Opinion ID: 2091620
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: self-incrimination rationale for standing is inapplicable

Text: The first reason for rejecting defendant's rationale for suppression is that it relies on the right against self-incrimination, but there is actually no self-incrimination involved. Defendant urges the automatic standing rule to protect against placing the defendant in a so-called dilemma. The dilemma was posited by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v United States, supra, p 262, to support the adoption of the automatic standing rule under the Fourth Amendment. [12] It was premised upon the fact that various federal circuit courts of appeal at that time had required the defendant to have standing, either to have owned or possessed the seized property or to have had a substantial possessory interest in the premises searched. Jones, supra, p 261. Since at that time there was no rule barring the admission against the defendant at trial of evidence introduced at a suppression hearing, the defendant frequently found himself faced with the dilemma of choosing between establishing standing by alleging that he possessed the item, thereby risking the possibility that such evidence would be used against him at trial, or not establishing standing and not being permitted to seek suppression of illegally obtained evidence. The Jones Court found this situation intolerable in cases where possession of the seized evidence was an essential element of the charged offense. In these cases, possession would both confer standing and convict. Therefore, the Jones Court sought to remedy this situation by giving the defendant automatic standing to seek the suppression of evidence. In the instant case, defendant does not allege that he has been pinioned by this dilemma. In fact, in the wake of Simmons v United States, 390 US 377, 390-394; 88 S Ct 967; 19 L Ed 2d 1247 (1968), no defendant can find himself faced with this dilemma. The Simmons Court held that pursuant to the federal constitution a defendant's suppression hearing testimony cannot be used as evidence of guilt against the defendant at trial. [13] We have recognized the principle set forth in Simmons, and we reaffirm our commitment to that principle. See People v DeClerk, 400 Mich 10, 18-19; 252 NW2d 782 (1977). As a consequence, the fundamental tenet upon which the dilemma was posited has been eliminated, and along with it the dilemma itself. See United States v Salvucci, supra, pp 89-90. See also Brown v United States, 411 US 223, 228; 93 S Ct 1565; 36 L Ed 2d 208 (1973). Therefore, we cannot accept the dilemma as supporting the adoption of the automatic standing rule. The Court of Appeals in this case chose to follow the rationale of Justices Marshall and Brennan in their dissent in Salvucci. 118 Mich 374. In his opinion, Justice Marshall argued: I cannot agree that Simmons provides complete protection against the `self-incrimination dilemma'   . Respondents contend that the testimony given at the suppression hearing might be held admissible for impeachment purposes and, while acknowledging that that question is not before us in this case, the majority broadly hints that this is so.    The use of the testimony for impeachment purposes would subject a defendant to precisely the same dilemma, unless he was prepared to relinquish his constitutional right to testify in his own defense, and would thereby create a strong deterrent to asserting Fourth Amendment claims.    Simmons, therefore, does not eliminate the possibility that a defendant will be deterred from presenting a Fourth Amendment claim because of `the risk that the words which he utters may later be used to incriminate him.' 448 US 96, 97. With due respect to the Court of Appeals and Justices Marshall and Brennan, we cannot agree that the possibility of defendant's testimony in favor of suppression being used to impeach him in the main trial justifies the automatic standing rule. It is one thing to protect a defendant from the dilemma of having to testify that there was possession to obtain standing at the cost of having that testimony used to incriminate him at trial. It is an entirely different proposition to give defendant protection against exposure of his lying at trial by denying the use of his suppression motion testimony. [14] See People v Graham, 386 Mich 452; 192 NW2d 255 (1971); Harris v New York, 401 US 222; 91 S Ct 643; 28 L Ed 2d 1 (1971). However, we agree with the majority in Salvucci that the issue whether the Simmons privilege should extend to exclude such impeachment is best treated in a proper case. Salvucci, supra, p 94. In sum, we do not find merit in any of the above arguments advanced that defendant should have automatic standing to argue suppression of evidence because of an allegedly illegal search or seizure, because with the Simmons change in procedure the defendant's right against self-incrimination is not jeopardized.