Opinion ID: 794951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assessing the Likelihood of Confusion

Text: 32 We turn next to the question of likelihood of confusion. In analyzing this second prong of the test for trademark infringement, courts apply the non-exclusive multi-factor test developed by Judge Friendly in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.1961), and consider: (1) the strength of the mark, (2) the similarity of the two marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) actual confusion, (5) the likelihood of plaintiff's bridging the gap, (6) defendant's good faith in adopting its mark, (7) the quality of defendant's products, and (8) the sophistication of the consumers. See, e.g., Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., 360 F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir.2004). A district court's findings with regard to each individual factor are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, but the ultimate issue of the likelihood of confusion is reviewed de novo.  Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 743 (2d Cir.1998). 33 The similarity of the marks is a key factor in determining likelihood of confusion. Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d at 537. To apply this factor, courts must analyze the mark's overall impression on a consumer, considering the context in which the marks are displayed and the `totality of factors that could cause confusion among prospective purchasers.' Id. (quoting Gruner + Jahr USA, 991 F.2d at 1078). 34 The district court here noted that there were obvious similarities between the Louis Vuitton and Dooney & Bourke handbags. However, citing Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., No. 04 Civ. 2644, 2004 WL 1161167, at  (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2004), it determined that despite the similarities, the two marks were not confusingly similar. See Dooney & Bourke, 340 F.Supp.2d at 440. 35 It appears the trial court made the same mistake that we criticized in Burlington Coat Factory: inappropriately focusing on the similarity of the marks in a side-by-side comparison instead of when viewed sequentially in the context of the marketplace. The district court reasoned 36 [I]t could not be more obvious that Louis Vuitton uses the initials LV, while Dooney & Bourke uses its trademarked DB logo. Thus, a consumer seeing these trademarks printed on these bags, either up close or at a distance, is not likely to be confused.... [T]he Dooney & Bourke bags only use their DB initials; there are no geometric shapes interspersed with the monogram.... [T]he colors used on the Dooney & Bourke bag are noticeably toned down, and consequently fail to evoke the characteristic friction sparked by Murakami's bright, clashing colors, the Louis Vuitton marks create a very different overall impression (i.e., large interspersed shapes and initials in crisp, bold colors) than the Dooney & Bourke bags (i.e., tightly interlocked initials in dulled colors). 37 Dooney & Bourke, 340 F.Supp.2d at 440 (emphasis added). We disapproved almost identical language in Burlington Coat Factory. See Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d at 537-38. 38 Utilizing a side-by-side comparison can be a useful heuristic means of investigating similarities and differences in... respective designs, so long as a court maintains a focus on the ultimate issue of the likelihood of consumer confusion. Id. at 538. Courts should keep in mind that in this context the law requires only confusing similarity, not identity. See, e.g., The Sports Auth., Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 962-63 (2d Cir.1996). Further, where, as here, the plaintiff claims initial-interest and post-sale confusion, market conditions must be examined closely to see whether the differences between the marks are likely to be memorable enough to dispel confusion on serial viewing. Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d at 538. 39 The district court erred because it based its determination that confusion between the Vuitton and Dooney & Bourke marks was unlikely at least in part on an overemphasized side-by-side comparison. This is suggested by the district court's comment that no amount of expert opinion, legal analysis, or demonstrative evidence can overcome the clarity that comes from direct observation. Dooney & Bourke, 340 F.Supp.2d at 421. 40 We do not believe the district court clearly erred with respect to the other Polaroid factors. Nonetheless, because no single factor is dispositive, we must remand for the district court to revisit the entire analysis, under the new standard described here and in Burlington Coat Factory. Upon remand, the district court should keep in mind that [n]o single factor is dispositive, nor is a court limited to consideration of only these factors. Brennan's, 360 F.3d at 130. Accordingly, we must vacate its order insofar as it declined to issue a preliminary injunction and remand the case to allow the district court to reassess Vuitton's claim of a design plus color trademark under the Lanham Act. III Dilution 41 Vuitton also appeals the denial of its motion for a preliminary injunction on its Federal Trademark Dilution Act claim (Trademark Dilution Act or Act), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). The discussion of this subject begins with the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub.L. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985, which amended § 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125, by adding a new § 43(c) to provide a cause of action for dilution of famous marks. That new section is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). The Trademark Dilution Act provides that the owner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). To establish a violation of the Act, a plaintiff must show that: (1) its mark is famous; (2) the defendant is making commercial use of the mark in commerce; (3) the defendant's use began after the mark became famous; and (4) the defendant's use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish goods and services. Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 448-49 (2d Cir.2004). 42 The new section lists factors a court may consider in deciding whether a mark qualifies for protection as a famous mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). But since Vuitton's mark is conceded to be a famous mark we need not discuss those factors. Under this law, the only relief a plaintiff may obtain is an injunction upon a finding of a defendant's liability for diluting the distinctive quality of a famous mark, except in cases of willful dilution where damages also may be awarded. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2). State law is not preempted, as it is in patent and copyright laws. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-374, at 7 (1995), as reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1035. 43 The Trademark Dilution Act also amended § 45 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127. The amended law defines dilution as the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception. 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 44 In Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 422-24, 123 S.Ct. 1115, 155 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003), the Supreme Court ruled on the Act in a suit between Victoria's Secret, concededly a famous mark, and Victor's Little Secret, a small retail store owned and operated in an Elizabethtown, Kentucky mall by Victor and Cathy Moseley. The Supreme Court held there must be a showing of actual — rather than a likelihood of — dilution to entitle the holder of a famous mark to injunctive relief. Id. at 433, 123 S.Ct. 1115. The fact that consumers mentally associate the junior mark with the famous mark, at least where the marks — as in the case at hand — are not identical, will not establish actionable dilution. The reason for this rule is that such mental association will not necessarily reduce the capacity of the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, as the statute requires. Id. Nor did the Supreme Court think blurring or tarnishing of a mark was ordinarily a consequence of mental association. Id. at 434, 123 S.Ct. 1115. 45 Assuming that Vuitton can prove fame and distinctiveness, it must still offer evidence of actual dilution. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433, 123 S.Ct. 1115; see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). Accordingly, similarity in the marks — even a close similarity — will not suffice to establish per se evidence of actual dilution. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 453. As the Supreme Court instructs, the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution. Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433, 123 S.Ct. 1115. 46 We agree with the district court that Vuitton has not offered any evidence of actual dilution. Specifically, plaintiff has failed to show that Dooney & Bourke's use of a similar mark has reduced the capacity of Vuitton's Multicolore mark to identify handbags and accessories manufactured by Vuitton. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Moseley, 537 U.S. at 433, 123 S.Ct. 1115. The denial of a preliminary injunction on the dilution claim must therefore be affirmed. IV State Law Claims 47 Vuitton claims, in addition, trademark infringement and unfair competition under New York state law, and trademark dilution and injury to business reputation under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 360-1. 48 We analyze claims under New York's unfair competition statute in a similar fashion to how we analyze claims under the Lanham Act. See Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d at 539 n. 5. For the reasons stated above, we hold the district court erred in determining that Vuitton could not prove likelihood of confusion under New York state law. We therefore must vacate the order insofar as it ruled Vuitton was not entitled to a preliminary injunction on state trademark infringement and unfair competition claims. 49 Finally, we remand also with respect to plaintiff's claims of dilution under state law, despite having affirmed the district court on plaintiff's claim of dilution under federal law. The federal dilution standard requires a showing of actual dilution,... and, thus, is more stringent than the New York standard. Savin Corp., 391 F.3d at 456. The New York standard, on the other hand, requires a showing of a mere likelihood of dilution. Id. 50 To analyze likelihood of dilution under N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 360-l, courts employ a multi-factor test. See Burlington Coat Factory, 426 F.3d at 539 n. 5. One of the factors to be considered for determining likelihood of dilution is also a factor in likelihood of confusion analysis for trademark claims under the Lanham Act; namely, courts must assess the similarity of the marks in a similar fashion as they do under the Lanham Act. Id. Because we are remanding for the district court to reconsider the similarity of the marks under the Lanham Act, we believe it would be useful and proper to remand on the state law dilution claims as well.