Opinion ID: 1835072
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law i. venue question

Text: In Mississippi venue is controlled by statute. Specifically, venue in chancery courts is controlled by MCA § 11-5-1 (1972) which states the following: § 11-5-1. Venue of Suits. Suits to confirm title to real estate, and suits to cancel clouds or remove doubts therefrom, shall be brought in the county where the land, or some part thereof, is situated; suits against executors, administrators, and guardians, touching the performance of their official duties, and suits for an account and settlement by them, and suits for the distribution of personalty of decedents among the heirs and distributee, and suit for the payment of legacies, shall be brought in the chancery court in which the will was admitted to probate, or letters of administration were granted, or the guardian was appointed; other suits respecting real or personal property may be brought in the chancery court of the county in which the property, or some portion thereof, may be; and all cases not otherwise provided for may be brought in the chancery court of any county where the defendant, or any necessary party defendant, may reside or be found; and in all cases process may issue to any county to bring defendants and to enforce all orders and decrees of the court. [Emphasis added] In a well-reasoned opinion, the chancellor explained why Lowrey had waived his right to change venue: Rule 82 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure, sub-paragraph (b) entitled Venue of Actions says that Except as provided by this rule, venue of all actions shall be as provided by statute. [3] Sub-section (d) provides that in the case of improper venue, upon timely motion made by defendant, the action shall be transferred to a proper court. Rule 82 modifies Section 11-5-1 to the extent that the statute provides that all cases may be brought in the Chancery Court where a defendant resides, but upon timely motion the Court is then compelled by Rule 82 to transfer. So you come to the question of whether there was a timely motion made? How does this affect this particular action? We go from there to Rule 12 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(a) provides that a defendant must answer within 30 days after the summons and complaint was served upon him. Rule 12(b) provides that every defense to a claim for relief in any plea shall be asserted in the responsive pleading when it is required, except as to certain defenses  there are seven of them named  may at the option of the pleader be made by motion. One of those seven defenses, number three, is improper venue  improper venue. Now, Section 12(h)(1) provides that a defense of improper venue is waived if it's neither made by motion or in a responsive pleading. In other words, it can be waived if it's not made by a motion or other responsive pleading. What do the facts and the pleadings in this case reveal? The facts revealed are the following: On March 19, 1986, the estate acting through Mr. M.B. Spencer, Administrator  I guess you would call him de bonis non  the successor fiduciary. On March 19, 1986, he filed his petition for summons to be issued and for other relief... . In response to the petition, a hearing was had before this Court. The Court made no particular adjudication of fact other than that a subpoena should be issued to Mr. Lowrey, who shall then present himself to the Court to account for the funds and to show cause why those funds should not be turned over to Mr. Spencer. In response thereto a summons was issued by this Court. The defendant then filed, on May 7, 1986, his Motion to Quash and Set Aside Decree. It was simply a Motion to Quash and Set Aside. Subsequently the Court heard the motion, and on July 1, 1986, a decree was entered denying the motion. On that very same day a second decree was issued by the Court authorizing the plaintiff to amend his pleading within a certain date, granted to the defendant a certain time within which to respond, and further granted both parties a certain date within which to complete discovery; and it then set the matter for hearing at a later date. The plaintiff amended his petition and alleged the existence of a fiduciary relationship between Mr. Lowrey and the Smiths  that was done on July 8, 1986. On the 22nd day of July, 1986, the defendant filed a Response to Petition for Summons to be Issued and for Other Relief. In his petition, for the first time, he raised the defense of improper venue, which is a defense authorized under Rule 12(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure. Now, the question arises before the Court as to whether or not the defense of improper venue was timely raised, or whether it was waived. In the case of Belk v. State Department of Public Welfare, [473] So.2d 447 (Miss. 1985), our Mississippi Supreme Court held that in an in personam  in personam type action, venue, being a personal privilege, could be waived. It's the opinion of this Court that the defendant, Lowrey, in this particular case, waived the right of raising the defense of improper venue when he failed to include that defense with his Motion to Quash and Set Aside the Decree. Now, the reason for that is simply that  Mr. Lowrey allowed the Court to rule on his Motion to Quash and to Set Aside Decree. In this Court's opinion he put all of his eggs in one basket. Since the Court has ruled against him he now wants this Court to rule in his favor to the defense of improper venue. This raises the question of which comes first the chicken or the egg? If the Court did not have proper venue in the first instance, then it could not have ruled on the Motion to Quash and Set Aside the Decree. Having granted to the Court the authority to hear the Motion to Quash and extending to the Court that authority without raising the defense of improper venue, he thus waived that defense. That's the judgment of the Court. The chancellor correctly held that defects in venue are deemed waived if not timely asserted. Rule 12(h)(1), Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure; H & W Transfer & Cartage Service v. Griffin, 511 So.2d 895, 901 (Miss. 1987); Belk v. State Dept. of Public Welfare, 473 So.2d 447, 451 (Miss. 1985). Moreover, since Lowrey agreed to act as de facto conservator for David and Lois, we find nothing startling in requiring such an individual under Miss. Code Ann. § 11-5-1 to be required to account for the funds in the county of their situs just as he would have been had he been appointed conservator by a court. Also, Miss. Code Ann. § 91-7-253.