Opinion ID: 2525572
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Manifest necessity in cases involving improper defense argument and jury bias

Text: First among the factors to consider in the manifest necessity calculus is the source of the difficulty that led to the mistriali.e., whether the difficulty was the product of the actions of the prosecutor, defense counsel or trial judge, or were events over which the participants lacked control. 5 J. Israel, N. King & W. LaFave, supra, § 25.2(c) at 654. Here, the defense, not the prosecution, caused the mistrial. The prosecution gave the defense advance warning it objected to Glover's statement being used, and the State did not seek a mistrial, despite the defense's repeated violations of the court's order excluding Glover's statement, until the court called a recess during the closing argument and called for argument on mistrial. Further, the district court based its mistrial decision on its determination that the jury's impartiality had been unacceptably compromised. The district court's manifest necessity determination thus deserves the highest level of deference. See Chapman, 524 F.3d at 1082. The lead Supreme Court case addressing manifest necessity for a mistrial produced by defense counsel's improper argument is Arizona v. Washington , [5] In Washington, defense counsel gave an opening statement in which he told the jury the defendant was being retried because the state had suppressed and hidden evidence at the first trial. 434 U.S. at 499, 98 S.Ct. 824. The Arizona state trial court judge determined this statement could not be proven by admissible evidence, that it carried the risk of impermissibly tainting the jury, and declared a mistrial on these bases. Id. at 510-11, 98 S.Ct. 824. The Ninth Circuit held this violated Washington's constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy. State of Arizona v. Washington, 546 F.2d 829 (1976). The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that the extent of the possible [juror] bias cannot be measured, that some trial judges might have proceeded with the trial after giving the jury appropriate cautionary instructions, and, thus, that [i]n a strict, literal sense, the mistrial was not `necessary.' Washington, 434 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. 824. Nevertheless, the overriding interest in the evenhanded administration of justice requires that we accord the highest degree of respect to the trial judge's evaluation of the likelihood that the impartiality of one or more jurors may have been affected by the improper comment. Id. Neither party has a right to have his case decided by a jury which may be tainted by bias. Id. at 516, 98 S.Ct. 824. Where the trial judge determines that improper advocacy by the defense has created an unacceptable risk of tainting the jury, the public's interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments must prevail over the defendant's valued right to have his trial concluded before the first jury impaneled. Id. (quotation omitted). Glover argues that the defense's transgressions in this case are minor compared to those in Washington. Perhaps. It is also reasonable to view the conduct in the two cases as functionally similar, since both involve accusations that the prosecution, in effect, hid evidence. Indeed, in terms of the risk of juror bias, this case is more serious given the number of times defense counsel put the inadmissible evidence before the jury, and given the fact the improper argument went to a core contested issue in the case (self-defense), in addition to discrediting the prosecution's tactics and strategy. In this case, as in Washington, the defense first introduced the improper evidence in opening statement. Unlike Washington, no mistrial was declared or even sought at that point. Crediting the defense's good faith, the State simply objected to the argument and the PowerPoint slide and its objections were sustained. However, after this exchange and after the court again ruled Glover's statement inadmissible, defense counsel returned to the statement during Prieto's cross-examination, when he held the unmarked envelope up for Prieto to identify as containing a videotape of the excluded interview. These displays apparently had a visible effect on the jury, because the court made specific note of counsel having paraded it around in front of them in dismissing the likelihood that a curative instruction could dispel the prejudice. Finally, in closing argument, defense counsel argued the inadmissible evidence directly as devastating, and persisted in doing so after the district court instructed him to stop. In Washington, by contrast, only one improper comment was made in opening, before the district court deemed it improper, and the defense did not openly defy the court in continuing to argue the point. [6] As Washington recognizes, the fact that the defendant or his counsel engaged in the misconduct that caused the mistrial does not necessarily trump the defendant's double jeopardy rights. However, it diminishes them considerably by increasing the level of deference accorded the district court's mistrial determination. See 4 J. Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused § 29:18 (3d ed.2009) (stating as a general rule that, [w]hen a mistrial is necessitated by the behavior of the accused, retrial will not be barred by the protection against double jeopardy [and that t]he same is true when the mistrial is occasioned by the actions of defense counsel). To hold otherwise would give unscrupulous defense counsel . . . an unfair advantage. Washington, 434 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 824. [W]hen defense counsel employs tactics which would be reversible error if used by a prosecutor the result may be an unreviewable acquittal. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9 n. 6, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985). To add to this incentive a rule readily allowing a double jeopardy challenge to bar retrial when a district court grants a mistrial based on a defense attorney's intentional defiance of an order in limine is thus inappropriate. Washington, 434 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 824 (noting that [t]he adoption of a stringent standard of appellate review in this area [of improper argument by defense counsel] . . . would seriously impede the trial judge in the proper performance of his `duty, in order to protect the integrity of the trial, to take prompt and affirmative action to stop . . . professional misconduct') (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 612, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (last alteration in original). Unless the district judge acted irrationally or irresponsibly in granting the mistrial, therefore, Glover's double jeopardy challenge fails. Washington, 434 U.S. at 514, 98 S.Ct. 824. Other courts, confronted with double jeopardy challenges to defense-produced mistrials, have similarly recognized that [t]he trial court has a duty to ensure that all parties have a fair trial and has the authority to grant a mistrial where injustice is caused to either party in a criminal case and is especially empowered to avoid the absurdity of a defendant benefitting[benefiting] from the prejudicial error he created. Pleas v. State, 268 Ga. 889, 495 S.E.2d 4, 6 (1998); see Banks v. State, 230 Ga.App. 258, 495 S.E.2d 877, 881 (1998) (upholding mistrial based on defense counsel introducing evidence prohibited by the rape shield statute in violation of the court's pretrial order); Porter v. Ferguson, 174 W.Va. 253, 324 S.E.2d 397, 401 (1984) (denying a defendant's writ of prohibition against retrial where the trial court granted a mistrial based on defense counsel twice violating an in limine order by asking a key prosecution witness if she had been arrested); People v. Burtron, 376 Ill. App.3d 856, 315 Ill.Dec. 600, 877 N.E.2d 87, 89, 94-95 (2007) (upholding trial court's grant of a mistrial based on its assessment of the prejudice to the State as a result of defense counsel's argument that the defendant would be willing to take a polygraph; noting that the district court was not obligated to tolerate what he found was intentional misconduct by defense counsel); Pavey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 692, 701 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (upholding grant of mistrial based on defense counsel's improper characterization of State's plea agreement with a key prosecution witness to the jury; noting that where the defendant's counsel's conduct was purposeful, the defendant is hard-pressed to claim that he has been subjected to double jeopardy in new proceedings brought about by his intentional misconduct in the original proceedings) (citation omitted); State v. Levison, 1 Neb.App. 1051, 510 N.W.2d 495, 499 (1993) (upholding the trial court's grant of a mistrial based on defense counsel's reference during opening to the state having previously dismissed the charges against the defendant). See also Hylton, 103 Nev. at 426, 743 P.2d at 628 (noting that [a]n important factor to be considered in assessing a double jeopardy clause challenge based on improper argument is the need to hold litigants on both sides to standards of responsible professional conduct in the clash of an adversary criminal process).