Opinion ID: 2301325
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: residential robbery murders: f-1 (selected cases)

Text: (1) WAYNE BUSBY After a twenty-four hour cocaine and alcohol binge, Wayne Busby found himself in need of money for more drugs. To that end, he broke into a neighboring house that belonged to a seventy-four-year-old woman. When the elderly woman confronted him, Busby struck her in the face and ribs before strangling her to death with a broom handle. Busby then stole money and various items from the house before fleeing. At some point after the murder, Busby attempted to take his own life. A little over two years later, Busby was arrested and charged with purposeful and knowing murder and felony murder. A jury found Busby guilty on both counts. At the penalty phase, the jury found aggravating factors c(4)(g) (contemporaneous murder) and c(4)(h) (escape detection). The jury also found mitigating factors c(5)(a) (emotional disturbance), c(5)(d) (mental disease or defect), and c(5)(h) (catch-all). The jury determined that the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors. Consequently, Busby was given a life sentence with a thirty-year parole disqualifier. Busby was thirty-one years old at the time of the crime. He endured physical and psychological abuse as a child. Although there were no known mental problems, he exhibited bizarre behavior and relatives believed he was unstable. Busby also has a long history of drug abuse and dependency. (2) LARRY DURDEN Larry Durden was employed as a security guard in an apartment building. After he changed the locks on a seventy-two-year-old tenant's door, the tenant invited him for dinner. At some point during the dinner, Durden stabbed the tenant in the head and abdomen. Prior to leaving the apartment, Durden stole some groceries, a television set, and a radio. Durden was caught by police after he tried to sell the stolen items to another tenant in the building. Durden eventually confessed to stealing the items, but denied killing the elderly woman. After a jury trial, Durden was found guilty of purposeful or knowing murder, felony murder, and burglary. At the penalty phase, the jury found aggravating factor c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) and mitigating factor c(5)(h) (catch-all). The jury determined that the mitigating factor was not outweighed by the aggravating factor, so Durden was sentenced to life plus seven years with a thirty year parole ineligibility term. Durden, who was thirty-one years old at the time of his crime, did not suffer from any emotional or mental problems and was not addicted to drugs. He had a GED and an honorable discharge from the U.S. Navy. Durden did, however, have a prior criminal record. (3) ALBERT FAINS Albert Fains lived next door to, and was friends with, the victim, who was confined to a wheelchair. One day, Fains and a female acquaintance visited the victim and smoked marijuana with him. Fains and his female friend left the apartment later that evening, but Fains returned at some point during the night. It was widely known that the victim kept large amounts of cash in the apartment. Fains struck the victim in the head repeatedly with a hammer and stabbed him once in the back. Fains also placed a white trash bag over the victim's head and tied his neck to the wheelchair with another trash bag. Fains also ransacked the victim's bedroom before fleeing the apartment. When he was questioned about the murder, Fains gave a false name and changed his story numerous times. After the police found the victim's wrist watch in Fains's apartment, Fains admitted to stealing the watch, but denied any participation in the murder. Fains was not capitally prosecuted. A jury convicted Fains of purposeful or knowing murder, robbery, felony murder, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a thirty year parole ineligibility term. Fains, who was twenty-six years old at the time of the murder, graduated from high school and was honorably discharged from the U.S. Army. He had been diagnosed as having an adjustment disorder with depressed mood and avoidance personality tract. Fains smoked marijuana, but had not received any drug abuse treatment. (4) AARON HUFF While in a liquor store, Aaron Huff recognized a seventy-three-year-old man from the neighborhood buying liquor. Knowing that the elderly gentleman had money on him, Huff broke into his apartment later that night. The man confronted Huff, so Huff threw him to the floor. Huff continued to beat the victim until he stopped moving. Huff took two hundred and seventy dollars, a television set, and a clock-radio. When Huff was arrested, he denied having any knowledge about the murder. A jury convicted Huff of purposeful or knowing murder, felony murder, and burglary. At the penalty phase, the jury found aggravating factors c(4)(c) (extreme suffering) and c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) and mitigating factors c(5)(d) (mental disease) and c(5)(h) (catch-all). After the jury concluded that the aggravating factors did not outweigh the mitigating factors, Huff was given a life sentence. Huff, age twenty-three, had a prior criminal record. Evidence was presented at the penalty trial that Huff was drug dependent, had an antisocial personal disorder and was mentally still as a child. There was also testimony that Huff was drinking heavily on the day of the murder. (5) HAROLD PERRY Harold Perry was employed as a maintenance man in the victim's apartment building. Perry killed a ninety-year-old female tenant by striking her in the head with a hammer. The victim had fourteen lacerations on her face and scalp and three cuts on her hands. Perry also stole some items from the apartment. Perry initially denied responsibility for the murder, but he subsequently confessed. He claimed, however, that the victim attacked him with the hammer and he acted out of self-defense. A jury convicted Perry of purposeful or knowing murder, felony murder, and armed robbery. The jury found aggravating factor c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) and mitigating factor c(5)(h) (catch-all). Perry received a life sentence with a thirty year parole ineligibility term. Perry was thirty-four years old at the time of the crime. He was a high school graduate with no history of drug abuse. He had a prior criminal record. There was testimony by several witnesses that Perry occasionally acted strange and talked to inanimate objects. (6) CHARLES PLOPPERT Charles Ploppert and an acquaintance planned to strike a forty-one-year-old blind man over the head with a baseball bat when he answered the door bell and then steal his money. That plan was foiled when the blind man answered the door bell through a locked screen door. Consequently, Ploppert was required to identify himself in order to gain access to the home. Once inside, Ploppert beat and kicked the victim until he was unconscious. Ploppert and the acquaintance then searched the house for money. Before leaving the scene, Ploppert piled some wood on top of the victim and lit him on fire. Ploppert pleaded guilty to purposeful or knowing murder, robbery, and arson. At the penalty phase, the jury found aggravating factors c(4)(c) (extreme suffering), c(4)(f) (escape detection), and c(4)(g)(contemporaneous felony). The jury also found mitigating factors c(5)(a) (emotional disturbance), c(5)(c)(age), c(5)(d) (mental disease or defect), and c(5)(h) (catch-all). He ultimately received a life sentence plus twenty years. Ploppert is a high school graduate with learning disabilities. He had a history of drug abuse, but no prior criminal record. A clinical psychologist diagnosed Ploppert as being perceptually impaired with a low range of intelligence and suffering from a serious addiction to methamphetamine and cocaine. (7) THOMAS REIGLE Thomas Reigle resided in a house with his mother, aunt, and uncle. His aunt and uncle shared an upstairs apartment. After returning home high on speed and needing more money to purchase additional drugs, Reigle asked his aunt and uncle to let him into their apartment because he wanted to borrow money. His aunt refused, so Reigle subsequently broke into their apartment. While he was rifling through his aunt's purse, he heard her stirring. He returned to her room and hit her with a motorcycle pipe that he was carrying. Reigle then proceeded to his uncle's room and struck him several times with the pipe. The uncle died from trauma to the head. Reigle lied to his family that he had been attacked by two men. A short time later, Reigle fled to another state, but he was eventually apprehended. After his arrest, he gave a full confession to police. Reigle was convicted of purposeful or knowing murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and burglary. At the penalty trial, the jury found aggravating factor c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) and mitigating factors c(5)(d) (mental disease), c(5)(f) (no criminal history), and c(5)(h) (catch-all). The jury did not find that the aggravating factor outweighed the mitigating factors, so Reigle was sentenced to life imprisonment. There was evidence presented during Reigle's trial that he suffered from emotional and psychiatric problems. As a child, he was placed on Ritalin to reduce his hyperactivity. Reigle also had a long history of drug and alcohol abuse. He had two prior convictions for drug possession and damage to property. He has no history of mental problems and did not finish high school. He was twenty-four years old when he murdered his uncle. (8) SAMUEL RODRIGUEZ An elderly woman allowed Samuel Rodriguez to enter her apartment while Rodriguez was under the influence of drugs. Once inside, Rodriguez pushed her to the ground and she began to bleed. According to Rodriguez, he tried to stop the bleeding, but was unsuccessful, so he just left the woman laying on the couch. He later told his brother and a female acquaintance that he had killed the victim. He was subsequently arrested and confessed to the police. A jury convicted Rodriguez of murder, felony murder, and robbery. There was no penalty phase and the AOC coded for aggravating factor c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) and mitigating factors c(5)(c)(age), c(5)(d) (diminished capacity), c(5)(h) (catch-all). Rodriguez received a life sentence. Rodriguez was eighteen years old at the time of the offense. As a child, he was placed in a class for socially maladjusted children. He did not graduate high school. He also suffered from a neurological impairment. Rodriguez had a history of drug and alcohol abuse. He also had a prior criminal record. (9) GEORGE SHAFFER Around midnight the night before the murder, the victim, George Shaffer's seventy-nine-year-old landlord, knocked on Shaffer's door to ask him to turn down his radio and to tell him that he would have to find another place to live. Defendant turned down his radio. The following day, Shaffer, drunk from a night of drinking, told his Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor that he wanted to kill his landlord and then himself. He was upset because he had seen the woman with whom he was infatuated with another man. Later that day, Shaffer knocked on his landlord's door. He planned to kill her, take her money and then spend the night drinking. He hoped to avoid being caught for twenty-four hours. The woman let him into her home and they spoke for a few minutes. He then started to strangle her and she fell to the floor. He then picked up a brass lamp and struck her repeatedly on the face and head. He tried to strangle her again with his hands, a chain, and then a lamp cord. When he was certain she was dead, he went to the bathroom and cleaned off the blood from his hands and face. The police apprehended Shaffer at the scene of the crime and he gave a