Opinion ID: 202888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to the DNA Act

Text: The other circuits have split in the analysis they apply to the federal DNA Act or its state law analogs. A majority  the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits  use the totality of the circumstances analysis described in Knights and Samson. See United States v. Kraklio, 451 F.3d 922, 924 (8th Cir.2006)(federal DNA Act); Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 489, 496 (D.C.Cir.2006)(federal DNA Act); United States v. Sczubelek, 402 F.3d 175, 184 (3d Cir.2005)(federal DNA Act); Padgett v. Donald, 401 F.3d 1273, 1280 (11th Cir.2005)(Georgia analog); United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 832 (9th Cir. 2004)(en banc)(federal DNA Act); Groceman v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 354 F.3d 411, 413-14 (5th Cir.2004)(per curiam)(federal DNA Act); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 306-07 (4th Cir.1992)(Virginia analog). A minority  the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits  apply the special needs analysis. See Amerson, 483 F.3d 73, 79 n. 6 (2d Cir.2007)(federal DNA Act); United States v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766, 773 (7th Cir.2006)(federal DNA Act); United States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1146 (10th Cir.2003)(federal DNA Act). Finally, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Conley, 453 F.3d 674, 679-81 (6th Cir.2006), declined to choose a mode of analysis, holding that the DNA Act was constitutional under either a totality of the circumstances or a special needs analysis. [6] Much of this authority preceded the Supreme Court's decision in Samson, which now offers additional guidance. Prior to Samson, the Court had never held that the totality of the circumstances was the appropriate test to apply in a suspicionless search of a conditional releasee. Thus, several courts had concluded that a suspicionless search could not be justified absent a special need (or some other exception). See, e.g., Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 666 (2d Cir.2005)(The Supreme Court has never applied a general balancing test to a suspicionless-search regime.). However, Samson now indicates that the totality of the circumstances analysis is, in fact, the appropriate framework to apply in a situation involving even a suspicionless search of a conditional releasee. Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2202; see also id. at 2204 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(explaining that the Court for the first time upholds an entirely suspicionless search unsupported by any special need). In so holding, the Court explained that [t]he touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, not individualized suspicion, and noted that the `Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion,' 126 S.Ct. at 2201 n. 4 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976)). It concluded: [A]lthough this Court has only sanctioned suspicionless searches in limited circumstances, namely programmatic [7] and special needs searches, we have never held that these are the only limited circumstances in which searches absent individualized suspicion could be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. In light of California's earnest concerns respecting recidivism, public safety, and reintegration of parolees into productive society, and because the object of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, our decision today is far from remarkable. Id. (footnote added). Samson thus indicates that a search of an individual on conditional release is properly subject to the totality of the circumstances analysis rather than the special needs analysis, notwithstanding the lack of individualized suspicion. The Court's application, in Samson, of the totality of the circumstances analysis also may reflect its recognition that the search in that case could not qualify as a special needs search. Special needs involve those beyond the normal need for law enforcement, Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, and the search in Samson  that of a suspected parole violator's person by a law enforcement officer, Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2196  is difficult to characterize as anything other than an ordinary law enforcement search for weapons or contraband. A similar problem arises in attempting to apply the special needs test to the DNA Act. The CODIS mission statement explicitly states that it is an effective tool for solving violent crimes and that it was formed in 1990 for law enforcement purposes. See Federal Bureau of Investigation, CODIS Mission Statement & Background, available at http://www.fbi.gov /hq/lab/codis/program.htm (last visited July 11, 2007). Moreover, the legislative history reveals a multitude of references to the goal of solving crimes. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 856 (9th Cir.2004)(Reinhardt, J., dissenting)(collecting citations to the legislative history). Although the government's brief emphasizes certain arguably non-law-enforcement-related purposes of the DNA Act, such as obtaining reliable proof of a felon's identity and preventing recidivism, it is clear that law enforcement objectives predominate. Thus, the centrality of law enforcement objectives to the DNA Act buttresses our conclusion that the totality of the circumstances analysis, rather than the special needs analysis, is appropriate. [8] Despite Samson 's focus on reasonableness and the totality of the circumstances, two circuits subsequently have applied the special needs analysis to the DNA Act. In Hook, the Seventh Circuit made no reference to Samson and followed, without discussion, its prior decision in Green v. Berge, 354 F.3d 675 (7th Cir.2004), in which it applied the special needs analysis. 471 F.3d at 772. Then, in Amerson, the Second Circuit concluded that Samson did not affect its prior decision in United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 180-81 (2d Cir.2004), in which it applied the special needs test to probationers challenging New York's DNA indexing statute. 483 F.3d at 79. In light of its circuit precedent, the court concluded that the special needs test should apply [b]ecause the Supreme Court has not, to date, held that the expectations of privacy of probationers are sufficiently diminished to permit probationer suspicionless searches to be tested by a general balancing test. Notwithstanding Amerson 's holding, we conclude that there is no rationale for differentiating supervised release from other conditional release statuses for purposes of determining whether to apply the totality of the circumstances analysis or the special needs analysis. The grounds cited by the Supreme Court in its decision to apply a totality of the circumstances analysis in Samson  the state's broad concerns regarding recidivism, public safety, and reintegration, Samson, 126 S.Ct. at 2201 n. 4  apply similarly to parolees and supervised releasees. Moreover, in general the circuits have not distinguished between parolees, probationers, and supervised releasees for Fourth Amendment purposes. Kincade, 379 F.3d at 817 n. 2 (collecting cases); see also Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 179 (explaining that, [e]ven though this is the first opportunity we have had to address this issue in the context of an individual on supervised release, we have addressed similar challenges in the context of parole and probation, and following those previous rulings). [9] Finally, as we have explained, law enforcement objectives are central to the DNA Act, and thus the analysis applicable to special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement, Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 107 S.Ct. 3164, is inapplicable here. Consequently, we hold that the analysis used for parolees in Samson is appropriately applied to the supervised release situation present here. See Kraklio, 451 F.3d at 924 (applying the totality of the circumstances analysis to a probationer's challenge to the DNA Act after Samson ).