Opinion ID: 2613608
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Aggravated Burglary Instruction

Text: Noriega next argues the trial court committed error in giving an instruction on aggravated burglary which did not specify the felony he intended to commit upon entering the residence. Aggravated burglary was one of the alternative felony charges underlying the felony murder charge. Noriega did not object to the instruction as given; therefore, the clearly erroneous standard applies. Burglary is defined as knowingly and without authority entering into or remaining within any ... [b]uilding, manufactured home, mobile home, tent or other structure which is a dwelling, with intent to commit a felony, theft or sexual battery therein. K.S.A. 21-3715. Aggravated burglary merely requires the additional element that the place of the burglary be occupied by a human being during the course of the burglary. K.S.A. 21-3716. The State's complaint charged aggravated burglary as follows: On or about the 11th day of January, 1994, in the County of Shawnee and State of Kansas, DOUGLAS LEON RAY ABEL, RAMON ALEXANDER NRIEGA, JR., did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly, without authority and with the intent to commit a felony or theft, to-wit: Robbery, Aggravated Robbery, or Theft therein, entered into a residence located at 417 NW Fairchild, occupied during time of said entrance by, Sidney J. Robinson, contrary to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the State of Kansas. (Emphasis added.) The trial court's instruction on aggravated burglary provided: To establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: (1) That the defendant knowingly entered a residence located at 417 NW Fairchild; (2) That the defendant did so without authority; (3) That the defendant did so with intent to commit a felony or theft therein; (4) That at the time there was a human being in the residence at 417 NW Fairchild; and (5) That this act occurred between January 9th and January 11th, 1994, in Shawnee County, Kansas. The theft charge which originally dealt with theft of Robinson's automobile was dismissed at the close of the State's case in chief. As Noriega argues, the aggravated burglary instruction failed to identify the felony intended to be committed. Noriega asserts that this case is similar to State v. Linn, 251 Kan. 797, Syl. ¶ 2, 840 P.2d 1133 (1992), where this court stated: An instruction as to the offense of aggravated burglary is defective unless it specifies and sets out the statutory elements of the offense intended by an accused in making the unauthorized entry. In Linn, the defendant was charged with felony murder, aggravated battery, and aggravated burglary. The underlying felony for the murder charge was aggravated burglary of a residence. At trial, the defendant requested that the felony-murder instruction specify aggravated burglary as the underlying felony and that the aggravated burglary instruction specify its underlying crime as theft. The State argued that the evidence supported theft, aggravated battery, or robbery as the underlying felony for aggravated burglary. The trial judge's instruction stated that to find the defendant guilty of aggravated burglary, the jury had to find that Linn entered or remained in the residence with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein. 251 Kan. at 799. The defendant objected to the instruction on the ground there was no evidence of any intent to commit a crime other than theft. On appeal, Linn argued that the judge's instruction to the jury failed to identify a specific felony he allegedly intended to commit inside the home and to set out the statutory elements of theft. The Linn court observed that an instruction as to aggravated burglary is defective unless it specifies and sets out the statutory elements of the offense intended by the accused in making the unauthorized entry. The Linn court found that the trial court's failure to specify the underlying felony or felonies and their elements prevented the jury from rendering a lawful verdict and was an error of constitutional magnitude, depriving Linn of a fair trial. 251 Kan. at 802. We agree that it would be error if the district court had failed to set out the statutory elements of the intended felony when instructing on aggravated burglary. See State v. Richmond, 258 Kan. 449, Syl. ¶ 5; State v. Watson, 256 Kan. 396, 404, 885 P.2d 1226 (1994); and State v. Maxwell, 234 Kan. 393, Syl. ¶ 3, 672 P.2d 590 (1983). Here, the defendant fails to consider the instructions together and as a whole. Jury instructions are to be considered together and read as a whole, without isolating any one instruction. If the instructions properly and fairly state the law as applied to the facts in the case, and if the jury could not reasonably have been misled by them, the instructions do not constitute reversible error although they may be in some small way erroneous. State v. Johnson, 255 Kan. 252, Syl. ¶ 4, 874 P.2d 623 (1994). The trial judge instructed the jury on count I of the complaint on the crime of aggravated burglary. Instruction No. 1 stated: That the defendant did so with the intent to commit a felony or theft therein. Instruction No. 2 informed the jury that the defendant was charged with the crime of aggravated robbery. It then set out each of the claims the State must prove to establish this charge. Instruction No. 3 informed the jury that the defendant was charged with the crime of murder in the first degree (felony murder). The jury was informed that to establish this charge, each of the following claims must be proved: The defendant killed Sidney J. Robinson during the commission of the crimes of aggravated burglary or aggravated robbery. Instruction No. 3 noted that the elements of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery were set forth in Instructions No. 1 and 2. The jury found the defendant guilty of the crimes of aggravated burglary, aggravated robbery, and firstdegree felony murder. When the three instructions are read together, we are able to conclude that the jury was properly instructed and to determine that the defendant entered the residence with the intent to commit the felony of aggravated robbery. Noriega's claim that the aggravated burglary instruction did not specify the felony he intended to commit upon entering the residence is without merit. Noriega also asserts that when alternative felonies are charged, and the jury does not expressly specify in its verdict which felony was the basis for the felony-murder conviction, the felony-murder conviction cannot stand if the evidence was not sufficient for conviction on both underlying felonies. He argues that because it is impossible to tell whether the jury relied upon a legally sufficient felony for the murder convictions, his conviction for felony murder must be vacated. Here, the jury was instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of felony murder if it convicted Noriega of either aggravated burglary or aggravated robbery and was instructed that its verdict must be unanimous. On separate verdict forms the jury found the defendant guilty of both aggravated robbery and aggravated burglary. Because the evidence of the underlying felony convictions was sufficient, the felony-murder conviction stands.