Opinion ID: 2545901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seaman status

Text: As the Supreme Court noted in Chandris: The federal courts have struggled over the years to articulate generally applicable criteria to distinguish among the many varieties of maritime workers, often developing detailed multipronged tests for seaman status. Since the 1950's, this Court largely has left definition of the Jones Act's scope to the lower courts. Unfortunately, as a result, `[t]he perils of the sea, which mariners suffer and shipowners insure against, have met their match in the perils of judicial review.' Or, as one court paraphrased Diderot in reference to this body of law: `We have made a labyrinth and got lost in it. We must find our way out.' 515 U.S. at 356, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (citations omitted); see also Puget Sound Freight Lines v. Marshall, 125 F.2d 876, 878 (9th Cir.1942) (a pre- Chandris case noting that [t]he definitions of `member of a crew' [under the LHWCA] and the tests to be applied in determining the status of a worker, as set forth in different opinions, are so many and varied that any attempt at reconciliation would be futile). Taking into account the statutory and caselaw history that gave rise to the labyrinth, however, and more recent Supreme Court precedents, the resolution of the issue whether Frazier might be a seaman under the Jones Act is clear. He is not. In McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111 S.Ct. 807, 112 L.Ed.2d 866 (1991), the Supreme Court stated: As had the lower federal courts before the Jones Act, this Court continued to construe `seaman' broadly after the Jones Act. In International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 272 U.S. 50 (1926), the Court held that a stevedore [11] is a `seaman' covered under the Act when engaged in maritime employment. Haverty was a longshore worker injured while stowing freight in the hold of a docked vessel. The Court recognized that `as the word is commonly used, stevedores are not seamen.' Id., at 52. `But words are flexible.... We cannot believe that Congress willingly would have allowed the protection to men engaged upon the same maritime duties to vary with the accident of their being employed by a stevedore rather than by the ship.' Ibid. Congress would, and did, however. Within six months of the decision in Haverty, Congress passed the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950. The Act provides recovery for injury to a broad range of land-based maritime workers, but explicitly excludes from its coverage `a master or member of a crew of any vessel.' 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G). This Court recognized the distinction, albeit belatedly, in Swanson v. Marra Brothers, Inc., 328 U.S. 1 (1946), concluding that the Jones Act and the LHWCA are mutually exclusive. The LHWCA provides relief for land-based maritime workers, and the Jones Act is restricted to `a master or member of a crew of any vessel': `We must take it that the effect of these provisions of the [LHWCA] is to confine the benefits of the Jones Act to the members of the crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters and to substitute for the right of recovery recognized by the Haverty case only such rights to compensation as are given by the [LHWCA].' Id., at 7. `[M]aster or member of a crew' is a refinement of the term `seaman' in the Jones Act; it excludes from LHWCA coverage those properly covered under the Jones Act. Thus, it is odd but true that the key requirement for Jones Act coverage now appears in another statute. With the passage of the LHWCA, Congress established a clear distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers. The latter, who owe their allegiance to a vessel and not solely to a land-based employer, are seamen. Ironically, on the same day that the Court decided Swanson it handed down Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946). With reasoning remarkably similar to that in Haverty, the Court extended to a stevedore the traditional seamen's remedy of unseaworthiness in those cases where the stevedore `is doing a seaman's work and incurring a seaman's hazards.' 328 U.S., at 99. It took Congress a bit longer to react this time. In 1972, Congress amended the LHWCA to bar longshore and harbor workers from recovery for breach of the duty of seaworthiness. See 86 Stat. 1263, 33 U.S.C. § 905(b); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 28 (1990). Whether under the Jones Act or general maritime law, seamen do not include land-based workers. 