Opinion ID: 2441011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Disclosure and Suppression Issues

Text: Skillicorn first contends that a statement made by Nicklasson to FBI Special Agent Arthur McOmber was improperly excluded as hearsay. He argues that the statement was admissible as an admission against Nicklasson's penal interest. Agent McOmber testified at a pretrial hearing that Nicklasson told him: They got out of the car. They walked Mr. Nicklasson walked with Mr. Drummond at gunpoint off into an area. Mr. Nicklasson stated he initially was intending to tie Mr. Drummond up and take his car and leave him out there in the area tied up. As he walked, he said he, quote, snapped, that he was so angry at the entire situation. He said something inside of him told him to do it, do it, and he was worried about that feeling that he was getting. So he kept trying to change the subject, kept trying to change his thoughts, and he talked to Mr. Drummond about his military service. They continued walking. Eventually Mr. Nicklasson told Mr. Drummond to kneel down. And one of the things that Mr. Nicklasson explained that made him so frustrated or mad is that Mr. Drummond was so submissive, that he never made any gesture whatsoever to try and flee or run away or even talk his way out of the situation, and Mr. Nicklasson stated that had Mr. Drummond done any of those things that maybe he might not have shot him or killed him, that maybe he would have left him there. A hearsay statement is any out-of-court statement that is used to prove the truth of the matter asserted and which depends upon the veracity of the statement for its value. State v. Sutherland, 939 S.W.2d 373 (Mo. banc 1997). Such statements are generally inadmissible unless they fall within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Id. Before Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), Missouri courts held that declarations made by an unavailable witness against that witness's penal interest were not admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule in criminal proceedings. State v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Mo. banc 1992). Chambers , however, recognized a constitutional right to proffer statements that would exonerate the defendant and were originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances that provided considerable assurance of their reliability.  410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. at 1048 (emphasis added). The Chambers ' court set forth the following tests of reliability: (1) each confession was `in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest;' (2) each statement was spontaneously made to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder occurred; and (3) the statements were corroborated by other evidence. State v. Smulls, 935 S.W.2d 9, 21 (Mo. banc 1996) (citations omitted). The indicators of reliability delineated in Chambers are not present in this case. First, Nicklasson's statement was not in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest. Nicklasson's statement could merely be an attempt to exonerate himself of the requisite mental state for first degree murder. Second, the statement was neither spontaneous nor made to a close acquaintance shortly after the murder occurred. Instead, it was made to an FBI agent after the declarant had been arrested on October 5, 1994, nearly a month and a half after the murder. Finally, the statement was not corroborated by other evidence. Although Nicklasson claimed that he was intending to tie Mr. Drummond up and take his car and leave him out there in the area tied up, Skillicorn testified that Nicklasson did not carry anything with which to bind Mr. Drummond. The only thing Nicklasson held as he lead Mr. Drummond off towards the woods was a .22 caliber pistol. Neither the circumstances surrounding the statement nor the statement itself create considerable assurance of [its] reliability. Nicklasson's statement was properly excluded. Point One is denied.
Skillicorn next claims that the trial court erred by denying his request to examine the mental health reports or statements of his co-defendant, Allen Nicklasson. He argues this denial violated his rights under Rule 25, the Missouri Constitution, and the United States Constitution's Due Process Clause, Compulsory Process Clause, and Eighth Amendment. Skillicorn seeks, as remedy to the purported error, an in camera inspection of Nicklasson's mental health evaluations by the trial court or this Court to determine whether they contain evidence exculpating Skillicorn of the requisite mental state for first degree murder. The state argues that the mental health evaluation of Nicklasson is protected by the physician-patient privilege created by section 491.060(5), RSMo 1994. Usually, if medical records are disclosed to a third party, the privilege is waived as to the whole world. See State v. Lewis, 735 S.W.2d 183, 187 (Mo.App.1987). However, here, it appears the evaluation was performed at the state's instance pursuant to chapter 552, RSMo. We need not address the relation between mental health evaluations performed pursuant to chapter 552 and section 491.060's physician-patient privilege. The record in this case indicates the trial court performed an in camera inspection of the documents at issue and found them irrelevant to Skillicorn's defense. [2] Skillicorn has already obtained the remedy he seeks. Point Four is denied.
