Opinion ID: 426287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fuller's Breach of Contract Claim Against SGE.

Text: 37 Despite Fuller's contention that the district court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on its claim that SGE breached duties owed to Fuller arising ex contractu, we affirm the district court refusal because SGE owed no contractual obligations to Fuller. 38 Fuller recognizes that it and SGE did not enter into any written contract. Rather, Fuller claims a breach of contract by SGE based upon the written agreement between Fuller and CCOM. According to Fuller's theory, SGE was CCOM's agent during the construction phase and that, as such agent, SGE agreed to be bound by the terms of the contract between Fuller and CCOM, a contract to which SGE was not a party. As support for this theory, Fuller points out that the Fuller/CCOM contract expressly refers to activities to be performed by the architect personally and that the SGE partner in charge of the project, Lawrence Harrison, testified that he considered himself bound by the provisions in that contract .... Tr. 825. 39 Fuller also recognizes that a disclosed agent is usually not contractually obligated to the other party, but states that an agent is personally bound if he agrees to be or if, by reasonable inference, his personal agreement can be implied in the contract. While the proposition is correct, Fuller's conclusion that SGE agreed to be bound is incorrect. 9 40 In Gateway Erectors Division v. Lutheran General Hospital, 102 Ill.App.3d 300, 58 Ill.Dec. 78, 430 N.E.2d 20 (1st Dist.1981), the cement contractor alleged that the construction manager owed contractual duties to the cement contractor based upon the contract between the cement contractor and the owner. That contract, to which the construction manager was not a party, expressly referred to many tasks which the manager was to carry out. The court affirmed the dismissal of the contract claim, concluding that the manager was the agent of a disclosed principal and did not agree, either expressly or inferentially, to become personally liable under the contract. 41 Here, Fuller was not a party to the CCOM/SGE contract and SGE was not a party to the CCOM/Fuller contract. SGE never expressly agreed to be bound by the CCOM/Fuller agreement. The district court properly refused to give Fuller's tendered jury instructions on its contract claim against SGE. 42