Opinion ID: 1201769
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence of Gregory Cudjo's Confession

Text: (1a) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence that Gregory had confessed to the murder of Amelia P. We agree that the ruling was erroneous, but we conclude that defendant was not thereby prejudiced.
The prosecution had intended to call Gregory Cudjo as a witness during its case-in-chief, but the trial court determined that Gregory was unavailable as a witness (see Evid. Code, ง 240) after Gregory asserted his privilege against self-incrimination during a nonjury hearing. The prosecution then introduced the testimony Gregory had given at defendant's preliminary hearing. During the defense case, defense counsel represented to the trial court that John Lee Culver was prepared to testify that Gregory Cudjo had admitted responsibility for the murder of Amelia P. while Culver and Gregory were incarcerated together at the Antelope Valley sheriff's substation. The prosecutor remarked that the trial court would have to rule on the admissibility of the proposed testimony both as a statement against penal interest and under Evidence Code section 352. [3] To permit the trial court to make the necessary determinations of preliminary fact (see Evid. Code, ง 402), Culver then testified out of the jury's presence, to the following effect. When not incarcerated, Culver lived in Littlerock. He had known defendant for approximately 15 to 20 years. He also knew defendant's mother, his sisters, and his brother Gregory. In March 1986, Culver was in custody at the Antelope Valley sheriff's substation, where he shared a cell with Gregory Cudjo. Because of Gregory's restless pacing, Culver asked what was wrong. Gregory answered, Man, they got me in here for a murder and I need [to] talk to somebody. As Culver put it, Gregory then started talking about why he'd done it and what he'd done.... According to Culver, Gregory said, I went over to rob, burglarize this lady's house and she seen me and then that's when all the stuff went down and that's what happened. Gregory then explained, in Culver's words, that he went in the house and this woman supposed to have been washing clothes, and she caught him coming in the house.... When the woman seen him he just started beating the woman up and then she started screaming, so he knocked her out and went and done it again, kept hitting her, kept hitting her.... He kept banging her around in the head. Gregory reportedly said that the woman started screaming as soon as she saw him, that he knocked her out, that she came back to, and that he started hitting her and hitting her with a hammer or whatever he hit her with. Gregory also said, reportedly, that he had found jewelry and guns in the house, and that he knew the lady because they had smoked dope together. Gregory did not mention raping the woman. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Culver if Gregory had mentioned anyone besides the woman being present in the house. Culver answered that at the time Gregory had not mentioned anyone else, but that Culver had talked to Gregory shortly before Culver's testimony and that through this conversation Culver had learned that there probably was a little boy or somebody in the house. According to Culver, Gregory had been taken from the cell he shared with Culver. When Gregory returned, he told Culver that detectives had interviewed him about the murder. Asked whether Gregory had admitted inculpating defendant for the murder, Culver at first said that Gregory had done so, but he immediately changed his testimony, stating that he merely inferred that Gregory had blamed defendant because Gregory was released shortly thereafter and because defendant's criminal record was worse than Gregory's. [4] Culver testified that he first became aware of defendant's presence at the substation two days after his conversation with Gregory, when Culver was being taken to court. At that time, Culver told defendant nothing about Gregory's confession, even after defendant said he was incarcerated for murder. Culver said he first spoke of the confession approximately three months before his testimony, when he was contacted and interviewed by a defense investigator. Following Culver's testimony, the trial court invited argument. The prosecutor asserted that Culver's demeanor, background, and relationship to the defendant, as well as the content of his testimony, made him unworthy of belief. The prosecutor framed the question as whether or not we should allow a liar to testify in front of the jury just for the purpose of propping up a straw man. The prosecutor urged the court to exclude Culver's testimony under Evidence Code section 352 as inherently incredible. The court inquired whether it would then be making a judgment as trier of fact and taking it away from the jury. The prosecutor said that Evidence Code section 352 required this on some occasions. The court agreed it must resolve issues such as Culver's friendship with defendant and the fact that Culver waited so long to come forward; [t]hese are the things that I consider. Defense counsel maintained that the evidence was admissible as a declaration against penal interest under Evidence Code section 1230. The trial court agreed with defense counsel that Gregory was unavailable as a witness because he had exercised his privilege against self-incrimination and that the statements attributed to him by Culver were against his penal interest. However, the court found that to allow this testimony would be a travesty of justice.... Concluding that the evidence lacked indicia of reliability, the court ruled that it was not admissible as a declaration against interest. In support of the ruling, the court cited Evidence Code section 1230 and People v. Martin (1983) 150 Cal. App.3d 148, 162 [197 Cal. Rptr. 655]. Later that day, after another defense witness had testified before the jury, the trial court added that in interpreting section 1230 of the Evidence Code it had also relied upon People v. Chapman (1975) 50 Cal. App.3d 872, 878-881 [123 Cal. Rptr. 862]. Later still, during a hearing on defendant's motion for a new trial, the court stated for the record that it had found Culver's testimony unreliable and untrustworthy and had concluded that the probative value of the evidence was outweighed by prejudice under section 352 of the Evidence Code within the meaning of People versus Green, 27 Cal.3d 1 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].
