Opinion ID: 792547
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lore's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause Challenge

Text: 51 Lore claims that the admission and misuse of grand jury testimony of defendants Hurley and Rackley, who did not testify, violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Specifically, Lore asserts that the grand jury testimony was testimonial hearsay inadmissible under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). We exercise plenary review over Confrontation Clause challenges. United States v. Trala, 386 F.3d 536, 543 (3d Cir.2004) (internal citation omitted). If evidence was admitted in contravention of Lore's confrontation rights, we must consider whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 140, 119 S.Ct. 1887, 1901, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (1999); United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir.2005). 52 The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment affords an accused the fundamental right to confront the witnesses against him. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42, 124 S.Ct. at 1359. The central function of this right is to protect the accused from the use of ex parte examinations as evidence against him in a criminal trial. Id. at 50, 124 S.Ct. at 1363. Accordingly, the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of testimonial statements made by witnesses outside of court, unless the witnesses are unavailable and the defendant had a previous opportunity to cross examine him or her. Id. at 59, 124 S.Ct. at 1369; United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 178-79 (3d Cir.2005). 53 Hurley's and Rackley's grand jury testimony was unquestionably testimonial within Crawford. See id. at 64, 124 S.Ct. at 1372 (listing grand jury testimony among examples of plainly testimonial statements). Nonetheless, a conclusion that the grand jury testimony was admitted properly is not inconsistent with Crawford. As we held in Trala, testimonial statements are admissible without prior cross-examination if they are not offered for their truth. 386 F.3d at 544 ( Crawford does not apply where the reliability of testimonial evidence is not at issue[.]); see also Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. at 1369 n. 9 (The [Confrontation] Clause also does not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.). As the district court observed, the grand jury testimony contains self-exculpatory statements denying all wrongdoing. Thus, as in Trala, these statements were admitted because they were so obviously false. 386 F.3d at 544-45. In addition to self-exculpatory statements, the district court described the balance of the statements as factual statements totally innocuous as to the co-defendants based upon what's already in the record. J.A. at 5221-22. 54 In any event, assuming, but not deciding, that the admission of these statements violated Lore's Sixth Amendment rights, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt inasmuch as there was overwhelming evidence of Lore's participation in the conspiracy. This evidence included testimony from other witnesses who set forth in convincing detail Lore's participation in the salary diversion and kickback schemes, and this testimony was corroborated independently of the challenged grand jury statements. Moreover, the questioned grand jury testimony did not name Lore, and the testimony was totally innocuous and duplicative of other record evidence. 55 Finally, the district court properly instructed the jury to consider Hurley's grand jury testimony only in connection with the government's case against him and likewise to consider Rackley's grand jury testimony only with respect to the case against him. 17 In accordance with the instruction, in summation the prosecution discussed the grand jury testimony only in the way that the court instructed the jury that it could be used.