Opinion ID: 211931
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of the Hatch Act as Amended

Text: 59 McEntee argues that even if the rebuttable presumption analysis is not precluded by the terms of the current Hatch Act, its application violates the First Amendment. His constitutional arguments are premised on the concept that the analysis makes unlawful activities which are otherwise legal and therefore protected under the Hatch Act. Specifically, McEntee believes that the rebuttable presumption analysis unjustifiably burdens employees' constitutional rights to engage in political speech and that it is void for vagueness. 6 60 As discussed above, McEntee's understanding of the effect of the analysis he refers to as the transformation theory is inaccurate. It is not a transformation as posited by McEntee that occurs, but rather a rebuttable presumption that is created. The rebuttable presumption analysis does not impose burdens on the political rights of employees beyond those provided for in the statute. Accordingly, McEntee's constitutional challenges are properly directed at the Hatch Act as amended. 61 Placed in the proper context, McEntee's constitutional arguments fail to acknowledge the clear precedent of the Supreme Court. The Court twice upheld the constitutionality of the pre-1993 Act against charges that it was vague, overbroad and placed an excessive burden on the free speech rights of federal employees. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556, 93 S.Ct. 2880; United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 93, 67 S.Ct. 556, 91 L.Ed. 754 (1947). Despite prior case law conclusively determining that the sweeping prohibitions of the pre-1993 Hatch Act did not excessively burden the protected rights of federal employees, McEntee attempts to argue that the more limited restrictions of the current statute impermissibly upset the balance of interests previously approved. McEntee's efforts are undermined by dicta from Letter Carriers in which the Court stated that the government has the power to prevent employees from engaging in precisely the activities with which McEntee is charged, namely actively participating in fund-raising activities for a partisan candidate or political party and becoming a partisan candidate for, or campaigning for, an elective public office. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. at 556, 93 S.Ct. 2880. As we stated in our most recent prior case involving the Hatch Act, precedent clearly precludes an attack on the Act as an improper restraint on government employee speech. 7 Briggs, 331 F.3d at 1315. 62 McEntee asserts that while the Hatch Act itself may be constitutional, the application of the rebuttable presumption analysis is not because it blurs the dividing line between permitted and prohibited activities. This vagueness argument again fails to recognize that it is the statute, not the analysis, that creates this distinction. The appropriate inquiry, then, is not into the vagueness of the rebuttable presumption analysis, but rather whether the amended statute and its implementing regulations are sufficiently definite so as to give fair warning ... in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 265, 117 S.Ct. 1219, 137 L.Ed.2d 432 (1997) (citation omitted). A statute will be found to be void for vagueness if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Id.; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972) (stating that vague statutes offend the principle that laws must give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971) (holding a statute to be unconstitutionally vague because it subjected First Amendment rights to an unascertainable standard). In applying the void for vagueness doctrine in the First Amendment context, we have determined that the alleged vagueness must pose a real and substantial threat to protected expression such that a substantial amount of legitimate speech will be chilled. Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1329-30 (Fed.Cir.2002). 63 The only speech at issue here is that of federal employees serving as candidates for elective office. 8 McEntee argues that the statute does not clearly indicate that an employee-candidate's assertion of affiliation with a major political party could run afoul of the provisions of the Hatch Act. But the statute does not prohibit the bare speech with which McEntee is concerned. An employee-candidate is not barred from identifying his political philosophy, I stand for the principles of the Republican Party, or stating his party status, I am a Republican. The statute and regulations clearly indicate, however, that federal employees are not to participate as candidates in elections in which any candidate represents a major political party. 64 Although the term represents is not defined by the statute or the regulations, its ordinarily understood meaning includes more than the formal endorsement process advocated by McEntee. See Best Power Tech. Sales Corp. v. Austin, 984 F.2d 1172, 1177 (Fed.Cir.1993) (It is a basic principle of statutory interpretation ... that undefined terms in a statute are deemed to have their ordinarily understood meaning.). While the definition of represent certainly includes to be an accredited deputy or substitute for (a number of persons) in a legislative or deliberative assembly, it also encompasses to describe as having a specified character or quality; to give out assert or declare to be of a certain kind and to symbolize, to serve as a visible or concrete embodiment. Oxford English Dictionary 657-58 (2d ed.1989). Thus, the term represent as used in the Hatch Act refers not only to candidates who have received the formal endorsement of a major political party, but also to candidates who act in concert with a major political party. We hold that while an employee-candidate in a presumptively nonpartisan election may independently assert a party affiliation, once the candidate and the party act in concert with each other, a representative relationship may be established sufficient to rebut the presumption of nonpartisanship. Interpreted in this manner, the amended statute sufficiently puts an employee on notice that, when serving as a candidate for nonpartisan public office, he is prohibited from engaging in speech and conduct that indicate he is acting in concert with a major political party. 65 McEntee further complains that the statute does not indicate the level of partisan speech and conduct required to rebut the presumption that an election deemed to be nonpartisan under state law was, in fact, a partisan race from which federal employees are banned. Admittedly, the statute does not give employees an absolute right to participate in elections deemed to be nonpartisan under state law, but rather it gives employees the right to participate in elections in which no candidate represents a major political party. Admittedly the statute identifies no bright line rule for the level of political speech and conduct, on the part of either the candidate or the party, that is necessary to establish representation of a major political party. Although the standard for what constitutes representation of a major political party is certainly flexible, perfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). McEntee has not established that the amended Hatch Act fails to provide persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Griffin, 288 F.3d at 1330. We do not believe that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 66