Opinion ID: 589633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Crane as a Public Official

Text: 93 Both sides agree that the district court properly labelled Henderson a public official, for purposes of applying the New York Times burden of proof to the juxtaposing claim. The allegations concerned Henderson's performance as a high-level government employee and head of the Strike Force. 94 The district court, however, declined to treat Crane as a public official because the thrust of the article addressed his activities as a private lawyer allegedly representing mob clients. 95 We affirm the district court's ruling that Crane is not a public official, with two qualifications. The bulk of the article addresses allegations that Crane, as a private attorney, exploited his personal contacts with Strike Force personnel to protect his clients from prosecution. The article thus addresses neither Crane's performance of official duties nor any misconduct engaged in while a prosecutor. That Crane's conduct allegedly impacted or influenced prosecutorial policy does not alone suffice to make him a public official. The press cannot, by virtue of the content of their news stories, create their own defense by making the claimant a public [official]. Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135, 99 S.Ct. 2675, 2688, 61 L.Ed.2d 411 (1979). A public official is a person whose position would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy. Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 87 n. 13, 86 S.Ct. at 676 n. 13. 96 Putting aside the allegations of corruption contained in the article, the position of private attorney does not automatically invite public scrutiny. An attorney is not a governmental official, so heightened press scrutiny does not serve a watchdog function. 97 Nor do those entering the legal profession expect to be at the center of the public spotlight. An individual who decides to seek governmental office, by contrast, must accept certain necessary consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public scrutiny than might otherwise be the case. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3009, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). 98 Finally, unlike governmental officials and public figures, private lawyers do not have that greater accessibility to the press needed to counter defamatory remarks. Id. (Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements then private individuals normally enjoy.). The policy concerns animating the public official designation thus militate against including private lawyers within its span. See Mosesian v. McClatchy Newspapers, 205 Cal.App.3d 597, 252 Cal.Rptr. 586, 594-95 (1988) (fact that state requires a license to perform a job and regulates an occupation, such as being a lawyer, does not establish public official status), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1066, 109 S.Ct. 2065, 104 L.Ed.2d 630 (1989). 99 A small portion of the article, however, does speak to Crane's activities as a prosecutor. Paragraph seven reports allegations that the two men avoided prosecuting certain organized crime figures. For purposes of the charges contained in this paragraph, Crane should be deemed a public official. Murray, 613 F.Supp. at 1279-80 (assistant district attorney is a public official); see Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85, 86 S.Ct. at 676 ([T]he 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.). 100 The nature of the relief sought by Crane also activates the New York Times standard with respect to his juxtaposing claim. Crane concedes that he suffered no economic damage as a result of the article's publication. He thus seeks only punitive, and perhaps some form of general, damages. A plaintiff must demonstrate actual malice, as that term is defined in New York Times, before punitive damages may be awarded. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350, 94 S.Ct. at 3012 ([T]he private defamation plaintiff who establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to compensate him for actual injury.). 10