Opinion ID: 1244833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Error

Text: Historically, the common law right of allocution provided capital defendants โ who were incompetent to testify and not entitled to counsel โ an opportunity to plead for their lives, and until the defendant had a chance to speak, the court could not properly pronounce sentence. See Ball v. United States, 140 U.S. 118, 129-31, 11 S.Ct. 761, 765-66, 35 L.Ed. 377 (1891). Perhaps because of the fairness of this practice, the common law eventually extended the right to all criminal defendants. Today, despite modern innovations in criminal procedure that allow defendants to testify and to have the assistance of counsel, the ancient common law right of allocution exists as a right by statute or rule in most states, including Utah, as well as in the federal system. See Utah R.Crim.P. 22(a); Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(a)(1)(C). Notably, the high courts of many states with statutes preserving the practice of allocution have insisted that the right be held inviolate. In this case, the lead opinion, although correctly asserting that [m]ost other jurisdictions that recognize the right of allocution consider it to be statutory [rather than constitutional] in nature, ignores the fact that in recent years these courts have resisted all requests to assess the harmlessness of a denial of allocution and instead have used a per se practice of requiring a new penalty hearing. For example, the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that failure to grant allocution renders [the sentence] invalid and explained that the defendant had a right of allocution prior to sentencing which cannot be withheld from him. People v. Emig, 177 Colo. 174, 493 P.2d 368, 369-70 (1972). The Alaska Supreme Court stated, [T]here is no substitute for the impact on sentencing which a defendant's own words might have if he chooses to make a statement. Mohn v. State, 584 P.2d 40, 44 (Alaska 1978). The New Mexico Supreme Court concluded that failure to [give the defendant an opportunity to speak before sentencing] renders the sentence invalid. Tomlinson v. State, 98 N.M. 213, 215, 647 P.2d 415, 417 (1982). The Rhode Island Supreme Court stated that violation of the right to allocution would require this court to remand the case for resentencing. State v. Nicoletti, 471 A.2d 613, 618 (R.I. 1984). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court in its memorandum opinion in Van Hook v. United States, 365 U.S. 609, 81 S.Ct. 823, 5 L.Ed.2d 821 (1961), apparently held that on direct appeal a defendant who was not offered an opportunity to make a statement prior to sentencing was entitled to resentencing. See also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 429 n. 6, 82 S.Ct. 468, 472, 7 L.Ed.2d 417 (1962). The above decisions, all invoking a per se rule of resentencing when a trial court has denied a defendant's statutory right of allocution, demonstrate that allocution continues to play a unique and important role in criminal sentencing, despite innovations in criminal procedure that permit defendants to testify and to have counsel. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, None of these modern innovations lessens the need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation. Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct. 653, 655, 5 L.Ed.2d 670 (1961). Although most of the above cases involved noncapital sentencing, their rationale is only strengthened in a capital case. The nature of capital sentencing, particularly the constitutional requirement that a convicted capital defendant have an unrestricted opportunity to present mitigating evidence, see, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, 875, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2964, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); State v. Wood, 648 P.2d 71, 86 (Utah), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988, 103 S.Ct. 341, 74 L.Ed.2d 383 (1982), leads me to conclude that if a trial court has denied allocution erroneously, this error typically will create more prejudice to a capital defendant than to a noncapital defendant. As it was originally, allocution today is of the utmost importance in permitting defendants to plead for their lives. The State has conceded that Utah Code Ann. ง 77-35-22 (now Utah R.Crim.P.22(a)), which provides that before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, required the court to allow Young to speak to the jury before it retired to deliberate his sentence. Having conceded the statutory error, the State argues only that it was harmless error not meriting a new sentencing trial. I disagree and conclude that it is at least reversible error, if not error per se, under our statutory harmless error standard. The lead opinion has failed to acknowledge the State's concession of statutory error. Understandably, once the lead opinion has determined that even under a constitutional error standard, the denial of allocution to Young was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, those joining in it would be free to ignore whether statutory error occurred. Instead, however, they decide, sua sponte and despite the State's concession, that in fact no statutory error occurred here because the trial court satisfied section 77-35-22 when it permitted Young to address