Opinion ID: 73608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Separation of Powers Under Article III

Text: The appellants next allege that the PLRA strips courts of their power and duty, enunciated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), to enforce effective remedies in constitutional litigation. The PLRA, they argue, does not simply regulate procedure in federal courts, but rather regulates the judicial enforcement of the Constitution generally – a power not granted to Congress. The 5 In Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 1997), the Second Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the PLRA against a separation of powers challenge. We have previously expressed disagreement with the rationale articulated by the Benjamin court. See Dougan, 129 F.3d at 1426 n.4. On December 23, 1997, the Second Circuit granted rehearing en banc in Benjamin, and oral argument was held on February 25, 1998. We also note that in Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998) a panel of the Ninth Circuit held the PLRA unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. On November 3, 1998, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel opinion and will hear the case en banc. See Taylor v. United States, 158 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1998). 9 purpose of the PLRA, appellants contend, is to place undue burdens upon the litigation of prison conditions in order to make such litigation impractical. The PLRA does not deprive courts of their authority to decide constitutional challenges to prison conditions. The PLRA requires only that the relief be “narrowly drawn,” go “no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right,” and “be the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(1)(A), (b)(2), (b)(3). Tailoring remedies to address the constitutional wrong is not an unusual practice. Congress has the authority to require a court in equity to make certain findings before issuing injunctive relief, see Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1087, and has previously legislated restrictions on the manner in which courts may grant prospective relief. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2049, 132 L.Ed.2d 63 (1995) (“the nature of the . . . remedy is to be determined by the nature and scope of the constitutional violation”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971) (same). Here, Congress has stated that the relief may not be broader than that which is necessary to protect the federal right. Importantly, the court may not terminate an existing decree if it finds that the decree satisfies the conditions set forth in section 3626(b)(3) at the time of the 10 motion to terminate. See Dougan, 129 F.3d at 1425. The district court, therefore, still has the ability to remedy constitutional violations. See Tyler v. Murphy, 135 F.3d 594, 597 (8th Cir. 1997) (“Section 3626(b)(3) expressly permits the district court to continue appropriately tailored prospective relief that the court finds necessary to remedy a current violation of federal rights. Thus, the statute preserves a court's ability to remedy constitutional violations.”); Thompson v. Gomez, 993 F. Supp. 749, 763 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (“PLRA does not substantively limit the power of courts to remedy constitutional violations.”). Accordingly, we hold that the PLRA does not deprive courts of their authority to enforce effective remedies in constitutional litigation.