Opinion ID: 2242748
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Evidentiary Rulings During Aggravation-Mitigation Phase

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in two evidentiary rulings during the aggravation-mitigation phase of trial. First, he contends that the court should have barred the State from introducing the testimony of Leon Anderson. Second, he contends the court erred in prohibiting defendant's mother, Mary Williams, from answering the question, Can you give the ladies and gentlemen of the jury any reasons why they should spare [defendant's] life?
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Leon Anderson to testify over defense counsel's objection that Anderson's identity was not disclosed until the day before he testified. Defendant filed a pretrial motion seeking disclosure of all nonstatutory aggravating evidence which the State would seek to introduce at sentencing. The court entered an order, agreed to by the State, that the State would furnish defense counsel with the names and updated addresses of any witnesses whom it intended to call in aggravation, along with any reports relevant to those witnesses. Before trial, the State informed the court and defense counsel that the State would have no evidence in aggravation beyond evidence of drug dealing by defendant and matters mentioned in jail records which had been tendered to defense counsel. However, the day before closing arguments in the guilt phase of trial, the State mentioned that it would have different aggravation. On the day of closing arguments in the guilt phase, the State revealed that in the aggravation-mitigation phase it would call two witnesses who knew defendant during his pretrial incarceration. [4] The prosecution refused to reveal the witnesses' names until it could be determined whether they were in protective custody. However, the State agreed to comply with the trial court's order to begin obtaining disciplinary reports and criminal record sheets immediately, in order to make them available to defense counsel as quickly as possible. The State did not reveal Anderson's name to the defense until the day before he testified. On the day Anderson was to testify, defense counsel objected to his testimony on the basis that he had had insufficient time to investigate the witness. The prosecutor explained to the court that the witness had only been located through an exhaustive search of five years of records regarding defendant's cell mates during his confinement. The assistant State's Attorney informed the court that the first time a representative of his office had interviewed Anderson was that very day, and that the State had tendered all available materials. The trial court refused to bar Anderson from testifying. Defense counsel then asked for a continuance to investigate Anderson. The State responded that they had tendered to the defense Anderson's rap sheets from both the State of Illinois and the City of Chicago, as well as an appellate court opinion describing the underlying facts of one of Anderson's convictions. However, the State represented that it would not be possible to obtain his Illinois Department of Corrections records until the next day. The court denied the request for a continuance, but stated that Anderson, who was normally incarcerated in an Illinois Department of Corrections facility in Centralia, would be held overnight in Chicago so as to be subject to recall by the defense the next day. However, after Anderson's testimony defense counsel stated that Anderson could be remanded to Centralia that evening. The next day, defense counsel informed the court that the State had tendered a disciplinary hearing report on Anderson, but defense counsel did not feel any need to recall Anderson. Defendant concedes that the Constitution does not entitle defendants in capital cases to discover the evidence the State intends to introduce in aggravation. People v. Armstrong, 183 Ill.2d 130, 160, 233 Ill.Dec. 252, 700 N.E.2d 960 (1998); People v. Williams, 147 Ill.2d 173, 167 Ill.Dec. 853, 588 N.E.2d 983 (1991). Nevertheless, defendant argues that because the trial court did enter an order directing the State to disclose such evidence, the court erred in failing to bar Anderson from testifying when the State failed to disclose his name until the day before he testified. We disagree. A trial court's rulings on admissibility of evidence in aggravation are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. People v. Thomas, 137 Ill.2d 500, 148 Ill. Dec. 751, 561 N.E.2d 57 (1990). We also review only for abuse of discretion any penalty imposed by a trial court for violation of a discovery order. People v. Newberry, 166 Ill.2d 310, 317-18, 209 Ill.Dec. 748, 652 N.E.2d 288 (1995). We do not find the trial court to have abused its discretion in refusing to bar Anderson's testimony when defendant was not constitutionally entitled to the information and there was no showing that the prosecution acted in bad faith in failing to disclose Anderson earlier. Defendant's reliance on Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 111 S.Ct. 1723, 114 L.Ed.2d 173 (1991), is misplaced. In that case the trial court sentenced defendant to death even though the prosecution had formally stated that it was not seeking the death penalty. See Lankford, 500 U.S. at 119-20, 111 S.Ct. at 1729, 114 L.Ed.2d at 183-84. The Court held that the proceeding violated defendant's due process rights because at the sentencing hearing defense counsel was unaware that there was even a possibility that defendant might be sentenced to death, and accordingly made no arguments against such a sentence. Lankford in no way resembles the case before us, in which defendant merely complains that the trial court punished the prosecution insufficiently for what the record reveals to have been an innocent failure to provide him with information he was not constitutionally entitled to receive. Moreover, defendant has not shown how the abbreviated disclosure inhibited his defense efforts, in that he has not suggested how counsel might have attacked Anderson's credibility if the State had disclosed him before trial. We find no basis for reversal. Cf. People v. Guest, 166 Ill.2d 381, 405-06, 211 Ill.Dec. 490, 655 N.E.2d 873 (1995) (counsel not ineffective for failing to move the State to disclose evidence in aggravation since defense was not constitutionally entitled to discovery and defendant failed to indicate what counsel could have done to challenge the aggravating evidence).
Defendant next argues that the court erred in sustaining the prosecution's objection when defense counsel asked defendant's mother if she could give the ladies and gentlemen of the jury any reasons why they should spare [defendant's] life. We find no error. When defense counsel posed this question to the witness, the State objected and a sidebar was called. The trial court sustained the objection and instructed defense counsel that she could not ask a witness anything with respect to the death penalty. That [means] why he shouldn't get it, why he should get it, whatever. The court explained that counsel could elicit facts about defendant from the witnesses and then, in closing argument, argue that the facts constituted mitigating circumstances sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty. However, counsel had to structure her questions without going into why somebody should not get the death penalty which is tantamount to saying do you think the defendant should get the death penalty. The trial court's ruling was correct. A witness' opinion that a defendant should not be sentenced to death is not admissible at a death penalty proceeding. People v. Williams, 161 Ill.2d 1, 70, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296 (1994); People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 67, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840 (1984). Witnesses may testify concerning matters relating to the record and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of the offense, but not as to their opinions regarding the appropriate sentence. This determination is left to the sentencing authority based on the evidence adduced, and a witness' opinion thus is irrelevant. Williams, 161 Ill.2d at 70, 204 Ill.Dec. 72, 641 N.E.2d 296. The trial court drew exactly this distinction in sustaining the State's objection to the question. A witness giving reasons that a defendant should not be sentenced to death is implicitly arguing that the defendant should not be sentenced to death. The trial court correctly foreclosed this attempted end-run around the rule that witness opinions regarding the appropriate penalty are inadmissible. The court also made clear to defense counsel that the proper procedure was to elicit the facts from the witness and then use closing argument at the aggravation-mitigation phase to show the jury why the facts militated against a sentence of death. Thus, reversal on this ground is unwarranted.