Opinion ID: 1741615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claims of the Counterclaim Plaintiffs

Text: As discussed previously in this opinion, the ACLUA, the AFA, and Judge Moore counterclaimed against the State. The ACLUA and the AFA sought to enjoin the State of Alabama, acting by and through its governor and attorney general, (1) from permitting circuit judges ... to open public court proceedings with prayer in the presence of ... jurors, and (2) from permit[ting] the depiction of the Ten Commandments on the walls of public courtrooms as an acknowledgment of G-d, ... without regard to whether ... the depiction ... is... in any context other than a religious one. (Emphasis added.) Judge Moore sought a judgment declaring that the State of Alabama does not have authority to prohibit ... any ... circuit judge, from displaying the Ten Commandments in his courtroom or from having a prayer at the beginning of court. He specifically challenged the assertions in ¶ 20 of the State's complaint that [t]he State of Alabama, through its Judicial Department, has supervisory authority over its circuit judges and the manner in which they conduct proceedings. The trial court dismissed the counterclaims insofar as they state a cause of action against the State of Alabama. None of the counterclaimants sought review of that dismissal. Instead, the AFA and the ACLUA amended their counterclaims to include a claim against Chief Justice Hooper in his official capacity as administrator. Judge Moore did not amend his counterclaim to state a claim against Chief Justice Hooper. Therefore, the only remaining counterclaims are those of the AFA and the ACLUA against Chief Justice Hooper. Those counterclaims seek the relief that the ACLUA had originally sought in its letters dated June 9, 1993, and July 6, 1994, to former Chief Justice Sonny Hornsby, namely, action by the State Judicial System to cause the cessation of pre-jury session prayer by all of Alabama's circuit judges. They also seek an injunction against displaying religious symbols, without regard to the context of the display, on the walls of public courtrooms.  (Emphasis added.) There is a flaw, however, in the manner in which this relief has been sought. That flaw, and it is a fatal one, consists of the fact that the complainants have sued the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Alabama, who is unable to provide the relief they seek. This fact was the only basis of Chief Justice Hooper's defense to the counterclaims. In his motion to dismiss, which he filed on July 17, 1996, Chief Justice Hooper argued that, as a matter of law, he, acting unilaterally, has no authority to control the conduct of a circuit judge. This contention was repeated by the attorney general during a hearing on the dismissal motion conducted on August 13, 1996. He argued: [Attorney general]: My motion only relates to whether or not they have stated a valid claim against Chief Justice Hooper. And my argument is simply this, Your Honor; if you believe that Chief Justice Hooper has the lawful authority under Alabama law to tell you what you canhow you can decorate this courtroom and how you can deal with your jurorsChief Justice Hooper acting by himself, not with any other members of the Supreme Court, just the Chief Justice if he has that lawful authorityif he can tell you, Judge Price, that you need to remove the American flag from this courtroom or you need to treat jurors a certain way, then I say deny my motion. .... ... And there is no single officeholder like the Chief Justice who can micromanage how the circuit judges run their courtroom. (Emphasis added.) We agree with the contentions of the Chief Justice and the attorney general, namely, that the Chief Justice, acting unilaterally, cannot provide the relief sought by the counterclaim plaintiffs. The powers and duties of the Chief Justice are described in various provisions of the Constitution and the Code of Alabama. The primary source of his authority is Ala. Const. 1901, amend. 328, § 6.10, which provides in pertinent part: The chief justice of the supreme court shall be the administrative head of the judicial system. He shall appoint an administrative director of courts and other needed personnel to assist him with his administrative tasks. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to his administrative authority, he may take affirmative and appropriate action to correct or alleviate any condition or situation adversely affecting the administration of justice within the state, Ala.Code 1975, § 12-2-30(b)(7), and he may take any such other, further or additional action as may be necessary for the orderly administration of justice within the state, whether or not enumerated in this section or elsewhere, § 12-2-30(b)(8). These and other provisions make it clear, however, that the Chief Justice's authority is administrative. A common definition of administration is a furnishing or tendering according to a prescribed rite or formula. Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language 28 (Unabridged) (1986) (emphasis added). The source of his specific authority is the Court, itself, as expressed elsewhere in the Constitution and the Code of Alabama. Authority to issue such orders as may be necessary [for] general supervision and control of courts of inferior jurisdiction, is vested by Amendment 328, § 6.02, in the Supreme Court. Similarly, it is the Supreme Court that is charged by Amendment 328, § 6.08, with adopt[ing] rules of conduct and canons of ethics ... for the judges of all courts of this State. Again, it is the Supreme Court that is charged by Amendment 328, § 6.11, with the duty to make and promulgate rules governing the administration of all courts and rules governing practice and procedure in all courts. The significance of the term supreme court in §§ 6.02, 6.08, and 6.11 is illustrated by Ala. R.App. P. 16(b), which provides: The concurrence of five justices in the determination of any cause shall be necessary ..., except when, by reason of disqualification the number of justices ... is reduced, in which event the concurrence of a majority of the justices sitting shall suffice; but, in no event, may a cause be determined unless at least four justices sitting shall concur therein.  (Emphasis added.) Indeed, as a hornbook principle of practice and procedure, no appellate pronouncement becomes binding on inferior courts unless it has the concurrence of a majority of the Judges or Justices qualified to decide the cause. Simply stated, action by the Chief Justice is not synonymous with action by the Court. The trial court, on November 22, 1996, ordered [t]he counter[claim]-defendants[, including Chief Justice Hooper] in their official capacit[ies], their agents, servants, employees, and all those acting in concert with them, ... to take all reasonable steps to prevent the conduct of unconstitutional prayer in the public courts of this state. That judgment could be binding only on Chief Justice Hooper, who is a party to the litigation in his official capacity. Actions will be deemed not justiciable... `where, by reason of inadequacy of parties defendant, the judgment could not be sufficiently conclusive. ` Stamps v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 642 So.2d 941, 944 (Ala.1994) (emphasis added in Stamps ) (quoting E. Borchard, Declaratory Judgments 31 (1934)). [4] In other words, actions will be deemed nonjusticiable [w]hen the defendant has no power to affect the plaintiff's rights. E. Borchard, supra, at 36. That is the situation in this case. In summary, despite the public attention it has attracted, the lawsuit out of which these appellate proceedings have arisen does not involve a justiciable controversy. It was invoked merely to try disputes involved in another action. See 2 W. Anderson, Actions for Declaratory Judgments § 401, at 972 (2d ed.1951). No appeal was taken from the judgment of dismissal in the federal district court. Adverseness between the State and Judge Moore is manifestly nonexistent, and the counterclaim defendants have no power to provide the relief sought by the AFA and the ACLUA. [5] The record does not reveal a cross-claim against Judge Moore in either his individual capacity or in his official capacity. Because the controversy was nonjusticiable, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter its judgments; those judgments were, therefore, void. [A] void judgment will not support an appeal .... Underwood v. State, 439 So.2d 125, 128 (Ala. 1983); see also State ex rel. Baxley v. Johnson, 293 Ala. 69, 300 So.2d 106 (1974). Consequently, the judgments are vacated and these appellate proceedings are dismissed. 1951975JUDGMENT VACATED AND PETITION DISMISSED. 1960572JUDGMENT VACATED AND APPEAL DISMISSED. 1960839JUDGMENT VACATED AND APPEAL DISMISSED. 1960927JUDGMENT VACATED AND APPEAL DISMISSED. ALMON and SHORES, JJ., concur. MADDOX and HOUSTON, JJ., concur in the result. HOOPER, C.J., and KENNEDY, BUTTS, [6] and SEE, [7] JJ., recuse themselves.