Opinion ID: 1385412
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Is the IDEA's Exhaustion Requirement Applicable in This Case?

Text: The applicability of the IDEA's exhaustion requirement to federal claims presented under statutes other than the IDEA is not a matter of first impression in this court. In Hope, we affirmed a district court's dismissal of a dyslexic student's disability and race discrimination claims under the ADA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, due to the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative review procedures available under the IDEA. Hope, 69 F.3d at 688. The district court in Hope had held that the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief against the school for its refusal to provide appropriate educational services was in essence an indirect challenge to the adequacy of the student's IEP and as such, a textbook example of the types of cases justifying administrative exhaustion. Hope v. Cortines, 872 F.Supp. 14, 21 (E.D.N.Y.1995). In Polera where, as in the present case, plaintiffs were seeking injunctive relief, as well as punitive and compensatory damageswe held that a visually impaired student's claims under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act were subject to the exhaustion rule, because the equitable relief sought was available under the IDEA. Polera, 288 F.3d at 486. In that case, we squarely examined the availability of monetary damages under the IDEA and, although we found that a damages remedy is fundamentally inconsistent with the IDEA's goals and is thus unavailable under that statute, id., we concluded that a prayer for damages does not enable a plaintiff to sidestep the exhaustion requirement of the IDEA, id. at 488. We emphasized that the theory behind the grievance may activate the IDEA process, even if the plaintiff wants a form of relief that the IDEA does not supply. Id. (quoting Charlie F. v. Bd. of Educ. of Skokie Sch. Dist., 98 F.3d 989, 991-92 (7th Cir.1996)). Both our holding in Polera and the district court's careful opinion in Hope are apposite. Appellants in their complaint seek damages and injunctive relief, along with attorneys' fees and court costs. The latter two items are indeed available under the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B). By contrast, compensatory and punitive damages, as we explained in Polera, are not available under the IDEA. Polera, 288 F.3d at 483-86. Nevertheless, in Polera we held that a disabled student who claims deficiencies in her educational program may not bypass the IDEA's administrative exhaustion rule merely by claiming monetary damages. Id. at 488. We thus decline to excuse appellants from the exhaustion requirement merely because in their suit they seek, inter alia, pecuniary damages, a remedy unavailable under the IDEA. Whether the permanent and temporary injunctive relief sought by appellants is available under the IDEA poses a more puzzling question. Appellants disclaim any challenge to the educational sufficiency of John, Jr.'s IEP. They strongly argue that their claim is not one of violation of the IDEA's mandate for the provision of a free appropriate public education to each disabled student, but a claim of unlawful discrimination. Simba's role is to be an independent life tool for John, Jr., `used to limit the effects of [his] disability, to allow him to continue to be more and more independent as he continues to grow and head toward a life as . . . a productive adult in a hearing society.' Cave, 480 F.Supp.2d at 619 (quoting Nancy Cave's testimony before the district court). In other words, they urge us to treat John, Jr. not as a student who is being deprived of an appropriate public education, but as a person who is being denied access to a public facility by reason of his disability and his non-educational need for a service dog. See Br. of Appellants at 8. This is a slightly different scenario than the situations in either Polera or Hope. Although in both cases plaintiffs' federal claims were also premised on statutes other than the IDEA, plaintiffs were essentially alleging that they were not provided services tailored to meet their special needs due to deficiencies in their IEP. Polera, 288 F.3d at 480; Hope, 872 F.Supp. at 17-19. In this case, however, appellants have explicitly renounced any challenge to the educational adequacy of John, Jr.'s current IEP. They request only that Simba be allowed to accompany John, Jr. while on the school premises as a matter of John, Jr.'s absolute right of entry into and use of a public facility. This case requires us to refine further our definition of types of relief available under the IDEA. We are not convinced that appellants' claims are materially distinguishable from claims that could fall within the ambit of the IDEA. The high school principal and the school district's director of special education testified before the district court that John, Jr.'s class schedule under his existing IEP would have to be changed to accommodate the concerns of allergic students and teachers and to diminish the distractions that Simba's presence would engender. Cave, 480 F.Supp.2d at 627-28, 631. School authorities would also have to make certain practical arrangements to maintain the smooth functioning of the school and to ensure both that Simba was receiving proper care and that John, Jr. continued to receive necessary and appropriate educational and support services. Id. It is hard to imagine, for example, how John, Jr. could still attend the physical education class while at the same time attending to the dog's needs; or how he could bring Simba to a class where another student with a certified allergic reaction to dogs would be present. Id. at 627, 631. These issues implicate John, Jr.'s IEP and would be best dealt with through the administrative process. The local and state education agencies are uniquely well suited to review the content and implementation of IEPs . . . and to determine what changes, if any, are needed. Polera, 288 F.3d at 487. We thus agree with the district court here that at least in part, the plaintiffs are challenging the adequacy of John, Jr.'s IEP because it does not include a service dog. Cave, 480 F.Supp.2d at 637. The relief appellants seek, namely permission to bring the service dog to school, is in substance a modification of John, Jr.'s IEP. . . . [and] is available under the IDEA. Id. at 638. We also concur with the district court's finding that `[e]ducation,' as used within the IDEA, encompasses more than simply academics. Id. at 635. We note in that regard that one of the goals of the IDEA is to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.  20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added). A request for a service dog to be permitted to escort a disabled student at school as an independent life tool is hence not entirely beyond the bounds of the IDEA's educational scheme. [3] Finally, we reject appellants' argument that their § 1983 discrimination claim is not subject to the exhaustion rule. The language of Section 1415(1) of the IDEA is sufficiently broad and encompasses complaints asserted under any federal statute, as long as they seek relief available under the IDEA. In Hope, we affirmed the dismissal of all of plaintiffs' claims, including their § 1983 cause of action, for want of subject matter jurisdiction due to non-exhaustion. Hope, 69 F.3d at 688; see also Hope, 872 F.Supp. at 19-20 (holding that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement applies to claims asserted under § 1983). In Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987), we found that the IDEA's exhaustion requirement is the same for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . actions and that the administrative remedies must be exhausted prior to instituting a civil action in federal court pursuant to . . . § 1983. Id. at 756. Appellants rely on Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) and Doe v. Pfrommer, 148 F.3d 73 (2d Cir.1998) for the proposition that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a § 1983 claim. Their reading of that caselaw is misguided. In Doe, we held that exhaustion is necessary prior to bringing a § 1983 action only where Congress has carved out a specific exception to the general rule that exhaustion is not required. Doe, 148 F.3d at 78. Doe found that there was no such exception, because the statute in question (Section 722(d) of the Rehabilitation Act) did not contain an explicit exhaustion rule. Id. The present case, however, involves the IDEA's Section 1415(/ ), which unequivocally directs all plaintiffs seeking relief available under the IDEA to first exhaust the administrative procedures provided by the IDEA before filing a lawsuit. By enacting this section, Congress undoubtedly intended to introduce a specific exception to the general rule that § 1983 plaintiffs are not subject to the exhaustion requirement. Appellants' § 1983 claim thus falls within the scope of Section 1415(1) to the same extent as their claims under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. Therefore, we hold that the IDEA's exhaustion rule applies to all of appellants' federal causes of action regardless of their statutory bases.