Opinion ID: 1057579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the alleged denial of mr. hester's right of self-representation

Text: Mr. Hester argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court unconstitutionally denied his request for permission to represent himself. The Court of Criminal Appeals found that the trial court's actions did not violate Mr. Hester's right of self-representation because he had not clearly and unequivocally asserted his right to proceed pro se. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . The Court of Criminal Appeals also noted that [t]he record does not reflect that the defendant objected to counsels' representation or reasserted his request to proceed pro se after Ms. Parton was permitted to withdraw and instead reflects that he proceeded to trial with Rich Heinsman as lead counsel and Lee Davis as second chair. State v. Hester, 2009 WL 275760, at . While we do not subscribe to the basis for the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision, we concur that the trial court did not unconstitutionally interfere with Mr. Hester's right of self-representation in this case. [9]
Mr. Hester's assertion of his right to self-representation must be considered in the rather convoluted context of his relationship with the lawyers who represented him in this case. As early as September 2000, Mr. Hester asked the trial court to appoint him another lawyer because he lacked confidence in William Donaldson, the assistant district public defender who had been assigned to represent him. Mr. Hester believed that Mr. Donaldson had lied to him. The trial court told Mr. Hester that Mr. Donaldson had been appointed to represent him and that he should endeavor to work with Mr. Donaldson. Following the State's decision to pursue the death penalty, the trial court appointed Mr. Heinsman, a Chattanooga lawyer, to represent Mr. Hester along with Mr. Donaldson. Three days later, the trial court designated Mr. Heinsman as Mr. Hester's lead counsel and Mr. Donaldson as co-counsel. On February 15, 2002, approximately two months following his appointment, Mr. Heinsman filed a sealed motion with the trial court requesting that the Office of the Public Defender be removed from its representation of Mr. Hester. [10] Mr. Donaldson took considerable offense. At a hearing conducted on February 19, 2002, Mr. Donaldson asserted that Mr. Heinsman had filed the motion in order to have one of his friends appointed co-counsel rather than Mr. Donaldson. Another public defender expressed concern that Mr. Heinsman had poisoned the Office of the Public Defender out of the case. To complicate matters further, the public defenders and the State requested the trial court to remove Mr. Heinsman from the case because he had arranged a meeting between Mr. Hester and Ms. Hester without their knowledge and because of the complications resulting from that meeting. The hearing resumed on February 25, 2002. During that hearing, the trial court learned that two persons working with Mr. Heinsman [11] had talked with Ms. Hester about her life with Mr. Hester and their efforts to keep [Mr. Hester] from getting the death penalty. In addition to making general offers of assistance with obtaining groceries or with transportation, they invited Ms. Hester to join them for dinner and then to accompany them to the McMinn County Justice Center to meet with Mr. Hester. Mr. Heinsman later joined his colleagues, and they asked Ms. Hester to help them find out how much of the events of December 14, 1999 Mr. Hester could remember. Ms. Hester accepted the dinner invitation and, following dinner, accompanied Mr. Heinsman and his two associates to the McMinn County Justice Center. Mr. Heinsman arranged for this meeting without consulting Mr. Donaldson. [12] By that time, the trial court had already decided to remove the Office of the Public Defender from the case. Based on the evidence presented at the hearing regarding the meeting between Ms. Hester and Mr. Hester and on its in camera review of a transcript of the recorded statements made by Mr. Hester, the trial court decided that Mr. Heinsman should also be removed from the case. The trial court's decision was based on the evidence that Mr. Heinsman had not consulted Mr. Donaldson about arranging for Ms. Hester to meet with Mr. Hester, the expressed concern that Mr. Hester's recorded statements which would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege, included inculpatory, as well as exculpatory, statements, and the possibility that Mr. Heinsman might be called to testify at trial. The trial court concluded that Mr. Heinsman's decision to permit his client to engage in an uncontrolled dialogue with one of the victims that would not be protected by the attorney-client privilege had created too much of a risk of future complications to permit Mr. Heinsman to continue representing Mr. Hester. Mr. Heinsman objected and sought permission to call Mr. Hester to testify regarding his desire to keep Mr. Heinsman as his lawyer. The trial court stated that Mr. Hester's