Opinion ID: 2363018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Third Party Letters

Text: The trial judge granted Grove's request to view some of the information in the personnel files of 341 individuals and determined that the remaining information in those files was irrelevant. Then, the trial judge caused a letter to be sent to the 341 individuals, whose information was in the files, asking them for permission to release the remaining information (the content of which the trial judge had already determined was irrelevant) to Grove's counsel. This was improper. The court below relied on the balancing test laid out by the Court of Special Appeals in Blades v. Woods, 107 Md.App. 178, 667 A.2d 917 (1995), to determine whether Grove's attorney should have access to information in the personnel files of 341 former State employees. The Blades balancing test was originally expressed in Zaal, supra, a criminal case, but since Zaal it has been applied in factually or procedurally unique civil cases by this Court. The relevant elements of the Zaal test have appeared in three civil appellate opinions of this State: Porter Hayden Co. v. Bullinger, 350 Md. 452, 713 A.2d 962 (1998), Baltimore City Dep't. of Social Services v. Stein, 328 Md. 1, 612 A.2d 880 (1992), and of course Blades which relied on Stein and Zaal in formulating its test. These cases are readily distinguishable from the present case because they do not directly involve the Governor of Maryland and his assertion of executive privilege, or the assertion by the Governor, or in fact an assertion by any party, of attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine. In Porter Hayden Co., we addressed the propriety of a trial court's decision to rely on confidential settlement agreements reached in a prior federal court litigation, in which not all of the Porter Hayden Co. parties were involved, without disclosing those agreements to such parties in a subsequent litigation before a court of this State. We held that the settlement agreements were to be disclosed, in a manner consistent with the procedures laid out in Zaal, because it was inappropriate for the trial court to rely on the agreements as evidence and then to deny a party affected by its decision access to that evidence. Porter Hayden Co., 350 Md. at 468-69, 713 A.2d at 970. At no point was any form of privilege, to include executive privilege, attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine, raised. Therefore, Porter Hayden Co. is not applicable in the present case. In Stein, the parents of Stephen Ray, in their own right and on his behalf, brought suit against James Stein for physical, mental, and emotional injury allegedly caused by lead paint poisoning suffered by Stephen while he was living in a home owned and managed by Stein. Stein, seeking information regarding Stephen's social environment that could offer alternative reasons for his alleged injuries, served the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (the BCDSS), a non-party, with a notice to take a deposition duces tecum requiring the BCDSS's director to produce the agency's entire file on Stephen's family. The BCDSS, relying in part on Maryland Code (1957, 1991 Repl.Vol.) Article 88A, § 6, resisted the subpoena on the grounds that the records were (1) confidential and could only be released pursuant to a court order, (2) that the records were protected by executive or governmental immunity, (3) that executive or governmental privilege exempts the records from disclosure, and (4) that the social worker, and/or psychologist/psychiatrist-patient, privilege potentially applied to the requested portions of the record. Stein, 328 Md. at 4-5, 612 A.2d at 881-82. Stein filed a motion to compel and the trial court granted Stein's motion giving him access to any of BCDSS's files on Stephen's family. The BCDSS noted an appeal based on the collateral order doctrine. We resolved the matter on the basis of the confidentiality provision found in Art. 88A § 6 and did not reach the other claims of privilege. The Stein Court found that the collateral order doctrine did not apply to the facts before it because the BCDSS was not a party to the suit, 328 Md. at 12, 612 A.2d at 885, but allowed an appeal anyway holding that: [A] discovery order directed to a governmental agency, a non-party to the underlying action, requiring the disclosure of files which contain information which, by statute, is confidential except when disclosed by the agency or by court order, is immediately appealable by the agency. The harm which will occur to the agency and the publicthe potential inability of the agency to acquire information essential to its missionwere we to hold otherwise is much greater than it would be for private individuals and entities. Id. at 20-21, 612 A.2d at 889. In so holding, the Stein Court found the circumstances presented to it were similar to the reasoning that the collateral order doctrine has permitted appeals in situations involving government official immunity. The Stein Court pointed out that if the BCDSS were forced to wait to appeal until after the records were disclosed the purpose of Art. 88A § 6's confidentiality protections would be frustrated just as the purpose of government official immunity would be frustrated if that official were not able to take an interlocutory appeal after a determination was made at the trial level regarding his or her immunity status. 