Opinion ID: 3037672
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: has an element the use, attempted use, or

Text: 9 Unless otherwise indicated, all citations to §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 are to the 1989 edition of the Guidelines, published in November 1989. ORTEGA-MENDEZ v. GONZALES 6639 threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1). Robinson held that battery under section 242 was a “crime of violence” within the meaning of §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2, reasoning, in full, as follows: In this case, battery includes as an element “the willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another.” CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (West 1988). We therefore conclude that battery on a peace officer, the crime for which Robinson was convicted, is a crime of violence for the purposes of determining Robinson’s career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. 967 F.2d at 293-94. As is apparent, Robinson did not consider the line of cases regarding the reach of section 242 that culminated, two years after Robinson, in the California Supreme Court’s Colantuono decision, which observed: It has long been established, both in tort and criminal law, that the least touching may constitute battery. In other words, force against the person is enough, it need not be violent or severe, it need not cause bodily harm or even pain, and it need not leave any mark. 7 Cal. 4th at 214 n.4 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the government is correct that Robinson held that battery under section 242 is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of §§ 4B1.1 and 4B1.2 and appeared to reach that 6640 ORTEGA-MENDEZ v. GONZALES conclusion by applying § 4B1.2(1)(i), which is identical in all material respects to § 16(a),10 we are not bound by Robinson in the present case. As Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), explained, a three-judge panel may not itself overrule a prior decision of the court, id. at 899, but “where the reasoning or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority,” id. at 893, three-judge panels “should consider themselves bound by the intervening higher authority and reject the prior opinion of this court as having been effectively overruled,” id. at 900. We are “ ‘bound not only by the holdings of [such intervening] decisions but also by their ‘mode of analysis.’ ” Gill v. Stern (In re Stern), 345 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Miller, 335 F.3d at 900)). “Intervening higher authority” includes intervening decisions of the Supreme Court, Miller, 335 F.3d at 900, and of this court sitting en banc, Overstreet v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., Local Union No. 1506, 409 F.3d 1199, 1205 n.8 (9th Cir. 2005). Because Robinson’s discussion of battery as a “crime of violence” is brief, it is difficult to discern the reasoning underlying its holding. That the Robinson court cited no case law suggests that that court assumed that only statutory language — not case law — is relevant to determining whether battery is a “crime of violence.” Furthermore, regardless of whether the Robinson court so assumed, that court certainly assumed that “crimes of violence” need not be violent in nature under § 16(a). After all, if the Robinson court did look to California case law, it could not have held that battery is a “crime of violence” without making this assumption, given that pre10 The only difference between U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1)(i) and 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) is that the latter provision includes “physical force against the person or property of another,” § 16(a) (emphasis added), whereas the former provision includes only “physical force against the person of another,” § 4B1.2(1)(i) (emphasis added). See United States v. Charles, 301 F.3d 309, 311-12 (5th Cir. 2002) (describing all of the differences between § 4B1.2 and § 16). ORTEGA-MENDEZ v. GONZALES 6641 Robinson case law clearly established that battery encompassed mere offensive touching, see, e.g., Rocha, 3 Cal. 3d at 899 n.12. And, if the Robinson court looked to the statutory text alone, it still could not have held that battery is a “crime of violence” without making this assumption, as section 242 defines battery as “any willful and unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another,” CAL. PENAL CODE § 242 (emphasis added), suggesting that battery encompasses use of force that is not violent. Thus, the Robinson court may have assumed that it need not examine case law in conducting the “crime of violence” inquiry, and it certainly assumed that “crimes of violence” need not be violent in nature. Both assumptions are, however, clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority. The first assumption — that a court may conclude that section 242 is a “crime of violence” on the basis of an examination of the statutory language alone — is clearly irreconcilable with United States v. Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), and United States v. Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d 905, 908-09 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), both of which were decided by this court sitting en banc after Robinson. In those cases, we stated that under the Taylor categorical approach, our inquiry must focus on whether the statute of conviction proscribed any conduct not included in the relevant federal definition. See CoronaSanchez, 291 F.3d at 1203 (“If the statute criminalizes conduct that would not constitute an aggravated felony under federal sentencing law, then the conviction may not be used for sentence enhancement unless the record includes documentation or judicially noticeable facts that clearly establish that the conviction is a predicate conviction for enhancement purposes.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d at 908 (“[I]f the statute and the judicially noticeable facts would allow the defendant to be convicted of an offense other than that defined as a qualifying offense by the guidelines, then the conviction does not qualify as a predicate offense.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 6642 ORTEGA-MENDEZ v. GONZALES We cannot conclude that all conduct proscribed by a statute falls within the purview of a federal definition — the inquiry Corona-Sanchez and Rivera-Sanchez require — without considering the case law interpreting the statute. Indeed, in Corona-Sanchez and Rivera-Sanchez, we looked not just to the text of the relevant statutes of conviction, but also to case law interpreting those statutes to determine whether all conduct proscribed by the statutes was within the ambit of the relevant federal definition. See Corona-Sanchez, 291 F.3d at 1207-08 (concluding that an offense under a California statute was not categorically an offense meeting the relevant federal definition and relying, in part, on California case law interpreting the California statute); Rivera-Sanchez, 247 F.3d at 908-09 (same). Thus, to the extent that Robinson assumed it appropriate to declare an offense a “crime of violence” by examining the statutory text alone, its assumption has been rejected by our en banc decisions in Corona-Sanchez and Rivera-Sanchez. The second assumption — that a “crime of violence” need not actually be “violent” in nature — is clearly irreconcilable with Leocal, decided by the Supreme Court after Robinson. Leocal emphasized that “crimes of violence” must actually be “violent” in nature, stating that “§ 16’s emphasis on the use of physical force against another person (or the risk of having to use such force in committing a crime), suggests a category of violent, active crimes.” 543 U.S. at 11 (emphasis added). Thus, Robinson’s assumption that “crimes of violence” need not be violent in nature is clearly irreconcilable with the reasoning and theory in Leocal. In sum, we cannot follow Robinson because that opinion necessarily rested on at least one assumption that is clearly irreconcilable with intervening higher authority. We therefore hold that battery under section 242 is not categorically a “crime of violence” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). ORTEGA-MENDEZ v. GONZALES 6643