Opinion ID: 86533
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The attachment was prematurely brought. Because,

Text: 1. The loan of its bills by the bank to McQueen & McKay was on an express agreement for credit; which agreement, if procured by fraud, was not void, but voidable, by the bank at its option. Chitty on Cont. 678; Story on Sales, §§ 420, 447, and cases cited; Galloway v. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 336; Rowley v. Bigelow, 12 Pick. 307. 2. There being an express contract for a loan on time, if the bank elected to consider it fraudulent and to sue immediately, the action should have been in tort. Story on Sales, §§ 432, 434, 442, 446, and cases cited there; Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285; Willett v. Willett, 3 Watts, 277; Cary v. Curtis, 3 Howard, 247, 248. 3. The remedy by foreign attachment in Indiana is confined to cases of debts due on contract and shown by affidavit; and the institution of such a suit was an affirmance of the contract of loan; and, inasmuch as the stipulated term of credit had not expired, the action was prematurely brought. Code of Indiana of 1843, pp. 762, 763, 772, 773; Lindon v. Hooper, Cowp. 418; Ferguson v. Carrington, 3 Carr. & Payne, 457, at Nisi Prius; same case in Bench, 9 Barn. & Cres. 59. This case is cited as law by Starkie, 2 Ev. 55; 1 Chitty on Pl. 157; 1 Com. on Cont. 221; Dutton v. Solomonson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 585; 15 Mass. 80, note a; Galloway v. Holmes, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 334. In the present case, the question is not whether the bank had a right to disaffirm; but whether, by bringing this action, she did not in fact affirm the express contract. The authorities cited show the general doctrine of the common law to be, that promises in law exist only in the absence of promises in fact; that where there is an express contract, suing in assumpsit is an affirmance of it; that in those cases in which it has been held that assumpsit would lie immediately on discovery of the fraud, there was a debt due, in prsenti, either by an express precedent contract, or by the absence of any agreement for credit; or the contract was incapable of confirmation and absolutely void, through illegality, or as being contrary to public policy. It is further contended, that the attachment of the pork and flour, as the property of McQueen & McKay, was an affirmance of the contract with them. Campbell v. Fleming, 1 Adolph. & Ell. 40; Selway v. Fogg, 5 Mees. & Wels. 86; Thompson v. Morris, 2 Murphy, 248; Dingley v. Robinson, 5 Greenl. 127; Hanna v. Mills, 21 Wend. 90; Ibid. 175. A party cannot claim in repugnant rights, and is concluded by the form of his action. Smith v. Hodson, 4 Term Rep. 217. 4. The retention of the bills of exchange, given by McQueen & McKay, as well as the form of the action, was an affirmance of the contract of loan. Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 72; Dayton v. Trull, 23 Wend. 346; Thomas v. Todd, 6 Hill, 341; Masson v. Bovet, 1 Denio, 74; Story on Sales, § 427. II. The bank, under her attachment, had no right, as against Gibson, to claim the pork and flour as the specific proceeds of her bills, on the ground of the alleged fraud of McQueen & McKay in procuring them. Because,  1. She attached it as the property of McQueen & McKay, and for the benefit of their general creditors. If trover had been brought, the alleged fraud would have been disputed. 2. Having voluntarily parted with the possession and ostensible ownership of her bills, she cannot claim them or their avails from a bonâ fide purchaser. Parker v. Patrick, 5 Term Rep. 175; Mowrey v. Walsh, 8 Cowen, 238; Root v. French, 13 Wend. 572; Hoffman v. Noble, 6 Metcalf, 68; Story on Sales, § 200, and cases cited there. III. The flour in the custody of Hanna, Hamilton, & Co., and the pork in the hands of D. & J.A.F. Nichols, were the legal property of McQueen & McKay, at the time of the transfer thereof by them to Gibson, the plaintiff, and said McQueen & McKay held, at the time of the attachment, the beneficial interest only in the residue of the proceeds of sale thereof, to be made by Gibson, when the property reached him, after satisfying his advance thereon, with commissions and all other charges. IV. McQueen & McKay acquired a vested legal title in said pork and flour, by their purchases. The bills of sale being their muniments of title, also a constructive possession thereof, the property remaining in the custody of the respective vendors, as their bailees. Because,  1. The sale was a perfect vested sale, and not an executory agreement to sell at a future period. Martindale v. Smith, 1 Adolph. & Ell. (N.S.) 389 (41 Cond. Com. Law, 595). 2. The bills of sale purport to pass a present vested interest, and they were delivered to McQueen & McKay. The payment of the purchase-money bound the bargain, and passed at once the legal title to them. Barret v. Goddard, 3 Mason, 110. 3. Whenever there is a present vested sale, valid in law, and the property sold is left with the vendor, he holds it in custody as bailee for the purchaser. Elmore v. Stone, 1 Taunton, 157; Bailey v. Ogdens, 3 Johns. 416; Dixon v. Yates, 5 Barn. & Adolph. 314. 4. The pork and flour were sufficiently identified and distinguishable from all other property, there being no other pork in the warehouse, and the flour being marked. Barret v. Goddard, 3 Mason, 107; Pleasants v. Pendleton, 6 Rand. 473; Swanwick v. Southern, 9 Adolph. & Ell. 895. 