Opinion ID: 1674515
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Remaining Ineffective Assistance Claims

Text: Many of Ervin's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were raised for the first time on appeal; they are procedurally barred and will not be considered here. Amrine, 785 S.W.2d at 535. We will review only those additional allegations properly raised in the original pro se motion or in the amended motion. To prevail on his Rule 29.15 motion, Ervin must demonstrate that trial counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To demonstrate prejudice, movant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068. Moreover, movant must overcome the underlying presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy. Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Sanders v. State, 738 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Mo. banc 1987). Finally, a court need not determine the performance component before examining for prejudice. If it is easier to dispose of the claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, the reviewing court is free to do so. O'Neal v. State, 766 S.W.2d 91, 92 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 874, 110 S.Ct. 206, 107 L.Ed.2d 159 (1989).
Ervin alleges that his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to play a videotape of Hunter's guilty plea during the guilt phase of the trial. When he pled guilty to the Hodgeses' murders, Hunter explained in detail the murders and told the court that Ervin was not his accomplice. Hunter declined to implicate anyone else. At Ervin's Rule 29.15 hearing, Ervin's lead trial attorney testified that he discussed the merits of playing the videotape with the movant as well as with the entire defense team. Counsel recognized the vital importance of Hunter's testimony to the State's case and that the decision to introduce evidence from the videotape was critical. Ultimately, however, counsel chose to avoid a rehash of the grisly details of the two murders. Although the lead defense counsel did not personally view the videotape, he testified that he read the transcript and that his co-counsel viewed the tape and discussed its contents with him. Trial counsel also testified that while Ervin initially wanted to play the video, Ervin ultimately agreed with counsel that it should not be played. Beyond this, the jury had ample evidence to reject Hunter's testimony as inconsistent. The motion court found that defense counsel could reasonably decide not to reprise the story of the Hodgeses' deaths to the jury as a matter of trial strategy. This finding is not clearly erroneous. The reasonable choice of trial strategy by counsel is not a foundation for finding that counsel ineffective. Sanders, 738 S.W.2d at 858.
Ervin also avers that his counsel was ineffective in failing to have Ervin present at all critical stages of the proceedings. He now asserts that it was prejudicial error for him to be absent from the instruction conference in which the decision was made to waive a second degree murder instruction. As previously indicated, Ervin does not claim that his decision to waive the second degree murder instruction was incorrectly stated by his counsel or that he made the decision to waive the instruction involuntarily or without knowledge of the consequences of that choice. Apparently Ervin's claim is that his attendance at the instruction conference somehow resulted in prejudice to him. This claim is stated conclusionally and is without merit. Ervin has failed to show any prejudice. With respect to additional claims regarding the presence of the movant that are asserted in the amended motion, the motion court ruled that the movant failed to indicate any particularized evidence concerning what stages of the proceeding the claim refers to. Under Rule 29.15(h) the movant has the burden of proving his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. The motion court did not clearly err in its ruling. The point is denied.
Ervin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct an adequate investigation of mitigating evidence and for the manner in which he presented mitigating evidence. Ervin contends in his brief that his childhood conditions, and additional witnesses who could have offered mitigating testimony, should have been investigated. There is no doubt that trial counsel has a duty to make a reasonable investigation of mitigating evidence or to make a reasonable decision that such an investigation is unnecessary. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. So, too, it is the responsibility of motion counsel to do more than make conclusional statements of ineffectiveness. The amended motion offers no factual bases to support its claim; the evidence before the motion court did not reveal any testimony or evidence that trial counsel failed to present. Thus, the motion court properly held that the movant failed to sustain his burden of proof with respect to this allegation.
Ervin also urges that counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate during pre-trial whether members of the grand jury and its indictment had been tainted by his acquaintance with one of its members and that person's animosity toward him. Ervin argues that he was prejudiced by defense counsel's failure to investigate this allegation. The amended motion also asserts that counsel failed to inquire into the validity of the indictment and also failed to challenge selection of the grand jury. The post-conviction court held that movant failed to present any evidence in support of these claims, thus abandoning them. Again, movant has the burden of proving his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Pure speculation as to what evidence might have been uncovered and its ultimate effect is not a proper basis for a conclusion that Ervin's counsel was ineffective. The motion court did not err on this point.
