Opinion ID: 2035760
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: robin praser

Text: The State explained the exclusion of Praser on the following grounds: (1) her unemployment; (2) inappropriate demeanor; (3) lack of attention to detail and instructions; and (4) the fact that the State sought more men to balance out the jury. We find these reasons to be valid. During voir dire, Praser admitted that she had been unemployed for several months. The State believed that working people have more of a stake in the community. Unemployment has been held to be a sufficiently race-neutral reason for excluding a venireperson. ( People v. Smith (1992), 236 Ill.App.3d 812, 817, 177 Ill.Dec. 51, 602 N.E.2d 946; People v. Lovelady (1991), 221 Ill.App.3d 829, 838, 164 Ill.Dec. 273, 582 N.E.2d 1217.) We agree. Although the record shows that juror Alfreda Behern was retired, we find that retirement is distinguishable from unemployment. Aside from her unemployment, the State explained that Praser's demeanor was inappropriate since she was inattentive during voir dire. Moreover, the State pointed out that since she did not completely fill out her jury card, Praser lacked attention to detail and instructions. This court has held that demeanor and body language constitute legitimate race-neutral reasons for exercising peremptory challenges. ( People v. Young (1989), 128 Ill.2d 1, 20, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453; see People v. Harris (1989), 129 Ill.2d 123, 176, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357.) Explanations based on such factors must be closely scrutinized because they are subjective and can be easily used by a prosecutor as a pretext for excluding persons on the basis of race. ( Harris, 129 Ill.2d at 176, 135 Ill.Dec. 861, 544 N.E.2d 357.) Nevertheless, we must recognize that a trial judge is in the best position to observe the demeanor of potential jurors and then evaluate the prosecutor's explanations for exercising a peremptory challenge. ( Young, 128 Ill.2d at 21, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453.) Given the great deference accorded to the trial court's ruling, which is based largely on an assessment of the State's credibility, we cannot say that the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous. The final factor relied on by the State was Praser's gender. Since the jury had more women than men, the State sought men to balance out the jury. Defendant contends that the State's rationale for desiring more men to balance out the jury was pretextual since the next two venirepersons accepted by the State were women, namely Diane Nummy and Maria Mentanis. We note, however, that although Nummy, Mentanis and Praser shared a trait which the State regarded as undesirable, only Nummy and Mentanis possessed another trait which the State believed made them desirable as jurors. (See Young, 128 Ill.2d at 23-24, 131 Ill.Dec. 78, 538 N.E.2d 453.) Unlike Praser, Nummy and Mentanis were employed. Consequently, the fact that Nummy and Mentanis were female was outweighed by their employment, which made them desirable to the State as jurors and distinguished them from Praser. In sum, we find that no discriminatory intent is inherent in the State's explanation for excluding Reynolds, Kosby, Sykes, McBee, and Praser. Accordingly, we deem the State's reasons to be valid and race-neutral. Finally, we consider defendant's procedural challenge to the trial court's Batson analysis. Defendant argues that the trial judge erroneously failed to render factual findings reflecting his own evaluation of the stricken venirepersons and the State's explanation for excluding such venirepersons. Defendant contends that lack of such findings resulted in an improper Batson proceeding. We disagree. In People v. Mack (1989), 128 Ill.2d 231, 245-46, 131 Ill.Dec. 551, 538 N.E.2d 1107, this court held that, where the trial judge found the State's explanation to be race-neutral, there was no further need for the trial judge to enter findings with respect to each black venireperson excluded by the State. After carefully reviewing the evidence, we conclude that the trial court's finding of no intentional discrimination was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we reject defendant's Batson claim.