Opinion ID: 3132420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions & Verdict

Text: At the end of the plaintiffs’ case in chief, and again following the close of the evidence, the City moved for judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 on the ground that the plaintiffs’ evidence was insufficient to sustain their claims. The court reserved decision on both occasions. At the end of the case, the district court instructed the jury on the elements of the plaintiffs’ claims and the City’s corresponding defenses. Beginning with the plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim, the court explained: To establish . . . a claim [of disparate impact discrimination], the plaintiff is not required to show that the defendant intended to discriminate . . . . Rather, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant’s conduct actually or predictably had a substantial and discriminatory impact on African-Americans or families with children. . . . I turn now to a defense to the [disparate impact claim] that w[as] raised by Saratoga Springs. . . . [W]hen it comes to this defense, this is something Saratoga needs to prove. If you find that Saratoga Springs’ conduct had a substantial discriminatory impact on African-Americans or families with children, then you must decide whether Saratoga Springs has proved by a preponderance of the evidence that its conduct furthered a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative action would have served that interest with a less discriminatory impact. This acts as a defense to liability for disparate impact discrimination, and so Saratoga Springs has the burden to prove that it is entitled to this defense. In summary, Ms. Anderson and The Anderson Group must each prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Saratoga Springs’ conduct had a substantial discriminatory impact on African-Americans or families with children. If you the jury are satisfied that Ms. Anderson and The Anderson Group has [sic] proved their claims of disparate impact discrimination, then and only then may you consider whether Saratoga Springs’ conduct furthered a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest, and that no alternative action would have served that interest with a less discriminatory impact. . . . Let me turn to the . . . claim for perpetuation of segregation. Th[is] . . . claim . . . operates like a claim based on disparate impact, except that it addresses harm done to the community in general rather than harm done to a particular protected group. 10 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs In order to establish a claim for a perpetuation of segregation in violation of the Fair Housing Act, the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the City of Saratoga Springs actually or predictably perpetuated, continued or maintained a segregation of African-Americans from predominantly white areas. . . . If you should find the affirmative defense that I just described for you as to the [disparate impact] claim applies in exactly the same way on this claim, so – rather than repeat it to you, I’m just going to summarize it for you – if you find that the plaintiffs have satisfied their burden of proof on the [perpetuation of segregation] claim, then you would consider whether Saratoga Springs has proved the defense I’ve already defined for you. If you were satisfied that it had, then Saratoga Springs would not be liable . . . . Trial Tr. 2049–53. As to damages, the district court instructed the jury that it was permitted to award compensatory damages for “any cost or expenses [TAG] . . . incurred as a result of the [City’s] discriminatory conduct,” including “financial losses, loss of business reputation and good will and loss of opportunity,” as well as “reasonable compensation for emotional distress and humiliation.” Trial Tr. 2054. The court cautioned, however, that the jurors “should not award compensatory damages for speculative injuries but only for those injuries that the plaintiff has actually suffered” and that “[h]arm to a plaintiff which is not the proximate result of unlawful conduct does not entitle . . . it to damages.” Trial Tr. 2055. After instructing the jury to begin its deliberations, the district court sent the jury a verdict form to which neither party lodged an objection. Trial Tr. 2063. The jury ultimately returned a verdict on July 2, 2010 in which it concluded that TAG (but not Gail Anderson) had proven both that the City “engaged in disparate impact discrimination against African Americans or families with children” and “engaged in the perpetuation of segregation against African Americans.” S.A. 6, 8. The jury found, however, that the City was liable only as to the disparate impact claim because, as to the perpetuation of segregation claim, the City had 11 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs met its burden of proving that its conduct furthered a legitimate governmental interest and that no alternative action would have served that interest with less discriminatory impact. Id. The jury awarded $1 million in compensatory damages.4 S.A. 10. After the court finished reading the jury’s verdict, it asked the City whether it would like to have the jury polled. Trial Tr. 2083. The City responded affirmatively and, after the jurors confirmed that the court’s reading of the verdict form was correct, the following colloquy took place: THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, that concludes your service. Thank you very much. I appreciate, as the parties do, the time you have given us. I’m going to stop back in a minute. You are not held; if you want to go, go. But I’ll stop back and stop in a minute to chat with you. If any of you wouldn’t want to stay, you’re free to go. Thank you. (Whereupon, jurors excused) THE COURT: I’m sure Saratoga Springs wants to bring a motion under Rule 50? MR. JOHNSON: Absolutely, your Honor. THE COURT: Yes. . . . Trial Tr. 2083–84. On July 6, 2010, four days after the jury rendered its verdict and before the City filed any post trial motion, the district court entered judgment in favor of TAG on the disparate impact claim. S.A. 13. IV. The City’s Post-Trial Motion On July 22, 2010, the City submitted a letter that it asked the court to construe as motions brought pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50 and 59. The City 4 The relevant portions of the jury’s verdict form are set forth as an appendix to this opinion. 12 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs reiterated its position that TAG lacked standing and argued that the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain the jury verdict on the disparate impact claim. It further contended that it was entitled to a new trial because it was not possible to harmonize the jury’s finding that the City had met its burden on its governmental interest justification as to the perpetuation of segregation claim but not as to the disparate impact claim. Finally, it argued that the trial evidence did not support the jury’s $1 million damages award and, therefore, remittitur was appropriate. By order entered on June 21, 2011, the district court granted the City’s motion to the extent it requested a new trial. S.A. 14. Although the court rejected the City’s standing and sufficiency of the evidence arguments, it agreed that the jury’s verdict was inconsistent and incapable of harmonization. Id. at 29–30. To reach this conclusion, the court rejected TAG’s argument that the City waived any inconsistency challenge by failing to raise it before the jury was discharged. Id. at 28–29 & n.8. In the alternative, the court stated that even if the verdict was salvageable, the $1 million damages award was excessive and unsupported by the evidence. Id. at 19–22. The “credible evidence” at trial, the court explained, supported damages of only $81,000 – TAG’s actual costs – because TAG’s entitlement to the $900,000 developer’s fee was based on “pure speculation” and the record contained “nothing more than passing references to and conjecture about” the harm to TAG’s business reputation. Id. at 20–21. The court therefore declared that if its inconsistent verdict ruling “fail[ed] to withstand scrutiny,” it would propose a remittitur, “pursuant to which [the City’s] motion for a new trial would be denied on the condition that [TAG] accept[ed] a reduced damages amount of $81,000.” Id. at 22. 13 12-3775-cv(L) The Anderson Group v. City of Saratoga Springs V. 2012 Trial & Judgments The parties thereafter proceeded to a new trial on TAG’s disparate impact and perpetuation of segregation claims. In August 2012, the second jury returned a verdict in favor of the City on both. The district court entered judgment on August 10, 2012, which TAG timely appealed.5 The City cross-appealed, specifying that it sought to challenge the district court’s denial of its pretrial motions that challenged TAG’s standing and sought to preclude the testimony of the plaintiffs’ two expert witnesses. VI. Arguments on Appeal TAG contends that the district court improperly entertained the City’s objection to the inconsistency of the 2010 jury verdict because the City waived that objection by not raising it before the jury was discharged. It also challenges the district court’s alternative conclusion as to remittitur of the 2010 jury’s $1 million compensatory damages award and raises a number of issues relating to the 2012 trial. Finally, it requests that we reassign the case to a different district court judge upon remand. On cross appeal, the City renews its argument that TAG lacks standing and contends that the district court should have precluded the reports and trial testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses.