Opinion ID: 1742617
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the march 2003 trial.

Text: The retrial of the sodomy and PFO 1st charges began on March 14, 2003. Again, the Commonwealth gave notice pursuant to KRE 404(c) of its intent to introduce during the guilt phase evidence pertaining to Appellant's 1989 and 1995 convictions. The nature of the intended evidence was not revealed, as the Commonwealth merely attached copies of the prior convictions to its motion. Appellant's new (third) attorney filed a written motion in limine to suppress the evidence on grounds that the evidence did not satisfy any of the other purpose(s) of KRE 404(b). Although the trial court had sustained Appellant's motion in limine to suppress evidence of the 1989 conviction at the May 2002 trial, it overruled the in limine motion with respect to both prior offenses at the March 2003 trial.
Appellant contends that the trial court's exclusion of evidence pertaining to the 1989 conviction at the May 2002 trial was the law of the case precluding its admission at the March 2003 trial. As applied in Kentucky, the law of the case doctrine applies only to rulings by an appellate court and not to rulings by a trial court. Scamahorne v. Commonwealth, 376 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Ky.1964). See also United States v. Akers, 702 F.2d 1145, 1147-48 (D.C.Cir.1983). While some courts take a more liberal view of the doctrine and have applied it to trial court rulings, see e.g., United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876-77 (9th Cir.1997), we decline to join them.
When the prosecutor began discussing the prior offenses during opening statement, defense counsel approached the bench and made the following statement: Judge, I would like a running objection as to any prior acts in this case and an objection that would follow throughout this whole trial so I won't have to make an objection again; but I object to any evidence of any prior bad acts on the part of Mr. Dickerson. (Emphasis added.) After obtaining reconfirmation from the prosecutor that the evidence would show a modus operandi, the trial court said to defense counsel, Okay, all right, by which we assume he granted defense counsel a continuing objection. The prosecutor did not elicit evidence pertaining to the 1995 conviction from the victim or anyone else with personal knowledge of the facts of that case. Instead, former Fulton Police Captain John Ward began reading from an unidentified document in his file. He read that the allegations involved sexual acts perpetrated against C.B. during the period from 1992 to 1995; that C.B. was over twelve years of age in 1995; that C.B. was the daughter of Appellant's girlfriend; that the acts occurred in the bedroom of the home while C.B.'s mother was at work; and that the acts involved an allegation of sodomy. There was no factual description of the alleged act of sodomy. Specifically, there was no evidence that Appellant licked C.B.'s vagina, that he placed his penis against, but did not penetrate, C.B.'s anus, or that he ejaculated on her anus. There was also no evidence that Appellant flourished a weapon or threatened to harm C.B. if she did not comply with his wishes. Ward did not testify that he was reading from a public record or from any record that had been prepared by him or that was in his custody or control. Since the 1995 conviction was premised upon offenses occurring in Jefferson County, it is likely that he was reading from an investigative report or summary prepared by a Jefferson County police agency. Defense counsel did not object to this obvious hearsay, apparently believing that the trial court's grant of a continuing objection to any evidence of prior bad acts sufficed to preserve the issue. Unlike its federal counterpart, KRE 103(a)(1) does not require a party objecting to evidence to state the grounds for the objection, except upon request of the court. Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 1.10[4][b], at 38-39 (4th ed. LexisNexis 2003). Continuing objections are appropriate when the claim of error is that the witness is incompetent to testify to anything, e.g., that the testimony violates the marital privilege; that out-of-court statements of the same declarant violate the hearsay rule; or that the same irrelevant evidence is inadmissible when repeated by different witnesses. Davis v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 709, 721 (Ky.2004). Appellant's continuing objection was obviously premised upon the denial of his motion in limine to exclude evidence pertaining to the prior convictions pursuant to KRE 404(b), not to exclude hearsay pursuant to KRE 802. The continuing objection did not preserve the hearsay issue.
