Opinion ID: 1855302
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: whether the trial court committed reversible error in overruling mr. humphrey's objection to a for cause challenge

Text: ¶ 43. We have stated: In order to strike a juror for cause there must be a clear showing that the prospective juror would be unable to follow the court's instructions and obey his oath; a juror's views alone do not constitute grounds for a challenge. A clear showing that a juror's views would prevent or significantly impair the performance of his duties requires more than a single response to an initial inquiry. Martin v. State, 592 So.2d 987, 988 (Miss. 1991) (citation omitted). ¶ 44. During jury selection juror number 134, Bobby Gardner, indicated that she was the niece of Johnny Street, a witness who was to be called by both sides. She stated that although Johnny Street was her uncle, she did not know Helen Street, Eric Jones, Janice Jones, or Humphrey, all of whom were members of Johnny Street's family. The trial court granted a for cause challenge made against Bobby Gardner, Humphrey objected, and the trial court overruled the objection. The trial court stated that she was too interwoven' with Johnny Street who was a relative and a witness for both sides, and that there were sufficient other neutral jurors available who were not connected to the defendant, the witnesses, or to the State. ¶ 45. Humphrey contests that because the juror stated she could be impartial he was denied his constitutional right to a fair trial by a jury of his peers as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Though the record is devoid of any express statement by Bobby Gardner that she could be impartial, when questioned whether the fact that she knew Johnny Street, and that he is Omar's stepfather, would cause her concern she replied that it would not. The question is thus whether the trial court was in error for allowing a for cause challenge against a juror who was to testify on both sides and was related to Humphrey as a cousin by marriage even though she did not actually know him or his immediate family members. This Court recently stated that the trial court has an affirmative duty to remove a juror for cause when they are related to a witness. Fleming v. State, 732 So.2d 172, 182 (Miss.1999). Further, the statute dealing with for cause challenges, Miss.Code Ann. § 13-5-79 (1972) states the following: Any person, otherwise competent, who will make oath that he is impartial in the case, shall be competent as a juror in any criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he has an impression or an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if it appear to the satisfaction of the court that he has no bias or feeling or prejudice in the case, and no desire to reach any result in it, except that to which the evidence may conduct. Any juror shall be excluded, however, if the court be of opinion that he cannot try the case impartially, and the exclusion shall not be assignable for error. (emphasis added). ¶ 46. The trial court felt that because the juror was so interwoven with the defendant through kinship ties, and the fact that her stepfather, who she did know, was going to be called as a witness during the case in chief that the for cause challenge should be sustained. Under the statute, and in light of case law pertaining to jurors who are related to witnesses, the trial court did not commit reversible error in granting the for cause challenge.