Opinion ID: 798531
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The fourteen summary charts

Text: 11 For the sake of convenience, a party can use summary charts to present in court “otherwise volumunious” information. Fed. R. Evid. 1006. Still, “summary charts are to be used with caution, due to their potential for abuse,” United States v. Richardson, 233 F.3d 1285, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000), and a trial court has “to make certain that an accused is not unjustly convicted in a ‘trial by charts.’” Gordon v. United States, 438 F.2d 858, 876 (5th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).4 But the likelihood of error in admitting a summary chart diminishes “where the defenses has the opportunity to cross-examine a witness concerning the disputed issue and to present its own version of the case.” Richardson, 233 F.3d at 1294. In Richardson, the district court gave numerous limiting instructions to the jury, the Government’s witness said the chart’s label represented only his opinion, and the label was ultimately changed before the charts went to the jury. 233 F.3d at 1294. Benavides makes much of the district court’s failure to use the exact same prophylactic measures in his case. But Richardson created no such rigid requirement. To the contrary, this Court stressed that district courts have wide discretion to admit summary charts “so long as supporting evidence has been presented previously to the jury” and “the court has ‘made clear that the ultimate 4 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 12 decision should be made by the jury as to what weight should be given to the evidence.” Id. (quoting United States v. Francis, 131 F.3d 1452, 1458 (11th Cir. 1997)). Here, the Government used two additional charts to separate out the Lacary and Lily frauds, which lessened the possibility of juror confusion. Benavides also had an opportunity to cross-examine Gjertsen on all of the charts, thus giving him the opportunity to clear up any misconceptions about the nature of the schemes. Most importantly, the underlying facts and jury instructions made clear that Benavides was on trial for the Lily scheme instead of the Lacary fraud, which helped minimize the likelihood of error. See United States v. Scott, 2011 WL 2150099 (11th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The district court consequently did not err by admitting the summary charts. 3. The handwritten notations on the adding machine tapes A statement falls outside of the definition of hearsay if it is “a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). To admit evidence under this rule, there “must be evidence that there was a conspiracy involving the declarant and the nonoffering party, and that the statement was made ‘during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.’” Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) (citing Fed. R. 13 Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)); United States v. West, 142 F.3d 1408, 1414 (11th Cir. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 526 U.S. 1155 (1999). Benavides claims the district court erred by admitting the notes without knowing the identity of the author or the circumstances surrounding the drafting. But a district court need not specifically identify the author if circumstantial evidence shows that the document’s author had intimate involvement in the operation of the conspiracy. United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1510, 1510–11 (11th Cir. 1990). Only without such circumstantial proof does “uncertainty as to the identity of the declarant . . . implicate[] the concerns which justify the general prohibition on hearsay evidence; namely, its lack of trustworthiness.” United States v. Christopher, 923 F.2d 1545, 1551 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court made the findings required by Bourjaily. Judge Lenard found that the conspiracy existed, that Benavides was a member, and that someone made the notations in furtherance of the conspiracy. And although the unknown identify of the author is troublesome, circumstantial evidence indicates the document’s trustworthiness: testimony established that Benavides and Guerra used Cashflow Financing to further their conspiracy, that the FBI found the tapes at Cashflow, and that the FBI maintained a sound chain-of-custody. The receipts, moreover, referred to Benavides and “King,” which was 14 Guerra’s nickname. In Smith, the trial court admitted a ledger with an unknown author that made reference to other co-conspirators, partly because the color codes in the ledger matched a color-coded business card found on one of the defendants during a search. 918 F.2d at 1505. Like the business card in Smith, which connected the co-conspirators and conspiracy itself to the ledgers, the references to both Benavides and Guerra on the receipts, combined with Guerra’s testimony about the duo engaging in a conspiracy to defraud Medicare, connects the adding tape notations to Benavides and the conspiracy itself. And this connection suggests that the author, although unknown, had an intimate connection with the conspiracy—or at least a close enough connection for the trial court to admit the evidence. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the four adding machine receipts.5 B. The district court’s decision to limit Benavides’ cross-examination of some of the Government’s key witnesses To merit reversal for limiting the permissible scope of cross-examination, the district court must commit a clear abuse of discretion. United States v. Jones, 913 F.2d 1552, 1564 (11th Cir. 1990); United States v. Calle, 822 F.2d 1016, 1019–1020 (11th Cir. 1987). A district court has no power, however, to keep a 5 In any event, even if we assume the district court erred, Benavides failed to brief whether such an error would amount to a reversible one. 15 defendant from impeaching a witness’s credibility with prior convictions for crimes involving dishonesty. Fed. R. Evid. 609(a)(2) (“evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted . . . if it readily can be determined that establishing the elements of the crime required proof or admission of an act of dishonesty or false statement by the witness.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Toney, 615 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1980). In fact, “a cross-examiner has an absolute right to introduce a crimen falsi conviction for impeachment purposes.” Toney, 615 F.2d at 278. But this rule does not apply to impeachment by contradiction or to convictions offered to prove things like knowledge, intent, or identity under Rule 404(b). See, e.g., United States v. Watchmaker, 761 F.2d 1459, 1474 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding conviction not subject to Rule 609 when offered for purpose other than impeaching credibility with conviction involving dishonesty); United States v. Davis, 787 F.2d 1501, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (citing Watchmaker and stating, “In this case, the government asked Davis about the conviction not to cast doubt on his credibility but to dispel the illusion that he gave the jury that he had never possessed an illegal substance.”); Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, 3 Federal Evidence § 6:57 (3d ed. 2011) (“[Rule] 609 does not apply to convictions offered to refute a witness who denies the underlying misconduct, or to prove circumstantially such things as knowledge, intent, or identity under [Rule] 16 404(b).”). 1. Limiting cross-examination into the underlying facts of Ruiz’s prior conviction involving dishonesty Benavides claims the district court erred by barring him from impeaching Ruiz with a prior conviction. While testifying, Ruiz admitted to an arrest for participating in an illegal Internet pharmacy scheme. When Benavides’ attorney asked Ruiz about a second set of charges stemming from the same incident, Ruiz claimed the new charges dealt with him working with a pharmacist after his license had expired. Defense counsel asked about the second charge in more detail; the prosecution objected. At this point, Judge Lenard held a sidebar and, after defense counsel asserted that Ruiz’s prior conviction related to the charged offense, prohibited further questioning into the matter. Benavides claims Rule 609(a)(2) allowed him to question Ruiz on the underlying facts of the second conviction because the crime involved dishonesty and since Ruiz allegedly misrepresented the nature of the conviction. But Benavides’ attorney proffered to Judge Lenard that she sought to have the convictions admitted to show that Ruiz learned from Guerra how to engage in the fraud for which Ruiz was arrested in 2005. Defense counsel never argued that the prior convictions involved proof of acts of dishonesty or false statements by Ruiz. Thus Rule 609(a)(2) did not apply to Judge Lenard’s decision; Rule 404(b) did. 17 See Watchmaker, 761 F.2d at 1474. Under Rule 404(b), Judge Lenard had leeway to limit the line of questioning Benavides’ counsel sought to employ, especially considering how Ruiz denied a connection between the two cases. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2) (providing trial court discretion to admit or exclude bad acts evidence used to prove “purpose, . . . motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”). In fact, Judge Lenard appears to have implicitly undertook the Rule 404(b)(2) analysis by asking defense counsel during the sidebar whether Ruiz’s prior conviction had any connection to the charges against Benavides. After she did, defense counsel replied, “it’s my theory, your Honor, that he learned how to do all this while he was working with Reinaldo Guerra,” to which the court responded, “But you haven’t been able to establish that. [Ruiz] said no to that question.” (VIII Tr. at 150.) This exchange makes clear that Benavides’ lawyer sought to ask Ruiz about his convictions not to impeach his credibility by showing that he had committed a crime involving dishonesty, but instead to show that Guerra had taught Ruiz how to commit fraud. Because the convictions fell outside the ambit of Rule 609 when offered for this reason, we cannot say that Judge Lenard abused her discretion by prohibiting questioning into 18 the details surrounding Ruiz’s conviction for forging prescriptions.6 2. Limiting cross-examination of Agent Gjertsen Benavides alleges the trial court abused its discretion by deciding to limit his cross-examination of Rolf Gjertsen, the FBI agent who testified for the Government. He claims that by keeping defense counsel from asking Gjertsen about whether he prepared the charts in anticipation of litigation, the court ran afoul of Delaware v. Van Arsdall, a case finding that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when a trial court cuts off all questioning about the source of a witness’s bias. 475 U.S. 673 (1986). In Van Arsdall, the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant should get to expose “a witness’ motivation for testifying.” 475 U.S. at 679. And given this right, the trial court in that case erred by barring defense counsel from asking about the deal the witness received from the government in exchange for testifying. Id. Still, the Van Arsdall Court made clear that the Confrontation Clause does not “prevent[] a trial judge from imposing . . . limits on defense counsel’s inquiry into the potential bias of a prosecution witness.” Id. Whereas Van Arsdall dealt with asking about the presence of a plea deal 6 Although Judge Lenard invoked Rule 609 instead of Rule 404(b) for support, we may affirm a district court’s decision on any ground supported by the record. See, e.g., Trotter v. Dep’t of Corrs., 535 F.3d 1286, 1291 (11th Cir. 2008). 19 exchanged for the witness’s testimony, this case deals with Benavides’ lawyer’s attempts to ask Agent Gjertsen about preparing charts in anticipation of litigation. The answer to the former is far more probative of bias than the answer to the latter. What is more, Agent Gjertsen took part in the investigation of Benavides, which likely made it apparent to the jury that he played for the same team as the Government. So unlike the witness in Van Arsdall who had a hidden motivation for cooperating, Gjertsen’s potential bias was patent. Given these differences, and because Judge Lenard permitted questioning about the charts until defense counsel began asking redundant questions about what each one plainly said, the district court exercised its discretion without violating Benavides’ constitutional right to confront witnesses against him. See Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (“trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues . . . or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”). 3. Limiting cross-examination regarding Guerra’s benefits for cooperating Benavides next claims the district court erred by allowing a misstatement by Guerra to go uncorrected. During Guerra’s direct examination by the Government, the prosecutor elicited from him that the Court used $99 million as the final loss 20 figure for calculating his sentencing guideline range. Guerra further stated that he did not receive a break because the court sentenced him to a top-of-the-guidelines range despite the Government recommending a sentence at the bottom of the range. But during Benavides’ cross, Guerra admitted that the Government refrained from charging him for other frauds that would have pushed his guidelines calculation higher, thus showing that Guerra did in fact receive a benefit from the Government despite his claims to the contrary. On redirect, the prosecutor asked, “If you were charged with $179 million in loss, you had, what, some $21 million to go before you could fall into the next highest category?” Guerra answered yes and, significantly, Benavides’ lawyer failed to object to either the question or the answer. Yet defense counsel sought to recall Guerra and re-cross him. The district court denied this request, stating that Benavides made clear that Guerra received benefits for testifying. The district court stayed within its discretion here for two reasons. First, Benavides had an opportunity to cross-examine Guerra. And defense counsel used that opportunity to impugn Guerra’s credibility by showing he received a greater benefit from the Government than he initially let on during direct examination. Second, Benavides failed to object to any incorrect impressions created by the prosecution during re-direct. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its 21 discretion by denying the request to recall Guerra for re-cross. C. Benavides’ claims of prosecutorial misconduct A prosecutorial misconduct claim requires a defendant to show that the prosecutor acted improperly and that the improper conduct prejudicially affected his substantial rights. Sexton v. Howard, 55 F.3d 1557, 1559 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The defendant also must show that, but for the improper conduct, the trial would have produced a different outcome. Id.; United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1206–07 (11th Cir. 1991). In undertaking this inquiry, we must evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks “in the context of the trial as a whole and assess their probable impact on the jury.” United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1998). And we must do so while keeping in mind that the trial court sits in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial effect of evidence on the jury, meaning that we will only overturn the a trial judge’s decision if she abused her discretion in denying a motion for a mistrial. United States v. Mendez, 117 F.3d 480, 484 (11th Cir. 1997). During closing arguments, the prosecutor referenced the statute of limitations and explained how it kept the Government from charging Benavides for the Lacary fraud. These comments were improper: they