Opinion ID: 2615891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing to seek declaratory relief.

Text: The unchallenged findings of fact disclose that one respondent is the District, a municipal corporation charged by state law with providing educational instruction for public school children in grades 1 through 12. Another group of respondents includes taxpayer-parents of such children, all of whom are citizens of the State, own real property in King County, are registered voters within the District and some of whom are District board members. Finally, the children-respondents all reside within the District and attend public school therein. Appellants assign error to the trial court's conclusion of law that the above-mentioned respondents have standing to contest the constitutionality of the school funding system. We find no error. Appellants assert that the District lacks standing to seek the requested declaratory relief based solely upon one case. Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis.2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976). Buse involved a challenge to the validity of Wisconsin's system of school financing. However, the financing, statutory, and state constitutional requirements discussed therein are unlike those here. Buse involved a challenge to Wisconsin's power-equalization system under which local tax revenues were diverted from wealthy school districts to poorer districts in the form of, what was imaginatively called, negative aid. Five school districts from which funds were diverted were petitioners along with taxpayers and parents of school children residing therein. The five districts were dismissed as parties but the taxpaying parents were left in the action. Buse is neither factually nor legally controlling. First, power-equalization or negative aid is not employed in this state's system of school financing. Second, as pointed out in Buse, the five school districts concerned were not placed in a position of having insufficient funds. Rather, all five had sufficient funds for lawfully operating the required educational program. They merely challenged diversion of their tax revenues to other districts. Further, the Buse challenge involved a question of tax uniformity rather than a constitutional duty to make ample provision for education. Finally, the Buse court commented that school districts held power delegated to them by the legislature and thus lacked power to challenge the constitutionality of the legislative acts under the circumstances. But, it also noted that there were exceptions not relevant in Buse, at least one of which is applicable here. For example, Wisconsin recognizes an exception if the case presents an issue of great public concern. Town of Germantown v. Village of Germantown, 70 Wis.2d 704, 235 N.W.2d 486 (1975). See also Fulton Foundation v. Department of Taxation, 13 Wis.2d 1, 108 N.W.2d 312, 109 N.W.2d 285 (1961) in which the Wisconsin court specifically refers to this exception, relying on our own Yelle v. Bishop, 55 Wn.2d 286, 347 P.2d 1081 (1959). It is difficult to imagine a greater interest in the outcome of litigation than that of respondent District. The current statutory system of school financing has been found insufficient to provide for the basic operation and maintenance of schools. Teaching staffs, educational programs and teaching materials are severely impacted. The failure of two special excess levy proposals has caused additional deferred plant maintenance, educational cutbacks and reductions in teaching staff. The latter fact alone has resulted in other school districts being sued by teachers separated from their positions. For example, see Oak Harbor School Dist. v. Oak Harbor Educ. Ass'n, 86 Wn.2d 497, 545 P.2d 1197 (1976); Hill v. Dayton School Dist. 2, 85 Wn.2d 204, 532 P.2d 1154 (1975); Pierce v. Lake Stevens School Dist. 4, 84 Wn.2d 772, 529 P.2d 810 (1974); Thayer v. Anacortes School Dist., 81 Wn.2d 709, 504 P.2d 1130 (1972); and Boyle v. Renton School Dist. 403, 10 Wn. App. 523, 518 P.2d 221 (1974). Respondent Seattle School District No. 1 is in no different position. For example, see consolidated cases One Thousand Persons v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County; Adams v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County; and, Angevine v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County, King County cause Nos. 795080, 795060, and 795058 respectively. All concern actions in which the District paid judgments arising out of litigation precipitated by the District's double levy failures in 1975. [4] Past unrealistically strict considerations of standing have been eroded thus permitting broader factual interests to give rise to standing. Association of Data Proc. Serv. Org'n, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 25 L.Ed.2d 184, 90 S.Ct. 827 (1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 25 L.Ed.2d 192, 90 S.Ct. 832 (1970); see also K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise 710 (Supp. 1970). In abandoning strict reliance upon the over legalistic interest-right test of standing, the United States Supreme Court commented in Association of Data Proc. Serv. Org'n v. Camp, supra at 153: The legal interest test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different. It concerns ... the question whether the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. A review of our own cases involving claims by municipal corporations clearly demonstrates that we no longer consider standing an insurmountable barrier to reaching a decision on the merits when a municipal corporation challenges, as unconstitutional, a legislative act. For example, see Moses Lake School Dist. 161 v. Big Bend Community College, 81 Wn.2d 551, 503 P.2d 86 (1972); Snohomish County Bd. of Equalization v. Department of Revenue, 80 Wn.2d 262, 493 P.2d 1012 (1972). Based on the more liberalized view of standing now recognized both by the United States Supreme Court and our own, [1] it is clear the District has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the school financing system. The interests of the District are not theoretical; they involve actual financial constraints imposed upon the District by the challenged system itself. In short, the interests sought to be protected by the District are within the zone of interest either regulated by the challenged regulations and legislation or by Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2. Under these circumstances it would be unreasonable to deny standing to the District which, far from being a nominal party, stands at the very vortex of the entire financing system. The basic reason school districts exist is for the education of children through development and maintenance of schools and associated education programs. To that end school districts are authorized to sue and be sued and to transact all business necessary for maintaining school and protecting the rights of the district ... RCW 28A.58.010. In considering the question of standing, what could be more fundamental to the maintenance of schools, and an educational program, than an action seeking to obtain sufficient revenue to keep a district operating with its basic programs intact so as to comply with the mandate of Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2? What could be more fundamental than respondent District's need for review of a system of public school financing that undermines its means of existence? When school districts are forced into litigation or potential litigation as parties defendant, how can it be said they lack sufficient interest to challenge the constitutionality of the very system of financing which forces them into that untenable position? Having demonstrated sufficient factual injury and having shown that the interest to be protected is within the zone of interest protected by Const. art. 9, §§ 1 and 2, we hold the District has standing. [5] Appellants do not seriously challenge the standing of those respondents who are voter-taxpayers, some of whom are members of the District school board, and all of whom are parents of minor children attending public schools within the District. Other than mentioning the subject, the matter is not discussed and no authority has been cited on this issue of standing. The claimed error does not appear meritorious on its face. Thus, we will not consider it further. Myers v. Harter, 76 Wn.2d 772, 782, 459 P.2d 25 (1969); Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wn.2d 833, 836, 454 P.2d 205 (1969); State v. Robinson, 75 Wn.2d 230, 234, 450 P.2d 180 (1969). Appellants suggest that respondent children lack standing to seek declaratory relief challenging the State's system of school financing. Yet, all respondent children are residents of the state of Washington, live with their respondent parents within the District, and each is enrolled in and attends one of the public schools within the District. At the outset it should be noted that Const. Art. 9, § 1, provides: It is the paramount duty of the state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing within its borders ... (Italics ours.) Clearly all respondent children fall within the zone of interest to be protected by the foregoing constitutional classification. They, of all people, are the intended and immediate objects of RCW Title 28A and WAC Title 180. Further, the adverse impact of insufficient revenue for the 1975-76 school year, as it relates to educational programs, is demonstrated by the findings of fact. Nevertheless, appellants challenge the children on the ground that we do not know enough about them, i.e., the children are challenged for what is not known about them rather than for what is known about them and their status as members of a class specifically recognized by the constitution and our statutes. While the negative approach is ingenious, it has little merit. Additionally, appellants have cited no authority to support this position. Consequently, we will not consider it further. Myers v. Harter, supra ; Brown v. Quick Mix Co., supra ; State v. Robinson, supra .