Opinion ID: 1100536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-Examination of Reverend Davis

Text: Anthony first argues that appellate counsel failed to claim prosecutorial misconduct during the cross-examination of Davis. Anthony claims that, during his cross-examination of Davis, the prosecutor elicited biblical authority that supported the imposition of the death penalty. [9] The relevant portions of the prosecutor's cross-examination are reproduced below: Q: You formed some pretty strong opinions about these young men.... I believe there's sincerely hell.... [D]id you rely ... upon your observations and experience, or did you put any thought... into how they stacked up according to the Bible? A: By the Bible's word, that and my emotion, because they were repentant to me for the crime[s] ... they ... committed.... I saw signs of that in their actions ... their verbalization, ... their emotions, and in their feelings. And to me that's the way I can look at something and tell whether it's what it says it is .... Q: But as a man of God, you certainly don't make real serious [judgments] or considerations without holding up your opinion to maybe God's standard and his word? Is that part of A: I'm definitely not God.... Q: [Y]ou put heavy reliance upon the Bible, don't you? A: Yes, I do. Q: What is the Bible to you? A: It's the infallible word of God, inspired word of God that God gave to us as our .... Q: But from my understanding of the Bible, is men actually wrote the words down and you say it's the word of God? A: Inspired by the Holy Spirit, right. Q: Are you familiar with the Book of Romans? Do you know who wrote it? A: Paul, Apostle Paul. Q: What happened to Paul ultimately? A: Paul was killed ultimately. Q: By the Roman government? A: Uh-huh.... Q: And even though Paul was a prisoner of the Roman government, he wrote a very significant book called the Romans; did he not? A: Yes, he did. Q: Are you familiar with the first of seven verses of Romans thirteen? A: Yes. About honoring authority, submitting to authority. The judge and the prosecutor and the defense attorneys all work for God and are ordained by God as being the authority and in the positions that they are and if theyGod is the one that allows them to be there. Q: Well, I don't want to say that defense attorneys aren't saved. But they're not the authorities, are they, they are defense lawyers versus the prosecutor? A: Right. MR. TANNER: Your honor, may I hand him something to help with his memory as well? MR. HATHAWAY: Your honor, I don't know what he's tendered to the witness. MR. TANNER: Romans. THE WITNESS: It's a copy of the Bible, scripture out of the Bible. MR. TANNER: Q: What does Romans one and two say about authority under God's law? MR. HATHAWAY: Perhaps he can show the relevancy of this. I don't know why we are referring to this at this time. THE COURT: What MR. HATHAWAY: Relevance objection. MR. TANNER: You[r] honor, I will link it up when I lay the foundation. I believe you will see the relevancy as we THE COURT: To this witness' testimony, not just a philosophical or religious discussion? MR. TANNER: No, sir. THE COURT: This is specific testimony? MR. TANNER: Yes. It will relate directly to this witness' testimony. THE COURT: Connect it up. And, Mr. Hathaway, if it's not properly connected up, go ahead and renew your objection. THE WITNESS: Read verse one and two? MR. TANNER: Q: Yes, sir. A: Everyone must submit himself to the governor of authorities for there is no authority except for which God has established. The authorities that exist have been established by God. Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is rebelling against what God has instituted. And those who do so will bring [judgment] on themselves. Q: The next verse deals with the prosecutor; does it not? What does it say? A: For the rulers hold no terror for those who do right, but for those who do wrong. Do you want to be free from fear that the one in authority and do what is right and you will ... he will commend you. Q: And the next verse? A: Where he is God's servant to do your good, but if you do wrong, be afraid for he does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God's servant and agent to wrath, to bring punishment to the wrongdoer. Q: And the next? A: Therefore, it is necessary to submit to the authorities not only because of the possible punishment, but also because of your conscience.... Q: Is there anything in scripture that you find that says the laws and the government should excuse crimes because someone is repentant? A: Specifically the law and government, no. Q: Tells us as Christians forgive one another? A: Yes. Q: But that's not inconsistent with the government's responsibility to uphold the law and bring the punishment which-and the word of the Lord, that you have just read, that bring [judgment] on themselves; is that correct? A: That's correct.... Q: [W]hen Christ was on the cross there was a condemned felon beside him that repented and accepted