Opinion ID: 1057584
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Angel of Death

Text: At the end of its closing argument during the sentencing phase of Defendant's trial, the defense offered the following quotations to the jury: The quality of mercy is not strained. It falls like the gentle rain from heaven upon the place beneath. It is twice blessed. It blesses him that gives and him that receives. It's the mightiest in the mighty. It becomes the throned monarch better than [h]is crown. His scepter shows the force of earthly power, the tribute to [h]is awe and majesty. Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings. But mercy is above this sceptered way. It is enthroned in the hearts of kings. It is a tribute to God himself. And, Earthly power shows most like God's when mercy seasons justice. Defense counsel did not identify the source of this quoted material to the jury. [15] In response, the prosecution argued as follows: Defense counsel would refer to God as he addresses this jury as he tries to make you feel responsible for doing what you told the State of Tennessee that you would do, and that's follow the law and the instructions of the Court. And each and every one of you promised, not only this Defendant, but the State of Tennessee that you would follow the instructions of the Court. That's very important for a legal reason, and I'll state that in a minute. ... Defense counsel would talk about the guilt trip he's putting on you with God and judgment. Let me tell you, ladies and gentlemen, what takes care and addresses that argument by defense counsel, is rendering unto Caesar that which is Caesar's and unto God, that which is God's. I represent Caesar, and I have the duty and responsibility, as you do, to follow the instructions given to you by the Court and that codified by the State of Tennessee, and I suggest to you and I tell you, and I know you'll follow that law and instructions given to you by the Court. ... They rely upon part of the testimony of Ms. Fisher, the former girlfriend, one of their, quote, mitigating factors, and I believe she said that Sydney, which would be Renee's child along with the Defendant, made the comment that, Mama is an angel in heaven looking down on me. And ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I'm going to suggest to you that there was another angel involved in this situation, and that angel is the angel of death. And the angel of death went into that crow's nest a few hours before Renee came to work, and a few hours before Jerry Hopper just happened to need to have his state truck serviced that day, and just a few hours before Mr. Gordon was involved in an auto accident. And how did the death angel know to go there that morning? Because the death angel heard the Defendant say on Tuesday, January 11th of '05 at 2:11 a.m., I'll see you at work, bitch. The death angel also heard at 2:17 a.m. the Defendant say, I hope you go to work tomorrow. So the death angel was there and saw everything that happened and everything that's been presented in evidence and wrote down the aggravating circumstances that occurred on or about 11:30 a.m. on the birthday of Renee's father. And these aggravating circumstances are that the Defendant knowingly created a risk of death to two or more persons other than the victim murdered during an act of murder. That will involve, I suggest, ladies and gentlemen, three different counts of this indictment which you will have. That will be the first count, the second count and the third count. And second, the angel wrote down that this murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel and that it involved serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and that will involve, I think the Court will tell you, the first count involving Renee and the fourth count involving Mr. Gordon and the fifth count of the felony murder indictment of Mr. Gordon. Now as the angel sat there and recorded these aggravating circumstances, the angel also wrote down, the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with or preventing a lawful arrest of the Defendant or another, and that will apply as you see when you look at the Defendant to Count 2 involving Mr. Hopper and his premeditated murder, and Mr. Hopper, his felony murder count, and Mr. Gordon, the count of his premeditated death, and the fifth count of this indictment, the felony murder of Mr. Gordon. The angel had a lot to write down and a lot to observe and a lot of things to have to be able to report at a later time. And also I submit to you he wrote down the fourth aggravating circumstance, that the murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed or aided by the Defendant while the Defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit first degree murder. This will encompass the first five counts of this indictment, Renee's premeditated murder, Mr. Hopper's premeditated murder, Mr. Hopper's felony murder, Mr. Gordon's premeditated murder and Mr. Gordon's felony murder. Then the angel goes and writes down that the Defendant committed mass murder which is defined as the murder of three or more persons when committed during a single criminal episode, which this was, or at different times within a 48-month period. And then the last thing that the angel wrote down which has been preserved for your consideration is that the Defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death. ... There's a part of [Defendant's] conduct, deliberate, premeditated. The one that Sydney wrote about, that My mama is in heaven, an