Opinion ID: 2745428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdictional Separation of Church and State

Text: Before considering the merits of this appeal, this Court should have determined whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over this ecclesiastical dispute. This Court has recognized that it is our judicial duty to consider lack of subject matter jurisdiction ex mero motu. Ex parte Smith, 438 So. 2d 766, 768 (Ala. 1983). As is the case with all churches, the courts will not assume jurisdiction, in fact [have] none, to resolve disputes regarding their spiritual or ecclesiastical affairs. Abyssinia Missionary Baptist Church v. Nixon, 340 So. 2d 746, 748 (Ala. 1976). The courts lack 12 1130539 jurisdiction over ecclesiastical disputes because of the jurisdictional separation of church and state. In accordance with the principles of our institutions and the organic law [Art. I, § 3, Ala. Const. 1901 (religious freedom)], the courts refrain from interfering when the office or functions are purely ecclesiastical or spiritual, disconnected from any fixed emoluments, salary, or other temporalities. State ex rel. McNeill v. Bibb St. Church, 84 Ala. 23, 33, 4 So. 40, 40 (1888). The jurisdictional separation of the institution of the church from the institution of the state is a fundamental part of the English common law; it predates Magna Carta and remains in force in Alabama.6 See § 1-3-1, Ala. Code 1975 (The common law of England, so far as it is not inconsistent with the Constitution, laws and institutions of this state, shall, together with such institutions and laws, be the rule of decisions, and shall continue in force, except as from time to time it may be altered or repealed by the Legislature.). 6 See Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So. 2d 331, 352 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., dissenting) ([T]he principle of the institutional separation of church and state became firmly established in the common-law jurisprudence of England and thereafter, as a result, in the jurisprudence of America.(surveying history of Magna Carta)). 13 1130539 Under § 1-3-1, the jurisdictional separation of church and state is also an institution of Alabama law. The word institution, as used in § 1-3-1, means [a]n elementary rule, principle, or practice. Black's Law Dictionary 918 (10th ed. 2014). Noah Webster defined institution as an [e]stablishment; that which is appointed, prescribed, or founded by authority and intended to be permanent.... We apply the word institution to laws, rites, and ceremonies, which are enjoined by authority as permanent rules of conduct or of government. Noah Webster, American Dictionary of the English Language Institution (1828). Thus, while the jurisdictional separation of church and state is part of our common law, it is also an institution, i.e., an established, elementary, and permanent rule of law. The Court should apply this rule of law in this and all ecclesiastical disputes, with the understanding that the jurisdictional separation of church and state binds both church and state to their respective jurisdictions and spheres of authority. B. Courts Have No Jurisdiction Over This Ecclesiastical Dispute 14 1130539 The question presented is which faction of members of the original Burns Assembly of God Church has the right to control the use and disposition of the property -- the Etheridge faction or the excommunicated faction. In this intra-church ecclesiastical dispute, the Court must look to the decisions made within the structure of church government. Where factional divisions occur in an ecclesiastical body, the rule of the civil courts is that 'the title to church property ... is in that part of [the ecclesiastical body] which is acting in harmony with its own law, and the ecclesiastical laws, and usages, customs, and principles which are accepted among them before the dispute began, are the standards for determining which party is right.'• Gewin v. Mount Pilgrim Baptist Church, 166 Ala. 345, 349, 51 So. 947, 948 (1909) (quoting Reorganized Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Church of Christ, 60 F. 937, 953 (1894)) (emphasis added). The Assemblies of God is a hierarchical church with a presbyterian form of government, with authority in an ascending order of bodies, each of which is composed by representatives of the laity and the clergy. Calvin Massey, Church Schisms, Church Property, and Civil Authority, 84 St. John's L. Rev. 23, 26 n.5 (2010). The Assemblies of God's form 15 1130539 of church government blends elements of congregational autonomy with a cooperative system of oversight and accountability provided by ascending levels of church councils. See Atkins v. Walker, 284 N.C. 306, 314, 200 S.E.2d 641, 646 (1973) (A denomination may be, in its government, congregational in part and connectional in part.); Western Conference of Original Free Will Baptists of N.C. v. Creech, 256 N.C. 128, 140, 123 S.E.2d 619, 627 (1962) (A church may be congregational in some respects and connectional in others.); 66 Am. Jur. 2d Religious Societies § 2 (2014) (same). The Assemblies of God has the unquestioned right of ecclesiastical government of all the members, local assemblies, and officers within its fellowship. 'The right to organize voluntary associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. ... It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decisions of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeal as the organism itself provides for.' 16 1130539 Hundley v. Collins, 131 Ala. 234, 245, 32 So. 575, 579 (1902) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 729 (1871)). The Court has stated that [t]he courts will not interfere with mere factional differences arising in ecclesiastical bodies, or in disparate interpretations of doctrine. Such matters are left for settlement to the societies. Davis v. Ross, 255 Ala. 668, 671, 53 So. 2d 544, 546 (1951). [T]he civil courts will not interfere in case of a division in a religious society unless property rights are affected, nor even then if the basis of the schism is due merely to a disparate interpretation of doctrine. Such matters must be settled by the society itself. Mount Olive Primitive Baptist Church v. Patrick, 252 Ala. 672, 674, 42 So. 2d 617, 618 (1949) (emphasis added). The basis of the present dispute is a disparate interpretation of church doctrine, constitutions, and bylaws. In such cases, the United States Supreme Court has explained: There are occasions when civil courts must draw lines between the responsibilities of church and state for the disposition or use of property. Even in those cases when the property right follows as an incident from decisions of the church custom or law on ecclesiastical issues, the church rule controls. 