Opinion ID: 2773584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title VII and ADEA Discriminatory Discharge

Text: Finally, Ms. Riser appeals the grant of summary judgment on her discriminatory discharge claims against QEP under Title VII and the ADEA. These claims, too, are governed by the McDonnell Douglass burden-shifting framework. Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 2005). The district court dismissed Ms. Riser’s discriminatory discharge claims on the grounds that she had not established a prima facie case, and that even if she had, QEP had supplied a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the discharge that Mr. Riser did not show to be pretextual. Riser, 2014 WL 257434, at –6. In Ms. Riser’s opening brief, she does not argue that she satisfied her prima facie case, but - 18 - simply asserts a prima facie case exists and proceeds to argue that QEP’s reasons for discharging her were pretextual. Aplt. Br. 56 (“After the plaintiff makes a prima facie case (as here), the burden shifts to the employer . . . .”). As this court has held, “[i]ssues not raised in the opening brief are deemed abandoned or waived.” Coleman v. B–G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 108 F.3d 1199, 1205 (10th Cir. 1997). Thus, Ms. Riser has waived this argument, and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her discriminatory discharge claims under Title VII and the ADEA. AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED. - 19 -