Opinion ID: 2800622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. De La Cruz

Text: On appeal, Mr. De La Cruz raises only one argument. It concerns the district court’s questioning of Agent Xirau of the United States Coast Guard. At trial, the agent testified about the rescue of Mr. De La Cruz aboard the vessel that had gone adrift. Agent Xirau stated that he had asked Mr. De La Cruz and the other individual aboard the vessel about the satellite phone that they had used to call the Coast Guard. During the agent’s testimony, on the fourth day of a six-day trial, the following exchange took place: THE GOVERNMENT: I will ask you to clarify, when you refer to one of the two individuals on the boat, what specifically as to each individual they said, if anything? AGENT XIRAU: Roger that. THE GOVERNMENT: I was asking you about Junior De la Cruz, if upon you questioning him did he answer anything to you? AGENT XIRAU: That was the only question that I remember him specifically giving me an answer. THE GOVERNMENT: What about the other individual? - 6 - AGENT XIRAU: I don’t remember his name. When I say they, I could mean either one or the other, I don’t remember who at time who was the one that gave answers to the several questions we asked. THE COURT: But were questions generally answered? AGENT XIRAU: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Any of them express a disagreement with what the other was saying at the time? AGENT XIRAU: No, ma’am.[4] Defense counsel objected to the district court’s questioning. In particular, counsel asserted that the questions conveyed that the district court was commenting on Mr. De La Cruz’s silence when speaking with Coast Guard officials. The district court disagreed, stating that the witness “is not saying that [Mr. De La Cruz] did not answer, he says he does not remember who answered what.”5 Nevertheless, despite its disagreement with defense counsel’s characterization of the exchange, the district court gave a cautionary instruction, stating that the jury was “not to draw any inferences from the 4 R.401 at 69–70. We have added the names of the speakers for the convenience of the reader. 5 Id. at 71. - 7 - questions that [the court] posed.”6 “My only intent here,” the district court explained, “was to assist in clarifying the situation. But once again I instruct you that there is no intent and . . . no inference [should be] drawn from any type of question I have posed.”7 Following the district court’s cautionary instruction, Agent Xirau then testified that Mr. De La Cruz and the other individual aboard the vessel had offered a strange explanation for no longer possessing the satellite phone that they had used to call for help. According to the agent, the men had told him that they threw the satellite phone overboard because it had become wet. The agent described this explanation as “odd.”8 Mr. De La Cruz now contends that the district court’s questioning of Agent Xirau evinces judicial bias in violation of his right to due process of law. “When addressing allegations of judicial bias, we consider whether the comments were improper and, if so, whether the complaining party can show serious prejudice.” United States v. Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). We assess statements in light of the record as a whole, not in isolation. Id. 6 Id. at 72. 7 Id. 8 Id. at 74–75. - 8 - In assessing this claim of judicial bias, our starting point is the basic principle that “there is nothing inherently improper about a judge posing questions at trial.” Id. Indeed, as we have previously observed, a court “has the prerogative, and at times the duty, of eliciting facts [it] deems necessary to the clear presentation of issues.” United States v. RiveraRodríguez, 761 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Paz Uribe, 891 F.2d 396, 400 (1st Cir. 1989)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 614(b) (“The court may examine a witness regardless of who calls the witness.”). Such questioning is permissible “so long as [the court] preserves an attitude of impartiality and guards against giving the jury an impression that the court believes the defendant is guilty.” RiveraRodríguez, 761 F.3d at 111 (quoting Paz Uribe, 891 F.2d at 400– 01). Notably, a question is not improper simply because it clarifies evidence to the disadvantage of the defendant. See United States v. Montas, 41 F.3d 775, 781 (1st Cir. 1994). “[T]he rule concerning judicial interrogation is designed to prevent judges from conveying prejudicial messages to the jury. It is not concerned with the damaging truth that the questions might uncover.” United States v. Martin, 189 F.3d 547, 554 (7th Cir. 1999). Even if a comment is improper, however, a defendant also must show that the judicial intervention resulted in - 9 - “serious prejudice.” Rivera-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d at 112. As we recently have observed, this burden is comparable to demonstrating prejudice under plain error review. See id. In other words, “improper judicial intervention ‘seriously prejudice[s]’ a defendant’s case when we find that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the verdict would have been different.” Id. The burden of establishing serious prejudice is more difficult where, as here, a court follows its comments with an appropriate cautionary instruction. See Ayala-Vazquez, 751 F.3d at 26 (noting that “within wide margins, the potential for prejudice stemming from improper testimony or comments can be satisfactorily dispelled by appropriate curative instructions” (quoting United States v. Pagán-Ferrer, 736 F.3d 573, 582 (1st Cir. 2013))). Here, Agent Xirau testified that he could not remember who, between Mr. De La Cruz and the other individual aboard the vessel, had answered his questions regarding the satellite phone. The district court then asked whether either of the men “express[ed] a disagreement with what the other was saying at 9 the time.” This question, Mr. De La Cruz contends, “conveyed to the jury that the defendant” was “in tacit agreement with any answers to the question about the satellite phone,” thus 9 Id. at 70. - 10 - “creat[ing] ‘cover’ for the government to attribute the satellite phone to” him.10 We perceive no error in the district court’s remarks. The court’s inquiry was neither tinged with partiality nor suggestive of the court’s stance on Mr. De La Cruz’s guilt. Rather, this inquiry merely clarified an ambiguity in Agent Xirau’s testimony. That the resulting clarification was adverse to Mr. De La Cruz’s case is not, without more, indicative of judicial bias. See Martin, 189 F.3d at 554. In any event, the court’s remarks, which came on the fourth day of a six-day trial and were followed by an appropriate cautionary instruction, did not seriously prejudice Mr. De La Cruz’s case. See AyalaVazquez, 751 F.3d at 25–26.