the trial judge after sentencing. Particularly in light of this court's recent opinion in State v. Andrews, 843 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Utah 1992), concluding that [i]n substance and effect, the verdict of the jury is the sentence, the lead opinion's conclusion today is unsupportable. The right of allocution contemplates permitting a convicted defendant to speak prior to the fixing of sentence in order to provide the defendant a chance to present a plea in mitigation. See, e.g., Green, 365 U.S. at 304, 81 S.Ct. at 655. In capital prosecutions in Utah, as in most states, the jury actually determines the defendant's sentence, and the judge has no discretion to modify the verdict on sentencing. See Andrews, 843 P.2d at 1028. Therefore, if a jury determines sentence and a statute has established a capital defendant's right of allocution, the defendant must have the opportunity to make this plea to the jury. Allocution in a capital sentencing trial after the jury has returned its verdict on sentencing is a meaningless formality, no more than an empty gesture. Tomlinson, 647 P.2d at 417; see J. Thomas Sullivan, The Capital Defendant's Right to Make a Personal Plea for Mercy: Common Law Allocution and Constitutional Mitigation, 15 N.M.L.Rev. 41, 56-60 (1985) [hereinafter J. Thomas Sullivan]. Furthermore, allocution in precisely the form Young requested, not the lead opinion's postverdict allocution, comports most closely with Utah's death penalty statute. After stating that at sentencing the parties may present evidence of any fact either in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty, the statute provides, The state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death. Utah Code Ann. ง 76-3-207(2). If the defendant has no personal entitlement to argue to the jury, one would expect the statute to permit the state's attorney and the defendant's attorney to present argument or, in the alternative to permit the state and the defendant to present argument. Therefore, one obvious implication of the literal language in Utah's death penalty statute is that it permits the defendant personally to address the sentencer as part of Utah's extensive sentencing procedure. In footnote 179, the lead opinion quotes a case asserting that allocution in its original common law form had nothing to do with afford[ing] an opportunity to present mitigating evidence or to plead for leniency. In fact, for centuries allocution has served exactly this role, and Utah now expressly preserves this role in its allocution rule, which states, Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in mitigation of punishment. Utah R.Crim.P. 22(a). Because by statute allocution is a right to introduce a mitigating statement and because capital defendants are entitled to present to the sentencing jury any mitigating information, courts must permit allocution at the sentencing phase, when requested, rather than postverdict. Accord People v. Davis, 794 P.2d 159, 191-92 (Colo.1990) (interpreting allocution statute identical to Utah's rule as establishing right of capital defendant to make statement to sentencing jury), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1018, 111 S.Ct. 662, 112 L.Ed.2d 656 (1991). Thus, the only question I believe this court should address regarding the statutory error claim is whether the error is reversible or harmless. We have stated that statutory error is reversible when a reasonable likelihood exists that absent the error, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant. State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1230 (Utah 1989). When the error occurs in a penalty trial in which the jury voted unanimously for death, this can only mean that there must be a reasonable likelihood that one of the twelve jurors would not have voted for death had the error not occurred. We also have explained that this reasonable likelihood standard is met when, as a result of the error, our confidence in the outcome is undermined. Id. The State bases its harmless error contention on two points: (1) the over-whelming evidence of aggravation; and (2) the fact that Young's proffered statement did not add anything to the evidence presented through other witnesses. For both of these reasons, the State suggests that Young cannot meet the reasonable likelihood standard. The lead opinion similarly concludes, after one paragraph of discussion, that given the many aggravating circumstances and defendant's presentation of days of testimony in mitigation, Young's allocution statement was not likely to influence the result and its potential impact upon a jury was minimal at best. The application of this calculus in a capital sentencing proceeding is astonishing. It is simply inconceivable, given the nature of our process for imposing capital punishment, that a defendant's personal statement would not add anything to the jury's understanding and view of his character, his crime, and his life. As many of the cases cited above adequately express, there is no substitute for a defendant's personal statement. Mohn, 584 P.2d at 44. The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. Green, 365 U.S. at 304, 81 S.Ct. at 655. The verbal content of the statement could be completely duplicative of evidence otherwise introduced, and yet the statement would not be cumulative, because it would convey