Opinion ID: 1689582
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim of Fraud by an Agent

Text: The plaintiffs also argue that Primus is vicariously liable for the actions of Jack Ingram because, they claim, Jack Ingram was acting as an agent of Primus, and as Primus's agent made misrepresentations concerning the acquisition fee. They support this claim with the fact that Primus provided Jack Ingram with a handbook containing guidelines for leases that Primus will accept; the fact that Primus provided Jack Ingram with forms; and the fact that Primus had the right to purchase the lease contract between Jack Ingram and the plaintiffs after it was executed. In Kimbrel v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 476 So.2d 94 (Ala.1985), this Court held that actions similar to those alleged by the plaintiffs in this case are not evidence of a principal-agent relationship between the finance company and the dealership: Kimbrel [the customer] contends that [Liberty Truck Sales, the dealer,] was an agent of Freightliner [Credit Corporation, the finance company]. As proof of this, Kimbrel argues that Freightliner had a right of approval of Kimbrel's credit, that Freightliner's name appeared upon the contract Kimbrel signed with Liberty, and that Freightliner dictated the terms of Kimbrel's payments. None of these actions is inconsistent with the extending of credit by an institution, and these actions would not legally amount to a ratification of any statements made during negotiations by Liberty employees. There is no evidence in the record that the relationship between Liberty and Freightliner would support a finding of agency. Id. at 97. Furthermore, this Court has consistently upheld this principle. Turner v. Deutz-Allis Credit Corp., 544 So.2d 840 (Ala.1988) (holding that the dealer's presenting and offering the finance plans of a finance company was not evidence of a principal-agent relationship); Battles v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 597 So.2d 688 (Ala. 1992) (finance company's right of approval and the fact that its name appeared on forms did not establish agency); Mardis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 642 So.2d 701 (Ala. 1994) (proof of dealer's offering finance plan does not establish principal-agent relationship). The evidence offered as proof of an agency relationship in the present case is similar to the evidence presented in those cases cited above. It is clear that there is no principal-agent relationship between Primus and Jack Ingram. The plaintiffs also contend, as part of their agency argument, that Primus ratified the lease agreement that was negotiated and executed by them and Crow. In ratifying it, they allege, Primus became a party to the alleged misrepresentation. We disagree. As with the general agency question above, this Court has held that factors such as the finance company's right of approval and the appearance of the finance company's name on forms does not amount to a ratification of any statements made by the dealer during its negotiations with the customer. Kimbrel, 476 So.2d at 97; Mardis v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 642 So.2d 701, 705. Consequently, it is clear that Primus, in accepting the lease, was not ratifying statements or representations made during the negotiations between Crow and the plaintiffs. Therefore, the summary judgment was also proper as to the plaintiffs' claim of fraud based on alleged misrepresentations of an agent.