Opinion ID: 761805
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of Section 8(a)(1)

Text: 14 ProGalv first argues that substantial evidence was not presented to support the Board's finding that it violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act. We disagree. 15 Section 7 of the Act guarantees employees the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West 1998). Section 8(a)(1) of the Act implements those guarantees by making it an unfair practice to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights. 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(a)(1) (West 1998). 16 In NLRB v. Okun Bros. Shoe Store, Inc., 825 F.2d 102, 105-06 (6th Cir.1987) (citations omitted), this Court stated that: 17 The test for determining whether an employer has violated section 8(a)(1) is whether the employer's conduct tends to be coercive or tends to interfere with the employees' exercise of their rights. In making this determination, the Board considers the total context in which the challenged conduct occurs and is justified in viewing the issue from the standpoint of its impact upon the employees. This assessment should take into account the economic dependence of the employees on their employers, and the necessary tendency of the former, because of that relationship, to pick up intended implications of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinterested ear. 18 In this case, the Board found that ProGalv violated § 8(a)(1) of the Act by: 19 (a) Instigating and soliciting the employee drafting and circulation of a petition seeking the decertification of the Union. 20 (b) Promising benefits in the form of institution of a monthly matching contribution savings plan for employees conditioned on employees' rejection of the Union as their collective bargaining representative. 21 (c) Threatening employees with loss of benefits if the employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. 22 (d) Threatening employees with closure of its plant if the employees selected the Union as their collective-bargaining representative. 23 (e) Interrogating an employee with regard to his cooperation in the Board's investigation in this case. 24 J.A. at 11. We will address each of the Board's findings of proscribed activity under § 8(a)(1) as follows. 3 25 (a) Petition Seeking Decertification of the Union 26 It is as violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act for an employer to sponsor and participate in the circulation of a petition among employees withdrawing support from a union. NLRB v. Allen's I.G.A. Foodliner, 651 F.2d 438, 440 (6th Cir.1981); see NLRB v. Priced-Less Discount Foods, Inc., 405 F.2d 67, 69 (6th Cir.1968) (bargaining order upheld because the company assisted in the preparation and mailing of letters withdrawing union support). Conversely, in Landmark Int'l Trucks, Inc. v. NLRB, 699 F.2d 815 (6th Cir.1983), we reasoned that 'an employer may bring to the attention of its employees their right to resign from a union ... so long as the communication is free from any threat or coercion.'  Adair Standish Corp., v. NLRB, 912 F.2d 854, 860 (6th Cir.1990) (quoting Landmark, 699 F.2d at 820). Here, we find that ProGalv's conduct fell within the impermissible activity described in Allen's I.G.A., as opposed to the permissible conduct described in Landmark. 27 The Board adopted the ALJ's finding that Griggs' testimony was more credible than that of President Kelley: 28 Griggs testified that in the spring (March or April) of 1995, he found a blank petition to get rid of the Union in an envelope marked NLRB in his truck as he was leaving work at the end of the day. The next day he asked President Kelley if he had put it in his truck and Kelley said, no, and also said he could not talk about it or it would get him in trouble. Griggs showed Kelley the petition and Kelley looked at it and told Griggs to see if he could obtain some signatures on it. Griggs took it out into the shop and attempted to obtain signatures. He signed it and obtained additional signatures. He then passed it around some more and then I couldn't get anybody else to sign it. He put the petition in his notebook in the office and Kelley told him to try to get additional signatures and when he went to retrieve the petition, he was unable to find it. Kelley was called by the Respondent [NLRB] at the hearing and corroborated the foregoing testimony part but denied having given Griggs any instructions with regard to the petition. 29 J.A. at 8. 