Opinion ID: 1225840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence in this Case

Text: In this case, the parties do not dispute that the government adequately proved that the Luna conspiracy existed; that Hawkins knew of the Luna conspiracy; that Hawkins purchased cocaine from Luna; that Hawkins intended to resell at least some of the cocaine he purchased from Luna; and that Luna and Febres knew that Hawkins intended to resell some of the purchased cocaine. See United States v. Hawkins, No. 05-cr-058, 2007 WL 1732767, at -4 (D.Conn. June 15, 2007) (finding sufficient evidence of a Luna conspiracy, Hawkins's knowledge thereof, and awareness by some Luna co-conspirators that Hawkins intended to resell cocaine). Hawkins does dispute, however, that he joined the conspiracy. He argues that he purchased the cocaine to use it, share it, or sell it, but it was only his business what he would do with it. The sole question, therefore, is whether the evidence was sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hawkins intentionally joined and participated in the Luna conspiracy. In granting Hawkins's motion, the District Court concluded that the evidence establishes at most that Hawkins acted as a go-between, i.e., one who facilitates sales between suppliers and users, without the intent to further the goals of the conspiracy. Id. at . The District Court held that the government proved that it [wa]s plausible that Hawkins joined the conspiracy, but not that he joined the charged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at . We find that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Hawkins knowingly and intentionally joined and participated in the Luna conspiracy. After reviewing the evidence against Hawkins in its totality and in the light most favorable to the government, we find that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hawkins intentionally joined the Luna conspiracy by entering into a distribution agreement with Luna himself that afforded Hawkins a source of cocaine and Luna another outletalbeit smallfor his contraband. In sum and as discussed further below, the evidence clearly establishes that Hawkins intended to redistribute some of the cocaine he purchased or sought to purchase from Luna and, moreover, that Luna and his associates knew this. In addition, the evidence supports the inference that Hawkins was not freelancing in this respect but that Hawkins agreed to engage in this conduct with Luna on an ongoing basis and that Hawkins and Luna trusted each other to work together as supplier and street-level dealer. Hawkins purchased or sought to purchase from Luna on several occasions within a short time frame. Hawkins repeatedly brought potential customers' needs to Luna's attention and then made arrangements with Luna to obtain cocaine for resale, using the cellphone number which Luna had disclosed to him and he had stored on his phone for future use. The mutual trust between Hawkins and Luna was further demonstrated by Hawkins's express preference of Luna over other local dealers and Luna's agreement, at least initially, to extend credit to Hawkins. First, the tape recordings provide direct proof of Hawkins's intent to redistribute the cocaine he purchased or sought to purchase from Luna and Luna's awareness of the same. On February 12, 2005, Hawkins purchased an eight-ball with the express intent of redistributing it to his co-workers, while perhaps reserving some for himself. There is no direct evidence regarding Hawkins's intent with respect to the two eight-balls he purchased five days later. But on February 23, 2005, Hawkins again expressed his intent to redistribute an eight-ball to another customer. Even if Hawkins's goal was to buy from Luna for his own use in addition to sharing it with these customers, he nevertheless displayed an intent to redistribute Luna's cocaine. As we recently held, and as the District Court instructed the jury, one who delivers or transfers narcotics to anotherfor consideration or gratisis distributing, and so even the social sharing of a small quantity of drugs, without consideration, constitutes the distribution of drugs within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). United States v. Wallace, 532 F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir.2008) (holding that defendant's testimony that he shared with friends is direct evidence that [he] engaged in the distribution of cocaine base). The evidence in this case clearly demonstrates that Hawkins intended to redistribute cocaine and made this known to Luna. This supports the jury's finding that Hawkins agreed to further the objectives of the Luna conspiracy beyond his mere agreement to buy cocaine. Second, additional evidence taken together supports the step from this clearly established joint knowledge to proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Hawkins was not just a Luna customer who happened to intend to redistribute cocaine independently, but that he agreed to join and participate in the Luna conspiracy. Hawkins purchased or sought to purchase cocaine from Luna four times within two weeks. See United States v. Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir.) (noting that repeat sales suggest more than a transient relationship, but are by themselves insufficient to support an inference of a conspiracy between the supplier and purchaser), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 914, 122 S.Ct. 258, 151 L.Ed.2d 188 (2001). On two occasions, Hawkins expressly contacted Luna because he had identified potential customers. See United States v. Mims, 92 F.3d 461, 463, 465 (7th Cir.1996) (noting that purchase of narcotics for resale is evidence of a conspiratorial agreement[,] especially when the purchases are repeated). Hawkins did so by calling Luna's cellphone number, which he had programmed into his phone in order to contact Luna more readily in the future. See United States v. Thompson, 528 F.3d 110, 118 (2d Cir.2008) (per curiam) (noting, in the course of rejecting a sufficiency challenge to a narcotics distribution conspiracy conviction, that a defendant's cell phone directory contained the telephone numbers of