Opinion ID: 2995134
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Extreme and Outrageous Conduct

Text: With regard to the first prong of this tort, whether the conduct alleged is extreme and outrageous, the Supreme Court of Illinois in McGrath described a number of non-exclusive factors that can inform this analysis. First, the degree of power or authority which a defendant has over a plaintiff can impact . . . whether that defendant’s conduct is outrageous, and the more control which a defendant has over the plaintiff, the more likely that defendant’s conduct will be deemed outrageous, particularly when the alleged conduct involves either a veiled or explicit threat to exercise such authority or power to plaintiff’s detriment. McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 809- 10. In examining this factor, courts have noted that it is appropriate to consider not only the power and influence wielded by the harassing party, see Lopacich v. Falk, 5 F.3d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1993); Milton v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 427 N.E.2d 829, 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), but also the likelihood that the threatened action could be carried out, see Lopacich, 5 F.3d at 212; Plocar v. Dunkin’ Donuts of Am., Inc., 431 N.E.2d 1175, 1180 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981). In doing so, courts have found extreme and outrageous behavior to exist in the employer/employee context where the employer clearly abuses the power it holds over an employee in a manner far more severe than the typical disagreements or job-related stress caused by the average work environment./10 Such an abuse of power also has been found where defendants exercised great economic leverage over a plaintiff and attempted to defraud that plaintiff out of millions of dollars, see McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 812; where disc jockeys used the medium of radio to belittle plaintiffs suffering from a disfiguring disease, see Kolegas, 607 N.E.2d at 212; or where a police officer abused his position of power by berating a sexual assault victim and refusing to save her children from attack for fear of personal liability for property damage, see Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 507-08. Another factor considered by the courts is whether the defendant reasonably believed that his objective was legitimate; greater latitude is given to a defendant pursuing a reasonable objective even if that pursuit results in some amount of distress for a plaintiff. See McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 810. For example, courts have recognized that employers will often take actions that may cause their employees serious upset, but such actions have not been classified as extreme and outrageous when they did not go well beyond the parameters of the typical workplace dispute./11 Additionally, in cases involving the actions of creditors who aggressively request payment, see Public Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 360 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. 1976); Sutherland v. Illinois Bell, 627 N.E.2d 145, 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), or legal authorities who assertively carry out their enforcement duties, see Khan v. American Airlines, 639 N.E.2d 210, 215 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), abrogation on other grounds recognized by Velez v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 721 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999); Anderson v. Village of Forest Park, 606 N.E.2d 205, 214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), courts often have not found extreme and outrageous behavior to exist, as such actions were undertaken with legitimate objectives in mind. An additional consideration in determining whether extreme and outrageous behavior exists is whether the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional distress because of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity; behavior that otherwise might be considered merely rude, abrasive or inconsiderate may be deemed outrageous if the defendant knows that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible to emotional turmoil. See McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 811- 12 (defendants knew plaintiff was suffering from heart disease); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (defendant knew plaintiff was undergoing psychotherapy); Wall v. Pecaro, 561 N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (defendant knew plaintiff was pregnant). Mr. Honaker claims that Mr. Smith’s actions in allegedly setting fire to his house and failing to properly extinguish that blaze suffice to demonstrate extreme and outrageous conduct under Illinois law. As we have previously explained in this opinion, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that Mr. Smith or the Lovington Fire Department were deficient in any way in putting out the fire at Mr. Honaker’s house. However, Mr. Honaker’s claim that Mr. Smith played a role in setting the fire deserves further analysis. As an initial matter, setting fire to a person’s house because one believes the house’s physical appearance is unsightly is similar in character to acts that have been deemed extreme and outrageous under Illinois law. Illinois courts have found actions to be extreme and outrageous in situ-ations such as when a financial institution attempted to defraud a plaintiff suffering from