Opinion ID: 6107079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The decision to exclude defendant from the trial

Text: The exclusion of a capital defendant from his own trial is unusual, but not  unprecedented. We have previously upheld death judgments where the trial court excluded the defendant from part or most of a trial because of the defendant's disruption of the proceedings. (See, e.g., People v. Banks (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113 , 1178-1181, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 [defendant was excluded from the entire penalty trial]; People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701 , 773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 [defendant was excluded on a number of occasions]; People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 , 735-740, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 [defendant was excluded from voir dire, presentation of the evidence, counsel's arguments, and reading of the jury instructions].) A disruptive defendant forfeits any constitutional and statutory rights to be present at trial. ( Medina, at p. 738, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 .) In egregious circumstances, that forfeiture may encompass the remainder of the trial. What justifies barring a defendant from the trial, after all, is the defendant's insistence on misconduct so disorderly,  disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. ( Allen , supra , 397 U.S. at p. 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057 .) Whether it makes sense to expect a defendant in a given case, once removed from the trial, to actually abandon a strategy of disruption and conform to courtroom decorum if allowed to return depends to a large extent on nuanced assessment of the severity and persistence of the disruptive conduct. The trial court is best situated to evaluate the defendant's conduct and the likelihood of further disruption. Which is why it makes sense for the decision to bar a defendant from the remainder of a trial to rest within the broad discretion of the trial court. (See People v. Welch , supra , 20 Cal.4th at p. 773, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203 , 976 P.2d 754 [appellate courts must give considerable deference to the trial court's judgment as to when disruption has occurred or may reasonably be anticipated].) The defendant in this case violently attacked his attorney, in full view of the court and the prospective jurors. He did so while wearing a stun belt meant to  control him in case it was needed. The attack was preceded by regular, repeated, and vulgar disparagement of his attorney, including cursing and spitting, as well as numerous epithets directed at the court and other outbursts. At subsequent hearings, when defendant was in the lockup adjacent to the courtroom, he continued his efforts to disrupt the proceedings by banging or kicking the cell door. So by the time the trial court barred defendant from the remainder of the trial during the October 19, 1988, hearing, it had ample reason to believe that defendant's desire to disrupt and delay the proceedings would not abate: I'm not going to have him in this courtroom no matter what he promises, since any promise to behave would be simply a subterfuge to gain access to the courtroom and allow him to continue his offensive, violent and outrageous conduct. Defendant faults the court for failing to warn him that an assault against his attorney could specifically lead to his permanent expulsion from the trial. We disagree. Defendant was already aware that continued misconduct could result in his removal, given that the trial court had removed him from the courtroom based on his outbursts during his first trial. (See People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195 , 1240, 283 Cal.Rptr. 144 , 812 P.2d 163 ; cf. People v. Medina , supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 731, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165 , 906 P.2d 2 [defendant's outburst in a prior trial in a different county justified shackling].) Defendant had no statutory or constitutional right to an estimate of how long he might be barred from the courtroom if his misconduct were to escalate. After all, the duration of his removal from the courtroom depended on the trial court's assessment of whether and when he would no longer pose a threat to the  court or the proceedings. In any event, defendant cites no authority suggesting that a court must explicitly put a defendant on notice that violence against an attorney-or anyone else in the courtroom-could result in his removal. (See Com. v. Scionti (2012) 81 Mass.App.Ct. 266 , 962 N.E.2d 190 , 200 [upholding defendant's removal without a warning where the defendant threatened violence if brought into the courtroom]; People v. Staffney , supra , 468 N.W.2d at p. 240 ; People v. Wilkins, supra , 822 N.Y.S.2d at pp. 272-273.) The trial court in this case