Opinion ID: 215816
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Diversity-of-Citizenship Jurisdiction over Clark's MHRA Claim

Text: We first address Matthews's claim that diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists over Clark's MHRA claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). That statute provides that federal jurisdiction exists over civil actions between citizens of different States where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000. In his initial complaint, Clark alleged that diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists over his MHRA claim after alleging that he is a citizen of the State of Missouri and that Matthews is a Pennsylvania corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania. In its answer, Matthews admitted the truth of Clark's allegations as to the parties' citizenship and also admitted that diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists over Clark's MHRA claim. While it is true that consent alone cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction, we take note of the parties' previous agreement on their diverse citizenship. Smith v. Ashland, Inc., 250 F.3d 1167, 1172 (8th Cir.2001). Despite this previous agreement, Clark now argues that the record never established that diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists over his MHRA claim. Thus, Matthews is now the party asserting jurisdiction, so Matthews bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists over Clark's MHRA claim. Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 956 (8th Cir.2009); see also 4:20 Commc'ns, Inc. v. Paradigm Co., 336 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2003). There is no question that the parties are citizens of different States; the only question is whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Since Clark did not allege a specific amount in controversy in his complaint, the amount in controversy depends upon the value of the relief Clark seeks. See Usery v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 606 F.3d 1017, 1018 (8th Cir.2010). Matthews notes that Clark seeks to recover a number of forms of relief if he is successful on his MHRA claim. One form of relief Clark seeks is back pay. See Pollock v. Wetterau Food Distribution Grp., 11 S.W.3d 754, 770 (Mo.Ct.App.1999) (noting back pay is recoverable under the MHRA). Back pay is calculated based upon the difference between the value of the compensation the plaintiff would have been entitled to had he remained employed by the defendant and whatever wages he earned during the relevant period. Hartley v. Dillard's, Inc., 310 F.3d 1054, 1062 (8th Cir.2002). Generally, the relevant period runs from the date of termination until the date of reinstatement or judgment. Morgan v. City of St. Louis, 154 S.W.3d 6, 12 (Mo.Ct.App.2004); Nord v. U.S. Steel Corp., 758 F.2d 1462, 1472-73 (11th Cir.1985). In this case, the record indicates that at the time of his termination on January 31, 2007, Clark earned at least $42,000 annually as a Matthews employee. Had Clark remained employed with Matthews at this same salary, he would have earned at least $168,000 from January 31, 2007, to the present. Although a proper calculation of back pay would account for the earnings Clark received from any employment that he held after his termination from Matthews, the record is unclear regarding these earnings. The record indicates that Clark was employed part-time with a retail store and that he worked as a security officer for at least two companies beginning at some point prior to October of 2008. The record does not indicate, however, the dates Clark was employed in these positions or the exact amounts that Clark earned in these positions. The record does suggest, however, that Clark's earnings were probably modest. [3] As a result, although this question is not free from doubt, we believe it is more likely than not that the back pay award that Clark seeks by itself exceeds $75,000. Consequently, we believe Matthews has carried its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists over Clark's MHRA claim. [4] Our conclusion that diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists over Clark's MHRA claim requires us to revisit our disposition of this claim in our prior opinion. In that opinion, we declined, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1), to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Clark's MHRA claim because it raises a novel or complex issue of State law. Clark, 628 F.3d at 472 (citing § 1367(c)(1)). However, the Supreme Court has indicated that, as a general rule, the novelty or complexity of a state-law issue is not an appropriate basis upon which to remand a case when diversity-of-citizenship jurisdiction exists. McNeese v. Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 673 n. 5, 83 S.Ct. 1433, 10 L.Ed.2d 622 (1963); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234-37, 64 S.Ct. 7, 88 L.Ed. 9 (1943); see also Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. City of N. Kan. City, 276 F.2d 932, 937 (8th Cir.1960). Although there may be exceptions to this rule, see, e.g., Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Mem'l Hosp., 679 F.2d 1258, 1261 n. 4 (8th Cir. 1982), we do not believe an exception applies in this case. Therefore, we grant Matthews's petition for a panel rehearing, vacate Section II.B of our prior opinion, and proceed to the merits of Clark's MHRA claim.