Opinion ID: 390520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Wanda Sue McAllister Evidence.

Text: 30 The state promised Wanda Sue McAllister immunity from prosecution for Mrs. Holt's murder if she would cooperate with the State. This short-lived cooperation produced two pieces of evidence: (1) McAllister's testimony at Holt's preliminary hearing; and (2) tape recordings of telephone conversations between Holt and McAllister. Holt asserts that the use of this evidence at his trial violated his rights under the sixth amendment as applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 62, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2537, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). 31
32 Wanda Sue McAllister testified at Holt's preliminary hearing. At trial, however, she exercised her fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to testify. The trial judge ruled McAllister unavailable after she refused, during two in camera examinations, to answer questions about the murder. McAllister stated that she would persist in exercising her fifth amendment privilege to the point of going to jail for contempt. The trial judge then permitted the state to introduce into evidence McAllister's preliminary hearing testimony. Holt argues that the admission of this testimony at his trial violated his right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him. 4 33 The confrontation clause guarantees the right to confront and cross-examine an accuser, face-to-face, at trial. Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 63 & nn.5 & 6, 100 S.Ct. at 2537 nn.5 & 6. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged that it is this literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of the trial that forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause, the Court has also recognized that confrontation clause values may be adequately protected under the rules governing the admission of hearsay evidence. 5 Id., 448 U.S. at 63 n.5, 100 S.Ct. at 2537 n.5, 2539 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1934, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). 34 In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, the Supreme Court formulated a two-part test for determining whether the confrontation clause bars the introduction of admissible hearsay in a criminal trial. First, in conformance with the Framer's preference for face-to-face accusation, the Sixth Amendment establishes a rule of necessity. In the usual case   , the prosecution must    demonstrate the unavailability of the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against the defendant. Id. 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538. Once a witness is shown to be unavailable, the confrontation clause sanctions the use of prior testimony only if sufficient indicia of reliability or requisite safeguards existed at the time the testimony was given. Phillips v. Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489, 494 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1283, 55 L.Ed.2d 793 (1978). See also Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539. The indicia of reliability assure that the trier of fact (has) a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 161, 90 S.Ct. at 1936. 35 On the first prong of the test, the record shows that McAllister was unavailable because she invoked her fifth amendment privilege and refused to testify. See Phillips v. Wyrick, supra, 558 F.2d at 494. 36 On the second prong, we conclude that McAllister's preliminary hearing testimony possesses the same indicia of reliability as prior testimony which the Supreme Court has previously held admissible. In Ohio v. Roberts, supra, the Court held that the accoutrements of the preliminary hearing itself justified the introduction into evidence of the preliminary hearing testimony of a witness who is unavailable at the defendant's subsequent criminal trial. Id. 448 U.S. at 73, 100 S.Ct. at 2542. Accord, California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at 165, 90 S.Ct. at 1938. Holt presents no basis to distinguish his case from Roberts or Green. 6 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court's admission of the preliminary hearing testimony did not deprive appellant of his right of confrontation. 37
38 After Holt's preliminary hearing, the prosecution, despite its knowledge that Holt was represented by counsel, contacted Wanda McAllister for the purpose of installing a wiretap on her telephone. Although McAllister didn't want to make the recording, state officials told her to make it or else. The prosecuting attorney told her that he wanted enough on (the recording) to convict (Eugene). Two highway patrolmen installed the wiretap, instructing McAllister not to call Holt, but to have him talk about the case when he called her. 39 After learning of the wiretap, Holt moved to suppress the tape recordings on the ground that they were obtained in violation of his right to counsel as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments. This motion was denied. The prosecution did not introduce this evidence in the state's case-in-chief. The prosecutor, however, apparently relied on information from the tapes in formulating his cross-examination of Holt. 7 40 Holt argues that the state, in procuring the tape recordings, intentionally (created) a situation likely to induce (him) to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel(.) United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274, 100 S.Ct. 2183, 2189, 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). See also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 97 S.Ct. 1232, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 84 S.Ct. 1199, 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964). Holt asserts that the state's conduct, in forcing Ms. McAllister to record her conversations with Holt, cannot be distinguished from that in Massiah where a coconspirator's surreptitious recording of conversations with the defendant amounted to unconstitutional interrogation in violation of the sixth amendment. See id. at 202-03, 84 S.Ct. at 1201. 41 Assuming that the prosecutor interfered with Holt's right to counsel, we deem the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The state did not introduce the tapes into evidence. Much of the cross-examination in question related to Holt's relationship with McAllister, a relationship conceded to by the defense. Further, the prosecution presented substantial evidence of Holt's guilt in the state's case-in-chief. 8 As we stated in United States v. Weir, 575 F.2d 668 (8th Cir. 1978), If, upon the record as a whole, this court is certain that the (use) of the evidence did not influence the jury, or had but a slight effect, the verdict should stand. Id. at 671. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the information derived from the tape recordings, at most, slightly affected the outcome of the case. We thus hold that any error resulting from the state's alleged unconstitutional behavior is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 42