Opinion ID: 203882
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Willfully Joining the Conspiracy

Text: Gonzalez asserts that we must review for abuse of discretion his claim that the court erred by failing to convey to the jury the requirement that he willfully join the conspiracy. The government counters that because Gonzalez only specifically objected to the court's refusal to adopt his suggested words and actions language, we must review this more general complaint as to willfulness for plain error only. We need not split hairs over the appropriate standard of review for this issue. There was no error at all in the trial court's instructions. Under our law, the requisite intent needed for a conspiracy conviction is that the defendant intended to join in the conspiracy and intended the substantive offense to be committed. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 110 (1st Cir.2003). That is the meaning of willfully in this context, and the court was not obligated to mention willfulness as an independent requirement. Indeed, appellant's own requested jury instruction defines willfulness in this way: To act `willfully' means to act voluntarily and intelligently and with the specific intent that the underlying crime be committed  that is to say, with bad purpose, either to disobey or disregard the law  not to act by ignorance, accident, or mistake. As we have explained, the court's instruction, as given, amply conveyed the intent requirement for a conspiracy conviction.