Opinion ID: 6357898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Dual-role representation

Text: When reviewing an order granting or denying termination of parental rights, we accept factual findings and credibility determinations supported by the record, and we assess whether the common pleas court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. See In re D.C.D. , 629 Pa. 325 , 339-40, 105 A.3d 662 , 670-71 (2014). We resolve all questions of law de novo. See id. Mother has abandoned her original challenge to the county court's exercise of its discretion, see supra note 12, and instead asserts that the Superior Court erred in not recognizing that L.B.M. required it to remand this matter to the trial court for a new termination proceeding at which the children's legal interests would be represented by appointed counsel. She structures her advocacy in terms of rebutting what she perceives as three erroneous assumptions made by the D.L.B. court. See Brief for Appellant at 13. 14 We address them in turn.
First, Mother asserts D.L.B . wrongly assumed that counsel appointed pursuant to Section 2313(a) may represent a child's best interests. She states that, in L.B.M. , the three-Justice plurality, joined by the concurrence, agreed that Section 2313(a) requires that the legal interests of the child be represented, and further, that the appointment of counsel is a necessary measure to ensure such representation occurs. See Brief for Appellant at 14-17. She concludes by suggesting that a majority of the L.B.M . Court disapproved the concept that Section 2313(a) counsel can ever represent a child's best interests. See id. at 17-18. As developed above, four Justices in L.B.M . agreed that, where a child's legal and best interests do not diverge in a termination proceeding, an attorney-GAL representing the child's best interests can also fulfill the role of the attorney appointed per Section 2313(a) to represent the child's legal interests. See supra note 3. 15 This majority view of the Justices was apparent from the face of the opinions in L.B.M. , as the Superior Court has recognized on multiple occasions. See D.L.B. , 166 A.3d at 329 ; In re Adoption of T.M.L.M. , 184 A.3d 585 , 588 (Pa. Super. 2018). Furthermore, all four Justices in a responsive position indicated that, where a child is too young to express a preference, it would be appropriate for the GAL to represent the child's best and legal interests simultaneously. See L.B.M. , 639 Pa. at 448 , 161 A.3d at 184 (Saylor, C.J., joined by Todd, J., concurring); id. at 461, 161 A.3d at 192 (Mundy, J., joined by Baer, J., dissenting). Although that circumstance was not before the L.B.M . Court, we now expressly reaffirm these legal principles in the context of the present case, as they are material to the result. See generally Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie , 553 Pa. 348 , 357, 719 A.2d 273 , 278 (1998) (explaining that a holding arises from a fragmented decision when a majority of Justices are in agreement on the legal point at issue), rev'd on other grounds , 529 U.S. 277 , 120 S.Ct. 1382 , 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000). Therefore, we disagree with Mother's contention that L.B.M . reflects prevailing case law of the Commonwealth that an attorney-GAL representing the child's best interests can never satisfy the mandate embodied in the first sentence of Section 2313(a), Brief for Appellant at 17, and that D.L.B. 'sassumption along these lines was incorrect.