5. This construction is confirmed by the condition of the property at the time, and the general, well-established usage of trade in regard to it; which usage is to leave such produce in the warehouse till the opening of navigation, the warehouseman being in the mean time the bailee of the owner; and for the owner to get an advance thereon from the Eastern merchant, and to transfer the same to secure the advance: he to sell the same on commission. 6. The delivery on board of canal-boats provided for, was a delivery as bailee for the purpose of transmission. The guarantee of inspection at Toledo was a warranty of quality, to be tested after sale, and it was not preliminary to the sale. V. McQueen & McKay passed the entire legal title in said produce to the plaintiff, together with the beneficial interest, to the extent of his advance thereon, and gave him the constructive possession. Because,  1. The condition of said produce was such as not to admit of actual delivery at the time, and it was in accordance with the course of business and the usage of trade to leave it with the warehouseman in the West. 2. The delivery order, according to the weight of authority, was sufficient of itself to pass the title to Gibson, on making the advance, before its presentment and acceptance. 3. But if not, the delivery to Gibson of the muniments of title, viz. the bills of sale, was sufficient for that purpose, especially when accompanied with a delivery order. Hollingsworth v. Napier, 3 Caines, 182; Wilkes v. Ferris, 5 Johns. 338; Bailey v. Johnson, 9 Cowen, 115; Lucas v. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. 279; Greaves v. Hepke, 2 Barn. & Ald. 131; Pleasants v. Pendleton, 6 Rand. 473; Ricker v. Cross, 5 N. Hamp. 571; Ingraham v. Wheeler, 6 Conn. 277; Atkinson v. Maling, 2 Term Rep. 465; Brown v. Heathcote, 1 Atk. 162; Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick. 599; Story on Sales, § 311; 2 Kent, 500. 4. It was sufficient for the plaintiff to give notice of his purchases in a reasonable time to the respective bailees of the property, so as to exempt himself from the imputation of laches; which notice was given in this case. Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 290; Meeker v. Wilson, 1 Gall. 419; 5 N. Hamp. 571; 6 Conn. 277. 5. The effect of the whole was to give the plaintiff the legal title in the produce, and not a mere lien thereon, or a mere pledge of the property; and this is the effect whether the transfer be governed by the law of New York (which is properly applicable to it) or by the law of Indiana. Story on Conflict of Laws, §§ 316 to 325; Black v. Zacharie, 3 Howard, 512. VI. If Gibson be considered as not having the entire legal title, but as a pledgee to the amount of his advances, he is pro tanto to be considered and protected as a purchaser. Story on Bailments, § 297; Story on Agency, § 361; Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 Term Rep. 63; Root v. French, 13 Wend. 572; Holbrook v. Wight, 24 Wend. 169; Hoffman v. Noble, 6 Metc. 69; Story on Agency, § 111. VII. The legal title of the plaintiff in said produce is not superseded or divested by the levy of the attachment on the property. Because,  1. The bank was not a bonâ fide purchaser. The attachment amounted only to an assignment in invitum by operation of law, and for the benefit of the creditors at large, as well as for the attaching creditor. Indiana Code, 1843, pp. 762-775; Lempriere v. Pasley, 2 Term Rep. 485; 1 Atk. 160; Nathan v. Giles, 5 Taunton, 558; United States v. Vaughan, 3 Bin. 394; Ingraham v. Wheeler, 6 Conn. 277; Ricker v. Cross, 5 N. Hamp. 571; Portland Bank v. Stacey, 4 Mass. 663; Putnam v. Dutch, 8 Mass. 287; Badlam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. 389; Gardner v. Howland, 2 Pick. 604; Arnold v. Brown, 24 Pick. 95; note to Lanfear v. Sumner, 17 Mass. 114. 2. If the bank had been a bonâ fide purchaser of said produce of McQueen & McKay, instead of being attaching creditors, such purchase would not divest the plaintiff of his title, which is a legal title, with a constructive possession, fairly acquired and unaccompanied with any laches in notifying the bailee thereof, or in reducing the same to actual possession, according to the course of trade; such a legal title, being prior in time, is prior in right. See cases cited under last proposition; also Caldwell v. Ball, 1 Term Rep. 205; Tuxworth v. Moore, 9 Pick. 348; Joy v. Sears, 9 Pick. 4; Turner v. Coolidge, 2 Metc. 351; 3 Mason, 114; Meeker v. Wilson, 1 Gall. 422; Phillemore v. Barry, 1 Camp. 563. The cases do not turn on the question of notice to an attaching creditor, but whether there has been such a delay in taking actual possession as to furnish evidence of fraud. 3. If the attachment had the character of a purchase, it would not be bonâ fide and without notice, within the reason of the rule, because McQueen & McKay were out of possession, actual or constructive, which put the purchaser upon inquiry, and amounted to constructive notice of the prior legal transfer to the plaintiff. Lucas v. Dorrien, 7 Taunt. 278; 1 Gall. 422. 