Opinion ID: 2396985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Felony Serious Injury by Vehicle Convictions

Text: Defendant argues that the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the jury's conflicting verdicts regarding the felony serious injury by vehicle and driving while impaired charges are legally inconsistent and contradictory, which requires the convictions for the compound offenses of felony serious injury by vehicle to be vacated. The State argues that the verdicts are merely inconsistent and as such cannot be disturbed pursuant to long-standing precedent. The standard of review for this issue is whether there was any error of law in the decision of the Court of Appeals. State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 149, 446 S.E.2d 579, 590 (1994) (citations omitted). In North Carolina jurisprudence, a distinction is drawn between verdicts that are merely inconsistent and those which are legally inconsistent and contradictory. See State v. Meshaw, 246 N.C. 205, 207-08, 98 S.E.2d 13, 15 (1957), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Speckman, 326 N.C. 576, 580, 391 S.E.2d 165, 168 (1990). It is firmly established that when there is sufficient evidence to support a verdict, mere inconsistency will not invalidate the verdict. State v. Davis, 214 N.C. 787, 794, 1 S.E.2d 104, 108 (1939) (citing State v. Sigmon, 190 N.C. 684, 130 S.E. 854 (1925)). However, when a verdict is inconsistent and contradictory, a defendant is entitled to relief. Meshaw, 246 N.C. at 207-08, 98 S.E.2d at 15. The distinction between verdicts that are merely inconsistent and those that are inconsistent and contradictory has not been clearly established by this Court, but several cases offer guidance on the issue. In State v. Sigmon the defendant was found guilty of transporting intoxicating liquors but not guilty of unlawful possession of intoxicating liquors. 190 N.C. at 690-91, 130 S.E. at 857. The defendant argued that a party could not be guilty of transporting unless likewise guilty of possession; therefore, the not guilty verdict obligated the court to vacate the transporting conviction. Id. at 691, 130 S.E. at 857. This Court disagreed, stating, [W]hile the jury would have been fully justified in finding the defendant guilty on both counts, under the evidence in this case, their failure to do so, does not, as a matter of law, vitiate the verdict on the count for transporting. Id. Seven years later in Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932), the Supreme Court of the United States held that [c]onsistency in [a] verdict is not necessary. Id. at 393, 52 S.Ct. 189. The defendant in Dunn was charged in a three count indictment for maintaining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor, unlawful possession of intoxicating liquor, and unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor. Id. at 391, 52 S.Ct. 189. The defendant argued that his acquittal of unlawful possession and unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor entitled him to a discharge of his conviction for maintaining a common nuisance by keeping for sale at a specified place intoxicating liquor. Id. at 391-92, 52 S.Ct. 189. The Court reasoned that the guilty verdict should stand because if the nuisance charge had been tried individually under a separate indictment, the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction. Id. at 393, 52 S.Ct. 189. The Court declined to venture into the reasons behind the jury's verdict, simply stating, That the verdict may have been the result of compromise, or of a mistake on the part of the jury, is possible. But verdicts cannot be upset by speculation or inquiry into such matters. Id. at 394, 52 S.Ct. 189. In United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984), the Supreme Court of the United States specifically addressed whether an acquittal of a predicate offense required a reversal of a guilty verdict on the compound felony. In Powell, the defendant was indicted on several charges related to the selling and distribution of cocaine. Id. at 59-60, 105 S.Ct. 471. The defendant was convicted of charges relating to using the telephone to sell and distribute cocaine, but acquitted of conspiracy to possess cocaine and possession of cocaine with the intent to sell or distribute, underlying offenses of the telephone facilitation charges. Id. The Court reaffirmed its ruling in Dunn, explaining that [t]he rule that the defendant may not upset [an inconsistent] verdict embodies a prudent acknowledgment of a number of factors. First ... inconsistent verdicts even verdicts that acquit on a predicate offense while convicting on the compound offenseshould not necessarily be interpreted as a windfall to the Government at the defendant's expense. It is equally possible that the jury, convinced of guilt, properly reached its conclusion on the compound offense, and then through mistake, compromise, or lenity, arrived at an inconsistent conclusion on the lesser offense. But in such situations the Government has no recourse if it wishes to correct the jury's error; the Government is precluded from appealing or otherwise upsetting such an acquittal by the Constitution's Double Jeopardy Clause. Inconsistent verdicts therefore present a situation where error, in the sense that the jury has not followed the court's instructions, most certainly has occurred, but it is