Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Excusal of Prospective Jurors Because of Their Views Opposing Capital Punishment

Text: (7a) Defendant contends in substance that the trial court erred under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16, of the California Constitution, with their impartial-jury guaranties, when it excused prospective jurors Michael J. Sullivan, Jr., Christine Giffin, and Johnnie D. Van Giesen for actual bias because of their views opposing capital punishment. In Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 [20 L.Ed.2d 776, 88 S.Ct. 1770], the United States Supreme Court implied that a prospective juror could not be excused for cause without violating a defendant's federal constitutional right to an impartial jury unless he made it unmistakably clear that he would  automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him, or that his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent [him] from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.  ( Id. at pp. 522-523, fn. 21 [20 L.Ed.2d at p. 785], italics in original.) In Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412 [83 L.Ed.2d 841, 105 S.Ct. 844], however, the court clarif[ied] Witherspoon and declared that the proper standard for excusal was whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Id. at p. 424 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 851-852], quoting Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38, 45 [65 L.Ed.2d 581, 589, 100 S.Ct. 2521].) In People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 767 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250], we adopted the Witt standard as the test for determining whether a defendant's state constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated by an excusal for cause. Thereafter, in People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 765 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260], we construed Witt in accordance with its plain terms, and beyond the factual context of Witherspoon, to state a measure of partiality that may be applied against prospective jurors in favor of capital punishment as well as those in opposition. (8) On appeal, the trial court's determination as to whether and how the prospective juror's views on capital punishment would affect his performance as a juror is entitled to deferential review. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1262 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) The general standard is substantial evidence. ( People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 809 [281 Cal. Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865].) The court's threshold finding on what those views actually are is examined under that same test. Such a finding, we have stated, is generally binding if the prospective juror's responses are equivocal ... or conflicting.... ( Ibid. ; see People v. Daniels (1991) 52 Cal.3d 815, 875 [277 Cal. Rptr. 122, 802 P.2d 906] [to similar effect]; see also People v. Fredericks (1895) 106 Cal. 554, 559 [39 P. 944] [a finding of this sort, however, will be struck down when the evidence upon the examination of the juror is so opposed to the decision of the trial court that the question becomes one of law].) The exclusion of a prospective juror in violation of Witherspoon and Witt requires automatic reversal  but only as to penalty and not as to guilt. ( Gray v. Mississippi (1987) 481 U.S. 648, 666-667 [95 L.Ed.2d 622, 638-639, 107 S.Ct. 2045] (opn. of the court); id. at pp. 667-668 [95 L.Ed.2d at pp. 638-639] (plur. opn.); id. at p. 672 [95 L.Ed.2d at p. 642] (conc. opn. of Powell, J.); see Witherspoon v. Illinois, supra, 391 U.S. at pp. 521-523 [20 L.Ed.2d at pp. 784-786] [antedating Witt ].) (7b) At individual sequestered voir dire, the People challenged prospective jurors Sullivan, Giffin, and Van Giesen because of their views opposing capital punishment. Defendant presented opposition. The trial court sustained the challenges and excused Sullivan, Giffin, and Van Giesen. After review, we find no error. Prospective juror Sullivan's views on capital punishment would, at the very least, have substantially impaired the performance of his duties as a juror. To be sure, as the trial court determined, he apparently could consider the death penalty as a reasonable possibility. But on more than one occasion during voir dire, he made plain that his feelings about the ultimate sanction would lead him to apply to the question of guilt or innocence a standard of proof higher than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Next, prospective juror Giffin's views on capital punishment would likely have prevented  and would certainly have substantially impaired  the performance of her duties as a juror. Through the beginning and middle of voir dire, she was reluctant to state her opposition to the death penalty categorically. But near the end, she declared without qualification: My decision is not going to be the death penalty. She proceeded to affirm that under no circumstances would she impose the ultimate sanction. Lastly, prospective juror Van Giesen's views on capital punishment would almost surely have prevented  and would surely have substantially impaired  the performance of her duties as a juror. Throughout voir dire, she revealed that she would all but automatically reject the death penalty and choose life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Like Giffin, she was reluctant to state her opposition categorically. But she asserted unreservedly: The way I feel now and the way I was raised and what I have always believed that nobody has the right to take a life. The judge says the state does, but if I'm on this jury, you make me the state. You make me responsible for taking someone else's life. I can't be responsible for taking another life. (Paragraphing omitted.) Defendant argues against our conclusion, but he is not persuasive. He asserts that if a prospective juror aver[s] that he will apply the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt yet ... frankly concede[s] that the prospects of the death penalty may affect ... what [he] may deem to be a reasonable doubt ( Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at p. 50 [65 L.Ed.2d at p. 593]), he could adequately perform his duties as a juror. Defendant claims that prospective juror Sullivan made such an averment. The record is otherwise. He also asserts that if a prospective juror could simply consider imposing the death penalty, he could adequately perform his duties as a juror. He claims that prospective jurors Giffin and Van Giesen could give such consideration. (9) But a juror must be able to do more, specifically, to consider imposing the death penalty as a reasonable possibility. Giffin and Van Giesen revealed an inability to do so. (7c) Throughout his argument, defendant maintains that the record does not support our result. We do not agree that voir dire was insufficient. We do agree, however, that prospective jurors Sullivan, Giffin, and Van Giesen each made certain statements that might be characterized as equivocal or ambiguous. Such statements, however, were relatively few, isolated, and unemphatic. Certainly, the trial court considered them insignificant. It effectively concluded that each of the three held views that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his or her duties as a juror. We find no reason to disagree. [7]