Opinion ID: 1739873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Corroboration of the Testimony of an Accomplice

Text: As a matter of law, Kimmons, the perpetrator or principal was an accomplice of petitioner. Boaz v. State, 537 S.W.2d 716 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1976). The Trial Judge correctly charged the jury that a conviction may not be based upon the testimony of an accomplice unless there is evidence in the case independent of his testimony corroborating his testimony, which independent evidence tends to show the commission of the offense charged and that the defendant committed the offense. Further, the Trial Judge correctly instructed that the corroboration is sufficient if ... without the aid of the accomplice's testimony, [it] tends to show the commission of the offense charged and the connection of the defendant with the offense. See T.P.I.  Crim. 37.09. The corroboration in this case may not rest upon mere presence and opportunity; it must extend to the involvement of the petitioner as a participant, aider or abettor, in furnishing Kimmons with the gun. Without the testimony of Kimmons, the record is devoid of any proof that even points the finger of suspicion at petitioner. Therefore, there was no corroboration. Without the testimony of Kimmons there is no independent evidence which fairly and legitimately tends to connect petitioner with the crime. He left the initial argument between Kimmons and the deceased, saying that it wasn't about nothing. He went home and later returned. Why, the record does not reveal. The purpose may have been criminal or wholly innocent. We can only speculate. We can only speculate that he owned a gun and if so that it was the murder weapon. Aside from Kimmons' uncorroborated testimony, the record clearly and conclusively shows that petitioner did not hand Kimmons a gun. Phrasing it another way, no witness, except Kimmons, even suggests that petitioner was present, aiding and abetting by handing petition a gun or otherwise. A verdict of a jury may not be based alone upon conjecture, guess, speculation or a mere possibility. Sullivan v. State, 513 S.W.2d 152, 154 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974). [T]here must be some fact testified to, entirely independent of the accomplice's testimony which, taken by itself, leads to an inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but also that the accused is implicated in the crime. (Emphasis supplied). McKinney v. State, 552 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977). The testimony in this case fails the test. There was no corroboration. Reversed and dismissed. BROCK, C.J., and FONES, COOPER and HARBISON, JJ., concur.