Opinion ID: $opinion_id
Heading Depth: 1.0
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: $label

Text: Before we consider whether Churchill is covered by the Act, we must address Perini's threshold contention that the Director does not have standing to seek review of the decision below. According to Perini, the Director's only interest in this case is in furthering a different interpretation of the Act than the one rendered by the Administrative Law Judge, the Benefits Review Board, and the Court of Appeals.[9]

Perini's claim ignores the procedural posture in which this case comes before the Court. That posture makes it unnecessary for us to consider whether the Director, as the agency *303 official "responsible for the administration and enforcement" of the Act,[10] has standing as an aggrieved party to seek review of the decision below.[11] The Director is not alone in arguing that Churchill is covered under the LHWCA. Churchill, the injured employee, is before the Court as well. He has filed a brief in support of the Director's request for a writ of certiorari, and a brief addressing the merits of his claim, in which he presents the same arguments presented by the Director. But, for some reason that is not entirely clear, Churchill has not elected to seek review as a petitioner, and by virtue of the Rules of this Court, he is considered a party *304 respondent.[12] It is in this procedural context that Perini's challenge to Art. III standing must be considered. Perini concedes that the Director was a proper party respondent before the Court of Appeals in this litigation.[13] As party respondent below, the Director is entitled under 28 U.S. C. § 1254(1) to petition for a writ of certiorari. Although the Director has statutory authority to seek review in this Court, he may not have Art. III standing to argue the merits of Churchill's claim because the Director's presence does not guarantee the existence of a justiciable controversy with respect to the merits of Churchill's coverage under the LHWCA. However, the Director's petition makes Churchill an automatic respondent under our Rule 19.6, and in that capacity, Churchill "may seek reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals on any ground urged in that court." O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773, 783-784, n. 14 (1980). The Director's petition, filed under 28 *305 U. S. C. § 1254(1), brings Churchill before this Court, and there is no doubt that Churchill, as the injured employee, has a sufficient interest in this question to give him standing to urge our consideration of the merits of the Second Circuit decision.

The constitutional dimension of standing theory requires, at the very least, that there be an "actual injury redressable by the court." Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1976). This requirement is meant "to assure that the legal questions presented to the court will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action," as well as to assure "an actual factual setting in which the litigant asserts a claim of injury in fact." Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). The presence of Churchill as a party respondent arguing for his coverage under the Act assures that an admittedly justiciable controversy is now before the Court.