Opinion ID: 2632200
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Qualified Immunity for the Strip-to-Undergarments Search

Text: {11} The Court of Appeals determined that the school officials' conduct violated the students' general Fourth Amendment right not to be strip searched in school without being individually suspected of wrongdoing. See Kennedy, 1998-NMCA-051, ¶ 16, 124 N.M. 764, 955 P.2d 693. We agree. According to the Court, however, whether or not that right was clearly established in 1992 turned on the degree of nudity exhibited by the student. Thus, the Court decided that a strip search that resulted in a student's full nudity violated clearly established law in 1992. See id. ¶ 39. A strip search that ended with the otherwise naked student still clinging to his underpants, on the other hand, did not violate that student's clearly established rights. See id. ¶ 41. We now reverse the Court of Appeals and hold that, in 1992, the search of Randy Ford violated not only his clearly established right to be free from strip searches conducted without individualized suspicion, but also his clearly established rights to be free from searches that are not justified at their inception and are clearly excessive in scope. {12} We address this issue with some hesitation because although the Court of Appeals devoted much of its opinion to the conclusion that the unconstitutionality of the s trip-to-undergarments search was not clearly established as of 1992, the Court never applied that conclusion to the case at bar. See id. ¶¶ 45-47. Rather, the Court's qualified immunity ruling depended upon factual analyses of the respective involvements of each individual Defendant. See id. Nevertheless, because the Court of Appeals' determination that the strip-to-undergarments search of Randy Ford did not violate clearly established law provides a latent source of qualified immunity for these or other school officials, we are compelled to rule upon the issue. {13} The United States Supreme Court has recognized that an inquiry into whether official conduct violates clearly established law depends substantially upon the level of generality at which the relevant legal rule is to be identified. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034. The Anderson Court pointed out that too general a characterization of the legal rule in question (e.g. due process of law) would effectively subtract the clearly established requirement from the doctrine and eliminate a state official's ability to predict whether or not her conduct might give rise to liability. See id. Importantly, the Supreme Court also cautioned against requiring too specific a correlation between the misconduct and the established law, refusing to hold that an official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in question has previously been held unlawful. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. Rather, in order for state action to violate clearly established law, the unlawfulness must be apparent in light of pre-existing law. Id. {14} In questioning whether the nude search of Crystal violated clearly established law, our Court of Appeals relied heavily upon the Tenth Circuit's approval of Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91 (7th Cir.1980), in Walters v. Western State Hosp., 864 F.2d 695, 699-700 (10th Cir.1988). Kennedy, 1998-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 39-40, 124 N.M. 764, 955 P.2d 693. In Renfrow, the Seventh Circuit wrote, It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a thirteen-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude. Renfrow, 631 F.2d at 92-93. Relying on the Tenth Circuit's approval of Renfrow, as well as the overall common sense of the proposition, the Court of Appeals ruled that at least individualized reasonable suspicion is required before school officials can conduct a nude search for a missing ring. Kennedy, 1998-NMCA-051, ¶ 40, 124 N.M. 764, 955 P.2d 693. {15} We agree with the Court of Appeals' use of common sense for the purposes of determining whether the search of Crystal violated clearly established law. See DeBoer v. Pennington, 206 F.3d 857, 864-65 (9th Cir.2000) (holding that a right may be established by common sense as well as by closely analogous case law); Newell v. Sauser, 79 F.3d 115, 117 (9th Cir.1996); Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 590 (9th Cir.1989). The Court of Appeals failed, however, to apply an equal measure of common sense to the search of Randy. The same common sense that compels the conclusion that a school official cannot strip a child naked without having some individualized basis to suspect that child of wrongdoing, also mandates that a child cannot be stripped to his boxer shorts by officials who have no reason to suspect him individually. If, as the United States Supreme Court suggested in Anderson, law casts light, then certainly the illegality of a strip-to-undergarments search conducted without individualized suspicion falls squarely within the light cast by law forbidding a strip-to-nude search conducted without individualized suspicion. 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034. While forcing the exposure of a child's genitals is more invasive than forcing the exposure of a child's chest, midriff, thighs, and underwear, we cannot accept that this distinction marked the outer boundary of the breadth of clearly established Fourth Amendment rights in 1992. We hold that in light of the Tenth Circuit's affirmation of Renfrow, the unlawfulness of conducting a strip-to-undergarments search without individualized suspicion was clearly established in 1992. See Renfrow, 631 F.2d at 92-93. {16} Although we believe that the lack of individualized suspicion was enough to clearly establish the illegality of the search of Randy Ford, Plaintiffs also argue that the Court of Appeals improperly limited itself to this issue, when the lack of individualized suspicion represents only one of the elements contributing to the illegality of the search. We agree. In addition to his right to be free from a strip search conducted without reasonable suspicion, Randy had clearly established rights to be free from searches that are not justified at their inception and from searches that are excessive in scope. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). We hold that these clearly established rights were violated by the school officials as well. {17} It was clearly established in 1992 that in order for a school search to be valid, it must be justified at its inception. See id.; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (generally). A search is justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342, 105 S.Ct. 733; see also State v. Michael G., 106 N.M. 644, 646, 748 P.2d 17, 19 (Ct.App.1987); Doe v. State, 88 N.M. 347, 352, 540 P.2d 827, 832 (Ct.App.1975). In T.L.O., a teacher discovered two girls smoking in the bathroom. 469 U.S. at 328, 105 S.Ct. 733. After one of the girls later denied smoking, the Assistant Principal searched the girl's purse and found cigarettes and rolling papers. Id. Associating the rolling papers with marijuana use, the school official continued looking through the purse whereupon he discovered a stash of marijuana and evidence of drug dealing. Id. The Supreme Court held that the search of the purse was justified by the fact that the official conducting the search had received a report from a teacher specifically alleging that he had witnessed the student engaging in illicit conduct. Id. at 345-46, 105 S.Ct. 733. Similarly, in Michael G., the Court of Appeals based its determination that the search of a student's locker for marijuana was justified by the fact that the information precipitating the search was provided by an eyewitness to the student's attempt to distribute the drug. 106 N.M. at 647, 748 P.2d at 20. In Doe, the Court of Appeals upheld the search of student who had been detained and required to turn over a marijuana pipe from which school officials had seen the student smoking. 88 N.M. at 352-53, 540 P.2d at 832-33. Thus, the officials responsible for the searches in T.L.O., Michael G., and Doe proceeded not only with individualized suspicion, but with eyewitness information that an infraction had occurred. {18} Unlike T.L.O., Michael G., and Doe, there was no individualized suspicion in the present case. Neither did the school officials rely on the information of an eyewitness. In fact, the decision to strip search all the students in Mr. Ragland's class was not justified by any information other than the circumstance of the missing ring. It had never been made clear, nor is it presently so, that any crime or violation of school rules had ever occurred. Under these circumstances, the search of Randy Ford violated his clearly established right to be free from searches that are unjustified at their inception. {19} T.L.O. also clearly established that a school search must be permissible in scope. A search is permissible in scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. T.L.O., 105 S.Ct. 733, 469 U.S. at 342. Here, requiring a student to strip to his underwear while being watched by two school officials is clearly excessive in light of his youth, the significant possibility that the ring was simply lost and no infraction ever occurred, and the non-dangerousness of the hypothesized infraction. Regardless of the degree of the student's physical exposure, subjecting a student to any strip search under these circumstances constitutes a violation of his clearly established rights.