Opinion ID: 1829190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Dora was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.

Text: ¶ 15. Regarding Dora's constitutional right to a speedy trial, the Court of Appeals found that: [u]nlike the statutory right, failure to assert the constitutional right is not fatal to the claim. State v. Woodall, 801 So.2d 678, 685 (Miss.2001) (quoting Barker [ v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)]); Smith v. State, 550 So.2d 406, 409 (Miss. 1989). When the constitutional right to a speedy trial violation is raised for the first time on appeal, the case is remanded to the lower court to consider reasons for the delay. State v. Woodall, 744 So.2d 747, 749-50 (Miss.1999). On remand, the court is instructed to conduct a constitutional speedy trial hearing. Dora, 986 So.2d at 970-71 (emphasis added). ¶ 16. There is no dispute that Dora raised the speedy-trial issue for the first time on appeal. In his brief, Dora argued that three of the four Barker factors (length of delay, the reason for delay, and prejudice to the defendant) weighed in his favor [13] and, therefore, the violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial was reversible error and should result in his discharge. The State countered that [t]he record reflects a lack of evidence for either a demand for trial, or of any prejudice to Dora's defense as a result of any delay. ¶ 17. According to this Court: [b]oth our federal and state constitutions provide that an accused enjoys the right to a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, inter alia, that the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial. U.S. Const. amend. VI. Our state constitution states, inter alia, the accused shall have a right to ... a speedy and public trial. Miss. Const. art. 3, § 26 (1890). When one reads these federal and state constitutional provisions, there can be absolutely no question that the accused in a criminal proceeding has a constitutional right to a speedy trial. Guice v. State, 952 So.2d 129, 139 (Miss. 2007) (emphasis in original). However, when the constitutional speedy-trial issue is raised for the first time on appeal: [t]his Court can only decide this issue if it views it as plain error.... As a rule, the Supreme Court only addresses issues on plain error review when the error of the trial court has impacted upon a fundamental right of the defendant. It has been established that where fundamental rights are violated, procedural rules give way to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316, 1321 (Miss.1989). Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 670 (Miss. 1996). This Court has stated that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental constitutional right[.] Id. See also Morgan v. State, 793 So.2d 615, 617 (Miss.2001) (quoting Gray, 549 So.2d at 1321) (plain-error review is applicable when the error is so fundamental that it generates a miscarriage of justice[.]); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1 (1967). ¶ 18. This Court and the Court of Appeals previously have found the constitutional speedy-trial-right issue to be waived for failure to be raised in the circuit court. See Bell v. State, 733 So.2d 372, 376 (Miss. Ct.App.1999) ([b]ecause delays in bringing a matter to trial may work to the defendant's advantage, we do not consider a claim that the defendant was denied a speedy trial to be a matter of plain error or fundamental error that may be raised for the first time on appeal); Sanders, 678 So.2d at 670-71 (this issue should also not be addressed because Sanders did not raise this issue below, and has not shown that this is a suitable case for plain error rev[iew]). However, in Woodall, this Court stated: Woodall contends his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated. However, he raises this issue for the first time on appeal. We have held that even when it appears that the speedy trial statute was violated, if it was not raised in the trial court, we may remand for the lower court to consider the reasons for the delay. Barnes v. State, 577 So.2d 840, 844 (Miss.1991). When the issue was not raised below and there was no plain error, we have refused to address allegations regarding speedy trial. [ Sanders, 678 So.2d at 671]. Therefore, the issue is remanded to the trial court for consideration of this issue. Woodall, 744 So.2d at 749-50 (emphasis added). The Woodall ruling was rendered in the factual context of a 1999 reinstatement of a 1998 indictment, for crimes allegedly committed by Woodall in 1995. Given the aforementioned scenario, this Court found that the circuit court erred in ruling that the State was barred from prosecuting Woodall because of an alleged statute-of-limitations violation, while acknowledging this Court was unable to determine the reasons for the delay. Given such circumstances, the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings, to include a constitutional speedy-trial inquiry. ¶ 19. This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in citing Woodall for the proposition that in all cases [w]hen the constitutional right to a speedy trial violation is raised for the first time on appeal, the case is remanded to the lower court to consider reasons for the delay. Dora, 986 So.2d at 971 (emphasis added). Woodall provides that when a violation of the speedy-trial statute is raised for the first time on appeal, this Court  may remand for the lower court to consider the reasons for the delay. Woodall, 744 So.2d at 749-50 (emphasis added). Given that the constitutional right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right, see Klopfer, 386 U.S. at 213, 87 S.Ct. 988, this Court must determine whether plain-error review is applicable, i.e., whether an error of the trial court has impacted upon a fundamental right[,] Sanders, 678 So.2d at 670, and is so fundamental that it generates a miscarriage of justice[.] Morgan, 793 So.2d at 617. Absent the plain-error criteria being satisfied unequivocally, appellate courts are loath to address issues not presented to the trial court. ¶ 20. Dora seeks to leapfrog over the required plain-error analysis by making Barker genre assertions, i.e., prejudice caused by length of delay, prejudice by virtue of the amended indictment which included prior felony convictions, and prejudice due to a change in Rebecca's testimony. Considering the claims of Dora first for a plain-error analysis, we find the following. Regarding delay, the record reflects that trial was set initially for August 22, 2002. From August 19, 2002, until trial commenced on November 9, 2004, Dora assented to the entry of nine separate Agreed Orders of Continuance. Dora also filed numerous pre-trial motions, including a Motion to Quash Indictment in which he claimed violations of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, without asserting a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, this Court finds this claim to be without merit. ¶ 21. Dora next asserts that he suffered prejudice because, prior to August 14, 2003, he could not have been sentenced as a subsequent and habitual offender[.] This Court finds that his contention that the trial court erred borders on the absurd and is patently untrue. Following Dora's conviction for possession of cocaine greater than 0.1 gram but less than two grams on November 12, 2001, his subsequent and habitual offender status was secure. As such, this Court also finds this claim to be without merit. ¶ 22. Finally, Dora argues that he suffered prejudice due to a change in Rebecca's testimony. This Court recently stated in Miller v. State, 956 So.2d 221 (2007), that: changes in witnesses' testimony are not necessarily due to the passage of time and do not, by themselves, constitute proof of prejudice due to delay. State of Wisconsin v. Huusko, 2006 WI App 223, 296 Wis.2d 935, 724 N.W.2d 273, 2006 Wis.App. LEXIS 837 at  (Wisc.App.2006). This Court is fully aware that witnesses regularly change their testimony and that, standing alone, does not mean that a delay in trial caused ... prejudice. Miller, 956 So.2d at 225, n. 10 (emphasis added). [14] Therefore, this Court finds the third claim to be without merit. ¶ 23. Dora's claims neither establish a plain-error basis to justify further appellate review, nor evidence a miscarriage of justice[.] Morgan, 793 So.2d at 617. Therefore, this Court concludes that the Court of Appeals erred in remanding this case for a constitutional speedy-trial hearing.