Opinion ID: 512583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the merits of the article 78 petitions

Text: 35 The Raceway and the Seminary contend on the merits that the City failed to comply with the notice, hearing and review requirements of Article 2 of New York's Eminent Domain Procedure Law (EDPL). In its condemnation petitions, the City claimed to be exempt from compliance with the procedural requirements of the statute pursuant to the emergency situation provision of EDPL Sec. 206. 36 Section 201 of the EDPL provides that, prior to acquisition, the condemnor, in order to inform the public and to review the public use to be served by a proposed public project and the impact on the environment and residents of the locality where such project will be constructed, shall conduct a public hearing. The hearing must be held on at least ten days prior notice, EDPL Sec. 202, and following the hearing, the condemnor is required, within ninety days, to make findings and a determination of the public purpose to be served by the proposed condemnation. EDPL Sec. 204. The factors to be considered in making such determination and findings include: 37 (1) the public use, benefit or purpose to be served by the proposed public project; 38 (2) the approximate location for the proposed public project and the reasons for the selection of that location; 39 (3) the general effect of the proposed project on the environment and residents of the locality; 40 (4) such other factors as [the condemnor] considers relevant. 41 Id. Sec. 204(B). 42 A condemnor is exempt from compliance with the provisions of Article 2 of the EDPL when, inter alia, because of an emergency situation the public interest will be endangered by any delay caused by the public hearing requirement in this article. Id. Sec. 206(D). The district court found that [c]ontrary to the claims of St. Joseph's and the Raceway, the City of Yonkers, in a very real sense, is faced with an emergency (emphasis in original). As the court further explained, [t]his matter must end because it is tearing Yonkers apart and Yonkers is bleeding. 43 We believe that the district court's factual finding of such an emergency situation is amply supported by the record. See id. Sec. 207(C)(3), (4) (scope of the review shall be limited to whether ... determination and findings were made in accordance with procedures set forth in [Article 2], and [whether] a public use, benefit or purpose will be served by the proposed acquisition); see also Gerges v. Koch, 62 N.Y.2d 84, 476 N.Y.S.2d 73, 464 N.E.2d 441 (1984) (emergency situation presented by prison overcrowding warranted temporary exemption under New York City's Environmental Quality Review (CEQR) procedures, which parallel provisions of SEQRA, from filing environmental impact statement in order to begin renovation and construction of facilities as remedy for deprivation of constitutional rights of prisoners); Board of Visitors-Marcy Psychiatric Center v. Coughlin, 60 N.Y.2d 14, 466 N.Y.S.2d 668, 453 N.E.2d 1085 (1983) (same, except pursuant to SEQRA); City of Yonkers v. Hvizd, 93 A.D.2d 887, 461 N.Y.S.2d 408, (2d Dep't 1983) (existence of emergency situation endangering public interest warrants application of EDPL 206(D) exemption); Matter of Village of Malverne, 70 A.D.2d 920, 418 N.Y.S.2d 93 (2d Dep't 1979) (same). More than two years after the issuance of the Housing Remedy Order and eight years since the commencement of the civil rights action, no housing remedy has been implemented. The public interest cannot wait any longer. We thus agree with the district court that the 1200 people on the waiting list for public housing in Yonkers have a right to a remedy, and in our judgment any further delay--aside from that which is necessary to address the first amendment claim of the Seminary as discussed in Part II. C. below--would be intolerable. 44 Appellants maintain that the only emergency in this case is the result of Yonkers own intransigence, and consequently that full compliance with the terms of the statute cannot be excused. We disagree. An assessment of blame regarding the predicament in which Yonkers presently finds itself is quite frankly irrelevant to a determination of whether or not Yonkers is faced with an emergency situation under the statute. Cf. Gerges, 62 N.Y.2d at 95, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 78 (that municipal officials might have foreseen and ... made appropriate provision for ... resolution of emergency situation regarding constitutionally inadequate prison facilities does not negate the existence of the present crisis). Indeed, the very purpose of the exemption provisions under Article 2 of the EDPL is to excuse compliance with the procedural requirements of the statute when the public interest so requires. See City of Buffalo Urban Renewal Agency v. Moreton, 100 A.D.2d 20, 473 N.Y.S.2d 278, 281 (4th Dep't 1984); see also Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 305, 494 N.E.2d 429, 436 (1986) (principal purpose of Article 2 ... is to ensure that [the condemnor] does not acquire property without having made a reasoned determination that the condemnation will serve a valid public purpose). 