Opinion ID: 1175976
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Heading: Dillon's common law wrongful discharge cause of action.

Text: In the case of Dillon's common law wrongful discharge cause of action, our conclusion that section 132a does not provide an exclusive remedy is only half the analysis. We must also decide whether disability discrimination can form the basis of a common law action of this type. In Tameny, we reaffirmed that when an employer's discharge of an employee violates fundamental principles of public policy, the discharged employee may maintain a tort action.... ( Tameny, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 170, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330.) In that case, the plaintiff alleged that his employer terminated him because he refused to participate in an illegal scheme to fix gasoline prices. ( Id. at p. 169, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330.) The trial court sustained the defendants' demurrer to the plaintiffs tort cause of action for wrongful discharge, and the plaintiff appealed. ( Id. at p. 171, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330.) We reversed, noting the long-standing rule that a wrongful act committed in the course of a contractual relationship may afford both tort and contractual relief.... ( Id. at pp. 174-175, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330.) We reasoned that an employer's obligation to refrain from discharging an employee who refuses to commit a criminal act ... reflects a duty imposed by law upon all employers in order to implement the fundamental public policies embodied in the state's penal statutes. As such, a wrongful discharge suit exhibits the classic elements of a tort cause of action. ( Id. at p. 176, 164 Cal.Rptr. 839, 610 P.2d 1330.) In subsequent cases applying Tameny, we recognized tort causes of action for wrongful discharge based on sex ( Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 90-91, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373), age ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at pp. 897, 909, 66 Cal. Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157), and retaliation for testifying truthfully ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1086-1087, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680). We have not, however, addressed whether disability discrimination, like sex and age discrimination, can form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim. In Stevenson, we articulated a fourpart test for determining whether a particular policy can support a common law wrongful discharge claim. The policy must be: (1) delineated in either constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) `public' in the sense that it `inures to the benefit of the public' rather than serving merely the interests of the individual; (3) well established at the time of the discharge; and (4) substantial and fundamental. ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157; see also Jennings v. Marralle, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 130, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 876 P.2d 1074; Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at pp. 1090, 1095, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680; Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 89-90, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373.) `[P]ublic policy' as a concept is notoriously resistant to precise definition, and ... courts should venture into this area, if at all, with great care.... ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680.) Therefore, when the constitutional provision or statute articulating a public policy also includes certain substantive limitations in scope or remedy, these limitations also circumscribe the common law wrongful discharge cause of action. Stated another way, the common law cause of action cannot be broader than the constitutional provision or statute on which it depends, and therefore it presents no impediment to employers that operate within the bounds of law. ( Ibid. ) For example, in Jennings, we noted that the FEHA does not apply to employers of fewer than five employees (Gov.Code, § 12926, subd. (d)), and therefore we found no fundamental public policy against age discrimination by these employers. ( Jennings v. Marralle, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 135-136, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 275, 876 P.2d 1074; see also Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 663-664, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) As in Stevenson, [t]hree of the[] four requirements [of a policy that can support a common law wrongful discharge claim] are not reasonably subject to dispute in this case. ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157.) First, the FEHA clearly delineates a policy against disability discrimination in employmentat least in the case of employers of five or more employees. (Gov.Code, §§ 12940, subd. (a), 12926, subd. (d).) Moreover, the FEHA is just one expression of a much broader policy against disability discrimination that appears in a variety of legislative enactments. (See, e.g., Civ.Code, §§ 51, 54 [barring disability discrimination in public accommodations]; Gov.Code, §§ 11135 [barring disability discrimination in state-funded programs], 19230, subd. (a) [declaring state policy to encourage disabled persons to participate in the social and economic life of the state], 19230, subds. (b), (c), 19702 [barring disability discrimination in state civil service employment].) Second, the policy `inures to the benefit of the public' ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 894, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157) because (1) any member of the public may develop a disability and become the victim of disability discrimination, (2) the public at large benefits from the productivity of disabled employees, and (3) any type of invidious discrimination `foments ... strife and unrest.' ( Id. at p. 895, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157.) Third, the policy against disability discrimination has been included in the FEHA since July 1, 1974, and therefore is well established. (Stats.1973, ch. 1189, §§ 6, 9, pp. 2501-2502.) Accordingly, we turn to whether the policy against disability discrimination is substantial and fundamental. Disability discrimination is indistinguishable in many ways from race and sex discrimination. Specifically, it can attack[] the individual's sense of selfworth in much the same fashion as race or sex discrimination. ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 896, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157.) Nevertheless, an employer may have valid reasons to treat disabled employees differently than nondisabled employees, and the FEHA recognizes this fact by expressly providing that it does not subject an employer to any legal liability resulting from the refusal to employ or the discharge of an employee with a physical or mental disability, where the employee, because of his or her physical or mental disability, is unable to perform his or her essential duties even with reasonable accommodations.... (Gov. Code, § 12940, subd. (a)(1).) But this caveat does not lead us to conclude that the policy against disability discrimination is not substantial and fundamental. Even in the case of race, sex, and age discrimination, the FEHA does not prohibit discrimination that is based upon a bona fide occupational qualification. (Gov.Code, § 12940.) Similarly, our opinions articulating substantial and fundamental policies against sex and age discrimination use the term discrimination only in the pejorative sense to refer to arbitrary judgments about individuals based on group stereotypes. ( Stevenson, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 896, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 888, 941 P.2d 1157.) Disability sometimes impacts a person's ability to perform a particular job, in which case the employer may treat a disabled employee differently than a nondisabled employee. Nevertheless, if disabled employees can prove that they can perform the job duties as effectively as nondisabled employees, taking into consideration the possibility, if any, that their condition will change, as well as the employer's shorthand long-term needs, then we think discrimination based on disability, like sex and age discrimination, violates a substantial and fundamental public policy and can form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim. Nevertheless, this remedy must be carefully tethered to fundamental policies that are delineated in the FEHA on which it is based. ( Gantt, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1095, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680.) Accordingly, just as disability discrimination in violation of section 132a does not alone establish a valid FEHA claim, it also does not alone establish a valid common law wrongful discharge claim. Furthermore, to the extent section 132a, the FEHA, and the common law remedies overlap, equitable principles preclude multiple recoveries for the same injury. We conclude that disability discrimination can form the basis of a common law wrongful discharge claim. Because section 132a does not provide the exclusive remedy for discrimination based on a work-related disability, the trial court was correct to overrule the demurrer to Dillon's common law wrongful discharge cause of action.