Opinion ID: 2609445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Instructed the Jury on Attempted Murder in the Second Degree.

Text: Defendant next argues that the trial court's instruction on attempted murder in the second degree was incomplete and confusing, because it substantially deviated from Hawai`i Standard Jury Instructions Criminal (HAWJIC) 14.02A. This argument is without merit. The trial court gave the following two instructions. State's proposed instruction no. 1, to which the defense objected, provided: In the indictment, the defendant ... is charged with the offense of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree. A person commits the offense of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree if she intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause the death of another person. There are two material elements of the offense of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These two elements are: 1. That on or about the 4th day of September 1995, in the City and County of Honolulu, State of Hawaii, the defendant... intentionally engaged in conduct; and 2. That the defendant['s] ... conduct was a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause the death of Angela Hammond. (Emphasis added.) State's proposed instruction no. 2, given by agreement, provided that A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if she intentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as she believes them to be, constitutes a substantial step in a course of conduct intended to culminate in her commission of the crime. When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime, if acting with the state of mind required to establish liability with respect to the attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, she intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause such a result. Defendant's conduct shall constitute a substantial step in a course of conduct, if it is strongly corroborative of intent to commit the offense charged. (Emphases added.) In comparison, HAWJIC 14.02A states in pertinent part: A person commits the offense of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree if he/she intentionally engages in conduct which, under the circumstances as he/she believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause the death of another person. There are two material elements of the offense of Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These two elements are: 1. That, on or about (date), in the [City and] County of (name of county), the Defendant intentionally engaged in conduct; and 2. That the conduct, under the circumstances Defendant believed them to be, was a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to be practically certain by the Defendant to cause the death of another person. HAWJIC 14.02A, reprinted in Hawai`i Court Rules, State and Federal 742 (1997) (some emphasis added and some in original). Specifically, Defendant claims that the instruction the trial court gave: (1) failed to direct the jury to find that Defendant intended to cause Hammond's death; (2) did not require that the jury examine her conduct under the circumstances as she believed them to be at the time; and (3) virtually t[old] the jury to find that the defendant's conduct is a substantial step rather than cautioning the jury that conduct cannot be a substantial step unless the jury finds that such conduct is strongly corroborative of intent. (Emphases in original.) First, Defendant's argument that deviation from the HAWJIC is prejudicial per se is disingenuous. The introduction to the instructions clearly states that nothing herein shall be construed as an approval by the Supreme Court of the State of Hawai[`i] of the substance of any of said instructions. HAWJIC(1991); see also HAWJIC, reprinted in Hawai`i Court Rules, State and Federal 627 (1997). Additionally, approval for publication and distribution is not and shall not be considered by this court or any other court to be an approval or judgment as to the validity or correctness of the substance of any pattern instruction. HAWJIC, reprinted in Hawai`i Court Rules, State and Federal 627 (1997). A failure, therefore, to strictly conform to HAWJIC 14.02A does not automatically result in incomplete and confusing jury instructions. Second, the instruction given in the instant case did, in fact, inform the jury regarding the requisite state of mind necessary to convict Defendant of attempted second degree murder. The elements of the charged crime, as provided in State's instruction no. 1, directed the jury to determine whether Defendant's conduct was intended or known to cause the death of Hammond. Third, as in State v. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i 1, 8, 946 P.2d 955, 962 (1997), the jury instruction was patterned after HRS § 705-500(2), which provides: When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, a person is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime if, acting with the state of mind required to establish liability with respect to the attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime, the person intentionally engages in conduct which is a substantial step in a course of conduct intended or known to cause such a result. See id. at 12, 946 P.2d at 966 (emphasis in original). HRS § 700-500(2) applies directly to attempted murder, wherein `causing a particular result,' i.e., the result of the actor's conduct is a material element. Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, the instant jury instructions contained the qualifying language that Defendant now claims was omitted. It is well settled that jury instructions are to be viewed as a whole. Cullen, 86 Hawai`i at 8, 946 P.2d at 962; see also Holbron, 80 Hawai`i at 32, 904 P.2d at 917. State's instruction no. 2, to which the defense did not object, provided that the jury must examine Defendant's conduct under the circumstances as she believed them to be at the time. Accordingly, when read as a whole, the State's proposed instructions nos. 1 and 2 properly explain the applicable law. Finally, State's instruction no. 2 provided that Defendant's conduct shall constitute a substantial step in a course of conduct, if it is strongly corroborative of intent to commit the offense charged. (Emphasis added.) This instruction is clear: it contains the qualifier if and does not tell the jury, as Defendant claims, that her conduct alone was a substantial step of the offense. As a whole, the trial court's instructions on attempted murder in the second degree were not prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in this regard.