Opinion ID: 2588256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: violation of ex post facto clause

Text: Anderson also contends K.S.A. 21-4608(f)(5) violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution because it inflicts a harsher punishment than the law in effect at the time of the commission of his 1979 offense. As noted previously, prior to 1983 prisoners were credited for time spent on parole in calculating parole eligibility, conditional release, and maximum dates after the commission of a new offense. See K.S.A. 1982 Supp. 21-4608(6)(e). The United States Constitution's ex post facto prohibition forbids legislative enactment of any law which imposes a punishment for an act which was not punishable at the time the act was committed or which imposes punishment additional to what was prescribed. See U.S. Const., art. 1, § 9, cl. 3; art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. In order for a law to be considered ex post facto, two elements must be present: (1) The law must be retrospective, applying to events occurring before its enactment, and (2) it must alter the definition of criminal conduct or increase the penalty by which a crime is punishable. Stansbury v. Hannigan, 265 Kan. 404, Syl. ¶ 2, 960 P.2d 227, cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 (1998). The United States Supreme Court stated in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30-31, 67 L. Ed.2d 17, 101 S. Ct. 960 (1981): Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated. Thus, even if a statute merely alters penal provisions accorded by the grace of the legislature, it violates the Clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous than the law in effect on the date of the offense. See Stansbury, 265 Kan. 404, Syl. ¶ 3. In reaching that conclusion, the Weaver Court recognized that the critical question in determining if there has been an ex post facto violation is whether the law changes the legal consequences of acts completed before its effective date. 450 U.S. at 31. Here, the subsequent aggregation and denial of credit for time spent on parole did not alter the legal consequences of acts completed prior to the 1983 amendment. No additional punishment was inflicted upon Anderson as a result of K.S.A. 21-4608(f)(5); thus, there was no ex post facto violation. The Court of Appeals previously addressed this issue in Thomas. As in this case, when Thomas committed his first crime, K.S.A. 1979 Supp. 21-4608(3)(e) was applicable and prisoners received credit for time spent on parole in calculating parole eligibility, conditional release, and maximum dates. Thomas was subsequently paroled and committed another offense in 1990, nearly 7 years after the amendment to K.S.A. 21-4608 denying credit for time spent on parole. Thomas was denied credit for the 7 years he had spent on parole. The majority of the Thomas court overruled the district court's finding that the failure to credit Thomas for the time spent on parole resulted in an ex post facto application of the law. The majority reasoned that the denial of the credits did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the punishment Thomas received was for new crimes. 27 Kan. App.2d at 620. In so holding, the majority distinguished cases in which ex post facto violations had been found regarding regulations that were enacted after the commission of a crime and that adversely affected the defendants' conditional release and parole eligibility dates. See Stansbury, 265 Kan. 404; Bankes v. Simmons, 265 Kan. 341, 963 P.2d 412, cert. denied 525 U.S. 1060 (1998); Garner v. Nelson, 25 Kan. App.2d 394, 963 P.2d 1242 (1998). Judge Lewis dissented in Thomas. Judge Lewis viewed the denial of credit as taking away credits already earned or guaranteed by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the underlying crime and was unable to distinguish Thomas from Garner, Stansbury, and Bankes. Thomas, 27 Kan. App.2d at 621. In Stansbury and Bankes, the regulation in effect at the time the petitioners committed the crimes for which they were convicted and sentenced provided that the petitioners would earn 100 percent of their authorized good time credits by remaining free of any prison offenses and by the discretionary grant of good time credits by the unit team manager. The regulation was subsequently amended and both petitioners were denied 100 percent of their good time credits upon their refusal to participate in a sexual abuse treatment program. The amendment had a detrimental effect upon the petitioners' parole eligibility and conditional release dates. This court found that the application of the new regulation to the petitioners violated the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution. See Stansbury, 265 Kan. 404, Syl. ¶ 7; Bankes, 265 Kan. 341, 353. In Garner, as a result of disciplinary violations, the petitioner had suffered an extension of his conditional release date under the amended regulation. The Court of Appeals applied the reasoning in Stansbury and Bankes to find an ex post facto violation in the application of a regulation concerning the earning, withholding, and forfeiting of good time credits that was amended after the petitioner committed his crime. 25 Kan. App.2d at 395-400, 404. The Thomas court distinguished Stansbury and Bankes, reasoning that Thomas, unlike the petitioners in those cases, was not required to earn credit he was entitled to under the old law in order to obtain an earlier conditional release or parole eligibility date. Instead, Thomas only had to remain offense free while on parole. Under the statutes in effect at that time, Thomas was subjected to forfeiture for the time spent on parole if he committed a new crime while on parole. The Thomas court determined that an individual on parole had ample notice that commission of a new crime would result in such forfeiture. 