testimony was not relevant and ruled from the bench on February 25, 2002 that Mr. Heinsman should be discharged as Mr. Hester's lawyer. On March 1, 2002, the court filed a written order removing Mr. Heinsman from the case. Mr. Hester promptly contested Mr. Heinsman's removal by filing a Tenn. R.App. P. 10 extraordinary appeal with the Court of Criminal Appeals on March 7, 2002. [13] On March 14, 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals entered an order staying proceedings in the trial court, including the removal of Mr. Heinsman. In an order entered on June 3, 2002, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court had improvidently discharged Mr. Heinsman and ordered that Mr. Heinsman be reinstated as Mr. Hester's lead counsel. On July 8, 2002, the trial court appointed Kim Parton as co-counsel for Mr. Hester. Little progress was made in the case over the course of the next year. During a June 9, 2003 hearing, the trial court expressed its disappointment with the performance of lead counsel for both the State and Mr. Hester. The trial court stated: I'm going to do a little talking here,... and I'm going to try to remain calm. But I want both of you gentlemen to know that you're very perilously close to trying the patience of the Court. There's been a lot of things, quite frankly, from both sides that I've not been very happy with that's been going on throughout the course of this trial. There are things I think each of you all have done to deliberately antagonize the other. None of that has helped this case, the progress of it under any way whatsoever. My main concern when I get a case is try to approach the case, and as rapidly as I can, [to] get this matter to trial, with both sides having the opportunity to do everything they need to do in order to properly prepare for the trial. I don't think that has happened in this case. And I understand at this point we've goteverybody's finger-pointing, saying it's the other side's fault. We're trying to do what we've got to do, but the other side won't do this and the other side won't do that. I understand my job is not supposed to be easy, and I've never pretended it ought to be. But none of this kind of antics on either side helps.... I don't think it helps any of us for the kind of transactions that we've had from both sides and the animosity that I see developing overand I know cases are complex, and nothing that I say in any way is to try to mitigate whatthe kind of case that Mr. Hester is facing. He faces the ultimate punishment. We've not dealt much with his case since this case has come out of grand jury. We've dealt with everything else, and Mr. Hester has sort of been off to the side. We're not in some ways any closer to getting this matter to trial than we were the day it came out of grand jury. And I'm at the point of being flustered from both sides, and I want everybody to understand that. The trial court requested the lawyers for both sides to work more professionally with each other. The trial court promised the parties that it would continue to be available to assist the lawyers in moving the case toward trial. Circumstances had not improved by the time of a hearing held on July 4, 2003. Reflecting upon a motion for recusal and on dueling motions to remove the District Attorney General's Office and Mr. Heinsman, the trial court decided to withdraw from the case and to request the appointment of a special judge. The trial court explained: I think the better procedure at this point is to get a judge who hasn't gone through all of this and belook at the case and listen to the facts on both sides.... I will call the administrative office and have a new judge appointed.... We may even try to call them today and explain the situation to them, have a judge appointed that can hear these things from a fresh standpoint. That may be what everybody needs. And certainly, if I've been any fault in moving this case, I apologize for that. But my interest from the beginning has been to move the case, and that hasn't happened. On July 21, 2003, the Chief Justice appointed a senior judge to replace the original trial judge. Just over one year after his appointment, the replacement trial judge had grown weary of Mr. Heinsman's dilatory conduct. During an August 6, 2004 hearing, the judge, addressing Mr. Heinsman, stated: I'm removing you from this case completely. You can't get ready for trial. You've drug your feet around here. I've set down a deadline for the case and you haven't followed it. The court reiterated, I've set down ... a scheduling order that has not been followed. This case has got to get to trial. The trial judge also permitted Mr. Hester to address the court regarding Mr. Heinsman's removal. Mr. Hester stated: I don't believe I can ... get a fair trial without Mr. [Heinsman]. He's been on my case long enough to know what's going on. He's ... worked with me. He's ... let me know everything that's going on as it's went.... Mr. [Heinsman] in my opinion is a fine lawyer. He's ... done ... what he set out to do, told me he was