Opinion ID: 1688159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Appellant's Post-Arrest Statements

Text: The analysis concerning appellant's post-arrest statements about the cocaine and his ex-girlfriend giving the tip is largely the same as with the consent search. Although the statements were made after the consent, they were still made within minutes of the illegal stop and this factor still weighs against a finding of attenuation. Likewise, there are no intervening circumstances that could weigh in favor of attenuation. The fact that appellant was given his Miranda warnings is a relevant factor, but it does not, as an intervening circumstance, create a sufficient filter between the illegal stop and the statements. See Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687, 691, 102 S.Ct. 2664, 2667, 73 L.Ed.2d 314 (1982). In Taylor , the defendant was arrested without probable cause and eventually confessed six hours after his arrest. The defendant was given Miranda warnings three times and was allowed to visit with his girlfriend and a male companion before confessing. Given this factual situation, the Supreme Court held that the confession was not attenuated from the initial illegal arrest. The Court noted that [i]f Miranda warnings were viewed as a talisman that cured all Fourth Amendment violations, then the constitutional guarantee against unlawful searches and seizures would be reduced to a mere `form of words.' Id. 457 U.S. at 690, 102 S.Ct. at 2666 (citations omitted). Again, although we find no misconduct on the part of the police in this case, this factor does not overwhelm the lack of temporal distance and intervening circumstances. The statements were obtained as a direct result of the initial illegal stop and appellant's motion to suppress his post-arrest statements should have been sustained.