Opinion ID: 2709205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the trial court’s warnings

Text: The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant “the right to counsel at all critical stages of the criminal pro‐ cess,” Iowa v. Tovar, 541 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2004), but also the right “to proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975). The defendant’s waiver of counsel must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Tovar, 541 U.S. at 88. 16 No. 12‐2614 The Supreme Court has said that a waiver is “knowing and intelligent” when the defendant “knows what he is do‐ ing and his choice is made with eyes open.” Id. (quoting Ad‐ ams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)). However, the Court has “not … prescribed any formula or script to be read to a defendant who states that he elects to proceed without counsel.” Id. Instead, the Court has in‐ structed that “[t]he information a defendant must possess in order to make an intelligent election … will depend on a range of case‐specific factors, including the defendant’s edu‐ cation or sophistication, the complex or easily grasped na‐ ture of the charge, and the stage of the proceeding.” Id. (cit‐ ing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)). Under this standard, the trial court’s warnings were suf‐ ficient. The court explicitly warned Kidd about “the hazards ahead.” Id. at 89. In their first colloquy, the judge explained to Kidd that the case was complex, the potential conse‐ quences were grave, the time‐frame before trial was brief, and the challenges of representing himself were many. The judge told Kidd that he would need to perform all the tasks that his attorney, Strunck, had performed at the first trial. The judge advised Kidd against proceeding pro se, told him to rethink this major decision, and gave him a week to do so. One week later, they engaged in another colloquy. The judge again emphasized the short timeline, the seriousness of the charges, the fact that Kidd faced the death penalty, and the complexity of conducting his own defense. The court added that Kidd had the right to a lawyer, even if he could not af‐ ford one. The court’s warnings “rigorous[ly] conveyed” the dangers of Kidd’s choice. Id. (quoting Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted)). No. 12‐2614 17