Opinion ID: 2211835
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: history of relevant state authorities

Text: Before the ratification of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, Const. 1908, art. 2, ง 19 provided that an accused was entitled in courts of record, when the trial court shall so order, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal. Criminal defendants, however, were not entitled to an appeal as of right. Const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20, provided before the adoption of Proposal B in 1994 that a defendant had an appeal as a matter of right; and as provided by law, when the trial court so orders, to have such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal. (Emphasis added.) [2] Art. 1, ง 20, in its earlier form, thus provided defendants an appeal of right from all criminal convictions. Accordingly, this Court held in People v. Smith, 402 Mich. 72, 259 N.W.2d 558 (1977), that defendants could appeal by right from plea-based convictions. Moreover, the Court of Appeals held that a defendant's right to appeal plea-based convictions included a corollary right to appointment of appellate counsel. People v. Gazaway, 35 Mich.App. 39, 42, 192 N.W.2d 122 (1971). Before the ratification of Proposal B in 1994, Michigan was one of only a handful of states that provided an unconditional right of appeal for those who pleaded guilty. [3] In 1994, the Legislature submitted Proposal B to the electorate to decide whether to make appeals from plea-based convictions discretionary. Eliminating appeals as a matter of right from plea-based convictions was suggested as a way to help control the case load [sic] of the Michigan Court of Appeals. Note, Limiting Michigan's guilty and nolo contendere plea appeals, 73 U. Det. Mercy L.R. 431 (1996). By 1992, the Court of Appeals had a backlog of more than 4,000 cases awaiting decision, and [p]lea-based appeals constitute[d] approximately thirty percent of all appeals facing the Michigan Court of Appeals. Id., p. 438. Eliminating appeals of right from plea-based convictions was one method proposed to reduce a crushing burden on our appellate courts. The voters approved Proposal B by a margin of sixty-four percent to thirty-six percent. Id., p. 431. As amended, Const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20 now states that an accused is entitled to have an appeal as a matter of right, except as provided by law an appeal by an accused who pleads guilty or nolo contendere shall be by leave of the court ....  (Emphasis added.) Proposal B did not alter the provision of art. 1, ง 20 that grants defendants as provided by law, when the trial court so orders, ... such reasonable assistance as may be necessary to perfect and prosecute an appeal. The Legislature subsequently enacted M.C.L. ง 770.3(1)(e); MSA 28.1100(1)(e), providing for appeals from plea-based convictions by application for leave to appeal. On December 30, 1994, this Court acted to preserve the issue of appointment of counsel and payment therefor pending legislative clarification because of the absence of legislative action clarifying the Legislature's position regarding the right to appointment of counsel in guilty plea cases in light of the November 1994 amendment of Const. 1963, art. 1, ง 20.... 447 Mich. cl. We adopted, on an interim basis, MCR 6.425(F)(1)(c), which provides that [i]n a case involving a conviction following a plea of guilty or nolo contendere the court should liberally grant the request [for appointed counsel] if it is filed within 42 days after sentencing. 447 Mich. cliii. This Court extended the expiration date of the amended court rule on several occasions in anticipation of legislation regarding the appointment of appellate counsel in guilty plea cases. 455 Mich. lxxx (1997). Concluding after several years of interim rules that the Legislature was not moving to address the problem, this Court extended the rule indefinitely. Id. In joining this Court's order, Justice Boyle explained: Absent legislative implementation of the constitutional amendment and consistent with our reluctance to prejudge legal issues through exercise of the rule-making power, we have entered four interim orders authorizing appointment of counsel in order to protect an indigent defendant's ability to have the assistance of counsel in pursuing appellate remedies. We have therefore repeatedly sought clarification of the Legislature's understanding of the amendment to avoid imposing costs on local funding units through court rules, expressing concern that the Legislature's failure to act reflects Headlee considerations. Every indication is that we have reached stalemate. Rather than deprive defendants of the assistance of counsel that the voters might not intend, I agree that the Court should extend the rules indefinitely. [ Id., pp. lxxx-lxxxi.] While this case has been pending in this Court, statutory amendments were enacted requiring the appointment of appellate counsel in guilty plea cases in certain defined circumstances, permitting appointment in another, and otherwise providing that appellate counsel shall not be appointed. 1999 PA 200, M.C.L. ง 770.3a; MSA 28.1100a. This act took effect on April 1, 2000. Because this new statute does not apply to defendant, the question of its constitutionality is not before us. [4]