Opinion ID: 2623194
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Other Instructional Issues

Text: Defendant contends the court committed several other instructional errors. (a) In People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, the defendant had taken the murder victim's clothing at gunpoint in order to attempt to conceal the murder. We held that, although the taking constituted a technical robbery, the robbery-murder special circumstance was not established because the crime was not a murder in the commission of robbery, but a robbery in the commission of murder. (See People v. Kimble (1988) 44 Cal.3d 480, 500, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803.) We said that the felony-based special circumstances reflected a legislative belief that it was appropriate to make those who killed to advance an independent felonious purpose death eligible, but that this goal was not achieved when the felony was merely incidental to the murder.... ( Green, supra, at p. 61, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468.) As we have summarized the rule, to prove a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation, the prosecution must show that the defendant had an independent purpose for the commission of the felony, that is, the commission of the felony was not merely incidental to an intended murder. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 182, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) The standard jury instructions were modified to reflect this holding. Today, as at the time of trial, CALJIC No. 8.81.17, paragraph 2, explains that, for a felony-based special circumstance to be found true, it must be proved: The murder was committed in order to carry out or advance the commission of the crime.... In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the [crime] was merely incidental to the commission of the murder. At trial, for reasons not clear from the record, the court gave the second, but not first, sentence of this paragraph. Thus, the court told the jury: In other words, the special circumstance referred to in these instructions is not established if the robbery or burglary were merely incidental to the commission of the murder. Defendant contends the court erred in not also telling the jury the murder had to be committed in order to carry out or advance the robbery or burglary. We disagree. As the transitional words in the instruction, In other words, suggest, Green established one requirement, not two. The point we made in People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468, is that if the felony was merely incidental to the murder  as the evidence showed it was in Green  no separate felony-based special circumstance exists. We have used various phrasings in explaining this requirement, two of which are included in CALJIC No. 8.81.17, but we have never suggested that we had created two separate requirements, or that any precise language was required to explain the concept to the jury. There is nothing magical about the phrase to carry out or advance the felony. Indeed, we ourselves have stated the requirement without using that phrase. (See People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 182, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 608, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) Several ways exist to explain the requirement. [8] Even if it might have been better to give the entire second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17, the court's explanation that the burglary or robbery must not be merely incidental to the commission of the murder, adequately conveyed the requirement. Moreover, we have held it is not error to fail to give any such instruction if the evidence does not warrant it. The second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 is appropriate where the evidence suggests the defendant may have intended to murder his victim without having an independent intent to commit the felony that forms the basis of the special circumstance allegation. In other words, if the felony is merely incidental to achieving the murder  the murder being the defendant's primary purpose  then the special circumstance is not present, but if the defendant has an `independent felonious purpose' (such as burglary or robbery) and commits the murder to advance that independent purpose, the special circumstance is present. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 505, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182; see also People v. Kimble, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 501-503, 244 Cal.Rptr. 148, 749 P.2d 803.) Defendant again suggests he might have killed in retaliation for McCullough's having identified his brother Steven as the perpetrator of a crime. But no evidence was presented to the jury that this was his sole motivation, and defendant did nothing to develop this theory of the case at trial.... Under the circumstances of the case as presented to the jury, the second paragraph of CALJIC No. 8.81.17 was not required. ( Navarette, supra, at p. 505, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182.) And certainly, the first sentence of that paragraph was not required in addition to the second sentence, which the court did give. (b) As the court explained to the jury, robbery requires a taking from a person or the person's immediate presence. (§ 211.) Defendant argues the court had a sua sponte duty to define the term immediate presence. We disagree. In the absence of a specific request, a court is not required to instruct the jury with respect to words or phrases that are commonly understood and not used in a technical or legal sense. [Citation.] We think the phrase `immediate presence' was sufficiently clear in the context of this case that no further clarification of the phrase was necessary. ( People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 503, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182.) If defendant thought the point needed additional clarification or explanation, defendant should have `requested appropriate clarifying or amplifying language' [citation]; absent such a request, the point is not preserved for appellate review. ( People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 557, 127 Cal. Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) (c) Pointing out that prosecution witness Jan Biaruta was an in-custody informant, defendant next argues the court erred in failing to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 3.20, which tells the jury to view such testimony with caution and close scrutiny. [9] However, the instruction need be given only upon the request of a party. (§ 1127a; see People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 201-202, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) Neither party requested the instruction in this case, so the court had no duty to give it. Moreover, it is far from clear whether the instruction would have helped or harmed defendant. Although it tells the jury to view the testimony with caution and close scrutiny, it also specifically directs the jury's attention to the extent to which the witness might have received or expected any benefits from the party calling him, in this case, the prosecution. Other than a trip to California to testify  where he remained in custody  no evidence was presented of any benefits the witness received or expected from the prosecution. Defendant reasonably might not have wanted to focus the jury's attention on the absence of any evidence of real or expected benefits. (d) Defendant next argues that his statement to Deputy Mayoya that he would not contradict his brother Steven if Steven had said he had committed the 1998 robbery of McCullough was evidence of another crime, and the court erred in not instructing the jury, sua sponte, on the limited purpose for which it could consider the evidence. However, the court has no sua sponte duty to give such a limiting instruction. (§ 355; People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63-64, 177 Cal.Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534.) Contrary to defendant's argument, [t]his was not an `extraordinary case' in which the unprotested evidence was ` both highly prejudicial and minimally relevant to any legitimate purpose,' and was `a dominant part of the evidence against the accused.' ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 163-164, 121 Cal. Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) Moreover, defendant might well not have wanted the court to give his statement the emphasis a limiting instruction would have provided. ( People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 495, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249.) (e) Defendant contends that the standard instructions on circumstantial evidence, which use the phrase appears to you to be reasonable, undermined the constitutional requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We have repeatedly rejected the argument and continue to do so. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 428, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) (f) Defendant contends that giving former CALJIC No. 2.90, with its use of the terms moral certainty and moral evidence, improperly diluted the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We have also repeatedly rejected the argument and continue to do so. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 429, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) (g) CALJIC No. 2.20 tells the jury it is the sole judge of the credibility of a witness and lists certain factors the jury may consider in determining credibility, one of which is a witness's felony conviction. CALJIC No. 2.23 tells the jury it may consider a felony conviction only to determine credibility, and such a conviction does not necessarily destroy or impair credibility but is a circumstance the jury may consider. The court deleted from CALJIC No. 2.20 the reference to a felony conviction and did not give CALJIC No. 2.23. Defendant contends the court erred because prosecution witness Jan Biaruta had a felony conviction. When the parties discussed the instructions, the question arose whether any witness had suffered a felony conviction. The parties believed that, with one possible exception not relevant here, none had such a conviction. Thus, they agreed that, subject to confirming whether the one witness had a felony conviction (it was never so confirmed), the court would delete the reference to a felony conviction and would not give CALJIC No. 2.23. Later, after the court had finished instructing the jury, one of defendant's attorneys stated that although we did withdraw that instruction on conviction of a felony, he had recently thought about it, and Mr. Biaruta did testify and he was convicted of a felony. The court did not want to add that instruction at that time as it would have highlighted it. We have said that the court should give the substance of CALJIC No. 2.20 in every criminal case, although it may omit factors that are inapplicable under the evidence. ( People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 883-884, 123 Cal.Rptr. 119, 538 P.2d 247.) Here, the court, with the concurrence of the parties, mistakenly believed no witness had suffered a felony conviction and, accordingly, failed to mention it or give CALJIC No. 2.23. Defendant argues that because of this, the jury evaluated Biaruta's damning testimony as if it had come from a thoroughly credible witness, without consideration of his felony conviction for burglary as a factor negatively affecting his credibility. We need not decide whether the court erred, or whether defendant invited any error, for the failure to give these instructions was harmless under any standard. Except to the extent that it duplicated CALJIC No. 2.20, CALJIC No. 2.23 contained nothing favorable to the defense. Telling the jury it could consider Biaruta's felony conviction only on credibility, and that such a conviction did not necessarily destroy or impair credibility, would not help the defense. Defendants usually want such a limiting instruction when they themselves had testified and been impeached with a felony conviction, not when a prosecution witness had the conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Lomeli (1993) 19 Cal. App.4th 649, 654-655, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 5, disapproved in People v. Hernandez (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1040, 1052, fn. 3, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 880, 94 P.3d 1080; People v. Kendrick (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1273, 260 Cal.Rptr. 27.) The failure to give CALJIC No. 2.23 did not prejudice defendant. In the abstract, it might have benefited defendant for the court to include a felony conviction among the specific factors listed in CALJIC No. 2.20, but it was unnecessary to do so here. Biaruta testified on direct examination that he had a burglary conviction for which he was serving a 12-year prison sentence. On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that he also had convictions for resisting arrest and criminal trespass. The court did give most of CAJLIC No. 2.20, including that, In determining the believability of a witness, you may consider anything that has a tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness including but not limited to any of the following.... (Italics added.) Accordingly, the jury was permitted to consider the felony conviction (and the witness's other convictions) on credibility. Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Biaruta and challenged his credibility. He argued that the jury should not believe the word of a convicted felon who was in the Arizona prison. The prosecutor cited Biaruta's testimony only briefly in his opening argument, and even he stated that Biaruta was certainly no prize in his own right. The record thus refutes defendant's claim that the jury evaluated Biaruta's testimony as if it had come from a thoroughly credible witness and without considering his felony conviction.