Opinion ID: 1860859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court erred in granting instruction s-1.

Text: ¶ 40. Stevens argues that instruction S 1 should not have been granted because it did not require the jury to find that Stevens acted wilfully, as charged in the indictment. In reviewing allegedly erroneous instructions, this Court reviews the instructions as a whole to determine whether the jury was properly instructed. Morgan v. State, 741 So.2d 246 (Miss.1999) (citing Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 680 (Miss.1991)). This Court does not review jury instructions in isolation. Nicholson v. State, 672 So.2d 744, 752 (Miss.1996) (citing Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 360, 365 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 41. Again, the indictment stated: Glynn Stevens, acting in conjunction with others ... did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kill and slay Jason Brown, a human being, without malice, but not in necessary self-defense, while he, the said Glynn Stevens and others were and there engaged in the perpetration of the felony crime of aggravated assault of Patrick Holiday, a human being.... S-1 provided: The Court instructs the Jury that the killing of a human being without malice or deliberate design, while such other is engaged in the commission of aggravated assault, as defined elsewhere in these instructions, shall be manslaughter. The Court instructs the jury that if two or more persons are engaged in the commission of a felony, then the acts of each in the commission of such felony are binding upon all, and all are equally responsible for the acts of each in the commission of such felony. Therefore, if each of you believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant, Glynn Stevens, on or about April 28, 1995, in the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, either alone or with another or others, was engaged in the commission of an aggravated assault as defined in other instructions of the Court, and each of you further believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that while the defendant, Glynn Stevens, was so engaged, he and another or he and others also so engaged killed Jason Brown, a human being, without authority of law, without malice or deliberate design, then in that event, the defendant, Glynn Stevens, is guilty of manslaughter and it is your sworn duty to so find. ¶ 42. Reviewing as a whole the instructions given to the jury, it is clear that the jury was not improperly instructed. Instruction D-6 instructed the jury that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crime with which [Stevens] is charged, including that he wilfully killed and slayed Jason Brown. Additionally, instruction S-4 stated that any person wilfully aiding, assisting, encouraging, or doing any material act in furtherance of, or directly contributing to, the commission of a felony is an accessory or accomplice, and every person who is an accessory or accomplice to any felony, before or during the fact, is deemed and considered a principal, as if he had with his own hand committed the entire offense. In this assignment of error and the next, Stevens argues that because he was indicted as the principal, the jury could convict him only if it found that the bullet which killed Brown was actually fired by Stevens. This Court has stated that an aider and abettor may be properly indicted and tried as a principal. Crossley v. State, 420 So.2d 1376, 1381 (Miss.1982) (citing Scales v. State, 289 So.2d 905 (Miss. 1974)). This argument is without merit. ¶ 43. Stevens also complains that S-1 required a finding that Stevens was engaged in the commission of an aggravated assault rather than an aggravated assault on Patrick Holiday. Stevens fails to recognize that, in defining aggravated assault, instruction S-3 requires that the jury find that the aggravated assault was committed upon Patrick Holiday. ¶ 44. Finally, Stevens asserts that the language of the indictment suggests that Stevens shot Brown, whereas S-1 required a finding by the jury that [Stevens] and another or [Stevens] and others killed Brown. This argument is without merit. The indictment states that Stevens, acting in conjunction with others, killed Brown. ¶ 45. Considering the instructions as a whole, this Court finds that the jury was properly instructed.