going to do.... I think he'd only been on the case for two months when they took and fired him because he was out there actually working for me. If you fire him, that's exactly what the State's been wanting to do all along, is get rid of Mr. ... Heinsman. Then ... somebody else can take this ... excuse ... the way I put this, but put their finger up their rear end.... At this juncture, the trial judge reconsidered removing Mr. Heinsman entirely from the case and suggested instead substituting Ms. Parton as lead counsel with Mr. Heinsman remaining as co-counsel. Ms. Parton and Mr. Heinsman conferred with Mr. Hester. They reported back to the court that client and counsel aren't interested in swapping roles. In response, the trial judge stated: Mr. Hester is pleased with his lawyer, pleased with Mr. Heinsman. But it's not up to Mr. Hester. It's up to me. Sure, if Mr. Heinsman can drag this thing out for 10 more years, I'd be pleased with him too. The trial court expressed its concerns about Mr. Heinsman's flagrant violations of scheduling orders and his attempts to delay the proceedings. During this discussion in open court, Mr. Hester blurted out, I don't think nobody would be more qualified than Mr. [Heinsman]. The court concluded that the case was never going to reach trial with Mr. Heinsman representing Mr. Hester. Accordingly, the court announced that Ms. Parton would take over as lead counsel and that he would take under advisement the issue of whether Mr. Heinsman would continue to represent Mr. Hester as second chair. In a written opinion filed on September 9, 2004, the trial court expanded on its reasons for replacing Mr. Heinsman with Ms. Parton. Among Mr. Heinsman's actions that the court found troubling were Mr. Heinsman's disregard of the scheduling orders and the inconsistencies and potentially misleading omissions in Mr. Heinsman's justifications for his many requests for continuances and extensions of time. Even though the trial court gave Mr. Heinsman numerous opportunities to address his concerns, Mr. Heinsman declined to respond. Eventually, and with great reluctance, the court decided to permit Mr. Heinsman to remain as co-counsel to Ms. Parton because Mr. Hester strongly wants Mr. Heinsman to stay on his case. Mr. Hester disagreed with the trial court's decision to remove Mr. Heinsman as lead counsel and wrote a series of letters directly to the court. In the first of these letters, Mr. Hester wrote that Mr. Heinsman did more for me in 6-8 weeks than [Mr.] Donaldson did in two years (more in two weeks, truth be known). [Mr. Heinsman] let me know every move[,] asked what I thought[,] explained the Whys + Why nots. He let me be involved in my case. He also wrote that Mr. Heinsman sto[o]d by me. Three years of fight. Three years of mud-slinging, name calling.... I don't know how he got all the work done he did. Mr. Hester concluded, [s]o if Mr. Rich Heinsman is not back on my case le[a]d attorney. I want to fire Mrs. Kim Parton. And represent myself. Because I believe Mrs. Parton is working with or for the DA's office.... I TRUST NO ONE but Rich Heinsman attorney at Law and that Mr. Heinsman had been the only one that's been stra[ight] up with me. Mr. Hester wrote a second letter to the trial court in two installments. [14] In the first installment dated October 27, 2004, Mr. Hester praised Mr. Heinsman and requested his reinstatement as lead counsel. [15] In the second portion of the letter, a postscript dated November 10, 2004, Mr. Hester announced his decision to fire both Mr. Heinsman and Ms. Parton and to represent himself. [16] On November 23, 2004, the trial court informed Mr. Hester that it was improper to correspond directly with the court. The court informed Mr. Hester that it had forwarded his letter to his lawyers and that the court would respond only to motions filed in accordance with the rules of court. On December 13, 2004, Mr. Heinsman and Ms. Parton filed a motion for instructions regarding Mr. Hester's request to represent himself, stating that they did not join the defendant's motion in substance, but have been instructed to bring this matter before the Court. During a January hearing on the motion for instructions, Mr. Hester explained that I've just found out within the last six months or ... so that the past three years they've not took and worked this case as to try to win it or anything, just... trying to get the death penalty off from me, which ... I feel they should not worry about that and work the case. I've ... been told they wasn't going to waste their time trying to defend me, that they are fighting against the death penalty. Not keeping in touch, or answering letters. They have not let me know what's going on, like when you fired Mr. Heinsman I didn't know he was even hired back up ... until a couple of days before after when we was suppose[d] to go to trial. The trial court also had an extensive discussion with Mr. Hester regarding his education and his lack of understanding of legal proceedings and the law. The trial court explained to Mr. Hester the problems