Opinion ID: 1059334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Sale of Beauregard Building

Text: The defendants contend that the chancellor erred when he held that the Beauregard Building was an asset in dissolution of JMHI. They contend that this building was sold to Freedman, one of JMHI's trustees in dissolution, and other bona fide purchasers for value who lacked notice of any adverse claim regarding the property. The defendants further contend that the imposition of a constructive trust on this property violated the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. We disagree with the defendants' arguments. In Tauber I, we held that the trustees in dissolution of JMHI were not entitled to any of the charity's assets after the dissolution of the charity. Id. at 455, 499 S.E.2d at 845. However, Freedman purportedly purchased his two-thirds interest in the Beauregard Building for $1 in 1992, during his tenure as a trustee in dissolution of JMHI. He entered into this purported transaction about 19 years after JMHI's charter revocation. A purchaser of real property is bound by both constructive and actual notice and has no right to shut his eyes or his ears to the inlet of information, and then say he is a bona fide purchaser [for value] without notice. Richmond v. Hall, 251 Va. 151, 157, 466 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1996) (quoting Burwell v. Fauber, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 446, 463, 1871 WL 4916 (1871)). Thus, we conclude that Freedman was not a bona fide purchaser for value without notice because at the time of his alleged purchase, he had actual notice that the charity had been dissolved and constructive notice that the Beauregard Building was one of the charity's assets. [1]