Opinion ID: 842360
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the availability of a private cause of action

Text: I disagree with the majority's dictum that no private cause of action is available to plaintiff. In Pompey v. Gen Motors Corp , [10] this Court summarized the rules of statutory interpretation that should be followed when determining whether an implied private cause of action exists to remedy a statutory violation. We observed that [t]he general rule, in which Michigan is aligned with a strong majority of jurisdictions, is that where a new right is created or a new duty is imposed by statute, the remedy provided for enforcement of that right by the statute for its violation and nonperformance is exclusive. [ Pompey v. Gen Motors Corp., 385 Mich. 537, 552, 189 N.W.2d 243 (1971).] Significantly, the Pompey Court also noted two important exceptions to this rule: In the absence of a pre-existent common-law remedy, the statutory remedy is not deemed exclusive if such remedy is plainly inadequate . . . or unless a contrary intent clearly appears. . . . [ Id. at 553 n. 14, 189 N.W.2d 243 (citations omitted).][ [11] ] In this case, it is undisputed that no common-law right to relief exists and MCL 15.602 does not explicitly provide a cause of action for the enforcement of its provisions. However, using the test set forth in Pompey, I would find that the statute implies the availability of a private cause of action. MCL 15.602 creates a new right in a particular class of persons. An employee has the right not to be required by his or her employer to reside within a specific geographic area, distance, or travel time from his or her place of employment. MCL 15.602(1). The legislative history of the statute supports the fact that the statute creates the right for an employee to be free from overly restrictive residency requirements imposed by his or her employer. The Senate Fiscal Agency bill analysis, in explaining the rationale behind the act, stated: Some people believe that these [residency] requirements unfairly infringe on what they believe is the right of the employee, as a citizen, to determine where he or she will live. It was proposed, therefore, that a State statute should prohibit the imposition of strict residency requirements on public employees, but allow local units of government to continue to require residency within a certain proximity. [Senate Fiscal Agency Analysis, SB 198, January 10, 2000.] The bill analysis suggests that the statute was intended to balance the employer's desire for reasonable residency requirements against the employee's right to be free from unduly strict residency requirements. When the Legislature creates a right in a statute, it must have intended that a remedy exist for a violation of the statute. However, MCL 15.602 does not contain an express remedy for its violation. The majority claims that defendant could enforce the statute by seeking injunctive relief pursuant to MCR 3.310 or declaratory relief pursuant to MCR 2.605(A)(1). Although such equitable remedies are available, they may often be impractical in cases such as the one before us. For example, although a court may grant injunctive relief, all too frequently a defendant would not learn of the statutory violation until the job opening had been filled or eliminated. No action by the employer would remain to be enjoined. Injunctive relief would be useful, if at all, mostly for future applicants and would not assist the plaintiff. Similar problems exist should a plaintiff bring a declaratory judgment action. It would be of no help to plaintiff in the instant case for a court to make a declaration that defendant's residency requirement is illegal. By the time the decision was issued, the job vacancy that plaintiff sought to fill would have been filled. Accordingly, the Legislature must have intended to allow a private cause of action that includes monetary damages for an aggrieved person in response to a violation of MCL 15.602.