Opinion ID: 1175747
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Narrowly Drawn Injunction

Text: [6] A state clearly may serve its legitimate interests, but it must do so by narrowly drawn regulations designed to serve those interests without unnecessarily interfering with First Amendment freedoms. (Citations omitted.) Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 637, 63 L.Ed.2d 73, 100 S.Ct. 826 (1980). Thus, although an injunction barring all speech might constitute an unconstitutional prior restraint, Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 75 L.Ed. 1357, 51 S.Ct. 625 (1931), a reasonable place restriction narrowly tailored to serve a significant state interest does not violate the First Amendment. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654, 69 L.Ed.2d 298, 101 S.Ct. 2559 (1981). To determine whether the necessary nexus exists, the court must compare the identified state interest with the terms and effect of the injunctive relief. As set forth above, the State has a compelling interest in maintaining ingress and egress of its citizens into and out of medical buildings to permit convenient access to medical care. Likewise, the State has a compelling interest in protecting a woman's ability to effectuate her constitutional right to obtain an abortion by mitigating the harassing effect of antiabortion picketers. The trial court's place restriction requires picketers to restrain their activities to Stevens Avenue, away from the building's entrance and the sidewalk fronting the building. This place restriction clearly serves the State's interest. Under the terms of the injunction, all interference with ingress and egress has been eliminated. Furthermore, restriction of the picketing to Stevens Avenue can be expected to mitigate the severe emotional impact otherwise experienced by many patients, especially women who are visiting the Medical Building for abortion-related services. Thus, the only question is whether the injunctive relief was tailored as narrowly as possible to serve the State's interest. With respect to the State's interest in maintaining ingress and egress, the injunction arguably could be narrowed without compromising that interest. The injunction could (1) limit the number of picketers, (2) require them to remain a certain distance from the walkway leading to the entrance, (3) require them to picket in single file, or (4) all of the above. By narrowing the injunction, the State could serve its significant interest in maintaining convenient access to medical care without unduly limiting the picketers' expressive activities. In Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc., 110 Misc.2d 369, 442 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1981), a New York trial court enjoined antiabortion picketers from demonstrating or picketing on the steps and plaza area of an abortion clinic. On appeal, the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, struck down this portion of the injunction on the ground that it was overly broad and unnecessarily restricted peaceful picketing and demonstrating ... Parkmed Co. v. Pro-Life Counselling, Inc., 91 A.D.2d 551, 552, 457 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1982). Likewise, some might argue that the injunction at issue in this case is broader than necessary, thereby prohibiting peaceful, controlled picketing that does not impede ingress or egress. Nonetheless, focusing upon the State's interest in protecting a woman's constitutional right of privacy, we believe the injunction is tailored as narrowly as possible to effectuate that interest. An injunction which permitted any antiabortion picketing on the Sixth Avenue sidewalk would not adequately serve the State's compelling interest in protecting a woman's constitutional right of privacy from the coercive impact generated by the presence of the picketers in front of the Medical Building. In the absence of a place restriction, women visiting the clinic for abortion-related services would be forced to walk a gauntlet of placard-carrying antiabortionists. Even if all picketers agreed to refrain from using harassing language, it is difficult to ascertain what constitutes harassment in the apprehensive mind of a woman coming face-to-face with the picketers. By restraining picketing to Stevens Avenue, the court can avoid conjecture on this point, knowing that the woman's right of privacy is protected to the extent permissible under the First Amendment.