Opinion ID: 78332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The June 29 Confession

Text: Lopez-Garcia also argues that his June 29, 2007 statements must be suppressed for two reasons. Both invoke some version of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, arguing that the June 29 statements were tainted by the constitutional infirmity of his June 19 statements. But even if we were to assume that Lopez-Garcia's rights had been violated by Diaz's questioning on June 19and we are not persuaded on that pointhe still would fall short of showing that his June 29 statements were suppressible. Lopez-Garcia's Fourth Amendment fruit of the poisonous tree argument is completely implausible when applied to the June 29 statements. As we have noted previously, we typically consider three factors in determining whether evidence has been tainted by a prior violation of constitutional rights: (1) the temporal proximity of the seizure and the consent; (2) the presence of intervening circumstances; and (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Delancy, 502 F.3d at 1309. Each of these factors yields the conclusion that the June 29 statements were far too attenuated from the June 19 statements to have been tainted by them. First, the temporal proximity between the events is exceedingly slight: a period of ten full days separates the two confessions. Moreover, the intervening circumstances here are even more pronounced than those obtaining between the June 19 confession and the arrest: while the subject of the June 19 and June 29 interviews was the same, the first interview was conducted by Diaz alone, whereas both Diaz and Agent Prieto were present for the June 29 interview. In addition, whereas the booking on June 18 and the interview on June 19 took place in the jail's intake area, Lopez-Garcia was transported to an ICE office within the jail for the June 29 questioning. Still further, Lopez-Garcia was fully Mirandized prior to the June 29 interview. Finally, nothing in the record suggests anything flagrant about the June 29 interview or anything nefarious about its purpose. On the contrary, in every respect, the interrogation was conducted according to Hoyle: Lopez-Garcia was given Miranda warnings prior to the interrogation; Diaz spoke to Lopez-Garcia in Spanish and took special care to ensure that he was aware of his rights and that he understood the questions he was asked. Indeed, the district court found that Lopez-Garcia appeared calm and composed throughout the interview. Lopez-Garcia's Fifth Amendment argument fares no better when applied to the June 29 statement. Here, Lopez-Garcia claims that even though he was Mirandized prior to the June 29 interview, his unwarned statements on June 19 invalidate his decision to waive his Miranda rights before making his June 29 confession. We are unpersuaded. In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed whether a properly warned confession is admissible after a defendant has first given an unwarned or improperly warned confession. The defendant in Elstad confessed to having committed a burglary after being subjected to unwarned custodial questioning at his home. Id. at 300-01, 105 S.Ct. 1285. The officers later took the defendant to their headquarters, and after giving him Miranda warnings for the first time about an hour later, he again made a full confession. Id. at 301, 105 S.Ct. 1285. The Supreme Court rejected the claim that the simple failure to administer the [ Miranda ] warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period. Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Rather, the Court held that the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made. Id.; see also United States v. Street, 472 F.3d 1298, 1313-14 (11th Cir.2006). Here, like the district court, we have no doubt that Lopez-Garcia's second confession was knowingly and voluntarily made. Diaz read Lopez-Garcia his rights in Spanish and gave him the opportunity to ask any questions he might have had. Lopez-Garcia unequivocally acknowledged that he understood his rights before signing the waiver form. Neither Diaz nor Prieto was armed during the interrogation, and Lopez-Garcia appeared calm throughout the meeting. Nor does Lopez-Garcia suggest that Diaz's failure to Mirandize him before the June 19 interview was somehow deliberate or strategic. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 609-11, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 159 L.Ed.2d 643 (2004) (plurality opinion) (discussing the tactic of purposefully withholding Miranda warnings while interrogating a suspect in order to obtain a full confession and later leading the defendant to re-confess after having provided Miranda warnings). Instead, the record suggests that Diaz did not provide Miranda warnings because, given the purpose of his interview, he did not think it likely that Lopez-Garcia would make any self-incriminating statements. Nor, finally, do we believe that Lopez-Garcia should, as he suggests, be given some leeway because of his lack of familiarity with the American criminal justice system. The current prosecution was not the first time that Lopez-Garcia found himself a defendant in a criminal case in an American court. Several years earlier, he was prosecuted by the State of Georgia on drug trafficking and gun possession charges. And most importantly, he was given Miranda warnings prior to making his confession, and he unequivocally stated that he understood his rights before waiving them.