Opinion ID: 1036479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our Circuit Precedent

Text: The Supreme Court’s Harrington and Johnson decisions are enough. But even before them, our own Circuit precedent required that we afford AEDPA deference even where the state court’s decision is a summary adjudication or engages in only some evaluation because “implicit findings” may be inferred from dispositive rulings. See Greene v. Upton, 644 F.3d 1145, 1155–56 (11th Cir. 85 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 86 of 128 2011) (emphasizing in a § 2254 capital case that “Batson does not require elaborate factual findings” and applying AEDPA deference to a state court’s Batson ruling even though it did not address every argument or make an explicit fact finding on Batson’s third step); Blankenship v. Hall, 542 F.3d 1253, 1271–72 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating in a § 2254 capital case that “implicit findings” may be inferred from a state court opinion and record and “these implicit findings of fact are entitled to deference under § 2254(d) to the same extent as explicit findings of fact”); Hightower v. Terry, 459 F.3d 1067, 1072 n.9 (11th Cir. 2006) (deferring to a state court judgment on a Batson claim in a § 2254 capital case and noting a state court’s “dispositive ruling may contain implicit findings, which, though unstated, are necessary to that ruling” (citing United States v. $242,484.00, 389 F.3d 1149, 1154 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“[W]e and other federal appellate courts have ‘inferred from a district court’s explicit factual findings and conclusion implied factual findings that are consistent with its judgment although unstated.’”))); Atwater v. Crosby, 451 F.3d 799, 807 (11th Cir. 2006) (applying AEDPA deference in a § 2254 capital case, where the state appellate court’s opinion “improperly condensed the second and third steps of Batson” but the opinion contained “some evaluation of the prosecutor’s reasons for the strike”); see also Johnson v. Sec’y, DOC, 643 F.3d 907, 910 (11th Cir. 2011) (“When faced with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that was denied on the merits by the state 86 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 87 of 128 courts, a federal habeas court ‘must determine what arguments or theories supported or, [if none were stated], could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of [the Supreme] Court.’” (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at —, 131 S. Ct. at 786) (alterations in original)).24 We recognize, of course, that this Court in McGahee in 2009 and Adkins in 2013 held in § 2254 capital cases that a state court’s decision denying Batson relief was an unreasonable application of Batson given the explicit racial statements and strong evidence of discriminatory purpose in each case. Contrary to Lee’s arguments, however, we do not read those two decisions as establishing new rules for state court opinion-writing before state court decisions may be entitled to AEDPA deference. What drove the unreasonable application result in each of those two cases was the abundant racial discrimination evidence that demonstrated 24 We contrast (a) a state court’s not explicitly addressing a claim or argument made by a petitioner and our inferring findings from that state court’s decision to (b) a wholly different type of case where the state court’s opinion itself makes clear that it considered one claim but expressly decided not to reach or rule on another claim. If a state court opinion expressly tells us that it is not ruling on an issue, then there is no ruling to which we can defer. See, e.g., Johnson, 643 F.3d at 930 n.9 (“The Court’s instruction from Harrington does not apply here because the Florida Supreme Court did provide an explanation of its decision which makes clear that it ruled on the deficiency prong [of the Strickland test] but it did not rule on the prejudice prong, and it is also clear that the trial court’s ruling on the prejudice prong did not address counsel’s investigation and presentation of non-statutory mitigating circumstances evidence. As a result, we are still required to follow the Court’s instructions from [ineffective-assistance cases] Rompilla and Wiggins and conduct a de novo review.” (citation omitted)). 87 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 88 of 128 that the state court’s Batson decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. There is some loose language to be sure but no holding in either McGahee or Adkins that a state court Batson opinion must discuss every fact or argument to be a reasonable application of Batson under § 2254(d). Given the solid wall of prior panel precedent and Supreme Court decisions prohibiting such an approach, we do not read those two decisions as holding that AEDPA deference does not apply to state court decisions accompanied by opinions that do not discuss all the evidence, circumstances, or arguments. If McGahee or Adkins were interpreted as holding that, they would run afoul of our earlier precedent in Atwater, Hightower, Blankenship, and Greene, and we must follow the earlier precedent of these decisions. See United States v. Ohayon, 483 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2007) (“When a decision of this Court conflicts with an earlier decision that has not been overturned en banc, we are bound by the earlier decision.”); Burke-Fowler v. Orange Cnty., Fla., 447 F.3d 1319, 1323 n.2 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[W]hen a later panel decision contradicts an earlier one, the earlier panel decision controls.”); Tompkins v. Moore, 193 F.3d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating that the Court was “duty bound to follow the decisions” in two earlier Circuit decisions instead of a more recent Circuit decision under the prior panel precedent rule). Lest there be any doubt, we recount our precedent in detail and in order of 88 Case: 12-14421 Date Filed: 08/01/2013 Page: 89 of 128 the earliest precedent first.