Opinion ID: 221079
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Decisions based on public policy

Text: Even if neither the Manual provisions or the FFA provisions on which Myers relies mandates a specific course of action, that is not the end of the discretionary function analysis. Instead, the court must then consider, in the second prong of the discretionary function inquiry, whether the judgment left to the agency is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield, that is, governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1129. The district court held that the evidence showed that Defendant made policy-based decisions regarding discretionary questions of whether to do the remediation work at all, and whether to do the work itself  or select a contractor. The district court apparently also concluded that the Navy made policy-based decisions about requirements for experience and training of key employees of the contractor, the frequency and degree of oversight by Navy employees, and the involvement of other federal agencies. Myers argues that, once the Navy undertook responsibility for the safety of the project, the execution of that responsibility was not subject to the discretionary function exception, because execution of safety standards is not susceptible to a policy analysis. The Navy argues that the government's discretionary oversight of a contractor, even of the contractor's compliance with safety standards, is immune from tort suit by virtue of the discretionary function exception and that the Navy never took on the responsibility of approving every step of every action of its remediation contractor, but instead relied on its contractor's expertise. This court must determine whether the work of remediation of contaminated soil would involve protected policy judgments. Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1133. Specifically, [t]he focus of our inquiry is `on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis.' Id. (quoting United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 325, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991)). [I]t is therefore `insufficient for the government to show merely that some choice was involved in the decision-making process. The balancing of policy considerations is a necessary prerequisite.' Bolt, 509 F.3d at 1033 (quoting ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 194 (9th Cir.1987), with alterations and internal quotation marks omitted by the Bolt court). As explained in Terbush, [t]he decision to adopt safety precautions may be based in policy considerations, but the implementation of those precautions is not.... Terbush, 516 F.3d at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is a recognized exception: The implementation of a government policy is shielded where the implementation itself implicates policy concerns, such as where government officials must consider competing firefighter safety and public safety considerations in deciding how to fight a forest fire. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). This case falls within the general rule, not the exception. The district court's conclusion that the Navy's decision about whether or not to pursue the remediation project at all was a discretionary one informed by public policy considerations misses the point, even if it were correct, where Camp Pendleton was on the EPA's National Priorities List of sites requiring environmental cleanup. Because [t]he focus of our inquiry is on the nature of the actions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy analysis, id. at 1133 (internal quotation marks omitted), we look at the nature of the actions in conducting the remediation project, not the decision to undertake the remediation project. With the focus properly on the conduct of the remediation project, it is well to remember that matters of scientific and professional judgment  particularly judgments concerning safety  are rarely considered to be susceptible to social, economic, or political policy. Whisnant, 400 F.3d at 1181; Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1214. More specifically, this court has held that implementation of a course of action is not a discretionary function. Id. Thus, while the Navy contends that its determinations about how much safety oversight was required were susceptible to policy considerations, those determinations properly fell within the scope of professional judgments about implementation of the safety plan that were not susceptible to public policy considerations. This case is similar in all important respects to Bear Medicine. What is at issue here, as in Bear Medicine, is not just a general statutory obligation to promote safety, but a failure to effectuate policy choices already made that are not protected under the discretionary function exception. See Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1215 (quoting Camozzi v. Roland/Miller and Hope Consulting Group, 866 F.2d 287, 290 (9th Cir.1989)). Even if the Navy did have discretion in its monitoring of IT/OHM's actions, the Navy's actions in carrying out its responsibilities were not protected policy judgments. Id. In other words, once the[Navy] ha[d] undertaken responsibility for the safety of [the OU-3] project, the execution of that responsibility [wa]s not subject to the discretionary function exception, and [t]he decision to adopt safety precautions may be based in policy considerations, but the implementation of those precautions is not. Id. Like the government's argument in Bear Medicine, the Navy's argument here `would essentially allow the Government to administratively immunize itself from tort liability under applicable state law as a matter of `policy.'' Id. (quoting McGarry v. United States, 549 F.2d 587, 591 (9th Cir. 1976)). The Navy's attempts to distinguish Bear Medicine are unavailing. First, the Navy asserts that Bear Medicine is distinguishable, because the agency in that case retained for itself the responsibility to regularly inspect the work (the logging) to ensure adherence to basic safety practices, but the Navy did not do so here. This assertion is simply wrong, and any such finding is clearly erroneous, because it is without support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record. Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Manual retained the Navy's responsibility to review HASPs, and the FFA required the Navy's QAO to ensure that all work was performed in accordance with approved work and sampling plans and to maintain for inspection a log of quality assurance field activities. Thus, in this case, as in Bear Medicine, the Navy was required to ensure that the contractor complied with the safety provisions of the contract. Bear Medicine, 241 F.3d at 1217. Like the BIA's failure in Bear Medicine, the Navy's failure to have IT/OHM's HASP reviewed by the Navy's own CIH or other competent person and the failure of the Navy's QAO to inspect any air monitoring were not policy judgments that Congress intended to protect from FTCA liability. Id. The Navy also contends that Bear Medicine is distinguishable, because here, unlike the BIA in that case, the Navy presented evidence that policy factors influenced its conduct, including the efficient allocation of agency resources and the need to rely on the contractor's expertise, because the Navy was not the organization with the required expertise. That argument is also unavailing, however. This court in Bear Medicine in fact rejected a contention that limited resources was a policy-based excuse for failure to adhere to accepted professional standards, id. at 1216-17, and it is no better as a policy-based excuse for failure to adhere to policy manual and contractual requirements. Thus, the Navy has also failed to carry its burden on the second prong of the discretionary function analysis.