with a defendant representing himself or herself, particularly in a complicated legal proceeding such as a capital case. The trial court also discussed with Mr. Hester some of his own limitations that would create complications for self-representation. Ultimately, the trial court decided not to allow Mr. Hester to represent himself. The court explained its reasoning as follows: It's obvious to the Court, I think it would be obvious to any judge that if this man were to represent himself it would be a catastrophe as far as his personal liberty is concerned, and so I'm going to leave the lawyers in the case. On February 10, 2005, the trial court conducted a second hearing on the issue of Mr. Hester's request to represent himself. The trial court stated that it had decided to reconsider its earlier decision and that it desired to hear from Mr. Hester again. The court again talked with Mr. Hester about his level of education and lack of legal experience, the charges against him and the sentences that could be imposed, the complexities of substantive and procedural law in handling a capital case both at the guilt and sentencing phase, and his constitutional rights with regard to electing whether to testify and to be represented by an attorney. The trial court informed Mr. Hester that he would be expected to proceed with the trial as of the scheduled trial date of March 8, 2005, less than one month away. In response, Mr. Hester stated that requiring him to be ready so quickly was unfair and improper. The trial court then inquired about Mr. Hester's desire to represent himself. This question prompted the following exchange: THE COURT: Do you understand that you have a right to be represented by counsel, by Ms. Parton and Mr. Heinsman? DEFENDANT HESTER: I'll not be represented by Ms. Parton. I'll represent myself. THE COURT: And it's your, it's your desire to give up the assistance of counsel and proceed without counsel and represent yourself. That's what you want to do. DEFENDANT HESTER: Unless I can get private counsel. THE COURT: Sir? DEFENDANT HESTER: Unless I can get private counsel between now and then. ... THE COURT: Now you had indicated that, that you were going to represent yourself unless you could hire an attorney in the meantime. DEFENDANT HESTER: Come up with a private attorney. I can't hire one, but if I can come up with a private attorney.... DEFENDANT HESTER: I, I feel I have to represent myself, because I've had insufficient THE COURT: No, no, I don't, I don't care what you have to do DEFENDANT HESTER: counsel for all along I've been in jail. ... THE COURT: I've told you this case is set for trial March 8th. Even going to trial on March 8th, you still want to represent yourself? DEFENDANT HESTER: Might as well. I'm going to be screwed either way, so ... ... DEFENDANT HESTER: They've not took andthey've went and spent three years fighting this death penalty, not trying to defend me. Ms. Parton says she will not, told me to my face, she would not waste her time trying to defend me. And that, in that ruling, I'll be better off representing myself, period. (Brief pause) They're fighting the death penalty. I've told them from the day one, I'm not worried about a death penalty. If I'm guilty, I deserve it, but fight the case, work the case. They've worked, they've ... THE COURT: Well, now you've just told me that representing yourself, that you'd have a hard time fighting this, the facts of the initial phase of this case. DEFENDANT HESTER: Right. I would. THE COURT: Well, don't you think they're going to have the same problem? DEFENDANT HESTER: Well, I've been in jail for five years. They've been on the streets. They could have took and done it. I mean, I ain't saying there's stuff out there. They may not have been able to, but theythere's things I've took and suggested, this, that, and the other, Can't be used in court. Great, it can't be used, but I've been told it can be used in a retrial. Then turns around, if it ain't used in, said in court, it can't be used in a retrial. That's contradicting itself. THE COURT: Mr. Hester, Mr. Hester ... DEFENDANT HESTER: I'll rep, I'll represent myself, sir. THE COURT: You almost DEFENDANT HESTER: Unless I can get a private lawyer. THE COURT: Well, are you, are you going to try to hire a private lawyer? DEFENDANT HESTER: I don't know. I don't, I don't see how I can. I ain't got ... THE COURT: Well, why do you think you, why do you think you need a private lawyer? DEFENDANT HESTER: I, I feel kind of strange that the State's paying somebody to represent me when the State's the one that's trying to kill me. It's sort of contradiction of, a contradiction of interest. ... THE COURT: And it's your desire that I appoint what is known as elbow counsel, someone to sit next to you and advise you, in case I grant your motion? DEFENDANT HESTER: According to what counsel it is. THE COURT: Now there you go trying to dictate to the Court again what I'm supposed to do and cannot do. DEFENDANT HESTER: You're asking me what I would like, yes or no. I'd like for Mr. Heinsman, if he wants