Opinion ID: 1058001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Because no evidence was taken on the plea in bar, we will review the circuit court's ruling upon the pleadings, supplemented by the facts as stipulated by the parties. Gray v. Virginia Sec'y of Transp., 276 Va. 93, 97, 662 S.E.2d 66, 68 (2008); Ola v. YMCA of S. Hampton Roads, Inc., 270 Va. 550, 555, 557-59, 621 S.E.2d 70, 72-74 (2005). There are no disputed facts relevant to the plea in bar and it presents a pure question of law, to which we apply a de novo standard of review. Hilton v. Martin, 275 Va. 176, 179-80, 654 S.E.2d 572, 574 (2008). We are, therefore, not bound by or limited to the conclusions of law to which the parties agreed in the circuit court. Code § 65.2-307 provides that the rights and remedies granted by the Act to an employee, when he and his employer have accepted its provisions, shall exclude all other rights and remedies the employee may have on account of injury or death by accident. The injured employee may have a common-law action against a third-party tortfeasor for accidental injuries sustained while working for his employer, but only if the third-party tortfeasor is a stranger to the work. Whalen v. Dean Steel Erection Co., 229 Va. 164, 167-68, 327 S.E.2d 102, 104-05 (1985); Slusher v. Paramount Warrior, Inc., 336 F.Supp. 1381, 1383 (W.D.Va.1971). The defendants were not strangers to the work. Both the plaintiff and the defendants were engaged in the same construction project at the time of the accident and both were engaged in the trade, business and occupation of Green, the general contractor. The defendants were subcontractors under Green and the plaintiff was Green's direct employee. The parties to this action were therefore statutory co-employees. Pfeifer v. Krauss Constr. Co. of Va., Inc., 262 Va. 262, 266-67, 546 S.E.2d 717, 718-19 (2001). Because the purpose of the Act is to bring within its operation all persons who are engaged in the trade, business or occupation of the contractor who engages to perform the work, all such persons are entitled to the protection afforded by Code § 65.2-307. Id. at 266, 546 S.E.2d at 719. Thus, the parties' agreement, in their stipulation, that the plaintiff and the defendants would ordinarily be deemed statutory co-employees and that the defendants would therefore have been entitled to immunity from a common-law action in tort if they had carried workers' compensation insurance, is based upon correct principles of law. The dispositive question remains: Did the defendants forfeit that protection by failing to carry insurance as required by the Act? That is a question of first impression, but our prior decisions are instructive. In Virginia Used Auto Parts, Inc. v. Robertson, 212 Va. 100, 103, 181 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1971), we held that the overriding legislative intent [expressed by the Act is] that an uninsured employer shall be liable to his employee injured in an accident arising out of and during the course of his employment. In that case, the employee was unsuccessful in a common-law action against the employer and thereafter sought an award from the Industrial Commission. We held that the employee was not required to make an election of remedies, but could proceed under the Act. In Delp v. Berry, 213 Va. 786, 195 S.E.2d 877 (1973), we considered a variation on that theme. There, an employee received from the Industrial Commission an award of benefits under the Act but found it to be uncollectable because his employer lacked insurance. The employee then filed a common-law action against the employer, but the circuit court sustained the employer's plea of res judicata and held that the Industrial Commission had exclusive jurisdiction. Id. at 786-87, 195 S.E.2d at 878. We reversed, holding that the employer's failure to carry workers' compensation insurance, as required by the Act, forfeited the protection from a common-law action that he would otherwise have had under the exclusivity provisions of the Act. Id. at 789, 195 S.E.2d at 879. Virginia Used Auto Parts and Delp are both cases in which an employee asserted a claim against an employer. The present case, like Pfeifer, is one in which an employee asserts a common-law action against statutory co-employees. An independent contractor and his employees, if engaged in the same project in which the injured worker is employed and not strangers to the work, are deemed the injured worker's statutory co-employees even though he is employed by another contractor on the same project. Although the statutory co-employees are not the injured worker's statutory employers, and are therefore not liable for the payment of workers' compensation benefits to him, they come within the canopy of the Act. Because the legislative purpose is to bring within the Act all those who are engaged in the work that is a part of the owner's or general contractor's trade, business or occupation, such statutory co-employees are entitled to the exclusivity protections of the Act. The injured worker's sole remedy for job-related injuries caused by statutory co-employees is a claim against his own statutory employer for an award of workers' compensation benefits. Evans v. Hook, 239 Va. 127, 130-31, 387 S.E.2d 777, 778-79 (1990). He may not bring a common-law action against his statutory co-employees. The statutory co-employees' lack of workers' compensation insurance is, in these circumstances, immaterial because they would in no event be liable to the injured worker for benefits under the Act. There is a significant difference between the facts in Delp and those in the present case. Delp, having found his award of benefits from the Industrial Commission to be uncollectable, would not be doubly compensated by pursuing a common-law action against his employer. Addressing that factor in Delp, we said: Appellees argue that Delp is entitled to only one full recovery and with this we agree. He can collect only one time. The problem here is that Delp has effected no recovery. 213 Va. at 789, 195 S.E.2d at 879. In the present case, by contrast, the plaintiff has made a full recovery of workers' compensation benefits under the Act. Permitting him to proceed in a common-law tort action against co-employees not only contravenes the exclusivity provisions of the Act but also would, if successful, result in a double recovery for a single injury.