Opinion ID: 2310940
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Curative Act

Text: There is one argument that would have absolutely defeated Ethel's motion for summary judgment on Counts I and II and required a trial on the allegations in her complaint, and possibly on Glenda's counterclaim as well, but it was never raised by Glenda in her response to the motion. Nor was it raised in the Court of Special Appeals or in Glenda's petition for certiorari, although counsel conceded at oral argument before us that he was aware of it. Md.Code (1974, 1996 Repl.Vol.), § 4-109(b) of the Real Property article, provides that, as to a deed recorded after January 1, 1973, any failure to comply with the formal requisites, including a defective acknowledgment, has no effect unless it is challenged in a judicial proceeding commenced within six months after [the deed] is recorded. The deed in question was recorded in March, 1992. This action was not filed until December, 1992. To the extent that Ethel's claim rested upon the alleged defective acknowledgment, which was the sole basis for her motion for summary judgment, it is unquestionably barred by § 4-109. The problem for us is that the issue of the curative statute was not raised in the petition for certiorari or in the briefs, and it is therefore not really before us. For the reasons shortly to be explained, we shall reverse the judgment entered on Counts I and II, as affirmed by the Court of Special Appeals, on the issues raised in the petition. Had the curative statute been properly raised in the circuit court, neither we nor the Court of Special Appeals would have been put to the trouble of answering what would essentially have been a moot point.