Opinion ID: 1440383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Penalty-phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: Appellant alleges several errors in relation to trial counsel's investigation and presentation of mitigation evidence at the penalty phase of trial. As this Court has observed, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment requires capital counsel to pursue all reasonably available avenues of developing mitigation evidence. Commonwealth v. Gorby, 589 Pa. 364, 909 A.2d 775, 790 (2006) (citing Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003)). Counsel must exercise reasonable professional judgment, and in examining counsel's conduct, we focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision not to introduce mitigating evidence . . . was itself reasonable. Commonwealth v. Malloy, 579 Pa. 425, 856 A.2d 767, 784 (2004) (quoting Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527). We proceed to address Appellant's claims seriatim. [16]
Appellant argues that counsel's failure to provide his psychologist, Dr. Allan M. Tepper, with various records in a timely fashion prevented Dr. Tepper from testifying effectively to certain mitigating factors. Appellant first questions counsel's failure to investigate and provide Dr. Tepper with evidence of his father's history of drug abuse, based on the affidavit of his older brother. He also contends that counsel's submission to Dr. Tepper of Appellant's drug history, as detailed in a pre-sentence report, was untimely because Dr. Tepper received them only after interviewing Appellant. Finally, he criticizes counsel's failure to investigate or present evidence of his caretaking function while his mother was suffering from cancer. Appellant fails to prove counsel's ineffectiveness for each of these claims. Regarding his father's history of drug abuse, Dr. Tepper testified to the following at the PCRA evidentiary hearing: The fact that it's reported that the father, in addition to being separated and absent and using somewhat physical discipline in the home, also, at least it's represented, had a daily or a chronic cocaine problem, again, would be very significant with respect to [Appellant]'s upbringing, his development, what he was exposed to, whether that literally was something he modeled. The substance abuse in parents is a very important piece of information for any kind of evaluation. N.T., 10/31/05, at 114-15 (emphasis added). At the penalty-phase hearing, Dr. Tepper added that Appellant's father was absent during Appellant's formative years. N.T., 11/12/97, at 94. Dr. Tepper did not explain, nor does Appellant explain now, how Appellant could have modeled his father's drug abuse when Appellant rarely saw his father. Furthermore, Appellant's brother, who claimed in an affidavit that their father used cocaine daily, testified: Well, from 1968 to '81, I wouldn't know if he did cocaine daily. I was born in '63, so that would be five years old. I don't think he would have showed me that then. In '81 he separated from my mom. Okay? So I know he wasn't doing it between '68 and '81. Or I didn't see him do it then. N.T., 11/28/05, at 67. In fact, the first instance in which Appellant's brother claims to have seen their father use cocaine was in 1985, and rather than state that it was a daily abuse of cocaine, he made a vague response of seeing the cocaine usage on [m]ore than [o]ne occasion. Id. at 75. Moreover, Dr. Tepper noted the substance abuse history of Appellant's mother and siblings. When considered in light of Appellant's penalty-phase argument that his father's abandonment created hardship, and the jury's finding of his life history as a mitigating factor, we cannot conclude that counsel's omission of this evidence was prejudicial. [17] See Strickland, supra . Appellant's claim about the timing of counsel's disclosure of Appellant's drug history to Dr. Tepper is equally without merit. Dr. Tepper testified that this information would have been additional information regarding that part of the evaluation of his drug-use history. N.T., 10/31/05, at 109-10. While Dr. Tepper noted that the information would have provided outside confirmation of Appellant's drug-use history and further details of it, he did not state that the evidence would have changed the diagnosis he expressed in his report or to the jury. Because this evidence would have been merely cumulative to Dr. Tepper's findings, Appellant suffered no prejudice from the timing of counsel's disclosure. Finally, Appellant presents numerous affidavits from witnesses who state that they would have testified to Appellant's caretaking duties during family illnesses, particularly his mother's battle with cancer. He claims that Dr. Tepper would have conducted a more thorough interview of Appellant had he heard from these witnesses. Again, Dr. Tepper did not claim at any point that these affidavits suggested a different diagnosis from the one he offered to the penalty-phase jury. In fact, as the Commonwealth observes, Dr. Tepper specifically admitted that the affidavits don't now allow [him] to make a diagnosis that [he] did not make back then. Id. at 135. Accordingly, we hold Appellant has failed to prove the ineffectiveness of his trial counsel in relation to the information provided to Dr. Tepper.