4. The bank, therefore, under the circumstances, took only the interest of McQueen & McKay then existing, and subject to all equitable, as well as legal, interests then outstanding against it. VIII. The only interest of McQueen & McKay was the equitable beneficial interest in the residue of the proceeds of the produce when sold by the plaintiff on the consignment to him, after satisfying thereout his advances and charges on sales, which alone was attachable, and which did not warrant the officer in taking the property. Story on Bailments, § 353, and cases cited; Badlam v. Tucker, 1 Pick. 399; Indiana Code, § 383, p. 744, and § 39, p. 770; Evans v. Darlington, 5 Blackf. 320. IX. The rights of the plaintiff are not weakened by his having purchased the property out of the State of Indiana, to be sent and sold in New York, according to the course of trade. Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 307-314; Black v. Zacharie, 3 Howard, 514. X. If there had been any danger that the plaintiff would have absconded with the property, to the injury of the equitable lien of the bank and other creditors, acquired by the attachment, (which is not shown or pretended,) their remedy would then have been in equity only. IX. The warehouse receipt accompanying the transfer to Gibson was equivalent, under the usage of trade, to a bill of lading, and its transfer divested all outstanding title unknown to Gibson, whether legal or equitable. Because,  1. Such instruments are assignable. Indiana Code, p. 576; Laws of New York of 1830, p. 203, § 5; 2 Rev. Stat. p. 60. 2. The case states that it was usual and customary to make advances on the assignment of proper evidences of title. Noble v. Kennoway, 1 Doug. 512; Zwinger v. Samuda, 7 Taunt. 265; Lucas v. Dorrien, Ibid. 288; Barton v. Baddington, 1 Car. & Payne, 207; Keyser v. Suse, Gow, 58. The argument filed on behalf of the defendant in error was an elaborate support of the following points:  1. If Gibson's claim be in the nature of a lien, he cannot recover, unless he, or his agent for the purpose expressly authorized, had the actual possession of the pork and flour before the attachment was levied. Under the circumstances of this case, a constructive possession cannot be conferred, for the following reasons:  1. Because the bills of parcels, &c., in this cause, do not amount to warehouse receipts; for instance, the memorandum of Hanna, Hamilton, & Co. is a mere receipted bill of parcels, and a guarantee of the inspection of the pork at Toledo; it does not even acknowledge the pork to be in store. Should the pork and flour not pass inspection, McQueen & McKay would not be bound to accept them. The bills of parcels, with their indorsements, &c., amount to nothing more than mere orders to deliver the pork and flour to Gibson; and until the Nicholses, and Hanna, Hamilton, & Co., were presented with such orders, and they had accepted the same, and assented to hold the pork and flour for Gibson, as his agents, his lien could not attach; and the attachment having been sued out, and levied on the pork and flour in question before they received orders in favor of Gibson, the attaching lien of the State Bank must prevail. 2. Although the memoranda may be considered as warehouse receipts, yet, there being no legislative enactment or usage in New York making the transfer and delivery thereof to confer a constructive possession of the pork and flour, their transfer and delivery to Gibson cannot have that effect. 3. Although, by the laws of New York, these memoranda might confer a constructive possession on Gibson, yet, as the pork and flour were, at the time of the delivery of those memoranda to Gibson, at Fort Wayne, in Indiana, the transaction must be governed by the laws of Indiana. In Indiana we have no law, or usage, giving such force to warehouse receipts. 2. Although Gibson should be regarded as an absolute purchaser, yet, as the attachment was levied upon the pork and flour before he or any agent of his had actual possession of them, Gibson cannot recover. A fortiori if Gibson's claim be only a lien. 3. If the pork and flour be regarded as a security to Gibson, for the repayment of the advance, nevertheless, as neither Gibson nor any agent of his had the actual possession of the pork and flour before they were attached, nor had the instruments by which his lien on the pork and flour was created been recorded in Allen county, Indiana, (the place where the pork and flour were,) within ten days, according to the Rev. Stat. of Indiana, 1843, p. 590, sec. 10, such assignment to Gibson is void as to the State Bank. 4. Whether Gibson's right be regarded as a lien on, or a purchase of, the pork and flour, still, as neither Gibson nor any agent of his, had the actual possession thereof, before the attachment was levied, Gibson cannot recover. 5. If Gibson be regarded a deemed pro tanto purchaser, McQueen & McKay must be regarded as owners of the residue. This condition of things necessarily makes Gibson and McQueen & McKay tenants in common of the pork and flour. If this be true, (which we regard as unquestionable, if Gibson be a pro tanto purchaser,) the interest of McQueen & McKay in the pork and flour is attachable, and the officer attaching can, by virtue of the attachment, take the whole of the pork and flour, even out of the actual possession of Gibson, and deliver it over to the purchaser, and Gibson cannot replevy them from the officer or the purchaser under the attachment. 6. If Gibson's right be only a lien, although such lien may have attached on the pork and flour before the attachment of the State Bank was levied thereon, nevertheless the interest of McQueen & McKay therein is attachable.