498 U.S. at 346-48, 111 S.Ct. 807. The Court continued: We now recognize that the LHWCA is one of a pair of mutually exclusive remedial statutes that distinguish between land-based and sea-based maritime employees. The LHWCA restricted the definition of `seaman' in the Jones Act only to the extent that `seaman' had been taken to include land-based employees. There is no indication in the Jones Act, the LHWCA, or elsewhere, that Congress has excluded from Jones Act remedies those traditional seamen who owe allegiance to a vessel at sea.... 498 U.S. at 353-54, 111 S.Ct. 807; see also Chandris, 515 U.S. at 355, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (In Warner [v. Goltra, 293 U.S. 155 (1934)], we stated that `a seaman is a mariner of any degree, one who lives his life upon the sea. ' Id., at 157. Similarly, in Norton v. Warner Co., 321 U.S. 565, 572 (1944), we suggested that `every one is entitled to the privilege of a seaman who, like seamen, at all times contributes to the labors about the operation and welfare of the ship when she is upon a voyage. ' (quoting The Buena Ventura, 243 F. 797, 799 (S.D.N.Y.1916)). (emphasis added)). In Chandris, which the trial court relied upon in its judgment in the present case, the Supreme Court was asked to further clarify what relationship a worker must have to a vessel in navigation in order to qualify for seaman status under the Jones Act. 515 U.S. at 350, 115 S.Ct. 2172. As to that issue the Chandris Court noted: Congress provided some content for the Jones Act requirement in 1927 when it enacted the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), which provides scheduled compensation (and the exclusive remedy) for injury to a broad range of land-based maritime workers but which also explicitly excludes from its coverage `a master or member of a crew of any vessel.' 44 Stat. (part 2) 1424, as amended, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(G). 515 U.S. at 355, 115 S.Ct. 2172. As noted above, the land-based maritime employees to whom Congress directed coverage under the LHWCA include any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker.... 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (emphasis added). The Chandris Court then undert[ook] the ... difficult task of developing a status-based standard that, although it determines Jones Act coverage without regard to the precise activity in which the worker is engaged at the time of the injury, nevertheless best furthers the Jones Act's remedial goals. 515 U.S. at 358, 115 S.Ct. 2172. The Court noted several basic principles regarding the definition of a seaman. First, `[w]hether under the Jones Act or general maritime law, seamen do not include land-based workers. ' [ McDermott Int'l, Inc. v.] Wilander, [498 U.S. 337] at 348 [ (1991) ]. 515 U.S. at 358, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (emphasis added). The Chandris Court further noted: In addition to recognizing a fundamental distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime employees, our cases also emphasize that Jones Act coverage, like the jurisdiction of admiralty over causes of action for maintenance and cure for injuries received in the course of a seaman's employment, depends `not on the place where the injury is inflicted ... but on the nature of the seaman's service, his status as a member of the vessel, and his relationship as such to the vessel and its operation in navigable waters.' Swanson [v. Marra Bros., Inc., 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946) ]. Thus, maritime workers who obtain seaman status do not lose that protection automatically when on shore and may recover under the Jones Act whenever they are injured in the service of a vessel, regardless of whether the injury occurs on or off the ship. 515 U.S. at 359-60, 115 S.Ct. 2172. The Chandris Court continued: Our LHWCA cases also recognize the converse: Land-based maritime workers injured while on a vessel in navigation remain covered by the LHWCA, which expressly provides compensation for injuries to certain workers engaged in `maritime employment' that are incurred `upon the navigable waters of the United States,' 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). Thus, in Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs v. Perini North River Associates, 459 U.S. 297 (1983), we held that a worker injured while `working on a barge in actual navigable waters' of the Hudson River, id., at 300, n. 4, could be compensated under the LHWCA, id., at 324. See also Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 244-245 (1941) (upholding LHWCA coverage for a worker testing outboard motors who `was drowned when a motor boat in which he was riding capsized'). These decisions, which reflect our longstanding view of the LHWCA's scope, indicate that a maritime worker does not become a `member of a crew' as soon as a vessel leaves the dock. It is therefore well settled after decades of judicial interpretation that the Jones Act inquiry is fundamentally status based: Land-based maritime workers do not become seamen because they happen to be working on board a vessel when they are injured, and seamen do not lose Jones Act protection when the course of their service to a vessel takes them ashore. In spite of this background, respondent and Justice STEVENS suggest that any maritime worker who is assigned to a vessel for the duration of a voyage  and whose duties contribute to the vessel's mission  should be classified as a seaman for purposes of injuries incurred during that voyage. See Brief for Respondent 