Opinion ID: 1248286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Amendment Retaliation Test

Text: Having determined that Eng had a personal constitutional interest in his own speech about the leak to the IRS and in Geragos's interview with the Los Angeles Times, we turn now to the question whether Eng has alleged a violation of that interest. It is well settled that the state may not abuse its position as employer to stifle the First Amendment rights[its employees] would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Acknowledging the limits on the state's ability to silence its employees, the Supreme Court has explained that [t]he problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Id. In the forty years since Pickering, First Amendment retaliation law has evolved dramatically, if sometimes inconsistently. Unraveling Pickering 's tangled history reveals a sequential five-step series of questions: (1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff's protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the protected speech. Analysis of these questions, further complicated by restraints on our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction, involves a complex array of factual and legal inquiries requiring detailed explanation. First, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the speech addressed an issue of public concern. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983); Bauer v. Sampson, 261 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir.2001). Speech involves a matter of public concern when it can fairly be considered to relate to `any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community.' Johnson v. Multnomah County, Or., 48 F.3d 420, 422 (9th Cir.1995) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684). But speech that deals with `individual personnel disputes and grievances' and that would be of `no relevance to the public's evaluation of the performance of governmental agencies' is generally not of `public concern.' Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.2003) (quoting McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir.1983)). `Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.' Johnson, 48 F.3d at 422 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684). The public concern inquiry is purely a question of law, which we review de novo. Berry v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 648 (9th Cir.2006) (citing Hyland v. Wonder, 972 F.2d 1129, 1134 (9th Cir.1992)). If the speech in question does not address a matter of public concern, then the speech is unprotected, and qualified immunity should be granted. Second, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the speech was spoken in the capacity of a private citizen and not a public employee. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); Posey v. Lake Pend Oreille School Dist. No. 84, 546 F.3d 1121, 1126-27 (9th Cir.2008). Statements are made in the speaker's capacity as citizen if the speaker `had no official duty' to make the questioned statements, or if the speech was not the product of `performing the tasks the employee was paid to perform.' Posey, 546 F.3d at 1127 n. 2 (some internal quotations and alterations omitted) (quoting, respectively, Marable v. Nitchman, 511 F.3d 924, 932-33 (9th Cir.2007), and Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 544 (9th Cir.2006)). While the question of the scope and content of a plaintiff's job responsibilities is a question of fact, the ultimate constitutional significance of the facts as found is a question of law. Id. at 1129-30. In evaluating whether a plaintiff spoke as a private citizen, we must therefore assume the truth of the facts as alleged by the plaintiff with respect to employment responsibilities. If the allegations demonstrate an official duty to utter the speech at issue, then the speech is unprotected, and qualified immunity should be granted. Third, the plaintiff bears the burden of showing the state took adverse employment action ... [and that the] speech was a `substantial or motivating' factor in the adverse action. Freitag, 468 F.3d at 543 (quoting Coszalter v. City of Salem, 320 F.3d 968, 973 (9th Cir.2003)); see also Marable, 511 F.3d at 930, n. 10 (It is [the plaintiff]'s burden to show that his constitutionally protected speech was a motivating factor in [the state]'s adverse employment action.). This third step is purely a question of fact. Once again, in evaluating whether the government's adverse employment action was motivated by the employee's speech, we must assume the truth of the plaintiff's allegations. If the plaintiff does not sufficiently allege that the state retaliated for the employee's exercise of First Amendment rights, there can be no recovery, and qualified immunity should be granted. Fourth, if the plaintiff has passed the first three steps, the burden shifts to the government to show that under the balancing test established by [ Pickering ], the [state]'s legitimate administrative interests outweigh the employee's First Amendment rights. Thomas v. City of Beaverton, 379 F.3d 802, 808 (9th Cir.2004); see also CarePartners, 545 F.3d at 880. This inquiry, known as the Pickering balancing test, asks whether the relevant government entity had an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Its qualified restriction of ordinarily protected speech recognizes that [a] government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity's operations. Id. Although the Pickering balancing inquiry is ultimately a legal question, like the private citizen inquiry, its resolution often entails underlying factual disputes. See, e.g., Rivero v. City & County of San Francisco, 316 F.3d 857, 865-66 (9th Cir.2002) (determining the outcome of the Pickering balancing test requires resolving underlying question[s] of fact); Hyland, 972 F.2d at 1139 (Application of this balancing test entails resolution of underlying factual inquir[ies]). Thus we must once again assume any underlying disputes will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff to determine, as a matter of law, whether the state has adequate justification to restrict the employee's speech. If the allegations, viewed in light most favorable to the plaintiff, indicate adequate justification, qualified immunity should be granted. Fifth and finally, if the government fails the Pickering balancing test, it alternatively bears the burden of demonstrating that it would have reached the same [adverse employment] decision even in the absence of the [employee's] protected conduct. Thomas, 379 F.3d at 808 (quoting Ulrich v. City and County of San Francisco, 308 F.3d 968, 976-77 (9th Cir.2002)). In other words, it may avoid liability by showing that the employee's protected speech was not a but-for cause of the adverse employment action. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). This question relates to, but is distinct from, the plaintiff's burden to show the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor. It asks whether the adverse employment action was based on protected and unprotected activities, and if the state would have taken the adverse action if the proper reason alone had existed. Knickerbocker v. City of Stockton, 81 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir.1996) (emphasis added). The Mt. Healthy but-for causation inquiry is purely a question of fact. Wagle v. Murray, 560 F.2d 401, 403 (9th Cir.1977) (per curium) ( Mt. Healthy indicates the `trier-of-fact' should determine whether the firing would have occurred without the protected conduct.); see also Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2003). In evaluating whether the employee's speech was a but-for cause of the adverse employment action, we must therefore once again assume the truth of the plaintiff's allegations. Immunity should be granted on this ground only if the state successfully alleges, without dispute by the plaintiff, that it would have made the same employment decisions even absent the questioned speech.