Opinion ID: 2607357
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the district court correctly denied lankford's motion for recusal

Text: The issue concerning Lankford's motion to recuse the sentencing judge is moot in light of the fact that sentencing will take place before a different judge. However, the court will address the question briefly to settle matters in the record. The sentencing judge took a guided tour of death row. Initially, the defense had no objection based on this disclosure and even discussed having the judge briefly occupy a cell in order to better understand the type of confinement Lankford had experienced. Yet when the court reconvened after the weekend, the defense had filed a recusal motion based on the judge's prison tour. On the tour the sentencing judge spoke briefly to Sgt. Taylor, a witness who had testified for the prosecution about Lankford's behavior in prison. [6] Sergeant Taylor was on duty in the death row unit but did not accompany the tour group. There was no discussion of the case. Lankford relies on cases from other jurisdictions involving ex parte contacts in sentencing procedures where the substance of the contact was, or could have been, relevant to the sentencing determination. By contrast, Lankford's claim is that even though nothing of substantive relevance was discussed by the trial judge and Sgt. Taylor, the contact could nevertheless have potentially impacted the sentencing procedure because the sentencing judge's assessment of Sgt. Taylor's credibility might have been affected. Lankford cites to no decision where such an attenuated impact on the sentencing procedure has been condemned as an impermissible ex parte contact, and this Court has discovered none. In State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993), the defendant sought to disqualify the judge in post-conviction proceedings based on the fact that the judge and the prosecutor had communicated about some administrative matters not involving the merits of the case. This Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion based on the defendant's inability to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the communications and the judge's representation that the merits of the case had not been discussed. Id. at 566, 873 P.2d at 820. While Pratt involved contact with a prosecutor rather than a prosecution witness, the interaction was as innocuous as what occurred in this case. Lankford's suggestion that any interaction between two people necessarily contributes to an assessment of credibility is simply too broad. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the sentencing judge received the type of information from Sgt. Taylor during the prison tour which one would expect a person to rely upon in formulating a credibility determination. Lankford's claim lacks support in fact and runs contrary to common experience. The denial of the motion to recuse is affirmed.