heart disease out of millions of dollars, see McGrath, 533 N.E.2d at 812; when radio disc jockeys denigrated the physical appearance of a plaintiff’s relatives who were afflicted with a disfiguring disease, see Kolegas, 607 N.E.2d at 212; when an employer pressured an employee for dates, offered her money in return for sexual favors, and threatened to kill and rape her, see Pavilon, 561 N.E.2d at 1251-52; when a police officer berated a sexual assault victim and refused to save her children for fear of personal liability for property damage, see Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 507-08; and when a defendant conspired to murder his estranged wife, see Vance v. Chandler, 597 N.E.2d 233, 236-37 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). We believe that, like the circumstances in these cases, intentionally causing a person’s house to be set on fire in an effort to force him to leave town also would be deemed to go beyond all possible bounds of decency . . . and be regarded as intolerable in a civilized community. Kolegas, 607 N.E.2d at 211. Additionally, the factors listed above, which provide Illinois courts with guidance in determining whether extreme and outrageous behavior exists, also provide some assistance in evaluating Mr. Honaker’s claim. Mr. Smith, as Mayor of the Village, obviously had a certain standing in the community. Moreover, if Mr. Smith actually did cause the fire to be set, that action would not be one in which Mr. Smith had a plausible belief that his conduct was legitimate./12 We therefore conclude that having a house burned under the circumstances described in this record is the sort of extreme and outrageous conduct that the Supreme Court of Illinois would consider actionable. Mr. Honaker also must have demonstrated a sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to find that Mr. Smith did in fact engage in such conduct. No physical evidence was found to link Mr. Smith to the fire’s origin and no witnesses testified that they knew Mr. Smith to be connected in any way with the blaze. Both Tankersly and an investigator from the Illinois State Police, Rodney Miller, examined the fire’s origin and found no evidence linking Mr. Smith to the start of the conflagration. However, Mr. Honaker claims that a few months prior to the fire, Mr. Smith approached him and told me to get my stuff and get out of town. He’d burn me out. R.70 at 76./13 Moreover, the fire was set under suspicious circumstances. Indeed, the fire inspector concluded that the conflagration was set intentionally. Mr. Honaker clearly had a longstanding history of acrimonious relations with the Village and with Mr. Smith personally. Mr. Honaker had engaged in contentious litigation with the Village in the past and also had been issued citations by local authorities a number of times due to the poor condition of his property. He testified that, at least once a week, Village personnel would walk by his property and make derogatory comments about its physical appearance. A number of Village residents also complained frequently about the property at City Council meetings, meetings at which Mr. Smith and the other members of the City Council discussed what they could do to address those complaints. Jokes were made by some residents and City Council members at these meetings, while Mr. Smith was in attendance, to the effect that, if a fire were to occur at Mr. Honaker’s house, it would not be a bad thing for the Village./14 At one meeting prior to the fire, when Crafton raised a number of complaints about the property’s condition, Mr. Smith told Crafton that he would look at the property and do whatever he could to resolve the problem under the law. Lastly, a number of witnesses testified that, due to the problems with the Honaker property, general feelings of animosity existed between Mr. Smith and Mr. Honaker. In addition, Mr. Honaker’s house was not the first troublesome property for the Village that had burned down. Prior to Mr. Honaker’s fire, Lovington resident Tom Brewer saw buildings that he had owned catch fire under what even Mr. Smith agreed were suspicious circumstances. Just a few weeks prior to that fire, the Village had requested that Brewer tear those buildings down, as there had been complaints about their condition at City Council meetings. The parallels between the fire at the Brewer property and that at Mr. Honaker’s house are difficult to ignore. Ultimately, no direct evidence was presented linking Mr. Smith to the fire at Mr. Honaker’s house. Mr. Smith was certainly not the only Village resident who was angered by the condition of the Honaker property./15 The only piece of evidence that concretely suggests that Mr. Smith set the fire was the alleged conversation between the two men, in which Mr. Honaker claims that Mr. Smith asserted that he would burn Mr. Honaker out of town. However, there is also little question that the house burned under questionable circumstances and that many members of the City Council, including Mr. Smith, were upset about the condition of the property and had complained about it for quite a while. Many witnesses testified that there was also longstanding animosity between Mr. Honaker and Mr. Smith. We believe that these facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Honaker, provide a legally sufficient amount of evidence to suggest that Mr. Smith might have beenresponsible for setting the fire, such that he could be said to have engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct under Illinois law.