Opinion ID: 2218920
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pertinent facts, procedure, and law

Text: Cast in a light favorable to the Mother, and supported by the records, she has made significant improvements in her life and personal well-being. Antipsychotic medications such as Lithium have proven beneficial in improving and stabilizing her psychological condition. Mother's efforts at abstinence from drugs and alcohol, although clouded with normal episodes of denial and occasional relapses, have also met with slow but steady progress. Mother's progress is clearly reflected in the record and accompanying exhibits. In August of 1989, Mother experienced a psychotic episode that was the genesis of this case. At that time, she flatly denied that she had any psychological condition, chemical dependency or otherwise and despised the fact that she was voluntarily admitted into Rapid City Regional Hospital. A short time after her admission into Rapid City Regional Hospital, Mother began to see that her behavior was not normal and also began to feel that the efforts of Dr. Manlove and the hospital staff were counter-productive to her recovery. Mother subsequently transferred to St. Mary's Hospital in Rochester, Minnesota (Mayo Clinic). After less than one month at the Mayo Clinic, Mother had progressed to the point where she could safely be discharged and sent home. While at home, Mother's condition improved still further, until she was allowed temporary custody of Z.Z. several days each week, with minimal supervision, not by DSS but by the child's maternal grandparents. Eventually, Mother progressed to the point that she was given full physical custody of the child. After approximately one month of having full custody of Z.Z., Mother, who was by now living with the child in her own apartment, began to feel the stirrings of emotional difficulties. On July 3, 1990, Mother took Z.Z. to Grandparents and then contacted DSS worker Damba. After Mother informed DSS of the situation, she voluntarily admitted herself into Rapid City Regional Hospital. This was a giant step which Damba admitted was a responsible one and agreed it was a remarkable step from where Mother was in December 1989. Several weeks after her release from the hospital, Mother recognized that her psychotic episodes were related to her chemical dependence, and admitted herself into the Addiction Recovery Center at Rapid City Regional Hospital. As mentioned above, Mother completed this program with marginal success due primarily to the reactionary denial of her condition. Notwithstanding Mother's occasional set-backs, her efforts met with progress. Progress that was ignored by the trial court, but which should not be ignored by this Court. People do come back from drug usage and alcohol. All of us must recognize that rehabilitation is a goal and a grace. Mother's treating psychiatrist, Dr. R.P. Renka, testified at the Dispositional Hearing that if Mother stays away from drugs and alcohol her prognosis for resolution on her psychosis is excellent. Dr. Renka went further to say that Mother's psychosis has already resolved and has become a lot easier to work with. Dr. Renka further opined that if Mother would refrain from drug and alcohol use and learn to take care of herself, he would have no reason to think she couldn't take care of the child. Therefore, this young mother is tryingtrying to rid herself of drugs and alcohol. With evidence such as this in the record, the trial court's conclusion that the involuntary termination of the parental rights of Mother over the little boy was supported by clear and convincing evidence, is clearly in error. As we have held, and as I mentioned above, termination of parental rights is a drastic, final step that should be exercised with great caution and with the best interests of the minor child in mind. People in Interest of S.M.M., supra . The evidence presented to the trial court was not that which was so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing that it could reasonably allow a trier of fact to reach a clear conviction that the permanent separation of this child from his mother was in his best interests. As such, the trial court was clearly erroneous in concluding that the evidence supporting termination was clear and convincing. Consider this: In a report to the trial court, dated November 17, 1989, submitted by DSS worker Akin, Akin noted: ... [i]t is clearly evident... that [Mother] has a lot of concern and love for her child. Z.... Ms. Akin went on to report to the trial court that Z.Z. remains in placement with the [Grandparents], who are doing exceptionally well in caring for Z.Z. and that the Department of Social Services feels very comfortable having Z.Z. remain in the [Grandparents] home. (Emphasis added mine). To that end, DSS recommended that placement of Z.Z. remain with Grandparents. This recommendation was continually made and followed until the Report to the Court dated April 20, 1990, wherein DSS worker Damba recommended that Mother be given physical custody of the child on Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday of each week so long as Grandparents maintain reasonable telephone contact with Mother while she has custody of Z.Z. Author's note: Is this clear and convincing evidence for termination? Citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 606 (1982), the Supreme Court of South Dakota explained: The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State. Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life. People in Interest of S.L.H., 342 N.W.2d 672, 677 (S.D.1983). State intervention for the best interest of the child cannot be used merely to insure that the child has a better home or someone better to care for it. Matter of B.E., 287 N.W.2d 91, 97 (S.D.1979). Taking this little boy away from grandpa and grandma, is not in his best interests. In fact, It is hazardous to assume that removing a child from an imperfect home invariably will benefit the child ... People in the Interest of S.M.M., supra . Trying to paint grandpa and grandma as unfit custodians of this little boy is not in keeping with the record herein. It is simply untrue. Apparently, it is the majority's stance that Z.Z. should be removed from grandpa and grandma's home because it is not perfect. Under the majority decision, he will be immediately thrust into a foster home with strangers. Foster homes are not perfect. Unquestionably, he will be terrified. Then, he will ultimately be adopted. There was no clear and convincing evidence that termination of mother's parental rights was the least restrictive alternative. The determining question here is: What is in the best interest of Z.Z.? SDCL 26-8-36. People in Interest of S.L.H. at 676. Our standard of review is whether the trial court's ultimate findingthat clear and convincing evidence indicated termination was the least restrictive alternative commensurate with the child's best interestswere clearly erroneous. People in Interest of K.C., 414 N.W.2d 616 (S.D. 1987); Matter of A.H., 421 N.W.2d 71 (S.D. 1988). The trial court's determination must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. In Interest of S.L.H., supra . In my opinion, it was not. Additionally, another Report to the Court, dated June 8, 1990, written by DSS worker Damba, informed the trial court that Mother has been providing the primary care for Z.Z. with supervision of Grandparents. Ms. Damba continued to state that It is apparent that [Z.Z.], is attached to [Mother], as is [Mother] to [Z.Z.], and, It is evident that [Mother] can physically care for [Z.Z.]. Based in part upon this Report to the Court, the court, after a review hearing on June 8, 1990, granted Mother full physical custody of Z.Z. Thereafter, Mother retained full physical custody of Z.Z., supervised by DSS, until July 3, 1990, when she voluntarily admitted herself into Rapid City Regional Hospital. Z.Z. was then placed in a foster home because Grandmother was indecisive about the role she wanted to play in the raising of Z.Z. and because she felt that foster placement of Z.Z. could perhaps demonstrate to Mother the effects her actions were causing. The child remained in foster care only until October 12, 1990 when, upon DSS' recommendation, the trial court granted physical custody to Grandfather for a two week trial period. On November 2, 1990, the court, again on DSS' recommendation, granted physical custody of Z.Z. to Grandfather as long as it remains in the child's best interests. The child remained in Grandfather's custody. In her final Report to the Court, dated March 1, 1991, DSS worker Damba continued to recommend physical placement of Z.Z. with Grandfather. Until March 4, 1991, DSS had found Grandfather's physical custody of Z.Z. to be in Z.Z.'s best interests for a total of approximately fifteen (15) months! [2] On at least two occasions during the time Grandparents had physical custody of Z.Z., both the Deputy State's Attorney and DSS personnel approached Grandparents about pursuing a guardianship over Z.Z. At that time, Mother had been showing progress and Grandparents chose not to pursue guardianship. It was after Grandfather regained physical custody of Z.Z. on November 2, 1990, and before the State's decision to seek termination of parental rights, that he retained the services of legal counsel and filed his verified Petition for Guardianship of Z.Z. On the two occasions when the State had been the one to suggest a guardianship, neither DSS nor the State's Attorney raised any concerns regarding Grandparents' fitness as guardians. However, once Grandfather filed his Petition seeking guardianship, DSS worker Damba suddenly began raising concerns about Grandfather's fitness to be guardian of Z.Z. As DSS worker Damba indicated at the Dispositional Hearing, she has concerns regarding Grandparents' living arrangements; two prior referrals that DSS had received, at least seven years ago, regarding Grandparents' relationship with Mother; Mother's potential access to the minor child; and Damba's perception of Grandfather's alleged alcohol dependency. Grandfather was not an alcoholic; he did drink and, believing he should not, went to an out-patient program. He went to counselling regimens. He also sought counselling with Dr. James Snow. It does not appear that Grandparents' relationship was a stormy one, laden with arguments and fights, nor is there an indication that Grandmother has ever neglected any of Z.Z.'s needs or that she has ever been a threat to him. Admittedly, there was a strained relationship between Grandfather and Grandmother. Evidence reflects that for seven months immediately prior to the Dispositional Hearing, Grandfather was the absolute primary caretaker of Z.Z. Moreover, that Z.Z. established a continuous, stable, caring relationship with Grandfather. However, the record is void of any instances when DSS felt that Grandfather's care of Z.Z. was lacking or that Grandfather's custody of