Opinion ID: 3135523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: On February 27, 2002, defendant was placed on mandatory supervised release (MSR)1 from a 15-year sentence for armed violence. When defendant was released, he signed a “Parole or Mandatory Supervised Release Agreement” (MSR agreement), which set forth the conditions of his release in accordance with section 3–3–7 of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/3–3–7 (West 2002)). Two of the conditions were as follows: “You shall consent to a search of your person, property, or residence under your control”; and “You shall refrain from the use or possession of narcotics or other controlled substances in any form, or both.” The MSR agreement also stated: “If such rules are violated, parole or mandatory supervised release may be revoked under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Prisoner Review Board or other releasing authority.  Until final discharge, you shall at all times be under the legal custody of the Department of Corrections, subject to being retaken at any time, with the establishment of probable cause, and the lodging of a warrant, within the enclosure of an Illinois State correctional center.” 1 What was referred to as “parole” in Illinois prior to February 1, 1978, is now termed “mandatory supervised release” (MSR). 730 ILCS 5/5–8–1(d) (West 2006). For clarity, Illinois defendants on MSR shall be referred to as “parolees” in this opinion. -2- On February 3, 2003, defendant, who was on parole, was arrested and charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Prior to his bench trial, defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest and suppress evidence. A hearing on defendant’s motion was held on March 18, 2003. At the hearing, parole officer Raymond Hayes testified that, on February 3, 2003, his office received an anonymous tip that defendant had narcotics and weapons in his apartment. Hayes stated that, based on this tip, he visited defendant’s apartment with two Chicago police officers to investigate this possible parole violation. At the apartment, he was given permission to enter by a relative who was “either [defendant’s] mother or grandmother.” Upon entering the apartment, Hayes saw defendant emerge from a bedroom just a few feet from the front door. Defendant told Hayes that the bedroom was his. Hayes then instructed the police officers to search defendant’s bedroom. The police officers found several containers of substances that the Illinois Crime Lab later determined to be cocaine and heroin. Hayes admitted that he did not have a warrant to search defendant or his room and did not ask defendant for his consent to search the room. Hayes testified that he felt neither a warrant nor defendant’s consent was needed because defendant’s MSR agreement constituted defendant’s consent to any searches of his person, property, or residence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress evidence, finding that defendant consented to the search when he signed his MSR agreement. Following a bench trial on September 23, 2003, defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the appellate court held, based on a totality of the circumstances, that the search of defendant’s bedroom was improper. Accordingly, the appellate court reversed defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. People v. Wilson, 361 Ill. App. 3d 93 (2005). The State then appealed to this court. We denied the appeal, but ordered the appellate court to vacate its decision and reconsider its judgment in light of People v. Moss, 217 Ill. 2d 511 (2005). Upon reconsideration, the appellate court again reversed -3- defendant’s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial. 364 Ill. App. 3d 762. This appeal followed.