Opinion ID: 755736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Dissemination of Charges

Text: 47 Finally, Major Gowan claims that the Air Force violated 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) by disclosing information about the charges against him to various third parties. He contends that the Privacy Act was offended by Amor's discussion of the charges during a telephone conference with other Air Force personnel, by Elder's release of the charges to the Wyoming Bar, and by the Air Force's discussion of the charges in response to inquiries by United States senators. 48 Under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b), agencies are prohibited from disclos[ing] any record which is contained in a system of records by any means of communication to any person, or to another agency unless they have the written consent of the individual to whom the record pertains or the disclosure fits one of twelve listed exceptions. If an agency intentionally and willfully violates § 552a(b) and the plaintiff suffers an adverse effect from the violation, the agency is liable for the plaintiff's actual damages as well as attorney's fees and costs. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4). Consequently, to maintain a § 552a(b) claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) the information came from a record in a system of records; (2) it was communicated to another entity; (3) the communication was without the individual's consent or does not fit one of the enumerated exceptions; (4) the communication was made intentionally or willfully; and (5) the communication caused an adverse effect on the plaintiff. See also Pippinger v. Rubin, 129 F.3d 519, 528 (10th Cir.1997) (In analyzing each of these three claims, we must decide whether a record was 'disclosed,' and, if so, whether it was disclosed pursuant to an exception enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).). 49 The district court held that the preferral of charges against Major Gowan was a matter of public record and thus disclosure of the charges did not violate § 552a(b). We disagree with the district court's conclusion that a matter of public record is not subject to the provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b). In Quinn v. Stone, 978 F.2d 126, 134 (3d Cir.1992), the Third Circuit rejected an argument that a disclosure of public information cannot violate the Privacy Act: 50 Appellees have cited to this court no case that stands for the proposition that there is no violation of the Act if the information is merely readily accessible to the members of the public (such as in the local telephone book) and our research has discovered none. We doubt if any court would so hold. To do so would eviscerate the Act's central prohibition, the prohibition against disclosure.... To define disclosure so narrowly as to exclude information that is readily accessible to the public would render superfluous the detailed statutory scheme of twelve exceptions to the prohibition on disclosure. We conclude the making available information which is readily accessible to the members of the public is a disclosure under 552a(b), subject, of course, to the Act's exceptions. 51 (footnote omitted). See also United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762-64, 109 S.Ct. 1468, 103 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989) (upholding privacy interest in rap sheet, even though components of summary are in public record). We adopt the Third Circuit's reasoning and hold that an agency may not defend a release of Privacy Act information simply by stating that the information is a matter of public record.
52 The district court found that Colonel Amor's discussion of the charges against Major Gowan during a telephone conference with other Air Force officers and staff did not violate the Privacy Act because the charges were a matter of public record and because Colonel Amor may have had independent knowledge of the preferral of charges. 53 Section 552a(b) of the Privacy Act by its terms contemplates a 'system of records' as the direct or indirect source of the information disclosed. The disclosure of information derived solely from independent sources is not prohibited by the statute even though identical information may be contained in an agency system of records. Thomas v. United States Dep't of Energy, 719 F.2d 342, 345 (10th Cir.1983). The Air Force indicates that Colonel Amor was Major Gowan's commanding officer and that he was kept apprised of the investigation as it progressed. However, we need not decide whether this satisfies the independent source exception. Cf. id. at 344 (supervisor's information came from personal participation in discussions about plaintiff and being told to order plaintiff to undergo psychiatric evaluation, not from plaintiff's records). 54 In this case the district court did not make an unequivocal finding that Colonel Amor's information was all derived independently of a record pertaining to Major Gowan found in a system of records. In any event, in order to recover, Major Gowan must prove that Colonel Amor's conduct was intentional or willful. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). The district court did not make this essential finding, and thus Major Gowan cannot recover on this claim. Because of our ruling, we need not address the Air Force's argument that this disclosure can be justified under the need to know exception found in § 552a(b)(1).
55 Major Gowan also contends that the Air Force is liable for Elder's informing the Wyoming Bar of the court martial charges. The district court again held that the charges were public knowledge, but it also held that Elder's actions were not intentional and willful, and thus Major Gowan could not recover. However, we need not decide whether Elder's actions were intentional and willful. See Knox, 124 F.3d at 1362 (court of appeals may affirm on any ground supported by the record). To recover for a violation of § 552a(b), Major Gowan must also show that the Air Force's disclosure had an adverse effect on him. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(D). Major Gowan himself informed the Wyoming Bar of the court martial charges without knowing Elder had already done so. Consequently, Elder's providing the same information (even though before Major Gowan did so) could not have had an adverse effect on Major Gowan. Cf. Kline v. Department of Health & Human Serv., 927 F.2d 522, 524 (10th Cir.1991) (A later release of information previously known does not violate the Privacy Act.).
