Opinion ID: 373006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Use of a Master

Text: 112 The court found that implementation of its order would be impossible without the assistance of a Special Master with the power and duty to plan, organize, direct, supervise and monitor the implementation of this and any further Orders . . . 446 F.Supp. at 1326. It directed the Commonwealth and County defendants to provide the Master with access to premises, records, documents, and residents, and to cooperate with him to the extent necessary to execute such orders. The Master was directed to prepare and present to the court for its approval various plans for the transfer of Pennhurst residents to CLAs and for the provision of services to the class members in the least separate, most integrated, least restrictive community setting, taking into account available resources. Id. at 1326-27. The order also directed that the Master prepare a plan for the interim operation of Pennhurst pending its replacement by other living arrangements and services. 113 The appellants contend that appointment of a master was improper under Rule 53(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 53(b). We disagree. It is abundantly clear that providing the 1200 Pennhurst residents with a right to habilitation in the least restrictive environment will be a complex and lengthy process, probably involving monitoring, dispute resolution, and development of detailed enforcement mechanisms. Were we to preclude the trial court from resorting to a master, we would help make self-fulfilling the frequently made prophecy that courts are institutionally incapable of remedying wholesale violations of legally protected rights. Masters have been used in a wide variety of remedial contexts. These include cases involving handicapped children, 32 as well as cases remedying various other statutory or constitutional violations. 33 Masters are peculiarly appropriate in the implementation of complex equitable decrees which require ongoing judicial supervision. 34 114 Moreover, by use of a master, the judge can minimize his personal participation in the details of implementation without sacrificing direct control or efficacy. 35 115 While they acknowledge that courts have frequently relied upon special masters, appellants nonetheless insist that the Master appointed by the trial court in this case will have excessive powers. The proper role of a master in federal litigation, appellants urge, is narrowly circumscribed. Brief for Commonwealth Appellant at 49. Specifically, it is urged, a master may only find facts. Since the lower court has already found the facts, any use of a master for implementation purposes intrudes excessively into the proper domain of local autonomy. Id. at 51-52. 116 This argument is unpersuasive. First, the Commonwealth is simply incorrect in asserting that the scope of a master's duties is narrow. As one commentator has properly noted, (m)asters may be delegated the authority to issue subpoenas, hear grievances, take sworn testimony, and make formal or binding recommendations, including contempt findings, to the court. Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 428, 451 (1977). In employment discrimination cases, for example, court-appointed administrators, who have the same powers as masters, have made frequent and successful use of rather wide-ranging powers. See Harris, The Title VII Administrator: A Case Study in Judicial Flexibility, 60 Cornell L.Rev. 53 (1974). Authorized to take all action necessary to implement the decree and to remedy breaches of compliance, these administrators have performed negotiating and investigatory functions, and have issued recommendations for future implementation. Id. at 55, 64. See Note, Implementation Problems in Institutional Reform Litigation, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 428, 452 (1977). 117 In this case, moreover, the court's resort to use of a master is particularly appropriate. After the decision on liability was announced, the appellants were afforded an opportunity to devise and present their own remedies for conditions at Pennhurst. They failed to do so. At that point, having received insufficient assistance from the officials directly involved, the court was faced with the choice of massive personal participation in devising a complex scheme for remedying the violations that were found, or of proceeding with the assistance of a master, whose functions would be supplementary to and supervisory over those of the Commonwealth and County defendants. We hold that the trial court chose correctly in ordering the appointment of a master. We are confident that the court will exercise appropriate supervision over the operations of the Master in order to minimize the expenditure of funds in the administration of his responsibilities and the manner in which he discharges his responsibilities under the decree in particular, the manner in which individualized habilitation programs are developed for each class member. As we understand the role of the Master under the decree, he is to supervise all implementation efforts with the aid and assistance of all parties to the lawsuit. The defendants will thus have an opportunity to participate in the structuring of relief. Moreover, their underlying obligation to provide habilitation in the least restrictive environment is derived, in part, from a state statute and federal statutes under which Pennsylvania has received federal funds. These duties were known and consented to. These considerations, in our view, vitiate whatever complaint the Commonwealth might otherwise have that the court order somehow violates whatever principles of federalism are relevant. Brief for Appellant at 59-62.