Opinion ID: 1831943
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Byrd v. State

Text: Before the jury was brought into the courtroom for trial, the following exchange took place on the record: COURT: Anything else before we bring in the jury? DEFENSE COUNSEL: As I indicated to the court, Mr. Byrd asked me what the court's inclination would be for a plea to the bench, and your honor indicated 30 years. COURT: From what I understand from the State, and I haven't seen the score sheet, but apparently he's not pure driven snow and his score sheet comes out to more than 15 years. So I think 30 years is a fair offer, considering what you would do is over 100 years, and this isn't your first robbery. Frankly, I thinkGood God, he's got numerous armed robberies. DEFENSE COUNSEL: They all arise out of one plea. COURT: Well, there you go. They all count, though. I think 30 years is a steal. He certainly won't get that low if he goes to trial. His record is horrendous. (Emphasis supplied.) Byrd rejected the offer and proceeded to trial, after which he was sentenced to seventy-five years in prison. On appeal, Byrd argued that when the defendant rejects the court's offer and is subsequently convicted, if the court exceeds its former offer, a presumption of vindictiveness arises and such presumption was not overcome in this case. Byrd, 794 So.2d at 672. A majority of the Fifth District's three-judge panel agreed, reasoning as follows: In McDonald v. State, 751 So.2d 56, 59 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999), the court held that when the judge has been involved in the plea negotiations and then later imposes a harsher sentence, the sentence is presumed to be vindictive. That is a reasonable method of dispelling a defendant's legitimate fear of retribution should he exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial. The supreme court may well have had such a presumption in mind when it required that [a] record must be made of all plea discussions involving the court. See [ State v.] Warner, 762 So.2d [507, 514 (Fla.2000) ]. During the discussion leading up to the offer the court should state the facts relied on by it in making the offer. Those facts can then be compared with any additional facts emerging prior to sentencing to see if the harsher sentence is justified. In any event, if the trial court elects to sentence more harshly based on additional facts which may emerge prior to sentencing, should the judge not at least put on record what the additional facts are and how those facts changed the judge's view? If the judge can change his or her mind merely by saying that after hearing the testimony he or she is convinced that a harsher sentence is justified, then there is no protection against vindictiveness in rejection of plea cases. Whether we call it an unrebutted presumption or merely hold that the court has failed to explain on the record what information it had at sentencing that it did not have at the time of the plea offer and how such information would have made a difference, the result is the same. The State suggests that the court was concerned about the timing of the offense in connection with the defendant's release from prison and was also concerned about the number of offenses. But this information was before the court at the time of its offer. It is less a reason than an excuse. Id. at 672-73 (footnote omitted). The Fifth District then considered several remedies, including setting the sentence itself, remanding to the trial judge to make findings supportive of the more severe sentence, or remanding for resentencing before a different judge. See id. at 673. Ultimately, the Fifth District concluded that the proper remedy was to reverse and remand to the trial court to sentence the defendant in accordance with its prior plea offer. Id. Judge Griffin concurred specially, agreeing with the result but rejecting the `presumption of vindictiveness' analysis. Byrd, 794 So.2d at 673 (Griffin, J., concurring specially). Judge Griffin concluded that the resentencing was required because the trial judge's actions appeared to violate one of the restrictions imposed by this Court in Warner, that a judge must neither state for imply alternative sentencing possibilities which hinge upon future procedural choices, such as the exercise of a defendant's right to trial. Id. (quoting Warner, 762 So.2d at 514).