Opinion ID: 206451
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Filla Standard in this Case

Text: As explained earlier, to prove that a plaintiff fraudulently joined a diversity-destroying defendant, we require a defendant seeking removal to prove that the plaintiff's claim against the diversity-destroying defendant has no reasonable basis in fact and law. Filla, 336 F.3d at 810 (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, if it is clear under governing state law that the complaint does not state a cause of action against the non-diverse defendant, the joinder is fraudulent and federal jurisdiction of the case should be retained. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, joinder is not fraudulent where there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that the state law might impose liability based upon the facts involved. [11] Id. at 811. By requiring the defendant to prove that the plaintiff's claim against the non-diverse defendant has no reasonable basis in law and fact, we require the defendant to do more than merely prove that the plaintiff's claim should be dismissed pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Junk, 628 F.3d at 445 (noting that the Rule 12(b)(6) standard is more demanding than the Filla standard). In this analysis, we do not focus on the artfulness of the plaintiff's pleadings. Wilkinson v. Shackelford, 478 F.3d 957, 964 (8th Cir.2007). Knudson claims that Long is liable in damages for the injuries that Knudson sustained to his lungs while installing the HVAC systems. In Missouri, when an employee is injured during the course of employment by an accident, the employee can generally only recover damages pursuant to Missouri's workers' compensation laws. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 287.120. Injured employees generally cannot sue employers or co-employees for such damages in state court. Burns v. Smith, 214 S.W.3d 335, 337 (Mo.2007) (en banc). However, an employee may sue a fellow employee for affirmative negligent acts outside the scope of an employer's responsibility to provide a safe workplace. Id. at 338 (internal quotation marks omitted). Missouri courts call this the something more exception. Id. The question of what constitutes an `affirmative negligent act' has not proven susceptible of reliable definition. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts have essentially applied the rule on a case-by-case basis with close reference to the facts in each individual case. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). [T]he notion of an affirmatively negligent actthe `something more'can best be described as an affirmative act that creates additional danger beyond that normally faced in the job-specific work environment. Id. Missouri courts have found that supervisors commit affirmative acts of negligence when they direct employees to engage in dangerous conditions that a reasonable person would recognize as hazardous beyond the usual requirements of employment. Sexton v. Jenkins & Assocs., Inc., 41 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Mo.Ct.App.2000) (citing Lyon v. McLaughlin, 960 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Mo.Ct.App.1998)); see also Burns, 214 S.W.3d at 340 (holding that a supervisor committed an affirmative act of negligence by intentionally direct[ing] the plaintiff[-employee] to undertake an activity that [the] defendant knew would result in a particularly dangerous event); Simpson, 484 F.3d at 1085 (noting that, under Missouri law, a supervisor is not entitled to his employer's immunity if he directed the plaintiff employee to engage in dangerous conditions that a reasonable person would recognize as hazardous beyond the usual requirements of employment (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is not necessary, however, that such a supervisor be responsible for creating the hazardous condition at issue. [12] Groh v. Kohler, 148 S.W.3d 11 (Mo.Ct.App. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by Burns, 214 S.W.3d at 338-39, illustrates this point. In Groh, the plaintiff's job required operating a machine that would compress plastic into particular shapes. Id. at 12. Over time, hardened plastic would accumulate in the machine and would have to be removed by hand. The plaintiff's machine began malfunctioning by sporadically compressing on its own. When the plaintiff told her supervisor, who was the defendant in the case, the supervisor told her to quit whining and to just deal with it. Id. at 16. Later, when the plaintiff was reaching her hand into the machine to remove some hardened plastic, the machine compressed on its own and injured the plaintiff's hand. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff had stated a claim for an affirmative act of negligence because, [a]lthough [the defendant] is not alleged to have caused the machine to malfunction, her alleged conduct of compelling [the plaintiff] to continue to perform her duties by operating the known dangerous machine that was likely to injure the operator effectively created the dangerous condition resulting in the injuries sustained by [the plaintiff]. Id. This case is similar to Groh. Knudson's complaint alleges that he was operating under the direct management and control of Long, which is essentially an allegation that Long was Knudson's supervisor. Knudson further alleges that Long instructed him to install HVAC systems in construction sites that were very poorly ventilated. Knudson alleges that he and other employees told Long of the poor ventilation and of their breathing difficulties. Nonetheless, Knudson alleges that Long demanded that Knudson get into the [stores] and complete the HVAC contract. Obviously, Long did not introduce the paint particulate into the air inside the construction sites, but, like Groh, Long may have effectively created the dangerous condition by ordering Knudson to work in an environment where Long knew the employees he was supervising were having breathing problems. For the foregoing reasons, there is arguably a reasonable basis for predicting that [Missouri law] might impose liability on Long. Filla, 336 F.3d at 811. As a result, Knudson did not fraudulently join Long. Thus, since Systems Painters has not proved that an exception to the time-of-filing rule applies, the district court erred in denying Knudson's motion to remand for lack of original jurisdiction.