found that defendant posed a continuing threat. Defendant's conduct at trial leaves no doubt about why the court made this decision. A court need not engage in the empty ritual of periodically inquiring whether a defendant is willing to correct his behavior once it has reasonably determined that the defendant cannot be trusted to do so. (See Com. v. Scionti , supra , 962 N.E.2d at p. 200 [If, in the alternative, she had ordered the defendant to be brought into court to receive an express warning, the safety of the defendant as well as court staff would have been at risk].) Defendant cites no authority to suggest that a trial court lacks the power to deploy tools useful in confronting violent conduct. Nor does he explain why the court is bound to offer a dangerous defendant repeated-indeed,  effectively unlimited-opportunities to inflict physical injury on counsel or others in the courtroom. (See People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385 , 415, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684 , 956 P.2d 1137 [ 'The trial court's ability to remove a disruptive or potentially  disruptive defendant follows not only from section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), but also from the trial court's inherent power to establish order in its courtroom' ].) In any event, defendant repeatedly manifested his lack of interest in the trial itself. He refused daily invitations to listen to the proceedings, 4 and demonstrated his unwillingness to conform to courtroom decorum by his continued misbehavior. On November 9, 1998, defendant attempted to spit on Hauser, and three days later, he refused all contact with Hauser and said if given the chance, he would spit all over Mr. Hauser again. Later in the trial, defendant reportedly stated that he should have taken the opportunity in the jury assembly room to slit counsel's throat. And when the court conducted a video simulation to determine whether defendant would follow the ordinary rules for a witness's examination by counsel, defendant refused to follow the question-and-answer format. Instead, he accused the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel of illegal conduct-including the presentation of false evidence, the withholding of exculpatory evidence, and a concerted effort to intentionally dump me-and was about to launch into profanity when the court cut off the audio. Defendant's assertion that he could have been trusted to correct his behavior is not supported by the record. What defendant argues next is that the trial court should have considered alternatives to excluding him from the courtroom, such as allowing him to be present while bound and gagged. Not once did defendant ask the court to consider this alternative, so he has forfeited the claim. (See People v. Banks , supra , 59 Cal.4th at p. 1181, 176 Cal.Rptr.3d 185 , 331 P.3d 1206 .) Even if the claim had been preserved, we held in Banks that a trial court does not commit constitutional error  when it opts to exclude a defendant from the courtroom in response to 'extreme and aggravated' conduct, even when options such as shackling are also available. ( Ibid . ) Indeed, because defendant's assault on counsel had occurred while he was wearing a stun belt, the trial court lacked assurance that restraints would be effective. (See Allen , supra , 397 U.S. at p. 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057 ; State v. Jones (2007) 281 Conn. 613 , 916 A.2d 17 , 35-36.) Defendant's final challenge to the court's removal order is a technical one. He contends the trial court overstepped its bounds by barring him before his trial had even begun. He relies on section 1043, subdivision (b), which creates an exception to the requirement that a defendant be personally present  at the trial only after the trial has commenced in his presence. (Cf. Smith v. Mann (2d Cir. 1999) 173 F.3d 73 , 76 [nothing in the Constitution prohibits a trial from being commenced in the defendant's absence so long as the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waives his right to be present].) He then points to dicta in People v. Concepcion (2008) 45 Cal.4th 77 , 80, footnote 4, 84 Cal.Rptr.3d 418 , 193 P.3d 1172 , where we observed in passing that commencement of trial under section 1043 begins at least as early as jury selection. Defendant reasons that because jury selection did not begin until November 5, 1998, the trial court acted prematurely when it barred him from the trial. Defendant misunderstands the timeline. The parties convened in the jury assembly room for jury selection on September 17, 1998. The court would have proceeded to consider hardships and pass out the general questionnaires, but was disrupted by defendant's attack on Hauser. When the court discovered that the prospective jurors were irrevocably tainted by defendant's misconduct, it dismissed the venire. (See People v. Silva (2001) 25 Cal.4th 345 , 372-373, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93 , 21 P.3d 769 ; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668 , 722, fn. 7, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1 , 928 P.2d 485 .) Because it would take at least three weeks to assemble another panel of 400 prospective jurors and the prosecutor declared a scheduling conflict thereafter, the trial court found good cause to continue the trial until November. Consequently, the proceedings on November 5,  1998, were merely a continuation of the trial that had begun, for purposes of section 1043, on September 17, 1998. (See People v. Granderson (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 703 , 707, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 .) In any event, the evident purpose of section 1043's requirement that trial have commenced in the defendant's presence is to ensure that the defendant is aware of the right to be present and that the trial will continue in the defendant's absence. (See People v. Ruiz (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 162 , 168, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 640 ; accord, Taylor v. United States (1973) 414 U.S. 17 , 20, 94 S.Ct. 194 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 .) The record shows that defendant was assuredly aware of these things. In short, the record supports the trial court's finding that defendant would not conform his conduct to the norms of a criminal trial. We therefore find, under the unusual circumstances presented, that the trial court did not err in excluding defendant from the courtroom for the entirety of his capital trial. B. Defendant's Forfeiture and Waiver of His Right To Testify Defendant challenges the trial court's findings that he forfeited his right to testify at the guilt phase and waived that right at the penalty phase. The challenges lack merit.  1. Guilt phase On November 17, 1998, during the guilt phase trial, the court discussed preparations  for defendant's testimony. Defendant would not be allowed in the courtroom because of the security risks he posed, but would be allowed to testify through a live TV audio transmission setup from a secure interview room in the courthouse. Before granting defense counsel an opportunity to confer with defendant, the court directed counsel to tell his client that he is to conform with the rules concerning testimony as any other witness; that [h]e will not be allowed to disregard such rules and use the opportunity to again attempt to disrupt the proceedings, delay the trial, or otherwise attempt to inject possible error into the proceedings; and that should he fail to comply with these rules, it may be necessary, depending on the seriousness of his disruptions, to terminate the audio-video arrangement entirely, in which event his testimony will of course terminate. Counsel reported back that when asked whether he wanted to testify, defendant said he would refuse to answer counsel's questions. So the court asked defendant, through the live video feed, whether he wanted to testify. Defendant said that he did. The court then reviewed the conditions for defendant's testimony: You understand that if you testify, it's going to be a question and answer procedure. Mr. Hauser will ask the questions, and then you'll respond. [¶] Do you understand and agree? Defendant replied, Oh yes, we understand it. We know how the proceedings supposed to work, but it don't seem to be functioning well in this courthouse. To emphasize the point, the court reiterated that [i]f we use this procedure tomorrow morning, once again, it will be question and answer by the lawyers; and you will simply follow the rules as any witness would in any other trial. [¶] Do you understand how that works? The colloquy proceeded as follows: DEFENDANT JOHNSON: I think it's already error been injected into these proceedings. Lots of them. Lots of errors. THE COURT: Do you understand what I'm saying to you, sir? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: I hear what you saying. THE COURT: All right. Now, in the event that you don't follow the rules, if you try to use the opportunity to do the things I've just mentioned or engage in profanity, which you have done that enough times, I will then-I have here a master switch in front of me. I will kill both the audio and video portion. At that point in time, you will be given a chance to reconsider your behavior. In the event that you don't want to conform, or if you say that you will and we reinstitute your testimony and you once again violate the rules, I want  you to know right now that I would terminate any further testimony. You will have then voluntarily given up your right to testify in this trial by your own actions.  Do you understand how this is going to work, sir? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: I understand y'all been violating rules in there. When did y'all start following rules in there? THE COURT: Do you understand what I'm saying, Mr. Johnson? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: I hear what you saying. THE COURT: Are you going to follow those rules? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: I'm going to do what I think is best on my own behalf. You know, if I write the rules-I understand you trying to set up criteria how you want me to operate.  THE COURT: Do you understand what I said to you, sir? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: I understand what you would like me to do. THE COURT: It's not what I'd like you to do. It's what you will do, Mr. Johnson. DEFENDANT JOHNSON: I understand what you would like me to do, and there is no need for further discussion. Let's wait until tomorrow and see what's going to happen. The court remained concerned whether defendant understood the ground rules for his testimony, so it tried once more: THE COURT: I want to know if you have any questions about what the rules are. DEFENDANT JOHNSON: No. No. There ain't no rules. Everything open in the courtroom. It ain't gonna get no rules until we get some attention to what's going on here.  THE COURT: And will you be able to talk with Mr. Hauser tomorrow? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: It ain't nothing to discuss with us. THE COURT: Well, you understand he's the one who is going to be asking you the questions? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: It doesn't matter. THE COURT: Will you be able to answer his questions? DEFENDANT JOHNSON: It's irrelevant. We'll see what goes on tomorrow. Let's talk about it tomorrow. [¶] .... [¶] THE COURT: No, you listen to me once more. I don't want any questions about this. You will testify tomorrow and follow the rules as any other witness. If you violate those rules, you know right now I will terminate your testimony; and you will never have an opportunity to testify before the jury. It's your choice. You can testify or not testify. That's how it's going to work. And you have a nice day, Mr. Johnson. DEFENDANT JOHNSON: You, too. Following this colloquy, counsel and the court remained concerned that defendant was not going to follow the rules. Counsel, who was opposed to defendant's decision to testify and feared the effect of his potential misbehavior on the jury, suggested prior to him actually testifying, that we have a little test run, out of the presence of the jury, just to see if he is going to cooperate. The court agreed to do so. The next morning, the court made the following statement for the record: Based on his disruptive record and upon yesterday's comments, 'we'll wait and see what will happen,' also based on Mr. Hauser's request for some sort of a test on how Mr. Johnson will behave in front of this jury, and also based on my concern as to what sort of damage, irreparable damage, Mr. Johnson might be able to cause at this, the end of our second jury trial, I'm going to do the following: The jury will not be present. The bailiffs will tell Mr. Johnson that he's about to be on the hookup. I will activate the TV audio system.  I will then tell Mr. Hauser to call his next witness. He will call Mr. Johnson. I will administer the oath. And I will then tell Mr. Johnson that the attorneys will be questioning him.  I'll ask each attorney to introduce themselves by their names so that he becomes familiar with the voice. And I will tell him then that Mr. Hauser is going to be then questioning him as his attorney.  And then, Mr. Hauser, I'll ask you to pose the first question to him, which would be what? MR. HAUSER: I'll probably ask him where he was living on the date of September 26th. THE COURT: Based on whatever happens at that point in time, we'll make the decision as to whether the jury is going to be brought out and hear his testimony. The clerk activated the video feed. After counsel called defendant, and defendant was sworn, the court asked counsel to begin questioning defendant. The exchange proceeded as follows: Q. Mr. Johnson, back on September 26th of 1996, where were you living? A. First of all, I wish to greet the jury. Good morning to y'all. And I apologize for not being able to be present at my own so-called trial, but it's beyond my control. First of all, you do not represent my interests and never have. And all three of you attorneys work together. Everything you got going is totally illegal, and I'm totally opposed to it. Q. Is that where you live? THE COURT: Did you hear the question?  