Opinion ID: 1975112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vindictiveness/Due Process

Text: [6] ¶ 28. To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation `of the most basic sort.' United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372 (1982) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978)). ¶ 29. In North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969), the United States Supreme Court held that [d]ue process of law . . . requires that vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new trial. The Court further held that since the fear of such vindictiveness may unconstitutionally deter a defendant's exercise of the right to appeal or collaterally attack his first conviction, due process also requires that a defendant be freed of apprehension of such a retaliatory motivation on the part of the sentencing judge. Id. [7] ¶ 30. It is clear, then, that [w]hile sentencing discretion permits consideration of a wide range of information relevant to the assessment of punishment, due process requires that it must not be exercised with the purpose of punishing a successful appeal. Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798 (1989) (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723-725). ¶ 31. To protect defendants against due process violations upon resentencing, the Supreme Court in Pearce adopted the following rule: In order to assure the absence of such a [vindictive] motivation, we have concluded that whenever a judge imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant after a new trial, the reasons for his doing so must affirmatively appear. Those reasons must be based upon objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding. And the factual data upon which the increased sentence is based must be made part of the record, so that the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. Because the defendant in each of the two cases at issue in Pearce had received a longer sentence after retrial without any reason or justification being offered beyond the naked power to impose it, the Supreme Court concluded that the longer sentences violated due process. Id. at 726. ¶ 32. Justice White concurred in Pearce, stating he would authorize an increased sentence on retrial based on any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding. Id. at 757 (White, J., concurring). This position departs somewhat from the Pearce majority, which appeared to limit the facts or information capable of justifying an increased sentence to conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing. Id. at 726. ¶ 33. The Pearce majority, however, also stated a bit more broadly elsewhere in its analysis that a court is not constitutionally precluded . . . from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant's `life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities.' Id. at 723 (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245 (1949)). The difference between conduct occurring after and events subsequent to the original sentencing seems subtle, but in any event, Justice White clearly would have allowed a harsher sentence based upon any information not known to the trial judge at the time of the initial sentencing, whether it pertained to conduct or events occurring before or after the initial sentencing. ¶ 34. Later decisions of the Supreme Court have amplified the Pearce holding. In Goodwin, a case involving an allegation of prosecutorial rather than judicial vindictiveness, the Court characterized the Pearce rule as a presumption of vindictiveness, which may be overcome only by objective information in the record justifying the increased sentence. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374. The Supreme Court explained in Goodwin that the presumption is necessary because [m]otives are complex and difficult to prove. Id. at 373. Because of this difficulty in proving that a harsher sentence was actually motivated by vindictiveness, the Court stated that in certain cases in which action detrimental to the defendant has been taken after the exercise of a legal right, the Court has found it necessary to `presume' an improper vindictive motive. Id. ¶ 35. In Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134 (1986), the Court clarified that Pearce did not necessarily limit the scope of the information capable of overcoming the presumption to `conduct or events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings.' Id. at 141 (quoting Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 572 (1984)). The Court held in McCullough that [t]his language . . . was never intended to describe exhaustively all of the possible circumstances in which a sentence increase could be justified. Restricting justifications for a sentence increase to only `events that occurred subsequent to the original sentencing proceedings' could in some circumstances lead to absurd results. Id. The Court in McCullough found no due process violation in an increased sentence after retrial where, in the second trial, unlike in the first, there was evidence that the defendant had actually committed the crime rather than merely aided and abetted it. Id. at 143. ¶ 36. The McCullough holding was based in large part on Wasman, in which the Court upheld an increased sentence after retrial based upon a new criminal conviction on an unrelated crime, where the new conviction was obtained after the first trial but arose out of conduct that occurred before the first trial. The Court held that [c]onsideration of a criminal conviction obtained in the interim between an original sentencing and a sentencing after retrial is manifestly legitimate. Wasman, 468 U.S. at 569-70. The Court also stated that [t]here is no logical support for a distinction between `events' and `conduct' of the defendant occurring after the initial sentencing insofar as the kind of information that may be relied upon to show a nonvindictive motive is concerned. Id. at 571-72. ¶ 37. The Court has also clarified that the Pearce presumption does not apply to every instance in which a defendant receives an increased sentence after successful post-conviction proceedings. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799. Because automatic application of the presumption may block a legitimate response to criminal conduct, the Court has applied it only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373. [8] ¶ 38. Thus, in Smith, the Supreme Court held that the Pearce presumption does not apply to a longer sentence imposed after a trial where the defendant had first been convicted and sentenced on a negotiated guilty plea that was later reversed on appeal. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799. The Court explained that [w]hile the Pearce opinion appeared on its face to announce a rule of sweeping dimension, [] subsequent cases have made clear that its presumption of vindictiveness `does not apply in every case where a convicted defendant receives a higher sentence on retrial.' Smith, 490 U.S. 799 (quoting Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 138 (1986)). Due process is not offended by all possibilities of increased punishment upon retrial after appeal, but only by those that pose a realistic likelihood of `vindictiveness.'  Id. at 800 n.3 (quoting Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27 (1974)). Furthermore, a mere opportunity for vindictiveness is insufficient to justify the imposition of a prophylactic rule. Id. (citing Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 384, and Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. 357). ¶ 39. More specifically, in Smith, the Supreme Court explained the justification for and application of the Pearce presumption as follows: As we explained in Texas v. McCullough , the evil the [ Pearce ] Court sought to prevent was not the imposition of enlarged sentences after a new trial but vindictiveness of a sentencing judge. Ibid. See also Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 25 (1973) (the Pearce presumption was not designed to prevent the imposition of an increased sentence on retrial for some valid reason associated with the need for flexibility and discretion in the sentencing process, but was premised on the apparent need to guard against vindictiveness in the resentencing process). Because the Pearce presumption may operate in the absence of any proof of an improper motive and thus . . . block a legitimate response to criminal conduct, United States v. Goodwin, supra, 457 U.S., at 373, we have limited its application, like that of other judicially created means of effectuating the rights secured by the [Constitution], to circumstances where its `objectives are thought most efficaciously served,' Texas v. McCullough, supra, 475 U.S., at 138, quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 482, 487 (1976). Such circumstances are those in which there is a reasonable likelihood, United States v. Goodwin, supra, 457 U.S., at 373, that the increase in sentence is the product of actual vindictiveness on the part of the sentencing authority. Where there is no such reasonable likelihood, the burden remains upon the defendant to prove actual vindictiveness, see Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559, 569 (1984). Smith, 490 U.S. at 799-800. [3] Noting that the relevant sentencing information available to the judge after [a guilty] plea will usually be considerably less than that available after trial, the Court in Smith held that resentencing after a defendant withdraws his guilty plea and is convicted at trial does not present a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness so as to justify application of the Pearce presumption. Id. at 801. The Court also noted that in this situation, the trial court is not simply `do[ing] over what it thought it had already done correctly,' which might otherwise present a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness. Id. at 801-02 (quoting Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 117 (1972)). ¶ 40. Wisconsin case law on the propriety of imposing a longer sentence following successful post-conviction proceedings flows from State v. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d 461, 159 N.W.2d 577 (1968), which predated, but in a sense anticipated, the Supreme Court's decision in Pearce. In Leonard, this court concluded that [O]n resentencing following a second conviction after retrial, or mere resentencing, the trial court shall be barred from imposing an increased sentence unless (1) events occur or come to the sentencing court's attention subsequent to the first imposition of sentence which warrant an increased penalty; and (2) the court affirmatively states its grounds in the record for increasing the sentence. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d at 473. ¶ 41. The foundation for the Leonard rule, however, is not entirely clear. The opinion recites case law from other jurisdictions but then says only that [s]ix justices believe that until the United States Supreme Court has spoken unequivocally on this issue the approach of Marano [v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967)] is correct. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d at 473. The author of the opinion, Justice Wilkie, would have held that any increase in sentencing constitutes a violation of the due-process and equal-protection guaranties of the United States Constitution. Id. Marano, from which the Leonard rule derives, does not elaborate any legal foundation for its holding. Because Marano was a federal prosecution, however, we can assume that the decision was premised on federal constitutional principles. This court has subsequently stated that the Leonard rule [has] its basis in the due process clause of the state and federal constitutions [and] is designed to insure that the sentencing judge does not modify a criminal sentence for the purpose of penalizing a defendant who exercises his postconviction rights. Grobarchik v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 461, 473, 307 N.W.2d 170 (1981). ¶ 42. A year after Leonard, the Supreme Court decided Pearce. Subsequent Wisconsin case law has not reconciled the two cases with any clarity or consistency. We have stated that the Leonard rule is both substantially similar to and broader than the Pearce rule, and also that the two rules are based on the same purposes and due process rules. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 687. ¶ 43. We have stated that Justice White's concurrence in Pearce is more in accord with Leonard. Denny v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 541, 545, 178 N.W.2d 38 (1970). In State v. Stubbendick, 110 Wis. 2d 693, 698, 329 N.W.2d 399 (1983), we characterized Denny as adopt[ing] Justice White's concurrence in Pearce, even though Denny did not do so, and it would be odd for a state court to adopt a single-vote Supreme Court concurrence as authoritative on a matter of federal constitutional law. In any event, the issue in Stubbendick was whether a circuit court may constitutionally impose an increased sentence after the defendant withdraws his no contest plea and goes to trial. The Supreme Court subsequently concluded in Smith that the Pearce presumption does not apply in this situation, so that actual vindictiveness must be shown to establish a due process violation. Smith, 490 U.S. at 799. ¶ 44. In Grobarchik and Martin, we held that neither the Pearce nor the Leonard rule was applicable where an initial sentence cannot be carried out because it was not authorized by law, and that in this situation, upon resentencing, an increased sentence is permissible only when `based upon a desire to implement the original dispositional scheme as manifested by the record in the first sentencing proceeding.' Carter, 208 Wis. 2d at 149-50 (quoting Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 474, and Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 687). ¶ 45. In Grobarchik, the original sentence on one count was invalid because of a defect in the circuit court's order of consecutive probation, in that the court had ordered the probation to commence on the defendant's release from prison as opposed to the completion of the imprisonment sentence (prison plus parole). Grobarchik, 102 Wis. 2d at 474-75. We concluded that the circuit court's correction of this error on resentencing, which operated to extend the period of supervision somewhat, was not subject to the Leonard or the Pearce rules. Id. at 473-74. Instead, we concluded that the resentencing was permissible because the court was motivated not by malice or vindictiveness in an attempt to penalize the defendant for seeking a correction of his sentence, but by a desire to implement its original dispositional plan. Id. at 475. ¶ 46. In Martin, the defendant had been convicted and sentenced to consecutive 17-year prison terms on armed robbery and second-degree felony murder predicated on the armed robbery. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 671-72. The back-to-back sentences were ordered concurrent to a four-year sentence the defendant was serving on a parole revocation. The circuit court granted the defendant's post-trial motion to vacate the armed robbery count on double jeopardy grounds, and resentenced the defendant to 20 years on the remaining second-degree murder count, consecutive to the parole revocation sentence, increasing his sentence on the murder but decreasing his total prison term from 34 to 24 years. ¶ 47. We declined to apply either Pearce or Leonard in Martin, and instead applied Grobarchik. Id. at 687-88. We concluded that because the circuit judge resentenced the defendant to correct a prior invalid sentence, the circuit court correctly attempted to implement the original dispositional scheme reflected by the record in the first sentencing proceeding. Id. at 688. We further held that [t]he new sentence was properly based on the record as initially compiled by the sentencing judge without any new evidence. To encourage the judge at resentencing to exercise independent discretion is inconsistent with the purpose of implementing the original dispositional scheme and would open the door to potential vindictiveness in the resentencing process. Id. ¶ 48. Martin and Grobarchik, therefore, appear to establish a rule that where the resentencing occurs to correct a prior invalid sentence, an increased sentence on any of the remaining counts does not violate due process as long as the circuit court does not deviate from the original sentencing record and dispositional scheme. [4] This rule is different from both Pearce and Leonard in that it disallows consideration of additional evidence and precludes application of new, independent sentencing discretion at resentencing. Applying this rule here would require reversal. At resentencing, the circuit court considered evidence outside the original sentencing record and evinced a clear intent to, and in fact did, depart from the original overall dispositional scheme. The circuit court added four years to Church's sexual assault sentence, increasing not just the prison term on that count but his overall prison term as well. ¶ 49. Applying either Leonard or Pearce also requires reversal, but applying Leonard would be problematic for a number of reasons. At first blush, Leonard appears to create a strict bar against increased sentences on resentencing (except where the two requirements are met), whether after retrial or otherwise. But while Leonard on its face applies to all resentencings, those following retrial or mere resentencings, id., we have held that there are some resentencings that do not fall within the Leonard rule. Grobarchik, Martin, and by implication the Ronzani-Gordon line of cases are not subject to the Leonard rule. Grobarchik and Martin guard against due process/vindictiveness violations on resentencing not by requiring the circuit court to state objective new factors on the record, but by requiring the circuit court to stick to the original record and general overall sentence structure. As we have noted, that did not occur here. ¶ 50. Reconciling Leonard with Pearce is difficult for another reason: the circumstances under which a harsher sentence may be imposed are stated more broadly in Leonard than in Pearce, even in light of later Supreme Court case law explaining the Pearce presumption. A longer sentence may be imposed under Leonard where events occur or come to the sentencing court's attention subsequent to the first imposition of sentence which warrant an increased penalty, as long as the court states its reasons on the record. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d at 473 (emphasis added). This appears to mean that events or conduct in existence and known to the prosecution but not brought to the circuit court's attention at the original sentencing hearing would be sufficient to justify a longer sentence on resentencing. ¶ 51. In practical terms, then, the resentencing, which occurs only because the defendant has been successful on post-conviction motion or appeal, can under Leonard become a second opportunity for the prosecution to persuade the judge to impose a harsher sentence based on information it could have presented the first time around, but did not. This contradicts Pearce's central purpose, which is to prevent the resentencing process from becoming a vindictive exercise that penalizes a defendant who has succeeded in having his conviction or sentence set aside. Our case law cannot provide less protection than federal due process law provides; at least some applications of the Leonard rule would be suspect under Pearce. [9] ¶ 52. We note also that the Leonard rule was expressly intended to apply until the United States Supreme Court has spoken on this issue. Id. There is now a significant body of Supreme Court case law on the due process implications of increased sentences. The constitutionality of an increased sentence upon resentencing is determined by reference to Pearce and the Supreme Court cases elaborating on the Pearce presumption. [10] ¶ 53. As we have stated, Church's increased sentence would not comply with the rule of Martin-Grobarchik. The circuit court evidently treated this resentencing as an opportunity to revisit the original sentence based upon updated information and argument. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the Pearce presumption is triggered. Although Church was not resentenced after retrial, as in Pearce, the circumstances of this case created the same sort of likelihood of vindictiveness as to require application of the presumption. ¶ 54. In this case, as in Pearce, the defendant received a longer sentence upon resentencing after successful post-conviction proceedings. The appeal in this case posed a direct challenge to a decision of the circuit court. The circuit court's decision on multiplicity was reversed, the entire case was remanded, and the circuit court was essentially `do[ing] over what it thought it had already done correctly.' Smith, 490 U.S. at 801 (quoting Colten, 407 U.S. at 117); Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 374, 383 nn. 5, 16 (quoting Colten). Inherent in these circumstances is the reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness that the Pearce presumption is intended to protect against. Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 373. [11] ¶ 55. The Pearce presumption of vindictiveness can be overcome if affirmative reasons justifying the longer sentence appear in the record and if those reasons are based upon objective information regarding events or identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant subsequent to the original sentencing proceeding. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 726. ¶ 56. The longer sentence in this case was premised on the passage of time: four years of incarceration had gone by, and Church was still (mostly) in denial and had not sought or received treatment. This does not constitute objective information of identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant subsequent to the original sentencing. It constitutes a subjective evaluation of the status of Church's rehabilitation at the time of resentencing, based not on any new facts but on the mere continued existence of the original facts. ¶ 57. Church was in denial and untreated at the time of the original sentencing. That he remained so four years later is not a new factor justifying a longer sentence after a successful appeal; it is merely a continuation of the status quo ante. Defendants who exercise their right to appeal often maintain their innocence. To premise an increased sentence after a successful appeal on a defendant's continued denial of responsibility, without more, comes far too close to punishing the defendant for exercising his right to appeal. ¶ 58. In addition, there is no evidence that Church refused any treatment opportunity while in prison. Indeed, the evidence at the resentencing hearing established that sex offender treatment was not typically offered until the end of an inmate's prison term and was not available to Church during his first four years of incarceration. ¶ 59. Accordingly, the circuit court's justification for the longer sentence herethat Church remained in denial and untreated four years into his prison term was insufficient to overcome the Pearce presumption. [5] Church's state of being in denial and untreated did not constitute a new factor, only a continuation of the same situation that existed at the time of the original sentencing. ¶ 60. In sum, we conclude that resentencing on convictions that remain intact after one or more counts in a multi-count case is vacated is not always required. Where, as here, the vacated count did not affect the overall dispositional structure of the original sentence, resentencing on the remaining counts is unnecessary. We also conclude that the increased sentence imposed upon Church was presumptively vindictive under Pearce, and was not supported by objective new factors in the record justifying the increase. Accordingly, the increased sentence violated Church's right to due process. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is reversed.