Opinion ID: 194634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981).

Text: Censullo was a contract employee until November 24. We must determine whether the evidence could support a finding that Censullo's status changed after November 24 to an at-will employee, such that the second termination could be wrongful. As the jury found a wrongful termination, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to this finding. In this light, the evidence sufficiently supports the jury finding. The president of Brenka Video sent Censullo a telegram on the same day that the A Heart of Stone article appeared. It informed Censullo that the initial termination had been reversed, 1 While an employer has great discretion to terminate an at will employee, he may not do so when he is motivated by bad faith, malice or retaliation. Cloutier v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140, 1143 (N.H. 1981). To state a claim for wrongful termination, the employee must also show that he was terminated for doing something that public policy would encourage, or refusing to do something that public policy would condemn. Id. As these elements of the wrongful termination claim are not in dispute here, we discuss them no further. -6- that Censullo had not been removed from Brenka Video's payroll, could continue to cash his paychecks, and was relieved of his working responsibilities. The president assured Censullo that I will personally get back to you. The next day, Censullo received a telegram from Brenka Video's controller explaining that Censullo had not at any time been removed from active employee status, but was considered to be on an indefinite administrative leave. When Censullo's personal situation was resolved, Censullo was to meet with Brenka Video to discuss the conditions and standards of continued employment. The controller asked Censullo to check in with Brenka Video regularly. In the ensuing period, Censullo did not contact Brenka Video. He cashed two paychecks and kept two others. He later explained that he considered himself at all times a terminated employee, and cashed two checks as severance pay. On December 14, Censullo received another communication terminating him for failure to comply with the administrative leave. Censullo's own views notwithstanding, we believe that the jury could find that Censullo became an at-will employee as a result of the telegrams from Brenka Video's principals. Those telegrams relieved Censullo of the job he had contracted to do, and placed him in a nebulous administrative leave status. The parties would later fix the terms of continued employment. As the telegrams contained no terms limiting Brenka Video's power to terminate Censullo, the jury reasonably could find that the -7- telegrams created an at-will relationship. Brenka Video asserts that while the telegrams could constitute an offer of at-will employment status, such status was not effective until Censullo accepted the offer, which he never did. While we agree that Censullo bore the burden of showing acceptance of the offer, see Panto, 547 A.2d at 264, we disagree as to whether Censullo actually met his burden. In Panto, the New Hampshire Supreme Court found that an employee accepted a change in employment status by merely performing as called for by the change. Id. at 265. In this case, the jury could find that Censullo had accepted the change in status by doing nothing and cashing his paychecks, which is what the telegram asked him to do. Censullo did not comply with the telegram from Brenka Video's controller urging Censullo to check in with the company periodically. The letter from Brenka Video's president, however, indicated that the company would be in touch with Censullo. The jury could have determined that the letter from the president more accurately stated the requirements of the change in status. The jury could have found from the evidence presented at trial that Censullo became an at-will employee after November 24. Therefore, a finding of wrongful termination was proper. The district court did not err in failing to grant Brenka Video's motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. APPEAL OF JAMES CENSULLO Censullo's first argument on appeal is that Brenka -8- Video is vicariously liable for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress committed by its employee David Bowders. Censullo's current claim of vicarious liability deviates from his original claim of indemnification. We address it in an abundance of caution, however, noting that Censullo's complaint at least contained an allegation of respondeat superior. For reasons that parallel those of the district court, we find the current claim meritless. Censullo presented this issue to the district court in a Motion to Assess Damages and for Indemnification, seeking to recover for the default against Bowders through indemnification of Bowders from Brenka Video. The district court denied the motion because Censullo cited no authority for the proposition that an employer must indemnify an employee. The district court noted that normally, when the negligence of an agent is imputed to the principal, the principal may recover from the agent the amount paid as indemnification. Furthermore, the district court already ruled that the state workmen's compensation scheme barred Censullo from recovering from Brenka Video for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court thus found that granting the motion would allow Censullo to recover indirectly from Brenka Video when he could not do so directly. The district court correctly found that the workmen's compensation statute bars employees from suing their employers for personal injuries arising out of the employment relationship. O'Keefe v. Associated Grocers of N.E., Inc., 424 A.2d 199, 201 -9- (N.H. 1980). Emotional distress is a personal injury, not subject to recovery in a common law action under state workmen's compensation statute. See Bourque v. Town of Bow, 736 F. Supp. 398, 404 (D.N.H. 1990). The district court also correctly held, in granting the default judgment, that Censullo could sue his co-employee acting as a supervisor for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Thompson v. Forest, 614 A.2d 1064, 1067 (N.H. 1992) (under workmen's compensation scheme, co-employee not immunized from suit for intentional torts). While Thompson authorizes Censullo to raise a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against his co-employee Bowders, it does not authorize such an action against Brenka Video, his employer. Indeed, according to a leading commentator, when the intentional injury is committed by a co-employee the better rule is that an action in damages will not lie against the employer . . . . 2A Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 68.00 (1992). Because we find that Censullo has not stated a valid claim on vicarious liability, we affirm the district court's order. Censullo's second argument, the only one remaining in this appeal, relates to the admission of the newspaper article entitled A Heart of Stone. As Censullo conceded that resolution of this issue is unnecessary unless we were to remand the case for a new trial, and we have found no reason to do so, we do not reach this issue.