Opinion ID: 379222
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurek's Mental Capacity

Text: 167 The panel opinion, in holding both of Jurek's written confessions involuntary, relied heavily on Jurek's limited mental capacity. The evidence is undisputed that Jurek is of somewhat low intelligence. The various doctors who testified agreed that Jurek's overall IQ is about 80. See, e. g., Tr., Vol. VIII, 1709 (testimony of Dr. Kenneth Owens); R., 82 (testimony of Dr. Russell Adams). The District Court found that Jurek is an individual of below-average intelligence, mildly retarded, with possible organic brain damage. And the evidence established that Jurek had only a seventh grade writing ability. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1678 (testimony of Dr. William McKinney). However, the effect of Jurek's dull normal intelligence on his ability to give a voluntary confession is not established by the evidence and clearly the panel's statement, (T)here is a serious danger both that Jurek did not want to confess and that his susceptibility to the police officers' influence made him confess to things he did not do, 593 F.2d at 677, is flagrant appellate fact finding at its worst. The District Court found that the psychiatric testimony presented to it was inconclusive and not convincing. R., 434. After hearing the testimony and reviewing the record, the District Court concluded: Considering Jurek's intelligence, either alone or in conjunction with the other factors, does not indicate an involuntary confession. R., 445. 168 There is some support in the record for the panel's position, although the evidence is at best inconclusive. Dr. Lawrence Schoenfeld, a witness at the Federal habeas hearing, testified that Jurek might be coerced into confessing to escape from a tension-producing situation. But Dr. Schoenfeld emphasized that this was not positively the case. See also Tr., Vol. VIII, 1714 (testimony of Dr. Kenneth Owens). Other medical experts were even less conclusive. For example, Dr. William McKinney testified that when he interviewed Jurek, Jurek did not feel coerced into giving answers he did not want to give: 169 . . . I did not feel that that, you know that he was just going just answering the questions just to give me an answer, irregardless. I think this is what you (Defense Attorney) are implying, that he would be willing to say anything to get over the question. I felt that he was giving me what he what he felt, although, at times, his statements were contradictory. 170 Tr., Vol. VIII, 1682. Dr. McKinney conceded, however, that his interviews with Jurek may not have been as stress-producing as police-house interrogation. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1684. Dr. McKinney also conceded that it was possible that Jurek could be swayed into signing a confession against his interests. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1700. 171 Moreover, although there was evidence that Jurek was somewhat susceptible to pressure in a stress-producing environment, the evidence also established that Jurek was capable of understanding the contents of the confessions. For example, Dr. Owens testified that if the two written confessions were read to Jurek he could understand them. Tr., Vol. VIII, 1718. Similarly, Dr. McKinney testified that Jurek could understand the two confessions: 172 I believe that he does have adequate intellectual capacity to read and understand (the confessions). . . . There would only be a few words that I would question whether he would, perhaps, comprehend the meaning of (them). 173 Tr., Vol. VIII, 1678. 174 The panel also stated, based on the psychological testimony, that Jurek is less likely to be able to understand his right to remain silent. He may also be unable to insist effectively that that right be observed. 593 F.2d at 677. The evidence is again very inconclusive, however. While Dr. Schoenfeld testified at the Federal habeas hearing that Jurek might have difficulty understanding the Miranda warnings, R., 37, Dr. Russell Adams disagreed with the tenor of that testimony: 175 There is one particular area that I would take a slightly different view, although I don't know that it certainly is a divergent view with Dr. Schoenfeld's report, and that has to do with whether or not Mr. Jurek understood the Miranda warning. It is my contention that he probably did understand it if it were presented if it were explained to him, I think he would have ability to understand it. R., 75. Later Dr. Adams testified: 176 I felt the patient was able to understand information presented him orally in a no, wait. I felt that the patient's ability to understand information presented him orally and in writing was poor, but it was generally in line with his intellectual ability and in my opinion he did have the ability to understand in general terms the Miranda warning. 177 R., 87. Dr. Adams conceded, however, that the warnings would have to be clearly explained to Jurek, see R., 76, and that Jurek's ability to understand the Miranda warnings was not as high as that of most other people. See R., 88-89. 178 To summarize, while it is undisputed that Jurek's intelligence was somewhat below normal, the exact impact of this on his susceptibility to coercion is far from undisputed. Moreover, it is anything but clear that Jurek could not understand the confessions or Miranda warnings. As stated above, the District Court concluded that Jurek's somewhat limited mental capacity did not, either alone or in conjunction with other factors, render his confessions involuntary. And we must remember that the District Court, having heard testimony by three medical experts, found that testimony unpersuasive and did not find anything persuasive in the record, either. Unlike this Court, the District Court had the opportunity to judge the credibility of these medical witnesses. In our view, because the impact of Jurek's limited mental capacity is so unclear, we think this is one of those occasions when the inferences drawn by the District Court are entitled to significant weight even with respect to the ultimate determination of voluntariness. See Culombe v. Connecticut, supra, 367 U.S. at 605, 81 S.Ct. at 1880, 6 L.Ed.2d at 1059; Haynes v. Washington, supra, 373 U.S. at 515, 83 S.Ct. at 1344, 10 L.Ed.2d at 522. The District Court's conclusion is buttressed by the conclusions of the State Trial Court, jury, and Appellate Court, all of which found, after considering the testimony presented at trial regarding Jurek's limited mentality, that Jurek's confessions were voluntary. Thus, after giving appropriate weight to the inferences drawn below, and after carefully reviewing the record, we conclude that Jurek's limited mental capacity, considered alone, or in conjunction with the other factors discussed in this opinion, did not make Jurek's written confessions involuntary. 19