Opinion ID: 13
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disability Discrimination under the ADA

Text: The district court found that Carreras failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA because he could not establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the statute. Under the ADA, a disability is defined as: (a) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of an individual's major life activities; (b) a record of such impairment; or (c) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). [5] We have employed a three-part test to determine whether an individual qualifies as disabled under the first definition, which is at issue here. First, does the plaintiff suffer a mental or physical impairment? Second, does the life activity limited by the impairment qualify as major? And finally, does the impairment, in fact, substantially limit that major life activity? See Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 20. The burden is on the plaintiff to establish these three elements. Id. Carreras contends that he is disabled because his diabetes is a physical impairment that substantially limits his ability to eat and see, two major life activities. We must determine the existence of a disability on a case-by-case basis. Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 566, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999). Thus, we must assess the effect of Carreras' alleged impairment on his life, rather than relying on his diagnoses alone, in order to determine whether he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Id. We agree with Carreras that insulin-dependent diabetes is a physical impairment. See, e.g., Rohr v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvements and Power Dist., 555 F.3d 850, 858 (9th Cir.2009) (Diabetes is a `physical impairment' because it affects the digestive, hemic and endocrine systems....). It is similarly beyond dispute that eating and seeing qualify as major life activities. See, e.g., Gillen v. Fallon Ambulance Serv., Inc., 283 F.3d 11, 21 (1st Cir.2002) (major life activities include functions such as caring for oneself, ... seeing); Calero-Cerezo, 355 F.3d at 21 (recognizing eating as a major life activity for purposes of the ADA). We cannot agree, however, that on the record before us there is any genuine issue of material fact as to whether Carreras' diabetes substantially limited his ability to eat or to see. The ADA does not define `substantially limits,' but `substantially' suggests `considerable' or `specified to a large degree.' Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491, 119 S.Ct. 2139, 144 L.Ed.2d 450 (1999), superseded by statute on other grounds, ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub.L. No. 110-325, 172 Stat. 3553 (2008). To be substantially limiting, an impairment must cause a person to be unable to perform a major life activity that an average person in the general population can perform, or to be significantly restricted in the performance of a particular major life activity as compared to an average person in the general population. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1); see also Carroll v. Xerox Corp., 294 F.3d 231, 239 (1st Cir.2002). [6] In assessing in this case the degree of limitation occasioned by a physical impairment, we also take into consideration the effectiveness, side effects and burdens of a plaintiff's mitigating measures, in this case Carreras' twice-daily insulin shots. Rohr, 555 F.3d at 859 (citing Sutton, 527 U.S. at 482-84, 119 S.Ct. 2139). [7] Our inquiry is fact-intensive and individualized. Sepulveda v. Glickman, 167 F.Supp.2d 186, 191 (D.P.R.2001); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483, 119 S.Ct. 2139.
The facts of record fail to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Carreras' vision is substantially limited by his diabetes. Carreras asserts that high blood sugar levels cause his vision to blur, constituting a substantial limitation under the ADA. He does not contest, however, that his latest blurred vision episode occurred a year before he was deposed in this case. Nor does he set forth facts that would explain how such infrequent episodes of blurred vision cause him to be significantly restricted in his ability to see. To qualify as disabling, a limitation ... must be permanent or long term, and considerable compared to the [seeing] most people do in their daily lives. Fredricksen v. United Parcel Serv., Co., 581 F.3d 516, 522 (7th Cir.2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The facts show that Carreras' ability to see does not differ in a significant way from the ability to see of the general population. Cf. Albertson's, Inc., v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-67, 119 S.Ct. 2162, 144 L.Ed.2d 518 (1999) (finding that monocular individuals must prove a disability by offering evidence that the extent of the limitation in terms of their own experience, as in loss of depth perception and visual field, is substantial); Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 106, 108 (3d Cir.1996) (finding plaintiff's limp and inability to walk more than a mile or jog did not substantially limit him in the relevant major life activity, walking). It is undisputed that Carreras drives his son to school and himself to work every morning, drives home again in the evening, reads as part of his current employment, and performs other routine daily activities that presumably would not be possible if his vision were substantially impaired. See Scheerer v. Potter, 443 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir.2006) (finding diabetic with intermittent episodes of significant neuropathy not substantially limited in his ability to walk because he nonetheless was generally able to walk and stand during the pertinent time period). As described in the record, Carreras' diabetes does not limit his sight to a degree that would differentiate him from the rest of the population.
Carreras has also failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether his diabetes substantially limits his life activity of eating. It is undisputed that Carreras' diabetes requires certain adjustments to his diet. He avoids refined flours, drinks juice that is not artificially sweetened, and eats six meals a day. Proof that a medical condition requires medication, a fixed meal schedule, [and] timely snack breaks, without more, does not amount to a substantial limitation under the ADA. Sepulveda, 167 F.Supp.2d at 191 (quotation marks omitted). The analysis of when and under what conditions diabetes is considered a disability for ADA purposes is a matter of degree. Id. at 190. We recognize that living with diabetes may result in a complex calculus balancing food intake, activity level, and the amount of insulin administered. An individual living with diabetes may or may not experience a substantial limitation in his or her ability to eat as contrasted with the rest of the population. See, e.g., Lawson v. CSX Transp., Inc., 245 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir.2001) (describing substantial limitation on eating entailed by perpetual, multi-faceted and demanding treatment regime for plaintiff's diabetes (quotation marks omitted)); Rohr, 555 F.3d at 859 (finding genuine issue of material fact as to whether plaintiff had a substantial impairment in eating where he described controlling his disease through a combination of diet and insulin as being on a chemical rollercoaster (quotation marks omitted)). Many diabetics follow a severely restrictive, and highly demanding regimen to control their disease from which any deviation could result in a trip to the emergency room. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1041 (9th Cir. 2003). The record indicates, however, that Carreras is at the far end of the spectrum from those plaintiffs who cannot put a morsel of food into their mouths without carefully assessing whether it will tip [their] blood sugar[ ] levels. Id. [8] He does not dispute that his twice daily insulin shots successfully control his diabetes. Cf. Lawson, 245 F.3d at 924 (finding jury question as to whether diabetic could meet the substantial limitation threshold because even when taking insulin, [plaintiff's] `ability to regulate his blood sugar and metabolize food is difficult, erratic, and substantially limited'). Indeed, the facts are that, by taking two insulin shots each day and eating fairly often, Carreras succeeds in preventing his diabetes from substantially limiting any of his major life activities. Compare Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-89, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (the wearing of corrective lenses to neutralize the effects of myopia negated substantial impairment of vision caused by plaintiff's disability) with Lawson, 245 F.3d at 925-26 (the need to coordinate multifaceted factors and to maintain constant vigilance over plaintiff's insulin regimen, coupled with the grave effects of noncompliance, distinguished plaintiff's case from Sutton ).
In summary, Carreras adduces no evidence that his diabetes causes more than minor limitations on his eating and seeing. See Rohr, 555 F.3d at 860 (If daily insulin injections alone more or less stabilized [plaintiff's] blood sugar levels, such that any limitation imposed on his diet would be minor, then [his] major life activity of eating might not be substantially limited.). We therefore agree with the district court that Carreras has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he is disabled under the ADA.