Opinion ID: 6110141
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duren

Text: We now turn to Reams's fair-cross-section-of-the-jury claims pursuant to Duren . His argument on appeal is twofold. First, Reams argues that he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to death by a predominantly Caucasian jury that was drawn from a mostly Caucasian jury pool and did not come close to reflecting a fair cross-section of the Jefferson County community. Reams argues that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because he knew that the jury pools in Jefferson County were not representative of the community and knew the likely reason for it-racially discretionary selection by the courtroom bailiffs-yet trial counsel failed to engage in reasonable advocacy to ensure that Reams's Sixth Amendment rights were protected. Regarding the prejudice prong, Reams argues that the circuit court erroneously denied relief on the ground that Reams failed to prove that a jury not tainted by discrimination would have likely reached a different verdict. Reams contends that the only prejudice he had to demonstrate was that his underlying fair-cross-section claim had merit but was not raised because of trial counsel's deficient performance. For his second fair-cross-section  claim, Reams argues that the circuit court committed clear error in ruling that only his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was cognizable in these Rule 37 proceedings. Specifically, Reams argues that his fair-cross-section claim is cognizable because it is structural in nature. Reams argues that he should therefore be permitted to raise a Duren claim in his Rule 37 proceeding. Upon our review, we note that Reams recognizes that, generally, a petition under Rule 37 does not provide a remedy when an issue could have been raised at trial or argued on appeal. E.g. , Springs v. State , 2012 Ark. 87 , at 14, 387 S.W.3d 143 , 154 ; see also Sasser v. State , 338 Ark. 375 , 383-84, 993 S.W.2d 901 , 906 (1999) (stating that even constitutional issues must be raised in the circuit court and on direct appeal rather than in Rule 37 proceedings). Rule 37 is a postconviction remedy and, as such, does not provide a method for the review of mere error in the conduct of the trial or to serve as a substitute for appeal. Hulsey v. State , 268 Ark. 312 , 595 S.W.2d 934 (1980). However, we have made an exception for errors that are so fundamental as to render the judgment of conviction void and subject to collateral attack. Collins v. State , 324 Ark. 322 , 920 S.W.2d 846 (1996). When we review a fundamental or structural error either on direct appeal or through the exception described above, the fundamental nature of the error precludes application of the harmless-error analysis. Sasser , 338 Ark. at 384 , 993 S.W.2d at 906 . With respect to fundamental errors, we have held that the right to trial by a twelve-member jury is a fundamental right that falls within the above-stated exception. Collins, supra. We have also held that double-jeopardy protection is a fundamental right that can be raised in a Rule 37.1 proceeding. Rowbottom v. State , 341 Ark. 33 , 13 S.W.3d 904 (2000). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has determined that errors are structural in very limited cases. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. 140 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice); Sullivan v. Louisiana , 508 U.S. 275 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 , 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993) (right to trial by jury denied by giving defective reasonable-doubt instruction); Vasquez v. Hillery , 474 U.S. 254 , 106 S.Ct. 617 , 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (discriminatory exclusion of African American grand jurors); Waller v. Georgia , 467 U.S. 39 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984) (denial of the right to public trial); McKaskle v. Wiggins , 465 U.S. 168 , 104 S.Ct. 944 , 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984) (denial of the right to self-representation); Gideon v. Wainwright , 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (denial of right to counsel). The Court has explained that these structural defects defy analysis by 'harmless-error' standards because they affec[t] the framework within which the trial proceeds, and are not simply an error in the trial process itself. Gonzalez-Lopez , 548 U.S. at 148-49 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante , 499 U.S. 279 , 310, 111 S.Ct. 1246 , 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) ). Thus, the issue for our consideration is whether Reams's alleged fair-cross-section-of-the-jury violation falls within the very narrow structural- or fundamental-error exception. The United States Supreme Court has held that [t]he American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. Taylor v. Louisiana , 419 U.S. 522 , 527, 95 S.Ct. 692 , 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975). Under the Sixth Amendment, petit juries must be drawn from a source fairly representative of the community; however, an accused is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition.  Id. at 538 , 95 S.Ct. 692 . The Court explained further, We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation. The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge. Duncan v. Louisiana , 391 U.S. [145] at 155-156, 88 S.Ct. [1444] at 1450-1451 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) ]. This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial. 'Trial by jury presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the community as well as impartial in a specific case.... (T)he broad representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.' Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co. , 328 U.S. 217 , 227, 66 S.Ct. 984 , 90 L.Ed. 1181 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 419 U.S. at 530-31 , 95 S.Ct. 692 (alteration in original). Based on Duren , to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, a litigant must demonstrate (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. 