Appellant again offers the affidavits of potential mitigation witnesses to argue that counsel was ineffective by failing to present them at the penalty-phase hearing. At the PCRA evidentiary hearing, Appellant questioned trial counsel about only one of those witnesses, April Brown, Appellant's former girlfriend. However, counsel explained that Brown was extremely hostile at the trial. Id. at 79-80. Accordingly, counsel provided a reasonable basis for his decision not to present Brown as a mitigation witness. Because Appellant did not question counsel about the other witnesses, we have no basis upon which to evaluate counsel's strategy regarding these witnesses and cannot grant relief on this claim. See Bracey, supra .
Appellant argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of the following: (1) his successful rehabilitation at a juvenile institution; (2) diagnosis of mixed personality disorder in 1989; and (3) psychiatric evaluation revealing an IQ of 75. He fails to develop the second and third claims in any meaningful fashion, except to provide citations to the relevant reports, nor did he question counsel about these claims. Accordingly, those claims are waived. [18] See Bracey, supra . Therefore, we will address only his rehabilitation-evidence claim. Appellant raises two arguments in regard to his rehabilitation at the juvenile institution. He first insists that counsel was required to forward the Forestry Camp records to Dr. Tepper because they indicated that he is receptive to, and would benefit from, rehabilitation. He also suggests that counsel should have used records from Youth Forestry Camp, a secure, juvenile institution, to counter the Commonwealth's evidence that Appellant had behavioral problems at the Sleighton School. During the evidentiary hearing, Dr. Tepper acknowledged that he was aware of the Youth Forestry Camp records: A. Yes, I know. I had the [Pre-Sentence Investigation report]. Q. Okay. A.  and that he had made  there's an indication there that he made a positive adjustment at the Youth Forestry placement and that I was aware of. Today, as we discussed, I cannot say a hundred percent if I had all those specific Youth Forestry records themselves, but there was a reference to them in the 1989 presentence report. N.T., 10/31/05, at 140. Dr. Tepper also specifically acknowledged the report on cross-examination during the penalty-phase hearing: Q: And your records indicate he was there for some period of time, don't they? A: At the Forestry Camp? Q: Yes. A: Yes. N.T., 11/12/97, at 121. Even if Dr. Tepper did not receive the report from Youth Forestry Camp, he was aware of the existence of a beneficial report and did not consider it crucial to his evaluation. Counsel added that [i]f [Dr. Tepper] said [the report] is important, I would have brought it out. Id. at 95. Accordingly, Appellant cannot prove that he was prejudiced by the failure, if any, of counsel to provide the report to Dr. Tepper. Nonetheless, Appellant asserts that counsel should have introduced the Youth Forestry Camp report to counter the unfavorable Sleighton School report, which had indicated that Appellant was not receptive to rehabilitation. [19] Initially, we observe that Appellant also claims the Commonwealth impermissibly introduced the evidence as a non-statutory aggravator. Appellant's Brief at 68. After reviewing the penalty-phase transcripts and jury instructions, we find no evidence that the Commonwealth attempted to introduce the Sleighton School report as an aggravator. Rather, the Commonwealth questioned Dr. Tepper further about his evaluation of Appellant's schooling. See N.T., 11/12/97, at 121. Thus, the Commonwealth's introduction of the report was appropriate, and Appellant's supporting citations involving impermissible use of non-statutory aggravating evidence, are inapposite. Compare Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 578 Pa. 284, 851 A.2d 883, 898-99 (2004) (permitting Commonwealth to question defendant about prior acquittal when direct examination opened door to subject), with Appellant's Brief at 68 n. 40 (citing Commonwealth v. Hughes, 581 Pa. 274, 865 A.2d 761, 795-97 (2004) (finding evidence that defendant entered into consent decree inadmissible because it was not finding of guilt and defendant's character was not at issue); Commonwealth v. DeJesus, 580 Pa. 303, 860 A.2d 102, 113 (2004) (vacating sentence when prosecutor exhorted jury to send a message during closing arguments); Malloy, supra (same)). [20] We therefore examine whether, in the context of Dr. Tepper's testimony, counsel should have asked Dr. Tepper on re-direct examination about the Youth Forestry Camp report. When questioned by Appellant about why he did not introduce the