Opinion ID: 2010799
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Delaware Law Controls

Text: Clinton argues that the Superior Court erred in applying the most significant relationship test to determine whether Maryland or Delaware law applies in this action; rather than applying Delaware's borrowing statute, which appears in title 10, section 8121 of the Delaware Code. [10] In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Lake , this Court abolished the automatic lex loci delecti choice of law standard. [11] In its place, we adopted section 145 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts as the basis for determining which state has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. [12] We hold that the Superior Court properly applied that analysis to the facts of this case. [13] For personal injury actions, the law of the state where the injury occurred is presumed to control unless another state has a more significant relationship. [14] In Clinton's case, the Superior Court correctly determined that the presumption had not been rebutted. Therefore, the Superior Court properly concluded that Delaware's statute of limitations and substantive law applied to Clinton's action. Notwithstanding our holding, we will address Clinton's alternative argument. Clinton claims that if the Superior Court had applied title 10, section 8121 of the Delaware Code to the facts of this case, the court would have concluded that Maryland's three-year statute of limitations controlled. That argument is without merit. Section 8121 provides: Where a cause of action arises outside of this State, an action cannot be brought in a court of this State to enforce such cause of action after the expiration of whichever is shorter, the time limited by the law of this State, or the time limited by the law of the state or country where the cause of action arose, for bringing an action upon such cause of action. Where the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a person who at the time of such accrual was a resident of this State, the time limited by the law of this State shall apply. [15] Clinton argues that section 8121 applies because the cause of action arose in Maryland, not in Delaware. To the contrary, although Enterprise requested that the keys be left in the vehicle in Maryland on February 15, 2005, Clinton's cause of action did not accrue under Delaware law until March 2, 2005, when her injury occurred. [16] As Clinton concedes, [17] prior to that date, there was no cause of action. Thus, Clinton's injury arose in Delaware. Because Clinton's cause of action arose in Delaware, title 10, section 8121 of the Delaware Code does not apply. Even if Clinton's cause of action against Enterprise arose in Maryland, section 8121 still would not require the application of Maryland law. It is undisputed that at both the time the key was left in the truck and the time the accident occurred, Clinton was a Delaware resident. Section 8121 unambiguously states that [w]here the cause of action originally accrued in favor of a person who at the time of such accrual was a resident of this State, the time limited by the law of this State shall apply. [18] Therefore, even if the cause of action arose in Maryland, section 8121 would dictate that Delaware's statutes of limitations applies. Applying Delaware's statute of limitations, we hold that Clinton's claims are barred. Delaware has a two-year statute of limitations for both personal injury and wrongful death actions. [19] Clinton's cause of action arose on March 2, 2005, but her estate did not file its complaint until January 29, 2008. Thus, as a matter of Delaware law, Clinton's claims are untimely.