Opinion ID: 6215538
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defining the essential topics

Text: Applying these principles here, the record shows that Christianson is using a stream-of-commerce-plus theory to argue that Texas courts have specific personal jurisdiction over Jana in this suit. Christianson’s challenged jurisdictional discovery must therefore seek facts essential to prove at least one disputed part of that theory. The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution imposes no obstacle to a Texas court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if that defendant has minimum contacts with the State and the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 795 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). These constitutional requirements are the reason that courts must guard the boundaries of jurisdictional discovery carefully, keeping in mind that they cannot constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a defendant challenging jurisdiction unless the plaintiff proves these requirements. This Court “has repeatedly emphasized that discovery may not be used as a fishing expedition,” and ensuring that “requests [are] reasonably tailored to include only matters relevant to” the disputed issues is particularly important in the jurisdictional context. In re Am. Optical Corp., 988 S.W.2d 711, 713 (Tex. 1998) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam). A nonresident defendant’s contacts may give rise to either general or specific jurisdiction. Guardian Royal Exch. Assurance, Ltd. v. Eng. 10 China Clays, P.L.C., 815 S.W.2d 223, 227–28 (Tex. 1991). General jurisdiction requires that a defendant be “essentially at home” in the forum State. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Specific jurisdiction exists when (1) the defendant has “made minimum contacts with Texas by purposefully availing itself of the privilege of conducting activities [in the state],” and (2) the defendant’s potential liability arose from or is related to those contacts. Moki Mac River Expeditions v. Drugg, 221 S.W.3d 569, 576 (Tex. 2007). Because specific jurisdiction is at issue here, we examine these two elements in turn. To show purposeful availment, a plaintiff must prove that a nonresident defendant seeks a benefit, advantage, or profit from the forum market. Michiana Easy Livin’ Country, Inc. v. Holten, 168 S.W.3d 777, 785 (Tex. 2005). Only the defendant’s contacts are relevant, not the unilateral activity of another party or third person. And those contacts “must be purposeful rather than random, fortuitous, or attenuated.” Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142, 151 (Tex. 2013) (quoting Retamco Operating, Inc. v. Republic Drilling Co., 278 S.W.3d 333, 338–39 (Tex. 2009)). In products liability cases, showing that the defendant placed the product in the stream of commerce is not alone sufficient to establish purposeful availment; some additional conduct or “plus factor”—such as design for use in the target market—must also be shown. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (explaining that “[a]dditional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose to serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State”); Spir Star AG v. Kimich, 310 S.W.3d 868, 873 (Tex. 11 2010); see also Luciano v. SprayFoamPolymers.com, LLC, 625 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. 2021) (“Additional conduct that [the defendant] tapped into the Texas market is evinced by its use of a Texas distribution center and a Texas sales representative to create a market to sell to local installers.”). Turning to relatedness, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “substantial connection” between the “defendant’s forum contacts . . . and the operative facts of the litigation.” Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 585. A special appearance must be granted when this connection is “too attenuated to satisfy specific jurisdiction’s due-process concerns.” Id. at 588. The foreseeability of litigation in the forum is relevant in determining whether a substantial connection exists. Guardian Royal, 815 S.W.2d at 227. Here, the parties’ dispute concerns the permissible scope of corporate representative depositions, a matter that courts commonly address on a topic-by-topic basis. Given the theory of specific jurisdiction that Christianson asserts, each topic must target discovery that is essential to prove (1) Jana’s purposeful availment (placement in the stream and “additional conduct”) or (2) relatedness (substantial connection between the forum contacts and the litigation). A proper topic need not be essential to all disputed factors simultaneously.6 6 We have not required plaintiffs to use the same evidence to prove all disputed elements. See Luciano, 625 S.W.3d at 17 (rejecting “conflat[ion of] the purposeful-availment inquiry and the relatedness inquiry,” which are “two co-equal components” of specific jurisdiction (quoting Moki Mac, 221 S.W.3d at 579)); id. at 18 (“[I]f the actionable conduct occurs in Texas, we have never required that the lawsuit also arise directly from the nonresident defendant’s additional conduct.”). Thus, for example, a proper topic may seek facts essential to prove “additional conduct” without also seeking facts essential to 12 The six deposition topics currently in dispute encompass some matters that are essential to prove purposeful availment or relatedness under Christianson’s stream-of-commerce-plus theory of personal jurisdiction. But they also include matters that are not essential in determining either factor, and they are overbroad and duplicative in certain respects. We do not fault the parties or the trial court for failing to anticipate the contours of the approach we have articulated today. Rather, we conclude that the parties should have an opportunity to discuss and reformulate the six topics with this approach in mind, and the trial court should have the opportunity in the first instance to rule on any disputes that remain.