Opinion ID: 2979776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: William Salyers

Text: William Salyers first argues that the district court erred in ordering restitution because there is no identifiable victim and restitution is otherwise inappropriate. He also challenges the methodology used by the district court for determining the amount of restitution. Following a request for briefing on the issue of restitution, the district court ordered $50,000.00 in restitution to 15 the Tennessee Wildlife Resources Agency and the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, with $45,000.00 going to the Tennessee agency and $5,000.00 to the Alabama agency. The restitution was ordered joint and several with Pamela Salyers and Tunguyan Shin. William Salyers did not raise either argument regarding restitution before the district court. While the government says William Salyers has waived any issues regarding restitution, that is not the case. Rather, when a defendant fails to object to an order of restitution, a subsequent challenge to the order is reviewable, but only for plain error. United States v. Schulte, 264 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hall, 71 F.3d 569, 573 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The Sixth Circuit has held that where no objection is made to the order of restitution at sentencing, the appellate court reviews for plain error.”)(internal citation omitted). By way of background, in April 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214. The AEDPA included the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), which amended the Victim Witness Protection Act of 1982. The MVRA added section 3663A, which requires mandatory restitution3 to victims of certain crimes, including offenses against property under Title 18 and including any offense committed by fraud or deceit. For the covered offenses under § 3663A, a district court “shall order” full restitution, which must be imposed “without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A(a)(1), 3664(f)(1)(A). William Salyers argues that restitution is not appropriate because the state agencies involved, the TWRA and the Alabama Department of Conservation and Natural Resources, cannot be 3 In the legislative history of the MVRA, the Senate Committee stated quite clearly: “It is the committee’s intent that courts order full restitution to all identifiable victims of covered offenses.” Sen. Rep. No. 179, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 924, 931. 16 considered “victims” for purposes of restitution. He is mistaken. In Ratliff v. United States, 999 F.2d 1023, 1027 (6th Cir. 1993), a panel of this court stated: The sentencing court’s order of restitution to the Department of Labor was not error because the government can be a “victim” under the VWPA. See e.g., United States v. Streebing, 987 F.2d 368 (6th Cir. 1993) (Social Security Administration); United States v. Smith, 944 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied [503 U.S. 951], 117 L.Ed.2d 651, 112 S.Ct. 1515 (1992) (Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation); United States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.1991), cert. denied [502 U.S. 1091], 117 L.Ed.2d 409, 112 S.Ct. 1162,(1992) (Internal Revenue Service). Like the federal agencies listed above, the state agencies involved in this case can be considered victims entitled to restitution. The undersized mussels were taken from Tennessee and Alabama waters in violation of a regulatory scheme. They were not the property of the possessors, but rather the states from whose waters they were taken. Thus, the states have a property interest in the mussel shells and are entitled to compensation for their loss. Notably, restitution was not awarded for investigation or prosecution costs, which is prohibited. See Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 112 (6th Cir. 1994) (“[I]nvestigative costs are not losses, but voluntary expenditures by the government for the procurement of evidence. . . . [W]here . . . a restitution award is based solely on the costs of the government’s investigation and prosecution of the defendant, it is not a direct loss resulting from defendant’s illegal conduct for which restitution may be awarded pursuant to the VWPA.”); Ratliff, 999 F.2d at 1026 (finding that “restitution may not be awarded under the VWPA for investigation or prosecution costs incurred in the offense of conviction”). With respect to the amount of restitution, William Salyers argues that the district court should have looked to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1(d), which provides that, for drug offenses, the amount of restitution should not exceed the fine imposed under § 5E1.2. This argument does not advance his cause. As noted in the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), he faced a statutory fine of $250,000.00 and 17 a guidelines fine of $6,000.00 to $60,000.00 PSR ¶ 66, 67. The amount of restitution ordered was within the guidelines range and therefore presumed reasonable. William Salyers also cites the civil and criminal penalties provisions for Lacey Act violations under 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372(a)(1), 3372(d)(2). However, as the government notes, William Salyers pled guilty to five counts, resulting in a possibility of $50,000.00 in civil penalties and $50,000.00 in criminal fines, precisely the amount of restitution. Moreover, the district court made a factual determination at sentencing that the value of the illegally harvested mussels was $85,120.00, a finding William Salyers does not challenge. Not only was there a basis for ordering restitution, but also for the amount of the restitution. Overall, we find that the district court did not commit plain error in ordering restitution to the state agencies in the amount of $50,000.00.
