Opinion ID: 2001513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: on motion for partial reargument

Text: On motion for partial reargument, the plaintiff urges this Court to reconsider its affirmance of the Superior Court's action in vacating the default judgment entered against defendant Oliphant. The plaintiff argues that 10 Del.C. § 8127 is a statute of limitations and that, therefore, any defense relying on that statute must be pleaded affirmatively in a responsive pleading under Superior Court Civil Rule 8(c). [1] The plaintiff contends that, in failing to raise the § 8127 defense prior to entry of the default judgment, Oliphant waived that defense and the Superior Court should not have considered it. We disagree. The key question here is whether § 8127 is a statute of limitations, which must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. While § 8127 does limit the time within which an action may be brought, it is not a statute of limitations in the ordinary sense; rather, as we have heretofore emphasized, it is a statute of repose. In referring in the opinion to § 8127 as a limitations statute, we did not in any way intend to imply, by utilizing that terminology of convenience, that a statute of repose and a statute of limitation are equivalent concepts. We elaborate at the risk of repetition: While the running of a statute of limitations will nullify a party's remedy, the running of a statute of repose will extinguish both the remedy and the right. The statute of limitations is therefore a procedural mechanism, which may be waived. On the other hand, the statute of repose is a substantive provision which may not be waived because the time limit expressly qualifies the right which the statute creates. Lincoln First Bank of Rochester v. Rupert, N.Y.App.Div., 60 A.D.2d 193, 400 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (1977). See Kline v. J.I. Case Co., N.D.Ill., 520 F.Supp. 564 (1981); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., N.C.Supr., 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982); Kahn v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., N.Y.App.Div., 82 A.D.2d 696, 443 N.Y. S.2d 79 (1981). The North Carolina Supreme Court explained further: Because of their unique manner of limiting actions [statutes of repose] have been referred to as `hybrid' statutes of limitations having potentially both a substantive and procedural effect. On the one hand, a date of injury is not a factor in computing the running of the time limitation. The statute thus acquires its substantive quality by barring a right of action even before the injury has occurred if the injury occurs subsequent to the prescribed time period. On the other hand, the statute's operation is similar to that of an ordinary statute of limitations as to the events occurring before the expiration of the prescribed time period. Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., supra at 418 (quoting Smith v. American Radiator & Sanitary Corp., N.C.App., 38 N.C. App. 457, 248 S.E.2d 462, 465-466 (1978) disc. rev. denied, N.C.Supr., 296 N.C. 586, 254 S.E.2d 33 (1979)). As a statute of repose is not a statute of limitations within the meaning of Superior Court Civil Rule 8(c), it need not be pleaded affirmatively. Moreover, because the statute of repose is a substantive provision, it relates to the jurisdiction of the court; hence any failure to commence the action within the applicable time period extinguishes the right itself and divests the ... court of any subject matter jurisdiction which it might otherwise have. First Savings & Loan Assoc. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of Hawaii, D. Hawaii, 547 F.Supp. 988, 995 (1982). Accordingly, as a matter of jurisdiction, the bar of § 8127 may not be waived and may be raised at any time during the proceedings. Maxwell v. Vetter, Del.Supr., 311 A.2d 864 (1973). We note in passing, however, that the defense of § 8127, when known, should be raised promptly as a matter of fair notice under Superior Court Civil Rule 8(b) and 12(b). [2] While a waiver of jurisdiction of the subject matter will not result from the failure to comply with the general duty of fair notice under the Rules, [3] counsel should be mindful of the obligation as a matter of professional responsibility.