Opinion ID: 2622975
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Stockholder Standing

Text: ¶ 58 Of the many petitioners in this case, only three are Questar stockholders. As stockholders, these individuals are explicitly granted the right to seek judicial review under the PUA. [62] Unlike the ratepayers, however, the stockholders lack appellate standing in this case because they are not aggrieved or substantially prejudiced by the Commission's decision. ¶ 59 In Utah Chapter of the Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Board, we held that standing requires a showing of injury, causation, and redressability. [63] And we have stated that the term aggrieved connotes nothing more than a showing of injury, the traditional principle that claimants `must be able to show that [they have] suffered some distinct and palpable injury that gives [them] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute.' [64] In this case, the stockholders fail to assert a proper injury to meet the first element of the traditional test; therefore, a full analysis of standing is unnecessary. ¶ 60 The Petitioners' brief does not provide much by way of argument as to how the Questar stockholders have been injured in that capacity by the Commission's decision. Although the Petitioners' brief inadequately addresses the stockholders' injury, the stockholders set forth in personal affidavits a claim that they may be adversely affected in the long term by Questar's self-dealing transaction with Questar Pipeline, which enabled the CO2 plant to be built. The stockholders allege that approving the Stipulation will encourage Questar to continue affiliate transactions and will lead stockholders to suffer a fate comparable to the stockholders of Enron, WorldCom, or Tyco. But the stockholders fail to assert any injury similar to the economic injury alleged by the ratepayers. In fact, the Petitioners' brief indicates that Questar stockholders have benefitted from the improved financial situation that resulted from the Commission's approval of the cost recovery. Furthermore, the stockholders do not assert that their alleged injury is imminent. Rather, their alleged injury is one that might take place sometime in the future. In short, stockholders may have appellate standing where the Commission's decision substantially prejudices the interests of those stockholders, but such is not the case here. ¶ 61 Protecting stockholders from corporate mismanagement does not fall within the zone of interest contemplated by section 54-7-15. A person who is aggrieved by agency action must establish that the injury he complains of . . . falls within the `zone of interests' sought to be protected by the statutory provision whose violation forms the legal basis for his complaint. [65] The Public Utilities Act was created to regulate utilities, not to protect stockholders from mismanagement. Stockholders are given other means to deal with such matters. Indeed, the Petitioners recognized before the Commission the stockholders' ultimate remedy when dealing with corporate mismanagement. The Petitioners' stated that, unlike ratepayers, [i]f the Questar shareholders believe that their company's executives have injured their interests by wrongheaded business decisions, they have a choice  they can seek redress through the corporate oversight shareholders have always had with respect to management functions or they can sell their shares and invest in better operated companies. ¶ 62 In sum, the ratepayers may have suffered a distinct and palpable injury but are not among the classes of persons authorized by statute to appeal an agency decision. On the other hand, the stockholders are an authorized class but lack a distinct and palpable injury to qualify as a party aggrieved or substantially prejudiced. Therefore, none of the Petitioners qualify for appellate standing before this Court.