Opinion ID: 2645755
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Oppressiveness and Vexation”

Text: Having concluded that the District Court did not err in according lesser deference to plaintiffs’ choice of forum, we turn to whether it abused its discretion when weighing the private and public interest factors in determining if plaintiffs’ actual purchase price of the plant and equipment was approximately $6.6 million. Rather, he argues that Shulman knew the actual purchase price, as it was discussed during negotiations, and the alleged additional $6.4 million received by Sapir was consideration for separate business deals—that there was, in other words, no misrepresentation. It appears, therefore, that much of the evidence that exists in Pennsylvania—such as the wires and witnesses that can authenticate them—has been admitted by Sapir. Sapir’s defense apparently relies on what happened during the negotiation of the deal, in Israel. 4 Defendants also argue that plaintiffs engaged in forum shopping to take advantage of the favorable United States laws, particularly RICO. The District Court declined to make a finding of forum shopping and did not consider it in its convenience analysis. Nevertheless, it is at least worth noting that the possibility of a treble damages award under RICO— and the unavailability of such remedy in Israel—may have, at least in part, motivated plaintiffs to choose a United States forum. See Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting possibility of forumshopping motives based on availability of RICO awards despite lack of district court findings). This, of course, would further support a presumption that plaintiffs’ forum choice was not based on convenience. 10 chosen forum would cause “oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to plaintiff’s convenience.” Koster, 330 U.S. at 524. When seeking dismissal on grounds of forum non conveniens, a defendant must show that the balance of public and private factors “tips decidedly in favor of trial in the foreign forum.” Lacey v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 932 F.2d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 1991) (“Lacey II”). As an initial matter, plaintiffs argue that the District Court erred as a matter of law in failing to apply the “oppressiveness and vexation” standard. This argument is without merit. While the R&R did not specifically mention those words, the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and the District Court’s opinion adopting the R&R clearly reflect that the appropriate standard was applied. Moreover, the District Court, when adopting and supplementing the R&R, explicitly acknowledged this standard when overruling plaintiffs’ objection that the Magistrate Judge “faile[ed] to apply the ‘oppressiveness and vexation’ standard.” (A00055.) Although the District Court did not engage in a lengthy discussion of “oppressiveness and vexation,” its thorough analysis of the private and public interest factors and its findings reflect a correct understanding of the standard and permits our appellate review of the Court’s “actual consideration and analysis.” Windt, 529 F.3d at 196 (stating that District Court’s failure to state correct “oppressiveness and vexation” standard was not error when it correctly applied the standard and permitted meaningful appellate review).
Plaintiffs argue that the District Court abused its discretion in its assessment of the private interest factors. To reiterate, private interests include such things as ease of access to sources of proof, ability to compel witness attendance, and other potential obstacles to a cost-effective and expeditious trial. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 619 F.3d at 296. The parties go through lengthy discussions of the witnesses, their countries of residence, their preferred 11 languages, and the facts to which each may testify. We need not scrutinize all of these materials to perform our function of appellate review, nor was it necessary for the District Court to have done so. See id. at 299-300 (“The Supreme Court has rejected the suggestion that defendants seeking forum non conveniens dismissal must submit affidavits identifying the witnesses they would call and the testimony these would provide if the trial were held in the alternative forum, explaining that such detail is not necessary. Rather, the defendant must provide enough information to enable the District Court to balance the parties’ interests.” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). It suffices to say that Shulman identifies several witnesses located in the United States with knowledge of the various deals, while Sapir identifies nearly twenty witnesses located abroad, the majority of whom live in Israel, the country of residence of both Sapir and Shulman. Sapir contends that Shulman’s witnesses in the United States will testify to facts not in dispute, such as the purchase price of the Warren plant and equipment and the fact that $500,000 was never paid to one Bob Stump in connection with this purchase. Rather, Sapir’s defense is that Shulman knew the actual purchase price and that the witnesses with information regarding the actual negotiation of the disputed deals are located in Israel or live closer to Israel. Shulman also argues, without any authority, that there are roughly 18,700 pages of documents in English that would need to be translated into Hebrew in an Israeli forum. As noted above, Sapir provided the declaration of an Israeli lawyer, asserting that documents in English need not be translated because Israel courts are typically proficient in English.5 5 Plaintiffs also object to the District Court’s consideration of defendant Sapir’s medical issues. Sapir submitted a declaration stating that he suffers from antiphospholipid syndrome which prevents him from flying long distances and that traveling to the United States would cause severe health risks. The District Court, however, with the competing affidavits of doctors from both sides, declined to conclusively resolve the issue and instead based its decision on other private interests. We do not address it further. 12 The location of the parties, their witnesses, and the availability of evidence favor resolution in Israel. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the private interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal.
Plaintiffs also argue that the District Court erred in weighing the public interest factors because it applied the wrong standard, citing Lacey II for the proposition that absent a showing that the private interest factors impose oppressiveness or vexation, a defendant must show the public interest factors weigh heavily in favor of dismissal. Plaintiffs misstate the relevant test: To prevail on a forum non conveniens motion, “the movant must show that the balance of these [private and public interest] factors tips decidedly in favor of trial in the foreign forum.” Lacey II, 932 F.2d at 180 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs contend that there is no congestion in the chosen district, that there is a strong federal interest in plaintiffs’ choice of forum, that a United States jury has a strong interest in the case, that Pennsylvania law will apply, that the locus of the culpable conduct occurred in Pennsylvania, and that the District Court has already invested substantial resources in the case. As the District Court noted, however, Shulman and Sapir met in Israel, discussed and negotiated the purchase of the Warren plant and equipment in Israel, discussed the coal deals in Israel, and most interactions with each other took place in Israel, Monaco or the Ukraine, not in Pennsylvania (or even in the United States). Other than the actual wire payments and Shulman’s law firm, there appears to be no other connection to Pennsylvania, and little else to the United States. The District Court further concluded that there had been no apparent progress made in the case. As to the other factors, the District Court found the choice-of-law issue potentially complicated and did not address it. See id. at 187 n.14 (“[I]n resolving a forum non conveniens motion, the district court is not required to predict what law the foreign court would apply.”). It also correctly noted that not every 13 public interest factor need weigh in favor of dismissal. Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that public interest factors weighed in favor of dismissal.