Next, Mother addresses the presumed legal interests of a child who cannot communicate information relevant to termination proceedings. She does not claim that the children in this case would have been able meaningfully to express their preferred outcome or otherwise direct counsel's representation of their legal interests. Rather, she agrees the children would not have been able to do so and states that, therefore, the question is what presumption should be made about the child's legal interest, i.e. , their preferred outcome, when the child is nonverbal or unable to satisfactorily verbalize their preferred outcome. Brief for Appellant at 23. Mother contends that the Superior Court assumed there can be no conflict of interest between the child's best and legal interests in such circumstances. She argues that such assumption was in error. Instead, she maintains, the child should be presumed as a matter of law to oppose termination - thereby creating a conflict whenever the GAL believes that termination would be in the child's best interests. The parties agree that, due to the children's very young age (two and three years old), they cannot have formed a subjective, articulable preference to be advanced by counsel during the termination proceedings, and this is entirely consistent with the record. 17 It follows that the legal interests to be represented by Section 2313(a) counsel - which, again, are synonymous with the child's preference, see In re L.B.M. , 639 Pa. at 432 , 161 A.3d at 174 - were not ascertainable during the termination proceedings. The question then becomes whether the requirement of Section 2313(a), that counsel be appointed to represent the child in a contested TPR proceeding, can be deemed to have been fulfilled by an attorney-GAL who has already been appointed and is present in those proceedings, advocating for the child's best interests (which may be denial of the TPR petition, depending on the facts of the case). The statute does not provide a clear answer to this question, as it does not expressly contemplate the circumstance that the child's wishes cannot be ascertained. We therefore look for guidance to the analogous provision of the Juvenile Act, which does contemplate that situation. Section 6311 of the Juvenile Act initially states that the guardian ad litem is to represent the legal interests and the best interests of the child. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311(a). It then specifies that the guardian ad litem must [a]dvise the court of the child's wishes to the extent that they can be ascertained and present to the court whatever evidence exists to support the child's wishes. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6311(b)(9) (emphasis added). 18 By straightforward implication, if the wishes of the child cannot be ascertained,  the GAL has no duty to advise the court of such wishes. For purposes of the proceeding, such wishes do not exist. That is not merely a legal fiction. As explained above, it comports with reality to the extent any participant in the proceedings can discern it. Moreover, and contrary to Mother's argument, it would be tenuous to simply presume a particular preference by the child as a matter of law. Such a circumstance does not negate the mandate of Section 2313(a) that counsel be appointed to represent the child in contested TPR proceedings. It does, however, bear on the question of whether a conflict arises if the trial court allows the attorney-GAL to fulfill that mandate. As a matter of sound logic, there can be no conflict between an attorney's duty to advance a subjective preference on the child's part which is incapable of ascertainment, and an attorney's concurrent obligation to advocate for the child's best interests as she understands them to be. Thus, we conclude that where an attorney-GAL is present in such proceedings undertaking the latter task (advocating for the child's best interests), Section 2313(a) does not require the appointment of another lawyer to fulfill the former (advancing the child's unknowable preference). 19 Mother disagrees with the above based on her contention that, in the case of a pre-verbal child, the law should indeed presume a preference on behalf of the child, and that it should presume the child opposes termination. Mother rests her argument in this regard on certain passages from the Supreme Court's decision in Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745 , 102 S.Ct. 1388 , 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). See Brief for Appellant at 23-25. In Santosky , the Court reviewed a New York State statute which bifurcated termination proceedings into two phases: a fact-finding phase designed to ascertain whether the parent was unfit - or, in the words of the statute, the child was permanently neglected - and a dispositional phase to determine what placement would serve the child's best interests. See Santosky , 455 U.S. at 748 , 102 S.Ct. at 1392 . The second phase would only be reached if the parent was found to be unfit at the conclusion of the first phase. Under the New York enactment, the party petitioning for termination could prevail in the fact-finding phase through proof of parental unfitness by a fair preponderance of the evidence. The question before the Court was whether that relatively low evidentiary standard satisfied due process. The Court held that it did not and that, in view of the nature of a parent's right to her natural children, proof by at least clear and convincing evidence was constitutionally required. See id. at 769 , 102 S.Ct. at 1403 . Mother notes that, in rejecting the preponderance-of-the-evidence  standard, Santosky indicated that until the State proves parental unfitness, the child and his parents share a vital interest in preventing erroneous termination of their natural relationship, and that in this phase the state cannot simply assume that a child and his parents are adversaries. Id. at 760 , 102 S.Ct. at 1398 . However, it is important to recognize the context in