Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Powell's Statements Regarding Other Workers

Text: On the day of the murder, Braziel twice informed Al Canale, the electrical contractor, that Hispanic workers, including defendant, were bothering Powell in her house. Semere, one of Powell's coworkers, talked to Powell on the telephone on the day of the murder and testified he heard in the background the voices of two men as they apparently entered Powell's house through her sliding glass door. On cross-examination by defense counsel, Braziel recalled only the first names of five members of the construction crew: Antonio, Roberto, Francisco (defendant), Ruijilio, and Omar. He testified he had observed Roberto, Antonio, and defendant in Powell's backyard. When counsel attempted to ask Braziel whether Powell had complained about Roberto being in her house, the trial court sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objection. Thereafter, Braziel testified that he had observed Roberto go to Powell's back door and that Powell complained Roberto and other construction workers were bothering her, knocking on her door two or three times a day. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it sustained the prosecutor's hearsay objection and prevented trial counsel from asking Braziel whether Powell complained about Roberto being in her house. We conclude the trial court properly limited counsel's cross-examination of Braziel. Defendant argues evidence of Powell's state of mind with respect to Roberto was relevant and admissible under Evidence Code section 1250 to explain her frustration with the workers and establish defendant was not the sole source of her frustration. But, as stated, the declarant's mental state or conduct must be at issue to qualify for admission under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay rule. ( People v. Noguera, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 621, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Here, there was no evidence of third party culpability or evidence that Powell feared Roberto. Powell's state of mind as to Roberto thus was not relevant to prove an element of an offense or to show Powell acted in conformity with that state of mind. (Evid.Code, § 1250.) Therefore, evidence that Powell may have been frustrated with Roberto or the other workers was irrelevant and inadmissible. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting counsel's inquiry on this point. Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion by limiting counsel's cross-examination of Braziel, any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable the evidence would have affected the outcome. ( People v. Fudge (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1075, 1102-1103, 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 321, 875 P.2d 36; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 611-612, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635 [erroneous exclusion of evidence of third party culpability]; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) The jury heard testimony that in addition to defendant, other workers had been in Powell's house. Semere testified he heard Powell holler for Jose and another man to get out of her house as he spoke with her on the telephone in the afternoon on the day of the murder. Further, Braziel testified Powell complained that Roberto and other workers knocked on her door two or three times a day. Indeed, for these reasons, we would find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.