Opinion ID: 2538904
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Remaining Washington plaintiffs' CPA claims (causation)

Text: ¶ 55 To prevail on a private CPA claim, a plaintiff must show the defendant (1) engaged in an unfair or deceptive act or practice, (2) in trade or commerce, (3) that affects the public interest, (4) and injured the plaintiff's business or property, and (5) there is a causal link between the unfair or deceptive act and the injury suffered. Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wash.2d 59, 74, 170 P.3d 10 (2007) (citing Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash.2d at 784-85, 719 P.2d 531). The fifth requirement, causation, is at issue here. ¶ 56 Causation is a factual question to be decided by the trier of fact. Id. at 83, 170 P.3d 10. A plaintiff is not limited in how he or she can prove causation, as long as there is some demonstration of a causal link between the misrepresentation and the plaintiff's injury. Id. In Indoor Billboard this court rejected the notion that payment of an invoice that contained a misrepresentation or omission was automatically sufficient evidence to establish causation; however, we recognized that such a payment, when considered with all relevant evidence, could be sufficient. Id. at 83-84, 170 P.3d 10. ¶ 57 That is the case here, where payment in combination with the whole of the evidence is sufficient to establish causation. The class members agreed to pay AT & T a certain amount for services; AT & T charged more than that amount; AT & T misrepresented that the excess charges were imposed by the federal government on the consumer; those charges were not imposed by the federal government on the consumer; and the class members paid the excess charges. [12] A trier of fact could make the common sense inference that people do not willingly pay more money for commercial services than they must and, in particular, more than they originally agreed. People do, however, expect to be taxed; AT & T's misrepresentation of the fee as a mandatory federal tax on consumers causes class members to pay the tax. Payment of the UCC in light of the nature of the misrepresentation and reasonable inferences drawn from common sense provides a sufficient basis for a trier of fact to find causation, as envisioned in Indoor Billboard. See id. at 84, 170 P.3d 10. Therefore the causation requirement does not preclude class certification here. ¶ 58 Despite our decision in Indoor Billboard the majority elevates the bar to prove causation far beyond any evidentiary standard that could be met by a class action seeking redress for a misrepresentation under the CPA. The majority requires each class member to show that he or she individually relied upon the misrepresentation including that he or she did not have knowledge of the true nature of the UCC. Majority at 940-41. The majority reasons this is necessary because knowledge of the truth of the charge would defeat causation since a misrepresentation could not cause an individual to pay a bogus fee where the individual already knew the fee to be bogus. See id. [13] ¶ 59 The majority's holding is nothing short of a disaster for plaintiffs, the CPA and CR 23, and the jurisprudence of this court. The majority's requirement of a showing of individualized reliance for misrepresentation claims under the CPA creates an individual issue that will predominate over the class issues here, see majority at 941, and in every CPA misrepresentation class action in the future. Under the majority's reasoning there is no longer any legal recourse for individuals who fall victim to the misrepresentations of corporations when those misrepresentations do not cause sufficient loss to make an individual lawsuit economically feasible. Yet assuring such access to the courts, even when the economic stakes are too small individually, is precisely the purpose of CR 23, see Scott v. Cingular Wireless, 160 Wash.2d 843, 856-57, 161 P.3d 1000 (2007) which the majority so effectively eviscerates. ¶ 60 The majority's holding also flies in the face of this court's history of liberally construing CR 23 and the CPA to effectuate their purposes. See Cingular Wireless, 160 Wash.2d at 856-57, 161 P.3d 1000 (`[T]he interests of justice require that in a doubtful case ... any error, if there is to be one, should be committed in favor of allowing the class action.') (quoting Behr, 113 Wash. App. at 318-19, 54 P.3d 665 (second alteration in original) (quoting Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir.1968))); Dix v. ICT Group, Inc., 160 Wash.2d 826, 161 P.3d 1016 (2007); see also RCW 19.86.920. The CPA, which permits private citizens to act as private attorneys general to protect the public interest against unfair and deceptive practices, see Cingular Wireless, 160 Wash.2d at 851-53, 161 P.3d 1000, no longer provides any ability to protect the public now if a corporation misrepresents its charges or services to the public. The majority's requirement of proof that each class member did not know the truth of the lie will destroy any class action. ¶ 61 The majority cites Kelley v. Microsoft Corp., 251 F.R.D. 544, 557-58 (W.D.Wash. 2008) for the proposition that deception-based claims require individualized proof of reliance (which then defeats class certification). See majority at 940. Causation is a fact-intensive inquiry, and the Kelley decision was decided under its facts. Under some facts, individualized proof may be required; under others, a trier of fact may find a sufficient causal link based upon a consideration of the circumstances as a whole. See Indoor Billboard, 162 Wash.2d at 84, 170 P.3d 10. ¶ 62 In Kelley, stickers on computer boxes stated the computers were using a Vista operating system, but did not inform customers that the Vista version they were using could not be upgraded to a premium version. 251 F.R.D. at 557. The court held a trier of fact considering causation would need to determine whether a consumer saw the sticker, knew the difference between the versions of Vista, and wanted the premium version. Id. at 558. The surrounding facts did not provide a basis to assume that all of the consumers wanted the ability to upgrade to the premium version. ¶ 63 Here, the surrounding facts provide a basis for a causal connection. Class members, after entering into a contract with AT & T at a certain price, would not have rationally intended to pay more without a valid justification for the additional charge. A trier of fact could draw the inference that individuals were motivated by the most obvious sourcea belief that the charge was a mandatory federal tax on consumers. Cf. Hangman Ridge, 105 Wash.2d at 795, 719 P.2d 531 (where this court made a similar distinction between fact sets, comparing those in Hangman Ridge where causation was not established due to causal gapsto those in our decision in Bowers v. Transamerica Title Ins. Co., 100 Wash.2d 581, 590, 675 P.2d 193 (1983)where the causal link was sufficiently established with reasonable inferences concerning the plaintiff's behavior). ¶ 64 The majority's view of causation is excessive and contrary to this court's previous holdings. Rather than render the CPA and CR 23 ineffectual in addressing the wholesale bilking of consumers, I would certify the class.