Opinion ID: 3065347
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Senate Factors 7 and 8

Text: [14] In its listing of the Factors that typically may be relevant to a § 2 claim, the Senate Report made clear that “there is no requirement that any particular number of Factors be proved or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 29; see id. at 29 n.118 (stating that the Factors were not intended “to be used[ ] as a mechanical ‘point-counting’ device”); see also Gomez, 863 F.2d at 1412 (noting the Senate Report’s emphasis that the “list of factors 20 Contrary to what the dissent contends, we do not “dictat[e] that a district court should not consider certain factors . . . in vote denial cases.” See Diss. at 160. We hold only that different factors will be of relevance in different cases, depending on the circumstances of those cases; that courts should consider each factor in light of the circumstances of the case before them; and that where, as here, plaintiffs provide compelling evidence of a law or system of laws that, as implemented, necessarily results in the discriminatory deprivation of racial minorities’ right to vote, that deprivation is sufficient, and the plaintiffs need not present additional evidence regarding other factors that are of less relevance to the plaintiffs’ claim. 136 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE was not a mandatory seven-pronged test” but “only meant as a guide to illustrate some of the variables that should be considered by the court”). Thus, “while the basic ‘totality of the circumstances’ test remains the same, the range of factors that [are] relevant in any given case will vary depending upon the nature of the claim and the facts of the case.” Gomez, 863 F.3d at 1412. Where the evidence of one central Factor in a particular case is compelling, that Factor may be sufficient. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has recognized, the enumerated Factors are “particularly [pertinent] to vote dilution claims,” Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 45, and, it follows, not as pertinent, generally, in vote denial cases. Thus, in vote denial cases, there is even more flexibility in determining whether, under the totality of the circumstances test, a single factor is controlling and whether any weight may or should be given to the presence or absence of others. The district court acknowledged that it was “not bound by the list of Senate factors,” but found that several of the Factors were relevant to Plaintiffs’ vote denial challenge. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at . Specifically, the district court found that Factors 7 and 8 — the extent of minority representation among elected officials, and the level of responsiveness of elected officials to minorities’ needs — were “certainly relevant to Plaintiffs’ VRA claim.” Id. at .21 We conclude, however, that, in light of its finding of “compelling evidence of racial discrimination and bias in Washington’s criminal justice system,” the district court erred in according any weight to Plaintiffs’ failure to introduce evidence regarding 21 The district court also noted that Plaintiffs had “failed to present any substantial evidence regarding” Senate Factors 2, 3, 4, and 6. Id. However, it then “admitted[ ]” that “several of these factors are not relevant in a VRA vote denial claim.” Id. Because we interpret this to mean that the district court did not rely on these factors in its totality of the circumstances analysis, we do not address these factors. In any event, we agree with the district court that these factors are not relevant to Plaintiffs’ vote denial claim. Therefore, to the extent the district court did weigh these factors in its analysis, we conclude that it erred. FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 137 Factors 7 and 8. These factors are not essential to a § 2 vote denial claim and in this case, while their presence might be of some relevance, their absence is insufficient cause to justify in any respect the denial of Plaintiffs’ claim. To understand which Senate Factors might be relevant to deciding a vote denial claim, it is important to recognize the analytical distinction between vote denial and vote dilution theories. A vote dilution claim does not allege that minority voters are denied access to the polls; rather, the claim is that, although minority voters have the formal right to vote, the challenged voting scheme “operates to minimize or cancel out [the minority voters’] ability to elect their preferred candidates.”22 Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48. In other words, the focus of a vote dilution challenge is on the effectiveness of the minority plaintiffs’ votes. Naturally then, the Factors most relevant to a vote dilution claim are those that examine whether minorities have the capacity to be politically influential as a group, and, if so, whether their political influence has been weakened — for example, whether the minority group is politically cohesive, whether the white majority votes in a bloc, whether voting is racially polarized, whether minorities have succeeded in being elected to public office, and whether elected officials have been responsive to the particularized needs of the minority group. