Opinion ID: 52785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Carlos Cardenas

Text: Cardenas first argues that the district court committed reversible error by allowing Agent Reagan to testify as to what Diaz told him when, during the investigation, Agent Reagan asked Diaz to identify the individuals listed in the drug ledgers. We review the district court’s decision to allow this testimony for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999). FRE 801(c) defines hearsay as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Hearsay is inadmissible unless excepted by another rule. See United States v. Fernandez, 892 F.2d 976 (11th Cir. 1989). More specifically, a declarant’s out-of-court statement made while cooperating with the police is inadmissible if offered for the truth of the matter asserted. United States v. Perez-Garcia, 904 F.2d 1534, 1540 (11th Cir. 1990). This is true even when the cooperating individual later testifies at trial because the out-of-court statements 9 “were not made by the declarant[] while testifying at a trial or hearing.” United States v. Summers, 598 F.2d 450, 459 n.11 (5th Cir. 1979).2 Cardenas argues that the government here improperly used the out-of-court statements from Diaz for the truth of the matter asserted and to prove the government’s case. The government concedes that some of Agent Reagan’s testimony exceeded the progress-of-the-investigation rationale and was impermissible hearsay because it was admitted for the truth of the matters asserted by Diaz.3 We conclude, however, that even if this introduction of the actual identities of the individuals in the drug ledgers was impermissible hearsay, this error does not require reversal in this case. Evidentiary decisions do not constitute reversible error unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and errors affect a substantial right of a party if they “have a ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome of a case or leave ‘grave doubt’ as to whether they affected the outcome of a case.” United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1266 n.20 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1063 (2005). Here, we conclude that the error in admitting Agent Reagan’s testimony regarding 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we adopted as binding precedent all decisions handed down by the former Fifth Circuit before the close of business on September 30, 1981. 3 The government states that the out-of-court revelations of the actual identities of the individuals listed in Diaz’s ledgers were impermissible hearsay. 10 what Diaz told him about the identities of the individuals in the drug ledgers was harmless error because (1) the same information imparted to the jury by Agent Reagan came in through Diaz’s own testimony, and, thus, Agent Reagan’s testimony did not contribute evidence not otherwise before the jury, and (2) the government properly introduced other overwhelming evidence of Cardenas’s guilt. Summers, 598 F.2d at 458-59. 2. Diaz’s Testimony Regarding Prior Drug Dealings with Cardenas During the trial, Diaz testified regarding how he met Cardenas and about their prior drug dealings together. Before this testimony was introduced, the district court instructed the jury regarding how it might receive the evidence, and made the following statement. Second, I had previously told you that evidence of prior bad acts or wrongs or crimes is not admissible to prove the character of the person in order to show that that person committed the bad acts charged in the Indictment. Do you remember that? We went over that previously. I said that you may receive this evidence only for a limited purpose and, that is, to explain how the alleged relationship between the participants in the crime charged in the Indictment developed and to explain the alleged mutual trust that existed between the participants. Diaz testified that he met Cardenas, a distant relative, at a family function. They 11 then began dealing cocaine and marijuana together around 1991, before Diaz fled to Spain. Diaz testified that, after returning from Spain, he approached Cardenas regarding purchasing Ecstacy because of their established business relationship. We review the district court’s decision to allow the admissibility of such evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Hands, 184 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999). Under FRE 404(b), “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” FRE 404(b), however, extends only to extrinsic evidence, and “bad acts” evidence is not extrinsic under FRE 404(b) if it is “(1) an uncharged offense which arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime, or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.” United States v. Utter, 97 F.3d 509, 513 (11th Cir. 1996). Evidence fitting within one of these prongs is governed by FRE 403 and may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. United States v. Fallen, 256 F.3d 1082, 1091 (11th Cir. 2001). Here, the district court did not err in admitting Diaz’s testimony regarding his prior drug dealings with Cardenas because the evidence was introduced for the 12 limited purpose of demonstrating why Diaz turned to Cardenas to distribute the new product line. United States v. Costa, 691 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Campbell to testify concerning his prior relationship with Costa, even though his testimony showed Costa previously had dealt in cocaine.”); see also United States v. Richardson, 764 F.2d 1514, 1521-22 (11th Cir. 1985). Because Diaz and Cardenas had an established relationship and the testimony was offered to explain this relationship and why Diaz approached Cardenas to distribute the Ecstacy, the evidence was inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.4 Furthermore, the district court gave the jury a limiting instruction to ensure there was no confusion regarding the purpose of this evidence. United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1472 (11th Cir. 1996) (“We presume that a jury follows the court’s instructions.”). 4 The term “inextricably intertwined”is defined in United States v. Williford: Evidence, not part of the crime charged but pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive and setup of the crime, is properly admitted if linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of the account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury. 764 F.2d 1493, 1499 (11th Cir. 1985). 13 3. Cardenas’s Requested Jury Instruction A district court’s decision not to give a proposed jury instruction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1150 (11th Cir. 2003). A defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction presented relating to a theory of defense for which there is any foundation in the evidence, even if the evidence is weak, insufficient, inconsistent, or of doubtful credibility. United States v. Opdahl, 930 F.2d 1530, 1535 (11th Cir. 1991). If the requisite evidence exists, the refusal to give a requested jury instruction “warrants reversal only if (1) the instruction is substantially correct, (2) the requested instruction was not addressed in the charge actually given, and (3) the failure to give the requested instruction seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to present an effective defense.” United States v. Moorman, 944 F.2d 801, 802 (11th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Ruiz, 59 F.3d 1151, 1154 (11th Cir. 1995). Cardenas argues that the government failed to establish more than a buyerseller relationship and, therefore, he requested a specific jury instruction on this defense. “Even if a requested jury instruction is proper, the trial court has some discretion in framing the instruction. If the charge to the jury adequately and correctly covers the substance of the requested instruction, there is no reversible 14 error.” United States v. Lively, 803 F.2d 1124, 1128 (11th Cir. 1986) (affirming district court’s refusal to give a “buyer/seller” instruction where the district court had instructed the jury on the elements of a drug conspiracy). Here, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of a drug conspiracy and specifically stated that “a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy but who happens to act in a way which advances some purpose of one does not thereby become a conspirator.” As in Lively, the drug conspiracy instruction here adequately addressed the substance of Cardenas’s requested buyer-seller instruction because it noted that a single act does not constitute participation in the conspiracy. See id. at 1128-29. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to give Cardenas’s requested jury instruction. 4. Sufficiency of the Evidence Cardenas also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the district court’s denial of his motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial. Based on a careful review of the record and the parties’ arguments, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to uphold Cardenas’s conviction, and we affirm his conviction without further discussion. 15