Opinion ID: 997603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grant of Summary Judgment Against Plaintiff

Text: Plaintiff Middlebrooks brought claims of race and gender discrimination under Title IX,2 Title VI,3 § 1981,4 and § 1983.5 Granting _________________________________________________________________ 2 Title IX provides that [n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance .... 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 3 Title VI provides that [n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. 4 Section 1981 provides that [a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens .... 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). 5 Section 1983 provides that [e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulations, custom, or usage, of any State or Terri- 6 Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the district court determined that Plaintiff had failed to make a prima facie case for race or gender discrimination under any of the claims. We review the district court determination de novo. In evaluating a summary judgment motion, the Court of Appeals must apply the same legal standards as the district court and view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Evans v. Technologies Applications & Service Co., 80 F.3d 954, 958 (4th Cir. 1996). Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Once the moving party discharges its burden by `showing' ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the nonmoving party then must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis in original). Summary judgment will be granted unless a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the [nonmoving party] on evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 252 (1986); see also Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that court can determine that trial is unnecessary only if facts are undisputed, or ... the dispute is of no consequence to the dispositive question). Thus, to evaluate the appropriateness of summary judgment, the Court must evaluate the elements of Appellant's Title IX, Title VI, § 1981, and § 1983 claims. Such claims are appropriately analyzed under the Title VII proof scheme, first articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Preston v. Virginia ex rel New River Comm. College, 31 F.3d 203, 207, 208 (4th Cir. _________________________________________________________________ tory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 7 1994) (holding that Title IX discrimination claim should be interpreted in accordance with principles governing Title VII); Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. State of Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying Title VII disparate treatment framework to Title VI case);6 Gairola v. Virginia Dept. of Gen. Serv., 753 F.2d 1281, 1285 (4th Cir. 1985) (Under Title VII and either § 1981 or § 1983, the elements of the required prima facie case are the same.). Under McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating a prima facie case of discrimination, which establishes a presumption of unlawful discrimination. 411 U.S. at 802. If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the court must rule in favor of the plaintiff unless the defendant provides a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-05; see also St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 (1993). If the defendant provides such an explanation, the presumption of discrimination dissolves, and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the proffered reason is a pretext to mask unlawful discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-805; see also Mitchell, 12 F.3d at 1315. Under McDonnell Douglas, Middlebrooks can establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was qualified for participation in the Program; and (3) was dismissed from the Program despite her qualifications. 411 U.S. at 802. Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff belongs to a protected class and was, indeed, terminated from the Ph.D. Program. They insist, however, that she is not qualified to remain a Ph.D. candidate. The University requires that its Ph.D. candidates in the Math Department pass two qualifying examinations before the end of their third year in the Program; after ten attempts, Middlebrooks passed no qualifying examination. Appellant insists that she failed her qualifying examinations because of the acts of racial and gender discrimination perpetrated by Defendants. As proof, she presents primarily conclusory statements and unsupported allegations that certain, named individuals at the _________________________________________________________________ 6 See also New York Urban League, Inc. v. State of New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2nd Cir. 1995) (applying Title VII test to Title VI case); City of Chicago v. Lindley, 66 F.3d 819, 830 (7th Cir. 1985) (same). 8 University had a reputation of discriminating against AfricanAmerican students. In addition, Middlebrooks complains of various incidents, including Professor Schafer's resistance to her admission into his class and undesirable testing conditions for at least one of her qualifying exams. Appellant posits that the offensive character and the cumulative effect of her alleged mistreatment raises a strong inference of discriminatory intent. Appellant does not, however, demonstrate that Professor Schafer's conduct is in any way connected to the administration of the qualifying exams or her poor performance; nor does she proffer any evidence that proves that she is, in fact, qualified to continue as a Ph.D. candidate. She does not suggest that she had mastered the material on which she was tested; nor does she offer testimony from others to that effect. See generally Gairola, 753 F.2d at 1287 (... the burden is on the plaintiff to establish that she was ... qualified ....). So, even though Plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination is not intended to be onerous, see Evans, 80 F.3d at 960, Appellant fails to establish the minimal but necessary requirements. Even if Plaintiff had established a prima facie case, she still must demonstrate that the University's explanation that she was terminated for failing her qualifying exams is mere pretext and that she was actually terminated because of her race or gender. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 941 (4th Cir. 1992). We believe that Plaintiff also has failed to satisfy this essential requirement. Plaintiff has charged that three of the ten examinations she took in an attempt to satisfy the Program's qualifying requirements were administered unfairly. For her Operations Research exam, administered August 1994, Middlebrooks claims that she did not receive credit for two problems that she answered correctly. Given Plaintiff's overall poor performance, however, even if she had received credit, it is not clear that she would have passed the exam. For a second exam, Zoology, Plaintiff asserts that she was forced to take it in an office where she was distracted by constant traffic and ongoing conversations. In addition, she maintains that another student was given a different test and was allowed to take it under more favorable conditions. In testimony, a University administrator con- 9 ceded that the venue, i.e. a busy office, was inappropriate for a qualifying exam. The administrator further admitted that it was unusual that different students would be given such different exams. While Plaintiff portrays highly unusual and inappropriate testing conditions, she does not demonstrate that they were because of her race or gender, as the relevant statutory and case law dictates. See generally Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511 (noting, in a Title VII case, that the ultimate question is whether plaintiff has proven `that defendant intentionally discriminated against [him]' because of his race) (emphasis added). Finally, Plaintiff again took the Operations Research exam in August 1995 and failed. An error appeared in one problem on the exam, causing students to spend an excessive amount of time on it. Middlebrooks requested an opportunity to re-take the exam but was refused. Since all students were given the same exam, with the same error, and presumably no other student was given an opportunity to re-take the exam, it does not seem unreasonable or unfair that Middlebrooks was not allowed to do so. More importantly, Plaintiff again presents no evidence that indicates that she was denied the chance to re-take the test because of her race or gender. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Appellant, there is no evidentiary basis to rebut Defendants' legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for dismissing her from the Program. So, even if we determined that Plaintiff established a prima facie case, which is doubtful under the facts contained in the record, she fails to prove that Defendants' explanation is pretextual.