Opinion ID: 4013709
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Rivernider

Text: We review the substantive reasonableness of a district court’s sentence for abuse of discretion, and we “take into account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We set aside a district court’s sentence as substantively unreasonable only if the sentence “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v. Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 189 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although “[w]e have previously declined to adopt a presumption of reasonableness for sentences that fall within the guidelines range,” opting instead “for a more flexible approach that allows consideration of the facts of an individual case,” United States v. Douglas, 713 F.3d 694, 700 (2d Cir. 2013), it is “difficult to find that a below‐Guidelines sentence is [substantively] unreasonable,” United States v. Perez‐Frias, 636 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 2011). 35 The challenged 144‐month sentence, which is substantially lower than the 324 to 405 month Guidelines range, easily falls within the range of permissible decisions available to the district court.8 In determining Rivernider’s sentence, the district court observed that the loss amount – over $20 million – overstated the seriousness of the offense, as Rivernider was not a predatory fraudster, had engaged in significant investment activity, and had himself been defrauded. Additionally, the court noted that, although Rivernider misled clients about the 8 Rivernider’s Guidelines range, which is not challenged here, is based on a total offense level of forty‐one, consisting of: a base offense level of seven, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1), a twenty‐two level enhancement based on loss amount, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L), a four‐level adjustment for the number of victims, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (as of 2013), a two‐level adjustment for the use of sophisticated means, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C), a two‐level adjustment because more than $1,000,000 was obtained from financial institutions, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A) and a four‐level role adjustment, see id. § 3B1.1(a). His criminal history category was I. At the time of Rivernider’s sentence, U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) provided for a four‐level increase when the crime involved between 50 and 250 victims. The Sentencing Commission amended U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) in 2015 to provide a four‐level increase where the crime resulted in ʺsubstantial financial harmʺ to five or more victims, replacing the previous version which provided for a four‐level increase based solely on number of victims. Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 80 Fed. Reg. 25,782, 25,790‐91 (May 5, 2015). That amendment, which was not made retroactive, does not apply on direct review. See United States v. Colon, 961 F.2d 41, 44‐46 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that amendments to the Guidelines that constitute a substantive change to, rather than a clarification of, a Guideline do not apply on direct review). Accordingly, we analyze the defendants’ sentencing challenges under the Guidelines provisions applicable at the time of their sentencing. 36 risk, he did not steal from them outright, had not led a lavish lifestyle, and was a first‐time offender. The district court determined that a substantial sentence was nonetheless necessary because of the severity of Rivernider’s conduct and the resulting devastation caused to his former clients. Rivernider argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because he was a first‐time offender, has strong family ties, did not begin the NMB program with the intent to steal money, and engaged in significant investment activity, and because a short sentence is sufficient to deter white collar crime. We disagree. The district court considered all of these arguments in sentencing Rivernider to a below‐Guidelines term of imprisonment, and acted well within its discretion in determining Rivernider’s sentence.