Opinion ID: 778724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Easement or Fee Simple

Text: 27 King County claims that under Washington state law the Hilchkanum deed conveyed a fee simple estate in the strip of land to the Railway. The Rasmussens argue that, even if Hilchkanum had the power to convey a fee simple estate to the Railway, he intended to convey only an easement. The district court agreed with King County, as do we. 28 A conveyance of a right of way to a railroad may be in fee simple, or it may be an easement. Veach v. Culp, 92 Wash.2d 570, 599 P.2d 526, 527 (Wash. 1979). The intent of the parties is of paramount importance in determining what interest the deed conveyed. Brown v. State, 130 Wash.2d 430, 924 P.2d 908, 911 (Wash.1996). It has been said that it is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties. Veach, 599 P.2d at 527. But the intent of parties to a deed as well as the legal consequences of that intent are in reality mixed questions of law and fact: legal rules of deed interpretation determine how the underlying facts reflect the intent of the parties. See Brown, 924 P.2d at 912 (determining intent from undisputed underlying facts on summary judgment). To ascertain the intent of the parties, one must look to the language of the deed as well as the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties. 6 Id. However, the parties must clearly indicate an intent to make a conveyance conditional. King County v. Hanson Inv. Co., 34 Wash.2d 112, 208 P.2d 113, 119 (1949) (cited in Brown, 924 P.2d at 912). 29 The Washington Supreme Court provided its most recent guidance on this issue in Brown. 7 The Brown court identified various factors to consider in determining whether a deed conveyed a fee simple or an easement: 30 [W]e have relied on the following factors: (1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof; (4) whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land; (5) whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; (6) whether the consideration expressed was substantial or nominal; 8 (7) whether the conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other considerations. 31 Brown, 924 P.2d at 912. 32 The Brown court further explained that whether the parties to a railroad right of way deed used a statutory form deed is a significant factor in determining their intent. Brown, 924 P.2d at 912; see Roeder Co. v. K & E Moving & Storage Co., 102 Wash.App. 49, 4 P.3d 839, 841 (Wash.Ct.App.2000). The court ruled that where the original parties utilized the statutory warranty form deed and the granting clauses convey definite strips of land, we must find that the grantors intended to convey fee simple title unless additional language in the deeds clearly and expressly limits or qualifies the interest conveyed. 9 Brown, 924 P.2d at 912. 33 In this case, however, the Hilchkanum deed did not follow the statutory warranty form. The statutory form is as follows: 34 The grantor (here insert the name or names and place of residence) for and in consideration of (here insert consideration), in hand paid, convey and warrant to (here insert the grantee's name) the following described real estate (here insert description), situated in the county of _______, state of Washington. 35 Laws of 1886, § 3, pp. 177-78. The Hilchkanum deed used a slightly different form: 36 In consideration of (here insert consideration), grantor (here insert name of grantor) does hereby donate grant and convey unto grantee (here insert name of grantee) the following described right of way (here insert description). 37 As a result, the Hilchkanum deed does not give rise to the presumption that the deed conveyed a fee simple. See Roeder, 4 P.3d at 843; Veach, 599 P.2d at 527 (no presumption that quitclaim deed conveyed fee simple). A failure to use the statutory warranty deed form, however, does not necessarily mean that the parties did not intend to convey a fee simple. The court must consider whether other factors indicate that the parties intended a fee simple. 38 Another factor on which the Brown court focused was if and how the deed uses the term right of way. The court noted that use of the term in the granting clause as a limitation or to specify the purpose of the grant generally creates only an easement. Brown, 924 P.2d at 913. The term right of way, however, can have two purposes: (1) to qualify or limit the interest granted in a deed to the right to pass over a tract of land (an easement), or (2) to describe the strip of land being conveyed to a railroad for the purpose of constructing a railway. Id. at 914. 39 In Brown, the term right of way appeared only in each deed's legal description or in the description of the railroad's obligations, instead of in the granting or habendum clauses. The court concluded that used in this manner,'right of way' merely describes a strip of land acquired for rail lines. Brown, 924 P.2d at 914. Since the term did not qualify or limit the interest expressly conveyed in the granting and habendum clauses of the deeds at issue, the court concluded it did not indicate an intent to grant an easement only. 10 40 Here the term right of way appears in the granting clause as well as in the legal description. 