Opinion ID: 2046389
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Adequacy

Text: Carver contends that the Commission provided her with statutorily inadequate notice of its decision. She points to section 10-50(b) of the Illinois Administrative Procedure Act (Procedure Act), which mandates: All agency orders shall specify whether they are final and subject to the Administrative Review Law. 5 ILCS 100/10-50(b) (West 1996). The Commission's decision did not include this information. Thus, according to Carver, the Commission's failure to follow this provision tolls the 35-day filing period. We cannot accept this argument. The Commission was not required to inform Carver that its decision was reviewable under the Act. The Procedure Act applies to every agency, as defined therein (5 ILCS 100/1-5 (West 1996)), and defines agency as, inter alia, each administrative unit or corporate outgrowth of the State government that is created by or pursuant to statute, other than units of local government and their officers, school districts, and boards of election commissioners   . (Emphasis added.) 5 ILCS 100/1-20 (West 1996). Counties are [u]nits of local government. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 1; 5 ILCS 70/1.28 (West 1996). In this case, the Adams County board, and not the state, created the Commission. See 55 ILCS 5/3-8002 (West 1996). Thus, the Commission is an agency of Adams County-a unit of local government-and not an agency of the state. Accordingly, the requirements of the Procedure Act do not apply to the Commission. See Bethune v. Larson, 188 Ill.App.3d 163, 170, 135 Ill.Dec. 692, 544 N.E.2d 49 (1989); County of Macon v. Board of Education of Decatur School District No. 61, 165 Ill.App.3d 1, 8, 116 Ill.Dec. 31, 518 N.E.2d 653 (1987). We note Carver's argument that the list of exempted entities-units of local government, school districts, and boards of election commissioners-is exclusive. According to Carver, had the legislature intended to exclude county sheriff's merit commissions from the Procedure Act's definition of agency, it would have expressly done so. However, this rule of statutory construction, that the enumeration of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of all others (see Baker v. Miller, 159 Ill.2d 249, 260, 201 Ill.Dec. 119, 636 N.E.2d 551 (1994)), does not apply here. The list of exempted entities does not exclude the Commission. As an agency of local government, the Commission falls squarely within the exemption for units of local government. In sum, although the Commission's decision was reviewable under the Act (55 ILCS 5/3-8014 (West 1996)), the Commission was not statutorily required to inform Carver of the same.