Opinion ID: 728966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether use of the term

Text: 21 SOLELY IN THE VERDICT FORM CORRECTLY STATED THE LIABILITY STANDARD UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 22 The stated purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (West 1995). Title I of the ADA, which applies to the private sector, provides for the elimination of disability-based discrimination as follows: 23 No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 24 Id. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). Title II of the ADA, which applies to public sector employment, contains a parallel provision. It provides: 25 Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 26 Id. § 12132 (emphasis added). 27 The ADA also seeks to eliminate retaliation by employers against employees who seek to enforce their statutory rights. Specifically, Title IV of the ADA provides as follows: 28 No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter. 29 Id. § 12203(a) (emphasis added). 30 The defendants contend that the foregoing provisions impose liability only if the employer takes an adverse employment action solely because of a reason prohibited by the statute, and for that reason the verdict form provided the jurors with an accurate statement of the law. Conversely, McNely contends that those provisions impose liability if a prohibited reason was but one factor in the employer's decision, so long as the inclusion of that prohibited factor made the difference in the decision. Stated differently, McNely contends that the ADA requires only but-for causation before liability can be imposed. In McNely's view, the verdict form misstated the liability standard applicable to this case. We agree.
31 As with any other statute, the appropriate starting point for our analysis is the plain language of the statute itself. We must give effect to this plain language unless there is good reason to believe Congress intended the language to have some more restrictive meaning. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 2900, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983) (citations omitted). As an initial matter, we note that the foregoing liability provisions do not contain the word solely, or any other similar restrictive term. Therefore, unless we can discern a very good reason to read the restrictive term solely into two statutory provisions where it is not found, this is a simple case. 32 The defendants argue that a good reason for judicially writing solely into the statute may be found in the ADA itself, when read in conjunction with the Rehabilitation Act. Specifically, the defendants point to the following language in the ADA: 33 Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 790 et seq.) or the regulations issued by Federal agencies pursuant to such title. 34 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(a) (West 1995). The defendants then point out that the liability provision of the Rehabilitation Act contains the word solely, as follows: 35 No otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the United States, as defined in section 706(7) of this title, shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal Service. 36 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (West 1985) (emphasis added). Thus, argue the defendants, the ADA can provide no greater relief to victims of discrimination than the Rehabilitation Act, which sets up a sole-cause liability scheme, see, e.g., Severino v. North Fort Myers Fire Control Dist., 935 F.2d 1179, 1182-83 (11th Cir.1991) (affirming judgment in favor of employer on Rehabilitation Act claim because employee could not demonstrate that he was discriminated against solely on the basis of his handicap). 37 Assuming that lesser standard in section 12201(a) means a more plaintiff-friendly standard, the defendants' argument has some superficial appeal. However, it loses its appeal upon closer inspection, because the same ADA provision the defendants rely upon to import the sole-cause liability standard of the Rehabilitation Act contains the limiting language [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this chapter, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12201(a) (West 1995). Because Congress has used language in the ADA that is broader than the language included in the comparable provision of the Rehabilitation Act, we are not persuaded that section 12201(a) nonetheless directs us to import into the ADA the more restrictive Rehabilitation Act language. Instead, we are convinced that section 12201(a), by its own terms, directs us not to do so. 38 Moreover, we believe that importing the restrictive term solely from the Rehabilitation Act into the ADA cannot be reconciled with the stated purpose of the ADA--the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities, 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (West 1995). That is true, because a standard that imposes liability only when an employee's disability is the sole basis for the decision necessarily tolerates discrimination against individuals with disabilities so long as the employer's decision was based--if ever so slightly--on at least one other factor. A liability standard that tolerates decisions that would not have been made in the absence of discrimination, but were nonetheless influenced by at least one other factor, does little to eliminate discrimination; instead, it indulges it. The plain language of the Rehabilitation Act appears to mandate such indulgence, but the plain language of the ADA does not. 39 Because we believe that importing the term solely into the ADA is not warranted under the statute's plain language, is not authorized by section 12201(a), and is not consistent with the explicitly stated purpose of the statute, our analysis could stop at this point. Nevertheless, for the sake of completeness, we add that even if section 12201(a) were viewed to create an ambiguity, for the following reasons, the ADA's legislative history would support the same result we reach under our plain language analysis.
