Opinion ID: 2190751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Constitutionality of the Enabling Statute

Text: The statute authorizes the municipalities to discriminate between their own residents and those of other municipalities in order to conserve and protect these resources when reasonably necessary. In testing the constitutionality of acts of our Legislature, we frequently commence with the statement of Justice, later Chief Justice, Fellows: `In passing upon the constitutionality of any act of the legislature the Court assumes that the legislature acted with knowledge of constitutional restrictions, and that the legislature honestly believed that it was acting within its rights, duties and powers. All acts of the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and this is a presumption of great strength. . . . The burden is upon him who claims that the act is unconstitutional to show its unconstitutionality.. . . Whether the enactment of the law is wise or not, and whether it is the best means to achieve the desired result are matters for the legislature and not for the Court.' (Citations omitted.) State v. Fantastic Fair & Karmil, 158 Me. 450, 466, 467, 186 A. 2d 352, 362, 363 (1961). Unquestionably, these Defendants have been disadvantaged by being barred from digging in Southern Harbor. Inequality of treatment is not forbidden if it is based upon an actual difference bearing some substantial relation to a proper public purpose which is sought to be accomplished when it is a proper discrimination based on the requirement of the commonweal. In re Stanley, 133 Me. 91, 97, 174 A. 93, 97 (1934). See also Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Commission, Me., 307 A.2d 1, 22 (1973); State v. Fantastic Fair & Karmil, supra; State v. King, 135 Me. 5, 188 A.2d 775 (1936). The traditional test requires the difference to be rationally related to a permissible goal. But if a fundamental personal interest is involved, the difference is legitimately defensible only if it furthers a compelling state interest. Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 809 (1st Cir. 1970). See also Westberry v. Fisher, 297 F. Supp. 1109 (S.D.Me.1969). The Legislature, as the sovereign-trustee of the people's property, has obligation to manage the shellfish populations to preserve, as far as possible, their benefit for all the people. But this does not mean that every citizen in the State must have identical opportunity with every other citizen to harvest clams in every area where clams are found because equality of opportunity might result in the destruction of some vulnerable clam populations to the detriment of all the people. One of the techniques of management, appropriate in some instances and not in others, we understand, is that of limitation upon the quantity harvested. This limitation may be accomplished by creating closed seasons, by establishing daily bag limits or by limiting the number of persons allowed to dig in an area. A particular method which would be appropriate in some areas might not be in others. In some particularly vulnerable areas daily bag limits, in order to be effective, might need to be so small as to be of no practical value to individual diggers. Admittedly, the limitation of the number of diggers might be accomplished in other ways than by barring nonresidentssuch as by imposing sufficiently high license fees but with likely undesirable results to the market and to individual diggers. We found in Alley that the statute in issue has an underlying strong, proper governmental purpose of protection of shellfish. The Legislature, aware of the ever mounting pressures upon clam populations caused by a reduction of suitable habitat due to pollution, magnified frequently by the ravages of nature, [5] combined with an expanding market, has concluded that the problem can best be managed on a local level by a concerned citizenry with a substantial stake in the endeavor (but with expert guidance by the Commission). The Legislature has apparently accepted the proposition expressed in Leavitt that when conservation considerations demand that a limitation be placed upon the number of diggers, the governmental purpose may, under appropriate circumstances, be achieved best by choosing local residents as the permitted group. We realize that the early rationale that tide waters and the fish in them (as far as they are capable of ownership) are the property of the State (McCready v. Virginia, supra) has undergone considerable erosion when examined in the light of recent considerations of equal protection. In Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 68 S. Ct. 1156, 92 L.Ed. 1460 (1948) it was held that a state may not discriminate against residents of another state fishing for shrimp in its tidal waters except as such selective restrictions are based upon recognizable peculiar sources of evil or bear a relation to the costs of management and conservation which are borne by resident fishermen. In Toomer, however, the Court was dealing with a State's claimed right to a preferential enjoyment of free swimming, migratory fish temporarily in its waters [6] a situation which we consider distinguishable from that of a State's responsibilities in management of shellfish which have fixed habitats in depletable beds. We consider that the McCready Court's observation that planting of nonmigratory shellfish (oysters) in soil covered by waters owned by the State is no different in principle from planting corn on dry land is still valid. 94 U.S. at 396, 24 L.Ed. at 248. While these Courts found no relationship between the purposes of conservation and discrimination against nonresidents it does not seem to usand the cases do not say that such a connection can never be established. Rather, we note that the Courts in the cases above have not found such a relationship in the particular instances facing them. We believe that such a relationship can be found here. We are satisfied that the State has a compelling governmental interest in the conservation of its clams. We cannot say that its attempt to achieve this purpose by, in part, authorizing municipalities to apply the resident-nonresident standard in proper circumstances as a device to limit digging is not substantially related to this proper public purpose. The Defendants have failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the statute.