Opinion ID: 3049898
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: If the vehicle is on an incline, the vehicle will

Text: potentially roll down the incline (emphasis added). Rakowicz believed that the tip-on-tip condition warranted a recall. At retrial, he testified that he was personally aware of 22 reported rollaways when he wrote his report.3 However, 1 Rakowicz also testified at the second trial that a “field campaign refers to recall,” and that “self-releasing refers to spontaneous disengagement.” 2 At the retrial, Rakowicz testified that this paper reflected a “misunderstanding” of the test results, and that he came to understand that the tests did not show spontaneous disengagement. But Rakowicz did not testify to such a misunderstanding in either of two depositions or at the first trial. 3 Rakowicz also acknowledged that, unbeknownst to him, Ford had additional reports of rollaways at the time. WHITE v. FORD MOTOR CO. 11001 more senior engineers at Ford disagreed with Rakowicz’s draft and required him to tone it down, concluding instead that the Orscheln test was not valid. Id. Thus, the CPPRG did not then or ever refer the matter to Ford’s Field Campaign Review Committee (FCRC), which made recall decisions. At the same time, Ford management worried about a recall and its potential cost. At a February 23, 1993 meeting of Ford and Orscheln personnel, a senior Ford engineer lamented that “this problem may cause serious financial ramifications for both companies with warrant recall.” A March 30, 1993 memo similarly referred to a full recall as the “worst case scenario.” The ultimate cost to recall 875,000 manual transmission vehicles was approximately $22 million. In March 1993, Orscheln proposed a solution for the skip out problem. The fix was a small plastic wedge, costing 15 cents to manufacture, which could be installed over the pawl to make sure it pressed down between the teeth instead of skipping over them. However, the wedge also disabled the self-adjusting feature of the brake and increased Ford’s cost. Id. at 1003-04. Meanwhile, the evidence of problems with the F-series parking brake increased, and in the same month (March 1993), the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) became involved in the investigation, having received reports of rollaways. In May 1993, Ford disclosed to NHTSA 65 reports of either skip-through or rollaway. The agency requested additional information in September 1993, including complaints, testing documents and accident reports, which Ford provided in February 1994.4 In addition, the agency collected and inspected 10 parking brake assemblies from complainants, bench tested five of these assemblies and 4 In its response to NHTSA, Ford also reported that it had only one reported injury from rollaway. White I, 312 F.3d at 1004. However, evidence at the retrial showed that five injuries had been reported to Ford, with the fifth coming in September 1993. 11002 WHITE v. FORD MOTOR CO. tested three of them on a complaint vehicle. Although NHTSA was unable to detect a “spontaneous disengagement” malfunction in these specific assemblies, it did find that some of them experienced skip out.5 By August or September 1993, the plastic wedge was approved for use, and enough were manufactured for Ford to install them in all of the trucks on the road.6 Id. at 1003. But rather than recall the vehicles, Ford issued a Technical Service Bulletin to dealers on November 10, 1993, making the wedge available for any vehicle owner who complained about a problem with skip out. Id. at 1004. The bulletin did not mention spontaneous disengagement or rollaway. In mid-1994, NHTSA began to pressure Ford to conduct a recall and install the wedge as a precautionary measure. On August 30, 1994, and in response to NHTSA’s urging, Ford informed the agency that it had decided to recall 884,400 manual transmission vehicles — which included 1992 through 1994 F-series pickup trucks — “rather than engag[e] in a protracted dispute with the agency.” In its letter to the agency, Ford stated that “[a]lthough all of the vehicles are potentially susceptible to the condition arising, less than one percent” — or 8,440 vehicles — “are expected to exhibit it, 5 Specifically, NHTSA observed 15 malfunctions during the bench tests of the five parking brake assemblies, where the assemblies were cycled 9,400 times. Fourteen of these malfunctions were of the skip out type, while the other was a failure-to-engage. On the vehicle tests, three parking brake assemblies were cycled almost 800 times, resulting in seven malfunctions, one of which was a skip out. The agency also observed additional skip out malfunctions on the vehicle for two of the three complaint parking brake assemblies during other tests. 6 Also by this time, Orscheln had proposed a design change for future vehicles referred to as a “cam-in,” which prevented skip out and the tipon-tip condition while also maintaining the self-adjusting feature. In late 1993, Ford authorized the use of the cam-in on future models. Ford was thus left to decide whether to correct the problem in vehicles that would be manufactured or sold prior to the availability of the cam-in and whether to recall vehicles already on the road. WHITE v. FORD MOTOR CO. 11003 and those which do . . . are expected to do so on an intermittent basis.” In describing the problem, Ford noted that it “may occur occasionally when the parking brake control self-adjust pawl lines up in a tip-to-tip relationship with the self-adjust ratchet,” explaining that “[i]f this occurs, the pawl may skip over one or more teeth in the ratchet during parking brake application.” Ford further informed the agency of 44 reports of “unattended vehicle[s] roll[ing] and result[ing] in property damage,” one of which alleged that an injury had occurred. However, the Whites proved at retrial that Ford knew of at least eight injuries and that it had received reports of over 100 rollaways at the time it submitted its letter to NHTSA. In November 1994, Ford provided NHTSA with its proposed recall notice, which stated: “During rapid pedal application of the parking brake, the pedal may go to the floor with little or no effort. Should this occur, the parking brake system may not achieve full tension, potentially resulting in parking brake ineffectiveness, or diminished effectiveness.” NHTSA acknowledged receipt of the recall notice and described the defect as: “The parking brake control self-adjust pawl does not line up properly with the self-adjust ratchet allowing the pawl to skip over one or more teeth in the ratchet. The parking brake will not hold the vehicle allowing the vehicle to roll freely.” The agency, however, did not ask Ford to make any changes to its notice. On December 16, 1994, Ford issued its recall notice to vehicle owners.7