Opinion ID: 1268223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Actual Bias from the Encounter

Text: [4] So far as the potential impact on Gholston is concerned, it is irrelevant whether Vicki (the skinnier Hamilton sister) and her fiancé were actually parked in the car that Gholston saw in the alley behind her home. Aside from conclusory allegations, Hamilton fails to explain how the supposed encounter engendered bias. In theory, an encounter of this nature could introduce the kind of unpredictable factor into the jury room that the doctrine of implied bias is meant to keep out. Dyer, 151 F.3d at 982. Nonetheless, Hamilton fails to overcome the presumption of correctness we accord the state's findings on this issue. As the California Supreme Court found: The episode described by Gholston was brief, isolated, and ambiguous. The people Gholston saw parked in her alley did not approach or speak to her. Gholston mentioned no display of weapons or threatening gestures. According to Gholston, the two individuals simply sat in their car, and they drove away rapidly the instant they realized that Gholston had seen them. By Gholston's own account, it never occurred to [her] to report the incident to the trial court. She further insisted she never discussed the incident with other jurors, and there is no contrary evidence. In re Hamilton, 975 P.2d at 621 (alteration in original). We agree with the California Supreme Court that the episode affords no basis for relief, id., and affirm the district court's conclusion that Hamilton has not shown, and the record does not reveal, that Gholston was biased against him. Cf. United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding no abuse of discretion in the district court's refusal to declare a mistrial as a result of phone calls received by a juror's husband, where the calls did not refer to the merits, did not articulate threats, and were not identified with either side, and agreeing with the district court that any resulting irregularity did not compromise the essential fairness of the process). B. Brady and Napue Claims [5] Hamilton claims that the prosecution suppressed evidence that could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995); see also Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959). Specifically, he argues that the prosecution withheld evidence of certain terms of Gilbert's plea agreement and of his personal ties to one of the Sheriff's detectives who investigated the case, Detective Jay Salazar; that the prosecution ordered Gilbert to conform his testimony to a scripted statement and pressured him to round up alibi witnesses; and that the prosecution withheld evidence of concessions Vicki received in exchange for her testimony. The California Supreme Court summarily rejected Hamilton's Brady and Napue claims, and the district court denied them on the merits. The district court also denied Hamilton's request for an evidentiary hearing on these claims pursuant to Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled on other grounds by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992), and its progeny, see, e.g., Insyxiengmay v. Morgan, 403 F.3d 657, 669-70 (9th Cir. 2005). We agree with the district court. There are three components to a Brady violation: (1) exculpatory or impeaching evidence favorable to the accused; (2) suppressed by the State; (3) resulting in prejudice. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999). To establish prejudice under Brady, Hamilton must demonstrate a `reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'  Id. at 280 (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)). In contrast, where the prosecution presents or fails to correct false evidence in violation of Napue, we assess whether there is `any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.'  Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 985 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc)). The materiality of suppressed evidence is `considered collectively, not item by item.'  Id. at 1071 (quoting Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436). [3] Even viewed collectively, however, the suppressed evidence at issue does not reveal a reasonable probability that the result of Hamilton's trial would have been different. Indeed, compared to the overwhelming evidence of Hamilton's guilt, the allegedly suppressed evidence is relatively insignificant. First, the jury received ample evidence of the connections between Gilbert's family and Detective Salazar. The significance of any additional evidence regarding these connections appears minimal and is unlikely to have altered the jury's assessment of the evidence. Second, the State convincingly explains that Gilbert was not forced to conform his testimony to a scripted statement. The prosecution's treatment of Gilbert subsequent to Lilly Bardsley's identification of him as the third participant in the purchase of the shotgun at K-Mart appears consistent with a general and unsurprising concern that Gilbert might not have testified truthfully. Indeed, had Gilbert been unable to confirm his whereabouts on the Halloween evening the shotgun was purchased, the prosecution may well have been justified in withdrawing the plea agreement, which was conditioned on Gilbert's honest and truthful testimony at trial. Because Gilbert explained the conditions of his plea agreement in open court, it is clear that everyone, including the jury, knew full well that if Gilbert had lied on the stand, he would have violated the terms of his deal. Thus, as soon as Bardsley identified Gilbert and thereby controverted his testimony, it would have been apparent that Gilbert's plea agreement was imperiled. Defense counsel's failure to examine Gilbert on this issue cannot be attributed to the prosecution. Moreover, this situation is markedly distinct from Smith v. Baldwin, in which the prosecutor informed [a witness] that if he insisted on testifying in accordance with his recantations, the state would seek to set aside his plea agreement in this case, subjecting [him] to capital murder charges. 510 F.3d 1127, 1136 (9th Cir. 2007) (en banc). Unlike the witness in Smith, Gilbert never attempted to recant his testimony. On the contrary, after Bardsley testified that Gilbert was present at the shotgun purchase, he simply produced alibi witnesses to confirm his consistent statement that he spent the late afternoon and evening trick-or-treating. [4] Third, given that Gilbert faced the death penalty in the absence of his plea agreement, the prosecution's facilitation of Gilbert's release on bond during the trial appears insignificant. Moreover, Gilbert's testimony that his release on bail was not part of the plea agreement appears consistent with the statement in his declaration that the prosecutor said he would not object to the court setting bail, and I accepted the plea bargain. After all, the court made the ultimate decision regarding bail, not the prosecution. Regardless, this additional inducement could not have affected the jury's scrutiny of Gilbert's testimony, given what the jury already knew about Gilbert's involvement in the murders and the other inducements he received to testify. Even assuming the prosecution's failure to correct this testimony at trial implicated Napue, there does not appear to be `any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury.' Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1078 (quoting Hayes, 399 F.3d at 985). Fourth, while Hamilton argues that the facts are in dispute as to the threats and inducements provided to Gilbert to elicit his testimony, it appears that the only real dispute pertains to the significance of such threats and inducements. To the extent any factual disputes remain, the resolution of these disputes in Hamilton's favor does not alter the prejudice analysis. Finally, although there is some conflict between Gilbert's description of the murders in his 1994 declaration and his trial testimony that he looked away when the shots were fired, [5] the fact that Gilbert actually watched the shootings is not probative of who pulled the trigger, and it is undisputed that Gilbert and Carolyn were present during the murders. As the State observes, this graphic testimony may have made Gilbert's testimony even more damaging. [6] Assuming Hamilton has otherwise identified Brady and Napue violations, he fails to establish that those violations are material. Cf. Jackson, 513 F.3d at 1075-79. In Jackson, we found material violations of Napue where the prosecution's solicitation of perjured testimony bolstered the credibility of two key witnesses, whereas the truthful testimony would have substantially impeached those witnesses' credibility. Id. at 1078. Similarly, in Hayes, in which the State knowingly presented false evidence to the jury and made false representations to the trial judge as to whether the State had agreed not to prosecute [a lead witness] on his pending felony charges, 399 F.3d at 978, we also found violations of Napue, reasoning that the witness's credibility would have been affected if the jury had been informed of the critical deal, id. at 987. Gilbert's testimony was admittedly critical to the prosecution's case against Hamilton. However, in contrast to both Jackson and Hayes, it is difficult to imagine Gilbert's credibility being even remotely affected by the correction or clarification of his testimony regarding the prosecution's involvement in his release on bail. The same is true of Vicki's possibly false testimony regarding additional benefits she and her fiancé received in exchange for their testimony. Once again, in light of the benefits of which the jury was already aware, the additional benefits would have been cumulative and insignificant. Accordingly, the Napue violations are not collectively material. [7] Similarly, considering all the possible Brady and Napue violations together, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the guilt phase of Hamilton's trial would have been different. The suppressed evidence and possible falsehoods pertained to the details of collateral matters with which the jury was well acquainted. Accordingly, because Hamilton has not shown that his allegations, if proved, would entitle him to relief, an evidentiary hearing on these claims was not required. Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted). The overwhelming evidence of Hamilton's guilt only strengthens our conclusion that he was not prejudiced by the alleged Brady and Napue violations. In light of this evidence, defense counsel's failure to prepare effectively for the penalty phase of Hamilton's trial is all the more egregious. C. Penalty Phase Claims Hamilton asserts two penalty phase claims. Because we grant relief as to Hamilton's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, we do not reach his claim of prosecutorial misconduct. To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Hamilton must demonstrate that his trial counsel's penalty phase performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness at the time of trial, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different, id. at 694. 1. Deficient Performance Although the Supreme Court ha[s] declined to articulate specific guidelines for appropriate attorney conduct and instead ha[s] emphasized that `the proper measure of attorney performance remains simply reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,'  Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003) (alteration omitted) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688), general principles have emerged regarding the duties of criminal defense attorneys that inform our view as to the `objective standard of reasonableness' by which we assess attorney performance, particularly with respect to the duty to investigate, Summerlin v. Schriro, 427 F.3d 623, 629 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc). [8] At the time of Hamilton's trial, his counsel had a duty to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000); see Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 873-74 (9th Cir. 2001). Because [t]he Constitution prohibits imposition of the death penalty without adequate consideration of factors which might evoke mercy, Hendricks v. Calderon, 70 F.3d 1032, 1044 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Deutscher v. Whitley, 884 F.2d 1151, 1152 (9th Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted), [i]t is imperative that all relevant mitigating information be unearthed for consideration at the capital sentencing phase, Caro v. Calderon, 165 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1999). To that end, trial counsel must inquire into a defendant's social background, . . . family abuse, mental impairment, physical health history, and substance abuse history, Correll, 539 F.3d at 943; obtain and examine mental and physical health records, school records, and criminal records, id. ; see Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 630; consult with appropriate medical experts, Mayfield v. Woodford, 270 F.3d 915, 927-28 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc); and pursue relevant leads, Lambright v. Schriro, 490 F.3d 1103, 1117 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam). Although we must avoid the temptation to secondguess [counsel's] performance or to indulge `the distorting effects of hindsight,'  Mayfield, 270 F.3d at 927 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689), we need not defer to counsel's choices at trial unless those choices [were] made after counsel. . . conducted reasonable investigations or [made] a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary, Summerlin, 427 F.3d at 630 (third alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). [9] Counsel also has an obligation to present and explain to the jury all available mitigating evidence. Correll, 539 F.3d at 946. Evidence about the defendant's background and character is relevant to the jury's determination because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse. Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 (1990) (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). In a capital case, such evidence can be the difference between a life sentence and a sentence of death. See Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) ([T]he issue for the jury is whether the defendant will live or die . . . . To fail to present important mitigating evidence in the penalty phaseif there is no risk in doing socan be as devastating as a failure to present proof of innocence in the guilt phase. (second alteration in original)).