Opinion ID: 3010036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: Patricia A. Lyon sued her employer, Whisman & Associates, an accounting firm which is a Delaware corporation, and its president James A. Whisman, in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, charging that they failed to pay her overtime wages as required by the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207(a). As a matter of convenience we will refer to both defendants as Whisman. Lyon's complaint also included Delaware contract and tort claims charging that Whisman failed to pay her a promised bonus on time or in full. At trial Lyon prevailed on all three grounds. Whisman then appealed, challenging only the judgment on the tort claim. We must vacate the judgments on both of the state law claims, however, because the claims did not share a common nucleus of operative fact with the FLSA claim, and thus the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over them supplemental to its federal question jurisdiction over the FLSA claim.1 We set forth the facts and the aspects of the procedural history necessary for resolution of the jurisdictional issue.2 Lyon began working as a bookkeeper for Whisman in January 1988 on an at-will basis for hourly wages. Lyon and Whisman soon became embroiled in a dispute over a bonus that Whisman promised to pay Lyon at the end of 1988; by 1989 Lyon planned to find a new job. Whisman, however, threatened to rescind the bonus if Lyon left its employment. Although Whisman eventually did pay Lyon a bonus, she charges that the payment was late and was for less than the promised amount. After Lyon left Whisman's employment she filed a threecount complaint alleging that it had (1) violated the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a), by failing to pay overtime wages; (2) violated Delaware contract law by paying a bonus smaller than promised; and (3) violated Delaware tort law by threatening to withhold a vested bonus if she left its employ. 1 . Since the initial notice of appeal invokes [appellate] jurisdiction over the whole case, we properly may consider the propriety of the state contract judgment despite the fact that Whisman appealed only from the tort judgment. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 943 F.2d 335, 344 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 1167 (1992). 2 . Because of procedural concerns which we need not recount, Whisman filed a notice of appeal and amended notices of appeal in a successful effort to ensure that we would have appellate jurisdiction. We have consolidated the appeals. The district court had federal question jurisdiction over Lyon's FLSA claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Lyon asserted that it had pendent federal jurisdiction over the state law claims in counts two and three. Neither the district court nor Whisman questioned this assertion of pendent jurisdiction which, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1367, we usually will call supplemental jurisdiction. Since the district court did not have diversity jurisdiction, it could entertain the state-law claims only by exercising supplemental jurisdiction. At trial Lyon won on all three counts. She recovered $731.20 on the contract claim and $5,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages on the tort claim.3 We cannot ascertain what she recovered on the FLSA claim as the docket sheets do not reflect the amount and the parties make no reference to it in their briefs. Whisman appealed only from the judgment on count three, the Delaware law tort claim. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.