Opinion ID: 4525130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Decision to Call Codefendant to Testify

Text: McFadden argues his counsel were ineffective in calling Codefendant to testify because, prior to his testimony at trial, Codefendant’s plea counsel told McFadden’s counsel that Codefendant would never testify contrary to his guilty plea that he and McFadden shot Victim. 4 Despite this information, counsel called Codefendant, who testified he and McFadden shot Victim. McFadden alleges counsel were ineffective for calling Codefendant to testify because (1) Codefendant’s testimony was harmful to the defense’s case, especially in light of Silas’ testimony that he did not see McFadden shoot Victim, and (2) by calling Codefendant to testify, counsel effectively conceded McFadden’s guilt. Although counsel were aware that Codefendant might testify McFadden was the second shooter – testimony that would be harmful to the defense’s case – counsel recognized that Codefendant’s testimony to that effect could be impeached with his prior inconsistent statements that Codefendant’s brother – and not McFadden – was the second 4 The same two counsel represented McFadden in both trials for the murder of Victim. 5 shooter. McFadden argues Silas’ testimony sufficiently established that McFadden did not shoot victim, eliminating any need to call Codefendant. But Silas’ testimony about this issue was unclear at best. Silas testified at trial that he was walking in Pine Lawn with Victim when they encountered McFadden and Codefendant. The remainder of much of Silas’ testimony consisted of claims of lack of memory. At various points, he testified that he did not know if someone was shot and that he simply heard shots and ran. In a recorded statement to police on the day of the incident, Silas reported McFadden was the second shooter. After the jury heard this recording, Silas testified he fabricated this statement in an effort to leave the police station. Accordingly, the record reflects Silas’ inconsistent and wavering testimony did not establish that McFadden did not shoot victim. At the postconviction hearing, counsel testified they believed calling Codefendant would aid McFadden’s case, as his testimony was the only way for the jury to hear the theory that Codefendant’s brother may have been the second shooter. Indeed, counsel elicited other helpful statements from Codefendant, including testimony that Codefendant entered a plea and did not receive the maximum sentence even though the State was seeking the death penalty for McFadden’s role in the same murder. As counsel made an informed, strategic decision to call Codefendant as a witness, the circuit court did not clearly err in finding counsel’s decision reasonable. Johnson v. State, 333 S.W.3d 459, 467 (Mo. banc 2011). McFadden also argues that, by calling Codefendant to testify, counsel violated his right to maintain his innocence by effectively conceding guilt. But this claim is not 6 preserved, as it was not raised in his Rule 29.15 motion. Shockley v. State, 579 S.W.3d 881, 899 (Mo. banc 2019). As “there is no plain error review in appeals from postconviction judgments for claims that were not presented in the post-conviction motion,” this Court cannot address this claim. Id. B. Failure to Impeach Codefendant with His Rule 24.035 Motion McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel ineffective for not using Codefendant’s pro se Rule 24.035 motion to impeach Codefendant’s testimony. In that motion, Codefendant asserted he was not present when Victim was shot. Although the circuit court took judicial notice of Codefendant’s Rule 24.035 motion, postconviction counsel failed to ask counsel for an explanation why they did not impeach Codefendant with the motion. It is presumed that counsel’s decision not to impeach a witness is a matter of trial strategy. Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 750 (Mo. banc 2014). Accordingly, McFadden “failed to provide the motion court with any basis for concluding that counsel did not have a strategic purpose.” Helmig v. State, 42 S.W.3d 658, 676 (Mo. App. 2001). Further, as the circuit court found, it was reasonable for counsel not to question Codefendant about the motion, as the motion’s substance did not support the defense’s strategy. The defense sought to prove McFadden’s innocence through evidence that Codefendant and his brother killed Victim. A statement by Codefendant that Codefendant was not involved in the shooting would be inconsistent with the defense’s position. Although McFadden may be correct that it would have been reasonable strategy 7 for counsel to impeach Codefendant using the motion, “[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel to pursue one reasonable trial strategy to the exclusion of another reasonable trial strategy.” Anderson v. State, 196 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Mo. banc 2006). Because McFadden has failed to overcome the presumption that counsel’s decision not to impeach Codefendant was reasonable trial strategy, the circuit court did not clearly err in denying this claim. C. Failure to Object to the State’s Introduction of Letters Exchanged between McFadden and Codefendant McFadden argues that the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel ineffective for not objecting to the admission of letters that McFadden and Codefendant exchanged while both individuals were in jail. McFadden asserts the letters written by Codefendant were inadmissible as hearsay and irrelevant evidence. Further, McFadden claims the letters he wrote were inadmissible as irrelevant. Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered as “evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” State v. Reed, 282 S.W.3d 835, 837 (Mo. banc 2009). Generally, hearsay is excluded because “the out-of-court statement is not subject to crossexamination, is not offered under oath, and the fact-finder is not able to judge the declarant’s demeanor and credibility as a witness.” State v. Link, 25 S.W.3d 136, 145 (Mo. banc 2000). When a declarant testifies live and under oath, “the dangers of hearsay are largely non-existent.” State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Mo. banc 2006). For this reason, prejudice cannot be found from the admission of hearsay evidence if the 8 declarant “was also a witness at trial, testified on the same matter, and was subject to cross-examination.” State v. Tindle, 395 S.W.3d 56, 63 (Mo. App. 2013). When the circuit court admitted the letters into evidence, it expressly ruled the letters could not be read to the jury unless Codefendant testified. Codefendant later testified, during which he admitted exchanging letters with McFadden. Because Codefendant testified at trial regarding the letters and was subject to cross-examination on the matter, McFadden was not prejudiced by the admission of the letters written by Codefendant. McFadden also asserts both sets of letters were inadmissible because they were irrelevant. To be admissible, evidence must be both logically and legally relevant. State v. Anderson, 306 S.W.3d 529, 538 (Mo. banc 2010). Evidence is logically relevant when it “tends to make the existence of a material fact more or less probable.” Id. Evidence is legally relevant when its probative value outweighs its costs, such as “unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.” Id. The State asserts the letters were admitted to establish that McFadden was attempting to persuade Codefendant to conceal McFadden’s involvement in the shooting, showing McFadden’s consciousness of guilt. For example, one of McFadden’s letters asked Codefendant to “[j]ust hold fast,” and one of Codefendant’s letters stated, “[T]ell your lawyer to put me on the stand because I know you wasn’t there and I’m willing to testify on your behalf.” The letters showed McFadden was communicating with Codefendant, making more probable the State’s argument that McFadden persuaded Codefendant to cover up McFadden’s involvement in the shooting. 9 McFadden further argues the phrases in the letters suggesting gang affiliation – such as “Love-N-Loyalty;” “Love is love. Loyalty is royalty;” and “Yung Hood” – caused unfair prejudice. But these phrases are vague in nature and not so prejudicial as to outweigh the letters’ probative value. See State v. Davidson, 242 S.W.3d 409, 415 (Mo. App. 2007) (“Where, as here, there is no reference to any specific criminal act committed either by the defendant or by any gang to which the defendant might belong, admission of such a vague reference . . . does not support a claim of reversible error.”). Accordingly, any objection by counsel regarding the relevance of the letters would have been meritless. Because McFadden has failed to prove that counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the letters resulted in prejudice, the circuit court did not clearly err in denying these claims. D. Failure to Object to the State’s Introduction of Identification and Fingerprint Evidence McFadden argues the circuit court clearly erred in failing to find counsel ineffective for not objecting to the State’s introduction of evidence demonstrating (1) Silas identified McFadden using a photograph on the wall at the police station and (2) fingerprints on a cigar wrapper found at the crime scene matched “on file” fingerprints belonging to McFadden. McFadden argues this evidence was inadmissible because it created the inference he had a criminal record or was in trouble with the police. “[P]roof of the commission of separate and distinct crimes is not admissible, unless such proof has some legitimate tendency to directly establish the defendant’s guilt of the charge for which he is on trial.” State v. Shilkett, 204 S.W.2d 920, 922-23 (Mo. 1947). 10
At trial, the State played Silas’ recorded statement to police, in which he identified McFadden by using the photograph from the police station wall. A police officer and detective also testified Silas used the photograph to identify McFadden. These references to the photograph were not made to indicate McFadden had committed prior bad acts or uncharged crimes. There were no references to the photograph as a “wanted” photograph and no explanation was provided for the photograph’s presence. There was no evidence linking McFadden’s photograph to other crimes he may or may not have committed. See State v. Carr, 50 S.W.3d 848, 857 (Mo. App. 2001) (requiring defendant, who alleged the State’s use of the term “mug shots” and reference to photographs on file with the police department indicated prior criminal activity, to demonstrate photographs maintained by the police department were solely of persons who committed prior crimes, or that the average juror believes same, to satisfy burden of involvement in prior criminal activity); Nunn v. State, 755 S.W.2d 269, 272 (Mo. App. 1988) (finding an officer testifying he saw defendant’s photograph at roll call was not suggestion that defendant had a criminal record when there was no actual evidence of other crimes). Even if the references to the photograph on the wall demonstrated McFadden committed prior crimes, “otherwise inadmissible evidence may be admitted . . . if it tends to establish . . . the identity of the person charged with commission of the crime on trial.” State v. Primm, 347 S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 2011). Because the references to the photograph were for the purpose of identification, there would have been no merit to an objection to the admission of this evidence. See Clay, 975 S.W.2d at 135. The circuit 11 court did not clearly err in failing to find counsel were ineffective for not objecting to the State’s presentation of evidence that Silas identified McFadden in a photograph on the wall at the police station. 2. Failure to Object to the Match of On-file Fingerprints A fingerprint examiner obtained a fingerprint from a cigar wrapper found near Victim’s body. The examiner testified that, after a comparison to prints on file in the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), he determined it was a match to McFadden’s fingerprints. “Fingerprint cards, in and of themselves, do not constitute evidence of a prior crime.” State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 111 (Mo. banc 1998). This Court finds the on-file fingerprints in this case to be analogous. The examiner’s testimony was neutral. He did not testify that McFadden’s fingerprints on file were obtained pursuant to an arrest, conviction of a crime, or negative interaction with law enforcement. The examiner merely testified about the procedure used. Because the evidence of the on-file fingerprint was referenced in the context of explaining the procedure for the match and did not, absent something more, raise an inference of prior criminal activity, there would have been no merit to the objection. The circuit court did not clearly err in failing to find counsel ineffective for not objecting to evidence that the fingerprint found at the murder scene matched one of McFadden’s on-file fingerprints. 12