Opinion ID: 1154947
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: vagueness and equal protection

Text: In addition to his other arguments, Stevens asserts that RCW 9A.36.080(1) is impermissibly vague. He argues that the meaning of the phrase in a way that is reasonably related to, associated with, or directed toward is unclear. He also questions whether the phrase reasonable fear is measured by a subjective or objective standard. [12, 13] This court applies the federal due process test for vagueness; a statute must provide both adequate notice and standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Huff, 111 Wn.2d at 929 (upholding state telephone harassment statute); accord, Plowman, 314 Or. at 162. Further, the challenging party must prove unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. Smith, 111 Wn.2d at 17. [14] Turning to the terms under challenge we note they are not defined in the statute. Where terms are not defined, the court will look to the plain, ordinary meaning of the words. American Legion Post 32 v. Walla Walla, 116 Wn.2d 1, 802 P.2d 784 (1991). In ordinary usage, the terms related and associated are synonymous and mean connected or united in purpose and interest. Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language 89, 1227 (1968). Directed toward means aimed at achieving an objective. Webster's, at 414; see also State v. Hansen, 67 Wn. App. 511, 837 P.2d 651 (1992) (defining the verb direct). [15, 16] Additionally, when analyzing the wording of a statute, the court will read the statute as a whole. Service Employees Int'l Union, Local 6 v. Superintendent of Pub. Instruction, 104 Wn.2d 344, 348-49, 705 P.2d 776 (1985). Applying the doctrine of ejusdem generis to the terms in the paragraph at issue, RCW 9A.36.080(1), we interpret the allegedly vague terms in a manner consistent with the other words in the sequence, in this case, consistent with the words because of. State v. Hutsell, 120 Wn.2d 913, 918, 845 P.2d 1325 (1993) (citing Dean v. McFarland, 81 Wn.2d 215, 221, 500 P.2d 1244, 74 A.L.R.3d 378 (1972)). In ordinary usage because of means by reason of or on account of. Webster's, at 131; see Plowman, at 161-62. When read as a whole, this language is clear and provides adequate notice that the prohibited conduct is the selection of crime victims from certain specified categories. We also find that the statute gives adequate standards to ensure proper enforcement. Requiring the State to prove that the threats placed the victim in reasonable fear provides an objective standard by which to evaluate the harm to the victim. While Judge Pechman expressed concern about the term reasonable fear, we note that the term reasonable is used commonly in criminal law. In the defenses chapter of the Washington Criminal Code, RCW 9A.16.010, necessary is defined as meaning no reasonably effective alternative to force exists and the force used is reasonable. Reasonable fear is an element of harassment under RCW 9A.46.020. In Smith, this court rejected a challenge to that statute noting that because the victim must reasonably fear that the threats will be carried out, the statute is not unconstitutional. Smith, 111 Wn.2d at 15-16. Reasonable fear by a victim that a threat will be carried out has been held to limit application of an overly broad intimidation statute. See Smith, 111 Wn.2d at 15 n. 5 (citing Wurtz v. Risley, 719 F.2d 1438, 1441 (9th Cir.1983)). We have likewise held that the term  un reasonable increases objectivity, thus reducing vagueness. Eze, 111 Wn.2d at 29. [17] We find the statute provides adequate notice and sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement because the average citizen can understand the proscription at hand. Huff, at 929.