Opinion ID: 2792931
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The OCCA’s Decision

Text: In rejecting on direct appeal the ineffective assistance claim based on his counsel’s failure-to-object during both trial and sentencing, the OCCA relied in part on its resolution of Williams’s related claim that the trial court committed plain error by not disallowing certain testimony even absent objection. See Williams, 188 P.3d at 230 n.20 (referring to the discussion of Williams’s proposition that the state introduced highly prejudicial evidence during trial). This claim regarding certain trial testimony is not before us on habeas. Nonetheless, in evaluating Williams’s ineffective assistance claims, - 20 - the OCCA considered whether the trial court’s admission of that testimony rose to the level of “plain error affecting substantial rights.” Id. at 222; see also Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 2104 (“Nothing in this section precludes taking notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of the court.”). Under Oklahoma law, an error affects the defendant’s substantial rights if it “affect[s] the outcome of the proceeding.” Hogan v. State, 139 P.3d 907, 923 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006). The OCCA concluded that no proposition of error rose to this level. Turning then to Williams’s Strickland claim, the OCCA referred back to its plain-error determinations: Williams points out that counsel failed to object to the introduction of several pieces of testimonial and real evidence, which he has complained about in several propositions in this appeal. In discussing these propositions of error, we found that either there was no error or that the error did not rise to the level of plain error. Williams also argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to several instances of prosecutorial misconduct which are raised as error in proposition six. We noted that counsel did object to the most egregious instances of misconduct. We further find that counsel’s failure to object to the introduction of certain items of evidence and the prosecutor’s alleged misconduct did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard. Williams, 188 P.3d at 231. Williams does not challenge the OCCA’s approach to resolving his Strickland claim. Initially, we had our own doubts as to whether the OCCA’s approach was faithful to federal law. True enough, when a defendant fails to show that a trial court’s admission of evidence was improper for some reason, it likely follows that the lawyer did not perform - 21 - deficiently by failing to object to its admission.1 See Cannon v. Mullin, 383 F.3d 1152, 1162 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding no deficient performance in defense counsel’s failure to object when there was “no meritorious state-law objection available” to counsel). However, it does not necessarily follow that there can be no prejudice under Strickland when there is no plain error under Oklahoma’s plain error standard. This is because, as far as we can tell, Oklahoma’s substantial rights/plain error standard requires a defendant to show more than what is necessary to satisfy the prejudice standard under Strickland. That is, for a defendant to meet Oklahoma’s plain error standard, he must show that the error affected the outcome of the proceeding. Hogan, 139 P.3d at 323. But to satisfy Strickland, a defendant need only show that counsel’s error created a reasonable probability that the proceeding’s outcome would be different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).2 Of course, if the OCCA made a positive finding that certain evidence did not affect the outcome of trial, then this would necessarily include a finding that the evidence did not influence the outcome to some lesser degree—or put another way, that the evidence did not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Here, however, the OCCA 1 The opposite, however, is certainly not true. A lawyer’s failure to object to error (even plain error) does not amount to ineffective assistance per se. Gordon v. United States, 518 F.3d 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2008). 2 In this context, both inquiries focus on the harm the contested evidence causes when it is stacked up against the other (uncontested) evidence of guilt. It follows that when a substantial-rights standard requires no more than Strickland, as is true of the federal plain-error standard, the standards are “virtually identical.” Close v. United States, 679 F.3d 714, 720–21 (8th Cir. 2012) cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 464, (2012). - 22 - simply concluded that there was no plain error. Under that general conclusion, it is impossible to say whether Williams lost because he just could not make the requisite showing that the error was outcome-determinative or because the OCCA affirmatively concluded that the error did not determine the outcome. The distinction is a subtle one, but it matters if the OCCA treated its plain-error determinations as dispositive. The OCCA did not. Instead, that court made the “further finding” that Williams failed to satisfy the requirements of Strickland—not just the requirements of plain error. Williams, 188 P.3d at 231. Because of this, we believe that the OCCA rejected Williams’s claims under the appropriate federal standard. Moreover, based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the OCCA’s decision was an unreasonable application of that standard. See Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1138–39 (10th Cir. 2005) (reaching the same conclusion when the OCCA found no plain error but also separately concluded that there was no prejudice under Strickland). None of this is to say that the OCCA’s disposition under Strickland was a model of clarity. Again, the OCCA simply concluded that Williams’s claims “did not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Strickland standard.” Williams, 188 P.3d at 231. From this statement, it is unclear which of Strickland’s prongs the OCCA believed Williams failed to satisfy. See Hooks, 689 F.3d at 1187 (recognizing that a court can decide a Strickland claim under either prong). The OCCA’s reference to its plainerror determinations does not help. By finding no error, the OCCA might have concluded that counsel did not perform deficiently. Conversely, it might just as reasonably have assumed deficient performance and concluded that there was no resulting prejudice, - 23 - particularly since Williams often did not explain why his lawyer should have objected. When the OCCA found error not requiring reversal, it might still have concluded that the lawyer’s representation was reasonable. Alternatively, it might have concluded that any error (actual or assumed) did not undermine confidence in the outcome. In short, we have no way of knowing what the OCCA was thinking. This uncertainty does not change our deference. Even “[w]here a state court’s decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner’s burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784; see Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1396 (2012) (“The state court’s analysis was admittedly not a model of clarity, but federal habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems, not a license to penalize a state court for its opinion-writing technique.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). This is true when, as here, the state court does not reveal which element of a claim it found insufficient. See Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. Our task is still to evaluate the reasonableness of the OCCA’s application of Strickland, considering the reasonableness of the theories that “could have supported” the OCCA’s decision. Id. at 786. This panel must identify what those theories are. We believe that the OCCA reasonably could have resolved Williams’s challenges under the first prong of Strickland by concluding that Williams’s lawyer did not commit any “serious errors in light of prevailing professional norms such that his legal representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Wackerly v. Workman, 580 F.3d 1171, 1176 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). First, we - 24 - consider Williams’s argument that lead counsel was constructively absent because of counsel’s substance abuse. We then will discuss Williams’s challenges involving his trial counsel’s alleged errors. Next, we address the challenges involving Officer Felton’s and Dyra Malone’s testimony. In those two cases, we assume deficient performance but nonetheless uphold the OCCA’s decision for lack of prejudice under prong two of Strickland. Finally, we decline to consider Williams’s challenge to alleged prosecutorial misconduct because he inadequately briefed it.