Opinion ID: 2033087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Search Issue.

Text: While Ortiz challenged the search on the basis the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the district court did not reach this issue because it found Ortiz did not have an expectation of privacy in Moranville's home and therefore could not challenge the warrant. The court observed that, if it were to reach the issue, the existence of probable cause to support issuance of [the first search warrant for alcohol] is in grave doubt. Officers must ordinarily obtain a search warrant prior to searching or entering an area where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 45 (Iowa 1998). A person challenging the legality of a search must first show a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561, 65 L.Ed.2d 633, 641 (1980); State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 342 (Iowa 1995). We have said [t]he determination of whether a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to a certain area is made on a case-by-case basis, considering the unique facts of each particular situation. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d at 46. Additionally, the expectation of privacy must be one that society considers reasonable, an issue that involves reference to property law or to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. Id. The party challenging a search must establish that his or her own Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, not the rights of someone else such as, in this case, the householder. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 131 & n. 1, 99 S.Ct. 421, 424 & n. 1, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 393 & n. 1 (1978). The Supreme Court has said a defendant challenging a search must show (1) a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) this expectation of privacy was reasonable in light of long-standing social custom[s] that serve[] functions recognized as valuable by society. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 1689, 109 L.Ed.2d 85, 94 (1990); see also 5 Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 11.3, at 118-19 (3d ed.1996). In December 1998 the United States Supreme Court decided Minnesota v. Carter, which compared the respective rights of overnight guests and similar persons who have a reasonable expectation of privacy with persons merely on the premises, albeit with permission, who do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. 525 U.S. 83, 91, 119 S.Ct. 469, 474, 142 L.Ed.2d 373, 381 (1998). Carter was decided after the district court's ruling on the motion to suppress in this case. The district court concluded a guest at a party does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in items found in the house at which the party occurs, citing United States v. Maddox, 944 F.2d 1223, 1234 (6th Cir.1991). However, that broad conclusion must be tempered in light of Carter. In Carter, Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote necessary for a majority, writing in a special concurrence that, as a general rule, social guests will have an expectation of privacy in their host's home. Carter, 525 U.S. at 102, 119 S.Ct. at 479, 142 L.Ed.2d at 387 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy noted the defendants in Carter were not social guests but had used the apartment merely as a processing station to prepare drugs for sale. Relying on the specific facts presented in Carter, Justice Kennedy concluded the defendants were an exception to the rule that social guests will have an expectation of privacy. He wrote: I join the Court's opinion, for its reasoning is consistent with my view that almost all social guests have a legitimate expectation of privacy, and hence protection against unreasonable searches, in their host's home. Id. at 99, 119 S.Ct. at 478, 142 L.Ed.2d at 386. In deciding the present case, we must be mindful of this concurring opinion, as well as the plurality opinion, because, without Justice Kennedy's concurrence, the Court's finding of no reasonable expectation of privacy would not have prevailed. The plurality opinion in Carter emphasized the lack of a social relationship between the defendant and the premises searched. Carter, 525 U.S. at 90, 119 S.Ct. at 473, 142 L.Ed.2d at 380. The defendants in Carter lived in Chicago, while the apartment searched was located in Minnesota. The defendants had come to the apartment for the sole purpose of preparing cocaine for sale, they had never been to the apartment before, and they were in the apartment for only about 2½ hours. Id. at 86, 119 S.Ct. at 471, 142 L.Ed.2d at 378. The Court in Carter discussed three factors bearing on the reasonable expectation of privacy: (1) the purely commercial nature of the transaction, (2) the defendants' relatively short period of time on the premises, and (3) the lack of any previous connection between the defendants and the occupant of the apartment. Id. at 91, 119 S.Ct. at 474, 142 L.Ed.2d at 381. The party at Moranville's residence appeared to lack any reasonable degree of privacy. According to Moranville's testimony, the door was unlocked and people were walking in and out at will. This was clearly not Moranville's party. According to her, Ortiz was in charge. At one point, according to Moranville, there [were] so many people coming in and out, I couldn't sleep. She did not even know some of the participants. She explained Ortiz's presence in her residence in the following colloquy: Q. Would you explain to the jury how Aurelio Ortiz came to be at your apartment on Memorial Day weekend of 1997? A. He had asked me, because his apartment from what he understood was underthe cops had been watching it for drug trafficking, and he asked me if he could use it because I lived alone and I had a very big apartment so. Q. And did you give him permission to move in with you? A. To use it, yes. Not to move in, but to use it, yes. Q. To use it for what? A. To do whatever he needed to do, to sell, to use, whatever. Moranville testified about Ortiz's activities in her apartment: There was using. There was selling. There was a lot of using and there was a lot of selling. As to the first factor under Carter, Ortiz was using Moranville's apartment, at least in part, for commercial transactions. He was there because he believed the police were watching his apartment. Even assuming the party was partially for commercial purposes and partially for social purposes, a fair interpretation of the evidence is that any social aspect of the gathering was based on drug use, and that most of the drugs had been purchased from Ortiz. It is significant that Moranville did not give Ortiz permission to move into her apartmentonly to do whatever with respect to drugs. On our de novo review, the presence of Ortiz and the other participants appears to be merely an ongoing drug transaction with the customers consuming the merchandise on the premises. Moranville observed Ortiz selling the drugs. The presence of the scale and Ortiz's possession of $1400 in cash confirms at least a substantial part of the deliveries were made as commercialnot socialtransactions. Ortiz, feeling the heat of police surveillance at his own place, moved his drug operations to the Moranville residence. This finding is supported by the fact that, although Moranville had earlier observed Ortiz selling drugs in his own apartment, a search of his apartment after his arrest revealed no drugs, scales, or other paraphernalia used for such a business. The obvious inference is these items had been moved to the Moranville residence. Comparing the facts of this case to Carter, we note first the defendant's activity here was not limited to preparing drugs for sale as it was in Carter; here, it involved drug use as well. However, the fact Ortiz's customers consumed the drugs on the premises does not change the primary purpose of his presence from commercial to social. We believe it was all part of his commercial activity, which was the predominant reason for his presence in Moranville's home. In addition, while the defendants in Carter remained on the premises a shorter time than here, and they had no previous connection with the householder, as Ortiz did here (a five-day acquaintance with Moranville), the Supreme Court did not suggest in Carter these distinctions would be dispositive if the purpose of the defendant's presence on the premises was commercial in nature. Here, as in Carter, Ortiz was one simply permitted on the premises, Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, 119 S.Ct. at 474, 142 L.Ed.2d at 381, and he failed to show he had a reasonable expectation of privacy as a social guest. Accordingly, we affirm the ruling of the district court denying the motion to suppress and admitting the evidence seized. This holding makes it unnecessary to consider Ortiz's probable-cause argument.