Opinion ID: 2718156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Terms Used in the Indictment

Text: ¶10. The indictment charged Hawkins with simple assault of a vulnerable person, set out the facts giving rise to the charge, and gave the code section. However, it charged Hawkins with “willfully, negligently[,] and feloniously” injuring Edwards. Comparing the indictment to the simple assault statute, it is not clear if Hawkins was charged under subsection (i) with 6 “purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly” injuring Edwards or under subsection (ii) with “negligently” injuring Edwards, presumably by means other than a deadly weapon. We do not dispute that the indictment was drafted inartfully, but we have held that “inartfully drafted” indictments were sufficient where the charge against the defendant was clear. Harrison v. State, 722 So. 2d 681, 686-87 (¶¶ 20-22) (Miss. 1998); Henderson v. State, 445 So. 2d 1364, 1368 (Miss. 1984). ¶11. The defense takes issue with the indictment’s charge that Hawkins “willfully, negligently[,] and feloniously” injured Edwards. First, the Court has held that the inclusion of the word “feloniously” in an indictment for simple assault, although the statute does not include the word, does not render the indictment defective. Reining v. State, 606 So. 2d 1098, 1103 (Miss. 1992). The crime for which Hawkins is charged, simple assault of a vulnerable person, is in fact a felony. ¶12. Second, use of the term “willfully” indicates that the charge was brought under subsection (a)(i), that Hawkins “purposely, knowingly[,] or recklessly” caused bodily injury to another. The Court has held that terms “willfully” and “knowingly” have substantially the same meaning in criminal statutes. Ousley, 122 So. at 732 (indictment was sufficient even though it used the words “willfully, unlawfully[,] and feloniously” rather than “knowingly” as used in the statute). See also Boyd v. State, 977 So. 2d 329, 335 (¶ 22) (Miss. 2008) (“An act ‘willfully’ done is an act ‘knowingly’ and ‘intentionally’ done.”); Moore v. State, 676 So. 2d 244, 246 (Miss. 1996) (“willfully” has the same meaning as “knowingly”). Relying on Ousley, the Court of Appeals held that the terms “wilfully and feloniously” had substantially the same meaning as “purposely or knowingly” when ruling on the sufficiency of a jury 7 instruction for aggravated assault. Davis v. State, 909 So. 2d 749, 752-53 (¶ 13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2005). ¶13. The State, however, did not argue that it brought the charge under subsection (a)(i). In fact, the State did not address the word “willfully” in its brief. It did, however, assert that the term “knowingly,” which appears later in the indictment, was meant to “give[] Hawkins the clear understanding that as a trained certified nursing assistant, proof would be made at trial that she was fully aware of the proper ways to have taken care of the victim.” The State argued that it brought the indictment under subsection (a)(ii), which provides that one “negligently causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon or other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm.” Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(1)(a)(ii). Because of the word “or” following “deadly weapon,” the State maintains that a deadly weapon is not required under subsection (ii), and that Hawkins’s conduct falls under the “other means likely to produce death or serious bodily harm” portion. ¶14. Although the State did not explain how inclusion of the word “willfully” affects its charge under subsection (a)(ii), the Court has held that “willfully” can be considered surplusage where the actions clearly show negligence. See Gray v. State, 427 So. 2d 1363, 1367 (Miss. 1983) (citing Yazzie v. State, 366 So. 2d 240 (Miss. 1979), in which the Court held that the word “willful” was surplusage in an indictment for manslaughter by culpable negligence).1 See also Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Sumner Gin Co., 156 Miss. 830, 127 So. 1 Yazzie v. State was overruled to the extent it conflicted with State v. Buckhalter, although the Court held that the cases did not actually conflict. State v. Buckhalter, 119 So. 3d 1015, 1018-19 (¶¶ 11-13) (Miss. 2013). 8 284, 286 (1930) (“[W]here a declaration charges gross or willful negligence, and the evidence shows simple negligence, there is no variance, as the charge of willfulness is regarded as surplusage.”); Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Hanes, 69 Miss. 160, 13 So. 246, 247 (1891) (“[I]f negligence is sufficiently averred, further allegations that the negligence was willful may be treated as mere surplusage.”). ¶15. In the instant case, the indictment clearly charged Hawkins with simple assault. The recitation of the relevant facts showed that Hawkins’s conduct was negligent. Therefore, the word “willfully” in the indictment was surplusage. Comparing the indictment to the statute, Hawkins could have determined that the charge was based on her negligence, and she should have been able to prepare her defense adequately.