Opinion ID: 2200435
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing into evidence expert testimony on the credibility of the complaining witnesses and rape trauma syndrome.

Text: Bachman next claims that the trial court erred when it admitted into evidence the opinions of Dr. Mary Curran and Dr. Vail Williams concerning the credibility of the testimony of A.E. and J.E. and allowing their testimony on rape trauma syndrome. Bachman requested the pretrial examination of A.E. and J.E. to determine their competency to testify truthfully and to determine whether they suffered from any mental or moral delusions or tendencies which would distort their imagination and affect their credibility. The girls were evaluated by Dr. Williams, who concluded that they were competent to testify. Later, Bachman moved to suppress the testimony of Dr. Williams and Dr. Curran (whom the State planned to call to testify regarding post-traumatic stress disorders). Bachman contended that Dr. Williams' deposition testimony had accomplished its purpose of showing that A.E. and J.E. knew the nature of the proceedings and were otherwise competent to testify. At the conclusion of the pretrial hearing, the trial court denied his motion to suppress the testimony of Dr. Curran and took under advisement Bachman's motion to suppress testimony of Dr. Williams. At trial, immediately before Dr. Williams' deposition was read to the jury, an in-chambers hearing was held at which time the trial court denied Bachman's motion to suppress. Dr. Williams, by deposition, told the jury that he interviewed both A.E. and J.E. and that, in his opinion, neither girl showed any symptoms of psychosis, delusions, or hallucinations, but that they showed some symptoms found in sexual abuse victims. Dr. Curran, who had not interviewed the children, gave live testimony concerning the behavior patterns that a sexually abused child would demonstrate, including their failure to disclose the claimed abuse, nightmares, insomnia, et cetera. We first note that the trial court has broad discretion concerning the qualification of experts and the admission of expert testimony. The trial court's decision on such matters will not be reversed absent a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. State v. Logue, 372 N.W.2d 151 (S.D.1985). Bachman submits that a different standard must be used in reviewing this issue. Relying on Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988), he claims that the admission of expert testimony is a matter of law, and [i]n ruling on a question of law, a judge is either right or wrong, and discretion plays no part. Id. 539 A.2d at 663. Using that standard, Bachman submits that the trial court erred in admitting the expert testimony due to its lack of relevance, its tendency to invade the province of the jury, its failure to meet the Frye test [3] and its violation of his right to a fair trial. Bachman also relies heavily on this court's holding in Logue, supra . In Logue, we held that it was prejudicial error for a social worker to give her opinion that an alleged victim gained his sexual knowledge from having sex with the defendant. We noted therein that permitting the social worker to testify as an expert in that case lent a stamp of undue legitimacy to her testimony. 372 N.W.2d at 157. Our ruling therein was based on an application of the Ultimate Fact Doctrine, which restricts witnesses from testifying as to ultimate issues. We decline to accept Bachman's invitation to stray from our own precedent concerning the trial court's discretion in admitting expert testimony. [4] Further, while we adhere to our holding in Logue, we believe that it is inapposite to the facts in this case. Unlike Logue, Drs. Williams and Curran were undoubtedly qualified as experts. Moreover, neither testified that either A.E. or J.E. had been molested by Bachman and neither testified that the girls were absolutely telling the truth. Instead, Drs. William and Curran both simply shared their expert knowledge with the jury in order to assist it in determining whether A.E. and J.E. had been molested and the amount of credence to give the girls' testimony. The use of such testimony was also discussed in State v. Swallow, 350 N.W.2d 606 (S.D.1984), wherein we stated that the determining factor in admitting expert testimony is whether it would assist the jury in understanding matters that normally would not lie within a layman's breadth of knowledge. Moreover, the jury here was instructed that it was to be the sole judge of the credibility of the child witnesses and that it was not bound to accept the opinions of either doctor. [5] Bachman also asserts that the expert testimony concerning rape trauma syndrome should not have been admitted, primarily relying on State v. Saldana, 324 N.W.2d 227 (Minn.1982). The court in Saldana stated that rape trauma syndrome is not a fact-finding tool, but rather a therapeutic tool useful in counseling. It also noted that a majority of courts that have considered the issue hold that it is erroneous to admit expert opinions which conclude that a rape or sexual assault had occurred. Again, we believe that Saldana is factually inapposite. Saldana involved