Opinion ID: 1968694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Immunity Doctrine And Its Exceptions

Text: We have traced the nature and history of the parent-child immunity doctrine on several occasions recently and need not do so again, in any significant detail, in this case. See Frye v. Frye, 305 Md. 542, 505 A.2d 826 (1986); Warren v. Warren, 336 Md. 618, 650 A.2d 252 (1994), and Renko v. McLean, supra . The doctrine was judicially created as a precept of common law. In Frye v. Frye, supra , we stated its basis as being the protection of family integrity and harmony and of parental discretion in the discipline and care of the child, and we posited that the doctrine enhances the public policy in that it subserves the repose of families and the best interests of society by preserving the peace and harmony of society and of the families composing society. Frye, 305 Md. at 552, 505 A.2d at 831. In Warren v. Warren, supra, 336 Md. at 625, 650 A.2d at 255, we noted three other policy justifications for the doctrine: preservation of parental discipline and control, prevention of fraud and collusion, and the threat that litigation between parents and children would deplete family resources. As we further observed in Warren: In the years since Schneider, we have deviated from the basic doctrine in only three instances. First, a minor child who has suffered harm from cruel, inhuman, or outrageous conduct at the hands of a parent may bring suit for monetary damages. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951). Second, an emancipated child may sue his parent in tort for claims arising after the child reaches the age of majority. Waltzinger v. Birsner, 212 Md. 107, 128 A.2d 617 (1957). Finally, a child may sue the business partner of his parent for negligence committed in the operation of the parent's partnership. Hatzinicolas v. Protopapas, 314 Md. 340, 550 A.2d 947 (1988). Id. That is the current state of the Maryland law. Subject to those three exceptions, the doctrine of parent-child immunity continues to exist in this State. Renko v. McLean, supra . The exception at issue here is the one recognized in Mahnke v. Moore . Mahnke v. Moore was an unusual case. A minor child, by her grandfather, filed suit against her father's estate for personal injuries caused by atrocious acts committed by her father in her presence. 197 Md. at 63, 77 A.2d at 923. The child alleged that, in her presence, her father shot her mother in the head with a shotgun, that he kept the child in the home with the dead body for six days, and that he then drove the child to his home in New Jersey where, in her presence, he shot and killed himself with a shotgun, causing his blood to spatter on her face and clothing. Those acts, she averred, caused her to suffer shock, mental anguish, and nervous and physical injuries. Relying on the doctrine of parent-child immunity, the trial court dismissed the complaint. We reversed. We noted that, at common law, there was no legal impediment to tort actions by children against their parents and that the immunity doctrine originated with an 1891 Mississippi case, Hewlett v. George, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), holding that a minor child could not maintain an action in tort against his parent for wrongful confinement in an insane asylum. The Mississippi court cited no authority for that proposition and drew no distinction in its broad grant of immunity between acts of negligence due to an error in judgment and wilful, wanton, and malicious acts. We observed that, despite its shaky foundation, the broad doctrine was accepted by a number of other States, including Maryland, although New Hampshire, in Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 A. 905, 910 (1930) put a limit on it, declaring that [t]he father who brutally assaults his son or outrages his daughter ought not to be heard to plead his parenthood and the peace of the home as answers to an action seeking compensation for the wrong. That case, we noted, was cited by this Court in Schneider v. Schneider, supra, 160 Md. at 22, 152 A. at 499. In Mahnke, we essentially adopted the view of the New Hampshire court that, although the doctrine was useful within the bounds of a normal parent-child relationship, it had no rational justification where that foundation did not exist. We acknowledged that parental authority needed to be maintained and that a child should forgo a recovery of damages if such recovery would unduly impair discipline and destroy the harmony of the family. 197 Md. at 68, 77 A.2d at 926. Thus, we confirmed that [o]rdinarily, the parent is not liable for damages to the child for a failure to perform a parental duty, or for excessive punishment of the child not maliciously inflicted, or for negligent disrepair of the home provided by the father. Id. Those acts, we said, grow out of and pertain to the relation of parent and child. Id. But, we added: [W]hen, as in this case, the parent is guilty of acts which show complete abandonment of the parental relation, the rule giving him immunity from suit by the child, on the ground that discipline should be maintained in the home, cannot logically be applied, for when he is guilty of such acts he forfeits his parental authority and privileges, including his immunity from suit. Justice demands that a minor child shall have a right of action against a parent for injuries resulting from cruel and inhuman treatment or for malicious and wanton wrongs. Id. In that particular case, we held that there can be no basis for the contention that the daughter's suit against her father's estate would be contrary to public policy, for the simple reason that there is no home at all in which discipline and tranquillity are to be preserved. Id. The question before us is whether the peg represented by this case can fit into that hole.