Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Specification of Defendants' Acts and Conspiracy Allegations

Text: The majority affirms the dismissal of the Fourth Claim for Relief on the ground that Arar's complaint does not specify any culpable action taken by any single defendant and fails to allege a conspiracy. Supra at 569. We disagree with each of these rationales. Arar should not have been required to name those defendants [who] were personally involved in the alleged unconstitutional treatment. Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 287. In actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which are analog[s] of the less-common Bivens action, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1948, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citation omitted), we allow plaintiffs to maintain[] supervisory personnel as defendants ... until [they have] been afforded an opportunity through at least brief discovery to identify the subordinate officials who have personal liability. Davis v. Kelly, 160 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Second Circuit authority). Similarly, courts have rejected the dismissal of suits against unnamed defendants described by roles ... until the plaintiff has had some opportunity for discovery to learn the identities of responsible officials. Once the supervisory officer has inquired within the institution and identified the actual decision-makers of the challenged action, those officials may then submit affidavits based on their personal knowledge of the circumstances. Id. (citations omitted). It should not be forgotten that the full name of the Bivens case itself is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971) (emphasis added). [14] To be sure, the Supreme Court has recently set a strict pleading standard for supervisory liability claims under Bivens against a former Attorney General of the United States and the Director of the FBI. See Iqbal, supra . We do not think, however, that the Court has thereby permitted governmental actors who are unnamed in a complaint automatically to escape personal civil rights liability. A plaintiff must, after all, have some way to identify a defendant who anonymously violates his civil rights. We doubt that Iqbal requires a plaintiff to obtain his abusers' business cards in order to state a civil rights claim. Put conversely, we do not think that Iqbal implies that federal government miscreants may avoid Bivens liability altogether through the simple expedient of wearing hoods while inflicting injury. Some manner of proceeding must be made available for the reasons we recognized in Davis. Whether or not there is a mechanism available to identify the Doe defendants, moreover, Arar's complaint does sufficiently name some individual defendants who personally took part in the alleged violation of his civil rights. The role of defendant J. Scott Blackman, formerly Director of the Regional Office of INS, for example, is, as reflected in the district court's explication of the facts, see Arar, 414 F.Supp.2d at 252-54, set forth in reasonable detail in the complaint. [15] So are at least some of the acts of the defendant Edward J. McElroy, District Director of the INS. [16] The majority also asserts that Arar does no more than allege[] (in passive voice) that his requests to make phone calls `were ignored,' and that `he was told' that he was not entitled to a lawyer. Supra at 569. But as indicated above, such an identification of the unnamed defendants by their roles should be sufficient to enable a plaintiff to survive a motion to dismiss, and subsequently to use discovery to identify them. And while the majority is correct that the complaint does not utter the talismanic words meeting of the minds to invoke an agreement among the defendants, see supra at 569, it is plain that the logistically complex concerted action allegedly taken to detain Arar and then transport him abroad implies an alleged agreement by government actors within the United States to act in concert.