expert testimony as to whether in fact a rape had occurred. It also involved two adults and focused on the issue of whether the act was consensual. Here, neither expert was asked whether A.E. or J.E. was actually molested. Moreover, contrary to Saldana, the present case deals with child victims and their ability to competently testify. Finally, Dr. Curran's testimony on rape trauma syndrome was not intended to point an accusing finger at Bachman, but rather to assist the jury by stating what type of behavior is displayed by victims of sexual abuse. We note that the Saldana court also considered State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604 (Minn.1984), which more closely resembles the facts present here and correctly draws a distinction between cases involving adults and those involving children. In Myers, the defendant was found guilty of having sexual contact with a seven-year-old girl who was the daughter of the defendant's live-in girl friend. The incident was not reported to the authorities until several months later. The victim was examined by a physician who determined that the victim's hymen was intact and that she was otherwise normal for a girl of her age. A clinical psychologist also examined the victim on several occasions, when the victim related the manner in which she was abused. The psychologist noted that her allegations remained consistent. At trial, the psychologist related what the complainant had told her about the incident and other occasions of sexual abuse and testified that the complainant's allegations had remained consistent throughout their meetings. The psychologist was also permitted to describe characteristics typically observed in sexually abused children and that she observed these characteristics in the victim. Finally, the psychologist testified that it is extremely rare for children to fabricate tales of sexual abuse and that, in her opinion, the victim knew the difference between truth and falsehood and that she was truthful in her allegations. On appeal, the court distinguished Saldana, noting that: [W]hen the alleged victim of a sexual assault is a child or mentally retarded person there is presented one of those `unusual cases' in which expert testimony concerning credibility of a witness should be received. In the case of a sexually abused child consent is irrelevant and jurors are often faced with determining the veracity of a young child who tells of a course of conduct carried on over an ill-defined time frame and who appears an uncertain or ambivalent accuser and who may even recant. Background data providing a relevant insight into the puzzling aspects of the child's conduct and demeanor which the jury could not otherwise bring to its evaluation of her credibility is helpful and appropriate in cases of sexual abuse of children, and particularly of children as young as this complainant. (Footnote omitted.) (Citations omitted.) We agree with the Myers court and hold here that the trial court did not err in admitting expert testimony concerning the traits and characteristics typically found in sexually abused children, characteristics or emotional conditions observed in the victims, and opinion testimony that the victims' allegations were truthful. See also State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983) and State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982). Bachman also contends that Dr. Curran's testimony on rape trauma syndrome should not have been admitted because it failed to meet the requirements of the Frye test. See Frye, supra note 3. Under Frye: [T]he opinions of experts ... are admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it, for the reason that the subject-matter so far partakes of a science, art, or trade as to require a previous habit or experience or study in it, in order to acquire knowledge of it. When the question involved does not lie within the range of common experience or common knowledge, but requires special experience or special knowledge, then the opinions of witnesses skilled in that particular science, art, or trade to which the question relates are admissible in evidence. Frye, 293 F. at 1014. The Frye test was recently reaffirmed by this court in State v. Miller, 429 N.W.2d 26 (S.D.1988) and State v. Adams, 418 N.W.2d 618 (S.D.1988). Bachman submits that those courts which have applied the Frye test to rape trauma syndrome have held that such testimony is inadmissible. See, e.g., People v. Bledsoe, 36 Cal.3d 236, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291 (1984). However, we believe that Bledsoe and the other cases cited by Bachman again are distinguishable. The testimony of Dr. Curran on rape trauma syndrome does not violate the mandate of Frye in the setting of a criminal trial for the sexual abuse of a child. The testimony was offered merely to inform the jury of the characteristics which may be displayed by one who has been sexually abused. The testimony did not reach an ultimate fact and did not invade the province of the jury, but rather was designed to assist it in making its decision. We thus hold that the testimony of Dr. Curran on rape trauma syndrome met the requirements set forth in Frye.