Opinion ID: 835851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: defendant's statutory and constitutional arguments

Text: Defendant petitioned for review, arguing that the police officer's questions to her and his seizure of a weapon from her bag violated her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We allowed review to examine defendant's statutory and constitutional arguments. We begin with ORS 810.410, the statute that authorizes certain police conduct when a police officer makes a valid traffic stop. That statute provides, in part: (3) A police officer:      (b) May stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic violation, identification and issuance of citation. (c) May make an inquiry into circumstances arising during the course of a detention and investigation under paragraph (b) of this subsection that give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (d) May make an inquiry to ensure the safety of the officer, the person stopped or other persons present, including an inquiry regarding the presence of weapons. Before 1997, ORS 810.410(3) included paragraph (b), but not paragraphs (c) and (d). The statute thus authorized a police officer to stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of an investigation reasonably related to that violation, but did not authorize an officer who was conducting a valid traffic stop to make inquiries unrelated to the reason for the stop. This court interpreted the absence of any authority in the pre-1997 version of ORS 810.410(3) to ask questions unrelated to the basis for the stop to bar an officer from asking such questions, unless the officer had a separate, valid basis for those questions. State v. Toevs, 327 Or. 525, 531, 964 P.2d 1007 (1998). In Toevs, the officer made a valid traffic stop, questioned the defendant about the infraction that was the basis for the stop, and told the defendant that he was free to go. However, the officer then continued to question the defendant about his possible possession of illegal drugs. Because the continued questioning by the officer in Toevs amounted to a further detention that was not reasonably related to the traffic infraction, and was not independently justified, this court required suppression of the evidence obtained as a result of that questioning. See also State v. Porter, 312 Or. 112, 817 P.2d 1306 (1991) (same). [2] By adding paragraphs (c) and (d) to ORS 810.410(3), the legislature expanded the authority of an officer who has made a valid traffic stop to make inquiries that are unrelated to the traffic infraction that was the basis for the stop. We now consider the text of ORS 810.410(3), following the 1997 amendments. At the outset, we note several significant distinctions that the current statute draws regarding the kinds of inquiries that a police officer is authorized to make as part of a valid motor vehicle stop. First, the statute authorizes a police officer to stop and detain a person for a traffic violation for the purposes of investigation reasonably related to the traffic violation   . ORS 810.410(3)(b). That provision authorizes only inquiries that are reasonably related to the traffic violation. See Toevs, 327 Or. at 531, 964 P.2d 1007; Bates, 304 Or. at 522, 747 P.2d 991 (questions not reasonably related to infraction not permitted under predecessor to ORS 810.410(3)(b)). Second, under ORS 810.410(3)(c), if the officer, during the stop, develops a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, then the officer is authorized to inquire into the circumstances that gave rise to that suspicion. The text of paragraph (c) does not limit the persons to whom the officer may direct an inquiry about criminal activity. Third, the statute authorizes the officer to make an inquiry to ensure the safety of the officer or others, including an inquiry about weapons. ORS 810.410(3)(d). In contrast to an inquiry concerning criminal activity, the text of paragraph (d) does not require reasonable suspicion of the presence of a weapon or of a threat to safety as a predicate for an officer's safety-related inquiries. Like an inquiry concerning criminal activity, however, paragraph (d) does not limit the category of persons to whom the officer may direct safety-related inquiries. Before considering the application of ORS 810.410(3), as summarized above, to this case, we note a shift in defendant's position. In the Court of Appeals, defendant argued that ORS 810.410(3)(d) should be interpreted to require that an officer have reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat of serious physical injury before the officer may ask safety-related questions. In other words, defendant argued that, notwithstanding the legislature's use of the phrase reasonable suspicion of criminal activity in ORS 810.410(3)(c), and its omission of the words reasonable suspicion in ORS 810.410(3)(d), the court nevertheless should read those words into paragraph (d) to make that paragraph consistent with the requirements of Article I, section 9, as interpreted in Bates. The Court of Appeals rejected defendant's argument that the statute should be so interpreted. Amaya, 176 Or.App. at 39-40, 29 P.3d 1177. On review, defendant expressly accepts the Court of Appeals' determination that paragraph (d) of ORS 810.410(3) does not require reasonable suspicion of an immediate threat to officer safety, and we also agree with that interpretation. Instead, defendant first makes a statutory argument that paragraph (d) does not apply to the questions asked here and then asserts that the officer's questions violated her state and federal constitutional rights. Defendant's statutory argument is that ORS 810.410(3)(d) does not apply to the officer's questions here because the officer never asked defendant about the presence of weapons. We disagree, because the statute does not limit permissible questions to those specifically asking about weapons but, instead, authorizes an inquiry to ensure the safety of the officer, the person stopped or other persons present. Here, Reynolds testified that his questions to defendant about the contents of defendant's bag were based on safety concerns, and the trial court made findings to that effect. We agree with the trial court that Reynolds's questions were of the kind that he had the authority to ask under ORS 810.410(3)(d) because they were asked to ensure the safety of the officer. We now turn to defendant's argument that, even if ORS 810.410(3)(d) authorized Reynolds's questions to defendant, the questioning violated defendant's rights under Article I, section 9. As explained above, before the 1997 amendments, ORS 810.410(3) barred officer questions about weapons unless the officer had a separate, valid basis for asking the questions. Toevs, 327 Or. at 531, 964 P.2d 1007. Under the current version of the statute, an officer conducting a valid traffic stop may make an inquiry to ensure his or her safety or the safety of others, including an inquiry about the presence of weapons, even if the officer does not reasonably suspect criminal activity or the threat of immediate harm. However, an officer's actions, even if authorized by ORS 810.410(3)(d), nevertheless must comply with Article I, section 9, which provides, in part, [n]o law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure[.] Defendant's initial argumentwhich she also made in the trial court and the Court of Appealsis that Article I, section 9, requires reasonable suspicion before a police officer may question a person during a traffic stop about matters beyond the scope of the traffic infraction that was the basis for the stop. Specifically, defendant argues that this court held in Bates that a police officer conducting a valid traffic stop may take reasonable steps to protect himself, including searching or seizing the person who is stopped, only if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person poses an immediate threat to the officer. As applied here, defendant argues that (1) Reynolds's questions to her about the bag at least temporarily restrained her liberty and therefore constituted a seizure for purposes of Article I, section 9; and (2) because Reynolds did not have a reasonable suspicion that defendant posed a threat to his safety, the seizure violated Article I, section 9. Defendant also argues that, even if Reynolds's questions about the bag did not constitute an unlawful seizure, he had seized her unlawfully before he questioned her about the bag's contents, and the evidence obtained as a result of that questioning therefore was inadmissible. Defendant now states that her primary argument in that regard is that she was seized unlawfully when Reynolds searched the pockets of her coat, but she also argues that other circumstances before Reynolds questioned her about the bag constituted an unlawful seizure, including Reynolds's request that she exit the van and stand where Reynolds could see her. The state responds that the Court of Appeals correctly held that Reynolds's questions to defendant had not amounted to a seizure because they had constituted mere conversation between defendant and Reynolds. Amaya, 176 Or.App. at 43-44, 29 P.3d 1177. The state argues that defendant was free to leave the scene and that she was not required to respond to Reynolds's questions. In those circumstances, the state asserts, Reynolds's questions did not constitute a seizure, thereby triggering the reasonable suspicion requirement of Article I, section 9. As to defendant's contention that she was seized unlawfully by Reynolds's conduct before he asked about weapons, the state responds that defendant failed to preserve that argument and, on the merits, that she always had been free to leave and therefore never had been seized.