William Salyers argues that his sentence is unreasonable because of a disparity with his codefendants and that the district court erred in failing to grant him a downward departure or variance based on his medical condition. As noted above, we review his sentence for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See Presley, 547 F.3d at 629. Here, William Salyers does not argue the district court was unaware of its authority, nor does the record reveal otherwise. Indeed, the fact that the district court imposed a sentence below the advisory guidelines range demonstrates its awareness of its discretion to vary from the guidelines. To the extent William Salyers sees error in the refusal of the district court to vary based on his medical condition, he is essentially arguing that his sentence is too long to accomplish the purposes set forth in § 3553(a), which is a substantive reasonableness complaint. “The essence of a substantive-reasonableness claim is whether the length of the sentence is 18 ‘greater than necessary’ to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601 F.3d 629, 632-33 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “‘A sentence is substantively unreasonable if the district court selects the sentence arbitrarily, bases the sentence on impermissible factors, fails to consider pertinent § 3553(a) factors or gives an unreasonable amount of weight to any pertinent factor.’” Id. at 633 (quoting United States v. Walls, 546 F.3d 728, 736 (6th Cir. 2008)). Here, the district court was well aware of William Salyers’s medical needs. The district court held a hearing prior to sentencing specific to his medical condition and found that the Bureau of Prisons could meet his medical needs. Moreover, a nurse practitioner testified at his sentencing, further detailing his conditions, which included sleep apnea, hypertension, elevated cholesterol, diabetes, and coronary artery disease, for which he was on several prescribed medications. In taking this into consideration, the district court recommended that William Salyers be housed at a medical facility. Based on the record, his sentence was not substantively unreasonable. Moreover, the district court clearly stated and considered the § 3553(a) factors before imposing the 20-month sentence. Regarding disparity, William Salyers argues that because many of his co-defendants received non-custodial sentences after pleading guilty, his custodial sentence is unreasonable. Putting aside that he did not raise the issue at sentencing, his argument lacks merit. Disparity in sentencing refers to national disparity, not disparity between co-defendants. As we have stated: Although 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) requires that the sentencing court consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct,” this factor “concerns national disparities between defendants with similar criminal histories convicted of similar conduct-not disparities between codefendants.” United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 521 (6th Cir. 2008), cert. 19 denied, Marlowe v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 450, 172 L.Ed.2d 320 (2008). “Disparities between the sentences of coconspirators can exist for valid reasons, such as differences in criminal histories, the offenses of conviction, or one co-conspirator's decision to plead guilty and cooperate with the government.” Id. at 522. Tait does not argue that his within-Guidelines sentence is disparate from those received by similarly-situated offenders at the national level, and his extensive criminal history amply justifies any discrepancy between his sentence and his coconspirators.’ United States v. Tait, 337 F. App’x, 498, 499-500 (6th Cir. 2009). Similarly, William Salyers does not argue that his sentence is disparate on a national level. Moreover, while his co-defendants received lesser sentences, William Salyers’s role in the conspiracy and the circumstances of his plea were decidedly different. He compares himself to Tungyuan Shin, who also purchased illegal shells. This comparison is not convincing. Unlike Shin, William Salyers employed five others at his business and purchased illegal shells from at least six divers. His level of cooperation was also different. While he initially cooperated and arranged for a buy with Tungyuan Shin, he refused to identify his divers. He went to trial. He pleaded guilty only after his wife and Bruce were convicted at trial. His co-defendants, including Tungyuan Shin, pleaded guilty and many testified at trial. A review of the sentencing transcript shows that the district court considered the roles of all defendants and their levels of cooperation and concluded, rightly so, that William Salyers was not entitled to the same treatment. In sum, William Salyers has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in imposing his sentence, or that his sentence was unreasonable.