Under one of the statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule, a party may introduce in evidence, for the truth of the matter stated, an out-of-court statement by a declarant who is unavailable as a witness at trial if the statement, when made, was against the declarant's penal, pecuniary, proprietary, or social interest. [5] (2) A party who maintains that an out-of-court statement is admissible under this exception as a declaration against penal interest must show that the declarant is unavailable, that the declaration was against the declarant's penal interest, and that the declaration was sufficiently reliable to warrant admission despite its hearsay character. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745 [280 Cal. Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197].) To determine whether the declaration passes the required threshold of trustworthiness, a trial court may take into account not just the words but the circumstances under which they were uttered, the possible motivation of the declarant, and the declarant's relationship to the defendant. ( Ibid. ) On appeal, the trial court's determination on this issue is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( Ibid. ) (1b) Here, Gregory Cudjo was unavailable as a witness because he had chosen to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Leach (1975) 15 Cal.3d 419, 438 [124 Cal. Rptr. 752, 541 P.2d 296].) It is likewise not disputed or reasonably disputable that a statement confessing to a killing during the course of a burglary and robbery, as attributed to Gregory in Culver's testimony, subjects the declarant to a risk of criminal liability and therefore on its face is against the alleged declarant's penal interest. Moreover, given the circumstances of Gregory's alleged statement, the trial court had discretion to conclude that it was admissible despite its hearsay character because, if made as claimed, it was probably true. By Culver's account, Gregory made his statement spontaneously, while alone with an acquaintance, within hours after a murder for which Gregory, who had no alibi, was in custody as a prime suspect. Gregory tended to fit Kevin P.'s description of the assailant, and much of the other evidence, in particular the incriminating shoe prints, was as consistent with Gregory's guilt as with defendant's. It is true, as the People suggest, that the alleged statement was inconsistent to some extent with the physical evidence, most notably the evidence that the victim was hog-tied before she was beaten to death. However, such discrepancies might be attributable to Gregory's agitation or Culver's misunderstanding of what he was told. They did not negate all possibility that if Gregory claimed to be the murderer, he was telling the truth. Hence, the court could properly have found that a reasonable [person] in [Gregory's] position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. (Evid. Code, ง 1230.) But the trial court did not focus exclusively, or even primarily, on whether Gregory's hearsay statement might be false. Instead, the court apparently accepted the prosecution's contention that Culver was probably a liar who should therefore be excluded as a live witness. In so doing, the court erred. The People argue that in considering the admissibility of evidence offered under the hearsay exception for declarations against interest, the trial court could properly consider the credibility of the in-court witness, Culver. We disagree. The credibility of the in-court witness is not a proper consideration in this context. (3) Hearsay is generally excluded because the out-of-court declarant is not under oath and cannot be cross-examined to test perception, memory, clarity of expression, and veracity, and because the jury (or other trier of fact) is unable to observe the declarant's demeanor. (See Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 298 [35 L.Ed.2d 297, 310-311, 93 S.Ct. 1038]; People v. Bob (1946) 29 Cal.2d 321, 325 [175 P.2d 12].) Because the rule excluding hearsay is based on these particular difficulties in assessing the credibility of statements made outside the jury's presence, the focus of the rule's several exceptions is also on the reliability of the out-of-court declaration. Thus, the various hearsay exceptions generally reflect situations in which circumstances affording some assurance of trustworthiness compensate for the absence of the oath, cross-examination, and jury observation. ( Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 298-299 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 310-311].) Neither the hearsay rule nor its exceptions are concerned with the credibility of witnesses who testify directly to the jury. (4) When evidence is offered under one of the hearsay exceptions, the trial court must determine, as preliminary facts, both that the out-of-court declarant made the statement as represented, and that the statement meets certain standards of trustworthiness. (See legis. committee com., 29B West's Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) ง 403, p. 268.) The first determination โ whether the declaration was made as represented โ is governed by the substantial evidence rule. The trial court is to determine only whether there is evidence sufficient to sustain a finding that the statement was made. ( Ibid. ) As with other facts, the direct testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a finding unless the testimony is physically impossible or its falsity is apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. ( People v. Huston (1943) 21 Cal.2d 690, 693 [134 P.2d 758]; accord, People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, 314-316 [270 Cal. Rptr. 611, 792 P.2d 643]; People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 754 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267].) Except in these rare instances of demonstrable falsity, doubts about the credibility of the in-court witness should be left for the jury's resolution; such doubts do not afford a ground for refusing to admit evidence under the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest. (See U.S. v. Seeley (1st Cir.1989) 892 F.2d 1, 3; Comment, Statements Against Penal Interest (1978) 66 Cal.L.Rev. 1189, 1205, fn. 99; Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest (1976) 56 B.U.L. Rev. 148, 178-179; 2 McCormick on Evidence (4th ed. 1992) ง 318, p. 342, fn. 10.)
(5a) When an objection to evidence is raised under Evidence Code section 352, the trial court is required to weigh the evidence's probative value against the dangers of prejudice, confusion, and undue time consumption. Unless these dangers substantially outweigh probative value, the objection must be overruled. (See People v. Babbitt (1988) 45 Cal.3d 660, 688 [248 Cal. Rptr. 69, 755 P.2d 253].) On appeal, the ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 973 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) (1c) Here, no claim is made that permitting Culver to testify would have taken an undue amount of time. Culver's testimony out of the jury's presence, including a thorough cross-examination, did not take long, and the prosecutor did not represent that rebuttal witnesses would be required. Nor is there any apparent danger of confusion of the issues. Culver's testimony would not even have introduced the issue of Gregory's possible culpability for the murder of Amelia P. The issue was already there, as defense counsel had made clear from the outset of trial; Gregory's culpability constituted the primary defense. (See People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1310, fn. 15 [283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563].) The evidence had substantial probative value. (5b) To withstand a challenge under Evidence Code section 352, evidence of a third party's culpability need only be capable of raising a reasonable doubt of [the] defendant's guilt. ( People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826, 833 [283 Cal. Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563].) (1d) Here, Culver would testify that Gregory, the other prime suspect in the case, had confessed to the murder within hours after the crime was committed and under circumstances providing substantial assurances that the confession was trustworthy. The issue of Gregory's guilt was highly material: given Kevin P.'s testimony describing a single intruder, and given also the single set of shoe prints leading away from the victim's residence, proof of Gregory's guilt would exonerate defendant. Thus, Culver's testimony raised the requisite reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. Finally, the evidence was highly necessary: although there was other evidence tending to cast suspicion on Gregory, there was no comparable direct evidence of Gregory's guilt. Gregory's decision to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination precluded the defense from calling Gregory as a witness. Nor was there any danger of undue prejudice to the prosecution. The evidence was not likely to arouse the emotions of the jurors or to be used in some manner unrelated to the issue on which it was admissible. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1016 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1]; see also, People v. Farmer (1989) 47 Cal.3d 888, 912 [254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940]; People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 638 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) As noted, the trial court apparently concluded that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative because Culver was not a credible witness. However, such doubts, however legitimate, do not constitute prejudice under Evidence Code section 352. (See People v. Alcala (1992) 4 Cal.4th 742, 791 [15 Cal. Rptr.2d 432, 842 P.2d 1192].) We have warned trial courts to avoid hasty conclusions that third-party-culpability evidence is incredible; this determination, we have affirmed, is properly the province of the jury. ( People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834.) Unlike other cases in which similar evidence was excluded for lack of credibility (e.g., People v. Blankenship (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 840, 849 [213 Cal. Rptr. 666]; People v. Martin, supra, 150 Cal. App.3d 148, 162; People v. Chapman, supra, 50 Cal. App.3d 872, 878), nothing in the record indicates that Culver's testimony was motivated by threats or bribery or expectation of personal advantage. We conclude that doubts about Culver's credibility, though reasonable and legitimate, did not provide a sufficient basis to exclude his testimony. In sustaining the prosecutor's objection to this evidence, the trial court abused its discretion.
