Opinion ID: 2745692
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Atkins-Based Claim

Text: Frazier first contends that his trial counsel provided constitutionally defective assistance by withdrawing the motion for an Atkins hearing despite record evidence indicating that Frazier might be mentally retarded. In particular, Frazier argues that his IQ scores are within the standard error of measurement, that the Social Security Administration’s finding that he was mentally retarded is particularly persuasive, and that counsel should have employed a mentalretardation expert. When Frazier raised this claim and these arguments on direct appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected them on the merits. Frazier, 873 N.E.2d at 1292. Specifically, it held that counsel’s representation was not constitutionally defective because: (1) Dr. Smalldon testified that Frazier’s Full Scale IQ score of 72 was “pretty accurate”; (2) Frazier failed to present evidence that linked his Social Security benefits to his mental retardation claim; (3) there was no evidence that Frazier’s attorney failed to consult with him prior to withdrawing the No. 11-4262 Frazier v. Jenkins Page 17 motion, particularly given Frazier’s in-court statements before the motion was withdrawn; and (4) counsel was permitted to rely on the judgments of Dr. Smalldon and Dr. Forgac. Id. The Ohio Supreme Court adjudicated this claim on the merits, and thus, we afford that decision substantial deference under AEDPA. Under this deferential standard, we cannot conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court’s ultimate decision was objectively unreasonable. Frazier’s main assignment of error is that his attorney failed to present evidence of mental retardation at an Atkins hearing. His counsel claimed that they skipped the Atkins hearing because Frazier’s Full Scale IQ scores were above 70, and on the advice of Dr. Smalldon and Dr. Forgac, they did not believe that the Lott presumption could be overcome. J.A. Vol. 4 at 1512– 13. Given the record in this case, we find counsel’s performance troubling for two reasons. First, the Ohio courts have found defendants mentally retarded even though their IQ scores exceeded 70. See, e.g., State v. Gumm, 864 N.E.2d 133 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006). Here, there is plenty of evidence that suggests Frazier had a chance to overcome the Lott presumption that he was not mentally retarded. Frazier had a well-documented history of academic struggles; for instance, the top of his high school records read, “Frazier, James (Slow Learner).” His IQ scores were within the standard error of measurement, and Dr. Smalldon could not complete various tests because Frazier’s limited abilities “wouldn’t enable [Dr. Smalldon] to produce valid profiles [from those tests].” J.A. Vol. 3 at 1075 (Smalldon Report). Moreover, the Social Security Administration had been paying Frazier disability benefits for years based on a finding of mental retardation. As we explained above, it is not clear from this evidence that Frazier could have overcome the Lott presumption, but there is a non-frivolous chance that the state trial court would have concluded that Frazier met the standard for mental retardation. Second and more fundamentally, we fail to see the downside in having a non-frivolous Atkins hearing, and it is difficult to ascertain a strategic reason for withdrawing the motion in this case. These hearings are before the judge, not the jury, see Lott, 779 N.E.2d at 1015, and thus, no potentially prejudicial material would be kept from the jury by foregoing the hearing. Moreover, to the extent that the evidence is helpful to Frazier, nothing bars counsel from presenting the same information to the jury during the mitigation stage of trial (as happened during Frazier’s trial). By choosing to withdraw the motion for an Atkins hearing, counsel No. 11-4262 Frazier v. Jenkins Page 18 deprived Frazier of the best opportunity to create a full record on the issue and to allow the statetrial-court judge—the judicial officer with the best sense of Frazier’s actual abilities—to decide whether he met the Lott definition of mental retardation. While we find counsel’s performance questionable, the Ohio Supreme Court’s application of Strickland in this case was not objectively unreasonable. Lawyers are permitted to rely upon qualified experts, see Murphy, 551 F.3d at 500–01 (citing Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 319 (6th Cir. 2005)), and in this case, Frazier’s own expert found him not to be mentally retarded. Fairminded jurists could find that counsel’s reliance upon Dr. Smalldon’s opinion was consistent with professional norms. Frazier also argues that counsel should have retained a mental-retardation specialist, but as the district court noted, Dr. Smalldon had consulted in about 200 capital cases over thirteen years, many of them involving issues of mental retardation. J.A. Vol. 1 at 145 (D. Ct. Op.). Certainly, Dr. Rheinscheld may have testified differently, but Frazier has not shown that Dr. Smalldon is unqualified. More importantly, Dr. Smalldon actually met Frazier, while Dr. Rheinscheld merely relied upon Dr. Smalldon’s reports and other materials available at trial. See J.A. Vol. 2 at 773 (Rheinscheld Aff.). Therefore, Dr. Rheinscheld’s analysis is merely another interpretation of Dr. Smalldon’s data. Given that Frazier has not shown that Dr. Smalldon’s interpretation was unreasonable or that he was unqualified, counsel could rely upon Dr. Smalldon’s recommendation—or so a reasonable jurist could find. As a result, we do not need to determine whether counsel’s performance prejudiced Frazier, and we AFFIRM the denial of Frazier’s petition on this claim.