Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Fair Trial by Use of False Evidence

Text: ¶ 38 Moody asserts that the State denied him a fair trial by providing mental health experts with the transcript of the grand jury proceedings in which Detective Wright repeated the false Carlos Logan evidence. Moody claims that providing this evidence tainted the mental health experts' opinions by suggesting that Moody's actions were a product of cocaine addiction, not of mental illness. This evidence, he argues, caused the mental health experts to believe that any mental illness was therefore feigned. ¶ 39 Challenges to the admissibility of evidence can be preserved only by a motion to preclude that evidence or by a specific, contemporaneous objection to its admission. State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 306 n. 5, 896 P.2d 830, 846 n. 5 (1995). The motion or objection must state specific grounds in order to preserve the issue for appeal. See State v. Briggs, 112 Ariz. 379, 382, 542 P.2d 804, 807 (1975). ¶ 40 Moody filed a motion to preclude Dr. Potts' testimony, but that motion was based on the late disclosure of Dr. Potts' notes, not on an argument that Dr. Potts' testimony was tainted or reports were improper because of the doctor's exposure to the grand jury transcripts. Additionally, while Moody did move for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's use of the doctors'tainted opinions to impeach Dr. Goldberg's testimony, that motion did not come until the day after the challenged actions, and Moody made no contemporaneous objection to the prosecutor's use of Dr. Goldberg's opinions during the trial. Consequently, Moody has waived this claim as well. See State v. Harris, 157 Ariz. 35, 36, 754 P.2d 1139, 1140 (1988) (The purpose of the contemporaneous objection requirement is to allow the court to remedy objectionable action; a party cannot permit an error to go unrectified and then [later] claim the right to a mistrial or a new trial.). Thus, we review Moody's challenges based on the use of the Carlos Logan evidence only for fundamental error. See Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 297, 896 P.2d at 837. ¶ 41 The Supreme Court has held that a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth Amendment. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). The Ninth Circuit has removed the knowledge requirement from the Napue equation: [E]ven if the government unwittingly presents false evidence, a defendant is entitled to a new trial `if there is a reasonable probability that [without the evidence] the result of the proceeding would have been different.' United States v. Young, 17 F.3d 1201, 1204 (9th Cir.1994) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Moody urges this court to adopt the Ninth Circuit's analysis in Young. We need not decide whether to adopt the Ninth Circuit's rule, however, because even were we to do so, Moody's claim would fail. ¶ 42 Because Moody has waived this claim by failing to interpose timely objections or file a motion in limine, he must demonstrate that any error contribut[ed] to or significantly affect[ed] the verdict. State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988). Moody makes no such argument. He argues only that the State rendered the opinions of [the mental health experts] unreliable. An independent review of the record suggests, however, that the Carlos Logan evidence likely had little or no impact on the doctors' assessments or the jury's rejection of Moody's insanity defense. ¶ 43 Drs. Sullivan and Morenz were the only State experts to testify at trial regarding Moody's insanity defense. Dr. Sullivan opined that Moody was faking mental illness by malingering, but his testimony was based almost entirely on various tests other experts had administered to Moody. He was not cross-examined regarding the Carlos Logan evidence, and while Dr. Sullivan did have access to the opinions of Drs. Potts, LaWall, and Morenz  all of whom had been provided the grand jury transcripts  Moody offers no citations to the record showing that Dr. Sullivan ever had access to the grand jury transcripts or relied upon portions of the other doctors' reports that were based upon the grand jury transcripts. In fact, before trial defense counsel argued that the only reason the State asked Dr. Sullivan to testify was that he was not exposed to the Carlos Logan information and the State wanted to sanitize the trial by having an expert testify who had not been exposed to that information and therefore was not subject to impeachment on that score. ¶ 44 Dr. Morenz, on the other hand, did admit that he considered the Carlos Logan information in arriving at his opinion that Moody was malingering. He indicated on direct examination that the Logan evidence was one of eleven factors that he considered in reaching his conclusions. Defense counsel then subjected Dr. Morenz to vigorous cross-examination that exposed to the jury that some of the information in the grand jury transcript was false and also exposed any possible prejudice Dr. Morenz might have developed from reading the grand jury transcript before meeting with Moody. This court has observed that cross-examination can place an expert's conclusions in context and help the jury appropriately weigh the testimony. State v. Schackart, 175 Ariz. 494, 502, 858 P.2d 639, 647 (1993) (If the defense wishes to challenge the manner in which a mental examination has been conducted, or an expert's conclusions, this can be done on cross-examination or during the testimony of its own witness.); see also State v. Mincey, 141 Ariz. 425, 441, 687 P.2d 1180, 1196 (1984). ¶ 45 In light of all of the above  that Dr. Morenz appears to be the only expert at the second trial whose opinion was influenced even in part by the Logan evidence, that the Logan evidence supported only one of eleven bases for the doctor's conclusion that Moody was malingering, and that the doctor was subject to cross-examination sufficient to expose to the jury possible biases or flaws in his reasoning  Moody has not met his burden of demonstrating that the false information contribut[ed] to or significantly affect[ed] the verdict. King, 158 Ariz. at 424, 763 P.2d at 244. We therefore conclude that there was no fundamental error on this issue.