Opinion ID: 149121
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reliance on Inappropriate Factors

Text: The government first argues that the district court relied on several inappropriate factors as mitigators, as it contends that being a musician and composer is not itself a cause for lenience and that providing care to a family member does not warrant the elimination of prison altogether when that care is entirely replaceable. In Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996), the Supreme Court explained that, while section 3553(b) authorizes district courts to depart from the applicable Guidelines range in cases that feature aggravating or mitigating circumstances, district courts are not left adrift. Id. at 94, 116 S.Ct. 2035. The Commission provides considerable guidance as to the factors that are apt or not apt to make a case atypical, by listing certain factors as either encouraged or discouraged bases for departure. Id. Discouraged factors are those not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. Id. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (citing U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment). Under the Guidelines, a defendant's family ties and responsibilities, [section] 5H1.6, his or her education and vocational skills, section 5H1.2, and his or her military, civic, charitable, or public service record, section 5H1.11, id., are discouraged factors that are `not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.' Id. (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment). Moreover, the Guidelines suggest that only in exceptional cases should the court consider such circumstances. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment; cf. Koon, 518 U.S. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035. Of course, [a]fter Booker, ... the fact that a factor is discouraged or forbidden under the guidelines does not automatically make it irrelevant when a court is weighing statutory factors apart from the guidelines. United States v. Husein, 478 F.3d 318, 326 (6th Cir.2007) (citing United States v. Aitoro, 446 F.3d 246, 255 n. 9 (1st Cir.2006)); see also United States v. Burton, 230 Fed.Appx. 505, 509-10 (6th Cir.2007). Nevertheless, section 3553(a)(5) requires that the district court consider applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, and the Guidelines' disfavored view towards age and physical condition is, therefore, relevant to our reasonableness review. Burton, 230 Fed.Appx. at 510. At the 2008 re-sentencing hearing, the district court stated that: Next, Mr. Christman's educational and vocational skills. He's also a composer and musician. He composes music on a self-contained synthesizer-type instrument that reproduces the sounds of many instruments. At Mr. Christman's original sentencing hearing in October, 2005, he played this music to the Court, and this factor can be considered by the Court under Sentencing Guideline Section 5H1.2 which is educational and vocational skills. Educational and vocational skills, as described under section 5H1.2, are a discouraged factor, and so should be relied upon only `in exceptional cases.' Koon, 518 U.S. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035 (quoting 1995 U.S. S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, intro. comment). While it is not an abuse of discretion for a judge to take note of a defendant's educational background and skill, see Stall, 581 F.3d at 288, neither is a defendant's job, in and of itself, relevant to sentencing absent unusual circumstances. Thus, the district court abused its discretion here in finding, without explanation, that the fact that Christman writes and plays music is, in and of itself, a mitigating factor. The district court also found that the fact that Christman had, while on bail pending his appeal, become the primary caregiver to his elderly mother, was a mitigating factor under section 5H1.6 (family ties and responsibilities). [F]amily circumstances [are] a `discouraged' factor under the Guidelines. Husein, 478 F.3d at 326 (quoting Koon, 518 U.S. at 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035). Commentary recently added to section 5H1.6 offers guidance by requiring the presence of the following four circumstances before a finding that extraordinariness exists in this case: (i) The defendant's service of a sentence within the applicable guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant's family. (ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a similarly situated defendant. For example, the fact that the defendant's family might incur some degree of financial hardship or suffer to some extent from the absence of a parent through incarceration is not in itself sufficient as a basis for departure because such hardship or suffering is of a sort ordinarily incident to incarceration. (iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for which no effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably are available, making the defendant's caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to the defendant's family. (iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or financial support. Id. at 326-27 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6, cmt. 1(B)). Here, defendant argues that Christman can be relieved but not replaced. (Appellee's Brief at 17.) However, in and of itself, this is not sufficient. When there are feasible alternatives of care that are relatively comparable to what the defendant provides, the defendant cannot be irreplaceable. United States v. Pereira, 272 F.3d 76, 83 (1st Cir.2001). There is a feasible alternative available: should his siblings be unable to provide care, a nursing home can provide the around-the-clock care that Christman provides to his mother and that his family believes to be necessary. While this is, of course, a substantial hardship to his mother, it is difficult to see how placement in a nursing home is necessarily a death sentence upon her, as the district court argues. Unlike in Husein, it has not been argued that Christman's family cannot afford to place his mother in a nursing home, just that they would prefer not to, so cost is not a relevant consideration here; they argue only that her quality of life would be greatly diminished. (Appellee's Brief at 17.) As the government notes, many adults provide care for their aged parents or their young children. See, e.g., United States v. Cantrell, 173 F.3d 430 (Table), 1999 WL 96656, at  (6th Cir.1999). However, as long as alternate arrangements for care can be made, which in the case of children may include foster care, [5] a situation analogous to placement in a nursing home, this does not argue for mitigation unless extraordinary circumstances exist. To say otherwise would be to invite gross sentencing disparities based solely on whether one has a young child or an infirm dependant. As no extraordinary circumstances appear here, either as argued by Christman's attorney or in the statements of Christman's family at the sentencing hearing, we find that the district court abused its discretion in weighing this factor so heavily in favor of mitigation.