Opinion ID: 1708933
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: INTERPRETATION OF MCL 750.167b(3); MSA 28.364(2)(3)

Text: Plaintiff Cartwright alleges that the defendants violated MCL 750.167b(3); MSA 28.364(2)(3) by charging a fee of $55 to post a $500 bond. The statute provides in pertinent part: It shall be lawful to charge for executing any bond in a criminal case, but no person engaged in the bonding business, either as principal or clerk, agent or representative of another, either directly or indirectly, shall charge, accept or receive any sum of money or property, other than the regular prevailing fee for bonding, which shall not exceed 10% of the face value of the bond for a 12 month period or any part thereof, from any person for whom he has executed bond, for any other service whatever performed in connection with any indictment, information or charge upon which the person is bailed or held. The plaintiff asserts that the meaning of the statute is plain, and that according to its terms the defendants were entitled to a fee of $50, 10% of the $500 bond. The defendants respond that the term face value is capable of two or more constructions. They contend that face value should be interpreted to mean the amount of the bondsman's risk. The defendants theorize that since another statute increased their costs in the event of forfeiture by 10%, [11] they were entitled to charge the plaintiff 10% of their increased risk. In this case the amount of their risk was $550, so their fee should be $55. The Court of Appeals applied the plain meaning rule and held that the term face value unambiguously means the amount of the bond. 88 Mich App 519, 550; 278 NW2d 653 (1979). We agree. Under the plain meaning rule, if the language of a statute is unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction. Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641, 648-649; 97 NW2d 804 (1959). Like the statutory language in that case, the term face value is clear, definite, and would be easily understood by even those not trained in the law to mean the value of the bond. Id., 649. There is no need for further judicial interpretation.
In addition to paying a $55 fee, plaintiff Cartwright pledged $250 in collateral with the defendants. The plaintiffs assert that the defendants violate MCL 750.167b(3); MSA 28.364(2)(3) when they require collateral security which either taken alone or together with the fee exceeds 10% of the face value of the bond. For convenience, we repeat the pertinent statutory language: It shall be lawful to charge for executing any bond in a criminal case, but no person engaged in the bonding business    shall charge, accept or receive any sum of money or property, other than the regular prevailing fee for bonding, which shall not exceed 10% of the face value of the bond for a 12 month period. (Emphasis added.) This statute authorizes a fee for executing a bond in a criminal case and limits the amount of such a fee. The statute does not specifically provide that giving the bondsman a security interest in collateral is included within the 10% fee. We must, therefore, analyze the statutory language to determine the legislative intent. To do so, it is appropriate to look to the language and interpretation of analogous statutes. See 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 53.03, p 346. The defendants cite to us several analogous statutes where language similar to that of the instant statute is used and the language has not been interpreted to prohibit the taking of collateral. For instance, MCL 493.13(4); MSA 23.667(13)(4), which is part of legislation regulating small loans by consumer finance companies in Michigan, provides in pertinent part: In addition to the charges provided for in this act, a further or other amount shall not be directly or indirectly charged, contracted for, or received except the lawful fees, if any, actually necessarily paid out by the licensee to a public officer, for filing, or recording, or releasing in a public office a financing statement, an instrument securing the loan, or both, and for noting or releasing a lien or transferring a certificate of title under Act No. 300 of the Public Acts of 1949, as amended. (Emphasis added.) MCL 492.118(a); MSA 23.628(18)(a), part of the Motor Vehicle Sales Finance Act, limits the finance charges by an installment seller of an automobile as follows: A seller licensed under the provisions of this act may charge, contract for, receive, or collect a finance charge, as defined in this act, on any installment sale contract covering the retail sale of a motor vehicle in this state which shall not exceed the rates indicated. (Emphasis added.) The limiting language in these statutes has not been applied to prevent the seller or lender from taking a security interest in collateral to secure the loan. The statute regulating pawnbrokers and limiting their rates, MCL 446.209; MSA 19.589, also uses the terms charge and receive and contemplates the taking of collateral in addition to the rates charged. No pawnbroker or agent or employee thereof shall make a loan upon any deposit, pawn or pledge at a rate of interest and charge or receive therefor in excess of the amounts provided for in this act. (Emphasis added.) After reviewing the above statutes, we are satisfied that the Legislature did not intend to prohibit bondsmen from taking a security interest in collateral in addition to the 10% fee. Posting a bond for a fee is similar to loaning money and charging interest. Statutes regulating the latter contain limiting language similar to the language found in the statute limiting bondsmen's fees, and they do not prohibit the taking of collateral. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point. The decision of the Court of Appeals is modified in part, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part. We remand to the Wayne Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.