Opinion ID: 730982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Steven Reed's Testimony

Text: 20 Steven Reed, an important Government witness at the first Ciak trial, died prior to Ciak's second trial. At the second trial, however, the Government successfully moved, over the defendant's objection, to have the court read Steven Reed's testimony from the first trial to the jury pursuant to FED.R.EVID. 804(b)(1). 1 The defendant argues on appeal that the court erred in admitting this testimony. He contends that, given our finding in Ciak I, 59 F.3d at 296, that his attorney in the first trial had a conflict of interest, the introduction of this testimony at the second trial violated his rights under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. 2 21 The Confrontation Clause requires that, where prior testimony is admitted at a later proceeding, the party against whom the testimony is admitted must have had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the earlier proceeding sufficient to endow the testimony as a whole with some indicia of reliability; the trier of fact [must have] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement. Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216, 92 S.Ct. 2308, 2315, 33 L.Ed.2d 293 (1972) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Compare Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-73, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2541-43, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) (upholding admission of testimony from preliminary hearing where witness was unavailable at trial and Court concluded from hearing transcript that, although adverse party's counsel had conducted direct examination of the witness at the hearing, counsel's questioning was the equivalent of cross-examination), and Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 214-16, 92 S.Ct. at 2313-15 (on collateral review, upholding admission at retrial of testimony from prior trial, notwithstanding fact that there had been ineffective assistance of counsel at first trial, where there had been adequate cross-examination of now-unavailable witness), with Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406-08, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1069-70, 13 L.Ed.2d 923 (1965) (finding no complete and adequate opportunity to cross-examine where prior testimony was taken from preliminary hearing at which criminal defendant was not represented by counsel and had not conducted any cross-examination of witness), and United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 315-17 (2d Cir.1975) (upholding lower court's refusal to admit testimony from prior suppression hearing that had focused on different issue such that Government had not cross-examined on now-relevant issue at earlier hearing). 22 The defendant urges us to find that Attorney Wieselman's cross-examination of Steven Reed at the first trial was constitutionally inadequate per se because of the difficulty in determining the limits to the effect of Wieselman's conflict of interest. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 32. We decline the invitation to adopt so broad a rule. Rather, following the approach now well-established in applicable precedent, we look to the actual transcript of Steven Reed's testimony--in particular to Wieselman's cross-examination of Reed--to determine whether the cross-examination imbues the testimony with the requisite indicia of reliability. See, e.g., Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71, 100 S.Ct. at 2541-42; Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 214-16, 92 S.Ct. at 2313-15. Our review of the transcript in the instant case convinces us that Wieselman's cross-examination easily imbues Reed's testimony with the reliability necessary to survive the defendant's Confrontation Clause challenge. Indeed, the transcript reveals a serious effort by Wieselman to undermine and discredit Reed's testimony. Wieselman questioned Reed about certain inconsistencies between his testimony on direct examination and his reports to the police; inconsistencies between his testimony and the physical evidence; and Reed's failure to report certain incidents to the police. Wieselman also elicited testimony on Reed's own criminal record that had not come out on direct examination. Reviewing the transcript of the cross-examination as a whole, we find that Wieselman's examination of Reed imbued Reed's testimony with sufficient indicia of reliability. 23 Moreover, while we are mindful of the practical difficulty inherent in any attempt to assess the precise effect ... of representation corrupted by conflicting interests, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), it is relevant that Steven Reed was in no way involved in the actual or potential conflict of interest that we identified in Ciak I, and Wiesleman's examination of Steven Reed played no part in our decision to grant Ciak's petition for habeas corpus. Rather, the conflict at issue in Ciak I stemmed from the fact that Wieselman had represented both Kristine Ciak and her then-fiance, Michael Reed, in forfeiture proceedings involving the white Trans Am impounded when the police apprehended Scott Ciak. Ciak I, 59 F.3d at 298-99. Wieselman also had an interest in the car itself. If Kristine Ciak regained possession of the vehicle, she had agreed to sell it and use the funds to pay Wieselman for representing the defendant. Id. at 299. By the time of the defendant's criminal trial, Wieselman had successfully recovered the vehicle for Kristine Ciak, but the car had then been stolen from her, allegedly by Michael Reed. Id. In granting the defendant's petition for habeas corpus, we were thus concerned primarily with Wieselman's cross-examination of Michael Reed, a key Government witness, in which Wieselman focused for some time on the location of the missing car, an issue that was irrelevant to Scott Ciak's criminal case. Id. at 299-300. Wieselman also examined Michael Reed about statements Michael Reed had made to Wieselman in the course of the forfeiture litigation, thereby introducing Wieselman's own recollections as unsworn testimony. Id. at 300, 304-05. In addition, we feared that Wieselman's stake in the vehicle may have influenced his decision not to summon Kristine Ciak as a witness at her brother's criminal trial. Kristine was apparently willing to testify that she had placed the two handguns in the white Trans Am, an admission that, although helpful to the defendant, might have triggered new forfeiture proceedings and jeopardized her right to retain possession of the car. Id. at 305-06. These actual and potential defects in Wieselman's representation, while serious, did not extend to Wieselman's cross-examination of Steven Reed. 24 Finally, the defendant argues that Wieselman improperly refrained from objecting to certain hearsay statements made by Steven Reed on direct examination. This argument is unavailing. The defendant himself made no such objections prior to or during the reading of the testimony to the jury in the second case. An objection at either point would have permitted Judge Covello to refrain from reading aloud any portions of the Reed testimony constituting inadmissible hearsay. Instead, the defendant raised a hearsay objection, aimed at Reed's direct testimony as a whole, only after the court had finished reading Steven Reed's complete testimony to the jury. To vacate the conviction based on the jury's exposure to hearsay evidence would be inappropriate where the defendant could have prevented this exposure with a timely objection. See generally United States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993, 1020 (2d Cir.1990) (noting contemporaneous objection requirement to preserve matter for appeal). 25 Accordingly, we find no violation of the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause in the district court's decision permitting the Government to introduce Steven Reed's prior testimony. Nor, as the defendant suggests in the alternative, can we find that Judge Covello should have denied the Government's request to introduce Steven Reed's testimony as unfairly prejudicial under FED.R.EVID. 403.