Z.Z. was not in Z.Z.'s best interests. Rather, it was DSS' opinion that Grandfather is doing a good job taking care of Z.Z., and that Grandfather has been very cooperative with DSS. (Emphasis added mine). Under SDCL 25-4-52, The circuit court may grant grandparents reasonable rights of visitation with their grandchild, with or without petition by the grandparents, if it is in the best interests of the grandchild. However, under SDCL 25-4-54, 25-4-52 does not apply if the child has been placed with a person other than the child's parent or grandparent. In King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky.1992), the highest court of Kentucky upheld the grandparent visitation statute authorizing a Kentucky court to grant reasonable visitation rights to either maternal or paternal grandparents, holding that such a statute was constitutional. In the Kentucky case, the trial court found that the best interests of the child would be served by allowing parental grandparents the right of visitation. The United States Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 378, 121 L.Ed.2d 289 (1992). There was, however, no question concerning the child's safety in the grandfather's home and that the child would receive proper care during visitation. Under our state law, as reflected by the statute cited above, grandparents in South Dakota have the right of reasonable visitation providing it is in the best interests of the grandchild. In my opinion, the trial judge's factual determination in the case before us was clearly erroneous. In King, at 631, the Kentucky court expressed: Under ordinary circumstance, few would dispute that there are benefits to be derived from the establishment of a bond between grandparent and grandchild. DSS worker Damba's concern, regarding the referrals, revolved around one referral received on December 30, 1984, and one referral received on July 24, 1985. Years prior to the present scenario. The 1984 referral alleged threatening and abusive language and emotional maltreatment of Mother by Grandmother. The 1985 referral alleged that, as a result of an argument between Mother and Grandfather, Grandfather struck Mother. This little boy's best interests should not be lost in an isolated scenario. His time is now. He needs his biological family now. He should not be shipped out to strangers. Furthermore, with respect to the referrals, (1) no evidence substantiated the allegations and (2) the DSS never involved itself beyond the referrals. The point is: These allegations should not prevent this little boy from being raised by his own flesh and blood. This little boy has not been physically, mentally, or psychologically abused. He should not be consigned to a netherworld of institutional care or a foster family. According to the evidentiary showing below, Z.Z. has bonded with his grandfather. See, State's exhibit 11, page 2, and State's exhibit 12, page 12. Factually, this case simply does not fit into a situation where a little boy has been abused or neglected. DSS had a concern over unsupervised contacts with the little boy by his Mother. This fades under the sunshine of truth. In 15 months that the boy was in the home of his grandfather and grandmother, his Mother had unsupervised contact with him but once; this consisted of two to three minutes when she stopped by to pick up a key to her apartment. This is, allegedly, a great sin in the eyes of the DSS worker; it was used as an example to prove to the trial court that Grandfather was a bad guy for permitting this. However, this transpired as he held the bottle to feed the baby boy. When I read this type of Statist aggression/persuasion, I recoil. Grandfather, feeding the little boy, was the good guy. DSS wanted Grandfather to take parenting classes with the West River Mental Health Service. He did it; in fact, each and every suggestion or program the DSS recommended, Grandfather accomplished. DSS found Grandfather followed a case service plan. Notwithstanding this pick and peck philosophy by counsel for the State, two reports to the trial court impale the State's case: (1) the January 25, 1991, report by DSS worker Damba that the grandfather ... has cooperated fully with Department of Social Services in all requests which recommended the continued placement of the little boy with his grandfather (2) the March 1, 1991, report by DSS worker Damba recommended that the grandfather (who was again complimented for his salutary efforts) seek a guardianship to place the little boy in the grandfather's home. Why did the DSS permit this little boy to remain with the grandfather for many months if it did not believe in the grandfather's goodness? Why would it recommend that the grandfather set about obtaining a legal guardianship unless it believed the grandfather was an excellent man to have custody of his grandson? And the date of this recommendation was on the day of the dispositional hearing! State should be bound by its findings, recommendations, and reports to the court. These reports were submitted into evidence. State should be bound by its evidence. It cannot elevate its position over its own exhibits. Exhibits are evidence, and State is bound by its position. See, Marnette v. Morgan, 485 N.W.2d 595 (S.D.1992); Klatt v. Continental Insurance Co., 409 N.W.2d 366, 370 (S.D.1987); Romey v. Landers, 392 N.W.2d 415, 421 (S.D.1986); Miller v. Stevens, 63 S.D. 10, 17, 256 N.W. 152, 155 (1934); 30 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 1087 (1967).