Opinion ID: 1562759
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Claims of Misconduct

Text: Finally, appellant claims that the prosecutor improperly commented on his right to remain silent, the defense's receipt of discovery, and the credibility of Commonwealth witnesses. The disputed comments are, respectively, as follows: (1) a comment the prosecutor made during his opening statement to the jury: So I ask you to listen as closely as you can to the evidence. All the evidence, both the Commonwealth evidence and the defense evidence[,] N.T., 2/2/87, at 28; (2) the prosecutor's comment during his closing statement that the defense had all the evidence, N.T., 2/6/87, at 669-70; and (3) other closing comments regarding how much time and effort the police had put in this case, and that just because Ferry and White had bad criminal records did not mean that appellant did not confide in them, id. at 673, 706. Appellant declares that any potential waiver in failing to object to the remarks is overcome by the ineffectiveness of all prior counsel. The Commonwealth responds that the PCRA court properly found each of these claims to be without merit. The Commonwealth asserts that, as with appellant's other claims, these claims are waived as to trial counsel's representation and only cognizable as claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The PCRA court concluded that the claims lacked arguable merit after finding that the comments did not have the unavoidable effect of prejudicing the jury. Comments by a prosecutor constitute reversible error only where their unavoidable effect is to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds a fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant such that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a fair verdict. Miller, 746 A.2d at 601-02. The prosecution's statements are unobjectionable if they are based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom, or represent mere oratorical flair. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 571 Pa. 112, 811 A.2d 994, 1006 (2002). Additionally, the prosecution must be permitted to respond to arguments made by the defense. Carson, 913 A.2d at 237. Review of the record demonstrates that these nested claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness were addressed in post-trial motions, though they were not necessarily renewed on direct appeal. [20] We see no error in the PCRA court's finding that the comments were not so objectionable and prejudicial that appellate counsel was unreasonable for declining to pursue the claims on direct appeal. First, appellate counsel was not obliged to view the innocuous remark requesting the jurors to listen as closely as [they] can to the evidence of both sides as misconduct designed to implicate and burden appellant's right to remain silent. Indeed, moments before making the now-disputed comment, the prosecutor added the proviso if the defense elects to present any. N.T., 2/2/87, at 26. In addition, the defense did in fact present evidence, including the testimony of appellant himself. And, finally, a reference to defense evidence is broader than a specific reference to evidence from the defendant's own mouth. We note also that this claim fails as one sounding in ineffectiveness because trial counsel did in fact request a mistrial in response to these comments, but the motion was denied. See id. at 29-31. Furthermore, and in any event, we agree with the PCRA court that the remark was not prejudicial. Second, respecting the comments in closing that the defense had all the evidence, we again agree with the PCRA court that there was no prejudice. The allegedly improper comments were as follows: The evidence the defendant heard was no surprise. The defense had all the police records in this case. You perhaps noticed the slip of the tongue the defendant made today when [one of the prosecutors] was asking him a question about something: Did he remember something or the other? He said: Well, I'm not sure if I know that from my memory or from reading a police report. That gives you an understanding of exactly what happens in this case. Defendant's testimony yesterday was designed to weave its way through the evidence. He had all the evidence. He knew what the Commonwealth had and what it didn't. He attempted yet to weave his way through the evidence explaining away what we proved and ignoring what we could not prove. N.T., 2/6/87, at 669-70 (emphasis added). Appellant argues that such a comment attempts to penalize the defense for exercising it rights to discovery and could be generally used to impeach the credibility of every witness who testifies in his own defense. Appellant's Brief at 70. Appellant's contentions, however, are not supported by the cited text. The prosecutor was merely commenting upon the way in which appellant's testimony attempted to respond to the Commonwealth's evidence. Moreover, the prosecutor's point is accurate: the defendant in a criminal case is not subject to sequestration like other witnesses, and so is uniquely positioned to tailor his testimony to try to account for whatever damning evidence the jury has heard. Highlighting that reality is not improper. We fail to see how such fair comment burdens a defendant's discovery rights; certainly, appellant cites no governing authority for such a proposition, and appellate counsel cannot be faulted for failing to forward an argument unsupported by existing law. [21] Third, appellant claims that the following statements improperly vouched for the thoroughness of the police investigation and credibility of the Commonwealth's case: The defendant made no effort to try to help the police with their investigation if what he is telling you is the truth and someone else murdered Jeanine Revak. You have seen how much time and effort the police had put in this case. If we assume for a minute what the defense was telling us yesterday was true, you can imagine how much help it would have been to the police.... But the defendant didn't cooperate with the police. And, yet, on the stand he couldn't even try to counterfeit an emotion of concern for her death. N.T., 2/6/87, at 673-74 (emphasis added). Trial counsel did not object. Taken in context, these comments were not improper and prejudicial. The jury had before it evidence of the extent of the police investigation. The prosecutor merely commented upon appellant's lack of concern for the police investigation into the victim's rape and murder, which seemed to contradict appellant's claim that he had a friendship, as well as recurring romantic encounters, with the victim. We fail to see how such commentary amounts to improper vouching, such that counsel was constitutionally obliged to object, and appellate counsel was obliged to pursue the claim. Appellant also claims that the following comments in closing constituted the prosecutor's improper vouching for witness credibility: Now Ferry and White both have bad records. Worse than bad. They got horrible records. That is no secret. We told you that.... No secrets. It doesn't necessarily mean that the defendant didn't confide in them. N.T., 2/6/87, at 706. Again, it is not self-evident why these comments should be deemed objectionable as a matter of law. The prosecutor merely made the unexceptional observation that the fact that Ferry and White had criminal records did not mean that appellant would not have confided in them. The prosecutor did not thereby improperly bolster or vouch for the credibility of the two witnesses. Therefore, this claim of prosecutorial misconduct, and all derivative ineffectiveness claims lacks arguable merit. Finally, appellant asserts that the Miller unavoidable effect standard employed by the PCRA court is inconsistent with the standards applied by the U.S. Supreme Court to evaluate prosecutorial misconduct claims. Citing Donnelly, supra, appellant states that the High Court recognizes two types of prosecutorial misconduct claims: (1) generalized claims of misconduct, which are reviewed to determine if the error so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process; and (2) claims implicating specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. See Donnelly, 416 U.S. at 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868. Appellant contends that the unavoidable effect standard is inconsistent even with Donnelly's generalized claims standard. Appellant's argument, however, is empty. The Miller standard is merely another way of stating the proposition that for a prosecutor's comments to be a basis for reversible trial court error, they must affect the defendant's right to a fair trial or deny him due process. Appellant's legal argument is therefore without merit. And, just as importantly, this side argument does not operate to advance appellant's cognizable claim, which must satisfy Strickland prejudice at two levels.