Opinion ID: 1433952
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligent retention, supervision, and failure to warn

Text: According to Doe's complaint, the Holy See negligently retained Ronan and failed to warn those coming into contact with him, even though it knew or should have known that Ronan had a history of sexually abusing children. The Holy See also failed to provide reasonable supervision of Ronan. Whether or not this alleged negligence otherwise comes within the language of the FSIA's tortious act exception  a question we do not decide  these causes of action may not go forward under that section because they are barred by the exclusion for discretionary functions. The district court thus erred in exercising jurisdiction over these claims. The discretionary function exclusion shields foreign sovereigns from tort claims based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be abused. § 1605(5)(A). The language of the discretionary function exclusion closely parallels the language of a similar exclusion in the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), so we look to case law on the FTCA when interpreting the FSIA's discretionary function exclusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a); Joseph, 830 F.2d at 1026. Extrapolating from FTCA case law, the Holy See is protected by the discretionary function exclusion if the challenged action meets two criteria: (1) it is discretionary in nature or involve[s] an element of judgment or choice and (2) the judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315, 322, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Soldano v. United States, 453 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir.2006) (clarifying that judgments of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield are governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As to the first Gaubert criterion, Doe refers vaguely in his complaint to the Holy See's policies, practices, and procedures of not firing priests for, and not warning others about, their abusive acts. He also refers in his brief to a policy promulgated by the Holy See to cover up incidents of child abuse, which he argues removed an[y] element of judgment or choice from the Holy See's actions to the extent that Appellants were acting pursuant to it. Yet nowhere does Doe allege the existence of a policy that is  specific and mandatory  on the Holy See. Kennewick Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.1989) (emphasis in original). He does not state the terms of this alleged policy, or describe any documents, promulgations, or orders embodying it. Nor does the complaint in any other way allege that the Holy See's decisions to retain Doe and not warn about his proclivities involved no element of judgment, choice, or discretion. While the burden of proving the Gaubert factors ultimately falls on the sovereign entity asserting the discretionary function exception, a plaintiff must advance a claim that is facially outside the discretionary function exception in order to survive a motion to dismiss. Prescott v. United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 & n. 4 (9th Cir.1992) (citing Carlyle v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 674 F.2d 554, 556 (6th Cir.1982) (Only after a plaintiff has successfully invoked jurisdiction by a pleading that facially alleges matters not excepted by [the FTCA] does the burden fall on the government to prove the applicability of a specific provision of [the FTCA].)). Doe has not pled any actions that fall facially outside the discretionary function exception. As to the second Gaubert criterion, the decision of whether and how to retain and supervise an employee, as well as whether to warn about his dangerous proclivities, are the type of discretionary judgments that the exclusion was designed to protect. We have held the hiring, supervision, and training of employees to be discretionary acts. See Nurse v. United States, 226 F.3d 996, 1001 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that plaintiff's claims of negligent and reckless employment, supervision and training of employees fall squarely within the discretionary function exception); see also Burkhart v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 112 F.3d 1207, 1217 (D.C.Cir.1997) (holding that decisions concerning the hiring, training, and super[vision] of employees are discretionary). Moreover, failure to warn about an individual's dangerousness is discretionary. [10] See Sigman v. United States, 217 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir.2000) (failure to warn individuals on Air Force Base about potentially dangerous serviceman was a discretionary function, because it brought into play sensitive and competing policy considerations of protecting safety while preserving resources and preventing unwarranted alarm); Weissich v. United States, 4 F.3d 810, 814-15 (9th Cir.1993) (failure of probation officers to warn a prosecutor that probationer was a threat to him was a discretionary decision). The Holy See's failure to present any evidence that its actions were actually based on policy considerations is not relevant to whether the discretionary function exception applies. A foreign state's decision need not actually be grounded in policy considerations so long as it is, by its nature[,] susceptible to a policy analysis. See Kelly v. United States, 241 F.3d 755, 764 n. 5 (9th Cir.2001) (second emphasis added). A policy analysis is one that implements political, social, and economic judgments. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 539, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the case of Father Ronan's alleged abuse, the Holy See might have decided to retain him and not to warn his parishioners because it felt that to do otherwise would have harmed the Church's reputation locally, or because it felt that pastoral stability was sufficiently important for the parishioners' well-being, or because low ordination rates or staffing shortages made it necessary to keep Ronan on. That such social, economic, or political policy considerations could have influenced the decision renders it the kind of judgment that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. In sum, the tortious act exception does not provide jurisdiction over Doe's negligent hiring, supervision, and failure to warn claims because they are barred by the discretionary function exclusion. [11] We therefore cannot affirm the district court's judgment on this ground.