Opinion ID: 2559012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to object to expert testimony

Text: Appellant next claims that direct appeal counsel was ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness for failing to object to testimony by the Commonwealth's criminal evidence expert, Caesar Mujica. Mr. Mujica testified regarding the red substance visible on a toy kitchen set at the crime scene, which was also visible in a crime scene photograph. Appellant argues that neither the red substance nor the toy kitchen set was referenced on the property receipt listing the evidence collected at the scene and sent to the laboratory to be analyzed; thus, the expert could not properly say that the substance was the victim's blood or even blood at all. Appellant contends that trial counsel should have objected to Mr. Mujica's opinion that the substance was blood, which permitted the prosecutor to refer to the blood-smeared toy kitchen set in what appellant alleges was a misrepresented characterization of the events surrounding the murder as an urban horror story. That characterization, appellant argues, misled and inflamed the jury. Moreover, appellant labels these references as fabrications and deliberate misrepresentations in the Commonwealth's case against him. The Commonwealth responds by arguing, inter alia, that trial counsel was not obliged to object simply because the Commonwealth had not tested every single bloody item from the crime scene. The Commonwealth asserts that Mr. Mujica's inference was supported by evidence that there was blood found throughout the victim's apartment, and that appellant has not shown that Mr. Mujica, as a matter of fact, was wrong. Furthermore, in the Commonwealth's estimation, the mere fact that one of the many places in which blood was found [at the scene] was on a child's toy is a minor point; its exclusion would not have likely changed the trial result. Commonwealth's Brief at 17-18 n. 14. Because there was nothing in either Mr. Mujica's statement or the prosecutor's comments that called for objection, the Commonwealth submits, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object, and direct appeal counsel cannot have been ineffective for not having pursued the matter on appeal. [5] The prosecution may not knowingly and deliberately misrepresent the evidence in order to gain a conviction. Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 6-7, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 L.Ed.2d 690 (1967). Nevertheless, a claim of purposeful prosecutorial misrepresentation will not stand if examination of the record fails to reveal any indication of deceptive tactics on the part of the prosecution. See Commonwealth v. Lobel, 514 Pa. 163, 523 A.2d 304, 308 (1987). Minor discrepancies in the Commonwealth's case will not be considered false evidence. Commonwealth v. Williams, 450 Pa. 327, 301 A.2d 867, 869 (1973); see also Commonwealth v. Harris, 572 Pa. 489, 817 A.2d 1033, 1051-52 (2002). Relevant to this claim, Mr. Mujica testified on direct examination as follows: Q: Did you obtain, I think in the vernacular you gentlemen use, did you obtain physical evidence which was termed red substance? A: That is correct. Q: That would be blood? A: Yes. Q: Can you tell the ladies and gentlemen of the jury in what particular areas, if you recall, a red substance, blood, was recovered or noted? A: It was all over the apartment. N.T., 11/6/91, at 78. Mr. Mujica then testified at length as to the various places throughout the apartment where he discovered a red substance, including the following description of a photograph of the murder scene: This is a close up view showing a red substance on the outside of a toy kitchen set near the west wall of the southeast bedroom. Id. at 90. The crime scene investigators' apparent failure to reference either the toy kitchen set or the red substance visible on the toy set on the master list of the evidence collected does not render Mr. Mujica's testimony, to which there was no objection, untrue, incorrect, or unsupported by the evidence of record; much less does it prove fabrication on the part of the prosecution, as appellant intemperately suggests. Mr. Mujica, as well as other witnesses, testified to the undisputed fact that there was blood found throughout the victim's apartment in the aftermath of the murder. [6] The mere fact that the red substance on the toy set was not itself listed on the police evidence property receipt or tested at the laboratory does not mean that the photograph Mr. Mujica described was fabricated, nor does it make Mr. Mujica's testimony untrue, misleading, or a prosecutorial fabrication that obliged trial counsel to object. Of course, counsel could have objected to any reference to the substance on the toy set on grounds that it had not specifically been tested, but to what ultimate purpose? The investigators' failure to sample and test the red substance from that particular item does not defeat the logical inference that the substance on the toy set was blood, since it is indisputable that blood was found throughout the apartment. By the same token, appellant has not demonstrated that the references caused Strickland prejudice. In light of the extensive and undisputed presence of blood throughout the victim's apartment, appellant has not shown a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different if an objection had been made to the above testimony of Mr. Mujica and the prosecutor's mention of blood on the toy kitchen set. Accordingly, this layered Strickland claim fails.