Opinion ID: 2084582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pursuit Immunity

Text: N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) provides in part: Neither a public entity nor a public employee is liable for: ... any injury caused by ... an escaping or escaped person. (Emphasis added). In Tice v. Cramer, 133 N.J. 347, 627 A. 2d 1090 (1993), this Court was called on to decide whether N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) applies to all injuries arising out of a police pursuit, even those that would not have occurred but for the negligence of the police. In that case a police pursuit ended with the fleeing vehicle colliding with a motorist, resulting in the motorist's death. The decedent's estate brought an action against the police officer, the police department, and the City, among others. Id. at 351, 627 A. 2d 1090. This Court held that N.J.S.A. 59:5-2b(2) confers absolute immunity except where the police officer engages in willful misconduct, id. at 356, 627 A. 2d 1090, and that such immunity applies to all injuries arising out of the police officer's pursuit even though those acts would not have occurred but for the negligence of the pursuing officer. The Tice Court observed that [t]he most likely legislative intention evinced by the statutory language in the context of police pursuit is that when the officer suspected someone of having violated the law and was pursing him, the officer's conduct was immune from liability. Id. at 361, 627 A. 2d 1090. Consequently, [t]he effect of section 5-2b(2) immunity would seem to be clear. The immunity relieves the officer (and the public entitythe immunity applies to both) of whatever liability would otherwise attach for the officer's negligent conduct in connection with the pursuit. Id. at 363, 627 A. 2d 1090. Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the Court in Tice, set forth the policy considerations that are the basis for pursuit immunity: [T]he justification is the encouragement of the police officer diligently and aggressively to enforce the law, thought to be diminished by the specter of tort liability. Not so clear, but equally applicable, is the policy consideration involved when the potential liability is that of the public entity for its independent negligence in failing to impose standards regarding pursuit, or in failing to train police officers in the execution of those standards. Obviously, such standards and training could result in greater care on the part of police officers and in fewer injuries. But, equally obviously, the potential of tort liability might encourage standards and training so restrictivefor the purpose of avoiding injuries and liabilityas to impede the ultimate goal of vigorous law enforcement, including the vigorous pursuit of suspects. It is true there might be much greater care, even better care, but it is also true that there might be less vigorous enforcement. The Legislature has made its choice, and we are bound by it.