27 Kan. App.2d at 620. However, if the petitioner in Garner would not have committed disciplinary violations, the amended regulation would not have detrimentally affected his conditional release date. This is similar to the reasoning that if Thomas had not committed a new crime while on parole, he would not have suffered the loss of credit for the time spent on parole. Thus, the Thomas court's basis for distinguishing Stansbury and Bankes does not work to distinguish Garner. Garner is, however, distinguishable. In Garner, the extension of the petitioner's conditional release date as a result of disciplinary violations goes directly toward the punishment for the crime committed prior to the enactment of the regulation. In Thomas, as in this case, the denial of credit for time spent on parole does not increase the penalty on the previous crime but, instead, affects the punishment for the crime committed while the petitioner was on parole. As was recognized in Blomeyer v. State, 22 Kan. App.2d 382, 385, 915 P.2d 790, rev. denied 260 Kan. 991 (1996), the legislative intent of K.S.A. 21-4608(f)(4) was to impose a harsher penalty by requiring consecutive sentences if a second crime is committed while a defendant is on probation, parole, conditional release, postrelease supervision, or assignment to a community correctional services program. See also State v. Daniels, 18 Kan. App.2d 338, 341, 853 P.2d 65, rev. denied 253 Kan. 861 (1993) (recognized legislature's clear intent to impose heavier penalties on those committing crimes while on release from custody). This same reasoning is used in determining the intent of the legislature in disallowing credit for time spent on parole in calculating parole eligibility, conditional release, and maximum dates. The credit for time spent on parole is denied in calculating the aggregate sentence and does not increase punishment on the prior crime. Any extension of parole eligibility, conditional release, or maximum dates is a direct result of the individual's commission of the new offense and does not increase the defendant's punishment for the prior offense. In reaching its decision, the Thomas court relied upon Wishteyah v. Kansas Parole Board, 17 Kan. App.2d 480, 838 P.2d 371 (1992). In Wishteyah, the Kansas Parole Board had an unwritten policy regarding conditions placed on individuals released from prison at the time Wishteyah committed the crimes for which he was incarcerated. The unwritten policy required that the individuals not violate state or federal law while on parole. During Wishteyah's incarceration, the policy was revised, placing conditions and requirements on individuals regarding such things as use of narcotics and alcohol, associating with others engaged in illegal activity, and counseling and aftercare. Wishteyah was conditionally released 6 years after the revised policy went into effect. His conditional release was subsequently revoked for violating these conditions. Wishteyah alleged the application of the revised policy was an ex post facto violation. The Wishteyah court held that application of the revised policy to Wishteyah was not an ex post facto violation because the revisions did not apply retrospectively to conduct occurring before the imposition of the conditions. The revisions applied only to Wishteyah's future conduct. 17 Kan. App.2d at 483. The Thomas court also relied upon United States v. Glover, 153 F.3d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which addressed an ex post facto challenge to the reclassification of prior crimes that resulted in a harsher sentence upon commission of additional offenses. At the time Glover committed his prior crimes, the offenses were considered misdemeanors, even though they carried the possibility of imprisonment for more than 1 year after taking into account Glover's criminal history. Until 1994, these offenses were also considered misdemeanors for the purpose of enhancing a federal sentence. However, in 1994, the law was amended to define these offenses as felony offenses. Because Glover's prior offenses were considered felony offenses, Glover received a harsher sentence upon a new conviction than he would have if the prior offenses had not been reclassified. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recognized that a sentencing enhancement based on past offenses is not an additional penalty for prior crimes but is a harsher penalty for the latest crime. 153 F.3d at 757. The Glover court stated: Despite Glover's characterization, the 1994 `reclassification' of his prior crimes did not add a new penalty for those crimes themselves. Like other repeat offender statutes, it did nothing more than prospectively define new, more drastic consequences if Glover committed a further crime ... Because the provision expanding the category of prior offenses that would prospectively be considered `felony drug offenses' was passed in 1994, a year before the first drug transaction at issue here, Glover had `fair warning,' see Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S. Ct. 2446, 96 L. Ed.2d 351 (1987), that he would face stiffer penalties as a repeat offender if he committed another drug-related offense. Those penalties were punishments for his 1995 crimes, not for his prior crimes, and therefore do not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause even though the federal statute labeled the prior convictions differently than did the states. 153 F.3d at 757-58. The federal courts' reasoning regarding the version of the sentencing guidelines to apply in cases involving crimes committed over a span of years is also persuasive. See United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889 (5th Cir. 1999) (at time of commission of latest offense, defendant had adequate notice that his previous offenses would be grouped with his latest offense; thus, defendant's decision to continue illegal activities after revision of guidelines allowed guidelines in effect at commission of latest offense to be applied without ex post facto violation), and United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381 (11th Cir. 1997) (defendant had fair notice that additional crimes would subject him to guidelines in effect at time the latest crime for which he was convicted was committed; no ex post facto violation). The 1983 amendment denying credit for time on parole went into effect while Anderson was in prison and was in effect for more than 2 years before Anderson committed the new crimes. Anderson had adequate notice that commission of a new offense would result in the denial of credit for time spent on parole. Anderson was not receiving an increased punishment on his prior offense, but an increased punishment on his new offenses because they were committed while he was on parole. Thus, there was no ex post facto violation in denying Anderson credit for the time spent on parole for his 1979 offense, even though the law in effect at the time of the commission of that offense would have provided for such credit.