Opinion ID: 562505
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence Admitted Under 404(b)

Text: 67 The defendant's final argument is that the district court erred by admitting other acts evidence under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The other acts evidence consisted of testimony by Serafin Andrade and Darrell Brewer. 404(b) provides that evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts may be admissible to show proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plans, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 4 The defendant admits that the testimony of these individuals may have had some bearing on the issues of motive or plan, but claims that the government's purpose in offering the evidence was to establish the defendant's propensity to commit the crimes charged. The defendant contends that [t]his case was one in which the sideshow of 'other act' evidence swallowed up the trial of the acts charged in the indictment. 68 In United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 620, (7th Cir.1989), this court formulated a four-point test to determine the admissibility of evidence under 404(b): 69 To determine if such evidence is admissible, the district court must engage in a four-pronged analysis and evaluate whether (1) the evidence is directed toward establishing a matter in issue other than the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged, (2) the evidence shows that the other act is similar enough and close enough in time to be relevant to the matter and issue, (3) the evidence is sufficient to support a jury finding that the defendant committed a similar act, and (4) the probative value of the evidence is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. (Citations omitted). 70 The first prong of the Zapata test is satisfied because the testimony and documents of Andrade and Brewer were offered to prove the defendant's intent and common scheme or plan, particularly as related to the conspiracy charge in the indictment, and not to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. The defendant was charged in Count One with conspiracy to defraud the United States by obstructing the lawful functions of the Internal Revenue Service. The overt acts charged in this count were that the defendant met Pacelli at a seminar that focused on income taxes, that Pacelli and the defendant discussed ways to thwart the Internal Revenue Service, that the defendant created a trust to insulate Pacelli from his potential creditors, and that the defendant counseled Pacelli to refrain from filing income tax returns. The testimony of Andrade and Brewer reveals that the defendant engaged in identical behavior with them. Both testified that they met the defendant at a seminar regarding the tax protest movement. Both testified that they met with the defendant several times to discuss ways to impede the Internal Revenue Service. Further, Brewer testified that the defendant discussed the formation of a trust to avoid taxes, similar to the one that he set upon behalf of Pacelli. Both testified that the defendant instructed them to cease filing income tax returns and based upon his advice, both of them did stop filing tax returns and paying taxes. Thus, it is clear that the testimony and documents of Andrade and Brewer were offered to prove the defendant's intent and common scheme or plan, particularly as it related to the conspiracy charge in the indictment, and were not offered to show the defendant's propensity to commit the crime charged. 71 The other acts evidence admitted under 404(b) also satisfies the second and third parts of the Zapata test. According to the testimony of Andrade and Brewer, the other acts occurred during the same time period as the charges in the indictment, the years 1980 through 1985. Also, as discussed in the previous paragraph, the other acts involving Andrade and Brewer were similar, often identical, to the acts charged in the indictment. 72 Finally, in applying the fourth prong of the Zapata test to the facts of the case before, we note that it is well settled that the trial judge who saw and heard the evidence firsthand, can best balance probity and prejudice, and the reviewing court may reverse only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. United States v. Chaimson, 706 F.2d 798, 808 (7th Cir.1985). The trial judge, in balancing the probative value versus unfair prejudice, must be accorded great deference because of his firsthand exposure to the evidence and his familiarity with the course of the trial proceeding. United States v. Liefer, 778 F.2d 1236, 1244 (7th Cir.1985) (citations omitted). There is no doubt that the testimony of Andrade and Brewer were highly probative of the matters at issue in this case. Indeed, any prejudicial effect of the evidence was minimized, as the jury was properly given a limiting instruction that the evidence was to be considered only in determining the defendant's intent, plan, and knowledge concerning the defendant's dealings with Pacelli. Thus, the district court acted properly within its discretion in admitting the testimony and documents of Andrade and Brewer pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b). The decision of the district court is 73 AFFIRMED.