Skillicorn claims the trial court erred in admitting video footage, and photographs of Mr. Drummond's body in an advanced state of decomposition. Skillicorn contends that there was no question as to Drummond's identity, the identity of the shooter, or the manner of death. He asserts the video and photographs possessed no probative value and were admitted into evidence solely to arouse the emotions of the jurors. The arguments posed by Skillicorn were considered and rejected in State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 10 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991). There the Court stated: The trial court is vested with broad discretion in the admission of photographs. Photographs, although gruesome, may be admitted where they show the nature and location of wounds, where they enable the jury to better understand the testimony, and where they aid in establishing any element of the state's case. Photographs are also relevant when they depict the condition and location of the body. [A] photograph is not rendered inadmissible because other evidence may have described what is shown in the photograph; nor is the state precluded from introducing the photograph because the defendant expresses a willingness to stipulate to some of the issues involved. Id. The same considerations pertain to video evidence. The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Exhibits 18, 20, 21, 26, and V-1. Points Nine and Ten are denied.
Skillicorn contends the trial court erred by admitting evidence of several crimes committed by Skillicorn and Nicklasson after Mr. Drummond's execution. After Nicklasson shot Mr. Drummond, Skillicorn, Nicklasson, and DeGraffenreid drove the stolen vehicle to a mutual friend's house in Blue Springs. Keri McEntee came to that house seeking DeGraffenreid. Upon her arrival, Skillicorn and Nicklasson came out of the house and Nicklasson accused McEntee of messing with their car. Both Skillicorn and Nicklasson obtained firearms from the trunk of Mr. Drummond's car and held them to McEntee's head. Nicklasson said he would not hesitate to kill her. The home owner then came out of his house, whereupon, Skillicorn and Nicklasson left. Skillicorn claims this evidence was improperly admitted because it was evidence of other crimes and because the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Criminal defendants have the right to be tried only for the offense for which they are charged. State v. Hornbuckle, 769 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 860, 110 S.Ct. 171, 107 L.Ed.2d 128 (1989). The general rule concerning the admission of evidence of uncharged crimes, wrongs, or acts is that evidence of prior uncharged misconduct is inadmissible for the purpose of showing the propensity of the defendant to commit such crimes. State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. banc 1993). To be admissible, proof of the commission of another crime or other crimes must have some legitimate tendency to prove that the accused committed the crime for which he is being tried. State v. Buxton, 324 Mo. 78, 22 S.W.2d 635, 636 (1929). It is clearly not admissible on the theory that, if a person will commit one offense, he will commit another. Id., 22 S.W.2d at 637. The evidence must also be legally relevant, in that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial effect. The balancing of the effect and value of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d 10, 13 (Mo. banc 1993) (citations omitted). This Court in Buxton noted some particular cases and scenarios in which evidence of other crimes helped to prove that the accused committed the crime for which he was charged, and was, therefore, admissible. In a 1938 opinion, this Court cited to Buxton stating that it had delineated five recognized exceptions. State v. Garrison, 342 Mo. 453, 116 S.W.2d 23, 24 (1938). Those exceptions provide for the admission of evidence that tends to establish motive, intent, the absence of mistake or accident, or a common scheme or plan. Id. We have also permitted the admission of other crimes evidence to show the circumstances or the sequence of events surrounding the offense charged, State v. Wacaser, 794 S.W.2d 190, 194 (Mo. banc 1990); State v. Flenoid, 838 S.W.2d 462, 467 (Mo.Ct.App.1992); State v. Davis, 806 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Mo.Ct.App.1991), and to help present a complete and coherent picture of the events that transpired. Flenoid, supra, at 467. But these recognized exceptions were never meant to be an exclusive list within which evidence must necessarily fall in order to be admissible. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 13 (evidence of misconduct that does not fall within one of the five enumerated exceptions may nevertheless be admissible). Rather, the test has always been whether the evidence has some legitimate tendency to prove that the accused committed the crime for which he is being tried, Buxton, 22 S.W.2d at 636, and is more probative than prejudicial. Bernard, 849 S.W.2d at 13. [3] To prove Skillicorn guilty of first degree murder in this case, the state was required to show that, with the purpose of promoting or furthering the death of Richard Drummond, the defendant aided or encouraged Allen Nicklasson in causing the death of Richard Drummond and did so after deliberation. See MAI-CR3d 304.04. At trial, Skillicorn disputed the element of deliberation in the murder of Mr. Drummond. Skillicorn contended that he believed Nicklasson was going to take Mr. Drummond into the woods and somehow restrain him there and that Nicklasson's murder of Mr. Drummond was a complete surprise to him. The challenged evidence is a continuation of the sequence of events that presents a coherent picture of Skillicorn's crime. The events occurred only hours after Mr. Drummond's murder as Skillicorn and Nicklasson were making their escape