Opinion ID: 36683
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Theories

Text: For each of her various discrimination claims, Washington advances two independent legal theories: disparate treatment (i.e., intentional race and sex discrimination) and retaliation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a), 2000e-16(a) (2003).
The McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework governs Washington’s Title VII claims for disparate treatment.3 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). Under this framework, “[a] Title VII plaintiff bears the initial burden to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.” LaPierre v. Benson Nissan, Inc., 86 F.3d 444, 448 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). Although the precise articulation of the elements of a prima facie case will vary according to the facts of the case and the nature of the claim, a plaintiff usually satisfies this initial burden by showing that: (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was qualified for the position, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the employer continued to seek applicants with the plaintiff’s qualifications, 3 The McDonnell Douglas framework applies here because Washington offers only circumstantial evidence to support her disparate treatment claims. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348-50 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Kendall v. Block, 821 F.2d 1142, 1145 (5th Cir. 1987). No. 04-30233 -6- the employer selected someone of a different race or sex, or that others similarly situated were treated more favorably than she. Id. at 448 & n.3; Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348-50 (5th Cir. 2001); Rios v. Rossotti, 252 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2001); Urbano v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204, 206 (5th Cir. 1998). “Once established, the plaintiff’s prima facie case raises an inference of intentional discrimination. The burden of production then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.” LaPierre, 86 F.3d at 448 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If the defendant proffers such a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the defendant’s reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. Rios, 252 F.3d at 378 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 138-42 (2000)). Of course, “[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143 (alteration in original) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)). Whether summary judgment is appropriate depends on a number of factors, including “the strength of the plaintiff’s prima facie case, the probative value of the proof that the employer’s explanation is false, and No. 04-30233 -7- any other evidence that supports the employer’s case and that properly may be considered.” Id. at 148-49.
Washington’s claims for retaliation also fall within the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.4 See Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, “the plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of retaliation.” Id. A plaintiff may satisfy this burden by demonstrating that: (1) she engaged in an activity protected by Title VII, (2) an adverse employment action was taken against her, and (3) a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Id.; Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff’s prima facie showing of retaliation establishes an inference of the employer’s impermissible retaliatory motive. Fierros, 274 F.3d at 191. Like in disparate treatment cases, the burden then shifts to the employer to produce a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the adverse 4 Again, the McDonnell Douglas framework applies because Washington bases her retaliation claims solely on circumstantial evidence. Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 191-92 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that in direct evidence cases, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to establish by a preponderance of evidence that the same decision would have been made regardless of the protected activity); Moore v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 55 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir. 1995). No. 04-30233 -8- employment action. Id. Once the employer produces evidence of such a reason, the plaintiff has the ultimate burden of proving that the protected activity was a but-for cause of the adverse employment decision. Long, 88 F.3d at 305 n.4. The jury may infer the existence of but-for causation from the combination of the plaintiff’s evidence establishing the prima facie case of retaliation and the plaintiff’s evidence that the reasons given by the employer are merely pretextual. Mota v. Univ. Tex. Houston Health Sci. Ctr., 261 F.3d 512, 519 (5th Cir. 2001).
We have consistently held that in order to present a prima facie case for either disparate treatment or retaliation, a plaintiff must show that the employer took an “adverse employment action” against the plaintiff. See, e.g., Pegram v. Honeywell, Inc., 361 F.3d 272, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2004). In this circuit, only “ultimate employment decisions” qualify as the adverse employment actions necessary to establish a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Dollis v. Rubin, 77 F.3d 777, 781-82 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (“Title VII was designed to address ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.”). Ultimate employment decisions include hiring, granting leave, discharging, No. 04-30233 -9- promoting, and compensating. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 707; Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material, 321 F.3d 528, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (explaining that the definition of ultimate employment actions in retaliation cases is derived from the definition of discrimination in disparate treatment cases).