14; post, at 2194 (opinion concurring in judgment). Under such a `voyage test,' which relies principally upon this Court's statements that the Jones Act was designed to protect maritime workers who are exposed to the `special hazards' and `particular perils' characteristic of work on vessels at sea, see, e.g., [ McDermott Int'l, Inc. v.] Wilander, [498 U.S. 337] at 354 [ (1991) ], the worker's activities at the time of the injury would be controlling. The difficulty with respondent's argument, as the foregoing discussion makes clear, is that the LHWCA repudiated the [ International Stevedoring Co. v.] Haverty[, 272 U.S. 50 (1926),] line of cases and established that a worker is no longer considered to be a seaman simply because he is doing a seaman's work at the time of the injury. Seaman status is not coextensive with seamen's risks. .... ... In evaluating the employment-related connection of a maritime worker to a vessel in navigation, courts should not employ `a snapshot test for seaman status, inspecting only the situation as it exists at the instant of injury; a more enduring relationship is contemplated in the jurisprudence.' Easley [v. Southern Shipbuilding Corp., 965 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir.1992) ]. Thus, a worker may not oscillate back and forth between Jones Act coverage and other remedies depending on the activity in which the worker was engaged while injured. Reeves v. Mobile Dredging & Pumping Co., 26 F.3d 1247, 1256 (C.A.3 1994). Unlike Justice STEVENS, see post, at 2194, we do not believe that any maritime worker on a ship at sea as part of his employment is automatically a member of the crew of the vessel within the meaning of the statutory terms. Our rejection of the voyage test is also consistent with the interests of employers and maritime workers alike in being able to predict who will be covered by the Jones Act (and, perhaps more importantly for purposes of the employers' workers' compensation obligations, who will be covered by the LHWCA) before a particular workday begins. To say that our cases have recognized a distinction between land-based and sea-based maritime workers that precludes application of a voyage test for seaman status, however, is not to say that a maritime employee must work only on board a vessel to qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. In Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81 (1991), decided only a few months after Wilander, we concluded that a worker's status as a ship repairman, one of the enumerated occupations encompassed within the term `employee' under the LHWCA, 33 U.S.C. § 902(3), did not necessarily restrict the worker to a remedy under that statute. We explained that, `[w]hile in some cases a ship repairman may lack the requisite connection to a vessel in navigation to qualify for seaman status, ... not all ship repairmen lack the requisite connection as a matter of law. This is so because [i]t is not the employee's particular job that is determinative, but the employee's connection to a vessel.' Gizoni, supra, at 89 (quoting Wilander, 498 U.S., at 354) (footnote omitted). Thus, we concluded, the Jones Act remedy may be available to maritime workers who are employed by a shipyard and who spend a portion of their time working on shore but spend the rest of their time at sea.  515 U.S. at 360-64, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (emphasis added). With the foregoing basic principles established, the Chandris Court then articulated the following two-part test for determining whether a particular employee is a seaman: [T]he essential requirements for seaman status are twofold. First, as we emphasized in [ McDermott Int'l, Inc. v.] Wilander, [498 U.S. 337 (1991),] `an employee's duties must contribut[e] to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its mission.' 498 U.S., at 355 (quoting [ Offshore Co. v.] Robison, 266 F.2d [769], 779 [(5th Cir.1959)]). The Jones Act's protections, like the other admiralty protections for seamen, only extend to those maritime employees who do the ship's work. But this threshold requirement is very broad: `All who work at sea in the service of a ship' are eligible for seaman status. 498 U.S., at 354. Second, and most important for our purposes here, a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both its duration and its nature. The fundamental purpose of this substantial connection requirement is to give full effect to the remedial scheme created by Congress and to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers who have only a transitory or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.  515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (emphasis added). [12] Further, commenting on the temporal aspect (duration) of a maritime employee's connection to a vessel in navigation, the Chandris Court stated: Generally, the Fifth Circuit seems to have identified an appropriate rule of thumb for the ordinary case: A worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act. This figure of course serves as no more than a guideline established by years of experience, and departure from it will certainly be justified in appropriate cases. As we have said, `[t]he inquiry into seaman status is of necessity fact specific; it will depend on the nature of the vessel and the employee's precise relation to it.' [ McDermott Int'l, Inc. v.] Wilander, 498 U.S. [337], at 356 [ (1991) ]. 