Opinion ID: 1372628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effectiveness of Counsel at the Guilt Trial.

Text: The referee correctly decided that this court reserved for itself the determination whether counsel was ineffective. Nevertheless, in answer to our question 3(c) (see fn. 9, ante )  whether counsel should have discovered the identities of and/or called various potential witnesses  the referee stated with reference to the guilt trial, While it is obvious that, in the best of all worlds, Mr. Ames should have undertaken a lot of investigation which he omitted to do, it is hard to fault his conclusion that the best defense of the guilt phase was based on [the] accidental shooting of Ora Pope, followed by an intentional shooting of [Edward] John Moreno. If he had succeeded in establishing the first shooting as manslaughter, there would never have been a penalty phase. (54)(See fn. 12.) Focusing for now just on the guilt phase, all the discussion about endocrinologists and toxicologists makes sense only if one concludes it would have been advantageous to suppress petitioner's statements.[ [12] ] But looking at the case, as Mr. Ames saw it before the fact, it is not clear that it would have been helpful to petitioner to suppress the statements. The prosecution could easily have proven that petitioner inflicted the fatal shots. It easily could have proven, and at the trial the prosecution did prove through the testimony of Michael Taylor, petitioner's cousin, that on the day of the shootings, petitioner stated he was going to kill Ora Pope. The prosecution also proved through Glen Brooks that on the day of the shooting, petitioner told Brooks that he was going to kill Ora Pope. The best evidence, and the only evidence, Mr. Ames had of the first shooting being accidental, was petitioner's statements to the police, made, as Mr. Ames pointed out to the jury, shortly after the shooting and long before he had any opportunity to contact counsel. [See ante, p. 166.] [¶] ... As to the guilt phase ... this court has a difficult time concluding that such exploration [of a mental state defense] would have led to anything of value. Anyone who listens to the audio tape or views the video tape is struck with how composed and rational petitioner seems to be. Even considering all the testimony produced by petitioner's experts at the reference hearing, it is very difficult for this court to conclude that any judge would have suppressed the confessions or that any jury would have accepted a diminished capacity [i.e., a lack-of-intent] defense. (55a), (56a) Petitioner objects to these statements, maintaining that they amount to recommendations and exceed the scope of our reference order. Whatever the technical merits of petitioner's claim (see In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 170, fn. 1 [249 Cal. Rptr. 342, 756 P.2d 1370]), our own review of the record of the trial and the evidentiary hearing confirms the sagacity of the referee's observations, and we independently reach the same conclusions. In particular, however deficient counsel may have been in failing to more fully explore a defense of lack of intent to kill or of lack of ability to waive his right to remain silent, we agree with the referee that it is very difficult to believe that such a defense would have been of use to petitioner. (Cf. In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247 [259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164].) The question of mental state arises in two contexts: the voluntariness of petitioner's confession and reenactment, and the presentation of a lack-of-intent defense because of mental impairment at trial. We turn to the confession issue first. (55b) The law is clear that to have suppressed the statements, petitioner would have had to show that his reasoning was in fact so impaired that he was incapable of free or rational choice. ( In re Cameron, supra, 68 Cal.2d 487, 498; see People v. Hernandez (1988) 204 Cal. App.3d 639, 648 [251 Cal. Rptr. 393]; see also Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 166-167 [93 L.Ed.2d 473, 483-484, 107 S.Ct. 515] [coercive police activity necessary predicate to finding of federal constitutional violation in obtaining confession; otherwise question of a defendant's state of mind is matter of state law].) We do not believe petitioner could have made such a showing. As we described ante, part II.A., petitioner told his interrogator at the beginning of the audiotaped session that he felt up to the task of talking with him. Moreover, our own review of the tape confirms the referee's findings regarding the very dubious effect of a mental state defense. Throughout the lengthy interview, including his comments immediately following the waiver, petitioner spoke clearly if somewhat slowly. At times he engaged in animated, jocular, prideful, indignant or defiant conversation with the interviewing detectives. Despite a relaxed quality to his speech, petitioner sounds lucid, much as he does on the videotape, by which time his medication evidently was not an issue, for petitioner does not contend he was deprived of insulin before the videotaping. Nor did petitioner ever inform his interviewers that he did not feel well, or ask them for medication. As far as the referee could or we can discern, defendant was not mentally impaired when he made his audiotaped statement. And the reference hearing produced scant evidence to the contrary. With one exception, at the reference hearing petitioner's panel of experts could only surmise  with varying degrees of confidence  that petitioner may have been under the influence of drugs or his diabetic condition so as to impair his capacity for judgment when he agreed to be taped. The exception, Dr. Rita Hargrave, a psychiatrist, opined that I do not believe that that was a voluntary waiver