Opinion ID: 2324757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: The error as to inexcusable neglect of duty.

Text: In spite of our rejection of the DCPL's challenge to the sufficiency of Ms. Okyiri's evidence, we are persuaded that a remand is necessary. We reach this conclusion because the trial judge's decision, like that of the OEA, appears to be predicated on a perception that Ms. Okyiri's retention of the Bert Smith & Company letter in her in-box for more than two months, and her consequent failure to pass it on, did not warrant a sanction by the DCPL, or at least the sanction actually imposed, namely, removal from her position. The only reason suggested by the trial judge for this conclusion was that no harm actually came to the agency. In our view, however, this favorable outcome was entirely fortuitous and did not significantly alleviate the gravity of Ms. Okyiri's neglect of duty. As we noted in our discussion of the proceedings before the OEA, see Part I C(3)(b), supra, a fact-finder's belief that an employee has done nothing to deserve to be disciplined may be an important factor in the court's determination whether a sanction was imposed for an illegitimate and pretextual reason. When, as in this case, we are satisfied that such a belief was erroneous, the judge must reassess her decision and accord appropriate weight in her calculus to our conclusion that, on the undisputed facts, legitimate grounds existed for Ms. Okyiri's removal for inexcusable neglect of duty. We emphasize, however, that our disposition does not require the trial judge, on remand, to rule in either party's favor. Adapting to the present case the language of the federal Merit Systems Protection Board, [t]he issue is not whether [Ms. Okyiri] was the ideal employee or whether [the DCPL] could have relied on [the Bert Smith & Company envelope] incident[ ] to terminate [her]. Rather, the issue is whether [the DCPL] actually did rely on these incidents to terminate [Ms. Okyiri] independent of the latter's protected conduct. Special Counsel v. Nielson, 71 M.S.P.R. 161, 170 (1996) (citation omitted). As the Supreme Court explained in a different but related context, once an employee has shown that protected conduct was a motivating factor in the employer's decision not to rehire him, the trial court must determine whether the [employer] ha[s] shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to [the employee's] re-employment even in the absence of the protected conduct. Mount Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977).