Opinion ID: 77845
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Order Was Reasonably Specific.

Text: Straub next argues that the order that he was charged with violating was not reasonably specific. Determining whether an order is reasonably specific involves a factual inquiry that must consider the context in which the order was entered and the audience to which the order was addressed. Bernardine, 237 F.3d at 1282 (quoting In re McDonald, 819 F.2d 1020, 1024 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam)). An order meets the `reasonable specificity' requirement only if it is a `clear, definite, and unambiguous' order requiring the action in question. In re E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.-Benlate Litig., 99 F.3d 363, 370 (11th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Koblitz, 803 F.2d 1523, 1527 (11th Cir.1986)). Straub argues that the order was not reasonably specific because the term removal could have meant moved from the shed to the water instead of fully launched and towed away. Straub's argument fails. The order of April 15 provided instructions for moving Hull No. 4 from Broward's shed into the water and for removal of the hull, engines, and any of [Seagrove's] other property still located on Broward's premises. The purpose of the order would have been undermined if it had prohibited Straub's interference with the transfer of the hull to the water but not the towing of the hull. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to support the conclusion that the order was reasonably specific about the meaning of the term removal. Straub also argues that the term premises was not reasonably specific because it left unclear whether the water and boat slip were included within the meaning of premises. Because Straub did not raise this issue during the contempt proceeding, we review for plain error. See Brough, 297 F.3d at 1180. Although the order of April 15 referred initially to the premises as including the launching facilities but later listed the premises and the launching facilities separately, the purpose of the order would have been undermined if it had not prohibited Straub's presence at the launching facility. It was not plain error for the district court to conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, was sufficient to determine that the order was reasonably specific about the term premises.