439 U.S. 357 , 364, 99 S.Ct. 664 . In Grinning v. City of Pine Bluff , 322 Ark. 45 , 907 S.W.2d 690 (1995), this court considered Grinning's conviction for disorderly conduct that was tried before a six-member jury. On appeal, Grinning challenged the constitutionality of her jury. The State contended that Grinning had waived any objection and urged this court to hold that the issue had not been preserved for review. Relying on Winkle v. State , 310 Ark. 713 , 841 S.W.2d 589 (1992), and Wicks v. State , 270 Ark. 781 , 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980), we reached the merits in Grinning's appeal and reversed the circuit court: In both cases, neither the appellants nor their counsel objected to the violation of their jury trial right. In Winkle , this court stated that denial of the right to trial by jury in a criminal case, without the requisite waiver in accordance with the law, is a serious error for which the trial court should intervene, and is therefore an exception to the contemporaneous objection rule. Winkle , 310 Ark. 713 , 717, 841 S.W.2d 589 , 591 (citing Wicks v. State , 270 Ark. 781 , 606 S.W.2d 366 (1980) ). Grinning , 322 Ark. at 49, 907 S.W.2d at 692 . Grinning extended Winkle by holding that the right to a jury trial included not only having a jury, but also having a jury composed of twelve members rather than  only six. Id. Almost a decade later, in Anderson v. State , 353 Ark. 384 , 397, 108 S.W.3d 592 , 600 (2003), we again addressed the significance of a right to a jury trial and explained, The right to jury trial is part of the basic structure of our courts. Every judge, on his own motion, should accord such a basic right. In Wicks v. State , supra , we set out various exceptions to the contemporaneous objection rule, and we provided that the rule is not applicable when the trial court should intervene on its own motion to correct a serious error. This is such a serious error. The right to a trial by jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right of our jurisprudence and is recognized by the Magna Charta, the Declaration of Independence, the federal constitution, and our state constitution. Anderson , 353 Ark. at 398 , 108 S.W.3d at 600 (citing Winkle , 310 Ark. at 717-18 , 841 S.W.2d at 591 ). Based on our discussion above, the law is clear: the right to a jury trial is part of the basic structure of our courts. Here, in addressing Reams's argument regarding the composition of his jury, we hold that a twelve-member jury is meant to include twelve members who represent a fair cross-section of the community. In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that this extension is supported by our case law. As we explained in Grinning , We are well aware of the view expressed by the state that some abuse of the criminal justice system could result from our construction of the Arkansas Constitution and the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. However ... this may be the price the judicial system must pay to ensure that a defendant is not deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to a trial by jury. 322 Ark. at 50, 907 S.W.2d at 692 (internal citations omitted). Accordingly, we hold that a fair-cross-section-of-the-jury violation is structural and therefore cognizable in Rule 37 proceedings. Having found that a fair-cross-section claim is structural in nature, we now turn to the circuit court's denial of Reams's ineffective-assistance claim on the basis that Reams failed to demonstrate the Strickland prejudice prong. Again, the circuit court found as follows: f. Fair cross section - Jury Challenges ... Wainwright v. State , 307 Ark. 569 , 577-78, 823 S.W.2d 449 , 453 (1992) (per curiam) (fair cross section ineffective-assistance claim fails in absence of showing of prejudice). The United States Supreme Court has held that in certain Sixth Amendment contexts, prejudice is presumed. Strickland , 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . In Weaver v. Massachusetts , --- U.S. ----, 137 S.Ct. 1899 , 198 L.Ed.2d 420 (2017), the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a defendant must demonstrate prejudice when a structural error is raised in the context of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. In Weaver , the Court specifically found that a violation of the right to a public trial, which has been deemed structural in nature, does not necessarily lead to a fundamentally unfair trial. Id. at 1911 . Therefore, with regard to prejudice, the Court held that a defendant must demonstrate either a reasonable probability of a different outcome in his or her case or that the structural error was so serious as to render his or her trial fundamentally unfair. Id. The Court explained that [n]either the reasoning nor the holding here calls into question the Court's precedents determining that certain errors are deemed structural and require reversal because they cause fundamental unfairness, either to the defendant in the specific case or by pervasive undermining of the systemic requirements of a  fair and open judicial process. Id. The Court cited Vasquez v. Hillery , supra , which holds that the exclusion of African Americans from grand juries is a structural error. 5 Based on our discussion above and a review of the appeal before us, we hold that Reams's fair-cross-section claim is analogous to the structural error of excluding African Americans from grand juries. See Hillery. Unlike the public-trial violation in Weaver , a fair-cross-section violation necessarily renders one's trial fundamentally unfair. This holding is likewise consistent with our decision in Wainwright v. State , 307 Ark. 569 , 823 S.W.2d 449 (1992) (per curiam). The parties dispute the meaning of our reference to prejudice in Wainwright . The State contends that Wainwright supports its position that fair-cross-section violations are not structural errors and that prejudice is still required to show ineffective assistance of counsel. In that case, the petitioner alleged that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to timely object to the makeup of the jury panel before voir dire began or in failing to present evidence to show that the panel did not represent a fair cross-section of the community. We explained that the petitioner has not shown that he was prejudiced in that he has not demonstrated that the jury which tried him was not selected in accordance with the requirements of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 577-78 , 823 S.W.2d at 453-54 (emphasis added). Reams contends that this language indicates that this Court has made clear that ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on the failure to litigate fair cross-section violation must employ the prejudice test reserved for structural errors-that is, the Court must ask whether an error occurred rather than ask whether a reasonable probability exists that the error affected the outcome. We agree with Reams's interpretation of Wainwright and take this opportunity to clarify that the prejudice prong of Strickland is demonstrated through the existence of a fair-cross-section violation. Stated differently, prejudice is presumed if a fair-cross-section violation is established. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court clearly erred by requiring Reams to prove that he was prejudiced by his counsel's failure to pursue the fair-cross-section claim. We reverse and remand for further findings as to whether Reams has established a valid Duren claim using the three-prong test set forth above.