Christ; is that right? A: That's right. Q: But he didn't take that felon off the cross or forgive the death penalty, did he? A: No. Q: He said he would see him in paradise. A: Yeah.... Q: Christ died for sinners. A: Yes. Q: And Paul died because of Christ? A: Yes. Q: Is there anything inconsistent with that. That these men face the death penalty for the murder of a seventeen-year-old-girl? A: No. The first issue we must address is whether a claim of prosecutorial misconduct was preserved for appeal. To preserve an issue, [f]irst, a litigant must make a timely, contemporaneous objection. Second, the party must state a legal ground for that objection. Third ... ` it must be the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection ... below.' Harrell v. State, 894 So.2d 935, 940 (Fla. 2005) (quoting Steinhorst v. State, 412 So.2d 332, 338 (Fla.1982)). Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the Bible based on relevance. The dissent claims that this objection was clearly valid. Dissenting op. at 640 n. 15. We agree with that contention as far as it goes. However, the issue Anthony argues before us now (prosecutorial misconduct) is not the specific contention asserted as legal ground for the objection ... below. Harrell, 894 So.2d at 940. At trial, defense counsel never argued that the prosecutor was engaging in misconduct. Therefore, it was not preserved for appeal. Furthermore, the issue also was not preserved because defense counsel did not obtain a ruling on the motion at trial. As we have held, the failure to obtain a ruling on a motion or objection fails to preserve an issue for appeal. Armstrong v. State, 642 So.2d 730, 740 (Fla.1994) (holding that the defendant's pretrial request for a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) test was procedurally barred because the trial judge reserved ruling on the issue and never issued a ruling) (citing Richardson v. State, 437 So.2d 1091, 1093 (Fla.1983)). When defense counsel objected, the trial court reserved judgment, allowed the prosecutor to illustrate the relevance of the Bible, and alerted the defense that it could renew its objection if the prosecutor's subsequent questioning failed to relieve its concerns. Defense counsel did not renew his objection at that time, and the court never ruled. Therefore, this issue was not preserved. We have held that [a]ppellate counsel has no obligation to raise an issue that was not preserved for review and is not ineffective for failing to raise an unpreserved issue on appeal. Zack v. State, 911 So.2d 1190, 1204 (Fla.2005) (citing Randolph, 853 So.2d at 1068). Anthony failed to preserve this issue of prosecutorial misconduct. Therefore, appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it on direct appeal. Nevertheless, Anthony argues that the prosecutor's conduct was fundamental error. [A]ppellate counsel may not be deemed ineffective for failing to challenge an unpreserved issue on direct appeal unless it resulted in fundamental error. Hendrix v. State, 908 So.2d 412, 426 (Fla.2005) (citing Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637, 646 (Fla.2000)). The critical issue then is whether the prosecutor's conduct represents fundamental error. Fundamental error is the sole exception to the preservation requirement. Harrell, 894 So.2d at 941. To be fundamental, an error must reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that a verdict of guilty could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. Id. (quoting Brown v. State, 124 So.2d 481, 484 (Fla.1960)). We have also defined it as error which goes to the foundation of the case. Ray v. State, 403 So.2d 956, 960 (Fla.1981) (quoting Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So.2d 134, 137 (Fla.1970)). We have cautioned appellate courts to exercise their discretion concerning fundamental error `very guardedly.' Id. [F]undamental error should be applied only in the rare cases where a jurisdictional error appears or where the interests of justice present a compelling demand for its application. Id. Specifically, prosecutorial misconduct constitutes fundamental error when, but for the misconduct, the jury could not have reached the verdict it did. Miller v. State, 782 So.2d 426, 432 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We now apply these standards to the prosecutor's conduct. We have condemned the invocation of religious authority in capital sentencing proceedings. Contrary to the dissent's belief, however, there is no categorical rule prohibiting it. Instead, we have reasoned that [c]ounsel should not be so restricted in argument as to prevent references by way of illustration to principles of divine law ... as may be appropriate to the case. This is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge .... Street v. State, 636 So.2d 1297, 1303 (Fla.1994) (emphasis added) (quoting Paramore v. State, 229 So.2d 855, 860-61 (Fla.1969), vacated in part on other grounds, 408 U.S. 935, 92 S.Ct. 2857, 33 L.Ed.2d 751 (1972)). We have cautioned, however, that trial judges and attorneys should refrain from discussing religious philosophy in court proceedings. Ferrell v. State, 686 So.2d 1324, 1328 (Fla. 1996). [10] Yet we have rarely found that such conduct rises to the level of fundamental error. In Street, for example, we held that a prosecutor's references to and quotes from the Bible during closing argument were not fundamental error. 