Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exclusion of Three Jurors for Cause

Text: Defendant also contends that the voir dire was inadequate because the trial court incorrectly excluded three members of the prospective-juror pool. Defendant contends that those jurors did not express views about the death penalty that would prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as [jurors] in accordance with [their] instructions and oath as described in Adams, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d at 589.
Defendant contends that the court incorrectly excused prospective-juror Timothy Wedeen from the jury pool. According to defendant, Mr. Wedeen did not articulate personal opinions that would prevent him from carrying out his oath as a juror. We disagree. Mr. Wedeen expressed significant doubts about his ability to impose a death sentence under any circumstances. Q. What are your feelings about the death penalty? A. I don't agree with it. Capital punishment is barbaric. Q. Are there any crimes that you think it is appropriate to impose the death penalty? A. No, I do not. Q. None at all? A. Not really, no. I feel life without parole is a more appropriate measure. Q. Well, you understand that you'd be placed under oath and you would have a duty to perform, that would be to listen to the evidence, accept the legal principles as the Court explains them to you. Do you understand that? A. Yes, I do. Q. And once having taken such an oath, if the facts warrant it and the principles warrant it, those combined, they warranted the imposition of the death penalty, would you be able to impose the death penalty? A. I would find it difficult. My judgment would be affected by my personal feelings. I could not say that it wouldn't. We recognize that Mr. Wedeen stated in response to questions from defense counsel that he could follow his oath as a juror and vote for a death sentence if the evidence warranted such a finding. However, the prospective juror immediately expressed reluctance in response to questions from the prosecutor. Q.    What we're trying to find out is whether or not you would be able to follow what the Court is going to be asking you to do should this matter reach the penalty phase. Now, do you understand what I'm talking about.         A.    The answer to your question, if I'm picked for jury duty and the law says I have to make a fair decision, I will. Q. Would you be able to make that decision based on the facts in the case putting aside your personal feelings? A. I don't know. I honestly do not know. I feel very strongly about this issue. Finally, in response to an inquiry from the trial court, Mr. Wedeen related that his judgment would be impaired by his beliefs regarding capital punishment. Q.    We're just trying to find out your honest views so that we have a jury who will listen to the evidence and make the decision based on the evidence and the proofs posed. I know it's difficult when you have strong feelings one way or another about a certain case. A. My judgment would be impaired by my feelings, yes. I have to be honest and say yes, it would when it comes to that issue. I wish I could say otherwise but that's how I feel. Over the objection of defense counsel, the trial court excused Mr. Wedeen. Concerning Mr. Wedeen's responses the court concluded: If he is not telling us that his ability to impose the death penalty may be impaired by his beliefs, he's at least telling us, `I don't know.' Mr. Wedeen's response was like that of the prospective juror in State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990), who stated that if the law conflicted with her conscience, she would follow conscience. Id. at 589, 575 A. 2d 816. We found no error in her excusal. Ibid. The trial court is afforded substantial deference in its determinations concerning the qualification of prospective jurors. State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 362, 558 A. 2d 1259. Because Mr. Wedeen indicated that his emotions would control his penalty-phase deliberations, his excusal for cause was well within the trial court's discretion.
Defendant similarly challenges the exclusion of prospective juror Ronald Vladyka. Mr. Vladyka expressed ambivalence about the possibility of voting for a death sentence. Q. Do you have any feelings or beliefs about the death penalty? A. I don't believe in it. Q. Under any circumstances? A. Well, I just  I don't know. I just don't believe in it. I really can't give a reason why. Q. Do you think there are any crimes where the death penalty is an appropriate penalty? A. Well  no. Q. None at all? A. No, not really. In response to rehabilitating questions from defense counsel, Mr. Vladyka indicated, with significant reluctance, that he could follow his oath as a juror and vote for a death sentence: I guess if everything was in place and I believed in it, I mean, you know it is hard to say yes or no. The court excused Mr. Vladyka after the following question and answer in which he expressed his inability to announce a sentence of death in open court: Q. If maybe you are the Foreperson, would you be able to announce that verdict in open Court? A. No. Again, the trial court was within its discretion to excuse Mr. Vladyka. [A] juror's bias for or against capital punishment need not be shown with `unmistakable clarity.' Pennington, supra, 119 N.J. at 588, 575 A. 2d 816 (quoting Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 256, 524 A. 2d 188). The prospective juror in this instance indicated an inability to fairly weigh the mitigating and aggravating factors prior to reaching a decision on sentence.
Defendant also challenges the exclusion of prospective juror Florence Zappala, arguing that she was excluded because of her stated reticence about voting for a death sentence. However, Mrs. Zappala also indicated her inability properly to evaluate the testimony of police officers. Q. You were asked if you would believe the testimony of a police officer just because the party testifying was a police officer, and you said yes. Why is that? A. I think I would. I mean, I would be inclined to. Q. Do you think you would give more weight to the testimony of a police officer just because it's a police officer and you had a civilian telling you one thing and a police officer telling you something else? A. I think I would have to think about that a while. It's all according to the person, I think, too. Q. You can't have jurors who come in and say, Well, anything a police officer tells me I'm going to believe. We want jurors who will listen to the evidence and fairly evaluate the evidence? A. Balance. Q. Now, based on your answer to the question, we don't know if you can do that. Only you can tell us. A. I don't know. I mean, it would be a question I would think about, I'd be inclined to believe a police officer, but I don't know. You know, I should think he'd be telling the truth. The trial court stated its reasons for excusing prospective juror Zappala: The reason for excusing the juror is basically based upon her answers concerning the police officer. At several times she was asked and still in the final analysis she may just give a little more weight to that testimony of a police officer only because it was a police officer, and the reason I didn't look up to you for your objection earlier is because people spend as much time as they have here, I don't want to ask them one question and send them on their way. The trial court was certainly within its discretion in excusing Mrs. Zappala based on her remarks concerning the veracity of police officers. To summarize our findings about the adequacy of the voir dire, the trial court should have questioned the potential jurors about the effect that aggravating factor c(4)(g) (murder committed in the course of a kidnapping) would have had on their ability to impose the death penalty. However, given the otherwise-adequate scope of voir dire, we are satisfied that the trial court conducted a sufficiently-thorough questioning to probe into the potential biases of the prospective jurors. The trial court's questioning of the jurors was sufficiently calculated to produce a fair and unbiased jury. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 247, 593 A. 2d 266. We further conclude that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in excusing the three prospective jurors for cause.