11 In this sense, the Hilchkanum deed suggests a possible intent to create only an easement in a way the deeds at issue in Brown did not. However, neither the granting nor the habendum clauses contains language clearly limiting the use of the land to a specific purpose. In virtually all cases where Washington courts have found only an easement, the granting or the habendum clauses contained such language. See Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wash.2d 533, 225 P.2d 199, 199 (Wash.1950) (granting premises for the purpose of a Railroad right-of-way); Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 278 P. 686, 687 (Wash.1929) (conveying a right of way for the construction of said company's railroad); Pacific Iron Works v. Bryant Lumber & Shingle Mill Co., 60 Wash. 502, 111 P. 578 (Wash.1910) (holding that deed providing to have and to hold the said premises ... for railway purposes, but if it should cease to be used for a railway the said premises shall revert to said grantors granted easement); Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry. Co., 10 Wash. 357, 38 P. 1126 (Wash.1894) (construing deed which provided so long as the same shall be used for the operation of a railroad as an easement); King County v. Squire Inv. Co., 59 Wash.App. 888, 801 P.2d 1022, 1022 (Wash.Ct.App. 1990) (granting premises to railroad so long as said land is used as a right-of-way by said railway Company, Expressly reserving to said grantors their heirs and assigns all their riparian rights....). Without such additional language, the use of the term right of way merely begs the question since a railroad could own a right of way either as an easement or in fee. Brown, 924 P.2d at 914. 41 The Hilchkanum deed contained precatory language indicating that the parties expected that the right of way would be used to construct and operate a railroad, but it did not actually condition the conveyance on such use. 12 Brown, 924 P.2d at 912-13. Also, in Brown, the court noted that identifying the general purpose of a conveyance, i.e., for railroad purposes, is not helpful in discerning intent because it does not clarify whether the right of way is an easement or a fee. Id. at 913. 42 One Washington case, Veach, supports the Rasmussens' contention that the mere use of the term right of way in the granting clause of the Hilchkanum deed, without additional language conditioning the use of the interest, creates an easement.. 599 P.2d at 527. In Veach, the 1901 deed stated: The said party of the first part, for and in consideration of the sum of Two Hundred and Twenty-five Dollars, ... do by these presents remise, release, and forever quit claim unto said party of the second part, and to its assigns, all that certain lot, piece or parcel of land situated in Whatcom County ... to-wit:  A right of way one hundred feet wide, being fifty feet on each side of the center line of the B.B. & Easter R.R..... To have and to hold, all and singular, said premises, together with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part, and to its assigns forever. 43 Id. Like the Hilchkanum deed, the language in the Veach deed did not expressly limit the use to a particular purpose. However, the district court distinguished Veach on the basis of other language in the Hilchkanum deed and extrinsic evidence indicating an intent to convey a fee simple estate, neither of which was present in Veach. Rasmussen, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1230 n. 4. 44 First, the district court compared the Hilchkanum deed's language granting an interest in the strip of land with its language granting the Railway the right to enter the adjacent land to cut trees: 45 The deed grants a strip of land described in metes and bounds rather than merely a right over the land (as it does with the tree-cutting grant). The deed uses the word convey when granting the strip, which is associated with fee transfers (notably,convey is absent in the tree-cutting grant). See Hanson, 208 P.2d at 119. 46 Id. We agree with the district court that these factors indicate that Hilchkanum intended to convey a fee simple interest in the strip of land described. Furthermore, the fact that he explicitly limited the purpose of the Railway's right to enter the adjacent land demonstrates that he was aware of the distinction between an easement and a fee simple conveyance. 13 47 The district court also looked to the behavior of the parties after the execution of the deed to the Railway, which bolsters the conclusion that the deed conveyed the right of way in fee. Rasmussen, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1230. Some of the deeds that the Hilchkanums subsequently used to convey the rest of their property explicitly excepted the strip of land belonging to the Railway. The deeds conveyed the surrounding property less (3) acres right of way of Rail Road. By excepting the right of way in terms of acres of land, the conveyances betray an understanding that the Railway owned the strip of land and did not merely have a right to enter the strip. 48 The Rasmussens point out that the Hilchkanums did not mention the railroad right of way in the deed conveying lot 2, which is where most of the strip to which the Rasmussens lay claim is located. However, this does not bring into dispute the fact that the Hilchkanums intended a fee simple. Had they used other language in conveying lot 2 that recognized the Railway's right of way as only an easement, then a factual finding reconciling the contradictory positions might be necessary. But the total failure to except the land subject to the right of way in the lot 2 deed is not significantly probative of whether or not the parties intended to convey a fee simple estate. Addisu v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 198 F.3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir.2000) (noting that a scintilla of evidence or evidence that is not significantly probative does not present a genuine issue of material fact). 