Opinion ID: 2518281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: cabaness' wrongful constructive termination claim fails as a matter of law

Text: ¶ 77 The district court found that Cabaness' wrongful constructive termination claim failed because the claim sounded in tort and Cabaness failed to allege any violations of a clear and substantial public policy. We agree. ¶ 78 Under Utah law, all employment relationships entered into for an indefinite period of time are presumed to be at-will, meaning that either the employer or the employee may terminate the employment for any reason (or no reason) except where prohibited by law. Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71, ¶ 3, 148 P.3d 945 (internal quotation marks omitted). [A]n employer's decision to terminate an employee is presumed to be valid. Id. In order to overcome this presumption, a discharged employee must show that: (1) there is an implied or express agreement that the employment may be terminated only for cause or upon satisfaction of [some] agreed-upon condition; (2) a statute or regulation restricts the right of an employer to terminate an employee under certain conditions; or (3) the termination of employment constitutes a violation of a clear and substantial public policy. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, Cabaness' employment was for an indefinite term and was therefore presumed to be at-will. Therefore, in order to succeed on any wrongful termination claim, Cabaness must demonstrate that one of the three exceptions to the at-will doctrine apply. ¶ 79 Neither Cabaness nor Bountiful City has argued that the second or statutory exception to the at-will doctrine applies to the facts of this case, and we therefore do not address it. Instead, Cabaness argues that his wrongful constructive termination claim falls under the first of the three exceptions to the at-will rule described above, i.e., that his constructive discharge was in violation of an implied or express employment agreement. As we have already determined, certain provisions of the Employee Manual created an implied contract between Cabaness and Bountiful Power. However, those provisions do not create any obligations on the part of Bountiful Power with respect to the process of terminating employees. Further, none of Cabaness' allegations in the complaint, nor any of his arguments before us, cite to any relevant portions of the Employee Manual regarding Bountiful Power's contractual obligations with respect to its decisions regarding the termination of employees. Instead, the thrust of Cabaness' argument is that Bountiful Power's failure to comply with its contractual obligation to provide a non-hostile working environment resulted in his wrongful constructive termination. While this may be an appropriate argument for consequential damages resulting from a breach of contract under Cabaness' implied contract claim, it does not satisfy the first exception to the at-will doctrine. [13] We therefore look to whether Cabaness' wrongful constructive termination claim succeeds under the third exception, the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. ¶ 80 In order to succeed under the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine, an employee must demonstrate that he or she was discharged in violation of clear and substantial public policy. Id. ¶ 4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Cabaness admits that he has not attempted to allege or plead any clear and substantial public policy, therefore he has failed to meet his burden under the third exception to the at-will doctrine. ¶ 81 Because Cabaness' wrongful constructive termination claim does not fall under one of the three exceptions to the at-will doctrine, we affirm the district court's holding that Cabaness' wrongful constructive termination claim fails as a matter of law.