Opinion ID: 1722513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Was the Item Received on the 19th Returned Before the Deadline?

Text: By virtue of paragraph 9 of the clearing agreement previously mentioned, the Bank and the other national banks in Omaha agreed with the Fed on a time for returning items earlier than the midnight deadline, to wit, 3:30 p. m. It also provided that failure to return by the 3:30 p. m. deadline constituted final payment. Clearing agreements modifying deadlines, such as is here involved, seem to be the kind of agreement contemplated by section 4-103(2), U.C.C., which reads: Federal reserve regulations and operating letters, clearing house rules, and the like, have the effect of agreements under subsection (1), whether or not specifically assented to by all parties interested in items handled. See comment 3 to section 4-103, U.C.C. at pages 318, 319. Also, see, Uniform Commercial Code Practice Handbook (4th Ed.), Bank Deposits & Collections, Clarke, Bailey & Young, pp. 21, 162, 194, 195; The Law of Bank Deposits, Collections and Credit Cards, Clark & Squillante, pp. 14 to 16. There exists in the record a factual dispute as to whether the item received on the 19th was returned before this deadline. An employee of the Fed in charge of returned items testified that the items had not been returned when she left the Fed at 4:30 p. m. on the 22nd, a Monday, which was the next banking day following the 19th. She also testified that notice of return of the drafts was not given to the depository bank until April 23rd. An officer of the Bank testified that he handed the items to the messenger Yahnke at about 3:25 or 3:26 p. m. with instructions to return them to the Fed. Yahnke's testimony was excluded for failure of Bank to disclose in answer to interrogatories Yahnke's name as a prospective witness. The offer of proof was that Yahnke received the drafts at a little before 3:25 p. m., that he proceeded at once to the Fed, and that when he arrived at the return desk of the Fed it was about 3:28 p. m. We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the offer of the testimony of Yahnke. An examination of the bill of exceptions leads us to the belief that long before trial Berman's attorney during pretrial discovery proceedings became aware of the existence of the messenger, but not of his name. Both sides thereafter failed to follow through on an understanding that the name would be obtained. Further, because of the ambiguous nature of the question and answer in the interrogatories which refer to persons who in any way worked with or handled the A. F. Ferer & Sons account or have any knowledge of the items, we do not feel that a conclusion that the Bank intentionally withheld the name of the witness can be sustained. The messenger was not one handling or having knowledge of the account. As to his knowledge of items, there is no evidence to show the messenger had any knowledge of the specifics of what he delivered. He would apparently only know that he made a delivery of the items entrusted to him. For the above reasons we reverse the court's finding on the fifth cause and remand it for retrial solely on the issue of whether the item received on the 19th, and which is the basis of the fifth cause of action, was returned to the Fed before the 3:30 p. m. deadline on April 22nd. We conclude from an examination of the record that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Berman's sixth and seventh causes of action and affirm the action of the trial court in directing the verdict against Berman on these causes. AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED AND REMANDED.