515 U.S. at 371, 115 S.Ct. 2172. The Court concluded: [T]he Jones Act was intended to protect sea-based maritime workers, who owe their allegiance to a vessel, and not land-based employees, who do not. Id. at 376, 115 S.Ct. 2172. In the present case, the trial court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Frazier satisfied the first element of the Chandris test. [13] As to the second element, however, the trial court determined that Frazier performed the bulk of his work either on land or on spud barges that were almost always spudded down and tied off. [Frazier's] connection to a vessel in navigation, if any, was sporadic and extremely short in duration, not substantial in duration or nature. [Frazier] was not `exposed to the perils of the sea' as required by Chandris. .... Here, [Frazier] was not a sea-based maritime employee whose duties regularly took him to sea. Instead, [Frazier] arrived at work every day by vehicle and went home every night to sleep in his own bed. [Frazier] did not take his meals on the boat and did not sleep on the boat. [Frazier] was not a member of the crews that regularly offloaded the barges and was not paid like them. He regularly did welding work on items that were on the land while he was on land. His base of operation was a mechanic shop on land. The work that [Frazier] did on a barge was almost always done while the barge was moored, spudded down, or completely out of operation. He was never on a vessel in navigation while working for Core, and the only time he was on a barge that was moving was when the barge was being moved short distances along the shoreline by a crane. These `trips' were infrequent and generally took between thirty minutes and an hour. The work that he actually did while he was on a barge, with the exception of occasionally handling lines, was done there only because the item that he was repairing was located on the vessel. Based on its judgment, the trial court appears to have concluded (1) that Frazier did not work on barges that were in navigation and (2) that Frazier's connection to barges in navigation was not substantial in duration and nature for purposes of the Jones Act. As to the issue of when a vessel is considered in navigation, the Chandris Court stated: Under our precedent and the law prevailing in the Circuits, it is generally accepted that `a vessel does not cease to be a vessel when she is not voyaging, but is at anchor, berthed, or at dockside,' DiGiovanni v. Traylor Bros., Inc., 959 F.2d 1119, 1121(CA1) (en banc), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 827 (1992), even when the vessel is undergoing repairs. See... [2 M. Norris, Law of Seamen § 30.13,] at 364 [ (4th ed. 1985) ] (`[A] vessel is in navigation ... when it returns from a voyage and is taken to a drydock or shipyard to undergo repairs in preparation to making another trip, and likewise a vessel is in navigation, although moored to a dock, if it remains in readiness for another voyage' (footnotes omitted)). At some point, however, repairs become sufficiently significant that the vessel can no longer be considered in navigation. In West v. United States, 361 U.S. 118 (1959), we held that a shoreside worker was not entitled to recover for unseaworthiness because the vessel on which he was injured was undergoing an overhaul for the purpose of making her seaworthy and therefore had been withdrawn from navigation. We explained that, in such cases, `the focus should be upon the status of the ship, the pattern of the repairs, and the extensive nature of the work contracted to be done.' Id., at 122.... The general rule among the Courts of Appeals is that vessels undergoing repairs or spending a relatively short period of time in drydock are still considered to be `in navigation' whereas ships being transformed through `major' overhauls or renovations are not. 515 U.S. at 373-74, 115 S.Ct. 2172. In light of the foregoing language from Chandris, the barge on which Frazier was injured in March 2005 arguably had not been taken out of service and was in navigation for purposes of the Jones Act. The same argument can be made as to most of Frazier's other work on Core's barges, which involved barges that might be considered in navigation for purposes of the Jones Act. We pretermit consideration, however, of whether the trial court erred when it concluded that Frazier was never on a vessel in navigation while working for Core. As hereinafter discussed, Frazier's Jones Act claims fail because the trial court was correct in its determination that no genuine issue exists as to whether Frazier's relationship to vessels in navigation was substantial in nature for purposes of the Jones Act. As the Chandris Court noted: [T]he question of who is a `member of a crew,' and therefore who is a `seaman,' is a mixed question of law and fact. Because statutory terms are at issue, their interpretation is a question of law and it is the court's duty to define the appropriate standard. [ McDermott Int'l, Inc. v.] Wilander, 498 U.S. [337] at 356 [(1991) ]. On the other hand, `[i]f reasonable persons, applying the proper legal standard, could differ as to whether the employee was a member of a crew, it is a question for the jury.' Ibid. ... The jury should be permitted, when determining whether a maritime employee has the requisite employment-related connection to a vessel in navigation to qualify as a member of the vessel's crew, to consider all relevant circumstances bearing on the two elements outlined above. 