Opinion ID: 2587611
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Basis for joinder

Text: NRS 173.115 provides: Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a separate count for each offense if the offenses charged ... are: 1. Based on the same act or transaction; or 2. Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. In this case, we are presented with the application of the language in subsection 2: Based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Weber concedes that the 17 felony counts for which he was indicted could be properly joined in three groups of charges, but he maintains that these groups should have been severed from each other. The three groups are: (1) the charges concerning his sexual misconduct and abuse of M. before April 4, 2002; (2) the charges concerning the murders of A. and Kim on April 4; and (3) the charges concerning his attack on C. and Froman on April 14. The sexual assault of M. on April 4, he argues, could have been joined as part of a common scheme or plan with either the first group of charges or the second, but not both. Weber contends that the prior sexual misconduct and the murders were not parts of a common scheme or plan. He also argues that the mere fact that the last sexual act with M. took place on the day of the murders does not create a common scheme or plan between the first two groups. As to the third group, he contends that the events of April 14 were born of the circumstances of the moment; motivated by and done in response to events as they unfolded at that time, and shared no common scheme or plan with the April 4 offenses or the prior sexual misconduct. We agree that, while joinder of charges within these three groups was justified because the offenses in each group shared a scheme or plan common to that group, no overarching scheme or plan common to the three groups was demonstrated. Determining whether a common scheme or plan existed in this, or any, case requires fact-specific analysis. And such analysis depends on the meaning of the pertinent statutory language scheme or plan. According to Black's Law Dictionary, a scheme is a design or plan formed to accomplish some purpose; a system. [4] A plan is a method of design or action, procedure, or arrangement for accomplishment of a particular act or object. Method of putting into effect an intention or proposal. [5] We conclude that these definitions pertain to scheme or plan as used in NRS 173.115(2). Thus, purposeful design is central to a scheme or plan, [6] though this does not mean that every scheme or plan must exhibit rigid consistency or coherency. We recognize that a person who forms and follows a scheme or plan may have to contend with contingencies, and therefore a scheme or plan can in practice reflect some flexibility and variation but still fall within an overall intended design. Nevertheless, we conclude that in this case the facts fail to show that Weber had a single scheme or plan that encompassed his ongoing sexual misconduct, his violence on April 4, and his violence on April 14. The 17 felony counts charged offenses that spanned a period of about five years, beginning as early as 1997. Although there is no dispute that Weber's sexual misconduct and abuse of M. over this span of time evinced a common scheme, his crimes on April 4 and April 14, 2002, did not fall into this scheme, except perhaps the April 4 kidnap and sexual assault of M. Although these crimes emerged from the context of Weber's sexual misconduct, the State did not show that they composed part of his scheme of sexually exploiting M. Instead, the April 4 crimes reflect Weber's recognition that his scheme of surreptitious sexual abuse was unraveling. Weber's attacks on C. and Froman on April 14 followed the murders of April 4, but the State did not show that the burglary and attacks actually shared a common scheme or plan with the murders. While the April 14 crimes occurred in the context of the preceding murders and sexual misconduct, Weber's attacks that day appear to be as much a response to discovery as a furtherance of a scheme or plan extending back to the earlier murders. We conclude that the three groups of crimes did not constitute a common scheme or plan and joinder cannot be sustained on that ground. However, the question remains: were the three groups of acts nevertheless connected together under NRS 173.115(2)? We have not addressed the connected together language in the statute, and it is a term that calls for more precise definition. We hold that for two charged crimes to be connected together under NRS 173.115(2), a court must determine that evidence of either crime would be admissible in a separate trial regarding the other crime. We have recognized this cross-admissibility as a basis for joinder of charges in some of our prior decisions. [7] We now expressly employ it to define connected together under NRS 173.115(2). We conclude that the groups of crimes charged and proven in this case are connected together because evidence of each group would have been relevant and admissible at separate trials of the other crimes. Generally, evidence of other uncharged acts by a defendant are not admissible at trial. As NRS 48.045(2) provides: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. But the statute does provide that other-act evidence may ... be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. To admit such evidence, we have held that it must be relevant, be proven by clear and convincing evidence, and have probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. [8] In this case, the evidence for all the crimes was clear and convincing. We now turn to whether the evidence of one group of crimes would have been relevant at a separate trial regarding crimes in the other groups, and if so, whether joinder resulted in undue prejudice.