Opinion ID: 1999588
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to submit a lesser-included offense.

Text: Prior to the submission of the case to the jury, defense counsel requested that the trial court give an instruction on the offense of resisting or obstructing an officer as that crime is defined in sec. 946.41, Stats. Defendant asserts that the denial of this request constitutes reversible error. In considering defendant's assertion, it is first necessary to determine whether or not the crime of resisting or obstructing an officer is an included crime of battery to a peace officer. The definition of included crime as applicable to the instant situation is found in sec. 939.66, Stats.: (1) A crime which does not require proof of any fact in addition to those which must be proved for the crime charged; . . . The elements which must be proven to sustain a conviction for battery to a peace officer were stated by this court in State v. Caruso (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 696, 703, 172 N. W. 2d 195, and reaffirmed in State v. Helnik (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 720, 723, 177 N. W. 2d 881: `(1) Causing bodily harm to a peace officer or fireman; `(2) The peace officer or fireman is acting in his official capacity; `(3) Where the person knows or has reason to know that the victim is a peace officer or fireman; `(4) Where the act is done with intent to cause bodily harm; `(5) Without the consent of the person so injured.' The requirement that the defendant know or have reason to know that the peace officer is, at the time, acting in his official capacity is not an element of the offense described in sec. 940.205. State v. Caruso, supra, page 702. On the other hand, such a requirement is an element of sec. 946.41, which provides: 946.41 Resisting or obstructing officer. (1) Whoever knowingly resists or obstructs an officer while such officer is doing any act in his official capacity and with lawful authority . . . . The elements of this offense are: First, that the defendant (resisted) (obstructed) an officer. Second, that the officer was doing an act in his official capacity and with lawful authority. Third, that the defendant (resisted) (obstructed) the officer, knowingly; that is, that the defendant knew or believed that he was (resisting) (obstructing) the officer while the officer was acting in his official capacity and with lawful authority. Wis J ICriminal, Part II, 1765. Because resisting or obstructing an officer requires the proof of this additional element (knowledge by the defendant that the officer was acting in his official capacity), resisting or obstructing an officer is not a lesser-included crime of battery to a peace officer. Even assuming such is a lesser-included crime, defendant has no absolute right to demand the jury be instructed thereon. The test is whether, upon a reasonable view of the evidence, it is doubtful that the greater offense has been committed, State v. Melvin (1970), 49 Wis. 2d 246, 252, 181 N. W. 2d 490; or to express it another way, there exists a reasonable basis for a conviction on the lesser charge and acquittal on the greater charge. Zebrowski v. State, supra, page 729. A reasonable view of the evidence clearly supports the conclusion that the crime alleged in the information was committed.