Opinion ID: 1666085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Appellant's Request for Funds for Expert Witnesses was Properly Denied.

Text: Appellant claims, in his sixth assignment of error, that the trial court erred to his substantial prejudice when it denied his request for funds to hire a psychologist or psychiatrist to assist in preparation of his defense. Specifically, Appellant argues that the trial court improperly denied funding to seek expert assistance, which was necessary for purposes of establishing extreme emotional disturbance as a mitigating defense. Therefore, the question becomes: whether the trial court's refusal to grant funds to Appellant to hire an expert witness substantially impaired his rights when Appellant requested such funding generally, and did not testify at trial, but where there were sufficient facts in evidence to warrant a jury instruction on the matter. KRS 31.110(1)(b) establishes that a needy defendant charged with serious crimes is entitled ... `to be provided with the necessary services and facilities of representation including investigation and other preparation.' Hicks v. Commonwealth, 670 S.W.2d 837, 838 (Ky.1984) ( quoting KRS 31.110(1)(b)). Additionally, in Young v. Commonwealth, 585 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Ky.1979), we recognized that indigent defendants are entitled to reasonably necessary expert assistance. Thus, while it is settled law that indigent defendants are entitled to funding for expert assistance, the dilemma of under what circumstances and to what extent such funding should be provided has elicited considerable deliberation. In Hicks, we found that such determinations should be adjudged by a reasonably necessary standard. 670 S.W.2d at 838. However, this has proven an evasive and amorphous standard, and while vesting the trial courts with great discretion, it provided little in the way of direction to assist them in determining when they are obligated to aid indigent defendants. In Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 393, 395 (Ky.1988), we attempted to further refine the parameters of when expert funding is reasonably necessary. In Simmons, we articulated that a certain level of specificity was required in demonstrating such reasonable necessity for expert assistance. Id. Therein, the Court noted: The appellant failed to show a necessity for the expert assistance he requested. He stated in general terms only that expert assistance was needed to prepare adequately for trial and possible sentence hearing. He did not state the names of any doctor or social worker that he desired to examine him, nor did he furnish any estimate of the cost. He further did not state what he expected to show or in what manner the requested assistance would be of any specific benefit to him. He made no challenge to the competency of Dr. Ravani or that Dr. Ravani was uncooperative with him or was not available for consultation. Id. Clearly then, the Simmons Court sought to establish a specificity requirement in demonstrating an articulable need for expert funding, seeking to alleviate the threat of continuous undeveloped assertions by a defendant leading to unsupported fishing expeditions at the Commonwealth's expense. Id.; see also McCracken County Fiscal Court v. Graves, 885 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Ky.1994). This Court recognized the due process implications inherent in providing indigent defendants financial access to experts in Crawford v. Commonwealth, 824 S.W.2d 847, 850 (Ky.1992). In Crawford , we acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 70, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 1089, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), noting that when the mental state of a defendant is `seriously in question,' due process requires a state to provide access to a competent psychiatrist to assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. Crawford, 824 S.W.2d at 850. Ake established a balancing approach for determining when an indigent defendant should be afforded access to psychological evaluation, weighing the competing interests of the government and the individual against the probable value and risk of error involved if access is not afforded. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77, 105 S.Ct. at 1093. However, in Crawford we also noted that Ake did not support the proposition that an indigent defendant had the right to choose a psychiatrist or receive funds to hire one of his choosing; nor did it entitle him to additional state funds simply because he was unhappy with the results of an initial examination. Crawford, 824 S.W.2d at 850. Therefore, acknowledging the aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the appropriate test for determining when an indigent defendant is entitled to receive funding for expert witnesses under KRS 31.110(1)(b), will consider 1) whether the request has been pleaded with requisite specificity; and 2) whether funding for the particularized assistance is reasonably necessary; 3) while weighing relevant due process considerations. Upon review, however, this Court's analysis is limited to whether the trial court has abused its discretion. Davenport v. Commonwealth, 177 S.W.3d 763, 773 (Ky.2005); Dillingham v. Commonwealth, 995 S.W.2d 377, 381 (Ky. 1999). Here, Appellant's counsel made an initial request for an ex parte hearing to request funding on February 28, 2005. In that motion, Appellant indicated in general terms that he wished to consult experts in order to render effective assistance and build an effective defense, adding that experts were needed to analyze the evidence and potentially testify at trial. The hearing was held on March 7th, wherein Appellant gave the name of the expert he wished to hire and stated that he wished to be evaluated for evidence of lack of criminal responsibility and to support an EED defense. The trial judge took the matter under submission and entered an order on March 15th, denying Appellant's motion. On March 28th, Appellant's counsel asked for evaluation by a state facility. This request was granted. Appellant was evaluated for competency and criminal responsibility and found competent. Thereafter, on July 11th, Appellant's counsel again filed a motion seeking expert funding, which was substantially similar to the first. The trial judge denied the motion on July 20th. Nearly one year later, on May 30, 2006, the day trial began, Appellant's counsel had an in-chambers hearing with the trial judge, wherein he argued that an expert would be able to explore Appellant's lack of memory of the murder, give context to what occurred, and discuss a possible triggering event for the murder. Appellant argued that such information would be beneficial in supporting an EED defense. The trial judge denied the request. Here, it is significant to note that Appellant's initial request lacked the requisite specificity to demonstrate a reasonable necessity under the law. Moreover, Appellant was initially requesting funding to hire an expert of his choosing. The trial judge was entirely proper in denying such request. Crawford, 824 S.W.2d at 850. Further, Appellant did receive a competency and criminal responsibility evaluation at a state facility. As in Crawford and McCracken , Appellant was not entitled to state funding to conduct a fishing expedition simply because he was unhappy with the results. Moreover, while Appellant's request on the first day of trial was pleaded with specificity, the trial judge properly denied such request, given the Commonwealth's interest in judicial economy and the fact that Appellant had already received a state funded evaluation. Thus, the trial judge's decision did not offend due process. Crawford, 824 S.W.2d at 850. At the outset, a defendant is not entitled to an additional state-provided examination or funds to hire additional experts simply because the initial evaluation is contrary to his defense. Nor does the fact that an additional evaluation might be beneficial to the defense add credence to his claim. In the subject case, appellant was afforded the constitutionally and statutorily required expert assistance and, as such, the trial court's refusal to provide additional examinations or funds did not violate his due process rights. Id. ( citing U.S. v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 568, 73 S.Ct. 391, 395, 97 L.Ed. 549 (1953) and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)). Here, the trial judge held at least three hearings on the matter and duly considered all the reasons set before him. Taking into consideration the findings from the state evaluation and Appellant's arguments, the trial judge determined that additional expert funding was not reasonably necessary. Therefore, there was no abuse of discretion. Thus, in the present instance, we find that the trial court was proper in denying Appellant's request for funding; Appellant had already availed himself of a state psychiatric evaluation, and his requests, other than the request on the first day of trial, were not pleaded with requisite specificity.