Opinion ID: 2372489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Necessity for proof of final disposition of Criminal proceedings

Text: Appellant contends that because the final disposition of related criminal proceedings is a condition precedent to the institution of a forfeiture proceeding, proof of such a final disposition was a necessary element of the case the appellee was required to establish by a preponderance of the evidence. We shall hold that Section 297 (b) (4) does not impose such a condition precedent. Appellant's contention rests upon passage of Ch. 666 of Maryland Acts, 1974, the pertinent portion of which is shown by the italicized words inserted in Section 297 (b) (4): (4) There is probable cause to believe that the property has been used or intended to be used in violation of this subheading. In the event of seizure pursuant to paragraphs (3) and (4) of this subsection, proceedings under subsection (d) of this section shall be instituted promptly, EXCEPT ALL PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO MONEY OR CURRENCY, WHICH SHALL BE INSTITUTED WITHIN NINETY (90) DAYS FROM THE DATE OF FINAL DISPOSITION OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH ARISE OUT OF ARTICLE 27, SECTION 276 THROUGH SECTION 302 INCLUSIVE. He argues that the Court of Special Appeals in Office of Finance v. Jones, 46 Md. App. 419, 424; 417 A.2d 470, 473 (1980), cert. den. 288 Md. 740 has held that final disposition [of criminal proceedings] trigger[s] the 90 day period within which [a local government is] required to file its forfeiture petition, and that this Court in United States Coin and Currency v. Director of Finance, 279 Md. 185, 367 A.2d 1243 (1977) held that the recordation of the establishment of guilt and the imposition of sentence were a condition precedent to the institution of forfeiture proceedings. He misreads both cases. In Jones and in U.S. Coin and Currency, the forfeiture proceeding was commenced after the specific limitation upon the filing fixed by statute. Both are inapposite to the subject issue. We note also that U.S. Coin and Currency dealt with Maryland Code Article 27, Section 264, a statute dealing with seizures of money or property incident to violations of the gambling laws (Subsection 237  263 incl.), all misdemeanors subject to the general statute of limitations that effectively bars prosecution after one year. Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, Section 5-106(a); Duncan v. State, 282 Md. 385, 386, 384 A.2d 456. The seizure of the money or currency in the subject case was pursuant to Section 297 (a) (6) and was incidental to the seizure of multiple controlled dangerous substances, the unlawful possession of which is felonious (Article 27, Section 286). We believe that the Legislature, by adding the previously emphasized language to Section 297 (b) (4) clearly intended to impose a fixed limitation upon the filing of applications for forfeiture if a trial has taken place and a final disposition of criminal proceedings has resulted. In such circumstances there remains no reason for the authorized official to delay the filing of an application for judicial decree that will approve or disapprove the seizure and grant or deny the forfeiture. The legislative purpose plainly was to place a specific time limitation of 90 days after a concluded criminal prosecution in the case of the seizure of money or currency in lieu of the previously indefinite requirement that the filing shall be instituted promptly. Section 297 (a) (6) provides inter alia that This [seized] money or currency shall be deemed to be contraband of law and all rights, title and interest in and to the money or currency shall immediately vest in and to Baltimore City or the county in which it was seized. (Emphasis added) The interpretation suggested by appellant of the words added to sub-section (b) (4) supra, would in effect have these words added to the above quotation: if criminal proceedings are concluded. The late Judge J. Dudley Digges said for this Court in Prince George's Co. v. Blue Bird Cab, 263 Md. 655, 659, 284 A.2d 203, 205, that it makes no difference whether there is any conviction of a crime related to those seized goods and footnoted that the individual who had been observed to carry out the heroin transaction has never been indicted or convicted. Judge Digges concluded by saying: [The drug forfeiture statute's] purpose is to attempt not only to curtail drug traffic in this State, but to discourage such a blight from continuing in the future. Historically, decisive action has been required to prevent any plague from spreading. In the present case, the Legislature has clearly indicated its purpose for this act. It is to control the proliferation of dangerous drugs in our society and it is a noble purpose, but an arduous task.... P. 662 of 263 Md., p. 207 of 284 A.2d. At this time in our society, the proliferation of drug abuse threatens the capability of the judicial system to deal with the criminality engendered thereby. Thus it is absurd to say that the legislative insertion of the noted language in subsection (b) (4) was intended to compel return to the illicit possessor of controlled dangerous substances the money or currency that is the root source of drug dissemination, merely because its possessor has not or not yet been brought to a concluding trial. Quite valid reasons may exist why the prosecution of a particular person may never be commenced or if commenced, never brought to final disposition. Prosecutorial choice or the accused becoming a fugitive from justice come instantly to mind. Surely it was not the legislative intent in such cases that the seized funds be returned, although clearly contraband within the meaning of the forfeiture statute. Equally certain it is that the Legislature did not intend that seized money or currency should remain forever in limbo if prosecution is not commenced and concluded. Subsection (a) (6) in pertinent part provides: and no such money or currency shall be returned to any person claiming it, or to any other person, except in the manner hereinafter provided [in sub-section (b) (4) (i) and (ii)]. We see nothing in the amendment of Section 297 (b) (4) by Ch. 666 of the Acts of 1974 that intended significantly to alter the interpretation and effect of the entire section except to compel institution of forfeiture proceedings within 90 days when a prosecution incident to the seizure has been concluded. We see nothing in the amendment that prohibits the Finance Director of the seizing jurisdiction from filing for forfeiture under Section 297 (b) (4) (i) (ii) when no prosecution has been initiated or to bar the filing of such an application earlier than the conclusion of an initiated prosecution.