Opinion ID: 1283283
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: schnabel's claim

Text: Schnabel claims title to M.S. 572, one of the three parcels which Foster sought to repurchase. He grounds his claim on adverse possession by his predecessor or, in the alternative, by Schnabel himself. In 1970, Schnabel purchased a quitclaim deed to the property for $5000 from Fred Emerson. Emerson originally entered the property in 1954  several years before the Territory's foreclosure. He mined the property, using a D-4 Cat and a sluice box, for the 1954 season. He worked there seven days a week during the mining season, but lived about a half mile away on another property. He continued mining until about two years before he sold the property to Schnabel in 1970. During the period of his use and occupancy, Emerson posted the property against trespassers, charged others for using the road he built on the property, paid taxes on the property, and exercised dominion over it. Furthermore, he filed federal mining claims, notices of annual assessment work, and a Statement of Real Property Ownership covering the property. Emerson's occupation of the property was unquestionably open and notorious. [12] From 1970, when Emerson quitclaimed the property to Schnabel, through 1982, Schnabel continued Emerson's pattern of occupancy and mining. If M.S. 572 were privately owned, Emerson and Schnabel, either alone or together, may have met the requirements for gaining title by adverse possession. [13] However, the State claims title pursuant to the deed following foreclosure. A person cannot acquire state land by adverse possession. AS 38.95.010. Schnabel alleges that he was completely unaware of the State's interest in M.S. 572 until 1980. Upon becoming aware, he submitted a repurchase application under the Land Registration Law. In July of 1984, the DNR rejected Schnabel's application, on the ground that Schnabel was not an assign of the record owner, since Emerson's claim was by adverse possession. [14] When Foster filed his second amended complaint in May of 1985, Schnabel answered, alleging as a counterclaim against Foster and a cross-claim against the State that Schnabel owned M.S. 572 in fee simple. [15] Schnabel's claim is based on his argument that the 1957 foreclosure is void, since the record owner was not given proper notice, in violation of statutory and constitutional requirements. [16] If the foreclosure was void, the record ownership is still in private hands. In that case, Emerson's adverse possession was effective to gain title, which was then quitclaimed to Schnabel. The superior court did not decide whether Emerson or Schnabel, alone or together, would have satisfied the requirements for adverse possession against a private owner. Nor did the court decide the merits of Schnabel's statutory and constitutional claims. Instead, the court held that Schnabel had no standing to challenge the validity of the foreclosure, and furthermore, that such a challenge would be barred by the doctrine of laches. Schnabel appealed.
We have previously recognized that the doctrine of laches applies solely to actions in equity. Kodiak Electric Ass'n v. Delaval Turbine, Inc., 694 P.2d 150, 157 (Alaska 1984). Schnabel's assertion that he owns M.S. 572 in fee simple is essentially a request of the court to remove a cloud on his title  an action generally considered equitable in nature. [17] Furthermore, once a court obtains jurisdiction for equitable purposes, it may dispose of all issues before it, whether equitable or legal. See, e.g., Burnworth v. Hughes, 670 P.2d 917, 922 (Kan. 1983); Thisted v. Country Club Tower Corp., 405 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Mont. 1965); Wittick v. Miles, 545 P.2d 121, 124 (Or. 1976). Thus, laches is entirely appropriate to bar Schnabel's claim of deficient notice. [18] The question of whether the facts support a finding of laches is left largely to the discretion of the court below: We will not overturn a trial court's decision that an action is barred by laches unless we have a firm and definite conviction that a mistake has been committed. Young v. Williams, 583 P.2d 201, 204 (Alaska 1978)... . This is the same test used to determine whether a trial judge's findings are clearly erroneous. Pavlik v. State, Dep't. of Community and Regional Affairs, 637 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Alaska 1981) (citation omitted). The superior court correctly identified the test: Laches requires that the plaintiff has unreasonably delayed in bringing the action, resulting in undue prejudice to the other party. City and Borough of Juneau v. Breck, 706 P.2d 313, 315 (Alaska 1985). The court found that Emerson, Schnabel's predecessor-in-interest, knew of the State's claim for at least twenty years. Neither this finding, nor the implicit decision that twenty years is unreasonable, is clearly erroneous. Even if a stale claim could be revived by transferring the underlying interest, which it generally cannot, Schnabel would still be barred. He claims to have been ignorant of the foreclosure judgment and ensuing deed to the Territory until ten years after he bought his quitclaim deed. By then, the foreclosure judgment and deed had been a matter of public record for over thirty years. One who purchases a mere quitclaim deed cannot insulate himself from the consequences by not checking the record. Even after Schnabel discovered the State's interest, he took no action to challenge the foreclosure until five years later, on the eve of trial in September of 1985, when he filed an answer to Foster's second amended complaint. [19] We think that this delay was unreasonable. The court also found that [t]he State is prejudiced by the problems inherent in having to defend an action undertaken nearly 30 years ago. Evidence that may have been available at the time is most likely not still available. For example, if the record owner had actual notice, then procedural deficiencies would be cured. Yet, this would be very difficult to establish 30 years later. The court's finding is not clearly erroneous. For these reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court's holding that Schnabel's claim is barred by laches. MOORE, J., with whom BURKE, J., joins, concurring.