636 So.2d at 1303. The prosecutor asked the jury: Should we excuse the sinner? Should we thank the sinner? Is that our job; is that our obligation under the law? Id. We agreed that these statements were not objectionable because they rebutted defense counsel's statement: You will have a unique opportunity to condemn what has happened, to condemn the sin but not condemn the sinner. Id. In Bonifay v. State, 680 So.2d 413 (Fla.1996), without detailing the nature of the references made, we also found that the prosecutor's biblical references during closing argument were not fundamental error. Id. at 418. Nevertheless, we caution[ed] against the use or approval of arguments which use references to divine law because argument which invokes religion can easily cross the boundary of proper argument and become prejudicial argument. Id. at 418 n. 10. In Ferrell, we addressed a similar problem. A juror stated on voir dire that she was recalling biblical sources to help her with her personal feelings on the death penalty. 686 So.2d at 1327. In response, the trial judge stated that Christian and Jewish scholars had determined that the Ten Commandments did not say thou shall not kill, but thou shall not commit murder. Id. He added further: [W]hen attorneys ask you, can you sit in judgment, you are not talking about sitting in judgment of a person morally or socially or any other thing, but just make a determination of guilt or innocence. Id. at 1328. We held that these comments were not fundamental error, because the judge's brief discussion was harmless when viewed in light of the entire record. Id. In other similar instances, we have consistently held that a prosecutor's references to biblical authority during closing argument were not fundamental error. See, e.g., Lugo v. State, 845 So.2d 74, 110 (Fla.2003) (where the prosecutor made no mercy and religion arguments); Lawrence v. State, 691 So.2d 1068, 1074 (Fla. 1997) (concluding that the prosecutor's statements, which equated the jury's sentencing task to God's judgment of the wicked, were similar to the prosecutor's comments in Bonifay ). The dissent relies on several cases in arguing that the prosecutor's conduct here was fundamental error. It first claims that, in Meade v. State, 431 So.2d 1031 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), the Fourth District Court of Appeal found a prosecutor's invocation of religious doctrine improper. Dissenting op. at 638-39. In Meade, defense counsel objected and the trial court denied the motion. 431 So.2d at 1032. Therefore, unlike the case before us, the issue in Meade was preserved for appeal, and the standard of review was whether the prosecutor's conduct was prejudicial. See id. The district court held that it was and reversed the defendant's manslaughter conviction. Id. at 1033. Here, in order to decide whether appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance for failing to raise a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, we must determine whether the alleged misconduct (which was not preserved) was fundamental errora higher standard than the one in Meade. Because the district court in Meade did not evaluate the prosecutor's conduct under this standard, the case does not apply here. The dissent's reliance on Harper v. State, 411 So.2d 235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), is incorrect for the same reason. See dissenting op. at 639. As in Meade, defense counsel in Harper objected to the prosecutor's invocation of religious authority, effectively preserving the issue for appeal. See Harper, 411 So.2d at 236-37. Thus, the standard was the same as in Meade. See id. In this case, we find that the prosecutor's conduct was not fundamental error for three reasons: (1) Davis's earlier testimony; (2) the prosecutor's freedom on cross-examination; and (3) the prosecutor's conduct in light of the entire record. First, it was Davis's testimony on direct examination, not the prosecutor, that first introduced religion into the proceedings. The State correctly argues that Anthony takes Davis's cross-examination out of context. Davis was a minister in Anthony's prison and frequently visited him. On direct examination, he stated that Anthony joined Stetson Baptist Church and professed his Christianity to other inmates. He believed that Anthony had a life-changing experience. Then on cross-examination by Jeffrey's defense counsel, Davis stated the following: There's no rehabilitation. Regeneration is the only thing that's going to work. And there's talk that some day we are going to have ... possibly a model Christian