Opinion ID: 3173394
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conditional Will

Text: ¶ 22. As to their challenge to the validity of the will as conditional, appellants contend that the civil division erred in finding their challenge to be an impermissible collateral attack on the probate division’s February 2013 order allowing the will because the effect of declaring the will to be conditional would be to disallow it, if the condition were not met. Appellants contend that their argument relates to construction, not allowance, and therefore the court erred in concluding it was without jurisdiction. We agree and therefore reverse and remand the superior court decision that it could not reach this issue. 9 ¶ 23. The issue of what precisely constitutes a conditional or contingent will, and how and when the issue should be raised, appears to be a matter of first impression in Vermont.5 There is a uniform consensus among states, however, that the concept of a will being conditioned on the happening of an event is permissible. See, e.g., In re Taylor’s Estate, 259 P.2d 1014, 1017 (1953) (stating that California statutorily authorizes conditional wills); Damon v. Damon, 90 Mass. 192, 194 (1864) (“There seems to be no reason upon principle why an instrument cannot be made which is to take effect as a will only on the happening of a contingency named in it.”); McMerriman v. Schiel, 140 N.E. 600, 601 (Ohio 1932) (“Conditional and contingent wills are fully recognized in the American and English cases.”); In re Estate of Crowell, 154 S.W.3d 556, 560 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing validity of conditional wills) (citing In re Estate of Franklin, E2000-02687-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 896635 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2001)); Bagnall v. Bagnall, 225 S.W.2d 401, 402 (Tex. 1949) (stating that conditional wills have been recognized by Texas courts). The parties present no argument to the contrary, and we can discern no principled reason why conditional wills would not be permissible in Vermont. Therefore, we hold that in Vermont, a will may be made contingent on the happening of a condition named therein so that the failure of the condition to occur means there is no will. ¶ 24. Although the parties agree to the propriety of conditional wills as instruments, they dispute when a court should determine whether a will is conditional. Appellants argue the matter should be determined following allowance to probate, while appellee contends that because a will made conditional on an event that never occurs is “inoperative and void,” the matter is properly considered at the allowance stage. 5 Although the cases discussing this concept use “conditional will” and “contingent will” interchangeably and without distinction, for ease of reference, we exclusively use the term “conditional will.” 10 ¶ 25. To determine whether the conditional language is a statement of the motive or inducement for making the will, or whether the testator clearly intended the instrument to be contingent on a condition precedent to the operation of the will, the court must undertake construction of the testator’s intent. See In re Houghton’s Estate, 118 Vt. 228, 232, 105 A.2d 257, 259 (1954) (stating objective of construction “is to ascertain the intention of the testator”). The probate of a will, however, is a limited proceeding in “form and substance upon the will itself to determine its validity” and “the status of the instrument, whether it is or is not the will of the testator.” Everett, 103 Vt. at 492, 156 A. at 395; see also Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411, 413 (1904) (“[L]ogically the only question upon the probate was the factum of the instrument”); Estate of Perry, 2012 VT 9, ¶ 9 (finding an order of the probate division an appealable final order as to the will’s validity). The purpose of this limitation is obvious: if the document is not in fact the last will and testament of the decedent, there is nothing to probate, and if the document has been tainted by an improper influence, it is ineffective for that purpose. ¶ 26. The point at which an interested party must raise the matter of whether an instrument is subject to a condition that was not fulfilled is controlled by 14 V.S.A. § 102, which provides that “[t]he allowance of a will of real or personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution.” Discussing this statute in In re Peck’s Estate, 80 Vt. 469, 481, 68 A. 433, 435-36 (1908), this Court found that the language controls what can be raised at the allowance stage, impliedly limiting challenges to those of “due execution.” Due execution, in turn, requires conformity with the statutory formalities in 14 V.S.A. § 5, including that the will be “in writing and signed by the testator . . . and attested and subscribed by two or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other.” Thus, the issues before the probate division at the allowance stage are very narrow. Whether or not a will is conditional and whether the condition 11 is fulfilled are entirely separate matters from whether the will was duly executed. See Peck, 80 Vt. at 481, 68 A. at 436 (“[A]ny question whether [the surviving spouse] shall take under the will . . . is involved in the decree of distribution, and should be determined in connection therewith,” rather than at the allowance stage). Because a determination of whether a will is conditional necessarily involves construction of the will, under the terms of § 102, that determination must be made subsequent to its allowance. Accordingly, appellants’ challenge to the conditional nature of the will following allowance was timely and does not constitute a collateral attack on the allowance of the will.