Opinion ID: 3014440
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Judicial review of all

Text: questions of law and fact, That brings us to the 1996 including interpretation and amendments under AEDPA and IIRIRA. application of constitutional The government initially advocated that and statutory provisions, the amendments to the INA enacted by arising from any action AEDPA and IIRIRA be treated as taken or proceeding brought precluding all judicial examination of to remove an alien from the removal determinations in the cases of United States under this criminal aliens. The Supreme Court, subchapter shall be available however, rejected that view. See St. Cyr, only in judicial review of a 533 U.S. at 312. The Court held that final order under this Congress succeeded only in repealing section. direct appellate review of such cases and the special immigration habeas provisions 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The judicial review of section 1105a; what remained was the section, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, in turn provides original section 2241 habeas remedy. That for direct review by the courts of appeals fact in itself suggests that the scope of of BIA decisions, but prohibits it in the review one would expect to find under the case of criminal aliens. residual section 2241 is no greater than The meaning of the term “judicial what existed before Congress began to review” became the critical interpretive graft APA-style review onto habeas issue presented to the Supreme Court. If jurisdiction in 1952. judicial review meant all review by any To be sure, St. Cyr does not court, as the government and the explicitly set forth the boundaries of dissenting Justices urged, then the zipper habeas review of removal actions under clause and the criminal alien preclusion section 2241, nor does it expressly address clause, taken together, made removal of whether review of discretion or criminal aliens totally unreviewable under administrative fact-finding is available. the statutory scheme. If “judicial review” See Sol, 274 F.3d at 651. But the actual was a term of art referring only to a certain reasoning in the St. Cyr decision compels type of court review, however, then what the conclusion that under section 2241 as was precluded was not all review by the it currently stands, the broader species of courts, but only review of a certain kind. review for substantial evidence and abuse The majority in St. Cyr adopted the of discretion typical of APA challenges latter interpretation, seizing upon the must be wholly out of bounds. earlier decision in Heikkila to differentiate In St. Cyr, the Court confronted the between “judicial review” in a specific 12 sense, and court review under the style “judicial review” for criminal aliens traditional habeas writ. See St. Cyr, 533 by eliminating direct “judicial review” in U.S. at 312 (citing Heikkila). The Court the courts of appeals. What remained for declared: “In the immigration context, criminal aliens facing removal was only ‘judicial review’ and ‘habeas corpus’ have the core section 2241 habeas provision historically distinct meanings.” St. Cyr, with its narrower scope of pure legal 533 U.S. at 311 (citing Heikkila, 345 U.S. review. at 236). But for this distinction to make The Supreme Court in St. Cyr also sense in reading the 1996 zipper addressed the provision of AEDPA that amendments, there had to be some specifically eliminated one of the 1961 significant difference between the scope of special habeas provisions of the INA, by review under “judicial review” and that deleting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10). St. Cyr, under section 2241 habeas corpus. 533 U.S. at 308-10. The Court held that Otherwise, the amendments’ withdrawal of the repeal of this section 1105a special “judicial review” on the one hand would habeas provisions did not implicitly repeal be nullified on the other hand by the the residual habeas statute, section 2241. retention of habeas corpus with identical Again, that interpretation can make sense scope of court review. In other words, a only if, as we have seen, section 2241 definition of habeas corpus jurisdiction residual habeas corpus is understood to that made the scope of claims available on carry a more limited scope of review than habeas review coextensive with the scope the broader APA-style review which the of claims available on direct review would courts applied under section 1105a. See necessarily render the preclusion provision Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d 824, of AEDPA and IIRIRA utterly pointless 828 (9th Cir. 2002). Were section 1105a and would create an internal contradiction review and section 2241 review to have within the immigration statutes. identical scope, the repeal by AEDPA and As a matter of logic, therefore, the IIRIRA of the former—and not the Court necessarily recognized that the latter—would appear to be a vain or “limited role played by the courts in incomplete legislative act. habeas corpus proceedings was far In short, to accept Bakhtriger’s narrower than the judicial review contention here that section 2241 habeas authorized by the APA.” Id. at 312. In review incorporates an examination of the effect, the Court reaffirmed the rule set exercise of discretion or weight of the forth in Heikkila. And by drawing that evidence in the underlying removal distinction as to scope of review, the Court proceedings would be to erase the was able to give meaning to the 1996 distinction between “judicial review” and statutory preclusion provision. For under habeas review that was an indispensable this interpretation, AEDPA and IIRIRA ingredient in the reasoning of St. Cyr. See succeeded in precluding broader APA- 533 U.S. at 311-12. Bakhtriger’s 13 argument would also wholly nullify the of asylum. For the reasons stated above, content of the preclusion provisions that these matters are not reviewable under the Congress enacted and would defy decades residual habeas provision—28 U.S.C. § of the history of interpretation of section 2241. Indeed, the BIA’s determination 2241. Accordingly, we believe that the that the circumstances of Bakhtriger’s case scope of review under section 2241 must do not rise to the level of other cases in be confined to questions of constitutional which the authorities have exercised their and statutory law. discretion in favor of asylum is precisely the sort of application of discretion that the Our interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court declined to review in decisions in other circuits. In the wake of Accardi, 347 U.S. at 264. In Accardi, the St. Cyr, we are not aware of any cases that petitioner’s challenge to the exercise of have upheld habeas review of factual discretion by the immigration officials was findings or discretionary determinations in effectively the same as that mounted by criminal alien removal cases. Rather, all Bakhtriger—the “allegation that the circuits to decide the issue have limited appellant was treated differently from criminal alien habeas petitions to other aliens similarly situated.” 206 F.2d constitutional challenges or errors of law. at 901. The Supreme Court expressly See Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592- affirmed the court of appeals in its refusal 93 (5th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez-Chavez, 298 to entertain that challenge to discretion F.3d at 828; Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, (although the Court ultimately reversed on 72 (1st Cir. 2002); Sol, 274 F.3d at 651; another ground). Accardi, 347 U.S. at 264 Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir. n. 5. We reject Bakhtriger’s identical 1999). 10 challenge to discretion here. We join them. Perhaps recognizing that his effort