Opinion ID: 3162246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Baker’s Claim

Text: Here, we cannot say the district court erred in denying relief on Ground One of Baker’s § 2254 petition, as Baker’s substantive double jeopardy claim, asserted as Claim One in Baker’s Rule 3.850 motion, was unexhausted in state court and, therefore, subject to procedural default. Moreover, the cause and prejudice exception in Martinez does not apply to Baker’s case.
Baker abandoned his substantive double jeopardy claim before the state post-conviction appellate court, as that claim was neither raised in Baker’s initial 9 Case: 14-14573 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Page: 10 of 12 counseled appellate brief, nor in his pro se appellate brief. See Marshall v. State, 854 So. 2d 1235, 1252 (Fla. 2003) (holding that if an appellant does not raise and argue a claim in his or her initial appellate brief, then that claim is deemed abandoned because it is insufficiently presented for review). While both briefs challenged the state post-conviction court’s denial of Claim Two of Baker’s Rule 3.850 motion, which alleged that trial counsel’s failure to inform Baker of potential double jeopardy issues amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, neither brief challenged the state post-conviction court’s denial of Claim One of Baker’s Rule 3.850 motion on the grounds that Baker waived any double jeopardy argument by entering into a written plea agreement. Therefore, Baker’s substantive double jeopardy claim was not exhausted in state court because Baker abandoned it on appeal and, thus, did not raise the claim throughout one round of Florida’s established appellate review process. O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845, 119 S. Ct. at 1732. Accordingly, Baker’s substantive double jeopardy claim was subject to a procedural default because he failed to exhaust the claim in state court, and his state remedy was no longer available because the claim would be time-barred. 2 Smith, 256 F.3d at 1138. 2 Florida requires a petitioner who seeks to challenge his judgment or sentence on the ground that it violates a constitutional right to file a motion, under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, within two years after his judgment and sentence become final, unless, in relevant part, the petitioner claims that the judgment or sentence violates a fundamental constitutional right that was not established within that two-year period and has been held to apply retroactively. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(a)(1), (b), (b)(2). 10 Case: 14-14573 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Page: 11 of 12
As an initial matter, we note that while this Court reads briefs filed by pro se litigants liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned. Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). Baker’s opening appellate brief asserts, without explanation, that “Petitioner has established cause and prejudice.” Typically, this Court would not even address this perfunctory and underdeveloped argument. United States Steel Corp. v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 1272, 1287 n.13 (11th Cir. 2007). Nevertheless, for the sake of comprehensiveness, we conclude that Baker failed to establish cause to excuse his failure to exhaust his substantive double jeopardy claim. Under the facts of this case, there would be no “objective factor[s] external to [Baker’s] defense” that impeded his ability to raise his substantive double jeopardy claim before the state post-conviction appellate court other than postconviction appellate counsel’s ineffective assistance. Henderson, 353 F.3d at 892. However, the Supreme Court has explicitly held that attorney errors made in appeals from initial-review collateral proceedings do not constitute cause excusing a procedural default. See Martinez, 566 U.S. at ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1320. Accordingly, Baker failed to demonstrate cause for his procedural default. See id. Because Baker failed to demonstrate cause for his procedural default, we need not address the existence of any resulting prejudice. 11 Case: 14-14573 Date Filed: 12/14/2015 Page: 12 of 12