Opinion ID: 2069869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: dissent from the recommendation of the committee on admissions

Text: A majority of the Committee on Admissions has recommended that the Court grant the petition of Byron C. Wells for admission to the Bar of the District of Columbia. For the reasons stated below, a minority of the Committee [1] respectfully dissents. As stated in the majority opinion, Mr. Wells is a former member of the Indiana Bar and a former judge of the Shelby County Court from 1977 until 1983. He was a newspaper reporter for the Indianapolis Star from 1965 until 1977 and he began practicing law in Indiana in 1977. On December 12, 1990, he was suspended from practice in Indiana for three years ( In re Wells, 572 N.E.2d 1290 (Ind.1991)) (R. 52-59), and twice denied readmission. His application to take the Tennessee Bar Exam was denied in February 1995. After leaving the bench in 1984, Mr. Wells opened a law practice. According to Mr. Wells, he began making unwanted sexual advances to male, criminal and civil, clients ranging in ages 16 to 24 because, Mr. Wells explained, he was overworked and his marriage was not working. Mr. Wells also displayed pornographic videos to two seventeen-year-old boys who had visited his law office. Mr. Wells informed this Committee's investigator that he was careful not to approach any male clients who were not of legal age, that is, below the age of sixteen, by checking the individual's drivers' license. Mr. Wells estimated that he approached 10-20 young males and would touch them to see if they were interested in a sexual relationship with him. At the hearing before the Committee, Mr. Wells also explained that he approached his male clients because he enjoyed the activity (R. 967). Mr. Wells stated that he never used coercion, threats, intimidation [or] tried to talk anybody into anything. It was just a simple sexual pass, and I handled the cases for the individuals. [R. 968] In 1987, Mr. Wells was arrested and charged with five counts of battery (R. 26-27). At the hearing before the Committee, Mr. Wells blamed his discovery on the fact that a former client with whom he had a sexual relationship offered to testify against him in order to obtain a lenient sentence following the former client's arrest for burglary (R. 958). [2] According to Mr. Wells, the local prosecutor feared that he, Mr. Wells, would be running for the Office of Prosecutor and used this information to investigate 150-200 of Mr. Wells' former clients. In a plea agreement, Mr. Wells admitted having sex with two of the clients and pled guilty to one count of battery (R. 899). The other four counts were dismissed. Disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Wells were instituted in Indiana in 1987. According to Mr. Wells, he turned down a one-year suspension because he did not believe at the time that he had done anything wrong (R. 961). Neither his wife nor his two grown children appeared in his behalf in Indiana or before this Committee. Mr. Wells sought reinstatement by the Indiana Supreme Court in 1994 (R. 60). [3] During the reinstatement hearing, Mr. Wells admitted to ten incidents during the years 1985 to 1987, but stated that he understood that he now understood that his actions were wrong and that he had been receiving psychiatric counseling. The Indiana Supreme Court denied reinstatement (R. 82). The Court found that it was not convinced that Mr. Wells has a proper understanding of and attitude toward the standards that are imposed upon members of the bar and that he will conduct himself in conformity with such standards. [The Court further concluded] that he has failed to meet the requirements set forth in Admis. Disc. R. 23, Section 4(b)   . [R. 82]. In 1997, Mr. Wells again sought reinstatement with the Indiana Supreme Court, while his application for admission to the Bar was pending in the District of Columbia. In support of his reinstatement request, Mr. Wells submitted a Report by him entitled The Sexual Revolution is over    at least for lawyers, in which he discussed the trend against attorney-client sexual contact, including the discipline of those who merely talk sexual activity with a client (R. 295-296). This report was used by Mr. Wells in an attempt to demonstrate that he was aware of the basis of his suspension in Indiana and of the consequences of his own actions. Mr. Wells also filed a list of any potential derogatory statements by Byron C. Wells which may have lead to the Indiana Supreme Court's conclusion by any method, and explanation of the process involved in the hearing, in the belief that his denial of reinstatement was based on something other than the record before the Court (R. 314-322). The Indiana Supreme Court again denied reinstatement (R. 860). The Supreme Court found that [b]oth the petitioner's pleadings and presentation at hearing are permeated by suggestions that he has been wronged by the disciplinary process of this state and that his misconduct did not warrant a sanction as severe as a three-year period with the additional burden of convincing this Court of his fitness for readmission at the conclusion of this period (R. 862). The Supreme Court went on to state that misconduct leading to petitioner's suspension was grave. He used his advantage, power and control to attempt to inappropriately incite sexual relations with young men, some of whom had come to the respondent to seek his professional assistance.    