Opinion ID: 2423727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Exceptions and Recommended Sanctions

Text: Petitioner did not file exceptions to the hearing judge's findings or conclusions of law, however, Respondent did file exceptions [9] and a supplement to those exceptions. As to sanction, Petitioner recommends that we impose a 60-day suspension because Respondent engaged in conduct that was both disruptive and prejudicial to the administration of justice. To the contrary, Respondent does not believe that his conduct is sanctionable because, in Respondent's view, his intent and efforts were always to protect his client from a prosecution that would have been contrary to the law. Thus, according to Respondent, we should refer his case back to a Peer Review Panel for its further consideration. As to Respondent's written exceptions to Judge Thompson's findings of fact and conclusions of law, he first contends that the professional misconduct, alleged to have occurred, never happened. In addition, he asserts that he has been deprived of his opportunity to present a defense and Due Process. Further, Respondent maintains that he never provided a disservice to his client and the allegation that he engaged in conduct intended to be wasteful of judicial resources was never charged. In support of his argument that the Petition does not mention he wasted judicial resources, Respondent refers to paragraph 11 of the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, which alleges that [d]uring the proceedings, Respondent was advised by the Court that he was to return with his client for a hearing later in the day[,] and paragraph 12, which alleges that Respondent failed to comply with the Court's direction. In its response to the first exception, Bar Counsel points out that, based upon the allegations contained in the Petition filed in this case, Respondent was on notice that he needed to defend against the allegation that he did not comply with the Court's direction and that he was not free to leave the courtroom or excused from the rest of the hearing. In addition, Bar Counsel asserts that, the Petition alleged misconduct related to Respondent's actions on May 15, 2008, and his representation of Paz-Rubio, wherein Respondent interrupted the proceedings, disrespected the trial judge and left the courtroom before the proceedings had concluded. The specific charge contained in the Petition was a violation of MRPC 8.4(d): It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. . . . Respondent does not contend that Judge Thompson's factual findings were clearly erroneous. See AGC v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 418-19, 969 A.2d 1010, 1019 (2009). Instead, he appears to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence offered against him. In our view, it is of no consequence that the Petition failed to allege that Respondent's conduct wasted judicial resources. There were sufficient facts presented for the hearing judge to conclude that Respondent's behavior wasted judicial resources. Judge Thompson concluded, as a matter of law, that Respondent's conduct was inexcusable, wasted judicial resources and was prejudicial to the administration of justice. In view of the specific allegations in the Petition and the abundance of evidence before the hearing court, we find no merit to Respondent's first exception. Next, Respondent excepts on the ground that the evidence was not clear and convincing that he heard and could appreciate the direction and comment of Judge Ambrose. Respondent does not fare any better on the merits of this exception than on the merits of his first exception. The hearing judge found that when Respondent left the courtroom he was engaged in dialogue with Judge Ambrose. As he was leaving the courtroom, the judge instructed him to remain because the case was not concluded. The instructions to remain in the courtroom were given to Respondent when he was approximately a distance of 40 feet from Judge Ambrose. Judge Thompson listened to the taped recording of the proceedings that took place in Judge Ambrose's courtroom. He concluded that Judge Ambrose's statements to Respondent and his client c[ould] be clearly heard. This fact was confirmed by the Prosecutor who testified that Judge Ambrose spoke loudly at the time she instructed Respondent that he was not excused and that Paz-Rubio was directed to remain and the case was not concluded. Respondent presents no factual or legal basis for us to disturb the factual findings or legal conclusions of the hearing judge. AGC v. Tanko, 408 Md. at 418-19, 969 A.2d at 1019 (noting that the hearing judge is in the best position to resolve questions of credibility of witnesses); AGC v. Dunietz, 368 Md. 419, 427-28, 795 A.2d 706, 711 (2002) (noting that a hearing judge's findings of fact are prima facie correct and will not be disturbed unless clearly erroneous). He points to no specific place in the record to support the conclusion that he did not hear or appreciate Judge Ambrose's directions. Nothing in Judge Ambrose's directions to him on May 15, 2008 or her testimony at Respondent's disciplinary hearing supports the conclusion that Respondent did not hear or appreciate Judge Ambrose's directions to Respondent and his client on May 15. Accordingly, we overrule Respondent's second exception. As to Respondent's third exception, he contends that the record does not support Judge Thompson's conclusion that Paz-Rubio suffered any anxiety as a result of Respondent's conduct. Respondent maintains that at no time was his client deprived of competent and effective representation, even for an instant. Judge Thompson's conclusion that Paz-Rubio suffered anxiety is a reasonable inference from the circumstances that occurred on May 15, 2008. Also, the hearing judge's conclusion that Respondent failed to act in his client's best interest is firmly supported by clear and convincing evidence on the record. Judge Thompson stated: The departure of Respondent from the courtroom also constituted a breach of ethical