Opinion ID: 1965447
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The government's concession

Text: As we have noted in reciting the facts, the government presented no testimony at the hearing on the motion to suppress with regard to the content of the lookout broadcast by the police. Further, no such evidence was introduced at the trial. The government now concedes, in its brief on appeal, that at least with respect to the show-up identification by Officer Commodore, Ellis' motion should have been granted. We quote the government's concession: In Milline v. United States, 856 A.2d 616 (D.C.2004), this Court held that, without more, conclusory testimony by police officers that a defendant matched an unknown description of the suspect is not a sufficient basis for a judge to determine that a stop was justified. Id. at 619. Although Milline, (which was decided only a few months before trial in this case) was not brought to the attention of the trial court, appellant now contends that the trial court should have granted his pre-trial motion to suppress identification because the government did not present any evidence from which the judge could have made an independent determination that there was reasonable, articulable suspicion or probable cause as required by Milline . . . . Although it is a close question, we acknowledge that the government's failure to elicit the details of the lookout description presented the trial court with the type of conclusory testimony that Milline has indicated is not sufficient to. sustain the government's burden in defending against a motion to suppress. Nonetheless, this Court should affirm appellant's conviction, because the admission of testimony concerning the show-up identification procedure was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In conformity with our general practice, we accept the government's concession, especially where, as here, the government appears to have deliberately conceded [the] issue as a matter of appellate strategy, rather than merely failing to argue the point inadvertently. Rose v. United States, 629 A.2d 526, 536 (D.C.1993). Moreover, in this case, the government's concession was not improvident. Indeed, it is consistent not only with Milline, but also with our precedents. See, e.g., In re T.L.L., 729 A.2d 334, 341 (D.C.1999), in which we held that the trial judge has the responsibility to make an independent assessment of the sufficiency of the basis for a stop, and that in order to do so, the judge must be apprised of sufficient facts to enable him [or her] to evaluate the reliability of that information. Accord, Sanders v. United States, 751 A.2d 952, 955 (D.C.2000). Ellis also contends, and the government expressly concedes, that in light of the constitutional nature of the error, we may affirm only if the government demonstrates that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. 824.