Opinion ID: 465422
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Supervisory Pro-Union Conduct

Text: 26 Active supervisory participation in a union organizing campaign destroys laboratory conditions and prevents employees from exercising an uncoerced vote. Such involvement requires an election to be set aside. Wright Memorial Hospital v. NLRB, 771 F.2d 400, 404 (8th Cir.1985); Fall River Savings Bank v. NLRB, 649 F.2d 50, 56 (1st Cir.1981). The courts, however, have never required actual proof of coercion. Supervisory activity need only reasonably tend to have a coercive effect on or likely to impair an employee's choice. ITT Lighting Fixtures v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 934, 937 (1981), appeal on remand, 712 F.2d 40 (2nd Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 978, 104 S.Ct. 2361, 80 L.Ed.2d 833 (1984). Implied threats of retaliation suffice to taint an election. See Wright Memorial Hospital, 771 F.2d at 404; Worley Mills, Inc. v. NLRB, 685 F.2d 362, 365 (10th Cir.1982); Fall River Savings Bank, 649 F.2d at 57. 27 The NLRB rested its decision on a distinction between major and minor supervisors. The hearing officer found that since head printers possessed only minor supervisory powers, their pre-election involvement could not have created a coercive atmosphere. Kahala Kai contends that such distinction is inapplicable. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held: 28 The Board's designation of ... minor supervisors is not supported by the evidence or the law. The Act does not grade supervisors as major or minor. An individual is either a supervisor or an employee. 29 Turner's Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 F.2d 289, 291 (4th Cir.1972) (Footnote omitted). Section 2(11) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 152(11), makes no mention of minor supervisors. 30 In ITT Lighting Fixtures, the court, in denying enforcement of the Board's order, held that the criteria developed by the Board for determining whether a supervisor [is] 'major' or 'minor,' and whether the exercise of a supervisor's authority could have an impact on the laboratory condition for voting, cannot be made simply by labeling a supervisor as 'minor'; instead there must be consideration of both the extent of the supervisor's authority and the extent of his pro-union activity. 712 F.2d at 43-44. The court held further: 31 It seems clear that in addition to the Board's criteria which are based solely on the power to retaliate, there should be included the power to reward. This power consists of giving one employee an advantage over another. The authority to grant rewards in the form of transfer, or favorable work assignments, or selection to work overtime to make more money, or excuse from overtime, can be just as coercive in the election process as the authority to issue written warnings. 32 Id. at 44. 33 We need not decide in this case whether a distinction between major and minor supervisors can ever be a permissible element in an analysis of the coercive impact of pre-election involvement by supervisors. In other contexts, it may prove appropriate to consider whether the potential for coercion was reduced where a supervisor possessed little actual power over employees, although the lack of substantial authority may instead be evidence that the individual was not in fact a statutory supervisor. 34 In this case, however, the hearing officer did not adequately support his finding that the supervisors possessed only minor authority. He did not give careful consideration to the extent of the supervisors' authority to reward employees by approving over-time and granting time-off. Moreover, the Regional Director, in the pre-election hearing, had found the supervisors to have authority to discipline workers, and effectively recommend termination and raises in the pay of employees. These individuals, who had been identified by official NLRB action as supervisors with the power to discipline employees, continued to campaign for the union right up until the election. Consequently, the hearing officer's classification of these individuals as minor supervisors appears to be a conclusory appellation adopted after the decision had already been made to uphold the election. 35 In reaching its decision, the NLRB applied a two-prong test. An affirmative answer to either prong would have required the election to be set aside. First, the NLRB asked whether the supervisors' conduct created an impression that the employer favored the union, and second, whether the supervisors' conduct created a fear of future retaliation. Kahala Kai does not argue that the employees were unaware of its anti-union position. It only contends that the supervisors created a fear of future retaliation. 36 Reviewing the second prong, this court has applied the following standard: 37 The type of solicitation which invalidates a union selection process is one that must contain the seeds of potential reprisal, punishment, or intimidation [or] the involvement of the supervisors does not rise to the level of supervisory 'solicitation.'  38 Global Marine, 528 F.2d at 95 (quoting NLRB v. WKRG-TV, Inc., 470 F.2d 1302, 1316 (5th Cir.1973)). We review the record as a whole to determine whether the head printers' conduct laid the foundation for potential coercion of the employees. 39 The head printers initiated the union organizing campaign and overcame employee apathy pervading Kahala Kai. Nichols testified that the supervisors established a type of underground. Most of the head printers organized and attended the initial union meeting. They also signed authorization cards in the presence of other employees. These actions were highly visible among employees. 8 40 Further, the head printers engaged in almost continuous conversations at the work place. They enumerated the many benefits a union would provide, and warned, among other things, that without a union employees would not receive vacations or seniority. Kuencer cautioned that the job would be rougher without union support. Two nights prior to the election, he told an employee that if he could, he would vote for the Union. These pervasive conversations clearly expressed the head printers' Union preference. 41 Each of the five head printers vocalized their Union support among the twenty-six employees who voted. Thus, the head printers exerted significant influence over a small group of employees. A switch of only four votes, not counting challenged ballots, would have resulted in a tie vote. 9 See ITT Lighting, 712 F.2d at 45; N.L.R.B. v. Klinger Electric, 656 F.2d 76, 86 (5th Cir.1981). The head printers' constant vocal support among such a small group of employees, combined with the supervisors' ability to effectively recommend pay increases, reprimand employees, and approve overtime, together with their assurance of benefits if the Union prevailed and unfavorable consequences if the Union lost the election, sowed the seeds of reprisal. 10 The NLRB, thus, improperly certified the Union as Kahala Kai employees' exclusive bargaining representative.