Opinion ID: 2077498
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Carlson as Decisive Precedent

Text: Rather tentatively, the four chief judges assert in their brief that our decision in County of Kane v. Carlson (1987), 116 Ill.2d 186, at least arguably resolved the issues raised in the present cause and that we could find in their favor on grounds of res judicata. In Carlson, we held that, for purposes of the Act, a circuit court clerk rather than a chief judge was the employer of his deputy clerks. (116 Ill.2d at 200.) In that case, the County of Kane had already conceded that it was not the employer of the deputy clerks. (116 Ill.2d at 200.) After our opinion was filed, the circuit court clerk moved that we recall our mandate and issue a revised mandate specifically determining that he was his deputy clerks' sole employer. We then entered an order on April 27, 1987, denying the motion and stating: The court resolved the question raised in this motion at page 6 of the slip opinion in this cause. That page contained the holding that a circuit court clerk was the employer of his deputy clerks. See Carlson, 116 Ill.2d at 200. Cook County responds that the doctrine of res judicata is inapplicable because neither the parties, nor the facts, nor the relief sought in Carlson is the same as in the present cause. (See Housing Authority v. Young Men's Christian Association (1984), 101 Ill.2d 246, 254 (facts and relief); Spiller v. Continental Tube Co. (1983), 95 Ill.2d 423, 432 (parties).) In addition, Cook County contends that Kane County's concession of nonemployer status in Carlson means that Carlson decided only whether chief judges, rather than counties, might be joint employers of deputy clerks of the circuit court. See County of Kane v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1988), 165 Ill. App.3d 614, 621. We agree with Cook County that neither res judicata nor the issues for decision in Carlson allow our opinion in that case to be viewed as decisive of the issues in the present one.