45 Appellants concede that the construction of low income housing in Yonkers required by the Housing Remedy Order would serve a valid public purpose. In addition, as the district court stated, [t]he process by which the public housing sites designated in the Consent Decree were determined, the notoriety of that process, the review already given to those sites and the continuing review ... by HUD certainly satisfied the substance of the State law provisions upon which St. Joseph's and the Raceway predicate their claims. See also Aswad v. City School Dist., 74 A.D.2d 972, 425 N.Y.S.2d 896, 898 (3d Dep't 1980) (holding that substantial compliance with exemption provisions of section 206 and four factors enumerated in section 204(B) was sufficient to confirm proposed condemnation). We agree that there was substantial compliance with the requirements of the EDPL in this case. During extensive proceedings before the district court, the City's independent planning experts, the court-appointed Outside Housing Advisor, the Municipal Housing Authority and the City's Community Development Agency all participated in a thorough review of the location, distribution and suitability of the designated sites. With regard to the general effect of the proposed condemnations on the environment and residents of the locality, EDPL Sec. 204(B)(3), HUD conducted a preliminary evaluation as part of its ongoing review of the sites and reported to the district court that the housing plan appeared to meet site, neighborhood and environmental standards for public housing. See generally 24 C.F.R. Sec. 941.202 (1988). 46 Consequently, given the undisputed public purpose inherent in the implementation of the Housing Remedy Order and the nature and extent of the review process, we are convinced that there was a valid determination that the proposed condemnations would be in the public interest as required under Article 2 of the EDPL.
47 The New York State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), Environmental Conservation Law (ECL) Sec. 8-0101 et seq., requires the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) by state and local agencies on any action they propose or approve which may have a significant effect on the environment. Id. Sec. 8-0109(2) (emphasis added). Pursuant to regulations adopted thereunder, the Department of Environmental Conservation has determined the types of actions having such a significant effect (Type I actions) for which an EIS must be prepared. 6 NYCRR Sec. 617.12. When an EIS is required, the full panoply of procedures prescribed under SEQRA comes into play. See ECL Sec. 8-0109. If, on the other hand, it is determined that the proposed action is one not likely to have a significant effect on the environment (Type II action), then such action do[es] not require [an] environmental impact statement[ ] or any other determination or procedure under SEQRA. 6 NYCRR Sec. 617.13; see Jackson v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 N.Y.2d 400, 503 N.Y.S.2d 298, 304, 494 N.E.2d 429, 435 (1986) (the heart of SEQRA is the [EIS] process); see also CPLR Sec. 7803(3) (scope of review is limited to whether determination was arbitrary[,] capricious or an abuse of discretion). 48 Although appellants concede that the proposed condemnations of the two sites are not Type I actions requiring the preparation of an EIS, see 6 NYCRR Sec. 617.12(b), they argue nonetheless that an environmental assessment of the proposed condemnations should have been made to determine if there would be a significant impact on the environment. See ECL Sec. 8-0109(4); 6 NYCRR Sec. 617.6(a)(1)(i). However, as indicated in Part II. A. above, HUD is in the process of conducting an environmental review of the proposed housing sites pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4321 et seq. See 24 C.F.R. Sec. 941.208(b) (1988); see also EDPL Sec. 204(B)(3) (requiring consideration by condemnor of the general effect of the proposed project on the environment). Thus, the environmental assessment that appellants seek is in fact taking place. 49 In any event, we agree with the district court that the proposed condemnations of the Raceway and the Seminary sites are exempt from compliance with SEQRA. The implementing regulations to SEQRA expressly provide an exemption for actions required to be undertaken pursuant to a judgment or order and for actions ... of any court. 6 NYCRR Sec. 617.2(q)(1), (5). Accordingly, in view of the fact that the City was compelled by a federal court order to institute condemnation proceedings against the subject properties and that there was, as the district court found, a meticulous inquiry regarding environmental factors, we conclude that the requirements of SEQRA were satisfied in all respects.