lacked relevance while suggesting to the jury that Benavides escaped criminal liability on a technicality for 22 a fraud that he admitted to participating in.7 Cf. Olinger v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 234 F.2d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 1956) (“[T]he risk that a jury will convict the defendant for crimes other than those charged—or that, uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person deserves punishment—creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs ordinary relevance.”). Even so, we cannot look at these comments in a vacuum. Rather, we have to look at the totality of the evidence and ask whether a different outcome would have resulted but for the prosecutor making the comments. We are not so convinced. The trial produced plenty of evidence implicating Benavides in defrauding Medicare and entering into a conspiracy to use Lily Orthopedic to this end. Guerra, a co-conspirator, testified on this point. So too did Ruiz, another co-conspirator. The adding machine tapes found at Cashflow amounted to documentary evidence linking Benavides to the fraud. And his own admissions related to his participation in Lacary showed that he had the knowledge 7 It is also worth noting that the Government knew about Benavides’ involvement in Lacary in 2004—well within the limitations period—yet declined to prosecute him for it. That the Government knew of Benavides’ involvement allowed the jury to infer the Government’s failure to prosecute Benavides meant it did not have a solid case against him. This alternative inference (the Government did not have a case so it voluntarily decided not to prosecute) weakens the improper inference (Benavides got away with the Lacary fraud on a technicality), thus lessening, although not negating, “the risk that [the] jury . . . convict[ed] . . . for crimes other than those charged.” Olinger v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 234 F.2d 823, 824 (5th Cir. 1956). 23 necessary to carry out such a scheme. Given the overwhelming amount of evidence implicating Benavides, we cannot say that anything more than a speculative probability exists as to whether the jury would have acquitted him but for the prosecutor’s improper remarks. D. Benavides’ cumulative error claim Benavides claims that the issues discussed above, combined with an ostensibly improper jury charge and hearsay instruction, establish cumulative error. A claim of cumulative error looks to “the prejudicial effect of all evidentiary errors, evaluated under both preserved and plain error standards, in the aggregate. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1203 (11th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). A court will overturn a verdict “if the cumulative effect of the errors is prejudicial, even if the prejudice caused by each individual error was harmless.” Id. In addressing a cumulative error claim, “courts look to see whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.” Id. at 1224. “The total effect of the errors on the trial will depend, among other things, on ‘the nature and number of the errors committed; their interrelationship, if any, and combined effect; how the district court dealt with errors as they arose (including the efficacy—or lack of efficacy—of any remedial efforts); the strength of the government’s case,’ and the length of trial.” Id. 24 Because the district court did not err as to the claims already discussed, Benavides’ claim of cumulative error hinges on an allegedly improper jury charge and limiting instruction. Beginning with his jury charge claim, Benavides had to show that his requested instruction correctly stated the law, concerned an issue so substantive that its omission impaired his defense, dealt with an issue properly before the jury, and was omitted from the charge actually give to the jury. United States v. Dulcio, 441 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2006) (citations omitted). He cannot meet the first Dulcio prong: his proffered jury instruction dealt with 18 U.S.C. § 286, which has a third element, instead of the statute he allegedly violated, 18 U.S.C. § 1349, which has only two elements. As to the hearsay instruction given by the trial court on its own motion, Benavides claims that the phrase “not coming in for the truth” suggested that Benavides’ testimony lacked trustworthiness. But not only was the instruction a correct statement of the law, see Fed. R. Evid. 801(c), Benavides’ own lawyer said, in front of the jury, “It’s not offered for the truth, your Honor,” right before Judge Lenard used similar phrasing in her limiting instruction.8 Because the trial court did not err as to the claims raised by Benavides, his cumulative error claim fails. 8 Defense counsel also said, within earshot of the jury, “Your Honor, again, not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but being offered to show the effect on the listener and what actions he took.” 25 E. The “organizer or leader” enhancement As a general rule, this Court reviews de novo a district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243, 1247 (11th Cir. 2004). Under the Guidelines, a district court can impose a four-level enhancement to a defendant’s sentence “if the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). “To qualify for an adjustment under this section, the defendant must have been organizer, leader, . . . of one or more other participants.