Opinion ID: 1059146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: issues

Text: In assigning error to the circuit court's denial of the defendant's pretrial motion challenging the constitutionality of Virginia's capital murder statutes, Jackson presents several reasons why he contends that the death penalty on its face and as applied violates the Sixth Amendment, the Eighth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as Article I, §§ 8, 9, and 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. We have previously rejected these arguments and find no reason to depart from our precedent. (1) The aggravating factor of future dangerousness is unconstitutionally vague because it does not provide meaningful guidance to the sentencing jury so as to avoid an arbitrary and capricious infliction of the death penalty  rejected in Bell, 264 Va. at 203, 563 S.E.2d at 716; Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 508, 537 S.E.2d 866, 874 (2000); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 476-78, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148-49 (1978). (2) Virginia's capital murder statutes do not require instructions to the jury regarding the duty to consider mitigating evidence, the meaning of mitigating evidence, the absence of any burden of proof on a defendant with regard to the mitigation evidence presented, and the liberty that each juror has to consider and give effect to mitigating evidence  rejected in Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76, 118 S.Ct. 757, 139 L.Ed.2d 702 (1998); Lovitt, 260 Va. at 508, 537 S.E.2d at 874; Mickens v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 315, 320, 478 S.E.2d 302, 305 (1996); Joseph v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 78, 82-83, 452 S.E.2d 862, 865 (1995). (3) The use of unadjudicated conduct to prove the aggravating factor of future dangerousness fails to comport with the constitutional requirement of reliability for capital sentencing  rejected in Bell, 264 Va. at 203, 563 S.E.2d at 716; Satcher v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 220, 228, 421 S.E.2d 821, 826 (1992); Stockton v. Commonwealth, 241 Va. 192, 210, 402 S.E.2d 196, 206 (1991). (4) A sentence of death under Code § 19.2-264.5 is unconstitutional because a trial court may consider hearsay evidence contained in a post-sentence report  rejected in Lenz v. Commonwealth, 261 Va. 451, 459, 544 S.E.2d 299, 303-04 (2001); Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 299-300, 513 S.E.2d 642, 647 (1999). (5) A sentence of death under Code 19.2-264.5 is unconstitutional because a trial court is not required to set aside a death penalty upon a showing of good cause  rejected in Chandler v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 270, 276, 455 S.E.2d 219, 223 (1995); Breard v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 68, 76, 445 S.E.2d 670, 675-76 (1994). (6) Virginia's death penalty statutes do not provide for meaningful appellate review, including the proportionality review  rejected in Emmett v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 364, 374-75, 569 S.E.2d 39, 46 (2002); Lenz, 261 Va. at 459, 544 S.E.2d at 304; Bailey v. Commonwealth, 259 Va. 723, 740-42, 529 S.E.2d 570, 580-81 (2000); Satcher, 244 Va. at 228, 421 S.E.2d at 826. (7) The expedited review of death penalty cases is unconstitutional  rejected in Morrisette v. Commonwealth, 264 Va. 386, 398, 569 S.E.2d 47, 55 (2002).