Opinion ID: 1383165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Freeman's prior offense as independently relevant to the issue of his intent.

Text: The state's second theory of admissibility is that the proof of Freeman's prior misconduct was directly and independently relevant on the issue of his intent with regard to the three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor charged against him. Although evidence of prior misconduct is as a rule inadmissible to show that the accused has a propensity to commit crime, we have consistently ruled that such evidence may be admitted if it is relevant for some other purpose. For instance, in Watson v. State [24] we held: Evidence that reveals the commission of an offense other than that for which the defendant is being tried is inadmissible if it is relevant merely to show criminal disposition. But such evidence is admissible, even when it shows the defendant's prior trouble with the law, when it is relevant to prove some other material fact. One of the most familiar instances in which evidence revealing the commission of another offense has been held admissible is when that evidence is relevant and necessary to show that the crime with which the accused is charged was committed with the requisite element of intent. [25] It is normally required that in order to be admissible on the issue of intent the prior misconduct of the accused must be similar to the crime charged and not too remote in time. Additionally, the intent of the accused must actually be in issue. [26] This last requirement deserves emphasis; for it is a requirement of substance, not of form. Evidence of other offenses committed by the accused will always be potentially prejudicial; for this reason, before such evidence is admitted, care must be taken to ascertain whether it is actually necessary in the circumstances of the particular case. Manifestly, where there is no dispute as to the issue of the accused's intent, evidence going merely to intent will be superfluous, and its only possible effect will be a deleterious one. Thus, in the words of United States v. Fierson, [27] to justify admission into evidence of an accused's prior criminal acts to establish willfulness and intent, it is necessary that willfulness and intent be more than merely formal issues in the sense that the defendant is entitled to an instruction thereon. While the question has not previously been ruled upon in Alaska, in other jurisdictions, evidence of prior sexual offenses committed by the accused has ordinarily been held to fall within the normal rules of admissibility; where such evidence was relevant on the issue of intent, it has been admitted. [28] Yet the law has also recognized that evidence of prior sexual misconduct is by its nature peculiarly apt to arouse the hostile sentiments of the jury. Consequently, courts have been particularly cautious in scrutinizing such evidence to assure, as a prerequisite to admissibility, that it is highly probative of the accused's intent and that the circumstances of the particular case are such as to demand specific proof of intent. Any doubt as to the relevance or necessity for such evidence has consistently been resolved in favor of the accused. [29] Within the context of a sex related offense, the classic example of proper use of prior misconduct as proof of intent is where the accused admits the act charged, but claims to have had a benign intent. A good illustration is People v. Goff, [30] where it was held: The rule is that when a defendant, testifying in his own defense, acknowledges the physical touch of a child but asserts his innocent intent, he definitely places in issue the necessary element of intent and the prosecution may then introduce evidence that the defendant has committed similar offenses upon a person or persons other than the prosecuting witness in order to rebut the testimony of the defendant on a point material to the establishment of his guilt of the crime charged. Although the rule stated in Goff will undoubtedly provide an accurate guide to admissibility in most cases of this nature, it should not be read inflexibly. Beyond the case where the accused admits a touching but denies culpable intent, there may arise cases where the acts charged are equivocal, and where there is a particularly close similarity and proximity between the facts of a prior offense and the facts of the offense charged. In such instances, the evidence of prior misconduct may be admissible despite the fact that the accused has not specifically raised the issue of intent. [31] We are of the view that in this case the detailed proof of Freeman's 1948 conviction falls far short of meeting the requirements for admissibility on the issue of intent. It must be noted that the relevance of this evidence was, at best, questionable. The subject of the state's inquiry was an offense committed in 1948, almost twenty years prior to the offenses charged against Freeman. Freeman was apparently not represented by counsel at the time of his prior conviction. [32] Moreover, the nature of Freeman's prior offense substantially differed from the offenses charged. As evidenced by the relatively light sentence given to Freeman in 1948, a distinction can be made between the case where an 18 year old boy makes indecent advances toward a 14 year old girl in his car, and the case where a 38 year old married man makes such advances toward the young playmates of his daughter in his own home. Adding to the probative weakness of the evidence of Freeman's prior offense is the fact that specific proof of Freeman's intent was simply not vital in the circumstances of this case. It is, of course, not contended that the evidence of Freeman's prior conviction was relevant to establish his intent with regard to the charges of statutory rape. As to these charges, there is little doubt that if Freeman committed the alleged acts, he did so with the requisite element of intent. Thus, the ostensible relevance of the prior crimes evidence is confined to the three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor pending against Freeman at the time of his cross-examination. A perusal of the testimony of the three complaining witnesses, taken together with the corroborating testimony of Freeman's step-daughter, reveals that the specific conduct with which Freeman was charged was in itself fairly strongly incriminating. A strong inference as to the culpability of Freeman's intent would have arisen from the specific nature of the conduct ascribed to Freeman by the state's witnesses. Nonetheless, it may be conceded that the acts with which Freeman was charged were not entirely unequivocal, and might have supported a plausible defense based upon lack of intent. Yet the fact is that such a defense was never advanced. It is crucial to note that prior to being cross-examined Freeman had already testified concerning the charges of contributing to the delinquency of a minor. His testimony made it obvious that he was not, in fact, basing his defense upon the innocence of his intent; instead, he flatly denied engaging in the conduct with which he was charged. Consequently, by the time the state began its cross-examination of Freeman, it had already become apparent that Freeman's intent with regard to the three counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor was not, and would not be, contested. Given this situation, it is simply difficult to perceive a compelling necessity for introducing evidence of other similar crimes on the issue of intent. Ultimately, the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes must be governed by balancing its probative value on a given issue against the potential for prejudice which it creates. Tenuous or marginal probative value of prior crimes evidence must never be allowed to serve as an excuse for implanting prejudice in the minds of the jury. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the highly prejudicial impact of the state's cross-examination far outweighed any value which it might have had on the issue of Freeman's intent.