Opinion ID: 1984671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Defendant Gannett

Text: It is undisputed that, prior to publishing the allegedly defamatory matter, Gannett undertook the following investigation. After learning of the alleged cheating incident at the meeting of the special committee which was investigating Portland's Civil Service Commission, Nancy Perry began her investigation in earnest by contacting Curley. By the time she finished speaking with him, she knew that Tucci had been involved in an alleged cheating incident; that Menario had prepared a memo detailing the incident; and that Curley had a copy of the Menario memo. Because Curley was in Boston at this time, she contacted Menario to obtain a copy of the memo and to inquire as to his recollections of the matter. He told her that he vaguely remembered the incident, but he did not remember drafting the Menario memo. They did not discuss details because of his lack of memory. He did tell her that she could possibly find it in the attic of City Hall, if it existed. Continuing her investigation, she received permission to search for the Menario memo in the attic of City Hall, but her search yielded nothing. After descending from the attic, she went to the office of the City's Corporation Counsel and received permission from him to search the files of the Civil Service Commission. Although she did not find that Menario memo, she observed some documents pertaining to a police promotional exam taken on August 6, 1970. She took notes concerning these documents; however, she did not realize their significance until later when she obtained the Menario memo. Having been thus far unsuccessful in her attempt to find the Menario memo, she called Curley and asked him if he would provide her with a copy of it. He consented and they agreed to meet that Friday when he returned to Cape Elizabeth, Maine. Curley met with Perry that Saturday (September 15, 1979), instead of Friday, at her office in Portland and he gave her a copy of the Menario memo. After reading the Menario memo she realized the significance of the documents observed by her at City Hall. Her notes referred to a comparison of Tucci's test with that of Karl Learned, the man from whom Tucci allegedly cheated, as did the Menario memo. Before leaving her office that day, Curley once again told her that he was convinced that Tucci had cheated on the examination. On September 18, 1979, Perry contacted John McDonough, a member of the Civil Service Commission in 1970, and he told her that he remembered allegations of cheating being lodged against Tucci. He further told her that the charges were dropped because it was Tucci's word against that of the monitors and that the Personnel Department should have taken immediate action at the examination. The next day she culminated her research by speaking with Tucci. Although he denied having cheated on the examination, he did not deny that accusations of cheating had been made against him. Tucci does not dispute that Gannett conducted its investigation as described by Nancy Perry's affidavit. However, he does claim that the investigation was inadequate in the circumstances and, therefore, the jury could infer actual malice in the New York Times sense. Specifically, in light of Menario's expressed dislike of Tucci, his disapproval of the Civil Service Commission's handling of the matter and the fact that this was not hot news, he claims that the record raises an issue of fact with respect to actual malice because: (1) Perry did not question Curley in any great detail; (2) she never questioned Dutton; (3) she never asked Curley whether he disliked Tucci; and (4) she never asked Menario about the dislike he expressed for Tucci in the Menario memo. We disagree. Actual malice may be inferred when an investigation is grossly inadequate in the circumstances. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 156-57, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1992-93, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); Vandenburg v. Newsweek, Inc., 507 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir.1975). Especially when the matter is not hot news, a more thorough investigation is expected. Schultz v. Reader's Digest Association, 468 F.Supp. 551, 564 (E.D. Mich.1979). However, even if there is an error that might have been prevented by a more thorough investigation, courts have held the evidence insufficient to support a jury verdict of actual malice where the defendant had no doubts about the accuracy of the information and the sources appeared reliable. Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 733-34 (4th Cir.1980); Dickey v. CBS Inc., 583 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (3rd Cir.1978); Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 912-14 (2d Cir.1977); Vandenburg, 507 F.2d at 1026. We do not think that a jury could reasonably find or infer that the investigation in this case was grossly inadequate or that it indicated a reckless disregard for the truth. The primary source for the publications was the Menario memo. Gannett, however, did not publish the articles and editorials solely on the basis of the Menario memo. Before publishing the articles and editorials, Gannett undertook a fairly extensive investigation. Perry spoke with Curley, who was one of the two proctors at the examination administered on August 6, 1970. She had no apparent reason to doubt his word and she did not know whether he harbored any ill will against Tucci. He told her now, as he had told Menario in 1970, that he had observed Tucci cheating. She also uncovered further information to corroborate the accuracy of the Menario memo. The documents she observed and noted at City Hall corroborated that part of the memo which referred to a comparison to Tucci's answer sheet with that of the man from whom he allegedly cheated. The Menario memo accurately reported those results and, as mentioned previously, those results do not serve to undercut Menario's opinion, as expressed in the memo, that he was convinced cheating took place. Her conversation with McDonough corroborated that cheating charges had been lodged against Tucci and that the Civil Service Commission criticized the Personnel Department for not taking immediate action at the examination. Perry also contacted Tucci and, although he denied cheating, he did not deny that cheating charges had been brought against him. The lead article fairly portrayed Tucci's denial of the charges. She did contact Menario during the investigation; he, however, was unhelpful because he vaguely remembered the incident. Finally, Nancy Perry averred both in her affidavit and at her deposition that she bore no ill will or malice to Tucci. At most, Perry may have negligently investigated the matter by failing to ask Curley whether he disliked Tucci, by failing to ask Menario about the dislike for Tucci he expressed in the Menario memo, and by failing to contact Dutton. A jury could not, however, reasonably conclude that the investigation was grossly inadequate in the circumstances. Negligent investigative reporting alone does not constitute actual malice, there must be a showing that the publisher entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the matter published. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 79, 85 S.Ct. at 218; New York Times, 376 U.S. at 288, 84 S.Ct. at 730; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 542, 445 A.2d 1038, 1045 (1982). The fact that Menario, through the Menario memo, expressed both dislike of Tucci and disapproval of the Civil Service Commission's handling of the matter does not create an inference of actual malice in light of Gannett's independent verification as to the accuracy of other aspects of the memo. [7] On the basis of this record, a jury could only reasonably conclude that Gannett acted on a reasonable belief that the statements were substantially correct. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 286, 84 S.Ct. at 729; Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc., 293 Md. at 540, 445 A.2d at 1045. We, therefore, must conclude that there was insufficient evidence from which a jury could reasonably find or infer with  convincing clarity  that Gannett entertained serious doubts about the truth of the publications. Accordingly, the presiding justice did not err when he granted summary judgment in Gannett's favor. In upholding the presiding justice's granting of summary judgment, we are aware that courts should proceed with caution when state of mind is at issue. See Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962). That is particularly true if the motion is submitted only upon affidavits. That does not mean, as plaintiff suggests, that summary judgment is always inappropriate when a party's state of mind is at issue. In the instant case, all the major characters had been deposed prior to the motion for summary judgment. The motion was submitted on those depositions, affidavits of Perry and Menario, and all of the relevant documents. In those circumstances, a plaintiff cannot avoid summary judgment merely by asserting that the cause of action puts in issue defendant's state of mind. See Jones v. Borden Co., 430 F.2d 568, 574 (5th Cir.1970); Miles v. Dickson, 40 F.R.D. 386, 389 (M.D.Ala.1966), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 387 F.2d 716 (5th Cir.1967). There must be some indication that [plaintiff] can produce the requisite quantum of evidence to enable him to reach the jury with his claim. Hahn v. Sargent, 523 F.2d 461, 468 (1st Cir.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 1495, 47 L.Ed.2d 754 (1976). Plaintiff has failed to do so in this case.