Opinion ID: 1238699
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remand to the DACORB For a Statement of Reasons

Text: Discharge of a voluntary enlistee for conscientious objection is a privilege granted by the executive branch, not a constitutional right. Nurnberg v. Froehlke, 489 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.1973). Army regulations provide that the DACORB is the final decision maker on all applications requesting discharge as a conscientious objector. See Army Reg. 600-43, ¶ 2-8a. Pursuant to regulation, before the DACORB forwards a case in which it recommends disapproval to Army Headquarters, the DACORB must furnish the applicant with a copy of the disapproval recommendation and the supporting reasons. Id. ¶ 2-8d(1); see also id. ¶ 2-8d(3) (If a determination by [Army Headquarters] that the person's request is disapproved [sic], the reasons for this decision will be made a part of the record. It will be provided to the person through command channels.). In United States ex rel. Checkman v. Laird, 469 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.1972), we held that When there is a requirement of law that reasons be stated by executive officials or administrative agencies responsible for decisions, there is an implicit corollary that the decision must stand or fall on the basis of the reasons stated. This is a general doctrine of administrative law. . . . Otherwise a court, if it sustains a decision by recourse to reasons outside those specified, opens the door to an improper substituting of the court's judgment and evaluation of evidence in place of that of the agency (here the [DACORB]) . . . with responsibility. The court's judgment, its reasons and approaches, may not be acceptable to and may even have been discredited by the administrative officials responsible. Id. at 780-81 (internal citations and quotations marks omitted). We recognized in Checkman that it is not the function of [a] court to search the record for some basis to affirm the Army's decision when the reasons given therefor are inadequate. Id. at 780 n. 10 (internal quotations marks omitted). The requirement that the DACORB provide a statement of reasons for its decision is not satisfied by mere conclusory statements of insincerity, United States v. Stewart, 478 F.2d 106, 113 (2d Cir.1973), or by a bare recitation . . . of the ultimate statutory criteria, Checkman, 469 F.2d at 787. Instead, [t]he facts or factors relied upon by the board must be stated. Stewart, 478 F.2d at 113; see also Checkman, 469 F.2d at 781 (The DACORB must identify, and be reviewed on the basis of the identification of, the salient underlying considerations and type of evidence relied on, for example letters from associates, reports of personal demeanor, and lateness in filing an application.). On appeal, the Army does not challenge the district court's determination that the DACORB's statement of reasons for denying Watson's application for discharge were deficient as a matter of law. Instead, it argues that the district court erred in conduct[ing] its own independent review of the record to determine what conclusion, in the court's view, should be drawn from the evidence rather than remanding to the DACORB to provide an adequate statement of reasons. See Appellant's Br. 13. When an agency has provided an insufficient explanation for its decision, the appropriate course for a reviewing court ordinarily is to remand the case to the agency. Ward v. Brown, 22 F.3d 516, 522 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985) ([I]f the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation.); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196, 67 S.Ct. 1575, 91 L.Ed. 1995 (1947) ([A] reviewing court, in dealing with a determination or judgment which an administrative agency alone is authorized to make, must judge the propriety of such action solely by the grounds invoked by the agency. If those grounds are inadequate or improper, the court is powerless to affirm the administrative action by substituting what it considers to be a more adequate or proper basis. . . . [There is] an important corollary of the foregoing rule. If the administrative action is to be tested by the basis upon which it purports to rest, that basis must be set forth with such clarity as to be understandable.). Thus, in the ordinary course, where the DACORB has failed to provide an adequate statement of reasons to explain its decision, the district court should remand to the DACORB for a sufficient statement of reasons. See United States ex rel. Coates v. Laird, 494 F.2d 709, 712 (4th Cir.1974). However, remand to the DACORB is not necessary if remand would be futile. See, e.g., Krauss v. Oxford Health Plans, Inc., 517 F.3d 614, 630 (2d Cir.2008) (plaintiffs not entitled to administrative remand where remand would be futile). If there is no basis in fact to support the DACORB's decision that Watson did not show, by clear and convincing evidence, a firm, fixed and sincere objection to participation in war in any form by reason of religious training or belief, then remand would be futile, and is thus not required. See Coates, 494 F.2d at 712 (remand is proper unless the record shows there is no basis in fact for denial of the application on any valid ground); see also George Hyman Constr. Co. v. Brooks, 963 F.2d 1532, 1539 (D.C.Cir.1992) (remand to the agency for further statement of reasons would be futile where only one disposition is possible as a matter of law). The Army conceded as much at oral argument. Oral Argument Tr. 8-9. To the extent that the Army argues that the futility inquiry would require a court, as a matter of course, to substitute its own independent weighing of the evidence before remanding the matter to the agency for its assessment, and therefore is incompatible with the ordinary remand rule and basic principles of administrative law, see Appellant's Br. 23 n. 10, we respectfully disagree. Allowing the district court to review the record to determine whether there is a basis in fact for the DACORB's denial of a conscientious objector application would not require the court to substitute its own independent weighing of the evidence on a question the agency has not reached. [5] First, the DACORB has reached the question once it has denied the application. The agency has determined that the applicant has not established, by clear and convincing evidence, that he has a firm, fixed and sincere objection to participation in war in any form by reason of religious training and belief, albeit without sufficiently stating its reasons for that conclusion. Second, the district court does not independently weigh any evidence. Rather, it merely determines if there was any objective evidence to support the DACORB's determination. Indeed, in this case, despite the Army's vigorous protestations to the contrary, the district court did not conduct its own independent review of the record to determine whether it believed that Watson's application should have been granted or denied in the first instance. Instead, based on the Army's own argument before the district court that the DACORB's rationale was readily discernible in the chain of command recommendations, the district court examined each and every reason stated and found that there was no objective fact to support denial of the application on any valid ground. Therefore, we hold that where the DACORB does not provide an adequate statement of the reasons for its denial of a conscientious objector application, a district court must remand to the Army for a statement of reasons unless remand is plainly futile, for example, when the record reveals there is no basis in fact to support the denial on any valid ground.