Opinion ID: 1188955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First Ground: Constitutional Disqualification [4]

Text: Article 3, section 1 of the Nevada Constitution provides as follows: The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments,the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. This court has consistently affirmed that [t]he division of powers is probably the most important single principle of government declaring and guaranteeing the liberties of the people. Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 18, 422 P.2d 237, 241 (1967). This principle is also of Federal Constitutional dimension and has occupied a position of unquestioned importance since the early days of the Republic. As James Madison noted in The Federalist No. 47, `[w]ere the power of judging joined ... to the executive power, the judge might behave with all the violence of the oppressor' (quoting Montesquieu). Merging the adjudicative power of the Commission with the executive power, as evidenced in the case before us raises this very specter. Article 6 (the Judicial Article), section 21 of the Nevada Constitution creates the Commission on Judicial Discipline. The Commission is a part of the judicial branch of government, vested with the constitutional power to censure, retire or remove a judge or justice, subject to such rules as this court might promulgate, and subject to appellate review by this court. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 21(1). The Attorney General, on the other hand, is a constitutional officer in the executive branch of government whose various duties are established by the legislature. See Ryan v. District Court, 88 Nev. 638, 642, 503 P.2d 842, 844 (1972); see generally Nev. Const. art. 5 § 19. In matters of judicial discipline, it is the Commission, not the Attorney General, which the constitution vests with the power and duty to deal with all matters relating to erring judges who are charged with violating the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Commission is constitutionally empowered to designate for each hearing an attorney or attorneys at law to act as counsel to conduct the proceeding, ( id. at art. 6, § 21(9)(a)). Nowhere in the constitution is the Commission required or empowered to employ the Attorney General, a member of a separate and co-equal branch of government, to act as its counsel. [5] It is not constitutionally permissible for the Attorney General to investigate or prosecute a judge or justice on behalf of the Commission. The Attorney General may not represent the Commission in judicial discipline matters, nor may the Attorney General prosecute a judge or justice before the Commission, because one department cannot exercise the power of the other two without violating article 3, section 1 of the Nevada Constitution. Galloway, 83 Nev. at 19, 422 P.2d at 242. [6] Although the Commission disputes that the Attorney General's office engaged in exercising any Commission functions, the record clearly reflects that Special Deputy Attorney General Don Campbell engaged in a very extensive investigation of the allegations against Petitioner on behalf of the Commission. Mr. Campbell's affidavit also indicates that he was involved in carrying out the Commission function of screening complaints and that in doing so made the determination that many of the incidents alleged in one of the complaints against Petitioner did not warrant further action by the Commission. Whether Special Deputy Attorney General Campbell was acting for the Commission in making these Commission decisions or was merely advising the Commission to take these actions, the executive branch, through the Attorney General's office, has been actively engaged in the judicial discipline processa process that can be carried out properly and constitutionally only by the Commission on Judicial Discipline itself. Nev. Const. art. 6, § 21(7). The State of Minnesota has recognized that it is not proper for the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General has acted in this case. See Rules of Board on Judicial Standards, Minn. Rules of Court, Rule 1(d)(10) at 693 (West Supp.1994) (Authorizing the Executive Secretary of the Board on Judicial Standards to [e]mploy, with the approval of the board, special counsel, private investigators, or other experts as necessary to investigate and process matters before the board or the Supreme Court. The use of the attorney general's staff for this purpose shall not be allowed. ) (Emphasis added.) The source of and basis for the Minnesota rule is the ABA's Standards Relating to Judicial Discipline and Disability Retirement. See Judicial Conduct Organizations Governing Provisions (Kathleen Sampson, ed., 1984). Standard 2.8 states that the use of members of the attorney general's staff to perform commission functions is not recommended.... Their use may also interfere with the independence of the judiciary. Id. at 15; see infra note 5 (emphasis added). We are, of course, well aware of NRS 1.450(2) which commands the Attorney General to act as counsel upon request of the Commission. If the Commission or its members were to be sued for, say, some alleged tortious activity, there would be no bar to the Attorney General's defending such a lawsuit, as long as it did not involve the Commission's constitutional mandate to hear and decide misconduct complaints against judges. [7] If we were to read NRS 1.450(2) as permitting the Attorney General to represent the Commission in matters relating to specific cases of judicial discipline or, worse, as permitting the Commission's legal advisor also to be the prosecutor of judicial discipline complaints, such a reading would run contrary to the constitution. State v. Douglass, 33 Nev. 82, 92, 110 P. 177, 180 (1910) (the Legislature, in the absence of express constitutional authority, is as powerless to add to a constitutional office duties foreign to that office, as it is to take away duties that naturally belong to it). The statute may properly permit the Commission to seek the legal advice of the Attorney General, much as another state entity might [8] ; however, the statute cannot permit the invasion of the judicial department by the executive department of government. This would occur if the Attorney General were permitted to sit in from day to day in the Commission's meetings, during which the principal Commission business is to deal with matters relating to judicial discipline. To allow this would be to allow the Attorney General to become almost an ex facto member of the Commission. It must be remembered that the Attorney General and her extensive staff must, in the performance of their constitutional duties, appear before the judges and justices of this state on a daily basis. If those same lawyers are privy to confidential and damaging information about judges, then, at the very least, the appearance of an impartial tribunal is lost. See conflict of interest section, infra, pp. 9-13; compare ARJD 2(9) (Prosecuting officer means an attorney designated by the commission to file and prosecute the Formal Statement of Charges.) (Emphasis added.) We must necessarily disapprove of the practice of having a member of the Attorney General's staff routinely participate in Commission meetings and deliberations. [9] The policy rationale behind requiring the Commission to use independent counsel to perform both advisory and prosecutorial functions for the Commission in judicial discipline proceedings is obvious: it ensures that disciplinary proceedings are not pursued for personal, partisan, or political gain, and it ensures that one branch of government does not usurp the vital functions of another or place itself in the position of holding the others hostage. Where a statute is susceptible to both a constitutional and an unconstitutional interpretation, this court is obliged to construe the statute so that it does not violate the constitution. Sheriff v. Wu, 101 Nev. 687, 708 P.2d 305 (1985). NRS 1.450(2) is constitutional insofar as it permits the Commission to request official legal opinions of the Attorney General in matters unrelated to judicial discipline. NRS 1.450(2) cannot be constitutionally read to authorize the Attorney General to act as counsel to the Commission or to act as prosecutor in judicial discipline proceedings.