Opinion ID: 1733568
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the challenged argument must be improper

Text: To receive a new trial in a civil case based on unobjected-to closing argument, a complaining party must first establish that the argument being challenged is, in fact, improper. In determining whether the argument being challenged is improper, a trial judge should be guided by the following principles. The purpose of closing argument is to help the jury understand the issues in a case by applying the evidence to the law applicable to the case. Hill v. State, 515 So.2d 176, 178 (Fla.1987). Attorneys should be afforded great latitude in presenting closing argument, but they must confine their argument to the facts and evidence presented to the jury and all logical deductions from the facts and evidence. Knoizen v. Bruegger, 713 So.2d 1071, 1072 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Venning v. Roe, 616 So.2d 604 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). Moreover, closing argument must not be used to inflame the minds and passions of the jurors so that their verdict reflects an emotional response ... rather than the logical analysis of the evidence in light of the applicable law. Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130, 134 (Fla. 1985). Attorneys presenting closing argument in Florida courts, whether in criminal or civil trials, are governed by rule 4-3.4 of the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. Rule 4-3.4 states: A lawyer shall not ... in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant, or the guilt or innocence of an accused. R. Regulating Fla. Bar 4-3.4(e). The underpinnings of this ethical rule are well-founded; it not only prevents lawyers from placing their own credibility at issue in a case, it also limits the possibility that the jury may decide a case based on non-record evidence. See Davis v. South Florida Water Management Dist., 715 So.2d 996, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998): Forman v. Wallshein, 671 So.2d 872, 875 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996). In sum, rule 4-3.4 is in place to help ensure that juries render verdicts based on record evidence and applicable law, not based on impermissible matters interjected by counsel during closing argument. While we do not attempt to list here all of the various types of improper argument, we do wish to clarify several matters regarding how rule 4-3.4 should be interpreted. First, it is not improper for counsel to state during closing argument that a witness lied or is a liar, provided such characterizations are supported by the record. See Craig v. State, 510 So.2d 857, 865 (Fla.1987) (finding that even though intemperate, prosecutor's closing argument remarks characterizing defendant's testimony as untruthful and the defendant himself as being a liar did not exceed the bounds of proper argument in view of the record evidence); Forman, 671 So.2d at 874 (refusing to find improper counsel's closing argument characterization of plaintiff as being a liar where there was an ample evidentiary basis on which to dispute the credibility of the plaintiff); see also Goutis v. Express Transport, Inc., 699 So.2d 757, 763-64 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (agreeing with Forman ). If the evidence supports such a characterization, counsel is not impermissibly stating a personal opinion about the credibility of a witness, but is instead submitting to the jury a conclusion that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence. [21] Second, use of the personal pronoun I during closing argument is not, in and of itself, improper. On this issue, we agree with the Third District's analysis in Forman, wherein the court reviewed several treatises and concluded that defense counsel's use of the phrases I think and I believe did not impermissibly express a personal opinion, but was instead merely a figure of speech. See 671 So.2d at 874-75 (reviewing Thomas A. Mauet, Fundamentals of Trial Techniques 366 (3d ed.1992), and Steven Lubet, Modern Trial Advocacy Analysis and Practice, 432-33 (1993)). When determining whether counsels' use of the personal pronoun I is improper, judges must not place form over substance; it must be understood that trial counsel is required to analyze the evidence and present reasonable interpretations and inferences based on the evidence to the jury.