report, counsel responded, I do see the next sentence [from the report], which gives me pause here. `His counselor was of the opinion that he derived maximum benefit from his placement there.' N.T., 10/31/05, at 52. The Commonwealth argues that counsel reasonably assessed the statement as implying that any further attempts at rehabilitation would be futile. Commonwealth's Brief at 53. We disagree. Counsel, on cross-examination, clarified his evaluation of the report: A. Well, it gave me pause because the jury just convicted him of doing these crimes and the report indicates they've already done what they could for him at Youth Forestry Camp so that's  that's why I was given pause. Q. In other words, it showed he could not be rehabilitated? A. Yes. N.T., 10/31/05, at 96. Our review of the report reveals that counsel's evaluation was unreasonable, as the report clearly details that Appellant had complied with all of the camp's goals. Thus, the camp did not, as the Commonwealth implies, give up on Appellant, but rather suggested that Appellant had adequately satisfied the requirements for leaving the camp. We cannot agree, therefore, that counsel's assessment of the report, as stated at the evidentiary hearing and construed by the Commonwealth, was reasonable. Nevertheless, Appellant must demonstrate that counsel's assessment was prejudicial. See Pierce, supra . When asked about the potential impact of the Youth Forestry Camp report, Dr. Tepper was less than certain: Q. Had you been asked by [counsel] what the Forestry Camp  forgive me, I'm struggling for a word  how [Appellant] behaved at the Forestry Camp, would you have been able to respond to the points made by [the prosecutor]? A. I can't say I would have been able to respond point by point to what Mr. Sax was asking me, but the Forestry Camp background would be  would have been a way to show that, with certain kind [sic] of guidance or structure, [Appellant] had certain either resources or ability to respond. That's what the Forestry Camp records seem to indicate. N.T., 10/31/05, at 118. As we found above, Dr. Tepper had opportunities on cross-examination to discuss the Youth Forestry Camp report, but did not do so. Further, Appellant compiled a significant history of drug abuse and criminal activity soon after his positive report from the Youth Forestry Camp, which was issued seven years prior to the instant crimes. [21] In the context of Dr. Tepper's testimony and the jury's finding of the previous-crimes aggravator, we cannot conclude that Appellant was prejudiced by counsel's interpretation of the Youth Forestry Camp report. Accordingly, Appellant is not entitled to relief on this claim. See Basemore, supra .
Appellant asserts that he was prejudiced by the trial court's and counsel's failure to life-qualify the jury. He argues that it was not only counsel's, but also the court's duty to inquire whether a prospective juror would be unable to return a life-sentence verdict based on his or her view of the death penalty. It is well-settled that while trial counsel is permitted to life-qualify the jury, he is not per se ineffective for failing to do so. See Commonwealth v. Rega, 933 A.2d 997, 1020 (Pa.2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Speight, 578 Pa. 520, 854 A.2d 450, 459 (2004); Commonwealth v. Rollins, 558 Pa. 532, 738 A.2d 435, 441 (1999); Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 Pa. 450, 701 A.2d 541 (1997)). Counsel is obligated only to ensure that the jury selection process is fair and impartial. Id. Appellant recognizes this precedent, but cites to a research note from Justice Quarterly in arguing that we should revisit our previous holdings. See Appellant's Brief at 79-80 (citing Wanda D. Foglia, They Know Not What They Do: Unguided and Misguided Discretion in Pennsylvania Capital Cases, 20 JUST. Q. 187 (2003)). However, Appellant did not raise this argument with the PCRA court, thereby waiving it on appeal. See Basemore, supra . Thus, Appellant must demonstrate that he was actually prejudiced by the failure to life-qualify the jury. See Rega, supra . In this regard, Appellant's situation mirrors that of the appellants in Rega and Speight, and our resolution here is the same. See Rega, 933 A.2d at 1020; Speight, 854 A.2d at 459. Just as this Court held in Rega and Speight, we also hold that Appellant has failed to demonstrate any prejudice by counsel's failure to ask life-qualification questions, particularly when each juror underwent extensive questioning concerning his or her ability to follow the law and assured the trial court that he or she would be able to render a fair and impartial verdict and sentence. Rega, 933 A.2d at 1021. Appellant is therefore due no relief on this claim.
