Opinion ID: 2609083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proof in an ultrahazardous case is as likely to be obscured by the passage of time as the proof in a dangerously defective products liability case.

Text: The primary ground on which the majority challenges the validity of the foregoing reasoning is as follows: The fallacy of this reasoning [referring to the reasoning of this dissent] is in assuming that problems concerning the availability and credibility of evidence as well as other related factors are the same in all types of strict liability. The dissent's assumption is valid only if such problems [relating to] ultrahazardousness cases are the same as they are in products liability cases. The sole and only basis offered by the majority in defense of its elaborate rationale analysis relating to availability and credibility of evidence on this critical issue is as follows:    Proof of the issues in [an ultrahazardousness] case is not so likely to be obscured by the passage of time. The principal issues are the extent of the damage, which necessarily is of recent vintage, and whether the activity which caused the damage is of the kind that is abnormally dangerous. The inherently dangerous propensities of liquid natural gas, dynamite, aluminum fumes, or of other substances and activities are matters that usually are readily capable of proof without regard to the passage of time.    The present statement by the majority may have been true in McLane v. Northwest Natural Gas, 255 Or. 324, 467 P.2d 635 (1970), the single case cited in support of that statement  a case involving an explosion of stored natural gas. It does not follow, however, that this broad statement by the majority is true in other types of ultrahazardous cases to any greater or lesser extent than in cases under § 402A. The majority mentions aluminum fume cases as another example. Anyone familiar with the problems of proof in an aluminum fume case involving damage to trees, cattle, or human health knows that the statement by the majority is completely untrue in such a case. The extent of damage in such a case is not necessarily    of recent vintage, but usually develops slowly over the course of years as minute amounts of fluorides are deposited upon the leaves of trees or upon vegetation consumed by cattle or humans or upon the soil from which it grows. Although the dangerous propensities of fluorides may be well known and readily capable of proof, the problems of proof of the amounts of fluorides particulates discharged by an aluminum plant, not to speak of the problems of proof of the amount deposited on the soil, vegetation or trees on property several miles from such a plant and the amount ingested by cattle or human beings, as evidenced by the amounts found to be present in bones or internal organs, are infinitely more difficult of proof. [5] In response to this, the majority says that:    One can draw all the similarities or dissimilarities one desires from the various theories of recovery, but the thing of importance is the similarity or dissimilarity of the evidence it takes to prove the respective theories. The fact remains that the evidence in products liability cases and negligence cases is identical, so the problems of the availability and credibility of evidence have to be the same. The contrary is true in the average ultrahazardous case.    (Emphasis added) This assumes that there is such a thing as an average ultrahazardous case. Such cases range in complexity and difficulty in proof from an aluminum fume case to a products liability case such as that involved in Wights v. Staff Jennings. It need not be demonstrated that the problems concerning the availability and credibility of evidence in the average ultrahazardous case are necessarily more difficult than those involved in an action for negligent injury or in an action under § 402A involving a dangerously defective product. What is important, however, is that this flat statement by the majority, without support by any empirical data, is a far too slender reed upon which to rest the contention by the majority that the legislature intended that an action in strict liability under § 402A for personal injuries caused by a dangerously defective product be considered to be an action for negligent injury, so as to be subject to the 10 year limitation provided by ORS 12.115 (1), but intended that an action in strict liability for injuries caused by an ultrahazardous product not be subject to that limitation.