Opinion ID: 2583906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: due process and compulsory process

Text: We have previously recognized that failure to grant a continuance may deprive a defendant of a fair trial and due process of law, within the circumstances of a particular case. Williams, 84 Wash.2d at 855, 529 P.2d 1088 (citing State v. Cadena, 74 Wash.2d 185, 443 P.2d 826 (1968)). Additionally, a denial of a request for a continuance may violate a defendant's right to compulsory process if the denial prevents the defendant from presenting a witness material to his defense. Eller, 84 Wash.2d at 95, 524 P.2d 242. Whether the denial of a continuance rises to the level of a constitutional violation requires a case by case inquiry. Id. at 96, 524 P.2d 242 (citing Cadena, 74 Wash.2d 185, 443 P.2d 826); ( Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)). [7] The existence of due diligence alone does not determine whether a constitutional right has been violated by the denial of a continuance. Compare Eller, 84 Wash.2d 90, 524 P.2d 242 with State v. Edwards, 68 Wash.2d 246, 412 P.2d 747 (1966). In Eller, this court found the defense counsel acted diligently to secure the attendance of a witness after the State's belated production of the undercover agent. Eller, 84 Wash.2d at 96, 524 P.2d 242. Yet, we held the trial court's denial of the request for a continuance was not a constitutional error because the testimony of the witness sought by the defense would have been merely cumulative of the evidence already adduced at trial. Eller, 84 Wash.2d at 96, 98, 524 P.2d 242. Whereas in Edwards, the inquiry turned on defense counsel's diligence by issuing subpeonas to compel attendance of witnesses who failed to appear, and thus the denial of a continuance violated the defendant's right to compulsory process. Edwards, 68 Wash.2d at 258, 412 P.2d 747. The facts of Downing's case bear a closer resemblance to those in Eller than Edwards. In both cases, defense counsel acted diligently in response to an action by the prosecuting attorney: belated production of a witness in Eller and allowing, if not facilitating, the introduction of the primary witness to other alleged victims in Downing. In both cases, the trial court found continuances to be unnecessary: because the witness's testimony would have been cumulative in Eller and because the witness's testimony would not have changed the fact that the witness's statements were consistent before and after the potentially tainting contact in Downing. We hold the trial court did not violate Downing's constitutional rights by denying his request for a continuance.