Opinion ID: 2631133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Juror T.'s conversation with a priest

Text: During penalty phase jury deliberations, the foreperson, Juror H., sent a note to the trial court that read: We have knowledge that one juror, after the guilt phase, spoke with a priest regarding the church's opinion about the death penalty. Upon questioning by the trial court outside the presence of the other jurors, Juror H. stated that Juror T. during penalty phase deliberations told another juror that he had briefly spoken with a priest about the death penalty. Thereafter, Juror T. described to all of the jurors the views of the priest and those of the Catholic Church regarding the death penalty. Juror H. could not recall either the priest's views or the Catholic Church's views on the death penalty, but remembered that one opposed the death penalty while the other supported it, When describing this conversation with the priest, Juror T. spoke loud enough for all of the jurors to hear. Under questioning by the trial court, Juror T. said that two or three weeks earlier, he had a brief conversation with a friend who was a retired priest. Juror T. thought the conversation might have occurred during the guilt phase. The trial court took judicial notice that the jury returned its guilt phase verdict on February 8, 1995, three weeks before the trial court's questioning of Juror T. Juror T. said he met with the priest for personal reasons and not to seek advice on how to vote at the penalty phase of defendant's trial. During the conversation, Juror T. told the priest he was on a jury and inquired about the Catholic Church's position on the death penalty. The priest stated that he personally `probably would be against it' but that `the Church approves the law of the land' and thus that a person would `not [be] breaking any law or any church law' by voting in favor of the death penalty. Juror T. denied discussing the details of this case with the priest. The trial court inquired whether Juror T. had asked the priest about the Catholic Church's position on the death penalty because Juror T. thought his penalty decision might conflict with church law. Juror T. replied: No, when I was askedwhen I first .. was selected to become a juror, I was asked that question, if it bothered me, at that time 1 probably would have been honest and open, you know, up front about it. I went ahead and agreed to it.... [¶] And Iand when I say, I agreed to it, I agreed thatthat Ithat Iyou know, if it meant the death penalty, it was justified, thatthat I would uphold whatever I felt the law was. [¶] This was just a comment that was on my mind and I thoughtwell, maybe I canI just throw it out there. That's all. I just threw it out there. [¶] I didn'tit wasn't for the purpose of [the priest] telling me what I could do and what I can't do. It was nothing like that, your honor. Juror T. explained that during the penalty phase deliberations, when the jurors were generally discussing the death penalty, he had mentioned his conversation with the priest, telling them: I was told that you could follow the law of the land. Andand if it came down to that, you could follow the law of the land. He said it's permissible. The trial court found that Juror T. had engaged in misconduct first by talking to the priest about the Catholic Church's position on the death penalty, possibly during the guilt phase, and second by relaying the contents of that conversation to the other jurors during penalty phase deliberations. The court removed Juror T. from the jury and individually asked the remaining jurors whether they could disregard Juror T.'s comments. All jurors except Juror V. said they would disregard Juror T.'s comments; Juror V. initially was uncertain whether she could disregard the comments but ultimately said that she would. After admonishing the 11 remaining jurors to disregard Juror T.'s comments about the priest's and the Catholic Church's views on the death penalty, the court selected an alternate juror, and it then instructed the jury to deliberate anew. Defendant did not move for a mistrial. After the jury returned its penalty verdict, defendant sought a new trial, asserting that Juror T.'s misconduct entitled him to a new trial on issues of guilt. The trial court, for reasons discussed earlier, assumed that Juror T.'s conversation with the priest occurred during the guilt phase. The court reiterated its earlier finding that Juror T. committed misconduct first by talking to the priest about the Catholic Church's position on the death penalty and second by describing that conversation to the other jurors during penalty phase deliberations. The trial court found Juror T. to be truthful when he said during voir dire that he had no religious convictions about the death penalty that would affect his ability to be fair and impartial. The trial court further found, based on his examination of Juror T., that the conversation with the priest had not influenced Juror T.'s guilt phase vote and that the conversation could not have affected the guilt phase votes of other jurors because Juror T. had not mentioned the conversation to his fellow jurors until the penalty phase. The court concluded that any misconduct by Juror T. based on his conversation with the priest was harmless beyond any question.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his new trial motion by finding that Juror T.'s conversation with the priest did not affect the guilt phase verdict. Defendant also argues that Juror T.'s information about the Catholic Church's view on the death penalty, which he conveyed to the other jurors, prejudiced penalty phase deliberations. We disagree. [W]here a verdict is attacked for juror taint, the focus is on whether there is any overt event or circumstance ... which suggests a likelihood that one or more members of the jury were influenced by improper bias. ( In re Hamilton (1999) 20 Cal.4th 273, 294, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600.) A juror who consciously receives outside information, discusses the case with nonjurors, or shares improper information with other jurors commits misconduct. (Ibid.) Jury misconduct raises a rebuttable `presumption' of prejudice. (Id. at p. 295, 84 Cal. Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600.) On appeal, the determination whether jury misconduct was prejudicial presents a mixed question of law and fact subject to an appellate court's independent determination. ( People v. Danks (2004) 32 Cal.4th 269, 303, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249.) We accept the trial court's factual findings and credibility determinations if supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at p. 304, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 767, 82 P.3d 1249.) We assess prejudice by a review of the entire record. The verdict will be set aside only if there appears a substantial likelihood of juror bias. Such bias can appear in two different ways. First, we will find bias if the extraneous material, judged objectively, is inherently and substantially likely to have influenced the juror. [Citations.] Second, we look to the nature of the misconduct and the surrounding circumstances to determine whether it is substantially likely the juror was actually biased against the defendant. [Citation.] The judgment must be set aside if the court finds prejudice under either test. ( In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634, 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) In general, when the evidence of guilt is overwhelming, the risk that exposure to extraneous information will prejudicially influence a juror is minimized. ( In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 301, fn. 21, 84 Cal.Rptr.2d 403, 975 P.2d 600.) An admonition by the trial court may also dispel the presumption of prejudice arising from any misconduct. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 996, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) Here, the trial court found that Juror T. engaged in misconduct by discussing the Catholic Church's position on the death penalty with a retired priest and by describing this conversation to the penalty phase jury. Substantial evidence supports these findings. We conclude, however, that the presumption of prejudice arising from the misconduct was rebutted. The trial court removed Juror T. from the jury and admonished the remaining jurors to disregard Juror T.'s improper comments. All remaining jurors agreed to do so. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings that Juror T.'s vote on guilt was not influenced by his conversation with the priest and that Juror T. did not share the content of this conversation with the other jurors during the guilt phase. We therefore conclude there is no inherent or substantial likelihood that the extraneous information influenced the jury's guilt phase verdict or that any juror was, on account of the extraneous information, actually biased against defendant, ( In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.) Moreover, defendant suffered no possible prejudice at the penalty phase. The Catholic Church's position on the death penalty did not weigh in favor of a death verdict as it was a neutral position that encouraged the jury to follow the law of the land. The priest's opinion that he probably would be against [the death penalty] weighed in favor of leniency toward defendant. Further, in advising his fellow jurors of these views, Juror T. did not advocate for one view or the other. Under these circumstances, there is no inherent and substantial likelihood that the extraneous information influenced the other jurors or resulted in any juror's actual bias in rendering the penalty phase verdict. ( In re Carpenter, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 653, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 889 P.2d 985.)