Opinion ID: 1640607
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Widespread abuse

Text: With respect to a history of widespread abuse, Jenkins alleges in her complaint that Sheriff Hale, as the supervisor of the jail, is liable for the alleged violations of Hodge's constitutional rights because, she argues, [Sheriff] Hale ... [was] on notice that a widespread problem existed wherein inmates of the County Jail were not receiving medical treatment for serious medical needs. Jenkins's brief, Exhibit B. Jenkins further alleges that the constitutional deprivations were obvious, flagrant, rampant and/or of continu[ed] duration. In her complaint, Jenkins supports the allegations with references to statements made by Sheriff Hale in his March 2007 complaint for a declaratory judgment in the Jefferson Circuit Court in Hale v. Jefferson County et al., (CV-2007-01040) (the DJA). These references in her complaint allege that, in the complaint in the DJA, Sheriff Hale admitted to a troubling pattern with respect to inmate health care at the county jail. Jenkins's complaint then identifies, from the DJA complaint, eight lawsuits or notices of claims [that have been] filed ... [that] demonstrate that [Sheriff] Hale is fully aware this troubling pattern exists. She alleges in her complaint that [s]ome of these instances and others ... placed [Sheriff Hale] ... on notice of widespread problems of inadequate medical care in the County Jail and his need to correct the inmates' constitutional deprivations and that [Sheriff Hale] ... failed to correct the widespread problems and constitutional deprivations. Jenkins's brief, Exhibit B (emphasis omitted). Jenkins concludes that [Sheriff Hale's] ... conduct proximately caused Hodge's death. Sheriff Hale argues that by interjecting the DJA into these proceedings, [Jenkins] has plead[ed] herself out of the litigation. Sheriff Hale's petition at 20. Sheriff Hale argues that the DJA demonstrates that the problem of inmate medical care was not widespread, given the fact that the complaint in the DJA references only nine incidents over a three-year period, one of which is the incident involving Hodge. Furthermore, Sheriff Hale argues that not all of these incidents occurred before December 2004 and, thus, would not serve as notice of the alleged widespread violations. Finally, Sheriff Hale asserts that the existence of the DJA proves that he was, in fact, attempting to improve inmate health care. This matter is before us because the trial court declined to dismiss the § 1983 claim against Sheriff Hale, not because of the denial of a summary-judgment motion; therefore, we do not address whether Jenkins's reference to the DJA would constitute substantial evidence of her claim. [7] We agree with Jenkins that she has sufficiently pleaded this issue to avoid a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. See Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So.2d 784, 791 (Ala.2007) (`In making this determination, [whether the pleader could prove any set of circumstances that would entitle her to relief under 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P.,] this Court does not consider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but only whether she may possibly prevail.' (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So.2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993))). Jenkins's complaint alleges the existence of widespread constitutional violations, alleges that those violations were obvious, flagrant, rampant and of continued duration, rather than isolated occurrences, and alleges that Sheriff Hale was aware of those violations and failed to take corrective action. Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269. Therefore, Jenkins's complaint ... allege[s] the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, Alabama Dep't of Youth Servs., 880 So.2d at 402. Thus, in light of Jenkins's allegation of widespread abuse with respect to medical care for inmates, Sheriff Hale has not demonstrated that he is entitled to a dismissal based on qualified immunity or that he has a clear legal right to mandamus relief on this issue.