Opinion ID: 844263
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gonzales as Aider and Abettor

Text: On appeal, Gonzales renews his trial counsel's closing arguments that Gonzales did nothing to aid and abet the shooting of Skyles and Price. Gonzales contends his mere presence at the scene of the crime and association with Soliz, who committed the crime, are insufficient to establish aiding and abetting. As we discuss below, however, evidence at trial established Gonzales knew and shared Soliz's intent to murder Skyles and Price or, alternatively, knew and shared Soliz's intent to assault Skyles and Price with a deadly weapon, the natural and probable consequence of which was their murder. Under either theory, Gonzales acted to encourage the shootings by providing armed backup to Soliz. (14) [A] person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, acting with (1) knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator; and (2) the intent or purpose of committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the offense, (3) by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates, the commission of the crime. ( People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 561 [199 Cal.Rptr. 60, 674 P.2d 1318].) Furthermore, under the `natural and probable consequences' doctrine, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the offense he or she intended to facilitate or encourage, but also any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the person he or she aids and abets. ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 261 [58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013].) As noted, both defendants urged the driver to turn the car around and drive back to the gas station so they could confront Skyles and Price, and both defendants exited the car. Because Gonzales had previously committed an armed robbery with Soliz at the Hillgrove Market, a jury reasonably could infer Gonzales knew Soliz was armed and capable of using deadly force. That Gonzales himself was carrying a firearm further strengthens the inference. A jury could reasonably conclude Gonzales knew of and shared Soliz's intention to murder Skyles and Price or, at the least, knew Soliz intended to assault them with a deadly weapon and shared that intention, which in turn establishes Gonzales's liability as an aider and abettor to the murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. That Gonzales and Soliz both argued with Skyles and Price further demonstrated Gonzales's shared intention and active participation in the confrontation. Because Gonzales was armed, his act of standing backup aided and encouraged Soliz in shooting Skyles and Price by providing further deadly force in case the victims resisted. Furthermore, based on Lusk's testimony about how gang members encourage each other to commit acts of gang violence by standing backup, a jury reasonably could have inferred that Gonzales's armed presence encouraged Soliz to go through with an act of gang retaliation, which was the motive supported by the evidence of the prior murder of Puente gang member Billy Gallegos. Finally, after the shootings, both defendants warned Judith Mejorado to forget what she had just witnessed, which displayed a consciousness of shared guilt. (15) Gonzales cites a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Juan H. v. Allen (9th Cir. 2005) 408 F.3d 1262, in support of his contention that the evidence presented was insufficient to support his conviction for first degree murder as an aider and abettor. We initially note that while we may find lower federal court decisions on points of state law persuasive, they do not control. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 431 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000].) In any event, the facts of Juan H. are distinguishable. In Juan H., the defendant, a juvenile, was at home with his family when someone fired two shots into the trailer in which he lived. ( Juan H., at p. 1266.) An hour and a half later, the defendant and his brother confronted two men with whom they had a history of conflict at the trailer park, and who were associated with a rival gang. ( Id. at pp. 1266-1267.) The defendant's brother asked the two men whether they had fired the shots, and the men replied they knew nothing about the incident. ( Id. at p. 1267.) The defendant's brother then pulled out a shotgun and fired at both men, killing one of them. ( Ibid. ) The Ninth Circuit granted Juan H.'s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, ruling that the record contained insufficient evidence to support the conclusions that Juan H. knew his brother planned to commit the first degree murders or that Juan H. acted in a way intended to encourage or facilitate the killings. ( Juan H. v. Allen, supra, 408 F.3d at p. 1277.) The court further held that, even assuming the element of knowledge, the record contained no evidence that Juan H. did or said anything before, during or after the shooting from which a reasonable fact finder would infer a purpose to aid and abet in the murders. ( Id. at pp. 1278-1279.) Specifically, the court held no reasonable fact finder could conclude that by standing, unarmed, behind his brother, Juan H. provided backup, in the sense of adding deadly force or protecting his brother, in a deadly exchange. ( Id. at p. 1279.) Significant differences exist between the evidence presented in Juan H. v. Allen, supra, 408 F.3d 1262, and that presented in the case before us. Unlike Juan H., Gonzales did and said things both before and after the shooting that indicated his intent to aid and abet the murders. Gonzales joined with Soliz in (1) asking the driver to turn the car around so they could confront Skyles and Price, (2) arguing with Skyles and Price, and (3) warning Judith Mejorado to forget what she had just witnessed. Finally, Gonzales was armed, further supporting the inference he provided backup by adding deadly force support to Soliz. We therefore reject Gonzales's claim that the evidence was insufficient to establish his aiding and abetting the murders.