Opinion ID: 183941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Technical Analysis

Text: The technical analysis of the treaty that the United States Department of Justice and Department of State prepared, which the President submitted to the Senate at the same time that he asked for the Senate's ratification, supports the government's view. See In re Comm'r's Subpoenas, 325 F.3d at 1297-98 (referring to a technical analysis in interpreting a treaty); United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1029-30 (2d Cir.1985) (same). The technical analysis does not address the issue of the procedure/substance distinction directly. But several parts of the technical analysis suggest that the government's view is correct. For instance, the first page states that [i]t is anticipated that the Treaty will be implemented in the United States pursuant to the procedural framework provided by Title 28, United States Code, Section 1782. (Emphasis added.) As another example, in footnote 2, the technical analysis discusses a particular substantive point and concludes that this paragraph [of the Treaty] accords the courts broader authority to execute requests than does Title 28, United States Code, Section 1782, as interpreted [by some courts]. That part of the analysis makes sense only if the authors viewed the treaty as expanding the ability of Russia to obtain judicial assistance beyond the reach of requests under § 1782. The same is true of the technical analysis' discussion of Article 10, paragraph 3, where the authors note that [t]his is consistent with the approach taken in Title 28, United States Code, Section 1782. If the substantive provisions of § 1782 controlled, that statement would be meaningless.