Opinion ID: 1232885
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing of the Petitioners

Text: As discussed above, the requirement that a party be aggrieved by a FERC order is coextensive with the requirement that it be able to establish both constitutional and prudential standing to challenge that order. Three elements comprise the `irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.' LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 269 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)). To satisfy Article III's standing requirements, a party must demonstrate that `(1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.' Pac. Capital Bank, N.A. v. Connecticut, 542 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir.2008) (quoting Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000)). The injury in fact requirement has been characterized as an invasion of a legally protected interest. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The party seeking judicial review bear[s] the burden of alleging facts that demonstrate [its] standing. LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 268. Prudential standing is not a constitutional consideration but rather embodies `judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.' Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)). Prudential standing considerations include, inter alia, `the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked.' Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 7, 122 S.Ct. 2005, 153 L.Ed.2d 27 (2002) (quoting Allen, 468 U.S. at 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315).
FERC contends that the only interest Adirondack has ever identified to justify its presence as a party in the relicensing proceedingsits interest in the New York State Dam Hydroelectric Project resulting from its position as the managing partner of that projectis insufficient to serve as the current basis for an injury-in-fact given that Adirondack no longer is involved with that project. It therefore argues that Adirondack lacks standing to challenge any of FERC's orders. Adirondack concedes that it no longer owns or operates any hydroelectric projects on the Mohawk River, but it contends that it can establish an injury-in-fact resulting from FERC's orders in three ways. First, Adirondack points to the fact that various parties moved to intervene out-of-time in the relicensing proceedings. Those parties had a broad range of interests, including environmental, cultural, aesthetic, public health, historic preservation, and restoration interests. FERC denied those motions, in part, on the ground that Adirondack, which was already a party to the proceedings, appear[ed] aligned with the potential intervenors and thus could represent their interests. See November 16 Order Denying Rehearing, 117 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,189, at 61,933. Adirondack contends that this constituted a concession by FERC that Adirondack shared those interests and therefore would have standing to challenge FERC's orders, such that it would be unfair to let FERC argue now that Adirondack lacks standing because it has suffered no injury. Assuming arguendo that FERC conceded Adirondack's interest in the proceedings, a point on which we express no view, we nonetheless have an independent obligation to conduct our own standing inquiry. Kendall v. Employees Ret. Plan of Avon Prods., 561 F.3d 112, 117 n. 11 (2d Cir.2009). And although we recognize that a party's standing can be predicated on an injury to aesthetic, environmental, or recreational interests, see, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc., 528 U.S. at 183-84, 120 S.Ct. 693; LaFleur, 300 F.3d at 270-71, Adirondack offers no support for its assertion that it has suffered any such injury as a result of any of FERC's orders. Second, Adirondack asserts that it has an interest, in its capacity as the development subsidiary of Albany Engineering (Albany), in the general development of hydroelectric projects on the Mohawk and Hudson Rivers in the vicinity of the School Street Project. But this argument is to no avail. As an initial matter, although Adirondack states that Albany has initiated licensing proceedings for a project on the Mohawk River upstream from the School Street Project, it makes no argument that this project would be impacted in any way by the relicensing of School Street. Furthermore, any potential injury that might result from Adirondack's purported interest in developing future hydroelectric projects on the Mohawk River is far too hypothetical to establish standing, because that injury would be dependent upon (1) Adirondack actually pursuing those projects, and (2) the School Street Project affecting their development. See Baur v. Veneman, 352 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir.2003) ([T]o support standing, the plaintiff's injury must be actual or imminent to ensure that the court avoids deciding a purely hypothetical case in which the projected harm may ultimately fail to occur.). Third, Adirondack asserts that it has an interest that derives from the development of the Cohoes Falls Project. Its argument proceeds as follows: Albany is Green Island's agent and primary consultant with respect to the Cohoes Falls Project and thus stands to profit by doing work for Green Island on that project. As a subsidiary of Albany, Adirondack stands to earn profits as a result of the work that Albany will perform. If FERC relicenses the School Street Project, however, Green Island cannot develop the Cohoes Falls Project. This will have a financial impact on Albany, which, in turn, will cause economic harm to Adirondack. Adirondack's argument, however, suffers from two flaws. The first is that Adirondack's purported injury derives from Albany's financial injury. Although it is settled law that a party can establish standing even if it has suffered only an indirect injury, see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504-05, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975), that does not relieve that party from establishing that it actually will suffer a concrete injury. In this case, Albany's injury is purely speculative. If School Street were not licensed, then Albany would stand to profit from its relationship with Green Island only if (1) Green Island carried through with its stated intention of filing a license application for the Cohoes Falls Project, (2) Green Island continued to use Albany as a consultant on that project, and (3) work needed to be performed by Albany as Green Island competed for that license. Because Albany's injury is speculative, Adirondack's purported injury necessarily is speculative as well. But even assuming arguendo that Albany would suffer a non-hypothetical injury as a result of the licensing order, Adirondack fails to explain the mechanism by which injury would flow to it. Indeed, although Adirondack asserts that it stands to profit from the Cohoes Falls Project because it is a subsidiary of Albany, it cites no authority to support the proposition that a subsidiary necessarily suffers financial injury whenever its parent suffers economic harm. [9] Nor does Adirondack identify any facts or characteristics unique to this particular parent-subsidiary relationship that could lead us to the conclusion that Adirondack will suffer an injury if Albany suffers an injury. In sum, none of the injuries identified by Adirondack are sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement of the standing analysis. Consequently, Adirondack lacks standing to challenge any of FERC's orders.
Green Island was not permitted to intervene as a party in the relicensing proceedings. As discussed above, however, it is a party for the limited purpose of challenging FERC's denial of its motion to intervene. Furthermore, Green Island has standing to challenge FERC's order denying its motion to intervene and its order denying rehearing of that order. See City of Orrville, 147 F.3d at 989-90 n. 12; Covelo Indian Cmty., 895 F.2d at 585-86. Accordingly, we now consider Green Island's petition for review of FERC's denial of its motion to intervene, and FERC's denial of Green Island's request for rehearing of that decision.