Opinion ID: 1957359
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Hybrid View [21]

Text: Next we discuss the cases that contain language, that supports, so to speak, a composite of the majority and the minority views. In some instances it is difficult to determine where these particular states are in respect to the various views. In some of the cases, such as those from Vermont, the language also would support that state as being among the majority view that we shall later discuss. These states that we consider to be somewhere in the middle include the states of Oregon, Connecticut, Vermont, Washington, Missouri, Louisiana, Maine, Nevada, Arkansas, Nebraska, Texas, perhaps California and, currently, perhaps this state. In some of the states the cases are intermediate appellate court cases, and in some of the states various intermediate appellate decisions differ. In some, both positions are found within the same opinion. This is perhaps a result of the confusion that the term `best interests' can generate when applied in differing contexts. Although the court in the Vermont case of In re S.B.L., 150 Vt. 294, 553 A.2d 1078 (Vt.1988), actually decided that an unmarried father of a child born out of wedlock did not enjoy the parental presumption of fitness, it utilized language that indicated that its position emphasized the best interest standard. In essence, it first found that under Vermont law a father (not married to the mother) of a child was not considered to be the natural father and thus not entitled to the presumptions afforded a natural parent. Thus, it considered the dispute as between two third parties [to which the best interests test always applies]. The Vermont Supreme Court first noted: The instant case is novel because it is presented as a custody fight between a father of a child born out of wedlock, and a person who is neither the spouse of that party nor a parent of the child over whom custody is sought. As none of our modern cases involve parties of either of these classes, the presence of both as adversaries in a single case requires us to break substantial new ground. Id. at 298-300, 553 A.2d at 1081. At this point the Vermont court noted in a footnote that: Our one precedent on the respective custody rights of parents and third parties was decided in 1926. Although the child in [that case] was in the care of a grandparent, the custody order awarded custody to the child's father. Two recent cases have involved proceedings to award guardianship of a child to a third party because the parent is `unsuitable.' Id. at 300 n. 1, 553 A.2d at 1081 n. 1 (alteration added) (citations omitted). After first noting that the unmarried father of a child born out of wedlock was, according to Vermont law and to the common law, not presumed to be a parent, that court stated: There is no per se statutory preference in favor of the natural father of a child born out of wedlock, and the statute does not impose on third parties seeking custody the initial burden of proving the father to be incompetent or unsuitable. ... For the above reasons, the statute does not prevent a grandparent from competing on an equal footing with a biological father for the guardianship and custody of an illegitimate child. If the statute alone controlled, we would have to reverse the judgment for the father.... ... Because the father in Lehr [22] had not come forward to participate in the rearing of his child, he had no cognizable due process interest.... However, to deny such status to a biological father who has developed the requisite custodial, personal or financial relationship with the child denies equal protection of the law to the biological father under the principles set forth in Lehr. We conclude therefore that granting guardianship to a third person in preference to a parent who has demonstrated a commitment to parenthood based solely on a judicial determination of the best interests of the child  without first requiring the third party to demonstrate that the parent is unfit  denies the natural parent due process of law. S.B.L., 150 Vt. at 301-05, 553 A.2d at 1083-85 (footnote added). While the case appears to be distinguishable from the minority and perhaps deserves instead to be in the majority category in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has placed it, a later Vermont case, Boisvert v. Harrington, 173 Vt. 285, 796 A.2d 1102 (2002), which, although involving an effort to revoke the granting of a motion to terminate guardianship and decided under Vermont case law in respect to such revocations, contains language that may be consistent with the minority category. The court said: Moreover, the parental preference doctrine is only that  a preference  an advantage given to parents over other persons. It does not answer the question of what is in the child's best interests. `The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the right of a parent to the custody of his or her child, where the extraordinary circumstances are present, would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the theory solely of an absolute legal right. Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when there is a conflict, the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the right of parental custody. Indeed, analysis of the cases reveals a shifting of emphasis rather than a remaking of substance. This shifting reflects more the modern principle that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom the parent has an absolute possessory interest.' Boisvert, 173 Vt. at 291, 796 A.2d at 1107-08 (emphasis added). To the extent Vermont requires extraordinary circumstances before best interests are considered it belongs to the majority category; to the extent it does not, it is consistent with the minority view. We place it in the middlethe hybrid view. The natural mother in the case of In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous) v. Commissioner of Children and Youth Services, 177 Conn. 648, 420 A.2d 875 (1979), [23] was to an extent suffering physical and emotional (depression) problems evolving from attempting to parent the child while at the same time earning a living for her family. Her husband was paralyzed from an accident and could not work and the mother was trying to avoid going on welfare. While receiving treatment she was involuntarily committed to a state hospital and later she was committed to another treatment center. She spent approximately four months in the two institutions. While she was committed, her child was cared for first by a baby-sitter, and ultimately was adjudicated an uncared for child and placed with the Commissioner of Children and Youth Services, which in turn, placed the child with the same baby sitter for care. Later, after sufficient recovery, the mother began efforts to regain custody of her child by filing suit against the Commissioner. Thereafter, the appropriate authorities determined that she was then fit to be a parent. Nonetheless, after further skirmishes, the Commissioner filed a separate petition to terminate her parental rights. Accordingly, this opinion is not a pure third-party case in that the state was the petitioning party. In spite of the Maine (she had undergone recovery at her parent's house in Maine) authorities confirming that she was fit, the trial court ultimately denied the natural mother's petition for revocation, terminated her parental rights and designated the Commissioner as a statutory parent for the purpose of placing the child for adoption with the babysitter and her husband. In its opinion the Supreme Court of Connecticut stated that it was the position of the Commissioner that the department disputed and still disputes, however, that return of the child to her mother was or is in the child's best interests because of the intervening attachment that formed between the child and her foster family during her mother's illness. Id. at 657, 420 A.2d at 880. The trial court had found for the Commissioner on that basis. In respect to the revocation of the child's commitment to the Commissioner, the court noted the statutory requirements and stated: While it is certainly true ... that parents have no natural right to the custody of their children that can prevail over a disposition effecting the child's best interests, parents are entitled to the presumption, absent a continuing cause for commitment, that revocation will be in the child's best interest unless the state can prove otherwise. ... We must reject the claim of so-called `parental rights' theory under which `the parent has rights superior to all others except when he is proved unfit.' Id. at 659-61, 420 A.2d at 881-82. The Connecticut Supreme Court then cited to several United States Supreme Court cases, including Stanley, supra, and in language that appears to contradict the earlier language noted: The termination of parental rights is defined as `the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent.' It is `a most serious and sensitive judicial action. Although that ultimate interference by the state in the parent-child relationship may be required under certain circumstances, the natural rights of parents in their children undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection. ' In contrast to custody proceedings [presumably between natural parents], in which the best interests of the child are always the paramount consideration and in fact usually dictate the outcome, in termination proceedings the statutory criteria must be met before termination can be accomplished and adoption proceedings begun. Juvenile Appeal, 177 Conn. at 671-72, 420 A.2d at 886 (alteration added) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Nebraska has propounded a series of cases in which the standard approved is sometimes unclear. [24] Gomez v. Savage, 254 Neb. 836, 580 N.W.2d 523 (1998), was a case in which third parties were attempting to adopt two children over the natural father's objection and over the objection of the natural mother who was attempting to revoke her consent to the adoption. When she had consented to the adoption she lied when she stated that she did not know who the father was and thus the natural father, Gomez, neither received notice nor consented to the adoption. The natural parents, although not married, had sporadically lived together and during those periods the natural father had partly supported the child. The natural father had married another woman by the time of the proceeding. Id. at 848, 580 N.W.2d at 533. The children were subsequently placed with the Savages. Gomez contested the adoption by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the return of his children. In the action Gomez conceded that if he were found to be unfit [to have custody] it was in the best interests of the children that they remain [ ] [in the custody of] the Savages. Id. at 852, 580 N.W.2d at 535 (alterations added). The trial court found him to be unfit. The appellate court opined, almost in conflicting terms: Where the custody of a minor child is involved in a habeas corpus action, the custody ... is to be determined by the best interests of the child, with due regard for the superior rights of a fit, proper, and suitable parent. A court may not properly deprive a parent of the custody of a minor child unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the relationship, or has forfeited that right. The right of a parent to the custody of a minor child is not lightly to be set aside in favor of more distant relatives or unrelated parties, and a court may not deprive a parent of such custody unless he or she is shown to be unfit or to have forfeited his or her superior right to such custody.