Opinion ID: 391130
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Untimeliness of Petition for Review

Text: 8 The Federal Mine Safety and Health Act (the Act) permits a person aggrieved by an ALJ's decision to file and serve a petition for discretionary review by the Commission of such decision within 30 days after the issuance of such decision. 30 U.S.C. § 823(d)(2)(A)(i). The filing of a petition for discretionary review is effective only upon receipt (by the Commission). 29 C.F.R. § 2700.5(d). 9 Duval contends that issuance should be interpreted to refer to the date on which the decision is received by the aggrieved party. 10 The Act provides that (n)o objection that has not been urged before the Commission shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary circumstances. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1). This provision permits the Commission to bring its expertise and experience to bear on the problem, and to make a record for review. See NLRB v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., 641 F.2d 794, 796 (9th Cir. 1981) (construing a nearly identical provision). 11 In its petition for reconsideration, Duval argued that the filing requirements should not be interpreted strictly, but only specifically challenged the provision making a petition for reconsideration effectively filed only upon receipt. It did not suggest that the date of issuance of the ALJ's decision should be interpreted to mean the date of its receipt of that decision. 12 The Commission implicitly permits petitions for reconsideration. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.75. Where the Commission decides a petition for review on grounds not argued before, the petitioner must test those grounds first before the Commission by petition for reconsideration. Because it failed to do so, Duval is barred from asserting that the date of issuance refers to the date of receipt. See NLRB v. Sambo's Restaurant, Inc., supra at 795-96.
13 Duval correctly points out that when a document is served by mail, five days is added to the time in which a response must be filed. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.8(b). 14 This contention was not raised below, but was presented for the first time in Duval's reply brief. We therefore do not consider it. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a)(1); Levy v. Urbach, 651 F.2d 1278 at 1280 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1981).
15 Duval contends that making filing of a petition for review effective only upon receipt by the Commission is unfair on the facts of this case. Duval apparently does not argue that the rule is invalid on its face. 16 The rule makes filing effective only upon receipt. 29 C.F.R. § 2700.5(d). The date on which the document is sent is irrelevant. Thus, Duval's petition was untimely. The question of whether these facts require liberalization of the rule depends on whether there was good cause for the late filing. The Commission considered this question in reviewing Duval's petition for reconsideration, and found no good cause. 17