Opinion ID: 200608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Fine and Forfeiture

Text: 20 Defendant argues that the imposition of a fine of $12,500 by the court, when the pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) recommended against a fine, and the government failed to object to this recommendation, is improper. In these circumstances, we review imposition of a fine for abuse of discretion. United States v. Cunan, 152 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir.1998). Cf. United States v. Thurston, 338 F.3d 50, 77 (1st Cir.)(holding that where a lower court declines to impose a fine when it is mandated by statute, review of questions of law is de novo ). 21 In recommending against a fine, the PSI had made the erroneous assumption that, after forfeiture of his residence, defendant would have no assets left with which to pay a fine. In fact, his known assets, even after forfeiture of his house, totaled over $50,000. The imposition of a fine at the lowest end of the Guideline range is well within judicial discretion, and Keene has not argued that he is unable to pay the amount. Further, the court offered Keene additional time to develop a response to the government's request for a fine at sentencing-time he chose not to use. We find no abuse of discretion in the imposition of a fine here. Whether to impose a fine is the prerogative of the court. That the PSI recommended against a fine, whether or not the recommendation was based on a mistake of fact, cannot be dispositive. 22 Having convicted defendant of possession of drugs with intent to distribute, the jury found defendant's residence was forfeit to the government. Defendant asserts that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.2 requires a more active and searching inquiry than that engaged in by the District Court to justify this forfeiture, and that the government did not meet its burden of proof. 23 For the first time on appeal, defendant argues that under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), the applicable standard of proof was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, other circuits have consistently refused to apply Apprendi requirements to criminal forfeitures. United States v. Vera, 278 F.3d 672, 673 (7th Cir.2002); United States v. Cabeza, 258 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir.2001) ( per curiam ); United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543, 550-51 (6th Cir.2000). The forfeiture is not viewed as a separate charge, but as an aspect of punishment imposed following conviction of a substantive offense. Cabeza, 258 F.3d at 1257 (quoting Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39, 116 S.Ct. 356, 133 L.Ed.2d 271 (1995)). This is because drug trafficking is at the core of the conduct at which the forfeiture statutes are directed. United States v. One Clipper Bow Ketch Nisku, 548 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir.1977). This Court has observed with approval that almost every circuit that has pronounced on the issue has held that the standard of proof as to forfeiture issues under section 853 ... is a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641, 647 (1st Cir.1996). The evidentiary standard used to impose the forfeiture was proper, as was the forfeiture itself. The preponderance standard was certainly satisfied here. 24 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.