Opinion ID: 1791862
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: retroactivity of ring

Text: For a defendant to be sentenced to death in Florida, the judge must find sufficient aggravating circumstances to warrant the death penalty. See § 775.082, Fla. Stat. (2004); § 921.141, Fla. Stat. (2004). Johnson, whose jury recommended death by a vote of seven to five, received a death sentence after his trial judge found four aggravating factors. [2] Johnson now argues that his death sentence is unconstitutional in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), which held that a jury, not a judge, must find every fact upon which eligibility for the death penalty depends. We conclude, however, that Johnson may not invoke Ring. Applying the retroactivity analysis we announced in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d 922, 925 (Fla.1980), we hold that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida to defendants whose convictions already were final when that decision was rendered.
We begin by summarizing Ring and our response to it. In June 2002, the United States Supreme Court held in Ring that a jury, not a judge, must find beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to expose a defendant to a sentence of death. 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Ring was not a sudden or unforeseeable development in constitutional law; rather, it was an evolutionary refinement in capital jurisprudence. Monlyn v. State, 894 So.2d 832, 841 (Fla.2004) (Pariente, C.J., specially concurring). The Supreme Court merely applied the reasoning of another case, Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), to death penalty cases. In Apprendi, the Court had announced that [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Although Apprendi had excluded death penalty cases from its holding, id. at 497, 120 S.Ct. 2348, the Court concluded two years later in Ring that [c]apital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants... are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. 536 U.S. at 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428. Ring not only invalidated the judicial finding of aggravating factors in Arizona, id. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428, but also cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the death penalty laws of many other states, including Florida, where judges are partially or entirely responsible for deciding whether to sentence defendants to death. See id. at 608, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (stating that Florida has a hybrid system of capital sentencing, involving both judge and jury). Those states must now determine whether Ring requires minor or even major adjustments to their capital sentencing schemes. We first analyzed Ring's effect on Florida law in two plurality opinions, Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1070, 123 S.Ct. 662, 154 L.Ed.2d 564 (2002), and King v. Moore, 831 So.2d 143 (Fla.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1067, 123 S.Ct. 657, 154 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). Both opinions noted that the United States Supreme Court repeatedly has upheld Florida's capital sentencing scheme. Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695; King, 831 So.2d at 143. They also cited that Court's admonition that [i]f a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the [other court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917, 104 L.Ed.2d 526 (1989), quoted in Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695, and King, 831 So.2d at 143. Neither Bottoson nor King, however, garnered a majority. In fact, Chief Justice Pariente later recognized that we have not yet as a Court determined whether Ring has any applicability to Florida's death penalty scheme or if so, whether any aspect of that holding would be retroactive to cases already final. See Allen v. State, 854 So.2d 1255, 1263 (Fla.2003) (Pariente, J., specially concurring). As a result of this lack of consensus, virtually every postconviction appeal filed in this Court since Ring invokes that case. We repeatedly have denied such requests for clear lack of merit, while reserving judgment on whether Ring even affects Florida law or applies retroactively to postconviction cases. Usually the Ring claims have failed because the sentence was supported by an aggravating factor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, such as a prior violent felony conviction or a contemporaneous enumerated felony conviction. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 886 So.2d 965 (Fla.2004); Pietri v. State, 885 So.2d 245 (Fla.2004); Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766 (Fla.2004). We could easily dispose of Johnson's Ring claim in the same way because his death sentence was supported by an aggravating factor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt  namely, his prior convictions of two violent felonies. Johnson, 442 So.2d at 197. We choose to use this opportunity, however, to answer one of the underlying questions on which we have previously reserved judgment: whether Ring applies retroactively in Florida to defendants, such as Johnson, whose convictions already were final at the time of that decision. Only in concurring opinions has this issue been discussed at length. See, e.g., Windom v. State, 886 So.2d 915, 935 (Fla.2004) (Cantero, J., specially concurring) (concluding that Ring should not apply retroactively in Florida); Bottoson v. Moore, 833 So.2d 693, 717 (Fla.2002) (Shaw, J., concurring in result only) (concluding that Ring should apply retroactively in Florida). Yet in our recent decision in Monlyn, a majority consensus began to emerge. Two concurring opinions, joined by a total of five justices, expressed the view that Ring is not retroactive in Florida. Chief Justice Pariente, joined by Justice Quince, concluded that Ring does not apply retroactively to cases on postconviction review under the test of Witt.  Monlyn, 894 So.2d at 841. Justice Cantero, joined by Justices Wells and Bell, agreed that under the Witt test Ring does not apply retroactively, but urged that, in determining the retroactivity of cases emanating from the United States Supreme Court, this Court abandon Witt in favor of the more recent test announced in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Id. at 840. Using the analysis articulated in Witt, we now hold that Ring does not apply retroactively in Florida.
