Opinion ID: 427621
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicability of Collateral Estoppel

Text: 15 As noted, the district court held that the collateral estoppel effects of Brown's guilty plea to the charges of public profanity and resisting arrest barred his section 1983 claim that his constitutional rights were violated by his being arrested and prosecuted for those offenses. Of course, Brown was also arrested for and charged with the concealed weapon offense, as to which there was no determination of his guilt, and hence no collateral estoppel or res judicata arose from the disposition of that charge, as the district court recognized. With respect to Brown's arrest claims, however, it might be argued that there was only one arrest for all offenses, and that collateral estoppel from the profanity offense plea and conviction establish that single, indivisible arrest to have been lawful, so that arrest-related claims as to all offenses, including the concealed weapon offense as to which there was no conviction, are barred. We do not decide that question, however, because we hold that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel bars Brown's making his arrest claims with respect to any of the offenses and that the district court erred insofar as it held to the contrary. 16 We do not doubt that under principles of collateral estoppel (and perhaps res judicata ) the outcome of or determinations made in state court criminal proceedings may, in a proper case, bar the state court defendant from subsequently relitigating the same matters in a section 1983 suit. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 101 S.Ct. 411, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982). We have several times so held. See decisions cited in Richardson v. Fleming, 651 F.2d 366, 374 (5th Cir.1981). Nevertheless, it appears from Allen, Kremer, and, most recently, Haring v. Prosise, --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2368, 76 L.Ed.2d 595 (1983), that the application of collateral estoppel (or res judicata ) in such a setting is derived from 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1738, pursuant to which the federal court will give no greater preclusive effect to the state court judgment than would the courts of the state rendering it. 17 The general rules of collateral estoppel and res judicata applicable in Mississippi are summarized in Dunaway v. W.H. Hopper & Associates, Inc., 422 So.2d 749 (Miss.1982). We think it evident that neither doctrine is applicable here to bar civil damage actions in respect to arrest for any of the offenses. The criminal and civil causes of action are different. The validity of the arrest was not actually litigated in the state court proceedings. And, there is nothing necessarily inconsistent between the arrest being illegal and each conviction being proper. This is the general rule. See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 250, 71 L.Ed. 505 (1927). It likewise appears to be the rule in Mississippi. See Smith v. State, 228 Miss. 476, 87 So.2d 917, 919 (1956). As there apparently was no search or extra-judicial confession incident to or resulting from the arrest, and certainly no such confession or fruits of search were offered in evidence, the legality of the arrest could not have been litigated in the state criminal proceedings. See Smith v. State, supra. Hence, the state criminal judgments do not operate, by res judicata or collateral estoppel, to bar civil complaints as to arrest in respect to any of the offenses. See Greer v. Turner, 603 F.2d 521 (5th Cir.1979). 18 It is perhaps a closer question whether collateral estoppel arising from the state convictions bars the section 1983 complaint as to being charged with, as opposed to being arrested for, the public profanity and resisting arrest offenses. Though res judicata is plainly inapplicable, since the causes of action are different, it might be argued that collateral estoppel is available on the theory that a conviction necessarily determines the propriety of the charge. But Haring and a literal application of the Mississippi test for collateral estoppel as stated in Dunaway, 422 So.2d at 751 (applies only to questions actually litigated in a prior suit) point in the other direction, as it is undisputed that Brown's present claims respecting these charges were not actually litigated, or even raised, in the state proceedings. In any event it is clear that Brown's wrongful charge claim respecting the concealed weapon offense must be reached, since there was no conviction of that offense. Although Brown has sought no actual damages respecting the alleged wrongful charging of the concealed weapon offense, he has sought nominal damages, and, should he prevail, would be entitled thereto. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1053-54, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). As we dispose of the merits of Brown's section 1983 claim respecting the concealed weapon charge and do so adversely to him on grounds equally applicable to his claims respecting the profanity and resisting arrest offenses, we pretermit further consideration of the collateral estoppel issue respecting the charging of the latter offenses. 19 Hence, we now turn to the merits of the damage claim. 8