to be my counsel, elbow counsel, yes. If it's Ms. Parton, I don't trust her. No.... Another attorney altogether would be fine too. In ruling upon Mr. Hester's motion, the trial court stated the following: Mr. Hester, it's almost a paradox for you to complain to the Court how long you've been on the case. Mr. Heinsman was your lead counsel, and every single time I tried to get you to trial, something would happen to frustrate that trial, and that's the reason Mr. Heinsman is not the lead counsel anymore. And then you come in here, and that's the only reason that you have filed this motion. You're upset because this Court relieved Mr. Heinsman. But I could not get Mr. Heinsman to get you to trial. And now the lawyer that you thought so much of, that you're now complaining because he hasn't got you to trial. I had this case set for trial twice... before, and every time something would come up. One time, he even had you an appointment at Vanderbilt on the date the trial was due to start. And you went along with all that. You was in court and heard it all. You had no objections to enter that time, not at all. And it's almost paradoxical to come here now and complain about being in jail for five years and not having a trial. Now you're not going to dictate to this Court. That's what you think you're doing. I think ... Mr. Hester, that ... you're almost to the point of playing with the system, and I'm as serious as any judge, any person in the world about the death penalty. It's not something to play with. It's not something that any person that's got any humane feeling about them at all enjoys seeing, or wants. But you're trying to play with the system because you didn't get your way with Mr. Heinsman who kept frustrating this Court trying to get this case to trial. And that's the bottom line. ... I was reading ... some cases ..., and I come across a case I thought ... hit home. It came out of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ... similar situation that we have here, and Judge Engel wrote a concurring opinion, except he reemphasized Judge Jones's opinion. [17] It says, In this, it seemed to me so, Judge Engel says, from a careful review of the record that this was a case in which the defendant in this case McDowell sought not the protection of the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel and to the right to represent oneself, but instead to manipulate a system designed for his own protection in order to gain advantage totally, from a totally unwarranted and unjust abuse of it. Mr. Hester didn't get his way with thishe got rid of one lawyer. He continued to complain about him. Then he didn't get his way here with Mr. Heinsman, and I don't think this is a matter of waiving counsel. I don't think it's a matter of constitutional rights. Mr. Hester is just a spoiled brat and he wants to come in here and play with this Court, and ... just to frustrate the process of this Court. That's all it is, Mr. Hester. You're not capable of representing yourself. You know that. ... The medical records in this case all have already been made a part of this record, and bear out the fact that.... Mr. Hester has a problem communicating physically and mentally. He loses his train[ ] of thought. It would be an absolute miscarriage of justice in this case for this Court to grant your request.... I said a while ago the State didn't care. They do. If they get someone on death row, they want to try to get them on there right, not by default. And you're trying to get on death row by default. And I don't, me or no other person trained in the law that has any respect for the law or any respect for the Constitution is going to allow that to happen. And that'syou're trying to frustrate the system. You're not getting your way. Tough. I'm not going to let you take advantage of the system. I don't think you're capable of representing yourself. I'm not going to accept your waiver. On February 25, 2005, approximately two weeks after the trial court's denial of Mr. Hester's request to represent himself, an incident occurred between Mr. Hester and Ms. Parton that prompted Ms. Parton to request permission to withdraw from representing Mr. Hester. In her motion, Ms. Parton stated that Mr. Hester was upset by the trial court's decision to name her as lead counsel, that he had refused to cooperate with her, that he had continued to insist that Mr. Heinsman should be lead counsel, and that Mr. Hester had threatened to have her and her family killed. Based on this information, the trial court permitted Ms. Parton to withdraw and returned Mr. Heinsman to the lead counsel position. When the trial court gave him an opportunity to respond to this decision, Mr. Hester did not object to Ms. Parton's withdrawing from the case. He also did not renew his request to represent himself after Mr. Heinsman again became his lead counsel.
