Opinion ID: 586865
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Paper

Text: 10 Chapman's second contention is that even if the initial pleading did not state a case that was removable pursuant to the first paragraph of § 1446(b), Powermatic's removal was still untimely pursuant to the second paragraph of § 1446(b). The medical bills and demand letter delivered by Chapman to Powermatic before it was sued revealing that Chapman was seeking damages in excess of $50,000, Chapman contends, were other paper within the meaning of the second paragraph of § 1446(b). Therefore, Chapman contends, Powermatic's receipt of that other paper (medical bills and demand letter) before it was sued, revealing that the amount in controversy exceeded $50,000, coupled with Powermatic's receipt of the initial pleading revealing complete diversity of citizenship between the parties, triggered the thirty-day time limit of the second paragraph of § 1446(b). In other words, Chapman contends that other paper for purposes of the second paragraph of § 1446(b) may come prior to the defendant's receipt of the initial pleading. And if this occurs, Chapman contends, that the thirty-day time period begins to run from the time that the defendant received the initial pleading. 11 Chapman bases his contention on the opinion of the district court in Central Iowa Agri-Systems v. Old Heritage Advertisers and Publishers, Inc., 727 F.Supp. 1304 (S.D. Iowa 1989). In Central Iowa, the plaintiff's initial pleading did not allege a specific amount of damages, but the plaintiff had sent the defendant a demand letter before he sued in which the plaintiff stated that he conservatively estimated his damages to be in excess of $40,000. 7 That pre-suit demand letter, the court held, was an other paper for purposes of the second paragraph of § 1446(b) from which the defendant could ascertain that the case was removable. Therefore, the court held that the defendant's removal of the case was untimely because the defendant did not remove within thirty days from its receipt of the initial pleading. 12 We decline to follow the district court's opinion in Central Iowa and consequently reject Chapman's contention, because we conclude that both are in conflict with the plain language of the removal statute. The plain language of the second paragraph of § 1446(b) requires that if an other paper is to start the thirty-day time period, a defendant must receive the other paper after receiving the initial pleading. 8 The second paragraph of § 1446(b) applies by its terms only if the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable.... 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). More important, the second paragraph of § 1446(b) requires that the defendant remove the case, if at all, within 30 days after receipt of an other paper from which the defendant may first ascertain that the case is removable. Logic dictates that a defendant can first ascertain whether a case is removable from an other paper only after receipt of both the initial pleading and that other paper; and therefore the thirty-day time period begins to run, not from the receipt of the initial pleading, but rather from the receipt of the other paper revealing that the case is removable. Chapman would have us adopt a rule which would be clearly inconsistent with the plain language of the second paragraph of § 1446(b), which states that a notice of removal may be filed within thirty days after receipt by the defendant ... [of an] other paper from which it may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become removable.... By its plain terms the statute requires that if an other paper is to trigger the thirty-day time period of the second paragraph of § 1446(b), the defendant must receive the other paper only after it receives the initial pleading. Finally, we believe that our holding that the other paper must be received after the filing of the initial pleading is supported by the recitation in the second paragraph of § 1446(b) of the words amended pleading, motion, order before the words or other paper, which clearly refer to actions normally and logically occurring after the filing of the initial pleading. Clearly the answer to interrogatory which triggered the filing of the notice of removal in this case is such an other paper. 13 We find the plain language of the statute to be clear in this regard and as such we are bound to follow it. [I]n any case requiring statutory construction, the High Court has instructed us to adhere to the plain language of the law unless 'literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.'  In re Meyerland Co., 960 F.2d 512, 516 (5th Cir.1992), (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 3250, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)). We conclude that adhering to the plain language of the second paragraph of § 1446(b) by requiring that an other paper, in order to trigger the thirty-day time period, be received by a defendant only after that defendant has received the initial pleading does not produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters, but, instead, produces a result that is entirely consistent with the intentions of its drafters. Id. 14 In summation, we hold that Powermatic timely removed this case because: (1) the initial pleading was not removable pursuant to the first paragraph of § 1446(b), since it did not reveal on its face that the amount in controversy was in excess of $50,000; and (2) the medical bills and demand letter received by Powermatic did not begin the running of the thirty-day time period of the second paragraph of § 1446(b), since Powermatic received the medical bills and demand letter before it received the initial pleading. 15 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.