prison.... If we ever see that in Florida, maybe we can see the recidivism rate turn around.... If we don't change the human and give him values and teach him how to do something different, rather than just locking him up and saying, okay, we are just going to keep you in this cell and treat you like a dog. We have got to do something. We have got to teach them. In addition, when asked about the capacity of both Jeffrey and Anthony to help convert people to religion, Davis stated the following: Yes. Both of them by their lifeby their witness of what they have been through and they can be a witness to others and possibly turn their lives around.... And sometimes inmates won't come out and hear what I have to say, but they will respect a fellow inmate and listen to his testimony. Davis's testimony attempted to build a case for mitigation and dissuade the jury from recommending the death penalty. Like the juror in Ferrell and the defense attorney in Street, Davis initially broached religion. In response, the prosecutor, like his counterpart in Street and the judge in Ferrell, attempted to reconcile that subject with the issues before the court. Second, the prosecutor's conduct is less egregious because it occurred during cross-examination and not during argument to the jury. The United States Supreme Court has stated that cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). [T]he cross-examiner is ... permitted to ... test the witness' perceptions and memory and impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. Id. We have stated that questions on cross-examination must either relate to credibility or be germane to the matters brought out on direct examination. Penn v. State, 574 So.2d 1079, 1082 (Fla.1991) (quoting Steinhorst, 412 So.2d at 337). In this case, the prosecutor's questions, which were objectionable and could possibly have resulted in reversal of the conviction had the issue been preserved, did not rise to the level of fundamental error. It was not an unethical biblical argument aimed at persuading the jury to recommend the death penalty. The prosecutor's questions were related to Davis's testimony on direct examination. Davis highlighted Anthony's ability to profess Christianity to other inmates and the importance of regeneration, rather than punishment, as a solution for crime. Davis was a minister, which conveyed to the jury a level of authority on religion. The prosecutor's conduct was an attempt to discredit Davis's testimony and illustrate to the jury that nothing prohibited it from recommending the death penalty. This conduct was similar to the judge's comments in Ferrell. In that case, the judge responded to a juror's express reliance on biblical sources for her personal feelings on the death penalty. He explained that the Ten Commandments only prohibited individuals from commit[ing] murder rather than articulating a prohibition on all killing. Ferrell, 686 So.2d at 1327. This clarification implies that the Bible does not prohibit the government from imposing the death penalty. In this case, the prosecutor apparently intended the same message. In Street, a similar situation arose when defense counsel used religious references during closing argument to dissuade the jury from recommending the death penalty. In response, the prosecutor asked the jury: Should we excuse the sinner? Should we thank the sinner? Is that our job; is that our obligation under the law? 636 So.2d at 1303. This language, like the prosecutor's conduct in the case before us, seems like an attempt to defuse the argument that religion discourages imposition of the death penalty. Nevertheless, in this case the prosecutor went further and introduced a Bible into the proceedings and asked a witness to read specific verses from it. In the transcript, this exchange lasted eight pages. The prosecutor should have refrained from this type of conduct. However, his behavior falls short of fundamental error. The penalty phase lasted five days and comprises 1244 pages of transcript. Davis was only one of thirty-six witnesses. The jury found five aggravating circumstances, including the HAC and CCP aggravators, two of the most serious aggravators ... in the statutory scheme. Larkins, 739 So.2d at 95. Davis's testimony did not address any of the aggravators. Without the prosecutor's cross-examination of Davis, the jury still would have recommended the death penalty. The prosecutor's cross-examination, while improper, did not reach down into the validity of the trial itself to the extent that [the jury's verdict] could not have been obtained without the assistance of the alleged error. Harrell, 894 So.2d at 941. Nor did the exchange between the prosecutor and the minister impact the foundation of the case. Ray, 403 So.2d at 960. Following our very guarded[] approach to this doctrine, we find in this case no compelling demand for its application. Id. The prosecutor's conduct was not fundamental error. The dissent nonetheless relies on case law from other jurisdictions, arguing