40 The ADA's legislative history does not directly inform us why Congress chose to leave the word solely out of the liability provision of Title I (the private sector title applicable to this case), nor why Congress left that term out of the anti-retaliation provision of Title IV. However, the legislative history does clearly explain why Congress chose to leave the word solely out of Title II (the public sector title). Because the relevant causal language in the liability provisions of all three titles is substantially identical, compare 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (because of the disability) with id. § 12132 (by reason of such disability) and id. § 12203 (because such individual has made a charge), Congress' rationale for leaving solely out of the Title II liability provision sheds some light on its rationale for leaving the same word out of the parallel Title I and Title IV provisions. The House Committee Report explained the decision to leave solely out of Title II, as follows: 41 The Committee recognizes that the phrasing of section 202 in this legislation differs from section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] by virtue of the fact that the phrase solely by reason of his or her handicap has been deleted. The deletion of this phrase is supported by the experience of the executive agencies charged with implementing section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act]. The regulations issued by most executive agencies use the exact language set out in section 202 in lieu of the language included in the section 504 statute. 42 A literal reliance on the phrase solely by reason of his or her handicap leads to absurd results. For example, assume that an employee is black and has a disability and that he needs a reasonable accommodation that, if provided, will enable him to perform the job for which he is applying. He is a qualified applicant. Nevertheless, the employer rejects the applicant because he is black and because he has a disability. 43 In this case, the employer did not refuse to hire the individual solely on the basis of his disability--the employer refused to hire him because of his disability and because he was black. Although the applicant might have a claim of race discrimination under title VII of the Civil Rights Act, it could be argued that he would not have a claim under section 504 [of the Rehabilitation Act] because the failure to hire was not based solely on his disability and as a result he would not be entitled to a reasonable accommodation. 44 The Committee, by adopting the language used in regulations issued by the executive agencies, rejects the result described above. 45 H.R.Rep. No. 485(II), 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., at 85 (1990). The Senate Committee Report contains a virtually identical passage. See S.Rep. No. 116, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., at 44-45 (1989). 46 The explanation the congressional committees gave shows that Congress knew exactly what it was doing when, by omitting the word solely, it provided a different liability standard under Title II of the ADA than it provided under the Rehabilitation Act. Congress deliberately used different language in the ADA, because it believed inclusion of the word solely in Title II could lead to absurd results. We have no reason to believe that Congress intended to condemn absurd results in Title II of the ADA, but using substantially identical language in Titles I and IV of the same statute wanted to invite those same absurd results. As we explain below, turning to other evidence of congressional intent, our conclusion is bolstered by the fact that when Congress enacted the ADA, the Supreme Court already had rejected the notion that because of in Title VII cases could be construed to mean solely because of. 47
Title VII Cases 48 Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 1994) (emphasis added). The relevant causal language of Title VII's liability provision is substantially identical to the causal language at issue in this case. Compare id. (Title VII) (because of) with 42 U.S.C.A. § 12101(b)(1) (ADA Title I) (because of) and 42 U.S.C.A. § 12203 (ADA Title IV anti-retaliation provision) (because). 49 When Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, the Supreme Court had already authoritatively determined that, for Title VII cases, because of does not mean solely because of. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989), the Supreme Court focused on the nature of the causal connection required by the phrase because of in Title VII cases. No opinion of the Court garnered a majority of the votes in Price Waterhouse, in part because the justices held differing views about whether the because of requirement meant that the impermissible consideration was a but-for cause, or meant only that it had been taken into account in the decisionmaking process. Compare id. at 244, 109 S.Ct. at 1787 (plurality opinion) with id. at 262-63, 109 S.Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). However, all of the justices agreed that because of, as used in Title VII, does not mean solely because of. See id. at 241, 109 S.Ct. at 1785 (plurality opinion); id. at 258-59, 109 S.Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 262-63, 109 S.Ct. at 1797 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 284, 109 S.Ct. at 1808 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 592-94 (3d Cir.1995) (analyzing and summarizing the because of analysis contained in the various Price Waterhouse opinions). 50 A familiar canon of statutory construction is that evaluation of congressional action must take into account its contemporary legal context. Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 1186, 1190, 134 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (plurality opinion) (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 698-99, 99 S.Ct. 1946, 1958-59, 60 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)); see also Motorcity of Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank N.A., 83 F.3d 1317, 1331 (11th Cir.1996) (en banc) (recognizing principle that Congress legislates against the background of the existing common law ). That presumption is particularly compelling where, as here, Congress adopts operative language to which the Supreme Court has recently given an authoritative interpretation in a similar context. When Congress enacted the ADA, it did so against the backdrop of recent Supreme Court employment discrimination case law that interpreted the phrase because of not to mean solely because of. We think Congress knew what it was doing, and we hold that the ADA imposes liability whenever the prohibited motivation makes the difference in the employer's decision, i.e., when it is a but-for cause.
