Opinion ID: 1710135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: discussion of issue raised in petition for certiorari[3]

Text: Connie argues in her petition for certiorari that the Court of Appeals decision is in conflict with this Court's decisions concerning modification of child custody. Specifically, Connie argues that this Court has required that the movant prove an adverse change in circumstances on the part of the custodial parent; therefore, the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority in affirming a decision that was not based on a material adverse change in Connie's circumstances. This Court has articulated the law of modification of child custody as follows: First, the moving party must prove by a preponderance of evidence that, since entry of the judgment or decree sought to be modified, there has been a material change in circumstances which adversely affects the welfare of the child. Second, if such an adverse change has been shown, the moving party must show by like evidence that the best interest of the child requires the change of custody. Ash v. Ash, 622 So.2d 1264, 1265-66 (Miss. 1993) (citing Pace v. Owens, 511 So.2d 489, 490 (Miss. 1987)). The change in circumstances is one in the overall living conditions in which the child is found. The `totality of the circumstances' must be considered. Tucker v. Tucker, 453 So.2d 1294, 1297 (Miss. 1984) (citing Kavanaugh v. Carraway, 435 So.2d 697, 700 (Miss. 1983)). A change of circumstances in the non-custodial parent is not in and of itself sufficient to warrant a modification of custody. See Duran v. Weaver, 495 So.2d 1355, 1357 (Miss. 1986); Bowden v. Fayard, 355 So.2d 662, 664 (Miss. 1978). The chancellor in this case stated that in his judgment, there was absolutely no question that ... it would be in the best interest of this child to live with her father. He noted, however, that the [Mississippi] Supreme Court puts that third and not first or second. The chancellor concluded that because the first two elements of the test had not been met  a showing of a change in circumstances, adversely effecting Desiree  he could not transfer custody of Desiree from Connie to Billy. [4] Accordingly, he did not transfer custody of Desiree to Billy until Connie failed the drug test. In essence, the chancellor made a best interests decision at that point. Such a best interest decision could have, and should have been made at the conclusion of trial, given the chancellor's findings concerning the still-unwholesome environment of Connie's home, and the improvement in Billy's circumstances. In earlier opinions on this subject, we have held that a change in the circumstances of the non-custodial parent does not, by itself, merit a modification of custody. Duran, 495 So.2d at 1357; Bowden, 355 So.2d at 664. We adhere to that holding today. However, we further hold that when the environment provided by the custodial parent is found to be adverse to the child's best interest, and that the circumstances of the non-custodial parent have changed such that he or she is able to provide an environment more suitable than that of the custodial parent, the chancellor may modify custody accordingly. This must be so, for in all child custody cases, the polestar consideration is the best interest of the child. Sellers v. Sellers, 638 So.2d 481, 485 (Miss. 1994). See also Moak v. Moak, 631 So.2d 196, 198 (Miss. 1994); Albright v. Albright, 437 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983). We further hold that where a child living in a custodial environment clearly adverse to the child's best interest, somehow appears to remain unscarred by his or her surroundings, the chancellor is not precluded from removing the child for placement in a healthier environment. Evidence that the home of the custodial parent is the site of dangerous and illegal behavior, such as drug use, may be sufficient to justify a modification of custody, even without a specific finding that such environment has adversely affected the child's welfare. A child's resilience and ability to cope with difficult circumstances should not serve to shackle the child to an unhealthy home, especially when a healthier one beckons. Accordingly, in this case, once the chancellor determined that Connie's home was the site of illegal drug use, as well as other behavior adverse to Desiree's welfare, and determined that Billy's circumstances had improved such that he was able to provide a good home for Desiree, it was within his discretion to transfer her custody from Connie to Billy, despite the fact that he could not discern any negative effect on Desiree caused by Connie's home environment. Moreover, the transfer would have been appropriate despite the absence of a material change in Connie's circumstances, since a lack of change in Connie's circumstances meant the perpetuation of an unhealthy environment. It is evident from the chancellor's comments that he felt constrained by doctrine developed by this Court concerning custody modification from doing what he thought was best for Desiree: transferring her custody from Connie to Billy. The chancellor stated that there was absolutely no question that ... it would be in the best interest of this child to live with her father, but that this Court puts [the child's best interest] third and not first or second in our test for custody modification. Since he could find no change in circumstances, the first element of the test, nor an adverse effect on Desiree, the second element of the test, the chancellor concluded that he was powerless to consider whether a change in custody was in Desiree's best interest  the third element of the test for modification. We understand and appreciate the chancellor's adherence to the test we have articulated. However, we take this opportunity to clarify that a chancellor is never obliged to ignore a child's best interest in weighing a custody change; in fact, a chancellor is bound to consider the child's best interest above all else. Above all, in `modification cases, as in original awards of custody, we never depart from our polestar consideration: the best interest and welfare of the child.' Ash v. Ash, 622 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Miss. 1993) (citing Marascalco v. Marascalco, 445 So.2d 1380, 1382 (Miss. 1984)). See also Albright, 437 So.2d at 1005. The test we have devised for custody modification need not be applied so rigidly, nor in such a formalistic manner so as to preclude the chancellor from rendering a decision appropriate to the facts of an individual case. In particular, it should not thwart the chancellor from transferring custody of a child from one parent to another when, in the chancellor's judgment, the child's welfare would be best served by such transfer. We note that in most cases, a straightforward application of the test for custody modification  that is, starting with the requirement of a showing of a material change in circumstances, adversely affecting the child's welfare  will result in a decision consistent with the best interests of the child. For that reason, today we neither reject nor alter this standard. We simply point out that there will occasionally be cases, such as the one at bar, in which a strict application of the test produces a result clearly contrary to the child's best interest. In such rare cases, no rigid test or magic words should stand in the way of the chancellor as he or she acts to improve the child's welfare through a modification of custody. In this case, the chancellor concluded from the evidence that Desiree's best interest would be served by transfer of custody from Connie to Billy. However, because a strict application of the test for custody modification dictated that no custody change was merited, the chancellor first ruled that Desiree would stay in Connie's custody. It was only after Connie tested positive for marijuana use, that custody of Desiree was transferred to Billy. Perhaps the better course would have been for the chancellor to transfer custody upon his original finding that there was absolutely no question that ... it would be in the best interest of this child to live with her father. However, as noted above, we understand that the chancellor sought to comply with the articulated standard of this Court. Ultimately, the chancellor placed Desiree in her father's home, where he found that her welfare would be best served. This was the correct result, if reached through somewhat indirect means. On appeal, we will affirm a decision where the right result is reached, even though we may disagree with the reason for that result. Puckett v. Stuckey, 633 So.2d 978, 980 (Miss. 1993); Stewart v. Walls, 534 So.2d 1033, 1035 (Miss. 1988).