Opinion ID: 1171916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: intent of the defendant.

Text: Keith contends the death penalty is excessive or disproportionate for a charge of aggravated kidnapping when that charge fails to allege he intentionally took a life. Count V of the information charged defendant with aggravated kidnapping and stated: [D]efendant DAVID CAMERON KEITH, committed the offense of aggravated kidnapping as specified in MCA § 45-5-303, when he purposely or knowingly and without lawful authority restrained HARRY LEE SHRYOCK, JR., by using or threatening to use physical force with the purposes of using HARRY LEE SHRYOCK, JR., as a shield or hostage and/or to facilitate the commission of several felonies or the flight thereafter. The defendant used a handgun in the commission of this offense and his conduct as described in this Count resulted in the death of HARRY LEE SHRYOCK, JR. Following Keith's guilty plea to the above charge, the District Court determined Keith was eligible for the death penalty because the charge was aggravated kidnapping which resulted in the death of the victim and there were no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. See §§ 46-18-303, -304, and -305, MCA. Keith's argument is that the language in the information fails to charge him with intentionally killing the victim. Keith argues the death penalty is excessive and disproportionate under Count V because he did not specifically plead guilty to any intentional conduct regarding the death of the victim. Defendant concludes that without this element of intent, the death penalty is excessive and disproportionate, resulting in cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of due process. In short, Keith alleges that an intentional killing is a constitutionally essential element if the death penalty is to be imposed. Defendant notes he did plead guilty to purposely or knowingly causing the death of his victim under Count VI (Deliberate Homicide), but argues that the mental state of Count VI should not be incorporated into Count V. However, Keith's contention merely confuses the issue by playing a shell game with the counts contained in the information. Keith entered guilty pleas to five crimes and makes no allegations that the information is incorrectly drafted in regards to those crimes. Subsequent to those guilty pleas and as he enters the sentencing phase of the trial process, the sentencing judge is allowed to consider a wide variety of factors. Section 46-18-302, MCA. It would be an injustice to prohibit the District Court from considering the fact that Keith plead guilty to deliberate homicide, when deciding whether capital punishment was appropriate for the aggravated kidnapping which resulted in the death of the victim. Even assuming Keith is correct and that the District Court can only look solely to the language contained in the count which charges an aggravated kidnapping of Harry Shryock, there is still no absolute prohibition from implementing the death penalty on that count. Keith is correct in stating that there are certain crimes for which the Constitution will not allow a death penalty. See, Coker v. Georgia (1977), 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (capital punishment is excessive and therefore unconstitutional if imposed for the charge of rape alone). However, we do not believe that capital punishment is constitutionally prohibited in all cases unless the defendant is responsible for an intentional killing. As support for his argument, Keith cites Enmund v. Florida (1982), 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d. 1140. Enmund involved the question of accomplice liability in situations where an accomplice did not directly participate in a murder, but only assisted the murderer in his escape from the scene of the crime. A death sentence for such an accomplice who did not intend to commit a homicide was rejected. The Court noted that capital punishment will probably serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and deliberation. 458 U.S. at 799, 102 S.Ct. at 3377. (quoting Fisher v. United States (1946), 328 U.S. 463, 484, 66 S.Ct. 1318, 1328, 90 L.Ed. 1382, (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). However, the Court indicated a substantial limitation by stating: It would be very different if the likelihood of a killing in the course of a robbery were so substantial that one should share the blame for the killing if he somehow participated in the felony. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799, 102 S.Ct. at 1377. The limited nature of Enmund is highlighted by the more recent case of Tison v. Arizona (1987), ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127. Tison involved the imposition of capital punishment against accomplices who were substantially involved in the commission of four homicides, but did not actually commit homicide themselves. The Court held that major participation in a felony murder charge, combined with a reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. Both Enmund and Tison can be distinguished from the present facts, since both address whether the death penalty is appropriate for an accomplice who did not actually take a life but assisted in a crime with that result. In contrast, defendant Keith has obviously taken a life himself. However, the