Opinion ID: 4127141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims against Lyons

Text: To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “a plaintiff must set forth facts that, when construed favorably, establish (1) the deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused by a person acting under the color of state law.” Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F.3d 610, 619 (6th Cir. 2013). Scott alleges that Lyons used excessive force in violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Lyons maintains that Scott was not deprived of his constitutional rights and raises the defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials performing discretionary functions “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional law of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Courts use a two-prong analysis to determine whether qualified immunity applies. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). We may discuss the prongs in either order, and the officer is entitled to qualified immunity if the plaintiff cannot establish both prongs in our inquiry. Id. For the first prong, the plaintiff must show that a constitutional violation occurred based upon applicable law and viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Brown, 779 F.3d at 411 (citing Sample v. Bailey, 409 F.3d 689, 695 (6th Cir. 2005)); see also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). To satisfy the second prong, the plaintiff must show that “the right was clearly established at the time of the incident.” Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2013). A right is “clearly established” when its “contours” are “sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The court makes this inquiry “in light of the specific context of the case, not a broad general proposition.” Id. at 201. -5- No. 16-1587, Scott v. Kent County “In addressing an excessive force claim brought under § 1983, analysis begins by identifying the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed by the challenged application of force.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). Before the district court, the parties disagreed as to the standard applicable to Scott’s excessive force claims. Scott argued for the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard, while Lyons argued that the Fourteenth Amendment “shock the conscience” standard should apply. The district court determined that Lyons was entitled to qualified immunity under either because Scott could not make the necessary showing for either claim under the second prong of the qualified immunity analysis. Because Scott does not address his Fourteenth Amendment claim in his appellate briefing, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that claim and evaluate Scott’s Fourth Amendment claim on appeal. We thus apply “an objective reasonableness test, looking to the reasonableness of the force in light of the totality of the circumstances confronting [Lyons], and not to [his] underlying intent or motivation,” and balance “the nature and quality of the intrusion on [Scott’s] Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Burgess, 735 F.3d at 472 (quoting Ciminillo v. Streicher, 434 F.3d 461, 466-67 (6th Cir. 2006)). This balancing is guided by three factors: “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, and whether he is actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 958 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The use of force is “judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. “This standard contains a built-in measure of deference to the officer’s on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary in light of the circumstances of -6- No. 16-1587, Scott v. Kent County the particular case.” Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2002). Scott argues that Lyons’s use of force was objectively unreasonable in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He states that he was arrested for creating a disturbance—a non-violent crime—and did not pose a significant threat to Lyons or anyone else at the time he exited the cell. As an initial matter, we must address the appropriate facts to use in our inquiry. In granting summary judgment to Lyons, the district court did not adopt the facts as alleged by Scott in his complaint or deposition testimony because those allegations were clearly contradicted by the video recording of the incident. Though Scott was shown stills from the video during his deposition, he maintained that he was not mistaken about being tapped on the shoulder and punched, and stated that he could not determine what the images depicted of the incident. Scott now acknowledges that the video is at odds with his complaint and his original deposition testimony that Lyons tapped him on the shoulder from behind and then punched him in the face, but asserts that his “testimony does not blatantly contradict the record so that no reasonable jury could believe, [by watching] the video, excessive force was applied.” He contrasts this to Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378-79 (2007), where the Supreme Court determined that the video evidence of the plaintiff driving contradicted his testimony that his driving was not a threat to others, that the roads were empty, and that he was in control of his vehicle. Scott argues that the video footage supports his claim that he was non-violent and nonaggressive when leaving the cell, and that “even if part of [his] testimony is blatantly contradicted by the [video] recording, that does not permit the district court to discredit his entire version of events.” Coble v. City of White House, 634 F.3d 865, 870 (6th Cir. 2011). Though the district court found that the video did “not in and of itself resolve the [summary judgment] motion,” it did establish that there was “clearly an issue with [Scott], to -7- No. 16-1587, Scott v. Kent County which Deputy Lyons responded.” The court found that the video contradicted Scott’s assertion that his manner was non-threatening, as it showed him exit the cell with his hands in fists and that he took a step toward Lyons. Scott himself testified that he was yelling and cursing while in his cell prior to the incident. Lyons also stated that Scott was shouting and throwing clothes around, and the notes made by Nurse McFadden indicate that Scott had been loud and argumentative while in the holding cell. The video confirms that prior to being removed from the cell holding other detainees, Scott was pacing, clearly agitated, and gesturing wildly. McFadden’s notes also indicate that Scott appeared intoxicated, and the incident report written at the time of Scott’s arrest stated that he was “obviously intoxicated.” Scott’s intoxication and his unruly behavior prior to his exit from the cell were part of the factual context known to Lyons. When Scott walked out, the video shows that his fists are clenched and that Lyons looked at and then pointed to Scott’s fists. The video then shows, as Scott concedes on appeal, Scott step toward Lyons, with his fists still clenched and within swinging distance. Under Pearson, we need not determine whether a constitutional violation occurred under these facts as this case can be resolved on the second prong of the qualified immunity test. See 555 U.S. at 236. Under the second prong, Scott must point to clearly established law that would have put a police officer on notice that a takedown in such close quarters, under these circumstances, was an unlawful use of force. A right is clearly established when its contours are sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that his conduct violates that right. Wheeler v. City of Lansing, 660 F.3d 931, 938 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 438 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). A right may be clearly established “even if there is no case involving ‘fundamentally similar’ or ‘materially similar’ facts.” Burchett, 310 F.3d at 945 (quoting Hope -8- No. 16-1587, Scott v. Kent County v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 740 (2002)). Rather, the question is whether Lyons had “fair warning” that his actions were unconstitutional. Hope, 536 U.S. at 741. The Supreme Court has clarified that the “dispositive question is whether the violative nature of particular conduct is clearly established,” examined “in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition.” Mullenix v. Luna, 136 S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015). In order to meet the clearly established prong, a plaintiff must “identify a case where an officer acting under similar circumstances . . . was held to have violated the Fourth Amendment.” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 552 (2017). Scott cites only to Griffith v. Coburn, 473 F.3d 650, 658-59 (6th Cir. 2007), where we determined that an officer’s use of a choke hold on a suspect sitting on his couch at home, passively resisting the officer’s commands, was objectively unreasonable. The circumstances presented in this case are not analogous to those in Griffith. While Scott was being removed from a cell for disruptive conduct, he stepped towards Lyons in close quarters, unhandcuffed and with clenched fists. We have not found other Supreme Court or Circuit precedent that would have put Lyons on notice that his takedown was an excessive use of force in this situation. Because Scott has not met his burden on this inquiry, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Lyons on the basis of qualified immunity.