Opinion ID: 1148850
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the prosecution's strikes for cause of jurors based solely upon their views on capital punishment systematically excluded blacks from the jury and violated justin underwood's right to a fair trial.

Text: ¶ 26. Underwood next argues that the State's systematic exclusion of blacks due to their opposition to capital punishment denied him of his rights to due process and equal protection. He claims that the challenges for cause on the basis of anti-death penalty views resulted in exclusion of blacks from the jury. He does not complain about the exclusion of any particular juror, only making a general objection to all of the jurors excused for cause on this basis. Underwood also asserts that a death qualified jury is incapable of rendering an impartial verdict. ¶ 27. On April 5, 1995, Underwood filed his Motion to Strike the Death Qualification Voir Dire Question and to Limit Disqualification for Particular Views on Punishment. Judge Toney ruled that pursuant to Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), the State would be allowed to ask potential jurors if they had any conscientious scruples against the death penalty, but decided that those jurors would also be asked if they could set aside their views and follow the law. Jurors who stated that they would be able to set aside their personal opinions and follow the judge's instructions would be allowed to remain. ¶ 28. At the close of voir dire, on the State's motion and over Underwood's continuing objection, the trial court excused ten jurors for cause based upon their views opposing the death penalty. All ten of those jurors stated during individual voir dire that they would not be able to follow the law if that meant considering the death penalty during sentencing. Their stance did not stop at the level of a mere general objection to the death penalty. Underwood does not argue that these jurors would have been fair and impartial, but that their removal resulted in diminishing the number of black jurors left on the venire. The record reflects that two of these ten jurors were white; the race of the other eight is not identified. This may imply that all of the other eights jurors excused were black, but Underwood again fails to ensure that the record contains sufficient evidence to support his assignment of error. Hansen, 592 So.2d at 127. However, the race of the excused jurors is immaterial in light of the law governing this issue. ¶ 29. In Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522, 88 S.Ct. at 1777, the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of death cannot be carried out if the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction. Characterizing Illinois's sentencing scheme, the Court stated, In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the State produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die. Id. at 520-21, 88 S.Ct. at 1776. The Supreme Court clarified its Witherspoon decision in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), adopted by this Court in Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 53-55 (Miss. 1985). Reaffirming its decision in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980), the Court set out the standard for determining when it is proper to exclude a juror for cause based upon his views on the death penalty. That standard is whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424, 105 S.Ct. at 852 ( quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526). The state of this case law leaves trial courts with the difficult task of distinguishing between prospective jurors whose opposition to capital punishment will not allow them to apply the law or view the facts impartially and jurors who, though opposed to capital punishment, will nevertheless conscientiously apply the law to the facts adduced at trial. Id. at 421, 105 S.Ct. at 850-51. [D]eference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id. at 426, 105 S.Ct. at 853. ¶ 30. At first glance this issue may appear to be controlled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that peremptory challenges could not be used to purposefully exclude members of the jury based solely upon their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 106 S.Ct. at 1719. However, Batson only applies to peremptory challenges, not challenges for cause. Because challenges for cause by nature must be made based upon a race-neutral reason, they are not subject to the Batson inquiry. Furthermore, we have previously held that opposition to the death penalty is a race-neutral reason for purposes of Batson. Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1300 (Miss. 1994). ¶ 31. Although he does not cite Batson directly, Underwood's argument combines the reasoning in Batson, Witherspoon, and Wainwright. We have previously addressed a very similar issue in Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d 329, 346-47 (Miss. 1988), vacated on other grounds by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S.Ct. 1800, 108 L.Ed.2d 931 (1990). Pinkney argued that the prosecution used Witherspoon challenges for cause in violation of Batson to further the elimination of blacks from the jury. Pinkney, 538 So.2d at 346. This Court held: The challenges for cause are to be examined under the Witherspoon cases and peremptory challenges are to be examined under Batson. If each of the challenges are found to be constitutionally sound, then the combination is also sound. A successful Witherspoon challenge against a black juror is not relevant, because ... a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race. Id. at 346-47 ( quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 85, 106 S.Ct. at 1716-17 ( quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879))). ¶ 32. Applying this reasoning to the current case, Underwood's argument fails. The State's challenges for cause were all proper under the standard set out in Wainwright. The race of those jurors, therefore, is not relevant. We give deference to the trial judge's decision to excuse the ten jurors for cause, and do not find merit in this assignment of error.