Opinion ID: 478970
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Open File

Text: 10 While Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 places some requirements on the government to disclose evidence to a defendant, 8 the government is not compelled by statute or the Constitution to disclose evidentiary details or  'to explain the legal theories upon which it intends to rely at trial.'  United States v. Gabriel, 715 F.2d 1447, 1449 (10th Cir.1983) (quoting United States v. Burgin, 621 F.2d 1352, 1359 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1015, 101 S.Ct. 574, 66 L.Ed.2d 474 (1980)). See also Weatherford v. Bursey, 329 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct. 837, 845, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977) ([t]here is no general constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case). If the government agrees to maintain an open file policy, thereby disclosing its evidence and theories to the defendant, however, the government is obligated to adhere to that agreement. See United States v. Herring, 582 F.2d 535, 540-41 (10th Cir.1978); United States v. Millet, 559 F.2d 253, 256-57 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1015, 98 S.Ct. 732, 54 L.Ed.2d 759 (1978). A defendant is justified in relying upon the government's representations of maintaining open records; breaking an open file agreement by withholding important evidence or a key theory can obviously cause great prejudice to a defendant. 11 However, the mere fact that a defendant is not made aware of certain evidence until shortly before or at trial does not mandate a finding that the government has violated its open file policy. Rather, if the government had not secreted the evidence, and had made the evidence available to the defendant within a reasonable time after the government learned of the evidence's significance or reliability, there has not been a violation of an open file policy. See, e.g., United States v. Franklin, 704 F.2d 1183, 1191 (10th Cir.) (evidence was not secreted and its relevance was not readily apparent), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 845, 104 S.Ct. 146, 78 L.Ed.2d 137 (1983); Herring, 582 F.2d at 541 (no abuse to admit evidence which was not secreted and was made available to the defendant before the trial began). Cf. United States v. Kelly, 420 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1969) (where prosecution failed to disclose evidence pursuant to a discovery order). 9 12 An open file agreement is essentially an informal discovery agreement; as with other discovery orders, it is generally within the district court's discretion to award sanctions when there has been a violation. See Franklin, 704 F.2d at 1191. Therefore, even if the government violated its open file policy, it would still be within the district court's discretion to determine what the appropriate sanction--such as excluding the evidence or awarding a continuance or mistrial--should be. 13 In the case at bar, the jury trial began on a Tuesday; the previous Friday, witness Benning had a conversation with Special Agent Lopez about the hijacking of a truckload of beef. The United States Attorney was not immediately notified of this new information and the first partial verification of Benning's statement was not received until Monday, the day before trial, when coconspirator Wayne Smith was interviewed by Lopez and the United States Attorney. Atisha argues that, although the evidence was not intentionally withheld, the government was obligated to inform him of this evidence on Friday, or at least before his counsel delivered an opening statement on the first day of trial. 14 The United States Attorney asserted that, although Benning had informed the government of a beef theft, the government did not have enough information to know whether the evidence would be used at trial until the trial was under way. At trial, the United States Attorney stated to the district court: 15 Mr. Benning did advise us the weekend before that he was aware of what basically he testified to. He did not know the name of the company. We had no details. We had no way to verify what company that came from. We couldn't verify the theft. It was not until the following week.... We did not know the name of the company involved with the meat until after we had begun this trial. 16 There is no assertion, or indication, that the government secreted this evidence, and we do not believe that an open file policy obligates the government to instantaneously inform a defendant of each new piece of information regardless of its significance or foundation. In the instant case, it was established that the beef incident was still under investigation when the trial began and that the government had yet to decide whether it could use the evidence; once it was decided that the evidence could be used, the government informed the defendants of its existence. We do not find the delay to have been unreasonable under the circumstances and do not believe that there was an open file violation. 17 The defendant nonetheless asserts that he was severely prejudiced by justifiably relying on the government's representations regarding its evidence and theory of the case; that defense counsel committed himself to a theory of defense and a strategy which he might not have chosen had he been informed about the beef incident. Specifically, defense counsel committed himself to placing the defendant on the stand and represented to the jury that only two thefts were involved. Atisha argues that the government's conduct was tantamount to sandbagging and that a new trial was essential in order to provide him an opportunity to restructure his defense. 10 18 Defense counsel's opening statement indeed indicates that Atisha's defense primarily focused on rebutting the government's case regarding the stolen chickens and dry goods. Defense counsel asserted that the evidence would establish that Atisha was never involved in the stolen chicken incident and that Atisha believed the dry goods were merely salvage merchandise. On more than one occasion, defense counsel also reminded the jury of its duty to determine whether the government has proven the specific charges in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt. Although defense counsel arguably committed himself during opening argument to proceed in a particular matter, we do not believe that the district court was required to exclude the evidence or grant a mistrial. 19 First, the mere fact that the defendant was suprised by the evidence does not mandate that the evidence be excluded. See Herring, 582 F.2d at 541; United States v. Wixom, 529 F.2d 217, 220 (8th Cir.1976) (per curiam). Second, there is no rule that evidence must be excluded or a mistrial granted on the basis that a defendant had committed himself to a theory which was undermined by new evidence. See United States v. Bavers, 787 F.2d 1022, 1028 (6th Cir.1985). There is always a possibility that new evidence will be discovered, even if the defense was structured around assurances made by the government. This may be particularly so when the indictment charges a conspiracy. 20 The defendant argues, however, that the district court used the incorrect legal standard in reviewing his motion for a mistrial. The district court, relying on Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424, 427, 73 S.Ct. 349, 350, 97 L.Ed. 456 (1953), reasoned that a mistrial motion must be granted only upon a showing of manifest necessity; absent a showing of serious prejudice, or a denial of due process, however, the district court stated that there was no requirement to grant a mistrial. The defendant argues that the court should not have used the manifest necessity test; rather, since the defendant was requesting the mistrial, as opposed to the government, a less strict standard should apply. Since the court did not use a lesser standard, the defendant asserts that the district court's exercise of discretion cannot be trusted. We are not persuaded by the defendant's argument in this regard and find that the district court's articulation and application of the test was not in error. 21 The defendant is correct in noting that more than one test for reviewing the granting of mistrials has been articulated by the Supreme Court, depending on whether the government or the defendant makes the motion. Compare Brock, 344 U.S. at 427, 73 S.Ct. at 350 ( 'a trial can be discontinued when particular circumstances manifest a necessity for so doing, and when failure to discontinue would defeat the ends of justice' ) (quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 690, 69 S.Ct. 834, 838, 93 L.Ed. 974 (1949)), with United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609-10, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1080-81, 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976) (if defendant has  'no choice' but to request a mistrial, and if there is a legitimate claim of seriously prejudicial error, a mistrial can be granted upon the defendant's motion even in the absence of a manifest necessity). 22 However, both Brock and Dinitz are double jeopardy cases where the issue presented was whether the retrial of a defendant placed him in double jeopardy. Under Brock, double jeopardy attaches if the court sua sponte, or pursuant to the government's motion, grants a mistrial and there was no manifest necessity for doing so; under such circumstances, the defendant cannot be retried. In contrast, if the defendant requests a mistrial, the general rule is that any barrier to a retrial is removed, United States v. Thomas, 728 F.2d 313, 318 (6th Cir.1984); there need not be a manifest necessity for a trial court to permissibly grant a defendant's motion for a mistrial, and double jeopardy will not attach. Dinitz, 424 U.S. at 610, 96 S.Ct. at 1081. 23 In the instant case, we are not reviewing a trial court's grant of a mistrial as in Dinitz or Brock; rather, we are reviewing a denial of a mistrial motion and must determine under what circumstances a mistrial must be granted, not simply when a mistrial may permissibly be granted. Since granting a mistrial is generally within a trial court's discretion, see Brock, 344 U.S. at 427, 73 S.Ct. at 350, we must decide when a trial court has abused its discretion by failing to grant a mistrial. See United States v. Faulkenbery, 472 F.2d 879, 882 (9th Cir.) (appeals court may reverse a denial of a mistrial motion only upon a showing of abuse of discretion), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970, 93 S.Ct. 2161, 36 L.Ed.2d 692 (1973). 24 We initially note that the district court arguably applied the Dinitz standard by inquiring into whether the defendant would suffer any serious prejudice were the trial to continue, and we agree with the district court that the allegation of prejudice in this case does not rise to the level of serious prejudice. 11 Further, the district court inquired into whether the defendant would be denied due process were the trial not aborted. We believe that a determination of the fairness to the accused is the primary concern in ruling upon a mistrial motion; if, by admitting this evidence, the trial was not rendered unfair, we do not believe the district court can be said to have abused its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial. See, e.g., United States v. Nace, 561 F.2d 763, 768-69 (9th Cir.1977) (admitting the evidence did not render the trial unfair). Our review of defense counsel's opening statement, as well as the record in this case, convinces us that the trial was not rendered unfair by the admission of this new evidence. Therefore, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion for a mistrial on the theory that the government violated its open file policy which consequently resulted in severe prejudice to the defendant.