Opinion ID: 770594
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Plaintiffs' First Amendment Activity and the Defendants' Chilling Conduct

Text: 43 Although the HUD officials frame this case in terms of a complex doctrinal debate involving Noerr-Pennington immunity and its labor law permutation, we find it to be, at heart, quite simple. In opposing their local government's approval of the Bel Air project, White, Deringer, and Graham engaged in activity paradigmatically protected by the First Amendment. The HUD officials' eight-month investigation into the plaintiffs' activities and beliefs chilled the exercise of their First Amendment rights. The plaintiffs are entitled to seek a remedy for this constitutional violation. 44
45 The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . . Here, the plaintiffs wrote and distributed flyers and published a newsletter in the advocacy of a politically controversial viewpoint -the essence of First Amendment expression. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) (The Constitution specifically selected the press, which includes not only newspapers, books, and magazines, but also humble leaflets and circulars, to play an important role in the discussion of public affairs.) (citation omitted). They organized and participated in a coalition of neighbors who shared their views, admirable or not. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984) ([I]mplicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment [is] a corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.) (citations omitted); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (describing as beyond debate that freedom of speech encompasses freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas) (citations omitted). The right to expressive association includes the right to pursue, as a group, discriminatory policies that are antithetical to the concept of equality for all persons. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, _______ U.S. _______, _______, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2457-58 (2000). 46 The First Amendment also guarantees the right to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.  The plaintiffs exercised this right by attending and speaking out at Zoning Adjustment Board hearings and by challenging in the courts the board's decision to grant a use permit for the Bel Air project. See, e.g., Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 896 F.2d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 1990) (neighbors who opposed zoning permit application by church by circulating a petition, testifying before the Planning Commission and writing letters to the editor were fully protected by the first amendment); Evers v. County of Custer, 745 F.2d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 1984) (activity of property owners who urged county officials not to close what they believed was public road falls within the first amendment's protection of the right to petition the government for redress of grievances) (citing Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961)). Regardless of what we might think of their objectives, the plaintiffs were doing what citizens should be encouraged to do, taking an active role in the decisions of government. Christian Gospel Church, 896 F.2d at 1226. 47 It is important to emphasize that a person's speech or petitioning activity is not removed from the ambit of First Amendment protection simply because it advocates an unlawful act. The First Amendment does not permit government to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969); see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 291 (1961); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 318 (1957) overruled in part on other grounds by Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 7, 12 (1978). Advocacy is unprotected only if it is intended to produce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder; advocacy of illegal action at some indefinite future time is not actionable. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973). 48 It is clear that the term advocacy, as used in Brandenburg, encompasses not only freedom of speech, but the other rights of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment as well. Brandenburg specifically held that[s]tatutes affecting the right of assembly, like those touching on freedom of speech, must observe the established distinctions between mere advocacy and incitement to imminent lawless action. 395 U.S. at 449 n.4. See also Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 448-50 (1974) (applying Brandenburg principles to state regulation of access to the ballot). The Supreme Court has also explained that the right to petition is inseparable from and was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985) (citations omitted). 49 We need not decide whether the plaintiffs' primary objective -the defeat of the proposed conversion of the Bel Air motel -would have involved an unlawful act. The mere fact that citizens urge their government to adopt measures that may be unlawful does not deprive the speech involved of its First Amendment protection. Cf. Manistee Town Ctr. v. City of Glendale, 227 F.3d. 1090 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal under Noerr-Pennington doctrine of complaint challenging lobbying of county officials that allegedly resulted in unconstitutional taking of plaintiff's property). Here, it is clear that nothing that the plaintiffs said or did came close to meeting the Brandenburg test. Imminent lawless action, as used in Brandenburg , means violence or physical disorder in the nature of a riot. Peaceful speech, even speech that urges civil disobedience, is fully protected by the First Amendment. Were this not the case, the right of Americans to speak out peacefully on issues and to petition their government would be sharply circumscribed. We therefore hold that the standard set forth in Brandenburg applies to all the First Amendment activity at issue in this case, including plaintiffs' petitioning activity, regardless of whether the denial of the permit on the grounds urged would have been contrary to the provisions of the Fair Housing Act. 50
51 The investigation by the HUD officials unquestionably chilled the plaintiffs' exercise of their First Amendment rights. It is true that the agency did not ban or seize the plaintiffs' materials, and officials in Washington ultimately decided not to pursue either criminal or civil sanctions against them. But in the First Amendment context, courts must look through forms to the substance of government conduct. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963). Informal measures, such as the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation, can violate the First Amendment also. Id. 8 This court has held that government officials violate this provision when their acts would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. Mendocino Environmental Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Here, the type of investigation conducted and the manner in which the individual defendants carried out their functions more than meets that standard. 52 The HUD officials carried out an investigation that lasted more than eight months, substantially longer than the presumptive 100-day time limit set by 42 U.S.C. 3610(a)(1) (B)(iv). During the investigation, defendant Zurowski conveyed a conciliation proposal requiring the plaintiffs to cease all litigation and publications regarding the Bel Air project and advised the plaintiffs to accept it because they had violated the Fair Housing Act by distributing discriminatory flyers. Defendants Lee and Smith directed the plaintiffs under threat of subpoena to produce all their publications regarding the Bel Air project, minutes of relevant meetings, correspondence with other organizations, and the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of persons who were involved in or had witnessed the alleged discriminatory conduct. 9 Smith interrogated the plaintiffs, again under threat of subpoena, about their views and public statements in opposition to the Bel Air project. In a letter drafted by Smith, defendant Gillespie asserted HUD's purported authority to investigate allegations that individuals have engaged in speech advocating illegal acts, including discrimination against persons based on their physical or mental disabilities and stated that the plaintiffs had violated the Fair Housing Act by writing news articles which referenced the mental disability of the intended residents of the proposed project as a reason for denial of the project. Defendant Phillips told a major metropolitan newspaper that the plaintiffs had broken the law. 10 We conclude that these actions would have chilled or silenced a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in future First Amendment activities.