Opinion ID: 1256583
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: void guilty plea

Text: Defendant contends that his guilty plea was void because this Court, in reversing his earlier jury conviction, allegedly had found him to be insane at the time of the commission of the homicides. As the basis for this contention, defendant refers to the comment by this Court that: But here by any standard the proof is nearly overwhelming that Makal was insane at the time of the commission of the homicides. 104 Ariz. 476 at 478, 455 P.2d 450 at 452. This comment has been used out of context by defendant; when placed in its true context the meaning it conveys is not that which defendant wishes to attach to it. The true context can perhaps best be shown by referring to the portion of the opinion from which the above quotation was extracted. In that opinion, our basis for reversing the conviction related to undersirable conduct by the prosecuting attorney in his opening and closing arguments to the jury and in his questioning of one of the expert medical witnesses. The trust of these arguments and questions was that defendant Makal was dangerous to other people and could eventually be released if committed to a mental institution, and that he should therefore be found guilty without regard to the issue of insanity. As we stated in the opinion, this conduct by the prosecution constituted reversible error, as the only real issue to be decided by the jury was whether Makal was sane at the time of the commission of the offense. As we further pointed out, the disposition of an insane defendant by society is determined by the laws of the state as enacted by the legislature; with that disposition the jury has neither concern nor responsibility. With reference to the questions asked and arguments made by the prosecutor, we stated that: Every jurisdiction which has passed upon a similar argument has held that it is erroneous misconduct on the part of the prosecuting attorney. [Citing cases.] There are some decisions which while recognizing the rule have affirmed convictions where either the trial court took prompt action to eradicate the effect of the argument, i.e. Bachelor v. State, 216 Ala. 356, 113 So. 67, or found that the argument was harmless because of the overwhelming proof of the sanity of the defendant i.e. State v. McDonald, 184 S.C. 290, 192 S.E. 365; Mott v. State, 94 Okl.Cr. 145, 232 P.2d 166. But here by any standard the proof is nearly overwhelming that Makal was insane at the time of the commission of the homicides.  [Emphasis added.] 104 Ariz. 476 at 478, 455 P.2d 450 at 452. Taken in its proper context, then, we see that the comment regarding Makal's sanity was intended only as an observation as to the weight of the evidence presented at the trial and not as a finding of fact. In other words, the evidence presented at the trial was such that there was a reasonable probability that the jury might have found Makal to be insane had it not been for the questions asked and arguments made by the prosecutor regarding the danger to society if Makal were found not guilty. Hence, we were of the opinion that the prosecutor's conduct constituted reversible error and accordingly ordered a new trial. From the above, it is clear that the observation by this Court as to defendant's sanity was not a finding of fact; rather, it was merely an observation as to the weight of the testimony given at trial as to defendant's sanity. As such, it was not binding on the court or jury in any subsequent proceeding. The next argument made by counsel for the defendant regarding insanity is that defendant Makal was incompetent to enter into a plea bargain and that the judgment and sentence resulting therefrom are void. As we stated earlier in this opinion, prior to the date set for the new trial the trial court held a Rule 250 hearing and found that Makal was able to understand the proceedings against him and was able to assist in his own defense. Several days later, the defendant entered a plea of guilty to one count of first degree murder and was thereafter sentenced to life imprisonment. Makal could have chosen to be retried before a jury on three counts of murder, but decided instead to plead guilty to the lesser charge. The trial judge who received the guilty plea was careful and thorough in her questioning of the defendant in order to determine that his guilty plea was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. We find no merit in the argument by defendant's counsel that defendant was incompetent to plead guilty. The trial court was eminently correct in accepting the guilty plea.