In addition to the evidence pertaining to the 1995 convictions, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of L.A., the victim of the 1989 convictions. L.A. testified that she was fourteen years old in 1988 and that Appellant's sexual activity with her had gone on for some time before the indictment was rendered. The activity usually occurred while her mother was at work or asleep, and Appellant told her that if she ever told anyone, he would kill her and her mother. When asked if Appellant had any weapons, L.A. responded that he had a machete and a sword. She did not testify that he threatened her with a firearm (or with the machete or sword). With respect to the facts of the sexual offenses, her entire testimony was as follows: Q. Did something occur in 1988 or before 1988 that resulted in a criminal prosecution in Louisville against Mr. Dickerson? A. Yes. Q. Did it involve acts of a sexual nature? A. Yes. Q. What if any part of those acts involved what the law calls sodomy  touching of his private areas with your private areas? A. (No response.) Q. These sexual acts, did they involve sodomy? A. Yes. Q. Do you understand what I mean by sodomy, the touching of your rear end, anus, with his private area or the touching of your frontal area with his mouth? A. Yes. Thus, L.A. was not asked and did not testify to any facts constituting the sexual offenses perpetrated against her other than that they involved sodomy. Specifically, she did not testify that Appellant licked her vagina, placed his penis against, but did not penetrate, her anus, or that he ejaculated on her anus. Although she testified to threats, she did not testify that Appellant threatened her with a gun (or even a machete or a sword) to induce her to accede to his wishes. Although she testified that her mother was either at work or asleep when the acts occurred, she did not testify as to where the acts occurred. KRE 404(b) first provides that [e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. (Emphasis added.) Thus, we have held that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is inadmissible if it proves only a lustful inclination. Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 685 S.W.2d 549, 552 (Ky.1985). However, KRE 404(b)(1) permits the admission of such evidence [i]f offered for some other purpose, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. This list of other purpose[s] is illustrative rather than exhaustive. Tamme v. Commonwealth, 973 S.W.2d 13, 29 (Ky.1998). Here, the evidence was offered to prove the corpus delicti, i.e., that the offense, in fact, occurred, by demonstrating a modus operandi. We first discussed the degree of similarity necessary to demonstrate a modus operandi in the pre-Rules case of Adcock v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 440 (Ky. 1986): In every case in which evidence of other crimes is sought to be introduced to establish a pattern or scheme, the real question is whether the method of the commission of the other crime or crimes is so similar and so unique as to indicate a reasonable probability that the crimes were committed by the same person. Id. at 443 (emphasis added). In Billings v. Commonwealth, 843 S.W.2d 890 (Ky.1992), we discussed at length the degree of similarity necessary to indicate a reasonable probability that sexual crimes were committed by the same person so as prove the corpus delicti by demonstrating a modus operandi. In the present case  as in many involving charges of sexual crimes  the ascendant issue is the corpus delicti  whether the event occurred at all. And on this issue is the application of the evidentiary rules most problematic. Unless the collateral act has some direct relationship to the charged act, the inference that the charged act occurred is necessarily founded on nothing more than the defendant's character and predisposition as revealed by the collateral act. In cases of this nature, we have long recognized that the degree of similarity between the charged and the uncharged acts is a critical factor in establishing a direct relationship independent of character. As the degree of similarity increases, and a modus operandi appears, inferences are more likely to be drawn from the events' common facts rather than their common criminality. .... The conclusion must be that two acts involving sexual crimes are not necessarily similar. ... [B]ad acts evidence offered to prove the corpus delicti by similarity should meet the same criteria as such evidence offered to prove identity by similarity  that is, it should indicate a modus operandi. .... While the issue of the corpus delicti is primary in these cases, identity of the perpetrator (if any) is not wholly irrelevant. It seems more accurate to say that the latter issue is assimilated into the former. If the act occurred, then the defendant almost certainly was the perpetrator. The two issues are essentially integrated. It is entirely appropriate, we believe, for purposes of assessing the admissibility of evidence of collateral crimes in the present context, to treat the evidence as if offered to prove identity by similarity, and to require that the details of the charged and uncharged acts be sufficiently