Opinion ID: 2576422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Statutory Right to a Speedy Trial and Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Text: Section 18-1-405, C.R.S. (2005), guarantees the criminal defendant the right to a speedy trial. Specifically, this section requires that a defendant be brought to trial within six months of his plea of not guilty. § 18-1-405(1), C.R.S. (2005). This statutory protection is meant to give effect to the constitutional right to a speedy trial. Ex parte Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82, 82 P.2d 762, 764 (Colo.1938) overruled on other grounds by Watson v. People, 700 P.2d 544 (Colo.1985). The statute does not create any additional rights. Id. Rather, it provides a method of securing the constitutional right of an accused to a speedy trial. Id. The court of appeals opinion rests upon the premise that because an improper denial of a statutory speedy trial motion is jurisdictional, it may be reviewed at any time. Relying on this as well as the fact that McMurtry moved to dismiss before entering his guilty plea, the court of appeals held that the denial of McMurtry's speedy trial motion was reviewable on appeal, despite his later guilty plea. This holding construes our decisions involving the statutory speedy trial right to reach the conclusion that this right is a matter of subject matter jurisdiction. The court of appeals cites language of this court stating that a court would be proceeding without jurisdiction if it were to try [a defendant] in violation of his rights under the Colorado speedy trial statute. McMurtry, 101 P.3d at 1100 (citing Hampton v. Dist. Court, 199 Colo. 104, 106, 605 P.2d 54, 56 (Colo.1980)); see also Marquez v. Dist. Court, 200 Colo. 55, 58, 613 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Colo.1980). When viewed in isolation, this statement could be read to support the court of appeals' position that the violation of a defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial divests the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea. Under this theory, McMurtry's guilty plea would not preclude an appellate court from hearing his statutory speedy trial claim because the issue of subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time. See Crim.P. 35(c)(2)(III); see also § 16-5-402(2)(a), C.R.S. (2005). Closer analysis of the Hampton opinion reveals that our discussion and the use of the word jurisdiction in Hampton did not involve the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Rather, we used the word jurisdiction in a section of the opinion which explained why this court was invoking its discretionary jurisdiction to entertain an original writ under C.A.R. 21. In that case, the trial court had exceeded its authority by improperly denying a defendant his statutory right to a speedy trial. The word jurisdiction as used in Hampton meant the trial court's authority or lack thereof, and did not refer to the concept of subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, Hampton does not stand for the proposition that violation of a statutory speedy trial right divests the trial court of jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea. Supporting our reading of Hampton 's use of the word jurisdiction to mean that the trial court acted in excess of its authority are two lines of reasoning which support the conclusion that an improper denial of this statutory right does not involve subject matter jurisdiction. The first concerns the relationship between the constitutional speedy trial right and the statutory right. The second concerns this court's precedent construing provisions of the statutory speedy trial act and how this statutory right may be waived and the wording of the statute itself. Turning to the relationship between the statutory and the constitutional speedy trial rights, we note that by entering a guilty plea, a criminal defendant waives his constitutional right to a speedy trial. People v. Schneider, 25 P.3d 755, 759 (Colo.2001). In addition, a defendant may only raise the improper denial of his constitutional right to a speedy trial on appeal if he raised it first in the trial court. See People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 (Colo.1988) (holding that this court will not consider constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal). This precedent supports the principle that improper denial of a constitutional speedy trial claim does not involve subject matter jurisdiction. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction can not be waived. See Downing v. People, 895 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Colo.1995). A defendant may challenge the subject matter jurisdiction of the court at any time, even for the first time in a post-conviction collateral attack on the judgment. See Crim.P. 35(c)(2)(III) (2005) (allowing post-conviction review when the court rendering judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction); see also § 16-5-402(2)(a), C.R.S. (2005) (allowing an exception to the statutory time limits for collateral attacks on convictions for cases where the court entering judgment lacked subject matter jurisdiction). Because subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and can be raised at any time while the constitutional right to a speedy trial can be waived and may not be raised on appeal if it was not raised in the trial court, it would be inconsistent to conclude that denial of the constitutional right to a speedy trial involves subject matter jurisdiction. The purpose of the statutory right to a speedy trial is to secure and effectuate an accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial. Rude v. People, 44 Colo. 384, 387, 99 P. 317, 318 (Colo.1909). To accept the reasoning of the court of appeals that a denial of a statutory speedy trial claim survives a guilty plea because this issue is one of subject matter jurisdiction causes the anomalous result that a denial of a statutory speedy trial motion is appealable while a denial of a constitutional speedy trial motion under the same circumstances is not. A defendant would paradoxically enjoy greater rights under the statute than under the constitutional provisions the statute is meant to effectuate. A similar illogical situation would result if the statutory right to a speedy trial were considered jurisdictional when both our precedent construing this statutory right and the statute itself provide for waiver of this right under a variety of circumstances and no words in the statute state that the right to a speedy trial involves the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Any express consent to the delay or other affirmative conduct by the defendant is treated as a waiver of the right to speedy trial. People ex rel. Gallagher v. District Court, 933 P.2d 583, 588 (Colo.1997) (internal citations omitted). Waiver can be explicit or inferred from the behavior of the defendant. Id. A defendant waives his statutory speedy trial right by failing to move for dismissal before trial, and by not moving for dismissal before pleading guilty. Section 18-1-405(5), C.R.S. (2005); Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Colo.1993). The statutory limit for bringing the accused to trial is automatically extended if a defendant fails to object to setting a trial date beyond the statutory time limit. § 18-1-405(5.1), C.R.S. (2005). Because subject matter jurisdiction can neither be waived nor created by consent of the parties, it would be inconsistent to conclude that denial of the statutory right to a speedy trial involves subject matter jurisdiction when the statute and our case law dictate numerous situations in which this right may be waived. Thus, we hold that wrongful denial of a motion to dismiss for violation of the statutory speedy trial right does not divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction to accept a guilty plea. McMurtry, by pleading guilty, waived his right to claim the improper denial of his statutory right to a speedy trial. McMurtry's motion to dismiss is therefore not appealable under a subject matter jurisdiction theory. Next we address McMurtry's second argument that his plea of guilty in this case permits his appeal because, unlike most guilty pleas, it was conditional.