Opinion ID: 2607868
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: luba's decision on standing

Text: The petition for review to LUBA must state [t]he facts that establish that the petitioner has standing. Or. Laws 1979, ch. 772, § 4(6)(a). This would include the facts concerning a petitioner's appearance before the local governing body and those needed to meet one of the three statutory tests: (1) entitlement as of right to prior notice and hearing; (2) interests adversely affected; or (3) aggrievement by the decision. Petitioners' statement of standing in their petition for review to LUBA read as follows: The County Commissioners Hearing was Quasi-Judicial. Petitioner Jefferson Landfill Committee is a [sic] organization of 157 persons who studied the conditional use application and major partitioning request, attended the Commission Hearing, filed written and oral objections to the proposed landfill and who live within the Jefferson area most immediately impacted by the proposed landfill site. Jeff Fahey is an individual who owns a home in the vicinity and who was entitled to and did receive notice of both this site and a nearby site. He attended the hearing and gave oral and written testimony and documentary evidence.
LUBA's final order denied petitioner Jefferson Landfill Committee's (Committee's) claim of standing in either its representational or organizational capacity. [4] Respondents argued and LUBA found that the Committee did not allege sufficient facts to show that it had standing under section 4(3). We disagree. An organization has standing, in its own right, to appeal a quasi-judicial decision when the section 4(3) criteria are met. [5] Person, as used in section 4(3), means any individual, partnership, corporation, association, governmental subdivision or agency or public or private organization of any kind. ORS 197.015(14). The definition of person clearly includes a committee, such as the Jefferson Landfill Committee, which falls under the rubric of a private organization of any kind. The Committee alleged that its members attended the hearing and made oral and filed written objections to the proposed landfill. Under our construction of aggrieved, the benefit of which LUBA did not have, the Committee meets the standing requirements of section 4(3) because its members appeared before the local decision-making body; they effectively were recognized as interested persons by the local body; they testified on the merits; and the decision made was contrary to the position they asserted. Sufficient facts were stated in the petition for review to show the Committee's aggrievement. Respondents argue that there is nothing stated in the petition for review to show that the Committee was recognized by the county. As noted above, absent a contrary finding by the local decision-makers or LUBA, it is assumed that a person who appeared before the local decision-makers and asserted a position on the merits is an interested person. The Committee's allegations are sufficient to show that its members' views were heard in opposition to the landfill site and, absent a contrary finding, it is assumed that its members appeared as interested persons. In this case, the Committee's position is strengthened by Marion County zoning ordinances, which provide, in part: 111.010 HOLDING PUBLIC HEARINGS.    At any such hearing all persons shall be given an opportunity to be heard. 111.020 APPEARANCES OF INTERESTED PERSONS,    Any person or persons desiring to be heard for or against the subject of the hearing may file with the Governing Body, Hearings Officer or the Planning Commission, whichever holds the hearing, a statement in writing, or may appear and respond orally at the hearing, either in person or by attorney.    These ordinances apply to individual persons and associations. [6] In Marion County, any person desiring to be heard for or against the subject of the hearing may file a statement in writing or may appear and respond orally at the hearing as an interested person. Because the Committee did this, it meets the county's definition of an interested person. Thus, the Committee has alleged sufficient facts to have standing to petition LUBA for review in a quasi-judicial proceeding. Because we hold that the Committee stated sufficient facts to establish entitlement to standing as aggrieved by the decision, under section 4(3), we need not decide whether the Committee, which received prior written notice of the hearing, was entitled as of right to notice and hearing prior to the decision.
Respondents contend that petitioner Fahey based his claim of standing on his alleged entitlement to notice. In his petition for review to LUBA, Fahey stated that he attended the hearing and gave oral and written testimony in opposition to the proposed landfill. He alleged that he was entitled to notice because he was aggrieved by the proximity of his land and home to the proposed landfill and also because he received prior notice of the hearing in the newspaper and in a written notice to the Committee of which he is a member. LUBA's final order denied Fahey's claim of standing because his allegation of entitlement to notice was not supported by the facts which the parties agreed were to be considered concerning standing. We agree with LUBA's conclusion that the notice specified in Oregon Laws 1979, chapter 772, section 4(3)(b), as amended by Oregon Laws 1981, chapter 748, section 35, refers to special or individual notice, not notice by publication in a newspaper or notice as a committee member. Furthermore, receiving notice is not necessarily the same as being entitled as of right to notice and hearing. While we agree that Fahey has not alleged facts showing that he was entitled as of right to notice and hearing prior to the county's decision, LUBA would not be precluded from determining, based on the facts alleged, that Fahey meets either of the other tests for standing under section 4(3), i.e., adversely affected or aggrieved. In light of our conclusion in respect of the Committee, we find that Fahey alleged sufficient facts in the petition for review to show that he meets the test for aggrievement. Fahey alleged that he appeared at the hearing before the county commissioners, gave testimony in opposition to the proposed action, and submitted written testimony and documentary evidence. As noted above, Marion County Zoning Ordinance 111.020 provides that any person desiring to be heard for or against the subject of the hearing may file a statement in writing or may appear and respond orally at the hearing as an interested person. This Fahey did. Thus, under our construction of aggrieved, absent a contrary finding by the local decision-makers or LUBA, Fahey meets the standing requirements of section 4(3) because he was recognized by the local decision-makers as an interested person in conformance with Marion County Zoning Ordinance 111.020; he appeared before the local body and testified on the merits; and the decision made was contrary to the position he asserted.