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.2; United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 720 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding defendant only had to supervise one other culpable participant to make defendant eligible for organizer or leader enhancement). In addition, more than one person can qualify as an organizer or leader of a criminal conspiracy. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4; United States v. Vallejo, 297 F.3d 1154, 1169 (11th Cir. 2002) (“The defendant does not have to be the sole leader or kingpin of the conspiracy in order to be considered an organizer or leader within the meaning of the Guidelines”). Benavides argues the district court erred by applying the “organizer or leader” enhancement to him, claiming that it only applies when a defendant directly organized or led five or more persons. He supports this contention in two 26 ways. First, he asserts the district court failed to find specifically that he organized or led five or more other culpable participants. Second, he points out that § 3B1.1(b), the three level-enhancement found in § 3B1.1, has a different structure—a structure that does not require the defendant to have organized or lead five or more persons—than the four-level enhancement found in § 3B1.1(a), which, by implication, requires the defendant to have directly led five or more people. Because of this structural difference, Benavides reasons, § 3B1.1(b) should have applied and, thus, he should have received no more than the three-level enhancement found in subsection (b). A district court may apply the four-level enhancement even if the defendant’s criminal activity involved fewer than five people, so long as the defendant’s participation was “otherwise extensive.” United States v. Hall, 996 F.2d 284, 287 (11th Cir. 1993). This answers Benavides’ first contention. Yet he attempts to undermine the district court’s decision by citing United States v. Alred, 144 F.3d 1405 (11th Cir. 1998), and by claiming that the “criminal activity” the defendant organizes has a direct link to the number of participants in the scheme. But Benavides misplaces his reliance on Alred: that case involved a drug dealer with extensive involvement as a buyer and seller of drugs, not as a leader or organizer of the enterprise. Benavides does not dispute that he had a leadership 27 position over Ruiz. And this admission takes his case outside Alred’s reach. The Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines, moreover, flatly contradicts his claim that he had to organize or lead five or more people for subsection (a) to apply. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a) cmt. n.3 (“In assessing whether an organization is ‘otherwise extensive,’ all persons involved during the course of the entire offense are to be considered. Thus, a fraud that involved only three participants but used the unknowing services of many outsiders could be considered extensive.”). Either way, the district court correctly found that more than five people—Benavides, Guerra, Ruiz, Suleidy Cano, Abner Diaz, and “the lawyer,” Benjamin Metsch—were involved with Lily. Benavides’ second argument hinges on the differences in grammatical structure between §§ 3B1.1(a) and (b). Together, the two subsections read as follows: Based on the defendant’s role in the offense, increase the offense level as follows:
leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.
supervisor (but not an organizer or leader) and the criminal activity involved five or more participants or was otherwise 28 extensive, increase by 3 levels. U.S.S.G. §§ 3B1.1(a), (b). Benavides claims that because the second hanging sentence uses the conjunction “and” to separate its first two clauses, the defendant need not have direct control over all five culpable participants for the enhancement to apply. Conversely, the first hanging sentence does not use “and” to separate its two clauses, which, according to Benavides, makes the numerosity requirement apply to both the criminal activity as a whole and to the phrase “organizer or leader.” It is true enough the two sections use different phrasing. But while § 3B1.1(b) uses “and” to separate its first two clauses, § 3B1.1(a) achieves the same effect by using the relative pronoun “that.” Indeed, the word “that” stands in place of the noun immediately preceding it, which, in this case, is “activity.” Applying this grammar and usage rule, the second clause in § 3B1.1(a) only requires that the criminal activity involved five or more people. It does not, as Benavides claims, modify the entire “organizer or leader” clause to require direct authority over those other people.9 Benavides’ linguistic argument thus fails, and the district court’s 9 To put it more simply, Benavides wants the court to read subsection (a) once and then again—the second time with an ellipses so as to require the defendant to be “an organizer or leader of . . . five or more participants” before the district court can impose the four-level enhancement. As explained above, this would violate well-established grammatical and usage rules. 29 decision to apply the four-level enhancement is affirmed.