Opinion ID: 51522
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: We generally have authority to review only the decision of the BIA.11 When the IJ’s ruling affects the BIA’s decision, however, we also review the 9 Zhu, 382 F.3d at 527-29 (internal citations omitted). 10 As Zhu does not challenge the dismissal of her CAT claim in her brief, we consider it waived. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994). 11 Majd v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 590, 594 (5th Cir. 2006). 6 No. 05-60891 decision of the IJ.12 With respect to timeliness, the BIA expressly adopted and affirmed the IJ’s findings and holding, so we review the IJ’s decision on that issue.13 With respect to the merits, the BIA did not expressly adopt the IJ’s findings. It did, however, state, as quoted earlier: Furthermore, we agree with the [IJ]’s finding that the respondent failed to establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution. We note that the respondent testified that the government did not force her to have the abortion, nor did she have any problems with the government due to her pregnancy. From the record, it appears that the respondent made a decision and chose to have an abortion. Considering the paucity of findings of fact, the conclusional perfunctoriness of the BIA’s opinion — particularly in light of its ignoring our explicit instructions to make specified legal determinations on remand — and the BIA’s initial decision affirming the IJ’s ruling without opinion, there is no question but that the IJ’s decision affected the BIA’s decision with respect to the merits as well. Thus, we also review the IJ’s findings and holding on the merits. We review factual findings of the BIA and IJ for substantial evidence, and questions of law de novo,14 giving “considerable deference to the BIA’s interpretation of the legislative scheme it is entrusted to administer.”15 12 Nakimbugwe, 475 F.3d at 283; Majd, 446 F.3d at 594; Beltran-Resendez v. INS, 207 F.3d 284, 286 (5th Cir. 2000). The government inexplicably argues that, because “the BIA’s order dismissing Zhu’s appeal adopted and affirmed the decision and findings of the IJ[,] . . . only the BIA’s decision is reviewed by this Court.” This directly contradicts our precedent. See, e.g., Majd, 446 F.3d at 594 (reviewing IJ’s decision when BIA expressly adopted and affirmed IJ’s ruling). Indeed, the case cited by the government, Beltran-Resendez, indicates that we “consider the Immigration Judge’s decision only to the extent that it affects the BIA’s decision.” 207 F.3d at 286 (emphasis added). 13 See Majd, 446 F.3d at 594 (reviewing the IJ’s decision when BIA expressly adopted and affirmed IJ’s ruling). 14 Nakimbugwe, 475 F.3d at 283. 15 Fonseca-Leite v. INS, 961 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). 7 No. 05-60891 Although we may reverse a decision on a factual finding only when the evidence compels us to do so, “we nevertheless may reverse an IJ’s decision if it was decided on the basis of an erroneous application of the law.”16