Opinion ID: 807808
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BIA’s Reversal of Section 212(c) Waiver

Text: Having found the BIA had the authority to consider the IJ’s waiver decision on appeal, we turn to the merits of that decision. The BIA found that SosaValenzuela was not eligible for a § 212(c) waiver, applying Matter of Brieva, 23 I. & N. Dec. 766 (BIA 2005). In Matter of Brieva the BIA determined that waiver applicants with convictions for an aggravated felony crime of violence are categorically ineligible for § 212(c) relief, formally adopting the so-called “comparable-grounds” rule, which “evaluates whether the ground for deportation charged in a case has a close analogue in the statute’s list of exclusion grounds.” Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 481. 7 Under this approach, Sosa-Valenzuela was ineligible for relief. After the BIA decided Matter of Brieva, its analysis generated conflicting decisions in the circuit courts. The Second Circuit, for example, rejected the comparable-grounds approach, see Blake v. Carbone, 489 F.3d 88, 103 (2d Cir. 2007), while the First, Third, and Sixth Circuits upheld the BIA’s policy, Kim v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 58, 62–63 (1st Cir. 2006); Caroleo v. Gonzales, 476 F.3d 158, 7 “Those mathematically inclined might think of the comparable-grounds approach as employing Venn diagrams. Within one circle are all the criminal offenses composing the particular ground of deportation charged. Within other circles are the offenses composing the various exclusion grounds. When, but only when, the ‘deportation circle’ sufficiently corresponds to one of the ‘exclusion circles’ may an alien apply for § 212(c) relief.” Judulang, 132 S. Ct. at 482. -17- 162–163, 168 (3d Cir. 2007); Koussan v. Holder, 556 F.3d 403, 412–414 (6th Cir. 2009). While this appeal was pending, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the circuit split, and ruled against the BIA. Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). In Judulang, the Court found that the BIA’s approach in Matter of Brieva “does not rest on any factors relevant to whether an alien (or any group of aliens) should be deported,” but “instead distinguishes among aliens—decides who should be eligible for discretionary relief and who should not—solely by comparing the metes and bounds of diverse statutory categories into which an alien falls.” 132 S. Ct. at 487. This BIA policy has “no connection to the goals of the deportation process or the rational operation of the immigration laws.” Id. Accordingly, it was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedures Act to rely on this approach to determine eligibility for relief from deportation. The Supreme Court remanded Judulang to the BIA with instructions to develop new criteria for determining who is eligible to apply for § 212(c) waivers. Id. at 490. In denying relief to Sosa-Valenzuela, the BIA relied on this now-rejected approach. We asked for supplemental briefing on Judulang’s application here. In their supplemental briefs the parties did not contest that the basis for the BIA’s decision to deny the § 212(c) waiver is now legally untenable. The only dispute -18- is whether it is necessary for us to remand this case to the BIA for an evaluation of Sosa-Valenzuela’s application under the correct legal criteria. DHS asks us to find any further remand would be futile. A § 212(c) waiver remains a discretionary remedy, and the BIA has already indicated its unwillingness to exercise discretion in favor of Sosa-Valenzuela. We disagree. “Generally speaking, a court of appeals should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands,” and “[t]his principle has obvious importance in the immigration context.” INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002). Remand is the preferred remedy because the BIA “can bring its expertise to bear upon the matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial determination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discussion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its decision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.” Id. at 16–17; See also Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009). Remand may well lead to a predictable result in this case. Nonetheless, “[b]ecause an agency has a duty not only to reach an outcome, but to explain that outcome, we intrude on the agency’s authority not only by reaching a certain result on the merits . . . but also by supporting a result reached by the agency with reasoning not explicitly relied on by the agency.” Mickeviciute v. INS, 327 F.3d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 2003). We should not presume a result on remand, and therefore “resist the temptation of stepping out of our limited judicial role even -19- where resolving the merits ourselves may seem an easier, more efficient, and more palatable course.” Id. 8 It is up to the BIA in the first instance to apply its post-Judulang approach to Sosa-Valenzuela’s request for a § 212(c) waiver. We therefore remand that question to the BIA.