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 & n.15. Vote denial claims, in contrast, challenge laws, as amici point out, “that directly exclude otherwise qualified voters from participating.” Whereas vote dilution claims “implicate the value of aggregation,” vote denial claims “implicate the value of participation.” Tokaji, supra, at 718 (emphasis added). Thus, the primary question in such cases is not whether a “denial or abridgement” occurs, but whether such 22 “Chief examples of vote-dilution practices include at-large elections and redistricting plans to keep minorities’ voting strength weak.” Tokaji, supra, at 691. 138 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE denial is “on account of race.” In vote denial claims brought under the “results test,” the “on account of” element is proved by showing that a “discriminatory impact . . . is attributable to racial discrimination in the surrounding social and historical circumstances.”23 Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1019. Consequently, factors that examine the political strength of minority voters in the jurisdiction are of lesser relevance. Given the analytical distinction between vote dilution and vote denial, it is clear that Senate Factors 7 and 8, while relevant to the former,24 are of lesser relevance to a vote denial claim. The “extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction” (Senate Factor 7) simply has no bearing on the question whether minorities are being denied the right to vote “on account of race.” Even if a majority of the elected officials in the jurisdiction were members of the minority group, it would still violate § 2 to deny minority citizens the right to vote on discriminatory grounds. The fact that minority candidates have had success in the state does not cure the discriminatory denial of the franchise to minority voters.25 Likewise, whether elected officials have been responsive to “the particularized 23 In the challenge under review, to felon disenfranchisement laws, the “social circumstance” is the operation of the criminal justice system. See Farrakhan I, 338 F.3d at 1012, 1019-20. In Salt River, the social circumstance at issue was land ownership. See 109 F.3d at 589. 24 The Supreme Court has, in fact, stated that Senate Factor 7 is an essential factor in a vote dilution challenge — that is, a factor that must be proved for the plaintiffs to succeed. See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15. As for Senate Factor 8, the Supreme Court explained that, while proving that factor “might be supportive of a [vote dilution] challenge,” it is “ ‘not essential to’ such a claim.” Gomez, 863 F.3d at 1413 (quoting Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 48 n.15) (emphasis in original). 25 The Senate Report strongly indicates that the Senate Committee included Senate Factor 7 to help § 2 plaintiffs prove vote dilution claims. See S. Rep. No. 94-417, at 29 n.115. This lends further support to the conclusion that although it may help them do so, the plaintiffs in a vote denial case are not required to produce evidence supporting Factor 7, and may not be penalized for failing to do so. FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE 139 needs of the members of the minority group” (Factor 8) may be probative of the minorities’ ability to influence the political process, but generally does not indicate whether minorities are being denied access to the polls on account of their race. If minorities are disproportionately deprived of their right to vote, and if that disparity is caused by racial discrimination, then whether the elected officials have been responsive to minority issues is simply of little relevance.26 [15] Accordingly, the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiffs’ “failure to produce any evidence” as to Factors 7 and 8 provided any support for its grant of summary judgment to Defendants. Farrakhan, 2006 WL 1889273, at . Plaintiffs’ failure to produce evidence regarding those factors is without legal significance because proof relating to them is not necessary to establish a vote denial claim. This is especially so in a case in which a “compelling” showing of discrimination has been made. Defendants, while contending that the district court was correct to rely on the absence of evidence regarding Factor 7 and Factor 8, do not even attempt to explain why such evidence is relevant to Plaintiffs’ vote denial claim. Their unsupported assertion that all of the Senate Factors are “relevant” does not make them so.27 26 Moreover, as with Senate Factor 7, Congress made clear that proving Factor 8 “is not an essential part of plaintiffs’ case.” S. Rep. No. 94-417, at 29 n.116. Even “Defendants’ proof of some responsiveness would not negate Plaintiffs’ showing by other, more objective factors enumerated here that minority voters nevertheless were shut out of equal access to the political process.” Id. Thus, the Senate Report makes clear that Factor 8 cannot negate Plaintiffs’ showing that the disproportionate disenfranchisement of minority voters in Washington is caused by racial discrimination in the state’s criminal justice system. 27 Because “the ingenuity of such schemes” to deny minorities the right to vote “seems endless,” S. Rep. No. 97-417, at 6, we do not imply that Senate Factors 7 and 8 are never relevant to establishing vote denial claims — only that the absence of such evidence may not serve as a justification for denying them. As we have noted, in cases in which the evidence of discrimination in the surrounding social and historical 140 FARRAKHAN v. GREGOIRE