Opinion ID: 1375029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denying Motion at Prior Trial to Exclude Evidence for Lack of Consent to Police Search of Apartment

Text: (23a) At the prior trial, defendant moved to exclude physical evidence obtained following his statements to the police. He testified at that trial that he did not consent to a search of his apartment after his arrest and confession. The court at that trial denied the motion to exclude the evidence resulting from the search. On this appeal, he contends that the search was unlawful because it was made without his effective consent. Defendant did not litigate the matter in the proceeding before us. In answer to an anticipated conclusion that there was no action of the court for us to review, he argues that the court made plain, by denying his application to relitigate his motion to suppress or exclude evidence under section 1538.5, that it would not entertain any request to reconsider the prior ruling, and therefore it would have been pointless to try. He contends that under these circumstances to deny review on the merits of his claim would violate the Eighth Amendment. Without necessarily agreeing with him, we will, in an abundance of caution, evaluate his contention on the merits. Prosecution witnesses from the South Gate and Bell Gardens Police Departments testified that defendant consented, from his jail cell, to let them search his apartment for physical evidence relating to the murders. Defendant testified that he could tell that the police had already searched his apartment before his second in-jail interrogation, at which time he had not consented to any further search of his premises, because they showed him items they had recovered from it. The parties dispute not only whether defendant consented to the search, but also whether any consent was effective given that it was sought, according to Officer Carter, about 4 a.m. (24) When reviewing a ruling on an unsuccessful motion to exclude evidence, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, upholding them if they are supported by substantial evidence, but we then independently review the court's determination that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. ( People v. Loewen (1983) 35 Cal.3d 117, 123 [196 Cal. Rptr. 846, 672 P.2d 436].) (25) The fourth amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person's home, either to make an arrest or to conduct a search. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 1380, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948). An exception to this general proscription arises, however, when voluntary consent to search has been given ... by the individual whose property is searched, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).... ( U.S. v. Towns (7th Cir.1990) 913 F.2d 434, 442.) (23b) When the court denied defendant's motion, we must assume that it found he consented to the search. We are bound by that implicit determination. But defendant contends that even under the testimony favoring the prosecution, his consent to the search would have been ineffective because the hour was late and he was exhausted, hungry, and distraught. However, we need not now decide whether [any] consent was valid or whether the ... searches were lawful. Even if the searches were unlawful and the evidence should not have been admitted against [defendant], the other evidence of his guilt was so overwhelming that the alleged error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( United States v. Murray (9th Cir.1976) 530 F.2d 856, 857.) His confessions amounted to almost the whole of the prosecution's guilt and penalty case. The record strongly suggests that his remorse prompted him to confess, not the fear or the realization that incriminating evidence might be found, or had been found, in his apartment. Although the physical evidence recovered from the apartment served to confirm certain details of his confession to Carter's murder, he confessed in detail and led the police to the body. The state proved by overwhelming evidence that he killed Carter. It has met its burden of showing that any possible error admitting the contested evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (See Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065].) ( People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 776 [103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129]; cf. U.S. v. Towns, supra, 913 F.2d at pp. 446-447.)