Opinion ID: 2967814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The IAC claim

Text: In his IAC claim, Hill maintains that his defense lawyers were ineffective in calling Dr. Edward Burt to testify during the trial’s sentencing phase. At sentencing, Hill’s lawyers sought to show that Hill suffered from a genetic condition that caused neurochemical imbalances in his brain. Specifically, they contended that Hill suffered from a genetically-based serotonin deficiency, which resulted in aggressive impulses. After his arrest and incarceration, Hill had been prescribed medication that they believed had successfully curbed these impulses. Thus, according to Hill’s lawyers, the death penalty was not warranted because Hill’s aggressive behavior was genetic (i.e., beyond his control) and treatable. To this end, Hill’s lawyers presented the testimony of Dr. Emil Coccaro, who explained the role of serotonin in brain chemistry, as well as how genetics affects serotonin levels. Next, the defense called Dr. Bernard Albiniak, a forensic psychologist, who had performed a series of spinal taps on Hill to monitor his serotonin levels. Dr. Albiniak opined that Hill suffered from a chronic serotonin deficiency. Finally, the defense called Hill’s psychiatrist, Dr. Edward Burt. Dr. Burt was expected to testify that he had prescribed Prozac to treat HILL v. OZMINT 21 Hill’s serotonin deficiency, and that Hill had responded favorably to the medication. Dr. Burt’s testimony sought to establish that Hill’s serotonin deficiency caused his aggressive behavior, and that a long history of violence and suicide in his family indicated that his aggressive impulses resulted from a genetic condition. Dr. Burt, however, apparently suffered a breakdown while on the witness stand. Thus, while testifying during the trial’s sentencing phase, Dr. Burt had difficulty responding to questions, particularly on cross-examination. Hill contended in the PCR Court that his defense lawyers should have known that Dr. Burt was incapable of testifying effectively. According to Hill, his lawyers also knew that, approximately eight months before trial, Dr. Burt had been arrested for public intoxication. Hill maintained that, in light of his lawyers’ knowledge of Dr. Burt’s problems, the decision to call him as a witness fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Further, the decision to present Dr. Burt’s evidence, Hill maintained, prejudiced his defense because it undermined the compelling evidence of Drs. Coccaro and Albiniak. The state court summarily rejected Hill’s IAC claim. It concluded that, although Dr. Burt was not as effective as [Hill] would have liked, Hill’s lawyers were not constitutionally ineffective in calling him as a witness because they had properly investigated him and prepared him for trial. PCR Order at 8-9. The district court also denied relief on the IAC claim, concluding that the state court’s rulings were neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Order at 41-42. Hill now challenges the district court’s ruling. Although we have issued a COA on this claim, we decline to award Hill any relief.
After full consideration, we agree with the district court that the state court’s resolution of the IAC claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Our analysis is guided by the principles of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and its progeny. In Strickland, the Supreme Court explained that, to be successful, an ineffective assistance claim must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. The 22 HILL v. OZMINT performance of trial counsel is only deficient from a constitutional standpoint if the representation [falls] below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688. Furthermore, the deficient performance of a defense lawyer will only result in prejudice if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694. In this instance, the state court appropriately concluded that the performance of Hill’s lawyers was not constitutionally deficient. The record shows that, at trial, Dr. Burt appeared competent and able to testify. In fact, Hill’s lawyers had prepped him for an hour immediately prior to his testimony. Although they knew of Dr. Burt’s recent arrest, they believed him to be capable of testifying effectively. As the magistrate judge concluded, Dr. Burt’s performance on the stand was unforeseen and unforeseeable. Magistrate Report at 90. Because Hill’s lawyers could not reasonably have foreseen that Dr. Burt would suffer a breakdown on the stand, they were not ineffective in presenting him as a witness. See Strickland, 486 U.S. at 689 (A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel’s perspective at the time.).16 Thus, the state court’s resolution of this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.