Opinion ID: 1560476
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether davis was denied crucial jury instructions.

Text: ¶ 14. The standard of review when appellate courts consider issues involving jury instructions is well-established. Jury instructions must be read as a whole to determine if the instructions were proper. Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 184 (Miss.2001). Jury instructions must fairly announce the law of the case and not create an injustice against the defendant. Id. This rule is summed up as follows: In other words, if all instructions taken as a whole fairly, but not necessarily perfectly, announce the applicable rules of law, no error results. Id. See Adams v. State, 772 So.2d 1010, 1016 (Miss.2000). ¶ 15. A defendant has a right to jury instructions that present his theory of the case, but that right is not absolute. The court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions or is without foundation in the evidence. Phillipson v. State, 943 So.2d 670, 671 (Miss. 2006). Also, jury instructions are within the discretion of the trial court. Higgins v. State, 725 So.2d 220, 223 (Miss. 1998). Finally, when serious doubt exists as to whether an instruction should be included, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Stringfellow v. State, 595 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Miss.1992). ¶ 16. Davis contends that the outcome of his trial was negatively affected because the trial judge refused to give crucial jury instructions. He claims that, had the jury been properly instructed, he would not have been convicted. The jury instructions in question are D-9, [6] which included an instruction on the defense of duress for the convicted-felon-in-possession-of-firearm charge, and D-11, [7] which included an instruction on the defense of necessity for the motor-vehicle-theft charge. ¶ 17. The trial court was correct in denying Instruction D-9, the instruction on the defense of duress for the convicted-felon-in-possession-of-firearm charge. Under our statute, it is illegal for a convicted felon to have possession of a firearm in the state of Mississippi. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-37-5 (Rev.2006). [8] All the evidence, including Davis's own testimony, proves that Davis was in possession of the firearm before the events occurred. Davis contends that the reason he had the gun in the first place was because he was being threatened by Wright's family, thus necessitating a duress instruction. For duress to be an affirmative defense, four requirements must be met. The impending danger must be present, imminent and impending, and not to be avoided. Ruffin v. State, 992 So.2d 1165, 1178 (Miss.2008). According to the United States Supreme Court, if there is a reasonable and legal alternative to violating the law, it must be used. Also, if there is a chance to avoid the threatened harm and refuse to do the criminal act, the defense of duress will fail. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 410, 100 S.Ct. 624, 62 L.Ed.2d 575 (1980). ¶ 18. Davis does not meet the four duress requirements. The danger was not present, imminent and impending, and not to be avoided. Davis admittedly had been threatened, but since the threat, Davis had not been physically harmed. He could have avoided the situation altogether by staying away from Wright, her property, and her family. Therefore, the evidence did not support giving a duress instruction to the jury. Nor did the refusal of the judge to give the duress instruction create an injustice to the defendant. Since the duress instruction was not supported by the evidence, the trial judge correctly denied the jury instruction on duress for the felony-possession-of-a-firearm charge, and this assignment of error is thus without merit. ¶ 19. However, the trial court erred in denying Jury Instruction No. D-11, the necessity instruction for the motor-vehicle-theft charge. The defense of necessity is available where the defendant reasonably acts out of fear of `imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm' to others. Stodghill v. State, 892 So.2d 236, 238 (Miss.2005) (citation omitted). The three components to the defense of necessity are (1) the act charged was done to prevent a significant evil, (2) there was no adequate alternative, and (3) the harm caused was not disproportionate to the harm avoided. Id. ¶ 20. The trial judge denied this instruction due to its wording and a lack of evidence to support it. Thus, any attempt by counsel to correct it would have been futile. There is, however, ample evidence that could show Davis took Wells's vehicle for the sole purpose of fleeing from the scene of the shootout. Davis testified that he took the vehicle because he felt it was the only option for him to successfully leave the scene and not be shot again. Based on the record in this case, a properly instructed jury reasonably could have found that taking the vehicle was a reasonable action under these circumstances. Where a person reasonably believes that he is in danger of physical harm, he may be excused for some conduct which ordinarily would be criminal. Knight v. State, 601 So.2d 403, 405 (Miss.1992). Again, if the jury believed Davis's testimony that he had felt he was in danger of physical harm if he did not flee the scene, then a properly instructed jury could have found that Davis's belief that he was in danger of physical harm was a reasonable one, considering the fact that he already had been shot once. ¶ 21. While there appears to be little doubt that the proposed instruction was indeed worded incorrectly, the law presented in the proposed instruction was supported by the evidence. Therefore, the judge should have taken affirmative action to cure the error or to inform counsel how to cure the faulty instruction. It is the duty of the trial judge to make sure that the jury has been properly informed about the applicable law. Duvall v. State, 634 So.2d 524, 526 (Miss.1994). See also Kolberg v. State, 829 So.2d 29, 45 (Miss.2002) (There is no doubt that the trial court is ultimately responsible for rendering proper guidance to the jury via appropriately given jury instructions, even sua sponte. ). The defense of necessity was supported by the evidence and was not mentioned anywhere else in the jury instructions. Because it was not addressed in jury instructions, the defendant suffered an injustice. The trial court is given considerable discretion when dealing with an issue of a refused jury instruction on appeal, and the primary concern on appeal is that `the jury was fairly instructed and that each party's proof-grounded theory of the case was placed before it.' Cohen v. State, 732 So.2d 867, 872 (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted). The denial of this instruction prevented Davis's proof-grounded theory of the case from being presented. ¶ 22. In some circumstances, the trial court's refusal of a similar instruction would constitute harmless error; however, that is not true in the present case. Harmless errors are those which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. Williams v. State, 991 So.2d 593, 599 (Miss.2008). The failure of the trial judge in this case to instruct the jury on the defense of necessity was not harmless error and could have been the difference between Davis being found guilty of the crime of motor-vehicle theft, or not; thus denying Davis his right to a fair trial. Therefore, Davis's conviction and sentence for motor-vehicle theft are reversed and remanded for a new trial.