Opinion ID: 754754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Plaintiffs' Entitlement to Damages for Mental Anguish

Text: 125 Brady, Chamblee, Evans, Fortenberry, Leach, and Rosas contend that the district court erred in concluding that they were not legally entitled to mental anguish damages. We conclude that the district court correctly granted judgment as a matter of law on this issue. 126 The Supreme Court has long required that compensatory damages for emotional distress be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). Failure to establish actual injury with sufficient evidence will result in the award of only nominal damages. Id. at 266-67, 98 S.Ct. 1042. In Patterson v. P.H.P. Healthcare Corp., 90 F.3d 927 (5th Cir.1996), this court set out to clarify the level of specificity required under Carey. 127 In Patterson, we addressed two separate issues regarding the proof necessary to support mental anguish damages. First, we articulated the level of specificity needed to prove a claim for mental damages under Carey. We held that there must be a specific discernable injury to the claimant's emotional state, Patterson, 90 F.3d at 940, proven with evidence regarding the nature and extent of the harm, id. at 938. We acknowledged that hurt feelings, anger and frustration are part of life, and were not the types of harm that could support a mental anguish award. Id. at 940. And our language describing the specificity standard was unequivocal; that standard must be met before mental anguish damages can be awarded. See id. at 938 (holding that plaintiff must present such evidence). 128 Second, we addressed the types of evidence that may be used to clear that hurdle. We observed that in proving mental damages a claimant's testimony alone may not be sufficient to support anything more than a nominal damage award. Id. at 938 (emphasis added). We noted that Carey requires evidence that may include corroborating testimony or medical or psychological evidence. Id. at 940 (emphasis added). Likewise, we turned to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's (EEOC) official guideline statement for guidance. EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE NO. 915.002 § II(A)(2) (July 14, 1992). That document provides: 129 Emotional harm will not be presumed simply because the complaining party is a victim of discrimination. The existence, nature, and severity of emotional harm must be proved. Emotional harm may manifest itself, for example, as sleeplessness, anxiety, stress, depression, marital strain, humiliation, emotional distress, loss of self esteem, excessive fatigue, or a nervous breakdown. Physical manifestations of emotional harm may consist of ulcers, gastrointestinal disorders, hair loss, or headaches.... The Commission will typically require medical evidence of emotional harm to seek damages for such harm in conciliation negotiations. 130 Id. at 10-12 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 131 About two months after our decision in Patterson, the Fourth Circuit issued its decision in Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241 (4th Cir.1996), which is a magnum opus on the evidence needed to support compensatory damages for emotional distress. Just as we did in Patterson, the Fourth Circuit used the Supreme Court decision in Carey as a beacon for its analysis. See id. at 1250. The Price court then conducted a comprehensive survey of circuit case law addressing the circumstances in which a plaintiff's own testimony was found sufficient, and the circumstances in which that testimony was found insufficient. See id. at 1251. In arriving at its determination that the testimony in Price was insufficient, the Fourth Circuit concluded: 132 Neither conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress nor the mere fact that a constitutional violation occurred supports an award of compensatory damages. In marshaling the evidence necessary to establish emotional distress resulting from a constitutional violation, Carey instructs us that genuine injury is necessary. 133 Id. at 1254 (citing Carey, 435 U.S. at 264, 98 S.Ct. 1042). 134 In this case, the Plaintiffs' own testimony is the sole source of evidence on mental damages. Brady testified that Molina's refusal to rehire him resulted in marital and family problems. Brady also claimed that he had spent more time on the couch in last three years because he didn't feel like the same person. Brady's testimony on mental anguish is less than two pages of trial transcript. 135 Chamblee testified that Molina's failure to rehire him caused him sleeplessness, loss of appetite, and weight loss. He claimed that he just couldn't accept it mentally, and that he worried over finding another job at age fifty-three. Chamblee's testimony on mental anguish is roughly eleven lines of trial transcript. 136 Evans testified that his job loss had produced nervousness, sleeplessness, and anxiety. He stated that he had been forced to forego insurance coverage due to his unemployment. He asserted that upon learning of Molina's decision not to rehire him [he] didn't feel like [he] could perform [his] duties for the remainder of time at the sheriff's department. Evans' testimony on mental anguish is roughly nineteen lines of trial transcript. 137 Fortenberry testified that the loss of his job had made him highly upset, prompting him to see a family physician. He asserted that he became concerned that his wife would have to quit college and return to work. He maintained that he had experienced nervousness, sleeplessness, and stress. Fortenberry's testimony on mental anguish is roughly one page of trial transcript. 