Opinion ID: 860978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: suppression of mosley’s confession

Text: Both Mosley and Moore assert that Mosley’s confession should have been suppressed since it was not voluntary. Mosley, who was fifteen years old at the time of the offense and who has a low IQ, claims that he was incapable of making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right against selfincrimination due to his low intelligence. When Mosley was questioned by police, his father was present, and both he and his father were advised of his Miranda rights. Both stated that they understood these rights. Mosley stated that he was willing to discuss the matter, and he admitted that he had burned the school. After Mosley admitted that he and Moore had burned the school, his father stated that he wanted to get an attorney for his son. The officers stopped questioning Mosley, but before they left the room, Mosley blurted out, Aren’t you going to arrest Tyrone Moore? At the suppression hearing, three law officers testified that Mosley and his father stated that they understood their rights and appeared to comprehend these rights.The officers testified that they did not threaten or coerce Mosley into making a statement and that Mosley freely and voluntarily gave them the statement. A psychologist testified on Mosley’s behalf that he did not believe that Mosley was intelligent enough to knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights; however, the psychologist admitted that he did not review the Miranda form with Mosley. The trial court found the psychologist’s testimony unconvincing and denied the motion to suppress. The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible, it must have been voluntarily given. Morgan, 681 So. 2d at 86. In determining whether a confession is voluntary, the trial court must decide whether the accused understood prior to his confession (1) the content and substance of the Miranda warnings and (2) the nature of the charges against him. Neal v. State, 451 So. 2d 743, 755 (Miss. 1984). See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 694 (1966). The prosecution bears the burden of showing that the confession was voluntary, and this burden may be met by the testimony of an officer or other person with knowledge of the facts that the confession was voluntarily made. Morgan, 681 So. 2d at 86-87. The accused’s mental abilities are one factor to consider in determining whether a confession is voluntary. Neal, 451 So. 2d at 756. The trial court must look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession to determine whether the confession was voluntary. Chase v. State, 645 So. 2d 829, 838 (Miss. 1994). This Court will reverse the trial court’s ruling that the confession was voluntary only upon a showing that the ruling was manifestly wrong or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Id. at 838. There was more than sufficient evidence that Mosley understood his Miranda warnings and the nature of the arson charge. The trial court’s ruling was entirely proper.
Moore also objects to the trial court’s failure to suppress Mosley’s confession on the grounds that the last portion of the statement about whether the police were going to arrest Mosley was made after Mosley’s request for an attorney. Moore does not cite any authority in support of his assertion that Mosley’s statement violated his right to counsel, and thus he is procedurally barred from raising this issue. Gerrard v. State, 619 So. 2d 212, 216 (Miss. 1993). Further, Mosley’s unsolicited question to police after his father’s request for an attorney was not made in response to interrogation, and therefor, it will not be suppressed. Moore does not cite any authority in support of his assertion that he has standing to object to an alleged violation of Mosley’s rights against self-incrimination and to assistance of counsel and is therefor procedurally barred from raising this issue. Id. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, there is no merit to this issue because the confession was voluntary, and the trial court properly admitted the statement. There is no merit to this issue.
Moore objects for the first time on appeal that the admission of Mosley’s confession violated his right to confront witnesses against him. Since Mosley did not testify at trial and Moore was therefore denied his right to cross-examine Mosley about his confession and the portions of his statement which incriminated Moore, the portion of Mosley’s confession dealing with Moore should not have come into evidence at the joint trial. See Mitchell v. State, 495 So. 2d 5, 9 (Miss. 1986); Langston v. State, 373 So. 2d 611, 613 (Miss. 1979). However, Moore failed to object to the use of the statement on these grounds at the suppression hearing, severance hearing, or even during trial. Moore also did not accept the State’s offer to redact portions of the statement referring to him. Constitutional arguments not asserted at trial are waived. Fleming v. State, 604 So. 2d 280, 292 (Miss. 1992). We would caution trial courts and prosecutors that the proper procedure would be for the State to refrain from offering a confession or to redact such portions on its own initiative or for the trial court to order such steps to be taken in a joint trial regardless of a defendant’s failure to object. However, since Moore failed to object and there was more than ample evidence of his guilt, any error is harmless. Magee v. State, 542 So. 2d 228, 233 (Miss. 1989).