Opinion ID: 1429543
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Objective of the Legislature

Text: When evaluating the objective of the Legislature, the court in Hancock asked, Is the intent of the Legislature to cooperate with the executive by furnishing some special expertise of one or more of its members or is the objective of the Legislature obviously one of establishing its superiority over the executive department in an area essentially executive in nature? Hancock, 142 Ariz. at 405, 690 P.2d at 124 (quoting Bennett, 547 P.2d at 792). Again, the Legislature's actions through its amendments to A.R.S. § 41-401 are relevant. See supra Separation of Powers, part I. The Legislature's actions in amending A.R.S. § 41-401 show its intent to take over an executive function by eliminating the Attorney General from the litigation process and adding two members of the Legislature as advisory members to CDC. CDC argues that appointing two legislative members as advisory members of CDC does not violate separation of powers because the members are not necessary for a quorum and have no voting rights. However, although the members have no voting rights, they still have the ability to influence the decisions of the board. Otherwise, no purpose exists in having them as members. Allowing members of a legislative body to serve, even as advisory members, on a board that performs an executive function may violate separation of powers. See Federal Election Comm'n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 826-27 (D.C.Cir.1993), cert. dismissed, 513 U.S. 88, 115 S.Ct. 537, 130 L.Ed.2d 439 (1994) (holding that Congress's appointment of the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House as non-voting members of the Federal Election Commission violated the separation of powers doctrine).