49 Finally, the district court properly looked to the circumstances surrounding the execution of the Hilchkanum deed and concluded that they confirmed the parties' intent to convey a fee simple estate. Rasmussen, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1230. Deeds to the Railway from other landowners executed in the same year as the Hilchkanum deed used the same form but contained additional language explicitly restricting the grant to railroad purposes and providing that the interest would revert to the grantor if the railroad ceased to operate. See Squire, 801 P.2d at 1023; Northlake Marine Works, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 70 Wash.App. 491, 857 P.2d 283, 286-87 (Wash.Ct.App.1993). The differences in these deeds reflected the common practice of the railroads of using fee simple form deeds and adding language to include limitations requested by landowners. See Danaya C. Wright & Jeffrey M. Hester, Pipes, Wires, and Bicycles: Rails-to-Trails, Utility Licenses, and the Shifting Scope of Railroad Easements From the Nineteenth to the Twenty-First Century, 27 Ecology L.Q. 351, 378 (2000). The deed in question here suggests that the Hilchkanums requested no such limitations. 50 In conclusion, [t]he language of the deed, the behavior of the parties, and the circumstances converge to show the Hilchkanums' intent to convey a fee simple. Rasmussen, 143 F.Supp.2d at 1230-31. The underlying facts are undisputed, and, viewing these facts in the light most favorable to the Rasmussens, as we must on summary judgment, we conclude that King County, as the Railway's successor, possesses a fee simple in the strip of land. 14 We, therefore, affirm the district court's summary judgment in favor of King County. V. Counterclaims 51 The district court dismissed all of the Rasmussens' counter-claims either for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). We review these dismissals de novo, see Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255 F.3d 734, 737 (9th Cir.2001) (reviewing 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo ); La Reunion Francaise SA v. Barnes, 247 F.3d 1022, 1024 (9th Cir.2001) (reviewing 12(b)(1) dismissal de novo ), and we affirm. A. Takings 52 The Rasmussens argue that they are entitled to just compensation for the taking of their land by the government under the state constitution and the Fifth Amendment. See Wash. Const., Art. 1, § 16. Their takings claim requires a finding that the Rasmussens own the strip of land. Because King County owns the strip of land in fee simple, the Rasmussens' land was not taken, and they can state no claim for which relief can be granted. B. Spur Line Arguments 53 The Rasmussens argue that King County's title to the right of way is invalid because the STB lacked subject matter jurisdiction to order interim trail use over the railroad right of way. They claim the rail line in question is a spur line over which the STB has no jurisdiction. As the district court wrote, [b]y challenging the STB proceedings, the Rasmussens are asking the court to reverse an STB order. The courts of appeals have exclusive jurisdiction over any proceeding to enjoin or suspend, in whole or in part, a rule, regulation, or order of the STB.... 28 U.S.C. § 2321(a); Dave v. Rails-to-Trails Conservancy, 79 F.3d 940, 942 (9th Cir.1996) (finding that district court has no jurisdiction to hear claims that have the practical effect of seeking review of an ICC (now STB) order). 54 No authority supports the Rasmussens' proposition that, in spite of 28 U.S.C. § 2321, the district court had jurisdiction to consider the subject matter jurisdiction of the STB. The Rasmussens cite Powelson v. United States, 150 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir.1998), which holds that a statute may create subject matter jurisdiction yet not waive sovereign immunity. They then argue that, because it is not clear whether Congress has waived sovereign immunity of the STB deliberations, there must be subject matter jurisdiction. This argument has no merit. The non-waiver of sovereign immunity does not supply subject matter jurisdiction. 55 The Rasmussens also rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1336(b), which allows a district court to refer a question or issue to the STB and to exercise exclusive jurisdiction of a civil action to enforce, enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend, in whole or in part, any order of the STB arising out of such referral. This case involves no such referral, and § 1336(b) does not give the district court any power to refer a question that challenges the STB's jurisdiction to issue an order that it has already issued. The STB implicitly has answered this question by asserting jurisdiction over the rail line; judicial review of the order must be obtained directly from a court of appeals as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2321(a). C. First Amendment 56 The Rasmussens contend that their First Amendment right to petition the government for redress has been violated because King County refused to communicate with them. In the Rasmussens' Answer and Counterclaim and in their briefing to the district court, the Rasmussens also argued that King County had violated their right to free speech. They argued that a letter from King County officials threatening to bring criminal harassment charges against Mr. Rasmussen constituted an impermissible prior restraint on his ability to say that he shall defend his life and his property, and that he shall arm himself. The letter apparently arose after Mr. Rasmussen threatened county employees who entered the railroad right of way bisecting his land. The Rasmussens now focus only on their right to petition the government for redress of grievances. 57 Counties are liable for constitutional violations under § 1983 only if the individual officer who committed the violation was acting pursuant to a local policy, practice or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The Rasmussens have failed to allege any local policy, practice or custom here. They attempt no response to this argument in their briefing to this court. The First Amendment claim was properly dismissed for failure to state a claim.