Opinion ID: 58386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard Applicable to W&S’s Motion to Dismiss

Text: We review de novo the district court’s conclusion that W&S is not subject to the jurisdiction of a Louisiana court.2 The first step in our review is to determine the legal standard the district court should have applied to W&S’s motion to dismiss despite an initial holding that Delasa made out a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. When the defendant disputes the factual bases for jurisdiction, as W&S does here, the court may receive interrogatories, depositions, or “any combination of the recognized methods of discovery” to help it resolve the jurisdictional issue.3 The court has discretion as to the type and amount of discovery to allow. But even if the court receives discovery materials, unless there is a full and fair hearing, it should not act as a fact finder and must construe all disputed facts in the plaintiff’s favor and consider them along with 2 Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., Inc., 188 F.3d 619, 625 (5th Cir. 1999). 3 Thompson v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 755 F.2d 1162, 1165 (5th Cir. 1985). 7 No. 06-30886 the undisputed facts.4 Moreover, at this stage the plaintiff is required to present only a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction.5 The Ninth Circuit has explained why: If the court determines that it will receive only affidavits or affidavits plus discovery materials, these very limitations dictate that a plaintiff must make only a prima facie showing of jurisdictional facts through the submitted materials in order to avoid a defendant’s motion to dismiss. Any greater burden such as proof by a preponderance of the evidence would permit a defendant to obtain a dismissal simply by controverting the facts established by a plaintiff through his own affidavit and supporting materials.6 Ultimately, the plaintiff must show by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction is proper.7 Often, the determination of whether this standard is met is resolved at trial along with the merits. This is especially likely when the jurisdictional issue is intertwined with the merits and therefore can be determined based on jury fact findings.8 In this situation, it is often “preferable that [the jurisdictional] determination be made at trial, where a plaintiff may present his case in a coherent, orderly fashion and without the risk of prejudicing his case on the merits.”9 But this court has said that after a pretrial 4 Guidry, 188 F.3d at 625; Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1165; DeMelo v. Toche Marine, Inc., 711 F.2d 1260, 1270–71 (5th Cir. 1983). 5 Irving v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 864 F.2d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1989); Thompson, 755 F.2d at 1165. 6 Data Disc, Inc., v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted). 7 Brown v. Slenker, 220 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2000). 8 See id. (holding that because the personal jurisdiction issue erroneously decided as a matter of law by the district court was intertwined with the merits, “on remand both [had to be] decided at a new trial, based on valid jury findings”). 9 Data Disc, 557 F.2d at 1285–86 n.2; cf. McBeath v. Inter-Am. Citizens for Decency Comm., 374 F.2d 359, 363 (5th Cir. 1967) (holding that “where the factual and jurisdictional issues are completely intermeshed, the jurisdictional issues should be referred to the merits, 8 No. 06-30886 evidentiary hearing confined to the jurisdictional issue, where both sides have the opportunity to present their cases fully, the district court can decide whether the plaintiff has established jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.10 The district court relied on these cases and required Delasa to establish more than a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction because, in its estimation, it was deciding the jurisdictional issue following an evidentiary hearing. This was error. The hearing in this case was inadequate to justify raising Delasa’s burden above the prima facie level. A pretrial evidentiary hearing is intended to serve as a substitute for the resolution of factual and legal disputes relevant to jurisdiction at trial. As such, both parties must be allowed to submit affidavits and to employ all forms of discovery, subject to the district court’s discretion and as long as the discovery pertains to the personal-jurisdiction issue. Furthermore, if requested by the parties, the district court often should convene a hearing where it entertains live testimony. In Data Disc the Ninth Circuit held that at a hearing where a court requires more than a prima facie case it should allow the plaintiff “to go[] beyond the written materials.”11 The district court only partially granted Delasa’s motion for jurisdictional discovery. Delasa asked for written discovery in the form of interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions from W&S, but the district court granted Delasa discovery only as to a document request for correspondence for it is impossible to decide one without the other”). 10 Felch v. Transportes Lar-Mex SA DE CV, 92 F.3d 320, 326–327 (5th Cir. 1996); Travelers Imdem. Co. v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 798 F.2d 826, 831 (5th Cir. 1986). Other circuits allow district courts to hold pretrial evidentiary hearings on personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., AT&T v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 588–89 (9th Cir. 1996); Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990). 11 557 F.2d at 1285. 9 No. 06-30886 in W&S’s possession that was directed to Delasa in Louisiana. By substantially curtailing the amount of discovery that could be obtained, the court erred in requiring more than a prima facie showing of jurisdiction from Delasa. Significantly, the district court did not allow Delasa to take any depositions of parties essential to its jurisdictional case, including Abramson. W&S argues that this was not required because Abramson was deposed in related litigation. But in that litigation personal jurisdiction over W&S in Louisiana was not at issue. The deposition of Abramson in the related litigation was not a substitute for a deposition in this case as to personal jurisdiction. The court also denied Delasa’s request for live testimony. Without live testimony in this case—where examination of Abramson and other relevant witnesses, such as Wheelock and Lewis, would help resolve factual disputes dispositive of the jurisdictional question—the court could not require more than a prima facie case from Delasa. Because the district court did not conduct a full-blown evidentiary hearing, it should have required Delasa to establish only a prima facie case for personal jurisdiction. Therefore, our review is restricted to determining whether Delasa met this burden.