Opinion ID: 1711146
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the court erred in refusing to allow the browns appraiser, leis, to testify as to the effect of the curb being placed by mdot and its further effect on the after value of browns property.

Text: ¶ 40. The Browns argue that the trial court erred in not allowing the appraiser to testify concerning placement of the curb on the property and its further effect on the property. However, the Browns failed to give support for their argument. Absent authority in support of an assignment, we will not consider the assignment. Ellis v. Ellis, 651 So.2d 1068, 1073 (Miss.1995). XIII. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW EVIDENCE BY THE BROWNS OF THE PROPERTY'S UNSALABLENESS. XIV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW HAZEL BROWN TO TESTIFY IN DETAIL OF HER FAMILIARITY WITH REAL ESTATE AND SIMILAR PROPERTIES. XV. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLOW WENDELL BROWN TO TESTIFY IN DETAIL OF HIS FAMILIARITY OF VARIOUS SIMILAR PROPERTIES OF WHICH HE HAD KNOWLEDGE AND ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE CONDITION OF THE PROPERTY NEXT DOOR WHICH HAD UNDERGROUND GASOLINE TANKS AND TWO BUILDINGS THAT HAD EXTENSIVE FIRE DAMAGE WHICH GREATLY REDUCED THE VALUE. XVI. THE COURT ERRED IN RESTRICTING THE LATITUDE OF BOTH BROWNS TESTIMONY. ¶ 41. The Browns seem to argue that they were prevented from establishing their expertise in real estate and that their testimony was restricted. Again, the Browns have failed to support their arguments with any authority. Therefore, we will not consider these arguments. XVII. THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING MDOT INSTRUCTION P-6. ¶ 42. The Browns argue that with instruction P-6, the jury was instructed to disregard their testimony even though Wendell Brown had extensive experience in appraising properties. The Browns cite Trustees of Trustees of Wade Baptist Church. v. Mississippi State Highway Comm'n, 411 So.2d 761 (Miss.1982), to support their position. ¶ 43. It is settled in eminent domain practice that a landowner may give his opinion of the fair market value of his property. Potters II v. State Highway Comm'n of Mississippi, 608 So.2d 1227, 1235 (Miss.1992); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Spencer, 209 So.2d 821, 824 (Miss.1968); Mississippi State Highway Comm'n v. Magee, 186 So.2d 238, 239 (Miss.1966). This does not, however, mean the landowner can get on the witness stand and say anything he wants. Properly understood, the rule exempts the landowner from showing that he possesses the qualifications necessary in law to be accepted as an expert witness. See M.R.E. 702. It proceeds on the premise that the landowner has acquired a unique view of the property and that he can and ought be allowed to share this view with the jury. Because landowners ordinarily are not experts and trained in the field of property valuation, we do not hold them to precise modes of articulation of the way in which they arrived at the values they give. Nothing in this rule, however, empowers a landowner to present an opinion based upon legally irrelevant factors. Potters, 608 So.2d at 1235. ¶ 44. The following instruction P-6 was given: The Court instructs the jury that a landowner may testify to the before and after value of his land without showing he has the same qualifications necessary under the law to be accepted as an expert witness. This does not mean, however, that the landowner may get on the witness stand and say anything he wants. For the members of the jury to find the landowners testimony of value to be of any assistance, the landowner must first establish by competent facts not conjecture or supposition, his substantial familiarity with the fair market values of properties of the type in issue and a like familiarity with the property in issue. The mere opinion of a landowner as to the value of or damages caused to his property is of little use unless he shows familiarity with the type of land in issue or gives some evidence on which he bases his fair market value testimony. Unless the landowner provides the jury with any substantial evidence to support his testimony, then you the members of the jury may choose to disregard the landowner's testimony on fair market value of his property. ¶ 45. Instruction P-6 appears to limit the weight that the jury should give the testimony of the landowners. Further, the second and third paragraphs seem to suggest that the landowners should be held to the precise mode of articulation of which they arrived at the values as that of an expert. ¶ 46. Instruction P-6 did not instruct the jury to disregard the Browns' testimony. The instruction seems to tell the jury that the Browns were attempting to give semi-expert opinion on land values. The Browns were not experts and were not required to adhere to the requirements for experts. As owners, however, they could testify to the before and after value of their property. It was error to give Instruction P-6 as the instruction appears confusing. However, the error was harmless and does not justify reversal. No trial is free of error; however, to require reversal the error must be of such magnitude as to leave no doubt that the appellant was unduly prejudiced. Davis v. Singing River Electric Power Ass'n, 501 So.2d 1128, 1131 (Miss.1987). ¶ 47. The Browns' testimony never established a basis upon which the jury could base a verdict. The measure of damages in a eminent domain case is the difference between the fair market value of the property before the taking and the fair market value of the property after the taking. Blanton v. Board of Supervisors of Copiah County, 720 So.2d 190, 193 (Miss.1998). Although both of the Browns testified as to their opinion of the value of the property before the taking, neither testified as to the fair market value of the property after the taking. Regarding the value of the remainder property, Hazel Brown stated Not very much, being that I'm unable to do a lot with it. Posed the same question, Wendell Brown simply agreed that the property was almost valueless. ¶ 48. However, the Browns expert appraiser salvaged their case because he testified that the before value of the property was $110,250 and the after taking value was $48,750. Notwithstanding the Browns expert appraisers testimony, their attorney argued to the jury that the proper verdict would be arrived at by using the Browns expert's opinion of the before taking value in the amount of $110,250, but the jury should then use the MDOT's appraisers opinion that the after value taking was only $32,750 and they should then return a verdict for $77,500. The jury awarded an amount that fell in between the values submitted by the Brown's appraiser and that submitted by the MDOT appraiser. Thus the granting of Instruction P-6 was harmless. ¶ 49. In addition, considering all the instructions as a whole, the jury was adequately instructed. Defects in specific jury instructions do not require reversal where all instructions taken as a whole fairly, although not perfectly, announce applicable primary rules of law. Snapp v. Harrison, 699 So.2d 567, 569 (Miss.1997). There is no merit to this issue.