Opinion ID: 1401773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: dc's testimony

Text: On direct examination, D.C. testified that during her ordeal with Morgan, he told her he had been in hundreds of houses in Ballard County but he did not take things from these houses, rather he looked to see what they had. Following this unsolicited reference to Morgan's statements to her, Morgan's counsel made a motion for a mistrial based on the alleged erroneous introduction of KRE 404(b) evidence. At that time the trial court overruled the motion based on its opinion that the prejudicial impact of the statement did not rise to a level necessary to warrant a mistrial. However, the court offered to give an admonition to the jury if desired. Defense counsel, rather, rejected the offered admonition on the belief it would compound the impact of the testimony. Later in the direct examination, D.C. started to refer to the hundreds of houses statement again, but was cut-off by the Commonwealth before the statement could be completed. Defense counsel again waited, until the end of D.C.'s direct examination, to object and move for mistrial. The trial court, again, overruled the motion. Later, during cross examination, Morgan's counsel initiated a line of questioning to D.C. regarding whether she was aware Morgan had been in her house, taken anything or moved anything. She then replied she had not known Morgan had been in her home, and explained that Morgan told her, during the course of her ordeal, he did not take anything from the houses he had been in; he only looked around to see what they had. D.C.'s response in this regard was somewhat more relevant to the question posed by defense counsel than that of the Commonwealth. From all of this, Morgan now complains the jury heard evidence of prior bad acts even though the Commonwealth had agreed not to introduce any KRE 404(b) evidence. He claims that D.C.'s multiple references to his being in hundreds of houses in Ballard County not only violated the pretrial KRE 404(b) agreement, but unduly prejudiced his case before the jury enough to warrant a mistrial. First, it is a well-settled presumption that a jury will follow a curative admonition when a potentially prejudicial statement has been made. [28] Therefore, a timely and appropriate admonition provided by the trial court to the jury following such a statement is generally sufficient to cure an error. [29] Obviously, the trial court did not believe declaring a mistrial was the appropriate cure for D.C.'s statements but, rather, believed that an admonition was sufficient. Yet the offer of the court of an admonition was refused. A mistrial is warranted only where the record reveals a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity. [30] The trial court has discretion in deciding whether to declare a mistrial, and its decision should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. [31] The trial court was the tier of fact of the impact of the statement and, upon evaluating the evidence before it, determined that the situation did not create an urgent or real necessity to declare a mistrial. A mistrial was not, in fact, warranted in this instance, but an admonition would have been appropriate. [32] Morgan's counsel, however, waived his right to the admonition. There was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in overruling the motion for mistrial. [33] In addressing Morgan's KRE 404(b) argument, we refer to Kentucky's kidnapping statute. KRS 509.010 defines the restraint element of kidnapping as being one that can be accomplished by physical force, intimidation, or deception, or by any means ... Moreover, KRS 509.040(1)(c) establishes an intent [t]o terrorize the victim or another, ... as an alternative element of kidnapping. Thus, Morgan's statement to D.C. is distinguishable from KRE 404(b) evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, in that the statement was intended as one of his several tools of domination (or mental restraint). Why else would he have made the statement except to intentionally intimidate (or terrorize) D.C. while she was under his control and as a means of maintaining that control? It was as much a weapon used by Morgan to further restrict and confine her mentally and emotionally, as were the shotgun and the knife. Morgan wanted D.C. to know that he could do whatever he wanted and she was helpless. In fact, she was compelled to do as he wanted  as embarrassing and frightful as it was. This is no different than Johnny Gilbert's use of alcohol, marijuana and pornographic movies to control, force or induce his stepdaughters into adult sexual activity; wherein we stated, [i]t was necessary that the jury see the entire picture ..., evidence that provides necessary perspective is competent. Juries do not have to perform their function of fact-finding in a vacuum. [34] D.C. could not have given a truthful account of the ordeal without testifying as to Morgan's use of fear and intimidation, as well as the shotgun and knife, as the weapons to effectuate her kidnapping and control. KRE 403 provides [A]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice, .... In adjudging whether or not the probative value of evidence is substantially outweighed by the undue prejudice, this Court has consistently indicated a willingness to protect probative evidence. In Springer v. Commonwealth, [35] we upheld the admission of evidence that the defendant was romantically involved with another person on the basis of its relevancy to establish a motive for the defendant to kill her spouse; we also upheld the admission of witness testimony of three person sexual acts involving the same defendant and her spouse. We have also held, in Hall v. Transit Authority, that evidence of a sexual harassment Plaintiff's previous extramarital affair was relevant over a KRE 403 undue prejudice objection. [36] The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Turpin v. Kassulke, upheld the admission of a letter written by a murder defendant as evidence of motive (which expressed envy of the wealth a friend received following the death of her husband) as well as a diary entry by the defendant which displayed the longing for wealth. [37] In Turpin , the Sixth Circuit discussed the standard of review for evidence admitted or excluded under KRE 403, A trial judge enjoys `various substantial discretion' in `balancing' probative value on one hand and `unfair prejudice' on the other. Indeed, in reviewing the trial judge's balancing under KRE 403, the appellate court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to its proponent, giving the evidence its maximum reasonable probative force and its minimum reasonable prejudicial value. [38] Thus the probative value of D.C.'s statements outweighed any prejudicial effect on Morgan's case. There was no abuse of discretion. With respect to the notice requirement of KRE 404(c), a prosecutor must first intend on introducing the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts before notice of intent is required. [39] In this instance, it was not the intent of the Commonwealth to introduce the statement as evidence; it originated from a non-responsive answer in the Commonwealth's direct and a later response to a series of questions from the defense on cross-examination. Thus we find no error occurred in this regard.