Opinion ID: 620295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the scope of the pat-down search was reasonable

Text: Any search, even a consensual one, is constrained by the bounds of reasonableness. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991). The question here is whether a request to conduct a search of the person for narcotics reasonably includes the groin area. In other words, when Russell consented to a search of his person, was it reasonable for Bruch to assume the consent included the groin area? The scope of consent is benchmarked against an objective reasonableness test. Id. at 252, 111 S.Ct. 1801. The factual context is key to our decision. Bruch specifically advised Russell that he was looking for narcotics. After consenting to the search, Russell was more than cooperative. To facilitate the search, he lifted his arms to shoulder height and spread his legs. Russell could have objected either of the two times he gave verbal consent before the search, or while Bruch worked his way up from the ankles to the groin. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 776 (8th Cir.2005) (granting a motion to suppress where the suspect consented to a search of his person but then withdrew consent by actively shielding his groin area from the officer's search). Indeed, Bruch purposely searched from the ankles up because it gives them an opportunity to say that they don't want the search ... there is an opportunity to stop. Instead Russell said nothing and certainly did nothing to manifest any change of heart about his consent to search. He never objected, expressed any concern, nor did he revoke consent or call a halt to the search, nor did he complain to the officer after the fact. We hold that the search was reasonable. Narcotics are often hidden on the body in locations that make discovery more difficult, including the groin area. [2] The search here did not extend inside the clothing. Finally, this case does not present a question of a body pat-down by an officer of the opposite gender. See, e.g., Hudson v. Hall, 231 F.3d 1289, 1298 (11th Cir.2000) (noting as a significant factor that the searching officer was the same gender as the suspect); United States v. Rodney, 956 F.2d 295, 298 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.1992) (In particular, we do not address situations where, unlike here, the officer and the suspect are of opposite sexes.). Not only would a reasonable person in Bruch's situation understand that the general consent for a narcotics search of the person included a pat-down of all areas of the body, including the groin area, Russell's unrestricted consent to the search and conduct during the search suggested nothing different. The Supreme Court has long recognized that searching a suspect's person may consist of a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing all over his or her body. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Terry the Court cited the following as an apt description of an officer fieldsearch: The officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the legs down to the feet. Id. at 17 n. 13, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (emphasis added) (quoting L.L. Priar & T.F. Martin, Searching and Disarming Criminals, 45 J.Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 481, 481 (1954)). Although Terry focused on weapons searches where officer safety considerations are paramount, id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, the Court's reference to the scope of a search of the person is instructive. Two other circuits previously addressed the groin issue and held that a search of the groin in the context of drug investigations falls within a general consent to a search of the person; we agree. The D.C. Circuit in Rodney concluded that a groin search is within a general consent to search the person for drugs. Rodney, 956 F.2d at 298. Justice Thomas, sitting by special designation and joined by then-Judge Ginsburg over a dissent, wrote, a request to conduct a body search for drugs reasonably includes a request to conduct some search of that [groin] area. Id. See also United States v. Ashley, 37 F.3d 678 (D.C.Cir.1994) (upholding a groin search as falling within the bounds set by Rodney ); United States v. Broxton, 926 F.2d 1180 (D.C.Cir.1991) (per curiam) (upholding as consensual a drug search including the crotch area). The Eleventh Circuit was presented with a similar issue in a qualified immunity appeal. The court held that a brief and discreet look into the pants of a suspect by an officer of the same sex during a search for drugs and for weapons was within the scope of a general consent to a pat-down search. Hudson, 231 F.3d at 1298. Russell's reliance on an earlier Eleventh Circuit case is misplaced. In United States v. Blake, the court affirmed a district court's determination that the consent given by the defendants allowing the officers to search their `persons' could not, under the circumstances, be construed as an authorization for the officers to touch their genitals in the middle of a public area. 888 F.2d 795, 800 (11th Cir.1989) (emphasis added). However, Blake presented significantly different facts than we consider here. The officers in Blake stopped and searched the defendants at random, and immediately searched their groin. Not so here where Bruch had concrete information that led him to seek out Russell, and then methodically worked his way up Russell's legs before searching the groin. This distinction is crucialthe extra time gave Russell an opportunity to withdraw or limit his consent. Bruch also testified that it would be intrusive and embarrassing and [not] good, to simply walk up and grab the genital area without cause. Another crucial distinction is that the standards of review in Blake and this case are both clear error for factual determinations, id. at 802, while the findings of the district courts are inverted. In Blake, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's determination as not being clearly erroneous. We do the same here. Three other circuits have upheld searches of the groin area in similar factual contexts but in cases that did not present a Fourth Amendment scope of consent issue. In United States v. Wilson, a deputy sheriff observed a passenger coming off a commuter flight behaving suspiciously. 895 F.2d 168, 170 (4th Cir.1990). The deputy asked if he could search his person, and, without making an oral response, [the suspect] simply shrugged his shoulders and extended his arms. [The deputy] felt a very hard substance in [the suspect's] groin area. Id. On these facts, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the conviction and the upheld the admissibility of the drug evidence. Similarly, the Sixth Circuit upheld the validity of a drug search which included the defendant's groin area, holding that the arresting officers had a reasonable and articulable suspicion legitimating the search. United States v. Winfrey, 915 F.2d 212, 216-18 (6th Cir.1990). Finally, the Fifth Circuit upheld the conviction of a drug courier who voluntarily consented to a search that revealed drugs hidden in his underwear. United States v. Bowles, 625 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1980). In contrast, and not surprisingly, in the case where consent was withdrawn, or restricted, the Eighth Circuit considered the reasonableness of the search against the scope of consent. Where the suspect had given consent to a search of his person but then withdrew consent by actively shielding his groin area from the officer's search, the Eighth Circuit held the search invalid. Sanders, 424 F.3d at 776. Here, too, Russell could have similarly withdrawn or limited his consent at any stage of the search, but he did not do so. We conclude that Russell voluntarily consented to a search of the person, encompassing a full-body frisk, including the groin area. We uphold the district court's denial of Russell's motion to suppress. AFFIRMED.