Opinion ID: 1342434
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Safety Belt Evidence

Text: The first issue raised by Ford in this appeal is the lower court's refusal to allow use of safety belt evidence at trial. Central to the trial court's ruling in this regard is the safety belt statute set forth in West Virginia Code § 17C-15-49. In addition to requiring that all occupants of vehicles on public highways wear safety belts, this statute contains a provision limiting when and for what purpose evidence of violations of the safety belt law is admissible in court. In this latter regard, the statute provides as follows: (d) A violation of this section is not admissible as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence or comparative negligence in any civil action or proceeding for damages, and shall not be admissible in mitigation of damages: Provided, That the court may, upon motion of the defendant, conduct an in camera hearing to determine whether an injured party's failure to wear a safety belt was a proximate cause of the injuries complained of. Upon such a finding by the court, the court may then, in a jury trial, by special interrogatory to the jury, determine (1) that the injured party failed to wear a safety belt and (2) that the failure to wear the safety belt constituted a failure to mitigate damages. The trier of fact may reduce the injured party's recovery for medical damages by an amount not to exceed five percent thereof. In the event the plaintiff stipulates to the reduction of five percent of medical damages, the court shall make the calculations and the issue of mitigation of damages for failure to wear a safety belt shall not be presented to the jury. In all cases, the actual computation of the dollar amount reduction shall be determined by the court. Ford's argument regarding application of the safety belt law has two elements. The first is that the lower court's reading of the statute is overly broad. Ford asserts that under the literal terms of the statute the only time evidence of a violation of the statute is inadmissible is when it is offered on the issues of negligence or mitigation of damages beyond the express limits of the statute. Second, Ford says that applying the language of the statute so as to preclude introduction of evidence of safety belt use in a crashworthiness case is unconstitutional. Ford supports this position by arguing that where the design of an entire restraint system is called into question, a manufacturer may not be precluded from explaining to the jury how all of the various components of the restraint system were intended to work without violating due process principles. A crashworthiness case involving a motor vehicle is sometimes referred to as a secondary impact, second collision, or enhanced injury case. 62A Am.Jur.2d Products Liability § 1020 (1997). This is because a defendant's liability is based on an alleged failure to protect the occupants of a vehicle from the consequences of the crash rather than liability for the crash itself. Id. The crashworthiness doctrine was adopted in West Virginia in Blankenship v. General Motors Corporation, 185 W.Va. 350, 406 S.E.2d 781 (1991). Syllabus point one of Blankenship addresses the enhanced injury premise of the doctrine in the following way: A complaint against the seller of a motor vehicle states a cause of action under West Virginia law if the complaint does not allege that a vehicle defect caused a collision, but alleges only that the injuries sustained by the occupant as a result of the collision were enhanced by a design defect in the vehicle. (Emphasis in original.) Ford contends that the lower court failed to appreciate that the provisions of the safety belt statute only preclude introduction of safety belt use in order to address issues of negligence or mitigation of damages rather than the adequacy of a product's design. The lower court's analysis of subsection (d) of West Virginia Code § 17C-15-49 is reflected in the following findings contained in the March 14, 2007, order denying Ford's post-trial motions. There is a two part analysis to section (d). The first part states that a violation of 17C-15-49, which is the failure to wear a seat belt, is not admissible as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence or comparative negligence in any civil action or proceeding for damages, and shall not be admissible in mitigation of damages. This language plainly relates to negligence and damages. The second part of section (d) relates to causation.... [E]vidence of not wearing a seat belt is admissible for the purpose of causation, unless the injured party stipulates to the five percent (5%) reduction of medical expenses.... Once the injured party stipulates to the five percent (5%) reduction, then evidence of not wearing a seat belt is not admissible. Plaintiffs stipulated to the five per cent (5%) reduction, which the Court applied to the verdict. This statute was enacted well over ten (10) years ago and this Court does not believe it is unconstitutional. We concur generally with the lower court's reading of the statute. The portion of the safety belt statute on which Ford focuses its argument states: A violation of this section is not admissible as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence or comparative negligence in any civil action or proceeding for damages, and shall not be admissible in mitigation of damages[.] W.Va.Code § 17C-15-49(d). Arguing the correctness of its interpretation of this statutory provision, Ford asks us to consider the course other courts, primarily federal, have taken in applying similar preclusive provisions of other states' laws. After examining the cases raised by both parties in support of their respective positions and the cases discovered through our independent research, [5] about the only certain conclusion to which we can arrive is that there is a split of authority regarding the adoption of what is dubbed the safety belt defense in crashworthiness cases. See also 1 Handling Motor Vehicle Accident Cases 2d § 1A:10 (2008); 63A Am.Jur.2d Products Liability § 1031(1997). Ultimately, the question boils down to statutory construction and treatment of legislative policy determinations by the courts. Concisely stated, Ford argues that it has designed a restraint system for the safety of an occupant of its motor vehicle. Unless reference is made to a part of that system, i.e. safety belts, Ford is unable to fully present its defense to the jury. We understand the concerns expressed by Ford. Nonetheless, we are obligated to look at the wording of the safety belt statute, which is admittedly broad. We essentially are being asked to insert the phrase except in crashworthiness cases into the statute in order to reach the result Ford wants. Ford proposes that the safety belt statute does not bar admission of evidence of a person's failure to wear a safety belt except when it would be used as evidence of negligence or contributory negligence or comparative negligence ... [or] in mitigation of damages. W.Va.Code § 17C-15-49 (d). Ford maintains it did not want to offer the safety belt evidence for any of these purposes, but instead wanted to use it to refute Ms. Estep's claim that Ford did not use