Opinion ID: 779927
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Lopez category three.

Text: 77 We accordingly conclude that the issue of whether the Hobbs Act is properly applied to these robberies turns on whether such application meets the test of Lopez category three, as to which the proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated activity `substantially affects' interstate commerce. Id. at 1630. 78 The evidence does not reflect any particular, concrete effect on interstate commerce that in fact actually resulted from any of the four robberies. But the evidence does support the conclusions that the victim stores each regularly used their funds to, among other things, purchase from local wholesalers inventory which included (but was not shown to be limited to) items manufactured out-of-state, and that the robberies reduced, by the amounts taken ($50, $100, $145, $1,500-2,000), the funds the stores would, but for the robbery, otherwise thereafter have had available for use in (or withdrawal from) their respective businesses, including (but not limited to) use for inventory purchasing. The evidence also shows that any reduction in a retailer's purchases from its wholesaler would reduce the funds the wholesaler would otherwise thereafter have had available for use in (or withdrawal from) its business, including (but not limited to) use for purchase of out-of-state merchandise. Cf. United States v. Atcheson, 94 F.3d 1237, 1243 (9th Cir.1996) (To establish a de minimis effect on interstate commerce, the Government need not show that a defendant's acts actually affected interstate commerce ... Rather, the jurisdictional requirement is satisfied `by proof of a probable or potential impact'). Assuming that all this suffices to show that each individual robbery did probably or potentially have some minimal, attenuated and indirect affect on interstate commerce, it is clear that none individually had what could fairly be described as a substantial affect (actual, probable or potential). 79 The Government in this connection relies on the aggregation principle under which in determining whether the affect on interstate commerce is substantial the focus is not upon any one individual instance of the activity covered by the regulation but is rather upon whether the aggregate of all covered instances as a whole substantially affects interstate commerce. The validity of that general principle has long been clearly established, and is recognized in both Lopez and Morrison. At the same time, however, each of those decisions holds that the principle is not of universal or unlimited application, and refused to apply it to sustain the statutes there under consideration. Thus, in Morrison the Court recognized that the aggregate of instances of gender-motive violence within the scope of section 13981 did ultimately have a large effect on interstate commerce, id. at 1752, but nevertheless held that the aggregation principle could not be applied, stating: 80 We accordingly reject the argument that Congress may regulate non-economic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what is truly national and what is truly local.... The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the province of the States. Id. at 1754. 81 The central question in this case, then, is whether this Hobbs Act prosecution can be sustained under the aggregation theory. We now turn to that question. 82