Opinion ID: 1358030
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exoneration, Duty, and Foreseeability

Text: Signal next argues that it was entitled to exoneration from liability because the damage to the Interstate 10 bridge was not a foreseeable consequence of its negligent mooring of the MISS TIFF and the JACK KING. [11] It has framed the issue of foreseeability as determinative of its duty to MDOT. With respect to Signal's duty, the district court held that the damages caused were foreseeable in that MDOT was within the class of those for which damage would be expected if barges moored on the Pascagoula River broke free during a hurricane, i.e. those owning property near the Pascagoula River. In re Signal Int'l, No. 1:05-CV-477, slip op. at 13 n. 12. Determination of the tortfeasor's duty is a question of law and thus a function of the court that we review de novo. See Canal Barge Co. v. Torco Oil Co., 220 F.3d 370, 376 (5th Cir.2000); Lloyd's Leasing Ltd. v. Conoco, 868 F.2d 1447, 1449 (5th Cir.1989); Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. C.F. Bean Corp., 833 F.2d 65, 67 (5th Cir.1987). [12] Maritime tort law governs the question of whether Signal owed a duty to MDOT. See Florida Fuels, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 6 F.3d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1993). The analysis of a maritime tort is guided by general principles of negligence law. Consol. Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 67 ( citing Casaceli v. Martech Int'l, Inc., 774 F.2d 1322 (5th Cir.1985); Daigle v. Point Landing, Inc., 616 F.2d 825 (5th Cir. 1980)). Under general tort principles, a tortfeasor is accountable only to those to whom a duty is owed. Id. (citing, e.g., Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 431 F.2d 100 (5th Cir.1970)); see also Canal Barge, 220 F.3d at 376 (holding that to establish maritime negligence, a plaintiff must demonstrate, inter alia, that there was a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff). Thus, if Signal owed no duty to MDOT, it is not liable for the allision and is entitled to exoneration. See Consol. Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 67; Watz, 431 F.2d at 104; see generally CLARENCE MORRIS & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., MORRIS ON TORTS 127 (2d ed.1980) (commenting that this form of no-duty rule interdicts trial of the fault issue; it relieves [the defendant] from liability even though [the defendant] is at fault.). Duty ... is measured by the scope of the risk that negligent conduct foreseeably entails. Consol. Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 67 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also id. (the determination of duty involves a number of factors, including most notably the foreseeability of the harm suffered by the complaining party. (citing, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 53 (5th ed.1984))); see generally 1 DOBBS, supra, at 466 (The defendant is liable for harms he negligently caused so long as a reasonable person in his position should have recognized or foreseen the general kind of harm the plaintiff suffered.); 3 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS § 18.2, at 762 (3d ed. 2007) (The obligation to refrain from that particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous.); MORRIS, supra, at 162 (Only when damages to someone could have been anticipated by a reasonable person in defendant's position is the defendant negligent.). Foreseeability obviously marks the limits placed on a defendant's duty; the precise meaning of the concept is vital. Consol. Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 67. The test [of foreseeability] is whether the harm that does occur is within the scope of danger created by the defendant's negligent conduct. 3 SPEISER, supra, at 71; see also 1 DOBBS, supra, at 463 ([F]oreseeability is a short hand expression intended to say that the scope of the defendant's liability is determined by the scope of the risk he negligently created.). Although we sometimes speak in terms of probability, we do so not in a mathematical, more-likely-than-not usage, but in terms of the natural and probable risks that a reasonable person would likely take into account in guiding her practical conduct. See Republic of Fr., 290 F.2d at 401; Consol. Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 68 ([F]oreseeability ... includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful person would take account of it in guiding practical conduct. (quotation marks and citation omitted)); see generally 3 HARPER, supra, at 768 ([I]n this inquiry foreseeability is not to be measured by what is more probable than not, but includes whatever is likely enough in the setting of modern life that a reasonably thoughtful person would take account of it in guiding practical conduct.). The scope of danger incorporates not only those [natural] forces which are constantly and habitually operating but also those forces which operate periodically or with a certain degree of frequency. Republic of Fr., 290 F.2d at 400 (quotation marks and citation omitted); see generally 3 HARPER, supra, at 765 ([W]e look to see what natural forces and what human conduct should have appeared likely to come on the scene, and we weigh the dangerous consequences likely to flow from the challenged conduct in the light of these interventions.). The emphasis in this determination is on the general types of harm and classes of persons within the scope of danger created by the negligence while accounting for probable or anticipated natural forces. See