of [petitioner's] right to remain silent. She based that conclusion on an opinion that petitioner's speech was more slurred and slow on the audiotape than on the videotape, and on the combined effect of him coming down off the PCP, plus the nature of his metabolic imbalance from his diabetes being out of control. But Dr. Hargrave was effectively impeached on cross-examination, agreeing she could not be sure that either petitioner's diabetes or petitioner himself was out of control. We are unpersuaded that a court, hearing petitioner's remark that he felt capable of talking to his interrogator before his audiotaped confession, listening to petitioner's demeanor on that tape, and hearing expert testimony on the subject of voluntariness, would have suppressed the evidence. Therefore, we do not perceive that counsel's failure to pursue other avenues to suppress the statements was prejudicial. There is no reasonable probability that the proceeding's outcome would have differed. [13] (56b) We turn next to the issue of petitioner's mental state at the time he committed the crimes. Normally, merely showing that the defendant had consumed alcohol or used drugs before the offense, without any showing of their effect on him, is not enough to warrant an instruction on diminished capacity. [Citations.] ( People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1241 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899] [considering the diminished capacity defense when the same was available under California law].) We see no reason for a different rule for a defense of lack of intent. The guilt phase evidence showed considerable evidence of the planning and premeditation of Ora Mae Pope's killing, and no witness at trial testified that petitioner was under the influence of either his diabetes or an intoxicating substance. At the reference hearing, as we have already stated, none of petitioner's expert witnesses could state unequivocally that his consumption of food, drugs or alcohol had altered his mental state in a definite or predictable manner. Therefore, we agree with the referee that it is very difficult to conclude that a jury would have accepted a defense of lack of intent by reason of disease or intoxication. On this point, too, petitioner has failed to show prejudice. Two other items require discussion. (57) First, the most significant evidence in favor of an accident defense, other than petitioner's own taped confession, would have been if the shotgun used to kill Ora Mae Pope and Edward Moreno had a hair trigger or was otherwise defective. Petitioner urges that the reference hearing established that the shotgun was abnormal; therefore trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain a criminalist to examine the gun. We are of a different view. Petitioner's expert conceded on cross-examination that there was nothing unusually dangerous about the shotgun. Indeed, our reading of the expert's testimony convinces us that if testimonal evidence similar to his had been introduced at trial it might have strengthened the case for premeditation and deliberation. The criminalist testified that when he pulled the hammer to full cocked position, the shotgun had a normal, even slightly heavy pull of seven pounds, but that if the gun were positioned as if it ha[d] been fired, it would have a very light pull of two pounds. As the referee found, there was no evidence petitioner handled or fired the weapon in the latter fashion, and if he had done so it might have shown more purposeful, intentional behavior, not less. (Italics by the referee.) (58a) Second, petitioner raises a claim in supplemental briefing that counsel's loyalty to him was tainted by a desire not to jeopardize his standing with the San Bernardino courts by seeking proper funding for petitioner's defense. He emphasized this contention at oral argument. (59) To be sure, when `counsel is burdened by an actual conflict of interest, prejudice is presumed....' ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th 86, 135, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696].) A claim that counsel's loyalty was divided by virtue of his own conflicting interests is a claim of such a conflict. ( People v. Hardy, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 135-136.) `... [T]he presumption arises, however, only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'' ( Id. at p. 135, quoting Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 692 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 696].) (58b) Our reading of the record leads us to conclude there is no merit to petitioner's claim, for there was no divided loyalty. Petitioner's counsel, S. Donald Ames, testified that it was difficult to obtain county funds for defense investigation at the time. For example, it required considerable effort for Ames to persuade a judge to grant funds to retain a neurologist at county expense, though the effort eventually succeeded. Ames conceded that in 1983 counsel could acquire a bad reputation, or jacket, among the judges for asking for large amounts of funds for expert and attorney fees. But he stated, I don't think that I made a conscious effort not to attain a jacket with the judges. If I did, so be it. [14] [¶] But I don't think that I either did or did not do any particular thing to avoid getting a jacket. Questioned further, Ames conceded he tried to avoid getting a reputation for asking for excessive attorney fees, but would not let that goal interfere with his representation of a client. On this record we conclude that petitioner has not met his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel by a preponderance of the evidence ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 449), because he has not shown by that standard that an actual conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance.