Opinion ID: 1308443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Closing Argument of the Commonwealth's Attorney.

Text: Bunch contends that because the trial court ruled the jury could consider the aggravating circumstance of vileness but not dangerousness, it was error for the court to permit the Commonwealth's attorney in his closing argument to comment upon evidence which pertained to dangerousness. We reject this contention. The trial court's ruling on dangerousness did not foreclose the Commonwealth's attorney from commenting on evidence that tended to establish both dangerousness and vileness. The portions of the closing argument Bunch challenges concerned evidence of this dual character. It was not improper for the Commonwealth's attorney to comment upon this evidence in an effort, as he told the jury, to show that Bunch's stated desire to kill somebody indicated a depraved person. d. Instructions Defining Torture, Depravity of Mind, and Aggravated Battery. As indicated previously, the trial court in the sentencing phase of the case permitted the jury to consider only the aggravating circumstance of vileness. In an instruction generally tracking, but expanding upon, the language of Code § 19.2-264.4(C), the court told the jury in pertinent part that: Before the penalty can be fixed at death, the Commonwealth must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant's conduct in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman, in that it involved: a. torture; or b. depravity of mind; or c. aggravated battery to the victim beyond the minimum necessary to accomplish the act of murder. [Emphasis added.] [2] Bunch contends the trial court erred in denying instructions he proffered which, he says, would have properly defined the terms torture, depravity of mind, and aggravated battery. We disagree with Bunch. We held in Clark that it is not reversible error for a trial court to refuse to define the statutory terms included in the aggravating circumstances upon which a sentence of death may be based. 220 Va. at 211, 257 S.E.2d at 790. Bunch argues, however, that Godfrey mandates definitional instructions and thus overrules Clark. We do not concur in Bunch's reading of Godfrey. The Court's concern there was not with the trial court's instructions, but with the Georgia Supreme Court's adoption, contrary to its earlier holdings, of such a broad construction of the term depravity of mind that the death penalty could be imposed for crimes reflecting a consciousness materially [no] more `depraved' than that of any person guilty of murder. 446 U.S. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767. But, given the lesson of Godfrey and considering the construction we have applied consistently to the term depravity of mind ever since our first decision on the subject in Smith, [3] we do not believe there can exist in Virginia the danger expressed in Godfrey that the death sentence might be imposed on `caprice or emotion.' 446 U.S. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767. We adhere to the view expressed in Clark, therefore, and hold that the trial court's instruction on vileness was sufficient. Indeed, [a]s to the trial court, Godfrey does not require that the court do any more than state exactly what the statute says. Westbrook v. Zant, 518 F.Supp. 1262, 1264 (M.D.Ga.1981); accord Stamper v. Baskerville, 531 F.Supp. 1122, 1130-31 (E.D.Va.1982). e. Failure of Trial Court to Set Aside Death Sentence. Under Code § 19.2-264.5, before imposing sentence when punishment has been fixed at death, the trial court shall consider the report of a probation officer as well as all other relevant facts and, upon good cause shown, may set aside the sentence of death and impose a life sentence. Bunch contends the trial court erred in not setting aside his death sentence. The record shows that the trial court received the report and heard the testimony of a probation officer and also heard the testimony of Robert Showalter, M.D., a psychiatrist. After hearing argument of counsel, the trial judge stated that he had spent many, many hours reviewing the evidence and had compared Bunch's sentence with all the cases involving the death penalty that were forwarded to [him] by the Supreme Court pursuant to Code § 17-110.1(E). The judge concluded that he would not interfere with the jury's verdict. Bunch's argument on this point stresses his lack of a prior criminal record. He also emphasizes the testimony of the psychiatrist to the effect that Bunch was under extreme emotional distress at the time he murdered Thomas and yet is capable of rehabilitation. As the Attorney General points out on brief, however, the record unerringly supports the proposition that the murder of Thomas resulted from a depraved and evil mind, rather than a disturbed one. Hence, we do not believe Bunch established good cause sufficient for the trial court to set aside the sentence of death.