Opinion ID: 2103784
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Historical Application of the Law of the Land Clause in Tennessee

Text: Although the majority apparently treats it as an issue of first impression in this State, the legitimate scope of Article I, section 8 has long been settled, and a careful and thorough review of our constitutional jurisprudence reveals nothing in the historical application of Article I, section 8 that warrants the conclusion that Tennessee's protection of liberty is far more extensive than that provided by the federal due process clauses. In fact, rather than being construed more broadly than the corresponding federal protections, Article I, section 8 has been universally interpreted as providing co-extensive protection with that of the federal constitution. In fact, virtually every Tennessee case examining the two clauses has concluded that the import and meaning of each clause are either exact, identical, or synonymous in effect and result, [12] and many of these cases have held that where a statute is constitutional under one provision, then it is entitled to be sustained under the other provision as well. See Harbison v. Knoxville Iron Co., 103 Tenn. 421, 431, 53 S.W. 955, 957 (1899). Even in those cases in which the Tennessee Supreme Court has implied that a greater liberty protection may emanate from Article I, section 8, no such holding has ever been sustained on any set of facts. [13] The majority apparently reads these cases differently than I, as the majority repeats several times that these older cases stand only for the proposition that the two clauses are  practically synonymous. As such, the majority concludes, we are free to depart from the history, language, and application of the Law of the Land Clause to reach the judicially desired result in this case. Respectfully, though, the language from this Court's own cases is far more compelling than the majority would indicate. Far from being merely  practically synonymous, the courts of this state have described these two phrases using the following language: are synonymous, see, e.g., Trusty, 919 S.W.2d at 309;  are synonymous phrases meaning one and the same thing, see, e.g., Hale, 840 S.W.2d at 312;  are equivalent in effect, see, e.g., Arutanoff, 223 Tenn. at 541, 448 S.W.2d at 411; are identical,  see, e.g., Nichols, 640 S.W.2d at 16;  is the exact equivalent, see, e.g., Maloney, 108 Tenn. at 88, 65 S.W. at 872; and  are synonymous and a statute which violates one is violative of the other, Kittrell, 409 S.W.2d at 181. Although the majority certainly can find some language to support its practically synonymous theory, these cases are overwhelmed by authority to the contrary. The Court should be prepared to explicitly acknowledge that its decision today effectively overrules two centuries of settled constitutional construction, and it must state the reasons why such overruling is required, other than it has the inherent power to do so. Instead, with its decision today, the Court has tried, and failed, to distinguish all of these older cases on the basis of language alone. The people of this state deserve to know why the meaning of their constitution has suddenly changed overnight and what changed circumstances have required such a radical reversal. The majority may have an even greater hurdle to overcome, however, than the lack of legal precedent or historical application upon which to ground its decision. My research of the relevant constitutional authority on this issue casts substantial doubt as to whether this Court even has the authority to find that state liberty protections are greater than the corresponding federal protections. Prior to 1870, several Tennessee cases asserted that the protections of Article I, section 8 were synonymous with federal due process protections. For example, in Fields v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 168, 169 (1827), this Court examined whether a county court could remove a constable from public office for extortion. In answering the question in the affirmative under Tennessee law, this Court noted that the federal due process protections and those contained in Article I, section 8 were the same in substance. This Court reaffirmed this principle again in Ferguson v. Miners & Manufacturers' Bank, 35 Tenn. (3 Sneed) 609, 616 (1856), when it stated that the Fifth Amendment and Article I, section 8 provided the same due process protections, and our case law is also replete with statements from this Court saying that the phrase Law of the Land is synonymous with due process of law. See, e.g., State v. Staten, 46 Tenn. (6 Cold.) 233, 244 (1869) (The phrase, `the law of the land' is another expression for the `due process of law;' and is of equivalent import.); Owens v. Rain's Lessee, 6 Tenn. (5 Hayw.) 106 (1818) (stating that law of the land carries same meaning as due course of law). In point of fact, the 1870 Constitution was not a new constitution, but was largely a re-enactment of the older 1834 Constitution. See Gold v. Fite, 61 Tenn. (2 Baxt.) 237, 243 (1872) (stating that [t]he Constitution of 1870 was not a new Constitution, but in all its main features was a re-enactment of the Constitution of 1834). As such, the judicial construction which had theretofore been placed upon it, forms a part of the enactment, and the construction is presumed to be as much a part of the re-enactment as if it were written into the plain language of the Constitution itself. Cf. Smith v. North Memphis Sav. Bank, 115 Tenn. 12, 30, 89 S.W. 392, 396 (1905); see also Jenkins v. Ewin, 55 Tenn. (8 Heisk.) 456, 475-76 (1872); State v. Schlier, 50 Tenn. (3 Heisk.) 281, 283 (1871). Indeed, this presumption may be accorded even greater weight given the fact that the 1870 Constitutional Convention re-enacted Article I, section 8 unanimously, without substantive amendment, and without floor discussion. [14] Accordingly, the modern version of the Law of the Land Clause itself incorporates the prior decisions of this Court concluding that its protections are co-extensive with that of federal due process. As such, this Court cannot now choose to re-interpret this provision so as to reach a more personally desirable result in this particular case. Even if this result does not necessarily follow, legitimate and fundamental questions are raised as to the authority of this Court to formulate new standards of review that are without historical or legal foundation and otherwise contrary to accepted canons of constitutional construction.
Plainly stated, the effect of the Court's holding today is to remove from the people all power, except by constitutional amendment, to enact reasonable regulations of abortion. Rather than leaving policy decisions regarding reasonable abortion regulation to the General Assembly, this Court has converted itself into a roving constitutional convention, which sees itself free to strike down the duly enacted laws of the legislature for no other reason than it feels they are burdensome and unwise. In so doing, the Court has been unable to convincingly point to any textual or historical basis for its decision, and its holding that our Constitution provides greater protection for the judicially created right of privacy than the federal Constitution is contrary to nearly two hundred years of legal precedent. Although I certainly respect the judgment of my colleagues, I believe that the Court has overstepped its authority with this decision. Its factual declaration of the fundamental nature of the right of privacyand by extension, abortionharkens back to a time when opinions of the courts were justified by natural law, whose malleable and fluid nature permitted almost any conclusion to be adopted. [15] Although the language is not seen in our cases today, we should be reminded that at one time, the courts of this state routinely held that a duly-enacted statute cannot be invalidated upon some supposed or assumed natural right or equity, upon the general statement that it is opposed to the inherent rights of freemen, nor upon any spirit supposed to pervade the constitution not expressed in words, nor because it is opposed to the genius of a free people, nor upon any general or vague interpretation of a provision beyond its plain and obvious import. Leeper v. State, 103 Tenn. 500, 510-11, 53 S.W. 962, 964 (1899) (emphasis added); see also Henley v. State, 98 Tenn. 665, 682, 41 S.W. 352, 354 (1897); Stratton Claimants v. Morris Claimants, 89 Tenn. 497, 511, 15 S.W. 87, 90 (1891); Davis v. State, 71 Tenn. (3 Lea) 376, 378 (1879). Nevertheless, despite this ancient concern, the majority has undertaken to use this precise form of adjudication. It has held that the abortion regulations of this state are violative of the right of privacy, which pervades the constitution and which is reflected in several of its provisions. It has held that the rights to privacy and abortion are inherent and fundamental, though neither enjoys textual support in the Constitution. It has further held that the protections of the Law of the Land Clause are beyond that which has been interpreted as its plain and obvious import. I am unsure why constitutional interpretation in this state has deviated from these maxims. It could be that we have grown wiser over the past century, or it could be that our courts have ignored the fact that the people of this staterather than the courtsare ultimately in the best position to make such policy decisions. [16] Whatever the reasons, I know that these tenets provide a sound basis from which to begin our analysis, and the majority could do much worse than to pay heed. I do not wish to be misunderstood. Without a doubt, due process is not a static legal principle, [and], in a free society, it is an advancing standard consisting of those basic rights which are deemed reasonable and right. See City of White House v. Whitley, 979 S.W.2d 262, 266 (Tenn.1998). For the integrity and legitimacy of this Court to be maintained, though, the growth of the law must at all times be solidly grounded in logic, reason, and experience. The power to declare laws unconstitutional that are otherwise duly enacted by representatives of the people is an awesome power, and in exercising this power, the judiciary must be prepared in all cases to state with clarity and precision the specific reasons upon which its constitutional decisions are made. In my opinion, this Court today has failed in this most essential duty. Even when presented with more than two centuries of legal precedent to the contrary, the majority boldly concludes that we remain opposed to any assertion that previous decisions ... require[] this court to interpret our constitution as coextensive to the United States Constitution. After reading such an astonishing statement that the constitution is subject to the whim and mercy of the present members of the Court, the next logical question must necessarily be: Of what benefit is a written constitution, with settled interpretation, that purports to guarantee rights and limit the powers of government? The answer must surely be none, because when courts take it upon themselves to amend the constitution at will through their own interpretive devices, the benefit of written constitutions with settled interpretation is lost. As the majority must certainly recognize with its citation to Article I, section 1, though, it is the prerogative of the people not that of the courtsto alter, reform, or abolish the government in such a manner as they may think proper. The Court's decision today illustrates well the dangers of constitutional interpretation that is akin to making it up as you go. The majority can offer no legitimate reason why strict scrutiny analysis is compelled other than it can require this standard through exercise of its inherent authority. Because the right of privacy enjoys no textual support in our Constitution, the right serves at the pleasure of the judiciary, and therefore, it can be easily manipulated by courts desiring to legislate from the bench. Expansion and interpretation of this fundamental right of privacy allow courts to impose upon the people their own view of the wisdom, propriety, and desirability of challenged legislation. It is for these reasons that I dissent.
Even assuming for sake of argument that the right of privacy guaranteed under the state constitution is more broad than the corresponding federal right, it is still not reasonable to subject abortion regulations to strict scrutiny analysis. The very problem with the right of privacy is that the right enjoys no textual support in our Constitution, and the right may be stretched to encompass virtually any perceived injustice. To conclude that all rights falling within the rubric of privacy are subject to the same level of constitutional scrutiny ignores the fact that every privacy right that we discover may not be entitled to such practical immunity from reasonable regulation. Although the majority portrays itself as lawfully bound to apply strict scrutiny analysis because the right to obtain an abortion is a fundamental right under the Tennessee Constitution, no case or rule of law compels this result. While the majority relies heavily upon Davis to provide the constitutional basis for its decision today, Davis simply cannot be read to mean that the state right of privacy is so broad as to require strict scrutiny in all cases involving infringement of that right, particularly when the federal Constitution does not so require. I can find no language in that opinion which actually declares that the right of privacy is fundamental under the state constitution, as one would certainly expect, and according to my reading of Davis, if the right of privacy is fundamental at all, it is because federal courts have so held under the federal Constitution. It is worth remembering, though, that the United States Supreme Court also views the right to obtain an abortion as a fundamental right, yet that Court has stopped reviewing abortion regulations under the strict scrutiny standard of Roe . The Supreme Court has reached this conclusion while simultaneously acknowledging in other cases that other privacy rights are usually protected by strict scrutiny analysis. Reading footnote seven of the majority opinion in this case, one would think that this Court is of the same opinion today, as the majority remarks that [d]ifferent tests may be warranted in different contexts. (emphasis added). This important principle having been admitted, it is of some wonder, then, why the majority goes to great pains to overrule scores of cases and centuries of constitutional interpretation to arrive at a decision that is not even compelled by our great charter of government.
The majority's primary criticism of the undue burden standard is that it provides no standard at all by which to review abortion regulations. Without a doubt, reasonable minds will sometimes disagree as to whether a particular regulation constitutes an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. Indeed, reasonable disagreement as to the meaning of rules and standards is commonplace in many parts of our law and is a direct consequence of the common law system of adjudication inherited from England. Despite its shortcomings, though, the flexibility of the undue burden standard is its very strength, and this more flexible standard allows courts to accommodate various interests and to fashion appropriate relief under the circumstances of an individual case. By way of contrast, the application of strict scrutiny is not flexible at all, and I can find no case in this state where application of this standard has resulted in upholding the challenged law. With the adoption of strict scrutiny, this Court has forced the State of Tennessee into an all-or-nothing scenario, where only the most impeccably drafted legislation withstands the slightest possibility of darkening the constitutional doorway. I simply cannot fathom that the people of Tennessee, who outlawed the practice of abortion until Roe v. Wade , intended to remove all power from themselves to enact reasonable regulations on abortion. Nevertheless, this is the very conclusion reached by the majority today. Even despite the majority's admittedly legitimate concerns, the undue burden standard is practically no more flexible than any other standard of review. After all, even strict scrutiny analysis begs the question of how a right achieves fundamental status, [17] or even how a state interest becomes compelling, rather than merely important or legitimate. [18] Other objective constitutional standards, such as the reasonableness of a search, or the fairness of a trial, are just as capable of lawless decision making by judges who refuse to follow precedent or who wish to place their own imprimatur upon the law. The undue burden standard, though, is not subjective or without definition as the majority asserts. As Casey defined the standard, the phrase undue burden is shorthand for those regulations which have the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. 505 U.S. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791 (emphasis added). Surely the majority does not shy away from the undue burden standard because it requires an examination of the purpose of a statute, as this task is performed daily within the halls of this hallowed institution. Moreover, an examination of the effects of a regulation requires only that the parties fully develop and document the appellate record and that the reviewing court diligently consider the relevant parts of that record. Contrary to the majority's assertions, therefore, a court that is faithful to its duty to declare what the law is does have an objective benchmark by which to measure whether a regulation places an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. Without any citation to legal authority or analysis whatsoever, the majority boldly declares that it would find that all of the challenged regulations also place an undue burden on the right to obtain an abortion. The majority then uses my disagreement with this statement to illustrate the subjective nature of the undue burden standard. The majority is certainly correct that application of the undue burden standard can result in subjective analysis, but only when that analysis consists of bald declarations of unconstitutionality. The reasoned judgment of the Courtnot the adoption of strict scrutinyis the check in our system against the arbitrary exercise of judicial power. So long as the judgment of the court can be supported by experience, logic, and precedent, then I cannot conceive that any standard, including the undue burden standard, offers no real guidance and engenders no expectation among the citizenry that governmental regulation of abortion will be objective, evenhanded, or well-reasoned. [19] It is true that by using the undue burden standard, we are forced to put our trust and faith in judges of good character who are dedicated to sound and reasoned interpretations of law, and I agree that we would be in trouble if the judges took it upon themselves to make law rather than interpret it. So long as the Court is able to make a reasoned decision, the majority's fears concerning the undue burden standard should be minimized. It is my hope and expectation, perhaps navely so, that reason and sound judgment would prevail at the end of the day. The flexibility of the undue burden standard is simply not a legitimate reason to adopt the wrought-iron hammer of strict scrutiny.
The right to obtain an abortion is the single most complex right falling under the privacy umbrella, and these procreational rights involve a myriad of interests other than that of the mother, including those legitimate interests of the fetus, the father, [20] and certainly of the state. As the Supreme Court of Mississippi held when faced with this same question: While we have previously analyzed cases involving the state constitutional right to privacy under a strict scrutiny standard requiring the State to prove a compelling interest, we are not bound to apply that standard in all privacy cases. The abortion issue is much more complex than most cases involving privacy rights. We are placed in the precarious position of both protecting a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy before viability and protecting unborn life. In an attempt to create a workable framework out of these diametrically opposed positions, we adopt the well reasoned decision in Casey , applying the undue burden standard to analyze laws restricting abortion. We do not limit any future application of the strict scrutiny standard for evaluating infringement on a person's right to privacy in other areas. Pro-Choice Miss. v. Fordice, 716 So.2d 645, 655 (Miss.1998). Because strict scrutiny is usually strict in theory, and fatal in fact, I question the Court's decision only to permit the General Assembly to enact regulations when those regulations are the least restrictive means to achieve the precise interest at stake. More specifically, I question whether abortion regulations can ever be crafted to serve a single interest, and any effort to balance and accommodate several competing interests may result in the regulation failing strict scrutiny with respect to any single interest. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has conceded, the state's important and legitimate interest in potential life ... has been given too little acknowledgment and implementation by the Court in its subsequent cases [using the strict scrutiny standard of Roe ]. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871, 112 S.Ct. 2791; see also Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The State has compelling interests in ensuring maternal health and in protecting potential human life, and these interests exist `throughout pregnancy.'), overruled by, Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Because the majority opinion refuses to recognize that many interests may be furthered by a single regulation, it weighs the value of a regulation against a single interest in order to strike down the regulation. For example, in its discussion of the mandatory waiting period, the majority concludes that the regulation cannot survive strict scrutiny simply because it does not further the State's interest in maternal health. When considering the possible purposes of the regulation, however, I recognize that the state also has an interest in fetal life, and that this interest combined with the state's interest in ensuring informed and deliberate decision making, see Casey, 505 U.S. at 885, 112 S.Ct. 2791, could work to uphold the regulation. Although the undue burden standard does not fully work to accommodate all the various interests involved, the standard certainly recognizes that the legislature may work to advance several interests with a single regulation. Nevertheless, with its adoption of strict scrutiny today, this Court is set to spiral down the same road which has already been traveled and abandoned by the United States Supreme Court. We do so while recognizing that this path is a rough one and not wide enough to safely accommodate all of its travelers. Although I understand the apparent motives of the majority, the judiciary of this state is simply not legitimately empowered to make our Constitution say today what it did not say yesterday. After all, if I were vested with law-making authority and remain[ed] opposed to any assertion that previous decisions should control the outcome of this case, it could be that I would also require a different constitutional standard when reviewing abortion regulationsI would probably only require the challenged regulation to be rationally related to the state's legitimate interests in ensuring maternal health and fetal life. Nevertheless, I recognize that the history, language, and structure of our Constitution provide protection that is co-extensive with federal due process. Accordingly, for the reasons given above, I would hold that the undue burden standard developed by the United States Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey , should apply to review abortion regulations under the Tennessee Law of the Land Clause. This standard is proper because our historical interpretation of the Law of the Land Clause is substantially identical to that of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and because the undue burden standard better works to accommodate the myriad of interests arising in this increasingly complex issue of public policy.
In Casey , the United States Supreme Court rejected strict scrutiny as the standard of review for regulations of abortion. In attempting to craft a standard of review that balanced the state's interests in protecting potential life, in regulating maternal and fetal health, and in expressing a preference for childbirth over abortion against a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy, the Court adopted an undue burden standard for statutes regulating pre-viability abortions. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-79, 112 S.Ct. 2791. Under the undue burden standard, a statute is unconstitutional only if it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. Id. at 877, 112 S.Ct. 2791. At the point of viability, the State's interest becomes far greater, and it may heavily regulate, or even completely proscribe abortion, except where the procedure is necessary to preserve a mother's life or health. See id. at 879, 112 S.Ct. 2791; see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, ___, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000).
In Casey , the United States Supreme Court began its analysis of Pennsylvania's abortion statutes by examining the exception for abortions in medical emergencies. The Court did so because it characterized the medical emergency exception as central to the operation of the statute's other provisions. See id. at 879, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The statute defined medical emergency as a condition necessitating immediate abortion to avert [the mother's] death or for which substantial delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. Id. Planned Parenthood argued that the exception was so narrowly defined that it foreclosed the possibility of an abortion in some circumstances in which the mother would be exposed to a threat to her health. The Court concluded that the statute was sufficiently broad to encompass all serious health risks. See id. at 880, 112 S.Ct. 2791. The Court noted, however, that if the statute did limit abortions in some circumstances in which the health of the mother would be endangered, the statute would have been unconstitutional because the essential holding of Roe forbids a State to interfere with a woman's choice to undergo an abortion procedure if continuing her pregnancy would constitute a threat to her health. Id. The Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this holding of Casey in Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 120 S.Ct. 2597, 147 L.Ed.2d 743 (2000). In striking down a law prohibiting an abortion procedure commonly known as partial birth abortion, the Court noted that the law lacks any exception `for the preservation of the ... health of the mother.' 530 U.S. at ___, 120 S.Ct. 2597 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879, 112 S.Ct. 2791). In her concurring opinion providing the crucial fifth vote for the majority, though, Justice O'Connor stated that if the Nebraska law was not as sweeping and if it included an exception for the life and health of the mother, then the law would be constitutional in [her] view. Thus, even after Stenberg , any system of abortion regulations must provide a medical emergency exception for the life and health of the mother to pass constitutional muster. Tennessee's abortion statutes contain three separate medical emergency exceptions. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-202(d)(3) (1997) suspends the forty-eight hour waiting period requirement when it would endanger the life of the pregnant woman. In addition, section 202(g) preempts the operation of the informed consent provisions as well as the waiting period when necessary to preserve the life of the pregnant woman. Neither of these provisions contains an exception when the health of the mother is threatened. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-15-201(c)(3) (1997) does provide that a woman may procure an abortion when necessary to preserve her life or health; however, this section applies only in situations when the fetus is viable. The State argues that the medical emergency provision for the health of a woman in section -201(c)(3) may be read into the medical emergency provisions of section -202. According to the State, the General Assembly added section -201(c)(3) in response to a federal court order enjoining the abortion regulations because they did not contain a medical emergency exception for the life of the mother. The General Assembly, though, also added section -202(g) at the same time. Consequently, while the General Assembly explicitly provided for the exception to apply when the life or health of the mother carrying a viable fetus was threatened in one provision, it provided a medical emergency exception in another section added at the time that covered circumstances only when the life of a woman carrying a pre-viable fetus was threatened. Clearly, the General Assembly knew how to provide for a medical emergency exception for the health of a woman carrying a pre-viable fetus when it so desired, and the absence of the health exception in section -202 must, therefore, be presumed to be intentional. Courts may read terms into the text of a statute when such an interpretation would clearly further the intent of the legislature or when the term to be supplied was clearly omitted only by inadvertence or mistake. See In re Swanson, 2 S.W.3d 180, 186 (Tenn.1999); Knoxville Power & Light Co. v. Thompson, 152 Tenn. 223, 226, 276 S.W. 1050, 1051 (1925). Nevertheless, I cannot conclude under the circumstances that reading the word health into section -202 would further the clear intent of the legislature or that the word health was omitted in section -202 only by inadvertence or mistake. I conclude, therefore, that the plain language of Tennessee's abortion statutes does not provide a medical emergency exception to the challenged regulations when the health of a woman carrying a pre-viable fetus is threatened. Consequently, I am compelled by the United States Supreme Court's decision in Casey to also conclude that the failure to provide a medical emergency exception for the health of a woman carrying a pre-viable fetus is unconstitutional, and that this failure renders the other challenged provisions unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Law of the Land Clause of the Tennessee Constitution. But for this deficiency in the medical emergency exceptions, I would find the remainder of the challenged provisions to be constitutionally sound.
The challenged informed consent provisions of section 39-15-202 can be divided into three components: (1) an attending physician requirement; (2) content requirements; and (3) a mandatory waiting period.