Opinion ID: 3063274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Error in Plea Colloquy

Text: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that, before a court accepts a plea of guilty, it must inform the defendant of any maximum possible penalty, including a term of supervised release, and any mandatory minimum penalty. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(H), (I). Because Votta failed to object to any alleged error under Rule 11 before the district court, we review for plain error. See United States v. Bejarano, 249 F.3d 1304, 1306 (11th Cir. 2001) (per curiam). Under plain-error review, the defendant has the burden to show that there was plain error that affected his substantial rights. United States v. Turner, 474 F.3d 1265, 1276 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). An error affects a defendant’s substantial rights if there is “a reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have entered the plea.” United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 2 542 U.S. 74, 83, 124 S. Ct. 2333, 2340 (2004). In addition, the error must seriously affect the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Turner, 474 F.3d at 1276 (citation and quotation omitted). In Bejarano, we held that the district court’s failure to inform the defendant of a minimum mandatory term of supervised release at the plea colloquy did not affect his substantial rights where (1) both the written plea agreement and the district court’s statement during the plea colloquy informed the defendant that his sentence would include a period of supervised release; (2) the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSI”) correctly stated that there was a minimum mandatory term of supervised release required by statute; and (3) the defendant failed to object to the PSI at sentencing. 249 F.3d at 1307; see also United States v. Carey, 884 F.2d 547, 549 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam) (holding that the defendant’s substantial rights were not affected where the district court failed to inform him during the plea colloquy of the potential period of supervised release under the Guidelines, but where the defendant did not object upon learning of this from the PSI and from the court at sentencing). We determined that the defendant’s conduct in failing to object indicated that his substantial rights were not affected. Bejarano, 249 F.3d at 1307. We recently upheld and applied Bejarano in the specific context of SORNA and its mandatory term of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. 3 § 3583(k). United States v. Brown, 586 F.3d 1342, 1345–47 (11th Cir. 2009). Here, the district court erred when it incorrectly advised Votta that he was subject to a term of supervised release of up to three years, when he was actually subject to a statutory minimum term of five years and a maximum of life. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k). Votta argues that he would not have pled guilty if he had known that there was a statutory minimum term, pointing to his statement to the district court at sentencing that in a prior state case, he had asked the court for a longer prison sentence to avoid a term of supervised release. However, the PSI set forth the correct terms of supervised release, but Votta did not object to this provision of the PSI. Furthermore, Votta did not object at sentencing after the district court expressly addressed his concerns over supervised release, indicated its reasons for imposing a ten-year term, and indicated that there was a mandatory minimum term of supervised release. Votta’s own conduct in failing to object at sentencing to the PSI, which correctly set forth the minimum and maximum terms of supervised release, indicates that his substantial rights were not affected, and, thus, the district court did not plainly err.