Opinion ID: 1773034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: jacobs's right to control his defense

Text: In Jacobs I , we addressed Jacobs's argument that he had a right to present a defense on the merits which his counsel denied by presenting an insanity defense over his objection and directed that, upon retrial, it is the trial court who shall determine if the defendant is the master of his own defense and pilot of the ship [32] by holding a hearing as to Jacobs' ability to voluntarily and intelligently understand and waive such [insanity] defense ... and upon the finding of the trial court as to Jacobs' ability to waive such defense, defense counsel shall be bound. [33] As explained in Part II(B) above, the trial court found Jacobs competent to both stand trial and to direct his defense. The trial court ruled that Jacobs's counsel were bound by the defendant's decision not to...present any evidence of any mental illness, including by avowal, during either the guilt/innocence or penalty phases of the trial. Jacobs's counsel filed an original action in this Court seeking a writ which would order the trial court to fashion an appropriate method or procedure which will permit petitioner's counsel to submit offers of proof and/or avowals on the issue of Mr. Jacobs' mental illness and its impact upon his conduct, behavior, his decision-making, and other matters of consequence in the upcoming proceedings and/or to order the respondent trial judge to permit counsel to present evidence of petitioner's mental illness, in order that petitioner exercise his right to present a defense to the charges, support jury instructions on lesser included offenses, or support a guilty but mentally ill finding, and present evidence in support of statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors which may convince a jury to not impose the penalty of death[.] In an unpublished order, this Court granted a portion of the relief requested, but allowed defense counsel to introduce mental health evidence during the guilt/innocence phase only by avowal: The trial court's refusal to allow evidence by avowal is an incorrect extension of Jacobs, supra , and against the clear weight of the law. For that reason, we grant the petition for a writ of prohibition as to the following issues. The trial court is hereby directed to allow appellant to present, by avowal only, evidence of mental illness during the guilt phase of the trial .... Furthermore, in the event there is a penalty phase, petitioner may present direct testimony concerning mitigating factors pursuant to KRS 532.025. Additionally, the trial court is directed to allow avowal testimony as to any mental illness issues not expressly included in the aforementioned statute. Jacobs argues that the trial court's ruling erroneously interpreted our holdings and incorrectly allowed Jacobs to direct his trial counsel not to introduce any mental illness evidence during the guilt/innocence phase. Jacobs attempts to distinguish a defendant's right to waive an insanity defense from other questions of trial strategy and argues that his trial counsel should have been allowed to introduce evidence relating to Jacobs's mental health which was not inconsistent with Jacobs's decision to pursue a guilt/innocence phase defense on the merits. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. First, although our order in Jacobs's original action allowed the defense to introduce such testimony by avowal during the guilt/innocence phase, the defense made no attempt to do so. Further, we find disingenuous Appellant's characterization of this proposed evidence as not inconsistent with the chosen defense. Jacobs's trial counsel wanted to introduce testimony to prove that Jacobs's testimony regarding the events leading to his victim's deathwhile a sincere beliefwas delusional. Although counsel sought to introduce this evidence for a purpose technically distinct from the pursuit of an insanity defense, allowing defense counsel to introduce evidence suggesting that Jacobs didn't know what he was talking about would certainly have seriously compromise[d] [Jacobs's] chosen alternative defense, as well as threaten[ed] his ... reputational interests. [34] The fact that Jacobs's defense of denial and his trial counsel's proposed mental health defense could both be broadly construed as a defense on the merits does not harmonize the inconsistencies. We believe the trial court properly found that Jacobs could choose to defend against the merits without introducing evidence of his mental illness. The trial court found Jacobs competent to act as master of his own defense and pilot of the ship. By seeking to introduce evidence of Jacobs's mental illness against their client's wishes, the well-intentioned defense counsel improperly attempted to replace their judgment for Jacobs's. The trial court's ruling properly placed Jacobs at the helm. We see no merit in Jacobs's remaining allegations of guilt/innocence phase error. Specifically, we find: (1) the trial court acted well within its discretion when it denied Jacobs's trial counsel's motion to withdraw; (2) the instances of prosecutorial misconduct alleged fell within the bounds of permissible questioning and argument; (3) the trial judge's remote connection to Alice Lloyd College did not require his recusal; and (4) no combination of errors warrants reversal of Jacobs's convictions.