Opinion ID: 842331
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: harmless error under blakely

Text: Finally, we find it important to note that Blakely errors are reviewed for harmless error. Accordingly, we add that even if an intermediate sanction is construed as a maximum sentence for Blakely purposes, in each of these cases, if an error occurred, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In Washington v. Recuenco, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 2546, 2553, 165 L.Ed.2d 466 (2006), the United States Supreme Court ruled that Blakely errors are not structural, but are subject to harmless error analysis. The Court had already rejected the argument that failure to submit aggravating facts to a jury offends a watershed rule of criminal procedure, such that it undermines the fairness and accuracy of the overall proceeding, in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 355-356, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004) (holding that such errors do not offend any watershed rule of criminal procedure to the extent of requiring retroactive application). In Schriro, the Court explained that it could not confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy. Id. at 356, 124 S.Ct. 2519. Recuenco compared Blakely errors to the error analyzed in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). Neder involved a jury trial for charges that included tax fraud. [64] One element of the offenses was the materiality of the fraudulent representation on the defendant's tax form. The trial court constitutionally erred when it failed to submit the question of materialityas an element of the offenseto the jury and, instead, decided the issue itself. [65] The error was harmless, however, because uncontested facts presented at trial showed that the misrepresentationwhich consisted of the defendant's failure to report $5 million of incomewas material. Indeed, the defendant did not suggest that he could introduce any contrary evidence, and he did not argue to the jury, or to the courts on appeal, that his false statements could be found immaterial. [66] Accordingly, the judge's conclusion that the element of materiality was proved was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because no jury could reasonably find otherwise. [67] The Court summarized the analysis as follows: In this situation, where a reviewing court concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that the omitted element was uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error, the erroneous instruction is properly found to be harmless. Id. at 17, 119 S.Ct. 1827. Recuenco, in turn, concluded that a similar analysis is appropriate if a trial court fails to submit sentencing factors to a jury, because there is no distinction, for Sixth Amendment purposes, between an element of an offense and a sentencing factor that increases a sentence beyond the sentence authorized by the elements of the offense. [68] The Washington Supreme Court had previously held that Blakely errors are structural. [69] The Recuenco Court disagreed and remanded the case, directing the Washington courts to analyze whether the error was harmless. [70]
In Harper, defendant preserved the constitutional challenge to his sentence by raising this issue in a motion for resentencing before the circuit court. Thus, as in Neder, our review must consider whether the alleged error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [71] The sentencing judge here exceeded the list of intermediate sanctions, and imposed a prison sentence on the basis of facts contained in the presentence investigation report (PSIR). Contrary to Justice Kelly's contention that Harper had no opportunity to present contrary evidence, post at 562, the judge permitted Harper and his attorney to review the PSIR and to challenge the accuracy of its contents, as required by MCL 771.14(5) and (6). The judge also specifically explained to Harper the importance of noting inaccuracies, saying: Now, sometimes they make mistakes on those reports and if they do it's important that you catch them. Mr. Harper, because we keep these reports for years and if there is a mistake now it could be used against you next year. . . . Harper stated that he had read the PSIR. When asked if he saw any mistakes, he pointed out that a prior felony conviction had not been included, previously, when his attorney estimated his PRV score. He agreed that he understood that the felony was properly added, however, and stated: I'm not contesting anything. . . . Defense counsel also specifically indicated that we ha[ve] reviewed this report, I have no additions, corrections or deletions to the report. [72] Now, on appeal, Harper makes no claim that his recordof parole revocations, absconding from parole, bench warrants for failures to appear, and run-ins with law enforcement in other statesis inaccurate. During his oral argument before this Court, he mounted a slight challenge to the sentencing judge's conclusion that he had ripped off a charity that was trying to do good for cold children. He claimed that [n]othing at the plea talked about stealing coats from children, adding that, although Old News Boys is a charity that served needy people . . ., there's lots of different needy people adult and children. . . . On this point, we simply note that, at the sentencing hearing, the president of Old News Boys explained that the organization served needy children and families who are less fortunate. Therefore, we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts used by the sentencing judge to support Harper's sentence were uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that a jury would have reached the same result. [73] Indeed, like the defendant in Neder, Harper does not suggest that he would offer contrary evidence, particularly concerning the facts contained in his court records, if given the opportunity to do so. [74] Accordingly, if the judge is found to have violated Blakely at sentencing, any error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and does not require reversal.
Similarly, in Burns, we conclude that if any Blakely error is found to have occurred, it would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. [75] At sentencing on the probation violation, the judge relied on evidence presented at the probation violation hearing to conclude that substantial and compelling reasons existed to depart from the original guidelines sentence. At the hearing, defense counsel did not contest that his client had touched the young woman's buttocks, nor did he contest that his client had used alcohol in violation of his probation order. Burns himself admitted to the officer that the sexual touching had occurred and that he had consumed six beers. The defense presented no evidence and called no witnesses to contest these facts, despite having an opportunity to do so. We thus conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts used by the sentencing judge to support Burns's sentence were uncontested and supported by overwhelming evidence, such that a jury would have reached the same result. [76]