similar as to demonstrate a modus operandi. Id. at 892-93 (footnote omitted). Thus, it is not the commonality of the crimes but the commonality of the facts constituting the crimes that demonstrates a modus operandi. Although it is not required that the facts be identical in all respects, evidence of other acts of sexual deviance ... must be so similar to the crime on trial as to constitute a so-called signature crime. Rearick v. Commonwealth, 858 S.W.2d 185, 187 (Ky.1993). Mere evidence that Appellant had previously sodomized C.B. and L.A. proved only a commonality of the crimes and established only Appellant's lustful inclination toward sodomizing females of that age group. No facts were introduced to describe the nature of the acts of sodomy that Appellant perpetrated against C.B. or L.A.  only the conclusory testimony that whatever he did was sodomy. While there was evidence that he sodomized C.B. in the bedroom while her mother was at work, there was no evidence that he threatened her with bodily harm if she did not accede to his advances. While there was evidence that he threatened to harm L.A. and that the sexual abuse sometimes occurred when her mother was at work (but also sometimes when her mother was asleep at home), there was no evidence indicating where the sodomy occurred and no evidence that Appellant used a firearm. Reiterating that the facts need not be identical in all respects, there was an insufficient commonality of facts in these cases to prove a signature crime demonstrating a modus operandi in order to prove that Appellant committed the present offense. This is not to say that there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of sodomizing A.H. A.H.'s testimony alone was sufficient to support his conviction. Nor are we saying that the Commonwealth could not present more detailed evidence of Appellant's prior sexual misconduct upon retrial that would meet the standard established by Adcock , Billings , and Rearick . We hold only that the evidence presented at the March 2003 trial was insufficient to prove a modus operandi and, thus, proved only Appellant's lustful inclination, requiring reversal for a new trial.
During one of the bench conferences, defense counsel advised the trial court that he had been unable to serve a subpoena on Jawan Ghoulson, who had testified at the May 2002 trial that Crumble told him that [Appellant] didn't do it, and defense counsel asked permission to read to the jury a transcript of Ghoulson's previous testimony. Instead, the trial court directed defense counsel to give the subpoena to the sheriff and directed the sheriff to attempt to serve it on Ghoulson before the conclusion of the trial. Later in the day, the sheriff advised the court that he had been unable to locate Ghoulson. The trial court found Ghoulson to be unavailable as a witness, as defined in KRE 804(a)(5), and indicated that defense counsel could read his prior testimony. The prosecutor then objected on grounds that the transcript was improperly authenticated, because the certificate of the notary public who had transcribed the testimony from the official videotape read: I, Kimberly Boyd, Notary Public in and for the State of Kentucky at Large, do hereby certify that the foregoing jury trial testimony in Commonwealth v. Dickerson has been transcribed by me to the best of my ability this the 8th day of August, 2002. The trial court reconsidered its ruling and sustained the objection, apparently because CR 30.06(1) requires that the officer taking a deposition shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn by him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness. Defense counsel introduced the transcript by way of avowal. KRE 103(a)(2). For some reason, defense counsel did not request to play the official videotape of Ghoulson's prior testimony to the jury. Regardless, the March 2003 jury never heard Ghoulson's May 2002 testimony that Crumble told him that [Appellant] didn't do it. Civil Rule 30.06(1) applies to a person who places the witness under oath and creates a record of the witness's oral testimony as it is given. That is how a transcript of prior testimony would have been produced prior to our adoption of video recording as the official record. There was no court reporter present at the May 2002 trial who could have prepared an official transcript of that trial. The transcript offered by Appellant did not purport to be official or even a public record. Thus, the applicable rule with respect to the authentication of that transcript is KRE 901(a), i.e., that authentication or identification is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. The answer to this issue is succinctly stated in Bruce v. Commonwealth, 441 S.W.2d 435 (Ky.1969): Appellant also contends that the testimony read was not duly authenticated, as required by RCr 7.22. We think this objection is without merit since no contention is made that the testimony read was not the testimony actually given by this witness at the former trial .... Id. at 437-38. Likewise, the prosecutor (who participated in both trials) did not claim that the transcript was inaccurate. Ghoulson's defense testimony lasted seven minutes and the transcript consists of fewer than six typewritten pages. We have compared the transcript with the official videotape and have found that the only discrepancy occurred when the notary, in transcribing defense counsel's statement to the trial court that he intended to introduce a prior inconsistent statement of Ms. Crumble's, substituted existing for inconsistent. Otherwise, the transcript is accurate. The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. This right, often termed the right to present a defense, is firmly ingrained in Kentucky jurisprudence, and has been recognized repeatedly by the United States Supreme Court. An exclusion of evidence will almost invariably be declared unconstitutional when it significantly undermines fundamental elements of the defendant's defense. Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 206-07 (Ky.2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted). It is crucial to a defendant's fundamental right to due process that he be allowed to develop and present any exculpatory evidence in his own defense, and we reject any alternative that would imperil that right. McGregor v. Hines, 995 S.W.2d 384, 388 (Ky.1999). A trial court may only infringe upon this right when the defense theory is unsupported, speculative, and far-fetched and could thereby confuse or mislead the jury. Beaty, 125 S.W.3d at 207 (internal citation and quotation omitted). Appellant's sole defense to the sodomy charge was that he did not commit the offense. Ghoulson's testimony with respect to Crumble's prior inconsistent statement was the only evidence other than Appellant's own testimony that proved his defense. If the facts are the same upon retrial, i.e., if Ghoulson is an unavailable witness as defined in KRE 804(a)(5), Appellant shall be permitted to either read the transcript of his testimony at the May 2002 trial or play the videotape of that testimony to the jury.
Appellant also complains of the admission of evidence pertaining to the emotional impact of the crime on A.H., i.e., that her mother took her to a rape crisis center for treatment, and evidence offered by several witnesses that A.H. repeated her version of the events several times and that the witnesses perceived no inconsistencies in her statements. There were no contemporaneous objections to any of this testimony; thus, this issue is not preserved for appellate review. KRE 103(a)(1). Nor did the admission of this testimony constitute manifest injustice. KRE 103(e). However, we will address these issues because they are likely to recur upon retrial.
The evidence of A.H.'s emotional injury was directly relevant to prove that she was sexually assaulted, an element of the Commonwealth's case-in-chief. The evidence became even more relevant when Appellant denied that the assault occurred. We reject Appellant's assertion that this evidence was inadmissible as indirect evidence of Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome. Although this is an issue of first impression in Kentucky, other jurisdictions have permitted evidence of a victim's emotional state following a sexual assault as proof that the assault, in fact, occurred. See, e.g., Simmons v. State, 504 N.E.2d 575, 581 (Ind.1987) (trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting testimony from family members that following rape, victim became afraid to go outside by herself, stayed at home more often, and feared for family members who went out alone, concluding that it was probative of fact that victim had been raped); State v. Bishop, 240 Kan. 647, 732 P.2d 765, 774 (1987) (victim's testimony that she received counseling as a result of being raped was circumstantial evidence that she had been raped); State v. Dube, 598 A.2d 742, 746 (Me.1991) (Evidence of changes in the victim's personality and behavior immediately after the time of the reported assault tends to prove that something of a traumatic nature had in fact occurred and thus was clearly relevant to the State's case.); Parker v. State, 156 Md.App. 252, 846 A.2d 485, 497-98 (2004) (jury could legitimately infer that victim's behavior changed due to rape from the fact that abrupt behavioral change[s] occurred closely on the heels of the rape); State v. Seiter, 949 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Mo.Ct.App.1997) (experts and laymen can testify about their observations concerning physical and psychological changes in the victim because such evidence helps to prove the elements of the sexual offense, itself, and thus may be admitted to show the offense did, in fact, occur); State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177, 1181-82 (Utah Ct.App.1994) (testimony of victim's mother contrasting victim's behavior prior to the incident with that after the incident was properly admitted as relevant circumstantial evidence that a traumatic experience such as rape has occurred); State v. Shaw, 149 Vt. 275, 542 A.2d 1106, 1107-08 (1987) (evidence of changes in the complainant's personality was material to the key question of whether a sexual assault occurred). We agree with these other courts and hold that evidence that A.H. visited a rape crisis center for treatment was relevant to prove that she was sexually assaulted.
