Opinion ID: 766875
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Double Jeopardy Implications of the Jury's Verdict

Text: 47 Chestaro contends that his retrial violated double jeopardy because the jury at the first trial acquitted him of the charged offense. This argument necessarily fails, however, in light of our holding that 111 defines three separate offenses. Chestaro was acquitted at the first trial of the offense defined in 111(b), assault on a federal official with a weapon or with the effect of causing bodily harm. The jury was deadlocked on the lesser included offense of all other assaults, defined in 111(a). Chestaro's double jeopardy claim is unavailing because it is well established that a defendant may be retried, with no offense to double jeopardy, after his first trial results in a deadlocked jury. See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324 (1984); United States v. Rosa, 17 F.3d 1531, 1540 (2d Cir. 1994). This principle is no different where the jury acquits the defendant of a greater offense but is deadlocked on a lesser included offense. Of course, [i]f no instructions are given on lesser included offenses then an acquittal on the crime explicitly charged necessarily implies an acquittal on all lesser offenses included within that charge, United States v. Gooday, 714 F.2d 80, 82 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 189-90 (1889)), and therefore double jeopardy would bar a second trial on a lesser included offense. But the double jeopardy bar does not apply where the jury has been expressly asked to consider a lesser included offense and states that it is unable to reach a verdict on that offense. See id.; United States v. Payne, 832 F. Supp. 594, 597 (E.D.N.Y. 1993). Cf. Edmonds v. United States, 273 F.2d 108, 113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (defendant as to whom jury expressed no verdict on first-degree murder charge but convicted of second-degree murder charge could be retried on second-degree charge after court of appeals reversed conviction). 48 Nor did the jury's acquittal on the charged offense preclude Chestaro's retrial on the lesser included offense on the basis of the collateral estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause. United States v. Medina, 709 F.2d 155, 156 (2d Cir. 1983) (per curiam). The collateral estoppel component precludes the government from retrying a defendant where the jury's verdict in the initial trial necessarily determined in the defendant's favor an issue that would be an element of the offense to be proven at the retrial. Cf. United States v. Citron, 853 F.2d 1055, 1058 (2d Cir. 1988) (The doctrine of collateral estoppel, as applied in criminal prosecutions, bars the Government from relitigating an issue decided in a defendant's favor by a valid final judgment.). Here, the jury's verdict at the first trial did not necessarily imply an unanimous finding that an element of the 111(a) lesser included offense had not been proved. The jury at the first trial acquitted Chestaro of the 111(b) offense but stated that it could not agree on the four elements comprising 111(a). 49 We note that even if 111(b) were simply a sentencing enhancement provision, a retrial on 111(a) would not offend double jeopardy. The defendant's sole remedy would be exactly what occurred in this case: Once the jury had acquitted the defendant of the 111(b) charge, the ten-year maximum penalty would have been forever out of the case. Even though the district court ultimately did find that Chestaro used a weapon, the district court was limited to the statutory three-year maximum term in imposing sentence.