Opinion ID: 2071605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: It is necessary, at the outset, to identify the basis for this court's exercise of jurisdiction over this appeal. The Board argues here, as it did before the appellate court, that a court of review has no jurisdiction over a trial court's order vacating a default judgment on grounds that service of process was defective. Such orders, the Board claims, are not final orders and, thus, not appealable under our supreme court rules. Although the Board acknowledges that there is a split of authority on this issue, the Board cites to cases which support its position. See Nelson v. United Airlines, Inc., 243 Ill.App.3d 795, 184 Ill. Dec. 104, 612 N.E.2d 980 (1993); Stankowicz v. Gonzalez, 103 Ill.App.3d 828, 59 Ill. Dec. 515, 431 N.E.2d 1272 (1981); Alexander v. Burke, 6 Ill.App.3d 919, 287 N.E.2d 53 (1972); Mabion v. Olds, 84 Ill.App.2d 291, 228 N.E.2d 188 (1967). Plaintiff disputes the Board's claim that the order here is not final. Citing Cavanaugh v. Lansing Municipal Airport, 288 Ill.App.3d 239, 224 Ill.Dec. 57, 681 N.E.2d 39 (1997), and DiNardo v. Lamela, 183 Ill.App.3d 1098, 132 Ill.Dec. 500, 539 N.E.2d 1306 (1989), plaintiff argues, and the appellate court below held, that an order vacating a default judgment for lack of proper service is, in essence, an order quashing service of process. Relying on this court's opinion in Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943), for the proposition that orders quashing service of process are final orders, plaintiff contends, where the judgment is vacated due to improper service    an appeal may be had from this order. DiNardo, 183 Ill. App.3d at 1103, 132 Ill.Dec. 500, 539 N.E.2d 1306. While we agree with the appellate court that appellate jurisdiction exists in this case, we do so for different reasons. Section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)) authorizes a party to seek relief from a final judgment, such as a default judgment, when brought more than 30 days after judgment has been entered. See Smith v. Airoom, Inc., 114 Ill.2d 209, 102 Ill.Dec. 368, 499 N.E.2d 1381 (1986); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2000). The filing of a section 2-1401 petition is considered a new proceeding, not a continuation of the old one. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b) (West 2000); Mitchell v. Fiat-Allis, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 143, 149, 198 Ill.Dec. 399, 632 N.E.2d 1010 (1994). Thus, a circuit court's ruling on such a petition is deemed a final order and provision has been made for immediate review of these orders in Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3), which states that appeal may be taken from a judgment or order granting or denying any of the relief prayed in a petition under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (155 Ill.2d R. 304(b)(3)). There are sound policy reasons for allowing review of orders granting relief from final judgments. Once a final judgment has been rendered, setting it aside is a matter of considerable significance. Moreover, it is impractical to subject parties to the time and expense of trial before it is known whether the circuit court's decision to set aside an existing final judgment is proper. In the present case, the Board filed a motion seeking relief from a final judgment, brought more than 30 days from the judgment's entry. Regardless of the label which the Board gave to its motion, the motion was, in substance, a section 2-1401 motion. See Barnes v. Southern Ry. Co., 116 Ill.2d 236, 107 Ill.Dec. 581, 507 N.E.2d 494 (1987) (the caption of a motion is not controlling; the character of the pleading is determined from its content, not its label); Padilla v. Vazquez, 223 Ill.App.3d 1018, 166 Ill.Dec. 351, 586 N.E.2d 309, (1991) (when analyzing a pleading, a court will look to the content of the pleading rather than its label). The order which plaintiff now seeks to have reviewed is the circuit court's order granting the Board's motion to vacate the final default judgment. In light of the foregoing, one might expect that, in the case at bar, there would be no question regarding appellate jurisdiction. However, the problem here stems from the fact that the Board's motion was brought more than seven years after the default judgment was entered, on grounds that the judgment was void for lack of proper service. As a general rule, petitions brought pursuant to section 2-1401, to be legally sufficient, must be filed within two years of the order or judgment, the petitioner must allege a meritorious defense to the original action, and the petitioner must show that the petition was brought with due diligence. 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(b), (c) (West 2000); Airoom, 114 Ill.2d at 221-22, 102 Ill.Dec. 368, 499 N.E.2d 1381. It is undisputed that, as a general matter, the Board had the right to challenge the default judgment on voidness grounds in the circuit court, for it is well settled that [a] judgment, order or decree entered by a court which lacks jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter, or which lacks the inherent power to make or enter the particular order involved, is void, and may be attacked at any time or in any court, either directly or collaterally. Barnard v. Michael, 392 Ill. 130, 135, 63 N.E.2d 858 (1945). The controversy, however, is over the proper labeling of the motion. The appellate court in Mabion, Alexander, Stankowicz and Nelson did not recognize petitions seeking to vacate void judgments as petitions for relief from judgment brought pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (formerly section 72 of the Civil Practice Act). These courts interpreted the language contained in paragraph (f) of section 2-1401 (formerly section 72(6) of the Civil Practice Act) as excluding motions brought on voidness grounds from the purview of section 2-1401. Not all appellate court panels have reached the same conclusion. In Slates v. International House of Pancakes, Inc., 90 Ill.App.3d 716, 723, 46 Ill.Dec. 17, 413 N.E.2d 457 (1980), the court said: We do not read this section, as some courts have, as removing motions attacking a void judgment from the ambit of section 72. [Citation.] Rather, we read section 72(6) as a clarification that section 72 provides a parallel mode for contesting void judgments. Until recently, this court had not spoken on the issue of whether motions attacking void judgments could be recognized as section 2-1401 petitions. However, in People v. Harvey, 196 Ill.2d 444, 454, 257 Ill.Dec. 98, 753 N.E.2d 293 (2001), four members of this court held that a motion to vacate a void judgment is properly