Opinion ID: 70142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 25 Rule 15 permits a district court to authorize a deposition in a criminal case when exceptional circumstances exist. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 15(a). The court's decision to authorize or deny the deposition will be upset only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Drogoul, 1 F.3d 1546, 1552 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Mills, 760 F.2d 1116, 1120 (11th Cir.1985). 26 In Drogoul, this Court found that three factors guide the exceptional circumstances analysis: whether (1) the witness is unavailable to testify at trial; (2) injustice will result because testimony material to the movant's case will be absent; and (3) countervailing factors render taking the deposition unjust to the nonmoving party. Drogoul, 1 F.3d at 1554.
27 The government did not charge Yepez and immediately deported him to Colombia. Pretrial, the prosecution sought special permission from the State Department to have Yepez reenter the country to testify at Ramos's trial. Yepez, however, has refused to reenter the United States. Under Drogoul, a substantial likelihood of unavailability can be found when the proposed deponent is beyond the subpoena powers of the United States and has declared his unwillingness to testify at trial, or even having declared willingness to testify cannot be subpoenaed if he changes his mind. Drogoul, 1 F.3d at 1553, 1557. We find a substantial likelihood Yepez that was unavailable under the meaning of Rule 15.
28 At no time before, during, or after trial has Ramos proffered anything to show that Yepez's testimony will exculpate him. His attorney merely stated in a pretrial colloquy with the district court judge that Yepez had provided exculpatory information as to Ramos. If this statement was the full extent of the attorney's proffer, it is insufficient. As this Court stated in United States v. Sheffield, 992 F.2d 1164 (11th Cir.1993), 29 [f]or error to be predicated on a ruling excluding evidence, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2) requires that the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer or was apparent from the context within which the questions were asked. Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2). The purpose of this requirement is to alert the [trial] court and opposing counsel to the thrust of the excluded evidence, enabling them to take appropriate action, and to construct a record appropriate for appellate review. Parliament Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982). 30 Sheffield, 992 F.2d at 1169. Such a proffer may be made by several means including affidavit, proffered testimony, or calling a witness to the stand; at the very least, the proffer must alert the district court to the substance of the evidence that is at peril of being excluded. See id. 31 To our surprise, however, the government has conceded on appeal that Yepez's testimony was material, citing Drogoul. 2 Under Drogoul, material is a term of art that means material to the party moving to depose. Accordingly, we must accept for purposes of appeal the concession that Yepez's testimony was material to Ramos's defense. Nonetheless, we point out that the district court has never considered materiality on the merits because the defense has never proffered what the testimony will be.
32 The government rests its argument for upholding the denial of the Rule 15 motion on the presence of countervailing factors that render taking the deposition unjust. 33 The government lists the following countervailing factors: Yepez's testimony was suspect because he cannot be sanctioned for perjury; because the defense had neither taken nor scheduled the deposition when the magistrate vacated the order five days before trial, it was unclear the deposition could actually be taken; deposing a suspected drug dealer at a place and time arranged by an undisclosed third party in Medellin, Colombia, posed a serious threat to the prosecutor's safety; because the defense never detailed what Yepez's testimony would be, the testimony may have been irrelevant, cumulative, or inadmissible. 34 We find that none of these factors, whether taken singly or together, render taking the deposition unjust. Indeed, this Court in Drogoul found that neither the possibility of inaccurate translations nor the defendant's inability to confront witnesses called only by deposition would render taking the deposition unjust. See Drogoul 1 F.3d at 1554-56. Delay in moving to take the deposition was an insufficient countervailing factor as well. Id. at 1556. Moreover, Drogoul dealt with injustice to the defendant; here, we find it impossible to conclude that preserving Yepez's testimony through deposition would have been unjust to the government. 35 Although concern for the safety of an Assistant United States Attorney in Colombia may be warranted, it is obvious that our government has officials in Colombia who could attend; it is also clear that the deposition could be accomplished through written interrogatories.