Opinion ID: 152284
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Cell Phone

Text: A cell phone linked with phone number (508) 536-1022 (the 1022 phone) was seized by the agents sometime during the events surrounding Jadlowe's arrest at 30 Arch Street on November 4. Relying on the testimony of Agent Barbuti, the district court found that the phone was seized from [Jadlowe's] person in a lawful search incident to his arrest. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (holding that a search incident to [a] custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Nascimento, 491 F.3d 25, 49 (1st Cir. 2007) (Officers effecting an arrest are entitled to make a search incident to that arrest.). In its written ruling on the suppression motion, the court stated that Barbuti had testified that Lieutenant Robert Andrade, the arresting officer, took the phone from Jadlowe during the search and handed it to him [Barbuti] for safekeeping. Jadlowe points out that the testimony presented by Barbuti and Andrade differed from the court's description and argues that, given the actual record, the court clearly erred in finding that the seizure of the phone was lawful. Barbuti in fact testified that he was uncertain about who had given him the phone -18- or when he had received it,20 and Andrade testified that he had no memory of taking the phone from Jadlowe.21 In light of this testimony, Jadlowe argues, the government failed to meet its burden of proving that the phone was seized legally. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 380 F.3d 538, 543 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting the government's burden to prove the lawfulness of a search). Although the officers' testimony leaves some ambiguity as to exactly when and how Barbuti acquired the phone, we are comfortable that the district court's finding that it was seized from Jadlowe's person at the time of his arrest was not clearly erroneous. See United States v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2004) (describing the relevant inquiry as whether the evidence presented at the suppression hearing fairly supports the court's finding). As the government points out, Barbuti testified unequivocally that he had been told the phone had been taken from Jadlowe's person, and Andrade testified that he knew there was a cell phone at the location. Jadlowe himself represented that the 20 Barbuti stated: At some point, I don't know if it was [right after the pat-frisk] or immediately after doing a protective sweep of the residence, I was handed the cell phone from Mr. Jadlowe's person. He said he did not remember who handed it to him, but confirmed that it was represented to [him] that it had come from Mr. Jadlowe's person. 21 When asked if a cell phone was found on Mr. Jadlowe subsequent to your arrest of him, Andrade responded: I know there was a cell phone at the location. I don't recall it being on Mr. Jadlowe. He reiterated that reply in response to a follow-up question: I don't recall a cell phone being found on his person. -19- phone had been on his person in his motion to suppress (a point noted by the district court).22 Moreover, the scope of a permissible search incident to an arrest is not limited to the arrestee's person, but includes 'the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' Nascimento, 491 F.3d at 49 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). There is no evidence that the officers entered either of the Jadlowe houses before obtaining the warrant, and the record therefore supports the view that the phone was found near Jadlowe, even if not on his person. To succeed in challenging the denial of a suppression motion, a defendant must show that no reasonable view of the evidence supports the district court's decision. United States v. Dunbar, 553 F.3d 48, 55 (1st Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 92 (1st Cir. 2010). Jadlowe has not made that showing here.