Ervin also contends that the failure of the State to disclose all discoverable information in a timely manner prejudiced him because defense counsel did not have all the necessary information in time to prepare a reasonable defense. No claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is asserted. The motion court nonetheless ruled that the State provided defense counsel all the discovery required under Rule 25.03. The motion court noted that the amended motion refers to a single specific item, a computer log, that the State allegedly failed to disclose in a timely fashion. Ervin sought a Department of Revenue computer log in order to verify certain inquiries made with respect to Ervin's automobile license number. The log was provided to Ervin prior to trial. Furthermore, the information simply corroborated information in police reports, which were already in Ervin's possession. Hence, the motion court was not clearly erroneous in ruling that movant failed to demonstrate any prejudice from the delay.
Next, Ervin alleges that the prosecutor's investigator, Richard Lee, tampered with evidence and threatened witnesses at trial. Ervin does not allege ineffective assistance of counsel but apparently relies on United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), as authority for the proposition that matters external to counsel's actions may support a claim of ineffective assistance. According to the amended motion, Lee changed the tab on a photograph of Mrs. Hodges' bedroom and told a witness prior to trial that his name had been mentioned as a possible suspect. The motion court did not make a specific ruling on the tampering with evidence charge. However, the transcript reveals that the license number found recorded on a pad in the Hodgeses' home had been incorrectly tabbed on the photograph. The investigator, seeing the mistake, simply corrected the tab to reflect the evidence. This is not tampering. With respect to the allegation that the investigator tampered with a witness, the motion court ruled that Ervin failed to carry the burden of proof on this issue. We agree. The amended motion briefly recites the allegation, giving only a cursory description of one conversation between defense witness Patrick Connell and the State's investigator, Richard Lee. Connell testified that the investigator advised him before he testified that his name was implicated in the murders. While such tactics cannot be condoned, reversal is not mandated where no prejudice is demonstrated. Connell testified at the hearing on Ervin's motion for new trial that the conversation with Lee did not affect his testimony. No other allegations of tampering are asserted. The point is denied.
Ervin apparently contends that Rule 29.07(b)(4) is unconstitutional both facially and as applied. Ervin asserts that he is denied effective assistance of counsel because this rule forced him to proceed pro se at a critical stage and also put him at odds with his appointed counsel. Rule 29.07(b)(4) requires the trial court at the conclusion of final sentencing to advise the defendant of his right to proceed under Rule 24.035 or Rule 29.15. The rule also mandates that the trial court conduct a preliminary examination of the assistance of counsel received by the defendant in order to determine whether probable cause exists to believe that the defendant received ineffective assistance. This argument is without substance. The conviction and sentencing are complete before the trial court begins its inquiry under Rule 29.07. Hence, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is not implicated. The point is denied.
Ervin's amended 29.15 motion claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a separate hearing on Ervin's pre-trial motion to suppress evidence. Defense counsel had filed a motion to suppress on December 12, 1989, seeking to keep out certain evidence because of an alleged illegal search and seizure. Law enforcement officials seized cocaine, green stamps, personal notes, credit card receipts, newspaper clippings, telephone bills and other items from Ervin's residence pursuant to a search warrant. The hearing on the motion to suppress took place with the trial. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress. The amended motion's bare claim asserts simply that trial counsel should have made sure that the hearing was conducted and/or properly reported and included in the record on appeal. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel recalled that the idea to combine the hearing on the motion to suppress with the trial came either from the trial judge or the prosecutor, but that he agreed to it. Counsel also testified that he felt that the motion would be unsuccessful. In addition, counsel vehemently denied that he agreed to hear the motion to suppress with the trial in order to speed things along. The motion court did not rule specifically on this matter, but included this claim within the myriad of other allegations of ineffectiveness that Ervin failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence. Here, the amended motion has failed to plead and motion counsel has failed to produce any evidence to indicate how counsel was specifically ineffectivewhether these items were later objected to by counsel, whether a separate hearing had any chance of success, or whether a successful ruling would have resulted in a different outcome. Ervin's claim is pure speculation. The motion court did not clearly err in overruling this aspect of the motion. The point is denied.
Appellant raises a myriad of claims asserting that defense counsel was generally ineffective for failing to object to numerous alleged instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The sum of these failures, it is alleged, resulted in an unfair trial. Ervin's meritorious claims have already been addressed. As to the remaining littany of claims, we find that the motion court did not clearly err in ruling that the movant had not met his burden of proving these allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.