Opinion ID: 666019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Davis's Statement to Agent Richard Ludowig

Text: 42 Davis moved the trial court for suppression of certain statements Davis made following his arrest to Agent Richard Ludowig during processing. Davis based his motion on the grounds that the statements were not volunteered, but rather were made in response to Agent Ludowig's prompting in the course of a dialogue. The district court denied the motion finding that Davis was not being interrogated as that term is defined in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). 43 In Innis, the Supreme Court held that interrogation 44 refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. 45 Where an objective observer would believe that the encounter was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the defendant, the court will find that the encounter constituted the functional equivalent of interrogation. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300-01, 100 S.Ct. at 1689-90. Voluntary statements, however, are admissible and not subject to the Miranda warnings, unless the statements are the result of compelling influence. Innis, 446 U.S. at 299-300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689, quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The question of which party encouraged the dialogue between the police and the accused plays an indicative role in the determination of whether the statement was the result of compelled influence. Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 2097, 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988). 46 The facts here indicate that Davis initiated the conversation. On March 24, 1990, during processing, Davis told Agent Ludowig that he did not know he was wanted and did not kill anyone. Davis added, You'd better have some witnesses. Agent Ludowig responded that They sure did. Agent Ludowig also replied to Davis that [he] would get a chance if he so desired to do the right thing and to cooperate. Davis then replied, Don't treat me like those holes who were talking. Go ahead and move them out of state. They will get theirs. The prosecutor sought to admit these statements as relevant to show consciousness of guilt. 47 Davis cites to United States v. Gomez, 927 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1991), for the proposition that an officer's statements encouraging cooperation constitutes the functional equivalent of interrogation. The Gomez case, however, involved a DEA agent's disclosure to the defendant of the impact of mandatory minimum sentencing and the benefits of cooperating with the police. Arguably, the DEA agent's statements would tend to compel or at least be likely to elicit a response. The facts of Gomez, however, do not equate to the exchange between Davis and Agent Ludowig in the instant case. Agent Ludowig's reference to cooperation was prospective and did not follow threats of what would happen to Davis if he did not cooperate. 48 This Court finds that Davis's statements were freely and voluntarily offered and that nothing functionally equivalent to interrogation occurred in the exchange. See e.g., Innis, 446 U.S. at 295, 100 S.Ct. at 1687 (no interrogation where police officer, in the presence of defendant, said to someone other than defendant there's a lot of handicapped children running around in this area, and God forbid one of them might find a weapon with shells and they might hurt themselves, and defendant made incriminating statements); United States v. Taylor, 985 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1993) (no interrogation where police arrested and transported suspect who said Why is this happening to me? Officer replied, You can't be growing dope on your property like that, and suspect then made incriminating statement); United States v. Payne, 954 F.2d 199, 201 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1680, 118 L.Ed.2d 396 (1992) (no interrogation where police officer told suspect They found a gun at your house, and suspect then made incriminating statement); and United States v. Henderson, 770 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir.1985) (no interrogation where police officer said, Well, you had the pipe and you certainly scared him. You made him fear for his safety, and the defendant made an incriminating statement).