328 Md. at 19, 612 A.2d at 889. In making this analogy, the Stein Court's purpose was to show the necessity of allowing the interlocutory appeal. Its purpose was not to imply that government official immunity applied to the facts before it. Turning to the merits of the case, the Court noted that because of the nature of Stephen's family's (the plaintiffs in the underlying case) claim, the complete environment in which Stephen was raised had been put at issue by them and, therefore, should be available to the opposing parties. 328 Md. at 30, 612 A.2d at 894. Thus, the Court, relying on Zaal, determined that Stein, based on the reasonable possibility that reviewing the records would lead to discoverable evidence, was entitled to examine the records without having disclosed to him more of the documents than necessary, consistent with the confidentiality protections in Art. 88A, § 6. Stein, 328 Md. at 30, 612 A.2d at 894. The Stein Court, however, did hold that the trial court erred in ordering BCDSS to release all of its records pertaining to Stephen's family and remanded the matter to the trial court to proceed consistent with the balancing test in Zaal. Stein, 328 Md. at 30, 612 A.2d at 895. The Stein case, albeit a civil case, was very similar to the Zaal case. It involved an underlying defendant attempting to counter the allegations proffered by a plaintiff. In the Stein case, although the BCDSS asserted immunity and certain privileges, including executive privilege, the Court decided the confidentiality issues presented to it solely on the basis of the statutory requirements of Art. 88A, § 6 and never reached the applicability of immunity or any type of privilege to include executive privilege, attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine. Thus, Stein is additionally distinguishable from the present case and does not apply here. The Blades case, supra, involved the termination of a police officer who alleged he was terminated for racial reasons. It was determined in Blades that the police officer there involved did not have absolute immunity. That court was also not dealing with any claims of executive privilege, attorney-client privilege, or the work product doctrine. The only issues discussed in that case concerned allegations that requests for interrogatories were over-broad in scope and whether confidential information was discoverable based on privacy concerns. Separation of powers issues and other privilege issues were not extant in that case. While we do not expressly adopt, or overrule, the application of the Zaal/Stein/Blades balancing test in the context of a case involving executive privilege, attorney-client privilege and/or the work product doctrine, even if it were to apply it was misapplied here. In its May 8, 2006, order, the Circuit Court determined that certain records and communications pertaining to the termination of the 341 former State employees were relevant to Grove's claim and should be subjected to expanded in camera review: Based on its in-camera inspection of the thirty (30) `sample' personnel files, this Court believes that because these files represent individuals who were terminated during the relevant time period, all documents representing notice of termination by certified and regular mail, and all communications generated by each employee pertaining to said termination, should be disclosed to Appellee's counsel of record, in their roles as officers of the Court. Then, in the same order, the trial court plainly stated that any additional information in those 341 individual's personnel files was irrelevant to Grove's claim: This Court further believes that all other documents contained within these thirty (30) individual personnel files, when considered in light of Md. Rule 2-402 and the `sparse' Maryland case law [] [ See Blades v. Woods, 107 Md.App. at 183, 667 A.2d at 919-20], should not be disclosed as they are not relevant or likely to lead to admissible evidence. This Court finds that disclosure of these documents would unnecessarily reveal confidential information of each individual.  . . . [T]his Court believes that the remainder of the three hundred forty one (341) individual files requested for production by Appellee Grove should be disclosed utilizing the same, precise methodology. . . . (Emphasis added.) Despite this determination, the trial court then exceeded even the bounds of the Court of Special Appeals's finding in Blades by improperly assisting Grove in contacting the 341 individuals so that Grove might discuss their individual situations or obtain the release of information, including information the trial court had already determined was irrelevant or would lead to inadmissable evidence. The May 8, 2006, order continued, in relevant part: The Court assumes that counsel for Appellee Grove may wish to contact all of these three hundred and forty one (341) individuals. Counsel for both parties shall meet on or before May 13, 2006 and draft a joint letter which will thereafter