Appellant contends that counsel should have objected to the following three of the trial court's jury instructions during the penalty phase of trial: [1.] Now, if your sentence is life imprisonment, you should check the finding in either C-1 or C-2 which explains why you're rejecting the death sentence and imposing a life sentence. . . . [2.] Now, loosely speaking, aggravating circumstances are things about the killing and the killer which make a first degree murder case more terrible and deserving of the death penalty, while mitigating circumstances are those things which make the case less terrible and less deserving of the death penalty. . . . [3.] The sentence you impose must be in accordance with the law as I instruct you and not based on sympathy, prejudice, emotion, or public opinion and not based on victim impact. N.T., 11/12/97, at 151, 49, 147. Appellant recited each instruction to counsel at the PCRA evidentiary hearing, then asked only whether he had any reason to object, to which counsel responded, each time, that he thought there was no reason to object, at which point Appellant's inquiry ended. N.T., 10/31/05, at 54-56. Appellant has pleaded the three prongs of the Pierce test. When reviewing a challenge to the jury instructions, we consider the entire charge, not merely the individual portions highlighted by the appellant. See Commonwealth v. Prosdocimo, 525 Pa. 147, 578 A.2d 1273, 1274 (1990). The trial court is free to use its own expressions as long as the concepts at issue are clearly and accurately presented to the jury. Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 360 (1999) (citing Commonwealth v. Faulkner, 528 Pa. 57, 595 A.2d 28 (1991)). We turn now to each of Appellant's challenges to the penalty-phase jury instruction.
Appellant acknowledges that this Court, in a plurality decision, recently rejected a similar challenge to this instruction. See Appellant's Brief at 81 (citing Marinelli, 910 A.2d at 682-84 (Opinion Announcing Judgment of Court)). In fact, he admits that Marinelli rejected his precise claim. Id. He nonetheless contends that Marinelli was wrongly decided because it did not consider the United States Supreme Court's holding in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002), or conduct a constitutional analysis of competing instructions. [22] We disagree with both of his reasons for revisiting Marinelli. We first note that, although Marinelli was a plurality decision, a majority of Justices joined the holding and reasoning of Madame Justice Newman's resolution of Marinelli's challenge to the relevant instruction. Mr. Justice Eakin and Madame Justice Baldwin joined Madame Justice Newman's Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, and Mr. Justice Saylor concurred, expressly joining Madame Justice Newman's resolution of this claim. See Marinelli, 910 A.2d at 690 (Saylor, J., concurring). [23] Appellant argues that the Marinelli plurality was required to evaluate the jury instructions in light of Ring because, he claims, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the burden of proof for aggravating factors lies with the Commonwealth. Appellant's Brief at 81-82. We fail to see, however, why this Court was required to discuss Ring in evaluating the propriety of the instruction. The Ring Court held that the Sixth Amendment forbids a judge from undertaking the jury's function of determining whether aggravating circumstances justifying a death sentence existed. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609, 122 S.Ct. 2428. The Marinelli Court was not confronted with the issue of whether an improper arbiter determined the existence of aggravating factors, nor are we confronted with that issue now. Regardless, the Marinelli plurality applied the exact standard Appellant claims Ring espouses: Thus, the three-sentence excerpt upon which Appellant relies appears in the context of the trial court's repeated emphasis on the more exacting requirements that the Commonwealth faced in attempting to prove its two aggravating circumstances, compared to the relatively lenient standards applicable to Appellant with respect to his two mitigating circumstances. Marinelli, 910 A.2d at 684 (emphasis added). In evaluating the entirety of the court's instruction to the jury, the plurality noted that the trial court clearly differentiated between the preponderance standard for defendants in proving mitigating circumstances, and the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard required of the Commonwealth in proving aggravating circumstances. Id. at 683. The Marinelli