Opinion ID: 1314390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stacking of Underinsured Motorist CoveragesStatutory and Case Law Background

Text: Certified question numbers 6, 7 and 7(a) relate to whether the limits of more than one underinsured motorist coverage may be combined or stacked by an insured. [8] W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b) [1982], applicable to this case, provides, in relevant part, that a motor vehicle liability insurance policy shall provide an option to the insured with appropriately adjusted premiums to pay the insured all sums which he [or she] shall legally be entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured or underinsured motor vehicle up to an amount not less than limits of bodily injury liability insurance and property damage liability insurance purchased by the insured. (emphasis added) W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b) [1982] also defines an underinsured motor vehicle as follows: `Underinsured motor vehicle' means a motor vehicle with respect to the ownership, operation, or use of which there is liability insurance applicable at the time of the accident, but the limits of that insurance are either (i) less than limits the insured carried for underinsured motorists' coverage, or (ii) has [sic; have] been reduced by payments to others injured in the accident to limits less than limits the insured carried for underinsured motorist's coverage. Underinsured motorist coverage was added in 1982 to this statute; the statute previously addressed only uninsured motorist coverage. It is obvious from the all sums ... as damages language of W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, that the legislature has articulated a public policy of full indemnification or compensation underlying both uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage in the State of West Virginia. That is, the preeminent public policy of this state in uninsured or underinsured motorist cases is that the injured person be fully compensated for his or her damages not compensated by a negligent tortfeasor, up to the limits of the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage. Because of this statutorily stated public policy of full indemnification, the Court in syllabus points 3-4 of Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 157 W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147 (1974), held that antistacking language in the automobile insurance policies applicable purportedly to the uninsured motorist policy endorsements was void as repugnant to the statute. See also W.Va.Code, 33-6-17 [1957] (any insurance policy provision or condition not complying with insurance statutes will yield to the statutes). After Bell, specifically, in 1979, subsection (k) was added to W.Va.Code, 33-6-31. Subsection (k) provides that nothing contained in W.Va.Code, 33-6-31 shall prevent any insurer from also offering benefits and limits other than those prescribed in that statute, nor shall this section be construed as preventing any insurer from incorporating in [sic] such terms, conditions and exclusions as may be consistent with the premium charged. Under W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(k), as amended, this Court has held that [i]nsurers may incorporate such terms, conditions and exclusions in an automobile insurance policy as may be consistent with the premium charged, so long as such [terms, conditions and] exclusions do not conflict with the spirit and intent of the uninsured and underinsured motorists statutes. Syl. pt. 3, Deel v. Sweeney, ___ W.Va. ___, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989) (involving underinsured motorist coverage) (emphasis added). We also stated in Deel v. Sweeney that [t]his Court will continue to be vigilant in holding the insurers' feet to the fire in instances where [terms, conditions,] exclusions or denials of coverage strike at the heart of the purposes of the uninsured and underinsured motorist statutes [`] provisions. Id. at ___, 383 S.E.2d at 95 (emphasis added). Antistacking language in an automobile insurance policy which is applicable purportedly to uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage strikes at the heart of the purpose of the uninsured and underinsured motorist statute and conflicts with the spirit and intent of such statute, in that antistacking language thwarts the statutorily stated public policy of full indemnification. Therefore, Bell 's holding on the invalidity of antistacking language in an uninsured motorist case remains valid, W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(k), as amended, notwithstanding. See Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Farmer, 330 So.2d 236, 238 (Fla. Dist.Ct.App.1976) (statutory language making underinsured motorist coverage subject to the terms and conditions of such coverage did not permit antistacking language in automobile insurance policies), cert. denied, 341 So.2d 291 (Fla.1976), and cert. denied, 342 So.2d 1101 (Fla.1977). The rationale of Bell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co . applies to underinsured, as well as to uninsured, motorist coverage. The statutory policy of full indemnification is stated in W.Va.Code, 33-6-31(b), as amended, to apply to either of these types of coverage. Consequently, the fact that uninsured motorist coverage is mandatory, while underinsured motorist coverage must be offered but may be declined, is a distinction without a difference here. Once the insured elects to pay for the underinsured motorist coverage, he or she is protected by the public policy of full indemnification. See, e.g., Hoeschen v. South Carolina Insurance Co., 378 N.W.2d 796, 800 (Minn.1985) (repeal of statute on mandatory offer of underinsured motorist coverage was not intended to permit insurer to prohibit stacking of optionally obtained underinsured motorist benefits). See generally annotation, Combining or Stacking Uninsured [or Underinsured] Motorist Coverages Provided in Separate Policies Issued by Same Insurer to Same Insured, 25 A.L.R. 4th 6 (1983), especially § 6 on underinsured motorist coverage.