Opinion ID: 2514663
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Clarity Element in Washington

Text: ś91 Clear public policy can be established through the `letter or purpose of a constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision or scheme.' Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 232, 685 P.2d 1081 (quoting Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982)). A court must proceed cautiously where no prior legislative or judicial expressions are on point. See also Green v. Ralee Eng'g Co., 19 Cal.4th 66, 80, 960 P.2d 1046, 78 Cal.Rptr.2d 16 (1998) (one of the primary reasons for requiring the public policy that gives rise to a wrongful termination action to have `a basis in either constitutional or statutory provisions,' is to limit `judicial policymaking' `lest [courts] mistake their own predilections for public policy which deserves recognition at law.') (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 1 Cal.4th 1083, 1095, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 874, 824 P.2d 680 (1992)). ś92 In Washington, we are required to strictly limit exceptions to clear employment law rules. This analysis is illustrated by the decision in Roe v. Quality Transportation Services, 67 Wash.App. 604, 609, 838 P.2d 128 (1992). In Roe, the court differentiated between West Virginia's looser substantial public policy standard and Washington's more stringent clarity element. The court held that the latter is a higher standard, requiring a rigorous expression of public policy before a claim of wrongful discharge can proceed. See id. (In West Virginia ... the employee's termination must contravene a `substantial public policy'. The standard is less rigorous than the clear mandate of public policy our courts require.  (emphasis added) (quoting Twigg v. Hercules Corp., 185 W.Va. 155, 157, 406 S.E.2d 52 (1990))). ś93 In Roe the court could not find a clear expression of Washington public policy against drug testing of private employees, even though Ms. Roe cited a variety of tangentially related statutes to support her claim. Roe, 67 Wash.App. at 609, 838 P.2d 128. Despite the cited statutes' general intent to protect privacy, the court held that these related privacy protections were not sufficient to establish the exception: None of these statutes suggest a legislative intent to announce public policy in the area of drug testing. In fact, their existence suggests to us a legislative desire to articulate public policy in the area of privacy. The Legislature has enacted many statutes specifically regulating employer-employee relationships. See RCW Title 49, Labor Regulations. The fact that the Legislature has not enacted a statute regulating drug testing by private employers is significant. The legislative process of hearings and debates is uniquely suited to this task of defining and balancing the employee's privacy interests and employer's interests in drug testing. Id. at 609-10, 838 P.2d 128 (emphasis added). ś94 The above language from Roe defines our role in the present case. Here, the legislature has enacted a similar web of protections in the domestic violence arena, infra, yet none evinces a clear articulation of public policy that changes the legal relationship between employer and employees. In sum, the lead opinion's citation of tangentially related statutes, pronouncements, case law, and executive orders does not constitute clear public policy nor meet the rigorous clarity standard employed in Roe.