THE WITNESS: Excuse me? Q. BY MR. HAUSER: Where do you live? A. You do not represent my interests and never have. What y'all doing is illegal. You have never tried to do nothing to benefit me. Y'all all working together. I oppose what's going on. I'm not illiterate, neither am I dyfunctional ( sic ). It shouldn't be conducted this way. This is reasonable doubt, ladies and gentlemen, what's going on in this trial. Q. So you don't want to testify. Is that you're saying? A. You do not represent my-I would appreciate if y'all read that letter I filed to the court Monday as a form of protest to what's going on to the jury to let them know that I'm not fooled or blind to what's going on. This is a concerted effort to intentionally dump me in that courtroom, ladies and gentlemen. Consider that. Q. Mr. Johnson, this is your chance. Now, are you going to testify or not? A. You do not represent my interest and never have, Mr. Hauser. I do not need to talk to you. Q. Does that mean 'no'? A. You have not-what about the tapes and everything y'all have to show that these witnesses was lying. Y'all knew they was lying and tried to withhold that evidence. That's discriminatory in nature, and what y'all doing is a crime. Q. Are you going to answer my questions?  A. Do you understand that you are committing a crime? You do not represent my interests and never have. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Johnson, I take it then by your comments that you do not intend to follow the normal witness rules of question and answer, and you will continue to make these kind of comments. Is that what you're going to do? THE WITNESS: Yes, Judge Cheroske. THE COURT: Well, I have a little surprise for you, Mr. Johnson. The jury is  not present. This was a test [to] see what kind of person you would be. You have proven by your conduct that you're not going to be able to testify in this case. THE WITNESS: That's right.  At that point, the court deactivated defendant's audio because the profanity was about to begin-and the trial judge had already witnessed the depth and breadth of defendant's distinctive talents in this area. The court reiterated that defendant had forfeited his right to testify by his conduct: I don't know how we could have had any more conduct that would have been disruptive to these proceedings than what we've just witnessed. We agree with the trial court: defendant forfeited his right to testify by his misconduct. The right to testify, like other constitutional rights such as the right to be present or the right to confront witnesses, can be forfeited by disorderly or disruptive behavior that causes the defendant to be barred from the courtroom. ( People v. Hayes (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1226 , 1233-1234, 280 Cal.Rptr. 578 ; accord, U.S. v. Nunez (10th Cir. 1989) 877 F.2d 1475 , 1478 ; People v. Menner (2003) 2 A.D.3d 650 , 769 N.Y.S.2d 569 , 570 ; State v. Mosley (Tenn.Crim.App. 2005) 200 S.W.3d 624 , 633-634 ; State v. Chapple (2001) 145 Wash.2d 310 , 36 P.3d 1025 , 1033-1034 ; State v. Anthony (2015) 361 Wis.2d 116 , 860 N.W.2d 10 , 22-25.) We explained in part II.A., ante , that the trial court did not err in excluding defendant from the trial. In this case, though, the trial court did more than simply rely on its prior determination that the trial could not proceed in defendant's presence. The trial court sought to accommodate its substantial and documented security concerns with defendant's constitutional right to testify by proposing that  defendant testify via closed-circuit television. Defendant was informed repeatedly his testimony would proceed in a question and answer format. He was warned at length that his refusal to comply with that (and other) courtroom procedures would lead to termination of his testimony and forfeiture of his right to testify. The court did not succeed in securing defendant's agreement to abide by these ground rules-despite the court's best efforts. Instead of promising to behave, defendant candidly admitted, I'm going to do what I think is best on my own behalf and proposed everyone else wait until tomorrow and see what's going to happen. When the court tried to probe further into defendant's willingness to follow the rules, defendant shot back, There ain't no rules. These responses proved unsettling to defense counsel, who feared that defendant's behavior would prejudice his chances with the jury. They were also unsettling to the court, who feared defendant was attempting to force a mistrial. Even though defendant had already forfeited his right to appear at trial-and even though defendant had failed to reassure the court that he would cooperate if granted the chance to testify remotely through video-the court agreed to offer defendant one more chance to show himself capable of testifying in an appropriate manner. It was defendant's own counsel who suggested the plan, which called for a dry run with the preliminaries of defendant's testimony, outside the presence of the jury, to see how defendant was going to behave. Defendant immediately demonstrated his refusal to abide by the question and answer format. He purported to offer unsupported legal conclusions, referred to alleged facts not in evidence, and declined to actually answer any questions-save the court's inquiry whether defendant intended to continue disregarding the question and answer format and to continue offering improper and inadmissible opinions about the proceedings. To that question,  defendant replied, Yes, Judge