Opinion ID: 1454650
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ALJ's evaluation of Dr. Ko's and Dr. Hanus's medical opinions

Text: Elder also argues that the ALJ erred by inadequately reviewing Dr. Ko's medical opinions and by failing to afford Dr. Hanus's medical opinions substantial weight. As to Dr. Ko's opinions, Elder contends that the ALJ did not consider specific statements that Dr. Ko made in his medical records that support a disability finding. Specifically, Elder asserts that Dr. Ko stated that she could probably go back to work on a part-time basis at a reduced capacity. According to Elder, these statements proved that she could work on a part-time basis only, and thus was disabled. See Bladow v. Apfel, 205 F.3d 356, 359 (8th Cir.2000) (explaining that, under Social Security Ruling 96-8p, ability to work only part-time mandates disability finding); Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (11th Cir.1999) (same). Elder therefore argues that the ALJ erred by completely failing to evaluate this evidence of her disability. However, Elder misconstrues Dr. Ko's statements and inflates their importance. Dr. Ko did not opine, as Elder puts it, that she could probably go back to work on a part-time basis at a reduced capacity. Instead, Dr. Ko stated that Elder could go back to work either on a part-time basis or at a reduced capacitymeaning that she could work on a full-time basis so long as she found a new job that required less exertion than her job at Eaton Corporation. Indeed, the fact that Dr. Ko regularly and repeatedly urged Elder to seek vocational rehabilitation for help with finding a less strenuous job reveals that he believed that she could work full-time. Simply put, the record does not support Elder's assertion that Dr. Ko opined that she could work only part-time. Even more, the ALJ ultimately agreed with Dr. Ko's assessment that Elder could work full-time at a reduced capacity. The ALJ stated that Dr. Ko's medical opinions did not support Elder's claim that she had no capacity for work, and formulated an RFC that reflected that she could work full-time at a reduced capacity. The ALJ even explicitly determined at Step Four that Elder could not go back to work at Eaton Corporation given her RFC, but could, nevertheless, perform a limited range of light work. Elder's argument that the ALJ ignored Dr. Ko's opinion is therefore meritless. Equally meritless is Elder's argument that the ALJ failed to afford substantial weight to Dr. Hanus's medical opinions. Elder asserts that, after she was discharged from Dr. Ko's care, she saw Dr. Hanus for fibromyalgia-related pain every two and-a-half months. And based on examinations performed during that period, Elder continues, Dr. Hanus concluded that she could rarely lift more than 10 pounds and could never lift more than 20 poundsconclusions that the ALJ was wrong to discount. The parties do not dispute that Dr. Hanus was Elder's treating physician. And a treating physician's opinion regarding the nature and severity of a medical condition is entitled to controlling weight if it is (1) supported by medical findings; and (2) consistent with substantial evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2); Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 503. A decision to deny a physician's opinion controlling weight does not prevent the ALJ from considering it, however, and the ALJ may still look to the opinion after opting to afford it less evidentiary weight. Exactly how much weight the ALJ affords depends on a number of factors, such as the length, nature, and extent of the physician and claimant's treatment relationship, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)(I)-(ii), whether the physician supported his or her opinions with sufficient explanations, see id. § 404.1527(d)(3), and whether the physician specializes in the medical conditions at issue, see id. § 404.1527(d)(5). See also Hofslien v. Barnhart, 439 F.3d 375, 377 (7th Cir.2006). If the ALJ discounts the physician's opinion after considering these factors, we must allow that decision to stand so long as the ALJ `minimally articulate[d]' his reasonsa very deferential standard that we have, in fact, deemed lax. Berger v. Astrue, 516 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Rice v. Barnhart, 384 F.3d 363, 372 (7th Cir.2004)). Elder does not argue that Dr. Hanus's opinions should have been afforded controlling weight; she has thus waived the point. See APS Sports Collectibles, Inc. v. Sports Time, Inc., 299 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir.2002). But even if she had raised the issue, her argument would have failed. Dr. Hanus's opinion that Elder could rarely lift more than 10 pounds and could never lift more than 20 pounds conflicted with substantial medical evidence showing that Elder's fibromyalgia was not disabling. Specifically, Dr. Holton determined that Elder had no difficulty walking, had normal muscle strength and tone, and could grip 25 pounds with both hands. Dr. Shah proffered a similar assessment, while adding that Elder could lift and carry 25 pounds occasionally and 20 pounds frequently; Dr. Shah also opined that Elder's fibromyalgia was unremarkable. In light of these conflicting medical opinions, we cannot see how Dr. Hanus's opinion could have been afforded controlling weight. See Skarbek, 390 F.3d at 503. But that aside, the ALJ did not err by refusing to afford Dr. Hanus's opinion even substantial weight. The ALJ explained that he discounted Dr. Hanus's opinion because he was not a specialist in fibromyalgia, and failed to conduct a thorough corroborating medical exam to assess the severity of Elder's conditions. These reasons are sound and supported by the record. Elder does not dispute that Dr. Hanus was not a specialist in fibromyalgianor could she because Dr. Hanus is not a rheumatologist. See Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir.1996) (Fibromyalgia is a rheumatic disease and the relevant specialist is a rheumatologist.); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(5) (We generally give more weight to the opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or her area of specialty than to the opinion of a source who is not a specialist.). Moreover, the record does not show that Dr. Hanus conducted a medical exammuch less a thorough one corroborating Elder's claims of the severity of her fibromyalgia. Although Dr. Hanus offered a preliminary diagnosis of Elder's fibromyalgia, he referred her to Dr. Ko's care both to confirm that diagnosis and to provide specialized treatment for her ailments. See id. § 404.1527(d)(2)(ii) (For example, if your ophthalmologist notices that you have complained of neck pain during your eye examinations, we will consider his or her opinion with respect to your neck pain, but we will give it less weight than that of another physician who has treated you for the neck pain.). And even after Dr. Ko discharged Elder, Dr. Hanus did nothing to assess the severity of her ailments; indeed, Dr. Hanus offered only general palliative care in the form of pain medication and medical excuses from work. See id. (We will look at the treatment the source has provided and at the kinds and extent of examinations and testing the source has performed. . . .). Thus, it makes no difference if Elder saw Dr. Hanus every two-and-a-half months; what does matter is that Dr. Hanus did not confirm the severity of Elder's fibromyalgia with medical examinations or tests. See id. § 404.1527(d)(3) (The better an explanation a source provides for an opinion, the more weight we will give that opinion.). And because the ALJ minimally articulated his reasons for declining to afford Dr. Hanus's medical opinion substantial weight, see Berger, 516 F.3d at 545, we see no fault in his determination.