Opinion ID: 2547964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Batson Challenge

Text: Appellant next argues that the trial court erred when it denied his Batson motion which objected to the removal of Reginald Dooley, an African American, from the jury pool. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth's striking of Dooley from the venire constituted racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (declaring that the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black defendant). Claims of racial discrimination in jury selection are analyzed in a threestep process. Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Id. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The defendant does this by: (1) show[ing] that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race; (2) rely[ing] on the fact ... that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits `those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate'; and (3) showing that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Id. (internal citations omitted). Second, once a prima facie showing is made, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. Id. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Finally, the trial court must then determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination. Id. The trial court's determination is afforded great deference and will only be overturned if clearly erroneous. Harris v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Ky. 2004). During voir dire of this case, members of the jury pool were asked if they knew Don Morehead, Appellant's attorney. Dooley responded that he and Morehead were high school basketball teammates in 1979, and that he had had no contact with Morehead since then. He further stated that the fact that they were teammates in 1979 would not render him more favorable to the defense, and that he would be fair and impartial. Nevertheless, the prosecutor used a peremptory strike on Dooley. We first note that Appellant made the requisite prima facie showing of racial discrimination necessary for a Batson challenge: (1) Appellant is African American, (2) Dooley is African American, (3) Dooley stated that his prior acquaintance with Morehead would not render him more favorable to the defense, (4) that he would be fair and impartial, and (5) the prosecutor struck him from the jury pool. This is sufficient to raise an inference of racial discrimination. Next, we are satisfied that the prosecution met its burden of asserting a race-neutral explanation for striking Dooley. First, the prosecutor asserted that the fact that Dooley had been a high school basketball teammate of Morehead's gave her cause for concern about the potential for bias. Second, the prosecutor stated that Dooley had been on a jury the week prior to Appellant's trial and had found the accused not guilty. [6] Thus, the prosecution met its burden of producing a race-neutral reason for striking Dooley. Finally, the trial court found that the race-neutral reasons offered by the prosecution overcame Appellant's Batson challengethat is, that Appellant had not proven intentional discrimination. [7] With respect to the potential for bias, the trial judge noted that he would hope any of his former teammates would give him the benefit of the doubt with regard to anything that he was involved in, which was enough to overcome any Batson issue. Upon the record before us, we cannot conclude that this finding is clearly erroneous. We therefore conclude that Appellant has not carried his burden to prove purposeful racial discrimination under the third prong of Batson, and hold that the trial court did not clearly err in denying Appellant's motion. [8]