Opinion ID: 78057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Young Apartments Has Standing Based on Its Own Injury.

Text: Young Apartments' first cause of action alleges that Jupiter enacted and enforced the Overcrowding Ordinance in order to harass landlords who provide affordable housing to Hispanic immigrants in the Center Street area. Although Jupiter's alleged animosity toward its Hispanic residents is at the heart of this claim, Young Apartments seeks to remedy its own injury. Courts have routinely found that a business has standing to bring § 1983 claims against state officials who are harming its business by discriminating against its customers. This rule of law is based on the uncontroversial principle that it is unconstitutional for a state actor, motivated by discriminatory animus, to interfere with an individual's right to contract or associate with members of a protected class. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 151-52, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237, 90 S.Ct. 400, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969). This Court's ruling in Baytree of Inverrary Realty Partners v. City of Lauderhill, 873 F.2d 1407 (11th Cir.1989), illustrates this principle. Plaintiff Baytree, a real estate developer, claimed that the defendant city had refused to amend its zoning ordinance in order to prevent Baytree from developing low-income housing. Baytree filed a civil rights suit against the city which alleged that the zoning decision was racially discriminatory. This Court found that Baytree had standing to make this claim based on its own injury, in language that is well suited to the current case: The defendants argue that there is no standing in this case, however, because of the so-called prudential limitations. These prudential principles recognize, inter alia, that even a plaintiff who has satisfied the Article III requirements must still assert his own legal rights and interests, and not those of third parties. [ See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 474-75, 102 S.Ct. 752, 759-60, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982).] The district court held that Baytree, a non-minority developer, had no standing because it was asserting the rights of hypothetical third persons. Whether non-minority developers have standing to pursue civil rights claims which allege that a local government's zoning decisions have a discriminatory adverse effect on racial minorities is an issue left open by the Supreme Court. [ See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 & n. 9, 97 S.Ct. 555, 562-63 & n. 9, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).] That, however, is not the case here, for Baytree argues its own injury from zoning decisions which are motivated by racial animus, not the injury that would be incurred by prospective tenants. Baytree, 873 F.2d at 1408-09. Similarly, Young Apartments has standing to allege that it was injured by Jupiter's discriminatory actions, regardless of whether such claims might also vindicate the rights of its immigrant tenants. Other courts have similarly found that a non-minority plaintiff has standing to allege that it was injured by defendants' discriminatory animus toward third parties. The non-minority plaintiff's own injury is sufficient to confer standing, separate from the question of whether the non-minority plaintiff also has standing to vindicate the rights of third parties. See Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409, 1415 (4th Cir.1983) (concluding that non-minority housing developer had standing to make an equal protection claim under § 1983, because if defendants singled out [plaintiff] for disadvantageous treatment because of his willingness to house minority tenants, then [plaintiff] in his own stead suffered injury to his right to be free from official discrimination); Des Vergnes v. Seekonk Water Dist., 601 F.2d 9, 17 (1st Cir.1979), vacated on other grounds, 454 U.S. 807, 102 S.Ct. 81, 70 L.Ed.2d 76 (1981) (finding that real estate corporation has standing under § 1983 to allege that state municipal corporation discriminated against it for its willingness to sell housing to low-income and minority families); Pagliuco v. City of Bridgeport, No. 3:01-CV-836, 2005 WL 3627409, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33738, at -17 (D.Conn. Dec. 13, 2005) (finding that club owners have standing to bring equal protection claims under § 1983 alleging they were singled out for enforcement because of their African-American clientele; explaining that prudential bar against third-party standing is not relevant because [p]laintiffs are not attempting to vindicate the rights of their clientele. They are asserting their own right to be free from unequal enforcement of the laws based on discriminatory criteria  namely the race of their patrons.); Hallmark Developers, Inc. v. Fulton County, No. 1:02-cv-01862-ODE, 2004 WL 5492706, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30616, at  (N.D.Ga. Sept. 27, 2004) (finding that plaintiff housing developers have Article III standing to vindicate, at a minimum, their own rights under § 1983 based on allegations that discriminatory zoning decisions prevented development of housing for low-income and minority residents); Pisello v. Town of Brookhaven, 933 F.Supp. 202, 212 (E.D.N.Y.1996) (finding that management company had standing to maintain equal protection claims under § 1983 where plaintiff alleged it was singled out for enforcement actions due to its efforts to place minority tenants in local rental housing); Puglisi v. Underhill Park Taxpayer Assoc., 947 F.Supp. 673, 689 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (finding that non-minority landlord had standing to vindicate his own rights under § 1983 based on allegations that he was targeted for enforcement in effort to drive out his African-American tenants). [5] As the First Circuit explained in the Des Vergnes case: [A] State may not punish a non-white for having social contacts with a black. Likewise it may not through one of its creatures, punish or discriminate against a corporation for its willingness, past or present, to make contracts with blacks. And if it does so, then the person so punished or discriminated against has a § 1983 right of action. Des Vergnes, 601 F.2d at 17 (citations omitted). Because Young Apartments alleges that it was directly injured by Jupiter's enactment and enforcement of the Overcrowding Ordinance, it has standing  on its own behalf  to challenge the allegedly discriminatory nature of Jupiter's actions.