Opinion ID: 2280027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review for a New Trial Order

Text: Appellate courts must give a great deal of deference to a trial court's decision to grant a new trial per CR 59.01. Bayless v. Boyer, 180 S.W.3d 439, 444 (Ky.2005). In fact, the trial court's decision whether to grant a new trial is presumptively correct. City of Louisville v. Allen, 385 S.W.2d 179, 184 (Ky.1964) (Clay, Comm'r), overruled on other grounds by Nolan v. Spears, 432 S.W.2d 425, 427 (Ky. 1968). Furthermore, an appellate court is more reluctant to reverse an order granting a new trial than one denying it. Louisville Mem'l Gardens, Inc. v. Com., Dept. of Highways, 586 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Ky.1979) (citing Allen, 385 S.W.2d at 181). This high level of deference by an appellate court is necessary because the decision to grant a new trial `depends to a great extent upon factors which may not readily appear in the appellate record.' Id. (quoting Turfway Park Racing Ass'n v. Griffin, 834 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Ky.1992)). Indeed, unlike appellate judges, the trial judge has heard the witnesses firsthand and observed and viewed their demeanor and . . . has observed the jury throughout the trial. Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky.1984). It is important to remember that the trial court's observations cannot [be] replicate[d] by reviewing a cold record. Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 366 (3d Cir.1999). Consequently, an appellate court is precluded from stepping `into the shoes' of a trial court in reviewing decisions under CR 59.01. Miller v. Swift, 42 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Ky.2001) (citing Prater v. Arnett, 648 S.W.2d 82 (Ky.App. 1983)). This Court has previously stated that [o]nly if the appellate court concludes that the trial court's order was clearly erroneous may it reverse. Turfway Park Racing Ass'n v. Griffin, 834 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Ky.1992). Yet, that decision also states that a CR 59.01 ruling [i]s `a discretionary function assigned to the trial judge.' Id. (quoting Davis v. Graviss, 672 S.W.2d 928, 932 (Ky.1984)). The Court of Appeals in this case seized on the discretionary language in many Kentucky cases, ignoring the clear statement in Griffin and other cases that the standard was clearly erroneous, to hold that the appropriate standard was abuse of discretion, which requires slightly less deference than the clear error standard. After reviewing Griffin and other cases addressing motions for a new trial, it is apparent that deciding such a motion actually requires multiple decisions by the trial court, consisting of both fact finding and discretionary judgment. Each of these sub-decisions is entitled to a different level of deference and standard of review. Cf. Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 916-22 (Ky.2004) (separating Daubert determination into multiple questions, some of fact and some requiring court's discretion). First, the trial court must decide whether one of the grounds laid out in CR 59.01 exists. This is a finding of fact and is thus subject to review for clear error. When reviewing a trial court's findings under the clear error standard, the appellant court must determine whether or not those findings are supported by substantial evidence. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky.2003). Though [substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established, Am. Rolling Mill Co. v. Pack, 278 Ky. 175, 128 S.W.2d 187, 190 (1939), it does not mean the evidence must be absolutely compelling or lead inescapably to but one conclusion. Rather, substantial evidence is `[ejvidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion,' Moore, 110 S.W.3d at 354 (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 580 (7th ed.1999)), or evidence that `has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable men,' id. (quoting City of Monticello v. Rankin, 521 S.W.2d 79, 80 (Ky.1975)). Second, upon a proper finding under CR 59.01, the trial court must make the discretionary decision whether to grant the motion. Even if the trial court finds that one of the grounds exists, it is not bound in every case to grant a new trial. The issue could be moot, or the grounds may be off-set by other factors. But we need not imagine every scenario where a court could find that one of the CR 59.01 grounds is technically present but still properly deny a new trial. Suffice it to say, whether to grant the motion for a new trial is always within the trial court's sound discretion and is entitled to a great deal of deference by an appellate court. Generally speaking, [t]he test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles. Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky.1999). However, a court can also `abuse[ ] its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.' Walters v. Moore, 121 S.W.3d 210, 215 (Ky.App.2003) (quoting Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir.1995)). Though this Court has criticized the finding of an abuse of discretion under this latter category as improperly confusing and mixing different standards of review, and urged a strict separation of the standards instead, see Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Ky.2004), such a strict separation is not always possible. What is certain, however, is that a court errs when it makes a discretionary decision based on a clearly erroneous finding of fact. No confusion arises, so long as the findings of fact are evaluated under the proper standard (i.e., clearly erroneous) and the reviewing court approaches the questions in the right order, id. (suggesting review of findings of fact precede review of discretionary decisions). Regardless, in most cases, a discretionary decision will be a close one, at least from the appellate perspective, and will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless it `is firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.' Walters, 121 S.W.3d at 215 (quoting Romstadt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 59 F.3d 608, 615 (6th Cir. 1995)). An appellate court can only reverse the trial court's decision if it is sure that the decision is incorrectany doubts must be resolved in favor of the trial court: If there is doubt about the correctness of his ruling, it must be upheld. If the record supports his ruling, it will not be reversed. Even if in our opinion the record would more strongly support a different conclusion, if there is substantial reason for his decision, then he has not clearly erred. Allen, 385 S.W.2d at 184. The trial court ordered a new trial here because it concluded that the jury's verdict finding no fault to be apportioned to any [empty-chair] defendant . . . is manifestly unsupported by the evidence and manifestly a product of jury passion and prejudice. It concluded that this satisfied CR 59.01(f)'s requirement that the verdict is not sustained by sufficient evidence, which is reviewed under the clear error standard. Applying the clear error standard to that decision is not a simple task, in large part because it not clear what quantum of evidence is necessary to require apportioning fault to empty-chair defendants.