Opinion ID: 1613796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether wilcox was deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel by counsels' failure to raise the double jeopardy issue before the sentencing court and on direct appeal to this court.

Text: After Wilcox was convicted of second-degree murder (SDCL 22-16-9) and manslaughter in the first degree (SDCL 22-16-15(2)), the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of life imprisonment. Wilcox was additionally sentenced to ten years for the child abuse conviction. Wilcox argues that his concurrent life sentences for one homicide violated the double jeopardy clause. Wilcox claims that his attorneys were ineffective because they failed to raise the double jeopardy issues before the sentencing court and on appeal to this court.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy consists of three separate guarantees. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, [664-65] (1969). The third guarantee `protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.' State v. Baker, 440 N.W.2d 284, 293 (S.D. 1989) (quoting State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618, 625 (S.D.1988)). See also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). The United States Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932), established the rule for determining whether two separate statutory offenses providing separate punishment are actually the `same offense.' Adams, 418 N.W.2d at 625. `[W]here the same act or transaction constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test to be applied... is whether each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.' Id. (quoting Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182, 76 L.Ed. at 309). The United States Supreme Court further explained the Blockburger test in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980): `Thus we stated that if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, [citation omitted],' the offenses are not the same under the Blockburger test. [Citations omitted.] (emphasis in original). Adams, 418 N.W.2d at 625 (quoting Vitale, 447 U.S. at 416, 100 S.Ct. at 2265, 65 L.Ed.2d at 235). Recently, the United States Supreme Court stated: [T]he Double Jeopardy Clause does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended [citations omitted] ... The Blockburger test is simply a `rule of statutory construction,' a guide to determine whether the legislature intended multiple punishments. Grady, 495 U.S. at 516-17, 110 S.Ct. at 2091, 109 L.Ed.2d at 561. Therefore, we must examine the statutes which Wilcox violated. SDCL 22-16-9 provides: Homicide is murder in the second degree when perpetrated without any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony other than as provided in § 22-16-4. SDCL 22-16-15(2) provides: Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree when perpetrated: .... (2) Without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner[.] The same facts and actions committed by Wilcox were used to convict him of both statutory offenses. Under SDCL 22-16-9 Wilcox had to commit a felony which resulted in death. Wilcox committed felony child abuse. SDCL 26-10-1 provides: Any person who abuses, exposes, tortures, torments or cruelly punishes a minor in a manner which does not constitute aggravated assault, is guilty of a Class 4 felony. SDCL 22-16-15(2) provides that homicide must have been committed in a cruel and unusual manner. In Wilcox I, we stated: Wilcox's beating upon this little girl was cruel and barbaric. It caused her death. 441 N.W.2d at 213. It is also interesting to note that SDCL 22-16-1 defines homicide in the disjunctive. Homicide is the killing of one human being by another. It is either: (1) Murder; (2) Manslaughter; (3) Excusable homicide; (4) Justifiable homicide; or (5) Vehicular homicide. (Emphasis added.) We have stated: The rule seems to be well settled that, when a penal statute mentions several acts disjunctively, and prescribes that each shall constitute the same offense and is subject to the same punishment, an information may charge any and all such acts conjunctively as constituting a single offense. (Emphasis in original.) Baker, 440 N.W.2d at 293 (quoting State v. Likness, 386 N.W.2d 42, 43 (S.D.1986)). Furthermore, there is no expressed legislative intent to punish a single death under both SDCL 22-16-9 (second-degree murder) and SDCL 22-16-15 (first-degree manslaughter). In this case, Wilcox was convicted of both murder and manslaughter for the death of Sheena Johnson. At this time, we hold that double homicide convictions for a single death are improper. In the future, we urge prosecutors to charge defendants in cases such as this in alternative counts. We conclude, however, that it is not necessary to reverse Wilcox' convictions. As we stated in Wilcox I, they were supported by law and fact. Rather, we must reverse Wilcox' sentence. We remand to the trial court with the direction that it vacate the sentence on the lesser offense of first-degree manslaughter and enter judgment on the greater offense of second-degree murder. People v. Zeitler, 183 Mich.App. 68, 454 N.W.2d 192 (1990); Com. v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 416 N.E.2d 502 (1981); Com. v. Grasso, 10 Mass.App. 915, 411 N.E.2d 191 (1978); Kuklis v. Commonwealth, 361 Mass. 302, 280 N.E.2d 155 (1972); Commonwealth v. White (No. 2), 365 Mass. 307, 311 N.E.2d 547 (1974); People v. Carl Johnson, 99 Mich.App. 547, 297 N.W.2d 713 (1980); People v. Densmore, 87 Mich.App. 434, 274 N.W.2d 811 (1978).