Republic of Fr., 290 F.2d at 400 (It is sufficient that the defendant would reasonably have anticipated consequences or an injury of the general nature of that which ensued. (quotation marks omitted)). Consistent with these general principles, in Consolidated Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 68, we defined the concept of foreseeability by reference to general classes of harms and victims: We perceive a harm to be the foreseeable consequence of an act or omission if harm of a general sort to persons of a general class might have been anticipated by a reasonably thoughtful person, as a probable result of the act or omission, considering the interplay of natural forces and likely human intervention. The critical question in this case is whether the allision with the Interstate 10 bridge was a harm of the general sort to an entity of a general class that a reasonably thoughtful person might have anticipated to result from Signal's negligent mooring of the MISS TIFF and the JACK KING in light of the anticipated natural forces wrought by Hurricane Katrina. As the question makes clear, our analysis does not focus on the particular allision site, but the general risk of allision; it does not focus on MDOT, but on the class of property owners in the paths available to the runaway barges. We agree with the district court that the risk of allision with a fixed structure located within the reach of the anticipated storm surge was foreseeable if the barges broke free due to negligent mooring. Allision with fixed structures is one of the principal risks of a vessel, moored inland, that breaks from its negligently executed moorings. For example, in In re Kinsman Transit, 338 F.2d 708, 722 (2d Cir.1964), Judge Friendly's learned discussion of the role of foreseeability in defining duty in admiralty cases led the Second Circuit to hold that a ship insecurely moored in a fast flowing river is a known danger not only to herself but to the owners of all other ships and structures down-river, and to persons upon them. Considering the topology of the area, the Interstate 10 bridge was within the general class of fixed structures in the low-lying areas near the Pascagoula River against which the MISS TIFF and JACK KING could foreseeably allide when propelled by the anticipated storm surge, and the general class of persons for which the harm of allision was foreseeable were those possessing fixed or other property within the path of the anticipated surge, including, in this case, MDOT. Signal does not dispute this general sort of foreseeable harm and these foreseeable plaintiffs, and we find the risk of these sorts to be dispositive of its duty. To support a lack of foreseeability, Signal instead recites the fact that the MISS TIFF and the JACK KING traveled 4.7 miles over typically non-navigable land before alliding with the Interstate 10 bridge. In asking us to hold that it had a duty only if it could have foreseen the specific risk of allision with this particular portion of the Interstate 10 bridge, Signal proposes too narrow of an inquiry. See 1 DOBBS, supra, at 467 (When the defendant unleashes large physical forces such as those associated with ... large ships broken loose from their moorings..., he creates risks that injury could be caused in diverse ways, too numerous and particular to foresee in detail .... The[se] cases call[ ] for the rule that if I foresee the risk in general, I need not foresee the details.); MORRIS, supra, at 165 (The exact consequences do not have to be foreseen.); 3 SPEISER, supra, at 71 (It is not essential that the (initial) tortfeasor be able to foresee the exact nature and extent of the injuries or the precise manner in which the injuries occur.). We find no principled reason to break with our precedent that guides our determination of duty by reference to the general sorts of harms that are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the scope of danger risked by the negligence involved. See Consol. Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 68; accord Agni v. Weinshall ( In re City of New York ), 522 F.3d 279, 284 (2d Cir.2008) (The probability that the injury would occur in this case... is very small. But the risk, while small, is undoubtedly foreseeable. The City freely admits that it was aware of the possibility ..., just as any reasonable person would be aware of that possibility.); In re Kinsman Transit, 338 F.2d at 722 (The shipowner and the wharfinger in this case having thus owed a duty of care to all within the reach of the ship's known destructive power, the impossibility of advance identification of the particular person who would be hurt is without legal consequence. (citations omitted)). Even when we move beyond the general sort of harms risked by the negligence and delve into the details of this case to determine whether the allision was a probable result considering the interplay of natural forces, we find that neither the distance covered by the barges nor the lack of typically navigable water around the allision site rendered the allision unforeseeable. The test of foreseeability is not measured against normal conditions, but those that were anticipated or reasonably should have been anticipated. See Consol. Aluminum, 833 F.2d at 68 (holding that foreseeability incorporates the interplay of natural forces); In re Kinsman Transit, 338 F.2d at 724 ([W]here ... the damage was caused by just those forces whose existence required the exercise of greater care than was takenthe current, the ice, and the physical mass of the [vessel], the incurring of consequences other and greater than foreseen does not ... provide a reasoned basis for insulation.) (citing HART AND HONORE CAUSATION IN THE LAW 234-48 (1959)). In this case, the approaching hurricane, the expected height and predicted movement of the storm surge, and the topology of the Pascagoula River basin gave rise to the need to moor the barges and made this allision a foreseeable consequence of negligence in that mooring. Signal expected and prepared for a Category 4 hurricane. [13] That preparation was designed to secure its vessels and facilities against the risk of 155 miles-per-hour winds and eighteen-feet storm surges. The hurricane winds experienced at the mooring site were not that strong, reaching Category 1 speeds at eighty to ninety miles per hour with gusts from 100 to 110 miles per hour. At the mooring site, the peak storm surge corresponded to that of a Category 4 hurricaneas was anticipatedwith depths of fourteen to sixteen feet. [14] Waves were likely two feet high. Thus, the hurricane exposed the barges to anticipated forces. Signal also foresaw that, in a large storm, its vessels would escape from the mooring site, despite the shelter offered by that location. The MISS TIFF and the JACK KING were moored in a shallow portion of the east branch of the Pascagoula River. The site was partially protected by a ridge of land and trees on the north side. Nonetheless, Signal's own witnessesincluding Schnoor; Gene Rice, Signal's engineering and emergency preparedness manager; Bingle; and Michael J. Schiehl, one of Signal's expert witnessestestified that if the vessels broke free due to faulty mooring, they would have expected them to head north into the marshes outside of the sheltered mooring area. Thus, they anticipated that the barges could leave the mooring site and the general confines of the Pascagoula River's east branch. Once unmoored and outside of the mooring area, however, the topology of the Pascagoula River basin combined with the anticipated height of the surge made it foreseeable to a reasonably thoughtful person that the barges could reach the Interstate 10 bridge. Navigable waters extended well north of Interstate 10. The Interstate 10 bridge crosses both branches of the river, and the area between the two river branches forms a flat, open, lowland channel of marshes, grassy wetlands, creeks, bayous, and lakes. In fact, the area between the mooring site and the allision is sufficiently flat that a mere quarter-mile upriver from the mooring site, the Interstate 10 bridge is visible over the marshes. Signal's naval architect and one of its experts, Alfonso M. Sotres, testified that during the surge, the water would fill in the Pascagoula River channel and move to the north-northwest. Both Schiehl and Tanner testified that with a ten- to fifteen-feet surge, they would expect an unobstructed waterway right to the bridge. There were no natural or man-made obstructions or barriers between the mooring site and the Interstate 10 bridge. [15] Because of the lack of other obstructions north of the mooring site, the Interstate 10 bridge was arguably the most likely target for a runaway vessel, as it served as a backstop to the marshlands. The allision in this case occurred in a way that was consistent with these predictable natural forces. During the surge, the water flowed upriver, at first following the course of the existing waterways, and then filling the entire basin. As might be expected in an eighteen-feet storm surge over a low-lying marshland, the surge rendered the lower Pascagoula River like a shallow lake: It was like a lake in the surge, according to Schiehl. That the allision occurred in an area that was typically marshland did not render the allision unforeseeable because a reasonable person could expect that a storm surge would inundate normally dry land. [16] The MISS TIFF and the JACK KING broke from the MR. T. and allided with the Interstate 10 bridge before the maximum height of the surge. The storm surge produced tremendous force and was moving the barges at two to three miles per hour at the time of allision. [17] The allision probably occurred between 8:00 a.m. and 9 a.m. on August, 29, 2005. At the time, the surge was around six to eight feet and its current pushed in a northwest direction. The exact course of the MISS TIFF and the JACK KING is unknown, although their starting point to end point trajectory followed the channel from the mooring site to the north or north-northwest. [18] While the distance that these barges covered and the exact allision point were undoubtedly surprising to those involved, we find that it was foreseeable to a reasonable person considering the interplay of the anticipated hurricane forces and the Pascagoula River basin's known topology. Based on the facts of this case, [w]e go only so far as to hold that where, as here, the damages resulted from the same physical forces whose existence required the exercise of greater care than was displayed and were of the same general sort that was expectable, unforeseeability of the exact developments ... will not limit liability. In re Kinsman Transit, 338 F.2d at 726. [19] We hold that Signal owed a duty to MDOT because allision with the Interstate 10 bridge in the Pascagoula River basin was foreseeable. The allision was a harm of the general sort to an entity of the general class that might have been anticipated by a reasonably thoughtful person as a probable consequence of the negligent mooring of the barges on the Pascagoula River in light of the interplay of the expected storm surge and the surrounding topology. The district court thus did not err in holding that Signal was not entitled to exoneration.