Opinion ID: 1102151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Miscellaneous Issues

Text: First, defendant contends the state impermissibly commented on the victim's character during his opening statement at the guilt phase when he asked the jury: What do you think Chester Howell wanted to do before he died? He probably wanted to watch his kids graduate from school. He probably wanted to take them off to college one day. He probably wanted to walk his daughters down the aisle one day when they got married. But Chester Howell didn't get to do what he wanted to do before he died because that man wanted to kill somebody before he died. In addition, defendant maintains the state went beyond the proper scope of examination by eliciting testimony about the victim's good character through its direct examination of Jay Kerr, the victim's co-worker. Specifically, when the state asked Mr. Kerr to describe the victim, he testified (notably, without objection) as follows: Chester was a[n] extremely affable, generous, sweet man. He was easy to work with. He was, I mean he was an asset to the dealership. He fit in real well with everyone and he was just a nice man, nice family man. With respect to the state's opening statement, a review of the record reveals the defense counsel objected, claiming the state's opening was argumentative and the trial court sustained the objection and further ordered the state to move on. This court has held that if an objection is sustained, a defendant cannot complain of the alleged error on appeal unless at trial he requested and was denied either an admonition or a mistrial. State v. Michel, 422 So.2d 1115, 1121 (La.1982); State v. Sharp, 414 So.2d 752, 755 (La.1982). Because defense counsel did not request an admonition or mistrial following his objection, defendant waived any claim concerning the state's opening statement. In any event, neither the state's opening statement nor Mr. Kerr's testimony technically constitutes victim impact evidence. State v. Bernard, 608 So.2d 966, 967-968 (La.1992) defines victim impact testimony as evidence of the character of the victim, evidence of the emotional, physical, and economic impact of the crime on the family of the murdered victim, and not evidence of the survivors' opinions of the crime and of the murderer. This court held that evidence of the survivors' opinions of the crime and of the murderer are clearly irrelevant to any issue at a sentencing hearing. Id. Thus, victim impact evidence has a highly specific meaning. In the present case, the state's opening statement and the testimony of the victim's co-worker were not offered in the penalty phase for the purpose of recounting the impact of the crime; thus, it should not be described as such. Even assuming the state's statement and the testimony from Mr. Kerr were irrelevant, the evidence was hardly prejudicial, considering it merely humanized the deceased victim and did not overly detail the victim's good qualities. Next, defendant argues that during the penalty phase, the trial court allowed two of the victim's co-workers and a family friend to testify, over defense objection, regarding the victim's relationship with his family and the impact the victim's death had on his family. As an initial matter, at the time of trial, the legislature had amended La.C.Cr. P. art. 905.2(A), [14] to provide that non-family members may testify in capital sentencing hearings: The sentencing hearing shall focus on the circumstances of the offense, the character and propensities of the offender, and the victim, and the impact that the crime has had on the victim, family members, friends, and associates. Thus, as the trial court correctly found, under the current version of La.C.Cr. P. art. 905.2(A), victim impact testimony from the victim's co-workers and friends at the capital sentencing hearing would be appropriate, even though they were not family members of the victim. Furthermore, defendant does not challenge the retroactivity of La.C.Cr. P. art. 905.2(A), but instead complains the victim impact testimony from the victim's co-workers and friend exceeded the bounds of Bernard. In Bernard, this court held that: ... some evidence of the murder victim's character and of the impact of the murder on the victim's survivors is admissible as relevant to the circumstances of the offense or the character and propensities of the offender. To the extent that such evidence reasonably shows that the murderer knew or should have known that the victim, like himself, was a unique person and that the victim had or probably had survivors, and the murderer nevertheless proceeded to commit the crime, the evidence bears on the murderer's character traits and moral culpability, and is relevant to his character and propensities as well as to the circumstances of the crime. However, introduction of detailed descriptions of the good qualities of the victim or particularized narrations of the emotional, psychological and economic sufferings of the victim's survivors, which go beyond the purpose of showing the victim's individual identity and verifying the existence of survivors reasonably expected to grieve and suffer because of the murder, treads dangerously on the possibility of reversal because of the influence of arbitrary factors on the jury's sentencing decision. 608 So.2d at 972. In the instant case, the three witnesses, whose testimony amounted to eight and one-half pages of transcript, did not give detailed lists or descriptions of the victim's good qualities, nor did they give a lengthy particularized narration of the emotional and psychological sufferings of themselves or the other survivors. See State v. Taylor, 93-2201, p. 12 (La.2/28/96), 669 So.2d 364, 371 (in finding the victim impact evidence was harmless, the court noted surely the jury regarded the testimony of these victim impact witnesses as normal human reactions to the death of a loved one). While defendant complains Mr. Nash, one of the victim's co-workers, described the victim as a devout Catholic, the defense voiced no objection to the witness's brief comment, an indication that the defense also found the remark non-prejudicial. Taylor, 669 So.2d at 375 ([T]he lack of an objection demonstrates the defense counsel's belief that the live [remarks] despite [their] appearance in the cold record, [were] not overly damaging.). In his last argument concerning victim impact evidence, defendant challenges the trial court's ruling allowing the state to introduce three photographs of the victim with his family. At the Bernard hearing held before the penalty phase, defense counsel stipulated to the admissibility of a wedding photograph of the victim and his wife; however, defense counsel objected to the state's introduction of two additional photographs of the victim with each of his two daughters. The trial court overruled the defense objection. Aside from his bare allegation of prejudice, defendant fails to show how the state's introduction of two photographs depicting the victim with each of his daughters so influenced the jury as to amount to reversible error. La.C.Cr. P. art. 921. Under these circumstances, defendant's claims concerning victim impact evidence are meritless.
Defendant maintains his sentence is disproportionate when compared with that of Timothy Taylor's sentence who was tried after him and convicted of first degree murder, but sentenced to life imprisonment. This assignment of error will be treated infra, in the Capital Sentence Review section.