Opinion ID: 688721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lara's appeal

Text: 14 Lara contends that the supplemental jury instructions were defective for lack of an adequate statement of the requisite mental state for a conspiracy conviction and because of the illustrative references to the facts of his case. Neither point has merit. The charge adequately conveyed the thought that a conspiracy conviction requires proof of active participation with knowledge of the venture's illegal purpose. See United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276, 282 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 602, 130 L.Ed.2d 513 (1994); United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 944 (2d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1646, 128 L.Ed.2d 365 (1994). 15 Though we have cautioned against the use in jury charges of hypotheticals that closely resemble the facts of a case, see United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 61-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3214, 96 L.Ed.2d 701 (1987); United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 14 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082, 100 S.Ct. 1037, 62 L.Ed.2d 767 (1980); United States v. Dizdar, 581 F.2d 1031, 1037 (2d Cir.1978), the instruction in this case provides no basis for disturbing the conviction. The principal risk of such hypotheticals is that they will make an unbalanced presentation that illustrates circumstances sufficient for conviction but not circumstances warranting an acquittal. If so, the jury may be unduly influenced toward a guilty verdict. That risk was of no concern in Lara's trial, once he admitted in his detailed testimony to all the key aspects of the Government's allegations.