56 Major Gowan's final complaints about improper communications concern the Air Force's responses to the letters sent by United States Senators Nunn and Bingaman. Although this issue was raised below, the district court did not resolve it. 57 The senators' inquiries resulted directly from Major Gowan's soliciting their assistance. Unlike in Swenson v. United States Postal Serv., 890 F.2d 1075, 1077-78 (9th Cir.1989), where the disclosure of information to congressmen violated the Privacy Act because the information had nothing to do with the subject the plaintiff had asked her legislators to investigate, Major Gowan requested the senators to inquire about the matters he now complains the Air Force discussed with them. Under these circumstances, Major Gowan's request for the senators' assistance estops him from complaining that the Air Force responded to the senators' inquiries on his behalf. See Pellerin v. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 1553, 1556 (11th Cir.1986) (Pellerin clearly solicited his congressmen's support in his battle with the VA. He cannot state a claim against the VA for releasing information to the congressmen when he requested their assistance in gathering such information.). 58 In addition, § 552a(b)(3) establishes a routine use exception to the general prohibition on disclosure. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). Disclosure of information regarding an individual to members of Congress in response to an inquiry from the congressional office made at the request of that individual  has been established as a routine use of Privacy Act information. See Department of Defense Privacy Act Program, 51 Fed.Reg. 2364, 2389 (1986) (emphasis added). We do not believe that the dissemination of this information in response to the senators' inquiries is incompatible with the purpose for which the information was collected, see 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7), and thus the disclosures would likely be protected under the routine use exception.
59 A Privacy Act plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees and costs. For suits under 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(A) and (g)(1)(B), to be eligible for fees and costs the plaintiff must have substantially prevailed. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(2)(B), (g)(3)(B). For suits under 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1)(C) and (g)(1)(D), there is no requirement that the plaintiff have substantially prevailed to be awarded fees, but the court must determine that the agency acted intentionally or willfully. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4). 60 Major Gowan's success in this lawsuit was limited to getting the statements of disagreement added to the Brower and Nameth letters and in obtaining access to the attorney working file. Both of these successes come under the portions of the Act that require a plaintiff to substantially prevail[ ] in order to receive attorney's fees and costs. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(A), (g)(1)(B), (g)(2)(B), (g)(3)(B). 61 In Volz v. United States Dept. of Justice, 619 F.2d 49, 50 (10th Cir.1980), we concluded without analysis that the plaintiff had not substantially prevailed in his Privacy Act suit despite the fact that the agency had released some of the information after the suit was filed. We have not had occasion since Volz to determine whether a plaintiff has substantially prevailed for purposes of obtaining fees under the Privacy Act. However, we note that the Privacy Act attorney's fee provisions are substantially similar to the fee provision of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E). Consequently, like at least two of our sister circuits, we shall apply a FOIA attorney's fee analysis to this Privacy Act case. See Sweatt v. United States Navy, 683 F.2d 420, 423 (D.C.Cir.1982) (per curiam) (applying FOIA principles to determine whether plaintiff substantially prevailed under Privacy Act); Barrett v. Bureau of Customs, 651 F.2d 1087, 1088 (5th Cir.1981) (same); see also Clarkson, 678 F.2d at 1371 (applying Privacy Act analysis to FOIA claim for fees). 62 In the FOIA attorney's fee context, we have held that a plaintiff must establish both that he or she is eligible for an attorney's fee award and that he or she is entitled to it. To show eligibility for the award, the plaintiff must show that he or she has substantially prevailed on his claim. See Anderson v. Secretary of Health and Human Serv., 80 F.3d 1500, 1504 (10th Cir.1996). If the plaintiff has substantially prevailed, the court must evaluate four factors to decide whether he or she is entitled to an award:  '(1) the benefit to the public, if any, derived from the case; (2) the commercial benefit to the complainant; (3) the nature of the complainant's interest in the records sought; and (4) whether the government's withholding of the records had a reasonable basis in the law.'  Id. (quoting Aviation Data Serv. v. FAA, 687 F.2d 1319, 1321 (10th Cir.1982)). 63 The plaintiff has substantially prevailed in a FOIA case if the lawsuit was reasonably necessary and substantially caused the requested records to be released. See Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Department of Agriculture, 11 F.3d 211, 216 (D.C.Cir.1993); see also Alan R. Gilbert, Annotation, Construction and Application of Freedom of Information Act Provision (5 USCS § 552(a)(4)(E)) Concerning Award of Attorney Fees and Other Litigation Costs, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 530 § 4 (1978 & Supp.1997). However, the Air Force contends that its release of the file and its willingness to attach the statements of disagreement were not motivated by Major Gowan's lawsuit but by new, less restrictive directives issued during the pendency of the litigation. 64 Even assuming that the attachment of the statements of disagreement and the release of the file were motivated by the lawsuit, so that Major Gowan is eligible for a fee award, under the factors we have identified he is not entitled to one. Although the government was not justified in refusing to act according to the clear directives of the Privacy Act, Major Gowan's suit was for his personal benefit rather than for the benefit of the public interest and he gained no commercial benefit from the attachment of the statements of disagreement or the release of the file. Given Major Gowan's limited success in this suit, especially in light of the fact that he had requested $13,300,000 in damages but received none, we do not believe he is entitled to an award of fees and costs.