unclear whose ox has been gored. Given this uncertainty, and the fact that the Government is precluded from challenging the acquittal, it is hardly satisfactory to allow the defendant to receive a new trial on the conviction as a matter of course. Id. at 65, 105 S.Ct. 471 (internal citations omitted). In State v. Reid, 335 N.C. 647, 658-61, 440 S.E.2d 776, 782-83 (1994), this Court adopted the above reasoning in Powell when upholding a conviction of an aider and abettor even though the principal had been acquitted. In the above cases each defendant was charged on multiple count indictments, and each jury returned guilty verdicts for a greater offense while acquitting the defendant of the lesser offense. These verdicts were inconsistent because they represented an apparent flaw in the jury's logicpresumably, a finding of guilt in the greater offense would establish guilt in the lesser offense. However, because each count of an indictment is, in fact and theory, a separate indictment, State v. Toole, 106 N.C. 736, 740, 11 S.E. 168, 169 (1890), the inconsistencies were permissible, and not found to be legally contradictory, as long as there was sufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. The outcome is different when a jury returns a mutually exclusive verdict. Verdicts are mutually exclusive when a verdict purports to establish that the [defendant] is guilty of two separate and distinct criminal offenses, the nature of which is such that guilt of one necessarily excludes guilt of the other. Meshaw, 246 N.C. at 207, 98 S.E.2d at 15 (holding that the defendant receive a new trial due to the mutually exclusive nature of the two separate and distinct criminal offenses of larceny and receiving stolen items). In State v. Speckman , the jury found the defendant guilty of both embezzlement and obtaining property by false pretenses. 326 N.C. at 577, 391 S.E.2d at 166. This Court found the two crimes to be mutually exclusive, stating: [T]o constitute embezzlement, the property in question initially must be acquired lawfully, pursuant to a trust relationship, and then wrongfully converted. On the other hand, to constitute false pretenses the property must be acquired unlawfully at the outset, pursuant to a false representation. This Court has previously held that, since property cannot be obtained simultaneously pursuant to both lawful and unlawful means, guilt of either embezzlement or false pretenses necessarily excludes guilt of the other.... [U]nder our law, a defendant may not be convicted of both embezzlement and false pretenses arising from the same act or transaction, due to the mutually exclusive nature of those offenses. Id. at 578, 391 S.E.2d at 166-67 (citations omitted). The defendant was entitled to a new trial on both charges. Id. at 580, 391 S.E.2d at 168. In the present case defendant was found guilty of the greater offense of felony serious injury by vehicle but acquitted of the lesser offense of driving while impaired. While these verdicts are certainly inconsistent, they are not mutually exclusive. Since this case presents nothing more than mere inconsistency, defendant is not entitled to relief. Meshaw, 246 N.C. at 207, 98 S.E.2d at 15. This result does not unjustly expose criminal defendants to nescient or rogue juries because a criminal defendant already is afforded protection against jury irrationality or error by the independent review of the sufficiency of the evidence undertaken by the trial and appellate courts. Powell, 469 U.S. at 67, 105 S.Ct. 471. In the instant case, defendant was convicted of five counts of felony serious injury by vehicle under N.C.G.S. § 20-141.4(a3). Subsection 20-141.4(a3) does not require a conviction of driving while impaired under N.C.G.S. § 20-138.1 or N.C.G.S. § 20-138.2, but only requires a finding that the defendant was engaged in the conduct described under either of these offenses. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence presented at trial to support defendant's convictions for felony serious injury by vehicle under N.C.G.S. § 20-141.4(a3). State v. Mumford, ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 688 S.E.2d 458, 462-63 (2010). For over seventy years, the prudence of the inconsistent verdict rule has guided this Court in analyzing conflicting and unexplained verdicts. We decline to depart from the wisdom of this well-established precedent today. As such, defendant's convictions for felony serious injury by vehicle should not be disturbed. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals vacating these convictions is reversed. We note that two cases appear to be contradictory to the above inconsistent verdict analysis and this Court's previous holdings in Meshaw and Speckman. See State v. Perry, 305 N.C. 225, 287 S.E.2d 810 (1982) (affirming the decision of the Court of Appeals to vacate defendant's sentence for felonious larceny when the trial court returned a guilty verdict for felonious larceny but acquitted defendant of breaking or entering); State v. Holloway, 265 N.C. 581, 144 S.E.2d 634 (1965) (per curiam) (ordering a new trial when defendant was found guilty of felonious larceny, but acquitted of breaking or entering and no evidence was presented at trial to prove the value of the stolen goods). To the extent that these two cases are contrary to today's holding and long-standing inconsistent verdict precedent, they are overruled.