Opinion ID: 669089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Newton's Unfair Competition Claim Under The Lanham Act

Text: 20 Newton contends that a genuine issue of material fact exists on the likelihood of confusion between Newton and the TV Series character. 6 We disagree. Mere possibility that a consumer may be misled by Appellees' use of the name Wood Newton is not enough to establish a cause of action for unfair competition. In opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Newton failed to offer proof of a likelihood that customers may be confused as to the source or endorsement for the TV Series. 21 We arrive at our conclusion by applying the following factors relevant to a determination of likelihood of confusion: (1) strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) relatedness of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) likely degree of purchaser care; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1400 (9th Cir.1992) (citing AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir.1979)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2443, 124 L.Ed.2d 660. 22 Applying these factors, none of the evidence before the court on summary judgment supports a finding of likelihood of confusion in this case. First, [i]n cases involving confusion over endorsement by a celebrity plaintiff, 'mark' means the celebrity's persona[, and] ... [t]he 'strength' of the mark refers to the level of recognition the celebrity enjoys among members of society. White, 971 F.2d at 1400 (citations omitted). Newton's work is limited to writing songs for country/western music and performing in certain Southern states. By his own declaration, he showed only that his name is known and recognized within the country/western music industry. Newton in no way showed name recognition broad enough to cover those viewers in all sections of the country to whom Appellees direct the TV Series and its advertisements. In the overall scheme of things, given the limited appeal of his work and considering the evidence before the court on summary judgment, Newton's mark is not strong. 23 Second, for evaluating the relatedness of the goods, Newton's goods are the reasons for or source of [his] fame. Id. Newton's fame is based on country/western music songwriting and performing. These are completely unrelated to the TV Series, which is Appellees' goods. 24 The third factor is the similarity of the marks. Both parties agree that Newton's name is identical to the fictional character's name. Still, Newton's persona is very different from that of the fictional character, as discussed supra. Newton responds that the differences between himself and the fictional character actually add to the confusion. In fact, the differences only underscore the improbability that viewers may believe that Newton endorses the TV Series or is in any way associated with the TV Series or the fictional character. 25 Fourth, there was no relevant evidence of actual confusion before the court on summary judgment. In his declaration, Newton stated that people who he met for the first time asked him whether he took his eccentric name from the Burt Reynolds character. Even if we assume that viewers erroneously believe that Newton appropriated his name from the TV Series, their confusion is irrelevant to his unfair competition claim. As Appellees correctly point out, such proof does not show that any of Newton's fans has actually been confused about whether he is affiliated with the TV Series or whether the TV Series is based on his name or life. To establish unfair competition, Newton should have presented evidence that confusion by consumers impairs his reputation and career as a professional country/western songwriter and performer. He presented no such evidence. 26 Fifth, the evidence before the court on summary judgment shows that the marketing channels used by Newton and Appellees are different. Newton markets his musical talents by advertising live and tape-recorded performances; most live performances occur in Southern states. Appellees, on the other hand, market the TV Series on a nationwide television network and in newspapers around the country, making it available to every television viewer and many newspaper readers in the country. 27 The sixth factor is the likely degree of purchaser care. Although viewers of the TV Series may not be particularly careful in determining who endorses the program, we doubt that they would actually believe that a fictional character's name represents the endorser's name. In this case, viewers are likely to perceive the fictional character as no more than a fictional character. 28 The seventh factor is defendant's intent in selecting the mark. To raise an inference of a likelihood of confusion, Newton must show that, in selecting his name, Appellees intended to profit by confusing consumers. Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 791 n. 2 (9th Cir.1981) (emphasis in original). Newton presented no evidence that Appellees intended to profit by confusing viewers into believing that Newton, the songwriter and performer, was affiliated with the TV Series. 29 Eighth, there is no likelihood that Appellees will expand into Newton's market. Appellees' TV Series does not compete with Newton's music. The fact that the TV Series concerns life in a small Southern town does not persuade us, as Newton urges, that its viewers are interested in country/western music or that Newton will lose fans due to the program's success. 30 2. Appeal by Newton and Childress Of Sanctions Order 31 We review for abuse of discretion the district court's order imposing sanctions under Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 2460-61, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990); United States v. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d 244, 248 (9th Cir.1992). A district court abuses its discretion in imposing sanctions when it bases its decision on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 405, 110 S.Ct. at 2461. 32 Rule 11 requires that an attorney sign a pleading, motion, or other paper, only if, to the best of [the attorney's] knowledge, information and belief formed after reasonable inquiry[,] it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and ... is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11. The central purpose of Rule 11 is to deter baseless filings. Borneo, Inc., 971 F.2d at 254 (citing Cooter & Gell, 496 U.S. at 393, 110 S.Ct. at 2454). A court may not impose sanctions where the attorney conducted a reasonable inquiry and ... determined that any papers filed with the court are well-grounded in fact, legally tenable, and not interposed for some improper purpose. Id. (reversing sanctions where claim was legally tenable); Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 886-87 (9th Cir.1987) (reversing sanctions where factual errors did not render plaintiff's complaint factually frivolous); Zaldivar v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 834-35 (9th Cir.1986) (reversing sanctions where successive filings did not amount to harassment), abrogated on other grounds, 496 U.S. 384, 110 S.Ct. 2447, 110 L.Ed.2d 359 (1990). 33 We conclude that the district court abused its discretion by sanctioning Newton's attorney Childress in the amount of $10,000 for an unnecessary and frivolous choice of venue. In its Order, the district court explained that Childress had no good faith justification for filing the lawsuit in Illinois because, even though venue was proper, Newton's suit was only tenuously connected to Illinois. Admittedly, only one expert witness resides in Illinois, and no parties live or have their principle place of business in Illinois. However, as each Appellee conceded in the Answer to Newton's Complaint, the injury (broadcasting the TV Series) occurred in all districts, including the Northern District of Illinois, making venue proper in any district where a defendant may be found. 7 Attorneys are not under an affirmative obligation to file an action in the most convenient forum; their only obligation is to file in a proper forum. 8 34 We hold that filing in an inconvenient but proper forum is not a legitimate ground for Rule 11 sanctions. The choice of an inconvenient forum is sanctionable only where the choice is made for an improper purpose such as harassment. We reject Appellees' attempt to characterize the Illinois filing as harassment: To constitute harassment, conduct must do more than in fact bother, annoy or vex the complaining party. Harassment under Rule 11 focuses upon the improper purpose of the signer, objectively tested, rather than the consequences of the signer's act, subjectively viewed by the signer's opponent. Zaldivar, 780 F.2d at 831-32 (emphasis added). Because there is no evidence of improper purpose, we reverse the sanctions order. 9 3. Appellees' Cross-Appeal 35 Appellees contend, in relevant part, that the district court erred by failing to grant their motion for attorneys' fees under Cal. Civil Code Sec. 3344(a) or the Lanham Act. Because the same issues underpin all of Newton's claims, Appellees seek an award of all attorneys' fees incurred to defend the case (a total of $140,297.00). 36 Section 35 of the Lanham Act permits a court to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party only in exceptional cases. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1117(a). We disagree that this is an exceptional case warranting an award under the Lanham Act. 37 Cal.Civil Code Sec. 3344(a) provides that [t]he prevailing party in any action under this section shall also be entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. We remand to the district court to determine a proper fee award under Cal.Civil Code Sec. 3344(a). 38 AFFIRMED as to summary judgment; REVERSED as to sanctions order; REMANDED as to attorney fee award.