Opinion ID: 1456526
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficient evidence supports Warman's conviction for the narcotics conspiracy

Text: Warman challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for conspiracy to sell narcotics. The relevant question on appeal is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir.2005) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). In making this determination, however, we may not reweigh the evidence, reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, or substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Id. To obtain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove: (1) an agreement to violate drug laws; (2) knowledge of and intent to join the conspiracy; and (3) participation in the conspiracy. Martinez, 430 F.3d at 330-31. [P]roof of a formal agreement is not necessary; `a tacit or material understanding among the parties' will suffice. Id. (citing United States v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 970-71 (6th Cir.1997)) (quoting United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 161 (6th Cir.1990)). The existence of a conspiracy `may be inferred from circumstantial evidence that can reasonably be interpreted as participation in the common plan.' Id. (quoting Avery, 128 F.3d at 971). Once a conspiracy is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, however, a defendant's connection to the conspiracy need only be slight, and a defendant's knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from his conduct and established by circumstantial evidence. Id. (quoting United States v. Salgado, 250 F.3d 438, 447 (6th Cir.2001)). A conspiracy requires: `(1) An object to be accomplished. (2) A plan or scheme embodying means to accomplish that object. (3) An agreement or understanding between two or more of the defendants whereby they become definitely committed to cooperate for the accomplishment of the object by the means embodied in the agreement, or by any effectual means.' United States v. Gibbs, 182 F.3d 408, 420 (6th Cir.1999) (quoting United States v. Bostic, 480 F.2d 965, 968 (6th Cir.1973)). Drug distribution conspiracies are often `chain' conspiracies such that agreement can be inferred from the interdependence of the enterprise. One can assume that participants understand that they are participating in a joint enterprise because success is dependent on the success of those from whom they buy and to whom they sell. United States v. Henley, 360 F.3d 509, 513 (6th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Spearman, 186 F.3d 743, 746 (6th Cir.1999)). Moreover, the government must show the willful membership of [a] defendant in the conspiracy, but the government need not prove that the defendant committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Gardner, 488 F.3d 700, 711 (6th Cir.2007). For a defendant [t]o be found guilty of conspiracy, the [government] must prove that [the defendant] was aware of the objects of the conspiracy, and that he voluntarily associated himself with it to further its objectives. Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 421 (quoting United States v. Hodges, 935 F.2d 766, 772 (6th Cir.1991)). The defendant `need not be an active participant in every phase of the conspiracy, so long as he is a party to the general conspiratorial agreement.' Id. (quoting Hodges, 935 F.2d at 773 (quoting United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1986))). A buyer[-]seller relationship alone is not enough to establish participation in the conspiracy, but further evidence indicating knowledge of and participation in the conspiracy can be enough to link the defendant to the conspiracy. Id. We have explained that conjecture and surmise regarding what a defendant may have intended or known is insufficient to support a conviction. The government is required to present evidence of the defendant's intent, knowledge and agreement to join a conspiracy. Absent such evidence, the government's case will not succeed merely because there is something fishy about the defendant's conduct. United States v. Coppin, 1 Fed.Appx. 283, 291 (6th Cir.2001) (finding evidence insufficient to sustain conviction for aiding and abetting possession of cocaine with intent to distribute where no drugs were found on defendant's person or in his vehicle and government put forth no evidence that he knew of the drug transactions at issue); see also Gibbs, 182 F.3d at 408 (vacating several defendants' convictions because though they sold drugs, the government put forth no evidence that they had agreed to participate in the charged conspiracy, which necessarily involved excluding outsiders). The record contains conflicting evidence of Warman's relationship with the Outlaws. On the one hand, there is evidence that Warman was not a participant in the OMC conspiracy. For instance, Armstrong, a major player in the Indianapolis chapter, testified that he would have known if Warman were a drug dealer and stated that Warman was only a recreational drug user. (JA 507.) Both Tipton and Bloor corroborated Armstrong's testimony, stating that although they had used drugs with Warman many times, they had never seen him sell drugs. Moreover, law enforcement seized only a relatively small quantity of cocaine from Warmanthe 3.5 grams of cocaine FBI investigators discovered in Warman's residencegiving rise to an inference that the drugs were merely for personal use. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 69 Fed. Appx. 213, 216 (6th Cir.2003) (noting that a small quantity of drugs implies personal consumption rather than an intent to distribute). In addition, Walters's testimony that Johnny said that he and Warman chose not to join the OMC so that they would not have to pay club dues or share profits from their drug sales arguably supports Warman's non-participation in the OMC conspiracy. However, other evidence suggests that Warman was a significant player in the OMC conspiracy who stood to inherit the bulk of the Green region cocaine business from Hannum. As mentioned above, Dilts testified that in 1999 he observed Warman at S & S with scales, plastic baggies, and cocaine, and that at Eisenhauer's, he saw Warman give drug-filled plastic baggies to Lawson and Hannum. See United States v. Bell, 516 F.3d 432, 446 (6th Cir.2008) (finding that intent to distribute could be inferred where police found scales, baggies, and other drug paraphernalia in defendant's possession). Dilts also recalled seeing Hannum hand Warman $2000 in cash at Eisenhauer's. See Stewart, 69 Fed.Appx. at 216 (noting that evidence that defendant possessed a large amount of cash when apprehended supported conclusion that he intended to distribute the drugs in his possession). Dilts further testified that Hannum told him that he and Warman were partners in the cocaine trade and that the two of them regularly traveled to Florida to obtain cocaine for resale. Walters testified that Johnny told him that he regularly processed large amounts of cocaine for Warman, and that Warman and Hannum regularly purchased one to two kilograms of cocaine from a supplier in Florida to sell to customers in and around Dayton. Also, when combined with the foregoing testimony, the evidence of Warman's association with the OMC the cocaine, OMC t-shirts, guns, plaque, and photographs seized from his house; witness testimony that he was friendly with and regularly partied with Outlaws at Eisenhauer's; and the fact that Warman employed Outlaws at S & S and rented properties to themsupports a finding that Warman was a member of the OMC conspiracy. Because much of the incriminating evidence against Warman consisted of hearsay testimony from Dilts, Watkins, and Walters, which the district court admitted under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay ruleWarman's sufficiency-of-the-evidence claims largely depend on his evidentiary arguments, to which we now turn.