Opinion ID: 4556240
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Robinson

Text: With respect to Robinson’s actions during the incident, Plaintiff does not appear to challenge the constitutionality of Robinson’s initial tase, but rather claims that Robinson’s subsequent taser cycles were objectively unreasonable. This is unsurprising, because Robinson repeatedly ordered Kapuscinski to separate from Christina before tasing him. Given the severe distress Christina appeared to be in and Kapuscinski’s failure to comply, this initial taser deployment was clearly reasonable. As for the subsequent discharges, we will take the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and assume that each tase was successful. But it is clear from the record that those discharges did not subdue Kapuscinski. In fact, that is partially why Mitchell’s taser deployment was justified. Moreover, the foregoing Graham analysis applies with equal force to Robinson. Each subsequent taser discharge was justified under the same logic: Kapuscinski was resisting arrest, he continued to present an active, energetic threat, and the defensive use of a taser to preserve officer safety was reasonable. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that Robinson is supervisorily liable for Mitchell’s taser deployment. In Binay v. Bettendorf, 601 F.3d 640, 650 (6th Cir. 2010), we held that an officer can be liable for excessive force employed by a fellow officer if she “supervised the officer who used excessive force, or . . . owed the victim a duty of protection against the use of excessive force.” But because Mitchell did not use excessive force against Kapuscinski, Robinson cannot be liable under this doctrine. Consequently, Kapuscinski’s alternative claim fails as well. Therefore, summary judgment was properly granted to Robinson. - 16 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al.