50 We come finally to the Seminary's challenge to the condemnation of its property on first amendment grounds. 3 In its Article 78 petition, the Seminary alleged that [b]y the inclusion of the subject property in the [Consent Decree] and by the commencement of the condemnation proceeding, [the City] has attempted to regulate the use of church owned property without any compelling public interest and has sought the acquisition of the subject property in violation of ... the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. The Seminary's position is that, because the district court recognized on a number of occasions the availability of suitable alternate sites to the Seminary parcel and repeatedly stated its willingness to modify the Consent Decree should the City designate such an alternate site, no compelling need existed to justify the proposed condemnation of the Seminary's property. 51 The first amendment provides that Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]. U.S. Const. amend. I; see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (first amendment free exercise clause is applicable to states through fourteenth amendment). In order to show that a particular governmental action implicates the free exercise clause, the aggrieved party must show that the challenged action--in this case, the condemnation of church-owned property--would coerce a violation of religious beliefs or would penalize the practice of religion by denying the aggrieved party an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1325, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988). See also School Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1572, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963) (coercion); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-06, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1792-95, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (penalty). The state may, however, justify any such limitation on religious liberty by showing that its action is essential to accomplish an overriding or compelling governmental interest. See, e.g., Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1049, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2034, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1055-56, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). 52 The Seminary's free exercise challenge to the proposed taking of its property raises an issue which has only very rarely been presented. While the condemnation of church property for public use is not unheard of, see, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, More or Less, 506 F.2d 796 (3d Cir.1974); Foster v. Herley, 491 F.2d 174 (6th Cir.1974); Kozemchak v. Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Am., 443 F.2d 401 (2d Cir.1971), we are aware of no federal court case in which a religious organization has challenged the taking of real property on free exercise grounds. The parties in the instant case, however, have discussed at some length a decision of the Colorado Supreme Court, Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 411, 509 P.2d 1250 (1973), in which this precise issue was considered, apparently for the first time. 53 In Pillar of Fire, an evangelical sect sought to enjoin a municipal urban renewal agency from condemning a church building said to have unique religious significance. The building was alleged to be sui generis and the birthplace of the Pillar of Fire denomination. However, the record contained no findings indicating that the trial court weighed the competing interests of church and state regarding the proposed condemnation. After expressing concern about direct confrontations of the sort in this case [which] have been avoided because legislatures and administrative bodies have generally accorded great respect to religious organizations, 509 P.2d at 1254 (emphasis added), the Colorado Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for a full hearing. The court noted that the loss of the Pillar of Fire [Church] would allegedly go far beyond the incidental burden of having to move to a new location and, as a result of the competing interests involved, required that on remand a determination be made whether the state had a substantial interest in the taking of the alleged birthplace of the Pillar of Fire Church without a reasonable alternate means of accomplishment of its plans for urban renewal. Id. at 1253-54; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); cf. Father Flanagan's Boys' Home v. Millard School Dist., 196 Neb. 299, 242 N.W.2d 637 (condemnation of 40-acre tract of farmland owned by church would not substantially interfere with church's school program since more than 900 acres would remain after taking), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 887, 97 S.Ct. 240, 50 L.Ed.2d 168 (1976). Although the Colorado court conceded that church property could be taken by eminent domain for paramount public use, 509 P.2d at 1254 (citation omitted), the court nonetheless concluded that the church was entitled to a hearing on the merits of its first amendment claim. 4 54 In support of its claim of a free exercise infringement, the Seminary, during the June 8, 1988 proceedings before the district court, relied principally on an affidavit of Monsignor Edwin O'Brien, the Rector at St. Joseph's, who stated that the Seminary grounds, including the two acres designated for public housing, form an apron of quietude surrounding St. Joseph's and contribute to the atmosphere of quiet reflection essential to the academic, spiritual, psychological and pastoral preparation of young men for the priesthood. Monsignor O'Brien also averred that the two-acre site together with the remaining forty-two acres of church property have been used for religious purposes by the Archdiocese at least since the opening of the Seminary in 1896 and that the construction of multi-family housing ... [would] substantially affect our work at St. Joseph's, the only facility in the Archdiocese for the training of new priests. 