Opinion ID: 2598750
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Intentional Interference with the Parental Rights

Text: [¶ 12] In the first cause of action, the parents claimed the grandparents individually, and in conspiracy with the neighbors, interfered with their parent-child relationship by harboring the daughter and inducing her to remain out of their custody. The district court dismissed this count on the grandparents' motion claiming lack of in personam jurisdiction. It granted the neighbors' motions for summary judgment because the cause of action is not recognized in Wyoming. [¶ 13] The Restatement (Second) of Torts, entitled Causing Minor Child to Leave or not to Return Home, provides: One who, with knowledge that the parent does not consent, abducts or otherwise compels or induces a minor child to leave a parent legally entitled to its custody or not to return to the parent after it has been left him, is subject to liability to the parent. 3 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 700 at 505 (1977). [¶ 14] In Stone v. Wall, 734 So.2d 1038 (Fla.1999), the Florida Supreme Court reviewed the history of the action and thoughtfully analyzed the effects of recognizing the tort. We acknowledge, as referenced by the Stone court, that the majority of states has recognized this tort and Wyoming is not yet one of them. Stone, 734 So.2d at 1042 n. 6. [3] [¶ 15] In Cosner v. Ridinger, 882 P.2d 1243 (Wyo.1994), we declined to recognize the tort when a noncustodial parent asserted it alleging deprivation of visitation. This court reviewed the Wyoming statutes which give priority to the child's best interests as well as the public policy behind those statutes and concluded recognition of the cause of action in the context of custody and visitation could negatively impact children by encouraging more litigation in already volatile family circumstances. Our reasoning was greatly influenced by the policy considerations raised in Larson v. Dunn, 460 N.W.2d 39 (Minn.1990), as follows: For the good of our children, the law should seek to promote such harmony as is possible in families .... At a minimum, the law should not provide a means of escalating intrafamily warfare.... It is clear that this tort would be used as a new weapon in such disputes.... The interest in compensation should not outweigh the effects of bitter accusations on... children.... Creating this tort would create a new wrong. It would place innocent children in the middle of a vigorous, probably vicious, lawsuit .... Cosner, 882 P.2d at 1247 (quoting Larson, 460 N.W.2d at 45-46 (citations omitted)). [¶ 16] The intentional interference with parental rights cause of action is commonly referenced in divorce situations where the noncustodial parent, with or without collusion with relatives, absconds with the children and hides from the custodial parent. See Marshak v. Marshak, 226 Conn. 652, 628 A.2d 964 (1993); Weirich v. Weirich, 796 S.W.2d 513 (Tex.App.1990). The elements of the tort include compelling or inducing a child to leave the parents and refusing to return the child. Those elements are not present in this case, which more closely resembles a voluntary foster care placement. [¶ 17] The father's affidavit reflects, at the time of the daughter's abuse accusations against him, the DFS suggested a cooling off period during which the daughter would be temporarily placed outside the home. The parents asked the paternal grandmother and step-grandfather to take their daughter to live with them for approximately one month, and the grandparents agreed. At a minimum, the placement effected de facto custody in the grandparents, implicitly giving them the necessary authority to address the daughter's day-to-day needs. Such a voluntary placement agreement usually remains in effect until revoked because, generally speaking, the voluntary transfer of parental rights is only effective due to the parental consent and is, therefore, revocable at will. 3 Donald T. Kramer, Legal Rights of Children § 29.02 (2d ed.1994). Thus, the daughter must be returned to the parents, if the parents request, unless there is some authority to continue custody under the state's juvenile law. Id. [¶ 18] The evidence submitted in response to the motions for dismissal and summary judgment does not indicate the parents ever revoked their grant of temporary custody or requested that their daughter be returned. The father stated in his affidavit, [d]uring the trial, I, of course, was not allowed contact with my daughter as a condition of my release on bond. We can reasonably infer that the contact prohibition was not limited to just the period of the trial but actually began when the father was released on bond and remained in place through the conclusion of the trial. Therefore, we can further infer that, during this time frame, the daughter could not return to the family home unless the father left. [¶ 19] However, nothing in the record suggests, after the father's acquittal, the parents ever revoked the grant of temporary custody or demanded the daughter's return or the grandparents ignored or rebuffed requests of this nature. In fact, the only evidence of the parents even asking to visit their daughter was the mother's purported request for the daughter to come home for the 1998 Thanksgiving holiday. Even though the grandmother allegedly refused to permit this visitation, the parents did not respond at any time thereafter by revoking the voluntary placement or taking legal action to regain physical custody of their daughter. [¶ 20] The father contends, after he was acquitted, he went to Nebraska to see his daughter only to have the daughter and the grandparents call the police to intervene and prevent contact. The record reflects that the District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska issued ex parte domestic abuse protection orders on March 23, 1999, precluding the parents from contacting or communicating with the grandmother and the daughter. These orders stated, as provided in Neb.Rev. Stat. § 42-925 (1998), [4] that a respondent has the right to file a request for a show cause hearing to demonstrate why the order should not remain in effect. The Nebraska statute requires the court to hold the hearing within thirty days of receipt of the request, if timely made. Section 42-925. [5] The parents do not contend they were not properly served with the orders. However, despite the parents' alleged emotional distress caused by separation from their daughter and the prohibition of contact with her, the record contains no request for such a hearing or evidence of an attempt to contest the issuance of the orders and gain access to their daughter. [¶ 21] Likewise, the parents failed to demonstrate an effort to utilize the Wyoming court system to regain custody of their daughter before she turned eighteen years of age. They filed no legal action in either Nebraska or Wyoming for her physical return subsequent to the March 1999 abuse trial. Instead, they waited until January of 2000 to file this lawsuit to seek money damages alleging the grandparents, whom they had asked to care for the daughter, in conspiracy with the neighbors, intentionally interfered with their parental authority. The primary goal of this lawsuit does not appear to be the daughter's best interests. Instead, it appears to be a means for the parents to vindicate themselves and retaliate against the grandparents, the neighbors, and others who assisted the daughter while she was placed out of her home. See Politte v. Politte, 727 S.W.2d 198 (Mo.Ct.App.1987). [¶ 22] The parents' evidence fails to persuade this court that recognition of the intentional interference with parental rights tort in these circumstances will advance the best interests of children and families. Even if we were inclined to recognize the tort now, the parents have failed to establish a prima facie case that the elements of the cause of action were present. [¶ 23] The district court also concluded it had no in personam jurisdiction over the grandparents regarding this claim. We need not address the jurisdictional issue as we decline to apply the cause of action in these circumstances. [¶ 24] We affirm the district court's dismissal of this claim against the grandparents and its grant of summary judgment to the neighbors. This holding does not necessarily preclude future recognition of the cause of action under different circumstances.