Opinion ID: 3066451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maloney

Text: The district court granted summary judgment to David Maloney, finding that although he was a driving force in the efforts to halt the renovations, he was not involved in the decision to seize documents. Elkins III, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 3334. We agree. Elkins points to no evidence suggesting that Maloney caused the seizure. Maloney works for HPO, which 15 was not responsible for the warrant and search; DCRA was. Elkins claims Maloney directed Williams-Cherry to participate in the search, but the evidence she identifies shows only that Williams-Cherry told him that she would be involved. That same evidence actually establishes that DCRA, not HPO, directed her to participate in the search. WilliamsCherry Dep. 79:2-80:16, Mar. 19, 2008. And Williams-Cherry was clear in her testimony that Maloney had “nothing to do with [the] search.” Id. at 80:7-8. Elkins argues that Maloney could have seen that the warrant was inadequate on its face. But there is no evidence that Maloney ever saw the warrant, and even if he had, the warrant was not facially invalid. As we have already discussed, there is nothing in the warrant even suggesting that anything would be seized during the search. Elkins also argues that Maloney should be held liable because he failed to properly train and supervise WilliamsCherry. The district court concluded that “mere allegation of a supervisory role” was insufficient to establish liability, and in any event the evidence could not show that his conduct was sufficiently deficient to establish supervisory liability. Elkins III, 636 F. Supp. 2d at 34. Supervisory liability is limited under § 1983. The plaintiff must show that “a duty to instruct the subordinate to prevent constitutional harm arose from the surrounding circumstances.” Haynesworth v. Miller, 820 F.2d 1245, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Even if Maloney did have a responsibility to train and supervise Williams-Cherry, which he disputes, summary judgment in his favor was still appropriate because the record shows, at best, “mere negligence,” not an “affirmative link” between Maloney’s conduct and the constitutional injury. Id. at 1260. This link must be strong enough that, from Maloney’s perspective, the possibility of a constitutional violation occurring due to poor training or supervision would have been highly likely, not simply foreseeable. Id. at 1261. Supervisory liability under 16 § 1983 is triggered only when a supervisor fails to provide more stringent training in the wake of a history of past transgressions by the agency or provides training “so clearly deficient that some deprivation of rights will inevitably result absent additional instruction.” Int’l Action Ctr., 365 F.3d at 27 (quoting Haynesworth, 820 F.2d at 1261-62) (internal quotation mark omitted). There was no pattern of constitutional violations to put Maloney on notice that training was required; indeed, this was the first search warrant DCRA had ever sought. And even if it was foreseeable that an untrained official might take a false step in these new and unfamiliar circumstances, such a result was by no means inevitable, especially as the search was led by officers from the MPD, who are trained in the proper execution of a warrant.