Opinion ID: 1195356
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Discovery related to police activities

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to grant discovery of certain evidence, and that the prosecution erred in failing to disclose it. He contends this error deprived him of his constitutional right to due process of law. The defendant generally is entitled to discovery of information that will assist in his defense or be useful for impeachment or cross-examination of adverse witnesses. ( People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 677, 214 Cal.Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446.) A motion for discovery must describe the information sought with some specificity and provide a plausible justification for disclosure. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1171, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146.) The court's ruling on a discovery motion is subject to review for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 979, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.) Under the due process clause of the federal Constitution, the government has the obligation to disclose to the defendant evidence in its possession that is favorable to the accused and material to the issues of guilt or punishment. ( Strickler v. Greene (1999) 527 U.S. 263, 280-282, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286; Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 [applying due process analysis in the context of court's denial of discovery]; People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 840-843, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 [same].) Evidence is material if a reasonable probability exists that a different result would have occurred in the proceeding had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the proceedings. ( Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 57, 107 S.Ct. 989; In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544, & fn. 5, 37 Cal. Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527, overruling broader statement of the standard in People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 30, fn. 14, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843, upon which defendant relies.) Defendant complains that the trial court refused to grant discovery of photographs of police officers who were involved in surveilling him prior to October 31, 1985, and of photographs of the vehicles used in the police surveillance. He asserts that such photographs could have been shown to neighbors of defendant and other witnesses for the purpose of identification. Defendant sought to demonstrate that police surveillance lasted longer than the police had admitted, thereby suggesting defendant would not have engaged in the charged crimes while he knew he was under surveillance. As respondent points out, the prosecution offered to make the surveillance officers available so that witnesses could view them in person. Thus, defendant had no further need for photographs of the officers. The court also acted within its discretion in determining that defendant had not shown sufficient cause to warrant discovery of photographs of the surveillance vehicles. As the court stated, the defense witnesses who testified in support of the discovery motion regarding the surveillance of defendant had little or no independent recollection of the vehicles defendant had told them were following him, so the utility of photographs of the surveillance vehicles for defendant's purposes was doubtful. The court also observed that it might be unduly suggestive to show photographs of the vehicles to witnesses who had no independent recollection of them. Further, we note that the court denied the discovery motion without prejudice, stating that if defendant had additional evidence, the court would reconsider the matter. Defense counsel stated he probably would put defendant on the stand to supply the needed foundation for the discovery request, but he never did so. Finally, the evidence was not material, such that its loss deprived defendant of due process of law. Defendant has not demonstrated that the prosecution had in its possession evidence that was favorable to him and material to the issues of guilt or punishment. (See Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at p. 57, 107 S.Ct. 989.) There is no reasonable probability a different result would have occurred in the proceeding had the evidence been disclosed to the defense ( ibid. )the evidence was not such as `could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.' ( Strickler v. Greene, supra, 527 U.S. at p. 290, 119 S.Ct at p. 1952.) Defendant was able to introduce evidence in support of his theory that the police surveillance had extended until the time of the Williams murder, and it would be entirely speculative to conclude that photographs of surveillance vehicles would have affected the verdict either by corroborating defense witnesses or by leading to potential exculpatory evidence. Defendant also contends the trial court erred in denying his request for discovery of memoranda written by Los Angeles Police Chief Gates and a lieutenant in the police department regarding an internal affairs investigation of Officers Pesante, Slack, and Riscens in connection with the alleged statement of Donald Sutton to Officer Pesante that defendant intended to kill Carpenter. As respondent notes, the People did provide defendant with the police department's written report on the internal affairs investigation that was the basis upon which Chief Gates and the lieutenant based their memoranda. The trial court properly reviewed the disputed memoranda in camera to weigh the People's claim of privilege against defendant's asserted need for the information (see People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 518, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779), and