Opinion ID: 1680886
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether shah was appropriately sanctioned.

Text: ¶ 14. When considering the imposition of sanctions, [t]he primary concern when imposing sanctions for attorney misconduct is that the punishment be sufficient `to vindicate in the eyes of the public the overall reputation of the Bar.' Parrish, 691 So.2d at 907 (citing Miss. State Bar v. Blackmon, 600 So.2d 166, 173 (Miss.1992)). We use two sets of criteria when reviewing the sanctions for misconduct. Miss. Bar v. Alexander, 669 So.2d 40, 42 (Miss.1996). However, we are essentially free to evaluate the discipline imposed on an attorney and on review modify punishment as needed to best serve the interest of the Bar and public. Parrish, 691 So.2d at 907. ¶ 15. The two sets of criteria mentioned in Parrish include nine areas of inquiry, four of which originate from the American Bar Association standards. These areas of inquiry include: (1) the nature of the conduct involved; (2) the need to deter similar misconduct; (3) the preservation of the dignity and reputation of the profession; (4) the protection of the public; (5) the sanctions imposed in similar cases; (6) the duty violated; (7) the lawyer's mental state; (8) the actual or potential injury caused by the lawyer's misconduct; and (9) the existence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Miss. Bar v. Sweeney, 849 So.2d 884, 888 (Miss.2003). See also Parrish, 691 So.2d at 907; Miss. Bar v. Alexander, 669 So.2d 40, 42 (Miss. 1996); Miss. Bar v. Attorney ST, 621 So.2d 229, 233 (Miss.1993); Blackmon, 600 So.2d at 173.
¶ 16. Vaughn retained and paid Shah to perform certain legal services. Shah kept Vaughn's money and never performed the legal services. Shah lied to Vaughn about the status of the legal matter. Because of Shah's actions, Vaughn lost a very valuable rightthat of a timely appeal from a criminal conviction. Shah attempted to thwart the Bar's investigation into Vaughn's complaint by failing to respond to repeated requests for production of documents. Shah's responses to questions were not credible because, depending on the occasion, the responses were different.
¶ 17. The United States and Mississippi Constitutions protect a criminal defendant's rights because of the potential loss of liberty and other civil rights. Attorneys representing criminal defendants must adhere to high standards when their clients' basic civil rights are at stake. Shah's failure to file a criminal appeal shocks the Court's conscience, and we must act commensurately to discourage attorneys from allowing this to happen ever again.
¶ 18. An attorney like Shah who fails to perform any legal services to a client who has paid the attorney for the legal services denigrates the dignity and reputation of the profession. So does an attorney who prevaricates and fails to be forthcoming.
¶ 19. Shah's pattern of misconduct and lack of true remorse indicate that there is no assurance that Shah's future conduct will meet professional and ethical standards.
¶ 20. We have disbarred attorneys in other similar cases. ¶ 21. Stegall v. Miss. Bar, 618 So.2d 1291 (Miss.1993), is a case almost exactly on point. An inmate hired Stegall to file a petition for post-conviction relief. He paid Stegall $2,500.00 as a retainer. As the deadline for filing the petition approached, the inmate made numerous attempts to contact Stegall by telephone and by mail, to no avail. The petition was not filed and the $2,500.00 was not returned to the inmate. Citing ABA Standard 4.4, We disbarred Stegall. 618 So.2d at 1295. ¶ 22. Other states have disbarred attorneys when they have violated a duty to a client and then evinced lack of candor before a Bar complaint tribunal. ¶ 23. In Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Ct. of the State of N.D. v. Crain, 566 N.W.2d 404 (N.D.1997), the disciplinary board began an investigation of an attorney who knew that a will of one of her clients had been probated and she failed to inform the court that a later will had been executed. When the attorney failed to respond to the Bar's investigation, the court found that she had obstructed the disciplinary process. The court found that the attorney's misconduct regarding the will plus her lack of candor to the disciplinary board merited disbarment. ¶ 24. Similarly, in Chang v. State Bar, 49 Cal.3d 114, 260 Cal.Rptr. 280, 775 P.2d 1049 (1989), Chang was disbarred for willfully misappropriating client funds, failing to attempt restitution to client, and displaying lack of candor during investigation, even though Chang had absolutely no prior disciplinary history. The court stated: His misrepresentations to the investigator fraudulently delayed the State Bar's investigation of his misconduct, and his evasiveness before the hearing panel hindered that body's fact-finding function. We have held that fraudulent and contrived misrepresentations to the State Bar may perhaps constitute a greater offense than misappropriation. Id. at 287, 775 P.2d 1056 (citation omitted). ¶ 25. The Supreme Court of Arizona disbarred an attorney for fee gorging, failure to protect the interest of a client, and lack of candor before the disciplinary board even when the disciplinary board recommended two suspensions, one for six months and another for seven months, in State Bar v. Douglas, 158 Ariz. 516, 764 P.2d 1 (1988).
¶ 26. Attorneys owe the following ethical duties to clients: (1) the duty of loyalty (Rule 1.15), including preserving the client's property, maintaining confidentiality, and avoiding conflicts; (2) the duty of diligence (Rules 1.3 & 1.4); (3) the duty of competence (Rule 1.1); and (4) the duty of candor (Rule 8.4). Here, the evidence supports a finding that Shah violated his duty of diligence to Vaughn when he completely failed to file the notice of appeal. Shah violated his duty of candor to Vaughn when he lied to Vaughn about the filing of the appeal and when he failed to inform Vaughn of his suspension. ¶ 27. For the violation of the duty of diligence, the Bar standards recommend disbarment when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes serious or potentially serious injury to a client and suspension when a lawyer knowingly fails to perform services for a client and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the difference in the two recommendations being whether the injury is serious or not. For the violation of the duty of candor, the Bar standards recommend disbarment when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client with the intent to benefit the lawyer or another, and causes serious injury or potential serious injury to a client. They recommend suspension for the violation of the duty of candor when the injury is not serious.
¶ 28. There is no evidence that Shah was suffering from any emotional or mental disability at the time of his actions.
¶ 29. Vaughn lost a very valuable rightthe right to a timely appeal. Vaughn did not receive legal services for which he paid $3,750.00.
¶ 30. As an aggravating circumstance, Shah has had disciplinary action taken against him previously: (1) an informal admonition (violations of Rules 1.4 and 8.1(b)); (2) a public reprimand (violations of Rules 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, and 8.4(a, c, and d)); (3) a private reprimand (violations of Rules 1.3, 1.4 and 8.4(a, c, and d)); (4) a second private reprimand (violation of Rule 1.16); (5) a six-month suspension by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for failure to disclose that he had accepted pre-petition filing fees and attorney fees; and (6) a concomitant six-month suspension by the Court for the same misconduct. As a second aggravating circumstance, Shah actively misled Vaughn as to the status of the appeal. Shah failed to be forthcoming before the investigatory committee and the Tribunal, a third aggravating circumstance. A fourth aggravating circumstance is Vaughn's vulnerability because Vaughn was in prison without freedom and was unable to protect his own rights. ¶ 31. No mitigating circumstances are present.