Opinion ID: 1310403
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Attempted Bank Fraud

Text: 18 U.S.C. § 1344 applies to anyone who knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice  (1) to defraud a financial institution; or (2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises (emphasis added). It is clear that an attempt to defraud a bank can be the basis for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1344. The record of Plaintiff's conviction [1] indicates that he was convicted of attempted bank fraud. Count Two of the Indictment alleges that Plaintiff unlawfully, willfully, and knowingly did attempt to execute a scheme and artifice to obtain money, funds, credits, assets, securities and other property under the custody of a financial institution, namely, Security Pacific National Trust Company . . . by means of false and fraudulent pretenses (emphasis added). The Plea Agreement indicates that Plaintiff would plead guilty to Count Two of the Indictment, and states that the `loss' figure . . . is $475,025.25, the amount the defendants would have realized had the scheme charged in Count Two been successful. The Judgment of Conviction states that Plaintiff was convicted on his plea of guilty to Count Two. As a defendant who pleads guilty admits all elements of the formal charge, United States v. Lasaga, 328 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 2003), Plaintiff pleaded guilty to attempted bank fraud. [2] Relying on United States v. Kilkenny, 493 F.3d 122 (2d Cir.2007), Plaintiff argues that because the money from Security Pacific was wired to his account, the crime was completed and not merely attempted. In Kilkenny, we held that the defendant's bank fraud scheme was executed no later than when he received the funds from his fraudulent loan application, and therefore found error in the district court's treatment of a subsequent failure to repay the loan as conduct that was part of the offense for purposes of determining which version of the Sentencing Guidelines to apply. Kilkenny, 493 F.3d at 130. There is no merit to Plaintiff's argument. Because an attempt to commit a substantive crime is a lesser included offense of that substantive crime, see United States v. Marin, 513 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir.1975), the facts that support a conviction for the completed crime also support a conviction for attempt. Regardless of whether Plaintiff might have been convicted of completed fraud, he was charged with, and pleaded to, and was convicted of, attempted bank fraud. Plaintiff also argues that because he was sentenced under United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2F1.1, rather than § 2X1.1, which covers attempt offenses, he must have been convicted of completed bank fraud rather than an attempt. He is mistaken. While § 2X1.1(b)(1) provides a three-level reduction for attempt, it explicitly excludes attempts in circumstances where the defendant completed all the acts the defendant believed necessary for successful completion of the substantive offense or the circumstances demonstrate that the defendant was about to complete all such acts but for apprehension or interruption by some similar event beyond the defendant's control. U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1(b)(1). Finally, Plaintiff argues that Subsection (U) is void for vagueness, or, in the alternative, that it is ambiguous and the rule of lenity should apply in interpreting it. These arguments are without merit. Outside the First Amendment context, we assess statutes for vagueness only as applied. United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir.2003) (en banc). Accordingly, we must determine whether an ordinary person would understand that a conviction for an attempt to execute a scheme to defraud a bank under 18 U.S.C. § 1344 would qualify under Subsection (U) as an attempt and whether Subsection (U) could be applied consistently to such convictions by CIS. See id. We see no reason why an ordinary person or CIS official would not understand that a conviction for attempt under § 1344 qualifies as a conviction for an attempt under Subsection (U). We see no ambiguity. As for the rule of lenity, furthermore, it cannot overcome a reasonable [Board of Immigration Appeals] interpretation entitled to Chevron deference. Mizrahi v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 156, 174-75 (2d Cir.2007). In Sui v. INS, 250 F.3d 105 (2d Cir.2001), we determined that the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) was entitled to Chevron deference for its reasonable interpretation of Subsection (U) to incorporate the well-established common law definition of attempt, namely, the presence of criminal intent and completion of a substantial step toward committing the crime. Id. at 115. The rule of lenity has no application here.