It is clear that new law announced by this Court or the United States Supreme Court applies to all non-final criminal cases  that is, to all cases involving convictions for which an appellate court mandate has not yet issued. See Smith v. State, 598 So.2d 1063, 1066 (Fla.1992) (holding that any decision of this Court announcing a new rule of law ... must be given retrospective application by the courts of this state in every case pending on direct review or not yet final), limited by Wuornos v. State, 644 So.2d 1000, 1008 n. 4 (Fla.1994) (reading Smith to mean that new points of law established by this Court shall be deemed retrospective with respect to all non-final cases unless this Court says otherwise). Whether newly announced rules of law apply to cases that already were final at the time of the announcement is a different question. We have recognized that once a conviction has been upheld on appeal, the State acquires a strong interest in finality: The importance of finality in any justice system, including the criminal justice system, cannot be understated. It has long been recognized that, for several reasons, litigation must, at some point, come to an end. In terms of the availability of judicial resources, cases must eventually become final simply to allow effective appellate review of other cases. There is no evidence that subsequent collateral review is generally better than contemporaneous appellate review for ensuring that a conviction or sentence is just. Moreover, an absence of finality casts a cloud of tentativeness over the criminal justice system, benefiting neither the person convicted nor society as a whole. Witt, 387 So.2d at 925; see also United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 184 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 L.Ed.2d 805 (1979) (noting that [i]nroads on the concept of finality tend to undermine confidence in the integrity of our procedures). To override the State's interest in finality every time a new rule is decided would ... destroy the stability of the law, render punishments uncertain and therefore ineffectual, and burden the judicial machinery of our state ... beyond any tolerable limit. Witt, 387 So.2d at 929-30. Thus, when deciding whether a decision containing new law applies retroactively, the fundamental consideration is the balancing of the need for decisional finality against the concern for fairness and uniformity in individual cases. State v. Callaway, 658 So.2d 983, 986 (Fla.1995). The United States Supreme Court first established standards for retroactivity in Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965). Linkletter considered the retroactivity of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), which applied the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule to the states. In determining whether Mapp applied retroactively, the Court adopted a three-part test that considered (a) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (b) the extent of reliance on the prior rule, and (c) the effect that retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. Id. at 636-40, 85 S.Ct. 1731. Under that test, the Court decided that Mapp would apply only to subsequent trials. Id. Two years later, in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), the Court again applied the three Linkletter factors, cementing their status as the controlling federal test. We incorporated Linkletter into our own retroactivity analysis in Witt v. State, 387 So.2d at 925. Witt held that a change in the law does not apply retroactively in Florida  unless the change: (a) emanates from this Court or the United States Supreme Court, (b) is constitutional in nature, and (c) constitutes a development of fundamental significance. Id. at 931. We explained that a development of fundamental significance is one that place[s] beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties, or alternatively is of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter.  Id. at 929. By permitting the retroactive application of new rules only in these limited circumstances, we declare[d] our adherence to the limited role for postconviction relief proceedings, even in death penalty cases. Id. at 927. Nine years after we decided Witt, the United States Supreme Court began to turn away from Linkletter. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). While acknowledging that new rules of constitutional law should apply to every case pending on direct appeal, the Teague plurality concluded that they should not apply retroactively to postconviction cases unless (1) they place conduct beyond the power of the government to proscribe, or (2) they announce a watershed rule of criminal procedure that is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. Id. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060. Less than a year later, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), the Court adopted Teague's retroactivity analysis as its majority view. Applying the test for retroactivity under Teague, the United States Supreme Court recently held in Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004), that Ring does not apply retroactively for purposes of federal law. But Summerlin does not control our decision. As courts in other states have noted, state courts are not bound by Teague in determining the retroactivity of decisions. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1014, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983) (acknowledging that [s]tates are free to provide greater protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires); Colwell v. State, 118 Nev. 807, 59 P.3d 463, 470 (2002) (noting that [w]e may choose to provide broader retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal procedure than Teague and its progeny require); Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 514, 517 (S.D.1990) (noting that states may decide how to provide access to state postconviction relief). We continue to apply our longstanding Witt analysis, which provides more expansive retroactivity standards than those adopted in Teague. We nevertheless conclude that, even under Witt, Ring does not apply retroactively.
