Opinion ID: 2384186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Subsequent Legislative Provisions

Text: The General Assembly recognized a need to provide some protection to adoptive parents and adoptive children, who had long been united, from separation. As a result, a two-year statute of limitations was passed in 1949. Although that statute has now been repealed, we likened it to a two-year statute of adverse possession of a child held under a court order intended to be an order of adoption. Dean v. Brown, 216 Ark. 761, 227 S.W.2d 623 (1950). A similar statute of limitations exists today as part of the Revised Uniform Adoption Act. That code section provides in part: [U]pon the expiration of one (1) year after an adoption decree is issued, the decree cannot be questioned by any person including the petitioner, in any manner upon any ground, including fraud, misrepresentation, failure to give any required notice, or lack of jurisdiction of the parties or of the subject matter unless, in the case of the adoption of a minor, the petitioner has not taken custody of the minor or, in the case of the adoption of an adult, the adult had had no knowledge of the decree within the one-year period. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-9-216(b) (Repl.1993) (emphasis supplied). The court of appeals, in discussing a comparable predecessor statute providing a one-year limitation, wrote: This statute which is couched in negative language gives rise to a corollary. For one year following the adoption decree, the adoption may be challenged by any person with an interest. Hensley v. Wist, 270 Ark. 1004, 1006, 607 S.W.2d 80, 82 (1980) (emphasis supplied), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Wallace, 274 Ark. 48, 622 S.W.2d 164 (1981). Another part of the Revised Uniform Adoption Act provides that A consent to adoption cannot be withdrawn after the entry of a decree of adoption. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-9-209(a) (Repl.1993). This is the statute upon which the majority opinion relies in affirming the case at bar. In our first case construing this provision, we reversed the ruling of a probate court that had allowed a consent to be withdrawn after the entry of an adoption decree. However, the consent was entered in compliance with the statutes providing the manner for biological parents to consent to adoption, and we implied that the statute presupposes a valid form of consent. We wrote: In making this ruling we do not imply that consent could not be withdrawn after an interlocutory order upon a proper showing of fraud, duress or intimidation. McCluskey v. Kerlen, 278 Ark. 338, 341, 645 S.W.2d 948, 949 (1983). We cited an Oklahoma case, In re: Adoption of Graves, 481 P.2d 136 (Okl.1971), as authority for our statement. Our dictum was eminently correct because the statute provides that a consent to adoption cannot be withdrawn after a decree of adoption has been entered, and the statute assumes a consent entered in accordance with the applicable adoption statutes. The cited Oklahoma case fully supports this position. In that case the biological parents sought to set aside an adoption decree and contended that their consent was the result of fraud, coercion, and intimidation. The Oklahoma trial court held that, under a statute with the same provision as § 9-9-209(a), it had no authority to declare the consent invalid after the decree of adoption was entered. The natural parents appealed. The Oklahoma appellate court ruled that the fact that the Uniform Adoption Act contains both a statute of limitations and the statute barring the withdrawal of a consent after a decree has been entered means that some actions can be brought after the decree has been entered, as long as they are brought before the one-year statute of limitations has run. The same reasoning applies to the comparable Arkansas statutes. Thus, the statute presupposes a consent executed in accordance with the applicable statutes, and if the statutes are not complied with, an action can be maintained after an adoption has been granted, as long as the statute of limitations has not run. The statute of limitations had not run in the case at bar. In our second case involving this provision, we affirmed the probate court's refusal to allow withdrawal of a valid consent after the decree of adoption, and in so doing we relied on our first case interpreting this provision, McCluskey , and, in dictum, said, [I]t is settled that consent to adoption can be withdrawn after an interlocutory order only upon a proper showing of fraud, duress, or intimidation. Pierce v. Pierce, 279 Ark. 62, 63, 648 S.W.2d 487, 487 (1983). The quoted dictum is the statement relied upon by the majority opinion. It wholly ignores the concept that the statute prohibiting the withdrawal of a consent after an interlocutory order presupposes a consent executed in accordance with the statute.