found, and defendant argues [3] , that the evidence can reasonably be interpreted in only one way  that the actual shooting occurred on the spur of the moment after an argument between defendant and Diana escalated into a physical confrontation. The dissent goes so far as to argue that the unspecified nasty remark Ortega made to defendant after she heard Diana screaming for help and saw him holding Diana by the hair precipitated the shooting. Although, as the court stated, there is some evidence suggestive of that view, that is not the test. (1b) A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the jury. It must view the record favorably to the judgment below to determine whether there is evidence to support the instruction, not scour the record in search of evidence suggesting a contrary view. (See People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1126.) (5b) The Court of Appeal focused on only part of the evidence. The jury also heard testimony of defendant's previous history with the victim, which provided a motive for lying in wait; testimony indicating that defendant waited until the social worker was talking with the occupants before he approached the house, using a bag of clothes as his excuse; that he parked the truck near the gate to the backyard, which the jury could reasonably infer was intended to provide a means of escape after he lured Diana to that yard and shot her there; that he concealed upon his person a loaded handgun well before any alleged argument arose; and that he tried to get the victim to accompany him alone to the backyard before having to settle on the front yard (which foiled his plan to escape with the truck). This evidence, generally ignored in the Court of Appeal's analysis, logically supports the inference ( People v. Perez, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1124) that the shooting was not a sudden outburst of provoked passion, but was the culmination of a plan to take his victim by surprise from a position of advantage. The victim's screams for assistance additionally indicate that she was taken by surprise, and was previously unaware of any plan to harm her. ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 554.) The fact that some of the witnesses characterized the words spoken between Diana and defendant immediately before the shooting as an argument is not dispositive. The jury could reasonably have interpreted the events as showing, not a dispute, as defendant would have it, or provocation, as the Court of Appeal termed it, but Diana screaming for help as soon as defendant's murderous scheme became apparent. Indeed, all the evidence regarding the content of the words, as distinguished from the tone of voice, showed no dispute but a plea by Diana for mercy from defendant and help from her friends. Similarly, all the specific evidence regarding what some called the fight or struggle between defendant and Diana, or what the Court of Appeal characterized as a physical confrontation, showed, not mutual combat, but solely defendant assaulting Diana. There was no evidence that Diana did anything confrontational or provocative, but merely sought to defend herself when defendant grabbed her by the hair or by the neck (Sierra), was holding her by the hair (Ortega), or hit her numerous times and knock[ed] her on the ground (Ashford). Moreover, the fact that the witnesses generally did not see the gun right away does not establish, as a matter of law, that defendant did not have it ready for use before it was seen. The jury could reasonably infer that defendant displayed the loaded handgun before Diana began struggling and pleading for her life. Finally, that Ortega said something nasty to defendant is hardly surprising, or even significant, under the circumstances; to argue as a matter of law that the remark triggered the shooting is to pervert settled rules of appellate review. Contrary to the Court of Appeal's view, the jury could reasonably find that defendant sought and obtained a position of advantage before he shot Diana. When defendant met Diana at the door, others were nearby. He tried to get her alone in the backyard, near his truck. When that failed, he lured her to the front yard, a more isolated area ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 555; see also People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 448) than the house, although perhaps not as ideal for his purposes as the backyard. It was not, however, until Roque returned to the house after accompanying defendant and Diana to the front yard that defendant was finally alone with his victim. At that point, the jury could reasonably find, defendant seized his advantage, and attacked. That the victim resisted long enough to cry for help, and for others to run out and witness the shooting, does not vitiate the lying in wait. Defendant contends that the shooting was not immediately preceded by the lying in wait. He cites Sierra's estimate that the time between his arrival at the house and the shooting was about 10 to 20 minutes and Ortega's estimate that it was about 15 minutes. He also argues that Bruce's estimates regarding the time she arrived at the house and the length of time that elapsed before defendant arrived, together with the evidence about the time the 911 call was made, established conclusively that at least 18 minutes passed between the time that [defendant] arrived and the time of the shooting. He further argues that this length of time between his arrival at the house and the shooting demonstrates that any lying in wait was necessarily interrupted by other events, including, presumably, an argument. We disagree. This testimony merely presented a jury question. The jury could reasonably have found the time period was shorter than defendant argues. Bruce's estimates regarding the time she arrived at the house, and the length of time that passed before defendant came, were necessarily vague. The jury was not required to treat them as mathematical certainties. Bruce also specifically testified that the events happened very fast and that the time from defendant's arrival to the shooting seemed quick, about five minutes. The jury could reasonably have considered this latter testimony to be the more reliable. Roque also estimated the time between defendant's arrival and the shooting as about five or ten minutes. The testimony of Bruce and Roque is other substantial evidence in the case [which] supports a reasonable inference that the shots were fired soon after the victim was isolated. ( People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1020 [involving a similar conflict in the evidence regarding the elapsed time before the shooting].) Bruce, a neutral outsider, might well have been more persuasive than others who were more emotionally involved, and especially someone like Sierra who had been watching television in a different room. (4b) The precise period of time is also not critical. As long as the murder is immediately preceded by lying in wait, the defendant need not strike at the first available opportunity, but may wait to maximize his position of advantage before taking his victim by surprise. In People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at page 825, we found that evidence from which the jury could infer that the defendant waited and watched until the [victims] reached the place of maximum vulnerability before shooting supported a finding of lying in wait. (Italics added.) (5c) This case is similar. Defendant could have watched and waited until Diana was as isolated as possible, after Roque returned to the house. Any delay from that point to the shooting can easily be explained by defendant waiting for those inside to resume whatever they were doing, trying to put Diana off her guard, or merely waiting and watching for the best moment to attack. The timing does not necessarily imply that the watching and waiting was interrupted by other events or, to use the language of the Court of Appeal, that the meeting escalated into an argument and a physical confrontation. The passage of time before the shooting does not, as a matter of law, defeat a finding of lying in wait. (See also People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1021 [The brief interval of time which appears to have elapsed between [the victim's] entry into her bedroom and the firing of the fatal shotgun did not make a finding of lying in wait unreasonable since a person concealed in ambush would wait for a clear shot at the intended victim.].) For these reasons, we find ample evidence to support all the elements of lying-in-wait murder. Instructions on that theory were proper.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.