Opinion ID: 1057633
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Nature of the Proceeding: Surrender or Termination

Text: Since initiating his efforts to overturn the trial court's April 25, 2007 order terminating his parental rights and allowing adoption of his children by their stepfather, Father has characterized the (allegedly erroneous) action of the trial court as a surrender of Father's parental rights rather than a termination. Father asserts that the court did not follow proper statutory procedures in accepting his surrender, thereby invalidating it. A review of the statutory requirements confirms that, if a surrender was attempted, his assertion is correct. Tennessee law provides a mechanism for parents to surrender parental rights voluntarily under certain circumstances. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-111. Although the proceeding is judicial, it occurs privately in the chambers of a judge, id. § 36-1-111(b), and does not require a finding on the part of the judge that the parent had neglected, mistreated, or in any way failed to parent the child appropriately. Tennessee law anticipates, however, that the surrender of parental rights is made in favor of a specific other person or entity who must (or will soon) have physical custody of the child, see id. § 36-1-111(d)(6), and that the child will be made available for adoption, see id. § 36-1-102(47) (2005 & Supp.2009). Until the child is actually adopted, and if the child remains in the custody of the State, parents obligated to pay child support must continue to pay that support even after the voluntary surrender of parental rights. Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-111(r)(1)(A); State ex rel. C.V. v. Visser, No. M2006-01229-COA-R3-JV, 2007 WL 1462235, at  (Tenn.Ct. App. May 18, 2007). Courts frown upon the voluntary surrender of parental rights if such surrender means that the child loses the right to receive support. See C.J.H. v. A.K.G., No. M2001-01234-COA-R3-JV, 2002 WL 1827660, at  (Tenn.Ct. App. Aug. 9, 2002). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-111 also provides for specific steps that must take place to render the surrender valid. The surrendering parent must execute a written surrender on a prescribed form. Id. §§ 36-1-111(e), (k)(1)(A) & (B)(i). A home study must be available to the court. Id. § 36-1-111(a)(2). The surrendering parent must communicate under oath whether the parent desires to receive legal and/or social counseling and, if requested, have actually received such counseling before the surrender is valid. Id. §§ 36-1-111(d)(4) & (k)(2)(E)-(F). The court must verify under oath the averments of the sworn surrender. Id. § 36-1-111(k)(1)(B)(i). The court must also ascertain whether the child is of Native American heritage and/or the tribe or organization of which the child is a member; whether the child will be sent out of state for the purposes of adoption; whether the person has paid or received or been promised anything of value; whether the person is freely and voluntarily executing the surrender or parental consent; and whether the child has any real or personal property or any expectation of receipt of real or personal property and the nature of that interest. Id. § 36-1-111(k)(2)(B)-(D), (G)-(H). A statement also must be provided concerning who has custody of the child. Id. § 36-1-111(k)(2)(I). However, if a court fails to follow these specific requirements exactly, an appellate court may still review the proceeding and determine that, in its entirety, a substantial compliance with the requirements has been obtained. In re Adoption of Hatcher, 16 S.W.3d 792, 797 (Tenn.Ct.App.1999). In the instant case virtually none of the requirements necessary for a lawful surrender of an individual's parental rights is found in the record. Father never filed a petition to surrender his rights; he never executed the required statutory form; his appearance to discuss the matter was conducted in open court rather than in chambers; and his colloquy with the judge, though conducted under oath, contained only a few of the several required questions incident to a surrender. No home study was ever conducted, and Father was not advised that he had ten days in which to revoke his surrender, see Tenn.Code Ann. § 36-1-112(a)(1)(A) (2005). Although both Father's attorney and the trial court used the word surrender at least once during the hearing on the amended petition, in no other way does the record of the proceedings reflect any attempt to denominate Father's tender of his rights as a surrender or to follow the statutory procedures. Thus, we conclude that a surrender of Father's parental rights, as defined by statute, was neither attempted nor accomplished in this case. However, this does not end our inquiry about the efficacy of the proceeding. The pleading giving rise to this appeal was originally filed by Mother alone as a Petition for Termination of Parental Rights. An Amended Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Petition for Adoption by a Step Parent was later filed by Mother and Stepfather jointly. [9] As the source of the chancery court's jurisdiction, the amended petition cited a provision from the termination statute, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(a). [10] The contents of the amended petition fulfilled the requirements of a termination petition as set forth in section 36-1-113(d)(2)-(3). [11] The amended petition asserts four facts in support of terminating Father's parental rights: abandonment by willful failure to visit for four months; lack of any contact for two and one-half years; negligence resulting in an order suspending Father's visitation rights; and arrearage of $57,000 in child support. The amended petition asserts that termination is in the children's best interests. The amended petition neither uses the word surrender nor cites the surrender statute. Finally, the amended petition requests that Stepfather be allowed to adopt the children. At the April 19, 2007 hearing, in response to questions posed by his counsel, Father testified that he had reviewed the Amended Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption and agreed that he wish[ed] to allow the termination of [his] parental rights. He also agreed that he inten[ded] to freely and voluntarily surrender the rights to these children. The trial court orally found that the surrender by the natural father is freely and voluntarily made. The trial court captioned its written order as a Final Judgment of Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption. The order acknowledged the prior hearing on the Amended Petition for Termination of Parental Rights and Adoption by a Stepparent. The language of the final judgment repeatedly refers to the proceeding as a termination: This judgment reflecting the termination of parental rights . . . shall be filed in the court record. The termination of parental rights. . . is in the best interest of the children. The parental rights of [Father] are hereby terminated. . . . In describing Father's testimony, the trial court uses the word surrender, but the same finding subsequently refers to Father's loss of parental rights as a termination: [Father] testified under oath in open court that he agrees to surrender his parental rights to the minor children . . . and that the termination of [Father's] parental rights . . . [is] in the best interest of the children. From our review of the record, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Mother and Stepfather attempted to obtain termination, rather than surrender, of Father's parental rights in the trial court. The language of the amended petition expressly sought termination and was tailored to satisfy the requirements of the termination statute, not the surrender statute. Father's last-minute attempt to agree to the adoption certainly caused some confusion. Father's counsel asked Father if the children were Native American, a question more appropriate to a surrender. Although Father's attorney and the trial court used the word surrender during the hearing, the transcript reflects that counsel for both sides also referred to the underlying filing as a petition for termination. However, other than one isolated reference to surrender, the trial court's final judgment consistently describes the proceedings as a termination, and few steps necessary to a surrender were included. We conclude that the Court of Appeals correctly characterized the trial court proceedings, even after Father indicated his consent, as a termination of parental rights.