Opinion ID: 781382
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Using a Firearm

Text: 67 The statute in question does not define use of a firearm. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). In its original wording, Section 924(c)(1) applied to defendants who use[] a firearm to commit any felony. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 147, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (1968)). A 1984 amendment altered the scope of predicate offenses... [and] substituted `during and in relation to' the predicate crimes for the earlier provisions linking the firearm to the predicate crimes. Id. The Supreme Court has determined that the statute, as amended, employed `use' expansively, to cover both use as a weapon and use as an item of barter. Id. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501 (citing Smith, 508 U.S. at 236, 113 S.Ct. 2050). 68 In Smith, which predated Bailey, the Supreme Court held that a criminal who trades his firearm for drugs `uses' it during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense within the meaning of § 924(c)(1). 508 U.S. at 241, 113 S.Ct. 2050. In Bailey, the Court limited the meaning of use by holding that it must connote more than mere possession of a firearm by a person who commits a drug offense, 516 U.S. at 143, 116 S.Ct. 501, and requires evidence sufficient to show an active employment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense. Id. (emphasis in original). Bailey expressly preserved Smith, however, since it was clear that the defendant [in Smith ] had `used' the gun by bartering with it. Bailey, 516 U.S. at 148, 116 S.Ct. 501. The Supreme Court explained that [t]he active-employment understanding of `use' certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm. Id. (emphasis added). 69 After Smith and Bailey, it is settled that one who tenders a firearm as barter for drugs is using it within the meaning of Section 924(c)(1). It is thus settled that the .357 handgun at issue in this case was used by Marazita during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense when he bartered with it to obtain drugs. The quite distinct question presented here is whether the gun was used by Jason Cox during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense when he received it from Marazita — the obverse of the barter transaction at issue in Smith. 70 The circuits are divided on the applicability of Section 924(c) to the receipt of a gun in a guns-for-drugs trade. That split is detailed in the margin. 2 This Circuit has not taken up the question, and we need not do so now because this case can be decided on a basis that distinguishes it from the scenario that has split the circuits: Cox took the gun as collateral for the cash price of drugs, not in barter of one commodity for another. Marazita testified that he gave Jason Cox his gun in exchange for the dollar equivalent of crack, explaining: 71 I would say give me ... 25 or 50 dollars worth of crack, I'll pay you tomorrow.... I was basically putting collateral up for the money that I owed him. So I would give him my gun. When I paid him the money I owed him for the drugs that I took, he would give me back the gun. 72 (Tr. of Jury Trial, dated Jan. 18, 2001, at 128.) This scenario appears to be unique in the case law. 3 73 The language of § 924(c)(1), supported by its history and context, compels the conclusion that Congress intended `use' in the active sense of `to avail oneself of.' Bailey, 516 U.S. at 150, 116 S.Ct. 501. Jason Cox, having sold drugs for cash to a buyer who lacked ready money (and whose obligation could not be enforced at law), took the buyer's gun as collateral to secure future payment. Jason Cox thus used the gun as leverage or security to facilitate a future transaction in which he would realize the value of the drugs by relinquishing the gun for cash (or other consideration) to the buyer (or someone else). 4 While it appears that Marazita never paid the cash he owed to Jason Cox — Cox told him in a February 2000 phone call that he had disposed of the gun in some other way — Cox nonetheless used the gun to close the drug transaction by selling or otherwise disposing of it to discharge Marazita's debt. This conclusion is reinforced by the significant role guns play in the drug trade. 5 Thus, the circumstances establish that Cox used the firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1).