which these statements were made. The Supreme Court's entire discussion related to how the risk of erroneous fact-finding should be allocated as between the state and the parent. The Court first recognized that, under due process, the function of a standard of proof is to allocate the risk of error between competing parties through consideration of the comparative loss each would suffer as a result of erroneous fact-finding. The Court recited the well-known concept that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard applies in civil disputes over money damages because society has only a minimal interest in the outcome and, in fairness, the litigants should share the risk of error equally. On the other hand, the majority observed, when the government initiates criminal proceedings to deprive an individual of life or liberty, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard obtains because of the severe consequences to the individual and the substantial societal loss occasioned when an innocent person is imprisoned. See id. at 755-58 , 102 S.Ct. at 1395-97 ; see also Commonwealth v. Maldonado , 576 Pa. 101 , 109, 838 A.2d 710 , 715 (2003) (discussing the function of the various standards of proof in similar terms). Turning to a state-initiated petition under New York law, the Court concluded that an erroneous finding of permanent neglect would result in a more significant loss than an erroneous finding of parental fitness. See Santosky , 455 U.S. at 761 , 102 S.Ct. at 1399 . Given this disparity of consequence, id. , the Court concluded that clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness was constitutionally necessary. When viewed in this context, it is evident that the Court's expressions about the child's interest were made solely to emphasize that the proceeding is a contest between the state and the parent, and not one in which equal but opposite interests of the parent and child are pitted against each other. See id. at 759 , 102 S.Ct. at 1398 (explaining that the fact-finding phase under New York law is not intended to balance the child's interest in a normal family home against the parents' interest in raising the child, but instead, it pits the State directly against the parents). Along these lines, the Court clarified that, although the child and his foster parents may be deeply interested in the outcome of the contest, at the fact-finding phase the focus emphatically is not on them. Id. ; see also id. at 761 , 102 S.Ct. at 1399 (Since the factfinding phase of a permanent neglect proceeding is an adversary contest between the State and the natural parents, the relevant question is whether a preponderance standard fairly allocates the risk of an erroneous factfinding between these two parties.  (emphasis added) ). That being the case, as long as trial courts require the state to prove parental unfitness - or, under Pennsylvania's law, grounds for termination, see 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) - by at least clear and convincing evidence, the child's status as a non-adversary has been folded into the analysis and the Due Process Clause is satisfied. Notably, the question of what a very young, pre-verbal child's legal interests should be presumed to be within proceedings that satisfy due process was not before the Santosky Court. 20 Further, the  Court did not indicate that such a child is deemed to have a constitutionally protected interest in remaining with his natural parents, and its emphasis that the proceeding only involves the parents' and the state's respective interests contradicts any such precept. If this were not so, moreover, it would call into question whether due process requires proof by clear and convincing evidence in circumstances where an older, verbal child directs his attorney to advocate in favor of termination. Santosky cannot reasonably be understood to suggest that due process would permit the state to prove its case by a less exacting evidentiary standard in that situation - again, because the Supreme Court's focus was not on the child's legal interests, but on those of the parent. In light of the above, when the passages of Santosky on which Mother relies are understood in their context, they do not undermine our conclusion that it would be inadvisable for us to impose a legal presumption as to the preferred outcome of a child who is too young to formulate a subjective, articulable preference.
Finally, Mother maintains D.L.B . wrongly assumed that a post-hoc appellate conflict analysis can be performed to assess whether the failure to appoint Section 2313(a) counsel was error. She notes that failure to appoint counsel as required constitutes structural error and posits that a remand for the appointment of counsel is always necessary due to the nature of the child's rights, as the intermediate court previously recognized in In re Adoption of G.K.T. , 75 A.3d 521 (Pa. Super. 2013). See Brief for Appellant at 20. To the extent Mother indicates that structural error is not subject to harmless error analysis, by definition she is correct. However, structural error cannot arise unless the trial court erred. While a majority of the L.B.M. Court agreed that the error under review was structural, the children in that matter were able to express their thoughts concerning whether they wanted to stay with their natural parent. Here, by contrast, and as developed above, the children were too young to have had any such capability. We have determined an attorney-GAL who is present and representing a child's best interests can properly fulfill the role of Section 2313(a) counsel where, as here, the child at issue is too young to be able to express a preference as to the outcome of the proceedings. Thus, the trial court did not err in allowing KidsVoice, the children's guardian ad litem , to act as the sole representative for T.S. and E.S. Moreover, G.K.T . is distinguishable in that, although the child in that case was very young and pre-verbal, no attorney represented the child at all.