Opinion ID: 2790370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the state has failed to independently

Text: CHALLENGE THE DISTRICT COURT’S DISMISSAL OF KAY II ¶24 Two days after the district court dismissed Kay I, the State refiled charges in Kay II. In the Kay II information, the State charged Mr. Kay with five counts of communications fraud on the basis of the e-mails he sent between March and June 2008. It also charged Mr. Kay with one count of a pattern of unlawful activity on the basis of the communications fraud charges. Mr. Kay again moved to dismiss the charges as barred by the statute of limitations. The State opposed dismissal on the grounds that Mr. Kay’s e-mails were designed to “lull” the Fowleses into thinking the parties could resolve the dispute, and that he therefore could not rely on the statute of limitations as a defense. ¶25 The district court dismissed the new charges against Mr. Kay, concluding that the evidence presented in Kay II was the same evidence presented in Kay I and that Kay II was merely “an attempt by the State to prosecute [Mr. Kay] for the same substantive offenses as in the previous case.” See UTAH R. CRIM . P. 25(d) (“An order of dismissal . . . based upon the statute of limitations[] shall be a bar to any other prosecution for the offense charged.”). ¶26 On appeal, the State’s opening brief addressed the sole issue of whether communications fraud is a continuing offense under Utah law.5 The State made no effort to independently challenge the district court’s dismissal of Kay II. Instead, it argued only that “should this Court agree with the State that the charges in this case are continuing offenses, then [Mr. Kay’s arguments] will not apply because . . . [Kay I] would be reinstated, and there would be no need for [Kay II].” And the State did not respond to Mr. Kay’s argument that the order of dismissal in Kay I on the basis of the 5 We do not foreclose the possibility that an e-mail sent for the purpose of executing or concealing a fraudulent scheme could give rise to a separate charge of communications fraud for which the statute of limitations would begin to run on the date of the mailing. In this case, however, the State failed to argue on appeal that the e- mails constituted an independent basis for separate charges of communications fraud. Rather, the State argued only that the e- mails continued the crimes charged in Kay I. Indeed, the State admitted at oral argument that a reversal in Kay II was entirely dependent upon a reversal in Kay I. 9 STATE v. KAY Opinion of the Court statute of limitations barred any subsequent prosecution of the same offense. ¶27 In short, the State has failed to separately challenge the district court’s dismissal of Kay II. Its arguments with regard to Kay II are entirely dependent upon our disposition of Kay I. Because we conclude that communications fraud is not a continuing offense and affirm the dismissal of Kay I, we also affirm the district court’s dismissal of Kay II.