In the present case, our concerns about the sincerity of the petitioner's remorse and the integrity of his attitude towards and understanding of the standards imposed upon members of the bar, coupled with the severity of his misconduct, outweigh the evidence he presented concerning his rehabilitation and present fitness to practice law. [R. 862-863]. Following the action of the Indiana Supreme Court, this Committee conducted an investigation to determine whether Mr. Wells presently possesses good moral character and general fitness to practice law in the District of Columbia. See In re Manville, 494 A.2d 1289 (D.C.1985) ( Manville I ). The Committee had the benefit of the record before the Supreme Court of Indiana. Mr. Wells has also supplemented the record given the passage of time since this matter was first heard by the Committee. [4] At the hearing before the Committee, Mr. Wells testified that he now understands that what he did was wrong because now he can separate his alternative lifestyle from his responsibility as an attorney (R. 970-972). In explaining his change in understanding to the Indiana Supreme Court, during the second reinstatement petition proceeding, Mr. Wells previously believed that if he had only asked a client to have sex, rather what he assumed was a subtle attempt by touching, then he would never have been in trouble with the disciplinary board and this Court.    He has rejected that contention, and now understands that although what may be legally permissible, may still be a moral violation and against the rules of this Court. [R. 220, emphasis added]. With regard to his inability to obtain reinstatement in Indiana, Mr. Wells also stated that he does not believe that he could ever obtain a license in Indiana because he has been placed on a higher level than other individuals, characterizing the Chief Justice's action as a vendetta (R. 1004). According to Mr. Wells, his reinstatement petitions were denied because the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court had been rumored to have an alternative lifestyle and if he ruled in Wells' favor, it would appear that he was showing favoritism to one who had the same lifestyle as himself (R. 900), or, in the alternative, it was because Mr. Wells had been a reporter for the same newspaper that had purportedly investigated the Chief Justice's lifestyle (R. 986-987). Mr. Wells did not provide the Committee with any evidence that supported his assertion that the Chief Justice of the Indiana Supreme Court had been investigated for having an alternative lifestyle, including any alleged newspaper reports, or any other evidence which would provide a basis for Mr. Wells' bald assertions. Mr. Wells had the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that he currently possesses good moral character and general fitness to practice law in the District of Columbia. D.C.App. R. 46(d) and (e). The Court of Appeals has made it clear that, in circumstances such as those present here, a prior conviction of a serious crime is not an insurmountable obstacle to our finding good moral character under Rule 46(e). Instead, the Committee is obligated to examine an applicant's present moral character, and if we are sufficiently convinced that the applicant is rehabilitated, we should recommend that admission should be granted. Manville I; In re Manville, 538 A.2d 1128 (D.C.1988) ( Manville II ); In re Sobin, 649 A.2d 589 (D.C.1994). Moreover, `The more serious the misconduct, the greater the showing of rehabilitation that will be required.' In re Demos, 564 A.2d 1147, 1149 (D.C.1989), quoting In re Matthews, 94 N.J. 59, 81, 462 A.2d 165, 176 (1983) (internal citation omitted) ( Demos I ), op. vacated, 564 A.2d 1155. On this record, a minority of the Committee cannot agree with the Committee's majority conclusion that Mr. Wells is rehabilitated or that he possesses the character required of a member of the Bar. The standard of clear and convincing evidence is far more demanding than a mere preponderance of the evidence. The clear and convincing standard requires evidence that will `produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the facts sought to be established.' In re T.J., 666 A.2d 1, 16 n. 17 (D.C.1995), quoting District of Columbia v. Hudson, 404 A.2d 175, 179 n. 7 (D.C.1979) (internal citation omitted). In the Committee's minority view, the record instead demonstrates a failure on Mr. Wells' part to accept full responsibility for his actions, troubling inconsistencies and contradictions between words and deeds, as well as the findings in Indiana that preceded us but are at variance with the position recommended by the Commission. Thus, I would recommend that Mr. Well's application be denied.