Opinion ID: 174443
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kone's Claim of Direct Persecution

Text: In addition to asserting a derivative claim, Kone also made a separate argument to the BIA: that FGM of Mariam would constitute direct persecution of her parents cognizable under the Convention Against Torture. [5] The BIA did not address this argument in its decision, but should have. Kone's direct-persecution argument finds support in recent case law, both in our circuit and in others. In Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611 (7th Cir.2009) ( Gatimi I ), a Kenyan man had defected from a criminal political/religious organization in Kenya and faced retribution for having done so. He sought asylum (along with his wife and daughter as derivative applicants) based on a fear of returning to Kenya where he claimed the persecution could continue. Id. at 613-14. Part of Gatimi's claim was that his wife would be subjected to FGM if returned to Kenya, because the organization compelled wives of defectors to undergo the procedure. Id. We found that this potential harm to Gatimi's wife could constitute persecution of him. Id. at 617 (emphasis in original). We noted: Genital mutilation of one's wife, unless one happens to be a supporter of the practice, is a way to punish one, and so the menace to Mrs. Gatimi is a legitimate component of Mr. Gatimi's case. To send her back to Kenya to face female genital mutilation would be to enable persecution of him. Id. ; see also Gatimi II, 606 F.3d at 348 ( persecution of Mrs. Gatimi can constitute persecution of Mr. Gatimi, and so her fear of persecution is relevant to his (and therefore their) claim for asylum.) (emphasis added). While not directly analogous to the situation before uswe see no evidence in this case indicating that Mariam would be subjected to FGM as a way to punish her familythe Gatimi cases are relevant here because they address the concept that genital mutilation of a petitioner's family member can constitute direct, as opposed to derivative, persecution of the petitioner. Kone made this argument on appeal, and the BIA should consider it. [6] Other circuits have also recognized the possibility that the prospect of FGM of one's child can constitute harm to an unwilling parent and similarly remanded to the BIA for further consideration of the issue. In Kone v. Holder, 596 F.3d 141, 143 (2d Cir.2010) (no relation to petitioner in this case), a woman from Cote d'Ivoire sought asylum based on, inter alia, the fear that her daughters would be forcibly subjected to FGM against her wishes were they to go to that country. The Second Circuit remanded the case to the BIA, and indicated that it could consider whether the mental anguish of a mother who was herself a victim of genital mutilation who faces the choice of seeing her daughter suffer the same fate, or avoiding that outcome by separation from her child would qualify as sufficient persecution of a petitioner so as to warrant a grant of asylum under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B). Id. at 153. The court recognized, as Kone did in the argument she made to the BIA here, that such a theory is distinct from a claim of derivative asylum. Id. [7] The Sixth Circuit has similarly indicated that a petitioner can potentially qualify for relief in her own right based on threats of FGM to a child. In Abay v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 634, 636 (6th Cir.2004), an Ethiopian mother and daughter sought asylum and withholding of removal based on the fear that the daughter would be subjected to FGM, as her mother had previously been, if they were deported to Ethiopia. Surveying previous BIA decisions, the court found that Abay could demonstrate persecution based on the harm she would suffer by being forced to witness the pain and suffering of her daughter if she were subjected to FGM. Id. at 642. The BIA itself has also addressed the possibility. See Matter of Dibba, No. A73 541 857 (BIA Nov. 23, 2001) (mother's argument that being forced to allow FGM of daughter in Gambia would cause her mental suffering was sufficient to reopen case). In light of the precedent we have discussed above, Kone may have a viable claim that FGM of Mariam against her will constitutes direct persecution of her parents. In light of the BIA's silence on the theory, it is impossible to be confident that Kone's claim has been fully understood or analyzed. Chitay-Pirir v. I.N.S., 169 F.3d 1079, 1081 (7th Cir.1999). Remand is appropriate so that the BIA can more fully address Kone's direct-persecution claim in light of the case law we have set forth. See Gonzales, 547 U.S. at 186, 126 S.Ct. 1613; Chen, 604 F.3d at 335; Gomes, 473 F.3d at 752.