Mr. Hester argued to the Court of Criminal Appeals that the trial court erred by denying his request to represent himself. While it found that Mr. Hester's request was timely, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the request was not clear or unequivocal. The Court of Criminal Appeals did not directly address whether Mr. Hester's waiver of his right to counsel was knowing and voluntary; however, the court did conclude that the trial court's inquiries regarding Mr. Hester's lack of legal skills were relevant to his competency to waive his right to counsel. In this Court, Mr. Hester again insists that the trial court deprived him of his right of self-representation protected by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution of Tennessee. The determination of whether a defendant has exercised his or her right of self-representation and has concurrently waived his or her right to counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. United States v. Kimball, 291 F.3d 726, 730 (11th Cir.2002); United States v. Robinson, 913 F.2d 712, 714 (9th Cir.1990); Spencer v. Ault, 941 F.Supp. 832, 851 (N.D.Iowa 1996); State v. Jordan, 118 Conn.App. 628, 984 A.2d 1160, 1166 (2009); 1 Kevin F. O'Malley et al., Federal Jury Practice & Instructions § 5:6 (6th ed.2009). Tennessee appellate courts review mixed questions of law and fact de novo, accompanied by a presumption that the trial court's findings of fact are correct. State v. Holmes, 302 S.W.3d 831, 837 (Tenn.2010). An error in denying the exercise of the right to self-representation is a structural constitutional error not amenable to harmless error review and requires automatic reversal when it occurs. State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn.2008). Article I, Section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee not only a right of the accused to be represented by counsel but also a right to self-representation. State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Tenn.1999). [18] These two rightsthe right to counsel and of self-representationare alternatives, with a defendant being able to assert one or the other but not both. Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d 275, 284 (Tenn.2009); State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673. Respect for individual autonomy when one's liberty has been imperiled through the leveling of an accusation of criminal conduct has led to a general prohibition upon forcing an unwanted attorney on an unwilling client. Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d at 285; see also Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). To exercise a constitutional right of self-representation, an individual must waive his or her constitutional right to counsel. State v. Small, 988 S.W.2d at 673; 3 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.5(c), at 739 (3d ed. 2009) (LaFave, Criminal Procedure). Just as the right to counsel extends through various stages in the criminal justice process, waiver of that right can occur at each of those stages. In some respects, what is required for a valid waiver will vary with the particular stage. 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 11.3(a), at 678. When balancing the right of self-representation against the right to counsel at the trial stage of proceedings, the courts have assigned a constitutional primacy to the right to counsel over the right of self-representation. See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. 152, 161-62, 120 S.Ct. 684, 145 L.Ed.2d 597 (2000); United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d 1227, 1236-37 (10th Cir.2000); United States v. Singleton, 107 F.3d 1091, 1102 (4th Cir.1997). As stated by the United States Supreme Court, it is clear that it is representation by counsel that is the standard, not the exception. Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., 528 U.S. at 161, 120 S.Ct. 684. In accordance therewith and given the mutually exclusive nature of the rights, we have observed that [c]ourts should indulge every presumption against waiver of the right to counsel. Lovin v. State, 286 S.W.3d at 288 n. 15. For a defendant to exercise his or her right of self-representation at the trial stage of the proceedings, (1) a defendant must make the request in a timely manner, (2) the assertion of the right of self-representation must be clear and unequivocal, and (3) the assertion of the right of self-representation must reflect a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. State v. McCary, 119 S.W.3d 226, 256 (Tenn.Crim.App.2003); State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d 627, 629-30 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1988); see also United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 271 (4th Cir.2005); United States v. Mackovich, 209 F.3d at 1236; W. Mark Ward, Tennessee Criminal Trial Practice § 8:4, at 220 (2009) (Ward, Tennessee Criminal Trial Practice ). In accordance with Tenn. R.Crim. P. 44(b)(1)(A), before accepting a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel, the trial court must advise the accused in open court of the right to the aid of counsel at every stage of the proceedings. The Court must also determine whether there has been a competent and intelligent waiver of such right by inquiring into the background, experience, and conduct of the accused, and other appropriate matters. Tenn. R.Crim. P. 44(b)(1)(B). The defendant must waive his or her right to counsel in writing, Tenn R.Crim. P. 44(b)(2), and this writing must be included in the record, Tenn. R.Crim. P. 44(b)(3). Even where the invocation of the right of self-representation meets these requirements, the effectiveness of the defendant's invocation and waiver is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. The right of self-representation is not absolute. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 2384, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008). Among other limitations, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the absence of a right of self-representation when a defendant seeks to abuse the dignity of the courtroom or to engage in serious obstructionist misconduct. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 171, 128 S.Ct. at 2384. Defendants are not entitled to use the right of self-representation as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process. United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555, 558 (8th Cir.2010) (internal quotation omitted); see also United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d 553, 560 (4th Cir.2000). The trial court's conclusion that Mr. Hester should not be permitted to exercise his right of self-representation based on its concern regarding Mr. Hester's lack of understanding of substantive and procedural law and on its belief that Mr. Hester would not be a competent or effective advocate was error. In general, the competence that is required of a defendant seeking to waive his right to counsel is the competence to waive the right, not the competence to represent himself. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 399, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993); State v. Connor, 292 Conn. 483, 973 A.2d 627, 646 (2009); State v. Campbell, 983 So.2d 810, 853 (La.2008). The United States Supreme Court has declared that a criminal defendant's ability to represent himself [or herself] has no bearing upon his [or her] competence to choose self-representation. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. at 400, 113 S.Ct. 2680. The United States Supreme Court has recently carved out what at present is a narrow exception that permits [19] States to insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to stand trial ... but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178, 128 S.Ct. at 2388 (footnote added). [20] However, in general, an accused's lack of capacity to present an effective defense is not a basis for denying the exercise of the right of self-representation. See State v. Herrod, 754 S.W.2d at 630; see, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. 2525; Hirschfield v. Payne, 420 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir.2005); State v. Black, 223 S.W.3d 149, 155 (Mo.2007); Vanisi v. State, 117 Nev. 330, 22 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2001). A trial court may properly conclude that a defendant is likely to be incompetent and ineffective as an advocate in his or her own defense and that the defendant lacks important knowledge about substantive and procedural law; however, these conclusions, without more, do not render the defendant incompetent or unable to waive the right to counsel. Deficiencies in legal skills and legal knowledge do not deprive a person of his or her right to self-representation. Nor does the trial court's reliance upon the special circumstances of a capital proceeding alter this conclusion. While the trial court's added concern for assuring that Mr. Hester is competently represented in a capital case is understandable, it was error to prevent Mr. Hester from exercising his right to self-representation on this basis. A defendant does not lose his or her right to self-representation because he is being tried for a capital offense. See, e.g., Sherwood v. State, 717 N.E.2d 131, 135 (Ind.1999); State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d 164, 173 (1972); Commonwealth v. Davido, 582 Pa. 52, 868 A.2d 431, 444 (2005); State v. Brewer, 328 S.C. 117, 492 S.E.2d 97, 98-99 (1997). As for the trial court's concern about Mr. Hester's communication difficulties, there is some authority to support a denial of self-representation where a mental or physical disability renders a defendant unable to communicate in an understandable manner. 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 11.5(d), at 756-57; see, e.g., Savage v. Estelle, 924 F.2d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.1991); People v. Watkins, 6 Cal.App.4th 595, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 5, 7-8 (1992). However, the correctness of these decisions is a matter of some dispute. Some have asserted that these decisions rest on a misunderstanding of Faretta, [21] as they go far beyond assessing the character of defendant's waiver. 3 LaFave, Criminal Procedure § 11.5(d), at 757-58 (footnote added). