Opinion ID: 2435790
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Opinions in Other Jurisdictions

Text: In the trial court, Norbert Buys argued that the 1990 amendment deprived the court of jurisdiction because it did not mention military retirement, and therefore, under his analysis did not treat it. He filed a motion to dismiss, a second motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, and an amended second motion to dismiss and plea to the jurisdiction, all of which presented different shades of his jurisdictional argument. Norbert also pled and argued the statute as a defensive matter. He offered it as a ground for summary judgment and a conclusive defense in his motion for new trial. The diversity of language about the statute perhaps explains his positions. However, we find his position unpersuasive. We acknowledge that language from opinions from other jurisdictions suggests or states that a divorce decree before June 25, 1981 must expressly mention military retirement benefits to treat them under section 1408(c)(1). We may distinguish all these cases because none of them considered an unambiguous residuary clause effective under state law to award the military retirement benefits. Further, by examining the factual context of each case, we conclude that the broad language was meant to apply only to the factual contexts at issue, and therefore not to a legally effective residuary clause. We review the factual contexts of several of these cases. In Kemp v. United States Department of Defense, 857 F.Supp. 32, 33 (W.D.La.1994), the court emphasized that the state court judgment of divorce did not contain any reference to Mr. Kemp's military retirement pay. In Kemp , the court concluded that the divorce decree did not treat military retirement. The factual context, however, was that there was a 1978 divorce judgment (without a residuary clause) followed by two subsequent partition actions in 1990 and 1992, the latter actions being to divide the military retirement benefits. In essence, the facts show a pure subsequent partition action. The Kemp opinion cited Dunham v. Dunham, 602 So.2d 1139 (La.App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 605 So.2d 1375 (La.1992), on what federal law required. The facts in Dunham (marriage 1959, divorce 1974 with no residuary clause or specific mention of military retirement, partition suit for military retirement benefits 1990) make it clear, however, that Dunham also was a pure partition suit to reopen the property division to reach the military retirement benefits. See Dunham, 602 So.2d at 1140, 1142-43. Likewise, in Johnson v. Johnson, 605 So.2d 1157, 1161 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 608 So.2d 152 (La.1992), the court wrote that section 1408(c)(1) required specific treatment of military retirement benefits in the divorce judgment. The factual context, in contrast, was a 1976 divorce with a property settlement agreement that did not mention military retirement benefits and did not have an unambiguous residuary clause sufficient to award military retirement benefits under state law. Again, the court essentially dealt with a pure partition suit rather than a suit enforcing an award under the divorce judgment. The court confronted a different construction issue in Terry v. Lee, 314 S.C. 420, 445 S.E.2d 435 (1994). The parties' 1968 California divorce judgment had a provision that if a court of competent jurisdiction later should determine that a party was possessed of community property unknown to the party or not specified in the property settlement, then the party agreed to pay the other party one-half of the fair market value of such property upon request. Terry, 445 S.E.2d at 436-37. The court concluded that the provision did not treat the military retirement benefits because at the time of the divorce the benefits were not divisible property under McCarty , and hence were not included as marital property contemplated by the provision. Terry, 445 S.E.2d at 437-38. A similar argument asking the appellate court to strain to find military retirement benefits treated under a general order was presented in White v. White, 623 So.2d 31 (La.App. 1st Cir.1993). The 1967 divorce did not partition the community property of the parties, and made no mention of military retirement benefits. The former wife argued that the entry of a permanent injunction when the parties legally separated enjoining the former husband from alienating, disposing or mortgaging the community property was enough to treat or reserve jurisdiction to treat military retirement benefits under section 1408(c)(1). White, 623 So.2d at 33. The court concluded, The clear wording of this federal preemption statute requires a specific treatment of military retirement benefits in the division of the community or a specific reservation of jurisdiction to treat military retirement benefits as community property. White, 623 So.2d at 34. The court further suggested that any reservation of military benefits should include a fractional amount. White, 623 So.2d at 34. In context, the White holding is that a broad reference to community property in an injunctive order is not enough to reserve treatment of military retirement benefits. White does not compel the conclusion that a broad residuary clause in the divorce decree which is actually effective to award the military retirement benefits is not treatment under the 1990 federal amendment. Opinions considering post-divorce suits to divide retirement rights equitably as marital property subject to division after a final divorce decree, with no claim that the divorce decree or its property settlement awarded the military retirement to a party, simply do not apply. Cf. Johnson v. Johnson, 824 P.2d 1381, 1382 (Alaska 1992)(pure post-divorce equitable suit in which divorce property settlement provisions did not specify husband's military retirement benefits in any way); Hollyfield v. Hollyfield, 618 So.2d 1303, 1304-05 (Miss.1993)(pure post-divorce equitable suit in which military retirement benefits were not mentioned in the [divorce] judgment, so decree neither treated, nor reserved jurisdiction to treat military retired pay); Mings v. Mings, 841 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Mo.App.1992)(equitable action for division of alleged marital property in which military retirement was not awarded by divorce decree); Mote v. Corser, 810 S.W.2d 122 (Mo.App.1991)(divorce decree did not award or mention military retirement such that pure equitable claims in later partition suit were not enough to meet federal requirements). We do not hold that the residuary clause is only broad enough to embrace the one-half of the community interest the trial court awarded Alene. Because she limited the request for relief in her application for writ of error to the retirement benefit sums the trial court awarded, we do not consider the issue whether the clause conveyed greater interests. Similarly, we do not imply that the residuary clause touches only one-half of the community part of the Civil Service retirement. Because the clause covers the trial court sum, we reach the same result as the court of appeals judgment on Civil Service benefits. Also, we do not consider and express no opinion on whether the 1990 amendment preempts a community property state court's ability to partition tenancy in common military retirement benefits earned during marriage but not awarded in the final divorce decree. Compare Walton v. Lee, 888 S.W.2d 604 (Tex.App.Beaumont 1994, writ denied), with Knowles v. Knowles, 811 S.W.2d 709 (Tex.App.Tyler 1991, no writ); see also Reppy, The 1990 U.S.F.S.P.A. Amendment, 29 Idaho L. Rev. at 961.