to the jury intangible personal qualities of the defendant that the jury can experience and assess in no other way. Furthermore, in this case the content of the proffered statement was not duplicative of evidence already introduced. It included Young's recognition that he had made a mistake. The lead opinion asserts that Young showed no remorse. In fact, however, the proffered statement did contain an implicit plea for forgiveness, and had Young personally made the statement, the jury, rather than this court, would have been left to evaluate the existence and depth of his remorse. The statement also included his assessment of his ability to work and contribute to the community. It included an expression of his desire to start a new life. None of these elements could have been communicated by anyone other than Young himself. Finally, because the death penalty is inherently different from any other punishment, modern capital punishment jurisprudence forcefully establishes that the sentencing jury must consider the unique personality and circumstances of every capital defendant. This court has echoed the United States Supreme Court's requirements that a capital sentencer must consider all factors in mitigation, including any aspect of a defendant's character ... that the defendant proffers, Wood, 648 P.2d at 86 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2965), and that the sentencer must make an individualized determination of the appropriateness of death for the particular defendant, id. The lead opinion argues that to communicate these factors to the sentencing jury, Young simply needed to take the witness stand and testify under oath and subject himself to cross-examination. It even suggests that this alternative would have produced greater impact on the jury than an unsworn statement. Yet the lead opinion also acknowledges that the trial court itself advised Young against testifying, because of the high risk of adverse impact from impeachment on cross-examination. A capital defendant should have the right to make a plea for mercy free from this adverse impact. [T]he accused making a plea for mercy does not intend to advance or to dispute facts, but instead uses the plea to ask for lenience or understanding in the sentencer's decision. If the accused does not stray from this subject matter in his statement, the plea made does not justify traditional impeachment. J. Thomas Sullivan at 63. Therefore, if Young did have a statutory right to allocution, as the State concedes, then the fact that he could have introduced his statement by taking the witness stand is irrelevant in determining whether denial of his right was harmless. The State's only remaining argument is that allocution would have been unavailing to Young because of the overwhelming evidence of aggravation. Given the nature of capital sentencing, very few circumstances would allow a reviewing court to properly conclude that aggravating evidence overwhelms mitigating factors. In capital trials, we ask the sentencing jury to make a subjective moral evaluation of the worth of the defendant and of the defendant's character. As this court stated in Wood, The ultimate purpose in the penalty phase is not one of factfinding, but... is a matter of judgment. 648 P.2d at 84. As a result, an inherent lack of predictability characterizes the jury's assessment of the appropriate sentence. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 311, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1777, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987). When an extended penalty trial has been held, presenting substantial issues in both aggravation and mitigation, a reviewing court should undertake to reweigh the jury's subjective assessment only with extreme caution. Many others have recognized that the role played by a capital sentencing jury is unlike the role of any other jury. For instance, the United States Supreme Court explained the fundamental difference as follows: In returning a conviction, the jury must satisfy itself that the necessary elements of the particular crime have been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In fixing a penalty, however, there is no similar central issue from which the jury's attention may be diverted.... [T]he jury ... is free to consider a myriad of factors to determine whether death is the appropriate punishment. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1008, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). Justice Powell also articulated this distinction: Underlying the question of guilt or innocence is an objective truth: the defendant, in fact, did or did not commit the acts constituting the crime charged. From the time an accused is first suspected to the time the decision on guilt or innocence is made, our criminal justice system is designed to enable the trier of fact to discover that truth according to the law. But triers of fact can err, and an innocent person can be pronounced guilty. In contrast, the law provides only limited standards for assessing the validity of a sentencing decision. The sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out just deserts as he sees them. Absent a mandatory sentence, there is no objective measure by which the sentencer's decision can be deemed correct or erroneous if it is duly made within the authority conferred by the legislature.