Opinion ID: 145671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The core provision of SLUSA reads as follows: [6]

Text: CLASS ACTION LIMITATIONS.  No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging (A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (B) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security. Id., at 3230 (codified as amended at 15 U. S. C. § 78bb(f)(1)). [7] A covered class action is a lawsuit in which damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 people. [8] A covered security is one traded nationally and listed on a regulated national exchange. [9] Respondent does not dispute that both the class and the securities at issue in this case are covered within the meaning of the statute, or that the complaint alleges misrepresentations and omissions of material facts. The only disputed issue is whether the alleged wrongdoing was in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Respondent urges that the operative language must be read narrowly to encompass (and therefore pre-empt) only those actions in which the purchaser-seller requirement of Blue Chip Stamps is met. Such, too, was the Second Circuit's view. But insofar as the argument assumes that the rule adopted in Blue Chip Stamps stems from the text of Rule 10b-5specifically, the in connection with language, it must be rejected. Unlike the Birnbaum court, which relied on Rule 10b-5's text in crafting its purchaser-seller limitation, this Court in Blue Chip Stamps relied chiefly, and candidly, on policy considerations in adopting that limitation. 421 U. S., at 737. The Blue Chip Stamps Court purported to define the scope of a private right of action under Rule 10b-5not to define the words in connection with the purchase or sale. Id., at 749 (No language in either [§ 10(b) or Rule 10b-5] speaks at all to the contours of a private cause of action for their violation). Any ambiguity on that score had long been resolved by the time Congress enacted SLUSA. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U. S. 642, 656, 664 (1997); Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation, 503 U. S. 258, 285 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); id., at 289-290 (SCALIA, J., concurring in judgment); United States v. Naftalin, 441 U. S. 768, 774, n. 6 (1979); see also 395 F. 3d, at 39 (acknowledging that [t]he limitation on standing to bring [a] private suit for damages for fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities is unquestionably a distinct concept from the general statutory and regulatory prohibition on fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of securities). Moreover, when this Court has sought to give meaning to the phrase in the context of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, it has espoused a broad interpretation. A narrow construction would not, as a matter of first impression, have been unreasonable; one might have concluded that an alleged fraud is in connection with a purchase or sale of securities only when the plaintiff himself was defrauded into purchasing or selling particular securities. After all, that was the interpretation adopted by the panel in the Birnbaum case. See 193 F. 2d, at 464. But this Court, in early cases like Superintendent of Ins. of N. Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6 (1971), and most recently in SEC v. Zandford, 535 U. S. 813, 820, 822 (2002), has rejected that view. Under our precedents, it is enough that the fraud alleged coincide with a securities transactionwhether by the plaintiff or by someone else. See O'Hagan, 521 U. S., at 651. The requisite showing, in other words, is deception `in connection with the purchase or sale of any security,' not deception of an identifiable purchaser or seller. Id., at 658. Notably, this broader interpretation of the statutory language comports with the longstanding views of the SEC. See Zandford, 535 U. S., at 819-820. [10] Congress can hardly have been unaware of the broad construction adopted by both this Court and the SEC when it imported the key phrasein connection with the purchase or saleinto SLUSA's core provision. And when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its . . . judicial interpretations as well. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U. S. 624, 645 (1998); see Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 696-699 (1979). Application of that presumption is particularly apt here; not only did Congress use the same words as are used in § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, but it used them in a provision that appears in the same statute as § 10(b). Generally, identical words used in different parts of the same statute are . . . presumed to have the same meaning. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U. S. 21, 34 (2005). The presumption that Congress envisioned a broad construction follows not only from ordinary principles of statutory construction but also from the particular concerns that culminated in SLUSA's enactment. A narrow reading of the statute would undercut the effectiveness of the 1995 Reform Act and thus run contrary to SLUSA's stated purpose, viz., to prevent certain State private securities class action lawsuits alleging fraud from being used to frustrate the objectives of the 1995 Act. SLUSA § 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227. As the Blue Chip Stamps Court observed, class actions brought by holders pose a special risk of vexatious litigation. 421 U. S., at 739. It would be odd, to say the least, if SLUSA exempted that particularly troublesome subset of class actions from its pre-emptive sweep. See Kircher, 403 F. 3d, at 484. Respondent's preferred construction also would give rise to wasteful, duplicative litigation. Facts supporting an action by purchasers under Rule 10b-5 (which must proceed in federal court if at all) typically support an action by holders as well, at least in those States that recognize holder claims. The prospect is raised, then, of parallel class actions proceeding in state and federal court, with different standards governing claims asserted on identical facts. That prospect, which exists to some extent in this very case, [11] squarely conflicts with the congressional preference for national standards for securities class action lawsuits involving nationally traded securities. SLUSA § 2(5), 112 Stat. 3227. [12] In concluding that SLUSA pre-empts state-law holder class-action claims of the kind alleged in Dabit's complaint, we do not lose sight of the general presum[ption] that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U. S. 470, 485 (1996). But that presumption carries less force here than in other contexts because SLUSA does not actually pre-empt any state cause of action. It simply denies plaintiffs the right to use the class-action device to vindicate certain claims. The Act does not deny any individual plaintiff, or indeed any group of fewer than 50 plaintiffs, the right to enforce any state-law cause of action that may exist. Moreover, the tailored exceptions to SLUSA's pre-emptive command demonstrate that Congress did not by any means act cavalierly here. The statute carefully exempts from its operation certain class actions based on the law of the State in which the issuer of the covered security is incorporated, actions brought by a state agency or state pension plan, actions under contracts between issuers and indenture trustees, and derivative actions brought by shareholders on behalf of a corporation. 15 U. S. C. §§ 78bb(f)(3)(A)(C), (f)(5)(C). The statute also expressly preserves state jurisdiction over state agency enforcement proceedings. § 78bb(f)(4). The existence of these carve-outs both evinces congressional sensitivity to state prerogatives in this field and makes it inappropriate for courts to create additional, implied exceptions. Finally, federal law, not state law, has long been the principal vehicle for asserting class-action securities fraud claims. See, e. g., H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 105-803, p. 14 (1998) (Prior to the passage of the Reform Act, there was essentially no significant securities class action litigation brought in State court). [13] More importantly, while state-law holder claims were theoretically available both before and after the decision in Blue Chip Stamps, the actual assertion of such claims by way of class action was virtually unheard of before SLUSA was enacted; respondent and his amici have identified only one pre-SLUSA case involving a state-law class action asserting holder claims. [14] This is hardly a situation, then, in which a federal statute has eliminated a historically entrenched state-law remedy. Cf. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U. S. 431, 449 (2005) (observing that a long history of state-law tort remedy add[ed] force to the presumption against pre-emption).