Opinion ID: 1309379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was contributory negligence an issue?

Text: Over the objection of the Institute, the court gave Instruction 11. [2] This instruction first told the jury that the Institute was charged with a duty to use reasonable care to reactivate its fire detection and alarm system if it knew or should have known that the system was deactivated. We believe the trial court erred in imposing that duty upon the Institute. The Institute had a right to assume that electrician Pulley, who originally installed the alarm system and was thoroughly familiar with it, and who on December 18, 1975, rendered the system inoperative in order to complete work then under his supervision, would reactivate the system when finished with his assigned tasks. There was no duty on the Institute, its agents or employees, to check or inspect behind Pulley or to assume that he would be negligent in the discharge of his duties. See Richmond & Petersburg Electric Railway Company v. Rubin, 102 Va. 809, 816-17, 47 S.E. 834, 836 (1904). See also J. Dooley, 1 Modern Tort Law Liability & Litigation § 4.18 (1977). The jury was then instructed that if the Institute knew or should have known that its premises were on fire it was charged with the duty to promptly notify the fire department. This instruction was apparently based upon evidence which showed that Dr. Baird and his social guests drove by the Institute building on the night of December 18, 1975. [3] We reject the argument that the Institute could be guilty of contributory negligence because Dr. Baird failed to detect the fire when he drove by the premises at 11:15 p. m. In Agricultural Association v. LeCato, 151 Va. 614, 618-19, 144 S.E. 713, 714 (1928), we said: It was not negligence on the part of the plaintiff to fail to be on the lookout for a possible omission of the defendant to comply with its duty. Dr. Baird was under no duty to inspect the premises at that time and the record discloses no evidence that the fire was ever visible. We conclude there is not sufficient evidence to support an instruction on contributory negligence, and we hold the lower court placed a burden on the Institute that it was not required to bear.