51 Despite the plain language of the ADA, its legislative history, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of identical causal language in Title VII, the defendants argue that we should nonetheless interpret because of to mean solely because of. They contend that precedents from the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits support that interpretation, and point us to Doe v. University of Maryland Medical Sys., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir.1995); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.1995); Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., 84 F.3d 758 (5th Cir.1996); Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir.1995); and White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357 (10th Cir.1995). Even if all five of those cases from four other circuits had actually held that because of means solely because of under the ADA, we would still part company with those circuits, because we are firmly convinced that such an interpretation is contrary to the language of the statute and the intent of Congress. However, in this case, our task is made much easier by the fact that only one of the five decisions cited by the defendants actually held that because of in the ADA context means solely because of. The others did not. 52 In University of Maryland Medical Sys., 50 F.3d at 1266, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer in an ADA case because the employee was not a qualified employee with a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Although the court stated that an ADA plaintiff is required to prove that he was discriminated against solely on the basis of the disability in order to prove his case, id. at 1264-65, that observation is dictum. Because the court determined that the plaintiff was not a qualified employee with a disability to begin with, it was not required to, and did not purport to, examine the causal connection between the plaintiff's termination and his disability. 53 Similarly, in Myers, 50 F.3d at 282, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer in an ADA case because the employee was not a qualified individual with a disability. Although the court observed in dicta that the substantive standards for determining liability are the same under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, id. at 281, the court was not required to, and did not purport to, authoritatively resolve the issue that faces us today. 54 In Rizzo, 84 F.3d at 760, the Fifth Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of an employer, because it found that a genuine question of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff was a qualified individual with a disability. Because the defendant in that case did not deny that the plaintiff was terminated because of her disability, there were no causal connection questions in the case. See id. at 762. Although the court did observe that the ADA required the plaintiff to prove that her employer took an adverse employment action solely because of her disability, that observation has no bearing on the court's decision; it is dictum. 55 In White, 45 F.3d at 363, the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer because the employee was not a qualified individual with a disability. As with the foregoing cases, the court had no occasion to consider the causal connection question at issue in this case, and it explicitly declined to address whether York terminated [the plaintiff] solely because of his disability. Id. A court does not make a holding with language directed toward an issue it expressly declines to address. 56 To summarize, the foregoing cases do not trouble us. Although they do contain dicta that supports the defendants' position, we are not required to follow dicta contained in our own precedents, much less dicta from our sister circuits. Dicta can sometimes be useful when it contains a persuasive analysis of a particular issue, but the opinions in the foregoing cases are not even useful for that purpose, because they do not include any meaningful analysis of whether because of in the ADA context means solely because of. The passing references that those cases make to the applicable causal standard shed little or no light on the question, and give us no pause. 57 However, Despears v. Milwaukee County, 63 F.3d 635 (7th Cir.1995), is more problematic. In that ADA case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for an employer. Id. at 637. In doing so, it held--not merely stated in dicta, but held--that judgment for the employer was proper, because the alleged disability was not the sole cause of the demotion in question. No extended discussion or helpful rationale is given in Despears for the holding that the ADA requires a showing of sole causation. Because we believe that holding is contrary to the language of the statute, the will of Congress, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of substantially identical causal language in the Title VII context, we decline to follow it. 58 We hold that the because of component of the ADA liability standard imposes no more restrictive standard than the ordinary, everyday meaning of the words would be understood to imply. In everyday usage, because of conveys the idea of a factor that made a difference in the outcome. The ADA imposes a but-for liability standard. The contrary verdict form language is error which requires reversal. That is not the only error in the verdict form. 59