Opinion ID: 2641089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: houston’s tester motive

Text: The district court made a factual finding that Plaintiff Houston is a tester and “not a bona fide patron.” While the evidence supports this factual finding, the threshold question is whether Houston’s tester motive deprives him of standing to sue for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). We review those statutes and then relevant precedent as to standing.
Title III of the ADA addresses “Public Accommodations and Services Operated by Private Entities.” Section 12182(a) sets for the “[g]eneral rule” that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full 10 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 11 of 43 and equal enjoyment” of the facilities or accommodations of “any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). As defined in Title III, the term “public accommodation” includes a “grocery store.” Id. § 12181(7)(E). Defendant Marod owns and operates a grocery store, the Presidente Supermarket. Therefore, § 12182(a) provides that “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment” of the facilities and accommodations in the Presidente Supermarket operated by Defendant Marod. Section 12182(b)(2) in Title III lists examples of what discrimination means for purposes of § 12182(a), including the “failure to remove architectural barriers . . . in existing facilities.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). Plaintiff Houston alleges discrimination in the form of architectural barriers in the Presidente Supermarket. In turn, §12188 is entitled “Enforcement,” and § 12188(a)(1) provides the remedies set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) “to any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of this subchapter [Title III].” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). The remedies in 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a) include “a civil action for preventive relief, including an application for a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order.” Section 12188(a)(1) of Title III also provides that “[n]othing in this section shall require a person with a 11 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 12 of 43 disability to engage in a futile gesture if such person has actual notice that a person or organization covered by this subchapter [Title III] does not intend to comply with its provisions.” 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1). This Court has not previously addressed whether a tester can have standing under Title III of the ADA. However, the Supreme Court and this Court have addressed tester standing under other anti-discrimination statutes, and we start there. B. Tester Standing Under Anti-discrimination Statutes The Supreme Court has recognized the standing of a tester to pursue a lawsuit to remedy violations of the Fair Housing Act’s (FHA) prohibition in § 804(d) against misrepresentations regarding the availability of housing. See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–74, 102 S. Ct. 1114, 1121–22 (1982) (involving FHA § 804(d) codified at 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)). The Supreme Court in Havens Realty defined “testers” as individuals “who, without an intent to rent or purchase a home or apartment, pose as renters or purchasers for the purpose of collecting evidence of unlawful steering practices.” Id. at 373, 102 S. Ct. at 1121. The Supreme Court concluded that a black tester who was misinformed about the availability of a rental property had alleged sufficient injury-in-fact to support standing to sue under § 804(d) of the FHA. Id. at 374, 102 S. Ct. at 1121– 22. The plaintiff-tester in Havens Realty never intended to rent the apartment; 12 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 13 of 43 rather, his sole purpose was to determine whether the defendant engaged in unlawful practices. Id. In considering the tester’s standing, the Supreme Court in Havens Realty explained that the “‘the actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing.” Id. at 373, 102 S. Ct. at 1121 (alterations adopted) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S. Ct. 2197, 2206 (1975)); see also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3, 93 S. Ct. 1146, 1148 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”). The statutory language of the relevant FHA provision, § 804(d), was therefore critical to the Supreme Court’s decision. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S. Ct. at 1121. The Supreme Court noted that FHA’s § 804(d) makes it unlawful “[t]o represent to any person because of race . . . that any dwelling is not available for . . . rental when such dwelling is in fact so available.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 3604(d)). The Supreme Court further observed that Congress made the prohibition in FHA’s § 804(d) “enforceable through the creation of an explicit cause of action in § 812(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3612(a).” Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373, 102 S. Ct. at 1121. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that § 804(d) “establishes an enforceable right to truthful information concerning the 13 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 14 of 43 availability of housing” and “[a] tester who has been the object of a misrepresentation made unlawful under § 804(d) has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against, and therefore has standing to maintain a claim for damages under the Act’s provisions.” Id. at 373-74; 102 S. Ct. at 1121. The Supreme Court admonished “[t]hat the tester may have approached the real estate agent fully expecting that he would receive false information, and without any intention of buying or renting a home, does not negate the simple fact of injury within the meaning of § 804(d).” Id. at 374; 102 S. Ct. at 1121. The Supreme Court explained that “[w]hereas Congress, in prohibiting discriminatory refusals to sell or rent in § 804(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), required that there be a ‘bona fide offer’ to rent or purchase, Congress plainly omitted any such requirement insofar as it banned discriminatory representations in § 804(d).” Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 374; 102 S. Ct. at 1122. Subsequently, in Watts v. Boyd Properties, 758 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), this Court applied the Supreme Court’s rationale in Havens Realty to recognize the standing of a tester to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. The plaintiff “Kathy Watts, a black female, was a volunteer ‘tester’ for Metro,” a nonprofit organization dedicated to eliminating discriminatory housing practices. Id. at 1483-84. Although Watts never intended to actually rent an apartment from the defendant, 14 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 15 of 43 she inquired about the availability of apartments in the defendant’s complex in June of 1982. Id. at 1483. Watts was told that no apartment would be available until the fall of 1982. Id. at 1484. Shortly thereafter, a white tester working for Metro inquired about the availability of apartments in the same complex. Id. The white tester was told that an apartment would be available for rent on July 1, 1982. Id. Plaintiff Watts brought suit under FHA § 804(d) and under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, alleging that the defendant had intentionally provided Watts with false information about the availability of housing. Id. The district court denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Watts’s FHA claim but granted it as to her § 1982 claim for lack of standing. Id. Because “Watts did not allege any injury to herself arising from a violation . . . of § 1982,” the district court concluded that “she was without standing to assert a claim based upon § 1982.” Id. In reversing the district court’s § 1982 ruling, this Court first turned to the language of § 1982, which provides that “[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.” 42 U.S.C. § 1982. This Court pointed to the similarities between § 1982 and FHA § 804(d), which Havens Realty found to confer standing to a tester. Watts, 785 F.2d at 1485. Extending the Supreme Court’s rationale in Havens Realty to § 1982, we concluded that 15 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 16 of 43 “even if a tester is motivated solely by the desire to challenge the legality of allegedly discriminatory practices, this is a sufficient purpose to confer standing” under § 1982. Id. In addition to our Circuit’s decision in Watts, we review the Tenth Circuit’s decision in Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004), which involved a tester suing under § 12132 of ADA’s Title II. That statute prohibits disability discrimination in the provision of public services. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The Tenth Circuit in Tandy observed that § 12132 of Title II includes language substantially similar to FHA § 804(d), which the Supreme Court analyzed in Havens Realty. Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1286. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit focused § 12132’s phrase that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in . . . the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132) (emphasis and alterations in original). The Tenth Circuit reasoned that “Title II’s words ‘no’ and ‘shall’ function like [FHA] § 804(d)’s phrase ‘any person’ because, read in context, these words clearly proscribe discrimination against any person who is a ‘qualified individual with a disability.’” Id. (emphasis in original). Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, “[t]he plain language of Title II evinces Congress’ intent to confer upon a ‘qualified individual with a disability’ a legal right not to be 16 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 17 of 43 excluded from participation in the services of a public entity by reason of his or her disability.” Id. The Tenth Circuit also considered the language of Title II’s enforcement provision, which extends “‘remedies, procedures, and rights’ under the statute to ‘any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of [Title II].’” Id. at 1287 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12133) (emphasis in Tandy). The Tenth Circuit stated that “the totality of Title II’s plain language, the plain language of its enforcement provision, and the statutory scheme’s anti-discriminatory purpose lead [that] court to conclude that Congress intended Title II to confer standing to the full limits of Article III.” Id. The Tenth Circuit therefore held that “testers have standing to sue under Title II of the ADA.” Id. With these decisions as background, we turn to Houston’s claims. C. Tester Motive Does Not Negate Injury-in-Fact For the following three reasons taken together, we conclude that Houston’s status as a tester does not deprive him of standing to maintain his civil action for injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and 12188(a)(1) of the ADA’s Title III. First, the plain language of § 12182(a) confers on Plaintiff Houston a legal right to be free from discrimination on the basis of disability with respect to “the full and equal enjoyment of the . . . facilities” of the Presidente Supermarket.” See 17 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 18 of 43 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). The invasion of Houston’s statutory right in § 12182(a) occurs when he encounters architectural barriers that discriminate against him on the basis of his disability. Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). When he encounters those barriers, Plaintiff Houston “has suffered injury in precisely the form the statute was intended to guard against.” Cf. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373-74, 102 S. Ct. at 1121. This legal right created by §§ 12182(a) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) does not depend on the motive behind Plaintiff Houston’s attempt to enjoy the facilities of the Presidente Supermarket. The text of §§ 12182(a) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) provides no basis for the suggestion that Plaintiff Houston’s motive is relevant to this legal right. The substantive right conferred by the statute is to be free from disability discrimination in the enjoyment of the facility, regardless of Houston’s motive for visiting the facility. Houston suffered an injury when he allegedly encountered architectural barriers at the Presidente Supermarket—notwithstanding that he did so while testing for ADA compliance. Thus, the tester motive behind Houston’s past and future visits to the Presidente Supermarket does not preclude his having standing to sue for invasions of his legal rights under §§ 12182(a) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv). See Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373-75, 102 S. Ct. at 1121; Watts, 758 F.2d at 1485; Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1287. Second, the relevant operative phrases here are (1) “[n]o individual shall be 18 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 19 of 43 discriminated against on the basis of disability,” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added); and (2) “any person who is being subjected to discrimination on the basis of disability” may bring suit. Id. § 12188(a)(1) (emphasis added). Nothing in that statutory language precludes standing for tester plaintiffs; if anything, “no individual” and “any person” are broad terms that necessarily encompass testers. These two phrases are similar to the language in FHA § 804(d) which the Supreme Court found to permit tester standing because it prohibits misrepresentations about the availability of housing to “any person.” Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 373-75; 102 S. Ct. at 1121-22. The two phrases are virtually identical to the Title II provisions in Tandy which provide that “no qualified individual” shall be excluded on the basis of disability, see 42 U.S.C. § 12132, and that “any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability” may sue, see 42 U.S.C. § 12133. See Tandy, 380 F.3d at 1286-87 (concluding that a tester can have standing for a lawsuit under § 12132 of Title II). Third, Congress has in other anti-discrimination statutes required that a plaintiff have “bona fide”—as opposed to tester––status. In FHA § 804(a) for example, Congress made it unlawful “[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer . . . to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added). In other words, a plaintiff seeking redress for an alleged refusal to sell or to rent housing on the 19 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 20 of 43 basis of race must have made an actual “bona fide” offer—not a mere “tester” offer. Congress said so expressly in § 804(a) of the FHA. But Congress imposed no “bona fide” requirement § 804(d) of the FHA. Havens Realty, 455 U.S. at 374; 102 S. Ct. at 1122. And, Congress imposed no “bona fide” requirement in the statutory provisions at issue here, namely 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and 12188(a)(1) of the ADA’s Title III. Importantly, Congress has limited other provisions of the ADA’s Title III to protect only “clients or customers of the covered public accommodation.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). Congress expressly imposed the “client or customer” limitation for three specific prohibited activities: (i) denial of participation, (ii) participation in unequal benefit, and (iii) separate benefit. Id. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(i-iii). But Congress made clear that the “client and customer” limitation applies only to these three prohibited activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv). Congress imposed no such limitation in the provisions of Title III upon which Plaintiff Houston relies, which are §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and 12188(a)(1). See Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113, 121-22 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that “both the language of Title III and its legislative history clearly demonstrate [that] the phrase ‘clients or customers,’ which only appears in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv), is not a general circumscription of 20 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 21 of 43 Title III and cannot serve to limit the broad rule announced in 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a),” and noting that the “[t]he operative rule announced in Title III speaks not in terms of ‘guests,’ ‘patrons,’ ‘clients,’ ‘customers,’ or ‘members of the public’ but, instead, broadly uses the word ‘individuals.’”); Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 733 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the “client or customer” limitation of § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) does not apply to § 12182(a) or to § 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv)); see also PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 679, 121 S. Ct. 1879, 1891 (2001) (noting that § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) “is not literally applicable to Title III’s general rule prohibiting discrimination against disabled individuals” and holding that “Title III’s broad general rule contains no express ‘clients or customers’ limitation, § 12182(a), and § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iv) provides that its limitation is only ‘[f]or purposes of’ the clauses in that separate subparagraph.”). These examples illustrate that Congress has said so expressly when it wants to limit the class of people protected by anti-discrimination statutes to only clients or customers or to people of bona fide status. But Congress expressed no such limitation in the parts of Title III that are relevant to Plaintiff Houston’s lawsuit. This absence of legislative language restricts our interpretation, as we are “not allowed to add or subtract words from a statute.” Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 F.3d 1210, 1224 (11th Cir. 2009). Because our task is 21 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 22 of 43 merely “to apply statutory language, not to rewrite it,” Harris v. Garner, 216 F.3d 970, 976 (11th Cir. 2000), we are not at liberty to impose a “bona fide patron” requirement for Plaintiff Houston’s lawsuit for violations of §§ 12182(a) and 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv) of Title III, see T-Mobile South, LLC v. City of Milton, Ga., No. 12-10487, --- F.3d ----, 2013 WL 4750549, at  (11th Cir. Sept. 5, 2013) (“Our duty is to say what statutory language means, not what it should mean, and not what it would mean if we had drafted it.”); Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 228, 128 S. Ct. 831, 841 (2008) (“We are not at liberty to rewrite the statute to reflect a meaning we deem more desirable.”). We hold that Plaintiff Houston’s tester motive behind his visits to the Presidente Supermarket does not foreclose standing for his claim under 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182(a), 12182(b)(2)(A)(iv), and 12188(a)(1) of Title III. By the same token, we conclude that “bona fide patron” status is a not a prerequisite for Houston to obtain standing for a lawsuit under these statutory provisions. Stated differently, the alleged violations of Houston’s statutory rights under Title III may constitute an injury-in-fact, even though he is a mere tester of ADA compliance. But this conclusion alone is not enough. Because Plaintiff Houston seeks injunctive relief, he also must show a real and immediate threat of future injury. We address this issue next. 22 Case: 12-15403 Date Filed: 11/01/2013 Page: 23 of 43