Opinion ID: 553863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: When Citations Achieve Finality

Text: 10 The first argument the Secretary makes when challenging the OSHRC's award of fees is that OSHRC lacked jurisdiction to award fees in connection with the Second Citation because Phoenix failed to meet the statutory time requirements for filing its application. This argument is based on the Secretary's interpretation of the phrase final disposition of an adversary adjudication. The EAJA provides that a party seeking an administrative fee award under the EAJA must submit an application to the adjudicating agency within thirty days of a final disposition in the adversary adjudication. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504(a)(2) (emphasis added). 11 The Secretary argues that the ALJ's decision vacating the Second Citation became final on May 23, 1988, thirty days after the decision had been docketed. According to the Secretary, since Phoenix appealed only the First Citation, and not the Second Citation, final disposition of the Second Citation occurred when the OSHRC ALJ docketed its decision. Therefore, according to the Secretary, Phoenix had to file an application to recover fees incurred in connection with the Second Citation on or before June 22, 1988. Since Phoenix did not file its application until July 13, 1989, after the appeal of the First Citation was final, the Secretary argues that Phoenix failed to satisfy the jurisdictional time requirements set out in the EAJA. 12 Therefore, the essential issue this court must address is the definition of final disposition as found in section 504(a)(2). While the legislative history of the EAJA is plentiful, scant attention has been paid to this phrase. The Secretary argues that when an appellate court is asked to review only a portion of an ALJ's adjudication, then the Commission ALJ retains jurisdiction over an EAJA application as to those items which are not the subject of the appellate court proceedings. The Secretary cites as authority for its position 29 C.F.R. 2204.302(c), which states [i]f review is sought in the court of appeals ... an application for an award ... shall be dismissed under 5 U.S.C. 504(c)(1) as to the item or items of which review is sought. See also Secretary of Labor v. A.A. Beiro Constr. Co., 11 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1813, 1814 (1984) [1983-1984] O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) p 26790, at 34263 (applying 29 C.F.R. 2204.302(c)). 13 For the reasons we outline below, we hold that when a party appeals only part of an ALJ's decision, the entire decision is on review; the failure to appeal the decision on a particular citation item does not make the ALJ's disposition of that item a final disposition of that item for EAJA purposes. As we stated earlier, the issue of finality is very important because under section 504(a)(2) 1 the thirty day deadline for filing a fee application is a jurisdictional prerequisite. See, e.g., Clifton v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 1138, 1144-45 (5th Cir.1985). If the Second Citation did become final when Phoenix failed to appeal it, then failure to file an application for attorney's fees within 30 days was fatal to Phoenix's claim for fees. 14 The Secretary's argument is not persuasive for several reasons. First, even if this interpretation was once valid, in the 1985 amendments to the EAJA Congress added the following language to the statute: 15 When the United States appeals the underlying merits of an adversary adjudication no decision on an application for fees and other expenses in connection with that adversary adjudication shall be made under this section [by the agency] until a final and unreviewable decision is rendered by the Court on appeal or until the underlying merits of the case have been finally determined pursuant to the appeal. 16 See Pub.L. No. 99-80, Sec. 1(b), 99 Stat. 183 (1985) (amending 5 U.S.C. Sec. 504(a)(2)). As we discuss more completely below, the exact meaning of this provision is unclear. Nevertheless, its plain language does indicate that Congress did not adopt the Secretary's interpretation of final disposition. Rather, Congress prohibits an agency from making an award of fees and expenses in connection with an adversary adjudication when an appeal is pending. Nowhere in this provision does Congress suggest that if the United States only appeals part of an adjudicative order that the remaining portions are a final disposition for the purposes of the EAJA. 17 As Phoenix persuasively argues, individual citation items should not achieve finality in piecemeal fashion. In Secretary of Labor v. Hamilton Die Cast, Inc., 12 OSH 1797, 1800-03 (BNA) (Rev.Comm.1986), the OSHRC held that items not directed for Commission review are not a final order of the Commission absent an order of severance under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Although Hamilton is not controlling authority, its application of Rule 54(b) is persuasive. 18 Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure addresses the precise finality question presented by the Secretary. Federal Rule 54(b) forbids partial judgment in a case involving multiple claims or multiple parties, except under certain circumstances. The rule states: 19 (b) Judgment Upon Multiple Claims or Involving Multiple Parties. When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment. 20 Thus, Rule 54(b) strikes a balance between two conflicting interests. It preserves the longstanding federal policy against piecemeal appeals while providing a means for avoiding the injustice that might result if judgment on a distinctly separate claim were delayed until adjudication of an entire case was complete. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 432, 76 S.Ct. 895, 898, 100 L.Ed. 1297 (1956); see generally 10 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure Sec. 2654 (2d ed.1983). Therefore in order to sever a claim, a judge must enter an order of final judgment under Rule 54(b); in the absence of such a determination, there is no final judgment as to any claim. 21 Our view that there is no final disposition until the entire decision is final and unappealable preserves the policy of avoiding piecemeal adjudication. Although the Secretary argues that filing separate fee requests based on two distinct challenges to agency action does not necessarily result in duplicative fee litigation, we disagree. As the Third Circuit stated in Taylor v. United States, courts should avoid the unnecessary fragmentation of fee petitions and the resultant waste of judicial resources. Taylor v. United States, 749 F.2d 171, 173 (3d Cir.1984). 22 As in this case, where both citations were adjudicated in one proceeding, it is virtually impossible to completely separate fees expended on one citation from fees expended on the other. If an OSHRC ALJ is considering an EAJA application for part of one suit and an appellate court is entertaining a motion for attorney's fees on another part, it is likely one court will award either too much or too little, because that court may assume that the other court is or is not awarding that portion of the costs. This problem does not occur when a party is only successful on one claim, or the court determines the agency action was substantially justified as to part of the proceeding, because then only one court is evaluating how much fees were expended in connection with the successful claim. 23 Finally, the congressional purpose behind enactment of the EAJA supports our interpretation of final disposition. Congress intended to make it easier, not harder, for people of limited means to collect their small claims from the government. See McDonald v. Schweiker, 726 F.2d 311, 315 (7th Cir.1983). Holding that there is no final disposition until the entire decision is final and unappealable avoids both the unnecessary fragmentation of the fee petitions and the waste of judicial resources that would result from filing multiple petitions in different courts for fees incurred in one case. Such multiple fee litigation unduly burdens both the litigants and the courts. For all of these reasons, we hold that there is no final disposition of a case until the entire decision is final and unappealable.