west. Rather than an unrelated crime that might be used only to prejudice the jury, Skillicorn's participation in the threat to McEntee was particularly relevant and connected to the crime charged. It occurred only a few hours after the murder took place. Skillicorn and Nicklasson threatened McEntee's life with the same guns used in the perpetration of Mr. Drummond's murder. These actions were taken to protect the very object for which they had murdered Mr. Drummond, that is, his car. The jury could also infer from this evidence Skillicorn's murderous mental state during the period surrounding the charged murder and that he had no intention of distancing himself from Nicklasson's actions. If Skillicorn had not deliberately become involved with Mr. Drummond's murder, under the circumstances of this case, he likely could have distanced himself from, not overtly worked as a team with, one he knew to be the murderer. This evidence helped establish Skillicorn's deliberation on Mr. Drummond's murder, and that he aided Nicklasson in perpetrating the murder, both elements of the crime charged. We expressly recognized the use of other crimes evidence that was strongly connected to the charged crime to support the element of deliberation in State v. Kenley, 693 S.W.2d 79, 81-82 (Mo.1985); rev'd on other grounds, 937 F.2d 1298 (8th Cir.1991) (ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase for failure to present proper expert mitigating evidence). We stated: Mental state, in this case deliberation and premeditation, is rarely capable of direct proof, and that findings of deliberation and premeditation depend usually upon an inference reasonably drawn from the evidence and circumstances surrounding the act.... [The Defendant's] subsequent robberies and his statements that he had killed earlier and would kill again are also indicative of a deliberative state of mind.... Conduct before and after the commission of the charged crime is relevant where it relates to the elements of the charged crime. Id. Such mens rea evidence is admissible particularly where different inferences may fairly and reasonably be drawn regarding the intent with which the alleged criminal act was done or where the surrounding circumstances are such as to be susceptible of an interpretation indicating innocence. State v. Shilkett, 356 Mo. 1081, 204 S.W.2d 920, 923 (1947) (citing State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397, 207 S.W. 809 (1918) (where the evidence tending to show arson was entirely circumstantial and the fire was susceptible of explanation as accidental); State v. Fischer, 297 Mo. 164, 249 S.W. 46, 49 (1923) (embezzlement, where the act charged was susceptible of an innocent explanation); State v. Patterson, 271 Mo. 99, 196 S.W. 3, 6 (1917) (robbery by extortion, where the circumstances of the act were susceptible of an interpretation indicating innocence)); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, UNCHARGED MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE § 5:01 (1996) ([T]he courts are most liberal in admitting evidence to prove mens rea.). The evidence was both logically and legally relevant to establish the crime for which Skillicorn was charged. Skillicorn also challenges the admission of evidence of subsequent burglaries and a robbery he and Nicklasson committed while on the run after the murder. The transcript contains no contemporaneous objection to the evidence of subsequent burglaries. The only somewhat contemporaneous objection challenged the procedure by which the state sought do admit the confession, and was made during the playback of several portions of Skillicorn's confession. No contemporaneous objection of any kind was made at the time the portion of the confession revealing such evidence was played for the jury. The defense made a continuing objection as to testimony regarding any statements Skillicorn made based on a motion... in limine regarding other crimes, before the relevant portions of the confession were played. However, the motion in limine challenges only evidence of other crimes alleged to have been committed by the defendant in Arizona and California. The transcript indicates that the portion of the confession Skillicorn here challenges referred to burglaries and a robbery committed before the pair arrived in Arizona and California. Thus, the alleged error was not preserved. [4] Under plain error review, Rule 30.20, Skillicorn has failed to show that admission of such evidence so violated his rights that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted. Parker, 886 S.W.2d at 917. Skillicorn alleges the trial court also erred in admitting two postcards sent by Skillicorn and Nicklasson from Houck, Arizona, during their flight west. Both postcards depicted cowboys on horses. Both postcards bore the same postage cancellation date, time, and place. Nicklasson's postcard read: Outlaws on the run, love you much, still would love to have hot heavy sex. Say hi to everyone. Hope you enjoyed the meal. It was signed OutlawsLove R.I.P. Skillicorn's postcard read: from a friend you only met once getting from one place to another See if this card reminds you of any one you know. Both were addressed to Annie Wyatt in Blue Springs, Missouri. Evidence presented at trial showed that Wyatt was an acquaintance of Nicklasson and that Skillicorn and Nicklasson had taken her and some of her friends to the Blue Springs Country Kitchen the evening of Mr. Drummond's murder. Skillicorn claims these were hearsay and were inadmissible evidence of other crimes. The transcript shows that these postcards were not admitted for the truth of their contents. Rather, they were admitted to show that Skillicorn and Nicklasson were acting together, that they were a team. As such, they were not inadmissible hearsay and were probative of the issue for which they were presented. Points Seven and Eighteen are denied.
