Opinion ID: 760199
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did The District Court Err In Departing Upward In Wells' Sentence?

Text: 54 Wells has argued that the government improperly departed upward from the sentencing guidelines based on domestic terrorism activities. A sentencing court's decision to depart upward or downward from the sentencing guidelines is reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 91, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 135 L.Ed.2d 392 (1996). 55 At the time Wells committed the crimes, the departure for terrorism addressed international, not domestic terrorism. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (1994). The guidelines were amended to include domestic terrorism after commission of the crimes but before sentencing. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3A1.4 (1996). The amendment is inapplicable to Wells because it is a substantive amendment that would retroactively increase Wells' sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1109 (4th Cir.1995) (stating that courts may retroactively apply clarifying, but not substantive amendments to the Guidelines). Thus, Wells has contended that there is no valid basis upon which the government may seek successfully to increase his sentence upward. 56 Although there was no specific provision at the time authorizing a court to consider domestic terrorist activities, the catch-all provision of the Guidelines is certainly broad enough to allow such consideration. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), the sentencing court can deviate from the Sentencing Guidelines to take into account any aggravating or mitigating circumstance that the Guidelines did not adequately consider. Id. In addition, the policy statement of the Sentencing Guidelines also provides for departure in such circumstances. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (1994) (Circumstances that may warrant departure from the guidelines pursuant to this provision cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance.). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in departing upward for Wells' domestic terrorist activities. 57 Wells then has made the contention that even if the court may depart from the Guidelines on that ground, his activities did not constitute terrorism. Terrorism, as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (the international terrorism statute), as violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are or would be a violation of the laws of the United States or any state, id. at (a), that are intended (1) to intimidate or coerce civilians; (2) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (3) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping. Id. at (b). Of course, the terrorism defined here must be international. Id. at (c). 58 Wells contends that his activities were not violent. He contends that the statute does not contemplate plans or schemes, but acts. Since he did not commit any violent acts, he contends, the departure cannot stand. 59 He points to several facts in support of his argument. First, he argues that although the Freemen discussed violence toward government officials, they never hurt any of them. Second, Wells did not sign any of the [w]anted posters, or personally participate in the Civil Rights Task Force's (the Freemen's enforcers) violent acts, if any. He thus argues that he is being punished for being a member of the Freemen organization, an arguable violation of the First Amendment. 60 However, there is ample evidence that shows that Wells' plans and activities support the upward departure. First, he agreed to participate in the grand jury of our one Supreme Court, the court that the Freemen established to try officials. That court was also the forum of Wells' trial of IRS agents Smith and Varnell. Second, Wells bought a Chevrolet Suburban that he brought to Montana. The plan, as articulated by Schweitzer to the seminar attendees, was to use the Suburbans to abduct government officials, who would later be hanged. He intended to bring a lot more of 'em out here. In fact, Wells was the only one supplying the Suburbans. Third, Wells otherwise actively participated in the group, despite knowing its violent goals, and even helped the group prepare. Finally, he has not challenged the district court's finding that the group engages in terrorist activities. 61 These facts counter balance Wells' contention that he neither knew of the Freemen's plans nor was involved in them. His use of the court for his own dispute with IRS officials, given the intention of the Freemen to injure or kill government officials, can be considered a terrorist act. In addition, as the only supplier of the vehicles that were to be used in a violent plan about which everyone knew, it is unlikely that Wells neither knew nor had reason to know of the Freemen's activities. Since, as Wells points out, the Guidelines permit a defendant to be held responsible for the conduct of his associates if that conduct was reasonably foreseeable, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3(b), his participation in the planning of violence may properly give rise to liability. Hence, the district court did not abuse its discretion by departing from the guidelines. 62