determined that nothing contained in the memoranda would be material to the defense. Our review of the documents confirms the court's conclusion. The court's refusal to grant discovery was within its discretion, and no due process violation has been shown. Defendant next contends the trial court erred in quashing a subpoena duces tecum for copies of manuals or other records concerning the operation of the county jail module in which defendant was confined. He sought these records to rebut the prosecutor's contention that its delay in disclosing jailhouse informant Carroll's statement implicating defendant until after the preliminary hearing, was reasonable because of concerns that defendant would retaliate against Carroll as long as Carroll was housed in the county jail. We observe that although the court quashed the subpoena, it examined the module itself and concluded that the prosecution's security concerns were reasonable. Without examining the merits of the court's decision with respect to discovery, we conclude that any error in denying discovery was harmless because the requested evidence went to the issue of delay in disclosing Carroll's statement. (See People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 134, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561 [defendant must demonstrate prejudice to prevail on claim of discovery error].) We have determined that the delay was nonprejudicial. No due process violation appears, because the evidence was not material; there is no reasonable probability a different result would have occurred in the proceeding, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense. Defendant also contends the court erred in denying his request for discovery of all cases that Detective Williams had investigated, or in which he had made an arrest, in the year before he was murdered. We observe that the trial court granted the request to the extent that it ordered disclosure of the names of persons who had made threats against Williams. Defendant's theory was that a person investigated or arrested by Williams may have borne a grudge against the officer and thus been responsible for the murder of the officer. Defendant noted that some eyewitnesses to the shooting of Detective Williams had described the assailant as White or Hispanic, whereas defendant is African-American. He contended that evidence of a White or Hispanic suspect in one of Williams's cases who bore a grudge against the officer  if such a person existed  would add weight to his defense. At the hearing, the prosecution, through the Los Angeles City Attorney, resisted discovery on the grounds that defendant had made an inadequate showing and that the request would impose an inordinate burden on the police department to sift through its records to determine what arrests or investigations Williams had been involved in during the year preceding his death. The city attorney offered: [t]o the extent that we're aware and can discover if any individuals which Detective Williams had been involved with made any kind of threat or which the department suspected may present a threat to Detective Williams, a serious threat of bodily injury or death, we will search our files and dig up that information to the extent that we can; to the extent that anyone is aware of that type of factor. The trial court concluded defendant had not given sufficient justification for the discovery, and denied the motion except insofar as any information that's been obtained by the Police Department that perhaps other individuals may have made threats against officer Williams. Defendant speculates that some person under investigation by Detective Williams, but who had not, to the knowledge of the prosecution, made any threat against the officer, may have been responsible for murdering the officer. The court acted within its discretion in denying defendant's request to the extent the request was not focused on evidence of threats to Detective Williams. (See People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 686-687, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) We are supported in reaching this conclusion by the circumstance that the information requested was subject to the official information privilege (Evid.Code, § 1040; In re David W. (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 840, 846-847, 133 Cal.Rptr. 342; see also Craig v. Municipal Court (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 69, 76-78, 161 Cal.Rptr. 19 [recognizing the need to keep confidential the arrest records of third parties]), at least to the extent the necessity for preserving the confidentiality of the information ... out-weighs the necessity for disclosure in the interest of justice.... (Evid.Code, § 1040, subd. (b)(2).) As we have observed, [although policy may favor granting liberal discovery to criminal defendants, courts may nevertheless refuse to grant discovery if the burdens placed on government and on third parties substantially outweigh the demonstrated need for discovery. ( People v. Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 686, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) There is a significant interest in preserving the confidentiality of an individual citizen's arrest records ( ibid.; Westbrook v. County of Los Angeles (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 157, 165-166, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 382; Craig v. Municipal Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.3d at pp. 76-78, 161 Cal.Rptr. 19), and defendant's showing of need for those records was based upon speculation and constituted the proverbial fishing expedition. No abuse of discretion is shown. We also reject defendant's due process claim with respect to this evidence, on the ground defendant is unable to demonstrate the existence of exculpatory material evidence in the possession of the prosecution. [7]