Opinion ID: 203524
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of the formal categorical approach

Text: The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court committed error by classifying Herrick's 1995 Wisconsin conviction for motor vehicle homicide (vehicular homicide) as a crime of violence pursuant to Guidelines section 4B1.2(a). A crime of violence, as defined in the Guidelines, means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that 1. has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or 2. is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) (emphasis added). This court takes a two-step formal categorical approach to the question of whether a putative predicate felony constitutes a crime of violence under the Guidelines. See United States v. Teague, 469 F.3d 205, 208 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Richards, 456 F.3d 260, 262-63 (1st Cir.2006); United States v. Winn, 364 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir.2004). Pursuant to the first step, where a violation of the statute underlying the prior conviction necessarily involves every element of a violent felony, the mere fact of conviction establishes the putative predicate offense as a violent felony. Richards, 456 F.3d at 263 (citing Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990)). If, however, the underlying statute criminalizes conduct that would not constitute a violent felony as well as conduct that would constitute a violent felony, then the putative predicate offense qualifies as a violent felony only if the particular conviction actually embodied every element of a violent felony. Id. To apply this principle, the jury must find, or the defendant must admit (in the context of a guilty plea), all the elements of a violent felony. In applying this second step of the categorical approach, the court must restrict its review to the record of conviction. Id. Typically, the record includes the charging document, jury instructions, and verdict form, or in the context of a guilty plea, the written plea agreement and the transcript of the change-of-plea colloquy. Id. ( citing Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)). Herrick's 1995 conviction for motor vehicle homicide necessarily involves every element of a violent felony, thus meeting the first step of the two-prong categorical approach. The Wisconsin statute, entitled Homicide by negligent operation of vehicle, under which Herrick was convicted, provides as follows: 1. Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony. 2. Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony. WIS. STAT. § 940.10. The term negligent as used in Wis. STAT. § 940.10 is defined in Wis. Stat. § 939.25 as follows: 1. In this section, criminal negligence means ordinary negligence to a high degree, consisting of conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another, except that for purposes of ss. 940.08(2), 940.10(2) and 940.24(2), criminal negligence means ordinary negligence to a high degree, consisting of conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to an unborn child, to the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or to another. 2. If criminal negligence is an element of a crime in chs. 939 to 951 or s. 346.62, the negligence is indicated by the term negligent or negligently. WIS. STAT. § 939.25. Reading the two statutes together (section 940.10 and section 939.25), the Wisconsin motor vehicle homicide statute requires a determination that the accused was criminally negligent, defined as conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another. WIS. STAT. § 939.25. This definition of criminal negligence fits neatly within the Guidelines definition for crime of violence: conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). In fact, this court understands the Wisconsin definition of criminal negligence to be triggered at a higher risk threshold than that incorporated into the crime of violence definition. While both standards call for an objective determination, [3] criminal negligence applies only to conduct creating a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm, which necessarily includes conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury. The inverse is not true, however. Conduct posing a serious potential risk of physical injury does not necessarily rise to the level of risking death or great bodily harm. Thus, because criminal negligence is a required element for a conviction under the Wisconsin motor vehicle homicide statute, and a finding of criminal negligence necessarily meets the standard for a crime of violence, there is no need for us to undertake step two of the categorical analysis outlined above. There is no possible formulation of the Wisconsin motor vehicle homicide statute that would criminalize conduct that would not constitute a violent felony under the formal categorical approach to Guidelines. [4] The analysis, however, does not end there. On April 16, 2008, after the parties briefed this Court and presented their oral arguments, the Supreme Court decided Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008), introducing a new test for determining whether a prior felony qualifies as a violent felony pursuant to the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). Precedent in this circuit, as well as in others, requires the application of case law interpreting violent felony in ACCA to crime of violence in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) because of the substantial similarity of the two sections. See United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1, 6-7 (1st Cir.2008); United States v. Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 n. 3 (1st Cir.1994); see, e.g., United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir.2008) (holding on remand that a Florida conviction for carrying a concealed weapon is not a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(1) after the Eleventh Circuit's earlier opinion was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Begay ). Given the relevance of Begay to this case, we requested and received additional briefing from the parties. The application of Begay to this case is not as simple as placing a square peg in a square hole. Not only was the Begay opinion tailored to the crime at hand, New Mexico's Driving Under the Influence law, see Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1589 (describing the majority's position as a piecemeal, suspenseful, Scrabble-like approach to the interpretation of ACCA) (Scalia, J., concurring), but it was also a close decision. Williams, 529 F.3d at 7. Moreover, the Court used language subject to varying interpretations in its new test. As a starting point, the Begay majority posed a two-part question: is the crime at issue roughly similar in kind, as well as in degree of risk posed, to the example crimes listed immediately before the otherwise clause (i.e., burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving use of explosives)? [5] Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1585. There the Supreme Court assumed that the lower courts were correct in concluding that DUI presented the requisite level of risk. Id. at 1584. Nonetheless, the Court found that DUI was not a violent felony pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) because [i]t is simply too unlike the provision's listed examples[.] Id. In other words, although DUI was roughly similar in degree of risk posed, it was not roughly similar in kind. The Supreme Court elucidated the similar-in-kind requirement by finding that all of the examples typically involve purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct. [6] Id. at 1586 (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court went on to use purposeful interchangeably with intentional. Id. at 1587-88. Perhaps because it is common sense that a DUI is not violent or aggressive in an ordinary sense, the Supreme Court did not define those terms or explain in other than conclusory terms why a DUI was not violent or aggressive. We note, therefore, that aggressive may be defined as tending toward or exhibiting aggression, which in turn is defined as a forceful action or procedure (as an unprovoked attack) esp. when intended to dominate or master. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 24 (11th ed.2003). Violence may be defined as marked by extreme force or sudden intense activity. Id. at 1396. Regardless of possible nuance in meaning, we understand that all three types of conducti.e., purposeful, violent and aggressiveare necessary for a predicate crime to qualify as a violent felony under ACCA, or a crime of violence under the Guidelines. See United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, 975 (8th Cir.2008) (All characteristics should typically be present before an `otherwise' crime reaches the level of an example crime.). Applying the Begay standard to this case, we conclude that Wisconsin's vehicular homicide felony is not a crime of violence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). Based on the statutory definition of criminal negligence in Wisconsin, vehicular homicide meets if not exceeds the necessary degree of risk to be a crime of violence: it poses a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. It is not, however, similar in kind to the enumerated offenses. Although it is no doubt violent, as a typical vehicular homicide involves the death of a victim resulting from a forceful collision, it is not necessarily aggressive, a term that dovetails with purposeful because it involves a degree of intent. Intent, however, is not an element of Wisconsin's vehicular homicide provision. [7] To recap, vehicular homicide for purposes of the Wisconsin statute under which Herrick was convicted requires criminal negligence, defined as conduct that the actor should realize creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another. WIS. STAT. §§ 939.25, 940.10. This is an objective and not a subjective standard. State v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 223 Wis.2d 511, 522, 589 N.W.2d 668, 673 (1998) (Criminal negligence involves the same degree of risk as criminal recklessness-an unreasonable and substantial risk of death or great bodily harm. The difference between the two is that recklessness requires that the actor be subjectively aware of the risk, while criminal negligence requires only that the actor should have been aware of the risk-an objective standard.) ( quoting Knutson, 196 Wis.2d at 110, 537 N.W.2d at 428). Thus, it cannot be said that someone convicted of vehicular homicide under the Wisconsin statute knew of the risk involved in his or her conduct, nor can it be said that such a person intended to kill or expose others to risky conduct. Although vehicular homicide's mens rea of criminal negligence under this statute surpasses that of the DUI at issue in Begay, which the Supreme Court described as a strict liability crime, it is below that of other crimes that the Begay majority listed as crimes that do not fall under the residual clause. For example, the Begay court cited a federal statute penalizing those who recklessly tamper with consumer products as an example of a crime that would have qualified as a violent felony if there were no similar in kind requirement. Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1587 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a)). The Supreme Court also cited an Arkansas statute which penalizes those who recklessly cause pollution of the waters or air of the state as another example of a crime similar enough in risk but not in kind to fall under the test. Id. at 1587 (Ark.Code Ann. § 8-4-103(a)(2)(A)(ii)). Looking to these examples from Begay, the Second Circuit held that New York's reckless endangerment law does not qualify as a crime of violence under the Guidelines. United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128, 131-32 (2d Cir.2008) (analyzing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.)). As the Second Circuit explained, [r]eckless endangerment on its face does not criminalize purposeful or deliberate conduct. Id. at 132. This case does not require us to decide whether crimes with a recklessness mens rea could ever come within the residual clause. We conclude only that vehicular homicide involving criminal negligence does not involve the requisite purposeful, intentional or deliberate conduct. Accordingly, the vehicular homicide provision under which Herrick was convicted is not a crime of violence pursuant to the residual clause of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a). [8]