Opinion ID: 405977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 13 Banco Nacional argues that the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict in favor of Banco Nacional on the issue of coverage. It advances two grounds to support this argument. First, Banco Nacional argues that the evidence is wholly insufficient to support the jury verdict. Second, it argues that because all of the affirmative defenses raised by Argonaut were stricken by the trial court, the trial judge was required to direct a verdict in favor of Banco Nacional. Banco Nacional also argues that the trial judge erred in failing to grant its motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. We reject these arguments. 14 The test for determining whether a party is entitled to a directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict is set forth in Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411 F.2d 365, 374-75 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc). We should consider all of the evidence-not just that evidence which supports the non-mover's case-but in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed to the motion. Id. at 374. It is proper to submit a case to the jury if there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evidence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions. Id. However, the court may not determine questions of credibility or weigh conflicting evidence or inferences. Id. at 375. 15 After reviewing the record before us, we conclude that there was substantial evidence supporting the jury verdict, and that therefore the district court properly denied appellant's motions for a directed verdict and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We reach this conclusion because of the evidence in the record supporting the theory that the Customs figures did not accurately reflect the amount of urea unloaded from the JAGAT PADMINI. The testimony of the bank's own employee, Mr. Duarte, who served as Banco Nacional's representative at the port during the discharge operation, indicated that the bulk urea that was placed in the warehouses at dockside was loaded directly into the warehouses without first being weighed. Mr. Duarte further testified that the only time that the urea was weighed was when it left the port on a truck. The record indicated that much of the bulk urea in the warehouses at port remained there for several months after the discharge operation was completed. The weighings of the bulk urea which formed the basis of the Customs figures, however, were completed by November 30, 1974, two days after the unloading was complete. The bank records reflecting the amounts of urea weighed as it left the port were not produced at trial. Thus, Mr. Duarte's testimony would support a conclusion by the jury that a large quantity of urea had escaped weighing by the Customs officials, and that the Customs document does not accurately reflect the amount of urea received in port. Although there is other testimony in the record which conflicts with that of Mr. Duarte, we of course may not weigh this conflicting evidence or make credibility choices among the witnesses. We therefore conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict in favor of Argonaut. 6 16 We find no merit in Banco Nacional's argument that it is entitled to a directed verdict because the district court struck the affirmative defenses raised by Argonaut. As indicated above, there is evidence in the record to support a conclusion by the jury that Banco Nacional had not carried its burden of proving a loss within the policy period. This provides ample basis for the denial of a directed verdict. In light of this, the fact that the trial judge had stricken the affirmative defenses raised by Argonaut is irrelevant, since the jury could have concluded that Banco Nacional had not proven its case. 17 Likewise, we must reject Banco Nacional's argument that the trial judge erroneously denied its motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. A motion for a new trial on weight of the evidence grounds is committed to the sound discretion of the district court, and the district court's denial of such a motion will be reversed by the court of appeals only where the record indicates an abuse of that discretion. Ellis v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 650 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir. 1981); 6A Moore's Federal Practice, P 59.08(5) (1979). In this case, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banco Nacional's motion for a new trial.