17 1130539 Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. America, 344 U.S. 94, 120-21 (1952) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). The District Council classifies mature local churches within the Assemblies of God as [s]overeign [a]ssemblies with their full share of responsibility for the maintenance of Scriptural order. Art. XI, § 2(b), District Council Const. The District Council also recommends that local church boards be authorized ... to remove from the list of active [church] members all names of those ... who may have fallen into sin and whose lives may have become inconsistent with the standards and teachings of the assembly. Art. I, § 6, Suggested Constitution and By-Laws for Local Assemblies. At the same time, such assemblies are organized under the supervision of the district officiary and shall be amenable to the district in all matters which affect the peace and harmony of the fellowship. Id. (emphasis added). Burns Assembly of God Church was required to meet the standards approved by the General Council and the District Council in regard to membership, doctrine, order, methods, conduct, and all other 18 1130539 matters affecting the harmony of the fellowship as a whole. Art XI, § 1, District Council Const. (emphasis added). Accordingly, a ruling by this Court or the trial court for either the Etheridge faction or the excommunicated faction constitutes a usurpation of the District Council's and the General Council's ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Burns Assembly of God Church. If, on the one hand, this Court affirms the judgment of the trial court and rules for the District Council and the excommunicated faction (as the Court has done), this Court must necessarily conclude that the District Council has the authority under its ecclesiastical constitution to intervene in the local church dispute on behalf of the excommunicated faction, thus effectively controlling the church property. The United States Supreme Court has explained: '[C]ivil courts do not inquire whether the relevant (hierarchical) church governing body has power under religious law (to decide such disputes).... Such a determination ... frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage. To permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a hierarchical church so as to decide ... religious law (governing church polity) ... would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.' 19 1130539 Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for United States of America & Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1976) (quoting Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 369 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)). Likewise, this Court should have declined in this case to explore the allocation of ecclesiastical authority between local Assemblies of God churches and the District Council, as doing so violates the jurisdictional separation of church and state. If, on the other hand, the Court were to reverse the trial court's judgment, the Court would essentially declare that the members of the Etheridge faction are true church members and that the members of the excommunicated faction are not, even though the District Council recognizes them as such. This would constitute a rejection of the ecclesiastical decision of the District Council, contrary to the jurisdictional separation of church and state. Because Alabama's courts have no jurisdiction to revise ordinary acts of church discipline or pass upon controverted rights of membership, Gewin, 166 Ala. at 349, 51 So. at 948, this Court 20 1130539 cannot question the District Council's decision to intervene in the dispute on behalf of the excommunicated faction. In addition, Etheridge is both chairman of the board of directors and corporate president of Burns Church, Inc., and thus the principal officer of the alleged property-holding corporation. In early June 2008, the General Council revoked Etheridge's ministerial license with the Assemblies of God. However, Etheridge continued to pastor Burns Assembly of God, Inc., after he had been dismissed from the Assemblies of God. Etheridge presided over the business meeting in which the members of Burns Assembly of God, Inc., voted to sever affiliation with the Assemblies of God. If the Court should conclude that Burns Church, Inc., owns the church property, the Court would thereby countenance the proceedings Etheridge led at Burns Assembly of God, Inc., after he had been dismissed from the Assemblies of God. In effect, the Court would be overruling Etheridge's dismissal from the Assemblies of God, which was affirmed by the General Council, the highest ecclesiastical body in the Assemblies of God. Similar to Milivojevich, supra, the resolution of the dispute between the Etheridge faction and the excommunicated faction affects not 21 1130539 only church property, but also the structure and administration of the Assemblies of God. Resolution of the religious disputes at issue here affects the control of church property in addition to the structure and administration of the American-Canadian Diocese. This is because the Diocesan Bishop controls respondent Monastery of St. Sava and is the principal officer of respondent property-holding corporations. Resolution of the religious dispute over Dionisije's defrockment therefore determines control of the property. Thus, this case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution of which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals. Even when rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 709 (emphasis added); see also Ex parte Central Alabama Conference, 860 So. 2d 865, 867 (Ala. 2003) ([T]he First Amendment prohibits a court's resolving property disputes on the basis of religious practice or doctrine.).