Opinion ID: 2601729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Related, Concurrent Civil and Criminal Proceedings in Alaska

Text: We have never before had occasion to address the precise question raised by this case: whether a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit who is simultaneously defending himself in a related criminal case and who seeks a stay of civil proceedings to protect his right against self-incrimination is entitled to the requested stay of civil proceedings. We have, however, decided cases in which the defendant in a civil proceeding seeks to stay those proceedings pending the resolution of his criminal case. In McCracken v. Corey , a parolee faced, for the same alleged conduct, a parole revocation hearing and a criminal trial. [11] We noted that holding the revocation hearing before the criminal trial could disrupt[ ] the maintenance of a `fair state-individual balance' at the criminal trial, where the burden of proving the guilt of the defendant must be shouldered entirely by the state. [12] In addition, forcing the parolee to choose between his right to defend himself at the parole revocation hearing and his right against self-incrimination with respect to his criminal trial posed an unfair dilemma which runs counter to our historic aversion to cruelty reflected in the privilege against self-incrimination. [13] We declined to require a stay of the revocation hearing but ruled that evidence and testimony presented by the parolee at the hearing, as well as fruits of any evidence and testimony presented, would be inadmissible by the State in the criminal proceeding. [14] In Resek v. State, an individual faced an in rem forfeiture proceeding and a criminal trial for the same alleged conduct. [15] We ruled that, under those circumstances, a court should stay civil proceedings in the absence of strong countervailing circumstances. [16] Distinguishing McCracken, we held that forfeiture proceedings present a greater danger of self-incrimination than parole revocation hearings because the defendant in a forfeiture proceeding carries the burden of proof. [17] We added that when one is unaided by an attorney and therefore not even aware of the scope of his privilege against self-incrimination, the problems are obviously aggravated. [18] McCracken and Resek implicated an individual's right to defend himself against the government's effort to take his liberty or property within the context of a civil action; this case implicates an individual's right as a plaintiff to access the courts. In Alaska, the right to seek redress, like the right to defend oneself, is constitutionally protected. As we have held, a personal injury claim is a form of property, and deprivation of access to the courts denies an individual the ability to reduce the claim to a money judgment ... or otherwise convert it into property of an appreciable value and liquid nature. [19] In this case, as in McCracken and Resek, the proceedings must therefore protect both an individual's Fifth Amendment and due process rights. We recognize, however, an important distinction between this case and McCracken and Resek: these earlier decisions involved civil and criminal proceedings initiated and controlled by the State of Alaska, against which McCracken and Resek defended themselves. Here, Armstrong is a plaintiff in a lawsuit, and we must consider the rights of an adverse party who is a private individual.