Opinion ID: 1953412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Jenkins' Preparation of the Sales Contract

Text: Jenkins contends that there was insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that he had prepared the sales agreement. We disagree. The trial court found specifically that Jenkins prepared a [sales contract] dated April 10, 1998, and noted that he testified, under oath, that he prepared the sales agreement. There is no error in this finding. The record shows that when called as an adverse witness in the Strausses' case and asked who had typed up the sales contract, Jenkins first testified, I don't know who typed it up. The girl, I don't know whether the girl typed it up or whether I typed it up. Although not precisely the same as the trial court's finding that Jenkins testified under oath that he prepared the sales contract, it sufficiently supports a finding that either he typed it himself, or he had the girl (an expression that strongly suggests a person who worked at his direction) type it up under his direction. Indeed, either way, it would fall comfortably within the definition of preparation of the sales contract, and whether he had it typed by the girl or typed it himself would make no difference. In either case, he would be responsible for its contents. See, e.g., Schecter v. Merchs. Home Delivery, Inc., 892 A.2d 415, 427 (D.C.2006) (employers are responsible for acts done in the prosecution of the business either impliedly or expressly intrusted to the agent (quoting Axman v. Washington Gaslight Co., 38 App.D.C. 150, 158 (1912))). Thus, the trial court had a sufficient basis for its finding that Jenkins testified under oath that he prepared the sales contract. The fact that he also gave contrary testimony is not determinative. Indeed, in later testimony addressing the issue of who prepared the sales contract, Jenkins wavered considerably. This wavering testimony, arguably self-protective and inconsistent with his original answer, provided a further basis for the court to conclude that Jenkins was concerned about blame being placed upon him for preparing this agreement and wished to deflect that blame elsewhere. Indeed, in this later context, when counsel asked the followup question: Did you either prepare this contract or cause it to be prepared by somebody, Jenkins backtracked, testifying, I don't know whether or not I prepared this particular contract or not. . . . Anybody could have prepared this contract because Mr. Strauss said this is not his signature.  (emphasis added) Moreover, in response to a question about whether this was the contract that was used to sell Mr. Strauss' home, Jenkins responded, I don't know if this was the particular contract or not. But those are the terms in there. Mr. Strauss read this at the title company.[ [7] ] He knew what he was signing. Jenkins later backed off further from his original testimony that either he or the girl typed it up, asserting I know I didn't prepare it. This was despite the fact that the agreement had the name of Jenkins Realty in three places on the document, and that Evans testified that it is generally the agent who will prepare the sales contract. In fact, Jenkins ultimately testified that [a]nybody could have prepared this particular contract, and suggested that when Benjamin left the settlement to get the power of attorney documents, he could have come back with this. The trial court was entirely justified in rejecting this testimony. The idea that Benjamin might have prepared this agreement, with terms antithetical to his purpose of selling the Nash Street home, is simply not credible. Moreover, it is apparent that Benjamin was unaware of and never approved the terms of this sales contract. His testimony about his sense of obligation toward his brother and his concern that there be sufficient funds to cover William's nursing home expenses was in no way impeached. The idea that Benjamin would agree to reduce the proceeds due his brother by paying consumer accounts in undefined amounts for the buyer of the Nash Street house, as well as the buyer's taxes and settlement costs, and permit a sale with a trust in the amount of $32,500 runs counter to the very purpose of this sale. In fact, when asked whether he accepted the term that involved paying off Brooks' consumer accounts, Benjamin responded: Oh, I would have never accepted that. . . . [T]hat would have been a dumb thing to do with someone else's money. The same is true with respect to the payment of her taxes, her settlement costs and the commission on the sale of her house and permitting a trust for $32,500 to be placed on the property. In the end, the terms of the sales contract benefitted Jenkins (and to a lesser extent Brooks), not the Strausses. That is an additional factor supporting the court's finding that it was indeed Jenkins who drew it up. In a non-jury trial, it is the trial court that must make credibility determinations. Such determinations may be either the result of conflicting testimony of different witnesses or conflicting testimony of a single witness. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 595 A.2d 1003, 1006 (D.C.1991) (Assessing the credibility of witnesses is uniquely a trial court's function, and we reverse only if we find those assessments plainly wrong or lacking evidentiary support.). Here, Jenkins contradicted himself, and the court had the obligation to decide which part of his testimony, if any, it chose to credit. We decline to second guess that decision.