Opinion ID: 4023
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rejection of the First Plea Agreement

Text: Penev argues that the court’s decision to reject the first plea agreement constituted impermissible participation in the parties’ plea negotiations and thereby violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 11(c). His argument relies upon this Court’s having held that “the sentencing judge should take no part whatever in any discussion or communication regarding the sentence to be imposed prior to the entry of a plea of guilty.” United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 1976). 4 “There is . . . no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted. A court may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971) (internal citation omitted); see also United States v. Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1997). Under Rule 11 “[a] trial judge is not required to accept every constitutionally valid [i.e., knowing, voluntary, and intelligent] guilty plea merely because a defendant wishes so to plead, and may reject a plea in exercise of sound judicial discretion.” United States v. Severino, 800 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (second brackets in original). “Among the reasons that may justify the exercise of discretion to reject a plea agreement is a concern that the resulting sentence would be too lenient.” Torres-Echavarria, 129 F.3d at 696. Rule 11(c)(5) requires a district court rejecting a plea to advise the defendant of various matters in open court. United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 204 (2d Cir. 2005). Under Rule 11(c)(1)(C), however, “a district court may not deviate from the ‘specific sentence or sentencing range’ recommended or requested by the accepted plea agreement.” United States v. Main, 579 F.3d 200, 203 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted) (citing United States v. Williams, 260 F.3d 160, 165 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[A] district court may accept or reject a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) 2 sentence bargain, but may in no event modify it.”)). In rejecting the first plea agreement, the district court so advised Penev as required under Rule 11, and it neither suggested terms for a plea that it would be inclined to accept nor 2 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(C) is Rule 11(c)(1)(C)’s predecessor, and was revised and renumbered in 2002 with only stylistic changes. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes. 5 otherwise interfered with subsequent plea negotiations. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion, let alone commit plain error, in rejecting the first plea agreement. Penev also argues to this court that the district court was “compromised” and “improperly influenced” when it accepted his guilty plea and sentenced him. This argument, however, is waived. United States v. Hester, 598 F.3d 86, 94 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (holding that “[b]ecause [the defendant] has not presented these [constitutional] arguments to the district court in the first instance and because the appeal waiver narrowly circumscribes what he may appeal . . . we deem these . . . arguments waived.”) (citing Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120 (1976) (“It is the general rule, of course, that a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.”)). Penev specifically declined to make an application to the district court to set aside his guilty plea based on a perceived conflict of interest. At the hearing on the subsequent plea agreement, which the district court did accept, Penev, through counsel, stated that, “[t]here is no overt indication that would support a conflict motion as to the proceedings here. . . . [T]here is no indication in the record of a conflict.” Having thus declined to put the issue before the district court expressly because he lacked sufficient evidence, Penev waived any claim based on allegations of conflict. See id.