515 U.S. at 369, 115 S.Ct. 2172. The Court continued: In our view, `the total circumstances of an individual's employment must be weighed to determine whether he had a sufficient relation to the navigation of vessels and the perils attendant thereon. ' Wallace v. Oceaneering Int'l, 727 F.2d 427, 432 (C.A.5 1984). The duration of a worker's connection to a vessel and the nature of the worker's activities, taken together, determine whether a maritime employee is a seaman because the ultimate inquiry is whether the worker in question is a member of the vessel's crew or simply a land-based employee who happens to be working on the vessel at a given time.  515 U.S. at 370, 115 S.Ct. 2172. (emphasis added). Although Frazier's argument parrots the language of Chandris so that superficially there appears to be merit in his contention that he had a connection to Core's barges that was substantial in nature for purposes of the Jones Act, his argument is at odds with the fundamental purpose of the substantial connection requirement. As the Chandris Court stated: The fundamental purpose of this substantial connection requirement is ... to separate the sea-based maritime employees who are entitled to Jones Act protection from those land-based workers... whose employment does not regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.  515 U.S. at 368, 115 S.Ct. 2172 (emphasis added). Perhaps more importantly, subsequent to its decision Chandris, the Supreme Court stated: For the substantial connection requirement to serve its purpose, the inquiry into the nature of the employee's connection to the vessel must concentrate on whether the employee's duties take him to sea. This will give substance to the inquiry both as to the duration and nature of the employee's connection to the vessel and be helpful in distinguishing land-based from sea-based employees.  Harbor Tug & Barge Co. v. Papai, 520 U.S. 548, 555, 117 S.Ct. 1535, 137 L.Ed.2d 800 (1997). In Papai, the Court held that Papai did not meet the test for seaman status, noting: Papai was qualified under the IBU [Inland Boatman's Union] Deckhands Agreement to perform non-seagoing work in addition to the seagoing duties described above. His actual duty on the Pt. Barrow throughout the employment in question did not include any seagoing activity; he was hired for one day to paint the vessel at dockside and he was not going to sail with the vessel after he finished painting it. This is not a case where the employee was hired to perform seagoing work during the employment in question, however brief, and we need not consider here the consequences of such an employment. The IBU Deckhands Agreement gives no reason to assume that any particular percentage of Papai's work would be of a seagoing nature, subjecting him to the perils of the sea. In these circumstances, the union agreement does not advance the accuracy of the seaman-status inquiry. Papai argues he qualifies as a seaman if we consider his 12 prior employments with Harbor Tug over the 2½ months before his injury. Papai testified at his deposition that he worked aboard the Pt. Barrow on three or four occasions before the day he was injured, the most recent of which was more than a week earlier. Each of these engagements involved only maintenance work while the tug was docked. The nature of Papai's connection to the Pt. Barrow was no more substantial for seaman-status purposes by virtue of these engagements than the one during which he was injured. Papai does not identify with specificity what he did for Harbor Tug the other eight or nine times he worked for the company in the 2½ months before his injury. The closest he comes is his deposition testimony that 70 percent of his work over the 2 1/4 years before his injury was deckhand work. Coupled with the fact that none of Papai's work aboard the Pt. Barrow was of a seagoing nature, it would not be reasonable to infer from Papai's testimony that his recent engagements with Harbor Tug involved work of a seagoing nature. In any event, these discrete engagements were separate from the one in question, which was the sort of `transitory or sporadic' connection to a vessel or group of vessels that, as we explained in Chandris, does not qualify one for seaman status. 515 U.S., at 368. 