responsibility to Respondent's client. One can only imagine the anxiety, uncertainty, and bewilderment of Paz-Rubio when his attorney walked out on the very authority that was to decide this important issue to the defendant. Even though the Respondent offered to provide legal services to deal with the consequences of his behavior, or to obtain another attorney at no further expense to his client, Respondent subordinated his responsibility to his client to his own desire to `make a statement' by leaving the courtroom and advancing Respondent's agenda of showing Judge Ambrose that he was correct about the entry of a stet disposition. By doing so, Respondent misapprehended his role in the courtroom. Respondent wanted to validate the State's right to place the case on the stet docket without the Court's approval. Asserting a right for the `benefit' of the State is not defense counsel's obligation or duty. Rather, Respondent should have been doing what was possible and ethical to obtain the best result for his client. According to Respondent's deposition testimony, he intended to vindicate and to validate the State's right to stet a case without the trial court's approval. The record of the proceedings before Judge Ambrose reveals that Respondent left the courtroom before the case was over and left his client seated in the courtroom. Respondent rejects the conclusion that he abandoned his client. Yet, he offers no credible response to Bar Counsel's observation that, Respondent had no way of knowing before he left the courtroom that a recess would be called or that his client would have an opportunity to speak with him prior to the resumption of the hearing. Thus, we overrule Respondent's third exception. Respondent's next exception is that Judge Thompson erred because he minimized the significance of the collateral consequences to Paz-Rubio in not obtaining a stet and also erred in restricting Respondent's examination of Judge Ambrose and Assistant State's Attorney Craven. Respondent maintains that Judge Thompson further erred by discrediting the newspaper articles that Respondent offered into evidence. According to Respondent, his client faced the risk of detention and deportation if he were to be convicted of driving without a license and, in Respondent's words, the collateral consequences were disproportionate to the traffic offense itself. During the hearing, Judge Thompson commented that Respondent's concerns about the [collateral consequences] were hyperbole. Respondent takes issue with this comment. In addition, Respondent contends that the judge gave little or no weight to the number of deportation detainers placed on criminal defendants in Frederick County, that the Sheriff of [Frederick County] has deported people, and that the Sheriff has implemented an aggressive deportation policy. Respondent's arguments are not persuasive. There is no requirement that the hearing judge adopt Respondent's theory of the case. The judge is at liberty to pick and choose what evidence to believe and what evidence to disbelieve, as well as what weight to give (or not) to any piece of evidence. If evidence is not relevant or competent, the evidence is not admissible. The deportation policies of the Sheriff of Frederick County are not relevant to this case. The primary issue in this case is Respondent's conduct in open court on May 15. Respondent's reasons for pursuing that course of action before Judge Ambrose, even if noble, did not and could not have justified the mis-guided and ill-founded methods he chose to disrupt or terminate the traffic case pending before Judge Ambrose. Therefore, the exception is overruled. As to Respondent's fifth exception, he maintains that Judge Thompson erred by ignoring Respondent's intention to obtain a stet for his client, and that there was established authority to support Respondent's view that his client was entitled to a stet disposition without prior court approval. Again, Respondent's view of the matter is short sighted. We pointed out in Usiak v. State, 413 Md. at 388, n. 5, 993 A.2d at 41, n. 5 that Respondent's interpretation of Maryland Rule 4-248, that the court has no authority or discretion other than to grant the State's motion to stet, is plainly wrong. Even if Respondent's interpretation of the Rule were correct and existing case law supported his position, the conduct that he displayed before Judge Ambrose was not justified and clearly violated MRPC 8.4(d). Accordingly, the exception is overruled. Finally, Respondent excepts to the hearing judge's failure to allow Respondent to introduce into evidence a transcript to show Judge Ambrose's resentment toward Respondent and Judge Ambrose's disregard for his client's right to effective representation. Respondent maintains that the hearing judge's ruling in that regard severely restricted Respondent's right to cross-examine Judge Ambrose. Again, Respondent loses sight of the issues in this case. When we consider Respondent's conversations with the Prosecutor and his announced plan to walk out on the judge if she did not grant the stet, Respondent's conduct and motivation, rather than the motivation or animosity that the trial judge held toward Respondent, is relevant. For whatever it is worth, Judge Thompson commented in his written findings under the category entitled, Mitigation, that the history between Judge Ambrose and Respondent played a role in this incident, but should not have. Judge Thompson concluded, however, that Respondent appears to have wanted to prevail over Judge Ambrose personally. Moreover, the transcript that Respondent offered into evidence involved an unrelated case and had no bearing on Respondent's conduct or motivation for his courtroom behavior in this case. Judge Thompson did not err in refusing to admit irrelevant evidence or limit Respondent's cross-examination of Judge Ambrose to matters that were relevant. We overrule Respondent's sixth exception, as well as his supplement to the exceptions, which was no more than a restatement of the exceptions filed in this case.