Opinion ID: 171617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion for the Initial Detention

Text: Mr. DeJear first argues that Officer Morrison lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him. He observes that the officer had not received any information indicating that illegal activity was occurring. Moreover, as they first approached the scene, none of the officers saw anything suspicious. In sum, officers saw three people in a car lawfully parked in a private residence in a high crime area. Aplt's Br. at 18. Mr. DeJear acknowledges that Officer Morrison saw him make stuffing movements toward the seat. But, he contends, these furtive movements were also insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion. He cites a Tenth Circuit decision, United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir.1969), which contains the statement that the allegedly furtive movements alone establish nothing. Mr. DeJear also invokes a district court case, United States v. Smith, 614 F.Supp. 25, 28 (D.D.C.1984), in which an officer saw a driver make furtive movements as though trying to hide something under the seat. Mr. DeJear observes that the furtive movements were viewed by the D.C. district court as part of the totality of the circumstances that supported reasonable suspicion but that the furtive movements were not sufficient, standing alone, to establish such suspicion. Mr. DeJear's arguments are not persuasive. Under the Fourth Amendment, an investigative detention such as the one that occurred here is reasonable if it is (1) justified at its inception and (2) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A detention is justified at its inception if the specific and articulable facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts give rise to a reasonable suspicion a person has or is committing a crime. United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir.1990) (discussing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)). [I]nchoate suspicions and unparticularized hunches are not sufficient. United States v. Lyons, 510 F.3d 1225, 1237 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, the level of suspicion required for reasonable suspicion is `considerably less' than proof by a preponderance of the evidence or that required for probable cause. United States v. Lopez, 518 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989)). Here, as the district court reasoned, the totality of the circumstances provided the officers with a reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. DeJear. In particular, before the detention began (by Officer Morrison telling Mr. DeJear to show his hands), the officer observed that Mr. DeJear appeared nervous and that he had begun stuffing both hands down into the car seat as though he was trying to conceal something. In addition, the house was in an area known for criminal activity, and, on previous occasions, Officer Morrison had seen people standing outside of it wearing colors affiliated with local gangs. Rec. vol. II, at 21 Moreover, Officer Morrison saw the backseat passenger was holding an object that could be used as a weapona baseball bat. Furtive movements, nervousness, and the fact that conduct occurs in an area known for criminal activity are all appropriate factors to consider in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists. See United States v. Bullock, 510 F.3d 342, 348 (D.C.Cir.2007) (stating that furtive gestures in response to the presence of the police can serve as the basis of an officer's reasonable suspicion) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2095, 170 L.Ed.2d 827 (2008); United States v. Dennison, 410 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2005) ([The defendant's] presence in a high-crime area is not, standing alone, enough to provide reasonable suspicion, but it may be a relevant contextual consideration in a Terry analysis.) (internal quotation marks omitted); Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1192 ([N]ervousness, even if it may be a normal reaction, is still among the pertinent factors a reasonable law enforcement officer would analyze in investigating possible crimes and should not be completely disregarded.); United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93, 98 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding that furtive movement provided a legal basis for the protective search). Accordingly, the district court properly concluded that Officer Morrison had reasonable suspicion to detain Mr. DeJear.