138 Leach testified that Molina's failure to rehire him caused nervousness and sleeplessness. He claimed that he had been forced to leave his home in Fort Bend County to find new employment. He described that travail as not fun. Leach's testimony on mental anguish is roughly nine lines of trial transcript. 139 Finally, Rosas testified that he gained roughly 100 pounds during the nine months of unemployment that resulted from Molina's failure to rehire him. He claimed that, like Chamblee, he worried over job prospects due to his age. He described the experience as the worst thing that ever happened to [him]. He stated that he was shocked and devastated. Rosas' testimony on mental anguish is roughly two and a half pages of trial transcript. 140 The Plaintiffs' testimony in this case is too vague and conclusory to support mental anguish damages. References to spending too much time on the couch (Brady), not accept[ing] it mentally (Chamblee), being highly upset (Fortenberry), and experiencing the worst thing that has ever happened to me (Rosas), hardly qualify as evidence of demonstrable emotional distress, as required by Carey. Moreover, when the Plaintiffs do refer to specific manifestations of emotional harm--like nervousness, sleeplessness, or stress--they fail to elaborate with any detail. Statements like [my termination] caused marital problems (Brady), or there were sleepless nights (Chamblee), go completely unexplained with no hint as to the nature or extent or severity of the alleged harm. Conclusory statements give the finder of fact no adequate basis from which to gauge the nature and circumstances of the wrong and its effect on the plaintiff. Carey, 435 U.S. at 263-64, 98 S.Ct. 1042. That failure of proof is unacceptable. As aptly stated by the Fourth Circuit, a plaintiff must present evidence of demonstrable emotional distress, which must be sufficiently articulated; [ ]conclusory statements that the plaintiff suffered emotional distress ... [do not] support an award of compensatory damages. Price, 93 F.3d at 1254. 141 Remarkably, in this case not one plaintiff presented medical or psychological expert testimony as to the emotional harm that was purportedly suffered. Similarly, not one plaintiff presented corroborating testimony from a spouse, family member, friend, or coworker, regarding objective evidence of emotional distress, such as crying spells, outbursts of anger, sleeplessness, or excessive sleeping. Not one of these plaintiffs presented any testimony as to the need for or use of prescription or over-the-counter medication to treat their mental upsets. As such, the evidence of mental damages in this case consists solely of the Plaintiffs' own uncorroborated testimony. Given that emotional distress [is] fraught with vagueness and speculation, [and] is easily susceptible to fictitious and trivial claims, id. at 1250, we must scrupulously analyze an award of compensatory damages for a claim of emotional distress predicated exclusively on the plaintiff's testimony, id. at 1251. 142 The Plaintiffs' testimony is further weakened by the method in which it was elicited. In several instances, the Plaintiffs' testimony consists of simple one-word, yes-or-no answers to leading questions. To a large extent, it was the Plaintiffs' attorneys, and not the Plaintiffs themselves, who testified on the mental damages issue. Evans' testimony on direct examination accurately portrays many of the shortcomings we have discussed: 143 Q: Did you have sleeplessness? 144 A: Yes, I did. 145 Q: Did you have nervousness? 146 A: Yes. 147 Q: Did you have anxiety? 148 A: Pardon? 149 Q: Did you have anxiety? 150 A: Yes. 151 In sum, the Plaintiffs' testimony in this case is vague, conclusory, and uncorroborated. Under Carey, Patterson, and Price, it cannot legally support mental anguish damages. 152 In reaching our conclusion, we do not now hold, nor have we ever held, that a plaintiff may never prove mental anguish damages with his own testimony alone. In certain cases a plaintiff's testimony alone may be sufficient proof of mental damages. See Migis v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 135 F.3d 1041, 1047 (5th Cir.1998) (Patterson recognizes that mental anguish damages ... [do] not always require that the plaintiff offer medical evidence or corroborating testimony in addition to her own testimony). Patterson does not conflict with that proposition. 153 Under Patterson it does not matter what type of evidence is used to satisfy Carey 's specificity requirement, so long as that standard is successfully met. When a plaintiff's testimony is particularized and extensive, such that it speaks to the nature, extent, and duration of the claimed emotional harm in a manner that portrays a specific and discernable injury, then that testimony alone may be sufficient. 154 We recognize that this court has occasionally permitted a plaintiff's uncorroborated testimony to support an award for mental anguish damages. Migis, 135 F.3d 1041; Forsyth v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 769 (5th Cir.1996). Both of those cases, however, were decided after Patterson and offer slim guidance when attempting to compare the sufficiency of the testimony in those cases with that in our case, which consists chiefly of one-word responses to leading questions. 155 We affirm the district court's decision to grant judgment as a matter of law in favor of the County on the mental anguish awards. 17