Opinion ID: 1354925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Certified Questions Numbered 1, 2 and 3

Text: The first three certified questions call upon us to determine whether the petitioner enjoyed judicial immunity if he 1) knew, 2) should have known, or 3) subsequently learned that the statute was obsolete. The petitioner argues that immunity exists and is applicable in all these situations, since all acts taken by the petitioner were judicial acts made within his actual or apparent jurisdiction. The respondent, however, argues that the petitioner judge was not performing a judicial act to which immunity would attach. It is critical to the independence of the judiciary that judicial officers be free to exercise their authority without fear of personal liability for their actions. Historically, courts have recognized this as the doctrine of judicial immunity, and it is as old as the law as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536, 19 L.Ed. 285 (1868). [6] Because it is a judge's duty to decide all cases within his jurisdiction, and because his decisions may arouse intense feelings, particularly in hotly-contested cases, fearless and independent judicial decision-making should not be intimidated by potential litigation from dissatisfied litigants. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554, 87 S.Ct. 1213, 1217, 18 L.Ed.2d 288 (1967). The doctrine of judicial immunity as enunciated by the United States Supreme Court is sweeping in its scope. In Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871) the United States Supreme Court recognized that judicial immunity applied to preclude liability however erroneous or injurious the judge's action may have been, or indeed whatever the judge's motive in taking such action may have been, so long as it was a judicial act. Id. at 347. Moreover, this Court in Pritchard v. Crouser, ___ W.Va. ___, 332 S.E.2d 611 (1985) concurred with the three major policy grounds identified by the United States Supreme Court for shielding judges from liability, which included: (1) the preservation of judicial independence; (2) the need for finality in lawsuits; and, (3) the existence of another remedy against judicial excess in the form of appellate review. 332 S.E.2d at 615. In Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978) the United States Supreme Court reiterated this doctrine despite circumstances indicating a rather aggravated lack of due process. In that case, the circuit judge approved a petition filed by the mother of a `somewhat retarded' girl to have the girl sterilized. Id. at 351, 98 S.Ct. at 1102. The approval of the petition came the same day it was filed after an ex parte proceeding without a hearing and without notice to either the girl or her guardian ad litem. Id. at 351-54, 360, 98 S.Ct. at 1101-04, 1106. The Court in Stump went so far as to hold that a judge would not be deprived of immunity even if the action were malicious or beyond his authority. Id. at 356, 98 S.Ct. at 1104. The Court made it clear that the judge would only be subjected to liability when he has acted in the `clear absence of all jurisdiction.' Id. at 356-57, 98 S.Ct. at 1105 (quoting Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 351). Courts have reasoned that it is necessary to imbue the doctrine of judicial immunity with such broad scope in order to preserve the integrity of the judicial system. As the Court stated in Stump, disagreement with the action taken by the judge does not justify a deprivation of immunity. 435 U.S. at 363, 98 S.Ct. at 1108. Even if this doctrine may in some circumstances create unfairness to litigants, it is necessary in order to ensure that judges render decisions without fear of personal consequences. Id. This Court has also recognized broad judicial immunity against civil liability. See Crouser, 332 S.E.2d 611. In Crouser, this Court was asked to determine the scope of judicial immunity in light of W.Va.Code §§ 50-4-7 (1978) and 53-1-8 (1933). [7] At issue was whether Magistrate Crouser had wrongfully refused to transfer the Pritchards' case after they filed an affidavit stating that the magistrate was prejudiced against them. 332 S.E.2d at 612. The Pritchards applied to the circuit court for a writ of prohibition against the magistrate and for costs arising from the action. Even though the underlying action involving the Pritchards was settled with the opposing party, thereby causing the Pritchards to request that the petition for a writ of prohibition be dismissed, the Pritchards maintained their claim to court costs. Id. at 612-13. The circuit court awarded those costs to the Pritchards, finding the magistrate's `arbitrary' refusal to transfer the Pritchards' case made him liable for an award of costs. Id. at 613. This Court upon review of the Crouser case reached a different conclusion. First, we concluded that the magistrate had acted appropriately in refusing to remove himself from the case in light of the fact that the Pritchards had filed multiple affidavits against three of the four magistrates within the county. Id. at 612-14. Further, in addressing the circuit court's award of costs to the Pritchards, we found that the statute allowing for the award of costs has never been utilized against a judicial officer in a proceeding