Opinion ID: 2066513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: application of the heightened scrutiny standard

Text: The test for determining whether the reasons given by the state in defense of the statutory classification at issue are sufficiently strong to satisfy heightened judicial scrutiny is settled. Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must determine whether the proffered justification is exceedingly persuasive. The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the [s]tate. . . . The [s]tate must show at least that the [challenged] classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives. . . . The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or invented post hoc in response to [the] litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of [the groups being classified]. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) United States v. Virginia, supra, 518 U.S. at 532-33, 116 S.Ct. 2264. Thus, [i]n cases of this genre, [United States Supreme Court] precedent instructs that `benign' justifications proffered in defense of categorical exclusions will not be accepted automatically; a tenable justification must describe actual state purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact differently grounded. Id., at 535-36, 116 S.Ct. 2264; see also Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 472, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (The government must establish that the classification is substantially related to important and legitimate objectives . . . so that valid and sufficiently weighty policies actually justify the departure from equality. Heightened scrutiny . . . seek[s] to assure that the hostility or thoughtlessness with which there is reason to be concerned has not carried the day. By invoking heightened scrutiny, the [c]ourt recognizes, and compels lower courts to recognize, that a group may well be the target of the sort of prejudiced, thoughtless, or stereotyped action that offends principles of equality found in [the equal protection clause]. [When] classifications based on a particular characteristic have done so in the past, and the threat that they may do so remains, heightened scrutiny is appropriate. [Citation omitted.]). The defendants posit two essential reasons why the legislature has prohibited same sex marriage: (1) to promote uniformity and consistency with the laws of other jurisdictions; and (2) to preserve the traditional definition of marriage as a union between one man and one woman. [78] The defendants contend that these reasons justify the statutory prohibition against same sex marriage under the heightened standard of review that is applicable to statutes that discriminate against quasi-suspect classes. [79] The defendants' first proffered justification, that is, uniformity and consistency with other state and federal laws, may be rationally related to the state's interest in limiting marriage to opposite sex couples, but it cannot withstand heightened scrutiny. Although the defendants maintain that this reason is sufficient to satisfy their demanding burden, they have identified no precedent in support of their claim. Indeed, beyond the mere assertion that uniformity and consistency with the laws of other jurisdictions represent a truly important governmental interest, the defendants have offered no reason why that is so, and we know of none. In the absence of such a showing, the defendants cannot prevail on their claim that the state's interest in defining marriage as most other jurisdictions do is sufficiently compelling to justify the discriminatory effect that that definition has on gay persons. It is abundantly clear that preserving the institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman is the overriding reason why same sex couples have been barred from marrying in this state. [80] We therefore must determine whether this reason alone is sufficient to justify the statutory ban on same sex marriage. Before doing so, however, we note that the defendants expressly have disavowed any claim that the legislative decision to create a separate legal framework for committed same sex couples was motivated by the belief that the preservation of marriage as a heterosexual institution is in the best interests of children, or that prohibiting same sex couples from marrying promotes responsible heterosexual procreation, two reasons often relied on by states in defending statutory provisions barring same sex marriage against claims that those provisions do not pass even rational basis review. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 359-60, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1. In the present case, the defendants' sole contention is that the legislature has a compelling interest in retaining the term marriage to describe the legal union of a man and woman because that is the definition of marriage that has always existed in Connecticut. . . and continues to represent the common understanding of marriage in almost all states in the country. The defendants acknowledge that many legislators hold strong personal beliefs . . . about the fundamental nature of marriage as being between a man and a woman, and that no measure providing equal rights for same sex couples would have passed the legislature unless it expressly defined marriage in those terms. Although we acknowledge that many legislators and many of their constituents hold strong personal convictions with respect to preserving the traditional concept of marriage as a heterosexual institution, such beliefs, no matter how deeply held, do not constitute the exceedingly persuasive justification required to sustain a statute that discriminates on the basis of a quasisuspect classification. That civil marriage has traditionally excluded same-sex couplesi.e., that the `historic and cultural understanding of marriage' has been between a man and a womancannot in itself provide a [sufficient] basis for the challenged exclusion. To say that the discrimination is `traditional' is to say only that the discrimination has existed for a long time. A classification, however, cannot be maintained merely `for its own sake' [ Romer v. Evans, supra, 517 U.S. at 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620]. Instead, the classification ([that is], the exclusion of gay [persons] from civil marriage) must advance a state interest that is separate from the classification itself [see id., at 633, 635, 116 S.Ct. 1620]. Because the `tradition' of excluding gay [persons] from civil marriage is no different from the classification itself, the exclusion cannot be justified on the basis of `history.' Indeed, the justification of `tradition' does not explain the classification; it merely repeats it. Simply put, a history or tradition of discriminationno matter how entrencheddoes not make the discrimination constitutional. . . . (Citation omitted.) Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 395, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting); cf. Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, supra, 440 Mass. at 348, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Greaney, J., concurring) ([t]o define the institution of marriage by the characteristics of those to whom it always has been accessible, in order to justify the exclusion of those to whom it never has been accessible, is conclusory and bypasses the core question [that the court has been] asked to decide). Indeed, the fact that same-sex couples have traditionally been prohibited from marrying is the reason [the action challenging the ban on same sex marriage] was commenced; it cannot be converted into the dispositive reason it cannot succeed. In re Marriage Cases, supra, 49 Cal.Rptr.3d at 750 (Kline, J., concurring and dissenting). Thus, when tradition is offered to justify preserving a statutory scheme that has been challenged on equal protection grounds, we must determine whether the reasons underlying that tradition are sufficient to satisfy constitutional requirements. Tradition alone never can provide sufficient cause to discriminate against a protected class, for [neither] the length of time a majority [of the populace] has held its convictions [nor] the passions with which it defends them can withdraw legislation from [the][c]ourt's scrutiny. Bowers v. Hardwick, supra, 478 U.S. at 210, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Furthermore, discrimination against one group also cannot be justified merely because the legislature prefers another group. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 882 n. 10, 105 S.Ct. 1676, 84 L.Ed.2d 751 (1985); see also Hernandez v. Robles, supra, 7 N.Y.3d at 394, 821 N.Y.S.2d 770, 855 N.E.2d 1 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting) ([t]he government cannot legitimately justify discrimination against one group of persons as a mere desire to preference another group). Without sound justification for denying same sex couples the right to marry, it therefore may be true, as Justice Scalia has asserted, that `preserving the traditional institution of marriage' is just a kinder way of describing the [s]tate's moral disapproval of same-sex couples. Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 601, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Moral disapproval alone, however, is insufficient reason to benefit one group and not another because statutory classifications cannot be drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law. Romer v. Evans, supra, 517 U.S. at 633, 116 S.Ct. 1620. Thus, just as a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group is not a legitimate basis for a statutory classification; (internal quotation marks omitted) Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc ., supra, 473 U.S. at 447, 105 S.Ct. 3249; so, too, is moral disapprobation an inadequate reason for discriminating against a disfavored minority. See Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 539 U.S. at 577, 123 S.Ct. 2472. As the United States Supreme Court has stated more than once, [p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 80 L.Ed.2d 421(1984); accord Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 448, 105 S.Ct. 3249; see also Bowers v. Hardwick, supra, 478 U.S. at 212, 106 S.Ct. 2841 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Palmore for same proposition). The defendants nevertheless maintain, in accordance with the teaching of Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 660 A.2d 742 (1995), that this court should be extremely hesitant to choose sides in the policy debate over same sex marriage by enshrin[ing] one policy choice as a matter of constitutional law. Id., at 614, 660 A.2d 742. The defendants contend that the authority to define marriage rests with the people and their elected representatives, and the courts should not appropriate to themselves the power to change that definition. Although we reaffirm the aforementioned principles articulated in Ganim, we do not agree that those principles dictate the outcome of the present case. In Ganim, this court was required to determine whether the state had an affirmative duty under the state constitution to provide subsistence benefits to the poor. Id., at 558-59, 660 A.2d 742. In declining to recognize such a duty, we stated, inter alia, that, [a]lthough we do not foreclose the possibility that unenumerated rights may inhere in our state constitution, we are unpersuaded that our constitution obligates the state to provide its citizens with economic subsistence benefits. Id., at 593, 660 A.2d 742. We further stated that [o]ur state and nation's continuing attempt to grapple with the complex societal problem of poverty is indicative of the intricacies of the problem. On the one hand . . . some legislators believe that the best way to help the indigent is to limit entitlement programs. On the other hand. . . other people contend that such policies are misguided, as they will only increase malnutrition, crime, substance abuse and general human suffering. . . . [W]e are extremely hesitant to choose sides in this policy debate and to enshrine one policy choice as a matter of constitutional law. . . . Although we are sympathetic to the plight of indigent persons, the [c]onstitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 614, 660 A.2d 742. Ganim, however, did not involve an equal protection challenge to the legislative action at issue. In Ganim, rather, we were asked to recognize a new fundamental and unenumerated right under the state constitution, an exercise of authority that quite properly required great restraint lest we create rights without convincing evidence of their existence. See id., at 560, 660 A.2d 742; cf. Washington v. Glucksberg, supra, 521 U.S. at 720, 117 S.Ct. 2258 (courts should be reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due process by extending constitutional protection to an asserted right or liberty interest that heretofore has not been so protected [internal quotation marks omitted]). The present case requires that we apply well established equal protection principles to determine whether gay persons are a quasi-suspect class. Because gay persons meet all of the criteria, they are entitled to recognition as a sensitive class and, along with such recognition, the right to heightened judicial protection from laws that discriminate against them. [81] That recognition itself, however, does not alter the nature of marriage. It is only because the state has not advanced a sufficiently persuasive justification for denying same sex couples the right to marry that the traditional definition of marriage necessarily must be expanded to include such couples. If the defendants were able to demonstrate sufficient cause to deny same sex couples the right to marry, then we would reject the plaintiffs' claim and honor the state's desire to preserve the institution of marriage as a union between a man and a woman. In the absence of such a showing, however, we cannot refuse to follow settled equal protection jurisprudence merely because doing so will result in a change in the definition of marriage. [82] Contrary to the suggestion of the defendants, therefore, we do not exceed our authority by mandating equal treatment for gay persons; in fact, any other action would be an abdication of our responsibility. See, e.g., Sheff v. O'Neill, 238 Conn. 1, 13, 678 A.2d 1267 (1996) (it is the role and the duty of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature has fulfilled its affirmative obligations within constitutional principles). In sum, the state has failed to establish adequate reason to justify the statutory ban on same sex marriage. Accordingly, under the equal protection provisions of the state constitution, our statutory scheme governing marriage cannot stand insofar as it bars same sex couples from marrying.