Opinion ID: 198785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Putative Waiver of Conflicts of Interest

Text: 53 The bankruptcy court nevertheless ruled that even assuming a conflict of interest, Pearson either consented to representation by the Wadleigh Firm or acquiesced in perpetrating a fraud upon the court, since Pearson neither notified the bankruptcy court of the grounds giving rise to any conflict nor instructed Attorney Gannon to do so. See Pearson, 210 B.R. at 502. The bankruptcy court noted as well that Pearson had encouraged, even badgered, the Wadleigh Firm into representing him, and only belatedly objected in 1996 when Attorney Gannon demanded that Pearson pay attorney fees. See id. at 502-03. We address these matters in turn. 54 First, under the governing ethical rules, some conflicts of interest are considered so fundamental that even an anxious prospective client is deemed incapacitated from providing informed consent. See, e.g., NHRPC 1.9; Kevlik, 724 F.2d at 850-51. '[W]hen a disinterested lawyer would conclude that the client should not agree to the representation under the circumstances, the lawyer involved cannot properly ask for such agreement or provide representation on the basis of the client's consent.' Kelley's Case, 627 A.2d 597, 600 (N.H. 1993) (quoting Comments, ABA Model Rule 1.7(b)) (emphasis added). In these circumstances, it is exceedingly difficult to envision that a disinterested attorney could have advised Pearson to consent to representation by the Wadleigh firm given the circumstances alleged in Pearson's state-court complaint. See supra Section I (describing allegations in No. 90-E-1082). 55 Second, although we leave it to the bankruptcy court on remand to determine whether any conflict of interest was sufficiently serious to preclude its competent waiver by Pearson, the matter at issue went well beyond whether Pearson's implied consent could be considered effectual, since Gannon did not simply remain silent concerning any potential conflict of interest. Rather, he presented to the bankruptcy court the unconditional representation that he had no connections with [Pearson's] creditors or any party in interest, their respective attorneys, and accountants, see supra Sections I & II.B., rather than reporting that such connections did in fact exist, but that Pearson knowingly had waived any such conflict of interest. Whatever safeguards counsel may realize in remaining silent do not extend to deliberate efforts to mislead the court through inaccurate representations. Clearly then, the Wadleigh Firm and Attorney Gannon acted at their peril, and appellees may not ward off all discovery and a further evidentiary inquiry simply by resorting to conclusory assertions that Pearson consented. 5 The bankruptcy court should address these concerns on remand. 56