Opinion ID: 1059619
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Constitutionality of Virginia's DNA Data Bank

Text: Johnson argues that the statutes providing for the Commonwealth's DNA data bank, Code §§ 19.2-310.2 through -310.7 (DNA statutes), which include a requirement that all convicted felons submit blood samples for DNA testing, violate various constitutional rights. He contends that these statutes violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, and the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. He further contends that the DNA statutes violate his constitutional right of due process. Johnson also relies on the parallel provisions of the Constitution of Virginia that articulate these constitutional rights. Finally, Johnson contends that these statutes are arbitrary and unreliable, fail to establish meaningful restrictions on the seizure and dissemination of DNA material, and constitute an undue delegation of [legislative] powers. We disagree with Johnson's arguments. The DNA statutes do not deny a criminal defendant any constitutional rights. Although we have not considered previously the issues Johnson raises, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has addressed the constitutionality of Virginia's DNA statutes in two cases. In Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977, 113 S.Ct. 472, 121 L.Ed.2d 378 (1992), the Court concluded that the procurement of a blood sample for DNA analysis from a convicted felon under Code § 19.2-310.2 does not violate the Fourth Amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Court held that in the case of convicted felons who are in the custody of the Commonwealth, we find that the minor intrusion caused by the taking of a blood sample is outweighed by Virginia's interest ... in determining inmates' `identification characteristics specific to the person' for improved law enforcement. Id. at 307 (quoting Code § 19.2-310.2); see also Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1111, 114 S.Ct. 2112, 128 L.Ed.2d 671 (1994). We agree with this conclusion and hold that it is equally applicable to the guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures set forth in Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution of Virginia. We also conclude that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, and the parallel right afforded by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Virginia, are not violated by the DNA statutes. The taking of a blood sample does not implicate any rights against self-incrimination, because such an act is not testimonial or communicative in nature. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); Shumate v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 877, 880, 153 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1967); Lawrence v. Bluford-Brown, 1 Va.App. 202, 204, 336 S.E.2d 899, 900-01 (1985). Thus, the withdrawal of blood from a convicted felon to provide a DNA sample for inclusion in the DNA data bank in accordance with Code § 19.2-310.2 does not violate the felon's constitutional protection against self-incrimination. Next, we conclude that the DNA statutes do not violate the Eighth Amendment guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment, and the parallel right secured by Article 1, Section 9 of the Constitution of Virginia. The DNA statutes are not penal in nature. Ewell, 11 F.3d at 485; Jones, 962 F.2d at 309. Therefore, there is no merit to Johnson's contention that the above rights are subverted by the requirement that a DNA blood sample be taken from persons convicted of a felony. We also disagree with Johnson's argument that the DNA statutes violate federal constitutional rights of due process and the due process provisions of Article I, Section 11 of the Constitution of Virginia. In support of his argument, Johnson states merely that the DNA statutes do not require that notice be given to individuals whose DNA is seized. This argument has no merit because the enactment of the statutes themselves in 1990 provided notice that all persons convicted of a felony will be required to give a blood sample for DNA analysis. We also reject Johnson's arguments that the DNA statutes are arbitrary and unreliable, fail to establish meaningful restrictions on the seizure and dissemination of DNA material, and constitute an undue delegation of [legislative] powers. The statutes apply uniformly to every convicted felon, and the use of the information collected from each felon is restricted to law enforcement purposes. Code §§ 19.2-310.2, -310.5, and -310.6. Further, since Johnson does not explain why the statutes are an undue delegation of powers, we do not address this argument because we are unable to discern its substance.