angel, and the one the death angel wrote about that's contained by the State of Tennessee in the law and evidence that will be instructed to you about aggravating circumstances. I even imagine that when the first shot went off and caught Renee in the leg and got her attention, that it really got the attention of the death angel who looked and realized that not only did it get Renee's attention but that it had gotten her attention. And then we've got the shot to the head. Who can ever forget that. The angel will never forget, and that's why it was written down in these instructions. ... I thank you for your consideration and your attention. It's been difficult. It's difficult for me to make the decision that I thought this was appropriate, but I did much the same, based upon the information provided by the angel of death, that delineate and record and file the aggravating circumstances. And I ask that you follow the law and the instructions given to you by the Court and return a verdict that truth dictates and justice demands. (Emphases added). Initially, we have no trouble concluding that the prosecution's repeated references to the angel of death and the death angel as recording and writing down and providing the aggravating circumstances were improper. This argument implied that the aggravating factors alleged to apply to Defendant's murders were somehow delivered from on high and possessed the imprimatur of a supernatural being. This implication is, of course, not accurate. In its brief to this Court, the State disingenuously purports that, [i]f the `angel of death' is a religious figure, the State is unaware of the scriptural passage to which it is referable. We are not persuaded. Persons possessing even a casual acquaintance with the Bible recognize that it refers to angels as holy messengers, for instance, the angel Gabriel's announcement to the Virgin Mary of her divine pregnancy. And, as we emphasized in State v. Middlebrooks, [w]e have condemned Biblical and scriptural references in a prosecutor's closing argument ... frequently.... The obvious danger in such references by both prosecutors and defense counsel is the risk that a sentencing decision may be made not upon the facts and the law but on an appeal to the bias or passion of the jury. 995 S.W.2d 550, 559 (Tenn.1999). While the prosecutor in this case may not have referred specifically to a particular Biblical passage, the repeated references to an angel acting as a messenger were inappropriate allusions to the Christian religion. This Court has admonished many times that closing arguments must be (1) temperate; (2) predicated on the evidence adduced at trial; and (3) pertinent to the issues. See State v. Hatcher, 310 S.W.3d 788, 813 (Tenn.2010); State v. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d 361, 413 (Tenn.2005) (appendix); Middlebrooks, 995 S.W.2d at 557; State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727, 736 (Tenn.1994); State v. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d 820, 823 (Tenn.1978); Russell v. State, 532 S.W.2d 268, 271 (Tenn.1976). Additionally, because a prosecutor's role is to seek justice rather than simply advocate, the State's prerogative during argument is more limited than that of other parties. Thomas, 158 S.W.3d at 413 (appendix). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, [The prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods... as it is to use every legitimate means.... Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). A prosecutor must therefore refrain from argument designed to inflame the jury. State v. Hall, 976 S.W.2d 121, 158 (Tenn.1998) (appendix) (quoting Coker v. State, 911 S.W.2d 357, 368 (Tenn.Crim.App.1995)). The State responds to this issue in its brief to this Court as follows: The comments were ... a trope; the prosecution depicted a supernatural figure writing down aggravating circumstances as [Defendant] pursued his course of conduct on January 11, 2005. The use of a literary device, in and of itself, violates no constitutional stricture, and because the aggravators that the prosecution portrayed the angel scribbling down were fully supported by the evidence, the argument cannot be viewed as inflammatory. We disagree that the argument cannot be viewed as inflammatory and suggest that the State misses the point. The metaphor utilized by the prosecutor suggested that, while he was shooting the victims, Defendant was accompanied by an angel who, apparently fulfilling some angelic mission, dutifully recorded Defendant's actions in order to later convince a jury to impose the death penalty. This metaphor is inappropriate on its face. We do not consider it temperate, it refers to no evidence in the record, it is not a justifiable inference from any proof in the record, and it is not pertinent to the issues. This argument was improper. We will not overturn a verdict on the basis of a prosecutor's improper argument unless the impropriety affected the verdict. Sutton, 562 S.W.2d at 823. In conducting this inquiry, we consider five factors: (1) the conduct complained of viewed in context and in light of the facts and circumstances of the case; (2) the curative measures undertaken by the [trial] [c]ourt and the prosecution; (3) the intent of the prosecutor in making the improper statement; (4) the cumulative effect of the improper conduct and any other errors in the record; and (5) the relative strength or weakness of the case. State v. Buck, 670 S.W.2d 600, 609 (Tenn. 1984) (quoting Judge v. State, 539 S.W.2d 340, 344 (Tenn.Crim.App.1976)). Taking these factors out of order, we first note that there were no specific curative measures taken by the court or the prosecution. While this would ordinarily weigh against the State, in this case, the defense must also bear some responsibility for failure to object during the prosecutor's argument, which limits our review to a plain error analysis. Combining the first and third factors, we observe that the prosecutor did not begin referring to the death angel until the rebuttal portion of his closing argument. The trigger for the prosecutor's improper comments appears to have been the defense's reference to Ms. Fisher's mitigation testimony. The defense described Fisher as Defendant's friend, who stood by him even after this horrible event and throughout this horrible tragedy. In rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor recalled that Fisher had testified that Defendant's daughter referred to Renee, her murdered mother, as an angel in heaven. The prosecutor then segued into his trope about the angel of death. Thus, the intent of the prosecutor appears to have been to strike back at defense argument. While the prosecutor reached too far in his argument, it appears that the prosecutor was at least trying to place his argument in some overall context triggered by the argument of defense counsel. We view the fourth and fifth factors in tandem. The strength of the State's case was overwhelming. Defendant's identity as the murderer was never in dispute; thus, the defense made no effort to argue residual doubt. Moreover, not only did the State adduce significant proof of multiple aggravating circumstances as to each victim, but this proof was largely unchallenged. Instead, the defense focused on Defendant's psychological state as mitigation, proof which was strongly challenged by the State. And, although we have identified other trial errors, we have deemed them harmless. Finally, we take note of the trial court's jury charges delivered during the sentencing proceeding. Prior to opening statements, the court told the jury that Tennessee statutory law provides that no death penalty shall be imposed unless you find unanimously that one or more specified statutory aggravating circumstances has been proven to you by the State beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. These statutory aggravating circumstances are specific circumstances enumerated by the legislature to establish which first degree murders will make a defendant eligible for the death penalty. The State is limited to the statutory aggravating circumstances. After the parties closed their sentencing proof and prior to closing argument beginning, the trial court instructed the jury as follows: It is now your duty to determine within the limits prescribed by law the penalty which shall be imposed as punishment for these three offenses. Tennessee law provides that a person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole or by lifeor by imprisonment for life. A defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for release until the defendant has served at least 51 full calendar years of his or her sentence. A defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life without parole shall never be eligible for release. In arising [sic] at this determination, you are authorized to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstances which may have been raised by the evidence throughout the entire course of this trial, including the guilt-finding phase or sentencing phase or both. The jury is the sole judge of the facts and of the law as it applies to the facts in this case. In arriving at your verdict, you are to consider the law in connection with the facts, but the Court is the proper source from which you are to get the law. After the trial court instructed the jury as to each of the statutory aggravating factors at issue, it continued: Members of the jury, the Court has read to you the aggravating circumstances which the law requires you to consider if you find are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. You shall not consider any other facts or circumstances as an aggravating circumstance in deciding whether the death penalty or imprisonment for life without possibility of parole would be appropriate punishment in this case. Additionally, prior to closing arguments in the guilt/innocence phase of the trial, the court instructed the jury that [s]tatements, arguments and remarks of counsel are intended to help you in understanding the evidence and applying the law, but they are not evidence. If any statements were made that you believe are not supported by the evidence, you should disregard them. Later in its charge, but still before closing arguments in the guilt/innocence phase, the court reiterated, [r]emember that the statements of attorneys are not evidence in this case. And, at the commencement of the sentencing phase, the trial judge told the jury, I will remind you that statements of counsel are not evidence. We presume that the jury follows its instructions. Young, 196 S.W.3d at 111. Considering the parties' arguments as a whole, the trial court's instructions, and the evidence adduced during the sentencing proceeding of both aggravating and mitigating factors, we hold that the prosecution's references to the angel of death did not affect the jury's verdicts. Because Defendant has not demonstrated that any of his substantial rights were adversely affected by the improper argument, he is not entitled to plain error relief on this basis.