Wilcox argues that he was denied his right to effective counsel because his attorneys did not raise the double jeopardy issue at the sentencing hearing or on direct appeal to this court, nor did they file a petition for rehearing. [T]o succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show two requirements. `First, ... that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, ... that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.' Miller v. Leapley, 472 N.W.2d 517, 518 (S.D.1991) (quoting Luna v. Solem, 411 N.W.2d 656, 658 (S.D.1987)) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). We have also stated that: Because of the difficulty inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Miller, 472 N.W.2d at 518 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694-95). We have concluded that Wilcox should be resentenced; however, we are not convinced that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. During the hearing on the writ of habeas corpus, one of Wilcox' trial attorneys testified as follows: Q: [By Ms. Haverly (habeas counsel) ] Okay. And that was not raisedthe double jeopardy issue was not raised either with regard to the felony, murder or underlying felony or with manslaughter and the murder two? A: [By Mr. Larson] Right. It wasn'tit was overlooked as an issue at the time of sentencing. It was considered and rejected, I believe at the time of the appeal. Q: Do you recall why you rejected it at the time of appeal? A: I do. The feeling was at that time was the best that was going to happen is Dan was going to come out with one life sentence instead of two. And we didn't want to let the Supreme Court, when we thought there was a legitimatesome legitimate matters to consider a retrial on the entire matter, to feel that they were, I don't know, giving us a half a loaf by saying, you know, okay, he's only got one life sentence, because that wouldn't really accomplish much for Dan. Q: Unless maybe cut by the board or whoever would cut the life sentence? A: In thelooking back now that we know we lost on the other issues, yes. But if I had to make that decision again, I would make that same decision because the chances of somebody getting something cut before the board relative to the chances of somebody getting a murder conviction reversed, I would rather take the chance on getting the whole thing reversed. It is important to note that this court has never before held that double homicide convictions for a single death are improper. We have recognized that our aggravated assault statute (SDCL 22-18-1.1) does not contain four separate offenses, but rather describes one violation that may be established in four different ways. Baker, 440 N.W.2d at 293. Likewise, SDCL 22-16-1 describes homicide as a violation that may be established in five different ways. In Wilcox I, Justice Sabers dissented, raising the sentencing issue sua sponte. In his dissent, he cited to other jurisdictions which hold that double homicide convictions for a single death are improper, regardless of the types of homicide. 441 N.W.2d 209, 214 (S.D.1989); Houser v. State, 474 So.2d 1193 (Fla.1985); Loscomb v. State, 45 Md.App. 598, 416 A.2d 1276 (1980); Com. v. Jones, supra ; Commonwealth v. Monteil, 273 Pa.Super. 94, 416 A.2d 1105 (1979). See also Zeitler, supra . However, to find that Wilcox' attorneys were ineffective because they failed to raise this issue would impose upon them a higher standard then the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Miller, 472 N.W.2d at 518. Wilcox was sentenced on February 5, 1988; State v. Baker was handed down May 10, 1989. Counsel clearly did not have the benefit of our holding in Baker to assist them at the time of sentencing. Furthermore, it is apparent that counsel thought there were valid, strategic reasons for not raising the issue on appeal. An attorney's performance must not be judged using the benefit of hindsight. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 682, 104 S.Ct. at 2065, 80 L.Ed.2d at 694. Moreover, our function is not to second-guess the tactical decisions of trial counsel, nor will we substitute our own theoretical judgment for that of the trial attorney. Woods v. Solem, 405 N.W.2d 59, 62 (S.D.1987). It is our opinion, after reviewing the record in this habeas corpus proceeding and Wilcox I, that Wilcox was not denied his right to effective assistance of counsel.