Defendant urges that the trial court's exclusion of Culver's testimony usurped his federal due process and fair trial rights. In essence, defendant complains he was unconstitutionally deprived of the right to present a defense. Hence, he reasons, the prejudicial effect of the error must be measured under the constitutional standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824, 24 A.L.R.3d 1065] (reversal required unless error harmless beyond reasonable doubt). (6) We find no constitutional violation. As a general matter, the ordinary rules of evidence do not impermissibly infringe on the accused's [constitutional] right to present a defense. Courts retain ... a traditional and intrinsic power to exercise discretion to control the admission of evidence in the interests of orderly procedure and the avoidance of prejudice. [Citations.] ... [T]his principle applies perforce to evidence of third-party culpability.... ( People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d 826, 834-835.) It follows, for the most part, that the mere erroneous exercise of discretion under such normal rules does not implicate the federal Constitution. Even in capital cases, we have consistently assumed that when a trial court misapplies Evidence Code section 352 to exclude defense evidence, including third-party-culpability evidence, the applicable standard of prejudice is that for state law error, as set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243] (error harmless if it does not appear reasonably probable verdict was affected). (E.g., People v. Alcala, supra, 4 Cal.4th 742, 791; People v. Babbitt, supra, 45 Cal.3d 660, 688; People v. Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 836; People v. Wright (1985) 39 Cal.3d 576, 585-586 [217 Cal. Rptr. 212, 703 P.2d 1106].) Justice Kennard, in her dissent, urges that by barring a crucial defense witness as incredible, the trial court unconstitutionally invaded the jury's function and denied defendant his right, under the compulsory process clause of the Sixth Amendment, to present witnesses in his behalf. The United States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional right to present and confront material witnesses may be infringed by general rules of evidence or procedure which preclude material testimony or pertinent cross-examination for arbitrary reasons, such as unwarranted and overbroad assumptions of untrustworthiness. However, the high court has never suggested that a trial court commits constitutional error whenever it individually assesses and rejects a material defense witness as incredible. (See, e.g., Michigan v. Lucas (1991) 500 U.S. 145 [114 L.Ed.2d 205, 111 S.Ct. 1743] [preclusive effect of statutory notice-of-evidence requirement in rape case]; Taylor v. Illinois (1988) 484 U.S. 400 [98 L.Ed.2d 798, 108 S.Ct. 646] [sanction of preclusion for defense violation of discovery rules]; Rock v. Arkansas (1987) 483 U.S. 44 [97 L.Ed.2d 37, 107 S.Ct. 2704] [exclusion of accused's own testimony under state rule disallowing all hypnotically refreshed evidence]; Green v. Georgia (1979) 442 U.S. 95 [60 L.Ed.2d 738, 99 S.Ct. 2150] [absolute state failure to recognize hearsay exception for declarations against penal interest]; Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308 [39 L.Ed.2d 347, 94 S.Ct. 1105] [denial of cross-examination for bias based on state rule making evidence of juvenile proceedings inadmissible in adult court]; Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, 410 U.S. 284 [state rule precluding cross-examination of party's own witness]; Washington v. Texas (1967) 388 U.S. 14 [18 L.Ed.2d 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1920] [state rule precluding accomplice from testifying for defense]; but cf. Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 106 S.Ct. 1431] [preclusion of cross-examination for bias, based upon individual assessment of probative value against prejudice, violated confrontation clause].) (7) We reiterate that in general under California law, the credibility of individual witnesses is properly the province of the jury. ( Hall, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 834.) Nonetheless, absent clearer guidance from above, we will not lightly assume that a trial court invites federal constitutional scrutiny each and every time it decides, on the basis of the particular circumstances, to exclude a defense witness as unworthy of credit. We decline to extend the federal decisions in the manner proposed by defendant and in Justice Kennard's dissent. We conclude that the Watson standard of prejudice applies to the trial court's mistake.
(8) Applying the Watson standard, we conclude that exclusion of Culver's testimony, though erroneous, was harmless because it is not reasonably probable that admission of the testimony would have affected the outcome. We recognize that Gregory was the other prime suspect in the murder, and he disclosed accurate crime-scene details, which he told the police defendant had revealed to him. Moreover, Kevin P., the only eyewitness, never identified the assailant and gave a description which more closely resembled Gregory than defendant. Some other evidence was consistent with Gregory's guilt as well as defendant's. Yet the inference that defendant, not Gregory, was the murderer was extremely strong. Trapped by a semen sample that included defendant but excluded all other known potential donors, including Gregory, defendant was forced to admit that he was present at the crime scene on the morning of the murder, and that he had sex with the victim. The physical evidence, in particular the shoe prints leading to and from the victim's home, strongly suggested there had been only one visitor during that morning. Just as important, Kevin described only one entry, by the man who robbed his mother. By contrast, defendant's uncorroborated effort to provide an innocent explanation for his presence in the victim's house was not convincing. Defendant testified he had encountered the victim purchasing cocaine on two prior occasions, and that she traded cocaine for sex on the day of the murder. However, these claims contravened all other evidence about the victim's life-style and values. The victim's husband testified that she never exhibited signs of drug use during a 13-year marriage, and there was no cocaine in her blood at the time of her death. Moreover, the victim's family was on a tight budget and managed its money carefully; the victim's husband noticed no unusual withdrawals from the family account. It also seems unlikely that the victim, a housewife and mother, would have engaged in casual sex and drug activity in her living room with a near stranger while her five-year-old son was at home. Defendant's version of events failed to mention or explain Kevin's presence during the alleged sex-for-drugs encounter. The implausibility of defendant's account enhanced the inference that he was involved in the homicide. Finally, as the trial court surmised, both Culver's testimony and the hearsay confession it recounted had obvious indicia of unreliability. Though he knew the entire Cudjo family, Culver was a particular friend of defendant and thus had a motive to lie. Moreover, Gregory's purported jailhouse confession contravened both the physical evidence and all other accounts Gregory had given, including his testimony under oath at the preliminary hearing. According to Culver, Gregory said that as he was entering the victim's home to burglarize it, the victim came upon him by surprise, whereupon he tripped and immediately began beating her with a hammer. As previously noted, however, the crime-scene evidence made clear that the victim was carefully hog-tied in her bedroom before she was beaten and killed. When asked whether Gregory had mentioned anybody else in the house, Culver admitted that Gregory had originally failed to account for this crucial detail. However, Culver claimed that in a courthouse conversation just minutes before Culver took the stand, Gregory belatedly mentioned that there probably was a little boy or somebody.... This claim is suspect. It strains common sense that Gregory willingly provided additional details to Culver at a moment when he must have known Culver was about to give incriminating testimony against him. In all his other known statements and sworn testimony, Gregory insisted he had no involvement in the homicide. Moreover, after observing Culver's demeanor and hearing his testimony, the trial court concluded that Culver was a patently incredible witness. Under all these circumstances, the chance that a competent jury would have given Culver's testimony substantial weight seems remote. Accordingly, it is not reasonably probable that admission of his testimony would have affected the outcome. No basis for reversal appears.