trial court also instructed the jury, If you do not all agree on one or the other of these findings, then the only verdict that you may return is a sentence of life imprisonment. Id. (emphasis added). The plurality concluded that the trial court aptly described the appropriate burdens of proof and presumptions to the jury. Id. at 684. We can discern no reason why Ring required a different analysis or conclusion. Appellant also cites Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 108 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990), for the proposition that the Marinelli Court should have examined whether competing instructions, one of which is unconstitutional, renders a death sentence illegal. Appellant's reliance on Boyde is misplaced. He specifically relies on the following statement from Boyde: In some instances, to be sure, we have held that when a case is submitted to the jury on alternative theories the unconstitutionality of any of the theories requires that the conviction be set aside. In those cases, a jury is clearly instructed by the court that it may convict a defendant on an impermissible legal theory, as well as on a proper theory or theories. Although it is possible that the guilty verdict may have had a proper basis, it is equally likely that the verdict . . . rested on an unconstitutional ground, and we have declined to choose between two such likely possibilities. Id. at 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190 (quotations and citations omitted). [24] However, the instant, challenged instruction did not clearly instruct the jury to sentence the defendant to death on an impermissible legal theory. Rather, Appellant surmises that instructing the jury to explain[ ] why you're rejecting the death sentence and imposing a life sentence equates to an instruction that it may return a life sentence only if it rejects the death sentence. We cannot agree. While Boyde reflects the sound principle that jury instructions should not put appellate courts in a position where they must determine whether a jury relied on a proper or illegal basis of guilt, it does not prevent courts from examining the propriety of a portion of an instruction by considering it in the context of the entire instruction. Therefore, if the instruction does not clearly require the jury to rely on an unconstitutional basis, then the courts may examine the instruction as a whole to determine the context of the challenged statement. In point of fact, the Boyde Court found that the instruction at issue there was ambiguous and therefore subject to an erroneous interpretation. Id. at 380, 110 S.Ct. 1190. Although Appellant claims that the instant instruction is not ambiguous, he argues only that it implies a presumption of a death sentence. Thus, he is, in actuality, arguing that it was subject to an erroneous interpretation of presuming a sentence of death, which triggers the Boyde Court's reasonable probability test. See id. In Marinelli, and instantly, the statement in question instructs the jury to place a checkmark next to the reason why it is imposing a life sentence. This requirement was entirely consistent with Section 9711(c)(1)(iv), which mandates that the jury must return a sentence of death if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). In the context of the entire jury instruction, the instruction at issue, which required only a written notation of the statutorily-mandated reason for imposing a life sentence, did not actually conflict with the clear and overwhelming instructions pertaining to the heightened burden of proof and unanimous votes necessary to impose a sentence of death, and also of the lower burden of proof and fewer number of votes necessary to find mitigating factors. See Marinelli, 910 A.2d at 682-84. We therefore find no error in the analysis in Marinelli, and because Appellant argues only that Marinelli was wrongly decided, he is not entitled to relief. Moreover, Appellant cannot correctly argue that the jury was forced to render a sentence of death by the instruction. In addition to requiring the jury to note the reasons for imposing a life sentence, the court also required the jury to explain why it was imposing a sentence of death rather than a life sentence, and also to list the specific aggravating and mitigating circumstances found. See Verdict Sheet at 1; N.T., 11/12/97, at 150-51. We therefore hold that an instruction requiring the jury to explain why it is rejecting a death sentence is not per se unconstitutional, and Appellant's claim fails. See Boyde, supra ; Marinelli, supra .
