Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Consideration of Facts Underlying Dismissed Charges

Text: Based on the incident described above, New York authorities filed a 15-count felony indictment, which included charges of robbery, attempted murder, assault with a deadly weapon and illegal possession of a loaded firearm. On August 29, 1978, defendant entered a plea of guilty to robbery. The remaining counts against him were dismissed. At the penalty phase in this case, the prosecution presented evidence of the New York robbery, attempted getaway, and shootout as criminal activity by the defendant involving force or violence, an aggravating factor. [8] (ง 190.3, factor (b).) Defense counsel objected to the admission of evidence of the chase and shootout. He relied on language in section 190.3, which prohibits the admission of aggravating evidence pertaining to prior criminal activity for an offense for which the defendant was prosecuted and acquitted. (13a) Counsel characterized as an implied acquittal the New York court's plea-bargained dismissal of the counts involving the getaway attempt and shootout. In support, he cited People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754, 758-759 [159 Cal. Rptr. 696, 602 P.2d 396], which holds that for purposes of sentence enhancement, a court may not consider facts that pertain solely to a charge that has been dismissed as part of a plea bargain. We conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence, for reasons that follow. After the trial in this case, we held in People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 193 [246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629], that for purposes of section 190.3, an acquittal did not include a charge dismissed as part of a plea bargain and thus not based on any judicial determination with respect to the truth or falsity of the charge.... (Accord People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 755 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].) We explained that the constraint [set out in People v. Harvey, supra, 25 Cal.3d 754, 758] against reliance on facts underlying the dismissed count to fix the sentence in the very case for which the plea bargain was executed does not preclude the use of such facts in the penalty phase of a later, separate trial for murder with special circumstances, in order to show criminal activity involving violence as an aggravating factor. ( People v. Heishman, supra, at p. 193, italics added.) Thus, in Heishman, we rejected the same argument that defendant in this case raised in the trial court. Defendant nonetheless maintains that his case is not controlled by People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, but rather by People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 951-952 [258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330]. In Sheldon, we held that admission of other-crimes evidence concerning lesser included offenses of attempted murder violated section 190.3, in view of the defendant's acquittal of attempted murder in a Nevada jury trial. We stated that under Nevada law [the defendant's] acquittal of attempted murder would bar conviction or retrial of all necessarily included offenses including those the prosecution had introduced as other-crimes evidence. ( People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 951.) Based on this reference to Nevada law, defendant suggests that we have held that the law of the state in which a defendant has been acquitted controls on the issue of what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of section 190.3, and he argues that under New York law he was acquitted of the dismissed charges. Defendant misreads Sheldon. Our conclusion in People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d 935, 951, that admission of other-crimes evidence was error, was premised on our earlier holding in People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 193, that for purposes of section 190.3, an offense for which the defendant [was] `prosecuted and acquitted' was one where the falsity of the charge had been judicially established. As we acknowledged, after such an acquittal, principles of double jeopardy and due process would bar a retrial of the same charge or of lesser offenses that are included in that charge. ( People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 951, citing People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 756, fn. 17.) Thus it was in that context that we looked to Nevada law in Sheldon to decide whether the evidence that had been presented was for crimes that were lesser included offenses of the charge of attempted murder of which the defendant had been acquitted. ( People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d 935, 951-952.) We did not at all suggest that the law of another state would control on the issue of what constituted an acquittal for purposes of section 190.3. (14)(See fn. 9.), (13b) Additionally, defendant argues that admission of evidence of facts pertaining to the dismissed charges violated the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution. (U.S. Const., art. IV, ง 1.) [9] He maintains that under New York law the facts involving a charge that has been dismissed as part of a plea bargain may not be considered as an aggravating circumstance, and that the trial court in this case had to apply New York law. We disagree. Under New York law, the dismissal of criminal charges as part of a plea bargain is an acquittal of those charges, which precludes prosecution on the dismissed charges ( People v. Romer (1972) 38 A.D.2d 757 [329 N.Y.S.2d 719, 721]) or consideration of their underlying facts for the purpose of imposing a sentence to a reduced charge ( People v. Griffin (1960) 7 N.Y.2d 511, 515-516 [199 N.Y.S.2d 674, 166 N.E.2d 684]). Thus, when as part of a plea bargain, a defendant pleads to a reduced charge and the remaining charges are dismissed, New York law precludes courts from considering the allegations supporting the dismissed charges when imposing sentence. ( People v. Griffin, supra, 7 N.Y.2d at p. 515.) A plea to a lesser charge does not presuppose the truth of the facts pleaded in the indictment.... [Defendant's] plea only admits the facts stated in the plea as constituting the lesser crime. ( Ibid. ; accord People v. Ayiotis (1965) 23 A.D.2d 760 [258 N.Y.S.2d 554, 556]; People v. DeFini (1964) 20 A.D.2d 250 [246 N.Y.S.2d 485, 487-488]; People v. Hall (1961) 28 Misc.2d 769 [216 N.Y.S.2d 148, 149-150].) These cases, however, do not purport to define what constitutes an acquittal for purposes of the admission of aggravating evidence in a California capital case. As previously explained, we have defined an offense for which the defendant [was] `prosecuted and acquitted' under section 190.3 as one in which there has been a judicial determination of the truth or falsity of the charge. ( People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 193.) An offense falls within this definition only if such a judicial determination has been made; a foreign jurisdiction's contrary definition of acquittal has no bearing on our construction of section 190.3. Accordingly, assuming that the full faith and credit clause applies in criminal cases, it does not require us to follow New York cases defining an acquittal.