55 The district court considered without resolving the question of whether the taking of the Seminary's property would constitute an interference with the free exercise rights of the Archdiocese. Counsel for the Seminary argued before the district court that, because the use of the two acres would substantially affect the work at the Seminary, the condemnation of the site would violate the first amendment. He added, however, that that doesn't mean ... the church could not agree voluntarily ... to the use of the property ..., but [the property] is not going to be ... willingly subjected to condemnation under this plan. Clearly perplexed by the varying positions of the Archdiocese regarding the inclusion of its property as part of the Consent Decree, the district court described the Seminary's claim of religious interference as equivocal: if there [is] agreement by the Archdiocese with the overall plan, it [would] allow the use of this property, and that would not interfere with free exercise rights; but since the Archdiocese has reservations ... with respect to the overall plan, it is resisting the taking on free exercise grounds. Nevertheless, the district court assumed the validity of the Archdiocese's claim of religious use of the property and proceeded to balance the competing interests of church and state, finding that the purported constitutional necessity to include the Seminary property into the Consent Decree outweighed the Seminary's first amendment rights. 56 The Seminary argues on appeal that while it is very true that a remedy for the proven segregative policies of the City is necessary, it is just as true that the Seminary property is not necessary to that remedy. Reply Brief at 22 (emphasis in original). The Archdiocese further contends that the City's refusal to modify the decree because it believed there were no politically acceptable alternatives to the Seminary site is hardly a sufficient reason to justify infringement of a first amendment privilege. In the Seminary's view, therefore, the district court's conclusion concerning the compelling need for the Seminary's property was simply not supported by the record. 57 Appellees respond first by claiming that under Lyng the Seminary was unable to show that the condemnation of its property would have a coercive or penal effect on the practice of religion. See 108 S.Ct. at 1325. In Lyng, members of three Indian tribes in northwest California challenged a United States Forest Service plan to build a paved 75-mile road connecting two towns, Gasquet and Orleans, on a 6-mile stretch of land located in the Six Rivers National Forest that, while owned by the federal government, traditionally had been used by the Indians for religious purposes. The Forest Service commissioned a study of the American Indian cultural and religious sites in the Chimney Rock area of Six Rivers which found that the region was integral to Indian religious ritual, and that privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting were necessary to the practice of their religion. Id. at 1322. The report accordingly recommended that the roadway not be completed. The Forest Service decided, however, not to adopt this recommendation and proceeded to select a route through the Chimney Rock area as far removed as possible from the archeological and other sites used by the Indians for spiritual activities. Alternate routes specifically were considered and rejected because they would have required the acquisition of private land, had serious soil stability problems, and would in any event have traversed areas having ritualistic value to American Indians. Id. (emphasis added). 58 The Supreme Court in Lyng held that notwithstanding the undisputed severe adverse effects completion of the proposed roadway would have on the practice of the Indians' religion, [w]hatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the [Chimney Rock] area ..., those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land. Id. at 1327 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). While recognizing that indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment, the Court noted that [t]his does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions. Id. at 1326 (emphasis added). 59 Appellees seize upon the first amendment principles considered in Lyng in support of their contention that the free exercise clause does not prohibit governmental action that would substantially interfere with the practice of religion so long as the government's conduct is not actually coercive or penal in nature. We disagree. The Lyng Court declined to determine the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs. Id. The Supreme Court merely held that whatever the effect completion of the roadway might have on traditional Indian religious practices, the government could not be denied use of its own land. Id. at 1327 (citing with approval Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 724-27, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2164-66, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (distinguishing between government's use of Social Security number in its possession to aid administration of welfare programs and the government's requiring individual to provide such information)). Besides, as Judge Lumbard has recognized, the government's use of its property involves significantly different considerations than the taking by the government of privately-owned religious property. