Opinion ID: 4015781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: introduction

Text: Of the 24 jurisdictions that have authorized their attorneys general to bring parens patriae actions, 3 18 jurisdictions expressly require that these claims be commenced within four years of accrual. 4 Washington, Connecticut, Oregon, and 2 Compare RCW 19.86.080(3) (permitting the State to file claims on behalf of private indirect purchasers), with RCW 19.86.090 (denying indirect purchasers the same private right of action). 3 See 15 U.S.C. § 15c(a)(1); ALASKA STAT.§ 45.50.577(b); ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4- 75-315(b); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 16760(a)(1); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 6-4-111(3)(a); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 35-32; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2108(b); D.C. CODE§ 28-4507(b); FLA. STAT. § 542.22(2); I-IAW. REV. STAT.§ 480-14(b); IDAHO CODE§ 48-108(2); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 /7; Mo. CODE ANN., Commercial Law§ 11-209(b)(5); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 9; NEV. REV. STAT.§ 598A.160(1); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 356:4-a(II); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 205(A)(1); OR. REV. STAT.§ 646.775(1)(a); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 6-36-12(a); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-1-32, 37-1-14.2; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-3108(1); VA. CODE ANN.§ 59.1-9.15(d); RCW 19.86.080; W.VA. CODE§ 47-18-17(a). 4See 15 U.S.C. § 15b; ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.588; CAL. Bus & PROF. CODE § 16750.1; COLO. REV. STAT.§ 6-4-118(1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 2111; D.C. CODE§ 284511(b); FLA. STAT. § 542.56(1); IDAHO CODE§ 48-115(1); 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 10 /7; MD. CODE ANN., Commercial Law§ 11-209(d)(l); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 93, § 13; NEV. 2 State v. LG Elecs., Inc. et al., No. 91263-7 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) Virginia, however, lack such express time limits for parens patriae actions. The certified questions 5 in this case ask us to determine whether parens patriae actions brought under RCW 19.86.080 are subject to the same four-year statute of limitations (of RCW 19.86.120) as private direct purchaser claims brought under RCW 19.86.090, or are instead exempt from general statutes of limitations by application ofRCW 4.16.160. See CP at 145. I agree with the majority's conclusion that RCW 19.86.120's time bar is inapplicable to RCW 19.86.080 claims. But I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the legislature gave the attorney general the authority to circumvent all statutes oflimitations by authorizing him or her to sue as parens patriae on behalf of persons residing in the state. RCW 19.86.080(1) (emphasis added). On the contrary, it is well settled that the State cannot avoid statutory time bars by lending REV. STAT. § 598A.220(2); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 356:12(1); OKLA. STAT. tit. 79, § 205(C); 6 R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 6-36-23; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS§ 37-1-14.4; UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-3117(1); W.VA. CODE§ 47-18-11. But see ARK. CODE ANN.§ 4-75-320 (five years); I-IA W. REV. STAT. § 480-14(b) (eight years). 5 The trial court certified two questions: (1) Whether the four-year statute of limitations under RCW 19.86.120 applies to the Washington[] Attorney General's Complaint brought pursuant to its parens patriae authority under RCW 19.86.080 that seeks actual damages for violations ofRCW 19.86.030? [and] (2) Whether RCW 4.16.160 should be applied to the Washington Attorney General's parens patriae antitrust lawsuit seeking actual damages and restitution for citizens of Washington? CP at 145. Notably, the certified questions do not ask us to determine what statute of limitations would apply in the instance we find, as I do, that neither RCW 19.86.120 nor RCW 4.16.160 apply. 3 State v. LG Elecs., Inc. eta!., No. 91263-7 (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part) its name to otherwise time-barred private claims. RCW 4.16.160, which exempts the State from time limits on certain claims, is therefore limited to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of the state. This parens patriae action does not fall into either category. It was brought under RCW 19.86.080, and that statute states that parens patriae actions are not brought in the name of the state or for the benefit of the state, but to vindicate individual claims on behalf of persons residing in the state. I therefore agree with the majority's answer to the first certified question: RCW 19.86.120's four-year time bar does not apply here. But I disagree with its answer to the second certified question. I would hold that RCW 4.16.160's exemption does not apply here, either.