30 Based upon this finding, substantial evidence was presented to support the Board's conclusion that ProGalv violated § 8(a)(1) in instigating and soliciting the employee drafting and circulation of a petition seeking the decertification of the Union. It is not this Court's function to resolve questions of fact and credibility when there is conflict in the testimony. Turnbull Cone Baking Co., 778 F.2d at 295. This Court ordinarily will not disturb credibility evaluations because the ALJ was in the superior position of observing the witness' demeanor. Id. Here, the ALJ was impressed by Griggs' demeanor and found him to be a truthful witness. Therefore, because Griggs' testimony indicated that President Kelley played an affirmative role in procuring signatures on the decertification petition, as well as in instigating the petition by leaving it in an envelope in Griggs' truck (if not physically placing the petition there himself, at least by authorizing someone to do so), substantial evidence was presented to uphold this finding and conclusion. See NLRB v. American Linen Supply Co., 945 F.2d 1428, 1433-34 (8th Cir.1991) (citing Allen's I.G.A., 651 F.2d at 440) (the company violated § 8(a)(1) by soliciting at least one employee to withdraw from the union and twenty-six such withdrawals were subsequently made); Adair, 912 F.2d at 860 (the company violated § 8(a)(1) by posting a notice apprising union members of their right to revoke their authorization cards, and by informing the members where to procure forms to do so); Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc. v. NLRB, 863 F.2d 1292, 1299-1300 (6th Cir.1988) (the fact that the decertification petition may have originated with an employee did not purge the taint of the company's act of drafting and circulating the petition in violation of § 8(a)(1)); Allen's I.G.A., 651 F.2d at 441 (the company violated § 8(a)(1) by sponsoring and participating in the circulation of a decertification petition). 31 ProGalv argues that this finding should not be upheld because Griggs' testimony lacked credibility and because evidence of the mysterious--and (ostensibly) lost--envelope in Griggs' truck is suspect. However, as noted above, issues of witness' credibility should not be disturbed by this Court because the ALJ sits in the superior position of observing the witness as he testifies. Turnbull Cone Baking Co., 778 F.2d at 295. In addition, circumstantial evidence, such as the presence of the envelope containing the decertification petition appearing in Griggs' truck, may be considered substantial evidence sufficient to support a finding of a § 8(a)(1) violation. See NLRB v. Price's Pic-Pac Supermarkets, Inc., 707 F.2d 236, 240 (6th Cir.1983); NLRB v. G. & S. Metal Prods., 489 F.2d 441, 443 (6th Cir.1973). 32 ProGalv also argues that Kelley's role in the drafting and circulation of the decertification petition merely amounted to ministerial assistance, and was therefore proper. ProGalv contends that Kelley simply provided information in response to employee questions as to whether they could be fined for crossing the picket line, and as to how the language of the decertification letter should read. We disagree inasmuch as this Court has found, under similar facts, that such ministerial assistance rises to the level of coercive conduct sufficient to constitute unfair labor practice. See Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc., 863 F.2d at 1299-1300. ProGalv's reliance upon Landmark Int'l Trucks, Inc., 699 F.2d at 820 is misplaced because in that case, the Court held that an employer may bring to the attention of its employees their right to resign from the union, but the employer must do so in an atmosphere that is not coercive. Here, the totality of the circumstances indicates a coercive environment, where the petition was found in Griggs' truck and Kelley instructed Griggs to circulate another petition when the original was lost. See Okun Bros. Shoe Store, Inc., 825 F.2d at 105-06 (conduct is considered in the total context in which it occurred). Accordingly, we conclude that ProGalv's argument is without merit. 33 (b) Promising Benefits 34 The Board also adopted the ALJ's finding that ProGalv violated § 8(a)(1) by promising its employees an additional benefit if they rejected the Union: 35 I further find that Griggs' testimony should be credited with respect to Kelley's promise of benefits by promising to Griggs the consideration of the institution of a monthly matching contribution savings plan if the employees rejected the Union (telling Griggs that his idea sounded good but would have to be discussed after all this was over). This promise by Kelley also violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. 36 J.A. at 10. ProGalv contends that this finding should not be upheld because Kelley testified that the idea--that had the employees rejected the Union the $25 that had previously been deducted from their paychecks for Union dues would instead be deducted and placed in a savings fund and matched by ProGalv--did not arise until after the decertification petition was submitted. Alternatively, ProGalv argues that, even if Griggs' recollection of when his conversation with Kelley took place is correct (i.e., before the decertification petition was submitted), Kelley's statement that, [the matching plan] sounded like a good idea, but we'd have to talk about it after all of this was over, did not rise to the level of an inducement for the employees to decertify the union; rather, it was a mere promise to talk about the idea in the future. 37 We disagree with ProGalv's contention where the Board's finding is supported by substantial evidence. As stated, Griggs' version of the timing of the promise made by Kelley should be credited and accepted by this Court because the ALJ found Griggs a more credible witness. Turnbull Cone Baking Co., 778 F.2d at 295 (credibility determinations should not be disturbed by this Court); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corp. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 1288, 1290 (6th Cir.1984) (demeanor-based credibility determinations are entitled to considerable weight). With that in mind, Kelley's statement clearly falls under the realm of substantial evidence of proscribed activity under § 8(a)(1). We find that this is particularly so when considering this Court's holding in Allen's I.G.A., 651 F.2d at 440-41: 38 The granting or withholding of benefits in order to discourage union activity is proscribed by Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409, 84 S.Ct. 457, 459, 11 L.Ed.2d 435 (1964), the Supreme Court stated: The danger inherent in well-timed increases in benefits is the suggestion of the fist inside the velvet glove. Employees are not likely to miss the inference that the source from which future benefits must flow and which may dry up if it is not obliged. Applying these principles, we hold that substantial evidence supports the Board's finding that Allen's violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act by sponsoring and participating in the circulation of the petition among employees withdrawing support from the Union and by announcing improved benefits in order to undermine the Union. 39 Likewise, here it is unlikely that the employees in this case would have missed the inference held in Kelley's statement that if they decertified the Union, it would result in an increased benefit. Accordingly, ProGalv's argument must fail. 40 (c) Threat of Loss of Benefits ; and 41 (d) Threat of Plant Closure 42 The Board adopted the ALJ's finding that a statement made by Morgan to Griggs--in response to Griggs' statement that the employees were thinking of bringing back the Union--constituted coercive and proscribed activity under § 8(a)(1). Morgan's statement, which the ALJ found to be coercive, was that Werner would lock the doors on this place and they could kiss the investment fund good bye. Specifically, the ALJ found that 43 under either Griggs' or Morgan's version of the conversation concerning the locking of the gates if the employees sought to bring the Union back, that Respondent [ProGalv] violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act as it is clear this was a threat of plant closure if the employees sought to exercise their Section 7 rights to be represented by the Union. I further find that Morgan did state as testified by Griggs that the employees could kiss the investment fund goodbye and that Respondent [ProGalv] thereby also violated Section 8(a)(1) as this constituted a threat of the loss of a future benefit. 44 J.A. at 10. ProGalv argues that these findings should not be upheld because even if Morgan made the statement as Griggs contends, the statement was nothing more than a single offhand remark that cannot rise to the level of coercion in violation of § 8(a)(1). In support of its claim, ProGalv relies upon a recent decision from the Court Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, where the Court found that a supervisor's comment, I hope you guys are ready to pack up and move to Mexico, did not constitute a threat of plant closure. See NLRB v. Champion Labs., 99 F.3d 223, 229 (7th Cir.1996). 45 It is well settled that an employer violates § 8(a)(1) of the Act by threatening to withhold benefits and by threatening to close the business for engaging in union activities. See NLRB v. Hovey Elec., Inc., 964 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir.1992); Indiana Cal-Pro, Inc., 863 F.2d at 1297; Price's Pic-Pac Supermarkets, 707 F.2d at 239-40; Allen's I.G.A., 651 F.2d at 440-41. As such, Morgan's threat, made in response to Griggs' statement that some of the employees were thinking of bring back the Union, was substantial evidence of this type of proscribed activity. ProGalv argues that Morgan's single offhanded remark should not be considered coercive; however, when viewed under a totality of the circumstances, Morgan's statement could be considered coercive by a reasonable mind. See Okun Bros. Shoe Store, Inc., 825 F.2d at 105-06 (conduct must be viewed in total context); Turnbull Cone Baking Co., 778 F.2d at 295 (evidence is considered substantial if it is adequate in a reasonable mind). Although ProGalv argues that Morgan made the comment in an offhanded fashion and that it therefore cannot be considered coercive, ProGalv's argument fails where this Court has found that even when such a threat is made in a seemingly lighthearted fashion, it still rises to the level of coercive because, in reality, threatening comments are often couched in ostensibly friendly or even humorous terms. See NLRB v. Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d 535, 550 (6th Cir.1984). 