Opinion ID: 1677631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the trial court properly used the guilty pleas entered by moeller to enhance the sentence under the habitual offender statutes.

Text: As a matter of federal constitutional law, Moeller has the unequivocal right to trial by jury, the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to confront and cross-examine witness and to be represented by counsel. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 92 S.Ct. 2006, 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d. 562 (1975). The Boykin rights to jury trial, against self-incrimination, and confrontation are of such importance in our system of justice, that on direct appeal from a conviction the conviction cannot stand if the record is devoid of a knowing and intelligent waiver of these rights. Unfortunately the reference to a silent record has been viewed by many to be a basis to challenge the validity of convictions other than from a direct appeal. It is our hope to clarify the law and procedure for examination of prior convictions under circumstances not involving a direct appeal. As the chronological and procedural challenge to a conviction becomes more removed from the conviction itself, the court must exercise decreasing scrutiny in the review of constitutional issues. There is an inverse relationship between the sensitivity of the courts to constitutional protection and the procedural and chronological distance from the original conviction. Challenges to distant convictions strike at finality, and it is of paramount importance to remember that: One of the law's very objects is the finality of its judgments. Neither innocence nor just punishment can be vindicated until the final judgment is known.  Without finality, the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect.  [citations omitted]. And when a habeas petitioner succeeds in obtaining a new trial, the `erosion of memory' and dispersion of witnesses that occur with the passage of time, [citation omitted] prejudice the government and diminish the chances of a reliable criminal adjudication. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 491, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1468, 113 L.Ed.2d 517, 542 (1991), (emphasis added). See also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Our highest Court noted that collateral review of a conviction extends the ordeal of trial for both society and the accused, ever-worsening during each subsequent collateral proceeding, and breeding perpetual disrespect for finality of convictions and necessarily resulting in disparagement of the entire criminal justice system. McCleskey, supra, 499 U.S. at 491, 111 S.Ct. at 1469, 113 L.Ed.2d at 543, (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-127, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 1571, 71 L.Ed.2d 783, 799-800 (1982)). Moreover, [a] procedural system which permits an endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law in a vain search for ultimate certitude implies a lack of confidence about the possibilities of justice that cannot but war with the underlying substantive commands.... There comes a point where a procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for immobility. Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Such perpetual review give[s] litigants incentives to withhold claims for manipulative purposes [... and] establish[es] disincentives to present claims when evidence is fresh. Id. Cf. State v. Aspen, 412 N.W.2d 881 (S.D.1987), (Chief Justice Miller, dissenting). Moreover, in addition to undermining confidence in the integrity of court procedures, these inroads on finality increase the volume of judicial work, inevitably delaying and impairing the orderly administration of justice, Hill v. Lockhart, supra , which directly contravenes one of the ends of Boykin, to wit: to forestall [the] spin-off of collateral proceedings that seek to probe murky memories. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. at 244, 89 S.Ct. at 1712-13, 23 L.Ed.2d at 280. [3] Likewise, this Court, acting in our appellate function on the cold and indeed ancient record before us, cannot presume greater insight into the defendant's understanding of his rights, his waiver of counsel, and his plea of guilty than that of the other courts that have considered this case. Boyd v. Dutton, 405 U.S. 1, 4, 92 S.Ct. 759, 761, 30 L.Ed.2d 755, 759 (1972), (Justice White, dissenting). The likelihood is minuscule, that new judicial scrutiny, one and a half decades later, will be conducive to dependable fact finding or will enlarge upon the evidence already considered. Id. While the defendant's right to an attorney is of equal importance to a defendant's  Boykin rights, the defendant must show that he was significantly prejudiced because he did not have an attorney. We will not imprison the defendant in his rights. State v. Jenner, 451 N.W.2d 710, 720 (S.D. 1990). It is well settled