Opinion ID: 2284545
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: election to remain silent both at trial and at sentencing

Text: Gilliam next contends that he was affirmatively misadvised about his right to testify or to remain silent both at the trial and at the sentencing hearing, and that the court was required to, but did not, take corrective action. According to Gilliam, the court's failure in this regard was reversible error. The relevant proceedings at trial were as follows: MR. DANEMAN [Defense Attorney]: Stand up, Mr. Gilliam. If Your Honor please, at this time I would most respectfully like to advise my client of his right to testify or right to remain silent. At this juncture of the case, the State having rested and the court having ruled on our motions, we have the privilege of going forth with testimony. You have the right to testify, sir. You have the right to remain silent. If you elect to remain silent, no inferences will be drawn from your refusal to testify. That means that this honorable court will not infer, nor will the court find you guilty if you elect to remain silent; do you understand that? (Emphasis added.) Counsel for Gilliam argues that Gilliam was told that he would not be found guilty if he elected to remain silent, and because this assertion was not reversed or negated by the trial judge, Gilliam may have been under the misapprehension that if he remained silent, and did not testify, the court would not find him guilty. Gilliam maintains that it was incumbent upon the trial judge to step in, correct any possible misapprehension, and ascertain whether Gilliam truly understood his options. Similarly, Gilliam claims that he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to testify at the sentencing hearing. In that proceeding, defense counsel told Gilliam on the record that: At this juncture, sir, you have the right to testify or you have the right to remain silent. If you elect to remain silent, no inference of guilt may be drawn from your refusal to testify. That means that His Honor would not find you guilty or infer that you are guilty because you would like to remain silent; do you understand that? (Emphasis added.) Gilliam would have us believe that he interpreted this explanation of his right to testify or to remain silent to mean that the court had not made a final determination as to his guilt, or that if he elected to remain silent that the court could not consider the fact of his guilt in imposing sentence. In Stevens v. State, 232 Md. 33, 192 A.2d 73, cert. denied 375 U.S. 886, 84 S.Ct. 160, 11 L.Ed.2d 115 (1963), this Court considered whether a defendant must be advised by the court of his right to elect not to testify. We held that where the accused has counsel, it should be presumed that he has been informed of his rights. Id. at 39, 192 A.2d at 77. In Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508, 515, 206 A.2d 802, 806 (1965), this presumption remained undisturbed where the Court found nothing in [the] record to indicate that the accused was not fully informed of his rights by counsel. Thus, only where it becomes clear to the trial court that the defendant does not understand the significance of his election not to testify or the inferences to be drawn therefrom and where the presumption is rebutted must the court advise the accused of his right to testify or to remain silent. Defense counsel's on-the-record explanation to Gilliam concerning his right to testify or to remain silent at trial is replete with references to previous discussions between defense counsel and his client, as well as his client's family, on the significance of the election not to testify. Indeed, defense counsel stated during the litany, MR. DANEMAN [Defense Attorney]: If you elect to testify, sir, you will be subject to cross-examination by the Assistant State's Attorney, the Court has a right to ask you questions and you must answer all questions truthfully, do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. MR. DANEMAN: In addition, any prior record that you have involving crimes of moral turpitude could possibly be brought out for the purposes of impeaching your credibility or your believability as a witness; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes sir. MR. DANEMAN: Now, we have discussed this many, many times, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: I discussed it with you yesterday, we discussed it today. I discussed it with your mother, your family seated behind you, that's correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: Are you prepared to make an intelligent decision now as to whether or not you wish to testify or whether you wish to remain silent? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. DANEMAN: What is your election, sir? THE DEFENDANT: I wish to remain silent. MR. DANEMAN: Is that a free and voluntary decision? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: Has anybody, including myself, threatened you, harassed you, or induced you or told you not to testify? THE DEFENDANT: No, sir. MR. DANEMAN: We have reviewed this in depth, have we not? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: Discussed the pros and cons of your testifying or not testifying, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: And we have discussed at length what possible benefits could be attained by your testifying, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: And we weighed that against the negative factors that could be developed if you testified, is that correct? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: Do you feel that you have had ample time to review this decision; do you think you have had ample time to discuss this with me, with your family? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: And you still wish to remain silent? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. MR. DANEMAN: The defendant requests the right to remain silent. Similarly at the sentencing hearing, defense counsel established on the record that he had repeatedly discussed with Gilliam the right to testify or to remain silent when he stated: MR. DANEMAN: ... We have discussed this many times, last Thursday, today, but it is a decision that you must make. I cannot make it for you; do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. DANEMAN: I know you discussed this with your mother because she was in my office when you called me Thursday night; you know that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. DANEMAN: Now, I asked you to reflect then and I ask you to reflect now. It is a major decision. Do you wish to testify or do you wish to remain silent? THE DEFENDANT: I wish to remain silent. MR. DANEMAN: That is your free and voluntary wish? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. DANEMAN: No one, including myself, or anyone in court has threatened, harassed you, induced you to remain silent? THE DEFENDANT: No. MR. DANEMAN: How long have you thought about whether or not you wanted to testify or not? THE DEFENDANT: I have thought about it for a while. MR. DANEMAN: And you think you have had ample time to reflect on the pros and cons of testifying? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. DANEMAN: And that is your final decision? THE DEFENDANT: Yes. MR. DANEMAN: You don't want to discuss it with your mother at any greater length? THE DEFENDANT: No. MR. DANEMAN: Defense rests. The record thereafter reflects that Gilliam was told, If you elect to remain silent, no inference of guilt may be drawn from your refusal to testify. That means that His Honor would not find you guilty or infer that you are guilty because you would like to remain silent.... We assume during the discussions alluded to in the on-the-record litany between Gilliam and his defense counsel, in the absence of any indication to the contrary, that defense counsel correctly informed Gilliam about the significance of his election not to testify both at trial and at sentencing. The record does not support the highly unlikely inference that either Gilliam or his attorney actually believed that an election to remain silent at trial mandated acquittal, or that an election to remain silent at sentencing meant either that the court had not yet made a final determination as to his guilt or that the court could not consider the fact of his guilt when imposing sentence. The trial court was, therefore, not required to advise Gilliam of his right to remain silent at trial or at sentencing. Defense counsel's colloquies with Gilliam on the record explaining the right to remain silent and the choices to be made was a formality not required by any decision of this Court. During these gratuitous colloquies, Gilliam admitted that the election to testify or not testify had previously been reviewed in depth, that he had considered and weighed the possible benefits against the negative factors, and had further discussed the election with his family, as well as with his attorney. The record supports the conclusion that Gilliam fully understood the consequences of his election not to testify. There is no reason to conclude, and we do not conclude, that as the result of the ambiguous statement in the lengthy dialogue by defense counsel Gilliam believed that if he elected not to testify at trial he must be found not guilty, and that when that did not occur, if he elected not to testify at his sentencing hearing, he could not be sentenced to death. Where there is no indication that the defendant has a misperception of his right to remain silent and the effect of exercising that right, and where he expressly indicates he has been fully advised of and understands the right, as well as the effect of a waiver, then an ambiguous statement made by defense counsel during an on the record explanation does not result in reversible error if the trial court fails to intervene and clarify counsel's ambiguous statement.