reasonable care in designing the 1999 Ranger to restrain occupants in a crash such as this. Although couched in different terms, Ford's intended use of the evidence nevertheless does relate to negligence and mitigation of damages. It would allow Ford to show that Ms. Estep contributed to her enhanced injury by failing to wear her safety belt, which in turn could influence the issue of mitigation of damages. [6] Without a proviso excluding crashworthiness cases, such use of this evidence is in derogation of the express terms of the safety belt statute. West Virginia Code § 17C-15-49 (d) does not specifically address the use of safety belt evidence in crashworthiness or design defect cases, but the phrase in any civil action or proceeding for damages is certainly broad enough to encompass such actions. In matters of statutory construction, `[a] statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full force and effect.' Syl. pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 65 S.E.2d 488 (1951). Syl. pt. 1, Sowa v. Huffman, 191 W.Va. 105, 443 S.E.2d 262 (1994). The Legislature chose not to limit the effect of this statute to cases proceeding on a theory of negligence alone as it extended the provisions regarding limitation and preclusion of safety belt evidence to all civil actions. The public policy expressed through the terms of the statute is that non-use of safety belts may only be raised in a civil action to mitigate damages, and even that use is limited to situations where the plaintiff does not stipulate to a five percent reduction in medical damages. As to statements of public policy, this Court is not at liberty to substitute our policy judgments for those of the Legislature. Taylor-Hurley v. Mingo County Bd. of Ed., 209 W.Va. 780, 787, 551 S.E.2d 702, 709 (2001). Consequently, we hold that in a crashworthiness or enhanced injury case involving a motor vehicle, the express provisions of West Virginia Code § 17C-15-49(d) (1993) (Repl.Vol.2004) limit the introduction of evidence of safety belt use in any civil action or proceeding for damages when, upon motion of the defendant, the trial court determines that failure to wear a safety belt was a proximate cause of the injuries sustained, and the trier of fact determines through use of a special interrogatory that (1) the injured party failed to wear a safety belt and (2) such omission constituted a failure to mitigate damages. Upon such findings, the trier of fact may reduce the injured party's recovery for medical damages in an amount not to exceed five percent. The statute further provides that introduction of safety belt use evidence is precluded when an injured party stipulates to a five percent reduction of medical damages. We turn now to Ford's secondary argument regarding the applicability of the safety belt statute to crashworthiness cases. Although less fully developed than its first argument, Ford's claim essentially is that even if it is found that the preclusive evidentiary provision of West Virginia Code § 17-C-15-49(d) is written broadly enough to include crashworthiness cases, the statute must be deemed unconstitutional as applied to such cases because it deprives manufacturers the opportunity to fully defend their positions. See Syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Miller v. Locke, 162 W.Va. 946, 253 S.E.2d 540 (1979) (A statute may be constitutional as written yet be unconstitutionally applied in a given case.). In order for a statute to withstand constitutional scrutiny under the substantive due process standard, [7] it must appear that the means chosen by the Legislature to achieve a proper legislative purpose bear a rational relationship to that purpose and are not arbitrary or discriminatory. State ex rel. Harris v. Calendine, 160 W.Va. 172, 179, 233 S.E.2d 318, 324 (1977) (footnote added). Thus the question raised under the facts of the present case is whether precluding safety belt evidence in a civil action in which the crashworthiness of a vehicle is called into question bears a rational relationship to some legitimate State concern. See Hartsock-Flesher Candy Co. v. Wheeling Wholesale Grocery Co., 174 W.Va. 538, 328 S.E.2d 144 (1985). A law will be upheld under the rational basis test as long as it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Sale ex rel. Sale v. Goldman, 208 W.Va. 186, 194, 539 S.E.2d 446, 454 (2000). In subsection (f) of West Virginia Code § 17C-15-49, the Legislature enlists the cooperation of the State Police, other state departments and agencies and county and municipal law-enforcement agencies with the Governor's Highway Safety Program to conduct an educational program to promote and encourage compliance with safety belt laws. The statute provides that [t]his program shall be focused on the effectiveness of safety belts, the monetary savings and the other benefits to the public from usage of safety belts and the requirements and penalties specified in this law. Id. This provision embodies the purpose or intent of the Legislature in enacting the safety belt law: the Legislature sought to promote public safety by protecting drivers and passengers traveling on our state highways. Protection of the citizenry is a legitimate state interest. Based upon the facts before us, the evidentiary preclusion set forth in the mandatory safety belt law appears to be a reasonable extension of the concern of the Legislature for the protection of drivers and passengers by allowing them to stipulate to a fixed reduction in damages in order to seek recovery unimpeded by the safety belt defense when they are injured in an accident. Taken as a whole, West Virginia Code § 17C-15-49 represents a rational policy that punishes noncompliance with the safety belt mandate through fines if certain conditions are met, [8] but avoids a second punishment of denying or severely limiting an injured plaintiff's recovery in a related civil action. The public policy underlying the statute may also reflect legislative recognition that such evidence could prove highly prejudicial and confusing to the trier of fact. We additionally observe that the Legislature did not ignore the interests of defendants in such cases since it tempered the effect of the evidentiary preclusion by specifying a statutory method for mitigating damages. This legislative intent and purpose is furthered whether or not the evidence of safety belt use is limited or precluded under the terms of the statute. Accordingly we find that West Virginia Code § 17C-15-49 (d) (1993) (Repl.Vol.2004), providing for the limitation or preclusion of the use of safety belt evidence in any civil action or proceeding for damages, has a reasonable and rational basis related to a legitimate state interest and does not violate the due process guarantee of Article III, section 10 of the West Virginia Constitution. When considering substantive due process challenges to statutory provisions, this Court is not at liberty to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. Of course, the Legislature is free to alter its policy statement by amending the safety belt statute to provide an exception for crashworthiness/enhanced injury cases. Thus, Ford's recourse for obtaining the relief it desires is legislative rather than judicial.