Opinion ID: 73516
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Feres to Foreign Military

Text: 49 This case requires an additional step in the Feres analysis because it involves a foreign service member. Feres and its progeny involve United States service members. Since recovery is sought by or on behalf of a foreign service member under the FTCA, a United States law, and money damages from the United States government, the same Feres analysis that applies to American service members is appropriate for foreign service members who claim injury or death resulting from the negligence of United States armed forces. Otherwise, there would be two standards of FTCA recovery, American and foreign, which would impair military discipline, the principal Feres concern. [M]ilitary discipline could be disrupted just as much by a foreign serviceman's law suit as by an American's; and liability for negligent orders would be equally detrimental whether the serviceman asserting a claim is a member of the United States or a foreign military. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.1978); see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.Supp. 762, 780 (E.D.N.Y.1980) ([T]o rule that the United States government has waived sovereign immunity with respect to the tort claims of foreign servicemen but not with respect to the claims of American servicemen would distort the underlying purposes of the FTCA, defy common sense, and almost certainly be contrary to the intent of an elected Congress.), reconsideration in part on other grounds, 580 F.Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y.1984). 50 Like a United States service member, a foreign service member who pursues an FTCA action because of injury or death resulting from the negligence of American armed forces, is adjudicated under the Feres, incident-to-service standard. If the injury to the foreign service member is determined to be incident to service, then FTCA recovery is precluded under Feres. In contrast, if the injury to the foreign service member is not incident to service, then FTCA recovery is permissible under the Brooks rationale. As with United States service members pursuing FTCA actions against the American military, such actions must be analyzed on a case by case basis. 51 While not binding upon us, the few cases involving injuries or death to foreign service members support our conclusion. In Daberkow, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany contracted to provide flight training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona to German student pilots to produce approximately 100 combat capable pilots a year. 32 Daberkow, 581 F.2d at 786. Attempting to follow the instructions of a United States Air Force pilot in another plane, a German officer assigned to the German squadron on a solo training flight crashed and was killed. Denying the FTCA action by the German officer's wife and son, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Feres prohibition on actions brought for injuries to servicemen arising out of activity incident to their service[ ] should apply with equal force in this case, although the serviceman is not a member of the United States military. Id. at 788. 52 In re Agent Orange concerned, inter alia, claims by Australian veterans that they suffered injuries resulting from their exposure to the herbicidal, defoliating chemical, Agent Orange, used by the United States during the Vietnam war. The Australian veterans concede[d] that their presence in southeast Asia during the period in question was the direct result of their country's participation in joint military operations with the United States. In re Agent Orange, 506 F.Supp. at 780. The court recognized that the factual elements that determine the Feres incident-to-service standard include whether the activity in question has a  'real and substantial relationship'  to the service member's military service, id. at 775 (citation omitted), or whether it is  'inseparably entwined' with, and directly related to, plaintiffs' military service, id. at 779 (citation omitted). Applying the incident-to-service standard to the facts in that case, the court determined that Feres barred the claims of the Australian veterans. 53 In Aketepe v. United States, 925 F.Supp. 731 (M.D.Fla.1996), aff'd, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 685, 139 L.Ed.2d 632 (1998), crew members of a Turkish destroyer and their survivors brought a negligence suit against the United States to recover for the injuries and deaths that resulted when live missiles were fired from an American carrier during a naval exercise. The navies of several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, including Turkey, were involved in a combined naval exercise to simulate wartime encounters between opposing powers. Id. at 734. A United States Navy admiral was the commander in chief in charge of all the participating NATO forces. During the  'enhanced tactical' or battle problem phase of the exercise, forces that included an American aircraft carrier and a Turkish destroyer were to actively seek and destroy each other in a simulated attack. Id. There was no advance notice to the American naval team of the drill when they were awakened at night to conduct it. Additionally, the personnel involved in the missile firing were unaware that the exercise was a simulation. The naval officers conducting the drill failed to understand the terminology and commands, which resulted in a live missile attack on the Turkish destroyer. 33 Consequently, members of the Turkish crew were injured or killed. 54 The district judge recognized that [t]he Plaintiffs in this case were members of the Turkish Navy who, as an incident of their service, participated in military exercises in which they were under the supervision of an American supervisor. Id. at 737 (emphasis added). Although citing Daberkow and noting that Feres would provide an alternative basis for dismissing the case, 34 see id. at n. 3, the district judge granted summary judgment to the United States because he determined that the case involved a nonjusticiable political question. Acknowledging the application of Feres to friendly fire cases involving American service members, the district judge noted that the principle behind Feres, that a service member should be precluded from suing the government for injuries suffered as a result of actions by a fellow service member, should apply with equal force in this case [involving foreign service members]. Id. at 737 n. 2. 55 The deaths or injuries in Daberkow, In re Agent Orange, and Aketepe occurred to active-duty, foreign service members during combat or combat training. The significance in these cases of the joint military operations under American supervision is that this supervision provided a conduit for recovery under the FTCA. Obviously, if the negligence that resulted in the injuries or deaths derived from their own commanders, or military supervisors from another country, there would be no cause of action under the FTCA. 56 The distinction between those cases and this case is readily apparent. The DWRRT, which included civilian players, was in the United States on off-duty status akin to furlough 35 and principally at their own expense at the invitation of the Columbus-Fort Benning Rugby Club, a civilian organization. This private rugby club had arranged various civilian rugby games for the DWRRT. During the British team's return from a civilian game and socializing in Atlanta, the single-vehicle accident occurred because of the negligence of the Army driver. 57 In contrast to the joint military exercises or combat in Daberkow, In re Agent Orange, and Aketepe, the connection of the DWRRT with the United States military was attenuated. The DWRRT was not to play in the official military Tournament; instead, the British team was to play one exhibition game with all-stars from the competing military teams. The British team was lodged on the Fort Benning reservation, but they paid for their own accommodations at a hotel there. The Army provided drivers for the commercially leased vans to transport the DWRRT while in the United States, but it extended similar courtesies to other civilian visitors. Plainly, the interaction of the British rugby team with the Army did not constitute a military purpose that would make the circumstances in which Lieutenant Whitley was killed apposite with the cases that have determined that Feres barred the claims of foreign service members injured or killed during military exercises with American military members. 36 As the district judge concluded: The courtesies provided by the American military do not implicate the sorts of concerns that would lead to the application of the Feres doctrine.... The Plaintiffs could just as easily have been a foreign civilian rugby team afforded the same accommodations. R5-60-29, 30. 58 We have explained that foreign service members and American service members must be treated alike in applying Feres to prevent disruption of military discipline. Previously herein, we analyzed the circumstances of Lieutenant Whitley's death under our circuit, three-part test to determine whether a foreign service member's injury or death is incident to service under Feres. 37 See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353-54; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013-15. Accordingly, our conclusion that Lieutenant Whitley's death was not incident to his military service and does not preclude plaintiffs-appellees' FTCA action on the facts of this case is unaffected by the fact that Lieutenant Whitley was a foreign soldier. Significantly, Specialist Kanney's negligence that caused the single-vehicle accident on a public highway while driving the British rugby team from a civilian game does not implicate military discipline by challenging military orders or intruding upon the relationship of any service member to superior officers.