Opinion ID: 472146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Weighing The Interests Of Justice

Text: 23 Having concluded that this situation does not fall within the context of a subsequently discovered prior inconsistent statement, we nevertheless must consider whether there are additional factors under these circumstances as a whole, that mandate a finding of abused discretion in failing to admit the transcripts of Dr. Schepers' prior inconsistent statements despite his unavailability. The appellant vehemently urges that the interests of justice required the admission of Schepers' prior testimony to prevent the jury from having an incomplete picture on a crucial issue. We perceive this argument as being bottomed in considerations of fairness--that the purpose behind Rule 613(b) is merely fairness to ensure that a witness has an opportunity to explain an apparent contradiction that may be explained away. See Bibbs, 564 F.2d at 1169; Notes Of Advisory Committee, supra. The appellant's argument here, by analogy, must be that Schepers' opportunity to explain may be dispensed with because the contradiction between his testimony is self-evident and simply cannot be explained. We do not agree. 24 In some circumstances, a prior statement may be so contradictory to a latter statement that the two simply cannot be reconciled. In such a case, there may well be no reason to exclude the prior inconsistent statement, regardless of the witness's unavailability. Such is not the case here. At trial, appellee's counsel informed the court that in fact, he had anticipated the problem that an apparent inconsistency would arise if Dr. Schepers identified National Gypsum rather than U.S. Gypsum in the context of correspondence regarding the hazards of mixed asbestos and gypsum products. Appellee's counsel informed the court that Dr. Schepers' prior testimony occurred in cases where his attention was not directed to National Gypsum, but other companies, and that his testimony then was that he did not recall dealing with any gypsum company but U.S. Gypsum Company. Furthermore, Dr. Schepers indicated to counsel that his memory had been refreshed by the contents of documents sent between Saranac Laboratories and National Gypsum. Those documents, which had already been admitted into evidence, were not presented to him for examination during any of his prior testimony. 25 Examination of Dr. Schepers' prior testimony, as well as the correspondence between Saranac and National Gypsum, reveals that this explanation is entirely plausible. The documents in question, Plaintiff's Exhibits 28-33, are documents sent between Saranac and National Gypsum, many bearing received stamps and the signature of Schepers' secretary. Furthermore, some of the correspondence was with a Mr. Pollard, identified by Schepers as National Gypsum's safety director who had attended a Saranac conference in 1955. Although the correspondence is not directed to Dr. Schepers himself, there does appear to be enough information in the documents relating to Saranac and National Gypsum, as well as in the circumstances of his prior testimony, to lend credence to his explanation that his recollection had been refreshed as he indicated to counsel. 26 The appellant argues that failing to admit the prior inconsistent statements left the jury with a mistaken impression as to Dr. Schepers' testimony. The argument stands up only if there is no explanation for the discrepancy. Assuming that there is a reasonable explanation for the inconsistency, doing away with the opportunity to explain could be the source of misimpression to the jury. Rule 613(b) inherently recognizes as much by ordinarily providing the witness with some opportunity to explain. We need not, and of course cannot, determine whether the doctor's memory was refreshed or whether, as the appellant contends, he simply testified incorrectly. But where there is a reasonable explanation for the prior inconsistent statement and the witness is no longer available to present it, the interests of justice do not necessarily weigh more heavily in favor of admitting the prior statement than excluding it. 7 27 In sum, the district court was faced with inconsistent statements on significant testimony that might be explained were the witness still available. As noted earlier, defense counsel did not indicate that this matter would be raised subsequently so that the witness's availability could be preserved. The inconsistent statements were offered as the last item of the defendant's case, the day after the witness had testified, and all other testimony was concluded. Counsel also had failed to timely raise other objections to the witness's testimony, which if sustained would have obviated the need to utilize the prior inconsistent statements. Finally, the location of the witness was unknown, and despite appellant's assertion to the contrary, we find nothing in the record to indicate that recessing the trial and returning the witness to Savannah in a day or two was a viable option. Under such circumstances, we cannot find that the interests of justice required the admission of Dr. Schepers' prior inconsistent statements or that the district court abused its discretion in excluding that evidence.