Opinion ID: 1130080
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: a one-year suspension is an appropriate sanction for respondent's professional misconduct

Text: Eakin urges the evidence adduced before the PRT is insufficient to support a finding of professional delinquency that warrants imposition of discipline. His argument challenges the sufficiency of evidence rather than the disciplinary cognizance of the Bar. Eakin relies on State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Sullivan. [37] Sullivan teaches that a lawyer, qua practitioner, may not be disciplined for conduct while in judicial office unless the acts of which complaint is made involve some element of moral turpitude, fraud, or some criminal (or dishonest) conduct. [38] Because we find that there is clear and convincing proof of Eakin's ex parte communications with Hathaway during the course of litigation, which constitute dishonest acts within the meaning of Rule 8.4(c), [39] Eakin stands subject to discipline under the standards of Sullivan. The court's responsibility in a disciplinary proceeding is not to inflict punishment on the respondent but to inquire into and test the accused lawyer's continued fitness, with a view to safeguarding the interest of the public, of the courts and of the legal profession. [40] The circumstances of a lawyer's professional misconduct (Rule 6) [41] are important in searching for solutions that would accord with the law's imperative of giving the public its due protection from substandard legal practitioners. [42] The complaint against Eakin was pressed as a Rule 6 proceeding. It focuses on the lawyer's offending past conduct. [43] Eakin has been charged with (1) engaging in acts involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation and (2) engaging in that conduct prejudicial to the administration of judicial process which is in violation of Rule 8.4(c) and (d). As reflected by the record, Eakin was shown to have markedly departed from these mandatory standards. A lawyer's license is a certificate of professional fitness to deal with the public as a legal practitioner. Public confidence in the practitioner is essential to the proper functioning of the profession. A lawyer's misconduct adversely reflects on the entire Bar because it exhibits a lack of commitment to the clients' causes, to the courts, and to other members of the Bar. Eakin's actions call for the imposition of severe discipline. The PRT panel recommended that Eakin be suspended from the practice of law for a nine-month interval. On de novo review of the record, we (a) find the one count of the Bar's complaint amply supported by clear and convincing record proof, [44] (b) declare the respondent's conduct to have been greatly prejudicial to the evenhanded administration of judicial process and to the public perception of judicial impartiality, and (c) conclude that, based on the totality of evidence focusing on the intensity of the respondent's excessive and grossly offensive entanglement with one who was then a litigant before the court over which he presided as judge, a suspension from practice for one year with payment of costs constitutes the proper discipline to be imposed in this case. Within thirty days of the date of this opinion Eakin shall pay the costs of this proceeding in the amount of $1,874.70. Respondent shall stand suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year from the day this opinion becomes final; costs of this disciplinary prosecution shall be promptly paid in full as a precondition for respondent's reinstatement. KAUGER, V.C.J., and HODGES, LAVENDER, OPALA, SUMMERS and WATT, JJ., concur. ALMA WILSON, C.J., and SIMMS, J., concur in part and dissent in part. HARGRAVE, J., not participating.