Opinion ID: 2974751
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Consider Mitigating Evidence

Text: Adams argues that the district court erred when it refused to consider Adams’ post-sentence rehabilitation and depart downward from the sentencing range recommended by the guidelines. The district court stated: The sentencing memorandum asks for a guideline departure based on rehabilitative efforts of the defendant as to education and substance abuse programs since being in prison. Defendant’s request has to be denied since post sentencing rehabilitative efforts are not an appropriate basis for downward departure when re-sentencing a defendant. If you don’t believe that, look at [U.S.S.G. §] 5K2.19. In United States v. Rudolph, finding a circuit split on the issue, we decided that “a district court has the discretion to depart downward on the basis of post-sentence rehabilitation. . . . [D]istrict courts may depart downward because neither the Sentencing Guidelines nor any statute explicitly bars consideration of post-sentence rehabilitation.” 190 F.3d 720, 723 (6th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Such a departure is only available, however, if the rehabilitative efforts “seem extraordinary or exceptional when compared to the rehabilitation of other defendants.” Id. at 728. Subsequently, however, a policy statement was added to the Guidelines, which stated, “[p]ost-sentencing rehabilitative efforts, even if exceptional, undertaken by a defendant after imposition of a term of imprisonment for the instant offense are not an appropriate basis for a downward departure when resentencing the defendant for that offense.” U.S.S.G. § 5K2.19 (effective November 1, 2000). This policy statement would appear to foreclose the availability of the downward departures based on post-sentencing rehabilitation. The parties disagree as to the effect of this policy statement. Adams argues that Booker declared such limitations on a district judge’s considerations unconstitutional. The government 7 counters that the mandate of § 5K2.19 is appropriate for two reasons: First, good behavior is already rewarded. Prisoners already may receive a maximum of 54 days per year off their sentence for good behavior at the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1). Second, allowing some defendants a second bite at the good behavior apple would result in unfair sentencing disparity and, thus, run afoul of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). It is worth noting that such a rule would also create incentives for procedural error in order to get additional benefits from a longer period to demonstrate rehabilitation. Regardless, this issue has already been foreclosed by our court. In United States v. Worley, the defendant, “insist[ed] that at his second sentencing hearing, the district court erred in failing to consider his successful efforts at rehabilitation during almost three years that he was incarcerated prior to re-sentencing . . . .” 453 F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 2006). We noted that, “[i]n point of fact, case law in this circuit previously permitted a sentencing court to depart downward for extraordinary rehabilitative efforts between an original sentencing and subsequent re-sentencing, but only under limited circumstances.” Id. at 709. Yet, we ultimately concluded that a Booker-remand was limited in scope and that, “[p]ost-sentencing events or conduct simply are not relevant . . . .” Id. (quoting United States v. Re, 419 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2005)). Therefore, the district court was not in error when it failed to consider Adams’ good behavior. Because the district court properly considered the Guidelines range and the § 3553(a) factors and did not improperly fail to consider any of Adams’ mitigating arguments, the sentence is not procedurally unreasonable. The sentence is also substantively reasonable. The factors on which the court relied – Adams’ criminal history, his apparent dedication to a life of crime, and the seriousness of the offense 8 – are not inappropriate. In addition, it does not appear that any one factor or a few factors were given inappropriate weight. Therefore, Adams has not rebutted the presumption that the within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable.