Opinion ID: 2419685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: infringement of freedom of speech

Text: The majority has overstepped its bounds. It is placing a burden on candidates for judicial office to censor every word which is written about them so as to comply with an interpretation of the rules of judicial ethics which is not reasonably foreseeable. If the Court wishes to lay down this rule, it should do so in an appropriate situation and not punish those who were acting under a reasonable interpretation of the rules as written. The JRRC has violated Patricia Summe's constitutional rights by its application of the canon to the facts here. The JRRC's prohibition against the use of a newspaper format and the use of the Mary Gregory Letter is unconstitutional in that it infringes upon Patricia Summe's constitutional right to freedom of speech under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Section 8 of the Kentucky Constitution. As pointed out in J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., Ky., 803 S.W.2d 953 (1991), freedom of speech extends to a candidate for public office, including judicial office. The candidate, no less than any other person, has a First Amendment right to engage in the discussion of public issues and vigorously and tirelessly to advocate his own election. . . ., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 52, 96 S.Ct. 612, 651, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976), and make [his] views known so that the electorate may intelligently evaluate the candidates' personal qualities and their positions on vital public issues before choosing among them on election day. Id. at 53, 96 S.Ct. at 651. A person does not surrender his constitutional right to freedom of speech when he becomes a candidate for judicial office. American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc. v. The Florida Bar, et al., 744 F.Supp. 1094 (N.D.Fla. 1990). Political advertisement, while undoubtedly designed to elect a candidate to office, should provide a voter with information to make an intelligent decision at the ballot box. J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., supra . The United States Supreme Court has considered the public's ability to review paid advertisements and utilize the information contained therein in its proper perspective. The disclosure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a positive contribution to decision-making than is concealment of such information. Peel v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Com'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 2281, 110 L.Ed.2d 83 (1990). While Peel was rendered in the context of commercial free speech and not judicial elections, the principle that disclosure of information allows the general public to make informed decisions is equally applicable here. In J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., supra , this Court indicated that a broad rule prohibiting judicial candidates from speaking on disputed issues served only to turn the judicial election into a popularity contest. Id. at 956. Freedom of speech extends to all candidates for public office, including judicial candidates and where state regulations extend so far as to completely outlaw speech because of subject matter, there is a strong presumption of unconstitutionality. While states have the authority to regulate the conduct of judicial elections, a person does not surrender her constitutional right to freedom of speech when she becomes a candidate for judicial office. Id. at 955. (Citing American Civil Liberties Union of Florida, Inc., supra . ) The cardinal principle in balancing the tension between free speech and judicial propriety must remain that state laws which restrict free speech and can result in disciplinary action against the speaker are subject to very strict scrutiny. In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 98 S.Ct. 1893, 56 L.Ed.2d 417 (1978). Under the strict scrutiny standard applicable to this analysis, the charges brought by the Commission against Patricia Summe for her use of a newspaper format in the Kenton County Citizen's Courier and the Mary Gregory letter offends, as a matter of law, her rights to freedom of speech. Enforcement of the charges chill a judicial candidate's ability to inform the electorate of her views and the views of her opponent. J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., supra . As established in J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R ., Patricia Summe, as a political candidate for a judicial office, can announce her views on legal and political issues without jeopardizing the integrity and independence of the legal system or undermining the impartiality of the judiciary, and do it in a way that is interesting and raises the probability that the recipient will actually read it. Significantly, all of the facts contained in the newsletter and the Mary Gregory letter were true and accurate. Both pieces had a disclaimer clearly indicating that the documents were paid for by the Committee to Elect Patricia Summe. Further, in the newsletter, Patricia Summe's letter to the voters made it clear that she was the author of the piece and she took full responsibility for it. Patricia Summe never intentionally tried to mislead the voters, nor was there any evidence that even one (1) Kenton County voter was misled. Nonetheless, Patricia Summe is being punished for political speech which is not even prohibited by the Judicial Canons or the law of Kentucky. On the contrary, in J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., supra , this Court held that to criticize a judge's decision, does not, in and of itself, undermine the public's confidence and respect for the judiciary. Id., at 955. Political advertisements which criticize other candidates do not equate to committing a judicial candidate to making a pledge to rule in a particular way. The public has a right to expect that the supervision of judicial elections, although necessary, will not erode the equally necessary principle that the First Amendment extends strong protection to judicial elections. Patricia Summe's right to freedom of speech has been abridged and both counts against her should be reversed.