Opinion ID: 762172
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Reweigh (Claim 11)

Text: 123 Three statutory aggravating factors were found to apply in Poland's case: 124 1. That defendant committed the crime in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(6). 125 2. That the crime was committed as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5). 126 3. That defendant had been previously convicted of a felony in the United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2). 127 State v. Poland, 698 P.2d at 199. 128 The Arizona Supreme Court set aside the finding that the murders were committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. Id. at 200. It left the death penalty in place. Id. at 202. 129 Poland claims that the Arizona Supreme Court failed to reweigh all the mitigating circumstances against the aggravating circumstances as required. See Richmond v. Lewis, 506 U.S. 40, 49, 113 S.Ct. 528, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992) (Where the death sentence has been infected by [an] ... invalid aggravating factor, the state appellate court or some other state sentencer must actually perform a new sentencing calculus, if the sentence is to stand.); Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 414 (9th Cir.1994) (en banc) ([W]hen a trial court bases its decision to impose a death sentence on both valid and invalid aggravating factors, a state appellate court can affirm the sentence only after performing a harmless-error review, or reweighing the mitigating evidence against the remaining valid aggravating factors.). We disagree. 130 After striking down one of the aggravating factors the trial court had relied upon in imposing the death penalty, the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed the evidence and found it sufficient to support the other aggravating circumstances found by the trial court: 131 The State has, however, proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in the expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value. A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(5). This circumstance is applied to murders having a financial motivation. In the instant case, the murders were part of an overall scheme to obtain items of pecuniary value. Under the facts of this case, the pecuniary gain finding was clearly warranted. 132 Defendant maintains, however, that the sentencing court incorrectly found the aggravating circumstance contained in A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2): that he was previously convicted of a felony in the United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person. He argues that this factor should not have been found absent an examination of whether violence played a role in his prior conviction for bank robbery. This argument was ... recently raised and rejected in State v. Nash, at 404, 694 P.2d at 234, where we held that judicial notice may be taken that certain felonies, by definition, involve violence against others. See also State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 448, 586 P.2d 1253, 1260 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 924, 99 S.Ct. 1254, 59 L.Ed.2d 478 (1979) (Fear of force is an element of robbery and the conviction of robbery presumes that such fear was present.) Furthermore, defendant's claim that Double Jeopardy principles bar the use of his prior conviction to enhance sentencing is without merit. 133 698 P.2d at 201. 134 The Arizona Supreme Court then reviewed the evidence presented in mitigation, weighed it against the aggravating circumstances, and found that the death penalty should be imposed: 135 The trial court found as mitigating circumstances the defendant's close family ties, and that he was a model prisoner. The trial court found that these mitigating circumstances were not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. 136 Defendant raises two arguments relating to mitigating circumstances. First, he argues that the sentencing court's failure to find good reputation as a mitigating circumstance was error. We do not agree. 137 Defendant points to numerous letters written by family members and acquaintances attesting to his good reputation. The sentencing court, however, found this evidence was contradicted by defendant's prior conviction. The court reasoned that defendant's reputation was not a mitigating factor because it was falsely built. 138 .... 139 In light of the conflicting evidence as to defendant's reputation, we do not believe that the defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence defendant's good reputation as a mitigating circumstance. 140 Second, defendant also claims error to the sentencing court's discussion of close family ties as a mitigating circumstance.... 141 Defendant contends that the court was using a mitigating factor as an aggravating factor contrary to State v. Just. We do not believe, however, that the court used defendant's close family ties in this manner. Rather, it appears that the court found this to be a mitigating factor but not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. We find no error. 142 We further find that neither defendant's age, twenty-seven at the time of the offenses, State v. Clark, supra; nor the fact that he was a model prisoner, State v. Carriger, 143 Ariz. 142, 161-62, 692 P.2d 991, 1010-1011 (1984), are mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. We believe the death penalty should be imposed in this case. 143 Id. at 201-02. 144 After discussing the proportionality of the death penalty in Poland's case, the court concluded: 145 The finding that the murders were committed in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner is set aside, but the findings as to the other aggravating circumstances are affirmed. No mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency have been shown. 146 Id. at 202 (emphasis added). 147 The Arizona Supreme Court's approach in reweighing the evidence is perfectly consistent with both our precedent and United States Supreme Court precedent. See Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 11, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 750-52, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990); Michael Poland v. Stewart, 117 F.3d at 1101; Jeffers, 38 F.3d at 414-15. In fact, the approach used by the Arizona Supreme Court is almost indistinguishable from the approach approved by the United States Supreme Court in Romano, 512 U.S. at 11, 114 S.Ct. 2004. 148 As we said in Michael Poland's case, we presume[ ] that state courts follow the law, even when they fail to so indicate. 117 F.3d at 1101 (quotation omitted). We concluded: 149 Here, the Arizona Supreme Court analyzed each mitigating factor claimed to exist. It ended the opinion by saying: No mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency have been found. 698 P.2d at 211. Given the presumption that the court followed the law, the court's recognition of its independent duty to review the factors, the court's specific discussion of each of the mitigating factors, and the closing sentence, we hold that the Arizona Supreme Court sufficiently weighed the remaining aggravating circumstance against the mitigating circumstances. 150 Id. (citations omitted). 151 As noted above, the Arizona Supreme Court made the same statement in Patrick's case concerning the inadequacy of the mitigating factors to call for leniency. The Arizona Supreme Court adequately reweighed in Patrick Poland's case, as it did in Michael's.