Opinion ID: 1855982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Prosecution for Two Crimes

Text: Sardeson next urges the view that the district court erred in overruling his motion to dismiss either the burglary charge or the possession charge; he argues that one cannot commit both the crimes of burglary and theft by receiving stolen property when the same property and incident form the substance of both charges. Although he declines to phrase it thus, Sardeson's argument is essentially that he may not be convicted both of a crime and of a lesser offense included within that crime. In this, he is correct. This court has recently reaffirmed that when a defendant is convicted of both a greater and lesser-included offense, the conviction and sentence on the lesser charge must be vacated, State v. Olsan, 231 Neb. 214, 436 N.W.2d 128 (1989), for the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy protects not only against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal or conviction, but also against multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Olsan, supra . It is equally clear, however, that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy has no application where two separate and distinct crimes are committed as the result of one act, because the constitutional proscription is directed to the identity of the offense and not to the act. State v. Rice, 231 Neb. 202, 435 N.W.2d 889 (1989). Section 28-507(1) provides: A person commits burglary if such person willfully, maliciously, and forcibly breaks and enters any real estate or any improvements erected thereon with intent to commit any felony or with intent to steal property of any value. Section 28-517 provides: A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of stolen movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing that it has been stolen, unless the property is received, retained, or disposed with intention to restore it to the owner. A lesser-included offense is one which is necessarily established by proof of the greater offense. State v. Rice, supra ; State v. Arthaloney, 230 Neb. 819, 433 N.W.2d 545 (1989); State v. Olsan, supra . One commits burglary in violation of § 28-507(1) when one, in the proscribed manner, breaks and enters any real property or improvements thereon with the proscribed intent; no actual theft or asportation of property is required. State v. Zemunski, 230 Neb. 613, 433 N.W.2d 170 (1988); State v. Vaughn, 225 Neb. 38, 402 N.W.2d 300 (1987). In stark contrast, one commits theft by receiving stolen property only if one receives, retains, or disposes of, in short, possesses, stolen movable property of another with the proscribed knowledge and intent. Clearly, burglary is not a lesser-included offense of theft by receiving stolen property, nor is theft by receiving stolen property a lesser-included offense of burglary. Sardeson seeks to buttress his position by citation to Milanovich v. United States, 365 U.S. 551, 81 S.Ct. 728, 5 L.Ed.2d 773 (1961). Milanovich relied upon Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415, 79 S.Ct. 451, 3 L.Ed.2d 407 (1959), in which the defendant was charged under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c) and (d) (1958). Under subsection (d), Heflin was charged with taking property by force and violence, and under subsection (c) it was alleged that Heflin did `receive, possess, conceal, store, and dispose' of the same property. 358 U.S. at 416, 79 S.Ct. at 452. Following conviction, consecutive sentences were imposed. The Supreme Court, after a brief review of what it characterized as meagre legislative history, concluded: From these [House and Senate] Reports it seems clear that subsection (c) was not designed to increase the punishment for him who robs a bank but only to provide punishment for those who receive the loot from the robber. We find no purpose of Congress to pyramid penalties for lesser offenses following the robbery.... [I]n view of the legislative history of subsection (c) we think Congress was trying to reach a new group of wrongdoers, not to multiply the offense of the bank robbers themselves. 358 U.S. at 419-20, 79 S.Ct. at 454. In Milanovich, supra, defendants Milanovich, husband and wife, were found guilty of stealing several thousand dollars in currency from a commissary store at a United States Naval Base, 365 U.S. at 552, 81 S.Ct. at 728; in addition, the wife was found guilty of receiving and concealing the stolen currency, id., all of these acts being crimes under 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1982). Concurrent sentences were imposed on the wife. The Supreme Court, citing Heflin, supra, reversed, observing: We find nothing in the language or history of the present statute which leads to a different conclusion here. 365 U.S. at 554, 81 S.Ct. at 729-30. The results of Heflin and Milanovich are grounded in principles of federal statutory construction, not of constitutional jurisprudence. As the Milanovich Court itself noted, the question is one of statutory construction, not of common law distinctions. 365 U.S. at 554, 81 S.Ct. at 729. See, also, United States v. Tyler, 466 F.2d 920 (9th Cir.1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 1045, 93 S.Ct. 544, 34 L.Ed.2d 497, declining to apply the Milanovich rule to convictions for larceny and possession of the same stolen goods under § 2113(b) and (c) (1982). We are here concerned with the construction of state statutes, to which neither Heflin nor Milanovich has any relevance. Sardeson's second summarized assignment of error is without merit.