Opinion ID: 1673800
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: People v Barker

Text: Defendants were each charged with one count of kidnapping, MCL 750.349; MSA 28.581, and one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1); MSA 28.788(2)(1). Each crime is punishable by any term of imprisonment up to life. The complainant charged that defendants forced her into their automobile, knocked her unconscious, drove some 15 to 18 miles into the country and there raped her. Defendant Barker was convicted by a jury of kidnapping and third-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520d; MSA 28.788(4), and was sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 18 months. Defendant Slayton was convicted of kidnapping, but acquitted of any criminal sexual conduct, and was sentenced to five years of probation, six months of which were to be spent in prison. People v Barker, 90 Mich App 151; 282 NW2d 266 (1979). Defendant Slayton appealed as of right. Defendant Barker was granted a delayed appeal. Their appeals were consolidated for review by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the kidnapping convictions of both defendants, holding that the trial court committed reversible error by instructing the jury that they could satisfy the required asportation element of kidnapping by finding the existence of movement that is merely incidental to the offense of criminal sexual conduct. The Court opined that the rule set forth in People v Adams, 389 Mich 222, 236; 205 NW2d 415 (1973), [2] is not limited solely to the prevention of the distortion of lesser offenses into those more serious, but to further prevent one crime from being transformed into two (e.g., kidnapping and rape), and that those decisions holding Adams applicable to coequal offenses represent the better reasoned approach.