Opinion ID: 70443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Independent Contractor Status

Text: 8 Ms. Tisdale brought this suit under the FTCA which provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions against the United States involving 9 injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 10 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). The United States argues, and the district court agreed, that the United States is not liable for the acts or omissions of Coleman under the FTCA because Coleman is an independent contractor, and not an employee or agency of the United States. 11 Suits under the FTCA are limited to those which involve claims arising from the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government ... acting within the scope of his office or employment. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b). The FTCA specifically excludes any contractor with the United States from its coverage. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2671. Thus, the United States is not liable for the acts or omissions of the independent contractors that it employs. See United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813-16, 96 S.Ct. 1971, 1975-77, 48 L.Ed.2d 390 (1976). Our review of this matter convinces us that the district court correctly concluded that Coleman held only the status of an independent contractor in regard to the McPherson Avenue property. Therefore, the United States is not liable for any negligent acts that Coleman may have committed. 12 It is true, as Ms. Tisdale argues, that HUD retained the authority under the AMB contract to ensure that Coleman fulfilled its contractually-assumed obligations, but this fact does not necessarily convert Coleman into an employee or agency of the United States. [B]y contract, the Government may fix specific and precise conditions to implement federal objectives. Although such regulations are aimed at assuring compliance with goals, the regulations do not convert the acts of entrepreneurs ... into federal governmental acts. Id. at 816, 96 S.Ct. at 1976-77. (footnote and citations omitted). The true test for independent contractor status addresses the United States' power  'to control the detailed physical performance of the contractor,'  or, in other words, whether Coleman's day-to-day operations are supervised by the Federal Government. Id. at 814, 815, 96 S.Ct. at 1976 (quoting Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528, 93 S.Ct. 2215, 2219, 37 L.Ed.2d 121 (1973)) (footnote omitted). 13 We find that Coleman is an independent contractor because the very purpose of an AMB contract is to turn over the day-to-day management, rehabilitation, and supervision of certain properties to AMB's such as Coleman. HUD's primary objective is to dispose of the properties covered by the AMB contracts; HUD owns far too many of these properties, and it is too insufficiently staffed to properly manage all of them itself. Therefore, HUD must enter into AMB contracts in order to facilitate its objective of disposing of these properties. The extensive list of duties assumed by Coleman under the AMB contract, recounted in footnote 1, supra, illustrates the extent to which HUD relinquished its day-to-day duties to Coleman. Those responsibilities that HUD did retain--e.g., determining the asking price for the property, authorizing repairs over $1000, reassessing the property every thirty days, and deciding whether to rent the property--cannot be characterized as day-to-day duties. 14