Opinion ID: 1780618
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pretrial transcripts

Text: At the pretrial stage, Gardner requested transcripts of all pretrial proceedings on the grounds that it may be necessary ... to use some of the testimony ... for impeachment purposes at the trial. The request was denied. Gardner later renewed the request as to portions of the pretrial proceedings contending that the defense would like to be able to quote the witnesses verbatim in case their testimony varies during the trial. The trial court again denied the request. At trial, Gardner raised the issue a third time when testimony of a State's witness regarding her ability to identify Gardner as the individual in Sara McCurdy's vehicle near Pocola varied from her previous testimony during a pretrial hearing. Once again, the court denied the request. On appeal, Gardner argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and the right to confront witnesses against him. As to the first point, Gardner failed to make the argument below. Barnes v. State, 294 Ark. 369, 742 S.W.2d 925 (1988). As to the second point, with the exception of Graves v. State, 256 Ark. 117, 505 S.W. 2d 748 (1974), cited in Gardner's reply brief, no authority is given for the proposition that transcripts of pretrial proceedings must be furnished merely because the defense might impeach the credibility of the State's witnesses at trial in the event the occasion to do so should arise. While there is mention in Graves of the benefit associated with a defendant's access to transcripts of pretrial proceedings, our decision in that case is clearly distinguishable from the facts before us now. Our comments in Graves simply emphasized that when a court fails to provide the defendant with counsel at a preliminary hearing, evidence that the defendant had access to transcripts of the hearing was relevant on the issue of whether defendant was prejudiced by the error in not appointing counsel. Here, Gardner does not contend that he did not have pretrial counsel. In any event, Graves did not create an affirmative obligation with respect to providing access to pretrial transcripts. Additionally, at the time of our decision in Graves , error was presumed prejudicial in the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrarya rule which this court no longer follows. Sutherland v. State, 292 Ark. 103, 728 S.W.2d 496 (1987). Nonetheless, we do find decisions from the United States Supreme Court which indicate that the State must provide an indigent defendant with a transcript of pretrial proceedings when that transcript is needed for an effective defense. Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 92 S.Ct. 431, 30 L.Ed.2d 400 (1971); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 194, 19 L.Ed.2d 41 (1967). In each case, the focus has been on whether the trial court properly determined that the transcript was in fact not needed for an effective defense. The inquiry balances the value of the transcript to the defendant and the availability of alternative devices that would fulfill the same function as a transcript. While there is language in Britt suggesting that the right to a transcript does not turn on whether the defendant specified at the trial level why the transcript was needed or whether the defendant had access to the court reporter's notes, we cited Britt in Mosby v. State, 253 Ark. 904, 489 S.W.2d 799 (1973), and stated that it was significant that appellant had failed to make any showing that the transcript was needed to prepare his defense ... [n]or was it shown that the reporter's notes ... could not have been read back if and when they were needed. We find those same considerations determinative here. The record reveals that at the time the initial requests were made for transcripts of the pretrial proceedings, the requests were based entirely upon conjecture and speculation that there might arise a need for the transcripts at trial. We would be hard pressed under those circumstances to say that the trial court erred in denying the requests at that juncture. Moreover, the record is devoid of any indication that later, when the alleged inconsistencies between pretrial and trial testimony were discovered, defense counsel made even the slightest effort to avail himself of the common practice of asking the trial judge to have the court reporter read back the reporter's notes of those parts of the pretrial hearings relevant to the testimony at issue. As such, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying Gardner's requests. Our position on this issue finds further support in light of Gardner's failure to demonstrate that the trial court's action was prejudicial. Sutherland, supra . The focal point of Gardner's argument rests upon the contention that whereas one of the State's witnesses testified at the pretrial stage that she merely got a glimpse of Gardner's profile as he drove past her in Sara McCurdy's car, her trial testimony was that she was also able to see Gardner's face. We have carefully examined defense counsel's cross-examination efforts at trial as to this witness and find that counsel was able not only to effectively impeach the credibility of the witness by exposing the inconsistent testimony but actually managed to get the witness to admit she only glanced at the person in the car for a split second, mainly got a side view of the person, and didn't see enough of the face to even tell whether the person had facial hair or what his facial features were. That testimony parallels the pretrial testimony to an extent that any alleged inconsistencies, for all practical purposes, no longer existedthereby rendering the need for the pretrial transcript of so little value that any error in denying Gardner's request would have been harmless at best. For the foregoing reasons we find Gardner's arguments on this issue without merit.