Opinion ID: 8414975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Molestation

Text: Al-Awadi makes several arguments on appeal regarding the admission of the evidence of the alleged digital molestation of CV1. At trial, Al-Awadi objected to the cumulative effect of testimony from multiple witnesses about the molestation, He repeats that argument now, so we review the district court’s decision to allow all the evidence of the molestation that it did for an abuse of discretion, United States v. Fifer, 863 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2017). He also makes several new arguments on appeal that he did not raise before the district court, and for those our review is for plain error. See United States v. Schrode, 839 F.3d 545, 554 (7th Cir. 2016), We address first whether evidence of CVl’s alleged molestation was admissible at all at trial. The government needed to prove as an element of the charged crime of making child pornography that Al-Awadi took the photographs .with the requisite intent. See 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). And in this trial, Al-Awadi’s intent was the principal dispute. He did not contest that he had taken the photographs. Instead, his position throughout trial was that he had not taken the pictures with a sexually motivated intent. His counsel argued in opening statements that Al-Awadi had another valid reason to take the pictures, albeit a “stupid reason,” and Al-Awadi took the stand and testified he was worried he had hurt CV1 so he took the pictures to check for injury. While saying it was the “dumbest thing” he had ever done, Al-Awadi maintained he had not taken the four photographs with sexual intent Al-Awadi therefore placed his intent at issue. The district court allowed evidence of the molestation at trial as direct evidence of the charged crimes, and the government introduced the evidence of molestation that was within seconds of when Al-Awadi took the photographs as evidence that Al-Awadi’s intent in taking the pictures was a sexually motivated one. The molestation made Al-Awadi’s criminal intent in taking the photographs more probable than it would have been without the evidence of molestation, so the molestation was relevant. See Fed. R. Evid.401, 402. Repeating an argument he made before the district court, Al-Awadi argues that too much evidence of the molestation was admitted. He emphasizes that he was charged with making child pornography, not with the crime of child molestation. The jury heard evidence of the molestation from the substitute kindergarten teacher, who was the first person CV1 told; the daycare’s assistant director, who interviewed both CV1 and Al-Awadi; CVl’s parents, who uncovered the molestation and took CV1 to the hospital;-and from people who investigated the allegations—the nurse who examined CV1, the lead detective, the pediatrician who did a follow-up examination, and two forensic scientists who examined CVl’s clothing for DNA and bodily fluids. We do not find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision to admit the testimony from-the multiple witnesses. The witnesses added different meaningful pieces to the account, and we do not see here an improper “drum beat repetition” of a victim’s story, cf. Stone v. State, 536 N.E.2d 534, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989), or the admission of “gruesome and unnecessary details,” United States v. Os-trowsky, 501 F.2d 318, 323 (7th Cir. 1974), as in the cases to which Al-Awadi points, especially in light of Al-Awadi’s defense at trial. Al-Awadi also argues that the district court failed to conduct'a proper Rule 403 analysis that balanced the evidence’s probative value with its potential for unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice.'...”); United States v. Loughry, 660 F.3d 965, 972 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding district court erred by failing to explain how it balanced the Rule 403 considerations)) We disagree. The district court first stated why it found the evidence-admissible: it was direct evidence of guilt, and if not, it was admissible under Rule 414 subject to Rule 403’s balancing test. It then explained why it concluded the molestation evidence was not unfairly prejudicial,, stating that Al-Awadi had not objected to most of it, the details were probative to demonstrate CVl’s credibility, and the evidence was not so graphic that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value. Al-Awadi makes other arguments regarding admissibility issues, all of which we review for plain error- because they are raised for the first- time on- appeal. He argués that the government failed to establish a temporal connection between OVl’s reports of pain and the alleged molestation- For example, the substitute kindergarten teacher testified that, on the day at issue, CV1 told her Al-Awadi had touched her “all the way down there and it really hurts. And Mommy said that I can’t take a bubble bath no more because it’s going to hurt worse.” Because CVl’s mother was not at the day care that day, Al-Awadi argues that the conversation about a bubble bath between CV1 and her mother must have taken place before Al-Awadi had any contact with CV1 on the day at issue. There was no plain error in the district court’s finding of sufficient evidence of a temporal connection between the alleged molestation and CVl’s reports of pain to warrant admission of the moles-tation evidence. Among other evidence, CV1 said that she was not hurting before Al-Awadi inserted his Anger in her, and the medical evidence supported an inference that her pain was from the molestation. Discrepancies in the conflicting testimony about timing go to the evidence’s weight,, not to its admissibility. See United States v. Mokol, 646 F.3d 479, 484 (7th Cir. 2011). Al-Awadi’s attorney had the opportunity to, and did, cross examine witnesses regarding contradictions in the timing. We find no plain error. Al-Awadi also argues that the videotaped statement CV1 gave to law' enforcement should not have been admitted at the trial that took place two years after the events. CV1 testified at trial and appeared for cross examination, so the Confrontation Clause did not bar the introduction of her prior statement. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59 n.9, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004) (“[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”). He also seems to suggest a due process violation in the admission of the videotaped statement, but his argument is difficult to discern. We find no plain ' error in the admission -of the statement or of any other challenged evidence.