Opinion ID: 412022
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exhaustion in General

Text: 13 The federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 2254(b) and (c), embodies the long-established principle that a state prisoner seeking federal habeas review of his conviction ordinarily must first exhaust available state remedies. 3 See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971); Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229, 90 S.Ct. 1963, 1966, 26 L.Ed.2d 578 (1970); Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394, 404-05, 79 S.Ct. 825, 831-32, 3 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 64 S.Ct. 448, 88 L.Ed. 572 (1944); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 6 S.Ct. 734, 29 L.Ed. 868 (1886). In general, the exhaustion doctrine provides that a habeas petitioner seeking to upset his state conviction on federal grounds must first have given the state courts a fair opportunity to pass upon his federal claim. Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S.Ct. at 512; Wilwording v. Swenson, 404 U.S. 249, 92 S.Ct. 407, 30 L.Ed.2d 418 (1971) (per curiam). 14 The exhaustion requirement springs primarily from considerations of comity. The writ of habeas corpus is designed to provide an efficacious remedy for imprisonment in violation of federal law. See, e.g., Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973). The exhaustion doctrine recognizes that state courts, no less than federal courts, are bound to safeguard the federal rights of state criminal defendants. See Irvin v. Dowd, supra, 359 U.S. at 404, 79 S.Ct. 825, 831, 3 L.Ed.2d 900 (1959); Ex parte Royall, supra, 117 U.S. at 251, 6 S.Ct. at 740. The requirement that federal courts not exercise habeas review of a state conviction unless the state courts have had an opportunity to consider and correct any violation of federal law expresses respect for our dual judicial system and concern for harmonious relations between the two adjudicatory institutions. See Rose v. Lundy, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 1198, 71 L.Ed.2d 379 (1982); Duckworth v. Serrano, 454 U.S. 1, 102 S.Ct. 18, 70 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (per curiam); Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. at 275, 92 S.Ct. at 512; Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 204, 70 S.Ct. 587, 590, 94 L.Ed. 761 (1950); Developments in the Law--Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1093-94 (1970). In addition to minimiz[ing] friction between our federal and state systems of justice, Duckworth v. Serrano, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 19, adherence to the exhaustion requirement has the salutary practical effects of enhancing the familiarity of state courts with federal doctrines, Rose v. Lundy, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 1203; Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, supra, 410 U.S. at 490-91, 93 S.Ct. at 1127-28, and of increasing the likelihood that the factual allegations necessary to a resolution of the claim will have been fully developed in state court, making federal habeas review more expeditious, Rose v. Lundy, supra, 102 S.Ct. at 1203-04. 15 The exhaustion requirement is not satisfied unless the federal claim has been fairly presented to the state courts. Wilwording v. Swenson, supra; see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447-50, 73 S.Ct. 397, 402-404, 97 L.Ed.2d 469 (1953). In order to have fairly presented his federal claim to the state courts the petitioner must have informed the state court of both the factual and the legal premises of the claim he asserts in federal court. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. at 276-77, 92 S.Ct. at 512-13; Twitty v. Smith, supra, 614 F.2d at 331. Specifically, he must have set forth in state court all of the essential factual allegations asserted in his federal petition; if material factual allegations were omitted, the state court has not had a fair opportunity to rule on the claim. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, supra, 404 U.S. at 276, 92 S.Ct. at 512; United States ex rel. Cleveland v. Casscles, 479 F.2d 15, 19-20 (2d Cir.1973); United States ex rel. Rogers v. La Vallee, 463 F.2d 185 (2d Cir.1972); United States ex rel. Boodie v. Herold, 349 F.2d 372, 374 (2d Cir.1965). 16 Likewise, the petitioner must have placed before the state court essentially the same legal doctrine he asserts in his federal petition. See, e.g., Picard v. Connor, supra; Callahan v. Le Fevre, 605 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir.1979); Wilson v. Fogg, 571 F.2d 91, 92-93 (2d Cir.1978); Fielding v. Le Fevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1107 (2d Cir.1977). The chief purposes of the exhaustion doctrine would be frustrated if the federal habeas court were to rule on a claim whose fundamental legal basis was substantially different from that asserted in state court. 4