Opinion ID: 1292861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Appeal by Lines et al.

Text: The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the appellees against these appellants. I think this ruling was erroneous. These appellants, like the people in general, have rights in the foreshore that cannot be abridged or denied by the appellees. Therefore, the judgment below, to the extent that it denied these appellants the right that the public has in the foreshore, should, in my opinion, be reversed. The rights that these appellants may have or may not have in the accreted land above the high-water mark and outside the confines of the foreshore poses a different problem. These appellants purchased their subdivision lots pursuant to a plat that showed Beach Drive as the eastern boundary of the subdivision. The eastern boundary of Beach Drive was, at that time, the high-water mark and the landward boundary of the foreshore. Since 1911, when the subdivision plat was prepared, the foreshore has moved seaward and accreted land now exists between the eastern boundary of Beach Drive and the present high-water mark. In other words, this accreted land now lies between Beach Drive and the foreshore. The 1911 plat designated the area east of Beach Drive, at that time the foreshore, as Beach. It is thus seen that the original subdivision owners, and the appellees here are their successors in title, had ownership rights in the foreshore after the passage of the 1902 Act. The land between Beach Drive and the present foreshore is therefore owned by the appellees unless the original subdivision owners, by conveying subdivision lots pursuant to the prepared plat, granted an easement to the purchasers of lots in the subdivision that would permit such purchasers to use the area east of Beach Drive. I conclude that the public has no rights in this accreted land, and such rights as the purchasers of lots may have is solely by virtue of their being purchasers of land pursuant to a subdivision plat. The appellees acquired their ownership rights in the accreted land from the original subdivision owners. Likewise, the appellants, owners of lots in the subdivision, derive their easement rights, if any, in the accreted land from the original subdivision owners. The contesting parties are therefore asserting rights in the accreted land that have come down to them from a common source of title. I think that this issue between subdivision lot owners and the appellees must yet be determined in the trial court. Beach Drive has never been opened and maintained as a street. Glynn County does not claim any rights in it. I think that the owners of subdivision lots that abut on the west side of Beach Drive now own the western one-half of Beach Drive. The appellees, whose predecessors in title retained ownership rights in the area east of Beach Drive, now own the eastern one-half of Beach Drive where it abuts accreted land in which they have ownership rights. I think that the appellees' ownership of such eastern one-half of Beach Drive and their ownership of the accreted land east of Beach Drive is subject to any easement thereover that subdivision lot-owners may have, an issue that should hereafter be determined in the trial court. My determination of the present ownership of Beach Drive is dictated by this court's decision in Johnson & Co. v. Arnold, 91 Ga. 659(18 SE 370) (1893). The marginal monument rule does not, in my opinion, apply in this case, because the original subdivision developers retained ownership rights in the area east of Beach Drive, this area being the foreshore when the subdivision plat was prepared.                         III