Opinion ID: 1226902
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Dismissal of a Juror During Deliberations

Text: Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(b)(3) provides that, [a]fter the jury has retired to deliberate, the court may permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict ... if the court finds good cause to excuse a juror. Fed.R.Crim.P. 23(b)(3). In this case, after the jury commenced its deliberations, the district court excused an absent juror who was unavailable because her child was ill. Simmons was then found guilty by the remaining eleven jurors. We review the decision to excuse a juror pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Reese, 33 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.1994). The crux of Simmons' challenge is that there was insufficient information to support the district court's decision to excuse the juror. See id. (All that is needed to satisfy a prudent exercise of discretion [under Rule 23(b)(3)] is to be certain the trial court had sufficient information to make an informed decision.). Simmons argues that a district court must have some information regarding the amount of time the juror is likely to be absent in order to dismiss the juror under Rule 23(b). While Simmons concedes that this Court has not specifically adopted such a rule, he contends that we also have not affirmed a juror dismissal under Rule 23(b)(3) in the absence of information regarding the juror's anticipated length of unavailability. See United States v. Paulino, 445 F.3d 211, 225-26 (2d Cir.2006) (the court, after repeated inquiries of the ill juror, determined that the illness would prevent the juror from deliberating for two days); United States v. Gibson, 135 F.3d 257, 259 (2d Cir.1998) (per curiam) (the district court, told by the juror's daughter that the juror had collapsed on the subway and was hospitalized, found that the juror would be unavailable for some time); United States v. Stratton, 779 F.2d 820, 832 (2d Cir.1985) (the district court found that the juror would be unavailable for four and one-half days to observe a religious holiday). We have recognized that Rule 23 accords wide latitude to district courts making trial management decisions, see, e.g., Paulino, 445 F.3d at 226 (quotation marks omitted), and for juror dismissal, requires that a court have `sufficient information to make an informed decision.' Id. (quoting Reese, 33 F.3d at 173). In this case, Juror No. 6 reported that she was unable to come [that day] because her child [was] ill. The district court, with knowledge of this report, had sufficient information that the child's illness would prevent Juror No. 6 from participating in deliberations for at least one day. See id. ([T]he law establishes no bright-line test for determining the length of juror unavailability that constitutes good cause for excusal.). Although the district court expressly noted that [p]ossibly [Juror No. 6] could come tomorrow, it made no additional inquiry of the juror's anticipated length of unavailability. Contra Paulino, 445 F.3d at 226; Stratton, 779 F.2d at 831. The question is whether it was error for the district courtknowing the juror would be absent at least one day but without knowledge as to the likelihood of her absence extending beyond that dayto fail to inquire of the juror's anticipated length of unavailability. Making an inquiry into a juror's anticipated length of unavailability, while certainly a better practice than foregoing such inquiry, is not necessarily required. See Reese, 33 F.3d at 173 (Whether and to what extent a juror should be questioned regarding the circumstances of a need to be excused is ... within the trial judge's sound discretion.). The district court here was not required to conduct a further inquiry after determining that a one-day absence supported dismissal. But this is only because the court also found that waiting an additional day before continuing deliberations risked the absence of another juror, who had alerted the court that extended jury service would cause financial hardship, and who would miss additional work days if deliberations were delayed. Without basing its decision on this additional factor, we have serious doubts as to whether the district court's decision would have been a permissible exercise of discretion, as the decision lies at the margins of that discretion. The absence of information regarding the anticipated length of a juror's unavailability, while it does not preclude excusing the juror, warrants closer scrutiny of the information the district court relied upon in arriving at its decision. The district court referred to the quality of the trial and the indivisible nature of justice as two of its reasons for dismissing the juror. We do not see how these abstractions offer support for excusing a juror. However, the district court also stressed the significant risk that another juror might seek to be excused if deliberations were delayed, appearing to be concerned with the possibility of a mistrial. See Gibson, 135 F.3d at 260 (We have held that proceeding with eleven jurors is generally preferable to a mistrial. (citing Stratton, 779 F.2d at 831-32)). While this case is close, because the district court determined both that the juror would be absent at least one day and that delaying deliberations might result in another juror's hardship, we find that the district court's decision to excuse the juror was based on sufficient information. [4] Simmons also argues that the district court should have investigated the juror's asserted unavailability because the jury was split and could not reach a unanimous decision. The deliberations prior to Juror No. 6's absencewhich included two requests to hear the reasonable doubt instruction and a note to the court stating, [w]e cannot come to a unanimous decision indicate that the jury was not initially able to reach a verdict. The course of deliberations prior to a juror's absence is relevant to the determination of whether to excuse a juror, and a district court might consider evidence of a divided jury to counsel restraint before excusing a juror. But, contrary to Simmons' suggestion, the record does not provide the slightest basis to believe that [Juror No. 6] was excused on a pretext to remove an obstacle to reaching a unanimous verdict. Stratton, 779 F.2d at 832. The district court, therefore, was permitted to excuse the juror even though the prior course of deliberations suggested a jury divided over whether to convict. As the district court noted, it had no knowledge of Juror No. 6's views on the merits of the case when she was excused. Cf. United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 620-22 (2d Cir.1997) (discussing the need for limits on inquiries that intrude upon the secrecy of the jury's deliberative process, and holding that dismissal cannot be based on the juror's view of the sufficiency of the government's evidence (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Hernandez, 862 F.2d 17, 23 (2d Cir. 1988) (That a juror may not be removed because he or she disagrees with the other jurors as to the merits of a case requires no citation.). The fact that the jury returned a guilty verdict about thirty minutes later does not support a finding that the district court abused its discretion in excusing the juror beforehand. Admittedly, the facts are at least consistent with Simmons' theory that excusing Juror No. 6 may have inadvertently cleared the way for a guilty verdict, as they are consistent with a jury returning from a weekend break, having already deliberated for two days, and reaching consensus. There is nothing in the record, however, to indicate that Juror No. 6 was excused to secure a verdict, see Stratton, 779 F.2d at 832, or because she disagreed with the other jurors, see Hernandez, 862 F.2d at 23. We therefore do not disturb the district court's decision.