cases are useful in analyzing whether capital punishment is an excessive or disproportionate penalty when the charging document does not specifically allege an intent to kill by the defendant for the particular crime that generated a death sentence. We believe that the cases demonstrate the United States Supreme Court has not absolutely prohibited capital punishment in such situations. Furthermore, this Court decided this precise issue in McKenzie v. Osborne (1981), 195 Mont. 26, 47, 48, 640 P.2d 368, 381. In that case, defendant challenged his death sentence for his conviction of aggravated kidnapping by stating that there was never any finding by the jury that he deliberately took the life of his victim. Defendant contended that capital punishment was unconstitutionally disproportionate for the crime of aggravated kidnapping because there was no charge or finding that he had an intent to kill. 195 Mont. at 47, 48, 640 P.2d at 381. [1] We rejected that contention in McKenzie v. Osborne, supra, and we reject it once again here. Capital punishment is not invariably disproportionate to the crime when a life has been taken by the offender. 195 Mont. at 48, 640 P.2d at 381. See also, Gregg v. Georgia (1976), 428 U.S. 153, 187, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 882. Defendant Keith entered a plea of guilty to a charge of aggravated kidnapping which resulted in the death of his victim. We conclude that capital punishment is not invariably disproportionate in such a case. Finally, Keith argues that the statutory aggravating circumstance of § 46-18-303(7), MCA, fails to properly narrow the class of defendants eligible for the death penalty. Keith relies on Zant v. Stephens (1983), 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, and states that an aggravating circumstance must narrow the class of people eligible for the death penalty and reasonably justify the more severe sentence. 462 U.S. at 877, 103 S.Ct. at 2742. Keith contends that the aggravating circumstance of § 46-18-303(7), MCA (an aggravated kidnapping resulting in the death of the victim), fails to perform this task. Keith reasons that this aggravating circumstance fails to narrow the class of defendants eligible for capital punishment because every aggravated kidnapping resulting in the death of the victim qualifies for the death penalty regardless of whether or not the defendant desired the resulting death. Keith states this particular aggravating circumstance does not reserve the punishment to extreme cases or to those particularly severe crimes for which the death penalty is particularly appropriate. He concludes that this aggravating circumstance fails to narrow the applicability of capital punishment to those few defendants truly deserving such punishment. Keith's argument is misplaced and is logically incorrect. He ignores the wording of the statutes. Section 45-5-303, MCA, defines the offense of kidnapping for the purposes of the present case as follows: A person commits the offense of aggravated kidnapping if he knowingly or purposely and without lawful authority restrains another person ... by using . .. physical force, with any of the following purposes: (a) to hold for ransom or reward or as a shield or hostage; ... In itself the statute points out that aggravated kidnapping was the result when Keith restrained Shryock by the use of physical force in order to hold him as a shield and hostage. The facts clearly demonstrate aggravated kidnapping as defined in this section. At this point, the sentence of death may be imposed pursuant to § 45-5-303(2), MCA. The court is required by § 46-18-301, MCA, to hold a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether further aggravating circumstances exist. Section 46-18-303, MCA, defines aggravating circumstances for this purpose as: Aggravating circumstances are any of the following: ..... (7) the offense was aggravated kidnaping which resulted in the death of the victim ... ..... Clearly the aggravating circumstance is the death of the victim which of course goes substantially beyond the aggravated kidnapping itself. Certainly the death of the victim is a statutory factor which narrows the cases in which capital punishment might be applicable. We conclude this meets the test set forth in Zant. The United States Supreme Court recently explained this test as follows: [T]he use of aggravating circumstances, is not an end in itself, but a means of genuinely narrowing the class of death-eligible persons and thereby channeling the [sentencer's] discretion. Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988), ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 546, 554, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (affirming the proposition that a sentence of death may validly rest upon a single aggravating circumstance even though that aggravating circumstance is a necessary element of the underlying offense of first degree murder). We specifically hold that § 46-18-303(7), MCA, genuinely narrows the class of death-eligible persons and is an appropriate aggravating circumstance for the death penalty. In addition, we point out that the District Court was required to consider whether any of the mitigating circumstances of § 46-18-304, MCA, would apply. These circumstances of course may have a narrowing effect if any of them are present.