Opinion ID: 1280742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ill Dec.eptive Acts and Practices.

Text: GM and Hattan contend that the trial court erred in holding they concealed knowledge concerning the electrical failure and misrepresented to plaintiffs the cause of the fire. Whether an act is a deceptive practice under K.S.A. 50-626 is a question of fact for the jury. Waggener, 233 Kan. at 522. Our standard of review, therefore, is whether there is substantial competent evidence to support the jury's findings. Williams Telecommunications Co. v. Gragg, 242 Kan. 675, 676, 750 P.2d 398 (1988). The jury was instructed on deceptive practices as follows: The Plaintiffs, Joseph and Carla Farrell, claim that Defendants General Motors Corporation and Don Hattan Chevrolet, Inc. engaged in deceptive acts and practicers by intentionally concealing knowledge of the electrical failure and misrepresenting to Plaintiffs the cause of the failure was undetermined. Deceptive acts and practices include the intentional failure to state a material fact, or the intentional concealment, suppression or omission of a material fact whether or not any person has in fact been mislead [ sic ]. K.S.A. 50-626(b)(3) provides that a deceptive act may include (but is not limited to) the intentional failure to state a material fact, or the intentional concealment, suppression or omission of a material fact, whether or not any person has in fact been misled. The appellants did not object to the instruction and do not contend on appeal it is erroneous. Appellants argue that it was not a fact that the fire was caused by an electrical failure, but that it was just the opinion of various service personnel. Appellants, citing Timi v. Prescott State Bank, 220 Kan. 377, 553 P.2d 315 (1976), state, A fact is a fact, capable of ascertainment. An opinion is not a fact. Timi does not stand for a blanket proposition that an opinion is not a fact. In Timi, an employee of the defendant bank, gave his honest opinion as to the financial solvency of a third party. This was held not to be fraud. Timi is simply not relevant to the present case. Here, the material fact that the Farrells allege was not disclosed was that the Hattan mechanics were of the opinion that the fire was caused by electrical failure. That the fire was so caused could never be more than an opinion. There is no way to prove it any further. Tanner believed that the fire was electrical. So did Hattan. This was material information. A matter is material if it is one to which a reasonable person would attach importance in determining his choice of action in the transaction involved. Griffith v. Byers Construction Co., 212 Kan. 65, 73, 510 P.2d 198 (1973). Knowing where the fire started prior to GM's offer would have put the Farrells in a better position. There was no objection made that Hattan and Tanner are not qualified to give an opinion as to what caused the fire and that issue is not before us. The penalties awarded for failure to disclose the cause of the fire are affirmed.