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 742 n. 3 (D.C.Cir.) (Lumbard, J., sitting by designation) (distinguishing Pillar of Fire ), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 956, 104 S.Ct. 371, 78 L.Ed.2d 330 (1983). Incidental burdens on the practice of religion will not suffice to require the state to come forward with a compelling reason justifying its actions. When, as is claimed in this case, however, a proposed governmental action would substantially affect religious practice, there exists at least a material issue of fact concerning whether the state has interfered with the free exercise of religion. Cf. Lyng, 108 S.Ct. at 1326; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218, 92 S.Ct. at 1534; see also Johnson v. Katz, 68 N.Y.2d 649, 505 N.Y.S.2d 64, 65, 496 N.E.2d 223, 224 (1986) (lack of material issue of fact warrants dismissal of Article 78 petition without a hearing); CPLR Sec. 7804(h) (requiring hearing on any triable issue of fact). 60 The Seminary's initial willingness to sell the two-acre parcel in January 1988 does not alter our determination that the proposed taking of the Seminary's property raises a significant question under the first amendment. As the district court itself stated, if [the] taking [of] these two acres [constitutes] an interference with [the] free exercise of a religion[,] that is the case regardless of what the attitude of the church is to the overall [housing] plan. There is in our judgment an enormous difference between the Archdiocese agreeing to sell its property and the government proceeding to condemn it. We certainly do not take lightly the Seminary's claim of interference with a first amendment right. In any event, the district court assumed for purposes of its decision the validity of the Seminary's claim of religious interference. To have held otherwise, the district court would have had to hold a plenary hearing on the issue. Indeed, since the record before us does not reflect a considered judgment on the religious interference question, we do not preclude the district court on remand from addressing this issue. Nevertheless, we too accept as true for purposes of this appeal the Archdiocese's allegations that the taking of the Seminary site would substantially affect [the] work at St. Joseph's and that the site is essential to the Seminary's mission. Cf. Pillar of Fire, 509 P.2d at 1253-54. 61 Turning to the question of whether the condemnation of the Seminary's property is essential to achieve a compelling state interest, it is well settled that a limitation by the government on the free exercise of religion is permitted only when the state can demonstrate that a compelling interest justifies the restriction and that no alternate means of accomplishing the state's compelling interest are available. See Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123, 102 S.Ct. 970, 71 L.Ed.2d 109 (1981); see also Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406, 83 S.Ct. at 1795; Pillar of Fire, 509 F.2d at 1253. Consistent with the district court's disposition below, appellees assert that the inclusion of the Seminary property in the Consent Decree is essential to the implementation of the Housing Remedy Order. 62 We do not agree that this is necessarily so. Although the district court considered the universe of reasonable alternate sites to be limited to those capable of being utilized in a federal decree [with] a reasonable timetable for implementation, the court also clearly recognized the availability of such sites since it was willing to permit the City to designate a substitute for the Seminary property. Thus, the City's steadfast refusal to propose a modification of the Consent Decree to delete the Seminary site does not provide a sufficient basis to justify interference with petitioner's first amendment rights. While the City now takes the position that the framework for remedying the constitutional violation found by the district court cannot be modified simply by substituting sites [because t]here are no politically acceptable alternatives, City of Yonkers Brief at 35, the fact remains that political expediency is far from a compelling reason to force the Seminary to give up its property in derogation of a constitutional right. 63 Consequently, assuming as we do for purposes of this appeal that the taking otherwise impermissibly burdens the Seminary's free exercise rights, the Seminary is entitled to be heard on the issue whether the taking is necessary to vindicate a compelling state interest. At such a plenary hearing with expert testimony from both sides and in which the competing interests of church and state are fully addressed and the availability of reasonable alternate sites seriously considered, the district court will be able to determine whether the public interest in remedying discrimination can be reasonably accomplished without the taking of the Seminary's property. The point is that on the basis of the existing record before us, we are not in a position to make an intelligent judgment in this matter one way or the other. The protections afforded by the first amendment require at the very least that the Seminary have a full and fair opportunity to have its rights considered in an attempt--consistent with the great respect courts accord religious groups--to avoid a direct confrontation between church and state. See Pillar of Fire, 509 P.2d at 1254. If accommodation between the competing interests of church and state is possible, then it ought to be pursued no matter how compelling the state interest might be. See Lyng, 108 S.Ct. at 1327-28 ([n]othing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen[; t]he Government's rights to the use of its own land, for example, need not and should not discourage it from accommodating religious practices) (citation omitted); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215, 92 S.Ct. at 1533; Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406-07, 83 S.Ct. at 1795-96. 64