Skillicorn alleges reversible error because his confession was improperly admitted in that 1) the warnings he received were inadequate; 2) he was promised leniency in return for his confession; 3) the trial court failed to make adequate findings of fact concerning whether his statement was voluntary; 4) he was illegally interrogated prior to receipt of Miranda warnings and, therefore, the statement should be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree; and 5) under the totality of all the circumstances the confession was involuntary. Grounds 1), 2), and 3) were not preserved below. We review them for plain error only. Rule 30.20. In order for Skillicorn to have voluntarily waived his rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning, his choice must have been uncoerced, and he must have been aware of his rights and the potential consequences of abandoning them. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 573, 107 S.Ct. 851, 856, 93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987). Voluntariness depends on the absence of police overreaching, not on the mental ability of the defendant to make a `choice.' State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 650 (Mo. banc 1993) (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522-23, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). The determination of police overreaching depends on the circumstances, including the defendant's physical and mental state, and length of questioning. Spring, supra, 479 U.S. at 573-74, 107 S.Ct. at 857; Connelly, supra, 479 U.S. at 170, 107 S.Ct. at 523. Skillicorn was read his Miranda rights before he made the statement that was used against him at trial. The following discussion took place between FBI Agent McOmber and Skillicorn prior to Skillicorn's confession: SKILLICORN: Is that the formality? MCOMBER: No, that's not formality. That's just to make sure I don't say something I shouldn't say. Basically, all we have here, you've seen the movies where you gotta make sure people understand their rights and this is all that is. I usually like to read this to the people and I like them to understand that and then we talk about it to make sure you exactly understand what's going on, okay. Uh, `cause like, uh, Dale said we, we've been straight up with you so far and that's how we're gonna be.' Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your Rights. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT. ANYTHING YOU SAY CAN BE USED AGAINST YOU IN COURT. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO TALK TO A LAWYER FOR ADVICE BEFORE WE ASK YOU ANY QUESTIONS, AND HAVE A LAWYER WITH YOU DURING QUESTIONING. IF YOU CANNOT AFFORD A LAWYER, ONE WILL BE APPOINTED FOR YOU, uh, BEFORE ANY QUESTIONING IF YOU WISH. IF YOU DECIDE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW WITHOUT A LAWYER PRESENT, YOU CAN STILL HAVE THE RIGHT TO STOP ANSWERING ANY TIME YOU ALSO HAVE THE RIGHT TO STOP ANSWERING ANY TIME TILL YOU TALK TO A LAWYER. And why don't you go ahead and read this portion right here to make sure you understand that. SKILLICORN: I read this statement of my rights and I understand what the rights are. I'm willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know I am doingknow what I'm doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressures or certain MCOMBER: Coercion. SKILLICORN: coercion of any kind has been, uh, used against me. MCOMBER: Okay, sign right there. Formality out of the way. Skillicorn signed an advice of rights form, did not ask for an attorney, and did not, at any time, request to terminate the interview. Skillicorn insists that because he could not properly pronounce the word coercion and because no one offered to explain the meaning of that word, his statement was not properly warned and was not voluntary. The terms pressure and coercion used in this context mean essentially the same thing. Moreover, Skillicorn's mental ability to make a choice is not the measure of voluntariness. Connelly, supra, at 169-70, 107 S.Ct. at 522-24; State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641, 650 (Mo. banc 1993). [M]ental condition, by itself and apart from its relation to official coercion, should [n]ever dispose of the inquiry into constitutional `voluntariness.' Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 164, 107 S.Ct. at 520. Nor can the agent's statement that the waiver form was a formality, without more, be considered overreaching. A confession extracted by a direct or implied promise of leniency is inadmissible. State v. Chandler, 605 S.W.2d 100, 116 (Mo. banc 1980). But the record belies Skillicorn's claim that agents offered him leniency in return for his statement. Skillicorn points to the following exchange as an implied promise of leniency: SKILLICORN: I don't, I'm debatin' whether or not I want to discuss that... or not, you know. I mean I'm just debatin' it. Because I already know basically that, uh, beyond a reasonable doubt, uh, regardless of what I say, I'm convicted, okay. I mean let's be real, MCOMBER: So what can you do to help this situation? SKILLICORN: you know. . . . . . MCOMBER: Like you just said, obviously, we would not be sitting here if we didn't have evidence against you. And ... I think I'm gonna try and help you understand here right now is that you are in a position to be the utmost ... for yourself.... . . . . . SKILLICORN: The only thing you can do is execute me and you're gonna do that regardless of what I say at this table. MCOMBER: No, that's not the truth ... That's not true. SKILLICORN: what's gonna motivate me to go into detail about anything? MCOMBER: The, courts are only concerned with three things. They're concerned, first of all right off the bat, are you cooperative. Do you have a feeling of remorse for what's happened and that's evident, you obviously do. Two, are you willing to come clean and, and, and clear up this whole matter. The truth is what the court sees. That's all they see. And you're in a position right now, Dennis, where you can provide us with more.. with the truth.... Now, I can understand your frustrations and feeling that ... nothing you can do that'll help you.... We believe differently because of the system.... There was no implicit or explicit promise of possible leniency or mitigation of punishment. If defendant had a hope of leniency, that hope sprang `from the seeds of his own planting [and] is not sufficient to render the resulting confession inadmissible.' State v. Hunter, 456 S.W.2d 314, 321 (Mo.1970) (citations omitted). At most the statements of the interviewing agents were encouragement to cooperate with the courts and law enforcement agencies. General encouragement to cooperate is far different from specific promises of leniency. United States v. Pelton, 835 F.2d 1067, 1073 (4th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1010, 108 S.Ct. 1741, 100 L.Ed.2d 204 (1988); State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336-37 (Mo. banc 1991). We also reject Skillicorn's claim that the trial court did not make adequate findings of fact concerning the voluntariness of his confession. The court overruled the motion to suppress Skillicorn's statement and stated: I went through the exhibits you offered at length. Mr. Skillicorn went through his travels or activities. And it's obvious to me it's voluntary based upon reading the statement I have or the exhibit I have. The finding here that the defendant voluntarily made statements is sufficient to support overruling the motion to suppress. A judge need not make any particular formal finding. The only prerequisite is that the trial court's conclusions make unmistakably clear that the confession is voluntary. If one is informed of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and understands his right to remain silent under Miranda, and thereafter makes voluntary statements, it is absurd to say that such person has not made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to remain silent. State v. Schnick, supra at 336 (citing Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 541-43, 87 S.Ct. 639, 642, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967)). Similarly, Skillicorn's claim that the statement was inadmissible because it was the fruit of an unwarned interrogation commencing before the recorded portion of his statement fails for at least two reasons. First, there is no indication that anything more than casual conversation commenced before the recorded statement. Second, even if Skillicorn had been questioned before the recorded statement at issue, [i]n the absence of some coercion by police in obtaining the original statement, the `fruit of the poisonous tree' doctrine has no application. Id. at 337. There is no evidence of coercion prior to or during the recorded statement. Finally, Skillicorn asserts that even if each of these claimed violations alone does not amount to reversible error, the totality of the circumstances mandates reversal. There is nothing to suggest any basis for a finding of police overreaching in the present record. Id. The State has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's statements made while in custody were voluntarily given. Absent a showing of special circumstances, the State need only make a prima facie showing of voluntariness. State v. Wood, 596 S.W.2d 394, 402 (Mo. banc 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 876, 101 S.Ct. 221, 66 L.Ed.2d 98 (1980) (citing State v. Olds, 569 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. banc 1978); State v. Nolan, 423 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1968)). The state sustained its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant's statements were given voluntarily. Schnick, supra at 337. Point Thirteen is denied.
