Opinion ID: 4564786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impaired Juror

Text: Walker also contends that the District Court abused its discretion when—rather than declaring a mistrial—it decided to dismiss a juror who advised the court that she had a nightmare after the close of the first phase of the trial, before the first set of verdicts was reached. He asserts that the episode reflects bias on the part of the excused juror, and therefore indelible taint in the proceedings leading up to her dismissal. Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure authorizes the court to “permit a jury of 11 persons to return a verdict, even without a stipulation by the parties, if the court finds good cause to excuse a juror.” We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s handling of juror dismissal, just as we do its denial of a Rule 33 motion. United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 168 (2d Cir. 2011). The District Court acted well within its discretion in denying Walker’s motion for a new trial on the basis of the excused juror’s hypothetical bias. The court reasonably considered the possibility of bias and found none, concluding that Walker was not, and had not been, harmed by the excused juror’s participation to that point. The juror stated under oath that she had been reminded of a long-ago robbery only after deliberations for the first phase of the trial had concluded and the verdict was announced; she had reported her concerns at the earliest possible opportunity; and she averred that she had not mentioned her dream to any of the other jurors. As the Supreme Court has explained, “the Constitution does not require a new trial every time a juror has been 27 placed in a potentially compromising situation.” Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 118 (1983). We see no basis to conclude that the District Court abused its discretion in its handling of this juror.