that a defendant may affirmatively waive constitutional rights to a jury trial, to confront and cross-examine witnesses, and to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self incrimination. U.S. v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.1992). The defendant may also waive the right to counsel. Id. Thus, upon a guilty plea, the absence of an attorney is not, in and of itself, a basis for setting aside a prior conviction. The defendant will not be allowed to merely rely on a silent record or the mere lack of an attorney to establish a constitutional error. There must be an affirmative showing of a specific denial of the right to counsel or a failure to advise the defendant of this right when one challenges a prior conviction. While Argersinger, and Faretta, require a detailed explanation of the dangers of self-representation at a trial or evidentiary proceeding, such advisement on the dangers of self-representation is not required for a valid waiver of the right to counsel when a defendant enters a plea of guilty to a criminal charge. State v. Cashman, 491 N.W.2d 462 (S.D.1992). By definition, a defendant who pleads guilty relinquishes his defense. He, therefore, does not need to be examined as to his understanding of courtroom procedure. Id. at 464 quoting Stano v. Dugger, 921 F.2d 1125, 1148-49 (11th Cir.1991). Any other requirement would fail ... to make common sense and eviscerate the chief virtues of plea agreements [] speed, economy and finality. Rutan, supra, 956 F.2d at 829. It is unreasonable to expect a trial court to explain the defendant's rights with the same fervor to one charged with disorderly conduct, as the court would to a defendant facing a murder charge. In point of fact, where jail is not imposed upon a defendant on a misdemeanor charge, he is not, constitutionally, entitled to counsel. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra . See also Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 16 St.Ct. 179, 40 L.Ed. 301, (1895). Upon a direct appeal from a conviction the defendant must be given all presumptions and protections possible under our constitution. However, when the proceeding before the court is in the nature of a collateral attack, as in a habeas corpus action or a challenge to the validity of predicate convictions, it becomes subject to less intense scrutiny upon review. There is no principal of law better settled, than that every act of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done, until the contrary appears. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. ___, ___, 113 S.Ct. 517, 523, 121 L.Ed.2d 391, 404 (1992). The defendant here, by definition, has collaterally attacked his previous convictions, not contending that he was innocent of the predicate convictions, but seeking to deprive them of their normal force and effect for enhancement purposes. On collateral review, we think it defies logic to presume from the mere unavailability of a transcript (assuming no allegation that the unavailability is due to governmental misconduct) that the defendant was not advised of his rights. Id., 506 U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 524, 121 L.Ed.2d at 404. (emphasis added). [E]ven when a collateral attack on a final conviction rests on constitutional grounds, the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments makes it appropriate to assign a proof burden to the defendant. Id., 506 U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 524, 121 L.Ed.2d at 405. The state is not required, by the due process clause, to adopt one procedure over another because it may produce results more favorable to the accused. Id. When a defendant challenges the validity of a previous guilty plea, the government will not invariably, or perhaps even usually, have superior access to evidence ... [t]he defendant may be the only witness who was actually present at the earlier proceeding. Id., 506 U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 524, 121 Ed.2d at 405. In Stuck v. Leapley, supra , we set forth the fundamental pattern of shifting burdens in the process for testing the validity of predicate convictions. To clarify the process, we require the state to first establish that there is a document which appears on its face to be a valid judgment. Upon such a showing by the state the doctrine of presumption of regularity is then applied, and unless the defendant presents credible evidence that there is some constitutional infirmity in the judgment it must stand. State v. King, 400 N.W.2d 878 (S.D.1987). Once the judgment is shown to be facially valid by the state, the burden of proof then shifts to the defendant to establish that there is a constitutional defect in the substance of the rights he should have been afforded by the plea taking court. Putting the burden of production upon the defendant is a reasonable middle ground approach, and has been recognized as constitutionally valid by the United States Supreme Court. Parke, supra . The Kentucky procedure, which we have previously noted to be parallel to our procedure, State v. King, supra , Stuck v. Leapley, supra , requires the defendant to produce evidence of invalidity once the fact of conviction has been shown by the state. Parke, supra , 506 U.S. at ___, 113 S.Ct. at 525, 121 L.Ed.2d at 406. Raising a challenge to a prior conviction requires the defendant do more than just make a naked claim. He must initiate a challenge by presenting some credible evidence through his testimony or other affirmative evidence. Dunn v. Simmons, 877 F.2d 1275 (6th Cir.1989), (Circuit Judge Ryan, concurring in part; dissenting in part). Silent records will not create a presumption that prior convictions are unconstitutional. State v. Lownes, 499 N.W.2d 896 (S.D.1993). Specific articulation of the Boykin rights by the trial judge is not an indispensable requisite for the record to establish a valid plea. As the Honorable Judge Wollman noted, when sitting for this Court almost two decades ago, [t]he fact that we require an on the record inquiry when a guilty plea is accepted does not, ... also require us to automatically wipe out the plea if no such inquiry is made. Merrill v. State, 87 S.D. 285, 206 N.W.2d 828, 830 (1973); Commonwealth v. Godfrey, 434 Pa. 532, 254 A.2d 923 (1969); Cf. State v. Garritsen 421 N.W.2d 499, 502, n. 3, (S.D.1988). It is sufficient when the record in some manner shows the defendant entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily. Quist v. Leapley, 486 N.W.2d 265, 267 (S.D.1992); Logan v. Solem, 406 N.W.2d 714, 717 (S.D.1987) (emphasis in original). The record need only show that he knew of his rights and the consequences of his guilty plea. Id. There is no requirement that the record show an express enumeration by the court nor an express waiver by the defendant ... as a condition precedent to a voluntary and intelligent guilty plea Id. The standard was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative causes of action open to the defendant. Id. Accord State v. King, supra, 400 N.W.2d at 879. Basic, conclusionary records of the defendant's prior convictions specifying that he made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights before pleading, are sufficient to establish that the prior convictions were constitutionally sound. U.S. v. Taylor, 882 F.2d 1018, 1031 (6th Cir.1989). To initiate a challenge to a predicate conviction, the defendant must produce credible evidence to establish a basis to declare his conviction was constitutionally defective. A bald assertion that he does not remember receiving his rights is patently insufficient. Wabasha v. State, 292 N.W.2d 340 (S.D.1980). Likewise, when no transcripts exist, for whatever reason, absent misconduct by the state, the court will be presumed to have discharged its duty. U.S. v. Dickerson, 901 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1990). In order to impose upon the state the burden of establishing the validity of guilty plea, the defendant must first offer evidence of non-compliance with Boykin. Dunn v. Simmons, supra, (Circuit Judge Ryan, concurring in part; dissenting in part). As we recently stated in State v. Lownes, supra , where the defendant has failed to produce evidence that prior convictions were constitutionally infirm, the convictions may properly be used for enhancement purposes. [4] Once the defendant has set forth an evidentiary basis which casts the predicate conviction in doubt, we would encourage the parties to produce relevant evidence to assist the fact finder in this inquiry. Among the methods of proof that would be useful are, of course, the verbatim record and the original court file. We recognize that these may not be available when the defendant seeks to exhume elusive claims of unconstitutionality from relatively ancient convictions. Consequently, it is also appropriate to utilize testimony from those who specifically recall the particular plea taking procedure of the judge or those who have appeared in the court regularly to establish what the court's normal and ordinary procedure was in explaining of rights to a defendant. U.S. v. Dickerson, 901 F.2d 579 (7th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Goodheim, 686 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.1982); U.S. v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.1990); U.S. v. Dickens, 879 F.2d 410 (8th Cir.1989). It is up to the court to determine whether the defendant has met his burden of producing credible evidence that there was a constitutional infirmity in his guilty plea, and then whether the state has met its resulting burden in establishing that the specific constitutional defect of which evidence has been presented, by the defendant, did not occur at the time of the predicate conviction. Only claimed constitutional defects and/or those that manifestly, on their face, establish a miscarriage of justice should be given countenance, for review purposes, by the court.