Opinion ID: 2712872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: past practice

Text: The parties have unambiguously expressed in the collective bargaining agreements their intent that the retirement ordinance governs the commission’s discretion to amend the actuarial tables used to calculate joint and survivor benefits and to ensure that retirees enjoy actuarially equivalent benefits regardless of the option that they select. Nevertheless, the charging parties claim that the past practice of using the female actuarial table to calculate those benefits created a new term or condition of employment that exists independently from the collective bargaining agreement. As stated, this Court’s caselaw allows a charging party to raise an unfair labor practice complaint for changing a term or condition of employment even when a collective bargaining agreement controls, but only when the new term or condition amounts to an amendment of the collective bargaining agreement. However, overcoming an unambiguous provision in the collective bargaining agreement requires the charging parties to “show the parties had a meeting of the minds with respect to the new terms or conditions so that there was an agreement to modify the contract.”65 The past practice 64 The collective bargaining agreement also supplies a grievance process “limited to a complaint or request of the grievant which involves the interpretation [or] application of, or compliance with, the provisions of this Agreement.” 65 Port Huron Ed Ass’n, 452 Mich at 312 (emphasis added). 21 must be “so widely acknowledged and mutually accepted that it creates an amendment to the contract.”66 The evidence here does not establish more than the charging parties’ unilateral expectation that the female actuarial table would continue to be used even if it were determined by the retirement commission that a different table would better effectuate the provisions of the retirement plan. The charging parties rely only on the fact that the female actuarial table has been used for more than two decades as dispositive of this issue. In Gogebic Community College Michigan Educational Support Personnel Ass’n v Gogebic Community College, the Court of Appeals ruled that the parties intended that the employer would have discretion to choose a dental insurance carrier because the collective bargaining agreement only articulated the benefits due employees.67 There, testimony that the union’s chief negotiator expected the employer to continue using a particular dental insurance carrier “does not amount to a ‘meeting of the minds’ that the employer would only use the [existing dental carrier] and falls far short of demonstrating conduct showing an unequivocal modification with ‘definite, certain, and intentional’ terms.”68 Gogebic is instructive in this case. Indeed, our conclusion here is stronger than that in Gogebic because the ordinance expressly stated that the retirement commission 66 Id. at 329 (emphasis added). 67 Gogebic Community College Mich Ed Support Personnel Ass’n v Gogebic Community College, 246 Mich App 342; 632 NW2d 517 (2001). 68 Id. at 354, quoting Port Huron, 452 Mich at 329. 22 has discretion to amend the actuarial table. Moreover, the parties negotiated the instant collective bargaining agreements before they took effect in 2005—after the retirement commission had been using the female actuarial table for 23 years. If the parties had intended to remove the discretion from the retirement commission’s authority, they had ample opportunity to do so. The fact that the retirement commission chose not to exercise its discretion until 2006 does not overcome the parties’ reaffirmation in their collective bargaining agreements of the discretion provided to the retirement commission in the ordinance. The dissent argues that § 15 of the retirement ordinance establishes the parties’ intent to enshrine the 100% female actuarial table as a term of employment, or at least creates an ambiguity regarding whether the retirement commission retained the discretion to adopt a different actuarial table. The dissent is wrong on both counts. First, § 15 of the ordinance initially reinforces that the retirement commission has discretion to formulate an appropriate actuarial table.69 Only then does this provision note that the retirement commission “is currently using . . . a blending of male and female rates.”70 This description of the current actuarial table does not in any way indicate the intent to limit the retirement commission’s discretion to adopt a different actuarial table in the future, nor does it create an ambiguity in the retirement commission’s discretion.71 69 “The Retirement Commission shall from time to time adopt such mortality and other tables of experience, and a rate or rates of regular interest, as are necessary in the Retirement System on an actuarial basis.” Macomb County Retirement Ordinance, § 15. 70 Id. (emphasis added). 71 In contrast to this case, the charging party in Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit provided evidence indicating that the employer admitted that the past practice was 23 Thus, § 15 does not negate—in fact, it reinforces—the retirement commission’s discretion to establish actuarial tables. Second, while the charging parties and dissent urge that the 100% female actuarial table was a bargained-for benefit that respondents could not unilaterally change, § 15 actually undercuts this argument. Rather than specifying with particularity that the retirement system was “currently using” the 100% female actuarial table, § 15 simply describes the then “current” actuarial table as a “blending of male and female rates.” Accordingly, the dissent’s reliance on § 15 is unfounded. Finally, the UAW asserts that the retirement commission acknowledged that the actuarial table is a term or condition of employment and points to a statement in the minutes that the county’s human resources director should “meet and confer (not meet and approve) with the unions regarding this change.” However, assuming that the retirement commission’s belief about the nature of these collective bargaining agreements was relevant, this statement actually belies the UAW’s claim that the retirement commission acted with the understanding that the actuarial table was a term or condition of employment. The statement indicates that the commission was not looking for the unions’ approval of the 60% male actuarial table but expected that the unions would be consulted about the change. The charging parties can point to no mutual commitment that the retirement commission would continue using the female actuarial table. As a result, binding. Detroit Police Officers Ass’n v Detroit, 452 Mich 339, 347; 551 NW2d 349 (1996). 24 the commission’s past practice of using the female actuarial table did not create a term or condition of employment independent from the collective bargaining agreements.