Opinion ID: 2981540
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mixed Dismissals

Text: With the definition of “action” in mind, we turn to how district courts should interpret mixed dismissals under §1915(g). We begin with the most relevant Sixth Circuit case. In Pointer, the court held that a mixed dismissal counts as a strike where some claims are dismissed for reasons enumerated in § 1915(g) and others are dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 502 F.3d at 373. The court noted that failing to count an action as a strike because the plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to some claims would subvert the purpose of the PLRA by allowing unexhausted claims to “inject merit into the action” where all other claims fail. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court noted that the rule advanced by the plaintiff would allow prisoners to avoid obtaining a strike by merely appending one unexhausted claim. Id. The Pointer court therefore held that if an entire action was dismissed, at least in part for § 1915(g) reasons, and if none of the claims were found to have merit, then the action counts as a strike under § 1915(g).7 See id. When the claims dismissed for non-§ 1915(g) reasons are dismissed without prejudice, the action counts as a strike unless the plaintiff proves the claims had merit by refiling any of them and proving that they do not fall within the gamut of § 1915(g). See id. at 376. 7 Taylor contends that Pointer only extends to unexhausted claims; however, this reading is too narrow. The Pointer court did not focus on the unexhausted nature of the claims; rather, the court focused on the underlying purposes of the PLRA, the fact that none of the claims were found to have merit, and the fact that the entire action was dismissed. Id. at 373-74. Limiting the Pointer holding to unexhausted claims would contradict the reasoning and holding of that case. - 13 - No. 10-6411 Taylor v. First Medical Management, et al. Implicit in the Pointer holding is that the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that a prior action did not fall within § 1915(g).8 When a prisoner’s suit is dismissed partially under § 1915(g) and partially for other reasons, the claims dismissed for non-§ 1915(g) reasons might later have been dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim. And a prisoner should not be given the benefit of the doubt in these circumstances. Instead, when an action is dismissed in its entirety at least in part for § 1915(g) reasons, the plaintiff subsequently bears the burden of proving that the entire action did not fall under § 1915(g) by showing that claims dismissed without prejudice were not frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim. Absent a plaintiff later proving this, the action counts as a strike.