the other members of the conspiracy); cf. Tyler, 758 F.2d at 68-69(noting, in the course of reversing the conspiracy conviction of a mere go-between, the absence of evidence that the defendant knew where to find [the supplier] or expected him to be in the area). Third, there was evidence reflecting mutual trust between Hawkins and Luna. Hawkins explained to Luna that he wanted to be supplied by him instead of alternative sources on Beaver Street. As noted, Luna disclosed his cellphone number to Hawkins. Moreover, Luna indicated his willingness to supply Hawkins with cocaine on credit. See Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 200 (A credit relationship may well reflect [mutual trust], and often evidences the parties' mutual stake in each other's transactions.). Luna's expressed willingness to provide Hawkins with approximately $100 worth of cocaine on credit reflects trust in Hawkins and a stake in his redistribution, even if an agreement to extend a greater amount of credit for a longer or less definite amount of time would have reflected an even more intimate relationship. That Luna and his colleagues might have been too busy compressing cocaine to consummate this credit transaction with Hawkins does not negate the inference of trust and shared interest. The jury could reasonably infer that Luna would have simply rejected Hawkins's proposal out of hand had he not trusted Hawkins or cared about his redistribution. This evidence in its totality suffices to permit a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hawkins intentionally joined the Luna conspiracy. The absence of prolonged cooperation in this case does not compel a different result. Hawkins was arrested in early March, just nine days after the evidence of his last attempted purchase from Luna. There is no rule prohibiting a conspiracy conviction of a defendant who joined the conspiracy only shortly before the government dismantled it. In addition, the relatively small quantity of cocaine at issue does not render the evidence insufficient. Despite conceding that the jury could have found that he intended to resell some of the drugs he purchased from Luna, Hawkins argues that the amount of cocaine he purchased supports his claim that he was a user rather than a dealer. In some cases, a large drug quantity may, in addition to establishing an intent to redistribute, support inferences about the relationship between the participants. A large transaction or an accumulation of deals suggests more trust, garnered over a period of time, as well as a greater likelihood that the parties have `put their heads together' to figure out planning, organization, and ways to conceal their activities. Gibbs, 190 F.3d at 199. The drug quantities in this case are, to be sure, extremely small and, in the absence of other evidence, consistent with mere personal use. Unlike the two to three kilograms of cocaine at issue in United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir.1991), the eight-balls here are not so large as to be obviously destined for resale. Luna conspirators testified, however, that even eight-balls might be broken down for resale into several 0.3 gram bags. This evidence is consistent with a finding that Hawkins intended to redistribute the cocaine, although by itself it does not establish that intent beyond a reasonable doubt. In any event, the tape recordings provide sufficient proof of joint knowledge of Hawkins's intent to redistribute Luna's cocaine. Although Hawkins's dealings with Luna were not standardized, the presence of some transaction costs also does not preclude a finding of conspiracy. Cf. United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 943-44 (7th Cir.1998) (rejecting a sufficiency challenge in part because the evidence shows a pattern of routine transactions rather than individualized ones, in contrast to evidence of high transaction costs, which would counsel against a finding of conspiracy (internal quotation marks omitted)), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1103, 119 S.Ct. 1586, 143 L.Ed.2d 680 (1999). Hawkins, Luna, and Febres discussed purchases, chatted about personal matters, and made arrangements to meet. The extent of such interactions in this case does not seem out of the ordinary for any business venture, especially an illegal one. We cannot say that any transaction costs borne by Hawkins and Luna were so high as to create a reasonable doubt where, as here, the jury was instructed that a mere buyer-seller relationship was insufficient and the evidence supports a finding that Hawkins was not only a customer but a knowing and willing participant in Luna's distribution of cocaine. Hawkins's argument that he was at most merely a go-between also fails. We have held that, standing alone, evidence that a defendant helped a willing buyer locate a willing seller ... is insufficient to establish the existence of an agreement between the facilitator and the seller. United States v. Tyler, 758 F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir.1985). As discussed, in this case the evidence that Hawkins acted as a go-between does not stand alone but rather is accompanied by additional evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer, and not merely speculate, that Hawkins agreed to carry out the objectives of the Luna conspiracy. See United States v. Desimone, 119 F.3d 217, 224 (2d Cir.1997). In addition, the jury was free to disregard Febres's conclusory testimony that Hawkins was only a go-between and was not a member of the Luna conspiracy and to conclude instead, based on Febres's account of Hawkins's actual conduct, that Hawkins joined the conspiracy. The evidence in this case was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Hawkins and Luna were not merely buyer and seller and, specifically, that Hawkins knowingly and intentionally joined in Luna's conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Although the scope of Hawkins's participation in the conspiracy might not have been especially significant, the evidence was sufficient to establish his intentional participation in the charged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.