full confession. Shaffer was convicted of murder, felony murder, armed robbery, and weapon possession. There was no penalty trial and the AOC coded aggravating factor c(4)(g) (contemporaneous felony) and mitigating factors c(5)(d) (diminished capacity), c(5)(f) (no significant criminal record), and c(5)(h) (catch-all). Shaffer received life imprisonment. He was forty-two years old at the time and was diagnosed as a manic depressive. He had no prior criminal convictions. He did not finish high school and was dishonorably discharged from the U.S. Army. Shaffer was addicted to alcohol and admitted to drug use. STEIN, J., concurring. I join in the Court's thoughtful and persuasive opinion. I write separately only to address a narrow but important aspect of the dissenting opinion that, in my view, is based on an erroneous conception of the nature of proportionality review. The Court's opinion concludes that for purposes of proportionality review, those factual issues that are disputed by the parties but not essential to the jury's verdict should be resolved by accepting the defendant's version for purposes of precedent-seeking review. Ante at 808. Our dissenting colleague concludes to the contrary that where disputed facts have not been resolved by the jury's guilty or not guilty verdicts, a reasonable inference arises that the jury relied on those facts that are most consistent with its imposition of the death sentence. That generally means accepting the State's version of the facts. Post at 834. Our dissenting colleague supports the conclusion that the State's version of disputed factual issues should prevail by characterizing a claim of disproportionality as in effect, a motion by the defendant to set aside the penalty-phase jury's verdict of death on the ground that it is an aberration. Post at 833. Accordingly, the dissent asserts that the appropriate standard to determine which of two conflicting versions of evidence should be accepted in proportionality review proceedings is the standard established under Rule 3:18-2 (motion for judgment of acquittal after discharge of jury), and its counterpart for civil cases. That standard requires the Court to consider whether the evidence, viewed in its entirety, ... and giving the State the benefit of all of its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, is sufficient to enable a jury to find that the State's charge has been established beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Kluber, 130 N.J.Super. 336, 341-42, 327 A. 2d 232 (App.Div.1974), certif. denied, 67 N.J. 72, 335 A. 2d 25 (1975). My disagreement with the dissent's justification for resolving disputed factual issues in favor of the State is that it proceeds on the mistaken assumption that proportionality review essentially constitutes a defendant's challenge to the reasonableness of the jury's determination to impose the death penalty. To the contrary, as this Court made crystal clear in State v. Marshall, 130 N.J. 109, 132-33, 613 A. 2d 1059 (1999), the primary focus is not on the reasonableness of the jury's sentence of death, but rather on how that sentence compares to jury dispositions in comparable cases: We offer this preliminary observation. The Attorney General, in briefs and at oral argument, objects to the inclusion of non-penalty-phase homicide cases in the universe, contending that consideration of such cases questions the correctness of the prosecutor's discretion to seek or not to seek a death penalty in a specific case. In our view, that objection misconceives the issue. Courts that conduct proportionality review by considering both death-sentenced cases and life-sentenced penalty-phase cases focus not on whether the jury decision was correct, but rather on whether the differences in the dispositions of comparable homicide cases are relevant to whether the death sentence under review may be disproportionate. [ (Citations omitted) (emphasis added).] In the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark proportionality review decision, Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 43, 104 S.Ct. 871, 875-76, 79 L.Ed. 2d 29, 36 (1984), the Court's opinion described clearly and concisely that the focus of proportionality review is not on the correctness of the jury's verdict in the specific case, but rather on whether the verdict is disproportionate when compared to other defendants convicted of the same offense: The proportionality review sought by Harris, required by the Court of Appeals, and provided for in numerous state statutes is of a different sort. This sort of proportionality review presumes that the death sentence is not disproportionate to the crime in the traditional sense. It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. We made virtually the same observation in State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 326, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987), when Chief Justice Wilentz observed: Proportionality review has a function entirely unique among the review proceedings in a capital proceeding. Proportionality review, in the context of a capital sentencing scheme, is not appellate review to ensure that the aggravating factors outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt all the mitigating factors, L.1985, c. 178, or to determine if the death sentence is disproportionate to the crime in violation of the ban against cruel and unusual punishment. That death is not disproportionate in the sense of being a cruel and unusual punishment is presumed by the nature of the review. Rather, the purpose of review here is of a different sort.... It purports to inquire instead whether the penalty is nonetheless unacceptable in a particular case because disproportionate to the punishment imposed on others convicted of the same crime. (quoting Pulley v. Harris, supra, 465 U.S. at 43, 104 S.Ct. at 876, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 36).