designated a petition for relief from judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2000)). Pursuant to Harvey, paragraph (f) of section 2-1401, which provides, Nothing contained in this Section affects any existing right to relief from a void order or judgment, or to employ any existing method to procure that relief, does not exclude, but merely differentiates, post-judgment petitions brought on voidness grounds from general section 2-1401 petitions. See 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(f) (West 2000). Under paragraph (f), the general rules pertaining to section 2-1401 petitionsthat they must be filed within two years of the order or judgment, that the petitioner must allege a meritorious defense to the original action, and that the petitioner must show that the petition was brought with due diligencedo not apply. Petitions brought on voidness grounds need not be brought within the two-year time limitation. Further, the allegation that the judgment or order is void substitutes for and negates the need to allege a meritorious defense and due diligence. People v. Harvey, 196 Ill.2d 444, 452, 257 Ill.Dec. 98, 753 N.E.2d 293 (2001) (McMorrow, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.). We note, also, that paragraph (a) of section 2-1401 expressly abolishes all other common law means of attacking void judgments. It provides in pertinent part: Writs of error coram nobis and coram vobis, bills of review and bills in the nature of bills of review are abolished. All relief heretofore obtainable and the grounds for such relief heretofore available, whether by any of the foregoing remedies or otherwise, shall be available in every case, by proceedings hereunder, regardless of the nature of the order or judgment from which relief is sought or of the proceedings in which it was entered. (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2-1401(a) (West 2000). Moreover, nowhere else in the Code of Civil Procedure does the legislature make provision for the filing of a motion to challenge a judgment on voidness grounds. Harvey recognized that petitions seeking relief from void judgments are section 2-1401 petitions. That being the case, it follows that any order granting or denying such relief is a final ruling, appealable pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3) (155 Ill.2d R. 304(b)(3)). In the present case, the Board petitioned for relief from a default judgment which had been entered more than seven years earlier. The Board alleged that the default judgment was void because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction due to defective service of process. We conclude, pursuant to Harvey, that the Board's petition was one which sought post-judgment relief under section 2-1401 and could validly be brought outside the two-year limitations period. Also, there was no need for the Board to establish that it had acted with due diligence or to allege that a meritorious defense existed. Because the Board's motion was a valid section 2-1401 motion, the trial court's order granting the Board's motion to vacate is, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(3), a final, appealable order. Justice Thomas maintains in his dissent that a motion to vacate a judgment as void is not the same as a section 2-1401 petition. 201 Ill.2d at 133, 267 Ill.Dec. at 80-81, 776 N.E.2d at 217-18 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald, J.). Accordingly, in the present case, Justice Thomas does not recognize the Board's motion to vacate as a petition brought under section 2-1401. Instead, he distills the Board's motion into a motion to quash service of process. Justice Thomas then reads Brauer Machine & Supply Co. v. Parkhill Truck Co., 383 Ill. 569, 50 N.E.2d 836 (1943), as standing for the proposition that the finality of an order quashing service of process turns on whether, under the facts of the particular case, the matter can move forward. He further concludes in his dissent that, in the present case, the matter is on file and pending before the trial court and that we know with certainty that plaintiff will be able to proceed to the merits of that complaint. 201 Ill.2d at 131, 267 Ill.Dec. at 80, 776 N.E.2d at 217 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Fitzgerald, J.). We observe that Justice Thomas' characterization of the Board's motion as one seeking to quash service of process ignores the fact that the circuit court's order does more than quash service, it sets aside a final judgment. In addition, it seems clear that the procedural posture of this case contradicts Justice Thomas' view that this case is capable of moving forward. In the present case, when the circuit court vacated the default judgment that had been entered, it did not do so merely to allow the Board to interpose a defense. The circuit court did not recognize the Board's appearance as a general appearance and require the Board to answer. Rather, the circuit court ordered plaintiff to serve an alias summons on the Board. We know from the record that an alias summons, addressed to the Board president, was delivered to the Board and, like the original summons, was accepted by a receptionist in the Board's law department. The Board has not filed an appearance in response to the alias summons. Moreover, appellate counsel conceded at oral argument that, should this court reverse the appellate court judgment and plaintiff attempt to proceed to trial on the underlying action, service of process on the alias summons would be contested as improper and a Rule 103(b) motion seeking dismissal with prejudice would be filed. This is the reason that the Board, though it continues to contest appellate jurisdiction over this matter, suggests in its brief that, to avoid undue delay, this court should exercise its supervisory authority to reach the merits of the appeal and determine whether service of process was proper. The general appearance filed by the Board on October 1, 1997, to which Justice Thomas' dissent makes reference, was filed in response to plaintiff's revival action, which the trial court dismissed when it vacated the default judgment as void. Thus, while, technically, the case may be pending in the circuit court, this court does not know with certainty that plaintiff will be able to proceed to the merits of the complaint. In fact, the opposite is true. Thus, even if Justice Thomas were correct in finding that Brauer did not intend to make all orders quashing service of process final and appealable orders, a matter on which we express no opinion, we observe that his rationale for finding the order here to be nonfinal is based on a misunderstanding of the posture of this case.