Opinion ID: 797350
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tenth Amendment Immunity

Text: 29 The Tenth Amendment prescribes that [t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people. U.S. Const. amend. X. Thus, in cases involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, [i]f a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on Congress. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). 30 [W]here Congress has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, [the Supreme Court has] recognized Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. Id. at 167, 112 S.Ct. 2408. Congress's offer of shared regulatory authority does not run afoul of the Tenth Amendment. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Recl. Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 69 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981) (We fail to see why [the statute at issue] should become constitutionally suspect simply because Congress chose to allow the States a regulatory role.). 31 In this case, there is no question that the Federal Government under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution (Art. I, § 8, cl.3) has dominion, to the exclusion of the States, over navigable waters of the United States. City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357 U.S. 320, 334, 78 S.Ct. 1209, 2 L.Ed.2d 1345 (1958). By enacting the CWA, Congress provided states with an offer of shared regulatory authority. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 101, 112 S.Ct. 1046, 117 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992) (stating that the CWA anticipates a partnership between the States and the Federal Government, animated by a shared objective). 32 Respondent does not dispute that under the CWA the Federal Government elected to maintain control over the mechanism of regulating discharges into navigable waters. Rather, Respondent argues that federal court review of a WQC decision infringes upon Connecticut's jurisdiction over its own public trust lands, i.e., the land underlying the Long Island Sound. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 283, 117 S.Ct. 2028, 138 L.Ed.2d 438 (1997) (concluding that the court order sought would divest the State of its sovereign control over submerged lands, lands with a unique status in the law and infused with a public trust the State itself is bound to respect); Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482 U.S. 193, 195-98, 107 S.Ct. 2318, 96 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (stating that lands underlying navigable waters have historically been considered sovereign lands, and state ownership of them is considered an essential attribute of sovereignty). 33 The Supreme Court cases cited by Respondent are inapposite, and we conclude that granting Islander East's petition for review would not interfere with Connecticut's control over its sovereign lands. The Supreme Court's decisions in Coeur d'Alene and Utah Div. of State Lands involved challenges to state sovereignty over state land: in Coeur d'Alene, a private party brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief against the State claiming ownership of various submerged lands, 521 U.S. at 261, 117 S.Ct. 2028, while in Utah Div. of State Lands, the State brought an action for declaratory and injunctive relief contending that it was the owner of a lake bed, 482 U.S. at 200, 107 S.Ct. 2318. Here, the grant or denial of a WQC does not involve an issue of land ownership. Islander East's authorization to exercise the power of eminent domain to obtain a right of way for the natural gas pipeline unquestionably comes from the FERC in accordance with its authority under the NGA. Thus, in this case, federal court review involves no infringement of state jurisdiction over its lands. Such review, at most, intrudes upon the State's authority to determine whether the anticipated construction of Islander East's federally approved pipeline on the land at issue satisfies state water quality standards. The exercise of this authority is not a sovereign state right under the Tenth Amendment. Rather, Congress has the authority to regulate discharges into navigable waters under the Commerce Clause, and the State, in this case, exercises only such authority as has been delegated by Congress. Accordingly, there is no basis for Respondent's Tenth Amendment challenge to Islander East's petition for review.