Opinion ID: 836195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: caselaw has employed similar reasoning

Text: Caselaw also supports my interpretation of  315(1). I find persuasive the fact that every previous case that has analyzed  315(1) with respect to the proration of attorney fees has employed reasoning similar to mine. The Court of Appeals first considered the proration of attorney fees pursuant to  315(1) in Boyce v. Grand Rapids Asphalt Paving Co. [82] There, the plaintiff argued that his health care provider should be held responsible for a portion of his attorney fees. The Court rejected this argument, noting that a party does not become liable for attorney fees merely by accepting the benefits of an attorney's services. [83] The Court also ruled that  315(1) could be construed to require either the employer or its insurance carrier to pay a plaintiff's attorney fees. Finally, the Court noted that Administrative Rule 14 of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, which was in effect when the plaintiff was injured, precluded attorneys from recovering a percentage fee for accrued medical services. [84] The Court questioned the soundness of Rule 14, noting that requiring employers or insurance carriers to pay attorney fees when they refuse to pay mandatory medical benefits would serve justice. [85] In Watkins v. Chrysler Corp., [86] the Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principle expounded in Boyce that the term prorate in the final sentence of  315(1) applies to employers and their insurance carriers. Watkins involved an injured plaintiff who sought and was awarded workers' compensation benefits. He subsequently requested a hearing regarding his right to attorney fees related to medical expenses ultimately paid by Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan. The magistrate ruled that he was not entitled to such fees. The Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (WCAB) reversed the magistrate's decision and awarded attorney fees to be paid by the plaintiff's employer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the imposition of attorney fees under  315(1) would be unconscionable. It noted that the plaintiffs medical expenses had been timely paid and that there had been no neglect, breach of duty, or failure to provide medical care. [87] Nonetheless, the Court reiterated that the WCAB had improperly ignored the policy aspect of Boyce that an employer and its insurer should bear attorney fees when medical expenses are not timely paid. [88] In contrast to Watkins, defendant in this case did not timely pay plaintiff's medical expenses such that there was no neglect, breach of duty, or failure to provide medical care. Midwest failed to pay medical expenses despite the fact that it was paying other workers' compensation benefits to plaintiff. As the WCAC noted, Midwest knew of plaintiff's medical bills well in advance of trial, yet simply refused to pay them. Thus, the employer fail[ed], neglect[ed], or refus[ed] to furnish reasonable medical expenses for plaintiffs injuries under  315(1). [89] Finally, in Harvlie v. Jack Post Corp., [90] the Court of Appeals found a unity of purpose for  315(1) by holding that its last sentence authorizes a magistrate to prorate attorney fees among an employer and its insurance carrier. The Court held: Here, the WCAC majority's construction of  315(1) is consistent with a harmonious reading of the last two sentences of  315(1). The third sentence of  315(1) provides that the ... magistrate may prorate attorney fees at the contingent fee rate paid by the employee. Standing alone, this sentence contains ambiguity because it fails to identify whom the magistrate may order to pay the attorney fees. This sentence is not to be construed in isolation, however, but instead must be read in the context of the whole statute and harmonized with the statute's other provisions in a manner that effectuates the purpose intended by the Legislature. The second sentence of  315(1) addresses the consequences of an employer's failure to pay medical expenses and authorizes a magistrate to order the employer to reimburse either the injured claimant or the claimant's medical insurance provider for the reasonable medical expenses incurred. This second sentence addresses the consequences to a nonpaying employer that fails, neglects, or refuses to provide reasonable medical services. The WCAC properly construed the final two sentences of  315(1) and provided a unity of purpose for this statute. [91] The Court noted that its holding was consistent with prior interpretations of 315(1). [92] In sum, I agree with the magistrate, the WCAC, the Court of Appeals, and established caselaw that employers and their insurance carriers are the only parties subject to a proration of attorney fees under  315(1). This interpretation harmonizes the last sentence of  315(1) with the preceding sentences of the provision as well as with the remedial goals of the WDCA. Workers' compensation magistrates may thus prorate an employee's attorney fee incurred in procuring payment for medical expenses against an employer, or against its insurance carrier, or against both. Here, the magistrate's proration of attorney fees against defendants was appropriate, given defendants' failure to pay plaintiff's medical services as mandated by  315(1). Accordingly, I conclude that the magistrate properly prorated plaintiff's attorney fees under  315(1) against Midwest and Magna.