Opinion ID: 2626357
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Developments in Utah's Statute of Limitations for Rape of a Child

Text: ¶ 16 To provide context for Mr. Green's challenge to the trial court's selection of the statute of limitations, we outline the developments of Utah's statute of limitations for the crime of rape of a child between 1986, the year in which Melvin Green was conceived and born, and the present. In 1986, Utah law required that the prosecution of a felony be commenced within four years after it [was] committed unless a different time period was otherwise provided in the Utah Code. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-302(1) (1978). Since 1983, Utah law has otherwise provided for rape of a child. Id. § 76-1-303(c) (1983). Section 303(c) authorizes prosecution for rape of a child beyond the four-year general felony period where the prosecution is initiated within one year after the report of the offense to law enforcement officials so long as no more than eight years [had] elapsed since the alleged commission of the offense. Id. For convenience we will refer to the statutory provisions relating to the statute of limitations for rape of a child, which were in effect in 1986, as the 1983 limitations. ¶ 17 Taking January 1986, the month Melvin Green was conceived, as the date of the commission of the offense, the four-year general felony limitation period would have expired in January 1990, and the eight-year maximum span under the 1983 limitations would have elapsed in January 1994. Since the State did not commence its prosecution of Mr. Green until April 2000, the prosecution would have been long since time-barred had these statutory provisions alone controlled. However, they did not. ¶ 18 In 1991, the legislature replac[ed] the eight-year statute of limitations with a limitations period permitting prosecution of sexual abuse of a child anytime ` within four years after the report of the offense to a law enforcement agency. ' Lusk, 2001 UT 102 at ¶ 16, 37 P.3d 1103 (emphasis added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-303(3) (1991)). This amendment removed the date of the offense as the landmark for calculating the rape of a child limitations period and replaced it with a date-of-report reference point. In this case, the amendment has the effect of rendering Melvin Green's conception date irrelevant to the statute of limitations analysis.