that other courts have ... been quick to condemn similar references to biblical authority to support imposition of the death penalty. Dissenting op. at 639. Although these cases are not binding on this Court, we examine one of them to emphasize the reasons for our conclusion here. The dissent cites Romine v. Head, 253 F.3d 1349 (11th Cir.2001), which held that a prosecutor's extensive reliance on biblical authority rendered the sentencing phase of the trial fundamentally unfair. See id. at 1371. [11] As in Anthony's case, there was no proper objection to the prosecutor's remarks. Id. at 1370. However, the circumstances in Romine are distinguishable from those here. In Romine, the court stated that an examination of the entire context of the judicial proceeding was necessary to determine whether the prosecutor's remarks rendered the proceeding fundamentally unfair. Id. at 1369 (quoting Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1400 (11th Cir. 1985)). The sentencing phase of the trial in Romine was saturated with evidence relating to religion. Id. at 1369. [12] [T]he jurors [were] sequestered at a Baptist assembly, where the judge suggested having `Brother Caylor out there' put the jurors in a room and `give you a good sermon.' Id. at 1369. Furthermore, the prosecutor in his closing argument gave the jurors a hell fire and brimstone mini-sermon the effect of which was to tell them that regardless of the law of Georgia, they ought to follow the law of God ... to rule out any consideration of mercy. Id. These remarks were strategically placed at the end. Id. In addition, one of the jurors consulted a Bible during deliberations. Id. at 1369 n. 20. Finally, defense counsel did not invite the prosecutor's references to religion because he had not argued yet and, when he did, there was no response that adequately ameliorated the effect of the prosecutor's argument. Id. at 1369. The court concluded that, [i]n view of all of the facts and circumstances, the prosecutor's improper argument ... undermine[d]... confidence in the sentencing result. Id. at 1371. By contrast, in Anthony's case there was no other evidence about religion, and there were no questionable tactics used in sequestering the jurors. No jurors consulted a Bible. Moreover, it was Davis's testimony on direct examination that introduced religion into the proceedings. When viewed within the totality of the circumstances, the prosecutor's conduct does not rise to the level of fundamental error. Most importantly, the conduct at issue occurred during cross-examination and not during closing argument. This distinction is critical. In Romine, a similar exchange occurred in a cross-examination of a witness: Romine's grandfather... appeared as a witness on behalf of Romine. The prosecutor cross-examined him about scripture, asking him whether he believed in the New Testament verse that commanded `honor your mother and father or be put to death.' Id. at 1358-59. The court, in dictum, concluded that this conduct alone would not have been constitutionally problematic. Id. at 1359. Instead, the court took issue with the prosecutor's remarks during closing argument: The problem is the prosecutor argued biblical law to the jury as a basis for urging it to eschew any consideration of mercy and sentence Romine to death, and that argument came against a background of circumstances that aggravated the error. Id. at 1358. As the Eleventh Circuit implied in Romine, the effect of arguing something directly to the jury is more powerful than the impression given by an exchange between a prosecutor and a witness. The circumstances in Romine and the placement of the prosecutor's remarks distinguish it from the case before us. Because we conclude that there was no fundamental error, appellate counsel may not be deemed ineffective for failing to challenge an unpreserved issue on direct appeal. Hendrix, 908 So.2d at 426. Even assuming the error was fundamental, we have held that appellate counsel is not necessarily ineffective for failing to raise a claim that might have had some possibility of success; effective appellate counsel need not raise every conceivable nonfrivolous issue. Valle v. Moore, 837 So.2d 905, 908 (Fla.2002) (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-53, 103 S.Ct. 3308, 77 L.Ed.2d 987 (1983), and Provenzano v. Dugger, 561 So.2d 541, 549 (Fla.1990)). In this case, appellate counsel's brief was 96 pages long and raised ten issues. [13] He also filed a supplemental brief raising two claims related to the appropriateness of his death sentence after Jeffrey had been sentenced to life imprisonment. Farina, 801 So.2d at 49. Appellate counsel could have reasonably concluded that these issues represented his strongest arguments. He could have reasoned that the prosecutor's alleged misconduct, given that it was not properly objected to, was a weaker claim with less chance of success. Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise it on appeal. Accordingly, we deny relief.