Opinion ID: 1134182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The extent of necessity of the easement to the claimant.

Text: In this case the cornerstone of the claim of easement by implication is necessity. Plaintiffs argue in their brief to this court that the trial court's finding that the grantor, Gregory, landlocked himself shows the necessity. The trial judge also determined that whatever necessity existed was terminated when Thompson gained access to the Schumacher Road in 1959. Plaintiffs asserted in oral argument before this court that an easement by implication is to be distinguished from an easement by necessity and that the cessation of necessity does not affect the easement by implication. We agree with those assertions and note that the necessity element serves a different function as a factor for easement by implication than it does as the basis for easement by necessity. With the former type of easement the necessity element is used as an indicator of the intent of the grantor and grantee at the time of the conveyance, while with the latter it is primarily of the nature of an on-going requirement, though it is also based upon the presumed intent of the conveying parties. Though there was no other direct outside access to the short quarter, Gregory in 1953 owned connecting land to the east which included access to the Clark and Wilson right-of-way. As of 1953 and the sale to Warren, no use by Gregory of the short quarter was established in the record to show the reason for the necessity of the Schuh access. There was no evidence as to whether Gregory considered the Schuh Road as necessary, though Thompson did testify that when he bought the short quarter in 1956 the road served the property. The degree of necessity shown in the record does not clearly evidence an implied easement. The court in Rose stated, 188 Or. at 43, 213 P.2d at 818: In some instances, like those in which (1) an adequate consideration was paid, (2) the claimant is the conveyor and executed a warranty deed, (3) no reciprocal benefits resulted, and (4) the servitude was not clearly defined, necessity must be more pressing than in instances where other elements speak up in behalf of the alleged easement. (f) Whether reciprocal benefits result to the conveyor and the conveyee. Unlike in Rose where there were reciprocal benefits, none were shown here. (g) The manner in which the land was used prior to its conveyance. Though the land was described as timberland, no evidence was introduced indicating Gregory's use of this short quarter. (h) The extent to which the manner of prior use was or might have been known to the parties. No evidence was introduced indicating whether the prior use, whatever it was, might have been known to the Warrens when they bought the property in 1953. We find the evidence is insufficient to prove an easement by implication. Included in plaintiffs' second count is the allegation that plaintiffs have no means of access to a public road other said roadway easement, apparently an assertion of easement by necessity. [6] Actually, there is access to the short quarter via the old logging road which connects with Schumacher Road and apparently with the Clark and Wilson right-of-way. The main question litigated by the parties was the practicability of making the other access serviceable, with plaintiff estimating a cost of $10,000 for a summer-only road. However, there was evidence that such a road could be built for as little as $1,000, that such limited use is all that is necessary considering the 1960 logging was only in the summer and fall, that the Schuh Road from the clearing to the Thompson property also needed repair, and that the entire Schuh Road, which defendant described as 10 feet wide and plaintiff himself described as 24 to 30 feet wide would have to be drastically altered to accommodate plaintiffs' claim in their complaint of use of a road 60 feet wide. We find plaintiffs failed to prove necessity. Affirmed.