Opinion ID: 2213829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Konnekers' Easement Grants Riparian Rights, Including the Right to Construct and Maintain a Pier

Text: ¶ 25 An easement `is a permanent interest in another's land, with a right to enjoy it fully and without obstruction.' [8] Hunter v. McDonald, 78 Wis.2d 338, 343, 254 N.W.2d 282 (1977) (quoting Schwartz v. Evangelical Deaconess Soc'y of Wis., 46 Wis.2d 432, 438, 175 N.W.2d 225 (1970)). The dominant estate enjoys the privileges granted by the easement, and the servient estate permits the exercise of those privileges. Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 Wis.2d 628, 637, 566 N.W.2d 158 (Ct.App.1997). While the servient estate may not unreasonably interfere with the dominant estate's right to use the easement, [t]he use of the easement must be in accordance with and confined to the terms and purposes of the grant. Stoesser v. Shore Drive P'ship, 172 Wis.2d 660, 668, 494 N.W.2d 204 (1993); Hunter, 78 Wis.2d at 343, 254 N.W.2d 282. ¶ 26 Because the easement in question is created by deed, the court must look to that instrument in construing the relative rights of the landowners. Hunter, 78 Wis.2d at 342-43, 254 N.W.2d 282. Deeds are construed as are other instruments; accordingly, the purpose of the court is to ascertain the intention of the parties. Rikkers, 76 Wis.2d at 188, 251 N.W.2d 25; see also Gilbert v. Geiger, 2008 WI App 29, ¶ 10, 307 Wis.2d 463, 747 N.W.2d 188. The primary source of the parties' intent is what is written within the four corners of the deed. Rikkers, 76 Wis.2d at 188, 251 N.W.2d 25. If the language is unambiguous, it would be improper to resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. Id. However, if the language of the deed is ambiguous, meaning it is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, then the parties may introduce other evidence to demonstrate the intent behind the language. Id.; see also Grosshans v. Rueping, 36 Wis.2d 519, 528, 153 N.W.2d 619 (1967) ([I]t is only when a deed is ambiguous that the intent of the parties can be manifested by extrinsic evidence.). ¶ 27 In this case, the issue is whether the Konnekers' lakefront easement grants riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a pier. [9] Riparian rights, one of which is the right to construct a pier to access navigable waters, are generally reserved for riparian landowners. See Stoesser, 172 Wis.2d at 666, 494 N.W.2d 204. However, up until April 9, 1994, [10] Wisconsin recognized the ability of a riparian landowner to convey riparian rights by easement. Id. at 668, 494 N.W.2d 204. [11] ¶ 28 For example, in Wendt v. Blazek, 2001 WI App 91, 242 Wis.2d 722, 626 N.W.2d 78, the court of appeals affirmed a summary judgment declaring that an easement, conveyed to the Blazeks and other non-riparian landowners, included the right to use and maintain a pier. In that case, the Jaeckle family owned a resort on Okauchee Lake along with other non-riparian lots that adjoined the resort property. Id., ¶ 2. The Jaeckles constructed and maintained a private pier on the resort property. Id., ¶ 3. When they sold the resort property, the deed reserved to the Jaeckles and their heirs and assigns `an easement for the purpose of access to Okauchee Lake on and over a strip of land 15 feet in width [along the resort property].' Id., ¶ 2. The aforementioned pier was located at the point where the easement met the edge of the lake. Id., ¶ 3. The Jaeckles eventually sold their non-riparian lots, one of which was sold to the Blazeks, and the conveyances included the easement. Id., ¶ 2. ¶ 29 Thereafter, the Wendts acquired the servient estate (the former resort property). Id., ¶ 4. The Wendts then sought a judgment declaring that the easement did not include a right to use and maintain the pier. Id. The court of appeals affirmed the circuit court's order granting summary judgment to the Blazeks and the other non-riparian landowners, concluding that the easement was intended to confer to the Jaeckles and their assigns the right to use and maintain the pier. Id., ¶ 18. According to the court of appeals, the critical evidence was an affidavit by a Jaeckle family member representing that the Jaeckles constructed the pier long before the easement was created, and when they sold the resort property, they reserved the easement in order to still use the pier and lakeshore. Id., ¶ 15. Because that affidavit was unrefuted, id., the court concluded that no material issue of fact existed, and the Blazeks and the other non-riparian landowners were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, id., ¶ 18. ¶ 30 Turning to the case at issue, we conclude that the language of the October 29, 2004, deed, which created the Konnekers' easement, is ambiguous. The relevant portion of the deed conveyed to the Konnekers Lot 1 TOGETHER WITH an easement 20 feet in width along the Westerly side of Lot Three (3) of Certified Survey Map No. 289 . . . extending from Orchard Avenue to Beyer's Cove. Clearly, the deed conveys to the Konnekers a 20-foot wide lakefront easement along the west side of the Romanos' and Nelsons' property. However, the deed is otherwise silent as to the easement's use and purpose. In particular, it is not clear from the deed whether the parties intended the easement holder to have riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a pier. Accordingly, the deed is ambiguous, and the court must resort to extrinsic evidence to ascertain the parties' intent. ¶ 31 In support of their cross motions for summary judgment, the parties presented competing affidavits demonstrating the intent behind the easement. Because the evidence as represented in the affidavits raised genuine issues of material fact, summary judgment was improper. ¶ 32 In support of their position that when the easement was created, the parties intended the easement holder to have riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a pier, the Konnekers submitted an affidavit representing that the only use for the easement's access area is to enter the lake by boat because Beyer's Cove consists of large amounts of vegetation, is not conducive to swimming, and lacks beach area for sun bathing. [12] That evidence, however, was refuted by the Nelsons' affidavit. The Nelsons asserted that when the easement was originally conveyed in 1983, no pier, boat lift, or boat was located on the easement, and therefore, it was not the parties' intent to permit the easement holder to construct or maintain a pier thereon. According to the Romanos, the fact that a pier did not exist on the easement at the time the easement was created raised a significant distinction between the facts of this case and those in Wendt. See 242 Wis.2d 722, ¶ 15, 626 N.W.2d 78. In addition, in support of their motion for reconsideration, the Romanos introduced evidence that as of August 1984, seven parcels of land were entitled to use Lot 3 for access to Beyer's Cove, and accordingly, the parties could not have possibly intended for each of those easement holders to have the right to construct a pier on the easement. ¶ 33 At the same time, the evidence put forth by the Nelsons and Romanos contradicted itself. Their assertion that it was never the parties' intent to have a pier constructed on the easement conflicted with the Nelsons' affidavit, which provided generally that sometime prior to May 1, 1990, [the Nelsons] constructed a pier on or close to the 20 foot easement for mooring their boat. (Emphasis added.) While the Nelsons maintained that said pier was not to be used in common with any of the easement holders, the pier leases to Grant Gardner and Arne Carlsson raised an inference otherwise. Each lease provided the same language: Lessees are advised and understand that seven other property owners have access rights on and to the subject premises and agree not to interfere with those rights. That provision can be construed as consistent with the Konnekers' position; that is, the parties intended for all the easement holders to have use of a pier for access to Green Lake. Because these competing affidavits raised a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether the parties intended the easement holders to have riparian rights, including the right to construct and maintain a pier, summary judgment was improper.