Opinion ID: 169778
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Time Needed to Create National Database

Text: Cartel also claims the district court abused its discretion in excluding TenBrook’s testimony based on his assumption that it would take four years to develop a sufficient database. W e disagree. TenBrook testified he used the four-year span because it was his -31- assumption “that it would be roughly four years to come up w ith . . . a minimal database to do what [O cw en Advisors] wanted to do.” (R. Vol. 7 at 2580.) TenBrook stated he based this assumption on his discussions with Coats, which was further substantiated by Gilbert’s testimony regarding initial attempts to build Ocwen A dvisors’ database in 1999 through 2000. Thereafter, the follow ing crossexamination took place: Q. To put this in context, . . . is it not true you didn’t conduct any independent investigation to test the information you received from M r. Coats that it would have taken the Ocwen defendants four years to produce [a] minimal broker database. A. Y es, that’s true. I did not conduct an independent review. Q. So you did take the information he gave you at face value? A. Yes. Again, with the substantiating things I talked about. Q. But the information he gave you was the only basis for your inclusion of a four-year period in your calculations, right? A. Yes. Q. You have no independent knowledge, correct, as to how long it takes to develop a minimal broker database? A. No. (R . Vol. 7 at 2583.) TenBrook further conceded he did not know how many names it takes to create a minimum database, nor did he know how long it took Cartel to develop a minimum database. He did not ask Coats, who had started doing business with Ocwen shortly after opening Cartel’s doors, how he managed to do business prior -32- to the four years he suggested it w ould take to build a minimal broker list. Consequently, TenBrook had no basis for believing a four-year period was an appropriate span for his damage calculations. Cartel argues it presented other evidence to support this time-frame via the testimony of three national vendors (including Cartel) stating the building of a network “takes years.” (R. Vol. 7 at 2262-63, 2303-06, 2308.) Cartel also points to Gilbert’s testimony regarding the difficulty Ocwen Advisors had in its initial efforts. W hile this testimony may establish the difficulty of building a network, it does not provide any information regarding what is necessary for a minimal national database or the time it would have taken a company in 1999 to develop such a database. Cartel’s final justification is the fact TenBrook’s analysis was compiled on a yearly basis for four years and, therefore, the jury was free to determine whether one year w as an appropriate time span and award damages accordingly. Instead, the jury determined, as a factual matter, four years w as an appropriate time frame for damages. This argument misses the point. Assuming the jury could parse the damages from one to four years, it had no information with which it could ascertain whether one or four years was appropriate. The four-year time frame was merely Coats’ unsubstantiated suggestion contained and endorsed in TenBrook’s calculations. This is insufficient. See Champagne M etals, 458 F.3d at 1080, n.4 (“[I]t [is] not ‘manifestly unreasonable’ for the district court to -33- conclude that [the expert’s] opinions lacked foundation because they were based on ‘the self-serving statements of an interested party.’”). Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that TenBrook’s testimony was speculative and inadmissible. Removing TenBrook’s testimony leaves Cartel without evidentiary support for the jury’s award of $4,900,000 in actual damages and in turn, eliminates a basis for the proper amount of punitive damages. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7-74-104(2) (exemplary damages awarded only after actual damages ascertained)