Opinion ID: 4535065
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Felony DUI Conviction Requires “Mandatory

Text: Sentencing,” Thereby Triggering a Defendant’s Right to a Preliminary Hearing. ¶12 Huckabay contends that because his felony DUI charge requires mandatory sentencing, the plain language of both section 16-5-301(1)(a) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1) entitles him to a preliminary hearing. We agree. ¶13 At the outset, we observe that “mandatory sentencing” is not expressly defined in either the statute or the rule. See People v. Austin, 2018 CO 47, ¶ 7, 419 P.3d 587, 588. The meaning of this term therefore presents a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. In interpreting a statute, we begin with the statute’s plain language. Wolf Ranch, LLC v. City of Colo. Springs, 220 P.3d 559, 563 (Colo. 2009). If the language is clear and unambiguous on its face, we simply apply it as written and will not resort to other interpretive aids. See Blooming Terrace No. 1, LLC v. KH Blake St., LLC, 2019 CO 58, ¶ 11, 444 P.3d 749, 752. Further, we regard the statutory 6 scheme “as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts.” McCoy, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389. ¶14 The preliminary hearing statute provides in relevant part: [O]nly those persons accused of a class 4, 5, or 6 felony by direct information or felony complaint which felony requires mandatory sentencing . . . shall have the right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the offense charged in the information or felony complaint was committed by the defendant. § 16-5-301(1)(a) (emphases added); see also Crim. P. 7(h)(1) (“In cases in which a direct information was filed pursuant to Rule 7(c), charging . . . a class 4, 5, or 6 felony . . . if such felony requires mandatory sentencing . . . a preliminary hearing is authorized.”). ¶15 Thus, a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing where two conditions are satisfied: (1) the defendant is accused of a class four, five, or six felony; and (2) the charge requires mandatory sentencing. For Huckabay—a defendant facing a DUI charge with at least three prior DUI convictions under his belt—we know with certainty that the first condition has been met. According to the DUI statute, “[d]riving under the influence is a misdemeanor, but it is a class 4 felony if the violation occurred after three or more prior convictions, arising out of separate and distinct criminal episodes, for DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI.” § 42-4-1301(1)(a) (emphasis added). The remaining question before us, therefore, is whether 7 Huckabay’s felony DUI charge carries “mandatory sentencing,” thereby triggering his right to a preliminary hearing. ¶16 To answer this question, we look to the statute outlining the various penalties for DUI. Section 42-4-1307(6.5)(a) specifies that “[a] person who commits a felony DUI, DUI per se, or DWAI offense shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-401 and this subsection (6.5).” (Emphasis added.) Here, we note that “[t]here is a presumption that the word ‘shall’ when used in a statute is mandatory.” Mook v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 2020 CO 12, ¶ 80, 457 P.3d 568, 583 (quoting Riley v. People, 104 P.3d 218, 221 (Colo. 2004)). And based on the usage of the word “shall” in the DUI penalty statute, a sentencing court may choose between two (and only two) sentencing alternatives for a felony DUI conviction—both of which require some period of incarceration. ¶17 One of these alternatives, set forth in the general felony classification statute at section 18-1.3-401, is a term of imprisonment. Where, as here, a defendant commits a class four felony on or after July 1, 2018, and prior to July 1, 2020, 1 the 1 Felony offenses committed on or after July 1, 2020 will be governed by a nearidentical schedule of penalties, see § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V.5)(A), except that the death penalty will no longer be available for class one felonies, see Ch. 61, sec. 10, § 18-1.3-401, 2020 Colo. Sess. Laws 204, 209–11. 8 defendant may be sentenced to a presumptive range 2 of two to six years in the custody of the Colorado Department of Corrections (“DOC”), with a mandatory three-year period of parole upon release. § 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V)(A.1). ¶18 The other alternative, laid out in the DUI penalty statute at section 42-4-1307(6.5), is a term of probation pursuant to section 18-1.3-202, C.R.S. (2019). Among other conditions, the DUI penalty statute specifies that, if the court elects a sentence to probation, “the court shall order” as a condition of probation for the defendant to serve either 90 to 180 days in the county jail, or between 120 days and two years in the county jail through participation in a work- or education-release program. § 42-4-1307(6.5)(b)(I), (II). And tellingly, in either case, the DUI penalty statute refers to this time in the county jail as a “mandatory period of imprisonment.” Id. ¶19 Reading these sentencing provisions together, we observe that a person convicted of felony DUI faces either a definite term of incarceration in the DOC 2 Based on the presence of “extraordinary mitigating or aggravating factors,” a sentencing court may impose a term of imprisonment ranging from one-half of the minimum term to twice the maximum term authorized in the presumptive range. § 18-1.3-401(6). However, the felony classification statute is clear in its mandate that “in no case shall the term of sentence” exceed or fall below this expanded range. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, to the extent that a defendant convicted of felony DUI is sentenced to imprisonment in the DOC at all, the legislature has mandated that the defendant must serve a term of at least one year. 9 under section 18-1.3-401, or probation with a definite term of incarceration in county jail under sections 18-1.3-202 and 42-4-1307(6.5)(b). Put simply then, in the context of felony DUI, a sentencing court is required to impose incarceration in one form or another. And the command at section 42-4-1307(6.5)(a) that a felony DUI defendant “shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of section 18-1.3-401 and this subsection (6.5)” leaves the sentencing court with no discretion to suspend incarceration or employ other sentencing alternatives not enumerated in the statute. (Emphasis added.) Indeed, any discretion the sentencing court may have had to suspend incarceration is further removed by section 18-1.3-401(11), which commands that “in no instance shall the court have the power to suspend a sentence to a term of incarceration when the defendant is sentenced pursuant to a sentencing provision that requires incarceration or imprisonment in the department of corrections, community corrections, or jail.” In view of these provisions, we conclude that the plain meaning of “mandatory sentencing,” as used in section 16-5-301(1)(a) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1), clearly contemplates periods of incarceration required by law. ¶20 Further, we reject the People’s contention that a felony DUI defendant does not face “mandatory sentencing” because “mandatory sentencing” refers only to a period of imprisonment with the DOC. The language of the preliminary hearing statute does not support this assertion. When we interpret a statute, “we must 10 accept the General Assembly’s choice of language and not add or imply words that simply are not there.” People v. Diaz, 2015 CO 28, ¶ 15, 347 P.3d 621, 625 (quoting People v. Benavidez, 222 P.3d 391, 393–94 (Colo. App. 2009)). The General Assembly did not modify the term “mandatory sentence” in the preliminary hearing statute with a limitation that the sentence must be to the DOC. If it wanted that limitation, the legislature could easily have included it. Rather, the legislature simply specified that a class four felony requiring “mandatory sentencing” triggers the right to a preliminary hearing. “Mandatory sentencing” can refer to incarceration either in the DOC or in a county jail. Nothing in the term suggests otherwise. ¶21 Applying these principles to this case, Huckabay’s felony DUI charge carries the risk of either a term in the DOC or a term of probation with time in the county jail as a condition thereof. As such, Huckabay now faces “mandatory sentencing” upon conviction, and he is entitled to a preliminary hearing under section 16-5-301(1)(a) and Crim. P. 7(h)(1). The district court’s failure to grant Huckabay this hearing was error.