Opinion ID: 2216780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did trial court err in overruling defendant's motion to dismiss?

Text: After defendant's motion for a second supplemental bill of particulars was overruled, he filed a motion to dismiss the indictment pursuant to Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(6)(a), which was also overruled. That rule provides: If it appears from the bill of particulars furnished pursuant to this rule that the particulars stated do not constitute the offense charged in the indictment . . ., or that the defendant did not commit that offense . . ., the court may and on motion of defendant shall dismiss the indictment . . . unless the prosecuting attorney shall furnish another bill of particulars which so states the particulars as to cure the defect. Specifically, defendant urges that the indictment should have been dismissed because the State's bill of particulars and supplemental bill failed to state that defendant actually killed Gloria Hoover although a requisite element of murder is killing another person. § 707.1, Supplement to the Code 1977. The State's counter-argument eludes the issue. It contends that because the indictment itself is sufficient at law to withstand a motion to dismiss under State v. Beyer, 258 N.W.2d 353, 357 (Iowa 1977) (A sufficient indictment or information simply may allege `A. B. murdered C. D.'), any motion to dismiss the indictment was properly overruled. What the State ignores is that rule 10(6)(a) gives a defendant a second chance to set aside the indictment, by securing a bill of particulars. State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702, 710 (Iowa 1975). This follows from the fact that a necessary predicate of a bill of particulars is a sufficient indictment or information. See Iowa R.Crim.P. 10(5) (When an indictment or information charges an offense in accordance with this rule [1] but fails to specify the particulars of the offense sufficiently to fairly enable the defendant to prepare his or her defense, a bill of particulars may be required.) (Emphasis added.) Accord, 42 C.J.S. Indictments & Informations § 156(d), at 1102 (1944). It also follows from the fact that the question of whether the indictment itself is sufficient is not the same as the question of whether the particulars in the bill of particulars constitute the offense charged in the indictment. Although this court has not had occasion to extensively examine the effect of rule 10(6)(a) (formerly § 773.7, The Code 1977), the Louisiana Supreme Court has construed a similar statutory provision, La.Code Crim. Pro.Ann. art. 485 (West 1967). [2] According to State v. Gerstenberger, 260 La. 145, 150, 255 So.2d 720, 722 (1971), a court, in considering this motion, is to accept as true the facts set out in the bill of particulars and indictment and determine if they charge a crime as a matter of law. The rationale for this provision is explained in State v. Legendre, 362 So.2d 570, 571 (La.1978): It will not do to base an indictment for a serious offense . . . upon an allegation of fact which cannot conceivably satisfy an essential element of the crime, and compel the accused to withstand the rigors of a jury trial with no expectation that a conviction can be supported by such an allegation. In considering the bills of particulars in question on this appeal, we first note that they are no longer reviewable for their sufficiency to constitute second degree murder. Because defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense, involuntary manslaughter, any defect in the indictment related to its charging second degree murder is now immaterial. State v. Harness, 214 Iowa 160, 163, 241 N.W. 645, 646 (1932); 42 C.J.S. Indictments & Informations § 276 (1944). If the sufficiency of the indictment as to that charge is immaterial, so too is the sufficiency of the bills of particulars. Defendant has not explicitly challenged the sufficiency of the bills' description of defendant's acts which constituted involuntary manslaughter. Nonetheless, we will consider the issue because the killing required for murder is essentially equivalent to the causing death required for involuntary manslaughter. See §§ 707.1,.5. It is an element of causation in both crimes. It requires that the defendant did some act which resulted in the victim's death. See, e. g., State v. Shimon, 182 N.W.2d 113, 115-16 (Iowa 1970); State v. McClain, 256 Iowa 188-89, 125 N.W.2d 764, 771-72 (1964). See generally W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 35, at 247-48 (1972). It is not essential for conviction in all cases that the accused actively participated in the immediate physical impetus of death. See Shimon, 182 N.W.2d at 115-16 (driving in drag race considered proximate cause of death of passenger in other vehicle, which went out of control). See generally 40 Am.Jur.2d Homicide §§ 18-22 (1968). In this case, the bills of particulars stated that the defendant did certain acts which resulted in the death of Gloria Hoover. In so doing, they satisfied the causation element of the crime.