Opinion ID: 1134775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: refusal to attend police interview

Text: Moore argues that the admission of testimony that he refused to meet with police violated his constitutional right to remain silent. The State counters that the testimony was offered not to show guilt, but to show that Moore was fleeing. In addition, the State argues that the prohibition against the use of a defendant's silence applies only post-arrest or post- Miranda. Whether the admission of evidence violates a defendant's right to remain silent is a constitutional question which this Court reviews de novo. Harris v. State Dept. of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992). This is a question of first impression in Idaho. This Court has previously held that it is clear error to admit testimony of pre-arrest silence for the purpose of inferring guilt. State v. Hodges, 105 Idaho 588, 671 P.2d 1051 (1983). In Hodges, however, the defendant had been informed of his right to remain silent although it apparently was not the standard Miranda warning. [2] The United States Supreme Court has approved the use of pre-arrest, pre- Miranda silence to impeach a defendant who has testified at trial. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). Brecht does not apply in this case, however, because the testimony in question was introduced as part of the State's case in chief, and not in rebuttal to Moore's testimony. The federal circuits are split on whether pre-arrest, pre- Miranda silence can be used as part of the prosecution's case in chief. The First, Seventh and Tenth circuits have held that pre-arrest, pre- Miranda silence cannot be used except for impeachment purposes, United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196 (10th Cir.1991); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562 (1st Cir.1989); United States ex. rel Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1987); while the Fifth, Eleventh and D.C. circuits have held that pre-arrest, pre- Miranda silence is admissible. United States v. Zanabria, 74 F.3d 590 (5th Cir.1996); United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Butler, 924 F.2d 1124 (D.C.Cir.1991). The Ninth Circuit has specifically declined to decide this issue. United States v. Thompson, 82 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Calise, 996 F.2d 1019 (9th Cir.1993). Several state appellate courts have held that the use by the prosecution of pre-arrest, pre- Miranda silence to infer guilt violates a defendant's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. State v. Easter, 130 Wash.2d 228, 922 P.2d 1285 (Wash.1996); Tortolito v. State, 901 P.2d 387 (Wyo.1995); State v. Palmer, 860 P.2d 339 (Utah App. 1993); State v. Rowland, 234 Neb. 846, 452 N.W.2d 758 (Neb.1990). We believe the better rule is that which holds that the defendants' Fifth Amendment right not to have their silence used against them in a court proceeding is applicable pre-arrest and pre- Miranda warnings. The constitutional right is always present. While the presence of Miranda warnings might provide an additional reason for disallowing use of the defendant's silence, they are not a necessary condition to such a prohibition. Savory, 832 F.2d at 1018. Miranda only defines the time at which the interrogation has become so coercive that the defendant must be advised of his rights and waive them. [W]ithout proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely. In order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights and the exercise of those right must be fully honored. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The constitutional right against self-incrimination is not absolute, however, and applies only when the silence is used solely for the purpose of implying guilt. In the present case, the testimony about Moore's failure to meet with Detective Mack was admitted to show that Moore fled the jurisdiction when he became aware of the investigation into the alleged sexual abuse of S.K. In admitting the evidence the trial court stated: My prior ruling isn't primarily because of the defendant's refusal to talk to Detective Mack. My prior ruling isto me the primary relevance is the defendant leaving town, suddenly quitting his job and the agreementor the conversation about whether or not he is going to talk to Detective Mack merely puts that in some sort of context, but that's notif he had just not talked to Detective Mack and hadn't left town and quit his job, then my ruling may be different as far as the admissibility. Because the evidence was probative on the issue of flight and was admitted for that purpose and not directly as an admission of guilt, we hold that the district court did not err in admitting the testimony.