46 Furthermore, ProGalv's reliance upon the Seventh Circuit's decision in Champion Labs., 99 F.3d at 229, (finding that, although coming close to the edge of what is acceptable under the Act, a single, offhanded remark regarding a plant closure if the employees voted for the union did not rise to the level of proscribed coercive activity), is misplaced. The context in which the threatening statement was made in Champion Labs. is distinguishable from that of the instant case. 4 For example, in Champion Labs., the court found that the statement about moving the facility to Mexico was made by a supervisor in the context of a casual banter, and was nothing more than a paraphrase of what another--admittedly anti-union person--had already said. Id. However, the context in which the instant threat of plant closure was made was in response to a serious comment; was not done in a joking or paraphrased manner; and was made by the chief executive officer (Morgan) and not a mere supervisor. Furthermore, for reasons set forth in Judge Ripple's dissent to the Champion Labs. majority decision, see supra note 4, we are not persuaded by the Seventh Circuit's decision. Accordingly, ProGalv's claims regarding these findings fail. 47 (e) Interrogating an Employee Regarding Union Involvement 48 Finally, the Board accepted the ALJ's finding that ProGalv violated § 8(a)(1) when Morgan interrogated Griggs: I find that based on my crediting of Griggs' testimony concerning his interrogation by Harvey Morgan about the NLRB investigation that Respondent [ProGalv] violated Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. J.A. at 10. 49 ProGalv argues that this finding should not be upheld because Morgan's question to Griggs did not rise to the level of coercive interrogation. Specifically, ProGalv argues that Morgan's question to Griggs, Oh, by the way, did you have fun talking with the NLRB yesterday?, is not coercive conduct, but rather a smart-aleck throw-away line that did not have any negative effect. The Board argues that the circumstances under which the question was asked clearly amount to a § 8(a)(1) violation of coercive conduct: Morgan, as chief executive officer, questioned Griggs when he returned to the plant after providing the Board with an affidavit, and added Boy, [union representative] Turnbull and them [union] guys are going to hang you out to dry, and did so in a sarcastic tone. We agree with the Board. 50 It is well-settled that an employer violates the Act by interrogating its employees about their union activities, NLRB v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 750 F.2d 524, 527 (6th Cir.1984). While questioning employees about a union is not per se unlawful, the Board's assessment of coercive effect, if reasonable, should be sustained. Price's Pic-Pac Supermarkets, Inc., 707 F.2d at 239 (citations omitted). The basic test used by the Board for evaluating the legality of an interrogation is  'whether under all of the circumstances the interrogation reasonably tends to restrain, coerce, or interfere with rights guaranteed by the Act.'  Dayton Typographic Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 778 F.2d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir.1985) (quoting Rossmore House, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 198, 116 L.R.R.M. 1025, 1026 (1984) enforced sub nom. Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.1985)). Furthermore, [w]hen assessing the coercive tendency of an interrogation, the NLRB looks at, among other things, the background, the nature of the information sought, the questioner's identity, and the place and method of interrogation. Id. 51 Here, the question was asked in a background cloaked with tension regarding the Union's decertification and question as to whether it would be reinstated; it was asked in a sarcastic fashion and sought information regarding Griggs' activity at the NLRB; chief executive officer Morgan was the person asking the sarcastic question; and the questioning took place at the plant. Under these facts, substantial evidence was presented for the ALJ to find that Morgan's questioning amounted to coercive interrogation. See E.I. DuPont De Nemours, 750 F.2d at 528 (finding that a supervisor's act of questioning an employee as to why he supported the union, as well as the supervisor's statement to the employee that he had supervisor potential if he did not support the union, rose to the level of coercive conduct). As ProGalv claims, although it is true that [i]nfrequent, isolated and innocuous inquires of a relatively small number of employees, standing alone, do not constitute interference, restraint or coercion within the meaning of section 8(a)(1) of the Act, Homemaker Shops, Inc., 724 F.2d at 548-49, because Morgan's question to Griggs had the probable effect of interfering with Griggs' free exercise of his right to organize and bargain collectively, the question at issue should be considered proscribed conduct. Id.Accordingly, ProGalv's claim on this finding is also without merit. 52 In summary, the ALJ's findings, as adopted by the Board, regarding ProGalv's violations of § 8(a)(1) of the Act, were supported by substantial evidence under a totality of the circumstances and should therefore be upheld. In arriving at this conclusion, we have considered, as we must, the axiom that: It is hornbook law of course that we must uphold and enforce the decision of the Board if substantial evidence on the record as a whole supports its findings, even though we might justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before the court de novo. Okun Bros. Shoe Store, Inc., 825 F.2d at 105.