Opinion ID: 3179275
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: “Amorphous” Burden on Inmates

Text: The district court then identified and examined various “structural problems” that could account for the Board’s denial of PTAs. The most troubling problem found by the district court was that Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(d)(1) places a new, additional, and “amorphous” burden on prisoners seeking an advance hearing—to show a “‘change in 12 We recognize that in Garner, the Georgia Board retained discretion, after denying parole, to schedule the next parole hearing at any time, and that here, the Board must schedule its next hearing three years later, at the soonest. However, the Board retains the power to advance a hearing sua sponte so that it occurs in less than three years. Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(b)(4). When the Board sets a hearing three years away, and does not advance that hearing, or when the Board denies a PTA, the Board necessarily exercises its discretion to deny parole by exercising its discretion, through individual Commissioners or Deputy Commissioners, to deny the PTA or advancement of the hearing. Thus, we treat the Board’s exercise of discretion during the PTA process as an exercise of discretion as to whether to grant or deny parole within the meaning of Garner. 13 As we described supra with respect to Proposition 89, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not violated just because two entities applying the same criteria arrive at different conclusions regarding parole decisions. That is all the more true here, because, unlike the Governor, the district court has no direct oversight of parole or PTA decisions. GILMAN V. BROWN 23 circumstances or new information’ . . . before [the Board] will even consider the question of suitability for parole.” The district court found that the Board has interpreted the statute to require a “change in circumstances or new information” “in a way that separates the ‘change in circumstances or new information’ from the question of suitability.” (Emphasis added.) This is an unnatural reading of Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(d)(1), which specifically ties the “change in circumstances or new information” to that which “establishes a reasonable likelihood that consideration of the public safety does not require the additional period of incarceration of the inmate”; that is, suitability for parole. Moreover, the evidence in the record favors this commonsense reading of the statute and runs counter to the district court’s finding. A non-exclusive list of examples included in the Board’s training materials suggests that the Board interprets Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(d)(1) broadly. To show new information or a changed circumstance, an inmate need present only one or more of the building blocks that could result in a suitability finding, such as an updated parole plan, a job offer, completion of a substance-abuse-treatment program, or attainment of an educational certificate. The Board also requires, as does the statute, that the new information or changed circumstance “establishes a reasonable likelihood that consideration of public safety does not require an additional period of incarceration”—that is, that the new information or changed circumstance is reasonably likely to result in a finding of suitability for parole. In other words, if the Board follows its manual, it will deny an advance hearing only if it concludes that the inmate is unlikely to be found suitable for parole in light of all the 24 GILMAN V. BROWN information presented.14 Such an inmate—one who is likely unsuitable for parole—by definition is likely not to have received parole before the enactment of Proposition 9. And an inmate who was unsuitable a year ago and as to whom nothing has changed, similarly, was as unlikely to obtain parole before Proposition 9 as he is after. Cf. Morales, 514 U.S. at 512 (“For these prisoners, the amendment simply allows the Board to avoid the futility of going through the motions of reannouncing its denial of parole suitability on a yearly basis.”). The district court concluded that the Board separated the “change in circumstances or new information” from parole suitability based on “some examples” of PTA denials, in particular, the denial of prisoner M. Brodheim’s PTA.15 14 Of course, “[a]bsent a demonstration to the contrary, we presume the Board follows its statutory commands and internal policies in fulfilling its obligations.” Garner, 529 U.S. at 256. 15 The district court mentioned three other cases. As to prisoner J. Kyne, the district court discerned that “even under the most skeptical and jaundiced eye, [Kyne] clearly presents new information and changed circumstances that addressed his suitability for parole.” Two problems emerge. First, Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(d)(1) requires changed circumstances or new information that establishes the likelihood of suitability, not that they “address” such suitability. Second, the district court was again erroneously second-guessing the Board’s decision, see supra, arrogating to itself the “unfettered discretion” assigned to the Board by law. Vicks, 295 P.3d at 882; see also Cooke, 562 U.S. at 220. As to prisoners J. Ferioli and C. Chruniak, the district court apparently thought that they deserved advance hearings because notations in their PTA denials suggested that they were “doing well,” even though the decisionmakers in those cases noted that they did not demonstrate changed circumstances or new information sufficient to warrant an advance hearing. If “doing well” since the last denial of parole were GILMAN V. BROWN 25 Brodheim did not procure an advance hearing through the PTA process. He obtained a hearing by successfully petitioning the district court for a writ of habeas corpus; we ultimately reversed the decision to grant the writ. While the appeal of that decision was pending, the Board found Brodheim suitable for parole but, after we reversed the improperly granted writ, Brodheim was returned to the same status as had obtained before the district court’s action. He then filed a PTA, appending the transcript from the parole hearing at which he was found suitable for parole, but his PTA was summarily denied. It may seem an abuse of discretion to have returned Brodheim to non-parole status after a hearing had determined him suitable for parole, even though that hearing was undeserved. Indeed, Brodheim may have had a state-law remedy, as Proposition 9 allows PTA denials to be “review[ed] by a court or magistrate . . . for a manifest abuse of discretion by the board.” Cal. Penal Code § 3041.5(d)(2). However, we do not think it is possible to extrapolate from this single, peculiar example a finding as to how the Board handled PTAs from Gilman and other class members. The district court’s inference, based solely on the Brodheim example, that after Proposition 9, class members face “incarceration indefinitely, unless the Board finds clear and convincing evidence of (a) a change in circumstances or new sufficient grounds to advance a hearing, only inmates misbehaving or not progressing would be declined advance hearings. The “change in circumstances” that would entitle murderers and other prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment to an advance hearing must be “sufficiently monumental” as to “alter their suitability for release on parole.” Morales, 514 U.S. at 512. Merely “doing well” does not rise to that level. And, again, it is for the Board, not the district court, to determine whether the requisite showing has been made to merit an advance hearing. 26 GILMAN V. BROWN information, and separately, (b) suitability,” is thus erroneous.