It is improper to permit a witness to testify that another witness has made prior consistent statements, absent an express or implied charge against the declarant of recent fabrication or improper influence. KRE 801A(a)(2). Otherwise, the witness is simply vouching for the truthfulness of the declarant's statement, which we have held to be reversible error. Bussey v. Commonwealth, 797 S.W.2d 483, 484-85 (Ky.1990). See also LaMastus v. Commonwealth, 878 S.W.2d 32, 34 (Ky. App.1994). We perceive no conceptual distinction between testimony that repeats the witness's prior consistent statement verbatim and testimony that the witness previously made statements that were consistent with her trial testimony. Either way, the evidence is offered to prove that the declarant's trial testimony is truthful because it is consistent with her prior statements. A witness cannot be corroborated by proof that on previous occasions he has made the same statements as those made in his testimony. Smith v. Commonwealth, 920 S.W.2d 514, 517 (Ky.1995).

During the penalty phase of the March 2003 trial, the trial court made the same error it made in the guilt phase of the September 2002 trial when it permitted the clerk to read from the 1995 judgment of conviction that the offenses of which Appellant was convicted were amended from Sodomy I (3 counts), with Rape I (2 counts), and Persistent Felony Offender II being dismissed. See Perdue, 916 S.W.2d at 164-65 (holding that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to grant a mistrial after the jury was informed, during the penalty phase, that the defendant's prior manslaughter conviction had resulted from an amendment of murder charges). Although this issue was not preserved by contemporaneous objection, we have addressed it because it is likely to recur upon retrial. Appellant did object to the prior convictions on grounds that they were improperly authenticated because there was no acknowledgment, as required by KRE 902(8). However, each conviction contains a certificate, which purports to be signed by a deputy clerk of the Jefferson Circuit Court, that it is a certified copy of records of Jefferson Circuit Court, Tony Miller, Clerk. That suffices to satisfy the authentication requirements of KRE 902(2).
Joe Morris, a probation and parole officer employed by the Department of Corrections (D.O.C.), testified from D.O.C. records that Appellant was released from prison on August 1, 1997, less than five years prior to the commission of the present offense. See KRS 532.080(2)(c)1 (providing that PFO status can be imposed for a previous felony conviction for which the offender completed service of the sentence within five years prior to the commission of the present felony). Appellant objected to Morris's testimony on grounds that he was not the custodian of the records and could not authenticate their accuracy. However, D.O.C. records are public records, not business records; thus the Commonwealth was not required to introduce them through a custodian or other qualified witness. Compare KRE 803(8) (public records) with KRE 803(6) (business records). Morris, an employee of the agency entrusted with custody of the records, testified from his knowledge that they were D.O.C., i.e., public, records. The trial court obviously believed that the source[] of information, i.e., Morris, did not indicate lack of trustworthiness. KRE 803(8). The records were properly admitted. Accordingly, the judgments of conviction and sentences imposed by the Fulton Circuit Court are reversed and this case is remanded to that court for further proceedings consistent with the content of this opinion. LAMBERT, C.J.; GRAVES, and JOHNSTONE, JJ., concur. ROACH, J., concurs by separate opinion. SCOTT, J., concurs in part and dissents in part by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., dissents without separate opinion.