Opinion ID: 21517
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vielma's Motion to Amend

Text: 30 In her second point on appeal, Vielma challenges the district court's denial of her motion to amend her complaint to assert federal age and disability discrimination claims. This Court reviews a district court's decision to grant or deny a motion to amend for abuse of discretion. See Briddle v. Scott, 63 F.3d 364, 379 (5th Cir. 1995). We conclude that the district court did not tread beyond the bounds of its discretion in denying Vielma's motion. 31 Vielma filed her motion to amend on January 29, 1999, after the district court entered judgment. While Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a) endows a district court with virtually unlimited discretion to allow amendments before entry of judgment, that discretion narrows considerably after entry of judgment. See 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1489 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1999). Post-judgment amendment to a complaint can only occur once the judgment itself is vacated under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 or 60. See id.; see also Dussoy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 597 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981). In cases where a party seeks to amend her complaint after entry of judgment, we have consistently upheld the denial of leave to amend where the party seeking to amend has not clearly established that he could not reasonably have raised the new matter prior to the trial court's merits ruling. Briddle, 63 F.3d at 380; see also Wright et al., § 1489 (A number of courts, exercising their discretion under Rule 15(a), have refused to allow a postjudgment amendment when the moving party had an opportunity to assert the amendment during trial but waited until after judgment before requesting leave.). This Court has followed that rule unwaveringly since the appearance of Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 469-70 (5th Cir. 1967), which observed that [m]uch of the value of summary judgment procedure in the cases in which it is appropriate . . . would be dissipated if a party were free to rely on one theory in an attempt to defeat a motion for summary judgment and then, should that theory prove unsound, come back long thereafter and fight on the basis of some other theory. Freeman, 381 F.2d at 469-70; see also Briddle, 63 F.3d at 380 (citing cases). 32 In her initial complaint, Vielma asserted only state law claims under the TCHRA. In her brief, she conceded that her reason for doing so was her belief that it would be easier to prevail under the TCHRA claims. As the district court pointed out, she had ample notice of Eureka's summary judgment motion, including its stated ground that her TCHRA claims were time-barred. Accordingly, Vielma could have sought to amend her complaint under Rule 15 to addher federal claims well before the court entered judgment. She did not do so, however, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to make a post-judgment amendment. See Briddle, 63 F.3d at 380; Freeman, 381 F.2d at 469-70.