Opinion ID: 1424312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rev Days's Claim to Title

Text: 2. The analysis begins with the 1965 warranty deeds. The deeds conveyed the property from the prior owners to Rev. Days as Trustee of Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ. The special master acknowledged that the 1965 warranty deeds conveyed title to Rev. Days as a trustee but found as a matter of fact that Rev. Days used the word Trustee merely as an honorary title. Based on this finding, the special master concluded that the 1965 warranty deeds did not create a religious land trust in favor of the congregation but instead passed title to Rev. Days in fee simple absolute. The congregation argues that the trial court's legal conclusion does not follow from this factual finding. We agree. Concurrent findings by a trial court and special master are entitled to great deference on appeal. Findings of fact will not be reversed unless they are clearly erroneous, and as long as there is any evidence in the record to support a particular finding, it will not be disturbed. [1] By contrast, conclusions of law by a trial court and special master are subject to de novo review on appeal. [2] The construction of a deed presents a question of law which this Court reviews de novo. [3] In construing a deed, the court's overriding goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. [4] Generally speaking, the intent of the parties must be determined from the deed's text alone, and extrinsic evidence will be admitted to interpret the deed only where the deed's text is so ambiguous that its meaning cannot be determined through application of the ordinary rules of textual construction. [5] Absent such ambiguity, there is no question of fact to be resolved by the fact-finder. [6] The 1965 warranty deeds are plain on their face. They conveyed the church property to Rev. Days as Trustee of Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ. Georgia law expressly authorizes the creation of religious land trusts, [7] and the language employed in the 1965 warranty deeds is the typical formulation employed to do so. [8] The trial court's finding that Rev. Days used the phrase as Trustee of Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ as a mere moniker does not alter the legal analysis. Where the language of a written instrument is clear and unambiguous, the courts must enforce it as written rather than giving effect to the subjective and unexpressed intentions and understandings of one party. [9] Thus, the trial court and special master erred in holding that fee simple absolute title to the church property vested in Rev. Days as a result of the 1965 warranty deeds. Even if the deed were ambiguous and extrinsic evidence could be considered, the special master's conclusion that title to the property vested in Rev. Days in fee simple absolute would still be erroneous as a matter of law. The property in question had an existing church building on it. A pastor made the down payment and executed a security deed in favor of the grantors as Trustee of the Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ. The congregation, not Rev. Days, paid off the security deed. Moreover, Rev. Days testified repeatedly at the hearing before the special master that he bought the property for the congregation and that the congregation was the owner of the property from the very beginning. Accordingly, both the text of the 1965 warranty deeds and the extrinsic evidence in the record point unequivocally in only one direction: the 1965 warranty deeds created a religious land trust in favor of the congregation with Rev. Days as the trustee. [10] As a result of the 1965 warranty deeds, Rev. Days secured legal title to the church property, but beneficial or equitable title passed to the congregation. [11] When the congregation later reorganized as a nonprofit religious corporation, equitable title to the church property passed to the corporation as the unincorporated body's legally constituted successor-in-interest. [12] Rev. Days had no power to convey title to the church property to anyone without a majority vote of the unincorporated congregation and, later, without authorization by the corporation's board of directors. [13] There is no evidence in the record that such a vote was ever taken.