Opinion ID: 4375711
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inherent Anticipation

Text: The Board found that Ye discloses that the M1 protein (i.e., the recombinant “shell protein” as claimed) binds to viral RNA (the recombinant “bifunctional polynucleotide” as claimed). Bd. Op. at . The Board quoted Ye’s disclosure that “[t]wo domains in M1 have been shown to affect the disposition of RNA. One domain residing in a palindromic stretch of basic amino acids (101RKLKR105) has been shown to bind vRNA . . . .” Id. (quoting Ye at p. 7467, col. 2). This is substantial evidence supporting the Board’s conclusion that Perez inherently discloses “a bifunctional polynucleotide having . . . a second aptameric activity for retaining said bifunctional polynucleotide within said enclosure by assembly with the interior surface of said shell protein.” Qapsule acknowledges that the Board’s understanding of Ye is correct. Appellant Reply Br. at 5 (“Although Ye teaches that vRNA binds to M1, Ye also teaches that ribonucleoproteins (RNP) also binds to M1 and that binding by both vRNA and ribonucleoproteins (RNP) are necessary for virus assembly . . . .”). Qapsule, however, attempts to differentiate the present claims by arguing that viral assembly in Ye occurs in the presence of ribonucleoprotein. However, the present claims use the open-ended term “comprising,” and do not exclude capsule assembly in the presence of ribonucleoprotein as long as the claimed IN RE: QAPSULE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 9 “bifunctional polynucleotide” (here, the viral RNA) assembles with the interior surface of the “shell protein.” See Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001): When a patent claim uses the word “comprising” as its transitional phrase, the use of “comprising” creates a presumption that the body of the claim is open. In the parlance of patent law, the transition “comprising” creates a presumption that the re- cited elements are only a part of the device, that the claim does not exclude additional, unrecited elements. Similarly, the word “having,” in the clause “a bifunctional polynucleotide having . . . a second aptameric activity for retaining said bifunctional polynucleotide within said enclosure by assembly with the interior surface of said shell protein” does not exclude additional, unrecited elements from participating in capsule assembly. See id.: The transition “having” can also make a claim open. However, the term “having” does not convey the open-ended meaning as strongly as “compris- ing.” “Having,” for instance, does not create a presumption that the body of the claim is open. Therefore, this court examines the claim in its full context to determine whether [Applicant’s] use of “having” limits claim 1 to its recited elements. (internal citation omitted). Claim 1 does not require that the claim excludes capsule assembly in the presence of ribonucleoproteins, as Qapsule has argued. First, the whole of the claimed “synthetic capsule construct” is offset by the “comprising” transitional, signaling the intent to have an open-ended claim that would allow for additional, unrecited elements beyond the listed shell protein, cargo protein, and bifunctional polynucleotide. The specification defines “synthetic capsule 10 IN RE: QAPSULE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. construct” broadly to mean “a non-naturally occurring capsule,” ’773 Appl. at p. 39, ll. 19–20, and defines the term “capsule” in equally broad language to mean “a nanoparticle sized structure having a well organized outer layer that defines an enclosure . . . ,” id. at p. 39, ll. 14–16. Qapsule has not directed us to any language that would rebut the presumption that has arisen from its choice to use the “comprising” transitional. Additionally, the use of the “having” transitional does not alter the construction, for it is specific to the recited “bifunctional polynucleotide” limitation and not the claimed “synthetic capsule construct” as a whole. The “having” transitional within this claim offsets two “aptameric activit[ies],”which the specification defines as “binding affinit[ies] . . . for a protein tag or protein binding site,” ’773 Appl. at p. 39, ll. 23–25. Although this usage, in conjunction with the “bifunctional” qualifier of nucleotide, could imply that the number of “aptameric affinities” of the polynucleotide should be limited, this does not restrict unrecited elements from participating in capsule assembly as long as the “bifunctional polynucleotide” possesses the two recited aptameric affinities. In sum, it does not affect the Board’s ground of rejection that Qapsule has purportedly created a capsule that will assemble in the presence of only a shell protein, cargo protein, and bifunctional polynucleotide, see Appellant Reply Br. at 6, for representative claim 1 is not so limited. Thus substantial evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that the Perez recombinant viral RNA inherently meets the “bifunctional polynucleotide” limitation in claim 1. Qapsule further argues that the Board misapplied the requirement of structural identity for inherent anticipation under In re Best. 562 F.2d 1252, 1256 (CCPA 1977) (“Where, as here, the claimed and prior art products are identical or substantially identical, or are produced by identical or substantially identical processes, the PTO can IN RE: QAPSULE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. 11 require an applicant to prove that the prior art products do not necessarily or inherently possess the characteristics of his claimed product.”). We find that the Board properly applied the concept of inherency on an element-by-element basis in order to establish that the M1 protein, viral RNA, and PB1 protein would meet the claimed “shell protein,” “bifunctional polynucleotide,” and “cargo protein” limitations, respectively. On appeal, Qapsule points to the presence of additional elements in Perez, such as a lipid envelope and other proteins, as evidencing a structural difference between Perez’s influenza A disclosure and the recited limitations of representative claim 1. See Appellant Br. at 9–12. Qapsule contends that these structural differences negate anticipation. That is incorrect, as applied herein, for as discussed supra, Qapsule’s claims are not limited to the three recited components. The Board correctly found that the Examiner met his burden of establishing structural identity of the claimed synthetic capsule construct in view of the scope of representative claim 1, and that this prima facie case has not been rebutted by the Applicant. See In re Jung, 637 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (explaining the burdenshifting framework during prosecution); In re Mousa, 479 F. App’x 348, 352 (applying the same specifically to inherency). Qapsule also argues that unlike the influenza A of Perez, Qapsule’s synthetic capsule is functionally different because it is non-infective and has utility in the chemical industry. Appellant Reply Br. at 8 (“Appellant’s claimed synthetic capsule construct is a simple system with three components and is employable in industrial chemical processes; in contrast, Perez’s virus particles are complex with many components and lack industrial applicability, but they might be employable for germ warfare.”). However, unclaimed functional distinctions or uses are insufficient to overcome anticipation. It is not before us to decide 12 IN RE: QAPSULE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. whether further specificity in the claims might distinguish these references. “First, and most importantly, the language of the claim defines the scope of the protected invention.” Bell Commc’ns Research, Inc. v. Vitalink Commc’ns Corp., 55 F.3d 615, 619 (Fed. Cir. 1995); see Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Greenleaf, 117 U.S. 554, 559 (1886) (“The scope of letterspatent must be limited to the invention covered by the claim, and while the claim may be illustrated it cannot be enlarged by language used in other parts of the specification.”). Unclaimed limitations cannot distinguish the claims. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc. v. Biogenex Labs., Inc., 473 F.3d 1173, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“[I]t is improper to limit the claim to other, unclaimed features.”). The structures of Perez anticipate representative claim 1. Unclaimed differences do not avoid anticipation, for claim 1 as written, in its breadth, reads on Perez. The Board correctly rejected claim 1 on this ground. We have considered all of Qapsule’s arguments, and affirm the judgment of the Board. AFFIRMED No costs.