Opinion ID: 1246974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: by peremptory challenges

Text: (30) Defendants contend that the use by the prosecution of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors who expressed negative views concerning the death penalty is improper under In re Anderson, 69 Cal.2d 613 [73 Cal. Rptr. 21, 447 P.2d 117]. However, a different question was raised in Anderson, where the Attorney General had argued that any Witherspoon error was nonprejudicial since the prosecution had sufficient peremptory challenges remaining to remove all jurors improperly excluded for cause. We rejected this argument, stating that we could not engage in conjecture that the prosecutor would have used his peremptory challenges to excuse such jurors. (69 Cal.2d at p. 620.) Similarly, we cannot engage in conjecture regarding the prosecutor's reasons for exercising some of his peremptory challenges to excuse some jurors who had reservations concerning the death penalty. Instead, we must assume that the prosecutor is acting on acceptable considerations related to the case he is trying, the particular defendant involved and the particular crime charged. ( Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 223 [13 L.Ed.2d 759, 774, 85 S.Ct. 824].) Swain held that the prosecutor could properly exclude all Negroes from a particular jury, regardless of the factual basis for his belief that such jurors, either as individuals or as a class, might be biased in the particular case to be tried. As the court stated, In the light of the purpose of the peremptory system and the function it serves in a pluralistic society in connection with the institution of jury trial, we cannot hold that the Constitution requires an examination of the prosecutor's reasons for the exercise of his challenges in any given case. (380 U.S. at p. 222 [13 L.Ed.2d at p. 773].) In any event, the voir dire examination of the jurors fails to establish that any juror was peremptorily challenged solely because of his scruples against the death penalty.