520 U.S. at 559-60, 117 S.Ct. 1535(references to record omitted; emphasis added). Based on the rationale behind the substantial in nature requirement announced in Chandris and on the interpretation and application of that language in Papai, we are clear to the conclusion that the trial court did not err when it determined that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Frazier's connection to Core's barges was substantial in nature. Frazier was a land-based employee whose work was not of a seagoing nature; he was not regularly exposed to the perils of the sea while performing his work for Core. Compare, e.g., Richard v. Mike Hooks, Inc., 799 So.2d 462, 466-67 (La.2001) (Richard's time spent aboard Hooks's vessels and the perils he faced must be considered along with other important facts to determine whether his connection[s] with defendant's vessels are substantial in nature and duration. In this particular instance, we consider an analysis of the following: all of the vessels on which plaintiff worked were dockside; he was never more than a gangplank's distance from shore when working on the vessels; some of the vessels were partially on land while being repaired; he never slept on the vessels; he did not eat on the vessels; he did not keep watch on vessels overnight; he was not a member of Hooks's dredge crew that performed welding on dredges in operation; he never worked on a vessel while it was performing its primary mission; he took his orders from a land-based foreman; he was only aboard small moving vessels once every month, for short durations, where he assisted in moving dredge pipe along a canal adjacent to Hooks's yard; and his repair duties did not take him to sea. While none of these individual facts alone prohibit an employee from attaining seaman status, a consideration of them together shows that Richard was a land-based employee, not a seaman. (footnote omitted)). Further, the LHWCA specifically defines an employee for purposes of that act as any person engaged in maritime employment, including any longshoreman or other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any harbor-worker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and ship-breaker. 33 U.S.C. § 902(3)(emphasis added). The trial court found that Frazier was a ship repairman and, though he testified that he acted as a deckhand on occasion, the only specific testimony he gives concerning what he did as a deckhand related to his occasionally assisting with matters related to the loading and unloading of the barges at dockside. In fact, Frazier conceded that so far as his work was concerned, the barges essentially served as work platforms. There is no evidence indicating that he performed the duties of a deckhand away from the dock on open water, i.e., duties that [took] him to sea where the barges were being pushed by tugboat to transport cargo. See Papai, 520 U.S. at 555, 117 S.Ct. 1535. Under these circumstances, if Frazier is a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act, then virtually all longshoremen, who typically work on ship during the loading and unloading process, see Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 254 n. 4, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977), could be classified as a seamen as well. Such an expansive view of seaman status would virtually eliminate the distinction Congress has drawn between the types of employees who are engage[d] in maritime employment, as illustrated in § 902(3), and those employees who are member[s] of a crew of any vessel. See, e.g., Roberts v. Ingram Barge Co., [No. 5:06-CV-00210-R, April 16, 2009] (W.D.Ky.2009)(stating in regard to a welder who spent all of his workday either in the fleets or performing repair work on barges that were moored alongside the dock: The hazards Roberts states he faced do not rise to the level of the special hazards and disadvantages faced by seaman; they are hazards that longshoremen commonly encounter. Therefore, Roberts was an intended beneficiary of the LHWCA.). Perhaps more importantly, such an expansive view of seaman status would remove the safe harbor of the LHWCA's no-fault maritime-workers'-compensation scheme for many persons who are engaged in maritime employment, leaving them to navigate through the tort-based schemes the LHWCA was intended to displace. [14] Considering the totality of the evidentiary materials presented to the trial court, we cannot conclude that reasonable jurors could differ as to whether Frazier's connection to a vessel in navigation was substantial in nature for purposes of the Jones Act. Accordingly, Frazier's negligence claim (count 1), which he based on his status as an able-bodied seaman, fails. Likewise, his Jones Act claim (count 2) and his unseaworthiness claim (count 3) fail. As for Frazier's claims based on Core's alleged wanton or reckless action (count 4), Frazier makes no specific argument addressing the denial of this claim, and he cites no authority that would support a ruling that the trial court erred by denying this claim. Thus, any argument relating to that count is waived. Chunn v. Whisenant, 877 So.2d 595, 601 (Ala.2003).