Opinion ID: 1311837
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Rankin Offenses.

Text: Defendant acknowledges evidence concerning the Kansas City theft of Rankin's car and credit cards was admissible as intertwined with the charged crimes, in that Rankin's car was used to transport Benham to the scene of her murder and defendant used his credit cards to buy gas in Vidal Junction. (E.g., People v. Viniegra (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 577, 582 [181 Cal. Rptr. 848].) (3) Defendant argues the court erred in failing to sever from the admissible evidence the further evidence of Rankin's kidnapping and murder  his murder implied from evidence he was never seen again after defendant stole his car. ( People v. Dabb (1948) 32 Cal.2d 491, 500 [197 P.2d 1]; People v. Haston (1968) 69 Cal.2d 233, 245 [70 Cal. Rptr. 419, 444 P.2d 91].) Before allowing Laughlin to testify to defendant's jailhouse statements, the trial court ruled admissible evidence concerning the circumstances of the taking of Rankin's car, including when he was last seen, but ruled inadmissible evidence Rankin is missing or was murdered. Contrary to defendant's assertion the court did not weigh the evidence's prejudicial effect against its probative value (Evid. Code, § 352), the court expressly recognized the serious consequences of admitting evidence of the Rankin offenses. Thereafter, asked by the prosecutor what defendant had told him about the circumstances surrounding the theft of a car, Laughlin replied defendant said he had stolen a vehicle from a male in the parking lot of a restaurant in Kansas City, had taken money and jewelry from him, and had then placed him in the trunk of the car and left. Defense counsel did not object. Rankin's wife testified the blue Buick used in the crime resembled her husband's and identified the stolen credit cards as his. He normally kept the cards in his wallet, which he kept in his pants pocket. He was due back from Kansas City March 20, 1981, but she has not seen him since. We believe in its ruling the trial court properly severed the most prejudicial aspects of the Rankin incident from the most relevant portions. (See People v. Dabb, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 500.) Admission of the kidnapping evidence was not error. That defendant had kidnapped Rankin was part of the circumstances of the theft of his car and credit cards and as such was relevant. Although Mrs. Rankin's testimony she had not seen her husband since March 1981 arguably suggested Rankin was missing, the testimony was not in violation of the court's ruling, nor did defense counsel object. The evidence, in any event, fell far short of establishing Rankin was dead or had been murdered, nor did the prosecutor exploit the issue. Any error therefore was harmless. Defendant contends it was prejudicial for the prosecutor to put Rankin's wife on the stand  to parade family members of murder victims before the jury. Mrs. Rankin's testimony concerning the Buick and the credit cards, however, was relevant and she clearly was the logical witness to establish these facts.