Appellant raises two primary arguments in regard to the more terrible/less terrible instruction. He first contends that murder cannot, by definition, be less terrible, and that, once again, this Court's decision in Marinelli was wrongly decided. [25] He also asserts the trial court failed to instruct the jury properly as to the Section 9711(e)(8) mitigator, and thus counsel was ineffective for failing to insist on a more specific instruction. There is no merit to either of these claims. Appellant again asks us to revisit the decision reached by the Marinelli plurality, insisting that the instruction, by using the conjunctive and rather than the disjunctive or in describing mitigating factors, restricted the jury's overall consideration of mitigating evidence unrelated to the terribleness of the crime. We have, however, found no merit to this exact argument on numerous occasions before and after Marinelli. See, e.g., Washington, 927 A.2d at 613-14; Commonwealth v. Rios, 591 Pa. 583, 920 A.2d 790, 817 (2007); Commonwealth v. Johnson, 572 Pa. 283, 815 A.2d 563, 587-88 (2002); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 559 Pa. 171, 739 A.2d 507, 527 (1999). Appellant raises no new argument on this issue, and thus provides no reason to revisit the well-settled precedent rejecting his claim. Appellant nonetheless attempts to distinguish the instant case from Marinelli and similar cases by contending that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the Section 9711(e)(8) mitigator, combined with the more terrible/less terrible instruction, narrowed the jury's consideration of mitigating factors even further. While his claim arguably has merit, Appellant cannot demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the court's omission. The jury found in favor of Appellant for the Section 9711(e)(8) mitigator, despite Appellant's concerns, and it specifically listed His Life History as the mitigating factor. See Verdict Sheet at 1. Therefore, even if Appellant is correct in arguing that the trial court impermissibly narrowed the focus of mitigating factors to only those relevant to the murder itself, the jury would appear to have ignored that instruction by finding his difficult family background as a mitigator. Because he cannot demonstrate prejudice, he fails to prove counsel's ineffectiveness. See Basemore, supra ; Pierce, supra .
Appellant's final challenge to the jury instructions is that they precluded the jury from giving any effect to feelings of sympathy it may have had for him. He argues that while Pennsylvania statute constitutionally forbids mere sympathy or absolute mercy verdicts, the jury may nonetheless consider feelings of sympathy for the defendant that arise out of the mitigating evidence presented in the case. Appellant's Brief at 89-90 (citing Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989) (plurality)). This Court addressed this exact claim, quoting a United States Supreme Court decision clarifying the standard for sympathy instructions: Further, the United States Supreme Court has also held that an instruction directing the jury to disregard sympathy in its sentencing determination does not violate the Eighth Amendment. In Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 110 S.Ct. 1257, 108 L.Ed.2d 415 (1990), the Court rejected the very argument set forth by Appellant here. It explained: This argument misapprehends the distinction between allowing the jury to consider mitigating evidence and guiding their consideration. It is no doubt constitutionally permissible, if not constitutionally required, for the State to insist that the individualized assessment of the appropriateness of the death penalty [be] a moral inquiry into the culpability of the defendant, and not an emotional response to the mitigating evidence. Saffle, 494 U.S. at 492-93, 110 S.Ct. 1257. As it is well established that a jury instruction not to allow feelings of sympathy to influence the sentencing consideration is constitutionally proper, counsel in this case were not ineffective in failing to object to such instruction. Appellant's claim thus fails. Rios, 920 A.2d at 817-18. As Appellant presents no new argument for our consideration, we rely on our holding in Rios and deny his claim of ineffective counsel.
Appellant concludes his challenge to counsel's effectiveness pertaining to the jury instructions by claiming that the cumulative effect of the jury instructions resulted in a prejudicial verdict. He provides no citation in support of his claim and therefore waives it. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). Moreover, because we have found no error in any of the challenged instructions, there is no basis upon which to find any accumulation of errors.
Finally, Appellant contends that all of his claims pertaining to counsel's stewardship at the penalty phase of trial cumulatively impacted the reliability of those proceedings. We have long held that no number of failed claims may collectively warrant relief if they fail to do so individually. Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 245 (Pa.2007) (citing Commonwealth v. (James) Williams, 586 Pa.553, 896 A.2d 523, 548 (2006), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1253, 167 L.Ed.2d 88 (2007); Commonwealth v. Blystone, 555 Pa. 565, 725 A.2d 1197, 1208-09 (1999), Commonwealth v. (Craig) Williams, 532 Pa.265, 615 A.2d 716, 722 (1992)).