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court declined the State of Indiana's invitation to adopt, as a measure of a defendant's ability to conduct a trial, a more specific standard that would `deny a criminal defendant the right to represent himself at trial where the defendant cannot communicate coherently with the court or a jury.' Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. at 178, 128 S.Ct. at 2388. Similarly, we do not foreclose the possibility that a defendant's communication skills may be so limited or impaired that they cannot be appropriately accommodated using means less restrictive than declining to allow a defendant to exercise his or her right of self-representation. This case, however, does not present circumstances requiring serious consideration of this question. The record lacks sufficiently detailed factual findings that might justify preventing Mr. Hester from exercising his right of self-representation. Mr. Hester was able to communicate using a voice amplifier that rendered his voice able to be heard. Furthermore, the record does not demonstrate that the limitations on Mr. Hester's ability to organize his thoughts and to communicate them is so impaired as to justify denying him his right of self-representation. Accordingly, the trial court's concerns about Mr. Hester's lack of knowledge of substantive and procedural law and Mr. Hester's lack of competence as a communicator and advocate do not support the trial court's denial of Mr. Hester's request to represent himself. However, the trial court cited one more ground for its decision. It found that Mr. Hester was trying to manipulate the judicial system in order to circumvent the trial court's order appointing Ms. Parton as his lead counsel. We understand the trial court's ruling as reflecting its conclusions that Mr. Hester was trying to manipulate the process to obtain a new lawyer or to have Mr. Heinsman reappointed as lead counsel and that Mr. Hester did not have a genuine desire or intent to represent himself at trial. This reasoning presents a difficult quandary and a close issue. As previously noted, defendants are not entitled to use the right of self-representation as a tactic for delay, for disruption, for distortion of the system, or for manipulation of the trial process. See, e.g., United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d at 558 (internal quotation omitted); see also United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 560. Defendants, however, are free to seek to invoke a right of self-representation as an alternative should their request for the appointment of a different attorney be denied. See, e.g., State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 613 (Minn. 2004); Gallego v. State, 117 Nev. 348, 23 P.3d 227, 236 (2001). Disingenuous invocations of the right of self-representation that are designed to manipulate the judicial process constitute an improper tactic by a defendant and are not entitled to succeed. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187 (3d Cir.1982). A court may deny a manipulative request for self-representation, distinguishing between a genuine desire to invoke a right of self-representation and a manipulative effort to frustrate the judicial process. See United States v. Bush, 404 F.3d at 271; United States v. Frazier-El, 204 F.3d at 560; Edwards v. Commonwealth, 49 Va.App. 727, 644 S.E.2d 396, 400 (2007); cf. People v. Marshall, 15 Cal.4th 1, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262, 272 (1997) (noting that one of the trial court's tasks when confronted with a motion for self-representation is to determine whether the defendant truly desires to represent himself or herself). Based on our review of the relevant portions of the record, we have concluded that the trial court did not commit constitutional error by denying Mr. Hester's request to represent himself after the trial court declined to reinstate Mr. Heinsman as his lead counsel. We base this decision on five conclusions. First, the record supports the trial court's finding that Mr. Hester was using his request to represent himself as a means to challenge the trial court's ruling that Ms. Parton, rather than Mr. Heinsman, would be his lead counsel. Second, the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court's conclusion that Mr. Hester did not have any genuine interest in exercising his right to self-representation and was instead requesting to represent himself as a manipulative and retaliatory tactic. Third, Mr. Hester stated during the February 10, 2005 hearing that he did not actually plan to represent himself at trial if he was able to find another private attorney to represent him. Fourth, Mr. Heinsman eventually replaced Ms. Parton as Mr. Hester's lead counsel without any objection or further requests for self-representation by Mr. Hester. Fifth, we are wary of creating incentives for defendants to use a request for self-representation as a subterfuge when they lack a genuine desire or intent to represent themselves.