Opinion ID: 697890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Firing Procedures.

Text: 27 As noted above, district courts sitting in diversity actions must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Klaxon Co., 313 U.S. at 496; Erie, 304 U.S. at 80. When a cause of action is contractual in nature, Virginia choice of law rules generally require the contract to be governed by the law of the place where the contract was made. E.g., Ryder Truck Rental, 790 F.Supp. at 641. However, if the contract is made in one state but is to be performed in a different state, the governing law is the place of performance. E.g., Ryder, 790 F.Supp. at 642; Sneed v. Am. Bank Stationary Co., 764 F.Supp. 65, 67 (W.D.Va.1991). An exception exists if the contract is to be performed approximately equally among two or more states, in which case the law of the state in which the contract was formed should apply. Ryder, 790 F.Supp. at 642; Roberts v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 687 F.Supp. 239, 241 (W.D.Va.1988). 28 Boginis' claim that he was entitled in his termination to the standard operating procedures contained in MORI's personnel policy statements is a claim sounding in contract. See Woolley v. Hoffman-Laroche, Inc., 99 N.J. 284, 491 A.2d 1257, passim (1985) (analyzing claim under principles of contract). When Boginis and MORI executed the modifications of Boginis' employment contract for the New Jersey position, both parties intended that the contract would be performed in New Jersey. Therefore, New Jersey law controls. 29 In 1985, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided the seminal case of Woolley v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc, 491 A.2d 1257. The facts of that case were as follows: An employer had a policy manual which was widely disseminated to employees at all levels and which provided that certain job termination procedures would be used for firing employees. An employee who, like most employees of the employer, had no individual employment contract, was fired without use of the procedures. The New Jersey Supreme Court held that the employer may have violated an implied contract created by the policy manual when it failed to use the procedures, and remanded for a determination as to whether the reasonable expectation of employees was that the termination policies in the manual would be followed. 491 A.2d at 1264. The court explained: 30 [W]hen an employer of a substantial number of employees circulates a manual that, when fairly read, provides that certain benefits are an incident of the employment (including, especially, job security provisions), the judiciary, instead of grudgingly conceding enforceability of those provisions, should construe them in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the employees. 31 Id. (citation omitted). According to Woolley, the meaning of such a manual must be determined by considering the probable context in which it was disseminated and the environment surrounding its continued existence. Id. at 1265. The Woolley court concluded that provisions of an employer manual concerning job security shall be considered binding unless the manual elsewhere prominently and unmistakably indicates that those provisions shall not be binding or unless there is some other similar proof of the employer's intent not to be bound. Id. at 1270. 32 In Ware v. Prudential Insurance Co., 220 N.J.Super. 135, 531 A.2d 757, 760 (1987), cert. denied, 113 N.J. 335, 550 A.2d 450 (1988), a New Jersey court found that Woolley did not extend to a case in which the employee had an individual employment contract which explicitly stated that the employee was employed at will and which contained an integration clause. The New Jersey court in Ware found that the reasonable expectation of the management employee who had been fired without the process described in the employer's policy manual, was that the manual would not apply to his position, but rather to non-management employees only. 531 A.2d at 760. On the other hand, in Preston v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 231 N.J.Super. 81, 555 A.2d 12, 15 (1989), a New Jersey court found that an employer's dissemination of a statement that it was not contractually bound by its policies was not sufficient to constitute that type of clear and unmistakable indication that the provisions of the handbook would not be binding as required by Woolley . The Preston opinion stated that in order to disclaim a good cause termination requirement in the employee handbook, the employer must state in a prominent disclaimer that the employer continues to have the absolute power to fire anyone with or without good cause. 555 A.2d at 15-16. 33 The instant case appears to fall between Ware and Preston. Viewing the facts in accordance with the summary judgment standard, Boginis has shown that he was not fired as part of a layoff. 2 He has shown that MORI fired him without adhering to the procedures outlined in their written and widely-disseminated policy handbook, as testified to by MORI's Human Resources employee (Callahan) and as admitted to by Cervasio, who actually fired Boginis. Callahan stated that the policy applied to managers, and Cervasio stated that it applied specifically to Boginis. However, Boginis' written individual contract does not contain any statement in regards to firing procedures, yet contains an integration clause similar to the clause in Ware. Thus the question presented is whether an individual employment contract which does not refer to firing policies but contains an integration clause meets the Woolley exception as some other similar proof of the employer's intent not to be bound, 491 A.2d at 1270. 34 There is conflicting evidence as to whether the integration clause in Boginis' contract was the type of employer disclaimer which a reasonable employee would understand to demonstrate MORI's intent not to be bound by its personnel policies. Boginis admitted that when he initially read the contract and the integration clause, which contract was modified for his New Jersey position to include any changes in standard operating procedures, he understood himself to be hired as an at-will employee. Only later, when he himself was required to follow the personnel procedures in order to fire employees, did he come to discover the policy. Cervasio and Callahan, however, admitted that MORI had a duty to follow the personnel policies, indicating that MORI had not disclaimed the procedures as to Boginis. In light of the conflicting evidence of the employer's intent and the employee's reasonable expectations here, the issue should be sent to a jury. As noted by a New Jersey court in Shebar v. Sanyo Business Systems Corp., 35 We conclude that the thrust of the Woolley holding and the rationale, as well as the public policy on which it is based, is directed to the existence of an employer's general policy rather than the form in which it is expressed. The difference between a manual or handbook policy and a policy otherwise expressed presents, in our view, an issue of proof rather than of substance. 36 218 N.J.Super. 111, 526 A.2d 1144, 1148-49 (1989), aff'd 111 N.J. 276, 544 A.2d 377 (1988). Just as the issue of whether a policy is disseminated such that a reasonable employee would view it as binding is an issue for the jury, the issue of whether a disclaimer, in whatever form it might be, demonstrates to reasonable employees the employer's intent not to be bound, is an issue for the jury. See Preston, 555 A.2d at 15 (noting that it is within the province of the jury to determine whether the employer had clearly indicated that it would not be bound by employee handbook provisions). Thus, we reverse summary judgment as to Boginis' claim of contractual breach by failure to follow personnel procedures, and remand for trial. 37