Opinion ID: 167997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Retaliatory Termination

Text: 11 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Antonio must show that (1) she engaged in protected opposition to discrimination; (2) she suffered an adverse action that a reasonable employee would have found material; and (3) there is a causal nexus between her opposition and the employer's adverse action. See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345, ___ (2006); Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202 (10th Cir.2006). Antonio challenges the district court's ruling that her prima facie case failed with respect to causation. 1 12 An employee may establish the causal connection by proffering evidence of circumstances that justify an inference of retaliatory motive, such as protected conduct closely followed by adverse action. Annett v. Univ. of Kan., 371 F.3d 1233, 1239-40 (10th Cir.2004) (quotation omitted). But [u]nless there is very close temporal proximity between the protected activity and the retaliatory conduct, the plaintiff must offer additional evidence to establish causation. O'Neal v. Ferguson Constr. Co., 237 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001). We agree with the district court that Antonio's termination nine months after her complaint about Johnson's remark is too temporally remote to support an inference of causation. See id. (observing that a three-month period, standing alone, is insufficient to establish causation). Consequently, we examine Antonio's other evidence for a connection between her complaint and subsequent termination. 13 As evidence that Antonio was terminated for complaining about Johnson's remark, Antonio cites: (1) deposition testimony that members of the personnel committee knew that Antonio liked her job and had been trying to leave Zimbabwe to return to work; (2) Johnson's deposition testimony that she would not rehire Antonio; (3) Sygma's failure to employ progressive discipline instead of termination; (4) Sygma's reliance on job abandonment when there was purportedly no written job abandonment policy; (5) Sygma's use of different discipline for white and American-born employees, Aplt. Br. at 35; and (6) Sygma's purported failure to give Antonio an opportunity to explain why she had not called as promised from Zimbabwe. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to Antonio does not reveal that Antonio's complaint had anything to do with her termination. Indeed, as Antonio acknowledges, three of the four individuals on the personnel committee testified that they would rehire Ms. Antonio if she were to apply for a position for which she was qualified. Id. at 26 (emphasis omitted). Assuming that all three of those individuals were aware of Antonio's complaint, the logical inference from their willingness to rehire Antonio is that her complaint had no bearing on their termination decision. And while Johnson testified that she would not rehire Antonio, any connection with Antonio's complaint is purely speculative, given that three months after Antonio complained, Johnson gave Antonio a favorable review and Antonio described Johnson as having been an excellent source of training and assistance. Aplt.App. at 168. Six more months passed without Johnson taking any action adverse to Antonio. As for Sygma's resort to termination rather than progressive discipline, it is undisputed that the personnel committee was following the Sygma employee handbook, which makes progressive discipline discretionary and warns that job abandonment is a consequence of failing to report to work without notice. Although a retaliatory motive could be inferred from a disparate application of handbook policies to similarly situated employees, see Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir.2000); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813, 820 (8th Cir.1998), Antonio identifies no such employees. 2 Finally, Antonio testified in deposition that Johnson's supervisor gave her an opportunity to discuss why [she] had been fired, but she declined. Aplt. App. at 77. 14 Because Antonio has not identified a triable issue of fact as to whether she was terminated for complaining about Johnson's remark, we conclude that summary judgment was appropriately entered on her retaliation claim.