Opinion ID: 1096680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying ginn's circumstantial evidence jury instruction.

Text: ¶ 6. Ginn's first assignment of error is whether the trial court should have given a jury instruction concerning circumstantial evidence as to Count I (possession of two or more precursor chemicals). This Court has held that [a] circumstantial evidence instruction must be given unless there is some type of direct evidence such as eyewitness testimony, dying declaration, or confession or admission of the accused. Deal v. State, 589 So.2d 1257, 1260 (Miss. 1991) (citing Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793, 795 (Miss.1985)). This Court has also stated: [C]ircumstantial evidence instructions are required where the only evidence of the crime is circumstantial. In other words, when the prosecution is without a confession and without eyewitnesses to the gravamen of the offense charged. Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d at 431. We have held failures to grant such an instruction where one is required to be reversible error. Simpson v. State, 553 So.2d 37, 39 (Miss.1989). Swinney v. State, 829 So.2d 1225, 1236 (¶ 52) (Miss.2002). ¶ 7. Ginn alleges that there was no direct evidence linking her to possession of the precursor chemicals and that the State's case was based upon circumstantial evidence. There was no evidence such as fingerprints, sales receipts, or a co-defendant's confession connecting her to the precursor chemicals. Conversely, the State contends that the case against Ginn was not circumstantial. The State relied on direct evidence, specifically the materials constituting the precursor chemicals were located in the vehicle where Ginn was a passenger and the written statement made by Ginn. The trial court admitted Ginn's post- Miranda warning statement: I know that Kris Ray cooks meth and believe has for 3 to 4 years. I also believe that on other occurrances [sic] pills that we purchased were for Kris Ray. This statement was admitted for the purpose of showing knowledge, intent, or plan under Miss. R. Evid. 404(b). Ginn also testified at trial that she was aware the chemicals in the vehicle were used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The post- Miranda warning out-of-court statement also placed her in possession of the chemicals. ¶ 8. Additionally, the trial court granted Jury Instruction Number 11(S-3), which informed the jury: In order to find the Defendant guilty of Possession of Pseudoephedrine/Ephedrine, Methanol and Ether, being two (2) or more precursor chemicals or drugs, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding by the jury that the Defendant was aware of the presence and character of the substance and was intentionally and consciously in possession the [sic] substance. It need not be actual physical possession. Constructive possession may be shown by establishing that the substance was subject to the Defendant's dominion or control. ¶ 9. Because (1) the precursor chemicals were found in the vehicle in which Ginn was a passenger; (2) there were two orange syringe caps in plain view on the dashboard; (3) there was a syringe loaded with methamphetamine in plain view on the driver's seat near Ginn; (4) Ginn had a packet of methamphetamine on her person; and, (5) the statement Ginn gave to police indicated that she was aware that the materials were used for the manufacture of methamphetamine, the quality and character of the evidence was such that it was beyond the realm of being circumstantial as it related to the charge of possession of two or more precursor chemicals in Count I of the indictment. The jury was thus properly instructed on constructive possession, and the jury was likewise justified in its verdict based on the evidence presented. Jones v. State, 693 So.2d 375, 376-77 (Miss.1997). Based on the totality of the evidence presented at trial, the evidence was not purely circumstantial, and the trial court thus properly refused Ginn's tendered circumstantial evidence instruction. Therefore, this issue is without merit.