Opinion ID: 1160300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Independent contractor or employee.

Text: The jury, given the facts and proper instructions, found Mr. Boone to be a vice principal or superior servant employee of Combined Insurance Company acting, at the time of the accident, within the scope of his employment, and, therefore, his negligence was imputed to his employer. The appellant's theory that Boone was an independent contractor was rejected. In Wyoming, as a matter of public policy and economic requirement, a master is liable for damages caused by the negligence of his servant while acting within the scope of the servant's employment. Blessing v. Pittman, 70 Wyo. 416, 251 P.2d 243, 246. The overriding consideration in determining whether one is an employee or an independent contractor lies in ascertaining whether or not the employer has the right to control the details of the work whereby liability is sought to be established. Stockwell v. Morris, 46 Wyo. 1, 22 P.2d 189. This issue is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury and becomes a question of law only when but one reasonable inference can be drawn. Barnes v. Fernandez, supra ; and Tyler v. Jensen, 75 Wyo. 249, 295 P.2d 742, 749. More particularly, the extent to which an employee has the right to control is primarily a jury question. Holly Sugar Corporation v. Perez, Wyo., 508 P.2d 595, 598. In deciding whether, as of the time of the accident, there is sufficient evidence of record to take the question of the employer-employee relationship between Boone and Combined Insurance to the jury and support a verdict holding the relationship to exist, we must look to the evidence most advantageous to the appellee and give it every favorable inference. [2] The base determining factor is whether Combined retained the right of control of the manner that Boone operated his vehicle and not whether such control was in fact exercised. Stockwell v. Morris, supra ; Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge Intern. Order of Odd Fellows, Wyo., 526 P.2d 52 (1974); Tyler v. Jensen (1956), supra; Fox Park Timber Co. v. Baker, 53 Wyo. 467, 84 P.2d 736, 120 A.L.R. 1020 (1938); Chatelain v. Thackery, 98 Utah 525, 100 P.2d 191, and Ludlow v. Industrial Commission, 65 Utah 168, 235 P. 884. See, also, 41 Am.Jur.2d, Independent Contractors, §§ 5 and 7. In addition to the right of control, another test (or perhaps an indicia of the right-of-control test) is said to be whether the right to terminate the employment is retained and can be exercised without incurring liability. In Fox Park Timber Company v. Baker, supra , and repeated in Brubaker v. Glenrock Lodge, supra, we said: ... Another test is whether either of the parties possesses the right to terminate the services at will without incurring liability to the other, this embracing, of course, the right of the employer at any time to discharge the party performing the work, an affirmative answer establishing the status of master and servant... . The same question arises in the corollary situation where the inquiry concerns which principal a servant is acting for when one or the other is to be held responsible for the servant's negligence. The tests reviewed above are, in such instances, applicable, with Tyler v. Jensen, supra , adding the `in whose business was the servant engaged' test. If, at the time of the accident, the employee is engaged in furthering the employer's business interests, and with respect thereto the employer has the right to control the details of the work and to discharge the employee for failing to follow orders without incurring liability, there can be no independent contractor relationship. We have defined an independent contractor when we said: `... An independent contractor is one who, exercising an independent employment, contracts to do a piece of work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of his employer except as to the result of the work.' ... Lichty v. Model Homes, 66 Wyo. 347, 211 P.2d 958, 967. Evidence of appellant's retention of the right to control the activities of Edward Boone may be summarized as follows: 1. He had to have a vehicle in order to further the business of Combined. 2. This was also true of the team members over whom he exercised supervision. 3. Boone was hired by, and under the contract was capable of being fired by, Combined. 4. The amount of Boone's commissions and bonuses were fixed by Combined. 5. Boone took his instructions as to the manner he would cover his territory and the way the team members would cover it from a superior employee of Combined  the District Manager. 6. The price of the product being sold was fixed by Combined. 7. It was a necessary part of Boone's job to be on the road and to keep the team members on the road in behalf of Combined. 8. Boone was performing work for the Company when he took Miss Sinclair to Jackson and back while working with her on her presentation, and it is not contended that he did not have a right to be doing this. 9. Boone was known as the Sales Manager of the Superior Policy Department of Combined Insurance. 10. He was described as a Combined Insurance Company supervisor. 11. Under his contract, Boone's entire efforts were to be exclusively devoted to his job as sales representative. 12. Boone was eligible to participate in the Combined Insurance Company's pension by reason of his association with his Company. 13. While Boone's job was that of promoting business through personal contact between his team members and the public, he did not hire and fire the team members, but this was done by a Combined Insurance District Manager. He accepted such team members as his District Manager assigned to him. 14. Combined furnished Boone the computerized list of policyholders from which most of his income originated. 15. Boone was required to report to and meet with a Combined Insurance Company District Manager each week, whereupon the last week's business, as well as the upcoming week's business, was discussed. 16. Boone was bound by the terms of his contract with Combined Insurance, which provided in relevant part: (1) The Company hereby appoints the Sales Manager as Sales Manager of the Superior Policy Department to act for the Company, subject to the rules and regulations of the Company and the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, exclusively for the sale of the policies and renewals indicated in this Paragraph (1) only in and for the following territory (hereinafter called the `Sales Territory'), viz: . .. . [Emphasis supplied] And it further provides: (3) The Sales Manager agrees to observe and practice, and cause those operating under his supervision to observe and practice, sound underwriting principles, and to abide by the rules, regulations and instructions issued by the Company from time to time ; further, the Sales Manager agrees to devote his entire time and best efforts in developing the sale of the above identified policies and renewals in the Sales Territory, and agrees that he will not replace, nor will he permit salesmen under his supervision to replace, policies already issued with new policies but will write and cause salesmen under his supervision to write renewals of policies in force, whether issued before or during the period the Sales Manager serves as such hereunder, except where the premium of the new policy is different from the premium of the policy being replaced and such replacement is authorized under the standard underwriting practices of the Company. The Sales Manager agrees that while this Agreement is in force, he will not, at any time, without written approval of the Company executed by its President or Executive Vice-President, directly or indirectly represent any other insurance organization or company or place any insurance except with the Company, or aid or abet anyone else in representing any other insurance organization or company or placing any insurance except with the Company. [Emphasis supplied] We think that the control and retention of the right-to-control factors set out above, together with the evidentiary showing that  at least in part  the business of the Company was being furthered by the trip to Jackson  all taken together  establish the employer-employee relationship between Combined and Boone at the time of the accident. At the very least, there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict. It is also clear that Combined retained and exercised the right of, as well as actual, control over the details of Boone's work. We should say  perhaps in emphasis  that the most telling evidence indicating the intention of the parties with respect to the type of association they contemplated is the contract of employment itself, which, as we have noted, provides that the conduct of Mr. Boone, while he was acting within the scope of his employment, was to be governed by the rules and regulations of the Company. The facts taken as a whole support the conclusion that this right of control extended to the manner in which Mr. Boone operated his vehicle.