Opinion ID: 215259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kurzweg’s ADA Lawsuit

Text: 2 The SSA’s decision found, inter alia, that: (1) Kurzweg had not engaged in any substantial gainful employment since June 9, 2008; (2) he had the severe impairments of “residuals of invasive urothelial carcinoma, status-post radical cystoprostatectomy with ileostomy and urinary diversion; lymphoma (versus lymphoproliferative disorder); bipolar disorder; attention deficit disorder; cervical degenerative disc disease; sleep apnea; and restless leg syndrome”; (3) Kurzweg was unable to perform his past relevant work because the demands of that work “exceed the residual functional capacity”; and (4) Kurzweg had the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work, but that he could not perform such work for eight hours a day, five days a week due to “psychologically based symptoms”; he could not perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; he could not deal with normal work stress; and he could not meet competitive standards for maintaining regular attendance and being punctual within customary, usually strict tolerances, sustaining an ordinary routine without special supervision and working in coordination with or in proximity to others without being unduly distracted. 4 On August 28, 2009, Kurzweg filed this complaint alleging that SCP violated his rights under the ADA and the FCRA when it terminated him.3 Following discovery, SCP moved for summary judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Kurzweg’s ADA claim was barred because it was inconsistent with his statements in his SSDI application that he was unable to work as of June 9, 2008. During a summary judgment hearing, Kurzweg explained that the SSA had used the June 9 termination date as the disability onset date because that was the last day Kurzweg had worked. Kurzweg maintained that on June 9, 2008 he was actually able to perform the duties of his job and that he only became disabled afterward based, at least in part, on the deterioration of his mental health condition after learning of his termination. The district court, citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 119 S. Ct. 1597 (1999), concluded that Kurzweg’s explanation for the inconsistency between his representations to the SSA and his representations in the ADA case was not sufficient. The district court noted that, under Cleveland, it was possible for an employee to be able to work with an accommodation and be disabled for Social 3 Kurzweg filed his action in Florida state court, and SCP removed the action to federal district court. 5 Security purposes without that accommodation, but that Kurzweg was not making such a claim. The district court concluded that “it is not an adequate explanation to say, as the plaintiff seems to say here, I was able to work, I was wrong when I asserted to the Social Security Administration that I was unable to work. I got the benefits, though I wasn’t entitled to them. In fact, I didn’t become disabled until later, after the date when I told the Social Security Administration I was disabled.” After the hearing, the district court entered an order granting SCP’s summary judgment motion and adopting the reasons the court had set out “at greater length” during the hearing. The district court’s order further stated that “[o]n the facts of this case, the plaintiff could not have been both qualified for his job as of June 9, 2008, as required under the ADA, and unable to work as of that date, as he successfully asserted in his social-security application,” and, thus, Kurzweg’s ADA claim was barred.4 Kurzweg filed this appeal.