Opinion ID: 2615014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards for Determining Sanctions

Text: This court gives great weight to the recommendations of the committee and commission; however, we are ultimately responsible for determining the appropriate sanctions. In re Lincoln, 165 Ariz. 233, 235, 798 P.2d 371, 373 (1990); In re Neville, 147 Ariz. 106, 108, 708 P.2d 1297, 1299 (1985). In making that determination, we are guided by the purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is not to punish the lawyer, but to protect the public and deter similar conduct by other lawyers. In re Rivkind, 164 Ariz. 154, 157, 791 P.2d 1037, 1040 (1990). An additional goal of the disciplinary system is to preserve the public's confidence in the integrity of the bar. In re Hoover, 161 Ariz. 529, 534, 779 P.2d 1268, 1273 (1989). For further assistance, we may look to the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986) ( Standards ), which we consider a useful tool in determining the proper sanction. In re Cardenas, 164 Ariz. 149, 152, 791 P.2d 1032, 1035 (1990). Under the Standards, before imposing sanctions the court should consider: (a) the duty violated; (b) the lawyer's mental state; and (c) the potential or actual injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (d) the existence of aggravating or mitigating factors. Standard 3.0; see In re Anderson, 163 Ariz. 362, 365, 788 P.2d 95, 98 (1990). In this case, the nature of the duty violated was respondent's abuse of the legal process. Standard 6.2 applies to such ethical violations. The subsections of that standard establish what the appropriate sanctions should be based on respondent's state of mind and the extent of injury to others. Thus, disbarment is appropriate when the violation is intentionally committed. See Standard 6.21, Commentary. Likewise, suspension is appropriate when a lawyer knows that he is violating a court order or rule, and there is injury or potential injury to a client or a party, or interference or potential interference with a legal proceeding. Standard 6.22 (emphasis added). If the violation is merely the result of negligence, reprimand is generally appropriate. Standard 6.23. The committee addressed respondent's state of mind as follows: Unfortunately the Respondent has engaged in a near decade long quest to make Harris and Palumbo pay for imagined faults, breaches and lapses. There is no evidence that Harris, Palumbo or the other individuals and entities which suffered as defendants in suits prosecuted by Respondent deserved to be pursued for anything.... The Committee is simply astounded that Respondent did not wake up to his blind spot when faced with sanction after sanction and rebuke after rebuke over a period of many years. We have previously held that actual knowledge of a frivolous litigation may be inferred from the circumstances. See section III(A), supra. Although the committee found evidence that respondent sincerely disagreed with most of the court rulings against him, the commission concluded that: Respondent justified many of his acts by his reliance on his client's instructions. Respondent, with his many years of experience in the legal profession, knows, or should know, that improper conduct, whether or not directed by a client, constitutes improper conduct. The commission rejected respondent's argument that he did not possess the requisite knowledge to receive a sanction of suspension. We agree that the evidence in this record is clear and convincing that respondent knowingly pursued frivolous claims. Respondent was repeatedly sanctioned at every judicial level for his objectively groundless claims; whether those rulings were substantively correct or not, they would certainly give a reasonable lawyer conscious awareness that his continuing conduct based on the same claims might be considered culpable under the ethical rules. See Hazard, supra, at 331. Thus, despite respondent's protestation of his sincerity in making these claims, we can infer sufficient knowledge that suspension is warranted under the standard. Moreover, we agree with bar counsel that the committee's characterization of respondent's blind spot was in reference to his lack of objectivity in any actions regarding Harris, rather than a reference to a lack of knowledge that he may have been violating an ethical rule. We also agree that respondent's action resulted in injury to others during the nine years of multiple litigations involved in this matter. As the committee pointed out: The violations resulted in hundreds of thousands of dollars of legal fees being expended in the defense of frivolous lawsuits, the waste of the untold hours of judicial time, placed burdens upon the various defendants (both financial and otherwise) and caused other serious problems. Besides the money spent to defend against various suits, the committee found that the defendants in these suits were also injured by their inability to obtain malpractice insurance for a period of years, and then faced increased costs of insurance afterwards, because of respondent's groundless lawsuits. Additionally, two of the victims of frivolous claims experienced difficulties with personal financing due to the contingent liability cast on their credit records by respondent's unfounded suits.