Opinion ID: 1356205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admission of Journal Testimony

Text: In his first contention, James argues that permitting L.H. to read entries from her journal during direct examination was inadmissible hearsay evidence, improperly admitted as prior consistent statements under W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B). The State contends that nowhere in the record does it appear that either the State or the district court justified admission of the journal on the ground of W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B), and no stated reason for offering or admitting the journal appears in the record. The State also contends that the absence of an expressed reason for offering or admitting the journal was caused by defense counsel's objection on the ground that it was improper to read from the journal because it had not been offered into evidence. The journal was then offered into evidence, and the district court twice asked defense counsel if there were any objections to its admission. Defense counsel answered no both times, and the journal was then admitted into evidence without any further explanation by the State and without further foundation. The State contends that defense counsel's actions require this Court to apply the invited error doctrine to James' claim of error in this appeal. W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) provides: A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior Statement by Witness.The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is    (B) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive[.] W.R.E. 801(d)(1)(B) has two express conditions. Lacey v. State 803 P.2d 1364, 1368 (Wyo.1990) (citing Makinen v. State, 737 P.2d 345, 349 (Wyo.1987)). First, the prior statement must be consistent with the declarant's testimony. Second, there must be an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or of improper influence or motive. Id. In this particular case, because the journal entries were offered as original evidence on direct examination, neither of these conditions is satisfied, and the journal evidence was inadmissible hearsay. The court is not required to make a determination of admissibility when there is no objection to receipt of hearsay evidence. Schmunk v. State, 714 P.2d 724, 739 (Wyo.1986). The doctrine of invited error has long been recognized in Wyoming and embodies the principle that a party will not be heard to complain on appeal of errors which he himself induced or provoked the court or the opposite party to commit. Schott v. State, 864 P.2d 38, 39 (Wyo.1993) (quoting 5 Am.Jur.2d Appeal and Error § 713, at 159 (1962)). Generally, defense counsel must have solicited or otherwise acted affirmatively for the invited error doctrine to apply. Id. In this case, James' defense counsel failed to object to the error at trial, but did not solicit or consent to admitting the hearsay evidence, and we will not apply the invited error doctrine to these facts. A party's failure to object at trial generally precludes appellate review unless the alleged error rises to the level of plain error. Schmunk, 714 P.2d at 739. James does not contend that any confrontation or due process concerns are implicated, presumably because the hearsay declarant was subject to cross-examination; however, he does contend that under a plain error review, the hearsay testimony prejudiced him. In past decisions, we have applied a plain error review to hearsay testimony. Id. For plain error to be found, the record must clearly establish the error; the error must violate a clear, unequivocal rule of law; and deny the substantial rights of the defendant, materially prejudicing him. Id. Our discussion has established that the first two elements are met, leaving for our review James' contention that he was materially prejudiced because the prosecutor used hearsay testimony to improperly bolster L.H.'s credibility. James provided a written statement admitting to sexual encounters with L.H. Specifically, he admitted to taking indecent liberties in Bicentennial Park; having sexual intercourse in Bicentennial Park; and having sexual intercourse in her house. He stated all encounters were sometime in July or August. At trial, L.H. read from a journal that covered the time period of April 28 through September 3, 1996. As each dated entry consists of just three or four lines, there are several dated entries on each page. The journal is a mere five pages long. The entry dated May 18 states: That Carloes [sic] guy is starting to hang around more. he's kinda cute. Hes [sic] 17, Hes [sic] black and he's funny. But on the other hand the guy looks like trouble to me. I dont [sic] know though. The prosecutor had L.H. read each entry from her diary, and asked: Q. Okay. Take another look at your journal. When is the next entry that makes any reference to Carlos James? A. May 18th. Q. In that entry, do you put down how old he was? A. Yes. Q. How old does your entry reflect he was? A. 17. Q. In that entry, you make a reference that, He is black, he is funny, but, on the other hand, the guy looks like trouble to me. I don't know though. Do you recall making that entry? A. Yes. There was nothing else to read from the journal concerning the events from May 18 and May 19. From her own recollection and through lengthy direct examination, L.H. testified about every event of that evening and the early hours of the next morning leading to her first two sexual encounters with James. She testified that she was with James the evening of May 18, and sometime in the early morning of May 19, she performed oral sex on James in the bathroom at Bicentennial Park and that she and James had sexual intercourse in the bushes at Bicentennial Park. In his written statement James admitted to one act of oral sex at Bicentennial Park and to one act of intercourse at Bicentennial Park occurring in July or August. His confession differed from L.H.'s independent recollection only upon dates. The jury apparently believed L.H.'s testimony that the sexual encounters occurred in May. We find that James was convicted on Count I and Count II based on admissible evidence that established the elements of each crime, and we find no prejudice to James. James' written statement also admitted to another act of sexual intercourse which he claimed took place at L.H.'s house sometime in July or August. L.H. testified from her own independent recollection that she and James had sexual intercourse twice, once during the early evening of June 30 and again about 3:00 a.m. the next morning. Counts VIII and IX charged him with third degree sexual assault on or about June 30, 1996, and we again find that the jury's verdict was based on admissible evidence. Having admitted to Counts I, II, and VIII, and finding admissible testimony supporting Count IX, we find the inadmissible hearsay testimony was cumulative and do not find James to have been prejudiced. Count X charged him with an indecent liberties charge between May 24 and June 30, 1996. Inadmissible evidence from the diary entry dated June 30, stated ... me and Carloes [sic] got back togeth[er] and have had sex twice scence [sic] then. From her own, independent recollection, L.H. testified that she performed oral sex on James on June 30, 1996, and Kistler testified that both L.H. and James were seen together in a bedroom on that date, purportedly having a sexual encounter. L.H. testified to five instances of sexual intercourse which she claimed occurred at friends' homes on May 24, June 1, June 8, June 17, and June 22. James was acquitted of those charges. For those charges upon which he was convicted, the hearsay testimony was cumulative to admissible testimony supporting conviction and did not prejudice James.