Opinion ID: 167079
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: False Alibi and Jury Instruction Regarding False Exculpatory Statements

Text: 17 Davis argues that the district court erred by admitting an FBI agent's testimony concerning Davis's statements to the agent and instructing the jury regarding false exculpatory statements. 18 We review a district court's ruling on the admissibility of evidence for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Serrata, 425 F.3d 886, 901 (10th Cir.2005). Under this standard, we will not reverse a trial court's evidentiary rulings unless we are convinced the district court `made a clear error of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.' Id. (citation omitted). 19 We also review de novo whether, as a whole, the district court's instructions correctly stated the governing law and provided the jury with an ample understanding of the issues and applicable standards. United States v. Cerrato-Reyes, 176 F.3d 1253, 1262 (10th Cir.1999) (citation omitted). An instructional error is harmless unless the error had a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial or if the court is left in grave doubt as to its influence. United States v. Cota-Meza, 367 F.3d 1218, 1221 (10th Cir.2004) (citation omitted). 20 At trial, FBI agent Matt Lotspeich testified, over objection, about an interview he conducted with Davis eight days after the robbery. Vol. V at 205, 212. According to Agent Lotspeich, Davis informed him that he was employed at a company called TCIM, and that he had been working there for the previous two weeks between 8 o'clock and 4 o'clock. Id. at 228. Agent Lotspeich testified that during the interview Davis changed his story, and explained that he was not at work at the time of the robbery, but was at his girlfriend's house. Id. at 229. 21 The government argued before the district court that Davis's evolving statement to Agent Lotspeich—that he was at work at the time of the robbery and then that he was actually at his girlfriend's house—constituted a voluntary, false exculpatory statement. The government maintained that it was entitled to exploit the false statement, call a witness from TCIM to prove that it was false, and to obtain an instruction about consciousness of guilt. Id. at 213. The district court allowed Agent Lotspeich's testimony, as well as a TCIM representative's testimony that Davis had neither worked at TCIM, nor interviewed for a position there. Over objection, the district court also gave the following jury instruction on false exculpatory statements: 22 When a defendant voluntarily and intentionally offers an explanation, or makes some statement before trial tending to show his innocence, and this explanation or statement is later shown to be false, you may consider whether this evidence points to consciousness of guilt. The significance to be attached to any such evidence is a matter for you to determine. 23 Vol. I, Doc. 96. 24 On appeal, Davis again maintains that the government improperly asked Agent Lotspeich about an alibi statement that he never raised as a defense. Specifically, Davis challenges the government's use of Agent Lotspeich's testimony to make it appear that Davis relied on a false alibi, and then to call another witness to demonstrate that Davis was not at work that day. Davis asserts that his statement that he was at work was an example of thinking out loud and that he merely had trouble remembering where he was on the day of the robbery. He argues that his statement did not rise to the level of a false alibi. Davis contends that the district court's error in admitting the testimony was compounded by the jury instruction given on false exculpatory statements. 25 We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the challenged testimony to prove consciousness of guilt. Although false exculpatory statements cannot be considered by the jury as direct evidence of guilt, such statements are admissible to prove circumstantially consciousness of guilt or unlawful intent. United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir.1982) (citations omitted). The jury was entitled to weigh the evidence and decide whether Davis fabricated a story as to his whereabouts on the date of the robbery, or just momentarily could not remember. See United States v. Ingram, 600 F.2d 260, 262 (10th Cir.1979) (concluding that it was proper to give an instruction regarding false exculpatory statements when the defendant informed FBI agents that though he wasn't sure, he believed that he was at Fort Carson, Colorado on the day of the robbery and the government established at trial that the statement was incorrect). We conclude that the district court's instruction to the jury about false exculpatory statements was supported by the evidence and is an accurate statement of the law. The instruction leaves exclusively to the jury the question as to whether false exculpatory statements, if made, indicate consciousness of guilt, or nothing at all. Id.