involving a writ of prohibition. Id. at 618. Moreover, we indicated that the statutory provision does not surreptitiously displace common law judicial immunity. Id. Additionally, this Court in Crouser stated [a] judge without immunity is a judge without power. Id. at 615. We also emphasized that immunity is required to prevent the chilling effect that even the threat of litigation would have on judges in the performance of their duties. Id. at 616. Finally, this Court in Crouser refused to grant attorney's fees against a judge although the United States Supreme Court had allowed similar fees in Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984). [8] Crouser, 332 S.E.2d at 617-19. Consequently, this Court's finding in Crouser that [j]udicial immunity in West Virginia is absolute indicates that we have given a broader interpretation to judicial immunity then found in many other jurisdictions. Id. at 619. In short, judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for actions taken in the exercise of their judicial duties. See Stump, 435 U.S. 349, 355-56, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104-05, 55 L.Ed.2d 331; see also Emswiler v. McCoy, 622 F.Supp. 786 (S.D.W.Va.1985); Cogar v. Strickler, 570 F.Supp. 34 (S.D.W.Va.1983). Furthermore, a judge may act within his jurisdiction even when he acts outside his authority. Crouser, 332 S.E.2d at 614 (citing Stump, 435 U.S. 349, 356-7, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 1104-05). [T]he factors determining whether an act by a judge is a `judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362, 98 S.Ct. at 1107. In this case, the Hovermale complaint was directed to Judge Dostert in his judicial capacity. The issuance of the show cause order in connection therewith clearly was also done in the judge's judicial capacity. The fact that respondent thereafter sought and was granted a writ of prohibition against the judge further substantiates that the issuance of the show cause order was judicial in nature, since only judicial acts can be prohibited by a writ of prohibition. See Carey, 294 S.E.2d 137; see also State ex rel. Collier v. County Court of Mingo County, 97 W.Va. 615, 618, 125 S.E. 576, 577 (1924); 15 Michie's Jurisprudence, Prohibition, § 2 (1979 & Supp.1990). Therefore, in this case, there is no question that all the acts taken were judicial in nature. Furthermore, the scope of a circuit judge's jurisdiction is broad-based. In West Virginia, a circuit court is one of general jurisdiction. W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 6; W.Va.Code § 51-2-2 (1978). In addition, the petitioner's December 7, 1981, order was premised upon statutory authority. Although this Court held in Carey I that it had the inherent power to regulate licenses to practice law, there had been no clear ruling at the time of the defendant's show cause order that W.Va.Code § 30-2-7 was not a viable and enforceable statute. See Syl. Pt. 1, 294 S.E.2d 137. Furthermore, the statute itself can be distinguished from the common law power of courts of general jurisdiction to disbar errant attorneys. State v. Shumate, 48 W.Va. 359, 361, 37 S.E. 618 (1900). Although the conflict between that statute and Article VIII of the West Virginia Constitution, W.Va.Code § 51-1-4a, and the Bylaws of the West Virginia State Bar was resolved by this Court in Carey I, the fact that W.Va.Code § 30-2-7 was subsequently found to be obsolete in no way indicates that the defendant acted in a clear absence of jurisdiction. [9] The fact that a judge acts upon a void or invalid law does not deprive him of immunity if he otherwise has jurisdiction. In Robinson v. McCorkle, 462 F.2d 111 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042, 93 S.Ct. 529, 34 L.Ed.2d 492 (1972), a judge had ordered the plaintiff committed under a repealed New Jersey summary commitment statute. Such a misapprehension of law, according to the court of appeals, did not remove the shield of immunity. Robinson, 462 F.2d at 112-13. In McDaniel v. Harrell, 81 Fla. 66, 87 So. 631 (1921), a damage award against a judge was set aside on immunity grounds, even though the judge had incarcerated the plaintiff under a statute later found to be unconstitutional. 87 So. at 633-34. Finally, the respondent makes much of the fact that Judge Dostert is covered by a general policy of insurance purchased by the State of West Virginia to cover all its employees, contending that the existence of such coverage along with the language of the policy constitutes a waiver of the right to assert judicial immunity as a defense in this action. While we do not reach the issue of the effect of this type of policy on the general doctrine of sovereign immunity, [10] we do here specifically hold that it has no effect whatsoever on the doctrine of judicial immunity in this jurisdiction. It would not be consonant with a doctrine which is meant to foster judicial independence to allow judges to be sued, but merely spared from any personal liability above the limits of an insurance policy. Therefore, we hold that judges in this jurisdiction are absolutely immune from suit for the results of any judicial act performed by them while acting in their official capacity. [11] Thus, we answer certified questions numbered 1, 2 and 3 in the affirmative.