Opinion ID: 2402231
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Departure from Existing Precedent

Text: Under the principle of stare decisis, this Court always makes a concerted effort to adhere to existing legal precedent. Perhaps the most important and familiar argument for stare decisis is one of public legitimacy. The respect given the Court by the public and by the other branches of government rests in large part on the knowledge that the Court is not composed of unelected judges free to write their policy views into law. Rather, the Court is a body vested with the duty to exercise the judicial power prescribed by the Constitution. An important aspect of this is the respect that the Court shows for its own previous opinions. State v. Musumeci, 717 A.2d 56, 68-69 (R.I.1998) (Weisberger, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Stare Decisis and Judicial Restraint, 1991 Journal of Supreme Court History 13, 16). Undeterred by that principle, the hospital posits two arguments in which it asks us to revisit or depart from the relevant precedents. We first address the hospital's contention that the term originate, as used in our previous opinions, should be interpreted only to mean to give rise to, noting the fact that the term originate is not found in the relevant statutory language. Cofone, 504 A.2d at 1000, states  and Moretti, 592 A.2d at 857, reiterates  that the statute affording the peer-review privilege protects only the records and the proceedings which originate with the peer-review board. That conclusion is supported by the statutory language. Unquestionably, both statutes protect only records and proceedings of peer-review boards. Section 23-17-25(a); § 5-37.3-7(c). Both statutes also do not protect [d]ocuments or records otherwise available from original sources. Section 23-17-25(a); § 5-37.3-7(c) (providing that [c]onfidential health care information discoverable or admissible from original sources shall not be construed as immune from discovery or use in any proceeding). Furthermore, both statutes also include other limitations on the scope of the privilege that pertain to information generated by entities other than a peer-review board. Section 23-17-25(a) (providing that [n]othing contained in this section shall apply to records made in the regular course of business by a hospital or other provider of health care information); § 5-37.3-7(c) (providing that a witness before a peer-review board cannot be prevented from testifying as to matters within his or her knowledge   , but that witness cannot be questioned about his or her testimony or other proceedings before that medical peer review board or about opinions formed by him or her as a result of those proceedings). Based on statutory language such as this, we stated that the policy supporting the limitations on the peer-review privilege was to prevent the privilege from becoming a shield behind which a physician's incompetence, impairment, or institutional malfeasance could be hidden. Moretti, 592 A.2d at 857-58. We conclude that Cofone and Moretti unquestionably remain viable as binding legal precedent in this jurisdiction: Requiring that information originate from the peer-review board to be protected by the privilege accurately reflects both the statutory language, and the policy evidenced by that language, of the peer-review privilege. [9] Despite our previous express conclusion to the contrary, the hospital also contends that the statutes creating the peer-review privilege are remedial in nature, and, therefore, should be liberally construed. This argument draws our attention to two divergent rules of statutory construction. We agree with the hospital that generally a remedial statute is to be construed liberally. Asadoorian v. Warwick School Committee, 691 A.2d 573, 580 (R.I.1997). It is equally true, however, that any legislation `in derogation of the common law' is to be construed strictly. Providence Journal Co. v. Rodgers, 711 A.2d 1131, 1134 (R.I.1998); see also Kelly v. Marcantonio, 678 A.2d 873, 876 (R.I. 1996) (applying a strict interpretation to the legislative definition of childhood sexual abuse). Derogation is not a mere change in the common law, but rather [t]he partial abrogation or repeal of a law. O'Sullivan v. Rhode Island Hospital, 874 A.2d 179, 184-85 n. 9 (R.I.2005) (quoting O'Grady v. Brown, 654 S.W.2d 904, 907-08 (Mo.1983)) (holding that a wrongful death statute should be liberally construed). The basis for the hospital's liberal construction argument is the preamble to P.L. 1986, ch. 350, which amended § 23-17-25. In identifying problems related to an increase in medical malpractice claims, it declares that it is the policy of this state to promote the free flow of information between health care providers and the various peer review and disciplinary organizations in the health care field. P.L.1986, ch. 350 at 730. Although we concur with the hospital's assertion that the peer-review privilege works to remedy problems related to medical malpractice, we since have held expressly that the statute creating the peer-review privilege should be strictly construed. Moretti, 592 A.2d at 857. Not only are the statutes at issue in this case in derogation of the common law, but also they create a limitation on discovery that often is viewed skeptically in the law. See id. Privileges, by their nature, `shut out the light' on `the ascertainment of the truth.' State v. Almonte, 644 A.2d 295, 298 (R.I.1994). We disagree with the hospital that a 1986 preamble to a public law recognizing that a statute affords a remedy is sufficient to disturb our well-established caselaw on this point. Furthermore, this is not the first time that we have concluded that a statute affording a liberal remedy nevertheless should be complied with strictly because it is in derogation of the common law. See Gem Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Rossi, 867 A.2d 796, 803 (R.I.2005). Finally, regardless of what type of construction we are to give these statutes, it is axiomatic that we should interpret statutory language in accordance with its plain and ordinary meaning. State v. Menard, 888 A.2d 57, 60 (R.I.2005). We see nothing in either Cofone or Moretti to suggest that those opinions have in any way strayed from that maxim of statutory interpretation. With our past caselaw now firmly entrenched in the present, we proceed to address the additional issues raised in this writ of certiorari. 2