be submitted to the Court for approval. Counsel for Appellee Grove may then utilize the approved letter in initially contacting the identified, terminated individuals to determine whether those individuals would object to further discussion of their personal situations with counsel for Appellee Grove and/or whether they would be willing to waive any claims for confidentiality of their personnel file which would allow counsel further opportunity to review other aspects of the files not released herein. . . . (Footnote omitted.) Apparently, the parties advised the trial court that they were unable to agree on the language of the letter to the 341 individuals. Consequently, the court drafted a letter to the 341 individuals and in its May 24, 2006, order, directed the parties to send it to the individuals in question. The letter read, in relevant part: We are writing to you to make you aware of a Court Order in the above-captioned litigation which may have implications for you. Pursuant to an Order entered by the Court, which is enclosed, the State has been ordered to make available to Mr. Grove's counsel any notices of termination generated by the State of Maryland or one of its agencies, which were served by certified and regular mail and all communications generated by said employees (recipients of said notices) pertaining to said termination. As is clear from the Court Order, these documents will not be released to anyone other than counsel in this matter and will continue to be held confidential unless you consent otherwise. Counsel for Mr. Grove has requested the right to contact you and discuss further aspects of this matter with you. You have the right to agree to discuss these matters with the attorneys or object and refuse to do so. You also have the right to determine whether you would object to the release of any information to anyone. In the event you have questions regarding the contents of this letter, you may contact the undersigned at the telephone numbers listed below. Every effort has been made to protect all aspects of your confidentiality with regard to this matter. Additionally, it is hoped that this matter will be of no inconvenience to you. We request that you indicate below whether you consent or wish to withhold consent to being contacted by counsel. We respectfully request that you sign and return this letter in the enclosed self-addressed envelope which will go directly to the judge overseeing the litigation. A second copy of this letter is enclosed for your file. (Emphasis added.) In short, the trial court ordered the parties to send a letter it drafted to the 341 individuals in order to obtain information, including the type of information it had already determined, in its May 8, 2006, order, was not relevant to Grove's claim. Pursuant to the May 8, 2006, order, Grove's attorney already had access, and for the procedure to gain access, to the information potentially relevant to Grove's claimthe documents and communications pertaining to the termination of those 341 former employees. This further action by the trial court far exceeded the actions prescribed even in Blades. The trial court made itself an active participant in aiding Grove. We are troubled by the trial court's actions in two respects. First, the trial court's May 8, 2006, order is inconsistent. The trial court made a determination that only certain information in the personnel files of the 341 individuals was relevant to Grove's claim and subject to expanded in camera review. Then, in the same order the court determined that Grove should be allowed to contact the 341 former state employees in order to discuss their personal situations and their willingness to waive confidentiality with respect to their entire personnel files-including the very information that the trial court determined was not relevant to Grove's claim. The end result is that the trial court encouraged Grove to contact the former employees about information it had already determined was irrelevant to Grove's claim and the order enabled Grove's attorney to go on a fishing expedition for additional claims against the Governor. Second, and perhaps most troubling, the nature of the trial court's order and its authorship of the letter, put the trial court in a position where its orders pro-actively assisted Grove in building his case to the detriment of the opposing party, i.e. the Governor of Maryland. We can perceive no proper reason why the trial court exceeded even the bounds of Blades in this manner. [16] Doing so was clearly an abuse of discretion. We recognize, however, that the letters to the 341 individuals cannot be un-mailed and that the attorneys for Grove, to the extent that they have had contact with any of the 341 individuals, cannot un-contact them. Regardless, the information so gathered, consistent with the trial court's original determination that the information was irrelevant, is not to be put before the finder of fact in any case. Moreover, any information received by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City in response to the letters mailed to the 341 former employees, is to be placed under seal and is not to be shared with Grove, his counsel, or any other entities.