Opinion ID: 2188128
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof in Post-Conviction Proceedings

Text: There is little direct authority on the question of who bears the burden of proof in post-conviction proceedings as to the prejudice prong of an ineffective assistance claim based on counsel's failure to object to restraints, where the effect of that failure is to deny the defendant a hearing on the particularized need for some form of restraint. The principal federal authority squarely addressing the burden of proving prejudice from counsel's failure to object to restraints is Marquard v. Sec'y for the Dep't of Corr., 429 F.3d 1278, 1313 (11th Cir.2005), which concluded that the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in Deck did not address, much less alter, the burden and different required prejudice showing on Marquard's IAC shackling claim. We addressed this issue in Stephenson II, where we noted the absence of proof of a need to impose restraints on Stephenson at his trial. In reviewing the post-conviction court's factual determinations under a clearly erroneous standard, we found that the record included evidence of a death threat to a witness and indications of organized criminal activity, and upheld the post-conviction court's finding that in view of all the circumstances surrounding this case and this Defendant, including the extremely violent nature of the murders committed, the use of the electronic restraint belt was warranted, reasonable and necessary under these circumstances. Stephenson II, 864 N.E.2d at 1040-41. We took these findings by the post-conviction court as a determination that the circumstances surrounding Stephenson's trial were such that shackling would have been ordered, and concluded that on the record before the post-conviction court that finding was not clearly erroneous. Id. We noted that in a direct appeal Deck shifted the burden to the state to prove harmlessness of shackling without a specific-needs inquiry. Id. at 1038. We concluded that in post-conviction proceedings the petitioner nevertheless retained the burden of showing a reasonable probability of a different result, quoting Marquard, 429 F.3d at 1313. In Stephenson III, the federal district court viewed the evidence of threats and organized crime as relevant only to the crime itself, and not to the issue of trial security. 2009 WL 1886081 at . The court then took the absence of evidence in the post-conviction hearing as establishing the lack of need for restraints, effectively placing the burden on the State to demonstrate a need for restraint in regards to the post-conviction claim for relief. Id. Stephenson III thus appears to be inconsistent with my view of the burden of proof in post-conviction proceedings, but I find no other contrary authority, and respectfully adhere to the view adopted in Stephenson II. I find only a few state cases squarely addressing the question of burden of proof of prejudice from counsel's failure to object to restraints, and the sparse authority seems consistent with our opinion in Stephenson II. The Georgia Supreme Court recently rejected a post-conviction claim of ineffective assistance for failure to object to shackles. The court noted that on direct appeal there was a presumption of harm that the State must rebut beyond a reasonable doubt, but a claim in post-conviction requires a showing of a reasonable probability that the shackling affected the outcome of the trial. Whatley v. Terry, 284 Ga. 555, 668 S.E.2d 651, 663 (Ga.2008) (citing Marquard, 429 F.3d at 1312-14); see also Cedillos v. State, 250 S.W.3d 145, 154 (Tex.Ct.App.2008) (holding that because the record did not explain the reason for shackling, the court could not determine whether an objection would have been successful, and there was therefore no showing that the outcome would have changed). In sum, I conclude that the presumption of prejudice from shackling is available at trial and on direct appeal, but in post-conviction proceedings the burden shifts to the defendant to establish substandard performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. A claim of ineffective assistance for failure to object therefore requires a showing of a reasonable probability that an objection, if raised, under the applicable law would have produced the absence of restraints or a reversible error in requiring restraints.