Opinion ID: 2602185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Governing Statutory Procedure

Text: In the present case, the trial court proceedings occurred prior to the unification of the municipal and superior courts. After unification, the proceedings in the early stages of a felony prosecution that formerly were held in municipal court now are held in superior court, but the basic procedural stepsthe filing of a complaint before a magistrate, the holding of a preliminary examination before a magistrate, and the filing of an information and arraignment on the information before a superior court judgeremain the same. Because the relevant proceedings in this case preceded unification, we discuss the statutory provisions with reference to the functional division between the municipal and superior courts that existed at that time. (See also Stats.1998, ch. 931, §§ 359, 360 [amending Pen.Code, §§ 806, 808, to conform to unification of trial courts].) Prior to unification, unless the prosecution elected to seek an indictment before a grand jury, felony proceedings were commenced with the filing of a complaint in municipal court before a magistrate. (§ 806.) Although the complaint was filed in municipal court, the magistrate could be either a municipal court or superior court judge. (§ 808.) [8] When a complaint was filed, section 859 directed that the defendant be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay, and that the magistrate inform the defendant of his or her right to counsel. The magistrate then was required to set a date for the preliminary examination. (§ 859b.) At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, the magistrate determined whether there was sufficient cause to hold the defendant to answer on a felony charge. (§ 872.) If the defendant was held to answer on a felony charge following the preliminary examination, the prosecution filed an accusatory pleadingan informationin superior court, charging the defendant with the felony offense. When the information was filed, the defendant was arraigned on the charges in superior court. (§ 976.) Section 987 provides that if a defendant appears for arraignment without counsel, the court shall inform the defendant of his or her right to counsel and shall ask the defendant whether he or she desires the assistance of counsel. [9] In sum, the governing statutes provided (and continue to provide) that a defendant in felony proceedings shall be advised of the right to counsel on at least two distinct occasions prior to trial: first, when the defendant is brought before a magistrate and advised of the filing of the complaint (§ 859), and second, after the preliminary examination, when the defendant is arraigned in superior court on the information (§ 987). Because, however, the same superior court judge sometimes served both as magistrate during the municipal court proceedings and also as the trial judge in superior court, the duty under section 987 to readvise the defendant of the right to counsel occasionally has been overlooked. Thus, when a superior court judge, sitting as a magistrate, already had conducted a lengthy exchange with the defendant in which the judge had explained to the defendant the defendant's right to counsel and had cautioned the defendant about the pitfalls of self-representation both at the preliminary hearing and at trial, and the defendant had expressed an understanding of the risks and a desire nonetheless to proceed without counsel throughout the proceedings, the judge inadvertently might fail to readvise the defendant when the defendant appeared before the same judge for arraignment on the felony information. That appears to be what occurred here. Prior decisions of this court have held that under section 987, the superior court is required to advise a defendant of his or her right to counsel in superior court whenever the defendant appears without counsel at the arraignment, even when the defendant previously has been advised of the right to counsel and has expressed an intention to waive counsel throughout the proceedings. ( People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, 858, fn. 5, 251 Cal.Rptr. 227, 760 P.2d 423; see also People v. McKenzie (1983) 34 Cal.3d 616, 635, 194 Cal.Rptr. 462, 668 P.2d 769 [observing that [t]he People concede that defendant's waiver of the right to counsel in municipal court did not continue in effect in superior court (italics added)].) Because the language of section 987 sets forth no exceptions, this rule applies even when, as in the case at bar, the same judge presides in the municipal court and at trial in the superior court. Despite some equivocation at oral argument, and a belated reference to In re Connor (1940) 15 Cal.2d 161, 99 P.2d 248, the People concede in their briefing that in view of our decisions in People v. Crandell and People v. McKenzie , the superior court in the present case erred in failing to readvise defendant of his right to counsel and in failing to obtain a new waiver of that right when defendant was arraigned on the felony information in superior court. The question presented here is whether the superior court's error was prejudicial under either federal or state law. To answer this question, we employ the analytical framework relied upon by the Court of Appeal. As that court explained: Defendants enjoy two distinct rights: (1) a constitutional right to the assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment, which may be waived, and (2) a statutory right under section 987, subdivision (a), to be informed at arraignment in superior court of the right to counsel and to have counsel appointed. Although both provisions protect the right to counsel, they derive from different sources and are not coterminous. (Original italics.)