Opinion ID: 159879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Webco's Threats and Comments on Union Organizing

Text: 55 [A] reviewing court must recognize the Board's competence in the first instance to judge the impact of utterances made in the context of the employer-employee relationship. NLRB v. Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 620 (1969). We also defer to the Board's judgment regarding the coercive nature of the conduct in question. See id.; Manna Pro Partners, v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 1346, 1351 (10th Cir. 1993).
56 On March 2, the day following the suspension of Ms. Almy, Mr. Thornton and another employee and the issuance of warnings to two other employees, President Weber convened two plantwide meetings during which she gave similar speeches regarding the union's organizational efforts. As the ALJ noted: 57 She also expressed the view of the Respondent that a union was not necessary or desirable at the facility. Referring to the five disciplined employees, she testified that she told the groups that the Union was supposed to warn employees not to violate the Respondent's no solicitation policy. She therefore concluded, she told employees, so, either the Union failed to warn them or encouraged them to violate the policy. She told the employees that if, in fact, the Union had either intentionally not warned the employees or had suggested that that they engage in activities in contravention of the policy, that would mean that the disciplined employees had been potentially sacrificed by the Union for the benefit of the Union. 58 ALJ Decision at 8. 59 In addition, a few employees recalled that President Weber began the speech mentioning the five employees disciplined for violation of the non-solicitation policy, and also recalled that she mentioned that the Union had sacrificed those employees for their union-related activities. 60 We continue to grapple with distinguishing between an employer's unprotected threats versus protected predictions under Gissell. See 395 U.S. at 617. An employer is free to communicate to its employees any of its general views about unionism or any of its specific views about a particular union, so long as the communications do not contain a threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. 29 U.S.C. 158(c). In addition, we recognize that [w]ords of disparagement alone concerning a union or its officials are insufficient for finding a violation of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act. In re Sears, Roebuck & Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 193, 193 (1991). 61 The dissenting Board member and Webco emphasize that section 8(c)'s protection extends to an employer's characterization of a union that is based on an objective fact, and that employees are capable of evaluating such remarks for themselves. See Order at 5; see also Camvac Int'l, Inc., 288 N.L.R.B. 816, 820 (1988). The dissenting Board member states that, at most, Ms. Weber suggested that soliciting in violation of the no-solicitation rule would lead to adverse employment consequences. Order at 4. 62 Even if Ms. Weber's remarks were meant to be confined to violations of the non-solicitation rule, Webco cannot rely upon its selective enforcement of the non-solicitation policy to justify its threats of further adverse employment consequences. President Weber's statements, unlike the flip and intemperate remarks at issue in In re Sears, Roebuck, 305 N.L.R.B. at 193, went beyond personal opinion. The speech came on the heels of an unprecedented staunch imposition of discipline for union-related violations of the non-solicitation rule. The disciplinary actions taken were severe, and as noted, disproportionate in relation to the violations that actually occurred. We defer to the Board's judgment regarding the coercive nature of the conduct in question, see Gissell, 395 U.S. at 617, and agree that Ms. Weber's statements were made in a particularly threatening context and with a particularly threatening quality. See In re Feldkamp Enters., 323 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1200 (1997) (noting particularly threatening quality of threats of business closure amounted to unlawful intimidation in violation of the Act).
63 The Board adopted the ALJ's finding that on or about March 5, in part to respond to the disciplinary actions imposed for alleged union solicitation, Supervisor Dan Marrs made coercive statements to employees regarding the union that violated 8(a)(1) of the Act. On March 5, Mr. Marrs indicated that if the employees chose union representation, their bargaining position would start from ground zero. Rec. vol. II at 288-90, 291, 301. The ALJ found the employees' testimony regarding these statements to be credible and that the statements were made to suggest that they would lose benefits if it voted for the union, which violated 8(a)(1). See ALJ Decision at 27-28; see also Manna Pro Partners, 986 F.2d at 1351 (An employer violates [8(a)(1)] by making statements that tend to coerce employees in the exercise of their statutory right to self-organize and engage in activities for the purpose of collective bargaining.). 64 Undoubtedly, an employer may properly point out the hazards of the collective bargaining process. NLRB v. Belcher Towing Co., 265 N.L.R.B. 1258, 1268 (1982), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 726 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984). Bargaining may start from 'scratch' or 'zero' and the employees may be so informed by their employer prior to an election. Id. It is when the statement exceeds an expression of opinion as to the natural and normal hazards of collective bargaining and carries with it the seed of a threat that the employer will become punitively intransigent in the event the union wins the election, that the statement becomes coercive and unlawful. Belcher Towing Co., 726 F.2d at 711; see In re Bi-Lo, 303 N.L.R.B. 749, 750 (1991) (indicating that bargaining from scratch comments undergo analysis considering whether it is (1) a lawful statement that benefits could be lost through the bargaining process or (2) an unlawful threat that benefits will be taken away and the union will have to bargain to get them back). 65 Here, the ALJ and Board considered Mr. Marrs' statements to be unlawful in the context of the above-described disciplinary actions that were unfair labor practices and the contemporaneous threats from Supervisor Coldiron and President Weber. The ALJ's determinations that Mr. Marrs' statements violated 8(a)(1) was proper. See Gissell Packing Co., 395 U.S. at 617 (stating that [a]ny assessment of the precise scope of employer expression . . .must be made in the context of its labor relations setting); In re Taylor-Dunn Mf'g. Co., 252 N.L.R.B. 799, 800 (1980) (stating that bargaining from ground zero or bargaining from scratch statements could reasonably be understood by employees as a threat of loss of existing benefits prior to bargaining that is unlawful in the absence of other statements regarding the normal give and take of collective bargaining), enforced, 679 F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1982).
66 The Board did not specifically address the ALJ's findings that Supervisor Coldiron's March 16 activities were similarly unlawful and coercive in violation of 8(a)(1), but the Board's general deference to the ALJ's credibility findings suggests its affirmation of this violation. In addition, the notice ordered posted by the remedy incorporates remediation measures for Mr. Coldiron's statements. See Order at 5 (App.). 67 On March 16, according to testimony of Ms. Almy, Mr. Coldiron apparently suggested to employees that union-supporting employees should quit their jobs, that bargaining with the union would start at the employees' entry pay level and that the union's representation would be futile. The ALJ found the Ms Almy's testimony on this matter to be highly credible and found Mr. Coldiron's to be the reverse. ALJ Decision at 28. After the ALJ made its credibility findings, the Board affirmed the rulings and adopted the ALJ's remediation for this violation. See Order at 5 (App.) (Notice to Employees Posted by Order of the National Labor Relations Board. . . . WE WILL NOT tell employees . . . that it would be futile for them to select the Union as their bargaining representative. WE WILL NOT tell employees who are union supporters to quit their jobs.). We defer to the findings and we affirm the Board's decision.