Opinion ID: 76994
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prima facie case under Section 4311

Text: 47 Section 4311 clearly mandates proof of discriminatory motive. See Sheehan v. Dep't of the Navy, 240 F.3d 1009, 1013 (Fed.Cir.2001); Brandsasse v. City of Suffolk, Va., 72 F.Supp.2d 608, 616-17 (E.D.Va.1999). The standard of proof is the so-called but for test. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1013. 48 In order to establish his prima facie case, Coffman must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his protected status was a motivating factor in Chugach's decision not to hire him. Brandsasse, 72 F.Supp.2d at 617. A motivating factor does not mean that it had to be the sole cause of the employment action. Instead, it is one of the factors that `a truthful employer would list if asked for the reasons for its decision.' Id. (citation omitted); see also Smith v. School Bd. of Polk County, Fla., 205 F.Supp.2d 1308, 1314 (M.D.Fla.2002). Indeed, [m]ilitary status is a motivating factor if the defendant relied on, took into account, considered, or conditioned its decision on that consideration. Brandsasse, 72 F.Supp.2d at 617 (citation omitted); see also Smith, 205 F.Supp.2d at 1314-15. Circumstantial evidence plays a critical part in these cases, for discrimination is seldom open or notorious. Sheehan, 240 F.3d at 1014. The court can infer discriminatory motivation under the USERRA from a variety of considerations, such as: 49 proximity in time between the employee's military activity and the adverse employment action, inconsistencies between the proffered reason and other actions of the employer, an employer's expressed hostility towards members protected by the statute together with knowledge of the employee's military activity, and disparate treatment of certain employees compared to other employees with similar work records or offenses. 50 Id. When the employee has met this burden, the burden shifts to the employer to prove the affirmative defense that legitimate reasons, standing alone, would have induced the employer to take the same adverse action. Id. This burden-shifting framework applies to both so-called `dual motive' cases and so-called `pretext' cases. Id. Thus in USERRA actions there must be an initial showing by the employee that military status was at least a motivating or substantial factor in the agency action, upon which the agency must prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that the action would have been taken despite the protected status. Id. 51 The district court correctly found that Coffman failed to present either direct or circumstantial evidence to demonstrate that Chugach relied on, took into account, considered, or conditioned its decision not to hire Coffman on the basis of his active military service. See Brandsasse, 72 F.Supp.2d at 617. Contrary to Coffman's contention, the district court utilized the proper analysis in making its determination. The court considered the factors enunciated in Sheehan and concluded that, although there was a close proximity in time between Coffman's military service and Chugach's decision not to hire him, Chugach had not expressed hostility towards service members. In fact, as the district court noted, Chugach hired both military and non-military personnel. Also, both Darkow and McCredie testified that Chugach did not consider Coffman's military status in its decision not to hire Coffman. Furthermore, the district court found that Coffman failed to demonstrate any disparate treatment of active military employees compared to other employees with similar work records. 52 In addition, there is no inconsistency between Chugach's proffered reason for not hiring Darkow and other actions taken by Chugach. Darkow testified that at the time of the interview with Coffman, Darkow was under the impression that Coffman held a managerial position with Del-Jen and was seeking similar employment with Chugach. As explained earlier, although Chugach had a similar position as the one Coffman had with Del-Jen, it was not a management position. 53 Darkow also testified that he was under the impression that Del-Jen was going to rehire Coffman and that he had spoken with Del-Jen officials about that. Although Coffman rightly contends that Kukak's testimony contradicts Darkow's claims about speaking with Del-Jen's officials on Coffman's pending status, this does not create a genuine issue of material fact as to Coffman's section 4311 claim of discrimination. As Chugach has sufficiently demonstrated, it would not have hired Coffman because he sought a management position that Chugach simply did not offer. In sum, based on the record evidence, and following the standard enunciated in Sheehan, we conclude that no reasonable jury could find that Coffman's military status was a motivating factor in Chugach's decision not to hire him. Even if Chugach had conditioned its decision in part on Coffman's military status, summary judgment was still proper because, as noted above, Chugach has shown it would have made the same decision absent Coffman's military status. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Chugach on Coffman's discrimination claim brought pursuant to section 4311 of USERRA.