Opinion ID: 1597851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim Brain Damage

Text: In this issue, Bates raises two claims. First, Bates cursorily states that he was deprived of a competent mental health expert in violation of Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). To the extent that Bates raises this Ake claim, it is procedurally barred as having been raised and rejected on direct appeal. See Bates IV, 750 So.2d at 16-17. Second, Bates argues that his resentencing counsel was ineffective for failing to present the testimony of Dr. Barry Crown, who would have testified to Bates' organic brain damage and to other mental health mitigation. The postconviction court held an evidentiary hearing on this claim and denied relief. We affirm that denial of relief. Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), this Court has held that for ineffective assistance of counsel claims to be successful, two requirements must be satisfied: First, the claimant must identify particular acts or omissions of the lawyer that are shown to be outside the broad range of reasonably competent performance under prevailing professional standards. Second, the clear, substantial deficiency shown must further be demonstrated to have so affected the fairness and reliability of the proceeding that confidence in the outcome is undermined. A court considering a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel need not make a specific ruling on the performance component of the test when it is clear that the prejudice component is not satisfied. Maxwell v. Wainwright, 490 So.2d 927, 932 (Fla.1986) (citations omitted). Because both prongs of the Strickland test present mixed questions of law and fact, this Court employs a mixed standard of review, deferring to the circuit court's factual findings that are supported by competent, substantial evidence but reviewing the circuit court's legal conclusions de novo. See Sochor v. State, 883 So.2d 766, 771-72 (Fla. 2004). Dr. Crown testified at the postconviction evidentiary hearing that it was his expert opinion that Bates had functional metabolic brain damage. Bates claims that his resentencing counsel was ineffective for not calling Dr. Crown as a witness during his trial. The postconviction court's order sets out this claim, stating: In the instant case, Thomas Dunn, as sentencing counsel, did offer extensive testimony from Dr. Larson and Dr. McMahon as mental health experts to explain why the defendant acted the way he did. Basically[,] they testified he suffered from an extreme mental disorder or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder due to several factors. However, sentencing counsel did not offer the testimony of a third mental health expert, Dr. Crown. [Bates] claims the failure to use the testing of Dr. Crown rendered sentencing counsel's performance ineffective. Defendant alleges Dr. Crown's testimony that the defendant suffered from a functional organic brain impairment was essential for the jury to consider in mitigation and the failure to present this testimony was not based on a strategic decision and was prejudicial to the defendant's case. Postconviction Order at 2-3. The postconviction court then found that defense counsel made a proper strategic decision not to call Dr. Crown. In its order, the postconviction court points to the following: It is, therefore, clear that trial counsel had investigated and presented evidence in mental mitigation. As to the decision not to offer Dr. Crown's testimony as to the existence of an organic brain impairment, the Court finds this was a strategic decision made in light of the existence of several factors. To fully understand why this Court believes this was, in fact, a strategic decision made by Mr. Dunn, it is necessary to closely review the record of the trial proceeding and the potential use of [an] MRI by the State in rebuttal of Dr. Crown's testimony. First, as noted previously, counsel had presented the testimony of Dr. Larson and Dr. McMahon to establish statutory mental mitigation and to answer the why question raised during opening statements. Dr. Crown's testimony could have been considered cumulative except for the additional element of the existence of organic brain impairment and its relationship to stress. Mr. Dunn did present testimony as to the defendant's reaction to his military experiences including his exposure to stress in the riots in Miami and to tear gas. Indeed, . . . Mr. Dunn used these in his hypothetical questions to his two mental health experts on the existence of any mitigating factors and to why the crime occurred. In response to a question on cross-examination on the significance of mace, Dr. Larson opined that I just think it's, I think it's one of the variables that probably participated [in] this situation. Mr. Dunn offered extensive testimony as to aspects of the defendant's life experiences and to how he was acting immediately after the crime had occurred. All of this testimony was offered not only as mitigating in and of themselves but also as additional support of the mental health experts' opinions as to why the crime occurred. Second, had Mr. Dunn called Dr. Crown, he would have had to negate the testimony of the State's rebuttal expert, Dr. Gregory Presser, a neurologist who had administered the MRI which showed the defendant had no organic brain damage. Mr. Dunn was fully aware of the existence of this report prior to his decision not to call Dr. Crown. Postconviction Order at 5-7 (record citation omitted). In addition to these facts, we note that Dr. Crown stated that he too was aware that the State had obtained an MRI that did not show any brain damage. However, he explained that a normal MRI would not prove that Bates did not have brain damage because MRIs do not show all types of brain damage. Specifically, Dr. Crown stated that Bates' type of brain damage  functional brain damage  would not appear on an MRI. He stated that he could have provided this same testimony in 1995 at Bates' resentencing. As we stated previously, the postconviction court denied this claim, concluding that Bates had not demonstrated that counsel was ineffective because Bates' trial counsel made an informed, advised decision not to call Dr. Crown. We find no error in the postconviction court's decision, which that court explained well in its extensive order. Even if we did conclude that counsel had been deficient in not calling Dr. Crown, we find that trial counsel not calling Dr. Crown at the resentencing did not prejudice Bates so as to be a basis for relief under Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052. At the resentencing, Bates' trial counsel presented the testimony of two experienced psychologists, Dr. Larson and Dr. McMahon, who gave testimony consistent with Dr. Crown's resentencing deposition and his testimony at the postconviction evidentiary hearing. Dr. Crown did add that his findings as to Bates' deficits showed that Bates had organic brain damage and a low stress threshold. When asked by the State in his deposition how exactly does the fact that he has these mental deficits . . . relate to what happened inside that insurance office in 1982, Dr. Crown responded, I believe that that lowered the threshold for him in dealing with stress, and later added, [i]n simple terms, his higher cortical functions shut down. Or in the sense, he froze. Thus, the crux of Dr. Crown's testimony was that Bates had brain damage that caused him to have an inability to deal with stress, and therefore he made poor decisions while under severe stress. Dr. Larson and Dr. McMahon testified at the resentencing that Bates had a lowered threshold for stress and that this caused him to make poor decisions. The single difference was that they did not expressly attribute Bates' deficiencies to brain damage. Further, they testified that as a result of Bates' lowered stress threshold and the other facts of the crime, Bates was under a substantial emotional disturbance at the time of the crime, and he was unable to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. Thus, since Dr. Larson and Dr. McMahon testified to Bates' lowered stress threshold, all that Dr. Crown could offer as noncumulative evidence was an opinion  unsupported by any showing on an MRI  that a basis for Bates' condition was organic brain damage. Accordingly, Dr. Crown's opinion testimony would have been substantially cumulative to the testimony of Dr. Larson and Dr. McMahon. To the extent that his opinion added the link to the brain damage, under the circumstances of this case, that link is not sufficient to undermine our confidence in the outcome. Accordingly, we affirm the postconviction court's denial of this claim.