Opinion ID: 1920879
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Improper Arguments and Statements by Prosecuting Attorneys

Text: Snelgrove also complains of a number of improper statements and arguments made by the prosecuting attorneys throughout the trial. [16] First, we consider the improper arguments Snelgrove objected to at trial, and we find that even if the trial court improperly overruled defense counsel's objection to these statements, this error was harmless. Dessaure v. State, 891 So.2d 455, 465 n. 5 (Fla.2004) (We recognize that the proper standard of review for an overruled defense objection is a harmless error standard.). Second, we analyze the arguments and statements that were not objected to at trial. These require us to consider whether fundamental error warrants a reversal, and we find it does not.
During the guilt phase, Snelgrove objected to two arguments made by the state attorney during the State's guilt phase closing argument. The first alleged that Snelgrove was attempting to transfer blame to the victim: Hmm. You know, it's funny. No one ever wants to take responsibility even when they do the worst. Shouldn't have happened that way. Shouldn't have happened that way. Oh, my gosh, look where I am. If they had only stayed asleep, I'd have never killed them. If I'd have only found the purse right away and snuck back out the window, I'd have never had to kill them. Defense counsel objected to this on the basis that it was irrelevant and unduly inflamed the jury. The second argument also occurred during closing arguments, and it spoke to the truth of Matthews' testimony: You know [Matthews] was telling the truth. Hmm. You can tell. You can tell better than I can, 12 of you can. Take your 12 years of experience and pool it. That man was telling the truth. And he knew things that only the killer would know, the kind of stuff that doesn't show up in the paper. Defense counsel claimed these statements were unsupported by the facts as there was no evidence that Snelgrove's admissions, as testified to by Matthews, did not appear in the newspaper. The trial court overruled both objections. Even if these arguments were improper and defense counsel's objections to them should have been sustained, we conclude that the trial court's failure to do so was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla.1986) (recognizing that an impermissible statement is harmless when, in light of all the evidence presented, there is no reasonable probability that the statement contributed to the verdict).
Three non-penalty phase comments that Snelgrove complains of on appeal were not properly preserved for review. These comments warrant reversal only if Snelgrove establishes that admitting them constituted fundamental error that leads us to question the validity of the trial itself. Card v. State, 803 So.2d 613, 622 (Fla.2001). We find no such error; therefore, we find no merit in these complaints. First, Snelgrove complains of an improper interjection by the state attorney during defense counsel's closing arguments. In response to hypothetical questions defense counsel posed to the jury, the state attorney interjected: Your Honor, I'd be glad to offer a scenario if you would like. The court immediately told the state attorney that that would be out of order. No objection or request for a mistrial was made. Second, Snelgrove argues that the State improperly coached Matthews while making a speaking objection. During his cross-examination of Matthews, defense counsel asked Matthews if his testimony was that Snelgrove went out ... the back door. Matthews responded affirmatively and then said, He went out the way he came in as far as I know. Defense counsel then asked, So he ... came in the back door. Matthews again responded affirmatively, and the State objected that defense counsel was trying to put words in the mouth of the witness. What Mr. Snelgrove said is he went out the way he came in.  (Emphasis added.) Matthews then responded: That's what I was fixing to say. Lastly, Snelgrove argues that the State made an improper argument about facts not in evidence during the State's closing argument. In response to the defense argument that none of the victims' blood had been found on the knife, the State made the following statement: I'd like to answer [defense counsel's] assertions that the fact that there did not appear to be any mixture of the victims' blood with their killer is reason to believe he didn't kill them. A considerable amount of blood was sampled, a considerable amount of DNA was collected, but I think one of the  probably the best examples is the knife. They took a small scraping, and they found David Snelgrove's blood on it. That was it. Does anyone here not believe that this was the murder weapon? This weapon was plunged into the heart of Mrs. Fowler, and it was plunged into Mr. Fowler five times or more. Their blood wasn't on it, according to the Defense, but that's not what the evidence said. The evidence says that David Snelgrove's blood was on it in the sample they took, the scraping. It doesn't say that no one else's blood was on it. And the fact that they didn't scrape the entire knife and take every piece of blood off of it doesn't mean that this wasn't the murder weapon. This statement was not followed by an objection, and so we review it only for fundamental error. [17] Whether viewed individually or collectively, none of these statements or arguments was so fundamentally improper that their utterance reache[d] down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty ... could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. See Card, 803 So.2d at 622. Snelgrove, therefore, is not entitled to relief on this claim.