Opinion ID: 314281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: contentions for reversal

Text: 126 Counsel representing appellant in this court are signally well-informed 8 and have made an effective presentation, as follows: 127 1. Appellant is an addict-as appears from his own testimony that he was using an average of $60 per day of heroin 9 at the time of the offense; Officer Daly's testimony that appellant was an addict; a 1969 NARA report to a judge of the then D.C. Court of General Sessions; and the April 13, 1971 NARA report of the trial judge. It was proffered that Dr. Kaufman would testify that appellant suffers, not from a mental illness, but from a mental disorder of a special character called drug addiction, that he is subject to drug dependence of morphine type as defined by the World Health Organization, 10 and that appellant was an old addict, i. e., one who continuously had not only a physiological craving but also a psychological compulsion to inject heroin. 11 128 2. Basic common law principles of criminal responsibility and capacity entitle a defendant to show that he is so far addicted to use of habit-forming narcotic drugs as to have lost the power of self-control with reference to his addiction thus rendering his drug-related actions involuntary. 129 3. Neither the statutes charged in the indictment, nor the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 preclude application of these basic principles. 130 4. If the statutes do preclude such application, then the Eighth Amendment-which embodies the same core principles or morality-bars appellant's conviction, under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, rehearing denied, 371 U.S. 905, 83 S.Ct. 202, 9 L.Ed.2d 166 (1962), and Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254, rehearing denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S.Ct. 65, 21 L.Ed.2d 185 (1968). 131 5. Appellant concludes (Br. 102): . . . [T]he compulsive acts inherent in a disease condition are no more blameworthy than having the disease itself. It is as barbarous to punish the one as the other.    While it is cruel and unusual to punish an addict for the acts inherent in his addiction, it certainly could not be argued that adequate and appropriate rehabilitative treatment, including withdrawal from heroin, is anything but humane and the preferred approach. In short, Appellant does not urge that an addict has a constitutional or any other legal right to purchase and possess heroin for injection.
132 A reflective brief filed, with leave of court, on behalf of the Washington Area Council on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse (WACADA), supports the jurisprudential argument of appellant's counsel, and further submits: 133 Our law enforcement forces are not equipped to deal with criminal behavior on the scale generated by the thousands of addicts, 17,000 officially estimated to reside in the District, who are daily (a) violating the narcotics laws and (b) engaged in other criminal activity to support the narcotics habit. The assignment of principal responsibility for dealing with drug addiction to the criminal justice system, instead of institutions better suited to deal with addiction, has produced a failure that has been expensive and intolerable to the community. 12 134 The judicial system is clogged and distorted. A 1971 study, conducted by an official of the D.C. Bail Agency, indicates that of all defendants charged with crime in the District of Columbia, approximately 50% have an indication of narcotics use, and of these 40% were charged solely with narcotics offenses, primarily possession. Even the select group released on personal recognizance show a recidivism rate for addicts, of 24%, almost twice the rate for all other offenders. However, addicts released on condition of treatment at D.C.'s NTA had a recidivism rate less than half that of other addicts. 135 The WACADA Council agrees that the criminal justice system should hold addicts who commit non-drug crimes, though with treatment rather than simple incarceration, but submits it should not reach mere possessors of drugs, and thus burden public facilities without any benefit in deterrent or rehabilitative effect. A defense of lack of power to control his drug behavior would permit treatment under, e. g., the 1953 D.C. Hospital Treatment Act, 24 D.C.Code Sec. 601 et seq. (1967), by institutions developed and designed to deal with drug addiction. 136 The Council sees a paradox, but no inconsistency, in its position that addicts should not be held criminally responsible for actions necessary to satisfy addiction, while rehabilitation centers are trying to make addicts bear more responsibility for their welfare and behavior to others, including crimes and drug behavior. While the Council would prefer a simple statutory exemption, in the situation as it exists the result we seek must come about within the context of the common law principles of 'responsibility.' So be it. We dislike the means, but we are convinced that the present situation is desperate, and the consequence of its continuation unacceptable. We therefore urge the Court to hold that Raymond Moore and others similarly situated may present the defense of their addiction    [as] the necessary first step 13 in the process of making the criminal justice system the instrumentality for identifying addicts so that they may be properly treated. . . . [T]he consequence of not confessing to the criminal law's inability to control drug addiction is that the criminal process becomes part of the problem, rather than part of the solution. (Brief at 23-24). 137