Opinion ID: 2994975
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Younger Worker’s Qualifications

Text: First, Rummery argues that he presented evidence indicating that he was better qualified than Taylor, a younger employee (age 25), who was not terminated, and that this constitutes sufficient evidence of pretext. However, this only goes to show the prima facie case which, as noted, we assume Rummery has established. See Ransom, 217 F.3d at 470, n. 1 (whether younger employees were less qualified, and yet not terminated, goes to the prima facie case). In any case, the evidence Rummery relies upon does not support his position that Illinois Bell did not honestly believe him to be less qualified than Taylor. Rummery points to the testimony of Purnell, the manager who ranked the at- risk group which included Rummery. While he did say that Rummery was head and shoulders above [Taylor] on a technical level, this merely indicates that Rummery was more qualified than Taylor in his technical expertise, something acquired through years of experience. But it does not establish that overall Rummery was more qualified than Taylor. Purnell testified that Taylor had potential as a manager, whereas Rummery was performing no better or worse than in the past. Rummery responds that, since Purnell did not supervise him in 1991 and admitted that he did not know about his performance before 1991, Purnell could not have made that assessment in good faith. However, without more, this assertion does not create a reasonable inference that Purnell lied about the reasons given in his evaluation. Essentially all Purnell is saying is that Rummery has reached a certain level of competence and has remained at that level. In any case, this evidence does not create a genuine issue of material fact regarding pretext because it does not cre-ate a reasonable inference that Purnell, or any other decision-maker at Illinois Bell, lied about the reasons given for his termination. As this court has often noted, we deal with small gradations, with an employer’s subjective comparison of one employee to another, and it is incumbent upon us to remember that what is at issue is not the wisdom of an employer’s decision, but the genuineness of the employer’s motives. Testerman v. EDS Technical Products Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 304 (7th Cir. 1996). Even an employer’s erroneous decisionmaking, exhibiting poor business judgment, is not sufficient to establish pretext. Abioye, 164 F.3d at 368. Therefore, even if Illinois Bell mistakenly but honestly believed that Rummery was less qualified than Taylor, that is still not enough for Rummery to avoid summary judgment. Rather he must present evidence that Illinois Bell did not believe its own evaluation. The district court correctly concluded that Purnell’s testimony, standing alone, does not demonstrate that he had distorted the evaluations in order to get rid of an older employee. Before closing, we note that even if we assume that Illinois Bell had erred in ranking Taylor as more qualified than Rummery, pretext is still not established. Illinois Bell terminated the nine lowest-ranked persons from the list of fourteen. Accordingly, even if Taylor (who was ranked eleventh in the list of fourteen) had been the first person laid off, Rummery (then ranked fourth instead of third) would have been terminated anyway because he still would have been ranked lower than several other managers. In fact, Rummery was ranked lower than six other managers who were his age or older. Rummery does not present any evidence that Illinois Bell did not believe that any of these workers were less qualified than Rummery. Thus, his attempts to prove age discrimination by comparing himself to Taylor are unavailing.