Opinion ID: 835146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Claims of Unconstitutionality

Text: The accused, in scattershot fashion, makes a variety of arguments in support of his position that the Oregon State Bar disciplinary system deprives its membership in general of equal protection, due process, and free speech. Many of those argumentsand particularly the accused's argument that the system is riggedreiterate points that the accused makes in support of his claim that the disciplinary proceedings against him were motivated by vindictiveness or retaliation. We do not address those arguments separately; they are answered by our disposition of his claim of vindictiveness and retaliation. We address only two remaining claims, neither of which merit extended discussion. First, the accused asserts that the free speech rights of lawyers charged with disciplinary rule violations are violated by Oregon State Bar Bylaw 18.103, which prevents a lawyer who is subject to a formal disciplinary proceeding from communicating with the Board of Governors and Bar employees, agents, or representatives regarding the matter. Once a formal disciplinary proceeding is underway, the Bar effectively is represented in the matter by disciplinary counsel. The lawyer who is the subject of the proceeding is therefore limited to communicating on the merits of the matter with Disciplinary Counsel's office and with appointed counsel for the Bar[.] The Bylaw thus effectively implements RPC 4.2, which restricts lawyers from communicating on the subject of the representation with a person that the lawyer knows to be represented by a lawyer. The accused's argument presents a facial challenge to the validity of Bylaw 18.103 that has no bearing on any issue in this case. [24] The accused was not charged with violating Bylaw 18.103 or RPC 4.2. If he had been alleged to have violated that rule, his argument might present a legitimate defense. See generally State v. Spencer, 289 Or. 225, 228, 611 P.2d 1147 (1980) (law that facially violates the state constitutional free speech protection is void and unenforceable, regardless of whether particular conduct involved was itself protected). But, as it stands, the accused's argument that Bylaw 18.102 violates constitutional free speech guarantees is purely collateral to the issues in this case. Whatever the merits of the accused's argument, it provides no ground on which the accused is entitled to avoid the consequences of the particular disciplinary violations involved in this proceeding. [25] The second, and final, argument that we address is the accused's claim that the disciplinary process violates due process and equal protection because lawyers accused of rule violations are not given adequate access to voluntary counsel. The accused's argument in that regard is a particularly narrow one. He does not assert a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Nor could he; he has not claimed that he is indigent, that he is similarly situated to others who receive appointed counsel, or that our precedent establishing that there is no general entitlement to appointed counsel in disciplinary proceedings is wrongly decided. See In re Harris, 334 Or. 353, 363-64, 49 P.3d 778 (2002) (federal due process principles do not require appointment of counsel for an indigent lawyer charged with violating disciplinary rules). The accused relies instead on the fact that members of the Bar volunteer to serve as Bar counsel in disciplinary matters free of charge. Therefore, according to the accused, the Bar must provide the accused with access to volunteer counsel as well. Whatever its constitutional merits, the accused's argument presents a nonissue. The accused's own questioning of Bar staff in this case established that, in fact, the Bar annually solicits its membership and collects the names of lawyers who will voluntarily represent accused lawyers in disciplinary cases. When a formal complaint alleging a violation is filed against a lawyer, that lawyer is provided with a list of those volunteers. The accused lawyer is then free to contact a lawyer on that list in an effort to arrange for voluntary representation. In this case, the accused has not claimed that a list of volunteer lawyers was not provided to him. Neither has he claimed that he tried unsuccessfully to avail himself of representation through that process. His argument does not even acknowledge the existence of that voluntary program. Given the record before us, and the limitations of the argument that the accused has presented, we conclude that his challenge on this ground is without merit.