Opinion ID: 1726966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: alleged prejudice relating to cass report

Text: We first address Harris' assignments of error relating to the Cass report. Harris argues that because of the State's prosecutorial misconduct in failing to disclose the Cass report in a timely manner, the jury was allowed to hear testimony as to Harris' inadmissible prejudicial statement that he knew Hicks by his nickname Homicide. Harris explains that this statement should have been suppressed before being heard by the jury, but because Harris was unaware of the report, he could not make a timely motion to suppress. Harris asserts that his due process rights under the 14th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution were thus violated. He also asserts his Fifth Amendment rights were violated, apparently in reference to the privilege against self-incrimination. We note that although Harris' amended petition for postconviction relief made several allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, Harris does not assign or argue in this appeal that the postconviction court erred in denying these ineffective assistance claims. [2-4] Postconviction relief is a very narrow category of relief. [9] In a motion for postconviction relief, the defendant must allege facts which, if proved, constitute a denial or violation of his or her rights under the U.S. or Nebraska Constitution, causing the judgment against the defendant to be void or voidable. [10] The appellant in a postconviction proceeding has the burden of alleging and proving that the claimed error is prejudicial. [11] Harris argues that his constitutional rights were violated, rendering his conviction void or voidable, by invoking the principles (1) requiring a voluntariness hearing under Jackson v. Denno , (2) prohibiting nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland , and (3) prohibiting late disclosure of material evidence under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1912 (Reissue 1995). The question of whether a constitutional error has occurred may differ depending upon the constitutional principles invoked. Harris' burden to show that he was prejudiced is the same, regardless of what constitutional provision he is claiming was violated. Ultimately, the only prejudice which Harris asserts is the fact that the jury heard the statement that Harris knew Hicks as Homicide. This, in turn, Harris argues, forced trial counsel to abandon Harris' theory of defense that Harris and Hicks did not even know each other. [12] Harris does not assert that the late disclosure of the Cass report impeded the ability of defense counsel to timely prepare Harris' defense. Harris' counsel did not make a motion to continue the trial in light of the late-discovered report. In fact, it appears that the contents of the report, if not the existence of the report itself, were already known to the defense. This is only reasonable, given that Harris was a participant in the interview with Cass and presumably knew what happened during it. Assuming, without deciding, that a constitutional error occurred, Harris has failed to sustain his burden on postconviction review to show that the constitutional error was prejudicial. The statement complained of was that Harris knew Hicks as Homicide. It is unclear whether this statement was brought forth in an attempt to reconcile testimony as to who Homicide was or whether it was meant to establish a relationship between Hicks and Harris. In any event, Harris' attorney, on cross-examination of Cass, clearly established that Harris had indicated to Cass only that he had heard of Hicks and that he knew his nickname was Homicide. Cass specifically testified during cross-examination that Harris never said he knew Hicks personally. Thus, the cross-examination mitigated any prejudice that might have resulted from the more ambiguous statement made by Cass on direct examination. There is scant evidence that Harris' defense strategy was that Hicks and Harris did not know each other, but, in any event, such a strategy was not irreparably harmed, given the cross-examination. [5] A court making the prejudice inquiry in a postconviction proceeding must ask if the defendant has met the burden of showing that the decision reached would reasonably likely have been different absent the errors. [13] The postconviction court found that there was nothing in the Cass report that could have led to other evidence, to help prepare defense witnesses, or could have been used to impeach a prosecution witness. The postconviction court further concluded that the statement from the report entered into the record did not materially influence the jury. In summary, the postconviction court found that Harris did not suffer any actual prejudice in relation to the late disclosure of the Cass report. We agree. In light of the other evidence presented at trial, including the testimony of Hicks and three witnesses who stated that Harris had admitted to the crime, we conclude that Harris has failed to meet his burden on postconviction to prove that the claimed constitutional errors relating to the Cass report were prejudicial. The postconviction court thus properly denied postconviction relief on the issues pertaining to the Cass report.