Opinion ID: 783149
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Holly D.'s Unreasonable Failure to Take Advantage of Opportunities to Avoid Harm

Text: 62 To prove its affirmative defense, Caltech must prove both that its efforts to provide relief were reasonable and that Holly D.'s decision to forego the available avenues of relief was unreasonable. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257; 1999 EEOC Guidance at § V.B. This second prong of the defense is intended to fulfill a policy imported from the general theory of damages, that a victim has a duty `to use such means as are reasonable under the circumstances to avoid or minimize the damages' that result from violations of the statute. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806, 118 S.Ct. 2275 (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 231 n. 15, 102 S.Ct. 3057, 73 L.Ed.2d 721 (1982)). And while proof that an employee failed to fulfill the . . . obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing an unreasonable failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense. Id. at 807-08, 118 S.Ct. 2275. 63 Here, it is undisputed that Holly D. sought no relief of any kind from Caltech until June 1999, after a full year of unwelcome sexual activity and almost two years after the first sexual incident. Holly D. explains her hesitation by asserting that she did not feel comfortable pursuing assistance from Caltech's employee relations department because she went to them on two occasions and [she] was unsatisfied with how they handled her disability discrimination complaint. Even if Holly D.'s hesitation to engage the employee relations department were reasonable — and we do not believe that it was — she has offered no evidence to explain why she did not seek help through any of the other sources affiliated with Caltech. The Division Administrator, Division Chair, Provost, Dean, Staff and Faculty Consultation Center, Counseling Center, and Women's Center at Caltech were all specifically identified by Caltech's written policy materials as equipped to offer assistance in cases of sexual harassment, but Holly D. made no attempt to seek relief from any person able to help put a stop to the harassment. Under similar circumstances, we have found a complete failure to use available and adequate procedures to be unreasonable. See Kohler v. Inter-Tel Techs., 244 F.3d 1167, 1181-82 (9th Cir. 2001); Montero v. Agco Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 863 (9th Cir.1999). Holly D. has presented no evidence to indicate that a different conclusion would be appropriate here. 24 64 Because Holly D. has not presented evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact either on her tangible employment action claim or on Caltech's affirmative defense to her hostile environment claim, we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to Caltech on her Title VII claim. 65