Opinion ID: 2821411
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McPherron’s COA Applications in Both Appeals

Text: With the exception of several motions to disqualify the District Judge, all of McPherron’s motions essentially sought an immediate ruling and relief on the merits of his habeas claims. Thus, we construe those motions as motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) seeking relief from the District Court’s order of March 12, 2014, dismissing his habeas petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust. A COA is required to appeal the denial of habeas-related Rule 60(b) motions. See Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333, 340-41 (3d Cir. 1999). But see Wilson v. Sec’y Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 782 F.3d 110, 115 (3d Cir. 2015) (noting that “the vitality of [this holding in 1 In addition to those rulings, the District Court wrote that “this action is again DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).” (ECF No. 147 at 1.) The District Court never previously dismissed this action with prejudice or pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), and the Prison Litigation Reform Act does not apply to true habeas petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Santana v. United States, 98 F.3d 752, 756 (3d Cir. 1996). The District Court did dismiss McPherron’s action at E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 2-13cv-04477 with prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), and it entered the show cause order in that action that led to the filing injunction in this one. The District Court apparently mistook that action for this one in purporting to “again” dismiss this action with prejudice pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). We thus regard that portion of the District Court’s order as inadvertent and a nullity. 5 Morris] is undermined somewhat by . . . Harbison v. Bell,” 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009), but not deciding whether Harbison has abrogated it). We previously concluded that McPherron has stated potentially valid constitutional claims for purposes of the COA requirement, see McPherron, 537 F. App’x at 16-17 & n.2, so he is entitled to a COA if jurists of reason would debate the reasons for the District Court’s denial of these motions, see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Morris, 187 F.3d at 341. In C.A. No. 14-4336, jurists of reason would not debate the District Court’s order of October 3, 2014, denying McPherron’s “petition for federal relief” at ECF No. 97. McPherron argued that his state-court remedies were now exhausted because the Superior Court had quashed his PCRA appeal. As the District Court correctly concluded, however, McPherron still had not exhausted his state-court remedies because the Superior Court later reinstated that appeal and it remained pending at that time. For the same reason, we would affirm in C.A. No. 14-4336 to the extent that Harbison may have abrogated the requirement that McPherron obtain a COA. In C.A. No. 15-1415, however, jurists of reason would debate the District Court’s denial of McPherron’s motions at ECF Nos. 127 and 128. In those motions, McPherron argued that he had exhausted his claims or that exhaustion should be excused because the PCRA court was refusing to rule on the merits of his PCRA petition even though it had dismissed that petition without prejudice pending his parole-revocation appeal and both that appeal and his PCRA appeal had been resolved. Although we express no opinion on the merits of that issue, it appears that McPherron may be right. 6 McPherron submitted a letter from the PCRA court in which it asserted that it would take no action on his renewed PCRA petition because “I have ruled on your PCRA petition” and “there is nothing pending before me.” (ECF No. 128 at 3.) The PCRA court’s previous ruling, however, was merely to dismiss McPherron’s PCRA petition without prejudice in light of a then-pending appeal that has since been resolved in a way that does not appear to preclude PCRA relief. Thus, it appears that the PCRA court views the matter as closed without having addressed the merits of McPherron’s PCRA claims (or having concluded that they are procedurally barred). That circumstance may mean that McPherron has exhausted his PCRA claims or that exhaustion should be excused. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 198 (3d Cir. 2010) (“Fair presentation by the petitioner to the state courts is sufficient [to exhaust]; the claims need not have been considered or discussed by those courts.”) (quotation marks omitted); Gonce v. Redman, 780 F.2d 333, 336 (3d Cir. 1985) (“[T]he test of exhaustion is not whether the state courts have considered a petitioner’s claims, but whether they were afforded an opportunity to do so.”). In summarily denying these and McPherron’s other motions, the District Court wrote that they “are frivolous, fail to state viable claims for relief and arise out of matters that have been fully and finally adjudicated to conclusion in this Court in this Civil Action.” (ECF No. 147 at 1.) That is true of most of McPherron’s motions, but it is not true of his motions at ECF Nos. 127 and 128 seeking relief on the basis of these new and previously unaddressed developments. Thus, McPherron’s application for a COA in C.A. No. 15-1415 is granted as to the denial of these motions (but is otherwise denied). 7