Opinion ID: 1265522
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expunction as a Component of Alaska's Statutory Set Aside Statute[5]

Text: Alaska Statute 12.55.085 authorizes our trial courts to suspend the imposition of a sentence and thereafter set aside a conviction if the defendant successfully completes a probationary period. Alaska Statute 12.55.085 provides, in part: (a) Except as provided in (f) of this section, if it appears that there are circumstances in mitigation of the punishment, or that the ends of justice will be served, the court may, in its discretion, suspend the imposition of sentence ... and shall place the person on probation, under the charge and supervision of the probation officer of the court during the suspension. ... . (e) Upon the discharge by the court without imposition of sentence, the court may set aside the conviction and issue to the person a certificate to that effect. See also Alaska R.Crim.P. 35.2(a). The issue of whether the term set aside includes expungement [6] of the defendant's criminal record is one of first impression. Journey acknowledges that the meaning of the set aside language has never been precisely defined, yet he contends that our case law, other jurisdictions' case law, and principles of statutory construction, as well as common sense, lead to but one conclusion: expungement is a necessary component of a set aside of a conviction. We disagree.
Looking first to the statutory language, AS 12.55.085(e) refers only to setting aside the conviction; expungement is not mentioned. Similarly, Alaska Criminal Rule 35.2, which implements AS 12.55.085(e), reiterates the statutory mandate that a certificate setting aside the conviction be issued, but is silent as to expungement. Passed in 1965, AS 12.55.085 has no legislative history to illuminate the meaning of its text. However, we note that in contrast to AS 12.55.085(e), the legislature has explicitly addressed the issue of criminal records in a related context. [7] Though not necessarily dispositive, the fact that the legislature has expressly provided for the sealing of a minor's criminal record demonstrates both its recognition of the issue as well as its ability to act accordingly. [8] Similarly, holding that AS 12.55.085 allows for expunction renders the statute internally inconsistent. That is, if convictions that are set aside are to be expunged, then a portion of subsection (f)(3) of the statute is effectively meaningless. [9] Principles of statutory interpretation militate against such a reading. [10] Journey relies heavily on Mekiana v. State [11] in which the court of appeals held that the enactment of AS 12.55.085 was clearly intended to provide probationers who received a suspended imposition of sentence with the prospect of a clean slate and the promise of a new beginning... . [12] Journey argues that such a prospect has little meaning if it fails to protect probationers from the adverse effect that a criminal record has upon one's employment prospects and reputation. In citing Larson v. State, [13] Journey similarly argues that since AS 12.55.085 ensure[s] that a defendant will not be prejudiced in his later law-abiding life by the collateral consequences flowing from a criminal conviction, [14] expungement is but a natural extension of an already accepted doctrine. In Larson, the court of appeals held that a conviction which had been set aside under AS 12.55.085(e) could not be considered a conviction for presumptive sentencing purposes. [15] However, the court of appeals also held that the set aside conviction could be used for certain other purposes related to sentencing. Specifically, the court of appeals allowed the use of the conviction to justify the imposition of the maximum sentence. [16] Implicit in this holding is that the court of appeals anticipated the preservation of records of the set aside conviction for use in certain limited circumstances. Thus, as Larson makes clear, the premise that the collateral consequences of a set-aside verdict should be limited does not lead to the conclusion that expungement is part and parcel of a set aside under AS 12.55.085(e). [17] The pernicious effects of criminal records are well documented. Courts, [18] commentators, [19] and legislatures [20] have recognized that a person with a criminal record is often burdened by social stigma, subjected to additional investigation, prejudiced in future criminal proceedings, and discriminated against by prospective employers. [21] Though we recognize this unfortunate reality, Journey's overall argument that expungement is a necessary component of a set aside is unpersuasive. Moreover, the decisions from other states which Journey cites do not support his position. Unlike AS 12.55.085(e), several jurisdictions' set aside statutes expressly provide for expungement or the sealing of records. [22] In contrast, and as already discussed, AS 12.55.085(e) does not speak to expungement or the sealing of records.
Journey also cites 6 Alaska Administrative Code (AAC) 60.100(a) to support his expungement claim. It states in pertinent part: PURGING OF CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION. (a) Criminal history record information collected, stored, processed or disseminated within the Alaska justice information system must be purged as follows: ... . (2) Upon final disposition of an arrest or criminal proceeding in favor of the arrestee, all criminal history record information collected and stored as a result of that arrest or proceeding must be immediately closed, except fingerprint classifications and medical information under 6 AAC 60.110. (3) Criminal history record information closed under ... (2) of this subsection must be expunged no sooner than 60 and no later than 90 days after closure. Journey argues that successful completion of a suspended imposition of sentence is a disposition in his favor, entitling him to expungement under 6 AAC 60.100(a). [23] On the merits, Journey's SIS is not a disposition in his favor pursuant to 6 AAC 60.100. Journey's case is similar to City of St. Paul v. Froysland [24] where the Minnesota Supreme Court denied an expunction request. After her arrest, Froysland pled guilty to a charge of disorderly conduct, and received a six-month stay of imposition of sentence pursuant to Minnesota's probation statute. [25] The trial court instructed the defendant that if she did not get into any more trouble, the charge would be dismissed, and that after dismissal she would be able to state that she had not been convicted of the offense. After the six-month period, the trial court struck the guilty plea, vacated the conviction, and dismissed the charge. However, when Froysland attempted to obtain the return of criminal identification data under a statute that provided for such return [u]pon the determination of all pending criminal actions or proceedings in favor of the arrested person, [26] the City of St. Paul denied her request. [27] The trial court upheld the denial. To this effect, the trial court reasoned that the statute providing for the return of criminal identification records was intended to benefit individuals who either were acquitted of an offense or were released without further proceedings, and that in the absence of legislative action extending the statute's protections to individuals who have admitted guilt, return of the records would infringe upon the record-keeping functions of the executive branch. [28] The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. [29] Thus, whether or not applicable, we conclude that Journey is not entitled to expungement per 6 AAC 60.100.
Lastly, Journey relies upon Doe v. Webster [30] in which the court rejected the government's argument that the use of the term set aside indicated a Congressional intent not to allow expunction. The Webster court based its holding on a provision of the former Federal Youth Corrections Act which provided a procedure for youthful offenders to have convictions set aside. [31] 18 U.S.C. § 5021(b) (repealed 1984). Journey correctly notes that when construing AS 12.55.085, this court has looked to cases construing the former Federal Youth Corrections Act. [32] Nonetheless, Webster is not entirely helpful to Journey's case. Though it construed the Act to mandate expunction of the conviction, the Webster court held that the Act did not require expunction of the record of arrest. [33] With regard to the defendant's arrest record, the Webster court applied the federal test for exercise of a court's inherent authority to expunge, and held that the defendant had not shown any extraordinary circumstances warranting expunction. [34] Furthermore, a number of federal circuits have reached a result contrary to Webster, concluding that the Act requires expunction of neither arrest nor conviction records. [35] In short, we conclude that our case law, the decisions of our sister states, and the application of traditional canons of statutory construction all lead to the conclusion that AS 12.55.085(e) does not authorize a court to expunge a defendant's criminal record relating to the underlying conviction which is to be set aside.