Opinion ID: 2657202
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Survey Evidence

Text: “Evidence of actual confusion is often introduced through the use of surveys, although their evidentiary value depends on the methodology and questions asked.” Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Vail Assocs., Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 864 n.8 (10th Cir. 2008)). The district court gave the Luth Survey—commissioned by DoubleTap—little weight, concluding that it improperly compared the parties’ marks “side-by-side.” Aplee. Br. Att. 18. Both - 14 - parties agree that the district court erred in determining that the survey was of the “side-by-side” variety. Aplt. Br. 52-53; Aplee. Br. 50. We also agree; the Luth Survey presented the parties’ products one at a time, thus properly measuring confusion when the allegedly infringing mark is “singly presented, rather than when presented side by side with the protected trademark.” Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 972. However, other methodological flaws support the district court’s conclusion that the Luth Survey was entitled to little weight. 8 In Water Pik, we agreed that the survey at issue was “devoid of any probative value and therefore irrelevant” because of methodological flaws. 726 F.3d at 1145. 9 Among the survey’s flaws was the fact that “the survey questions [were] improperly leading.” Id. at 1147. We described the survey as follows: Respondents were shown only three products and were asked whether two or more of the products were made by the same company; whether two or more of the products’ makers had a business affiliation; and whether one or more of the makers had received permission or approval from one of the others. They could answer yes, no, or not sure. 8 We are not required to restrict ourselves to the district court’s stated reasoning, and we may affirm for any reason supported by the record. Brady v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc., 538 F.3d 1319, 1327 (10th Cir. 2008). 9 Hornady argues that the weight of expert testimony, such as competing interpretations of a survey, must be tested by the jury, not the court on summary judgment. Aplt. Br. 55. It argues that methodological flaws go to a survey’s weight, not its admissibility, and it therefore must be presented to a jury. Aplt. Reply Br. 24. Even on summary judgment, however, the district court may register “concerns about the survey’s methodology” and “decid[e] that the survey failed to support a likelihood of confusion.” Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1145. - 15 - Id. The Luth Survey followed an identical strategy: After viewing [three] packages, respondents were asked to answer whether they thought that the [DoubleTap] and the Hornady and control[, Federal Premium,] packages were: (1) of the same company or owned by the first company shown; (2) affiliated with the first company shown, (3) had permission from the first company shown to use this name on their website, or (4) had no affiliation or connection to the first website shown, or that they were unsure. Aplt. App. 130. By suggesting the possibility that DoubleTap might be connected with another brand, and limiting the candidates to Hornady and Federal Premium, the Luth Survey risked sowing confusion between DoubleTap and TAP when none would have arisen otherwise. See Water Pik, 726 F.3d at 1148. This prevented the survey from eliciting responses as they might occur spontaneously in the marketplace. Because of this and other methodological flaws, the Luth Survey is entitled to little weight on the issue of actual confusion. 10 Presented with no significantly probative evidence of actual confusion, the district court properly weighed this factor in DoubleTap’s favor.