Opinion ID: 2156512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: When Such Writs May Be Issued

Text: In In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. 280, 539 A.2d 664 (1988), our seminal opinion on prerogatory writs authored by Judge William Adkins, we considered this Court's authority to issue prerogatory or extraordinary writs such as writs of mandamus or prohibition. Although there is no express language authorizing the issuance of such writs by this Court as an aspect of our original jurisdiction in the Maryland Constitution, we identified the power to do so as arising out of the Court's appellate jurisdiction. We explained: The Maryland Constitution is silent as to any mandamus or prohibition power in this Court. The only general statutory provision dealing with mandamus jurisdiction is [Md.Code (1973, 2002 Repl.Vol.); § 3-8B-01 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article]; it relates only to the circuit courts. Nor is there any express grant of superintending power to this Court. Whether we have, as the highest court in this State, an inherent superintending or supervisory power over the courts below us in the judicial hierarchy, and whether any such power is implicit in Article IV, § 18 of the Maryland Constitution, are questions we reserve for another day. We need not and do not address them today because we hold that under the circumstances of this case we have the power to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition in aid of our appellate jurisdiction. In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. at 292-93, 539 A.2d at 669-70 (citations omitted). Moreover, we stated that: it is manifestly necessary, to the ends of justice, that there should be a power in special cases to suspend proceedings on the matter appealed from.... Id. at 298, 539 A.2d at 672. We recognized that the availability of the writs in aid of our appellate jurisdiction has long been established, even if we almost never exercised the power to issue them, id. at 297, 539 A.2d at 672, and then considered what circumstances would properly warrant issuing a writ in aid of [our] appellate jurisdiction. Id. In response to this inquiry, we stated: [I]t appears that mandamus or prohibition may issue in aid of appellate jurisdiction even though no appellate proceeding is pending in the appellate court, at least where there is some potentiality of eventual appellate review by appeal or by certiorari.... If the writ is necessary to enable ... [the Court] to exercise appellate jurisdiction it is in aid of that jurisdiction. Id. at 302-03, 539 A.2d at 675. Thus, we recognized that by making possible the review of a potentially unreviewable question [writs such as mandamus and] prohibition aided the appellate process. Id. at 299, 539 A.2d at 673. These writs are used to prevent disorder, from a failure of justice, where the law has established no specific remedy, and where in justice and good government there ought to be one. Id. at 307, 539 A.2d at 677, citing Runkel v. Winemiller, 4 H. & McH. 429, 449 (Gen. Ct. Oct. Term 1799). The power to issue prerogatory writs is necessarily incident to this Court, to preserve the usefulness of its appellate jurisdiction. If it were otherwise, cases might arise in which the appeal would be but as a shadow, pending which the substance might be lost. In re Petition for Writ of Prohibition, 312 Md. at 298, 539 A.2d at 672, quoting Thompson v. McKim, 6 H. & J. 302, 333 (1825). In Philip Morris, Inc. v. Angeletti, 358 Md. 689, 752 A.2d 200 (2000), we determined that mandamus relief should be granted, based upon a petition for interlocutory relief, where a trial judge improperly certified a class action in complex civil litigation about tobacco. Id. at 699-700, 752 A.2d at 205-06. Several large tobacco manufacturers and distributors petitioned this Court to vacate the circuit court's certification of two plaintiff classes, current and former users of tobacco products, that claimed to be injured by tobacco use or nicotine addiction and argued that the circuit court grossly abused its discretion in certifying the classes, in violation of the Maryland Constitution and this Court's rules of civil procedure. Id. at 699-700, 704, 752 A.2d at 205-06, 208. We noted, however, that class certification normally was only appealable after a final judgment in the underlying case. Id. at 714, 752 A.2d at 213-14. See Md. Rule 8-131(d) (stating [o]n appeal from a final judgment, an interlocutory order previously entered in the action is open to review by the Court unless an appeal has previously been taken from that order and decided on the merits by the Court). Petitioners, therefore, would have had to endure a costly and lengthy trial and the trial court's entry of a final judgment before seeking appellate review of the class certification action. Philip Morris, Inc., 358 Md. at 714, 752 A.2d at 213-14. We concluded that although the traditional routes of appeal were available, because the parties would have suffered as a result of proceeding to trial based on the assertedly erroneous certification decision and the potential waste of judicial resources was substantial, this Court's exercise of its appellate jurisdiction at an interlocutory point in the proceedings was warranted. Id. We also found that, had there been no such intervention, the expense and delay of the trial would have prejudiced the parties' ability to utilize effectively the appellate process. Id. Thus, Judge Raker, speaking for this Court, stated, Both the public interest and our responsibility in exercising the supreme judicial authority of this State thus compel[led] the exercise of this Court's discretion in [that] extraordinary case. Id. at 718, 752 A.2d at 215. Accordingly, we issued the writ.