Skillicorn next claims the trial court erred in refusing to admit portions of his confession that he sought to present as evidence absolving him of the murder. During his confession, Skillicorn related that he and Nicklasson shot rattlesnakes for sport while in Arizona and that the snakes were the first thing I ever shot in my life. The trial court ruled that evidence inadmissible. Because Skillicorn failed to include this claim in his motion for new trial, it is reviewed here for plain error, only. Rule 30.20. The rule of completeness seeks to ensure that a statement is not admitted out of context. The rule is violated only when admission of the statement in an edited form distorts the meaning of the statement or excludes information that is substantially exculpatory to the declarant. See State v. Collier, 892 S.W.2d 686, 695 (Mo.Ct.App. 1994). The statement in dispute was not substantially exculpatory. The state never sought to prove that Skillicorn actually shot Mr. Drummond. Thus, that Skillicorn had never shot anything before the rattlesnake was not substantially exculpatory. Indeed, it was basically irrelevant to the inquiry. The failure to admit this statement does not rise to the level of manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice.... State v. Parker, supra, at 917. Point Fourteen is denied.
Skillicorn contends that the trial court committed reversible error by admitting the medical examiner's testimony in which he opined that, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, a person would die within eight days without water. We disagree. The trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence where the issue is relevancy. State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 867 (Mo. banc 1996). Because expert testimony is always fraught with questions of relevancy and competency, the decision to admit expert conclusions is a matter of trial court discretion that will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Copeland, 928 S.W.2d 828, 837 (Mo. banc 1996) (citing State v. Davis, 814 S.W.2d 593, 603 (Mo. banc 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1047, 112 S.Ct. 911, 116 L.Ed.2d 812 (1992)). The testimony was both logically and legally relevant. Skillicorn argued in his opening statement that he believed Nicklasson was going to tie Mr. Drummond up and leave him in the woods. Skillicorn asserted that this negated the necessary element of deliberation by him on the murder of Mr. Drummond. The medical examiner's testimony that Mr. Drummond would, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, die of dehydration within eight days was relevant to contradict the negative inference raised by the defense's theory. Moreover, where the defendant has injected an issue into the case, the State may be allowed to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to explain or counteract a negative inference raised by the issue defendant injects. State v. Lingar, 726 S.W.2d 728, 734-35 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 206, 98 L.Ed.2d 157 (1987). The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Point Fifteen is denied.
Skillicorn challenges the admission of certain testimony by FBI Agent Arthur McOmber. The prosecutor asked Do you have an opinion whether suspects accused of criminal activity, sir, downplay their involvement in that particular offense. McOmber answered: Yes. That's quite often the case. We call it minimizing. They minimize their involvement. Skillicorn advances a two-pronged attack on this testimony. He claims that 1) it was improper testimony on issues of witness credibility, and 2) the expert testimony was on a matter within the general realm of common experience of the members of the jury. McOmber's testimony was a statement of how suspects generally respond. It was generic. As such, it was not testimony directly impugning Skillicorn's credibility. It was not error on that basis. Nor did the trial court commit error by admitting the statement because it was within the realm of the jury's common experience. Skillicorn's authority for this proposition purportedly found in State v. Lawhorn, 762 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. banc 1988), is inapposite. That case merely states that a defendant does not have a right to expert testimony when such testimony reiterates what the jury would know by general experience. Certainly, evidence should be excluded if it unnecessarily diverts the attention of the jury from the question to be decided. But it is within the trial court's sound discretion whether to admit an expert's testimony. State v. Taylor, 663 S.W.2d 235, 239 (Mo. banc 1984) (citing State v. White, 621 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Mo.1981)). The testimony given by FBI Agent McOmber came from his special knowledge as a career law enforcement officer, not from the realm of common experience shared by the members of the jury. Moreover, even if admission of the testimony had been error, Skillicorn fails to demonstrate how such testimony was so prejudicial that it deprived [him] of a fair trial. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 761 (Mo. banc 1996) (quoting State v. McMillin, 783 S.W.2d 82, 98 (Mo. banc 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 881, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 179 (1990)). Point Sixteen is denied.