Cheroske. Together, defendant's actions impelled the trial court to conclude that defendant had forfeited his right to testify by his misconduct. The trial court did not err in this conclusion. (See State v. Anthony , supra , 860 N.W.2d at pp. 24-29, 361 Wis.2d 116 .) Defendant's claim to the contrary-that the trial court should have given [him] another warning and chance to conform his behavior-ignores the numerous warnings and chances he had already been given. Defendant complains next that the trial court misrepresented whether the jury was present, thereby improperly inducing him to waive his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. We find that defendant suffered no Fifth Amendment violation. None of the questions at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing sought answers  that might tend to incriminate him (see Hoffman v. United States (1951) 341 U.S. 479 , 486-487, 71 S.Ct. 814 , 95 L.Ed. 1118 ), nor were any of his nonresponsive statements ever used against him in the trial (see Maldonado v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1112 , 1128, 140 Cal.Rptr.3d 113 , 274 P.3d 1110 ). We likewise reject  defendant's claim that defendant was denied due process by the trial court's failure to inform him of the jury's absence. Had the court allowed defendant to begin his testimony in front of the jury, the events all but certainly would have unfolded exactly as they did: Defendant would have offered incompetent and unsupported legal conclusions, referred to alleged facts not in evidence, and declined to actually answer any questions-save the one in which he manifested his unwillingness to abide by the question and answer format-and the court would have terminated his testimony. The only difference is that the jury would have been witnesses to his disruptive conduct. It was not fundamentally unfair to prevent defendant from prejudicing his defense in this manner. Nor can we embrace defendant's contention that new counsel ought to have been appointed because Hauser undermined his interests by cooperating with the dry run procedure. Hauser was legitimately concerned that defendant's antics would prejudice him in the jury's eyes-and defendant's scattershot accusations at the Evidence Code section 402 hearing, had they occurred before the jury, might well have done so. Hauser's efforts to protect defendant's right to a fair trial cannot reasonably be characterized as a breach of his duty of loyalty. We disagree, too, that the trial court had an obligation to suggest that defendant's testimony from the prior trial be offered in lieu of defendant's live testimony. Defendant forfeited any claim about his prior testimony by failing to offer it in evidence below. (See Evid. Code, § 354.) Moreover, whether defendant's prior testimony would have been helpful to defendant was a question of strategy reserved to the defense. Even assuming that defendant's prior testimony would have been admissible, it was not a choice the trial court was required to make or speculate about. 2. Penalty phase Near the end of the penalty phase, the prosecution asked whether the parties should revisit the issue of defendant's potential testimony via closed-circuit television. Counsel reiterated his desire that defendant not testify, and the court wondered whether there would be the same type of reaction that we had from him when he thought a jury was here once before. The next day, the prosecutor asked for some kind of statement, either on the record or through Mr. Hauser, with Mr. Johnson saying he would rather not testify or something to that effect. The court responded that the only thing I can  do is what I've done throughout the whole trial, is have the deputy take Mr. Hauser down to the holding area and see if ... Mr. Johnson will come out of his cell and go into the interview room so he could communicate. The court refused to require Mr. Hauser to approach Mr. Johnson in a noninterviewing area  where there is [no] glass to protect him from whatever evils Mr. Johnson has intended for Mr. Hauser. I don't think he needs to go through that that many times. (The court was evidently referring to defendant's regular practice of spitting on his attorney.) During a pause in the proceedings, defendant was asked whether he would be willing to talk with counsel about testifying. According to the bailiff, defendant told the sergeant that he did not want anything to do with Mr. Hauser or anything to do with the trial. The trial court concluded, Well, that answers that then. We find no error. Because the record contained nothing to suggest that defendant disagreed with counsel's decision not to call him as a witness, the trial court had no obligation to advise defendant of his right to testify or elicit an express statement confirming counsel's waiver of that right. (See People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229 , 1332-1333, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 .)