The holding of Ring clearly satisfies the first two prongs of Witt because the United States Supreme Court issued a new rule that is constitutional in nature. 387 So.2d at 930. Ring's retroactivity therefore depends on the third prong: whether the new rule constitutes a development of fundamental significance. Id. In Witt, we clarified that most developments of fundamental significance fall within two categories: changes which place beyond the authority of the state the power to regulate certain conduct or impose certain penalties, and those which are of sufficient magnitude to necessitate retroactive application as ascertained by the three-fold test of Stovall and Linkletter.  Id. at 929. Ring does not fall within the first category because it does not prohibit the government from criminalizing certain conduct or imposing certain penalties. Thus, the question is whether Ring is of sufficient magnitude to require retroactive application under three factors: (a) the purpose to be served by the rule, (b) the extent of reliance on the prior rule, and (c) the effect that retroactive application of the new rule would have on the administration of justice. Id. at 926. [3] We address each factor in turn.
The first factor under Witt is the purpose to be served by the new rule. Id. The United States Supreme Court noted in Summerlin that its holding in Ring was not a substantive change to the law, but rather a prototypical procedural rule[], in that it regulates the manner in which culpability is determined but does not alter the range of conduct or class of persons that the law punishes. 124 S.Ct. at 2523. The Court also determined that Ring does not change the elements of the offense of murder punishable by death, and does not greatly enhance the fairness or accuracy of death penalty proceedings. See id. at 2524-26. Regarding the latter concern, the Court noted that because the burden of proof in Arizona for aggravating factors found by the trial court was beyond a reasonable doubt, the requirement of Apprendi that facts authorizing an increased sentence be found beyond a reasonable doubt was not at issue in Ring. Id. at 2522 n. 1. Florida law also requires that aggravating factors in death penalty cases be established beyond a reasonable doubt. See Rogers v. State, 783 So.2d 980, 992-93 (Fla.2001). The Supreme Court cautioned in Ring that its determination of who decides whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of potential factfinders. 536 U.S. at 607, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Court subsequently stated in Summerlin that for every argument why juries are more accurate factfinders, there is another why they are less accurate. 124 S.Ct. at 2525. Applying the Teague test, the Court concluded that [w]hen so many presumably reasonable minds continue to disagree over whether juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot confidently say that judicial factfinding seriously diminishes accuracy. Id. Deferring to the United States Supreme Court's assessment of its own decision in Ring, we conclude that the purpose of the new rule does not support retroactivity. [4] The purpose of the new rule in Ring is to conform criminal procedure to the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, and not to enhance the fairness or efficiency of death penalty procedures. In Williams v. State, 421 So.2d 512, 515 (Fla.1982), we refused to apply a rule retroactively in part because it did not involve an attack on the fairness of the trial. As we recognized in Witt, new rules generally will not warrant retroactive application in the absence of fundamental and constitutional law changes which cast serious doubt on the veracity or integrity of the original trial proceeding. 387 So.2d at 929. Ring casts no such doubt. The first Witt factor therefore disfavors retroactive application.
The second Witt factor is the extent of reliance on the old rule. Id. at 926. Like the first factor, this one weighs heavily against retroactive application of Ring. Florida has relied to an immeasurably large extent on its capital sentencing scheme. Since Florida's reinstatement of the death penalty in 1972, hundreds of defendants have been sentenced to death employing the procedures in section 921.141, Florida Statutes, that call upon the jury only to render an advisory sentence by majority vote. Fifty-nine defendants have been executed. See Fla. Dep't of Corrections, Death Row Fact Sheet, available at http://www.dc.state. fl.us/oth/deathrow/ index.html. Our situation is very different, for example, from the one the Missouri Supreme Court faced when it applied Ring retroactively. That court concluded that only five collateral cases would potentially be affected. See State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253, 269 (Mo.2003). [5] In contrast, about 367 defendants currently reside on Florida's Death Row. Florida's reliance on its capital sentencing scheme has been entirely in good faith. The United States Supreme Court has examined and upheld Florida's capital sentencing statute for more than a quarter of a century. See Bottoson, 833 So.2d at 695 (citing cases). In Apprendi, decided two years before Ring, the Supreme Court specifically excluded death penalty cases from its holding and confirmed the validity of its prior decision upholding Arizona's sentencing scheme, Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). Based on all of the information available at the time of Ring, Florida had every reason to believe that its capital sentencing scheme was constitutionally sound and worthy of reliance. We still have not held otherwise. That Florida has reasonably relied on its longstanding capital sentencing scheme is an important factor weighing against the retroactive application of Ring. See Williams, 421 So.2d at 515 (It was reasonable... to rely upon [the old] law. That significant reliance has been placed on the old rule is an important factor supporting [exclusively] prospective application of the new rule.); State v. Towery, 204 Ariz. 386, 64 P.3d 828, 835 (2003) (concluding under the Linkletter test that the [Arizona] justice system's good faith reliance on Walton v. Arizona weighs against retroactivity).